Source: https://caselaw.findlaw.com/us-2nd-circuit/1717876.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 19:32:42+00:00

Document:
Before WALKER, JACOBS, and LIVINGSTON, Circuit Judges. Randolph Z. Volkell, Law Office of Randolph Z. Volkell, Merrick, NY, for Petitioner–Appellant. Donald J. Berk, Assistant District Attorney, Nassau County (Madeline Singas, District Attorney, Nassau County, Tammy J. Smiley, Assistant District Attorney, on the brief), Mineola, NY, for Respondent–Appellee.
Petitioner-appellant David Martinez appeals from the decision of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York (Gershon, J.), denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. [A 1] Although Martinez seeks to challenge his 2007 New York state conviction for charges including murder in the second degree, he failed to file his petition within the one-year limitations period provided by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) (2015) (“AEDPA”). The district court held that Martinez was not entitled to equitable tolling of the statute of limitations because he had not acted with reasonable diligence during the period for which he sought tolling. [A 10] We conclude that the court's analysis of Martinez's degree of diligence was premised upon a misapplication of our decision in Doe v. Menefee, 391 F.3d 147 (2d Cir.2004). Accordingly, we VACATE the district court's order dismissing the petition and REMAND the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
On July 20, 2007, David Martinez entered a guilty plea in New York state court to charges including attempted murder, robbery, and assault. [A 1–2, RB 3] On February 11, 2008, he was sentenced to twelve years' imprisonment, five years' post-release supervision, and restitution. [RB 5] He was then transferred to the custody of the New York State Department of Corrections and Community Supervision. [RB 6] Martinez immediately hired an attorney to seek post-conviction relief, but this attorney evidently showed a greater interest in collecting fee payments than in providing Martinez with adequate representation. The attorney missed the habeas petition deadline and was barely responsive to Martinez's case, as the following facts demonstrate.
Denaro claims his firm sent Martinez two letters in early 2009, more than ten months after Martinez hired him: a letter from Denaro on January 28, 2009, enclosing all court documents in his possession, and a letter from Denaro's colleague, Jack Evans, on February 12, 2009, requesting a detailed statement of the facts and circumstances in his case. [A 3, 14] Denaro also claims he received a letter on March 3, 2009 from Martinez, answering Evans' request. [BB 3] None of these letters are in the record, however, and Martinez claims Denaro sent him “nothing” until March 4, 2009. [A 3].
We review de novo a district court's denial of equitable tolling when premised on a finding that “governing legal standards would not permit equitable tolling in the circumstances.” Belot v. Burge, 490 F.3d 201, 206 (2d Cir.2007); see Dillon v. Conway, 642 F.3d 358, (2d Cir.2011) (per curiam).
The district court dismissed Martinez's petition as untimely under AEDPA. That act places a one-year limitation on a prisoner's right to seek federal review of a state criminal conviction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Smith v. McGinnis, 208 F.3d 13, 15 (2d Cir.2000) (per curiam). The statute of limitations “runs from the latest of a number of triggering events, including the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review.” Rivas v. Fischer, 687 F.3d 514, 533 (2d Cir.2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). AEDPA's time constraint “promotes judicial efficiency and conservation of judicial resources” and “safeguards the accuracy of state court judgments by requiring resolution of constitutional questions while the record is fresh.” Acosta v. Artuz, 221 F.3d 117, 123 (2d Cir.2000).
A petitioner may secure equitable tolling of the limitations period in certain “rare and exceptional circumstance[s].” Smith, 208 F.3d at 17 (internal quotation marks omitted); see Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 649 (2010). The petitioner must establish that (a) “extraordinary circumstances” prevented him from filing a timely petition, and (b) he acted with “reasonable diligence” during the period for which he now seeks tolling. Smith, 208 F.3d at 17. Attorney error generally does not rise to the level of an “extraordinary circumstance.” Baldayaque v. United States, 338 F.3d 145, 152 (2d Cir.2003). However, attorney negligence may constitute an extraordinary circumstance when it is “so egregious as to amount to an effective abandonment of the attorney-client relationship.” Rivas, 687 F.3d at 538.
As we explain below, in assessing whether Martinez's level of diligence rendered him ineligible for equitable tolling, the district court premised its conclusions on a misapplication of Doe . The district court specifically should have (a) considered the effect of Denaro's misleading conduct on Martinez's ability to evaluate his lawyer's performance, (b) inquired further into Martinez's financial and logistical ability to secure alternative legal representation, (c) inquired further into Martinez's ability to comprehend legal materials and file his own petition, and (d) tailored its “reasonable diligence” analysis to the circumstances of a counseled litigant.
