Source: https://supremecourt.gov.ng/profile/justice/18
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 05:46:41+00:00

Document:
Hon. Mr. Justice Chima Centus Nweze, a native of Obollo, Udenu Local Government Area of Enugu State, was born on September 25, 1958. A practising Christian of the Roman Catholic Denomination, he is married to Hon Justice Ugonne Jacinta Nweze of the Enugu State Judiciary. Their union is blessed with five children and a grandchild.
He attended St John Cross Seminary, Nsukka, from 1972 -1977, emerging with a Distinction in the West African School Certificate Examination, [WASCE]. Between 1979 – 1983, he was an undergraduate student at the University of Nigeria, Enugu Campus. In 1983, he represented the Faculty of Law, and indeed, all Nigerian Law Faculties, at the Phillip Jessup International Law Moot Court Competition in Washington DC, as the Chief Oralist. Upon his graduation in 1983, [LL. B. (Hons) (Nig.)], he proceeded to the Nigeria Law School, from 1983 - 1984, where he obtained the qualifying Certificate, [BL]. He did his NYSC between 1984 – 1985 in Bauchi.
Subsequently, he returned to the University of Nigeria, Enugu Campus, between 1993 – 1995, where he studied for, and obtained, the Master of Laws Certificate, [LL. M]. Between 1997 – 2001, he studied for, and achieved, the Doctorate Degree [Ph. D.] of the same university, the University of Nigeria.
Having practised at the private Bar from 1985 – 1995, he was elevated to the High Court Bench of Enugu State in November, 1995. While on the High Court Bench, he served as Chairman, Second Robbery and Firearms Tribunal, Enugu State, 1996 -1998; Chairman, Robbery and Firearms Tribunal, Nsukka, 1998 -1999; Member, Ondo State Local Government Election Petition Tribunal, 1999; Chairman, Ogun State Governorship and Legislative Houses Election Petition Tribunal, 1999; Administrative Judge, Nsukka Judicial Division, Enugu State, 2001. He was appointed a Justice of the Court of Appeal of Nigeria, February 15, 2008; and served thereat until October, 2014, when he was, finally, elevated to Nigeria’s apex court as a Justice of the Supreme Court of Nigeria, October 29, 2014. He has been on the Bench of the Supreme Court from October, 2014 – Date.
Hon Justice Chima Centus Nweze has served in various capacities in extra-judicial vocational activities. These include: Member, DFID Access to Justice Programme, Enugu State, 2003; Member, National Working Group on the Reform of Criminal Justice Administration, 2004 [the Administration of Criminal Justice Act, ACJA, is the brainchild of this group]; Team Member, Enugu State Sector Strategic Plan, 2004; PATHS-DFID Hon Consultant, District Health System Law/Regulations, 2004; Member, OSIWARD C Expert Consultative Forum on Federal Budget Act and Facilitator, Enugu State Justice Sector Reform Team.
A former Convenor/Co-coordinator, LL. M (International Human Rights Programme), and Visiting Human Rights Scholar, Faculty of Law, University of Nigeria, Enugu Campus, 2000 -2008; Justice Nweze, who was a Distinguished Scholar, Pro Bono, Faculty of Law, Enugu State University of Science and Technology, ESUT, Enugu, was formerly, a Visiting Associate Professor of Law, Faculty of Law, Ebonyi State University and Member, International Advisory Board, Annual Survey of International & Comparative Law (Golden Gate University School of Law, San Francisco, USA).
(a) “Contentual Analysis and Overview of the Implementation Problematic of Codes of Judicial Conduct in Selected Commonwealth Jurisdictions”, in Commonwealth Judicial Colloquium on Combating Corruption in the Judiciary (London: Commonwealth Secretariat, 2002).
“Expanding the Frontiers of legal Aid Services – The Humanitarian Perspective “, in S.A Akpala (eds), Legal Aid services in Nigeria: The Humanitarian Perspective (Enugu: SWEWP, 2001) Chapter 7.
