Source: https://www.scribd.com/document/321207140/Manuel-Mondragon-v-Eric-Holder-Jr-4th-Cir-2013
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 10:57:48+00:00

Document:
1. Light Rail Transit v. Venus Jr.
of the Board of Immigration Appeals.
Before NIEMEYER, KING, and AGEE, Circuit Judges.
the opinion, in which Judge King and Judge Agee joined.
Acting Assistant Attorney General, Civil Division, Carl H.
Adjustment and Central American Relief Act ("NACARA").
to him, in violation of his due process rights.
the BIAs application of the modified categorical approach.
retroactive. Accordingly, we deny his petitions for review.
protected status based on an ongoing civil war in El Salvador.
this conviction is a two-page document that served as a warrant for his arrest and recorded the disposition of the charge.
was sentenced to one years imprisonment, suspended.
or paroled . . . is inadmissible").
from removal, this time under 203 of NACARA, Pub. L.
INA, is ineligible for its discretionary relief. Id.
assault and battery, his conviction did not constitute an "aggravated felony." At that time, the term "aggravated felony"
assault and battery was one year. See 8 U.S.C.
322(a), Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009, 3009-627, 3009629 (1996) (codified at 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(F) (2006)).
[IIRIRA], regardless of when the conviction occurred."
IIRIRA 321(c) (emphasis added); see also id. 322(c).
punishable by imprisonment for at least five years.
like you would take your child by the arm across the street."
there were no injuries. I did not do anything violent at all."
ruling, Mondragn filed his second petition for review.
Both petitions for review are now before us.
would not have precluded him from cancellation of removal."
what the law is and to conform their conduct accordingly."
Like the St. Cyr respondent, at the time Mr. Mondragn entered his guilty plea, it would not have rendered him ineligible for relief from deportation.
reliance on the lawprinciples that serve as a bedrock of the United States judicial system and foundational precepts of the rule of law.
States illegally and is therefore removable. See 8 U.S.C.
"shall" be paroled if certain conditions are satisfied.
class of aliens ineligible for this relief"); Huicochea-Gomez v.
(1981) (quoting Leis v. Flynt, 439 U.S. 438, 444 n.5 (1979)).
rational basis for doing so. See, e.g., Gen. Motors Corp. v.
233, 235-36 (6th Cir. 1996) (same).
Lopez-Elias v. Reno, 209 F.3d 788, 793 n.12 (5th Cir. 2000).
Congress leaves the issue of retroactivity unresolved.
to withdraw that discretion was not retroactively applicable.
the power to enact laws with retrospective effect").
Here, we do not face the situation presented in St. Cyr.
in the face of this unambiguous provision.
the course of that conviction).
delay and protraction of federal sentencing process."
similar limitation in habeas proceedings challenging a sentencing enhancement. See Daniels v. United States, 532 U.S.
apply Custis to the immigration context. See, e.g., Drakes v.
1330 (11th Cir. 2005) (same).
prior conviction under the Custis line of cases applies here.
statute, we reject his Sixth Amendment challenge.
application of the revised definition of "aggravated felony"
a modified categorical approach, which limited its consideration to the record of conviction.
to present evidence on his own behalf. See 8 U.S.C.
We begin with an understanding of the statutory context.
from removal rests on the alien seeking the relief. 8 U.S.C.
for special rule cancellation of removal, the applicant . . .
imprisonment of at least one year. See 8 U.S.C.
capable of causing physical pain or injury to another person,"
conviction whether the conviction was for a crime of violence.
insufficient to meet an aliens burden of demonstrating eligibility for cancellation of removal. See Salem, 647 F.3d at 116.
presented only an inconclusive record of conviction, his petition for discretionary relief should likewise fail.
always been taught to respect people older than me.
pulled him away from my car door so I could get in.
him, there were no injuries.
turns on the fact of conviction and the elements of the crime.
enhance a sentence based on a prior conviction. See Taylor v.
did something similar. It gave effectineligibility for discretionary reliefto convictions that fell within the same category, "violent crimes." See NACARA 203; 8 C.F.R.
fact of conviction and the elements of the crime.
U.S. at 601. The plain language of the "aggravated felony"
of a factual approach" that would go behind the conviction.
unreliable and time-consuming wastes of judicial resources.
United States v. Spence, 661 F.3d 194, 198 (4th Cir. 2011).
correct in applying it here.
relief, not the conduct of conviction.
587 F.3d 219, 223 (4th Cir. 2009)).
what are known as Shepard documents. See Shepard v.
and therefore did not fall within the class of evidence protected by 8 U.S.C. 1229a(b)(4).
Supreme Courts decision in Nijhawan v. Holder, 557 U.S.
a crime of violence, the focus remains on the fact of conviction and the elements of the crime.
afforded by NACARA. The burden rests on him, and unfortunately, he was unable to meet it.
Notice: Alaska Native claims selection: NIMA Corp.

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