Source: https://h2o.law.harvard.edu/cases/66
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 02:03:30+00:00

Document:
1. Every unauthorized entry on land of another, though without damage, constitutes actionable "trespass".
See Words and Phrases, Permanent Edition, for all other definitions of "Trespass".
2. The casting of light of about intensity of moonlight 832 feet onto screen of drive-in open air moving picture theater outside limits of city by corporation operation a night horse race track where there were numerous floodlights, so as to interfere with proper showing of moving pictures, was not actionable "trespass".
3. Ownership of lands includes not only the face of the earth but everything under it or over it, and has in its legal signification an indefinite extent upward and downward giving rise to the maxim "cujus est solum ejus est usque ad coelum".
See Words and Phrases, Permanent Edition, for all other definitions of "Cujus Est Solum Ejus Est Usque Ad Coelum".
4. One who intentionally and without the privilege enter land, is a "trespasser".
See Words and Phrases, Permanent Edition, for all other definitions of "Trespasser".
5. Air travel over another's land is a "trespass" prima facie imposing liability, but rights of airplane travel are established or recognized by doctrine of privelege.
6. "Nuisances" may consist of harm to human comfort, safety, or health by reason of maintenance by a defendant on his land of noxious or dangerous instrumentalities causing damage to plaintiff in respect to legally protected interests of plaintiff in his land, illegal or immoral practices, and acts outraging public decency, obstructions to streets, public ways, common rights, access to property and the like, and damage to land itself, as by flooding.
See Words and Phrases, Permanent Edition, for all other definitions of "Nuisance".
7. Generally, the existence or non-existence of a private nuisance is a question of fact for the jury.
8. An intentional interference with the use and enjoyment of land is not actionable unless that interference be both substantial and unreasonable.
9. Whether a particular annoyance or inconvenience is sufficient to constitute a nuisance depends on its effect on an "ordinarily reasonable man," that is, a normal person of ordinary habits and sensibilities.
See Words and Phrases, Permanent Edition, for all other definitions of "Ordinarily Reasonable Man".
10. No action will lie for a nuisance in respect of damage which, even though substantial, is due solely to the fact that the plaintiff is abnormally sensitive to deleterious influences, or uses his land for some purpose which requires exceptional freedom from such influences.
11. One having property rights and privileges in land can maintain an action for damages for nuisance only when conduct of defendant interferes with the exercise of the particular rights and privileges which the plaintiff owns.
12. The casting of light of about intensity of moonlight 832 feet onto screen of drive-in open air moving picture theater outside limits of city by corporation operating a night horse race track where there were numerous floodlights, so as to interfere with proper showing of moving pictures, did not constitute actionable "nuisance", where both theater and track were constructed about same time.
13. The Supreme Court took judicial knowledge that many lighted parks and fields are located adjacent to residential property and must to some extent interfere with the full enjoyment of the darkness by residents.
See 46 C.J., Nuisance, § 201.
Appeal from the Circuit Court, Multnomah County.
James Arthur Powers, of Portland, and Byron C. Congdon, of Seattle, Washington, argued the cause for appellant. With them on the brief was Kenneth Kraemer, of Portland.
Vern Dusenbery, of Portland, argued the cause for respondents. On the brief were Crum, Dusenbery and Martin, of Portland.
Before ROSSMAN, Chief Justice, and LUSK, KELLY, BAILEY and BRAND, Justices.
Action at law by Amphitheaters, Inc., as operator of a drive-in open air motion picture theater, against Portland Meadows, a corporation, as operator of an adjoining race track for horses, which track was brilliantly lighted for night racing. The charge is that the lights from the track destroy the natural darkness on the plaintiff's property, rendering it impossible successfully to show outdoor moving pictures, and thus constitute a trespass, or in the alternative, a nuisance for which damages are sought. From a judgment based on a directed verdict for the defendant, plaintiff appeals.
operate a race meet to be held in May, 1946, and the license was issued. In October and early November, 1945, extensive newspaper publicity was given to the race track project, featuring the fact that the property would be lighted for night racing. On 15 October, 1945, a contractor was employed to plan and construct the race track and the facilities incidental thereto. Grading was commenced in November and the work was continued until the project was completed on 14 September, 1946.
