CELEX: 32014M7340
Language: en
Date: 2014-09-12 00:00:00
Title: Commission Decision of 12/09/2014 declaring a concentration to be compatible with the common market (Case No COMP/M.7340 - FERRERO INTERNATIONAL / OLTAN GROUP) according to Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 (Only the English text is authentic)

|[pic]                             |EUROPEAN COMMISSION                                                                                      |

Brussels, 12.09.2014
C(2014) 6505 final

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|To the notifying party:                                               |                                                                      |
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Dear Sir/Madam,

Subject:    Case M.7340 - FERRERO INTERNATIONAL/ OLTAN GROUP
Commission decision pursuant to Article 6(1)(b) of Council Regulation No 139/2004[1]

 1. On 7 August 2014, the European Commission received a notification of a proposed concentration pursuant to Article 4 of the Merger Regulation
    by which the undertaking Ferrero International S.A. ("Ferrero", Luxembourg) acquires within the meaning of Article  3(1)(b)  of  the  Merger
    Regulation sole control of the whole of the undertaking Oltan Gida Maddeleri İhracat İthalat ve  Ticaret  Anonim  Şirketi,  the  undertaking
    Oltan Fındık İşletmeleri Sanayi Ve Ticaret Anonim Şirketi, the undertaking Oltan Fındık Sanayi ve Ticaret Anonim  Şirketi,  the  undertaking
    Oltan Boyer SAS and the undertaking Oltan Grout Limited (together "Oltan") by way of purchase of shares.[2] Ferrero is hereinafter  referred
    to as "the Notifying Party". Ferrero and Oltan are collectively referred to as "the Parties".

The Parties and the transaction

 2. Ferrero is the holding company of the Ferrero group,  a  producer  of  foodstuffs,  active  worldwide  in  the  manufacturing  and  sale  of
    confectionery and other sweet products (e.g. chocolate confectionery, candies, snacks and sweet spreadable products), and  in  the  purchase
    and commercialization of edible nuts, in particular hazelnuts.

 3. Oltan is a group of companies active in the purchase, processing and commercialization of edible nuts, and in particular hazelnuts, all over
    the world.

 4. On 16 July 2014, Ferrero entered into three sale and purchase agreements with Mr Orhan Veli Oltan pursuant to which Ferrero acquires 100% of
    the share capital and voting rights of Oltan. By means of such sale and purchase agreements, Ferrero will acquire sole control  over  Oltan.
    The proposed transaction therefore constitutes a concentration within the meaning of Article 3(1)(b) of the Merger Regulation.

EU DIMENSION

 5. The undertakings concerned have a combined aggregate worldwide turnover of more than EUR 5 000 million [Ferrero: EUR […] million and  Oltan:
    EUR […] million]. Each of them has an EU-wide turnover in excess of EUR 250 million [Ferrero: EUR […] million and Oltan: EUR  […]  million],
    but they do not achieve more than two-thirds of their aggregate EU-wide turnover within one and the same Member State.

 6. The notified transaction therefore has an EU dimension pursuant to Article 1(2) of the Merger Regulation.

COMMISSION'S ASSESSMENT

       Relevant product markets

 7. The proposed transaction involves horizontal overlaps and  vertical  relationships.  Horizontal  overlaps  arise  in  the  markets  for  the
    procurement and supply of hazelnuts, where both  Ferrero  and  Oltan  operate.  Ferrero  also  uses  hazelnuts  as  an  ingredient  for  the
    manufacturing of chocolate confectionery and sweet spreadable products. There are therefore vertical relationships between Oltan's  upstream
    activities, and Ferrero's downstream activities.

Overview of the hazelnut procurement and supply chain

 8. The proposed transaction mainly concerns the procurement and supply of hazelnuts.

 9. Hazelnuts (Corylus avellana), or filberts, originated in the Mediterranean region. They are currently  grown  all  over  the  world  in  the
    Northern as well as in the Southern hemisphere. Turkey accounts for around 70% of worldwide hazelnut production; other  producing  countries
    include inter alia Italy, Georgia and Azerbaijan.

