Source: https://openjurist.org/347/us/17
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 02:13:45+00:00

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RADIO OFFICERS' UNION OF COMMERCIAL TELEGRAPHERS UNION, A.F.L.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD v. INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS, CHAUFFEURS, WAREHOUSEMEN & HELPERS OF AMERICA et al. GAYNOR NEWS CO., Inc. v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD.
Reargued Nov. 9, 10, 1953.
Teamsters. Upon the basis of a charge filed by Frank Boston, a truck driver employed by Byers Transportation Company and a member of Local Union No. 41, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, A.F.L., the General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board issued a complaint against the union alleging violation of §§ 8(b)(1)(A)13 and 8(b)(2) of the National Labor Relations Act by causing the company to discriminate against Boston by reducing his seniority standing because of Boston's delinquency in paying his union dues. A hearing was had before a trial examiner, whose intermediate report was largely adopted by the Board14 with one member dissenting.
The Board found that the union, as exclusive bargaining representative of the teamsters in the company's employ, had in 1949 negotiated a collective-bargaining agreement with the company which governed working conditions on all over-the-road operations of the company.15 This agreement established a seniority system under which the union was to furnish periodically to the company a seniority list and provided that 'any controversy over the seniority standing of any employee on this list shall be referred to the Union for settlement.' Union security provisions of the agreement were not effective due to lack of the authorization then required by § 8(a)(3) of the Act.16 The seniority list therefore included both union members and nonmembers. Each new employee of the company, after a thirty-day trial period, was placed at the bottom of this list, and such employee would gradually advance in position as senior members were either removed from the list or reduced in their position on it. Position upon the seniority list governed the order of truck-driving assignments, the quality of such assignments, and the order of layoff.
The bylaws of Teamsters Local Union No. 41 provided that 'any member, under contract, one month in arrears for dues shall forfeit all seniority rights. * * *'17 A member's dues were payable on the first day of each month, and he was deemed 'in arrears' for any month's dues on the second day of the following month. Boston did not pay his dues for June 1950, until July 5, 1950. When the union transmitted a new seniority list to the company on the following July 15, Boston, who had previously been eighteenth on the list, was reduced to fifty-fourth, the bottom position on the list. As a result of such reduction Boston was denied driving assignments he would otherwise have obtained and for which he would have received compensation.
'Section 1. The Company agrees when vacancies occur necessitating the employment of Radio Officers, to select such Radio Officers who are members of the Union in good standing, when available, on vessels covered by this Agreement, provided such members are in the opinion of the Company qualified to fill such vacancies.
The union's contention that this contract provided for a hiring hall under which complete control over selection of radio officers to be hired by any company was given to the union was rejected by the Trial Examiner and by a majority of the Board. Such an agreement would have legalized the actions of the union in this case.24 But the Board concluded, primarily from the last sentence of § 6 of the contract, that the contract 'was clear on its face and did not provide for any hiring hall arrangement' and that it therefore was not improper for the Trial Examiner to exclude evidence that general, although not universal, practice had been for radio officers to be assigned to employers by the union.
The Board also found that: On February 24, 1948, the company telegraphed an offer of a job as radio officer on the company's ship S. S. Frances to Fowler, who had often previously been employed by the company; Fowler had notified the company that he would accept the job; the company then informed Kozel, the radio officer on the previous voyage of the ship, that he was being replaced by 'a man with senior service in the company'; Fowler reported to the Frances without seeking clearance from the union and Kozel reported such action to the union; the union secretary wired Fowler that he had been suspended from membership for 'bumping' another member and taking a job without clearance and notified the company that Fowler was not in good standing in the union; the union secretary had no authority to effect such a suspension, the suspension was void and Fowler was in good standing in the union at all times material in this case;25 express requests to the union for clearance of Fowler for employment on the Frances by the company and by Fowler were subsequently refused, the union secretary stating that he would never again clear Fowler for a position with that company although Fowler would be cleared for jobs with other employers; unable to obtain clearance for Fowler, the company gave the job to another man supplied by the union, and Fowler returned to his home in Florida; on April 22, 1948, Fowler returned to New York and again advised the company that he was available for work before reporting to the union; the union secretary told Fowler he was being made 'a company stiff' and adhered to his position that he would not clear Fowler for work with that company; clearance sought by the company for Fowler for a job on the S. S. Evelyn was subsequently refused, and another man was dispatched to the job by the union.
The Board found that in 1946 the company, engaged in the wholesale distribution and delivery of newspapers and periodicals, entered into a collective-bargaining agreement respecting delivery department employees with the union. This agreement provided for specified wages and paid vacations, and also provided for a closed shop, i.e., restricting employment by the company to members of the union. The agreement, however, permitted the employment by the company of nonunion employees pending such time as the union could supply union employees. This provision was necessary because the union was closed, ordinarily admitting to membership only first-born legitimate sons of members. The company at all pertinent times had nonunion as well as union employees in its delivery department. This original agreement was subsequently extended to 1948 and a supplementary agreement was executed by the parties in 1947 providing that in the event the parties negotiated a new contract, the wage rates set therein would be retroactive for three months. In October 1948 the company and the union entered into such a new contract which included an invalid union-security clause32 and provided for increased wage and vacation benefits. In this agreement the company expressly recognized the union as exclusive bargaining agent of all employees in the delivery department. In compliance with the 1947 supplementary agreement the company in November 1948 made lump sum payments to its union employees of the differential between the old and new wage rates for the three months' retroactive period. Further payments were subsequently made to union members to compensate for differences in vacation benefits under the two contracts even though the supplementary agreement made no reference to such benefits. The company refused to make similar payments to any of its nonunion employees on the grounds that it was not contractually bound to do so,33 and, in its business judgment, did not choose to do so.
