Source: http://ga.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20180312_0000558.SGA.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2019-04-22 18:45:23+00:00

Document:
J. RANDAL HALL, CHIEF JUDGE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT.
Recusal is governed by 28 U.S.C. §§ 144 and 455. Jones v. Commonwealth Land Title Ins. Co., 459 Fed.Appx. 808, 810 (11th Cir. 2012). Under Section 144, a judge must recuse himself when a party to a district court proceeding "files a timely and sufficient affidavit that the judge before whom the matter is pending has a personal bias or prejudice either against him or in favor of any adverse party." 28 U.S.C. § 144. "To warrant recusal under § 144, the moving party must allege facts that would convince a reasonable person that bias actually exists." Chris to v. Padgett, 223 F.3d 1324, 1333 (11th Cir. 2000); see also Jones, 459 Fed.Appx. at 811 ("The facts alleged in the affidavit must show that the bias was personal, not judicial in nature." (citing United States v. Archbold-Newball, 554 F.2d 665, 682 (5th Cir. 1977))). Section 455(a) requires recusal where ''an objective, disinterested, lay observer fully informed of the facts underlying the grounds on which recusal was sought would entertain a significant doubt about the judge's impartiality." Parker v. Connors Steel Co., 855 F.2d 1510, 1524 (11th Cir. 1988) . Any doubts must be resolved in favor of recusal. United States v. Kelly, 888 F.2d 732, 744 (11th Cir. 1989). Generally, judicial rulings "cannot serve as the basis for recusal or cast doubts on impartiality unless [the moving party] establishes pervasive bias and prejudice." Jones, 459 Fed.Appx. at 811 (citing Archbold-Newball, 554 F.2d at 682). "Neither a trial judge's comments on lack of evidence, rulings adverse to a party, nor friction between the court and counsel constitute pervasive bias." Hamm v. Members of Bd. of Regents of State of Fla., 708 F.2d 647, 651 (11th Cir. 1983) (citations omitted).
Here, Petitioner's Motion to Recuse is rife with feeble conclusions of impropriety as well as numerous misstatements and over-simplifications of the relevant cases' proceedings and the Court's Orders and reasoning in relation thereto. More importantly, however, Petitioner's allegations stem solely from his disagreements with the rulings of Magistrate Judge Baker and myself and the unsound assumptions Petitioner has drawn therefrom. (See Doc. 95, at 6-22 (identifying seven purported instances of alleged bias/prejudice, including disparate docket management, incorrect application of legal precedent, "flipflopping" instructions, and sua sponte resolution of various issues (i.e., acting as a "surrogate prosecutor")).) These are reasons for appeal, not recusal. See Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555-56 (1994) . Moreover, Petitioner's motion fails to: (i) establish pervasive judicial bias or prejudice against Petitioner; (ii) demonstrate deep-seated or unequivocal antagonism rendering fair judgment impossible; or (iii) otherwise raise an objective doubt about the assigned judges' impartiality. Accordingly, recusal by the assigned judges is not warranted.
Based on the foregoing and upon due consideration, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Petitioner's Motion to Recuse (doc. 95) is DENIED.

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