Source: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/181/481/
Timestamp: 2019-04-18 10:43:37+00:00

Document:
(1) That the United States were bound to respect the rights of private property in the ceded territory, but that it had the right to require reasonable means for determining the validity of all titles within the ceded territory, to require all persons having claims to lands to present them for recognition, and to decree that all claims which are not thus presented, shall be considered abandoned.
(2) That, so far as the Indians are concerned, the land was rightfully to be regarded as part of the public domain, and subject to sale and disposition by the government.
(3) That if the Indians had any claims founded on the action of the Mexican government, they abandoned them by not presenting them to the commission for consideration.
(4) That lands which were burdened with a right of permanent occupancy were not a part of the public domain, subject to the full disposal by the United States.
Some discussion appears in the briefs as to the meaning of the word servidumbres, (translated, "usages"). The Court declines to define its meaning when standing by itself, but holds that, in these grants, it does not mean that the general occupation and control of the property was limited by them, but only that such full control should not be taken as allowing any interference with established roads or crossroads, or other things of like nature.
state, and by that court affirmed. 126 Cal. 262. To such affirmance these writs of error have been sued out.
The facts in the cases are so nearly alike that it is sufficient to consider only the first. The land in question is within the limits of the territory ceded to the United States by the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, February 2, 1848. 9 Stat. 922. Generally speaking, the plaintiffs claim title by virtue of a patent issued to John J. Warner on January 16, 1880, in confirmation of two grants made by the Mexican government. On the other hand, the defendants do not claim a fee in the premises, but only a right of permanent occupancy by virtue of the alleged fact that they are mission Indians, so called, and had been in occupation of the premises long before the Mexican grants, and, of course, before any dominion acquired by this government over the territory, insisting further that the government of Mexico had always recognized the lawfulness and permanence of their occupancy, and that such right of occupancy was protected by the terms of the treaty and the rules of international law.
"Mexicans now established in territories previously belonging to Mexico, and which remain for the future within the limits of the United States, as defined by the present treaty, shall be free to continue where they now reside, or to remove at any time to the Mexican Republic, retaining the property which they possess in the said territories or disposing thereof and removing the proceeds wherever they please, without their being subjected on this account to any contribution, tax, or charge whatever."
character of Mexicans shall be considered to have elected to become citizens of the United States."
"In the said territories, the property of every kind now belonging to Mexicans not established there shall be inviolably respected. The present owners, the heirs of these, and all Mexicans who may hereafter acquire said property by contract shall enjoy with respect to it guaranties equally ample as if the same belonged to citizens of the United States."
"2d. The American government, by suppressing the tenth article of the treaty of Guadalupe, did not in any way intend to annul the grants of lands made by Mexico in the ceded territories. These grants, notwithstanding the suppression of the article of the treaty, preserve the legal value which they may possess, and the grantees may cause their legitimate [titles] to be acknowledged before the American tribunals."
"Conformably to the law of the United States, legitimate titles to every description of property, personal and real, existing in the ceded territory are those which were legitimate titles under the Mexican law in California and New Mexico up to the 13th of May, 1846, and in Texas up to the 2d March, 1836."
Ex.Doc. No. 50 H.R. 30th Cong.2d Sess. p. 77.
evidence and testimony of witnesses as the said claimant relies upon in support of such claims, and it shall be the duty of the commissioners, when the case is ready for hearing, to proceed promptly to examine the same upon such evidence, and upon the evidence produced in behalf of the United States, and to decide upon the validity of the said claim and, within thirty days after such decision is rendered, to certify the same, with the reasons on which it is founded, to the district attorney of the United States in and for the district in which such decision shall be rendered."
for hearing the same: And provided, further, That it shall and may be lawful for the district judge of the United States, upon the hearing of such petition, to grant an injunction to restrain the party at whose instance the claim to the said lands has been confirmed from suing out a patent for the same, until the title thereto shall have been finally decided, a copy of which order shall be transmitted to the Commissioner of the General Land Office, and thereupon no patent shall issue until such decision shall be made, or until sufficient time shall, in the opinion of the said judge, have been allowed for obtaining the same, and thereafter the said injunction shall be dissolved."
