Source: http://www.williamgoren.com/blog/tag/eeoc-v-abercrombie-and-fitch-stores-inc/
Timestamp: 2019-04-18 11:54:17+00:00

Document:
EEOC v. Abercrombie and Fitch stores Inc.
Did you know that persons with disabilities are undefeated at the Supreme Court when it comes to title II and title III matters? It’s true.
Cleveland v. Policy Management Systems Corporation, 526 U.S. 795. A win for persons with disabilities with the court holding that an SSDI filing does not automatically prevent a person from filing an ADA claim later.
S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391. A loss for persons with disabilities with the court holding that a person with a disability did not have the right to bump a more senior person when a seniority system was present.
Raytheon v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44. A loss for persons with disabilities with the court holding that a facially neutral policy applied in a uniform way can be used to escape ADA liability.
Wright v. Universal Marine Service Corporation, 525 U.S. 70. A win for persons with disabilities with the court holding that there was no presumption of arbitrability with respect to ADA claims, and where an arbitration clause said that ADA claims would be subject to the clause, such a clause must be clear and unmistakable.
Board of Trustees of University of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356. A loss for persons with disabilities with the court holding that persons with disabilities when it comes to employment are in the rational basis class and therefore, sovereign immunity applied to title I suits against state entities.
Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184. A loss for persons with disabilities with the court holding that a person was substantially limited in the major life activity of performing manual tasks if they were severely restricted or prevented from performing that major life activity. It also held that a major life activity was one of central importance to daily lives. Keep in mind, this decision was overruled by the amendments to the ADA.
Albertson’s v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555. A loss for persons with disabilities. One of the three Sutton trilogy cases holding that mitigating measures must be factored into the calculus of whether a person has a disability. Keep in mind, this decision was overruled by the amendment to the ADA or not… (but see this blog entry).
Sutton v. United Airlines, 527 U.S. 471. See paragraph 7 immediately above.
EEOC v. Waffle House, 534 U.S. 279. A win for persons with disabilities saying that the EEOC had an independent right to bring a claim regardless of whether the plaintiff has signed an agreement to arbitrate.
Murphy v. UPS, 527 U.S. 516. See paragraph 7 of this section.
Clackamas Gastroenterology Associates PC v. Wells 538 U.S. 440. A win for persons with disabilities with the court holding that it depends upon the facts as to whether someone who may be a partner or owner of the business in name is actually an employee for purposes of the ADA.
EEOC v. Abercrombie and Fitch 135 S. Ct. 2028. Not an ADA case at all but containing language favorable to persons with disabilities (see this blog entry).
Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509. A win of sorts for persons with disability with the court holding that sovereign immunity can be forcibly waived with respect to non-employment suits against state entities depending upon the facts of the case.
Olmstead v. L.C. by Zimring, 527 U.S. 581. A huge win for persons with disabilities with the court holding that persons with disabilities have a right to be served within the community.
S. v. Georgia, 546 U.S. 151. A win for persons with disabilities holding that a showing of constitutional violations waives sovereign immunity.
Pennsylvania Department of Corrections v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206. A win for persons with disabilities with the court holding that the ADA applies to prisons.
City and County of San Francisco v. Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. 1765. A win for persons with disabilities as it acknowledges that title II of the ADA applies to everything that a public entity does. It also remanded the case for ADA proceedings.
Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624. A win for persons with disabilities holding that HIV positivity is a disability under the ADA and that a dentist had to serve such an individual absent a direct threat.
PGA Tour v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661. A big win for persons with disabilities holding that the ADA applies to professional sports and containing lots of favorable language for persons with disabilities.
Spector v. Norwegian Cruise Lines, 545 U.S. 119. A win for persons with disabilities with the court holding that foreign flag cruise ships were subject to the ADA within certain limits.
Chevron v. Echazabal, 536 U.S. 73. A split decision because the court found in favor of the EEOC but against the person with a disability when it held that a direct threat defense applies to the self as well as to others.
Barnes v. Gorman, 536 U.S. 181. A split decision with the court finding that compensatory damages against state entities are available under title II of the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act but not punitives.
University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517. A split decision with the court holding that retaliation requires but for causation but containing very favorable language with respect to causation in non-retaliation ADA claims.
