Source: https://cis.org/Report/Massive-Increase-Immigration-Court-Backlog
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 13:00:32+00:00

Document:
Changes in border enforcement policies will limit the number of new cases that are added to the immigration courts' dockets.
Changes to interior enforcement policies will reduce the incentives for aliens to remain in the United States and fight meritless cases.
Rescission of Obama-era policies will also reduce the incentives for aliens to remain in removal proceedings.
The attorney general must use his certification authority to set stricter standards for IJs to follow in granting continuances.
The Department of Justice must vigorously litigate cases in the federal circuit courts to provide the IJs with more "bright-line" rules to follow in deciding cases, and to limit variations in the law among circuits.
Why was there such a stark increase in the backlog of cases, and decrease in the percentage of cases completed? A variety of factors, some of them susceptible to analysis, others less so, contributed to what has become a vicious circle of backlog, delay, and continuance.
The first is resources. There are, simply put, too few judges (and complementary staff) to adequately do the job. With the swearing-in of 11 new IJs in June 2017, there are 326 so-called "adjudicator" IJs, including assistant chief IJs in the field who hear some cases.37 According to the Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse (TRAC) at Syracuse University, through May 2017, there were 598,943 pending cases in the nation's immigration courts.38 This means that there are approximately 1,837 pending cases per IJ. GAO determined that the average IJ completed 807 cases in FY 2015.39 Therefore, even if no new cases were filed, it would take the immigration courts more than two years to complete their pending cases.
Second, the number of hours that those IJs actually spend hearing cases is, on average, shrinking as the judges gain seniority. According to GAO, 39 percent of all IJs are eligible for retirement, which means that many are senior government employees, at the high end of the pay and leave scale.43 Senior government employees, those who have 15 or more years of federal government service, are entitled to eight hours of leave each pay period, about 208 hours or 23 (nine-hour) days per year.44 There are also 10 federal holidays per year when court is not in session.45 Finally, many IJs are on a "flex schedule", or "alternative work schedule" (AWS), meaning that they work eight nine-hour days and one eight-hour day per pay period, and get one extra day off, for an additional 26 "working" days off per year. Assuming that there are 260 working days in a year (five days in a work week times 52 weeks in the year), any potential IJ entitled to the full rate of leave receiving each federal holiday with AWS may only be working 201 of them (260-23-10-26), or just more than 40 work weeks per year. In addition, IJs receive one-half day every two weeks for case preparation (too little time for this purpose), another 13 "working" days per year not spent in court.
Third, the "surge" in families across the southern border has also contributed to the backlogs and delays in completion of cases in the immigration courts.
The cases highlighted54 by the referenced "EOIR officials" did, in fact, complicate courts' application of the "categorical approach" that IJs are required to apply in determining removability on many criminal grounds (Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243 (2016) and Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276 (2013)), as well as the standard for determining whether a drug offense is "illicit trafficking in a controlled substance" and therefore an "aggravated felony" under section 101(a)(43)(B) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) (Moncrieffe v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 1678 (2013)). In certain instances, those decisions would have mandated numerous remands from the BIA and federal circuit courts, and may have rendered otherwise-ineligible aliens eligible for relief; either scenario would have extended the length of numerous removal proceedings for IJ review and briefing by the parties.
Under Rodriguez, an alien is entitled to a bond hearing wherein the government bears the burden of showing by clear and convincing evidence that the alien poses a risk of flight or a danger to the community.56 This is a higher burden of proof than the "preponderance of the evidence" standard, "which only requires a showing that something is more likely than not to be true."57Moreover, unlike an initial bond hearing, where the alien bears the burden58 of showing that he or she is not a danger or flight risk, as noted, under Rodriguez, the government now bears that burden for continued detention past six months. This decision will encourage aliens with questionable cases to continue to fight their cases, knowing that they have a greater chance to be released after six months.
There is, however, significant pressure from federal courts and the BIA on IJs to grant continuances, and little downside to the IJs in doing so.
