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Timestamp: 2019-04-23 17:15:20+00:00

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The United States Court of the Allied High Commission for Germany had jurisdiction, in 1950, to try petitioner, a civilian citizen of the United States who was the dependent wife of a member of the United States Armed Forces, on a charge of murdering her husband, in October 1949, within the United States Area of Control in Germany, in violation of 211 of the German Criminal Code. Pp. 342-362.
1. Both United States courts-martial and United States Military Commissions or tribunals in the nature of such commissions had jurisdiction in Germany in 1949-1950 to try persons in the status of petitioner on the charge against her. Pp. 345-355.
(a) The jurisdiction of United States courts-martial over this case was concurrent with, not exclusive of, that of the occupation courts. Pp. 345-355.
(b) The provisions added in 1916 by Articles 2 and 12 of the Articles of War, extending the jurisdiction of courts-martial over civilian offenders and over certain nonmilitary offenses, did not deprive military commissions and other military tribunals of whatever jurisdiction they then had over such offenders and offenses, since that concurrent jurisdiction was preserved to such commissions and tribunals by Article 15. Pp. 350-355.
2. The United States Courts of the Allied High Commission for Germany were, at the time of the trial of petitioner's case, tribunals in the nature of military commissions conforming to the Constitution and laws of the United States. Pp. 356-360.
(a) The fact that the occupation statute took effect prior to the date of the crime did not vitiate the constitutional authority for petitioner's trial by military commission. P. 360.
3. Petitioner and the offense charged against her came within the jurisdiction assigned to the court which tried her. Pp. 360-362.
(a) Military Government Ordinance No. 31 expressly gave to the occupation courts jurisdiction over civilian men and women who were subject to military law, and petitioner was a "person subject to military law" within the definition of Article of War 2 (d). Pp. 360-361.
(b) The requirement of Article 7 of Military Government Ordinance No. 31, that no person subject to military law shall be [343 U.S. 341, 342] brought to trial for any offense "except upon authorization of the Commander-in-Chief, European Command," was satisfied in this case. P. 361.
(c) The German Criminal Code was applicable to petitioner's offense by virtue of its express adoption by the United States Military Government. Pp. 361-362.
(d) The United States expressly required that its civilians be tried by its occupation courts rather than by the German courts. P. 362.
4. The jurisdiction of the United States Courts of the Allied High Commission for Germany to try petitioner being established, the judgment of the Court of Appeals affirming the discharge of the writ of habeas corpus for petitioner's release from custody is affirmed. P. 362.
In a habeas corpus proceeding seeking petitioner's release from federal custody, the District Court discharged the writ and remanded petitioner to the custody of respondent. 93 F. Supp. 319. The Court of Appeals affirmed. 188 F.2d 272. This Court granted certiorari. 342 U.S. 865 . Affirmed, p. 362.
Joseph S. Robinson argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief were Dayton M. Harrington and James D. Graham, Jr.
Robert W. Ginnane argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Perlman, Assistant Attorney General McInerney, Beatrice Rosenberg, J. F. Bishop and John M. Raymond.
The principal question here is whether a United States Court of the Allied High Commission for Germany had jurisdiction, in 1950, to try a civilian citizen of the United States, who was the dependent wife of a member of the United States Armed Forces, on a charge of murdering her husband in violation of 211 of the German Criminal [343 U.S. 341, 343] Code. The homicide occurred in October, 1949, within the United States Area of Control in Germany. For the reasons hereafter stated, we hold that such court had that jurisdiction.
The present proceeding originates with a petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed by petitioner, Yvette J. Madsen, in the United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia, seeking her release from the Federal Reformatory for Women in West Virginia where she is serving a sentence imposed by a United States Court of the Allied High Commission for Germany. She contends that her confinement is invalid because the court which convicted and sentenced her had no jurisdiction to do so. The District Court, after a hearing based on exhibits and agreed facts, discharged the writ and remanded petitioner to the custody of the respondent warden of the reformatory. 93 F. Supp. 319. The Court of Appeals affirmed. 188 F.2d 272. Because of the importance and novelty of the jurisdictional issues raised, we granted certiorari. 342 U.S. 865 .
I. Petitioner's status in Germany. - Petitioner is a native-born citizen of the United States who lawfully entered the American Zone of Occupied Germany in 1947 with her husband, Lieutenant Madsen of the United States Air Force. In 1949, she resided there, with him, in a house requisitioned for military use, furnished and maintained by military authority. She was permitted to use the facilities of the United States Army maintained there for persons in its service and for those serving with or accompanying the United States Armed Forces. In brief, her status was that of a civilian dependent wife of a member of the United States Armed Forces which were then occupying the United States Area of Control in Germany.