The Board concluded that, since nothing in the supplementary agreement prohibited equal payment to non-union employees, 'the contract affords no defense to the allegation that the Respondent engaged in disparate treatment of employees on the basis of union membership or lack of it * * *,'34 and held that the company had violated the Act as alleged. The company's arguments that its actions had not violated § 8(a)(3) because 'the record is barren of any evidence that the discriminatory treatment of non-union employes encouraged them to join the union' or had such purpose, and that there could be no such evidence because all the nonunion employees had previously sought membership in the union and been denied because of the union's closed policy were rejected. The Board adopted the Trial Examiner's finding that 'it is obvious that the discrimination with respect to retroactive wages and vacation benefits had the natural and probable effect not only of encouraging non-union employees to join the union, but also of encouraging union employees to retain their union membership.' We assume this concedes that the employer acted from self-interest and not to encourage unionism. An order was entered requiring the company to cease and desist from the unfair labor practices found and from related conduct; to make whole Loner and all other nonunion employees similarly situated for any loss of pay they have suffered by reason of the company's discrimination against them; and to post appropriate notices of compliance.
The language employed by Congress in enacting the heart of § 8(a)(3) is identical with that of the predecessor section in the Wagner Act, § 8(3): 'By discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization * * *.' These are the first cases to reach us involving application of this section or its predecessor to the problem of encouragement of union membership by employers. We have on many occasions considered aspects of the application of these sections to actions by employers aimed at discouragement of union membership.37 The principles invoked in those cases are, of course, equally applicable to both aspects of employer discrimination, but most of the issues of statutory construction raised here have not previously been considered by this Court.
From the foregoing it is clear that the Eighth Circuit too restrictively interpreted the term 'membership' in Teamsters. Boston was discriminated against by his employer because he was delinquent in a union obligation. Thus he was denied employment to which he was otherwise entitled for no reason other than his tardy payment of union dues. The union caused this discrimination by applying a rule apparently aimed at encouraging prompt payment of dues. The union's action was not sanctioned by a valid union security contract, and, in any event, the union did not choose to terminate Boston's membership for his delinquency. Thus the union by requesting such discrimination, and the employer by submitting to such an illegal request, deprived Boston of the right guaranteed by the Act to join in or abstain from union activities without thereby affecting his job. A fortiori the Second Circuit correctly concluded in Radio Officers that such encouragement to remain in good standing in a union is proscribed. Thus that union in causing the employer to discriminate against Fowler by denying him employment in order to coerce Fowler into following the union's desired hiring practices deprived Fowler of a protected right.
II. A.—Necessity for Proving Employer's Motive.
The language of § 8(a)(3) is not ambiguous. The unfair labor practice is for an employer to encourage or discourage membership by means of discrimination. Thus this section does not outlaw all encouragement or discouragement of membership in labor organizations; only such as is accomplished by discrimination is prohibited. Nor does this section outlaw discrimination in employment as such; only such discrimination as encourages or discourages membership in a labor organization is proscribed.
But it is also clear that specific evidence of intent to encourage or discourage is not an indispensable element of proof of violation of § 8(a)(3). This fact was recognized in the House Report on the Wagner Act when it was stated that under § 8(3) 'agreements more favorable to the majority than to the minority are impossible. * * *'52 Both the Board and the courts have recognized that proof of certain types of discrimination satisfies the intent requirement.53 This recognition that specific proof of intent is unnecessary where employer conduct inherently encourages or discourages union membership is but an application of the common law rule that a man is held to intend the foreseeable consequences of his conduct. Cramer v. United States, 325 U.S. 1, 31, 65 S.Ct. 918, 933, 89 L.Ed. 1441; Nash v. United States, 229 U.S. 373, 376, 33 S.Ct. 780, 781, 57 L.Ed. 1232; United States v. Patten, 226 U.S. 525, 539, 33 S.Ct. 141, 143, 57 L.Ed. 333; Agnew v. United States, 165 U.S. 36, 50, 17 S.Ct. 235, 240, 41 L.Ed. 624. Thus an employer's protestation that he did not intend to encourage or discourage must be unavailing where a natural consequence of his action was such encouragement or discouragement. Concluding that encouragement or discouragement will result, it is presumed that he intended such consequence. In such circumstances intent to encourage is sufficiently established. Our decision in Republic Aviation Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board, 324 U.S. 793, 65 S.Ct. 982, 984, 89 L.Ed. 1372, relied upon by the Board to support its contention that employers' motives are irrelevant under § 8(a)(3), applied this principle. That decision dealt primarily with the right of the Board to infer discouragement from facts proven for purposes of proof of violation of § 8(3). In holding that discharges and suspensions of employees under company 'no solicitation' rules for soliciting union membership, in the circumstances disclosed, violated § 8(3), we noted that such employer action was not 'motivated by opposition to the particular union, or we deduce, to unionism' and that 'there was no union bias or discrimination by the company in enforcing the rule.' But we affirmed the Board's holding that the rules involved were invalid when applied to union solicitation since they interfered with the employees' right to organize. Since the rules were no defense and the employers intended to discriminate solely on the ground of such protected union activity, it did not matter that they did not intend to discourage membership since such was a foreseeable result.