10. After collection, hazelnuts need to undergo several processing stages. First of all, hazelnuts need to be cleaned and dried. Processors air-
    dry the nuts to reduce their moisture level. Once dried, the hazelnuts are subject to a first sizing in the shell in order to separate  nuts
    of different sizes. The shells of the nuts are then cracked in the crackers, and the nutmeats are separated from the  shells.  Shelled  nuts
    are sized once again and sorted by grade. Sizing, of both in shell and shelled hazelnuts, takes place in cylinders with holes  of  different
    sizes. Hazelnuts are moved through the processing facility by exploiting the force of gravity in tall structures.

11. Raw hazelnuts may further undergo different types of processing. They may be dry roasted in an oven (most hazelnuts are lightly  roasted  to
    provide flavour), or they may be diced or processed into flour or paste.

12. Hazelnuts are sold all over the world as raw or processed hazelnuts to large industrial customers that are, by market convention,  customers
    who purchase 2 000 tons or more of shelled hazelnuts, or to smaller non-industrial customers such as patisseries and bakeries.

13. Given that the proposed transaction concerns the acquisition of a hazelnut  trader  active  almost  exclusively  in  the  trade  of  Turkish
    hazelnuts and given that Turkey is by far the largest exporter of hazelnuts, accounting for around 70% of worldwide  export,  the  following
    will briefly provide a more detailed description of the hazelnut supply chain in Turkey.

14. In Turkey, the hazelnut supply chain is divided into five levels:

 a. Farmers cultivate the land and grow the hazelnuts. There are around  300,000  -  400,000  farmers  in  Turkey,  with  a  fragmented  orchard
    structure, each orchard being on average one hectare.

 b. Farmers sell the hazelnuts to collectors, called manau in Turkish. There are around 800-1,000 manau in Turkey, whose main function is to act
    as intermediaries between farmers and players further downstream in the supply chain by gathering sufficient quantities  of  hazelnuts  from
    the orchards that are then sold on to crackers or, sometimes, directly to exporters.

 c. Crackers are undertakings that shell hazelnuts and carry out a first selection based on the size  and  quality  of  the  shelled  hazelnuts.
    According to the Notifying Party, there are around 80-100 crackers in Turkey. Crackers generally do not export hazelnuts but sell them on to
    exporters.

 d. Exporters are larger firms that have the necessary know-how and infrastructure to carry out a more sophisticated selection of hazelnuts than
    crackers and to process hazelnuts by, for example, toasting or dicing them. According to the Notifying  Party,  exporters  generally  export
    most of the hazelnuts they buy as around 80% of the Turkish hazelnut harvest is exported. Hazelnuts are sold  to  other  traders,  to  large
    industrial customers in the confectionery sector, and to other customers such as smaller confectionery producers, bakeries and patisseries.

 e. Traders purchase hazelnuts from exporters and resell them on the international market. These traders such as  Cargill,  Olam,  Tiryaki  Agro
    Gida San Ve Tic, Shoei Fodds Corporation, Besana, or brokers generally  deal  in  several  products,  whether  edible  nuts  or  other  food
    ingredients, and sell, potentially, to the same customers as the exporters, although the  largest  industrial  customers  tend  to  purchase
    directly from exporters. According to the Notifying Party, exporters and traders compete against each other.

15. The structure of the hazelnut procurement chain in Turkey described above is not rigid. In particular, exporters may purchase hazelnuts from
    either crackers or manau. Oltan, for example, buys from both categories of suppliers. According to the Notifying Party, the  choice  depends
    on three main factors:

 a. the quantity of the harvest;

 b. the supply and availability of hazelnuts at any given time; and

 c. the quality of the hazelnuts available.

Procurement and supply of hazelnut

16. The Parties do not operate their own hazelnut plantations, but rather purchase hazelnuts from farmers, crackers  and  exporters.  Ferrero[3]
    and Oltan purchase hazelnuts in Turkey and other countries around the world, and resell them on a global basis.

17. There are no Commission precedents relating to the procurement and supply of hazelnuts.

18. The Notifying Party submits that the relevant product markets are the market for the procurement and supply of edible nuts.  In  particular,
    edible nuts have similar characteristics and satisfy the same needs, as the nutritional content of edible nuts is very similar, all types of
    edible nuts contain antioxidants, all edible nuts can be consumed as a snack or can be used as a food ingredient or in  the  manufacture  of
    confectionery products and sweet spreads or in the preparation of cakes, desserts and bread. In addition, according to the Notifying  Party,
    the soil and weather conditions necessary for the growth of nut tree cultivation are very similar, all edible nuts are almost all  harvested
    once a year, the know-how, equipment and logistical infrastructure necessary for the procurement of one type of edible nuts  is  similar  to
    those necessary for the procurement of other types of edible nuts.

