CELEX: 62008CJ0012
Language: en
Date: 2009-07-16
Title: Judgment of the Court (Fourth Chamber) of 16 July 2009. # Mono Car Styling SA, in liquidation v Dervis Odemis and Others # Reference for a preliminary ruling: Cour du travail de Liège - Belgium. # Reference for a preliminary ruling - Directive 98/59/EC - Articles 2 and 6 - Procedure for informing and consulting employees in the case of collective redundancy - Employer’s obligations - Workers’ right of action - Obligation to interpret national law in conformity with Community law. # Case C-12/08.

Case C-12/08
      Mono Car Styling SA, in liquidation
      v
      Dervis Odemis and Others
      (Reference for a preliminary ruling from the Cour du travail de Liège)
      (Reference for a preliminary ruling – Directive 98/59/EC – Articles 2 and 6 – Procedure for informing and consulting employees in the case of collective redundancy – Employer’s obligations – Workers’ right of action – Obligation to interpret national law in conformity with Community law)
      Summary of the Judgment
      1.        Social policy – Approximation of laws – Collective redundancies – Directive 98/59 – Procedure for informing and consulting
            employees
      (Council Directive 98/59, Arts 2 and 6)
      2.        Community law – Principles – Right to effective judicial protection – National rules for informing and consulting employees
            in the case of collective redundancy
      (Council Directive 98/59, Arts 2 and 6)
      3.        Social policy – Approximation of laws – Collective redundancies – Directive 98/59 – Procedure for informing and consulting
            employees
      (Council Directive 98/59, Art. 2)
      1.        Article 6 of Council Directive 98/59 on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to collective redundancies,
         read in conjunction with Article 2 thereof, is to be interpreted as not precluding national rules which introduce procedures
         intended to permit both workers’ representatives and the workers themselves as individuals to ensure compliance with the obligations
         laid down in that directive, but which limit the individual right of action of workers in regard to the complaints which may
         be raised and makes that right subject to the requirement that workers’ representatives should first have raised objections
         with the employer and that the worker concerned has informed the employer in advance of his intention to query whether the
         information and consultation procedure has been complied with.
      
      The right to information and consultation provided for in Directive 98/59, in particular by Article 2 thereof, is intended
         to benefit workers as a collective group and is therefore collective in nature. The level of protection of that collective
         right required by Article 6 of the directive is reached when the applicable national rules give workers’ representatives a
         right to act which is not limited by specific conditions. 
      
      (see paras 42-43, 45, operative part 1)
      2.        The fact that national rules, establishing procedures which permit workers’ representatives to ensure that the employer has
         complied with all the information and consultation obligations set out in Directive 98/59 on the approximation of the laws
         of the Member States relating to collective redundancies, impose limits and conditions on the individual right of action which
         it also grants to every worker affected by collective redundancy is not of such a nature as to infringe the principle of effective
         judicial protection.
      
      (see para. 52, operative part 2)
      3.        Article 2 of Directive 98/59 on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to collective redundancies must
         be interpreted as precluding national rules which reduce the obligations of an employer who intends to proceed with collective
         redundancies below those laid down in Article 2 of that directive. In applying domestic law, the national court is required,
         applying the principle of interpreting national law in conformity with Community law, to consider all the rules of national
         law and to interpret them, so far as possible, in the light of the wording and purpose of Directive 98/59 in order to achieve
         an outcome consistent with the objective pursued by the directive. Consequently, it must ensure, within the limits of its
         jurisdiction, that the obligations binding such an employer are not reduced below those laid down in Article 2 of that directive.
      
      (see para. 65, operative part 3)
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT (Fourth Chamber)
      16 July 2009 (*)
      
      (Reference for a preliminary ruling – Directive 98/59/EC – Articles 2 and 6 – Procedure for informing and consulting employees in the case of collective redundancy – Employer’s obligations – Workers’ right of action – Obligation to interpret national law in conformity with Community law)
      In Case C‑12/08,
      REFERENCE for a preliminary ruling under Article 234 EC from the Cour du travail de Liège (Belgium), made by decision of 3
         January 2008, received at the Court on 11 January 2008, in the proceedings
      
      Mono Car Styling SA, in liquidation,
      
      v
      Dervis Odemis and Others,
      THE COURT (Fourth Chamber),
      composed of K. Lenaerts, President of the Chamber, T. von Danwitz, R. Silva de Lapuerta (Rapporteur), E. Juhász and J. Malenovský,
         Judges,
      
