Source: http://freeassembly.net/foaa-online/legal-personality-registration/
Timestamp: 2019-04-26 04:56:27+00:00

Document:
It is well established in international law that the right to freedom of association equally protects registered and non-registered associations (Does an association need to be registered to be protected? See Association Section 1.1). The Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association has on numerous occasions emphasized that the right to freedom of association applies to informal associations and does not require that a group be registered. UN Human Rights Council, First Thematic Report of the Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association, UN Doc. A/HRC/20/27, 21 May 2012, at para. 56; UN Human Rights Council, Fourth Report of the Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association, Maina Kiai, UN Doc. A/HRC/29/25, 28 April 2015, at para. 59.
Depending on the national legal context, registration and/or legal personality may be required to fulfill certain functions or access to certain benefits, which associations may wish to have access to.
Registration and obtaining legal personality may be – but are not necessarily – the same process in different legal systems. For example: in certain countries, formally acknowledged and registered religious communities may have access to certain benefits (e.g. their leaders may receive a compensation from the State). At the same time, these religious communities do not necessarily have a legal personality as such. However, the standards and principles applied in international law for both processes are very similar; therefore the arguments below are valid for both.
If associations wish to obtain legal personality, they should be allowed to do so. Acquisition of legal personality may be important for associations in order to obtain additional rights, such as public benefits, to solicit resources and to employ people. Legal personality also enables associations to fulfill certain needs, such as holding bank accounts, signing contracts or owning or renting property.
The Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association has confirmed that this entitlement to legal personality is a core element of the right to freedom of association, and has called on States to ensure and facilitate the ability of associations to acquire it. UN Human Rights Council, First Thematic Report of the Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association, Maina Kiai, UN Doc. A/HRC/20/27, 21 May 2012, at para. 57; see also United Nations Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful Assembly and of association, Maina Kiai, Amicus curiae before the Constitutional Court of Bolivia, 30 April 2015, para. 22.
(t)he most important aspect of the right to freedom of association is that citizens should be able to create a legal entity in order to act collectively in a field of mutual interest. Without this, that right would have no practical meaning. Gorzelik and Others v Poland, ECtHR, Judgment of 17 February 2004, at para 55.
(t)he acquisition of legal personality shall be viewed as a right and not a privilege. AComHPR, Draft Guidelines on Freedom of Association and Assembly in Africa, 22 September 2016, para. 12.
This implies that, as the recognition of the association as a legal entity is an inherent part of the freedom of association, the refusal of registration is also fully covered by the scope of Article 22 of the ICCPR and Article 11 of the ECHR. Venice Commission, Opinion on the Compatibility with Universal Human Rights Standards of Article 193-1 of the Criminal Code on the Rights of Non-Registered Associations of The Republic of Belarus, 18 October 2011.
Generally, States rely upon two types of regimes with regard to the registration/legal personality of an association: (i) notification and (ii) prior authorization.
Notification regimes offer a higher level of protection of the freedom of association and are considered best practice by international legal experts, including the UN Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association. Under a notification regime, the legal personality of an association does not depend upon the approval of the State; associations automatically acquire legal personality by notifying authorities of their creation. UN Human Rights Council, First Thematic Report of the Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association, Maina Kiai, UN Doc. A/HRC/20/27, 21 May 2012, para 58(e).
States that impose a prior authorization regime only recognize or grant legal personality to associations that have filed a request and obtained the approval of the State. UN Human Rights Council, First Thematic Report of the Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association, Maina Kiai, UN Doc. A/HRC/20/27, 21 May 2012, para 61. Where States require authorization, they must take great care to avoid arbitrary requirements or lengthy delays in approvals. The Special Rapporteur has thus called on States to follow best practices to allow for the procedure to be simple, non-onerous and expeditious. UN Human Rights Council, First Thematic Report of the UN Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association, Maina Kiai, UN Doc. A/HRC/20/27, 21 May 2012, para. 57.
The IACHR has noted that States have the obligation to ensure that related laws and regulations are clear and unambiguous and that bodies responsible for registration do not exercise broad discretion in interpreting provisions in ways that might limit freedom of expression. IACHR, Second Report on the Situation of Human Rights Defenders in the Americas, OEA/Ser/L/V/II Doc. 66, 31 December 2011, para. 172. The ECtHR accepts that some formal process may be applied, but follows the same logic. In practice, the ECtHR always assesses whether procedural requirements, as well as delays and overly wide discretionary powers, violate the right to freedom of associations. See Koretskyy v. Ukraine, ECtHR, Judgment of 3 April 2008, paras. 48; 53-55.
Registration shall be governed by a notification rather than an authorization regime, meaning that procedures shall be simple, clear, transparent, non-discretionary and non-burdensome. AComHPR, Draft Guidelines on Freedom of Association and Assembly in Africa, 22 September 2016, para. 13.
