Source: http://environmentglobalwarming.org/index.php/environmental-law
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 02:29:29+00:00

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(iii) Impair or interfere with amenities or with the environment.
The noise which is a nuisance, or would endanger human health or damage property or harm the environment.
For the first time under the Environmental Protection Agency Act 1992 (the EPA Act) a statutory remedy was created which is set out at s 108 of the EPA Act, which is misleadingly entitled in the margin as ‘Noise as a Nuisance’. This is not a nuisance in the sense of the common law tort of nuisance but rather represents a new statutory nuisance provision.
Section 108 provides as follows: 108(1). Where any noise which is so loud, so continuous, so repeated, of such duration or pitch or occurring at such times as to give reasonable cause for annoyance to a person in any premises in the neighborhood or to a person lawfully using any public place, a local authority, the Agency or any such person may complain to the District Court and the court may order the person or body making, causing or responsible for the noise to take the measures necessary to reduce the noise to a specified level or to take specified measures for the prevention or limitation of the noise and the person or body concerned shall comply with such order.
(ii) Regulations under s 106.
(b) Of the Environmental Protection Agency Act 1992).
(a) The occupier of any premises other than a private dwelling shall use the best practicable means to limit and, if possible, to prevent an emission from such premises (s 24(1) of the Air Pollution Act 1987).
(b) The occupier of any premises shall not cause or permit an emission from such premises in such a quantity or in such a manner, as to be a nuisance (s 24(2) of the Air Pollution Act 1987).
(c) Under both the 1987 Act and the EPA Act there are specific provisions which make it an offence to contravene any provision of either Act or any regulations made under them or of any notice served under the Act.
(1) Any person who contravenes any provision of this Act or of any regulation made under this Act or of any notice served under this Act shall be guilty of an offence.
(2) Where an offence under this Act is committed by a body corporate or by a person acting on behalf of a body corporate and is proved to have been so committed with the consent, connivance or approval of, or to have been facilitated by any neglect on the part of, any director, manager, secretary or other official of such body, such person shall also be guilty of an offence.
(3) In this section, a reference to the contravention of the provision includes, where appropriate, a reference to a refusal, or a failure, to comply with that provision.
The best known and most detailed air emissions case in Ireland is that of Hanrahan v Merck, Sharp & Dohme Ltd  ILRM 629, which was a case decided ultimately in favour of the plaintiffs, not on the grounds of negligence, which was not proven, but on the grounds of (malodorous) nuisance, which is a strict liability tort. In that particular case, the Hanrahan family claimed not only in respect of property damage but also damage to their cattle and to themselves individually in terms of personal injuries. The evidence was painstakingly gone through by each court, including the Supreme Court, which ultimately remitted the case to the High Court. It did so on the basis that, although negligence had not been proven, no amount of scientific or theoretical evidence, no matter how expert and learned the witnesses, could displace the empirical evidence on oath of the numerous witnesses who gave evidence on oath of their physical discomfort and medical conditions arising at times when sharp, chemical-type smells were noted in the air in the vicinity of the defendants’ factory.
On the facts, causation was found and therefore, nuisance being a strict liability tort, the Supreme Court ultimately found in favour - at least in part-of the plaintiffs.
The definition of noise as a nuisance in the EPA Act is the most practical guide available to the ordinary person on the type of noise which one can successfully prosecute. However, it should be noted that compensation does not arise as a remedy under this statutory provision. In addition there are other specific reference and guidance documents on what is or is not acceptable noise and, in particular, the EPA has issued Guidance Notes for Noise in relation to its IPPC licensed activities as well as Environmental Noise Survey Guidance documents, created to assist IPPC licensed facilities in complying with the atmospheric emissions and noise conditions of their licences. Typically, noise sensitive locations are agreed/stipulated by the EPA. These locations become the monitoring points for compliance by the IPPC licence holder with its noise emissions conditions. As with other emission monitoring data, the information gathered is publicly available both at the EPA’s offices and at the IPPC licensed site premises.
Any sound that has the potential to cause disturbance, discomfort or psychological stress to a subject exposed to it, or any sound that could cause actual physiological harm to a subject exposed to it, or physical damage to any structure exposed to it, is known as noise.
Any dwelling house, hotel or hostel, health building, educational establishment, place of worship or entertainment, or any other facility or other areas of high amenity which affords proper enjoyment requires the absence of noise at nuisance levels.
How noisy can it get?
The EPA accepts that in a modern world, noise is almost ubiquitous. Most normal everyday activities lead to the production of noise. Noise from traffic, lawnmowers, household appliances, concerts, industrial activities and so on, are considered commonplace, particularly in the urban setting. In most cases, the majority of people scarcely notice these noises and if they do, they are not bothered by them, but in some cases, people can perceive the same noise as a nuisance. Such people may have more sensitive ears than others or maybe less reasonable than others. Some may be annoyed by noise because they have a personal particular need to sleep at a particular time or relax in a quiet atmosphere. In some cases, noise may present such a nuisance as to cause harmful effect on the health of those exposed to it. It inevitably depends on all the circumstances whether noise is a nuisance, and both subjective and objective criteria must be used when considering this question.
In the Guidance Notes the EPA explains that, in order to assess whether intervention is needed to prevent, control or minimise noise, it is necessary to be able to quantify it, and ascribe a scale of measurement to it. This is not as simple or straightforward a science as one might think. Noise is usually measured on the decibel scale, which is a logarithmic scale of sound intensity. For human noise response, the decibel scale is adjusted slightly to compensate for slight aberrations in the way the human ear ‘hears’ sound along the scale. This adjusted scale is known as the A-weighted decibel scale, and the units of the scale are dBa. The EPA Guidance Notes include a table, set out below, which illustrates examples of everyday sound levels: As a general rule, the sensitivity to noise is usually greater at nighttime than it is during the day and this has been worked out as by about ten decibels A weighted dBa. Audible tones and impulsive tones at sensitive locations should be avoided irrespective of the noise level. In addition, it should be noted that noise includes vibration, under s 3 of the EPA Act.
A recent decision of the High Court is useful, if not salutary: Sheeran and Another v Meehan and Another (High Court Appeal No 2001/202CA, judgment of Mr Justice Herbert, delivered 6 February 2003). This case concerns a long-running dispute between the neighbouring occupiers of numbers 20 and 21 Belleview Park Avenue, Blackrock, County Dublin.
In this case the definition of nuisance approved by the Supreme Court in the case of Hanrahan v Merck, Sharp & Dohme referred to above was adopted. The test is found in the following excerpt (Henchy J in Hanrahan v Merck, Sharp & Dohme  ILRM 629 at p 640): As I have pointed out earlier in this judgment, by reference to the cited passage from the judgment of Gannon J in Halpin & Others v Tara Mines Ltd, where the conduct relied on as constituting a nuisance is said to be an interference with the plaintiff’s comfort in the enjoyment of his property, the test is whether the interference is beyond what an objectively reasonable person should have to put up with in the circumstances of the case. The plaintiff is not entitled to insist that his personal nicety of taste or fastidiousness of requirements should be treated as inviolable. The case for damages and nuisance - we are not concerned here with the question of an injunction - is made out if the interference is so pronounced and prolonged or repeated that a person of normal or average sensibilities should not be expected to put up with it.
Essentially the case concerned the Meehans using their hi-fi radio stereo system to interfere with the Sheerans’ comfort and the enjoyment of their home. The extent of personal evidence was copious, including Mrs Meehan accepting in cross-examination that her response to Mr Sheeran’s complaint about the noise (when she had the radio playing from the kitchen of her house while she cleaned her car from 20 or more feet away from where she was working outside the house) was that Mr Sheeran ‘should turn up his own radio and then he would not be so conscious of theirs’. Acoustic engineers on both sides carried out detailed technical tests. Both experts considered that when the Meehans’ radio was played at a particular sound setting, it was non-intrusive and could not be heard in the Sheerans’ kitchen and master bedroom. It was ultimately accepted that the Meehans did not keep their hi-fi stereo radio system at the agreed limited sound setting (despite the placing of a physical limiter on their stereo). It would appear that from time to time the radio was turned up full blast and the family would leave the house and let it play all day or early in the morning at weekends.
The High Court judge, in describing this case as tragic, remarked that there were many aspects which were extremely distasteful. In a 19-page judgment, the High Court exercised its discretion to make no order for costs in favour of the extraordinary and unjustifiably belligerent defendants/appellants, having regard to what the court found to have been the altogether unsatisfactory manner in which they acted throughout the matter. The plaintiffs/respondents were found to have successfully established their claim as to approximately one-half only of the period of alleged nuisance and were accordingly limited in their costs recovery.
Directive 2002/49/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 June 2002 relates to the assessment and management of environmental noise. It is due to be implemented in Ireland by 18 July 2004. It sets out in its recitals those categories of products already controlled by Community legislation on their noise emission limits. These include permissible sound levels for motor vehicles and their exhaust systems, the noise levels of tractors from the driver’s perception, subsonic aircraft, two and three-wheel motor vehicles and noise emissions in the environment from equipment for use outdoors. The key driver of the legislation is that the Community intends to achieve a high level of health protection and environmental protection from noise. The stated aim of the Directive at Art 1 is to avoid, prevent or reduce on a prioritized basis the harmful effects, including annoyance, due to exposure to environmental noise. In this piece of legislation, the decision has been made to establish a common assessment method throughout the EU for environmental noise and a definition for limit values. This will undoubtedly assist those in the future who wish to bring claims arising from noise pollution. European-wide common noise indicators are to be put in place: Lden which will assess annoyance, and Lnight which will assess sleep disturbance, amongst other things. Competent authorities in each Member State are required to draw up action plans addressing priorities for noise reduction in areas of interest. For the purposes of the Directive, Art 3 defines environmental noise as: Unwanted or harmful outdoor sound created by human activities, including noise emitted by means of transport, road traffic, rail traffic, air traffic, and from sites of industrial activity such as those defined in Annex I to Council Directive 96/61/EC of 24 September 1996 concerning integrated pollution prevention and control.
Harmful effects are defined as ‘negative effects on human health’. It is envisaged under Art 4 that each Member State will designate the competent authority to make and approve noise maps and action plans for agglomerations, major roads, major railways and major airports, all of which are defined; and for collecting noise maps and action plans. Annexe I sets out the noise indicators which shall be applied and commonly assessed throughout the EU. The remaining five Annexes set out minimum requirements for strategic noise mapping and for action plans, detail the assessment methods for harmful effects and for the noise indicators and list the data to be sent to the Commission.
The definition of air pollution in the 1987 Act was imported into the definition of ‘environmental pollution’ by virtue of the Environmental Protection Agency Act 1992, s 4(2)(a). In addition, environmental pollution is also defined in s 4(2)(d) of the Environmental Protection Agency Act 1992 to mean: Noise which is a nuisance or would endanger human health or damage property or harm the environment.
108(1). Where any noise which is so loud, so continuous, so repeated, of such duration or pitch or occurring at such times as to give reasonable cause for annoyance to a person in any premises in the neighbourhood or to a person lawfully using any public place, a local authority, the Agency or any such person may complain to the District Court and the court may order the person or body making, causing or responsible for the noise to take the measures necessary to reduce the noise to a specified level or to take specified measures for the prevention or limitation of the noise and the person or body concerned shall comply with such order.
The section also provides for exceptions so that it shall not apply to noise caused by aircraft or statutory undertakers or local authorities in the exercise of the powers conferred on them by or under any enactment (s 108(4)(a) and (b) of the Environmental Protection Agency Act 1992).
On the facts, causation was found and therefore, nuisance being a strict liability tort, the Supreme Court ultimately found in favour - at least in part - of the plaintiffs.
In the Environmental Noise Survey Guidance Document most recently issued by the EPA (ISBN 1-84095-113-3) the definition of noise is: Any sound that has the potential to cause disturbance, discomfort or psychological stress to a subject exposed to it, or any sound that could cause actual physiological harm to a subject exposed to it, or physical damage to any structure exposed to it, is known as noise.
For all IPPC licence holders, noise sensitive locations are defined as: Any dwelling house, hotel or hostel, health building, educational establishment, place of worship or entertainment, or any other facility or another area of high amenity which affords proper enjoyment requires the absence of noise at nuisance levels.
