Source: https://www.legalcrystal.com/case/98551/breard-vs-alexandria
Timestamp: 2019-04-26 00:28:09+00:00

Document:
1. The ordinance is not invalid under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Pp. 341 U. S. 629 -633.
(a) The ordinance can be characterized as prohibitory of appellant's legitimate business of obtaining subscriptions to periodicals only in the limited sense of subscriptions by house-to-house canvass without invitation. It leaves open the usual methods of solicitation -- by radio, periodicals, mail and local agencies. Pp. 341 U. S. 631 -632.
(b) The Constitution's protection of property rights does not render a state or city impotent to guard its citizens against the annoyances of life because the regulation may restrict the manner of doing a legitimate business. Pp. 341 U. S. 632 -633.
2. The ordinance does not so burden or impede interstate commerce as to violate the Commerce Clause of the Federal Constitution. Pp. 341 U. S. 633 -641.
(a) The ordinance does not discriminate against interstate business and is a valid local regulation of solicitation. Hood & Sons v. Du Mond, 336 U. S. 525 , and Dean Milk Co. v. Madison, 340 U. S. 349 , distinguished. Pp. 341 U. S. 633 -641.
(b) Appellant, as a publishers' representative or in his own right as a door-to-door canvasser, is no more free to violate local regulations to protect privacy than are other solicitors. Pp. 341 U. S. 637 -641.
(c) When there is a reasonable basis for legislation to protect the social, as distinguished from the economic, welfare of a community, it is not for this Court, because of the Commerce Clause, to deny the exercise locally of the sovereign power of the state. Pp. 341 U. S. 640 -641.
3. The ordinance does not abridge the freedom of speech and press guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Pp. 341 U. S. 641 -645.
(a) The fact that periodicals are sold does not put them beyond the protection of the First Amendment. Pp. 341 U. S. 641 -642.
(b) The constitutional guaranties of free speech and free press are not absolutes. P. 341 U. S. 642 .
(c) Martin v. Struthers, 319 U. S. 141 ; Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U. S. 501 ; and Tucker v. Texas, 326 U. S. 517 , distinguished. Pp. 341 U. S. 642 -644.
(d) It would be a misuse of the great guaranties of free speech and free press to use them to force a community to admit the solicitors of publications to the home premises of its residents. P. 341 U. S. 645 .
At appellant's trial for violation of the ordinance, there was a motion to quash on the ground that the ordinance violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution; that it violates the Federal Commerce Clause, art. 1, § 8, cl. 3; and that it violates the guarantees of the First Amendment of freedom of speech and of the press, made applicable to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. Appellant's motion to quash was overruled by the trial court, and he was found guilty and sentenced to pay a $25 fine or serve 30 days in jail. The Supreme Court of Louisiana affirmed appellant's conviction, and expressly rejected the federal constitutional objections. 217 La. 820, 47 So.2d 553. The case is here on appeal, 28 U.S.C. § 1257, Jamison v. Texas, 318 U. S. 413 .
-- radio, periodicals, mail, local agencies -- are open. [ Footnote 11 ] Furthermore, neither case is in as strong a position today as it was when Bunger appealed. See Olsen v. Nebraska, 313 U. S. 236 , 313 U. S. 243 , et seq., and Lincoln Federal Labor Union v. Northwestern Iron & Metal Co., 335 U. S. 525 , 335 U. S. 535 .
or prohibited in the public interest. See the dissent in New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U. S. 262 , 285 U. S. 280 , 285 U. S. 303 . The problem is legislative where there are reasonable bases for legislative action. [ Footnote 13 ] We hold that this ordinance is not invalid under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
"Under our constitutional system, there necessarily remains to the States, until Congress acts, a wide range for the permissible exercise of power appropriate to their territorial jurisdiction although interstate commerce may be affected. . . . States are thus enabled to deal with local exigencies and to exert, in the absence of conflict with federal legislation, an essential protective power. [ Footnote 16 ]"
as distinct from private, action. [ Footnote 21 ] Likewise, in Hood & Sons v. DuMond, it was the discrimination against out-of-state dealers that invalidated the order refusing a license to buy milk to an out-of-state distributor. [ Footnote 22 ] Where no discrimination existed, in a somewhat similar situation, we upheld the state regulation as a permissible burden on commerce. [ Footnote 23 ] See in accord, Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co. v. Michigan Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 341 U. S. 329 , 341 U. S. 336 .
