Source: https://mirickrealestatelawblog.com/
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 00:50:47+00:00

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The Massachusetts Department of Environmental Protection (MassDEP) announced proposed revisions to the Massachusetts Contingency Plan (310 CMR 40.0000). This begins a 3-month public comment period that will end July 19, 2019, and will include four public hearings.
the addition of RCs and Method 1 standards for six perfluoroalkyl substances—Perfluoroheptanoic Acid (PFHpA), Perfluorohexanesulfonic Acid (PFHxS), Perfluorooctanoic Acid (PFOA), Perfluorooctane Sulfonate (PFOS), Perfluorononanoic Acid (PFNA) and Perfluorodecanoic Acid (PFDA)—emerging contaminants of concern for exposure in drinking water.
Perhaps the most meaningful and groundbreaking revision is the last – a proposed RC for PFAS. PFAS are a family of emerging contaminants best known for their widespread use in firefighting foam and waterproofing and “non-stick” coatings. Some observers have called PFAS a “coming tsunami” in environmental law. Massachusetts’ experience with PFAS is not uncommon – according to MassDEP, at least 14 Massachusetts public water sources have had PFAS detections to date. Expect more detections as standards are set and testing becomes more widespread.
A further primer on PFAS will have to wait for another post, but the takeaway is that MassDEP has set an aggressive RC of 20 parts per trillion (0.02 ug/L, or ppt) for six PFAS chemicals combined. By way of comparison, in May 2016, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) issued a lifetime Health Advisory of 70 ppt for the combination of two PFAS chemicals, PFOS and PFOA, in drinking water. More than two dozen other states have proposed rules addressing PFAS in various forms, although only New Jersey has set a binding drinking water standard of 13 ppt for PFNA. Massachusetts will shortly join that list. In addition to establishing an RC for PFAS under the MCP, expect a revised drinking water guideline to follow from MassDEP shortly.
Follow these pages for more updates as this story and public comment and hearing process unfolds.
EPA’s 57-page Interpretive Statement carefully details the agency’s position. EPA relies on the text of the CWA (focusing on broad review of the statute and the distinction it draws between navigable waters and groundwater, rather than a narrow reading of any particular provision), the legislative history of the CWA, and rulings from Fifth, Sixth and Seventh Circuits in Rice v. Harken Exploration Co., 250 F.3d 264 (5th Cir. 2001), Village of Oconomowoc Lake v. Dayton Hudson Corp., 24 F.3d 962 (7th Cir. 1994), and Kentucky Waterways Alliance v. Kentucky Utilities Co., 905 F.3d 925 (6th Cir. 2018).
I think EPA has the better side of this argument and offers a more faithful reading of the CWA and its legislative history. While the distinction between navigable waters and groundwater might appear arbitrary from a regulatory standpoint, there’s little doubt the CWA makes and Congress intended that distinction. The Interpretive Statement, not surprisingly, also reflects the strong emphasis that EPA Administrator Wheeler has placed on “cooperative federalism” – that certain issues are the appropriate subject of federal regulation while others are purposely left to the states.
Two recent rulings address the issue of whether a landfill is a “point source” under the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251 et seq. (CWA), Sierra Club v. Virginia Electric et al and Toxics Action Center et al v. Casella Waste Systems et al. While much of the attention in CWA litigation recently has focused on the scope of CWA jurisdiction over groundwater as “Waters of the United States,” the “point source” question is not one to be overlooked.
A little background: the CWA generally prohibits the “addition of any pollutant to navigable waters from any point source” without a permit. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(12) (emphasis added). “Navigable waters” are “the waters of the United States, including the territorial seas.” 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7). A “point source” includes “any discernible, confined and discrete conveyance, including but not limited to any pipe, ditch, channel, tunnel, conduit, well, discrete fissure, container, rolling stock, concentrated animal feeding operation, or vessel or other floating craft, from which pollutants are or may be discharged.” 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14).
More recently and closer to home, the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts (Hillman, J.) came to the same conclusion concerning the Southbridge Landfill in Toxics Action Center et al v. Casella Waste Systems et al. Like the Fourth Circuit, Judge Hillman did not decide whether a “hydrological connection” between groundwater and Waters of the U.S. is sufficient for CWA jurisdiction. Instead, citing the 4th Circuit’s decision in Sierra Club, the Court found CWA jurisdiction lacking because the landfill is not a discrete point source within the meaning of the CWA. Under the Court’s analysis, generalized diffusion through groundwater is insufficient to satisfy the requirement under the CWA that the discharge be from a discrete point source.
There is no doubt that litigants will continue to test the limits of CWA jurisdiction, both on the issues of Waters of the U.S. and the point source requirement. Sierra Club and Toxics Action Center signal a growing trend that alleged, non-discrete discharges from a landfill to groundwater are insufficient to satisfy the point source requirement for CWA jurisdiction.
NOTE: My firm and your humble author were counsel to the Town of Southbridge, a defendant in the Toxics Action Center case.
On Tuesday, the Appeals Court issued its opinion in Talmo v. Zoning Board of Appeals of Framingham. Massachusetts suffers no shortage of case law on standing (the right to file suit) in zoning appeals. In this case, the issue was whether the abutter’s “injury” was sufficient to create “standing” to appeal Framingham’s issuance of a building permit to his neighbor to convert a barn into “additional” living space. This otherwise routine standing case is notable for two reasons.
First, it’s a useful reminder that a fatally flawed case can remain fatally flawed, even if the opponent doesn’t press the issue at trial. Here, Land Court Judge Howard Speicher found sua sponte (without being asked to do so by the parties) that Talmo lacked standing to bring his appeal. Although Framingham had asserted a lack of standing as an affirmative defense, it never contested Talmo’s standing at trial. Nevertheless, Judge Speicher found Talmo had no injury sufficient to confer standing. Concluding that standing was a “jurisdictional prerequisite” to proceeding with the case, the Appeals Court affirmed.
Second, Talmo’s “presumptive” standing as an abutter was just that, a presumption. To have standing, the abutter’s injury must be more than speculative, and it must be different than the concerns of the rest of the community. In this instance, Talmo’s home was more than 250 feet from the offending barn and buffered by trees, boulders and other landscaping. The Court also rejected Talmo’s suggestion that his drinking water well was contaminated by the barn’s septic system. Based on those facts, Judge Speicher concluded, and the Appeals Court affirmed, that Talmo’s presumptive standing was rebutted by the facts, including Talmo’s own testimony.

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