In the Guidance Notes the EPA explains that, in order to assess whether intervention is needed to prevent, control or minimise noise, it is necessary to be able to quantify it and ascribe a scale of measurement to it. This is not as simple or straightforward a science as one might think. Noise is usually measured on the decibel scale, which is a logarithmic scale of sound intensity. For human noise response, the decibel scale is adjusted slightly to compensate for slight aberrations in the way the human ear ‘hears’ sound along the scale. This adjusted scale is known as the A-weighted decibel scale, and the units of the scale are dBa. As a general rule, the sensitivity to noise is usually greater at nighttime than it is during the day and this has been worked out as by about ten decibels A weighted dBa. Audible tones and impulsive tones at sensitive locations should be avoided irrespective of the noise level. In addition, it should be noted that noise includes vibration, under s 3 of the EPA Act.
According to s 24(4) of the Sea Pollution Act, if a ship which has been detained under s 24 leaves or attempts to leave any harbour or other places otherwise than in accordance with s 24, the owner and the master of the ship shall each be guilty of an offence and the ship, wherever it may be, may be detained, or further detained, by an inspector or by a harbour master in his harbour.
Section 24(5) of the Sea Pollution Act provides that an inspector or a harbourmaster who detains a ship must not unduly detain or delay it.
Section 26 of the Sea Pollution Act deals with the powers of the Minister to prevent, mitigate or eliminate pollution. Section 26(1) provides that the Minister or any person authorised by him may for the purpose of preventing, mitigating or eliminating danger from pollution or threat of pollution by oil, or any substance other than oil (as defined in s 26(10) of the Sea Pollution Act) following on a maritime casualty or acts related to such a casualty, give directions to the owner or master of the ship or any person who is, or who in the reasonable opinion of the Minister or any person authorised by him, is in charge of the ship, or any salvor who is in possession of the vessel and is in charge of a salvage operation. Directions may also be given to such other person to whom it may appear reasonable and necessary to the Minister or authorised person to give directions. In giving such directions the Minister or authorised person must not unduly detain or delay the ship from proceeding on its voyage.
Section 26(3) of the Sea Pollution Act provides that if, in the opinion of the Minister, the powers conferred by s 26(1) are, or have proved to be, inadequate for the purpose, the Minister or authorised person may take such action and do such things in relation to the ship concerned or its stores, equipment or cargo as appear to be necessary and reasonable for the purpose of preventing, mitigating or eliminating the effects of pollution arising from a maritime casualty.
Crude oil, fuel oil, diesel oil and lubricating oil. ‘Substance other than oil’ is defined as meaning: any substance in a list annexed to the Intervention Protocol and any other substance which is liable to create hazards to human health, to harm living resources and marine life, to damage amenities or to interfere with other legitimate uses of the sea.
Section 27(1) of the Sea Pollution Act gives a right to recover compensation from the Minister to any person who establishes that any measures taken outside the territorial waters of the state under s 26 of the Sea Pollution Act in relation to a ship registered in the state, or in a country which is a party to the Intervention Convention, went beyond what was reasonably necessary to achieve their purpose.
Such compensation shall be recoverable either by an arbitration award under the Intervention Convention or in any court of competent jurisdiction for any loss or damage caused to that person by reason of the fact that such measures went beyond those reasonably necessary to achieve that purpose.
(c) The extent of the damage caused by such measures.
Under s 28 of the Sea Pollution Act if the Minister is satisfied that any country (other than the state) has accepted or denounced the Intervention Convention, the Intervention Protocol or the MARPOL Convention or any Convention or Protocol which has been ratified by the state and which amends or extends any such Convention or Protocol he may by order so declare. He may also declare by order that any such Convention or Protocol extends, or ceases to extend, to any territory.
Section 30(1) of the Sea Pollution Act provides that summary proceedings for any offence under the Sea Pollution Act may be brought and prosecuted by the Minister. Where an offence is committed in relation to a particular harbour or particular harbour-master, s 30(2) provides that summary proceedings for such an offence may be brought and prosecuted by the harbour authority. Section 30(3) provides that summary proceedings in relation to an offence under the Sea Pollution Act may be brought, in every case, within two years from the date of the offence, or if, at the expiry of that period, the person to be charged is outside the state, within six months of the date on which the next enters the state.
According to s 30(4), proceedings in relation to an offence under the Sea Pollution Act may be taken at any place in the state and the offence may be treated as having been committed in that place. By virtue of s 30(5), such proceedings may be brought against a person wherever he may be.
Section 33(1) of the Sea Pollution Act provides that, subject to s 33(3), all fines in respect of offences under the Sea Pollution Act shall be paid into the Exchequer in accordance with such directions as may be given by the Minister for Finance.
Where a fine imposed on the owner or master a ship is not duly paid, s 33(2) of the Sea Pollution Act provides that the court may, without prejudice to any other powers for enforcing payment, direct that any amount of the fine remaining unpaid be levied by the distress and sale of such property, comprising the ship, its equipment and stores as the court thinks necessary. Section 33(3) of the Sea Pollution Act provides that, where it appears to the court imposing the fines that any person has incurred, or will incur, expense in removing any pollution, or making good any damage attributable to the offence, the court may order that the whole or part of the fine be paid to that person for or towards defraying the expense.
Sections 31 and 32 of the Sea Pollution Act deal with the prosecution of offences committed by bodies corporate. Section 33 concerns payment of fines and s 34 deals with proof of certain documents.
Section 35 of the Sea Pollution Act provides that where a discharge of any substance to which the Sea Pollution Act applies is sighted, and a ship registered in the state, or a ship wherever registered while in the state, is sighted in close proximity to the discharge, it shall be presumed, until the contrary is proved,that it was discharged from the ship.
Section 39 of the Sea Pollution Act provides that whenever an inspector or harbour-master detain a ship in the exercise of the powers conferred on him under s 22(2) or s 24, he must as soon as possible bring the master of the ship against whom proceedings for an offence under the Sea Pollution Act have been, or are about to be, instituted before a District Court judge. If the District Court judge is satisfied that such proceedings have been or are about to be issued against the master of the ship, he may by order directed to an inspector, or, as the case may be, harbour-master, require the inspector or harbour-master to detain the master on board the ship or such other person as he may direct at a specified place in the state until such proceedings have been adjudicated upon by a court in the exercise of its criminal jurisdiction, or until a further order has been made.
Section 40(1) of the Sea Pollution Act states that where a person is convicted of an offence under the Sea Pollution Act or proceedings in relation to an offence are dismissed, and the ship in relation to which the offence has been committed has been detained under the Sea Pollution Act, the judge concerned shall order the inspector or harbour-master in the event of an appeal from, or other proceedings in relation to, the order of the court hearing the matter, to detain the master on board the ship pending the determination of the appeal or other proceedings at a specified place in the state or until a further order has been made.
(b) The estimated amount of the costs (if any) of any trials, appeals or other proceedings which may be awarded, in the event of conviction of the defendant in respect of the offence or offences with which he was charged, or in the event of his failure to attend before any court when such attendance is required for the purposes of any preliminary examination under the Criminal Procedure Act 1967.
Section 41 of the Sea Pollution Act provides that whenever security is given by a defendant under s 40, the court may, when the trial, appeal or other proceedings, as the case may be, has or have been finally determined, direct that the amount of the fine imposed in respect of the offence, together with the amount of any costs awarded, be paid to the Minister out of the security.
Section 42 of the Sea Pollution Act states that where a person is convicted of an offence under the Sea Pollution Act, the court shall, unless it is satisfied that there are special and substantial reasons for not doing so, order the person to pay to the Minister, or to the harbour authority concerned, the costs and expenses reasonably incurred by the Minister or authority in relation to the investigation, detection and prosecution of the offence. Such costs may also include costs incurred in the taking of samples, the carrying out of tests, examinations and analyses and the remuneration and other expenses of employees, consultants and advisers.
Where the Minister is of the opinion that the facilities in any harbour in the state for the discharge or disposal of oil, oily mixtures, noxious liquid substances, harmful substances, sewage or garbage are necessary or that the facilities which exist at that harbour for such discharge or such disposal are inadequate, he may make regulations under s 12(1) of the Sea Pollution Act requiring where there is a harbour authority in charge of the harbour, the harbour authority, and in any other case, the person under whose control the harbour is to make such provision as may be specified in the regulations for such discharge or such disposal.
According to s 12(2), regulations made under s 12(1) may provide for such matters as the manner in which oil, oily mixture, noxious liquid substances, harmful substances, sewage and garbage may be discharged from a ship, the disposal of any such substance so discharged, the facilities for such discharge or such disposal to be provided by a harbour authority or, as the case may be, the person having control of the harbour and the time within which such facilities are to be provided.
Section 12(4) of the Sea Pollution Act provides that a person who contravenes a regulation made under s 12 shall be guilty of an offence.
(c) For the purpose of saving human life.
A report must also be made where there is, during the operation of a ship in the state or any such prescribed area, a discharge or probable discharge of any such substance in excess of the quantity (if any) permitted by regulations made under s 10 of the Sea Pollution Act.
If the discharge or probable discharge occurred in the state or in any prescribed area outside the state other than in a harbour, the Minister must be notified of the fact and cause of the incident. If the discharge or probable discharge occurred in a harbour, the harbour-master or person having control of the harbour must be notified of the fact and cause of the incident and such person must then report the incident to the Minister under s 13(2).
Section 13(3) specifies that every report made under s 13 must give details of the nature of the incident, the identity of the ship or ships concerned, the time, type and location of the incident, the quantity and type of substance the incident.
The Minister is given power by s 13(4) to make regulations in relation to the making of a report under s 13 of the Sea Pollution Act.
The Minister may make regulations under s 14(1) of the Sea Pollution Act requiring the owner or master of a ship, or ship of a prescribed class, which is registered in the state, to have such ship constructed, fitted or operated in such manner as may be specified in the regulations and the owner or master must comply with such other requirements as may be so specified, so as to prevent, control or reduce the discharge into the sea of oil, oily mixtures, noxious liquid substances, harmful substances, sewage or garbage.
It shall be an offence under s 14(2) for the owner or master of a ship to contravene any regulation made under s 14 of the Sea Pollution Act.
Section 15(1) of the Sea Pollution Act requires the master of a ship to which s 14 of the Sea Pollution Act applies to keep such records as may be prescribed of operations on board his ship in relation to any prescribed substance and of the discharge of any prescribed substance resulting from damage to a ship, or for the purpose of securing the safety of a ship or saving life at sea. Records must also be kept by the master of the discharge of any substance, in excess of the quantity (if any) permitted by regulations under s 10 of the Sea Pollution Act.
Section 15(2) provides that the Minister may make regulations under s 15(1) in relation to the manner and form in which any records required under s 15 should be kept, the custody, preservation and disposal of any such records, the making available of any such records for inspection and such other matters as appear to the Minister to be necessary.
It shall be an offence under s 15(3) for any person to contravene s 15, or any regulation made under that section, or to make any entry or alteration in any record required to be kept under s 15 of the Sea Pollution Act which is to his knowledge false and misleading in a material respect.
Section 16 extends the application of ss 14 and 15 to a ship and the owner and master of a ship registered in a country other than the state whilst that ship is in the state as if the ship was registered in the state.
Part III of the Sea Pollution Act deals with enforcement. Section 17(1) gives the Minister power to make regulations requiring that any ship, or a ship of such class as may be specified in the regulations, its equipment and fittings be surveyed, inspected or tested in such manner and at such times as may be prescribed. Section 17(2) provides that all duties in respect of a survey, inspection or test for the purposes of regulations made under s 17 shall be performed in accordance with the directions of the Minister by a surveyor of ships, or an inspector appointed under s 20 of the Sea Pollution Act.
Section 17(3) of the Sea Pollution Act imposes a duty on the owner or master of the ship to submit the ship to such survey, inspection or test and to pay such fee as may be prescribed.
If the surveyor of ships or other person appointed for the purposes of s 17 surveys the ship and is satisfied that the ship, its equipment or fittings to which the survey relates complies with the requirements of the Sea Pollution Act, the Minister shall, on payment of the prescribed fee, cause a certificate of compliance to be issued under s 17(4). The certificate may be issued in such form and manner as the Minister may prescribe.
The Minister may, with the consent of the Minister for Finance, make an order under s 17(5), prescribing the fees to be paid for surveys, inspections and tests carried and certificates issued under s 17 of the Sea Pollution Act.
Where a certificate has been issued under s 17(4) of the Sea Pollution Act in relation to a ship, s 17(6) provides that no change, other than the replacement of any defective equipment or fittings, shall be made in the structure, equipment or fittings of the ship, without prior consent given by or on behalf of the Minister.
Section 17(7) states that the owner and the master of a ship in respect of which there is a contravention of s 17 or regulations made under that section shall be guilty of an offence.
