CELEX: 52012PC0350
Language: en
Date: 2012-07-03
Title: Proposal for a DIRECTIVE OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL amending Directive 2009/65/EC on the coordination of laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to undertakings for collective investment in transferable securities (UCITS) as regards depositary functions, remuneration policies and sanctions

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		52012PC0350
		
			Proposal for a DIRECTIVE OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL amending Directive 2009/65/EC on the coordination of laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to undertakings for collective investment in transferable securities (UCITS) as regards depositary functions, remuneration policies and sanctions /* COM/2012/0350 final - 2012/0168 (COD) */
			
				
		
		
			
			   	EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM
1.           Context of the proposal
1.1.        General
Since the UCITS Directive was adopted in 1985, the
rules relating to depositaries in the Directive have remained unchanged: they
consist of a number of generic principles setting out the duties of
depositaries. The principal UCITS rule is that all assets of a UCITS fund must
be entrusted to a depositary. This depositary shall, in accordance with
national law, be liable for losses suffered as a result of a failure to perform
its duties. The UCITS Directive, apart from employing a negligence-based
standard, makes reference to national laws in respect of the precise contours
of these duties. This reference leaves considerable scope for diverging
interpretations regarding the scope of a depositary's duties and the liability
for the negligent performance thereof. As a result, different approaches have
developed across the European Union, leading to UCITS investors facing uneven levels of protection in different
jurisdictions. 
The potential consequences of national divergences in the liability
standard came to the fore following the Lehman bankruptcy[1] and the
Madoff fraud. In particular, the consequences of the Madoff fraud have been
particularly acute in some EU Member States. In one instance, a particular fund
that acted as a feeder fund for Madoff lost around € 1.4 billion. The large
scale of the Madoff fraud essentially went undetected for a long period because
the depositary had delegated custody of the assets to an entity run by Bernard
Madoff, the US broker "Bernard Madoff Investment Securities". At the
same time, Bernard Madoff was also the manager and broker responsible for
purchasing financial instruments on behalf of the fund. The Madoff case raised
several important issues in relation to UCITS funds. First, it raises the
question of the precise conditions under which a depositary acting on behalf of
a UCITS fund can delegate safekeeping of assets to a sub-custodian? The current
UCITS Directive is silent on the precise conditions under which custody may be
delegated. 
The Madoff case
also raises the issue of conflicts of interest. More particularly, to what
extent should the manager of an investment fund be allowed to belong to the
same corporate group as the sub-custodian to whom custody has been delegated?
Can it really be expected that a fund manager will always behave in a manner
conducive to protecting the interests of a fund's investors where the manager
is also the sub-custodian of the assets they invest in? In respect of conflicts
of interests that may arise in relation to the independence of the depositary,
the UCITS Directive is limited to stipulating the general principle that a
company cannot manage a UCITS fund and also act as its depositary. The UCITS
Directive contains no rule to cover the conflicts of interest that may arise in
case the management function and the depositary functions are delegated to one
and the same third party. 
Finally, the
Madoff case has also revealed general uncertainties within the UCITS framework,
especially in relation to the principal custodian's liability in case of
delegation of custody to a sub-custodian. The issue of liability in case of
delegation, in the absence of hard and fast rules in the relevant UCITS
Directive, is dealt with differently in individual Member States. 
The Madoff case brought to the fore an essential development in the
UCITS sphere: while the UCITS provisions on depositaries have remained
unchanged, the investment environment for UCITS has evolved. UCITS are now able
to invest in a wider range of financial assets, which may be more complex and
also may be issued and held in custody outside the EU (for instance, in
emerging markets); fund portfolios are increasingly diverse and international. 
As a consequence, holding assets through sub-custody arrangements,
so as to match the fund's investment strategies, have become increasingly
common. The Madoff fraud has shown that the risks associated with the use of
delegated sub-custody networks are not always negligible. Assets can be lost at
the level of the sub-custodian, which might include loss through fraud
committed by the sub-custodian, negligence of the sub-custodian or the
bankruptcy of the sub-custodian. Under the current UCITS framework, it is
unclear what duties a depositary has in the selection and the oversight of the
sub-custodian. As a result, there is a legal uncertainty to what extent a
depositary is liable for losses at sub-custodian level. 
It must be noted that on 12 July 2010 the
Commission proposed the extension of investor compensation schemes to cover investors
in UCITS. The amendments to Directive 97/9/EC aimed to cover situations where a
depositary is liable for the loss of assets of UCITS but is not able to cover
its liabilities. This should serve as an additional means to increase the
protection for investors in UCITS. However, at this stage this proposal has not
been accepted by the Council and is subject to further negotiations. 
In addition, the financial crisis also
revealed that the remuneration and incentive schemes commonly applied within
financial institutions were themselves exacerbating the impact and scale of the
crisis. Remuneration policies contributed to short-term decision making and
created incentives for taking excessive risk. 
Finally, the
analysis of national sanctioning regimes carried out by the Commission, along
with the Committees of Supervisors (now transformed into European Supervisory
Authorities) has shown a number of divergences and weaknesses which may have a
negative impact on the proper application of EU legislation, the effectiveness
of financial supervision, and ultimately on competition, stability and
integrity of financial markets and consumer protection. Therefore, in its
Communication of 9 December 2010 "Reinforcing sanctioning regimes in the
financial sector"[2]
the Commission suggested setting EU minimum common standards on certain key
issues, in order to promote convergence and reinforcement of national
sanctioning regimes. The Commission has included such common rules, adapted to the
specifics of the sectors concerned, in all its recent proposals for the review
of the sectoral EU legislation concerned (CRD IV, MiFID, Market Abuse
Directive, Transparency Directive). Extending this work to the UCITS framework
is a natural additional step in this process.
This proposal
forms part of a wider legislative package dedicated to rebuilding consumer
trust in financial markets. The package has two other parts. The first is an
extensive overhaul of the Insurance Mediation Directive 2002/92/EC to ensure
that customers benefit from a high level of protection when buying insurance
products. The final part of the package aims at improving transparency in the
investment market for retail investors (a proposal for a Regulation on key
information documents for investment products).
1.2.        Results of consultations
with the interested parties and impact assessment 
1.2.1.     Consultation with
interested parties
On 3 July 2009
the Commission launched a consultation on UCITS depositaries. This was followed
by a feed-back statement in November of the same year.[3] The results of the
consultation, supplemented by the technical input from ESMA, are duly reflected
in the impact assessment report. 
On 9 December
2010, the Commission services launched a second public consultation on the UCITS depositary function and on managers' remuneration,
which closed on 31 January, 2011. In total, 58 contributions were received most
of which signalled a broad support of the review initiative, particularly with
respect to the clarification of depositary functions and to the simplification
of the regulatory landscape as a result of the proposed alignment with the AIFM
Directive.[4]
Respondents however took a more critical stance vis-à-vis the issue of
depositary liability.[5]
The feed-back statements to both consultations are available in Annex 2 of that
impact assessment. 
As to the issue
of administrative sanctions, this report reflects replies to an ad hoc
questionnaire prepared by the Commission services and sent to the European
Securities Committee (ESC), as well as to ESMA. A summary of the Member State
replies to the questionnaire is presented as Annex 7 to the Impact Assessment.
1.2.2.     Impact assessment
The impact assessment focused on five
issues: eligibility to act as a depositary, criteria for delegating custody,
liability for the loss of financial instruments held in custody, remunerations
of UCITS managers and sanctions for breaches of the UCITS rules. 
Eligibility to act as a depositary 
The current UCITS framework provides little
clarity on the institutions that are eligible to act as a depositary for a
UCITS fund. According to Article 23(3) UCITS Member States enjoy significant
discretion as to the institutions they deem eligible to act as UCITS
depositaries, provided that the institutions comply with the requirements of
Article 23 (2) (i.e. they are subject to prudential regulation and on-going
supervision). 
This has led to divergent approaches across
Member States: out of the 17 Member States that require depositaries to be credit
institutions, 12 impose specific capital requirements just for carrying out custody activities or other related UCITS
depositary functions. In those Member States that allow entities other
than credit institutions to act as a UCITS depositary, only 3 require
depositaries to fulfil additional capital requirements. 
National divergences as to the entities
that can act as depositaries for a UCITS fund may be at the origin of significant
legal uncertainty and could lead to differential levels of investor protection.
Furthermore, allowing entities that are not either credit institutions or
investment firms to act as depositaries without applying minimum capital
requirements entails considerable risk in relation to the resources available
to these entities. 
