Source: http://bc-injury-law.com/blog/2012/04
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 07:52:11+00:00

Document:
Reasons for judgement were released last week by the BC Supreme Court, Penticton Registry, assessing damages for soft tissue injuries caused by a motor vehicle collision.
In last week’s case (Kingsfield v. Powers) the Plaintiff was involved in a 2007 collision in Oliver, BC. Fault for the crash was disputed and ultimately the Court held that both parties were to blame with the Plaintiff shouldering 75% of the fault.
 It follows from the foregoing that I am not satisfied that the on-going low back problems that Mr. Kingsfield is experiencing are causally related to the injuries he sustained in the motor vehicle accident.
 The next issue is an assessment of Mr. Kingsfield’s other injuries. They gave rise to fairly significant pain and discomfort for the first month after the accident. He was unable to do his job during that time, and when he did return to work it was to light duties for about six weeks. He continued to experience headaches until approximately mid-March and his neck was painful beyond that, perhaps until June 2008, some seven months after the accident. During this time his injuries did affect his life. He had difficulty sleeping, did not continue with his recreational activities, curling in particular, and generally felt poorly.
 The cases of Dolha v. Heft, 2011 BCSC 738; Morales v. Neilson, 2009 BCSC 1890; and De Leon v. Harold, 2010 BCSC 1802, are instructive in terms of quantum. All involved soft tissue injuries that resolved within a year. In Dolha the plaintiff’s significant injury was to her back and neck. Those injuries resolved within six to nine months following the accident. She was awarded $10,000 in non-pecuniary damages. In Morales the plaintiff suffered soft tissue injuries to his shoulder, neck and back. While those injuries limited his activities somewhat he was able to work seven days a week in a physically demanding job since the accident. His injuries were all resolved by a year post-accident. He was awarded $11,000 in non-pecuniary damages. In De Leon, the stoic plaintiff suffered soft tissue injuries which, due to her active participation, resolved substantially within two months of the accident and almost entirely within six months. She was awarded non-pecuniary damages of $12,000.
 I am of the view that an appropriate award of non-pecuniary damages in this case is $12,000. Mr. Kingsfield’s injuries significantly affected his life, including how he performed at work. Although he is entitled to compensation for past wage loss, I accept that the plaintiff takes pride in being able to do his job and his inability to do it was a source of significant anxiety while he awaited the resolution of his injuries.
Reasons for judgement were released last week by the BC Supreme Court, New Westminster Registry, assessing damages for a sacroiliac joint injury caused by a motor vehicle collision.
 It is apparent from a review of the whole of the evidence that Ms. Bartel suffered injuries to her neck and back in the accident which had resolved for the most part by February 2009, although she was still experiencing intermittent pain in her sacroiliac joint areas. Since then she has had flare-ups, the October 2009 incident being the most significant. Although there is some evidence of ongoing shoulder problems, the evidence is that Ms. Bartel suffered from shoulder problems prior to the accident. There is insufficient evidence to conclude that her ongoing shoulder problems are as a result of the motor vehicle accident.
 Both Dr. Kelly and Dr. le Nobel are of the opinion that Ms. Bartel’s prospect for full recovery is guarded. However, Dr. le Nobel is of the opinion that Ms. Bartel may have significant improvement if not complete resolution of her symptoms with injections into her back and an exercise program.
 Having considered the extent of the injuries, the fact that the symptoms were largely resolved within seven months with occasional flare-ups and the ongoing restrictions on Ms. Bartel’s gardening, as well as the authorities I was provided, I am of the view that the appropriate award for non pecuniary damages is $35,000.
Significant injuries can be caused by the most casual of slip and falls. Conversely, accidents causing extensive property damage may leave those involved unscathed. The presence and extent of injuries are to be determined on the basis of evidence given in court. Objectivity is thus preserved and the public does not have to concern itself with extraneous philosophies that some would impose on the judicial process.
 Although the severity of the accident is a factor that should be taken into consideration when determining whether Ms. Bartel suffered injuries in the motor vehicle accident and the extent of those injuries, it is not determinative of either issue. Rather the whole of the evidence must be considered in determining those issues.
The BC Supreme Court released Practice Direction 34, effective April 25, 2012, clarifying the matters in which a Master does and does not have jurisdiction.
The most notable change relates to granting Masters authority to preside over Trial Management Conferences which is consistent with a recent amendment, also in force on April 25, 2012, to Rule 12-2(2).
Unreported reasons for judgement recently came to my attention addressing, for what I believe is the first time since the New Rules came into force, the issue of whether a party can elect trial by jury when a new Notice of Trial is issued if they failed to so elect in the fist instance. In short the Court held this is not permitted.
In the recent case (Hung v. Sellars, BC Supreme Court Duncan Registry) the Plaintiff was injured in a motor vehicle collision. The case was set for trial and neither party filed a notice requiring trial by jury. The trial was adjourned by consent. The Plaintiff filed a new notice of trial (as is required by BC Supreme Court Practice Direction 25). The Defendant then filed a notice requiring trial by jury.