In Gaynor, the Second Circuit also properly applied this principle. The court there held that disparate wage treatment of employees based solely on union membership status is 'inherently conducive to increased union membership.' In holding that a natural consequence of discrimination, based solely on union membership or lack thereof, is discouragement or encouragement of membership in such union, the court merely recognized a fact of common experience—that the desire of employees to unionize is directly proportional to the advantages thought to be obtained from such action. No more striking example of discrimination so foreseeably causing employee response as to obviate he need for any other proof of intent is apparent than the payment of different wages to union employees doing a job than to nonunion employees doing the same job. As noted above, the House Report on § 8(3) of the Wagner Act emphasized that such disparate treatment was impossible under the Act.
In Gaynor it was conceded that the sole criterion for extra payments was union membership, and the vacation payments were admittedly gratuitous. The wage differential payments, on the other hand, were based upon the 1947 supplementary agreement which the company below contended was negotiated solely in behalf of union members. However, the court below held that the union was exclusive bargaining agent for both union and nonunion employees. The company has not challenged this holding, asserting only that, even though the union represented all employees, the company's only liability to the nonunion employees can be for breach of contract.
We express no opinion as to the legality of disparate payments where the union is not exclusive bargaining agent since that case is not before us. We do hold that in the circumstances of this case, the union being exclusive bargaining agent for both member and nonmember employees, the employer could not, without violating § 8(a)(3), discriminate in wages solely on the basis of such membership even though it had executed a contract with the union prescribing such action. Statements throughout the legislative history of the National Labor Relations Act emphasize that exclusive bargaining agents are powerless 'to make agreements more favorable to the majority than to the minority.'54 Such discriminatory contracts are illegal and provide no defense to an action under § 8(a)(3). See Steele v. louisville & Nashville R. Co., 323 U.S. 192, 65 S.Ct. 226, 89 L.Ed. 173; Wallace Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board, 323 U.S. 248, 65 S.Ct. 238, 89 L.Ed. 216; J.I. Case Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 321 U.S. 332, 64 S.Ct. 576, 88 L.Ed. 762; Order of Railroad Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency, 321 U.S. 342, 64 S.Ct. 582, 88 L.Ed. 788. Cf. Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330, 73 S.Ct. 681, 97 L.Ed. 1048.
We considered this problem in the Republic Aviation case. To the contention 'that there must be evidence before the Board to show that the rules and orders of the employers interfered with and discouraged union organization in the circumstances and situation of each company' we replied that the statutory plan for an adversary proceeding 'does not go beyond the necessity for the production of evidential facts, however, and compel evidence as to the results which may flow from such facts. * * * An administrative agency with power after hearings to determine on the evidence in adversary proceedings whether violations of statutory commands have occurred may infer within the limits of the inquiry from the proven facts such conclusions as reasonably may be based upon the facts proven. One of the purposes which lead to the creation of such boards is to have decisions based upon evidential facts under the particular statute made by experienced officials with an adequate appreciation of the complexities of the subject which is entrusted to their administration. * * *' See also National Labor Relations Board v. Nevada Consolidated Copper Corp., 316 U.S. 105, 62 S.Ct. 960, 86 L.Ed. 1305; National Labor Relations Board v. Link-belt Co., 311 U.S. 584, 61 S.Ct. 358, 85 L.Ed. 368. In these cases we but restated a rule familiar to the law and followed by all factfinding tribunals—that it is permissible to draw on experience in factual inquiries.
It is argued, however, that these cases ceased to be good law under the Taft-Hartley amendments. The House Report on their version of § 10 of the amendments, in discussing 'shocking injustices' resulting from limited court review of Board rulings, stated that 'requiring the Board to rest its rulings upon facts, not interferences (sic), conjectures, background, imponderables, and presumed expertness will correct abuses under the act.'55 We do not read that statement nor statements in the House Conference Report, upon which petitioners rely to support their contention, to hold that the Board may not draw reasonable inferences from proven facts. The House Conference Report stated that under the Wagner Act standard of review courts had 'abdicated' to the Board and 'in many instances deference on the part of the courts to specialized knowledge that is supposed to inhere in administrative agencies has led the courts to acquiesce in decisions of the Board, even where the findings concerned mixed issues of law and fact (citing cases), or when they rested only on inferences that were not, in turn, supported by facts in the record (citing the Republic Aviation case).'56 The report concluded that the amendment to § 10(e), requiring Board findings to be 'supported by substantial evidence on the record considered as a whole,' 'will be adequate to preclude such decisions as those in' inter alia the Nevada Copper Corp. and Republic Aviation cases.
In Universal Camera Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board, 340 U.S. 474, 71 S.Ct. 456, 465, 95 L.Ed. 456, we carefully considered this legislative history and interpreted it to express dissatisfaction with too restricted application of the 'substantial evidence' test of the Wagner Act. We noted, however, that sufficiency of evidence to support findings of fact was not involved in the Republic Aviation case, and stated that the amendment was not 'intended to negative the function of the Labor Board as one of those agencies presumably equipped or informed by experience to deal with a specialized field of knowledge, whose findings within that field carry the authority of an expertness which courts do not possess and therefore must respect.' There is nothing in the language of the amendment itself that suggests denial to the Board of power to draw reasonable inferences. It is inconceivable that the authors of the reports intended such a result for a factfinding body must have some power to decide which inferences to draw and which to reject. We therefore conclude that insofar as the power to draw reasonable inferences is concerned, Taft-Hartley did not alter prior law.
