CELEX: 62012CN0601
Language: en
Date: 2012-12-20 00:00:00
Title: Case C-601/12 P: Appeal brought on 20 December 2012 by Ningbo Yonghong Fasteners Co. Ltd against the judgment of the General Court (Seventh Chamber) delivered on 10 October 2012 in Case T-150/09: Ningbo Yonghong Fasteners Co. Ltd v Council of the European Union

9.3.2013   
            
            
               EN
            
            
               Official Journal of the European Union
            
            
               C 71/8
            
         Appeal brought on 20 December 2012 by Ningbo Yonghong Fasteners Co. Ltd against the judgment of the General Court (Seventh Chamber) delivered on 10 October 2012 in Case T-150/09: Ningbo Yonghong Fasteners Co. Ltd v Council of the European Union
   (Case C-601/12 P)
   2013/C 71/14
   Language of the case: English
   
      Parties
   
   
      Appellant: Ningbo Yonghong Fasteners Co. Ltd (represented by: F. Graafsma, J. Cornelis, advocaten)
   
      Other parties to the proceedings: Council of the European Union, European Commission, European Industrial Fasteners Institute AISBL (EIFI)
   
      Form of order sought
   
   The appellant claims that the Court should adopt a judgment that:
   
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               sets aside the Judgment of the General Court of the European Union of 10 October 2012 in Case T-I50/09 Ningbo Yonghong Fasteners Co., Ltd. v Council by which the General Court dismissed the application for annulment of Council Regulation (EC) No 91/2009 (1) of 26 January 2009 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain iron or steel fasteners originating in the People's Republic of China;
            
         
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               annuls Council Regulation (EC) No 91/2009 of 26 January 2009 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain iron or steel fasteners originating in the People's Republic of China, in so far as it concerns the Appellant; and
            
         
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               orders the Council of the European Union to pay the Appellant's costs of this appeal as well as those of the proceedings before the General Court in Case T-150/09.
            
         
      Pleas in law and main arguments
   
   The Appellant submits that the General Court's findings with respect to Appellant's first plea before the General Court are vitiated by several errors of law as well as a distortion of the evidence. The Appellant therefore submits that the Contested Judgment should be set aside. In addition, the Appellant submits that the facts underlying the first plea are sufficiently established so that the Court of Justice can decide on that plea. The Appellant only challenges the General Court's findings with respect to the (original) first plea and this on the basis of three grounds of appeal.
   First, by introducing an ‘only plausible hypothesis’ criterion as a result of which the three-month time-limit in the second paragraph of Article 2 (7) (c) of Council Regulation (EC) No 384/96 (2) of 22 December 1995 on protection against dumped imports from countries not members of the European Community (hereafter the ‘basic regulation’) allegedly does not apply, the Contested Judgment renders the three-month time limit meaningless. As a result, the Contested Judgment interpreted the second paragraph of Article 2 (7) (c) of the basic Regulation in a legally impermissible way since an interpreter is not free to adopt a reading that would result in rendering whole provisions or paragraphs to redundant or useless.
   Second, in examining the legal consequences of a failure to comply with a procedural time-limit, the Contested Judgment applied the incorrect test, thereby imposing an unreasonable burden of proof on the Appellant. If the Contested Judgment had applied the correct test, as set out by this Court in previous cases, it would have found that the failure to comply with the procedural time-limit justified the annulment of the Contested Regulation.
   Finally, in arriving at its findings, the General Court distorted the evidence and the facts before it.
   
      (1)  OJ L 29, p. 1
   
      (2)  OJ L 56, p. 1