Source: http://cololawyer.com/colorado-statutes-dissolution-marriage-parental-responsibilities-article-10/
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 16:50:16+00:00

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(III) The court finds that ninety-one days or more have elapsed since it acquired jurisdiction over the respondent either as the result of process pursuant to rule 4 of the Colorado rules of civil procedure or as the result of the act of the respondent in joining as co-petitioner in the petition or in entering an appearance in any other manner.
(b) In connection with every decree of dissolution of marriage or decree of legal separation and to the extent of its jurisdiction to do so, the court shall consider, approve, or allocate parental responsibilities with respect to any child of the marriage, the support of any child of the marriage who is entitled to support, the maintenance of either spouse, and the disposition of property; but the entry of a decree with respect to parental responsibilities, support, maintenance, or disposition of property may be deferred by the court until after the entry of the decree of dissolution of marriage or the decree of legal separation upon a finding that a deferral is in the best interests of the parties.
(II) Provides for support of the child by the husband unless paternity is specifically disclaimed in the order.
(d) Paternity is not adjudicated for a child not mentioned in the final order.
(2) If a party requests a decree of legal separation rather than a decree of dissolution of marriage, the court shall grant the decree in that form unless the other party objects.
History. L. 71: R&RE, p. 521, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 46-1-6. L. 73: p. 552, § 2. L. 77: (1)(a)(I) and (1)(a)(II) amended and (1)(a)(III) added, p. 823, § 1, effective June 1. L. 98: (1)(b) amended, p. 1395, § 34, effective February 1, 1999. L. 2003: (1)(c) and (1)(d) added, p. 1264, § 50, effective July 1. L. 2012: IP(1)(a) and (1)(b) amended, (HB12-1233), ch. 52, p. 187, § 1, effective July 1; (1)(a)(I) and (1)(a)(III) amended, (SB 12-175), ch. 208, p. 830, § 24, effective July 1.
(1) Section 3 of chapter 52, Session Laws of Colorado 2012, provides that the act amending the introductory portion to subsection (1)(a) and subsection (1)(b) applies to petitions for legal separation filed on or after July 1, 2012.
(2) Section 173 of chapter 208, Session Laws of Colorado 2012, provides that the act amending subsections (1)(a)(I) and (1)(a)(III) applies to specified time intervals.
Law reviews. For article on residence of plaintiff in divorce action, see 25 Dicta 110 (1948). For article, “Ten Years of Domestic Relations in Colorado — 1940-1950″, see 27 Dicta 399 (1950). For comment on People v. District Court, appearing below, see 31 Dicta 118 (1954). For article, “One Year Review of Civil Procedure and Appeals”, see 37 Dicta 21 (1960). For article, “One Year Review of Domestic Relations”, see 37 Dicta 55 (1960). For article, “One Year Review of Domestic Relations”, see 40 Den. L. Ctr. J. 115 (1963). For article, “Child Support Obligations After Death of the Supporting Parent”, see 16 Colo. Law. 790 (1987).
Annotator’s note. Since § 14-10-106 is similar to repealed §§ 46-1-2 and 46-1-3, C.R.S. 1963, §§ 46-1-2 and 46-1-3, CRS 53, CSA, C. 56, §§ 6 and 8, and laws antecedent thereto, relevant cases construing those provisions have been included in the annotations to this section.
An action for divorce is of a purely personal nature. Morris v. Propst, 98 Colo. 213, 55 P.2d 944 (1936); Wood v. Parkerson, 163 Colo. 271, 430 P.2d 467 (1967).
The power of the court in such an action to issue decrees relative to alimony, to exonerate the wife’s estate from the husband’s claims, and to make orders relative to the care and custody of the children is merely incidental to the primary object of changing the status or relation of the parties to each other. Wood v. Parkerson, 163 Colo. 271, 430 P.2d 467 (1967).
Such actions, in the absence of a statute providing to the contrary, abate absolutely upon the death of either party before judgment, and cannot be revived in the name of or against the representatives of the deceased party. Wood v. Parkerson, 163 Colo. 271, 430 P.2d 467 (1967).
Masters should not be appointed as a routine matter in divorce cases where the issues are not complex and the facts are not complicated. Carlson v. Carlson, 178 Colo. 283, 497 P.2d 1006 (1972).
The trial court may, for good cause shown, allow an extension of time within which to file an answer in a divorce action, even though the original time within which to file has expired. Reap v. Reap, 142 Colo. 354, 350 P.2d 1063 (1960).
Not abuse to refuse continuance when party could not appear. It is not an abuse of discretion for the court to refuse to grant a continuance at a hearing as to the question of dissolution of the marriage, where the wife could not appear at the hearing. In re Lester, 647 P.2d 688 (Colo. App. 1982).
