Source: https://bruteforcelawyer.com/category/cplr/cplr-%C2%A7-308/
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 01:05:13+00:00

Document:
In order to establish entitlement to a default judgment, the plaintiff was required to [*2]submit proof of valid service of process, the facts constituting the causes of action, and the default (see CPLR 3215[f]; Miterko v Peaslee, 80 AD3d 736, 737; Valiotis v Psaroudis, 78 AD3d 683, 683-684). The plaintiff allegedly served process on the defendant pursuant to CPLR 308(4). Once the "affixing and mailing" was accomplished, the plaintiff was required to file proof of service with the clerk of the court within 20 days of either the affixing or mailing, whichever was later (see CPLR 308). Once such timely filing is accomplished, service is deemed completed 10 days thereafter (see id.).
Here, the affidavit of service was not filed within 20 days of either the mailing or affixing; thus, service was never completed (see id.). Since service was never completed, the defendant's time to answer the complaint had not yet started to run and, therefore, she could not be in default (see Pipinias v J. Sackaris & Sons, Inc., 116 AD3d 749, 750; Bank of New York v Schwab, 97 AD2d 450).
However, the "failure to file proof of service is a procedural irregularity, not a jurisdictional defect, that may be cured by motion or sua sponte by the court in its discretion pursuant to CPLR 2004" (Khan v Hernandez, 122 AD3d 802, 803; see Buist v Bromley Co., LLC, 151 AD3d 682, 683; Pipinias v J. Sackaris & Sons, Inc., 116 AD3d at 750). Thus, we agree with the Supreme Court's determination to deem the affidavit of service timely filed, sua sponte, pursuant to CPLR 2004.
In granting this relief, however, the court must do so upon such terms as may be just, and only where a substantial right of a party is not prejudiced (see CPLR 2001; Discover Bank v Eschwege, 71 AD3d 1413, 1414). The court may not make such relief retroactive, to the prejudice of the defendant, by placing the defendant in default as of a date prior to the order (see Khan v Hernandez, 122 AD3d at 803; Discover Bank v Eschwege, 71 AD3d at 1414), "nor may a court give effect to a default judgment that, prior to the curing of the irregularity, was a nullity requiring vacatur" (Discover Bank v Eschwege, 71 AD3d at 1414 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Bank of New York v Schwab, 97 AD2d 450). Rather, the defendant must be afforded an additional 30 days to appear and answer after service upon her of a copy of the decision and order (see CPLR 320[a]; Buist v Bromley Co., LLC, 151 AD3d at 683; Khan v Hernandez, 122 AD3d at 803; Pipinias v J. Sackaris & Sons, Inc., 116 AD3d at 750; Discover Bank v Eschwege, 71 AD3d at 1414).
Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have vacated the default judgment, and, upon deeming the affidavit of service timely filed, nunc pro tunc, should have extended the time for the defendant to serve and file an answer.
Contrary to the contention of the nonparty witness (Inga), she was properly served via email with plaintiff's order to show cause. While a criminal contempt proceeding requires personal service on the contemnor (see Matter of Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 144 AD2d 252, 255-256 [1st Dept 1988]), CPLR 308(5) permits a court to direct another manner of service if the methods set forth in the statute prove impracticable. Here, Inga left the jurisdiction after the same court and Justice found her in contempt, and offers no evidence that she was at either her residence in London or Lithuania. Under these circumstances, the court properly directed that she be served via email (see Alfred E. Mann Living Trust v ETIRC Aviation S.A.R.L., 78 AD3d 137, 141-142 [1st Dept 2010]). Since Inga was properly served with the contempt motion, and had knowledge of the terms of the subject orders of which she was in violation, the court was empowered to find her in contempt without plaintiff commencing a special proceeding (see Citibank v Anthony Lincoln-Mercury, 86 AD2d 828, 829 [1st Dept 1982]).
Contrary to her contention, she was properly served with plaintiff's order to show cause. The order to show cause directed plaintiff to serve Inga under CPLR 308 and her counsel by overnight mail on or before June 20, 2016. Inga's claim that her counsel was untimely served because he did not receive papers until June 21, 2016 is without merit (see CPLR 2103[b] [service is complete upon deposit into the custody of the overnight delivery service]). Likewise, the record supports that Inga was personally served at the New York City apartment she and defendant owned, which constituted her "dwelling place or usual place of abode within the state" for the purposes of CPLR 308 (see Krechmer v Boulakh, 277 AD2d 288, 289 [2d Dept 2000]).
