Source: http://riverdeepbook.blogspot.com/2016/10/kelley-lynch-appeal-reply-brief-leonard.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 16:08:25+00:00

Document:
Appellant Kelley Lynch was Leonard Cohen’s personal manager, and worked in other capacities (although never as his business manager), for approximately seventeen years. As of October 2004, Cohen understood that Lynch had or planned to report allegations related to tax fraud to Internal Revenue Service, and demanded that she meet with him and his personal tax and corporate lawyer, Richard Westin, privately hand over corporate books and records, and assist with the unraveling of certain entities and transactions. Lynch refused. Lynch addressed the background information, and blatant retaliation, quite specifically in the declaration she submitted to the trial court supporting her motion for terminating sanctions (fraud upon the court). (Cohen Aug. 29 – 147, Unredacted.) The record includes: a six-volume clerk’s transcript (“CT”), two volume supplemental clerk’s transcript (“Supp. CT”), one volume augmented record (“Aug. CT”), Cohen’s motion to augment granted July 26, 2016 (“Cohen Aug.”), Lynch’s Opposition to Cohen’s Motion to Augment (“Lynch’s Opposition”), and all documents and records on file with this Court.
Respondents simply used their disingenuous argument, falsely alleging that Lynch did not “accurately present the record,” as an opportunity to reframe and reargue their case and the underlying merits of the motion for terminating sanctions itself. Additionally, Respondents’ Reply Brief was submitted to this Court a week late following two separate requests for extensions of time and should be disregarded in its entirety. With respect to Respondents position that Lynch did not present facts favorable to Respondents, Lynch will remind this court that her appeal relates to a motion addressing fraud upon the court. That fraud has now infested the appeal process itself. Lynch is under no legal or ethical obligation to advance fraudulent misrepresentations, perjured statements, or any type of deception into a legal proceeding. This is an unconscionable abuse of process.
Respondent’s Brief: Lynch has twice attacked the 2006 default judgment. The first time was a motion to vacate filed in 2013, in which claimed that she was never served with Cohen’s summons and complaint. (1 Supp. 1-100 [“2013 Motion”].) The trial court denied the motion with prejudice because Lynch did not establish that Cohen’s proof of service was false and did not demonstrate extrinsic fraud (1 CT 5; 5 CT 1159B, 1159G; Cohen Aug. 150, 153.) Lynch repackaged the same arguments in a 1,100 page “Motion for Terminating Sanctions” that she filed in 2015 (“2015 Motion”). (1 CT 6 – 5 CT 1133.) The court granted Cohen’s motion to seal some of Lynch’s evidence, and denied the 2015 Motion as “fundamentally flawed” because it was, in effect, a motion for reconsideration filed fourteen months after the court denied her 2013 Motion seeking equitable relief from the 2006 default judgment. The court concluded that Lynch did not show new or different facts, circumstances, or law, and without showing extrinsic fraud. (Cohen Aug. 150-156, 164.) RB 8-9.
Lynch did not “repackage” the arguments made in her 2013 Motion to Vacate when she submitted her 2015 Motion for Terminating Sanctions to the Court. Lynch’s 2013 Motion to Vacate argued that she was not served Cohen’s summons and complaint, the proof of service was evidence of extrinsic fraud, the court lacked jurisdiction over her, and the judgment was void. While these facts with respect to service, lack of jurisdiction, and the void judgment remained the same at the time Lynch filed her 2015 Motion for Terminating Sanctions, that motion addressed Respondents, and their attorneys, use of fraudulent misrepresentations, fabricated evidence, perjured statements, and other misconduct – committing fraud upon the court – in the legal pleadings and declarations submitted to the trial court in response to Lynch’s 2013 Motion to Vacate. (CT 6 – 34; 5 CT 34 – 1133). Void judgments are ineffective and unenforceable. County of San Diego v. Gorham (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 1215, 1226. For that reason, an order incorrectly denying relief from a void judgment is also void, as it gives effect to the judgment. Carlson v. Eassa (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 684, 691.
Respondents’ themselves have argued: “A factual presentation that is ‘but an attempt to reargue on appeal those factual issues decided adversely to the trial level … is doomed to fail.” In re Marriage of Davenport (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 1507. Nevertheless, twenty-three pages out of the forty-two page Reply Brief restate and reargue Respondents’ case and attempt to argue the merits of the underlying case.
Due to the fact that Leonard Cohen and his legal team have transmitted the extensive fraudulent and perjured legal pleadings and declarations in this case to Internal Revenue Service, Franchise Tax Board, and other authorities, Lynch will privately address the fraudulent misrepresentations and blatantly false statements that now infest this appeal with those authorities. Respondents have also used their new case statement to insert unrelated matters, such as the settlement with Richard Westin, into their Brief. Lynch assumes they are attempting to include that and other unrelated matters in future res judicata and/or claims preclusion arguments. This is another tactic Respondents have used against Lynch.
In addition to wielding its inherent power, there are other vehicles – including dismissal - by which a court may sanction a bad faith litigant. Cases involving such nefarious litigation conduct have been decided by the United States Supreme Court. For example, in Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238 (1944), the plaintiff obtained a patent by concocting a fraudulent trade journal article praising its glass-making device as “revolutionary.” The article was used to persuade the Patent Office to issue a patent. The plaintiff then relied on the fraudulent article to obtain a judgment for patent infringement against a business competitor. In the instant case, Respondents have used their complaint, other legal pleadings and declarations signed under the oath of perjury, to fraudulently persuade the court to enter default judgment against Lynch. The default judgment wrongfully converted Lynch’s property, the property of corporations (including at least two suspended corporations), to Leonard Cohen and his wholly owned LC Investments, LLC. Leonard Cohen then used the fraudulent legal pleadings and declarations to persuade Internal Revenue Service and Franchise Tax Board to accept Cohen’s tax returns, amend others, and apply for and obtain fraudulent tax refunds. However, in this case, Lynch was not served the summons and complaint and there is indeed extrinsic fraud, and now perjury, with respect to the proof of service.
