Source: https://tcf.org/content/report/how-defunding-public-sector-unions-will-diminish-our-democracy/
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 08:06:02+00:00

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This report highlights an additional problem that should concern people across the political spectrum: defunding public sector unions could deal a substantial blow to a critical driver of American democracy.
Public sector unions promote democratic values and practices in a variety of ways. They serve as a check on arbitrary government power and help sustain middle-class wages and benefits; serve as schools of democracy for workers; and, in the case of teacher unions, help support a public school system that promotes democratic values. These larger interests should enter into the calculus the Supreme Court uses to weigh free speech rights against state interests.
Indeed, the whole idea of unionism is based on basic democratic values. The fundamental idea that duly-elected union leadership has the right to collect dues and advocate as the majority of workers wants is analogous to a democracy’s right to impose taxation in order to promote the common good. The 1935 National Labor Relations Act embodied this democratic vision. Section 1 provides: “It is declared to be the policy of the United States to eliminate the causes of certain substantial obstructions to the free flow of commerce and to mitigate and eliminate these obstructions when they have occurred by encouraging the practice and procedure of collective bargaining and by protecting the exercise by workers of full freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of representatives of their own choosing, for the purpose of negotiating the terms and conditions of their employment or other mutual aid or protection”4 (emphasis supplied). Subsequent state laws governing collective bargaining for public sector employees were modeled on the NLRA’s vision.
The report proceeds in four parts. Part I analyzes the claims in Friedrichs under the current framework of balancing envisioned by the Supreme Court, and concludes that fair share fees are justified. Part II broadens the discussion to consider the state’s powerful interest in promoting institutions that strengthen American democracy. Part III considers an objection raised by supporters of Friedrichs: that public sector unions will do just fine if they lose the Friedrichs case. Part IV concludes.
The current legal framework in which courts weigh cases such as Friedrichs is narrowly constrained, balancing the free speech rights of dissenting union members against the state’s interests in promoting stable labor relations with its public employees.
On the other hand, the Court recognized that the state, as an employer, has an interest in promoting harmonious labor relations. To discourage the formation of multiple unions with competing claims, the state has an interest in facilitating a single union negotiating on the behalf of all workers, whether or not individual employees choose to be a member of the union. Under an exclusive bargaining arrangement, the union has a duty to represent members and nonmembers alike. Accordingly, the Court held, the state may prevent employees from being “free riders” by compelling contribution to that portion of union membership dues that underwrite the cost of collective bargaining over issues such as wages and benefits.
In Friedrichs, the petitioner explicitly seeks to have the Supreme Court overrule the longstanding Abood compromise.8 That would be a serious mistake, for reasons outlined below.
The U.S. Supreme Court has long recognized that First Amendment rights extend beyond the right to speak to include the right not to be compelled to subsidize speech to which an individual objects. The lawyers for Friedrichs invoke Thomas Jefferson’s statement “to compel a man to furnish contributions of money for the propagation of opinions which he disbelieves is sinful and tyrannical.”9 The state cannot require that, as a condition of employment, public employees must contribute to an ideological cause they may oppose.
Friedrichs tries to argue that the distinction between political speech and collective bargaining for public sector unions outlined in Abood is illusory; that because collective bargaining over wages and benefits impacts state budgets, it is inherently political speech. But respondents point out that if this were true—that collective bargaining is a form of political speech—how could it be legal for states to ban it among public employees, as several states currently do?
Moreover, the Abood Court noted that dissenting public employees are still free to express their disagreements with the union publicly and vocally. A “public employee who believes that a union representing him is urging a course that is unwise as a matter of public policy is not barred from expressing his viewpoint.”10 And, of course, if teachers such as Friedrichs are upset with union leadership, they can seek to have leaders ousted through periodic democratic elections of officers, or even run for office themselves.
Free speech rights are never absolute. Jefferson’s statement about compelled contributions, for example, cannot be taken literally. For instance, the government may, in fact, compel taxation from an individual who is opposed to the war in Afghanistan, and then use those funds to engage in speech to recruit soldiers for the war effort. Free speech rights must always be balanced against other considerations.
