CELEX: 61995CC0309
Language: en
Date: 1997-04-24 00:00:00
Title: Opinion of Mr Advocate General Cosmas delivered on 24 April 1997. # Commission of the European Communities v Council of the European Union. # Exceptional aid to producers of table wine in France. # Case C-309/95.

Important legal notice

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61995C0309

Opinion of Mr Advocate General Cosmas delivered on 24 April 1997.  -  Commission of the European Communities v Council of the European Union.  -  Exceptional aid to producers of table wine in France.  -  Case C-309/95.  

European Court reports 1998 Page I-00655

Opinion of the Advocate-General

Preliminary observations1 This action has been brought by the Commission under Article 173 of the EC Treaty for the annulment of the Council's decision of 22 June 1995 adopted on the basis of the third subparagraph of Article 93(2) of the EC Treaty, in which the Council found that the grant by France of exceptional aid to wine producers taking part in the preventive distillation of table wines was compatible with the common market. 2 This case provides the Court with an opportunity to clarify its case-law with regard to the third criterion laid down by the fifth paragraph of Article 173 of the Treaty relating to the admissibility of the action. I - Legal context 3 Pursuant to Articles 42 and 43 of the Treaty, the Council adopted Regulation (EEC) No 822/87, (1) which recodified the basic provisions on the common organisation of the market in wine. 4 In the framework of the common organisation of the market in wine, Regulation No 822/87 provided as financial stabilisation factors and measures for the stabilisation of the market in question inter alia for measures of both preventive distillation (Article 38) and compulsory distillation (Article 39) to be adopted by the Commission under the conditions and in accordance with the procedure laid down by Articles 38 and 39. 5 With regard to the conditions for preventive distillation, Article 38(1) of Regulation No 822/87 provides that: `Where necessary, having regard to harvest forecasts or in order to improve the quality of products put on the market, preventive distillation of table wines and wines suitable for yielding table wines may be decided on in each wine year, from 1 September until a date to be determined. ... .' 6 Article 38(2) provides that the buying-in price for wine delivered for preventive distillation is to be 65% of the guide price. (2)  Preventive distillation depends on the voluntary adherence by producers to this procedure. 7 Regulation (EC) No 2028/94 of 8 August 1994 (3) provided for the preventive distillation of certain quantities of wine for the 1994/95 wine year. 8 The objective of that Commission Regulation was to meet the need for stabilisation and sound management of the table-wine market.  In particular, the second subparagraph of Article 1(1) provided that the quantity of wine which producers could cause to be distilled was to be limited to 12 hectolitres per hectare (`hl/ha').  For France, this represented a total of 1 403 000 hl. 9 Under Article 2(1) of the same Regulation, contracts and declarations signed for that distillation measure could be presented for approval by the competent intervention agency up to 10 November 1994.  Under Article 2(2), the quantities for which a contract and declaration had been signed and approved had to be delivered to the distillery by 15 March 1995 at the latest. 10 Pursuant to Article 39(1) and (2) of Regulation No 822/87, the Commission is to order compulsory distillation where, in respect of a given wine year, the market in table wine and wine suitable for yielding table wine is in a state of serious imbalance. 11 The compulsory distillation price makes this measure into a deterrent for producers.  It fluctuates at around 25% of the guide price.  Producers may deduct the quantity delivered for preventive distillation from that which must be delivered for compulsory distillation. 12 Article 76 of Regulation No 822/87 provides that the provisions of Articles 92, 93 and 94 of the Treaty are to apply to the wine market. 13 Thus an express provision of Regulation No 822/87 provides for the application to the wine market of Article 93 of the Treaty, which in principle gives the Commission (4) and, exceptionally, the Council (5) the task of ensuring that any kind of State aid, whether already in existence or to be granted or subject to alteration, is compatible with the common market.  The third and fourth subparagraphs of Article 93(2) are worded as follows: `On application by a Member State, the Council may, acting unanimously, decide that aid which that State is granting or intends to grant shall be considered to be compatible with the common market, in derogation from the provisions of Article 92 or from the regulations provided for in Article 94, if such a decision is justified by exceptional circumstances.  