Source: https://openjurist.org/415/us/1
Timestamp: 2019-04-20 01:18:32+00:00

Document:
BANNERCRAFT CLOTHING COMPANY, INC., et al.
1. The FOIA does not limit the inherent powers of an equity court to grant relief, as is manifest from the broad statutory language that Congress used, with its emphasis on disclosure, its carefully delineated exemptions, and the fact that § 552(a) vests equitable jurisdiction in the district courts. Pp. 16—20.
2. In a renegotiation case a contractor must pursue its administrative remedy under the Renegotiation Act and cannot through resort to preliminary litigation over an FOIA claim obtain judicial interference with the procedures set forth in the Renegotiation Act. Aircraft & Diesel Equipment Corp. v. Hirsch, 331 U.S. 752, 67 S.Ct. 1493, 91 L.Ed. 1796; Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S. 742, 68 S.Ct. 1294, 92 L.Ed. 1694; Macauley v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 327 U.S. 540, 66 S.Ct. 712, 90 L.Ed. 839. Pp. 20—25.
(a) It would contravene the Act's legislative purpose if judicial review by way of injunctive relief under FOIA were allowed to interrupt the process of bargaining that inheres in the statutory renegotiation scheme and would delay the Government's recovery of excessive profits. Pp. 20—25.
(b) The contractor through a de novo proceeding in the Court of Claims, where discovery procedures are available, is not limited in exercising its normal litigation rights. Pp. 23—24.
Three cases, consolidated for hearing in the court below, raise the issue of the effect of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. § 552, upon proceedings pending under the Renegotiation Act of 1951, c. 15, 65 Stat. 7, as amended, 50 U.S.C. App. § 1211 et seq. In particular, they concern the jurisdiction of a federal district court to enjoin the renegotiation process until an FOIA claim is resolved.
On March 16, Bannercraft, pursuant to the FOIA, made a written request of the Renegotiation Board that six categories of documents be produced.3 No response to this request was forthcoming.
B. Astro. This respondent's factual case is essentially the same as Bannercraft's. The year at issue is the fiscal year ended September 30, 1967. Astro, pursuant to the FOIA, requested production by the Board of five categories of material.6 At a conference held on May 12, 1970, Astro was advised that the Board had made a tentative determination of excessive profits for the year in the amount of $225,000. In July, the Board denied Astro's FOIA request.
The three appeals were consolidated and heard together in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. The Court of Appeals, one judge dissenting, affirmed all three decisions. 151 U.S.App.D.C. 174, 466 F.2d 345 (1972). It held that the District Court possessed jurisdiction under the FOIA to enjoin administrative proceedings before the Board and to order the production of appropriate documents. It concluded that, 'although it is undeniably true that Congress was principally interested in opening administrative processes to the scrutiny of the press and general public' when it enacted the FOIA, 'Congress was also troubled by the plight of those forced to litigate with agencies on the basis of secret laws or incomplete information.' Id., at 181, 466 F.2d, at 352. The court then described this latter congressional concern as a 'subsidiary statutory purpose,' citing excerpts from S.Rep.No.813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 7 (1965), and from H.R.Rep.No.1497, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., 8 (1966), U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1966, p. 2418, and also citing 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(2). See infra, at 12 n. 9. It reasoned that, despite 'the fact that the Act nowhere in terms authorizes . . . injunctions' against agency proceedings, in enacting the statute Congress intended to confer broad equitable. jurisdiction upon the district courts, and that 'temporary stays of pending administrative procedures may be necessary on occasion to enforce the policy' of the FOIA. 151 U.S.App.D.C., at 181—183, 466 F.2d, at 352—354.
The dissent also was at odds with the majority's disposition of the exhaustion issue. It asserted that the majority seriously misconstrued the intended functioning of the Renegotiation Board's procedures, namely, that controlled access to information concerning the Government's position plays a significant role in the administrative process; that interruption of the administrative proceedings totally destroys the balance of negotiating strength; and that the attempt to enjoin the ongoing negotiations was really not a request for relief under the FOIA but was a challenge to the Board's procedures themselves. Id., at 194—195, 466 F.2d, at 365—366.