      Advocate General: P. Mengozzi,
      Registrar: M. Ferreira, Principal Administrator,
      having regard to the written procedure and further to the hearing on 6 November 2008,
      after considering the observations submitted on behalf of:
      –        Mono Car Styling SA, in liquidation, by P. Cavenaile and F. Ligot, avocats,
      –        Mr Odemis and Others, by H. Deckers, avocat,
      –        the Belgian Government, by L. Van den Broeck, acting as Agent, assisted by G. Demez, avocat,
      –        the United Kingdom Government, by I. Rao, acting as Agent, assisted by K. Smith, Barrister,
      –        the Commission of the European Communities, by M. Van Hoof and J. Enegren, acting as Agents,
      after hearing the Opinion of the Advocate General at the sitting on 21 January 2009,
      gives the following
      Judgment
      1        This reference for a preliminary ruling relates to the interpretation of Articles 2 and 6 of Council Directive 98/59/EC of
         20 July 1998 on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to collective redundancies (OJ 1998 L 225, p. 16).
      
      2        The reference has been made in the course of proceedings between Mono Car Styling SA (‘Mono Car’), a company in liquidation,
         and certain of its former employees in regard to their collective redundancy.
      
       Legal framework
       The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
      3        Under the title ‘Right to a fair trial’, Article 6(1) of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
         Freedoms, signed in Rome on 4 November 1950 (‘ECHR’) provides that:
      
      ‘In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a
         fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. …’
      
       Community law
      4        Directive 98/59 consolidated Directive 75/129/EC on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to collective
         redundancies (OJ 1998 L 48, p. 29).
      
      5        According to recitals 2, 6, 10 and 12 in Directive 98/59:
      
      ‘(2)      … it is important that greater protection should be afforded to workers in the event of collective redundancies while taking
         into account the need for balanced economic and social development within the Community;
      
      …
      (6)      … the Community Charter of the fundamental social rights of workers, adopted at the European Council meeting held in Strasbourg
         on 9 December 1989 by the Heads of State or Government of 11 Member States, states, inter alia, in point 7, first paragraph,
         first sentence, and second paragraph; in point 17, first paragraph; and in point 18, third indent:
      
      “7.      The completion of the internal market must lead to an improvement in the living and working conditions of workers in the European
         Community …
      
      The improvement must cover, where necessary, the development of certain aspects of employment regulations such as procedures
         for collective redundancies and those regarding bankruptcies.
      
      …
      17.      Information, consultation and participation for workers must be developed along appropriate lines, taking account of the practices
         in force in the various Member States. 
      
      …
      18.      Such information, consultation and participation must be implemented in due time, particularly in the following cases:
      …
      …
      –        in cases of collective redundancy procedures;
      …”;
      …
      (10)      … the Member States should be given the option of stipulating that workers’ representatives may call on experts on grounds
         of the technical complexity of the matters which are likely to be the subject of the informing and consulting;
      
      …
      (12)      … Member States should ensure that workers’ representatives and/or workers have at their disposal administrative and/or judicial
         procedures in order to ensure that the obligations laid down in this Directive are fulfilled’.
      
      6        Article 2 of Directive 98/59 provides as follows:
      
      ‘1.      Where an employer is contemplating collective redundancies, he shall begin consultations with the workers’ representatives
         in good time with a view to reaching an agreement.
      
      2.      These consultations shall, at least, cover ways and means of avoiding collective redundancies or reducing the number of workers
         affected, and of mitigating the consequences by recourse to accompanying social measures aimed, inter alia, at aid for redeploying
         or retraining workers made redundant.
      
      Member States may provide that the workers’ representatives may call on the services of experts in accordance with national
         legislation and/or practice.
      
      3.      To enable workers’ representatives to make constructive proposals, the employers shall in good time during the course of the
         consultations:
      
      (a)      supply them with all relevant information and
      (b)      in any event notify them in writing of:
      (i)      the reasons for the projected redundancies;
      (ii)      the number of categories of workers to be made redundant;
      (iii) the number and categories of workers normally employed;
      (iv)      the period over which the projected redundancies are to be effected;
      (v)      the criteria proposed for the selection of the workers to be made redundant in so far as national legislation and/or practice
         confers the power therefor upon the employer;
      
      (vi)      the method for calculating any redundancy payments other than those arising out of national legislation and/or practice.
      The employer shall forward to the competent public authority a copy of, at least, the elements of the written communication
         which are provided for in the first subparagraph, point (b), subpoints (i) to (v).
      
