Source: https://www.policelawblog.com/blog/2010/10/index.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 19:50:09+00:00

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When Federal Law Enforcement Officers (LEOs) are subjected to disciplinary actions by their federal police departments and/or related agencies, our law practice frequently uses a legal approach to attempt to mitigate (lessen) the penalty in these proposed disciplinary actions. The purpose of this article is to take a look at the current application, as of 2010, of the Douglas (mitigation) factors to Federal LEOs facing discipline in the federal sector. The attempt by defense counsel to reduce the severity of the penalty focuses on an attempt by the defense to mitigate proposed penalties in such cases.
Mitigation, for Federal LEOs, is almost always referred to in the context of the Douglas factors, a landmark case in federal personnel law issued in 1981, which specifies 12 factors which can be used to mitigate or to aggravate a proposed disciplinary penalty. Douglas v. Veterans Affairs, 5 M.S.P.R. 280, 305-306 (1981).
The Douglas factors are used to mitigate or aggravate disciplinary actions for Federal LEOs and other federal employees that are proposed for disciplinary action. The factors originally relate back to 1981 in the Douglas case, where the Merit Systems Protection Board examined what issues might come up to mitigate disciplinary penalties. Typically, the issue of mitigation comes up when an officer receives a proposed disciplinary action or termination and I have to come into the officer's case and argue that the penalty being proposed must be mitigated.
To take a step back for the moment, it is key to understand that the Douglas factors are the second part of the disciplinary process; the first being whether or not the allegations themselves are true and can be proven. In the context of federal disciplinary actions, there are always these two parts to a Federal LEO’s disciplinary defense: (1) disprove the facts; and (2) contest the penalty as unreasonable in light of the Douglas (mitigating) factors. While these Douglas factors apply generally to all Federal employees, this article takes a look at how they apply specifically to federal law enforcement in the year 2010.
To start, when evaluating Douglas factor arguments for Federal LEOs, the first step is to consider which of these mitigating factors might apply so that one can argue for a lesser penalty. It is important to note that there are 12 individual factors for consideration and that they should all be reviewed for possible use in a case.
a. This factor tends to be used in aggravation by federal police departments.
b. Typically, in disciplinary actions, departments will use this factor to attempt to increase disciplinary penalties for officers based on their perceived view of the seriousness of the charges. For example, this comes up a lot in charges involving Giglio (candor/truthfulness charges) where police departments attempt to increase disciplinary penalties on this basis.
a. This factor is used quite commonly by federal police departments in an attempt to aggravate or raise the penalties against federal police officers. For example, see McManus v. Dep’t of Justice, 66 MSPR 564, 566 (1995) (federal correctional officers must conform to a higher standard of conduct than non-law enforcement employees).
b. Most often, a proposed disciplinary or adverse action against a federal law enforcement officer will attempt to tie their police officer position to the disciplinary charges at issue in order to increase a disciplinary penalty. Police officer's misconduct “was extremely serious and inconsistent with his duties and responsibilities as a law enforcement officer.” Watson v. Dep’t of Justice, 64 F.3d 1524, 1530 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (“Law enforcement officers are held to a higher standard of conduct than are other federal employees . . . .”).
c. The extent of this higher standard for federal law enforcement, for purposes of the Douglas factors can vary with the type of federal law enforcement official involved, i.e. supervisory or non-supervisory. Kirk v. Dep’t of Navy 58 MSPR 663, 671-72 (1993).
a. This factor can be used as mitigating in nature or as an aggravating factor. The key in mitigation is to show that the federal police officer does not have a disciplinary record, or in the alternative, does not have one involving similar alleged misconduct as the one currently alleged.
a. This is a significant mitigating factor for federal law enforcement officers, and one that we argue quite often on their behalf. Typically, in federal police officer cases, this is one of the best methods for an officer to attempt to mitigate disciplinary penalties by focusing on their background, successful career and performance, commendations from the department or the public and their awards.
