CELEX: 51995PC0171
Language: en
Date: 1995-05-10
Title: Draft COUNCIL DECISION approving the conclusion by the Commission of an Agreement for peaceful nuclear co- operation between the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) and the Government of the United States of America

COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES
                                      Brussels, 10.05.1995
                                      COM(95) 171 final
     COMMISSION COMMUNICATION TO THE COUNCIL
   CONCERNING THE CONCLUSION OF AN AGREEMENT
  FOR PEACEFUL NUCLEAR COOPERATION BETWEEN THE
EUROPEAN ATOMIC ENERGY COMMUNITY (EURATOM) AND
 THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                             Draft
                     COUNCIL DECISION
               approving the conclusion by the
   Commision of an Agreement for peaceful nuclear co-operation
    between the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom)
        and the Government of the United States of America
                 (presented by the Commission)
 ---pagebreak---     COMMISSION COMMUNICATION TO THE COUNCIL
   CONCERNING THE CONCLUSION OF AN AGREEMENT
  FOR PEACEFUL NUCLEAR COOPERATION BETWEEN THE
EUROPEAN ATOMIC ENERGY COMMUNITY (EURATOM) AND
 THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                      ^
 ---pagebreak--- I. Introduction
1. The co-operation between the European Atomic Energy Community and the
   United States in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy dates back to the late 1950's.
   It was consolidated in a bilateral agreement that entered into force in 1960 and
   will expire on 31 December 1995. A new co-operation agreement to replace the
   existing one has been negotiated on the basis of negotiating Directives proposed
   by the Commission and adopted by the Council on 16/12/1991. The successful
   conclusion of these negotiations is the basis of this Communication to the Council
   with its explanatory memorandum.
2. The co-operation developed over the last 35 years under this agreement is valued
   as highly positive by both parties. For the European Union it has provided the
   framework to import from the US essential materials, equipment and technology
   that made it possible for the European nuclear industry to reach eventually a high
   level of maturity. For the United States, peaceful nuclear co-operation with
   Euratom provided a major and reliable nuclear trading partner with which there
   was, since the beginning, a large degree of agreement on nuclear non-proliferation
   issues which opened the way to the full commitment to the multilateral nuclear
   non-proliferation regime that both the E.U. and the U.S. share today.
3. Both parties had therefore a favourable predisposition to negotiate a new
   cooperation agreement. The degree of interest was however not the same, and as
   regards Euratom it was greatly influenced by the adoption by the U.S. Congress
   in 1978 of the U.S. Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act which introduced stricter
   requirements - including some of a bilateral nature - for U.S. peaceful co-
   operation with other countries. While Euratom and the U.S. realised that the
   continuation of their bilateral co-operation in a field as sensitive as nuclear energy
   was politically important, both sides started the negotiations with specific
   priorities and not necessarily compatible agendas.
4. For the U.S. Administration it was particularly important to confirm in a new
   agreement the vested rights that in its view result from the earlier nuclear exports
   to Europe as well as to cast the new agreement within the basic requirements of
   present U.S. law. The Commission, the Member States and the nuclear industry
   of the Community were reluctant to envisage conditions for cooperation that - in
    spite of the formally reciprocal character of all provisions - could in practice
   introduce and expand in an unpredictable manner consentrightson U.S.-obligated
   nuclear material present in the E.U. and thus jeopardize the long term stability
   that the Community nuclear industry needs for planning and carrying out its
    activities.
                                \  <X
 ---pagebreak--- 5.  It was important for both sides to successfully conclude a cooperation agreement,
    and also as far as possible, to reach agreement within a timeframe that avoided
    a lapse of the present Agreement. In the absence of an agreement, trade in US
    obligated materials with the EU both directly and via third countries, such as
    deliveries of US-obligated spent fuel from Japan and Switzerland for reprocessing
    in the EU, would be halted. A lapse with no agreement in prospect, because of
    its knock-on effects for third countries' fuel cycle choices, would be likely to
    cause uncertainty and disruption in the international nuclear fuel market. Over a
    lapse of many years, EU reprocessing and other fuel cycle business worth up to
    10 bn ECU could be at stake, and a similar amount of potential business possibly
    lost by the US. However, a short lapse (for istance for the completion of US
    Congressional approval procedures), while not without costs for EU industry in
    rearranging business, would be unlikely to inflict major damage on the industry
    EU dependency on US supplies is decreasing, and most of the spent fuel from
    third countries is already inside the Union. It should be noted that in 1994, there
    was an average stock in the territory of the European Union of 341 tonnes of
    plutonium. Some 31% of this is US obligated.
II. Summary of the negotiations
6.  In view of the expiration of the current Euratom/U.S. Nuclear Co-operation
    Agreement (signed in 1960) on 31.12.95, the Commission approved a
    Communication to the Council for negotiating directiveson 23.7.91 and the
    Council adopted these directives on 16.12.91. The EU legal basis for negotiation
    was the Euratom Treaty and the U.S. basis its domestic legislation - the Nuclear
    Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 (NNPA). Negotiations opened in 1992. Good
    progress was made during 1992 and 1993 in agreeing texts, in particular, on
    industrial and commercial co-operation, nuclear research and development, nuclear
    safety and some aspects of safeguards, non-proliferation and related matters.
    However, some difficulties were caused by U.S. requirements to insert in the
    Agreement certain conditions stemming largely from U.S. domestic legislation -
    the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 (NNPA).
7.  Early in 1994 a high level démarche was made by the Commission to U.S.
    Secretary of State, Mr. Warren Christopher. The Commission advised the U.S.
    that a waiver was the best solution to these problems. The U.S. Secretary of
    State advised the Commission in June 1994 that the U.S. Government would not
    be using this waiver but committed the U.S. side to flexibility in its negotiating
    position. Faced with this situation, Commission negotiators strove to obtain
    equivalent mechanisms that would provide, in practice, the same kind of long-term
    assurances and predictability needed for the E.U. nuclear programmes and
    international trade. The General Affairs Council of 19/20 December 1994, while
    confirming the December 1991 negotiating mandate, asked the Commission to
    continue to explore possible solutions. Accordingly, the Commission negotiators
    explored, in depth, a solution consisting of improving substantially the U.S.
    original offer of advance generic prior consent on a programmatic basis.
8.    The Commission considers that a draft agreement has been reached which fully
    meets the requirements of the negotiating directives laid down by the Council and
 ---pagebreak---      which preserves Euratom's essential interests.. Throughout all the lengthy period
     of the negotiations, which started in March 1992 and involved fifteen formal
     negotiating sesssions, the relevant Working Group of the Council (AQG) has been
     associated in an unprecedented way withall steps and developments. Innumerable
     meetings of the AQG, supplemented by frequent ad hoc information meetings in
     die Commission's premises, have permitted the Commission to provide to Member
     States prompt, in-depth and exhaustive information, to examine thoroughly with
     them each issue at stake, and to receive from them an input that the Commission
     has highly valued and that has contributed significantly to the ad-referendum
     agreement which was finally reached with the US.
9.   Given the extended negotiation period and the long procedures necessary for the
     approval of theAgreement by the Council of Ministers and the US Congress (6-9
     months), there has been an interest on both sides to conclude the Agreement as
     soon as possible, so that the undesirable lapse of Agreement at the end of 1995
     can be avoided. The strong economic interest of EU industry is for there to be no
     gap between the expiry of the current agreement and the entry into force of a new
     agreement.
III. The results of the negotiations
10.  A primary objective of the negotiations was to agree on a legal framework which
     would guarantee to European nuclear industry, whenever it operates with U n -
     obligated materials, security of supply, stability and long-term predictability. The
     Commission considers that these objectives have been attained, since the new
     agreement, which will remain in force for at least 30 years, followed possibly by
     subsequent 5-year roll-over periods, guarantees the following framework as long
     as it remains in force :
             any non-sensitive nuclear activities, as well as enrichment up to 20 %,
             irradiation of fissile materials, and post-irradiation examination involving
             chemical dissolution or separation of irradiated nuclear material will be
             freely and unconditionally allowed;
             retransfers to third countries will take place according to procedures set
             out in the agreed minute;
             storage of sensitive fissile material will be possible in any facility that
             meets the usual physical protection levels;
             reprocessing and alteration in form or content of sensitive fissile materials
             will take place under a generic programmatic consent, in facilities forming
             part of the peaceful programme delineated by each Party; such generic
             consent will, in normal circumstances, be defacto irrevocable, and
             therefore valid in practice for the entire life of the agreement.
 11.  Against this general background, a number of specific difficult issues have been
      successfully resolved as follows:-
 12.  One of the major issues of particular concern to E.U. industry was the U.S. claim
      for extension of U.S. obligations to non-U.S. items as a result of certain basic
 ---pagebreak---     industrial operations, e.g. in power reactors for generating electricity. The U.S.
    side finally conceded that there would be no practical change in the status quo
    (under the current Euratom/U.S. Agreement) in these areas. .
13. Another special problem was the applicability of national legislation to operations
    within the scope of this Agreement; in particular the E.U. could not accept that
    a change in the U.S. NNPA, which Congress could make at any time, could lead
    to U.S. action amounting to a determination to change the terms of co-operation.
    In spite of U.S. strong resistance the Commission has secured an Article to protect
    the E.U. position in this connection (Article 13).
14. As regards exchanges of technology and certain components a side-letter to the
    proposed Agreement includes terms which are in E.U. interests.
15. In the area of nuclear safeguards, the text of the proposed Agreement confirms
    that if, for any reason, I.A.E.A. (International Atomic Energy Agency) safeguards
    were not being applied in the Community then co-operation could continue fully
    under Euratom safeguards only. This is a useful guarantee and also a further
    recognition of the non-proliferation credentials of the Community.
16. Furthermore, the U.S. had declined up to now to terminate its separate bilateral
    nuclear agreements with Portugal, Spain, Austria, Finland and Sweden still in
    force. Such termination was however a political priority for the Commission. It
    has now been ensured that these agreements will be terminated on favourable
    terms and that future relevant co-operation will take place under the proposed new
    Agreement on more favourable terms for the EU than under these Member States'
    existing agreements with the U.S.
17. Further issues to which attention should be drawn are:
    a)        Alteration in form or content of certain strategic material
              The scope of such alterations is limited. In particular, processing and
             production operations by E.U. industry for overseas customers (where
              original U.S. supplies are involved) will continue without hindrance.
    b)        Storage of certain strategic material
              The Commission has ensured that storage no longer falls under the
              programmatic prior consent mechanism; only physical protection and
              security aspects are relevant. These will pose no problems for Member
              States.
    c)        Indefinite duration of consent rights (i.e. in the event the Agreement is
              terminated or suspended - Article 14)
              The Commission has not accepted wide U.S. claims for indefinite duration
              of consent rights on the existing very large inventory of material already
              transferred under the current agreement. The regime that would continue
              to apply would be that of the current Agreement but including permanent
              retransfer consent. Duration of consents relating to certain key fuel cycle
              activities involving U.S. supplied material under the new Agreement will
 ---pagebreak---           be discussed by the Parties whenever the Agreement will terminate l and,
          in case of disagreement, will be deferred to the decision of an arbitral
          Tribunal. The result cannot be forecast at this stage, but achieving a
          mutually agreed framework for later consultations on the extent of duration
          of consent rights has been a key element in reaching agreement on a final
          text.
   d)     Suspension of programmatic consent rights
          (i)     the programmatic consent rights may only be suspended if, after
                  full consultations, there is objective evidence to show that the
                  Union has committed a fundamental breach of the international
                  non-proliferation regime or unless the safeguarding or physical
                  protection of the installation concerned are seriously and directly
                  threatened. Given the non-proliferation commitments of Member
                   States of the European Union and their powers in this context to
                  enforce due application of safeguards and physical protection, this
                  means that the rights can be considered as de facto non-revocable;
          (ii)     even in the extremely unlikely event of such a suspension of the
                   consent rights, the Union retains all the rights existing under the
                   current Euratom/U.S. Agreement on a quantity of US- obligated
                   nuclear material equivalent to that on the inventory at the time of
                   the entry into force of the new Agreement.
