Source: https://www.povertylaw.org/clearinghouse/fpmd/chapter5/section2
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 03:49:27+00:00

Document:
In 1971, in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, the Supreme Court created a federal cause of action against federal officers for damages due to a violation of the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures.8 This cause of action is not based on an express or implied statutory authorization to sue, but rather is grounded in the Constitution. Such an action is often referred to as a “Bivens action,” a “cause of action arising directly under the Constitution,” or a “constitutional tort.” This section discusses the circumstances in which a Bivens action may be brought.
Bivens actions are not needed when a statute authorizes the relief sought. For example, Bivens actions are not necessary to sue for claims under the Tucker Act and the Federal Tort Claims Act, because those statutes authorize damages.9 In contrast, the Administrative Procedure Act does not authorize damages against persons acting under color of federal law, and therefore, Bivens actions are necessary to support a damage claim against individual federal actors for constitutional violations.
Although the Court has not overruled Bivens, the Court has refused to extend it. In Correctional Services Corporation v. Malesko, the Court expressly limited Bivens actions to the narrow range of claims previously recognized.10 In Ziglar v. Abbasi, a 2017 case in which only six justices participated, the Court did the same.11 It provided a detailed historical look at Bivens actions, refined its Bivens analysis, and explained why it has limited the Bivens remedy. Abbasi is essential reading for any lawyer contemplating a Bivens action.
In both Bivens and Davis, the plaintiffs had no other available remedy; it was, therefore, a question of “damages or nothing.”20 In each case, this factor weighed heavily in the Court’s decision to imply a cause of action. However, the Court subsequently created a Bivens action in a case in which the plaintiff clearly had a statutory cause of action and limited remedy under the Federal Tort Claims Act. In Carlson v. Green, the Court allowed a Bivens action by an asthmatic prisoner under the Eighth Amendment against individual federal prison officials who allegedly failed to give him needed medical attention.21 The Court decided that a Bivens action was available because Congress had explicitly stated its intent to allow both the Federal Tort Claims Act and Bivens actions to coexist as complements.22 Carlson marks the high-water mark for the Bivens cause of action; the Supreme Court has consistently declined further invitations to extend Bivens.
Although Bivens, Davis, and Carlson initially seemed to suggest that Bivens actions for constitutional violations would be broadly available to fill gaps in federal damage remedies, the Court subsequently refused to extend Bivens actions beyond the scope of those earlier cases. When Congress provides a statutory cause of action without expressly indicating its intent to allow Bivens actions as well (as was the case in the legislative history examined in Carlson), the Court is very unlikely to imply a cause of action.
Abbasi involved Fourth and Fifth Amendment claims by post-September 11 detainees in the Administrative Maximum Special Housing Unit against Department of Justice officials and prison wardens. They challenged the conditions of their incarceration; claimed that those conditions were the result of equal protection violations based on race, religion, or national origin; and alleged that the wardens permitted guards to abuse them.
The Court had little difficulty concluding that these detention policy claims by "illegal aliens" in the wake of a terrorist attack were very different than the claims made in Bivens, Davis, and Carlson even though two of them involved Fourth and Fifth Amendment violations.50 The Court turned second to whether there were any "special factors counselling hesitation" to the courts implying a damages action in the new context. The general inquiry is "whether the Judiciary is well suited, absent congressional action or instruction, to consider and weigh the costs and benefits of allowing a damages action to proceed."51 So framed, the answer is almost invariably no.
In Abbasi, the Court cautioned that it is not appropriate to use Bivens cases to change government policy. Thus, cases that involve discovery into the discussion, deliberation, and formulation of policy divert the time and attention of officials from their Executive Branch duties. Here, that special factor applied with greater force because the policies at issue fell within the national security realm.
The Court placed great emphasis on the failure of Congress to enact an statutory remedy but did examine whether that absence was inadvertent. The Court observed that Congress has been actively engaged in studying the terrorist attacks and, in particular, asked the Department of Justice Inspector General to report on conditions of the prison at issue. The failure of Congress to legislate under such circumstances led the Court to conclude that the absence of a remedy was not inadvertent.
