Source: http://www.juricaf.org/arret/CONSEILDELEUROPE-COUREUROPEENNEDESDROITSDELHOMME-19831214-930081
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CAN c. AUTRICHE
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Type d'affaire : DécisionType de recours : Partielllement recevable ; partielllement irrecevableNumérotation : Numéro d'arrêt : 9300/81Identifiant URN:LEX : urn:lex;coe;cour.europeenne.droits.homme;arret;1983-12-14;9300.81 Analyses : (Art. 6-1) DELAI RAISONNABLE, (Art. 6-1) JUGEMENT PUBLIC, (Art. 6-1) PROCES EQUITABLEParties : Demandeurs : CANDéfendeurs : AUTRICHETexte : APPLICATION / REQUÃTE NÂ° 9300/8 1 Elvan CAN v/AUSTRI A
Elvan CAN c/AUTRICH E DECISION of 14 December 1983 on the admissibility of the application .
DÃCISION du 14 dÃ©cembre 1983 sur la recevabilitÃ© de la requÃªt e
Artide 5, paragrap8 3 of the Convention : Preventive detention, which lasted 14 months and war maintained because of a danger of absconding, despite the offer of a surety, deemed insufficient (Complaint declared admissibfe) . Article 6, paragraph 3 (c) ol'the Convention :,lccused prevented, during the first three months of the investigation proceedings, from consulting his defence counsel without the supe rvision of a court officer (Complaint declared admissible) .
Article 5, paragraphe 3 de la Convention : DÃ©tention prÃ©ventive ayant durÃ© 14 mois et maintenue pour risque de fuite malgr( l'offre d'une caution, jugÃ©e insuffisante (Grief dÃ©clarÃ© recevable) . Ar[icle 6, paragrephe 3, litt. c) de la Convention : InculpÃ© empÃªchÃ©, durant les trois premiers mois de l'instruction, de s'emretenir avec son avocat hors la prÃ©sence d'un fonctionnaire du tribunal (Grief dÃ©clarÃ© recevable) .
(jranÃ§ais : voir p. 52 )
The applicant is a Turkish citizen, born in 1947 and living in Hallein / Austria . He was in detention on remand in prison in Wels when he lodged this application . Before the Commission he is represented by Mr Zitta, a lawyer in Salzburg .
On 17 August 1980 the applicant was arrested under suspicion of having participated in a crime of arson (Brandstiftung) . The applicant's brother, R ., had confessed to setting fire to a restaurant and a storage room . The restaurant was run by E .R . , -46-
and managed by the applicant . The ahree, and a fourth person, E .F ., were also suspected of an insurance fraud, by having taken away insured objects from the restaurant, and later claimed that these objects had been destroyed by the fire . On 18 August 1980 the applicant was heard by the police and stated that he wished to contact a lawyer . On the following day he was remanded in prison . According to rhe investigating judge, there existed a danger of collusion (Verdunkelungsgefahr) and a danger of absconding (Fluchtgefahr) . On 2 September 1980 the District Court (Ratskanrmer des Rreisge richts) in Wels rejected the applicant's request for his release, and stated that there was still danger of collusion, because the facts had not yet been clearly established . The applicant then chose Mr Zitta as his defence counsel . On 4 Septentber 1980 the Gmunden constabulary established a full complaint (Vollanzeige) against all four suspects . In addition to a statement of the facts, it contained reports on the examination of the suspects, statements by witnesses, results of investigations, sketches, photos, other evidence and the opinion of the expert present at the site of the crime on 10 August 1980 . The applicant's defence counsel joined the proceedings on 3 September 1980. A lawyer in Wels contacted the applicant briefly on 4 September 1 980, on the instructions of his defence counsel . On 15 and 30 September 1980 respectively, an assistant of the defence counsel, and counsel himself, spoke with the applicant in the presence of an officer of the court . Inspection of the complete file was refused . On 30 September 1980 the District Court (Ratskammer des Kreisgerichts) rejected another request for the applicant's release . The court stated that not only the applicant's contact with the co-accused, two of whom had likewise requested their release, but also his contact with other persons, risked jeopardising the purpose of the investigation proceedings as, in a letter written by a third person to one of the co-accused, the applicant had been incriminated . Also, a coded lener, which was apparently related to the applicant's family clan, had been stopped by the investigating judge . In these circumstances, there was still danger of collusion .
