Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/413/1/
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 04:29:21+00:00

Document:
civilian disorders when the total circumstances are such that nonlethal force would suffice to restore order. . . ."
Since the complaint was filed, the named respondents have left the university; the officials originally named as defendants no longer hold offices in which they can exercise authority over the Guard; the Guard has adopted new and substantially different "use of force" rules; and the civil disorder training of Guard recruits has been revised.
1. The case is resolved on the basis of whether the claims alleged in the complaint, as narrowed by the Court of Appeals' remand, are justiciable, rather than on possible mootness. Pp. 413 U. S. 5.
2. No justiciable controversy is presented in this case, as the relief sought by respondents, requiring initial judicial review and continuing judicial surveillance over the training, weaponry, and standing orders of the National Guard, embraces critical areas of responsibility vested by the Constitution, see Art. I, § 8, cl. 16, in the Legislative and Executive Branches of the Government. Pp. 413 U. S. 5-12.
BURGER, C.J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which WHITE, BLACKMUN, POWELL, and REHNQUIST, JJ., joined. BLACKMUN, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which POWELL, J., joined, post, p. 413 U. S. 12. DOUGLAS, BRENNAN, STEWART, and MARSHALL, JJ., filed a dissenting statement, post, p. 413 U. S. 12.
"Was there and is there a pattern of training, weaponry and orders in the Ohio National Guard which, singly or together, require or make inevitable the use of fatal force in suppressing civilian disorders when the total circumstances at the critical time are such that nonlethal force would suffice to restore order and the use of lethal force is not reasonably necessary? [Footnote 5]"
effect when the complaint was filed; we are also informed that the initial training of National Guard recruits relating to civil disorder control [Footnote 9] has been revised.
National Guard. They further demand, and the Court of Appeals' remand would require, that the District Court establish standards for the training, kind of weapons and scope and kind of orders to control the actions of the National Guard. Respondents contend that thereafter the District Court must assume and exercise a continuing judicial surveillance over the Guard to assure compliance with whatever training and operations procedures may be approved by that court. Respondents press for a remedial decree of this scope, even assuming that the recently adopted changes are deemed acceptable after an evidentiary hearing by the court. Continued judicial surveillance to assure compliance with the changed standards is what respondents demand.
"To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the Militia, and for governing such Part of them as may be employed in the Service of the United States, reserving to the States respectively, the Appointment of the Officers, and the Authority of training the Militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress."
"[F]or example: Prevention and Control of Mobs and Riots, Federal Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Dept. of Justice, J. Edgar Hoover (1967). . . ; 32 C.F.R. § 501 (1971), 'Employment of Troops in Aid of Civil Authorities;' Instructions for Members of the Force at Mass Demonstrations, Police Department, City of New York (no date); Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders (1968)."
"I believe that the congressional and executive authority to prescribe and regulate the training and weaponry of the National Guard, as set forth above, clearly precludes any form of judicial regulation of the same matters. I can envision no form of judicial relief which, if directed at the training and weaponry of the National Guard, would not involve a serious conflict with a"
political decision already made; [and] the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on on question."
"Baker v. Carr, supra, 369 U.S. at 369 U. S. 217. . . . Any such relief, whether it prescribed standards of training and weaponry or simply ordered compliance with the standards set by Congress and/or the Executive, would necessarily draw the courts into a nonjusticiable political question, over which we have no jurisdiction."
456 F.2d at 619 (emphasis added).
"Justiciability is itself a concept of uncertain meaning and scope. Its reach is illustrated by the various grounds upon which questions sought to be adjudicated in federal courts have been held not to be justiciable. Thus, no justiciable controversy is presented when the parties seek adjudication of only a political question, when the parties are asking for an advisory opinion, when the question sought to be adjudicated has been mooted by subsequent developments, and when there is no standing to maintain the action. Yet it remains true that '[j]usticiability is . . . not a legal concept with a fixed content or susceptible of scientific verification. Its utilization is the resultant of many subtle pressures. . . .' Poe v. Ullman, 367 U. S. 497, 367 U. S. 508 (1961). [Footnote 14]"
"[j]usticiability is. . . not a legal concept with a fixed content or susceptible of scientific verification. Its utilization is the resultant of many subtle pressures. . . ."
367 U.S. at 367 U. S. 508.
Voting rights cases such as Baker v. Carr, 369 U. S. 186 (1962), Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U. S. 533 (1964), and prisoner rights cases such as Haines v. Kerner, 404 U. S. 519 (1972), are cited by the court as supporting the "diminish[ing] vitality of the political question doctrine." 456 F.2d at 613. Yet, because this doctrine has been held inapplicable to certain carefully delineated situations, it is no reason for federal courts to assume its demise. The voting rights cases, indeed, have represented the Court's efforts to strengthen the political system by assuring a higher level of fairness and responsiveness to the political processes, not the assumption of a continuing judicial review of substantive political judgments entrusted expressly to the coordinate branches of government.
unlawful conduct by military personnel, [Footnote 16] whether by way of damages or injunctive relief. We hold only that no such questions are presented in this case. We decline to require a United States District Court to involve itself so directly and so intimately in the task assigned that court by the Court of Appeals. Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U. S. 83, 345 U. S. 93-94 (1953).