During the fall of 1945 the land on which the plaintiff's theater is located was being prepared and equipped for night auto racing by Northwest Sports, Inc., an activity which, like that of defendant, would have involved the use of flood lights. On 29 November, 1945, a lease agreement was executed between Northwest Sports, Inc. and the promoters of the plaintiff corporation, entitling the lessees and their assignee, Amphitheaters, Inc., to construct and operate a drive-in outdoor motion picture theater upon the property adjoining the race track of defendants. But the lease provided that the operation of the theater must not interfere with the operations of the same property for auto racing. Plans for the construction of the theater were turned over in March, 1946, and construction was commenced in May or June of that year. At least some of the promoters of the theater project knew that the race track was to be lighted for night racing, though they may not have known the volume or extent of the proposed lighting.
the outdoor theater and sums greatly in excess of that amount were expended by the defendant in the development of the race track and facilities. The lighting facilities alone involved an investment by the defendant of $100,000. The two tracts operated by plaintiff and defendant respectively are located just north of the city limits of Portland, Oregon. They adjoin and lie between two arterial highways, Denver Avenue and Union Avenue. The defendant's track consists of a mile-long oval extending in a general northerly and southerly direction. The auto race track which encloses the plaintiff's moving picture amphitheater lies between Union Avenue and the Northeast curve of the defendant's oval track. Union Avenue runs in a northwesterly direction along and parallel to the plaintiff's property of which it forms the northeasterly boundary. The theater screen, approximately 40 feet high and 50 feet wide, is backed up against the westerly line of Union Avenue and faces slightly south of west and directly toward the defendant's race track. At the trial a photograph showing the relative positions of the two properties and the nature of the adjacent territory was offered in evidence by the plaintiff and received without objection. It fairly represents the true situation. It is reproduced as a part of this opinion to illustrate the facts giving rise to our problem. The picture was taken from a point on defendant's property. The northeasterly portion of defendant's oval track appears in the foreground. The camera was aimed directly at the screen of plaintiff's theater. Far better than words, the picture indicates the character of the area in which the two properties are located.
interference. For that purpose the plaintiff constructed wing fences for a considerable distance on each side of the screen and along the westerly line of Union Avenue for the purpose of shutting off the light from the cars traveling on that arterial highway. It was also necessary to construct a shadow box extending on both sides and above the screen for the purpose of excluding the light from the moon and stars. The testimony indicates that the construction of the shadow box was necessary if a good picture was to be presented on the screen. The extreme delicacy of plaintiff's operation and the susceptibility of outdoor moving pictures to light in any form was conclusively established by the evidence.
In order to illuminate the defendant's track for night horse racing, approximately 350 1500-watt lights are mounted in clusters on 80-foot poles placed at intervals of approximately 250 feet around the track. The flood lights are in general, directed at the track, but there is substantial evidence to the effect that reflected light "spills" over onto the plaintiff's premises and has a serious effect on the quality of pictures shown on the screen. The nearest cluster of lights on the defendant's track is 832 feet distant from the plaintiff's screen. The light from the defendant's track not only impairs the quality of the pictures exhibited by the plaintiff, but there is also substantial evidence that plaintiffs have suffered financial loss as the result of the illumination of which they complain. On one occasion at least, plaintiffs felt themselves required to refund admission fees to their patrons on account of the poor quality of the picture exhibited. The evidence discloses that the light from the defendant's race track when measured at plaintiff's screen is approximately that of full moonlight.
Upon the opening of the racing season in September, 1946, the plaintiff immediately complained to the defendant concerning the detrimental effect of defendant's lights, and shortly thereafter suit was filed. In the fall of 1946 the defendant, while denying liability, nevertheless made substantial efforts to protect the plaintiff from the effect of defendant's lights. One hundred hoods were installed on the lights, and particular attention was given to those nearest to the plaintiff's property. In 1947, and prior to the spring racing season, which was to last 25 days, thirty louvers were also installed for the purpose of further confining the light to the defendant's property. These efforts materially reduced, but did not eliminate the conditions of which plaintiff complains.
noxious odors and the like have been universally classified as falling within the law of nuisance. In fact, cases of this type are described in the Restatement of the Law as "non trespassory" invasions. Restatement of the Law of Torts, Vol. 4, Ch. 40, p. 214, et seq.
