Source: https://openjurist.org/504/us/334
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 19:58:52+00:00

Document:
Guy HUNT, Governor of Alabama et al.
(b) Alabama has not met its burden of showing the unavailability of nondiscriminatory alternatives adequate to preserve the local interests at stake. See Hunt v. Washington Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 353, 97 S.Ct. 2434, 2446-2447, 53 L.Ed.2d 383. Alabama's concern about the volume of waste entering the Emelle facility could be alleviated by less discriminatory means—such as applying an additional fee on all hazardous waste disposed of within Alabama, a per-mile tax on all vehicles transporting such waste across state roads, or an evenhanded cap on the total tonnage landfilled at Emelle—which would curtail volume from all sources. Additionally, any concern touching on environmental conservation and Alabama citizens' health and safety does not vary with the waste's point of origin, and the State has the power to monitor and regulate more closely the transportation and disposal of all hazardous waste within its borders. Even possible future financial and environmental risks to be borne by Alabama do not vary with the waste's State of origin in a way allowing foreign, but not local, waste to be burdened. Pp. 343-346.
(c) This Court's decisions regarding quarantine laws do not counsel a different conclusion. The additional fee may not legitimately be deemed a quarantine law because Alabama permits both the generation and landfilling of hazardous waste within its borders and the importation of additional hazardous waste. Moreover, the quarantine laws upheld by this Court "did not discriminate against interstate commerce as such, but simply prevented traffic in noxious articles, whatever their origin." Philadelphia v. New Jersey, supra, 437 U.S., at 629, 98 S.Ct., at 2538. This Court's decision in Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 106 S.Ct. 2440, 91 L.Ed.2d 110—upholding a state ban on the importation of baitfish after Maine showed that such fish were subject to parasites foreign to in-state baitfish and that there were no less discriminatory means of protecting its natural resources—likewise offers no respite to Alabama, since here the hazardous waste is the same regardless of its point of origin and adequate means other than overt discrimination meet Alabama's concerns. Pp. 346-348.
* Petitioner, Chemical Waste Management, Inc., a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in Oak Brook, Illinois, owns and operates one of the Nation's oldest commercial hazardous waste land disposal facilities, located in Emelle, Alabama. Opened in 1977 and acquired by petitioner in 1978, the Emelle facility is a hazardous waste treatment, storage, and disposal facility operating pursuant to permits issued by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA), 90 Stat. 2795, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 6901 et seq., and the Toxic Substances Control Act, 90 Stat. 2003, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq. (1988 ed. and Supp. II), and by the State of Alabama under Ala.Code § 22-30-12(i) (1990). Alabama is 1 of only 16 States that have commercial hazardous waste landfills, and the Emelle facility is the largest of the 21 landfills of this kind located in these 16 States. Brief for Nat. Governors' Assn. et al. as Amici Curiae 3, citing E. Smith, EI Digest 26-27 (Mar. 1992).
The parties do not dispute that the wastes and substances being landfilled at the Emelle facility "include substances that are inherently dangerous to human health and safety and to the environment. Such waste consists of ignitable, corrosive, toxic and reactive wastes which contain poisonous and cancer causing chemicals and which can cause birth defects, genetic damage, blindness, crippling and death."1 584 So.2d 1367, 1373 (1991). Increasing amounts of out-of-state hazardous wastes are shipped to the Emelle facility for permanent storage each year. From 1985 through 1989, the tonnage of hazardous waste received per year has more than doubled, increasing from 341,000 tons in 1985 to 788,000 tons by 1989. Of this, up to 90% of the tonnage permanently buried each year is shipped in from other States.
" '[T]he evil of protectionism can reside in legislative means as well as legislative ends. Thus, it does not matter whether the ultimate aim of ch. 363 is to reduce the waste disposal costs of New Jersey residents or to save remaining open lands from pollution, for we assume New Jersey has every right to protect its residents' pocketbooks as well as their environment. And it may be assumed as well that New Jersey may pursue those ends by slowing the flow of all waste into the State's remaining landfills, even though interstate commerce may incidentally be affected. But whatever New Jersey's ultimate purpose, it may not be accompanied by discriminating against articles of commerce coming from outside the State unless there is some reason, apart from their origin, to treat them differently. Both on its face and in its plain effect, ch. 363 violates this principle of nondiscrimination.