CRST Van Expedited v. EEOC. A non-ADA case, but a loss for persons with disabilities with the court expanding the possibilities for a defendant to get attorneys fees.
Buckhannon Board and Care Home v. West Virginia Department of Health and Human Resources, 532 U.S. 598. A loss for persons with disabilities with the court holding that prevailing party means a judgment on the merits or a consent decree and rejecting the catalyst theory.
Supremes agreed to hear two cases last week involving disability rights.
The first case the Supreme Court decided to hear is the case of Fry v. Napoleon Community Schools, 788 F.3d 622 (6th 2015). In that case, the Sixth Circuit held that the IDEA exhaustion requirement had to be construed very broadly so as to preclude the plaintiffs from pursuing an ADA/Rehabilitation Act claim before IDEA exhaustion was completed. There was a vigorous dissent in that case. I have previously discussed this issue in this blog entry and in this blog entry. Whether this case is viewed as a win or a lose for persons with disabilities depending upon its decision, entirely depends upon what your view of IDEA is v. § 504/ADA. The two laws have very different philosophies and very different approaches to resolving differences.
The second case is Ivy v. Williams, 781 F.3d 250 (5th 2015). This is an interesting case. I am not aware of a Circuit court split on this one.
Facts in Ivy: In this case, in Texas, individuals under the age of 25 cannot obtain driver’s licenses unless they submit a driver education certificate to the Department of Public Safety. Driver education certificates are only available from private driver education schools licensed by the Texas Education Agency. The plaintiffs, all deaf, contacted a variety of Texas Education Agency licensed private driver education schools, all of which informed the named plaintiffs that the schools would not accommodate them. As a result, the plaintiffs cannot obtain driver education certificates and therefore, cannot obtain driver licenses. A deafness resource specialist with the Texas Department of Assistive and Rehabilitative Services informed the Texas Education Agency of the inability of the deaf individuals to receive driver education certificates. However the Texas Education Agency declined to intervene, stating that it would not required to enforce the ADA and that it would not act against the private driver education schools unless the United States Department of Justice found that the schools had violated the ADA. The deafness resource specialist filed a complaint against the Texas Education Agency with the Department of Justice, which the Department of Justice apparently dismissed. The plaintiff then filed a lawsuit in federal district court against the Texas Education Agency and a private driver education school requesting injunctive and declaratory relief against both parties under title II of the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act. Interestingly enough, the driver education schools themselves were not sued for violating title III of the ADA. All of the judges on the panel agreed that the plaintiffs had standing, but disagreed on the merits.
Just because the driver education schools are heavily regulated and supervised by the Texas Education Agency does not make the schools a service, program, or activity of the Texas Education Agency. Otherwise, states and localities would be required to ensure the ADA compliance of every heavily-regulated industry.
State of Texas cannot legislatively mandate driver education and then abate ADA responsibility by a flea flicker lateral from the Texas Education Agency to private licensees. I should point out that this is much the same argument as the ADA being a non-delegable duty (see this blog entry).
With respect to promoting handicap accessibility, Congress made the conscious calculation to impose the burden on public entities. In light of the unseemly history of systematically excluding persons with disability from public life and public activities, Congress quite intently wrote the ADA to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination. While it might not be convenient for the Texas Education Agency to require ADA compliance by licensed driver education schools, nevertheless, the ADA’s sweeping purpose is clear. Finally, if the Texas Education Agency if it finds that such modifications are too strenuous, it is allowed per the ADA to demonstrate as a defense that making the modification would fundamentally alter the nature of the service, program, or activity.
With respect to Ivy v. Williams, interesting that the case was accepted by the U.S. Supreme Court since there was no Circuit split on the issue and the court is currently at eight members. Accepting the case meant that four of them wanted to hear the case. Impossible to say which four, though one could guess it might have been Breyer, Sotomayor, Ginsberg, and Kagan voting for cert. One also wonders why the case would be accepted if they thought a 4-4 split was in order, since there is no way to tell when a new Justice will join the court. I would not hazard a guess as to which way this case will go. That said, one possibility is they might split the difference. That is, saying that a program, service, or activity is not involved, but the Texas Education Agency cannot engage in the flea flicker pass that it engages in. It also might be possible that they might say that the licensing system itself is a program, service, or activity. It will be very interesting to see how this case is decided and the breakdown of the Justices (party lines are not a good indicator of how the justices break down in ADA cases).
