Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/74/624/
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 02:47:38+00:00

Document:
1. In all cases where a maritime lien arises, the original jurisdiction to enforce it by a proceeding in rem is exclusive in the district courts of the United States, as provided by the ninth section of the Judiciary Act of 1789.
original cognizance of the district courts of the United States, albeit the contract be for transportation between ports and places within the same state and all the parties be citizens of the same state, provided only that such contract be for transportation upon navigable waters to which the general jurisdiction of the admiralty extends.
4. The "saving," in the ninth section of the Judiciary Act, "to suitors, in all cases, of the right of a common law remedy, where the common law is competent to give it" does not authorize a proceeding in rem to enforce a maritime lien in a common law court, whether state or federal. Common law remedies are not applicable to enforce such a lien, but are suits in personam, though such suits, under special statutes, may be commenced by attachment of the property of the debtor. Proceedings in a suit at common law on a contract of affreightment are the same as in suits on contracts not regarded as maritime, wholly irrespective of the fact that the injured party might have sought redress in the admiralty. The judgment in such a case is not against the vessel as the offending thing, but against the parties who have violated their contract, and can only affect the vessel so far as the defendants may have property therein.
5. These principles applied to the provision of the statute of 7th October, 1864, of the State of Alabama, under which contracts of affreightment are authorized to be enforced in rem through courts of the state by proceedings the same in form as those used in courts of admiralty of the United States, and the statute held unconstitutional and void.
"Shall have exclusive original cognizance of all civil causes of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, . . . saving to suitors in all cases the right of a common law remedy, where the common law is competent to give it."
and for the wages of the officers, crew &c., in preference to other debts due from the owners thereof. By the terms of the code, the lien is to be asserted by filing a complaint in any county in which the vessel may be found, stating the amount and nature of the claim and praying a seizure of the vessel. Thereupon the clerk is to issue a writ commanding the sheriff to seize the vessel, her tackle, apparel and furniture. At any time before judgment, the master, owner or other persons may release the vessel by entering into bond in double the amount of the claim stipulating to pay the amount of the judgment. Any number of persons may unite in the same complaint, and if more than one complaint be filed, the court must consolidate them and render but one judgment against the vessel, which is to be considered several as to each complainant. If a stipulation be entered into, the stipulators are defendants. If none, the court must render a judgment ex parte condemning the boat, tackle &c., to be sold in satisfaction of the claim, and the affidavit of complainant is made presumptive evidence of the justice of the demand.
"unless where otherwise provided in this chapter, the proceedings to enforce the lien shall be the same as in the courts of admiralty of the United States, but either party may have any question of fact decided by a jury, upon an issue made up under direction of the court."
By the act of 7th October, 1864, "to amend the admiralty laws of the state," these provisions are extended to the contract of affreightment.
Under this statute, Boone & Co. filed their libel, March 30, 1866, in the City Court of Mobile, claiming $5,800 for the loss of certain bales of cotton shipped to them from Vienna, in the State of Alabama, to Mobile, in the same state, and prayed "process in admiralty" for the seizure of the steamboat Belfast.
In the same court a libel was also filed by J. & S. Steers, claiming compensation for other bales, shipped by them from Columbus, Mississippi, to Mobile, in Alabama, already mentioned. And a libel by Watson & Co. claiming it for cotton shipped by them, from and to the same points.
All the navigation which was the subject of the case was upon the Tombigbee River, navigable water of the United States.
Under these several libels, the sheriff, by virtue of writs of seizure, took the steamer into possession and posted his monitions, and the causes under the statute were consolidated and heard together. The answer, applicable to the three cases alike, set forth that the steamer was duly enrolled and licensed in pursuance of laws of the United States, and that on the 15th January, 1866, she was regularly cleared at Mobile, Alabama, for Columbus, Mississippi, and that on her downward trip, the cotton claimed was lost, and therefore that the city court had no jurisdiction.
A decree was rendered on 28 July for the three libellants. Appeal was taken to the Supreme Court of Alabama, where one assignment of errors was: "That the city court erred in overruling the protest to the jurisdiction." The decree of the city court was, however, affirmed by the supreme court, and deciding, as that court thus did, in favor of the validity of a statute of a state drawn in question on the ground of its being repugnant to the laws of the United States, the case was brought here under the twenty-fifth section of the Judiciary Act.