II. Both United States courts-martial, and United States Military Commissions or tribunals in the nature of such commissions, had jurisdiction in Germany in 1949-1950 to try persons in the status of petitioner on the charge against her. - Petitioner does not here attack the merits of her conviction nor does she claim that any nonmilitary court of the United States or Germany had jurisdiction to try her. 7 It is agreed by the parties to this proceeding that a regularly convened United States general court-martial would have had jurisdiction to try her. The United States, however, contends, and petitioner denies, that the United States Court of the Allied High Commission for Germany, which tried her, also had jurisdiction [343 U.S. 341, 346] to do so. In other words, the United States contends that its courts-martial's jurisdiction was concurrent with that of its occupation courts, whereas petitioner contends that it was exclusive of that of its occupation courts.
The key to the issue is to be found in the history of United States military commissions 8 and of United States occupation courts in the nature of such commissions. Since our nation's earliest days, such commissions have been constitutionally recognized agencies for meeting many urgent governmental responsibilities related to war. 9 They have been called our common-law war [343 U.S. 341, 347] courts. 10 They have taken many forms and borne many names. 11 Neither their procedure nor their jurisdiction has been prescribed by statute. It has been adapted in [343 U.S. 341, 348] each instance to the need that called it forth. See In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 18 -23.
In the absence of attempts by Congress to limit the President's power, it appears that, as Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, he may, in time of war, establish and prescribe the jurisdiction and procedure of military commissions, and of tribunals in the nature of such commissions, in territory occupied by Armed Forces of the United States. His authority to do this sometimes survives cessation of hostilities. 12 The President has the urgent and infinite responsibility not only of combating the enemy but of governing any territory occupied by the United States by force of arms. 13 The policy of Congress to refrain from legislating in this [343 U.S. 341, 349] uncharted area does not imply its lack of power to legislate. That evident restraint contrasts with its traditional readiness to "make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces; . . . ." 14 Under that clause Congress has enacted and repeatedly revised the Articles of War which have prescribed, with particularity, the jurisdiction and procedure of United States courts-martial.
"Article 15 is new. We have included in article 2 as subject to military law a number of persons who are also subject to trial by military commission. A military commission is our common-law war court. It has no statutory existence, though it is recognized by statute law. As long as the articles embraced them in the designation `persons subject to military law,' and provided that they might be tried by court-martial, I was afraid that, having made a special provision for their trial by court-martial, it might be held that the provision operated to exclude trials by military commission and other war courts; so this new article was introduced: . . . ."
III. The United States Courts of the Allied High Commission for Germany were, at the time of the trial of petitioner's case, tribunals in the nature of military commissions conforming to the Constitution and laws of the United States. - Under the authority of the President as Commander-in-Chief of the United States Armed Forces occupying a certain area of Germany conquered by the allies, the system of occupation courts now before us developed gradually. The occupation courts in Germany are designed especially to meet the needs of law enforcement in that occupied territory in relation to civilians and to nonmilitary offenses. Those courts have been directed to apply the German Criminal Code largely as it was theretofore in force. (See Appendix, infra, pp. 362-371, entitled "Chronology of Establishment of United States Military Government Courts and Their Jurisdiction Over Civilians in the United States Area of Control in Germany 1945-1950.") The President, as Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy, in 1945 established, through the Commanding General of the United States Forces in the European Theater, a United States Military Government for Germany within the United States Area of Control. Military Government Courts, in the nature of military commissions, were then a part of the Military Government. By October 20, 1949, when petitioner was alleged to have committed the offense charged against her, those courts were known as United States Military Government Courts. They were vested with jurisdiction to enforce the German Criminal Code in relation to civilians in petitioner's status in the area where the homicide occurred.
September 21, 1949, the occupation statute had taken effect. Under it the President vested the authority of the United States Military Government in a civilian acting as the United States High Commissioner for Germany. He gave that Commissioner "authority, under the immediate supervision of the Secretary of State (subject, [343 U.S. 341, 357] however, to consultation with and ultimate direction by the President), to exercise all of the governmental functions of the United States in Germany (other than the command of troops) . . . ." Executive Order 10062, June 6, 1949, 14 Fed. Reg. 2965, Appendix, infra, p. 367; Office of the United States High Commissioner for Germany, Staff Announcement No. 1, September 21, 1949, Appendix, infra, p. 368. Under the Transitional Provisions of Allied High Commission, Law No. 3, Article 5, 14 Fed. Reg. 7458, Appendix, infra, p. 369, preexisting legislation was applied to the appropriate new authorities. Finally by Allied High Commission, Law No. 1, Article 1, 15 Fed. Reg. 2086, Appendix, infra, p. 370, effective January 1, 1950, the name of the "United States Military Government Courts for Germany" was changed to "United States Courts of the Allied High Commission for Germany." They derived their authority from the President as occupation courts, or tribunals in the nature of military commissions, in areas still occupied by United States troops. Although the local government was no longer a "Military Government," it was a government prescribed by an occupying power and it depended upon the continuing military occupancy of the territory.