Under s 18(1) of the Sea Pollution Act the government of another country which is a party to the MARPOL Convention may request the Minister to have a ship registered in that country surveyed and the Minister may comply with such a request. Where such a request is made, ss 14 and 17 shall apply to such ship as if it was a ship registered in the state and the owner had submitted to the survey.
Section 18(2) provides that any certificate issued under s 17 of the Sea Pollution Act in respect of such a ship must contain a statement that it has been issued at the request of the government concerned. Section 18(3) provides that a copy of a survey report and a copy of a certificate made or issued in pursuance of s 18 must be transmitted as soon as possible to the government concerned.
(c) Whether facilities exist in any harbour or any other place in the state for the discharge and disposal of such substances and whether such facilities are adequate.
The Minister is given power by s 20 of the Sea Pollution Act to appoint a person to be an inspector for the purposes of the Act to carry out such functions as are specified in his warrant of appointment.
(h) Require a witness to make and subscribe a declaration of the truth of any statements made at his examination.
Section 21(3), (4), and (5) of the Sea Pollution Act contain procedural provisions as to the taking of evidence.
Section 21(6) of the Sea Pollution Act states that any person who is summoned as a witness before an inspector and tendered his expenses but fails to attend or who refuses to take an oath legally required by the inspector to be taken, or refuses or neglects to make any answer, or to produce any document, or certify a copy of any entry, or, on being requested by an inspector to stop a ship for the purpose of enabling the inspector to board the ship, shall be guilty of an offence.
Section 22(1) of the Sea Pollution Act provides that where an inspector determines, having inspected a ship, that the ship or any equipment or fitting on that ship does not correspond substantially with the particulars specified in a certificate under s 17 or an equivalent certificate issued by another party to the MARPOL Convention, or is so defective that the ship is not fit to be put to sea without presenting a serious threat of damage to the marine environment, he may direct the master of the ship to take all action necessary to ensure that the ship or its equipment corresponds with those specified particulars, or that any defect is remedied.
Section 22(2) of the Sea Pollution Act gives an inspector power to detain a ship to which s 22(1) applies until there has been compliance with any directions given by him under s 22 in relation to the ship. Section 22(3) imposes a duty on an inspector to take all such steps as appear to him to be necessary to ensure that a ship in relation to which he has given directions under s 22 of the Sea Pollution Act will not put to sea or leave harbour for the purpose of proceeding to the nearest repair yard without presenting an undue threat of damage to living marine resources.
It shall be an offence under s 22(4) of the Sea Pollution Act for any person to fail to comply with a direction of any inspector under s 22, or to put to sea, or attempt to put to sea, otherwise than in accordance with the Sea Pollution Act, a ship which has been detained by an inspector under s 22(2).
If the master of a ship registered in the state does not comply with the direction of an inspector under s 22, s 22(5) provides that the inspector must immediately report the fact to the Minister who may direct that a certificate issued under s 17 of the Sea Pollution Act, in relation to the ship be withdrawn.
Power of a harbour-master to refuse entry of a ship into a harbor Section 23(1) of the Sea Pollution Act gives a harbour-master power to refuse entry into the harbour over which he has control to a ship where he has reasonable cause to believe that the ship does not comply with the requirements of the Sea Pollution Act, or that it would cause a serious threat of damage to flora or fauna, living marine resources, the harbour or other ships, unless the entry of the ship is necessary for the purpose of saving life.
Section 23(2) gives the Minister, or a person appointed by him under s 23(4) to act on his behalf, a similar power to refuse entry to a ship into the state, or into a harbour or to require the ship to leave the state or harbour and to comply with such conditions as may be specified, where he is satisfied that the ship does not comply with any of the specified conditions as may be specified.
If a harbour-master has refused entry under s 23(1) of the Sea Pollution Act, the Minister, or a person appointed by him to act on his behalf, may direct the harbour-master under s 23(3) to permit the ship to enter, and to comply with such conditions as may be specified, following consultation with the harbourmaster. Where such a direction is issued, the harbour-master must permit the ship to enter the harbour upon such conditions, and the master of the ship must comply with those conditions.
Section 23(4) of the Sea Pollution Act gives the Minister power to appoint by warrant a person to act on his behalf for the purposes of s 23(2) and (3). Such a person will be provided with a warrant which he must produce on request for inspection when exercising a function under s 23 of the Sea Pollution Act.
The Minister is given power by section 23(5) of the Sea Pollution Act to make regulations providing, in respect of ships generally or ships of any prescribed class, for the giving by the owner or master of a ship of notice of the entry or intended entry of the ship into the state and of its passage and destination while in the state and such other information relating to the ship and its cargo as may be prescribed.
The Minister may also make regulations preventing the entry of a ship or of a ship carrying a specified cargo into the state if he has reasonable cause to believe it will cause serious threat of hazards to human health, damage to human life, harm to living marine resources or to flora or fauna or damage to amenities, or interference with legitimate uses of the sea.
Section 23(6) makes it an offence for the owner, master or any person to fail to comply with a direction, or the requirements of regulations, under s 23 of the Sea Pollution Act.
Section 24(1) of the Sea Pollution Act gives an inspector or a harbour-master power to stop and detain a ship where he has reasonable cause to believe that the ship has caused, or may cause, pollution and the ship is in the state. However, s 24(2) of the Sea Pollution Act states that a harbour-master may only exercise such power whilst the ship concerned is within the harbour over which he has control.
The Sea Pollution Act 1991 gives effect to the London Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships 1973 (the MARPOL Convention), as amended by the London Protocol of 1978. It also gives effect to the London Protocol Relating to Intervention on the High Seas in Cases of Pollution by Substances other than Oil 1973 (the Intervention Protocol). The Sea Pollution Act 1991 also repeals the Oil Pollution of the Sea Acts 1956 to 1977 and provides for other related matters.
(c) The release of oil, oily mixtures, noxious liquid substances, or harmful substances for the purpose of legitimate scientific research into pollution abatement or control.
‘Garbage’ is defined as meaning: all kind of victual, domestic and operational waste (excluding fresh fish and parts thereof) and any other substance generated during the normal operation of a ship and liable to be disposed of either continuously or periodically other than a substance specifically regulated by [the] Act.
‘Harbour’ is defined as including: any dock, pier, wharf, jetty, boat slip, offshore terminal, installation or place intended or used for the accommodation, berthing or anchorage or for the shipping, unshipping or transshipping of goods.
(e) Interfere with legitimate uses of the sea, and any substance subject to control by the MARPOL Convention or prescribed under s 10 as a harmful substance and includes any such substance carried at sea, however carried.
(d) A member of the Garda Síochána.
The ‘Intervention Convention’ means: the International Convention Relating to Intervention on the High Seas in Cases of Oil Pollution Casualties 1969, done at Brussels on the 29th day of November, 1969.
The ‘Intervention Protocol’ means: the Protocol Relating to Intervention on the High Seas in Cases of Pollution by Substances other than Oil done at London on the 2nd day of November, 1973.
‘Maritime casualty’ means: a collision of ships, stranding or other incident of navigation, or other occurrence on board a ship or external to it resulting in material damage or imminent threat of material damage to a ship or cargo.
‘Master’ is defined as: the person having, for the time being, the command or charge of the ship.
(e) Interfere with legitimate uses of the sea; and any liquid substance prescribed under s 10 as a noxious liquid substance.
‘Oil’ is defined as meaning: (other than in s 26) ... petroleum in any form including crude oil, fuel oil, diesel oil, lubricating oil, sludge, oil refuse and refined products and any oil or oily mixture prescribed as such under s 10 but does not include any substance prescribed as a noxious liquid substance ‘Oily mixture’ means: a mixture which has any oil content.
‘Owner’, in relation to a ship, is defined as: the person registered as the owner of the ship, the person who owns the ship, and, in the case of a ship which is owned by a state (including the state) and is operated by a person who in that state is registered as the ship’s operator, ‘owner’ means the person registered as such operator.
‘Pollution’ is defined as including: when used without qualification ... pollution by oil, by an oily mixture, by a noxious liquid substance, by a harmful substance, by sewage or by garbage.
(d) Any other waste water discharged from a ship when such water is intermingled with any of the drainages specified at paragraphs (a), (b) or (c).
‘Ship’ is defined as: a vessel of any type whatsoever operating in the marine environment and includes hydrofoil boats, air-cushioned vehicles, submersibles, floating craft and fixed or floating platforms and includes fixtures, fittings and equipment.
Section 4(1) provides that the Sea Pollution Act shall not apply to any warship or to any ship for the time being used by the government of any country for purposes other than commercial purposes.
The Minister may make regulations exempting, subject to such conditions (if any) as may be specified in the regulations, any class or classes of ships registered in the state from compliance with any provision of the Sea Pollution Act or of any of the regulations made under the Sea Pollution Act, where he is satisfied that such an exemption would not result in a mere risk of pollution.
Part II of the Sea Pollution Act deals with the prevention of pollution. Section 10(1) gives the Minister power to make regulations prohibiting or regulating the discharge anywhere at sea from a ship registered in the state, or the discharge in the state from any ship, of any oil, oily mixture, noxious liquid substance, harmful substance, sewage or garbage. The Minister may also make regulations, pursuant to the section, governing prescribed operations on board ship relating to any such substance carried on the ship.
Section 10(3) of the Sea Pollution Act provides that regulations made under s 10 may relate to ships generally or to any class of ship, to substances generally or any description of substance and may be made subject to such conditions and such exemptions as may be rescribed. Section 10(4) of the Sea Pollution Act gives the Minister power to provide by regulations that any prescribed substance shall be a harmful substance, a noxious liquid substance, an oil or oily mixture, sewage or garbage, for the purposes of the Sea Pollution Act.
The Minister may also, by regulations made under s 10(5) of the Sea Pollution Act, require the notification at such time and in such manner as may be prescribed, by the master or owner of a ship carrying any prescribed substance of any intent to load or unload any such substance in the state.
Where any regulations made under s 10 are contravened, the owner and the master of the ship in respect of which there is a contravention shall be guilty of an offence under s 10(2) of the Sea Pollution Act.
(c) To the discharge into the sea of any prescribed substance for the purpose of minimizing the damage from pollution, provided that the discharge was sanctioned by or on behalf of the Minister.
This Act (the 1990 Act) amends and extends the Act and the Fisheries Act 1959 (in so far as the Fisheries Act 1959 relates to water pollution).
(b) if the entry was occasioned by an act or omission of any person that, in the opinion of the court, contravenes a provision of the Act or the 1990 Act, from that person.
Section 20(2) provides that s 20(1) does not apply to the entry of trade effluent, sewage effluent or other polluting matter to waters which is under and in accordance with a licence under s 4 of the 1977 Act or s 171 of the Fisheries Act 1959 or is exempted from the application of s 3(1) of the Act by s 3(5) of that Act.
Under s 21(2) of the 1990 Act a local authority may make bye-laws prohibiting the carrying on of a specified activity in all or part of its area, or providing for the regulation of a specified activity, if it considers it necessary to do so for the purpose of preventing or eliminating the entry of polluted matter to waters.
(c) any other operation, activity, practice or use of land or other premises for the purposes of agriculture, horticulture or forestry.
Section 21(3) of the 1990 Act provides that it shall be an offence to contravene or fail to comply with any bye-laws made under s 21.
Section 22(1) of the 1990 Act provides that a sanitary authority may declare by order that a specified combined drain shall become and be a sewer for the purposes of the Act and the 1990 Act. Whenever it does so the drain concerned shall, on commencement of the order, become and be a sewer for those purposes.
Section 22(2) of the Act requires the sanitary authority to give written a notice to the owner of the drain and to the occupier of premises from which effluent is being discharged to the drain of its intention to make such an order. The owner and the occupier may, within 30 days of receipt of the notice, then make written representations to the sanitary authority in relation to the proposed order. These representations, if any, must be considered by the sanitary authority before the order is made.
Under s 23 of the 1990 Act, where an offence under the Act or the 1990 Act has been committed by a body corporate and is proved to have been committed with the consent or connivance of, or is to be attributable to any neglect on the part of, a person being a director, manager, secretary or other officer of that body corporate, or a person who was purporting to act in such capacity, that person shall also be guilty of an offence.
Where a prosecution is brought by a local authority, sanitary authority or regional board, s 26 of the 1990 Act empowers the court, on the application of the local authority, sanitary authority or regional board concerned, to provide for payment of the fine imposed by the court to the relevant local authority, sanitary authority or regional board.
