Source: http://bc-injury-law.com/blog/2011/09
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 07:54:26+00:00

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Earlier this year the BC Supreme Court released reasons for judgement finding that when a Defendant succeeds in a lawsuit and is awarded costs the order is for their benefit not their insurer. In short the Court held that ICBC has no subrogated right to costs awards under section 84(1) of the Insurance (Vehicle) Act. Reasons for judgement were released this week by the BC Supreme Court, New Westminster Registry, taking an opposite view of this issue.
In the result, the defendants will have their costs. Under s. 84(1) of the Insurance (Vehicle) Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 231, the Insurance Corporation of British Columbia (“ICBC”) is subrogated to its insured and is entitled to recover the costs to which the insured would be entitled. Accordingly, ICBC is entitled to recover the costs awarded to the defendants.
Given the contradictory recent court findings on this issue I suspect the BC Court of Appeal will be asked to weigh in on the topic of insurers subrogated rights to costs following the successful defence of a lawsuit.
Reasons for judgement were released this week by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, assessing non-pecuniary damages (money for pain and suffering and loss of enjoyment of life) for a mandibular fracture.
In this week’s case (Besic v. Kerenyi) the Plaintiff alleged he was assaulted by the defendant. After being ‘punched from behind’ the Plaintiff was briefly knocked unconscious. He suffered a mandibular fracture which needed to be wired shut. He also lost two teeth. He went on to suffer permanent nerve damage to his trigeminal nerve which caused numbness and drooling.
 There is no doubt that Mr. Besic’s life has been altered by this incident. He had to undergo surgery to repair the fracture and his jaw was wired shut for over a month. He was placed on a liquid-only diet and, consequently, experienced some short-term weight loss.
 The long-term consequences have been more severe. Two of Mr. Besic’s left molars were knocked out. He has not had the recommended dental repair performed so the gaps in his mouth are still there, eight years later. He either has to undergo surgery, risking further nerve damage, or live without these two teeth for the remainder of his life.
 The mandibular fracture caused permanent damage to the trigeminal nerve. As a result, Mr. Besic experiences numbness in his chin, lips and jaw. This causes him to drool while he eats and is a source of embarrassment. He does not notice if food has dripped, or become stuck, on his face because he cannot feel it. He finds himself constantly wiping his face in an attempt to ensure no food is lingering there.
 The nerve damage has caused a prickling pain in his face and jaw. Both this and the numbness are unlikely to improve. There is also a possibility that a future facial injury could cause the numbness to worsen.
 Since the incident, Mr. Besic finds that he has issues with his speech. Occasionally, he will slur his words or mumble, particularly when he becomes tired or is out in the cold. He believes that this is as a result of the numbness, although his neurologist, Dr. Frank Kemble, has questioned whether that is, in fact, the cause.
 The mumbling is also a source of social awkwardness, especially at his work at the North Fraser Pre-Trial Center in Surrey, where he is a correctional officer.
 I find $70,000 to be an appropriate amount for Mr. Besic’s injuries. While Mr. Besic does not suffer from a deformity of the jaw or dramatic weight loss, like the plaintiff in Pete, he does suffer from some similar injuries, such as numbness in the face and jaw, as well as jaw pain. He also experiences the resulting social embarrassment these injuries cause.
Reasons for judgement were released this week by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, highlighting the important benefits of BC’s open ended limitation period for victims of sexual abuse.
In this week’s case (Lakes v. MacDougall) the Defendant worked as a correctional guard in BC’s prison system for over 20 years. During this time he sexually abused a number of convicts. He was criminally convicted for these deeds. He was also successfully sued by some of his victims.
The Plaintiff, an alleged victim of this abuse, sued the Defendant and the Province of BC alleging the Province was vicariously liable for the abuse. He proposed to make his lawsuit a class action on behalf of all of the Defendant’s victims. The Province of BC agreed that a class action was appropraite. The Plaintiff and the Province asked the Court to certify a class action and further to approve a settlement process which would permit the victims to seek compensation by way of private arbitration.