IV. Petitioner and the offense charged against her came within the jurisdiction assigned to the court which tried her. - Under United States Military Government Ordinance [343 U.S. 341, 361] No. 31, August 18, 1948, Article 7, 14 Fed. Reg. 126, Appendix, infra, p. 365, the United States gave its Military Government District Courts "criminal jurisdiction over all persons in the United States Area of Control except persons, other than civilians, who are subject to military, naval or air force law and are serving with any forces of the United Nations." It thus excepted from the jurisdiction of those occupation courts military men and women who were subject to military law but expressly gave those courts jurisdiction over civilian men and women who were subject to military law. Article of War 2 (d) further defined "any person subject to military law" as including "all persons accompanying or serving with the armies of the United States without the territorial jurisdiction of the United States . . . ." 28 This included petitioner.
Article 7 of United States Military Government Ordinance No. 31 further provided, however, that "No person subject to military law of the United States shall be brought to trial for any offense except upon authorization of the Commander-in-Chief, European Command." 14 Fed. Reg. 126, Appendix, infra, p. 365. That authorization appears in the official correspondence relating to the case of Wilma B. Ybarbo. The correspondence includes a written endorsement from the proper authority, dated December 11, 1948, covering not only the Ybarbo case but also the case "of any dependent of a member of the United States Armed Forces . . . ." See Appendix, infra, p. 367.
The applicability of the German Criminal Code to petitioner's offense springs from its express adoption by the United States Military Government. The United States Commanding General, in his Proclamation No. 2, September 19, 1945, stated that, except as abrogated, suspended or modified by the Military Government or by the Control [343 U.S. 341, 362] Council for Germany, "the German law in force at the time of the occupation shall be applicable in each area of the United States Zone of Occupation . . . ." 12 Fed. Reg. 6997, Appendix, infra, p. 363. 29 Section 211 of the German Criminal Code accordingly was applicable to petitioner on October 20, 1949. The United States also expressly required that its civilians be tried by its occupation courts rather than by the German courts. United States Military Government Law No. 2, German courts, Art. VI (i) (c) and (d), 12 Fed. Reg. 2191, 2192, Appendix, infra, p. 364. United States Military Government Ordinance No. 2, Art. II (2) (iii), 12 Fed. Reg. 2190-2191, Appendix, infra, p. 363.
Chronology of Establishment of United States Military Government Courts and Their Jurisdiction Over Civilians in the United States Area of Control in Germany 1945-1950.
1. June 5, 1945. - Allied Powers assumed "supreme authority with respect to Germany, including all the powers possessed by the German Government, the High Command and any state, municipal, or local government or authority. The assumption, for the purposes stated [343 U.S. 341, 363] above, of the said authority and powers does not effect the annexation of Germany." Declaration by Commanding Generals representing the United States, the Soviet Union, Great Britain and the French Provisional Government, THE AXIS IN DEFEAT - A Collection of Documents on American Policy Toward Germany and Japan, published by the United States Department of State, p. 63.
2. July 14, 1945. - Commanding General, United States Armed Forces in Europe, established a Military Government under his authority in the United States Zone of Occupation - Military Government - United States Area of Control, Proclamation No. 1, 12 Fed. Reg. 6997.
"Article II. Except as heretofore abrogated, suspended or modified by Military Government or by the Control Council for Germany, the German law in force at the time of the occupation shall be applicable in each area of the United States Zone of Occupation, until repealed by, or superseded by a new law enacted by the Control Council for Germany, or by Military Government or the states hereby constituted or by other competent authority." Military Government - United States Area of Control, Proclamation No. 2, 12 Fed. Reg. 6997.
4. 1946. - Military Government Courts, as distinguished from courts-martial, were given jurisdiction over all persons in the occupied territory, including civilians subject to military law and over offenses under the laws of the occupied territory.
". . . Article II; jurisdiction. (1) Military Government courts shall have jurisdiction over all persons in the occupied territory except persons other than civilians who are subject to military, naval or air force law and are serving under the command [343 U.S. 341, 364] of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force, or any other Commander of any forces of the United Nations.
"(i) All offences against the laws and usages of war.
"(ii) All offences under any proclamation, law, ordinance, notice or order issued by or under the authority of the Military Government or of the Allied Forces.
"(iii) All offences under the laws of the occupied territory or of any part thereof." United States Military Government Ordinance No. 2, Military Government Courts, 12 Fed. Reg. 2190-2191.