Three options emerged for harmonising the
scope of institutions that are deemed to provide sufficient guarantees in terms
of prudential regulation and capital requirements to fulfil the task of being a
depositary. The impact assessment concludes that both credit institutions and
regulated investment firms provide sufficient guarantees in terms of prudential
regulation, capital requirements and effective supervision to act as UCITS
depositaries. Other institutions (such as, e.g., law firms, notaries) are not
deemed to provide these guarantees and would have, if they wished to act as
UCITS depositaries, to transform themselves into regulated investment firms. As
most UCITS depositaries are already credit institutions or regulated investment
firms, the impact of the chosen option would thus only concern a small minority
of unlicensed service providers. Notaries and law firms would, obviously, be
allowed to continue to act in their traditional field as depositaries for
non-UCITS funds, such as small venture capital and private equity funds that
rarely invest in listed securities.
Delegation
of custody 
Changes to the
UCITS directive introduced in 2001 extended
the scope of eligible assets for UCITS to new classes of assets.[6] As a result, UCITS managers now
invest in a much greater number of countries and in more complex instruments
than in 1985. As more investment opportunities arise in different third country
jurisdictions, the necessity to appoint sub-custodians in these jurisdictions
increases. 
Despite the enlargement
of eligible investment instruments, the UCITS Directive does not define the
conditions applicable in case a depositary delegates custody to a
sub-custodian. The lack of clarity pertains both to the conditions under which
a delegation can take place (e.g., objective reason for delegation, level of
skill in selecting sub-custodian, intensity of ongoing monitoring of
sub-custodian) and to the conditions under which, exceptionally, custody might
be delegated to third country custodians who do not meet prudential and
supervisory standards. 
The impact assessment concludes that the
delegation of custody should be governed by rules on diligence in selecting an
appointing a sub-custodian, and on the ongoing monitoring of the activities of
the sub-custodian. For the rare case in which a UCITS' investment strategy
would involve investing in financial instruments issued in countries that
require mandatory local custody and where no custodian operates that could
comply with the above delegation requirements and prudential standards,
delegation should nevertheless be allowed so long as strict circumstances are
fulfilled. 
Liability
According to Article 24 of UCITS Directive,
liability for loss of a financial instrument that is held in custody only
arises in case of 'unjustifiable failure to perform obligations' or 'improper
performance' of these duties. These legal terms have given rise to different
interpretations in Member States and thus differences in investor protection. Some Member States apply a so-called 'strict' liability regime,
where the depositary has an immediate obligation to return the lost asset to
the UCITS, while others take the view that the loss of assets does not always imply
an unjustifiable failure to perform its duties on the part of the depositary
that should lead to liability for that depositary. As a consequence, the
liability standard is not the same in all Member States. 
The issue of liability is most relevant
where custody is delegated. According to Article 22(2), the depositary's liability
"shall not be affected by the fact that it has entrusted to a third
party all or some of the assets in its safe-keeping". The UCITS
Directive contains no further provisions governing
liability for the loss of a financial instrument where custody has been delegated to a third party. This issue is left to the
general principle expressed in Article 22(2), which gives a wide margin of
interpretation to Member States. For instance, some
Member States only impose an obligation to monitor the sub-custodian which
means that the depositary will not be held liable in case of loss if it shows
it has performed its monitoring duty correctly (a negligence-based standard).
By contrast, other Members States impose an obligation to return the assets
irrespective of whether a monitoring duty was breached. The Madoff case
demonstrated the fundamental difference between strict liability and negligence
standards. 
The impact assessment concludes that a
'strict liability' standard obliging depositaries to return instruments lost in
custody irrespective of fault or negligence is both conducive to ensuring a
high level of investor protection and to achieving a uniform standard across
the EU. In line with the needs of retail investors, liability in case of the
loss of an instrument held in custody should be based on a uniform EU standard that
entails a 'strict liability' for returning lost instruments at the cost of the
principal custodian, without any option for the principal custodian to
discharge liability in case of delegated custody. 
Remuneration
Given that the remuneration of UCITS
managers is, at least partly, based on the performance of the fund, there is an
incentive to increase the level of risk in a fund's portfolio in order to
increase potential returns. However, the higher level of risk exposes the fund
investors to higher potential losses than might be expected given the disclosed
risk profile of the fund. Remuneration structures might be skewed so that
managers participate in materialized returns but do not participate in
materialized losses, creating further incentives to take on higher risk
strategies. Furthermore, remuneration structures are seldom disclosed in the
fund's offering documents, rendering managers largely unaccountable to
investors as far as the determinants of executive pay in line with fund
performance are concerned.
It is envisaged to introduce a requirement
for the UCITS management company to implement remuneration policy that is
consistent with sound risk management of the UCITS fund and complies with
minimum remuneration principles. The UCITS management company would also be
required to disclose the amount of remuneration for the financial year with
appropriate detail in the annual report of the UCITS fund.
Sanctions
The analysis of national rules on sanctions
for breaches of the obligations of the UCITS Directive carried out by the
Commission has revealed three salient features: (i) differences in the amounts
of pecuniary sanctions (i.e. fines) applied to the same categories of breaches;
(ii) different criteria were applicable to determining the amount of
administrative sanctions; and (iii) variations in the level of the use of
sanctions. 
The policy choice is to achieve minimum
harmonization of the sanctioning regimes by requiring (i) a minimum catalogue
of administrative sanctions and measures (including harmonization of the lower
bound of the maximum amounts of administrative fines), (ii) a minimum list of
sanctioning criteria, and (iii) competent authorities and management companies
to establish whistle-blowing mechanisms. This sanctioning regime would apply to
a catalogue of breaches of main investor protection safeguards in the UCITS
Directive. 
2.           LEGAL ELEMENTS OF THE PROPOSAL
2.1.        Rules on depositaries’
duties
In relation to the depositary's core
safekeeping and oversight duties, the draft proposes to amend Article 22 UCITS
in the following manner: 
Article 22(1) specifies that a single
depositary shall be appointed for each UCITS fund. This rule intends to ensure
that one fund cannot have several depositaries. 
Article 22(2) proposes to specify that the
appointment of a depositary shall be evidenced by written contract. 
Article 22(3) makes uniform a list of
oversight duties of depositaries of UCITS established in a contractual form and
UCITS established in a corporate form. These duties involve verifying
compliance with applicable rules when UCITS shares are sold,
issued, re-purchased, redeemed and cancelled; verifying that any consideration
is remitted to it within the usual time limits; verifying that the investment
company's income is applied in accordance with the law and its instruments of
incorporation, ensuring that the value of units in a
UCITS is calculated in accordance with the applicable national law and the fund
rules; and carrying out instructions of the management or investment company. 
Article 22(4) contains detailed provisions
on cash monitoring. This paragraph intends to equip the depositary with a view
over all the assets of the UCITS, cash included. This paragraph also ensures
that no cash account associated with the funds' transactions shall be opened
without the depositary's knowledge. The aim is to avoid the possibility of
fraudulent cash transfers. This paragraph also introduces a segregation
requirement, so that any financial instruments on the depositary's book held
for a UCITS can be distinguished from the depositary's own assets and can at
all times be identified as belonging to that UCITS; such a requirement aims to
confer an additional layer of protection for investors should the depositary
default. 
Article 22(5) introduces a distinction
between (1) custody duties relating to financial instruments that can be held
in custody by the depositary and (2) verification of the ownership duties relating
to the remaining types of assets. A reference to the custody of physical
assets, such as real estate or commodities, is not necessary because such
assets are currently not eligible to be held in a UCITS portfolio.
New Article 25(2) contains a series of
customary provisions on conduct, the avoidance of and the management of
conflicts of interest. 
In this context, Article 26b introduces new
implementing measures defining detailed conditions for performing depositary
monitoring and custody functions, including (i) the type of financial
instruments that shall be included in the scope of the depositary's custody
duties; (ii) the conditions under which the depositary may exercise its custody
duties over financial instruments registered with a central securities
depositary; and (iii) the conditions under which the depositary shall monitor
financial instruments issued in a nominative form and registered with an issuer
or a registrar. 
2.2.        Rules on delegation
Article 22(7) defines the conditions in
which the depositary’s safekeeping duties can be delegated to a sub-custodian.
Essentially, the conditions and requirements upon which a UCITS depositary may
entrust its safekeeping duties to a third party are aligned with those
applicable under the AIFM Directive. 
Article 26b delegates to the Commission the
power to adopt delegated acts that will further define the depositary's initial
and on-going due diligence duties, including those that apply to the selection
and appointment of a sub-custodian. 