Section 27 of the 1990 Act deals with a number of matters relating to prosecution of offences under the Act. Section 27(a) and (b) stipulate the persons who may bring prosecutions under various sections of the Act. Section 27(c) of the 1990 Act provides that a summary offence under s 21 of the 1990 Act may be prosecuted by the local authority concerned.
According to s 27(d) of the 1990 Act, summary proceedings may be commenced within a period of six months from the date on which evidence sufficient to initiate proceedings comes to the knowledge of the person prosecuting those proceedings. Proceedings may not be initiated later than five years from the date of commission of the offence.
Acertificate signed by, or on behalf of, the person bringing the proceedings, setting out the date or dates on which the relevant evidence came to his knowledge would provide prima facie evidence of those dates, unless the contrary is shown.
According to s 28 of the 1990 Act where a person is convicted of an offence under the Act 1977 or the 1990 Act, or s 171 or s 172 of the Fisheries Act 1959, the court shall, unless it is satisfied that there are special and substantial reasons for not doing so, order the person to pay to any local authority, sanitary authority or regional board concerned the costs reasonably incurred by that local authority, sanitary authority or regional board in relation to the investigation, detection and prosecution of the offence, including the costs incurred in taking samples, carrying out tests and examinations and in respect of the remuneration and other expenses of employees, consultants and advisors.
This text examines the legislation concerning water pollution in Ireland.
The Local Government (Water Pollution) Act 1977 (the Act) provides for the prevention of water pollution in Ireland.
Offence to cause or permit polluting matter to enter waters Section 3(1) makes it an offence for a person to cause or permit any polluting matter to enter waters.
Any poisonous or noxious matter, and any substance (including any explosive, liquid or gas), the entry or discharge of which into any waters is liable to render those or any other waters poisonous or injurious to fish, spawning grounds or the food of any fish, or to injure fish in their value as human food, or to impair the usefulness of the bed and soil of any waters as spawning grounds or their capacity to produce the food of fish or to render such waters harmful or detrimental to public health or to domestic, commercial, industrial, agricultural or recreational uses.
(c) Where the context permits, any beach, river bank and salt marsh or another area which is contiguous to anything mentioned in paragraph (a) or (b), and the channel or bed of anything mentioned in paragraph (a) which is for the time being dry, but does not include a sewer.
‘Sewer’ is defined in s 1 of the Act, as substituted by s 2 of the Local Government (Water Pollution) (Amendment) Act 1990 (the 1990 Act), as being: a sewer within the meaning of the Local Government (Sanitary Services) Acts, 1878 to 1964, that is vested in or controlled by a sanitary authority and includes a sewage treatment works, and a sewage disposal works, that is vested in or controlled by a sanitary authority.
‘Aquifer’ is defined in s 1 of the Act, as substituted by s 2 of the 1990 Act, as being: any stratum or combination of strata that stores or transmits groundwater.
Section 3(3), as substituted by s 3(1)(a) of the 1990 Act, provides, however, that it is a good defence to a charge of committing an offence under s 3(1) of the Act for the accused to prove that he took all reasonable care to prevent the entry of any polluting matter into any waters to which the charge relates to providing, maintaining, using, operating and supervising facilities, or by employing practices or methods of operation that were suitable for the purpose of such prevention.
Section 27(b) of the 1990 Act (which replaces s 3(4) of the Act) provides that a prosecution for a summary offence under s 3(1) of the Act may be brought by a local authority, or regional board, in or adjoining whose area any of the waters concerned are situated or any other person affected.
Section 3(5) of the Act, as substituted by s 3(1)(b) of the 1990 Act provides that certain discharges which are controlled by other provisions of the Act or by other enactments are not offences within s 3(1) of the Act.
These discharges include, inter alia, discharges of trade effluent or sewage effluent made under and in accordance with a licence granted under s 4 of the Act or in accordance with any applicable regulations, the entry of any matter from vessels to tidal waters or discharges authorised by the Foreshore Act 1933, the Harbours Act 1946 or the Fisheries Acts 1959 to 1997.
Section 4(1) of the Act controls the discharge of any trade effluent or sewage effluent. It provides that a person shall not discharge, or cause or permit the discharge of, any trade effluent or sewage effluent to any waters except under and in accordance with a licence granted, in the case of a discharge to waters, by the local authority of the area in which the waters into which the effluent is discharged are located, or, in any other case, by the local authority in whose area any premises, works, apparatus, plant or drainage pipe from which the effluent is discharged are situated. According to s 4(2), s 4(1) does not apply to discharges to tidal waters from vessels or marine structures, or to discharges from a sewer, or discharges exempted by regulations made under s 4(10) of the Act.
Section 4(3) of the Act provides that a local authority may grant or refuse to grant a licence under s 4, or may grant it subject to conditions. In deciding whether or not to grant a licence the local authority must have regard to the objectives contained in any relevant water quality management plan made under s 15 of the Act.
By virtue of s 4(4) of the Act, a local authority must not grant a licence in respect of the discharge of an effluent which would not comply with, or would result in the waters to which the discharge is made not complying with, any relevant water quality standard prescribed under s 26 of the of the Act.
Section 4(5) of the Act lists the types of conditions which may be attached to a licence. The conditions may deal with such matters as the nature, composition, rate, volume, method of treatment and location of a discharge, the periods during which a discharge may or may not be made, the provision and maintenance of meters, gauges and other apparatus, the keeping of records of discharges and the prevention of a discharge in the event of breakdown in plant. A local authority may also attach a condition requiring the payment of a charge or charges to the local authority.
If a licence has been granted under s 4(1) for a certain type of discharge but no such discharge has been made or has ceased, for three years, s 4(7) provides that the licence shall cease to have an effect.
Section 4(9), which listed the parties permitted to bring a prosecution for a na offence under s 4 of the Act, was repealed by s 30 of the 1990 Act. In its place, s 27(b) of the 1990 Act provides that a prosecution for a summary offence under 4 of the Act may be brought by a local authority, or regional board, in whose area or adjoining whose area any of the waters concerned are situated, or any other person affected.
Section 4(11) of the Act states that it shall be a good defence to a prosecution for an offence under any other enactment that the act constituting the alleged offence is authorised by a licence under s 4 of the Act.
Section 4(12) provides that the fact that a person has a licence under s 4 does not mean that he is entitled to discharge trade effluent or sewage effluent to waters solely by reason of such licence without regard to such obligations which he may have to others.
Section 5 of the Act deals with the licensing of existing discharges of trade effluent or sewage effluent which were being made before, and continued to be made after, the Act came into force. It provides that once a licence application is made for an existing discharge before a date to be prescribed by regulations and any information required by any regulations in relation to a licence is furnished, the applicant may continue to make discharges without being in breach of s 4(1) until such time as the local authority grants or refuses a licence.
Section 7(1) of the Act provides that licences issued under s 4(1) may be reviewed by a local authority at intervals of not less than three years from the date of granting of the licence, or the date of its last review, or at any time with the consent of the person making, causing or permitting the discharge.
(e) The licensee applies to the local authority concerned to review the licence.
Section 7(3) of the Act, as substituted, provides that on completion of a review under s 7, a local authority may amend or delete any condition of the licence or may attach conditions or further conditions to it or may revoke it. Where it proposes to exercise any of these powers it must do so as soon as may be after the completion of the relevant review.
A new s 8 of the Act has been substituted by s 6(1) of the 1990 Act. Section 8(1)(a), as substituted, gives any person a right of appeal to A Bord Pleanála in relation to the grant, refusal to grant or revocation of a licence by a local authority under s 4. An appeal may also be made in relation to the attachment of conditions or additional conditions to such a licence or the amendment or deletion of any such condition. An appeal under s 8(1) must be made before the expiration of such period as may be prescribed by regulations.
Section 8(1)(b) of the Act provides that a decision of a local authority in relation to the grant, refusal to grant, or revocation of a licence, or in relation to the conditions attached to such a licence, shall have effect, where no appeal is brought against it, on the expiration of the period prescribed by regulations.
If an appeal is brought against such a decision and the decision is not set aside by the final determination of the appeal, the decision will have effect in accordance with such final determination. Where an appeal is brought against such a decision but is withdrawn before the final determination of the appeal, the decision shall have effect on such withdrawal if the period prescribed by regulations has expired. If the period has not expired, the decision shall have an effect on its expiry.
Section 8(2) of the Act provides that A Bord Pleanála, after consideration of an appeal under s 8, shall (as it thinks proper) allow or refuse an appeal and may give any direction that it considers appropriate to the local authority concerned. This may include a direction that a specified condition is attached to the licence concerned or be amended or deleted. The alocal authority must comply with any such direction.
Section 9 of the Act obliges a local authority to establish and keep a register of all licences granted by it under s 4 and also to keep a register of abstractions from waters in its area. Each sanitary authority must also keep a register of all licences granted by it under s 16 of the Act. All registers must be kept at the offices of the local authority or sanitary authority and must be open to inspection by any person at all reasonable times. Any person is also entitled to obtain a copy of any entry in a register on payment of a prescribed fee.
• To pay to the applicant or other specified person a specified amount to defray all or part of the costs incurred by the applicant or such specified person in investigating, mitigating or remedying the effects of the entry or discharge concerned.
An application under s 10(1) of the Act, as substituted, may, in any case, be made to the High Court. If the estimated cost of complying with the order to which the application relates comes within the jurisdiction of the District Court or Circuit Court it may, alternatively, be made to the relevant court. If such an application is made and during the hearing of the action the court is of the opinion that the estimated cost will exceed the jurisdiction of the court, it may, if it thinks fit, transfer the application to the appropriate court. An application under s 10(1) of the Act shall be brought in a summary manner and a court may, if it thinks fit, make such interim or interlocutory order as it considers appropriate.
If a person does not comply with an order made under s 10(1), he shall be guilty of an offence under s 10(2).
Defendant must be heard by the court before an order is made Section 10(3) of the Act, as substituted, provides that an order shall not be made by a court under s 10(1) unless the person named in the order has been given an opportunity of being heard by the court in proceedings relating to an application for the order.
Section 10(4) of the Act, as substituted, gives the local authority, or the regional board, in whose area the waters concerned are situated, the power, where a person does not comply with an order under s 10(1), to take any steps specified in the order to remedy or mitigate the effects of the entry or discharge. The costs of taking such steps shall be recoverable by the local authority or regional board, as the case may be, from the person in respect of whom the order was made as a simple contract debt in any court of competent jurisdiction.
Section 10(5) of the Act as substituted, empowers a local authority to require, by notice in writing, the cessation of the entry or discharge of polluting matter, or trade or sewage effluent, to waters. Such a notice may be served on a person who is causing or permitting the entry of polluting matter, or trade or sewage effluent, to waters where s 3(5) or s 4(2) of the Act does not apply to such entry or discharge and the entry or discharge is not under and in accordance with a licence under s 171 of the Fisheries Act 1959.
Contents of a notice served under s 10(5) of the Act According to s 10(5) of the Act, as substituted, the notice shall require the cesser of the entry or discharge within such period as may be specified in the notice and shall require the mitigation or remedy of any effects of the entry or discharge within such period and in such manner as may be specified.
If the notice is not complied with within the specified period, s 10(6), as substituted, provides that the local authority may carry out the works itself and recover the cost from the person on whom the notice was served as a simple contract debt in any court of competent jurisdiction.
Jurisdiction of courts in making an order under s 10(1) of the Act Section 10(7) of the Act, as substituted, deals with the jurisdiction of the District Court or Circuit Court in relation to the making of orders under s 10(1). Where an order is sought under s 10(1), as substituted, an application must be made to the judge of the District Court or Circuit Court, as the case may be, for the district or circuit in which the waters concerned, or the land or other premises from which the entry or discharge concerned takes place, are situated.
Action which may be specified in a notice served under s 10(5) of the Act Section 10(8) of the Act, as substituted, specifies the steps which an order made, or notice served, under s 10(1) or s 10(5), as substituted, may require to be taken.
These include the replacement of fish stocks, the restoration of spawning grounds, the removal of polluting matter from waters and the treatment of affected waters so as to mitigate or remedy the effects of the entry or discharge concerned.
By virtue of s 10(9), as substituted, an application may be made under s 10(1), as substituted, and a notice may be served under s 10(5) whether or not there has been a prosecution under s 3 or s 4.
(c) The polluting matter has escaped, is escaping or is likely to escape accidentally from premises to waters.
(c) For the purposes of preventing the escape of polluting matter from premises, require the carrying out by the occupier of any such premises of specified measures or to do, refrain from, or cease doing any specified act or making any specified omission.
Section 11(1A) of the Act provides that an application may be brought under s 11(1) Notwithstanding that a prosecution under s 3 or s 4 in respect of the relevant entry or discharge has not been brought.
