Source: https://freedomhouse.org/print/50269
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 22:40:25+00:00

Document:
Civil Society rating declined from 6.50 to 6.75 due to ongoing routine harassment and persecution of activists, journalists, lawyers, individual users of social networks, and religious communities against the backdrop of increasingly restrictive legislation and administrative pressure on civil society, which manifested itself in fines against two human rights NGOs and the liquidation of the Confederation of Trade Unions in 2017.
Judicial Framework and Independence rating declined from 6.50 to 6.75 due to recent changes that create the legal possibility of stripping citizenship for a broadly formulated range of crimes, leaving space for potential arbitrary prosecution of dissent. The right to a nationality is a fundamental human right and deprivation of citizenship should not be available in a judicial system unless double citizenship is recognized.
As a result, Kazakhstan’s Democracy Score declined from 6.64 to 6.71.
In practice, the reform will not affect the current political structure as long as Nazarbayev is in power. But in the context of weak institutions and informal inter-elite decision making, they could be instrumental in ensuring a smooth transition that does not allow for the appearance of outsiders, and envisions greater collegiality of rule, guaranteeing continuity and the “evolutionary” development of the established political model.
In 2017, the remnants of an independent civic sector and press continued to feel the aftershocks of a turbulent 2016, which saw two major violent attacks on law enforcement and a heavy-handed crackdown on Kazakhstan’s largest public protest movement. The government continued to prosecute journalists and activists, as well as individual users of social networks, on charges of “inciting social and ethnic discord,” “libel,” “knowingly false denunciations,” “infringing the procedure for the conduct of assemblies, meetings, street marches and demonstrations,”5 as well as financial crimes. Several amendments to legislation have been adopted or are currently being developed with a view to tightening control over society, often on the grounds of counteracting radicalization and violent extremism. The amendments introduce new or reinforce existing restrictions on freedoms of association, speech, assembly, and religion.
Assuming Nazarbayev stays in good health in 2018, nothing indicates cardinal changes in the political structure or how Kazakhstan is governed. The recent constitutional reforms only reiterate the regime’s intentions to control every aspect of political life and the eventually inevitable transition of power. In the meantime, the regime will remain vulnerable and thus especially sensitive to any manifestation of dissent. In this context, the authorities are likely to continue cracking down on the perceived threat from the surviving political opposition, civil society activists, and journalists, and further tighten control over religion and social networks. These measures will be complemented by a reinforced state propaganda of “stability first” and major spending to create the desired image of Nazarbayev’s legacy.
In another change affecting the electoral process, the constitutional reform authorized the legislature to define the procedure for appointing or electing the city, district and rural akims, as well as for dismissing them from office.41Previously, the procedure was regulated by a decree of the president.
In 2017, four electoral campaigns were held in Kazakhstan: two by-elections to maslikhats (local representative bodies) were held in March and October, elections to the Senate were conducted in June, and there were indirect elections of akims of rural districts within the framework of the mechanism of local self-government in August.42 All of the campaigns went unnoticed by large parts of the population and lacked genuine competition. In the only four districts that published figures on the elections of rural akims, 70 percent of the winning candidates received 100 percent of votes.43 That is not surprising given that all candidates were nominated by a governor and elected by the local maslikhats.
The government, previously the exclusive domain of the president, acquired a measure accountability to the parliament under the new constitution: the parliament is now consulted on the composition of the government and is empowered to dismiss government members. Moreover, the government is to resign its powers to the Majilis, the lower chamber of parliament, rather than to the president.13 The reforms also require the president to consult with the Majilis prior to appointing and dismissing the cabinet (except for the ministers of defense and foreign affairs).14 Nevertheless, the president preserves considerable influence over the executive branch, having kept the right to terminate the powers of the government, dismiss the prime minister and any other member of the government, as well as to accept or decline the resignation of the government in the event of a parliamentary motion of no confidence.
The reform limits the previously omnipotent lawmaking powers of the president, such as the right to issue decrees with the force of law and the possibility to assume legislative powers of the parliament for up to a year. Likewise, the president no longer has the power to instruct the government to prepare and submit draft laws to the parliament, as well as the power to revoke or suspend the acts of the government and the prime minister.15 On the other hand, the president retains the right of legislative initiative, still unavailable to the parliament, whose role is confined to considering the proposals of the government.
The constitutional reform further cemented the position of Nazarbayev personally by including “the fundamental principles […] laid down by the Founder of independent Kazakhstan, the First President of the Republic of Kazakhstan - Yelbasy, and his status”16 into the list of constitutional values, which cannot be changed even through constitutional amendments.
