CELEX: 62003TJ0153
Language: en
Date: 2006-06-13
Title: Judgment of the Court of First Instance (Second Chamber) of 13 June 2006. # Inex SA v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) (OHIM). # Community trade mark - Opposition proceedings - Application for a figurative mark consisting of a representation of a cowhide in black and white - Earlier national figurative trade mark comprising in part a representation of a cowhide in black and white - Distinctive character of an element of a trade mark - Absence of likelihood of confusion - Rejection of the opposition - Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 40/94. # Case T-153/03.

Case T‑153/03
      Inex SA
      v
      Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market 
      (Trade Marks and Designs) (OHIM)
      (Community trade mark – Opposition proceedings – Application for a figurative mark consisting of a representation of a cowhide in black and white – Earlier national figurative trade mark comprising in part a representation of a cowhide in black and white – Distinctive character of an element of a trade mark – No likelihood of confusion – Rejection of the opposition – Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 40/94)
      Summary of the Judgment
      1.      Community trade mark – Definition and acquisition of the Community trade mark – Relative grounds for refusal – Opposition
            by the proprietor of an earlier identical or similar mark registered for identical or similar goods or services 
      (Council Regulation No 40/94, Art. (8)(1)(b))
      2.      Community trade mark – Definition and acquisition of the Community trade mark – Relative grounds for refusal – Opposition
            by the proprietor of an earlier identical or similar mark registered for identical or similar goods or services 
      (Council Regulation No 40/94, Art. 8(1)(b))
      1.      Although it is settled case-law that, in the assessment of the similarity of trade marks within the meaning of Article 8(1)(b)
         of Regulation No 40/94 on the Community trade mark, as a general rule the public will not consider a descriptive element forming
         part of a complex mark as the distinctive and dominant element of the overall impression conveyed by that mark, the weak distinctive
         character of an element of a complex mark does not necessarily imply that that element cannot constitute a dominant element
         since, because, in particular, of its position in the sign or its size, it may make an impression on consumers and be remembered
         by them.
      
      None the less, since the comparison between marks must be based on the overall impression given by them having regard, in
         particular, to the distinctive character of their elements in relation to the goods or services concerned, it does not suffice,
         in order to find a similarity between marks, that an element essential to the visual impression of a complex mark and the
         sole element of the other sign are identical or similar. On the other hand, it should be concluded that there is a similarity
         where, considered as a whole, the impression given by a complex mark is dominated by one of its elements in such a way that
         the other components of that mark appear negligible in the image of that mark which the relevant public remembers, in the
         light of the goods or services designated.
      
      (see paras 32-33)
      2.      There is no likelihood of confusion for the average consumer between the figurative mark consisting of a representation of
         a cowhide in black and white, in respect of which registration is sought for ‘Milk, milk beverages, milk products, dairy products,
         cream and yoghurt’ in Class 29 of the Nice Agreement, and the complex mark comprising in part a representation of a cowhide
         in black and white, and made up of a number of figurative and word elements, including the word element ‘inex’, registered
         previously in the Benelux countries for ‘Milk and milk products’ in the same class of that agreement.
      
      Since the ‘inex’ word element contributes in a decisive manner to the overall impression given by the earlier mark, its presence
         does not permit the inference that the cowhide design of the earlier mark is likely to dominate, by itself, the image of that
         mark which the public keeps in mind. Accordingly, although the cowhide design is essential to the visual and conceptual impression
         given by the earlier mark, neither the significant visual differences between the signs at issue nor the weak distinctive
         character of the cowhide design in this case lead to the conclusion that there is a likelihood of confusion between the marks
         at issue.
      
      (see paras 41, 47)
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE (Second Chamber)
      13 June 2006 (*)
      
      (Community trade mark – Opposition proceedings – Application for a figurative mark consisting of a representation of a cowhide in black and white – Earlier national figurative trade mark comprising in part a representation of a cowhide in black and white – Distinctive character of an element of a trade mark – No likelihood of confusion – Rejection of the opposition – Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 40/94)
      In Case T-153/03,
      Inex SA, established in Bavegem (Belgium), represented by T. van Innis, lawyer,
      
      applicant,
      v
      Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) (OHIM), represented initially by U. Pfleghar and G. Schneider, and subsequently by G. Schneider and A. Folliard-Monguiral, acting
         as Agents,
      
      defendant,
      the other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of the Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade
         Marks and Designs), intervener before the Court of First Instance, being
      
