Source: http://tx.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20180330_0000951.NTX.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2019-04-24 05:50:31+00:00

Document:
CITY OF ARLINGTON, TEXAS, a municipality; and THEDRICK ANDRES, individually and as a Police Officer for the City of Arlington, Defendants.
Before the court are Thedrick Andres' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint (Doc. 18), filed March 31, 2017; and Defendant City of Arlington's Second Motion to Dismiss Under Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) (Doc. 20), filed March 31, 2017. No response was filed with respect to either motion; however, the court held a hearing on the motions on October 25, 2017. After careful consideration of the motions, briefs, pleadings, arguments of counsel, and applicable law, the court grants in part and denies in part Thedrick Andres' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint (Doc. 18); and grants in part and denies in part Defendant City of Arlington's Second Motion to Dismiss Under Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) (Doc. 20).
After the initial pleading was filed, several motions to dismiss were filed. As a result of the motions, certain claims were dismissed, and the court ordered Plaintiffs to replead and file an amended complaint. Specifically, to the extent set forth in its Memorandum Opinion and Order, filed February 17, 2017 (Doc. 12), the court granted Defendant City of Arlington Police Department's Motion to Dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), Defendant Sgt. Thedrick Andres' Motion to Dismiss Under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) and Alternative Request that Plaintiffs Reply to His Immunity,  and Defendant Sgt. Andres' Motion to Stay Discovery; stayed all discovery until further order of the court; denied Defendant Sgt. Thedrick Andres' Motion for Leave to Supplement Briefing on Motion to Dismiss; and dismissed with prejudice Plaintiffs' state law claim of “homicide” and the action against the Arlington Police Department. Rather than dismiss the entire action, the court ordered that Plaintiffs be allowed an opportunity to amend their pleadings. As a result of the order and an agreed extension between the parties, Plaintiffs' First Amended Original Complaint (“Amended Complaint”) was filed on March 17, 2017. Two weeks later, the referenced motions to dismiss were filed.
In the Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs (Jordan May, Jasmine May, and Ava May as next of kin of Juan O'Neil May, decedent; and Jindia May Blunt,  individually and as representative of the estate of Juan May, deceased), assert claims against the City of Arlington (the “City”) and Thedrick Andres (“Andres”) as a result of the shooting death of Juan O'Neil May. Specifically, Plaintiffs assert claims against the City and Andres under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“§ 1983”); claims under the Texas Tort Claims Act; claims for wrongful death under Texas law; a survival claim under Texas law; a civil rights claim under § 1983 for violation of familial relationship; claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress and assault. Plaintiffs seek compensatory damages, exemplary and punitive damages, costs of court and attorney's fees.
The City and Andres have both filed second motions to dismiss. First, the City contends that Plaintiffs failed to allege sufficiently that a policy or custom of the City caused any of them to be deprived of a constitutional right. Second, the City contends it is immune from the intentional torts under the Texas Tort Claims Act. Third, the City contends that Plaintiffs' claims for assault under § 22.01 of the Texas Penal Code and the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress should be dismissed with prejudice for lack of jurisdiction. Fourth, the City contends that Plaintiffs' claims for exemplary and punitive damages under federal and state law should be dismissed with prejudice for lack of jurisdiction. Finally, the City contends that Jindia Blunt, sister of Juan May, does not have standing to bring any claims in her individual capacity and that any claim in such capacity should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
Andres contends that Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint does not address the shortcomings previously identified by the court and that it does not provide specific allegations to defeat Andres's qualified immunity defense. Andres contends that Plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment claim for excessive force should be dismissed because it does not meet the pleading requirements set forth in Twombly and Iqbal. Andres also contends that Plaintiffs' claims under Texas Tort Claims Act are barred against him because they also chose to sue the City and their claims are barred by an immediate, irrevocable statutory election pursuant to Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code, § 101.106. He further contends that the claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress fail because it is a “gap-filler” and there is no gap to fill in this case. He also contends that the § 1983 claim for violation of familial relationship should be dismissed. Andres requests that Plaintiffs be required to amend and replead, and address Andres's qualified immunity defense by submitting a Rule 7 Reply.
As the court stated earlier, Plaintiffs filed no response to the motions to dismiss; however, the hearing held on October 25, 2017, assists the court in ruling on the motions. The court will first address the City's motion to dismiss, and then it will proceed to address Andres's motion.
