Source: https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution-conan/article-3/section-1/ancillary-powers-of-federal-courts
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 04:29:40+00:00

Document:
The nature of the contempt power was described Justice Field, writing for the Court in Ex parte Robinson,202 sustaining the act of 1831: “The power to punish for contempts is inherent in all courts; its existence is essential to the preservation of order in judicial proceedings, and to the enforcement of the judgments, orders, and writs of the courts, and consequently to the due administration of justice. The moment the courts of the United States were called into existence and invested with jurisdiction over any subject, they became possessed of this power.” Expressing doubts concerning the validity of the act as to the Supreme Court, he declared, however, that there could be no question of its validity as applied to the lower courts on the ground that they are created by Congress and that their “powers and duties depend upon the act calling them into existence, or subsequent acts extending or limiting their jurisdiction.”203 With the passage of time, later adjudications, especially after 1890, came to place more emphasis on the inherent power of courts to punish contempts than upon the power of Congress to regulate summary attachment.
By 1911, the Court was saying that the contempt power must be exercised by a court without referring the issues of fact or law to another tribunal or to a jury in the same tribunal.204 In Michaelson v. United States,205 the Court intentionally placed a narrow interpretation upon those sections of the Clayton Act206 relating to punishment for contempt of court by disobedience of injunctions in labor disputes. The sections in question provided for a jury upon the demand of the accused in contempt cases in which the acts committed in violation of district court orders also constituted a crime under the laws of the United States or of those of the state where they were committed. Although Justice Sutherland reaffirmed earlier rulings establishing the authority of Congress to regulate the contempt power, he went on to qualify this authority and declared that “the attributes which inhere in the power [to punish contempt] and are inseparable from it can neither be abrogated nor rendered practically inoperative.” The Court mentioned specifically “the power to deal summarily with contempt committed in the presence of the courts or so near thereto as to obstruct the administration of justice,” and the power to enforce mandatory decrees by coercive means.207 This latter power, to enforce, the Court has held, includes the authority to appoint private counsel to prosecute a criminal contempt.208 Although the contempt power may be inherent, it is not unlimited. In Spallone v. United States,209 the Court held that a district court had abused its discretion by imposing contempt sanctions on individual members of a city council for refusing to vote to implement a consent decree remedying housing discrimination by the city. The proper remedy, the Court indicated, was to proceed first with contempt sanctions against the city, and only if that course failed should it proceed against the council members individually.
First Amendment Limitations on the Contempt Power.
The phrase, “in the presence of the Court or so near thereto as to obstruct the administration of justice,” was interpreted so broadly in Toledo Newspaper Co. v. United States210 as to uphold the action of a district court judge in punishing a newspaper for contempt for publishing spirited editorials and cartoons issues raised in an action challenging a street railway’s rates. A majority of the Court held that the test to be applied in determining the obstruction of the administration of justice is not the actual obstruction resulting from an act, but “the character of the act done and its direct tendency to prevent and obstruct the discharge of judicial duty.” Similarly, the test whether a particular act is an attempt to influence or intimidate a court is not the influence exerted upon the mind of a particular judge but “the reasonable tendency of the acts done to influence or bring about the baleful result . . . without reference to the consideration of how far they may have been without influence in a particular case.”211 In Craig v. Hecht,212 these criteria were applied to sustain the imprisonment of the comptroller of New York City for writing and publishing a letter to a public service commissioner criticizing the action of a United States district judge in receivership proceedings.
Due Process Limitations on Contempt Power: Right to Jury Trial.
Due Process Limitations on Contempt Powers: Impartial Tribunal.
In Offutt v. United States,239 acting under its supervisory powers over the lower federal courts, the Court set aside a criminal contempt conviction imposed on a lawyer after a trial marked by highly personal recriminations between the trial judge and the lawyer. In a situation in which the record revealed that the contumacious conduct was the product of both lack of self-restraint on the part of the contemnor and a reaction to the excessive zeal and personal animosity of the trial judge, the majority felt that any contempt trial must be held before another judge. This holding, that when a judge becomes personally embroiled in the controversy with an accused he must defer trial of his contempt citation to another judge, which was founded on the Court’s supervisory powers, was constitutionalized in Mayberry v. Pennsylvania,240 in which a defendant acting as his own counsel engaged in quite personal abuse of the trial judge. The Court appeared to leave open the option of the trial judge to act immediately and summarily to quell contempt by citing and convicting an offender, thus empowering the judge to keep the trial going,241 but if he should wait until the conclusion of the trial he must defer to another judge.
Contempt by Disobedience of Orders.
Contempt Power in Aid of Administrative Power.
Common Law Powers of District of Columbia Courts.
Habeas Corpus: Congressional and Judicial Control.