" 'The Court has consistently found parochial legislation of this kind to be constitutionally invalid, whether the ultimate aim of the legislation was to assure a steady supply of milk by erecting barriers to allegedly ruinous outside competition, Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. [511,] 522-524 [55 S.Ct. 497, 500-501, 79 L.Ed. 1032 (1935) ]; or to create jobs by keeping industry within the State, Foster-Fountain Packing Co. v. Haydel, 278 U.S. 1, 10 [49 S.Ct. 1, 3-4, 73 L.Ed. 147 (1928) ]; Johnson v. Haydel, 278 U.S. 16 [49 S.Ct. 6, 73 L.Ed. 155 (1928) ]; Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. [385,] 403-404 [68 S.Ct. 1156, 1166, 92 L.Ed. 1460 (1948) ]; or to preserve the State's financial resources from depletion by fencing out indigent immigrants, Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 173-174 [62 S.Ct. 164, 167, 86 L.Ed. 119 (1941) ].' " Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, --- U.S., at ----, 112 S.Ct., at 2024 (quoting Philadelphia v. New Jersey, supra, 437 U.S., at 626-627, 98 S.Ct., at 2537).
The Act's additional fee facially discriminates against hazardous waste generated in States other than Alabama, and the Act overall has plainly discouraged the full operation of petitioner's Emelle facility.4 Such burdensome taxes imposed on interstate commerce alone are generally forbidden: "[A] State may not tax a transaction or incident more heavily when it crosses state lines than when it occurs entirely within the State." Armco Inc. v. Hardesty, 467 U.S. 638, 642, 104 S.Ct. 2620, 2622, 81 L.Ed.2d 540 (1984); see also Walling v. Michigan, 116 U.S. 446, 455, 6 S.Ct. 454, 457, 29 L.Ed. 691 (1886); Guy v. Baltimore, 100 U.S. (10 Otto) 434, 439, 25 L.Ed. 743 (1880). Once a state tax is found to discriminate against out-of-state commerce, it is typically struck down without further inquiry. See, e.g., Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. Tully, 466 U.S. 388, 406-407, 104 S.Ct. 1856, 1867, 80 L.Ed.2d 388 (1984); Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 759-760, 101 S.Ct. 2114, 2136, 68 L.Ed.2d 576 (1981); Boston Stock Exchange v. State Tax Comm'n, 429 U.S. 318, 336-337, 97 S.Ct. 599, 610, 50 L.Ed.2d 514 (1977).
These may all be legitimate local interests, and petitioner has not attacked them. But only rhetoric, and not explanation, emerges as to why Alabama targets only interstate hazardous waste to meet these goals. As found by the Trial Court, "[a]lthough the Legislature imposed an additional fee of $72.00 per ton on waste generated outside Alabama, there is absolutely no evidence before this Court that waste generated outside Alabama is more dangerous than waste generated in Alabama. The Court finds under the facts of this case that the only basis for the additional fee is the origin of the waste." App. to Pet. for Cert. 83a-84a. In the face of such findings, invalidity under the Commerce Clause necessarily follows, for "whatever [Alabama's] ultimate purpose, it may not be accomplished by discriminating against articles of commerce coming from outside the State unless there is some reason, apart from their origin, to treat them differently." Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S., at 626-627, 98 S.Ct., at 2537; see New Energy Co., supra, 486 U.S., at 279-280, 108 S.Ct., at 1811. The burden is on the State to show that "the discrimination is demonstrably justified by a valid factor unrelated to economic protectionism,"6 Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. ----, ----, 112 S.Ct. 789, 801, 117 L.Ed.2d 1 (1992) (emphasis added), and it has not carried this burden. Cf. Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, --- U.S., at ----, 112 S.Ct., at 2024.
