CELEX: 32018M7000
Language: en
Date: 2018-05-30 00:00:00
Title: Commission Decision of 30/05/2018 declaring a concentration to be compatible with the common market (Case No COMP/M.7000 - Liberty Global plc / Ziggo N.V. / Vodafone Group Plc) according to Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 (Only the English text is authentic)

EUROPEAN COMMISSION
  In the published version of this decision, some              Brussels, 30.5.2018
  information has been omitted pursuant to Article             C(2018) 3569 final
  17(2) of Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004
  concerning non-disclosure of business secrets and
  other confidential information. The omissions are                     PUBLIC VERSION
  shown thus […]. Where possible the information
  omitted has been replaced by ranges of figures or a
  general description.                                         To the notifying Parties
Subject:             Case M.7000 – LIBERTY GLOBAL / ZIGGO
                     Commission decision pursuant to Article 6(1)(b) in conjunction with
                     Article 6(2) of Council Regulation No 139/20041 and Article 57 of the
                     Agreement on the European Economic Area2
1.        INTRODUCTION
(1)       On 14 March 2014, the European Commission received notification of a proposed
          concentration pursuant to Article 4 of Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 (the
          "Merger Regulation") by which Liberty Global plc (''Liberty Global", the United
          Kingdom, also the "Notifying Party"), acquired within the meaning of Article
          3(1)(b) of the Merger Regulation sole control over Ziggo N.V. ("Ziggo", the
          Netherlands) by way of a public bid ("the Transaction") in order to form an entity
          which would take over the parties' respective activities in the Netherlands
          ("NewZiggo").
(2)       On 10 October 2014, the Commission declared the Transaction compatible with
          the internal market subject to the fulfilment of certain conditions (the
          "Conditional Clearance Decision" or "the 2014 Decision").
(3)       By judgment of 26 October 2017 (the "Judgment"), the General Court annulled
          the Commission's Conditional Clearance Decision on the ground that the
          Commission failed to state the reasons of its finding that the proposed merger
          would not lead to vertical anti-competitive effects on the possible market for
1    OJ L 24, 29.1.2004, p. 1 (the 'Merger Regulation'). With effect from 1 December 2009, the Treaty on
     the Functioning of the European Union ('TFEU') has introduced certain changes, such as the
     replacement of 'Community' by 'Union' and 'common market' by 'internal market'. The terminology of
     the TFEU will be used throughout this decision.
2    OJ L 1, 3.1.1994, p. 3 (the 'EEA Agreement').
Commission européenne, DG COMP MERGER REGISTRY, 1049 Bruxelles, BELGIQUE
Europese Commissie, DG COMP MERGER REGISTRY, 1049 Brussel, BELGIË
Tel: +32 229-91111. Fax: +32 229-64301. E-mail: COMP-MERGER-REGISTRY@ec.europa.eu.
 ---pagebreak---         Premium pay TV sports channels.3 The General Court found, in fact, that the
        Conditional Clearance Decision did not contain any analysis of the impact of the
        downstream structural changes, with the joining together of Liberty Global’s and
        Ziggo’s respective distribution platforms, on the relevant market in question. In
        addition, the Court argued, when discussing the ability and incentive of Liberty
        Global to engage in foreclosure of Sport1, the Commission should also have
        assessed the respective market positions and competitive relationships of Fox
        Sports and Sport1.4
(4)     In order to comply with the Judgment, the Commission is undertaking a re-
        assessment of the entire Transaction, including all affected markets, under current
        market conditions as stipulated by the text of Article 10(5) of the Merger
        Regulation.
(5)     On 4 April 2018, Liberty Global and Vodafone (the "Notifying Parties")
        submitted to the Commission a supplement Form CO providing information on
        the Transaction, on its effect on competition and on the changes in market
        conditions occurred since the Conditional Clearance Decision (the "Supplement
        Form CO").
(6)     Since the Conditional Clearance Decision, Liberty Global and Vodafone have
        combined their telecommunications businesses in the Netherlands in
        VodafoneZiggo. This subsequent transaction was conditionally cleared by the
        Commission on 3 August 20165 and was completed on 31 December 2016. As of
        that date, the target (which had become part of NewZiggo), was contributed by
        Liberty Global to VodafoneZiggo and is now indirectly jointly controlled by
        Liberty Global and Vodafone.
2.      THE PARTIES
    (7)     Liberty Global owns and operates cable networks and some mobile networks
            worldwide and offers television, broadband internet, mobile and telephony
            services as well as mobile services.
    (8)     At the time of the Conditional Clearance Decision, Liberty Global owned a
            regional cable network in the Netherlands under the brand UPC. This was
            then merged with the Ziggo business into NewZiggo. Today, Liberty Global
            is active in the Netherlands via its joint venture with Vodafone –
            VodafoneZiggo - into which the NewZiggo entity was contributed.
    (9)     The Conditional Clearance Decision found that John Malone, a United States
            citizen, is the largest shareholder (albeit a minority shareholder) of Liberty
3   Case T-394/15, KPN v Commission, EU:T:2017:756.
4   KPN v Commission, paragraphs 57-69.
5   Commission decision of 3 August 2016, in case M.7978, Vodafone/Liberty Global/ Dutch JV.
                                                     2
 ---pagebreak---            Global.6 He also held significant minority shareholdings in Liberty Interactive
           Corporation ("LIC"), Liberty Media Corporation ("LMC") and Discovery
           Communications, Inc. ("Discovery"). John Malone also held the positions of
           Chairman of the respective boards of Liberty Global, LIC and LMC, as well
           as of director of Discovery. None of LIC, LMC or Discovery was found to be
           part of Liberty Global. Discovery was found to be active in the wholesale
           supply of TV channels, including in the Netherlands, and had recently
           acquired Eurosport SAS ("Eurosport").7
  (10)     The issue of whether John Malone controls Liberty Global, LIC or LMC was
           left open in the Conditional Clearance Decision given that the outcome of the
           competitive assessment was considered not to change whether or not John
           Malone controlled those companies.8
  (11)     Today, John Malone still holds significant minority shareholdings in Liberty
           Global, LMC, Discovery and LIC (which was renamed Qurate Retail, Inc.
           ("Qurate Retail") as of March 2018). In addition, John Malone today holds
           significant minority shareholdings in GCI Liberty, Inc ("GCI") and Liberty
           Broadband Corporation ("Liberty Broadband").9
  (12)     The Commission has assessed whether the exercise of voting rights or powers
           related to corporate offices enables John Malone to exercise either de jure or
           de facto control on, in particular, LMC and Discovery. The purpose of the
           assessment is to verify whether Liberty Global and LMC (with its Formula 1
           broadcasting rights owned as of January 2017) may be subject to the control
           of the same individual, so that Liberty Global may be considered active in the
           supply of sports broadcasting rights in the Netherlands. The same analysis has
           been carried out in relation to Discovery, which controls the sports channel
           Eurosport.
  (13)     In this respect, the Commission has requested and examined all relevant
           information concerning the corporate governance of the companies in which
           Mr John Malone owns voting rights and/or holds corporate offices.
6 Liberty Global was (and is) listed on the NASDAQ stock exchange with the largest shareholder, John
  Malone, ultimately holding approximately 28% of voting power in Liberty Global. To Liberty Global's
  knowledge, no other stockholder had a significant equity interest in Liberty Global.
7 Commission's decision of 8 April 2014 in Case No M.7170 - Discovery Communications/Eurosport.
8 The issue of possible control by John Malone over Liberty Global, LMC or Discovery was left open in
  the Commission's decision of 14 April 2013 in Case No COMP/M.6880 - Liberty Global/Virgin
  Media, because the transaction did not raise competition concerns, even when assuming that such
  control were to exist. The same was considered to apply in the Conditional Clearance Decision given
  that LCI has no activities in the Netherlands and LMC's interest in relevant companies (Viacom and
  Time Warner) equated to less than 3% voting rights.
9 As of 31 March 2018, Mr John Malone controls 26.9% of the voting rights in GCI Liberty, a company
  that provides communication services in the United States. As of 28 February 2018, Mr John Malone
  controls 47.1% of the voting rights in Liberty Broadband, whose principal assets consist of its interest
  in Charter Communications, Inc. and its subsidiary TruePosition, Inc. Charter Communications, Inc.
  appears to be one of the largest providers of cable services in the United States. TruePosition, Inc. is a
  mobile positioning and contextual location intelligence solutions business.
                                                       3
 ---pagebreak---    (14)      Mr John Malone holds, with his spouse and trusts, 28% of the voting rights in
             Liberty Global. Voter turnout percentages at the shareholders meeting of the
             company have been [...] in the years 2017, 2016 and 2015 respectively.
             Therefore, Mr Malone has less than 50% of the voting rights in the
             shareholders meeting. His voting shares allow him to block the approval of
             special resolutions that require a pass majority of 75% (and do not concern
             strategic commercial decisions), but do not allow Mr Malone to either pass or
             block the approval of ordinary resolutions that concern strategic commercial
             decisions.
   (15)      Based on information publicly available and information provided by the
             Notifying Parties, GCI, Qurate Retail and Liberty Broadband, where Mr
             Malone has minority shareholdings too, carry out business activities unrelated
             to the Netherlands.10
   (16)      With respect to LMC, where Mr Malone holds a minority shareholding of
             47.7%, the Notifying Parties have not been able to provide updated voter
             presence data for the shareholders meeting. In any event, for completeness,
             the Commission will undertake an "even if" assessment of the hypothetical
             situation that John Malone de facto controls both Liberty Global and LMC in
             which case there would be indirect control between Liberty Global’s activities
             and Formula 1.11
   (17)      With       respect       to       Discovery,        in      the       decision         Liberty
             Global/Discovery/All3Media,12 the Commission concluded that, based on the
             information available at the time, no single shareholder (including Mr John
             Malone) had the ability to exercise sole or joint control over Discovery. The
             Commission has found no evidence that the situation has changed since the
             adoption of that decision.13 Moreover, according to the most recent SEC
             disclosure from Discovery, John Malone currently holds a 28.5% interest in
10 GCI, Inc. provides communications services in the United States. Its business carries out a range of
   wireless, data, video, voice, and managed services to residential customers, businesses, governmental
   entities, and educational and medical institutions. Qurate Retail Group is a group of eight retail brands,
   reaching approximately 370 million homes worldwide through 16 television networks and multiple
   ecommerce sites, social pages, mobile apps, print catalogs and in-store destinations. It has subsidiaries
   worldwide and in Europe, but not in the Netherlands. Liberty Broadband’s principal assets consist of
   its interest in Charter Communications, Inc. and its subsidiary TruePosition, Inc. Charter
   Communications, Inc., according to the Notifying Parties, appears to be one of the largest providers of
   cable services in the United States, whose business includes a variety of entertainment, information
   and communications solutions to residential and commercial customers. TruePosition, Inc. is a mobile
   positioning and contextual location intelligence solutions business.
11 See section 5.1.1.3.
12 Commission decision of 19.09.2014, Case COMP/M.7282, Liberty Global/Discovery/All3Media, para
   5 and footnote 7.
13 In the recent case Discovery/Scripps, the Commission has rejected the application of the Polish
   Competition Authority to refer the case to it. One of the reasons at the basis of the Commission
   decision was precisely that the Polish Competition Authority could not provide evidence of Mr
   Malone's (de iure or de facto) control over Discovery. See Commission decision of 06.02.2018,
   pursuant to Article 9(3) of the Merger Regulation, in case COMP/M.8665, Discovery/Scripps, para 44.
                                                        4
 ---pagebreak---            Discovery, which is slightly less than what he held at the time of the
           aforementioned decision.14
   (18)    In addition to the mentioned minority (although in some cases significant)
           shareholdings, the Commission has also taken into consideration the minority
           shareholdings of other natural and legal persons. It observes, in that respect,
           that certain members of Liberty Global's Board of Directors own shares in
           various companies (such as Liberty Global itself, LMC, Qurate Retail) in
           which Mr Malone is a shareholder. The same applies to investment funds and
           financial institutions, whose names recur in the shareholders' lists of the same
           companies. With specific respect to Liberty Global, the Commission notes
           that Mr John Malone is the chairman of the company's Board of Directors
           and, in the last ten years, has been one of the two members of the company's
           Executive Committee, to which the Board of Directors delegates some of its
           executive powers.
   (19)    At the same time, however, Mr Malone is not able, solely relying on his
           voting rights and corporate powers, to unilaterally appoint directors (whose
           appointment is based on the designation of a specific committee subject to the
           approval of the shareholders meeting)
   (20)    Based on the above considerations, the Commission concludes that there is
           not sufficient evidence that Mr John Malone is capable of exercising either de
           jure or de facto control over Liberty Global. In relation to his role in the
           companies in question, the Commission adds that, even if any form of
           "significant influence" (which is not "decisive influence") of Mr Malone over
           any of the companies at hand existed, it is a mere minority shareholding and
           there is no proof of a causal link between the business behaviour of each
           (otherwise independent) undertaking and the aforementioned minority
           shareholdings.
   (21)    Vodafone is the holding company of a group primarily involved in the
           operation of mobile telecommunications networks and the provision of mobile
           telecommunications services, such as mobile voice, messaging and data
           services.
   (22)    VodafoneZiggo is a provider of telecommunication services in the
           Netherlands. It was established on 31 December 2016 as a joint venture in
           which Liberty Global and Vodafone combined their respective
           telecommunication activities in the Netherlands. VodafoneZiggo operates a
           cable network under the Ziggo brand, which covers approx. 90% of
           households in the Netherlands. In addition, VodafoneZiggo provides retail
           mobile telecommunications services and mobile wholesale access and call
           origination services, under the Vodafone and the Hollandse Nieuwe brands, as
           one of the four mobile network operators (MNOs) active in the Dutch market.
           It provides digital and analogue cable video, broadband internet, and digital
           telephony services to 3,978,600 customers as of December 31, 2016.
           VodafoneZiggo has approx. 4.97 million mobile customers as of 30
           September, 2017. In addition to its core cable and mobile operations,
14 The Notifying Parties mention this in Supplement to Form CO, para. 66.
                                                      5
 ---pagebreak---          VodafoneZiggo has limited broadcasting activities in the form of (i) a suite of
         Pay TV sports channels, Ziggo Sport Totaal ("ZST") (which until 11
         November 2015, was called Sport1) and (ii) a basic package TV channel,
         Ziggo Sport ("ZSB", launched on 11 November 2015).
   (23)  The target, Ziggo, was established on 1 February 2007 and has operated under
         the Ziggo brand since May 2008. At the time of the Conditional Clearance
         Decision, Ziggo owned and operated a cable network that span more than half
         of the Netherlands, including the third and fourth biggest cities, Den Haag and
         Utrecht. Ziggo's cable network did not overlap with that of UPC. In 2013,
         Ziggo provided digital and analogue cable video, broadband internet, mobile
         telephony and digital telephony (VoIP) services.
   (24)  Liberty Global’s UPC, Ziggo, NewZiggo or VodafoneZiggo have never been
         under any regulated access obligations in the Netherlands and has never
         granted access to its cable network on a commercial basis.
   (25)  For the purpose of this decision, Liberty Global and Vodafone are referred to
         as the "Notifying Parties". Liberty Global, Vodafone and VodafoneZiggo are
         together referred to as the "Parties".
3.    THE OPERATION AND THE CONCENTRATION
   (26)  The concentration, which was notified on 14 March 2014, consisted of the
         acquisition of sole control over Ziggo by Liberty Global, which operated a
         non-overlapping regional cable network in the Netherlands under the brand
         UPC. For this purpose, in particular, Liberty Global would launch a public bid
         for the remaining shares in Ziggo that it did not already own. If the bid would
         be successful, Liberty Global would have a controlling interest in Ziggo.
   (27)  This therefore constituted a concentration within the meaning of Article
         3(1)(b) of the Merger Regulation.
   (28)  At the time of the 2014 notification the intention to launch a public bid had
         been publicly announced. After receiving approval by the relevant securities
         markets authorities and clearance by the Commission on 10 October 2014, the
         tender offer was successfully completed on 21 November 2014.
4.  EU DIMENSION
   (29)  The Transaction had an EU dimension at the time of the 2014 notification.
         The undertakings concerned at the time had a combined aggregate worldwide
         turnover of more than EUR 5 000 million in 2012 (Liberty Global: EUR 13
         082 million; Ziggo: EUR 1 537 million). They each had a combined aggregate
         EU-wide turnover of more than EUR 250 million in 2012 (Liberty Global:
         EUR 11 260 million; Ziggo: EUR 1 537 million). While Ziggo achieved more
         than two-thirds of its aggregate EU-wide turnover in the Netherlands, Liberty
         Global did not. The Transaction therefore had a Union dimension. The
         Transaction may be considered to be of an EU dimension also today. Based
                                                6
 ---pagebreak---               on 2016 data, the Parties have a combined aggregate world-wide turnover of
              more than EUR 5 000 million15 (Liberty Global: EUR 18 076 million;
              Vodafone: EUR 47 631 million). Each of them has an EU-wide turnover in
              excess of EUR 250 million (Liberty Global: EUR 14 371 million; Vodafone:
              EUR 34 516 million), while neither achieved two-thirds of its aggregate EU-
              wide turnover within one and the same Member State.
     (30)     The Transaction therefore has an EU dimension.
5.       RELEVANT MARKETS
     (31)     The Transaction gave rise to certain horizontal overlaps and vertical
              relationships between UPC’s and Ziggo’s activities in a number of relevant
              markets along the value chain for the distribution of audio visual TV content
              and the provision of telecommunication services (fixed and mobile telephony
              and broadband Internet) in the Netherlands.
5.1.     Television services
     (32)     As regards the TV-related markets where the Parties are active, with respect
              to the licensing and distribution of content and channels, the Commission has
              in previous decisions made a distinction between the following markets:
             Licensing and acquisition of broadcasting rights for TV content;
             Wholesale supply and acquisition of TV channels; and
             Retail supply of TV services.
     (33)     With reference to the abovementioned TV-related markets, it is possible to
              identify several levels of activity in the product chain.
     (34)     Upstream, in the audio-visual chain, there are the holders of broadcasting
              rights for audio-visual content such as (i) films, (ii) sport events and (iii) other
              content (such as TV series and documentaries).16
     (35)     At the second level, the broadcasting rights are licensed to: (i) broadcasters
              which then incorporate them into linear TV channels; or (ii) content platform
              operators which retail the content to end users on a (non-linear) VOD/PPV
              basis. Licenses for sports broadcasting rights are typically granted through
              tenders on an exclusive basis for a specific geography and for a limited
              period.
     (36)     At the third level, TV channel suppliers (such as ZST or Fox Sports) license
              their channels to providers of retail TV services for incorporation into broader
 15  Turnover calculated in accordance with Article 5(1) of the Merger Regulation and the Commission
     Consolidated Jurisdictional Notice (OJ C95, 16.4.2008, p. 1).
 16  Commission decision of 21.12.2010, in Case COMP/M.5932, News Corp/BSkyB; Commission
     decision of 22.09.2006 in Case COMP/M.4353 Permira/All3Media Group and Commission decision
     of 15.04.2013 in Case COMP/M.6880, Liberty Global/Virgin Media.
                                                        7
 ---pagebreak---              TV channel bouquets that are in turn sold to viewers. Some TV channel
             suppliers (such as ZST) are vertically-integrated as they own a technical
             platform and/or are active as retail Pay TV operators. They broadcast their
             own channels together with third party channels via their own platform. Other
             TV channel suppliers (such as Fox Sports) are not vertically-integrated and
             depend on platform operators or retail pay-TV operators to broadcast their
             channels.
    (37)     FTA channels are mainly financed by advertising and sometimes, public
             funds. Pay-TV channels are primarily financed by subscription fees paid by
             viewers; other sources of finance are carriage fees paid by retail operators and
             advertising.
    (38)     At the final stage of the product chain, retail TV providers offer a TV
             subscription to end-users, which typically consist of a selection of packages
             combining a number of TV channels (different operators may package
             channels differently). In addition, certain TV channels may also be distributed
             on a standalone basis, either as an "add-on" to a traditional TV subscription or
             via an OTT service.
    (39)     In addition, these TV propositions may be offered standalone or as part of
             bundles with other fixed services (internet, telephony) and/or in combination
             with services via a mobile network ("mobile services") (known as "multi-
             play" bundles).
5.1.1. Licensing and acquisition of broadcasting rights for TV content
    (40)     Audio visual TV content comprises "entertainment products", such as films,
             sports, and TV programmes that can be broadcast via TV.17 The broadcasting
             rights generally belong to the creators of the content. These rights owners,
             which constitute the supply side of this market, license them to broadcasters
             for linear broadcasting, as part of TV channels, or to platform operators for
             non-linear distribution through pay-per-view ("PPV") or video-on-demand
             ("VOD"). Those broadcasters and content platform operators, together,
             comprise the demand side of this market.
    (41)     In previous decisions, the Commission has divided the market for the
             licensing and acquisition of individual content in the following manner: (i)
             Pay TV versus Free-To-Air ("FTA") TV,18 (ii) linear versus non-linear
             broadcast,19 (iii) by exhibition window, that is to say subscription VOD
             ("SVOD"), transactional VOD ("TVOD"),20 PPV, first Pay TV window,
17  Commission's decision of 26 August 2008 in Case No COMP/M.5121 - News Corp/Premiere,
    paragraph 28.
18  Commission's decision of 26 August 2008 in Case No COMP/M.5121 - News Corp/Premiere,
    paragraph 35.
19  Commission's decision of 18 July 2007 in Case No COMP/M.4504 - SFR/Télé 2 France, paragraphs
     27-36.
20  Subscription VOD designates a product where an end user obtains the right to watch multiple titles
    within a designated time frame (for example one month) through a single payment. Transactional
    VOD designates a product where an end user obtains the right to watch a single title within a
    designated time frame (for example 48 hours) through a single payment. PPV designates a product
                                                      8
 ---pagebreak---             second Pay TV window,21 and FTA, (iv) by content type, that is to say films,
            sports, other content.
    (42)    As regards content type, the Commission has further distinguished between:
            (i) exclusive rights to premium films, (ii) rights to football events that are
            played regularly throughout every year (for example national league matches,
            national cup, UEFA Cup and UEFA Champions League), (iii) rights to
            football events that are played more intermittently, every four years, for
            example the FIFA World Cup and European Championship of Nations, and
            (iv) exclusive rights to other sport events,22 and by type of supplier in respect
            of films, that is to say major Hollywood studios/smaller suppliers.23
5.1.1.1. Product market definition
        The Notifying Party's views in 2014
    (43)    In the 2014 notification, the Notifying Party submitted that the exact
            definition of the market could be left open as the proposed concentration
            would not lead to a significant impediment to effective competition on any
            potential submarket.
    (44)    With respect to specific market sub-segments, in particular, the Notifying
            Party indicated that no distinction should be made between linear and non-
            linear broadcasting. The Notifying Party considered that, from a demand side
            perspective, providers of linear TV services were facing increasing
            competition from over-the-top ("OTT") players, that is to say operators
            providing audio visual services over the Internet, providing non-linear
            services. According to the Notifying Party there was also a high degree of
            supply side substitutability between the rights for linear and non-linear
            broadcast and those rights were often negotiated together and covered by a
            single agreement.
    (45)    The Notifying Party also indicated a certain degree of demand-side and
            supply-side substitutability between the broadcasting rights for the different
            exhibition windows, including SVOD and TVOD, pointing out that TV
            channels and VOD services often offered a mix of first Pay TV window,
            second Pay TV window and library content. In addition, the Notifying Party
            considered that substitutability also existed on the supply side, with some
            content right owners creating second Pay TV windows in response to the
            increased demand for exclusive windows created by the emergence of OTT
            providers thus blurring the distinction between the different exhibition
            windows.
    where an end user obtains the right to watch a single title during a specific time frame (for example
    Sunday between 2.00 pm and 3.45 pm) through a single payment.
21  Audio-visual content is typically sold separately for usage in different retail services or points in time.
    These different offers are generally referred to as broadcast windows.
22  Commission's decision of 13 November 2001 in Case No COMP/M.2483 – Group
    Canal+/RTL/GJCD/JV, paragraph 21; Commission's decision of 2 April 2003 in Case No
    COMP/M.2876 - Newscorp/Telepiù, paragraphs 61, 69 and 71.
23  Commission's decision of 21 December 2011 in Case No COMP/M.6369 - HBO/Ziggo/HBO
    Nederland, paragraph 18.
                                                          9
 ---pagebreak---    (46)   As to the distinction between various type of content (sports, films and other
          content), The Notifying Party submitted that a single market existed for all
          individual content due to the high degree of supply-side substitutability. The
          Notifying Party argued that it was not always possible to make a strict
          distinction between the different content segments as TV products are highly
          differentiated and a given product could be aimed at various types of target
          audience.
Commission's assessment and conclusions in 2014
   (47)   In its assessment, the Commission noted that the market investigation
          confirmed the traditional distinction between FTA and Pay TV content. At the
          same time, as the Dutch market was essentially a Pay TV market with only
          three FTA channels, the Commission concluded that the distinction between
          FTA and Pay TV was of little relevance and the definition could be left open,
          because the assessment of the Transaction would remain the same, whether
          the licensing and acquisition of broadcasting rights for FTA TV and Pay TV
          were considered to belong to the same product market or to two separate
          markets.
   (48)   In relation to the distinction between linear and non-linear broadcasting, the
          Commission noted that the information gathered during the market
          investigation, and in particular the differences in the pricing models and the
          licensing conditions, suggested the existence of separate markets for licensing
          and acquisition of broadcasting rights for (i) linear broadcasting and (ii) non-
          linear broadcasting. In any event, since the Transaction did not raise
          competition concerns under any possible market segmentation, the
          Commission considered that the exact scope of the relevant product markets
          could be left open in that respect.
   (49)   In relation to the market definition according to broadcasting windows, the
          Commission found that, given the different conditions for the acquisition of
          rights for each exhibition window, and the limited instances in which a
          window could be replaced by another, there were indications that a different
          market for each exhibition window could be distinguished.
   (50)   As regards VOD, the market investigation indicated a clear distinction
          between SVOD and TVOD, mostly due to the fact that both types of VOD
          services had different business models, different pricing conditions, and fell
          into separate and distinct viewing windows. Those differences in business
          models and pricing conditions suggested that SVOD and TVOD could
          constitute two separate product markets.
   (51)   Since the Transaction did not raise competition concerns under any possible
          market segmentation, the Commission left open the question whether
          licensing and acquisition of broadcasting rights for each exhibition window,
          including for SVOD and for TVOD, belonged to the same or to separate
          markets.
   (52)   As to a possible differentiation based on the type of content (sport, films,
          other content), the investigation revealed absence of interchangeability
          between the various types of content, different target audiences and the
          differences in licensing agreements as elements suggesting that the acquisition
                                               10
 ---pagebreak---       of rights for films could be distinguished from the acquisition of rights for
      sport events and from the acquisition of rights for other types of content.
(53)  Since, in any event, the Transaction did not raise competition concerns under
      any possible market segmentation, the Commission left open the exact scope
      of the relevant product market.
(54)  The Commission also assessed the existence of possible separate markets for
      premium and non-premium content both in sports and in film right licensing.
      The market investigation revealed differences in price and ability to attract
      viewers (e.g. films with high box office success and popular sports, such as
      Formula 1, Uefa Champions League and Fifa World Cup) and suggested the
      existence of a distinction between the acquisition of rights for premium
      content and the acquisition of rights for non-premium content. In any event,
      the Commission considered that for the purposes of the decision, the question
      whether broadcasting rights for premium and for non-premium content
      constituted different markets could be left open.
(55)  As regards a differentiation between United States and non-United States film
      productions, responses to the market investigation differed and it was unclear
      whether a differentiation between United States and non-United States films
      should indeed be made. However, this question was left open, since the
      Transaction did not raise competition concerns whether or not a
      differentiation was made between United States and non-United States film
      productions.
(56)  The Commission also considered, based on its investigation, that the
      differences in pricing, production model and terms of acquisition of
      broadcasting rights for Dutch-language content (film and series) and other
      content did not seem to justify the delineation of a separate product market for
      Dutch-language content. In any event, the Commission concluded that even if
      a separate market for acquisition of Dutch-language content were to exist, the
      final commitments proposed by the Notifying Party would also address all
      possible concerns related to the acquisition of premium Dutch-language
      content.
(57)  Based on the previous considerations, the Commission left open the exact
      definition of the relevant product market in the Conditional Clearance
      Decision.
   The Notifying Parties' views in their Supplementary Notification
(58)  With respect to the possible segmentation between Pay TV and FTA services,
      the Notifying Parties submit in the Supplement Form CO that there is no clear
      distinction between Pay TV and FTA services from Dutch consumers'
      perspective given that there are only three FTA channels (NPO 1, 2 and 3)
      broadcast via unencrypted terrestrial TV signals in a limited standard
      definition quality, while all other TV channels are available only through a
      Pay TV subscription.
(59)  As to the difference between linear and non-linear broadcasting, in the
      Supplement Form CO, the Notifying Parties indicate, as a key development in
      the broadcasting and television markets since 2014, the ongoing shift of the
                                           11
 ---pagebreak---             relative amount of time consumers spend watching linear television via
            "traditional" technologies versus accessing the internet and watching content
            on demand. More specifically, they submit that the growth of the offer of non-
            linear services, which was identified in 2014, has been very significant, with
            the penetration of Netflix in the Netherlands (with 2.6 million subscribers in
            2017) being a key example.24
   (60)     The Notifying Parties further argue that, from a demand side perspective,
            linear TV services are to a very considerable extent substitutable with non-
            linear TV services. This is evidenced by the growth of non-linear services at
            the expense of linear services (in terms of viewing time). Several OTT players
            have successfully entered the market (e.g. NLZiet, Videoland, and Netflix)
            offering consumers a readily available, cost effective possibility to obtain high
            quality content. Actual competition in the acquisition of premium content is
            for instance exerted by players such as Netflix, which managed to secure
            exclusive deals for certain content with Disney and Sony. In the case of
            Netflix, that means that it secures linear rights together with the VOD rights,
            while it is of course only interested in the latter. Furthermore, they add, an
            increasing number of content creators are offering their content directly to
            consumers. An example is Netflix (with e.g. House of Cards), which creates
            its own content and broadcasts this directly to consumers via its OTT
            platform. This exerts even further competitive pressure on traditional linear
            services. Moreover, even though the terms under which linear and non-linear
            rights are licensed may differ to some extent, these rights are usually
            negotiated together and covered by a single agreement.
   (61)     In the Supplement Form CO, the Notifying Parties submit that, given the
            increased competitive pressure that non-linear services exert on linear
            services, this potential segmentation is no longer appropriate. This is further
            evidenced by the fact that, for the main types of content, the contractual
            structure for acquiring rights covers/typically involves both linear and non-
            linear distribution.
   (62)     In relation to sports, the Notifying Parties note that VodafoneZiggo's
            negotiations for sports rights are generally focussed on linear rights as from a
            commercial perspective the value of the rights is almost exclusively based on
            the linear content provided and non-linear rights are perceived as an add-on
            since non-linear sports broadcasting is in practice of little importance. Where
            rights-holders do make non-linear rights available, however, these are
            generally included in the same agreement.
   (63)     The Notifying Parties also note that they purchase sport rights separately for
            the Ziggo GO app (both linear and non-linear exhibition) due to the high level
            of technical details this app requires. In addition, after the divestiture of
24 As further examples, in the Supplement Form CO, the Notifying Parties refer to the increased use of
   catch-up television and to the online (joint) efforts of broadcasters to offer this service via their own
   websites with key examples being Uitzending Gemist, RTLXL and NLZiet. Furthermore, they argue,
   these OTT players are also offering linear content via their OTT services. For instance, besides
   offering a variety of non-linear content (catch-up TV, VOD etc.) NLZiet also offers live (linear) TV
   channels via its OTT platform (the channels of NPO, RTL and SBS).
                                                        12
 ---pagebreak---             Film1, VodafoneZiggo focuses on the purchase of film rights for SVOD
            distribution and agreements for such rights may also include rights for linear
            distribution ([...]).
   (64)     As to a market definition based on exhibition windows, the Notifying Parties
            maintain the position they had in 2014 and submit that a degree of
            substitutability exists between these distribution modes on the demand and
            supply side of the market.
   (65)     As to a possible market segmentation based on the type of content (such as
            between sports, films and other TV content) the Notifying Parties argue that it
            is not always possible to apply a strict distinction between certain types of
            content.
   (66)     On a market distinction based on the language of the content, the Notifying
            Parties submit that indeed, the differences in market conditions are not such as
            to justify a separate market for Dutch-language content. The negotiation
            position of a content provider depends for a large part on the commercial
            success of the content, rather than the language of such content.
   (67)     In general, the Notifying Parties conclude, a single market exists for all
            individual content types due to the high degree of supply substitutability and
            because individual rights can be sold for use in different products or channels
            without any modification.
   (68)     As to a possible market segmentation based on the nature of the content
            supplier (such as Hollywood studios or small content producers), the
            Notifying Parties consider that no strict segmentation between “major”
            Hollywood studios and smaller suppliers can be made, particularly since the
            negotiation position of the relevant content supplier will depend mainly on the
            commercial success of the film that is being sold, rather than on the nature of
            the supplier.
   (69)     Concluding on the relevant product market for broadcasting rights on TV
            content, the Notifying Parties still consider that the possible segmentations of
            the market as discussed above can be left open, as the Transaction has not led
            and does not lead to any competition concerns on even the narrowest
            conceivable market.
       Commission's assessment
   (70)     The results of the market investigation confirm the Notifying Parties' view in
            relation to the large penetration of Pay TV in the Dutch market. The market
            investigation also confirms that a distinction between basic Pay TV and
            Premium Pay TV would be more appropriate in the Netherlands than a
            distinction between FTA and Pay TV.25 This market structure impacts the
            market for content, making a distinction of content licenced for FTA or Pay
            TV broadcasting irrelevant.
25 Replies to Q2 to TV channel wholesale suppliers of 5 April 2018, question B.1. Replies to Q3 to retail
   Pay TV providers of 5 April 2018, question B.A.1
                                                     13
 ---pagebreak---    (71)     In light of the limited significance of FTA TV in the Netherlands, since
            essentially, the Dutch TV market is a Pay TV market, the assessment of the
            Transaction would remain the same whether the licensing and acquisition of
            broadcasting rights for FTA TV and Pay TV are considered to belong to the
            same product market or to two separate markets. As a consequence, the
            Commission considers that the market definition can be left open for the
            purpose of this decision.
   (72)     As to the possible distinction between linear and non-linear content, the
            market investigation indicates that, on the demand side, content rights for the
            two distribution modes are not substitutable and, in some cases, are used as
            complementary offers by TV broadcasters.26 At the same time, non-linear is
            increasingly constraining linear broadcasting, with viewers replacing linear
            broadcasting with a selection of their preferred non-linear content ("cord
            cutting"). On the supply side there is a degree of elasticity, as linear and non-
            linear rights for content are licensed together.27 In any event, the Commission
            considers that, for the purposes of this decision, the question as to whether
            there exists a distinct market for linear and non-linear content can be left
            open, as the Commission considers that the Transaction does not raise serious
            doubts as to its compatibility with the internal market irrespective of the
            conclusion on this point.
   (73)     As to the distinction between different types of content, the market
            investigation confirms the fundamental distinction, emerged already in the
            2014 market investigation, between (i) sport, (ii) film; and (iii) other
            content.28 The market investigation includes indications that the distinction
            between popular films and popular TV series is fading, as also the latter can
            be considered premium content.29 The results of the market investigation
            indicate that US productions and non-US productions may not be considered
            alternatives.30
   (74)     Within these content types, the replies of TV retailers to the market
            investigation indicate the existence of premium and non-premium
            content.31 The qualification of content as premium or not, however, seems to
            depend not solely on the nature of the content, but also on contingent
26 Replies to Q2 to TV channel wholesale suppliers of 5 April 2018, question B.2. Replies to Q3 to retail
   Pay TV providers of 5 April 2018, questions B.A.2 and B.A.2.1.
27 Replies to Q1 to content providers of 5 April 2018, question 6; replies to Q2 to TV channel suppliers
   of 5 April 2018, questions B.2 and B.2.1; replies to Q3 of 5 April 2018, questions B.A.2 and B.A.2.1.
28 Replies to Q1 to content providers of 5 April 2018, question 7; Replies to Q3 to retail Pay TV
   providers of 5 April 2018, questions B.A.7, B.A.7.1 and B.A.7.2.
29 Replies to Q2 to TV channels suppliers of 5 April 2018, question B.3.1 (particularly the explanation of
   TalpaTV); Replies to Q3 to retail Pay TV providers of 5 April 2018, question B.A.3.1.
30 Replies to Q2 to TV channels suppliers of 5 April 2018, question B.4.1; Replies to Q3 to retail Pay TV
   providers of 5 April 2018, questions B.A.4 and B.A.4.1.
31 Replies to Q3 to retail Pay TV providers of 5 April 2018, question B.A.3, B.A.3.1 and B.A.3.2.
                                                        14
 ---pagebreak---             circumstances (for instance the emergence of a national champion or talent in
            the case of sports).
   (75)     The Commission considers that the differences in price and ability to attract
            viewers suggest the existence of a distinction between the acquisition of
            rights for premium content and the acquisition of rights for non-
            premium content. In any event, the Commission considers that, for the
            purposes of this decision, the question as to whether broadcasting rights for
            premium and for non-premium content (and, within premium films, US and
            non-US productions) can be left open, as the Commission considers that the
            Transaction does not raise serious doubts as to its compatibility with the
            internal market irrespective of the conclusion on this point.
   (76)     In the above respect, some complainants and third interested parties have
            indicated that certain sports events (such as the Formula 1 World
            championship, the English Premier League, the Spanish La Liga and the
            Eredivisie football league) are to be considered "essential" competitive
            factors, so important for the business that, in order to realise a level playing
            field, all competitors should have access to them.
   (77)     The Commission, however, considers that an essential factor is an input that
            forces out of the market (or prevents market entry of) those which do not have
            it. In the case at hand, the sport contents mentioned can attract viewers and
            generate revenues, but having access to them is not a requirement to continue
            to operate on the market for the wholesale supply of TV channels or of retail
            supply of Pay TV services. Operators in the Pay TV value chain (TV channels
            providers and retail Pay TV providers), in fact, still have the possibility to
            differentiate themselves by investing in alternative content which can be (or
            become over time) equally or more attractive for viewers and subscribers. The
            replies to the market investigation point to a number of premium sports events
            (some traditionally considered premium, others considered premium due to
            contingent circumstances, such as the presence of a Dutch athlete) that are
            substitutable among themselves.32 The Commission therefore, considers that
            the narrowest plausible markets are those for broadcasting rights for premium
            and non-premium content, without any possible further distinction.
   (78)     For films, the market investigation has also indicated that, from the demand
            side, a difference exists between various broadcasting windows for films
            and, within VOD, between SVOD and TVOD. The replies to the market
            investigation, however, indicate a certain degree of supply side substitutability
            in offering various content.33 In any event, the Commission considers that, for
            the purposes of this decision, the question as to whether the VOD market
            should be further segmented in SVOD and TVOD can be left open, as the
            Commission considers that the Transaction does not raise serious doubts as to
32 See replies to Q2 of 5 April 2018 to TV channel suppliers, questions B.3.1 and B.9.1.; replies to Q3 of
   5 April 2018 to retail Pay TV providers, questions B.A.3.1 and B.A.9.1.
33 Replies to Q1 to content providers of 5 April 2018, questions 11 and 12; replies to Q2 to TV channel
   suppliers of 5 April 2018, questions B.5 and B.5.1 and B.6; replies to Q3 to retail Pay TV providers of
   5 April 2018, questions B.A.5 and B.A.6.
                                                       15
 ---pagebreak---              its compatibility with the internal market irrespective of the conclusion on this
             point.34
         Overall conclusion
    (79)     In light of the above, the Commission concludes that the relevant product
             markets for the purpose of this decision are the markets for licensing and
             acquisition of TV broadcasting rights in relation to (i) sports content, (ii)
             movies and series, and (iii) other content. The question as to whether these
             markets should be further segmented based on content for FTA or Pay TV,
             linear or non-linear broadcasting, premium or non-premium quality and
             broadcasting window can be left open, as the Commission considers that the
             Transaction does not raise serious doubts as to its compatibility with the
             internal market irrespective of the conclusion on this point.
5.1.1.2.          Geographic market definition
    (80)     At the time of the 2014 notification, the Notifying Party did not take a
             position on the geographic scope of the market but referred to the SFR/Télé 2
             France case,35 where the Commission had found that the market was national
             in scope.
    (81)     The Commission has previously considered that the market for the
             licensing/acquisition of broadcasting rights for audio visual TV content is
             either national in scope or potentially comprises a broader linguistically
             homogeneous area.36
    (82)     The Dutch Authority for Consumers and Markets (ACM) (previously the
             Nederlandse Mededingingsautoriteit (NMa)) concluded in its decision in
             UPC-Canal+37 that, since licenses for exclusive rights to premium film
             content are limited to the Netherlands, the market is national in scope. In its
             later decisions in cases Sanoma-SBS38 and RTL NL-Radio 538,39 the ACM
             (NMa) stated that the geographic scope of the market for the licensing and
             acquisition of content is national in scope or relates to a linguistically
             homogeneous area. However, in each case, it ultimately left the question
             open, as the geographic market definition did not impact on the competitive
             assessment.
34  Today, following the divestment of Film1 and the dissolvement of the HBO joint venture (see
    paragraph 138 of the Supplement Form CO), the Parties are only active in the purchase of VOD rights
    for films and series.
35  Commission's decision of 18 July 2007 in Case No COMP/M.4504 - SFR/Télé 2 France, paragraph 48.
36  Commission's decision of 2 April 2003 in Case No COMP/M.2876 - Newscorp/Telepiù, paragraph 62;
    Commission's decision of 21 December 2010 in Case No COMP/M.5932 - News Corp/BSkyB,
    paragraphs 73-75.
37  ACM (NMa) decision of 28 June 2005 in case 4490/UPC-Canal+, paragraphs 42-43.
38  ACM (NMa) decision of 22 July 2011 in case 7185/Sanoma-SBS, paragraphs 62-63.
39  ACM (NMa) decision of 13 August 2007 in case 6126/RTL NL-Radio 538, paragraphs 39.
                                                     16
 ---pagebreak--- (83) The vast majority of respondents to the 2014 market investigation considered
     that the geographic scope of the market for licensing and acquisition of
     broadcasting rights in general, but also broken down by film, sport and other
     content is national.
(84) As regards the geographic scope of a potential market for the licensing and
     acquisition of broadcasting rights for Dutch-language audio visual content,
     around half of the respondents to the 2014 second phase market investigation
     that replied to the relevant question considered that the geographic scope of
     such a market should cover the Netherlands only (excluding Dutch-speaking
     Flanders). Some respondents highlighted the fact that Dutch-language content
     produced in the Netherlands in general did not have the same commercial
     success in Flanders and vice versa. The other half of the respondents stated
     that the geographic market should naturally comprise both the Netherlands
     and Flanders because of their linguistic homogeneity. That being said, the
     rights for the Netherlands and Flanders were still licensed and acquired
     separately and, as mentioned by one respondent, not all purchasers of
     broadcasting rights for Dutch-language content would even be interested in
     acquiring the rights for both the Netherlands and Flanders. This latter point
     was indeed confirmed by the fact that the majority of respondents confirmed
     that the scope of the licensing contracts concluded for Dutch-language audio
     visual content encompass the Netherlands only.
(85) In that regard, in 2014, the Commission noted that all of the relevant supply
     agreements covering (i) VOD rights, (ii) first and second window Pay TV
     rights, (iii) TVOD, as well as (iv) SVOD rights at the time in force between
     the Notifying Party and suppliers of individual audio visual content [reference
     to supply agreements between the Parties and suppliers of audio-visual
     content]. Similarly, all such supply agreements in force between Ziggo and
     suppliers of individual audio visual content [reference to supply agreements
     between the Parties and suppliers of audio-visual content].
(86) Based on the above elements the Commission considered in the Conditional
     Clearance Decision that the relevant markets for the licensing and acquisition
     of broadcasting rights were national in scope.
(87) In the Supplement Form CO, the Notifying Parties submit the market has a
     national dimension [reference to the geographic scope of supply agreements
     between the Parties and suppliers of audio-visual content]. Furthermore, they
     indicate that significant differences exist in Dutch language individual content
     produced for Dutch target audiences on the one hand and Flanders target
     audiences on the other hand. Although there is a degree of co-productions,
     most of the Dutch language series and programmes are targeted at either
     Dutch or Flemish audiences, but not both. The Notifying Parties therefore
     consider that there is no separate geographic market that covers both Dutch
     and Flemish individual content.
(88) The market investigation undertaken for the reassessment indicated that
     broadcasting rights for sport events are generally sold on a country-by-country
     basis. With some exceptions, linked to the fact that the broadcaster purchasing
                                           17
 ---pagebreak---              content is active in multiple countries, film broadcasting rights are also
             licensed on a national basis.40
    (89)     Therefore, for the purposes of this decision, the Commission concludes that
             the relevant geographic market is national.
5.1.1.3.          Affected market
    (90)     In 2014, as regards the acquisition of content, the Notifying Party could not
             rule out that the merged entity's market share would exceed 20% in the
             hypothetical market for the acquisition of film content and, in particular, the
             markets for the acquisition of first Pay TV window film content and TVOD
             film content. As such, those markets were considered to be affected for the
             purposes of that decision.
    (91)     Today, the Notifying Parties submit that the combined market share of Liberty
             Global and Ziggo in the market for the acquisition of all content to be
             broadcast in linear and VOD mode was [5-10]% in 2013 and that the
             estimated market share of VodafoneZiggo in the same market in 2017 is [5-
             10]%.41
    (92)     As indicated in paragraph (63) as a consequence of the divestiture of the
             Film1 channel, VodafoneZiggo only purchases rights for movies and series
             for non-linear, mainly SVOD, broadcasting. The Notifying Parties submit
             they are no longer active in the purchase of linear content rights, which may
             only still be licensed to VodafoneZiggo as a part of SVOD agreements.42
             Therefore, the hypothetical market for movies and series broadcast in linear
             mode is not an affected market.
    (93)     As to the acquisition of VOD rights only for movies and series (thus
             excluding sports), the Notifying Parties indicate that, while, in 2013, Liberty
             Global and Ziggo held a combined market share of [20-30]%, in 2017 the
             estimated market share of VodafoneZiggo in the same market is [5-10]%.
             Therefore, the market for movies and series broadcast in non-linear/VOD
             mode is not an affected market.
    (94)     If the market for non-linear broadcasting rights for movies and series is split
             between SVOD and TVOD, the 2017 market share of the Parties amounts to
             less than 20% in SVOD, while the Notifying Parties cannot exclude that the
40  Replies to Q1 to content providers of 5 April 2018, question 14; replies to Q2 to TV channel suppliers
    of 5 April 2018, questions B.12; replies to Q3 of 5 April 2018, questions B.A.12.
41  Such estimate, as indicated by the Notifying Parties, is conservative, as it includes the Parties'
    expenditure in VOD, while it excludes the expenditures of small broadcasters and VOD service
    providers. In relation to the supply of TV content, the Notifying Parties indicate that Liberty Global
    has, since 2014, become active in the market through the acquisition of All3Media in 2014. The
    Notifying Parties refer to that development as not being merger specific, but indicate that under current
    market conditions a potential vertical link exists between All3Media and what is now VodafoneZiggo.
    By virtue of very limited market shares of All3Media and VodafoneZiggo on the respective,
    potentially related markets, these cannot be considered vertically affected.
42  See paragraphs (182) and (183) of the Supplement Form CO.
                                                          18
 ---pagebreak---          market share of VodafoneZiggo in TVOD exceeds 20%. The market for non-
         linear broadcasting rights for movies and series for TVOD distribution,
         therefore, is considered an affected marked.
    (95) The Notifying Parties indicate that the expenditure for other broadcasting
         rights excluding sports (that is, documentaries, concert broadcasts, etc.) is
         negligible.
    (96) As to the acquisition of sport content (where non-linear rights, according to
         the Notifying Parties, are generally included in the linear rights) the estimated
         market share of VodafoneZiggo is [10-20]% in 2017, while the combined
         market share of Liberty Global and Ziggo was [5-10]% in 2014. The market
         therefore is not horizontally affected.
    (97) In a hypothetical scenario where Mr. John Malone were considered to de facto
         control both Liberty Global (and thereby jointly control VodafoneZiggo) and
         LMC (and thereby Formula 1), Liberty Global would be then active in the
         supply (or licensing) of content rights for broadcasting in the Netherlands.
         The Notifying Parties have therefore submitted the estimated market shares of
         Formula 1 in the hypothetical relevant markets. On the hypothetical market
         segment for supply of broadcasting rights for all premium and non-premium
         sports content rights in the Netherlands, the market share of Formula 1 would
         be 1.2%. Taking into account sports content supplied for premium sports
         channels, Formula 1’s estimated market share would still be limited to approx.
         2.2%. Formula 1's estimated market share would be even smaller (0.3%) in
         the market for the supply of all content for Pay TV and for linear and non-
         linear distribution. Therefore, the Commission concludes that, even if Mr
         John Malone were to be considered as de facto controlling both Liberty
         Global and LMC and, thus, the Parties were to be considered active in the
         market for the supply of sports content (and various sub-segments), this
         market would not be either horizontally or vertically affected.
    (98) In the light of the figures and estimates provided by the Notifying Parties in
         the Supplement Form CO and subsequent submissions, the Commission
         concludes that the market for the acquisition of non-linear broadcasting rights
         for movies and series for TVOD distribution is an affected market.
5.1.2. Wholesale supply and acquisition of TV channels
    (99) TV channels suppliers acquire or produce individual audio visual content and
         package it into TV channels. These TV channels are then broadcast to end
         users via different distribution infrastructures, for example cable, satellite,
         Internet, and mobile, either on a FTA basis or on a Pay TV basis, individually
         or as part of so-called "channel bouquets". Hence, the supply side of that
         market comprises TV channel suppliers. Its demand side comprises providers
         of retail TV services, which either limit themselves to "carrying" the TV
         channels and making them available to end users, or also act as channel
         aggregators, which also "package" TV channels.
                                              19
 ---pagebreak--- 5.1.2.1. Product market definition
        The Notifying Party's views in 2014
    (100) In the 2014 notification, the Notifying Party submitted that there was a
            separate wholesale market for the supply and acquisition of TV channels.
            Within the Netherlands, the traditional distinction between FTA and Pay TV
            channels appeared increasingly blurred and a more appropriate distinction
            could be made between Basic Pay TV channels, including FTA channels and
            ordinary commercial channels available in standard bundles, and Premium
            Pay TV channels. The latter market could be split into two broad segments,
            namely Premium Pay TV sports channels (carrying high-value sport rights)
            and Premium Pay TV film channels (featuring blockbuster films or series).
    (101) The Notifying Party also indicated that a strict distinction between general
            interest and thematic Pay TV channels could not be made as a wide range of
            highly differentiated channels was available: although certain channels may
            not be always substitutable, depending on the content offered by the channel
            and viewers' preferences, channels in both segments overlapped in target
            audience and type of content.
    (102) As regards a possible segmentation according to distribution infrastructure,
            the Notifying Party argued that distribution via satellite or Direct to Home
            (DTH) exerted a similar competitive constraint on the Parties as other
            distribution infrastructures such as Internet Protocol TV ("IPTV"), fibre and
            vDSL (very high bit-rate Digital Subscriber Line) in line with previous
            decisions of the Commission.
        Commission's assessment and conclusions in 2014
    (103) In light of the limited significance of FTA TV in the Netherlands (essentially,
            the Dutch TV market is a Pay TV market), the assessment of the Transaction
            would remain the same whether FTA TV channels and Pay TV channels are
            regarded as belonging to the same product market or to two separate markets.
            Therefore, for the purpose of the decision, the Commission decided to leave
            the exact market definition open.
    (104) In light of the differences in content offering, pricing conditions and size of
            the audience attracted between Basic and Premium Pay TV channels, and for
            the purposes of the decision, the Commission considered that Basic Pay TV
            channels and Premium Pay TV channels belonged to separate product markets
            with the latter being possibly further segmented between Premium Pay TV
            film channels and Premium Pay TV sports channels. In any event, the
            Commission left open the question whether the market for Premium Pay TV
            channels could be further segmented into areas of interest as the assessment of
            the Transaction would have remained the same. The Commission also left
            open the question whether all general interest Pay TV channels and all
            thematic Pay TV channels belonged to separate product markets, as the
            assessment of the Transaction would have remained the same.
    (105) As to a possible market segmentation based on distribution infrastructure, the
            market investigation at the time indicated interchangeability of the different
            infrastructures. Therefore, also in consideration of its precedents on this issue,
                                                 20
 ---pagebreak---              the Commission considered that at least cable, IPTV over DSL, fiber and
             possibly Satellite (DTH) were part of the same product market.
        The Notifying Parties' views in their Supplementary Notification
   (106) In the Supplement Form CO, the Notifying Parties refer to the Commission's
             precedents in defining the Dutch market for the wholesale supply and
             acquisition of TV channels. They agree with the distinction between Basic
             Pay TV channels and Premium Pay TV channels and indicate that Premium
             Pay TV sport channels were either being offered in the Basic Pay TV tier or
             increasingly subject to competition by Basic Pay TV sports channels.
   (107) The Notifying Parties indicate that, even if there may be some competitive
             interaction between Premium Pay TV sports channels and Basic Pay TV
             sports channels, the exact market definition can be left open, since also on the
             more narrow segment for Premium Pay TV sports channels the Transaction
             has not led and will not lead to a significant impediment of effective
             competition.
   (108) They refer to the fact that, until now, the Commission has left open the exact
             definition of the market and whether Premium Pay TV channels could be
             further segmented into areas of interest such as movies and/or sports. The
             Notifying Parties submit that also in this case the question whether Premium
             Pay TV channels should be further segmented into sports and film channels
             can be left open as the Transaction has not and does not lead to any
             competition concerns even on the narrowest markets.
   (109) The Notifying Parties also submit that it can be left open whether all general
             interest Pay TV channels and all thematic Pay TV channels belong to separate
             product markets, as current market conditions demonstrate that the
             Transaction has not and does not lead to any competition concerns even on
             the narrowest markets.
   (110) To conclude, the Notifying Parties submit that the exact definition of the
             relevant product market can be left open as the Transaction has not and does
             not lead to any competition concerns on even the narrowest market.
        Commission's assessment
   (111) The market investigation has confirmed that the Netherlands is essentially a
             Pay TV market.43 Therefore, the difference between FTA and Pay TV
             channels has a reduced relevance and the question as to whether they belong
             to separate markets can be left open, as the Commission considers that the
             Transaction does not raise serious doubts as to its compatibility with the
             internal market irrespective of the conclusion on this point.
43 Replies to Q2 to TV channel suppliers of 5 April 2018, question B.B.3; replies to Q3 of 5 April 2018
   to retailers, question B.B.2.
                                                     21
 ---pagebreak---    (112) The market investigation has confirmed the distinction between Basic and
             Premium Pay TV channels44 and between Premium Pay TV film channels and
             Premium Pay TV sports channels.45 With respect to sports channels, the
             market investigation has indicated that Premium Pay TV sports channels
             cannot be replaced by other (that is, non-sport) premium and/or thematic
             channels.46 For the same reasons indicated in section 5.1.1.1, the Commission
             rejects the argument that the market can be further segmented in order to
             include certain "essential" channels alone. The fact that these channels can
             attract subscribers and generate revenue does not mean that there are no
             alternatives for them and that retail TV providers cannot differentiate their
             offers otherwise.47 In any event, in section 6.3 the Commission carries out an
             assessment of the risk of foreclosure in relation to the channel ZST.
   (113) A change in business model (Fox Sports has, since August 2016, shifted from
             a revenue-sharing model to a flat fee model with minimum guaranteed)48 and
             the availability of premium content for channels distributed in the Basic Pay
             TV tier (ZSB)49 seems to blur the distinction between Basic and Premium Pay
             TV sport channels to some extent.50 However, the Commission considers that
             those changes in business model and in market positioning are not the effect
             of reduced differences between the two categories of channels, but rather the
             effect of the greater attractiveness of the Premium Pay TV sports channels
             (and of their content) and the related intention of the broadcasters to draw
             higher profits by offering them to a wider audience at a marginally lower rate.
             The Commission therefore considers that Basic Pay TV channels and
             Premium Pay TV channels belong to separate product markets.51
44 Replies to Q2 to TV channel suppliers of 5 April 2018, question B.B.5; replies to Q3 of 5 April 2018
   to retailers, question B.B.5.
45 Replies to Q2 to TV channel suppliers of 5 April 2018, questions B.B.9.1, B.B.9.2.1, B.B.9.3.1,
   B.B.10.1, B.B.10.2.1; replies to Q3 of 5 April 2018 to retailers, questions B.B.10, B.B.10.1, B.B.10.2,
   B.B.10.2.1.
46 Replies to Q2 to TV channel suppliers of 5 April 2018, question B.B.10; replies to Q3 of 5 April 2018
   to retailers, question B.B.10 and ss.
47 The replies to the market investigation refer not to a single, but to a number of premium channels (and
   premium sports channels) which the respondents consider equally attractive. See replies to
   questionnaire Q2 to TV channel suppliers of 5 April 2018, questions B.B.6.1, B.B.11; replies to Q3 of
   5 April 2018 to retailers, questions B.B.10.1, B.B.10.2.1.
48 Under the revenue-sharing model, Fox was charging retail TV providers a fee per each subscriber to
   the channel. Under the model implemented since August 2016, retail TV providers pay a fixed fee and
   a minimum amount guaranteed calculated in proportion to their customer base with access to Fox
   Sports.
49 See Q3 of 5 April 2018 to retailers, non-confidential replies to question B.B.11.1.
50 See Q3 of 5 April 2018 to retailers, reply by M7 to question B.A.3.1, reply by CAIW to question
   B.B.5.1.
51 In case Basic Pay TV and Premium Pay TV channels were considered to be part of the same relevant
   product market, this market would include a large number of suppliers, including NPO, RTL,
   Eurosport, Fox Sports, SBS/Talpa, etc.