A. The FOIA. This statute, 5 U.S.C. § 552, was enacted in 1966, 80 Stat. 383, as a revision of § 3 of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 1002 (1964 ed.). S.Rep.No.813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 3—4 (1965); H.R.Rep.No.1497, 89th Cong.,2d Sess., 1—6 (1966). It was amended by Pub.L. 90—23, adopted June 5, 1967, 81 Stat. 54.
B. The Renegotiation Act of 1951.11 This statute, 50 U.S.C. App. §§ 1211—1233, enacted shortly after the close of World War II and at the height of the Korean conflict, recites that Congress had made available 'extensive funds' for the execution of the national defense program and that 'sound execution' of the program requires 'the elimination of excessive profits from contracts made with the United States, and from related subcontracts.' § 101, 50 U.S.C. App. § 1211. The Renegotiation Board is established as an independent agency in the Executive Branch to accomplish this objective. § 107, 50 U.S.C. App. § 1217(a). The Board's functions are excluded from the operation of the Administrative Procedure Act (5 U.S.C. § 551 et seq., and § 701 et seq.) except the public information section thereof (5 U.S.C. § 552), § 111, 50 U.S.C. App. § 1221.
The Board operates primarily by informal negotiation with the contractor and not by formal hearing. It is directed to 'endeavor to make an agreement with the contractor . . . with respect to he elimination of excessive profits.' § 105(a), 50 U.S.C. App. § 1215(a). The contractor subject to the Act must file, for its fiscal year, a detailed financial statement. § 105(e)(1), 50 U.S.C.App. § 1215(e)(1). On the basis of this statement an initial determination of excessive profits is made. From the date of filing of the statement, the Board has one year to commence proceedings12 and, with stated exceptions, the renegotiation is to be completed within two years following its commencement or 'all liabilities of the contractor . . . for excessive profits with respect to which such proceeding was commenced shall thereupon be discharged.'13 § 105(c), 50 U.S.C. App. § 1215(c).
If the Board and the contractor do not agree, the Board by order determines the excessive profits. § 105(a), 50 U.S.C. App. § 1215(a). At the request of the contractor, the Board shall furnish it 'with a statement of such determination, of the facts used as a basis therefor, and of its reasons for such determination.' Ibid. The contractor then may initiate a de novo proceeding in the Court of Claims,14 which has exclusive jurisdiction to determine the contractor's excessive profits. § 108, 50 U.S.C. App. § 1218 (1970 ed., Supp. II). The action 'shall not be treated as a proceeding to review the determination of the Board,' ibid., and the Board's statement 'shall not be used in the Court of Claims as proof of the facts or conclusions stated therein,' § 105(a), 50 U.S.C. App. § 1215(a) (1970 ed., Supp. II).
The renegotiation process itself is initiated by notice to the contractor and by assignment of the contractor's report to the appropriate Regional Board. 32 CFR § 1472.2 (1972).15 Personnel of the Regional Board then prepare a 'Report of Renegotiation' which includes a 'recommendation with respect to the amount, if any, of excessive profits for the fiscal year under review.' 32 CFR § 1472.3(d). This is only the first of several steps within the agency structure. Thereafter the statement is reviewed, succesively, by a panel of the Regional Board, by the Regional Board itself, and finally by the Rengotiation Board. At each level there is consultation with the contractor, the preparation of a report and analysis, and submission to the next higher level of a recommendation as to excessive profits. 32 CFR ss1472.3(d) and (f) (i), and §§ 1472.4(b)—(d). At each stage, the contractor is entitled to a statement of the basis for the recommendation. Each level is free to make new findings and no level is bound by the determination of the level below; the recommended settlement may decrease or increase at each level. Ibid.
