CELEX: 62005TJ0154
Language: en
Date: 2007-10-25
Title: Judgment of the Court of First Instance (Third Chamber) of 25 October 2007. # Carmela Lo Giudice v Commission of the European Communities. # Public service - Officials - Admissibility. # Case T-154/05.

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE (Third Chamber)
      25 October 2007
      Case T-154/05
      Carmela Lo Giudice
      v
      Commission of the European Communities 
      (Civil service – Officials – Mental harassment – Actions for annulment – Duty to provide assistance – Duty to state reasons – Legitimate expectations – Article 24 of the Staff Regulations – Duty to have regard for the welfare of officials – Admissibility – Application for damages)
      Application: in substance, for, first, annulment of the Commission’s decision concluding there was no mental harassment and, secondly,
         damages seeking compensation for the non-material harm allegedly suffered.
      
      Held: The action is dismissed. The parties are ordered to bear their own costs.
      
      Summary
      1.      Officials – Mental harassment – Definition
      2.      Officials – Actions – Prior administrative complaint – Requirement that there must be harmony between a complaint and the
            action
      (Staff Regulations, Arts 90 and 91)
      3.      Officials – Obligation of administration to provide assistance – Scope 
      (Staff Regulations, Art. 24)
      4.      Officials – Decision adversely affecting an official – Duty to state reasons – Scope
      (Staff Regulations, Art. 25)
      1.      An official who claims to have been the victim of mental harassment must, irrespective of the subjective perception which
         he may have had of the facts alleged by him, put forward a body of evidence proving that he has been subjected to conduct
         aimed, on an objective view, at discrediting him or at deliberately impairing his working conditions.
      
      It follows that, in order to prove the existence of mental harassment, the conduct in question must, viewed objectively, be
         of an intentional nature.
      
      A refusal to grant leave in order to ensure the proper working of the department cannot, in principle, be regarded as a case
         of harassment. Moreover, the official concerned cannot reasonably complain that his superior has refused an application for
         leave where he has failed to fulfil the administrative requirements laid down in the rules on absence for leave applications.
      
      (see paras 82-83, 107)
      See: T‑7/87, T‑208/98 and T‑109/99 De Nicola v EIB [2001] ECR‑SC I‑A‑49 and II‑185, para. 286; T‑136/03 Schochaert v Council [2004] ECR-SC I‑A‑215 and II‑957, para. 41; T‑144/03 Schmit v Commission [2005] ECR-SC I‑A‑101 and II‑465, paras 64, 65 and 78
      
      2.       The rule of harmony between a complaint, within the meaning of Article 90(2) of the Staff Regulations, and the action which
         follows requires that, for a plea before the Community judicature to be admissible, it must have already been raised in the
         pre-litigation procedure, enabling the appointing authority to know in sufficient detail the criticisms made by the person
         concerned of the contested decision. 
      
      (see para. 122)
      See: 58/75 Sergy v Commission [1976] ECR 1139, para. 32; T‑174/02 Wieme v Commission [2003] ECR-SC I‑A‑241 and II‑1165, para. 18; T‑96/04 Cwik v Commission [2005] ECR-SC I‑A‑343 and II‑1523, para. 32
      
      3.      Article 24 of the Staff Regulations was designed to protect officials of the European Communities from harassment or any form
         of degrading treatment not just by third parties, but also by their superiors or colleagues.
      
      By virtue of the duty to render assistance provided for in that article, the administration, when faced with an incident which
         is incompatible with the good order and tranquillity of the service, must intervene with all the necessary vigour and respond
         with the rapidity and solicitude required by the circumstances of the case with a view to ascertaining the facts and taking
         the appropriate action in full knowledge of the facts. To that end, it is sufficient that the official who is seeking the
         protection of his institution provide at least some evidence of the reality of attacks of which he claims he was the victim.
         When such evidence is provided, the institution concerned is under an obligation to take the necessary measures, in particular
         to undertake an inquiry, with the cooperation of the complainant, to determine the facts which gave rise to the complaint.
      
      With regard to the measures to be adopted in a situation covered by Article 24 of the Staff Regulations, the administration
         enjoys a wide discretion, subject to review by the Community judicature, regarding the choice of ways and means for implementing
         Article 24 of the Staff Regulations. Review by the Community judicature is confined to the question whether the institution
         concerned remained within reasonable limits and did not use its discretion in a manifestly wrong way.
      
      (see paras 135-137)
      See: 18/78 V v Commission [1979] ECR 2093, para. 15; 224/87 Koutchoumoff v Commission [1989] ECR 99, paras 15 and 16; T‑5/92 Tallarico v Parliament [1993] ECR II‑477, para. 31; T‑39/93 and T‑553/93 Baltsavias v Commission [1995] ECR-SC I‑A‑233 and II‑695, para. 58; T‑3/96 Haas and Others v Commission [1998] ECR-SC I‑A‑475 and II‑1395, para. 54; T‑136/98 Campogrande v Commission [2000] ECR-SC I‑A‑267 and II‑1225, para. 42; Schochaert v Council, paras 48 and 49; Schmit v Commission, paras 96 and 98
      
      4.      The purpose of the obligation to state the reasons on which a decision adversely affecting an official is based is to provide
         the persons concerned with sufficient information to determine whether the decision is well founded or whether it is defective
         in such a way that its legality may be challenged, and to enable the Community judicature to exercise its review of the legality
         of the contested decision. 
      
      The extent of the duty to state reasons must be determined in each case on the basis not just of the contested decision, but
         also of the specific circumstances surrounding that decision.
      
      Consequently, the reasons given for a decision are sufficient if the measure forming the subject-matter of the action was
         adopted in circumstances which are known to the official concerned and enable him to understand its scope.
      
      (see paras 160-162)
      See: 125/80 Arning v Commission [1981] ECR 2539, para. 13; 195/80 Michel v Parliament [1981] ECR 2861, para. 22; 69/83 Lux v Court of Auditors [1984] ECR 2447, para. 36; C‑169/88 Prelle v Commission [1989] ECR 4335, para. 9; T‑80/92 Turner v Commission [1993] ECR II‑1465, para. 62; T‑589/93 Ryan-Sheridan v Eurofound [1996] ECR-SC I‑A‑27 and II‑77, para. 95; T‑86/97 Apostolidis v Court of Justice [1998] ECR-SC I‑A‑167 and II‑521, paras 73 to 77; T‑100/00 Campoli v Commission [2001] ECR-SC I‑A‑71 and II‑347, para. 53; T‑351/99 Brumter v Commission [2001] ECR-SC I‑A‑165 and II‑757, para. 28; Schmit v Commission, paras 115 and 116