Deferring property division. A specific finding that it is in the best interest of the parties to defer the property division is required to prevent unwarranted delays in dividing property in dissolution of marriage cases. That purpose is complied with when the parties are given time limits within which to submit their proposals for the property division. In re Rose, 40 Colo. App. 176, 574 P.2d 112 (1977).
II. DOMICILE OR RESIDENCY REQUIRED.
Domicile is keystone for jurisdiction to determine the marital status, and domicile of one of the parties to the divorce action is required. Viernes v. District Court, 181 Colo. 284, 509 P.2d 306 (1973).
Jurisdiction cannot be conferred by consent; lack of residence cannot be waived. Watson v. Watson, 135 Colo. 296, 310 P.2d 554 (1957); McMillion v. McMillion, 31 Colo. 33, 497 P.2d 331 (1972).
Actual bona fide residence is essential and must be established with some degree of certainty. Watson v. Watson, 135 Colo. 296, 310 P.2d 554 (1957).
Unless the residence required by this section is in some manner shown, the court is without jurisdiction. People ex rel. Plunkett v. District Court, 127 Colo. 483, 258 P.2d 483 (1953).
When bona fide residence in a county is not established, the court is under a mandatory duty to refuse to hear or grant any motions whatever in an action, and its dismissal must follow. People ex rel. Plunkett v. District Court, 127 Colo. 483, 258 P.2d 483 (1953).
Under statutes pertaining to jurisdiction in divorce proceedings, the word “residence” is synonymous with the legal meaning of the word “domicile”, and a person’s domicile, once established, continues until he acquires legal residence or domicile elsewhere. McMillion v. McMillion, 31 Colo. App. 33, 497 P.2d 331 (1972).
Residence requires domicile. Residence for the purposes of divorce jurisdiction has always required and continues to require domicile. Viernes v. District Court, 181 Colo. 284, 509 P.2d 306 (1973).
Where husband’s residency was established by an earlier proceeding as being in Colorado, that determination is res judicata and creates a presumption that he is still a resident, absent a showing that a new residency has been established. McMillion v. McMillion, 31 Colo. App. 33, 497 P.2d 331 (1972).
Where jurisdictional facts are admitted in pleadings, decree is not void for failing to recite them. Jones v. Jones, 71 Colo. 420, 207 P. 596 (1922).
Failure to allege 90-day residence immediately prior to proceeding is not fatal. Section 14-10-107 does not require that a petition for dissolution of marriage contain an allegation that the residency period includes the 90 days immediately prior to the commencement of the proceeding, and petitioner’s failure to make her allegation in the words of this section was not a fatal defect. In re Alper, 33 Colo. App. 225, 517 P.2d 404 (1973).
Purpose of residency requirements was to prevent nonresidents from establishing temporary residence to obtain divorce. Cairnes v. Cairnes, 29 Colo. 260, 68 P. 233 (1902); Sedgwick v. Sedgwick, 50 Colo. 164, 114 P. 488 (1911).
An alien who made this state his home, in good faith, and had no residence elsewhere, was a citizen within the meaning of the former statute. Sedgwick v. Sedgwick, 50 Colo. 164, 114 P. 488 (1911).
Where no witness testified to plaintiff’s residence, in answer to any direct question, but in effect it appeared that he had resided here for many years prior to the institution of his action, it was held a compliance with the statute. Sedgwick v. Sedgwick, 50 Colo. 164, 114 P. 488 (1911).
Where plaintiff alleged and proved more than a year’s residence in Colorado before the commencement of the action, but defendant at the time of filing his cross complaint had resided in Colorado less than one year, the allegations of plaintiff’s complaint vested the court with jurisdiction of plaintiff and the subject matter. Harms v. Harms, 120 Colo. 212, 209 P.2d 552 (1949).
Where prior to the trial plaintiff had registered to vote in Colorado, his automobile was registered in Colorado, he had a Colorado driver’s license, and for several months prior to trial he has been engaged in part-time civilian employment in Colorado Springs in a field in which he intended to continue on his retirement, and plaintiff had for four years been present in Colorado in military service, the foregoing facts formed a sound basis for the finding of the trial judge that the court had jurisdiction based on residence. Mulhollen v. Mulhollen, 145 Colo. 479, 358 P.2d 887 (1961).
Mere presence in state as member of armed forces insufficient to confer jurisdiction but after 90 days domicile may be established. A serviceman may establish a Colorado domicile to support jurisdiction for a Colorado court to grant a decree of dissolution of marriage after he has been stationed in Colorado for 90 days. Viernes v. District Court, 181 Colo. 284, 509 P.2d 306 (1973).
The district courts are invested by the statute with jurisdiction in this class of actions. Pleyte v. Pleyte, 1 Colo. App. 70, 28 P. 23 (1891).
Only a final decree of divorce in a foreign state constitutes a bar to a divorce action in Colorado. In re Quay, 647 P.2d 693 (Colo. App. 1982).