or in his own right as a door-to-door canvasser, is no more free to violate local regulations to protect privacy than are other solicitors. As we said above, the usual methods of seeking business are left open by the ordinance. That such methods do not produce as much business as house-to-house canvassing is, constitutionally, immaterial, and a matter for adjustment at the local level in the absence of federal legislation. Cf. Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U. S. 408 . Taxation that threatens interstate commerce with prohibition or discrimination is bad, Nippert v. Richmond, 327 U. S. 416 , 327 U. S. 434 , but regulation that leaves out-of-state sellers on the same basis as local sellers cannot be invalid for that reason.
While taxation and licensing of hawking or peddling, defined as selling and delivering in the state, has long been thought to show no violation of the Commerce Clause, solicitation of orders with subsequent interstate shipment has been immune from such an exaction. [ Footnote 25 ] These decisions have been explained by this Court as embodying a protection of commerce against discrimination made most apparent by fixed-sum licenses regardless of sales. [ Footnote 26 ] Where the legislation is not an added financial burden upon sales in commerce or an exaction for the privilege of doing interstate commerce but a regulation of local matters, different considerations apply.
"The police power of a state extends beyond health, morals and safety, and comprehends the duty, within constitutional limitations, to protect the wellbeing and tranquility of a community. [ Footnote 28 ]"
the publications from First Amendment protection. [ Footnote 31 ] We agree that the fact that periodicals are sold does not put them beyond the protection of the First Amendment. [ Footnote 32 ] The selling, however, brings into the transaction a commercial feature.
The First and Fourteenth Amendments have never been treated as absolutes. [ Footnote 33 ] Freedom of speech or press does not mean that one can talk or distribute where, when and how one chooses. Rights other than those of the advocates are involved. By adjustment of rights, we can have both full liberty of expression and an orderly life.
319 U.S. at 319 U. S. 143 -144.
319 U.S. at 319 U. S. 146 -147. There was dissent even to this carefully phrased application of the principles of the First Amendment. As no element of the commercial entered into this free solicitation and the opinion was narrowly limited to the precise fact of the free distribution of an invitation to religious services, we feel that it is not necessarily inconsistent with the conclusion reached in this case.
Since it is not private individuals, but the local and federal governments, that are prohibited by the First and Fourteenth Amendments from abridging free speech or press, Hall v. Virginia does not rule a conviction for trespass after notice by ordinance. However, if, as we have shown above, p. 341 U. S. 640 , a city council may speak for the citizens on matters subject to the police power, we would have in the present prosecution the time-honored offense of trespass on private grounds after notice. Thus, the Marsh and Tucker cases are not applicable here.
The ordinance now under consideration, § 3, does not apply to "the sale, or soliciting of orders for the sale, of milk, dairy products, vegetables, poultry, eggs and other farm and garden produce. . . ." Appellant makes no point against the present ordinance on the ground of invalid classification. Cf. Tigner v. Texas, 310 U. S. 141 ; Williams v. Arkansas, 217 U. S. 79 , 217 U. S. 90 .
