Source: http://lawlibrary.chanrobles.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=83188:57163&catid=1584&Itemid=566
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 02:46:41+00:00

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G.R. No. 160110, June 18, 2014 - MARIANO C. MENDOZA AND ELVIRA LIM, Petitioners, v. SPOUSES LEONORA J. GOMEZ AND GABRIEL V. GOMEZ, Respondent.
MARIANO C. MENDOZA AND ELVIRA LIM, Petitioners, v. SPOUSES LEONORA J. GOMEZ AND GABRIEL V. GOMEZ, Respondent.
Assailed in the present appeal by certiorari is the Decision1 dated 29 September 2003 of the Special Fourth Division of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 71877, which affirmed with modification the Decision2 dated 31 January 2001 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 172, Valenzuela City in Civil Case No. 5352-V-97, and which effectively allowed the award of actual, moral, and exemplary damages, as well as attorney's fees and costs of the suit in favor of respondent Spouses Leonora and Gabriel Gomez (respondents).
Owing to the incident, an Information for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property and multiple physical injuries was filed against Mendoza.9 Mendoza, however, eluded arrest, thus, respondents filed a separate complaint for damages against Mendoza and Lim, seeking actual damages, compensation for lost income, moral damages, exemplary damages, attorney’s fees and costs of the suit.10 This was docketed as Civil Case No. 5352-V-97.
Additionally, respondents averred that the mishap deprived them of a daily income of P1,000.00. Engaged in the business of buying plastic scraps and delivering them to recycling plants, respondents claimed that the Isuzu truck was vital in the furtherance of their business.
For their part, petitioners capitalized on the issue of ownership of the bus in question. Respondents argued that although the registered owner was Lim, the actual owner of the bus was SPO1 Cirilo Enriquez (Enriquez), who had the bus attached with Mayamy Transportation Company (Mayamy Transport) under the so-called “kabit system.” Respondents then impleaded both Lim and Enriquez.
After weighing the evidence, the RTC found Mendoza liable for direct personal negligence under Article 2176 of the Civil Code, and it also found Lim vicariously liable under Article 2180 of the same Code.
As regards Lim, the RTC relied on the Certificate of Registration issued by the Land Transportation Office on 9 December 199617 in concluding that she is the registered owner of the bus in question. Although actually owned by Enriquez, following the established principle in transportation law, Lim, as the registered owner, is the one who can be held liable.
a. Moral damages in spite of the fact that the [respondents’] cause of action is clearly based on quasi-delict and [respondents] did not sustain physical injuries to be entitled thereto pursuant to Article 2219 (2) of the New Civil Code and pertinent decisions of the Supreme Court to that effect. The court a quo erroneously concluded that the driver acted in bad faith and erroneously applied the provision of Article 21 of the same code to justify the award for bad faith is not consistent with quasi-delict which is founded on fault or negligence.
b. Exemplary damages in spite of the fact that there is no finding that the vehicular accident was due to petitioner-driver’s gross negligence to be entitled thereto pursuant to Article 2231 of the New Civil Code and pertinent decisions of the Supreme Court to that effect. The factual basis of the court a quo that “the act of the driver of the bus in attempting to escape after causing the accident in wanton disregard of the consequences of his negligent act is such gross negligence that justifies an award of exemplary damages” is an act after the fact which is not within the contemplation of Article 2231 of the New Civil Code.
c. Attorney’s fees in spite of the fact that the assailed decisions of the trial court and the court a quo are bereft with jurisdictions for the award of attorney’s fees pursuant to the pertinent decisions of the Supreme Court on the matter and provision Article 2208 of the New Civil Code. The court a quo erroneously applied the decision of the Supreme Court in Bañas, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals, 325 SCRA 259.
Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one’s own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business of industry.
As found by the RTC, and affirmed by the CA, Mendoza was negligent in driving the subject Mayamy bus, as demonstrated by the fact that, at the time of the collision, the bus intruded on the lane intended for the Isuzu truck. Having encroached on the opposite lane, Mendoza was clearly in violation of traffic laws. Article 2185 of the Civil Code provides that unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that a person driving a motor vehicle has been negligent if at the time of the mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation. In the case at bar, Mendoza’s violation of traffic laws was the proximate cause of the harm.
The evidence on record shows that before the collision, the Isuzu truck was in its rightful lane, and was even at a stop, having been flagged down by a security guard of St. Ignatius Village.23 The mishap occurred when the Mayamy bus, travelling at a fast speed as shown by the impact of the collision, and going in the opposite direction as that of the Isuzu truck, encroached on the lane rightfully occupied by said Isuzu truck, and caused the latter to spin, injuring Perez, Anla, Banca, and Repisada, and considerably damaging the Isuzu truck.