 As I see it, the question is whether the loss of that benefit in this particular case is appropriately balanced by the gains offered by certification and approval of the settlement.
 In these circumstances, I exercise my discretion under s. 5(6) of the Class Proceeding Act, and direct that the plaintiff’s applications be adjourned to permit the parties to engage in further negotiations and amend their materials if they choose to do so.
Important reasons for judgement were released today by the BC Supreme Court, New Westminster Registry, further clarifying the examination for discovery limit in the new Rules of Court. In short the Court held that notwithstanding the time limit, generally only one examination for discovery is permitted.
 Defence counsel responds that it is implied that examinations should not be scheduled if it was abusive, but apart from that, a party can schedule multiple examinations for up to seven hours in total.
 In my view, the use of the plural “examinations for discovery” has to be read in the context of the entire sub-rule. It makes reference to examinations under other sub-rules, which relate to re-examination in subsection (17), in subsection (22) to informing himself or herself and it being adjourned for that purpose, and subsection (24) continuing an examination for discovery following receiving a letter.
 In my view, the sub-rule does not suggest that there should be more than one examination for discovery of a party. A party should be able to know whether they are finished with examinations for discovery or whether more are pending.
 I do not accept the interpretation of the sub-rule advanced by defence counsel. Since defence counsel has effectively conceded that it has had one examination for discovery of the plaintiff, the defence application to have a further examination for discovery of the plaintiff is dismissed.
Reasons for judgement were released last week by the BC Supreme Court, Victoria Registry, addressing the time limit for examinations for discovery when two actions are set for trial at the same time. In short the Court held that the Rules permit up to 14 hours of Plaintiff examination in these circumstances without the need for a Court Order.
In last week’s case (Campbell v. McDougall) the Plaintiff was involved in two separate motor vehicle collisions. She sued for damages in both actions. In the course of the lawsuit the Plaintiff was examined for discovery which was discontinued after 3.5 hours due to the Plaintiff’s fatigue. The discovery was reset and continued for a full day for a total of 10.5 hours of examination.
The Defendant wished to have 2.5 further hours of examination. The Plaintiff opposed and a Court application was brought. It appears the the parties worked out many of their differences prior to the hearing of the application but ultimately the Court ordered that the Plaintiff attend a further 2.5 hours.
 In the end, the plaintiff could be required to undergo up to 14 hours of an examination under Rule 7-2 without the defence having to obtain leave of the court.
 In this case, the defence has chosen to have one counsel conduct an examination, but effectively with respect to both actions.
 There is a sound basis for requesting the “additional” examination time, particularly with respect to the plaintiff’s new employment status. While it seems unlikely that the court would grant leave to exceed the specified hour allotment simply when some new information comes to light, the plaintiff’s earning abilities and capacity forms a significant part of the overall claim. A very large monetary amount for that loss will probably be advanced. An additional 2½ hours (and still less than the allowable 14 hours) examination time is not out of proportion to the amount involved in this proceeding.
Reasons for judgement were released last week by the BC Supreme Court, New Westminster Registry, assessing damages for a shoulder injury caused by a motor vehicle collision and subsequently aggravated by an at-work incident.
In last week’s case (Kaleta v. MacDougall) the Plaintiff was injured in a 2008 collision. Fault was admitted by the Defendant. As a consequence the Plaintiff suffered from “chronic neck and left shoulder pain”. The symptoms were due to soft tissue injury and there was a “moderate probability” for long lasting symptoms.
 In Dr. McAnulty’s last assessment on March 3, 2011 the plaintiff again reported with chronic neck and left shoulder pain, worse at night. His prior knee and back pain had resolved.
 Dr. McAnulty’s diagnostic impression at the time was of chronic myofascial pain post motor vehicle accident affecting the left neck and shoulder and the plaintiff was advised to continue with activity as tolerated.
