Source: http://massachusettslandlords.com/1979-darmetko-v-boston-housing-authority-double-damages-illegal-student-lawyers-get-paid/
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 07:06:09+00:00

Document:
GRETCHEN DARMETKO vs. BOSTON HOUSING AUTHORITY.
Present: HENNESSEY, C.J., KAPLAN, WILKINS, & ABRAMS, JJ.
CIVIL ACTION commenced in the Housing Court of the City of Boston on December 19, 1975.
The case was heard by Daher, C.J.
George F. Mahoney for the defendant.
James Henry Wexler for the plaintiff.
distress due to the BHA’s failure to repair the premises had not been proved.
The judge further ruled that the leaks in the roof (but not the defective floors) interfered with the plaintiff’s quiet enjoyment of the leased premises. Because of this interference, and based on his reading of G. L. c. 186, Section 14, the judge ruled that the plaintiff was entitled to an additional $5,358, three times her monthly rent obligation ($47) for each month during which the leaky roof was unrepaired (from May 15, 1973, to July 20, 1976).
Prior to the trial, the judge had fined the BHA $3,150 for contempt of court for failure to repair the leaks and had ordered that the money be paid to the plaintiff. The $3,150 represented a fine of $50 a day for the period from July 21, 1976, to September 21, 1976. [Note 3] At trial, the judge did not award any damages for the period after July 20, 1976, because, in his view, the contempt award had adequately compensated the plaintiff for the period from July 21, 1976, to September 21, 1976, the date already determined to be the date on which the leaks in the roof were repaired.
“without compensation” on behalf of an indigent party in civil proceedings in a Housing Court, provided that a member of the bar employed by a law school clinical instruction program generally supervises the conduct of the case.
1. Damages. The damages awarded to the plaintiff were determined incorrectly.
It is clear that the plaintiff’s actual damages exceeded three times her monthly rent of $47. Her actual damages included the diminution of the value of the leasehold due to the breach of the implied warranty of habitability, as well as the damage to her personal property. Damages for the breach were $793.50, and damage to her personal property was $415.
The amount of a reasonable attorney’s fee lies largely in the discretion of the judge. Our cases have noted the factors to be considered. See Heller v. Silverbranch Constr. Corp., 376 Mass. 621 , 629-630 (1978); First Nat’l Bank v. Brink, 372 Mass. 257 , 265-267 (1977); Cummings v. National Shawmut Bank, 284 Mass. 563 , 569 (1933). See also S.J.C. Rule 3:22, DR 2-106, 359 Mass. 807 (1972). Federal courts reviewing an award of statutorily authorized attorney’s fees have adopted similar standards. See Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717-719 (5th Cir. 1974), approved in Souza v. Southworth, 564 F.2d 609, 612 (1st Cir. 1977).
services must be carefully assessed because the students’ efforts may have been unproductive or may have been duplicated in the work of the supervising attorney. On the record before us, however, we find no showing of a duplication of effort that would make the judge’s determination clearly improper.
The plaintiff argued below that the degree of success was a factor in determining the amount of a reasonable attorney’s fee. Of course, success in establishing a statutory violation was a precondition to entitlement to an attorney’s fee. Here, we do not know how much weight the judge placed on the degree of the plaintiff’s success. The judge gave no explanation as to how he arrived at the amount of the fee. Although it has been substantially reduced through this appeal, the plaintiff’s success was considerable. After obtaining $3,150 as a contempt award, the plaintiff, whose monthly rent was $47, was granted over $5,300 in (erroneously determined) statutory damages and over $1,200 in actual damages. Because we have ruled that the damages awarded were excessive, a new determination of attorney’s fees should be made, which may include attorney’s fees on this appeal.
3. The judgment is reversed. The case is remanded for the entry of a judgment awarding damages and counsel fees in accordance with this opinion.
[Note 1] The BHA also has argued that a class action, known as the Perez case, barred the maintenance of this action. See Perez v. Boston Hous. Auth., 368 Mass. 333 , appeal dismissed sub nom. Perez v. Bateman, 423 U.S. 1009 (1975). The record fails to disclose any reason why that case bars the maintenance of this one.
