Source: http://www.legalthree.com/law-school-outlines/special-education-law-school-outline/
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 07:59:32+00:00

Document:
ONLY when . . .
· Level of Access – has to provide some educational benefit and access needs to be meaningful. If the state takes the funding, 3 requirements must be met (1) state has to develop a plan approved by the federal government (2) states agree they will meet the needs of the children with disabilities with an IEP, (3) follow procedural requirements – notice of changes to the child’s plan, parents can bring complaint, etc.
§ Includes: Mental retardation, hearing impairments, speech or language impairments, visual impairments, serious emotional disturbance, orthopedic impairments, autism, traumatic brain injury, other health impairments, specific learning disabilities, deaf-blindness, multiple disabilities.
· Related Services– Transportation, Developmental services, Corrective Services, & Other support services, as may be required to assist a child with a disability to benefit from special education.
· LRE– To the maximum extent possible educated with non-disabled peers.
§ Removal from regular education ONLY when…nature or severity is such that education in regular education cannot be achieved satisfactorily even with use of supplementary aids and services.
o When placement is not the least restrictive environment.
Rowley was a high functioning deaf student. Parents also deaf. Parents wanted an interpreter, however Amy showed progress without the help of an interpreter so school was not required to provide this services because they are not required to maximize the potential.
Issue: (1) What is meant by the Act’s requirement of FAPE?; (2) What is the role of state and federal courts in exercising the review of the courts?
Held: Law requires appropriate education, w/some educational benefit, measurable & meaningful. (Does not require school district to maximize benefit). Need personalized services with enough support to benefit to meet FAPE.
1. The Act’s requirement of a “free appropriate public education” is satisfied when the State provides personalized instruction with sufficient support services to permit the handicapped child to benefit educationally from that instruction. Such instruction and services must be provided at public expense, must meet the State’s educational standards, must approximate grade levels used in the State’s regular education, and must comport with the child’s IEP, as formulated in accordance with the Act’s requirements. If the child is being educated in regular classrooms, as here, the IEP should be reasonably calculated to enable the child to achieve passing marks and advance from grade to grade.
2. In suits brought under the Act’s judicial review provisions, a court must first determine whether the State has complied with the statutory procedures, and must then determine whether the individualized program developed through such procedures is reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive educational benefits. If these requirements are met, the State has complied with the obligations imposed by Congress, and the courts can require no more.
Issue: IDEA eligibility for a behaviorally and emotionally disturbed child who is academically gifted?
While the circumstances in this case arose before the IDEA 2004 amendments (and also involved specific California law), many school districts are still implementing a modified discrepancy formula as part of a “strengths and weaknesses” model. Every eligibility determination is a three-pronged decision – whether the student meets the state’s disability criteria, whether the disability is adversely affecting the student’s education, and whether, as a result, the student needs special education services. Hood v. Encinitas involves the third prong of this determination and supports looking at a student’s classroom performance (whether the student is benefitting without special education), rather than just looking at standardized test scores, to determine whether special education services are needed.
Section 504 – no otherwise qualified individual with a disability shall, solely by reason of his disability, be excluded from the participation in be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination in, be denied the benefits of or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance or under any program or activity conducted by any Executive agency or by the United States Postal Service.
Even though Pottgen cannot meet this essential requirement, he is otherwise qualified if reasonable accommodations would enable him to meet the age limit. Reasonable accommodations do not require an institution to lower or to effect substantial modifications of standards to accommodate a handicapped person. Accommodations are not reasonable if they impose undue financial and administrative burdens or if they require a fundamental alteration in the nature of the program.
Other than waiving the age limit, no manner, method, or means is available which would permit Pottgen to satisfy the age limit. Consequently, no reasonable accommodations exist.
To determine whether Pottgen is a qualified individual under the ADA< we must first determine whether the age limit is an essential eligibility requirement by reviewing the importance of the requirement to the interscholastic baseball program. If this requirement is essential, we then determine whether Pottgen meets this requirement with or without modifications. It is at this later stage that the ADA requires an individualized inquiry.
