Source: http://bc-injury-law.com/blog/2010/08
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 16:43:24+00:00

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Reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Supreme Court, Victoria Registry, interpreting two topics under the New BC Supreme Court Civil Rules, the test of “proportionality” and the circumstances permitting a Court to sever liability (the issue of fault) from quantum (the value of a personal injury claim).
In today’s case (Cayou v. Cayou) the Plaintiff was injured in an intersection collision in 2006. The Plaintiff was the front seat passenger in a vehicle being driven by her daughter. The Plaintiff sued the drivers of both vehicles. ICBC alleged that the Plaintiff was in breach of her policy of insurance and intervened as a statutory Third Party. The Plaintiff’s claim was set for trial in November to be heard by Judge and Jury. The Plaintiff applied for an order seperating quantum from liability seeking to have the issue of fault determined by Judge alone.
 The plaintiff’s application is said to be made pursuant to Rule 1-3 and 12-1(9), of the Rules of Court.
 Rule 1-3 directs the court on the object of the rules, including the notion of “proportionality”.
 Rule 12-1(9) confers upon the court a power to adjourn a trial.
 Although not stated, the plaintiff also, presumably, finds authority for her application in Rule 12-5(67) and (68).
(67) The court may order that one or more questions of fact or law arising in an action be tried and determined before the others.
(68) The court may order that different questions of fact arising in an action be tried by different modes of trial.
 There is a change in the wording between Rule 12-5(67) and the former rule, Rule 39(29).
 I conclude that the power to sever issues is the same in substance between the former rule and the current rule.
 The governing principles established for the exercise of the power conferred under the previous rules have been established. Since I find that the power conferred under the new rule is the same as the old rule, I conclude that the principles defined under the former rule must be considered.
(c) the complexity of the proceeding.
 Expense was the sole factor urged by the plaintiff in support of severance. In the event of a review, however, I will set out my findings on the factors prescribed in the rule.
 First, I take the “amount involved” to mean the quantum of monetary damages awarded to the plaintiff as the result of a successful prosecution of her lawsuit.
 This factor was not argued. But, seemingly, the method of trial currently extant is proportionate to, that is to say, “duly related” to, the amount involved. I find this factor to be neutral.
 Second, the issue of credibility is important to the issue of fault, and, I am told, to the issue of quantum.
 For the reasons given above, for deciding against severance on the ground of interconnected issues, I find that one trial of all issues is proportionate to the expense to be incurred, to conduct one trial.
 Severance, for the economic reasons advanced in this case, by denying the trier of fact all of the evidence on the issue of credibility, would be disproportionate to the twin objectives of a just and speedy determination of the action, on its merits.
 Third, I would not characterize this action as one of complexity.
 Mr. Shumka is probably right. This action arises out of a routine intersection collision, involving a vehicle turning left in the path of an oncoming vehicle, with its attendant personal injuries. In the event, there is nothing on the record to suggest that complexity was a factor contributing to the notion of proportionality.
 No other factors (other than economical) were identified.
 In result, the plaintiff’s application is dismissed. Costs of the application will be in the cause, pursuant to Rule 14-1(12).
Reasons for judgement were released today awarding a Plaintiff damages for post accident migraine headaches.
In today’s case (Ward v. Klaus) the Plaintiff was involved in a rear-end collision in Chilliwack, BC. Fault was admitted by the rear-motorist focusing the trial on the value of the claim.
 In May 2008, the plaintiff consulted Dr. Kumar, a neurosurgeon in Regina, for an assessment on the suitability for neurostimulator implants. She qualified and in September, at Regina Saskatchewan, a neurotransmitter was implanted in the back of her neck. It had two leads and an external remote that connected the wires under her skin. From September to mid-October 2008, she had two more operations in Regina and two more temporary implants were imbedded. In December 2008, two permanent implants were installed in the back of her head in the same area as before. To deal with the pain of the operation, she took more medication.
 In January 2009, the plaintiff had permanent leads installed at the front of her head.