      4.      The obligations laid down in paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 shall apply irrespective of whether the decision regarding collective redundancies
         is being taken by the employer or by an undertaking controlling the employer.
      
      In considering alleged breaches of the information, consultation and notification requirements laid down by this Directive,
         account shall not be taken of any defence on the part of the employer on the ground that the necessary information has not
         been provided to the employer by the undertaking which took the decision leading to collective redundancies.’
      
      7        Article 3 of Directive 98/59 states that:
      
      ‘1.      Employers shall notify the competent public authority in writing of any projected collective redundancies.
      …
      This notification shall contain all relevant information concerning the projected collective redundancies and the consultations
         with workers’ representatives provided for in Article 2, and particularly the reasons for the redundancies, the number of
         workers to be made redundant, the number of workers normally employed and the period over which the redundancies are to be
         effected.
      
      2.      Employers shall forward to the workers’ representatives a copy of the notification provided for in paragraph 1.
      The workers’ representatives may send any comments they may have to the competent public authority.’
      8        According to Article 5 of Directive 98/59:
      
      ‘This Directive shall not affect the right of Member States to apply or to introduce laws, regulations or administrative provisions
         which are more favourable to workers or to promote or to allow the application of collective agreements more favourable to
         workers.’
      
      9        Article 6 of Directive 98/59 provides as follows:
      
      ‘Member States shall ensure that judicial and/or administrative procedures for the enforcement of obligations under this Directive
         are available to the workers’ representatives and/or workers.’
      
       National law
      10      Directive 75/129 was transposed into Belgian law by Collective Labour Agreement No 24 of 2 October 1975 concerning the procedure
         for informing and consulting employees in regard to collective redundancies, given the force of law by Royal Decree of 21
         January 1976 (Moniteur belge of 17 February 1976, p. 1716), as amended by Collective Labour Agreement No 24 quater of 21 December 1993, given the force of law by Royal Decree of 28 February 1994 (Moniteur belge of 15 March 1994, p. 6345, ‘Collective Agreement No 24’).
      
      11      According to Article 6 of Collective Agreement No 24:
      
      ‘Where an employer contemplates collective redundancies he shall first inform workers’ representatives and consult them; that
         information shall be given within the works council or, where no such council exists, to the union delegation …
      
      Information must be given to the staff or their representatives, where there is no works council or union delegation.
      These consultations shall cover ways and means of avoiding collective redundancies or reducing the number of workers affected,
         and of mitigating the consequences by recourse to collateral social measures aimed, inter alia, at aid for redeploying or
         retraining workers made redundant.
      
      For that purpose the employer shall supply to the workers’ representatives all relevant information and, in any event, communicate
         to them in writing, the reasons for the projected redundancies, the criteria proposed for the selection of the workers to
         be made redundant, the number and categories of workers to be made redundant and the method for calculating any redundancy
         payments other than those arising out of national law or a collective labour agreement, the period over which the redundancies
         are to be effected, to enable the workers’ representatives to make observations and proposals in order that they may be taken
         into account.’
      
      12      The Belgian Law of 13 February 1998 on measures in favour of employment (Moniteur belge of 19 February 1998, p. 4643, ‘the 1998 Law’) includes Chapter VII entitled ‘collective redundancies’. According to Article
         66 of that law:
      
      ‘1.      An employer who intends to proceed with collective redundancies shall observe the procedure for informing and consulting provided
         for in the event of collective redundancies, as laid down in a collective labour agreement concluded by the National Labour
         Council.
      