Here, the affidavit of service indicating that the respondent was served pursuant to CPLR 308(2) by delivery of the papers to a person of suitable age and discretion was insufficient on its face to establish, prima facie, that the respondent was validly served pursuant to that section. However, a second affidavit of service constituted prima facie evidence of proper service of the summons and complaint pursuant to CPLR 308(1) (see Reich v Redley, 96 AD3d 1038), and of proper service of the notice required by Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law § 1303 (see US Bank N.A. v Tate, 102 AD3d 859). The respondent's bare and unsubstantiated denial of service lacked the factual specificity and detail required to rebut the prima facie proof of proper service set forth in that affidavit of service (see ACT Props., LLC v Garcia, 102 AD3d 712, 713; Scarano v Scarano, 63 AD3d 716, 716-717).
Tricked into coming to NY for service?
Contrary to the defendant's contention, the Supreme Court properly denied, without a hearing, his motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction. The plaintiff demonstrated that jurisdiction was acquired over the defendant by personal delivery of a copy of the summons and complaint to him while he was physically present in New York (see CPLR 308). Moreover, accepting as true the defendant's factual allegations regarding the circumstances under which he was served with process, we conclude that he failed to raise any issue regarding whether he was lured, enticed, or induced into entering New York by fraudulent or deceptive conduct on the part of the plaintiff for the purpose of effecting service. Therefore, a hearing on the validity of the service is unwarranted (see Matter of Hammett v Hammett, 74 AD2d 540; United Indus. Corp. v Shreiber, 51 AD2d 688, cert denied 429 US 1023; Gumperz v Hofmann, 245 App Div 622, affd 271 NY 544; cf. DeMartino v Rivera, 148 AD2d 568; Terlizzi v Brodie, 38 AD2d 762).
Author DMGPosted on May 10, 2012 Categories CPLR § 308, [App Div 2d Dept]Leave a comment on Tricked into coming to NY for service?
The Supreme Court properly denied, without a hearing, the defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(8) for lack of personal jurisdiction. The affidavits of the process servers constituted prima facie evidence of proper service pursuant to CPLR 308(4) (see Scarano v Scarano, 63 AD3d 716, 716; Mortgage Elec. Registration Sys., Inc. v Schotter, 50 AD3d 983, 983; 425 E. 26th St. Owners Corp. v Beaton, 50 AD3d 845, 846; Simonds v Grobman, 277 AD2d 369, 370). Although a defendant's sworn denial of receipt of service generally rebuts the presumption of proper service established by a process server's affidavit and necessitates an evidentiary hearing, no hearing is required where the defendant fails to swear to specific facts to rebut the statements in the process server's affidavits (see Scarano v Scarano, 63 AD3d at 716; Simonds v Grobman, 277 AD2d at 370). Here, the defendants' bare denial of service was insufficient to rebut the prima facie proof of proper service pursuant to CPLR 308(4) created by the process servers' affidavits and to necessitate a traverse hearing (see Scarano v Scarano, 63 AD3d at 716; Mortgage Elec. Registration Sys., Inc. v Schotter, 50 AD3d at 983; 425 E. 26th St. Owners Corp. v Beaton, 50 AD3d at 846; Simonds v Grobman, 277 AD2d at 370).
The Supreme Court also properly denied the defendants' motion, inter alia, to vacate a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction based on lack of proper service of the order to show cause. "The method of service provided for in an order to show cause is jurisdictional in nature and must be strictly complied with" (Matter of El Greco Socy. of Visual Arts, Inc. v Diamantidis, 47 AD3d 929, 929; see Matter of Del Villar v Vekiarelis, 59 AD3d 642, 643; Matter [*2]of Master v Pohanka, 43 AD3d 478, 480, affd 10 NY3d 620; Matter of Hennessey v DiCarlo, 21 AD3d 505, 505). Here, the express terms of the order to show cause required the plaintiffs to serve the order to show cause and other papers on the defendants as well as their attorneys. However, while it is undisputed that attorney Vincent M. Gerardi represented the defendants in a related but separate and independent action, and that the plaintiffs were aware of that action, it is also undisputed that, in the instant action, as of the time the plaintiffs were required to serve the order to show cause, no attorney had appeared on behalf of the defendants (see generally CPLR 320[a], 321[a]). CPLR 2103(c) expressly provides that, if a party has not appeared by an attorney, service shall be upon the party. Thus, notwithstanding the language directing service in the order to show cause, the plaintiffs were not required to serve Gerardi with the order to show cause merely because he represented the defendants in a separate and independent, if not entirely unrelated, action, where neither he nor any other attorney had appeared on behalf of the defendants in this action (see Long v Long, 196 Misc 982, 984).
I'm adding another case (5/31/10) because it doesn't deserve it's own post, but is nonetheless relevant to the blog.
with service of the motion on the referee.
The CPLR R. 3211 Roundup: It’s going to be loooong.
Because I can't let all of these decisions keep on piling up, I'm doing a 3211 dump. This will probably be followed by a 300's dump, and maybe a 3212 dump.