                                                        22
 ---pagebreak---     (114) As to a possible market segmentation based on distribution infrastructure, the
              market investigation revealed that cable and IPTV through DSL or fibre
              appear as interchangeable technical solutions, as they both allow TV
              distribution and interactivity. On the other hand, satellite (DTH) and digital
              terrestrial television (DTT) appear to be slightly less valid alternatives.52 In
              any event, based on the results of the market investigation and on its own
              precedents, the Commission considers that at least cable, IPTV over DSL,
              fiber and possibly satellite (DTH) are part of the same product market.
         Overall conclusion
    (115) Based on the above considerations, therefore, the Commission considers that
              the market can be segmented in (i) Basic and Premium Pay TV channels, and,
              within the latter, between (ii) Premium Pay TV film channels and Premium
              Pay TV sports channels. The Commission also considers that at least cable,
              IPTV over DSL, fiber and possibly satellite (DTH) are part of the same
              product market. The question as to whether a distinction FTA vis-à-vis Pay
              exist can be left open, as the Commission considers that the Transaction does
              not raise serious doubts as to its compatibility with the internal market
              irrespective of the conclusion on this point.
5.1.2.2.           Geographic market definition
    (116) In their notification of 2014, the Notifying Party submitted that the geographic
              market was national in scope.
    (117) In a number of previous decisions, the Commission considered that the market
              for the wholesale supply and acquisition of TV channels was national in
              scope, or at most covering a single linguistically homogeneous area.53 The
              exact geographic scope of the market was however ultimately left open.
    (118) Based on the results of the market investigation and on other evidence
              available, the Commission concluded that the markets for the wholesale
              supply and acquisition of TV channels were national in scope.
    (119) In the Supplement Form CO, the Notifying Parties submit that the geographic
              market in the present case is likely to comprise the Netherlands given the way
              the carriage agreements are concluded. Moreover, the Notifying Parties
              consider that generally, agreements in place for the acquisition of TV
              channels [reference to the geographic scope of supply agreements between the
              Parties and suppliers of audio-visual content]. As such, the Notifying Parties
52  Replies to Q2 to TV channel suppliers of 5 April 2018, question B.B.2; replies to Q3 of 5 April 2018
    to retailers, questions B.B.1 and B.B.1.2.
53  Commission's decision of 2 June 2006 in Case No COMP/M.4217 - Providence/Carlyle/UPC Sweden,
    paragraph 19; Commission's decision of 6 September 2006 in Case No COMP/M.4338 -
    Cinven/Warburg Pincus/Casema/Multikabel, paragraph 31; Commission's decision of 26 February
    2007 in Case No COMP/M.4521 - Liberty Global/Telenet, paragraph 35; Commission's decision of 18
    July 2007 in Case No COMP/M.4504 - SFR/Télé 2 France, paragraph 48 (French mainland);
    Commission's decision of 21 December 2010 in Case No COMP/M.5932 - News Corp/BSkyB,
    paragraph 88 and Commission's decision of 25 January 2010 in Case No COMP/M.5734 - Liberty
    Global Europe/Unitymedia, paragraph 30 (regional or national in Germany).
                                                      23
 ---pagebreak---               consider that no subnational or regional market for the acquisition of TV
              channels exists.
    (120) The market investigation confirms that the geographic scope of the wholesale
              market for the supply and acquisition of Pay TV channels mainly consists of
              the territory of the Netherlands.54
    (121) Therefore, the Commission concludes for the purpose of this decision that the
              relevant market is national in scope.
5.1.2.3.           Affected market
    (122) The divestiture of the Premium Pay TV film channel Film1, offered as a
              remedy by the Notifying Party and approved with the Conditional Clearance
              Decision has addressed the horizontal and vertical concerns the Commission
              had raised in the wholesale market for the supply and acquisition of Premium
              Pay TV film channels (supply side). Since that divestiture and the dissolution
              of the HBO NL joint venture, VodafoneZiggo is no longer active on the
              wholesale market for Premium Pay TV film channels (supply side).55
    (123) Notwithstanding this, however, the Commission will still carry out56 the
              assessment of the possible vertical concerns in relation to the HBO content,
              now distributed by VodafoneZiggo through the Movies&Series VOD service.
    (124) The OTT remedies offered by the Notifying Party and accepted by the
              Commission in the Conditional Clearance Decision addressed the concern of
              the increased buyer power of the entity resulting from the merger.
    (125) In the Supplement Form CO,57 the Notifying Parties estimate at [50-60]% the
              market share of VodafoneZiggo in the acquisition of Basic Pay TV channels,
              of Premium Pay TV film channels and of Premium Pay TV sports channels.
              The markets for the acquisition of Basic Pay TV channels, Premium Pay TV
              film channels and Premium Pay TV sports channels are therefore horizontally
              affected markets. These are also vertically affected markets, as
              VodafoneZiggo has a 53% market share on the downstream market for the
              retail supply of Pay TV services.
    (126) In the Supplement Form CO, in relation to the supply side of the wholesale
              market for the acquisition and supply of Premium Pay TV sports channels, the
              Notifying Parties argue that ZSB is not a premium channel and that the
54  Replies to Q2 to TV channel suppliers of 5 April 2018, question B.C.1; replies to Q3 of 5 April 2018
    to retailers, questions B.B.12.
55  Some third parties have raised the issue that the linear TV channel is no longer available and that the
    dissolution of the HBO NL joint venture is a direct effect of the Transaction. However, there is no
    linear channel available to the merged entity’s own retail customers either. In any event, the same
    arguments as discussed in section 6.2 also apply to linear distribution.
56  See section 6.2.5, below.
57  Supplement Form CO, paragraph 357.
                                                         24
 ---pagebreak---             market share of VodafoneZiggo in the wholesale supply of Premium Pay TV
            channels (where VodafoneZiggo only supplies ZST) is [10-20]%. In terms of
            subscribers at retail level, the penetration of ZST is just [5-10]% ([5-10]%,
            when disregarding subscribers on VodafoneZiggo's platform).Therefore, this
            is not a horizontally affected market.
5.1.3. Retail provision of TV services.
    (127) In the market for the retail provision of TV services, the suppliers of linear
            and non-linear (mainly VOD) TV services serve end customers who wish to
            purchase such services.
5.1.3.1. Product market definition
        The Notifying Party's views in 2014
    (128) In the 2014 notification, the Notifying Party claimed that the retail market for
            FTA TV services did not exist in the Netherlands. Instead, the Notifying Party
            considered it appropriate to distinguish between the retail provision of Basic
            Pay TV channels and Premium Pay TV channels. As regards linear Pay TV
            services and non-linear services, the Notifying Party's view was that those
            should be considered to belong to the same product market given the
            competitive constraints which VOD services exercised on linear Pay TV
            services. As regards a possible distinction between the different distribution
            technologies for the provision of retail TV services, the Notifying Party
            recalled the different Commission and ACM (OPTA and NMa) precedents
            where no distinction between distribution technologies had been made.
        Commission's assessment and conclusion in 2014
    (129) In consideration of the limited offer of FTA channels in the Netherlands and
            given the fact that the assessment of the Transaction would remain the same
            whether FTA TV services and Pay TV services were considered to belong to
            the same product market or to two separate markets, the Commission
            considered that the market definition in that respect could be left open.
    (130) In relation to the difference between linear and non-linear retail TV services,
            the Commission noted that the market investigation had highlighted a number
            of differences between the two distribution modes. In any event, the
            Commission considered that the exact scope of the relevant market for Pay
            TV services could be left open in that regard, as the Transaction did not raise
            competition concerns on the market for the retail provision of Pay TV services
            under any alternative product market definition considered.
    (131) Taking into account the responses to the market investigation, and in
            particular considering the demand-side substitutability between retail Pay TV
            services provided through the different distribution technologies such as
            cable, DSL, Fibre-to-the-Home (FttH) and possibly DTH satellite, the
            Commission considered that the provision of retail Pay TV services through
            those different distribution technologies belonged to the same product market.
                                                 25
 ---pagebreak---         The Notifying Parties' views in their Supplementary Notification
   (132) In the Supplement to the Form CO, the Notifying Parties argue that, in
             relation to the Dutch market, a distinction between Basic Pay TV channels
             and Premium Pay TV channels is most appropriate.
   (133) With respect to the distinction between linear and non-linear technology, the
             Notifying Parties are of the view that a distinction between linear and non-
             linear Pay TV services is disappearing and is no longer appropriate, given the
             growing competitive constraint that VOD services exert on linear TV services
             and the continuing convergence between traditional linear Pay TV services
             and OTT services. They also refer to research conducted by Telecompaper,
             indicating that Dutch households spend approximately 38% of their daily
             viewing on linear TV channels and the remainder on VOD services (either
             TVOD, SVOD or other OTT services). The Telecompaper research also
             indicated that an increasing number of households had access to a Smart TV
             which could be used for streaming SVOD (e.g. Netflix) services.
   (134) However, the Notifying Parties conclude that, given that the Transaction has
             not raised and does not raise any competition concerns, the market definition
             can be left open.
        Commission's assessment
   (135) The market investigation has confirmed that the Dutch market has a very
             limited offer of FTA TV services, which makes the distinction between Basic
             Pay TV and Premium Pay TV more appropriate.58 The market investigation
             also indicated that some differences persist between linear and non-linear
             broadcasting, which are seen more as complements than as substitutes.
             Although the two distributions mode tend to converge and overlap,
             PPV/TVOD and OTT/SVOD do not yet seem as viable alternatives to Pay TV
             in case of switching.59
   (136) As to different distribution technologies, the market investigation indicates
             that switching appears possible from cable to IPTV over fibre or DSL, much
             less to satellite (DTH) and terrestrial (DTT) technologies.60
   (137) Based on the foregoing, the Commission considers that the question as to
             whether the TV retail market may be segmented in FTA TV and Pay TV, can
             be left open, as the Commission considers that the Transaction does not raise
             serious doubts as to its compatibility with the internal market irrespective of
             the conclusion on this point. For the same reason, it can also be left open the
             question whether there is a distinction between linear and non-linear
58 Replies to Q2 to TV channel suppliers of 5 April 2018, question B.C.2 and B.C.2.1; replies to Q3 of 5
   April 2018 to retailers, questions B.B.13 and B.B.13.1.
59 Replies to Q2 to TV channel suppliers of 5 April 2018, questions B.C.3, B.C.3.1, B.C.5 and B.C.5.1;
   replies to Q3 of 5 April 2018 to retailers, questions B.B.14, B.B.14.1, B.B.15 and B.B.15.1.
60 Replies to Q2 to TV channel suppliers of 5 April 2018, questions B.C.6, B.C.6.1, B.C.7 and B.C.7.1;
   replies to Q3 of 5 April 2018 to retailers, questions B.B.16, B.B.16.1, B.B.17 and B.B.17.1.
                                                         26
 ---pagebreak---               distribution. As to the different distribution technologies, the Commission
              considers that they are all part of the same product market.
5.1.3.2.           Geographic market definition
    (138) In the notification of 2014, the Notifying Party did not take a view on the
              exact geographic scope of the market. Based on the results of the market
              investigation, and considering that following the Transaction the merged
              entity would have had almost national coverage, the Commission considered
              that the relevant market was national in scope.
    (139) In the Supplement Form CO, the Notifying Parties submit that the question of
              geographic market definition is not of decisive importance for the assessment
              of competition in the market for the retail supply of TV services. However,
              for the purpose of the Supplement, the Notifying Parties provide data for a
              national market.
    (140) The market investigation indicates that the market for retail supply of TV
              services is national in scope.61 The Commission, therefore, considers that the
              relevant market is national in scope.
5.1.3.3.           Affected market
    (141) The retail market for the provision of Pay TV services is an affected market
              considering that, as of Q3 2017, VodafoneZiggo holds a market share of 53%
              for services provided in linear mode (55% after the combination of Liberty
              Global/UPC's and Ziggo's networks) and of [20-30]% for VOD services.
      5.2.    Fixed telephony and Internet services
    (142) The Parties provide fixed telephony and fixed Internet services in the
              Netherlands. In particular, they provide services on the following markets:
              fixed telephony/voice at retail level;
              call termination on fixed networks at wholesale level;
              fixed Internet access at retail level;
              fixed Internet access at wholesale level;
              business communication services; and
              carrier services at wholesale level.
61  Replies to Q2 to TV channel suppliers of 5 April 2018, question B.C.8; replies to Q3 of 5 April 2018
    to retailers, questions B.B.18.
                                                      27
 ---pagebreak---              5.2.1.    Fixed telephony/voice at retail level
5.2.1.1. Product market definition
    (143) In the downstream market for the retail provision of fixed telephony and voice
             services, operators provide fixed voice services to end customers. Both Parties
             are active on this market offering fixed voice services bundled together with
             fixed broadband Internet access and TV.
        The Notifying Party's view in 2014
    (144) In the 2014 notification, the Notifying Party submitted that a product market
             existed for the retail provision of fixed telephony services, but that the
             definition of its exact scope and in particular whether it should be further
             segmented could be left open, as it would not significantly affect the
             competition assessment.
        Commission's assessment and conclusion in 2014
    (145) In its assessment, the Commission considered that the exact scope of the
             product market definition, and specifically, whether fixed line and VoIP
             telephony services belonged to the same product market, and whether there
             was a separate market for residential and non-residential customers, could be
             left open as the Transaction did not raise competitive concerns under any
             alternative product market definition considered.
        The Notifying Parties' view in their Supplementary Notification
    (146) In the Supplement Form CO, the Notifying Parties submit that the exact scope
             of the relevant product market can be left open as no competition concerns
             have arisen or will arise on any plausible market segment.
        Commission's assessment
    (147) The market investigation confirmed the Commission existing definition of the
             market (including VOIP) in 2014. According to some respondents, additional
             fixed services (such as for business customers and for international calls)
             should also be included in the same market.62 In any event, the Commission
             considers that the exact scope of the product market may be left open for the
             purposes of this Decision.
5.2.1.2.         Geographic market definition
    (148) In the 2014 notification, the Notifying Party did not take any view on the
             geographic scope of the market. Consistently with its previous practice and
             with the results of the market investigation, the Commission considered that
             the market for the retail provision of fixed telephony services was national in
             scope.
62  Replies to Q3 of 5 April 2018 to retailers, questions B.C.1, B.C.2, B.C.3.
                                                         28
 ---pagebreak---     (149) In the Supplement Form CO, the Notifying Parties submit that no definite
             position has to be taken on the exact geographic scope of this market.
             However, in line with the previous approaches taken by the Commission and
             the ACM, the Notifying Parties will provide data for the smallest possible
             segment (a national market).
    (150) The market investigation carried out by the Commission confirms that the
             market is national in scope.63 The Commission, therefore, considers the
             market to be national in scope.
5.2.1.3.         Affected market
    (151) In the Conditional Clearance Decision, the Commission assessed all the retail
             markets jointly. The Commission noted that all retail services, such as fixed
             telephony, were provided by Liberty Global and Ziggo in the respective, non-
             overlapping footprints in the Netherlands. Therefore, no customer switching
             could take place between Liberty Global and Ziggo. Nonetheless, the
             Commission still considered whether Liberty Global and Ziggo took each
             other's actions into account before taking commercial decisions. The
             Commission found that there was insufficient evidence pointing to the risk of
             non-coordinated effects as a consequence of the elimination of an indirect
             constraint between Liberty Global and Ziggo.
    (152) Under current market conditions (Q3 2017), VodafoneZiggo holds a market
             share of 41% in the retail market for fixed telephony services, which is
             therefore an affected market. The market is also technically a vertically
             affected market, due to its connection to the wholesale market for call
             termination on fixed network, where each operator holds by definition a 100%
             market share.
             5.2.2.    Call termination on fixed networks at wholesale level
    (153) Call termination is a service provided by telephony operator B to telephony
             operator A, whereby a call originating on operator A's network is delivered to
             a user of B's network. This essentially allows users of different networks to
             communicate with each other.
5.2.2.1. Product market definition
    (154) In the Supplement Form CO, the Notifying Parties recall that, in previous
             cases, the Commission found that there are no substitutes for call termination
             on each individual fixed network, since the operator transmitting the outgoing
             call can reach the intended recipient only through the operator of the network
             to which that recipient subscribed. Each individual fixed network therefore
             constitutes a separate market for call termination and each network operator
             has, by definition, a 100% market share on that market.
63  Replies to Q3 of 5 April 2018 to retailers, question B.C.4.
                                                         29
 ---pagebreak---     (155) The ACM has taken a similar view as the Commission and the Notifying
            Parties therefore submit that the relevant product market is the wholesale
            market for call termination on each individual fixed network.
    (156) In view of the above, the Commission considers that each individual fixed
            network constitutes a separate market for call termination.
5.2.2.2.         Geographic market definition
    (157) As to the geographic scope of the relevant market, the Notifying Parties
            submit in the Supplement Form CO that the market is national in scope, due
            to regulatory reasons, namely the fact that the geographic scope of regulatory
            licenses do not extend beyond the territory of a Member State. The
            Commission shares such view.
5.2.2.3.        Affected market
    (158) The Commission concluded in its Conditional Clearance Decision that the
            concentration could have no impact on the market, as each network
            constituted a market on its own. For that reason, wholesale call termination on
            fixed networks was not discussed further in the Commission's Conditional
            Clearance Decision.
    (159) For the purposes of the re-assessment of the Transaction, the Commission
            considers this reasoning still holds, because Liberty Global and Ziggo provide
            call termination services each in its own footprint with a market share of
            100% and the Transaction does not thus bring about any horizontal overlap.
            The Commission, therefore, has granted a waiver to the Notifying Parties, in
            relation to the wholesale market for call termination on fixed network.
    (160) The market for call termination on fixed network at wholesale level is also
            vertically related to the retail market for fixed telephony services. In this
            regard, the Commission notes that the markets of wholesale call termination
            services on fixed networks in the Netherlands are subject to ex-ante regulation
            by the ACM. The Commission therefore considers that the Transaction does
            not give rise to serious doubts as to the compatibility with the internal market
            and has granted a waiver to this vertical relation as well.
            5.2.3.    Fixed Internet access at retail level
5.2.3.1. Product market definition
    (161) As regards the retail provision of fixed Internet access services, retail
            operators provide fixed Internet services to end customers.
        The Notifying Party's views in 2014
    (162) The Notifying Party submitted that both Parties' activities should be qualified
            as provision of broadband Internet access and that the nature of access
            services requested by large corporate customers was materially different from
            the services provided to residential and small businesses. The Notifying Party
            also claimed that mobile broadband Internet accessible at retail level via 4G
                                                  30
 ---pagebreak---             technology in the Netherlands exercised at least to a certain extent
            competitive constraint on fixed Internet access services.
       Commission's assessment and conclusion in 2014
   (163) In light of a large majority of responses indicating that the distinction between
            the different infrastructures, that is to say DSL, cable and fibre, was not
            appropriate, the Commission considered that there was no reason to divide the
            relevant market according to those different infrastructures. However, the
            Commission considered that a distinction between the market for mobile
            Internet and the market for fixed broadband Internet was justified. As regards
            the question whether fixed broadband Internet access services to residential
            and small business customers on one hand and large business customers on
            the other should be considered to belong to separate markets, the Commission
            left the question open given that the Transaction did not raise competition
            concerns whether those customer groups were considered together or
            separately.
       The Notifying Parties' views in their Supplementary Notification
   (164) In the Supplement Form CO, the Notifying Parties submit that the relevant
            product market is the market for retail internet access without it being
            necessary to define any hypothetical sub-segments. The Notifying Parties
            indicate that, from a demand-side perspective, the various internet offerings
            with various speeds are clear substitutes. There is also significant supply-side
            substitution in respect of internet offerings with various speeds, as confirmed
            by the ACM. The Notifying Parties submit that because of these demand-side
            and supply-side substitutability considerations, it is neither necessary nor
            appropriate to define separate markets based on download speed. Referring to
            the results of the 2014 market investigation, the Notifying Parties also submit
            that the retail market for fixed internet services should not be segmented
            according to distribution technology (i.e. DSL, cable or fibre) either. The
            Notifying Parties submit that also the question as to whether the market
            should be segmented by customer type can be left open by the Commission.
       Commission's assessment
   (165) The market investigation has confirmed that different technologies (cable,
            fibre, DSL) for the provision of retail fixed internet access are part of the
            same market.64 It has also indicated that mobile and fixed internet access are
            not substitutable65 and that residential business and small business customers
            belong to a separate product market from that for large business customers.66
   (166) The Commission considers therefore that the relevant market for internet
            access at retail level includes all different technologies, while distinctions
64 Replies to Q3 of 5 April 2018 to retailers, question B.D.1.
65 Replies to Q3 of 5 April 2018 to retailers, question B.D.2.
66 Replies to Q3 of 5 April 2018 to retailers, question B.D.3.
                                                        31
 ---pagebreak---               exist between mobile and fixed internet access and between residential
              business and small business customers, on the one hand, and large business
              customers, on the other.
5.2.3.2.           Geographic market definition
    (167) In the 2014 notification, the Notifying Party did not express a view on the
              geographic scope of the relevant market. Based on the results of the market
              investigation, the Commission considered that the relevant market was
              national in scope.
    (168) In the Supplement Form CO, in line with the Commission’s and ACM’s
              previous decision practice, the Notifying Parties consider that the retail
              market for fixed internet access is national in scope.
    (169) Based on the results of the market investigation,67 the Commission takes the
              position that the relevant market is national in scope.
5.2.3.3.           Affected market
    (170) Information provided by the Notifying Parties in the Supplement Form CO
              indicates that VodafoneZiggo holds (as at Q3 2017) a market share of 44% on
              the retail market for Internet access. Therefore the market shall be considered
              an affected market for the purposes of this decision.
              5.2.4.     Fixed Internet access at wholesale level
    (171) In 2015, the ACM issued ex ante regulation requiring KPN to continue to
              provide access to its DSL and fibre-optic networks in the period 2016 - 2019
              (LLU regulation). At the beginning of 2017, the ACM announced that it
              would perform an early revision of its 2015 analysis, given the significant
              change in market conditions following the creation of the joint venture
              VodafoneZiggo. The ACM has issued a draft decision on 27 February 2018,68
              from which it follows that the ACM intends to impose access obligations on
              VodafoneZiggo, in addition to access obligations on KPN. This is the result of
              perceived consumer harm resulting from, in the absence of regulation, the risk
              of joint dominance of KPN and VodafoneZiggo at retail level and the finding
              of joint dominance on the wholesale market including LLU, VULA and
              WBA.
    (172) In the Conditional Clearance Decision, the Commission did not assess the
              wholesale market for fixed internet access because neither UPC nor Ziggo
              was active on that market. Only KPN provided regulated access to its copper
              and fiber-optic networks.
67  Replies to Q3 of 5 April 2018 to retailers, question B.D.4.
68  ACM draft decision of 27 February 2018, Market analysis Wholesale Fixed Access, Annex E Analysis
    of the retail market for (bundled) internet access, paragraphs 1048-1056.
                                                          32
 ---pagebreak---     (173) Today, VodafoneZiggo is still not providing wholesale access to its cable
            networks. Up to today, only KPN has been regulated to provide wholesale
            fixed internet access.
    (174) The ACM finds in its draft decision of 27 February 2018, that there is a single
            wholesale market for access to copper, fiber-optic and cable networks in
            which KPN and VodafoneZiggo are both players. According to the ACM, a
            broader market definition is justified on the basis of technological
            developments, as physical unbundled access becomes less attractive and
            alternative providers opt for access to a higher level in the network. In the
            ACM's view, for comparable types of access, VodafoneZiggo’s cable network
            is increasingly becoming a good alternative for offering services to end-users.
    (175) The ACM has already consulted stakeholders on its proposal at national level
            and is analysing stakeholders' contributions.
    (176) For completeness, the Commission, in section 6.6, will assess the impact of
            the Transaction on this potential market.
            5.2.5.    Business communication services
    (177) Business-to-business (B2B) telecommunication services are value added
            corporate services offered by telecommunication providers to corporate
            business customers. Customers of business communication services in the
            Netherlands can be broadly categorised into three main groups: (i) Small
            office/home office (SOHO); (ii) Small and medium-sized enterprises (SME);
            and (iii) Large enterprise customers.
5.2.5.1. Product market definition
    (178) In its 2014 notification, the Notifying Party estimated that the Parties
            combined market share on a national market for business connectivity
            services in the Netherlands would be [10-20]%. As a consequence, there was
            no affected market and those services were not discussed further in the
            Conditional Clearance Decision.
    (179) In the Supplement Form CO, the Notifying Parties recall the Commission’s
            previous practice in relation to telecommunication services provided to
            business customers and argue that voice services provided to corporate clients
            are part of the broader market for business connectivity services.
    (180) As to a possible market segmentation, based on the type of customers, the
            Notifying Parties recall that in Vodafone/Liberty Global/Dutch JV,69 the
            Commission ultimately left the question open, after the market investigation
            had indicated a difference between residential, SME and SoHo customers, on
            the one hand, and large businesses on the other.
    (181) The Commission considers that, for the purposes of assessing the impact of
            the Transaction, the exact definition of the relevant product market may be
69  Commission decision of 03 August 2016, in case M.7978, Vodafone/Liberty Global/Dutch JV.
                                                    33
 ---pagebreak---              left open, as the Transaction does not raise serious doubts as to its
             compatibility with the internal market irrespective of the conclusion on this
             point.
5.2.5.2.         Geographic market definition
    (182) As to the geographic dimension of the market, the Notifying Parties recall that
             in previous cases the Commission found that the relevant market was national,
             if not wider, in scope. They submit that sometimes these services are provided
             cross-border, but that, however, the exact definition of the geographic scope
             of the market may be left open for the purposes of assessing the Transaction.
    (183) The Commission considers that, for the purposes of assessing the impact of
             the Transaction, the exact definition of the relevant geographic market may be
             left open, as the Transaction does not raise serious doubts as to its
             compatibility with the internal market irrespective of the conclusion on this
             point.
5.2.5.3.         Affected market
    (184) In assessing the Transaction in 2014, the Commission found that, based on the
             limited combined market share of the merging parties (less than 11%), there
             was no affected market and these services were thus not further discussed in
             the Conditional Clearance Decision.
    (185) As to the present market conditions, in the Supplement Form CO, the
             Notifying Parties note that the current, estimated market share of
             VodafoneZiggo is approximately 27.4%, which would then lead to an affected
             market.
    (186) In this respect, however, the Notifying Parties submit that VodafoneZiggo has
             achieved the current market share as a consequence of the combination with
             Vodafone, which held a market share of 10%-15% (such combination and the
             related impact of competition was assessed by the Commission in the
             Vodafone/Liberty Global/Dutch JV decision).
    (187) The Commission, therefore, considers that such growth in market share is
             non-merger specific.70
    (188) If the two segments for (i) single business customers (that is, individuals with
             a business subscription), SME and SoHo, and (ii) large businesses are
             considered, VodafoneZiggo has market shares of [10-20]% and [5-10]%
             respectively (excluding mobile services that the Notifying Parties indicate
             were added in 2016 and are thus not merger-specific). These, therefore, are
             not affected markets for the purpose of assessing the Transaction.
70  In any event, based on the information provided by the Notifying Parties, the market leader in the
    sector is (by far) KPN, with an estimated market share of 51.7%. Therefore, even considering the
    market shares, the Transaction does not raise serious doubts as to its compatibility with the internal
    market.
                                                       34
 ---pagebreak---             5.2.6.    Carrier services at wholesale level
    (189) The market for carrier services at wholesale level involves the provision of
            transmission capacity on telecommunications infrastructure (typically
            international cable networks) to other telecommunications companies and
            business communications providers.
5.2.6.1. Product market definition
    (190) In the Supplement Form CO, the Notifying Parties submit that, in order to
            operate their services, telecommunications companies such as internet service
            providers and mobile network operators lease transmission capacity on
            telecommunications infrastructure.
    (191) The Notifying Parties further recall that the Commission has previously
            described this market as a market for "the lease of transmission capacity and
            the provision of related services to third party telecommunication traffic
            carriers and service providers." The market investigation in Vodafone/Liberty
            Global/Dutch JV, they also argue, confirmed this product market definition,
            and the Commission therefore concluded that the market for wholesale
            international carrier services comprises the lease of transmission capacity and
            the provision of related services to third party telecommunication traffic
            carriers and service providers.
    (192) For the purposes of the present decision, the Commission considers that the
            exact market definition may be left open, as the Transaction does not raise
            serious doubts as to its compatibility with the internal market irrespective of
            the conclusion on this point.
5.2.6.2.         Geographic market definition
    (193) In the Supplement Form CO, the Notifying Parties argue that the relevant
            market is likely to be global in scope. In Vodafone/Liberty Global/Dutch JV,
            the Commission left open the exact definition of the geographic scope of the
            market. The Commission considers that in this case too, the exact geographic
            scope may be left open, as it will not affect the outcome of the Commission
            assessment.
5.2.6.3.         Affected market
    (194) In the Conditional Clearance Decision, on the basis of the Parties' limited
            market shares, the Commission concluded that there was no affected market
            and therefore did not further discuss the market in its assessment.
    (195) In the Supplement Form CO, the Notifying Parties estimate at USD 47.8
            billion the size of the global market for wholesale carrier services in 2016. In
            such market, VodafoneZiggo has an estimated market share of less than 0.2%.
            The market, therefore, would not be horizontally affected.
    (196) The Notifying Parties also mention a small vertical relationship, created by
            the Vodafone/Liberty Global/Dutch JV transaction, in the upstream market for
            carrier services at wholesale level and, downstream, in the retail mobile and
                                                 35
 ---pagebreak---             business communication services markets. Based on the information provided
            by the Notifying Parties, such vertical relationship leads to an affected market.
    (197) The Commission considers, in this respect, that, because the vertical relation
            between Vodafone and Ziggo is a result of the Vodafone/Liberty
            Global/Dutch JV transaction, such effect is not merger specific.71
      5.3.  Mobile services
    (198) The Parties are also active in the following markets for mobile services in the
            Netherlands:
         i.        Mobile telecommunication services at retail level
        ii.        Call termination on mobile networks at wholesale level
            5.3.1.      Mobile telecommunication services at retail level
    (199) Mobile telecommunication services to end customers, or "retail mobile
            services", encompass services for national and international voice calls, SMS
            (including MMS and other messages), mobile Internet with data services,
            access to content via the mobile network and retail international roaming
            services. Those services are provided on 2G/GSM, 3G/UMTS and 4G/LTE
            networks with the 2G network historically having better coverage and the 3G
            network being better adapted for larger amounts of data and faster download
            speeds. 4G/LTE, the last technology to be launched, is a mobile technology
            which increases the speed and capacity of the network and is adapted for
            improved voice quality and high speed data transmission from wireless
            devices, for example, to stream video, Internet TV and to use broadband
            Internet.
5.3.1.1. Product market definition
         The Notifying Party's views in 2014
    (200) The Notifying Party did not take a view on the exact product market
            definition.
         Commission's assessment and conclusion in 2014
    (201) In its previous decisions, the Commission had assessed the concentrations on
            the basis of a single market for mobile telecommunication services without
            segmenting according to the type of customers, services or network
            technology. In particular, the Commission had not defined separate markets
            for pre-paid and post-paid customers in light of supply-side substitution.
            Therefore, the Commission considered that the exact definition of the product
71  In addition, based on information submitted by the Notifying Parties, the market share of
    VodafoneZiggo has remained modest and there are sufficient alternative suppliers which compete to
    provide wholesale access to downstream retail service providers. Therefore, even considering the
    market specific characteristics and structure, the Transaction would not raise serious doubts as to its
    compatibility with the internal market.
                                                        36
 ---pagebreak---       market could be left open as the Transaction did not raise competition
      concerns, regardless of the precise product market definition retained.
   The Notifying Parties' views in their Supplementary Notification
(202) In the Supplement Form CO, the Notifying Parties agree with the
      Commission’s previous assessment and submit that the relevant product
      market is the overall retail market for mobile telecommunications services.
      The Notifying Parties submit that it is not necessary for the Commission to
      further segment this well-established market, inter alia by reference to
      customer or service type, for the following reasons.
(203) First, with respect to the type of service, usually internet access, data services
      and content access are part of the same retail offering, or are separate
      components alongside voice and text services, which are invoiced or charged
      together in the same way as the other services. Monthly allowances or topped-
      up credit can be used to buy either service. It is therefore not useful or
      practical to distinguish mobile internet from voice and text services for market
      definition purposes;
(204) Second, with respect to the type of customer, there is no logical distinction
      between business and private users. While business customers are generally
      considered to be heavier users of mobile services than private customers, there
      is no significant difference between the types of services provided to both
      groups. Furthermore, business customers regularly use business phones for
      personal calls and private phones for business calls, which blurs the
      distinction between the two categories. In any event, on the supply side, the
      same mobile networks can be used to supply both business and private
      customers;
(205) Third, with respect to the type of tariff, although tariff plans for pre-paid and
      post-paid contracts may be different, customers can switch easily between
      them. Furthermore, the distinction between pre-paid and post-paid tariffs has
      become blurred due to, for example, the ability to automatically top-up and
      predetermined commitments to pay through monthly invoices; and, in post-
      paid, the ability to obtain lower cost “SIM only” contracts which are sold
      without a handset and which are an alternative to pre-paid SIM offers; and
(206) Fourth, with respect to the type of network technology, it is not possible to
      distinguish between services that are provided through different technologies.
      The choice of network technology used for a particular service is simply a
      function of the providing MNO’s preference, although there is generally a
      preference to use 3G and 4G technology for the provision of data services.
      Moreover, all 3G phones have the capacity to support both 2G and 3G
      networks, while 4G phones have the capacity to support all networks.
   Commission's assessment
(207) In the present case, the Commission has not detected any element justifying a
      departure from its previous position that there is an overall market for retail
      mobile telecommunication services. In any event, for the purpose of this case,
      the definition of the relevant product market may be left open.
                                            37
 ---pagebreak--- 5.3.1.2.        Geographic market definition
    (208) The Notifying Party did not take a view on the exact geographic market
            definition.
    (209) The Commission had consistently found that the markets for the retail mobile
            services provided to end consumers were national in scope. Because nothing
            in the course of the investigation justified a deviation from previous findings,
            the Commission considered that the mobile telecommunication services
            market(s) was national in scope.
    (210) In line with previous Commission decisions, in the Supplement Form CO, the
            Notifying Parties submit that the relevant geographic market is national in
            scope. The relevant criteria on which the Commission has based its past
            decisions are also directly relevant to the Netherlands: operating licences for
            mobile services (including spectrum licences) are granted by the Dutch
            government for the territory of the Netherlands and each of the operators
            active on the Dutch market sell, market and price their services on a national
            level.
    (211) The Commission considers that the relevant market is national in scope.
5.3.1.3.        Affected market
    (212) At the time of the Conditional Clearance Decision (and before the completion
            of the Vodafone/Ziggo joint venture), Liberty Global and Ziggo operated as
            MVNOs with very modest market shares, which did not support the
            conclusion that the relevant market was a horizontally affected market.
            Technically, the market for mobile telephony was a vertically affected market
            as Liberty Global and Ziggo held more than 25% market share on the
            upstream market for wholesale call termination services on fixed networks.
            The Commission however granted a waiver in that respect, as there were no
            competitive concerns.
    (213) For the purposes of this re-assessment, the Commission considers this
            reasoning still holds in relation to the retail market for mobile telephony
            services.
            5.3.2.    Call termination on mobile networks at wholesale level
    (214) Call termination is a service provided by operator B to operator A, whereby a
            call originating on operator A’s network is delivered to a user of B’s network.
            This essentially allows users of different networks to communicate with each
            other.
5.3.2.1. Product market definition
    (215) In the Supplement Form CO, the Notifying Parties submit, in line with
            previous Commission decisions, that each network constitutes a separate
            wholesale market for call termination. The Commission shares that view.
                                                 38
 ---pagebreak--- 5.3.2.2.        Geographic market definition
    (216) In line with previous Commission decisions, the Commission considers that
            the relevant market should be considered as national in scope, consistently
            with the extension of the network of each operator.
5.3.2.3.        Affected market
    (217) In the Conditional Clearance Decision, the Commission considered that each
            mobile network constituted a separate market and that therefore there was no
            horizontally affected market. Still, from a vertical perspective, the relevant
            market for wholesale mobile call termination was connected to the retail
            mobile operations of Liberty Global and Ziggo. The Parties had already a
            monopoly on their respective networks and would have, after the Transaction,
            a monopoly on the combined network. The Commission therefore granted a
            waiver in relation to the wholesale market for call termination on mobile
            network, which was no longer discussed in the Conditional Clearance
            Decision.
    (218) As nothing has changed in market conditions since 2014, the Commission
            considers this reasoning still holds and has granted a waiver to the Notifying
            Parties, in relation to the wholesale market for call termination on mobile
            network.
     5.4.   Hypothetical retail market for multi-play and triple play services
    (219) “Multiple play" offerings comprise a bundle of usually three or more of the
            following retail services to end customers: fixed telephony services, mobile
            services, fixed Internet access services and TV services. Such packaged offers
            may consist of so-called "triple play" comprising three services or even
            "quadruple play" comprising all those services.
5.4.1.1. Product market definition
The Notifying Party's views in 2014
    (220) In the 2014 case, the Notifying Party’s view was that multiple play did not
            constitute a separate market.
Commission's assessment and conclusion in 2014
    (221) In its assessment of the case, in 2014, among other things, the Commission
            noted that, based on the results of the market investigation, TV services, along
            with Internet services, were key drivers for multiple play services and there
            was therefore a strong link between the strength of a market participant's TV
            offering (as well as its Internet offering) and its success in the provision of
            multiple play services. Finally, the Commission noted that the Netherlands in
            particular had a high penetration rate of multiple play customers with around
            50% of the market being served through triple play subscriptions. In any
            event, the Commission considered that the exact product market definition
            could be left open since the Transaction did not raise competition concerns
            regardless of whether multiple play services were considered a separate
            market or included in the markets for unbundled offers.
                                                  39
 ---pagebreak---    (222) ACM has also consistently refrained from defining a market for multi-play
             services separate from its components.72 Similarly, in their regulatory
             decisions, ACM and the OPTA have not found that multi-play services
             constitute a separate market.73
        The Notifying Parties' views in the Supplementary Notification
   (223) In this instance, the Notifying Parties submit that there is no separate retail
             market for multi-play services. In particular:
   (224) First, also in light of the absence of pure bundling in the Netherlands, there is
             no indication of any lack of demand-side substitutability between multi-play
             offerings and the separate services which they comprise. Consumers can and
             do switch easily between purchasing their services as part of a multi-play
             offering (whatever the combination may be) or individually (i.e. “unpicking”
             the bundle), depending on their needs. Indeed, the most important reason for
             customers choosing to purchase different products as part of a mixed bundle is
             the reduction in price they achieve compared to purchasing the same products
             separately. Accordingly, from a demand-side perspective, multi-play offerings
             and the individual services they comprise are perfect substitutes.
   (225) Second, there is no indication of any lack of supply-side substitutability, since
             suppliers offering all (or some) the individual services (either using their own
             networks or via wholesale access to other operators’ networks) can start
             offering these services as part of a multi-play offering without incurring extra
             costs. Accordingly, also from a supply-side perspective, multi-play offerings
             and the individual services they comprise are perfect substitutes.
   (226) Third, furthermore, from a practical perspective, given the large number of
             possible permutations of dual-play, triple-play, or quad-play offers that are
             increasingly being sold in the market, it is unclear which package of services
             should be taken as a possible candidate market and which different types of
             bundles are seen by customers as potential substitutes in the event of a price
             rise. For instance, in Vodafone/ONO74 and Vodafone/Kabel Deutschland,75 the
             Commission itself recognised that triple-play offers could combine either
             fixed telephony, fixed internet and TV, or mobile telephony, fixed telephony
72 ACM Decision of 8 December 2006 in case 5796 Cinven/Warburg Pincus/Essent Kabelcour; ACM
   Decision of 22 December 2006 in case 5807 KPN Telecom/Tiscali; ACM Decision of 19 December
   2008 in case 6397 KPN/Reggefiber, para. 45.
73 See e.g. OPTA decision of 17 March 2006, De markten voor de doorgifte en verzorging van omroep
   transmissiediensten —Multikabel, OPTA/BO/2006/200536, para. 284; OPTA decision of 19
   December 2008, Marktanalyse Vaste Telefonie, OPTA/AM/2008/202721, para. 337; OPTA decision
   of     19      December    2008,     Marktanalyse    Breedband,     Wholesale-breedbandtoegang,
   OPTA/AM/2008/202717, para. 270; OPTA decision of 5 March 2009, Analyse van de wholesalemarkt
   voor doorgifte van rtv-signalen via en het op wholesale niveau leveren van de aansluiting op het
   omroeptransmissieplatform van CAIW in het verzorgingsgebied van CAIW, OPTA/AM/2009/200369-
   ), para. 355.
74 Commission decision of 02 July 2014, in case COMP/M.7231, Vodafone/ONO.
75 Commission decision of 20 September 2013, in case COMP/M.6990, Vodafone/Kabel Deutschland.
                                                    40
 ---pagebreak---             and fixed internet. Similarly, in Orange/Jazztel,76 the Commission considered
            that if multi-play services were to be regarded as a market separate from their
            components, there are five possible markets for multi-play services: (i) a
            general market for all multi-play services, (ii) separate markets for dual play
            services, (iii) triple-play services, (iv) quad-play services, and (v) a market
            combining triple and quad-play services. This is not yet possible considering
            the different combinations for each of the dual play, triple-play and quad play
            packages, nor are there any possible combinations with products such as
            Premium Pay TV.
   (227) The Notifying Parties further argument that, in any event, even if the
            Commission were to define a market for multi-play services separate from the
            markets for unbundled offers, such a market would not include undiscounted
            joint purchasing. Adopting the approach of the Commission in Liberty
            Global/Base,77 undiscounted joint purchasing should be excluded from the
            notion of multi-play services and should not be considered as a bundle in the
            sense of the Non-Horizontal Merger Guidelines. This is because if a customer
            does not benefit from purchasing components jointly, it is likely to switch to
            purchasing these components separately as a result of a small but permanent
            increase in the price of the joint offer.
   (228) What ultimately matters, the Notifying Parties argue, is to take account of the
            competitive dynamics pre- and post-merger in the areas where the activities of
            the Parties overlap. In any event, even if one were to assume the existence of
            a hypothetical multi-play retail market, which is separate from its individual
            services, no competition concerns have arisen and would arise. As such,
            according to the Notifying Parties, the exact definition of the relevant product
            market can be left open.
       Commission's assessment
   (229) The market investigation does not appear to support the conclusion that a
            separate market for multi-play services exist.78 Some respondents have
            highlighted the increasing penetration of bundled offers in the Netherlands
            and the competitive strength that such bundle have in attracting consumers
            and in providing them with discounted mobile services offers. It was noted, at
            the same time, that the transition to this new business model is by no means
            completed and that consumer still have and exercise the option to buy
            unbundled services.
   (230) For such reasons, the Commission considers that the question whether
            separate product markets for multi-play or bundled services exist may be left
            open for the purposes of this decision.
76 Commission decision of 19 May 2015, in case COMP/M.7421, Orange/Jazztel.
77 Commission decision of 04 February 2016, in case COMP/M.7637, Liberty Global/Base Belgium.
78 Replies to Q3 of 5 April 2018 to retailers, questions B.E.7 and B.E.7.1.
                                                        41
 ---pagebreak--- 5.4.1.2.        Geographic market definition
    (231) In the 2014 notification, the Notifying Party did not take view as to the
            definition of the geographic market for multiple play offers. Respondents to
            the market investigation mostly considered that the hypothetical market for
            multiple play services would be national in scope. Therefore, the Commission
            considered that the geographic scope of the possible market for multiple play
            offers is national.
    (232) The market investigation does not appear to support the conclusion that a
            separate market for multi-play or bundled offers exist. In any event,
            respondents pointed out that bundles display their competitive effects on a
            national basis.
5.4.1.3.        Affected market
    (233) In the Conditional Clearance Decision, the Commission assessed the retail
            markets (that is, those for the supply of TV services, fixed telephony, Internet
            access and multiple play services) jointly. In this respect, the Commission
            noted that retail services (such as those provided in the hypothetical market
            for multiple play services) were only provided in Liberty Global's and Ziggo's
            respective footprints in the Netherlands, with no overlap or possibility for
            direct customer switching. In addition, indirect competitive pressure that
            would be removed as a result of the Transaction, would only cause a
            significant impediment to effective competition if it was particularly strong.
            The Commission also excluded other potential anticompetitive effects.
    (234) Information submitted by the Notifying Parties in the Supplement Form CO
            shows that the market share of VodafoneZiggo has been decreasing since
            2014. Nonetheless, VodafoneZiggo still holds a market share of 52.4% in the
            market for fixed triple-play subscriptions. Therefore, the hypothetical market
            for multi-play services shall be considered an affected market.
6.      COMPETITIVE ASSESSMENT
Introduction
    (235) Based on the analysis of the information and the market shares submitted by
            the Notifying Parties in the Supplement Form CO, the Commission considers
            that the following are the relevant product markets which are horizontally
            and/or vertically affected, as a consequence of the Transaction.
        (a)     Licensing and acquisition of broadcasting rights for movies and series
                content for non-linear distribution (and when segmented further into
                SVOD and TVOD);
        (b)     Markets for the supply and acquisition of Basic Pay TV channels,
                Premium Pay TV film channels and Premium Pay TV sports channels;
        (c)     Retail market for the provision of Pay TV services;
        (d)     Retail market for fixed telephony services;
                                                 42
 ---pagebreak---         (e)     Retail market for fixed Internet access;
        (f)     Hypothetical retail market for multi-play and triple-play services;
                Television services
6.1. Licensing and acquisition of broadcasting rights for TV content
    (236) In 2014, there was a horizontal overlap between the activities of Liberty
            Global and Ziggo on the acquisition side of the market for licensing and
            acquisition of broadcasting rights for individual audio visual TV content in
            the Netherlands.
    (237) Liberty Global owned the Premium Pay TV film channel Film1 and the
            Premium Pay TV sports channel Sport1 and Ziggo owned the Premium Pay
            TV film channel HBO NL jointly with HBO, Inc.
    (238) Today, after the divestiture of Film1 and the dissolution of the HBO NL joint
            venture, VodafoneZiggo is no longer active in the purchasing of film content
            for linear distribution. It does, however, acquire content for the purpose of its
            downstream activities in the fields of VOD services (called Movies & Series)
            and Premium Pay TV sports offerings.
6.1.1. The Notifying Party's views in 2014
    (239) In 2014, the Notifying Party submitted that the merged entity would have a
            market share of [5-10]% in the overall market for the acquisition of all
            individual audio visual TV content, if the geographic market is limited to the
            Netherlands.
    (240) On the possible market for the acquisition of non-linear audio visual TV
            content only, Liberty Global and Ziggo would have a combined market share
            of around [20-30]%. The Notifying Party also submitted that if this product
            market were to be segmented further between non-linear SVOD and non-
            linear TVOD services, the merged entity’s market share might exceed 20% on
            the segments of non-linear TVOD services. The Notifying Party was not able
            to provide the market share of the merged entity on the segment of non-linear
            SVOD services. Within the possible market segments for the acquisition of
            first Pay TV window and second Pay TV window film TV content, the
            merged entity would have a combined market share of 100% in both
            segments.
    (241) The Notifying Party first submitted that the merged entity would not have
            increased buyer power vis-à-vis the suppliers of premium audio visual
            content, major producers operating on a global scale. Moreover, it also
            submitted that there were a number of OTT VOD services providers in the
            Netherlands that competed for the purchase of broadcasting rights for the first
            Pay TV window and second Pay TV window as well as for TVOD.
    (242) In addition, the Notifying Party argued, TVOD services often provided access
            to both films and TV series on a non-exclusive basis prior to the first and
                                                 43
 ---pagebreak---           second Pay TV exhibition windows thus facilitating the access of consumers
          to films and TV series and reducing the importance of first Pay TV window.
          Finally, the Notifying Party stated that content right owners had a significant
          freedom in negotiating the level of exclusivity of their broadcasting rights for
          the different windows with different buyers, which further made the
          distinction between them unclear.
6.1.2. Commission's assessment in 2014
    (243) The Commission noted that the increase post-Transaction would be very
          limited in the overall market for the acquisition of individual content, while it
          would be more significant in a number of possible narrower segments (first
          Pay TV window; non-linear broadcasting rights (VOD) and, in particular,
          TVOD rights). According to the Commission, this could have led to two
          potential negative effects on competition: (i) the merged entity might have an
          incentive to buy less audio visual content in order to obtain lower prices
          (ultimately resulting in consumer harm in the form of less choice and
          diversity) and; (ii) it could also have demanded stricter conditions for example
          over more content in order to limit the availability of premium content for its
          rivals in the downstream markets for the wholesale supply and acquisition of
          Pay TV channels and the retail provision of Pay TV services.
    (244) The market investigation carried out in 2014 revealed that the majority of TV
          services retailers who replied to the Commission's market investigation were
          concerned that the Transaction could harm their position on the market. This
          could have happened because either the merged entity would have been able
          to negotiate more favourable price conditions from content owners and these
          would have charged higher prices to the other players in the market, in order
          to recoup any decrease in revenue or because the content owners would have
          had an incentive to deal exclusively with the merged entity, through which a
          substantial portion of potential viewers could be reached. The market
          investigation also showed that the majority of content owners who replied to
          the Commission's market investigation did not consider that the merged entity
          would have an incentive to acquire less content post-merger.
    (245) The Commission noted that most of the licensors of premium content were
          large Hollywood film studios whose negotiating position vis-à-vis the merged
          entity was unlikely to deteriorate as a result of the Transaction. As for Dutch-
          language content, the market investigation carried out in 2014 revealed that
          some respondents considered that the ability to offer Dutch-language content
          to the local audience was an important advantage in terms of product
          differentiation. However, other respondents expressed the view that even
          though Dutch content was undoubtedly important, United States Hollywood
          film content was even more important.
6.1.3. Commission's conclusion in 2014
    (246) The Commission held that it did not need to reach a conclusion on whether
          the Transaction would have been likely to impede effective competition on
          the market for the acquisition of Dutch-language content or on the markets for
          the acquisition of individual audio visual content for first and second Pay TV
          windows. Indeed, the remedies proposed by the Notifying Party would
          eliminate also the possible anti-competitive effects on these markets.
                                                44
 ---pagebreak---     (247) As for VOD content the Commission held that the merged entity was unlikely
          to purchase less VOD content. In addition, the Commission considered also a
          further segmentation of the market into a market for TVOD and SVOD
          windows and held that TVOD deals were in general concluded on a non-
          exclusive basis to retailers and that there was no reason why this could change
          post-Transaction. With reference to SVOD rights, which could also be
          negotiated exclusively, the Commission held that the Transaction would not
          change the pre-merger situation. It concluded that the Transaction would not
          have led to a significant impediment to effective competition on the possible
          markets for acquisition of VOD, be it SVOD or TVOD and that in any event
          the commitments proposed by the Notifying Party would in any event remove
          also any increment added by the Transaction to the possible market for
          acquisition of SVOD rights.
6.1.4. The Notifying Parties' views in their Supplementary Notification
    (248) The Notifying Parties submit that the overall market for the acquisition of all
          individual audio visual TV content would not be affected as Liberty Global's
          and Ziggo's combined acquisition expenditure for individual TV content in
          2017 would amount to a combined market share of [5-10]% if the geographic
          market is limited to the Netherlands.
    (249) The Notifying Parties have been unable to collect reliable estimates for the
          sizes of the various possible separate relevant product markets involving TV
          content that were previously identified by the Commission. However, on the
          possible market for the acquisition of non-linear audio visual TV content only,
          Liberty Global's and Ziggo's combined expenditure for VOD content rights in
          2017 would give them a combined market share of around [5-10]% in the
          Netherlands. The Notifying Parties estimate that the market shares for the
          merged entity on the segment of non-linear SVOD is less than 20%, while the
          market share for non-linear TVOD services might exceed 20%.
    (250) The Notifying Parties submit that since 2016, VodafoneZiggo has ceased to
          acquire individual content for first Pay-TV window and second Pay-TV
          window, inter alia, as a result of the divestment of Film1 and the termination
          of HBO NL, VodafoneZiggo is thus no longer active on the potential market
          segments for the acquisition of individual linear content for first Pay-TV
          window and second Pay-TV window.
    (251) With reference to the acquisition of sports rights, the Notifying Parties were
          not able to provide actual information on the size of the market for the
          acquisition of sports content rights. However, it provides figures according to
          which the total of sport content spend by VodafoneZiggo has increased from
          EUR [...] in 2014 to EUR [...] in 2017. Moreover, VodafoneZiggo's market
          share based on spending on sports content increased from [5-10]% in 2014 to
          [10-20]% in 2017.
    (252) According to the Notifying Parties, following the divestment of Film1, none
          of the possible segments within the market for the acquisition of individual
          content can be considered affected for the purpose of the reassessment of the
          Transaction. Moreover, the Notifying Parties submit that the market presence
          of OTT players increased since 2014 and they are actually concluding
          exclusive deals for first Pay-TV window. The proliferation of OTT players
                                                45
 ---pagebreak---              (such as Netflix and Amazon, both of which have vast budgets) has led to
             rapidly increasing demand for quality content and reduced buyer power of the
             traditional market players, including VodafoneZiggo.
    (253) The Notifying Parties also submit that their content acquisition activities are
             significantly reduced since 2014 and they are mainly focused on linear sports
             rights and non-linear movies/series content for VOD distribution.
             Furthermore, the Transaction has not led to any increase in buyer power in
             relation to sports content given the lack of horizontal overlap.
    (254) With respect to the acquisition of broadcasting rights for movies and series for
             TVOD distribution, the Notifying Parties emphasise that this hypothetical
             market segment is rather competitive and is characterised by a wide variety of
             different types of players. Market players, in fact, include Pathé Thuis,
             iTunes, Amazon Prime, KPN, T-Mobile, M7 and Tele2. It must also be noted,
             the Notifying Parties argue, that broadcasters offer TVOD OTT services via
             their websites (such as RTL XL) and may therefore allocate some of their
             content acquisition costs to their TVOD services. The Notifying Parties
             finally indicate that they have no reliable estimates available on the individual
             TVOD spend of these players.
    (255) Finally, the Notifying Parties submit that there are contractual limitations
             preventing issues arising due to exclusive content use. According to the
             Notifying Parties, the practice of granting exclusive licensing has not changed
             but more third party bidders have become active and this means that
             competition for these licence windows has increased over the past years.
6.1.5. Commission's assessment
    (256) In response to the market investigation, a number of broadcasters and retail
             TV distributors indicated that the merged entity is in a better position to buy
             content due to the Transaction and that this bargaining position negatively
             affects smaller providers. 79,80
    (257) On the other hand, the majority of content owners who replied to the market
             investigation do not consider that the merged entity will be in a better
             bargaining position post-Transaction81 and, in general, they did not see the
             Transaction as problematic.82
    (258) Furthermore, the Commission notes that most of the licensors of premium
             content, which is the only content using first and second Pay TV windows, are
             large Hollywood film studios whose negotiating position vis-à-vis the merged
             entity is unlikely to deteriorate as a result of the Transaction.
79  Replies to Q2 to TV channel suppliers of 5 April 2018, questions D.1.1 and D.2.1.1.
80  Replies to Q3 to retail Pay TV providers of 5 April 2018, question D.2.1.1.
81  Replies to Q1 to content providers of 5 April 2018, question B.A.12.
82  Replies to Q1 to content providers of 5 April 2018, question C1.
                                                        46
 ---pagebreak---     (259) With reference to sports rights, the Commission observes that these rights
             come up for tender regularly and that the merged entity faces effective
             competition from a large number of TV channels as well as from major OTT
             operators, such as Amazon and Facebook (the Notifying Parties provide
             evidence of recent bids for sports rights).83
    (260) Moreover, the increase in spending in sports content does not appear to be
             linked to the fact that the Transaction allowed the merged entity to spread the
             investment costs to acquire content over a larger customer base. Indeed, pre-
             Transaction, Ziggo already distributed Liberty Global's Sport1 channel to its
             subscribers. When bidding to acquire content for its Sport1 channel, Liberty
             Global must therefore already have taken into account the value it could
             extract from selling the channel to Ziggo. The Transaction would therefore
             not have led to any change in that respect (apart from the elimination of
             double-marginalisation). Given the different geographic footprints of Liberty
             Global and Ziggo it is easy to understand that Liberty Global had pre-
             Transaction every incentive to provide its Sport1 channel to Ziggo.
    (261) With respect to the acquisition of movies and series for TVOD distribution,
             the Commission considers that the segment is highly competitive84, also in
             consideration of the entry of new players in the market.
6.1.6. Overall conclusion
    (262) In light of the above, the Commission concludes that the Transaction does not
             raise serious doubts as to its compatibility with the internal market as regards
             the market for licensing and acquisition of broadcasting rights for TV content
             in the Netherlands.
6.2. Market for the supply and acquisition of Premium Pay TV film channels
     (supply side)
6.2.1. The Notifying Party's views in 2014
    (263) Horizontal non-coordinated effects. The Notifying Party acknowledged at
             the outset that if a separate product market for the supply and acquisition of
             Premium Pay TV film channels were to exist, the Transaction would combine
             the only two TV channels in this category in the Netherlands, namely Film1
             and HBO Nederland.
    (264) According to the Notifying Party, however, the two channels represented
             complementary, rather than competing entertainment offers, given that they
             had a different focus. Moreover, the Notifying Party submitted that Premium
             Pay TV film channels were competitively constrained by the growing number
             of SVOD and TVOD offerings, including Internet-based OTT services. In
             addition, the availability of wholesale offers for non-linear content would
             have rendered it relatively easy for providers of retail TV services to introduce
83  Supplement Form CO, paragraph 242.
84  There is a significant number of small and large players active in this market, such as Apple, Pathé
    Thuis, YouTube, or Google Play as well as several Dutch providers of retail Pay TV services.
                                                      47
 ---pagebreak---       or continue to expand their own VOD offerings, thus increasing the
      competitive constraint exerted on Film1 and HBO Nederland.
(265) The Notifying Party also submitted that Film1 and HBO Nederland constitute
      recent services, with a relatively low penetration rate with Dutch households.