If, as regards the aid in question, the Commission has already initiated the procedure provided for in the first subparagraph of this paragraph, the fact that the State concerned has made its application to the Council shall have the effect of suspending that procedure until the Council has made its attitude known. If, however, the Council has not made its attitude known within three months of the said application being made, the Commission shall give its decision on the case. ... .' II - Facts 14 On 26 July 1994 the Commission referred to the Management Committee for wine a draft regulation introducing preventive distillation for the 1994/95 wine year. 15 On 28 July 1994 a meeting took place at the French Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, during which the grant of aid to French wine producers was decided upon in principle in view of the considerable price differences between French, Italian and Portuguese wines. 16 On 8 August 1994, by Regulation (EC) No 2028/94, the Commission decided to introduce preventive distillation for the 1994/95 wine year. 17 On 17 August 1994 the Commission asked to be notified of the aid which France had decided to grant wine producers in connection with the carrying out of preventive distillation. 18 On 20 October 1994 the French authorities notified the Commission of the aid in question pursuant to Article 93(3) of the Treaty. 19 During the Council meeting of 29 and 30 May 1995 France asked the Council to authorise the grant of aid to French wine producers pursuant to the third subparagraph of Article 93(2). 20 On 22 June 1995 the Council adopted a decision in relation to the grant of additional aid to French wine producers for the 1994/95 wine year amounting to a maximum of FF 660 per hectare and thus enabled producers to obtain a preventive distillation price close to the price of wine sold on the market during the wine year in question.  That Council decision, according to Article 2 thereof, was addressed to the French Republic. 21 The Council's decision was not published in the Official Journal of the European Communities, but it was notified to the French Government by letter from the Secretary-General of the Council dated 27 July 1995. 22 Under cover of a letter of 27 July 1995, the Director-General (for Agriculture), acting on behalf of the Secretary-General of the Council, sent the Commission authentic copies of the decision and informed the Commission of the adoption of the contested decision by the Council, informing it also that on the same day the President of the Council had notified the addressee (i.e. the French Republic) of the decision and that it had taken effect by such notification. 23 The Council decision reached the Commission on 1 August 1995. III - Forms of order sought by the parties 24 By application lodged on 29 September 1995, the Commission brought an action before the Court of Justice against the Council's decision of 22 June 1995 authorising the grant of aid to French wine producers. 25 The Commission asks the Court: (1) to annul the contested Council decision of 22 June 1995; (2) to order the Council to pay the costs; and (3) to order the French Republic to pay its own costs. 26 By a separate document dated 6 November 1995, the Council raised a plea of inadmissibility.  By decision of 18 June 1996 the Court decided to reserve its decision for the final judgment. 27 In particular, the Council asks the Court: (1) to dismiss the action as inadmissible; (2) in the alternative, to dismiss the action as unfounded; and (3) to order the Commission to pay the costs.  The French Republic has intervened in support of the Council, lodging written statements. IV - Admissibility 28 In this case the question of admissibility has been raised as a preliminary matter.  The Council, whose viewpoint is shared by the French Republic, considers that the Commission, which lodged the application at the Court Registry on 29 September 1995, did not bring its action within the prescribed period, since the action was brought after the expiry of the prescribed period of two months from the date when the Commission had precise knowledge of the contested decision (22 June 1995). 29 On this point, my observations are as follows. 30 Under the fourth paragraph of Article 189 of the EC Treaty, a decision is to be binding in its entirety upon those to whom it is addressed.  Moreover, under Article 191(3), decisions are to be notified to those to whom they are addressed and they take effect upon such notification. 31 Furthermore, the fifth paragraph of Article 173 lays down that proceedings must be instituted within two months of the publication of the measure, or of its notification to the plaintiff, or, in the absence thereof, of the day on which it came to the knowledge of the latter, as the case may be.  