The Board relies heavily upon the House Report on § 8(3) which stated that the section outlawed discrimination 'which tends to 'encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization"57 for its conclusion that only a tendency to encourage or discourage membership is required by § 8(a)(3). We read this language to mean that subjective evidence of employee response was not contemplated by the drafters, and to accord with our holding that such proof is not required where encouragement or discouragement can be reasonably inferred from the nature of the discrimination.
Encouragement and discouragement are 'subtle things' requiring 'a high degree of introspective perception.' Cf. National Labor Relations Board v. Donnelly Garment Co., 330 U.S. 219, 231, 67 S.Ct. 756, 763, 91 L.Ed. 854. But, as noted above, it is common experience that the desire of employees to unionize is raised or lowered by the advantages thought to be attained by such action. Moreover, the Act does not require that the employees discriminated againt be the ones encouraged for purposes of violations of § 8(a)(3). Nor does the Act require that this change in employees' 'quantum of desire' to join a union have immediate manifestations.
Obviously, it would be gross inconsistency to hold that an inherent effect of certain discrimination is encouragement of union membership, but that the Board may not reasonably infer such encouragement. We have held that a natural result of the disparate wage treatment in Gaynor was encouragement of union membership; thus it would be unreasonable to draw any inference other than that encouragement would result from such action. The company complains that it could have disproved this natural result if allowed to prove that Loner, the employee who filed the charges against it, had previously applied for and been denied membership in the union. But it is clear that such evidence would not have rebutted the inference: not only would it have failed to disprove an increase in desire on the part of other employees, union members or nonmembers, to join or retain good standing in the union, but it would not have shown lack of encouragement of Loner. In rejecting this argument the Second Circuit noted that union admission policies are not necessarily static and that employees may be encouraged to join when conditions change. This proved to be an accurate prophecy regarding the Newspaper and Mail Deliverers' Union, involved in this case, for in 1952 it altered its admission policy to allow membership of 'all steady situation holders,' thus admitting many employees not previously eligible.
IV. Sanction Against Union Under § 8(b)(2).
Section 8(b)(2) was added to the National Labor Relations Act by the Taft-Hartley amendments in 1947. It provides that "it shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents * * * to cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against an employee in violation of subsection (a)(3) or to discriminate against an employee with respect to whom membership in such organization has been denied or terminated on some ground other than his failure to tender the periodic dues and initiation fees uniformly required as a condition of acquiring or retaining membership'. Petitioner in Radio Officers contends that it was fatal error for the Board to proceed against it, a union, without joining the employer, and that absent a finding of violation of § 8(a)(3) by and a reinstatement order against such employer, the Board could not order the union to pay back pay under § 8(b)(2).
We find no support for these arguments in the Act. No such limitation is contained in the language of § 8(b)(2). That section makes it clear that there are circumstances under which charges against a union for violating the section must be brought without joining a charge against the employer under § 8(a)(3) for attempts to cause employers to discriminate are proscribed. Thus a literal reading of the section requires only a showing that the union caused or attempted to cause the employer to engage in conduct which, if committed, would violate § 8(a)(3).58 No charge was filed against the company by Fowler when he filed his charge against the union. The General Counsel is entrusted with 'final authority, on behalf of the Board, in respect of the investigation of charges and issuance of complaints',59 but without a charge he has no authority to issue a complaint.60 Even when a charge is filed many factors must influence exercise by the General Counsel of this discretion relative to prosecution of unfair labor practices. Abuse of discretion has not been shown, and, when a complaint is prosecuted, the Board is empowered by § 10(a) 'to prevent any person from engaging in any unfair labor practice * * *.' It, therefore, had the power to find that the union had violated § 8(b)(2).
Nor does the absence of joinder of the employer preclude entry of a backpay order against the union. The union cites in support of its position the language of § 10(c)61 which empowers the Board to issue orders requiring 'such affirmative action including reinstatement of employees with or without back pay, as will effectuate the policies of this Act: Provided, That where an order directs reinstatement of an employee, back pay may be required of the employer or labor organization, as the case may be, responsible for the discrimination suffered by him: * * *.' In Phelps Dodge Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board, 313 U.S. 177, 189, 61 S.Ct. 845, 850, 85 L.Ed. 1271, we interpreted the phrase giving the Board power to order 'reinstatement of employees with or without back pay' not to limit, but merely to illustrate the general grant of power to award affirmative relief. Thus we held that the Board could order back pay without ordering reinstatement. The proviso in § 10(c) was added by the 1947 amendments. The purpose of Congress in enacting this provision was not to limit the power of the Board to order back pay without ordering reinstatement but to give the Board power to remedy union unfair labor practices comparable to the power it possessed to remedy unfair labor practices by employers.62 Petitioner argues, however, that it will not 'effectuate the policies of this Act' to require it to reimburse back pay if the employer is not made to share this burden, but, on the contrary, will frustrate the Act's purposes. We do not agree. It does not follow that because one form of remedy is not available or appropriate in a case, as here, that no remedy should be granted. It is clear that petitioner committed an unfair labor practice and the policy of the Act is to make whole employees thus discriminated against. We therefore hold that the Board properly exercised its power in ordering petitioner to pay such back pay to Fowler.
