CELEX: 62018CJ0418
Language: en
Date: 2019-12-19
Title: Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 19 December 2019.#Patrick Grégor Puppinck and Others v European Commission.#Appeal — Institutional law — Citizens’ initiative ‘One of us’ — Communication from the European Commission setting out its conclusions and the reasons for not taking the action requested in the citizens’ initiative.#Case C-418/18 P.

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT (Grand Chamber)
19 December 2019  (*)
(Appeal — Institutional law — Citizens’ initiative ‘One of us’ — Communication from the European Commission setting out its conclusions and the reasons for not taking the action requested in the citizens’ initiative)
In Case C‑418/18 P,
APPEAL under Article 56 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, brought on 22 June 2018,

Patrick Grégor Puppinck, residing in Strasbourg (France), 

Filippo Vari, residing in Rome (Italy), 

Josephine Quintavalle, residing in London (United Kingdom), 

Edith Frivaldszky, residing in Tata (Hungary), 

Jakub Baltroszewicz, residing in Cracow (Poland), 

Alicia Latorre Canizares, residing in Cuenca (Spain), 

Manfred Liebner, residing in Zeitlofs (Germany), 
represented by R. Kiska, Solicitor, and P. Diamond, Barrister,
appellants,
the other parties to the proceedings being:

European Citizens’ Initiative One of Us,

applicant at first instance,

European Commission, represented by H. Krämer, acting as Agent,
defendant at first instance,

Republic  of Poland, 

European Parliament, 

Council of the  European Union,

interveners at first instance,
THE COURT (Grand Chamber),
composed of K. Lenaerts, President, R. Silva de Lapuerta, Vice-President, A. Prechal, M. Vilaras, E. Regan, S. Rodin (Rapporteur), P.G. Xuereb, L.S. Rossi and I. Jarukaitis, Presidents of Chambers, E. Juhász, M. Ilešič, J. Malenovský and N. Piçarra, Judges,
Advocate General: M. Bobek,
Registrar: M. Aleksejev, Head of Unit,
having regard to the written procedure and further to the hearing on 25 March 2019,
after hearing the Opinion of the Advocate General at the sitting on 29 July 2019,
gives the following

Judgment

1        By their appeal,  Mr Patrick  Grégor Puppinck, Mr Filippo  Vari,  Ms Josephine Quintavalle, Ms Edith Frivaldszky, Mr Jakub  Baltroszewicz,  Ms Alicia Latorre Canizares and Mr Manfred  Liebner ask the Court to set aside the judgment of the  General Court  of the European Union of  23 April 2018, One of Us and Others v Commission (T‑561/14;  ‘the  judgment under appeal’, EU:T:2018:210), whereby the General Court  dismissed  their action seeking the  annulment of  Communication COM(2014) 355 final from the Commission of  28 May 2014 on the  European citizens’ initiative  ‘One of us’ (‘the contested communication’).
 Legal context

2        Recital 1 of Regulation (EU) No 211/2011 of the European Parliament and of the  Council  of  16 February 2011 on the citizens’ initiative (OJ  2011 L 65, p. 1, and corrigendum OJ 2012 L 94, p. 49),  is worded as follows:
‘The Treaty on European Union (TEU) reinforces citizenship of the Union and enhances further the democratic functioning of the Union by providing, inter alia, that every citizen is to have the right to participate in the democratic life of the Union by way of a European citizens’ initiative. That procedure affords citizens the possibility of directly approaching the Commission with a request inviting it to submit a proposal for a legal act of the Union for the purpose of implementing the Treaties similar to the right conferred on the European Parliament under Article 225 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) and on the Council under Article 241 TFEU.’

3        Recital 20 of that  regulation  states:
‘The Commission should examine a citizens’ initiative and set out its legal and political conclusions separately. It should also set out the action it intends to take in response to it, within a period of three months. In order to demonstrate that a citizens’ initiative supported by at least one million Union citizens and its possible follow-up are carefully examined, the Commission should explain in a clear, comprehensible and detailed manner the reasons for its intended action, and should likewise give its reasons if it does not intend to take any action. When the Commission has received a citizens’ initiative supported by the requisite number of signatories which fulfils the other requirements of this Regulation, the organisers should be entitled to present that initiative at a public hearing at Union level.’

4        Article 2(1) of that  regulation provides:
‘For the purpose of this Regulation the following definitions shall apply:
(1)      “citizens’ initiative” means an initiative submitted to the Commission in accordance with this Regulation, inviting the Commission, within the framework of its powers, to submit any appropriate proposal on matters where citizens consider that a legal act of the Union is required for the purpose of implementing the Treaties, which has received the support of at least one million eligible signatories coming from at least one quarter of all Member States.’

5        Article 4(1)  and  (2)  of  Regulation  No 211/2011 states:
‘1.      Prior to initiating the collection of statements of support from signatories for a proposed citizens’ initiative, the organisers shall be required to register it with the Commission, providing the information set out in Annex II, in particular on the subject matter and objectives of the proposed citizens’ initiative.
That information shall be provided in one of the official languages of the Union, in an online register made available for that purpose by the Commission (“the register”).
The organisers shall provide, for the register and where appropriate on their website, regularly updated information on the sources of support and funding for the proposed citizens’ initiative.
After the registration is confirmed in accordance with paragraph 2, the organisers may provide the proposed citizens’ initiative in other official languages of the Union for inclusion in the register. The translation of the proposed citizens’ initiative into other official languages of the Union shall be the responsibility of the organisers.
The Commission shall establish a point of contact which provides information and assistance.
2.      Within two months from the receipt of the information set out in Annex II, the Commission shall register a proposed citizens’ initiative under a unique registration number and send a confirmation to the organisers, provided that the following conditions are fulfilled:
(a)      the citizens’ committee has been formed and the contact persons have been designated in accordance with Article 3(2);
(b)      the proposed citizens’ initiative does not manifestly fall outside the framework of the Commission’s powers to submit a proposal for a legal act of the Union for the purpose of implementing the Treaties;
(c)      the proposed citizens’ initiative is not manifestly abusive, frivolous or vexatious; and
(d)      the proposed citizens’ initiative is not manifestly contrary to the values of the Union as set out in Article 2 TEU.’

6        The first paragraph of Article 9 of that  regulation, that article being headed  ‘Submission of a citizens’ initiative to the Commission’, provides:
‘After obtaining the certificates provided for in Article 8(2), and provided that all relevant procedures and conditions set out in this Regulation have been complied with, the organisers may submit the citizens’ initiative to the Commission, accompanied by information regarding any support and funding received for that initiative. That information shall be published in the register.’

7        Article 10 of that  regulation  provides:
‘1.      Where the Commission receives a citizens’ initiative in accordance with Article 9 it shall:
(a)      publish the citizens’ initiative without delay in the register;
(b)      receive the organisers at an appropriate level to allow them to explain in detail the matters raised by the citizens’ initiative;
(c)      within three months, set out in a communication its legal and political conclusions on the citizens’ initiative, the action it intends to take, if any, and its reasons for taking or not taking that action.
2.      The communication referred to in paragraph 1(c) shall be notified to the organisers as well as to the European Parliament and the Council and shall be made public.’