      For this reason, the two TV channels would have an interest in not raising
      price, thereby aiming at generating additional profits by increasing subscriber
      numbers. Moreover, according to the Notifying Party, there is a large degree
      of price sensitivity for Premium Pay TV channels.
(266) In addition, the Notifying Party considered that the Transaction would not in
      any way influence that situation, suggesting that HBO Nederland had at most
      a limited effect on Film1 subscribers. The Notifying Party therefore
      contended that if post-merger, it could simultaneously raise both Film1 and
      HBO Nederland prices, the resulting decline in the Film1 and HBO Nederland
      subscriber base would not have been less significant than the decline that
      would have resulted, pre-Transaction, from an individual price increase for
      Film1.
(267) To conclude, the Notifying Party argued that the Transaction would not have
      given rise to either the ability or the incentive to increase the prices of either
      Film1 or HBO Nederland, which the Notifying Party claimed would have
      been unlikely due to the expected continuation of the HBO joint venture.
(268) Foreclosure effects. The Notifying Party submitted that Film1was neither a
      TV channel with significant market power, nor an important "must-have" TV
      channel. Moreover, in the case of HBO Nederland, the merged entity noted
      that it did not enjoy unilateral control, but only had joint control of the
      company and, as such, was unable to restrict the supply to its downstream
      rivals.
(269) As regards incentives to foreclose, the Notifying Party submitted that this
      would be both commercially unattractive and inconsistent with those
      channels’ business strategies of enhancing overall viewership and market
      penetration. As regards HBO Nederland, the Notifying Party highlighted that
      even if a foreclosure strategy were theoretically attractive to the merged
      entity, would likely to be vetoed by Time Warner/HBO and could thus be
      disregarded. At the Commission's request, the Notifying Party performed a
      margin analysis for a merged entity strategy of complete foreclosure of Film 1
      and/or HBO Nederland from rival platforms. According to the calculation of
      the Notifying Party, the critical level of switching that is required for such a
      foreclosure to be profitable is too high, and therefore, it is unlikely that this
      could be a commercially attractive option for the merged entity. As regards a
      scenario of ‘partial’ foreclosure, in which the merged entity continues to offer
      the retained Premium Pay TV channel to competitors but on worse terms, the
      Notifying Party submitted that competing TV platform operators have the
      option to continue offering the other Premium Pay TV channel as well as the
      presence of the premium OTT SVOD alternatives.
(270) As regards the overall competitive effect on competition, the Notifying Party
      contended that even if it were the case that the merged entity foreclosed for
      example KPN with respect to Film1, no anti-competitive effect could
      reasonably be envisaged. The Notifying Party did not regard Film1 channel as
                                            48
 ---pagebreak---           having "must-have" content whose absence could prevent an operator from
          competing effectively.
6.2.2. Commission's assessment in 2014
    (271) Horizontal non-coordinated effects. The Commission first noted that the
          Transaction would have combined the only two linear Premium Pay TV film
          channels (Film1 and HBO Nederland) that are present in the Netherlands. As
          a result of the merger, retail providers of Pay TV services would have no
          possibility of switching supplier for those services in that market, making
          them particularly vulnerable to price increases. Indeed, the merger would have
          likely resulted in higher wholesale prices for the retail providers of Pay TV
          services and this would have, in turn, likely resulted in higher subscription
          fees for subscribers of Premium Pay TV services in the Netherlands.
    (272) The Commission then analysed the relationship between HBO and Film1,
          concluding that the two were substitutes, and not complements, pre-
          Transaction. According to the Commission, although both Premium Pay TV
          film channels were offering inherently largely complementary content, due to
          their generally exclusive distribution models, significant competitive pressure
          seemed to be exerted between them. Moreover, with reference to the potential
          competitive pressure exerted by providers of SVOD services such as Netflix,
          RTL's Videoland and Pathé Thuis on Film1 and HBO Nederland, the
          Commission concluded that Film1 and HBO Nederland constitute the only
          two linear Premium Pay TV film channels in the Netherlands which, as
          opposed to for instance Netflix, are only available as part of or an add-on to a
          retail TV services provider's Pay TV subscription. The Commission also
          noted that linear and non-linear Pay TV services are not fully substitutable. To
          conclude, the Commission expressed the view that OTT SVOD services were
          still nascent in the Netherlands and, therefore, it was not clear to what extent
          they could constrain post-merger price increases.
    (273) With reference to the broader market for the wholesale supply of Premium
          Pay TV channels, the Commission noted that the Transaction would have
          brought together three out of the four Premium Pay TV channels in the
          Netherlands. However, the Commission considered that, in light of the
          competitive situation in the market for the wholesale supply of Premium Pay
          TV film channels, the conclusions reached with regard to the latter applied
          equally to the broader Premium Pay TV channels market.
    (274) Foreclosure effects. As regards the ability to engage in complete or partial
          foreclosure, the starting point of the Commission's analysis was the fact that
          the merged entity would control the only two linear Premium Pay TV film
          channels in the Netherlands. Accordingly, the Commission considered that the
          merged entity would hold a significant degree of market power in the relevant
          upstream market (in effect, it arguably had the ability to prevent competitors
          from being able to provide any Premium Pay TV film channels).
    (275) In terms of incentive, the Commission considered that there was more
          incentive to foreclose Film1 (over which the merged entity had sole control)
          than HBO given that the other controlling shareholder of the HBO Nederland
          joint venture, Time Warner/HBO, would advocate for the widest possible
                                               49
 ---pagebreak---           distribution of its TV channels and would get no direct benefit from additional
          retail Pay TV subscribers to the merged entity.
    (276) The Commission considered that the Transaction would increase the
          profitability of any foreclosure of Liberty Global's Film1 Premium Pay TV
          film channel due to the increase in the downstream footprint. The
          Commission assessed the margin analysis carried out by the Notifying Party
          and established that the critical level of switching was much lower than
          submitted by the Notifying Party. Therefore, the Commission considered that
          the margin analysis supported the finding of a likely financial incentive to
          foreclose Film1.
6.2.3. Commission's assessment and conclusion in 2014
    (277) Horizontal non-coordinated effects. The Commission concluded that the
          Transaction as originally notified was unlikely to be compatible with the
          internal market in that it was likely to create a significant impediment to
          effective competition in the possible market for the wholesale supply and
          acquisition of Premium Pay TV film channels in the Netherlands as well as in
          any broader market for the wholesale supply and acquisition of Premium Pay
          TV channels in the Netherlands.
    (278) Foreclosure effects. The Commission concluded that the Transaction as
          originally notified was likely to create a significant impediment to effective
          competition in the upstream market for the wholesale supply and acquisition
          of Premium Pay TV (film) channels on the one hand, and the downstream
          markets for the retail supply of Pay TV services which would also form part
          of the possible market for the retail supply of multiple play services in the
          Netherlands on the other hand.
Film1 Commitment
    (279) In order to maintain effective competition in relation to Premium Pay TV film
          channels in the Netherlands, the Notifying Party committed to divest, or
          procure the divestiture of the Film1 Divestment Business, by the end of the
          Trustee Divestiture Period, as a going concern to a purchaser and on terms of
          sale approved by the Commission.
    (280) To carry out the divestiture, the Notifying Party committed to find a purchaser
          and to enter into a final binding sale and purchase agreement for the sale of
          the Film1 Divestment Business within the First Divestiture Period.
    (281) The Notifying Party also committed to exercise reasonable efforts to ensure
          that the Film1 business would be remain viable in the future, e.g. by entering
          into a [...]year carriage agreement for the distribution of Film1 on the merged
          entity’s Pay TV platform in the Netherlands on reasonable commercial
          conditions or by transferring to the Purchaser all current Film1 main exclusive
          content licence agreements.
    (282) In order to maintain the structural effect of the Commitments, the Notifying
          Party shall, for a period of 10 years after the Effective Date, not acquire,
          whether directly or indirectly, the possibility of exercising influence, as
          defined in paragraph 43 of the Remedies Notice, over the whole or part of the
                                               50
 ---pagebreak---           Film1 Divestment Business, unless, following the submission of a reasoned
          request from the Notifying Party showing good cause and accompanied by a
          report from the Monitoring Trustee, the Commission finds that the structure of
          the market has changed to such an extent that the absence of influence over
          the Film1 Divestment Business is no longer necessary to render the proposed
          concentration compatible with the internal market.
    (283) The Commission considered that the Final Commitments contained all
          necessary safeguards to ensure the successful transfer of the Film1
          Divestment Business to a suitable purchaser.
    (284) The Commission considered that the Film1 Divestiture Commitment was
          suitable and sufficient to remove the competition concerns expressed. The
          Commission also concluded that it could be implemented effectively within a
          short time period.
6.2.4. The Notifying Parties' views in their Supplementary Notification
    (285) Key developments. The Notifying Parties explain the key developments that
          have taken place in the Premium Pay TV film channel segment since the
          Conditional Clearance Decision.
    (286) Pursuant to the Conditional Clearance Decision, Film1 was divested to Sony
          in March 2015. The Notifying Parties consider that Film1 continues to
          compete as a Premium Pay TV film channel. Further, they note that this
          segment only includes the offers from Film1 since HBO is no longer offered
          as a Premium Pay TV channel.
    (287) The HBO Nederland ("HBO NL") joint venture was terminated in December
          2016. In 2017, VodafoneZiggo replaced its VOD service My Prime with the
          rebranded VOD service Movies & Series which contains some of the former
          HBO NL content. There are three different Movies & Series packages
          available. Movies & Series contains all SVOD content, except the exclusive
          HBO content, and is included in certain triple-play packages or available as
          paid subscription add-on. Movies & Series L includes all SVOD content,
          including the HBO content and is available as free-add on for quad-play
          customers only. Movies & Series XL additionally includes 50 linear TV
          channels and is included in a high-tier triple-play package or available as paid
          subscription add-on.
    (288) Horizontal non-coordinated effects. The Parties argue that, following the
          divestment of Film1 in the context of the Transaction notified in 2014 and the
          winding up of the HBO NL joint venture, VodafoneZiggo is no longer active
          on the market for Premium Pay TV film channels. Therefore, any pre-merger
          overlap in relation to Premium Pay TV film channels has been removed.
    (289) Foreclosure effects. The Parties argue that, following the divestment of
          Film1 in the context of the Transaction notified in 2014 and the winding up of
          the HBO NL joint venture, VodafoneZiggo is no longer active on the market
          for Premium Pay TV film channels. Therefore, any pre-merger vertical
          concerns in relation to Premium Pay TV film channels have been removed.
                                               51
 ---pagebreak--- 6.2.5. Commission's assessment
    (290) Horizontal non-coordinated effects. According to the Horizontal Merger
            Guidelines, "increased market power" means the ability of one or more firms
            to profitably increase prices, reduce output, choice or quality of goods and
            services, diminish innovation, or otherwise influence parameters of
            competition.85 The Horizontal Merger Guidelines state, that in assessing the
            competitive effects of the merger, the Commission shall compare the
            competitive conditions that would result from the merger with the conditions
            that would have prevailed without the merger.86
    (291) In this regard, the Commission considers that, following the divestment of
            Film1 in the context of the Transaction notified in 2014 and the winding up of
            the HBO NL joint venture, any overlap in relation to Premium Pay TV film
            channels has been removed. Therefore, the Transaction does no longer have
            an effect on the competitive conditions.
    (292) In order to maintain the structural effect of the Film1 divestment, the
            Notifying Parties have re-committed not to acquire Film1 for the remaining
            period of the 10 years after the Effective Date. Film1 was divested to Sony in
            March 2015. The Notifying Party's Film1 non-acquisition commitment in the
            Final Commitments ensures that the divestiture of Film1 remains in effect
            until 11 October 2024 (see section 7.3).
    (293) Foreclosure effects. During the pre-notification phase and the market
            investigation87, competitors of the Parties in the market for retail TV services
            raised the concern that the merged entity foreclosed competing providers of
            retail TV services by withholding access to the HBO content which was
            formerly broadcast on the HBO NL linear Pay TV channels and is now
            available to the merged entity's customers with access to Movies & Series
            only. They claim that HBO produces very important content, such as the
            popular series "Game of Thrones".
    (294) First of all, the Commission investigated the reasons for the termination of the
            HBO NL joint venture and the subsequent exclusive licensing agreement
            between HBO Inc. and VodafoneZiggo. At the request of the Commission, the
            Notifying Parties provided a detailed description of the chain of events that
            have led to the termination of the HBO NL joint venture and the inclusion of
            the HBO content in the merged entity's VOD service Movies & Series.88
85  Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers under the Council Regulation on the control of
    concentrations between undertakings (OJ C 31, 05.02.2004, p.5), (the "Horizontal Merger
    Guidelines"), paragraph 8.
86  Horizontal Merger Guidelines, paragraph 9.
87  Replies to Q3 to retailers of 5 April 2018, question A.3 and C.D.7.2; Submission of T-Mobile
    Netherlands dated 15 May 2018.
88  Supplement Form CO, p. 34 ff.
                                                    52
 ---pagebreak---        (a)     The HBO NL joint venture was not economically viable. In fact, HBO NL
               was loss-making; in the financial year 2014 for instance losses amounted
               to approx. EUR [...]. In that light, HBO Inc. and NewZiggo contemplated
               to end their joint venture.
       (b)     Subsequently, the change of control over Ziggo as a result of the
               acquisition of Ziggo by Liberty Global gave HBO Inc. the option to
               exercise its put option contained in the joint venture agreement.
       (c)     HBO Inc. contemplated exercising its put option and withdrawing from
               the joint venture by requiring NewZiggo to purchase its interests. In the
               event of such termination, Liberty Global would have had to pay at least
               EUR [...] (equivalent to HBO's initial capital contribution) to HBO Inc. in
               accordance with the agreement and as a direct result of their acquisition of
               Ziggo. In addition, it would have to take over the liabilities, debt and
               obligations of the joint venture; the total cost of which was estimated to
               amount to at least EUR [...].
       (d)     Meanwhile, HBO NL continued to be loss making (in financial year 2015
               losses still amounted to approx. EUR [...] and in financial year 2016 losses
               amounted to approx. EUR [...]).
       (e)     The acquisition of the additional Hollywood studio first-pay movies at
               significant cost had resulted in a relatively high subscription fee for the
               linear HBO channel. The linear channel also required programming and
               editorial work and was labour intensive.
       (f)     In that light, NewZiggo considered its options to better monetise HBO
               content and HBO Inc. and NewZiggo decided to negotiate a settlement of
               the termination of the joint venture. Subsequently HBO Inc. and
               NewZiggo negotiated a separate contract on the exclusive rights to HBO
               content bilaterally, which resulted in the current agreement for the
               exclusive rights to HBO content.
       (g)     NewZiggo's rationale for seeking and agreeing a licence agreement with
               HBO after the termination of the joint venture was that it considered that
               including the HBO content in its SVOD service Movies &Series offerings
               would be a commercially viable alternative.
       (h)     [...].
       (i)     Consequently, the linear HBO NL Pay TV channels were terminated in
               December 2016 and some of the HBO content was subsequently broadcast
               on the merged entity's SVOD platform Movies & Series starting in 2017.
   (295) The presented reasoning is consistent with the merged entity's internal
            documents.89
89 Reply to RFI 1, questions 1 and 2, e.g. Annex B.87.
                                                       53
 ---pagebreak---    (296) In light of this reasoning, the termination of the HBO NL joint venture was
             linked to the Transaction as the change in ownership of Ziggo gave HBO Inc.
             the possibility to exercise its put option which led to the negotiation of the
             settlement agreement and the subsequent exclusive licensing agreement. The
             Commission found that the merged entity had the merger-specific opportunity
             to stop the distribution of the linear HBO NL Pay TV channels and to include
             some of the HBO content in its SVOD platform Movies & Series.
   (297) The Commission investigated whether the termination of the HBO NL linear
             Pay TV channels as well as the withholding of the VOD service Movies &
             Series, which includes some of the HBO content, prevents downstream
             competitors from effectively competing in the market for retail Pay TV
             services.
   (298) With regard to the HBO NL Pay TV channels, the Commission notes that it is
             no longer available in the Dutch Pay TV market, neither to VodafoneZiggo's
             own customers nor to customers of competing retail TV providers. Therefore,
             the merged entity is indeed no longer active in the supply of Premium Pay TV
             film channels.90
   (299) With regard to the SVOD service Movies & Series, the Commission notes
             that some of the former content of the HBO NL Pay TV channels is made
             available exclusively to a part of the merged entity's own downstream
             subscriber base.
   (300) For the withholding of the SVOD service Movies & Series to translate into an
             ability to foreclose competitors from the downstream market, the merged
             entity must have a significant degree of market power in the upstream market.
             It is only in those circumstances that the merged entity can be expected to
             have a significant influence on the conditions of competition in the upstream
             market and thus, possibly, on prices and supply conditions in the downstream
             market.91 In this respect, the Commission concluded that Movies & Series is
             not a sufficiently important input to foreclose downstream competitors for the
             following reasons.
   (301) First, the VOD market in the Netherlands is not concentrated. There are many
             different providers of VOD services active in the Netherlands, including both
             national players, such as public and commercial Dutch broadcasters,
             European players, such as Pathé Thuis, as well as international players, such
             as Apple.92 The market share estimates provided by the Notifying Parties
             show that Movies & Series has a share of below 30% both in terms of
             revenues and subscribers as well as both in the overall VOD segment and
90 [Reference to distribution agreements with third parties]. Hence, any anti-competitive effects would
   arise from the exclusive distribution via the SVOD platform Movies & Series, which will be discussed
   in the following paragraphs. In addition, with regard to Premium Pay TV film channels, the divestment
   of Film 1 to Sony had fully addressed the Commission's concerns.
91 Commission's non-horizontal Guidelines, paragraph 35.
92 Reply to RFI 7, question 1.
                                                       54
 ---pagebreak---             narrower SVOD segment in 2017 and in previous years.93 Looking at the
            potential market for SVOD services, there are several non-vertically
            integrated SVOD providers active in the Netherlands, such as the following
            ones:
        (a)     Netflix has been growing significantly over the last years and has
                increased its number of subscribers from 863 000 in 2014 to 2.6 million in
                2017. Netflix is now the largest provider of SVOD services in the
                Netherlands.
        (b)     Videoland, owned by RTL Netherlands, increased its number of
                subscribers from 105 000 in 2014 to 435 000 subscribers in 2017.
        (c)     The Premium Pay TV film channel Film1, that was divested to Sony and
                had more than 230 000 subscribers in 2017, also offers SVOD services to
                its subscribers.
        (d)     Public and commercial broadcasters, such as NPO and RTL respectively,
                offer paid SVOD services in addition to their free advertisement-based
                VOD services.
        (e)     Other commercial providers of SVOD services, such as MUBI or
                Cinetree.
   (302) Respondents to the market investigation generally confirmed that the movies
            and/or series offered by Netflix, Film1, RTL's Videoland and Pathé Thuis
            qualify as premium content competing with Movies & Series.94
   (303) The above mentioned providers of VOD services are non-vertically integrated
            market players. While retail TV providers have the possibility to promote
            certain VOD services together with their retail Pay TV subscription, VOD
            services are generally offered on a stand-alone basis. Customers may
            complement their retail Pay TV subscription with a VOD service of their
            choice, irrespective of the provider of their retail TV subscription. Hence,
            customers of competing retail TV providers have access to a large pool of
            (S)VOD services offered by non-vertically integrated providers.
   (304) Second, beyond the VOD offerings already established in the Netherlands,
            entry of further VOD players is ongoing. Examples include Amazon, which
            launched its "Prime Video" service in the Netherlands in November 2017.95
            Content available via Amazon Prime Video is overall high profile and
            considered very attractive by consumers.96
93 Reply to RFI 13, question 5.
94 Replies to Q3 to retailers of 5 April 2018, question B.A.3.1.
95 https://www.dutchnews nl/news/2017/11/online-retailer-amazon-launches-prime-in-netherlands/
   [accessed on 25 May 2018].
96 Reply to RFI 12, question 6.
                                                        55
 ---pagebreak---     (305) Third, as explained in section 6.1.5, the upstream market for the licensing and
             acquisition of broadcastings rights is highly competitive. In particular, the
             merged entity itself has a market share of less than 20% in the acquisition of
             non-linear audio visual TV content for VOD and SVOD services. In addition,
             beyond the HBO content, the merged entity does not hold many exclusive
             broadcasting rights for distribution on Movies & Series.97 The Commission
             notes that competing retail TV providers can launch their own VOD services
             either by entering into licencing agreements with content providers or by
             producing content themselves. For instance, KPN also offers SVOD services
             to its customers (KPN TV Plus, KPN Play). In addition, KPN produces its
             own content, such as the successful Dutch series "Brussel", for its TV channel
             and VOD service "KPN Presenteert"98, which is exclusively offered to KPN
             customers. The ACM notes that retail TV operators also react to the loss of
             the HBO content by adding extra linear TV channels or giving price
             reductions.99
    (306) In addition, respondents to the market investigation referred mainly to one
             popular HBO-produced content only, namely the series Game of Thrones (of
             which the final season will be broadcast in 2019). In this respect, the
             Commission refers to section 5.1.1.1 where it has explained that a narrower
             possible market definition with respect to allegedly particularly important
             content is not plausible. The attractiveness of one series is not sufficient to
             justify the "must-have" nature of a SVOD service. In addition, the popularity
             of film and series content changes over time. The next large commercial
             success may be broadcast on Netflix or KPN Presenteert.
    (307) Even if the HBO content was particularly important to Dutch consumers, the
             Commission notes that the exclusive agreement between HBO Inc. and the
             merged entity only runs until [...]. It is uncertain what will happen with the
             HBO rights thereafter. Competing retail TV providers will have the possibility
             to enter into negotiations with HBO Inc.
    (308) As regards the effects100, the Commission notes that the merged entity was not
             able to foreclose downstream competitors by offering Movies & Series to its
             own customers and withholding it from downstream competitors. As shown in
             Table 1, the market share of the merged entity has further decreased in 2017
             after the introduction of Movies & Series at the beginning of 2017. Therefore,
             the Commission considers that the exclusivity of the HBO content has not led
             to churn from other platforms.
    (309) This view is confirmed by retail competitor M7 which stated: "We do not
             think that the exclusivity of HBO content has le[a]d to churn from other
97  Reply to RFI 12, question 2. Indeed, the list of exclusive content is very limited. Moreover, exclusivity
    is sometimes obtained for only one or two seasons and/or for a very limited period only.
98  https://www kpn.com/entertainment/kpn-presenteert htm [accessed on 25 May 2018].
99  ACM report of July 2017, "Bundling of telecom services and content in the Netherlands", p. 23 f.
100 Commission's non-horizontal Guidelines, paragraph 32.
                                                         56
 ---pagebreak---  ---pagebreak--- 6.3. Market for the supply and acquisition of Premium Pay TV sports channels
     (supply side)
6.3.1. The Notifying Party's views in 2014
    (314) Horizontal non-coordinated effects. The Notifying Party acknowledged that
           if a separate product market for the supply and acquisition of Premium Pay
           TV sports channels were to exist, this segment would only include the offers
           from Sport1 and Fox Sports.
    (315) According to the Notifying Party, Sport1 realised total revenues of EU [...]
           million and had a subscriber base of around [...] in 2013. However, the
           Notifying Party was not able to obtain a reliable estimate of the size of the
           market for Premium Pay TV sports channels and was therefore not in a
           position to accurately determine the market share of Sport1. The Notifying
           Party provided market shares based on viewing share data. According to
           these, Sport1 had a viewing share of less than 15% in the sports segment.
    (316) The Notifying Party concluded that irrespective of Sport1’s market share, the
           Premium Pay TV sport channel segment could not be an Affected Market as
           Ziggo was not active in this market.
    (317) Foreclosure effects. The Notifying Party submitted that the merged entity
           would not have the ability or the incentive to foreclose retail competitors with
           regard to Sport1.
    (318) As regards ability to foreclose, the Notifying Party argued that Sport1 was
           neither a channel with significant market power nor an important ("must-
           have") channel. The Notifying Party estimated Sport1 to have a market share
           of less than 15% in the possible market for Premium Pay TV sports channels
           and a penetration of just 2% in the total Dutch Pay TV market. Therefore, the
           Notifying Party concluded that Sport1 would not have the market power
           required to foreclose competitors.
    (319) In addition, the Notifying Party noted that the key sports content rights in the
           Dutch market, such as the Dutch football league Eredivisie, were held by Fox
           Sports and that its rights would remain under contract with Fox Sports until
           2025.
    (320) As regards incentive to foreclose, the Notifying Party explained that Sport1
           was just breaking even in the face of competition from Fox Sport's superior
           content offer. With sports rights paid on a fixed-fee basis and operating
           expenses (marketing and play-out) anyway sunk, Sport1 would be best served
           by expanding its subscriber base by any means. Moreover, the Notifying Party
           submitted that Sport1 would be an unlikely candidate to drive switching onto
           the merged entity's network, given its negligible market penetration and lack
           of key sports content rights.
6.3.2. Commission's assessment in 2014
    (321) Horizontal non-coordinated effects. The Commission found that there was
           no horizontal overlap with respect to the supply of Premium Pay TV sports
           channels, as Ziggo was not active in (that) possible market.
                                               58
 ---pagebreak---     (322) Foreclosure effects. The Commission did not find vertical foreclosure
            concerns with respect to the supply of Premium Pay TV sports channels but
            did not explicitly state its reasoning for the absence of vertical anti-
            competitive effects in the Conditional Clearance Decision.
6.3.3. Commission's assessment and conclusion in 2014
    (323) The Commission concluded that the Transaction would not lead to a
            significant impediment to effective competition in the possible market for the
            wholesale supply of Premium Pay TV sports channels.102
6.3.4. The Notifying Parties' views in their Supplementary Notification
    (324) Key developments. The Notifying Parties explain the key developments that
            have taken place in the Premium Pay TV sports channel segment since the
            Conditional Clearance Decision.
    (325) On 11 November 2015, Sport1 was rebranded to Ziggo Sport Totaal ("ZST").
            At the same time, NewZiggo launched the Ziggo Sport basic ("ZSB") which it
            provides to subscribers to its retail basic package TV service. While ZST
            consists of six linear TV channels, ZSB is one single linear TV channel. ZSB
            includes only a selection of the content included in the ZST channels in
            addition to certain other sports related content (e.g. sports documentaries, the
            Dutch Field Hockey League and the Dutch Basketball League). ZSB has
            never been made available on a wholesale basis to retail competitors.
    (326) Similar to ZST's distribution model, Fox Sports was initially offered to retail
            TV providers through a revenue share model. Under this model, the
            commercial risk in principle remains with the channel provider. In contrast,
            under the minimum wholesale guarantee model, which is applied by Fox
            Sports in relation to Fox Sports Eredivisie channels, as of August 2016, to
            contracts with retail TV providers, whose distribution contracts expire, retail
            TV providers pay a minimum fee per TV customer that could potentially
            subscribe to Fox Sports via their platform. This ensures that retailers have a
            greater incentive to distribute Fox Sports Eredivisie. VodafoneZiggo's
            contract with Fox Sports is still under the old revenue share model.
    (327) The Notifying Parties note that the distinction between Premium and Basic
            Pay TV sports channels has become increasingly blurred. Market participants
            from both segments sometimes compete to acquire the same content and
            Basic Pay TV sports channels hold attractive sports rights. At the same time,
            Premium Pay TV sports channels have become available to a broader
            audience due to Fox's new business model and retail TV providers' practice of
            including them as free optional add-ons to multi-play bundles. This is the case
            for Fox Sports with multi-play offers of KPN and T-Mobile Netherlands and
            for ZST with multi-play offers of VodafoneZiggo.
102 As explained in paragraph (3) above, the General Court annulled the Commission's Conditional
    Clearance Decision on the ground that the Commission failed to state the reasons of its finding that the
    proposed merger would not lead to vertical anti-competitive effects on the possible market for the
    wholesale supply of Premium Pay TV sports channels.
                                                     59
 ---pagebreak--- (328) Foreclosure effects. The Notifying Parties submit that the merged entity
      would not have the ability or the incentive to foreclose downstream
      competitors with respect to ZST and that any potential foreclosure strategy
      would not have a detrimental impact on competition.
(329) As regards ability to foreclose, the Notifying Parties argue that ZST, as
      previously Sport1, is not a sufficiently important input for the downstream
      product.
(330) First, the Notifying Parties highlight that ZST has a very limited subscriber
      base. According to the Notifying Parties, ZST had a subscriber base of about
      [...] in 2017, of which [...] subscribers are on third platforms. This corresponds
      to a market penetration of [5-10]% of Dutch households (and [5-10]% when
      disregarding the VodafoneZiggo base).
(331) Second, according to the Notifying Parties, any sports rights currently held by
      ZST are contestable. The Notifying Parties note that sports rights are
      generally acquired for a limited period of time only, made available to
      broadcasters via open tenders and often change hands. The Notifying Parties
      face competition from public and commercial broadcasters as well as
      dedicated sports channels in the acquisition of sports rights which then
      compete with ZST in the downstream market. In addition, the Notifying
      Parties point out that retail TV operators, that are not yet active in this
      segment, can themselves acquire sports broadcasting rights.
(332) Third, the Notifying Parties submit that there are a number of alternative TV
      channels to ZST with attractive content, such as Eurosport, NPO, RTL
      Netherland and SBS/Talpa.
(333) Fourth, the Notifying Parties highlight that Fox Sports, in particular, provides
      more attractive sports content and has more subscribers. The Notifying Parties
      point out that Fox Sports currently has more than double the amount of
      subscribers than ZST. Moreover, as a result of entering into a joint venture
      with Dutch football clubs in 2012, Fox Sports holds the Dutch football league
      broadcasting rights until 2025. The Notifying Parties explain that Fox Sports
      committed to the ACM to distribute the Eredivisie live channels on non-
      discriminatory terms to all distribution platforms at the creation of the joint
      venture. Therefore, the Fox Sports Eredivisie channels will be available to all
      retail TV operators until at least 2025.
(334) Fifth, the Notifying Parties refer to statements made by the ACM which
      confirm that ZST is not an important input. In its study into bundling of
      telecom services and content in the Netherlands, the ACM notes that "Ziggo
      Sport and Ziggo Sport Totaal have not led to a significant shift in the
      television market". In addition, in its investigation of Fox's new business
      model following a complaint by CAIW, the ACM found that there were
      insufficient indications that Fox Sports Eredivisie channels were an essential
      input for retail providers. For instance, the ACM found that Tele2
      Netherlands, who had terminated its contract with Fox Sports, did not suffer
      any significant loss of customers as a result. The ACM also noted that other
      factors than content, including price and internet speed are more relevant to
      consumers when choosing retail telecommunications services.
                                             60
 ---pagebreak--- (335) Finally, the Notifying Parties point out that ZST faces rights holders' pressure
      for maximal exposure which limits VodafoneZiggo's ability and incentive to
      foreclose retail competitors with regard to ZST.
(336) As regards incentive to foreclose, the Notifying Parties first of all notes that
      ZST, as previously Sport1, has always been offered to all retail TV providers
      in the Netherlands. In addition, the Notifying Parties give three key reasons
      for distributing rather than withholding ZST.
(337) First, the Notifying Parties submit that they benefit from the wholesale
      revenues gained from distributing ZST. The Notifying Parties acknowledge
      that in an internal assessment from August 2016, the modelling of the gains
      and losses associated with the decision whether to supply ZST to KPN
      showed a financial upside of about EUR [...] from a withholding strategy. The
      Notifying Parties note, however, that the financial gain is very limited
      compared to a total downstream fixed market size of EUR 114.2 million and
      that it was outweighed by the potential risks as explained below. In addition,
      the Notifying Parties emphasise that the underlying assumptions were not
      based on market research.
(338) Second, the Notifying Parties highlight the risk of reputational damage in the
      eyes of both customers and TV providers attached to withholding ZST.
(339) Third, the Notifying Parties highlight the risk of relational damage in
      discussion with content rights holders. The Notifying Parties explain that
      content rights holders consider broad distribution a key criterion for licensing
      sports content. Withholding ZST would create the risk that content rights
      holders would no longer be willing to license rights to ZST in the next round
      of negotiations.
(340) As regard the impact on competition, the Notifying Parties reiterate that ZST
      is not a sufficiently important input having a market penetration of only [5-
      10]% of the Dutch TV base. In addition, the Notifying Parties argue that while
      content differentiation is currently not an important factor of competition in
      the Dutch market as most content is widely available (as applied to ZST),
      content differentiation should not necessarily lead to any competition
      concerns. Differentiation at retail level follows from factors such as price,
      internet, speed, hardware and service. The availability of content could be one
      further means of differentiation.
(341) The Notifying Parties submit that the same reasoning also applies to any
      potential partial foreclosure strategies which would also not be achievable as
      ZST is not a sufficiently important input.
(342) Lastly, the Notifying Parties note that there are no input foreclosure concerns
      in relation to ZSB. The ZSB Pay TV channel includes only a selection of the
      content included in the ZST channels in addition to certain other less
      attractive sports related content. The Notifying Parties submit that the
      introduction of ZSB was not merger specific.
                                           61
 ---pagebreak--- 6.3.5. Commission's assessment
    (343) Foreclosure effects. During the pre-notification phase and the market
             investigation103, competitors of the Parties in the market for retail TV services
             raised the concern that the merged entity might foreclose ZST from
             competing providers of retail TV services. They claim that VodafoneZiggo
             controls very important exclusive sports content and that it has already
             engaged in partial input foreclosure in the past, by deteriorating the terms and
             conditions for distributing ZST.
    (344) The Commission has investigated whether the merged entity would have the
             ability and the incentive to engage in an input foreclosure strategy in relation
             to ZST, in particular full input foreclosure by refusing to provide access to
             ZST to its retail competitors. The Commission has also assessed whether such
             foreclosure strategies would have a significant detrimental effect on
             competition downstream.104 In the case of partial input foreclosure, that is to
             say an increase in the wholesale price for ZST channels, downstream
             competitors on the market for the retail provision of Pay TV services would
             likely pass on, at least partially, those increased costs to end consumers.105
             Partial input foreclosure can also take more subtle forms such as the
             degradation of the quality of the input supplied. Input foreclosure would
             hence result in ZST no longer being available or being available, at higher
             retail prices or at lower quality on competitors' platforms. The Commission
             considers that this would induce at least a proportion of customers valuing
             such services to switch away from the foreclosed competing retail Pay TV
             platforms to the merged entity's product. The Commission has also
             investigated if the merged entity has already made any attempts to withhold
             ZST from its retail competitors since the Transaction and if such attempts
             have had an impact on competition in the downstream market.
    (345) In carrying out such assessment, the Commission must take into account only
             the changes brought about by the Transaction. In this respect, the Commission
             notes that Liberty Global already controlled Sport1, the predecessor of ZST,
             and could therefore, in theory, already have withheld the channel to
             downstream providers of retail TV services pre-Transaction. The change as a
             result of the Transaction is the addition of Ziggo's downstream customer base.
    (346) The aim of such a foreclosure strategy would be to increase demand for the
             merged entity's own downstream retail Pay TV services simultaneously
             reducing demand for competitor's retail services thereby increasing the
             merged entity's downstream profits.
103 Replies to Q3 to retailers of 5 April 2018, question C.B.6.1; Submission of KPN dated 20 December
    2017; Submission of T-Mobile Netherlands dated 15 May 2018.
104 In line with the Commission's Guidelines on the assessment of non-horizontal mergers under the
    Council Regulation on the control of concentrations between undertakings (OJ C 265,18.10.2008, p.6)
    (the "Commission's non-horizontal Guidelines"), paragraph 32.
105 To achieve this, the merged entity could worsen wholesale conditions for ZST such that it increases
    downstream rivals' costs of serving ZST customers.
                                                        62
 ---pagebreak---     (347) In order for input foreclosure to be a concern, three conditions need to be met
             cumulatively post-merger: (i) the merged entity needs to have the ability to
             foreclose its rivals; (ii) the merged entity needs to have the incentive to
             foreclose its rivals; and (iii) the foreclosure strategy needs to have a
             significant detrimental effect on competition on the downstream market.106
Ability to engage in input foreclosure
    (348) As prerequisite for the ability to engage in input foreclosure, the Commission
             has investigated whether the merged entity would have the technical ability to
             withhold ZST.
    (349) The bilateral agreements between the merged entity and its retail competitors
             regarding the distribution of ZST are the outcomes of commercial
             negotiations. The merged entity has neither a legal obligation to supply ZST
             to its rivals nor a legal obligation to provide it at non-discriminatory terms and
             conditions. The Notifying Parties confirm that the distribution agreements
             concluded with retail TV providers, while being broadly similar, can differ
             with respect to pricing and other terms and conditions.107
    (350) The Notifying Parties note that sports rights holders favour maximal exposure
             given the importance of sponsorship and advertisement income in addition to
             the income accrued through the licensing of the content. Therefore, some
             rights holders, [reference to third party], push broadcasters, such as
             VodafoneZiggo, to distribute their content as widely as possible.108 However,
             the Notifying Parties acknowledge that [reference to distribution agreement
             with third party].109 The Commission concludes that it remains in the hands of
             the merged entity whether to prioritise the future relationship with the sports
             rights holders or potential immediate financial upsides from withholding ZST.
    (351) Therefore, the Commission considers that the merged entity has the technical
             ability to withhold ZST from its downstream competitors.
    (352) For the technical ability to withhold ZST to translate into an ability to
             foreclose competitors from the downstream market, the vertically integrated
             firm resulting from the merger must have a significant degree of market
             power in the upstream market. It is only in those circumstances that the
             merged entity can be expected to have a significant influence on the
             conditions of competition in the upstream market and thus, possibly, on prices
             and supply conditions in the downstream market.110 In the following
             paragraphs, the Commission analyses whether the merged entity holds a
106 Commission's non-horizontal Guidelines, paragraph 32.
107 Supplement Form CO, p. 101.
108 Supplement Form CO, p. 110.
109 Reply to RFI 4, question 14.
110 Commission's non-horizontal Guidelines, paragraph 35.
                                                     63
 ---pagebreak---  ---pagebreak---              [80-90]% in 2014. The Commission notes that the total number of ZST
             subscriptions on third-party platforms is only [...] in 2017 and has been
             increasing slowly while Fox Sports almost doubled its presence from 2014 to
             2017. Overall, the Commission concludes that Fox Sports is by far the largest
             player in the possible market for Premium Pay TV sports channels.
    (356) For completeness, the Commission also indicates ZST's market share in terms
             of total subscribers of Premium Pay TV sports channels. Although ZST’s
             absolute number of subscribers increased strongly from 2016 to 2017, ZST's
             share of subscribers decreased from [20-30]% in 2014 to [20-30]% in 2017.
             At the same time, Fox Sports increased its market share from 71.1% in 2014
             to 72.6% in 2017. The Commission notes that Fox Sports is still more than
             twice as large when taking into account ZST's subscribers on
             VodafoneZiggo's platform. Fox Sports has also been able to grow its total
             subscriber base by more than ZST between 2014 and 2017.
    (357) The increasing number of total Premium Pay TV sports channel subscriptions
             is linked to two of the key market developments explained above. First, Fox
             Sports changed its distribution model in August 2016 to incentivise wider
             distribution of the Fox Sports Eredivisie channels. Second, since summer
             2017, VodafoneZiggo's quadplay customers have the option to choose ZST as
             free add-on. [...] of ZST subscribers on VodafoneZiggo's network, that is [...]
             out of a total of [...] subscribers, receive ZST as free add-on.112 It appears
             likely that a part of these customers would not be willing to pay for ZST if it
             was not offered for free. The Commission considers that these developments
             relativise the increase in the total market size and hence the importance of the
             Premium Pay TV sports segment as the increase in subscribers is supply-
             rather than demand-driven. It is also worth noting that VodafoneZiggo's
             customers who opted for the free ZST package only represent [20-30]% of
             their quad-play subscriptions while [40-50]% of eligible customers did not
             take up a free add-on at all.
    (358) Table 3 shows the market penetration of ZST and Fox Sports channels in
             terms of Dutch TV customers over time. From 2014 to 2017, ZST's market
             penetration increased from [0-5]% to [5-10]% of all Dutch TV customers and
             to [5-10]% when excluding VodafoneZiggo's customer base.113 By contrast,
             Fox Sports currently has a market penetration of [10-20]%. The overall
             market penetration of Premium Pay TV channels increased from [10-20]% to
             [20-30]%.114 The Commission notes that ZST's market penetration remains
             low.115
112 Supplement Form CO, p. 105; Reply to RFI 7, question 3.
113 Supplement Form CO, p. 102.
114 The overall market penetration is overstated as some Dutch TV customers subscribe to both ZST and
    Fox Sports. This effect is not taken into account in the data shown in Table 3 and therefore the share of
    subscribers that have at least one Premium Pay TV sports channel is in fact lower than [20-30]% in
    2017.
115 According to reply to RFI 9, question 2, the low penetration also holds on a per platform basis with the
    exception of M7 which has a ZST penetration of [10-20]% of its customer base. The Notifying Parties
                                                          65
 ---pagebreak---  ---pagebreak---         (a)      Fox Sports has 1 190 000 subscribers in 2017 and is hence more than
                 twice as large as ZST.
        (b)      At the request of the Commission, the Notifying Parties have submitted a
                 market research report ("SKIM report") from March 2017 that was
                 commissioned in the context of discussions on the evolution of ZST's
                 sports portfolio.116 The SKIM report shows that the most appealing sports
                 content in the Netherlands, in terms of the net score117, is football, and in
                 particular Dutch football. The top ranked sports content is World Cup
                 football (49%), Euro Cup football (42%) and Dutch league football (41%),
                 followed by winter sports (25%), Champions League football (23%),
                 Formula 1 (19%) and Europa League (16%).118 After the World and Euro
                 Cup football content, which are more important in years when the Dutch
                 national team participates, the most important content is the Dutch League
                 football content which Fox Sports owns and distributes at least until 2025.
        (c)      Similarly, the market research report submitted by KPN ("Blauw report")
                 from March 2018 underlines the stronger market position of Fox Sports
                 compared to ZST.119 While 28% of respondents receive the Fox Sports
                 Eredivisie channel at home, 11% receive ZST.120 Similarly, 22% of
                 respondents indicate that they "really want to watch" Fox Sports
                 Eredivisie, while 10% indicate the same for ZST.121 The majority of TV
                 customers has "no interest" to watch Fox Sports Eredivisie (53%) or ZST
                 (65%). Fox Sports Eredivisie also ranks better in terms of prominence.
                 39% of respondents "know well" Fox Sports and 11% "don't know it",
                 while ZST is well known by 18% and not known by 31% (the remaining
                 50% have heard of both channels respectively).122
        (d)      Retail TV providers responding to the market investigation agree that Fox
                 Sports has very attractive content rights.123 When referring to premium
                 sports content and "must-have" sports content, the respondents
                 consistently point to both content rights held by ZST, such as Formula 1,
                 as well as content rights held by Fox Sports, such as Dutch football league
                 Eredivisie.
116 Reply to RFI 5, question 5, Annex R5.11.
117 Presented on a scale of – 100 to +100%, indicating how appealing the content is.
118 SKIM report of March 2017,"Premium content strategy", slide 9.
119 Reply of KPN to Q3 to retailers of 5 April 2018, Annex 4.
120 Blauw report of March 2018, "The role of (exclusive) content when choosing a TV provider", slide 15.
121 Blauw report of March 2018, "The role of (exclusive) content when choosing a TV provider", slide 13.
122 Blauw report of March 2018, "The role of (exclusive) content when choosing a TV provider", slide 14.
123 Replies to Q3 to retailers of 5 April 2018, questions B.A.3.1 and B.A.9.
                                                         67
 ---pagebreak---          (e)      These findings are also in line with the results of the market investigation
                  in case Vodafone/Liberty Global/Dutch JV, where the majority of
                  respondents noted that Fox Sports' channels have equally or more
                  attractive and valuable content offers than ZST.124
    (362) In this respect, the Commission notes that the ACM has in a recent decision
              rejected a complaint by Dutch cable operator CAIW, who contested Fox
              Sports' new distribution fees and claimed in particular that access to the
              channel was essential to compete on the market for retail TV services.125
              ACM observed among other factors that, based on the number of customers
              that terminated their relationship with Tele2 Netherlands since it stopped
              offering Fox Sports, the channel could not be considered as an important
              element for competition on market for retail TV services.126 There is no
              reason to assume that the importance of ZST (which has a significantly lower
              number of subscribers than Fox Sports) would be different, or it would even
              appear that ZST's importance would be smaller.
    (363) Third, next to ZST and Fox Sports, there are a number of Basic Pay TV sports
              channels as well as non-dedicated public and commercial channels
              broadcasting attractive sports content. In particular, the Commission notes the
              competitive pressure exercised by the following broadcasters:
         (a)      Eurosport127, which amongst others has the rights to Wimbledon, the
                  Italian and French football leagues, cycling and the Olympic Games
                  (jointly with NPO);
         (a)      NPO, which holds the broadcasting rights to the Eredivisie football
                  highlights, Dutch national football team matches, ice skating, cycling and
                  the Olympic Games (jointly with Eurosport);
         (b)      SBS/Talpa, which holds the broadcasting rights for the Champions League
                  matches of the Dutch teams;
         (c)      RTL Netherlands, which holds broadcasting rights for the Europa League,
                  and darts; and
124 Commission decision of 3 August 2016, in case M.7978, Vodafone/Liberty Global/Dutch JV,
    paragraph 501.
125 ACM decision of 10 July 2017 in case CAIW/Fox Sports.
126 ACM decision of 10 July 2017 in case CAIW/Fox Sports, paragraph 47.
127 Eurosport is owned by Discovery in which John Malone holds a minority stake. As explained in
    section 2, John Malone does not de jure or de facto control Discovery. However, even if John Malone
    was able to jointly control both Liberty Global and Discovery, it would be highly unlikely that
    Eurosport would change its business model in the Netherlands as Eurosport is generally included in all
    basic tier TV packages throughout Europe. If Eurosport were to depart from this business model in the
    Netherlands, it would stand to lose sports content registered on the Dutch Events list to competing
    open channels. Hence, the position of the remaining Basic Pay TV sports channels would be
    strengthened.
                                                       68
 ---pagebreak---          (d)      Foreign channels broadcasting attractive sports content, such as German
                  (ARD, ZDF and RTL Germany), British (BBC One and Two), and
                  Belgian (EEN, canvas) channels.
    (364) Retail TV providers responding to the market investigation agree that these
             channels compete to a certain extent in the premium segment.128 In particular,
             market respondents highlight the role of Eurosport. KPN states: "At the same
             time, it should be noted that also basic (non-premium) sports Pay TV
             channels tend to acquire more and more rights which could be considered as
             must-have. Eurosport, for instance, acquired the rights to the Olympic Games,
             Giro, Ligue 1, and the Flemish classic cycling races."129 T-Mobile
             Netherlands states: "To a (much) lesser extent other "Basic Pay TV" channels
             also offer sports that could sometimes be considered 'premium' (like
             Eurosport)."130 Similarly, M7's response reads: "Eurosport only competes
             within the premium sport channels segment on specific sports content
             (cycling)."131 M7 also explicitly refers to non-dedicated sports channels: "RTL
             and SBS/Talpa might compete in some areas of Premium as well as non-
             premium Sport."132 The foreign channels, irrespective of their sports content
             rights, are considered to mainly compete in the non-premium segment only.
    (365) The sports content shown on the Dutch Basic Pay TV channels are partly
             registered on the Dutch Events List because they qualify as important sports
             events.133 Pursuant to the Dutch Media Act, these events can only be
             broadcasted on an open channel reaching 75% of Dutch households. Premium
             Pay TV sports channels, such as ZST, are hence precluded from acquiring
             rights for these events.134 ZST could hence in any case not foreclose the most
             important sports content in the Netherlands.
    (366) Fourth, the Commission notes that there are counter-strategies available to
             providers of retail Pay TV services. For instance, the merged entity's retail
             competitors have the possibility to bid for sports rights themselves. At the
             request of the Commission, the Notifying Parties have provided a list of
128 Replies to Q3 to retailers of 5 April 2018, question B.B.11.
129 Reply of KPN to Q3 to retailers of 5 April 2018, question B.A.9.1.
130 Reply of T-Mobile Netherlands to Q3 to retailers of 5 April 2018, question B.A.3.1.
131 Reply of M7 to Q3 to retailers of 5 April 2018, question B.B.11.1.
132 Reply of M7 to Q3 to retailers of 5 April 2018, question B.B.11.1.
133 The most popular sports content in the Netherlands are subject to media regulation (based on the
    Media Decree 2008 - Mediabesluit 2008) and must be broadcast to at least 75% of Dutch households,
    on so called "open channels". The list covers, inter alia, the following sports and sports events: Dutch
    football league highlights, Dutch national football team matches; World and European football cups
    matches of national teams; World and European ice skate championship (all-round, sprint and
    distances); and tennis tournaments Wimbledon and Roland Garros.
134 Supplement Form CO, p. 66.
                                                         69
 ---pagebreak---              recent entries of European retail TV providers in the acquisition of sports
             rights and distribution of their own channels.135
    (367) The examples listed below illustrate that entry in this market is possible:
        (a)      Telekom Sport, Germany: Retail TV provider Deutsche Telekom launched
                 the Pay TV sports channel Telekom Sport (at the time: Telekom
                 Basketball) in 2017. Telekom Sports initially mainly broadcasted
                 basketball and has since included combat sports such as boxing, MMA
                 and kickboxing, the 3rd division of the German football league
                 (Bundesliga), the German ice hockey league, top games of the women’s
                 Bundesliga and Bayern München’s own TV production to its content
                 offering.
        (b)      SFR Sport, France: Retail TV provider SFR launched the Pay TV sports
                 channel SFR Sport in 2016. SFR Sport broadcasts the English football
                 league (Premier League), Premiership rugby, French Pro A and Pro B
                 basketball, circuit WTA tennis, Champions League volleyball, and various
                 other sports including extreme sports and combat sports.
        (c)      O2 Sport, Czech Republic: Retail TV provider O2 launched three Pay TV
                 sports channels from 2015 to 2017, including a dedicated football channel
                 and a dedicated tennis channel. O2 Sport broadcasts inter alia Champions
                 League, the English football league (Premier League), WRC Rally, Euro
                 league basketball, European Championship volleyball and a variety of
                 martial arts sports.
        (d)      BT Sport, UK: Retail TV provider British Telecom launched the pay TV
                 sports channel BT Sport in 2013. BT Sport acquired broadcasting rights
                 for instance for Premiership Rugby, the German football league
                 (Bundesliga), Scottish Premier League, the French (Ligue 1) and Italian
                 (Serie A) football leagues, WTA Tennis as well as Champions- and
                 Europa League.
        (e)      In addition, the Irish retail TV provider Eir purchased the Setanta Group,
                 including sports TV channels Setanta Ireland and Setanta Sports, in 2016
                 and rebranded them as Eir Sport 1 and Eir Sports 2. This exemplifies that
                 retail TV providers also have the option of purchasing established sports
                 channels instead of bidding for sports rights and creating a sports channel
                 themselves
    (368) Retail providers of Pay TV services responding to the market investigation
             claimed that they would not be able to acquire broadcasting rights for sports
             events to launch a (Premium) Pay TV sports channel. First, some retailers
             were of the opinion that they were disadvantaged because their activities were
             limited to the Netherlands. However, as explained in section 5.1.1.1,
             broadcasting rights for sport events are generally auctioned on a country-by-
             country basis and therefore the Commission concluded that the relevant
             geographic market is national. Dutch providers of retail Pay TV services are
135 Reply to RFI 4, question 12.
                                                  70
 ---pagebreak---            hence able to bid for the broadcasting rights for sports events for the
           Netherlands.
    (369) Second, retail providers of Pay TV services claimed that they do not have the
           financial resources needed to bid for the acquisition of broadcasting rights for
           sports events. The investments needed to start a sports channel include
           expenses related to marketing, personnel (commentators etc.), and technical
           costs, such as hardware and application fees for a playout facility. These
           amount to about EUR [...] for ZST. However, the vast majority of upfront
           investments needed relate to the acquisition of sports content rights. For
           instance, the merged entity spent over EUR [...] on individual sports content
           rights in 2017.136 In this regard, the Commission agrees that retail Pay TV
           providers' ability to enter the markets for the acquisition of broadcasting rights
           and for the supply of (Premium) Pay TV sports channels depends on their
           ability to finance the investments needed to acquire sports content. Therefore,
           this counter-strategy is more appropriate for incumbent players, such as KPN,
           but also subsidiaries of incumbents from other countries, such as T-Mobile
           Netherlands or Tele2 Netherlands. With regard to the latter, the Commission
           notes that Tele2 Netherlands held the rights for the Dutch football league
           Eredivisie from 2005 to 2008.137
    (370) With regard to the downstream subscriber base, the Commission notes that it
           is easier for larger downstream players to monetarize a newly created sports
           channel. However, any market player with the required financial resources is
           able to set up a sports channel and sell it on the wholesale market for
           (Premium) Pay TV sports channels to providers of retail Pay TV services,
           hence reaching the total Dutch TV market.
    (371) Moreover, sports content (and ZST in particular) is only one possible source
           of differentiation. Competing retail Pay TV providers have the ability to
           differentiate using other means such as by offering bundled products, better
           speed or other types of content. With regard to the latter, the Commission
           notes that KPN produces its own film and series content as explained in
           section 6.2.5. In addition, KPN and T-Mobile Netherlands have reacted to the
           merged entity's free ZST option for quad-play customers by offering the Fox
           Eredivisie channels as a freebie option to their quad-play customers.138 This
           example shows that content differentiation may be in the interest of the
           consumers.
    (372) A downstream rival can also differentiate itself by not offering a specific or
           any Premium Pay TV sports channel and thereby placing itself in the market
           as a “no frills” provider able to offer lower prices (which is what Tele2
           Netherlands has chosen to do in 2016 when it decided to stop carrying Fox
           Sports). In this respect, M7 confirms the Commission's understanding that the
           availability of Premium Pay TV Sports channels is the key driver for sports
136 Supplement Form CO, p. 60.
137 Supplement Form CO, Annex 19.
138 Supplement Form CO, p. 76.
                                                71
 ---pagebreak---              fans' decision only when they chose a Pay TV retailer: "In general, consumers
             choose on the basis of their needs which are mainly a fast internet connection
             and a cheap bundle of TV with the main channels and telephony. Sports fans
             of course might also choose on the base of the availability of the sports
             channels."139
    (373) Recent findings of the ACM support the Commission's view that there are
             several possible ways of differentiation and that content differentiation can be
             pro-competitive.
         (a)    The results of a consumer survey carried out on behalf of the ACM
                confirm that price remains the most important reason to switch for multi-
                play customers.140
         (b)    ACM's CAIW/Fox Sports decision confirms that the main drivers for
                consumers switching between retail TV providers are rather the price of
                the package and the speed of the internet connection.141
         (c)    The ACM has analysed the possible consequences of bundling telecom
                services and content and has come to the following conclusion in a recent
                report of July 2017: "In the short term, ACM believes it is more likely that
                competition based on content will have a pro-competitive effect on the
                market. This is what ACM is currently also seeing in the market, with ISPs
                endeavoring to distinguish themselves from each other with their content
                propositions. The responses from market participants do not lead to any
                different conclusion. In its analysis, ACM has examined the current
                market situation and, on that basis, has come to the conclusion that having
                regard to the content that is currently being offered exclusively, this is
                unlikely to lead to the exclusion of providers. Possible exclusionary effects
                of content will have to be analyzed on a case-by-case basis, and it cannot
                necessarily be assumed that exclusive content will lead to exclusion. At
                present, ACM notes that the content that is currently offered exclusively
                has not hitherto led to major shifts in the market. ACM also has no
                indications at present that this will be the case in the near future. ACM
                therefore believes a must-offer provision for premium content would
                currently be disproportionate."142 (emphasis added). In relation to the
                long-term risks of exclusive content, the ACM will continue to monitor
                the market, examine the availability of content and take action if particular
                conduct among market participants is a serious restriction of competition.
    (374) Despite ZST's limited market share in the upstream market and its low market
             penetration in terms of subscribers, all retail Pay TV providers responding to
             the market investigation consider ZST to be a "must-have" in order to
139 Reply of M7 to Q3 to retailers of 5 April 2018, question C.B.5.1.
140 ACM report of 21 June 2017, "Switch binnen de telecommarkt blijft gelijk: een op de vijf stapt over",
    p. 41.
141 ACM decision of 10 July 2017 in case CAIW/Fox Sports, paragraph 37.
142 ACM report of July 2017, "Bundling of telecom services and content in the Netherlands", p. 27 ff.
                                                        72
 ---pagebreak---              effectively compete on the market for the provision of retail TV services.143
             They consider that ZST contains very important content such as the English
             and Spanish football leagues, UEFA Champions League and Formula 1
             (currently very popular in the Netherlands due to the success of Dutch driver
             Max Verstappen). In addition, the majority of respondents considers that the
             only other Premium Pay TV channel, Fox Sports, is complementary (not
             substitutable) to ZST as it offers a different portfolio of (premium) sports.144
    (375) As explained in section 5.1.2.1, the Commission considers that the market for
             the wholesale supply of Pay TV (sports) channels can be segmented further in
             premium and non-premium, without any plausible further segmentation
             possible.
    (376) Even if, as alleged by the retail Pay TV providers responding to the market
             investigation, ZST or certain sports content broadcast on ZST were
             considered to be particularly important, the Commission does not consider
             ZST to be a sufficiently important needed to effectively compete on the
             downstream market for the following reasons.
    (377) First, ZST has [...] subscribers only, representing [5-10]% of Dutch TV
             customers.
    (378) Second, VodafoneZiggo faces pressure from sports rights holders for maximal
             exposure. Although, as explained above (see paragraphs (348)-(351)), the
             merged entity is not legally impeded from and thus “technically” able to
             withhold ZST from other operators, nevertheless, [reference to distribution
             agreement with third party].145 During the market investigation, Formula 1
             confirmed that "the reach of a channel is one of the factors that we consider
             when assessing a bid for our rights"146. Hence, a strategy of withholding ZST
             may negatively impact the broadcasting rights VodafoneZiggo will be able to
             (re)acquire in the future.