When the fraud in Hazel Atlas was uncovered, the U.S. Supreme Court set aside the judgment. Justice Hugo Black, addressing the plaintiff’s manipulation of the judicial process, explained the legal rationale as follows: Tampering with the administration of justice in the manner indisputably shown here involves far more than an injury to a single litigant. It is a wrong against the institutions set up to protect and safeguard the public, institutions in which fraud cannot complacently be tolerated consistently with the good order of society. Hazel-Atlas, 322 U.S. at 246. For approximately 80 years now, the U.S. Supreme Court has illuminated the appropriate legal remedy for holding the unscrupulous litigant accountable. The opinion did not refer to the distinction between extrinsic or intrinsic fraud.
It is well established that a trial court may use its inherent power to sanction parties that intentionally abuse the litigation process, such as those who perpetrate fraud on the court. See Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 46 (1991). Because this kind of fraud is so insidious, the penalties a court may impose on a bad faith litigant who attempts to defile the sanctity of the judicial process are justifiably stiff and include sanctions of dismissal and default. See Aoude v. Mobil Oil Corp., 892 F.2d 1115, 1119-20, 1122 (1st Cir. 1989) (“Appellant chose to play fast and loose with [defendant] and with the district court. He was caught out . . . Appellant’s brazen conduct merited so extreme a sanction . . . and the court, jealous of its integrity and concerned about deterrence, was entitled to send a message, loud and clear”).
When fraud has been discovered and exposed, the consequences ought to be severe enough to inhibit and repel repetition rather than serving to reward the abusive litigant. The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit skillfully defined the concept of fraud upon the court in Aoude, supra at 1118, as follows: A ‘fraud on the court’ occurs where it can be demonstrated, clearly and convincingly, that a party has sentiently set in motion some unconscionable scheme calculated to interfere with the judicial system's ability impartially to adjudicate a matter by improperly influencing the trier or unfairly hampering the presentation of the opposing party's claim or defense.
When fraud upon the court is demonstrated, a trial court has the inherent power to take action in response to the fraudulent conduct. As the U.S. Supreme Court concluded, in Hazel Atlas, dismissal of claims or an entire action may be warranted by the fraud.
specifically addressing fraud upon the court. Her motion addressed the egregious use of fraudulent misrepresentations, perjured statements, and blatantly false accusations in the documents and declarations submitted to the trial court in response to Lynch’s motion to vacate. Lynch has continuously maintained that she was not served the summons and complaint, the proof of service is evidence of extrinsic fraud, the court did not obtain jurisdiction over her, and the original default judgment is void. She has also maintained that all judgments emanating from the original void order are void as well. That would include, but is not limited to, the trial court’s January 17, 2014 decision. A void judgment is appealable.
Although certain post-judgment orders are appealable (see § 904.2, subd. (a)(2)), “not every post-judgment order that follows a final appealable judgment is appealable.” Lakin v. Watkins Associated Industries (1993) 6 Cal.4th 644, 651. A post-judgment order is appealable if it satisfies two additional requirements, one of which is “that the issues raised by the appeal from the order must be different from those arising from an appeal from the judgment” … “The reason for this general rule is that to allow the appeal from [an order raising the same issues as those raised by the judgment] would have the effect of allowing two appeals from the same ruling and might in some cases permit circumvention of the time limitations for appealing from the judgment.” (Ibid.) There was no appeal from either the original default judgment or the January 17, 2014 decision.
Witkin describes four exceptions to the general rule that an order denying a motion to vacate is non-appealable. (9 Witkin, Cal. Procedure, supra, Appeal §§ 198–201, pp. 274–278.) An order may be appealable if (1) there is no effective appeal from the judgment, (2) the appellant was not an original party to the action, (3) the motion to vacate is authorized by statute, or (4) the motion seeks to vacate a void judgment. (Ibid.) At least two of the exceptions apply in this case.
In her motion for terminating sanctions (fraud upon the court), Lynch moved to set aside the May 15, 2006 default judgment and all resulting judgments. She argued the original default judgment, and all decisions emanating therefrom, were void due to lack of service. Lynch’s argument, in her Opening Brief, set forth the fact that the trial court lacked fundamental jurisdiction to act and/or that it acted outside the scope of its jurisdiction. Therefore, Lynch has presented arguments that the order is appealable which include the trial court’s lack of jurisdiction.
An important consideration in any appeal is the applicable standard of review. The California Supreme Court has described the standard as “whether the trial court exceeded the bounds of reason.” See Shamblin v. Brittain, 44 Cal.3d 474, 478 (1988). Other courts have offered similar definitions—as one court put it, an abuse of discretion occurs only when “it can fairly be said that no judge would reasonably make the same order under the same circumstances.” In re Marriage of Lopez, 38 Cal.App.3d 93, 114 (1974). The varying definitions have evidently led to heavy criticism. One appellate court complained that the abuse of discretion standard is “so amorphous as to mean everything and nothing at the same time and be virtually useless as an analytic tool.” Hurtado v. Statewide Home Loan Company, 167 Cal.App.3d 1019, 1022 (1985). Another court noted that such “pejorative boilerplate is misleading since it implies that in every case in which a trial court is reversed for abuse of discretion its action was utterly irrational.” City of Sacramento v. Drew, 207 Cal.App.3d 1287, 1297 (1989).
