Source: https://caselaw.findlaw.com/ga-court-of-appeals/1661959.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 01:15:36+00:00

Document:
Rebecca Torres Kozycki, Jeffrey Robert Filipovits, for Michael W. Jones. Barry William Hixson, Jessica K. Moss for, The State.
In January 2013, a jury found Michael Jones guilty of driving under the influence of alcohol with an unlawful blood alcohol concentration (“DUI per se”),1 driving under the influence of alcohol to the extent it was less safe for him to drive (“DUI less safe”),2 and speeding. For sentencing purposes, the trial court merged the DUI less safe count into the DUI per se count, and sentenced Jones for DUI per se and speeding. After his convictions were entered, Jones moved for a new trial, which the trial court denied.
On appeal, Jones contends that the trial court erred by admitting evidence of a prior (2005) conviction for driving under the influence of alcohol, pursuant to OCGA § 24–4–404(b), because the prior conviction evidence was not relevant to, or probative of, any issue at trial aside from his character. Jones further contends that even if the prior conviction evidence had some relevance and was admissible under OCGA § 24–4–404(b), it should have been excluded under OCGA § 24–4–403, because its unfair prejudicial effect substantially outweighed its probative value. Because evidence of the prior conviction was improperly admitted, we reverse the conviction for DUI per se, and vacate the guilty verdict on the DUI less safe count; because the evidence meets the standard of Jackson v. Virginia,3 the case may be retried on the DUI counts. Because evidence of the prior conviction would have had no impact on the speeding offense, we affirm the conviction for speeding.
The evidence at trial showed the following. At about 11:45 p. m., on January 21, 2011, Jones was stopped by a police officer for driving in excess of the posted speed limit. The officer noticed that Jones's eyes were red and watery, and that an odor of an alcoholic beverage was coming from inside the vehicle. Jones, the sole occupant of the vehicle, denied that he had been drinking. At the officer's request, Jones exited his vehicle; at that point, the officer identified the source of the odor of alcohol as Jones's breath. Still, Jones denied that he had been drinking. Jones showed clues of impairment on each of three field sobriety evaluations the officer administered, and Jones ultimately admitted that earlier that day he had drunk two beers at a bar. The officer formed the opinion that Jones was a less safe driver, and arrested him. Jones was read implied consent warnings, and he consented to state-administered chemical testing of his breath. Jones registered blood alcohol levels of 0.147 and 0.139, in sequential breath samples administered on an Intoxilyzer 5000.
probative of the fact that he's aware of what [drinking alcohol] did to him the first time and this is what it did to him the second time. We're talking about less safe. We're not talking about limits․ [F]orget about the levels. We're talking about what the substance did to him, within his knowledge․ [H]e knows, better than anybody does, what alcohol does to him this time.
Therefore, at trial, the state adduced evidence that in March 2005, Jones drove a vehicle when he was under the influence of alcohol to the extent that it was less safe for him to do so, and with an unlawful blood alcohol concentration. On that prior occasion, Jones was stopped by a police officer for, inter alia, failing to maintain his lane of traffic and following too closely. The officer testified that he had smelled a strong odor of an alcoholic beverage coming from Jones and observed that Jones's eyes were bloodshot and glassy and that his speech was slurred. The officer testified that Jones admitted to him that he had drunk “a few” beers, later stating that he had drunk about four “adult beverages.” Jones showed clues of impairment on field sobriety tests. The officer formed the opinion that Jones was less safe to drive and arrested him for driving under the influence. Jones was read implied consent warnings, and consented to chemical testing of his breath. Jones registered blood alcohol levels of 0.195 and 0.199 in two sequential breath samples administered on an Intoxilyzer 5000.
1. Jones contends that the trial court erred by admitting evidence of his prior DUI conviction to prove that he had the requisite intent and knowledge to violate OCGA § 40–6–391(a)(1) and OCGA § 40–6–391(a)(5), because the prior conviction evidence was not relevant to, or probative of, any issue at trial aside from his character.
Citing United States v. Delgado,28 the state asserts: “When a defendant enters a plea of ‘not guilty,’ he makes intent a material issue, imposing on the prosecution a substantial burden to prove his intent. The prosecution may meet this burden with qualifying Rule 404(b) evidence.” But what the Eleventh Circuit court actually said in Delgado was: “A defendant who enters a not guilty plea makes intent a material issue, imposing a substantial burden on the government to prove intent; the government may meet this burden with qualifying 404(b) evidence absent affirmative steps by the defendant to remove intent as an issue.”29 In Delgado and the case upon which it relies for this proposition, the indicted activity involved specific intent crimes,30 not, as discussed above, the general type of intent required to commit the strict liability traffic offense in this case.
2. Because of our holding in Division 1,39 we need not address Jones's alternative argument that evidence of the prior DUI conviction should have been excluded because its unfair prejudicial effect substantially outweighed its probative value.
Judgment affirmed in part, reversed in part, and vacated in part.
ELLINGTON, P. J., and BRANCH, J., concur.

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