3-5. Many of the cases on which plaintiff relies in support of its theory of trespass involve the flight of airplanes at low level over plaintiffs' land. The modern law with reference to trespass by airplanes has developed under the influence of ancient rules concerning the nature of property. Ownership of lands, it has been said, "includes, not only the face of the earth, but everything under it or over it, and has in its legal signification an indefinite extent upward and downward, giving rise to the maxim, Cujus est solum ejus est usque ad coelum". 50 C.J. 752, Property, § 24. Harmonizing the ancient rule with the necessities of modern life, the Restatement of the Law declares that one who intentionally and without a privilege enters land, is a trespasser. Restatement of the Law of Torts, Vol. 1, § 158, p. 359. Air travel over a plaintiff's land is still recognized as trespass prima facie imposing liability but the rights of airplane travel are established or recognized by the doctrine of privilege. Restatement of the Law of Torts, §§ 158, 159, 194.
them from the non trespassory cases which are controlled by the law of nuisance. Portsmouth Harbor Land & Hotel Co. v. United States, 260 U.S. 327, 67 L.Ed. 287, was similar in principle to the Causby case, supra. The case involved a taking by the United States by means of the continuous firing of artillery over the petitioners' land. We need not argue the distinction between a cannon ball and a ray of light. Upon this issue plaintiff also cites National Refining Co. v. Batte, 135 Miss. 819, 100 So. 388, 35 A.L.R. 91, and The Shelburns, Inc. v. Crossan Corporation, 95 N.J. Eq. 188, 122 Atl. 749, both of which cases involve the shedding of light upon defendant's property, but both were decided upon the theory of nuisance and not of trespass. They will be considered later. We have considered the other cases cited in support of the theory of trespass and find them not in point.
As its second assignment, the plaintiff asserts that the trial court erred in failing to submit the case to the jury on the theory of nuisance.
involving obstructions to streets, public ways, common rights, access to property and the like. (4) Cases involving damage to the land itself, as by flooding. The cases, with the exception of those falling in the first class, bear no resemblance to the one at bar, and require no further comment.
As falling within the first class, we find the following Oregon cases: Fleischner v. Citizens' Real Estate Investment Co., 25 Or. 119, 35 P. 174, (filth and sewage seepage on adjacent property); Portland v. Cook, 48 Or. 550, 87 P. 772, (slaughter house); Ulmen v. Town of Mt. Angel, 57 Or. 547, 112 P. 529, (pollution of adjacent surface water); Borne v. Wilson-Case Lumber Co., 58 Or. 48, 113 P. 52, (ashes and cinders); Templeton v. Williams, 59 Or. 160, 116 P. 1062, (noxious odors and flies from barn); Smith v. Silverton, 71 Or. 379, 142 P. 609, (stream pollution); Dibert v. Giebisch, 74 Or. 64, 144 P. 1184, (dynamite); Porges v. Jacobs, 75 Or. 488, 147 P. 396, (livery stable); Phipps v. Rogue River Canal Co., 80 Or. 175, 156 P. 794, (stagnant water dangerous to health); Adams v. Clover Hill Farms, 86 Or. 140, 167 P. 1015, (noxious odors); Wilson v. City of Portland, 153 Or. 679, 58 P. (2d) 257, (foul odors); Adams v. City of Toledo, 163 Or. 185, 96 P. (2d) 1078, (fire); Lindley v. Hyland et al., 173 Or. 93, 144 P. (2d) 295, (smoke and cinders); Arneil v. Schnitzer, 173 Or. 179, 144 P. (2d) 707, (fire); Kramer v. Sweet, 179 Or. 324, 169 P. (2d) 892, (slaughter house).
involving smoke, noxious odors, flies and disease germs are claimed to be analogous to the case at bar, it must be answered that in every case the activity or thing which has been held to be a nuisance has been something which was, 1, inherently harmful, and 2, an unreasonable and substantial interference with the ordinary use or enjoyment of property. No one can contend that light is inherently harmful to persons in the ordinary enjoyment of property.
