Source: http://riverdeepbook.blogspot.com/2017/09/kelley-lynchs-reply-to-leonard-cohens.html
Timestamp: 2019-04-23 16:23:35+00:00

Document:
This is an appeal from an order denying a motion to vacate the renewal of a default judgment. Appellant Kelley Lynch moved for the order on the ground that Leonard Cohen and LC Investments, LLC, the original judgment creditors, failed to serve the summons and complaint, the proof of substituted service is evidence of extrinsic fraud, respondent has submitted no evidence whatsoever proving that the alleged Jane Doe existed and/or was served, the Court failed to obtain jurisdiction, the Court has no jurisdiction over the corporations, Cohen had no standing to bring the suit in his individual capacity, a number of the corporations inserted into the judgment were and remain suspended, and, the judgment as well as the renewal of judgment are void. The court denied her motion. Please refer to Appellant’s Opening Brief for the facts and discussion set forth therein.
On August 9, 2013, Appellant filed a Motion to Vacate and/or Modify Default Judgment entered May 15, 2006; Memorandum of Points & Authorities; Declarations of Kelley Lynch and Rutger Penick. 1 CT 7.
On January 6, 2014, Respondent filed an Opposition to Defendant’s motion; Declaration of Scott Edelman; Declaration of Michelle Rice; Declaration of Robert Kory; and Declaration of Leonard Cohen. Leonard Cohen’s declaration addressed his statements that Lynch was in fact Jane Doe. Cohen submitted two photographs supporting his false assertions. 1 CT 107. Michelle Rice’s declaration contained a tremendous amount of immaterial, irrelevant information, which seemed centered around personal attacks on Lynch and prejudicial information meant to influence the Court. 2 CT 232. It is of interest to note that Rice’s declaration confirmed that Cohen did not hear from Lynch, following issuance of the Colorado restraining order, until early 2011. This followed both FTB and IRS instructing Appellant to obtain the tax information Leonard Cohen and the corporations were required to provide her. “In early 2011, upon Mr. Cohen’s return to Los Angeles at the conclusion of his 2008-2010 World Tour, Ms. Lynch resumed her harassment of Mr. Cohen and my law partner, Robert Kory …” 2 CT 234. Robert Kory’s declaration essentially addressed federal tax matters and arguments. The declaration confirmed that the fraudulent complaint narrative, LA Superior Court Case No. BC338322, was used to file and amend Leonard Cohen’s personal returns and apply for/obtain federal and state tax refunds. This is a relevant and material issue as Kory & Rice, LLP and other Cohen representatives refused to respond to Lynch’s statements that she was not served the summons and complaint. By December 2005, Leonard Cohen and his representatives clearly felt that a default judgment was assured or they most likely wouldn’t have filed personal tax returns that could later be attacked as fraudulent. Letters Kory sent to IRS were attached to his declaration which had no relevance or materiality to the issues before the Court. Robert Kory’s letters were replete with fraudulent misrepresentations that Lynch has addressed with Internal Revenue Service directly. 2 CT 296.
On January 17, 2014, the Court denied Appellant’s original motion to set aside the May 15, 2006 default judgment.
On July 13, 2015, Respondent filed a renewal of judgment totaling $14,059,183.80. At the October 6, 2015 hearing on her motions, Appellant challenged the initial judgment amount and additional application of $6,717,808.80 in financial interest as fraud and noted that Respondent was engaged in extortion with respect to these amounts. 1 RT 5 – 6 (10.06.15 hearing transcript); 2 CT 360.
On July 28, 2015, Appellant filed a Motion to Set Aside Renewal of Judgment; Declarations of Kelley Lynch, John Rutger Penick, Etc. The motion was made, in accordance with CCP Section 683.170, on the grounds that Appellant was entitled to relief as the original judgment (May 15, 2006) and renewal of judgment (July 13, 2015) were void and taken against her through extrinsic fraud. Thus, Appellant was deprived of a fair adversary hearing. 1 Supp. CT 1.
On September 21, 2015, Respondent filed an Opposition to Appellant’s Motion to Set Aside July 13, 2015 Renewal of Judgment. 2 CT 367.
On October 16, 2015, Appellant filed her Notice of Appeal. 2 CT 400.
On February 23, 2016, Appellant lodged the Reporter’s Transcript dated October 6, 2015 with the Court of Appeals. RT (10.06.15).
On April 20, 2017, Appellant filed her Opening Brief.
On July 20, 2017, Respondent’s Brief was filed.