Eleven states, on the other hand, have held such ordinances invalid. All of these states acted in part, at least, on nonfederal grounds, and the only federal constitutional argument, which was considered by three states, was that based on the Due Process Clause. No state court, in voiding the ordinance, has reached the Commerce Clause or the First Amendment issues urged here. The principal grounds relied on have been that the prohibited conduct amounted, at most, only to a private nuisance, and not a public one; that there was no showing of injury to public health or safety by the prohibited conduct; that there was a vested right in a lawful occupation, so that it was subject only to regulation, but not to prohibition; and that the ordinance was beyond the delegated powers of the municipality. Prior v. White, 132 Fla. 1, 180 So. 347 (not more than a private nuisance); Clay v. Matthews, 185 Ga. 279, 194 S.E. 172 (affirming without opinion by an evenly divided court); DeBerry v. LaGrange, 62 Ga.App. 74, 8 S.E.2d 146 (not a nuisance; invades an inalienable right to the occupation of soliciting); Osceola v. Blair, 231 Iowa 770, 2 N.W.2d 83 (not a nuisance, deprives persons of a property right in their occupation); City of Mt. Sterling v. Donaldson Baking Co., 287 Ky. 781, 155 S.W.2d 237 (not a public nuisance, beyond the scope of the municipal police power); Jewel Tea Co. v. Bel Air, 172 Md. 536, 192 A. 417 (not a nuisance, nor within delegated powers of municipality); Jewel Tea Co. v. Geneva, 137 Neb. 768, 291 N.W. 664 (not a public nuisance, arbitrary, violates Due Process Clause, citing Jay Burns Baking Co. v. Bryan, 264 U. S. 504 ); N.J. Good Humor, Inc. v. Board of Commissioners, 124 N.J.L. 162, 11 A.2d 113 (not a valid police regulation, beyond powers of municipality); McAlester v. Grand Union Tea Co., 186 Okl. 487, 98 P.2d 924 (only a private nuisance); City of Orangeburg v. Farmer, 181 S.C. 143, 186 S.E. 783 (unreasonable, prohibits a lawful occupation, in violation of state and federal due process, enacted with improper motive); Ex parte Faulkner, 143 Tex.Cr.R. 272, 158 S.W.2d 525 (beyond the powers of the municipality); White v. Town of Culpeper, 172 Va. 630, 1 S.E.2d 269 (not a public nuisance).
The ordinances in the Bel Air and Culpeper cases contained discriminatory provisions not involved in the instant case. It should be noted also that, while New York upheld the ordinance in Bohnke, supra, as applied to distribution of religious tracts, that case was decided before this Court's decision in Martin v. Struthers, 319 U. S. 141 . Enforcement of Green River ordinances has subsequently been enjoined as against members of the Jehovah's Witnesses sect in Donley v. Colorado Springs, 40 F.Supp. 15, and Zimmerman v. Village of London, 38 F.Supp. 582.
He cited: Real Silk Hosiery Mills v. Portland, 268 U. S. 325 ; DiSanto v. Pennsylvania, 273 U. S. 34 ; International Textbook Co. v. Pigg, 217 U. S. 91 ; Rogers v. Arkansas, 227 U. S. 401 ; Robbins v. Shelby Taxing District, 120 U. S. 489 ; Baldwin v. G. A. F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U. S. 511 ; Stewart v. Michigan, 232 U. S. 665 .
177 U.S. at 177 U. S. 188 .
204 U.S. at 204 U. S. 363 .
204 U.S. at 204 U. S. 364 .
217 U.S. 217 U. S. 86 .
217 U.S. 217 U. S. 89 .
Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U. S. 106 ; Daniel v. Family Security Life Ins. Co., 336 U. S. 220 .
Arizona v. California, 283 U. S. 423 , 283 U. S. 454 -455; Henneford v. Silas Mason Co., 300 U. S. 577 , 300 U. S. 586 .
"Nor can we accept the theory that an expressed purpose to prevent possible frauds is enough to justify legislation which really interferes with the free flow of legitimate interstate commerce. See Shafer v. Farmers' Grain Co., 268 U. S. 189 ."
268 U.S. at 268 U. S. 336 . That should be read as a comment on an ordinance requiring a license and a bond to carry on interstate business. Cf. Parker v. Brown, 317 U. S. 341 , 317 U. S. 361 .
