Source: https://www.lawfareblog.com/five-unanswered-questions-trump-v-hawaii
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 15:49:36+00:00

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The outcome in Trump v. Hawaii should not have been much of a surprise. In December, a majority of the Supreme Court allowed the entirety of the travel ban to go into effect temporarily. Over the past decade, when the Roberts Court has stayed a lower court’s ruling, it has almost always reversed its judgment. This case was no exception. Furthermore, the court resolved the legality of the presidential proclamation in its entirety. The justices did not settle on some sort of Solomonic split: for example, holding that the government could deny entry to aliens with non-immigrant visas but must admit aliens with immigrant visas. President Trump prevailed on all claims.
Fourth, the travel ban does not run afoul of the non-delegation doctrine.
Finally, the court concluded that the comparison between the travel ban and Korematsu is inapposite.
The majority opinion, however, leaves open at least five unanswered questions that the judiciary is likely to have to address in the near future.
First, what happens on remand with respect to discovery?
Without question, the plaintiffs will seek discovery. They always do. And the district courts very well may oblige such requests. Following the lead of Justice Stephen Breyer’s dissent, the district courts could probe whether, in fact, exemptions are being granted under the terms of the proclamation. (If the government wants to avoid another trip to the Supreme Court, it should implement the waiver policies in a liberal fashion.) Justice Anthony Kennedy’s concurring opinion, however, erects important guardrails for allowing discovery beyond official records, such as waiver requests. First, Justice Kennedy questions “[w]hether judicial proceedings may properly continue in this case, in light of the substantial deference that is and must be accorded to the Executive in the conduct of foreign affairs and in light of today’s decision, is a matter to be addressed in the first instance on remand.” It is not a given that any further proceedings would be “proper,” given the court’s definitive ruling, albeit on a threshold question about the preliminary injunction. Specifically, Justice Kennedy writes that this may be a case wherein the president has “discretion free from judicial scrutiny.” Second, Justice Kennedy explains that “even if further proceedings are permitted, it would be necessary to determine that any discovery and other preliminary matters would not themselves intrude on the foreign affairs power of the Executive.” Again, he reiterates the deference due to the executive with respect to discovery matters.
Indeed, this admonition sheds light on the Supreme Court’s unsigned order from December in In Re United States. In this case, Judge William Alsup of the Northern District of California ordered the government to produce internal documents about its decision to terminate the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) policy. (To borrow from Feldman’s formulation, the plaintiffs sought “discovery to uncover new evidence of Trump’s thinking.”) The Supreme Court, however, issued a writ of mandamus, blocking the discovery request by a vote of 5 to 4. In dissent, Justice Breyer contended that “the Government’s arguments do not come close to carrying the heavy burden that the Government bears in seeking such extraordinary relief.” Based on Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion in Trump v. Hawaii, the soon-to-be retired jurist likely agreed that the “heavy burden” was satisfied because of the risk of intruding onto the executive’s powers. Additionally, DACA—unlike the travel ban—does not implicate “the foreign affairs power of the Executive.” Yet, a majority of the court still intervened at an early juncture to halt intrusive discovery.
In light of Kennedy’s concurrence and the order in the DACA case, I do not share Feldman and Fiss’s optimism as to the prospects of discovery for the plaintiffs here, beyond the production of official documents concerning the waiver process. The court—with or without Kennedy—will not lightly entertain intrusive discovery orders. And if no meaningful evidence is added to the record, it is difficult to see how the district courts could find the proclamation unlawful on remand.
Second, going forward, how should the lower courts treat “this President,” as opposed to “the President”?
Justice Kennedy made this point explicitly in his concurring opinion. He referenced “the substantial deference that is and must be accorded to the Executive in the conduct of foreign affairs,” adding that “an official”—in this case, the president—“may have broad discretion, discretion free from judicial scrutiny.” Not all officials receive such deference. During oral arguments, Justice Kennedy asked the solicitor general about the relevance of “hateful statements” made by a “local mayor” “as a candidate.” As his concurring opinion illustrates, a “local mayor” is very different from the president of the United States. Likewise, the president of the United States is in a very different position from that of a mere commissioner of the Colorado Civil Rights Commission, who disparaged the beliefs of Jack Phillips, the owner of the Masterpiece Cake Shop. Both the majority and concurring opinions in Hawaii reflect a principle I refer to as the “Presidential avoidance canon”: because of his unique role in the separation of powers, the law applies differently to the president than it does to anyone else. As I noted in a recent post on obstruction of justice, without question, the president is not “above the law.” The far more important question is: What “law” applies to the president?
In stark contrast, Justice Sonia Sotomayor’s dissent focused primarily, if not exclusively, on “this president.” Will Baude pointed out that “Justice Sotomayor’s dissent contains repeated references to ‘President Trump,’” and “mentions the ‘Trump administration.’” He added, “I doubt that either is an accident.” Indeed, as Justice Sotomayor delivered her opinion from the bench, she expressly referred to “President Donald Trump.” I was surprised that she used the president’s first name.