Under s 12(1) of the Act, a local authority may serve a notice in writing to any person having the custody or control of any polluting matter on premises in its area, where it appears that it is necessary to do so in order to prevent or control pollution of waters.
in the notice within a stated period.
(b) Require the provision, re-location or alteration of facilities for the collection or storage of polluting matter.
Section 9 of the 1990 Act also substitutes a new s 12(3) into the Act. This provides that a person on whom a notice under s 12(1) of the Act is served may make representations in writing to the local authority regarding the terms of the notice within such period as may be specified in the notice and the local authority may, after consideration of any representations, confirm, amend or revoke the notice and shall inform the person in question of its decision.
(d) mitigating or remedying in relation to its area or any such seashore the effects of any polluting matter in any such waters, drain or sewer.
The measures taken by a local authority or sanitary authority under s 13(1) may include the giving of assistance, whether financial or otherwise and the procuring of the taking of measures by others. The local authority or sanitary authority may also dispose of any such polluting matter in such manner as it thinks fit.
Section 13(2) of the Act, as amended, states that where any measures taken by a local authority or a sanitary authority under s 13(1) were necessitated by the acts or omissions of a person which that person ought reasonably to have foreseen would or might necessitate the taking of the measures by the relevant authority, the authority may recover the expenditure incurred in taking such measures from the person as a simple contract debt.
Under s 14, notification of any accidental discharge, spillage or deposit of any polluting matter which enters, or is likely to enter, any waters or a sewer must be made as soon as practicable after the occurrence of the discharge, spillage or deposit by the person responsible to the local authority in whose area the discharge, spillage or deposit occurs or, in the case of a sewer, to the sanitary authority in which the sewer is vested or by which it is controlled. It is a na offence to fail to make such notification.
Section 16(1) of the Act provides that a person, other than a sanitary authority, shall not discharge or cause or permit the discharge of any trade effluent or other matter (other than domestic sewage or storm water) to a sewer, except under and in accordance with a licence granted by the sanitary authority in which the sewer is vested or by which it is controlled.
(c) Only the applicant, the occupier of premises for which a discharge to which a licence under s 16(1) relates and the sanitary authority which granted, refused or reviewed such a licence may appeal a decision on the licence, whereas any person may appeal against a decision by a local authority relating to a licence granted pursuant to s 4(1) of the Act.
Section 16(2) of the Act gives a sanitary authority power to refuse to grant a licence under s 16(1) of the Act or to grant such a licence subject to specified conditions. In considering whether or not to grant a licence, a sanitary authority is obliged to consider the objectives stated in any relevant water quality management plan made under s 15 of the Act. In addition, s 16(3) prohibits the granting of a licence in respect of the discharge of a trade effluent which would not comply with any water quality standards made under s 26(1) of the Act.
Section 16(4)(a) provides that any conditions attached to a licence granted under s 16(1) may relate (but are not limited) to such matters as the nature, composition, temperature, volume, method of treatment and location of a discharge and the times during which a discharge may or may not be made. Conditions may also provide for the provision and maintenance of meters, gauges and other apparatus and require the taking of samples and the keeping of records. The update may also be specified by which conditions must be complied with.
A new s 16(4)(b) has been substituted by s 12 of the 1990 Act. This gives the sanitary authority power to attach a condition to a licence requiring the licence holder to pay the sanitary authority such amount as may be specified by it, having regard to expenditure incurred by it in monitoring, treating and disposing of discharges to sewers in its area.
Section 16(5) provides that any condition attached to a licence granted under s 16(1) of the Act shall be binding on any person discharging, or causing or permitting the discharge of, trade effluent or other matter to which the licence relates.
If after three years from the date on which such a licence is granted no discharge of the type authorised by that licence has been made, or where such a discharge has ceased for a period of three years, s 16(6) of the Act stipulates that the licence shall cease to have an effect.
Section 16(7) of the Act makes it an offence for a person to permit or cause the entry of any polluting matter (including sewage) to any drain or sewer provided solely for the reception or disposal of storm water.
Section 16(9), which provided for the prosecution of offences under s 16 by any sanitary authority, has been repealed by s 30 of the 1990 Act and, in its place, s 27(b) of the 1990 Act now provides that a summary offence under s 16 of the Act may only be prosecuted by the sanitary authority in which the sewer concerned is vested, or by which it is controlled, or in whose area it is situated.
According to s 16(11) of the Act, it shall be a good defence to a prosecution under any other enactment that the act constituting the alleged offence is authorised by a licence under s 16.
However, s 16(12) provides that a person shall not be entitled solely by reason of a licence under s 16 to make, cause or permit a discharge to a sewer.
A sanitary authority is given power by s 16(13) to serve a notice in writing to any person making, causing or permitting a discharge or entry in breach of s 16(1) or 16(7), requiring the cessation of the breach within such period as may be specified in the notice. The notice may also require the mitigation or remedy of any effects of the breach within a specified period and may specify the actual steps to be taken.
Section 16(13) has been strengthened by the insertion by s 12(b) of the 1990 Act of a news 16(13A) into the Act. Section 16(13A), as inserted, makes it an offence not to comply with a notice served under s 16(13).
In addition, where a person does not comply with a notice served under s 16(13) of the Act within the period specified in the notice, s 16(14) provides that the sanitary authority which served the notice may take any steps it considers necessary to prevent the discharge or entry or to mitigate or remedy any effects of the breach. It may recover the cost of such steps from the person on whom the notice is served as a simple contract debt in a court of competent jurisdiction on proving to the satisfaction of the court that that person is responsible for the breach.
Section 17, as amended by s 13 of the 1990 Act, deals with the power and, in certain cases, the obligation of a sanitary authority to review a licence granted by it under s 16(1).
The circumstances in which the sanitary authority may, and those in which it must, review a licence granted under s 16 are in terms identical to those specified in s 7 of the Act, as amended by s 5 of the 1990 Act, relating to licences granted under s 4(1) of the Act.
Section 19(3)(a) of the Act, as amended by s 24(2) of the 1990 Act, provides that a person who, on application for a licence under s 16, or on appeal under s 20, makes a statement in writing which is false or to his knowledge misleading in a material respect shall be guilty of an offence. In addition, any licence issued to that person as a result of the application or appeal in relation to which the information was furnished shall stand revoked from the date of the conviction.
A news 20 of the Act has been substituted by s 15(1) of the 1990 Act. The news 20(1)(a), as substituted, now provides that the occupier of premises from which a discharge is made which requires a licence under s 16 may appeal to the Planning Board, within such period as may be prescribed by regulations, against the decision of the sanitary authority to revoke the licence, attach conditions to the licence, or amend or delete any such conditions. Section 20(1), as substituted, gives a person whose application for a licence under s 16(1) has been refused by a sanitary authority a right of appeal to Na Bord Pleanála within such period as may be prescribed by regulations.
Section 20(2) of the Act, as substituted, provides that the Planning Board, after consideration of an appeal, shall allow or refuse the appeal and may give a direction to the sanitary authority concerned, which must be complied with by that sanitary authority. Any such direction may require that a specified condition is attached to the licence concerned or be amended or deleted.
Under s 22(1) of the Act a local authority or sanitary authority must carry out, or cause to be carried out, such monitoring of waters and discharges of trade effluents and sewage effluents and other matter to waters or to sewers, as the case may be, as it considers necessary for the performance of any of its functions under the Act.
It also may collect, or cause to be collected, such information as it considers necessary for the performance of any of its functions under the Act. Section 22(2) gives a local authority or a sanitary authority the power to provide meters, manholes or inspection chambers, or any other apparatus for any of these purposes.
Section 23(1) of the Act, as substituted by s 17 of the 1990 Act, provides that a local authority may serve a notice in writing on certain persons requiring them to give to the local authority in writing, within a specified period of not less than 14 days beginning on the date of the giving or serving of the notice, such details as may be so specified in relation to any such activities or practices and such other information (if any) as it may consider necessary for the purposes of these functions.
(d) are engaged in activities or practices that, in the opinion of the local authority, may cause or permit polluting matter to enter waters.
(c) Any sewer, and showing the relationship of those evidential exhibits to any waters.
Details may also be requested of the systems, methods and arrangements in use or proposed for the disposal of the effluent or other polluting matter and of the times and rates at which such disposal is effected.
Section 23(4) of the Act, as substituted by s 17 of the 1990 Act, provides that it is an offence to fail or refuse to comply with such a notice or to give information which, to the knowledge of the person giving it, is false or misleading in a material respect.
1.The concept of environmental impact assessment (EIA) has its origins in European law and Directive 85/337/EEC on the assessment of the effects of certain public and private projects on the environment, as amended by Directive 97/11/EC (the Directive). The Directive will be further amended by the Directive providing for public participation in respect of the drawing up of certain plans and programmes relating to the environment (2003/35/EC) and amending Council Directives 85/337/EEC and 96/91/EC.
(d) The interaction between the above factors.
The Directive gives effect to an important principle of European environmental policy known as the prevention principle: the creation of pollution should be prevented at source rather than subsequently trying to counteract its effects.
The EIA procedure enables the decision-making authority to decide whether or not to grant consent to a project based on its likely effects on the environment and, if it does decide to grant consent, to impose conditions preventing or mitigating these effects. The information received by the authority as a result of the EIA procedure need only be taken into consideration: Art 8. The Directive is of a procedural nature and does not stipulate the actual decision which the authority should reach as a result of the EIA.
In summary, the Directive provides that EIA is mandatory for all Annexe I projects on the basis that they will always have significant environmental effects: Art 4(1). The term ‘project’ has a very broad definition for the purposes of the Directive and is defined as the execution of construction works or of other installations or schemes, and other interventions in the natural surroundings and landscape including those involving the extraction of mineral resources. Annexe I projects include oil refineries, integrated chemical installations and significant infrastructure projects. As regards projects listed in Annex II, Member States must determine on a case-by-case basis and/or on the basis of thresholds or other criteria whether or not an Annexe II project should be subject to EIA: Art 4(2). The criteria in Annex III must be taken into account when a case-by-case examination is being carried out or criteria or thresholds are being set. Projects which require an EIA must be subject to an EIA in accordance with Arts 5 to 10 which deal inter alia with the information to be provided by the developer, scoping requests, public consultation requirements and transboundary effects. These provisions are considered in more detail in the context of Irish implementing legislation.
The directive has been implemented through the integration of its requirements into the planning control system and several other development consent procedures covering, for example, local authority development, road development and the laying of oil and gas pipelines. This has been done principally by the European Communities (Environmental Impact Assessment) Regulations 1989 to 2001 (the EIA Regulations), the Planning and Development Act 2000 (the 2000 Act) and the Planning and Development Regulations 2001 (the 2001 Regulations).
This text will focus on the EIA system in the context of the planning control system. It will also look briefly at the integration of EIA into other development consent systems and at Irish and European case law on general issues concerning EIA.
The Local Government (Planning and Development) Regulations 1990 and 1994 and the EIA Regulations originally implemented the Directive into the planning control system. The 2000 Act and 2001 Regulations have superseded this regime. Part X of the 2000 Act now provides the framework for EIA in the planning process. The 2001 Regulations contain the procedural details.
EIA is required for classes of development prescribed in regulations made under s 176 of the 2000 Act. These classes of development are set out in Schedule 5 to the 2001 Regulations (see Art 93, 2001 Regulations). Part 1 of Schedule 5 replicates Annexe I of the Directive. Part 2 replicates Annex II.
However, it also sets the thresholds or criteria which determine whether an Annex II project requires an EIA (as required by Art 4(2) of the Directive).
An environmental impact statement (EIS) must accompany a planning application made in respect of a development referred to in Schedule 5, which meets the specified thresholds and criteria. There is a distinction between the EIA, the procedure which assesses the likely environmental effects of a project, and the EIS, which is part of the information on which that assessment is based.
Outline planning applications may not be made in respect of development which requires an EIA (Art 96, 2001 Regulations).
Sub-threshold development is defined in Art 92, 2001 Regulations, as development of a type set out in Schedule 5 which does not exceed a quantity, area or other limit specified in that Schedule in respect of the relevant class of development.
Where a planning application for sub-threshold development is not accompanied by an EIS, and the planning authority or the Planning Board (the Board) on appeal considers that the development would be likely to have significant effects on the environment, it must require an EIS (Arts 103(1) and 109(2), 2001 Regulations).
