Source: https://thewesternmarylandadvocate.com/page/3/
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 13:05:28+00:00

Document:
Defense counsel is in District Court with client charged with theft under $100.00. Defense counsel asks the assigned State’s Attorney for a plea offer. The State’s Attorney responds “If your client pleads guilty to theft under $100.00, I will recommend a suspended sentence. There is no restitution in this case.” Defense lawyer advises client. Client wishes to accept. Defense lawyer tells the State’s Attorney, “my client accepts.” There is no further discussion. A guilty plea is entered and the judge follows the recommendation. Later, Defense counsel files for a sentence modification, seeking probation before judgment. The State objects to the modification, claiming that the original plea offer was binding and that probation before judgment cannot be granted over his objection. Defense counsel argues that it was a non-binding plea agreement.
With a binding plea agreement, any deviation from the sentence, even on revision, must be done with the consent of both the Defendant and the State. To do otherwise would be an illegal sentence. (See: Chertkov v. State, 335 Md. 161 (1994); see also: Bonilla v. State, 443 Md. 1, 12 (2015)).
What is a non-binding plea agreement?
A non-binding plea agreement is one in which “the State would recommend that the judge impose the sentence suggested by the plea agreement with the perhaps illusory hope that the sentencing judge would do so. That sort of watered down plea bargain is the one contemplated by [Maryland Rule] 4-243(b) which provides: ‘(b) Recommendations of State’s Attorney on sentencing. The recommendation of the State’s Attorney with respect to a particular sentence, disposition, or other judicial action made pursuant to subsection (a)(1)(E) of this Rule is not binding on the court. The court shall advise the defendant at or before the time the State’s Attorney makes a recommendation that the court is not bound by the recommendation, that it may impose the maximum penalties provided by law for the offense to which the defendant pleads guilty, and that imposition of a penalty more severe than the one recommended by the State’s Attorney will not be grounds for withdrawal of the plea.’” (State v. Smith, Md. App. No. 2634 page 6-7 (September Term, 2015) quoting Maryland Rule 4-243(b), emphasis added by the Court of Special Appeals).
If the Defense and State disagree if a plea was binding or non-binding, how do you figure out who is right?
“We conclude that, by its express terms, Rule 4-243 requires strict compliance with its provisions. We further conclude, as the natural consequence of requiring strict compliance with the Rule, that any question that later arises concerning the meaning of the sentencing term of a binding plea agreement must be resolved by resort solely to the record established at the Rule 4-243 plea proceeding. The record of that proceeding must be examined to ascertain precisely what was presented to the court, in the defendant’s presence and before the court accepts the agreement, to determine what the defendant reasonably understood to be the sentence the parties negotiated and the court agreed to impose. The test for determining what the defendant reasonably understood at the time of the plea is an objective one. It depends not on what the defendant actually understood the agreement to mean, but rather, on what a reasonable lay person in the defendant’s position and unaware of the niceties of sentencing law would have understood the agreement to mean, based on the record developed at the plea proceeding. It is for this reason that extrinsic evidence of what the defendant’s actual understanding might have been is irrelevant to the inquiry.” (Cuffley v. State, 416 Md. 568, 582 (2010)).
“If the record of the plea proceeding clearly discloses what the defendant reasonably understood to be the terms of the agreement, then the defendant is entitled to the benefit of the bargain, which, at the defendant’s option, is either specific enforcement of the agreement or withdrawal of the plea. Solorzano, 397 Md. at 667-68, 919 A.2d at 656. If examination of the record leaves ambiguous the sentence agreed upon by the parties, then the ambiguity must be resolved in the defendant’s favor. See id. at 673, 919 A.2d at 659; see also United States v. Gebbie, 294 F.3d 540, 552 (3d Cir.2002) (ambiguity in plea agreement is resolved against the government ‘[b]ecause of the Government’s advantage in bargaining power’); United States v. Jefferies, 908 F.2d 1520, 1523 (11th Cir.1990) (ambiguity in a plea agreement must be resolved against the government because a plea ‘constitutes a waiver of substantial constitutional rights requiring that the defendant be adequately warned of the consequences of the plea.’” (Id. at 583).
