Source: http://lawlibrary.chanrobles.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=82931:56812&catid=1582&Itemid=566
Timestamp: 2019-04-19 10:15:43+00:00

Document:
G.R. No. 192582, April 07, 2014 - BLUER THAN BLUE JOINT VENTURES COMPANY/MARY ANN DELA VEGA, Petitioners, v. GLYZA ESTEBAN, Respondent.
BLUER THAN BLUE JOINT VENTURES COMPANY/MARY ANN DELA VEGA, Petitioners, v. GLYZA ESTEBAN, Respondent.
“It is not the job title but the actual work that the employee performs that determines whether he or she occupies a position of trust and confidence.”1 In this case, while respondent’s position was denominated as Sales Clerk, the nature of her work included inventory and cashiering, a function that clearly falls within the sphere of rank–and–file positions imbued with trust and confidence.
Respondent Glyza Esteban (Esteban) was employed in January 2004 as Sales Clerk, and assigned at Bluer Than Blue Joint Ventures Company’s (petitioner) EGG boutique in SM City Marilao, Bulacan, beginning the year 2006. Part of her primary tasks were attending to all customer needs, ensuring efficient inventory, coordinating orders from clients, cashiering and reporting to the accounting department.
In November 2006, the petitioner received a report that several employees have access to its point–of–sale (POS) system through a universal password given by Elmer Flores (Flores). Upon investigation, it was discovered that it was Esteban who gave Flores the password. The petitioner sent a letter memorandum to Esteban on November 8, 2006, asking her to explain in writing why she should not be disciplinary dealt with for tampering with the company’s POS system through the use of an unauthorized password. Esteban was also placed under preventive suspension for ten days.
In her explanation, Esteban admitted that she used the universal password three times on the same day in December 2005, after she learned of it from two other employees who she saw browsing through the petitioner’s sales inquiry. She inquired how the employees were able to open the system and she was told that they used the “123456” password.
On November 13, 2006, Esteban’s preventive suspension was lifted, but at the same time, a notice of termination was sent to her, finding her explanation unsatisfactory and terminating her employment immediately on the ground of loss of trust and confidence. Esteban was given her final pay, including benefits and bonuses, less inventory variances incurred by the store amounting to P8,304.93. Esteban signed a quitclaim and release in favor of the petitioner.
On December 6, 2006, Esteban filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, illegal suspension, holiday pay, rest day and separation pay.
WHEREFORE, a Decision is hereby rendered declaring [Esteban] to have been illegally dismissed. Corollarily, she is entitled for the payment of separation pay as prayed for at one month salary for every year of service, plus backwages from November 13, 2006 when she was dismissed up to the rendition of this Decision.
Further, as [Esteban] was illegally suspended she is entitled to salaries during her suspension from November 9–13, 2006.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed and set aside and in its stead a new one is rendered dismissing this case for lack of merit.
[Petitioners] however are ordered to refund to [Esteban] the amount of [P]8,304.93 which was illegally deducted from her salary.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated September 23, 2008 and Resolution dated November 27, 2008 of public respondent National Labor Relations Commission are ANNULLED and SET ASIDE[.] Accordingly, the Decision of the Labor Arbiter dated September 28, 2007 is REINSTATED with MODIFICATION, that the award of separation pay is computed from January 2, 2004, and not from November 25, 2003.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT HELD THAT RANK–AND–FILE EMPLOYEES CANNOT BE DISMISSED ON GROUND OF LOSS OF TRUST AND CONFIDENCE.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN APPLYING THE PRINCIPLE OF REASONABLE PROPORTIONALITY ON THE WRONGFUL ACTS OF RESPONDENT ESTEBAN.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN HOLDING THAT THE PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION OF RESPONDENT ESTEBAN WAS UNWARRANTED.
Esteban, on the other hand, avers that the competency clause she signed with the petitioner merely states the following functions: (1) attend to and assist the customer in all their needs; (2) conduct physical inventory; (3) clean and tidy up the merchandise and store; and (4) coordinate with the stockroom for orders. As regards the cashiering function, it merely states “to follow.”12 As such, her main task is that of a sales clerk.
The antecedent facts that gave rise to Esteban’s dismissal from employment are not disputed in this case. The issue is whether Esteban’s acts constitute just cause to terminate her employment with the company on the ground of loss of trust and confidence.
Esteban is, no doubt, a rank–and–file employee. The question now is whether she occupies a position of trust and confidence.