8        Article 11  of  Regulation  No 211/2011, headed  ‘Public hearing’, states:
‘Where the conditions of Article 10(1)(a) and (b) are fulfilled, and within the deadline laid down in Article 10(1)(c), the organisers shall be given the opportunity to present the citizens’ initiative at a public hearing. The Commission and the European Parliament shall ensure that this hearing is organised at the European Parliament, if appropriate together with such other institutions and bodies of the Union as may wish to participate, and that the Commission is represented at an appropriate level.’

9        Annex II to that  regulation, headed  ‘Required information for registering  a proposed  citizens’ initiative’,  is worded as follows :
‘The following information shall be provided in order to register a proposed citizens’ initiative on the Commission’s online register:
1.      The title of the proposed citizens’ initiative, in no more than 100 characters;
2.      The subject matter, in no more than 200 characters;
3.      A description of the objectives of the proposed citizens’ initiative on which the Commission is invited to act, in no more than 500 characters;
4.      The provisions of the Treaties considered relevant by the organisers for the proposed action;
…
Organisers may provide more detailed information on the subject, objectives and background to the proposed citizens’ initiative in an annex. They may also, if they wish, submit a draft legal act.’

Background to the dispute

10      The background to the dispute is set out in paragraphs 1 to 30 of the judgment under appeal and may be summarised as follows.

11      On  11 May 2012 the Commission, in accordance with  Article 4(2)  of  Regulation  No 211/2011, registered the proposed  European citizens’ initiative  with the title  ‘One of us’ (‘the  ECI  at issue’). 

12      The subject matter of the  ECI at issue was  ‘the juridical protection of the dignity, the right to life and of the integrity of every human being from conception in the areas of EU competence in which such protection is of particular importance’. 

13      The objectives  of that  ECI  were described as follows:
‘The human embryo deserves respect to its dignity and integrity. This is [stated] by the [Court of Justice of the European Union] in the Brüstle case, which defines the human embryo as the beginning of the development of the human being. To ensure consistency in areas of its competence where the life of the human embryo is at stake, the [Union] should establish a ban and end the financing of activities which presuppose the destruction of human embryos, in particular in the areas of research, development aid and public health.’  

14      In an annex to the application for registration  of  the ECI at issue, three  amendments  to EU acts, existing or in prospect, were proposed.  First, the organisers  of that  ECI  requested  that there be inserted  a new article into Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1605/2002 of 25 June 2002 on the Financial Regulation applicable to the general budget of the European Communities (OJ 2002 L 248, p. 1), prohibiting any European Union budget allocation being made for the funding of activities that destroy human embryos, or that presume their destruction.  Second, they proposed the insertion of a  new subparagraph in  Article 16(3) of the Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing Horizon 2020 — The Framework Programme for Research and Innovation (2014-2020) (COM(2011) 809 final), excluding from all funding under that framework programme research activities that destroyed human embryos, including those aimed at obtaining stem cells, and research involving the use of human embryonic stem cells in subsequent steps to obtain them.  Third, they proposed the addition of  a  paragraph 5  to  Article 2  of  Regulation (EC) No 1905/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 December 2006 establishing a financing instrument for development cooperation (OJ 2006 L 378 p. 41), providing, in essence, that EU financial assistance should not be used, directly or indirectly, to fund  abortions.

15      The provisions of the Treaties deemed relevant by the organisers of the ECI at issue were Articles 2 and 17 TEU and to Article 4(3) and (4) and  Articles 168, 180, 182, 209, 210 and 322 TFEU.

16      On 28 February 2014, pursuant to Article 9 of Regulation No 211/2011, the organisers of the ECI at issue submitted it to the Commission.

17      On 9 April 2014, pursuant to Article 10(1)(b) of Regulation No 211/2011, the Commission’s representatives received the organisers of the ECI at issue.  On 10 April 2014, pursuant to Article 11 of that regulation, the organisers of the ECI at issue were given the opportunity to present it at a public hearing organised at the European Parliament.

18      On 28 May 2014 the Commission,  on the basis of Article 10(1)(c) of that  regulation, adopted  the contested communication, which has  four parts, and in which  the Commission stated  that it would take no action on  the ECI at issue.

19      In Section 1 of that communication, headed  ‘Introduction’, the Commission set out, inter alia, the subject matter and objectives  of  the ECI at issue and the three proposed  legislative amendments.

20      In Section 2 of that communication, headed  ‘State of play’, the Commission,  first, described the current state  of EU legislation in relation to the protection of human dignity  and specified the competences of the Union in that  regard and stated, inter alia, that whether scientific research  making use of  human embryos may  be  carried out and  funded by the European Union is an issue that has not been  addressed by the Court’s case-law.

21      Second, the Commission  set out the  state  of  human embryonic stem cell research (‘hESC research’), the competences and activities  of the  EU Member States  in that field, and the mechanisms  put in place by the Union to ensure respect for  human dignity in the  funding of that  research. In that regard, with respect to the competences of the Union, the Commission  stated that  hESC research operates  within a  strict ethical framework  comprising a  ‘triple lock’ system  which entails that  (i)  EU projects  must follow  the laws of the country  in which the research  is carried out;  (ii)  all projects must be scientifically validated by peer review and must undergo rigorous ethical review;  and (iii)  EU funds may not be used for derivation of new stem cell lines, or for research  that involves the destruction of  human embryos.

22      Last, the Commission set out the competences  and activities  of the  Member States and of the Union  with respect to  maternal and child health in the context of development cooperation.

23      In Section 3 of  the contested communication, headed  ‘Assessment of the [ECI] Requests’, the Commission set out the  reasons why  it did not intend  to take any of the actions proposed  by the  organisers  of that  ECI.

24      First, the Commission stated that  the Financial Regulation already ensured that all EU expenditure, including that in the areas of research, development cooperation and public health, must respect human dignity, the right to life, and the right to the integrity of the person.

25      Second, the Commission stated that the provisions of the Horizon 2020 framework programme on hESC research already addressed a number of important requests of the organisers of the ECI at issue, notably the request that the European Union  should not fund the destruction of human embryos and that appropriate controls be put in place.

26      Last, the Commission  stated that  a prohibition on the  funding of  abortions  in developing countries, as  advocated by the  organisers  of  the ECI at issue, would constrain the Union’s ability  to achieve  the objectives  set in the area of development cooperation.

27      Section 4 of  the contested communication, headed  ‘Conclusions’, contains a  summary of the  arguments  set out in the preceding  sections of that communication.
 The procedure before the General Court and the judgment under appeal

28      By application lodged at the Registry of the General Court on  25 July 2014, the entity known as  ‘European Citizens’ Initiative One of Us’  and the seven natural persons  who are the organisers  of  the ECI at issue  and who form its  citizens’ committee  brought an action  seeking the  annulment  of  the contested communication  and, in the alternative, the annulment of  Article 10(1)(c)  of  Regulation  No 211/2011.