Free rider problems exist in many organizations. Why donate to a religious institution if you can still attend and enjoy services whether or not you pay? To counter this, some groups can provide “special advantages” to backers—a leadership position in the church, for example. Unions cannot take this approach, however. As Justice Kagan noted in Harris v. Quinn, because “the law compels unions to represent—and represent fairly—every worker in the bargaining union, regardless whether they join or contribute to the union,” the collective action problem is “of far greater magnitude than in the typical interest group.”15 She referenced Justice Antonin Scalia’s opinion in an earlier decision, making this point: “where the state creates in the nonmembers a legal entitlement from the union, it may compel them to pay the cost.”16 This principle, “there is no free lunch,” is something conservatives usually understand well.
All unions—including, and perhaps especially, public sector unions—also contribute to one of the most important foundational interests of the state: democracy. And they do this in many different ways. Unions are critical civic organizations that serve as a check on government power. They are important players in promoting a strong middle class, upon which democracy depends. They serve as schools of democracy for workers. And teacher unions, in particular, help ensure that our educational system is sufficiently funded to teach children to become thoughtful and enlightened citizens in our self-governing democracy.
In 1980, President Ronald Reagan championed the role of Polish unions in challenging dictatorial rule by the Communist Party. Reagan declared in a Labor Day speech that year, “where free unions and collective bargaining are forbidden, freedom is lost.” Albert Shanker, the legendary president of the American Federation of Teachers from 1974 to 1997, saw a pattern in authoritarian regimes. “There is no freedom or democracy without trade unions,” he noted. “The first thing a dictator does is to get rid of the trade unions.”20 Public sector unions, in particular, have played an important role in bringing down dictators in countries such as Chile.21 In free societies across the globe, from Finland to Japan, the rights of teachers and other public sector employees to unionize are well established. Indeed, when the United States attempts to plant the seeds of democracy in other countries, free trade unions—for private and public sector workers alike—are critical elements of what we advocate.
If such unions are to have the capacity to wield influence, they cannot be starved of the fees from workers necessary to play that role.
International studies also connect the relatively low levels of U.S. union density (when compared with other nations) and the higher level of economic inequality found in the United States. According to a 2011 analysis by the Center for Economic and Policy Research looking at twenty-one wealthy nations, nine countries had more than 80 percent of their workers covered by collective bargaining agreements; nine had between 30 and 80 percent covered; and just three—the United States, Japan, and New Zealand—had coverage rates below 20 percent. Using data from the Central Intelligence Agency’s World Factbook on levels of income inequality, my colleague Moshe Marvit and I demonstrate in Why Labor Organizing Should Be a Civil Right that the three nations with the lowest collective bargaining coverage also were among the four countries with the highest degrees of income inequality, as measured by the Gini coefficient.29 Defunding public sector unions will only accelerate the extreme economic inequality that threatens our political democracy.
Indeed, one could argue that teachers unions provide a healthy enhancement to democratic decision-making on education policy because teachers, as much as any other group in society, serve as powerful advocates for those Americans who cannot vote—school children. As journalist Jonathan Chait has noted, politicians—who have short-term horizons—are prone to under-investing in education, and teachers unions “provide a natural bulwark” against that tendency. Since most voters do not have children in the public school system, those parents who do need political allies have their concerns heard.
The interests of teachers and their unions do not always coincide with those of students, but on the really big issues, such as overall investment in education, the convergence of interests is strong. And evidence suggests that the alliance is working.
In general, American society consistently under-invests in children outside of schools, compared with other leading democratic societies. According to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the child poverty rate in the United States is 21.6 percent, the fifth highest among the forty member-nations. Only Turkey, Romania, Mexico, and Israel have higher child poverty rates. Put differently, the United States is in the bottom eighth in preventing child poverty.
By contrast, when the interests of children are represented by and connected to the interests of teachers—as they are on the question of public education spending—the United States ranks close to the top third. Among thirty-nine OECD nations, the United States ranks fourteenth in spending on primary and secondary education as a percentage of gross domestic product.43 There is little doubt that, without the voice of teachers, the United States would under-spend on public education as well.