The applicant's appeal against the decision of 30 September 1980 was rejected by the Court of Appeal (Oberlandesgericht) in Linz on 22 October 1980 . The decision was served on the applicant's defence counsel on 6 November 1980 . The Appellate Court considered that suspicion against the applicant continued to exist . Also, there was still danger of collusion, as a letter written by the applicant's brother to his wife, on 9 September 1980, seemed to indicate that the applicant was involved in the matter, although his brother tried to discharge him . Danger of absconding was considered to exist in view of the severe punishment (I to 10 years' imprisonment) which the applicant risked, and which he could be tempted to avoid by fleeing to his home country . In this connection the court stated that the applicant's family ties were loose, as he had an intimate relationship with E .R ., one of the co-accused . -47-
On 6 October 1980 the applicant made a request to be allowed to talk to his defence counsel without being supervised by a court officer . On 9 October 1 980 this request was rejected by the investigating judge, who simply referred to Section 45 (3) of the Code on Criminal Procedure, adding that this provision was clearly compatible with constitutional rights . The provision cited reads as follows : "3 . A detained defendant may converse with his defence counsel without a court officer being present . But where the defendant is in detention also, or exclusively, because of danger of collusion, a court officer shall be present at conversations with the defence counsel until the indictment has been communicated . " The period during which a detained person may be thus restricted in his contacts with his defence counsel is limited to a maximum of three months, because detention on remand, for the sole reason that there is danger of collusion, may not, according to Section 193 (3) of the Code on Criminal Procedu re , exceed three months . The applicant's appeal against the decision of 9 October 1980 was rejected by a chamber of the District Court ( Ratskatruner des Kreisgeri chts) on 13 March 1981 . The cou rt stated that, according to Section 45 (3) of the Code on C riminal Procedure, only ci rcumstances related to the person of the remand prisoner we re decisive for the maintenance of control over all his contacts with the outside world . This did not mean that the regulation was motivated by the idea that defence counsel could become an accomplice to the machinations of a re mand p ri soner . It was rather in the interests of defence counsel that no situation could occur which could give rise to any kind of suspicion in this respect . Section 45 (3) was, therefore, considered to be compatible with the European Convention on Human Rights, as well as with Austrfan Constitutional law . Insofar as the applicant had complained that his defence counsel had not been allowed to examine ce rtain parts of the file, the cou rt stated that at the material time these pans had only recently been included in the file and the investigating judge had himself not yet examined them . On 23 December 1 980 an assistant of defence counsel, and the applicant, were able to prep are the defence withoui being superv ised by an officer of the cou rt . On 13 January 1981 the District Court rejected another request for the applicant' s release . Danger of collusion was no longer considered to exist, but danger of absconding was . This decision was confirmed by the Court of Appeal in Linz on 28 January 1981 . On the same day, in view of the complexity of the case and the difficulties of the investigations, the Appellate Cou rt ordered that detention on remand should last up to seven months . The cou rt added that, according to the result of the investigations, it could be expected that the main proceedings against the co-accused would be gin in M arch 1 981 . However, by decisions of 25 Februa ry and 8 Apri l 1981 this court ruled thatthe applicant's detention could last upto 8 and 1 0 months respectively . Meanwhile, on 3 December 1980, the Appellate Cou rt had ordered the release of E .R ., stating that the danger of collusion and repetition, which still existed in her case, could be met by the provisional seizu re of her travel documents .-48
On 30 April 1981 the District Court ordered the applicant's release on bail in the amount of 90 000 AS, and under the condition that the applicant respected certain obligations (mainly to remain in Hallein and report to the police once a month) . In fixing the amount of bail, the court took account of damage caused by the arson (450 000 AS) and the applicant's personal and financial situation . The applicant appealed and requested that bail should not exceed the amount of 20 000 AS . This appeal was rejected on 27 May 1981 . The Appellate Court stated that reasons justifying detention on remand still existed, but release on bail was, contrary to the Public Prosecutor's opinion, to be granted, as detention had already lasted for more than nine months . Therefore, the danger of absconding was diminished . In this context, the court also took into account that compatriots of the applicant had offered to provide the bail . The amount of the bail was considered to be adequate, as it depended, in the court's opinion, not only on the applicant's personal situation, but also on the amount of damage caused by the criminal offence in question . The bail should, in case of absconding, provide a fund for the compensation of the victim(s) . On 16 September 1981 the District Coun again rejected the applicant's request to be released on bail in the amount of 20 000 AS only, or without bail . Danger of absconding was considered to be established, in view of the applicant's nationality . The Appellate Court confirmed this decision on 2 October 1981 . It considered that the detention on remand was compatible with Article 5, para . 3 of the Convention, and was also proportionate to the sentence which the applicant had to expect . The court stated that it had not been possible to file the indictment earlier than 20 May 1981, and that the period between the filing of the indictment and the date on which the trial was supposed to begin, namely 8 October 1981, was not objectionable . The trial was supposed to begin in October, but had to be postponed to 12 November 1981, as on 8 October 1981 one of the co-accused did not appear . The applicant was finally released in the course of the trial on 12 Novembe r
1981 On 14 January 1983 he was convicted of being an accomplice to arson and sentenced to 14 months' imprisonment . His appeal and plea of nullity were rejected by the Supreme Court (Oberster Gerichtshof) on 15 November and 13 December 1983 respectively .