      Robert Wiseman & Sons Ltd, established in Glasgow (United Kingdom), represented by A. Roughton, Barrister,
      
      ACTION brought against the decision of the Second Board of Appeal of the Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade
         Marks and Designs) of 4 February 2003 (Case R 106/2001-2), relating to opposition proceedings between Inex SA and Robert Wiseman
         & Sons Ltd,
      
      THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCEOF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES (Second Chamber),
      
      composed of J. Pirrung, A.W.H. Meij and I. Pelikánová, Judges,
      Registrar: C. Kristensen, Administrator,
      having regard to the application lodged at the Registry of the Court of First Instance on 18 April 2003,
      having regard to the responses of the intervener and of the Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and
         Designs) lodged at the Registry of the Court of First Instance on 4 and 12 September 2003 respectively,
      
      further to the hearing on 7 September 2005,
      gives the following
      Judgment
       Background to the dispute
      1        On 1 April 1996, the intervener filed an application for a Community trade mark at the Office for Harmonisation in the Internal
         Market (Trade Marks and Designs) (‘the Office’) under Council Regulation (EC) No 40/94 of 20 December 1993 on the Community
         trade mark (OJ 1994 L 11, p. 1), as amended. 
      
      2        The mark in respect of which registration was sought is the following figurative sign:
      
      
         
      3        The goods for which registration was sought fall within Classes 29, 32 and 39 under the Nice Agreement Concerning the International
         Classification of Goods and Services for the Purposes of the Registration of Marks of 15 June 1957, as revised and amended,
         and correspond, for each of those classes, to the following description: 
      
      –        Class 29: ‘Milk, milk beverages, milk products, dairy products, cream and yoghurt’;
      –        Class 32: ‘Beers; mineral and aerated waters and other non-alcoholic drinks; fruit drinks and fruit juices, syrups and other
         preparations for making beverages’;
      
      –        Class 39: ‘Collection, delivery, distribution and transport of goods by road’.
      4        On 27 October 1997, that application for registration was published in Community Trade Marks Bulletin No 25/97.
      
      5        On 22 January 1998, the applicant filed a notice of opposition under Article 42 of Regulation No 40/94 against that Community
         trade mark application, relying on Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation No 40/94.
      
      6        The opposition was based on the earlier figurative trade mark No 580 538, registered in the Benelux countries on 17 October 1995 for goods in Classes 29 and 30 under the Nice Agreement and
         reproduced below:
      
      
         
      7        The opposition concerned some of the goods covered by the earlier mark, namely ‘Milk and milk products, dairy products’, and
         was directed against ‘Milk, milk beverages and milk products, dairy products’ referred to by the trade mark application. In
         reply to the observations of the intervener, the applicant stated that the opposition was directed against all of the goods
         in Class 29 designated in the trade mark application, including ‘cream and yogurt’.
      
      8        By decision of 29 November 2000, the Opposition Division rejected the opposition on the ground that the signs at issue were
         sufficiently different not to give rise to any likelihood of confusion.
      
      9        On 22 January 2001, the applicant filed a notice of appeal at the Office under Articles 57 to 62 of Regulation No 40/94 against
         the decision of the Opposition Division.
      
      10      By decision of 4 February 2003 (‘the contested decision’), the Second Board of Appeal of the Office dismissed the appeal.
         The Board of Appeal stated that strong visual differences existed between the marks at issue. It considered, however, that
         the marks at issue were conceptually similar since they both called to mind the idea of a cow. However, on account of the
         fact that that similarity related to an aspect which was not very distinctive for the goods in question, it was not considered
         sufficient to lead to the conclusion that there was a likelihood of confusion. Accordingly, despite the fact that the two
         marks designated identical goods, the Board of Appeal concluded that there was no likelihood of confusion.
      
       Forms of order sought
      11      The applicant claims that the Court should:
      
      –      annul the contested decision;
      –      order the Office to pay the costs. 
      12      The Office contends that the Court should:
      
      –      dismiss the action;
      –      order the applicant to pay the costs.
      13      The intervener contends that the Court should:
      
      –      dismiss the action;
      –      order the applicant to pay the costs of the intervener.
       Law
      14      The applicant relies on a single plea in law alleging infringement of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation No 40/94.
      