The court in City of Sacramento v. Drew, concluded: very little of general significance can be said about discretion. The discretion of a trial judge is not a whimsical, uncontrolled power, but a legal discretion, which is subject to the limitations of legal principles governing the subject of its action, and to reversal on appeal where no reasonable basis for the action is shown. Westside Community for Independent Living, Inc. v. Obledo (1988) 33 Cal. 3d 348, 355 [188 Cal. Rptr. 873, 657 P.2d 365], citing to 6 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (2d ed. 1971) Appeal, § 244. The scope of discretion always resides in the particular law being applied, i.e., in the legal principles governing the subject of [the] action .... Action that transgresses the confines of the applicable principles of law is outside the scope of discretion and we call such action an “abuse” of discretion. (See Hurtado, supra, 167 Cal.App.3d at p. 1022.) If the trial [207 Cal. App. 3d 1298] court is mistaken about the scope of its discretion, the mistaken position may be “reasonable,” i.e., one as to which reasonable judges could differ. (See, e.g., the majority and dissenting opinions in Baggett v. Gates, supra, 32 Cal. 3d 128.) But if the trial court acts in accord with its mistaken view the action is nonetheless error; it is wrong on the law. The legal principles that govern the subject of discretionary action vary greatly with context. (See Hurtado, supra, 167 Cal.App.3d at p. 1023.) They are derived from the common law or statutes under which discretion is conferred.
Here the principles are embodied in a question of equity. The court exercises not only statutory but also common law and equity jurisdiction. Courts have inherent equity, supervisory and administrative powers. Bauguess v. Paine (1978) 22 Cal. 3d 626, 635 [150 Cal. Rptr. 461, 586 P.2d 942]) as well as inherent power to control litigation before them. Western Steel & Ship Repair, Inc. v. RMI, Inc. (1986) 176 Cal. App. 3d 1108, 1116-1117 [222 Cal. Rptr. 556]. Inherent powers of the court are derived from the state Constitution and are not confined by or dependent on statute. Walker v. Superior Court (1991) 53 Cal. 3d 257, 267 [279 Cal. Rptr. 576, 807 P.2d 418].
The pertinent question is whether the grounds given by the court for its denial of Lynch’s motion for terminating sanctions were appropriate given the fact that her motion was not a motion for reconsider and specifically addressed fraud upon the court. The trial court erroneously applied the incorrect legal standard, and erred in its interpretation of the facts, when construing Lynch’s motion addressing fraud upon the court as a motion to reconsider.
It has generally been stated that “the acts for which a court of equity will on account of fraud set aside or annul a judgment or decree between the same parties rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction have relation to frauds extrinsic or collateral to the matter tried by the first court, and not to a fraud in the matter on which the decree was rendered.” United States v. Throckmorton, 98 U. S. 61, 68 (1878). There is little doubt that the majority state rule is that the only type of fraud for which a court of equity will upset a judgment is extrinsic fraud; that intrinsic fraud does not afford ground for relief. a Cf. RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS, § 126 with § 121. See FREEMAN, JUDGMENTS, § 1233; 3 Moore, FEDERAL PRACTICE, (1st ed. 1938), § 60.03; 126 A.L.R. 386. Extrinsic fraud is illustrated by McGuinness v. Superior Court, 196 Cal. 222, 237 Pac. 42 (1925), where the fraud alleged was the failure to notify interested parties of the pendency of a suit.
The U.S. Supreme Court has rendered decisions, in Hazel-Atlas and Throckmorton, that have concluded that dependent upon the facts, extrinsic and intrinsic fraud constitute grounds for setting aside a judgment. The allegations of Lynch’s motion for terminating sanctions clearly stated claims related to fraud on the court. The trial court identified the incorrect legal rule to apply to the relief requested. Lynch requested appropriate relief for both the extrinsic and intrinsic fraud. With respect to the intrinsic fraud, Lynch asked the trial court to refer Cohen and his lawyers, Robert Kory and Michelle Rice, to the District Attorney for perjury prosecutions and the State Bar for disciplinary actions.
United States Supreme Court precedent confirms that the court retains the power to set aside a judgment that defiles our system of justice. The integrity of the civil litigation process depends on truthful disclosure of facts. A system that depends on an adversary’s ability to uncover falsehoods is doomed to failure, which is why this kind of conduct must be discouraged in the strongest possible way. A court’s inherent power to vacate a judgment procured by fraud “fulfills a universally recognized need for correcting injustices which, in certain instances, are deemed sufficiently gross to demand a departure from rigid adherence” to the rule that a final judgment is typically binding and final. Hazel- Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co. In Hazel-Atlas, the Supreme Court recognized that relief from a judgment obtained by fraud on the court is warranted even where the underlying action settled. 322 U.S. at 243. The Supreme Court stated: “Every element of the fraud here disclosed demands the exercise of the historic power of equity to set aside fraudulently begotten judgments.” Id. at 245. The majority ruled that relief was warranted despite Hazel’s apparent lack of diligence in raising the fraud sooner. Id. at 245-46. The proper focus is the “integrity of the judicial process” itself. See id. at 246.
