CELEX: 62011CN0632
Language: en
Date: 2011-12-08 00:00:00
Title: Case C-632/11 P: Appeal brought on 8 December 2011 by Timsas Srl against the judgment of the General Court (Fourth Chamber) delivered on 20 September 2011 in Joined Cases T-394/08, T-408/08, T-453/08 and T-454/08 Regione autonoma della Sardegna and Others v Commission

21.4.2012   
            
            
               EN
            
            
               Official Journal of the European Union
            
            
               C 118/9
            
         Appeal brought on 8 December 2011 by Timsas Srl against the judgment of the General Court (Fourth Chamber) delivered on 20 September 2011 in Joined Cases T-394/08, T-408/08, T-453/08 and T-454/08 Regione autonoma della Sardegna and Others v Commission
   (Case C-632/11 P)
   2012/C 118/14
   Language of the case: Italian
   
      Parties
   
   
      Appellant: Timsas Srl (represented by: D. Dodaro and S. Pinna, avvocati)
   
      Other parties to the proceedings: European Commission, Regione autonoma della Sardegna, Selene di Alessandra Cannas Sas and Others
   
      Form of order sought
   
   
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               Set aside the judgment of the General Court of 20 September 2011 in Joined Cases T-394/08, T-408/08, T-453/08 and T-454/08 in so far as it rejects the appellant’s complaint alleging failure to state reasons with regard to the assessment of the incentive effect of the aid at issue;
            
         
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               Annul Commission Decision 2008/854/EC of 2 July 2008 concerning the aid scheme ‘Regional Law No 9 of 1998 — Misapplication of aid N 272/98’ C/104 (ex NN 158/03 and CP 15/2003) (OJ 2008 L 302, p. 9);
            
         
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               the European Commission to pay the costs of the appeal proceedings.
            
         
      Pleas in law and main arguments
   
   The judgment under appeal is flawed on the basis that it distorts the pleas in law relied on in the application; error of law and illogical and inconsistent reasoning. In particular, the appellant submits that the General Court failed to give reasons, even implicitly, for rejecting the complaint alleging manifest error on the part of the Commission in its assessment of the incentive effect of the aid. The General Court stated that ‘it is necessary … only to consider whether the applicants have demonstrated, in the present case, the existence of circumstances such as to ensure the incentive effect of the scheme at issue, even where no application had been submitted before work had commenced on the projects in question’, However, it did not state that the applicants had not demonstrated this and nor did it give any reason on the basis of which it would be possible to understand the ground for such a (wholly implicit) belief.
   The statement at paragraph 227 of the judgment under appeal that the Commission was not under any obligation to assess the particular circumstances of the individual beneficiaries is insufficient and contradictory. It is impossible to understand how the applicants could substantiate their argument that there was an incentive effect other than by setting out their own individual circumstances: the Commission and the General Court, when the case was brought before it, should have devised a uniform principle enabling an objective assessment of the position of each person represented, which could be regarded as particular or specific to that person only in relation to specific facts, but which nevertheless lends itself to a general and abstract statement.
   Lastly, both the Commission in the contested decision and the General Court in the judgment under appeal misinterpreted the appellant’s intentions, attributing to it the aim of contriving to render a decision which referred to a general scheme one that concerned it individually and, as a result of that misunderstanding, incorrectly failed to consider the impact which the factors brought to their attention by the appellant could have had on the assessment of the scope of the aid scheme in general terms.