5. 1946. - German courts were denied jurisdiction in certain criminal cases, including those involving any national of the United Nations or any dependent accompanying any of the Armed Forces of any of the United Nations.
6. August 18, 1948. - United States Military Government Courts for Germany established.
". . . Ordinance No. 31; United States Military Government Courts for Germany; creation of the courts - (a) Article 1; judicial system. A system of courts is hereby established for the United States Area of Control of Germany . . . .
"(c) Article 3; District Courts. (1) A District Court is hereby established for each judicial district within the United States Area of Control.
"(3) Each District Court shall consist of one or more District Judges and one or more Magistrates who shall sit singly except as provided in subparagraph (5) of this paragraph.
"(5) A District Court composed of three District Judges or two District Judges and a Magistrate may hear and decide any civil or criminal case, and, in the latter, may impose any lawful sentence including death. A majority of such Court shall decide any case before it, provided that no sentence of death shall be imposed except by the unanimous decision of the Court.
"(8) Where an accused is charged with an offense under German law, the Court shall be limited to the sentence or other penal provision of such law.
"(g) Article 7, jurisdiction of District Courts in criminal cases. (1) District Courts shall have criminal [343 U.S. 341, 366] jurisdiction over all persons in the United States Area of Control except persons, other than civilians, who are subject to military, naval or air force law and are serving with any forces of the United Nations. No person subject to military law of the United States shall be brought to trial for any offense except upon authorization of the Commander-in-Chief, European Command. No member of an Allied Mission, visiting governmental official, or person subject to the military law of any country other than the United States, shall be brought to trial for any offense except upon authorization of the Military Governor.
"(iii) Offenses under German law in force in the Judicial District of the Court." 14 Fed. Reg. 124, 125, 126.
"1. During the period in which it is necessary that the occupation continue . . . [the occupying powers] desire and intend that the German people shall enjoy self-government to the maximum possible degree consistent with such occupation. The Federal State and the participating Laender [states] shall have, subject only to the limitations in this Instrument, full legislative, executive and judicial powers in accordance with the Basic Law and with their respective constitutions.
"2. In order to ensure the accomplishment of the basic purposes of the occupation, powers in the following fields are specifically reserved . . . .
"(e) Protection, prestige, and security of Allied forces, dependents, employees and representatives, their immunities and satisfaction of occupation costs and their other requirements; . . . ." 14 Fed. Reg. 7457.
"2. The United States High Commissioner for Germany, hereinafter referred to as the High Commissioner, shall be the supreme United States authority in Germany. The High Commissioner shall have the authority, under the immediate supervision of the Secretary of State (subject, however, to consultation with and ultimate direction by the President), to exercise all of the governmental functions of the United States in Germany (other than the command [343 U.S. 341, 368] of troops), including representation of the United States on the Allied High Commission for Germany when established, and the exercise of appropriate functions of a Chief of Mission within the meaning of the Foreign Service Act of 1946.
"4. In the event that the High Commissioner shall assume his duties in accordance with this Executive Order prior to the date that the Military Government of the United States Zone of Germany is terminated, he shall during such interval report to the Secretary of Defense, through the Secretary of the Army, and shall be the United States Military Governor with all the powers thereof including those vested in the United States Military Governor under all international agreements." 14 Fed. Reg. 2965.
10. September 21, 1949. - Council of Allied High Commission declared occupation statute to be in force as promulgated May 12, 1949. 14 Fed. Reg. 7456.
12. September 21, 1949. - The United States High Commissioner for Germany announced that the United States Courts for Germany, as established by Staff Announcement No. 1 (and previously established as the "United States Military Government Courts for Germany," pursuant to United States Military Government Ordinance No. 31) "form an independent judicial unit responsible directly to the United States High Commissioner. The integrated system provides for district judges and magistrates at the district court level and for a Chief Judge and associate judges of the Court of Appeals." Office of the United States High Commissioner for Germany, Staff Announcement No. 5, Resp. Ex. 2, R. 69. Similar announcement was made as to the Office of General Counsel and of the Chief Attorney. Staff Announcement No. 6, Resp. Ex. 3, R. 70.
"(b) The Occupation Forces and their members.
"(c) Non-German nationals, civilian or military, who are serving with the Occupation Authorities.
"(d) Members of the families and non-German persons in the service of the persons referred to in subparagraphs (a) (b) and (c) of this paragraph." Allied High Commission, Law No. 2, Art. 1, 14 Fed. Reg. 7457.
"References in any legislation enacted before the entry into force of the Occupation Statute to the Control Council, the Supreme Commander Allied Expeditionary Force, the Commanding General, the Armed Forces, Military Government, the Military Governor and to other authorities shall, where the context so requires or admits, be deemed to refer to the appropriate authorities exercising the particular functions mentioned in such legislation." Allied High Commission, Law No. 3, 14 Fed. Reg. 7458.
