Source: http://supreme.nolo.com/us/248/276/case.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-26 13:44:41+00:00

Document:
states; (3) because, even if the Webb-Kenyon Law was held not to be repugnant to the Constitution for the reasons stated, nevertheless, that assumed law afforded no basis for the exertion of the state power in question, because it had never been enacted by Congress conformably to the Constitution, and therefore, in legal intendment, must be treated as nonexisting.
It is conceded that the ruling of this Court, sustaining the Webb-Kenyon Law as a valid exercise by Congress of its power to regulate commerce (Clark Distilling Co. v. Western Maryland Ry. Co., 242 U. S. 311, 242 U. S. 325), disposes of the first two contentions, and leaves only the third for consideration. In fact, in argument, it is admitted that such question alone is relied upon. The proposition is this -- that as the provision of the Constitution exacting a two-thirds vote of each house to pass a bill over a veto means a two-thirds vote not of a quorum of each house, but of all the members of the body, the Webb-Kenyon Act was never enacted into law, because, after its veto by the President, it received in the Senate only a two-thirds vote of the Senators present (a quorum), which was less than two-thirds of all the members elected to and entitled to sit in that body.
Granting the premise of fact as to what the face of the journal disclosed, and assuming for the sake of the argument (Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U. S. 107, 220 U. S. 143; Rainey v. United States, 232 U. S. 310, 232 U. S. 317) that the resulting question would be justiciable, we might adversely dispose of it by merely referring to the practice to the contrary which has prevailed from the beginning. In view, however, of the importance of the subject, and with the purpose not to leave unnoticed the grave misconceptions involved in the arguments by which the proposition relied upon is sought to be supported, we come briefly to dispose of the subject.
". . . he shall return it, with his objections to that house in which it shall have originated, who shall enter the objections at large on their journal, and proceed to reconsider it. If, after such reconsideration, two-thirds of that house shall agree to pass the bill, it shall be sent, together with the objections, to the other house, by which it shall likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by two-thirds of that house, it shall become a law. . . ."
The extent of the vote exacted being certain, the question depends upon the significance of the words "that house" -- that is, whether those words relate to the two houses by which the bill was passed and upon which full legislative power is conferred by the Constitution in case of the presence of a quorum (a majority of the members of each house; § 5, Art. I), or whether they refer to a body which must be assumed to embrace not a majority, but all its members, for the purpose of estimating the two-thirds vote required. As the context leaves no doubt that the provision was dealing with the two houses as organized and entitled to exert legislative power, it follows that to state the contention is to adversely dispose of it.
"but if, after such reconsideration, two-thirds of the Senate or House of Assembly shall, notwithstanding such objections, agree to pass the same, it shall be . . . sent to the other branch of the legislature, where it shall also be reconsidered, and if approved by two-thirds of the members, present, shall be a law,"
thus identifying the bodies embraced by the words "senate" and "house" and definitely fixing the two-thirds majority required in each as two-thirds of the members present.
The identity between the provision of Article V of the Constitution, giving the power by a two-thirds vote to submit amendments, and the requirements we are considering as to the two-thirds vote necessary to override a veto makes the practice as to the one applicable to the other.
"Resolved: that the Senate do concur in the resolve of the House of Representatives on 'Articles to be proposed to the legislatures of the states as amendments to the Constitution of the United States,' with amendments; two-thirds of the Senators present concurring therein."
1st Cong., 1st Sess., September 9, 1789, Senate Journal 77.
"A message from the House of Representatives. Mr. Beckley, their clerk, brought up a resolve of the House of this date, to agree to the . . . amendments proposed by the Senate to 'Articles of amendment to be proposed to the legislatures of the several states as amendments to the Constitution of the United States,' . . . ; two-thirds of the members present concurring on each vote. . . ."
1st Cong., 1st Sess., Sept. 21, 1789, Senate Journal 83.
When it is considered that the chairman of the committee in charge of the amendments for the House was Mr. Madison, and that both branches of Congress contained many members who had participated in the deliberations of the convention or in the proceedings which led to the ratification of the Constitution, and that the whole subject was necessarily vividly present in the minds of those who dealt with it, the convincing effect of the action cannot be overstated.
But this is not all, for the Journal of the Senate contains further evidence that the character of the two-thirds vote exacted by the Constitution (that is, two-thirds of a quorum) could not have been overlooked, since that Journal shows that, at the very time the amendments just referred to were under consideration, there were also pending other proposed amendments, dealing with the treaty and lawmaking power. Those concerning the treatymaking power provided that a two-thirds vote of all the members (instead of that proportion of a quorum) should be necessary to ratify a treaty dealing with enumerated subjects, and exacted even a larger proportionate vote of all the members in order to ratify a treaty dealing with other mentioned subjects, and those dealing with the lawmaking power required that a two-thirds (instead of a majority) vote of a quorum should be necessary to pass a law concerning specified subjects.
of the Constitution says 'two-thirds of both Houses.' What constitutes a House? A quorum of the membership, a majority, one-half and one more. That is all that is necessary to constitute a House to do all the business that comes before the House. Among the business that comes before the House is the reconsideration of a bill which has been vetoed by the President; another is a proposed amendment to the Constitution, and the practice is uniform in both cases that, if a quorum of the House is present, the House is constituted, and two-thirds of those voting are sufficient in order to accomplish the object. . . ."
5 Hinds' Precedents of the House of Representatives, pp. 1009-1010.
This occurrence demonstrates that there is no ground for saying that the adherence to the practice settled in both houses in 1789 resulted from a mere blind application of an existing rule, a conclusion which is also clearly manifested, as to the Senate, by proceedings in that body in 1861 where, on the passage of a pending amendment to the Constitution, as the result of an inquiry made by Mr. Trumbull relative to the vote required to pass it, it was determined by the Senate by a vote of 33 to 1 that two-thirds of a quorum only was essential. 36 Cong., 2nd Sess., March 2, 1861, Senate Journal 383.
In consequence of the identity in principle between the rule applicable to amendments to the Constitution and that controlling in passing a bill over a veto, the rule of two-thirds of a quorum has been universally applied as to the two-thirds vote essential to pass a bill over a veto. In passing from the subject, however, we again direct attention to the fact that, in both cases, the continued application of the rule was the result of no mere formal following of what had gone before, but came from conviction expressed, after deliberation, as to its correctness by many illustrious men.
in the state courts of last resort the question has arisen and been passed upon, resulting in every case in the recognition of the principle that, in the absence of an express command to the contrary, the two-thirds vote of the house required to pass a bill over a veto is the two-thirds of a quorum of the body as empowered to perform other legislative duties. Warehouse v. McIntoch, 1 Ala.App. 407; State v. McBride, 4 Mo. 303; Southworth v. Railroad, 2 Mich. 287; Smith v. Jennings, 67 S.C. 324; Green v. Weller, 32 Miss. 650. We say that the decisions have been without difference, for the insistence that the ruling in Minnesota ex rel. Eastland v. Gould, 31 Minn. 189, is to the contrary is a wholly mistaken one, since the decision in that case was that, as the state constitution required a vote of the majority of all the members elected to the house to pass a law, the two-thirds vote necessary to override a veto was a two-thirds vote of the same body.

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