29      By order of  26 November 2015, One of Us and Others v Commission (T‑561/14, not published, EU:T:2015:917), the General  Court  dismissed  that action as being inadmissible  in so far as it  was directed  against  Article 10(1)(c)  of that  regulation. The  Parliament  and the  Council,  since  they could no longer be considered  to be defendants  in the proceedings, were, as they requested, granted leave to intervene  by decision of the  President of the First  Chamber  of the  General Court  of  30 November 2015.

30      By the judgment under appeal  the General Court dismissed the action.

31      After the General Court held, in  paragraphs 53  to 65 of  that judgment, that the action was  inadmissible  in so far as it had been brought by  the entity known as European Citizens’ Initiative One of Us, that  court examined,  in  paragraphs 68  to 101 of that judgment, the question  whether the contested communication could be challenged  under Article 263 TFEU. The General Court  held,  in  paragraph 77  of that  judgment, that that  communication  produced binding legal effects such as to affect the interests of the appellants, by bringing about a distinct change in their legal position.  The General  Court  stated in that  regard that, under  Article 10(1)(c)  of  Regulation  No 211/2011,  the Commission  was obliged  to set out in  a communication, such  as the contested communication,  its legal and  political conclusions on the citizens’ initiative  submitted.  The General Court  accordingly held  that the action  directed against that communication was admissible.

32      As regards examination of the substance of the action, the General  Court rejected, in  paragraphs 105  to 118 of  the judgment under appeal, the first plea in law, claiming an infringement of Article 10(1)(c)  of  Regulation  No 211/2011 on account of  a failure to submit a proposal  for a legal act  in response to  the ECI at issue, on the ground that  the Commission  has, by virtue of both that  provision  and  Articles 11  TEU  and 24 TFEU, the power to  take action in response to  an  ECI. The General  Court  stated in that  regard  that the Treaties  confer  on  the Commission  a  near-monopoly of legislative initiative.

33      For the same reasons the General Court rejected,  in  paragraphs 122  to 125 of  the judgment under appeal,  the second plea in law,  claiming an  infringement of  Article 11(4) TEU.

34      The General  Court rejected, in  paragraphs 128  to 132 of that judgment, the third plea in law, claiming that  the Commission  had infringed  Article 10(1)(c)  of  Regulation  No 211/2011, read in the light of  recital 20  of that regulation,  by reason of  failing to set out,  separately, its legal and political conclusions on  the ECI at issue. In that regard, the General Court  stated that,  while  that recital  states  that  the Commission  is to set out separately  its legal and political conclusions, that recital cannot be understood  as  imposing such an obligation on the Commission, since the preamble of  an EU act  has no binding legal force.  Accordingly, since it is  not stated  in the wording of  Article 10  of that regulation that the Commission  is subject to such an obligation, the Commission cannot be criticised  for not having  set out its  conclusions separately. For the sake of completeness, the General  Court  added  that, even if such an obligation existed, a breach of that  obligation could not  have entailed  the annulment of  the contested communication.

35      The General  Court  also rejected,  in  paragraphs 141 to 158 of  the judgment under appeal, the fourth plea in law, claiming an infringement of the obligation to state reasons, on the ground that  the information  provided in  the contested communication  was sufficient to  enable the  appellants  to understand  why  the Commission  declined to take any action in response to  the ECI at issue. Further, the General  Court  held  that  the argument that  the Commission  had infringed  the obligation to state reasons by failing to  define  or  clarify  the legal status  of the  human embryo  in  the contested communication  was  ineffective  and had to be rejected, since the sufficiency of the  statement of reasons  had to be assessed  solely in relation to the objective  of  the ECI at issue.

36      Last, the General  Court  rejected, in  paragraphs 168  to 183 of  the judgment under appeal, the fifth plea in law, concerning errors of assessment  made by  the Commission in  the contested communication.

37      The General Court  held in that  regard that, given the  broad discretion enjoyed  by  the Commission  in the exercise  of its power of legislative initiative, the Commission’s decision not to submit  a proposal  for a legal act  to the legislature  had to be subject to  limited review. 

38      The General  Court  held, first, in  paragraphs 172  to 175 of  the judgment under appeal, that  the Commission  had not committed a  manifest error of assessment,  considering that  the judgment of the Court of Justice  of  18 October 2011, Brüstle (C‑34/10, EU:C:2011:669), was  irrelevant for the purposes  of assessing  the  lawfulness  of  the contested communication, since that  judgment concerns  only  the question whether  biotechnological inventions are patentable and does not deal with the issue  of the funding of  research activities involving or  presupposing  the destruction of human embryos. 

39      The  General Court  held, second, in  paragraph 176 of  the judgment under appeal, that the  appellants  had not  demonstrated  the existence of a manifest error of assessment in relation to  the ethical approach  of  the Commission to the subject of  hESC research. The General Court  also rejected, on the ground that it was  insufficiently substantiated, the appellants’ claim that  that  research was  unnecessary.

40      Third, the  General Court  held, in  paragraph 180 of  the judgment under appeal, that  the Commission  had again not  committed a manifest error of assessment  in relying on  a publication of  the World Health Organisation,  which states that there is a  link between  unsafe  abortions  and maternal mortality,  to support the conclusion that  a prohibition  on funding  abortions  would constrain the Union’s ability to attain the objective of reducing maternal mortality.

41      Fourth and last, the  General Court  held, in  paragraph 182 of  the judgment under appeal, that  the Commission had not committed any  manifest error of assessment  in deciding  not to submit  to the EU legislature  a proposed  amendment to the  Financial Regulation  designed to prohibit  the funding of activities  that are  contrary  to  human dignity and  human rights.
 Forms of order sought by the parties before the Court of Justice

42      The appellants claim that the Court should:
–        set aside the judgment under appeal;
–        annul  the contested communication, and
–        order the Commission to pay the costs.

43      The Commission contends that the Court should:
–        dismiss the appeal; and
–        order the appellants to pay the costs.
 The appeal

44      In support of their appeal, the appellants put forward five grounds of appeal.
 The first ground of appeal

 Arguments of the parties

45      By their first ground of appeal, the  appellants  claim that  the General  Court  erred in law  when it rejected, in paragraphs 118  and 125 of  the judgment under appeal, their argument in relation to the interpretation of  Article 11(4) TEU and  Regulation  No 211/2011.  They consider that the General  Court, in holding, in  paragraphs 111  and  113 of  the judgment under appeal, that  the near-monopoly  of legislative initiative enjoyed by  the Commission  was not affected  by the introduction of the  ECI mechanism, failed to appreciate  the specific character  of that mechanism.

46      The  appellants consider  that, while  Article 17(2) TEU  provides that Union legislative acts may only be adopted  on the basis of a Commission proposal, that provision cannot however  be interpreted  as conferring on  the Commission  an unlimited discretion  with respect to proposals for legislation  relating to  a matter  forming  the subject of a citizens’ initiative  that has obtained the  required support, within the meaning of  Article 2(l) of  Regulation  No 211/2011. The  appellants  infer from  the judgment of  14 April 2015, Council  v Commission (C‑409/13, EU:C:2015:217),  that the Commission’s discretionary power of legislative initiative  has to reach its limits  where the Commission decides  not  to submit  a proposal  for a legislative act  in response to an  ECI, and the exercise of its discretion in order to  impede  the objective  of an  ECI  must then be considered  to be unlawful.