Having determined in Bollman that a statute was necessary before the federal courts had power to issue writs of habeas corpus, Chief Justice Marshall pointed to § 14 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 as containing the necessary authority.281 As the Chief Justice read it, the authorization was limited to persons imprisoned under federal authority. It was not until 1867, with two small exceptions,282 that legislation specifically empowered federal courts to inquire into the imprisonment of persons under state authority.283 Pursuant to this authorization, the Court then expanded the use of the writ into a major instrument to reform procedural criminal law in both federal and state jurisdictions.
Habeas Corpus: The Process of the Writ.
Perhaps pressing its powers further than prior legislation, Congress has enacted the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1996.319 Essentially, the law imposes a series of restrictions on judicial remedies in prison-conditions cases. Thus, courts may not issue prospective relief that extends beyond that necessary to correct the violation of a federal right that they have found, that is narrowly drawn, is the least intrusive, and that does not give attention to the adverse impact on public safety. Preliminary injunctive relief is limited by the same standards. Consent decrees may not be approved unless they are subject to the same conditions, meaning that the court must conduct a trial and find violations, thus cutting off consent decrees. If a decree was previously issued without regard to the standards now imposed, the defendant or intervenor is entitled to move to vacate it. No prospective relief is to last longer than two years if any party or intervenor so moves. Finally, a previously issued decree that does not conform to the new standards imposed by the Act is subject to termination upon the motion of the defendant or an intervenor. After a short period (30 or 60 days, depending on whether there is “good cause” for a 30-day extension), such a motion operates as an automatic stay of the prior decree pending the court’s decision on the merits. The Court upheld the termination and automatic stay provisions in Miller v. French,320 rejecting the contention that the automatic stay provision offends separation of powers principles by legislative revision of a final judgment. Rather, Congress merely established new standards for the enforcement of prospective relief, and the automatic stay provision “helps to implement the change in the law.”321 A number of constitutional challenges can be expected respecting Congress’s power to limit federal judicial authority to remedy constitutional violations.
In Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering,324 the Supreme Court placed a narrow construction upon the labor provisions of the Clayton Act and thereby contributed in part to the more extensive restriction by Congress on the use of injunctions in labor disputes in the Norris-LaGuardia Act of 1932, which has not only been declared constitutional325 but has been applied liberally326 and in such a manner as to repudiate the notion of an inherent power to issue injunctions contrary to statutory provisions.
Injunctions Under the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942.
Among the incidental powers of courts is that of making all necessary rules governing their process and practice and for the orderly conduct of their business.331 However, this power too is derived from the statutes and cannot go beyond them. The landmark case is Wayman v. Southard,332 which sustained the validity of the Process Acts of 1789 and 1792 as a valid exercise of authority under the necessary and proper clause. Although Chief Justice Marshall regarded the rule-making power as essentially legislative in nature, he ruled that Congress could delegate to the courts the power to vary minor regulations in the outlines marked out by the statute. Fifty-seven years later, in Fink v. O’Neil,333 in which the United States sought to enforce by summary process the payment of a debt, the Supreme Court ruled that under the process acts the law of Wisconsin was the law of the United States, and hence the government was required to bring a suit, obtain a judgment, and cause execution to issue. Justice Matthews for a unanimous Court declared that the courts have “no inherent authority to take any one of these steps, except as it may have been conferred by the legislative department; for they can exercise no jurisdiction, except as the law confers and limits it.”334 Conceding, in 1934, the limited competence of legislative bodies to establish a comprehensive system of court procedure, and acknowledging the inherent power of courts to regulate the conduct of their business, Congress authorized the Supreme Court to prescribe rules for the lower federal courts not inconsistent with the Constitution and statutes.335 Their operation being restricted, in conformity with the proviso attached to the congressional authorization, to matters of pleading and practice, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure thus judicially promulgated neither affect the substantive rights of litigants336 nor alter the jurisdiction337 of federal courts and the venue of actions therein338 and, thus circumscribed, have been upheld as valid.
The administration of insolvent enterprises, investigations into the reasonableness of public utility rates, and the performance of other judicial functions often require the special services of masters in chancery, referees, auditors, and other special aids. The practice of referring pending actions to a referee was held in Heckers v. Fowler353 to be coequal with the organization of the federal courts. In the leading case of Ex parte Peterson,354 a United States district court appointed an auditor with power to compel the attendance of witnesses and the production of testimony. The court authorized him to conduct a preliminary investigation of facts and file a report thereon for the purpose of simplifying the issues for the jury. This action was neither authorized nor prohibited by statute. In sustaining the action of the district judge, Justice Brandeis, speaking for the Court, declared: “Courts have (at least in the absence of legislation to the contrary) inherent power to provide themselves with appropriate instruments required for the performance of their duties. . . . This power includes authority to appoint persons unconnected with the court to aid judges in the performance of specific judicial duties, as they may arise in the progress of a cause.”355 The power to appoint auditors by federal courts sitting in equity has been exercised from their very beginning, and here it was held that this power is the same whether the court sits in law or equity.

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