The lower courts have given conflicting interpretations to the phrase, 'by discrimination * * * to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization', contained in § 8(a)(3). We should settle this conflict without giving rise to avoidable new controversies.
(a) On the basis of the employer's disparate treatment of his employees standing alone, or as supplemented by evidence of the particular circumstances under which the employer acted, it is open for the Board to conclude that the conduct of the employer tends to encourage or discourage union membership, thereby establishing a violation of the statute.
In sum, any inference that may be drawn from the employer's alleged discriminatory acts is just one element of evidence which may or may not be sufficient, without more, to show a violation. But that should not obscure the fact that this inference may be bolstered or rebutted by other evidence which may be adduced, and which the Board must take into consideration. The Board's task is to weigh everything before it, including those inferences which, with its specialized experience, it believes can fairly be drawn. On the basis of this process, it must determine whether the alleged discriminatory acts of the employer were such that he should have reasonably anticipated that they would encourage or discourage union membership.
Since the issue which the Board thus has to decide involves pre-eminently an exercise of judgment on matters peculiarly within its special competence, little room will be left for judicial review. See Universal Camera Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board, 340 U.S. 474, 488, 74 S.Ct. 456, 464, 95 L.Ed. 456.
No. 7—The Gaynor Case.—Eighteen years ago the language considered here became a part of what is now known as § 8(a)(3) of the Labor Act. The Court today, gives that language an entirely new interpretation. I dissent. The Section makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer 'by discrimination in regard to * * * any term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization * * *.' Unquestionably payment of disparate wages to union and nonunion employees is 'discrimination' as that term is used in § 8(a)(3). But the Section does not forbid all 'discrimination.' It carefully limits the conditions under which 'discrimination' is 'unfair.' The plain and long accepted meaning of § 8(a)(3) is that it forbids an employer to discriminate only when he does so in order to 'encourage or discourage' union membership. National Labor Relations Board v. Waterman S.S. Co., 309 U.S. 206, 219, 60 S.Ct. 493, 500, 84 L.Ed. 704. Recently, however, the Labor Board has adopted the view that the Section outlaws discrimination merely having a 'tendency to encourage * * *' or 'the natural and probable effect' of which would be to encourage union membership. The Court apparently now accepts this interpretation, for here there is no finding that Gaynor acted in order to encourage union membership. Indeed, the Board concedes that Gaynor had no such purpose, and this concession is fully supported by the evidence. Gaynor had no desire to make retroactive payments to any employees. It yielded to the union not because it wanted to but because it was compelled to by a collective bargaining contract.
I think the Court's new interpretation of § 8(a)(3) imputes guilt to an employer for conduct which Congress did not wish to outlaw. Behind the Labor Act was a long history of employer hostility to strong unions and affection for weak ones. Power over wages, hours and other working conditions permitted employers to help unions they liked and hurt unions they disliked. To enable workers to join or not join unions without fear of reprisal, Congress passed the Labor Act prohibiting such employer discrimination. But aside from this limitation on the employer's powers, Congress did not mean to invade his normal right to fix different wages, hours and other working conditions for different employees according to his best business judgment.1 Section 8(a)(3) is aptly phrased to accomplish both these purposes.
Even now trial examiners and the Board continue to make findings as to the employer's purpose.3 The courts have regularly held that § 8(a)(3) requires such findings, and have been called on to determine if they were supported by substantial evidence.4 I think the Section should not at this late date be held to penalize an employer for using his judgment in fixing working conditions unless he discriminates among employees in order to strengthen or weaken a union for his own advantage. For this reason, I would not sustain the Board's holding that Gaynor violated § 8(a)(3).
Nos. 5 and 6—The Radio Officers and Teamsters Cases.—In these cases the Board found that the Radio Officers and Teamsters unions had violated § 8(b)(2) of the Taft-Hartley Act which makes it an 'unfair labor practice' for a union 'to cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against an employee in violation' of § 8(a)(3). The Board found on sufficient evidence that each of the two unions here 'caused' an employer to treat an employee differently from the way it treated other employees, that is, the employer was caused 'to discriminate' within the meaning of § 8(a)(3). The Board also found that this 'discrimination' had a tendency to encourage union membership. But there was no finding that either employer's discrimination occurred in order to encourage union membership. For the reasons set out in my discussion of § 8(a)(3) in the Gaynor case, I think these findings fall short of showing an employer 'violation of § 8(a)(3).' A union does not violate § 8(b)(2) by causing an employer to discriminate unless that employer discrimination is 'in violation of § 8(a)(3).' For this reason I would reverse No. 5 and affirm No. 6.
Section 8(a)(3) was enacted as part of the Taft-Hartley Act, 61 Stat. 136, in 1947, and amended in 1951, 65 Stat. 601. Provisions added by the 1951 amendment are in italics; provisions eliminated in 1951 are in brackets. This section derived from § 8(3) of the 1935 Wagner Act, 49 Stat. 452, 29 U.S.C. § 158(3), 29 U.S.C.A. § 158(3), with the proviso amended. See note 42, infra.
National Labor Relations Board v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 196 F.2d 1, certiorari granted 344 U.S. 853, 73 S.Ct. 95, 97 L.Ed. 663. See also National Labor Relations Board v. Del E. Webb Construction Co., 8 Cir., 196 F.2d 702.