As to this question, the respondent contractors assert that, although the FOIA does not grant this injunctive power in express terms, the power is to be implied from the court's inherent capacity to provide appropriate equitable relief. The Board, on the other hand, emphasizes that Congress in the Act expressly authorized the court to compel the production of agency records improperly withheld, placed the burden on the agency to sustain its action, and directed precedence on the docket for suits under the Act 'over all other causes' and expedition of those suits 'in every way.' 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3). The Board then contends that these provisions constitute the exclusive method for enforcing the disclosure requirements of the Act and that any implication of other injunctive power, at the behest of a litigant before the agency, would be inconsistent with the statutory language.
The FOIA, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (3), explicitly confers jurisdiction18 to grant injunctive relief of a described type, namely, 'to enjoin the agency from withholding agency records and to order the production of any agency records improperly withheld from the complainant.' In addition, it provides a specific remedy for noncompliance.
There is significant authority however, that points to the opposite conclusion. Porter itself, although recognizing the kind of situation to which Babcock is applicable, 328 U.S., at 403, 66 S.Ct., at 1091, upheld broad equitable power in the District Court under a statute authorizing the court to grant injunctive and restraining relief 'or other order,' and did so, not only because of the presence of the 'other order' language, but because of the 'traditional equity powers of a court.' Id., at 400, 66 S.Ct., at 1090. Emphasis on broad equity power, even in the face of a silent statute, also appears in Mitchell v. Robert Demario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S. 288, 290—291, 80 S.Ct. 332, 334—335, 4 L.Ed.2d 323 (1960); Scripps-Howard Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 316 U.S. 4, 62 S.Ct. 875, 86 L.Ed. 1229 (1942); Arrow Transportation Co. v. Southern R. Co., 372 U.S. 658, 671 n. 22, 83 S.Ct. 984, 991, 10 L.Ed.2d 52 (1963); see L. Jaffe, Judicial Control of Administrative Action, 659 (1965), and is sometimes related to the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a). FTC v. Dean Foods Co., 384 U.S. 597, 603—604, 86 S.Ct. 1738, 1742—1743, 16 L.Ed.2d 802 (1966).
The broad language of the FOIA, with its obvious emphasis on disclosure and with its exemptions carefully delineated as exceptions; the truism that Congress knows how to deprive a court of broad equitable power when it chooses so to do, Scripps-Howard, supra, 316 U.S., at 17, 62 S.Ct., at 883; and the fact that the Act, to a definite degree, makes the District Court the enforcement arm of the sttute, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3), persuade us that the babcock and Switchmen's Union principle of a statutorily prescribed special and exclusive remedy is not applicable to FOIA cases. With the express vesting of equitable jurisdiction in the district court by § 552(a), there is little to suggest, despite the Act's primary purpose, that Congress sought to limit the inherent powers of an equity court.
Before the adoption of the FOIA this Court consistently held that the design of the Renegotiation Act was to have renegotiation proceed expeditiously without interruption for judicial review, and that the Board's proceedings were not to be enjoined prior to the exhaustion of the administrative process. This was the result where the proceedings were challenged on constitutional grounds, Aircraft & Diesel Equipment Corp. v. Hirsch, 331 U.S. 752, 67 S.Ct. 1493, 91 L.Ed. 1796 (1947); Lichter v. united States, 334 U.S. 742, 789—793, 68 S.Ct. 1294, 1318—1320, 92 L.Ed. 1694 (1948), on statutory grounds, Macauley v. Waterman S.S. Crop., 327 U.S. 540, 66 S.Ct. 712, 90 L.Ed. 839 (1946), and on procedural grounds, Lichter, 334 U.S., at 791, 68 S.Ct., at 1319. The Court's emphasis was on the absence of any 'lawful function' on the part of the courts 'to anticipate the administrative decison with their own,' Aircraft, 331 U.S., at 767, 67 S.Ct., at 1501; on the availability of a due process hearing in the post-administrative de novo proceeding in the Tax Court, Macauley, 327 U.S., at 543, 66 S.Ct. at 714, where constitutional as well as nonconstitutional issues could be resolved, Aircraft, 331 U.S., at 769 n. 30, 67 S.Ct., at 1501, citing 89 Cong.Rec. 9930 (1943),20 and at 771, 67 S.Ct., at 1502; and on the Act's provisions for expeditious settlement in informal negotiation free 'from the tedious burden of litigation.' Id., at 770, 67 S.Ct., at 1502.