Under Article 81(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, the period of time allowed for commencing proceedings against a measure adopted by an institution, where it has been notified, runs from the day following the receipt by the person concerned of notification of the measure. 32 Finally, Article 18(1) and (2) of the Council's Rules of Procedure (6) provides, inter alia, that the Secretary-General must notify Council decisions to their addressees and must send authentic copies of Council decisions to the Governments of the Member States and to the Commission. 33 It further follows from the abovementioned provisions that the starting point of the period allowed for instituting proceedings is, firstly, with regard to measures which must be published, the date of publication, secondly, with regard to measures which, according to the relevant provisions, must be notified, the date of notification, and thirdly, in cases where there is no provision for publication or notification, the date when knowledge of the measure is acquired, and such knowledge must be precise. (7) 34 It further follows from those provisions that decisions must be notified to the persons to whom they are addressed by name and that such notification means that they take effect.  Notification is not a precondition for the validity of the measure, (8) but an extraneous factor. (9) 35 In the present case the contested Council decision of 22 June 1995 designates the addressee as the French Republic and no-one else (Article 2).  Therefore, if the French Government had wished to institute proceedings, the time-limit for doing so would have begun to run only on the date when it was notified of the decision.  In contrast, with regard to the Commission, which is not designated by the decision as an addressee, notification is not necessary in order for the time-limit to begin to run; this occurs when the Commission acquires precise knowledge of the measure, if that appears from the documents in the file. Consequently, a copy of the contested decision addressed to the Commission after it acquired such knowledge has no effect on the time-limit, which has already begun to run, any more than it causes a new period to begin to run. 36 The documents in the file show - and this point is not disputed - that from 16 June 1995 the members of the Council and the Commission were in possession of a draft decision (document 8100/95 Agri 62) (10) which was available in the room where the meeting in question was held. (11)  This draft was the basis of the decision in question, which was adopted on 22 June 1995.  A comparison of the text of the draft and the decision shows that the draft was approved unanimously, without amendment. Moreover, the Commission admits (in paragraph 7 of its observations concerning the plea of inadmissibility) that it was present at the meeting in question of the Agriculture Council from 19 to 22 June 1995. 37 The Commission's application is accompanied, in Annex VI, by a document (summary of record) dated 23 June 1995 and prepared by the General Secretariat of the Commission on the day after the Agriculture Council held in Brussels from 19 to 22 June 1995.   This document, particularly paragraph 9, mentions the terms of the contested decision and states that the Agriculture Council meeting resulted in the unanimous approval (with one abstention) of France's request.  This document also describes the discussion which led to the contested decision, mentions the French Government's arguments and also makes mention of the fact that certain Member States and the Commissioner responsible, who was present, expressed doubts as to whether a favourable response to France's request was justified. 38 All the abovementioned circumstances raise the presumption that the Commission had precise knowledge of the Council's decision at the latest on the date of that record (23 June 1995).  Therefore the period allowed for instituting proceedings against the decision began to run, so far as the Commission was concerned, on the following day (24 June 1995).  The period expired after two months, that is to say, on 26 August 1995, allowing for two additional days on account of distance. (12) 39 In addition, as already mentioned (in paragraphs 21 to 23 and 35), the contested Council decision was notified to the French Government on 27 July 1995 and sent on the same day to the Commission, where it arrived on 1 August 1995 (it was entered in the register under No SG(95)A/12870/1 8 1995).  The Commission maintains that the time-limit for instituting proceedings began to run on 27 July 1995, when the decision was notified to the French Republic and when it took effect, and that therefore the application was lodged within the prescribed period on 29 September 1995. However, that view is mistaken, since notification of the decision to the French Republic caused the time-limit to begin to run only in relation to the latter, which was named as the addressee of the contested decision.   