a. This Douglas factor is almost always used by federal police departments to attempt to aggravate a proposed penalty. However, the allegations of loss of trust towards federal law enforcement officers must be specific and detailed. Departments tend to make mistakes in regards to this particular Douglas factor in disciplining police officers.
a. Typically, this factor is one that we argue in favor of mitigation on behalf of the officer involved. In particular, it is usually a given, depending on the particular federal sector police department involved, that some individuals on the department will have been charged and found guilty of similar administrative misconduct. If there are prior cases involving similar charges where the police official or officer involved received a lower penalty than what is being proposed for the officer pending discipline, we usually argue this as a basis for mitigation and seek a lower penalty for the officer that we are representing.
a. Typically, this is a factor argued by the Agency to justify their penalty. These tables of penalties are usually broad and can cover many kinds of broadly categorized misconduct charges. Therefore, this Douglas factor is usually argued by management to support a particular penalty or their position in a case.
a. This is a factor used to aggravate the penalty. Typically used in cases where a large number of individuals are aware of the disciplinary charges in the case or where the news media becomes aware of the situation and reports on it. I have found that this factor is commonly misused to attempt to raise the penalty in a disciplinary case.
a. This is a significant mitigating factor that is used quite frequently in our firm’s defense of federal law enforcement officers. Typically, it is clear that an alleged charge relates to duties or actions that the officer was never tried in or perhaps received training to the opposite of what the charges and/or allegations contend. This factor is key to mitigating discipline when we represent federal law enforcement officers on appeal in either the Merit Systems Protection Board or in arbitration.
a. This Douglas factor is important in disciplinary action cases for federal law enforcement officer clients. The potential for rehabilitation is a critical factor relied upon by administrative judges and arbitrators in mitigating discipline in cases involving federal law enforcement officers. Often times this factor comes into play with federal law enforcement officer cases where the officer has reported their own misconduct, before the Department itself is aware of any wrongdoing. If this has occurred, there is a strong legal argument for mitigating discipline in the case for the officer.
a. This is a significant factor for mitigation for a federal law enforcement officer, and a general catch all mitigating factor. See Brown v. Dep’t of Treasury, 61 MSPR (1994). It can be used to explain a particular set of misconduct as involving personality issues and conflicts between an officer/supervisor and their superior or other miscellaneous mitigating factors in a case.
(12) The adequacy and effectiveness of alternative sanctions to deter such conduct in the future by the employee or others.
a. This factor is very significant in that there might very well be other types of penalties, other than the one proposed, for an officer. Often times, one could argue that an officer or law enforcement supervisor’s penalty should be mitigated and that training be provided instead. The key is to stress that the penalty being proposed does not fit the misconduct in terms of addressing future misconduct. This is becoming a major factor in cases presently.
Of these 12 Douglas factors, there are a number of them that come up more often than others, given the nature of the federal law enforcement officer profession. In practice, it is important to highlight the law enforcement professional years of service, performance record, citizen and department based commendations.
There are many more details that can up in an individual officer's case. Please contact our law firm at www.berrylegal.com if you have any questions about how these Douglas factors might affect a case or situation that is applicable to you. Remember, it is always key to obtain legal counsel when evaluating a particular Douglas factor argument because each factor applies differently in individual cases.
An interesting Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) lawsuit was filed on October 12, 2010, by a police lieutenant and member of the Chattanooga Police Department (Department) alleging that the Department failed to properly pay overtime to him and others similarly situated under the FLSA. It appears that the claim period in which lost overtime is sought started on or about July 20, 2010, according to the complaint that was filed in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee.
The July 20, 2010 timeframe appears to relate to the date in which the City Personnel Officer for the City of Chattanooga issued guidance on positions within the municipality that were to be considered exempt from Section 7(K) of the FLSA. One of the recommendations apparently involved a recommendation that police lieutenants in the Department were to be considered exempt.