In determining whether to continue proceedings to afford the respondent an opportunity to apply for adjustment of status premised on a pending visa petition, a variety of factors may be considered, including, but not limited to: (1) the DHS response to the motion; (2) whether the underlying visa petition is prima facie approvable; (3) the respondent's statutory eligibility for adjustment of status; (4) whether the respondent's application for adjustment merits a favorable exercise of discretion; and (5) the reason for the continuance and other procedural factors.
Cases involving pending visas are not the only ones in which IJs feel pressure to grant continuances. If an alien is unrepresented, the court will generally grant at least one continuance to find counsel. If the court subsequently goes ahead thereafter, notwithstanding the request of the alien for an additional continuance to find counsel, the case will likely be remanded, and the IJ runs the risk of being accused of denying due process. Similarly, an IJ who refuses to grant multiple continuances to an alien to file an application for relief, or to submit evidence in a case, may be accused by a reviewing court of violating due process. In such an instance, the IJ's reputation would be besmirched, and the BIA or circuit court would simply remand the case, in essence granting the continuance requested.
[M]any community groups ... called for exercising prosecutorial discretion in individual cases by declining to put people in removal proceedings, terminating proceedings, or delaying removals in cases where people have longstanding ties to the community, U.S.-citizen family members, or other characteristics that merit a favorable exercise of discretion.
Over the course of the summer [of 2011], the Obama Administration began to address these requests [and requests from Congress], relying on its ability to exercise prosecutorial discretion in deportation decisions. On June 17, 2011, [ICE] Director John Morton issued a memorandum directing ICE staff to consider many of these same factors when deciding whether or not to exercise prosecutorial discretion. On August 18, 2011, in a response to the letter from Senator Durbin and others, DHS Secretary Janet Napolitano declined to grant deferral of removal to DREAM Act students across the board, but indicated a willingness to re-examine individual cases. She announced a two-pronged initiative to implement the June 2011 Morton memo across all DHS divisions to ensure that DHS priorities remained focused on removing persons who are most dangerous to the country.
These policies likely had another effect that is not quantifiable. Taken as a whole, DHS's purported "prosecutorial discretion" policies made it clear that most cases involving non-criminal aliens were not a priority for the Obama administration, and it would have been only natural for IJs to have placed a lower priority on completing those cases. It does not call the diligence of the IJ corps into question to suggest that many of the judges would have concluded that there was no reason to work overtime to complete matters that the president did not consider important, or to keep a docket of such cases on track.
This is especially true in light of the fact that the Enforcement Memo made clear that, as of November 20, 2014, final orders of removal issued before January 1, 2014, were not a priority.86 Given the lack of enforcement that memo represented, it would have been reasonable for any given IJ in a non-detained court to conclude that a removal order in today's case would soon no longer be tomorrow's priority, either.
This leads to the final factor: IJ burnout. A 2009 study found "many immigration judges adjudicating cases of asylum seekers are suffering from significant symptoms of secondary traumatic stress and job burnout, which, according to the researchers, may shape their judicial decision-making processes."87 IJs' working conditions have only gotten worse as the backlogs have grown.88 A crushing docket adds to the stress of being a judge, and as that stress rises, performance logically suffers. This would, in turn, result in more reversals and remands, adding even more cases to the backlog.
Although the problem of the backlog in the immigration courts may seem insurmountable, and the causes of that backlog may appear intractable, in reality, solutions to most of these problems can be found, assuming that the president has the will to enforce the immigration laws and Congress has the will to provide adequate resources to do the job.
If the attorney general is to be believed, more resources will soon be available to the immigration courts.
It should be noted, however, that simply hiring more judges is not enough. EOIR must position those judges where the need is greatest, and support those judges with enough staff, including clerks, to enable those IJs to discharge their duties efficiently. That said, more judges are better than fewer.