47      The appellants  maintain that, first, reasons must be stated for the Commission’s decision  not  to submit a proposal for legislation  in response to an  ECI, and those reasons must be supported by  cogent evidence  and must not be contrary to  the objective  of the ECI  concerned. Second, they consider that  the Commission’s discretion  must be exercised with due regard  for  general policies  and public policy objectives, subject to  judicial review. According to the  appellants, the General  Court  did not either address or identify  the  public policy objectives of  the ECI at issue  and the interdependence of Title III of the  EU Treaty  and  Article 24  TFEU  stemming from  Regulation  No 211/2011.

48      The  appellants  consider  that  the General  Court  erred in law  when it found, in  paragraph 124 of  the judgment under appeal, that the sole objective of the ECI mechanism was to  ‘invite’ the Commission  to  submit a proposal. Since  Article 11(4) TEU  does not provide that  only those who have  collected at least  one million signatures are allowed to  ‘invite’ the Commission  to take  appropriate measures, the  appellants  consider that  any person or  any  group can  ‘invite’  the Commission to take such measures. In the view of the appellants, given the  nature of an ECI,  and the  costs and organisational difficulties  involved,  an  ECI  cannot be  treated as no more than a mere  ‘invitation’  to  the Commission to take  appropriate measures.

49      The  appellants  claim that  the interpretation of the  ECI mechanism adopted by  the General  Court  in  paragraphs 111, 113 and 124 of  the judgment under appeal deprives  the ECI mechanism of any effectiveness  and results in its  failing to address the democratic deficit of the  European Union.

50      The appellants  consider that, taking into consideration the power of the  Council  and  Parliament  to influence  the Commission, the General  Court  ought to have recognised that  a group of at least one  million citizens  who have supported  an  ECI  have parity with those institutions. They consider  that  the Commission’s power  to take action or not take action  in response to an  ECI  must depend on  assessment criteria  compliance with which must be subject to judicial review. In the view of the appellants, the findings made by  the General  Court  in the judgment under appeal are incoherent,  since the very existence of review  of the lawfulness of  the contested communication, carried out  by  the General  Court  in that judgment, supports their argument that  the Commission  is not free  to take action or not take action in response to an  ECI. 

51      Last, the  appellants  maintain that  the General  Court  erred in law  in  considering that  Regulation  No 211/2011 was  to be interpreted  as permitting the  Commission  to  deprive citizens  of their right, within the framework  of an  ECI, to have their  proposals for legislative acts examined  by the Parliament.

52      The Commission  states that  it claimed  before  the General  Court  that  the contested communication  did not constitute  a challengeable act, under  Article 263 TFEU. The Commission considers that, as regards the substance, the first ground of appeal should be rejected.
 Findings of the Court

53      Article 11(4) TEU, introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon, provides that Union citizens may, subject to certain conditions, take the initiative of inviting the Commission, within the framework of its powers, to submit any appropriate proposal on matters where those citizens consider that a legal act of the Union is required for the purpose of implementing the Treaties (judgment of 12 September 2017, Anagnostakis v Commission, C‑589/15 P, EU:C:2017:663, paragraph 23).  

54      The right to undertake an ECI constitutes, as does, in particular, the right to petition the Parliament, an instrument concerning the right of citizens to participate in the democratic life of the Union, provided for in Article 10(3) TEU, in that it allows them to apply directly to the Commission in order to submit to it a request inviting it to submit a proposal for a legal act of the Union, for the purposes of the application of the Treaties (judgment of 12 September 2017, Anagnostakis v Commission, C‑589/15 P, EU:C:2017:663, paragraph 24).

55      In accordance with the first paragraph of Article 24 TFEU, the procedures and conditions for submitting an ECI have been specified in Regulation No 211/2011.

56      By their first ground of appeal, the  appellants  maintain that  the General  Court  erred in law  in holding  that the Commission  was not obliged, under Article 11(4) TEU and  Regulation  No 211/2011, to submit  a proposal for a  legislative act in response to  the ECI at issue.

57      In that regard, it must, in the first place, be noted  that it is clear from the very wording of  Article 11(4) TEU that an ECI  is designed to  ‘invite’ the Commission  to submit  an appropriate proposal  for the purpose of  implementing the Treaties, and not, as claimed by  the  appellants, to oblige that institution to take  the action or actions envisaged  by the ECI  concerned. That textual interpretation is confirmed by the wording of  Article 2(1) of  Regulation  No 211/2011, which defines  a ‘citizens’ initiative’  as an initiative submitted to the Commission, in accordance with  that  regulation, ‘inviting’  the Commission to submit  a proposal such as  that specified in  Article 11(4) TEU. It is clear moreover from the wording of  Article 10(1)(c) and  from  recital  20 of that  regulation  that, when the Commission  receives an  ECI, it is to set out the action that it intends to take, if any, and its reasons for taking or not taking action, which confirms  that the submission by  the Commission  of a  proposal  for an EU act  in response to an  ECI  is optional.

58      As regards, in the second place, the background to the  ECI mechanism, it cannot,  as argued by the Commission, be inferred  from the judgment of  14 April 2015, Council v Commission (C‑409/13, EU:C:2015:217), which concerned  the withdrawal, by the Commission, of a proposal  for an EU act during  the legislative process, that  the Commission  is  compelled  to submit  a proposal for an EU act in response to an ECI.

59      On the contrary,  as  the Court  stated in that  judgment, both  Article 17(2) TEU and  Article 289  TFEU confer  on  the Commission  the power of legislative initiative,  which means that  it is for  the Commission to decide whether or not to submit a proposal for a legislative act, except in the situation where it has an obligation under EU law to submit such a proposal. By virtue of that power, if a proposal for a legislative act is submitted, it is also for the Commission, which, in accordance with Article 17(1) TEU, is to promote the general interest of the European Union and take appropriate initiatives to that end, to determine the subject matter, objective and content of that proposal (judgment of  14 April 2015, Council v Commission, C‑409/13, EU:C:2015:217, paragraph 70). 

60      That  power of legislative initiative  conferred on  the Commission  is one of  the  expressions  of  the principle of institutional balance, characteristic of the institutional structure of the European Union, which means that  each of the institutions must exercise its powers with due regard for the powers of the other institutions (see, to that effect, judgment of  14 April 2015, Council  v Commission, C‑409/13, EU:C:2015:217, paragraph 64  and the case-law cited).  