As “otherwise qualified handicapped individuals,” the Rothschilds are entitled to “meaningful access to” the activities that the school offers parents. However, our determination must be “responsive to two powerful but countervailing considerations – the need to give effect to the statutory objectives and the desire to keep 504 within manageable bounds.” Accommodations to permit access to handicapped persons should not impose “undue financial and administrative burdens.” Thus, a recipient of federal financial assistance should not be “required to make fundamental or substantial modifications to accommodate the handicapped.” A recipient may, however, be required to make “reasonable” modifications to accommodate an otherwise qualified handicapped individual. “Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act requires some degree of positive effort to expand the availability of federally funded programs to handicapped persons otherwise qualified to benefit from them.
OVERVIEW: The district court found no IDEA violations and reversed the reimbursement ordered by the ALJ. Plaintiffs argued that it erred by (1) allowing and relying upon the board’s additional evidence; (2) failing to take judicial notice of federal court filings challenging the credibility of a board experts; (3) reversing those aspects of the ALJ’s decision that found violations of the IDEA and granted reimbursement and (4) awarding costs. On the first issue, the court gave great latitude to district courts and found no prohibition against the district court allowing even a large amount of additional evidence if it would add something to the administrative record or assist the district court in deciding the issues before it. On the second issue, plaintiffs were essentially attempting to get the district court to take judicial notice of a witness’s lack of credibility, a fact very much in dispute, and there was no abuse of discretion in the refusal to take judicial notice. On the third issue, because the school system deprived plaintiffs of a meaningful opportunity to participate, the predetermination the court found amounted to denial of a free appropriate public education.
OVERVIEW: The district court concluded that the 1997 IDEA amendment superseded the U.S. Supreme Court’s free appropriate public education “educational benefit” standard in Rowley. The court found that there was no plausible way to read the definition of “transition services” as changing the free appropriate public education standard. The vague legislative findings cited by the district court were insufficient for the court to conclude that Congress sought to supersede the standard set forth in Rowley. The district court erred in declaring Rowley superseded. The proper standard to determine whether a disabled child had received a free appropriate public education was the “educational benefit” standard set forth in Rowley. The district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to consider whether the district committed a procedural violation of the IDEA in regards to transition services because plaintiffs failed to exhaust their claim. The district did not commit a procedural violation of the IDEA in its pre-meeting meeting. Finally, the district did not violate the IDEA by not specifying minutes of instruction in the minor’s individualized educational program.
OUTCOME: The orders were vacated except to the extent that the conclusion that the district committed procedural violations of the IDEA that resulted in the denial of a free appropriate public education was reversed. The matter was remanded to the district court to review the ALJ’s determination that the district provided a free appropriate public education as required by Rowley. The district’s request for a different judge on remand was denied.
We hold that administrative findings in an IDEA case may be set aside only if the evidence before the court is more likely than not to preclude the administrative decision from being justified based on the agency’s presumed educational expertise, a fair estimate of the testimony or both. A court should defer to the administrative findings only when educational expertise is relevant to those findings and the decision is reasonable.
The school violated the IDEA’s procedural mandates in its development of the student’s IEP, and thereby denied student’s a FAPE, by not including a representative from CID (the private school) or student’s parents at the June 8 IEP.
We have held that a school district’s failure the include a representative from a private school that a child is currently attending violates the procedural mandates of the IDEA. IDEA requires the persons most knowledgeable about the child to attend the IEP meeting. The school made no attempt to include a representative from CID at the IPE meeting. As a result, the teachers most knowledgeable about student’s special education levels and needs did not attend the meeting, in violation of the IDEA.
We engage in a two-part test to determine whether the district afforded student a FAPE. First, we must determine whether the school complied with the procedures set forth in the IDEA. Second, we must determine whether the IEP developed through the IDEA’s procedures was reasonable calculated to confer educational benefit upon student.
The school’s failure to include the persons most knowledgeable about student’s educational levels and needs at the IEP meeting and its concomitant creation of a defective IEP resulted in lost educational opportunity for students.
Is it excluded as a medical service?
SC says some health services, like administering medication, etc are already provided at a school, how is this any different?