“Continuing Professional Education for Law Library Staff”, in Oluremi Jegede (ed), Law Libraries in Nigeria: Match to the 21st Century (Lagos: Association of law libraries, 1998) (See Chapter 7).
“Antinomy of Rights: Human Rights Perspectives on the Recovery of Premises Procedure”, in LASER Contact Vol. 4. No. 1 January – June, 2000.
“The Judiciary: The Guardian of Democracy under the Constitution”, UNIZIK Law Journal Vol. 1 No. 3.
“Judicial Integrity: Desideratum for good governance”, Jos Bar Journal 2003.
Book Review: Introduction to Civil Procedure, Nigerian Bar Journal Vol. 1 No. 4, 2003.
“Issues and Options in the Domestication of the ICC Statute in Nigeria”, Nigerian Bar Journal, Vol. 2 No. 1, 2004.
“Reflections on Selected Judicial Decisions on Women’s Rights”, UNIZIK Law Journal. Vol. 4 No. 1, 2004.
“The Impacts of Legal Aid Services in the provision of Access to Justice to the Poor in Nigeria”, in SWEWP 10th Anniversary (Enugu: SWEWP, 2003) P. 23.
“The Christian Option in a Corrupt Society”, in Bigard Theological Studies vol. 26 No. 1 (January to June 2006) p. 71.
“Confronting the Leviathan: Overview of the Constitutional Framework for transparency in Public office”, in Mind- Opener (2005) Vol. 2.
Session of the African Commission on Human and People’s Rights, Banjul, The Gambia, 1999.
Session of the African Commission on Human and People’s Rights, Pretoria, South Africa.
World Conference on Penal Reform, Burkina Faso, 2002.
International Retreat on the Future of Nations State, Klingenthal, nr. Strasbourg, France, 1999.
International Conference on the International Criminal Court, Accra, Ghana, 2003.
International Seminar on Litigating Socio-economic Rights, Swedru, Central Region, Ghana, 2004.
Commonwealth Judicial Colloquium on Combating Corruption in the Judiciary, Cyprus, 2002.
International Conference on Africa and the Future of international Criminal Justice, University of Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, South Africa, July, 2010.
Fellow, Chartered Institute of Arbitrators, Chartered Institute of Arbitrators, Nigeria, 2015.
Oladotun v State (2010) 15 NWLR (pt 1217) 490.
Olateju v Sanni (2011) All FWLR (pt 590) 1257; (2011) 31 WRN 83; (2010) LPELR -4752 (CA).
Ekiti State Government v Ashaolu (2011) 15 WRN 112.
Kings Planet Int’ v CPWA Ltd (2013) 2 NWLR (pt 1392) 605.
“…we find it curious that the learned senior counsel for the appellant could invite us to jettison the position of the Nigerian Supreme Court in favour of the position taken by the Court of Appeal in England on joinder. As shown above, the appellant’s counsel had contended that the English Court of Appeal in Guthrie v Circuit (supra) held that Amon v Raphael Tuck and Sons Ltd (supra) was ‘too narrow to represent the position of the law’, see paragraph 2.14 [page 8 of the reply brief]. Wonders shall never end.
As indicated earlier, our apex court, approvingly, adopted the said Amon v Raphael Tuck and Sons Ltd (supra) in Uku and Ors v Okumagba and Ors (supra) and Peanock Investment Co Ltd (supra). It, therefore, beats our imagination how learned senior counsel expected this court to denigrate the authority of the final court in Nigeria in favour of the view of a subordinate foreign court.