So what else should I know?
On May 4, 2017, the Maryland Court of Appeals heard oral argument in State of Maryland v. Stephanie Smith. Opinion is pending.
“Issues – Criminal Law – 1) Do the holdings in Cuffley v. State, 416 Md. 568 (2010) and Baines v. State, 416 Md. 204 (2010), under which a plea agreement is construed according to what a reasonable lay person in the defendant’s position would have understood it to mean, apply when the State challenges a sentence allegedly imposed in violation of Md. Rule 4-243(c)? 2) Would a reasonable lay person in Petitioner’s situation have believed that probation before judgment was precluded by the plea agreement where the agreement was silent as to probation before judgment and required Petitioner to pay restitution? 3) Under Md. Rule 4-243(c), which provides in part that “if [the guilty plea] is accepted, [the judge] may approve the [plea] agreement or defer decision as to its approval or rejection until after such pre-sentence proceedings and investigation as the judge directs,” is the court bound to the plea agreement upon accepting the guilty plea or may it reject the agreement after accepting the plea, and if the latter, did the trial court reject the agreement after accepting Petitioner’s guilty plea? 4) Did CSA err in holding that Petitioner’s sentence was imposed in violation of Rule 4-243(c)?” (http://www.courts.state.md.us/coappeals/schedule/201705schedule.html (Last Accessed 5/21/2017)).
This article is a collection of forms a practitioner could use if they feel their notice of appeal was wrongly stricken.
Facts: The defendant was convicted “of violating the conditions of a previously imposed period of probation. The court sentenced Montgomery to ten years imprisonment for the violation, with no new period of probation involved. The court then deferred for three years the date when the defendant was to report to the Division of Correction and begin serving his sentence. The reason given for the deferral, by the trial judge at sentencing, was that, “if you [Montgomery] are of good behavior between now and three years from now I will reconsider it and vacate it and not make you serve another day.” The dispositive issues before this Court are whether the deferred reporting date, based on the reasons set forth by the Circuit Court, was authorized by Maryland Rule 4–348(d) and, if not authorized, whether the sentence amounted to an illegal sentence within the meaning of Maryland Rule 4–345(a). We shall hold that the deferred reporting date, under the circumstances, was not authorized by Rule 4–348(d) and that it constituted an illegal sentence.” Id. at 68-69.
“ the purpose of …[Maryland] Rule 4–348(d)… [is] to authorize a trial judge to defer a convicted defendant’s prison reporting date so that the defendant could “take [ ] care of” his or her “personal, financial or other commitments.” This would include such things as winding up business affairs, making arrangements for the care of children or other dependents, etc. The original placement of the new provision, in the Rule dealing with stays pending appeal, is a strong indication that the authorized deferral of the prison reporting date was not intended to be for a multi-year or indefinite period. The purpose of the provision was not to allow a trial judge to monitor the defendant’s behavior for several years.” Id. at 81.
See Also: The United States Supreme Court, as well as the Maryland Court of Appeals has held, that “having determined that a fine or restitution is an appropriate sentence, a court cannot then imprison a defendant solely because of his inability to pay it.” (Reddick v. State, 327 Md 270 at 273-74, (1992) citing Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 665 (1983)).
Below is an argument to prevent the State from seeking subsequent offender status for a defendant whose past matter resulted in a probation before judgment. It was drafted by Paul J. Notarianni.