15. November 25, 1949. - Judicial powers were reserved, from the German courts, as to members of families of members of the Occupation Forces, thus bringing them under the jurisdiction of the occupation courts.
"(a) (i) Over the Allied Forces; . . . ." Allied High Commission, Law No. 13, 15 Fed. Reg. 1056.
16. December 28, 1949 (Effective January 1, 1950). - Occupation courts were changed.
"`The Courts so created shall be known as the United States Courts of the Allied High Commission for Germany.'"
"`The Court of Appeals shall consist of a Chief Justice and eight Associate Justices.'"
"Wherever the term `United States Military Government Courts for Germany' or the terms `Chief Judge' or `Associate Judge' or `Associate Judges' of the Court of Appeals are used in any legislation and regulations now in force, such terms shall be deemed to refer to the United States Courts of the Allied High Commission for Germany and the Chief Justice and an Associate Justice or Associate Justices of the Court of Appeals of such Courts, respectively." Allied High Commission, Law No. 1, 15 Fed. Reg. 2086.
[ Footnote 1 ] See United States Military Government Ordinance No. 31, August 18, 1948, 14 Fed. Reg. 124-128. See Appendix, infra, p. 365.
"`211. (As in force prior to 4 September 1941). Whoever intentionally kills a human being is guilty of murder if the killing was accomplished with premeditation, and shall be punished by death.
"`211. (As amended 4 September 1941, RGBI I, 549). The murderer shall be punished by death.
"`In order to make possible or to conceal another offense.
"`If, in especially exceptional cases, the death penalty is not suitable (angemessen), punishment of confinement for life in a penitentiary shall be imposed.'"
The agreed statement also contains a translation of 44 and 51 of the German Criminal Code providing for reduction of sentence under circumstances which were deemed applicable to petitioner by the trial court.
[ Footnote 3 ] See Allied High Commission, Law No. 1, Art. 1, December 28, 1949, 15 Fed. Reg. 2086, Appendix, infra, pp. 370-371.
[ Footnote 4 ] See United States Military Government Ordinance No. 31, Art. 13, August 18, 1948, 14 Fed. Reg. 127.
[ Footnote 5 ] See notes 1, 3 and 4, supra.
[ Footnote 6 ] See 38 Stat. 1084-1085, 10 U.S.C. 1452, and, since May 31, 1951, see Art. 58 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, 64 Stat. 126, 50 U.S.C. (Supp. IV) 639.
[ Footnote 7 ] There was no nonmilitary court of the United States in Germany. She enjoyed the immunity from the jurisdiction of all German courts which had been granted to nationals of the United Nations and to families of members of the occupation forces. United States Military Government Law No. 2, Art. VI (1), 12 Fed. Reg. 2191, 2192, Appendix, infra, p. 364; Allied High Commission, Law No. 2, Art. 1, 14 Fed. Reg. 7457, Appendix, infra, p. 369; Allied High Commission, Law No. 13, Art. 1, 15 Fed. Reg. 1056-1057, see Appendix, infra, p. 370.
[ Footnote 8 ] "By a practice dating from 1847 and renewed and firmly established during the Civil War, military commissions have become adopted as authorized tribunals in this country in time of war. They are simply criminal war courts, resorted to for the reason that the jurisdiction of courts-martial, creatures as they are of statute, is restricted by law, and can not be extended to include certain classes of offenses which in war would go unpunished in the absence of a provisional forum for the trial of the offenders. . . . There [Their] competency has been recognized not only in acts of Congress, but in executive proclamations, in rulings of the courts, and in the opinions of the Attorneys General. During the Civil War they were employed in several thousand cases; . . . ." Howland, Digest of Opinions of the Judge-Advocates General of the Army (1912), 1066-1067.
". . . it is those provisions of the Constitution which empower Congress to `declare war' and `raise armies,' and which, in authorizing the initiation of war, authorize the employment of all necessary and proper agencies for its due prosecution, from which this tribunal derives its original sanction. Its authority is thus the same as the authority for the making and waging of war and for the exercise of military government and martial law. The commission is simply an instrumentality for the more efficient execution of the war powers vested in Congress and the power vested in the President as Commander-in-chief in war. In some instances . . . Congress has specifically recognized the military commission as the proper war-court, and in terms provided for the trial thereby of certain offences. In [343 U.S. 341, 347] general, however, it has left it to the President, and the military commanders representing him, to employ the commission, as occasion may require, for the investigation and punishment of violations of the laws of war and other offences not cognizable by court-martial.