      In that regard, the employer must fulfil the following conditions:
      1°      he must present to the works council or, where no such council exists, to the union delegation or, where no such delegation
         exists, to the workers, a written report in which he announces his intention to proceed with collective redundancies;
      
      2°      he must be able to provide evidence that, as regards his intention to proceed with collective redundancies, he has assembled
         the works council or, where no such council exists, that he has met with the union delegation or, where no such delegation
         exists, with the workers;
      
      3°      he must allow staff representatives within the works council or, where no such council exists, members of the union delegation
         or, where no such delegation exists, the workers, to ask questions regarding the collective redundancies contemplated and
         to put forward arguments or make counter-proposals on that issue;
      
      4°      he must have examined the questions, arguments and counter-proposals referred to in 3° and have replied to them.
      The employer must provide evidence that he has satisfied the conditions referred to in the previous subparagraph.
      2.      The employer must notify the official appointed by the King of the intention to proceed with collective redundancies. That
         notification must confirm that the conditions referred to in the second subparagraph of Article 66(1) have been fulfilled.
      
      On the date when the notification is sent to the official referred to in the first subparagraph, a copy of that notification
         shall be sent to the works council or, where no such council exists, to the union delegation, and shall be displayed in the
         workplace. In addition, a copy shall be sent, by recorded delivery, on the day the notification is displayed, to those workers
         who are affected by the collective redundancies and whose employment contracts have already expired on the day the notice
         is displayed.’
      
      13      Article 67 of the 1998 Law provides as follows:
      
      ‘A redundant worker may challenge due observance of the procedure for informing and consulting only on the ground that the
         employer has not satisfied one of the four conditions set out in the second subparagraph of Article 66(1).
      
      A redundant worker may no longer challenge due observance of the procedure for informing and consulting if the staff representatives
         within the works council or, where no such council exists, the members of the union delegation or, where no such delegation
         exists, the workers who were to be informed and consulted, have not notified the employer of any objections in respect of
         satisfaction of one or more of the conditions provided for in the second subparagraph of Article 66(1), within a period of
         30 days from the display of the notice referred to in the second subparagraph of Article 66(2).
      
      Within a period of 30 days from the date of being made redundant or from the date on which the redundancies became collective
         redundancies, a redundant worker must inform the employer, in a letter sent by recorded delivery, that he challenges the due
         observance of the procedure for informing and consulting.’
      
      14      Where a redundant worker challenges observance of the procedure for informing and consulting, and if that challenge is justified,
         Articles 68 and 69 of the 1998 Law provide for the suspension of the notice period or the reinstatement of the worker.
      
       The dispute in the main proceedings and the questions referred for a preliminary ruling
      15      Mono Car appealed to the court making the reference against a judgment in an action between the parties to the main proceedings
         delivered by the Tribunal du travail de Liège on 3 February 2006. Mr Odemis and the parties acting with him brought a cross-appeal
         against that judgment.
      
      16      Mono Car, a subsidiary of Mono International, manufactured parts, decorative accessories and interior trim for various vehicle
         manufacturers. In 2004, following large losses, the board of directors of Mono Car decided to study the possibility of either
         a voluntary liquidation of the company or a substantial reduction in staff.
      
      17      It informed the works council of the financial situation and of the possibility of collective redundancies. Later, it signed
         a draft written agreement concerning a social plan with all the union representatives, later ratified by a collective labour
         agreement, which fixed the detailed arrangements for restructuring the business and the conditions for collective redundancies,
         among which were the absence of notice and factors for calculating compensation for dismissal and for non-material damage.
         The collective agreement stated that the procedure for information and consultation in cases of collective dismissal had been
         observed by Mono Car.
      
      18      A general meeting of the staff of Mono Car adopted the social plan and the works council ratified the vote taken at that meeting.
      
      19      On 14 June 2004, Mono Car sent to the competent public authority the list of the 30 workers made redundant and the criteria
         used to select them, and made those workers redundant with effect from 21 June 2004. The staff representatives on the works
         council raised no objection concerning observance of one or more of the conditions laid down in Article 66 of the 1998 Law.
      
      20      On 15 June 2004, the competent public authority granted a reduction in the waiting period prior to dismissal to one day and
         stated that the information and consultation procedure had been complied with.
      
      21      None the less, following a meeting between Mono Car and the redundant workers, 21 of them challenged the regularity of that
         procedure before the Tribunal du travail de Liège on the basis of the third paragraph of Article 67 of the 1998 Law and applied,
         first, for reinstatement in the company and payment of earnings lost from the date on which their contracts were terminated
         and, secondly, compensation for the material and non-material loss suffered.
      