Since there is no Oregon precedent to support plaintiff's contention, we must go back to fundamental principles. Plaintiff relies upon the general definition of a nuisance as set forth in Adams v. City of Toledo, supra, and State ex rel Rudd v. Ringold, 102 Or. 401, 202 P. 734. A private nuisance is defined as "anything done to the hurt, annoyance or detriment of the lands or hereditaments of another, and not amounting to a trespass". Definitions in such general terms are of no practical assistance to the court.
"It has been said that the term `nuisance' is incapable of an exact and exhaustive definition which will fit all cases, because the controlling facts are seldom alike, and each case stands on its own footing. * * *" 39 Am. Jur., § 2, p. 281.
always include something which really is not intended to be included in them."
"Decisions * * * often are presented as hollow deductions from empty general propositions like sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas, which teaches nothing but a benevolent yearning." 8 Harv. L. Rev. 3.
See also, Jeremiah Smith, Reasonable Use of One's Own Property As a Justification for Damage to a Neighbor, 17 Col. L. Rev. 383.
The statement of Addison, Torts, 8th Ed. 66, that "The due regulation and subordination of conflicting rights constitute the chief part of the science of law" is peculiarly applicable in the field of private nuisance, for the rights of neither party in the use and enjoyment of their respective properties are absolute.
"What is a reasonable use and whether a particular use is a nuisance cannot be determined by any fixed general rules, but depend upon the facts of each particular case, such as location, character of the neighborhood, nature of the use, extent and frequency of the injury, the effect upon the enjoyment of life, health, and property, and the like." 39 Am. Jur. 298, § 16.
7, 8. Notwithstanding the fact that the existence vel non of a nuisance is generally a question of fact, there have arisen several rules of law which guide and sometimes control decision. It is established law that an intentional interference with the use and enjoyment of land is not actionable unless that interference be both substantial and unreasonable. Restatement of the Law of Torts, Vol. 4, § 822, Comment g, and § 826, comment a.
9. Again it is held that whether a particular annoyance or inconvenience is sufficient to constitute a nuisance depends upon its effect upon an ordinarily reasonable man, that is, a normal person of ordinary habits and sensibilities, Stoddard v. Snodgrass, 117 Or. 262, 241 P. 73; 39 Am. Jur., Nuisances, § 31, citing many cases; Kellogg v. Mertens, (La. App.), 30 So. (2d) 777; Kimball v. Thompson, 70 F. Supp. 803; Columbian Carbon Co. v. Tholen, (Tex. Civ. App.), 199 S.W. 825; Metropoulos v. MacPherson, 241 Mass. 491, 135 N.E. 693; Price v. Grantz, 118 Pa. St. 402, 4 Am. St. Rep. 601; Walker v. Wearb, 6 N.Y.S. (2d) 548; Kentucky & West Virginia Power Co. v. Anderson, 288 Ky. 501, 156 S.W. (2d) 857. The doctrine upheld in the above cited cases appears to have had its origin in Aldred's Case, (1601) 9 Coke 57b, 77 Eng. Reprint 816. The rule announced in that case, "Lex non favet delicatorum votis", was quoted with approval by this court in Kramer v. Sweet, supra. This doctrine has been applied in many cases involving smoke, dust, noxious odors, vibration and the like, in which the injury was not to the land itself but to the personal comfort of dwellers on the land.