Not much contesting the point that if the court had no jurisdiction in the two cases where the carriage was not wholly within one state no agreement below could authorize what it did about these two (jurisdiction being of course to be conferred by the law alone), the matter of debate was reduced here chiefly to the first case -- that, namely, of Boone & Co. -- where the whole carriage was within the State of Alabama and to the question of constitutional law arising upon it, to-wit: whether the contract, made as it was for the transportation of goods from one place to another both in the same state and without the goods being carried in transitu into or through any other state or foreign dominion, was a contract which could be enforced by a proceeding in admiralty in the federal courts alone.
If the state court had no jurisdiction in that case, a fortiori it could have none in the two others.
the State of Alabama, and that the cotton described in the libel was lost in her trip down the river from the former city to her port of destination. Defense of the respondents upon the merits was that the steamer and cargo were captured by a band of robbers in the trip down the river, within the ebb and flow of the tide and within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United States, and without any negligence or fault on the part of the officers and crew of the steamer. They also set up the defense that it was agreed between the master and the shippers that the vessel should not be liable for the loss of the cotton if it was captured by armed men during the voyage without any negligence or fault on the part of the carrier. Libellants excepted to that part of the answer denying the jurisdiction of the court as insufficient and invalid, and they also excepted to the defense, as pleaded, that the steamer was robbed of the cotton, as no bar to a recovery in the case, and the court sustained the views of the libellants in both particulars, and the respondents excepted to the respective rulings of the court.
Two other consignments of cotton were also on board the steamer at the time the alleged robbery occurred. Ninety bales were shipped by J. H. Steers & Company at Columbus, and one hundred bales were shipped by John Watson & Company at the same place. Both shipments were to be transported to the port of Mobile, and there to be delivered to certain consignees under a similar contract of affreightment as that alleged in the first case, except as to the price to be paid for the transportation. Steers & Company lost thirty-four bales of their shipment, and Watson & Company lost thirty bales, as alleged by the respective parties. Libels in the same form were also filed by those parties about the same time in the same court, and the owners of the steamer appeared in each case as claimants and pleaded the same defenses in the three cases.
the several bills of lading, and the respondents admitted the shipments as alleged in the respective libels. On the other hand, the libellants admitted that the steamer was robbed as alleged in the answer, and without any neglect or fault of the owners of the steamer or those in charge of her navigation.
Exceptions were seasonably tendered by the respondents to the rulings and decision of the court, and the exceptions were duly allowed by the court. Appeals were then taken by the respondents to the supreme court of the state, where the objections to the jurisdiction of the court were renewed in the formal assignment of errors. The parties were heard, but the court overruled the objections to the jurisdiction of the court and affirmed the respective decrees rendered in the subordinate court. Writs of error were then sued out under the twenty-fifth section of the Judiciary Act, and the respective causes were removed into this Court.
Jurisdiction of this Court to reexamine the questions presented in the pleadings may be assumed as existing without discussion, as it is conceded that the questions are the same as were raised and decided in the state courts, and it is not controverted that the questions are such as may be reexamined here under the twenty-fifth section of the Judiciary Act.
2. They also contend, if their first proposition is not sustained, that inasmuch as the three cases were heard together under an agreement that they should be tried upon the same issues, and that the libel filed by W. C. Boon & Company, as stated in the bill of exceptions, was selected as the case to be tried in the court where the suits were commenced, the rights of the parties in the other two cases must abide the decision of this Court in that case.
Assuming that to be so, then they contend that the state court had jurisdiction in the first case, because the contract of affreightment was for the transportation of goods and merchandise between ports and places in the same state. Impliedly the argument admits that the rule is otherwise where the contract is for the transportation of goods and merchandise between ports and places in different states, but the proposition is that where the contract is between citizens of the same state for the transportation of goods and merchandise from one port to another in the same state, the case is not one within the jurisdiction of the admiralty courts of the United States unless it becomes necessary, in the course of the voyage, to carry the goods or merchandise into or through some other state or foreign dominion.
engaged in an important and lucrative branch of commerce and navigation.
Best guides as to the extent of the admiralty jurisdiction of the federal courts are the Constitution of the United States, the laws of Congress, and the decisions of this Court.
