Source: http://lawlibrary.chanrobles.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=83751:58142&catid=1588&Itemid=566
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 10:15:59+00:00

Document:
G.R. No. 166414, October 22, 2014 - GODOFREDO ENRILE AND DR. FREDERICK ENRILE, Petitioners, v. HON. DANILO A. MANALASTAS (AS PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MALOLOS BULACAN, BR. VII), HON. ERANIO G. CEDILLO, SR., (AS PRESIDING JUDGE, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT OF MEYCAUAYAN, BULACAN, BR. 1) AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
GODOFREDO ENRILE AND DR. FREDERICK ENRILE, Petitioners, v. HON. DANILO A. MANALASTAS (AS PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MALOLOS BULACAN, BR. VII), HON. ERANIO G. CEDILLO, SR., (AS PRESIDING JUDGE, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT OF MEYCAUAYAN, BULACAN, BR. 1) AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
The remedy against the denial of a motion to quash is for the movant accused to enter a plea, go to trial, and should the decision be adverse, reiterate on appeal from the final judgment and assign as error the denial of the motion to quash. The denial, being an interlocutory order, is not appealable, and may not be the subject of a petition for certiorari because of the availability of other remedies in the ordinary course of law.
Petitioners Godofredo Enrile and Dr. Frederick Enrile come to the Court on appeal, seeking to reverse and undo the adverse resolutions promulgated on August 31, 20041 and December 21, 2004,2 whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) respectively dismissed their petition for certiorari and prohibition (assailing the dismissal of their petition for certiorari by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 7, in Malolos, Bulacan, presided by RTC Judge Danilo A. Manalastas, to assail the denial of their motions to quash the two informations charging them with less serious physical injuries by the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Meycauayan, Bulacan), and denied their motion for reconsideration anent such dismissal.
As to the Motion to Quash, this Court cannot give due course to said motion. A perusal of the records shows that the grounds and/or issues raised therein are matters of defense that can be fully ventilated in a full blown trial on the merits.
Accordingly, Criminal Cases Nos. 03-276 and 03-277 both for Less Serious Physical Injuries are hereby ordered tried under the ordinary procedure.
The Motion to Quash is hereby DENIED for reasons aforestated.
Meanwhile, set these cases for arraignment on March 15, 2004 as previously scheduled.
Unsatisfied, the petitioners commenced a special civil action for certiorari assailing the order dated February 11, 2004 denying their motion to quash, and the order dated March 25, 2004 denying their motion for reconsideration. The special civil action for certiorari was assigned to Branch 7, presided by RTC Judge Manalastas.
As could be gleaned from the order of the public respondent dated February 11, 2004, the issues raised in the motion to quash are matters of defense that could only be threshed out in a full blown trial on the merits. Indeed, proof of the actual healing period of the alleged injuries of the private complainants could only be established in the trial of the cases filed against herein petitioners by means of competent evidence x x x. On the other hand, this court is likewise not in a position, not being a trier of fact insofar as the instant petition is concerned, to rule on the issue as to whether or not there was probable cause to prosecute the petitioners for the alleged less physical injuries with which they stand charged. x x x.
The petitioners next went to the CA via a petition for certiorari and prohibition to nullify the orders issued by the RTC on May 25, 2004 and July 9, 2004, averring grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the RTC. They urged the dismissal of the criminal cases on the same grounds they advanced in the RTC.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE TRIAL COURTS’ RULING DENYING THE PETITIONERS' MOTION TO QUASH THE COMPLAINTS DESPITE THE CLEAR AND PATENT SHOWING THAT BOTH COMPLAINTS, ON THEIR FACE, LACKED ONE OF THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF THE ALLEGED CRIME OF LESS SERIOUS PHYSICAL INJURIES.
The CA did not commit any reversible errors.
Yet, the petitioners chose to assail the dismissal by the RTC through petitions for certiorari and prohibition in the CA, instead of appealing by notice of appeal. Such choice was patently erroneous and impermissible, because certiorari and prohibition, being extraordinary reliefs to address jurisdictional errors of a lower court, were not available to them. Worthy to stress is that the RTC dismissed the petition for certiorari upon its finding that the MTC did not gravely abuse its discretion in denying the petitioners’ motion to quash. In its view, the RTC considered the denial of the motion to quash correct, for it would be premature and unfounded for the MTC to dismiss the criminal cases against the petitioners upon the supposed failure by the complainants to prove the period of their incapacity or of the medical attendance for them. Indeed, the time and the occasion to establish the duration of the incapacity or medical attendance would only be at the trial on the merits.