It is highly significant that an identical principle has been applied where the uses to which a plaintiff puts his land are abnormally sensitive to the type of interference caused by the defendant.
ordinary occupation of land, the law of nuisance will not confer upon me any such special and extraordinary protection. I must acquire immunity from damage of this sort by special contract with my neighbours. Thus, in Eastern & South African Telegraph Co. v. Cape Town Tramways Co., (q) an action was brought by the telegraph company for interference with its telegraphic operations through induced currents caused by the working of the defendants' electric cars. The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council held the defendants not liable on the ground that such a cause would do no harm to the ordinary occupation of land, and that the damage done was solely due to the exceptionally delicate nature of the operations conducted by the plaintiffs. `A man cannot increase the liabilities of his neighbour by applying his own property to special uses, whether for business or pleasure' (r). The same principle was acted on by the Court of Appeal in Robinson v. Kilvert (s), where the nuisance complained of was one of heat causing damage to the exceptionally delicate manufacture of the plaintiff." Salmond on the Law of Torts, 9th Ed., pp. 238, 239.
"It has been shown that the interference with property or personal comfort must be substantial. But even if the interference is substantial, no action will lie where it can be shown that, but for the infirmity of the person or property, there would have been no substantial interference * * * Nor again can damage to sensitive property be complained of if the act causing the damage would not have harmed more ordinary things * * *". Pearce and Meston, Ch. 1, p. 19.
it does harm to some particular trade of a delicate nature in the adjoining property where it does not affect any ordinary trade carried on there nor interfere with the ordinary enjoyment of life. A man who carries on an exceptionally delicate trade cannot complain because it is injured by his neighbor doing something lawful on his property, if it is something which would not injure an ordinary trade or anything but an exceptionally delicate trade."
To the same effect see Prosser on Torts, p. 559, and note p. 67. See 39 Am. Jur. 424; 46 C.J. 682.
"* * * Plaintiff had the legal right to stack its marble on its yard, and to leave it uncovered. Defendant had the legal right to operate its gas machines in a careful and skillful manner, and to discharge such substances therefrom as were not injurious to the neighboring property when used in the usual way. Therefore, if plaintiff is making an unusual use of its yard, in view of the fact that it is located in a district largely devoted to manufacturing purposes, or if the marble it stacks in its yard is of such a delicate nature as to become stained and injured from substances discharged from the smokestacks of factories by which it is surrounded, it ought not to recover. * * *"
And see Pennsylvania Co. v. Sun Co., 290 Pa. 404, 138 Atl. 909; Lake Shore & M.S. Ry. Co. v. Chicago, L.S. & S.B. Ry. Co., 48 Ind. App. 584, 92 N.E. 989; Postal Telegraph Cable Co. v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co., 202 Cal. 382, 260 P. 1101; and Cremidas v. Fenton, 223 Mass. 249, 111 N.E. 855.
that in his manufactory he used a peculiar process of great delicacy.
"* * * If the apparatus of such concerns requires special protection against the operations of their neighbours, that must be found in legislation; the remedy at present invoked is an appeal to a common law principle which applies to much more usual and less special conditions. A man cannot increase the liabilities of his neighbour by applying his own property to special uses, whether for business or pleasure. * * *"
"I think we must bear in mind that in these cases, which are conveniently grouped together as cases in which the proper form of action is an action of nuisance, citizens are not to be allowed to enforce rights which limit the user by others of property, unless the facts relied upon as constituting a nuisance are such as interfere with the ordinary rights which according to the ordinary notions of mankind they are entitled to exercise in relation to one another and in relation to their property."
See also Robinson v. Kilvert, 41 Ch. D. 88, and Hoare & Co. v. McAlpine, 1 L.R., Ch. D. (1923) 167.
rule here stated, only when the conduct of the actor interferes with the exercise of the particular rights and privileges which he owns. * * *"
12. It follows from the application of this rule that the plaintiff's only basis of complaint is the fact that it is attempting to show upon the screen moving pictures, and that the operation is such a delicate one that it has been necessary for the plaintiff to build high fences to prevent the light of automobiles upon the public highway from invading the property and to build a shadow box over the screen to protect it from the ordinary light of moon and stars, and that it now claims damage because the lights from the defendant's property, which it has not excluded by high fences, shine with the approximate intensity of full moonlight upon the screen and interfere thereby with the showing of the pictures. We think that this is a clear case coming within the doctrine of the English and American cases, and that a man cannot increase the liabilities of his neighbor by applying his own property to special and delicate uses, whether for business or pleasure.