Two of the contracts of affreightment in these cases were for the transportation of cotton between ports and places in different states, but as the contract alleged in the libel filed in the first case was for the transportation of cotton from one port to another in the same state, it becomes necessary to determine, irrespective of the questions presented in the other cases, whether such a contract is cognizable in the admiralty courts of the United States, because if not, the libellants in any view of the case must prevail, as there would be, in that state of the case, no jurisdiction in this Court to reexamine the decision of the state court in that case.
Much controversy has existed as to the true extent of the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the federal courts, but great aid will be derived in the solution of this question by an examination of the decisions of this Court at different periods since the judicial system of the United States was organized.
Principal subjects of admiralty jurisdiction are maritime contracts and maritime torts, including captures jure belli and seizures on water for municipal and revenue forfeitures.
(2) Torts or injuries committed on navigable waters of a civil nature are also cognizable in the admiralty courts.
Such jurisdiction, whether of torts or of contracts, was and still is restricted in the parent country to tidewaters, as they have no large fresh water lakes or fresh water rivers which are navigable. Waters where the tide did not ebb and flow were regarded in that country as not within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, and such was the decision of this Court in the case of The Jefferson, [Footnote 8] and the rule established in that case was followed for more than a quarter of a century.
in collision cases arising upon the Hudson, the Penobscot, the Kennebec, the Merrimac, the Alabama, and many other rivers navigable only between ports and places in one state.
When the case of The Lexington was decided, it was still supposed that the admiralty jurisdiction was limited to waters affected by the ebb and flow of the tide, but the case is a decisive authority to show that the jurisdiction of the admiralty in matters of contract was understood to be coextensive with the jurisdiction in cases of marine torts.
Subject matter of the suit in the case of Waring v. Clarke was that of a collision, and the subject matter in the case of The Lexington was a loss of specie in transitu under a contract of affreightment. Viewed in any light, those two cases settle the question that where the voyage and transportation are over tidewaters, the jurisdiction of the admiralty is the same in matters in maritime contracts as in marine torts.
Such was the state of the law upon the subject, as decided by this Court, when the case of The Genesee Chief [Footnote 11] was brought here for reexamination, and in that case this Court held that the jurisdiction in admiralty depended not upon the ebb and flow of the tide, but upon the navigable character of the water; that if the water was navigable, it was deemed to be public, and if public, that it was regarded as within the legitimate scope of the admiralty jurisdiction conferred by the Constitution.
Prior to that decision, the Western lakes and navigable rivers of the United States above tidewaters were not supposed to be waters within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the federal courts. Strange as that proposition may now appear to one familiar with the provision contained in the ninth section of the Judiciary Act, it is nevertheless true that the rule restricting admiralty jurisdiction to tidewaters had prevailed from the organization of the judicial system to that date, but the effect of that decision was to dispel that error and place the admiralty jurisdiction upon its true constitutional and legal basis as defined in the Constitution of the United States and the laws of Congress.
Navigable rivers which empty into the sea or into the bays and gulfs which form a part of the sea are but arms of the sea, and are as much within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United States as the sea itself.
Such a rule, if applied to the commerce and navigation of the Atlantic coast, would produce incalculable mischief, as the vessels in many cases, even in voyages from one port in a state to another port in the same state, are obliged, in the course of the voyage, to go outside of any particular state, and it would not be difficult to give examples where more than half the voyage is necessarily upon the high seas. Unless the admiralty has jurisdiction in such a case to enforce the maritime lien in case of a collision or jettison, it is difficult to see to what forum the injured party can resort for redress. Piracy, it is said, is justiciable everywhere, but it cannot be admitted that maritime torts are justiciable nowhere.
over maritime contracts set up a distinction, and contend that the admiralty jurisdiction over such contracts is limited by the power granted to Congress to regulate commerce. Reference may be made to the case of Maguire v. Card, [Footnote 19] as one where that distinction was adopted, but the decisive answer to that case, and the one preceding it in the same volume, will be found in the later cases already referred to, and in the case of The Mary Washington, [Footnote 20] where the opinion was given by the present CHIEF JUSTICE. All three of the cases, therefore, as well the case of W. C. Boon & Company as the other two, are cases within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the federal courts.
