Source: http://www.flp.org.fj/judgement-against-vice-president-and-others/
Timestamp: 2019-04-26 05:46:24+00:00

Document:
The prosecution have now closed their case. The accused persons submit there is no case for them to answer, and counsel have made several legal submissions on the law. This is an opportune time to deal with them, and then to rule on Section 293 of the Criminal Procedure Code.
There is an additional element of “not being compelled to do so” which the prosecution says is a negative averment, but which the defence says, is just another element to be proved by the prosecution, the evidential basis for which must be raised by the defence.
The charges against all accused persons are in identical terms. They say that each accused person, on the 20th of May 2000 at Veiuto in Suva, not being a person compelled to do so, took an engagement in the nature of an oath purporting to bind the said accused to commit and offence namely treason.
It follows that such acts would constitute treason in Fiji.
There appears to be no dispute as to the definition of treason. The real dispute at this stage of the trial is as to the meaning of the words “purporting to bind the accused” and as to whether these words refer to a mens rea of specific intent, that is of an intent to bind oneself to commit treason. The other area of dispute is as to the scope of the defence of compulsion in this case.
As for the submissions made as to sufficiency of evidence beyond reasonable doubt, they are submissions properly made to the assessors.
Counsel for the 4th accused submitted also that there was no evidence to go before the assessors of “an engagement in the nature of an oath” because the entire ceremony was illegal and non-binding, the 4th accused had not been appointed as a Minister properly under the Constitution, and the “oaths” could not have been binding. If he means that there is no evidence that engagements were taken in the nature of an oath, then I cannot agree. The words used in the oath ceremony closely resemble the Constitutional oaths and the offence requires proof of the taking of an engagement in the nature of an oath. The lawfulness of the oath or the legal correctness of it is not relevant and it is not open to the defence to suggest to the assessors that because the Speight government was illegal per see, then no one can be prosecuted or convicted [for] agreeing to take an engagement in it. There is evidence to put before the assessors that words which appeared to be an oath, relating to engagements in the illegal government, were read by each accused person. The question of whether the words of the oaths themselves in the context of the events at Parliament, appeared to bind the accused is relevant however, to the next element of the offence, the “purporting”.
He referred me to the case of Steane v. R (1947) to suggest that the prosection should prove a specific intent to be bound to commit treason. However the offence carged in that case included a specific definition of an intent to assist the enemy, and the court held that it is not enough for the prosecution to rely on a general presumption of intent as to the natural consequences of one’s act. That case cannot assist in this trial, because there is no reference in section 5(b) of the Public Order Act to an intent to be bound to commit treason.
The other defence counsel submit that the word “purporting” means “intending”. Mr. Singh and Mr. Raza referred me to He Kaw The v. The Queen (1985) 157 CLR, Proudman v. Dayman (1941) 67 CLR 536 and Hawthorne v. Morcam Pty. Ltd. 29 NSWR 120 and submitted that some proof of an intention to bind oneself to treason was necessary. In particular they relied on these cases to say that an honest and reasonable mistake of fact was available to all charges whether or not the statute specifically provided for mens rea. I accept these submissions, and the dicta in all the cases cited. I do not consider the offences charged in this case to be offences of strict or absolute liability and I consider that the prosecution must prove that the accused intentionally took alleged. Further, the prosecution must prove that the oaths taken, purported to bind each accused to commit treason.
The case of “Trial of William Edgar” (1817) ER 145 concerns a trial on charges of taking oaths or engagements purporting or intending to bind the person taking the oaths to commit treason. The report contains extensive definitions of the word “purporting” but since they all appear in counsels’ speeches, they are not as helpful as they might be. The indictment was subsequently overtaken by another indictment for other offences. However, in respect of the first indictment, counsel at least appeared to agree that the word “purporting” referred not to the mind of the defendant, but to the words of the oaths taken and to the apparent meaning of the words. That construction is consistent with the dictionary meanings of the word.
I consider therefore, that the word “purport” refers to the apparent, or stated meaning of the oaths themselves. The intention of the accused is relevant only to the act of the taking of the engagements in the nature of the oath. Thus if the accused did not take the ceremony seriously, or they thought it was a joke, as Mr. Sharma says in his submissions filed today, he can be said to be disputing the taking of the engagement. The question of the purported meaning of the engagements in the nature of the oath, is for the assessors to consider on an objective test. The assessors will be asked if they are satisfied be asked if they are satisfied beyond reasonable doubt, that on the ordinary meaning of the words of the oath taken, the accused persons were undertaking or promising to commit acts of treason. It is irrelevant that the accused did not intend that the taking of the engagements would be committing him to treason. What is relevant is that he intentionally took an engagement in the nature of an oath which appears from the words of the oath itself, to bind him to commit treason.