Finding no case in this jurisdiction in which the casting of light upon the premises of another has been judged as a nuisance, we turn to the cases from other jurisdictions in which that question has been discussed. We call attention first to the fundamental distinction between cases involving light and those involving smoke, gas, noxious odors and the like. The fact that the plaintiff in this case loves darkness rather than light does not mean that light can be classed as a noxious or generally injurious instrumentality.
grain tanks 60 feet high across the street from plaintiff's residence. He alleged that the tanks were painted white and reflected the afternoon sun on his front porch "to his great annoyance and discomfort, and that his house was thereby rendered unsalable and no longer fit for residential purposes whereby its value was reduced some $1800". The court quoted the ancient maxim, Sic utere tuo, but stated that it has its limitations.
`It is a principle well established, that where a person, corporation, or individual is doing a lawful thing in a lawful way, his conduct is not actionable, though it may result in damage to another; for, though the damage done is undoubted, no legal right of another is invaded, and hence it is said to be damnum absque injuria.'"
no substantial analogy between such cases and the action sought to be maintained in the instant case. Plaintiff has no cause of action against defendant, and judgment to that effect must be directed."
The case was decided as a pure question of law on demurrer to plaintiff's complaint.
In Village of Wadena v. Folkestad, 194 Minn. 146, 260 N.W. 221, the plaintiff sued to abate an alleged nuisance maintained by the defendant. The defendant maintained upon his property a truck terminal, warehouse and depot. The building was in a semi-residential district. Plaintiff alleged that the operation of the property constituted a nuisance because of the noise involved and the flashing of truck headlights. The lower court was reversed and the decree was entered in favor of the defendant.
from cars stopping at the service station and from the noise of horns, the grinding of brakes, etc., incident thereto. Plaintiff also complained that the work done on the grease rack caused smoke and odors to invade his premises and that the lights from the cars shone into the plaintiff's house and sleeping quarters, destroying sleep and privacy. It also appeared that the defendant caused gasoline explosions on his property. Relying on National Refining Co. v. Batte, supra, the court held that the light of cars shining into plaintiff's home constituted a nuisance. The defendant had indicated a willingness to erect a screen to shut off the rays of light from plaintiff's property. Thereupon an injunction was issued requiring the plaintiff to establish the screen, restraining the defendant from causing explosions on his property and requiring the removal of the grease rack from its then location. The court rejected the doctrine of Rylands v. Fletcher, L.R. 3 H.L. 330, and held that the leakage of gasoline was not actionable. The defendant was permitted to continue operations, subject to the limited provisions of the injunction.
and proper use and enjoyment of plaintiffs' premises."
In Nugent v. Melville Shoe Corporation, 280 Mass. 469, 182 N.E. 825, the plaintiffs were owners of a dwelling house which immediately adjoined the property of the defendants. The acts complained of occurred in the construction of a building on the defendants' property within 4 feet of plaintiffs' house. The defendants, during the course of construction, maintained windows about 10 feet high and 6 feet wide with steel casings within a few feet of plaintiffs' bedrooms; the opening and closing of the windows caused a loud, slamming noise and the windows were frequently slammed about one o'clock in the morning. It further appeared that the defendants' windows, when fully opened, actually extended on plaintiffs' land a distance of 6 to 8 inches. In the course of construction the defendants also maintained a row of nitrogen lights in their buildings on the side opposite plaintiffs' bedrooms, which lights were turned on about midnight, and which disturbed the sleep of the plaintiffs. Other items of damage were the destruction of trees and shrubbery and the splattering of cement on plaintiffs' property. A decree was affirmed enjoining the nitrogen lights and the injury to trees and shrubbery, and awarding damages to the plaintiffs. This case also was one in which the interference was with the normal and ordinary use of the plaintiffs' property by persons of ordinary sensibilities.
and gasoline fumes, ringing of trolley bells, and brilliant lights outside of, and in the arena. It appeared that the lights were frequently flashing on and off.
