Source: http://texas-opinions.com/08-Bic-Pen-Corp-v-Carter-Tex-2008-by-Justice-David-Medina-product-liability-suit-by-parents-of-burnt-child-design-defect-claim-preemption.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 15:58:06+00:00

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wrote the unanimous opinion of eight members of the court.
Commentary by on Legal Trade blogger Mary Flood (Houston Chronicle): Renegade Texas Supreme Court?
Justice Wainwright, Justice Brister, Justice Johnson, and Justice Willett joined.
defect claim. 171 S.W.3d 657, 662.
the causes and prevention of product-related . . . injuries.” Id. § 2051(b)(1), (b)(2), (b)(4).
a lighter’s child resistance. See 16 C.F.R. § 1210.4. The regulations set forth specific requirements for compliance.
81 (July 12, 1993) (codified at 16 C.F.R. pt. 1210).
The United States Constitution provides that the laws of the United States are “the supreme Law of the Land; . . .
laws and be preempted in three ways. See Great Dane Trailers, Inc. v. Estate of Wells, 52 S.W.3d 737, 743 (Tex.
2001). First, “[a] federal law may expressly preempt state law.” Id. (citing Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S.
because the CPSA’s saving clause specifically retains common law actions.
unless such requirements are identical to the requirements of the Federal standard.Id. § 2075(a).
other person.” Id. § 2074(a).
preemption; if the state-law claim conflicts with federal regulations, it is still preempted. Id. at 872.
federal regulation under the CPSA.
the other hand, rejected preemption, interpreting the CPSA to set only minimum standards for disposable lighters.
the variability and randomness of child testing, the product’s utility, and the importance of consumer acceptance.
face, appear to increase safety,” but in effect would not. 58 Fed. Reg. 37,570; see also 57 Fed. Reg. 36,950.
percent effectiveness when tested. See 58 Fed. Reg. 37,570.
(2) does not unduly burden interstate commerce.
free to raise the liability bar through application of their common law.
a more dangerous design, and is not concerned with its benefits . . . .Id. at 1008.
were preempted. Id. at 1005, 1011.
Although Riegel addressed an express preemption provision, its policy analysis is likewise applicable here. See id.
purpose and objections of Congress.” Lohr, 518 U.S. at 496 (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
would conflict with the federal regulatory scheme in this area.
question separate from whether the design itself was faulty.
court of appeals for its review. See Campbell v. State, 85 S.W.3d 176, 184 (Tex. 2002).
firm conviction or belief that BIC acted with malice. 171 S.W.3d at 675.
with conscious indifference to the rights, safety, or welfare of others.
claimant. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 41.004(b).
effect immediately upon signing by the Governor on June 20, 2003.
house, in order to declare an emergency, could be evaded.
two-thirds majority vote to go into effect before ninety days after adjournment. See id.
rate did not apply to the judgment in this case.
court to review the issues that remain.
apply, and the parties do not dispute that conclusion here. See 171 S.W.3d at 671.
such vehicle or item of equipment which is not identical to the Federal standard.
15 U.S.C. § 1392(d) (1988), repealed by Pub. L. No. 103-272, § 7(b), 108 Stat. 1379 (1994).
U.S.C. § 1397(k) (1988), repealed by Pub. L. No. 103-272, § 7(b), 108 Stat. 1379 (1994).
matters beyond that scope are not preempted. Id. Later, the Court relaxed this position in Freightliner Corp. v.
common law claims did not conflict with federal law. Id. at 289. Shortly thereafter, however, in Medtronic, Inc. v.
apply. Id. at 1018 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
§ 23.02(d), 2003 Tex. Gen. Laws 847, 899. Citations in the text to section 41.001 refer to the prior version.
interest provisions of Texas Finance Code section 304.003(c). Compare Act of June 2, 2003, 78th Leg., R.S., ch.
entered upon the journals.” Tex. Const. art. III, § 39.

References: § 2051
 § 1210
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 v. 
 § 2075
 § 2074
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 § 41
 § 1392
 § 7
 § 1397
 § 7
 v.

 v.

§ 23
 § 39