CELEX: 62017CN0728
Language: en
Date: 2017-12-24 00:00:00
Title: Case C-728/17 P: Appeal brought on 24 December 2017 by the European Commission against the judgment of the General Court (Third Chamber) delivered on 13 October 2017 in Case T-572/16, Brouillard v Commission

26.3.2018   
            
            
               EN
            
            
               Official Journal of the European Union
            
            
               C 112/20
            
         Appeal brought on 24 December 2017 by the European Commission against the judgment of the General Court (Third Chamber) delivered on 13 October 2017 in Case T-572/16, Brouillard v Commission
   (Case C-728/17 P)
   (2018/C 112/27)
   Language of the case: French
   
      Parties
   
   
      Appellant: European Commission (represented by: P. Mihaylova and G. Gattinara, acting as Agents)
   
      Other party to the proceedings: Alain Laurent Brouillard
   
      Form of order sought
   
   The Commission requests the Court to:
   
               —
            
            
               set aside the judgment of the General Court of 13 October 2017, Brouillard v Commission (T-572/16);
            
         
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               dismiss the action brought at first instance;
            
         
               —
            
            
               order the respondent to pay in full the costs of both sets of proceedings.
            
         
      Grounds of appeal and main arguments
   
   The first ground of appeal alleges an error of law and distortion. That ground is divided into three parts and concerns paragraphs 36, 39, 43 to 56, 62 and 63 of the judgment under appeal.
   By the first part, the Commission claims that the General Court erred in law in the interpretation of the notice of competition. In paragraphs 36, 45 and 47 to 56 of the judgment under appeal, it wrongly took the view, first, that the adjective ‘full’, used in the expression ‘full legal education’, appearing in the notice of competition, did not refer to the content of the diploma required and, second, that the word ‘corresponding’ in the expression ‘a diploma corresponding to a Master’s degree as a minimum’ did not refer to the diploma but to training. Similarly, the Commission considers that a contextual and teleological interpretation does not in any way support the General Court’s findings since the interpretation of the conditions for taking part in a competition must be undertaken in the light of the description of the tasks of the positions to be filled, which were, according to Annex I to the notice of competition, translation tasks to be carried out by ‘highly qualified lawyers’.
   By the second part, the Commission claims that the General Court erred in law in its interpretation of Article 5(3)(c)(i) of the Staff Regulations in paragraphs 46 to 49 and 52 to 53 of the judgment under appeal. The Commission considers that that provision of the Staff Regulations is irrelevant for purposes of recruitment procedures and, in particular, that it does not preclude an administrative authority, when determining the content of a notice of competition, from laying down more stringent participation conditions than the criteria laid down in that provision. Contrary to the General Court’s finding, a notice of competition cannot be interpreted in the light of that provision of the Staff Regulations.
   By the third part, the Commission alleges distortion of the content of the vocational Master’s degree of the University of Poitiers and of the application submitted by the applicant at first instance. The Commission considers that it is manifestly evident from both those items of evidence that the applicant did not have a diploma certifying the completion of a five-year ‘Master 2’ degree in law, as required by the notice of competition. The findings of the General Court in paragraphs 39, 43, 44, 52, 53 and 54 of the judgment under appeal are therefore erroneous.
   The second ground of appeal alleges an error in law in the interpretation of the rules governing the delimitation of the powers of a competition selection board during the verification of the award of a candidate’s diploma. This second ground, which concerns paragraphs 37, 52, 54, 55 and 56 of the judgment under appeal, seeks to challenge the General Court’s reasoning that a selection board must accept the diploma of the applicant at first instance on the sole basis of the national rules governing the award of the diploma.
   The third ground of appeal, which concerns paragraphs 39, 44, 47, 48, 52 and 57 to 61 of the judgment under appeal, alleges infringement of the duty to state reasons in that the General Court failed to make it sufficiently clear on the basis of which documents in the case the applicant at first instance is demonstrated to have been awarded a diploma enabling him to satisfy the condition required by the notice of competition. Moreover, it is submitted, the General Court is inconsistent because, although it stated that a full legal education and the diploma certifying completed university studies were two distinct criteria, it found that a diploma had been awarded, without specifying which document was capable of constituting evidence of the completion of a full legal training. Finally, the General Court did not provide sufficient explanations as to why, in the judgment delivered in Case T-420/13, which now has the force of res judicata, the applicant’s diploma was refused in a tendering procedure for freelance translation services for the Court, even though that same diploma is now being claimed as a basis on which that applicant can be appointed as a professional lawyer-linguist in the translation services of the Court.