Respondent’s Brief opened by arguing that this appeal is the “Groundhog Day appeal” due to the fact that it involves a “situation in which a series of unwelcome or tedious events appear to be recurring in exactly the same way.” [RB 8.] Appellant finds this characterization of the appeal shameless, offensive and unprofessional in the extreme. California law is clear that “An order made by a court or judge wholly without jurisdiction is void and of no force or effect … A void order remains without effect as completely as if never entered.” Svistunoff v Svistunoff (1952) 108 CA2d 638. Furthermore, as the judgment deprived Lynch of substantial property interests, the due process violations are egregious under both state and federal constitutions.
Section 683.120 provides: “(a) The judgment creditor may renew a judgment by filing an application for renewal of the judgment with the court in which the judgment was entered. (b) Except as otherwise provided in this article, the filing of the application renews the judgment in the amount determined under Section 683.150 and extends the period of enforceability of the judgment as renewed for a period of 10 years from the date the application is filed.” Section 683.170, subdivision (a), provides, “The renewal of a judgment pursuant to this article may be vacated on any ground that would be a defense to an action on the judgment, including the ground that the amount of the renewed judgment as entered pursuant to this article is incorrect, and shall be vacated if the application for renewal was filed within five years from the time the judgment was previously renewed under this article.” The denial of an order to vacate a renewal of a judgment is an appealable order. Jonathan Neil & Associates, Inc. v. Jones (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 1481, 1487.
Respondent’s generally have argued as follows: “Appellant’s motion to vacate renewal of the judgment is a motion for reconsideration by another name. The principal ground she asserts is the same as the ground she relied on in the previous, unsuccessful motion: that she was not served the summons and complaint, and therefore the default judgment and renewal are void. (AOB 29). In other words, she is again seeking reconsideration of the 2014 order denying her motion to vacate the 2006 default judgment. The outcome of the motion to vacate the renewal is controlled by the B265753 decision. In that case, the court dismissed Lynch’s appeal from the denial of her motion for terminating sanctions on the ground that “orders denying reconsideration motions are not appealable’ but may be reviewed only as part of a timely appeal from the underlying order, but “Lynch did not appeal from the order denying her 2013 motion to vacate.” (B265753 Opin. P.3.)” (Respondent’s Brief 23-24). This is an unpublished opinion in an unrelated case. California Rules of Court Rule 8.1115 states that “...an opinion of a California Court of Appeal or superior court appellate division that is not certified for publication or ordered published must not be cited or relied on by a court or a party in any other action.” The facts in that case, which involved a motion for terminating sanctions (related to fraud upon the court) are entirely different from the facts upon which Appellant’s motion to vacate the renewal of judgment and/or this appeal are based.
Respondent further argued that 1) the Court should dismiss this appeal in light of its decision in Case No. B265753. RB 24; 2) Lynch forfeited any jurisdiction challenge in the judgment by making a general appearance. Notes that Trial Court deny discuss this reason. RB 27. Lynch argued the general rule does not apply where the judgments are void. AOB 34-35. RB 30; and, 3) The Renewal of Judgment is Valid. Because the previous decision controls and because Lynch has waived any further challenge to jurisdiction, the court need not reach the “merits” of the appeal. But if the court were to revisit the issue of jurisdiction to impose a default judgment on Lynch, it should affirm. Lynch has not demonstrated any valid grounds for setting aside the renewal of the judgment. RB 31. This Court should not dismiss this appeal based upon a decision related to a motion for terminating sanctions that is unrelated to the motion to vacate the renewal of the default judgment; Lynch did not make a general appearance and/or forfeit any jurisdictional challenges; and the renewal of the default judgment is void for lack of jurisdiction.
Before the 1982 enactment of the Enforcement of Judgments Law (§ 680.010 et seq.), the sole method by which a judgment creditor could extend the enforcement period of a money judgment was by obtaining a new judgment against the judgment debtor in an independent action based on the judgment. (See Pratali v. Gates (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 632, 637-638, 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 733.) In the Enforcement of Judgments Law, the Legislature adopted an alternative summary procedure for renewal. (Ibid.; § 683.050; see Recommendation Proposing the Enforcement of Judgments Law (Oct. 1980) 15 Cal. Law Revision Com. Rep. (1980) p. 2009.) Under this procedure, a money judgment is enforceable for 10 years from the date it is entered. (§ 683.020.) To obtain a renewal of the judgment, the judgment creditor must file an application for renewal with the clerk of the court that entered the judgment before the expiration of the 10-year period of enforceability. (§ 683.130, subd. (a); see § 683.140 [setting forth information to be included in application].) "Upon the filing of the application, the court clerk shall enter the renewal of the judgment in the court records." (§ 683.150, subd. (a).) The creditor must serve notice of the renewal on the debtor, (§ 683.160, subd. (a)), and the debtor then has 30 days after service to make a motion to vacate or modify the renewal (ibid.;see § 683.170, subd. (b)).