Formerly, where a complaint alleged that the parties were residents of the state of Colorado, and that defendant had been guilty of acts of mental cruelty committed within the state of Colorado, and prayed for divorce alleging sufficient facts to give the court jurisdiction. Raygor v. Raygor, 29 Colo. App. 453, 485 P.2d 930 (1971).
Service by publication insufficient for jurisdiction in custody issue. Service by publication pursuant to the uniform act is not sufficient to vest a trial court with jurisdiction to resolve a custody issue. In re Blair, 42 Colo. App. 270, 592 P.2d 1354 (1979).
A trial court which in fact lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter cannot acquire jurisdiction even though the parties expressly or impliedly consent thereto. Triebelhorn v. Turzanski, 149 Colo. 558, 370 P.2d 757 (1962).
The jurisdiction of the district court of Adams county, arising from the filing and disposition of the divorce action would not preclude the district court of the city and county of Denver from proceeding pursuant to the reciprocal support act when the mother and children had moved to Nevada. Scheer v. District Court, 147 Colo. 265, 363 P.2d 1059 (1961).
A district court is without jurisdiction to hear a divorce action involving two members of a reservation Indian tribe. Whyte v. District Court, 140 Colo. 334, 346 P.2d 1012 (1959), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 829, 80 S. Ct. 1600, 4 L. Ed.2d 1524 (1960).
Where the trial court had jurisdiction to divide property at the time of entry of a final decree of divorce, but did not do so, nor then reserve the matter for further consideration, it lost jurisdiction to thereafter make a valid division of such property. Triebelhorn v. Turzanski, 149 Colo. 558, 370 P.2d 757 (1962); Kelley v. Kelley, 161 Colo. 486, 423 P.2d 315 (1967).
Trial court, which had personal jurisdiction over husband but lacked the authority to divide the husband’s military pension as marital property, did not retain jurisdiction to divide the pension at a later date. Even though final decree provided that trial court had continuing jurisdiction over the action and that the wife would remain entitled to any and all military benefits, the court did not have the authority to divide military pension as a result of subsequent case law declaring such pensions to be marital property. Language in final decree refers only to the court’s continuing authority to divide property as such court had on the date of the final decree. In Re Booker, 833 P.2d 734 (Colo. 1992).
Federal act specifying whether the court has jurisdiction over a military member’s pension preempts state rules of procedure governing jurisdiction. In Re Booker, 833 P.2d 734 (Colo. 1992).
Jurisdiction retained until all matters resolved. A district court which properly acquires jurisdiction of the parties and subject matter in a dissolution action retains that jurisdiction until all matters arising out of the litigation are resolved. Gonzales v. District Court, 629 P.2d 1074 (Colo. 1981).
Jurisdiction does not extend to resolution of all financial issues. Jurisdiction to grant a divorce does not automatically include the right to resolve all financial issues between the parties to the marriage. Viernes v. District Court, 181 Colo. 284, 509 P.2d 306 (1973).
The dissolution court has jurisdiction to grant relief but only in equity and not at law. Tort claims concerning property that was the subject of the dissolution court may not be joined into an otherwise equitable dissolution proceeding. In re Mockelmann, 121 P.3d 335 (Colo. App. 2005).
Where it appears from a record and from the conduct of counsel that the parties agreed that a court would defer determination of permanent alimony, property settlement, and related matters until after the entry of a final decree. Rodgers v. Rodgers, 137 Colo. 74, 323 P.2d 892 (1958).
Although, resumption of marital relations by the parties to a divorce action affords good grounds for a dismissal thereof, it does not serve to divest the court of jurisdiction. Stockham v. Stockham, 145 Colo. 376, 358 P.2d 1026 (1961).
Husband’s motion to abate and reduce child support amounted to consent to the court’s personal jurisdiction. In Re Booker, 833 P.2d 734 (Colo. 1992).
Purported father found to have transacted business in state. Purported father’s sending of letter agreeing to pay support that father knew would be relied upon by Colorado authorities for purpose of determining eligibility for public assistance constituted transacting business in this state conferring personal jurisdiction over him pursuant to § 13-1-124. In re Parental Responsibilities of H.Z.G., 77 P.3d 848 (Colo. App. 2003).
Decree of dissolution entered after a spouse’s death is void for lack of jurisdiction, and the dissolution action is abated. In Re Connell, 870 P.2d 632 (Colo. App. 1994).
This section mandates that bifurcation of dissolution proceedings may occur only if the district court finds that “such a deferral is necessary in the best interest of the parties” and should only be considered in exceptional cases. Estate of Burford v. Burford, 935 P.2d 943 (Colo. 1997).
A decree of dissolution when entered by the district court is final to dissolve the marriage even when the district court refuses to certify the decree as a final judgment appealable under C.R.C.P. 54 (b). Estate of Burford v. Burford, 935 P.2d 943 (Colo. 1997).

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