As an added benefit, those judges will also (in many if not most instances) come in with less seniority than the IJs they join. This means that they will receive fewer hours of leave per pay period, and will therefore be available to hear more cases on an annual basis.
A change in policy and rhetoric from the executive branch on immigration enforcement at the border and the interior will, however, likely be the biggest driver in lowering the number of incoming cases and shrinking the backlog.
Throughout the campaign, then-candidate Donald Trump made it clear that he intended to enforce the immigration laws if elected.90 Backing up this rhetoric as it pertained to those entering illegally, on January 25, 2017, President Trump issued Executive Order 13767, captioned "Border Security and Immigration Enforcement Improvements."91 While each of the sections of that order enhance immigration enforcement, four in particular will reduce the number of aliens who are placed into removal proceedings, by reducing the number of aliens entering the United States illegally.
The theory behind these provisions appears to be that, if a foreign national considering illegal entry into the United States knows that he or she will be arrested and detained (and possibly prosecuted) pending a determination of removability and relief, that foreign national will be less likely to try to enter illegally. If this is true, the order ostensibly has had the intended effect.
These numbers directly affect the backlog in the immigration courts, because the fewer aliens apprehended along the border, the fewer new removal cases will be filed in the immigration courts. In addition, it can be assumed that some significant proportion of those aliens would have claimed "credible fear" had they entered illegally.
A credible fear request is a precondition to filing a defensive asylum application for an alien in expedited removal proceedings under section 235(b) of the [INA]. That section of the INA allows immigration officers — rather than judges — to order the deportation of aliens who have failed to establish that they have been in the United States continuously for two years and who have been charged with inadmissibility under section 212(a)(6)(c) (fraud or misrepresentation) and/or section 212(a)(7) (no documentation) of the INA. DHS has expanded its use of expedited removal over the years.
The most common instance in which DHS uses expedited removal is when it apprehends (1) an alien seeking admission without a proper entry document at a port of entry; or (2) an alien who is attempting to enter or who has entered illegally along the border. If the alien asserts a fear of persecution, the arresting officer will refer the alien to an asylum officer for a "credible fear interview". If the asylum officer determines that the alien has a credible fear, the alien is placed in removal proceedings before an immigration judge, where the alien can file his or her application for asylum.
Once a "credible fear" case is referred to the immigration court, at least four separate hearings are held: a master calendar hearing at which pleadings are taken and the alien requests an opportunity to apply for asylum, withholding of removal, and/or protection under Article III of the Convention Against Torture; a request for a bond; a hearing at which the asylum application is filed; and at least one hearing on the merits of that application.99 While the first and second (or second and third) hearings are often held on the same docket, each requires at least a setting of the matter and takes up time on a docket. Moreover, there may be additional continuances when an alien seeks counsel or is released (requiring the case to be reset to a non-detained docket), or when additional time is sought to complete the application or to obtain evidence or witnesses. The fewer the "credible fear" cases, the fewer the hearings, and the lower the backlog, or at least the lower the increase in the backlog.
These decreases will, by themselves, significantly relieve additional pressure on the immigration courts' dockets, as explained above. And, as noted, cases involving UACs and families are generally more complex (and time-consuming), so the decline in the number of those cases will provide even more relief to the IJs.
That said, however, the reassignment of IJs under section 5(c) of the order has (or is likely to have) caused delays in the short term in the courts from which they were reassigned.104 In the long run, however, by deterring future illegal entries of aliens who will never appear on court dockets, the result of this change in policy should be a net decrease in the immigration courts' backlog.
A change in message and policy, as it relates to interior enforcement, will likely have a positive effect on the backlog as well.
In the short run, the additional number of aliens arrested and detained will likely increase the dockets of the immigration courts. Again, however, by making it clear that all aliens who are removable are subject to arrest and removal, Director Homan's statements (and ICE's actions) should deter individuals from seeking to enter illegally, which will reduce the burdens on the immigration courts' dockets in the long run.
