Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/309/261/
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 13:57:45+00:00

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Justia › US Law › US Case Law › US Supreme Court › Volume 309 › Utility Workers v. Consolidated Edison Co.
Amalgamated Utility Workers v. Consolidated Edison Co.
Under the National Labor Relations Act, the authority to apply to the Circuit Court of Appeals to have an employer adjudged in contempt for failure to obey a decree enforcing an order of the National Labor Relations Board lies exclusively in the Board itself, acting as a public agency. A labor organization has no standing to make such an application in virtue of having filed the charges upon which the Board's proceedings were initiated. P. 309 U. S. 269.
Certiorari, 308 U.S. 541, to review the denial of an application for a contempt order.
found to be unfair and to take certain affirmative action. The Circuit Court of Appeals granted the Board's petition for enforcement of the order, and its decree, as modified, was affirmed by this Court. Consolidated Edison Co. v. Labor Board, 305 U. S. 197. Petitioner, Amalgamated Utility Workers, brought the present proceeding before the Circuit Court of Appeals to have the Consolidated Edison Company and its affiliated companies adjudged in contempt for failure to comply with certain requirements of the decree.
The Board, in response to the motion, asserted its willingness to participate in an investigation to ascertain whether acts in violation of the decree had been committed, and suggested that the court direct such investigation as might be deemed appropriate.
"the Board is the proper party to apply to the court for an order of enforcement and to present to the court charges that the court's order has not been obeyed."
106 F.2d 991. In view of the importance of the question in relation to the proper administration of the National Labor Relations Act, we granted certiorari. 308 U.S. 541.
these charges that the Board issued its complaint and held the hearing which resulted in the order in question. Also, that petitioner was permitted to intervene in the proceedings before the Circuit Court of Appeals where the companies had moved to set aside the Board's order, and the Board had moved to enforce it, and that the petitioner had also been heard in this Court in the certiorari proceedings for review of the decree of enforcement.
"Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in concerted activities, for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection."
Neither this provision nor any other provision of the Act can properly be said to have "created" the right of self-organization or of collective bargaining through representatives of the employees' own choosing. In Labor Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U. S. 1, 301 U. S. 33-34, we observed that this right is a fundamental one; that employees "have as clear a right to organize and select their representatives for lawful purposes" as the employer has "to organize its business and select its own officers and agents;" that discrimination and coercion "to prevent the free exercise of the right of employees to self-organization and representation" was a proper subject for condemnation by competent legislative authority. We noted that "long ago"
we had stated the reason for labor organizations -- that, through united action, employees might have "opportunity to deal on an equality with their employer," referring to what we had said in American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Central Trades Council, 257 U. S. 184, 257 U. S. 209. And, in recognition of this right, we concluded that Congress could safeguard it in the interest of interstate commerce and seek to make appropriate collective action "an instrument of peace, rather than of strife." To that end, Congress enacted the National Labor Relations Act.
To attain its object, Congress created a particular agency, the National Labor Relations Board, and established a special procedure. The aim, character, and scope of that special procedure are determinative of the question now before us. Within the range of its constitutional power, Congress was entitled to determine what remedy it would provide, the way that remedy should be sought, the extent to which it should be afforded, and the means by which it should be made effective.
"The Board is empowered, as hereinafter provided, to prevent any person from engaging in any unfair labor practice (listed in section 8) affecting commerce. This power shall be exclusive, and shall not be affected by any other means of adjustment or prevention that has been or may be established by agreement, code, law, or otherwise."
So far, it is apparent that Congress has entrusted to the Board exclusively the prosecution of the proceeding by its own complaint, the conduct of the hearing, the adjudication, and the granting of appropriate relief. The Board as a public agency acting in the public interest, not any private person or group, not any employee or group of employees, is chosen as the instrument to assure protection from the described unfair conduct in order to remove obstructions to interstate commerce.