The statute held invalid in the International Textbook case, 217 U. S. 91 , was one construed to require a license to transact interstate business. Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U. S. 511 , held invalid a state law prohibiting the sale of milk imported from another state unless the price paid in the selling state reached the minimum price requirement of sellers in the regulating state. The DiSanto case, 273 U. S. 34 , holding invalid as a direct burden on commerce a state law requiring steamship agents to procure a license, can no longer be cited as authority for such a ruling. California v. Thompson, 313 U. S. 109 , 313 U. S. 115 .
Kelly v. Washington, 302 U. S. 1 , 302 U. S. 9 -10.
Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 12 How. 299; Emert v. Missouri, 156 U. S. 296 ; Austin v. Tennessee, 179 U. S. 343 ; Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U. S. 352 , 230 U. S. 402 , 230 U. S. 408 ; South Carolina Dept. v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U. S. 177 , 303 U. S. 187 ; California v. Thompson, 313 U. S. 109 ; Parker v. Brown, 317 U. S. 341 , 317 U. S. 359 , 317 U. S. 362 ; Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U. S. 385 , 334 U. S. 394 ; Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co. v. Michigan Pub.Serv. Comm., 341 U. S. 329 .
Nippert v. Richmond, 327 U. S. 416 , 327 U. S. 425 -426.
And cf. Nelson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 312 U. S. 359 , where the maintenance of retail stores within a state by a corporation engaged in direct mail selling was held to permit the state to tax such sales to its residents, even though none of the corporation's agents within the state had any connection with the sales.
Parker v. Brown, 317 U. S. 341 , 317 U. S. 362 -363.
So far as this argument seeks to blame the passage of the ordinance on local retailers, we disregard it. Such arguments should be presented to legislators, not to courts. Arizona v. California, 283 U. S. 423 , 283 U. S. 455 . See 341 U. S. 341 U.S. 639, supra.
"It [the opinion in Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U. S. 511 ] recognized, as do we, broad power in the State to protect its inhabitants against perils to health or safety, fraudulent traders and highway hazards, even by use of measures which bear adversely upon interstate commerce. But it laid repeated emphasis upon the principle that the State may not promote its own economic advantages by curtailment or burdening of interstate commerce."
Milk Control Board v. Eisenberg Farm Products, 306 U. S. 346 .
Giragi v. Moore, 301 U.S. 670, 48 Ariz. 33, 58 P.2d 1249, 49 Ariz. 74, 64 P.2d 819; Associated Press v. Labor Board, 301 U. S. 103 , 301 U. S. 132 -133; Associated Press v. United States, 326 U. S. 1 , 326 U. S. 7 .
Emert v. Missouri, 156 U. S. 296 ; see Commonwealth v. Ober, 12 Cush. (Mass.) 493; Crenshaw v. Arkansas, 227 U. S. 389 , 227 U. S. 399 -400; Rogers v. Arkansas, 227 U. S. 401 ; Caskey Baking Co. v. Virginia, 313 U. S. 117 , 313 U. S. 119 .
McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Co., 309 U. S. 33 , 309 U. S. 55 -57; Nippert v. Richmond, 327 U. S. 416 , 327 U. S. 421 -425.
Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U. S. 77 , 336 U. S. 83 .
See Jamison v. Texas, 318 U. S. 413 ; Skiriotes v. Florida, 313 U. S. 69 , 313 U. S. 79 ; Hebert v. Louisiana, 272 U. S. 312 , 272 U. S. 316 .
Cf. Martin v. Struthers, 319 U. S. 141 , 319 U. S. 146 ; Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U. S. 444 , 303 U. S. 452 .
Thomas v. Collins, 323 U. S. 516 , 323 U. S. 531 .
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296 , 310 U. S. 303 , 310 U. S. 304 ; Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U. S. 569 ; Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U. S. 568 ; Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U. S. 105 , 319 U. S. 109 -110; Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U. S. 158 , 321 U. S. 166 ; Saia v. New York, 334 U. S. 558 , 334 U. S. 561 ; Feiner v. New York, 340 U. S. 315 . See the collection of cases in Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U. S. 268 , at 340 U. S. 276 ff.