Respondents have perpetrated an unconscionable plan or scheme to defraud the court and defile our system of justice. Hazel Atlas, 322 U.S. at 250. The fraud upon the court is based on the parties’ overall course of conduct as well as separate acts of malfeasance and warrant relief from judgment. Because the focus with respect to fraud upon the court is on the court itself, focusing on whether the consequence of that fraud is final between the parties misapprehends the nature of the question presented.
otherwise the point is waived. Foreman & Clark Corp. v. Fallon (1971) 3 Cal.3d 875, 881. “When a party does not present evidence favorable to the respondent, the appellate court may presume the record contains evidence to sustain every finding of fact by the trial court.” Doe v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Cashel & Emily (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 209, 218. Lynch’s “Statement of the Case” presents only Lynch’s version of the evidence and omits the conflicting evidence favorable to Cohen that supports the trial court’s findings. (AOB 1-3.) Instead, Lynch tries to reargue the facts already decided against her. For example, Lynch continues to assert, as she did in both her 2013 and 2015 Motions, that she “was not served the summons and complaint or legally notified of the entry of the default judgment (AOB 1.) But Lynch cites merely to the proof of service, without identifying any record evidence to support her contention, while avoiding the Edelman declaration that Cohen submitted to show all the details of service and notice. (AOB 1-3; see 1 Supp. CT 136 – 2 Supp. CT 201.) RB 27.
Lynch’s Opening Brief addressed evidence favorable to Leonard Cohen. It also referred the Appellate Court to the entire record as the evidence submitted to the trial court, while substantial, supports her argument that the proceedings were tainted by fraudulent misrepresentations, perjured statements, and blatantly false accusations. Lynch’s Opening Brief addressed the fact that Leonard Cohen and Michelle Rice submitted declarations to the trial court arguing that Lynch was the “Jane Doe” who was subserved. (AOB 10.) Lynch was not the individual subserved. No female co-occupant existed. Lynch and her son, John Rutger Penick, know of no such individual, and Respondents did not provide the court with any evidence whatsoever related to the “Jane Doe.” They argued that Lynch was the Jane Doe although she did not resemble the individual described in the proof of service.
Furthermore, Lynch’s Opening Brief referred to approximately six (6) declarations submitted to the trial court rebutting the allegations that she resembled the individual in the proof of service, was in fact the Jane Doe who was allegedly subserved, had a female co-occupant, or was in fact served and/or subserved. See Declarations of Joan Lynch Declaration (CT 184-255), John Rutger Penick (CT 257-260), Paulette Brandt (CT 262-274), Clea Surkhang (Westphal) (CT 276-277), Palden Ronge (CT 279-281), and Daniel J. Meade (CT 283 – 287), and CT 1215 - 1345. Ann Diamond’s declaration (CT 1327 – 1333) addressed the fact that, as a former friend and lover of Leonard Cohen’s, she understands that Cohen makes false accusations about others, relies on gossip to advance his cause, moves offensively to destroy people when forced to confront troubling situations, is a “skilled fabricator,” and is a “master manipulator … [who] becomes ruthless and will go to great lengths to see you neutralized and destroyed.” Lynch also submitted a declaration (CT 1217 - 1260) in support of her motion for terminating sanctions. All seven (7) declarations, submitted to the trial court in support of Lynch’s motion for terminating sanctions, have been submitted to this court and can be reviewed at CT 1215-1345. The record contains evidence to sustain Lynch’s argument that her motion is not a motion to reconsider, she was not served the summons and complaint, and intrinsic and extrinsic fraud are not mutually exclusive. Scott Edelman’s declaration does not “show all the details of service and notice.” His statements with respect to Chad Knaak’s phone call are entirely hearsay and should be disregarded in their entirety. Furthermore, the hearsay statements of Edelman’s assistant are inaccurate. Lynch’s email to Edelman stated: “If you try to serve this fraudulent lawsuit on me one more time, I will hold you personally responsible for mental duress.” (2 Supp. CT 152) Individuals who are properly served do not inform people that “If you try to serve this fraudulent lawsuit” and inform opposing parties, and their representatives, repeatedly and consistently that they were not served. Cohen, a wealthy individual with a team of professional lawyers, had every opportunity to serve Lynch. He simply elected not to.
Additionally, Lynch’s Opening Brief, as stated above, addressed the declarations used to support the motion for terminating sanctions. Paulette Brandt’s declaration confirmed that she was at Lynch’s home on August 24, 2005 (the day the process server allegedly subserved “Jane Doe”), was present for Chad Knaak’s call to Edelman’s office, heard Chad inform Edelman’s office that Lynch was not served, and heard Lynch advise Chad to further inform Edelman that she had reported allegations that Cohen committed tax fraud to IRS and viewed the lawsuit as retaliation. (RT 1279.) Rutger Penick’s initial declaration confirmed that he resided with Lynch, they did not have a female co-occupant; he knew of no individual who resembled Jane Doe; no one was advised to evade service; he personally was home on August 24, 2005 (the day the process server alleged to have served “Jane Doe”), he was present when Lynch came into his room (where he and Chad were) and asked Chad to phone Cohen’s lawyer and advise him that she had not been served and if Edelman attempted to serve the lawsuit, Lynch would hold him personally accountable. Rutger Penick’s declaration also confirmed that, since 2005, Lynch has consistently maintained that she was not served Cohen’s lawsuit and he was personally present on numerous occasions when Lynch phoned Cohen’s lawyers to discuss the fact that she was not served and they simply hung up on her. Rutger’s declaration (RT 1299 – 1301.) Lynch submitted sufficient evidence to the trial court with respect to the extrinsic fraud re. the proof of service. Cohen and Rice have merely perjured themselves, in their declarations, in their attempts to argue that Lynch was the “Jane Doe” who was served. She was not and, as of August 24, 2005, Cohen had not seen Lynch since October 2004 and Rice had not met Lynch.
Respondents’ Brief: The appellant must identify where in the record evidence appears to support her contentions … The opening briefly repeatedly makes factual contentions without record citations. For example, the factual assertions on page 2 of Lynch’s opening brief are not supported by any record references. Instead, Lynch refers to matters outside the record, such as another default judgment entered against her in a separate case Cohen had brought against her for return of his personal and business records.
