Source: https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/395/411
Timestamp: 2019-04-21 06:30:47+00:00

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This case involves the constitutionality of a 1967 Louisiana statute, known as Act No. 2, which creates a body called the Labor-Management Commission of Inquiry. La.Rev.Stat.Ann. §§ 23:880.123:880.18 (Supp.1969). The stated purpose of this Commission is 'the investigation and findings of facts relating to violations or possible violations of criminal laws of the state of Louisiana or of the United States arising out of or in connection with matters in the field of labor-management relations * * *.' Act No. 2, Preamble, (1967 Extra.Sess.) La.Acts 3. Appellant, a member of a labor union, filed this suit in the District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana challenging the constitutionality of Act No. 2 and of certain actions taken by state officials in the administration of the Act and otherwise. He sought both declaratory and injunctive relief. A three-judge court was convened and that court ultimately granted appellees' motion to dismiss the complaint. Jenkins v. McKeithen, 286 F.Supp. 537 (D.C.E.D.La.1968). We noted probable jurisdiction of an appeal brought under 28 U.S.C. 1253. 1 We reverse.
The scope of the Commission's investigative authority is explicitly limited by the Act to violations of criminal laws. 'The commission shall have no power, authority or jurisdiction to investigate, hold hearings or seek to ascertain the facts or make any reports or recommendations on any of the strictly civil aspects of any labor problem * * *.' La.Rev.Stat.Ann. § 23:880.6 B (Supp.1969). 2 Further, the Commission has no power to participate in any manner in any civil proceeding, except, of course, contempt proceedings. Ibid. The limitation of the Commission to criminal matters is further reinforced by the provision of the Act allowing the Commission, at the request of the Governor, to assign its investigatory forces to the state police to assist the latter in their investigatory activities. La.Rev.Stat.Ann. § 23:880.6 C (Supp.1969).
The court, relying largely on the opinion of the Louisiana Supreme Court in Martone v. Morgan, 251 La. 993, 207 So.2d 770, appeal dismissed, 393 U.S. 12, 89 S.Ct. 46, 21 L.Ed.2d 12 (1968) (petition for rehearing pending), held that this Court's decision in Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 80 S.Ct. 1502, 4 L.Ed.2d 1307 (1960), was dispositive of the issue of the constitutionality of the Act. The court further ruled that appellant had not stated any other claim for relief under §§ 1981, 1983, and 1988 of Title 42, United States Code. Rather, the court held that the other matters sought to be raised in the complaint were merely potential defenses to the pending criminal charges and that appellant had not alleged any basis for restraining prosecution of those charges. Finally, the court ruled that appellant's suit was not a proper class action under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 3 The court did not explicitly rule on the issue of whether appellant lacked standing to challenge the Act.
Appellant presents two questions for review in this Court: Whether Act No. 2 is constitutional and whether the complaint otherwise states a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. 1981, 1983, and 1988.
The present case was decided on appellees' motion to dismiss, in which appellees contested appellant's standing to challenge the constitutionality of the Act. As noted above, the court below made no explicit reference to the issue of standing. But since the question of standing goes to this Court's jurisdiction, see Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 94101, 88 S.Ct. 1942, 19491953, 20 L.Ed.2d 947 (1968), we must decide the issue even though the court below passed over it without comment. Cf. Tileston v. Ullman, supra.
For the purposes of a motion to dismiss, the material allegations of the complaint are taken as admitted. See, e.g., Walker Process Equipment, Inc. v. Food Machinery & Chemical Corp., 382 U.S. 172, 174175, 86 S.Ct. 347, 348349, 15 L.Ed.2d 247 (1965). And, the complaint is to be liberally construed in favor of plaintiff. See Fed.Rule Civ.Proc. 8(f); Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957). The complaint should not be dismissed unless it appears that appellant could 'prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.' Conley v. Gibson, supra, at 4546, 78 S.Ct. at 102. With these rules in mind, we turn to an examination of the allegations of appellant's complaint.
The concept of standing to sue, as we noted in Flast v. Cohen, supra, 'is surrounded by the same complexities and vagaries that inhere in (the concept of) justiciability' in general. 392 U.S. at 98, 88 S.Ct. at 1952. Nevertheless, the outlines of the concept can be stated with some certainty. The indispensable requirement is, of course, that the party seeking relief allege 'such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions. * * *' Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204, 82 S.Ct. 691, 703, 7 L.Ed.2d 663 (1962); see Flast v. Cohen, supra; Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 151, 71 S.Ct. 624, 637, 95 L.Ed. 817 (1951) (concurring opinion). In this sense, the concept of standing focuses on the party seeking relief, rather than on the precise nature of the relief sought. See Flast v. Cohen, supra, 392 U.S. at 99100, 88 S.Ct. at 1952. The decisions of this Court have also made it clear that something more than an 'adversary interest' is necessary to confer standing. There must in addition be some connection between the official action challenged and some legally protected interest of the party challenging that action. See Flast v. Cohen, supra, at 101106, 88 S.Ct. at 19531955.