At a minimum, Trump v. Hawaii—coupled with the imminent arrival of a new justice—should further lower the temperature of the judiciary toward President Trump. A ruling against the president, however, would have sent the opposite signal to an emboldened lower-court judiciary. Still, the lower courts will no doubt take notice of the fact that the Supreme Court considered extrinsic evidence, including pre-inauguration campaign-trail statements. Although that evidence did not tip the balance in this case, under the deferential standard of review the court applied, such evidence may yield a different result in cases involving domestic affairs—such as the DACA litigation—with more stringent scrutiny.
Third, how does the Constitution apply to aliens who are not seeking entry into the United States but have already crossed the border?
Does Trump v. Hawaii inform other immigration-related litigation, such as cases concerning the rescission of DACA, the rights of asylum seekers and family-separation policies? The short answer is no, not directly. The level of scrutiny in Trump v. Hawaii was extremely deferential, but it was employed in a limited context. Chief Justice Roberts explained that the “exclusion of foreign nationals is a ‘fundamental sovereign attribute exercised by the Government’s political departments largely immune from judicial control.’” The key word in that sentence is “exclusion.” The pivotal question, then, is how does Hawaii extend to other pending cases that do not involve “exclusion”? It is helpful to distinguish between four categories of cases: (1) aliens seeking entry into the United States; (2) aliens outside the United States not seeking entry; (3) aliens who recently crossed the border into the United States; and (4) aliens within the border. The Constitution applies to each category differently.
Hawaii does not provide the rule for the second category: what rights are due to aliens outside the United States who are not seeking entry. In 2017, the Supreme Court left this question open in Hernandez v. Mesa. In that case, a border patrol agent fired two bullets across the border, killing a Mexican national. After deciding Ziglar v. Abassi, the court remanded Hernandez back to the Fifth Circuit to consider whether damages are available under the Bivens doctrine. On remand, the en banc Fifth Circuit rejected the argument that the Fourth and Fifth Amendments protected “foreign citizens on foreign soil” Hernandez v. Mesa, 885 F.3d 811, 817 (5th Cir. 2018). Hernandez has been appealed to the Supreme Court a second time. Justice Kennedy’s replacement will be able to decide whether certiorari should be granted.
The fourth category considers the constitutional rights of aliens who are within the United States. In Zadvydas v. Davis, the Supreme Court recognized that “once an alien enters the country, the legal circumstance changes, for the Due Process Clause applies to all ‘persons’ within the United States, including aliens, whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent.” Yet that holding merely raises the question of what process is due. Specifically, do noncitizens receive the full panoply of constitutional rights? The simple answer is that they do not. Zadvydas acknowledged “that the Due Process Clause protects an alien subject to a final order of deportation . . . though the nature of that protection may vary depending upon status and circumstance.” In Osorio-Martinez v. Attorney General, for example, the Third Circuit found that aliens with the requisite connection with the United States “enjoy at least ‘minimum due process rights.’” The panel, however, did not explain precisely what those “minimum” rights are. There is also an open question of whether the federal government could expand “expedited removal” procedures into the interior of the United States—currently, regulations limit such removals to areas within 100 miles of the border. Beyond procedural rights, aliens lack certain substantive rights. For example, even lawful permanent residents are denied basic First and Second Amendment rights: They cannot contribute to political campaigns and are subject to a categorical ban on firearm ownership. Other issues are being actively litigated. Some courts have found that a liberty interest in family unity based on the Due Process Clause prevents the separation of parents from their children. And the Supreme Court did not resolve the scope of abortion rights that are due unaccompanied minors who are held in federal custody, a matter with which the D.C. Circuit has struggled recently. Trump v. Hawaii, far from a comprehensive explication of presidential power at the border, leaves these issues unresolved.
Fourth, what is the scope of the president’s Article II powers?
The scope of the president’s Article II powers may return to the court in the DACA litigation. Recall that Attorney General Jeff Sessions initially justified the recision of the deferred action policy because he determined it was unlawful. In several various writings, I have urged the Justice Department to state this position more forcefully. Homeland Security Secretary Kirstjen Nielsen explained in a recent memorandum, however, that DACA was terminated without regard to any Article II argument. As a result, the Supreme Court likely will not have to address the scope of the president’s inherent powers unless the justices find that Nielsen’s other justifications are inadequate.
Finally, what is the permissible scope of a nationwide injunction?
The lower courts have already taken notice. Earlier this year, a district court found that the attorney general could not deny Chicago certain federal funding because of the city’s “sanctuary” policies. Rather than limiting its relief to Chicago, the court entered a nationwide injunction. A panel of the Seventh Circuit unanimously affirmed the ruling but split 2-1 on the validity of the nationwide injunction. The attorney general asked the en banc Seventh Circuit to limit the relief to the city of Chicago. The en banc court granted review but postponed ruling on whether the nationwide injunction should be stayed until “the Supreme Court’s resolution of Trump v. Hawaii.” The U.S. solicitor general sought an application for a stay from the Supreme Court. Hours after Hawaii was decided, the en banc Seventh Circuit put the nationwide injunction on hold.
Eventually, the Supreme Court will address the scope of nationwide injunctions in the sanctuary city, or perhaps the DACA litigation.

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