is to proceed upon notice to those against whom the order runs and with appropriate hearing. If the court, upon application by either party, is satisfied that additional evidence should be taken, it may order the Board, its member or agent, to take it. The Board may then modify its findings of fact and make new findings. The jurisdiction conferred upon the court is exclusive, and its decree is final save as it may be reviewed in the customary manner. § 10(e). [Footnote 6] Again, the Act gives no authority for any proceeding by a private person or group, or by any employee or group of employees, to secure enforcement of the Board's order. The vindication of the desired freedom of employees is thus confided by the Act, by reason of the recognized public interest, to the public agency the Act creates. Petitioner emphasizes the opportunity afforded to private persons by § 10(f). [Footnote 7] But that opportunity is given to a person aggrieved by a final order of the Board which has granted or denied in whole or in part the relief sought. That is, it is an opportunity afforded to contest a final order of the Board, not to enforce it. The procedure on such a contest before the Circuit Court of Appeals is assimilated to that provided in § 10(e) when the Board seeks an enforcement of its order. But that assimilation does not change the nature of the proceeding under § 10(f), which seeks not to require compliance with the Board's order but to overturn it.
"Section 10(a) gives the National Labor Relations Board exclusive jurisdiction to prevent and redress unfair labor practices, and, taken in conjunction with section 14, establishes clearly that this bill is paramount over other laws that might touch upon similar subject matters. Thus, it is intended to dispel the confusion resulting from dispersion of authority and to establish a single paramount administrative or quasi-judicial authority in connection with the development of the Federal American law regarding collective bargaining."
"The Board is empowered, according to the procedure provided in section 10, to prevent any person from engaging in any unfair labor practice listed in section 8 'affecting commerce' as that term is defined in section 2(7). This power is vested exclusively in the Board, and is not to be affected by any other means of adjustment or prevention. The Board is thus made the paramount agency for dealing with the unfair labor practices described in the bill."
and affirmative order is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the bill to remove obstructions to interstate commerce which are by the law declared to be detrimental to the public weal."
"Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act does not provide private persons with an administrative remedy for private wrongs. The formal complaint is brought in the Commission's name; the prosecution is wholly that of the government, and it bears the entire expense of the prosecution. A person who deems himself aggrieved by the use of an unfair method of competition is not given the right to institute before the Commission a complaint against the alleged wrongdoer. Nor may the Commission authorize him to do so. He may, of course, bring the matter to the Commission's attention and request it to file a complaint. But a denial of his request is final. And if the request is granted and a proceeding is instituted, he does not become a party to it or have any control over it."
upon the carrier many duties and creates in the individual corresponding rights. For the violation of the private right, it affords "a private administrative remedy." The interested person can file as of right a complaint before the Interstate Commerce Commission, and the carrier is required to make answer. We said that the Federal Trade Commission Act "contains no such features." Id., p. 280 U. S. 26. The present Act, drawn in analogy to the Federal Trade Commission Act, contains no such features.
As Congress has in this instance created a public agency entrusted by the terms of its creation with the exclusive authority for the enforcement of the provisions of the Act, decisions dealing with the legal obligations arising under the Railway Labor Act [Footnote 11] cannot be regarded as apposite. Texas & N.O. R. Co. v. Brotherhood of Railway Clerks, 281 U. S. 548, 281 U. S. 569-570; Virginian Railway Co. v. System Federation No. 40, 300 U. S. 515, 300 U. S. 543-544.
unfair labor practice. If the decree of enforcement is disobeyed, the unfair labor practice is still not prevented. The Board still remains as the sole authority to secure that prevention. The appropriate procedure to that end is to ask the court to punish the violation of its decree as a contempt. As the court has no jurisdiction to enforce the order at the suit of any private person or group of persons, we think it is clear that the court cannot entertain a petition for violation of its decree of enforcement save as the Board presents it. As the Conference Report upon the bill stated, [Footnote 12] in case the unfair labor practice is resumed, "there will be immediately available to the Board an existing court decree to serve as a basis for contempt proceedings."
MR. JUSTICE MURPHY took no part in the consideration and decision of this cause.
49 Stat. 449, 29 U.S.C. § 151, et seq.
Sen.Rep. No. 573, 74th Cong., 1st sess., p. 15.
H.R.Rep. No. 972, 71th Cong., 1st sess., p. 21.
45 U.S.C. § 151 et seq. See 50 Harvard Law Review 1089, 1090.
Conference Report, Cong.Rec. 74th Cong., 1st sess., pt. 9, p. 10,299.

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