We also think that appellant has alleged that the Act's administration was the direct cause of sufficient injury to his own legally protected interests to accord him standing to challenge the validity of the Act. We are not presented with a case in which any injury to appellant is merely a collateral consequence of the actions of an investigative body. See Hannah v. Larche, supra, 363 U.S. at 443, 80 S.Ct. at 1515; cf. Sinclair v. United States, 279 U.S. 263, 295, 49 S.Ct. 268, 272, 73 L.Ed. 692 (1929); McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 179180, 47 S.Ct. 319, 330, 71 L.Ed. 580 (1927). Rather, it is alleged that the very purpose of the Commission is to find persons guilty of violating criminal laws without trial or procedural safeguards, and to publicize those findings. Moreover, we think that the personal and economic consequences alleged to flow from such actions are sufficient to meet the requirement that appellant prove a legally redressable injury. Those consequences would certainly be actionable if caused by a private party and thus should be sufficient to accord appellant standing. See Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 493, n. 22, 79 S.Ct. 1400, 1411, 3 L.Ed.2d 1377 (1959); Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, supra, 341 U.S. at 140141, 71 S.Ct. at 632 (opinion of Burton, J.); id., at 151160, 71 S.Ct., at 637642 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). It is no answer that the Commission has not itself tried to impose any direct sanctions on appellant; it is enough that the Commission's alleged actions will have a substantial impact on him. See, e.g., Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. United States, 316 U.S. 407, 62 S.Ct. 1194, 86 L.Ed. 1563 (1942); cf. NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460463, 78 S.Ct. 1163, 11701172, 2 L.Ed.2d 1488 (1958). Finally, in the circumstances of the present case, we do not regard appellant's opportunity to defend any criminal prosecutions as sufficient to deprive him of standing to challenge the Act. Cf. United States v. Los Angeles & S.L.R. Co., 273 U.S. 299, 47 S.Ct. 413, 71 L.Ed. 651 (1927). Appellant's allegations go beyond the normal publicity attending criminal prosecution; he alleges a concerted attempt publicly to brand him a criminal without a trial. Further, he alleges that he has been unsuccessful in his attempts to secure prosecution of the charges againsth im.
The Commission is limited to criminal law violations; the Act explicitly provides that the Commission shall have no jurisdiction over civil matters in the labor-management relations field. Indeed, the Commission is even limited to certain types of criminal activities. 4 As noted above, nothing in the Act indicates that the Commission's findings are to be used for legislative purposes. Rather, everything in the Act points to the fact that it is concerned only with exposing violations of criminal laws by specific individuals. In short, the Commission very clearly exercises an accusatory function; it is empowered to be used and allegedly is used to find named individuals guilty of violating the criminal laws of Louisiana and the United States and to brand them as criminals in public.
When viewed from this perspective, it is clear the procedures of the Commission do not meet the minimal requirements made obligatory on the States by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Specifically, the Act severely limits the right of a person being investigated to confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him. Only a person appearing as a witness may cross-examine other witnesses. Cross-examination is further limited to those questions which the Commission 'deems to be appropriate to its inquiry,' and those questions must be submitted, presumably beforehand, in writing to the Commission. We have frequently emphasized that the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses is a fundamental aspect of procedural due process. See, e.g., Willner v. Committee on Character and Fitness, 373 U.S. 96, 103104, 83 S.Ct. 1175, 1180, 10 L.Ed.2d 224 (1963); Greene v. McElroy, supra, 360 U.S. at 496499, 79 S.Ct. 14131415, and cases cited. In the present context, where the Commission allegedly makes an actual finding that a specific individual is guilty of a crime, we think that due process requires the Commission to afford a person being investigated the right to confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him, subject only to traditional limitations on those rights. Cf. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 85 S.Ct. 1065, 13 L.Ed.2d 923 (1965).
