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Timestamp: 2019-04-19 21:10:01+00:00

Document:
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF HARFORD COUNTY, Defendant.
James K. Bredar, Chief Judge.
Kourtney Hamel (“Plaintiff”) filed suit against her former employer, the Board of Education of Harford County (“Defendant”), alleging violations of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794 et seq. (the “Rehabilitation Act”) and Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. (the “ADA”). Now pending before the Court is Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 31), seeking judgment as a matter of law as to Plaintiff's hostile-work-environment and failure-to-accommodate claims under the ADA and Rehabilitation Act. The issues have been briefed (ECF Nos. 31-1, 33, & 39), and no hearing is required, Local Rule 105.6 (D. Md. 2016). For the reasons explained below, Defendant's motion will be granted.
Plaintiff was initially quite happy with her employment conditions, however, that changed in the fall of 2010 with the appointment of Peter Carpenter, Ph.D., as Principal of EES. Notably, Plaintiff was not the only teacher at EES who felt that the school environment changed for the worse under Dr. Carpenter's tenure. Indeed, a number of her colleagues testified that Dr. Carpenter and Ms. Vohs, the Assistant Principal, created a cliquey environment in which certain teachers were treated more favorably than others. That said, Plaintiff and at least some of her colleagues believe that she was more disfavored by the administration than others and that she was specifically targeted because of her disability. (See Phillips Dep., ECF No. 33-1, at 160-61; Spector Dep., id. at 171-72; Elliott Dep., id. at 33-34.) She also contends that Defendant failed to grant her reasonable accommodations that would have allowed her to continue to work as a teacher.
Plaintiff contends that Dr. Carpenter-almost from the moment he arrived at EES- embarked on a sustained campaign of harassment targeted at her because of her physical disability. Dr. Carpenter (and Ms. Vohs) allegedly harassed Plaintiff by: excessively supervising her activities at school, making unsolicited inquiries into her medical condition, treating her rudely, changing school policies in a manner targeted to impede Plaintiff's work, designing school activities so as to exclude Plaintiff, and relocating Plaintiff's classroom on multiple occasions.
Another representative of Defendant also inquired into Plaintiff's health and asked if she needed any accommodations. This inquiry was triggered by an incident in which Plaintiff was injured at work. On May 24, 2012, Plaintiff suffered an injury to her shoulder and leg when a chair she was sitting on collapsed. (Vohs Aff., ECF No. 31-2, at 152-53; Supervisor's Accident Investigation Report, ECF No. 33-2, at 2; Vohs Dep. Tr., ECF No. 31-2, at 210.) The next day Plaintiff reported the incident to Ms. Vohs, who completed an Accident Investigation Report. (Id.) In the course of completing the report, Ms. Vohs asked Plaintiff if she had any preexisting conditions, and Plaintiff responded that she was “hypermobile.” (Vohs Dep. Tr., ECF No. 31-2, at 213.) Ms. Vohs later met with Dr. Carpenter regarding the incident and, at the direction of the Board's Risk Management Department, they amended the form to mark Plaintiff's preexisting condition as “Ellers”-a misspelling of Ehlers-Danlos Syndrome. (Id. at 213-14; ECF No. 33-2, at 2.) Shortly after Plaintiff's injury, Dr. Carpenter submitted a “Request for Fitness for Duty Examination” regarding Plaintiff to Kathy Dehoff, Defendant's Medical Case Manager. As grounds for the request, Dr. Carpenter noted that Plaintiff had a degenerative condition that affected her mobility and that he was concerned about her ability to safely evacuate students in an emergency. (Request for “Fitness for Duty” Examination, ECF No. 31-2, at 138-40; Carpenter Aff., id. at 130.) Ms. Dehoff denied the request; however, she and Dr. Carpenter continued to communicate privately about Plaintiff's health and, in particular, whether her condition posed a safety risk should she need to help evacuate students in an emergency. (Emails between Kathy DeHoff and Peter Carpenter, ECF No. 33-2, at 13-19.) Plaintiff was not aware of these communications.
As described supra, Defendant and its employees asked Plaintiff on multiple occasions if she needed any accommodations. Each time, Plaintiff rebuffed them and insisted that she could fully perform her job without any assistance. Despite this history, Plaintiff did eventually ask for several accommodations from Defendant.
On August 28, 2013, Dr. Carpenter held a meeting with teachers to announce a new initiative for teachers to volunteer to meet students at the local library and walk them to school in the morning. (Carpenter Dep. Tr., ECF No. 31-2, at 226.) Deborah Elliot, another member of Plaintiff's team, commented that Plaintiff would need a wheelchair to participate. (Hamel Dep. Tr., ECF No. 33-1, at 96.) Plaintiff was embarrassed and upset by the comment and left the meeting crying. (Carpenter Aff., ECF No. 32-1, at 132.) Plaintiff refused to speak to any of her colleagues and instead waited for her father to pick her up. (Id.) Plaintiff did not return to EES after this incident. She took a series of paid and unpaid leaves and eventually entered disability retirement on January 31, 2015.
A party seeking summary judgment must show “that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact” and that it is “entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). The burden is on the moving party to demonstrate the absence of any genuine dispute of material fact. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970). If a party carries this burden, then the court will award summary judgment unless the opposing party can identify specific facts, beyond the allegations or denials in the pleadings, that show a genuine issue for trial. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)(2). If sufficient evidence exists for a reasonable jury to render a verdict in favor of the party opposing the motion, then a genuine dispute of material fact is presented and summary judgment should be denied. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). However, the “mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the [opposing party's] position” is insufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment. Id. at 252. To carry these respective burdens, each party must support its assertions by citing specific evidence from the record. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1)(A). The court will assess the merits of the motion, and any responses, viewing all facts and reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378 (2007); Iko v. Shreve, 535 F.3d 225, 230 (4th Cir. 2008).

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