The Defendant in this matter cannot be subject to enhanced penalties under Maryland Rule 4-245, as he is not a subsequent offender. When a defendant, who receives Probation Before Judgment, successfully completes his conditions of probation, the court discharges the defendant from probation and that discharge is the final disposition of the matter. (Md Criminal Procedure Section 6-220 (g)). A discharge of a successful probationer under Criminal Procedure Section 6-220 is “without judgment of conviction and is not a conviction for the purpose of any disqualification or disability imposed by law because of conviction of crime.” (Id. at g(3)). Maryland Rule 4-245, permits enhanced sentences for subsequent offenders in many instances. By statute, a “subsequent offender” is defined as “a defendant who, because of a prior conviction, is subject to additional or mandatory statutory punishment for the offense charged.” (Md Rule 4-245 (a)). In the annotated code, the Maryland Court of Appeals is specifically cited as holding that Probation Before Judgment is “not a conviction where a defendant is satisfactorily discharged from probation because he has fulfilled the terms and conditions of his probation order.” (Maryland Rule 4-245 Annotated, unnumbered annotation, citing Shilling v. State, 320 Md. 288, 577 A.2d 83 (1990)). Probation Before Judgment is not a conviction. A defendant is not a subsequent offender, simply for having a prior Probation Before Judgment.
Below is the argument section for a motion to enforce a plea agreement. It was drafted by Paul J. Notarianni. For this scenario, the relevant facts are as follows. A defendant was charged with a crime. At the initial court appearance, the assigned Assistant State’s Attorney offered to dismiss the charges if the defendant performed a particular task to make the alleged victim whole. The defendant performed as agreed, however another member of the State’s Attorney’s office attempted to pursue prosecution in the matter.
The Federal Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has held that a plea proposal must be specific and unambiguous and must be made without any reservation related to a super[vising State’s Attorney’s] approval. (Cooper v. United States, 594 F.2d 12, 18 (4th Cir. 1979)). The proposal must be reasonable in content and must be made by a prosecutor with apparent authority. (Id. at 19) It also must be communicated promptly to the defendant so that no question of staleness is involved. (Id.) The defendant must promptly and unequivocally assent to the proposal. (Id.) Finally, the assent must be made through defendant’s counsel, who must expediently communicate defendant’s acceptance to the government. When a plea proposal embodies these criteria, constitutional fairness requires that the proposal be enforced. (Id. and see Rojas v. State of Maryland, 52 Md. App. 440, 444 (1982) “The fairness of any voluntary agreement turns upon the parties’ expectations, first, that it will be honored by the other party and, second, that redress is available when necessary in the courts. With predictability and reliance as the foundation of plea bargaining itself, the court must apply fundamental contract and agency principles to plea bargains as the best means to fair enforcement of the parties’ agreed obligation.”) The Maryland Court of Appeals has gone further to hold that this is especially true in instances where a defendant has substantially performed his part of the bargain. (State v. Brockman, 277 Md. 687, 698 (1976)).
In the matter at hand, the Defendant and State entered into an agreement to resolve the matter. As outlined by Federal, Maryland, and other state courts across the nation; all of the fundamental necessities of a contract existed. The State’s Attorney made a reasonable offer, through Assistant State’s Attorney Mr. [redacted], a prosecutor with apparent authority to handle the matter. The agreement was for the Defendant to make the alleged victim whole by [redacted,] which he substantially completed to the satisfaction of the alleged victim and Assistant State’s Attorney Mr. [redacted]. The offer was both made and accepted in a timely manner, and prior to the [negotiated deadline] substantially completed. The promise was breached by the State’s Attorney’s Office’s continued prosecution before this Honorable Court.
As a breach has occurred after the Defendant substantially performed his promise, he is entitled to a remedy. As both Federal and Maryland courts have recognized, it is largely at the discretion of the trial court to determine the appropriate remedy, typically either a dismissal or withdrawal of a guilty plea with a continuation to trial. The nature of the agreement in this matter was to dismiss the case in its entirety, not seek any finding of guilt, and to not seek further prosecution.
In this matter, any resolution other than a dismissal would have the same effect as no cure. To not dismiss this matter would result in a judicial blessing for a practice of the State’s Attorney’s Office which has a clear possibility for massive future abuse. Therefore, the Defendant would respectfully offer that a dismissal of the matter is the only remedy that would be appropriate.

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