Equitable relief from default judgment may be granted where a party was prevented from participating in the action due to an extrinsic mistake of a third party, and this denied the party a fair hearing. See e.g., Kulchar v. Kulchar (1969) 1 Cal.3d 467, 472; Cruz v. Fagor America, Inc. (2006) 146 Cal.App.4th 488, 502; Marriage of Park (1980) 27 Cal.3d 337, 342; Sporn v. Home Depot USA, Inc., 126 Cal.App.4th 1294, 1300 (relief from default with evidence that papers were lost).
The Appellate Court, in Rochin v. Pat Johnson Manufacturing Co., (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1228. 51, held that a void judgment is subject to attack at any time and any subsequent order denying a party’s motion to vacate, giving effect to a void judgment, is itself void.
A judgment void on its face because rendered when the court lacked personal or subject matter jurisdiction or exceeded its jurisdiction in granting relief which the court had no power to grant, is subject to collateral attack at any time. See County of Ventura v. Tillett (1982) 133 Cal.App.3d 105, 110, 183 Cal.Rptr. 741; disapproved of on other grounds by County of Los Angeles v. Soto (1984) 35 Cal.3d 483, 198 Cal.Rptr. 779, 674 P.2d 750; see also Security Pac. Nat. Bank v. Lyon (1980) 165 Cal.Rptr. 95, 105 Cal.App.3d Supp. 8, 13.) An attack on a void judgment may also be direct, since a court has inherent power, apart from statute, to correct its records by vacating a judgment which is void on its face, for such a judgment is a nullity and may be ignored. Olivera v. Grace (1942) 19 Cal.2d 570, 574, 122 P.2d 564. See Rochin v. Pat Johnson Manufacturing Co.
The doctrine of res judicata is inapplicable to void judgments. “Obviously a judgment, though final and on the merits, has no binding force and is subject to collateral attack if it is wholly void for lack of jurisdiction of the subject matter or person, and perhaps for excess of jurisdiction, or where it is obtained by extrinsic fraud.” (7 Witkin, Cal. Procedure, supra, Judgment, § 286, p. 828.) See Rochin v. Pat Johnson Manufacturing Co.
As discussed above, the amended judgment was void and of no effect … In addition, the trial court's subsequent order denying plaintiff's motion to vacate the amended judgment, in that it gives effect to a void judgment, is itself void. County of Ventura v. Tillett, supra, 133 Cal.App.3d at p. 110, 183 Cal.Rptr. 741. “While defendants are correct in stating that the order denying the motion to vacate was itself appealable, plaintiff's failure to appeal from it, thus allowing it to become final, makes no difference. A ‘final’ but void order can have no preclusive effect. ‘A void judgment [or order] is, in legal effect, no judgment. By it no rights are divested. From it no rights can be obtained. Being worthless in itself, all proceedings founded upon it are equally worthless. It neither binds nor bars any one.’” Bennett v. Wilson (1898) 122 Cal. 509, 513-514, 55 P. 390. See Rochin v. Pat Johnson Manufacturing Co.
Code of Civil Procedure section 1008, subdivision (a) provides that, within 10 days after service of the order, a party may make a motion to reconsider “based upon new or different facts, circumstances, or law.” “A party seeking reconsideration also must provide a satisfactory explanation for the failure to produce the evidence at an earlier time.” New York Times Co. v. Superior Court (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 206, 212.
Court: Ms. Lynch, this is your motion for terminating and other sanctions. This action was originally filed many years ago in about 2005, and as a – among other things, a Complaint for breach of fiduciary duty against you. And a default judgment was entered against you on May 15, 2006, and that default judgment has been subsisting since that time. In August of 2013, you filed a Motion to Vacate and/or Modify Default Judgment, and that was eventually heard on January 17th, 2014. And in that motion, you argued that the judgment is void and dismissal was mandatory because there was no jurisdiction over you because you had never properly been served with summons and complaint. And at the conclusion of that hearing, the motion to vacate was denied with prejudice on a variety of grounds, among other things, that it was procedurally deficient because it did not – it wasn’t properly served on Plaintiffs, your own declaration was unsigned, that you had not acted with diligence in bringing the motion to vacate because you said you found out about the action in April of 2010 but did not seek to have this set aside until August 2013. You bore the burden of persuasion that the Proof of Service was false, and you had not carried that burden of proof because you had failed to produce any evidence of that beyond an unsigned declaration by yourself and a signed declaration by your son that said only that you were home at all times during 2005. And you did not demonstrate extrinsic fraud because you conceded you were living in the home where the request – where the Notice of Request for Default was sent, and that you were home when the process server attempted to serve you on the six occasions - before subserving the Jane Doe. Now, when the court made that order, at that point you had a couple of options, and one of those was to let it go, and the second was to take an appeal.
Lynch: This is not a motion to reconsider. This is a motion addressing fraud upon the court which was used to obtain the default judgment. I was not served. I was home. No one came to my house.
Court: We have adjudicated that already.
Lynch: But it was obtained through fraud upon the court. There’s tremendous perjury, fraudulent misrepresentations, and other things I’ve addressed.
Court: Ma’am, if I remember correctly, the proof of service on the underlying case was filed – was signed by the California Registered Processor, and under Evidence Code Section 647, the Affidavit of Service by a Registered Process Server carries a presumption of correctness that affects the burden of producing evidence. It is not conclusive, but it affects the burden of producing evidence, and it requires you, the person who is – who is challenging that service, to persuade me that it is incorrect. It is – there is no doubt whatsoever that you were living at the residence where the service was attempting to be made.