61      In that regard, it must be observed that, as stated in  recital 1  of  Regulation  No 211/2011, the ECI  is intended  to confer  on Union citizens  a  right comparable to that held, pursuant to  Articles 225  and 241 TFEU respectively, by the Parliament and the  Council,  to request  the Commission  to submit  any appropriate proposal  for the purpose of implementing the Treaties. It is apparent from those  two articles that the right thus  conferred on the  Parliament  and the  Council  does not undermine  the Commission’s  power of legislative initiative, and the Commission remains free  not to  submit  a  proposal  provided that  it informs the institution concerned of the reasons. Consequently, an  ECI  submitted on the  basis  of Article 11(4) TEU  and  Regulation  No 211/2011 can likewise not  affect that power. 

62      In addition, the  appellants’ argument  that  the Commission  is obliged,  in all cases,  to take action in response to  proposals in  an  ECI  that has been registered  and that has obtained  the required  support  cannot be reconciled with the discretion  enjoyed by  the Commission, under  Article 17(1) TEU,  in its task  of promoting the general interest of the Union and taking appropriate initiatives  to that end, and with the  general obligation incumbent  on  the Commission, under  Article 17(3) TEU, to be completely independent  in the exercise of its  power of initiative. 

63      Accordingly, the General  Court  was correct in holding, in  paragraph 111  of  the judgment under appeal, that the  near-monopoly  of  legislative initiative conferred  by the Treaties  on  the Commission  is not affected  by the right to an  ECI  provided for in  Article 11(4) TEU. 

64      In the third place, as regards the appellants’ argument that  the interpretation of  the  ECI mechanism  by  the General  Court  in the judgment under appeal deprives  that  mechanism  of any effectiveness,  it must be recalled that, as stated in  Article 10(1) TEU, the  functioning of the Union is to be based on  representative democracy, which  gives concrete expression to democracy as a value. Democracy  is, under  Article 2 TEU, one of the values  on which  the Union is founded.

65      That  system of  representative democracy was complemented, with the Treaty of Lisbon, by instruments  of participatory democracy,  such as the  ECI mechanism,  the objective  of which is to  encourage the participation of  citizens  in the democratic process  and to promote dialogue between  citizens  and the EU institutions. However, as stated, in essence,  by  the Advocate General in point 71 of his Opinion, that  objective  fits within the pre-existing institutional balance  and is pursued  within the limits  of the powers attributed to  each EU institution  by the Treaties, the authors  of which did not intend, by means of the introduction  of that  mechanism, to deprive the Commission  of the  power of legislative initiative conferred on it by  Article 17 TEU.

66      That said, the fact that  the Commission  is not obliged  to take action in response to an  ECI  does not mean  that such an initiative lacks any effectiveness.

67      An  ECI  which has  been registered  in accordance with  Article 4(2)  of  Regulation  No 211/2011  and which complies with all  the procedures and conditions laid down in that  regulation  imposes a  series  of specific obligations on the Commission, as set out in Articles 10  and 11 of that  regulation.

68      First, as soon as it receives  an ECI,  the Commission must, pursuant to Article 10(1)(a)  of that  regulation, publish it without delay  in the  prescribed register,  in order to inform the public  of the matters  appearing in that  ECI  with respect to which  the  citizens consider  that an EU legal act is required. Second, under  Article 10(1)(b),  the Commission  is obliged  to receive,  at an appropriate level, the  organisers  of an ECI  that has collected the support  of at least  a million signatories,  in order to allow them  to explain in detail  the matters  raised by that  ECI. Last, Article 10(1)(c) provides that  the Commission is to  set out in a communication its legal and political conclusions on the ECI, the action it intends to take, if any, and its reasons for taking or not taking that action.

69      It is stated also in  Article 11  of  Regulation  No 211/2011 that the  organisers  of an  ECI  which satisfies the conditions laid down in  Article 10(1)(a) and  (b) of that  regulation  have the opportunity  to present that initiative  at a public hearing,  organised  at the  Parliament, if appropriate together with other institutions and bodies of the Union that may wish to participate, at which the Commission  is represented, which  ensures that they have  privileged access to the EU institutions.  

70      The General  Court  was therefore correct in holding, in  paragraph 124 of  the judgment under appeal, that a rejection of the  appellants’ argument  that  the Commission  is obliged to take action in response to the  ECI at issue  does not deprive the  ECI mechanism of all effectiveness. As  the Advocate General observed, in  point 78  of his Opinion, the particular added value of the ECI mechanism resides not  in certainty of outcome, but in the possibilities and  opportunities  that it creates  for Union  citizens  to initiate  debate on policy  within the EU institutions without having to wait for  the  commencement of a legislative procedure.

71      In the light of the foregoing, the General  Court  was justified in holding,  in  paragraphs 105  to 118 of  the judgment under appeal, that  the interpretation of Article 10(1)(c) of  Regulation  No 211/2011  advocated by  the  appellants  is wrong in law. The General Court was also correct to reject, in  paragraphs 122  to 125  of  the judgment under appeal, the appellants’ arguments  that  Article 11(4) TEU  imposes an obligation on  the Commission  to initiate  a legislative procedure in response to an  ECI  that has been registered and that has the required support.

72      It follows that the first ground of appeal must be rejected as being unfounded.
 The second ground of appeal

 Arguments of the parties

73      By their  second ground of appeal, the  appellants  claim that  the General  Court  erred in law  in holding, in  paragraphs 128  and 132 of  the judgment under appeal, that  the Commission was not obliged, under  Article 10(1)(c)  of  Regulation  No 211/2011, to set out separately  its  legal and political conclusions on the  ECIs  submitted to it.  The appellants  maintain that that  provision must be read in the  light of  recital 20 of that  regulation, where it is stated that  the Commission  should set out its  ‘legal’ and ‘political’ conclusions separately.

74      The Commission  considers,  expressing its support for the  finding of the  General Court  that the preamble  of an EU act  has no binding legal force  and cannot be relied on as a ground for derogating from  a  provision  or for interpreting  that  provision  in a manner that  is clearly contrary to its  wording, that the  second ground of appeal must be rejected.
 Findings of the Court

75      The preamble of an EU act  may  explain the content  of the  provisions of that act (see, to that effect, judgment of  10 January 2006, IATA and ELFAA, C‑344/04, EU:C:2006:10, paragraph 76).  As stated by the  Advocate General in  point 93  of his Opinion, the  recitals of an EU act constitute  important  elements for the purposes of  interpretation, which may  clarify  the intentions of the  author of that act. 

76      However, the preamble to an EU act has no binding legal force and cannot be relied on as a ground either for derogating from the actual provisions of the act in question or for interpreting those provisions in a manner that is clearly contrary to their wording  (see, to that effect, judgment of  24 November 2005, Deutsches Milch-Kontor, C‑136/04, EU:C:2005:716, paragraph 32  and the case-law cited). 

77      In this case, the General  Court  recalled, in  paragraph 128  of  the judgment under appeal, the settled case-law  on the legal force of a preamble,  and then,  in  paragraphs 129  and 130  of that judgment, held that  the Commission  was not subject to an obligation to set out separately  its legal and political conclusions, since that  obligation, which appears in  recital  20 of  Regulation  No 211/2011, is not reproduced in Article 10(1)(c)  of that  regulation. For the sake of completeness, the  General Court  added, in  paragraph 131  of  the judgment under appeal, that,  even if  the Commission  were  obliged,  under that  provision, to set out separately its legal and political conclusions, that obligation would be purely formal,  and consequently  its breach  would not result in  the annulment of  the contested communication. 

