CELEX: 62017CA0118
Language: en
Date: 2019-03-14 00:00:00
Title: Case C-118/17: Judgment of the Court (Third Chamber) of 14 March 2019 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Budai Központi Kerületi Bíróság — Hungary) — Zsuzsanna Dunai v ERSTE Bank Hungary Zrt (Reference for a preliminary ruling — Consumer protection — Unfair terms in consumer contracts — Directive 93/13/EEC — Article 1(2) — Article 6(1) — Loan contract denominated in a foreign currency — Exchange difference — Substitution of a legislative provision for an unfair term declared void — Exchange rate risk — Continued existence of the contract after the unfair term has been deleted — National system for a uniform interpretation of law)

6.5.2019   
            
            
               EN
            
            
               Official Journal of the European Union
            
            
               C 155/2
            
         
      Judgment of the Court (Third Chamber) of 14 March 2019 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Budai Központi Kerületi Bíróság — Hungary) — Zsuzsanna Dunai v ERSTE Bank Hungary Zrt
      (Case C-118/17) (1)
      
      (Reference for a preliminary ruling - Consumer protection - Unfair terms in consumer contracts - Directive 93/13/EEC - Article 1(2) - Article 6(1) - Loan contract denominated in a foreign currency - Exchange difference - Substitution of a legislative provision for an unfair term declared void - Exchange rate risk - Continued existence of the contract after the unfair term has been deleted - National system for a uniform interpretation of law)
      (2019/C 155/02)
      Language of the case: Hungarian
      
         Referring court
      
      Budai Központi Kerületi Bíróság
      
         Parties to the main proceedings
      
      
         Applicant: Zsuzsanna Dunai
      
         Defendant: ERSTE Bank Hungary Zrt
      
         Operative part of the judgment
      
      
                  1.
               
               
                  Article 6(1) of Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts must be interpreted as meaning that:
                  
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                              it does not preclude national legislation which prevents the court seised of the case from granting an application for the cancellation of a loan contract on the basis of the unfair nature of a term relating to the exchange difference, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, provided that a finding that terms in such an agreement were unfair would restore the legal and factual situation that the consumer would have been in had that unfair term not existed; and
                           
                        
                              —
                           
                           
                              it precludes national legislation which prevents, in circumstances such as those at issue in the main proceedings, the court seised of the case from granting an application for the cancellation of a loan contract on the basis of the unfair nature of a term relating to exchange rate risk where it is found that that term is unfair and that the contract cannot continue to exist without that term.
                           
                        
            
                  2.
               
               
                  Directive 93/13, read in the light of Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, does not preclude a supreme court of a Member State from adopting, in the interest of ensuring uniform interpretation of the law, binding decisions concerning the modalities for implementing that directive, in so far as those decisions do not prevent the competent court from ensuring the full effect of the norms laid down in that directive and from offering consumers an effective remedy for the protection of the rights that they can derive therefrom, or from referring a question for a preliminary ruling to the Court in that regard, which it is for the referring court to determine.
               
            
         (1)  OJ C 221, 10.7.2017.