   The many other important operations in the nuclear fuel cycle, e.g. enrichment of
   material and production of electricity, continue on the same basis as at present.
   e)     Automatic retransfer consent
          For a wide range of exports of nuclear material the Commission has
          obtained what is, in practice, an irrevocable advance consent for exports
           (where U.S. obligated materials are involved) to proceed to those
          countries which, as a minimum, meet non-proliferation requirements
           acceptable to the Community. This is a major improvement on the current
           regime (case^by-case U.S. prior consent) and brings considerable long-term
           security to the E.U.'s international nuclear trade.
   f)      International obligation exchanges
           The Community has obtained agreement to the principle of such exchanges
           which allow, where feasible, book transfers of material internationally thus
           avoiding the considerable costs of physical transfers as well as the
           attendant need for safety and security measures during such transport.
   After 30 years, but with automatic 5-year roll-over periods.
2)
 ---pagebreak---     g)     Special arrangements with Japan and Switzerland
           The advantageous retransfer provisions set out in the Exchange of Notes
           dated 18 July 1988 between the Commission and the United States have
           been further improved in that these provisions remain in effect for the life
           of this new Agreement and may only be suspended under the same
           conditions as those applying to the Agreement. The provisions now also
           extend to mixed oxide nuclear fuel. In a note attached to the proposed
           Agreement the United States makes the political commitments that it will
           apply such an arrangement to imports from and re-exports to Switzerland,
           provided a U.S./Switzerland nuclear agreement continues to exist. These
           arrangements are of particular value to the Union's reprocessing and mixed
           oxide fuel fabrication operations which involve a substantial number of
           jobs and generate large export revenue.
    h)     Commercial guarantees
           Articles 3 and 4 provide for appropriate industrial and commercial co-
           operation, better procedures of handling licences for exports and the fullest
           possible exchange of equipment, material and information. The text of
           Article 10 of the Agreement comprises a comprehensive set of commercial
           guarantees of non-interference by the U.S. in the Union's domestic
           operations and international trade (and vice versa). These are essential to
           the Union's nuclear industry, especially since a significant quantity of US-
           obligated material is already inside the EU. Paragraph 11 of the Agreed
           Minute C further states that the consents embodied in the Agreement may
           not be suspended owing to differences over the nature of the Parties'
           peaceful nuclear programmes or fuel cycle choices, or for purposes of
           obtaining commercial advantage, or of delaying, hampering or hindering
           the peaceful nuclear programmes or activities in the Community, the
           Member States of the Community or the United States, or their peaceful
           nuclear co-operation with third countries. This is the first time that the
           U.S. has even given such extensive and important guarantees to a trading
           partner.
IV. Final overall Assessment
18. The political and commercial importance of the Agreement should not be
    underestimated. The positive results can be summarised as follows :-
    a)      The nuclear energy aspects
            As an important energy source for the Union (35% of all electricity is
            nuclear produced), it was necessary to ensure that industrial and trade
            aspects relating in particular to security of nuclear supply and
            competitivity were secured by the Agreement. This Memorandum
            demonstrates that, both within the Union and internationally, significant
            advantages have been obtained in this respect. Although the E.U. is no
            longer dependent on the U.S. in the nuclear sector, the Agreement forms
            a secure and favourable basis for considerable co-operation and trade
            between the E.U. and U.S. nuclear industries as well as a number of third
            countries, and provides a durable framework for this trade to expand in the
            future according to the commercial choices and needs of the E.U. nuclear
 ---pagebreak---            industry. It also responds effectively to the objectives of the Commission's
           recent Energy Green paper.
    b)     Bilateral EC/US aspects
           The differences of views, finally resolved, concerning U.S. claims for
           consent rights should not overshadow the overall picture. The Union and
           the United States are the two major players in this peaceful use of nuclear
           energy. (Japan's position is of course also significant). The U.S. voiced
           the view that it would be inconceivable not to have an Agreement for Co-
           operation between the U.S. and the Union. This new Agreement
           constitutes a strong expression of the political and economic value of the
           partnership that exists between the U.S. and the Union reaffirmed in the
           Joint Declaration on E.C./U.S. relations of November 1990. There is also
           no doubt that certain key third countries such as Japan will also welcome
           this Agreement as bringing stability to nuclear co-operation and trading in
           the industrialised world.
    c)     International Non-Proliferation aspects
           The European Union, its Member States and the United States have
           indisputable non-proliferation credentials. These form a key basis of the
           co-operation. Any form of co-operation under the Agreement is for
           peaceful use only. Article 11 records that all material is subject to
           international instruments dealing with their physical protection and
           security. In addition safety aspects are covered. The Agreement ensures
           that internationally accepted levels of non-proliferation and physical
           protection apply indefinitely to all material and sets an appropriate
           example for other countries.
19. It should be noted that this reciprocal Agreement must, of course, also be
    approved by the U.S. Congress.
V.  Conclusion
20. In conclusion, the Commission considers that the benefits and the satisfactory
    provisions obtained constitute an Agreement which can suitably replace the
    current Nuclear Agreement that expires at the end of 1995. The Commission
    considers that the proposed new Agreement for Nuclear Co-operation between the
    European Atomic Energy Community and the United States:
            complies in all respects with the negotiating directives issued by the
            Council on 16.12.1991;
            guarantees to the European nuclear industries the stability, the long-term
            predictability and all the assurances that they need;
            will provide a significant contribution to strengthening the E.U./U.S.A.
            overall relationship.
21. The Commission therefore invites the Council to approve the Decision set out in
    the Annex.
 ---pagebreak---                                                 Draft
                     Council Decision approving the conclusion by the
              Commision of an Agreement for peaceful nuclear co-operation
              between the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom)
                   and the Government of the United States of America
THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,
        Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community, and
in particular the second paragraph of Article 101 thereof,
        Having regard to the draft decision presented by the Commission,
        WHEREAS the Commission has carried out negotiations in accordance with Council
directives, adopted by Council Decision of 16.12.1991, for an Agreement between the
European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) and the Government of the United States of
America,
        WHEREAS the conclusion by the Commission of that Agreement should be approved,
                              HAS DECIDED AS FOLLOWS
                                          Sole Article
The conclusion by the Commission of an Agreement for peaceful nuclear co-operation
between the European Energy Community (Euratom) and the Government of the United States
is hereby approved.
The text of the Agreement is attached to this Decision.
Done in Brussels
                                                            For the Council,
                                                            The President
                                           ?
 ---pagebreak---           AGREEMENT FOR CO-OPERATION IN THE PEACEFUL USES
     OF NUCLEAR ENERGY BETWEEN THE EUROPEAN ATOMIC ENERGY
              COMMUNITY AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
THE EUROPEAN ATOMIC ENERGY COMMUNITY, HEREINAFTER REFERRED TO
AS "THE COMMUNITY", AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA, HEREINAFTER REFERRED TO AS "THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA";
                                         PREAMBLE
Whereas the Community and the United States of America concluded an Agreement which
entered into force on 27 August 1958 and an Additional Agreement for Co-operation which
entered into force on 25 July 1960, as subsequently amended, which expire on 31 December
1995;
Whereas the Community and the United States of America recognise the value of their past
co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and wish to provide for renewed co-
operation on the basis of equality, mutual benefit, reciprocity and without prejudice to the
respective powers of each Party;
Whereas the Community and the United States of America are convinced that by
strengthening and expanding their partnership on an equal footing they will contribute to
continued international stability as well as to political and economic progress;
Whereas the Community, its Member States and the United States of America have attained
a comparable advanced level in the use of nuclear energy for electricity production, in the
development of their nuclear industries and in the security afforded by their respective laws
and regulations concerning health, safety, the peaceful use of nuclear energy and the
protection of the environment;
Whereas it is necessary to establish the conditions governing transfers of nuclear items
between the Community and the United States of America, to ensure continued compliance
with the requirement for free movement of such items within the Community and to avoid
interference in nuclear programmes in place in the Community and the United States of
America as well as in their international trading relations;
Whereas all Member States of the Community and the United States of America are Parties
to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, hereinafter referred to as "the
Non-Proliferation Treaty";
 ---pagebreak--- Whereas the Community, its Member States, and the United States of America are committed
to ensuring that the research, development and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes
are carried out in a manner consistent with the objectives of that Treaty;
Whereas nuclear safeguards are applied in the Community pursuant to the Treaty establishing
the European Atomic Energy Community;
Whereas the Community, its Member States and the United States of America reaffirm their
support of the International Atomic Energy Agency, hereinafter referred to as "the IAEA",
and of its safeguards system;
Whereas the Community, its Member States and the United States of America are strongly
committed to strengthening the international nuclear non-proliferation and related safeguards
regimes;
Whereas the Community, its Member States and the United States of America are strongly
committed to adequate physical protection of nuclear material and are Parties to the
International Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material;
Whereas it is desirable to facilitate, as appropriate, trade, exchanges and co-operation
activities at an industrial and commercial scale, including peaceful international co-operation
with third Parties, in accordance with Article IV of the Non-Proliferation Treaty;
Whereas it is also desirable to set up a framework for exchanges of information and for
consultations between the Parties on nuclear matters of common interest;
Whereas co-operation should extend to nuclear research and development on nuclear safety
and to regulatory and operational aspects of radiological protection;
Whereas co-operation relating to nuclear fission research and development in such fields as
safety, radiological protection, health and the environment, and safeguards may be subject to
specific agreements between the Community and the United States of America;
Whereas the Community and the United States of America contribute to international co-
operation in the field of controlled thermonuclear fusion and, in particular, to the activities
of the international thermonuclear experimental reactor (ITER);
Whereas it is appropriate that the nuclear co-operation Agreements concluded between, on the
one hand, the United States of America and, on the other hand, the Republic of Austria, the
Kingdom of Spain, the Portuguese Republic, the Kingdom of Sweden and the Republic of
Finland before their accession to the European Community be terminated upon the entry into
force of the present Agreement;
Whereas likewise the United States of America is prepared to terminate any nuclear co-
operation agreement it may have with third states acceding to the Community,
HAVE AGREED AS FOLLOWS:
                                              1 O
 ---pagebreak---                                            Article 1
                               SCOPE OF CO-OPERATION
1.     The Parties may co-operate in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy in the following
areas:
       A)     Nuclear fission research and development on such terms as may be agreed
              between the Parties;
       B)     Nuclear safety matters of mutual interest and competence, as set out in Article
              2;
       C)     Facilitation of exchange and co-operation activities at an industrial or
              commercial scale between persons and undertakings;
       D)     Subj ect to the provisions of this Agreement, supply between the Parties of non-
              nuclear material, nuclear material and equipment and provision of nuclear fuel
              cycle services, whether for use by or for the benefit of the Parties or third
              countries;
       E)     Exchange of information on major international questions related to nuclear
              energy, such as promotion of development in the field of international nuclear
              safeguards and non-proliferation within areas of mutual interest and
              competence, including collaboration with the IAEA on safeguards matters and
              dn the interaction between nuclear energy and the environment;
       F)     Controlled thermonuclear fusion including multilateral projects;
       G)     Other areas of mutual interest.