As regards the Commission, however, which was not designated as an addressee and to which notification was unnecessary, under the fifth paragraph of Article 173 of the Treaty, the time-limit began to run on the date when the Commission acquired precise knowledge of it, that is to say, not later than 23 June 1995. 40 It follows that, as the present application was lodged on 29 September 1995, i.e. after the two-month time-limit had expired, the proceedings were instituted outside the time-limit and, on that well-founded ground, the action must be dismissed, as the Council and the French Government rightly contend. (13) V - Alleged grounds for annulment 41 Regardless of whether the proceedings were instituted within the prescribed period, I now wish to consider briefly the grounds for annulment which have been raised and which are very similar to those raised by the Commission in Case C-122/94 Commission v Council, on which the Court gave judgment on 29 February 1996. (14)  That judgment gives sufficient guidance to resolve the questions of substance raised by the present action. A - First ground for annulment: misapplication of the third subparagraph of Article 93(2) of the Treaty 42 With its first and principal ground in the introduction to its application, the Commission claims that the third subparagraph of Article 93(2) of the Treaty was misapplied; although it does not apply solely in the framework of the Chapter on competition, it cannot result in aid which is contrary to the other provisions of the Treaty, except Articles 92 to 94, being considered lawful.  The Commission claims that there was lack of competence and abuse of procedure in so far as the third subparagraph of Article 93(2) was used as the basis for derogations to the system of the common organisation of the wine market. 43 In the judgment in Case C-122/94 Commission v Council (15) the Court dismissed a very similar ground for annulment. (16)  This is why the Commission stated in its reply that, as the first ground for annulment, it adhered only to the claim that the Council had exceeded the limits of the discretion conferred upon it by the third subparagraph of Article 93(2).  Accordingly I take the view that the Court should not examine the first ground for annulment raised by the Commission. B - Second ground for annulment: manifest error in the assessment of the facts 44 In the second ground for annulment, which was originally raised solely in the alternative, the  Commission argues that the `exceptional circumstances' which, among other conditions, must exist pursuant to the third subparagraph of Article 93(2) of the Treaty before aid which a Member State is granting or intends to grant may be considered compatible with the common market, did not exist in this case.  The Commission claims that the Council made improper use of its discretion under the third subparagraph of Article 93(2), committing a manifest error in its assessment of the facts when it adopted the contested decision.  Accordingly it seeks the annulment of the decision on the ground that the statement of reasons is unlawful. 45 Under the third subparagraph of Article 93(2) the Council has a wide discretion with regard to the expediency of adopting certain measures (`the Council may, acting unanimously, decide') and it determines when the `exceptional circumstances' which constitute the conditio sine qua non for a decision that aid which a State is granting or intends to grant is to be considered compatible with the common market are present.  That is so even if, in the framework of the procedure laid down by Article 93(3), the Commission has decided that the aid is not compatible with the common market. 46 In Case C-122/94 Commission v Council, the Court observed (17) that `when the implementation by the Council of the Community's agricultural policy necessitates the evaluation of a complex economic situation, the discretion which it has does not apply exclusively to the nature and scope of the measures to be taken, but also to some extent to the finding of the basic facts inasmuch as, in particular, it is open to the Council to rely if necessary on general findings.  In reviewing the exercise of such a power, the Court must confine itself to examining whether it contains a manifest error or constitutes a misuse of power or whether the authority in question did not clearly exceed the bounds of its discretion'. (18)  The Court added (19)  that `the very wording of the third subparagraph of Article 93(2) shows that the Council, when deciding that exceptional circumstances justify an aid being considered compatible with the common market, thus derogating from Article 92, is called upon to carry out an assessment of a complex economic situation'. 