       Arguments of the parties
      15      The applicant claims that the Board of Appeal failed to have regard to the rule of interdependence between similarity between
         the trade marks and similarity between the goods and services, as stated in the judgments in Case C-39/97 Canon [1998] ECR I-5507 and Case C-342/97 Lloyd Schuhfabrik Meyer [1999] ECR I-3819, according to which a lesser degree of similarity between the goods or services covered may be offset by
         a greater degree of similarity between the conflicting marks, and vice versa.
      
      16      Further, the Board of Appeal failed to have regard to the rule under which the global assessment of the similarity of the
         signs at issue must be based on the overall impression given by them, bearing in mind their distinctive and dominant components,
         and the fact that the average consumer only rarely has the chance to make a direct comparison between the marks, of which
         he will retain only an imperfect picture. The applicant submits in this regard that the Board of Appeal should have found
         that the likelihood of confusion between the signs at issue is increased by the fact that the goods in question are targeted
         at the general public.
      
      17      The applicant claims, in addition, that the Board of Appeal contradicted itself in finding, on the one hand, that the figurative
         aspect of the mark applied for, representing a cowhide, was identical to the dominant element of the earlier mark, and, on
         the other hand, that the marks at issue displayed strong visual differences. According to the applicant, the Board of Appeal
         should have found that there was a visual similarity between those two trade marks, one of which consists exclusively of the
         dominant element of the other.
      
      18      The applicant submits, finally, that the dominant element of the earlier mark is necessarily distinctive owing to the fact
         that one of the marks is exclusively composed of that element. In that respect, in the Benelux countries the dominant element
         of the earlier mark is distinctive since its packaging is the only one, in those countries, which bears a representation of
         a cowhide in black and white as its dominant element. In reply to the written questions of the Court and at the hearing, the
         applicant stated that, in so far as the intervener did not contest that the earlier mark was the only one, in the Benelux
         countries, to use the drawing of a cowhide as its dominant element, it has implicitly admitted that that element is distinctive.
         The Court would infringe the principle under which the parties delimit the scope of the case if it were to call into question
         that statement. The applicant also submits that the dominant element of its mark cannot but be distinctive, having regard
         to the highly competitive nature of the market.
      
      19      The Office and the intervener challenge the applicant’s arguments.
      
       Findings of the Court
      20      Under Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation No 40/94, upon opposition by the proprietor of an earlier trade mark, the trade mark applied
         for is not to be registered if because of its identity with or similarity to the earlier trade mark and the identity or similarity
         of the goods or services covered by the trade marks there exists a likelihood of confusion on the part of the public in the
         territory in which the earlier trade mark is protected. The likelihood of confusion includes the likelihood of association
         with the earlier trade mark. Moreover, under Article 8(2)(a)(ii) of Regulation No 40/94, ‘earlier trade marks’ means trade
         marks registered in a Member State with a date of application for registration which is earlier than the date of application
         for registration of the Community trade mark.
      
      21      According to settled case-law, the risk that the public might believe that the goods or services in question come from the
         same undertaking or, as the case may be, from economically-linked undertakings, constitutes a likelihood of confusion (Case
         T-6/01 Matratzen Concord v OHIM – Hukla Germany (MATRATZEN) [2002] ECR II-4335, paragraph 23, and Case T-129/01 Alejandro v OHIM– Anheuser-Busch (BUDMEN) [2003] ECR II-2251, paragraph 37).
      
      22      The likelihood of confusion must be assessed globally by reference to the perception which the relevant public has of the
         signs and of the goods or services in question, taking into account all factors relevant to the circumstances of the case
         (Case T-185/02 Ruiz-Picasso and Others v OHIM – DaimlerChrysler (PICARO) [2004] ECR II-1739, paragraph 50).
      
      23      That global assessment takes account, in particular, of awareness of the mark on the market, and of the degree of similarity
         between the marks and between the goods or services covered. In that respect, it implies some interdependence between the
         factors taken into account, so that a lesser degree of similarity between the goods or services covered may be offset by a
         greater degree of similarity between the marks, and vice versa (Canon, paragraph 17, and Lloyd Schuhfabrik Meyer, paragraph 19).
      