Thus, a judgment creditor has two distinct methods by which to continue to pursue collection of a judgment as it nears expiration of the 10-year period of enforceability: the renewal of judgment provisions set forth in sections 683.110 et seq., or an independent action on the judgment. Although the two methods are distinct, the defenses available to the judgment debtor in the statutory procedure are the same as in an independent action on the judgment. As here relevant, section 683.170, subdivision (a), provides that "[t]he renewal of a judgment pursuant to this article may be vacated on any ground that would be a defense to an action on the judgment.
Section 683.170, subdivision (a), provides that “the renewal of a judgment pursuant to this article may be vacated on any ground that would be a defense to an [independent] action on the judgment.” In an independent action on a judgment, the debtor may challenge the judgment “in accordance with the rules and principles governing collateral attack.” See Kirkpatrick v. Harvey and Cradduck v. Financial Indent. Co.
A collateral attack on a judgment is fundamentally different from a motion to vacate a judgment in that it ordinarily involves initiating a lawsuit to vacate the judgment for lack of personal jurisdiction. The complaint could also include other causes of action such as vacating the judgment on the grounds of extrinsic fraud or mistake in certain situations. Appellant’s motion to vacate the renewal of judgment, and all defenses available to her, should be viewed in the identical light as that of an independent action in equity.
With respect to an independent action in equity, there are no time limits for a collateral attack on a judgment. The party seeking to vacate the judgment is allowed the full panoply of discovery methods utilized in California litigation including discovery requests, depositions, and most importantly, the use of oral testimony. A California Court of Appeal ruled that laches cannot be invoked as a defense in cases where there has been a complete failure of service of process upon a defendant. See County of San Diego v. Gorham (2010) 186 CA4th 1215, 1229. Prejudice is not a factor in setting aside a void judgment or order. See Sindler v. Brennan (2003) 105 CA4th 1350, 1354.
A denial of any motion made under section 473 of the Code of Civil Procedure generally does not preclude an independent action in equity to set aside the judgment. In other words, the denial of the previous motion is not entitled to collateral estoppel effect in most cases. See Groves v. Peterson (2002) 100 CA4th 659, 668. In that case the Court of Appeals held that collateral estoppel may apply if the defendant had an opportunity to present oral testimony at the section 473 motion hearing and the issues were fully litigated. In the instant case, the issues have never been litigated and no oral testimony has ever been permitted.
The reasoning behind the general rule that the denial of the previous motion is not entitled to collateral estoppel effect, which has been well settled in California for over 100 years, is the fact that in the standard motion procedure, the moving party is limited to presenting affidavits of voluntary witnesses unless the trial court exercises discretion and permits a greater latitude. In using the motion procedure the party does not have the right to produce oral testimony or to compel witnesses to attend for deposition or cross-examination. The motion procedure, while simpler and more convenient, does not involve all the aspects of full litigation. Because the remedies of a motion in the underlying case and an independent action in equity are cumulative, parties should be entitled to resort first to the convenient and expeditious remedy without worrying about the issue of collateral estoppel if the motion is denied. Thus even if a section 473 motion has been denied, parties may still pursue an independent action that affords them all the advantages of a regular trial of the issue.
Under Los Angeles Superior Court rule 9.1(b) and California Rules of Court rule 323(a), oral testimony is not allowed on motions except upon good cause in the trial court’s discretion. Appellant raised the fact that, as she was not permitted to provide oral testimony, she did not receive a full and fair hearing on her motion for renewal of default judgment. 1 RT 33. Nothing has ever been actually litigated. Res Judicata and/or collateral estoppels are inapplicable. There has never been a trial with oral testimony although witnesses have appeared in Court, related to this motion, in anticipation of providing oral testimony. Additionally, Appellant was not provided the opportunity to confront and/or cross examine any of the witnesses who submitted declarations to the court and/or the process server. Appellant has most certainly addressed her requests for oral testimony with the Trial Court.