Reflection upon the nature of the Renegotiation Board's process fortifies these conclusions. The character and the entire atmosphere of the process is negotiation—that is, renegotiation—of an existing contract. And negotiation is a bargaining process, with give and take, and with stress upon and use of the strengths of one's own position and the weaknesses of the position of the other party. It is in a process such as this where the phrase 'leading from strength' has been so effectively transferred in practical application from the card table to the world of commerce. It is part of the warp and woof of production. It is pure bargaining permitted by the statute with respect to contracts already made the same kind of bargaining that produces the union- employer agreement or the transfer of substantial property from the willing seller to the interested buyer.
We see nothing in the adoption of the FOIA in 1966 that impinges upon the settled law of the Aircraft-Lichter-Macauley cases or that warrants an exception to the principle they espouse. Nothing new by way of due process emerged with the FOIA. Nothing therein indicates that Congress wished to change the Renegotiation Act's purposeful design of negotiation without interruption for judicial review. FOIA's stress was on disclosure, to be sure, but it was on disclosure for the public, Environmental Production Agency v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 80, 93 S.Ct. 827, 832, 35 L.Ed.2d 119 (1973), and not for the negotiating self-interested contractor. Id., at 86, 93 S.Ct., at 835; see K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise § 3A.4, p. 120, § 3A.29, p. 171 (Supp.1970). And when Congress in 1971 reviewed the Renegotiation Act and substituted the Court of Claims for the Tax Court, no other significant change in the existing process was effected. See S.Rep.No.92—245 (1971), accompanying H.R. 8311, U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1971, p. 1130, which became the amending statute, Pub.L. 92—41, 85 Stat. 97.
There is no limitation or denial of the contractor's normal litigation rights when the renegotiation process is at end. The contractor may institute its de novo proceeding in the Court of Claims, unfettered by any prejudice from the agency proceeding and free from any claim that the Board's determination is supported by substantial evidence. There the usual rights of discovery are available.21 And there the parties are not bound by a prior determination made at any level of the Renegotiation Board structure. 50 U.S.C. App. § 1218. That proceeding is the judicial remedy at law provided by the Renegotiation Act and is adequate protection against injury. Note, 41 Geo.Wash.L.Rev. 1072, 1084 (1973). We note that a contractor does not become obligated to remit excessive profits until termination of the Court of Claims suit, if it elects that course. The jury suffered, absent an injunction is no more than the risk of being unsuccessful in the de novo bargaining process and the incurrence of the expense incident to renegotiation.22 Mere litigation expense, even substantial and unrecoupable cost, does not constitute irreparable injury. Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41, 51—52, 58 S.Ct. 459, 464, 82 L.Ed. 638 (1938); L. Jaffe, Judicial Control of Administrative Action 429 (1965). Without a clear showing of irreparable injury, see Virginia Petroleum Jobbers Assn. v. FPC, 104 U.S.App.D.C. 106, 111, 259 F.2d 921, 926 (1958), failure to exhaust administrative remedies serves as a bar to judicial intervention in the agency process. Myers, supra; Sears Roebuck & Co. v. NLRB, 153 U.S.App.D.C. 380, 382, 473 F.2d 91, 93 (1972).
Interference with the agency proceeding opens the way to the use of the FOIA as a tool of discovery, see Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. NLRB, 433 F.2d 210, 211 (CA6 1970), over and beyond that provided by the regulations issued by the Renegotiation Board for its proceedings. See 32 CFR §§ 1480.1—1480.12 (1972).23 Discovery for litigation purposes is not an expressly indicated purpose of the Act. Protection for the contractor in the renegotiation process is afforded through the injunctive power specifically bestowed by 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3).