COMPLAINT S The applicant first complains that as a result of the fact that the courts wrongly considered there was a danger of collusion, he could not, for a period of three months, talk to his defence counsel without the supervision of a court officer . He argues that an effective defence is not guaranteed if the remand prisoner cannot talk freely to his defence counsel for a period of three months at the beginning of th e
investigation proceedings . During this phase of the investigations, evidence may get lost, important mistakes may be made by the investigating authorities, while the defence counsel may not be able to take the necessary action, because he may lack important infortnation due to the fact that he cannot freely talk to the accused ..TheaplicntfuromshelngtfidoremanH e points out that the police report was established in September 1980 . After October 1980 none of the co-accused was again heard in the matter . The investigating judge ordered, in February 1981, that two witnesses should be he ard in Wels, although these witnesses were available to him in September or October 1980 . A hearing of the witnesses in question in Wels by another judge caused a delay of several weeks . Their statements added nothing new to the results of the investigations . Furthermore, he submits that the period between the fding of the indictment and the trial was unreasonably long, taking into account that none of the co-accused raised any objections against the indictment . He submits that the amount of bail was unreasonable, because the courts wrongly took into account the alleged damage caused by the fire . He considers that he was only kept in detention on remand because he is a Turkish citizen, while the two Austrian co-accused were released in 1980, without bail .
THE LAW I . The applicant first complains that after his arrest he was allowed to talk to his defence counsel only in the presence of an officer of the court . He submits that he was thus prevented from defending himself properly, as is guaranteed by Article 6, para . 3 (c) of the Convention . The respondent Government submit that, according to the Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure, the period during which such restriction may be imposed, on the ground that there exists a danger of collusion, is limited to two months . It ended in the applicant's case on 19 October 1980 . An extension by one month, which was possible, was not, however, ordered . As the applicant did not attempt to find out whether, between 19 October and 19 November 1980, he would be allowed to speak to his defence counsel in an unsupervised manner, he has not, so the respondent Govemment argue, exhausted domestic remedies to this extent .
The Commission notes that the applicant made a request on 6 October 1 980 to be allowed to talk to his defence counsel without being supervised . This request was rejected on 9 October 1980 . The applicant lodged an appeal, which was not rejected until 13 March 1981 . In consequence of his appeal the Austrian judicial authorities were aware of his persistent desire to talk freely to his defence counsel, and, in these circumstances, the applicant could expect that, as soon as the authorities no longer considered supervision to be necessary, they would inform him accordingly . - 50 -
The applicant, having appealed against the decision of 9 October 1980 maintaining the restriction, must therefore be considered to have exhausted the remedies available under Austrian law, and he also respected the six months time-limit, as his appeal was dismissed on 13 March 1981, while the application was lodged on 14 April 1981 . As regards the substance of the present complaint the Commission has first contpared the case with Bonzi v . Switurland (D .R . 12, Decision No . 7854/77, 12 .7 .78, p . 185), which was rejected as being manifestly ill-founded . The Commission finds that both cases are distinguishable on their facts . The applicant of that case complained of solitary confinement during a period of one month . The Commission based its decision rejecting the application, inter alia, on the finding that the applicant, Bonzi, could have requested a relaxation of the isolation measure, insofar as his counsel's visits were concemed . In the present case, the applicant requested permission to talk to his defence counsel without being supervised . This request was rejected . The Commission considers that, in these circumstances, the present application raises issues under Article 6, para . 3 of the Convention, which are of such complexity in fact and law that their determination should depend on an examination of the merits . 2 . The applicant has further complained of the length of his detention on remand, which lasted from 17 August 1980 until 17 November 1981, i .e . nearly 14 months . He submits that Article 5, para . 3 has been violated in this context . The Comntission has again carried out a preliminary examination of the information and arguments presented by the parties . It considers that this aspect of the application equally raises questions of fact and of law, which require an examination of their merits .
