Source: https://collections.lib.utah.edu/details?id=1139121
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 03:11:32+00:00

Document:
739 vided, that no inferior right may be acquired by a superior right without just compensation.182 The constitution provides further that the use of water for power purposes shall never be alienated, but may be leased or otherwise developed as prescribed by law.153 The statute governing the appropriation of water requires the holder of an approved appli- cation for water power, before using the water, to lease from the State the use of all water so appropriated, such lease to run for not more than 50 years. Upon expiration of the lease the value of improvements is to be appraised by the State Department of Roads and Irrigation, subject to appeal to court, and the value as finally determined is to be paid to the lesee owning such improvements by any subsequent lessee.154 Jurisdiction over all matters pertaining to water rights for irrigation, power, or other useful purposes is vested in the Department of Roads and Irrigation.165 The statute provides an exclusive procedure for appropriating water, the first step being the making of an application to the Department for a permit, the Department to issue a certificate when the prerequisites for a completed appropriation have been com- plied with.186 When the use of appropriated water ceases, the right ceases. It is the duty of the Department, if it finds that an appropria- tion has not been used beneficially for more than three years, to hold a hearing to determine whether the right shall not be declared forfeited, "a Nebr. Const., art. XV, § 6. The preference in favor of domestic purposes was placed in the constitution in £920. A similar statutory preference (Rev. Stats. 1943, § 46-204), enacted much earlier, did not provide for compensa- tion; but the Nebraska Supreme Court held that vested rights of completed appropriations could not be destroyed without compensation: Kearney Water & Electric Powers Co. v. Alfalfa Irrigation Dist., 97 Nebr. 139, 146, 149 N. W. 363 (1914). In a case decided in 1942, a public power and irrigation district con- tended that it had the right to take water in excess of its appropriation as against a prior appropriation for power purposes, as long as the water could be put to beneficial use in the irrigation of farm lands: Loup River Public Power Dist. v. North Loup River Public Power & Irr. Dist., 142 Nebr. 141, 151-152, 156, 5 N. W. (2d) 240 (1942). The supreme court stated: "It was clearly the intention of the framers of our Constitution to provide that water previously appropriated for power purposes may be taken and appropriated for irrigation use upon the payment of just compensation therefor. It never was the inten- tion of the framers of the Constitution to provide that water appropriated for power purposes could thereafter arbitrarily be appropriated for irrigation with- out the payment of compensation. * * * We necessarily come to the con- clusion that a senior appropriative right for power purposes may not be destroyed by a superior user except by the employment of formal condemnation proceed- ings and the tender of compensation prior to interference." 158 Nebr. Const., art. XV, § 7. 154 Nebr. Rev. Stats. 1943, § 46-236. 1MNebr. Rev. Stats. 1943, § 46-209. M6Nebr. Rev. Stats. 1943, §§46-233 to 46-243. Exclusiveness of present statutory procedure: Enterprise Irr. Dist. v. Tri-State Land Co., 92 Nebr. 121, 147-148, 138 N. W. 171 (1912); Kersenbrock v. Boyes, 95 Nebr. 407, 409-411, 145 N.W. 837 (1914).

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