"The occasion for the military commission arises principally from the fact that the jurisdiction of the court-martial proper, in our law, is restricted by statute almost exclusively to members of the military force and to certain specific offences defined in a written code. It does not extend to many criminal acts, especially of civilians, peculiar to time of war; and for the trial of these a different tribunal is required. . . . Hence, in our military law, the distinctive name of military commission has been adopted for the exclusively war-court, which . . . is essentially a distinct tribunal from the court-martial of the Articles of war."
For text of General Scott's General Order No. 20, as amended by General Order No. 287, September 17, 1847, authorizing the appointment of military commissions in Mexico, see Birkhimer, Military Government and Martial Law (2d ed. rev. 1904), App. I, 581-582. See also, Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304 ; In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 ; Santiago v. Nogueras, 214 U.S. 260 ; Neely v. Henkel, 180 U.S. 109 ; Mechanics' & Traders' Bank v. Union Bank, 22 Wall. 276, 279 note; The Grapeshot, 9 Wall. 129, 132; Cross v. Harrison, 16 How. 164, 190; II Halleck, International Law (3d ed. 1893), 444-445. For an example of the exercise of jurisdiction in a murder case by a Provisional Court established in Louisiana, in 1862, by executive order of the President of the United States and an opinion by the Provisional Judge reviewing the constitutional authority for the establishment of his court, see United States v. Reiter, 27 Fed. Cas. No. 16,146.
[ Footnote 10 ] While explaining a proposed reference to military commissions in Article of War 15, Judge Advocate General Crowder, in 1916, said, "A military commission is our common-law war court. It has no statutory existence, though it is recognized by statute law." S. Rep. No. 130, 64th Cong., 1st Sess. 40.
[ Footnote 11 ] Such as Military Commission, Council of War, Military Tribunal, Military Government Court, Provisional Court, Provost Court, Court of Conciliation, Arbitrator, Superior Court, and Appellate Court. And see Winthrop, op. cit. 803-804.
[ Footnote 12 ] It has been recognized, even after peace has been declared, pending complete establishment of civil government. See Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304 ; In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 12 -13; Santiago v. Nogueras, 214 U.S. 260 ; Neely v. Henkel, 180 U.S. 109 ; Burke v. Miltenberger, 19 Wall. 519; Leitensdorfer v. Webb, 20 How. 176; Cross v. Harrison, 16 How. 164.
"The authority of the legitimate power having in fact passed into the hands of the occupant, the latter shall take all the measures in his power to restore, and ensure, as far as possible, public order and safety, while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the country." 36 Stat. 2306.
"Military government . . . is an exercise of sovereignty, and as such dominates the country which is its theatre in all the branches of administration. Whether administered by officers of the army of the belligerent, or by civilians left in office or appointed by him for the purpose, it is the government of and for all the inhabitants, native or foreign, wholly superseding the local law and civil authority except in so far as the same may be permitted by him to subsist. . . . The local laws and ordinances may be left in force, and in general should be, subject however to their being in whole or in part suspended and others substituted in their stead - in the discretion of the governing authority." Winthrop, op. cit. 800.
[ Footnote 14 ] U.S. Const., Art. I, 8, cl. 14.
[ Footnote 15 ] Article XXXII of the American Articles of War of 1775 was taken from Article XXIII of Section XIV of the British Articles of War of 1765. It provided only that "All suttlers and retailers to a camp, and all persons whatsoever, serving with the continental army in the field, though not inlisted soldiers, are to be subject to the articles, rules, and regulations of the continental army." (Emphasis supplied.) Winthrop's Military Law and Precedents (2d ed. 1920 reprint) 956, and see 941 and 950. Article 60 of the Articles of War of 1806 was similar. It substituted "retainers" for "retailers." Id., at 981. Article 60 was slightly amended in 1874. By 1916, as Article 63, Congress still provided, as to civilians, merely that "All retainers to the camp, and all persons serving with the armies of the United States in the field, though not enlisted soldiers, are to be subject to orders, according to the rules and discipline of war." (Emphasis supplied.) Id., at 991, and see 98-99.
"SEC. 30. . . . in time of war, insurrection, or rebellion, murder, assault and battery with an intent to kill, manslaughter . . . shall be punishable by the sentence of a general court-martial or military commission, when committed by persons who are in the military service of the United States, and subject to the articles of war; and the punishments for such offences shall never be less than those inflicted by the laws of the state, territory, or district in which they may have been committed." (Emphasis supplied.) 12 Stat. 736.