We stress, in conclusion, that the merits are not before us. They are yet to be decided by the District Court. Whether any demand made by these contractors is so vague as not to constitute a 'request for identifiable records,' 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3), or is for material exempt from disclosure under 5 U.S.C. § 552(b), are questions that remain open for decision on remand.
The nature of the so-called administrative law aspects of the problems under the Renegotiation Act is unique. The aim, of course, is the elimination of excessive profits of contractors and subcontractors in the national defense program 50 U.S.C. App. § 1211. Detailed financial information must be filed with the Renegotiation Board, id., § 1215(e)(1). If on the basis of those data the Board decides to proceed, it refers the case to a Regional Renegotiation Board which determines tentatively the amount of excessive profits, 32 CFR § 1472.3(e).1 A conference with the contractor is then arranged. It may agree with the Regional Board's determination or contest it. If the latter, a second conference is held with a panel of the Regional Board which hears the arguments of the contractor and submits its recommendations to the Regional Board which may be for a greater or lesser amount than the original tentative determination, id., §§ 1472.3(f), (h), (i). Thereupon the Regional Board makes its recommendation, id., § 1472.3(i). If the contractor is still dissatisfied, it can appeal to the Renegotiation Board itself. In that event the case is assigned to a division of the Board which is not bound by or limited to any finding or determination of the Regional Board, id., § 1472.4(b). The division studies the case de novo and makes a recommendation to the Board which then makes a determination greater than, equal to, or less than any of the prior determinations, id., § 1472.4(d). Even then the renegotiation process continues, the Board seeking to obtain the contractor's voluntary agreement. Only if that effort fails is a final order determining the amount of excessive profits made, ibid.
The history of the Act makes plain what can be inferred from the nature of the administrative process just described—that Congress chose negotiation, not confrontation or traditional adjudication, as the desirable route. The Act requires the Board to 'endeavor to make an agreement with the contractor or subcontractor with respect to the elimination of excessive profits,' id., § 1215(a). The pressure is on the contractor to settle, as at each successive step in the procedure its liability may be increased. The standards are rather vague and imprecise, §§ 1213(e)(1)—(6),2 the regulations stating that '(r) easonable profits will be determined in every case by over-all evaluation of the particular factors present and not by the application of any fixed formula with respect to rate of profit, or otherwise,' 32 CFR § 1460.8. The vagueness of the standards and the risk of an increase in liability at every level of the administrative process have a powerful coercive influence. Approximately 88% of the Board's cases are ended by voluntary agreement, coercive orders being entered in only 12% of the cases. See Fifteenth Annual Report, Renegotiation Board 13 (1970).
The Court properly holds that the Renegotiation Board is an 'agency' within the meaning of the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a). The Court also properly holds that § 552(a)(3), which grants the district court jurisdiction 'to enjoin the agency from withholding agency records and to order the production of any agency records improperly withheld from the complainant,' makes that court the enforcement arm of the FOIA. But it denies relief here on the ground that these contractors are obliged to pursue their 'administrative remedy' before going to court for an enforcement order.
Exhaustion of administrative remedies has skeins of various colors, McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 193—194, 89 S.Ct. 1657, 1662—1663, 23 L.Ed.2d 194. Ordinarily courts do not interfere until the agency has completed its action, id., at 194, 89 S.Ct., at 1663, 'or else has clearly exceeded its jurisdiction,' ibid. The present case does not entail supplanting administrative expertise on the merits. The issues tendered concern only administrative procedure.
A procedure that accelerates settlements furthers the policy of the Renegotiation Act. The Board judges the profits of the contractors involved in the present case with the profits of other contractors in determining whether their profits are excessive. The relative prices, costs, and profits of those other companies are germane to the ultimate issue to be resolved. One of these contractors has a low (front office' overhead, as the executive officer is the president who has only a secretary. The rest of the employees are engaged in production. The contractor who has a low 'front office' expense is penalized for efficiency, if its profits are reduced to the scale allowed contractors who have a high 'front office' expense. The Board in its Regulations under the FOIA makes 'available for public inspection and copying summaries of facts and reasons issued by the Board,' 32 CFR § 1480.5(a). But an agency making decisions has no right to make secret the basis of those decisions,3 if the FOIA is to have any real meaning in the activities of the Renegotiation Board. If a contractor does not know the reasons why the Board or any of its agencies cuts the profits of a contractor 95%, it has no meaningful criteria to determine whether it should settle with the Board or continue to pursue its remedies up the escalator of the hierarchy. It is as if a court could rule for the plaintiff or for the defendant without ever having to disclose its reasons.