      22      By judgment of 3 February 2006, the Tribunal du travail de Liège declared the action admissible and partly granted the relief
         applied for, ordering Mono Car to pay damages for material loss arising from its failure to comply with the information and
         consultation procedure. That court noted as failings the lack of a written report and discussion in the works council, the
         failure to observe the waiting period prior to dismissal and the carrying-on of the social consultation procedure outside
         of the works council.
      
      23      Mono Car appealed against that judgment to the Cour du travail de Liège, seeking that the judgment be completely set aside.
         The respondent workers cross-appealed, seeking an increase in the amounts of damages for material loss and a declaration that
         they had suffered non-material loss.
      
      24      It was in that context that the Cour du travail de Liège, after declaring the appeal and the cross-appeal admissible, decided
         to stay proceedings and refer the following questions to the Court for a preliminary ruling:
      
      ‘(1)      …
      Should Article 6 of [Directive 98/59] be interpreted as precluding a provision of national law, such as Article 67 of the
         [1998 Law] …, in so far as it provides that a worker can no longer challenge compliance with the procedure for informing and
         consulting, except on the ground that the employer has not complied with the conditions referred to in the second subparagraph
         of Article 66(1) of that law and to the extent that the staff representatives within the Works Council or, where no such council
         exists, the members of the union delegation or, where no such delegation exists, those workers who should be informed and
         consulted, have notified the employer of objections, in respect of compliance with one or more of the conditions referred
         to in the second subparagraph of Article 66(1) within 30 days of the display referred to in the second subparagraph of Article
         66(2), and where the worker made redundant has informed the employer, in a letter sent by recorded delivery (within 30 days
         from the date of redundancy) or from the date on which the redundancies acquired their status as collective redundancies,
         that he was challenging compliance with the procedure for informing and consulting and he was seeking to be reinstated in
         his post?
      
      (2)      …
      Assuming that Article 6 of [Directive 98/59] may be interpreted as allowing Member States to adopt provisions of national
         law such as Article 67 of the [1998 Law], is such a system compatible with the fundamental rights of the individual which
         form an integral part of the general principles of law – respect for which is ensured by the Community judicature – and more
         particularly with Article 6 of the [ECHR]?
      
      (3)      …
      Can a national court seised of a dispute between two individuals – in the present case a worker and his former employer –
         disapply a provision of national law which is contrary to the provisions of a Community directive, such as Article 67 of the
         [1998 Law], in order to give effect to other provisions of national law which transpose, apparently correctly, a Community
         directive, such as the provisions contained in Collective Labour Agreement No 24 …, whose effective application is frustrated
         by the provision of national law which is contrary to a Community directive, in the present case Article 67 of the [1998 Law]?
      
      (4)      …
      (a)      Must Article 2 of [Directive 98/59], particularly paragraphs (1), (2) and (3) thereof, be interpreted as precluding a provision
         of national law, such as Article 66(1) of the [1998 Law], in so far as it provides that an employer who intends to satisfy
         his obligations in the context of collective redundancies is only bound to provide evidence that he has fulfilled the following
         conditions:
      
      1°      he must present to the Works Council or, where no such council exists, to the union delegation or, where no such delegation
         exists, to the workers, a written report in which he indicates his intention to proceed with collective redundancies;
      
      2°      he must be able to provide evidence, in respect of the intention to proceed with collective redundancies, that he has assembled
         the Works Council or, where no such council exists, that he has met with the union delegation or, where no such delegation
         exists, with the workers;
      
      3°      he must have allowed the staff representatives within the Works Council or, where no such council exists, the members of the
         union delegation or, where no such delegation exits, the workers, to raise questions regarding the collective redundancies
         contemplated and to make arguments or submit counter-proposals on that issue;
      
      4°      he must have examined those questions, arguments and counter-proposals referred to in 3 and have replied to them?
      (b)      Must that same provision [of Directive 98/59] be interpreted as precluding a provision of national law, such as Article 67(2)
         of the [1998 Law], in so far as it provides that a worker made redundant can challenge compliance with the procedure for informing
         and consulting only on the ground that the employer has not complied with the conditions referred to in the second subparagraph
         of Article 66(1) at issue in point (a) above?’
      
       The questions referred to the Court
       Admissibility
      25      The Belgian Government raises a plea of inadmissibility in regard to the questions referred by the national court. It claims,
         first, that the provisions of the 1998 Law do not apply to the main proceedings, since that law covers only applications for
         reinstatement or suspension of the notice period referred to in Articles 68 and 69 thereof and no such applications were presented
         in the appeal procedure. Secondly, it maintains that Directive 98/59 does not harmonise the forms of action in regard to collective
         redundancies.
      