In a recent decision, in the case of People v. Drew Peterson, Case No. 08 CF 1169 (Oct. 1, 2010), by Judge Richard Schoenstedt of the 12th Judicial Circuit of the State of Illinois, the issue of LEOSA arose again. In particular, Judge Schoenstedt issued a ruling finding that the defendant in this case, Drew Peterson, could not be charged with the unlawful use of a weapon as a result of the Law Enforcement Officers’ Safety Act of 2004 (LEOSA). In so ruling, the judge had been faced with the legal issue of whether or not the defendant, a police officer, could be charged with felony unlawful use of a weapon given the implications of the Federal LEOSA legislation passed into law in 2004.
In court, the defendant’s defense attorneys had argued that Mr. Peterson, as a police officer, had been allowed by LEOSA to own the weapon in question, which they said he used in his law enforcement duties. As background, Will County prosecutors in May of 2008 had charged Mr. Peterson with felony unlawful use of a weapon, contending he had illegally modified the rifle by shortening the barrel.
This cause comes before this Court for decision following hearing of the Defendant's renewed motion to dismiss the charge against the Defendant for the charge of Unlawful Use of a Weapon. This Court has reviewed and considered the pleadings, testimony, exhibits admitted, arguments of counsel and case law.
On July 30, 2008, this Court entered an order finding that "LEOSA" is applicable to this matter and that the Defendant was a qualified law enforcement officer as defined by "LEOSA". By their renewed motion to dismiss, the defense has requested that this Court, on a pretrial basis, decide the factual and legal issues regarding whether this Defendant can be charged with this criminal offense. The State has not objected to this matter being heard by the Court on a pre-trial basis.
The defense argues simply that "LEOSA" applies to any firearm not specifically excluded whether or not that firearm is illegal by State law. The State's position is that "LEOSA" only applies to legal firearms, including those as determined by State law. The State argues that factors including conceal' carry; possession; privately owned v.
department issued; and illegal firearms are not covered by "LEOSA"; are important considerations in their favor.
An intent of LEOSA is to allow qualified law enforcement officers to carry concealed firearms, so that if the need arises, such an officer may unconceal; show; and ultimately use his weapon. LEOSA does not provide definitions as to the issue of carry or concealment, including whether it is permissible to have the weapon in a case, holster, waistband, and so forth. Similarly, LEOSA does not indicate that the size of the weapon is a factor in determining whether it can be concealed and carried. In fact, machine guns are typically larger than handguns and the machine gun is the only true firearm excepted from LEOSA. The State has presented no evidence sufficient to show this court that in some way the Defendant acted outside of his authority at any time relevant hereto while carrying or concealing the subject weapon.
qualified law enforcement officer who violates the department policy; and one who does not. The protection provided by LEOSA is simply not reduced or eliminated because an otherwise qualified officer fails to obtain permission from his department to use the weapon; or to arrange to have that weapon issued by his department.
Whether Illegal Firearms (by State Law) are Protected by "LEOSA"
For this Court, this is the closest question to be determined. From a review of the evidence and law, this Court does not believe it was the intent of the drafters of "LEOSA" that qualified officers should be immune from prosecution by the State when in possession of an illegal firearm as determined by that State. This issue may simply have not been considered at all. However, the State is essentially requesting this Court to assume or infer that the drafters intended to provide immunity only for State sanctioned weapons. In fact, it is possible to assume or infer the opposite in part because the evidence here shows that under different circumstances the officers of the Bolingbrook Police Department would have been able to possess and conceal carry this very weapon. From the evidence, this Court is unable to draw any inference of the intent relative to this issue.
Regardless, at trial it is the State's burden to prove each element of the offense charged. By these findings, it would be impossible for the State to do so. The defense's renewed motion to dismiss is granted.
While this is a state decision, which would apply only in a limited area of Illinois, unless an appeal is taken by prosecutors, it appears that the case could have a number of LEOSA implications towards various state weapons laws taken in this type of context. It is expected that these types of cases will begin to come to the forefront as the law in this area continues to be tested, analyzed and interpreted by the courts. For now, this kind of decision leaves open the possibility that law enforcement officers might be able to argue a wider application of LEOSA in defensive unlawful possession cases in the future. It is definitely an opinion for legal practitioners in this area of law, like myself, to keep in mind as these issues continue to arise under LEOSA.

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