 The implant battery has to be recharged, usually once a week. She keeps it on at all times other than when she is driving. She has a device that plugs into an electrical outlet. It tells her if the battery needs to be recharged. Sometimes it has to charge for up to four hours, but usually it takes an hour or an hour and a half. When pain flares, she can increase the strength of the current from the stimulator. Again, she does not see it as the answer. It simply “takes the edge off”.
 In this case, counsel on both sides agree that this was a soft-tissue injury to the neck resulting in continuing neck pain, and continuing generalized moderate headaches with severe migraine headaches, occurring two or three times per week. The pain during such migraine headaches is excruciating, and her pain and suffering as a whole have affected very negatively almost every aspect of her life. According to doctors’ recommendations, she has taken medications that only partially help, and at one point led her to addiction to narcotics. She has undergone surgeries to implant a neurostimulator which has only been moderately successful at best as a means of alleviating the pain. The consensus of the medical experts has been that the plaintiff has reached the point of maximum medical improvement, and that the headaches and pain will continue indefinitely.
 The purpose of non-pecuniary damage awards is to compensate the plaintiff for “pain, suffering, loss of enjoyment of life and loss of amenities”: Jackson v. Lai, 2007 BCSC 1023 at para. 134. While each award must be made with reference to the particular circumstances and facts of the case, other cases may serve as a guide to assist the court in arriving at an award that is just and fair to both parties: Kuskis v. Tin, 2008 BCSC 862 at para. 136.
 Taking all of the foregoing into account, my view is that the appropriate award for non-pecuniary loss is $150,000. In this amount I take account of all aspects of general pain and suffering, including a reasonable portion attributable to the effect of diminished capacity in her homemaking role.
Cross examination is one of the more powerful tools at a lawyers disposal. It allows a lawyer to use leading questions to suggest the answer to the opposing witness. Knowing what admissions will help or hurt the case, a lawyer can tailor a series of leading questions designed to advance their clients interests. So what can Stephen Colbert teach a lawyer about cross-examination? The answer is a lot.
Many lawyers fail to use leading questions when cross examining. In failing to use this advantage lawyers let witnesses control the flow of information and potentially allow for more damaging answers to come out. Controlling a witness with leading questions can minimize this risk.
Few people use leading questions better than Stephen Colbert. When interviewing his guests he often gets them to admit to ridiculous facts. These ‘admissions’ are obtained through leading questions. The guests often agree even when the substance of the admission is outrageous and not accurate. You can click here to access Stephen’s Interviews and see how leading questions can lead to helpful (or in Stephen’s case, amusing) answers.
ICBC Claims and Requests for "Particulars"
When suing for compensation in an ICBC claim the BC Supreme Court Rules contain various ways to force disclosure of information. From requiring the exchange of relevant documents, permitting the parties to attend an examination for discovery and even forcing an ‘independent medical exam’ in certain circumstances there are many tools which can be used to learn about your opponents case.
One further tool is the request for “particulars“. If a party to a lawsuit is not clear what the other side is formally putting in issue they can ask for clarification by making a demand for particulars under Rule 3-7(23) of the Rules of Court. There are, however, limits to the use of this Rule and this was demonstrated in reasons for judgement released this week by the BC Supreme Court.
The entitlement of a party to particulars…is discussed by Mr. Justice Joyce in Delaney & Friends Cartoon Productions Ltd. v. Radical Entertainment Inc. et al, 2005 BCSC 371, beginning at paragraph 9.
Particulars are provided to disclose what the pleader intends to prove. How that party intends to prove the material facts and particulars is a matter of evidence. The pleading party is not required to, and indeed, is not entitled to set out in the pleadings the evidence that he or she intends to adduce at trial to prove the facts that have been pleaded.
In my view the concern raised by the plaintiff at this stage is that he does not know but would like to know now what precise evidence the defendant may lead in support of his allegations of fact. In my respectful opinion the plaintiff is not entitled to ascertain the evidentiary basis of the defendant’s case by way of this demand for particulars.
In my view, that is an inappropriate request for particulars and is a matter that can and should be pursued by way of examination for discovery. In my view, it is not necessary to provide particulars with respect to that head of damage.
The injuries alleged by the plaintiff have been set out in the statement of claim and the extent of his disability arising therefrom is not a matter that is required as an item of pleadings. It, too, should be pursued by examination for discovery.