[Note 2] We are unable to calculate how the judge arrived at the figure of $793.50 from the per diem damages determined by him, but neither party has objected to the figure. Perhaps the BHA’s liability indicated by the subsidiary findings was offset by unpaid rent.
[Note 3] The fine of $50 a day had been proposed in an order entered by another judge of the Housing Court who found the BHA in contempt for failure to repair the leaks as directed. That order gave the BHA seven days to repair the leaks with the threat of a fine thereafter of $50 for each day that the leaks were not repaired.
[Note 4] Damages for breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment where the tenant remains in possession of the premises are measured by the difference between the value of what the lessee should have received and the value of what he did receive. Charles E. Burt, Inc. v. Seven Grand Corp., 340 Mass. 124 , 130 (1959). Damages for breach of the implied warranty of habitability are measured by “the difference between the value of the dwelling as warranted (the rent agreed on may be evidence of this value) and the value of the dwelling as it exists in its defective condition.” Boston Hous. Auth. v. Hemingway, 363 Mass. 184 , 203 (1973) (footnote omitted). These remedies are “quite similar.” Id. at n.21.
Section 14 of G. L. c. 186 expands the measure of damages to include all “actual and consequential damages” where, as here, there has been a breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment.
[Note 5] In its brief, the BHA cites cases in which the other judge of the Housing Court of the City of Boston has interpreted Section 14 as we have in this opinion.
[Note 6] A contempt order issued during the course of a proceeding has been held not to be a final order appealable by a party. See, e.g., Securities & Exch. Comm’n v. Sloan, 535 F.2d 679, 680 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 966 (1977); Cromaglass Corp. v. Ferm, 500 F.2d 601, 604 (3d Cir. 1974), and cases cited; Hughes v. Sharp, 476 F.2d 975, 975 (9th Cir. 1973); Hodgson v. Mahoney, 460 F.2d 326, 328 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1039 (1972). A civil contempt proceeding has been said to be reviewable in connection with an appeal from a final judgment in the main action. See 9 Moore’s Federal Practice par. 110.13, at 167-168 (2d ed. 1975); 15 C. A. Wright, A. R. Miller & E. H. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure Section 3917, at 620-621 (1976); Wright, Byrne, Haakh, Westbrook & Wheat, Civil and Criminal Contempt in the Federal Courts, 17 F.R.D. 167, 176 (1955).
[Note 7] A fine for civil contempt should include only fair compensation for losses suffered because of disobedience of the court’s order. Lyon v. Bloomfield, 355 Mass. 738 , 744 (1969). Grunberg v. Louison, 343 Mass. 729 , 736 (1962). Godard v. Babson-Dow Mfg. Co., 319 Mass. 345 , 349 (1946). Those losses, which need not be measured with undue precision (Department of Pub. Health v. Cumberland Cattle Co., 361 Mass. 817 , 832 ), include pecuniary injury caused by the act of disobedience, any taxable costs of the suit, the expense of counsel fees and other disbursements in enforcing the plaintiff’s rights (Coyne Indus. Laundry of Schenectady, Inc. v. Gould, 359 Mass. 269 , 277 ).
[Note 8] Once the date of the repair of the roof was determined for purposes of the contempt order, the BHA had no right to insist that the repair date be redetermined in the course of subsequent proceedings in the case.
[Note 9] Cases relied on by the BHA not involving any statute are irrelevant. In its brief, the BHA fails to face the explicit, mandatory language of G. L. c. 186, Section 14.
[Note 10] There is nothing in S.J.C. Rule 3:11 ( 366 Mass. 867 ) that bars a legal services organization employing a law student from receiving a statutorily authorized fee. The prohibition against a law student’s receiving compensation was originally included in rule 3:11 to assure that no law student representing an indigent criminal defendant could receive compensation from public funds. That reference to service “without compensation” has been preserved in the course of subsequent, expansive amendments of rule 3:11.
This court recently amended its order implementing rule 3:11 to make it clear that a law student may receive compensation from the legal services organization for which he works.

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