2.3.        Rules on eligibility to
act as a UCITS custodian
In light of the different national
eligibility criteria that currently apply to the activities of depositaries,
the draft proposes to modify Article 23(2) setting out an exhaustive list of
entities that are eligible to act as depositaries. The policy choice is to only
allow credit institutions and investment firms to act as UCITS depositaries.
Article 23 contains transitional provisions for UCITS that appointed entities
that are no longer able to act as depositaries. 
2.4.        Rules on liability
Article 24(1) aims to clarify the UCITS
depositary's liability in case of the loss of a financial instrument that is
held in custody. According to this paragraph, the UCITS depositary, in case a
financial instrument held in custody is lost, shall be under the obligation to
return a financial instrument of the identical type or of the corresponding
amount to the UCITS. No further discharge of liability in case of loss of
assets is envisaged, except in case the depositary can prove that the loss is
due to an 'external event beyond its reasonable control'. Moreover, it is made
clear that, in case of assets that are lost, the UCITS depositary has the
general obligation to return the financial instruments of the identical type or
of the corresponding amount to the UCITS ‘without undue delay’.
Article 26b provides for corresponding
implementing measures to clarify certain technical aspects, for example to
specify circumstances under which an instrument held in custody may be
considered as lost. 
Article 24(2) contains the rule according
to which the depositary's liability is not affected by the fact that it has
entrusted to a third party all or some of its custody tasks. As a result, the
depositary is obliged to return instruments held in custody that are lost, even
if the loss occurred with the sub-custodian. As mentioned above, no further
discharge of liability (either regulatory or contractual) in case of loss of
assets by a sub custodian shall be envisaged. 
Article 24(2), in contrast to Article
21(12) AIFMD, therefore holds the depositary liable for the return of the
instrument, also in case of delegation, without the possibility to discharge
liability by contract. This strengthening of the liability in case of
delegation of custody appears justified in light of the
very large investors base and the retail nature of UCITS holders. Introducing a
regime with the same contractual possibility for the depositary to be
discharged of its liability as it is allowed under AIFM Directive, is not
considered to be entirely appropriate. To a similar extent, envisaging that the
liability of the depositary could be discharged where assets are transferred to
a sub-custodian that does not comply with delegation criteria would also not be
appropriate.
2.5.        Redress
Article 24(5) concerns redress against the
depositary. This paragraph aligns the rights of investors in both corporate and
contractual UCITS so that they are able to invoke claims relating to the
liabilities of depositaries, either directly or indirectly (through the
management company), depending on the legal nature of the relationship between
the depositary, the management company and the unit-holders. 
2.6.        Remuneration
The proposed Articles 14a and 14b reflect
current policy on remuneration of senior management, risk takers and those who
exercise control functions. These principles should also apply to those that
manage a UCITS fund, be it managed in the form of an investment company or in
the form of a management company. 
2.7.      Access to telephone and data
records
Existing telephone and data traffic records
constitute important evidence to detect and prove a breach of the provisions of
the UCITS Directive. Therefore, Article 98 is modified in order to ensure that competent
authorities should be able to require existing telephone and existing data
traffic records held by a telecommunication operator or by a UCITS, a
management company, an investment company or a depositary, where a reasonable
suspicion exists that such records related to the subject-matter of the
inspection may be relevant to prove a breach of the provisions of the UCITS
Directive. It should also be clear that these records shall however not concern
the content of the communication to which they relate.
2.8.        Sanctions and measures
Articles 99a to 99e reflect current
horizontal policies in the financial service sector concerning sanctions and
measures. They define a common approach to the main breaches of the UCITS
Directive. Article 99a sets out a list of the main breaches. It also lays down
the administrative sanctions and measures that the competent authorities should
be empowered to apply in case of the main breaches. 
3.           Budgetary implication
There are no implications for the EU budget
in that no additional funding and no additional posts will be required to perform
these tasks. The tasks envisaged for the European Securities and Markets
Authority fall within the scope of existing responsibilities for this
Authority, therefore the allocation of resources and staff foreseen in the
approved Legislative Financial Statements for this Authority will be sufficient
to facilitate the execution of these tasks. 
2012/0168 (COD)
Proposal for a
DIRECTIVE OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT
AND OF THE COUNCIL
amending Directive 2009/65/EC on the
coordination of laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to
undertakings for collective investment in transferable securities (UCITS) as
regards depositary functions, remuneration policies and sanctions
(Text with EEA relevance)
THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE
COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,
Having regard to the Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union, and in particular Article 53(1) thereof,
Having regard to the proposal from the
European Commission[7],
After transmission of the draft legislative
act to the national Parliaments,
Having regard to the opinion of the
European Central Bank[8],

After consulting the European Data
Protection Supervisor,
Acting in accordance with the ordinary
legislative procedure,
Whereas:
(1)       Directive 2009/65/EC of
the European Parliament and of the Council[9]
should be amended in order to take into account market developments and the
experiences of market participants and supervisors gathered so far, in
particular to address discrepancies between national provisions in respect of
depositaries' duties and liability, remuneration policy and sanctions. 
(2)       In order to address the
potentially detrimental effect of poorly designed remuneration structures on
the sound management of risks and control of risk-taking behaviour by
individuals, there should be an express obligation for undertakings of
collective investment in transferable securities (UCITS) management companies
to establish and maintain, for those categories of staff whose professional
activities have a material impact on the risk profiles of the UCITS they
manage, remuneration policies and practices that are consistent with sound and
effective risk management. Those
categories of staff should at least include senior management, risk takers,
control functions, and any employees receiving total remuneration that takes
them into the same remuneration bracket as senior management and risk takers. Those rules should also apply to UCITS investment companies that do
not designate a management company.
(3)       The principles governing
remuneration policies should recognise that UCITS management companies are able
to apply those policies in different ways according to their size and the size
of the UCITS they manage, their internal organisation and the nature, scope and
complexity of their activities.
(4)       The principles regarding
sound remuneration policies established in this Directive should be consistent
with and be complemented by the principles set out in the Commission
Recommendation 2009/384/EC of 30 April 2009 on remuneration policies in the
financial services sector[10].
(5)       In order to promote
supervisory convergence in the assessment of remuneration policies and
practices, the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA), established by
Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council[11] should ensure the existence of
guidelines on sound remuneration policies in the asset management sector. The European
Banking Authority (EBA) established by Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 of the
European Parliament and of the Council[12]
should assist ESMA in the elaboration of such guidelines.
(6)       The provisions on
remuneration should be without prejudice to the full exercise of fundamental
rights guaranteed by the Treaties, general principles of national contract and
labour law, applicable legislation regarding shareholders’ rights and
involvement and the general responsibilities of the administrative and
supervisory bodies of the institution concerned, as well as the right, where
applicable, of social partners to conclude and enforce collective agreements,
in accordance with national laws and custom.
(7)       In order to ensure the
necessary level of harmonisation of the relevant regulatory requirements in
different Member States additional rules should be adopted defining the tasks
and duties of depositaries, designating the legal entities that may be
appointed as depositaries and clarifying the liability of depositaries in cases
UCITS assets are lost in custody or in the case of depositaries' improper
performance of their oversight duties. Such improper performance may result in the
loss of assets but also in the loss of the value of assets, if, for example, a
depositary tolerated investments that were not compliant with fund rules, while
exposing the investor to unexpected or anticipated risks. Additional rules
should also clarify the conditions under which depositary functions may be
delegated.
(8)       It is necessary to clarify
that a UCITS should appoint a single depositary having general oversight over
the UCITS's assets. Requiring that there be a single depositary should ensure
that the depositary has a view over all the assets of the UCITS and both fund
managers and investors have a single point of reference in the event that problems
occur in relation to the safekeeping of the assets or the performance of
oversight functions. The safekeeping of assets includes holding assets in
custody or, where assets are of such a nature that they cannot be held in
custody, verification of the ownership of those assets as well as record-keeping
for those assets.
(9)       In performing its tasks, a
depositary should act honestly, fairly, professionally, independently and in
the interest of the UCITS or of the investors of the UCITS.
(10)     In order to ensure a
harmonised approach to the performance of depositaries duties in all Member
States irrespective of the legal form taken by the UCITS, it is necessary to
introduce a uniform list of oversight duties that are incumbent on both a UCITS
with a corporate form (an investment company) and a UCITS in a contractual form.