Increased detention will also make it less likely that aliens with non-meritorious cases will remain in the court system. Logic and experience indicate that aliens enter the United States illegally to remain at large in the United States; assume for purposes of argument that they enter to work to provide for themselves and their families. The longer that the alien is able to remain at large and work, therefore, the better. If the alien is detained and cannot work, however, there is no longer an incentive to remain; instead, accepting an order of removal or a grant of the privilege of voluntary departure is therefore more advantageous to the alien than continued detention.
These policies and their implementation will also encourage aliens to leave the United States without ever coming to the attention of ICE. It is axiomatic that no one wants to be detained, and most aliens at large in the United States do not want to go through the process of deportation, either. As immigration enforcement becomes more of a certainty, therefore, aliens will be more likely to leave on their own. This is the "self-deportation" concept that Mitt Romney was excoriated for promoting in the 2012 election,111 but that has actually been demonstrated in at least one discrete context: aliens facing registration under post-9/11 policies, especially NSEERS.
Port-of-entry registration began as a pilot program in September 2002 and has been implemented at all ports of entry (e.g., border crossings, sea ports, and airports) since October 2002. Port-of-entry registration applies to all foreign visitors entering the U.S. since October 2002 who are identified as presenting an elevated national security concern or who are from Iran, Iraq, Libya, Sudan and Syria. The criteria for identifying these individuals is based on intelligence information provided to immigration officers at ports of entry or to visa-issuing officials abroad. Upon entry to the U.S., foreign visitors are fingerprinted, photographed, and asked detailed background information. Some 49,712 foreign visitors had registered through port-of-entry registration as of March 25, 2003. In addition to the initial registration, foreign visitors must also appear at a U.S. immigration office if they plan on staying in the country for more than 30 days, and all are required to complete a departure check only at a designated departure port (of which there are approximately 100 nationwide) on the same day that they intend to leave the country.
The lesson is that if the immigration laws are enforced, and if aliens believe that there is a possibility that they could face removal, they will act in a rational manner and leave without ever having to face that process. Although it is impossible to quantify the effect of those departures on the immigration court system, that effect would be real, and would spare the immigration courts the resources that they would have expended on removal proceedings for those aliens.
MPI has estimated that as many as 3.7 million aliens could have been covered by DAPA.120 Many aliens who were in removal proceedings at the time that DAPA was announced sought, and were granted, continuances to assess their eligibility and apply for that benefit, even though federal District Court Judge Andrew Hanen blocked that program from going into effect in February 2015.121 The ending of the program should clear the way for the completion of those cases.
The next step is for Attorney General Sessions is to issue a decision on certification that sets standards for the issuance of continuances in immigration court. As I explained above, there is currently little downside for an IJ who grants a continuance, but the judge may face problems if he or she denies one.
He should use this authority to set limits on the ability of IJs to grant continuances by specifying the parameters of their regulatory authority to do so "for good cause shown".123 I believe that most IJs would prefer such guidance to a system in which they have scant ability to control their dockets without running the risk of a reviewing court finding that they have denied "due process" by denying continuances to aliens who have already been granted numerous continuances.
Finally, DOJ must fight vigorously for decisions that provide uniformity of law and "bright-line" rules for IJs to apply in real-world cases. Most people I talk to about my work as an IJ are surprised when I tell them that I handled more than 15,000 cases in eight years on the bench. Because of the volume of cases they handle, IJs must be able to decide cases quickly, or run the risk that their dockets will be uncontrollable; otherwise, justice suffers, and the job becomes overwhelming. Uniform, clear standards of law are essential to this task.
In Hawaii v. Trump,124 its recent decision on the Executive Order125 suspending entry of nationals from six countries in Asia and Africa, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit stated that a nationwide injunction of portions of that order was necessary "because 'immigration laws of the United States should be enforced vigorously and uniformly.'" This is ironic coming from a court that has set rules for IJs to apply that vary significantly from those in the other circuits. The Supreme Court's docket, however, is finite, so cases must be won or lost in the circuit courts. It is the Justice Department's job to do so.