National Labor Relations Board v. Reliable Newspaper Delivery, Inc., 187 F.2d 547. See also Western Cartridge Co., v. National Labor Relations Board, 7 Cir., 139 F.2d 855.
Radio Officers' Union of Commercial Telegraphers Union, A.F.L. v. National Labor Relations Board, 196 F.2d 960, certiorari granted, 344 U.S. 852, 73 S.Ct. 91, 97 L.Ed. 662.
National Labor Relations Board v. Gaynor News Co., Inc., 197 F.2d 719, certiorari granted, 345 U.S. 902, 73 S.Ct. 640, 97 L.Ed. 1339. But cf. National Labor Relations Board v. Air Associates, Inc., 2 Cir., 121 F.2d 586.
National Labor Relations Board v. Whitin Machine Works, 204 F.2d 883.
National Labor Relations Board v. Walt Disney Productions, Inc., 146 F.2d 44.
See, e.g., National Labor Relations Board v. Reliable Newspaper Delivery, Inc., 187 F.2d 547; Wells, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board, 162 F.2d 457; National Labor Relations Board v. Reynold's International Pen Co., 162 F.2d 680; National Labor Relations Board v. Draper Corp., 145 F.2d 199; National Labor Relations Board v. Air Associates, 121 F.2d 586.
See also Union Starch & Refining Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 7 Cir., 186 F.2d 1008; Colonie Fibre Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 2 Cir., 163 F.2d 65; National Labor Relations Board v. Walt Disney Productions, Inc., 9 Cir., 146 F.2d 44; Sperry Gyroscope Co., Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board, 2 Cir., 129 F.2d 922; Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 93 N.L.R.B. 981.
345 U.S. 962, 73 S.Ct. 947, 97 L.Ed. 1382.
This agreement, known as the 'Central States Area Over-the-Road Agreement,' has been executed with employers by more than 300 locals of the Teamsters Union in 12 different states.
'Section 45. Any member, under contract, one month in arrears for dues shall forfeit all seniority rights.
(Trial Examiner's Footnote.) If, as Respondent appears to suggest, its conduct discouraged membership in a labor organization, it could be argued that from the plain meaning of § 8(a)(3), a union would equally violate the Act by causing an employer to discriminate against an employee in order to rid itself of slowpaying or otherwise recalcitrant members.
344 U.S. 853, 73 S.Ct. 95, 97 L.Ed. 663.
Such an agreement was permissible under § 8(3) of the National Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat. 449, 29 U.S.C. § 158 (3), 29 U.S.C.A. § 158(3). The agreement in this case was signed on January 11, 1947, and was extended for a period of one year on August 16, 1947. Under § 102 of the 1947 amendments to the National Labor Relations Act, 61 Stat. 152, 29 U.S.C.A. § 158 note, acts performed under such agreement which would not have been unfair labor practices under § 8(3) were not unfair practices under the amended act.
Section 8(c) provides: 'The expressing of any views, argument, or opinion, or the dissemination thereof, whether in written, printed, graphic, or visual form, shall not constitute or be evidence of an unfair labor practice under any of the provisions of this subchapter, if such expression contains no threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit.' 29 U.S.C. (Supp. V) § 158(c), 29 U.S.C.A. § 158(c).
The original charge filed on February 3, 1949, alleged violation only of §§ 8(a)(1) and (3) by the above action relative to Loner between July and October 1948. This charge was amended on June 13, 1950, to allege violation of §§ 8(a) (1) and (2) by executing the October 1948 contract with the illegal union security clause. The complaint issued by the General Counsel on the same day contained all of these allegations and alleged that the discriminatory treatment extended to all nonunion employees. The company contends that inclusion of such employees who did not file charges is prohibited by the six-month statute of limitations period provided in § 10(b) of the Act. We agree with the Trial Examiner, the Board, and the court below that this charge relates back to the charges timely filed and thus the company was given adequate notice and was not prejudiced by the amendment. National Labor Relations Board v. Kobritz, 1 Cir., 193 F.2d 8, 14; National Labor Relations Board v. Bradley Washfountain Co., 7 Cir., 192 F.2d 144, 149; National Labor Relations Board v. Kingston Cake Co., 3 Cir., 191 F.2d 563, 567; cf. Consolidated Edison Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 305 U.S. 197, 225, 238, 59 S.Ct. 206, 215, 220, 83 L.Ed. 126.
This clause requiring all new employees to become union members within thirty days was not authorized as then required by § 8(a)(3). See the bracketed language of note 1, supra.
The 1946 contract stated that the union was contracting 'for and in behalf of the Union and for and in behalf of the members thereof now employed and hereafter to be employed by the employer.' The president of the company testified before the Trial Examiner that he believed the 1946 contract and the supplementary agreement applied to union members only.
The Board rejected the company's contention that since the closed shop provision in the 1946 contract was valid under § 8(3), see note 24, supra, and it thus could have legally discharged the nonunion employees during the life of that contract, it could legally retain such employees and contract to discriminate as to their wages.
The Board found, however, that the 'evidence indicates that the Respondent had contracted to make retroactive wage payments to the employees covered by the original contract. * * *' The Board also adopted the Trial Examiner's finding that, regardless of the status of the wage payment, the retroactive vacation payments were entirely voluntary.
In its brief the company seeks to raise the issue of the illegality of that contract. This question was not presented in the petition for certiorari and is, therefore, not properly before the Court. General Talking Pictures Corp. v. Western Elec. Co., 304 U.S. 175, 58 S.Ct. 849, 82 L.Ed. 1273.