In the late 1960s, the Supreme Court held that private individuals could enforce federal anti-discrimination statutes to remedy explicit racial discrimination, based on an implied statutory cause of action.60 These decisions focused on the need to provide a remedy to correct racial injustice when a federal statute establishes the right to be free from racial discrimination.
In 1975, in Cort v. Ash, the Court, however, unanimously limited the use of implied statutory causes of action.61 In an opinion by Justice Brennan, the Court set forth a four-prong test for finding an implied cause of action. The test asks whether 1) the plaintiff is in the class for whose especial benefit the statute was enacted; 2) there is any indication of legislative intent, explicit or implicit, either to deny or to create a private right to enforce; 3) a private right to enforce would be consistent with the underlying purpose of the statute; and 4) the cause of action is traditionally in the purview of state law, such that a federal right to enforce would be inappropriate.62 The holding of the case was that there was no implied cause of action in the Federal Election Campaign Act for stockholders to obtain damages from corporate directors, because none of the four factors were met.
In Wright v. City of Roanoke Redevelopment and Housing Authority,81 Justice O'Connor wrote a dissent on behalf of four Justices which introduced the idea that the Cort v. Ash test for an implied right of action should be utilized in determining whether a plaintiff may access the express right of action in 42 U.S.C. § 1983. She suggested that each specific provision of the statute, not the statute as a whole, be carefully scrutinized to "determine congressional intent to create enforceable rights."82 This analysis imports into the § 1983 analysis the second prong of the Cort v. Ash test—a search for legislative intent to create a private right of action in a statute devoid of any express right to sue in federal court.
Alexander v. Sandoval involved a challenge to the Alabama Department of Safety’s refusal to administer its driver’s examination in a language other than English.86 The plaintiff was a Mexican immigrant who did not have the English skills necessary to take a written examination. She sued, arguing that the driver’s license rule violated the regulations implementing Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Section 601 of Title VI forbids discrimination based on race or national origin in any program or activity receiving federal funds. Section 602 of the statute authorizes the federal government to promulgate regulations to implement Section 601. The regulations interpret national origin discrimination to include actions that did not intend to discriminate but had that effect because of factors having a disparate impact, such as an individual’s limited ability to speak English.
The Supreme Court's recent decision in Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Center, Incorporated104 put an end to that idea. In Armstrong, providers of Medicaid-covered habilitation services sued officials in Idaho's Department of Health and Welfare on the ground that Idaho's Medicaid plan reimburses them at rates lower than required by a federal statute.105 Suing directly under the Supremacy Clause, the plaintiffs asked a federal court to enjoin the state plan.
Both the majority and the dissent agreed that the Supremacy Clause does not create a cause of action.106 In response to the argument that the Court had frequently enjoined state actors violating federal law, the Court responded that, because it had done the same with respect to federal actors, the Supremacy Clause cannot serve as the explanation.107 Instead, the Supremacy Clause merely provides a rule of decision in cases correctly raising preemption claims, instructing courts on what to do when state and federal law clash.
Armstrong does not preclude preemption arguments, but it does preclude preemption claims based solely on the Supremacy Clause. Such arguments must be tied to another cause of action, such as those involving the court's equitable power to enjoin state laws and acts that conflict with federal law.111 However, that law can serve as a basis for such injunctive relief only when Congress has not precluded private enforcement. While Armstrong provides some guidance on when this may be so, and appears to draw from some of the prongs of Gonzaga analysis, future cases will explore these contours.
1. Anthony J. Belia, Jr., Article III and the Cause of Action, 89 Iowa L. Rev. 777, 784, 793, 797 (2004).
2. Rochelle Bobroff, Section 1983 and Preemption: Alternative Means of Court Access for Safety Net Statutes, 10 Loy. J. Pub. Int. L. 27, 32 (2009).