 It may be concluded from all this that the prospect of a chronic injury in the nature of a permanent or indefinite injury is only a possibility, but in Dr. McAnulty’s report he also says that the patient has more likely than not reached the point of maximal medical improvement and that statement reflects a standard of probability and not possibility.
 I award the plaintiff $80,000 for general damages for pain and suffering and loss of enjoyment of life.
Reasons for judgement were released this week by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, providing comments critical of the practice of obtaining medical opinion evidence without accompanying physical examination of a Plaintiff.
In this week’s case (Ruscheinski v. Biln) the Plaintiff was involved in three collisions. She sustained soft tissue injuries to her her neck and shoulder in the initial crash. The following crashes had a ‘cascading effect‘ on these injuries resulting in chronic pain with partial disability. Non-Pecuniary Damages of $85,000 were assessed.
Ms. Ruscheinski evidently suffered soft tissue injuries in the MVA of February 24, 2006 which may have been aggravated by the MVAs of September 9 and September 17, 2006.
 In my opinion, Dr. Turnbull’s choice of the word “evidently” results from the fact that he did not conduct an examination of Ms. Ruscheinski. Dr. Turnbull has not met, nor has he ever examined Ms. Ruscheinski. His opinions are based solely on his review of medical records.
 I prefer the evidence of Drs. Feldman and Wasti over the defence expert, Dr. Turnbull. I accept Dr. Feldman’s opinion (supported by Dr. Wasti) that meeting a patient, obtaining their history directly, and conducting a thorough examination are essential to provide an accurate diagnosis of a patient’s injuries and to determine an appropriate prognosis.
 In my opinion, when dealing with cases where chronic pain is suggested or suspected, an examination of a patient that is designed to look for objective evidence of injury, such as muscle spasm, as opposed to feigned pain behaviour, coupled with an appropriate and thoughtful approach to taking a patient’s history, will lead to a diagnosis and prognosis that is much more reliable than a records review. I accept Dr. Feldman’s evidence that without a physical examination of Ms. Ruscheinski, it would not have been possible to detect the winging of her scapula.
 Dr. Turnbull agreed in cross-examination that muscle spasm and tenderness provide an objective basis for a diagnosis and prognosis. Those objective findings were found by Drs. Feldman and Wasti. Dr. Turnbull is not in a position to contradict the findings of Drs. Wasti and Feldman because he did not examine Ms. Ruscheinski. Further, Dr. Turnbull did not address Dr. Feldman’s findings, the findings from the flexion/extension x-rays, nor the focused treatment recommended by Dr. Feldman that consists of active and passive treatments. Finally, I wish to note that Dr. Turnbull acknowledged that most of his patients with neck and back pain do not have a history of being involved in motor vehicle accidents.
Reasons for judgement were released last week by the BC Supreme Court, Vancouver Registry, dealing with fault for a collision involving a jaywalking pedestrian.
In last week’s case (Wong-Lai v. Ong) the elderly Plaintiff and her husband where involved in a serious collision in 2009. It was a dark and rainy Vancouver Autumn evening. As they crossed the street to return to their car they were struck by a vehicle driven by the Defendant. The Plaintiff was not in a marked cross-walk at the time. Her husband died and the Plaintiff suffered severe injuries.
 I have concluded that Mr. Ong must bear some of the legal responsibility for the accident. The law is well-settled that a driver of a vehicle owes a duty to keep a proper lookout and to avoid exercising his or her right of way in the face of danger of which he or she was or ought to have been aware. In some cases the expression used is that that person must avoid dangers of which he or she was aware or which were reasonably apparent. I do not think that the defendant in this case can avoid liability merely because he did not see Ms. Lai before impact. The critical question is whether he ought to have seen her or, in other words, whether her presence was reasonably apparent at a point when Mr. Ong could have taken steps to avoid running her down.