2.     The co-operation referred to in this Article, as between the Parties, may also take place
between persons and undertakings established in the respective territories of the Parties.
                                            Article 2
       CO-OPERATION ON NUCLEAR RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
 1.    The Parties may co-operate in nuclear research and development including the
following activities, in so far as they are covered by the respective nuclear research and
development programmes of the Parties:
       a.     nuclear safety, including regulatory and operational aspects of radiological
              protection;
       b.     development of nuclear energy including, inter alia, research into new reactors,
              decommissioning of nuclear installations, radiological safety research into
                                               4s\
 ---pagebreak---                 waste management and disposal and interaction between nuclear energy and
                the environment;
         c.     nuclear safeguards;
         d.     research on controlled thermonuclear fusion including, inter -alia, bilateral
                activities and contributions towards multilateral projects such as the
                International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor (ITER).
2.       Co-operation pursuant to this Article may include, but is not limited to, training,
exchange of personnel, meetings, exchanges of samples, materials and instruments for
experimental purposes and a balanced participation in joint studies and projects.
3.       Information arising from the implementation of this article which, in the judgement
of the appropriate authorities of the Parties, should be placed in the public domain may be
so disseminated by them in a consolidated or other appropriate form, subject to the Guidelines
set out in Annex B.
                                              Article 3
                 INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL CO-OPERATION
In conformity with the provisions of Article IV of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Parties
undertake to facilitate the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and
technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. To this end, the Parties
will facilitate, as appropriate, commercial relations between persons and undertakings
involving nuclear co-operation.
Such co-operation may include, but is not limited to:
        investments;
        joint ventures;
        environmental aspects at industrial or commercial scale;
        trade in nuclear items, non-nuclear material and technical and specialised services as
        specified in Article 4;
        licensing arrangements between persons and undertakings in the territory of either
        Party.
                                               4 2L
 ---pagebreak---                                                   Article 4
                                          NUCLEAR TRADE
   1.      The Parties shall facilitate nuclear trade between themselves, in the mutual interests
   of .industry, utilities and consumers and also, where appropriate, trade between third countries
   and either Party of items obligated to the other Party.
   2.      Authorisations, including export and import licences as well as authorisations or
   consents to third parties, relating to trade, industrial operations or nuclear material movements
   on the territories of the Parties shall not be used to restrict trade. The relevant authority shall
   act upon applications for such authorisations as soon as possible after submission and without
   unreasonable expense. Appropriate administrative procedures shall be in place to ensure
   respect of this provision.
                                                  Article 5
                              ITEMS SUBJECT TO THE AGREEMENT
   1. Non- nuclear material, nuclear material and equipment transferred between the Parties or
   their respective persons or undertakings, whether directly or through a third country, shall
   become subject to this Agreement upon their entry into the territorial jurisdiction of the
   receiving Party, provided that the supplying Party has notified the receiving Party in writing
   of the intended transfer and the receiving Party has acknowledged in writing the receipt of
   this notification.
   2. Non-nuclear material, nuclear material and equipment referred to in this Article shall
   remain subject to the provisions of this Agreement until it has been determined, in-accordance
   with the procedures set out in the Administrative Arrangement:
           that such items have been retransferred beyond the jurisdiction of the receiving Party;
           that nuclear material or non-nuclear material are no longer usable for any nuclear
           activity relevant from the point of view of international safeguards or have become
           practically irrecoverable;
           or that equipment is no longer usable for nuclear purposes.
                                                  Article 6
                                             SAFEGUARDS
   1.      Safeguards required under this Agreement shall be those applied by the Community
   pursuant to the Euratom Treaty and by the IAEA pursuant to the following safeguards
   agreements, as relevant, as they may be revised and replaced so long as coverage as required
   by the Non-Proliferation Treaty is provided for:
                                                   /)3
3)
 ---pagebreak---         (a)      the agreement between the Community, its non-nuclear weapon Member States
                 and the IAEA., which entered into force on 21.2.1977;
        (b)      the agreement between the Community, the United Kingdom of Great Britain
                 and Northern Ireland and the IAEA., which entered into force on 14.08.78;
        (c)      the agreement between the Community, France and the IAEA, which entered
                 into force on 12.9.1981;
        (d)      the agreement between the United States of America and the IAEA, which
                 entered into force on 9.12.1980;
2.      (A)      Nuclear material transferred to the Community pursuant to this Agreement, and
                 special fissionable material used in or produced through the use of any non-
                 nuclear material, nuclear material or equipment, so transferred, shall be subject
                 to the relevant agreements referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article.
        (B)      Nuclear material transferred to the United States pursuant to this Agreement,
                 and special fissionable material used in or produced through the use of any
                 non-nuclear material, nuclear material or equipment, so transferred, shall be
                 subject to the agreement referred to in paragraph 1(d) of this Article.
3.      In the event that any of the IAEA safeguards agreements referred to in paragraph
1(a), (b) or (c) are not being applied,
        (a)      the Community shall enter into an agreement or agreements with the IAEA for
        the application of safeguards which provide for effectiveness and coverage equivalent
        to that provided by the safeguards agreements required by paragraphs 1(a), (b) and (c)
        or, if that is not possible,
        (b)      the Community shall give the United States of America an assurance that
        safeguards are being applied by the Community which provide for effectiveness and
        coverage equivalent to that provided by the safeguards agreements required by
        paragraph 1(a), (b) and (c). In the fulfillment of obligations arising from these
        paragraphs, the United States of America hereby recognizes the unique role and
        importance of the Euratom safeguards system and of its application in the Community
        pursuant to the Euratom Treaty. In this context, the United States of America further
        takes note that the IAEA, pursuant to the safeguards agreements concluded with the
        Community and its Member States as well as in subsequent implementing
        arrangements shall take due account, inter alia, of the effectiveness of the
        Community's system of safeguards enabling the IAEA to deploy an inspection effort
        less than that applied under other safeguards agreements in which there are
        comparable nuclear facilities producing, processing, using or storing safeguarded
        nuclear material where a regional safeguards system does not exist.
        (c)      In the event that conditions arise which do not permit application of such
        safeguards by the Community, the Parties shall immediately establish safeguards
        arrangements for the application of safeguards which provide for effectiveness and
                                               4S
 ---pagebreak---         coverage equivalent to that provided by the safeguards agreements required by
        paragraphs 1 (a), (b) and (c) of this Article.
4.      In the event that the IAEA, safeguards Agreement referred to in paragraph 1(d) of this
Article, is not being applied,
        (a)     the United States of America shall enter into an agreement or agreements with
                the IAEA for the application of safeguards which provide for effectiveness and
                coverage equivalent to that provided by the safeguards agreement required by
                paragraph 1(d) of this Article; or, if that is not possible,
        (b)     the Parties shall immediately establish safeguards arrangements for the
                application of safeguards which provide for effectiveness and coverage
                equivalent to that provided by the safeguards agreement required by paragraph
                1(d) of this Article.
                                            Article 7
                                       PEACEFUL USE
1.      Co-operation under this Agreement shall be carried out for peaceful purposes.
2.      Non-nuclear material, nuclear material and equipment transferred pursuant to this
Agreement and special fissionable material used in or produced through the use of such items
shall not be used for any nuclear explosive device, for research on or development of any
nuclear explosive device or for any military purpose.
                                            Article 8
                          NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE ACTTVITIES
1.      The nuclear fuel cycle activities carried out pursuant to this Agreement include :
        (A)     Within the territorial jurisdiction of either Party, enrichment up to twenty
        percent in the isotope 235, of uranium transferred pursuant to this Agreement, as well
        as of uranium used in or produced through the use of equipment so transferred.
        Enrichment of such uranium to more than twenty percent in the isotope 235 and
        reenrichment of such uranium already enriched to more than twenty percent in the
        isotope 235 may be carried out according to conditions agreed upon in writing which
        shall be the subject of consultations between the Parties within 40 days of the receipt
        of a request from either Party.
        (B)     Irradiation within the territorial jurisdiction of either Party of plutonium,
        uranium-233, high enriched uranium and irradiated nuclear material transferred
        pursuant to this Agreement or used in or produced through the use of non-nuclear
        material, nuclear material or equipment so transferred;
                                              Af
 ---pagebreak--- (C)      Retransfer to third countries according to procedures set out in the Agreed
Minute of:
(i)      low enriched uranium, non-nuclear material, equipment and source material
        transferred pursuant to this Agreement or of low enriched uranium produced
        through the use of nuclear material or equipment transferred pursuant to this
         Agreement, for nuclear fuel cycle activities other than the production of HEU;
(ii)     irradiated nuclear material transferred pursuant to this Agreement or irradiated
         nuclear material used in or produced through the use of non-nuclear material,
        nuclear material or equipment transferred pursuant to this Agreement, for
         storage or disposal not involving reprocessing;
(iii)   other nuclear material transferred pursuant to this Agreement and other special
        fissionable material produced through the use of non-nuclear material, nuclear
         material or equipment transferred pursuant to this Agreement, for other fuel
         cycle activities including those specified in paragraphs 2 and 3 of this Article.
(D)     Post-irradiation examination involving chemical dissolution or separation of
irradiated nuclear material transferred pursuant to this Agreement or irradiated nuclear
material used in or produced through the use of non-nuclear material, nuclear material
or equipment so transferred.
The following nuclear fuel cycle activities may be carried out pursuant to this
Agreement within the territorial jurisdiction of either Party in facilities forming part
of the delineated peaceful nuclear programs described in Annex A:
A)        Reprocessing of nuclear material transferred pursuant to this Agreement and
nuclear material used in or produced through the use of non-nuclear material, nuclear
material or equipment so transferred;
B)      Alteration in form or content of plutonium, uranium 233 and high enriched
uranium transferred pursuant to this Agreement or used in or produced through the
use of non-nuclear material, nuclear material or equipment so transferred;
The following nuclear materials:
(i) plutonium, uranium-233 and high enriched uranium, if not contained in irradiated
nuclear fuel, transferred pursuant to this Agreement;
(ii) plutonium, uranium-233 and high enriched uranium recovered from nuclear
material transferred pursuant to this Agreement;
(iii) plutonium, uranium-233 and high enriched uranium recovered from nuclear
material used in equipment transferred pursuant to this Agreement
may be stored in facilities that are at all times subject, as a minimum, to the levels of
physical protection that are set out in Annex C to IAEA document INFCIRC 254/Rev.