19. The large majority of the respondents to the Commission's requests for information stated that hazelnuts are not  substitutable  with  other
    edible nuts.[4] This is because of the unique taste profile of hazelnuts, which make them unsuitable for substitution, as well as  the  need
    to adjust recipes for final products, which may affect the final taste. This is confirmed by the fact that no  hazelnut  buyer  among  those
    questioned by the Commission has in the past 5 years switched a substantial share of their hazelnut  purchases  to  other  types  of  edible
    nuts.[5]

20. In addition, the large majority of the respondents to the Commission's requests for information stated that it is not possible for  hazelnut
    suppliers to start supplying other types of edible nuts, and that a price change in hazelnuts would not have an impact  on  other  types  of
    edible nuts.

21. Respondents have also stated that in general all different types and qualities of hazelnuts are  interchangeable,  and  that  suppliers  can
    switch from one type of hazelnuts to another within a short time frame and without incurring significant expenses.[6]

22. In light of the above and of the other available evidence, the  Commission  will  assess  in  this  decision  the  impact  of  the  proposed
    transaction on the markets for the procurement and supply of hazelnuts. In any event, it is not necessary to conclude on the  precise  scope
    of the product market, given that the proposed transaction does not raise serious doubts as to its compatibility with  the  internal  market
    under any plausible definition.

Manufacturing and sale of chocolate confectionery

23. Ferrero is active in the manufacturing and sale of confectionery. Ferrero uses  hazelnuts  as  an  ingredient  for  some  of  its  chocolate
    products, such as Kinder Bueno, Kinder Surprise, Rocher and Mon Cheri.

24. In Kraft/Danone Biscuits, the Commission defined as two different relevant markets countlines[7] and  other  chocolate  confectionery,  only
    limited to Hungary.[8] In Kraft Foods/Cadbury, the Commission found different relevant product markets for countlines, chocolate tablets and
    pralines.[9]

25. The Notifying Party submits that the relevant product market is the market for the manufacturing and sale of  chocolate  confectionery.  The
    Notifying Party also submits that the above-mentioned findings of the Commission are not applicable to the proposed transaction because  the
    segmentation of the chocolate confectionery sector based on the product format was upheld only in relation to certain national  markets  and
    not for others, which means that this approach cannot be generalised as it may vary from country to country.

26. The Commission's market investigation has broadly confirmed the approach followed by the Commission in previous cases.  In  any  event,  the
    precise scope of the product market can be left open, given that the transaction does not raise serious doubts as to its compatibility  with
    the internal market under any plausible definition.

Manufacturing and sale of sweet spreadable products

27. Ferrero is active in the market for manufacturing and sale of sweet spreadable  products.  In  particular,  Ferrero  uses  hazelnuts  as  an
    ingredient for manufacturing its sweet spreadable cream Nutella.

28. In Heinz/CSM, the Commission considered that the relevant market for the purpose of assessing that case included all sizes of bread toppings
    packaging. The Commission pointed out that sweet bread toppings may be distinguished from savoury bread toppings.[10]

29. The Notifying Party submits that the relevant product market is the market for the manufacturing and sale of sweet spreadable products.  The
    Notifying Party submits that Ferrero's internal reporting is structured on the basis that there is a market for sweet spreadable products in
    which Ferrero competes against suppliers of products such as jam, honey and peanut butter. The Notifying Party submitted information also on
    a narrower potential product market definition, which could be the market for the manufacturing and sale of chocolate spreadable products.

30. The market investigation has been inconclusive as to whether chocolate spreadable products form part of  the  same  market  as  other  sweet
    spreadable products. In any event, the precise scope of the product market can be left open, given  that  the  transaction  does  not  raise
    serious doubts under any plausible definition.

       Relevant geographic markets

      Procurement and supply of hazelnut

31. There are no Commission precedents relating to the procurement and supply of hazelnuts.

32. The Notifying Party submits that the relevant geographic markets for the procurement and supply of hazelnuts are worldwide in  scope  mainly
    because of (i) globally active exporters, (ii) low transport costs and (iii) globally active customers.