At least since the decision in Robbins v. Shelby County Taxing District, 120 U. S. 489 , 120 U. S. 497 (1887), this Court has regarded the process of soliciting orders for goods to be shipped across state lines as being interstate commerce as much as the transportation itself. Under the line of cases following this principle, reexamined and reaffirmed in Nippert v. Richmond, 327 U. S. 416 (1946), the process of solicitation for interstate commerce cannot be subjected to taxes, licenses or bonding requirements that, in their practical operation, discriminate against or unduly burden interstate commerce. The Court does not today purport to overrule this line of decisions. And it acknowledges, as it must, that the Court has sharply distinguished the process of solicitation of interstate business from the essentially local retailing operations of hawking and peddling. See Wagner v. Covington, 251 U. S. 95 , 251 U. S. 103 -104 (1919), and cases cited therein. Nor does the opinion dispute that this ordinance has a severe economic impact upon the substantial interstate business of appellant's employer, as well as the entire magazine industry, which derives 50% to 60% of its annual subscription circulation from the very type of solicitation prohibited by this ordinance. I disagree with the Court in its holding that an ordinance imposing a "blanket prohibition" can be sustained under the Commerce Clause as mere regulation.
Best & Co. v. Maxwell, 311 U. S. 454 , 311 U. S. 455 -456 (1940). That this ordinance, on its face, professes to protect the home does not relieve us of our duty to weigh the practical effect of the ordinance upon interstate commerce. Lack of discrimination on its face has not heretofore been regarded as sufficient to sustain an ordinance without inquiry into its practical effects upon interstate commerce. E.g., Dean Milk Co. v. Madison, 340 U. S. 349 , 340 U. S. 354 (1951) (prohibition against sale of milk pasteurized more than five miles from city); Real Silk Hosiery Mills v. Portland, 268 U. S. 325 , 268 U. S. 336 (1925) (requirement that solicitors file bond); Minnesota v. Barber, 136 U. S. 313 (1890) (statute requiring inspection of meat within state).
practical effect of this ordinance as a deterrent to interstate commerce, ante, p. 341 U. S. 639 . I think it plain that a "blanket prohibition" upon appellant's solicitation discriminates against and unduly burdens interstate commerce in favoring local retail merchants. "Whether or not it was so intended, those are its necessary effects." Nippert v. Richmond, supra, at 327 U. S. 434 . The fact that this ordinance exempts solicitation by the essentially local purveyors of farm products shows that local economic interests are relieved of the burdensome effects of the ordinance. No one doubts that protection of the home is a proper subject of legislation, but that end can be served without prohibiting interstate commerce. Our prior decisions cannot be avoided by limiting their authority to the limited categories of tax and license. On the contrary, we must guard against state action which, "in any form or under any guise, directly burden[s] the prosecution of interstate business." Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U. S. 511 , 294 U. S. 522 (1935), citing International Textbook Co. v. Pigg, 217 U. S. 91 , 217 U. S. 112 (1910). See also Hood & Sons v. DuMond, 336 U. S. 525 (1949). I cannot agree that this Court should defer to the City Council of Alexandria as though we had before us an act of Congress regulating commerce. See 341 U. S. 640 .
Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U. S. 761 , 325 U. S. 769 (1945).
I would apply to this case the principles so recently announced in Dean Milk Co. v. Madison, 340 U. S. 349 (1951). In the course of its discussion of our Dean Milk decision, the Court remarks that, in the instant case "[i]nterstate commerce itself knocks on the local door." Ante, p. 341 U. S. 636 . As I read the prior decisions of this Court, that fact, far from justifying avoidance of Dean Milk, buttresses my conclusion that the ordinance cannot, consistently with the Commerce Clause, be applied to appellant.
* Of course, I believe that the present ordinance could constitutionally be applied to a "merchant" who goes from door to door "selling pots." Compare Martin v. Struthers, 319 U. S. 141 , 319 U. S. 144 , with Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U. S. 52 .

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