3. John Harrison, Jurisdiction, Congressional Power, and Constitutional Remedies, 86 Geo. L. J. 2513, 2520-21 (1998).
4. See, e.g., J.I. Case Company v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
5. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1948 (2009).
6. Bobroff, Section 1983 and Preemption, supra note 2.
7. Verizon Maryland, Incorporated v. Public Service Commission, 535 U.S. 635 (2002).
8. The term “Bivens action” refers to the case in which the Supreme Court first held that the federal courts could create such a cause of action. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
9. These statutes are discussed in Chapters 2.5.C. and 2.5.D. of this MANUAL.
10. Correctional Services Corporation v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61 (2001).
11. Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S.Ct. 1843 (2017).
12. Procedurally, reasoning by analogy from § 1983 actions, all courts considering the issue have held that state personal injury statutes of limitation should govern Bivens. Kelly v. Serna, 87 F.3d 1235, 1238 (11th Cir. 1996); Van Tu v. Koster, 364 F.3d 1196, 1199 (10th Cir. 2004); Papa v. United States, 281 F.3d 1004, 1009 n.11 (9th Cir. 2002); King v. One Unknown Federal Corrections Officer, 201 F.3d 910, 913 (7th Cir. 2000); Polanco v. U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration, 158 F.3d 647, 653 (2d Cir. 1998); Sanchez v. United States, 49 F.3d 1329, 1330 (8th Cir. 1995); Napier v. Thirty or More Unidentified Federal Agents, Employees, or Officers, 855 F.2d 1080, 1088 n.3 (3d Cir. 1988). Additionally, there is currently no express or implied statutory authorization for an award of attorney's fees to prevailing plaintiffs in Bivens actions and the Supreme Court has expressly declined to rule on the question. Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 372 n.9 (1983).
13. 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1); McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 150 (1992).
14. The determination that a plaintiff has a Bivens cause of action does not necessarily mean that the plaintiff may recover damages in the case. The additional, and distinct, question of whether the defendants are entitled to absolute or qualified immunity must also be adjudicated. Government officials performing discretionary functions are generally granted a qualified immunity and are “shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). The immunity analysis is the same under either a Bivens or a § 1983 cause of action. See, e.g., Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 609 (1999); Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394 n.9 (1989); Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 340 n.2 (1986). For a discussion of the circumstances in which government officials sued in their individual capacities are entitled to either absolute or qualified immunity, see Chapters 8.2.A. and 8.2.B. of this MANUAL.
15. The Federal Tort Claims Act was amended in 1974 to provide a remedy for intentional torts committed by federal law enforcement officials. See 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h).
16. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 391-92, 394-95.
17. Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979).
18. Id. at 230-31 n.3.
19. Id. at 245, 247.
20. Id. at 245 (quoting Bivens, 403 U.S. at 410 (Harlan, J., concurring)).
21. Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980). In Hui v. Castaneda, 130 S. Ct. 1845 (2010), the Supreme Court distinguished Carlson and held that 42 U.S.C. § 233(a), a provision in the Public Health Service Act, precludes Bivens claims against individual Public Health Service employees and instead requires that the United States be substituted and a case brought under the Federal Tort Claims Act.
22. Id. at 19-20. The Supreme Court relied on language in the Senate Report on the 1974 Federal Tort Claims Act Amendments, showing that “Congress views [the Act] and Bivens as parallel, complementary causes of action.” The Court also noted that in several respects the Bivens remedy was more effective. Unlike a Federal Tort Claims Act suit, a Bivens suit allows recovery against individual officers (thus more effectively deterring unconstitutional conduct), allows punitive damages, can be tried before a jury, and is not dependent on “the vagaries” of state tort statutes and doctrines. Id. at 19-23. The 1988 Amendment to the Federal Tort Claim Act’s exclusivity-of-remedy provision, 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b)(1)-(2), made clear that Congress had maintained its position that the Act is not the exclusive remedy for a constitutional tort, and thus that Congress declined to overturn Bivens, Davis, and Carlson.
23. Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367 (1983).
25. The Court deferred to Congress’ greater familiarity with the appropriate remedial scheme as reflected in the long history of legislative management of the civil service system. The Supreme Court took a hands-off approach, even though Congress had not stated that it considered the statutory civil service remedies to be exclusive, and even though the Court assumed that a Bivens action would provide greater relief. See Bush, 462 U.S. at 378.
27. Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296 (1983).
28. Id. at 302, 304.
29. United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 684 (1987) (quoting Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 146 (1950)).
30. Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412, 423-29 (1988).
31. Id. at 415-16 (“Finding that benefits were too often being improperly terminated by state agencies, only to be reinstated by a federal administrative law judge (ALJ), Congress enacted temporary emergency legislation in 1983.”).
33. Correctional Services Corporation v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 75 (2001) (Scalia, J., concurring).
34. J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
35. Malesko, 534 U.S. at 67 n.3 (quoting Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 287 (2001)).
36. Id. at 68, 70.
37. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471 (1994).
40. Minneci v. Pollard, 132 S. Ct. 617 (2012).
42. Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537, 541, 548 (2007).
44. Id. at 550 (quoting Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367 , 378 (1983).
46. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843.
54. In light of Abbasi, the Court remanded Hernandez v. Mesa, No. 15-118 (U.S. June 26, 2017), a case in which the appellate court avoided the Bivens claim by holding, possibly incorrectly, that an officer who shot a Mexican youth at the border was entitled to qualified immunity.
55. The Court first assumed a Bivens claim under the First Amendment in Bush, 462 U.S. at 372-73.
56. Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250 (2006).
57. Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1948 (2009).
58. See, e.g., Gibson v. United States, 781 F.2d 1334 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1054 (1987) (allegation that Federal Bureau of Investigation agents impermissibly curbed plaintiff’s protected speech claim, properly cognizable as a Bivens-type action under the First Amendment); Spagnola v. Mathis, 809 F.2d 16 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (reversing dismissal of Bivens claim by federal employee who allegedly suffered harassment by supervisors for exercising his First Amendment rights; and distinguishing Bush on grounds that remedial scheme is less comprehensive than that of the Civil Service Reform Act, and remedies are less meaningful).
59. Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001).
60. Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, 396 U.S. 229, 238 (1969); Allen v. State Board of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 556-57 (1969); Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 414-415, and 414 n.13 (1969).
61. Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
63. Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 709 (1979).
67. Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Incorporated v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 24 (1979); Touche Ross and Company v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 575-76 (1979).
68. Transamerica, 444 U.S. at 24.
69. Id. at 15-16. The dissent argued on behalf of four Justices that "courts may provide private litigants exercising implied rights of action whatever relief is consistent with the congressional purpose." Id. at 30 (White, J. dissenting). But the majority clearly rejected the dissent's approach of focusing on overall congressional purpose.
70. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner and Smith v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353 (1982).
72. Id. at 384-85. See also Herman and MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 386-87 (1983) (express remedy does not preclude enforcement of another statute which had previously been held enforceable under an implied private right of action).
74. Guardians Association v. Civil Service Commission, 463 U.S. 582 (1983).
75. Id. at 607, n.27.
76. Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794a(a)(2). See Lane v. Peña, 518 U.S. 187, 191-92 (1996).
77. See Virginia Bankshares, Incorporated v. Sandberg, 501 U.S. 1083, 1102 (1991); Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Incorporated v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 812, n. 9 (1986) (collecting cases).
78. Montgomery Improvement Association v. U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, 645 F.2d 291, 295 (5th Cir. 1981).
79. Latinos Unidos de Chelsea En Accion (Lucha) v. Secretary of Housing and Urban Development, 799 F.2d 774, 795 (1st Cir. 1986).
80. Lisa E. Key, Private Enforcement of Federal Funding Conditions under 1983: the Supreme Court’s Failure to Adhere to the Doctrine of Separation of Powers, 29 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 283, 286 (1996). See also Donald H. Zeigler, Rights, Rights of Action, and Remedies: An Integrated Approach, 76 Wash. L. Rev. 67, 91 (2001).