(11)     The depositary should be
responsible for the proper monitoring of the UCITS' cash flows, and, in
particular, for ensuring that investor money and cash belonging to the UCITS is
booked correctly on accounts opened in the name of the UCITS, or in the name of
the management company acting on behalf of the UCITS, or in the name of the
depositary acting on behalf of the UCITS. Therefore detailed provisions should
be adopted on cash monitoring so as to ensure effective and consistent levels
of investor protection. When ensuring investor money is booked in cash
accounts, the depositary should take into account the principles set out in
Article 16 of Commission Directive 2006/73/EC of 10 August 2006 implementing
Directive 2004/39/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards
organisational requirements and operating conditions for investment firms and
defined terms for the purposes of that Directive[13]. 
(12)     In order to prevent
fraudulent cash transfers, it should be required that no cash account associated
with the funds' transactions be opened without the depositary's knowledge. 
(13)     Any financial instrument
held in custody for a UCITS should be distinguished from the depositary's own
assets, and at all times be identified as belonging to that UCITS; such a
requirement should confer an additional layer of protection for investors
should the depositary default.
(14)     In addition to the existing
duty to safe keep assets belonging to a UCITS, assets should be differentiated
between those that are capable of being held in custody and those that are not,
where a record-keeping and ownership verification requirement applies instead. The
group of assets that can be held in custody should be clearly differentiated,
since the duty to return lost assets should only apply to that specific
category of financial assets. 
(15)     It is necessary to define
the conditions for the delegation of the depositary's safe-keeping duties to a third
party. Delegation and sub-delegation should be objectively justified and
subject to strict requirements in relation to the suitability of the third
party entrusted with the delegated function, and in relation to the due skill,
care and diligence that the depositary should employ to select, appoint and
review that third party. For the purpose of achieving uniform market conditions
and an equally high level of investor protection, such conditions should be
aligned with those applicable under Directive 2011/61/EU of the European
Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2011 on Alternative Investment Fund
Managers and amending Directives 2003/41/EC and 2009/65/EC and Regulations (EC)
No 1060/2009 and (EU) No 1095/2010[14].
Provisions should be adopted to ensure that third parties dispose of the
necessary means to perform their duties and that they segregate UCITS' assets. 
(16)     Entrusting the custody of
assets to the operator of a securities settlement system as provided for in Directive
98/26/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 May 1998 on
settlement finality in payment and securities settlement systems[15] or entrusting the provision of
similar services to third-country securities settlement systems should not be
considered a delegation of custody functions. 
(17)     A third party to whom the
safe-keeping of assets is delegated should be able to maintain an omnibus
account, as a common segregated account for multiple UCITS.
(18)     Where custody is delegated
to a third party, it is also necessary to ensure that the third party is
subject to specific requirements on effective prudential regulation and
supervision. In addition, in order to ensure that the financial instruments are
in the possession of the third party to whom custody was delegated, periodic external
audits should be performed. 
(19)     In order to ensure
consistently high levels of investor protection, provisions on conduct and on
the management of conflicts of interest should be adopted and they should apply
in all situations, including in case of delegation of safe-keeping duties.
Those rules should in particular ensure a clear separation of tasks and
functions between the depositary, the UCITS and the management company.
(20)     In order to ensure a high
level of investor protection and to guarantee an appropriate level of
prudential regulation and on-going control, it is necessary to establish an
exhaustive list of entities that are eligible to act as depositaries, such that
only credit institutions and investment firms are permitted to act as UCITS
depositaries. In order to allow other entities that may have previously been eligible
to act as depositaries for UCITS funds to convert themselves into eligible
entities, transitional provisions should be provided for those entities.
(21)     It is necessary to specify
and clarify the UCITS depositary's liability in case of the loss of a financial
instrument that is held in custody. The depositary should be liable, where a
financial instrument held in custody has been lost, to return a financial
instrument of the identical type or of the corresponding amount to the UCITS.
No further discharge of liability in case of loss of assets should be
envisaged, except where the depositary is able to prove that the loss is due to
an 'external event beyond its reasonable control, the consequences of which
would have been unavoidable despite all reasonable efforts to the contrary'. In
this context, a depositary should not be able to rely on internal situations
such as a fraudulent act by an employee to discharge itself of liability.
(22)     Where the depositary
delegates custody tasks and the financial instruments held in custody by a
third party are lost, the depositary should be liable. It should also be
established that in case of loss of an instrument held in custody, a depositary
is bound to return a financial instrument of identical type or the corresponding
amount, even if the loss occurred with a sub-custodian. The depositary shall
only discharge that liability where it can prove that the loss resulted from an
external event beyond its reasonable control and with consequences that were
unavoidable despite all reasonable efforts to the contrary. In this context, a
depositary should not be able to rely on internal situations such as a
fraudulent act by an employee to discharge itself of liability. No discharge of
liability either regulatory or contractual should be possible in case of loss
of assets by a depository or its sub-custodian.
(23)     Every investor in a UCITS
fund should be able to invoke claims relating to the liability of its depositary,
either directly or indirectly, through the management company. Redress against
the depositary should not depend on the legal form that a UCITS fund takes
(corporate or contractual form) or the legal nature of the relationship between
the depositary, the management company and the unit-holders. 
(24)     On 12 July 2010 the
Commission proposed amendments to Directive 97/9/EC of the European Parliament
and of the Council of 3 March 1997 on investor compensation schemes.[16] It is essential that that the
proposal of 12 July 2010 be complemented by clarifying the obligations and the
scope of the liability of the depositary and the sub-custodians of UCITS with a
view to provide a high level of protection for UCITS investors where a
depositary cannot meet its obligations set out in this Directive.
(25)     It is necessary to ensure
that the same requirements apply to depositaries irrespective of the legal form
a UCITS takes. Consistency of requirements should enhance legal certainty,
increase investor protection and contribute to a creating uniform market
conditions. The Commission has not received any notification that the
derogation from the general obligation to entrust assets to a depositary has been
used by an investment company. Therefore, the requirements of Directive
2009/65/EC regarding the depositary of an investment company should be
considered redundant. 
(26)     In line with the Commission
Communication of 8 December 2010 on reinforcing sanctioning regimes in the
financial services sector,[17]
competent authorities should be empowered to impose pecuniary sanctions which
are sufficiently high so as to be dissuasive and proportionate, so as to offset
expected benefits from behaviours which breach requirements.
(27)     In order to ensure a
consistent application across Member States, when determining the type of
administrative sanctions or measures and the level of administrative pecuniary
sanctions, Member States should be required to ensure that competent
authorities take into account all relevant circumstances.
(28)     In order to strengthen the
dissuasive effect on the public at large and to inform them about breaches of
rules which may be detrimental to investors' protection, sanctions should be
published, save in certain well-defined circumstances. In order to ensure
compliance with the principle of proportionality, sanctions should be published
on an anonymous basis where publication would cause a disproportionate damage
to the parties involved. 
(29)     In order to detect
potential breaches, competent authorities should be entrusted with the
necessary investigatory powers, and should establish effective mechanisms to
encourage reporting of potential or actual breaches. 
(30)     This Directive should be
without prejudice to any provisions in the law of Member States relating to
criminal offences and sanctions.
(31)     This Directive respects the
fundamental rights and observes the principles recognised in the Charter of
Fundamental Rights of the European Union as enshrined in the Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union. 
(32)     In order to ensure that the
objectives of this Directive are attained, the Commission should be empowered
to adopt delegated acts in accordance with Article 290 of the Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union. In particular, the Commission should be
empowered to adopt delegated acts to specify the particulars that need to be
included in the standard agreement between the depositary and the management
company or the investment company, the conditions for performing depositary
functions, including the type of financial instruments that should be included
in the scope of the depositary’s custody duties, the conditions subject to
which the depositary may exercise its custody duties over financial instruments
registered with a central depositary and the conditions subject to which the
depositary should safe keep the financial instruments issued in a nominative
form and registered with an issuer or a registrar, the due diligence duties of
depositaries, the segregation obligation, the conditions subject to and
circumstances in which financial instruments held in custody should be
considered as lost, what is to be understood by external events beyond
reasonable control, the consequences of which would have been unavoidable
despite all reasonable efforts to the contrary. The Commission, when preparing
and drawing-up delegated acts, should ensure simultaneous, timely and
appropriate transmission of relevant documents to the European Parliament and
to the Council.
(33)     In accordance with the
Joint Political Declaration of 28 September 2011 of Member States and the
Commission on explanatory documents[18],
Member States have undertaken to accompany, in justified cases, the
notification of their transposition measures with one or more documents
explaining the relationship between the components of a directive and the
corresponding parts of national transposition instruments. With regard to this
Directive, the legislator considers the transmission of such documents to be
justified. 