                                       4£
 ---pagebreak---         1/Part 1 (Guidelines for nuclear transfers) as it may be revised and accepted by the
        Parties and the Member States of the Community.
        Each Party shall record its facilities on a list, made available to the other Party. A
        Party's list shall be held confidential if that Party so requests. Either Party may make
        changes to its list by notifying the other Party in writing and receiving a written
        acknowledgement. Such acknowledgement shall be given no later than thirty days after
        the receipt of the notification and shall be limited to a statement that the notification
        has been received.
        If there are grounds to believe that the provisions of this sub-Article are not being
        fully complied with, immediate consultations in accordance with the provisions of
        Article 12.2 of this Agreement may be called for.
        The Parties shall ensure by means of such consultations that necessary corrective
        measures are taken immediately. Such measures shall be sufficient to restore the levels
        of physical protection referred to above at the facility in question. If this proves not
        to be feasible, the nuclear material in question shall be transferred for storage at
        another appropriate, listed facility.
                                             Article 9
                     INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS EXCHANGES
The Parties shall establish expeditious procedures to be applied when nuclear material is to
be made subject to this Agreement or removed from the coverage of this Agreement. These
procedures shall include provisions on international exchanges of obligations, which will be
set out in the Administrative Arrangement, provided for in paragraph 1 of Article 16.
                                            Article 10
                        IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AGREEMENT
1.      The terms of this Agreement shall be implemented in good faith and with due regard
to the legitimate commercial interests, whether international or domestic, of either Party.
2.      This Agreement shall be implemented in a manner designed :
        (a)      to avoid hampering or delaying the nuclear activities in the territory of either
                Party;
        (b)      to avoid interference in such activities;             v_
        (c)      to be consistent with prudent management practices required for the economic
                 and safe conduct of such activities;
                                           -1T-
 ---pagebreak---         (d)     to take full account of the long-term requirements of the nuclear energy
                programmes in place in the Community and in the U.S.A.
3.      The provisions of this Agreement shall not be used for the purpose of :
        (a)     securing unfair commercial or industrial advantages, or of restricting trade to
                the disadvantage of persons and undertakings of either Party or hampering
                their commercial or industrial interests, whether international or domestic;
        (b)     interfering with the nuclear policy or programmes of either Party nor for
                hindering the promotion of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.
        (c)     impeding the free movement of nuclear material, non-nuclear material and
                equipment within the territory of the Community.
4.      In exercising the rights arising from other nuclear co-operation agreements it might
have concluded with third parties, each Party to this agreement will pay due regard to the
legitimate commercial interests of the other Party; in case of difficulty either Party may call
for consultations which shall take place within 40 days, in accordance with the provisions of
Article 12.
                                            Article 11
                                 PHYSICAL PROTECTION
1.      Nuclear material transferred pursuant to this Agreement and special fissionable
material used in or produced through the use of non-nuclear material, nuclear material or
equipment so transfened shall be subject to adequate measures of physical protection.
2.      Such physical protection measures shall be at levels which shall satisfy the criteria set
out in Annex C to IAEA document INFCIRC 254/Revl/Parti (Guidelines for nuclear
transfers) as it may be revised and accepted by the Parties and the Member States of the
Community. As a supplement to this document, the Member States of the Community, the
Commission of the European Communities (as appropriate), and the United States of America
will refer, when applying these measures, to the recommendations of IAEA document
INFCIRC 225/Rev.3 on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, as it may be revised and
accepted by the Parties and the Member States of the Community.
3.      International transport of nuclear material subject to this Agreement shall be subject
to the provisions of the International Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear
Material (INFCIRC 274/Rev.l), as it may be revised and accepted by the Parties and the
Member States of the Community.
                                             4%
 ---pagebreak---                                             Article 12
                          CONSULTATION AND ARBITRATION
1.      The Parties shall consult at the request of either of them to promote co-operation under
this Agreement and to ensure its effective implementation. A Joint Committee shall be
established for these purposes. This Committee will also consult on nuclear questions of
mutual interest and any other significant matters relating to the co-operation envisaged by this
Agreement. A Joint Technical Working Group reporting to the Joint Committee will be set
up to ensure the fulfilment of the requirements of the Administrative Arrangement referred
to in Article 16.
2.      The Parties shall consult, at the request of either of them, on any question arising out
of the interpretation or application of this Agreement.
3.      Any dispute arising out of the interpretation or application of this Agreement shall be
settled by negotiation, mediation, conciliation or other similar procedure or, if both Parties
agree, by submission to an arbitral tribunal which shall be composed of three arbitrators
appointed in accordance with the provisions of this paragraph. Each Party shall designate one
arbitrator and the two arbitrators so designated shall elect a third, a national of a country other
than the United States or a Member State of the Community, who shall be the Chairman. If,
within thirty days of the request for arbitration, a Party has not designated an arbitrator, the
other Party may request the President of the International Court of Justice to appoint an
arbitrator. The same procedure shall apply if, within thirty days of the designation or
appointment of the second arbitrator, the third arbitrator has not been elected, provided that
the third arbitrator so appointed shall not be a national of the United States or of a Member
State of the Community. All decisions shall require the concurrence of two arbitrators. The
arbitral procedure shall be fixed by the tribunal. The decisions of the tribunal shall be
binding on the Parties.
                                            Article 13
                            SUSPENSION AND TERMINATION
                                     A. CIRCUMSTANCES
 1.     If either Party or a Member State of the Community at any time following the entry
into force of this Agreement:
        (a)     materially acts in violation of the fundamental provisions of Articles 4, 5, 6,
                7, 10 or 11 of the Agreement or contravenes a decision of the arbitral tribunal
                refened to in Article 12 of this Agreement, or
        (b)     takes action of any kind which results in a material violation of its obligations
                under this Agreement, including prevention of nuclear trade envisaged under
                this Agreement,
                                              h 9
 ---pagebreak--- the other Party shall have the right to cease further co-operation under this Agreement or to
suspend or terminate, in whole or in part, this Agreement.
2.       If either Party or a Member State of the Community at any time following entry into
force of this Agreement terminates or abrogates a safeguards agreement with the Agency and
the safeguards agreement so terminated or abrogated has not been replaced by an equivalent
safeguards agreement when appropriate and relevant, the other Party shall have the right to
require the return in whole or in part of non-nuclear material, nuclear material or equipment
transferred pursuant to this Agreement and special fissionable material produced through the
use of such items.
3.       If the Community or a non-nuclear weapon State member of the Community detonates
a nuclear explosive device, the Government of the United States of America shall have the
right specified in paragraph 2 of this Article.
4.       If a nuclear-weapon-State member of the Community detonates a nuclear explosive
device using any item subject to this Agreement, the United States shall have the right
specified in paragraph 2 of this Article.
5.       If the United States of America detonates a nuclear explosive device using any item
subject to this Agreement, the Community shall hâve therightspecified in paragraph 2 of this
Article.
                                   B. IMPLEMENTATION
6.      Before either Party decides to take action pursuant to paragraphs 1 to 5 above, the
Parties shall hold consultations for the purpose of taking corrective measures and shall
carefully consider the effects of such action, taking into account the need to make such other
appropriate arrangements as may be required and, in particular, to ensure security and
continuity of supply and adequate time for replacement and further to honour commitments
to third countries and their industrial entities.
7.      Before taking action under this Article, the Parties shall consider whether the facts
triggering.such steps were caused deliberately.
8.      Action under this Article shall only be taken if the other Party fails to take corrective
measures within an appropriate period of time following consultations.
9.      If either Party exercises its right, pursuant to paragraphs 2 to 5 of this Article, to
require the return of any items, it shall, prior to the removal from the territory or from the
control of the other Party, compensate promptly that Party for the fair market value thereof
and for the costs incurred as a consequence of such removal. If the return of nuclear items
is to be required, the Parties shall determine jointly the relevant quantity of nuclear items,
taking account of the circumstances involved. The Parties shall further satisfy themselves that
full safety, radiological and physical protection measures, in accordance with their existing
obligations, are taken in relation to the return of the items, that no unreasonable risks are
incurred and that the return of items takes place in a manner consistent with all the relevant
laws and regulations of the Parties.
                                                2o
 ---pagebreak---                                                Article 14
                                 DURATION AND AMENDMENT
   1.      This Agreement shall enter into force on the date on which the Parties exchange
   diplomatic notes informing each other that their respective internal procedures necessary for
   its entry into force have been completed.
   2.      This Agreement shall remain in force for a period of thirty years and shall continue
   in force thereafter for additional periods of five years each. Either Party may, by giving six
   months' written notice to the other Party, terminate this Agreement at the end of the initial
   thirty year period or at the end of any subsequent five year period.
   3.      Notwithstanding the termination or suspension of this Agreement, the rights and
   obligations pursuant to Articles 6, 7, 8.1.(C) and 11 and to paragraphs 2, 3, 4, 5, 8, 9, 10, 11
   and 12 of the Agreed Minute shall continue in effect.
   4.      If a Party gives to the other Party the written notice provided for in paragraph 2, or
   if a Party suspends or terminates this Agreement pursuant to Article 13.1, the Parties shall
   hold consultations as soon as possible but not later than one month afterwards, for the purpose
   of deciding jointly whether, in addition to those referred to in paragraph 3 of this Article,
   further rights and obligations arising out of this Agreement, and in particular out of Article
   8.1 (A), 8.1.(B), 8.1.(D), 8.2. and 8.3. and the Agreed Minute relating thereto, shall continue
   in effect.
   5. If the Parties are unable to reach a joint decision pursuant to paragraph 4,
           a.      quantities of nuclear material equivalent to the inventory described in Article
                   20.1., and items of equipment described in Article 20.2., shall continue to be
                   subject to the provisions of Articles 8.1.(A), 8.1.(B), 8.1.(D), 8.2., 8.3. and
                   Article 13 and their Agreed Minute but only to the extent covered by the
                   Agreements referred to in Article 19.
           b.      The question whether further rights and obligations, in addition to those
                   referred to in paragraph 3 and subparagraph (a) of this paragraph of this
                   Article, shall continue in effect in relation to nuclear material and equipment
                   not covered by sub-paragraph (a), and to all non-nuclear material, shall be
                   submitted to an arbitral tribunal composed pursuant to Article 12.3. The
                   tribunal shall make its decision on the basis of the application of the rules and
                   principles of international law, and in particular the Vienna Convention on the
                   Law of Treaties.
           c.      If the arbitral tribunal decides that rights and obligations other than those
                   referred to in paragraph 3 of this Article shall not continue in effect with
                   respect to non-nuclear material, nuclear material and equipment subject to
                   arbitration pursuant to subparagraph (b), either Party shall have the right to
                   require, subject to the procedures provided for in Article 13.9, the return of
                                                  2-7
=U
 ---pagebreak---                 such non-nuclear material, nuclear material and equipment in the territory of
                the other Party on the day of termination of this Agreement.
         d.     Until the Parties reach a joint decision or the arbitral tribunal renders its
                decision, this Agreement will remain in force notwithstanding the written
                notice pursuant to para. 2.