Court: The – the process server’s declaration did not say that you were personally served.
Lynch: Well, there was no other female co-occupant there, apart from Paulette.
Court: The process server’s declaration says that a Jane Doe came to the door and then – and they subserved the Jane Doe after multiple attempts to serve you, and thereafter it was mailed.
Lynch: Well, plaintiffs are arguing it was me, first of all.
Lynch: But there was no [male] co-occupant, and no one has been identified, and I was home at all times. My son, Rutger, lived with me, and his friend Chad Knaak at that point was staying with us. On the morning where I was alleged served, Paulette Brandt who is over here was with me. No one came to my house. So it is conceivable that a process server lied or simply didn’t come there.
Court: It is, but you have to – it affects the burden of producing evidence, and unfortunately you had the opportunity to present that in 2013, when you filed that motion in August 2013.
Court: Did you get the summons and complaint in the mail?
Lynch: I still don’t know if your order was entered. I mean, I was in jail. I got out of jail. Jeffrey Korn had sent me an email on January 22nd saying I would like you to approve or comment on this. When I got out of jail a number of months later, I called him. He said he would serve me; I never received anything. I don’t even know if an order was filed. It’s not on LA Superior Court’s website. And he refused to serve me anything, which is pretty fascinating.
Court: Is there anything else you would like to add?
“Compliance with the statutory procedures for service of process is essential to establish personal jurisdiction. Thus, a default judgment entered against a defendant who was not served with a summons in the manner prescribed by statute is void.” Dill v. Berquist Construction Co., 24 Cal.App.4th at p. 1444, 29 Cal.Rptr.2d 746. Lynch has consistently maintained that Respondents failed to comply with the statutory requirements for service of process, the court has no jurisdiction over her, and the default judgment is void as are all judgments or decisions emanating therefrom.
Code of Civil Procedure Section 415.20, subdivision (b), provides that if a copy of the summons and complaint “cannot with reasonable diligence be personally delivered to the person to be served” as specified in Section 416.60, 416.70, 416.80, or 416.90, they may instead be served by leaving a copy of each at the person’s “usual place of abode” … in the presence of a competent member of the household or person apparently in charge … and thereafter mailing a copy of the summons and of the complaint by first class mail” to the person to be served at the address where the documents were left.
Lynch has disputed service of the summons and complaint. (AOB 10-11.) Lynch had no female co-occupant, Respondents have identified no such individual, Respondents have falsely argued that Lynch was the Jane Doe, and Lynch did not resemble the individual described in the proof of service. See Declarations of Joan Lynch Declaration (CT 184-255), John Rutger Penick (CT 257-260), Paulette Brandt (CT 262-274), Clea Surkhang (Westphal) (CT 276-277), Palden Ronge (CT 279-281), and Daniel J. Meade (CT 283 – 287). The declarations, personally signed by all declarants, can be reviewed at CT 1215-1345.
Respondents argue, in their Reply Brief, that “the court also discredited Lynch’s statement that the person who accepted the complaint was not Lynch herself and found that Lynch had actual notice of the request for entry of default.” (5 CT 1158-1159B). The trial court informed Lynch, at the June 23, 2015 hearing, as follows: Court: “The – the process server’s declaration did not say that you were personally served.” (Cohen Aug. 154) That statement does not indicate that the Court determined that the person who accepted the complaint was Lynch. No one at Lynch’s home, including Lynch herself, was served.
On appeal from an order denying a motion to vacate a judgment, the reviewing court “will not revisit the trial court’s factual determination if supported by substantial evidence,” and will not second guess the trial court’s credibility findings. Conseco Marketing, LLC v. IFA & Ins. Services, Inc. (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 831, 841.
“A trial court may ․ vacate a default on equitable grounds even if statutory relief is unavailable.” Rappleyea v. Campbell (1994) 8 Cal.4th 975, 981, 35 Cal.Rptr.2d 669, 884 P.2d 126. Appellant has carried the burden of proving that she is entitled to equitable relief. Moghaddam v. Bone (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 283, 290-291, 47 Cal.Rptr.3d 602. Lynch’s Opening Brief extensively addressed the trial court’s equitable powers and explains how the general principles apply to the specific facts of this case.
Respondents’ Brief: From the date the process server left eh summons and complaint with “Jane Doe,” Lynch has repeatedly demonstrated that she had notice of the action. These demonstrations began the afternoon of the substituted service of the summons and complaint at Lynch’s residence with the call to Edelman’s office from Chad, threatening to assert mental duress if Edelman persisted in trying to serve Lynch (1 Supp. CT 138), followed by emails from Lynch. (2 Supp. CT 152.) Lynch subsequently emailed Edelman to say she would not attend the case management conference. (1 Supp. 139; 2 Supp. CT 154.) Lynch does not deny receiving Edelman’s notices or sending responsive emails. RB 36-37.