47 In the present case, I consider (20) that the Council was called upon to evaluate a complex economic situation and the discretion which it had did not apply exclusively to the nature and scope of the measures to be taken, but also to the findings of the basic facts.  It was therefore open to the Council to rely on general findings.  In other words, the Council could assess together a whole set of factors for the purpose of determining whether exceptional circumstances existed. 48 In particular, since the common organisation of the wine market has for a number of years been characterised by a `permanent structural imbalance which is in the process of being reformed', as the Court has observed, (21) it was open to the Council not only to rely on the figures for the opening of the 1994/95 wine year, but also to take account of the 1995 figures.  That is also clear from the third recital in the preamble to the decision in question which, although mentioning that at the time when the decision was adopted there was nothing exceptional about the wine market which would justify introducing compulsory distillation, states nevertheless that the proper implementation of preventive distillation in all producer countries was essential in a market characterised by consistent falls in the volumes used. (22)  The Council could also have taken account of the overall figures relating, first, to the situation in the Community and not only to that in the French market and, secondly, to all wines and not merely to the table wines to which the Commission's preventive distillation measure and the French Government aid related. Finally, in my opinion, in its assessment the Council could have taken into account the trend in official prices in national currency when considering whether such prices were unfavourable to French producers by comparison with those in other Member States to such a degree as to warrant the adoption of a special measure. 49 I certainly do not consider lawful per se the reasoning in the decision (second recital) based on the fact that the sector in question has a regulatory framework which is in the process of being reformed with a view to the implementation of measures permitting permanent stabilisation of the market, because that type of situation could not be considered an `exceptional circumstance' within the meaning of the third subparagraph of Article 93(2).  In my opinion, such a fact cannot amount to an `exceptional circumstance' since if that concept were taken to extremes it would become null and void through being stretched too far.  In other words, its meaning would be altered, so that this vague legal concept would have only a nominal value without any specially compelling scope and in the last resort without any special practical value. (23) 50 The Commission claims that there were no `exceptional circumstances' because the market prices of table wines in France rose in that year in relation to those in the 1993/94 wine year.  Throughout 1994/95 the market prices of French wines were higher than the guide price, whereas those of Italian and Spanish wines remained below the guide price.  The Commission maintains that another reason why there were no exceptional circumstances was that the preventive distillation contracts agreed on by the Member States were for quantities below those of the preceding wine years.  Therefore, so far as the Commission is concerned, there was no exceptional fall in or low level of income which could have justified the adoption of the decision in question. 51 Those questions call for the following observations. Firstly, the distillation measure constitutes, if not a conflict, so to speak, between two objectives of equal priority pursued by the common agricultural policy under Article 39 of the Treaty, then at least a patent attempt to reconcile them.  According to Article 39(1), the objectives of the common agricultural policy are `(b) ... to ensure a fair standard of living for the agricultural community' and `(c) to stabilise markets'.  In this connection the Court has repeatedly held that (24) `in pursuing the various aims laid down in Article 39 of the Treaty, the Community institutions must constantly reconcile any conflicts between those aims taken individually and, where necessary, give any one of them the temporary priority which the facts or circumstances, in view of which their decisions are made, require'. 52 I consider that, in the decision in question, the Council sought to create a balance between these conflicting objectives of Article 39 of the Treaty in the context of the wine market and, since it has a broad discretion, it was the appropriate institution for assessing the extent to which the present malfunctioning of the market at Member State level and the resulting adverse consequences for French wine producers justified the adoption of an ad hoc corrective measure. 