Having settled the fact of Mendoza’s negligence, then, the next question that confronts us is who may be held liable. According to Manresa, liability for personal acts and omissions is founded on that indisputable principle of justice recognized by all legislations that when a person by his act or omission causes damage or prejudice to another, a juridical relation is created by virtue of which the injured person acquires a right to be indemnified and the person causing the damage is charged with the corresponding duty of repairing the damage. The reason for this is found in the obvious truth that man should subordinate his acts to the precepts of prudence and if he fails to observe them and causes damage to another, he must repair the damage.24 His negligence having caused the damage, Mendoza is certainly liable to repair said damage.
In the case at bar, who is deemed as Mendoza’s employer? Is it Enriquez, the actual owner of the bus or Lim, the registered owner of the bus?
x x x The main aim of motor vehicle registration is to identify the owner so that if any accident happens, or that any damage or injury is caused by the vehicles on the public highways, responsibility therefore can be fixed on a definite individual, the registered owner. Instances are numerous where vehicle running on public highways caused accidents or injuries to pedestrians or other vehicles without positive identification of the owner or drivers, or with very scant means of identification. It is to forestall these circumstances, so inconvenient or prejudicial to the public, that the motor vehicle registration is primarily ordained, in the interest of the determination of persons responsible for damages or injuries caused on public highways.
As such, there can be no other conclusion but to hold Lim vicariously liable with Mendoza.
This does not mean, however, that Lim is left without any recourse against Enriquez and Mendoza. Under the civil law principle of unjust enrichment, the registered owner of the motor vehicle has a right to be indemnified by the actual employer of the driver; and under Article 2181 of the Civil Code, whoever pays for the damage caused by his dependents or employees may recover from the latter what he has paid or delivered in satisfaction of the claim.
Having identified the persons liable, our next question is what may be awarded.
Article 2202 of the Civil Code provides that in crimes and quasi- delicts, the defendant shall be liable for all damages which are the natural and probable consequences of the act or omission complained of. It is not necessary that such damages have been foreseen or could have reasonably been foreseen by the defendant. Article 2199 of the same Code, however, sets the limitation that, except as provided by law or by stipulation, one is entitled to an adequate compensation only for such pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has duly proved. As such, to warrant an award of actual or compensatory damages, the claimant must prove that the damage sustained is the natural and probable consequences of the negligent act and, moreover, the claimant must adequately prove the amount of such damage.
In the case at bar, the RTC, basing on the receipts submitted by respondents and which receipts petitioners had the opportunity to examine, found that the total repairs on the Isuzu truck amounted to P142,757.40, and that the full hospitalization and medical expenses of Perez, Anla, Banca, and Repisada amounted to P11,267.35. As such, these are the amounts that respondents are entitled to as actual and compensatory damages.
Although respondents alleged in their complaint that the damage to their Isuzu truck caused them the loss of a daily income of P1,000.00, such claim was not duly substantiated by any evidence on record, and thus cannot be awarded in their favor.
Q: Did you ever spend covering attorney’s fees?
Q: Aside from the actual damage that you have mentioned x x x, how much more would you like this Court to award you by way of moral damages?
Q: How about exemplary damages?
Q: What happened to you, what did you feel when the defendants failed to immediately repair your vehicle that was damaged Madam Witness?
A: I have incurred expenses and I was forced to apply for a loan, sir.
In Kierulf v. CA,39 we observed that this Court cannot remind the bench and the bar often enough that in order that moral damages may be awarded, there must be pleading and proof of moral suffering, mental anguish, fright and the like. Citing Francisco v. GSIS,40 the Court held that there must be clear testimony on the anguish and other forms of mental suffering. Thus, if the plaintiff fails to take the witness stand and testify as to his social humiliation, wounded feelings and anxiety, moral damages cannot be awarded.
Moreover, respondents were not able to show that their claim properly falls under Articles 2219 and 2220 of the Civil Code. Respondents cannot rely on Article 2219 (2) of the Civil Code which allows moral damages in quasi-delicts causing physical injuries because in physical injuries, moral damages are recoverable only by the injured party,41 and in the case at bar, herein respondents were not the ones who were actually injured.
In B.F. Metal (Corp.) v. Sps. Lomotan, et al.,42 the Court, in a claim for damages based on quasi-delict causing physical injuries, similarly disallowed an award of moral damages to the owners of the damaged vehicle, when neither of them figured in the accident and sustained injuries.
Neither can respondents rely on Article 21 of the Civil Code as the RTC erroneously did. Article 21 deals with acts contra bonus mores, and has the following elements: (1) There is an act which is legal; (2) but which is contrary to morals, good custom, public order, or public policy; (3) and it is done with intent to injure.43 In the present case, it can hardly be said that Mendoza’s negligent driving and violation of traffic laws are legal acts. Moreover, it was not proven that Mendoza intended to injure Perez, et al. Thus, Article 21 finds no application to the case at bar.
All in all, we find that the RTC and the CA erred in granting moral damages to respondents.
Exemplary Damages. Article 2229 of the Civil Code provides that exemplary or corrective damages are imposed, by way of example or correction for the public good, in addition to moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages. Article 2231 of the same Code further states that in quasi-delicts, exemplary damages may be granted if the defendant acted with gross negligence.