78      It must be observed  that the only respect in which the wording of Article 10(1)(c)  of  Regulation  No 211/2011 and  that of recital 20 of that  regulation  differ is that  the latter recital  alone makes reference to  the Commission  setting out ‘separately’  its legal and political conclusions. That  reference  thus serves to  clarify the obligation incumbent on  the Commission  under that  provision. 

79      In that  regard, the word  ‘separately’, used in  recital  20 of that  regulation, must be understood as meaning that  both the  legal conclusions and the  political conclusions of  the Commission  must appear in the communication relating to  the ECI  at issue  in such a way  as to ensure that  the legal and political nature of the  reasons  contained in that communication can be understood.

80      However, that word cannot be understood  as imposing  an obligation to  make a formal separation of the legal conclusions, on the one hand, and the political conclusions, on the other, an obligation the breach of which  would incur the penalty of annulment  of the communication concerned.

81      In this case, as also stated by  the Advocate General in point 104 of his Opinion, it is clear from  paragraphs 13 to  30  of  the judgment under appeal that  the contested communication satisfies  the  requirement  mentioned  in  paragraph 79  of the present judgment. 

82      It follows that  the argument pursued by  the  appellants  in the second ground of  appeal  cannot, in any event, succeed. 

83      Consequently, the second ground of appeal must be rejected as being ineffective.
 The third ground of appeal

 Arguments of the parties

84      By their  third ground of appeal, the  appellants  claim that  the General  Court  erred in law,  in  paragraph 170 of  the judgment under appeal,  in holding  that  the contested communication  had to be subject to  limited review  by the  General Court, restricted to  manifest errors of assessment.  They consider, first, that  the General  Court  relied on case-law  that is not applicable to the  ECI mechanism  and, second, that the General Court  offered no criterion  by which  errors  that are ‘manifest’ can be  distinguished from errors that are not.

85      The appellants  argue, more specifically, that  the General  Court  erred  in accepting that the Commission, when it submits  a communication in response to an ECI, has a broad discretion comparable to that which it has  in the area of socio-economic policy. They add that  the General  Court  did not state the reasons why  it  relied, by analogy,  on the judgment of  14 July 2005, Rica Foods v Commission (C‑40/03 P, EU:C:2005:455), though that judgment is not transposable to the ECI mechanism.

86      The Commission contends that the third ground of appeal is unfounded.
 Findings of the Court

87      The  General Court  held, in  paragraph 169 of  the judgment under appeal, that the Commission, in exercising its powers of legislative initiative, must be allowed broad discretion, in so far as, through that exercise, it is called upon, pursuant to Article 17(1) TEU, to promote the general interest of the Union, carrying out, as necessary, the difficult task of reconciling divergent interests.  Consequently, the General Court  considered, in  paragraph 170  of that judgment, that the contested communication  should be subject to  limited judicial review.  

88      In that regard, as has been stated  in the examination of the first  ground of appeal, the Commission’s decision not to take action in response to an  ECI  which has been registered  and which has collected  the required support  is part of the exercise, by that institution, of its  power of legislative initiative conferred in  Article 17 TEU.

89      Since, as rightly stated by  the General  Court  in  paragraph 169 of  the judgment under appeal, the Commission  has, in the exercise of that  power, a broad discretion, the General Court was also correct to hold, in  paragraph 170 of that judgment,  that  the contested communication  was subject to  limited judicial review, and not to  full review  as claimed by  the  appellants. 

90      It must, moreover, be made clear in that regard that  while it is true, as  pointed out by the Commission, that the Court  held, in the judgment of  9 December 2014, Schönberger v Parliament (C‑261/13 P, EU:C:2014:2423, paragraph 24), that a decision of the  Parliament  concerning the  action to be taken in response to a petition meeting the conditions laid down in  Article 227  TFEU  is not amenable to review by the EU Courts, a communication from  the Commission  adopted  under  Article 10(1)(c)  of  Regulation  No 211/2011 is, however, to be distinguished from  such a decision in various respects.

91      Unlike such  a petition, an  ECI  that is registered  on the basis of  Article 4(2)  of Regulation  No 211/2011 is subject, in accordance with that  regulation, to strict conditions and to specific procedural safeguards. Further, while a decision of the  Parliament  of the kind mentioned in the  preceding paragraph  falls within a  discretion  ‘of a political nature’ (judgment of  9 December 2014,  Schönberger v Parliament, C‑261/13 P, EU:C:2014:2423, paragraph 24), it is clear from  Article 10(1)(c)  of that  regulation  that  the Commission  is obliged to set out, in a communication,  its conclusions, both legal and political,  on the ECI  concerned, the action it intends to take, if any, and its reasons for taking or not taking that action. 

92      The aim of those requirements  is not only to  inform, in a clear, comprehensible and detailed manner,  the  organisers  of an ECI  of the  Commission’s position  on their initiative, but,  also  to enable the EU Courts  to review the communications of  the Commission  adopted  in accordance with  Article 10(1)(c)  of  Regulation  No 211/2011.

93      As regards the extent of that  review, the  General Court  held, in  paragraph 170 of  the judgment under appeal, that the aim of that review  is to  determine, not only  whether the reasons stated in the contested communication are sufficient, but also whether  that communication is vitiated by, inter alia, manifest errors of assessment.  

94      In that regard, it must, first, be recalled that  the obligation to state reasons  must apply, as a general rule, to all EU acts  that produce  legal effects  (see, to that effect, judgment of  25 October 2017, Commission  v Council (WRC‑15), C‑687/15, EU:C:2017:803, paragraph 52). The statement of reasons must disclose, clearly and unequivocally, the reasoning of the institution that is the author of the measure, in such a way as to enable, on the one hand, interested parties to ascertain the reasons for the measure in order to defend their rights, and, on the other hand, the EU Courts to exercise their power to review the legality of that decision (see, to that  effect, judgment of  12 September 2017, Anagnostakis v Commission, C‑589/15 P, EU:C:2017:663, paragraph 28). 

95      Second, where the EU institutions enjoy, as  the Commission does  in this case, a broad discretion  and, in particular, when they are required to  make choices  that are, in particular, of a political nature  and to  undertake complex assessments, judicial review of the  assessments  that underpin  the exercise of that discretion  must consist in determining  the absence of manifest errors (see, to that effect, judgment of  6 September 2017, Slovakia  and Hungary v Council, C‑643/15 and C‑647/15, EU:C:2017:631, paragraphs 123  and 124 and  the case-law cited). 

96      Accordingly, the General  Court  did not err in law in holding, in  paragraphs 169 and 170 of  the judgment under appeal, that  the contested communication  falls within the exercise by the Commission of its  broad  discretion  and must, consequently, be subject to limited judicial review, with the aim of determining, inter alia, the sufficiency  of its statement of reasons  and the absence of manifest errors of assessment.