Applying this rule to the present case, the trial court erred in concluding Groves's present action is barred by collateral estoppel. The subsequent action is not barred even if the trial court actually decided the disputed issue against Groves on the motion. Because of the limitations of the motion procedure, the California courts do not treat the denial of the motion as a bar to the subsequent action.
Relying on Barker, the Petersons contend that here Groves had time to gather his evidence, he submitted his four affidavits, and he “never requested the opportunity to gather more evidence.” This certainly does not amount to a showing fitting the Darlington exception (proof that oral testimony was actually presented). If the mere fact Groves “never requested the opportunity to gather more evidence” were sufficient to meet the Barker test, we would have to conclude that Barker is irreconcilable with Rohrbasser and should not be followed.
We hold, therefore, that Groves's present independent action in equity is not barred by collateral estoppel because, following the general rule, the denial of the prior motion in the underlying case to set aside the judgment has no collateral estoppel effect.
Groves held that the independent action in equity was not barred by collateral estoppel because, following the general rule, the denial of the prior motion in the underlying case to set aside the judgment has no collateral estoppel effect. The same principles should apply in this case.
Respondent argues that appellant failed to raise the above contention in the trial court, and that therefore this court has no standing to consider it on appeal. Although it is true that appellant did not present this ground in its motion to set aside the default judgment below, questions of jurisdiction are never waived and may be raised for the first [94 Cal. App. 3d 799] time on appeal. Consolidated Theatres, Inc. v. Theatrical Stage Employees Union (1968) 69 Cal. 2d 713, 721 [73 Cal. Rptr. 213, 447 P.2d 325]; Costa v. Banta (1950) 98 Cal. App. 2d 181, 182 [219 P.2d 478]; 1 Witkin, Cal. Procedure, supra, Jurisdiction, § 10, p. 535.
Leonard Cohen passed away while this matter has been before the Court of Appeals. There is no evidence to support Kory’s argument that the Trust is the assignee of the judgment. There is also no evidence to support any argument that LC Investments, LLC, a cancelled corporation or its alleged assets, are part of the Cohen Family Trust. Under section 686.010, these alleged successors should have formally substituted as the judgment creditors. Renewing the judgment in the name of deceased parties constitutes a statutory basis for vacating the renewal. Section 683.170, subdivision (a) provides the “renewal of a judgment pursuant to this article may be vacated on any ground that would be a defense to any action on the judgment . . . .” Generally, a valid defense to an action on a judgment is that the action is not brought by the proper party. See Redevelopment Agency of San Diego v. San Diego Gas & Electric Co.(2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 912, 920-921. A defendant has a statutory right to have an action prosecuted against him or her in the name of the real party in interest. Giselman v. Starr (1895) 106 Cal. 651, 657. “The real party in interest is `the person possessing the right sued upon by reason of the substantive law.” Ventura County Ry. Co. v. Hadley Auto Transport (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 878, 880. In this case, the real party in interest is deceased singer-songwriter Leonard Cohen and cancelled corporation LC Investments, LLC. Since there has not been an appropriate substitution of the real party in interest in this case, the wrong party bringing or continuing an action is a defense to an action on the judgment, and thus constitutes a basis for vacating the renewal of judgment. (§ 683.170, subd. (a). The renewal of judgment remains in the names of the original judgment creditors, Leonard Cohen and LC Investments, LLC.
When it can be proved that a judgment of a court was obtained by fraud, the question arises whether or not it can be set aside and a new trial had. The problem to be discussed here is when can relief be obtained. Two different procedures are to be distinguished: 1. A motion in the court that rendered the judgment. 2. An independent action to set the judgment aside brought in the same court or a different court.
In Hazel-Atlas, 322 U.S., 234, the United States Supreme Court held that a federal court could grant relief in equity from the court’s own prior final judgment under certain rare circumstances, including when there is “after-discovered fraud.” Id. at 244. A Hazel-Atlas claim for fraud requires clear and convincing evidence that there was “(1) an intentional fraud; (2) by an officer of the court; (3) which is directed at the court itself; and (4) in fact deceives the court.” Herring v. United States, 424 F.3d 384, 386-87 (3d Cir. 2005). All of these elements are present and that includes blatant fraud with respect to service of process and the transmittal of legal pleadings to IRS and FTB in a further attempt to defraud the U.S. Government and State of California. This is a nearly identical situation to Hazel-Atlas although in this case the “article” can be viewed as fraudulent legal pleadings and perjured declarations. This is a deliberately planned and carefully executed scheme to defraud not only Kelley Lynch, corporations which the Court has no jurisdiction over, but the Internal Revenue Service, Franchise Tax Board, and other tax authorities. In fact, the lawsuit is nothing other than Leonard Cohen’s defense to allegations that he committed criminal and civil tax fraud and he used it as an opportunity to engage in further fraudulent conduct.
