Source: http://thewordout.net/pages/page.asp?page_id=56674
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 07:05:46+00:00

Document:
While it would be inappropriate to provide you with legal advice under these circumstances, we are pleased to provide you with the following information regarding your area of concern. Caveat: remember, freel legal advice is usually worth what you pay for it (Note: This is in no way intended to be legal advice).
This brief addresses whether the United States Constitution forbids social service workers or school guidance counselors from questioning students at school without first obtaining parental consent.
The United States Constitution has generally not been held to forbid social service or counseling interviews of students without parental consent. Although the Supreme Court has repeatedly upheld the affirmative right of parents to oversee and to direct the upbringing of their children,1 most courts view as compelling the state?s interest in preventing child abuse and additionally deem such interviews as not only a reasonable means but also the least restrictive means of safeguarding that state interest.
judgment that there is reason to believe that the child may suffer from abuse, courts are unlikely to sustain a challenge to the interview regardless of the particular constitutional provision under which a claim is brought.
At a minimum, interviewing children at school without parental consent implicates four constitutional provisions: the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment;2 the Fourth Amendment prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures;3 the Fourteenth Amendment right to substantive due process;4 and the Fourteenth Amendment right to procedural due process.5 Because of the state's compelling interest in preventing child abuse, and because of the relatively limited intrusion effected by an interview investigating child abuse, the courts are unlikely to sustain a claim brought under any one of these provisions. As a result, a policy or practice of questioning children in school without first obtaining parental consent will not likely be ruled constitutional.
The Context of Most Investigative Interviews.
The Free Exercise Clause is rarely invoked in response to such interviews.12 If invoked, however, Free Exercise claims are governed by rule stated by the United States Supreme Court in Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources v. Smith.13 There, the Court held that ?the right of free exercise does not relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a ?valid and neutral law of general applicability on the ground that the law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his religion prescribes (or proscribes).14 The Court did recognize an exception to this rule where the application of such a law involved not the Free Exercise Clause alone, but the Free Exercise in conjunction with other constitutional protections, such as . . . the right of parents . . . to direct the education of their children,15 Thus, in order to avoid dismissal of a suit challenging such in-school interviews, parents must state the Free Exercise claim in the form of a religious objection to the interview insofar as it substantially burdens their ability to direct the upbringing of their child.
Subject to such a claim, a law or policy permitting in-school questioning becomes subject to strict scrutiny, meaning that the law as applied to the child of religiously objecting parents may stand only if it is justified by a compelling interest that cannot be served by less restrictive means.16 Most courts accept that the states have a compelling interest in preventing child abuse;17 hence, the relevant question is whether less restrictive means would suffice.
[T]he reliability of a child's statements at an interview is of paramount importance. Unreliable or contaminated evidence resulting from the exercise of undue influence by the alleged abuse perpetrator will destroy the utility of the interview and prevent the defendant's employees from ascertaining whether a child is in need of further care and protection. Consequently, in this case, it was infeasible and not advisable for [the social workers] to alert [the parents] of the allegations against [the father] prior to conducting the interview of [the child]. State officials could not guess what circumstances existed in the home, or whether [the mother] would assist in or deter [the social workers] efforts to properly investigate the matter.
Countering this markedly deferential valuation of in-school questioning is the potential for its abuse, whether as a means of harassment or otherwise, although this is theoretically limited by the reasonableness requirements of the state reporting laws, as well as of the Fourth Amendment, discussed below. Still, the potential for abuse remains problematic in light of such current weaknesses of the intervention system as vague statutory standards, disproportionate impact on minority and poor families, and instability of foster care.21 In the current legal climate, however, rulings such as those cited here render a Free Exercise claim unlikely to prevail.
Fourth Amendment Prohibition Against Unreasonable Searches and Seizures.
The second constitutional provision implicated by in-school interviews is the Fourth Amendment prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures. In general, the courts agree that in making a Fourth Amendment claim regarding a child abuse investigation, plaintiff parents do not have standing to sue on their own behalf, but may sue only in their capacity to represent their children.22 In this context, the courts have held that taking protective custody of a child constitutes a seizure under the Fourth Amendment,23 although not all courts specify whether removing the child from classes in order to conduct an interview is equivalent to taking custody or merely constitutes a search.