53 It should be noted that, according to the fourth recital of the decision in question, French wine producers were making considerable efforts to control production by reducing their yield of table wine and that consequently they were suffering a considerable drop in income. 54 In addition, according to the fifth recital, the minimum buying-in price received by French wine producers for wine to be delivered for preventive distillation was far more of a disincentive than that received by wine producers in other producer countries. 55 In my opinion, those recitals in the preamble constitute a lawful statement of reasons.  More particularly, I consider that the Council committed no manifest error of assessment in taking the view that French wine producers were suffering a considerable drop in income because of their efforts to reduce the production and yield of table wine.  The Council contends that this state of affairs was due to the fact that the price obtained by French wine producers for preventive distillation was far less than that received by Spanish or Italian wine producers because of the depreciation in the Spanish and Italian currencies, the devaluation of the peseta and the lira having produced effects up to the end of 1994.  This has not been convincingly refuted by the Commission.  In particular, according to the Council, from the end of the 1992/93 wine year to the summer of 1994 trends in official agricultural prices in national currency were very unfavourable for French wine producers.  Those of Italy and Spain benefited from buying-in prices for preventive distillation which had risen by 35% and 27% respectively whereas, for French producers, the price level had remained constant by comparison with the previous year. 56 Therefore I consider that the Council committed no manifest error of assessment of the facts when it attempted, by adopting the contested decision, to remedy the unfavourable situation for French producers.  In other words, the Council attempted to meet the situation with corrective measures the adoption of which was not provided for by the legislative framework existing in the sector concerned (in the framework of Regulation No 822/87). 57 Moreover, the eighth recital mentions the existence of exceptional circumstances permitting the aid granted to French wine producers by the French Government to be deemed `by derogation, compatible with the common market to the extent and for the period strictly necessary to rectify the situation of imbalance found to exist'. (25) 58 It seems to me, therefore, that the Council committed no manifest error of assessment when, in giving special attention to the aim of ensuring a fair income for wine producers, it decided that the aid in question should be deemed compatible with the common market since it did not in any case cause a real and lasting disturbance in the functioning of the common organisation of the wine market. (26) 59 I therefore consider that the matters raised by the Council are `exceptional circumstances' within the meaning of the third subparagraph of Article 93(2) of the Treaty. I also consider that, in its task of assessing complex economic situations, the Council made proper use of its discretion and committed no manifest error of assessment of the facts.  Consequently the second ground for annulment raised by the Commission must be dismissed. C - Third ground for annulment: inadequate statement of reasons 60 The third and final ground on which the Commission seeks annulment is that the statement of reasons for the contested decision is inadequate, brief, incomplete and erroneous. (27) 61 Since the second ground for annulment of the decision in question, alleging a manifest error by the Council in finding that there were exceptional circumstances within the meaning of the third subparagraph of Article 93(2), has been dismissed, the third plea needs to be examined only in so far as it alleges incomplete reasoning. (28) 62 I find that the statement of reasons in the contested decision, though succinct, shows clearly and unequivocally that, by reason of exceptional circumstances, the aid could, by way of derogation, be considered compatible with the common market to the extent and for the period strictly necessary. (29)  That statement of reasons shows the essential objective pursued by the institution, which consisted in ensuring a fair income for French farmers. Therefore I conclude that the third ground for annulment must also be dismissed. VI - Conclusion 63 Consequently I suggest that the Court should: (1)  dismiss the action brought by the Commission; (2) order the Commission to pay the costs. (1) - Council Regulation (EEC) No 822/87 of 16 March 1987 on the common organisation of the market in wine (OJ 1987 L 84, p. 1).  