Source: https://federalfmla.typepad.com/fmla_blog/2006/09/index.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 13:50:33+00:00

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We believe that the above-mentioned refinements in the final rule should take care of those circumstances where the employer or the employer’s plan is wiling to accept medical services by a chiropractor that go beyond the treatment specified in the definition.
The above language strongly suggests that, as far as the DOL is concerned, a chiropractor is an FMLA-covered "health care provider" where the group health benefit plan recognizes the chiropractor as such even though the subluxation was not verified by x-ray.
In Mickelson v. New York Life Insurance Co., No. 05-3049, 2006 U.S.App. LEXIS 21944 (10th Cir. Aug. 28, 2006) Ms. Mickelson was approved for six weeks of FMLA leave. Two weeks after her leave began she inquired whether she could return to work on a part time basis, which as approved by her doctor. New York Life denied her request stating that, because of business demands and staffing requirements, her position had to be filled by a full-time employee during her scheduled six-week absence. HYL’s handbook permitted employee’s to take FMLA leave on an intermittent or reduced schedule if medically necessary. After her request to work part-time was denied, Ms. Mickelson’s condition worsened. When her FMLA leave was exhausted she was terminated. The Tenth Circuit reversed the district court’s award of summary judgment to the employer on her Title VII retaliation claim. The Tenth Circuit found that district court erred in determining that Ms. Mickelson failed to establish that she suffered an adverse employment action, a necessary element of any retaliation claim. The district court reached that conclusion by finding that her claim was only actionable under the FMLA and not Title VII. Ms. Mickelson had not asserted violation of the FMLA. The Court found that the denial of the request work part-time violated the FMLA. It also caused Ms. Mickelson to exhaust her FMLA leave sooner and denied her the opportunity to earn income on a part-time basis, which the court found were adverse employment actions.
Comments: The case reminds us that the FMLA does not exist in a vacuum. Violation of the FMLA may also be used to establish violation of other applicable laws, including, in this instance, the anti-retaliation provisions of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
In Bordeau v. Saginaw Control & Engineering, Inc., No. 04-10312-BC, 2006 U.S.Dist. LEXIS 59774 (E.D.Mich. Aug. 24, 2006), the issue presented was whether an employee may recover under the FMLA damages for physical injuries sustained when the employee returned to work following an approved medical leave but was placed in a job that required manual labor and therefore was not comparable to the job he left. Mr. Bordeau was employed as a purchasing manager when he took approved FMLA leave to care for his elderly mother. On his return Mr. Bordeau was given a manual labor job on the plant floor and not his previous purchasing manager job. While performing his labor job Mr. Bordeau sustained a disabling back injury and has not been able to return two work. Mr. Bordeau’s employment was terminated shortly after sustaining the injury. Mr. Bordeau sued alleging violation of the FMLA. Specifically, he sought damages for physical injuries he suffered as a result of the employer’s failure to return him to his same or an equivalent position. The employer moved for summary judgment alleging that the FMLA does not permit recovery of the damages sought by Mr. Bordeau. The court agreed with the employer, but with a twist.
The remedy section of the FMLA states that an employer who violates the Act must pay the employee “damages equal to … any wages, salary, employment benefits, or other compensation denied or lost to such employee by reason of the violation; or … any actual monetary losses sustained by the employee as a direct result of the violation.” The employer argued that Mr. Bordeau’s inability to work and earn money because of his back injury does not amount to wage loss or actual monetary loss “by reason of” or “as a direct result of” Saginaw Control’s FMLA violation. The court agreed. Relying on precedent in other courts, the court in Bordeau determined that the controlling language of the FMLA limits damages to actual, direct losses that ensue because of interference with or denial of rights under the Act. To be compensable, actual direct losses must arise out of a quid pro quo relationship between the employer and an employee. Here, the court found that Mr. Bordeau’s inability to work because of injury to his back was not a direct result of the employer’s FMLA violation. At most, the court found that disabling back injury was a consequences of the employer’ FMLA violation, but consequential damages were not available under the FMLA. The court went on, however to find that the FMLA permits equitable relief, including front pay where, as here, reinstatement is not appropriate.
Comment: Monetary damages are available for violation of the FMLA. The FMLA does, however, permit recovery for all damages suffered as a consequence of a violation. Damages that do not arise directly out of the employer-employee relationship are generally not available. Note, however, that the availability of front pay as an equitable remedy may go a long way in compensating an employee for loss of future income due to injuries suffered as a result of an employer’s FMLA violation. The remedies available to employees for violation of the FMLA are addressed in Chapter 15 of A Federal Sector Guide to the Family and Medical Leave Act & Related Litigation (Dewey Publications, Inc. 2003 & 2005 Supplement).
Comment: An employer is required to notify the employee that it has designated leave as FMLA leave. The FMLA does not require that such notice inform the employee when the employer expects the employee to return from work. An employer may, however, be required to inform the employee of the expected return date if, for example, such notice is required pursuant to the terms of a collective bargaining agreement or company policy. Although not required, it is probably a good idea for employer's to inform employees when it expects them to return from FMLA leave, particularly where, as in Garcia, the leave is of an extended duration.