Insofar as the past loss of earnings is concerned, this is information that can be identified and quantified and should be provided by the plaintiff to the defendant. It is not, in my view, appropriate that it be provided as particulars, but I am satisfied it should be provided in some fashion to the defendant, and I am going to direct that the plaintiff quantify his claim for past loss of earnings and provide that information to the defendant.
Insofar as prospective loss of earnings is concerned, I am not satisfied that that is a matter that can be necessarily particularized, and I leave it to the defendant to pursue that through examinations for discovery.
Like the prospective loss of earnings, I do not consider this to be an appropriate subject matter for particulars, and it is a matter that can be pursued by way of examination for discovery.
This is a head that is hard to distinguish from past and prospective loss of earning capacity. To the extent there is any difference, in my view it should be treated the same as the request for particulars of past and prospective loss of earning capacity.
This is another matter that in my view does not warrant particularization in the pleadings. It can be pursued through examinations for discovery.
This, too, is not a matter that, in my view, should be dealt with by way of particulars, with this exception: The individual or individuals for whom a trust award is claimed should be identified in the statement of claim where the trust award is advanced.
These are matters that should be identified by the plaintiff for the defendant, but not as particulars of the pleadings.
Medical and Transportation Costs Need To Be Assessed "In The Real World"
When suing an at fault party in a personal injury claim the Plaintiff is entitled to compensation for their reasonable medical expenses. These expenses may include the cost of driving to and from various medical and therapy appointments. How much is a reasonable amount to claim for transportation costs? Reasons for judgement were released today addressing this topic.
In today’s case (Greewal-Cheema v. Tassone) the Plaintiff was injured in a 2007 BC motor vehicle accident. Her vehicle was rear-ended. Fault was admitted by the rear motorist. The trial focused on the value of her ICBC claim.
 The plaintiff claims special damages of $2,683.50. The defendants take issue with only a few things. The defendants say that the amount allowed for mileage should be $.30 per kilometre not $.50 per kilometre. Both counsel refer to the Schedules that form part of the Rules of Court. I am not bound by the Rules on this point. I say that what matters is that judges live in the real world. In this day and age $.50 per kilometre is, if anything, too little. I am against the defendants. $.50 per kilometre it will be. The defendants also made a submission about the period June 5, 2008 to August 25, 2008 and what the plaintiff was about during her “voluntary work strengthening program”. Simply put, I found the defendants’ submission unconvincing. I accept the plaintiff’s testimony to the effect that she worked hard and diligently and treated what she was about as if it were her job. In the result I award the plaintiff $2,683.50 by way of special damages.
After a collision occurs it is not uncommon for the parties involved to disagree as to how the crash happened and who is at fault. If there are no independent witnesses to a crash it can be difficult to decide which version is more believable. When these cases go to trial it is vital to give evidence in a consistent, reliable and credible way otherwise the Court may discount what you have to say. Reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Supreme Court, Cranbrook Registry, dealing with the topic of credibility.
 The absence of physical evidence, and the unreliability of the various witnesses, including irreconcilable contradictions in the evidence, leaves the court to weigh what it has. This is not a case where both parties are implicated and it is not possible to discern the degree to which each is responsible, leading to an equal split in liability. For the plaintiff to succeed, the court must accept his evidence that, first, he intended to turn right at the curve and second, that the defendant was in his lane at that point. His own evidence and the surrounding evidence and circumstances suggest it is unlikely that his intention at the time was to go up to the highway.
 The defendant on the other hand, gives a straightforward story of proceeding from the highway to the curve on Jennings Avenue, having made a recent right turn. She had had little opportunity to accelerate as she approached the curve. She was not preoccupied or distracted. Her evidence is unreliable in the aftermath of the realization that her vehicle was in danger of colliding with the plaintiff’s motorcycle, but not in respect to the details leading up to the event..
 I do not think it is possible to say what happened with complete confidence, although I think the defendant’s version of events more likely. What that means for the plaintiff is that he has failed to carry the burden of proof that, on a balance of probabilities, the defendant’s negligence was the cause of the accident. This means, accordingly, that the plaintiff’s action is dismissed.