345 U.S. 902, 73 S.Ct. 640, 97 L.Ed. 1339.
See, e.g., National Labor Relations Board v. Gullett Gin Co., Inc., 340 U.S. 361, 71 S.Ct. 337, 95 L.Ed. 337; National Labor Relations Board v. Universal Camera Corp., 340 U.S. 474, 71 S.Ct. 456, 95 L.Ed. 456; Phelps Dodge Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board, 313 U.S. 177, 61 S.Ct. 845, 85 L.Ed. 1271; Republic Steel Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board, 311 U.S. 7, 61 S.Ct. 77, 85 L.Ed. 6; National Labor Relations Board v. Sands Mfg. Co., 306 U.S. 332, 59 S.Ct. 508, 83 L.Ed. 682; National Labor Relations Board v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U.S. 240, 59 S.Ct. 490, 83 L.Ed. 627; National Labor Relations Board v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co., 304 U.S. 333, 58 S.Ct. 904, 82 L.Ed. 1381; National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 57 S.Ct. 615, 81 L.Ed. 893.
National Labor Relations Board v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., supra; National Labor Relations Board v. Sands Mfg. Co., supra; Southern Steamship Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 316 U.S. 31, 62 S.Ct. 886, 86 L.Ed. 1246. Cf. National Labor Relations Board v. Local Union No. 1229, 346 U.S. 464, 74 S.Ct. 172.
Associated Press v. National Labor Relations Board, 301 U.S. 103, 57 S.Ct. 650, 81 L.Ed. 953. Cf. National Labor Relations Board v. Kennametal, Inc., 3 Cir., 182 F.2d 817, 19 A.L.R.2d 562; National Labor Relations Board v. Peter Cailler Kohler Swiss Chocolate Co., 2 Cir., 130 F.2d 503.
See § 7, 29 U.S.C. (Supp. V) § 157, 29 U.S.C.A. § 157, note 13, supra.
Under the Wagner Act the proviso read: 'Provided, That nothing in sections 151—166 of this title or in any other statute of the United States, shall preclude an employer from making an agreement with a labor organization (not established, maintained, or assisted by any action defined in said sections as an unfair labor practice) to require as a condition of employment membership therein, * * * if such labor organization is the representative of the employees as provided in section 159(a) of this title, in the appropriate collective-bargaining unit covered by such agreement when made'. 29 U.S.C. § 158(3), 29 U.S.C.A. § 158(3). See Colgate-Palmolive-Peet Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 338 U.S. 355, 70 S.Ct. 166, 94 L.Ed. 161.
For example, Senator Taft said: 'It is contended that the employer should be obliged to discharge the man because the union does not like him. That is what we are trying to prevent. I do not see why a union should have such power over a man in that situation.' 93 Cong.Rec. 4191.
See also 93 Cong.Rec. 4135, 4193, 4272, 4275, 4432; S.Rep.No.105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 et seq.; H.R. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 27—28; H.Conf.Rep.No.510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 41.
See National Labor Relations Board v. Eclipse Lumber Co., 9 Cir., 199 F.2d 684; Union Starch & Refining Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 7 Cir., 186 F.2d 1008, 27 A.L.R.2d 629.
Associated Press v. National Labor Relations Board, 301 U.S. 103, 57 S.Ct. 650, 655, 81 L.Ed. 953.
See cases cited, note 8, supra.
E.g., Manoff, Labor Relations Law, 82; CCH, Guidebook to Labor Relations Law, 142; Wollett, Labor Relations and Federal Law, 62; Millis & Brown, From the Wagner Act to Taft-Hartley, 428; Cox, Some Aspects of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, 61 Harv.L.Rev. 1, 20; Ward, 'Discrimination' Under the National Labor Relations Act, 48 Yale L.J. 1152, 1158.
H.R.Rep.No.1147, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 21; see also Ward, note 47, supra, at 1166.
See, e.g., National Labor Relations Board v. Industrial Cotton Mills, 4 Cir., 208 F.2d 87; Cusano v. National Labor Relations Board, 3 Cir., 190 F.2d 898; Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 70 N.L.R.B. 48, enforced, 7 Cir., 162 F.2d 435; National Labor Relations Board v. Gluek Brewing Co., 8 Cir., 144 F.2d 847.
S.Rep.No.573, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 13. During a debate on the Act Senator Wagner stated: 'Under this proposed legislation, assuming an agreement has been consummated by the agency elected by the majority of the employees, there will be no advantage which a majority can have under an agreement to which the minority is not also entitled, and in order to have that advantage the minority need not join the organization. It can join or not join, either way. It cannot be discriminated against under any other provision of the law.' 79 Cong.Rec. 7673. See also note 52, supra.
H.R.Rep.No.510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 55. See Cox, op cit. supra, note 46, at 39 et seq.
See National Labor Relations Board v. Newspaper & Mail Deliverers' Union, 2 Cir., 192 F.2d 654. Cf. Katz v. National Labor Relations Board, 9 Cir., 196 F.2d 411.
29 U.S.C. (Supp. V) § 153(d), 29 U.S.C.A. § 153(d).
Id., § 160(b). But see National Labor Relations Board v. Indiana & Michigan Electric Co., 318 U.S. 9, 17, 63 S.Ct. 394, 399, 87 L.Ed. 579.