Secondly, the motion to quash is the mode by which an accused, before entering his plea, challenges the complaint or information for insufficiency on its face in point of law, or for defects apparent on its face.20 Section 3, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court enumerates the grounds for the quashal of the complaint or information, as follows: (a) the facts charged do not constitute an offense; (b) the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense charged; (c) the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the person of the accused; (d) the officer who filed the information had no authority to do so; (e) the complaint or information does not conform substantially to the prescribed form; (f) more than one offense is charged except when a single punishment for various offenses is prescribed by law; (g) the criminal action or liability has been extinguished; (h) the complaint or information contains averments which, if true, would constitute a legal excuse or justification; and (i) the accused has been previously convicted or acquitted of the offense charged, or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent.
Article 265. Less serious physical injuries – Any person who shall inflict upon another physical injuries x x x which shall incapacitate the offended party for labor for ten days or more, or shall require medical assistance for the same period, shall be guilty of less serious physical injuries and shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor.
Based on the law, the elements of the crime of less serious physical injuries are, namely: (1) that the offender inflicted physical injuries upon another; and (2) that the physical injuries inflicted either incapacitated the victim for labor for 10 days or more, or the injuries required medical assistance for more than 10 days.
That on the 18th day of January 2003, at around 7:30 in the evening more or less, in Brgy. Pandayan (St. Francis Subd.), Municipality of Meycauayan, Province of Bulacan, Republic of the Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named accused motivated by anger by conspiring, confederating and mutually helping with another did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and strike the face of one JOSEFINA GUINTO MORAÑO, thereby inflicting upon his (sic) physical injuries that will require a period of 10 to 12 days barring healing and will incapacitate his customary labor for the same period of time attached Medical Certificate (sic).
That on the 18th day of January 2003, at around 7:30 in the evening more or less, in Brgy. Pandayan (St. Francis Subd.), Municipality of Meycauayan, Province of Bulacan, Republic of the Philippines and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the above named accused MOTIVATED by anger did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and right and give hitting her head against pavement of one PERLA BELTRAN MORAÑO inflicting the latter physical injuries and will require Medical Attendance for a period of 12 to 15 days barring unforeseen complication as per Medical Certificate hereto attached.
In the context of Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court,25cralawred the complaints sufficiently charged the petitioners with less serious physical injuries. Indeed, the complaints only needed to aver the ultimate facts constituting the offense, not the details of why and how the illegal acts allegedly amounted to undue injury or damage, for such matters, being evidentiary, were appropriate for the trial. Hence, the complaints were not quashable.
The petitioners’ insistence is utterly bereft of merit.
The petitioners’ disregard of the fundamental conditions precluded the success of their recourse. To start with, the petitioners did not show that the MTC had no jurisdiction, or exceeded its jurisdiction in denying the motion to quash, or gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in its denial. That showing was the door that would have opened the way to their success with the recourse. Yet, the door remained unopened to them because the denial by the MTC of the motion to quash was procedurally and substantively correct because the duration of the physical incapacity or medical attendance should be dealt with only during the trial on the merits, not at the early stage of dealing with and resolving the motion to quash. As to the second condition, the fact that the denial was interlocutory, not a final order, signified that the MTC did not yet completely terminate its proceedings in the criminal cases. The proper recourse of the petitioners was to enter their pleas as the accused, go to trial in the MTC, and should the decision of the MTC be adverse to them in the end, reiterate the issue on their appeal from the judgment and assign as error the unwarranted denial of their motion to quash.33Certiorari was not available to them in the RTC because they had an appeal, or another plain, speedy or adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition for review on certiorari; AFFIRMS the resolutions promulgated on August 31, 2004 and December 21, 2004; and ORDERS the petitioners to pay the costs of suit.
1Rollo, pp. 26-28, penned by Associate Justice Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando, and concurred in by Presiding Justice Cancio C. Garcia (later a Member of the Court/deceased) and Associate Justice Hakim S. Abdulwahid.
3 Surname Moraño was spelled as Morano in some documents.
4 At times referred to in various documents as Alfred Enrile.
19 Section 3, Rule 41, Rules of Court.
20Serapio v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 148468, January 28, 2003, 396 SCRA 443, 474.
21 Section 6. Sufficiency of complaint or information. - A complaint or information is sufficient if it states the name of the accused; the designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate date of the commission of the offense; and the place where the offense was committed.
22 People v. Balao, G.R. No. 176819, January 26, 2011, 640 SCRA 565, 573; Cabrera v. Sandiganbayan, G..R. Nos. 162314-17, October 25, 2004, 441 SCRA 377, 385.
27 G.R. Nos. 92362-67, October 15, 1991, 202 SCRA 726.
29 Tandoc v. Resultas, G. R. Nos. 59241-44, July 5, 1989, 175 SCRA 37, 43.
30Trocio v. Manta, L-34834, November 15, 1982, 118 SCRA 241, 246.
32 Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
33Lalican v. Vergara, G.R. No. 108619, July 31, 1997, 276 SCRA 518, 529; Socrates v. Sandiganbayan, 324 Phil. 151, 176 (1996); Cruz, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 83754, February 18, 1991, 194 SCRA 145, 192.

References: v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v.