The result of today's decision is to put the citizen in a game of 'blind man's buff' with the Renegotiation Board. Enforcement of the policy of full disclosure under the FOIA is no intrusion in the determination of the merits of the controversy before the Board. The expertise of the Board does not relate to the FOIA but only to the Renegotiation Act. The FOIA merely describes some of the procedure to be followed by the Board. Aircraft concerned the intrusion of the judiciary into the administrative process by a suit to declare the whole renegotiating procedure unconstitutional prior to any adjudication of the merits of the contractor's claim. Granting the relief asked in that case would have gutted the statutes. Granting the relief here would merely make the rules of discovery, established by Congress, applicable to the Renegotiation Board. Denial of the relief establishes a regime of secrecy when Congress has demanded disclosure and gives the Renegotiation Board a degree of administrative absolution4 at war with the philosophy of the FOIA.
The Board took the position (a) that the Board-agency communications, the investigatory and other reports, and the 'procurement information' (to the extent it consisted of written records), being the first, second, and sixth items specified in the request of March 16, were exempt under 5 U.S.C. §§ 552(b)(3), (4), (5), and (7); (b) that the facts relied upon by the Board in concluding that Bannercraft's pricing policy was unreasonable, that is, the fourth item in the request of March 16, and the identification of manufacturers, the fifth item, were not requests 'for records'; and (c) that copies of clearance notices, orders, and renegotiation agreements issued with respect to the 11 companies named in the third item of the March 16 request, and with respect to manufacturers with whom Bannercraft's production cost was compared, as called for by the fifth item, all with identifying details deleted, were supplied therewith. Beyond this, documents requested by Bannercraft were refused.
The CFR citations throughout this section of this opinion are to the 1972 version of Renegotiation Board procedures in effect at the time of the Court of Appeal's decision. The regulations were amended substantially in the fall of 1972. See 32 CFR pts. 1400—1599 (1973).
Among other decisions emphasizing this general public purpose of the Act are Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 478 F.2d 47, 48 (CA4 1973); Sterling Drug, Inc. v. FTC, 146 U.S.App.D.C. 237, 242, 450 F.2d 698, 703 (1971); Soucie v. David, 145 U.S.App.D.C. 144, 153, 448 F.2d 1067, 1076 (1971); LaMorte v.Mansfield, 438 F.2d 448, 451 (CA2 1971); Bristol—Myers Co. v. FTC, 138 U.S.App.D.C. 22, 25, 424 F.2d 935, 938, cert. denied, 400 U.S. 824, 91 S.Ct. 46, 27 L.Ed.2d 52 (1970).
S.1666, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., was passed by the Senate on July 28, 1964, 110 Cong.Rec. 17086—17089, and reconsidered and passed again on July 31, 1964, 110 Cong.Rec. 17666—17668. There was insufficient time, however, for full consideration by the House. S.1160, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., then became the FOIA and 'is substantially S. 1666.' S.Rep.No.813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 4 (1965). There was no change in the remedy provided.
The hygienic effect of the Administrative Procedure Act is absent here because the Renegotiation Board is excluded from that Act by reason of 50 U.S.C. App. § 1221, the only exception being found in § 5 U.S.C. § 552, at issue in this case.
For an account of the operation of the FOIA between 1967 and 1971 see Archibald, Access to Government Information—The Right Before First Amendment, The First Amendment and the News Media, Final Report, Annual Warren Conference on Advocacy in the United States, June 8—9, 1973.

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