CELEX: 62011TN0359
Language: en
Date: 2011-07-07 00:00:00
Title: Case T-359/11: Action brought on 7 July 2011 — Makhlouf v Council

24.9.2011   
            
            
               EN
            
            
               Official Journal of the European Union
            
            
               C 282/25
            
         Action brought on 7 July 2011 — Makhlouf v Council
   (Case T-359/11)
   2011/C 282/54
   Language of the case: French
   
      Parties
   
   
      Applicant: Hafez Makhlouf (Damas, Syria) (represented by: P. Grollet and G. Karouni, lawyers)
   
      Defendant: Council of the European Union
   
      Form of order sought
   
   The applicant submits that the Court should:
   
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               annul Council Regulation (EU) No 442/2011 of 9 May 2011 concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Syria, in so far as it concerns the applicant;
            
         
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               annul Council Decision 2011/273/CFSP of 9 May 2011 concerning restrictive measures against Syria, in so far as it concerns the applicant;
            
         
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               annul Council Implementing Decision 2011/302/CFSP, by which the Annex to Decision 2011/273/CFSP is replaced by the text set out in the Annex to the Decision of 23 May, in so far as it concerns the applicant;
            
         
               —
            
            
               order the Council of the European Union to pay the costs, pursuant to Articles 87 and 91 of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court.
            
         
      Pleas in law and main arguments
   
   In support of the action, the applicant relies on six pleas in law.
   
               1.
            
            
               First plea in law, alleging infringement of the rights of the defence and the right to a fair hearing. The applicant argues that his rights of defence have been infringed by the imposition of the penalties in question, without his having previously been heard, had the opportunity to defend himself or having been informed of the evidence on the basis of which the measures were adopted.
            
         
               2.
            
            
               Second plea in law, alleging infringement of the obligation to state reasons provided for by the second paragraph of Article 296 TFEU. The applicant criticises the Council for having adopted restrictive measures in respect of him without having informed him of the grounds, in order to enable him to put forward his pleas in defence. The applicant criticises the defendant for having merely used a general, stereotypical formulation, without specifying the factual and legal elements justifying its decision and the considerations which led it to adopt that measure.
            
         
               3.
            
            
               Third plea in law, alleging infringement of the guarantee relating to effective judicial protection. The applicant argues that not only did he not have the opportunity to make his views duly known to the Council, but that, in the absence of any indication in the contested decision as to the specific and actual reasons justifying it, nor is he able to pursue his action properly before the General Court.
            
         
               4.
            
            
               Fourth plea in law, alleging infringement of the general principle of proportionality.
            
         
               5.
            
            
               Fifth plea in law, alleging infringement of the right to property, in that the restrictive measures, more specifically the measure freezing funds, constitute a disproportionate interference with the applicant’s fundamental right to dispose freely of his assets.
            
         
               6.
            
            
               Sixth plea in law, alleging infringement of the right to privacy, in that the measures freezing funds and restricting the freedom of movement also constitute a disproportionate interference with the applicant’s fundamental right.