The Commission finds, therefore, that the application cannot be rejected as being manifestly ill-founded, and that no other ground for declaring it inadmissible has been established . For these reasons, and without prejudging in any way the merits of the case, the Commissio n
DECLARES THE APPLICATION ADMISSIBLE .
(IRADUGT/ON)
EN FAIT Le requÃ©rant est un ressortissant turc, nÃ© en 1947 et habitant Hallein (Autriche) . Il se trouvait en dÃ©tention provisoire Ã la prison de Wels lorsqu'il a introduit la prÃ©sente requÃªte . Il est reprÃ©sentÃ© devant la Commission par MÂ° Zitta, avocat Ã Salzburg . Le 17 aoÃ»t 1980, le requÃ©rant fut arretÃ© pour participation Ã un incendie volontaire (Brnndstiftung) . Le frÃ¨re du requÃ©rant . R ., avait avouÃ© avoir ntis le feu Ã un restaurant et Ã un local servant de dÃ©pÃ´t . Le restaurant Ã©tait exploitÃ© par E.R . et gÃ©rÃ© par le requÃ©rant . Ces trois personnes plus une quatriÃ¨me, E .F ., Ã©taient Ã©galement soupÃ§onnÃ©es d'escroquerie Ã l'assurance pour avoir enlevÃ© du restaurant des objets assurÃ©s et prÃ©tendu par la suite que l'incendie les avait dÃ©trvits . Le 18 aoÃ»t 1980, le requÃ©rant fut entendu par la police et dÃ©clara vouloir prendre contact avec un avocat . Le lendemain, il fut Ã©crouÃ© . Selon le juge d'instruction, il y avait risque de collusion (Verdunkelungsgefahr) et risque de fuite (Fluchtgefahr) . Le 2 septembre 1980, le tribunal rÃ©gional (Ratskanuner des Kreisgerichts) de Wels rejeta la demande de mise en libertÃ© prÃ©sentÃ©e par le requÃ©rant et dÃ©clara qu'il y avait toujours risque de collusion, les faits n'ayant pas encore Ã©tÃ© clairement Ã©tablis . Le requÃ©rant choisit Mâ¢ Zitta comme dÃ©fenseur . Le 4 septembre 1980, le commissaire de police de Gntunden Ã©tablit un rapport complet de dÃ©nonciation(Vollanzeige) contre les quatre suspects . Outre un exposÃ© des faits, ce document contenait des comptes rendus de l'interrogatoire des suspects, les dÃ©clarations des tÃ©moins, rÃ©sultats des enquÃªtes, des croquis, des photos, d'autres Ã©lÃ©ments de preuve et l'avis de l'expen prÃ©sent Ã l'inspection des lieux le 10 aoÃ»t 1980 . L'avocat du requÃ©rarit pÃ rticipa Ã la proÃ©Ã©dure dÃ¨s le 3 septembre 1980 . Un avocat de Wels entra briÃ¨vement en rapport avec le requÃ©rant le 4 septembre 1980, sur instruction de l'avocat de la dÃ©fense . Les 15 et 30 septembre 1980, le conseil du requÃ©rant et l'un de ses assistants s'entretinrent avec le requÃ©rant en prÃ©sence d'un fonctionnaire du tribunal . Les avocats se virent refuser la possibilitÃ© de consulter la totalitÃ© du dossier . Le 30 septembre 1980, le tribunal rÃ©gional (Ratskammer des Kreisgerichts) rejeta une autre demande de mise en libertÃ© du requÃ©rant . Il dÃ©clara que non seulement les rappons du requÃ©rant avec ses co-accusÃ©s, dont deux avaient Ã©galement sollicitÃ© leur Ã©largissement, mais aussi ses contacts avec d'autres personnes, risquaient de compromettre l'instruction puisque, dans une lettre Ã©crite par un tiers Ã l'un des coaccusÃ©s, le requÃ©rant avait Ã©tÃ© mis en cause . Par ailleurs, une lettre codÃ©e concernant apparemment la famille du requÃ©rant, avait Ã©tÃ© interceptÃ©e par le juge d'instruction . Dans ces conditions, le risque de collusion persistait .