(34)     The objectives of the
actions to be taken to improve investors' confidence in UCITS, by enhancing
requirements concerning the duties and the liability of depositaries, the
remuneration policies of management companies and investment companies, and by
introducing common standards for the sanctions applying to the main breaches of
the provisions of this Directive, cannot be sufficiently achieved by Member
States acting independently of one another. Since only action at the European
level can address the identified weaknesses, and therefore such action can be
better achieved at Union level, the Union should adopt the necessary measures,
in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity as set out in Article 5 of the
Treaty on the European Union. In accordance with the principle of
proportionality, as set out in that Article, this Directive does not go beyond
what is necessary in order to achieve that objective.
(35)     Directive 2009/65/EC should
therefore be amended accordingly, 
HAVE ADOPTED THIS DIRECTIVE:
Article 1
Directive 2009/65/EC is amended as follows:
(1)                   
The following Articles 14a and 14b are inserted:
"Article 14a
1. Member States shall require management
companies to establish and apply remuneration policies and practices that are
consistent with and promote sound and effective risk management and do not
encourage risk-taking which is inconsistent with the risk profiles, rules or
instruments of incorporation of the UCITS they manage.
2. The remuneration policies and practices shall
cover salaries and discretionary pension benefits.
3. The remuneration policies and practices
shall apply to those categories of staff, including senior management, risk
takers, control functions and any employee receiving total remuneration that falls
within the remuneration bracket of senior management and risk takers and whose
professional activities have a material impact on the risk profiles of the
management companies or of UCITS they manage.
4. In accordance with Article 16 of Regulation
(EU) No 1095/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council(*), ESMA shall issue guidelines addressed to
competent authorities which comply with Article 14b. Those guidelines shall
take into account the principles on sound remuneration policies set out in Commission
Recommendation 2009/384/EC(**),
the size of the management company and the size of UCITS they manage, their
internal organisation and the nature, the scope and the complexity of their
activities. In the process of development of the guidelines ESMA shall
cooperate closely with the European Banking Authority (EBA) in order to ensure
consistency with requirements developed for other sectors of financial services,
in particular credit institutions and investment firms. 
Article 14b
1. When establishing and applying the
remuneration policies referred to in Article 14a, management companies shall
comply with the following principles in a way and to the extent that is
appropriate to their size, internal organisation and the nature, scope and
complexity of their activities:
(a)          
the remuneration policy is consistent with and
promotes sound and effective risk management and does not encourage risk-taking
which is inconsistent with the risk profiles, rules or instruments of
incorporation of the UCITS they manage;
(b)         
the remuneration policy is in line with the
business strategy, objectives, values and interests of the management company
and the UCITS it manages or the investors of such UCITS, and includes measures
to avoid conflicts of interest;
(c)          
the management body of the management company,
in its supervisory function, adopts and periodically reviews the general
principles of the remuneration policy and is responsible for its
implementation;
(d)         
the implementation of the remuneration policy
is, at least annually, subject to central and independent internal review for
compliance with policies and procedures for remuneration adopted by the
management body in its supervisory function;
(e)          
staff engaged in control functions are
compensated in accordance with the achievement of the objectives linked to
their functions, independent of the performance of the business areas they
control;
(f)           
the remuneration of the senior officers in the
risk management and compliance functions is directly overseen by the
remuneration committee;
(g)          
where remuneration is performance related, the
total amount of remuneration is based on a combination of the assessment of the
performance of the individual and of the business unit or UCITS concerned and
of the overall results of the management company, and when assessing individual
performance, financial as well as non-financial criteria are taken into
account;
(h)          
the assessment of performance is set in a
multi-year framework appropriate to the life-cycle of the UCITS managed by the
management company in order to ensure that the assessment process is based on
longer term performance and that the actual payment of performance-based
components of remuneration is spread over a period which takes account of the
redemption policy of the UCITS it manages and their investment risks;
(i)            
guaranteed variable remuneration is exceptional,
occurs only in the context of hiring new staff and is limited to the first year;
(j)           
fixed and variable components of total
remuneration are appropriately balanced and the fixed component represents a
sufficiently high proportion of the total remuneration to allow the operation
of a fully flexible policy on variable remuneration components, including the
possibility to pay no variable remuneration component;
(k)         
payments related to the early termination of a
contract reflect performance achieved over time and are designed in a way that
does not reward failure;
(l)            
the measurement of performance used to calculate
variable remuneration components or pools of variable remuneration components
includes a comprehensive adjustment mechanism to integrate all relevant types
of current and future risks;
(m)        
subject to the legal structure of the UCITS and
its fund rules or instruments of incorporation, a substantial portion, and in
any event at least 50% of any variable remuneration consists of units of the
UCITS concerned, or equivalent ownership interests, or share-linked instruments
or equivalent non-cash instruments, unless the management of UCITS accounts for
less than 50% of the total portfolio managed by the management company, in
which case the minimum of 50% does not apply.
The instruments referred to in this point shall
be subject to an appropriate retention policy designed to align incentives with
the interests of the management company and the UCITS it manages and the
investors of such UCITS. Member States or their competent authorities may place
restrictions on the types and designs of those instruments or ban certain
instruments as appropriate. This point shall be applied to both the portion of
the variable remuneration component deferred in line with point (n) and the
portion of the variable remuneration component not deferred;
(n)          
a substantial portion, and in any event at least
40%, of the variable remuneration component, is deferred over a period which is
appropriate in view of the life cycle and redemption policy of the UCITS
concerned and is correctly aligned with the nature of the risks of the UCITS in
question.
The period referred to in this point shall be
at least three to five years unless the life cycle of the UCITS concerned is
shorter; remuneration payable under deferral arrangements vests no faster than
on a pro-rata basis; in the case of a variable remuneration component of a
particularly high amount, at least 60% of the amount shall be deferred;
(o)         
the variable remuneration, including the
deferred portion, is paid or vests only if it is sustainable according to the
financial situation of the management company as a whole, and justified
according to the performance of the business unit, the UCITS and the individual
concerned.
The total variable remuneration shall generally
be considerably contracted where subdued or negative financial performance of
the management company or of the UCITS concerned occurs, taking into account
both current compensation and reductions in payouts of amounts previously
earned, including through malus or clawback arrangements;
(p)         
the pension policy is in line with the business
strategy, objectives, values and long-term interests of the management company
and the UCITS it manages.
If the employee leaves the management company
before retirement, discretionary pension benefits shall be held by the
management company for a period of five years in the form of instruments referred
to in point (m). In the case of an employee reaching retirement, discretionary
pension benefits shall be paid to the employee in the form of instruments referred
to in point (m), subject to a five year retention period;
(q)         
staff are required to undertake not to use
personal hedging strategies or remuneration- and liability-related insurance to
undermine the risk alignment effects embedded in their remuneration
arrangements;
(r)           
variable remuneration is not paid through
vehicles or methods that facilitate the avoidance of the requirements of this
Directive.
2. The principles set out in paragraph 1 shall
apply to remuneration of any type paid by the management companies and to any
transfer of units or shares of the UCITS, made to the benefits of those
categories of staff, including senior management, risk takers, control
functions and any employee receiving total remuneration that falls into the
remuneration bracket of senior management and risk takers, whose professional
activities have a material impact on their risk profile or the risk profiles of
the UCITS that they manage.
3. Management companies that are significant in
terms of their size or the size of the UCITS they manage, their internal
organisation and the nature, the scope and the complexity of their activities
shall establish a remuneration committee. The remuneration committee shall be
constituted in a way that enables it to exercise competent and independent
judgment on remuneration policies and practices and the incentives created for
managing risk.
The remuneration committee shall be responsible
for the preparation of decisions regarding remuneration, including those which
have implications for the risk and risk management of the management company or
the UCITS concerned and which are to be taken by the management body in its
supervisory function. The remuneration committee shall be chaired by a member
of the management body who does not perform any executive functions in the
management company concerned. The members of the remuneration committee shall
be members of the management body who do not perform any executive functions in
the management company concerned.
_______
(*)     OJ L 331, 15.12.2010, p. 12.
(**)   OJ L 120,
15.5.2009, p. 22.”
(2)                   
In Article 20(1), point (a) is replaced by the
following:
"(a) the written contract with the depositary
referred to in Article 22(2); "
(3)                   
Article 22 is replaced by the following:
"Article 22
1. An investment company and, for each of the
common funds it manages, a management company shall ensure that a single
depositary is appointed in accordance with the provisions of this Chapter.