There should be a presumption in favour of the formation of associations, as well as in favour of the lawfulness of their establishment, objectives, charter, aims, goals and activities. This means that, until proven otherwise, the state should presume that a given association has been established in a lawful and adequate manner, and that its activities are lawful. Any action against an association and/or its members may only be taken where the articles of its founding instrument (including charters, statutes and by-laws) are unambiguously unlawful, or where specific illegal activities have been undertaken.
This presumption should exist even where legislation stipulates that certain requirements, such as registration formalities, be fulfilled in order to establish an association. It is important to recall, however, that an unregistered association can also benefit from the protection conferred by Article 22 of the ICCPR and Article 11 of the ECHR, as well as by other international and regional instruments that reaffirm this freedom. OSCE/ODIHR and Venice Commission, Joint Guidelines on Freedom of Association, 2015, paras. 68-9.
Associations have the right to register and create a legal entity in pursuit of their objectives. Where the State denies an association’s registration or legal personality, it must meet the three-prong test for restricting the right to freedom of association (see Association Section 6).
Courts have found the impact on the association – particularly whether or not the association would still be able to engage in its activities – to be a key determinant in deciding whether States had pursued a legitimate aim. Other cases have distinguished between the mere suspicion of illegality versus concrete actions that are contrary to the law. In a number of cases, courts have failed to find a violation of the right to freedom of association where the association could have easily complied with registration requirements and/or could continue their activities despite the State’s refusal to register.
The ECtHR has held that States may not refuse to register or acknowledge an association on the basis that it was founded by “foreigners” or is a branch of an international association. Moscow Branch of Salvation Army v Russia, ECtHR, Judgment of 5 October 2006, para. 86; see also, Partidul Comunistilor Nepeceristi and Ungureanu v. Romania, ECtHR, Judgment of 2 February 2005, para. 49.
In a number of leading cases, the impact of the refusal on the association has been a key feature in deciding whether or not there was a violation.
The Committee notes the author’s submission that registration of the association was refused on the basis of a number of reasons given by the State party, which must be assessed in the light of the consequences arising for the author and his association. The Committee also notes that, even though the reasons stated are prescribed by the relevant law, as it follows from the material before it, the State party has not attempted to advance any arguments as to why they are necessary in the interests of national security or public safety, public order, the protection of public health or morals or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others, nor why the refusal to register the association was a proportionate response in the circumstances. The Committee further notes that, in the decisions of the domestic authorities that were made available, no explanation was given by the authorities, particularly the Supreme Court, as to why it was necessary to restrict the author’s right to freedom of association, further to article 22(2) of the Covenant.
The Committee notes that the refusal to register the association led directly to the operation of the association in the territory of the State party being unlawful and directly precluded the author from enjoying his right to freedom of association. Romanovsky v. Belarus, Human Rights Committee, UN Doc. CCPR/C/115/D/2011/2010, Views of 29 October 2015, paras. 7.3-7.5.
since [the applicant] was unable to function for a substantial period of time and could not participate in regional elections. Furthermore, the damage appears irreparable given that, under current legislation, the party cannot be reconstituted in its original concept. Presidential Party of Mordovia v. Russia, ECtHR, Judgment of 5 October 2004, para. 31.
The Commission recalls its case law according to which a refusal of the authorities to register an association does not necessarily involve an interference with its rights under Article 11 (Art. 11) of the Convention where the association is nevertheless free to continue its activities … The Commission notes that an unregistered association, such as the applicant in the present case, is authorised by law to engage in “political activity”, but cannot participate in elections. Movement for Democratic Kingdom v. Bulgaria, EComHR, Judgment of 29 November 1995.
A mere suspicion that the real intents or activities of an association may be illegal is insufficient to justify not registering or granting legal personality to an association.
In the landmark case Sidiropoulos v. Greece, the ECtHR found that Greek courts’ refusal to register applicants’ association on the basis of suspicions as to the true intentions of the association’s founders was disproportionate. The purpose of the association was legitimate and clear, namely to preserve and develop traditions and folk culture of the Florina region. The ECtHR added that if activities would raise any legality questions, they should be dealt with at that point and not by preemptive denial of registration: Sidiropoulos et al. v. Greece, ECtHR, Judgment of 10 July 1998, para. 46.
once founded, the association might, under cover of the aims mentioned in its memorandum of association, have engaged in activities incompatible with those aims. … [However] [i]f the possibility had become a reality, the authorities would not have been powerless; under Article 105 of the Civil Code, the Court of First Instance could order that the association should be dissolved if it subsequently pursued an aim different from the one laid down in its memorandum of association or if its functioning proved. Sidiropoulos et al. v. Greece, ECtHR, Judgment of 10 July 1998, para. 46.
The case involved individuals who aimed to form an association to promote the interests of those who felt themselves to be victims of the justice system in Romania; the association aimed to use legal means for publicizing alleged injustices, irregularities or illegalities, including by lawfully protesting.