In this case, Esteban was a sales clerk. Her duties, however, were more than that of a sales clerk. Aside from attending to customers and tending to the shop, Esteban also assumed cashiering duties. This, she does not deny; instead, she insists that the competency clause provided that her tasks were that of a sales clerk and the cashiering function was labelled “to follow.”22 A perusal of the competency clause, however, shows that it is merely an attestation on her part that she is competent to “meet the basic requirements needed for the position [she] is applying for x x x”. It does not define her actual duties. As consistently ruled by the Court, it is not the job title but the actual work that the employee performs that determines whether he or she occupies a position of trust and confidence.23 In Philippine Plaza Holdings, Inc. v. Episcope,24 the Court ruled that a service attendant, who was tasked to attend to dining guests, handle their bills and receive payments for transmittal to the cashier and was therefore involved in the handling of company funds, is considered an employee occupying a position of trust and confidence. Similarly in Esteban’s case, given that she had in her care and custody the store’s property and funds, she is considered as a rank–and–file employee occupying a position of trust and confidence.
Proceeding from the above conclusion, the pivotal question that must be answered is whether Esteban’s acts constitute just cause to terminate her employment.
In this case, the Court finds that the acts committed by Esteban do not amount to a wilful breach of trust. She admitted that she accessed the POS system28 with the use of the unauthorized “123456” password. She did so, however, out of curiosity and without any obvious intention of defrauding the petitioner. As professed by Esteban, “she was acting in good faith in verifying what her co–staff told her about the opening of the computer by the use of the “123456” password, x x x. She even told her co–staff not to open again said computer, and that was the first and last time she opened said computer.”29 Moreover, the petitioner even admitted that Esteban has her own password to the POS system. If it was her intention to manipulate the store’s inventory and funds, she could have done so long before she had knowledge of the unauthorized password. But the facts on hand show that she did not. The petitioner also failed to establish a substantial connection between Esteban’s use of the “123456” password and any loss suffered by the petitioner. Indeed, it may be true that, as posited by the petitioner, it is the fact that she used the password that gives cause to the loss of trust and confidence on Esteban. However, as ruled above, such breach must have been done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, and without any justifiable excuse, and not simply something done carelessly, thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently. To the Court’s mind, Esteban’s lapse is, at best, a careless act that does not merit the imposition of the penalty of dismissal.
The petitioner deducted the amount of P8,304.93 from Esteban’s last salary. According to the petitioner, this represents the store’s negative variance for the year 2005 to 2006. The petitioner justifies the deduction on the basis of alleged trade practice and that it is allowed by the Labor Code.
(d) That the deduction from the wages of the employee does not exceed 20 percent of the employee’s wages in a week.
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Decision dated November 25, 2009 and Resolution dated June 10, 2010 of the Court of Appeals in CA–G.R. SP No. 107573 insofar as it reinstated with modification the Decision of the Labor Arbiter dated September 28, 2007 are AFFIRMED. Insofar as it affirmed respondent Glyza Esteban’s preventive suspension, the same are hereby REVERSED.
The Labor Arbiter is hereby ORDERED to re–compute the monetary award in favor of Glyza Esteban and to exclude the award of backwages during such period of preventive suspension, if any.
1M+W Zander Phils. Inc., et al. v. Enriquez, 606 Phil. 591, 609 (2009).
2 Issued by Labor Arbiter Lilia S. Savari; rollo, pp. 145–157.
6 Penned by Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr., with Associate Justices Pampio A. Abarintos and Francisco P. Acosta, concurring; id. at 41–52.
14 Id. at 49, 155.
18Caltex (Philippines), Inc. v. Agad, G.R. No. 162017, April 23, 2010, 619 SCRA 196, 214.
19Zenaida D. Mendoza v. HMS Credit Corporation, G.R. No. 187232, April 17, 2013, citing Etcuban v. Sulpicio Lines, 489 SCRA 483, 496–497.
20Eric Alvarez v. Golden Tri Bloc, Inc. and Enrique Lee, G.R. No. 202158, September 25, 2013.
23Abel v. Philex Mining Corporation, G.R. No. 178976, July 31, 2009, 594 SCRA 683, 694; M+W Zander Phils., Inc., et al. v. Enriquez, supra note 1; Bristol Myers Squibb (Phils.) Inc. v. Baban, 594 Phil. 620, 629 (2008).
24 G.R. No. 192826, February 27, 2013, 692 SCRA 227.
25Eric Alvarez v. Golden Tri Bloc, Inc. and Enrique Lee, supra note 20; Rexie Hormillosa v. Coca–Cola Bottlers, Inc., G.R. No. 198699, October 9, 2013, citing Bristol Myers Squibb (Phils.) Inc. v. Baban, supra note 23, at 628.
26The Coca–Cola Export Corporation v. Gacayan, G.R. No. 149433, June 22, 2011, 652 SCRA 463, 471.
30Lima Land, Inc. v. Cuevas, G.R. No. 169523, June 16, 2010, 621 SCRA 36, 50.
32 Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code, as amended by Department Order No. 9, Series of 1997, Book V, Rule XXIII, Section 8.
33Mandapat v. Add Force Personnel Services, Inc., G.R. No. 180285, July 6, 2010, 624 SCRA 155, 162.
35 G.R. No. 188169, November 28, 2011, 661 SCRA 416.

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