Source: http://ny.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20180802_0000859.NNY.htm/qx
Timestamp: 2019-04-25 22:04:20+00:00

Document:
RODNEY DAVIS Petitioner, pro se.
MAE A. D'AGOSTINO UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
On July 26, 2018, petitioner Rodney Davis filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Dkt. No. 1, Petition ("Pet."). He has paid the statutory filing fee. Dkt. Entry dated 7/26/2018. For the reasons that follow, the petition is dismissed without prejudice to refiling once petitioner has exhausted his claims in state court.
Petitioner challenges a 2013 judgment of conviction in Schenectady County, upon a jury verdict, of second degree murder, attempted murder, assault, criminal possession of a weapon, and attempted assault. Pet. at 1-2. On November 3, 2016, the New York State Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third Department, affirmed the judgment of conviction, and, on January 23, 2017, the New York Court of Appeals denied leave to appeal. Id. at 2-3; see also, People v. Davis, 144 A.D.3d 1188, 1190 (3d Dep't 2016), lv. denied, 28 N.Y.3d 1144 (2017). Petitioner asserts that, on or about March 20 or 26, 2018, he filed a writ of error coram nobis for ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, and that, on May 3, 2018, the Third Department denied his motion without an evidentiary hearing. Pet. at 3-4, 14. Petitioner then states that on or about May 20, 2018, he sought leave to appeal the denial to the Court of Appeals. Id. at 14. That appeal is apparently still pending.
Petitioner contends that he is entitled to federal habeas relief because (1) he received ineffective assistance of counsel during both his trial and appeal and (2) there was prosecutorial misconduct which deprived petitioner of a fair trial. Pet. at 5-9. For a more complete statement of petitioner's claims, reference is made to the petition.
To properly exhaust his claims, petitioner must do so both procedurally and substantively. Procedural exhaustion requires that the petitioner raise all claims in state court prior to raising them in a federal habeas corpus petition. O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845 (1999). Substantive exhaustion requires that the petitioner "fairly present" each claim for habeas relief in "each appropriate state court (including a state supreme court with powers of discretionary review), thereby alerting that court to the federal nature of the claim." Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29 (2004) (citations omitted). In other words, petitioner "must give the state courts one full opportunity to resolve any constitutional issues by invoking one complete round of the State's established appellate review process." O'Sullivan, 526 U.S. at 845.
There is no basis on the record before this Court to conclude that there is an absence of available State corrective process (e.g., where there is no further state proceeding for a petitioner to pursue) or circumstances exist that render that state court process ineffective to protect petitioner's rights (e.g. where further pursuit would be futile). 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(B)(i), (ii); Lurie v. Wittner, 228 F.3d 113, 124 (2d Cir. 2000). Petitioner has state court remedies available to him, and is in the process of exhausting those remedies by pursuing his appeal of the denial of his collateral motion. It is not futile to require him to complete exhaustion of his state court remedies before pursuing a federal habeas petition.
While petitioner's papers do not reflect his awareness that his petition was filed prematurely as a protective filing, to the extent that petitioner may be understood to request that this action be stayed and his petition held in abeyance, that request is denied. The Supreme Court has stated, in dicta, that a habeas petitioner "might avoid" the application of the statute of limitations resulting from "reasonable confusion" about the timeliness of a state filling "by filing a 'protective' petition in federal court and asking the federal court to stay and abey" the habeas proceedings. Pace v. Diguglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 416 (2005); see also Zarvela v. Artuz, 254 F.3d 374, 380 (2d Cir. 2001) (noting that a stay and abeyance may be warranted "where an outright dismissal" of a mixed petition "could jeopardize the timeliness of a collateral attack") (internal quotation marks omitted). However, "Pace suggests that whether a stay and abeyance is appropriate in a particular case is governed by the" considerations set forth in Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269, 275-76 (2005). Rivera v. Kaplan, No. 1:17-CV-2257, 2017 WL 3017713, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. July 13, 2017). Under Rhines, a stay and abeyance should be "available only in limited circumstances" where the petitioner can show both (1) "good cause" for failing to "exhaust his claims first in state court" and (2) that his unexhausted claims are not "plainly meritless." 544 U.S. at 277.

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