      24      Further, the perception of marks in the mind of the average consumer of the goods or services in question plays a decisive
         role in the global assessment of the likelihood of confusion. The average consumer normally perceives a mark as a whole and
         does not proceed to analyse its various details (Case C-251/95 SABEL [1997] ECR I-6191, paragraph 23, and Lloyd Schuhfabrik Meyer, paragraph 25). For the purposes of that global assessment, the average consumer of the goods concerned is deemed to be reasonably
         well informed and reasonably observant and circumspect. Account should also be taken of the fact that the average consumer’s
         level of attention is likely to vary according to the category of goods or services in question (Lloyd Schuhfabrik Meyer, paragraph 26).
      
      25      In the present case, the similarity between the goods covered by the marks in question is not disputed by the parties. The
         only question under discussion is whether the Board of Appeal was entitled to consider that the marks in question were sufficiently
         dissimilar not to give rise to a likelihood of confusion.
      
       Similarity between the signs
      26      The global assessment of the likelihood of confusion, as far as concerns the visual, aural or conceptual similarity of the
         conflicting signs, must be based on the overall impression given by those signs, bearing in mind, inter alia, their distinctive
         and dominant components (see Case T-292/01 Phillips-Van Heusen v OHIM – Pash Textilvertrieb und Einzelhandel (BASS) [2003] ECR II-4335, paragraph 47, and the case-law cited therein).
      
      27      Furthermore, it is settled case-law that a complex mark and another mark which is identical or similar to one of the components
         of the complex mark may be regarded as being similar where that component forms the dominant element within the overall impression
         given by the complex mark. That is the case where that component is likely to dominate, by itself, the image of that mark
         which the relevant public keeps in mind, with the result that all the other components of the mark are negligible within the
         overall impression given by it (MATRATZEN, paragraph 33, and Case T-359/02 Chum v OHIM – Star TV (STAR TV) [2005] ECR II-0000, paragraph 44). That approach does not amount, however, to taking into consideration only one component
         of a complex trade mark and comparing it with another mark. On the contrary, such a comparison must be made by examining the
         marks in question, each considered as a whole (MATRATZEN, paragraph 34).
      
      28      At issue in the present case are, on the one hand, a mark composed of a single element which, in the light of the goods which
         it designates, will be perceived as the representation of a cowhide and, on the other, an earlier complex mark consisting
         of figurative and word elements. The figurative elements of the earlier mark consist of the representation of a cowhide in
         black and white covering the packaging, with stylised grass at the bottom of the carton, a farm with a little red barn near
         the top of the carton as well as the standardised bar code near the bottom of the carton. The word elements of the earlier
         mark are the words ‘inex’, ‘halfvolle melk’ and the abbreviation ‘UHT – e 1L’.
      
      29      Since the phonetic similarity of the conflicting marks is not called into question in this case, only the visual and conceptual
         similarities will be examined.
      
      –       Visual similarity
      30      It must be noted, first of all, that the design to be perceived as a cowhide constitutes the sole element of the mark applied
         for.
      
      31      In respect of the earlier mark, the cowhide design completely covers the packaging of the goods and dominates the visual impression
         given by the mark, as found by the Board of Appeal in paragraph 21 of the contested decision. That design constitutes a striking
         element of the earlier mark.
      
      32      In that respect, the argument of the Office that the weak distinctive character of the cowhide design precludes that design
         from being regarded as a dominant element cannot be accepted in all circumstances. Although it is settled case-law that, as
         a general rule, the public will not consider a descriptive element forming part of a complex mark as the distinctive and dominant
         element of the overall impression conveyed by that mark (BUDMEN, paragraph 53, and Joined Cases T-117/03 to T-119/03 and T-171/03 New Look v OHIM – Naulover (NLSPORT, NLJEANS, NLACTIVE and NLCollection) [2004] ECR II-0000, paragraph 34), the weak distinctive character of an element of a complex mark does not necessarily imply
         that that element cannot constitute a dominant element since, because, in particular, of its position in the sign or its size,
         it may make an impression on consumers and be remembered by them (see, to that effect, Case T-115/02 AVEX v OHIM – Ahlers (a) [2004] ECR II-2907, paragraph 20).
      