2. The appointment of the depositary shall take
the form of a written contract. 
That contract shall comprise rules establishing
the flow of information deemed necessary to allow the depositary to perform its
functions in respect of the UCITS for which it has been appointed as
depositary, as set out in this Directive and in other laws, regulations and
administrative provisions which are relevant for depositaries in the UCITS home
Member State. 
3. The depositary shall:
(a)          
ensure that the sale, issue, re-purchase,
redemption and cancellation of units of the UCITS are carried out in accordance
with the applicable national laws and the fund rules or instruments of
incorporation;
(b)         
ensure that the value of the units of the UCITS
is calculated in accordance with the applicable national laws and the fund
rules or the instruments of incorporation;
(c)          
carry out the instructions of the management
company or an investment company, unless they conflict with the applicable
national laws or the fund rules or the instruments of incorporation;
(d)         
ensure that in transactions involving the assets
of the UCITS any consideration is remitted to the UCITS within the usual time
limits;
(e)          
ensure that the income of the UCITS is applied
in accordance with the applicable national laws and the fund rules or the instruments
of incorporation.
4. The depositary shall ensure that the cash
flows of the UCITS are properly monitored, and shall in particular ensure that
all payments made by or on behalf of investors upon the subscription of units
of the UCITS have been received, and that
all cash of the UCITS has been booked in cash accounts that meet the following
conditions:
(a)          
they are opened in the name of the UCITS or in
the name of the management company acting on behalf of the UCITS, or in the name of the depositary acting on behalf
of the UCITS;
(b)         
they are opened at an entity referred to in
points (a), (b) and (c) of Article 18(1) of Commission Directive 2006/73/EC(*) and
(c)          
they are maintained in accordance with the
principles set out in Article 16 of Directive 2006/73/EC.
Where the cash accounts are opened in the name
of the depositary acting on behalf of the UCITS, no cash of the entity referred
to in point (b) of the first subparagraph and none of the own cash of the
depositary shall be booked on such accounts. 
5. The assets of the UCITS shall be entrusted
to the depositary for safe-keeping as follows: 
(a)         
for financial instruments that may be held in custody,
the depositary shall: 
(i) hold in custody all financial instruments
that may be registered in a financial instruments account opened in the depositary's
books and all financial instruments that can be physically delivered to the depositary;
(ii) ensure that all those financial
instruments that can be registered in a financial instruments account opened in
the depositary's books are registered in the depositary's books within
segregated accounts in accordance with the principles set out in Article 16 of
Directive 2006/73/EC, opened in the name of the UCITS or the management company
acting on behalf of the UCITS, so that they can be clearly identified as
belonging to the UCITS in accordance with the applicable law at all times;
(b)         
for other assets the depositary shall:
(i) verify the ownership of the UCITS or the
management company acting on behalf of the UCITS of such assets by assessing
whether the UCITS or the management company acting on behalf of the UCITS holds
the ownership based on information or documents provided by the UCITS or the
management company and, where available, on external evidence;
(ii) maintain a record of those assets for
which it is satisfied that the UCITS or the management company acting on behalf
of the UCITS holds the ownership and keep that record up-to-date.
6. Member States shall ensure that in the event
of insolvency of the depositary, assets of a UCITS held by the depositary in
custody are unavailable for distribution among or realisation for the benefit
of creditors of the depositary.
7. The depositary shall not delegate to third
parties its functions as referred to in paragraphs 3 and 4. 
The depositary may delegate to third parties
the functions referred to in paragraph 5 only where: 
(a)          
the tasks are not delegated with the intention
of avoiding the requirements of this Directive;
(b)         
the depositary can demonstrate that there is an
objective reason for the delegation;
(c)          
the depositary has exercised all due skill, care
and diligence in the selection and the appointment of any third party to whom
it wants to delegate parts of its tasks, and keeps exercising all due skill,
care and diligence in the periodic review and ongoing monitoring of any third
party to whom it has delegated parts of its tasks and of the arrangements of
the third party in respect of the matters delegated to it.
The functions referred to in paragraph 5 may be
delegated by the depositary only to a third party which at all time during the
performance of the tasks delegated to it:
(a)          
has structures and expertise that are adequate
and proportionate to the nature and complexity of the assets of the UCITS or
the management company acting on behalf of the UCITS which have been entrusted
to it;
(b)         
for custody tasks referred to in point (a) of
paragraph 5, is subject to effective prudential regulation, including minimum
capital requirements, and supervision in the jurisdiction concerned;
(c)          
for custody tasks referred to in point (a) of
paragraph 5, is subject to an external periodic audit to ensure that the
financial instruments are in its possession;
(d)         
segregates the assets of the clients of the
depositary from its own assets and from the assets of the depositary in such a
way that they can at any time be clearly identified as belonging to clients of
a particular depositary;
(e)          
in the event of insolvency of the third party,
assets of a UCITS held by the third party in custody are unavailable for
distribution among or realisation for the benefit of creditors of the third
party;
(f)           
complies with the general obligations and
prohibitions set out in paragraph 5 and Article 25.
Notwithstanding point (b) of the third subparagraph
where the law of a third country requires that certain financial instruments be
held in custody by a local entity and no local entities satisfy the delegation
requirements laid down in that point, the depositary may delegate its functions
to such a local entity only to the extent required by the law of the third
country and only for as long as there are no local entities that satisfy the
delegation requirements, and only where:
(a)          
the investors of the relevant UCITS are duly
informed that such delegation is required due to legal constraints in the law
of the third country and of the circumstances justifying the delegation, prior
to their investment; 
(b)         
the UCITS, or the management company on behalf
of the UCITS, have instructed the depositary to delegate the custody of such
financial instruments to such a local entity.
The third party may, in turn, sub-delegate
those functions, subject to the same requirements. In such a case, Article
24(2) shall apply mutatis mutandis to the relevant parties.
For the purposes of the first to the fifth subparagraphs,
the provision of services as specified by Directive 98/26/EC of the European
Parliament and of the Council(**) by securities settlement systems as designated for the purposes of
Directive 98/26/EC or the provision of similar services by third-country
securities settlement systems shall not be considered a delegation of its
custody functions.
_________ 
(*) OJ L 241,
2.9.2006, p. 26.
(**) OJ L 166, 11.6.1998,
p. 45.”
(4)                   
Article 23 is amended as follows:
(a)         
Paragraph 2 is replaced by the following:
"2. The depositary shall be:
(a)          
a credit institution authorised in accordance
with Directive 2006/48/EC;
(b)         
an investment firm, subject to capital adequacy
requirements in accordance with Article 20(1) of Directive 2006/49/EC including
capital requirements for operational risks and authorised in accordance with
Directive 2004/39/EC and which also provides the ancillary service of
safe-keeping and administration of financial instruments for the account of
clients in accordance with point (1) of Section B of Annex I to Directive
2004/39/EC; such investment firms shall in any case have own funds not less
than the amount of initial capital referred to in Article 9 of Directive
2006/49/EC;
Investment companies or management companies
acting on behalf of the UCITS they manage, that, before [date: transposition
deadline set out in Article 2(1) first subparagraph], appointed as a depositary
an institution that does not meet the requirements set out in this paragraph,
shall appoint a depositary that meets those requirements before [date: 1 year
after a deadline set out in Article 2(1) first subparagraph"
(b)         
Paragraphs 3, 4, 5 and 6 are deleted. 
(5)                   
Article 24 is replaced by the following:
"Article 24
1. Member States shall ensure that the
depositary shall be liable to the UCITS and to the unit holders of the UCITS
for the loss by the depositary or a third party to whom the custody of
financial instruments held in custody in accordance with point (a) of Article
22(5) has been delegated.
In case of a loss of a financial instrument
held in custody, Member States shall ensure that the depositary shall return a
financial instrument of identical type or the corresponding amount to the UCITS
or the management company acting on behalf of the UCITS without undue delay.
The depositary shall not be liable if it can prove that the loss has arisen as
a result of an external event beyond its reasonable control, the consequences
of which would have been unavoidable despite all reasonable efforts to the
contrary.
Member States shall ensure that the depositary
shall also be liable to the UCITS, and to the investors of the UCITS, for all
other losses suffered as a result of the depositary’s negligent or intentional
failure to properly fulfil its obligations pursuant to this Directive.
2. The liability of the depositary shall not be
affected by any delegation referred to in Article 22(7).