In Hazel-Atlas the court said: The general rule [is] that [courts] not alter or set aside their judgments after the expiration of the term at which the judgments were finally entered . . . [But] every element of the fraud here disclosed demands the exercise of the historic power of equity to set aside the fraudulently begotten judgment. Here . . . we find a deliberately planned and carefully executed scheme to defraud not only the Patent Office but the Circuit Court of Appeals... The public welfare demands that the agencies of public justice be not so impotent that they must always be mute and helpless victims of deception and fraud . . ." The opinion did not refer to the distinction between extrinsic or intrinsic fraud. Lynch takes great offense at the mere notion that someone may submit one fraudulent legal pleading after another, essentially slandering and falsely accusing her, with impunity. She has argued that intrinsic and extrinsic fraud, including with respect to service of process, are not mutually exclusive. Both elements are present in this case.
The type of fraud involved in the Hartford case certainly leads to the conclusion that intrinsic and/or extrinsic fraud could be grounds for upsetting a judgment. Mr. Justice Black's assertion that the "agencies of public justice [are] not so impotent that they must always be mute and helpless victims of deception and fraud ...” would apply to deception committed by intrinsic fraud as well as deception by extrinsic fraud. Perjury is considered intrinsic fraud and since the false article utilized by Hartford seems analogous to perjured evidence submitted by Respondent in declarations signed under oath of perjury. As has been seen, the amendment to Federal Rule 60(b) introduced the term "fraud on the court" and no distinction was drawn between extrinsic and intrinsic fraud in the saving clause. The rule expressly provides that either intrinsic or extrinsic fraud can be ground for relief by motion to the court that rendered the judgment.
In Hazel-Atlas, Mr. Justice Black concluded that “tampering with the administration of justice as indisputably shown here involves far more than injury to a single litigant. It is a wrong against the institutions set up to protect and safeguard the public, institutions in which fraud cannot complacently be tolerated consistent with the good order of society."
Additionally, Universal Oil Products Co. v. Root Refining Co., 328 U. S. 575 (1945), cited the Hartford case and said at p. 580, the U.S. Supreme Court concluded that: "The inherent power of a federal court to investigate whether a judgment was obtained by fraud is beyond question." It would seem to follow that the same inherent powers apply to state courts.
Lynch’s motion for terminating sanctions addressed egregious fraud upon the court in pursuit of the denial of the original motion to vacate as well as the renewal of judgment. The fraud upon the court remains unresolved and continues throughout this appeal.
Any order or judgment that gives effect to a void judgment is in fact void. County of Ventura v. Tillett (1982) 133 Cal.App.3d 105, 110, 183 Cal.Rptr. 741. A void judgment [or order] is, in legal effect, no judgment. By it no rights are divested. From it no rights can be obtained. Being worthless in itself, all proceedings founded upon it are equally worthless. It neither binds nor bars any one.’” Bennett v. Wilson (1898) 122 Cal. 509, 513-514, 55 P. 390. “There is an abuse of discretion when the trial court’s action ‘transgresses the confines of the applicable principles of law.’” Gabriel P. v. Suedi D. (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 850, 862.
The orders of the trial court should be reversed and the trial court directed to (1) vacate its orders denying Lynch’s motion to vacate the renewal of judgment and motion to set aside default and default judgment, (2) enter a new order granting the motion, (3) and permit Lynch to file her answer to the complaint and require the court to proceed to hear the case based upon the merits. Finally, Respondent’s request for attorney’s fees should be denied and the Court of Appeals should note that numerous parties are financially benefiting from their misconduct.
 Due to the fraudulent misrepresentations, perjured statements in declarations, and fabricated evidence submitted to numerous courts in this case, Kelley Lynch reserves the right to properly and legally address and correct this misinformation and/or false statements directly with Internal Revenue Service, Franchise Tax Board, and other tax authorities. Many of the legal pleadings and declarations at issue have been transmitted to these authorities and used by Leonard Cohen to obtain fraudulent tax refunds. Appellant has challenged those tax refunds as fraudulent directly with IRS and FTB. Lynch addressed the outstanding federal tax matters, including her inclusion as a partner on federal corporate tax returns prepared by Leonard Cohen’s representatives for his benefit, during the October 6, 2015 hearing.

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