In Miller v. North Little Rock Police Department, No. 4:06-CV-00515 GTE, 2006 U.S.Dist. LEXIS 61560 (E.D. Ark.Aug. 25, 2006), the employee alleged that his employer interfered with his FMLA rights when his supervisor visited the employee’s home subsequent to the employee’s request for leave. When he called his employer Miller stated that he needed “to be off work because he had to take his infant daughter to the Doctor cause [sic] of an illness.” Because it was doubtful that the employee had provided information sufficient to place his employer on notice that the employee was requesting FMLA leave, rather than just a day off for a doctor’s visit, the court found that his supervisor’s home visit did not violate the FMLA. Moreover, the court “questions whether the FMLA prohibits an employer from visiting an employee’s home,” noting the absence of supporting authority.
Comment: The FMLA does not explicitly prohibit an employer from visiting an employee’s home during a period of leave. It does, however, prohibit employers from interfering with or discriminating against an employee for exercising FMLA rights. An employer that visits an employee at home while the employee is on FMLA leave who does not make such visits to employees who are on non-FMLA leave runs a risk of violating the FMLA. Depending the nature of the home visit, courts are likely to find that a single visit does not interfere with an employee's right to leave. Multiple or lengthy visits, however, may constitute actionable interference.
In Hall v. Serv. Centers of New Jersey, Inc., No. 05-1695 (DRD), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60515 (D.N.J. Aug. 15, 2006) the court rejected the employee’s FMLA interference claim. The court noted that the employee failed to establish that she provided her employer sufficient notice that she was requesting leave for an FMLA-qualifying condition by providing her employer with enough information for the employer to reasonably conclude that n even described in the FMLA has occurred. The court found that Hall did not provide evidence that she requested FMLA leave for July 22 and 23. Nor did she establish that she provided her employee with enough information for it to conclude that she was suffering from a serious health condition. The court noted that Hall’s time sheets, which she signed as “true and accurate” reflected that she took vacation time rather than sick time on those days. The time sheets reflected that she took other days off from work in the months leading up to her termination but there was no evidence that Hall informed her employer that those absences were due to a serious health condition.
Comment: To perfect the right to FMLA leave an eligible employee must at least provide the agency employer with sufficient information that that the need for leave may be covered by the FMLA to shift the burden on the agency to inquire further. The employee does not have to specifically invoke the FMLA by name. On the other hand, an employee who identifies a reason for leave, such as vacation, without identifying that the vacation leave might be being used for an FMLA-covered condition will not perfect his or her right to the benefits and protections of the FMLA.
In Decato v. Northeast Med. Center Hospital, No. H-05-0449, 2006 U.S.Dist. LEXIS 57520 (S.D.Tex. Aug. 15, 2006), the court dismissed an FMLA retaliation claim. The employee argued that the timing of her discharge, occurring only 4 days after she completed FMLA leave, established an inference of discrimination. Disagreeing, the court noted that, while admittedly short, the interval between her misconduct (failure to report to work following her request for non-FMLA leave) and discharge was even shorter. Absent evidence that other similarly situated employees were treated differently, or that the employer was otherwise hostile to the FMLA, the court found that the discharge for insubordination was not related to the employee’s use of FMLA leave.
Comment: Courts will often find that close temporal proximity between FMLA protected activity (use of FMLA leave) and an adverse action will raise an inference that the adverse action violated the FMLA. This case reminds us that the inference of discrimination raised by close temporal proximity is rebuttable. Here, the employer successfully rebutted the inference by demonstrating that the discharge was due to the employee’s intervening insubordinate act of failing to report to work.
In Yansick v.Temple UniversityHealth System, et. al., No. 04-4228, 2006 U.S.Dist. LEXIS 53789 (E.D.Pa. July 27, 2006) the Court found that an employee does not establish an actionable interference claim just because some of the absences cited in an attendance-based termination were covered by the FMLA. The Court reasoned that to demonstrate that an employer’s interference prevented the meaningful exercise of FMLA rights, an employee must show that the interference resulted in prejudice. Yansick argued that prejudice can be shown if he could have taken FMLA leave in place of any one of the absences considered in deciding to terminate him. The Court disagreed. The Court found that an attendance-based termination would be invalid if an employee can show that “enough of the relevant absences were FMLA-protected that he or she should not have been subject to termination or excluded from reinstatement.” The Court found that Yansick failed to establish that a sufficient number of cited absences should have been covered by the FMLA such that he would not have been terminated pursuant to the Employer’s policy.
Comment: The decision represents a fairly limited interpretation of when employer conduct interferes with an employee’s FMLA rights. The rationale of the court appears to be based on the well-established principal that an employee who has exercised FMLA rights does not enjoy any greater employment right or benefit than if the employee had never taken FMLA leave.
The time frame set forth in § 825.303(a)-one to two working days- is precatory only; it does not purport to establish a drop-dead date for providing notice, after which any such notice is fatally defective. As that provision indicates, timeliness must be considered in light of the “facts and circumstances of the particular case.
The court denied the employer’s motion for summary judgment after finding material issues of fact were in dispute regarding the timing of the notice.
Comment: The case reminds us that the one to two day employee notice requirement for unforeseen FMLA leave is not written in stone. Circumstances may permit notice by an employee in excess of one or two days.

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