Where a proposed development would be located on or in a European site, a proposed or designated Natural Heritage Area or a nature reserve or nature refuge, then the planning authority or the Board must make a specific decision as to whether the development would or would not be likely to have significant effects on the environment of such a site (Arts 103(2) and 109(3), 2001 Regulations).
The planning authority or the Board on appeal must have regard to the criteria set out in Schedule 7 to the Regulations in determining whether or not a sub-threshold development would or would not be likely to have significant effects on the environment. These include details regarding the characteristics, location and potential impacts of the proposed development. Professor Yvonne Scannell submits that regulatory authorities should always consider and decide whether or not to require an EIS for a sub-threshold development, regardless of whether or not it is located in or on a sensitive site, and that proper records should be kept of this decision (Arts 103(2) and 109(3), 2001 Regulations).
An applicant or person intending to apply for planning permission can request the Board to grant an exemption from the requirement to prepare an EIS. The Board may only grant an exemption in exceptional circumstances and only after having considered the observations of the relevant planning authority and whether the environmental effects of the development should be assessed in some other manner. Notice of the Board’s decision to grant an exemption and the reasons for doing so must be published in Iris Oifigúil and one daily newspaper (s 172(3) and (4), 2000 Act). A European site includes proposed and designated Special Areas of Conservation and Special Protected Areas (see s 2, 2000 Act).
• A description of the proposed development comprising information on the site, design and size of the proposed development.
• A description of the measures envisaged in order to avoid, reduce and, if possible, remedy significant adverse affects.
• The data required to identify and assess the main effects which the proposed development is likely to have on the environment.
• An outline of the main alternatives studied by the developer and an indication of the main reasons for his/her choice, taking into account the effects on the environment.
• The person preparing the EIS may reasonably be required to compile such information, having regard, among other things, to current knowledge and methods of assessment.
(c) A non-technical summary of the above information. In 2002, the EPA also published new Guidelines on the Information to be Contained in EIS. These include guidelines on determining whether an EIS should be prepared for sub-threshold development. Local authorities are bound by these guidelines.
Applicants for planning permission can request the planning authority and the Board, where appropriate, to give a written opinion on the information which should be contained in the EIS prior to submitting the planning application. This is known as a ‘scoping request’. This facilitates the preparation of an adequate EIS and reduces the likelihood of requests for further information once an EIS has been submitted, thereby avoiding delays. However, as noted by Patrick Sweetman (‘Recent developments in conveyancing practice - the European Communities (Environmental Impact Assessment) (Amendment) Regulations 1999’  6 IPELJ 110): to seek an opinion is to invite the planning authority to request a very much more comprehensive and wide-ranging EIS than might be warranted in the circumstances of a particular case.
The giving of a written opinion by the planning authority does not prejudice its powers to request further information (s 173 of the 2000 Act; Art 95 of the 2001 Regulations sets out the detailed procedure for scoping requests).
The Commission published Guidelines on Scoping in 2001.
The planning authority or the Board must consider whether the EIS is adequate, ie whether it complies with Art 94 or, if it has given a written opinion pursuant to a scoping request, with that written opinion. Applications for judicial review of planning decisions often challenge them on the basis that the EIS was inadequate.
The Directive requires that any request for development consent and any information gathered pursuant to Art 5 must be made available to the public in order to give them an opportunity to express their opinion before consent may be granted: Art 6(2). As noted by Lord Hoffmann in the House of Lords decision of Berkley v Secretary of State for the Environment  3 All ER 897: The directly enforceable right of the citizen which is required by the Directive is not merely a right to a fully informed decision on the substantive issues. It must have been adopted on an appropriate basis and that requires the inclusive and democratic procedure prescribed by the Directive in which the public, however, misguided or wrong-headed its views may be, is given an opportunity to express its opinion on the environmental issues.
The newspaper notice, which must be published in respect of a planning application, must also state that an EIS will be submitted to the planning authority and that it will be available for inspection or purchase for a reasonable fee: Art 98, 2001 Regulations. Where a planning authority requires an EIS for subthreshold development, the applicant must publish a further newspaper notice of its intention to submit an EIS. The public is, therefore, made aware of the development that requires an EIA and is entitled to make submissions or observations in relation to the EIS in accordance with planning legislation. The Commission has issued a Reasoned Opinion against Ireland stating that it is contrary to the EIA Directive to make comment by the public subject to a participation fee (currently €20). Similar provisions also apply in respect of appeals to the Board which involve an EIS: Arts 112 to 115, 2001 Regulations.
The Directive also requires that Member States take the necessary measures to ensure that the authorities likely to be concerned by the project by reason of their specific environmental responsibilities are given an opportunity to express their opinion on the EIS and the proposed development: Art 6. Under the 2001 Regulations, the planning authority must send a copy of the EIS to the bodies it is required to notify in Art 28(2), stating that written sub-missions or observations can be made in relation to the EIS within five weeks of receipt by the planning authority of the EIS: Art 107, 2001 Regulations. For example, the authority must send a copy of the EIS to the EPA if the proposed development comprises or is for the purposes of an activity which requires an IPC licence or a waste licence, or to An Taisce and the Department of the Environment if it appears that the development might have significant effects in relation to nature conservation.
(b) consultations with the state in relation to the potential transboundary effects of the proposed development.
The planning authority or Board must then provide information to the state concerned and enter into consultations with it (Art 126, 2001 Regulations). The planning authority can also, having regard to the views of a transboundary state, require the developer to submit further information and notify certain persons in relation to the additional information received (Arts 128 and 129, 2001 Regulations).
The planning authority or Board shall not reach its decision until after the views if any, of the relevant transboundary state, have been received or consultations are otherwise completed (Art 130, 2001 Regulations).
In reaching its decision, the planning authority or the Board on appeal must have regard to the EIS, any supplementary information relating to the EIS and any submissions or observations concerning the effects on the environment of the proposed development (s 173, 2000 Act).
The 2001 Regulations contain similar provisions regarding sub-threshold local authority development as noted above (Arts 117 to 124, 2001 Regulations). Where a local authority proposes to carry out sub-threshold development and it considers the development would be likely to have significant effects on the environment, it must prepare an EIS for submission to the Board. Similarly, a local authority must make a specific decision as to whether or not sub-threshold development in or on a sensitive site requires an EIS. The Board can also request an EIS be prepared in respect of sub-threshold development which it considers would be likely to have significant effects on the environment. The local authority or the Board must also have regard to the criteria set out in Schedule 7 when deciding whether a development is likely to have significant effects on the environment.
(b) The likely effects on the environment of the proposed development if carried out.
The local authority must also send a copy of the application and the EIS to certain prescribed authorities together with a notice stating that they may also make such submissions or observations (Art 121 of the 2001 Regulations sets out the prescribed authorities for the purposes of s 175). Under s 175(5), the Board can require a local authority to furnish additional information in relation to the effects on the environment of the proposed development. If the Board considers that the further information contains significant additional data, it must require the local authority to publish a further newspaper notice stating that submissions or observations can be made in relation to the additional information.
Before making a decision in respect of the proposed development, the Board must consider the EIS, any submissions or observations from the public and the prescribed authorities, the views of a transboundary state and the views of the EPA where requested under s 175(10). Section 175(10) relates to proposed local authority development, which comprises or is for the purposes of an activity for which an IPC licence or waste licence is required. The Board can consult with the EPA regarding such development. Like s 98 of the Environmental Protection Agency Act 1992, where the Board decides to approve the proposed development it shall not subject that approval to conditions which are for the purposes of controlling emissions. However, the Board can, notwithstanding the licensing of the activity, decide to refuse the proposed development where the Board considers the development is unacceptable on environmental grounds having regard to the proper planning and sustainable development of the area in which the development is or will be situated.
The Roads Acts 1993 to 2001 require that local authorities prepare an EIS in respect of certain proposed road development such as motorways, bus ways, a new road of four or more lanes and a new bridge or tunnel 100 m or more in length. Section 50(1)(d) of the Roads Act (as inserted by the European Communities (Environment Impact Assessment) (Amendment) Regulations 1999, SI 93/1999, Art 14) also provides that a local authority must prepare an EIS in respect of other types of proposed road development if they would be likely to have significant environmental effects on a sensitive site.
Section 50 of the Roads Act as amended by Art 14 of the European Communities (Environment Impact Assessment) (Amendment) Regulations 1999 prescribes the content of the EIS. The information that the EIS must contain is identical to that which is required for private sector development.
The local authority must then apply to the Board for approval of the road development under s 51, which application must include the EIS. Initially, the Minister for the Environment and Local Government was responsible for approving road development under s 51 of the Roads Acts. His functions have now been transferred to the Board under s 215 of the Planning and Development Act 2000. The EIS can be inspected by members of the public who can make written submissions to the Board regarding the likely effects of the proposed road development on the environment. The EIS must also be sent to various prescribed authorities for comment.
The Board can hold an oral hearing where it considers it necessary or expedient for the purposes of reaching its decision (European Communities (Environment Impact Assessment) (Amendment) Regulations 2001, SI 450/2001, Art 6). However, the inspector conducting the oral hearing into the compulsory acquisition of land for the proposed road development is entitled to hear evidence in relation to the likely effects on the environment of the road development (s 51(7)). The Board must also approve the compulsory purchase order at the same time. So, in practice, one oral hearing is held to consider both the environmental and compulsory acquisition issues relating to proposed road development.
The Board may, by order, approve the proposed road development with or without modifications or may refuse to approve it (s 51(6)).
The EPA does not have a statutory power to request an EIS of its own accord when considering whether or not to grant an IPC licence or a waste licence. However, where an application for planning permission for development (comprising or for the purposes of an activity which also requires an IPC licence) requires an EIS, then copies of the EIS must also be sent to the EPA. The EPA must consider the EIS in so far as the risk of environmental pollution is concerned and has the power to seek further information (Environmental Protection Agency (Licensing) Regulations 1994, SI 85/1994, Art 14). Similar provisions apply with respect to waste licensing (Waste Management (Licensing) Regulations 2001, SI 185/2000, Art 13). The EPAalso has environmental assessment functions under the European Communities (Natural Habitats) Regulations 1997 (SI 94/1997).
The EIA procedure has also been incorporated into various other development control systems relating to, for example, development on the foreshore, arterial drainage, afforestation and oil and gas pipelines development.
The decisions of regulatory authorities are often challenged by way of a judicial review on the basis of a failure to comply with EIA requirements. The following are some of the issues which have come before the Irish and European courts.
Pig rearing installations where the capacity would exceed 1,000 units on gley soils or 3,000 units on other soils and where units have the equivalents: 1 pig = 1 unit; 1 sow = 10 units.
The Board had excluded weaners and finishers from the calculation of the number of units. On that basis, the Board considered that the capacity of the installation would only be 2,208 units and that an EIA was not therefore required as it fell below the 3,000 unit threshold. Kelly J in the High Court held that the proper interpretation of the EIA Regulations and questions as to whether thresholds had been exceeded are matters of law to be decided by the courts. He stressed that since the EIA Regulations have their genesis in an EU Directive, they must be interpreted in accordance with the underlying purpose of the Directive: projects likely to have a significant effect on the environment must be subject to an EIA. Having regard to these purposes, Kelly J held that the Board had incorrectly included weaners and finishers among the 10 units attributed to a sow (although it was correct to include unweaned piglets). They ought to have been regarded as pigs attracting one point each which meant that the capacity of the piggery was well in excess of the 3000 unit threshold. An EIA was therefore required. As no EIA had been carried out, the Board’s decision to grant planning permission was fatally flawed and was accordingly quashed.
See also Shannon v Regional Fisheries Board and An Bord Pleanála  3 IR 449, where the High Court interpreted the word ‘sow’ purposively to include a pregnant gilt and rejected the Board’s contention that it was not entitled to interpret the EIA Regulations unless the Board’s decision could be classified as wholly irrational.
The matter is less clear when it comes to the role of the courts in determining whether an EIA is required for sub-threshold development. As noted above, where a planning authority considers that a sub-threshold development is likely to have significant effects on the environment, it must require an EIA.
In O’Nuallain v Dublin Corporation (unreported, 2 July 1999, High Court, Smyth J), the decision to grant planning permission for the Millennium Spike was challenged on the basis that an EIS should have been prepared. The High Court held that the Spike was an urban development project within the meaning of the EIA Regulations even though it fell well below the thresholds set for an EIA.
The EIA Regulations required an EIA for urban development projects comprising an area greater than two hectares within existing urban areas. However, the High Court found that the development would have significant effects on the environment noting that the planning authority should consider the positive as well as the negative impacts of the proposed development on the environment. Dublin Corporation was therefore obliged to carry out an EIA in respect of the Spike.