Precisely how these standards for evaluating seizures would be applied to interviews conducted in school without parental consent, would depend on the particular fact pattern. Still, a few factors may give some general indication. For one, the above standards were developed in cases pertaining to taking protective custody of children, a measure that is typically more intrusive than conducting an interview, hence courts are likely to adjust their requirements accordingly. Moreover, as indicated above, courts are often deferential toward teachers and social workers based on their view of such questioning as the least restrictive means of preventing child abuse. Consequently, courts are unlikely to sustain a Fourth Amendment challenge on grounds of seizure unless the alleged grounds for questioning the child without parental consent were clearly unreasonable as a matter of professional judgment.
Second, owing to the prophylactic and nonpunitive nature of these interviews, at least with respect to the child, a policy of interviewing students might more appropriately be compared to the drug testing policy in Vernonia than to the evidentiary searches in T.L.O.44 At the same time, the intrusive nature of an in-school interview may be more akin to the individualized searches in T.L.O. than to the blanket searches in Vernonia, insofar as it singles out a particular student for questioning. Still, even if the reasonable cause requirement of T.L.O. were to be imposed, the state reporting laws discussed above would already meet that standard.
In practice, however, the theoretical differences among the various standards make little actual difference. In Picarella, for example, the court emphasized that federal courts must act deferentially toward the decisions of school officials not only out of respect for a traditional area of state and local concern,58 but also because ?over-expanding the notion of fundamental liberties protected by the Constitution compromises the value of and threatens the protection accorded those liberties.59 Thus, in addressing in-school interviews within the context of substantive due process, the court stated simply, With respect to the questioning of [the plaintiffs' daughter], the discussion above concerning the Fourth Amendment applies with equal force to this contention[, since the] same basic analysis of weighing interests applies to Fourth Amendment and due process claims.60 Given the current structuring of the respective interests of parent, state, and child, as discussed above, in combination with deference toward school officials, then, a substantive due process claim brought under any applicable standard is likely to fail.61 The Fourteenth Amendment Right to Procedural Due Process.
Whether brought under procedural due process or another provision, a suit challenging the constitutionality of questioning children at school without parental consent is unlikely to prevail. In theory, the respective differences in the analysis of different constitutional provisions might alter the outcome, with, for example, First Amendment strict scrutiny perhaps favoring the parents more so than Fourth Amendment reasonableness. Despite these differences, the present structuring of state and parental interests, combined with a deference toward local school officials, predisposes courts to reject challenges regardless of the particular provision under which a claim is brought. Therefore, the courts will likely regard the questioning of children at school without parental consent, based on a school official's professional judgment that there exist reasonable grounds to fear child abuse, as constitutional.
upbringing of their children), as well as the cases cited therein.
2 U.S. CONST. AMEND. I.
3 U.S. CONST. AMEND. IV.
4 U.S. CONST. AMEND. XIV.
of in-home abuse ordinarily investigated by conducting an interview at child?s school).
7 DeShaney v. Winnebago County Social Serv. Dept., 489 U.S. 189, 191 (1989).
8 2 Legal Rights of Children ?? 16.14-15, at 58-59 (Donald T. Kramer, ed., 2d ed. 1994).
9 Id. ? 16.16, at 66-67.
Lebanon Intermediate Unit 13, 880 F. Supp. 319, 330-32 (E.D. Pa. 1994).
11 See e.g., Callahan, supra.
unpublished decisions when making their decisions.
13 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
14 Id. at 879 (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.3 (1982)).
17 See e.g., J.B., 905 F. Supp. at 988; R.S. v. State, 459 N.W.2d 680, 689 (Minn. 1990).
18 R.S., 459 N.W.2d at 690.
19 Wojcik v. Town of North Smithfield, 76 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1996).
20 J.B., 905 F. Supp. at 986-87.
21 See 2 Legal Rights of Children, ? 16.02, at 12.
22 See e.g., Gardiner v. Incorporated Village of Endicott, 50 F.3d 151, 155 (2d Cir. 1995); Tenenbaum v.
Williams, 862 F. Supp. 962, 974 (E.D.N.Y. 1994).
23 See e.g., Tenenbaum, 862 F. Supp. at 973.
24 Donald v. Polk County, 836 F.2d 376, 384 (7th Cir. 1988).
25 Tenenbaum, 862 F. Supp. at 975.
27 J.B., 905 F. Supp. at 990.
28 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
29 515 U.S. 646 (1995).
30 T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 336.
32 Id. at 337, 341.
34 515 U.S. at 663.
38 Id. at 655, 656.
39 Id. at 658, n.2.
42 Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 653 (quoting T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 341).
43 But cf. People v. Dilworth, 661 N.E.2d 310, 319 (Ill. 1996) (?The main reason the Supreme Court . . .
?special relationship? between students and teachers.?).
45 Wojcik v. Town of Smithfield, 76 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1996).
48 893 F. Supp. 1292 (M.D. Pa. 1995).
52 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925).
53 455 U.S. 747, 748 (1982).
55 Tenenbaum, 862 F. Supp. at 973.
56 J.B., 905 F. Supp. at 988.
57 In re Scott County Master Docket, 672 F. Supp. 1152, 1165-68 (D. Minn. 1987), aff?d, Myers v.
Scott County, 868 F.2d 1017 (8th Cir. 1989). See also Wilkinson v. Balsam, 885 F. Supp. 651, 662 (D.
familial relationships. This is but an instance of a general principle of substantive due process.?).
58 893 F. Supp. at 1297.
60 Id. at 1302 (citing Darryl H. v. Coler, 801 F.2d 893, 901-02 n.7 (7th Cir. 1986)).
61 See also R.S., 459 N.W.2d at 689-90.
62 See e.g., Chayo, 844 F. Supp. at 171.
63 Callahan, 880 F. Supp. at 332 (quoting In re Scott County Master Docket, 672 F. Supp. at 1169).
64 Callahan, 880 F. Supp. at 332 (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1970)).
65 See e.g., J.B., 905 F. Supp. at 986-87.

References: v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v.

 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v.

 v. 
 v. 
 v.