The reforms, rather than enhancing the system of checks and balances over the current regime, look more like half-hearted measures for reducing vulnerabilities of the transition to a post-Nazarbayev era, as well as for distancing Nazarbayev from “unpopular” anti-crisis policies that might tarnish the legacy of the Founder of the Nation. The reforms should provide continuity to the system put in place by Nazarbayev, excluding unexpected elements of the transition by imposing restrictions on who can stand for president and ensuring greater collegiality of the decision-making process.
Although Kazakhstan’s constitution guarantees the separation of powers and independence of the judiciary, de facto, the executive dominates the judicial branch. The president forms a considerable part of the judiciary, namely by appointing chairpersons and judges of local and other courts; with his consent, the Senate elects the supreme body of the judicial branch of power – the Supreme Court. The pervasive corruption of the courts, and the ruling elites’ control over them, results in low public expectations and trust in the justice system.
The changes introduced under the Article 10 are particularly concerning. These amendments allow courts to deprive Kazakhstani citizens of their citizenship for terrorism offences and “other serious damage to the vital interests of the Republic of Kazakhstan”. The reform raises serious concerns, as it contradicts the inalienable right of every person to citizenship.104 Moreover, given the justice system’s dependence upon political pressure, the potentially broad interpretations of terms like “terrorism” and “vital interests” may arm the state with yet another repressive instrument in its fight against political dissent.
Torture is still widespread in Kazakhstan. According to official information, every year there are about 700 new registered complaints of “unlawful methods of investigation and violence against detainees and prisoners.”105 According to Kadyr Kassiyet, a prominent human rights NGO, torture-related complaints often stay unregistered or unreported due to “risks and restrictions on the right to file complaints, […] lack of an independent complaint mechanism, and guarantees of non-repetition of torture,” and only a small number of cases reach the court.106 In 2017, torture allegedly was used during some of the year’s most notorious cases: those of Zhanbolat Mamay,107 Seitkazy Matayev,108Vadim Kuramshin,109 Iskander Yerimbetov,110 and Muratkhan Tokmadi.111 Two of the defendants later publicly withdrew their own complaints, and no investigations of the allegations followed.
National strategic documents, such as Kazakhstan-2050, the Strategic Development Plan until 2020, and the Nation's Plan “100 concrete steps”, give the fight against corruption the highest priority. In February, in his annual address to the nation, President Nazarbayev listed “rooting out corruption” as one of the five priorities of the country’s “third modernization” strategy.123 In 2017, Kazakhstan continued to implement the Anticorruption Strategy for 2015-2025, which is designed to facilitate “transition from combating consequences to the systematic prevention of corruption.”124 Despite extensive anticorruption legislation and much government emphasis on the issue, petty corruption, nepotism, patronage, and state capture are endemic.
Author: Malika Tukmadiyeva is an independent researcher. She holds an MA in Politics and Security in Central Asia from the OSCE Academy in Bishkek and an MA in Global and European Security from the Geneva Center for Security Policy/the University of Geneva. Malika has several years of working experience in the civil society and research sectors. She was a research intern for the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI) and a Visiting Research Fellow at the George Washington University.
1 Constitution of the Republic of Kazakhstan, Art. 91, Par. 2.
10 Nurlan Onzhanov, "Уверенный курс Лидера нации" [Confident course of the Leader of the nation], Kazakhstanskaya Pravda, 8 December 2015, www.kazpravda.kz/fresh/view/uverennii-kurs-lidera-natsii/.
11 Catherine Putz, “Are Political Reforms Afoot in Kazakhstan?”, The Diplomat, 27 January 2017, https://thediplomat.com/2017/01/are-political-reforms-afoot-in-kazakhstan/.
12 Catherine Putz, “Are Political Reforms Afoot in Kazakhstan?”, The Diplomat, 27 January 2017, https://thediplomat.com/2017/01/are-political-reforms-afoot-in-kazakhstan/.
32 "Центральная избирательная комиссия установила итоги внеочередных выборов депутатов Мажилиса Парламента Республики Казахстан" [The Central Election Commission has established the results of the early elections of deputies of the Majilis of the Parliament of the Republic of Kazakhstan], The Central Election Commission, Press Release, 22 March 2016, https://www.election.gov.kz/rus/news/releases/index.php?ID=3291.
34The Constitutional Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan "On the Parliament of the Republic of Kazakhstan and the Status of Its Deputies", Art. 4, Par. 4, Zakon.kz, https://online.zakon.kz/m/document/?doc_id=1003961.
35 The Constitutional Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan “On elections in the Republic of Kazakhstan", Art. 55, Zakon.kz, https://online.zakon.kz/document/?doc_id=1004029#pos=0;0.