3. The liability of the depositary referred to
in paragraph 1 shall not be excluded or limited by agreement. 
4. Any agreement that contravenes the provision
of paragraph 3 shall be void. 
5. Unit holders in the UCITS may invoke the
liability of the depositary directly or indirectly through the management company."
(6)                   
In Article 25, paragraph 2 is replaced by the
following:
"2. In carrying out their respective
functions, the management company and the depositary shall act honestly,
fairly, professionally, independently and in the interest of the UCITS and the
investors of the UCITS.
A depositary shall not carry out activities
with regard to the UCITS or the management company on behalf of the UCITS that
may create conflicts of interest between the UCITS, the investors in the UCITS,
the management company and itself, unless the depositary has functionally and
hierarchically separated the performance of its depositary tasks from its other
potentially conflicting tasks, and the potential conflicts of interest are
properly identified, managed, monitored and disclosed to the investors of the
UCITS."
(7)                   
Article 26 is replaced by the following:
"Article 26
1. The law or the fund rules of the common fund
shall lay down the conditions for the replacement of the management company and
the depositary and rules to ensure the protection of unit-holders in the event
of such replacement.
2. The law or the instruments of incorporation
of the investment company shall lay down the conditions for the replacement of
the management company and the depositary and rules to ensure the protection of
unit-holders in the event of such replacement. 
(8)                   
The following Articles 26a and 26b are inserted:
"Article 26a 
The depositary shall make available to its
competent authorities, competent authorities of the management company's home
Member State and the competent authorities of the UCITS home Member State, on
request, all information which it has obtained while performing its duties and
that may be necessary for the competent authorities to carry out their duties
under this Directive.
Article 26b 
1.           The Commission shall be
empowered to adopt, by means of delegated acts in accordance with Article 112
and subject to the conditions of Articles 112a and 112b, measures specifying:
(a)          
the particulars that need to be included in the
written contract referred to in Article 22(2);
(b)         
the conditions for performing the depositary
functions pursuant to Articles 22(3), (4) and (5), including:
(i) the type of financial instruments to be
included in the scope of the custody duties of the depositary in accordance
with point (a) of Article 22(5);
(ii) the conditions subject to which the
depositary is able to exercise its custody duties over financial instruments
registered with a central depositary; 
(iii) the conditions subject to which the
depositary is to safekeep the financial instruments issued in a nominative form
and registered with an issuer or a registrar, in accordance with point (b) of Article
22(5);
(c)          
the due diligence duties of depositaries
pursuant to point (c) of second subparagraph of Article 22(7);
(d)         
the segregation obligation pursuant to point (d)
of third subparagraph of Article 22(7);
(e)          
the conditions subject to which and
circumstances in which financial instruments held in custody are to be
considered as lost for the purpose of Article 24;
(f)           
what is to be understood by external events
beyond reasonable control, the consequences of which would have been
unavoidable despite all reasonable efforts to the contrary pursuant to Article
24(1)."
(9)                   
In Article 30, the first paragraph is replaced
by the following:
"Articles 13, 14, 14a and 14b shall apply mutatis
mutandis to investment companies that have not designated a management
company authorised pursuant to this Directive."
(10)               
Section 3 of Chapter V is deleted.
(11)               
In Article 69(3) the following second subparagraph
is added:
"The annual report shall also contain: 
(a)          
the total amount of remuneration for the
financial year, split into fixed and variable remuneration paid by the
management company and by the investment company to its staff, and the number
of beneficiaries, and where relevant, the carried interest paid by the UCITS;
(b)         
the aggregate amount of remuneration broken down
by senior management and members of staff of the management company and, where
relevant, of the investment company, whose actions have a material impact on
the risk profile of the UCITS."
(12)               
Article 98 is amended as follows:
(a)         
In paragraph 2 point (d) is replaced by the
following:
"(d) require existing telephone records
and traffic data, as defined in Article 2 (b) of Directive 2002/58/EC of the
European Parliament and of the Council(*), that are held by UCITS, management companies, investment companies
or depositories where a serious suspicion exists that such records related to
the subject-matter of the inspection may be relevant to prove a breach by the
UCITS, management companies, investment companies or depositories of their obligations
under this Directive; these records shall however not concern the content of
the communication to which they relate.
_________ 
(*)        OJ L 201, 31.7.2002, p. 37."
(b)         
The following paragraph 3 is added:
"3. If a request for records of telephone
or data traffic referred to in point (d) of paragraph 2 requires authorisation
from a judicial authority according to national rules such authorisation shall
be applied for. Such authorisation may also be applied for as a precautionary
measure."
(13)               
Article 99 is replaced by the following:
"Article 99
1. Member States shall provide that their
respective competent authorities may take appropriate administrative sanctions
and measures where the national provisions adopted in the implementation of
this Directive have not been complied with, and shall ensure that those
measures are applied. The sanctions and measures shall be effective,
proportionate and dissuasive.
2. Member States shall ensure that where
obligations apply to UCITS, management companies, investment companies or
depositaries, in case of a breach, sanctions or measures may be applied to the
members of the management body, and to any other individuals who under national
law are responsible for the breach. 
3. Competent authorities shall be given all
investigatory powers that are necessary for the exercise of their functions. In
the exercise of their powers, competent authorities shall cooperate closely to
ensure that sanctions or measures produce the desired results and coordinate
their action when dealing with cross border cases."
(14)               
The following Articles 99a, 99b, 99c, 99d and
99e are inserted:
"Article 99a
1. This Article shall apply when:
(a)          
the activities of UCITS are pursued without
obtaining authorisation in breach of Article 5;
(b)         
the business of a management company is carried
on without obtaining prior authorisation in breach of Article 6;
(c)          
the business of an investment company is carried
on without obtaining prior authorisation in breach of Article 27;
(d)         
a qualifying holding in a management company is
acquired, directly or indirectly, or such a qualifying holding in a management
company is further increased so that the proportion of the voting rights or of
the capital held would reach or exceed 20%, 30% or 50% or so that the
management company would become its subsidiary (hereinafter referred to as the
proposed acquisition), without notifying in writing the competent authorities
of the management company in which the acquirer is seeking to acquire or
increase a qualifying holding in breach of Article 11(1);
(e)          
a qualifying holding in a management company is
disposed of, directly or indirectly, or reduced so that the proportion of the
voting rights or of the capital held would fall below 20%, 30% or 50% or so
that the management company would cease to be a subsidiary, without notifying
in writing the competent authorities, in breach of Article 11(1);
(f)           
a management company has obtained an
authorisation through false statements or any other irregular means in breach
of Article 7(5)(b);
(g)          
an investment company has obtained an
authorisation through false statements or any other irregular means in breach
of Article 29(4)(b);
(h)          
a management company, on becoming aware of any
acquisition or disposal of holdings in their capital that cause holdings to
exceed or fall below one of the thresholds referred to in Article 11(10) of Directive
2004/39/EC, fails to inform the competent authorities of those acquisitions or
disposals in breach of Article 11(1);
(i)            
a management company fails to, at least once a
year, inform the competent authority of the names of shareholders and members
possessing qualifying holdings and the sizes of such holdings in breach of
Article 11(1);
(j)           
a management company fails to comply with
procedures and arrangements imposed in accordance with the national provisions
implementing Article 12(1)(a);
(k)         
a management company fails to comply with
structural and organisational requirements imposed in accordance with the
national provisions implementing Article 12(1)(b);
(l)            
an investment company fails to comply with
procedures and arrangements imposed in accordance with the national provisions
implementing Article 31;
(m)        
a management company or an investment company fails
to comply with requirements related to delegation of its functions to third
parties imposed in accordance with the national provisions implementing
Articles 13 and 30;
(n)          
a management company or an investment company fails
to comply with rules of conduct imposed in accordance with the national
provisions implementing Articles 14 and 30;
(o)         
a depositary fails to perform its tasks in
accordance with national provisions implementing paragraphs (3) to (7) of
Article 22;
(p)         
an investment company and, for each of the
common fund it manages, a management company repeatedly fails to comply with
obligations concerning the investment policies of UCITS set out by national
provisions implementing Chapter VII;
(q)         
a management company or an investment company
fails to employ a risk management process and a process for accurate and
independent assessment of the value of OTC derivatives as set out in national
provisions implementing Article 51(1);
(r)           
an investment company and, for each of the
common fund it manages, a management company repeatedly fails to comply with
obligations concerning information to be provided to investors imposed in
accordance with the national provisions implementing Articles 68 to 82;
(s)          
a management company or an investment company
marketing units of UCITS it manages in a Member State other than the UCITS home
Member State fails to comply with the notification requirement set out in
Article 93(1).