    (379) Third, the merged entity's position is contestable in the upstream market for
             the licensing and acquisition of broadcasting rights for TV content. The
             broadcasting rights are typically tendered by sports rights holders on an
             exclusive basis for a specific geography and for a limited period.147 This
             allows both competing broadcasters and retail TV providers to regularly bid
             for sports content, including that currently aired by ZST.
    (380) There are numerous examples of broadcasting rights that have changed hands
             in recent years:148 the English Premier League was with Fox Sports and is
143 Replies to Q3 to retailers of 5 April 2018, question C.D.3.
144 Replies to Q3 to retailers of 5 April 2018, question C.B.1.
145 Reply to RFI 4, question 14.
146 Reply of Formula 1 to Q1 to content providers of 5 April 2018, question B.A.6.
147 Reply to RFI 4, question 1.
148 Supplement Form CO, Annex 19.
                                                         73
 ---pagebreak---               since mid-2016 with VodafoneZiggo; the German football league Bundesliga,
              the Italian football league Serie A and French football league Ligue 1 were
              with Sport1 and are since mid-2014 with Fox (Bundesliga) and since mid-
              2015 with Eurosport (Serie A and Ligue 1), and ATP tennis was with Sport1
              and is since 2013 with Fox.
    (381) The current agreements for VodafoneZiggo's football rights come to an end in
              [...] (English Premier league), [...] (Spanish football league La Liga) and [...]
              (Champions League). The outcome of the next tender process is uncertain and
              may change the alleged "must-have" nature of ZST.
    (382) The Formula 1 contract expires at the end of 2018.149 During the market
              investigation, Formula 1 has confirmed that the contract for 2016-2018 was
              awarded "following a competitive tender process"150. Formula 1 notifies all
              potential licensees of the availability of the content and invites them to
              indicate an interest, provides interested parties a broad specification of the
              rights available and invites them to submit a proposal. Formula 1 also
              confirmed that they "could licence to other pay TV or FTA broadcasters
              including Fox, Eurosport, RTL Group. Talpa TV (SBS6, Net5, Veronica) and
              NOS"151 and are hence not bound to stay with ZST. However, some third
              parties consider that the Formula 1 rights are owned by Liberty Global
              following the purchase of Formula 1 by LMC in 2017 and given the minority
              stake held by John Malone in both Liberty Global and LMC.152
    (383) Even if John Malone controlled both Liberty Global and LMC and
              consequently the merged entity kept the rights for Formula 1 for the next
              licensing periods, the Commission does not consider that this would give
              market power to the merged entity for the following reasons.
    (384) First, as explained above, Formula 1 is less popular than the Dutch football
              league Eredivisie which was not found to be an essential input to compete.
    (385) Second, the alleged "must-have" nature of sports fluctuates over time and
              heavily depends on the success of Dutch athletes. This is also acknowledged
              by the respondents of the market investigation. For instance, KPN notes: "The
              must-have character of content is not fixed [for], for instance, cycling,
              athletics and Formula 1 racing, but became premium due to the successes by
              Dutch participants Dumoulin, Daphne Schippers, Max Verstappen and the
              Netherlands women’s national football team."153 Similarly, T-Mobile
149 Formula 1 is currently in discussion about the licensing of the broadcasting rights to Formula 1 for the
    period 2019-2020. While the Notifying Parties understand that several market players have confirmed
    their interest and placed a bid for these rights, the Parties are not aware of the identity of these market
    players [...] (Reply to RFI 2, question 13). Therefore, it is currently unclear which broadcaster will
    hold the broadcasting rights for Formula 1 in the next licensing period.
150 Reply of Formula 1 to Q1 to content providers of 5 April 2018, A.2.1 and B.A.2.
151 Reply of Formula 1 to question B.A.7 of Q1.
152 Reply of T-Mobile Netherlands to Q3 to retailers of 5 April 2018, question B.A.3.1.
153 Reply of KPN to Q3 to retailers of 5 April 2018, question B.A.3.1.
                                                           74
 ---pagebreak---              Netherlands refers to Max Verstappen as reason for the increased popularity
             of Formula 1 popular in the Netherlands154, while Tele2 Netherlands mentions
             the "Max Verstappen effect"155.
    (386) Third, the Dutch Events List ensures that the most important sports content is
             shown on open channels. The list has last been amended in 2015, inter alia, to
             include certain swimming and tennis events. In 2016, after Max Verstappen
             had won his first Grand Prix, the Secretary of State for Education, Culture and
             Science was specifically asked by public broadcaster NOS to extend the
             events list to include Formula 1. In the written response, the Secretary of State
             explains that the Events List had been amended very recently and frequent
             changes should be avoided for sake of legal certainty. The written response
             further states that "there has been an enormous increase of media-offer and
             individual choice for consumers with the ongoing digitalisation which
             distribution companies are engaged in. This means that more so than
             previously, access to the broadcasting of events of general importance can be
             safeguarded without intervention of the Events List. For Formula 1 this means
             that the races are not only offered to the customers of Ziggo, but that
             individual races are also offered for sale online."156 Given the State
             Secretary's reasoning, the Commission notes that it considers it likely that the
             Events List would be amended if the merged entity were to withhold ZST
             from consumers of competing retail TV competitors (and if popularity of
             Formula 1 continued). This also applies to any other sports content that may
             become popular in the future.
    (387) Fourth, as pointed out by the State Secretary, there are indeed alternative ways
             to watch Formula 1.157 Viewers in the Netherlands are able to watch Formula
             1 via ZST either through (i) a subscription to ZST, (ii) a stand-alone
             subscription to the ZST Go app or (iii) online via Pay-Per-View (available for
             Formula 1 races and many other sports). This also applies to any other sports
             content that may become popular in the future.
    (388) Assuming that the merged entity would also withhold the stand-alone
             subscriptions it currently offers directly to end customers, Formula 1 is also
             broadcast live on RTL Germany, which is part of the basic TV package of all
             retail Pay TV operators in the Netherlands, and UK SKY Sports (via satellite
             TV). In addition, the highlights of each race are shown on the Belgian
             Flemish speaking VRT, which is also part of the basic TV package in the
             Netherlands.
Conclusion: No ability to foreclose downstream competitors
154 Reply of T-Mobile Netherlands to Q3 to retailers of 5 April 2018, question B.A.8.
155 Reply of Tele2 Netherlands to Q3 to retailers of 5 April 2018, question C.D.3 of Q3.
156 Reply to RFI 4, question 3 (translation of Dutch text by Notifying Parties).
157 Reply to RFI 4, question 13.
                                                         75
 ---pagebreak---     (389) The Commission concludes that while the merged entity has the technical
           ability to stop providing ZST on a wholesale basis to third parties in the
           future, it would lack the ability to foreclose its downstream competitors. The
           market penetration of ZST is low, customers can switch to alternatives to ZST
           and retail TV providers have counter-strategies available. Even if particularly
           important sports content was broadcast on ZST, the Commission considers
           that this would not give a significant degree of market power to the merged
           entity. This is because the broadcasting rights for sports content are
           contestable in the upstream market and the popularity of certain sports content
           fluctuates over time. In addition, the most popular sports content is likely to
           be added to the Dutch Events List in the medium term, especially if there
           were attempts to withhold such content.
Incentive to engage in input foreclosure
    (390) As regards the incentive of the merged entity to engage in a full foreclosure
           strategy in relation to ZST, that is to say a refusal to supply ZST to competing
           retail Pay TV distributors post-Transaction, it is important to recall that the
           merger increases the downstream footprint of the merged entity. Accordingly,
           the Transaction would increase the profitability of any foreclosure of ZST.
           Indeed, pre-merger, the Notifying Parties would stand to lose all revenues
           from ZST subscribers located outside its geographic footprint if it were to
           completely foreclose ZST from its retail competitors. By combining the
           respective geographic footprints of UPC and Ziggo, the Transaction ensures
           that a much greater proportion of subscribers of ZST in the Netherlands on
           retail competitors' networks could switch their subscription to the merged
           entity's network which covers about 90% of the Dutch territory.
    (391) Following the Transaction, the merged entity has continued to provide its
           downstream retail competitors access to ZST. Therefore, four years after the
           Transaction, the merged entity has not engaged in any attempts to implement
           a full input foreclosure strategy.
    (392) However, the Commission notes that the merged entity has carried out an
           internal assessment of the impact of no longer providing ZST to KPN in the
           context of the negotiations on a distribution contract starting in September
           2016.158 The Commission assessed the analysis carried out by the merged
           entity.
    (393) As regards the profitability of withholding ZST from KPN, the Commission
           notes that the merged entity's analysis shows a financial upside of withholding
           ZST from KPN based on the following assumptions presented in Table 4:
158 Supplement Form CO, Annex 24.
                                                 76
 ---pagebreak---  ---pagebreak---                that are not covered by the merged entity's network would not have the
               possibility to switch to the merged entity to keep their subscription.
       (b)     Relational risk: [...], all content rights holders favour a wide distribution.
       (c)     Regulatory risk: The merged entity fears a regulatory reaction as there is a
               strong political, ministerial and regulatory preference for a wide
               distribution of sports content.
    (396) The financial impact of the associated risks was not quantified. As regards the
           outcome of negotiations with KPN, it was decided not to withdraw ZST from
           KPN. However, this is no guarantor for the future that the related risks will
           always outweigh the financial upside.
    (397) Therefore, the Commission concludes that it cannot be excluded that the
           merged entity would have the merger-specific incentive to engage in
           foreclosure of ZST on competing retail Pay TV platforms post-Transaction.
    (398) The Commission has not assessed whether complete or partial foreclosure
           would be the most profitable strategy.
Impact of engaging in input foreclosure
    (399) As to the effect of any full foreclosure of ZST, the Commission is not able to
           assess actual effects based on the past market evolution as the merged entity
           continued to offer ZST to all retail TV providers.
    (400) In line with the Commission's non-horizontal Guidelines159, the three limbs of
           the foreclosure test are closely intertwined, as they share the need for a
           sufficiently important input. Where the absence of the ability to foreclose
           competition from the retail TV market has been demonstrated because of the
           lack of a sufficiently important input, the impact of such a foreclosure strategy
           could not result in a significant detrimental impact on competition. Therefore,
           the reasoning proving that ZST is not a sufficiently input for the merged entity
           to have the ability to foreclose also serves to show that any attempts to
           foreclose downstream competitors with regard to ZST would have a very
           limited effect.
    (401) The Commission recalls the following competitive characteristics of ZST and
           the market conditions in the wholesale market for the supply of Premium Pay
           TV sports channels that demonstrate that a withholding of ZST would have no
           detrimental impact on competition:
    (402) In a full foreclosure scenario, the withdrawal of ZST by the merged entity
           would affect only a limited number of retail Pay TV customers. ZST has [...]
           subscribers only, representing [5-10]% of Dutch TV customers. [...]
           subscribers of ZST on third party platforms would be deprived of the channel.
           In addition, [...] subscribers on VodafoneZiggo may be less likely to change to
           a competing provider.
159 Commission's non-horizontal Guidelines, paragraph 32.
                                                     78
 ---pagebreak---     (403) In addition, it has been demonstrated that only a part of this group of affected
              ZST customers would be likely to switch to or stay with the merged entity if
              ZST was no longer available on competing platforms. First, ZST subscribers
              can switch to similar alternatives, such as Fox Sports or the commercial and
              public non-dedicated sports channels that have been increasingly investing in
              sports content. Second, retailers have effective counter-strategies available to
              attract customers by replicating a similar sports offering or by competing
              based on other means of differentiation.
    (404) The Blauw report submitted by KPN actually supports the Commission's view
              that the withholding of ZST would affect a limited share of ZST subscribers
              only. In its submission, KPN suggests that the results of the Blauw report
              indicate that withholding of ZST would have a large market impact.160
              However, this is not correct. According to the report, only 26% of ZST
              viewers (and 29% of ZST viewers among KPN's customers) would switch to
              another provider if ZST was no longer available while 41% of them would not
              readily consider an offer by a competitor not offering ZST (and 39% of ZST
              viewers among KPN's customers).161 These results are based on and apply
              only to current ZST viewers who have shown to attach a greater importance to
              ZST. It is not conceivable that customers that do not subscribe to ZST would
              consider switching if ZST was no longer available. Given ZST's penetration
              of [5-10]%, the results from the Blauw report demonstrate that:
         (a)       Only about 1.5% of all TV customers would switch to another provider if
                   ZST was no longer available on their current platform;
         (b)       Only about 2.5% of all TV customers would not consider an alternative
                   retail Pay TV offer if ZST was not available on that alternative offer.162
    (405) Therefore, the withholding of ZST may negatively impact the addressable
              market of competing retail TV providers, however, to a very limited extent
              only. As ZST is not a sufficiently important input, the Commission does not
              consider that the withholding of ZST could have a detrimental effect on
              competition in the downstream market for the provision of retail TV services,
              or the hypothetical market for the retail supply of multiple play services
              including Pay TV services in the Netherlands, for instance in form of higher
              prices or by raising barriers to entry.
Alleged partial foreclosure strategies
    (406) As the Commission considers that the merged entity lacks the ability to
              foreclosure competing providers of retail Pay TV services with regard to ZST,
              the same conclusion holds for any attempts to partially foreclosure retail
160 Reply of KPN to Q3 to retailers of 5 April 2018, question C.B.5.
161 Blauw report of March 2018, "The role of (exclusive) conten when choosing a TV provider", slide 20.
162 The Commission did not receive the requested information on the quality of the online panel used by
    Blauw. With regard to ZST viewers, the sample size is only about 150 and the results may involve a
    significant margin of error. Nevertheless, the Commission shows that the obtained results, as presented
    in the report, do not raise any competition concerns.
                                                         79
 ---pagebreak---              competitors. As explained above, the merged entity lacks the ability to
             foreclose competing retail TV competitors and the impact of such a
             foreclosure strategy on retail TV competitors would be limited, irrespective of
             whether such foreclosure would be complete or partial.
    (407) Some respondents to the market investigation have, however, alleged that the
             merged entity has been engaging in partial foreclosure strategies post-
             Transaction. In particular, respondents to the market investigation raised the
             following concerns:
        (a)      The merged entity increased the wholesale price of ZST to an anti-
                 competitive level;163
        (b)      The merged entity withholds the ZST Go App from retail competitors for
                 resale as stand-alone proposition and discriminates between retail
                 competitors and OTT players such as Apple;164
        (c)      The merged entity's launch of ZSB has decreased the relative
                 attractiveness of other retail providers' offering of ZST.165 In addition, the
                 merged entity refuses to supply ZSB to retail competitors.
    (408) The Commission has investigated for each of these claims whether they are an
             accurate description of the merged entity's conduct, whether the merged
             entity's conduct represents an attempt to implement a partial foreclosure
             strategy and if so, which impact such strategy has had on the market.
    (409) First, the Commission disagrees with the claim that the increase in wholesale
             prices for ZST is mainly attributable to a partial foreclosure strategy. At the
             request of the Commission, the Notifying Parties have provided the wholesale
             price evolution for ZST as well as the evolution of content costs.166 The
             minimum cost per subscriber for ZST [...]. VodafoneZiggo’s expenditure on
             the ZST offering has increased from EUR [...] in 2013 to EUR [...] in 2017;
             hence the merged entity's content costs have tripled. This was partly the result
             of the increase in price for content.167 In addition, VodafoneZiggo’s increase
             in content spend can further be explained by the fact that VodafoneZiggo has
             also extended the ZST content portfolio significantly. Compared to 2013, ZST
             has for instance added Premier League and UEFA World Qualifiers.
             Furthermore, VodafoneZiggo enhanced the quality of the service of the ZST
             offering, for instance the ZST Go App is now provided as part of ZST
163 Replies to Q3 to retailers of 5 April 2018, questions of A.3 and C.B.6; Submission of KPN dated 20
    December 2017.
164 Replies to Q3 to retailers of 5 April 2018, questions A.3, B.A.3.1 and C.B.6; Submission of KPN dated
    20 December 2017; Submission of T-Mobile Netherlands dated 15 May 2018.
165 Replies to Q3 to retailers of 5 April 2018, question C.B.2; Submission of KPN dated 20 December
    2017; Submission of T-Mobile Netherlands dated 15 May 2018.
166 Reply to RFI 4, question 5.
167 […].
                                                         80
 ---pagebreak---              wholesale offering. The Commission considers that the increase in certain of
             the wholesale prices can be explained by the more significant increase in the
             cost of content of ZST.
    (410) In addition, the Commission notes that the merged entity's retail price for paid
             ZST subscriptions is at the same level as those of its competitors. According
             to the latest information from May 2018, the merged entity offers ZST for
             EUR 14.95. While CAIW offers ZST for the same price, some competitors'
             prices lie slightly above the merged entity's retail price (KPN: EUR 14.99;
             Tele2 Netherlands: EUR 15.00) and other competitors below it (Delta: EUR
             14.50; M7: EUR 13.95168).
    (411) Second, the Commission disagrees with the claim that the merged entity's
             refusal to give retail competitors access to the ZST Go App on stand-alone
             basis is part of a partial foreclosure strategy.
    (412) At request of the Commission, the Notifying Parties have explained in great
             detail which ZST related OTT services are available to retail competitors and
             directly to end customers:169
         (a)     First, any retail TV provider may – but is not obliged to – offer its ZST
                 subscribers access to the ZST GO App as part of the ZST subscription.
                 All larger retail competitors170 offer the ZST GO App together with the
                 linear subscription. However, a limited selection of small retail TV
                 providers has not yet allocated sufficient technical resources to support the
                 ZST GO App. For instance, in order to provide the ZST GO App (or any
                 other app), a retail TV provider must ensure that its customers can create a
                 ZST GO App account and that its administration can process all customer
                 information required for the ZST GO App. VodafoneZiggo has always
                 offered this combination on a wholesale level and never offered a more
                 restrictive version of the ZST package (e.g. without the ZST GO App) to
                 other retail TV providers. It is subsequently up to the distributors
                 themselves whether to use it or not. To the best of VodafoneZiggo’s
                 knowledge, all parties who are technically able to do so, offer the ZST GO
                 app as part of the ZST offering.
         (b)     Second, VodafoneZiggo provides all its ZST wholesale customers the
                 possibility to offer PPV services in relation to ZST sports content, subject
                 to VodafoneZiggo having been able to purchase a licence for PPV
                 broadcasting from the rights holder (e.g. VodafoneZiggo does not have the
                 rights to offer Premier League football matches on a PPV basis).
                 However, at this point in time, KPN is the only retail TV provider which is
                 interested in offering this service to its customers. VodafoneZiggo is not
168 Contrary to the other providers of retail TV services, M7 is the only company which also provides
    retail TV via satellite and faces capacity constraints. Therefore, VodafoneZiggo accepted M7's request
    to broadcast only three out of six ZST channels.
169 Replies to RFI 4 and RFI 7.
170 This includes KPN (including XS4all of Telfort), CAIW, Tele2 Netherlands, Delta, Kabelreus
    Helmond, Kabeltex, SKV, Solcon, Kabelnoord, T-Mobile Thuis, SKP, and M7 (Canal Digitaal).
                                                          81
 ---pagebreak---                  aware of the reasons why other retail TV providers do not have an interest
                 in offering the PPV services.
         (c)     Third, VodafoneZiggo confirms that it has never granted any retail TV
                 provider the right to offer the ZST GO App on a stand-alone basis.
                 However, TV customers of such providers can directly purchase the ZST
                 GO App from VodafoneZiggo without the need to purchase or have a TV
                 subscription with VodafoneZiggo as well. Hence, any customer in the
                 Netherlands can access the ZST GO App irrespective of the retail
                 provider.171
         (d)     Fourth, VodafoneZiggo does not price discriminate between retail
                 competitors and OTT players. In fact, VodafoneZiggo does not have
                 wholesale contracts in place with OTT players. These parties merely
                 function as the “middle-man” or an agent. VodafoneZiggo determines the
                 retail prices for these offerings of ZST GO App and directly contracts with
                 the end user. The subscription offered in Apple’s app store for EUR 9.99
                 only relates to the ZST OTT service, the ZST GO App. The ZST GO App
                 does not guarantee the same “quality of service” as the ZST television
                 service but is provided on a “best effort” basis. This means that the signal,
                 quality of the broadcast and other factors are not guaranteed. By contrast,
                 the regular TV ZST service does include such a quality of service
                 guarantee. Moreover, as indicated, the monthly ZST subscription
                 comprises both the higher quality ZST TV service and the ZST GO App.
                 This is reflected in the higher subscription fee.
    (413) The Commission concludes that the merged entity is currently not attempting
             to foreclose retail competitors with regard to the ZST GO App. Any
             individual in the Netherlands can view the ZST channels on devices with an
             internet connection, irrespective of whether they also acquire a traditional Pay
             TV subscription (or multi-play bundle) with VodafoneZiggo, KPN or any
             other provider.
    (414) Third, as regards the claim that ZSB decreases the relative value of ZST as
             well as the claim that it is not offered to retail competitors, the Commission
             has investigated whether ZSB can be considered as attempt to foreclose retail
             competitors.
    (415) The Commission notes that it is correct that ZSB has never been offered to
             third parties on wholesale basis.
    (416) ZSB predominantly contains a best-of of the content available on ZST. It does
             not contain any attractive content that is not available on ZST.172 This was
171 Therefore, the Commission also does not consider that the merged entity's approach would discourage
    or prevent new OTT incentives (as claimed in reply of T-Mobile Netherlands to Q3 to retailers of 5
    April 2018, question C.H.1.1), as the ZST Go App could always be purchased as stand-alone product.
172 The following sports are only available on ZSB: Field Hockey Dutch League, Volleyball Dutch
    League, Basketball Dutch League, Netball (Kortbal) Dutch League and Netball European League. In
    addition, ZSB broadcasts some sport documentaries and films. Generally, if ZSB carries sports which
    are not available on ZST, this concerns less popular niche sports which are not sufficiently attractive
    for the Premium Pay TV sports channel ZST. These sports have very limited viewers.
                                                       82
 ---pagebreak---               also confirmed by the respondents of the market investigation.173 On the
              contrary, as ZST has six linear TV channels and ZSB only one, ZST can
              broadcast much more content live and simultaneously than ZSB can.174 ZSB
              has to make choices on which sport to broadcast in any given timeslot. In
              addition, certain broadcasting rights have restrictions in place with regard to
              the distribution on basic tier channel ZSB.175 Overall, it follows that ZSB is
              significantly less attractive than ZST and not an important input in itself.
     (417) However, ZSB is marketed for free by the merged entity as it is included in
              the basic tier Pay TV packages at no extra charge. In this regard, the
              Commission notes that ZSB may represent an attractive offer for ZST
              subscribers who are satisfied with the more limited content available on ZSB.
     (418) While the Notifying Parties explain that ZSB was introduced to find a solution
              for Sport1, that was already barely breaking even before the Transaction, they
              also confirm that the idea behind ZSB was to reduce churn.176
     (419) In addition, while the Notifying Parties submit that it is not unreasonable to
              assume that ZSB would have been introduced in the absence of the
              Transaction177, the Commission considers that the introduction of ZSB may at
              least be partially linked to the Transaction. First, the merged entity introduced
              ZSB after the Transaction only. Second, the Transaction had increased the
              merged entity's downstream footprint and hence offered an even better
              possibility to generate value from the sports content rights.
     (420) For these reasons, the Commission considers that the merged entity has
              attempted to engage in a potentially merger-specific partial foreclosure
              strategy with regard to ZSB, which reduces the relative value of ZST on third
              party platforms. As the Commission has found that the merged entity did not
              have the ability to fully foreclose its competitors with respect to ZST, the
              same holds for the introduction of the less attractive ZSB.
     (421) This is also confirmed by the actual effects. These show that the merged
              entity's attempt to put competitors at a competitive disadvantage by only
              offering ZSB to its own customers, did not have an impact on the downstream
              market.
     (422) First, the introduction of ZSB has not decreased the number of ZST
              subscribers on third party platforms (see Table 2). This suggests that the
              introduction of ZSB has not led to significant switching of ZST subscribers
              from third party platforms to the merged entity's platform.
173  Replies to Q3 to retailers of 5 April 2018, questions C.B.1.2 and C.B.2.
174  Supplement Form CO, p. 37.
175 […].
176  Supplement Form CO, p. 114.
177  Reply to RFI 5, question 9.
                                                          83
 ---pagebreak---  ---pagebreak---                   watch it frequently. Only 20% of customers watch ZSB 6 days a month or
                  more.181
    (425) Fourth, the ACM has come to a similar conclusion in its analysis of the
              bundling of telecom services and content: "So far, however, Ziggo Sport and
              Ziggo Sport Totaal have not led to a significant shift in the television market
              ".182
6.3.6. Overall conclusion
    (426) In light of the above, the Commission concludes that the Transaction does not
              raise serious doubts as to its compatibility with the internal market as regards
              the vertical relationship between the market for the supply and acquisition of
              Premium Pay TV sports channels and the market for the retail provision of
              Pay TV services, or the hypothetical market for the retail supply of multiple
              play services including Pay TV services, in the Netherlands. The merged
              entity may have the incentive but lacks the ability to foreclose downstream
              competitors from effectively competing in the downstream market. Even if
              the merged entity were to engage in a full or partial foreclosure strategy in the
              future, the impact on the market would be very limited. This finding is
              confirmed by the stable market share of the merged entity in the last four
              years.183
6.4. Markets for the supply and acquisition of Basic and Premium Pay TV channels
     (acquisition side)
              6.4.1.     Introduction
    (427) The Transaction would combine the retail Pay TV operations of the two
              largest cable operators in the Netherlands. In 2014 the Commission found that
              the merged entity would control access to around [60-70]% of the Pay TV
              subscribers in the Netherlands. This could in turn strengthen the market power
              that the merged entity would have as a purchaser of the Basic and Premium
              TV channels that are included in such Pay TV subscriptions. Against that
              background, the Commission has assessed whether the merger would
              strengthen the merged entity's buyer power on the upstream markets for the
              supply and acquisition of Basic and Premium Pay TV channels, and whether
              this would significantly impede effective competition.
181 Reply to RFI 5, question 2. The following definitions apply: Never (0 days per month); Rarely (1 day
    or less); Occasionally (2 days); Frequently (3 to 6 days); Heavily (6 days or more).
182 ACM report of July 2017, "Bundling of telecom services and content in the Netherlands", p. 23.
183 As the Commission concluded that the merged entity's sports channels (ZST, including ZSB) as well
    as its VOD platform Movies & Series are no sufficiently important inputs to foreclose downstream
    competitors, the Commission considers that also the combination the two inputs does not raise any
    competition concerns. The Commission has demonstrated that for both inputs customers can switch to
    attractive alternative offerings while providers of retail Pay TV services have counter-strategies
    available. Therefore, if the merged entity were to bundle these products for its own customers and
    withhold both inputs from downstream competitors, the discussed individual alternative offerings and
    counter-strategies could be employed jointly to react to such a foreclosure strategy.
                                                         85
 ---pagebreak---     (428) According to the Horizontal Merger Guidelines, "increased market power"
            means the ability of one or more firms to profitably increase prices, reduce
            output, choice or quality of goods and services, diminish innovation, or
            otherwise influence parameters of competition.184 Throughout the Guidelines,
            the expression "increased prices" is used to refer to those various ways in
            which a merger may result in competitive harm.
    (429) The Horizontal Merger Guidelines expressly recognise that both suppliers and
            buyers can have market power that is likely to produce such effects.185 Thus,
            the Commission has to assess whether a merger brings about a degree of
            buyer power in an upstream market that is likely to have negative effects on
            the availability of high-quality products, on the existence and availability a
            wide selection of services, and on innovation on a downstream market.
    (430) As concerns buyer power in particular, the Horizontal Merger Guidelines state
            that the Commission may analyse to what extent a merged entity will increase
            its buyer power in an upstream market.186 The Guidelines explain that
            increases in a buyer's bargaining power may be beneficial for competition. In
            particular, lower input costs resulting from increased buyer power are likely to
            at least partly be passed on to consumers in case neither downstream
            competition nor total output is restricted.187
    (431) The Horizontal Merger Guidelines also make clear that a merger that creates
            or strengthens the market power of a buyer may significantly impede effective
            competition, in particular by creating or strengthening a dominant position.
            Competition in downstream markets may be adversely affected if the merged
            entity were likely to restrict output in the downstream market, or to use its
            buyer-power vis-à-vis its suppliers to foreclose its rivals.188
            6.4.2.     Effect of the Transaction on the merged entity's bargaining power
                       vis-à-vis broadcasters
                       6.4.2.1. The Notifying Party's views in 2014
    (432) The Notifying Party disputed that it can exert market power vis-à-vis TV
            broadcasters.
184 Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers under the Council Regulation on the control of
    concentrations between undertakings (OJ C 31, 05.02.2004, p.5), (the "Horizontal Merger
    Guidelines"), paragraph 8.
185 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, paragraph 8.
186 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, paragraph 61.
187 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, paragraph 62.
188 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, paragraph 61.
                                                    86
 ---pagebreak---     (433) In that context, the Notifying Party submitted that the merged entity's share of
              expenditure on the acquisition of linear TV channels in the Netherlands would
              be [50-60]%.189
    (434) The Notifying Party submitted that such share of expenditure on TV channels
              is not indicative of buyer power. It advanced a number of arguments to
              support that contention. It argued, first, that content rights are intangible assets
              that are not susceptible to economies of scale. It argued second, that there
              would be a mutual dependency between TV broadcasters, who rely on the
              widest possible distribution to secure advertising income, and retail TV
              service providers, who need attractive content in order to be competitive at
              retail level. It argued third, that the Transaction would have, if any, a limited
              impact on the negotiation position of TV broadcasters, as it would create an
              unavoidable trading partner for only a limited number of them. It also argued
              that in any event, many TV broadcasters are large multinational companies
              with significant bargaining power vis-à-vis retail TV providers.
    (435) The Notifying Party also submitted that it would not be able to restrict the
              availability of TV content in the downstream market for retail TV services. In
              that context, the Notifying Party referred to the conclusion drawn by the
              Dutch competition authority in a previous case. In that case, the ACM found
              no link between the number of subscribers of a given TV service provider and
              the number of TV channels offered as part of the Basic Pay TV package in the
              Netherlands. Accordingly, the ACM concluded that there was no indication that
              an increase in the size of a given retail TV service provider would lead to a
              lower quality TV offering.190 The Notifying Party has submitted further
              correlation analysis to argue that this is still the case.191
    (436) Moreover, the Notifying Party argued that at most, the Transaction would
              create a new unavoidable trading partner for a very small number of TV
              channels only.192 The Notifying Party further argued that the specific
              characteristics of the Transaction make it significantly less likely that
              bargaining power could be materially enhanced through the merger than in the
              (then) recent Universal/EMI case193 and that the idea that becoming a
189 Form CO, paragraphs 289, 454 and Annex 33. The Notifying Party considered that the merged entity's
    share of expenditure on Basic Pay TV channels would be broadly in line with its share of the market
    for the retail provision of Pay TV. With respect to Premium Pay TV film channels and Premium Pay
    TV sports channels, the position of the merged entity would be different as there were a small number
    of retail Pay TV providers who did not offer Film1, Sport1 and/or HBO Nederland. As a result, the
    Notifying Party expected that the merged entity's share of spend on Premium Pay TV channels would
    be slightly higher than its market share on the market for the retail provision of Pay TV services.
190 Reference was made to the ACM (NMa) decision 5796/ Cinven – Warburg Pincus – Essent Kabelcom,
    of 8 December 2006.
191 Liberty Global submission "Comments on the European Commission's Decision pursuant to Article
    6(1)(c) of Council Regulation No 139/2004", prepared by Oxera, 21 May 2014.
192 Liberty Global submission "Comments on the European Commission's Decision pursuant to Article
    6(1)(c) of Council Regulation No 139/2004" prepared by Oxera 21 May 2014.
193 Commission's decision of 21 September 2012 in Case No COMP/M.6458 – Universal Music
    Group/EMI Music.
                                                        87
 ---pagebreak---              "pivotal" buyer would increase bargaining power is incorrect. It also argued
             that it would not be possible to empirically verify the relationship between the
             number of downstream customers served by TV services providers and their
             bargaining power vis-à-vis TV broadcasters because contracts with
             broadcasters vary along many dimensions and because there are too few
             contracts to systematically distinguish bargaining effects from other
             influences.194
                       6.4.2.2. Commission's assessment in 2014
    (437) The Commission noted that the merging companies purchased TV channels to
             include those channels into the Pay TV packages that they offered to their
             subscribers. The Pay TV packages included both Basic Pay TV channels and
             Premium Pay TV channels (hereinafter referred to as "Pay TV channels").
             The market position that the merged entity would have in the acquisition of
             both types of Pay TV channels was derived from similar market conditions,
             such as the position of the merged entity as a large distribution channel to
             reach subscribers, the size of their customer base and the scope of their
             network footprint. When assessing the likely competitive impact of the
             Transaction, the Commission undertook its analysis for both sets of Pay TV
             channels together.195
    (438) The Commission considered that the Transaction would lead to the creation of
             a merged entity that would account for [50-60]%196 of the market for the
             acquisition of Pay TV channels in the Netherlands. The increment that the
             merger brought was very sizeable, namely [10-20]%.197 The Commission
             considered that this market share was likely to understate the degree of buyer
             power that the merged entity would have on this market. This was due to the
             fact that the merged entity would have a far more significant market position
             downstream, namely on the market for the retail provision of Pay TV services.
    (439) Both the Commission198 and the Dutch Competition Authority have in the
             past confirmed that the market position of purchasers of Pay TV channels is
194 Liberty Global submission "On the applicability of insights from bargaining models in Universal/EMI"
    prepared by Cristina Caffarra, Kai-Uwe Kühn, Perre Régibeau of CRA, 9 June 2014.
195 The Commission noted that this approach was favourable to the Parties. In relation to the acquisition
    of Premium Pay TV channels, the merged entity would itself own three out of four Premium Pay TV
    channels in the Netherlands. The operator of the remaining fourth Premium Pay TV channel, Fox, was
    also a TV broadcaster that would have to negotiate the distribution of its Basic Pay TV channels with
    the merged entity. The combination of the merged entity's position as a purchaser of Premium Pay TV
    channels and its ownership of competing Premium Pay TV content could only aggravate any negative
    impact that the proposed transaction may have on the merged entity's ability and incentive to exert its
    buyer power vis-à-vis the owner of the remaining Premium Pay TV channel in an anticompetitive
    manner.
196 Form CO, paragraphs 289, 454 and Annex 33.
197 Form CO, Annex 33.
198 Commission's decision of 16 April 2004 in Case No COMP/M.2876 - Newscorp/Telepiù, paragraphs
    21, 42 and 186.
                                                       88
 ---pagebreak---               closely related to the number of households those purchasers serve as retail
              providers of TV services.
    (440) In Liberty Media/Casema199, the ACM assessed the then proposed merger
              between the Notifying Party and Casema Holding B.V. ("Casema"), which
              would later form Ziggo, together with Multikabel B.V. ("Multikabel") and
              Essent Kabelcom B.V. ("@Home"), in the Netherlands. In its decision to open
              in-depth proceedings, the ACM underlined that a combined Liberty/Casema
              would have served 60% of all cable subscribers in the Netherlands. According
              to the ACM, there were concerns that this could increase Liberty's market
              power in the market for the acquisition of Pay TV channels to such an extent
              that it could dictate the TV content that consumers in the Netherlands could
              access. The ACM did not take a final decision on the case since Liberty
              Media abandoned the proposed acquisition.200
    (441) The Commission considered that the Notifying Party's reference to the ACM's
              decision in Essent Kabelcom/Multikabel/Casema201, where that authority
              reached a different conclusion, was not relevant to this case. The ACM
              concluded that that merger of the companies that now form Ziggo was not
              likely to significantly impede effective competition on the market for the
              acquisition of Pay TV channels. However, first, the market position of those
              companies was significantly more modest than the market position that a
              merged Liberty/Ziggo would have.202 Second, the ACM took its decision
              based on the market features as they existed in the Netherlands at the time.
              Most notably, the ACM concluded that Ziggo's alleged market power in the
              acquisition of Pay TV channels would be constrained by the potential
              competition from alternative digital distribution channels such as the
              Internet.203 The ACM reached that conclusion whilst Liberty Global and
              Ziggo would still be active as independent competitors on the market. In this
              case, the Commission had to assess the likely impact that the proposed merger
              between Liberty Global and Ziggo would have on that potential competition,
              and needed to makes that assessment on the basis of the competitive situation
              in relation to Internet services as they exist today. Third, the ACM also
              distinguished Ziggo from Liberty insofar as Liberty Global is a vertically
              integrated undertaking that has interests in content providers as well and
              whose strategy it is to expand those upstream interests. The ACM considered
              that this vertical integration could give it a further incentive to limit the
199 Decision of the ACM of 6 November 2002 in Case 3052, Liberty Media/Casema, points 264-267, and
    272.
200 http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB1037655917540774628 [accessed on 4 September 2014].
201 Decision of the ACM of 8 December 2006 in Case 5796, Cinven/Warburg Pincus/Essent Kabelcom.
202 At that time, the companies that now form Ziggo had an approximate [40-50]% share of the retail
    market for the provision of Pay TV services in the Netherlands.
203 Decision of the ACM of 8 December 2006 in Case 5796, Cinven/Warburg Pincus/Essent Kabelcom,
    paragraph 96.
                                                        89
 ---pagebreak---             availability of certain TV content, in particular competing TV content, to
            consumers in the Netherlands.204
    (442) In this case, therefore, the Commission needed to make its own assessment of
            the likely market power of the merged entity on the market for the acquisition
            of Pay TV channels.
    (443) The Commission noted that the theoretical framework used in
            Universal/EMI205 could easily be applied to the present case and that a
            "pivotal" buyer does not always have increased bargaining power.
    (444) The Commission also noted that, given in particular the limited number of
            contracts with TV broadcasters and their complexity, it is difficult to calculate
            the effect of the merger on the merged entity's bargaining power while fully
            accounting for other factors such as variations in contract terms. Nevertheless,
            data collected during the market investigation by the Commission on annual
            payments received by TV broadcasters from different TV services providers
            confirmed that there is a negative correlation between the price paid by TV
            services providers per TV household to TV broadcasters and the number of
            TV households served by the TV services providers. This is consistent with
            TV services providers' bargaining power increasing with the number of
            subscribers they serve.
    (445) Furthermore, the merged entity's share of the downstream market would
            amount to [60-70]% by value206 and to [60-70]% by TV homes controlled.207
            The merged entity would thus control at least twice if not three times as many
            TV subscribers as the second-largest market participant KPN, which had an
            estimated retail market share of between 20% and 25%.208 The Commission
            considered that the fact that the Parties' combined share of expenditure on
            broadcasters' TV channels was significantly smaller than their combined share
            of revenue generated from reselling those same TV channels was an
            indication that they already held some degree of bargaining power vis-à-vis
            TV broadcasters in the Netherlands. It implied that the Parties paid less per
            subscriber than their rivals and that this relationship was not commensurate
            with the difference between the size of the customer base of the Parties and
            their competitors alone. Moreover, internal documents of Liberty Global
            confirmed that from 2011 onwards, it was already paying 40% under average
204 Decision of the ACM of 8 December 2006 in Case 5796, Cinven/Warburg Pincus/Essent Kabelcom,
    paragraph 84; Decision of the ACM of 6 November 2002 in Case 3052, Liberty Media/Casema,
    paragraph 266.
205 Commission's decision of 21 September 2012 in Case No COMP/M.6458 – Universal Music
    Group/EMI Music.
206 Form CO, Annex 33.
207 [Reference to the Parties' internal business documents].
208 22% in Q4 2012 and 25% in Q3 2013; Form CO, Table 36.
                                                        90
 ---pagebreak---              market cost for the TV channels that it included in its retail Pay TV
             packages.209
    (446) Other evidence on the Commission's file equally confirmed that there is a
             close link between the number of households that a retail TV operator serves
             and the market power it exerts on the upstream market for the acquisition of
             TV channels.
    (447) The Notifying Party noted the following in its internal business documents:
         (i) [Reference to the Parties' internal business documents]210;
         (ii) [Reference to the Parties' internal business documents]211;
         (iii)[Reference to the Parties' internal business documents]212
    (448) The large majority of TV Broadcasters confirmed the direct relation between
             the number of TV subscribers served by a provider of retail TV services and
             the bargaining power that such a TV service provider exerts vis-à-vis TV
             Broadcasters.213
    (449) One respondent during the Commission's 2014 investigation stated the
             following: "Commercial income via advertising is dependent on the amount of
             viewers a channel attracts. As TV broadcasters are looking for distribution as
             wide as possible, cable operators can leverage the amount of subscribers they
             serve. The amount of subscribers served is therefore one of the most
             important determinants of bargaining power of the cable operators. Since the
             market shares of the merged entity become greater, it is logical that their
             market power will increase".214
    (450) SBS Broadcasting B.V. ("SBS") confirmed that "The amount of TV
             households (eye-balls) a retail TV service provider serves is an important
             factor determining buyer power. The merged entity would serve more TV
             households, and thus exert more buyer power."215 NPO confirmed that the
             merged entity would exert significant buyer power vis-à-vis it and other TV
209 [Reference to the Parties' internal business documents].
210 [Reference to the Parties' internal business documents].
211  [Reference to the Parties' internal business documents].
212 [Reference to the Parties' internal business documents].
213 Replies to questionnaire Q4 to Phase II Questionnaire to Broadcasters of 28 May 2014, question 19.1;
    Document ID2270, non-confidential minutes of conference call between Commission's services and
    Fox International Channels of 25 June 2014, page 3; Document ID1908, non-confidential minutes of
    conference call between Commission's services and SBS of 19 June 2014, page 3.
214 Reply to questionnaire Q2 to TV channel wholesale suppliers of 17 March 2014, question 55.1.
215 Document ID1400, non-confidential reply of SBS to Q4 Phase II Questionnaire to TV Broadcasters,
    question 19.
                                                        91
 ---pagebreak---               Broadcasters by merely re-stating the fact that the merged entity would serve
              around 70% of the joined cable, DSL and fibre market in the Netherlands.216
    (451) The Commission was not convinced by the Notifying Party's argument that
              after the merger, there would be a balance of bargaining power between it and
              the TV broadcasters. The Notifying Party had indicated that the licence or
              carriage fees it paid to TV broadcasters had increased over the last year. Its
              own internal documents however confirmed that in its own view, this increase
              in licence or carriage fees resulted from those TV broadcasters' [Reference to
              the Parties' internal business documents], as they would be "[Reference to the
              Parties' internal business documents]" because their "[Reference to the Parties'
              internal business documents]" – especially in the Netherlands.217 The
              Notifying Party itself predicted that the Transaction would allow the merged
              entity to prevent having to increase its payments to even the most powerful
              TV broadcasters in the Dutch market.218
    (452) Respondents to the Commission's 2014 market investigation also confirmed
              that the merger would significantly enhance the merged entity's market power
              as a buyer of Pay TV channels.
    (453) A large majority of TV broadcasters believed that in the market for the
              acquisition of Pay TV channels, retail providers of TV services already held
              the most bargaining power.219 That majority considered that the Transaction
              would lead to an increase of the merged entity's market power to the extent
              that it would be able to dictate its prices and other conditions to them.220 That
              conclusion was also shared by all providers of retail TV services that provided
              a response to the Commission's first phase market investigation.221
                        6.4.2.3. Commission's assessment and conclusion in 2014
    (454) In light of that evidence from the 2014 market investigation and from the
              Notifying Party the Commission considered that the Transaction was likely to
              strengthen the merged entity's market power in the market for the acquisition
              of Pay TV channels.
    (455) The Commission reiterated that increases in a buyer's bargaining power may
              generally be beneficial for competition. The Commission's Horizontal Merger
216 Document ID1424, non-confidential reply of NPO to Q4 Phase II Questionnaire to TV Broadcasters,
    question 19.
217 [Reference to the Parties' internal business documents].
218 RTL, SBS and NPO together accounted for an overall viewing share of 70% in 2013 in the
    Netherlands:        Stichting       KijkOnderzoek        Jaarrapport      2013,       available      at:
    https://kijkonderzoek.nl/images/SKO Jaarrapport/SKO jaarrapport 2013.pdf.
219 Replies to questionnaire Q2 to TV channel wholesale suppliers of 17 March 2014, question 54.
220 Replies to questionnaire Q2 to TV channel wholesale suppliers of 17 March 2014, question 55.
221 Replies to questionnaire Q3 to retailers of TV, telephony and Internet access services, question 64.
                                                         92
 ---pagebreak---               Guidelines explain that lower input costs resulting from increased buyer
              power are likely to, at least partly, be passed on to consumers in case neither
              downstream competition nor total output is restricted.222
    (456) Nevertheless, an increase in the merged entity's bargaining power could have
              detrimental effects on effective competition. Respondents to the
              Commission's market investigation indicated that there could be several such
              detrimental effects on competition. Following those submissions, the
              Commission assessed in detail whether the increase in the merged entity's
              market power as a purchaser of Pay TV channels could:
            –     Increase its ability and incentive to hamper the emergence of innovative
                  Pay TV services;
            –     Increase its ability and incentive to negatively influence the breadth and
                  quality of the programming content that broadcasters offer in the
                  Netherlands;
            –     Increase its ability and incentive to obtain terms and conditions from
                  broadcasters that ultimately have a negative impact on the access of
                  competing retail TV providers to that very same content;
            –     Increase its ability and incentive to block TV broadcasters' hybrid
                  broadcast broadband TV signals.223
                        6.4.2.4. The Notifying Parties' views in their Supplementary
                                   Notification
    (457) The Notifying Parties note that in 2013, Liberty Global's expenditure on the
              acquisition of linear channels for the Netherlands amounted to EUR [...] and
              Ziggo's expenditure amounted to EUR [...]. Currently, VodafoneZiggo's
              expenditure on the acquisition of linear Pay TV channels for the Netherlands
              amounts to EUR [...]. VodafoneZiggo's market share for retail TV is [50-
              60]%. While the Parties were unable to provide a third party estimate for the
              total expenditure on the acquisition of TV channels in the Netherlands, they
              consider that overall market shares for the acquisition of linear TV channels
              are similar to those for retail TV. Therefore, the Parties estimate that
              VodafoneZiggo's expenditure of EUR [...] represents a market share of
              approximately [50-60]%, in line with its position on the retail TV market.
              Since this market share is comparable to and in fact even lower than the
              combined share of Liberty Global and Ziggo in 2013 (which, as set out in the
              2014 notification was approximately [50-60]%), the Notifying Parties submit
              that the Transaction has not led and will not lead to a substantial impediment
              to effective competition in relation to the acquisition of TV channels.
222  Horizontal Merger Guidelines, paragraph 62.
223 Through HbbTV signals TV broadcasters are able to allow retail TV customers that have a smart TV to
     directly connect to those broadcasters' own interactive OTT services via a linear broadcasting that
     encompasses so-called 'HbbTV triggers'.
                                                       93
 ---pagebreak---                         6.4.2.5. Commission's assessment
    (458) The Commission considers that, based on current market conditions, the
              Transaction is likely to strengthen the merged entity's market power in the
              market for the acquisition of Pay TV channels, for the following reasons:
    (459) First, VodafoneZiggo's market share on the market for the acquisition of
              linear Pay TV channels in the Netherlands indeed appears to be around [50-
              60]%. In this regard, the Commission recalls that the increment brought was
              [10-20]%.224
    (460) Second, VodafoneZiggo's share of the downstream market would amount to
              [50-60]% by value225, to [50-60]% by subscribers and to [40-50]% by TV
              homes connected.226 VodafoneZiggo's thus still controls significantly more
              TV subscribers as the second-largest market participant KPN, which had in
              2017 Q3 an estimated retail market share of 32%.227
    (461) Third, respondents to the Commission's investigation consider that, as a result
              of the merger, the market power of the merged entity in the market for the
              acquisition of TV channels has significantly changed vis-à-vis the wholesale
              suppliers of TV channels in the Netherlands to the extent that the merged
              entity is able to dictate its prices and other conditions to Pay TV channels.228
              A respondent noted:
                  "Commercial income via advertising is dependent on the amount of
                  viewers a channel attracts. As TV broadcasters are looking for
                  distribution as wide as possible, cable operators can leverage the amount
                  of subscribers they serve. The amount of subscribers served is therefore
                  one of the most important determinants of bargaining power of the cable
                  operators. Since the market shares of the merged entity become greater
                  (more than 50% of the dutch TV households), it is logical that their market
                  power will increase."229
              6.4.3.    Effect of increased bargaining power on the emergence of OTT
                        services
    (462) In the Commission's 2014 decision, the Commission noted that in (then)
              recent years, TV broadcasters that operated in the Netherlands had been
224  Form CO, Annex 33.
225  Notifying Parties’ reply to the Commission’s request for information of 24 May 2018 (RFI 13), 25
     May 2018, paragraph 1.1.
226  Supplement to Form CO, Table 37.
227  Supplement to Form CO, Table 38.
228 Replies to questionnaire Q2 to TV channel wholesale suppliers of 5 April 2018, question C.B.16.
229 Reply from Talpa TV to questionnaire Q2 to TV channel wholesale suppliers of 5 April 2018, question
     C.B.16.
                                                      94
 ---pagebreak---       taking initiatives to allow Dutch consumers to access and view TV content in
      innovative ways. In particular, TV broadcasters had taken initiatives to offer
      the content that is shown on the linear Pay TV channels that are offered via
      the Parties' Pay TV platform also over the Internet via OTT services.
(463) The Commission noted that the Parties were active as buyers on the Dutch
      market for the acquisition of Pay TV channels. This market was to a certain
      extent characterised by the existence of agreements that restrict TV
      broadcasters in their ability to offer their TV channels and content via the
      Internet. As far as the Parties were concerned, this mainly concerned
      agreements that Liberty Global negotiated with TV broadcasters. Liberty
      Global concluded those agreements as part of, or together with, the agreement
      under which it carried the broadcasters' Pay TV channels on its Pay TV
      platform.
(464) Where TV broadcasters provided OTT services themselves, those agreements
      were between Liberty Global and providers that could compete with Liberty
      Global's Pay TV packages. Where TV broadcasters provided their content to
      third party providers of OTT services, those agreements could restrict the
      access of potential competitors of Liberty Global's Pay TV platform to the
      inputs that they needed in order to operate their services.
(465) Against that background, the Commission had to assess whether the merger
      between Liberty Global and Ziggo could increase the market power of Liberty
      Global to sustain such restrictive agreements, or to conclude agreements that
      are more onerous from the perspective of TV broadcasters and ultimately of
      consumers in the Netherlands.
                6.4.3.1. The Notifying Party's views in 2014
(466) The Notifying Party argued that any claim that it sought to hold back the OTT
      distribution of TV channels and content of TV broadcasters is not specific to
      the Transaction, as Ziggo and UPC already had an incentive to attempt to get
      TV broadcasters to hold back such OTT distribution of linear channels and
      associated content.
(467) In order to support its arguments, the Notifying Party referred to the
      commercial negotiations that had taken place with NPO, which is its
      negotiation partner for the carriage of the TV channels of the Dutch public
      broadcasters. The Notifying Party submitted that NLkabel, a trade association
      that included both Liberty Global and Ziggo, had already asked NPO to hold
      back the OTT streaming of its linear TV channels.
(468) Also, the Notifying Party explained that the request to NPO was made in the
      context of contractual negotiations in which NPO requested a significantly
      higher fee for the carriage of the TV channels of the Dutch public
      broadcasters. This happened in light of a 2013 report prepared for the Dutch
      government, in which a suggestion was made that NPO could strengthen its
      bargaining position with the platform operators by expanding its OTT
      distribution of linear TV channels on the Internet. That hypothetical increase
      in bargaining power would be based on the threat that NPO could cease to
      offer its channels to cable operators and instead distribute nationally via OTT.
      In such situations – where TV broadcasters were demanding more
                                           95
 ---pagebreak---       compensation for their content – UPC and Ziggo would naturally respond by
      attempting to raise their revenues by preventing the same content from being
      given away for free via the Internet. TV broadcasters' commercial choice to
      provide free OTT access to their content would risk degrading the value of
      their content and this would be the case irrespective of any perceived market
      power of the merged entity.
(469) The Notifying Party claimed that ultimately, its new 2014 agreement
      negotiated with NPO did not include any restriction on the broadcasters with
      respect to OTT service provision. The Notifying Party submitted that the same
      applied to the agreement that it had recently concluded with RTL. Finally, the
      Notifying Party stated that no such restriction was being sought in the ongoing
      negotiations with SBS.
(470) The Notifying Party also explained that, from a conceptual viewpoint, it
      strongly believed that restrictions on broadcasters with respect to OTT service
      provision in the context of TV transmission agreements should be seen as a
      normal outcome of commercial negotiations, and not as an anti-competitive
      exercise of market power. It continued by explaining that, in principle, there
      would be several ways in which a broadcaster could monetize its content,
      which would include: carriage fees paid by platform operators in return for the
      right to air a channel; subscription fees paid by consumers who subscribe to
      pay-for channels; advertising or sponsorship fees paid to broadcasters for
      including adverts alongside their programming; as well as other less
      significant revenue streams such as advertising on channel websites or OTT
      portals, or premium rate ‘phone-ins’. The broadcaster’s choice of business
      models from those would also have implications for its optimal strategy with
      respect to content distribution. In that respect, the Notifying Party explained
      that, for example, a broadcaster that chooses to rely solely on advertising
      income would be incentivised to distribute content freely and as widely as
      possible, including all platforms as well as OTT. Conversely, a platform
      choosing to rely on carriage income alone would be incentivised to maximise
      the value of its channels to its customers, the platform operators. This might
      include exclusive deals, which would allow the platform operators to pay a
      greater price for carriage rights. In practice, most channels derive income
      from a combination of sources and would be required to balance those
      opposing incentives.
(471) The Notifying Party claimed that, in the above context, a restriction with
      respect to OTT service provision can be seen as a simple commercial reality.
      By increasing the free distribution of content via OTT, broadcasters would
      necessarily be decreasing the value of that content for platform operators. It
      would follow that a widely available, free distribution model is therefore
      incompatible with a premium carriage fee model. This would not be unique to
      broadcasters: media owners of all kinds would struggle to trade-off the
      advantages versus the disadvantages of making content available for free. All
      of them would face the same choices and trade-offs, and, according to the
      Notifying Party, none of them can expect to charge high fees for content that
      is widely available for free on the internet. Again, in the Notifying Party's
      view, that market development was not related to any increase in market
      power that the Transaction would bring about.
                                           96
 ---pagebreak---                    6.4.3.2. Commission's assessment in 2014
  (472) The Commission considered in the 2014 decision that in order to undertake its
         competitive assessment of the Transaction's likely impact on OTT services in
         the Netherlands, the Commission needed to take into consideration that the
         Parties and TV broadcasters deal with each other at multiple market levels.
  (473) The Commission noted that the Parties and TV broadcasters negotiated the
         carriage of the broadcasters' Pay TV channels and associated content via the
         Parties' Pay TV platforms. This negotiation took place on the Dutch market
         for the acquisition of Pay TV channels. At the same time, TV broadcasters
         were increasingly offering their content via Internet-based OTT services. To
         the extent that this content was offered to third-party operators of OTT
         services, those operators competed with the Parties as buyers of that content.
         Those operators also potentially competed, on the downstream retail market
         for Pay TV services, with the Pay TV platforms of the Parties. To the extent
         that broadcasters themselves offered their content online, they too potentially
         competed with the Parties' Pay TV platforms on the downstream retail market
         for Pay TV services.
  (474) In the 2014 decision, the Commission assessed whether the merged entity's
         increased market power as purchaser of TV channels could increase its ability
         to condition the carriage of TV broadcasters' linear TV channels (and
         associated catch-up services) on its Pay TV platform in the Netherlands on
         terms that would prevent those broadcasters from operating, or providing
         content to, Internet-based OTT services. The likely effects of such strategy
         would be felt beyond the Dutch market for the acquisition of Pay TV
         channels, namely on the retail market for Pay TV services on which those
         OTT services could compete with the merged entity's Pay TV platform.
  (475) The Commission noted that OTT services were emerging services that
         constituted a significant competitive threat to traditional Pay TV. The
         Commission found evidence that suggested that the Notifying Party already
         had every incentive to prevent, delay or hamper such OTT innovation. By
         using its increased buyer power, the merged entity could prevent innovative
         new TV services from entering the markets for the acquisition of Pay TV
         channels and for the retail provision of Pay TV services, thereby degrading
         the quality and choice for Dutch consumers.
  (476) The Commission's explanations from the 2014 decision on the role and
         importance of existing and future OTT services are set out in paragraphs (477)
         to (489) below, while the type of restrictive agreements that were in place in
         the Netherlands in relation to such OTT services are set out in paragraphs
         (505) to (544). The Commission's assessment of the likely impact that the
         Transaction would have on the continuation or the worsening of such
         restrictive agreements is set out in paragraphs (545) to (593).
Importance of OTT services
  (477) In the Conditional Clearance Decision, the Commission noted that a TV
         broadcaster that acquires the broadcasting rights to TV content can deploy
         that content in various ways. First, it can include that content in the
         programming of its linear TV channels that it in turn offers to retail TV
                                               97
 ---pagebreak---              services providers such as the Parties for distribution to consumers. Second, it
             can seek to offer that content, in a non-linear fashion, to retail TV services
             providers such as the Parties for inclusion into their VOD services. Third, it
             can seek to offer that content over the Internet. It can do so directly, or via the
             services of an aggregator that packages the content of different content
             owners in a broad Internet offer to consumers.
    (478) The Commission understands that it is also feasible to offer TV channels in a
             linear fashion over the Internet, for instance, live streaming of TV
             programmes as shown on the TV channels over the cable, which NPO had (at
             the time) recently introduced.230 However, as internal documents of the
             Parties also confirm231, OTT services until then had focussed on offering non-
             linear content to Internet users. Such OTT services were emerging in the
             Netherlands. A number of them were already available to consumers.
    (479) Various TV broadcasters in the Netherlands offer so-called "catch-up
             services" over the Internet. Consumers that use those services can re-watch
             the content that was available on their linear TV channels for a limited period
             of time after it was shown on such channels. Those catch-up services can be
             combined with "preview services", where consumers can watch individual TV
             programmes before they are shown on the linear TV channels.
