Source: https://wcc.state.ct.us/crb/2012/5699crb.htm
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 04:40:17+00:00

Document:
Cordero v. State Auto Sales, Inc.
The claimant was represented by Meghan A. Woods, Esq., McHugh, Chapman and Montalbano, LLC, 140 Washington Street, Middletown, CT 06457.
David Brancale, 333 South Broad Street, Meriden, CT 06450, appeared in his capacity as Vice President of State Auto Sales, Inc.
The Second Injury Fund was represented by Michael J. Belzer, Esq., Assistant Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General, 55 Elm Street, PO Box 120, Hartford, CT 06141-0120.
This Petition for Review from the November 8, 2011 Finding and Award of the Commissioner acting for the Sixth District was heard April 27, 2012 before a Compensation Review Board panel consisting of the Commission Chairman John A. Mastropietro and Commissioners Jodi Murray Gregg and Daniel E. Dilzer.
JOHN A. MASTROPIETRO, CHAIRMAN. The present appeal is from a Finding and Award where the trial commissioner dealt with the impact of an uninsured employer declaring bankruptcy. The trial commissioner levied an award directly against the Second Injury Fund, (“Fund”) believing that he was legally prevented from assessing an award against the respondent-employer by virtue of its bankruptcy. The Fund has appealed this decision. We believe this decision was an incorrect application of the law. We remand this matter to the trial commissioner to assess initial liability for the award to the respondent-employer; with the Fund responsible pursuant to statute for any benefits due the claimant that the respondent is unable to pay.
“ . . . the automatic stay . . . is modified to the extent necessary to permit Rafael Cordero and/or his successors and assigns to pursue recovery from the Second Injury Fund pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. §31-355; provided, however, subject to further order of the court, recovery shall be limited to distributions from the Second Injury Fund.” Findings, ¶ 5.
While the Order Granting Relief From Stay in the bankruptcy allows the Claimant to pursue benefits from the Second Injury Fund, the effect of the bankruptcy proceeding precludes a finding against the Respondent-Employer. Conclusion, ¶ F.
The trial commissioner explained his reasoning that due to the bankruptcy filing the Fund should consider the statutory prerequisite of an unpaid award against the respondent having already been satisfied.1 The commissioner issued orders against the Fund directing them to make payment to the claimant and various medical providers. The Fund filed a Motion to Correct seeking that the “statutorily necessary step” of entering an award against State Auto Sales, Inc., be done so as to enable it to jurisdictionally take responsibility for the award. The trial commissioner denied the Motion to Correct in its entirety and the Fund has pursued this appeal.
The Fund argues in its appeal that it is strictly limited in its statutory authority and in the absence of an award against the respondent-employer it may not take further action. The Fund cites Going v. Cromwell Fire District, 159 Conn. 53 (1970) and Everett v. Ingraham, 150 Conn. 153 (1962) for this stance. In the Fund’s view, in the absence of an award first levied against the respondent-employer any payment to the claimant or his medical providers would be ultra vires.
The claimant argues that the Bankruptcy Court order prohibited a Finding and Award against the respondent-employer. Based on the claimant’s interpretation of the Bankruptcy Court order the respondent-employer is already “unable to pay” any award in accordance with the statute and the Fund should immediately commence payment. The claimant argues that the trial commissioner had the power, pursuant to Hunnihan v. Mattatuck Mfg. Co., 243 Conn. 438 (1997), to interpret statutes other than Chapter 568 if it was necessary to render a decision in a workers’ compensation hearing. The claimant believes the trial commissioner properly applied the Bankruptcy Code to the facts in this case.
We agree with the claimant’s position that Hunnihan, supra, enables a trial commissioner to consider statutes such as the Bankruptcy Code when rendering a decision. However appellate authority on this point leads us to a different legal conclusion.
Over thirty years ago the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals issued its decision in In re Mansfield Tire and Rubber Company, 660 F.2d 1108 (1981). The Mansfield Tire case stands for the principle that administration of workers’ compensation claims by a state agency are a valid exercise of the government’s police or regulatory powers, and therefore, were exempt from the automatic stay provisions (11 USC § 362) of the bankruptcy code. Id. The Mansfield Tire case continues to be good law, and suggests a different interpretation of law than that espoused by the trial commissioner.
Reading the order of the Bankruptcy Court in the context of the Mansfield Tire decision it is clear that while the Commission may not be able to enforce an order against the assets of the bankrupt employer-respondent, this Commission is not barred from issuing an order.2 The plain language of the Bankruptcy Court order permits the trial commissioner to take actions “to the extent necessary” to pursue recovery against the Fund. The claimant was limited to recovery against the Fund “subject to further order of the court.” This clause suggests that in the event the Bankruptcy Court dismissed the respondent-employer’s petition, or determined assets were available to creditors, the claimant would retain rights to recovery. We presume that by citing § 31-355 C.G.S. in its order the Bankruptcy Court was aware that this statute requires an award to be levied and unpaid so as to allow the Fund to administer the claim; therefore, we do not presume the order would prevent the trial commissioner from placing an award against the respondent-employer. Had the Bankruptcy Court intended such a prohibition, we believe the order would have specifically said that.
The facts herein are distinguishable from Pascarelli v. Moliterno Stone Sales, 14 Conn. Workers’ Comp. Rev. Op. 328, 2115 CRB-4-94-8 (September 15, 1995), aff’d, 44 Conn. App. 397 (1997), which the claimant cites. In that case, there had been no modification to the employer-respondent’s automatic stay prior to the hearing on the claim. We held that while the claimant believed § 31-287 C.G.S. would allow his claim to proceed; this position was not persuasive.3 We held that since these proceedings would directly affect the debtor’s estate the trial commissioner could reasonably conclude these issues went beyond the exemption from the automatic stay granted workers’ compensation commissions in Mansfield Tire. We do not find Pascarelli particularly relevant in cases where the automatic stay has already been modified by the Bankruptcy Court.
We believe an appropriate reading of the relevant precedent and the plain meaning of the Bankruptcy Court order would enable an order to issue against the employer-respondent with its enforcement stayed barring further court order. This would establish the statutory basis for the Fund to pay the claim. We believe this reading is more consistent with the statutes herein and the intent of the Bankruptcy Court.
The matter is remanded to the trial commissioner for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

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