33. In procurement markets, international traders and exporters compete in the country of origin for exportable quantities. Respondents  overall
    converged in mentioning the elements submitted by the Notifying Party (e.g. low transport costs).  In view  of  the  above,  the  Commission
    concludes that the relevant geographic market for the procurement of hazelnuts is global in scope.

34. The relevant geographic market for the supply of hazelnuts is  at  least  EEA-wide  in  scope.  The  majority  of  the  respondents  to  the
    Commission's requests for information stated that contracts for the sale of hazelnuts are negotiated on a global basis.[11] In any event, it
    is not necessary to conclude on the precise scope of the geographic market for the supply of hazelnuts, given that the transaction does  not
    raise serious doubts under any plausible approach.

      Manufacturing and sale of chocolate confectionery

35. According to Commission's previous decisions,[12] the market for manufacturing and sale of chocolate confectionery is national. This is  not
    contested by the Notifying Party.

36. The Commission's market investigation has essentially confirmed the Commission's approach  in  previous  cases.  In  any  event,  the  exact
    definition of the geographic market can be left open, given that the transaction  does  not  raise  serious  doubts  under  any  alternative
    approach.

      Manufacturing and sale of sweet spreadable products

37. In Heinz/CSM, the Commission left open the geographic market definition for bread toppings.

38. The Notifying Party submits that the geographic market definition for manufacturing and sale  of  sweet  spreadable  products  is  at  least
    national in scope. Customer tastes vary between Member States, negotiations with customers of sweet spreadable  products  are  predominantly
    national in scope and the prices of sweet spreadable products are generally determined on a national basis.

39. The Commission's market investigation has essentially confirmed the Notifying Party's position. In any event, the exact  definition  of  the
    geographic market can be left open, given that the transaction does not raise serious doubts under any alternative approach.

       Competitive assessment

Horizontal overlaps

      Procurement and supply of hazelnuts

40. Both Ferrero and Oltan are active in the procurement and supply of hazelnuts.

41. According to the Notifying Party, the size of the worldwide market for the procurement of hazelnuts was approximately […] tons in  2013.  On
    this market, the merged entity’s combined market share would be  approximately  [20-30]%  (Ferrero  [5-10]%,  Oltan  [10-20]%).  The  merged
    entity's main competitors would be Progida (market share of [5-10]% in 2013, up from [0-5]% the previous year),[13] Ozgun (market  share  of
    [5-10]%), Balsu (market share of [0-5]%), Durak (market share of [0-5]%), Gursoy and Yavuz.

42. According to the Notifying Party, the size of the worldwide market for the supply of hazelnuts would be around […]  tons  in  2013.  On  the
    worldwide market for the supply of hazelnuts, Ferrero and the Oltan would have market shares of [0-5]% and [20-30]%, respectively. The other
    players active in the supply of hazelnuts would be almost the same as in the procurement of hazelnuts.

                                              Figure 1: Market shares of the Parties (2013, volume)

|                   |                          |                                                          |
|                   |                          |Ferrero         |Oltan             |Combined              |
|Hazelnuts          |Worldwide Procurement     |[5-10]%         |[10-20]%          |[20-30]%              |
|                   |Worldwide Supply          |[0-5]%          |[20-30]%          |[20-30]%              |
|                   |EEA Supply                |[5-10]%         |[20-30]%          |[20-30]%              |

      Source: Notifying Party's estimates based on Istanbul Exporters' Union[14]

43. Overall, the hazelnut procurement and supply markets are relatively fragmented. Hazelnut customers have generally confirmed that further  to
    the proposed transaction a sufficient number of suppliers would still remain active on the market.[15]

44. Moreover, customers have confirmed that multi-sourcing and switching between different suppliers are common practices in the market.[16] All
    players have sourced in recent years from more than one suppliers and often from 4 or 5 different suppliers, and respondents who  expect  to
    increase their requirements in the future have stated that they will find sufficient alternatives to expand their  purchases.  In  addition,
    the majority of the respondents stated that in case of price increase from one supplier, they  would  be  able  to  switch  to  a  different
    supplier within a short time and without incurring significant costs.

45. Half of the customers have also stated that all or most of the hazelnut suppliers are capable of meeting  their  quality  specification.  No
    customer has stated that Oltan is an unavoidable commercial partner, or that it has peculiar distinctive features in terms of quality of the
    hazelnuts it supplies.