Supporters of Rebecca Friedrichs argue that unions are crying wolf; that public sector unions will be just fine if Abood is overturned and the Supreme Court effectively makes all public sector unions live under a national “right-to-work” regime.
But strong empirical evidence suggests that even though unions can survive without “fair share” or agency fees, they will suffer a severe financial penalty, reducing their capacity to collectively bargain, recruit new members, and play an important role in our democratic society. For example, an amicus brief by Social Scientists Richard Freeman, Eunice Han, and Joel Rogers notes that in states that recognize a duty to bargain, but prohibit agency fees, 34 percent of teachers are free riders.48 They also note that in states permitting or not barring fair share fees, public sector union density averaged 49.6 percent, compared with a 17.4 percent average in states that barred agency fees. They conclude, “Everybody agrees that abolishing agency shop would significantly hurt unions, the union wage premium, the positive effects of spillover to other workers, the likelihood of success in new organizing, and on and on.”49 Public sector unions will become a much weaker shell of their former selves.
A decision disempowering public sector unions, moreover, could indirectly weaken private sector unions as well. The First Amendment concerns in Friedrichs do not apply directly to private sector employees, but the ripple effect on the entire union movement would be felt. The labor movement thrives on solidarity. When public sector unions like New York City teachers first began to fight for collective bargaining rights, they received critical financial support from private sector unions such as the United Auto Workers.50 Today, it is public sector unions which are in a position to aid their private sector counterparts. A decision weakening the public sector labor movement, therefore, could weaken trade unions across the board.
Supporters of Friedrichs want the Supreme Court to recognize a new constitutional right to free ride on public sector unions. The suit itself can be seen as a naked political grab, one that seeks to undermine the power of collective action by hardworking Americans and weakening the ability for unions to promote the interests of workers’ rights nationally.
As Harold Meyerson wrote in the Washington Post, a decision in favor of the petitioner in Friedrichs will be set alongside other ignominious decisions, such as Bush v. Gore, handing the presidency to George W. Bush; Citizens United, upending campaign finance laws; and Shelby County, gutting the Voting Rights Act as part of a series of efforts to tilt the political playing field against Democrats.51 The move would further jeopardize the legitimacy of the Supreme Court as a nonpartisan actor interpreting the Constitution.
Historically, labor unions have been recognized, by Democrats and Republicans alike, as essential actors that help our democracy flourish. Imposing a harsh right-to-work regime on public sector workers nationally would not just be a political power grab; it would severely weaken a key set of institutions that make our democracy work.
1. The Supreme Court defines the clash of interests somewhat differently—the rights for free speech against the state interest as an employer in “labor peace”—but this report argues the interests should be viewed more broadly.
2. Richard D. Kahlenberg and Moshe Z. Marvit, Why Labor Organizing Should Be a Civil Right: Rebuilding a Middle-Class Democracy by Enhancing Worker Voice (New York: Century Foundation Press, 2012), 37.
3. Harold Meyerson, “Another ‘Bush v. Gore’?” Washington Post, July 23, 2015.
5. Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, 431 U.S. 209 (1977).
6. Catherine Fisk, “The Friedrichs petition should be dismissed,” Scotusblog, August 26, 2015.
7. Harris v. Quinn, 134 S.Ct. 2618 (2014).
8. As a fallback strategy, the petitioner asks the Supreme Court to eliminate the state requirement that dissenters from the union affirmatively opt out of being members Brief for Petitioners, Friedrichs v. California Teachers Association, September 4, 2015, 1–2.
9. Brief for Petitioners, Friedrichs, 16.
16. Harris, at 2656–57, quoting Lehnert, v. Ferris Faculty, 500 U.S. 507, at 556 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
17. Brief of Petitioner, Friedrichs, 7.
18. Brief of American Federation of Teachers and American Association of University Professors as Amici Curiae in support of Respondents, Friedrichs v. California Teachers Association, 3.
19. Brief of National Women’s Law Center, the Leadership Conference on Civil and Human Rights, the Human Rights Campaign, and seventy additional organizations committed to civil rights and economic opportunity as Amici Curiae in support of Respondents, Friedrichs v. California Teachers Association (November 13, 2015).