While there are no novel legal principles arising out of this decision, this case is worth reviewing in full for anyone involved in an ICBC case where credibility will play a crucial role to see the types of facts a Court can take into account when weighing two different versions to a motor vehicle collision. For more on this topic you can click here to read my archived posts discussing credibility in ICBC claims.
As I’ve previously discussed, some of the most important factors to consider when valuing a claim for pain and suffering are the severity and duration of the injury.
Not all injuries have the same course of recovery. Some soft tissue injuries never heal. Sometimes they cause constant chronic pain. Other times these injuries largely recover but ‘wax and wane’ with activity. What is the fair value of a soft tissue injury with symptoms that come and go over the years? Reasons for judgement were released this week by the BC Supreme Court, Kamloops Registry, addressing such an injury.
In this week’s case (Schmidt v. Hawkins) the Plaintiff was involved in a 2005 BC motor vehicle collision. The crash happened at near highway speed when the Defendant pulled into the Plaintiff’s lane of travel resulting in a significant T-bone type collision. The Defendant admitted fault for the crash focusing the trial on the value of the Plaintiff’s ICBC claim.
 Drs. Waller, Raghavan and Lau, for the most part, agree in their diagnosis and prognosis. Drs. Raghavan and Lau expect Mrs. Schmidt’s injuries to “wax and wane” over her lifetime. Drs. McDougall and Boyce are much more optimistic. For the most part, the doctors agree on the nature of Mrs. Schmidt’s injuries.
 They all agree that Mrs. Schmidt should participate in a gym conditioning program. This was initially recommended by Dr. McDougall on February 6, 2007. Dr. Lau discouraged dependency on outside modules in place of an aerobic program, as did Dr. Boyce. All the doctors were of the opinion that Mrs. Schmidt could return to full-time employment….
 At the time of trial, Mrs. Schmidt was age 39. The accident resulted in causing injuries to Mrs. Schmidt leaving her with a stiff and painful neck, pain in her upper back and, in particular, between the shoulder blades and headaches.
 Mrs. Schmidt believes that her condition was not getting any better causing Mrs. Schmidt to have some minor depression.
 It impacted her social life and some of her activities. At trial, for the most part, she was back to her regular activities.
 I assess Mrs. Schmidt’s non-pecuniary damages at $45,000.00.
As I’ve previously written, objective signs aren’t always present to verify an injury. Often times victims of motor vehicle collisions experience pain and limitations but the source of the injury can’t be documented through objective tests such as X-rays, CT Scans and MRI’s. If an injury can’t be objectively verified does that prevent a successful lawsuit for compensation? The answer is no and reasons for judgement were released today demonstrating this fact.
In today’s case (Sandher v. Hogg) the Plaintiff was involved in a 2006 motor vehicle collision. Her vehicle was rear-ended by the Defendant’s. The Defendant admitted fault for the crash. The trial focused on the nature and extent of the Plaintiff’s injuries.
The Plaintiff’s doctors gave evidence that she suffered injuries to her connective tissues (often referred to as soft tissue injuries) and that these have not fully healed. The Plaintiff went on to experience chronic pain as a result of these injuries with a chance that the pain would continue indefinitely.
 The absence of objective physical findings is not determinative of whether Ms. Sandher continues to suffer from chronic pain. Since pain may well be a subjective phenomenon not easily measurable by independent objective indicia, the assessment of Ms. Sandher’s soft tissue injuries to a certain extent turns on the assessment of her subjective complaints and reported symptoms: Szymanski v. Morin, 2010 BCSC 1 at para. 106; and Shapiro v. Dailey, 2010 BCSC 770 at para. 35.
 The defence contends that the minor damage to Ms. Sandher’s vehicle is inconsistent with the severity of her reported injuries. While evidence of vehicle damage is relevant to the assessment of injuries, ultimately the extent of her injuries is to be assessed on the evidence as a whole: Robbie v. King, 2003 BCSC 1553 at para. 35….
 On the totality of the evidence, I conclude that there is a realistic prospect for significant improvement in the foreseeable future, but there is also a realistic prospect that Ms. Sandher may never recover to her pre-accident levels of fitness.