    (480) An example of that type of service is the kijk.nl service of SBS. That service
             offers catch-up content that was available on the SBS channels SBS6, Net5
             and Veronica. With its "kijk eerder" service, it also allows consumers to
             watch certain films and series before they are shown on those channels.
    (481) RTL has an OTT service called "RTLXL". That service includes content from
             RTL's main channels RTL 4, 5, 7 and 8, as well as its thematic channels RTL
             Crime, RTL Lounge and Telekids. In 2014, RTL also launched the Videoland
             Unlimited service. For a monthly payment of EUR 10, consumers obtain
             unlimited access to films and series. Through Videoland Unlimited, RTL also
             intended to produce its own series.232
    (482) Public broadcasters in the Netherlands offer their catch-up content and certain
             previews online on "Uitzending Gemist." Their (then) more recent paid OTT
             service NPO Plus allows consumers to have access to a wider, more premium
             library of content offered by the Dutch public broadcasters.233 Consumers can
             view this content in high quality.
230 http://www.npo nl/live.
231 [Reference to the Parties' internal business documents].
232 For March 2015, it plans to show the first episodes of a high-quality Dutch drama series called
    "Zwarte Tulp.": http://pressroom.rtl nl/videoland/persberichten/persbericht/sterrencast-in-eerste-eigen-
    serie-videoland-zwarte-tulp [accessed 08 August 2014]
233 Document ID1989, non-confidential minutes of conference call between Commission's services and
    NPO of 19 June 2014.
                                                        98
 ---pagebreak---     (483) Other OTT offers that are available in the Netherlands include the Eurosport
           Player service of Eurosport, which allows consumers to access live streamed
           sports events across the Internet connected devices that they use.
    (484) In June 2014, the three main TV broadcasters in the Netherlands – NPO, RTL
           and SBS - commercially launched their joint venture NLZiet. For EUR 7.95
           per month, consumers obtain Internet access to the content that is shown on
           the TV channels of each of those TV broadcasters. NLZiet is integrated with
           the three stand-alone OTT offers of those broadcasters, allowing consumers to
           search and access content across those platforms in a streamlined manner.
           NLZiet offers access to catch-up and pre-view content. NLZiet markets itself
           as a complete, all-encompassing service that offers consumers access to all
           content that is shown on the linear TV channels of the associated
           broadcasters. The aim is to include content that goes back as far as is feasible
           under the broadcasters' content agreements with content providers. NLZiet
           also offers additional service features. For instance, it allows consumers an
           easy way to search for and access content of their liking that is available from
           each of these broadcasters. It provides alerts if a new episode of a consumers'
           favourite TV series is on-line. The content on NLZiet can be accessed on any
           connected device. NLZiet guarantees that consumers can access the available
           content in high quality.
    (485) The Commission considered in the Conditional Clearance Decision that those
           OTT offerings constituted important innovations, potentially changing the
           way in which consumers in the Netherlands can search for, and watch, TV
           content online. If such OTT offerings became successful, consumers would
           face a genuine choice between the Notifying Party's cable TV subscription,
           and the content that is available on the Internet. OTT services were hence
           (then) an emerging form of competition to the Parties' cable TV operations.
    (486) For the same reason, the Notifying Party sees those offerings as a threat to its
           own cable TV operations. In its response to the Article 6(1)(c) decision in the
           current matter, Liberty Global explained that "the use of OTT services has
           expanded rapidly and expectations are that this expansion will continue, to
           the detriment of 'traditional' video and television services offered by network
           operators such as UPC, Ziggo and KPN".234 Also in the Form CO, the
           Notifying Party noted that 'the increased availability of channels via the
           internet is expected to negatively impact the Parties' retail TV services
           activities'.235
    (487) Ultimately, the Notifying Party feared that consumers could choose to end
           their cable TV subscription and subscribe instead to an Internet offer of a
           player like KPN and possibly the OTT SVOD service of a content provider. In
           industry parlance, this is the threat that Pay TV consumers "cut the cable or
           cord".
234 Document ID1179, Liberty Global response to the Commission's Article 6(1)(c) decision in case
    M.7000 – Liberty Global/Ziggo, paragraph 37.
235 Form CO, paragraph 464.
                                                 99
 ---pagebreak---     (488) […] this threat would be particularly credible if those OTT services offered a
            combination of […] and catch-up TV offers.236 […] that an explosive growth
            of OTT providers constituted […].237 The availability of TV broadcasters'
            content OTT […] for reaching the end consumer.238
    (489) Therefore, the Commission considered that OTT services were a relatively
            new way for distributing content to end users and that they were growing in
            importance. If unhindered, OTT services were likely to exert a growing
            competitive constraint on the traditional distribution model of cable TV
            operators.
The Parties' approach towards OTT services in negotiations with TV
broadcasters pre-merger
    (490) The acquisition of linear Pay TV channels and the provision of OTT services
            are typically negotiated jointly between TV broadcasters and the Parties.
    (491) This is mirrored in the contractual arrangements for those services. Typically,
            contractual clauses that govern the ability of TV broadcasters to offer their TV
            content OTT form part of the same agreement as the carriage agreements for
            their linear Pay TV channels. Irrespective of whether such contractual 'OTT'
            clauses are in the end contained in one and the same contract, or subject to a
            separate agreement, commercial negotiations on the TV broadcasters' OTT
            offers tend to take place simultaneously with, and form part of, the overall
            negotiations for the distribution of their Pay TV channels.
    (492) There is thus a strong and direct link between the merged entity's bargaining
            position in the acquisition of Pay TV channels and its market power to
            prevent, delay or hamper OTT innovation of TV broadcasters.
    (493) This link is strengthened by the fact that the agreements for, and the
            commercial negotiations of, the distribution of the TV broadcasters' Pay TV
            channels also cover the key content, namely the channels and attractive
            programming content, that could form part of the broadcasters' OTT offers.
    (494) Paragraphs (496) to (504) contain first the Commission’s review in the
            Conditional Clearance Decision of the evidence from the market investigation
            regarding the link between OTT services and the acquisition of linear Pay TV
            channels in negotiations with TV broadcasters.
    (495) Subsequently the Commission has reviewed the contractual conditions which
            the Parties have sought to impose on TV broadcasters pre-merger.
236 [Reference to the Parties' internal business documents].
237 [Reference to the Parties' internal business documents].
238 [Reference to the Parties' internal business documents].
                                                       100
 ---pagebreak---              The link between negotiations for the acquisition of linear TV channels
             and OTT services
    (496) Virtually all TV Broadcasters confirmed that their commercial negotiations
             for the distribution of their linear TV channels simultaneously covered the
             distribution of non-linear TV content that is associated to those TV channels
             such as catch-up, preview and start-over TV content.239 The Notifying Party's
             internal documents equally confirmed that negotiations for the distribution of
             linear TV channels simultaneously cover the rights to distribute those
             channels and the content contained therein over the Internet.240
    (497) The Parties' internal documents also confirmed that negotiations may even
             cover individual content, that is to say specific series and film titles, which
             broadcasters could include in their OTT offerings.
    (498) For instance, Ziggo had (then) been negotiating [references to the individual
             content covered by commercial negotiations between one of the Notifying
             Parties' and various third party broadcasters].241 The Notifying Party had done
             the same for [references to the individual content covered by commercial
             negotiations between one of the Notifying Parties' and various third party
             broadcasters].
    (499) The Notifying Party's internal business documents confirmed that [Reference
             to the Parties' internal business documents].
    (500) Internal business documents of the Notifying Party confirmed that it would be
             willing to use the leverage that it had over broadcasters for the distribution of
             their linear Pay TV channels to prevent, delay or hamper such innovation.
             [Reference to the Parties' internal business documents]:
             (i) [Reference to the Parties' internal business documents];
             (ii) [Reference to the Parties' internal business documents]242
    (501) This document reveals that Liberty Global would be willing to use its
             bargaining power in the distribution of linear Pay TV channels fully to
             prevent, delay or hamper OTT innovation.
    (502) Other internal business documents showed that the Notifying Party
             implemented that strategy in individual commercial negotiations with TV
             broadcasters. […].243 […].244 […]. The Notifying Party seemed to have
239 Non-confidential replies of TV Broadcasters to Q4 Phase II Questionnaire to TV Broadcasters,
    question 17.
240 [Reference to the Parties' internal business documents].
241 [Reference to the Parties' internal business documents].
242 [Reference to the Parties' internal business documents].
243 [Reference to the Parties' internal business documents].
                                                       101
 ---pagebreak---             purposefully made thematic TV channels part of the overall linear TV channel
            negotiations with TV broadcasters in order for those to be used as
            'leverage'.245
    (503) The same pattern emerged from the negotiations that the Notifying Party had
            been conducting with […] for the distribution of its linear […] Pay TV
            channels. In internal business documents, the Notifying Party indicated that it
            wished to hamper the ability of […] to offer the content of those channels via
            an OTT service online. If […] did not agree with the Notifying Party's
            position, Liberty Global stated that its distribution of its linear Pay TV
            channels "may very well have to be postponed".246
    (504) Therefore, the Commission considered that there was a strong link between
            the Parties' market power in the acquisition of Pay TV channels and their
            market power to influence the manner in which broadcasters distribute their
            TV channels and their individual content over the Internet. Against this
            background, any increased market power that the merged entity would enjoy
            in the acquisition of Pay TV channels translates directly into increased market
            power to influence the distribution of those channels and the content
            contained therein over the Internet.
            The Parties' approach to OTT services in their negotiations with
            broadcasters
    (505) There were already at the time of the Conditional Clearance Decision,
            agreements in place between the Notifying Party and some of the TV
            broadcasters in the Netherlands that hampered the latters' ability, directly or
            indirectly, to launch and sustain OTT services for Dutch consumers. For
            instance, such agreements had been concluded with [...], which are important
            TV broadcasters in the Netherlands. The Commission has assessed in the
            Conditional Clearance Decision whether the proposed combination of Liberty
            Global and Ziggo could significantly increase the ability of the merged entity
            to sustain such restrictive agreements, or to apply them to more TV
            broadcasters, or to overall impose agreements that are more onerous from the
            perspective of the TV broadcasters and ultimately the Dutch consumers.
    (506) The Commission considered that the Parties' ability to insist on such
            contractual clauses should be assessed in conjunction with the technical
            means the Parties have at their disposal to hamper or limit the distribution of
            OTT content over their respective Internet networks. This assessment is made
            in paragraphs (550) to (578).
    (507) The Commission has assessed in the Conditional Clearance Decision the
            available evidence on the Notifying Party's negotiations and agreements with
            the broadcasters RTL, SBS, NPO, Fox, the Walt Disney Company ("Disney"),
244 [Reference to the Parties' internal business documents].
245 [Reference to the Parties' internal business documents].
246 [Reference to the Parties' internal business documents]
                                                       102
 ---pagebreak---               HBO and VIMN.247 This approach was justified as together, those
              broadcasters accounted for over 80% of the TV content that was available in
              the Netherlands. In fact, RTL, SBS and NPO alone accounted for more than
              70% of the TV content that is available in that country.
    (508) That evidence revealed that the Notifying Party had sought to impose various
              direct and indirect restrictions on the ability of those broadcasters to offer
              their TV channels and individual content via OTT services in the Netherlands.
    (509) A first restriction that the Notifying Party had sought to impose is an outright
              contractual ban for broadcasters to offer their content via OTT services in the
              Netherlands. This ban targeted OTT services that broadcasters could offer
              themselves. It also targeted OTT services of existing and potential third party
              suppliers, such as Smart TV (TV connected to the Internet) providers and
              aggregators of OTT content that is offered online. The ban finally targeted the
              individual content, especially premium content that broadcasters can make
              available OTT.
    (510) An example is the clause that the Notifying Party sought to impose on [a third
              party TV broadcaster]. The proposed clause was as follows:
          (a)       During the term of the contract [a third party TV broadcaster] will not
                    offer the linear channels and VOD content to so called OTT parties
                    (among others: Netflix, Voddler, Zattoo, Lovefilm, Weepee and Magix)
          (b)       During the term [a third party TV broadcaster] will not offer the linear
                    channels to so called Smart tv parties (among others: Samsung, Sony,
                    LG and Philips). [a third party TV broadcaster] is however allowed to
                    offer its VOD content to these parties but only if the content will be
                    offered in a transactional way to the consumer (regardless whether
                    content includes advertising)
          (c)       During the term [a third party TV broadcaster] will not offer the linear
                    channels OTT by itself248
    (511) If accepted, that clause would have banned [a third party TV broadcaster]
              from offering its content altogether to OTT service providers that were then
              already active in the Netherlands, such as Netflix. It would also have banned
              [a third party TV broadcaster] from dealing with OTT service providers that
              were active in other countries, but might wish to launch in the Netherlands in
              the future, such as Voddler Inc. and LoveFilm (the latter was then part of
              Amazon). It banned [a third party TV broadcaster] from dealing with players
              such as Magix that were then active in adjacent markets, but might wish to
              launch OTT services with film and other content geared towards consumers in
247 [Reference to the Parties' internal business documents]; Document ID1985, non-confidential minutes
    of conference call between Commission's services and NPO of 19 June 2014, p. 3; [Reference to the
    Parties' internal business documents].
248 [Reference to the Parties' internal business documents], and; Document ID1674, non-confidential
    submission by […].
                                                      103
 ---pagebreak---               the future. The ban would also apply to online broadcasters of linear TV
              channels.249
    (512) In addition, that clause would have banned [a third party TV broadcaster]
              from dealing freely with Smart TV providers such as Samsung Electronics
              Co., Ltd. and Sony Corporation. If accepted, [a third party TV broadcaster]
              would not be allowed to distribute its linear channels to those providers. The
              VOD content that it would be allowed to distribute via them would be limited
              to TVOD services. That content would exclude potentially lucrative SVOD
              services.
    (513) Finally, the ban would have precluded [a third party TV broadcaster] from
              offering its own linear channels over the Internet to consumers.
    (514) A second type of restriction that the Notifying Party had sought to impose on
              the ability of broadcasters to launch OTT services was a contractual right for
              it to terminate the agreement for the carriage of the broadcasters' linear Pay
              TV channels, should those broadcasters offer their channels or the content
              contained therein via OTT services in the Netherlands. The Notifying Party
              had sought to impose such clauses in relation to both paid and free OTT
              services. This type of clause creates a strong disincentive for broadcasters to
              launch OTT services, as that launch would mean that a large part of the reach
              of their TV channels would fall away. In order to sustain that reach, they
              would have to re-negotiate the carriage of their linear Pay TV channels, for
              which they are heavily dependent on the Notifying Party.250
    (515) That type of clause had been proposed to [a third party TV broadcaster], one
              of the largest commercial broadcasters in the Netherlands, as well as to other
              providers of TV channels and OTT services.251 Internal business documents
              of the Notifying Party confirmed that the goal of such clauses would be to
              prevent the emergence of OTT providers that could deliver their TV channels
              in competition with its own cable TV offering.252
    (516) A third category of restriction that the Notifying Party had sought to impose
              limited the possibility for broadcasters to offer their content to existing Pay
              TV platforms, such as competing cable companies, that might wish to broaden
              their offering in the future. For instance, the Notifying Party sought to ensure
              that broadcasters would limit the scope of the IPTV distribution right for other
              cable operators to the existing cable footprint of those operators. In that way,
              the Notifying Party sought to ensure that existing Pay TV operators could not
249 Zattoo is an on-line distributor of linear TV channels. It had experienced legal difficulties with content
    right holders regarding its ability to re-broadcast their signals over the Internet. However, YouCa B.V.,
    another company then wishing to enter the OTT market with a linear TV channels offering would also
    be covered by the contractual clause that Liberty Global sought to impose, which would have meant
    that it could not obtain the [a third party TV broadcaster] content for inclusion in its services.
250 [Reference to the Parties' internal business documents].
251 [Reference to the Parties' internal business documents].
252 [Reference to the Parties' internal business documents].
                                                          104
 ---pagebreak---             expand their commercial presence through other means than their existing
            cable networks, for instance over the Internet.
    (517) For instance, the Notifying Party asked [a third party TV content provider] to
            limit the scope of the IPTV distribution right that [a third party TV content
            provider] was about to grant another cable operator, CAIW. CAIW had
            publicly expressed its strategy to "expand their footprint through other means
            than traditional cable networks". The Notifying Party explained that it could
            not "risk a potential OTT IPTV in our [their] footprint" and accordingly
            required [a third party TV content provider] to limit CAIW's IPTV license to
            the latter's existing geographic footprint.253
    (518) A fourth category of restrictions on the ability of broadcasters to offer their
            content via an OTT service concerned the obligation for those broadcasters to
            only offer OTT services in the Netherlands, if those services were tied
            technically to the cable TV offering of the Notifying Party. That would for
            instance mean that broadcasters could only offer OTT services in an
            unencrypted fashion to subscribers that also have a Pay TV subscription with
            the Notifying Party. Some services could not be available to consumers at all
            if those consumers did not take a Pay TV subscription with the Notifying
            Party, or only at lower quality.
    (519) The following clause imposed on Fox is an example of that type of restriction.
            Fox:
            4. Content Commitments, Free-to-air provisions and holdbacks
            Channel Provider shall not distribute, nor shall it grant any third party the
            right to distribute the Channels or any programming contained therein,
            including the Key Content, in the Territory via cable systems, DSL systems
            and/or any open or public access computer integrated networks such as the
            world-wide matrix of interconnecting computers known as the “Internet” on
            an unencrypted or free basis, unless the unencrypted or free basis distribution
            of a Channel(s) or any programming contained therein, is complementary to
            the distribution of such Channel on a pay tv basis via any television
            distribution system to subscribers authorized to receive the Channel via such
            television distribution system. It is understood that limited volumes of content
            (no more than 5 hours of content per month, but in no event live matches)
            contained in the Channel may be distributed on a non-linear unencrypted or
            free basis for promotional purposes only.
            Channels Provider shall not make the FOX Sports EDL GO Interface or the
            Fox Sports International GO Interface, or any materially similar interface,
            nor any of the FOX Sports EDL GO Content or FOX Sports International GO
            Content directly available to end-consumers in the Netherlands by whatever
            means (including but not limited to by means of OTT or connected TV
            portals). Channel Provider shall only allow third party platform providers to
            enable their subscribers to access FOX Sports EDL GO and/or FOX Sports
253 [Reference to the Parties' internal business documents].
                                                       105
 ---pagebreak---             International GO, if such subscribers does also receive Fox Sports EDL
            Channels or Fox Sports International Channels as part of a pay tv
            subscription.254
    (520) That clause covered both the [a third party TV content provider] channels and
            the content that is shown on those channels. If both or either were included in
            an unencrypted or free Internet offer, it had to be limited to authorised
            subscribers that also took the channels as part of a Pay TV bouquet from the
            Notifying Party. [a third party TV content provider ]'s existing [a third party
            TV content provider] services could not be available to any end-consumers
            that did not also subscribe to the TV channels as part of a cable subscription
            with the Notifying Party.
    (521) The Commission noted that in the same document concerning [a third party
            TV content provider], the Notifying Party proposed to go even further, and to
            force [a third party TV content provider] to cease offering premium content to
            consumers directly altogether. Ultimately, the outcome of the negotiations
            between the Notifying Party and [a third party TV content provider] was that
            that particular clause was not agreed upon.
    (522) […]255 [...].
    (523) In fact, a similar tying arrangement to that with [third party broadcasters] had
            been considered for [third party broadcasters], associated to the main public
            broadcasters in the Netherlands256, and for [third party TV content provider].
            As concerns the latter (then) broadcaster, the Notifying Party wished to
            achieve the integration of the [third party TV content provider] GO service
            into its own TV services, thus preventing [third party TV content provider]
            from offering the GO services directly to consumers. In this regard, the
            Notifying Party wanted to achieve the same technical restrictions that [a
            foreign cable operator] had managed to impose on [third party TV content
            provider] in the [...].257
    (524) […]258 [...].259
    (525) Other clauses proposed to TV broadcasters in the Netherlands were a
            combination of the type of restrictions mentioned in paragraphs (505) to
            (523). […]260 […]261 [...].
254 [Reference to the Parties' internal business documents].
255 [Reference to the Parties' internal business documents].
256 [Reference to the Parties' internal business documents].
257 [Reference to the Parties' internal business documents].
258 [Reference to the Parties' internal business documents].
259 [Reference to the Parties' internal business documents].
260 [Reference to the Parties' internal business documents].
                                                       106
 ---pagebreak---     (526) A final category of restrictions on the ability of TV broadcasters to launch or
            sustain OTT services in the Netherlands relates to agreements that the merged
            entity would strike in relation to the TV content that can be included in such
            OTT offerings.
    (527) As mentioned in paragraphs (497) and (498), the Parties already sought to
            conclude agreements with TV broadcasters for the non-linear use of the TV
            content on their Pay TV platforms. For instance, Liberty Global had sought
            [...] such as [...].
    (528) In submissions to the Commission, the Notifying Party explained that it
            wished to obtain the exclusive right to certain films, shows, series and other
            content of TV broadcasters. Although those types of exclusive agreements
            were then not very prevalent, the Notifying Party saw them as an important
            tenet of its strategy in the near future.
    (529) To the extent that those content agreements are entered into with operators
            that own premium film and series content, such as the Hollywood majors
            (main Hollywood studios, including Fox, Warner Brothers and Disney), those
            agreements are entered into in the market for the licensing of TV content,
            where the Commission had not identified competition concerns in the context
            of this case.
    (530) However, to the extent that those content agreements were concluded with TV
            broadcasters that would be dependent on the merged entity to distribute their
            TV channels, concluding exclusivity agreements for the TV content that the
            TV broadcaster owned or for which it had the right to distribute it in the
            Netherlands, could seriously undermine the viability of the OTT offers that
            those TV broadcasters could make to Dutch consumers. As shown in
            paragraphs (497) and (498), the commercial negotiations for TV content deals
            with TV broadcasters take place in the context of, or at the very least are
            closely linked with, commercial negotiations for the carriage of the Pay TV
            channels of those same TV broadcasters. The market power that the merged
            entity would have vis-à-vis those TV broadcasters in the distribution of those
            Pay TV channels would then also translate into market power to pressure
            those TV broadcasters into exclusivity agreements for the content that is
            shown on those channels, or any other content that those TV broadcasters
            themselves own or for which they have the rights to distribute in the
            Netherlands. The Notifying Party itself underlined that the ultimate
            competitiveness of OTT services would depend on the attractive content, in
            particular recent films and series that those services offer to consumers.
            Allowing such exclusive deals to go ahead unfettered, would mean that the
            merged entity could use market power in a way that deprives the OTT
            services of the TV broadcasters of the attractive TV content they need in order
            to operate those services.
    (531) Insofar as the merged entity pursued such exclusivity agreements in the
            context of, or together with, its negotiations for the distribution of linear Pay
261 [Reference to the Parties' internal business documents].
                                                       107
 ---pagebreak---             TV channels, those agreements were an indirect restriction of the TV
            broadcasters' ability to launch or sustain OTT services for Dutch consumers.
    (532) The Commission considered in the Conditional Clearance Decision that the
            Transaction was likely to significantly increase the merged entity's market
            power to continue the restrictive agreements for OTT services of the types
            identified above, and to apply them to even more TV broadcasters. Overall,
            the merger was likely to significantly increase the Notifying Party's market
            power to make those restrictive agreements even more onerous.
    (533) While the Notifying Party had sought to implement such clauses in its
            contracts with TV broadcasters, the Commission noted that [third party TV
            broadcasters] as well as [a third party TV broadcaster] had so far been able to
            resist, to a certain extent, attempts to conclude contractual bans for their OTT
            services.
    (534) [a third party TV broadcaster], for example, was able to at least negotiate a
            change to the nature of the OTT clause that was initially proposed by the
            Notifying Party such that it was transformed from an outright prohibition on
            the provision of [a third party TV broadcaster]' content OTT to a unilateral
            right for the Notifying Party to terminate the carriage agreement in case [a
            third party TV broadcaster] were to provide its linear TV channels to OTT
            parties.262 Similarly, [a third party TV broadcaster] managed to change an
            outright prohibition on the free provision of additional VOD content on its
            OTT catch-up TV service into a provision that would make the payment of
            certain minimum guarantees by the Notifying Party conditional upon [a third
            party TV broadcaster] refraining from doing so.263
    (535) [a third party TV broadcaster], in turn, did not agree to include any text on
            OTT in its agreement with the Notifying Party. The Notifying Party therefore
            moved away from the aforementioned ban on OTT, that is to say that the
            distribution agreement would be terminated in case [a third party TV
            broadcaster] were to go OTT. Instead, it proposed that certain minimum
            guarantees and marketing commitments undertaken by it would be dropped in
            case [a third party TV broadcaster] were to launch an OTT product in the
            Netherlands.264 [a third party TV broadcaster] was seemingly able to trade off
            a contractual prohibition on the provision of its VOD content OTT for one on
            the provision of its linear content OTT.265
262 Document ID1674, […]. Document ID1908, non-confidential minutes of conference call between
    Commission's services and […] of 19 June 2014, p. 4. […].
263 [Reference to the Parties' internal business documents].
264 [Reference to the Parties' internal business documents].
265 [Reference to the Parties' internal business documents].
                                                       108
 ---pagebreak---     (536) Finally, SBS, RTL and NPO had been able to jointly launch a standalone OTT
             catch-up TV service (NLZiet)266 and NPO provided its linear TV channels
             free of charge OTT.267
    (537) As regards Ziggo's approach to OTT services, the Commission found that,
             similarly to Liberty Global, Ziggo had also been proposing clauses to
             broadcasters to limit their freedom to offer OTT services. Ziggo's approach
             had however been more lenient than that of the Notifying Party. [...].268
    (538) That policy of Ziggo was reflected in the documentation of its commercial
             negotiations with TV broadcasters. For instance, as regards [a third party TV
             broadcaster], Ziggo proposed that if [a third party TV broadcaster] were to
             make its content available on the Internet for free, Ziggo should also obtain
             the non-exclusive right to distribute that content for free.269 Ziggo had not, as
             the Notifying Party had, sought to insist on a clause that would ban [a third
             party TV broadcaster] from such streaming entirely. During the market
             investigation, [a third party TV broadcaster] indicated that only one of the two
             Parties had demanded it to refrain from free OTT streaming. The evidence
             from the Parties shows that this party is the Notifying Party, and not Ziggo.270
    (539) Likewise, the distribution agreement between [a third party TV broadcaster]
             and Ziggo did not contain any provision limiting [a third party TV broadcaster
             ]'s ability to provide OTT services. Rather, it contained a clause whereby
             Ziggo was prohibited from transmitting [a third party TV broadcaster ]'s TV
             channels via the open Internet.271
    (540) The same pattern emerged in relation to [...]. Ziggo initially confronted [...]
             with the same [...] proposal that the Notifying Party made to [...]. However,
             [...] insisted on conducting separate negotiations with the Notifying Party and
             Ziggo, to which both parties seemingly agreed.272 Ziggo's subsequent
266 Document ID1908, non-confidential minutes of conference call between Commission's services and
    SBS of 19 June 2014, p. 4; Document ID1985, non-confidential minutes of conference call between
    Commission's services and NPO of 19 June 2014, p. 3; https://www nlziet nl/ [accessed at 31 July
    2014].
267 Document ID01424, NPO's non-confidential reply to questionnaire Q4 to Phase II Questionnaire to
    Broadcasters of 28 May 2014, question 16.
268 [Reference to the Parties' internal business documents].
269 This restriction was contained in the Deal Memo of 7 February 2011 and the ultimate agreement with
    SBS of 23 May 2011 (Doc ID336-11521). SBS also agreed that its free OTT offers would be at a
    maximum download speed, which would however be benchmarked against that of its competitors
    NPO and RTL.
270 Document ID1400, SBS' non-confidential reply to questionnaire Q4 Phase II Questionnaire to
    Broadcasters of 28 May 2014, question 18.1; Document ID1769, SBS' non-confidential submission of
    30 June 2014.
271 Document ID366-11396, signed carriage agreement between Ziggo and RTL of 15 February 2012,
    Article 7(2).
272 [Reference to the Parties' internal business documents].
                                                       109
 ---pagebreak---             individual proposals were similar to the proposals that it made to [...]. In those
            proposals, Ziggo focussed on obtaining access to the OTT services that [...]
            chose to make available online, rather than seeking a ban on such OTT
            services altogether.273 Thus, [...] was able to obtain more favourable draft
            clauses once it could avoid dealing with Liberty Global and Ziggo together.
    (541) Ziggo's agreement with [a third party TV content provider] did not contain a
            clause banning [a third party TV content provider] from offering its TV
            channels over the Internet. As concerns [a third party TV content provider]'
            non-linear [that third party's OTT service], the agreement contained the right
            for Ziggo to obtain some monetary compensation for its subscribers using the
            [that third party's OTT service] service directly over the Internet, rather than
            as part of the VOD offering of Ziggo.274 The Notifying Party's contract
            restricted such direct consumer access to the [that third party's OTT service]
            service.275
    (542) In the distribution agreement currently in place between Ziggo and [a third
            party TV content provider], [a third party TV content provider] explicitly
            reserved to itself the right to freely exploit the rights granted therein via other
            means of distribution, including the Internet.276
    (543) In sum, the Commission's investigation in the Conditional Clearance Decision
            had confirmed that the Dutch market was to a certain extent already
            characterised by the existence of agreements that restricted the TV
            broadcasters' ability to offer their TV channels and content via OTT services
            to Dutch consumers. However, some TV broadcasters had until then been able
            to resist the conclusion of such restrictive agreements, whilst others had been
            able to water down the restrictive nature of the initially proposed agreements.
            A factor that had played a role in those dynamics was that Ziggo has taken a
            more lenient approach to the OTT services of TV broadcasters.
    (544) In light of this evidence, the Commission has assessed in the Conditional
            Clearance Decision the likely impact of the proposed combination of Liberty
            Global and Ziggo on the merged entity's market power to continue to enforce
            such restrictive agreements, or to apply them to more TV broadcasters or to
            make them more onerous overall, to the detriment of TV broadcasters and
            ultimately the Dutch consumers.
Ability to prevent, delay or hamper OTT innovation post-Transaction
    (545) Paragraphs (546) to (578) contain the Commission's assessment in the 2014
            decision of the ability of the merged entity, post-Transaction, to prevent, delay
            or hamper OTT innovation. As set out in paragraph (578), the Commission
273 [Reference to the Parties' internal business documents].
274 [Reference to the Parties' internal business documents].
275 [Reference to the Parties' internal business documents].
276 [Reference to the Parties' internal business documents].
                                                       110
 ---pagebreak---              concluded that the Transaction clearly increased the merged entity's ability to
             prevent, delay or hamper OTT services by contractual means resulting from
             the merged entity's increased buyer power. That increased ability was
             furthermore compounded by the merged entity's ability to hamper Internet
             traffic via technical means.
Ability to prevent, delay or hamper OTT innovation by contractual means
    (546) As the merger of the Notifying Party and Ziggo was likely to significantly
             enhance the Notifying Party's market power vis-à-vis TV broadcasters, the
             merged entity was likely to have an increased ability to impose its stringent
             contractual OTT conditions on TV Broadcasters compared to the situation
             absent the merger.
    (547) Moreover, the fact that Ziggo was present on the market with a relatively
             more lenient policy on OTT services, gave TV broadcasters a degree of
             leverage vis-à-vis the Notifying Party pre-merger. TV Broadcasters had
             explained that in terms of clauses on OTT services, they tended to benchmark
             the conditions of their supply agreements entered into with either the
             Notifying Party or Ziggo in subsequent negotiations with the other.277 Some
             TV broadcasters confirmed that they are able to put pressure on either the
             Notifying Party or Ziggo by communicating the outcome of the negotiations
             for the distribution of their TV channels with the other. The Parties' internal
             documents confirmed the existence of this constraint. For instance, [...].278 As
             explained in paragraph (540), [...] was able to obtain more favourable draft
             clauses once it could avoid dealing with Liberty Global and Ziggo together.
             This would however be precisely the situation in which it would be following
             the merger.
    (548) The Commission found in the Conditional Clearance Decision that it was
             unlikely that TV broadcasters would be able to resist contractual clauses that
             hamper their ability to launch or sustain OTT services by adapting a
             coordinated market response to the merged entity to relinquish such clauses.
             Indeed, when faced with requests by the merged entity to agree to restrictive
             OTT agreements, each TV broadcaster was likely to weigh its short term gain
             derived from not losing income from the merged entity – in the form of higher
             licence fees - if it agreed to such clauses against the longer-term gain that
             could be derived from cross-platform competition between cable TV and OTT
             TV, that is to say by facilitating entry at the downstream level. However, for
             OTT TV to become a viable and credible substitute to cable TV, the
             Commission considered that it would likely require OTT content from a large
             proportion of major TV broadcasters. Each TV broadcaster therefore faces the
277 Document ID1985, non-confidential minutes of conference call between Commission's services and
    NPO of 19 June 2014, p 2; Document ID1908, non-confidential minutes of conference call between
    Commission's services and SBS of 19 June 2014, p. 3; Document ID1700, non-confidential minutes of
    conference call between Commission's services and VIMN of 20 June 2014, p. 2; Document ID2209,
    non-confidential version of the European Broadcasters' Union's submission of 30 June 2014, p. 4;
    Document ID2270, non-confidential minutes of conference call between Commission's services and
    Fox International Channels of 25 June 2014, p. 4.
278 Document ID331-12405, Liberty Global email 'Status update NPO/RTL/SBS' of 23 April 2012.
                                                      111
 ---pagebreak---              risk that a sufficiently high proportion of TV broadcasters agree to restrictive
             contract terms on OTT, jeopardising the long-term benefit of additional
             competition from OTT services overall. Under those circumstances, the
             longer term benefits of cross-platform competition to TV broadcasters may be
             sufficiently uncertain to be outweighed by the short term benefit of agreeing
             to such restrictions. The risk of such coordination failure is likely increased by
             the dispersed nature of TV broadcasters.279 The fact that some broadcasters
             had so far resisted these clauses did not alter that assessment. After the
             Transaction, they would face a combined Liberty Global/Ziggo. The short-
             term gain derived from the licensing income of such a large market player
             would only make it more difficult for those broadcasters to secure the long-
             term gain of bringing additional competition to the market in the form of OTT
             services.
    (549) Therefore, the Commission considered that, post-merger, the Notifying Party
             would likely have a greater ability contractually to prevent, delay or hamper
             OTT innovation. This increased ability to prevent, delay or hamper OTT
             innovation by contractual means, needed to be assessed in conjunction with
             the ability that each of the Parties already had pre-merger to technically
             degrade the distribution of OTT content via their Internet networks, which
             was another market where they were active.
Ability to prevent, delay or hamper OTT innovation compounded by the ability
to technically restrict OTT services
    (550) The Commission further considered in the Conditional Clearance Decision
             that both Liberty Global and Ziggo were also active as a provider of Internet
             access services to consumers in the Netherlands. In that role, they operated the
             Internet networks that providers of OTT services needed to access Liberty
             Global's and Ziggo's broadband customers in the Netherlands. Post-merger,
             the Notifying Party would provide access to around 43% of Dutch broadband
             customers. Under those circumstances, the Commission had to assess whether
             the merged entity's increased ability to prevent, delay or hamper OTT
             innovation by contractual means would be compounded by its ability to
             technically degrade the distribution of OTT content via its Internet network.
    (551) In terms of access to the Parties' broadband customers in the Netherlands,
             providers of OTT audio visual services could reach the Parties' broadband
             customers in three distinct ways:
         (i) Private direct peering: the OTT provider can directly connect to the Parties'
              Internet networks via a private physical interconnection link.280 The Notifying
279 This reasoning is in line with established models of exclusive dealing. See C. Fumagalli and M. Motta,
    'Buyers' miscoordination, entry, and downstream competition' in Working Paper no. 152 Centre for
    Studies in Economics and Finance of January 2006, page 15, and Commission decision of 18 October
    1996 in case IV/M.580, ABB/Daimler Benz.
280 This is often a dedicated fibre connection between the two parties' routers to be used exclusively for
    the exchange of traffic flowing between their respective Internet networks.
                                                        112
 ---pagebreak---               Party refers to this as direct physical network interconnect (PNI). OTT
              providers can achieve this PNI at a paid or settlement-free basis;
         (ii) Public direct peering: the OTT provider can directly connect to the Parties'
              Internet networks via a physical interconnection link at a public Internet
              exchange. The Parties' overall interconnection capacity at an Internet
              exchange is shared between all of the companies they connect with there
              (between 50 and 500 Gbit/s for the Notifying Party);
         (iii)Transit: the OTT provider can contract a third-party Internet connectivity
              transit provider, whose Internet network is connected to that of the Parties,
              through private direct peering281, to hand over its Internet traffic to the
              Parties' networks in exchange for a transit fee.282
    (552) The Commission's investigation confirmed that there were close links
             between the Parties' technical role in delivering OTT services to their
             broadband customers and their ability to insist upon contractual clauses that
             restrict, directly or indirectly, the ability of TV broadcasters to offer their
             content via OTT services. The existence of such links became apparent from
             the Notifying Party's approach to, for example, the OTT TV (GO) services of
             [...] and of [...]. As regards both of those OTT services, the Notifying Party
             was only willing to guarantee a free high quality (in this case meaning a
             direct, private and uncongested interconnection) access to its Internet network
             if those services would be exclusively available to its own [...] customers. In
             that way, the Notifying Party sought to achieve a contractual restriction of
             […]' possibility to offer OTT services to consumers in the Netherlands by
             partly relying on its position as an Internet network provider and route to
             deliver OTT traffic to its broadband customers.
    (553) The Commission has assessed in detail in the Conditional Clearance Decision
             the technical means that the Parties have at their disposal to influence the
             manner in which OTT services can reach their broadband customers. The
             Commission's investigation confirmed that, ultimately, each of the routes that
             OTT providers can use to interconnect with the Parties' Internet networks,
             thereby obtaining access to the Parties' broadband customers, are under the
             control of the Parties.
    (554) Private and public direct peering. As regards direct peering, that is to say the
             first way, so-called 'private direct peering', and the second way, so-called
             'public direct peering', of interconnecting with the Parties' Internet networks,
             the Notifying Party shortly before the 2014 Transaction publicly enforced a
             policy by which providers of OTT audio visual services would not be allowed
             to engage in settlement-free direct peering with it, whether public or
             private.283 Moreover, under its peering policy, the Notifying Party had
281 According to the Notifying Party, interconnections at an Internet exchange are usually not allowed to
    be used to provide transit services. See: Document ID2384, Liberty Global presentation 'M.7000:
    technical presentation', of 1 July 2014.
282 Document ID2384, Liberty Global presentation 'M.7000: technical presentation', of 1 July 2014.
283 Indeed, OTT audio visual services will never comply with the maximum ratio of 3:1 between traffic
    incoming to the Notifying Party's Internet network and traffic outgoing from the Notifying Party's
                                                      113
 ---pagebreak---               reserved the right not to engage in private direct peering with any party at all,
              regardless of whether the requirements for settlement-free private direct
              peering were met. The Notifying Party's policy was summed up in its internal
              documents as: [...]284 Given that any OTT audio visual service would thus
              only qualify for paid direct private peering, if at all, the Notifying Party could
              refuse or severely restrict those services from having access to its Internet
              network, either by charging excessive fees for paid direct private peering or
              by altogether refusing to engage in private direct peering.
    (555) As already mentioned in paragraph (552), the Commission stated in the
              Conditional Clearance Decision that it had found evidence that suggested that
              the Notifying Party already refused to offer direct high quality access to its
              Internet network to OTT service providers. […]:
          (i) [Reference to the Parties' internal business documents]285;
          (ii) [Reference to the Parties' internal business documents]286;
          (iii)[Reference to the Parties' internal business documents]287;
          (iv) [Reference to the Parties' internal business documents]288
          (v) [Reference to the Parties' internal business documents]289
          (vi) [Reference to the Parties' internal business documents]290
    (556) [...]. As regards [a third party TV content provider], the Notifying Party
              offered to conclude a [...] direct interconnection in relation to the imposition
              of a contractual clause that would prohibit [a third party TV content provider]
              from providing its streaming service directly to end users.291
    Internet network, required by the Notifying Party for settlement-free private direct peering. Such OTT
    services generate largely one-way traffic, sometimes achieving inbound-outbound ratios in excess of
    100:1. Liberty Global's peering policy is available at: http://www.libertyglobal.com/PDF/LGI-
    Settlement-Free-IP-Peering-Policy-2012-final.pdf [Accessed at 16 July 2014].
284 [Reference to the Parties' internal business documents].
285 Document ID331-41175, Liberty Global Engineering PNI/ODIA Scope Document of 19 June 2013,
    section 1.2.
286  Document ID331-7320, Liberty Global email 'RE: Fox sports GO | direct peering / Kosten direct
    peering' of 11 June 2013.
287  Document ID331-10359, Liberty Global email 'RE: HBO NL – Big Questions' of 7 November 2012.
288  [Reference to the Parties' internal business documents].
289  [Reference to the Parties' internal business documents].
290 [Reference to the Parties' internal business documents].
291 [Reference to the Parties' internal business documents].
                                                        114
 ---pagebreak---     (557) [...]. That indicated that the Notifying Party was unlikely to be deterred from
            engaging in such strategy due to any perceived risk that it infringes Dutch net
            neutrality law.
    (558) In addition to that inability to interconnect directly via a private link with the
            Notifying Party’s Internet network, those OTT audio visual services could not
            engage in public direct peering with the Notifying Party, that is to say direct
            peering at an Internet exchange, as those would not be allowed, pursuant to its
            peering policy, to generate traffic in excess of 3 Gbit/s at any one Internet
            exchange. This effectively made it impossible for any successful OTT service
            to use that route to reach the Notifying Party's broadband customers. In that
            regard, Ziggo indicated that even a limited number of around [...] concurrent
            OTT video streams at peak time then already generated traffic far exceeding
            the threshold of 3 Gbit/s (namely around [...]).292 In addition to that, the
            Notifying Party had confirmed that it would be unlikely to establish new
            direct peering relationships at the Amsterdam Internet Exchange with peers
            that did not already connect to its Internet network in some other way, that is
            to say it would be unlikely to establish direct peering relationships only at the
            Amsterdam Internet Exchange.293 Furthermore, the Commission found that
            the Notifying Party maintained highly limited interconnection capacity and
            only for certain legacy interconnections that it still had at, for example, the
            NL-IX Internet exchange. This limited capacity for non-exclusive OTT
            competitors had, […], already caused problems as a result of port
            congestion.294
    (559) For all of those reasons, the Commission considered in the Conditional
            Clearance Decision that OTT audio visual service providers already had
            limited prospects of using private or public direct interconnection effectively
            in order to reach the Notifying Party's broadband customers.
    (560) Transit. In the Conditional Clearance Decision, the Commission noted that
            direct       interconnection         capacity      with        third-party      Internet
            interconnectivity/transit providers, that is to say the third way of reaching the
            Parties' customers ('transit') was the only access route for Internet content
            providers that did not obtain access through private or public direct peering.295
            Owners of Internet access networks such as the Parties were also capable of
            severely hampering access via any such transit links, for example by
            refraining from upgrading direct interconnection capacity in line with
            increased Internet traffic flows.
292 Document ID1548, Liberty Global and Ziggo response to Commission's request for information of 11
    June 2014, p. 10.
293 Document ID1790, Liberty Global response to Commission's request for information of 2 July 2014,
    p. 3.
294 Document ID331-20108, Liberty Global email 'Eredivisie Live Go' of 25 March 2013.
295 Draft Report on the BEREC public consultations on net neutrality, Berec Conclusion on Question 7.
    Available at: www.berec.europa.eu [as at 8 August 2014].
                                                     115
 ---pagebreak---     (561) Importantly in that respect, the Notifying Party was not contractually bound,
              under its direct peering agreements with transit providers, to increase
              interconnection capacity in line with capacity utilization on the relevant
              interconnection point(s).296 The Notifying Party acknowledged that it could
              even decrease the capacity of an entire transit connection, thereby increasing
              the risk of congestion.297
    (562) The Commission considered in the Conditional Clearance Decision that
              refusal by the Notifying Party to upgrade transit capacity or to even degrade
              it, would have had serious consequences for the viability of OTT services in
              the Netherlands. The Commission's investigation namely confirmed that only
              a small proportion of Dutch Pay TV subscribers would have to switch to
              linear OTT TV in order to significantly increase Internet traffic flows, such
              that the Parties' existing interconnection capacity with transit providers would
              be exhausted, resulting in port congestion.
    (563) For example, the Commission had compared Netflix' publicly available speed
              index for Ziggo (3.74 Mbit/s)298 with Ziggo's current total paid transit
              capacity ([...]).299 Based on that comparison, only [...] concurrent video
              streams at peak time would exhaust that total transit capacity. In other words,
              interconnection congestion would occur if only [0-5]% of Ziggo's then DTV
              subscriber base of 2.253 million customers300 were to switch to watching, for
              instance, the daily news, which then attracted large viewing shares, via the
              Internet.
    (564) In terms of the Notifying Party's then overall paid transit capacity, which
              could be used by all Internet networks but was exclusively located in the
              United States, for its entire pan-European network, this would already be
              congested in the event that 30 500 concurrent video streams were to occur at
              peak time ([…]301). In fact, the Notifying Party's main Internet network
              AS6830 that covered 9 different European countries could potentially no
              longer be effectively reached via transit providers at all, including all
              settlement-free peers in Europe, in the event that around [...] concurrent video
              streams were to occur at peak time.302 When taking account of the existing
296 Document ID2135, Liberty Global response to Commission's request for information of 15 July 2014,
    p. 5.
297 Document ID1179, Liberty Global response to the Commission's Article 6(1)(c) decision in case
    M.7000 – Liberty Global/Ziggo, para. 167.
298 http://ispspeedindex.netflix.com/netherlands [accessed at 23 July 2014].
299 Document ID1548, Liberty Global and Ziggo response to Commission's request for information of 11
    June 2014, p. 10.
300 Document ID1627, Liberty Global response to Commission's request for information of 20 June,
    annex XXI.
301 Document ID1790, Liberty Global response to Commission's request for information of 2 July 2014.
302 This is based on AS6830's current overall direct interconnection capacity with transit providers of
    3395 Gbit/s, as estimated in Document ID2135, Liberty Global response to Commission's request for
    information of 15 July 2014. The Commission has compared this with the average speed of 3.6 Mbit/s
                                                       116
 ---pagebreak---               maximum peak-time capacity utilization on the same direct interconnections
              points, it become apparent that AS6830's direct settlement-free
              interconnection links with transit providers could in fact not – in the worst
              case scenario303 – handle more than [...] additional concurrent peak-time video
              streams.304 NPO in that regard indicated that the Dutch Internet infrastructure
              was not well equipped to handle more than 300 000 – 400 000 concurrent
              Internet video streams.305 Finally, the Notifying Party itself noted in internal
              business documents that [...].306
    (565) In any event, the Commission noted in the Conditional Clearance Decision,
              that the Notifying Party at the time maintained a total paid transit capacity of
              only [...] for its entire pan-European AS6830 Internet network, whilst those
              transit connections were located exclusively in the United States. That
              rendered the connections less efficient for Internet traffic originating from and
              destined to Europe.307
    (566) Finally, the availability of transit as a viable route to the merged entity's
              broadband customers could not be assessed separately from the Notifying
              Party's peering policy in general. The Notifying Party did not pay for
              maintaining interconnection capacity with providers of transit services in
              Europe. […]308 […]309, [internal business policy of one of the Notifying
              Parties].310 This business policy affected the traffic that transit providers were
    that the Notifying Party currently attains for Netflix streams                     in    the   Netherlands.
    http://ispspeedindex.netflix.com/netherlands [accessed at 23 July 2014].
303 The Commission notes that the Notifying Party has indicated that peak times do not necessarily
    coincide for all providers of Internet content; Document ID2135, Liberty Global response to
    Commission's request for information of 15 July 2014, p. 3.
304 This is based on AS6830's current maximum peak-time capacity utilization of 2108 Gbit/s as estimated
    in Document ID2135, Liberty Global response to Commission's request for information of 15 July
    2014, and an average speed of 3.6 Mbit/s that the Notifying Party currently attains for Netflix streams
    in the Netherlands (http://ispspeedindex netflix.com/netherlands) [Accessed at 23 July 2014].
305 Document ID1983, non-confidential version of NPO email of 3 July 2014.
306 [Reference to the Parties' internal business documents].
307 Transit providers historically received two-sided payment; from the Internet content provider whose
    content was delivered to a terminating network, as well as from the terminating network itself, whose
    customers where thus able to access that content. When a terminating network ceases to pay transit
    providers for delivering traffic, the transit provider will in turn only hand over traffic for which it gets
    paid by its Internet content customers and not from its settlement-free peers. By limiting/eliminating
    paid transit capacity, the Notifying Party thereby already limits the interconnectivity of its Internet
    network because the entire network of Tier 1 transit providers will no longer hand over each other's
    traffic to the network of the Notifying Party, because that would mean doing it for free.
308 A Tier 1 network is an Internet Protocol (IP) network that participates in the Internet solely via
    settlement-free interconnection (also known as settlement-free peering), rather than paid
    interconnection – See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tier 1 network [accessed on 11 August 2014].
309 [Reference to the Parties' internal business documents].
310 [Reference to the Parties' internal business documents].
                                                          117
 ---pagebreak---               likely, or capable, to hand over to the Notifying Party for final delivery to the
              broadband customers. During the Commission's investigation, a number of
              transit providers explained that if they interconnected with the Notifying Party
              on a settlement-free basis, they were only likely to hand over traffic of their
              own paying customers to the Notifying Party's Internet network. The
              providers of transit services that it interconnected with on a settlement-free
              basis would accordingly only hand over traffic of their own paying customers
              to the Notifying Party's Internet network. If the latter were to hand over traffic
              of their own settlement-free peers, for example other Tier 1 transit providers,
              to the Notifying Party, itself being a settlement-free peer as well, those transit
              providers would not receive any payment for providing their services.311 They
              would have no economic incentive to hand over that traffic.312
    (567) Furthermore, the contractual arrangements covering the settlement-free direct
              interconnections between the Notifying Party and providers of transit services
              did not even allow transit providers to hand over traffic of their peers, that is
              to say other transit providers.313 The Notifying Party was thereby able to
              congest specific interconnection links with providers of transit services in a
              targeted manner, knowing that congestion on that particular link would only
              affect the direct, paying customers of that particular provider of transit
              services, rather than the Internet at large. The Notifying Party acknowledged
              this in its internal business documents: [Reference to the Parties’ internal
              business documents].314 In that regard, it was also important to note that the
              Notifying Party had indicated that several public tools existed, such as
              http://bgp.he.net/ and https:stat.ripe.net/widget/bgplay, that gave insight about
              who has a relation with what AS315 and may or may not be a transit provider
              for it, although it claimed this would never be exact.316 The Commission
              noted in the Conditional Clearance Decision that those tools indeed listed the
311 See for an explanation on this issue, for example: Draft report for public consultation (BoR 12-33) An
    assessment of IP-Interconnection in the context of Net Neutrality Comments from Cogent
    Communications, p. 7. Available at: www.berec.europa.eu [as at 8 August 2014]; non-confidential
    minutes of conference call between the Commission's services and Level 3 of 31 July 2014, p. 2.
312 Draft report for public consultation (BoR 12-33) An assessment of IP-Interconnection in the context of
    Net Neutrality Comments from Cogent Communications, p. 7. Available at: www.berec.europa.eu [as
    at 8 August 2014]; Michael Kende, The Digital Handshake: Connecting Internet backbones Office of
    Plans and Policy Federal Communications Commission Working Paper No. 32 of September 2000.
    Available at: http://www fcc.gov/working-papers/digital-handshake-connecting-internet-backbones [as
    at 8 August 2014]; Comments of AT&T on the BEREC Consultation Paper, An assessment of IP
    Interconnection in the context of net neutrality of 31 July 2012. Available at: www.berec.europa.eu [as
    at 8 August 2014].
313 [Reference to the Parties' internal business documents].
314 [Reference to the Parties' internal business documents].
315 Within the Internet, an autonomous system (AS) is a collection of connected Internet Protocol (IP)
    routing prefixes under the control of one or more network operators that presents a common, clearly
    defined           routing          policy         to          the        Internet         –         see
    http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Autonomous System (Internet) [accessed on 11 August 2014].
316 Document ID1790, Liberty Global response to Commission's request for information of 2 July 2014,
    p. 5.
                                                         118
 ---pagebreak---               AS number of specific Internet content providers such as Netflix, RTL
              Nederland, NPO, SBS and others. They also seemed to list the peers of such
              Internet content providers, as well as the extent to which those peers were
              exchanging traffic with them. The public tool www.robtex.com furthermore
              provided a detailed up-to-date insight into which transit providers were used
              for handing over Internet traffic by any given Internet content provider, the
              extent to which those were used, and the type of routing announcements
              employed (allowing one to determine whether a connection with a given
              provider of transit services is a paid transit connection), all in an efficient
              graphic representation. Using that tool would, for example, allowed one to
              first find out which Internet network hosts NPO's catch-up service Uitzending
              Gemist – being NPO's AS25182 – and to subsequently determine which of the
              transit providers that were paid by NPO, for example, KPN International
              Eurorings that advertised all routes into NPO's AS, would be capable of
              handing over Internet traffic to the Notifying Party's Internet network
              AS6830.
    (568) Regarding Ziggo, its internal documents showed that despite the fact that it
              had a more ad-hoc policy in terms of establishing peering and interconnection
              relationships shortly before the 2014 Transaction, it had been moving towards
              a policy that was in line with that of the Notifying Party. [...]317 The merger
              would cement that strategic shift of Ziggo as the Notifying Party's existing
              policy would apply to the merged entity.
    (569) The Commission considered in the Conditional Clearance Decision that the
              Notifying Party's arguments as to why it would not be able to shut down or
              hamper the access of OTT service providers to its Internet network in such a
              manner, were not convincing.318 Rather, explicit evidence to the contrary was
              found during the Commission's investigation:
         (i)       [Reference to the Parties' internal business documents]319
317 Document ID366-8846, Ziggo presentation of February 2014, 'Internet interconnectie / peering' by
    Arie van der Giessen, slide 1. The Parties explained, in their reply to the Commission's decision
    initiating proceedings, that the document in question merely concerned an internal exploration on the
    different peering policies that would be available. The Commission however notes that Ziggo's CEO
    has similarly been reported to want data-intensive Internet services to pay for direct interconnection:
    http://www.nrc nl/nieuws/2014/03/08/nieuwe-topman-ziggo-netflix-mogelijk-vragen-om-extra-
    betaling [accessed at 25 July 2014].
318 In that regard, the Commission understands that by creating so-called Border Gateway Protocol
    communities, it even seems to be technically possible to exclude certain specific, individual Internet
    networks from having access to the Notifying Party's own Internet network (or only via less effective,
    congested interconnections or more costly ones), without having to physically congest any
    interconnections. BGP is also employed by the Notifying Party's Internet network to communicate
    with other Internet networks: Document ID2384, Liberty Global presentation 'M.7000: technical
    presentation', of 1 July 2014. See for an explanation on this issue: Alexander Reicher, Redefining Net
    Neutrality after Comcast v. FCC, Berkeley Technology Law Journal, Vol. 26:733, pp. 757 and 758;
    Christopher S. Yoo, Innovations in the Internet's Architecture that Challenge the Status Quo, J. on
    Telecomm. & High Tech. L. 79 (2010); Draft report for public consultation (BoR 12-33) An
    assessment of IP-Interconnection in the context of Net Neutrality Comments from Cogent
    Communications, p. 7. Available at: www.berec.europa.eu [as at 8 August 2014].
319 [Reference to the Parties' internal business documents].
                                                       119
 ---pagebreak---           (ii)      [Reference to the Parties' internal business documents]320
          (iii)     [Reference to the Parties' internal business documents]321
    (570) All of this evidence confirmed that the Parties had the technical ability to
                preclude or significantly hamper OTT competitors from having effective
                access to their respective Internet networks.
    (571) Indeed, if the Notifying Party were to refrain from upgrading direct
                interconnection capacity with providers of transit services in line with
                increased Internet traffic levels, congestion could have occurred. Due to such
                congestion, providers of OTT audio visual services could then have been
                altogether foreclosed from effective access to the merged entity's broadband
                customers in the Netherlands, as it would eventually result in lost IP packets,
                that is to say parts of the requested Internet content would be lost.322
                Importantly, any such congestion would have likely be limited to peak time
                usage of OTT audio visual services and would not, in any case, affect the
                quality of the merged entity's broadband offer across the board. Indeed, the
                Commission considered in the Conditional Clearance Decision that first,
                given that the Notifying Party peered directly with Internet content providers
                such as [...]323, a foreclosure of providers of OTT audio visual services would
                leave these major Internet services [...] wholly unaffected. Second, the
                Commission considered that it seemed that the congestion on the merged
                entity's settlement-free direct interconnections with transit providers would
                only affect the direct paying customers of the transit providers in question,
                whose identity could be established through the public tools referred to in
                paragraph (567). Furthermore, the Notifying Party had confirmed that its own
                OTT service Horizon Online would be unaffected by such congestion.324
    (572) The Commission considered in the Conditional Clearance Decision that the
                implications of a general strategy to restrict overall interconnection capacity
                that is available for OTT services and to force providers of such OTT services
                to rely on paid peering models under Dutch net neutrality rules had never
                been investigated in full by the competent Dutch authorities. In any event,
                evidence referred to in paragraphs (554) to (556) showed that [...].
    (573) A number of respondents to the Commission's market investigation confirmed
                that finding. They indicated that insufficient interconnection capacity can
                affect, and in some cases had already affected the viability of OTT TV as a
320 [Reference to the Parties' internal business documents].
321 [Reference to the Parties' internal business documents].
322 See for an explanation on this issue, for example: Draft report for public consultation (BoR 12-33) An
    assessment of IP-Interconnection in the context of Net Neutrality Comments from Cogent
    Communications, p. 6 and 7. Available at: www.berec.europa.eu [as at 8 August 2014].
323 Document ID1623, Liberty Global submission 'Annex XVIII – List of direct peers', of 24 June 2014.
324 Document ID1790, Liberty Global response to Commission's request for information of 2 July 2014,
    p. 9.