There is a lot here, but it's worth skimming. Most of the cases related to improper service or conversion (3211–>3212).
Mihlovan v Grozavu, 72 NY2d 506; Bowes v Healy, 40 AD3d 566).
contradicted by the record, are not entitled to any such consideration (id.).
Accordingly, it waived the defense (see CPLR 3211 [a] ; [e]).
complaining of improper joinder (see McDaniel v Clarkstown Cent.
subject accident on the very day that it occurred.
Robinson, 39 NY2d 554, 560 ).
result (see Stagg v City of New York, 39 AD3d at 534).
judgment in favor of defendants.
Author DMGPosted on March 28, 2010 Categories CPLR § 1003, CPLR § 306-b, CPLR § 308, CPLR § 311, CPLR R. 3211, [App Div 1st Dept], [App Div 2d Dept]Leave a comment on The CPLR R. 3211 Roundup: It’s going to be loooong.
obtaining an affidavit from Carvajal (see CPLR 2221[e], ; Simpson v Tommy Hilfiger U.S.A., Inc., 48 AD3d 389, 392; Miller v Duffy, 162 AD2d 438, 439-440; Matter of Mangialino v White Haven Mem. Park, 132 AD2d 970, 971).
of the evidence (see Mortgage Access Corp. v Webb, 11 AD3d 592, 593; Bankers Trust Co. of Cal. v Tsoukas, 303 AD2d at 344; Kingsland Group v Pose, 296 AD2d 440; Balancio v Santorelli, 267 AD2d 189; New Is. Invs. v Wynne, 251 AD2d 560; Bank of Am. Nat. Trust & Sav. Assn. v Herrick, 233 AD2d at 352).
the appeal from the order dated December 4, 2007.
I'm only posting the analysis on this one. For the facts in their entirety, read the decision. For a brief intro to the decision, click here.
that she is the intended defendant by a reading of the papers (see Olmsted v Pizza Hut of Am., Inc., 28 AD3d 855, 856; Justin v Orshan, 14 AD3d 492; Lebowitz v Fieldston Travel Bur., 181 AD2d 481, 482).
AD3d at 492-493). An insufficient description subjects the "Jane Doe"
complaint to dismissal for being jurisdictionally defective (see Lebowitz v Fieldston Travel Bur., 181 AD2d 481, 482-483; Reid v Niagra Mach. & Tool Co., 170 AD2d 662). A third pitfall unique to CPLR 1024 is its interplay with CPLR 306-b.
statute of limitations (see Luckern [*3]v Lyondale Energy Ltd. Partnership, 229 AD2d 249, 255)[FN1].
of limitations purpose (see Leader v Maroney, Ponzini & Spencer, 97 NY2d at 100; Matter of Gershel v Porr, 89 NY2d 327, 330).
process is even more challenging.
circumstances beyond the plaintiff's control (see U.S. 1 Brookville Real Estate Corp. v Spallone, 13 Misc 3d 1236[A], quoting Eastern Refractories Co., Inc. v Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 187 FRD 503, 505; see also Greco v Renegades, Inc., 307 AD2d 711, 712 [difficulties of service associated with locating defendant enlisted in military]; Kulpa v Jackson, 3 Misc 3d 227, 235 [difficulties associated with service abroad through the Hague Convention]).
extension, and prejudice to the defendant (see Leader v Maroney, Ponzini & Spencer, 97 NY2d at 105-106; Matter of Jordan v City of New York, 38 AD3d 336, 339; Estey-Dorsa v Chavez, 27 AD3d 277; Mead v Singleman, 24 AD3d at 1144; de Vries v Metropolitan Tr. Auth., 11 AD3d 312, 313; Hafkin v North Shore Univ. Hosp., 279 AD2d 86, 90-91, affd 97 NY2d 95; see also Slate v Schiavone Const. Co., 4 NY3d 816).
process upon "Jane Doe" defendants who cannot be readily identified.
filing of a summons and complaint.
statute of limitations (accord Misa v Hossain, 42 AD3d at 486).
their actions against known parties.
limitations (see Hall v Rao, 26 AD3d at 695; Scoma v Doe, 2 AD3d at 433; Tucker v Lorieo, 291 AD2d at 262).
statutory period (see Leader v Maroney, Ponzini & Spencer, 97 NY2d at 106-07), prompt motions are more likely to be successful (id.; Scarabaggio v Olympia & York Estates Co., 278 AD2d at 476), as they are a sign of diligence, whereas dilatory motions are less so (see Matter of Anonymous v New York State Off. of Children & Family Services, 53 AD3d at 810-811).

References: § 1303
 § 308
 § 1003
 § 306
 § 308
 § 311