Source: http://cyb3rcrim3.blogspot.com/2014/07/forgery-compelled-decryption-and-5th.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 17:15:48+00:00

Document:
In prior posts, I examined how the 5th Amendment privilege against self-incrimination can, and cannot, apply to the act of producing evidence to a grand jury or a court. This post examines a recent decision from a Massachusetts court that addresses this issue, i.e., whether the government could compel a suspect to decrypt the contents of certain computers. Commonwealth v. Gelfgatt, 2014 WL 2853731 (Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts 2014).
State grand jury returned indictments charging [Leon Gelfgatt] with seventeen counts of forgery of a document, Massachusetts General Laws c. 267, § 1; seventeen counts of uttering a forged instrument, Massachusetts General Laws c. 267, § 5; and three counts of attempting to commit . . . larceny by false pretenses of the property of another, Massachusetts General Laws c. 274, § 6.
The charges arose from allegations that [Gelfgatt], through his use of computers, conducted a sophisticated scheme of diverting to himself funds that were intended to be used to pay off large mortgage loans on residential properties. On November 21, 2011, the Commonwealth filed in the Superior Court a `Motion to Compel the Defendant to Enter His Password into Encryption Software He Placed on Various Digital Media Storage Devices that Are Now in the Custody of the Commonwealth’. . . . The Commonwealth also filed a motion to report a question of law to the Appeals Court prior to trial pursuant to Massachusetts Rules of Criminal Procedure Rule 34. . . .
Commonwealth v. Gelfgatt, supra. In a footnote, the court explains that the “parties treat as synonymous the terms `encryption key’ and `password’ to encryption software. For the sake of simplicity, we shall do the same.” Commonwealth v. Gelfgatt, supra.
Beginning in 2009, [Gelfgatt], who is an attorney, allegedly orchestrated a scheme to acquire for himself funds that were intended to be used to pay off home mortgage loans. According to the Commonwealth, [he] identified high-end properties that were listed in an online database as `under agreement.’ He would research each one at the applicable registry of deeds to determine whether there was a mortgage on the property. If there was, [Gelfgatt], purportedly using a computer, would forge an assignment of the mortgage to either `Puren Ventures, Inc.’ (Puren Ventures) or `Baylor Holdings, Ltd.’ (Baylor Holdings). He then would record the forged assignment at the applicable registry of deeds and mail a notice to the seller stating that the mortgage on the property had been assigned to one of these sham companies, which he had set up.
[Gelfgatt] fostered the illusion that Puren Ventures and Baylor Holdings were actual companies by giving each one Internet-based telephone and facsimile numbers. When a closing attorney would contact one of these companies to request a statement documenting the sum necessary to pay off the reassigned mortgage, the attorney would be instructed to send the request to the facsimile number [Gelfgatt] had created. Next, [he] would request an actual payoff figure from the true mortgage holder.
[Gelfgatt] would transmit this information by Internet facsimile number to the closing attorney, doing so under the guise of the sham company. [He] would instruct the closing attorney to send the payoff check to a Boston address where [Gelfgatt] once had practiced law. Although ultimately unsuccessful, [he] purportedly created seventeen fraudulent assignments of mortgages, totaling over $13 million. According to the Commonwealth, [Gelfgatt] relied heavily on the use of computers to conceal his identity and perpetrate his alleged scheme.
On December 17, 2009, State police troopers arrested [Gelfgatt] immediately after he retrieved what he believed to be over $1.3 million in payoff funds from two real estate closings. They also executed search warrants for his residence in Marblehead and for his vehicle.
During the search of [Gelfgatt’s] residence, troopers observed several computers that were powered on, and they photographed the computer screens. [Appearing on the computer screens were the following phrases that were visible as headings or icons: `K:*Leon Documents*My Scans’; `Erasing Report’; `Erased area’; `Attorney Leon I. Gelfgatt’; `TrueCrypt’; and `DriveCrypt Plus Pack.’] The troopers seized from [his] residence two desktop computers, one laptop computer, and various other devices capable of storing electronic data.
However, all of the data on the four computers were encrypted with `DriveCrypt Plus’ software.
Commonwealth v. Gelfgatt, supra. The text in brackets above appears in footnotes in the opinion. I inserted the text for each footnote after the text that had that note.
encryption software on the computers is virtually impossible to circumvent. Its manufacturer touts the fact that it does not contain a `back door’ that would allow access to data by anyone other than the authorized user. Thus, the Commonwealth states, the files on the four computers cannot be accessed and viewed unless the authorized user first enters the correct password to unlock the encryption. The Commonwealth believes that evidence of [Gelfgatt’s] purported criminal activities is located on these computers.
[Gelfgatt] said he used encryption for privacy purposes, and that when law enforcement officials asked him about the type of encryption used, they essentially were asking for [his] help in putting him in jail. [Gelfgatt] reiterated that he was able to decrypt the computers, but he refused to divulge any further information that would enable a forensic search.
decryption pursuant to Massachusetts Rules of Criminal Procedure Rule 14(a)(2). . . . It sought an order compelling [Gelfgatt’s] compliance with a `protocol’ the Commonwealth had established to obtain decrypted digital data. . . . [T]he Commonwealth stated that compelling [him] to enter the key to encryption software on various digital media storage devices that had been seized by the Commonwealth was essential to the discovery of `material’ or `significant’ evidence relating to the defendant's purported criminal conduct. The Commonwealth further stated that its protocol would not violate [Gelfgatt’s] rights under . . . the 5h Amendment to the United States Constitution. . . .