The above statements from Respondents’ Reply Brief misstate the facts and evidence. On March 17, 2015, Lynch submitted a declaration to the trial court in support of her motion for terminating sanctions (fraud upon the court). That declaration, among other things, addressed the perjured statements and misrepresentations in the declarations of Leonard Cohen, Michelle Rice, Robert Kory, and Kevin Prins (Kory’s declaration reintroduced Prins’ declaration into response documents related to Lynch’s motion to vacate). CT 985 – 1025. With respect to Edelman’s declaration, and the call Chad Knaak placed to Edelman’s office, Lynch’s declaration addressed the fact that all statements Edelman made with respect to his assistant were hearsay, Lynch was not served the summons and complaint and the proof of service was evidence of extrinsic fraud, why she refused to provide a declaration from Chad Knaak (ongoing criminal harassment with respect to her son, John Rutger Penick, and others), Lynch’s confirmation that she was not served and if Edelman attempted to serve her she would hold Gibson, Dunn accountable for mental duress, the fact that the LA Times brought Cohen’s lawsuit to her attention, and the fact that Edelman did not have the legal authority to serve her by email (including re. the notice default judgment and all documents attached to his emails, sent while Lynch was homeless, that she could not open, download, read, review, or print, and attending any hearing would be preposterous as Lynch was unaware of the actual allegations set forth in Cohen’s Complaint. CT 1021 – 1025.
process. Lynch repeatedly contacted Respondents and their attorneys with respect to their failure to serve her. The news accounts did not provide Lynch with the allegations set forth in the complaint. A motion to set aside a judgment may be brought at any time despite a statutory time bar where a party is able to establish that default was obtained through extrinsic fraud. In re Marriage of Melton (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 931, 937. “Extrinsic fraud occurs when a party is deprived of the opportunity to present a claim or defense to the court as a result of being kept in ignorance or in some other manner being fraudulently prevented by the opposing party from fully participating in the proceeding.” County of San Diego v. Gorham (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 1215, 1228-1229. Extrinsic fraud is distinguishable from intrinsic fraud, “[which] goes to the merits of the prior proceeding and is ‘not a valid ground for setting aside a judgment when the party has been given notice of the action and has had an opportunity to present his case and to protect himself from any mistake or fraud of his adversary but has unreasonably neglected to do so. Such a claim of fraud goes to the merits of the prior proceeding which the moving party should have guarded against at the time.” In re Margarita D. (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 1288, 1295. “Because of the strong public policy in favor of the finality of judgments, equitable relief from a default judgment or order is available only in exceptional circumstances.” (Gorham, supra, at pp. 1229-1230.) The trial court’s denial of equitable relief was an abuse of discretion. Lynch’s Opening Brief addressed her claims of extrinsic fraud. With respect to the intrinsic fraud, Lynch believes – particularly based on the quasi-criminal nature of allegations related to “misappropriation” – that she had a right to confront the fabricated evidence used against her, fraudulent misrepresentations alleged in the legal pleadings, and perjured statements submitted to the court in declarations by Respondent and his representatives.
“An essential principle of due process is that a deprivation of life, liberty, or property be preceded by notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case.” See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 542 (1985). The court had the discretion to allow oral testimony and an opportunity for cross-examination. The documentary evidence was incapable of replacing oral testimony. See Rosenthal v. Great W. Fin. Securities Corp. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 394, 18 414.
The failure to permit live testimony, confrontation, and cross-examination was an abuse of discretion, caused by errors on the part of the court’s personnel, and deprived Lynch of the right to a fair hearing. In the hearing on the motion to vacate, Lynch was further prejudiced by the trial court’s position that her declaration was unsigned. Lynch authorized her former appellate attorney to sign her declaration and he elected to transform her declaration and case history into a declaration, Exhibit A, and signed on her behalf. The refusal to permit live testimony, confrontation, and cross-examination deprived Lynch of due process.
The default judgment language is itself entirely fraudulent. Lynch had a legal interest in Blue Mist Touring Company, Inc., Traditional Holdings, LLC, and Old Ideas, LLC. The trial court wrongfully converted Lynch’s property, and the property of corporations (including at least two suspended corporations), to Leonard Cohen and his wholly owned LC Investments, LLC. (AOB 14.) Lynch was excluded from attorney/client privileged by Cohen who intentionally wrapped Richard Westin and Neal Greenberg, his representatives, into attorney/client privilege with him. (6 CT 1219.) At no time was Lynch informed that any of the documents under seal were privileged communications. To the extent that any allegedly privileged or confidential information was provided to Lynch, which she in turn relied on with respect to her federal and state tax returns and in other ways, the privilege was waived. Furthermore, Lynch’s communications to Cohen and his representatives, including those arguing that the corporations did not have offices or clarifying her role in certain transactions, K-1s, and corporate documents themselves are not Cohen’s privileged or confidential communications. Lynch’s Opposition, filed with this Court on July 11, 2016 addressed this more fully and attached a Crime Waiver Exception schedule. That declaration, redacted by order of the trial court, and portions of the evidence attached thereto, sealed by order of the trial court, is evidence related to a federal and state tax controversy, all evidence supporting the declaration is evidence related to that controversy, and the Crime Waiver Exception schedule should be taken into consideration with respect to the sealing of Lynch’s declaration and evidence.
Respondents argue, in their Reply Brief, that certain documents (corresponding to Exhibits OO, QQ and RR to Lynch’s Declaration) were not sealed by the trial court. Based upon an order that includes evidence grouped together, and imprecise underlining, Lynch is unable to discern precisely what is under seal. She has received Respondents’ Request for Judicial Notice, filed one day after Respondents filed their late Brief, but is unable to determine what the precise issue is. It is Lynch’s understanding that Leonard Cohen’s declaration in the CAK bond deal litigation before the Southern District of New York was in fact submitted to the Court. Lynch does not agree with Respondents position regarding what was or was not sealed by the federal courts and finds the argument that documents left unsealed for ten to fifteen years – and currently available through Pacer, Southern District of New York, and U.S. District Court in Colorado – totally unavailing. As Respondent’s Brief was over one week late, and the Request for Judicial Notice filed a day after the late Brief, Lynch asks this Court to strike the request from the record.