46. Furthermore, the Notifying Party also submits that entry of new players in this sector is frequent: from the list published by the  Istanbul
    Exporters' Union, it appears that three exporters entered the market in 2010, accounting for a total export  share  of  1.8%,  one  exporter
    entered the market in 2011, accounting for an export share of 1.8%, in 2012 three players entered the market, accounting for a total  export
    share of 0.8%, and in 2013 three players entered the market, accounting for a total market share of 0.4%. These findings are broadly in line
    with the result of the market investigation, even if according to some players there are some barriers for new players to enter the  markets
    for the procurement and supply of hazelnuts.

47. In view of the above, the Commission concludes that the proposed transaction does not raise serious doubts as to its compatibility with  the
    internal market with respect to the procurement and supply of hazelnuts.

Vertical relationships

      Supply of hazelnut / Manufacturing and sale of chocolate confectionery

48. The proposed transaction gives rise to technically vertically affected markets between the Parties' activities in the  supply  of  hazelnuts
    (upstream) and Ferrero's activity in the manufacturing and sale of chocolate confectionery (downstream).

49. In the worldwide market for sale of hazelnuts, the market share of the merged entity would be [20-30]% in 2013. In  the  downstream  markets
    for the manufacturing and sale of chocolate confectionery, Ferrero has a market share above 30% only in Italy ([30-40]%  in  2013).  In  the
    potential narrower segments for countlines, chocolate tablets and pralines, the proposed transaction  would  lead  to  technically  affected
    markets for countlines in France ([40-50]%) and Italy ([60-70]%), and for pralines in Cyprus (range of [70-80]%), Germany ([30-40]%), Greece
    ([30-40]%), Spain ([40-50]%) and Italy ([30-40]%). However, even in these narrower segments, the  proposed  transaction  is  not  likely  to
    create anti-competitive foreclosure effects given that the merged entity does not gain any significant market power on any  upstream  market
    and therefore the merged entity does not have the ability to foreclose access to hazelnuts.

50. According to the Notifying Party, Ferrero, once vertically integrated with Oltan, would continue to supply hazelnuts to its  competitors  in
    the downstream markets, as it did after the acquisition of Stelliferi in 2013. Even if the amount of hazelnuts purchased by Ferrero  through
    Oltan[17] increased post-transaction, Ferrero would free an equivalent amount of hazelnuts – currently purchased  from  players  other  than
    Oltan – that would become available on the market. This would partially offset any potential reduction  of  the  supplies  of  hazelnuts  to
    Ferrero International's downstream competitors previously supplied by  Oltan.  In  addition,  Ferrero  is  already  the  major  customer  of
    Oltan.[18]

51. In addition, the large majority of the respondents to the Commission's requests for information confirmed that the Parties will not have the
    ability and incentive to foreclose access to hazelnuts.[19]

52. In the light of the above, of other available evidence, and taking into account that the merged entity would  not  gain  significant  market
    power so as to foreclose access to upstream market under any plausible definition, the Commission concludes that  the  proposed  transaction
    does not raise serious doubts as to its compatibility with the internal market as  regards  the  supply  of  hazelnuts  for  the  downstream
    manufacturing and sale of chocolate confectionery.

      Supply of hazelnut / Manufacturing and sale of sweet spreadable products

53. The proposed transaction gives rise to technically vertically affected markets with respect to the Parties'  activities  in  the  supply  of
    hazelnuts (upstream) and Ferrero's activity in the manufacturing and sale of sweet spreadable products (downstream).

54. In the worldwide market for sale of hazelnuts, the market share of the merged entity would be [20-30]% in 2013. In  the  downstream  markets
    for the manufacturing and sale of sweet spreadable products, Ferrero has a market share above 30% only in Italy ([40-50]% in 2013).  In  the
    potential narrower market for chocolate spreadable products, the proposed transaction would lead to technically affected markets  with  high
    to very high market shares in Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland,  France,  Germany,  Hungary,  Ireland,  Italy,  Poland,  Slovenia,
    Sweden, the Netherlands and the UK in a range from [30-40]% to [90-100]%. However, even in this narrower segment, the  proposed  transaction
    cannot create anti-competitive foreclosure effects given that the merged entity does not gain any significant market power on  any  upstream
    market and therefore the merged entity does not have the ability to foreclose access to hazelnuts.

55. The elements described in the above paragraph 50 also apply to the market for the manufacturing and sale of sweet spreadable products.