97      It follows that the third ground of appeal must be rejected as being unfounded.
 The fourth ground of appeal

 Arguments of the parties

98      By their  fourth ground of appeal, the  appellants  claim that  the General  Court  erred in law  when it undertook a limited  review of the  Commission’s discretion  and, further,  carried out an incomplete  review  of the contested communication. 

99      More specifically, the  appellants  argue that  the  General Court, in  paragraphs 159  to 165 of  the judgment under appeal, identified  the  alleged errors of assessment, and restricted its review, in  paragraphs 166 to 177  of that  judgment, to determining  whether such errors  were manifest errors. However, according to the appellants, it is clear from  paragraphs 172 to 183 of the judgment under appeal that  the General  Court  carried out that review  only with respect to some  of the  alleged errors of assessment.

100    In that regard,  the appellants argue, in the first place,  that  the General  Court  erred in law  by failing to identify  an inconsistency  between  the prohibition,  laid down in  the judgment of  18 October 2011, Brüstle (C‑34/10, EU:C:2011:669), on patenting inventions which involve  the destruction of human embryos  and the funding of  research  in relation to such inventions  and, in addition,  by failing to conclude from  that judgment that  the  human embryo should be recognised to be a human being. The appellants consider  that  paragraphs 33  and 34 of that judgment establish human dignity  as a legal principle that takes precedence over  the law of patents  and that must also be ‘taken into account  in order to rule on the  economic and financial contribution of  the Union to the destruction of human embryos’.

101    In the second place,  the  appellants consider  that  the General  Court  failed to  declare that  the Commission  was obliged  to establish in advance the  legal status  of a human embryo, in order to be able to  strike a balance between  the interests of  hESC research and the dignity  of the  human embryo. In their opinion, if the  Commission  had recognised the  human dignity  of the embryo,  that would have precluded it from  seeking to balance  that dignity  and any competing  interest of society, since the  very notion of  human dignity prohibits such balancing.

102    In the third place, as regards  hESC research, the  appellants  argue  that  the assertion that  the ‘triple lock’  system constitutes  an ethically sound criterion  for the assessment of  research projects  is manifestly  misconceived,  since  such a system  does not prevent  the funding of  illegal research projects and  even offers an incentive  to the  Member States  to lower their ethical standards. The appellants  maintain that the finding made  by  the General  Court, in  paragraph 176 of  the judgment under appeal, that the ethical approach of  the Commission, which is different from that of  the ECI at issue, is not vitiated by a  manifest error of assessment, constitutes  an error of law. According to the appellants, it is not the role of the  General Court  to determine  the merits  of competing socio-ethical interests since such an exercise  is political in nature, not a matter of law. The  appellants  add  that the review carried out by  the General  Court  is incomplete, in that  it did not examine  all the alleged  errors of assessment. In that regard, they claim that  the General  Court  failed to examine  the manifestly erroneous  assertions of  the Commission  concerning  the ‘triple lock’ system, and did not offer any additional observations in relation  to such  assertions.

103    In the fourth place, the appellants claim that the assertion, unaccompanied by any evidence in that regard, that the provision of abortions through funding  from the EU budget reduces abortions is manifestly paradoxical.

104    In the fifth place, the  appellants  claim that  the General  Court, in  paragraph 164 of  the judgment under appeal, misrepresented their arguments, since those arguments  related, in reality,  to the fact that  the Commission  had wrongly characterised  the commitments  made in the context of the objectives  of the  Millennium Development Goals (‘MDGs’) and the  International Conference on Population and Development (‘ICPD’) Programme of Action as constituting  binding legal obligations. 

105    The Commission contends that the fourth ground of appeal  should be rejected as being unfounded.
 Findings of the Court

106    First, it is necessary to reject  the appellants’ argument that  the General  Court  erred  when it found, in  paragraphs 173  to 175 of  the judgment under appeal, that  the issue whether scientific research  involving  the use of human embryos can be financed  by EU funds  is clearly distinct from  the issue that  led to the delivery  of the judgment of  18 October 2011, Brüstle (C‑34/10, EU:C:2011:669).

107    As is clear from  paragraph 40  of that judgment, the Court  stated that  it is not the purpose of Directive 98/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 July 1998 on the legal protection of biotechnological inventions (OJ 1998 L 213, p. 13), the interpretation of which was at issue in that  judgment, to regulate the  use  of human embryos in the context of  scientific research, the purpose  of that directive being limited to the patentability  of biotechnological inventions (see  also, to that effect, judgment of  18 December 2014, International Stem Cell, C‑364/13, EU:C:2014:2451, paragraph 22). The judgment of  18 October 2011, Brüstle (C‑34/10, EU:C:2011:669), moreover,  contains no finding by the Court  that  scientific research making use of  human embryos could under no circumstances be  funded by the Union. 

108    Accordingly, since that argument is based on  a misreading of  the judgment of  18 October 2011, Brüstle (C‑34/10, EU:C:2011:669), the General  Court  committed no error in law in holding that  that  judgment  could not be relied on by  the appellants  to demonstrate an inconsistency  in the approach of  the Commission  with respect to the use of human embryos in  scientific research.

109    Second, the appellants’ argument in relation to the obligation to clarify  the legal status  of a  human embryo is directed, as stated by  the Advocate General in point 136 of his Opinion, against paragraph 156 of the judgment under appeal,  which concerns  the fourth plea in law  relied on  before  the General  Court, claiming a  breach of the Commission’s obligation to state reasons.  

110    That being the case, and besides the fact  that that argument does no more than  repeat  an argument presented in the procedure before  the General  Court  to challenge the contested communication, that argument cannot  properly support  the fourth ground of appeal, which concerns the  General  Court’s  failure to  identify alleged manifest errors of assessment  committed by the  Commission in that communication.

111    In the third place, as regards the  arguments  in relation to  hESC research, claiming that the General  Court determined, in  paragraphs 176 and 177 of  the judgment under appeal,  the merits  of competing socio-ethical  interests, it must be said that  those arguments  are based on a misreading of the judgment under appeal. 

112    It is clear from  paragraph 176 of the judgment under appeal that  the General  Court  set out the  ethical approaches in relation to  hESC research  respectively followed  in  the ECI at issue and by the Commission.  The General Court  held that the  Commission’s approach  was not vitiated by a  manifest error of assessment. Further, in  paragraph 177  of that judgment, the General Court rejected  as being  insufficiently  substantiated  the  appellants’ argument  that there are solutions  other than  hESC research which, they claim,  render  that research  redundant. 

113    In so proceeding, the General  Court  did not engage in an examination of the respective merits  of competing socio-ethical approaches. The General Court  merely determined  that the Commission, in its choice of the approach  it decided to adopt, had not  committed a manifest error of assessment.

114    It follows that  the appellants’ arguments in relation to  hESC research must be rejected as being  unfounded. 

115    In the fourth place, as regards the  argument in relation to the alleged  error  committed  by  the General  Court  in  paragraphs 179 and 180 of  the judgment under appeal, where it is stated that  the provision of  abortion services funded from the EU budget reduces  abortions, it is clear that  that argument is based on a misreading  of  the judgment under appeal.