The Court ruled that the exception to covered related services for medical services does not reach the service of clean, intermittent catheterization (CIC) for a child who cannot urinate normally (so school must provide for service since it doesn’t have to be done by a doctor).
The issue in this case is whether CIC is a “related service” that petitioner is obliged to provide to Amber. We must answer two questions: first, whether CIC is a “supportive service required to assist a handicapped child to benefit from special education;” and second, whether CIC is excluded from this definition as a “medical service” serving purposes other than diagnosis or evaluation.
We conclude that provision of CIC to Amber is not subject to exclusions as a “medical service,” and we affirm the Court of Appeals’ holding that CIC is a “related service” under the Education of Handicapped Act.
This case established that extensive services to enable a child with quadriplegia who uses a ventilator are related services that must be provided under the federal special education law. Rather than excluded medical services.
District also tries to apply an undue burden test, based on 504, but SC doesn’t even address Section 504 since they resolve the District must provide services based on IDEA.
The primary problem with Tatro, and the majority’s reliance on it today, is that the Court focused on the provider of the services rather than the services themselves.
Instead, he regulations actually define only those medical services that are owed to handicapped children. Now, as when Tatro was decided, the regulations require districts to provide services performed by a licensed physician to determine a child’s medically related handicapping condition which resuls in the child’s need for special education and related services.
The Tatro Court did not defer to the regulation itself, but rather relied on an inference drawn from it to speculate about how a regulation might read if the Dept of Education promulgated one. Deference in those circumstances is impermissible. We cannot defer to a regulation that does not exist.
Assuming that Tatro was correctly decided in the first instance, it does not control the outcome of this case. Because IDEA was enacted pursuant to Congress’ spending power, our analysis of the statute in this case is governed by special rules of construction. We have repeatedly emphasized that, when Congress places conditions on the receipt of federal funds, it must do so unambiguously. It follows that we must interpret Spending Clause legislation narrowly, in order to avoid saddling the States with obligations that they did not anticipate.
We have previously recognized that Congress did not intend to impose upon the States a burden of unspecified proportions and weight in enacting IDEA.
Although the majority recognizes the extreme of cost of these services, it nonetheless concludes that the more extensive the nature of those services that respondent needs is irrelevant to the question whether those services fall under the medical services exclusion. This approach disregards the constitutionally mandated principles of construction applicable to Spending Clause legilsation and blindsides unwary States with fiscal obligations that they could not have anticipated.
(a) Because IDEA is silent on the allocation of the burden of persuasion, this Court begins with the ordinary default rule that plaintiffs bear the burden regarding the essential aspects of their claims. Although the ordinary rule admits of exceptions, decisions that place the entire burden of persuasion on the opposing party at the outset of a proceeding–as petitioners urge the Court to do here–are extremely rare. Absent some reason to believe that Congress intended otherwise, the Court will conclude that the burden of persuasion lies where it usually falls, upon the party seeking relief.
(b) Petitioners’ arguments for departing from the ordinary default rule are rejected. Petitioners’ assertion that putting the burden of persuasion on school districts will help ensure that children receive a free appropriate public education is unavailing. Assigning the burden to schools might encourage them to put more resources into preparing IEPs and presenting their evidence, but IDEA is silent about whether marginal dollars should be allocated to litigation and administrative expenditures or to educational services. There is reason to believe that a great deal is already spent on IDEA administration, and Congress has repeatedly amended the Act to reduce its administrative and litigation-related costs. The Act also does not support petitioners’ conclusion, in effect, that every IEP should be assumed to be invalid until the school district demonstrates that it is not. Petitioners’ most plausible argument–that ordinary fairness requires that a litigant not have the burden of establishing facts peculiarly within the knowledge of his adversary, United States v. New York –fails because IDEA gives parents a number of procedural protections that ensure that they are not left without a realistic chance to access evidence or without an expert to match the government.