decision to the extent of saying that "in the pursuit of this entertainment and pleasure, its devotees have no right to trespass upon the premises or disturb the ordinary use and enjoyment of the homes of law-abiding, industrious citizens". The case was sent back to the trial court for additional evidence upon the single issue as to the reasonable hour at which the games should close in order to properly protect the rights of the plaintiffs. The case was again before the Supreme Court upon plaintiffs' appeal from the decree of the lower court which was issued pursuant to the mandate of the Supreme Court on rehearing. The final injunction which was approved by the Supreme Court merely enjoined the defendants from allowing games to be played, noise incident to said games to exist, and lights used in connection with the games to shine on plaintiffs' premises so as to interfere with their sleep and with the reasonable and necessary enjoyment of their property after the hour of 10:45 P.M. The injunction also restrained defendants from allowing baseballs to be batted on the plaintiffs' premises. The final decree appears to have reduced the entire case to a tempest in a teapot.
"* * * if the statements of the bill are true, it would be impossible to sit upon complainant's front porch, and use the porch as a place of rest or pleasure, while such lights were being constantly thrown directly thereon. * * *"
It was held that the demurrer to the complaint was properly overruled. This case arose in Jackson, Mississippi in the year 1924. We doubt if the case would be followed in any state under conditions prevailing at the present time.
and lowers the value of the rooms. The court held that light "may become a nuisance if it materially interferes with the ordinary comfort physically of human existence". The trial judge held that the complainant was entitled to a decree restricting the operation of the electric lights during each night after the hour of 12 o'clock midnight. The plaintiff's hotel was located on the famous board walk at Atlantic City, where the primary activity appears to be the entertainment of luxury-loving people. We suspect that the court was moved by a comparison of the utility of plaintiff's hotel in that district with the utility of an advertising sign. In any event, the interference was with the normal and ordinary sensibilities of dwellers in the hotel, and with the ordinary use of property.
All of the cases in this group, with the exception of Shelburne v. Crossan, may be distinguished in two respects: In each case the shedding of light upon plaintiffs' property was only one, and a minor element among many, which, together, were held to constitute nuisance. In all of the cases, including the Shelburne case, the harm complained of related to the normal and ordinary use of residential property.
By way of summary, we have found no case in which it has been held that light alone constitutes a nuisance merely because it damaged one who was abnormally sensitive or whose use of his land was of a peculiarly delicate and sensitive character.
unimproved land. Neither party can claim any greater social utility than the other. Both were in process of construction at the same time, and the case should not be decided upon the basis of the priority of occupation. The case differs fundamentally from other cases, all typical cases of nuisance, in that light is not a noxious, but is, in general, a highly beneficial element. The development of parks and playgrounds equipped for the enjoyment of the working public, whose recreation is necessarily taken after working hours, and frequently after dark, is a significant phenomenon in thousands of urban communities. The court takes judicial knowledge that many lighted parks and fields are located adjacent to residential property and must to some extent interfere with the full enjoyment of darkness (if desired) by the residents.
We do not say that the shedding of light upon another's property may never under any conditions become a nuisance, but we do say that extreme caution must be employed in applying any such legal theory. The conditions of modern city life impose upon the city dweller and his property many burdens more severe than that of light reflected upon him or it.
or unreasonable as a matter of law. This crystallization may appear in the form of a legislative enactment, or it may be the result of a series of judicial decisions. * * *" Restatement of the Law of Torts, Vol. 4, § 826, comment d.
See also Shepler v. Kansas Milling Co., supra, and McCarty v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 189 N.Y. 40, 81 N.E. 549, where it is said that, "What is reasonable is sometimes a question of law and at others a question of fact". We limit our decision to the specific facts of this case and hold as a matter of law that the loss sustained by the plaintiff by the spilled light which has been reflected onto the highly sensitized moving picture screen from the defendant's property 832 feet distant, and which light in intensity is approximately that of a full moon, is damnum abseque injuria.
The trial court did not err in directing a verdict. The judgment is affirmed.

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