In the codification published as the Revised Statutes of 1874, the incidental reference to military commissions was omitted. Article of War 58 at 234. Petitioner attaches substantial significance to the omission. It seems clear, however, that regardless of what effect, if any, may attach to that omission in its relation to the jurisdiction of military commissions over persons in the military service, it has no effect on the jurisdiction of military commissions over civilians not "in the military service." This section of the Act of 1863 was enacted so as to place soldiers who committed certain nonmilitary crimes under the jurisdiction of military courts. See Caldwell v. Parker, 252 U.S. 376 . The section did not relate to the jurisdiction of courts or commissions over civilians not in the military service. Cong. Globe, 37th Cong., 3d Sess. 988, 1256, 1377, 1384 (1863). For discussion of the phrase "in the military service" as used in Articles 58 and 60, see Gen. Crowder's testimony. S. Rep. No. 229, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 104.
[ Footnote 17 ] In 1920, Article of War 15 was reenacted with the addition of "by statute or" before the words "by the law of war." 41 Stat. 790, 10 U.S.C. 1486. It was in that form in 1949 and 1950. It was again reenacted May 5, 1950, as the present Article 21 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, effective May 31, 1951. 64 Stat. 115, 145, 50 U.S.C. (Supp. IV) 581. The hearings, in 1949, on the latter legislation are of some significance here. They disclosed that the United States Military Government Courts in Germany were then exercising, in the occupied territory, criminal jurisdiction over United States civilians accompanying the Armed Forces. Attention even was called to the recent case of Wilma B. Ybarbo. Like petitioner in the instant case, she was a civilian dependent wife of a member of the United States Armed Forces in Germany, charged with the murder of her husband in violation of the German Criminal Code. She was convicted by the United States Military Government Court for the Third Judicial District. The Court of Appeals of the United States Military Government Courts, March 14, 1949, upheld her conviction, on a lesser charge, and sentenced her to five years' imprisonment. In its opinion, the latter court reviewed the basis for its jurisdiction. United States Military Government v. Ybarbo, 1 U.S. M. G. Court of Appeals 207. See also, Hearings before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Armed Services on H. R. 2498, Uniform Code of Military Justice, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 876, 975, 1061. With this practice before them, the Committees of both Houses of Congress recommended the reenactment of Article of War 15 as Article 21 of the new code. They said, "This article preserves existing Army and Air Force law which gives concurrent jurisdiction to military tribunals other than courts martial." S. Rep. No. 486, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 13; H. R. Rep. No. 491, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 17.
"(d) All retainers to the camp and all persons accompanying or serving with the armies of the United States without the territorial jurisdiction of the United States, and in time of war all such retainers and persons accompanying or serving with the armies of the United States in the field, both within and without the territorial jurisdiction of the United States, though not otherwise subject to these articles; . . . ." (Emphasis supplied.) 39 Stat. 651, 41 Stat. 787, 10 U.S.C. 1473 (d).
[ Footnote 19 ] In 1916, new Articles 92 and 93 expanded the jurisdiction of courts-martial over murder and certain other nonmilitary crimes so as to cover their commission by any "person subject to military law." That phrase, through Article 2, included civilians in the status of petitioner. See note 18, supra. For Articles 92 and 93, see 39 Stat. 664, 41 Stat. 805, 62 Stat. 640, 10 U.S.C. (Supp. IV) 1564, 1565. See note 16, supra, for the substance of Article 30 of the Articles of War of 1863 and of Article 58 of the Articles of War of 1874.
"The next article, No. 15, is entirely new, and the reasons for its insertion in the code are these: In our War with Mexico two war courts were brought into existence by orders of Gen. Scott, viz, the military commission and the council of war. By the military commission Gen. Scott tried cases cognizable in time of peace by civil courts, and by the council of war he tried offenses against the laws of war. The council of war did not survive the Mexican War period, and in our subsequent wars its jurisdiction has been taken over by the [343 U.S. 341, 354] military commission, which during the Civil War period tried more than 2,000 cases. While the military commission has not been formally authorized by statute, its jurisdiction as a war court has been upheld by the Supreme Court of the United States. It is an institution of the greatest importance in a period of war and should be preserved. In the new code the jurisdiction of courts-martial has been somewhat amplified by the introduction of the phrase `Persons subject to military law.' There will be more instances in the future than in the past when the jurisdiction of courts-martial will overlap that of the war courts, and the question would arise whether Congress having vested jurisdiction by statute the common law of war jurisdiction was not ousted. I wish to make it perfectly plain by the new article that in such cases the jurisdiction of the war court is concurrent.
". . . I was influenced to propose the article 15. largely, perhaps, by experience during our second intervention in Cuba. It was not very long after that intervention had been inaugurated until two soldiers were charged with homicide of some natives. There was no civil court of the United States having jurisdiction. Plainly the court-martial could not try them, as the condition was not war. There were two courses open: First, to surrender them for trial before a Cuban court . . . the second course was to utilize the extraordinary authority which inhered in the office of the provisional governor and which extended to the making of laws, to promulgate a special decree creating a provisional court for the trial of these men. This second course was followed, and the accused soldiers were tried by a court composed of officers of the Army, which administered the provisions of the Spanish criminal code. Should we be confronted again with the necessity of intervention, that situation is likely to repeat itself." S. Rep. No. 229, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 53, 98-99.