1. The grant of authority to a reviewing court under § 1415(e)(2) includes the power to order school authorities to reimburse parents for their expenditures on private special education for a child if the court ultimately determines that such placement, rather than a proposed IEP, is proper under the Act. The ordinary meaning of the language in § 1415(e)(2) directing the court to “grant such relief as [it] determines is appropriate” confers broad discretion on the court. To deny such reimbursement would mean that the child’s right to a free appropriate public education, the parents’ right to participate fully in developing a proper IEP, and all of the procedural safeguards of the Act would be less than complete.
2. A parental violation of § 1415(e)(3) by changing the “then current educational placement” of their child during the pendency of proceedings to review a challenged proposed IEP does not constitute a waiver of the parents’ right to reimbursement for expenses of the private placement. Otherwise, the parents would be forced to leave the child in what may turn out to be an inappropriate educational placement or to obtain the appropriate placement only by sacrificing any claim for reimbursement. But if the courts ultimately determine that the proposed IEP was appropriate, the parents would be barred from obtaining reimbursement for any interim period in which their child’s placement violated § 1415(e)(3).
Reasoning: Justice Alito, writing for the majority, ruled that the ability to award attorneys’ fees does not include the ability to award experts’ fees. “Costs,” the Court wrote, is a term of art that generally does not include either type of fees. To add attorney’s fees to costs is exceptional under American law, which is why it was written into the statute. That change of the court’s power does not affect its power over experts’ fees.
Furthermore, the Court said that without clear notice to the states, a statute cannot require that a certain fee shall be assessed against the state. In response to the Murphys’ contention that the legislative history suggests that experts’ fees should be included, the Court stated that because the statute’s actual wording is unambiguous, there is no need to consult outside sources. In addition, the fact that the Act authorized a GAO study of the effect of awarding costs does not change the actual wording of the Act, which does not so award them.
Breyer’s dissent: Justice Breyer dissented from the Court’s ruling, and was joined by Justices Stevens and Souter. Stating that the statute is not unambiguous, and relying on the legislative history, Breyer wrote that the term “costs” was intended by Congress to include the cost of hiring expert witnesses. He also wrote that the “Act’s basic purpose” dictates that the award of all costs, including experts’ fees, be allowed. He rejected the application of the “clear notice” rule.
Souter’s dissent: Although he had also joined Justice Breyer’s dissent, Justice Souter dissented separately to write that certain GAO studies authorized by IDEA give weight to Breyer’s arguments and distinguish this case from those the majority cites.
Reasoning: The “stay-put” provision prohibits state or local school authorities from unilaterally excluding disabled children from the classroom for dangerous or disruptive conduct growing out of their disabilities during the pendency of all review proceedings. Section 1415(e)(3) is unequivocal in its mandate that “the child shall remain in the then current educational placement,” and demonstrates a congressional intent to strip schools of the unilateral authority they had traditionally employed to exclude disabled students, particularly emotionally disturbed students, from school. This Court will not rewrite the statute to infer a “dangerousness” exception on the basis of obviousness or congressional inadvertence, since, in drafting the statute, Congress devoted close attention to Mills v. Board of Education of District of Columbia, and Pennsylvania Assn. for Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania, thereby establishing that the omission of an emergency exception for dangerous students was intentional. However, Congress did not leave school administrators powerless to deal with such students, since implementing regulations allow the use of normal, nonplacement-changing procedures, including temporary suspensions for up to 10 schooldays for students posing an immediate threat to others’ safety, while the Act allows for interim placements where parents and school officials are able to agree, and authorizes officials to file a § 1415(e)(2) suit for “appropriate” injunctive relief where such an agreement cannot be reached. In such a suit, § 1415(e)(3) effectively creates a presumption in favor of the child’s current educational placement which school officials can rebut only by showing that maintaining the current placement is substantially likely to result in injury to the student or to others. Here, the District Court properly balanced respondents’ interests under the Act against the state and local school officials’ safety interest, and both lower courts properly construed and applied § 1415(e)(3), except insofar as the Court of Appeals held that a suspension exceeding 10 schooldays does not constitute a prohibited change in placement. The Court of Appeals’ judgment is modified to that extent.
– Congress meant to include retroactive reimbursement to parents as an available remedy in a proper case.