      33      It must none the less be pointed out that, since the comparison between marks must be based on the overall impression given
         by them having regard, in particular, to the distinctive character of their elements in relation to the goods or services
         concerned, it does not suffice, in order to find a similarity between marks, that an element essential to the visual impression
         of a complex mark and the sole element of the other sign are identical or similar. On the other hand, it should be concluded
         that there is a similarity where, considered as a whole, the impression given by a complex mark is dominated by one of its
         elements in such a way that the other components of that mark appear negligible in the image of that mark which the relevant
         public remembers, in the light of the goods or services designated.
      
      34      In this instance, although the cowhide design constitutes an essential element in the visual impression of the earlier mark,
         the fact remains, none the less, that that design has only weak distinctive character in the present case.
      
      35      For the purpose of assessing the distinctive character of an element making up a mark, an assessment must be made of the greater
         or lesser capacity of that element to identify the goods or services for which the mark was registered as coming from a particular
         undertaking, and thus to distinguish those goods or services from those of other undertakings. In making that assessment,
         account should be taken, in particular, of the inherent characteristics of the element in question in the light of whether
         it is at all descriptive of the goods or services for which the mark has been registered (see, by analogy, Lloyd Schuhfabrik Meyer, paragraphs 22 and 23). 
      
      36      In this case, it should be noted that, having regard to the goods concerned, the cowhide design cannot be regarded as highly
         distinctive, since that element is strongly allusive to the goods in question. That design refers to the idea of a cow, an
         animal known for its milk production, and constitutes an element which is unimaginative to designate milk and milk and dairy
         products.
      
      37      In that respect, it is appropriate to reject the applicant’s argument that in the Benelux countries that element of the earlier
         mark is distinctive on account of the fact that that mark is the only one in those countries to have a cowhide in black and
         white as the dominant element. That fact is not such as to alter the finding in the preceding paragraph concerning the weak
         distinctive character of the cowhide design. Moreover, in so far as that argument seeks to claim that the cowhide design of
         the earlier mark is highly distinctive because of the possible renown of that mark in the Benelux countries, the Court notes
         that the applicant has not put forward any evidence to prove that that mark enjoys such renown with the public.
      
      38      It is also appropriate to reject the applicant’s argument that to call into question the distinctive character of that cowhide
         design would amount to infringement of the principle under which the parties delimit the scope of the case. The absence of
         any challenge by the intervener of the contention that the earlier mark is the only one in the Benelux countries to bear that
         design in a dominant way cannot permit the inference that the intervener accepts that that element is particularly distinctive.
         As was found in the preceding paragraph, the fact alleged by the applicant that the earlier mark is the only one in the Benelux
         countries to bear the cowhide design as the dominant element is not, in itself, in the least capable of conferring on that
         element a particularly distinctive character.
      
      39      The applicant’s argument that the cowhide design contained in its mark is distinctive by virtue of the fact that the market
         for the goods in question is very competitive must also be rejected. The applicant puts forward no evidence to permit the
         inference that that fact is, in itself, capable of conferring a particularly distinctive character on the cowhide representation
         of the earlier mark.
      
      40      Finally, in so far as the applicant seeks to claim that the cowhide design of the earlier mark has distinctive character in
         the light of the fact that the mark applied for, which is made up exclusively of that design, was accepted for registration
         by the Office, it must be observed that it is not disputed that the marks in question are not devoid of any distinctive character
         within the meaning of Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation No 40/94 and that they can therefore be registered. In this case, the
         analysis of the distinctive character of the signs in question does not form part of the assessment of the absolute grounds
         for refusal, but of the global assessment of likelihood of confusion. As the Office correctly points out, it is not therefore
         a question of determining whether the cowhide designs are devoid of any distinctive character, but of assessing the distinctive
         character of those designs in relation to the goods in question, for the purposes of determining whether there is a likelihood
         of confusion on the part of the public concerned between the marks at issue, each considered as a whole.
      