[ Footnote 21 ] See note 9, supra.
"By the Articles of War, and especially Article 15, Congress has explicitly provided, so far as it may constitutionally do so, that military tribunals shall have jurisdiction to try offenders or offenses against the law of war in appropriate cases. Congress, in addition to making rules for the government of our Armed Forces, has thus exercised its authority to define and punish offenses against the law of nations by sanctioning, within constitutional limitations, the jurisdiction of military commissions to try persons for offenses which, according to the rules and precepts of the law of nations, and more particularly the law of war, are cognizable by such tribunals. And the President, as Commander in Chief, by his Proclamation in time of war has invoked that law. By his Order creating the present Commission he has undertaken to exercise the authority conferred upon him by Congress, and also such authority as the Constitution itself gives the Commander in Chief, to direct the performance of those functions which may constitutionally be performed by the military arm of the nation in time of war."
In that case the military commission's conviction of saboteurs, including one citizen of the United States, was upheld on charges of violating the law of war as defined by statute. Id., at 35-38.
[ Footnote 23 ] The Government estimates that the United States Area of Control has a German population of about 17,000,000, plus United Nations nationals, including refugees. As of November 30, 1949, it estimates that there were in Germany about 34,000 dependents of members of United States Armed Forces, plus 4,700 civilian employees with 5,000 dependents. Other United States agencies had 4,100 employees in Germany. The occupation courts have been handling at least 1,000 criminal cases a month, including from 25 to 30 cases involving American civilians. See also, general account of the development of the Military Government Courts in Clay, Decision in Germany (1950), 246-248.
"(vii) To have the proceedings translated, when he is otherwise unable to understand the language in which they are conducted; . . . ." 12 Fed. Reg. 2191.
[ Footnote 25 ] United States Military Government Ordinances 32 and 33, code of criminal procedure for United States Military Government Courts for Germany, 14 Fed. Reg. 128-133.
"Military government tribunals are not governed by the provisions of the Manual for Courts-Martial nor by the limitations imposed on courts-martial by Articles of War. Experience has demonstrated that in administering justice in an occupied area, it is desirable to follow forms of judicial procedure which are generally similar to the forms of procedure to which the people are accustomed."
"a provisional judge, to hold said court, with authority to hear, try, and determine all causes, civil and criminal, including causes in law, equity, revenue, and admiralty, and particularly all such powers and jurisdiction as belong to the District and Circuit courts of the United States, conforming his proceedings, so far as possible, to the course of proceedings and practice which has been customary in the courts of the United States in Louisiana; his judgments to be final and conclusive. . . . These appointments [of prosecuting attorney, marshal [343 U.S. 341, 360] and clerk of the court] are to continue during the pleasure of the President, not extending beyond the military occupation of the city of New Orleans, or the restoration of the civil authority in that city and the State of Louisiana." (Emphasis supplied.) Mechanics' & Traders' Bank v. Union Bank, 22 Wall. 276, 279 note; and see United States v. Reiter, 27 Fed. Cas. No. 16,146.
[ Footnote 26 ] They did not provide for juries. The presentment or indictment of a grand jury required in a federal capital case by the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, under the terms of that Amendment, has no application to "cases arising in the land or naval forces . . . ." The right of trial by jury required in federal criminal prosecutions by the Sixth Amendment is similarly limited. See Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 40 , 43-45; Ex parte Milligan, 4 Wall. 2, 123, 138.
[ Footnote 27 ] ". . . The status of military government continues from the inception of the actual occupation till the invader is expelled by force of arms, or himself abandons his conquest, or till, under a treaty of peace, the country is restored to its original allegiance or becomes incorporated with the domain of the prevailing belligerent." Winthrop, op. cit. 801.
[ Footnote 28 ] See note 18, supra.
[ Footnote 29 ] Cf. Dow v. Johnson, 100 U.S. 158, 166 ; Ketchum v. Buckley, 99 U.S. 188 , as illustrations of the practice of recognizing the existing law of the occupied area; and Winthrop, op. cit. 800.
Petitioner, a United States citizen, is now serving a fifteen-year sentence for murdering her husband. At the time of the alleged crime, she was living in the United States Area of Control in Germany with her husband who was an Air Force lieutenant on active duty in Germany. It appears that the court that tried her and the law she was judged by were not established or authorized by the [343 U.S. 341, 372] Congress. Executive officers acting under presidential authority created the system of courts that tried her, promulgated the edicts she was convicted of violating, and appointed the judges who took away her liberty.

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