Per Nweze JCA (as he then was) in Mothercat Nig Ltd v Regtd Trustess, FGAN (2013 LPELR-22118 (CA) 24-26, C-C: “From a conspectus of a host of Supreme Court decisions, we are emboldened in our view that the only permissible mode of proving the legal personality of Incorporated Trustees under Part C of CAMA, or Registered Trustees under the old Land (Perpetual Succession) Act, when the adversary has not conceded that status to the plaintiffs, is by the production in evidence of the certificate of incorporation issued by the Corporate Affairs Commission [CAC], Geneva v AfriBank Nig Plc (supra); ACB Nig Plc v Emotrade Ltd (supra). Thus, where a group of persons claims to have been registered as Incorporated Trustees under Part C of CAMA, they have to produce their certificate of incorporation, as nothing else would suffice, Emotrade. In effect, for Incorporated Trustees to establish their juristic personality, except if it is admitted by the opposing party, they must tender their certificate of incorporation under Part C of CAMA. It is, thus, not enough to describe themselves as Incorporated Trustees, Bank of Baroda v Iyalabani Company Limited,  12 SCM 7. Indeed, there is even a binding authority which favours the view that the status of Incorporated or Registered Trustees can only be established as a matter of law by the production in evidence of the certificate of incorporation under Part C of CAMA, whatever may be the admission of the defendants, Registered Trustees of Apostolic Church v AG Mid-West (supra); Geneva v AfriBank (supra); J.K. Randle v Kwara Breweries Ltd  6 SC 1.
Per Nweze JCA (as he then was) in University of Ilorin v Oluwadare (2009) All FWLR (pt 452) 1175 at 1204: “ ...jurisdiction is to a court what a gate or door is to a house. That is why the question of a court's jurisdiction is called a threshold issue: it is at the threshold [that is, at the gate] of the temple of justice [the court]. To be able to gain access to the temple [that is, the court], a prospective litigant must satisfy the gate keeper that he has a genuine cause to be allowed ingress. Where he fails to convince the gate keeper, he will be denied access to the inns of the temple. The gate keeper, as vigilant as he is always, will readily intercept and query all persons who intrude in his domain."
Per Nweze JCA (as he then was) in Kwara State Water Corp v AIC Nig Ltd (2008) LPELR-4414 (CA) 25-26, paragraphs C-F: “The courts have very often confessed the difficulty in distinguishing a ground of law from a ground of mixed law and fact, Ogbechie v Onochie (1986) 1 NWLR (pt. 70) 370 (where Eso JSC approvingly adopted the scintillating expose on the subject by C. T. Emery and Professor B. Smythe in their article titled, ‘Error of Law in Administrative Law’, in Law Quarterly Review Vol. 100 (October 1984); UBA Ltd v Stahlbau Gmbh & Co (1989) 3 NWLR (110) 374, 391-392; Obatoyinbo v Oshatoba (1996) 5 NWLR (pt. 450) 531, 548; MDPDT v Okonkwo (2001) 3 KLR (pt.117) 739 etc. This handicap, notwithstanding, they have ingeniously fashioned out formulae for navigating through the nuances of the characterisation of the grounds. The first formula aims at facilitating the ascertainment of what constitutes a ground of appeal. It comes to this: a court has a duty to do a thorough examination of the grounds of appeal filed. The main purpose of the examination will be to find out whether - if from the grounds of appeal, it is evident that the lower court misunderstood the law or whether the said court misapplied the law to the facts which are already proved or admitted. In any of these two instances, the ground will qualify as a ground of law. On the other hand, if the ground complains of the manner in which the lower court evaluated the facts before applying the law, the ground is of mixed law and fact. The determination of grounds of fact is much easier. Put in very simple terms, this formula simply means that it is the essence of the ground; the main grouse: that is, the reality of the complaint embedded in that name that determines what any particular ground involves, Abidoye v Alawode (2001) 3 KLR (pt. 118) 917, 919; NEPA v Eze (2001) 3 NWLR (pt. 709) 606; Ezeobi v Abang (2000) 9 NWLR (pt. 672) 230; Ojukwu v Kaine (2000) 15 NWLR (pt. 691) 516. In effect, it is neither its cognomen nor its designation as "Error of Law" that determines the essence of a ground of appeal, Abidoye v Alawode (supra) 927; UBA Ltd v Stahlbau Gmbh & Co (1989) 3 NWLR (110) 374, 377; Ojemen v Momodu (1983) 3 SC 173.