37 Andrey Osavolyuk, et. al., "История оппозиционного движения «Демократический выбор Казахстана»" [The history of the opposition movement "Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan"], Open Dialogue Foundation, 29 January 2016, ru.odfoundation.eu/a/7249,istoriya-oppozicionnogo-dvizheniya-demokraticheskiy-vybor-kazahstana.
38 “Главой государства подписан Конституционный закон РК «О внесении изменений и дополнений в некоторые Конституционные законы Республики Казахстан», [The Head of the State signed the Constitutional Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan "On Amendments and Additions to Some Constitutional Laws of the Republic of Kazakhstan"], Central Election Committee of the Republic of Kazakhstan, 14 July 2017, https://www.election.gov.kz/rus/news/releases/index.php?ID=4014.
39 Askhat Rakhimjanov, “Дискриминация законом” [Discrimination by law], National Social Democratic Party, 3 June 2017, http://www.osdp.info/diskriminacija-zakonom/.
40 Askhat Rakhimjanov, “Дискриминация законом” [Discrimination by law], National Social Democratic Party, 3 June 2017, http://www.osdp.info/diskriminacija-zakonom/.
43 “Завершились выборы сельских акимов” [The elections of rural akims completed], Public Association "ECHO", 25 August 2017, http://www.echo.kz/35-zavershilis-vybory-selskikh-akimov.html.
44 “Центральная избирательная комиссия подвела итоги выборов депутатов Сената Парламента Республики Казахстан” [The Central Elections Commission summed up the election of deputies of the Senate of the Parliament of the Republic of Kazakhstan], The Central Elections Commission of the Republic of Kazakhstan, 29 June 2017, https://www.election.gov.kz/rus/news/releases/index.php?ID=3970.
73 "Парламент принял закон в пользу коррупционеров" [Parliament passed a law in favor of corrupt officials], Adil Soz, 21 December 2017, http://www.adilsoz.kz/news/show/id/2535.
74 “Cтатистика нарушений права на свободу выражения в Казахстане за январь-декабрь 2017 года” [Statistics on violations of the right to freedom of expression in Kazakhstan January-December 2017], Adil Soz, 21 January 2018, http://www.adilsoz.kz/politcor/show/id/223.
75 “Cтатистика нарушений права на свободу выражения в Казахстане за январь-декабрь 2017 года” [Statistics on violations of the right to freedom of expression in Kazakhstan January-December 2017], Adil Soz, 21 January 2018, http://www.adilsoz.kz/politcor/show/id/223.
80 “Amnesty International Report 2016/17: The State of Human Rights”, 22 February 2017, http://www.refworld.org/docid/58b033e8a.html and Gaziza Baituova, Vasilina Atoyanz-Larina, "Казахстан ужесточает контроль за интернетом" [Kazakhstan tightens control over the Internet], IWPR Central Asia, 15 February 2016, https://iwpr.net/ru/global-voices/казахстан-ужесточает-контроль-за-интернетом.
98 “Kazakhstan. Country Profile”, Participatry Local Democracy, https://localdemocracy.net/countries/asia-west/kazakhstan/.
104 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Art. 15, Sec. 2.
111 Igor Savchenko, “The Report: The case of Muratkhan Tokmadi”, Open Dialog Foundation, 10 August 2017, http://ru.odfoundation.eu/a/8262,otchet-delo-murathana-tokmadi.
112 ICCPR Case Digest, Vladislav Chelakh v. Kazakhstan, Communication 2645/2015, Submission: 2 February 2015, Center for Civil and Political Rights, ccprcentre.org/decision/16826.
113 ICCPR Case Digest, Dmitry Tyan v. Kazakhstan, Communication 2125/2011, Submission: 1 April 2011, Center for Civil and Political Rights, http://ccprcentre.org/decision/16731.
114 ICCPR Case Digest, Dmitry Tyan v. Kazakhstan, Communication 2125/2011, Submission: 1 April 2011, Center for Civil and Political Rights, http://ccprcentre.org/decision/16731.
115 ICCPR Case Digest, Zhaslan Suleimenov v. Kazakhstan, Communication 2146/2012, Submission: 14 January 2011, Center for Civil and Political Rights, http://ccprcentre.org/decision/16734.
116 ICCPR Case Digest, Andrei Sviridov v. Kazakhstan, Communication 2158/2012, Submission: 23 February 2012, Center for Civil and Political Rights, http://ccprcentre.org/decision/16764 .

References: in fine
 Art. 91
 Art. 4
 Art. 55
 Art. 15
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