81. Wright v. City of Roanoke Redevelopment and Housing Authority, 479 U.S. 418 (1987).
82. Id. at 433 (O'Connor, J. dissenting). Prior to Justice O'Connor's Wright dissent, Justices Powell and Rehnquist had objected to enforcement of civil rights and safety net statutes under § 1983 on policy grounds, arguing that these cases were an undue burden on the state. Bobroff, Section 1983 and Preemption, supra note 2, at 39-42.
83. Wilder v. Virginia Hospital Association, 496 U.S. 498, 508 n.9 (1990).
84. Gonzaga University v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273 (2002) (finding no right to suit under § 1983 where plaintiff alleged a violation of the Federal Educational Right to Privacy Act, the federal statute protecting the privacy of educational records).
86. Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001).
94. Jackson v. Birmingham Board of Education, 544 U.S. 167 (2004).
95. Id. at 178. Cf. Rolland v. Romney, 318 F.3d 42, 52-53 (1st Cir. 2003) (relying on same Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001) language and finding private right of action under § 1983 to enforce regulations interpreting the Nursing Home Reform Amendments, 42 U.S.C. § 1396r, based on “rights-creating language” contained in statute).
96. Price v. City of Stockton, 390 F.3d 1105, 1112 n.6 (9th Cir. 2004); see Johnson v. City of Detroit, 446 F.3d 614, 629 (6th Cir. 2006); Save Our Valley v. Sound Transit, 335 F.3d 932, 943 (9th Cir. 2003). See also South Camden Citizens in Action v. New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection, 274 F.3d 771, 784 (3d Cir. 2001) (finding disparate impact regulation unenforceable under § 1983 based on Sandoval; decided before Gonzaga). Two circuits had held that regulations alone could not be enforced under § 1983 prior to Sandoval. Harris v. James, 127 F.3d 993, 1008 (11th Cir. 1997); Smith v. Kirk, 821 F.2d 980, 984 (4th Cir. 1987).
97. Shakhnes v. Proud, 689 F.3d 244, 251 (2d Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 1808 (2013); Price, 390 F.3d at 1112 n.6.
98. Lonberg v. City of Riverside, 571 F.3d 846, 851 (9th Cir. 2009).
99. Ability Center of Greater Toledo v. Sandusky, 385 F.3d 901, 906 (6th Cir. 2004) (“if the regulation simply effectuates the express mandates of the controlling statute, then the regulation may be enforced via the private cause of action available under that statute”); Chaffin v. Kansas State Fair Board, 348 F.3d 850, 858 (10th Cir. 2003) (distinguishing Sandoval on this basis and permitting enforcement of Americans with Disabilities Act regulations and guidelines through a private action).
100. See generally, Bobroff, Section 1983 and Preemption, supra note 2.
101. “This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any state to the Contrary notwithstanding. “ U.S. Const. art. VI.
102. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 31 (1824).
103. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., et al., Hart and Wechsler's The Federal Courts and the Federal System, 903 (5th ed. 2003); 13D Charles Alan Wright, et al., Federal Practice & Procedure § 3566 (3d ed. 2009) (concluding that “the Supremacy Clause creates an implied right of action for injunctive relief against state officers who are threatening to violate the federal Constitution or laws”).
104. Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Center, Incorporated, 135 S. Ct. 1378 (2015).
105. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(30)(A) (2014).
106. Armstrong, 135 S. Ct. at 1383; id. at 1391 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
108. Id. at 1385. As the dissent explained, the "most famous exposition" of that power is Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). Armstrong, 135 S. Ct. at 1390 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
109. Id. (citing Gonzaga University v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 292 (2002) (Breyer, J., concurring in judgment)).
111. While the Court in Armstrong did not address whether there would be federal jurisdiction over such claims, Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Incorporated, 463 U.S. 85, 96 n.14 (1983), would suggest there is.

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