"SEC. 16. That it shall be the duty of the commissioners herein provided for to ascertain and report to the Secretary of the Interior the tenure by which the mission lands are held, and those held by civilized Indians, and those who are engaged in agriculture or labor of any kind, and also those which are occupied and cultivated by Pueblos or Rancheros Indians."
"but with the stipulation that in virtue of the fifteenth section of the said act neither the conformation of this claim nor this patent shall affect the interests of third persons."
It was admitted that Warner's title had passed to plaintiffs and that the taxes had all been paid by them. On the other hand, the appeal statement showed that the defendants offered copies of the expedientes of both of the grants referred to in the patent, and also oral testimony of occupation by the defendants and their ancestors. Some witnesses were introduced by the plaintiffs to contradict this matter of occupancy, but, on final consideration, the court struck out all the testimony in reference to occupancy and of the Mexican grants upon which the patent was issued. Upon the evidence, therefore, that was received by the trial court, there could be no doubt of the rightfulness of the decree, and the question presented by the record to the supreme court of the state was whether there was error in striking out the testimony offered on behalf of the defense.
and to decree that all claims which are not thus presented shall be considered abandoned.
"Undoubtedly private rights of property within the ceded territory were not affected by the change of sovereignty and jurisdiction, and were entitled to protection whether the party had the full and absolute ownership of the land or merely an equitable interest therein which required some further act of the government to vest in him a perfect title. But the duty of providing the mode of securing these rights, and of fulfilling the obligations imposed upon the United States by the treaties, belonged to the political department of the government, and Congress might either itself discharge that duty or delegate it to the judicial department. De la Croix v. Chamberlain, 12 Wheat. 599, 25 U. S. 601-602; Chouteau v. Eckhart, 2 How. 344, 43 U. S. 374; Tameling v. United States Freehold & Emigration Co., 93 U. S. 644, 93 U. S. 661; Botiller v. Dominguez, 130 U. S. 238."
Astiazaran v. Santa Rita Land & Mining Co., 148 U. S. 80, 148 U. S. 81.
government, but, on the contrary, only to such as were imperfect, inchoate, and equitable in their character, without being a strict legal title."
"With regard to the first of these propositions, it may be said that, so far as the act of Congress is in conflict with the treaty with Mexico, that is a matter in which the Court is bound to follow the statutory enactments of its own government. If the treaty was violated by this general statute enacted for the purpose of ascertaining the validity of claims derived from the Mexican government, it was a matter of international concern which the two states must determine by treaty or by such other means as enables one state to enforce upon another the obligations of a treaty. This Court, in a class of cases like the present, has no power to set itself up as the instrumentality for enforcing the provisions of a treaty with a foreign nation which the government of the United States, as a sovereign power, chooses to disregard. The Cherokee Tobacco, 11 Wall. 616; Taylor v. Morton, 2 Curtis 454; Head Money Cases, 112 U. S. 580, 112 U. S. 598; Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U. S. 190, 124 U. S. 195."
"It is not possible, therefore, from the language of this statute to infer that there was in the minds of its framers any distinction as to the jurisdiction they were conferring upon this board between claims derived from the Spanish or Mexican government, which were perfect under the laws of those governments, and those which were incipient, imperfect, or inchoate. . . . It was equally important to the object which the United States had in the passage of it that claims under perfect grants from the Mexican government should be established as that imperfect claims should be established or rejected."
to determine whether it was such a claim as the United States was bound to respect, even though it was not perfect as to all the forms and proceedings under which it was derived. So that the superior value of a perfected Mexican claim had the same influence in a court of justice which is now set up for it in an action where the title is contested."
"Nor can it be said that there is anything unjust or oppressive in requiring the owner of a valid claim, in that vast wilderness of lands unclaimed, and unjustly claimed, to present his demand to a tribunal possessing all the elements of judicial functions with a guaranty of judicial proceedings so that his title could be established if it was found to be valid or rejected if it was invalid."