The Commission's procedures also drastically limit the right of a person investigated to present evidence on his own behalf. It is true that he may appear and call a 'reasonable number of witnesses' in executive session, but should the Commission decide to hold a public hearing, he is limited to presentation of his own testimony and the 'pertinent' written statements of others. The right to present oral testimony from other witnesses and the power to compel attendance of those witnesses may be denied in the discretion of the Commission. The right to present evidence § , of course, essential to the fair hearing required by the Due Process Clause. See, e.g., Morgan v. United States, supra, 304 U.S., at 18, 58 S.Ct., at 776; Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. United States, 298 U.S. 349, 368369, 56 S.Ct. 797, 807, 80 L.Ed. 1209 (1936). And, as we have noted above, this right becomes particularly fundamental when the proceeding allegedly results in a finding that a particular individual was guilty of a crime. Cf. Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 87 S.Ct. 1920, 18 L.Ed.2d 1019 (1967); In re Oliver, 333 U.S., 257, 273, 68 S.Ct. 499, 507, 92 L.Ed. 682 (1948). We do not mean to say that the Commission may not impose reasonable restrictions on the number of witnesses and on the substance of their testimony; we only hold that a person's right to present his case should not be left to the unfettered discretion of the Commission.
We do not mean to say that this same analysis applies to every body which has an accusatory function. The grand jury, for example, need not provide all the procedural guarantees alleged by appellant to be applicable to the Commission. As this Court noted in Hannah, 'the grand jury merely investigates and reports. It does not try.' 363 U.S., at 449, 80 S.Ct., at 1518. Moreover, '(t)he functions of that institution and its constitutional prerogatives are rooted in long centuries of Anglo-American history.' Id., at 489490, 80 S.Ct. at 1544 (Frankfurter, J., concurring in the result). Finally the grand jury is designed to interpose an independent body of citizens between the accused and the prosecuting attorney and the court. See Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212, 218, 80 S.Ct. 270, 273, 4 L.Ed.2d 252 (1960); Ex parte Bain, 121 U.S. 1, 11, 7 S.Ct. 781, 786, 30 L.Ed. 849 (1887); Hannah v. Larche, supra, 363 U.S., at 497499, 80 S.Ct., at 15471548 (dissenting opinion). Investigative bodies such as the Commission have no claim to specific constitutional sanction. In addition, the alleged function of the Commission is to make specific findings of guilt, not merely to investigate and recommend. Finally, it is clear from the Act and from the allegations of the complaint that the Commission is in no sense an 'independent' body of citizens. Rather, its members serve at the pleasure of the Governor, La.Rev.Stat.Ann. § 23:880.1 (Supp.1969), and it cannot act in the absence of a 'referral' from the Governor, La.Rev.Stat.Ann. §§ 23:880.5, 23:880.6 A (Supp.1969).
As noted above, appellant also alleges in his complaint that appellees, and those acting in concert with them, have engaged in a course of conduct, both pursuant to the Act and otherwise, that has resulted in the filing of false criminal charges against appellant. He alleges numerous other related actions allegedly depriving him of his rights secured by the Constitution. The complaint seeks declaratory and injunctive relief with regard to these acts; in particular, appellant prays that the District Court enjoin all civil and criminal actions pending or to be instituted against him. To the extent that these allegations involve actions taken under the direct authority of Act No. 2, we think that they may properly be considered by the District Court in determining the constitutionality of the Act. However, the District Court characterized many of appellant's allegations as involving merely potential defenses to the criminal charges assertedly pending. In the exercise of its discretion and because the issues were 'intertwined' with the issue of the constitutionality of the Act, the court passed upon the question of whether appellant had alleged a cause of action for declaratory and injunctive relief. Relying in part on its determination that the Act was constitutional, the court held that appellant had not stated a claim for declaratory or injunctive relief and that appellant's remedy was to defend any criminal prosecutions then pending or that might be brought. Jenkins v. McKeithen, supra, 286 F.Supp., at 542543. Whether the court will take the same view of the propriety of passing on the question or of the merits in light of our holding and the evidence adduced at trial cannot be determined at this time. Accordingly, we think that issue should be left open for reconsideration on remand.
Mr. Justice DOUGLAS concurs in the result for the reasons stated in his dissenting opinion in Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 493508, 80 S.Ct. 1502, 15451553, 4 L.Ed.2d 1307 (1960).
In concur in the Court's judgment and in much of what is said in the prevailing opinion. I cannot agree, however, to reaffirming Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 80 S.Ct. 1502, 4 L.Ed.2d 1307. I joined the dissent of Mr. Justice DOUGLAS in the Hannah case and still adhere to that dissent. The Louisiana law here, like the federal law considered in the Hannah case, is, in my judgment, nothing more nor less than a scheme for a nonjudicial tribunal to charge, try, convict, and punish people without courts, without juries, without lawyers, without witnessesin short, without any of the procedural protections that the Bill of Rights provides. The Louisiana law is reminiscent of the old Parliamentary and Ecclesiastical Commission trials which took away the liberty of John Lilburne and his contemporaries without due process of lawthat is, without giving them the benefit of a trial in accordance with the law of the land. For these reasons I believe that the Louisiana law denies due process of law.