Le recours interjetÃ© par le requÃ©rant contre la dÃ©cision du 30 septembre 1980 fut rejetÃ© par le cour d'appel (Oberlandesgericht) de Linz le 22 octobre 1980 . La dÃ©cision fut signifiÃ©e Ã l'avocat du requÃ©rant le 6 novembre 1980 . La cour estima que les soupÃ§ons persistaient contre le requÃ©rant . De mÃªme subsistait le risque de collusion, puisqu'une lettre Ã©crite par le frÃ¨re du requÃ©rant Ã son Ã©pouse le 9 septembre 1 980 semblait indiquer que le requÃ©rant Ã©tait impliquÃ© dans l'affaire, bien que son frÃ¨re tentÃ t de l'en disculper . La cour estima Ã©galement qu'il y avait risque de fuite compte tenu de la peine sÃ©vÃ¨re (un Ã dix ans de prison) encourue par le requÃ©rant, qui pouvait Ãªtre tentÃ© de s'y soustraire en rejoignant son pays d'origine . La cour dÃ©clara Ã cet Ã©gard que les liens familiaux du requÃ©rant Ã©taient assez lÃ ches, puisque l'intÃ©ressÃ© avait des rapports intimes avec Mm E .R ., l'une des co-accusÃ©es . Le 6 octobre 1980, le requÃ©rant demanda Ã Ãªtre autorisÃ© Ã s'entretenir avec son avocat hors la prÃ©sence d'un fonctionnaire du tribunal . Le 9 octobre 1980, le juge d'instruction rejeta cette demande en renvoyant simplement Ã l'article 45, par . 3 du Code de procÃ©dure pÃ©nale et en ajoutant que cette disposition Ã©tait manifestement compatible avec les droits garantis par la Constitution . Cette disposition est ainsi libellÃ©e : .3 . Un prÃ©venu dÃ©tenu peut s'entretenir avec son avocat hors la prÃ©sence d'un fonctionnaire du tribunal . Mais lorsque le prÃ©venu se trouve en dÃ©tention Ã©galement ou exclusivement du fait du risque de collusion, un fonctionnaire du tribunal assistera Ã ses entretiens avec son dÃ©fenseur jusqu'Ã ce que l'acte d'accusation ait Ã©tÃ© communiquÃ© . â¢ La pÃ©riode pendant laquelle un dÃ©tenu peut se voir ainsi restreint dans ses rapports avec son avocat ne peut pas dÃ©passer trois mois car aux termes de l'article 193, par. 3 du Code de procÃ©dure pÃ©nale, la dÃ©tention prÃ©ventive motivÃ©e uniquement par l'existence d'un risque de collusion ne peut pas excÃ©der trois mois . Le recours interjetÃ© par le requÃ©rant contre la dÃ©cision du 9 octobre 1980 fut rejetÃ© le 13 mars 1981 par la chambre du conseil du tribunal rÃ©gional (Ratskammer des Kreisgerichts) . Le tribunal dÃ©clara que, conformÃ©ment Ã l'article 45, par . 3 du Code de procÃ©dure pÃ©nale, seules les circonstances liÃ©es Ã la personne du prÃ©venu entrent en ligne de compte pour dÃ©cider du maintien de la surveillance en ce qui concerne ses contacts avec le monde extÃ©rieur . Cela ne veut pas dire que cene rÃ¨gle s'inspire de l'idÃ©e que l'avocat de la dÃ©fense pourrait se faire le complice d'une machination du dÃ©tenu . C'est plutÃ´t l'intÃ©r@t de l'avocat de la dÃ©fense que rien ne puisse susciter quelque soupÃ§on que ce soit Ã cet Ã©gard . Le juge estimait donc l'article 45, par . 3 compatible avec la Convention europÃ©enne des Droits de l'Homme, ainsi qu'avec la Constitution autrichienne . Quant au grief du requÃ©rant selon lequel son avocat n'avait Ã©tÃ© autorisÃ© Ã consulter que certaines parties du dossier, le tribunal dÃ©clara qu'Ã l'Ã©poque ces parties venaient tout juste d'Ãªtre versÃ©es au dossier et que le juge d'instruction lui-mÃªme ne les avait pas encore examinÃ©es .