Per Nweze, JCA (as he then was) in Onjuri Anjola v The State (2012) LPELR-19699 (CA) 21-22, paragraphs B-D: “...in a charge of murder, the prosecution is obliged to prove: (1) that the deceased died; (2) that his/her death was caused by the accused; (3) that she/he intended to either kill the victim or cause her/him grievous bodily harm, see, for example, Woolmington v. DPP  AC 462; Hyam v. DPP  2 All ER 41; R v. Hopwood (1913) 8 Cr. App. R. 143, [England]. The Nigerian cases on these ingredients include: Madu v. State  15 NWLR (pt 1324) 405, 443, citing Durwode v. State  15 NWLR (pt 691) 467; Idemudia v. State  FWLR (pt 55) 549, 564;  7 NWLR (pt. 610) 202; Akpan v. State  FWLR (pt 56) 735;  12 NWLR (pt 682) 607. Elsewhere in the Commonwealth, the courts have, similarly, upheld these ingredients, R. v. Nichols (1958) QWR 46; R v. Hughes (1958) 84 CLR 170; Timbu Kolian v The Queen (1958) 42 A. L. J. R.; R v. Tralka  Qd. R. 225, [Queensland, Australia]. In the recent decision of Madu v. State (supra) at page 443, the Nigerian Supreme Court provided further insights into the nature of the duty on the prosecution.
Speaking for the apex court, Ariwoola JSC opined that: ...in a murder charge, prosecution owes it a duty to discharge by proving the death of the victim, responsibility of the accused by act or omission, intentional act or omission of the accused with knowledge that it could cause grievous bodily harm or death. The prosecution must prove that the act or omission caused death but not it could have caused death. The erudite and distinguished jurist cited, with approval, Ubani and Ors. v State  FWLR (pt 191) 1533, 1545;  18 NWLR (Pt 851) 224; Godwin Igabele v The State  3 SCM 143, 151;  6 NWLR (pt 975) 100; Alewo Abogede v State  5 NWLR (pt 448) 270."
Per Nweze JCA (as he then was) in Oyeyemi and Ors v Owoeye (2012) LPELR -19695 (CA) 23-24, E-G: “Like Order 3 Rule 18 (1) of the Court of Appeal Rules, 1981; Order 11 Rule (1) of the Court of Appeal Rules, 2007 is similarly worded like Order 11 Rule (1) of the 2011 Rules. Two unrelated circumstances are, clearly, distinguishable under these Rules. The first is where an appeal has been brought sequel to the proper filing of a Notice of Appeal at the court below, Ogunremi v. Dada (1962)1 All NLR 663; Adewoyin & Ors. v. Adeyeye (1962) 2 All NLR 108.
The second situation relates to where an appeal has been entered at the Court of Appeal, that is, when the Appeal Court has received the Record of Appeal and the appeal is called for hearing, Ezomo v AG, Bendel State (supra) Ogunremi v. Dada (supra); Adewoyin & ors. v. Adeyeye (supra). Put simply, these Rules recognise that there are two distinct periods: the period between the time when the appeal was deemed brought, that is, when the notice of appeal was filed, and before the record of appeal was forwarded to the Court of Appeal.
During this period, that is, when the appeal has not been entered at the Court of Appeal, the appellate Court has limited control over the proceedings as between the parties. In such a circumstance, every application should, usually, be first made to the Court below where the notice of the Appeal was given, Ogunremi v. Dada (supra).
The other period relates to the time after the record of appeal is received at the Court of Appeal. At this period, when the record has been received at the Court of Appeal, technically referred to as when the appeal has been entered at the Court of Appeal, the High Court, from which the appeal emanated, would cease to have jurisdiction, Ogunremi & Anor v Dada (supra); Ezomo v AG, Bendel State (supra); Adeleke v OYSHA  10 NWLR (pt 987) 50; Ezeokafor v Ezeilo  6 SCNJ 209; Shodeinde v Registered Trustees, Ahmadiyya Movement  FWLR (pt 58) 1065.
Governor of Ekiti State and Ors v Olubunmo  3 NWLR (pt 1551).

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