The backlogs in immigration courts are too large, but they are, to some degree, explained by the poor policies set by the executive branch in the recent past. There is much that needs to be done to remedy the problem, but the Trump administration has taken some crucial first steps. It must follow through on those steps and its promises on immigration enforcement to reduce those backlogs, and Congress must also do its part by providing the needed funding to fully staff the immigration courts.
1 "Actions Needed to Reduce Case Backlog and Address Long-Standing Management and Operational Challenges", GAO-17-438, Government Accountability Office, June 2017.
9 "United States Border Patrol Southwest Family Unit Subject and Unaccompanied Alien Children Apprehensions Fiscal Year 2016", U.S. Customs and Border Protection, October 18, 2016.
10 "Department of Justice Announces New Priorities to Address Surge of Migrants Crossing into the U.S." , U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Public Affairs, July 9, 2014.
11 See "Actions Needed to Reduce Case Backlog and Address Long-Standing Management and Operational Challenges", GAO-17-438, Government Accountability Office, June 2017, at 23.
13 See Rodriguez v. Robbins, 804 F.3d 1060, 1078-85 (9th Cir. 2015), cert. granted sub nom. Jennings v. Rodriguez, 136 S. Ct. 2489 (2016).
14 "Attorney General Jeff Sessions Announces the Department of Justice's Renewed Commitment to Criminal Immigration Enforcement", U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Public Affairs, April 11, 2017.
15 "About GAO", Government Accountability Office, undated.
16 "Actions Needed to Reduce Case Backlog and Address Long-Standing Management and Operational Challenges", GAO-17-438, Government Accountability Office, June 2017, at 3.
17 "Office of the Director", U.S. Department of Justice, Executive Office for Immigration Review, updated May 30, 2017.
18 See "Office of the Chief Immigration Judge", U.S. Department of Justice, Executive Office for Immigration Review, updated September 22, 2016.
19 "Actions Needed to Reduce Case Backlog and Address Long-Standing Management and Operational Challenges", GAO-17-438, Government Accountability Office, June 2017, Highlights.
20 See Id. at 22.
26 See "Immigration Court Practice Manual", U.S. Department of Justice, Executive Office for Immigration Review, undated, at 75-78.
27 See Matter of W-Y-U-, 27 I&N Dec. 17, at 17-18 (BIA 2017) (citations omitted).
28 "Actions Needed to Reduce Case Backlog and Address Long-Standing Management and Operational Challenges", GAO-17-438, Government Accountability Office, June 2017, at 24 n. 48.
29 Id. at 25, n. 50.
37 "Executive Office for Immigration Review Swears in 11 Immigration Judges", U.S. Department of Justice, Executive Office for Immigration Review, June 16, 2017.
38 "Immigration Court Backlog Tool, Pending Cases and Length of Wait in Immigration Court", Syracuse University, Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse (TRAC), May 2017.
39 "Actions Needed to Reduce Case Backlog and Address Long-Standing Management and Operational Challenges", GAO-17-438, Government Accountability Office, June 2017, at 23.
40 "Case Backlogs in Immigration Courts Expand, Resulting Wait Times Grow", Syracuse University, Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse (TRAC), June 18, 2009.
42 "Actions Needed to Reduce Case Backlog and Address Long-Standing Management and Operational Challenges", GAO-17-438, Government Accountability Office, June 2017, at 27.
44 See "Fact Sheet: Annual Leave (General Information), Annual Leave Entitlement", U.S. Office of Personnel Management, undated.
45 "2017 Holiday Schedule", U.S. Office of Personnel Management, undated.
46 "Actions Needed to Reduce Case Backlog and Address Long-Standing Management and Operational Challenges", GAO-17-438, Government Accountability Office, June 2017, at 131, Appendix III, Table 15.
47 "United States Border Patrol Southwest Family Unit Subject and Unaccompanied Alien Children Apprehensions Fiscal Year 2016", U.S. Customs and Border Protection, October 18, 2016.