Le 23 dÃ©cembre 1980, un assistant de l'avocat et le requÃ©rant pu re nt prÃ©p arer la dÃ©fense sans la su rv eillance d'un fonctionnaire du tribunal . Le 13 janvier 1981, le t ribunal rÃ©gional rejeta une autre demande de mis e en libertÃ© du requÃ©rant . Il estima que, si le risque de collusion . avait cessÃ© d'exister, celui de fuite persistait . La cour d'appel de Linz confirma cette dÃ©cision le 28 janvier 1981 . Le mÃ©me jour, vu la complexitÃ© de l'affaire et les diffisultÃ©s de l'instruction, la cour d'appel ordonna la prolongation it sept mois de la dÃ©tention provisoire . Elle ajouta qu'en fonction des rÃ©sultats de l'instruction, il fallÃ¢it s'attendre Ã ce que le procÃ¨s de l'accusÃ© s'ouvre en mars 1981 . Cependant, par dÃ©cisions des 25 fÃ©vrier et 8 avril 1981, cette juridiction dÃ©cida de porter Ã huit et dix mois, respectivement, la dÃ©tention du requÃ©rant . Entre temps, le 3 dÃ©cembre 1980, la cour d'appel avait ordonnÃ© la mise en libertÃ© de E.R ., dÃ©clarant que l'on pouvait faire disparaPtre de collusion et de rÃ©cidive qui persistaient dans son cas par la sÃ isie provisoire de ses titres de voyage . Le 30 avril 1981, le tribunal rÃ©gional ordonna la mise en libertÃ© du requÃ©rant, moyennant une caution de 90 000 Schillings autrichiens, Ã condition que l'intÃ©ressÃ© se soumette Ã certaines obligations (en gros : rester Ã Hallein et se prÃ©senter Ã la police une fois par mois) . Pour fixer le montant de la caution, le tribunal prit en compte les dommages causÃ©s par l'incendie volontaire (450 000 SA) et la situation personnelle et financiÃ©re du requÃ©rant . Celui-ci recourut et demanda que la caution ne dÃ©passe pas 20 000 Schillings autrichiens . Son recours fut rejetÃ© le 27 mai 1981 . La cour d'appel indiqua que les motifs justifiant la dÃ©tention prÃ©ventive subsistaient mais que, contrairement Ã l'avis du Parquet, la libÃ©ration sous caution devait Ãªtre accordÃ©e car la dÃ©tention avait dÃ©jÃ durÃ© plus de neuf mois . Le risque dÃ© fuite avait donc diminuÃ© . Dans ce contexte, la cour prit Ã©galement en compte le fait que des compatriotes du requÃ©rant avaient offert de payer la caution . Le montant de celle-ci Ã©tait jugÃ© adÃ©quat, la cour estimant qu'elle devait Ãªtre calculÃ©e non seulement en fonction de la situation personnelle du requÃ©rant, mais aussi du montant des dommages causÃ©s par l'infraction en question . La caution devait, en cas de fuite, servir de fond pour indemnisation de la ou des victimes .
Le 16 septembre 1981, le tribunal rÃ©gional rejeta une nouvelle demande du requÃ©rant tendant Ã sa mise en libertÃ© moyennant une caution de 20 000 SA seulement ou sans caution du tout . Il estima que le risque de fuite persistait, compte tenu de la nationalitÃ© du requÃ©rant . La cour d'appel confirma cette dÃ©cision le 2 octobre 1981 et estima la durÃ©e de la dÃ©tention provisoire compatible avec l'articlÃ¨ 5, par . 3 de la Convention et proportionnÃ©e aussi Ã la peine encourue par le requÃ©rant . La cour indiqua qu'il n'avait pas Ã©tÃ© possible de dÃ©poser l'acte d'accusation avant le 20 mai 1981 et qu'il n'y avait rien Ã redire Ã la pÃ©riode sÃ©parant la mise en accusation de la date prÃ©vue pour l'ouverture du procÃ¨s, c'est-Ã -dire le 8 octobre 1981 .