Section 140(a)(18)(A) requires the the education be “provided at public expense, under public supervision and direction.” Similarly, 1401(a)(18)(D) requires chools to provide an IEP, which must be designed by a respresentative of the local education agency, and must be established, revised, and reviewed by the agency, 1414(a)(5). These requirements do not make sense in the context of a parental placement. In this case, as in all Burlignton reimbursement cases, the parents’ rejection of the school district’s proposed IEP is the very reason for the parents’ decision to put their child in a private school. In such cases, where the private placement has necessarily been made over the school district’s objection, the private school education will not be under public supervision and direction. Accordingly to read the 1401(a)(18) requiremens as applying to parental placements would effectively eliminate the right of unilateral withdrawal recognized in Burlington.
– Moreovver, IDEA was intended to ensure that children with disabilities receive an education that is both appropriate and free. To read the provisions of 140(a)(18) to bar reimbursement in the circumstnaces of this case would defeat this statutory purpose.
– Public educational authorities who want to avoid reimbursing parents for the private education of a disabled child can do one of two things: give the child a free appropriate public education in a public setting, or place the child in an appropriate private setting of the State’s choice. This is IDEA’s mandate, and school officials who conform to it need not worry about reimbursement claims.
– The DC was free to fashion appropriate relief for Draper regardless of the options offered in the discussion of the administrative law judge. The Act requires appropriate relief, and the only possible interpretation is that the relief is to be appropriate in light of the purpose of the Act. Equitable consideations are relevant in fashioning relief, and the court enjoys broad discretion in so doing. This Circuit has held compensatory education appropriate relief where responsible authroities have failed to provide a handicapped student with an appropriate education as required by the Act.
1. IDEA grants parents independent, enforceable rights, which are not limited to procedural and reimbursement-related matters but encompass the entitlement to a free appropriate public education for their child.
(a) IDEA’s text resolves the question whether parents or only children have rights under the Act. Proper interpretation requires considering the entire statutory scheme. IDEA’s goals include “ensur[ing] that all children with disabilities have available to them a free appropriate public education” and “that the rights of children with disabilities and parents of such children are protected,” 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400(d)(1)(A)-(B), and many of its terms mandate or otherwise describe parental involvement. Parents play “a significant role,” Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 53, 126 S. Ct. 528, 163 L. Ed. 2d 387, in the development of each child’s IEP, see §§ 1412(a)(4), 1414(d). They are IEP team members, § 1414(d)(1)(B), and their “concerns” “for enhancing [their child’s] education” must be considered by the team, § 1414(d)(3)(A)(ii). A State must, moreover, give “any [***912] party” who objects to the adequacy of the education provided, the IEP’s construction, or related matter the opportunity “to present a complaint . . .,” § 1415(b)(6), and engage in an administrative review process that culminates in an “impartial due process hearing,” § 1415(f)(1)(A), before a hearing officer. “Any party aggrieved by the [hearing officer’s] findings and decision . . . [has] the right to bring a civil action with respect to the complaint.” § 1415(i)(2)(A). A court or hearing officer may require a state agency “to reimburse the parents for the cost of [private school] enrollment if . . . the agency had not made a free appropriate public education available to the child.” § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii). IDEA also governs when and to what extent a court may award attorney’s fees, see § 1415(i)(3)(B), including an award “to a prevailing party who is the parent of a child with a disability,” § 1415(i)(3)(B)(i)(I).
(b) These various provisions accord parents independent, enforceable rights. Parents have enforceable rights at the administrative stage, and it would be inconsistent with the statutory scheme to bar them from continuing to assert those rights in federal court at the adjudication stage.
– Respondent argues that parental involvement is contemplated only to the extent parents represent their child’s interests, but this view is foreclosed by the Act’s provisions. The grammatical structure of IDEA’s purpose of protecting “the rights of children with disabilities and parents of such children,” § 1400(d)(1)(B), would make no sense unless “rights” refers to the parents’ rights as well as the child’s. Other provisions confirm this view. See, e.g., § 1415(a). Even if this Court were inclined to ignore the Act’s plain text and adopt respondent’s countertextual reading, the Court disagrees that the sole purpose driving IDEA’s involvement of parents is to facilitate vindication of a child’s rights. It is not novel for parents to have a recognized legal interest in their child’s education and upbringing.