56. In addition, the large majority of the respondents to the Commission's requests for information confirmed that the Parties will not have the
    ability and incentive to foreclose access to hazelnuts.[20]

57. In the light of the above, of other available evidence, and taking into account that the merged entity would  not  gain  significant  market
    power so as to foreclose access to upstream market under any plausible definition, the Commission concludes that  the  proposed  transaction
    does not raise serious doubts as to its compatibility with the internal market as  regards  the  supply  of  hazelnuts  for  the  downstream
    manufacturing and sale of sweet spreadable products.

       CONCLUSION

58. For the above reasons, the Commission has decided not to oppose the notified operation and to declare it compatible with the internal market
    and with the functioning of the EEA Agreement. This decision is adopted in application of Article 6(1)(b) of the Merger Regulation.

For the Commission
(signed)
Neelie KROES
Vice-President

-----------------------
[1]   OJ L 24, 29.1.2004, p. 1 ("the Merger Regulation"). With effect from 1 December 2009, the Treaty on the Functioning of the  European  Union
("TFEU") has introduced certain changes, such as the replacement of "Community"  by  "Union"  and  "common  market"  by  "internal  market".  The
terminology of the TFEU will be used throughout this decision.

[2]   Publication in the Official Journal of the European Union No C 267, 14.8.2014, p. 28.
[3]   Ferrero entered the procurement and supply of hazelnuts in 2013, through its acquisition of  the  Stelliferi  group,  an  Italian  hazelnut
trader active mainly in Italy and, to a lesser extent, in Turkey and other producing countries.

[4]   See replies to question 4 of the Commission's request for information addressed to hazelnuts customers (Q2) on 7 August 2014.

[5]   See replies to question 5 of the Commission's request for information addressed to hazelnuts customers (Q2) on 7 August 2014.

[6]   See replies to questions 8 and 10 of the Commission's request for information addressed to hazelnuts customers (Q2) on 7 August 2014.

[7]   Chocolate countlines are chocolate-covered bars designed to be eaten in one go (e.g. Kinder Bueno).

[8]   Case COMP/M.4824 Kraft/Danone Biscuits, para 22.
[9]   Case COMP/M.5644 Kraft Foods/Cadbury, paras 22-23.
[10]  Case COMP/M.2302 - Heinz/CSM, para. 14.

[11]  See replies to question 17 of the Commission's request for information addressed to hazelnuts suppliers (Q1) on 7 August 2014.

[12]  See e.g. COMP/M. Kraft/Danone Biscuits, para. 19; COMP/M.2072 Philipp Morris/Nabisco, para. 17.

[13]  According to the Notifying Party, the market share increase is due to Progida's acquisition by Olam and suggests that the  market  for  the
procurement of hazelnuts is relatively fluid and there are possibilities for growth  for  companies  with  the  right  financial,  technical  and
commercial characteristics.

[14]  The Notifying Party has carried out the following exercise: it has added to the export data provided by the Istanbul  Exporters’  Union  an
estimate of the volume of the domestic consumption of hazelnuts in Turkey based on its knowledge of the market. To the  figure  representing  the
sale of Turkish hazelnuts (representing about 70% of the worldwide market), the Notifying Party has added its estimates of  the  volumes  of  the
remaining countries.

[15]  See replies to question 24 of the Commission's request for information addressed to hazelnuts customers (Q2) on 7 August 2014.

[16]  See replies to question 40 of the Commission's request for information addressed to hazelnuts customers (Q2) on 7 August 2014.

[17]  In 2013, [40-50]% of Ferrero International's overall hazelnut requirements were satisfied by Oltan's volumes.

[18]  In 2013 Oltan sold around […] tons of shelled hazelnuts to third parties  and  out  of  these  volumes,  […]  tons  were  sold  to  Ferrero
International, representing [50-60]% of Oltan's sales.

[19]  See replies to question 51 of the Commission's request for information addressed to hazelnuts customers (Q2) on 7 August 2014  and  replies
to question 10 of the Commission's request for information addressed to retailers (Q3) on 7 August 2014.

[20]  See replies to question 51 of the Commission's request for information addressed to hazelnuts customers (Q2) on 7 August 2014  and  replies
to question 10 of the Commission's request for information addressed to retailers (Q3) on 7 August 2014.

-----------------------
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                                                                  PUBLIC VERSION

                                                    MERGER PROCEDURE ARTICLE 6(1)(b) DECISION