Le procÃ¨s, qui devait commencer en octobre, dut Ã¨t re re po rtÃ© au 12 novembre 1981 car le 8 octob re 1981, l'un des co-accusÃ©s n'a pas comparu . Le requÃ©rant fut finalement mis en libertÃ© au cours du procÃ¨s, le 12 novembre 1981 . Le 14 janvier 1983, il fut reconnu coupable de complicitÃ© d'incendie et condamnÃ© Ã 14 mois de prison . Son appel et son pourvoi en cassation furent rejetÃ©s par la Cour suprÃªme (Oberster Gerichtshof) les 15 novembre et 13 dÃ©cembre 1983, respectivement .
GRIEFS Le requÃ©rant se plaint d'abord de ce que les tribunaux ayant Ã tort prÃ©sumÃ© l'existence d'un risque de collusion, il n'a pas pu, trois mois durant, s'entretenir avec son avocat hors la prÃ©sence d'un fonctionnaire du tribunal . Selon lui, la dÃ©fense n'est pas effectivement garantie si le dÃ©tenu ne peut pas communiquer librement avec son avocat pendant les trois mois du dÃ©but de l'instruction . Pendant cette phase de l'instruction, en effet, des Ã©lÃ©ments de preuve peuvent se perdre, d'importantes erreurs peuvent btre commises par les autoritÃ©s d'instruction, alors que l'avocat ne pourra pas prendre les mesures nÃ©cessaires, puisqu'il lui manquera d'importantes informations en raison du fait qu'il ne peut pas parler librement Ã l'accusÃ© . Le requÃ©rant se plaint en outre de la durÃ©e de sa dÃ©tention prÃ©ventive . Il souligne que le rapport de police a Ã©tÃ© Ã©tabli dÃ¨s septembre 1980 et qu'aprÃ¨s octobre 1980, aucun des co-accusÃ©s n'a Ã©tÃ© entendu sur l'affaire . C'est en fÃ©vrier 1981 que le juge d'instruction a ordonnÃ© d'entendre Ã Wels deux tÃ©moins qu'il avait pourtant Ã sa disposition depuis septembre ou octobre 1980 . L'audition de ces tÃ©moins Ã Wels par un autre magistrat a provoquÃ© un retard de plusieurs semaines . Les dÃ©clarations de ces tÃ©moins n'ont d'ailleurs apportÃ© aucun Ã©lÃ©ment nouveau Ã l'instruction . Le requÃ©rant soutient en outre que la pÃ©riode comprise entre l'acte d'accusation et le procÃ©s est dÃ©raisonnable, compte tenu du fait qu'aucun des co-accusÃ©s n'a fait opposition Ã l'acte d'accusation . Selon lui, le montant de la caution lui aussi Ã©tait dÃ©raisonnable car les tribunaux ont Ã tort pris en compte les prÃ©tendus dommages causÃ©s par l'incendie . Il considÃ©re n'avoir Ã©tÃ© maintenu en dÃ©tention provisoire que parce qu'il est ressortissant turc, alors que ses deux co-accusÃ©s autrichiens ont Ã©tÃ© mis en libertÃ© sans caution en 1980.
EN DROI T 1 . Le requÃ©rant se plaint en premier lieu de n'avoir pu, aprÃ¨s son arrestation, s'entretenir avec son avocat qu'en prÃ©sence d'un fonctionnaire du tribunal . Il soutient avoir Ã©tÃ© ainsi empÃ©chÃ© de se dÃ©fendre convenablement, comme le lui garantit pourtant l'article 6, par . 3 c) de la Convention .