      41      The visual comparison of the conflicting marks indicates that the overall impression given by each of those marks differs
         significantly. Whereas the mark applied for consists only of a representation which must be perceived, given the goods designated,
         as a cowhide, the earlier mark is made up, as the Office observes, of a number of figurative and word elements other than
         the mere representation of a cowhide, which contribute significantly to the sign’s overall impression. It should be noted
         in particular that those elements include the presence of stylised grass at the bottom of the carton, the image of a farm
         with a little red barn near the top of the carton and the word element ‘inex’. As the Office notes, the last element is a
         word with no obvious meaning, which should be recognised as having a much higher degree of distinctive character than the
         cowhide design. Since the ‘inex’ word element contributes in a decisive manner to the overall impression given by the earlier
         mark, its presence does not permit the inference that the cowhide design of the earlier mark is likely to dominate, by itself,
         the image of that mark which the public keeps in mind.
      
      42      In addition, it must be stated that the design which is the subject of the trade mark application is composed of a drawing
         different from that of the cowhide design of the earlier mark. As appears from the contested decision, the mark applied for
         is not an entirely obvious representation of cowhide, and the Board of Appeal found that the mark will be perceived as a representation
         of cowhide on account of the goods it designates.
      
      43      For the same reason, it is also necessary to dismiss the applicant’s argument that the Office contradicted itself in finding,
         on the one hand, that the mark against which the opposition is directed is identical to the dominant element of the earlier
         mark and, on the other, that the marks at issue have strong differences. First, as was observed in the preceding paragraph,
         the contested decision does not make a finding that the design of the mark applied for is identical to that of the earlier
         mark. Secondly, as was noted in paragraph 33 above, since the comparison between the marks is based on the overall impression
         given by them having regard, in particular, to the distinctive character of their elements in relation to the goods or services
         concerned, it does not suffice, in order to find a similarity, that an element essential to the visual impression of a complex
         mark is identical or similar to the sole element of another sign.
      
      44      It must therefore be found that the Board of Appeal did not err in finding that the marks in question have strong visual differences.
      
      –       Conceptual similarity
      45      As the Board of Appeal pointed out, there is a conceptual similarity between the marks in question on account of the fact
         that they call to mind the idea of a cow known for its milk production. None the less, as the Court found in paragraph 36
         above, that idea has only weak distinctive character in the light of the goods in question. Where the earlier mark is not
         especially well known to the public and consists of an image with little imaginative content, the mere fact that the two marks
         are conceptually similar is not sufficient to give rise to a likelihood of confusion (SABEL, paragraph 25).
      
      46      The Board of Appeal was therefore fully entitled to find that a conceptual similarity between the marks at issue was unlikely,
         in this case, to lead to a likelihood of confusion.
      
       Global assessment of likelihood of confusion
      47      It follows from the foregoing that, although the cowhide design is essential to the visual and conceptual impression given
         by the earlier mark, neither the significant visual differences between the signs at issue nor the weak distinctive character
         of the cowhide design in this case lead to the conclusion that there is a likelihood of confusion between the marks at issue.
      
      48      Moreover, the Board of Appeal did not fail to take account of the interdependence between the factors to be taken into consideration.
         Neither the presence of strong visual differences between the marks in question nor the weak distinctive character of the
         cowhide design in this case can be offset by the fact that the goods are identical.
      
      49      Further, the applicant’s argument that the Board of Appeal should have found that the likelihood of confusion is increased
         by the fact that the goods in question are targeted at the general public must also be rejected. The fact that consumers have
         a relatively low level of attention does not, in the absence of sufficient similarities between the marks in question, and
         having regard to the weak distinctive character of the cowhide design in the light of the goods concerned, lead to the conclusion
         that there is a likelihood of confusion.
      
      50      Accordingly, the Board of Appeal did not err in finding that the global assessment of the conflicting signs did not give rise
         to a likelihood of confusion. 
      
      51      It follows from the foregoing that the application must be dismissed.
      
       Costs
      52      Under Article 87(2) of the Rules of Procedure, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been
         applied for in the successful party’s pleadings. Since the applicant has been unsuccessful, it must be ordered to pay the
         costs in accordance with the form of order sought by the Office and the intervener. 
      
      On those grounds,
      THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE (Second Chamber)
      hereby:
      1.      Dismisses the action;
      2.      Orders the applicant to pay the costs.
      
               Pirrung 
            
            
                Meij 
            
            
                Pelikánová
            
         Delivered in open court in Luxembourg on 13 June 2006.
      
               E. Coulon 
            
             
            
                      J. Pirrung
            
         
               Registrar 
            
             
            
                     President
            
         * Language of the case: English.