This decision can be contrasted with that of the Supreme Court in Lancefort v An Bord Pleanála  ILRM 401. In this case, the applicants sought to challenge the Board’s decision to grant planning permission to develop what is now the Westin Hotel, office accommodation and a bank on the grounds inter alia that it involved the demolition of and interference with listed buildings.
Again, the development fell below the thresholds set for EIA. However, the applicants considered that it would unarguably have a significant effect on the environment and specifically the material assets and cultural heritage of the area (see Art 3 of the Directive, third indent). Accordingly, the applicants contended that the Board was obliged at the least to consider whether it should exercise its power to require an EIS for sub-threshold development. The Supreme Court held that the applicants, a limited liability company, did not have locus standing to challenge the Board’s decision primarily on the basis that it had been incorporated after the decision which it sought to challenge had been reached. However, the court did consider the merits of the case in determining whether the applicants had locus stand. The court said it would be unwilling to interfere with the exercise of the Board’s discretion unless it involved an abuse of power or grave default in the procedure. The Supreme Court also considered that it had not been shown that the failure to consider whether an EIS should have been prepared had the slightest effect on the attainment of the Directive’s objectives.
The Irish courts have generally been proactive in determining whether or not an EIS is required. However, they have consistently deferred to the regulatory authorities regarding the adequacy of EIS. In Browne v An Bord Pleanála  ILRM 865, Baron J took the view that it is solely for a planning authority to determine upon the sufficiency of an EIS. He considered that any other approach would be to turn an application for judicial review into a further appeal. A similar approach was taken by the High Court in Murphy v Wicklow County Council (unreported, 19 March 1999, High Court, Kearns J). The applicant had brought judicial review proceedings challenging the controversial decision of the Minister to approve a road-widening scheme through the Glen of the Downs nature reserve.
To interfere, the court would require being satisfied that there was virtually no material upon which the Minister could reasonably exercise his discretion to grant a certificate. It is not a function of the court to ‘second-guess’ the Minister or to apply standards of an extreme nature particularly when any review is taking place almost ten years after the EIS was first prepared.
Kearns J, therefore, adopted the test of unreasonableness laid down in O’Keefe v An Bord Pleanála  1 IR 39. This case established that an applicant must satisfy the courts that a decision-making authority had no information before it which would support its decision before a court would quash the decision.
This is subject to the caveat that the courts will intervene if the statutory requirements have not been complied with (for example, if the EIS fails to contain the basic information specified in Art 94 of the 2001 Regulations). Once the statutory requirements have been satisfied, the Irish courts will not concern themselves with the qualitative nature of the EIS unless the decision of the planning authority or the Board, that the EIS was adequate, was so unreasonable that it should be quashed. See also Kenny v An Bord Pleanála  1 IR 565 where the applicant unsuccessfully sought to impugn the decision of the Board to grant planning permission to Trinity College Dublin for the development of student accommodation at Trinity Hall, Dartry, on the grounds that the EIS was so defective that it did not comply with the statutory requirements.
Section 98 provided that, where a proposed development required an IPC licence, the planning authority or the Board could not have regard to the risk of environmental pollution when deciding whether to grant permission or when imposing conditions on the grant. The reason for this is that, in cases where an IPC licence is required, the EPAis the competent authority to consider matters relating to environmental pollution. Several cases have come before the courts alleging that this division of functions between the planning authorities and the EPA fails to implement the Directive.
(c) Therefore, in order to give effect to the Directive the court should interpret the powers of the EPA as including a power to demand an EIS, otherwise, the state is in breach of its obligations under EC law.
(b) Some environmental effects - especially those which can arise from the interaction between planning and environmental effects - are not considered at all.
However, the High Court, applying Campus Oil principles, refused the application for a stay of the Board’s proceedings until the court had determined, at the substantive hearing, whether the Directive had been correctly implemented into Irish law. In O’Brien v South Tipperary County Council (unreported, 22 October 2002, High Court, O’Caoimh J), the decision of a planning authority was challenged on very similar grounds. The respondents conceded that the applicant raised substantial grounds of a challenge but O’Caoimh J rejected their argument that an appeal to the Board was a more appropriate remedy. He also considered that the balance of convenience favoured the granting of a stay on an appeal to the Board. In this regard, O’Caoimh J attached significance to the fact that the applicant would be in a position to honour his undertaking as to damages (distinguishing the Martin case where the court considered that the applicant had only made a perfunctory undertaking as to damages).
The Commission also issued a reasoned opinion against Ireland in July 2001 arguing that s 98 results in a breach of Art 3 of the Directive (as there is no provision to ensure that the EIA will cover the interaction of factors mentioned) and of Art 8 (which requires that the competent authority take into account all the information gathered under Arts 5, 6 and 7).
We need to await the outcome of the courts’ decisions in Martin and O’Brien and possibly a decision of the ECJ for a final determination of the matter. It should, however, be noted that s 98 has since been amended by s 256 of the 2000 Act. Planning authorities and the Board are prohibited from imposing conditions for the purposes of controlling emissions (this is the function of the IPC licence). However, they can now refuse a grant of permission, notwithstanding the licensing of the activity, if it considers that the development is unacceptable on environmental grounds having regard to the proper planning and sustainable development of the area. This goes some way to remedying any perceived defects in the implementation of the Directive as the planning authority and Board can have regard to environmental effects in deciding whether to grant permission.
This division of functions between the EPAand local authorities also exists under the waste licensing regime (see s 54 of the Waste Management Act 1996). Section 54 has also been amended by s 257 of the 2000 Act so that planning authorities and the Board can refuse permission for development on environmental grounds notwithstanding the licensing of the activity.
EIS have been challenged as being inadequate on the basis that they failed to take into consideration the cumulative impacts of existing development or other proposed development. As noted by Scannell, developers are not expected to enter the realms of speculation but the Advocate General in Bund Naturschutzin Bayern v Freistaat Bayern  ECR I-3137 referred to projects within ‘current plans’ (Yvonne Scannell, Environmental Impact Assessment (Intensive Course on Planning Law 2002, Centre for Environmental Law and Policy)).
In O’Connell v O’Connell  IEHC 69 (29 March 2001), the applicants’ argument that the EIS should have covered a possible future extension of the road was rejected by the High Court. Similarly, in Sloan v An Bord Pleanála (unreported, High Court, 7 March 2003), the High Court refused an application to challenge a decision of the Board confirming a proposed motorway scheme.
The principle ground of challenge was that the inspector conducting the oral hearing had wrongfully excluded evidence in relation to the cross-border route on the basis that it did not relate to the proposed development, the subject matter of the application. The High Court held that the inquiry did not require an investigation into a road, which would be the subject matter of a future scheme and a separate inquiry.
The ECJ has however condemned Ireland for failing inter alia to take into account the cumulative effects of certain projects in Commission v Ireland  ECR I-5901. As noted above, Art 4(2) of the Directive requires that projects listed in Annex II must be the subject of an assessment where their characteristics so require. Member States can specify certain types of projects or may establish the criteria and/or thresholds necessary to identify such projects. In this case, the Commission challenged Irish legislation regarding EIS for afforestation, peat extraction and the use of uncultivated/semi-natural areas for intensive agricultural purposes. The legislation provided that only projects which exceeded certain size thresholds had to be subject to an EIS. The ECJ held that Ireland was in breach of the Directive as the thresholds failed to take the nature and location of the projects into consideration contrary to Art 2(1). The ECJ also stated that a Member State would exceed the limits on its discretion under Arts 2(1) and 4(2): where a Member State merely set a criterion of project size and did not also ensure that the objective of the legislation would not be circumvented by the splitting of projects. Not taking account of the cumulative effects of projects means in practice that all projects of a certain type may escape the obligation to carry out an assessment when taken together, they are likely to have a significant effect on the environment within the meaning of Art 2(1).
The European Communities (Environmental Impact Assessment) (Amendment) Regulations 2001 (SI 450/2001) were subsequently introduced to facilitate compliance with the ECJ’s decision. With regard to initial afforestation, the Regulations provide for the introduction of a statutory consent system by the Minister for the Marine and Natural Resources which provides for mandatory EIA above the reduced 50-hectare threshold and also provides for the possibility of sub-threshold EIA, where a project is likely to have significant effects on the environment. The threshold for mandatory EIA in relation to peat extraction has been reduced from 50 hectares to 30 hectares. The 2001 Planning Regulations also include a new planning threshold for peat extraction of 10 hectares. These EIA Regulations also amend the Wildlife (Amendment) Act 2000 and the European Communities (Natural Habitats) Regulations 1997 to allow for the possibility of EIA for peat extraction below the 10-hectare threshold in Natural Heritage Areas and Special Areas of Conservation, where a project is likely to have significant effects on the environment.
An issue that has been attracting some debate is whether ‘substantial compliance’ with the Directive is sufficient. The decision of the House of Lords in Berkeley v Secretary of State for the Environment  3 All ER 897 considers this issue. The applicant challenged the decision of the Secretary of State for the Environment approving the redevelopment of the Fulham Football Club ground at Craven Cottage on the grounds that he should have considered whether the project should have been subject to an EIA. Both the High Court and the Court of Appeal rejected his application on the basis that an EIA would not have altered the Secretary’s decision and that the objectors had not been prejudiced by the absence of an EIA. However, the House of Lords quashed the Secretary’s decision.
By the time the matter came before the House of Lords, the parties had agreed that the Secretary’s decision was ultra vires because of his failure to consider whether an EIA was required. They also agreed that the fact that his decision would have been the same did not remedy the situation. The issue before the House of Lords was whether there had been ‘substantial compliance’ with the Directive. Hoffmann LJ considered that an EIA by any other name would satisfy the requirements of the Directive provided that the procedure followed was ‘in substance’ an EIA. However, he rejected the argument that the equivalent of an EIS could be found in the documents submitted in this case, namely, the statement of case submitted by the developer, which in turn referred to the local authority’s statement of case, which in turn incorporated the report to the planning sub-committee which incorporated third party submissions! The public had access to all these documents and would have been entitled to express an opinion on them at the public inquiry. He stated as follows: My Lords, I do not accept that this paper chase can be treated as the equivalent of an environmental statement … The point about the environmental statement contemplated by the Directive is that it constitutes a single and accessible compilation, produced by the applicant at the very start of the application process, of the relevant environmental information and the summary in nontechnical language. It is true that Art 6(3) gives member states a discretion as to the places where the information can be consulted, the way in which the public may be informed and the manner in which the public is to be consulted.
But I do not think it allows member states to treat a disparate collection of documents produced by parties other than the developer and traceable only by persons with a great deal of energy and persistence as satisfying the requirement to make available to the public the Annex III information which should have been provided by the developer.
Hoffmann LJ did accept that a court could exercise its discretion not to quash a planning permission in a case where there was a failure to observe ‘a procedural step which was clearly superfluous to the requirements of the Directive’ without breaching the courts’ obligations under Community law. However, this was not such a case. See Aine Ryall, ‘Environmental assessment law: Berkeley v Secretary of State for the Environment’  2 IPELJ for an analysis of this decision in the context of ECJ judgments regarding the Directive. Ryall submits that the judgments of the ECJ are sufficiently broad to be interpreted as requiring national courts to quash decisions taken in breach of the Directive.
She notes that the ECJ has acknowledged that a Member State could adopt an alternative assessment procedure provided that it satisfied the requirements of Arts 3 and Arts 5 to 10 of the Directive. However, in light of the ECJ’s determination to ensure that the effectiveness of the Directive is not undermined, it may take a strict approach if asked to provide a preliminary ruling on the substantial compliance issue.
The decision in Berkeley can be contrasted with the approach of the Supreme Court in the Lancefort case discussed at 7.4.1 above. Keane J was of the view that it had not been shown that the failure to consider whether an EIS should have been prepared had ‘the slightest adverse effect’ on the attainment of the Directive’s objectives. In particular, he noted that the public had access to the detailed plans lodged with the planning application and that an exhaustive public consultation process had been carried out. Ryall considers that the judgment suggests a minimalist approach to the requirements of the Directive in contrast to the approach taken by Hoffmann J in Berkeley. In particular, she notes that Keane J did not consider how the information supplied complied with the requirements of Arts 3 and 5 of the Directive. However, it is possible that the courts will take a different approach where the applicant has been granted locus stand.
The decision in Berkeley also raises questions regarding excessive requests by decision-making bodies for further information on the EIS.
