Source: https://caselaw.findlaw.com/us-supreme-court/304/359.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 01:11:13+00:00

Document:
[304 U.S. 359, 360] Messrs. Homer S. Cummings, Atty. Gen., and Bates Booth, of Washington, D.C., for petitioner.
Mr. J. Frank Kemp, of Atlanta, Ga., for respondents.
Respondents were paroled before completing sentences in federal prisons. 1 Before expiration of their sentences and while on parole, they committed second federal offenses, for which they were convicted, sentenced, and thereafter completely served sentences in the Atlanta Penitentiary. Respondents contend that from the moment of their imprisonment in the penitentiary under the second sentences, they also began service of the unexpired part of their original sentences. If this contention is correct, respondents have also completely served the unexpired parts of the first sentences.
When respondent committed a federal crime while on parole, for which he was arrested, convicted, sentenced, and imprisoned, not only was his parole violated, but service of his original sentence was interrupted and suspended. Thereafter, his imprisonment was attributable to his second sentence only, and his rights and status as to his first sentence were 'analogous to those of an escaped convict.' 5 Not only had he-by his own conduct-forfeited the privileges granted him by parole, but, since he was no longer in either actual or constructive custody under his first sentence, service under the second sentence cannot be credited to the first without doing violence to the plain intent and purpose of the statutes providing for a parole system.
Since service of the original sentence was interrupted by parole violation, the full term of that sentence has not been completed. Just as respondent's own misconduct (parole violation) has prevented completion of the original sentence, so has it continued the authority of the boar o ver respondent until that sentence is completed and expires. Discretionary authority in the board to revoke a parole at any time before expiration of a parolee's sentence was provided-and is necessary-as a means of insuring the public that parole violators would be punished. 8 The proper working of the parole system re- [304 U.S. 359, 363] quires that the board have authority to discipline, guide and control parole violators whose sentences have not been completed. It is not reasonable to assume that Congress intended that a parolee whose conduct measures up to parole standards should remain under control of the board until expiration of the term of his sentence, but that misconduct of a parole violator could result in reducing the time during which the board has control over him to a period less than his original sentence.
Respondents have not completed service of their original sentences and were not entitled to release. The causes [304 U.S. 359, 364] are reversed and remanded to the District Court for proceedings in conformity with this opinion.
[ Footnote 1 ] Some were released with credit for good conduct but are treated as on parole until their maximum terms have expired. 18 U.S.C. c. 22, 716b, 18 U.S.C.A. 716b.
[ Footnote 2 ] 19 F.Supp. 475. Respondents filed separate petitions for habeas corpus raising substantially identical issues, which will be treated together here, and the respondents will be dealt with as one.
[ Footnote 3 ] 5 Cir., 92 F.2d 756.
[ Footnote 4 ] Zerbst v. Kidwell, 303 U.S. 632 , 58 S.Ct. 757, 82 L.Ed. --; Zerbst v. Smith, 303 U.S. 632 , 58 S.Ct. 757, 82 L.Ed. --; Zerbst v. Collins, 303 U.S. 633 , 58 S.Ct. 757, 82 L.Ed. --; Zerbst v. Owens, 303 U.S. 633 , 58 S. Ct. 757, 82 L.Ed. --; Zerbst v. Peel, 303 U.S. 633 , 58 S.Ct. 758, 82 L.Ed . --; Zerbst v. Jones, 303 U.S. 633 , 58 S.Ct. 758, 82 L.Ed. --; Zerbst v. Stone, 303 U.S. 633 , 58 S.Ct. 758, 82 L.Ed. --; Zerbst v. Sullivan, 303 U.S. 633 , 58 S.Ct. 758, 82 L.Ed. --.
[ Footnote 5 ] Anderson v. Corall, 263 U.S. 193, 196 , 197 S., 44 S.Ct. 43, 44.
[ Footnote 6 ] 18 U.S.C. c. 22, 723c, 18 U.S.C.A. 723c.
[ Footnote 7 ] Id.
[ Footnote 8 ] The parole system was intended to make parole discretionary 'and revocable at any time ... (the parole authority) may elect to revoke it,' Cong. Rec., Vol. 45, p. 6374. '... the prisoner is under the absolute control of that board, and he may be apprehended and returned at any time on violation of his parole. Those are the safeguards for the benefit of society.' Id., p. 6377.
The governing Act expressly provides that: '... if said (retaken) prisoner shall have been returned to said prison, he shall be given an opportunity to appear before said Board of Parole, and the said Board may then or at any time in its discretion revoke the order and terminate such parole or modify the terms and conditions thereof. ...' (Italics supplied.) 18 U.S.C. c. 22, 719, 18 U.S.C.A. 719.
[ Footnote 9 ] See Cong. Record, vol. 45, p. 6374; United States v. Murray, 275 U.S. 347, 357 , 48 S.Ct. 146, 149.
[ Footnote 10 ] Cf. United States v. Farrell, 8 Cir., 87 F.2d 957, 961.

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