Wherever a maritime lien arises, the injured party may pursue his remedy, whether for a breach of a maritime contract or for a marine tort, by a suit in rem, or by a suit in personam, at his election. Attention will be called to three classes of cases only as examples to illustrate that proposition, but many more might be given to the same effect.
described and saved, in the circuit court of the district as well as in the state courts.
State legislatures have no authority to create a maritime lien, nor can they confer any jurisdiction upon a state court to enforce such a lien by a suit or proceeding in rem, as practiced in the admiralty courts. Observe the language of the saving clause under consideration. It is to suitors, and not to the state courts, nor to the circuit courts of the United States. Examined carefully, it is evident that Congress intended by that provision to allow the party to seek redress in the admiralty if he saw fit to do so, but not to make it compulsory in any case where the common law is competent to give him a remedy. Properly construed, a party under that provision may proceed in rem in the admiralty, or he may bring a suit in personam in the same jurisdiction, or he may elect not to go into admiralty at all, and may resort to his common law remedy in the state courts or in the circuit court of the United States, if he can make proper parties to give that court jurisdiction of his case.
Undoubtedly most common law remedies in cases of contract and tort, as given in common law courts, and suits in personam in the admiralty courts, bear a strong resemblance to each other, and it is not perhaps inaccurate to regard the two jurisdictions in that behalf as concurrent, but there is no form of action at common law which, when compared with the proceeding in rem in the admiralty, can be regarded as a concurrent remedy.
Consignees or shippers may proceed in the admiralty in rem against the vessel to enforce their maritime lien, or they may waive that lien and still proceed in the admiralty in personam against the owners of the vessel to recover damages for the nonfulfillment of the contract, or they may elect to bring a common action against the owners to recover damages, as in other cases for the breach of a contract to be executed on land.
Proceedings in a suit at common law on a contract of affreightment are precisely the same as in suits on contracts not regarded as maritime, wholly irrespective of the fact that the injured party might have sought redress in the admiralty. When properly brought, the suit is against the owners of the vessel, and in states where there are attachment laws, the plaintiff may attach any property, not exempted from execution, belonging to the defendants.
Liability of the owners of the vessel under the contract being the foundation of the suit, nothing can finally be held under the attachment except the interest of the owners in the vessel, because the vessel is held under the attachment as the property of the defendants, and not as the offending thing, as in the case of a proceeding in rem to enforce a maritime lien. Attachment in such suits may be of the property of nonresidents or of defendants absent from the state, as in suits on contracts not maritime, and the same rules apply in respect to the service of process and notice to the defendants.
Respective decrees reversed and the several causes remanded with instructions to dismiss the respective libels.
Revised Code, §§ 3127, 3142.
Waring v. Clarke, 5 How. 454.
Bags of Linseed, 1 Black 108.
The Commerce, 1 Black 579; 2 Story on the Constitution (3d ed) §§ 1666-1669.
23 U. S. 10 Wheat. 428.
The Lexington, 6 How. 390; The Vengeance, 3 Dall. 297; The Betsey, 4 Cranch 443; The Samuel, 1 Wheat. 9; The Octavia, 1 Wheat. 20.
53 U. S. 12 How. 457.
The Magnolia, 20 How. 296; 5 Stat. at Large 516.
66 U. S. 1 Black 578.
2 Story on the Constitution, § 1669.
The Genesee Chief, 12 How. 452.
The St. Lawrence, 1 Black 526.
62 U. S. 21 How. 245.
The Hine v. Trevor, 4 Wall. 555.
62 U. S. 21 How. 249.
The Bird of Paradise, 5 Wall. 545; The Eddy, 5 Wall. 481; Bags of Linseed, 1 Black 112; Maude & Pollock on Shipping 254.
Sturgis v. Boyer, 24 How. 117; Chamberlain v. Ward, 21 How. 553.
The St. Lawrence, 1 Black 529; Manro v. Almeida, 10 Wheat. 473; The Reindeer, 2 Wall. 384; The General Smith, 4 Wheat. 438.
The Moses Taylor, 4 Wall. 411.
The General Smith, 4 Wheat. 438; The St. Lawrence, 1 Black 529.
Ferry Company v. Beers, 20 How. 402.

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