116    In  paragraph 180 of  the judgment under appeal, the General Court correctly  stated that, in  the contested communication, the Commission, relying on a  World Health Organisation publication, had mentioned the fact that  improving the safety of  health services  associated with, inter alia, abortion  helps to reduce  maternal mortality  and maternal illness, one causal factor being the  practice  of unsafe abortions.

117    Consequently, the General Court  was correct to hold that  the Commission  had not committed any  manifest error of assessment  in considering that EU funding of  a number of  safe and effective health services, including abortion services, contributed  to a reduction in the number of  unsafe abortions  and, therefore, in the risk of  maternal mortality  and maternal illness. It follows that the appellants’ argument must be rejected as being manifestly unfounded.

118    In the fifth place, as regards the contention  that the arguments of the  appellants  as stated in  paragraph 164 of  the judgment under appeal,  in relation  to the  MDGs  and the IPCD Programme of Action, were misrepresented, suffice it to state, as observed by  the Advocate General in  point 146 of his Opinion,  that that  argument  cannot, in any event, succeed  when there is no assertion in the contested communication  that  the  MDGs  and the IPCD Programme of Action contain  binding legal obligations.

119    It follows from all the foregoing considerations that the fourth ground of appeal must be rejected.
 The fifth ground of appeal

 Arguments of the parties

120    By their  fifth ground of appeal, the  appellants  claim that  the General Court  erred in law  in stating, in  paragraph 156  of  the judgment under appeal, that there was no need to clarify  the legal status of the  human embryo  for the purpose of rejecting  the three  proposals for the amendment of  EU acts, existing or in prospect, suggested  by  the ECI at issue. According to the appellants, the objective  of  the ECI at issue  did not  concern  solely  the adoption of the three measures suggested  to Commission, but  primarily concerned  the legal protection of the dignity, right to life and  right to integrity  of every human being  from the moment of conception. The  appellants consider  that  the Commission  was obliged to cooperate  with the  organisers  of  the ECI at issue  and to submit  a  proposal  for a legislative act in response to it. The General Court  erred in law  in failing to take into account  the specific subject matter  of that  ECI  where it held  that  the Commission  was not obliged to take action in response to that  ECI.

121    The Commission contends that the fifth ground of appeal must be rejected.
 Findings of the Court

122    By the  fifth ground of appeal, the  appellants  claim, in essence, that, in  paragraph 156 of  the judgment under appeal, the General Court  was wrong to  hold that  the Commission  was justified in  understanding  the objective of the ECI at issue  to be  solely that the Commission  submit the three  proposals for legislation  that had been described in  that  ECI  and not also  that it produce a definition or clarification of the  legal status  of the human embryo.

123    In that regard, it is clear from  Article 4(1)  of  Regulation  No 211/2011  that the  organisers  of an ECI, if it is to be registered, must provide the information set out in  Annex II  to that regulation.  The requirements  set out in that annex include  the title  of the  proposal  for an  ECI, the subject matter  of that  ECI, a  description of its objectives, and the  provisions of the Treaties  considered relevant  by the organisers  for  the proposed action. Further, the  organisers  may annex to their request  for  registration  more detailed information on  the subject and objectives of  and  background to  that  ECI, or  a draft legal act.

124    In this case, it is clear from  paragraphs 2  to 4 of the judgment under appeal that, on the basis of what was recorded  in the Commission’s online register  for the purposes of  the registration  of ECIs, first, the subject matter  of  the ECI at issue  consisted  in  the legal protection of the dignity, right to life and right to integrity of every human being from conception, in the areas of EU competence in which such protection is of particular importance. 

125    Second, that  ECI  had as an objective  the protection of the dignity  and  integrity  of the  human embryo  further to  the judgment of  18 October 2011, Brüstle (C‑34/10, EU:C:2011:669), which, according to the  organisers, defines  the human embryo  as the  beginning  of the process of development of a human being. The  organisers  stated, in that  regard, that, in order to ensure  consistency  in the  exercise of its competences, the European Union should prohibit and put an end to  the funding of activities that involve the destruction of human embryos, particularly in the  fields of  research, development aid and public health.

126    Third, the  organisers  made reference to  Articles 2 and 17 TEU, and to  Article 4(3)  and  (4)  and Articles 168, 180, 182, 209, 210 and 322 TFEU  as relevant  provisions. 

127    The  organisers  of  the ECI at issue  had annexed  to their request for registration  three  proposals for amendments to  existing or proposed EU acts.

128    More specifically, as stated in  paragraph 14  of the present judgment, the organisers  requested  (i)  the insertion, in the Financial  Regulation applicable to the EU budget, of a  provision  prohibiting the funding by the Union of activities  that destroy  human embryos or presuppose their destruction;  (ii) the addition,  in a  proposed EU regulation on the  establishment of a framework programme  for  research  and innovation, of a  provision excluding from all funding under that programme research activities that destroy human embryos, including those aimed at obtaining stem cells, and research involving the use of human embryonic stem cells in subsequent steps to obtain them;  and (iii)  the addition, in the EU legislation  establishing a financing instrument for development cooperation, of a  provision  stating, in essence, that EU financial assistance  should not be used, directly or indirectly, to finance abortions.

129    It follows from the foregoing  that the General Court was right, in  paragraph 156 of  the judgment under appeal, to hold  that the objective  of  the ECI at issue  was  to invite the Commission  to submit  three  proposals for legislation consisting in  amending existing or proposed EU acts, relating respectively to the EU budget, to research  and innovation,  and  to development cooperation, and not to submit, in addition,  a  proposal  aimed at the definition  or clarification  of the legal status  of the  human embryo.

130    Consequently, the fifth ground of appeal must be rejected and, therefore, the appeal must be dismissed.
 Costs

131    In accordance with Article 184(2) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, where the appeal is unfounded, the Court is to make a decision as to costs.

132    Under Article 138(1) of those rules, applicable to appeal proceedings by virtue of Article 184(1) thereof, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings.

133    Since the Commission has applied for costs and the appellants have been unsuccessful, the latter must be ordered to pay the costs of the Commission and to bear their own costs.
On those grounds, the Court (Grand Chamber) hereby:
1.      Dismisses the appeal;

2.      Orders Mr Patrick Grégor Puppinck, Mr Filippo Vari, Ms Josephine Quintavalle, Ms Edith Frivaldszky, Mr Jakub Baltroszewicz, Ms Alicia Latorre Canizares and Mr Manfred Liebner to bear their own costs and to pay those incurred by the European Commission.

Lenaerts

Silva de Lapuerta

Prechal

Vilaras

Regan

Rodin

Xuereb

Rossi

Jarukaitis

Juhász
 
Ilešič

Malenovský
 
Piçarra

Delivered in open court in Luxembourg on 19 December 2019.

A. Calot Escobar
 
K. Lenaerts

Registrar
 
President

*      Language of the case: English.