The national courts of Romania ruled that the refusal to register was legitimate as the aim of the association was in conflict with the Romanian Constitution (a.o. the principles of a State governed by the rule of law).
Taking into account all the above, the Court considers that the reasons invoked by the authorities for refusing registration of the applicant association were not determined by any ‘pressing social need’, nor were they convincing and compelling. Moreover, such a radical measure as the refusal of registration, taken even before the association started operating, appears disproportionate to the aim pursued. Association of Victims of Romanian Judges and Others V. Romania, ECtHR, Judgment of 14 January 2014, paras. 25, 30, 32, 34.
the ECtHR similarly found that mere suspicions of illegality of aims or activities cannot be a ground for refusing registration. The Court found that the refusal to register the Association of Victims of Romanian Judges was based on the mere suspicions that the true intentions of the founders of the association aimed at undermining the authority of the judiciary in the country. The ECtHR concluded that the right to freedom of association was violated as the refusal was not based upon an actual illegality of the aims of the association.
Where applicants could have taken reasonable steps to amend their applications, the ECtHR – and before that the European Commission – has found that the registration process was not overly burdensome and therefore it did not find a violation of the right to freedom of association when the State failed to register the organization.
The case of the Movement for Democratic Kingdom v Bulgaria concerned a political party whose request for registration was denied as its initial application did not conform to the requirements for registration and the applicant did not comply with the instructions of the courts to rectify the irregularities. The Bulgarian courts held that amendments had to be adopted by a general assembly, which the applicants had not convened.
Furthermore, the Commission notes that the applicant party was free at any time to rectify the procedural omissions by convening a general assembly for the approval of the amended statute. Such a formal requirement was neither arbitrary, nor an onerous obstacle.
Moreover, the possibility for the applicant party to submit a fresh petition for registration, once it has complied with the pertinent requirements under the law, has remained open.
Therefore, the Commission does not find that the Bulgarian courts, when refusing the applicant party’s petition for registration in the particular circumstances of the case, have interfered with its rights under Article 11 (Art. 11) of the Convention. Movement for Democratic Kingdom v. Bulgaria, EComHR, Judgment of 29 November 1995.
In the Gorzelik and Others v Poland, the ECtHR did not find a violation of article 11. The Court accepted the State’s argumentation that it had to act at the moment of registration and in doing so it did not act upon mere suspicion.
102. The Court will accordingly proceed on the understanding [… that] the risk that the association and its members might claim electoral privileges was inherent in any decision that allowed them to form the association without first amending paragraph 30 of the memorandum of association.
105. However, the degree of interference under paragraph 2 of Article 11 cannot be considered in the abstract and must be assessed in the particular context of the case. […] It by no means amounted to a denial of the distinctive ethnic and cultural identity of Silesians or to a disregard for the association’s primary aim, which was to “awaken and strengthen the national consciousness of Silesians.” Gorzelik v. Poland, ECtHR, 17 February 2004, paras. 94, 102-105.
the ECtHR concluded that in this particular case, Polish national legislation provided that the adequate moment to intervene indeed was at registration and that the State did not act upon mere suspicion. The case involved the Polish authorities’ refusal to register an association with the name “Organisation of the Silesian national minority” with the primary aim to strengthen national consciousness of Silesians. According to Polish law, an association recognized as a national minority – as mentioned in the association’s denomination and constituting documents – automatically may trigger privileges with regard to elections. Therefore the risk of using the registration to acquire special status under the electoral laws of the country would automatically rise with the registration. In this specific circumstance, the ECtHR found that there had been no violation of Article 11. The moment to act for the State was at the point of registration. In addition, the applicants could have amended the organization’s statutes to remove concerns about electoral ambitions, and in doing so, could have still continued to conduct its cultural and other activities.
Any decision rejecting the submission or application must be clearly motivated and duly communicated in writing to the applicant. Associations whose submissions or applications have been rejected should have the opportunity to challenge the decision before an independent and impartial court. In this regard, the Special Rapporteur refers to a decision of the Freedom of Association Committee of the International Labour Organization (ILO), in which it ruled that “the absence of recourse to a judicial authority against any refusal by the Ministry to grant an authorization to establish a trade union violates the principles of freedom of association.” UN Human Rights Council, First Thematic Report of the UN Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association, Maina Kiai, UN Doc. A/HRC/20/27, 21 May 2012, para. 61.
States should guarantee the right of an association to appeal against any refusal of registration. Effective and prompt recourse against any rejection of application and independent judicial review regarding the decisions of the registration authority is necessary to ensure that the laws governing the registration process are not used as obstacles to the right to freedom of association. UN General Assembly, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights defenders, Margaret Sekaggya, UN Doc. A/64/226, 4 August 2009, at para. 113.

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