Commonwealth merely was requesting a sequence of numbers and characters that would enable it to access information on the computers, but that, on the other hand, the Commonwealth was asking for [Gelfgatt’s] help in accessing potentially incriminating evidence the Commonwealth had seized.
In the judge's view, there was merit to [Gelfgatt’s] contention that production of a password to decrypt the computers constituted an admission of knowledge, ownership, and control. Further, the judge continued, the scenario presented in this case was far different from compelling a defendant to provide a voice exemplar, a handwriting exemplar, or a blood sample, all of which are deemed to be nontestimonial. The judge said that [Gelfgatt’s] refusal to disclose the encryption key during his interview with law enforcement officials could be construed as an invocation of his rights under the 5th Amendment. . . .
5th Amendment provides that `[n]o person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.’ . . . It is well established that `the 5th Amendment does not independently proscribe the compelled production of every sort of incriminating evidence but applies only when the accused is compelled to make a testimonial communication that is incriminating’ (emphasis in original). Fisher v. U.S., 425 U.S. 391 (1976). See U.S. v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27 (2000) (`The word “witness'” in the constitutional text limits the relevant category of compelled incriminating communications to those that are “testimonial” in character). . . .
is seeking to compel [Gelfgatt] to decrypt `all’ of the `digital storage devices that were seized from him.’ Given that the Commonwealth believes that those devices contain information about [Gelfgatt’s] alleged mortgage payoff scheme, the entry of the encryption key or password presumably would be incriminating because `it would furnish the Government with a link in the chain of evidence leading to [the defendant's] indictment.. Doe v. U.S., 487U.S. 201 (1988), and accompanying text. The issue on which this case turns is whether [his] act of decrypting the computers is a testimonial communication that triggers 5th Amendment protection.
oral or written statements that are deemed to be testimonial, . . . the act of producing evidence demanded by the government may have `communicative aspects’ that would render the 5th Amendment applicable. Fisher v. U.S. supra; U.S. v. Hubbell, supra. . . . Whether an act of production is testimonial depends on whether the government compels the individual to disclose `the contents of his own mind’ to . . . communicate some statement of fact. U.S. v. Hubbell, supra. . . .
[T]he act of complying with the government's demand could constitute a testimonial communication where it is . . . a tacit admission to the existence of the evidence demanded, the possession or control of such evidence by the individual, and the authenticity of the evidence. See U.S. v. Hubbell, supra. . . . The determination whether an act of producing evidence in response to a governmental demand is sufficiently testimonial that it renders the 5th Amendment applicable `depend[s] on the facts and circumstances of [each] particular case[ ].’ Fisher v. U.S., supra. . . .
[N]ot all acts of production have communicative aspects such that they will be deemed testimonial. See U.S. v. Hubbell, supra. . . . [T]he 5th Amendment privilege is not triggered where the government seeks to compel an individual to be the source of real or physical evidence by, for example, furnishing a blood sample, . . . ; producing a voice exemplar; . . . standing in a lineup, . . . ; [or] providing a handwriting exemplar. . . . [It] is not implicated in these circumstances because the individual is `not required “to disclose any knowledge he might have,” or “to speak his guilt.”’ Doe v. U.S., 487 U.S. 201 (1988). . . .
an encryption key in the computers seized by the Commonwealth would appear, at first blush, to be a testimonial communication that triggers 5th Amendment protection. By such action, [he] implicitly would be acknowledging that he has ownership and control of the computers and their contents. This is not simply the production of real or physical evidence like a blood sample or a handwriting exemplar. Rather, [his] act of entering the encryption key would be a communication of his knowledge about particular facts that would be relevant to the Commonwealth's case.
provides that an act of production does not involve testimonial communication where the facts conveyed already are known to the government, such that the individual `adds little or nothing to the sum total of the Government's information.’ Fisher v. U.S., supra. For [it] to apply, the government must establish its knowledge of (1) the existence of the evidence demanded; (2) the possession or control of that evidence by the defendant; and (3) the authenticity of the evidence. Fisher v. U.S., supra.
[W]hen the government produces evidence to satisfy the `foregone conclusion principle, `no constitutional rights are touched. The question is not of testimony but of surrender.’ See Fisher v. U.S., supra (quoting Matter of Harris, 221 U.S. 274 (1911). . . . In essence, . . . the act of production does not compel a defendant to be a witness against himself.
factual statements that would be conveyed by [Gelgfatt’s] act of entering an encryption key in the computers are `foregone conclusions’ and, therefore, the act of decryption is not a testimonial communication that is protected by the 5th Amendment. The investigation by the corruption, fraud, and computer crime division of the Attorney General's office uncovered detailed evidence that at least two mortgage assignments to Baylor Holdings were fraudulent.
[Gelfgatt] acknowledged that he was able to perform decryption. Further, and most significantly, [he] said that because of encryption, the police were `not going to get to any of [his] computers,’ thereby implying that all of them were encrypted.
The Commonwealth's motion to compel decryption does not violate [Gelfgatt’s] rights under the 5th Amendment because [he] is only telling the government what it already knows.
Commonwealth v. Gelfgatt, supra. The court therefore reversed the trial judge’s denying the Commonwealth’s motion to compel decryption. Commonwealth v. Gelfgatt, supra.
You can, if you are interested, read more about the trial judge’s opinion, and the case, in the news story you can find here. And according to this news story, Gelfgatt’s lawyer is going to try to get the U.S. Supreme Court to review the case.

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