As noted above, outline planning permission is not permissible where an EIS is required for the reason that an outline application would not contain sufficient details to enable the likely significant effects on the environment to be described and to then identify the requisite mitigation measures. Similar concerns arise regarding ‘qualified consents’, ie consents which leave certain matters to be addressed at a later stage. An acommon example is a planning permission which contains conditions that certain matters, such as landscaping or wastewater treatment, must be the subject of a future agreement with the planning authority. The leading case in this area is Boland v An Bord Pleanála  3 IR 435. The courts are of the view that some degree of flexibility must be left to developers engaged in a complex development. The extent to which flexibility is permissible in a planning permission is largely a matter of degree.
These types of condition raise concerns regarding public participation requirements and the abdication by the authorities of their responsibilities (and particularly of the Board if it remits matters to be decided between the developer and the planning authority). However, they also raise questions regarding compliance with the EIA Directive.
In McNamara v An Bord Pleanála  2 ILRM 125, the High Court held that substantial grounds for granting leave to apply for judicial review included the fact that a condition in the planning permission required the large-scale excavation of sand and gravel below the waterline. An EIA may have been required for this development and the planning authority should have required further information from the developer on the environmental effects of this condition. Similarly, in Houlihan v An Bord Pleanála (unreported, 4 October 1993, High Court, Murphy J), the High Court held that most of the conditions requiring future agreement were valid as they concerned matters of detail. However, it held that the Board had improperly abdicated its responsibilities by imposing a condition which required the effluent discharge to be re-routed in an easterly direction in a manner to be agreed with the planning authority. The Board should at least have prescribed that the main should be re-routed along a wide but defined pathway with the particular route to be agreed with the planning authority.
A recent decision of the English courts goes much farther than this. In R v Cornwall County Council ex p Hardy  Env LR 25, ecological surveys revealed the possible existence of a habitat for bats. The planning authority considered that the development did not raise any significant nature conservation issues and granted planning permission. However, the permission was subject to conditions prohibiting the commencement of the development until additional surveys had been carried out and, if such habitats existed, the approval of mitigatory measures. The High Court considered that the planning authority could not rationally have decided that nature conservation aspects did not amount to significant adverse effects until it had the results of the surveys. This information should have been included in the EIS, otherwise, the authority could not comply with the EIA Regulations. The authority must have all the information it needs to assess the likely significant effects of the project before it reaches its decision.
Professor Scannell submits that it is permissible to impose conditions reserving matters for future approval or agreement, provided the reserved matters deal with the proposed development, the likely significant impacts of which are capable of being assessed at the initial consent stage. As was the case in Hardy, the developer can do this by providing a worst case scenario. The planning authority can then impose conditions requiring that these effects be mitigated in the event that the worst case scenario occurs.
Paragraph 13 of Annex II to the Directive includes: Projects which involve any change or extension of projects listed in Annexe I or Annex II already authorised, executed or in the process of being executed, which may have significant effects on the environment.
So projects which may already have been the subject of an EIA will require a further EIA if they have been modified in a manner which is likely to have significant effects on the environment. See Commission v Germany  ECR I-02189, where the ECJ held that a project which comes within Annexe I must undergo an EIA irrespective of whether it is a separate project, will be added to a pre-existing project or even if it has close functional links with the pre-existing project. A project which comes within Annexe I cannot come within the category of ‘modifications to development projects included in Annexe I’ mentioned in paragraph 12 of Annex II for which an optional assessment is provided.
The EIA Directive will be expressly amended to incorporate the ECJ’s decision by adding a new class of projects to Annex I to include: any changes to or extension of projects listed in this Annexe where such a change or extension in itself meets the appropriate criteria or threshold set out in this Annexe.
(b) Result in an increase in size greater than 25% or an amount equal to 50% of the appropriate threshold, whichever is the greater.
It is questionable whether the thresholds have been set too high. In addition, it does not appear to cover modifications to a development which was already in a class listed in Schedule 5.
Modifications to road development which have already been approved by the Minister, now the Board, under the Roads Acts have given rise to some challenges. As noted above, certain road development is subject to a separate regime under the Roads Act. Unlike the planning regulations, the Roads Acts do not contain any express provisions regarding modifications to road development post statutory approval.
In the decision of O’Connell v O’Connell noted above, the applicant sought to argue that the EIS was inadequate on the basis that it did not consider the effects of a subsequent omission of a 1 km stretch of road. The High Court refused to amend the applicant’s grounds for judicial review in this regard holding that the EIS covered the effects of such an omission. This case is not, strictly speaking, a case of modification post approval (as the scheme was modified on the last day of the oral hearing). However, it raises similar issues regarding the adequacy of the EIA.
The development of the M50 through an archaeological site at Carrick mines also raised these issues. The Minister approved the road development in 1998. In 2001, subsequent modifications were proposed in order to preserve more of the site. An application was made to the Board requesting a further EIS under the Roads Acts in respect of these modifications.
(b) Would not of themselves have significant adverse effects on the environment and accordingly do not comprise a project specified in paragraph 13 of Annex II of the EIA Directive.
In DeFreitas Waddington v An Bord Pleanála (unreported, 21 December 2000, High Court, Butler J) where the applicant sought judicial review of the Board’s decision to grant permission for a 60 m riverside quay extension which was adjacent to a Special Protection Area (SPA). The High Court held that the Board had already conducted an EIA for the previous development of the quay and in any event was entitled to conclude that that the proposed extension was not ‘likely to have a significant effect’ on the site under Regulation 27 of the European Communities (Natural Habitats) Regulations 1997. Accordingly, leave to apply for judicial review was refused.
(a) Individuals may invoke the obligations imposed on the Member States by the EIADirective in proceedings before the national courts to consider whether the legislative or administrative authorities have remained within the limits of their discretion, as set out in the Directive. See Luxembourg v Linster  ECR I-06917; WWF and Others v Autonome Provinz Bozen  ECR I-05613; and Kraaijeveld  ECR I-054030.
(b) Individuals can call on the national courts to set aside national rules or measures incompatible with the provisions of the Directive. As noted by Aine Ryall, it appears that the national court is also obliged to quash a planning decision taken in breach of the requirements of the Directive. However, this point is not settled. The ECJ in its case law has referred to national ‘provisions’, ‘rules’ and ‘measures’ that must be set aside, rather than expressly, stating that individual planning decisions taken in breach of the Directive must be quashed. However, Ryall submits that the ECJ’s ruling in Kraaijeveld is sufficiently broad to be interpreted as requiring national courts to quash such decisions.
(c) Member States cannot exclude, from the outset and in their entirety, from the EIA procedure certain classes of Annex II projects or specific projects unless the specific project or those classes of projects ‘in their entirety’ could be regarded, on the basis of a comprehensive assessment, as not being likely to have significant effects on the environment (the Bozen case).
(d) Member States are entitled to use an assessment procedure other than the procedure introduced by the Directive provided that it satisfies the requirements of Art 3 and Arts 5 to 10 of the Directive, including the public participation requirements laid down in Art 6 (the Bozen case).
The EIA Directive discussed above requires an environmental assessment of certain projects. Directive 2001/42/EC on the assessment of certain plans and programmes on the environment, as its name suggests, requires that certain plans and programmes, which provide a framework for the development consent of projects, be assessed for their environmental effects. (Plans and programmes are defined as plans and programmes, including those co-financed by the European Community, as well as any modifications to them, which are subject to preparation and/or adoption by an authority at national, regional or local level or which are prepared by an authority for adoption, through a legislative procedure by Parliament or Government, and which are required by legislative, regulatory or administrative provisions.) This is known as strategic environmental assessment (SEA) and this Directive is often referred to as the SEA Directive.
The SEA Directive was adopted on 21 July 2001 and must be transposed by 21 July 2004. The essential objective of the SEA Directive is the same: to ensure that the environmental effects of plans and programmes are taken into consideration during their preparation and before their adoption. The SEA Directive is also of a procedural nature.
(b) In view of the likely effect on sites, have been determined to require an assessment under Arts 6 or 7 of the Habitats Directive 92/43/EEC.
However, these types of plans and programmes which determine the use of small areas at the local level and minor modifications to these plans and programmes will only require an environmental assessment where the Member States determine that they are likely to have significant environmental effects. Similarly, any other types of plans and programmes, which set the framework for development consent of projects, will only require an assessment if they are likely to have significant effects on the environment. Member States must determine whether these plans and programmes are likely to have significant environmental effects on a case-by-case basis and/or by specifying certain types (taking into account the criteria set out in Annex II).
The SEA Directive does not apply to certain plans and programmes eg those whose sole purpose is to serve national defence or civil emergency.
The requirements of the SEA Directive must be integrated into existing procedures or into procedures established to comply with the Directive. The environmental assessment must be carried out before the adoption of the plan or programme and is defined in Art 2(b) as: the preparation of an environmental report, the carrying out of consultations, the taking into account of the environmental report and the results of the consultations in decision-making and the provision of information on the decision in accordance with Arts 4 to 9.
This definition neatly summarises the requirements of the SEA Directive. An environmental report must be prepared in which the likely significant effects on the environment and reasonable alternatives are identified and evaluated. The information which the report must contain is set out in Annex I. This includes inter alia the contents of the plan or programme and its main objectives, any relevant existing environmental problems, relevant environmental protection objectives, the likely environmental effects and mitigation measures. Like the EIA Directive, the report must also include a non-technical summary of the information. The public, certain authorities by virtue of their specific environmental responsibilities and affected Member States must be consulted. Their views and the environmental report must be taken into account during the preparation of the plan or programme and before its adoption. An environmental assessment carried out under the SEA Directive shall be without prejudice to any requirements under the EIA Directive and any other Community law requirements. However, Member States may provide for coordinated or joint procedures for plans and programmes which require an environmental assessment under both the SEA Directive and other Community legislation (Art 11).
As noted by Professor Scannell, there has been some informal SEA in Ireland already. The National Development Programme 2000–2006 and other programmes for investment in infrastructure have been subjected to eco-audits. Under the 2000 Act, development plans, local area action plans and regional planning guidelines must also contain information on the likely effects on the environment of implementing the plan.
In May 2003, the Council adopted Directive 2003/35/EC providing for public participation in respect of the drawing up of certain plans and programmes relating to the environment and amending Council Directives 85/337/EEC and 96/61/EC. This Directive amends the EIA Directive in order to comply with the Community’s obligations arising under the UN/ECE Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters (otherwise known as the Aarhus Convention). This Directive still has to be formally approved and will come into effect two years from the date of its publication in the Official Journal. The text of the approved Directive is published as OJ L156/17, 25/6/03.
Current information indicates that the new Directive contains the main elements of the Commission’s proposal. This amends Art 6 of the EIA Directive to ensure fuller public participation in the EIA procedure. Article 6 previously just provided that the information gathered under Art 5 had to be made available to the public within a reasonable time in order to give the public concerned the opportunity to express an opinion before the development consent was granted. Article 6, as amended, should ensure greater public participation as it specifies that the public is given an early and effective opportunity to participate in the development consent procedure and that it be informed, whether by public notices or other means, of certain specified information. The public concerned must then be entitled to express comments and opinions to the competent authority before it reaches its decision.
The Commission proposal also inserts a new Art 10(a) which provides that Member States must ensure that the public concerned has access to a review procedure before the courts or other body established by law to challenge the substantive or procedural legality of decisions, acts or omissions subject to the public participation provisions of the EIA Directive. This procedure must be expeditious and must not be prohibitively expensive. Irish legislation would already appear to comply with these amendments regarding public participation and the availability of a review procedure.
The Council has also adopted a new Directive 2003/4/EC on public access to environmental information. This Directive must be implemented by 14 February 2005 and will replace the current Directive 90/313/EEC on the Freedom of Access to Information on the Environment. This Directive also seeks to ensure compliance with the Community’s obligations under the Aarhus Convention regarding access to environmental information. The objectives of the Directive are to guarantee the right of access to environmental information held by or for public authorities and to ensure that environmental information is progressively made available and disseminated to the public in order to achieve the widest possible systematic availability and dissemination to the public of environmental information (Art 1). These Directives, therefore, complement the EIA and SEA Directives.

References: Art 1
 Art 3
 Art 4
 Art 8
 Art 4
 Art 4
 Art 93
 Art 4
 Art 92
 Art 95
 Art 94
 Art 5
 Art 6
 Art 98
 Art 6
 Art 28
 Art 107
 Art 14
 Art 14
 Art 6
 Art 14
 Art 13
 Art 3
 Art 94
 Art 3
 Art 8
 Art 4
 Art 2
 Art 2
 Art 6
 Art 3
 Art 6
 Art 2
 Art 6
 Art 5
 Art 10