6.        The Parties may consult, at the request of either, on possible amendments to this
Agreement, particularly to take account of international developments in the field of nuclear
safeguards. This Agreement may be amended if the Parties so agree. Any amendment shall
enter into force on the date on which the Parties exchange diplomatic notes informing each
other that their respective internal procedures necessary for its entry into force have been
completed.
                                            Article 15
                                MULTIPLE OBLIGATIONS
1.      The Parties shall endeavour to avoid any difficulties arising out of the overlapping of
obligations on nuclear material as a result of the application of several agreements concerning
international trade.
2.      The Parties shall promote multilateral consultations with a view to achieving mutually
satisfactory solutions at international level.
                                            Article 16
                          ADMINISTRATIVE ARRANGEMENT
1.      The appropriate authorities of the Parties shall establish an Administrative
Arrangement in order to provide for the effective implementation of the provisions of this
Agreement.
2       The principles of fungibility, equivalence and proportionality shall apply to nuclear
material subject to the Agreement and the detailed provisions thereof will be set out in the
Administrative Arrangement.
3.      An Administrative Arrangement established pursuant to this Article may be amended
by written agreement between the appropriate authorities of the Parties.
                                               Ih
 ---pagebreak---                                             Article 17
                               INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
1.      The Parties shall apply international rules they have both formally accepted governing
the treatment of intellectual property and technology transfers to intellectual property created
or transferred and technology transferred pursuant to this Agreement.
2.      Annex (B) shall apply to intellectual property created or transfened and technology
transferred pursuant to this Agreement.
3.      The Parties shall ensure that individual agreements they enter into pursuant to Annex
B are consistent with this Agreement and with any additional rules concerning treatment of
sensitive or confidential information in the nuclear field that may be agreed by the Parties.
                                            Article 18
                                    STATUS OF ANNEXES
The Annexes form an integral part of this Agreement and, unless expressly provided
otherwise, a reference to this Agreement includes its Annexes.
                                            Article 19
                     TERMINATION OF EXISTING AGREEMENTS
 1.      The Agreement between the European Atomic Energy Community and the
 Government of the United States of America that entered into force on 27 August 1958 and
 the Additional Agreement for Co-operation that entered into force on 25 July 1960, as
 subsequently amended, shall be terminated upon the entry into force of this Agreement.
 2.      The bilateral nuclear co-operation agreements that the United States of America has
 concluded with the Republic of Austria, on 11 July 1969, the Kingdom of Spain, on 20 March
 1974, the Portuguese Republic, on 16 May 1974, the Kingdom of Sweden, on 19 December
 1983, and the Republic of Finland, on 2 May 1985, shall be terminated upon the entry into
 force of this Agreement. The rights and obligations with respect to nuclear supply arising out
 of such agreements shall be replaced by those of this Agreement.
 3.      The rights and obligations with respect to nuclear supply arising out of a nuclear co-
 operation agreement between the United States of America and any third State that accedes
 to the Community after the entry into force of this Agreement shall be replaced by those of
 this Agreement upon accession by that State to the Community. The rights and obligations
 with respect to other areas of nuclear co-operation shall be the subject of negotiations between
 the Community, the United States of America and the third state concerned, in accordance
 with the provisions of Article 106 of the Euratom Treaty.
                                               2-3
 ---pagebreak--- the Community, the United States of America and the third state concerned, in accordance
with the provisions of Article 106 of the Euratom Treaty.
                                           Article 20
                                  INITIAL INVENTORIES
 1.     The provisions of this Agreement shall apply to the inventory of nuclear material
formerly subject to the agreements referred to in Article 19 from the date such agreements
are terminated pursuant to the provisions of that Article.
2.       The provisions of this Agreement shall apply to equipment and non-nuclear material
transferred pursuant to the agreements referred to in Article 19 only to the extent covered by
those agreements.
3.       The inventories of nuclear material, equipment and non-nuclear material subject to the
agreements referred to in Article 19 shall be approved by the appropriate authorities of the
Parties.
                                           Article 21
                                         DEFINITIONS
For the purposes of this Agreement:
 1.      "Parties" means the Government of the United States of America and the European
Atomic Energy Community.
2.       a)     "Community" means both:
                I.     the legal person created by the Treaty establishing the European
                       Atomic Energy Community (Euratom), Party to this Agreement;
                II.    the territories to which the Euratom Treaty applies;
         b)     "within the Community" means within the territories to which the Euratom
                Treaty applies;
         c)     "beyond the Community" has the corresponding meaning.
3.       "Appropriate authority" means, in the case of the United States of America, the
Department of State; in the case of the Community, the European Commission, or such other
authority as the Party concerned may at any time notify to the other Party;
4.       "Equipment" means any reactor as a complete unit, other than one designed or used
primarily for the formation of plutonium or uranium-233 or any other item so designated
jointly by the appropriate authorities of the Parties.
                                               2y
 ---pagebreak--- 5.       "Non-nuclear material" means heavy water, or any other material suitable for use
in a reactor to slow down high velocity neutrons and increase the likelihood of further
fission, as may be jointly designated by the appropriate authorities of the Parties;
6.       "Nuclear material" means (1) source material and (2) special fissionable material.
"Source material" means uranium containing the mixture of isotopes occurring in nature;
uranium depleted in the isotope 235; thorium; any of the foregoing in the form of metal,
alloy, chemical compound, or concentrate; any other material containing one or more of the
foregoing in such concentration as the Board of Governors of the IAEA shall from time to
time determine; and such other materials as the Board of Governors of the Agency may
determine or as may be agreed by the appropriate authorities of both Parties. "Special
fissionable material" means plutonium, uranium-233, uranium enriched in the isotope 233
or 235, any substance containing one or more of the foregoing, and such other substances as
the Board of Governors of the Agency may determine or as may be agreed by the appropriate
authorities of both Parties. "Special fissionable material" does not include "source material".
Any determination by the Board of Governors of the Agency under Article XX of that
Agency's Statute or otherwise that amends the list of materials considered to be "source
material" or "special fissionable material" shall only have effect under this Agreement when
both Parties to this Agreement have informed each other in writing that they accept such
amendment.
7.       "High enriched uranium" means uranium enriched to more than twenty percent in
the isotope 235 (and/or uranium 233); "low enriched uranium" means uranium enriched to
twenty percent or less in the isotope 235 (and/or uranium 233);
8.       The following definitions relate to Article 17 and Annex B:
         - "Cooperative activity" means any joint activity carried on under this Agreement,
         and includes joint research.
         - "Information" means scientific or technical data, results or methods of research and
         development stemming from the joint research and any other information deemed
         necessary to be provided or exchanged under this Agreement or research pursuant
         thereto.
         - "Joint research" means research undertaken jointly by the Parties directly or on
         their behalf by a person, legal entity, research institute or other body designated by
         a Party or research undertaken jointly by participants.
         - "Participant" means a person, legal entity, research institute or other body
         participating in joint research but not on behalf of one of the Parties.
9.       "Persons and undertakings" means any natural person who, and any undertaking or
institution, whatever its public or private legal status, which pursues all or any of its activities
within the Community or in the territory of the United States of America within the scope of
this Agreement.
                                               zs
 ---pagebreak---  10.     "Alteration in form or content" means conversion of plutonium, high enriched
uranium or uranium 233 or fabrication of fuel containing plutonium, high enriched uranium
or uranium 233; it does not include post irradiation examination involving chemical
dissolution or separation, dissasembly or reassembly of fuel assemblies, irradiation,
reprocessing or enrichment.
11.     "Storage facility" means any facility (or any part of a facility so designated by
inclusion in one of the lists referred to in Article 8.3) the primary purpose and function of
which is the separate storage of sensitive nuclear material as described in paragraphs (i), (ii)
and (iii) of Article 8.3 under adequate conditions of control, safety and safeguards as well as
of physical protection as described in Article 11.2.
In witness whereof the undersigned, being duly authorized thereto by the Government of the
United States and the European Atomic Energy Community respectively, have signed this
Agreement.
Done at Brussels on                    1995 and at Washington on                      1995, in
duplicate.
For the European Atomic Energy Community,                    For the United States of America
                                              2£
 ---pagebreak---                                        AGREED MINUTE
During the negotiation of the Agreement for Co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear
energy between the United States of America and the Community signed today, the following
understandings, which shall be an integral part of the Agreement, were reached.
                                  A. PEACEFUL PURPOSES
1.      The Parties agree that, with reference to Article 7, "peaceful purposes" includes
provision of power for a military base drawn from any power network or production of
radioisotopes to be used for medical purposes in a military hospital.
                          B. NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE ACTIVITIES
2.      Upon entry into force of this Agreement, the Parties shall exchange lists of third
countries to which retransfers pursuant to Article 8.1.(C)(i) may be made by the other Party.
Eligibility for continued inclusion on such lists shall be based, as a minimum, upon
satisfaction of the fojlowing criteria :
        third countries must have made effective non-proliferation commitments, normally by
        being party to, and in full respect of their obligations under the Non-Proliferation
        Treaty or the Treaty of Tlatelolco and by being in compliance with the conditions of
        INFCIRC 254/Rev.l/Partl, and
        in case of retransfer of items obligated to the United States from the territory of the
        Member States of the Community, third countries must be party to a nuclear co-
        operation agreement with the United States.
3.      Should retransfers pursuant to Article 8.1.(C)(ii) and (iii) be requested in the future
by a Party, a list of third countries to which such retransfers may be made, shall be provided
by the other Party. In this connection, the Parties shall take into account the following
additional criteria:
        consistency of the proposed action with the guidelines contained in IAEA document
        INFCIRC 225/Rev.3 and with the provisions of IAEA document INFCIRC 274/Rev. 1,
        as they may be revised and accepted by the Parties and the Member States;
        the nature and content of the peaceful nuclear programs of the third country in
        question;
        the potential proliferation and security implications of the transfer for either Party or
        a Member State of the Community.
                                              ^
 ---pagebreak--- 4.       Either Party may add eligible third countries to its lists at any time. Either Party may
delete third countries from its lists following consultations with the other Party. Neither Party
shall delete third countries from its lists for the purpose of obtaining commercial advantage
or of delaying, hampering or hindering the peaceful nuclear programmes of the other Party
or its peaceful nuclear co-operation with third countries. The Parties will co-operate in efforts
to obtain as soon as possible on a generic basis a confirmation from the third countries on the
lists that any retransferred items will be subject to any agreement for co-operation in force
between the receiving country and the non-retransferring Party. The receipt of such
confirmation shall not constitute a pre-condition for the addition of a third country to the
lists.
5.       The Parties agree that, notwithstanding the provisions of paragraphs 2, 3 and 4, the
provisions set out in the Exchange of Notes dated 18 July 1988 between the Commission of
the European Communities and the United States Mission to the European Communities
concerning the Agreement for Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy between
the United States of America and Japan shall remain in effect as long as this Agreement
remains in force. The Parties confirm that the above-mentioned provisions shall apply, inter
alia, to plutonium contained in mixed oxide fuel. The consents granted therein may be
suspended only if an event of the same or greater degree of seriousness as those referred to
in paragraph 8 arises which directly threatens either the retransfer or the activities involving
the retransferred plutonium in Japan.