48 "Department of Justice Announces New Priorities to Address Surge of Migrants Crossing into the U.S.", U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Public Affairs, July 9, 2014.
49 "Department of Justice Actions to Address the Influx of Migrants Crossing the Southwest Border in the United States", U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Public Affairs, undated.
51 "Actions Needed to Reduce Case Backlog and Address Long-Standing Management and Operational Challenges", GAO-17-438, Government Accountability Office, June 2017, at 131, Appendix III, Table 15.
55 Rodriguez v. Robbins, 804 F.3d 1060, 1078-85 (9th Cir. 2015), cert. granted sub nom. Jennings v. Rodriguez, 136 S. Ct. 2489 (2016).
57 Michael Kaufman and Michael Tan, "Bond Hearings for Immigrants Subject to Prolonged Immigration Detention, in the Ninth Circuit", American Civil Liberties Union, December 2015, at 8.
58 Matter of Fatahi, 26 I&N Dec. 791, 793 (BIA 2016).
59 "Actions Needed to Reduce Case Backlog and Address Long-Standing Management and Operational Challenges", GAO-17-438, Government Accountability Office, June 2017, at 69.
60 8 C.F.R. § 1003.29 (2017).
61 Matter of Hashmi, 24 I&N Dec. 785, 790 (BIA 2009).
64 Simon v. Holder, 654 F. 3d 440 (3d Cir. 2011).
70 "Board of Immigration Appeals Practice Manual, § 4.14", U.S. Department of Justice, Executive Office for Immigration Review, July 27, 2015, at 69.
71 See Matter of M-D-, 24 I&N Dec. 138, 139 (BIA 2007).
72 "Actions Needed to Reduce Case Backlog and Address Long-Standing Management and Operational Challenges", GAO-17-438, Government Accountability Office, June 2017, at 69.
73 "Consideration of Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA)" , U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, December 22, 2016.
76 "Consideration of Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals Process, Frequently Asked Questions", U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, April 25, 2017.
77 Miley & Brown, P.C., "Removal Proceedings – Practical Tips In A Post DACA/DAPA World", undated.
78 "Understanding Prosecutorial Discretion in Immigration Law", American Immigration Council, May 26, 2011.
79 "Understanding Prosecutorial Discretion in Immigration Law", Immigration Policy Center, American Immigration Council, September 2011.
80 Riah Ramlogan, acting principal legal advisor, "Guidance Regarding Cases Pending Before EOIR Impacted by Secretary Johnson's Memorandum entitled Policies for the Apprehension, Detention and Removal of Undocumented immigrants", U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, April 6, 2015, at 1-2.
81 Jeh Johnson, secretary of Homeland Security, "Policies for the Apprehension, Detention and Removal of Undocumented Immigrants", November 20, 2014.
84 Riah Ramlogan, acting principal legal advisor, "Guidance Regarding Cases Pending Before EOIR Impacted by Secretary Johnson's Memorandum entitled Policies for the Apprehension, Detention and Removal of Undocumented immigrants", U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, April 6, 2015, at 2.
85 "Actions Needed to Reduce Case Backlog and Address Long-Standing Management and Operational Challenges", GAO-17-438, Government Accountability Office, June 2017, at 126, Appendix III, Table 13.
86 Jeh Johnson, secretary of Homeland Security, "Policies for the Apprehension, Detention and Removal of Undocumented Immigrants", November 20, 2014, at 4.
87 See Kirsten Michener, "Stress and burnout found among nation's immigration judges", University of California San Francisco, June 25, 2009.
88 See Rachel Glickhouse, "Immigration judges are burning out faster than prison wardens and hospital doctors", Quartz, August 3, 2015.
89 "Attorney General Jeff Sessions Announces the Department of Justice's Renewed Commitment to Criminal Immigration Enforcement", U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Public Affairs, April 11, 2017.