                                                       120
 ---pagebreak---              result of congestion, both in the Netherlands and abroad.325 The majority of
             Pay TV retailers and a number of TV broadcasters confirmed that post-
             merger, the merged entity would be able to restrict OTT SVOD services in
             having effective access to its Internet network by technically degrading their
             quality.326 The Commission considered that this technical ability compounded
             the merged entity's increased ability to hamper, delay or prevent OTT
             innovation by contractual means.
    (574) Moreover, in internal business documents, the Notifying Party itself noted that
             […].327
    (575) The Notifying Party has highlighted the fact that OTT providers can always
             reach consumers in the Netherlands via KPN's Internet access network.
             However, the Commission explained in the Conditional Clearance Decision
             that it had found indications that suggested that KPN's Internet network was
             then less suited to handle data-intensive OTT services than that of the merged
             entity. NPO had indicated that congestion occured on the last-mile of the DSL
             network, hampering the viability of large-scale OTT audio visual services.328
             CanalDigitaal pointed out that given the ongoing market trends towards
             bundled triple play services the DSL network had a competitive disadvantage
             since for it to carry a TV signal with an acceptable quality, comparable to the
             quality on cable, less bandwidth would be available on DSL for Internet
             access.329
    (576) Under those circumstances, the Commission found that the risk of losing
             distribution on the merged entity's enlarged cable network combined with the
             possibility that an OTT TV service could not even effectively reach the single
             largest group of Dutch broadband customers was likely to severely limit
             content providers' prospects of successfully launching or contributing to OTT
             services.
    (577) Therefore, the Commission found that the increased ability of the merged
             entity to restrict by contractual means the availability of OTT services in the
             Netherlands would be compounded by its technical ability to preclude or
325 Document ID1982, NPO's non-confidential email of 3 July 2014; Document ID2269, non-confidential
    minutes of conference call between Commission services and Fox International Channels, p. 3;
    Document ID1987, Netflix' non-confidential submission of 11 July 2014; Draft report for public
    consultation (BoR 12-33) An assessment of IP-Interconnection in the context of Net Neutrality
    Comments from Cogent Communications, p. 7. Available at: www.berec.europa.eu [as at 8 August
    2014].
326 Replies to Phase I Questionnaire Q2 to TV channels wholesale suppliers of 17 March 2014, questions
    69 and 70; replies to Phase I Questionnaire Q3 to retailers of TV, telephony and Internet access
    services of 17 March 2014, questions 107 and 108.
327 [Reference to the Parties' internal business documents].
328 Document ID1982, NPO's non-confidential email of 3 July 2014.
329 Document ID845, M7 Group's reply to questionnaire Q3 to retailers of TV, telephony and Internet
    access services' of 17 March 2014, questions 30.1 and 37.1.
                                                       121
 ---pagebreak---          hamper OTT service providers from reaching their broadband customers over
         its Internet network.
    Conclusion
  (578) Therefore, the Commission concluded that the Transaction would confer upon
         the merged entity an increased degree of buyer power vis-à-vis TV
         broadcasters in the Netherlands. This would increase its ability to impose
         contractual terms on TV broadcasters that prevent, hamper or delay, by direct
         and indirect means, the OTT services that include those broadcasters' content.
         The increased ability to do so would be compounded by the fact that the
         Parties already have the technical means at their disposal to shut down or to
         degrade the access to their Internet networks, which these OTT services
         would need to reach the merged entity's broadband customers.
The incentive to prevent, hamper or delay OTT innovation
  (579) The Commission considered in the Conditional Clearance Decision that
         preventing, hampering or delaying OTT innovation would reduce or eliminate
         the risk that such innovation would lead to cross-platform competition which
         might ultimately threaten cable companies' business model – a competitive
         threat which was well recognised in internal documents of the Parties, as
         outlined in paragraph (488).
  (580) Based on the Parties' approach to OTT services described in section 6.4.3.2 of
         this decision, the Commission considered in the Conditional Clearance
         Decision that the Notifying Party then already had the incentive to try and
         prevent TV broadcasters from providing their linear and non-linear content
         OTT, either on a standalone basis or in cooperation with others, but that, pre-
         merger, it might be limited in its ability to do so. The different contractual
         clauses that Liberty Global had sought to negotiate in its contracts with TV
         broadcasters in order to restrict their ability to develop their OTT offers
         showed that the Notifying Party had a clear incentive to engage in such
         practices.
  (581) Furthermore, the Commission considered in the Conditional Clearance
         Decision that the existing incentive would increase as a result of the
         Transaction. Since the successful foreclosure of competition from OTT
         services at the retail level would benefit all existing Pay TV services
         providers, Pay TV services providers have an incentive to free-ride on the
         foreclosure efforts of their competitors at the retail level (i.e. Ziggo did not
         need to engage in the same foreclosure efforts in order to benefit from any
         such effort that could be made by its competitors). As shown in the previous
         paragraph (568), Ziggo had been less assertive than Liberty Global in
         preventing or hampering OTT innovation which is consistent with such an
         effect. Indeed, prior to the Transaction, Ziggo would have benefited as an
         external third party competitor from any success that Liberty Global would
         have had in restricting OTT services overall. However, the proposed
         combination of Liberty Global and Ziggo would allow the merged entity to
         internalise the benefit to both parties of successful foreclosure of OTT
         services. That increases the incentive for the merged entity to engage in such
         foreclosure.
                                             122
 ---pagebreak---     (582) The Commission therefore concluded in the Conditional Clearance Decision
             that the existing incentive for the Notifying Party to prevent or hamper OTT
             services was likely to increase as a result of the Transaction. In combination
             with the increased ability to prevent, hamper, or delay OTT innovation, and in
             light of the pre-merger approach by the Notifying Party towards OTT
             services, the Commission considered that the merged entity was likely to
             engage in strategies to prevent, hamper, or delay OTT innovation post-
             merger.
Likely negative effects on competition
    (583) As set out in the Horizontal Merger Guidelines, the exercise of buyer power in
             an upstream market can adversely affect competition in a downstream market.
             That is particularly the case if the merged entity were likely to use its buyer
             power vis-à-vis its suppliers to foreclose its rivals.
    (584) The Commission considered in the Conditional Clearance Decision that the
             merged entity would indeed be likely to use its increased buyer power in the
             upstream market for the acquisition of Pay TV channels to foreclose its
             potential and existing competitors in the downstream market for the retail
             provision of Pay TV services, in particular, potential innovative OTT audio
             visual service providers.
    (585) In this regard, the Commission considered first, that the increased ability of
             the merged entity to restrict TV broadcasters' possibilities to offer their
             content over the Internet was likely to result in a foreclosure of rival third
             party OTT audio visual service providers that could distribute that content to
             retail consumers. Those third parties included Smart TV providers such as
             Sony and Samsung, but also potential new aggregators of Internet content
             such as Netflix, Weepee NV330 and others. These third parties would be
             precluded from having access to consumers on the retail market for Pay TV,
             restricting consumer choice on that market. Second, the Commission
             considered that TV broadcasters themselves could offer their content directly
             to consumers via the Internet. That concerned the OTT offerings that were
             available in the Netherlands, such as NLZiet and the individual OTT offers of
             TV broadcasters.
    (586) Restrictions to that alternative distribution method for their TV content would
             ultimately cement the significant market power that the merged entity would
             hold vis-à-vis the TV broadcasters as the main distributor of their TV content
             in the Netherlands. That was likely to have negative effects on the upstream
             market for the acquisition of Pay TV channels.
    (587) Importantly, OTT offers would introduce further competition and innovation
             into the retail market for Pay TV services. The merger was likely to prevent
             that from happening. That would have led to higher prices to Dutch
             consumers and deprive Dutch consumers of the benefits of innovation in the
             way they watch TV.
330 http://www.broadbandtvnews.com/2013/05/13/weepee-tv-looking-at-dutch-ott-market/ [accessed at 8
    September 2014].
                                                  123
 ---pagebreak---     (588) The Commission considered in the Conditional Clearance Decision that the
              likely raising of barriers to entry to OTT competitors on the downstream
              market for the retail provision of Pay TV services was particularly relevant to
              the Netherlands, where significant developments in the provision of OTT TV
              services had already taken place. Indeed, the Commission noted that NPO had
              started streaming its linear TV channels, although in lower quality, that RTL
              had recently introduced a standalone OTT SVOD service and that Netflix had
              recently also entered the Netherlands, while RTL, SBS and NPO had jointly
              launched an OTT catch-up TV service.331 That development was
              acknowledged by the Notifying Party, which noted the following: "The use of
              OTT services has expanded rapidly and expectations are that this expansion
              will continue, to the detriment of 'traditional' video and television services
              offered by network operators such as UPC, Ziggo and KPN".332
    (589) If the merged entity were to succeed in preventing, hampering or delaying the
              OTT TV services of the seven TV broadcasters that the Commission analysed
              in the Conditional Clearance Decision (see paragraph (507) above), that
              would have already eliminated the potential OTT distribution of around 80%
              of all TV watched in the Netherlands.333 If the merged entity were to succeed
              only in relation to RTL, SBS and NPO, that would have eliminated the
              potential OTT distribution of around 70% of all TV watched in the
              Netherlands.334 As the Notifying Party itself noted in its internal business
              documents, OTT TV cannot constitute a viable alternative to traditional cable
              TV without those TV broadcasters' content and the Transaction was
              accordingly likely to prevent, hamper or delay OTT competition.
    (590) The negative effects on competition would be felt beyond the merged entity's
              Internet subscribers alone. The Commission recalled in the Conditional
              Clearance Decision that the successful inclusion of an OTT ban in a carriage
              agreement between the merged entity and any TV broadcaster in the
              Netherlands would prevent that particular TV broadcaster from offering its
              content via the Internet network of every broadband retailer in the
              Netherlands and not just that of the merged entity, thereby affecting all
              broadband customers in the Netherlands, and would prevent TV broadcasters
              from offering their content directly to end consumers, thereby eliminating
              likely efficiencies that derived from such vertical integration. Such an OTT
              ban would accordingly eliminate any potential cross-platform competition on
              retail TV services between traditional 'cable' TV and OTT TV.
331 https://www nlziet.nl/ [accessed at 31 July 2014]; http://www npo.nl/live [accessed at 31 July 2014];
    https://www.videoland.com/ [accessed at 31 July 2014];
    https://pr.netflix.com/WebClient/loginPageSalesNetWorksAction.do?contentGroupId=10477&content
    Group=Company+Timeline [accessed at 31 July 2014].
332 Document ID1179, Liberty Global response to the Commission's Article 6(1)(c) decision in case
    M.7000 – Liberty Global/Ziggo, paragraph 37.
333 Stichting            KijkOnderzoek           Jaarrapport         2013,            available           at:
    https://kijkonderzoek.nl/images/SKO Jaarrapport/SKO jaarrapport 2013.pdf.
334 Stichting KijkOnderzoek Jaarrapport 2013, available at:
    https://kijkonderzoek.nl/images/SKO Jaarrapport/SKO jaarrapport 2013.pdf.
                                                        124
 ---pagebreak--- (591) In the Conditional Clearance Decision the Commission considered that the
      effects of a successful imposition of a contractual ban on TV broadcasters'
      OTT activities could not, therefore, inherently, be off-set by the presence of
      the merged entity's competitors on the downstream market for the retail
      provision of fixed Internet access, such as KPN and the alternative operators
      on its network benefiting from wholesale access. The consequences of a
      contractual ban imposed by the largest provider of retail fixed Internet access
      services post-merger automatically extended to all competing providers of
      retail Pay TV services and retail fixed Internet access that would, post-merger,
      remain active in the market. Those remaining competitors would not,
      therefore, constitute a constraint on the negative effects on competition that
      would result from a foreclosure of existing and potential OTT TV
      competitors.
(592) Without the threat of potential increased cross-platform competition from
      OTT TV, the existing providers of retail Pay TV services would be less
      constrained in their price-setting. Given the degree of concentration that
      would exist on this relevant downstream market for the retail supply of TV
      services, or the hypothetical retail market for the retail supply of multiple play
      services, the elimination of potential or emerging competition from OTT
      services was all the more likely to lead to consumer harm.
                6.4.3.3. Commission's assessment and conclusion in 2014
(593) Therefore, the Commission found that the Transaction was unlikely to be
      compatible with the internal market in that it was likely to significantly
      impede effective competition on the market for the acquisition of Pay TV
      channels, on the market for the retail provision of Pay TV services or on the
      hypothetical market for the retail provision of multiple play services.
                6.4.3.4. The OTT Commitment in 2014
(594) In order to remove the significant impediment to effective competition in
      relation to OTT services, the Notifying Party had committed not to enter into
      or renew agreements with TV broadcasters that contained terms which would
      directly or indirectly restrict the TV broadcasters' ability to offer their
      channels and associated content via OTT services. This applied to any
      agreements with TV broadcasters for the distribution of those broadcasters'
      linear channels and catch-up TV services on the Liberty Global and Ziggo Pay
      TV Platform in the Netherlands. The Commitments made clear that the
      Notifying Party was not allowed to, directly or indirectly, restrict the ability of
      the broadcasters to offer, on a standalone basis or in partnership with a third
      party, OTT services in the Netherlands, or the ability of those broadcasters to
      offer their linear channels and any content owned or controlled by the TV
      broadcaster via such OTT services in the Netherlands. In addition, the
      Notifying Party offered commitments to ensure the effectiveness of the
      distribution of OTT content via NewZiggo's internet network. To that end, the
      Notifying Party sought to make it impossible to engage in a foreclosure
      capacity by committing to maintaining sufficient interconnection capacity
      towards NewZiggo's customers in the Netherlands by ensuring there are
      always at least three uncongested internet routes into the merged entity's IP
      network in the Netherlands. The commitment not to prohibit OTT distribution
                                           125
 ---pagebreak---       of content would, in its entirety, be in force for a period of eight years
      following the date of adoption of the 2014 decision.
(595) In the 2014 decision, the Commission assessed whether the OTT
      Commitments were suitable and sufficient to eliminate the competition
      concerns; and capable of being implemented effectively within a short period
      of time.
(596) The Commission noted that the significant impediment to effective
      competition that would arise in relation to OTT services was a specific one.
      The Commission had found that the Dutch market for the acquisition of Pay
      TV channels was characterised by the existence of agreements that restricted
      or aimed to restrict TV broadcasters in their ability to offer their TV channels
      and associated content via the internet. The Commission had found that the
      Transaction would increase Liberty Global's ability and incentive to continue
      such restrictive agreements, or to have made them even more onerous. That
      would have deprived consumers in the Netherlands from innovations
      regarding the ways in which they can watch TV content over the internet.
      With the OTT Commitments, the Notifying Party effectively committed to
      terminate any agreement between it and TV broadcasters that related to the
      carriage of the TV broadcasters' linear and catch-up services on NewZiggo's
      Pay TV platform and which restricted their ability to offer their channels and
      content via an OTT service in the Netherlands. It also committed that
      NewZiggo would not enter into such agreements in the future. Against that
      background and in the context of the 2014 notification, the Commission
      considered that the effective termination of those agreements was a suitable
      and sufficient remedy to remove the significant impediment to effective
      competition. Taking into account the additional safeguards that ensure the
      viability and effectiveness of the OTT commitment, including maintaining
      sufficient interconnectivity capacity towards its Dutch internet customers, the
      Commission considered that the OTT Commitment was capable of being
      implemented effectively and immediately.
(597) Therefore, the Commission considered that the OTT Commitment was
      suitable and sufficient to eliminate the competition concerns expressed,
      according to which the Transaction would have resulted in a significant
      impediment to effective competition in relation to OTT Services.
                6.4.3.5. The Notifying Parties' views in their Supplementary
                          Notification
(598) The Notifying Parties submit that none of the current contracts with
      broadcasters contain restrictions on broadcasters' OTT offerings (or even
      clauses relating to broadcasters' OTT offerings), in line with the OTT
      commitments. Old contracts which previously contained such OTT
      restrictions have been amended via an addendum to ensure compliance with
      the OTT commitments.
(599) The Notifying Parties note in their Supplementary Notification that they have
      implemented the OTT commitment with all third parties based on their
      evolving understanding of it and are not aware that any conflicts have arisen
      in relation to the OTT commitment.
                                          126
 ---pagebreak---     (600) The Notifying Parties state that during the course of 2015, the Parties worked
             internally and with the Monitoring Trustee to develop a practical
             understanding of the OTT Commitments and a process for securing necessary
             transparency. They largely reached agreement on key elements in June 2015.
             The Notifying Parties consider that since then, the Parties have continued to
             engage constructively with the Monitoring Trustee.
    (601) The Notifying Parties further submit that the Parties cannot assess the impact
             of the OTT Commitment as there is no counterfactual to compare it with.
    (602) Regarding the requirements on IP interconnect which flank the main
             commitment, the Notifying Party notes that the peering edge of the IP
             network serving Dutch customers is and always has been uncongested and
             that the aim of the IP interconnect requirement was to remove any ability for
             the Parties to congest this peering edge and so remove the incentive to try to
             do so.
    (603) The Notifying Parties further submit that the Parties do not and would in any
             event never have any incentive to allow such congestion to happen as this
             would negatively impact its retail customers. This position would further have
             been strengthened by the entry into force of Regulation (EU) 2015/2120
             concerning open internet access which considerably restricts any ability to
             manage internet traffic and ensures an open internet. According to the
             Notifying Party, the IP interconnect requirement has no impact on the Parties'
             actions or incentives.
                        6.4.3.6. Commission's assessment
    (604) The Commission notes that, based on current market conditions, the Parties
             would appear to have a market share of approximately [50-60]% on the
             market for the acquisition of Pay TV channels in the Netherlands. The
             Transaction results in a very significant market share increment as absent the
             Transaction each of UPC and Ziggo would distribute Pay TV channels only
             within their respective footprint and, as a consequence, would also have
             individually much smaller market shares in the market for the acquisition of
             Pay TV channels.
    (605) Given that the OTT commitments have been in force since the adoption of the
             2014 decision, the Commission has assessed whether the OTT commitment
             was still necessary and, if so, for which period.335
335 The Commission notes that in Section 7.5 of the Conditional Clearance Decision (The market for the
    provision of retail fixed Internet access services- network access foreclosure), the Commission
    assessed the concerns expressed during the market investigation that the proposed Transaction raised
    two distinct competition concerns that would stem exclusively from the increased size and importance
    of the merged entity's Internet network in the Netherlands: the first concern was that the merged entity
    would have the ability and the incentive to engage in Internet network access foreclosure vis-à-vis
    competing (OTT) providers of retail TV content, and the second was that the merged entity could
    leverage its position in the market for the retail provision of fixed Internet access vis-à-vis certain
    providers of data-intensive Internet content such as OTT audio visual services in order to force them to
    start paying for having access to its broadband customers. Having assessed these concerns, the
    Commission concluded that it did not need to conclude whether the proposed Transaction raised
    competition concerns as a result of the merged entity's increased share of the market for the retail
                                                        127
 ---pagebreak---     (606) A majority of respondents to the market investigation, wholesale suppliers of
               TV channels as well as retail providers of TV services, consider that, as a
               result of the merger, in the absence of the OTT remedy, the merged entity
               would have the ability to degrade the quality of OTT SVOD services in order
               to benefit the merged entity's own retail offerings.336 In addition, a majority of
               them also considers that the merged entity would have the commercial
               incentive to degrade the quality of OTT SVOD services of Dutch
               broadcasters, in the absence of the OTT remedy337.
    (607) A majority of wholesale suppliers of TV channels also report that the OTT
               remedy has been helpful in their negotiations with the merged entity.338
          (a)       Fox Networks Group stated: "UPC also required FNG to agree to
                    discontinue its OTT-product, FOX Sports GO, in order to favour UPC's
                    own Horizon service. After the OTT-service remedies were made binding,
                    New Ziggo ceased this behaviour."
          (b)       RTL: "This subject not to offer OTT was a topic in previous talks before
                    the remedy was in place. As a result of the remedy this subject wasn't
                    discussed again."
          (c)       Talpa TV: "During the negotiation of the previous contract (January
                    2015- December 2017), VodafoneZiggo had sought to impose a clause
                    that would have prohibited Talpa TV from distributing her linear TV
                    channels on other OTT platforms. Because of the commitments on
                    VodafoneZiggo in case M.7000, the clause was removed from the draft
                    contract."
    (608) In light of the above, the Commission concludes that the Transaction raises
               serious doubts as to its compatibility with the internal market as regards the
               market for the acquisition of Pay TV channels, the market for the retail
               provision of Pay TV services or the hypothetical market for the retail
               provision of multiple play services.
     provision of fixed Internet access, given that the commitments entered into by the Notifying Party
     would eliminate any potential adverse effects on competition that could stem therefrom. Given that, in
     the present case, the Notifying Parties have submitted an OTT remedy again, the Commission
     considers that also in the present case it is not necessary to conclude whether the proposed Transaction
     raises competition concerns as a result of the merged entity's increased share of the market for the
     retail provision of fixed Internet access.
336 Replies to Q2 to TV channel wholesale suppliers of 5 April 2018, question C.D.1; replies to Q3 to
     retailers of TV, telephony and Internet access services of 5 April 2018, question C.H.1..
337 Replies from Q2 to TV channel wholesale suppliers of 5 April 2018, question C.D.2; replies to from Q3
     to retailers of TV, telephony and Internet access services of 5 April 2018, question C.H.2.
338 Replies from Q2 to TV channel wholesale suppliers of 5 April 2018, question C.D.4.
                                                           128
 ---pagebreak---             6.4.4.     Ability and incentive of the Notifying Party to use its increased buyer
                       power to foreclose TV broadcasters' competing content from having
                       access to its Pay TV distribution platform
                       6.4.4.1. The Notifying Party's views in 2014
    (609) In relation to the access of competing TV channel broadcasters to the merged
            entity's Pay TV platform, the Notifying Party claimed that it would be in the
            interest of the merged entity to distribute as much attractive content as
            possible and to be able to offer to consumers a wide ranging of channels.
            Hence there was no reason to assume that post-Transaction the incentive of
            the merged entity to foreclose TV channels from access to its TV platform
            would change.339 The Notifying Party also noted that there was no correlation
            between the size and number of subscribers of a retail TV services provider
            and the number of channels offered by that provider.340 The Notifying Party
            did not express a view on its ability or incentive to foreclose thematic TV
            channels in particular.
                       6.4.4.2. Commission's assessment in 2014
    (610) In the Article 6(1)(c) decision, the Commission considered that the proposed
            Transaction raised serious doubts as to its compatibility with the internal
            market also to the extent that it may confer upon the merged entity an ability
            to engage in customer foreclosure in respect of TV broadcasters' new
            initiatives.341
    (611) As established in recitals (258) to (275) of the Conditional Clearance
            Decision, the Commission considered it likely that the Notifying Party would,
            as a result of the proposed Transaction, enjoy significantly increased
            bargaining power vis-à-vis TV broadcasters. That conclusion was based on
            several of the Notifying Party's internal business documents and had been
            overwhelmingly confirmed by the respondents to the Commission's market
            investigation.
    (612) According to the Notifying Party's own internal business documents, this
            increased buyer power [...].342
    (613) During the Commission's in-depth market investigation, several respondents
            expressed their concern that the merged entity would be able to engage in
            customer foreclosure specifically in relation to TV broadcasters' (then) new
339 Form CO, paragraph 560.
340 Liberty Global response to the Commission's Article 6(1)(c) decision in case M.7000 – Liberty
    Global/Ziggo, paragraph 75.
341 Commission decision pursuant to Article 6(1)(c) of 8 May 2014 in case M.7000 – Liberty
    Global/Ziggo, paragraph 165.
342 [Reference to the Parties' internal business documents].
                                                       129
 ---pagebreak---              and existing thematic TV channels.343 Thematic TV channels are linear TV
             channels that feature content revolving around one central theme such as, for
             example, nature, history, documentaries and cooking, or those that target a
             specific consumer group, such as women, men or children. Examples of
             thematic TV channels that then existed in the Netherlands were 24Kitchen,
             NPO Cultura, NPO Doc, RTL Crime, RTL Telekids and Comedy Central
             Family. Given that those thematic TV channels would depend largely on
             income derived from retail TV distributors, the largest portion of which would
             be accounted for by the merged entity, the latter would have the ability to
             determine their very existence. NPO for example indicated that it was obliged,
             under the Dutch Media Act, to spend all income received from 3rd parties on
             programming and that, accordingly, any decrease in the licence fee secured by
             NPO from TV distributors would directly influence the content it offered on
             its thematic TV channels, given that its costs would remain the same.344 Fox
             similarly indicated that its thematic TV channels would not be able to survive
             in the long term without receiving income both from advertising as well as
             from licence fees.345 RTL, in turn, explained that 93% of the income
             generated by its thematic TV channels RTL Lounge, RTL Crime and RTL
             Telekids was derived from licensing fees paid by TV distributors.346 Given
             that the merged entity would account for at least [50-60]% of the overall
             expenditure on TV channels and [60-70]% of all TV subscribers in the
             Netherlands, TV broadcasters' thematic TV channels were unlikely to be able
             to survive in the long term without being carried by, and receiving a licence
             fee from, the former.
    (614) Moreover, some of the respondents to the Commission's market investigation
             that had raised this particular concern also indicated that providing their new
             thematic TV channels OTT was not, at that time, a fully adequate alternative
             to being carried by Pay TV distributors. This would be due to the fact that the
             OTT market (i.e. the percentage of the overall TV audience that received its
             TV services OTT) was not yet sufficiently large to allow the advertising-
             based business model, while the price of OTT subscriptions would remain
             low.347 The Commission however reiterated that the OTT market in the
             Netherlands had (then) recently (even as recent as June 2014, when NLZiet
             was launched) seen a number of major developments that suggested that this
343 Document ID1908, non-confidential minutes of conference call between Commission's services and
    SBS of 19 June 2014; Document ID1400, non-confidential response of SBS to the Commission's
    questionnaire Q4 'Phase II Questionnaire to Broadcasters' of 28 May 2014, questions 20.3.1 and 20.6;
    Document ID1989, non-confidential minutes of conference call between the Commission's services
    and NPO of 19 June 2014, paragraph 6; Non-confidential response of RTL to the Commission's
    questionnaire Q4 'Phase II Questionnaire to Broadcasters' of 28 May 2014, question 20.3;
344 Document ID1989, non-confidential minutes of conference call between the Commission's services
    and NPO of 19 June 2014, paragraph 6.
345 Non-confidential minutes of conference call between the Commission's services and Fox of 25 June
    2014.
346 Document ID1741, non-confidential submission of RTL of 26 June 2014.
347 See, for example, Non-confidential submission of RTL of 23 June 2014.
                                                      130
 ---pagebreak---              market could become ever more interesting for advertisers and customers
             alike.
    (615) The Commission further noted, as already stated in the section on the
             Notifying Party's increased ability to hamper OTT innovation of the
             Conditional Clearance Decision, that there was evidence suggesting that the
             Notifying Party already considered its ability to cease carrying TV
             broadcasters' thematic TV channels to constitute a serious threat.348 [...].
    (616) Those internal documents suggested that the Notifying Party already
             constituted an important partner to TV broadcasters' thematic TV channels but
             that those same channels, if popular with TV viewers, could constitute a
             competitive threat at the retail Pay TV level if one were not to carry them.
    (617) Therefore, the Commission considered that the Notifying Party could well
             have the ability post-merger to determine which of the TV broadcasters'
             thematic TV channels would survive in the long run.
    (618) Whether the merged entity was likely to have an incentive not to carry
             thematic TV channels depended on the attractiveness of the content offered
             and whether the content was in competition with the merged entity's own
             content. A successful thematic TV channel that did not compete with the
             Notifying Party's own content would constitute an enrichment of its Pay TV
             offering, possibly allowing it to attract additional subscribers or to move more
             of its subscribers to its premium subscriptions. Indeed, the Notifying Party
             noted in an internal business document [...].349 However, the merged entity
             might have an incentive not to carry new thematic channels – thereby
             undermining TV broadcasters' business case for their launch or continuation –
             if such new channels competed with the merged entity's own content.
             Moreover, any post-merger ability to hamper thematic TV channels' viability
             could also help attain the Notifying Party's goal to prevent retail Pay TV
             competitors from obtaining exclusive carriage rights to such TV channels, as
             it mentioned in relation to [...].350
    (619) Although the Parties' combined share of content ownership in the Netherlands
             then remained limited, the Notifying Party seemed to have a strategy whereby
             it aimed to integrate the wholesale supply of content and of TV channels with
             the retail distribution thereof.351 As part of the proposed Transaction, the
348 [Reference to the Parties' internal business documents].
349 [Reference to the Parties' internal business documents].
350 [Reference to the Parties' internal business documents].
351 The Commission notes in this respect that the Notifying Party has recently acquired a 6.4% stake in
    ITV (Liberty Global press release of 17 July 2014, 'Liberty Global acquires a 6.4% stake in ITV, the
    leading commercial broadcaster in the United Kingdom), and is in the process of acquiring control
    over several important content production houses, including in the Netherlands (Cases No M.7282 -
    Liberty Global/Discovery/All3Media; No M.7194 - Liberty Global/Corelio/W&W/De Vijver Media).
                                                       131
 ---pagebreak---            Notifying Party would add Ziggo's thematic TV channel Xite352 and Premium
           Pay TV channel HBO to its content portfolio and its incentive to foreclose
           competing TV channels from having access to its network was thus expected
           to increase in the future. While the Commission considered that further
           integration by the Notifying Party in the wholesale supply of content might
           provide it with an incentive to foreclose TV broadcasters' thematic TV
           channels from having access to its cable network in the future, the then
           limited content ownership implied that the merged entity's incentive to
           foreclose thematic TV channels was also likely to be limited immediately
           following the proposed Transaction.
    (620) Moreover, significant developments had then recently taken place in the
           Netherlands that could contribute to the establishing of a successful
           alternative OTT route to customers for (thematic) TV channels. Amongst
           those were the launch of NLZiet, a major catch-up TV platform combining
           the content of the three largest TV broadcasters in the Netherlands, the launch
           of Netflix' OTT SVOD service and the launch of NPO's paid OTT service
           NPO Plus.
    (621) Although those OTT developments then mainly revolved around VOD TV
           services, if such new services were successful they would provide different
           routes to customers and different models for distributing content. Over time,
           this was likely to undermine the merged entity's ability to prevent the
           emergence of new thematic TV channels.
    (622) The Notifying Party had – as part of the proposed Transaction – entered into
           commitments vis-à-vis the Commission which aimed at removing any ability
           on the part of the Notifying Party to use its buyer power in the market for the
           acquisition of Pay TV channels in order to hamper OTT innovation. Those
           commitments would therefore leave TV broadcasters at liberty to further
           develop the OTT TV market. Importantly, the Commission understood that
           new thematic TV channels generally required time to develop and were not,
           therefore, expected to be profitable from the start. Fox for example indicated
           that when it launched its thematic TV channel 24Kitchen, it had to offer it for
           free to the large TV distributors in the Netherlands in order for it to get onto
           their networks.353 Regardless of whether a fully-fledged linear OTT TV
           market eventually develops, the commitments entered into by the Notifying
           Party allowed TV broadcasters in the Netherlands to try and do so, without
           having to risk losing their existing business with the Notifying Party. The
           Commission considered that the mere possibility that TV broadcasters might
           for example start offering their existing and new thematic or non-thematic TV
           channels OTT directly after having concluded a carriage agreement for those
           TV channels with the Notifying Party, should confer a degree of leverage on
           those TV broadcasters. The Commission considered that the risk that certain
           (potentially) successful thematic TV channels became exclusively available
352 Form CO, paragraph 187; Document ID1989, non-confidential minutes of conference call between the
    Commission's services and NPO of 19 June 2014.
353 Non-confidential minutes of conference call between the Commission's services and Fox of 25 June
    2014.
                                                    132
 ---pagebreak---                on TV broadcasters' OTT platforms should remove the Notifying Party's post-
               merger ability, and thereby its incentive, to foreclose them from having access
               to TV customers in the Netherlands.
                          6.4.4.3. Commission's assessment and conclusion in 2014
     (623) The Commission considered that it did not need to conclude on whether the
               proposed Transaction gave rise to competition concerns as a result of any
               increased ability and (future) incentive on the part of the merged entity to
               engage in customer foreclosure vis-à-vis TV broadcasters competing thematic
               TV channels, given that the commitments entered into by the Notifying Party
               were likely to eliminate potential adverse effects on competition that could
               stem therefrom.354
                          6.4.4.4. The Notifying Parties' views in their Supplementary
                                      Notification
     (624) In their Supplementary Notification, the Notifying Parties' set out the
               Commission's assessment and conclusion of the Conditional Clearance
               Decision.
                          6.4.4.5. Commission's assessment
     (625) The Commission considers that it does not need to conclude on whether the
               Transaction gives rise to competition concerns as a result of any increased
               ability and (future) incentive on the part of the merged entity to engage in
               customer foreclosure355 vis-à-vis TV broadcasters competing thematic TV
               channels, given that the commitments entered into by the Notifying Parties are
               likely to eliminate potential adverse effects on competition that could stem
               therefrom.
               6.4.5.     Ability and incentive of the Notifying Party post-merger to use its
                          increased buyer power to foreclose its rivals in the retail market for
                          the provision of Pay TV services
     (626) in their responses to the first phase market investigation, responding providers
               of retail TV services considered that the merged entity would enjoy increased
               bargaining power vis-à-vis TV broadcasters that could, in turn, negatively
               affect the availability or cost of TV channels for them.356 Based on those
354 Conditional Clearance Decision, recital 424.
355 In particular, this also applies to Fox Sports which is the only directly competing Premium Pay TV
     sports channel. First, the Commission notes that the merged entity has always been offering Fox Sports
     to its customers since the Transaction. Second, as explained in section 6.3, Fox Sports is carrying one
     of the most popular sports content in the Netherlands, the Dutch football league Eredivisie, at least
     until 2025, and possibly beyond given that Fox Sports entered into a joint venture with the Dutch
     football clubs in 2012. Therefore, it would not be in the interest of the merged entity to withhold Fox
     Sports' very attractive package of channels from its customers. Third, the commitments entered into by
     the Notifying Parties are likely to eliminate potential adverse effects on competition.
356  Replies to questionnaire Q3 to retailers of TV, telephony and Internet access services of 5 April 2018,
     question 65.
                                                          133
 ---pagebreak---              results, and in line with its Horizontal Merger Guidelines, the Commission
             considered in the Article 6(1)(c) decision that the proposed Transaction raised
             serious doubts as to its compatibility with the internal market as a result of the
             impact that an increase in the merged entity's bargaining power might have on
             the availability or cost of TV channels to rival providers of retail TV services
             in the Netherlands and whether this could significantly impact competition in
             the market for the retail provision of Pay TV services.357
                        6.4.5.1. The Notifying Party's views in 2014
    (627) The Notifying Party argued that even if the proposed Transaction resulted in
             increased buyer power of the merged entity, there was no reason to believe
             that this would have an impact on the costs of competing providers of Pay TV
             services, which is often called a waterbed effect. That would require TV
             channel suppliers to seek to recoup any potential loss in revenue resulting
             from lower fees that the merged entity would be able to negotiate given its
             increased bargaining power vis-à-vis TV channel suppliers, by charging
             higher fees to competing TV services providers.
    (628) First, the Notifying Party considered that there was no reason to believe that a
             reduction in the price that one TV services provider could negotiate would
             lead to an increase in the price to another TV services provider operating in
             the same territory. TV channel suppliers would in any event seek to maximise
             to the extent possible the income derived from each individual agreement with
             a given TV services provider and the incentive for TV channel providers to do
             so would not be affected by the proposed Transaction.358 The bargaining
             power that TV channel suppliers enjoyed vis-à-vis other retailers of TV
             services would not increase as a result of the proposed Transaction thus
             preventing TV channel suppliers from charging increased fees in order to
             compensate any possible reduction in their revenue derived from the merged
             entity.359 On the contrary, the Notifying Party argued that it cannot be
             excluded that a reduction in price might serve as a benchmark leading to a
             reduced price being offered to other TV service providers as well.360 Second,
             the Notifying party considered that the conditions required for the waterbed
             effects to appear in economic theory models were very limited and unlikely to
             be satisfied in this case.
    (629) As regards the possibility that the merged entity would foreclose downstream
             rivals from access to channels through exclusivity agreements with
             broadcasters, the Notifying Party submitted that neither Liberty Global nor
             Ziggo in general aimed at concluding exclusive distribution contracts with TV
             channel suppliers thus preventing competing TV services retailers from
357 The Article 6(1)(c) decision, paragraphs 168-173.
358 Form CO, paragraph 489.
359 Liberty Global response to the Article 6(1)(c) decision, paragraphs 16 and 79.
360 Form CO, paragraph 488; [Liberty Global economic submission prepared by Oxera, 21 May 2014,
    Section 6.2.3].
                                                        134
 ---pagebreak---              distributing certain channels. The Notifying Party claimed that the proposed
             Transaction would not increase the incentive of the merged entity to seek
             exclusivity over channels and that in any event pursuing such exclusivity
             would be feasible only if the merged entity could compensate the TV channel
             supplier for the revenues foregone from competing TV services retailers and
             at the same time gain sufficient advantage at retail level in the form of
             attracting extra customers in order to offset the extra cost related to obtaining
             exclusivity over the channels at hand.361
    (630) The Notifying Party also claimed that seeking exclusivity over a channel that
             is relatively less important would make no sense as customers were unlikely
             to switch to the merged entity only to be able to follow a relatively less
             important channel that was available exclusively on the Liberty Global/Ziggo
             TV platform. Even if the merged entity could obtain exclusivity over one of
             the most popular or attractive channels it was not likely that a sufficient
             number of consumers would switch to Liberty Global/Ziggo to offset the extra
             costs of obtaining the channel exclusively. In addition the Notifying Party
             submitted that advertising revenues represented a very important part of the
             revenues generated by TV channel suppliers and they would expect a
             distributor seeking exclusivity over certain channels to pay substantially
             higher fees for exclusivity in order to compensate for the foregone advertising
             revenues thus making the cost for exclusivity unrealistically high.362
                       6.4.5.2. Commission's assessment in 2014
    (631) During its in-depth investigation, the Commission first of all investigated
             whether the proposed Transaction was likely to increase the degree of buyer
             power that the Notifying Party would enjoy in the market for the acquisition
             of Pay TV channels in the Netherlands. As indicated in section 7.3.2 of the
             Conditional Clearance Decision, such an increase in bargaining power was
             likely to indeed ensue from the proposed Transaction, as evidenced by,
             amongst others, the Parties' internal business documents and the responses to
             the Commission's market investigation.
    (632) The Commission therefore continued to investigate whether an increased
             buyer power on the part of the merged entity could (i) allow it to limit the
             availability of TV channels in the Netherlands by forcing TV broadcasters to
             conclude exclusivity agreements in return for increased license fees; or (ii)
             lead to TV broadcasters in the Netherlands charging higher fees to the merged
             entity's downstream competitors to an extent that a significant impediment to
             effective competition would arise in the downstream market via a waterbed
             effect.
    (633) As regards point (i) of paragraph (632), the Commission noted that the TV
             broadcasters that responded to its in-depth market investigation unanimously
             indicated that they would not be able to operate profitably if their TV
361 Form CO, paragraphs 482, 483 and 484.
362 Liberty Global submission "Financial data on broadcasters", 24 June 2014.
                                                      135
 ---pagebreak---               channels were exclusively broadcast on the merged entity's cable network.363
              Any lost income ensuing from exclusivity would not be able to be off-set by
              an increased fee paid by the merged entity. Relying mainly on advertising
              income, SBS required its TV channels to have a national reach.364 RTL also
              stated in that regard that, in order to remain economically viable, it would
              have to be able to reach 100% of Dutch households.365 SBS further explained:
              "In order to make a channel financially viable (based on an advertising
              model) a minimum coverage is required of at least 90% of the Dutch
              households. Thus advertisers would not choose a channel for their
              advertisements, if they were only to have access to only the merged entity's
              cable network (or generally anything lower than 90%). Thus, losing access to
              for example 20% of the viewer market would not amount to a linear decrease
              of advertising revenue, but probably with more than 40%".366 Commercial
              broadcasters such as SBS and RTL were accordingly unlikely to be able to
              concede to providing their content exclusively to the merged entity. Also,
              NPO's TV channels were subject to a 'must-carry' obligation for TV
              distributors in the Netherlands pursuant to the Dutch Media Act and could
              not, therefore, be the subject of an exclusivity arrangement.367 Given that
              NPO, RTL and SBS together already accounted for around 70% of all TV
              viewed in the Netherlands368, and given that the TV broadcasters that
              responded to the Commission's market investigation unanimously ruled out
              the possibility of licensing their TV channels exclusively to the merged entity,
              the Commission concluded that the merged entity was unlikely to have the
              ability to foreclose its downstream rivals by demanding exclusivity over TV
              broadcasters' channels.
    (634) As regards point (ii) of paragraph (632), the Commission noted that a
              competitive concern based on a waterbed effect requires that the exercise of
              increased buyer power by the merged entity would lead to higher licence fees
              paid by downstream rivals, and that the negative effects on competition of
              higher costs for downstream rivals would outweigh the positive effect of
              lower licence fees paid by the merged entity.369
363 Responses to the Commission's questionnaire Q4 'Phase II Questionnaire to Broadcasters' of 28 May
    2014, question 14.
364 Document ID1908, non-confidential minutes of conference call between Commission's services and
    SBS of 19 June 2014;
365 Non-confidential response of RTL to the Commission's questionnaire Q4 'Phase II Questionnaire to
    Broadcasters' of 28 May 2014, question 11.
366 Document ID1400, non-confidential response of SBS to the Commission's questionnaire Q4 'Phase II
    Questionnaire to Broadcasters' of 28 May 2014, question 14.1.
367 Document ID1424, non-confidential response of NPO to the Commission's questionnaire Q4 'Phase II
    Questionnaire to Broadcasters' of 28 May 2014, question 14.1.
368 Stichting           KijkOnderzoek            Jaarrapport         2013,          available           at:
    https://kijkonderzoek.nl/images/SKO Jaarrapport/SKO jaarrapport 2013.pdf.
369 A waterbed effect further requires that upstream cost reductions will affect downstream prices, that is
    it requires a degree of pass-through.
                                                        136
 ---pagebreak---     (635) The Commission noted, first, that the retailers which voiced concerns that
              they would be harmed as a result of increased bargaining power by the
              merged entity had not identified a clear mechanism of how this would arise.
              An argument that better terms for the merged entity would put retail rivals at a
              relative competitive disadvantage did not imply that rivals have to pay higher
              licence fees to broadcasters. Rather it could simply be the result of a pro-
              competitive effect of lower licence fees by the merged entity that does not
              affect the level of fees paid by rivals.
    (636) Moreover, the Commission acknowledged that the argument that because
              broadcasters may receive lower licence fees from the merged entity, they
              would recoup those losses by extracting higher licence fees from the merged
              entity's downstream competitors was not convincing unless there was
              evidence for the mechanism through which this would arise. In particular, as
              pointed out by the Notifying Party, this argument did not answer the question
              why broadcasters, if they were in a position to negotiate higher licence fees
              from the merged entity's rivals post-merger, they could not use that ability to
              increase their revenues from those firms already pre-merger.
    (637) The Commission noted that it was in theory conceivable that a merged entity
              that benefits from increased bargaining power would pay less for its inputs
              which allowed it to be more competitive on the downstream market and gain
              market share from rivals. That in turn could worsen the bargaining position of
              rivals and lead to an increase in their input prices if the lower market share
              implied that not concluding an agreement with suppliers becomes relatively
              more costly for rivals. Such an effect on rivals' cost could negatively affect
              competition in the downstream market.370
    (638) However, in this case, the evidence collected during the market investigation
              did not allow the Commission to identify a specific mechanism by which the
              merged entity's increased buyer power would lead to higher licence fees for
              downstream rivals.371 The market investigation did not produce convincing
              evidence that the merged entity's downstream competitors' bargaining position
              vis-à-vis TV broadcasters would materially deteriorate as a result of the
              Transaction so that TV broadcasters would be able to recoup some of their
              lost licence revenues from the merged entity's rivals. In fact, some evidence
              from the market investigation indicated that TV broadcasters that exclusively
              relied on licence fees would become more rather than less dependent on the
              merged entity's downstream rivals were the merged entity to lower its licence
              fee payments and that broadcasters would not be able to recoup reduced
370 Such an effect has been discussed in an economic paper (Inderst, R and TM Valetti (2011), Buyer
    Power and the 'Waterbed Effect', Journal of Industrial Economics, Volume LIX(1), pp1-20). In that
    paper, it is shown that the worsening of the bargaining position of rivals occurs, because not agreeing
    triggers a fixed cost to self-supply the input. As the rival's market share is reduced, the cost per unit of
    self-supply (including the fixed cost element) increases.
371 For example, there is also no evidence that the merger would affect the credibility of rivals'
    contingency plans in the absence of an agreement with broadcasters.
                                                          137
 ---pagebreak---              licence revenues from the merged entity by increasing licence fees to
             downstream rivals.372
     (639) The Commission further noted that Fox' premium sport channel, which
             carried the live football rights to the Dutch premier league, the Eredivisie, was
             subject to a non-discrimination obligation imposed by the Dutch regulator,
             which required Fox to apply the same terms and conditions to all retail TV
             distributors in the Netherlands.373 Any lost income derived from the merged
             entity could not, therefore, be recouped by Fox by charging higher,
             discriminatory prices to other TV retailers.
                        6.4.5.3. Commission's conclusion in 2014
     (640) Following its in-depth investigation, the Commission considered that the
             Transaction would not significantly impede effective competition in so far as
             it is unlikely to confer upon the Notifying Party the ability and the incentive to
             engage in input foreclosure vis-à-vis its downstream rivals.
                        6.4.5.4. The Notifying Parties' views in their Supplementary
                                   Notification
     (641) In their Supplementary Notification, the Notifying Parties' set out the
             Commission's assessment and conclusion of the Conditional Clearance
             Decision.
                        6.4.5.5. Commission's assessment
     (642) The Commission notes that based on the results of the market investigation,
             the Transaction is likely to have increased the degree of buyer power that the
             Parties have enjoyed in the market for the acquisition of Pay TV channels in
             the Netherlands.374
     (643) The Commission therefore assessed whether an increased buyer power on the
             part of the merged entity could (i) allow it to limit the availability of TV
             channels in the Netherlands by forcing TV broadcasters to conclude
             exclusivity agreements in return for increased license fees; or (ii) lead to TV
             broadcasters in the Netherlands charging higher fees to the merged entity's
             downstream competitors to an extent that the Transaction would raise serious
             doubts as to its compatibility with the internal market as a result of the impact
             in the downstream market via a waterbed effect.
372  See, for example, Document ID1380, non-confidential response of BBC to the Commission's
     questionnaire Q4 'Phase II Questionnaire to Broadcasters' of 28 May 2014, question 14.1, question 11;
     Non-confidential minutes of conference call between the Commission's services and the BBC of 25
     June 2014.
373  Non-confidential minutes of conference call between the Commission's services and Fox of 25 June
     2014.
374 See Section 6.4.2 above.
                                                       138
 ---pagebreak---     (644) As regards point (i), the Commission considers that the merged entity is
              unlikely to have the ability to foreclose its downstream rivals by demanding
              exclusivity over TV broadcasters' channels, for the following reasons. First,
              broadcasters which responded to the market investigation indicated that it is
              important to have maximum reach to operate profitably. 375 For example Talpa
              TV noted: "In general a wholesale supplier like Talpa TV needs to be featured
              on every possible network. Thus, the question whether or not a wholesale
              supplier must have access to a specific platform is somewhat arbitrary. Talpa
              TV wants a 100 percent coverage if possible, but would not be able to exploit
              its business model with less than approximately 90 to 95 percent coverage."
              RTL also emphasized that it was important "to have a maximum reach".
              Discovery noted: "as basic pay channels we need to have a maximum reach
              and possibility to monetise our IP." It remains therefore unlikely that
              commercial broadcasters would be able to concede to providing their content
              exclusively to the merged entity. Second, NPO's TV channels are still subject
              to a 'must-carry' obligation for TV distributors in the Netherlands pursuant to
              the Dutch Media Act and could not, therefore, be the subject of an exclusivity
              arrangement.376 Together NPO, RTL and Talpa TV still today, as in 2014,
              together account for more than 70% of all TV channels viewed in the
              Netherlands.377
    (645) As to the competitive concern based on a waterbed effect mentioned in point
              (ii), the market investigation has not brought to light any new fact that would
              lead the Commission to adopt a different conclusion in the present
              assessment. With regard to Fox Sports, the market investigation confirmed
              that Fox Sports Eredivisie channels are distributed on a non-discriminatory
              basis and therefore any lost income derived from the merged entity could not,
              therefore, be recouped by Fox by charging higher, discriminatory prices to
              other TV retailers.378
                        6.4.5.6. Overall conclusion
    (646) Therefore, the Commission concludes that the Transaction does not raise
              serious doubts as to its compatibility with the internal market as a result of
              any possible ability and incentive on the part of the merged entity to, post-
              Transaction, engage in input foreclosure vis-à-vis its downstream rivals.
375 Replies to questionnaire Q2 to TV channel wholesale suppliers of 5 April 2018, questions C.B.13 and
    C.B.14.
376 Replies to questionnaire Q2 to TV channel wholesale suppliers of 5 April 2018, questions B.B.3.1 and
    C.B.14.
377 Reply to RFI 5, question 3, providing the market shares for the top 20 most viewed TV channels in the
    Netherlands based on information from Stichting Kijk Onderzoek.
                                                       139
 ---pagebreak---              6.4.6.     Ability and incentive of the Notifying Party post-merger to block TV
                        broadcasters' Hybrid Broadcast Broadband TV signals
                        6.4.6.1. The Notifying Party's views in 2014
    (647) The Notifying Party pointed out that the transmission of Hybrid Broadcast
             Broadband TV (“HbbTV”) signals ('triggers') had been the subject of political
             discussions in the Netherlands and the Dutch government refrained from
             imposing a compulsory transmission of that technology.379 The Notifying
             Party was also of the view that as a result of imposing an HbbTV standard,
             other more recent standards would be obstructed or jeopardised, leading to
             disproportionate costs.
    (648) The Notifying Party also claimed that Ziggo did not apply a more liberal
             policy towards allowing HbbTV signals in its footprint than the Notifying
             Party. Accordingly, the Transaction would not affect the ability or the
             incentive of the merged entity to engage in the blocking of TV broadcasters'
             HbbTV signals on its network.380
                        6.4.6.2. Commission's assessment in 2014
    (649) The Commission explained that certain specific internal business documents
             of the Parties had warranted an investigation into the possible effects of the
             Transaction on the merged entity's ability and incentive to block HbbTV
             signals on its network.
    (650) The Commission's concern was mainly premised on the possible existence of
             a significant difference in the respective policies of the Notifying Party and of
             Ziggo on the carriage of HbbTV triggers.
    (651) During the Commission's 2014 in-depth market investigation, however,
             evidence had been found that, neither the Notifying Party nor Ziggo, allowed
             HbbTV triggers in their respective cable network footprints in the
             Netherlands, while the Notifying Party seemed to have very recently altered
             its strict policy on allowing HbbTV triggers on its cable network, as it had in
             fact reached an agreement with NPO for the carriage of its HbbTV triggers
             relating to the TV channels Nederland 1, Nederland 2 and Nederland 3.381
                        6.4.6.3. Commission's conclusion in 2014
    (652) The Commission concluded that, insofar as the merged entity may have the
             ability and the incentive to engage in the filtering out and blocking of TV
379 Letter of the Dutch Ministry of Education, Culture and Science to parliament, entitled 'Rode Knop
    (Amendement/motie Van Dam-Huizing)' of 7 April 2014.
380 Document ID1179, Liberty Global response to the Commission's Article 6(1)(c) decision in case
    M.7000 – Liberty Global/Ziggo, paragraphs 149-151.
381 http://www.upc.nl/klantenservice/uitleg/hbbtv/;     http://www.broadbandtvnews.com/2014/08/08/upc-
    starts-hbbtv-distribution-for-npo-channels/;    http://tweakers.net/nieuws/97714/upc-voorlopig-enige-
    grote-tv-aanbieder-met-hbbtv-ondersteuning.html.
                                                       140
 ---pagebreak---            broadcasters' HbbTV triggers, any such ability and incentive is not specific to
           the Transaction. This was particularly true given that the Notifying Party and
           Ziggo had both already engaged in such filtering out and blocking of HbbTV
           triggers in the past, while the former was the only of the large TV distributors
           in the Netherlands (encompassing KPN, Ziggo and UPC) to partly support
           this technology.
    (653) Therefore, the Commission concluded that the Transaction would not
           significantly impede effective competition as a result of any possible ability
           and incentive on the part of the merged entity to, post-merger, refuse to carry
           HbbTV triggers on its network.
                     6.4.6.4. The Notifying Parties' views in their Supplementary
                               Notification
    (654) In their Supplementary Notification, the Notifying Parties' set out the
           Commission's assessment and conclusion without providing any particular
           view.
                     6.4.6.5. Commission's assessment
    (655) The Commission considers that the Commission's assessment and conclusions
           still hold and that there have been no market developments capable of
           changing the Commission's assessment in 2014. The market investigation did
           not raise any elements that would cast doubt on this conclusion.
                     6.4.6.6. Overall conclusion
    (656) Therefore, the Commission concludes that the Transaction does not raise
           serious doubts as to its compatibility with the internal market as a result of
           any possible ability and incentive on the part of the merged entity to, post-
           Transaction, refuse to carry HbbTV triggers on its network.
6.5. The markets for the retail provision of pay TV services, fixed Internet access
     services, fixed telephony services and multiple play services
            6.5.1.   Horizontal concerns – non-coordinated effects
            6.5.1.1. The Notifying Party's views in 2014
    (657) The Notifying Party submitted that no direct competition was taking place
           between the Notifying Party and Ziggo at retail level in the Netherlands, as
           the geographic footprint of their respective cable networks did not overlap. In
           light of this, no standard unilateral upward price effect could result from the
           Transaction as it did not allow the merged entity to capture customers that
           would, pre-merger, have switched between the two independent parties in the
           event of a unilateral price rise.
    (658) The Notifying Party also submitted that there was no evidence for a theory of
           harm based on sequential pricing. Indeed, the merger could have led to a
           hypothetical price increase only if KPN was not the price leader who was
           systematically setting prices first and there was no evidence of such patterns.
                                                141
 ---pagebreak---       In conclusion, according to the Notifying Party, there was no evidence of
      indirect competition between the Notifying Party and Ziggo.
(659) Finally, the Notifying Party noted that if any direct benchmarking between the
      Notifying Party and Ziggo that did not exceed simple commercial
      benchmarking aimed at monitoring, and possibly imitating, industry's best
      practices were to discontinue after the Transaction, this would have been
      unlikely to constitute a significant lessening of competition.
       6.5.1.2. Commission's assessment in 2014
(660) The Commission first took into account the market shares of the merged
      entity and of its main competitors.
(661) The Commission noted that in Q3 2013 UPC and Ziggo had a combined
      market share of 56% by number of subscribers or [60-70]% by value in the
      retail supply of Pay TV services in the Netherlands. In the same market, KPN
      was the second largest retail TV operator with a market share of 25%,
      followed by CanalDigitaal with 10% and others with 10% including Tele2.
(662) In the market for the retail provision of fixed telephony services, UPC and
      Ziggo had a combined market share of 34% in Q4 2012 and 41% in Q3 2013.
      In the same market, KPN had a market share of 60% in Q4 2012 and 43% in
      Q3 2013. Tele2 had a market share of 5% and other smaller competitors a
      combined market share of 12% in Q3 2013.
(663) In referring to the market for the retail provision of fixed Internet access
      services, the Parties' combined market share was 42% in Q4 2012 and 43% in
      Q3 2013. In the same market, KPN had a market share of 43% in Q4 2012
      and 41% in Q3 2013. Tele2 had a market share of 5% and other smaller
      competitors a combined market share of 11% in Q3 2013.
(664) In the hypothetical retail market for multiple play services, the combined
      market share of UPC and Ziggo amounted to between 65%-75% in Q2 of
      2013 and to between 55%-65% in Q4 of 2013. On the same market, the
      second most important participant would be KPN with a market share of 30%
      and Tele2 with a market share of 3%.
(665) The Commission analysed the results of its investigation on retail markets
      jointly, given that Ziggo and the Notifying Party were active on all of the
      investigated retail markets and they often provided those retail services as part
      of multiple play packages. The Commission noted at the outset that the retail
      services were exclusively provided within the respective geographic footprints
      of UPC and Ziggo in the Netherlands, which did not overlap and that,
      accordingly, no direct customer switching could have taken place between
      them. UPC and Ziggo were, therefore, not exerting a direct competitive
      constraint on each other's prices.
(666) However, the Commission also assessed whether UPC and Ziggo, despite
      their different geographic footprints, still took account of each other's actions
      when making their commercial decisions. According to the Commission, this
      could have been done either directly, by benchmarking their pricing against
      each other, or via a mechanism that involves KPN as the nation-wide
                                            142
 ---pagebreak---               competitor of both UPC and Ziggo. The Commission noted that UPC and
              Ziggo could have exercised on each other an indirect competitive constraint
              but that, in order to give rise to a significant impediment to effective
              competition, any existing indirect competitive pressure that would be removed
              as a result of the Transaction would have to be particularly strong.
    (667) With reference to indirect competition between UPC and Ziggo, while the
              evidence indicated that the competitors on the Dutch retail market tended to
              closely monitor each other and responded to each other's promotional offers,
              the Commission concluded that insufficient evidence existed to suggest that
              this limited direct benchmarking between the Parties exceeded simple
              commercial benchmarking aimed at monitoring and possibly imitating best
              practices in the industry. Moreover, an analysis of retail prices did not indicate
              that price element changes in the Dutch retail telecommunications markets
              were consistently initiated by UPC or Ziggo, sufficiently close in time to each
              other and in the same sequence, as would have been required for the two
              undertakings to indirectly constrain each other via a sequential pricing
              mechanism that transmits price changes of one undertaking to the territory of
              the other via national price responses of KPN.