2. A persistent, widespread practice of [city] officials or employees which, although not authorized by officially adopted and promulgated policy, is so common and well-settled as to constitute a custom that fairly represents [city] policy. Actual or constructive knowledge of such custom must be attributable to the governing body of the [city] or to an official to whom that body had delegated policy-making authority.
Webster v. City of Houston, 735 F.2d 838, 841 (5th Cir. 1984) (en banc); Bennett v. City of Slidell, 735 F.2d 861, 862 (5th Cir. 1984) (en banc). For purposes of a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a plaintiff must plead facts from which the court can reasonably infer that the “challenged policy was promulgated or ratified by the city's policymaker.” Groden v. City of Dallas, Texas, 826 F.3d 280, 285 (5th Cir. 2016). “[C]ourts should not grant motions to dismiss for [the] fail[ure] to plead the specific identity of the policymaker.” Id. (citing Johnson v. City of Shelby, Miss., 135 S.Ct. 346 (2014)).
The ultimate question in deciding the sufficiency of a complaint is whether a person has alleged facts to show that a policymaker promulgated or ratified an unconstitutional policy that resulted in injury to him or her. Although a plaintiff need not offer proof of his or her allegations at the pleading stage, a plaintiff “must plead facts that plausibly support each element of § 1983 municipal liability.” Peña v. City of Rio Grande, Tex., 879 F.3d 613, 621 (5th Cir. 2018) (citation omitted). In other words, a plaintiff must set forth facts, or those from which the court can reasonably infer, that: “(1) an official policy; (2) promulgated by the municipal policymaker; (3) was the moving force behind the violation of a constitutional right.” Hicks-Fields v. Harris Cty., 860 F.3d 803, 808 (5th Cir. 2017) (footnote and citations omitted). “Official municipal policy includes the decisions of a government's lawmakers, the acts of its policymaking officials, and practices so persistent and widespread as to practically have the force of law.” Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 61 (2011) (citations omitted).
To defeat “a motion to dismiss, a complaint's ‘description of a policy or custom and its relationship to the underlying constitutional violation . . . cannot be conclusory; it must contain specific facts.'” Balle v. Nueces Cty. Tex., 690 F. App'x 847, 852 (5th Cir. 2017) (quoting Spiller v. City of Tex. City Police Dep't, 130 F.3d 162, 167 (5th Cir. 1997)). In other words, the pleadings are adequate with respect to a section 1983 claim against a city when they set forth “specific factual allegations that allow a court to reasonably infer that a policy or practice exists and that the alleged policy or practice was the moving force” for the constitutional violation asserted. Id. (citation omitted). Although Spiller is over twenty years old, its holding that allegations of an allegedly unconstitutional policy or custom of a local government may not be stated conclusorily but must set forth specific facts is still solid law, and it was recently cited with approval by the Fifth Circuit in Peña, 879 F.3d at 622. If a complaint does not meet the standard set forth in Spiller, an action cannot “proceed beyond the pleading stage.” Peña, 879 F.3d at 622.
The City contends that Plaintiffs' pleadings are too conclusory and speculative to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The essence of the City's contentions is that sufficient facts have not been pleaded in the Amended Complaint as required by Supreme Court and Fifth Circuit authority for this court to reasonably infer that a City policy or custom was the moving force behind any constitutional injury Plaintiffs may have suffered.
22. This incident [the shooting of Juan May], coupled with the recent firing of Arlington Police Officer Brad Miller, suggests that there is a pattern of misconduct being engaged in by certain law enforcement officers in the City of Arlington Police Department that seek to deprive a segment of our community of their constitutional rights. This intentional and reckless disregard for human life lies far below the stated brand of “excellent service, ” suggested by the City of Arlington Police Department.
24. As a result of the pre-existing customs, policies, patterns and/or practices of such abuses by members of Defendant, CITY OF ARLINGTON Police Department, decedent and Plaintiffs were subjected to the violation of their constitutional rights as alleged herein.
53. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference herein paragraphs 1 through 52 of this complaint.
54. Plaintiffs plead that Juan May's constitutional rights were violated when he was shot and killed by Officer Andres. The Plaintiffs' injuries directly resulted from Officer Andres' excessive use of deadly force in shooting and killing Juan May.

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