"We are unable to see any injustice, any want of constitutional power, or any violation of the treaty in the means by which the United States undertook to separate the lands in which it held the proprietary interest from those which belonged, either equitably or by a strict legal title, to private persons. Every person owning land or other property is at all times liable to be called into a court of justice to contest his title to it. This may be done by another individual or by the government under which he lives. It is a necessary part of a free government, in which all are equally subject to the laws, that whoever asserts rights or exercises powers over property may be called before the proper tribunals to sustain them."
"We are of opinion that these acts applied and were intended to apply to all claims, whether perfect or imperfect, in that particular resembling the California act; that the courts were bound to accept their provisions, and that there was no want of constitutional power in prescribing reasonable limitations operating to bar claims if the course pointed out were not pursued."
"Every question which could arise on the title claimed could come to and receive judgment from this Court. The scheme of adjudication was made complete and all the purposes of an act to give repose to titles were accomplished. And it was certainly the purpose of the act of 1851 to give repose to titles. It was enacted not only to fulfill our treaty obligations to individuals, but to settle and define what portion of the acquired territory was public domain. It not only permitted but required all claims to be presented to the board, and barred all from future assertion which were not presented within two years after the date of the act. Sec. 13. The jurisdiction of the board was necessarily commensurate with the purposes of its creation, and it was a jurisdiction to decide rightly or wrongly. If wrongly, a corrective was afforded, as we have said, by an appeal by the claimant or by the United States to the district court."
These rulings go far toward sustaining the decision of the Supreme Court of California in the present cases. As between the United States and Warner, the patent is as conclusive of the title of the latter as any other patent from the United States is of the title of the grantee named therein. As between the United States and the Indians, their failure to present their claims to the land commission within the time named made the land, within the language of the statute, "part of the public domain of the United States." "Public domain" is equivalent to "public lands," and these words have acquired a settled meaning in the legislation of this country. "The words public lands' are habitually used in our legislation to describe such as are subject to sale or other disposal under general laws." Newhall v. Sanger, 92 U. S. 761, 92 U. S. 763.
"The grant is of alternate sections of public land, and by public land, as it has been long settled, is meant such land as is open to sale or other disposition under general laws."
"When informed by the action of its tribunals and officers that a claim asserted is valid and entitled to recognition, the government acts, and issues its patent to the claimant. This instrument is therefore record evidence of the action of the government upon the title of the claimant. By it, the government declares that the claim asserted was valid under the laws of Mexico, that it was entitled to recognition and protection by the stipulations of the treaty, and might have been located under the former government, and is correctly located now, so as to embrace the premises as they are surveyed and described. As against the government, this record, so long as it remains unvacated, is conclusive. . . . The term 'third persons,' as there used, does not embrace all persons other than the United States and the claimants, but only those who hold superior titles such as will enable them to resist successfully any action of the government in disposing of the property."
given to an Indian tribe a temporary occupancy, and that over lands which were subjected by the action of some prior government to a right of permanent occupancy, for, in the latter case, the right, which is one of private property, antecedes and is superior to the title of this government and limits necessarily its power of disposal. Surely a claimant would have little reason for presenting to the land commission his claim to land and securing a confirmation of that claim if the only result was to transfer the naked fee to him, burdened by an Indian right of permanent occupancy.
"to ascertain and report to the Secretary of the Interior the tenure by which the mission lands are held, and those held by civilized Indians, and those who are engaged in agriculture or labor of any kind, and also those which are occupied and cultivated by Pueblos or Rancheros Indians."
considered that they had no claims which called for special action.
"the place 'Agua Caliente,' belonging to the mission of San Luis Rey, since it is not needed by the said mission, having a house on it, and an orchard of little utility."
"that the land 'Agua Caliente' is the property of the San Luis Rey mission, which has improvements, buildings, and an orchard, from which derive their subsistence the Indians who live thereon, which is bounded by the property of Joaquin Ortega, and I believe it can be awarded to the interested party for being worthy, but without prejudice to the Indians, who from it derive their support."