90 See Miriam Valverde, "Compare the candidates: Clinton vs. Trump on immigration", Politifact, July 15, 2016: "Presidential candidates Donald Trump and Hillary Clinton have taken opposite roads on their quest for immigration reform. Trump calls for mass deportations, migrant bans and a wall to keep away people from coming into the country, while Clinton wants a pathway to citizenship, immigrant integration and protection from deportation."
91 E.O. 13767, "Border Security and Immigration Enforcement Improvements", January 25, 2017.
92 Id. at section 2.
93 Id. at section 5.
94 Id. at section 6.
95 Id. at section 13.
96 "Southwest Border Migration", U.S. Customs and Border Protection, June 8, 2017.
98 Andrew R. Arthur, "Fraud in the 'Credible Fear' Process, Threats to the Integrity of the Asylum System", Center for Immigration Studies, April 2017.
99 "I-589, Application for Asylum and for Withholding of Removal", U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, March 23, 2017.
100 See "Southwest Border Migration", U.S. Customs and Border Protection, June 8, 2017.
104 See Jonathan Blitzer, "What Will Trump Do with Half a Million Backlogged Immigration Cases?" , The New Yorker, June 20, 2017: "Since March, New York City, for example, has had at least eight of its twenty-nine immigration judges reassigned, at least temporarily, to Texas and Louisiana, WNYC has reported. But in relocating them the federal government is exacerbating the city's own significant backlog: roughly eighty thousand pending cases and an average delay of six hundred and twenty-five days per case."
105 "Executive Order 13768, Enhancing Public Safety in the Interior of the United States", the White House, January 25, 2017.
107 See Paul Bedard, "ICE chief rips critics of deportations, entering illegally 'is a crime", Washington Examiner, June 13, 2017.
108 Thomas Homan, "Immigration and Customs Enforcement & Customs and Border Protection FY18 Budget Request", testimony before the House Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Homeland Security, 115th Congress, 2017.
109 Stephen Dinan, "No apologies: ICE chief says illegal immigrants should live in fear of deportation", Washington Times, June 13, 2017.
110 Thomas Homan, "Immigration and Customs Enforcement & Customs and Border Protection FY18 Budget Request", testimony before the House Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Homeland Security, 115th Congress, 2017.
111 See Lucy Madison, "Romney on immigration: I'm for 'self-deportation'", CBS News, January 24, 2012.
112 See Kris W. Kobach, "State and Local Authority to Enforce Immigration Law: A Unified Approach for Stopping Terrorists", Center for Immigration Studies, June 2004.
113 See Maia Jachimowicz and Ramah McKay, "Special Registration' Program", Migration Policy Institute, April 1, 2003.
115 Rachel L. Swarns, "Thousands of Arabs and Muslims Could Be Deported, Officials Say", The New York Times, June 7, 2003.
118 "Rescission of Memorandum Providing for Deferred Action for Parents of Americans and Lawful Permanent Residents ('DAPA')" , U.S. Department of Homeland Security, June 15, 2017.
119 "2014 Executive Actions on Immigration", U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, April 15, 2015.
120 "MPI: As Many as 3.7 Million Unauthorized Immigrants Could Get Relief from Deportation under Anticipated New Deferred Action Program", Migration Policy Institute, November 19, 2014.
121 Texas v. United States, 86 F. Supp. 3d 591 (S.D. Tex. 2015), affirmed 809 F.3d 134 (5th Cir. 2015).
122 Matter of A-H-, 23 I&N Dec. 774, 779 n. 4 (A.G. 2005), review granted in part on other grounds sub nom. Haddam v. Holder, 547 Fed.Appx. 306 (4th Cir. 2013).
123 8 C.F.R. § 1003.29 (2017).
124 Hawaii v. Trump, __ F.3d __ (9th Cir. 2017).
125 Executive Order 13780, "Protecting The Nation From Foreign Terrorist Entry Into The United States", the White House, March 6, 2017.

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