The complaint was brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 with jurisdiction asserted under 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3).
This section provides that, under certain circumstances, law enforcement personnel who are engaged in suppressing a riot are "guiltless" for the consequences of the use of necessary and proper force. Ohio Rev.Code Ann. § 2923.55 (Supp. 1972).
The opinion of the Court of Appeals is reported sub nom. Morgan v. Rhodes, 456 F.2d 608 (CA6 1972).
Respondents have not sought certiorari with respect to those claims.
Tr. of Oral Arg. 25, 33.
Memorandum of Petitioners Suggesting a Question of Mootness 2.
In 1971, the Army began to give National Guard recruits 16 hours of additional special civil disturbance control training recognizing the peculiar role of the National Guard in this area.
E.g., 32 U.S.C. §§ 105, 501-507, 701-714 (1970 ed. and Supp. I).
10 U.S.C. § 331 et seq.
The initial and basic training of National Guard personnel is, by Regulation of the Department of the Army, pursuant to statutory authority, under federal jurisdiction. Commencing in 1971, National Guard units received, as part of the basic training, 16 hours of special civil disturbance control training, in recognition of the likelihood that the National Guard would be the primary source of military personnel called into civil disorder situations. See Dept. of the Army, Reserve Enlistment Program of 1963, CON Supp. 1 to AR350-1, App. XXV, Anx. F, Par. 3c (Aug. 31, 1972).
392 U.S. at 392 U. S. 95 (footnotes omitted).
"Would it be a fair characterization of your position that, if the case goes back to the district court, you do not quarrel with the specific [National Guard] regulations now in force, but (a) you want them made permanent and, (b) you want a continuing surveillance to see that they are carried out; is that a fair statement of your case?"
"Yes, Your Honor, that is a fair statement of what we are seeking at this point, understanding that, at the time the complaint was filed, we were seeking a more specific change in what then existed."
Tr. of Oral Arg. 56.
"[W]hen presented with claims of judicially cognizable injury resulting from military intrusion into the civilian sector, federal courts are fully empowered to consider claims of those asserting such injury; there is nothing in our Nation's history or in this Court's decided cases, including our holding today, that can properly be seen as giving any indication that actual or threatened injury by reason of unlawful activities of the military would go unnoticed or unremedied."
MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN, MR. JUSTICE STEWART, and MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL dissent.
For many of the reasons stated in 413 U. S. they are convinced that this case is now moot. Accordingly, they would vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand the case to the District Court with directions to dismiss it as moot. See United States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U. S. 36, 340 U. S. 39.
singly or together require or make inevitable" the unjustifiable use of lethal force in suppressing civilian disorders. 456 F.2d 608, 612. The Ohio use-of-force rules have now been changed, and are identical to the Army use-of-force rules. Counsel for respondents stated at oral argument that the use-of-force rules now in effect provide satisfactory safeguards against unwarranted use of lethal force by the Ohio National Guard. Tr. of Oral Arg. 31. And, as of 1971, special civil disturbance control training had been provided for the various National Guard units.
of unspecified, speculative threats of uncertain harm that might occur at some indefinite time in the future, cannot support respondents' standing to maintain this action. See Complaint, par. 11, App. 6; Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113, 410 U. S. 128 (1973).
The relief sought by respondents, moreover, is beyond the province of the judiciary. Respondents would have the District Court, through continuing surveillance, evaluate and pass upon the merits of the Guard's training programs, weapons, use of force, and orders. The relief sought is prospective only; an evaluation of those matters in the context of a particular factual setting as a predicate to relief in the form of an injunction against continuing activity or for damages would present wholly different issues. This case relates to prospective relief in the form of judicial surveillance of highly subjective and technical matters involving military training and command. As such, it presents an "[inappropriate] . . . subject matter for judicial consideration," for respondents are asking the District Court, in fashioning that prospective relief, "to enter upon policy determinations for which judicially manageable standards are lacking." Baker v. Carr, 369 U. S. 186, 369 U. S. 198, 369 U. S. 226 (1962).
For these reasons, the judgment of the Court of Appeals must be reversed. On the understanding that this is what the Court's opinion holds, I join that opinion.

References: § 8
 § 501
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 v. 
 § 1983
 § 1343
 § 2923
 v. 
 § 331
 v. 
 v. 
 v.