2.       Member States shall ensure that in all
cases referred to in paragraph 1, the administrative sanctions and measures
that may be applied include at least the following: 
(a)          
a public statement which indicates the natural
or legal person and the nature of the breach;
(b)         
issuing an order requiring the natural or legal
person to cease the conduct and to desist from a repetition of that conduct;
(c)          
in case of a management company or a UCITS,
withdrawal of the authorisation of the management company or the UCITS;
(d)         
imposing a temporary ban against any member of
the management company's or the investment company's management body or any
other natural person, who is held responsible, to exercise functions in those
companies;
(e)          
in case of a legal person, imposing administrative
pecuniary sanctions of up to 10% of the total annual turnover of that legal
person in the preceding business year; where the legal person is a subsidiary
of a parent undertaking, the relevant total annual turnover shall be the total
annual turnover resulting from the consolidated account of the ultimate parent
undertaking in the preceding business year;
(f)           
in case of a natural person, imposing administrative
pecuniary sanctions of up to EUR 5 000 000, or in the Member States where the euro
is not the official currency, the corresponding value in the national currency
on the date of entry into force of this Directive;
(g)          
imposing administrative pecuniary sanctions of
up to twice the amount of the profits gained or losses avoided because of the
breach where those can be determined.
Article 99b
Member States shall ensure that the competent
authorities publish any sanction or measure imposed for breach of the national
provisions adopted in the implementation of this Directive without undue delay,
including information on the type and nature of the breach and the identity of
persons responsible for it, unless such publication would seriously jeopardise
the stability of financial markets. Where publication would cause a
disproportionate damage to the parties involved, competent authorities shall
publish the sanction or measure imposed on an anonymous basis.
Article 99c
1. Member States shall ensure that when
determining the type of administrative sanctions or measures and the level of
administrative pecuniary sanctions, the competent authorities shall take into
account all relevant circumstances, including:
(a)          
the gravity and the duration of the breach;
(b)         
the degree of responsibility of the responsible
natural or legal person; 
(c)          
the financial strength of the responsible
natural or legal person, as indicated by the total turnover of the responsible
legal person or the annual income of the responsible natural person;
(d)         
the importance of profits gained or losses avoided
by the responsible natural or legal person, insofar as they can be determined;
(e)          
the level of cooperation of the responsible
natural or legal person with the competent authority;
(f)           
previous breaches by the responsible natural or
legal person.
2. ESMA shall issue guidelines addressed to
competent authorities in accordance with Article 16 of Regulation (EU) No
1093/2010 on types of administrative measures and sanctions and level of
administrative pecuniary sanctions.
Article 99d
1. Member States shall ensure that competent
authorities establish effective mechanisms to encourage reporting of breaches
of the national provisions implementing this Directive to competent
authorities.
2. The mechanisms referred to in paragraph 1
shall include at least:
(a)          
specific procedures for the receipt of reports
on breaches and their follow-up; 
(b)         
appropriate protection for employees of investment
companies and management companies who report breaches committed within the company;
(c)          
protection of personal data concerning both the
person who reports the breaches and the natural person who is allegedly
responsible for a breach, in compliance with the principles laid down in
Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council(*).
3. Member States shall require institutions to have
in place appropriate procedures for their employees to report breaches
internally through a specific channel.
Article 99e
1. Member States shall provide ESMA annually
with aggregated information regarding all measures or sanctions imposed in
accordance with Article 99. ESMA shall publish this information in an annual
report.
2. Where the competent authority has published a
measure or sanction, it shall also report the measures or sanctions to ESMA.
Where a published measure or sanction relates to a management company, ESMA
shall add a reference to the published measure or sanction in the list of
management companies published under Article 6(1). 
3. ESMA shall develop draft implementing
technical standards concerning the procedures and forms for submitting
information as referred to in this Article.
Power is conferred on the Commission to adopt
the implementing technical standards referred to in the first subparagraph in
accordance with Article 15 of Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010.
ESMA shall submit those draft implementing
technical standards to the Commission by [insert date]."
________ 
(*)     OJ L 281, 23.11.1995, p. 31."
(15)               
The following Article 104a is inserted:
"Article 104a
1. Member State shall apply Directive 95/46/EC
to the processing of personal data carried out in the Member State pursuant to
this Directive.
2. Regulation EC No 45/2001 of the European
Parliament and of the Council(*) shall apply to the processing of personal data
carried out by ESMA pursuant to this Directive.
________ 
(*)     OJ L 8, 12.1.2001, p. 1."
(16)               
In Article 112, paragraph 2 is replaced by the
following:
"2. The power to adopt the delegated acts
referred to in Articles 12, 14, 43, 51, 60, 61, 62, 64, 75, 78, 81, 95 and 111
shall be conferred on the Commission for a period of four years from 4 January
2011. The power to adopt the delegated acts referred to in Article 50a shall be
conferred on the Commission for a period of four years from 21 July 2011. The
power to adopt the delegated acts referred to in Article 26b shall be conferred
on the Commission for a period of four years from […]. The Commission shall
draw up a report in respect of delegated powers not later than six months
before the end of the four-year period. The delegation of power shall be
automatically extended for periods of an identical duration, unless the
European Parliament or the Council revokes them in accordance with Article
112a."
(17)               
In Article 112a, paragraph 1 is replaced by the
following:
"1. The delegation of power referred to in
Articles 12, 14, 26b, 43, 50a, 51, 60, 61, 62, 64, 75, 78, 81, 95 and 111 may
be revoked at any time by the European Parliament or by the Council."
(18)               
Annex I is amended as set out in the Annex to
this Directive
Article 2
1.           Member States shall adopt
and publish, by […] at the latest, the laws, regulations and administrative
provisions necessary to comply with this Directive. They shall forthwith
communicate to the Commission the text of those provisions.
They shall apply the laws, regulations and
administrative provisions referred to in paragraph 1 from […].
When Member States adopt those provisions, they
shall contain a reference to this Directive or be accompanied by such a
reference on the occasion of their official publication. Member States shall
determine how such reference is to be made.
2.           Member States shall
communicate to the Commission the text of the main provisions of national law
which they adopt in the field covered by this Directive.
Article 3
This Directive shall enter into force on
the twentieth day following that of its publication in the Official Journal
of the European Union.
Article 4
This Directive is addressed to the Member
States.
Done at Strasbourg, 
For the European Parliament                       For
the Council
The President                                                 The
President
ANNEX 
In Annex I, point 2 of the Schedule A is
replaced by the following;
"2. Information concerning the depositary:
2.1. The identity of the depositary of the
UCITS and a description of its duties;
2.2. A description of any safe-keeping
functions delegated by the depositary, the identification of the delegate and
any conflicts of interest that may arise from such delegation"
[1]               One of the consequences of the financial crisis was
the bankruptcy of the Lehman Brothers International Europe,
the Lehman UK entity which collapsed in 2008. This entity was entrusted as
a sub-custodian with assets of some collective investment schemes (although
non-UCITS funds, the
regulatory model was similar to that of UCITS in terms of depositary rules).
[2]               COM(2010)716 final.
[3]               Available at:           http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/consultations/docs/2009/ucits/feedback_statement_en.pdf

[4]               Categories of respondents: corporate entities and
their industry associations (46), Member State public authorities (11), and
consumer organisations (1).
[5]               Two public consultations are respectively available
at:                
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/consultations/docs/2009/ucits/consultation_paper_en.pdf
and 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/consultations/docs/2010/ucits/consultation_paper_en.pdf
[6]               Including money market
instruments, index-based funds including exchange traded funds (ETFs) fund of funds, derivatives (options, swaps, futures/forwards) or other
over-the-counter derivatives. Please refer to Directive 2007/16/EC, available
at:        
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2007:079:0011:0019:EN:PDF
[7]               OJ C,,p.
[8]               OJ C,,p.
[9]               OJ L 302,17.11.2009, p.32.
[10]             OJ L 120,15.5.2009,p.22.
[11]             OJ L 331,15.12.2010,p.84.
[12]             OJ L 331,15.12.2010,p.12.
[13]             OJ
L 241, 2.9.2006, p. 26.
[14]             OJ L 174, 1.7.2011, p. 1.
[15]             OJ L 166, 11.6.1998, p. 45.
[16]             OJ L 84, 26.03.1997,p.22
[17]             COM(2010)716 final..
[18]             OJ C 369,17.12.2011, p. 14.