      26      The Belgian Government also considers that the order for reference is inadmissible because it deals with the interpretation
         of national law and because the national court did not correctly set out the scope of applicable Belgian law.
      
      27      In that regard, it must be recalled that, in proceedings under Article 234 EC, it is solely for the national court before
         which the dispute has been brought, and which must assume responsibility for the subsequent judicial decision, to determine
         in the light of the particular circumstances of the case both the need for a preliminary ruling in order to enable it to deliver
         judgment and the relevance of the questions which it submits to the Court. Consequently, where the questions submitted concern
         the interpretation of Community law, the Court is in principle bound to give a ruling (see, inter alia, Case C‑119/05 Lucchini [2007] ECR I‑6199, paragraph 43, and Case C‑414/07 Magoora [2008] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 22).
      
      28      Thus, the Court may reject a request for a preliminary ruling submitted by a national court only where it is quite obvious
         that the interpretation of Community law that is sought bears no relation to the actual facts of the main action or its purpose,
         where the problem is hypothetical, or where the Court does not have before it the factual or legal material necessary to give
         a useful answer to the questions submitted to it (see, inter alia, Case C‑379/98 PreussenElektra [2001] ECR I‑2099, paragraph 39; Joined Cases C‑94/04 and C‑202/94 Cipolla and Others [2006] ECR I‑11421, paragraph 25; and Magoora, paragraph 23).
      
      29      With regard to the present reference for a preliminary ruling, it must be stated, first of all, that the order for reference
         contains a detailed statement of the factual and legal framework of the main proceedings and the reasons why the national
         court considered that an answer to the questions referred was necessary to enable it to give judgment.
      
      30      Secondly, although it is true that the order for reference notes differences in national case-law in regard to the scope of
         the applicable national law, the fact remains that the questions submitted concern the interpretation of Community law and
         such an interpretation appears to be necessary in order to resolve the dispute in the main proceedings.
      
      31      Consequently, the reference for a preliminary ruling must be declared admissible.
      
       The first question and the second part of the fourth question
      32      By these questions, which it is appropriate to consider together, the national court is asking, in essence, whether Article
         6 of Directive 98/59, read in conjunction with Article 2(1) to (3) thereof, precludes a national provision such as Article
         67 of the 1998 Law, which, where workers acting individually challenge compliance by the employer with the information and
         consultation procedure laid down in that directive, first, limits the complaints which may be raised to failure to comply
         with the obligations laid down in a provision such as the second subparagraph of Article 66(1) of that law and, secondly,
         makes the admissibility of such a challenge subject to the giving of prior notice to the employer, by the representatives
         of the staff in the works council, of objections concerning compliance with those obligations and subject to the worker concerned
         providing the employer with prior information of the fact that he challenges compliance with the information and consultation
         procedure.
      
      33      According to Article 6 of Directive 98/59, Member States are to ensure that judicial and/or administrative procedures for
         the enforcement of obligations under the directive are available to the workers’ representatives and/or workers.
      
      34      It is clear therefore from the terms of that provision that the Member States are required to introduce procedures to ensure
         compliance with the obligations laid down in Directive 98/59. On the other hand, and in so far as the directive does not develop
         that obligation further, it is for the Member States to lay down detailed arrangements for those procedures.
      
      35      However, it should be pointed out that, although it is true that Directive 98/59 merely carries out a partial harmonisation
         of the rules for the protection of workers in the event of collective redundancies, it is also true that the limited character
         of such harmonisation cannot deprive the provisions of the directive of useful effect (see, in regard to Directive 75/129,
         Case C‑383/92 Commission v United Kingdom [1994] ECR I‑2479, paragraph 25).
      
      36      Consequently, although it is for the Member States to introduce procedures to ensure compliance with the obligations laid
         down in Directive 98/59, such procedures must not deprive the provisions of the directive of useful effect.
      