Only last Term, in Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 88 S.Ct. 1942, 20 L.Ed.2d 947 (1968), the Court reaffirmed the proposition that 'when standing (to sue) is placed in issue in a case, the question is whether the person whose standing is challenged is a proper party to request an adjudication of a particular issue * * *,' id., at 99100, 88 S.Ct., at 1952, that is, 'whether there is a logical nexus between the status asserted and the claim sought to be adjudicated.' Id., at 102, 88 S.Ct. at 1953. In the present context, this means, simply, that for a plaintiff to challenge a particular course of conduct pursued or threatened to be pursued by a defendant, it is not enough for the plaintiff to allege that he has been or will be injured by the defendant; the plaintiff must further claim that the injury to him (or to those whom he has status to represent 1 ) results from the particular course of conduct he challenges.
Paragraphs 13 identify the plaintiff and defendants.
Paragraphs 46 characterize the Commission as an 'executive trial agency,' and outline its investigative functions. Paragraph 7 avers that the Commission's procedures for performing these functions are constitutionally defective with respect to matters of counsel, confrontation, compulsory process, rules of evidence, standards of guilt, right of appeal, and self-incrimination. Nowhere, either directly or indirectly, do these paragraphs intimate that appellant (or for that matter, anyone else) has been affected by the procedures themselves and their asserted effects.
In paragraph 9, appellant avers, 'as more specifically applies to him,' that appellees conspired to file false criminal charges against him. Paragraphs 1014 describe in detail the chronology and conduct of the resulting criminal proceedings.
Reading and re-reading these many paragraphs of legal and factual averments, one cannot help but be struck by the conspicuous absence of any claim that appellant has been or will be investigated by the Commission, or called as a witness before it, or identified in its findings, or, indeed, subjected to any of its processes. 2 Can this lacuna be filled by implication? I believe not.
Only paragraphs 914 relate specifically to appellant, and they contain no hint that the filing of the criminal informations against him was the result of the Commission's use of any of the procedures which the Court today indicates are constitutionally suspect. And assuming, contrary to fact, see n. 1, supra, that appellant represents others besides himself in this action, the only other arguably germane paragraph is 8(a), which alleges the 'deliberate circulation for public consumption of willful falsehoods about members of said labor union.' This paragraph conspicuously omits any suggestion that such 'falsehoods' were the result of testimony before the Commission or that they were contained in the Commission's 'findings'a term that is repeatedly emphasized in the earlier description of the Commission's functions.
The prevailing opinion's strained construction of the complaint goes well beyond the principle, with which I have no quarrel, that federal pleadings should be most liberally construed. It entirely undermines an important function of the federal system of procedurethat of disposing of unmeritorious and unjusticiable claims at the outset, before the parties and courts must undergo the expense and time consumed by evidentiary hearings.
The prevailing opinion fails to articulate what I deem to be a constitutionally significant distinction between two kinds of governmental bodies. The first is an agency whose sole or predominant function, without serving any other public interest, is to expose and publicize the names of persons it finds guilty of wrongdoing. To the extent that such a determinationwhether called a 'finding' or an 'adjudication'finally and directly affects the substantial personal interests, I do not doubt that the Due Process Clause may require that it be accompanied by many of the traditional adjudicatory procedural safeguards. Cf. Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 71 S.Ct. 624, 95 L.Ed. 817 (1951).
The statutory safeguards afforded persons being investigated by the Louisiana Commission are at least equal to those provided by most of these federal agencies. See id., at 454485, 80 S.Ct., at 15211541.
As I noted above, the very insubstantiality of appellant's complaint leaves it unclear what the Court holds today. It may be that some of my Brethren understand the complaint to allege that in fact the Commission acts primarily as an agency of 'exposure,' rather than one which serves the ends required by the state statutes. If soalthough I do not believe that the complaint can be reasonably thus construedthe area of disagreement between us may be small or nonexistent.
Before the Court holds that a purely investigatory agency must adopt the full roster of adjudicative safeguards, however, it would do well to heed carefully its own warning in Hannah, that such a requirement 'would make a shambles of the investigation and stifle the agency in its gathering of facts.' 363 U.S., at 444, 80 S.Ct., at 1515. Such a requirement would not only incapacitate state criminal investigatory bodies at a time when their need cannot be gainsaid, but would cast a broad shadow of doubt over the propriety of long-standing procedures employed by many federal agenciesprocedures which less than a decade ago the Court believed to be proper and necessary.
Carl D. BISHOP, Petitioner, v. W. H. WOOD, etc., et al.

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