Regarding Fry, it is more understandable that this case was accepted since the cases have gone both ways on requiring IDEA exhaustion with respect to service animals where the student has an IEP. This particular case is even a harder guess than Ivy as to how it might go. A ruling in favor of the school district might mean a rush away from IDEA to 504 by parents of students with disabilities so that by not having an IEP, they do not have to worry about exhausting the IDEA process.
Regarding deaf drivers, readers might be interested in this article involving Uber seeking out deaf drivers.
EEOC v. Abercrombie and Fitch stores Inc.: How does it Apply to the ADA?
My schedule has been topsy-turvy lately. That is why you are seeing posting of the blog on different days than typical. I am also going out of town over the weekend and be back early in the week, and so my next blog will also be later in the week. The weekend after next, I expect to get back to my early in the week blogging.
In Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Abercrombie and Fitch Stores, Inc., the Supreme Court held that it wasn’t necessary for an applicant to have to inform the employer of his need for religious accommodations for the employer to be held liable for violating title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. All the commentaries in my blog roll and then some have talked about this opinion. What I have not seen is this case talked about in terms of the impact that it has on the ADA. So here goes… As is typical for my blog entries, I have divided the blog entry into categories: facts; reasoning (including how it might apply to the ADA on the reasoning as a separate paragraph underneath the particular reason); and conclusions. The blog entry is short and kind of flows. Therefore, you probably want to read the whole thing, but nevertheless the categories remain.
Plaintiff, a practicing Muslim, wears a headscarf. She applied for a position at the store and was given a rating that qualified her to be hired. However, the person that gave the rating was concerned that her headscarf would conflict with the store’s look policy, since modified. The person doing the rating sought guidance from the store manager to clarify whether the headscarf violated the company’s look policy. When she received a no answer she then took it to the district manager who informed her that he believed the applicant wore the headscarf because of her faith and that the headscarf would indeed violate the look policy. When she was denied the job she brought it to the EEOC who then brought suit.
1. Disparate treatment and disparate impact are the only causes of action under title VII.
ADA take: The ADA doesn’t work this way. Yes, you can have disparate impact and you could also have disparate treatment. However, the ADA is a world unto itself. For example, reasonable accommodations is something else entirely. Also, as discussed previously, the ADA is not a place where you often see comparables, which is often the case in disparate treatment claims, and comparables is not necessary for liability under the ADA as discussed here.
2. The applicant need only show that his need for an accommodation was a motivating factor in the employer’s decision.
ADA take: Footnote 2 of the opinion says that the employer has the burden of establishing an undue hardship defense because of the phrasing of the statute. That phrasing is similar to the phrasing of the ADA with respect to undue hardship/undue burden. Thus, the long line of cases talking about undue hardship/undue burden being an affirmative defense is probably correct.
3. The ADA requires that reasonable accommodations be made to the known physical or mental limitations of an applicant and title VII does not have any such limitation.
ADA take: True, the ADA requires that the employer has to be aware of the physical or mental limitations of an applicant prior to making a reasonable accommodation. But, the question remains what does it mean for the employer to know. For example, many a case has said that magic words are not necessary to request a reasonable accommodation.
ADA take: Title I of the ADA is tied into title VII of the Civil Rights Act with respect to remedies. This particular statement is a strong indicator that motivating factor is in play with respect to title I, a point which I have made previously.
3. Title VII does not demand mere neutrality with regards to religious practices, rather it gives them favored treatment, affirmatively obligating employers not to fail or refuse to hire or discharge any individual because of such individual’s religious observance and practice. Further, title VII requires otherwise neutral policy to give way to the need for an accommodation.
1. For those in the ADA field, such as myself, I would count this decision as a plus for persons with disabilities as it reaffirms many of the basic premises of the ADA.
3. The ADA does impose a knowledge requirement with respect to reasonable accommodations, but just what is that knowledge requirement is not addressed by this case, which didn’t have anything to do with the ADA. As mentioned above, there is a long line of cases that says actual knowledge is not required. It is my view that you are better off thinking of the knowledge requirement for reasonable accommodations vis-à-vis the ADA in terms of an objective standard of knew or should have known.

References: v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v.