Source: https://cbaclelegalconnection.com/tag/burden-of-proof/
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 16:03:39+00:00

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The Colorado Court of Appeals issued its opinion in People v. Tardif on Thursday, November 2, 2017.
Jury Instructions—Burden of Proof—Heat of Passion Provocation—Attempted Second Degree Murder—First Degree Assault—Mitigating Factor—Evidence—Due Process—Self-Defense—Deadly Physical Force—Slow Motion Video—Unfair Prejudice—Prosecutorial Misconduct.
Tardif’s friend Soto was at a skate park and got into an argument with the victim. Tardif and Soto were members of the same gang, and the victim was wearing the colors of a rival gang. Soto called Tardif, and when Tardif arrived, Tardif and Soto walked up to the victim and Tardif shot him once in the abdomen. The victim fled and survived. Other people in the skate park recorded video of part of the initial argument between Soto and the victim as well as the shooting. A jury found Tardif guilty of attempted second degree murder, first degree assault, conspiracy to commit first degree assault, and three crime of violence counts.
On appeal, Tardif argued that the trial court erred by not instructing the jury that the prosecution had the burden to prove the absence of heat of passion provocation beyond a reasonable doubt. Heat of passion provocation is a mitigating factor for attempted second degree murder and first degree assault. Here, the heat of passion provocation instructions failed to inform the jury that the prosecution had to prove the absence of heat of passion provocation beyond a reasonable doubt. Therefore, the instructions, considered together, failed to properly instruct the jury on the prosecution’s burden of proof. Because Tardif presented sufficient evidence for a heat of passion provocation instruction, the error lowered the prosecution’s burden of proof and violated Tardif’s constitutional right to due process. Tardif also argued that the trial court’s self-defense instructions included several reversible errors. Self-defense is not an affirmative defense to conspiracy to commit first degree assault, and therefore, the court did not err in failing to instruct the jury that it was. But the trial court erred by instructing the jury on when deadly physical force may be used in self-defense because deadly physical force requires death, and here the victim did not die.
Tardif additionally argued that the trial court erred by admitting slow motion video recordings of the shooting. Although this evidence was relevant to explain the events around the shooting and to determine whether defendant acted with aggression or in self-defense, the probative value of the slow motion recordings was very low. This evidence was also cumulative of the real-time recording that was also admitted. Further, because Tardif’s state of mind at the time of the shooting was a disputed issue, the slow motion recordings’ low probative value was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. The slow motion recordings may have portrayed Tardif’s actions as more premeditated than they actually were. The trial court abused its discretion by failing to weigh the slow motion recordings’ probative value against their danger of unfair prejudice.
Tardif further argued that two statements by the prosecutor during closing argument constituted misconduct and required reversal. The court of appeals did not doubt the reliability of Tardif’s conspiracy conviction and concluded that the prosecutor’s allegedly improper statements did not constitute plain error.
The conspiracy to commit first degree assault conviction was affirmed. The remaining convictions were reversed and the case was remanded with directions.
The Colorado Supreme Court issued its opinion in People v. Molina on Monday, February 6, 2017.
This case came to the Colorado Supreme Court on certiorari review of the court of appeals’ unpublished opinion, People v. Molina, No. 11CA1650 (Colo. App. June 19, 2014). A jury convicted Daniela Molina of two counts of identity theft and three counts of forgery. The court granted certiorari to resolve three issues: (1) whether the People must show that Molina knew she stole another person’s information; (2) whether there was sufficient evidence that Molina knew she stole a real person’s information; and (3) whether an apartment lease and employment qualify under the identity theft statute as “thing[s] of value.” The court answered all three questions in the affirmative. Therefore, the court affirmed in part and reversed in part the court of appeals’ judgment and remanded the case for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
The Colorado Supreme Court issued its opinion in City of Littleton v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office on Monday, May 2, 2016.
