CELEX: 62015TN0180
Language: en
Date: 2015-04-14 00:00:00
Title: Case T-180/15: Action brought on 14 April 2015 — Icap a.o. v Commission

27.7.2015   
            
            
               EN
            
            
               Official Journal of the European Union
            
            
               C 245/30
            
         Action brought on 14 April 2015 — Icap a.o. v Commission
   (Case T-180/15)
   (2015/C 245/37)
   Language of the case: English
   
      Parties
   
   
      Applicants: Icap plc (London, United Kingdom), Icap Management Services Ltd (London) and Icap New Zealand Ltd (Wellington, New Zealand) (represented by: C. Riis-Madsen and S. Frank, lawyers)
   
      Defendants: European Commission
   
      Form of order sought
   
   The applicants claim that the Court should:
   
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               annul, in whole or in part, Commission decision of 4 February 2015, in Case AT.39861 — Yen Interest Rate Derivatives — C(2015) 432 final;
            
         
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               in the alternative, annul or reduce the level of the fine imposed;
            
         
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               in any event, order the defendant to pay the applicant’s legal and other costs and expenses in relation to this matter;
            
         
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               take any other measures that this Court considers appropriate.
            
         
      Pleas in law and main arguments
   
   In support of the action, the applicants rely on six pleas in law.
   
               1.
            
            
               First plea in law, alleging errors in fact and in law by the Commission in finding that the banks engaged in conduct restricting and/or distorting competition ‘by object’
            
         
               2.
            
            
               Second plea in law, alleging errors in fact and in law by the defendant in finding that the alleged facilitation by the applicants of the banks’ conduct constituted an infringement of competition law within the meaning of Article 101 TFUE
               
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                           According to the applicants, Article 101 TFUE does not cover conduct by an accomplice which does not take part in an agreement which restricts/distorts competition. The test applied by the Commission was, in any event, incorrect and covers too broad a spectrum of conduct that is not sufficiently closely connected to the infringing conduct. The conduct of the applicants falls outside the test for facilitation adopted by the defendant. In particular, the applicants put forward that the finding that the applicants facilitated the exchange of information between the banks lacks any basis in fact, and that the defendant does not point out a single instance of the applicants facilitating such exchanges. According to the applicants, the same applies to the exploration of alignment trades. With respect to the manipulation of the Yen LIBPR submissions, the Commission has acknowledged that only one of two banks knew of ICAP’s involvement. As such, so the applicants claim, ICAP had no facilitating role as far as the conduct of the banks is concerned. Moreover, for those infringements, the infringing conduct started well before ICAP allegedly commenced the facilitation.
                        
                     
         
               3.
            
            
               Third plea in law, alleging errors in fact and in law by the Commission in setting duration of the applicant’s alleged involvement in the infringements.
               
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                           The applicants put forward that the banks were trading parties in Yen Interest rate Derivatives and therefore had knowledge of each other’s trading positions and interests. As such, according to the applicants, the evidence put forward by the Commission in support of the argument that ICAP had knowledge of the bilateral infringement is inconsequential, vague and misleading. Furthermore, so the applicants claim, the Commission’s approach assumes knowledge and conduct on part of the applicants through to the end of the bilateral infringement of the banks without providing any evidence of the applicant’s ongoing knowledge about the bank’s infringements.
                        
                     
         
               4.
            
            
               Fourth plea in law, alleging a breach by the Commission of the principle of the presumption of innocence and the principle of good administration.
               
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                           According to the applicants, the Commission conducted a hybrid settlement procedure, in which the settlement decision adopted in December 2013 implicated ICAP by extensively describing its role as a facilitator. From that point on, the Commission could no longer pretend to have no bias in dealing with ICAP’s case.
                        
                     
         
               5.
            
            
               Fifth plea in law, alleging an infringement by the Commission of the Fining Guidelines, a breach of the principle of equal treatment, a breach of the principle of proportionality and a breach of the principle of legal certainty.
               
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                           The applicants put forward that the Commission breached the principle of legal certainty by imposing fines that go beyond mere nominal fines. This allegedly also constitutes a departure from its decisional practice. In addition, so the applicants claim, the Commission breached its Fining Guidelines by declining to use the value of the applicant’s sales as a basis for the fine, by failing to adequately specify its method in calculating the fine and by failing to justify these departures from its previous decisional practice. In addition, it’s the applicants’ opinion that the Commission breached the principle of equal treatment by treating the applicants differently from another broker accused of facilitation in similar circumstances and within the same infringement as well as by ultimately treating the applicants like the banks who perpetrated the infringement despite the applicants being accused only of facilitation. The applicants claim that as a result of this, the fines imposed are wholly disproportionate and the Commission has thus breached the principle of proportionality.
                        
                     
         
               6.
            
            
               Sixth plea in law, alleging a breach by the Commission of the principle of ‘ne bis in idem’.