6.       With reference to paragraph 2 of Article 8 of the Agreement and notwithstanding
paragraph 6 of Article 14, either Party, acting through its appropriate authorities, may make
changes to the peaceful nuclear programmes it has delineated by notifying the other Party in
writing in accordance with the procedures set forth below and receiving a written
acknowledgement.
7.       Such acknowledgement shall be given no later than thirty days after the receipt of the
notification and shall be limited to a statement that the notification has been received.
Intended changes in delineated programmes shall receive the fullest possible consideration
during consultations under the Agreement, which may include discussions on safeguards.
(A)      For an addition of a facility within its territorial jurisdiction to the peaceful nuclear
programme delineated by the Community, the notification shall contain:
         (i)     the name, type and location of the facility and its existing or planned capacity;
         (ii)    a confirmation that the Euratom Safeguards Regulation 3227/76, as amended,
                 is fully applied;
         (iii)   for a facility to be under IAEA safeguards inspections pursuant to a safeguards
                 agreement referred to in paragraph 1 (a), (b) or (c) of Article 6, a confirmation
                 that relevant safeguards arrangements have been agreed upon with the IAEA
                 and that those arrangements will permit the IAEA to exercise fully its rights
                 pursuant to the aforementioned safeguards agreements, in the light of how
                 these agreements are implemented during the life of this Agreement and so as
                 to enable the IAEA to meet its objectives and inspection goal.
                                               2%
 ---pagebreak---        (iv)   such non-confidential information as is available to the Community on the
              IAEA safeguards approach and information on Euratom safeguards relevant to
              the facility;
       (v)     a confirmation that physical protection measures as required by Article 11 of
               this Agreement will be applied.
       (B)     For an addition of a facility within its territorial jurisdiction to the delineated
       peaceful nuclear programme of the United States, the notification shall contain:
               (i)     the name, type and location of the facility and its existing or planned
                       capacity;
               (ii)    for facilities licensed or certified by the United States Nuclear
                       Regulatory Commission, a confirmation that the Fundamental Nuclear
                       Material Control Plan, describing how the requirements of the U.S.
                       Code of Federal Regulations, Title 10, Part 74, as; amended, will be
                       met, has been approved for the facility; for United States Department
                       of Energy civil facilities, a confirmation that the facility is in
                       compliance with the requirements of the Department of Energy Order
                       5633.3B, "Control and Accountability of Nuclear Materials," and
                       associated guides, as amended;
                (iii)  for à facility to be under IAEA safeguards inspections pursuant to the
                       safeguards agreement referred to in paragraph 1 (d) of Article 6, a
                       confirmation that the relevant safeguards arrangements have been
                       agreed upon with the IAEA and that those arrangements Will permit the
                       IAEA to exercise fully its rights pursuant to the aforementioned
                       safeguards agreement, in the light of how this agreement is
                       implemented during the life of this Agreement and so as to enable the
                       IAEA to meet its objectives and inspection goal;
                (iv)    information on the basic features contained in the Fundamental Nuclear
                        Material Control Plan or the compliance with the Department of
                        Energy Order refened to above, and such non-confidential information
                        as is available to the United States on the IAEA safeguards approach;
                        and
                 (v)    a confirmation that physical protection measures as required by Article
                         11 of this Agreement will be applied.
(C)     Either Party may delete a facility from the peaceful nuclear programme it has
delineated, by. providing to the other Party a notification containing the facility name and
other relevant information available.
                                               -D
 ---pagebreak--- 8.  A.      The activities referred to in paragraph 2 of Article 8 of this Agreementmay
    proceed as long as those provisions continue in effect with respect to the peaceful
    nuclear programme delineated by a Party, unless the other Party considers, pursuant
   to the procedures set out below, that these activities should be suspended on the basis
   of objective evidence that their continuation would entail a serious threat to the
   security of either Party or of a Member State jof the Community, or a significant
   increase in the risk of a nuclear proliferation, resulting from a situation of the same
   or greater degree of seriousness as the following:
   a)      With regard to the Community :
   (i)      a non-nuclear-weapon State member of the Community detonates a nuclear
           weapon or any other nuclear explosive device;
   (ii)     a nuclear-weapon State member of the Community detonates a nuclear weapon
            or any other nuclear explosive device using any item subject to this
            Agreement;
   (iii)    a Member State of the Community or the Community, as relevant, materially
           violates, terminates, or declares itself not to be bound by, the Non-Proliferation
           Treaty or the relevant safeguards agreements referred to in Article 6.1, or the
           Guidelines applicable to the transfers of nuclear items laid down in document
           INFCIRC 254/Rev 1./Parti, as it may be revised and accepted by the Parties;
   (iv)    a Member State of the Community retransfers an item subject to this
           Agreement to a non-nuclear-weapon State which has not concluded a full-
           scope safeguards agreement with the IAEA;
   (v)     a Member State of the Community is subjected to measures taken by the
           Board of Governors of the IAEA, pursuant to Article 19 of the relevant
           safeguards Agreement referred to in Article 6.1.(a), (b) or (c);
   (vi)    acts of war or serious internal disturbances preventing the maintenance of law
           and order, or serious international tension constituting a threat of war, that
           threaten severely and directly the safeguarding or physical protection of such
           activities.
   (b)     With regard to the United States:
   (i)     the United States detonates a nuclear weapon or any other nuclear explosive
           device using any item subject to this Agreement;
   (ii)    the United States materially violates, terminates or declares itself not to be
           bound by, the Non-Proliferation Treaty or the relevant safeguards agreement
           referred to in Article 6.1.(d), or the Guidelines applicable to the transfers of
           nuclear items laid down in document INFCIRC 254/Rev. 1/Part 1, as it may be
           revised and accepted by the Parties;
                                          3o
 ---pagebreak---         (iii)   the United States retransfers an item subject to this Agreement to a non-
                nuclear-weapon state which has not concluded a full-scope safeguards
                agreement with the IAEA;
        (iv)    the United States is subjected to measures taken by the Board of Governors of
                the IAEA, pursuant to Article 19 of the safeguards agreement refened in
                Article 6.l.(d);
        (v)     acts of war or serious internal disturbances preventing the maintenance of law
                and order or serious international tension constituting a threat of war, that
                threaten severely and directly the safeguarding or physical protection of such
                activities.
        B.      The Party considering that such objective evidence may exist, shall consult
        with the other Party, at Cabinet level for the United States and at European
        Commission level for the Community, before Teaching any decision.
        C.      Any such decision that such objective evidence does exist, and that activities
        referred to in paragraph 2 of Article 8 should therefore be suspended, shall be taken
        only by the President of the United States or by the Council of the European Union,
        as the case may be, and shall be notified in writing to the other Party.
        D.      Any decision taken by a Party pursuant to this paragraph shall apply to the
        activities of the other Party referred to in Article 8, paragraph 2 of this Agreement,
        taken as a whole.
        E.       The Parties confirm that, as of the time of entry into force of this Agreement,
        there exists no objective evidence of any of the threats referred to above and that they
        do not foresee any such threats developing in the future.
9.      Actions of governments of third countries or events beyond the territorial jurisdiction
of either Party shall not be used as a basis for invoking the provisions of paragraph 8 with
respect to activities or facility operations within that Party's territorial jurisdiction unless, due
to such actions or events, those activities or facility operations would clearly result in a
significant increase in the risk of nuclear proliferation or in a serious threat to the security of
the Party invoking the provisions of paragraph 8.
10.     The Party invoking the provisions of paragraph 8 shall keep under constant review the
development of the situation which prompted the decision and shall withdraw its invocation
as soon as warranted.
11.     The provisions of paragraph 8 shall not be invoked due to differences over the nature
of the Parties' peaceful nuclear programmes or fuel cycle choices, or for the purpose of
obtaining commercial advantage, or of delaying, hampering or hindering the peaceful nuclear
programmes or activities of the other Party, or its peaceful nuclear co-operation with third
countries.
                                                O  1
 ---pagebreak---  12.     Any decision to invoke the provisions of paragraph 8 shall only be taken in the most
extreme circumstances of exceptional concern from a non-proliferation or security point of
view and shall be applied for the minimum period of time necessary to deal in a manner
acceptable to the Parties with the exceptional case.
 13.     Should the activities agreed upon in paragraph 2 of Article 8 of the Agreement be
suspended, as provided in paragraph 8, quantities of nuclear material equivalent to the
inventory described in Article 20.1 shall, at the option of the Party against which the
suspension is applied, be regarded during such suspension as subject to this Agreement but
only to the extent covered by the agreements referred to in Article 19.
                                   C. PROPORTIONALITY
 14.     For the purpose of implementing the provisions of Article 8 and paragraphs 2-5 of
Article 13 with respect to special fissionable material produced through the use of nuclear
material and/or non-nuclear material transferred pursuant to the Agreement, when such nuclear
material and/or non-nuclear material is used in equipment not so transferred, such provisions
shall be applied to that proportion of special fissionable material produced that represents the
ratio of transferred nuclear material and/or non-nuclear material used in the production of the
special fissionable material to the total amount of nuclear material and/or non-nuclear material
so used.
                               D. RESULTING OBLIGATIONS
15.       The obligations arising out of Articles 6, 7 and 11 in relation to special fissionable
material produced through the use of nuclear material subject to the Agreement in equipment
not transferred under the Agreement may be satisfied without specific tracking of that special
fissionable material. When such special fissionable material is subsequently used in equipment
not so transferred, that equipment shall, during such use, be operated for peaceful applications
only.
                           E. SUSPENSION AND TERMINATION
16.      Both sides regard it as extremely unlikely that actions would be taken by the
Community, its Member States or the United States of America which would cause the other
Party to invoke the rights specified in Article 13. Nonetheless this Article reflects the firm
conviction of both Parties that they would view with the utmost concern acts constituting a
material violation or breach of non-proliferation commitments by any country and that
appropriate actions such as those provided for in Article 13 would be taken by the
Community, its Member States or the United States of America in response to any material
violation of non-proliferation commitments.
17.      No violation may be considered as being material unless corresponding to the
definition of material violation or breach contained in the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties.
                                               3^
 ---pagebreak--- 18.     Additionally, a determination as to whether there has been a material violation of the
fundamental safeguards commitments contained in the safeguards agreements referred to in
Article 6.1. or in such other agreement as may amend or replace them, would only be made
by the President of the United States of America or the Council of the European Union, as
relevant. In making such a determination, a crucial factor will be whether the Board of
Governors of the Agency has made a finding of non-compliance.