"Juan B. Alvarado, Constitutional Governor of the Department of both Californias:"
"Whereas Jose Antonio Pico has petitioned for his own personal benefit and that of his family the land known by the name of 'Agua Caliente,' bounded by the ranch of 'San Jose Valley,' with the boundary of the canyon of 'Buena Vista,' and by the mountains of 'Palomar,' having previously complied with the writs and investigations corresponding, as required by the laws and regulations, exercising the powers which are conferred on me in the name of the Mexican nation, I have resolved to grant to him the said place, subjecting himself to pay for the place of worship and other improvements that be there, belonging to the San Luis Rey mission, and not molest (prejudicar) the Indians that thereon may be established, and to the approbation of the most excellent assembly of the department, and to the conditions following, to-wit: "
"First. He is allowed to fence it in, without interfering with the roads, crossroads, and other usages (servidumbres); he will possess it fully and exclusively, turning it to agricultural or any other use he may see fit, but within a year he shall construct a house thereon and live in it."
"Second. When the property shall have been confirmed to him, he shall petition the respective judge to give him possession thereof, by virtue of this order, and shall mark out the boundaries on whose limits he shall fix the landmarks, some fruit and wild trees that may be of some utility."
"Third. The land of which donation is hereby made is of the extent mentioned in the plan, which goes with the 'expediente.' The judge who should give possession thereof shall have it surveyed according to law, leaving the residue that may result to the nation for other purposes."
"Fourth. If he should fail to comply with these conditions, he shall forfeit his title to the land, and it will be denounceable by another."
"Therefore I command that this present order be to him the title, and holding it for good and valid, a copy thereof be entered into the proper book, and given to the party interested for his protection and other purposes."
"Office of the First Justice of the Peace"
"In view of the petition which the party interested remits to this office, I beg to state that the said 'Valle San Jose' is, and has for the past two years been vacant and abandoned, without any goods nor cultivation on the part of San Diego, but said place belongs at the present time to the said mission, and at petitioner's request I sign this in San Diego."
"August 6, 1844 Juan MaMarron"
"To the Most R. P. Vincent Olivas:"
"With the object of soliciting in property the place known by the name 'Valle de San Jose,' formerly occupied by the mission under your charge, I beg of you to be so kind as to inform me if at the present day the mission of San Diego does occupy the said land, and if not, how long since it has been abandoned."
"San Diego, August 5, 1844 Juan J. Warner"
"The 'Valley of San Jose' can be granted to the party who petitions for it, inasmuch as the mission of San Diego, to whom it belonged, has no means sufficient to cultivate and occupy it, and it is not so necessary for the mission."
"Mission of San Diego, August 5, 1844"
"The citizen, Manuel Micheltorena, general of brigade of the Mexican army, adjutant general of the same, governor general, commander, and inspector of both Californias:"
"Whereas Juan Jose Warner, Mexican by naturalization, has petitioned for his own personal benefit, and that of his family, the land known by the name 'Valle de San Jose,' bounded on the east by the entrance into San Felipe and the mountain, on the west by the mountain and canyon of Aguanga, and on the north bounded by the mountain, and the boundaries on the south being the 'Carrizo' and the mountain, having previously complied with the notices and investigations on such matters as prescribed by the laws and regulations, exercising the powers conferred on me in the name of the Mexican nation, I have resolved to grant him the said land, declaring it by these presents his property, subject to the approbation of the most excellent assembly of the department and to the conditions following, to-wit:"
"First. He will not be allowed to sell it, to alienate it, nor to mortgage it, to place it under bond, or to place it under any obligation, nor give it away."
other use he may please, and he shall build a house on it within one year and live in it."
"Third. He shall apply to the respective judge to give him judicial possession thereof, by virtue of this order, by which he shall mark out the boundaries whereon he shall place the stakes, some fruit and wild trees of some use or other."
"Fourth. The land which is being granted consists of six leagues, more or less (seis sitios de ganado mayor) according to the respective map or plan. The judge who may give possession thereof shall have it surveyed according to law, leaving the residue (sobrante) to the nation for its use."
