Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/23/204/
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 09:48:09+00:00

Document:
The principal question arising in this case is what estate Mary, the wife of James Page, took under his will -- whether an estate for life or in fee. If the former, then the judgment of the circuit court is to be affirmed; if the latter, then it is to be reversed.
that the testator intends the legacies to be a charge on the land. When, therefore, the testator orders legacies to be paid out of his lands, or where, subject to legacies or after payment of legacies, he devises his lands, courts have held the land charged with the legacies upon the manifest intention of the testator. But here there is no such language. There is no direction that the devisee shall pay the legacies out of the land. The charge is personal, and the case falls directly within the authority of Reeves v. Gower, 11 Mod. 208.
We may, then, proceed to the consideration of the will of James Page, inasmuch as that of his father affords no light to guide us in the construction. The grounds mainly relied on to establish that Mary, the wife of the testator, took a fee are that the legacies given to his sisters are a charge on his real estate in the hands of his widow; that all the rest of his "lands and tenements," in possession, reversion, or remainder, are given; that the devise is subject to the proviso "that she has no lawful issue," which is not a condition merely, but a substitution for an estate intended for his children; and finally that the lands, &c., are devised to her "freely to be possessed and enjoyed," which words are best satisfied upon the supposition of a fee.
estate for life only unless, from the language there used or from other parts of the will, there is a plain intention to give a larger estate. We say a plain intention because if it be doubtful or conjectural upon the terms of the will or if full legal effect can be given to the language without such an estate, the general rule prevails. It is not sufficient that the court may entertain a private belief that the testator intended a fee; it must see that he has expressed that intention with reasonable certainty on the face of his will. For the law will not suffer the heir to be disinherited upon conjecture. He is favored by its policy, and though the testator may disinherit him, yet the law will execute that intention only when it is put in a clear and unambiguous shape.
hold of the introductory clause to assist them in ascertaining the intention. The case of Hogan v. Jackson, Cowper 297, admits this doctrine. That case itself did not turn upon the effect of the introductory clause, but upon the other words of the will, which were thought sufficient to carry the fee, particularly the words, "all my effects, both real and personal." The case of Grayson v. Atkinson, 1 Wils. 333, admits of the same explanation, and besides the inheritance was there charged with debts and legacies.
real estate, there could be no residue of real estate on which the clause could operate.
enlarge the estate of the wife to a fee, since they are not made a personal charge upon her.
"All the rest, residue and remainder of my messuages, lands, &c., after my just debts, legacies, &c., are fully satisfied and paid I give to my executors in trust for my daughters,"
and the question was whether these words passed an estate in fee or for life to the executors. The court decided that they passed a life estate only. The authority of this case was fully established in Moor v. Denn, ex dem. Mellor, 2 Bos. & Pull. 247, in the House of Lords, where words equally extensive occurred, and the authority of this last case has never been broken in upon.
so that the words naturally and properly had relation to the quantity of estate which the testator intended to give J.C. -- that is, all the remainder, which is the same in effect as all his estate. If the words were merely to be referred to the lands he intended to devise to J.C., they would be ineffectual, for it was impossible that he could have any remainder of lands when he had devised all to A.C., so that they must refer to the estate in the lands.
personal estate for payment of debts and legacies; and then the will says, as to the rest "of my goods and chattels, real and personal, moveable and immoveable, as houses, gardens, tenements, my share in the copperas works, &c., I give to the said A." Lord Hardwicke, after some hesitation, held it a fee in A., relying upon the introductory clause, and the charge of the debts and legacies on the land, and upon the language of the residuary clause. Whatever may be the authority of this decision, it certainly does not pretend to rest solely on the residuary clause, and its containing a mixed devise of real and personal estate was not insignificant in ascertaining the testator's intention.
It may also be admitted that the words "lands and tenements" do sometimes carry a fee, and are not confined to a mere local description of the property. But in their ordinary sense, they import the latter only, and when a more extensive signification is given to them in wills, it arises from the context, and is justified by the apparent intention of the testator to use them in such extensive signification. The cases cited at the bar reach to this extent and no further. Their authority is not denied, but their application to the present case is not admitted.
devisee, will, if there be no words of limitation, take only a life estate.
somewhat clash with its authority. In Peiton v. Banks, 1 Vern. 65, the case was that a man devised his lands to his wife for life, and he gave the reversion to A. and B., to be equally divided betwixt them. The court decided that A. and B. took an estate as tenants in common for life only. And Sergeant Maynard stated a similar decision to have been made about twenty years before that time. It is not material, however, to enter upon the delicate inquiry which of these authorities is entitled to most weight, because the present case does not require it.