                                             S3
 ---pagebreak---                                              ANNEX A (Art. 8)
             EURATOM DELINEATED PEACEFUL PROGRAM
REPROCESSING FACILITIES
CÔGEMA - ETABLISSEMENT DE LA HAGUE     LA HAGUE        FRANCE
COGEMA - USINE UP-1                    MARCOULE        FRANCE
BRITISH NUCLEAR FUELS pic              SELLAFIELD      UNITED
                                                       KINGDOM
AEA TECHNOLOGY                         DOUNREAY        UNITED
                                                       KINGDOM
ALTERATION IN FORM OR CONTENT FACILITIES
BELGONUCLEAIRE - USINE DE FABRICATION  MOL             BELGIUM
D'ELEMENTS PU
FBFC INTERNATIONAL - ASSEMBLAGE DES    DESSEL          BELGIUM
COMBUSTIBLES MOX
SIEMENS BRENNELEMENTEWERK -            HANAU           ŒRMANY
BETRIEBSTEIL MOX-VERARBEITUNG
CERCA/ETABLISSEMENT DE ROMANS          ROMANS          FRANCE
                                       SUR ISERE
SOCIETE INDUSTRIELLE DE COMBUSTIBLE    VEUREY          FRANCE
NUCLEAIRE
COGEMA - COMPLEXE DE FABRICATION       CADARACHE       FRANCE
DES COMBUSTIBLES
ETABLISSEMENT MELOX                    MARCOULE        FRANCE
AEA TECHNOLOGY - MTR FUEL              DOUNREAY        UNITED
                                                       KINGDOM
BRITISH NUCLEAR FUELS pic -            SELLAFIELD      UNITED
MOX FACILITY                                           KINGDOM
                               31
 ---pagebreak--- SEBNEJAD/TU5 7
4/26/93
                                             ANNEX A
                  U.S. DELINEATED PEACEFUL NUCLEAR PROGRAM
I. Facilities for reprocessing or alteration in form or
content of plutonium, uranium 233 and high enriched uranium in
an aggregate quantity exceeding one (1) effective kilogram.
                                A.     REPROCESSING FACILITIES
                                               None
            B.     F A C I L I T I E S FOR ALTERATION IN FORM OR CONTENT
                                          CONVERSION PLANTS
MU^WL&J&CUXXCW                          TYPE                  LICENSED CAPACITJC
Nuclear Fuel Services                   Uranium downblending  7,000 kgs U-235.
P.O. Box 337, MS123
Erwin, TN 37650
Radiochemi st re-                       Conversion            Less than 1000 kg
processing Pilot Plant                                        of HEU and more
Oak Ridge Nat'l Lab                                           than 100 kg of
P.O. Box X -                                                  U-233.
Oak Ridge, TN 37830
                2.      FUEL FABRICATION AND PROCESSING PLANTS
NAME a n d LOCATION                     T£PE                   LJ^Ej^ED_CAJÇACXCX
General Atomics                         Fuel fabrication for   >20% enr U, 100 kg
P . O . Box 8 1 6 0 8                   TRIGA research        U-235.
San Diego, CA          92138            reactors
II. Facilities for reprocessing or alteration in form or content
of plutonium, uranium 233 and high enriched uranium in an
aggregate quantity not to exceed one (1) effective kilogram do
not require specification.
                                           S^
 ---pagebreak---                                                                                     Annex B
                                  Intellectual Property Rights
Pursuant to Article 17 of this Agreement, rights to intellectual property created or furnished
under this Agreement shall be allocated as provided in this Annex.
I.     Application
       This annex is applicable to all cooperative activities undertaken pursuant to this
       Agreement, except as otherwise specifically agreed.
II.   Qwnership. Allocation and Exercise of Rights
      1. For purposes of this Agreement, "intellectual property" shall have the meaning
          found in Article 2 of the Convention establishing the World Intellectual Property
          Organisation, done at Stockholm, July 14, 1967.
      2. This Annex addresses the allocation of rights, interests and royalties between the
          Parties and participants. Each Party shall ensure that the other Party may obtain the
          rights to intellectual property allocated to it in accordance with this Annex. This
          Annex does not otherwise alter or prejudice the allocation between a Party and its
          nationals, which shall be determined by that Party's laws and practices.
      3. Termination or expiry of this Agreement shall not affect rights or obligations under
          this Annex.
     4.    a) In the case of cooperative activities between the Parties, intellectual property
           arising from joint research, i.e., cooperative research supported by both Parties,
           shall be treated in a Technology Management Plan according to the following
           principles :
                i.    The Parties shall notify each other within a reasonable time of any
           intellectual property rights arising under this Agreement (or relevant implementing
           arrangements).
                ii.   Unless otherwise agreed, rights and interests in intellectual property
           created during joint research shall be exploitable by either Party without territorial
           restriction.
                iii. Each Party shall seek protection for the intellectual property to which it
           obtains rights and interests under the Technology Management Plan in a timely
           fashion.
                                                       36
 ---pagebreak---               iv. Each Party shall have a non-exclusive, irrevocable, royalty-free license
        to use any intellectual property arising under the Agreement for research and
        development purposes only.
              v.    Visiting researchers shall receive intellectual property rights and royally
        shares earned by the host institutions from licensing of such intellectual properly
        rights under the policies of the host institutions.
        b) In all other cases, to the extent required by its laws and regulations, each Party
        shall require all its participants to enter into specific agreements concerning the
        implementation of joint research and the respective rights and obligations of the
        participants. With respect to intellectual property, the agreement will normally
        address, among other things, ownership, protection, user rights for research and
        development purposes, exploitation and dissemination, including arrangements for
        joint publication, the rights and obligations of visiting researchers and dispute
         settlement procedures. The agreement may also address foreground and
        background information, licensing and deliverables.
         While maintaining the conditions of competition in areas afTected by the
         Agreement, each Party shall endeavour to ensure that rights acquired pursuant to
        this Agreement and arrangements made under it are exercised in such a way as to
         encourage, in particular i) the use of information created, or otherwise made
         available, under the Agreement and its dissemination in so far as this is in
         accordance both with the conditions set out in this Agreement, the provisions of
         section IV hereof and any rules which may be in force under the Parties' domestic
         laws governing treatment of sensitive or confidential information in the nuclear
         field, and ii) the adoption and implementation of international standards.
HI. Copyright works
    Consistent with the terms of this Agreement, copyright belonging to the Parties or to
    participants shall be accorded treatment consistent with Agreement on Trade Related
    Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights administered by the World Trade Organization.
IV. Scientific Literary Works
    Subjea to the treatment provided for undisclosed information in section V, the
    following procedures shall apply:
    1. Each Party shall be entitled to a non-exclusive, irrevocable, royalty-free licence in
         all countries to translate, reproduce, and publicly distribute information contained
         in scientific and technical journals, articles, reports, books, or other media, directly
         arising from joint research pursuant to this Agreement by or on behalf of the
         Parties.
                                             39-
 ---pagebreak---        All publicly distributed copies of a cqpyrighted work prepared under this provision
       shall indicate the names of the authors of the work unless an author explicitly
       declines to be named. They shall also bear a clearly visible acknowledgment of the
       cooperative support of the Parties. '
V. Undisclosed Information
                                                  i.
   A. Documentary undisclosed informationon
   1. Each Party and the participants shaljl identify at the earliest possible moment the
       information that they wish to remain undisclosed in relation to this Agreement,
       taking account, inter alia, of the following criteria :
                                                i
       - the infonnation is secret in the sjense that it is not, as a body or in the precise
          configuration or assembly of its components, generally known or readily
          accessible by lawful means ;
                                              |
      - the infonnation has actual or potential commercial value by virtue of its secrecy;
                                             i
       - the information has been subjject to steps that were reasonable under the
          circumstances by the person lawfully in control, to maintain its secrecy;
                                           i
      The Parties or the participants may- in certain cases agree that, unless otherwise
      indicated, parts or all of the infonnation provided, exchanged or created in the
      course of joint research pursuant to this Agreement may not be disclosed.
   2. Each Party or participant. shall (ensure that undisclosed infonnation under the
      Agreement and its ensuant privileged nature is readily recognisable as such by the
      other Party or participant, for example by means of an appropriate marking or
      restrictive legend. This also applips to any reproduction of the said information, in
      whole or in pan.
      A Party or participant receiving undisclosed infonnation pursuant to such agreement
      shall respect the privileged natuife thereof. These limitations shall automatically
      terminate when this infonnation is disclosed by the owner without restriction.
   3. Undisclosed information communicated under this Agreement may be disseminated
      by the receiving Party or participlant to persons employed by the receiving Party or
      participant including its contractors, and other concerned departments of the Party
      or participant authorised for the;specific purposes of the joint research underway,
      provided that any undisclosed information so disseminated shall be protected to the
      extent provided by each Party's laws and regulations and shall be readily
      recognisable as such, as set out labove.
                                           2>K
 ---pagebreak---     B. Non-documentary undisclosed information
    Non-documentary undisclosed or other confidential or privileged information provided
    in seminars and other meetings arranged under the Agreement, or information arising
    from the attachment of staff, use of facilities, or joint projects, will be treated by the
    Parties or their designees according to the principles specified for documentary
    information in the Agreement, provided, however, that the recipient of such undisclosed
    or other confidential or privileged information has been made aware in writing of the
    confidential character of the information communicated not later than the time such a
    communication is made.
    C. Control
    Each Parry shall endeavour to ensure that undisclosed infonnation received by it under
    this Agreement shall be controlled as provided herein. If one of the Parties becomes
    aware that it will be, or may be reasonably expected to become, unable to meet the
    non-dissemination provisions of paragraphs A and B above, it shall immediately inform
    the other Party. The Parties shall thereafter consult to define an appropriate course of
    action.
VI. Dispute Settlement and New Types and Unforeseen Intellectual Property
    1. Disputes between the Parties concerning intellectual property shall be resolved in
         accordance with Article 12 of this Agreement.
    2.   In the event either Party or a participant concludes that a new type of intellectual
         property not covered in a TMP or agreement between participants may result from
         a cooperative activity undertaken pursuant to this Agreement, or if other unforeseen
         difficulties arise, the Parties shall enter into immediate discussions with the object
         of assuring that the protection, exploitation and dissemination of the intellectual
         property in question are adequately provided for in their respective territories.
                                                33
 ---pagebreak---                  E.C. Side Letter on Issue of Export Licences
Sir,
     I have the honour to refer to Article 4.2 of the Agreement for co-operation in the peaceful
uses of nuclear energy between the European Atomic Energy Community and the United
States of America.
    With regard to the implementation of that Article it is my understanding that we have
agreed on the following. Authorisations, including export and import licences as well as
authorisations or consents to third parties relating to trade, industrial operations or nuclear
material movements on the territories of the Parties should generally be issued within a period
of two months of a submission to the relevant authority. Nuclear trade between the European
Community and the U.S. should be facilitated and encouraged; it is recognised that reliability
of supply is essential and that industry in the Community and in the U.S.A. needs continuing
reassurance that deliveries can be made on time in order to plan for the efficient operation
of nuclear installations; it is further recognised that undue delays in the grant of export
licences and other relevant authorisations including import licences would be inconsistent with
the sound and efficient administration of this agreement.
    I wish to recall that, in accordance with Article 10 of the Agreement, the Parties will not
interfere in the nuclear programmes of each other; they recognise that the European Union,
its Member States and the U.S.A. are equally strongly committed to international nuclear
non-proliferation and safeguards regimes .
    In the negotiation of the Agreement the Parties took due note of the undertakings which
had been entered into in this field.