"Fifth. Should he fail to comply with these conditions, he shall forfeit his right to the land, and it will be denounceable by another. Therefore I order that this present decree be to him his title, and holding it for good and valid notice thereof be entered into the respective books and be given to the interested party for his protection and other purposes."
"J. J. Warner v. The United States, for the place called Agua Caliente y Valle de San Jose, in San Diego County, containing six square leagues of land."
by Warner is known by these names, but more frequently it has recently been called Warner's rancho. The testimony shows that Pico had set out some vines on the place before the grant was made to him, and that he built a house on the place after the grant, but in 1842, he left the place, probably on account of the danger from the Indians, and does not appear to have done anything more in connection with it."
"The proof is scarcely sufficient to establish the performance of the conditions of the grant by him, while his absence from the place and the want of any evidence of an attempt to return to it after 1842 indicate an abandonment of it. It was so treated by Warner in petitioning for a grant of the same in 1844, and by the governor in making the concession to him. If, however, there was any remaining interest in said Pico by virtue of the grant to him, the present claimant has succeeded to that interest by virtue of a conveyance made to him by said Pico on the 13th day of January, 1852. This conveyance is given in evidence."
"I think, however, that the right of the present claimant must be determined entirely by the merits of the case based on Micheltorena's grant to him."
"This grant was approved by the departmental assembly May 21, 1845."
"The testimony of Andres Pico shows that Warner was living with his family on the place in the fall of 1844, and cultivating portions of the land."
"His residence on the place appears to have been continued until 1851, when the Indians burnt his buildings and destroyed his stock. Since that time, his occupation has been continued by his servants."
"In the grant, the description of the land petitioned for is such as to embrace the entire valley called San Jose, as laid down on the map constituting a part of the expediente, giving well defined landmarks and boundaries, which the witnesses testify are well known objects."
"The valley is very irregular in shape, and is surrounded by high hills."
square leagues was granted, but as the measurement was never obtained, it is important to determine whether the grantee is entitled to hold the entire premises described in the grant; using the scale given on the desino referred to in the grant, the quantity included in the premises cannot exceed six square leagues of land."
"The testimony of the witnesses who were interrogated on the subject estimate it variously -- some more and some less than the quantity conceded. On an examination of the whole case, however, we are inclined to the opinion that the petitioner should have a confirmation of the premises according to the description contained in the grant to him, and a decree will be entered accordingly."
Upon that report, the title was confirmed, which, as heretofore stated, was approved by the district court, and thereupon a patent was issued.
From these papers, the following appears: the grant to Pico was made subject to the condition that he should "not molest the Indians that thereon may be established." No such condition was attached to the subsequent grant to Warner. On the contrary, the report of the justice of the peace was that the land had been for two years vacant and abandoned; that there were some property rights vested -- not in the Indians, but in the mission of San Diego -- and the official of that mission consented to the grant, inasmuch as the mission had no means to cultivate and occupy the land, and it was no longer necessary for its purposes.
the distinct provision that the Indians established on the land shall not be molested, but the grantee "is allowed to fence it in without interfering with the roads, cross roads, and other usages" (servidumbres). In the second, the grantee is "allowed to fence it in without interference with the roads and other usages" (servidumbres). Obviously it is in these two clauses contemplated that the fencing is to be without interference with roads and other usages or burdens. It does not mean that the general occupation and control of the property is limited by any so-called servidumbres, but only that such full control shall not be taken as allowing any interference with established roads or crossroads, or other things of like nature.
It thus appears that, prior to the cession, the Mexican authorities, upon examination, found that the Indians had abandoned the land; that the only adverse claim was vested in the mission of San Diego and made an absolute grant, subject only to the condition of satisfying whatever claims the mission might have. How can it be said, therefore, that, when the cession was made by Mexico to the United States, there was a present recognition by the Mexican government of the occupancy of these Indians? On the contrary, so far as any official action is disclosed, it was distinctly to the contrary, and carried with it an affirmation that they had abandoned their occupancy and that whatever of title there was outside of the Mexican nation was in the mission, and an absolute grant was made subject only to the rights of such mission.
MR. JUSTICE WHITE did not hear the argument of these cases or take part in their decision.

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