               6.5.1.3. Commission's conclusion in 2014
    (668) The Commission considered that the Transaction would not have significantly
              impeded effective competition as a result of any possible non-coordinated
              effects occurring in the retail markets for the provision of Pay TV, fixed
              Internet access, fixed telephony and multiple play services in the Netherlands.
               6.5.1.4. The Notifying Parties' views in their Supplementary Notification
    (669) The Notifying Parties submit that the current market circumstances
              demonstrate that the Transaction has not led and will not lead to a substantial
              impediment to effective competition in the retail markets for the provision of
              Pay TV, fixed Internet access, fixed telephony and multiple play services in
              the Netherlands.
    (670) In relation to linear Basic Pay TV services (national and regional), according
              to the data provided by the Notifying Parties, in 2017 VodafoneZiggo had a
              footprint, based on homes connected, equal to [50-60]% and has lost market
              shares to KPN from the time of the Transaction (VodafoneZiggo went from
              55% market share based on subscribers in 2014 to 53% in 2017 Q3 and KPN
              went from 27% in 2014 to 32% in 2017 Q3). Moreover, the Notifying Parties
              submitted that competition has increased since the Transaction.
    (671) As for non-linear services (national), the Notifying Parties submit that the
              market has grown from 2013 to 2017 and that the market share of
              VodafoneZiggo based on revenues decreased from [40-50]% in 2013382 to
              [20-30]% in 2017.
382 This figure is based on PWC's retrospective update, on the basis of market input, of the estimates for
    previous years contained in the PWC's Media and Entertainment Outlook, on which Liberty Global
    relied in the 2014 Notification. At the time of the 2014 Notification, PWC estimated the total market to
                                                         143
 ---pagebreak--- (672) With reference to the market for fixed telephony services, the Notifying
        Parties submit that, under the current market circumstances, there remains a
        clear threat of entry and/or expansion by a number of smaller competitors.
        The Parties provide the example of the recent expansion of M7, KPN and
        EQT Infrastructure and they refer to the entry into the Dutch market for retail
        fixed telephony services of NLE in October 2016. Moreover, the absence of
        non-coordinated effects of the Transaction is underlined by the evolution of
        the market shares of the merged entity in the market for retail fixed telephony
        services. Indeed, the market shares have fundamentally remained stable.
(673) In referring to the market for retail Internet access, the Notifying Parties
        submit that the market share of the merged entity has essentially remained
        stable. Moreover, according to them, today significant competitive pressure is
        exerted by a clear threat of entry of and/or expansion by a number of smaller
        competitors (M7, KPN and EQT Infrastructure). The Notifying Parties also
        submit that the Transaction has not raised competition concerns as a result of
        NewZiggo’s increased share of the market for the retail provision of fixed
        internet access. In any event, the commitments entered into following the
        2014 Decision have eliminated any potential adverse effects on competition
        that could hypothetically have stemmed therefrom.
(674) With regard to the hypothetical market for the retail provision of multiple play
        services, the Notifying Parties submit that the current market circumstances
        demonstrate that the Transaction has not led and will not lead to a substantial
        impediment to effective competition in any hypothetical retail market for
        multiple play to end customers. According to them, the Transaction has not
        removed any competitive constraint from the potential market for multiple
        play and triple play services and, therefore, it has not led to any non-
        coordinated effects. The Notifying Parties also claim that the merged entity
        has not increased its market share as a result of the Transaction. Indeed, KPN
        continues to grow (from 23.6% in 2012 to 35.6% in 2017), while
        VodafoneZiggo's subscriptions for triple play have continued to decrease
        (from 65.3% in 2012 to 52.4%). Last, according to the Notifying Parties, the
        fact that VodafoneZiggo's market share has decreased notwithstanding the
        significant increase in multi-play bundles in the Netherlands demonstrates that
        there is competition on the market and that the Transaction has not led to any
        non-coordinated effects.
(675) The Notifying Parties concluded that they could not exercise a direct
        constraint on each other given that their respective geographic footprints in
        the Netherlands did not overlap and that the finding on indirect competition
        that the Commission made in the 2014 Decision should be re-stated.
(676) According to the Notifying Parties, the Commission's assessment on the
        absence of unilateral effects is demonstrated by the fact that VodafoneZiggo’s
        market shares have generally remained the same or even decreased compared
        to 2014. If anything, according to the Notifying Parties, the market has
        become even more dynamic as a result of T-Mobile aggressively selling
be considerably larger (i.e. 97 million). With this figure, the market share of VodafoneZiggo in 2013
would be [20-30]%.
                                                    144
 ---pagebreak---  ---pagebreak---  ---pagebreak---  ---pagebreak---      (685) The Commission also notes that the merged entity has been losing market
              shares to KPN in the period from 2014 to 2017 in the market for Pay TV
              services. Moreover, their market share remained stable in the market for fixed
              telephony services and for retail internet access and, in the hypothetical
              market for the retail provision of multiple play services, VodafoneZiggo lost
              market shares notwithstanding the significant increase in multi-play bundles
              in the Netherlands.
     (686) The market investigation has highlighted that one market participant
              considered that the Notifying Parties were not competitors pre-Transaction
              due to their different footprints.383 One market participant underlined that
              VodafoneZiggo is currently the largest provider of retail services and
              submitted that the position of the cable operator improved significantly due to
              its increased scale.384 The market investigation confirmed that KPN and
              VodafoneZiggo are the two biggest players in all the retail markets.
     (687) The market investigation has also indicated that one market player is
              concerned that the Transaction paved the way for the merger between Liberty
              Global and Vodafone and so strengthened the dominance of the market for
              multi-play offerings by just two players – KPN and VodafoneZiggo.
              Moreover, the same market player is also concerned that the Transaction will
              reinforce the market structure in which two large players dominate the
              provision of fixed line services, with implications for related markets such as
              the supply of retail mobile services in the Netherlands. According to the
              respondents to the market investigation, neither VodafoneZiggo nor KPN will
              have an incentive to challenge each other post-Transaction; they will both
              benefit from increasing prices and will have no incentive to invest materially
              in infrastructure. Without robust measures being taken, third parties will not
              be able to exert any meaningful competitive pressure on these providers.385
     (688) According to the Horizontal Merger Guidelines386, a merger can have a
              negative impact due to a reduction in key competitive pressure on one or more
              providers who would acquire, or benefit from increased market power. If, for
              instance, one of the companies to be merged increased its prices prior to the
              merger, it would have lost turnover to a certain extent to the other undertaking
              to be merged. The merger removes that competitive pressure, which could
              serve as an incentive for the new undertaking to increase prices. Non-merging
              firms in the same market can also benefit from the reduction of competitive
              pressure that thus results from the merger since the merging firms' price
              increase may switch some demand to the rival firms which, in turn, may find
              it profitable to increase their own prices.387 If that is the case, the merger
383  Reply to Q3 to retailers.of 5 April 2018, question C.D.9.
384 Reply to Q3 to retail providers of TV services, question C.F.4.
385 Reply to Q3 to retail providers of TV services of 5 April 2018, question C.E.5. and D.1.
386 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, paragraph 24.
387 Ibid.
                                                         148
 ---pagebreak---              results in so-called non-coordinated effects. Although a merger giving rise to
             non-coordinated effects typically creates or strengthens a dominant position in
             the relevant markets, that is not the only situation in which such effects can
             arise. Mergers in oligopolistic markets involving the elimination of important
             constraints that the Parties previously exerted on each other, together with a
             reduction of competitive pressure on the remaining competitors, may also
             result in a significant impediment to effective competition.388
    (689) The Commission notes that the retail services are exclusively provided within
             the Parties' respective geographic footprints in the Netherlands, which do not
             overlap. Accordingly, no direct customer switching can take place between
             the Parties. As a consequence, the Parties are not in direct competition with
             one another and the Transaction does not lead to the elimination of a direct
             competitive constraint between the Parties.
    (690) The Commission has also assessed whether the Parties, despite their different
             geographic footprints, still take account of each other's actions when making
             their commercial decisions. This could either be done directly, by
             benchmarking their pricing against each other, or via a mechanism that
             involves KPN as the nation-wide competitor of both Parties. If such indirect
             constraints are significant, constituting 'key' competitive pressure, the
             Transaction, which would remove such an indirect pricing constraint between
             the Parties and on the remaining competitors, could result in negative
             competitive effects even if direct customer switching between Liberty Global
             and Ziggo is not possible. However, the Commission recognizes that in order
             to give rise to a significant impediment to effective competition, any existing
             indirect competitive pressure that would be removed as a result of the
             Transaction would have to be particularly strong.
    (691) For the Transaction to potentially lead to non-coordinated price increases due
             to the elimination of an indirect competitive constraint between the Parties, a
             systematic mechanism through for this constraint should be identified. In
             particular, firms need to act sequentially, and one of the cable operators must
             act as a price leader. The leader's price is subsequently transmitted via KPN to
             the other cable operator thereby exerting an indirect constraint on the other
             cable operator. That indirect constraint would be eliminated by the merger.
    (692) It should hence be established that firms in the retail TV, Internet and
             telephony markets revisit the same price elements in a recurring, consistent
             sequence. Price changes should also occur sufficiently close in time, as it
             would otherwise be impossible to discern whether any firm consistently
             moves first thereby initiating a recurring sequence of price changes and they
             should take place consistently between the Notifying Parties and KPN.
    (693) In the absence of clear evidence of such sequential pricing, firms' static
             pricing incentives are typically analysed on the assumption that they set their
             prices simultaneously, that is to say based on what they expect others to do
             rather than on their rivals' actual choices. In a simultaneous price-setting
             model the lack of direct competition occurring between two regional players
388 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, paragraph 25.
                                                  149
 ---pagebreak---              whose respective footprints do not overlap necessarily implies that a merger
             between such regional players does not generate non-coordinated effects. In
             other words, non-coordinated effects in case of lack of direct competition
             could occur only in cases where the markets are characterized by sequential
             pricing. In all other circumstances, firms are expected to set prices
             independently and unilateral effects cannot arise.
    (694) As noted in paragraph (667) the Commission found in 2014 that, while the
             evidence indicated that the competitors on the Dutch retail market tended to
             closely monitor each other and responded to each other's promotional offers,
             insufficient evidence existed to suggest that this limited direct benchmarking
             between the Parties exceeded simple commercial benchmarking aimed at
             monitoring and possibly imitating best practices in the industry. Moreover, an
             analysis of retail prices did not indicate that price element changes in the
             Dutch retail telecommunications markets were consistently initiated by UPC
             or Ziggo, sufficiently close in time to each other and in the same sequence, as
             would have been required for the two firms to indirectly constrain each other
             via a sequential pricing mechanism that transmits price changes of one firm to
             the territory of the other via national price responses of KPN.
    (695) The Commission considers that the reasoning above still holds and that there
             have been no market developments capable of changing the Commission's
             assessment in 2014. 389
              6.5.1.6. Overall conclusion
    (696) In light of the above, the Commission concludes that the Transaction does not
             raise serious doubts as to its compatibility with the internal market as regards
             non-coordinated effects in the market for the retail provision of pay TV
             services, retail provision of fixed telephony services, retail provision of fixed
             internet access and multi-play and triple play services in the Netherlands.
             6.5.2.     Horizontal concerns – coordinated effects
             6.5.2.1. The Notifying Party's views in 2014
    (697) The Notifying Party submitted that the Transaction could not give rise to
             coordinated effects on the markets for the retail provision of TV, fixed and
             mobile telephony and Internet access, and on the possible market for multiple
             play products.
    (698) First, the Notifying Party argued that the Transaction would not increase the
             ability to coordinate as the number of competitors on the market would not be
             reduced as a result of the merger.
    (699) Second, the Notifying Party submitted that the Airtours criteria were not met
             in any of the markets being considered.
389 Moreover, as UPC and Ziggo were operating as one entity since 2014, the Commission's 2014 analysis
    of the sequence of retail prices cannot be updated.
                                                        150
 ---pagebreak--- (700) According to the Notifying Party, there was a high degree of differentiation
      between the offers provided by KPN and by the Notifying Party; the market
      for the retail provision of TV services had not been stable; and the respective
      infrastructure and associated cost-base employed by the two main competitors
      were different in a number of respects.
(701) The Notifying Party also pointed to current and future smaller, innovative
      competitors, which would maintain an external competitive pressure on the
      main competitors.
(702) The Notifying Party contested the credibility of there being a deterrent
      mechanism.
      6.5.2.2. Commission's assessment in 2014
(703) The Commission underlined at the outset that the Transaction involved a
      combination of two firms whose physical cable networks did not overlap
      geographically. Indeed, even if the market was defined as national, in practice
      the ability of KPN and NewZiggo to coordinate was limited within their
      networks.
(704) In relation to the ability to reach terms of coordination, the Commission first
      noted that the Dutch retail markets seem to be moving towards multiple play,
      and considered that given that KPN, Ziggo and UPC all already offered
      roughly the same types of bundled services, the Transaction was not likely to
      alter the degree to which those bundles' price points could constitute effective
      focal points for coordination.
(705) The Commission also noted that, in terms of market shares, the increased
      symmetry in the broadband and fixed telephony markets did not significantly
      increase the firms' ability to reach terms of coordination across retail markets,
      also in light of the lack of evidence of non-coordinated effects arising in all
      those markets as a result of the Transaction.
(706) The Commission concluded that the Transaction was not likely to
      significantly alter or improve any existing ability of firms to reach terms of
      coordination in the retail markets in the Netherlands by virtue of the: (i) non
      overlapping network footprints; (ii) lack of evidence of either party operating
      very aggressively on any of the Dutch retail markets; (iii) lack of evidence of
      significant differences in their cost structures; (iv) existing cooperation
      through several industry bodies and; (v) cross-shareholding of 28.5% (Liberty
      Global being the largest minority shareholder in Ziggo at the time).
(707) In relation to deterrent mechanisms, the Commission considered that the
      Transaction could not be considered to be likely to enhance the availability
      and/or efficiency of deterrent mechanisms. The Commission also noted that
      UPC and Ziggo did not seem to be asymmetrical in such a way that the
      Transaction could provide the merged entity with additional or enhanced
      retaliatory measures. The Commission's key arguments were that; (i) UPC and
      Ziggo’s activities were already exactly the same and, therefore, the
      Transaction did not increase the number of markets in which Liberty Global
      could, post-merger, retaliate against diverging behaviour; and (ii) UPC and
      Ziggo used the same technology and were both in the process of upgrading
                                            151
 ---pagebreak---       their network technology, meaning that the Notifying Party was not likely to
      have an enhanced ability to retaliate by implementation of technology
      upgrades of its network.
(708) In relation to the transparency of the markets and ability to monitor
      deviations, the Commission noted that some characteristics of the retail
      market for TV services, fixed telephony, Internet access and multi play
      services seemed to make it conducive to coordination. The Commission
      concluded that the Dutch retail Pay TV, broadband, fixed telephony and
      multiple play markets were characterised by a degree of transparency that
      could have allowed firms to monitor deviations from coordinated behaviour.
      However, since there was no evidence to suggest that the Transaction would
      have materially changed the existing degree of transparency of those markets,
      the Commission considered that any possible impact of the Transaction on
      transparency would have not significantly altered firms' existing ability to
      monitor deviations.
(709) In relation to the reaction of outsiders, the Commission noted that several
      alternative operators to KPN, UPC and Ziggo were active on a more or less
      national basis in the Dutch markets for the provision of retail services. Given
      that those alternative operators did not rely on either the Notifying Party or
      Ziggo for having access to those markets, the Commission considered that
      neither their technical ability nor their incentive to distort coordinated
      behaviour would have changed as a result of the Transaction.
(710) In 2014 the Commission concluded that, although there were many elements
      suggesting that the Dutch retail Pay TV, broadband, fixed telephony and
      multiple play could be conducive to coordination, it was not necessary for the
      Commission to conclude on the precise degree to which that was the case
      since there was not sufficient evidence to conclude that the Transaction could
      create the conditions for coordination or make coordination easier, more
      stable or more effective.
      6.5.2.3. The assessment of coordinated effects in case M.7978
(711) In 2016, the Commission assessed the possibility that the joint venture
      between Vodafone and Ziggo could make coordination with KPN more likely,
      more effective and more sustainable in the retail markets affected by the
      transaction.
(712) In relation to the ability to reach terms of coordination and focal point of
      coordination, the Commission noted that there were a number of factors that
      made the possible markets for fixed triple play and fixed-mobile quadruple
      play more conducive for coordination.
(713) The Commission first highlighted the fact that the market shares of KPN and
      Ziggo in all retail markets for standalone fixed services were already broadly
      similar pre-transaction (TV services being less symmetric) and that, therefore,
      the transaction had not led to any significant increase of the symmetry on
      these markets. The Commission, however, also noted that the positions of
      KPN and Ziggo were far less symmetrical on the fixed triple play market and
      that, through the transaction, the symmetry would increase. Moreover, the
                                          152
 ---pagebreak---       symmetry between KPN and Ziggo would have increased, post-merger, also
      in relation to fixed-mobile quadruple play market.
(714) With reference to the focal point for coordinated behaviour, the Commission
      noted that, notwithstanding the existence of a certain level of product (and
      pricing) differentiation, market shares and related customer churn figures
      could constitute an effective focal point for possible coordination. The
      Commission also noted that the market for fixed-mobile bundles was still
      growing and unstable and, therefore, it was doubtful whether the merged
      entity would have had an incentive to establish coordination with KPN.
      Moreover, there was no evidence of past coordination or proof of plans of
      such coordination.
(715) In relation to transparency and ability to monitor deviations, the Commission
      considered that the market was characterized by a certain degree of
      transparency but that there was no evidence suggesting that the transaction
      would have significantly altered the degree of transparency of the market
      existing at the time.
(716) As to the existence of a deterrent mechanism, the Commission held that no
      evidence was gathered to support the conclusion that the transaction could
      enhance the availability and/or efficiency of deterrent mechanisms and the
      scope of retaliation.
(717) In referring to the reactions of outsiders, the Commission noted that there
      were outsiders (Tele2 and M7) active in the markets for the retail provision of
      internet access, fixed telephony, TV services and multiple play services and
      that those operators did not rely on either Vodafone or Ziggo for having
      access to the markets. Indeed, those operators were able to compete on the
      markets for the retail provision of fixed telephony, fixed Internet access and
      TV services through access to KPN's network, which is guaranteed through ex
      ante regulation. In light of the above, the joint venture between Vodafone and
      Ziggo would neither have changed the ability nor the incentive of outsiders to
      disrupt coordinated behaviour.
      6.5.2.4. The Notifying Parties' views in their Supplementary Notification
(718) The Notifying Parties submit that current market circumstances confirm the
      conclusions of the Commission that the Transaction has not led to any
      coordinated effects on any of the retail markets and that no such effects
      currently occur, regardless of the question whether these markets are
      conducive to coordination.
(719) In relation to the ability to reach terms of coordination, the Notifying Parties
      first note that, in the VodafoneZiggo 2016 decision, the Commission
      confirmed that the combination of Vodafone’s Dutch business and NewZiggo
      would not result in coordinated effects. According to the Notifying Parties,
      since then, the market dynamics have not altered significantly so as to
      increase any risk of coordinated effects.
(720) In terms of the likelihood of elimination of destabilising factors, the Notifying
      Parties submit that the fact that the Transaction has not enabled KPN and
      VodafoneZiggo to eliminate destabilising factors in the market is proven by
                                           153
 ---pagebreak---       the fact that competition on the retail markets has only become more dynamic.
      According to the Notifying Parties, (i) the number of market players that enter
      the market on the basis of a commercial agreement for wholesale broadband
      access (WBA) with KPN continues to grow; (ii) increased competition is also
      exerted by mobile players, which can offer a (near) substitute; (iii) T-Mobile
      and Tele2 are also positioning themselves on the market with competitive
      multi-play offerings; (iv) Delta and CAIW have joined forces as of January
      2018.
(721) In terms of the degree of symmetry between market shares, the Notifying
      Parties submit that current market conditions confirm the Commission’s
      conclusion in the 2014 Decision that the increased asymmetry in terms of
      market shares in the Pay TV and hypothetical multi-play markets rendered it
      unlikely that any potential increased symmetry in the broadband and fixed
      telephony markets would significantly increase the firms’ ability to reach
      terms of coordination across those retail markets. According to the Parties,
      relevant in this respect is the lack of evidence of non-coordinated effects
      arising in all those markets as a result of the concentration. The Notifying
      Parties, moreover, refer to the Commission's assessment in the 2014 Decision
      according to which the Transaction would not lead to higher stability on the
      market due to the elimination of aggressive competitive force.
(722) In relation to transparency of the markets and ability to monitor deviations,
      the Notifying Parties submit that they are not aware of any evidence to
      suggest that the Transaction would have increased the degree of transparency
      on the retail markets since 2014 and therefore the Transaction has not
      significantly improved the ability pre-Transaction to monitor deviations of
      coordination in the market.
(723) According to the Notifying Parties, the degree of transparency on the retail
      markets has actually decreased and this has also been confirmed by the ACM.
      Moreover, the Notifying Parties are of the view that under the current market
      conditions it would be impossible to reach an agreement with KPN or monitor
      a tacit agreement due to the increased complexity of the product offerings (in
      terms of products that are being offered and prices).
(724) In relation to deterrent mechanisms, the Notifying Parties argue that the
      conclusion reached by the Commission in the 2014 Decision, according to
      which Liberty Global and Ziggo were not sufficiently asymmetrical for the
      Transaction to enhance the availability and/or efficiency of deterrent
      mechanisms, still holds.
(725) In relation to reactions from outsiders, the Notifying Parties submit that the
      alternative operators identified by the Commission in the 2014 Decision do
      not rely on the combined business brought about by the Transaction for
      having access to any of the retail markets. Therefore, neither the technical
      ability nor the incentive to resort to coordinated behaviour has changed as a
      result of Transaction.
(726) The Notifying Parties also submit that to the extent that some players are
      dependent on access to KPN’s network, the unbundled local loop access
      obligation continues to be imposed on KPN and access to KPN’s fibre (FttH)
      network is also guaranteed. Moreover, KPN continues to provide commercial
                                           154
 ---pagebreak---                wholesale arrangements on a significant scale. Finally, the Notifying Parties
               submit that the competitive pressure exerted by OTT players on retail TV
               services have since 2014 only increased further.
              6.5.2.5. Results of the market investigation
     (727) During the market investigation, the Commission received some negative
               replies about the possible anti-competitive coordinated effects arising from
               the Transaction and a more articulated complaint from one market player.
     (728) According to this market player, which presented more articulated
               submissions, first, the Transaction transformed the Dutch telecommunications
               market from an asymmetric competitive landscape into a highly symmetrical
               duopoly. Pre-Transaction, there was one player with nation-wide coverage
               and two non-overlapping regional networks. Post-Transaction, there would be
               only two fixed network operators, both with nation-wide networks.390
     (729) According to the complainant, the situation described above would have given
               rise, post-2014, to significant price increases and, by contributing to the
               creation of a symmetric duopoly of fixed and mobile network operators at the
               national level and by reducing the number of players required for coordination
               from three to two, the Transaction triggered coordinated effects on the Dutch
               market.391 In contrast, looking at product level data before 2014 would not
               indicate any price parallelism.
     (730) Finally, according to this complainant, the Transaction would have caused a
               decrease in the investment in network development on the part of the merged
               entity.392
              6.5.2.6. Commission's assessment
     (731) As set out in the case law393 and the Horizontal Merger Guidelines,394 to find
               coordinated effects evidence is needed that the horizontal merger changes the
               nature of competition in such a way that firms that previously were not
               coordinating their behaviour are now significantly more likely to coordinate
               and raise prices or otherwise harm effective competition. A merger may also
390 Submission of T-Mobile Netherlands dated 16 April 2018.
391 Ibid.
392 Submission of T-Mobile Netherlands dated 27 April 2018.
393 Case C-413/06 P, Bertelsmann AG and Sony Corporation of America v Independent Music Publishers
     and Labels Association (Impala) [2008] ECRI-4951, and in particular paragraphs 122-123 regarding
     the conditions for tacit coordination;; Case T-342/99, Airtours v Commission [2002] ECR II-2585, and
     in particular paragraphs 58 and 82 regarding the fact that “[i]f there is no significant change in the
     level of competition obtaining previously, the merger should be approved because it does not restrict
     competition”.
394 Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers under the Council Regulation on the
     control of concentrations between undertakings (OJ C 31, 05.02.2004, p.5), (the "Horizontal Merger
     Guidelines"), paragraphs 22, 39 et seq.
                                                         155
 ---pagebreak---                make coordinationeasier, more stable or more effective for firms which were
               coordinating prior to the merger.395 The Commission will therefore asses the
               changes brought about by the merger. The analysis will include an assessment
               of: (i) the ability to reach terms of coordination; (ii) the ability to monitor
               deviations from the terms of coordination; (iii) the existence of a credible
               deterrent mechanism if deviation is detected; and (iv) the reaction of outsiders
               such as current and future competitors not participating in the coordination, as
               well as customers, should not be able to jeopardise the results expected from
               the coordination.
     (732) However, before turning to these standard elements relevant for the
               assessment of coordinated effects under current market conditions, it is first
               useful to discuss the situation that would exist absent the Transaction in light
               of developments since 2014, in particular the creation of the VodafoneZiggo
               joint venture in 2016.
     (733) As a second preliminary step, the Commission will then examine the
               consequences for the assessment of coordinated effects of the specific feature
               that the present Transaction combines two firms that are not in direct
               competition for retail customers with each other as they are active in distinct
               non-overlapping areas within the national market corresponding to the
               footprint of their respective fixed network areas.
          The situation absent the Transaction
     (734) The reassessment of the Transaction under current market conditions has to
               take account of the fact that, in 2016, the Notifying Parties set up a joint
               venture, which combined the respective businesses of UPC/Ziggo and the
               (primarily mobile) operator Vodafone in the Netherlands, which was cleared
               by the Commission subject to the divestment of Vodafone's fixed business.
               That transaction therefore led to the creation of an operator (VodafoneZiggo)
               which, similarly to KPN, owns both fixed and mobile networks. This might
               have potentially led to an increased coordination between the two operators
               owing nation-wide fixed and mobile networks.
     (735) As mentioned at paragraphs (711) to (717) above, the Commission thoroughly
               assessed the potential coordinated effects stemming from the creation of the
               joint venture and dismissed such concerns because the transaction did not
               significantly alter any of the factors generally considered conducive to
               coordination.396
     (736) These conclusions concerning the addition of Vodafone's mobile network to
               the Parties' fixed network apply a fortiori to the present case, which concerns
               the combination of two regional non-overlapping fixed networks into a single
               near nation-wide one. Indeed, the existence of an already unified fixed
               network was taken into account in the Commission's assessment of the
395 Ibid., paragraph 22(b).
396  See Commission decision of 03.08.2016, in case M.7978, Vodafone/Liberty Global/Dutch JV,
     paragraph 629 et seq.
                                                    156
 ---pagebreak---       VodafoneZiggo joint venture in 2016, which – as mentioned – excluded the
      presence of any significant evidence of past coordination (including following
      the combination of UPC and Ziggo) or increased risk of future coordination.
(737) When assessing the Transaction under current market conditions, the
      Commission will account for the formation of the VodafoneZiggo joint
      venture by considering that, in the absence of the Transaction, each of UPC
      and Ziggo is present in the market as a mobile operator owning its own
      mobile network but is offering fixed services (or fixed-mobile bundles) only
      within the respective (non-overlapping) footprint of its fixed infrastructure.
   Combination of non-overlapping network areas through the Transaction
(738) The non-overlapping nature of the UPC and Ziggo's respective fixed
      infrastructures remains a key relevant fact for the assessment. It implies that
      the UPC and Ziggo are not directly competing in the provision of fixed
      products or fixed-mobile products to retail customers and distinguishes the
      assessment of the Transaction from that of standard horizontal mergers which
      eliminate direct competition between the merging firms.
(739) Due to this central feature, the Transaction does not reduce the number of
      firms that would need to take part in a hypothetical coordination scheme in
      each of the Parties' network area, nor does it affect the number or identity of
      outsiders that could disrupt such coordination. Absent the Transaction, each of
      the merging parties would need to coordinate with its main competitor, KPN,
      in its respective fixed network area, subject to the competitive constraint
      exerted by outsiders (which, in each case, do not include the other merging
      party). In other words, a hypothetical coordination scheme would, in each of
      UPC's and Ziggo's respective fixed network area, involve two firms. Post-
      Transaction, a hypothetical coordination would also involve two firms, i.e. the
      merged entity and KPN, subject to the competitive constraint exerted by the
      same outsiders. The main difference is that post-Transaction, there is the
      potential of having a single two-firm coordination scheme that covers the
      combined network areas of UPC and Ziggo, as opposed to two separate two-
      firm coordination schemes, on in each of the two network areas, in the
      absence the Transaction. In each of the areas, the Transaction does therefore
      not affect the number of firms that would need to coordinate.
(740) Accordingly, the Commission has investigated (taking into account possible
      competitive pressure exercised by third parties using regulated wholesale
      access) whether the Transaction affects the likelihood for coordination
      between KPN and the merged entity in the combined (fixed) network area of
      the Parties relative to the likelihood for coordination between KPN and UPC,
      respectively KPN and Ziggo, in the Parties respective network areas.
(741) A merger that brings together firms that are active in separate geographic
      areas could potentially facilitate coordination through the establishment of
      "multi-market" contact. Meeting the same competitor in several different
      markets may lead to a greater alignment of firms' ability and incentive to
      coordinate than when each market is analysed in isolation, if it results in
                                           157
 ---pagebreak---             greater symmetry in the "combined market" relative to "individual
            markets".397
    (742) In the present case, the question is, therefore, whether the Transaction may
            lead to an alignment in the incentives to coordinate (and to adhere to
            coordination) or increased deterrence potential between the merged entity and
            KPN relative to the incentives for coordination of each of the Parties and KPN
            in the Parties' respective network areas.
    (743) The Commission considers this unlikely to be the case because the situation
            between KPN and the cable operator in each of the respective footprints of
            UPC and Ziggo is comparable to that between KPN and the merged entity at a
            national level post-Transaction. The Transaction does therefore not lead to
            increased symmetry relative to the situation in each Party's network area and
            is hence unlikely to lead to a greater alignment of the ability and incentives to
            coordinate with KPN.
    (744) First, as can be seen in Table 10 below, in 2014 KPN's market shares in UPC's
            footprint were broadlysimilar to KPN's corresponding market shares in
            Ziggo's footprint; and UPC's market shares in its footprint were broadly
            similar to the corresponding market shares of Ziggo in the latter's footprint.
            The position of KPN and that of the cable operator, UPC and Ziggo, is
            therefore largely similar in both of the latter's network footprints and will not
            change significantly in the combined footprint post-merger. Second, in each
            of their respective network footprints, Ziggo and UPC were active in the same
            retail TV, Internet, telephony and multiple play markets, using the exact same
            network technology (DOCSIS) and with broadly comparable product
            offerings. Third, KPN and the merged entity would, post-merger, continue to
            face the same (number of) competitors that could potentially be able to distort
            coordination.
397 For example, consider two markets of equal size. Assume firm A has a 20% market share in market 1
    and an 80% market share in market 2. Firm A faces firm B (with 80% market share) in market 1 and
    firm C (with 20% market share) in market 2. Each of the markets is hence characterised by a rather
    asymmetric structure with one very large player (with 80% market share) and a smaller player (with
    20%) market share. A hypothetical merger between firm B and C in this example might lead to
    coordinated effects in such a setting, because the multi-market contact between the merged entity
    (B+C) and firm A would make these firms more symmetric with each having an "average" market
    share across the two individual markets of 50% which might significantly align their incentives to
    coordinate.
                                                     158
 ---pagebreak---    Table 10: Retail supply of Pay TV, broadband and fixed telephony services –
   market shares (2013)
(745) The assessment in Table 10 necessarily relates to the situation in 2014. An
      assessment of the Transaction under current market conditions (which notably
      would reflect that the merged entity has formed a joint venture with Vodafone
      in 2016) is unlikely to affect the conclusion that the combination of the Parties
      non-overlapping networks will facilitate coordination. In particular, in the
      counterfactual situation relevant for the current Transaction, each of UPC and
      Ziggo would have become a fixed-mobile player (by entering into a joint
      venture with Vodafone in their respective footprint). To the extent that the
      emergence of fixed-mobile players facilitates coordination (quod non as
      assessed in the 2016 case), it would also facilitate coordination absent the
      Transaction in each of UPC's and Ziggo's respective network areas.
      Specifically, absent the Transaction, KPN would need to coordinate with each
      Party (and only that Party) in that Party's respective network area (including,
      potentially, on fixed-mobile services). Post-Transaction KPN would need to
      coordinate with the merged entity in the combined network area, without the
      Transaction (for the reasons explained above) leading to a greater symmetry
      or alignment between the merged entity and KPN at a national level relative
      to the situation between each Party and KPN in their respective footprint. The
      fact, that the UPC and Ziggo, as a result of the 2016 transaction, have become
      fixed-mobile players does therefore not affect the conclusion that the
      combination of UPC's and Ziggo's non-overlapping (fixed) networks is
      unlikely to affect the likelihood of coordination.
(746) Moreover, as explained in paragraphs (748) to (771) below, the Commission
      concludes that, on the basis of the current market conditions, the Transaction
      does not significantly alter any of the factors generally considered conducive
      to coordinated behaviour. The absence of non-coordinated effects combined
      with the inherent non-overlapping nature of the Parties' cable networks limits
      any impact the Transaction may have on the post-merger ability of firms to
      reach terms of coordination, their ability and incentives to enforce
      coordination through a deterrent mechanism or the constraint from outsiders.
(747) The Commission's investigation has, furthermore, not yielded any substantial
      evidence of past coordination that could support a coordinated-effects theory
      of harm in fixed and fixed-mobile bundles markets. This finding exists
      irrespective of the degree to which the latter markets may currently be
      conducive to coordinated behaviour. In that respect, the Commission's
                                           159
 ---pagebreak---            investigation showed that those markets may, to an extent, already be
           conducive to coordination.
        Ability to reach terms of coordination and focal point of coordination
     (748) The Commission notes that, given that it has found that the Transaction does
           not eliminate direct competition (see paragraph (689)), any pre-existing
           stability of the retail markets is not material to establishing possible
           coordinated effects arising as a result of the Transaction.
     (749) Similarly, since the Dutch market is moving towards multiple play bundles (in
           particular fixed-mobile ones), the Commission does not consider that the
           Transaction is likely to alter the degree to which those bundles' price points
           can constitute effective focal points for coordination. In particular, the
           provision of fixed-mobile bundles as a result of the VodafoneZiggo
           transaction has likely added more complexity to the offering, with a number
           of additional price and non-price features, which does not seem to increase the
           likelihood of coordination with KPN around a focal point. Moreover, as
           already noted by the Commission when assessing the VodafoneZiggo joint
           venture, the fixed-mobile bundles market segment is expanding (growing to
           almost 2 million subscribers in 2017398), with VodafoneZiggo rapidly eroding
           KPN's established leading position. It is therefore doubtful that the merged
           entity would have the incentive to establish coordination with KPN in respect
           to fixed-mobile bundles.
     (750) In 2016, the Commission noted that KPN's market shares were broadly
           similar to Ziggo's on all retail markets for standalone fixed services (with the
           exception of retail TV) and that the proposed joint venture would not lead to
           any significant increase in symmetry on any of those markets. It also noted
           that Ziggo's position on the fixed triple play market was considerably stronger
           than KPN's and that the elimination of Vodafone as a fixed player would have
           strengthened Ziggo's position in the fixed markets (including triple play
           bundles) and, in turn, the positions of both KPN and Ziggo post-merger. In
           this context, the Commission found that post-transaction the joint venture
           would have been better positioned to compete more aggressively in the
           expanding market for fixed-mobile bundles. It was therefore doubtful that the
           merged entity would have had an incentive to coordinate with KPN in respect
           of fixed-mobile bundles. The 2016 Decision was also conditional on remedies
           which the Commission considered sufficient to offset the elimination of the
           competitive constraint from VF's fixed activities on the Parties.
     (751) As noted in paragraphs (734) to (737), the fact that the Parties both have fixed
           and mobile networks, while relevant for the assessment of the Transaction
           under current market conditions, cannot be considered to be a result of the
           current Transaction.
     (752) Over the course of the following years (2016 and 2017), while
           VodafoneZiggo's shares have slightly increased for fixed telephony and
           internet access, they still show symmetry with KPN's, as it existed already in
398 Form CO, table 50. See also ACM's Telecom Monitor for Q1-2 2017 (Form CO, paragraph 503).
                                                   160
 ---pagebreak---            2014. On the other hand, VodafoneZiggo and KPN still have asymmetric
           market shares in retail TV and triple-play bundles (although VodafoneZiggo's
           share has slightly decreased in retail TV and remained stable for fixed
           telephony triple-play bundles). At the same time, VodafoneZiggo has
           significantly increased its presence in the expanding fixed-mobile bundles
           market segment.
    (753) The abovementioned evolution of the markets, on the one hand, does not
           provide evidence that the retail markets have been or are more likely to be
           prone to coordination as a result of the Transaction and, on the other, confirm
           the finding of the Commission in its 2016 decision of the increasing
           importance of fixed-mobile bundles. In this respect, the Commission notes
           that, by bringing together two operators with non-overlapping fixed networks
           (which should be considered as each having its own mobile network, in light
           of the setting up of the joint venture with Vodafone in 2016), the Transaction
           does not affect coordination for fixed-mobile bundles is it does not lead to a
           reduction in the number of players nor to an increased symmetry relative to
           the situation where each of UPC and Ziggo are active in the non-overlapping
           regional footprint areas (paragraphs (738) to (745)).
    (754) With regard to evidence on the evolution of prices, T-Mobile Netherlands
           ("TMNL") submits that 2011-2014 pricing data from Telecompaper supports
           its claims that prior to the 2014 Transaction there was no coordinated tacit
           price coordination between Liberty/Ziggo and KPN. TMNL399 further
           submits, referring to an ACM presentation,400 that post-merger coordination
           arose between these market players, and that Vodafone/Ziggo and KPN
           enacted very significant price increases in a parallel manner, which were far
           beyond those of the other Dutch market players.
    (755) The Commission notes that Telecompaper data on monthly fees of triple-play
           ("3P") packages for the period 2013-2017 does not seem to reveal a
           substantially different pricing behaviour or increased price parallelism after
           the 2014 merger. While in mid-2014 KPN introduced several higher priced
           packages it also kept its products with middle or low price positioning. As for
           the overall evolution of 3P monthly fees, there does not seem to be a trend to
           exclusively increase over the period. While there were several price increases
           by several operators, there were also price decreases. In particular, though
399    TMNL's submission of 16 April 2018.
400    Presentatie industry group voor marktanalyse ontbundelde toegang, dated 4 July 2017, p. 22.
                                                     161
 ---pagebreak---               KPN raised all of its monthly fees effective of July 2016 and some of them
              effective from July 2017, it also decreased all the fees equally or even more at
              the end of 2016. Vodafone/Ziggo also increased some of its monthly fees
              effective of July 2017 (mostly in the high and middle price range), but in
              many cases this followed a prior decrease. Moreover, unlike KPN,
              Vodafone/Ziggo tended not to decrease its fees at the end of 2016, and, in the
              case of the high range fees, it even increased prices. Some, but not all
              Vodafone/Ziggo fees were increased effective from July 2017.
     (756) Overall, these patterns do not provide evidence of changes in behaviour or in
              the degree of pricing parallelism between Vodafone/Ziggo and KPN in the
              post-2014 period relative to the period before 2014.
     (757) Moreover, the monthly fees referred to by TMNL do not include promotional
              discounts, which could significantly alter the effective price available for
              consumers.401 The absence of an analysis of promotions raises doubts as to the
              existence of effective price parallelism in the prices ultimately applied to final
              customers.
     (758) Furthermore, the Notifying Parties explained that VodafoneZiggo generally
              introduces a price change across the whole of its customer base once a year,
              through a lengthy process taking several months since it involves thousands of
              different products and does not translate into the same increase for all those
              products. This decision-making process, together with the statutory waiting
              period after communication to the customers, means that July is the earliest
              moment in the financial year to implement a price change. Since
              VodafoneZiggo's financial year corresponds to the solar year, the earlier
              VodafoneZiggo introduces the change, the greater are the effects on its annual
              accounts. Therefore, VodafoneZiggo has an interest to implement the change
              as early as possible in the year. Moreover, VodafoneZiggo only announces the
              price change for all its products once the decision-making process has been
              finalized, thereby voluntarily extending to fixed products regulatory
              commitments applicable only to mobile products402.
     (759) Finally, in 2014 UPC and Ziggo were both working towards the same network
              technology upgrades. Therefore, in terms of their (non-overlapping) fixed
              networks, the Transaction did not lead to the elimination of a more aggressive
              innovator that could have distorted the firm's pre-merger ability to coordinate.
          Deterrent mechanisms
     (760) In relation to the possible existence of effective deterrent mechanisms, the
              Commission considers that the Transaction cannot be considered to be likely
401  See, for example, paragraph 764 below.
402 In 2014, Vodafone Libertel B.V., together with KPN and TMNL, committed – in the field of mobile
     services – that the senior management would not make any oral or written announcements about future
     prices and other commercial conditions, before the internal decision-making process had been
     finalized and laid down in writing (see ACM Case 13.0612.53 Toezeggingsbesluit mobiele operators).
     Although those commitments lapsed as of 7 January 2017, VodafoneZiggo has continued to abide by
     them.
                                                      162
 ---pagebreak---              to enhance the availability and/or efficiency of deterrent mechanisms relative
             to the possible deterrent mechanisms in each of the two (fixed) network areas
             of UPC and Ziggo absent the Transaction.
    (761) First, the Transaction does not lead to significantly increased symmetry
             between KPN and the merged entity relative to the degree of symmetry
             between KPN and UPC, respectively KPN and Ziggo, in their respective
             (fixed) network areas. It hence does not lead to a greater alignment of
             incentives or enhanced possibilities via increased symmetry resulting from the
             combination of the non-overlapping network areas or via contact in multiple
             markets (see paragraphs ((741) to (745))
    (762) Moreover, while UPC and Ziggo, as cable operators, both use the same fixed
             network technology, that technology remains different from KPN's DSL
             infrastructure. And while the roll-out of fibre networks may have resulted in a
             somewhat greater similarity in terms of network technologies between KPN
             and the Parties in certain areas, this development could not be a consequence
             of the Transaction. Therefore, the Parties are not likely to have an enhanced
             ability to retaliate by implementation of technology upgrades of their network
             relative to the retaliation possibilities of each Party absent the Transaction.
    (763) Furthermore, the Commission notes that UPC and Ziggo were active in the
             exact same markets in 2014 and, also under current market conditions, in a
             scenario where each is considered as having entered into a joint venture with
             Vodafone and therefore each is also considered as owning and operating a
             mobile network. Therefore, the Transaction does not increase the number of
             markets in which the Parties could, post-merger, retaliate against diverging
             behaviour.
    (764) The Commission also does not consider that the Transaction would facilitate
             retaliation by creating a national competitor to KPN. While KPN may be
             bound to some extent by national pricing policies, KPN was, already before
             the Transaction, likely to take retaliatory actions against deviations by one (or
             both) of UPC and Ziggo through targeted offers or discounting (e.g. by
             offering below the line discounts to customers in a specific region). Indeed,
             KPN does not appear to have been (and does not appear to be) prevented from
             running promotions only in specific parts of the Netherlands and in 2013 has,
             for example, launched a promotion for a fixed telephony, internet and
             television subscription limited to residents in the area with a specific postal
             code.403 It is hence unlikely that national pricing would be a constraint on
             KPN's possibilities to retaliate or deviate that would be softened through the
             creation of a national competitor through the Transaction.
403 See Notifying Parties' reply to request for information dated 25 May 2018. The offer of 13 May 2013
    was presented as a "Postcode Waardencheque" with a value of more than EUR 130 and consisted of a
    subscription to fixed telephony, internet and television for the reduced price of EUR 35 per month
    during the first six months (instead of EUR 58 per month). The offer was only valid for residents of
    postal code 8061 DC (one of the postal codes in Zwolle), as evidenced by the following extracts:
    "Speciaal voor bewoners met postcode 8016 DC"; "Tijdelijk meer dan €130;- voordeel voor bewoners
    met postcode 8016 DC".
                                                        163
 ---pagebreak---    Transparency of the market and ability to monitor deviations
(765) The Commission considers that some characteristics of the post-merger retail
      markets for TV services, fixed telephony, Internet access and multi play
      services in the Netherlands seem to have made those markets conducive to
      coordination already before the Transaction. Coordination on retail prices for
      instance might be possible because prices seem to be transparent and
      publically available.
(766) Notwithstanding the fact that the products offered in those retail markets are
      mostly bundled products that can be offered in different configurations and
      that have an array of features that could allow operators to differentiate, the
      Commission takes the position that it would not have been impossible to reach
      an agreement with KPN or monitor a tacit agreement due to the complexity of
      the product offerings, neither before nor after the Transaction. Indeed, the
      degree of transparency might allow easy detection of deviations from
      coordination and may, therefore, have been and also in the future be
      conducive to coordination.
(767) The Commission concludes that the Dutch retail Pay TV, broadband, fixed
      telephony and multiple play markets were and are characterised by a degree of
      transparency that could allow firms to monitor deviations from coordinated
      behaviour. However, since there is no evidence to suggest that the Transaction
      would materially change the existing degree of transparency of those markets,
      the Commission considers that any possible impact of the Transaction on
      transparency will not significantly alter firms' existing ability to monitor
      deviations.
   Reaction of outsiders
(768) The Commission notes that several alternative operators to KPN and
      VodafoneZiggo are currently active on a more or less national basis in the
      Dutch markets for the retail provision of internet access, fixed telephony, TV
      services and multiple play services, either exclusively or partly by means of
      regulated and commercial wholesale access to KPN's copper (vDSL) and fibre
      (FttH) networks. Those alternative, "outsider" operators are Tele2, Canal
      Digitaal and T-Mobile. Given that those alternative operators do not rely on
      either of the Parties for having access to those markets, the Commission
      considers that neither their technical ability nor their incentive to distort
      coordinated behaviour will change as a result of the Transaction.
(769) Any competitive pressure that those alternative players are able to impose on
      KPN and VodafoneZiggo, stems from access obligations on both KPN's
      copper and fibre networks. Based on unbundled local loop access as well as
      wholesale broadband access, those operators are able to compete on the Dutch
      markets for the retail provision of fixed telephony, fixed Internet access and
      TV services.
(770) Access to KPN's fibre network is guaranteed through ex ante regulation
      which, as it will be explained below (see Section 6.6), is expected to continue
      in the foreseeable future. Moreover, KPN continues to provide commercial
      wholesale arrangements on a significant scale. An example of a market player
      that offers retail services as a result of a commercial WBA deal with KPN is
                                            164
 ---pagebreak---              NLE. In October 2016, NLE launched a multi-play offer, specifically targeted
             at VodafoneZiggo's customers.
    (771) As regards the threat that potential competition from OTT would pose to the
             successful outcome of coordination in the retail Pay TV market, the
             Commission considers that the Final Commitments offered by the Notifying
             Parties in the context of the Transaction ensure that it will remain unchanged.
             Moreover, the Commission notes that the competitive pressure exerted by
             OTT players on retail TV services has since 2014 only increased further.
             6.5.2.7. Conclusion
    (772) In light of the above, the Commission concludes that the Transaction does not
             raise serious doubts as to its compatibility with the internal market as regards
             coordinated effects in the market for the retail provision of pay TV services,
             the retail market for fixed telephony, the retail market for the provision of
             fixed Internet access services and for multi-play and triple play services in the
             Netherlands.
      6.6.   The possible market for fixed internet access at wholesale level
    (773) As mentioned above in Section 5.2.4, the ACM found in its draft decision of
             27 February 2018 that there is a single wholesale market for access to copper,
             fiber-optic and cable networks in which KPN and VodafoneZiggo are active
             market players. In light of the abovementioned concerns raised by a market
             player with regard to coordinated effects stemming from the Transaction (see
             Section 6.5.2 above), the Commission will in the following assess also
             whether the Transaction gives rise to coordinated effects on the possible
             market for fixed internet access at wholesale level.
    (774) As indicated in the Commission's Guidelines on market analysis and the
             assessment of significant market power, the national regulatory authorities
             shall carry out their assessment by taking into account "existing market
             conditions as well as expected or foreseeable market developments over the
             course of the next review period in the absence of regulation"404, which is
             known as "Modified Greenfield Approach".
    (775) The Commission, on the other hand, evaluates mergers in the market context
             within which they arise, which includes the regulatory environment.
             Anticipated changes to the regulatory environment within the timeframe of
             the prospective merger analysis can be taken into account if future changes
             can be reasonably predicted.405
404 Guidelines on market analysis and the assessment of significant market power under the EU regulatory
    framework for electronic communications and services, C(2018)2374; OJ C 159, 7.5.2018, p. 1–15,
    paragraphs 17 and following.
405 According to paragraph 9 of the Commission's Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers
    under the Council Regulation on the control of concentrations between undertakings, (2004/ C 31/03),
    generally, the conditions existing at the time of the merger constitute the relevant comparison for
    evaluation the effects of a merger. Only in some circumstances, the Commission may take into account
    future changes to the market that can reasonably be predicted.
                                                        165
 ---pagebreak---     (776) As to the present market context, KPN owns and operates a fiber to the home
             ("FttH") network and a hybrid fibre-copper network. Both KPN's fixed
             telecommunications networks are subject to ex ante regulation in the form of
             local unbundling and virtual unbundled local access (VULA) under the terms
             of the ACM's decision of 17 December 2015 resulting from the market review
             carried out in the period October 2013 to October 2015. VodafoneZiggo
             operates a hybrid-coax network, which is not currently subject to ex ante
             regulation, and does not grant access to it to third parties on a voluntary basis.
    (777) In light of the existing regulation, the Commission considers that the
             Transaction in itself does not make coordination between KPN and
             VodafoneZiggo on the hypothetical single wholesale market for access to
             copper, fiber-optic and cable networks more likely, considering that KPN is
             currently obliged to grant access to its network at specific terms included in a
             reference offer. If one of the two potential parties to the coordination is
             subject to these obligations, the other party (VodafoneZiggo) would not have
             increased incentives to coordinate post-Transaction, also in light of the fact
             that so far it has not granted access to any third party.
    (778) As to the future changes to the regulation that can be reasonably predicted, the
             ACM's draft decision found that KPN and VodafoneZiggo have joint
             significant market power (“SMP”) and proposed to impose access obligations
             on both KPN and VodafoneZiggo. While changes to the draft decision cannot
             be excluded at this stage (also in light of the fact that this decision does not
             prejudge the Commission's own review under Article 7 of the Framework
             Directive406 of any proposed regulation), there are no indications at this stage
             that ACM has identified market developments justifying any such change
             concerning the finding of joint SMP. Assuming therefore the most likely
             scenario that ACM will maintain its proposed approach concerning the
             finding of joint SMP and will impose access obligations on both KPN and
             VodafoneZiggo as foreseen in its draft decision, there would be no ability for
             them to coordinate on refusing access (or granting it only at unfavourable
             terms) as both would be under an obligation to provide access at terms which
             would be put forward in a reference offer.407
    (779) In light of the above, and without prejudice to any future finding of the ACM
             in the context of the ongoing market review, the Commission therefore
             considers that the Transaction does not give rise to serious doubts as to its
             compatibility with the internal market regarding a merger-specific increased
             likelihood of coordinated effects on the possible market for fixed internet
             access at wholesale level to copper, fiber-optic and cable networks.
    (780) In any event, the Commission notes that, similarly to the assessment on
             possible coordinated effects on the retail markets in Section 6.5.2 , the non-
406 Directive 2002/21/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on a common
    regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services.
407 On the other hand, if ACM confirmed its finding of joint SMP but imposed access remedies only on
    KPN, the situation would be similar to that under the existing regulation described above in paragraph
    777.
                                                       166
 ---pagebreak---          overlapping nature of the UPC and Ziggo's respective fixed infrastructures
         implies that they are not directly competing in the provision of fixed products
         or fixed-mobile products to final customers. As a consequence, in each of
         their respective areas, the Transaction does not reduce the number of firms
         that would need to take part in a hypothetical coordination scheme at
         wholesale level, nor does it affect the number or identity of outsiders that
         could disrupt such coordination. Therefore, the Transaction does not appear to
         lead to (or at least not to increase the risk of) coordination at wholesale level.
   (781) Moreover, the potential coordination scheme at wholesale level would have a
         clearer focal point than at the retail one (i.e., the refusal to grant access to their
         network). In light of the relative easiness to reach terms of coordination, the
         Transaction does not appear to be materially increase the chances of reaching
         coordination among two operators with nation-wide networks, compared to a
         pre-merger situation where three competitors could already as easily
         coordinate on a refusal to grant access at wholesale level in their respective
         areas.
   (782) Finally, with regard to T-Mobile's argument that, according to the ACM,
         VodafoneZiggo and KPN might have delayed investments in their respective
         fixed networks in a coordinated way, the Commission notes that ACM only
         refers to the fact that VodafoneZiggo and KPN are aware of a situation of
         strategic interdependence. However, considering that the Transaction
         combines non-overlapping fixed networks, it does not seem to increase the
         chances of a similar situation to occur, compared to a scenario where KPN
         faces two operators each in a separate geographic area.
   (783) Also for those (independent) reasons, the Commission considers that the
         Transaction does not give rise to serious doubts as to its compatibility with the
         internal market regarding a merger-specific increased likelihood of
         coordinated effects on the possible market for fixed internet access at
         wholesale level to copper, fiber-optic and cable networks.
7.    PROPOSED REMEDIES
   (784) In order to render the concentration compatible with the internal market, the
         Notifying Parties submitted commitments under Article 6(2) of the Merger
         Regulation on 3 May 2018 (the "Proposed Commitments" or "Initial
         Commitments"). These commitments were market tested by the Commission.
         Following certain modifications, a final set of commitments was submitted on
         29 May 2018 (the "Final Commitments"). These Final Commitments are
         annexed to this decision and form an integral part thereof.
                                                167
 ---pagebreak---      7.1.   Analytical framework
    (785) Where the Commission considers that a concentration will raise competition
            concerns the parties may seek to modify the concentration in order to resolve
            such competition concerns and thereby gain clearance of their merger.408
    (786) In Phase I, commitments offered by the parties can only be accepted where the
            competition problem is readily identifiable and can easily be remedied. The
            competition problem therefore needs to be so straightforward and the remedies
            so clear-cut that it is not necessary to enter into an in-depth investigation and that
            the commitments are sufficient to clearly rule out "serious doubts" within the
            meaning of Article 6(1)(c) of the Merger Regulation. Where the assessment
            confirms that the proposed commitments remove the grounds for serious doubts
            on this basis, the Commission clears the merger in Phase I.409
    (787) In assessing whether the proposed commitments will likely eliminate the
            competition concerns identified, the Commission considers all relevant factors
            including inter alia the type, scale and scope of the proposed commitments,
            judged by reference to the structure and particular characteristics of the market
            in which the competition concerns arise, including the position of the parties and
            other participants on the market.410
    (788) In order for the commitments to comply with these principles, commitments
            must be capable of being implemented effectively within a short period of
            time.411 Where, however, the parties submit remedies proposals that are so
            extensive and complex that it is not possible for the Commission to determine
            with the requisite degree of certainty, at the time of its decision, that they will be
            fully implemented and that they are likely to maintain effective competition in
            the market, an authorisation decision cannot be granted.412
    (789) As concerns the form of acceptable commitments, the Merger Regulation leaves
            discretion to the Commission as long as the commitments meet the requisite
            standard.413
    (790) Commitments which are structural in nature, such as the commitment to sell a
            business unit, are generally preferable. Such commitments prevent durably the
            competition concerns which would be raised by the merger as notified and do
            not require medium or long-term monitoring. Nonetheless, it cannot be ruled
408 Commission notice on remedies acceptable under Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 and under
    Commission Regulation (EC) No 802/2004 (the "Remedies Notice"), OJ C 267, 22.10.2008, p. 1,
    paragraph 5.
409 Remedies Notice, paragraph 81.
410 Remedies Notice, paragraph 12.
411 Remedies Notice, paragraph 9.
412 Remedies Notice, paragraphs 13, 14 and 61 et seq.
413 Case T-177/04 easyJet v Commission [2006] ECR II-1913, paragraph 197.
                                                      168
 ---pagebreak---       out that other types of commitments may also be capable of preventing the
      significant impediment to effective competition.
(791) It is against this background that the Commission analysed the proposed
      commitments in this case.
 7.2. The First Commitments
      7.2.1.    Description of the First Commitments
(792) The First Commitments submitted on 3 May 2018 comprised a commitment
      not to enter into or renew agreements with TV broadcasters that contain terms
      which would directly or indirectly restrict the TV broadcasters' ability to offer
      their channels and associated content via OTT services. That Commitment
      applied to any agreements with TV broadcasters for the distribution of those
      broadcasters' linear channels and catch-up TV services on the Parties’ Pay TV
      Platform in the Netherlands. The Commitments made clear that the Parties
      shall not, directly or indirectly, restrict the ability of the broadcasters to offer,
      on a standalone basis or in partnership with a third party, OTT services in the
      Netherlands, or the ability of those broadcasters to offer their linear channels
      and any content owned or controlled by the TV broadcaster via such OTT
      services in the Netherlands.
(793) If any such restrictive terms were included in existing agreements that the
      Parties and TV broadcasters had concluded for the distribution of those
      broadcasters' linear TV channels and catch-up TV services on the Parties' Pay
      TV platform in the Netherlands, the Parties would not enforce those restrictive
      terms.
(794) In addition, the Notifying Parties offered commitments to ensure the
      effectiveness of the distribution of OTT content via VodafoneZiggo's Internet
      network. To that end, the Notifying Parties committed to maintain sufficient
      interconnection capacity for parties seeking to distribute data to
      VodafoneZiggo's broadband customers by ensuring such parties have at least
      three uncongested routes into VodafoneZiggo's IP network in the Netherlands.