 In summary, having considered Ms. Sandher’s own evidence and all of the medical evidence, I conclude that as a result of the accident Ms. Sandher sustained soft tissue injuries to her shoulder and upper and lower back, and that these injuries have caused her pain and suffering. I accept that Ms. Sandher continues to experience pain from her injuries. I find on balance that there will be some continuing chronic pain suffered by Ms. Sandher in the future for an uncertain period of time….
 Having reviewed all of the authorities provided by both counsel, and in considering all of Ms. Sandher’s particular circumstances, I conclude that a fair and reasonable award for non-pecuniary damages is $40,000.
When a party succeeds in a BC Supreme Court lawsuit the losing party usually has to pay the winner’s ‘costs and disbursements‘. Disbursements are the out of pocket expenses incurred in moving the lawsuit forward. (common disbursements include Court filing fees and the costs of medical reports).
What if your case is complex and your lawyer needs to hire an additional lawyer to properly advance your case? Is this extra legal expenses a reasonable disbursement? Reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Court of Appeal addressing this topic.
In today’s case (Baiden v. Vancouver) the Plaintiff was injured at the hands of the Vancouver Police. Before the matter could proceed to trial the Defendant’s raised a “s. 10 WCB Defence”. A section 10 defence, when successful, prevents a plaintiff from suing in court where the Plaintiff is injured while acting within the scope and course of his/her employment and the at fault entity is also a person or employer that caused the accident in the course of their employment. In these circumstances the Plaintiff must turn to WCB for compensation.
Once this defence is raised, BC Courts cannot deal with its merits rather under s. 257 of the Workers Compensation Act the Workers Compensation Appeal Tribunal (WCAT) has the exclusive jurisdiction to determine the status of parties to a legal action. This is frustrating to Plaintiffs because if this defence is pursued the lawsuit is basically put on hold, a hearing has to be had at WCAT, and only if the defence fails at WCAT can the Plaintiff carry on with their lawsuit. That is exactly what happened in today’s case.
 The limited authority on this issue in this province supports the view that if counsel retains another lawyer to perform a specialized function due to his or her own lack of experience, it does not follow that such fees are recoverable from the opposing party, but remains a matter between the original lawyer and his client: Noble v. Wong, Bell v. Fantini (1981), 32 B.C.L.R. 322 (S.C.). That is a practical and appropriate approach, and should have been followed here. Outsourcing portions of legal work during litigation and then permitting recovery of that lawyer’s fees as a disbursement undermines the policy of party and party costs. While there may be cases in which this can be justified, they would be limited and exceptional.
 This is not such a case. I would therefore allow the appeal, and set aside the order permitting Mr. Baiden to recover Mr. Ishkanian’s fees of $8,400 as a disbursement.
Reasons for judgement were released this week by the BC Supreme Court, Port Alberni Registry, awarding a Plaintiff just over $220,000 in total damages for injuries and loss sustained as a result of a 2007 BC motor vehicle collision.
In this week’s case (Haley v. Gust) the Plaintiff was operating her motorcycle when she was struck by a left-turning motorist. The Defendant admitted full fault for the crash. The trial focused on the extent of and value of the Plaintiff’s injuries.
 She is currently 38-years-old and has suffered a permanent injury to her knee. Her injuries, while not catastrophic, are very real. As a result of the accident she clearly has suffered pain and a loss of enjoyment of life, and she will no doubt continue to do so. As well, as referred to earlier, she faces the realistic prospect of osteoarthritis, and in Dr. Leete’s opinion, it is more likely than not that she will require a total knee replacement in 20 to 25 years….
60] While she attempts to remain as active as possible (she now participates in “quadding”), she remains limited when compared to her pre-accident activities. Since the accident, she has become very cautious about any activity that might injure her knee. She is no longer able to participate in mini-triathlons and dirt-biking with her family. She cannot ski or participate in water sports. It is likely she will continue to be restricted for the rest of her life to some degree in respect of the scope of the activities she would have enjoyed but for the accident.
 Having reviewed all of the authorities provided by both counsel, and in considering all of Ms. Haley’s particular circumstances, I conclude that a fair and reasonable award for non-pecuniary damages is $75,000.

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