    The Parties express their full confidence in each other's compliance with such
undertakings. Accordingly the parties, in the grant of licences for the export of items pursuant
to this agreement, will refrain from requiring additional confirmation from the other party
and its relevant persons, undertakings or authorities about full compliance with these
commitments.
    In this context, it is further agreed that if the relevant authority considers that an
application cannot be processed within the target two months period, it shall immediately
provide a reasoned information to the submitting persons or undertakings. In the event of a
refusal to authorise an application or of a delay exceeding four months from the date of the
first application, the Party of the submitting persons or undertakings may call for urgent
consultations under Article 12 of the Agreement which shall take place at the earliest
opportunity, and in any case not later than 30 days after such request.
    I would appreciate your confirmation that you share the understandings recorded in this
letter.
         Please accept, Sir, etc.
                                                Ho
 ---pagebreak---                                      Note on Switzerland
        I have the honour to refer to the Agreement for co-operation in the peaceful uses of
nuclear energy between the European Atomic Energy Community and the United States of
America (hereinafter referred to as "the U.S./Euratom Agreement") and in particular to Article
8.1..C (iii) of that Agreement.
        I have the honour further to confirm that the United States is negotiating a new
peaceful nuclear co-operation agreement with the Swiss Federation, and that the United States
is prepared to offer long-term prior consent to the Swiss Federation for the transfer of
irradiated nuclear material subject to such an agreement into Euratom for reprocessing and
for storage of the recovered plutonium and its fabrication into mixed oxide fuel elements. The
United States is also prepared, in connection with a new peaceful nuclear co-operation
agreement with the Swiss Federation, to offer long-term, prior consent to Euratom to the
retransfer of Swiss plutonium, including such plutonium contained in MOX fuel elements,
subject to the U.S./Euratom Agreement to Switzerland for use in that country's -peaceful
nuclear programme.
                                               Ml
 ---pagebreak---                          SIDE LETTER ON SENSITIVE NUCLEAR
                     TECHNOLOGY AND REACTOR TECHNOLOGY
I have the honor to refer to the Agreement for cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear
energy between the European Atomic Energy Community and the United States of America,
 signed
 Sensitive Nuclear Technology
 The Government of the United States notes that the Agreement does not provide for the
 transfer of sensitive nuclear technology or any component or group of components which are
 essential to the operation of a complete uranium enrichment, nuclear fuel processing or heavy
water production facility. The Government of the United States confirms to the European
 Community that sensitive nuclear technology, defined as any information (including
 information incorporated in a production or utilization facility or important component part
thereof) which is not available to the public and which is important to the design,
 construction, fabrication, operation or maintenance of a uranium enrichment or nuclear fuel
reprocessing facility or a facility for the production of heavy water, but not including
Restricted Data(1), may be transferred to the Community outside an agreement for co-operation
pursuant to sections 127 and 128 of the U.S. Atomic Energy Act). The transfer of a
reprocessing, enrichment or heavy water facility or a major critical component thereof may
take place only pursuant to an agreement for co-operation.
Reactor Technology
The Government of the United States further confirms that nuclear power reactor technology
may be transferred to the Community outside an agreement for co-operation.
Non-nuclear material other than the one defined in Article 21.5 of the Agreement, e.g.
zirconium and its alloys and compounds may be transferred from the United States of
America to persons and undertakings in the Community outside an agreement for co-
operation.
The Government of the United States notes that Sensitive Technology and Reactor
Technology may be transferred from the European Community to the United States outside
an agreement for co-operation between them.
The Government of the United States avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the
European Commission the assurance of its highest consideration.
(I)
   Restricted Data" means any data concerning (1) design, manufacture, or utilization of
nuclear weapons, (2) the production of special fissionable material or (3) the use of special
fissionable material in the production of energy, but does not include data of a Party which
it has declassified or removed from the category of Restricted Data.
                                               U
 ---pagebreak---                 Proposed reply to side letter on Sensitive Nuclear Technology
                                  and Reactor Technology
The European Commission presents its compliments to the Mission of the United States of
America to the European Union and has the honour to ackowledge receipt of the letter, dated
             from the Mission concerning sensitive nuclear technology and reactor technology,
a copy of which is attached.
The Commission wishes to inform the Mission that it has taken due note of the contents of
this letter.
The Commission avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the Mission of the United States
of America to the European Union the assurance of its highest consideration.
                                                Vi
 ---pagebreak---                       Declaration-on Non-Proliferation Policy
1. On the occasion of the signature of the new Agreement for cooperation in the peaceful
   uses of nuclear energy between the European Atomic Energy Community and the
   United States of America, the United States of America and the European Union have
   decided to record the following understandings.
2. The United States and the European Union re-affirm their support for strengthening
   nuclear non-proliferation measures on a worldwide basis; their commitment
   increasingly to open peaceful nuclear trade and technology for states that abide by
   accepted international non-proliferation rules; and their opposition to controls that
   unfairly burden legitimate commerce and unduly restrain worldwide growth and
   opportunity in the peaceful nuclear area.
3. The United States and the European Union are committed to ensuring that research
   on, and development and use of, nuclear energy for peaceful purposes are carried out
   in a manner consistent with the objectives of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
   Nuclear Weapons ("the Treaty"), to which the United States of America and all
   Member States of the Community are parties. They affirm their intention to work
   closely together and with other interested states to urge universal adherence to the
   Treaty. They share the view that the Treaty is the cornerstone of the global non-
   proliferation regime, and that an effective non-proliferation regime is necessary to
   achieve a full realization of the peaceful benefits of nuclear energy and the objectives
   of Article IV of the Treaty. They further share the view that assurance of non-
   proliferation has an important bearing on assurance of supply and that recognition of
   this relationship has proved important in many deliberations on measures to facilitate
   international nuclear trade and co-operation.
4. The United States of America and the European Union consider that nuclear non-
   proliferation policy, as reflected in the Agreement, fully meets U.S. and E.U. present
   and foreseeable proliferation concerns.
5. Neither expects any policy changes or other circumstances to take place that would
   adversely affect the terms for co-operation established by the Agreement including,
   in particular, those terms relating to agreement for certain activities to be carried out
   on an assured, secure and uninterrupted basis over the life of the Agreement.
6. The United States and the European Union acknowledge that inclusion of reciprocal
   consent provisions in the Agreement does not reflect a lack of confidence in the
   nuclear non-proliferation credentials of either Party.
7. The United States furthermore confirms its readiness to engage in negotiations with
   Euratom pursuant to paragraph 6 of Article 14 concerning elimination of provisions
   contained in Article 8.2 of the Agreement, in so far as improvements in the global
   non-proliferation environment lead to changes in the U.S. position regarding consent.
                                            WV
 ---pagebreak--- 8.  The United States and the European Union fully support the International Atomic
    Energy Agency (IAEA) and its role in reducing the risk of proliferation.They
    recognize the IAEA's safeguards system as an essential element of the international
    non-proliferation regime. They have confidence in the IAEA safeguards system, while
    recognizing the need for the continuation of work on improvement of that system
    especially in countries of proliferation concern. They share the view that non-nuclear
    weapon states having nuclear facilities that are not under IAEA safeguards should put
    such facilities under IAEA safeguards, and that adherence to the Treaty is the best
    way to achieve this result.
9.  The United States and the European Union are prepared to continue to take such steps
    as are necessary to allow the IAEA to apply safeguards effectively and efficiently and
    to attain its inspection goals at nuclear facilities in their respective jurisdictions in
    accordance, respectively with the safeguards agreement between the Agency and the
    United States of America and the safeguards agreements between the Agency, the
    Community and the Member States of the Community.
10. The United States further recognizes that pursuant to the Euratom Treaty, the
    Community has to make certain, by appropriate supervision, that nuclear materials
    are not diverted to purposes other than those for which they are intended, and that to
    this end safeguards are applied in accordance with Chapter VII of the EURATOM
    Treaty. The United States and the European Union share the view that the
    Community's regional safeguards system makes an important and valuable contribution
    to the achievement of non-proliferation goals and the above-mentioned objectives.
11  The United States of America, the Community, and all its Member States recall that
    they are parties to the International Convention of the Physical Protection of Nuclear
    Material, the provisions of which are important to the prevention of the illicit
    circulation of nuclear material. The United States and the Member States of the
    Community affirm their intention to ensure application of adequate physical protection
    to the use, storage and transport of nuclear material within their respective
    jurisdictions.
12. The United States of America and all Member States of the Community recall that
    they adhere to the Guidelines for Nuclear Transfers of the Nuclear Suppliers Group
    (NSG). The United States of America and all Member States of the Community that
    presently export nuclear commodities also participate in the NPT Exporters
     Committee. The United States and the European Union re-affirm their shared view that
    the common nuclear non-proliferation export policies and practices reflected in the
    NSG and the NPT Exporters Committee Guidelines play an essential role in ensuring
    that peaceful nuclear cooperation is carried out under appropriate conditions and
    controls. The United States and the European Union stress in particular the importance
    of the NSG policy of requiring IAEA safeguards on all nuclear activities, present and
    future, as a condition for transfer to any non-nuclear weapon state of any nuclear
    facilities, equipment, components or materials on the NSG trigger list and of the NSG
    arrangement for the control of nuclear-related dual-use equipment, material and related
    technology. They also reaffirm their intention to exercise caution and restraint in the
                                            ys
 ---pagebreak---        export of sensitive items such as reprocessing and enrichment equipment and
       technology, recovered plutonium, and highly enriched uranium.
13.    The United States and the European Union affirm their intention to co-operate with
       each other and with other interested states to urge all nuclear suppliers to adhere to
       the NSG Guidelines for Nuclear Transfers and otherwise to conduct nuclear export
       policies in a manner that contributes to the prevention of nuclear proliferation.
14.    The United States and the European Union acknowledge that the separation, storage,
       transportation, and use of plutonium call for the continuation of measures to ensure
       the avoidance of risk of nuclear proliferation; they are determined to continue to
       support the strengthening of international safeguards and other non-proliferation
       measures.
Signed at                            on                    1995
For the United States of America                                  for the European Union
                                            V6
 ---pagebreak---                                    U.S. Draft Side Letter
        I have the honor to refer to the Agreement for co-operation in the peaceful uses of
nuclear energy between the United States of America and the European Atomic Energy
Community signed ...... (hereinafter referred to as "the Agreement"), and in particular to
paragraph 2 of Article 7 of the Agreement, which provides that "Non-nuclear material, nuclear
material and equipment transferred pursuant to this Agreement, and special fissionable
material used in or produced through the use of such items shall not be used ... for any
military purpose."
        In consequence of this provision, any U.S. nuclear co-operation with the Community
or a Member State for military purposes would necessarily take place outside the scope of the
Agreement and would require a separate agreement for co-operation specifically intended to
further such military purposes. I can confirm on behalf of the Government of the United
States that such nuclear co-operation with a Member State for military purposes will be
suitably considered when circumstances so warrant.
Signed at Washington on                     1995.
                                              n
 ---pagebreak---                                                                    ISSN 0254-1475
                                                             COM(95) 171 final
                                              DOCUMENTS
EN                                                                        12   U
                                     Catalogue number : CB-CO-95-209-EN-C
                                                              ISBN 92-77-88931-4
Office for Official Publicatioas of the European Communities
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