– The Act’s provisions also contradict the variation on respondent’s argument that parents can be “parties aggrieved” for aspects of the hearing officer’s findings and decision relating to certain procedures and reimbursements, but not “parties aggrieved” with regard to any challenge not implicating those limited concerns. The IEP proceedings entitle parents to participate not only in the implementation of IDEA’s procedures but also in the substantive formulation of their child’s educational program. The Act also allows expansive challenge by parents of “any matter” related to the proceedings and requires that administrative resolution be based on whether the child “received a free appropriate public education,” § 1415(f)(3)(E), with judicial review to follow. The text and structure of IDEA create in parents an independent stake not only in the procedures and costs implicated by the process but also in the substantive decision to be made. Incongruous results would follow, moreover, were the Court to accept the proposition that parents’ IDEA rights are limited to certain nonsubstantive matters. It is difficult to disentangle the Act’s procedural and reimbursement-related rights from its substantive ones, and attempting to do so would impose upon parties a confusing and onerous legal regime, one worsened by the absence of any express guidance in IDEA concerning how a court might differentiate between these matters. This bifurcated regime would also leave some parents without any legal remedy.
(c) Respondent misplaces its reliance on Arlington Central School Dist. Bd. of Ed. v. Murphy, when it contends that because IDEA was passed pursuant to the Spending Clause, it must provide clear notice before it can be interpreted to provide independent rights to parents. Arlington held that IDEA had not furnished clear notice before requiring States to reimburse experts’ fees to prevailing parties in IDEA actions. However, this case does not invoke Arlington’s rule, for the determination that IDEA gives parents independent, enforceable rights does not impose any substantive condition or obligation on States that they would not otherwise be required by law to observe. The basic measure of monetary recovery is not expanded by recognizing that some rights repose in both the parent and the child. Increased costs borne by States defending against suits brought by nonlawyers do not suffice to invoke Spending Clause concerns, particularly in light of provisions in IDEA that empower courts to award attorney’s fees to prevailing educational agencies if a parent files an action for an “improper purpose,” § 1415(i)(3)(B)(i)(III).
2. The Sixth Circuit erred in dismissing the Winkelmans’ appeal for lack of counsel. Because parents enjoy rights under IDEA, they are entitled to prosecute IDEA claims on their own behalf. In light of this holding, the Court need not reach petitioners’ argument concerning whether IDEA entitles parents to litigate their child’s claims pro se.
– This reading od 1412(a)(10(C) is necessary to avoid the conclusion that Congress abrogated sub silent our decision in Burlington and Carter. In those cases, we construed 1415(i)(2)(C)(iii) to authorize reimbursement when a school district fails to provide a FAPE and a child’s private school placement is appropriate, without regard to the child’s prior receipt of services. IT would take more than Congress’ failure to comment on the category of cases in which a child has not previously received special education services for us to conclude that the Amendments substantially superseded our decision and in large part replaced 1415(i)(2)(C)(iii). Absent a clearly expressed congressional intention, repeals by implication are not favored. WE accordingly adopt the reading of 1412(a)(10(C) that is consistent with those decisions.
– In 1997, Congress amended the DIEA with a number of provisions explicitly addressing the issue of payment for education of children enrolled in private schools without consent of or referral by the public agency 1412(a)(10)(C). These amendments generally prohibit reimbursement if the school district made a FAPE available, 1412(a)(10)(C)(i), and if they are to have any effect, there is no exception except by agreement, 1412(a)(10)(B), or for a student who previously received special education services that were inadequate, 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii). The majority says otherwise and hold that were inadequate, 1412(a)(10(C)(ii) places no limit on reimbursements for private tuition.
Cases: know the rule and the law and how to apply it.
Qualify for 504 – assessment with review of records & team gets together to determine what accommodations are appropriate.
What constitutes a denial of FAPE?

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