Ultimately, the State's concern focuses on the volume of the waste entering the Emelle facility.7 Less discriminatory alternatives, however, are available to alleviate this concern, not the least of which are a generally applicable per-ton additional fee on all hazardous waste disposed of within Alabama, cf. Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609, 619, 101 S.Ct. 2946, 2954, 69 L.Ed.2d 884 (1981), or a per-mile tax on all vehicles transporting hazardous waste across Alabama roads, cf. American Trucking Assns., Inc. v. Scheiner, 483 U.S. 266, 286, 107 S.Ct. 2829, 2841-2842, 97 L.Ed.2d 226 (1987), or an evenhanded cap on the total tonnage landfilled at Emelle, see Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S., at 626, 98 S.Ct., at 2536, which would curtail volume from all sources.8 To the extent Alabama's concern touches environmental conservation and the health and safety of its citizens, such concern does not vary with the point of origin of the waste, and it remains within the State's power to monitor and regulate more closely the transportation and disposal of all hazardous waste within its borders. Even with the possible future financial and environmental risks to be borne by Alabama, such risks likewise do not vary with the waste's State of origin in a way allowing foreign, but not local, waste to be burdened.9 In sum, we find the additional fee to be "an obvious effort to saddle those outside the State" with most of the burden of slowing the flow of waste into the Emelle facility. Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S., at 629, 98 S.Ct., at 2538. "That legislative effort is clearly impermissible under the Commerce Clause of the Constitution." Ibid.
The law struck down in Philadelphia v. New Jersey left local waste untouched, although no basis existed by which to distinguish interstate waste. But "[i]f one is inherently harmful, so is the other. Yet New Jersey has banned the former while leaving its landfill sites open to the latter." 437 U.S., at 629, 98 S.Ct., at 2538. Here, the additional fee applies only to interstate hazardous waste, but at all points from its entrance into Alabama until it is landfilled at the Emelle facility, every concern related to quarantine applies perforce to local hazardous waste, which pays no additional fee. For this reason, the additional fee does not survive the appropriate scrutiny applicable to discriminations against interstate commerce.
Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 106 S.Ct. 2440, 91 L.Ed.2d 110 (1986), provides no additional justification. Maine there demonstrated that the out-of-state baitfish were subject to parasites foreign to in-state baitfish. This difference posed a threat to the State's natural resources, and absent a less discriminatory means of protecting the environment—and none was available—the importation of baitfish could properly be banned. Id., at 140, 106 S.Ct., at 2448. To the contrary, the record establishes that the hazardous waste at issue in this case is the same regardless of its point of origin. As noted in Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, "our conclusion would be different if the imported waste raised health or other concerns not presented by [Alabama] waste." --- U.S., at ----, 112 S.Ct., at 2027. Because no unique threat is posed, and because adequate means other than overt discrimination meet Alabama's concerns, Maine v. Taylor provides the State no respite.
Taxes are a recognized and effective means for discouraging the consumption of scarce commodities—in this case the safe environment that attends appropriate disposal of hazardous wastes. Cf. 26 U.S.C.A. §§ 4681, 4682 (Supp.1992) (tax on ozone-depleting chemicals); 26 U.S.C. § 4064 (gas guzzler excise tax). I therefore see nothing unconstitutional in Alabama's use of a tax to discourage the export of this commodity to other States, when the commodity is a public good that Alabama has helped to produce. Cf. Fort Gratiot, --- U.S., at ----, 112 S.Ct., at 2029 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). Nor do I see any significance in the fact that Alabama has chosen to adopt a differential tax rather than an outright ban. Nothing in the Commerce Clause requires Alabama to adopt an "all or nothing" regulatory approach to noxious materials coming from without the State. See Mintz v. Baldwin, 289 U.S. 346, 53 S.Ct. 611, 77 L.Ed. 1245 (1933) (upholding State's partial ban on cattle importation).
In short, the Court continues to err by its failure to recognize that waste—in this case admittedly hazardous waste presents risks to the public health and environment that a State may legitimately wish to avoid, and that the State may pursue such an objective by means less Draconian than an outright ban. Under force of this Court's precedent, though, it increasingly appears that the only avenue by which a State may avoid the importation of hazardous wastes is to ban such waste disposal altogether, regardless of the waste's source of origin. I see little logic in creating, and nothing in the Commerce Clause that requires us to create, such perverse regulatory incentives. The Court errs in substantial measure because it refuses to acknowledge that a safe and attractive environment is the commodity really at issue in cases such as this, see Fort Gratiot, --- U.S., at ----, 112 S.Ct., at 2029-2030 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). The result is that the Court today gets it exactly backward when it suggests that Alabama is attempting to "isolate itself from a problem common to the several States," ante, at 339. To the contrary, it is the 34 States that have no hazardous waste facility whatsoever, not to mention the remaining 15 States with facilities all smaller than Emelle, that have isolated themselves.

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