20. “Al Shanker, Tough Liberal, Think Tank with Ben Wattenberg, PBS,&nbsp; http://www.pbs.org/thinktank/transcript1284.html.
21. Richard D. Kahlenberg, Tough Liberal: Albert Shanker and the Battles Over Schools, Unions, Race and Democracy (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), 261.
22. See Seymour Martin Lipset, Martin Trow and James Coleman, Union Democracy: The Inside Politics of the International Typographical Union (New York: Free Press, 1977), 13–14, citing Aristotle Politics, 4.11.
23. Sidney Hook, Speech to Social Democrats, July 1976.
24. Theodore Roosevelt, New Nationalism Speech, https://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2011/12/06/archives-president-teddy-roosevelts-new-nationalism-speech.
25. Spence, quoted in Nicholas D. Kristof, “Occupy the Agenda,” New York Times, November 20, 2011.
26. Alexander Colvin, Rosemary Batt, and Harry Katz, “How High Performance Human Resource Practices and Workforce Unionization Affect Managerial Pay,” Cornell University ILR School, Articles and Chapters, Paper 274, 2001, 24, http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1276&context=articles.
27. Pew Research Center, “The American Middle Class Is Losing Ground:&nbsp; No longer the majority and falling behind financially,” December 9, 2015, http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2015/12/09/the-american-middle-class-is-losing-ground/.
28. Mishel and International Monetary Fund cited in Dan Kauffman, “Labor’s Last Stand: Scott Walker and the Dismantling of Unions,” New York Times Magazine, June 14, 2015, 54.
29. Kahlenberg and Marvit, Why Labor Organizing, Figure 2.9.
30. Robert Putnam, Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2000), 80–81, 337, 456, 494–96.
31. Randall Garton, “Collective Bargaining Teaches Democratic Values, Actions,” Albert Shanker Institute Blog, September 16, 2011.
32. David Madland, Karla Walter, and Nick Bunker, “Unions Make the Middle Class,” Center for American Progress April 4, 2011, 15, citing Benjamin Radcliffe and Patricia Davis, “Labor Organizing and Electoral Participation in Industrial Democracies,” American Journal of Political Science 44, no. 1 (2000): 132–41.
33. Daniel DiSalvo, Government against Itself: Public Union Power and Its Consequences (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 16.
34. Quoted in Richard D. Kahlenberg, All Together Now: Creating Middle-Class Schools through Public School Choice (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2001), 13–14.
35. Brief of Petitioner, Friedrichs, 26–28.
36. Richard D. Kahlenberg, “Unions and the Public Interest,” Education Next, Winter 2012, 63 68.
37. American Federation of Teachers and American Association of University Professors Amicus Brief, 29.
38. Robert M. Carini, “Teacher Unions and Student Achievement,” in School Reform Proposals: The Research Evidence, ed. Alex Molnar et al. (2002), cited in American Federation of Teachers and American Association of University Professors Amicus Brief, 28.
39. Richard D. Kahlenberg and Halley Potter, A Smarter Charter: Finding What Works for Charter Schools and Public Education (New York: Teachers College Press, 2014), 30.
40. Leo Casey, “The Educational Value of Democratic Voice: A Defense of Collective Bargaining in American Education,” in Collective Bargaining in Education: Negotiating Change in Today’s Schools, ed. Jane Hannaway and Andrew Rotherham (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Education Press, 2006), 181.
41. Kahlenberg, Tough Liberal, 34.
42. See Kahlenberg and Potter, A Smarter Charter, 30–31.
43. Richard D. Kahlenberg, “Unions and the Public Interest,” 63.
44. Harris, at 2648 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
45. Kahlenberg and Potter, A Smarter Charter, 151.
46. Brief of Amicus Curiae Mackinac Center for Public Policy in Support of Petitioners, Friedrichs v. California Teachers Association.
47. Brief of Petitioner, 31.
48. Brief of Amici Social Scientists in support of respondents, Friedrichs v. California Teachers Association, November 13, 2015, 23, Table 3.
49. Brief of Amici Social Scientists, 28–29.
50. Kahlenberg, Tough Liberal, 42.

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