29 U.S.C. (Supp. V) § 160(c), 29 U.S.C.A. § 160(c).
See National Labor Relations Board v. J.I. Case Co., 8 Cir., 198 F.2d 919, 924; H.N. Newman, 85 N.L.R.B. 725, enforced, 2 Cir., 187 F.2d 488; Union Starch & Refining Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 7 Cir., 186 F.2d 1008, 1014.
National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 1937, 301 U.S. 1, 45—46, 57 S.Ct. 615, 628, 81 L.Ed. 893; Phelps Dodge Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board, 1941, 313 U.S. 177, 182—183, 61 S.Ct. 845, 846, 847, 85 L.Ed. 1271.
See, e.g., Fruehauf Trailer Co., 1 N.L.R.B. 68, 74—77 (1935), sustained, 1937, 301 U.S. 49, 55—57, 57 S.Ct. 642, 643, 644, 81 L.Ed. 918; Union Pacific Stages, Inc., 2 N.L.R.B. 471, 486 (1936), enforced as modified, 9 Cir., 1938, 99 F.2d 153, 168, 176 177; Kansas City Power & Light Co., 12 N.L.R.B. 1414, 1436—1453 (1939), enforced as modified, 8 Cir., 1940, 111 F.2d 340, 349—351; Martel Mills Corporation, 20 N.L.R.B. 712, 721, 724, 733 (1940), enforcement denied, 4 Cir., 1940, 114 F.2d 624, 630—633; Air Associates, Inc., 20 N.L.R.B. 356 (1940), enforced as modified, 2 Cir., 1941, 121 F.2d 586, 591—592; Stonewall Cotton Mills, 36 N.L.R.B. 240 (1941), enforced as modified, 5 Cir., 1942, 129 F.2d 629, 632—633; Western Cartridge Co., 48 N.L.R.B. 434 (1943), enforced as modified, 7 Cir., 1943, 139 F.2d 855, 858—860; Robbins Tire and Rubber, Co., 69 N.L.R.B. 440, 441, (1946), enforced, 5 Cir., 1947, 161 F.2d 798, 801; Wells, Inc., 68 N.L.R.B. 545, 546 547 (1946), enforced as modified, 9 Cir., 1947, 162 F.2d 457, 459 460; Victor Mfg. & Gasket Co., 79 N.L.R.B. 234, 235 (1948), enforced, 7 Cir., 1949, 174 F.2d 867, 868; B & Z Hosiery Products Co., 85 N.L.R.B. 633 (1949), enforced, Bochner v. National Labor Relations Board, 3 Cir., 1950, 180 F.2d 1021. To support its position here that an employer's purpose is irrelevant under § 8(a)(3) the Board relies on its decisions in General Motors Corp., 59 N.L.R.B. 1143, 1145 (1944), enforced as modified, 3 cir., 1945, 150 F.2d 201; Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 70 N.L.R.B. 348, 349—350 (1946), Enforced, 7 Cir., 1947, 162 F.2d 435; and Reliable Newspaper Delivery, Inc., 88 N.L.R.B. 659, 669—670 (1950), enforcement denied, 3 Cir., 1951, 187 F.2d 547. In the first two decisions specific findings of employer purpose were made, and in the latter the facts are substantially identical to the case here.
E.g., in Marathon Electric Mfg. Co., 106 N.L.R.B. No. 199 (September 29, 1953), the trial examiner found that numerous acts of an employer violated § 8(a)(3) because the employer 'discriminated * * * to discourage membership in UE. * * *' In sustaining the examiner as to some of the acts and overruling him as to others the Board's decision rested on such findings as: 'the discharges were not only calculated to discourage concerted activities * * * but also to deter * * * from joining, or giving support in the future to; UE or any other labor organization'; the record did not show 'that the failure to recall them (certain employees) was because of their actual or supposed connection with UE'; and there was 'no evidence in the record to rebut the Respondent's (employer's) contention that its only reason for not recalling these employees was the cancellation of the contract.' See also New Mexico Transportation Co., 107 N.L.R.B. No. 8 (November 13, 1953); Terri Lee, Inc., 107 N.L.R.B. No. 141 (December 28, 1953).
See court decisions cited in note 2, supra. See also National Labor Relations Board v. Waterman S.S. Co., 1940, 309 U.S. 206, 218, 220—226, 60 S.Ct. 493, 500, 501, 503, 84 L.Ed. 704, where this Court reviewed the record and held that a finding of discrimination by an employer 'because of' union membership was sustained by substantial evidence. Republic Aviation Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board, 1945, 324 U.S. 793, 65 S.Ct. 982, 89 L.Ed. 1372, indicated no intent to repudiate the interpretation of § 8(a)(3) accepted in the Waterman case, supra. The Board also relies on such cases as: National Labor Relations Board v. Hudson Motor Car Co., 6 Cir., 1942, 128 F.2d 528, 532—533, enforcing 34 N.L.R.B. 815, 826—827 (1941); National Labor Relations Board v. Gluek Brewing Co., 8 Cir., 1944, 144 F.2d 847, 853, modifying and enforcing 47 N.L.R.B. 1079, 1095 (1943); and National Labor Relations Board v. Industrial Cotton Mills, 4 Cir., 1953, 208 F.2d 87, modifying and enforcing 102 N.L.R.B. 1265 (1953). However, none of these cases is in point here, since in each the Board made findings of the employer's purpose.

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