This Regulation replaced Council Regulation (EEC) No 337/79 of 5 February 1979 on the common organisation of the market in wine (OJ 1979 L 54, p. 1). (2) - Article 27(2), (3) and (4) of Regulation No 822/87 provides as follows: `2. For each of the types of table wine referred to in paragraph 1, a guide price shall be fixed before 1 August for each marketing year. 3. The guide price shall be fixed on the basis of the average of prices recorded for the type of wine in question during the two marketing years preceding the date of fixing and on the basis of price trends during the current marketing year. ... 4. The guide price shall be fixed at the production stage and shall be expressed, according to the type of wine, either in ECU per % vol/hl or in ECU per hl.' (3) - Commission Regulation (EC) No 2028/94 of 8 August 1994 introducing preventive distillation as provided for in Article 38 of Regulation (EEC) No 822/87 for the 1994/95 wine year (OJ 1994 L 206, p. 5). (4) - See, for example, the judgments in Case 78/76 Steinike und Weinlig [1977] ECR 595,  end of paragraph 9, and Joined Cases C-72/91 and C-73/91 Sloman Neptun [1993] ECR I-887, paragraph 11. (5) - See the judgment in Case C-225/91 Matra v Commission [1993] ECR I-3203,  paragraph 41. (6) - Council Decision 93/662/EC of 6 December 1993 adopting the Council's Rules of Procedure (OJ 1993 L 304, p. 1). (7) - The Court has repeatedly held that, failing publication or notification, the period for bringing an action can begin to run only from the moment when the third party concerned acquires precise knowledge of the content of the decision in question and of the reasons on which it is based in such a way as to enable it to exercise its right of action.  See the judgments in Case C-180/88 Wirtchaftsvereinigung Eisen- und Stahlindustrie v Commission [1990] ECR I-4413, paragraph 22; Case 236/86 Dillinger Hüttenwerke [1988] ECR 3761, paragraph 14, and Case C-143/95 P Commission v Socurte and Others [1997] ECR I-1, paragraph 31. (8) - Clarification of that question is necessary because the Commission makes a distinction (in paragraph 9 of its written observations on the plea of inadmissibility) between the date of manifestation of the Council's intended policy, i.e. 22 June 1995, and the date when the addressee was notified of the measure which, it maintained, gave it legal effect, i.e. 27 July 1995. (9) - Furthermore, the Court has held that due notification must be given and although irregularities in the procedure for notification of a decision `are extraneous to that measure' and cannot therefore invalidate it, they may prevent the period within which an application must be lodged from starting to run.  See the judgment in Case 48/69 ICI v Commission [1972] ECR 619, paragraphs 39 and 40. (10) - The Rules of Procedure of the Council (Article 2(1)) provide that the President must draw up the provisional agenda for each meeting. It must be sent to the other members of the Council and to the Commission at least 14 days before the beginning of the meeting.  Likewise the Commission is to be invited to take part in meetings of the Council, unless the Council decides to deliberate without the presence of the Commission (Article 4(2)). (11) - It should be observed that, according to the Council, the Commission, like the fifteen members of the Council, received the documents prepared by the General Secretariat for decisions to be taken by the Council.  The Council also contends that the Commission was in possession of the provisional agenda for  the meeting of the Agriculture Council which was to be held from 19 to 22 June 1995. (12) - In accordance with Annex II to the Rules of Procedure of the Court, containing the decision on extension of time-limits on account of distance if the parties are not habitually resident in the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, procedural time-limits for the Kingdom of Belgium are extended by two days on account of distance. (13) - It seems to me that this is also the conclusion which appears from the Court's case-law.  It has repeatedly been held that `the strict application of Community rules on procedural time-limits serves the requirement of legal certainty and the need to avoid any discrimination or arbitrary treatment in the administration of justice'.  See Case 42/85 Cockerill-Sambre v Commission [1985] ECR 3749, paragraph 10; Case 209/83 Ferriera Valsabbia v Commission [1984] ECR 3089, paragraph 14; and order in Case 352/87 Farzoo and Kortmann v Commission [1988] ECR 2281, paragraph 7. (14) - [1996] ECR I-881.  See also my Opinion in that case, delivered on 22 November 1995.  The Court dismissed the action brought by the Commission on 25 April 1994 for the annulment of two Council decisions of 21 February 1994, which had been adopted under the third subparagraph of Article 93(2) of the Treaty and related to the grant of special aid for the distillation of certain wines in France and Italy.  