In respect to the word "tenements," it is only necessary to observe that is has never been construed in a will, independently of other circumstances, to pass a fee. In Canning v. Canning, Moseley 240, and Doe ex dem. Palmer, v. Richards, 3 D. & E. 356, and Denn ex dem. Moor v. Miller, 5 D. & E. 558, S.C. 2 Bos. & Pull. 247, the same term occurred, as well as the broader expression, "hereditaments;" in neither case was the term "tenement" supposed to have any peculiar effect, and the argument attempting to establish a fee upon the import of the word "hereditaments" even in a residuary clause was deliberately overruled by the court. The same doctrine was held in Hopwell v. Ackland, Salk. 239.
annexed to them. It is our duty to give effect to all the words of a will if by the rules of law it can be done. And where words occur in a will, their plain and ordinary sense is to be attached to them unless the testator manifestly applies them in some other sense. But if words are used by him which are insensible in the place where they occur, or their common meaning is deserted and no other is furnished by the will, courts are driven to the necessity of deeming them as merely insignificant or surplusage, and to find the true interpretation of the will without them. In the present case, the words, "all the rest of my lands and tenements" stand wholly disconnected with any preceding clause. There is nothing to which "the rest" has relation, for no other devise of real estate is made. We have no certain guide to the testator's intention in using them. We may indulge conjectures, but the law does not decide upon conjectures, but upon plain, reasonable, and certain expressions of intention found on the face of the will.
to defeat a life estate, as a fee in the whole of the lands. The testator, with a limited property, might justly think it too much to take from his own issue the substance of their inheritance during a long minority in favor of a wife, who might live many years and form new connections. In such an event, leaving her to the general provision of law as to dower would not be unkindness or injustice. But it is sufficient to say that the words are too equivocal to enable the court to ascertain from them the clear purpose of establishing a fee. And if the proviso refers to any lawful issue by any other husband, then it must be deemed a condition subsequent, and in the events which have happened, the estate of the wife, whether it be for life or in fee, has been defeated, and the plaintiffs in error are not entitled to reverse the present judgment. Quacunque via data est, the proviso cannot help the case.
"As touching such worldly estate wherewith it hath pleased God to bless me in this life, I give, . . . in the following manner and form:"
"First of all, I give and bequeath to E.M., my dearly beloved wife, the sum of five pounds, to be paid yearly out of my estate, called G., and also one part of the dwelling house, being the west side, with as much wood craft, home at her, as she shall have need of, by my executors hereafter named. I give . . . unto my son T.M. the sum of five pounds, to be paid in twelve months after my decease. I give unto my granddaughter E. the sum of five pounds, to be paid twelve months after my decease."
"Item. I give unto J.M., and R.M., my two sons, whom I make my and ordain my sole executors, . . . all and singular my lands and messuages, by them freely to be possessed and enjoyed alike."
"I give and bequeath to my brother T.D., a cottage house, and all belonging to it, to him and his heirs forever, W.C. tenant. Also, I give and bequeath to my wife E., whom I likewise make my sole executrix, all and singular my lands, messuages, and tenements, by her freely to be possessed and enjoyed."
encumbered the estate, the words must have meant to pass a fee, or they would have no meaning at all. Mr. Justice Le Blanc added that the words used were not inconsistent with a life estate only, and he distinguished between them and the words "freely to be disposed of," admitting that the latter would pass a fee. So that, taking both these cases together, the fair deduction is that the words "freely to be possessed," &c., are too uncertain of themselves to raise a fee, but they may be aided by other circumstances.
The case before us is far less strong than either of the foregoing cases, for there is no introductory clause showing an intention to dispose of the whole property, as there was both in Goodright v. Barron and Loveacres v. Blight, nor is there any encumbrance created by the testator on the land, which was the decisive circumstance that governed the latter.
Upon the whole, upon the most careful examination, we cannot find a sufficient warrant in the words of this will to pass a fee to the wife. The testator may have intended it, and probably did, but the intention cannot be extracted from his words with reasonable certainty, and we have no right to indulge ourselves in mere private conjectures.
See Roe ex dem. Peter v. Day, 3 M. & S. 518; 5 East 87; 4 East 495.
See Lord Hardwicke's comments on this case in Bailis v. Gale, 2 Vesey 48.

References: v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v.