 Drivers of motor vehicles are not to be held to a standard of perfection. However I do not think that the possibility that persons may be crossing a highway at a point other than a crosswalk or intersection is so remote that a driver has no duty to take it into account in keeping a lookout. The evidence in this case persuades me that Mr. Ong was not keeping a proper lookout immediately prior to the accident. His own evidence is that he was not looking forward. While it is perfectly permissible and prudent for a driver who is changing lanes to do a shoulder check I think it is also incumbent on such a driver to take the steps necessary to ensure that it is safe for him to do so.
 In all of the circumstances I find that Ms. Lai is 75% liable for the accident that occurred and Mr. Ong 25%. Ms. Lai is therefore entitled to recover 25% of the damages she suffered as a result of this tragic accident.
1) Gross bleeding from urine requiring emergency urological consultation. A CT cystogram ruled out bladder rupture. Ct scans of the kidneys did not show any severe renal damage and she only required observation and support. However angiogram showed the pelvic fractures has ruptured blood vessels and she had bleeding in the blood supply to the pubic bone and these required embolisation to stop the bleeding.
2] Cervical Cl C2 unstable fracture. This required immobilisation and stabilisation in a collar and traction for the first eight weeks. She also has a moderate central cervical disc protrusion at level C6-7 which indented her cervical spinal cord.
3] Chest contusions left upper lobe, right middle lobe, and multiple rib fractures of the left 3 to 6 ribs and left 8 rib.
4) Multiple pelvic comminuted fractures bilaterally, namely superior and inferior pubic rami. She required immobilisation for her neck and leg fractures as well as for these fractures for the first eight weeks. She remained in the intensive care unit for a few weeks for treatment and stabilisation of all her injuries.
5) The left Tibial and left Fibular fractures require manual reduction and internal fixations on December 1, 2009. She returned to the intensive care unit post operatively.
 In my view the most important factors in this case are the severe and painful injuries suffered by Ms. Lai, the marked degree of permanent disability, the loss of independence and the increased risk of morbidity and mortality identified in Dr. Guy’s opinion. I also note that Ms. Lai’s stoicism and determination to make the best of her predicament should not diminish the amount of damages awarded to her.
 I have reviewed the numerous decisions on pecuniary damages involving serious injuries cited to me by counsel. These cases are all of course fact specific. My review of them, coupled with a consideration of the principles restated in Stapley, leads me to conclude that an award of non pecuniary damages in the amount of $200,000 is appropriate in this case.
In my effort to archive ‘voir dire‘ rulings dealing with civil procedure issues in personal injury cases, I summarize recent reasons for judgement released by the BC Supreme Court, New Westminster Registry, addressing the admissibility of a Plaintiff’s post accident statement to police.
Ms. Nerval applied to tender her statement to Cst. Baskin because she could not recall the events surrounding the collisions. A voir dire was held. Cst. Baskin reported that Ms. Nerval had told him that she was making a left-hand turn to go westbound on Sandpiper. At the time there was a van facing southbound indicating a left turn and an intention to go eastbound on Sandpiper. She said she did not see any other motor vehicle coming towards her. She did not remember if she had her signal light on; there was no mention of a signal light in his notes. Ms. Nerval told him that the other van had its signal on. That is the totality of his conversation with Ms. Nerval.
The defence opposed the admission of this statement into evidence on the basis that it fails to meet the requirement of necessity. The defence argues that to be admissible the statement must be used to rebut an allegation of recent fabrication, be a prior inconsistent statement, or be a statement contemporaneous with an event reported in the statement.
I conclude that the statement is not admissible. The circumstances under which the statement was taken do not reflect that it was taken contemporaneously with the event. The evidence did not support the suggestion that it was a contemporaneous report. There was no suggestion that the statement was inconsistent with the evidence given by Ms. Nerval at the trial and no suggestion that the there was an allegation of recent fabrication of evidence.
If I am wrong in my conclusions regarding the admissibility of the statement, I would otherwise have concluded that the statement did not contain any information that materially augmented the evidence of Ms. Nerval at trial.

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