. Le Gouvernement dÃ©fendeur soutient de son cÃ´tÃ© que, conformÃ©ment au Code autrichien de procÃ©dure pÃ©nale, la pÃ©riode pendant laquelle cette restriction peut Ã¨tre imposÃ©e parce qu'il existe un risque de collusion, est limitÃ©e Ã deux mois . En l'espÃ¨ce, elle a pris fin le 19 octobre 1980 . Une prolongation d'un mois Ã©tait possible mais n'a cependant pas Ã©tÃ© ordonnÃ©e . Le requÃ©rant n'ayant pas essayÃ© de savoir si, entre le 19 octobre et le 19 novembre 1980, il aurait Ã©tÃ© autorisÃ© Ã s'entretenir sans su rveillance avec son avocat, il n'a pas, selon le Gouvernement dÃ©fendeur, Ã©puisÃ© les recours internes Ã cet effet . La Commission relÃ¨ve que le requÃ©rant a prÃ©sentÃ© le 6 octobre 1980 une demande d'entretien sans su rveillance avec son avocat . Cette demande a Ã©tÃ© rejetÃ©e le 9 octobre 1980 . Le requÃ©rant a formÃ© recours, mais il a Ã©tÃ© dÃ©boutÃ© le 13 mars 1981 . Du fait de ce recours, les instances judiciai res d'Autriche connaissaient le dÃ©sir persistant du requÃ©rant de s'entretenir librement avec son avocat ; aussi le requÃ©rant pouvait-il penser que dÃ¨s que les autoritÃ©s ne jugeraient plus la surveillance nÃ©cessaire, elles l'en informeraient . Le requÃ©rant, qui a recouru contre la dÃ©cision du 9 octob re 1 980 maintenant la rest riction, doit donc Ã©tre considÃ©rÃ© comme ayant Ã©puisÃ© les recours dont il disposait en droit autrichien . De mÃ¨me, il a respectÃ© le dÃ©lai de six mois, puisque son recours a Ã©tÃ© rejetÃ© le 13 mars 1981 et qu'il a introduit sa requÃ¨te le 1 4 avrit 1981 . Quant au prÃ©sent grief lui-mÃªme, la Commission a tout d'abord comparÃ© la prÃ©sente affaire Ã la requÃ©te nÂ° 7854/77, Bonzi c/Suisse ( D .R . 12, p . 185), qu'elle avait rejetÃ©e pour dÃ©faut manifeste de fondement . Elle estime que les deux affaires se distinguent en fait . Le requÃ©rant Bonzi se plaignait d'un isolement cellulaire pendant une pÃ© ri ode d'un mois . La Commission a fondÃ© sa dÃ©cision de rejet notamment sur la constatation que Bonzi aurait pu demander un adoucissement de l'isolement pour ce qui concerne les visites de son avocat . En l'esp8ce, le requÃ©rant a demandÃ© l'autorisation de s'entretenir sans surveillance avec son avocat et sa demande a Ã©tÃ© rejetÃ©e . La Commissionestime que, dans ces conditions, la prÃ©sente requÃªte pose, au regard de l'article 6, par . 3 de la Convention, des problÃ¨mes d'une telle complexitÃ© en fait et endroit qu'ils appellent pour en dÃ©cider un examen au fond . 2 . Le requÃ©rant se plaint Ã©n outre que la durÃ©e de sa dÃ©tention provisoi re , qui s'est Ã©tendue du 1 7 aoÃ»t 1980 au 17 novembre 1981, soit sur prÃ¨s de 14 mois . Selon lui, l'article 5, p ar . 3 a Ã©tÃ© mÃ©connu Ã cet Ã©gard . La Commission a procÃ©dÃ© ici aussi Ã un examen prÃ©liminaire des informations et arguments soumis par les part ies . Elle estime que cet aspect de la requÃ¨te pose Ã©galement des questions de fait et de droit qui exigent un examen au fond . La Commission estime en consÃ©quence que la requÃªte ne saurait Ãªtre rejetÃ©e comme manifestement mal fondÃ©e et qu'aucun autre motif d'irrecevabilitÃ© n'a Ã©tÃ© Ã©tabli . Par ces motifs, tous moyens de fond rÃ©se rv Ã©s, la Commissio n
DECLARE LA REQUETE RECEVABL E -56-Origine de la décision Pays : Conseil de l'EuropeJuridiction : Cour européenne des droits de l'hommeFormation : Commission (plénière)Date de la décision : 14/12/1983Fonds documentaire : HUDOC Haut de page

References: l'article 45
 l'article 193
 l'article 45
 l'article 45
 l'article 6
 l'article 6
 l'article 5