In the case at bar, having established respondents’ right to compensatory damages, exemplary damages are also in order, given the fact that Mendoza was grossly negligent in driving the Mayamy bus. His act of intruding or encroaching on the lane rightfully occupied by the Isuzu truck shows his reckless disregard for safety.
In Baño v. Bachelor Express, Inc., et al.,47 where an erring bus, in the process of overtaking a jeepney, also encroached on the opposite lane, and consequently collided with a dump truck, the Court held the driver of the bus grossly negligent and affirmed the award of exemplary damages.
As such, in Spouses Agustin v. CA,49 we held that, the award of attorney’s fees being an exception rather than the general rule, it is necessary for the court to make findings of facts and law that would bring the case within the exception and justify the grant of such award. Thus, the reason for the award of attorney’s fees must be stated in the text of the court’s decision; otherwise, if it is stated only in the dispositive portion of the decision, the same must be disallowed on appeal.
In the case at bar, the RTC Decision had nil discussion on the propriety of attorney’s fees, and it merely awarded such in the dispositive. The CA Decision, on the other hand, merely stated that the award of attorney’s fees is merited as such is allowed when exemplary damages are awarded.50 Following established jurisprudence,51 however, the CA should have disallowed on appeal said award of attorney’s fees as the RTC failed to substantiate said award.
Section 1. Costs ordinarily follow results of suit.- Unless otherwise provided in these rules, costs shall be allowed to the prevailing party as a matter of course, but the court shall have power, for special reasons, to adjudge that either party shall pay the costs of an action, or that the same be divided, as may be equitable. No costs shall be allowed against the Republic of the Philippines, unless otherwise provided by law.
In the present case, the award of costs of suit to respondents, as the prevailing party, is in order.
The legal provision on interests in quasi-delicts is Article 2211 of the Civil Code which provides that in crimes and quasi-delicts, interest as part of the damage, may, in a proper case, be adjudicated in the discretion of the court.
Generally, interest is allowed as a matter of right for failure to pay liquidated claims when due.54 For unliquidated claims, however, Article 2213 of the Civil Code provides that interest cannot be recovered upon unliquidated claims or damages, except when the demand can be established with reasonable certainty.
MAINTAIN the award of costs of suit.
Brion,* (Acting Chairperson), Del Castillo, Mendoza,**and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., concur.
* Per Special Order No. 1698 dated 13 June 2014.
1Rollo, pp. 17-23; penned by Associate Justice Elvi John S. Asuncion with Associate Justices Mercedes Gozo-Dadole and Lucas P. Bersamin (now a member of this Court) concurring.
2 Records, pp. 86-88; penned by Judge Floro P. Alejo.
10 Id. at 1-4 and 57-59.
12 TSN, 18 September 1998, p. 8; Testimony of PO1 Rosales.
14 Records, p. 86; RTC Decision.
15 TSN, 13 April 1999, p. 2; Testimony of Gutierrez.
21 TOLENTINO, Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol. V, p. 594.
22Dumayag v. People, G.R. No. 172778, 26 November 2012, 686 SCRA 347, 359, citing Vallacar Transit v. Catubig, G.R. No. 175512, 30 May 2011, 649 SCRA 281, 295-296.
23 TSN, 18 September 1998, p. 1; Testimony of Anlap.
24 SANGCO, Torts and Damages, Vol. I, p. 1.
25 Id., Vol. II, p. 433.
26 Id., Vol. II, p. 466.
27 G.R. No. 174156, 20 June 2012, 674 SCRA 117, 128.
29Filcar Transport Services v. Espinas, supra note 28 at 130.
30 102 Phil. 103, 108-109 (1957).
31 Id. at 109, citing King v. Brenham Automobile Co., 145 S. W. 278, 279.
32 SANGCO, Torts and Damages, Vol. II, pp. 553-554.
33Filcar Transport Services v. Espinas, supra note 28 at 131.
34 TOLENTINO, Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol. V, p. 633.
35Kierulf v. CA, 336 Phil. 414, 432 (1997).
36Regala v. Carin, G.R. No. 188715, 6 April 2011, 647 SCRA 419, 426-427.
38 TSN, 17 September 1998, pp. 12-13; Testimony of Gomez.
39 Supra note 36 at 431-432.
40 117 Phil. 586, 597 (1963).
41Soberano, et al. v. MRR Co., 124 Phil. 1330, 1337 (1966).
42 574 Phil. 740, 753 (2008).
43 SANGCO, Torts and Damages, Vol. II, p. 754.
46Achevara v. Ramos, G.R. No. 175172, 29 September 2009, 601 SCRA 270, 288.
47 G.R. No. 191703, 12 March 2012, 667 SCRA 782.
48Mirasol v. Judge De La Cruz, 173 Phil. 518, 522 (1978).
49 264 Phil. 744, 752 (1990).
51 See also Mercury Drug Corporation v. Baking, 551 Phil. 182 (2007).
52 Sec. 1, Rule 142 of the Rules of Court.
53 SANGCO, Torts and Damages, Vol. II, p. 1081.

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