As for the Motion allegedly Lodging the proposed order related to the January 17, 2014 hearing, that information is not on LA Superior Court’s website and the Court itself recently confirmed that it is not in their database. In any event, Lynch was incarcerated when Respondents allegedly served this document upon her, was not served, and – after her release from LA County Jail (related to the fraud domestic violence order), Lynch attempted to have Cohen’s lawyer, Jeffrey Korn serve the document on her but he, in keeping with all of Cohen’s lawyers and their conduct towards Lynch, refused to communicate with or serve Lynch. San Diego v. Gorham addressed lack of service upon an inmate and that case would most definitely apply to this situation.
Respondents’ Brief: Regardless of whether the sealing order was proper, that is irrelevant to the fundamental question of whether lynch is entitled to equitable relief from the 2006 default judgment. The few documents that Lynch claims were improperly sealed have nothing to do with the reasons Lynch offers for setting aside the 2006 default judgment.
The trial court has absolutely no jurisdiction to seal these documents. Lynch has consistently maintained that the court lacked jurisdiction due to the fact that she was not served the summons and complaint or notified of entry of default judgment. Respondents are the individuals, through the documents (including Michelle Rice’s declaration, 5 CT 987-1002) who introduced the related case (BC341120) into this matter. That case is not before this court. That court was devoid of jurisdiction with respect to corporate property that was not part of the writ of possession related to Cohen’s personal property. That would include, but is not limited to, the property Lynch stored as a courtesy for Cohen from approximately 1996 and which he abandoned and failed to retrieve once they parted ways. Corporate property is not Leonard Cohen’s personal property.
Leonard Cohen’s application to seal court records was and remains unjustified. The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized a long-standing public right to access court records that results in a presumption that anything filed with a court should be available to the public. The public in general and news media in particular have a qualified right of access to court proceedings and records. This right is rooted in the common law. Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 596–97 (1978). The First Amendment also confers on the public a qualified right of access. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 580 (1980). Since the public has a First Amendment right of access to a court proceeding or record, the sealing of the proceeding or record to preserve confidentiality must be narrowly tailored to a compelling confidentiality interest.
As the California Supreme Court made clear in the palimony/fraud trial of celebrities Clint Eastwood and Sondra Locke, the First Amendment and the common law provide a presumptive right of public and press access to civil court proceedings and documents. NBC Subsidiary (KNBC-TV), Inc. v. Superior Court, 20 Cal.4th 1187, 1208 & n.25; 1211 n.27, 1218-19(1999). These rights do not simply disappear because the proceedings – as in the instant case - involve wealthy, powerful public figures represented by an army of professionals. To the contrary, the public’s interest in ensuring that equal treatment in such cases is arguably stronger when public figures are involved.
Furthermore, the presumptive openness that applies to civil court proceedings and records includes disputes involving personal relationships – as in the Eastwood/Locke trial in NBC Subsidiary – as well as those involving personal financial matters - as in Burkle v. Burkle (2006) 135 Cal. App. 4th 1045, and the case at hand.
Despite this well-established right of public access, Respondent Leonard Cohen has asked Los Angeles Superior Court and the Appellate Division to issue what are essentially blanket sealing orders, as well as prior restraints on Lynch’s speech, to conceal evidence and information from public scrutiny.
California Evidence Code Section 956 explains that there is no attorney-client privilege if an attorney was sought or obtained to facilitate the commission or the planning of a crime or fraud.
The main issue on appeal is the fact that a Court decision, as well as the original default judgment, was obtained through the use of extensive fraudulent misrepresentations, the submission of perjured declarations and fabricated evidence, as well as through other litigation misconduct. Therefore, this Court should promote transparency with respect to the judicial decision-making process. The public’s right of access serves that interest for our court system.
Kelley Lynch correctly contends that the cumulative effect of the fraud upon the court, failure to serve Lynch, extrinsic fraud – and now perjury – with respect to the proof of service, failure to permit Lynch to call and/or cross examine witnesses, and general misconduct violated her right to due process and inconceivably harmed and prejudiced her. The record establishes that Respondents, together with their attorneys, engaged in deliberate and egregious misconduct. The trial courts judgments and orders were procured through fraud upon the court and Lynch has requested a corrective remedy.
The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment governs any action of a State through its legislature, its courts, or its executive officers, including action through its prosecuting officers. In denying Lynch’s motion for terminating sanctions (fraud upon the court), the trial court has failed to provide her with a corrective judicial process. It seems impossible to believe that the State of California, even if it has elected not to follow Hazel-Atlas, is without power to issue a remedial process when one is deprived of her property without due process of law in violation of the Constitution of the United States. Upon the state courts, equally with the courts of the Union, rests the obligation to guard and enforce every right secured by that Constitution. Robb v. Connolly, 111 U. S. 624, 111 U. S. 637. In view of the requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Appellate Court should not simply assume that the state has denied to its court jurisdiction to redress a prohibited wrong or provide a corrective judicial process. See Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 (1935).
Respondents argue, in their Reply Brief, that “there is no basis” for reversing the Trial Court’s January 17, 2014 decision or for “granting terminating sanctions, or any sanctions whatsoever, against Cohen.” There is indeed a basis for providing relief to Lynch from judgments and decisions, related to void orders that were procured through fraud upon the court.
The Appellate Court should reverse the trial court’s decisions with respect to Appellant’s motion for terminating sanctions, the sealing order, and instruct the court to vacate the fraudulent yet void May 15, 2006 default judgment. The harm to Lynch is inconceivable and entirely prejudicial.
Leonard Cohen, after wrongfully converting Lynch’s property to himself via the fraud default judgment, and withholding commissions and monies due her, has now asked this Court to award him his costs on appeal. Cohen and his attorneys of record should be sanctioned for their ongoing misconduct with this Court.

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