In particular, the Council had authorised the grant to French wine producers of supplementary aid for the 1993/94 wine year, equal to the difference between FF 24/% vol/hl, which was the market price during that year, and the minimum Community price of ECU 2.06/% vol/hl for preventive distillation (the difference was approximately FF 8). Consequently the price for preventive distillation was brought into line with the market price during the wine year in question.  The Council also authorised the grant to Italian wine producers of supplementary aid of not more than the difference between the minimum buying-in price for preventive distillation (ECU 2.06/% vol/hl) and that laid down for compulsory distillation (ECU 0.83/% vol/hl).  In other words, the Council brought the price for compulsory distillation into line with that for preventive distillation. (15) - Cited in footnote 14. (16) - In particular, the Court found that `the power granted to the Council by the third subparagraph of Article 93(2) is to apply in the wine sector within the limits indicated by that provision, namely the existence of exceptional circumstances'.  See the analysis of the first ground for annulment in paragraphs 46 to 71 of my Opinion in Case C-122/94 Commission v Council, cited in footnote 14. (17) - See Case C-122/94 Commission v Council, cited in footnote 14 (paragraph 18).  See also Case 84/87 Erpelding [1988] ECR 2647, paragraph 27; Case 179/84 Bozzetti [1985] ECR 2301, paragraph 30; Case 265/87 Schräder [1989] ECR 2237, paragraphs 23 and 24; and Joined Cases C-267/88 to C-285/88 Wuidart and Others [1990] ECR I-435, paragraph 14. (18) - See also Case 138/79 Roquette Frères v Council [1980] ECR 3333, paragraph 25. (19) - See Case C-122/94 Commission v Council, cited in footnote 14 (paragraph 19). (20) - For a more detailed approach to the extent of the Council's discretion under the third subparagraph  of Article 93(2), the concept of `exceptional circumstances' and the question of the extent to which there is incorrect legal characterisation or manifestly incorrect appraisal, see paragraphs 75 to 97 of my Opinion in Case C-122/94 Commission v Council, cited in footnote 14. (21) - See the judgment in Case C-122/94, cited in footnote 14 (paragraph 22). (22) - According to the sixth recital of the decision, the French Government envisaged a grant of special aid to French wine producers in order to compensate them for loss of income and to make preventive distillation more effective. (23) - See the similar reservations I expressed in paragraph 94 of my Opinion in Case C-122/94, cited in footnote 14. (24) - See, for instance, Case C-122/94 Commission v Council, cited in footnote 14 (paragraph 24); Joined Cases C-133/93, C-300/93 and C-362/93 Crispoltoni and Others [1994] ECR I-4863, paragraph 32; and Case C-280/93 Germany v Council [1994] ECR I-4973, paragraph 47. (25) - See the judgment in Case C-122/94 Commission v Council, cited in footnote 14 (paragraph 25). (26) - In paragraph 21 of the judgment in Case C-122/94 Commission v Council, cited in footnote 14, the Court stated that `it must be observed in this regard that, although the situation on the wine market was comparable to that in previous wine years, the Council cannot be regarded as having committed a manifest error of assessment in taking the view, ... without being contradicted by the Commission, that the imbalance on the Community market at the beginning of the 1993/94 wine year could indeed, owing to the continued existence of such a situation, entail in Italy's case a risk of serious economic and social repercussions, in particular for small producers and cooperative wine cellars and, in the case of France, the risk of engendering a critical situation'. (27) - In Case C-122/94 Commission v Council, cited in footnote 14 (paragraph 29), the Court dismissed a similar plea of annulment on the following grounds: `Although the reasoning required by Article 190 of the EC Treaty must show clearly and unequivocally the reasoning of the Community authority which adopted the contested measure so as to enable the persons concerned to ascertain the reasons for the measure and to enable the Court to exercise its review (see the judgment in Case C-466/93 Atlanta Fruchthandelsgesellschaft and Others v Bundesamt für Ernährung und Forstwirtschaft [1995] ECR I-3799, paragraph 16), it is not required to go into every relevant point of fact and law.'  It continued: `The question whether a statement of reasons satisfies those requirements must be assessed with reference not only to its wording but also to its context and the whole body of legal rules governing the matter in question.  Consequently if the contested measure clearly discloses the essential objective pursued by the institution, it would be excessive to require a specific statement of reasons of each of the technical choices made by the institution.' (28) - As the Court found in Case C-122/94 Commission v Council, cited in footnote 14 (paragraph 28). (29) - See the judgment in Case C-122/94 Commission v Council, cited in footnote 14 (paragraph 30).