 As noted, the authorities have held the election whether the trial be by judge alone or by judge sitting with a jury contemplates that the election will be made promptly after the first notice of trial. Some latitude is possible where a party seeks to make an election outside the tie limited by the rules in certain restricted circumstances.
 In this case, a jury notice, in accordance with the principle in Hoare v. Firestone and Pelech v. Pelech, could have been filed and served after the first notice of trial that was issued in this action. The jury notice should have been filed and delivered within the rules after the date of the first notice of trial…Therefore the notice requiring trial by jury in this case…is struck as being filed outside the tine allowed by Rule 12-6.
As of today’s date this decision is not publicly available but, as always, I’m happy to provide a copy to anyone who contacts me and requests one.
Reasons for judgement were released earlier this month by the BC Supreme Court, Nanaimo Registry, assessing damages for a chronic soft tissue injury sustained in a motor vehicle collision.
In the recent case (Noon v. Lawlor) the Plaintiff was involved in a 2009 rear-end collision. Fault was admitted by the offending motorist focusing the trial on the value of the case. The Plaintiff sustained a chronic soft tissue injury to his neck and upper back. The injury caused difficulties with the heavier aspects of the Plaintiff’s job as a journeyman plumber and his symptoms were expected to continue into the future.
 I find that the plaintiff sustained injury to the soft tissues of his neck and upper back, as a result of the collision of January 22, 2009. The plaintiff also sustained minor injuries to his forehead and to his low back. The head injury resolved in about three weeks and the plaintiff had recovered from his low back injury, within six months. The plaintiff continued to experience headaches associated with his neck injury, but the headaches had diminished in about a year to the point where they occurred only occasionally, and were not disabling.
 The medical experts did not offer an opinion as to the severity of the whiplash injury to the plaintiff. I find that the impact of the collision was violent and that the forces exerted on the plaintiff’s body were capable of causing significant injury. On all of the evidence, I find that the injury was at least moderate in severity.
 The plaintiff must be compensated for the amount of pain and suffering and loss of enjoyment of life that he has incurred to date, as well as the amount that he will experience in the future, as the result of the injury caused by the defendant’s negligence. Having regard to the findings of fact that I have made, it is my opinion that the plaintiff should be awarded $60,000 as damages for non-pecuniary loss, and I so order.
As previously discussed, if you are insured with ICBC the amount of Part 7 Benefits that you are entitled to must be deducted from tort trial damages due to the operation of section 83 of BC’s Insurance (Vehicle) Act. This deduction can be made even if you don’t apply/receive your Part 7 benefits.
As previously discussed, having the right of way does not automatically result in a driver being found faultless for a collision. Reasons for judgement were released this week by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, demonstrating this.
In this week’s case (Matheson v. Fichten) the Plaintiff was a passenger in a Northbound vehicle in a designated left hand turn lane. The advance green arrow ran its course resulting in a green light for North and south bound traffic. The driver proceeded with his turn despite no longer having the advance green arrow.
At the same time the Defendant was driving Southbound in the curb lane. He was several car lengths back from the intersection when his light turned green. Other Southbound vehicles began to accelerate but then stopped realizing the Plaintiff vehicle was turning. The Defendant did not stop and entered the intersection when the collision occurred.
 I have found as fact that Mr. Bahniwal proceeded through the intersection on a green light. Accordingly, he had the right of way. His was the dominant vehicle; Mr. Fichten’s vehicle was in the servient position.
 The question in the end is whether either Mr. Fichten or Mr. Bahniwal or both, was in breach of the duty of care he owed to the plaintiff. I take into account the Motor Vehicle Act provisions as informing the requisite standard of care (Ryan v. Victoria,  1 S.C.R. 201 at para. 29).
 It is clear that Mr. Fichten was negligent in making his left turn when it was unsafe to do so after the light had changed, and in particular by crossing the curb lane of southbound traffic without checking that it was free of oncoming vehicles.
 In my opinion, when the light facing Mr. Bahniwal turned green and the vehicles on his left proceeded forward and then stopped, Mr. Bahniwal had the opportunity to recognize, and should have recognized, that something had caused them to stop. His approach into the intersection should then have been tempered with caution, even though he had the light in his favour and had built up some momentum. He did not take that approach but, instead, proceeded at the speed limit into the intersection. His vehicle was in the dominant position, but he was not entitled to overlook a clear indication of a possible hazard in the fact that the vehicles to his left had stopped very soon after having begun to move. The traffic was not backed up in the southbound lanes, as it was inRobinson v. Wong, and the timing of the vehicles stopping was inexplicable from his vantage point. A careful driver would have reacted to the possibility that a left-turning vehicle, a pedestrian, or some other hazard was still in the intersection.
 I find that Mr. Bahniwal was in breach of his duty of care, and allocate liability 10% to him and 90% to Mr. Fichten.

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