Source: http://masscases.com/cases/app/25/25massappct439.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 14:50:29+00:00

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CIVIL ACTION commenced in the Superior Court Department on June 25, 1985.
The case was heard by Francis W. Keating, J.
John C. Weld for the plaintiff.
Augustus J. Camelio for Local 2977, State Council 93, American Federation of State, County & Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO.
John B. Cochran, for Labor Relations Commission, amicus curiae.
under the collective bargaining agreement between the town and the defendant union, the exclusive representative of the relevant unit of employees, of which Ames and Baker were members. The grievance charged that the selection of Baker was in violation of article V ("Seniority") of the collective agreement, quoted in the margin, [Note 3] and that, upon a proper application of this provision, Ames deserved the appointment. Ames's grievance was denied at the first and second stages of the grievance procedure, but at the third stage, consisting of submission to the selectmen, the town allowed the grievance and appointed Ames to the post. Accordingly, Baker reverted to his previous position as mechanic in the highway division.
margin; Ames could be found to be minimally qualified. Ames, however, had a wide advantage over Baker in seniority: Ames had twenty-four years of service, Baker eight. The judge, upon findings of fact and rulings of law, holding in effect that Baker had failed to establish breach of duty on the part of the union, entered judgment denying the application to compel arbitration. Baker appeals.
[Note 1] Town of Barnstable.
[Note 2] The record does not describe the evaluation and selection procedure that was applied.
[Note 3] "An employee's continued length of service with the Employer shall determine the seniority of the employee. All promotions within the bargaining unit shall be determined on a seniority basis, however, merit shall be a factor. The reasonableness of the employer's judgment with respect to merit may be made the subject matter of the grievance procedure after proper discussion with the chairman of the bargaining unit."
[Note 4] Baker also requested the town to proceed with arbitration, but was refused. We have no occasion to consider whether there may be events under the collective agreement upon which the town can demand arbitration. Compare Trinque v. Mount Wachusett Community College Faculty Assn., 14 Mass. App. Ct. 191 , 193 (1982).
[Note 5] There is no contention that the court's competence was ousted by the "primary jurisdiction" of the Labor Relations Commission. See the discussion in Leahy v. Local 1526, American Fedn. of State, County, & Municipal Employees, 399 Mass. 341 , 345-351 (1987).
[Note 6] See Amalgamated Assn. of St., Elec. Ry. & Motor Coach Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274, 301 (1971); Berman v. Drake Motor Lines, Inc., 6 Mass. App. Ct. 438 , 445 (1978).
[Note 7] See Norton v. Massachusetts Bay Transp. Authy., 369 Mass. 1 , 2 (1975).
[Note 8] See Local 285, Serv. Employees Intl. Union, 9 M.L.C. 1760, 1764 (1983) (in this and other cited cases before the Labor Relations Commission the employee is bringing a charge of prohibited practice against the union under c. 150E, Section 10[b]). In later decisions, the commission has spoken of "unlawful" rather than "improper" motivation. See Boston Teachers Union, 12 M.L.C. 1577, 1584 (1986).
[Note 9] See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 195 (1967).
[Note 10] See Berman v. Drake Motor Lines, Inc., 6 Mass. App. Ct. 438 , 445 (1978).
[Note 11] Teamsters Local 437, 10 M.L.C. 1467, 1474 (1984).
[Note 12] See Fitchburg Sch. Comm., 9 M.L.C. 1399, 1415 (1982).
[Note 13] Teamsters Local 437, 10 M.L.C. 1467, 1477 (1984).
[Note 14] See Amalgamated Assn. of St., Elec. Ry. & Motor Coach Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274, 301 (1971); and generally, Trinque v. Mount Wachusett Community College Faculty Assn., 14 Mass. App. Ct. 191 (1982).
A public policy may be so strong as to justify the overthrow of a union's decision refusing to process a grievance even where the union may have acted in good faith. So for a case where the union's refusal was based on the fact that the employee was not a union member and had not paid dues. See Carbone v. School Comm. of Medford, 12 Mass. App. Ct. 948 (1981).
[Note 15] A previous contest between two employees for a position resulted in arbitration under American Arbitration Association auspices in 1982 at the instance of the present union; the same seniority clause was involved. The record before the arbitrator (Harold Fuller grievance) was a full one on how the town made its selection (the arbitrator was critical of the process). In the arbitrator's view, the collective agreement placed "greatest emphasis on seniority, with merit nonetheless remaining a factor to be taken into consideration." He considered the candidates of roughly equal merit, and, upsetting the town's selection, awarded the post to the candidate who had a small edge (about one year) in seniority.
The arbitrator's decision is not contradictory of the union's action in the present case. We point out, also, that the function of an arbitrator in deciding priority under the contract is different from that of the Labor Relations Commission, or a court, in deciding whether a union has violated its duty of fair representation in declining to take a grievance to arbitration. See Fitchburg Sch. Comm., 9 M.L.C. 1399, 1415 (1982).
[Note 16] We have had the benefit of a brief submitted by the Labor Relations Commission as a friend of the court.

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