The court held that an employer can meet its burden by establishing the absence of either general or specific causation. Specifically, an employer can show, by a preponderance of the medical evidence, either: (1) that a firefighter’s known or typical occupational exposures are not capable of causing the cause of the claimant’s condition or type of cancer at issue; or (2) that the firefighter’s employment did not cause the firefighter’s particular cancer where, for example, the claimant firefighter was not exposed to the substance or substances that are known to cause the firefighter’s condition or impairment, or where the medical evidence renders it more probable that the cause of the claimant’s condition or impairment was not job-related.
The Colorado Supreme Court issued its opinion in Industrial Claim Appeals Office v. Town of Castle Rock on Monday, May 2, 2016.
Here, the court held that an employer can seek to meet its burden to show a firefighter’s cancer “did not occur on the job” by presenting particularized risk-factor evidence indicating that it is more probable that the claimant firefighter’s cancer arose from some source other than the firefighter’s employment. To meet its burden of proof, the employer is not required to prove a specific alternate cause of the firefighter’s cancer. Rather, the employer need only establish, by a preponderance of the medical evidence, that the firefighter’s employment did not cause the firefighter’s cancer because the firefighter’s particular risk factors render it more probable that the firefighter’s cancer arose from a source outside the workplace.
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals issued its opinion in United States v. Ferdman on Friday, February 13, 2015.
Joshua Ferdman and three co-conspirators concocted a plan in which they obtained account information for several corporate customers of Sprint. Defendant impersonated account representatives and purchased cell phones from various Sprint stores, charging them to the corporate accounts. After he was caught, he pled guilty to a two-count indictment. He was sentenced to 15 months in prison and ordered to pay $48,715.59 in restitution pursuant to the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act (MVRA). The court calculated the restitution amount based on what Sprint referred to as the “retail unsubsidized price” of 86 stolen phones, plus Sprint’s shipping and investigative costs. Defendant appeals the restitution order, arguing the government’s proof of loss was insufficient to support the award.
The Tenth Circuit first analyzed the MVRA in detail in light of last term’s Supreme Court decision in Paroline. The Tenth Circuit emphasized that restitution is intended to make victims whole, not unjustly enrich them or provide them a windfall. The Tenth Circuit determined the MVRA is intended to compensate for actual losses, not merely speculated losses, but does not preclude a district court’s exercise of discretion in determining actual loss. The government bears the burden of proof to demonstrate the actual amount of loss.
In this case, Sprint’s regional manager of investigations submitted an unverified letter setting forth Sprint’s losses, basing its calculations on the “retail unsubsidized price” of each fraudulently obtained phone, $449 to $549 per phone. The letter also listed estimated shipping costs, travel expenses, investigatory expenses, and GPS activation expenses, listing Sprint’s estimated total loss as $48, 715.59.
Defendant argued the better measure of actual loss was the price he paid per phone, or $149 to $199 per phone, and repeatedly questioned the government’s evidence of actual losses. Defendant pointed out that the government did not present any evidence his crimes caused Sprint to lose retail sales or attendant profits. The district court denied an evidentiary hearing on the restitution amount, and found the MVRA’s “value of the property” language broad enough to cover lost profits.
The Tenth Circuit found that the government’s complete lack of verified evidence precluded a restitution award. Because the MVRA requires proof of actual losses, the Tenth Circuit vacated the district court’s restitution award and remanded for further proceedings.
The Colorado Supreme Court issued its opinion in City of Brighton v. Rodriguez on Monday, February 3, 2014.
Workers’ Compensation—Liability—CRS § 8-41-301(1)(c)—Settlement and Hearing Procedures—CRS § 8-43-201(1).
In this workers’ compensation case, the Supreme Court held that an “unexplained fall” satisfies the “arising out of” employment requirement in CRS § 8-41-301(1)(c), if the fall would not have occurred but for the fact that the conditions and obligations of employment placed the employee in the position where he or she was injured. Additionally, the Court held that when a party seeks to modify an issue determined by a general or final admission, a summary order, or a full order, per CRS § 8-43-201(1), that party has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that a modification is warranted. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the court of appeals’ holding, but for different reasons.

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