As to whether the purported effect of the words of the oaths had this effect, is a question of fact for the assessors, having been directed as to the legal definition of treason, in the context of the armed takeover of Parliament, and in the light of all the evidence led.
The Prosecution agree that despite the statutory limitation or the availability of compulsion under section 7 of the Public Order Act, the defence should be allowed to be put it before the assessors provided the evidential basis for the defence has been laid by the defence to prove compulsion on a balance of probabilities.
Counsel for the defence agree that the defence should raise the issue, but say that it is for the prosecution to disprove compulsion.
The words “not being compelled to do so” clearly create a negative averment.
In R v. Edwards (1975) QB 59 Cr. App. R. 213, the English Court of Appeal held that the burden of proof rested on the defence to prove exceptions, excuses or qualifications, and that both the legal and evidential burden shifted to the defence in such cases. The decision was considered by the House of Lords in R v. Hunt (1987) AC 352. The court held that a “negative averment” can arise either specifically or by necessary implication. In R v. Carr-Briant (1943) KB 607, it was held that the standard of proof in such cases was the standard required in a civil case. It is usually referred to as the “balance of probability” and the jury should be told to consider whether a fact was more probable than not and more likely than not.
In this case, the words “not being compelled to do so” provide for an excuse for the commission of the offence. It is a negative averment and the burden of proving compulsion rests on the defence. It must be proved on a balance of probabilities.
However section 2(a) of the Penal Code provides that the Code does not apply to the trials of persons for offences created by other laws in for in Fiji. Counsel for the State and for the defence submit that the common law definition applies. I agree. In any event it is a definition which is more favourable to the accused.
All counsel agree that the section does not apply. Mr. Sharma submits that there was uncertainty in the nation as to who held authority and that it was neither safe nor practical for the accused to make such a complaint. Mr. Seru submits that the accused did not know they were committing an offence, and therefore that they did not know that they should lay a complaint.
State counsel agrees that the defence of compulsion ought to be put to the assessors, and suggests that because the purpose of section 7 is to ensure disclosure of information against those taking (or taking part in) secret criminal oaths, and because this oath-taking ceremony was conducted in a most public sphere, section 7 had in fact been complied with in spirit.
It is correct that there was no attempt, either at the time or after police investigation commenced, to suppress information about the ceremony itself. Indeed disclosure was effected at the time of the ceremony, simply as a result of the presence of the media. There would have been no purpose in later reporting the matter to the authorities, when the authorities already knew about the ceremony.
Further, as Mr. Sharma submits, there was uncertainty in Fiji, both politically and legally until the High Court decision in Republic of Fiji v. Chandrika Prasad. In the circumstances I consider the accused (the 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, and 6th) ought to have the defence of compulsion considered by the assessors in the circumstances of this case.
“The relevant direction in relation to the objective test for duress should therefore be that the prosecution must establish that there is no reasonable possibility that a person of ordinary firmness of mind and will would have yielded to the threat” [R v. Abusifah (1991) 24 NSWLR 531].
The defence will be put to the assessors in this way, the only other direction being that it is for the defence to prove that duress applies on a balance of probabilities.
In this case the defence allege the former and I have already ruled that the defence of duress can be considered by the assessors. Necessity is not available on the facts of this case.
Mr. A.K. Singh on behalf of all accused submits that the Information, and prosecution are incompetent because there is no evidence that the Public Safety Act had been utilised by the late President, and because the Public Order Act could only come into effect when Public Safety Act Regulations were passed. I cannot agree. The Public Order Act exists separately from the Public Safety Act, and there are a number of provisions in it, which obviously apply at all times, whether or not there is a public emergency. A person committing an offence under section 5(b) of the Public Order Act can be prosecuted for it at any time, and I see no link with the Public Safety Act.
I understand that the Regulations identified by Mr. Brown and tendered by the prosecution, to the evidence of background information only, and in relation to an undisputed matter. That is, that on the 19th of May 2000 Ratu Mara was in office, and attempting to exercise executive authority.
The question for the judge at the end of the prosecution case is whether there is no evidence in relation to each element of the offence. I consider that there is evidence in respect of each element of the offences charged, and that each accused must be put to his defence.

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