To qualify for equitable tolling, a petitioner must “act as diligently as reasonably could have been expected under the circumstances.” Baldayaque, 338 F.3d at 153 (emphasis in original). Doe designated four factors relevant to a diligence inquiry “in the attorney incompetence context”: (1) “the purpose for which the petitioner retained the lawyer,” (2) “his ability to evaluate the lawyer's performance,” (3) “his financial and logistical ability to consult other lawyers or obtain new representation,” and (4) “his ability to comprehend legal materials and file the petition on his own.” Doe, 391 F.3d at 175.
The first Doe factor, as the district court acknowledged, supports a finding in favor of Martinez. [A 10] Martinez hired Denaro to handle all his post-conviction relief, including a potential federal habeas petition. [A 10] The timely filing of that petition thus fit squarely within Martinez's reasonable expectations.
The second Doe factor, contrary to the district court conclusion, also supports a finding in favor of Martinez. Martinez's ability to evaluate his lawyer's performance was compromised by Denaro's active concealment of his firm's poor performance. The firm sent numerous billing statements and requests for information, implying ongoing work. [BB 3–4] Letters from the firm also consistently contained reassuring language. A May 4, 2009 letter, for example, promised the firm would “do what we can to help you.” [A 45] An April 30, 2009 letter said the firm was “mak[ing] every effort to assist you.” [A 48] A June 25, 2009 letter stated that Denaro had “thoroughly investigated and researched the appeal issues” and could bring to bear “forty-five years [of] legal experience” and a “record [of] favorable results” on Martinez's behalf. [A 49] A November 13, 2009 letter said that the firm was “working very hard to make this happen for you.” [A 5] Although Denaro often left Martinez waiting for months for updates on the case, the evident tendency of Denaro's correspondence would have been to lull Martinez into believing that the firm was hard at work during periods of non-communication.
The district court found that “[t]here is no reason to believe that Mr. Martinez could not evaluate Mr. Denaro's performance” because Martinez was able to critically analyze the lawyer's work in complaints filed years later. [A 10] However, the district court should have considered whether Denaro's written misrepresentations reasonably could have impeded and delayed Martinez's ability to evaluate his lawyer's performance at the time that it mattered and without the benefit of hindsight.
The district court placed particular weight upon our statement in Doe that “it would be inequitable to require less diligence from petitioners who are able to hire attorneys than from those who are forced to proceed pro se.” Doe, 391 F.3d at 175.[A 9] It is important to clarify that statement. Although we do not require less diligence from counseled litigants, it should be recognized that a counseled litigant may display the same level of diligence in a different way. A litigant with an attorney, for example, may reasonably delegate certain tasks and decisions to the attorney. The litigant may then reasonably rely upon the attorney to do the necessary work, if, as here, the attorney leads the client to believe that he is fully engaged in the matter.
We stated in Doe that “the act of retaining an attorney does not absolve the petitioner of his responsibility for overseeing the attorney's conduct or the preparation of the petition,” id., and we still endorse that statement. Martinez, however, not only swiftly secured representation but also made efforts to reach out to Denaro and ensure that the attorney was diligently pursuing post-conviction relief. Martinez repeatedly wrote to Denaro to inquire about his case and responded promptly each time his attorney asked for information. [RB 12–13, BB 9] Eight months after receiving his last communication from Denaro, which itself was ten months after the habeas corpus deadline had passed, Martinez filed a writ of error coram nobis pro se in August 2010 and wrote letters to the Grievance Committee in September 2010, December 2010, and August 2011. [RB 12–13, BB 10] The district court stated that, because the Grievance Committee letters were sent after the habeas deadline had passed, “that evidence is not relevant to the court's equitable tolling analysis.” [A 10] However, given that Martinez seeks tolling for the entire period between when his judgment became final and when he ultimately filed his habeas petition pro se, his actions after the deadline passed remain relevant to the tolling analysis. These letters, as well as Martinez's efforts to communicate with his attorney and his pro se filings, all indicate diligence.
To be sure, significant gaps in the record also indicate that Martinez may have been inactive for portions of the time for which he now seeks tolling. [RB 6–10, 18–19] However, Martinez must be given the opportunity to explain his activity level during these time periods. Whether the gaps truly indicate inactivity, and whether such inactivity overcomes the acts of diligence that Martinez did exhibit, will be matters for the district court to examine on remand. Viewing the record in the context of Denaro's extraordinary misconduct, we conclude that there are significant indications that Martinez acted with reasonable diligence and that these indications justified a more detailed inquiry and findings by the district court. In light of these findings and in light of our clarification of Doe, we remand this matter to the district court for a hearing on the issue of diligence.
For the reasons stated above, we VACATE the district court's order dismissing the petition and REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
2. Ordinarily, of course, a litigant who relies on his attorney bears the risk of his agent's negligence (with respect to missed deadlines and otherwise). See Lawrence v. Florida, 549 U.S. 327, 336 (2007). However, when an attorney actually impedes timely filing in circumstances (such as abandonment) that are extraordinary, the petitioner's reasonable reliance on counsel is relevant to his reasonable diligence for the purposes of equitable tolling.

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