Source: https://justice.org/what-we-do/enhance-practice-law/publications/trial-magazine/defending-servicemembers-forced
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 06:41:59+00:00

Document:
Federal law protects the employment rights of servicemembers who leave their jobs for active duty—but their ability to assert those rights in court is being compromised.
People are often surprised to find that employers sometimes fire or refuse to rehire servicemembers­ returning from active duty even though the Uniformed Services Employment and ­Reemployment Rights Act of 1994 (USERRA) protects against this discrimination.1 The statute guarantees them prompt reemployment to their civilian jobs and provides federal courts with broad powers to enforce those rights.
But with forced arbitration agreements becoming more common—and with five federal appellate courts having addressed their validity in the context of USERRA—it is crucial to understand the current legal landscape.
Before USERRA, a handful of cases addressed the validity of forced arbitration clauses involving veterans’ employment rights, and arbitration provisions in employment agreements were not often used outside of collective bargaining agreements. Two U.S. Supreme Court decisions also ensured veterans could enforce their employment and ­reemployment rights in court under USERRA’s statutory predecessors.
Following these principles, district courts generally concluded that employers could not impose other requirements to “thwart the clear purpose”6 of statutes guaranteeing ­servicemembers’ reemployment­ rights. Even if the plaintiff had proceeded to arbitration and received an ­unfavorable ruling, the ruling would not prevent the plaintiff from pursuing his or her right in court since the federal courts are the exclusive forum for the vindication of these “distinctively federal rights.”7 While several district courts followed this rationale in the USERRA context as recently as 12 years ago, today’s judiciary has rejected these principles.
The Sixth Circuit’s concurring opinion, however, acknowledged that its decision precludes an employer from requiring an employee to submit to arbitration as a prerequisite to filing suit in federal court but requires an employee to substitute federal court with arbitration if the contract requires him or her to do so.20 This strange result contradicts the plain language of §4302(b) and is not likely what Congress intended.
The Federal Circuit addressed mandatory arbitration for USERRA claims in an unpublished ­decision. In Russell v. Merit Systems Protection Board, the collective bargaining agreement required that the employee submit her USERRA claim to arbitration.21 Without citing the Fifth or Sixth Circuit decisions, the Federal Circuit concluded that the plain language of §4302(b) prohibited such a provision because it “amounts to an impermissible attempt to subordinate individual rights under USERRA to majoritarian collective bargaining processes” and that ­USERRA’s legislative history confirmed the result.22 As there should be no difference between an arbitration clause in collective bargaining and an arbitration clause in an individual agreement, the Federal Circuit reached a different conclusion than the Fifth and Sixth Circuits.
In the Fifth, Sixth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits, challenging arbitration provisions involving USERRA claims will be limited to the same grounds on which any other arbitration provisions can be challenged. In other circuits, however, you can argue that §4302(b) precludes arbitration—and that any decisions to the contrary suffer from flawed reasoning.
Third, CompuCredit and other employment-rights statutes are distinguishable, as explained by the concurring opinion in Ziober.32 The concurring opinion recognized the argument that USERRA contains a “contrary congressional command” that overrides the FAA’s pro-arbitration mandate.
Finally, particularly with respect to arbitration agreements with provisions that violate other sections of USERRA—such as requiring payment of costs, allowing cost-shifting, or limiting venue options—you can argue that there is a conflict with USERRA’s purpose. The point of the statute is to ensure that servicemembers are promptly ­reemployed and can enforce those employment rights through specific provisions.
Hopefully, members of Congress who publicly praise our veterans and ­servicemembers will back up those words with action—and pass legislation ensuring their ability to enforce their USERRA rights in court.
R. Joseph Barton is a partner at Block & Leviton in Washington, D.C. He can be reached at joe@blockesq.com.
38 U.S.C. §§4301 et seq. (2012).
See Rivera-Melendez v. Pfizer Pharm., LLC, 730 F.3d 49, 54 (1st Cir. 2013) (citing 20 C.F.R. §1002.2 (2017)).
328 U.S. 275, 285 (1946).
357 U.S. 265, 268 (1958).
Taylor v. S. Pac. Co., 308 F. Supp. 606, 609 (N.D. Cal. 1969).
Kidder v. E. Air Lines, Inc., 469 F. Supp. 1060, 1065 (S.D. Fla. 1978) (quoting McKinney v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas Railroad Co., 357 U.S. at 269); see also Brown v. Consol. Rail Corp., 605 F. Supp. 629, 633 (N.D. Ohio 1985).
Garrett v. Cir. City Stores, Inc., 449 F.3d 672, 673 (5th Cir. 2006).
Garrett v. Cir. City Stores, Inc., 338 F. Supp. 2d 717, 722 (N.D. Tex. 2004), rev’d, 449 F.3d 672 (5th Cir. 2006).
Garrett, 449 F.3d at 677.
500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991).
38 U.S.C. §4302 (2012) (emphasis added).
H.R. Rep. No. 103-65 (1994).
Landis v. Pinnacle Eye Care, LLC, 537 F.3d 559, 562–64 (6th Cir. 2008).
Id. at 564 (Cole, J. concurring).
Russell v. Merit Sys. Protec. Bd., 324 Fed. App’x 872 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (unpublished).
Id. at 875 (quoting Russell v. Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm’n, 104 M.S.P.R. 14, 19 (2006)).
Ziober v. BLB Resources, Inc., 839 F.3d 814, 818 (9th Cir. 2016) (citing CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 565 U.S. 95, 98 (2012)).
Bodine v. Cook’s Pest Control, Inc., 830 F.3d 1320, 1325–26 (11th Cir. 2016).
Id. at 1332–33 (Martin, J. dissenting).
Lopez v. Dillard’s Inc., 382 F. Supp. 2d 1245, 1248 (D. Kan. 2005).
Henderson v. Shinseki, 562 U.S. 428 (2011); Kirkendall v. Dep’t of Army, 479 F.3d 830, 843–44 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (en banc); Feore v. North Shore Bus Co., 161 F.2d 552, 553–54 (2d Cir. 1947).
Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115, 118 (1994).
See King v. St. Vincent’s Hosp., 502 U.S. 215, 220 n.9 (1991).
Ziober, 839 F.3d at 822 (Watford, J. concurring).
Milhauser v. Minco Prods., Inc., 701 F.3d 268, 273 (8th Cir. 2012) (according “considerable deference to the Secretary’s interpretation, since [the DOL] is tasked with ‘implementing the provisions’ of USERRA”).
“It is the Committee’s intent that, even if a person protected under the Act resorts to arbitration, any arbitration decision shall not be binding as a matter of law.” H.R. Rep. 103-65, supra note 13, at 20.
“Section 4302(b) would reaffirm a general preemption as to state and local laws and ordinances as well as to employer practices and agreements, which provide fewer rights or otherwise limit rights provided under amended chapter 43 or put additional conditions on those rights . . . Moreover, this section would reaffirm that additional resort to mechanisms such as grievance procedures or arbitration or similar administrative appeals is not required.” H.R. Rep. 103-65, supra note 13, at 20.
14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 556 U.S. 247, 258 (2009).
Ziober, 839 F.3d at 822 (Watford, J. concurring); Landis, 537 F.3d at 565 (Cole, J. concurring).

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