(795) In more detail, the Notifying Parties offered to ensure that the daily peak
      utilization, defined as the daily 95th percentile over 5-minute average bits
      transferred sample intervals, across their interconnection points with each of a
      group of at least three reputable interconnectivity providers (ICPs) who are
      willing to sell transit services via one or more physical interconnection points
      in the Netherlands over which traffic may flow to its broadband customers,
      will not exceed 80%, that is to say that there will be at least 20% capacity
      available above the daily peak as calculated in arriving at daily peak
      utilization. The Notifying Parties further offered to ensure that the capacity
      available above the daily peak across that group of three ICPs shall be at least
      20 Gbit/s. That figure would be reviewed annually by the Monitoring Trustee.
(796) The three ICPs that were subject to those additional commitments would be
      selected by the Notifying Parties from a predetermined list of ICPs which
      would also contain the ten largest ICPs that were willing to sell transit
      services via one or more physical interconnection points in the Netherlands
      over which traffic may flow to VodafoneZiggo's broadband customers. The
                                            169
 ---pagebreak---       list, holding the identity of the ten largest ICPs, could be changed from time to
      time with the approval of the Monitoring Trustee. One of the three selected
      ICPs had to be one from those ten largest ICPs. The group of at least three
      reputable ICPs could vary from time to time. However, it could not vary more
      than once per year for the ICP that was one of the ten largest ICPs and no
      more than once per quarter for the other two selected ICPs. Any alteration in a
      situation where there was an urgent need for the Notifying Party to upgrade
      capacity and it being impossible to achieve that upgrade in a timely manner
      with the three ICPs – had to be approved by the Monitoring Trustee, and
      ultimately by the Commission. In that case the Notifying Party would use
      reasonable commercial endeavours to agree and implement an upgrade with
      the ICP at hand and, if it could do so, to immediately return that ICP to the
      group of three, in place of the ICP which replaced it, at least until it would
      otherwise have been possible to change that ICP pursuant to those additional
      commitments.
(797) The Notifying Parties committed to request each ICP with whom the Parties
      directly interconnected in the Netherlands for permission to publish in arrears
      on a monthly basis the highest Daily Peak Utilization in the preceding month,
      as a percentage of available aggregated direct capacity between that ICP and
      the Parties. As long as at least half of such ICPs agreed to such publication,
      the Notifying Parties would publish, on a publicly available website, on a
      monthly basis, that information with respect to any such ICP who was and
      remained willing for it to be published. Where fewer than half such ICPs
      agreed to such publication the Notifying Parties would publish, on a publicly
      available website, on a monthly basis, only an aggregated figure based on the
      highest Daily Peak Utilization in the preceding month of aggregated direct
      interconnect capacity in the Netherlands.
(798) A fast track dispute resolution procedure would be applicable in the event that
      a third party would claim that the Notifying Parties were failing to comply
      with the Commitments. Any third party that wished to avail itself of the fast
      track dispute resolution procedure ("Requesting Party") had to send a written
      request to the Notifying Parties and the Monitoring Trustee setting out in
      detail the reasons leading the Requesting Party to believe that the Notifying
      Parties were failing to comply with the Commitments. The Notifying Parties
      and the Requesting Party then had a maximum of fifteen working days after
      receipt of the request to resolve the issue through cooperation and
      consultation. Within eight working days after receipt of the request, the
      Monitoring Trustee had to present its proposal to resolve the dispute and to
      specify in writing any action that the Notifying Parties had to take to ensure
      compliance with the Commitments. If the Requesting Party and the Notifying
      Parties could not resolve their differences of opinion, the dispute had to be
      resolved by arbitration under the Rules of the Arbitration Court of the
      International Chamber of Commerce. The arbitration had to be conducted in
      Amsterdam and in the English language. It was also fast-track, in that the
      Arbitral Tribunal would shorten all applicable procedural limits as far as
      admissible and appropriate. The Arbitral Tribunal could give a preliminary
      ruling within one month, and would as a rule not give its final decision any
      later than six months after its confirmation.
                                             170
 ---pagebreak---     (799) The Commission would be closely associated to any arbitration proceedings.
             In case of disagreement between the arbitrating parties on the interpretation of
             the Commitments, the Arbitral Tribunal could seek the Commission's
             interpretation and that interpretation would be binding. The fast-track dispute
             resolution procedure did not affect the power of the Commission to take
             decisions in relation to the Commitments and in accordance with the Merger
             Regulation.
    (800) The commitment not to prohibit OTT distribution of content would, in its
             entirety, be in force for a period of eight years following the date of adoption
             of this Decision.
             7.2.2.    Results of the market test
    (801) Some respondents considered that the First Commitments would not be
             sufficient to remedy the competition concerns raised by the Transaction, in
             particular insofar as they failed to address coordinated effects414 and input
             foreclosure concerns415 resulting from the Transaction.
    (802) As regards the commitment not to contractually restrict broadcasters in
             distributing their content via an OTT service, a majority of those respondents
             who expressed an opinion to the market test considered that the First
             Commitments were not sufficient to ensure that broadcasters can effectively
             distribute their content via an OTT service, in addition to distributing it via the
             merged entity's platform, should they wish to do so.416 Some respondents to
             the market test also emphasised, in particular,417 the need to modify certain
             provisions of the Commitments in order to ensure their effectiveness, namely
             (i) to add the obligation for the Parties to inform the relevant broadcasters that
             the Parties waive their rights to enforce any clauses in existing agreements
             that restrict the Broadcasters' OTT Services and to remove such terms; (ii) to
             reflect that OTT Services include such services delivered over all delivery
             models including WiFi, hotspots and mobile internet; (iii) to ensure that the
             legal entities subject to the proposed commitment include affiliated
             undertakings of the Parties; (iv) to clarify that the Parties' TV platform include
             mobile propositions; (v) to make sure that the agreements covered include
             also any contractual terms agreed through e.g. e-mails, side letters or other;
             and (vi) to prolong the duration of the Commitment.
    (803) As regards the commitment to maintain sufficient direct interconnection
             capacity between VodafoneZiggo's Internet network covering the Netherlands
             and third-party providers of transit services, respondents to the market test
414 Observations by TMNL, on the Remedy Proposal of 7 May 2018 in addition to the response to the
    Remedy RFI, 15 May 2018.
415 Replies to Q4 - Market test of the proposed remedies of 7 May 2018, question C.2.1, Observations by
    TMNL, on the Remedy Proposal of 7 May 2018 in addition to the response to the Remedy RFI, 15
    May 2018.
416 Replies to Q4 - Market test of the proposed remedies of 7 May 2018, question A.1.
417 Replies to Q4 - Market test of the proposed remedies of 7 May 2018, questions A.1, A.2, A.4, A.5.
                                                      171
 ---pagebreak---               highlighted a number of technical improvements required for such a
              commitment to be effective418, relating mainly to the lowering of the 80%
              congestion threshold, the suitability of the ICPs listed in the Schedule, the
              need to guarantee that the chosen ICP's have good capacity / connectivity
              within the Netherlands, the need to be given prior notice in case of switching
              between different ICP's and the duration of the commitment. Finally, some
              respondents to the market investigation claimed that the remedies should not
              only include direct interconnect capacity via ICPs but also alternative capacity
              via direct peering.419
              7.2.3.     Assessment of the First Commitments
     (804) In line with concerns expressed by the respondents to the market test, the
              Commission considered that the First Commitments were insufficient to
              eliminate the competition concerns raised by the Transaction.
     (805) As regards the commitment not to contractually restrict broadcasters in their
              OTT activities, the Commission considered that this could only be effective if
              it applied also to the Parties’ affiliated undertakings (as defined in the
              Commitments) and if it covered also agreements for the distribution of
              broadcasters' channels via the Parties’ mobile network. In addition, in order to
              improve the ability to enforce that commitment, the Parties would have to
              inform the relevant broadcasters that they waive their rights to enforce any
              clauses in existing agreements and remove such terms. The Commission also
              considered that it would have to be clarified that OTT Services included such
              services delivered over all delivery models (including WiFi, hotspots and
              mobile internet). Furthermore, it would have to be specified that the
              agreements covered with broadcasters would not be limited to formal written
              agreements but also included any contractual terms agreed through, for
              example, e-mails and side letters.
     (806) However, the Commission considered that the duration of eight years
              following the date of adoption of this Decision is in line with the investment
              cycle that OTT service providers take into account when deciding to launch
              and sustain OTT services. The Commission therefore considers that this
              duration is suitable and sufficient.
     (807) In relation to the commitment to maintain sufficient direct interconnection
              capacity, the Commission was of the opinion that the commitment did not
              require modifications. The commitment has applied in its current form since
              its acceptance in the 2014 Decision and has been monitored by the Monitoring
              Trustee. In particular, the reporting of the Monitoring Trustee has confirmed
              that Liberty Global’s implementation of it has “had [no] impact on Dutch
              broadcasters' ability to distribute content OTT or on the user experience of
              viewers of Dutch broadcaster OTT content in the Netherlands”.420 The
418  Replies to Q4 - Market test of the proposed remedies of 7 May 2018, questions B.3, B.4, B.6, B.7, B.8,
     B.9.
419  Replies to Q4 - Market test of the proposed remedies of 7 May 2018, questions B.3.1, B.4.1, B.9.1.
420 Para. 11 of the 11th Trustee report on Case M.7000 – Liberty Global / Ziggo of 21 November 2017.
                                                       172
 ---pagebreak---               commitments foresee that the available capacity will follow demand421 and
              that capacity above the daily peak shall be at least 20 Gbit/s, a figure that can
              be reviewed annually to ensure a reasonable level of spare capacity. The
              commitment also provides that the Monitoring Trustee shall review Schedule
              1 every three months to ensure that it contains a sufficient number of
              reputable ICPs. Furthermore, the 3 ICPs chosen must be willing to sell transit
              in the Netherlands. Further, the Commission considers that based on the
              implementation of the commitment since the 2014 Conditional Clearance
              Decision, the commitment in its current drafting ensures that the aim to ensure
              that VodafoneZiggo's broadband customers can be accessed across relevant
              interconnection points without congestions, is achieved even if the
              commitment does not include direct peering and no prior notice in case of
              switching between different ICP's.
    (808) As to the duration of the commitment, the Commission considers that eight
              years is sufficient, given the considerations in paragraph (806) and the fact
              that the commitment to maintain sufficient direct interconnection capacity
              also ensures the effectiveness of the commitment not to contractually restrict
              broadcasters in their OTT activities.
      7.3.    The Final Commitments
    (809) Following the communication to the Notifying Parties of the results of the
              market test and the Commission's own assessment of the First Commitments,
              the Notifying Party submitted an improved and final set of commitments
              (“Final Commitments”) on 29 May 2018.
              7.3.1.    Description of the Final Commitments
    (810) The Final Commitments contain a commitment not to enter into or renew
              agreements with TV broadcasters that contain terms which would directly or
              indirectly restrict the TV broadcasters' ability to offer their channels and
              associated content via OTT services and containing modifications by the
              Notifying Parties to address the shortcomings described in paragraph (805).
    (811) In addition, in the Final Commitments the Notifying Parties commit to ensure
              sufficient direct interconnection capacity between VodafoneZiggo’s network
              and third-party providers of transit services.
    (812) Finally, the Final Commitments contain a commitment not to acquire, whether
              directly or indirectly, the possibility of exercising influence over the whole or
              part of Film1's activities in the Netherlands, being the provision of movies,
              series and documentaries to customers through a package of Premium Pay TV
              channels and related VOD services.
421 See in this regard also the Notifying Parties’ reply to the Commission’s request for information of 18
    May 2018 (RFI 8), 21 May 2018, paragraph 8.2.
                                                        173
 ---pagebreak---            7.3.2.     Assessment of the Final Commitments
    (813) In accordance with the principles of the Merger Regulation on the
           acceptability of commitments, the Commission has assessed whether the Final
           Commitments:
       (d)     are suitable and sufficient to eliminate the competition concerns; and
       (e)     capable of being implemented effectively within a short period of time.
    (814) As explained in paragraph (790), divestiture commitments are the best way to
           eliminate competition concerns resulting from horizontal overlaps and may
           also be the best means of resolving problems resulting from vertical or
           conglomerate concerns.422 Other commitments may be suitable and sufficient
           only if those remedies are equivalent to a divestiture in their effects.423 The
           question whether a remedy, or more specifically, which type of remedy is
           suitable to eliminate the competition concerns identified, has to be examined
           on a case-by-case basis.424
    (815) In this case, the serious doubts as to the compatibility of the Transaction with
           the internal market that would arise in relation to OTT services are a specific
           concern. The Commission had found in 2014 that the Dutch market for the
           acquisition of Pay TV channels was characterised by the existence of
           agreements that restrict or aim to restrict TV broadcasters in their ability to
           offer their TV channels and associated content via the Internet. The
           Commission had found in 2014 that the merger would increase the Notifying
           Party's ability and incentive to continue such restrictive agreements, or to
           make them even more onerous. That would deprive consumers in the
           Netherlands from innovations in the way they can watch TV content over the
           Internet.
    (816) The market investigation has confirmed that these concerns are still relevant
           post-Transaction.
    (817) As set out in the Remedies Notice425, remedies that fall short of complete
           divestitures, but are equivalent to them in terms of effects, may be considered
           in situations where markets are characterised by agreements between the
           Parties and their competitors that restrict competition. In certain
           circumstances, the Commission may accept commitments to terminate such
           agreements.426
422 Remedies Notice, paragraph 17.
423 Remedies Notice, paragraph 61.
424 Remedies Notice, paragraph 16.
425 Remedies Notice, paragraph 17.
426 Remedies Notice, paragraph 60.
                                                 174
 ---pagebreak---     (818) As also set out in the Remedies Notice427, the change in market structure
           resulting from a proposed transaction may cause existing contractual
           arrangements to be inimical to effective competition.428 That is true for
           exclusive long-term supply agreements if such agreements foreclose upstream
           the input for competitors that are active downstream. In such circumstances,
           the termination or change of existing exclusive agreements may be considered
           appropriate to eliminate the competition concerns.429 The available evidence
           must allow the Commission to determine that no de facto exclusivity will be
           maintained. Such change of long-term agreements will normally only be
           considered sufficient as part of a remedies package to remove the competition
           concerns identified.
    (819) The serious doubts as to the compatibility of the Transaction with the internal
           market in relation to OTT services in the present case is similar to the two
           categories of agreements mentioned above in paragraphs (817) and (818).
    (820) As far as TV broadcasters are providers of OTT services themselves, the
           restrictive agreements that Liberty Global had in place are agreements
           between providers that at the very least potentially compete with each other.
           The effect of the OTT clauses is that this potential competition is limited, or
           in the extreme situation, eliminated altogether.
    (821) As far as TV broadcasters provide their linear channels or the content that
           they own or control to third party providers of OTT services, the restrictive
           agreements that Liberty Global had in place are agreements that restrict
           Liberty Global's potential competitors access to those inputs that they need to
           offer their OTT services.
    (822) Against that background and in the context of this case, the Commission
           considers that the effective termination of those agreements has been – and is
           still – a suitable and sufficient remedy to remove serious doubts as to the
           compatibility of the Transaction with the internal market.
    (823) With the OTT Commitments, the Notifying Parties effectively commit to
           terminate any agreement between the Parties and TV broadcasters that relates
           to the carriage of the TV broadcasters linear and catch-up services on the
           merged entity's Pay TV platform and which restricts their ability to offer their
           channels and content via an OTT service in the Netherlands. The fact that the
           Parties shall promptly inform the relevant broadcaster that they waive their
           rights to enforce such terms and commit to remove such terms from their
           existing agreements, addresses a concern expressed by third parties to the
           market test that the commitment would not be effective without such
           provision. The Notifying Parties also commit that the Parties will not enter
           into such agreements in the future. The OTT Commitments cover all the
427 Remedies Notice, paragraphs 67 and 68.
428 Remedies Notice, paragraph 67.
429 Remedies Notice, paragraph 68.
                                                175
 ---pagebreak---        restrictive agreements that the Commission has identified in this case. In
       particular, the Commitments cover the following:
   (a)     clauses that restrict TV broadcasters in offering their linear TV channels
           and content in their own OTT services that can compete with
           VodafoneZiggo's Pay TV packages;
   (b)     clauses that restrict TV broadcasters in offering linear TV channels and
           associated content to third party OTT services that can compete with
           VodafoneZiggo's Pay TV packages;
   (c)     clauses according to which the distribution agreements for Pay TV
           channels and associated content would be terminated, in whole or in part,
           in the event that TV broadcasters were to offer their channels and
           associated content via such OTT services;
   (d)     clauses that limit TV broadcasters in their ability to offer their channels
           and associated content to competing retail providers of Pay TV services
           that are willing to offer those channels and content via their Internet
           networks. Banning such restrictions preserves the freedom of KPN, other
           cable operators and remaining providers of Pay TV services to allow for
           such OTT innovation;
   (e)     clauses that limit the ability of TV broadcasters to offer their channels and
           associated content via OTT services in the Netherlands to content that can
           be viewed by subscribers of the Parties only. This covers requirements to
           make unencrypted or free OTT services available only to authorised
           subscribers of the Parties. It also covers other clauses that tie the OTT
           services technically and exclusively into the Pay TV offering of the
           Parties;
   (f)     exclusivity deals for the use of TV content that a TV broadcaster owns or
           for which it has the right to distribute it in the Netherlands, insofar as
           exclusivity is agreed as part of, or in parallel to, agreements between the
           merged entity and TV broadcasters for the distribution of linear Pay TV
           channels over the merged entity's Pay TV platform.
(824) With those clarifications, the commitment not to include such direct or
       indirect restrictions in the agreements with the TV broadcasters is capable of
       being monitored effectively by market participants, the Trustee and ultimately
       the Commission.
(825) The Commitments apply in relation to contracts that TV Broadcasters
       conclude with the Parties for the distribution of TV channels and associated
       catch-up content via the Parties' Pay TV platform. That is appropriate, given
       that VodafoneZiggo would enjoy market power at the level of the market
       where those agreements are concluded.
(826) The commitment not to contractually restrict broadcasters in their OTT
       activities, applies also to the Parties’ affiliated undertakings. The commitment
       covers also agreements for the distribution of broadcasters channels via the
       Parties’ mobile network and OTT services delivered over the internet,
       including such services delivered over all delivery models (including WiFi,
                                             176
 ---pagebreak---       hotspots and mobile internet). These provisions address concerns of
      respondents during the market test.
(827) The Commitments cover new and existing agreements between the Parties
      and TV broadcasters. The fact that they also cover terms agreed orally and in
      writing, whether formal or informal (including in side letters, via e-mails or
      other) addresses a concern expressed during the market test by third parties
      that the commitment could only be effective if it also covered these other
      types of agreements.
(828) The Commitments also cover exclusivity agreements for TV content that TV
      broadcasters own or for which they have the right to distribute it in the
      Netherlands. Those agreements are covered insofar they are concluded as part
      of, or in parallel with, the agreement for the carriage of those TV broadcasters'
      linear Pay TV channels over the merged entity's Pay TV platform.
(829) The OTT Commitments contain additional safeguards that ensure their
      viability and effectiveness.
(830) In order to prevent de facto restrictions on the TV broadcasters' ability to offer
      their channels and content via OTT services to remain, the Notifying Parties
      commit in particular not to make the conclusion or renewal of a separate
      agreement to distribute TV channels and associated content via the Parties'
      Pay TV platforms conditional on the acceptance of such restrictive
      agreements. That safeguard is important to ensure that the OTT Commitments
      are not circumvented during commercial negotiations between the merged
      entity and TV broadcasters. It preserves a balance in the bargaining power
      between the merged entity and the TV broadcasters, allowing the TV
      broadcasters genuinely to resist the type of restrictive agreements that the
      Commission has identified as giving rise to a serious doubts.
(831) Moreover, as set out in recitals (550) to (578), since the merged entity's role as
      an Internet network provider would compound its ability to restrict the TV
      broadcasters' ability to distribute their channels and content via OTT services,
      it is necessary to restrain its technical ability to hamper OTT services in order
      to preserve the viability and effectiveness of the OTT Commitments.
      Otherwise, the merged entity’s ability to hamper the technical access that
      OTT service providers have to its Internet network could be used to
      circumvent the commitment not to restrict the TV broadcasters' ability to use
      OTT services by contractual means.
(832) In order to ensure the effectiveness of the distribution of OTT content, Liberty
      Global therefore commits to maintain sufficient interconnection capacity for
      parties seeking to distribute data to its broadband customers. In particular, it
      will ensure that it has at least three uncongested routes into the merged entity's
      IP network in the Netherlands.
(833) The Commitments are capable of being implemented effectively and
      immediately. They apply from the date of the adoption of this decision. They
      apply to contracts that are concluded after that date, as well as contracts that
      are in place before it. Therefore, from the date of adoption of this Decision,
      TV broadcasters can insist upon, and monitor, the Notifying Parties'
      compliance with the OTT Commitments.
                                             177
 ---pagebreak---     (834) Any third party can use fast-track dispute resolution to resolve any issues that
            may arise in relation to the compliance with the OTT Commitments. Given
            that the arbitration tribunal may make a preliminary ruling within one month
            and the final ruling shall be rendered within six months, the procedure should
            allow OTT providers to enforce any breach of the OTT Commitments
            quickly.
    (835) Moreover, the Final Commitments provide for the appointment of a
            Monitoring Trustee to be approved by the Commission and to carry out
            obligations consistent with the Commission’s precedents430 in this area. The
            function, mandate and related provisions provided for in the Final
            Commitments are in line with the Commission standard requirements for
            commitments, according to which the Monitoring Trustee must be in a
            position to ensure full compliance of the Notifying Parties with the
            commitments.
    (836) Once appointed, the Monitoring Trustee has an extensive role in ensuring that
            the Commitments are complied with in full. In particular, the Monitoring
            Trustee will act as a contact point for any complaints that the Final
            Commitments are not complied with. The Monitoring Trustee can give, in
            agreement with the Commission, any instructions to the Notifying Parties to
            ensure full compliance. The Monitoring Trustee will also be closely involved
            in any fast-track dispute resolution that beneficiaries of the Commitments may
            launch.
    (837) The Commission retains the ultimate authority to verify the compliance with
            the OTT Commitments.
    (838) Therefore, the Commission considers that the Commitments are suitable and
            sufficient to eliminate the serious doubts as to the compatibility of the
            Transaction with the internal market in relation to OTT Services. The
            Commission also considers that the Commitments can be implemented
            effectively and immediately.
    (839) Finally, with regard to the Notifying Parties' commitment in the Final
            Commitments not to acquire, whether directly or indirectly, the possibility of
            exercising influence over the whole or part of Film1's activities in the
            Netherlands, the Commission recalls that, as noted in paragraph (279),
            pursuant to the Conditional Clearance Decision, the Notifying Parties
            committed to divest Film1 in order to maintain effective competition in
            relation to Premium Pay TV film channels in the Netherlands. In order to
            maintain the structural effect of that commitment, the Notifying Parties had
            committed, for a period of 10 years after the date of adoption of the decision,
            not to acquire, whether directly or indirectly, the possibility of exercising
            influence, as defined in paragraph 43 of the Remedies Notice, over the whole
            or part of the Film1 Divestment Business, unless, following the submission of
            a reasoned request from the Notifying Parties showing good cause and
            accompanied by a report from the Monitoring Trustee, the Commission finds
430 See for example Commission's decision of 26 January 2011 in Case No COMP/M.5984 -
    Intel/McAfee.
                                                 178
 ---pagebreak---          that the structure of the market has changed to such an extent that the absence
         of influence over the Film1 Divestment Business is no longer necessary to
         render the proposed concentration compatible with the internal market (see
         paragraph (282)). Film1 was divested to Sony in March 2015. The
         Commission has concluded in this Decision that following the divestment of
         Film1 and the winding up of the HBO NL joint venture, any overlap in
         relation to Premium Pay TV film channels has been removed and therefore,
         no horizontal non-coordinated effects can arise. However, if the Notifying
         Parties were to be able to re-acquire Film1, the structural effect of the
         divestiture that took place in 2015 could be undone. The Commission's
         analysis, which is premised on the Notifying Parties having no control over
         Film1, would then be erroneous. The Notifying Parties' Film1 non-acquisition
         commitment in the Final Commitments ensures that, the divestiture of Film1
         remains in effect at least until 11 October 2024.
    7.4. Conclusion
   (840) For the reasons outlined above, the commitments entered into by the
         undertakings concerned are sufficient to eliminate the serious doubts as to the
         compatibility of the Transaction with the internal market.
8.    CONDITIONS AND OBLIGATIONS
   (841) Pursuant to the second subparagraph of Article 6(2) of the Merger Regulation,
         the Commission may attach to its decision conditions and obligations intended
         to ensure that the undertakings concerned comply with the commitments they
         have entered into vis-à-vis the Commission with a view to rendering the
         concentration compatible with the internal market.
   (842) The fulfilment of the measures that give rise to the structural change of the
         market is a condition, whereas the implementing steps which are necessary to
         achieve this result are generally obligations on the Parties. Where a condition
         is not fulfilled, the Commission’s decision declaring the concentration
         compatible with the internal market is no longer applicable. Where the
         undertakings concerned commit a breach of an obligation, the Commission
         may revoke the clearance decision in accordance with Article 6(3) of the
         Merger Regulation. The undertakings concerned may also be subject to fines
         and periodic penalty payments under Articles 14(2) and 15(1) of the Merger
         Regulation.
   (843) In accordance with the described distinction as regards conditions and
         obligations, this Decision should be made conditional on the full compliance
         by the Notifying Party with Section D of the commitments set out in the
         Annex, while all other Sections of those commitments constitute obligations.
   (844) The full text of the commitments is an integral part of and is attached as
         Annex 1 to this Decision.
                                              179
 ---pagebreak--- 9.    CONCLUSION
   (845) For the above reasons, the Commission has decided not to oppose the notified
         operation as modified by the commitments and to declare it compatible with
         the internal market and with the functioning of the EEA Agreement, subject to
         full compliance with the conditions in section D of the commitments annexed
         to the present decision and with the obligations contained in the other sections
         of the said commitments. This decision is adopted in application of Article
         6(1)(b) in conjunction with Article 6(2) of the Merger Regulation and Article
         57 of the EEA Agreement.
                                                    For the Commission
                                                    (Signed)
                                                    Margrethe VESTAGER
                                                    Member of the Commission
                                             180
 ---pagebreak---                       Case COMP/M.7000 — Liberty Global / Ziggo
               COMMITMENTS TO THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION
Pursuant to Article 10(5) of the European Union Merger Regulation 139/2004 (EUMR),
the 2014 Notification was supplemented on 4 April 2018 to reflect changes in market
conditions and information provided since the annulled approval by the Commission on
10 October 2014 subject to certain conditions (Initial Clearance Decision).
Pursuant to Article 6(2) in conjunction with Article 6(1)(b) of the EUMR, Liberty Global
plc (Liberty Global) and Vodafone Group plc (Vodafone and jointly with Liberty Global
Notifying Parties) hereby enter into the following commitment (the Commitments) vis-
à-vis the European Commission (the Commission) with a view to rendering the
acquisition of control by Liberty Global of Ziggo N.V. (Ziggo) (the Concentration)
compatible with the internal market and the functioning of the EEA Agreement.
This text shall be interpreted in light of the Commission's decision pursuant to Article 6(2)
in conjunction with Article 6(1)(b) of the EUMR to declare the Concentration compatible
with the internal market and the functioning of the EEA Agreement (the Decision), in the
general framework of European Union law, in particular in light of the EUMR, and by
reference to the Commission Notice on remedies acceptable under Council Regulation
(EC) No 139/2004 and under Commission Regulation (EC) No 802/2004 (the Remedies
Notice).
Section A.      Definitions
For the purpose of the Commitments, the following terms shall have the following
meaning:
2014 Notification: The initial notification to the Commission of the Concentration (Case
COMP/M.7000).
Affiliated Undertakings: undertakings controlled by the Parties and/or by the ultimate
parents of the Parties, whereby the notion of control shall be interpreted pursuant to
Article 3 Merger Regulation and in light of the Commission Consolidated Jurisdictional
Notice under Council Regulation (EC) No. 139/2004 on the control of concentrations
between undertakings (the Consolidated Jurisdictional Notice).
Broadband Customers: consumers located in the Netherlands, that have a subscription
to VodafoneZiggo' broadband internet services either on a stand-alone basis or as part of
a bundle.
Broadcaster: a provider of one or more linear TV channels.
Confidential Information: any business secret, know-how, commercial information, or
any other information of a proprietary nature that is not in the public domain.
Conflict of Interest: any conflict of interest that impairs the Trustee's objectivity and
independence in discharging its duties under the Commitments.
Daily Peak Utilization: the daily 95th percentile over 5-minute average bits transferred
sample intervals (technically Liberty Global takes 288 measurements of interface bit
input counters per day, the highest 14 values are discarded and 15th highest is used for
this purpose) of the sum of measured inbound capacity.
Effective Date: the date of adoption of the Decision.
 ---pagebreak--- Film1 business: Film1’s activities in the Netherlands, being the provision of movies,
series and documentaries to customers through a package of Premium Pay TV channels
and related VOD services.
Internet: the world-wide matrix of interconnecting computers known as the internet
which transfers data using Internet Protocol, covering all delivery models including, but
not limited to Wi-Fi, hotspots and mobile internet.
Liberty Global: Liberty Global Plc.
Monitoring Trustee: one or more natural or legal person(s), independent from the
Parties, who is approved by the Commission and appointed by the Notifying Parties, and
who has the duty to monitor the Notifying Parties' compliance with the conditions and
obligations attached to the Decision.
OTT Service: any service that allows consumers access to audio-visual content, whether
linear or non-linear, over the internet (howsoever delivered) via one or more devices.
Parties: Liberty Global, Vodafone Group, and VodafoneZiggo and their respective
affiliated undertakings.
Parties' TV Platform: television content distributed pursuant to a contract for such
distribution on the Parties' hybrid fibre co-ax network via the analogue PAL standard, the
digital DVB-C standard, the PTV standard or any future standard used for the
distribution of such television content on the Parties' hybrid fibre co-ax network as well
as on their mobile network in the Netherlands.
Trustee: the Monitoring Trustee.
Vodafone: Vodafone Group Plc.
VodafoneZiggo: VodafoneZiggo Group Holding B.V. and its subsidiaries, including its
cable network and related business.
Ziggo: Ziggo N.V. and its subsidiaries, including its cable network and related business.
Section B.        Commitment not to restrict OTT distribution of content
1.       By the below commitment, the Notifying Parties seek to remove any link that could exist
         between, on the one hand, commercial negotiations of the Parties and Broadcasters and
         conditions agreed with Broadcasters in such negotiations regarding the distribution of
         Broadcasters' linear channels and catch-up TV services relating to content on such linear
         channels via the Parties' TV Platform in the Netherlands and, on the other hand, such
         Broadcasters' OTT activities, including the content that such Broadcasters could offer for
         inclusion in such OTT activities (OTT Commitment).
2.       As of the Effective Date, the Parties shall not enter into or renew any agreement (whether
         in writing or oral and whether formal or informal, including but not limited to e-mails,
         side letters or other) with a Broadcaster that includes the distribution of such
         Broadcaster's linear channels and catch-up TV services relating to content in such linear
         channels via the Parties' TV Platform in the Netherlands and that contains terms that
         would directly or indirectly restrict such Broadcaster's ability to offer to third parties
         and/or end-users, on a stand-alone basis or in partnership with another entity or third
         party:
         (i)      an OTT Service in the Netherlands;
         (ii)     its linear channels via an OTT Service in the Netherlands; or
                                                      2
 ---pagebreak---         (iii)    any content owned and controlled by such Broadcaster (that is to say any content
                 in respect of which that Broadcaster holds the relevant intellectual property
                 rights for OTT distribution in the Netherlands, for so long as it is so owned and
                 controlled), including content from such linear channels, for inclusion in an OTT
                 Service in the Netherlands.
3.      To the extent any such terms are included in agreements with Broadcasters regarding the
        distribution of linear channels and catch-up TV services relating to content on such linear
        channels of such Broadcasters on the Parties' TV Platform in the Netherlands made
        before the Effective Date, the Parties shall not enforce such terms and shall promptly
        after the Effective Date inform the relevant Broadcaster that they waive their rights to
        enforce such terms and commit to remove such terms from their existing agreements.
        Furthermore, the Parties shall not make the entry into or renewal of agreements with
        Broadcasters regarding the distribution of linear channels and catch-up TV services
        relating to content on such linear channels of such Broadcasters on the Parties' TV
        Platform in the Netherlands in any way conditional upon the conclusion of a separate
        agreement with such Broadcasters relating to OTT Services and/or the linear and non-
        linear content contained therein.
Section C.       Interconnection capacity commitment
        Purpose
4.      By the interconnection capacity commitment, the Notifying Parties seek to ensure that
        they maintain at least three uncongested routes into VodafoneZiggo’s IP network in the
        Netherlands. By doing this the Notifying Parties seek to ensure they have an incentive to
        provide sufficient interconnection capacity so as to allow VodafoneZiggo’s Broadband
        Customers to access OTT Services in the Netherlands either via the interconnection
        points described in paragraph 5 or otherwise.
        Practicality
5.      To this end, the Notifying Parties will ensure that the Daily Peak Utilization across their
        interconnection points with each of a group of at least three (3) reputable
        interconnectivity providers (ICPs) who are willing to sell transit services via one or more
        physical interconnection points in the Netherlands over which traffic may flow to
        Broadband Customers, will not exceed eighty (80) percent. That is to say that there will
        be at least [20-30] per cent capacity available above the daily peak as calculated in
        arriving at Daily Peak Utilization.
6.      The Notifying Parties will further ensure that the capacity available above the daily peak,
        as calculated in arriving at Daily Peak Utilization across that group of at least three (3)
        reputable ICPs, shall be at least twenty [20-30] Gbit/s. This figure shall be reviewed
        annually in accordance with the procedure described in paragraph 22.
7.      Subject to paragraph 8 below, this group of at least three (3) reputable ICPs may vary
        from time to time but no more than once per quarter generally and once per year in
        respect of the one (1) ICP declared as being one of the ten (10) largest ICPs in
        accordance with paragraph 9.
8.      By way of exception to paragraph 7, where there is an urgent need to upgrade capacity
        with a particular ICP and it does not prove possible to agree or implement such upgrade
        in a timely manner the Notifying Parties will seek the approval of the Commission via
                                                    3
 ---pagebreak---         the Monitoring Trustee in accordance with paragraph 22 to replace that ICP with another
        ICP irrespective of when it was last changed. In that case the Notifying Parties will use
        their reasonable commercial endeavours to agree and implement an upgrade with that
        ICP and, if it can do so, to immediately return that ICP to the group of three (3), in place
        of the ICP which replaced it, at least until it would otherwise have been possible to
        change that ICP in accordance with paragraph 7.
9.      Schedule 1 contains a long list of ICPs which will include the three (3) reputable ICPs
        referred to above in paragraph 5. This list may be changed from time to time in
        coordination with the Commission and the Monitoring Trustee, in particular by the
        addition of other reputable ICPs. This long list shall include the ten (10) largest ICPs who
        are willing to sell transit services via one or more physical interconnection points in the
        Netherlands over which traffic may flow to Broadband Customers. The group of three (3)
        reputable ICPs referred to above in paragraph 5 shall include at least one of these ten (10)
        largest ICPs.
10.     The Notifying Parties shall request each ICP with whom the Parties directly interconnect
        in the Netherlands and over which interconnection points traffic may flow to
        VodafoneZiggo’s Broadband Customers for permission to publish in arrears on a
        monthly basis the highest Daily Peak Utilization in the preceding month, as a percentage
        of available aggregated direct capacity between that ICP and the Parties. As long as at
        least half of such ICPs agrees to such publication the Notifying Parties shall publish, on a
        publicly available website, on a monthly basis, this information with respect to any such
        ICP who is and remains willing for this to be published. Where fewer than half such ICPs
        agrees to such publication the Notifying Parties shall publish, on a publicly available
        website, on a monthly basis, only an aggregated figure based on the highest Daily Peak
        Utilization in the preceding month of aggregated direct interconnect capacity in the
        Netherlands.
Section D.       Film1 non-acquisition commitment
11.    The Notifying Parties commit not to acquire, whether directly or indirectly, the possibility
       of exercising influence (as defined in paragraph 43 of the Remedies Notice) over the
       whole or part of the Filml Business (Film1 Commitment).
Section E.       Trustee
I.      Appointment Procedure
12.     The Notifying Parties shall appoint a Monitoring Trustee to carry out the functions
        specified in the Commitments for a Monitoring Trustee.
13.     The Trustee shall:
        (i)      at the time of appointment, be independent of the Parties and their Affiliated
                 Undertakings;
        (ii)     possess the necessary qualifications to carry out its mandate, for example have
                 sufficient experience as an investment bank or consultant or auditor; and
        (iii)    neither have nor become exposed to a Conflict of Interest.
                                                      4
 ---pagebreak--- 14. The Trustee shall be remunerated by the Notifying Parties in a way that does not impede
    the independent and effective fulfilment of its mandate.
    Proposal by the Notifying Parties
15. No later than two (2) weeks after the Effective Date, the Notifying Parties shall submit a
    name or names of one or more natural or legal persons whom the Notifying Parties
    propose to appoint as the Monitoring Trustee to the Commission for approval.
16. The proposal shall contain sufficient information for the Commission to verify that the
    person or persons proposed as Trustee fulfil the requirements set out in paragraph 13 and
    shall include:
    (a)       the full terms of the proposed mandate, which shall include all
              provisions necessary to enable the Trustee to fulfil its duties under these
              Commitments; and
    (b)       the outline of a work plan which describes how the Trustee intends to
              carry out its assigned tasks.
    Approval or rejection by the Commission
17. The Commission shall have the discretion to approve or reject the proposed Trustee and
    to approve the proposed mandate subject to any modifications it deems necessary for the
    Trustee to fulfil its obligations. If only one name is approved, the Notifying Parties shall
    appoint or cause to be appointed, the individual or institution concerned as Trustee, in
    accordance with the mandate approved by the Commission. If more than one name is
    approved, the Notifying Parties shall be free to choose the Trustee to be appointed from
    among the names approved. The Trustee shall be appointed within one week of the
    Commission's approval, in accordance with the mandate approved by the Commission.
    New proposal by the Notifying Parties
18. If all the proposed Trustees are rejected, the Notifying Parties shall submit the names of
    at least two more natural or legal persons within one week of being informed of the
    rejection, in accordance with paragraph 15.
    Trustee nominated by the Commission
19. If all further proposed Trustees are rejected by the Commission, the Commission shall
    nominate a Trustee, whom the Notifying Parties shall appoint, or cause to be appointed,
    in accordance with a trustee mandate approved by the Commission.
II. Functions of the Trustee
20. The Trustee shall assume its specified duties in order to ensure compliance with the
    Commitments. The Commission may, on its own initiative or at the request of the
    Trustee or the Notifying Parties, give any orders or instructions to the Trustee in order to
    ensure compliance with the conditions and obligations attached to the Decision.
    Duties and obligations of the Monitoring Trustee with regard to agreements with
    Broadcasters
                                                  5
 ---pagebreak--- 21.  The Monitoring Trustee shall make use of the methodology in Schedule 2 for reviewing
     existing and new agreements with Broadcasters in order to monitor compliance with the
     OTT Commitment.
     Duties and obligations of the Monitoring Trustee with regard to the
     interconnection capacity commitment
22.  The Monitoring Trustee shall monitor compliance with the interconnection capacity
     commitment set out in Section C. To that end the Monitoring Trustee shall:
     (a)      verify, on the basis of information provided to it by the Notifying Parties
              that, in accordance with paragraph 5, the Daily Peak Utilization across
              the relevant interconnection points does not exceed 80%;
     (b)      review Schedule 1 every three (3) months with the aim of ensuring that
              Schedule 1 will always contain a sufficient number of reputable ICPs;
     (c)      identify which of the ICPs referred to in Schedule 1 are amongst the ten
              (10) largest ICPs for the purposes of paragraph 9. It shall determine the
              appropriate metric for defining the 10 largest ICPs in consultation with
              the Notifying Parties, having regard to paragraph 4;
     (d)      review every year the minimum capacity level described in paragraph 6
              to determine whether such commitment is still required to prevent that
              the Concentration gives rise to a significant impediment to competition
              and if so, to agree with the Notifying Parties a number which allows for a
              reasonable level of spare capacity;
     (e)      in the event that the Notifying Parties contend that they need to vary the
              group of three (3) ICPs in the situation referred to in paragraph 8, where
              there is an urgent need to upgrade capacity and it does not prove possible
              to agree or implement such upgrade in a timely manner, to review this
              matter with the Notifying Parties and if deemed appropriate, to allow the
              Notifying Parties to make this change;
     (f)      provide to the Commission, sending the Notifying Parties a copy at the
              same time, a written report within fifteen (15) days after the end of each
              quarter that shall cover, for that period: (i) the three (3) ICPs referred to
              in paragraph 5 and (ii) the Daily Peak Utilisation; and
     (g)      promptly report in writing to the Commission, sending the Notifying
              Parties a copy at the same time, if it concludes on reasonable grounds that
              the Notifying Parties are failing to comply with any of the Commitments.
III. Duties and obligations of the Notifying Parties
23.  The Notifying Parties shall provide and shall cause its advisors to provide the Trustee
     with all such co-operation, assistance and information as the Trustee may reasonably
     require to perform its tasks. The Trustee shall have full and complete access to any of the
     Parties' books, records, documents, management or other personnel, facilities, sites and
     technical information necessary for fulfilling its duties under the Commitments and the
     Parties shall provide the Trustee upon request with copies of any document (see in
     relation to the OTT Commitment further Schedules 2 and 3). The Notifying Parties shall
     make available to the Trustee one or more offices on their premises and shall be available
                                                 6
 ---pagebreak---     for meetings in order to provide the Trustee with all information necessary for the
    performance of its tasks.
24. The Notifying Parties shall indemnify the Trustee and its employees and agents (each an
    Indemnified Party) and hold each Indemnified Party harmless against, and hereby agrees
    that an Indemnified Party shall have no liability to the Notifying Parties for any liabilities
    arising out of the performance of the Trustee's duties under the Commitments, except to
    the extent that such liabilities result from the wilful default, recklessness, gross
    negligence or bad faith of the Trustee, its employees, agents or advisors.
25. At the expense of the Notifying Parties, the Trustee may appoint advisors (in particular
    for corporate finance or legal advice), subject to the Notifying Parties' approval (this
    approval not to be unreasonably withheld or delayed) if the Trustee considers the
    appointment of such advisors necessary or appropriate for the performance of its duties
    and obligations under the Mandate, provided that any fees and other expenses incurred
    by the Trustee are reasonable. Should the Notifying Parties refuse to approve the advisors
    proposed by the Trustee the Commission may approve the appointment of such advisors
    instead, after having heard the Notifying Parties. Only the Trustee shall be entitled to
    issue instructions to the advisors. Paragraph 27 shall apply mutatis mutandis.
26. The Notifying Parties agree that the Commission may share Confidential Information
    proprietary to the Notifying Parties with the Trustee. The Trustee shall not disclose such
    information and the principles contained in Article 17(1) and (2) of the EUMR apply
    mutatis mutandis.
27. The Notifying Parties agree that the contact details of the Monitoring Trustee are
    published on the website of the Commission's Directorate-General for Competition and
    the shall inform interested third parties of the identity and the tasks of the Monitoring
    Trustee.
28. For a period of ten (10) years from the Effective Date the Commission may request all
    information from the Parties that is reasonably necessary to monitor the effective
    implementation of the Commitments.
IV. Replacement, discharge and reappointment of the Trustee
29. If the Trustee ceases to perform its functions under the Commitments or for any other
    good cause, including the exposure of the Trustee to a Conflict of Interest:
     (a)      the Commission may, after hearing the Trustee, require the Notifying
              Parties to replace the Trustee; or
     (b)      the Notifying Parties, with the prior approval of the Commission, may
              replace the Trustee.
30. If the Trustee is removed according to paragraph 29, the Trustee may be required to
    continue in its function until a new Trustee is in place to whom the Trustee has effected a
    full hand over of all relevant information. The new Trustee shall be appointed in
    accordance with the procedure referred to in paragraphs 12 to 19.
                                                 7
 ---pagebreak--- 31.     Besides the removal according to paragraph 29, the Trustee shall cease to act as Trustee
        only after the Commission has discharged it from its duties after the Commitments with
        which the Trustee has been entrusted have been implemented and/or have expired in
        accordance with Section F above. However, the Commission may at any time require
        the reappointment of the Monitoring Trustee if it subsequently appears that the relevant
        remedies might not have been fully and properly implemented.
Section F.        Arbitration
       Fast Track Dispute Resolution
32.     In the event that a third party claims that the Notifying Parties or an Affiliated
        Undertaking is failing to comply with the requirements of the Commitments vis-à-vis
        that third party, the fast track dispute resolution procedure as described herein shall
        apply.
33.     Any third party who wishes to avail itself of the fast track dispute resolution procedure (a
        Requesting Party) shall send a written request to the Notifying Parties (with a copy to
        the Trustee) setting out in detail the reasons leading that party to believe that the
        Notifying Parties are failing to comply with the requirements of the Commitments. The
        Requesting Party and the Notifying Parties will use their commercially reasonable efforts
        to resolve all differences of opinion and to settle all disputes that may arise through co-
        operation and consultation within a reasonable period of time not exceeding fifteen (15)
        working days after receipt of the request.
34.     The Trustee shall present its own proposal (the Trustee Proposal) for resolving the
        dispute within eight (8) working days, specifying in writing the action, if any, to be taken
        by the Notifying Parties or an Affiliated Undertaking in order to ensure compliance with
        the Commitments vis-à-vis the Requesting Party, and be prepared, if requested, to
        facilitate the settlement of the dispute.
35.     Should the Requesting Party and the Notifying Parties (together the Parties to the
        Arbitration) fail to resolve their differences of opinion in the consultation phase, the
        Requesting Party shall serve a notice (the Notice), in the sense of a request for
        arbitration, to the International Chamber of Commerce (hereinafter the Arbitral
        Institution), with a copy of such Notice and request for arbitration to the Notifying
        Parties.
36.     The Notice shall set out in detail the dispute, difference or claim (the Dispute) and shall
        contain, inter alia, all issues of both fact and law, including any suggestions as to the
        procedure, and all documents relied upon shall be attached, e.g. documents, agreements,
        expert reports, and witness statements. The Notice shall also contain a detailed
        description of the action to be undertaken by the Notifying Parties (including, if
        appropriate, a draft contract comprising all relevant terms and conditions) and the
        Trustee Proposal, including a comment as to its appropriateness.
37.     The Notifying Parties shall, within ten (10) working days from receipt of the Notice,
        submit its answer (the Answer), which shall provide detailed reasons for its conduct and
        set out, inter alia, all issues of both fact and law, including any suggestions as to the
        procedure, and all documents relied upon, e.g. documents, agreements, expert reports,
        and witness statements. The Answer shall, if appropriate, contain a detailed description
        of the action which the Notifying Parties propose to undertake vis-a-vis the Requesting
                                                     8
 ---pagebreak---     Party (including, if appropriate, a draft contract comprising all relevant terms and
    conditions) and the Trustee Proposal (if not already submitted), including a comment as
    to its appropriateness.
    Appointment of the Arbitrators
38. The Arbitral Tribunal shall consist of three (3) persons. The Requesting Party shall
    nominate its arbitrator in the Notice; The Notifying Parties shall nominate its arbitrator in
    the Answer. The arbitrator nominated by the Requesting Party and by the Notifying
    Parties shall, within five (5) working days of the nomination of the latter, nominate the
    chairman, making such nomination known to the parties and the Arbitral Institution
    which shall forthwith confirm the appointment of all three (3) arbitrators.
39. Should the Requesting Party wish to have the Dispute decided by a sole arbitrator it shall
    indicate this in the Notice. In this case, the Requesting Party and the Notifying Parties
    shall agree on the nomination of a sole arbitrator within five (5) working days from the
    communication of the Answer, communicating this to the Arbitral Institution which shall
    forthwith confirm the appointment of the arbitrator.
40. Should the Notifying Parties fail to nominate an arbitrator, or if the two (2) arbitrators
    fail to agree on the chairman, or should the Parties to the Arbitration fail to agree on a
    sole arbitrator, the default appointment(s) shall be made by the Arbitral Institution.
41. The three-person arbitral tribunal or, as the case may be, the sole arbitrator, are herein
    referred to as the Arbitral Tribunal.
    Arbitration Procedure
42. The Dispute shall be finally resolved by arbitration under the Rules of the Arbitration
    Court of the International Chamber of Commerce, with such modifications or adaptations
    as foreseen herein or necessary under the circumstances (the Rules). The arbitration shall
    be conducted in Amsterdam in the English language.
43. The procedure shall be a fast-track procedure. For this purpose, the Arbitral Tribunal
    shall shorten all applicable procedural time-limits under the Rules as far as admissible
    and appropriate in the circumstances. The Parties to the Arbitration shall consent to the
    use of e-mail for the exchange of documents.
44. The Arbitral Tribunal shall, as soon as practical after the confirmation of the Arbitral
    Tribunal, hold an organisational conference to discuss any procedural issues with the
    Parties to the Arbitration. Terms of Reference shall be drawn up and signed by the
    Parties to the Arbitration and the Arbitration Tribunal at the organisational meeting or
    thereafter and a procedural time-table shall be established by the Arbitral Tribunal. An
    oral hearing shall, as a rule, be established within two months of the confirmation of the
    Arbitral Tribunal.
45. In order to enable the Arbitral Tribunal to reach a decision, it shall be entitled to request
    any relevant information from the Parties to the Arbitration, to appoint experts and to
    examine them at the hearing, and to establish the facts by all appropriate means. The
    Arbitral Tribunal is also entitled to ask for assistance by the Trustee in all stages of the
    procedure if the Parties to the Arbitration agree.
                                                  9
 ---pagebreak--- 46. The Arbitral Tribunal shall not disclose confidential information and apply the standards
    attributable to confidential information under the EUMR. The Arbitral Tribunal may take
    the measures necessary for protecting confidential information in particular by restricting
    access to confidential information to the Arbitral Tribunal, the Trustee, and outside
    counsel and experts of the opposing party.
47. The burden of proof in any dispute under these Rules shall be borne as follows: (i) the
    Requesting Party must produce evidence of a prima facie case and (ii) if the Requesting
    Party produces evidence of a prima facie case, the Arbitral Tribunal must find in favour
    of the Requesting Party unless the Notifying Parties can produce evidence to the
    contrary.
    Involvement of the Commission
48. The Commission shall be allowed and enabled to participate in all stages of the
    procedure by:
    (i)      receiving all written submissions (including documents and reports, etc.) made
             by the Parties to the Arbitration;
    (ii)     receiving all orders, interim and final awards and other documents exchanged by
             the Arbitral Tribunal with the Parties to the Arbitration (including Terms of
             Reference and procedural timetable);
    (iii)    having the opportunity to file amicus curiae briefs; and
    (iv)     being present at the hearing(s) and being allowed to ask questions to parties,
             witnesses and experts.
49. The Arbitral Tribunal shall forward, or shall order the Parties to the Arbitration to
    forward, the documents mentioned to the Commission without delay.
50. In the event of disagreement between the Parties to the Arbitration regarding the
    interpretation of the Commitments, the Arbitral Tribunal may seek the Commission's
    interpretation of the Commitments before finding in favour of any Party to the
    Arbitration and shall be bound by the interpretation.
    Decisions of the Arbitral Tribunal
51. The Arbitral Tribunal shall decide the dispute on the basis of the Commitments and the
    Decision. Issues not covered by the Commitments and the Decision shall be decided (in
    the order as stated) by reference to the EUMR, EU law and general principles of law
    common to the legal orders of the Member States without a requirement to apply a
    particular national system. The Arbitral Tribunal shall take all decisions by majority vote.
52. Upon request of the Requesting Party, the Arbitral Tribunal may make a preliminary
    ruling on the Dispute. The preliminary ruling shall be rendered within one month after
    the confirmation of the Arbitral Tribunal, shall be applicable immediately and, as a rule,
    remain in force until a final decision is rendered.
53. The Arbitral Tribunal shall, in the preliminary ruling as well as in the final award,
    specify the action, if any, to be taken by the Notifying Parties or an Affiliated
    Undertaking in order to comply with the Commitments vis-à-vis the Requesting Party
    (e.g. specify a contract including all relevant terms and conditions). The final award shall
                                                 10
 ---pagebreak---         be final and binding on the Parties to the Arbitration and shall resolve the Dispute and
        determine any and all claims, motions or requests submitted to the Arbitral Tribunal. The
        arbitral award shall also determine the reimbursement of the costs of the successful party
        and the allocation of the arbitration costs. In case of granting a preliminary ruling or if
        otherwise appropriate, the Arbitral Tribunal shall specify that terms and conditions
        determined in the final award apply retroactively.
54.     The final award shall, as a rule, be rendered within six (6) months after the confirmation
        of the Arbitral Tribunal. The time-frame shall, in any case, be extended by the time the
        Commission takes to submit an interpretation of the Commitments if asked by the
        Arbitral Tribunal.
55.     The Parties to the Arbitration shall prepare a non-confidential version of the final award,
        without business secrets. The Commission may publish the non-confidential version of
        the award.
56.     Nothing in the arbitration procedure shall affect the power to the Commission to take
        decisions in relation to the Commitments in accordance with its powers under the Merger
        Regulation.
Section G.       Duration
57.     The OTT Commitment will expire eight (8) years from the Effective Date, unless in
        response to a request by the Notifying Parties in accordance with the Review Clause, the
        Commission decides to waive, modify or substitute this commitment on grounds that the
        conditions of competition would no longer justify the undiminished continuation of this
        commitment.
58.    The Film1 Commitment will expire on 11 October 2024, unless in response to a request
       by the Notifying Parties in accordance with the Review Clause, the Commission finds
       that the structure of the market has changed to such an extent that the absence of
       influence over the Film1 Business is no longer necessary to render the Concentration
       compatible with the internal market.
Section H.       The Review Clause
59.     The Commission may extend the time periods foreseen in the Commitments in response
        to a request from the Notifying Parties or, in appropriate cases, on its own initiative. For
        the avoidance of doubt, the Commission cannot extend the duration of the OTT
        Commitment in Section B and Section C beyond the eight (8) years specified in
        paragraph 57 and the Film1 Commitment in Section D beyond the date specified in
        paragraph 58. Where the Notifying Parties request a change to a time period, they shall
        submit a reasoned request to the Commission no later than one month before the expiry
        of that period, showing good cause. This request shall be accompanied by a report from
        the Monitoring Trustee, who shall, at the same time send a non-confidential copy of the
        report to the Notifying Parties. Only in exceptional circumstances shall the Notifying
        Parties be entitled to request an extension within the last month of any period.
60.     The Commission may further, in response to a reasoned request from the Notifying
        Parties, showing good cause waive, modify or substitute one or more of the undertakings
                                                    11
 ---pagebreak---         in these Commitments. This request shall be accompanied by a report from the
        Monitoring Trustee, who shall at the same time send a non-confidential copy of the
        report to the Notifying Parties. The request shall not have the effect of suspending the
        application of the undertaking and, in particular, of suspending the expiry of any time
        period in which the undertaking has to be complied with. Such a request may be
        submitted by the Notifying Parties pursuant to paragraph 57 or 58, or in exceptional
        circumstances, in any other instance.
Section I.       Entry into Force
61.    The Commitments shall take effect upon the date of adoption of the Decision.
                                                  12
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                                   13
 ---pagebreak--- SCHEDULE 2 — REVIEW OF AGREEMENTS
Pursuant to Section E, the following methodology shall be applied for reviewing
agreements with Broadcasters by the Trustee in order to monitor compliance with the
OTT Commitment, set out in Section B:
       (a)   Any (part of an) agreement with a Broadcaster, existing on, amended or signed
             after the Effective Date, in so far as it directly or indirectly relates to OTT
             services, and regardless its form (Relevant Agreement), shall be provided to the
             Trustee for review in a database to which the Trustee and Commission have
             access.
       (b)   The Parties will maintain a rolling list of potential Relevant Agreements to be
             reviewed by the Trustee with an indication of the expected commencement,
             duration and finalisation of negotiations. This rolling list is to be updated every
             three months.
       (c)   The Parties have the discretion whether to submit an agreement for review either
             before or after its signature. If after signature, the Parties will not delay
             submission of the agreement for review.
       (d)   In the event that the Parties and the Broadcaster are enforcing terms, without
             signing a formal agreement, the Parties will provide the Trustee with the then
             current draft of such agreement (or any summary of such terms including by e-
             mail) to the extent it directly or indirectly relates to OTT services.
       (e)   The Trustee will have 48 hours to review agreements which have not yet been
             signed and one week to review if the agreement has been signed.
       (f)   Communication with the Commission:
             (i)      The Trustee will keep the Commission informed of any potential
                      concern identified by the Trustee relating to terms addressing OTT
                      services, identified by the Trustee, regardless of whether it is ultimately
                      (quickly) resolved in cooperation with the Parties.
             (ii)     The Parties will have the opportunity to discuss queries with the Trustee
                      before the Trustee escalating any issue identified to the Commission.
                                                   14
 ---pagebreak--- SCHEDULE 3 —INFORMATION PROVISION
Pursuant to Section E, the Notifying Parties shall secure that the Trustee shall be provided with
all information reasonably required in order to undertake its functions. To this end, the Parties
shall provide the Trustee, on a regular basis, but and at least automatically every quarter, and in
addition in timely manner on request, with the following (which may vary from time to time by
agreement with the Trustee):
         (g)    A chart showing for the last month for each of the three ICPs, daily peak
                capacity (as a percentage of total), daily capacity (as a percentage of total) and
                daily available bandwidth in Tera bits per second (Tbps).
         (h)    Three documents in a format mutually agreed with the Trustee, containing the
                following:
                (i)     Capacity planning notes;
                (ii)    Hourly data (one line every hour for each interface of the three ICPs)
                        with data on Device, Interface, Timestamp, Average usage, Minimum
                        Usage and Maximum Usage;
                (iii)   Interface speeds (total physical capacity for each interface of the three
                        ICPs) snapshot of one day per month with data on Device, Interface and
                        Speed; and
                (iv)    Daily interface 95th percentile capacity (one line for each interface of the
                        three ICPs, one column per day, done monthly).
                                                    15