      37      In this instance, it is common ground that the Belgian legislation gives workers’ representatives a right of challenge which,
         first, is not limited in regard to the complaints which may be raised and, secondly, is not subject to specific conditions,
         other than those relating to the general conditions of admissibility of legal proceedings in domestic law. Similarly, it is
         common ground that Article 67 of the 1998 Law gives workers an individual right of challenge, although it is limited in regard
         to the complaints which may be raised and subject to the conditions that workers’ representatives should first have raised
         objections and that the worker concerned has informed the employer in advance of his intention to challenge compliance with
         the information and consultation procedure. The question therefore arises whether such a limitation of workers’ individual
         right of challenge or such a condition placed on the exercise of that right could deprive the provisions of Directive 98/59
         of their effectiveness or, as Mr Odemis and his fellow applicants claim, limit the protection of workers provided for in that
         directive.
      
      38      In that regard, it is clear, first of all, from the text and scheme of Directive 98/59 that the right to information and consultation
         which it lays down is intended for workers’ representatives and not for workers individually.
      
      39      Thus, recital 10 and the second subparagraph of Article 2(2) of Directive 98/59 refer to experts on whose services workers’
         representatives may call on grounds of the technical complexity of the matters which are likely to be the subject of the informing
         and consulting. Also, Article 1(1) of the directive, which contains definitions for the purposes thereof, defines the expression
         ‘workers’ representatives’ but not ‘workers’. Similarly, Article 2 of the directive sets out the employer’s obligations and
         the right to information and consultation but refers only to workers’ representatives. In the same manner, Article 3 of the
         directive requires that notice be given to the competent public authority of any projected collective redundancies with all
         relevant information concerning those redundancies and the consultations with workers’ representatives, to whom the employer
         is to forward a copy of the notification and who may send any comments they may have to the public authority concerned, but
         such possibilities are not open to workers.
      
      40      Secondly, the collective nature of the right to information and consultation also flows from a teleological interpretation
         of Directive 98/59. In so far as the information and consultation provided for in the directive are intended, in particular,
         to permit, first, the formulation of constructive proposals covering, at least, ways and means of avoiding collective redundancies
         or reducing the number of workers affected, and of mitigating the consequences of such redundancies and, secondly, the possible
         submission of comments to the competent public authority, workers’ representatives are best placed to achieve the objective
         which the directive seeks to attain.
      
      41      Finally, the Court has already had occasion to rule that the right to information and consultation, previously provided for
         in an identical manner by Directive 75/129, is exercised through workers’ representatives (see, to that effect, Commission v United Kingdom, paragraphs 17 and 23, and Case C‑385/05 Confédération générale du travail and Others [2007] ECR I‑611, paragraph 48).
      
      42      It must therefore be held that the right to information and consultation provided for in Directive 98/59, in particular by
         Article 2 thereof, is intended to benefit workers as a collective group and is therefore collective in nature.
      
      43      The level of protection of that collective right required by Article 6 of the directive is reached in a context such as that
         of the main proceedings, since the applicable national rules give workers’ representatives a right to act which, as was pointed
         out in paragraph 37 of the present judgment, is not limited by specific conditions.
      
      44      Consequently, and without prejudice to remedies in domestic law intended to ensure protection of the individual rights of
         workers in the case of improper dismissal, it cannot reasonably be argued that the protection of workers is restricted or
         that the useful effect of Directive 98/59 is affected by the fact that, in the framework of the procedures permitting workers
         to act individually in order to ensure compliance with the information and consultation obligations laid down in that directive,
         the complaints which may be raised by them are limited or that their right of action is subject to the conditions that workers’
         representatives should first have raised objections and that the worker concerned has informed the employer in advance of
         his intention to challenge compliance with the information and consultation procedure.
      
      45      In the light of the foregoing, the answer to the first question and the second part of the fourth question must be that Article
         6 of Directive 98/59, read in conjunction with Article 2 thereof, is to be interpreted as not precluding national rules which
         introduce procedures intended to permit both workers’ representatives and the workers themselves as individuals to ensure
         compliance with the obligations laid down in that directive, but which limit the individual right of action of workers in
         regard to the complaints which may be raised and makes that right subject to the requirement that workers’ representatives
         should first have raised objections with the employer and that the worker concerned has informed the employer in advance of
         his intention to query whether the information and consultation procedure has been complied with.
      
       The second question
      46      By its second question the referring court asks whether, bearing in mind the answer to the first question and the second part
         of the fourth question, a system such as that considered in the framework of these questions, in which the right of workers
         to act individually in order to ensure compliance with the obligations to inform and consult laid down in that directive is
         limited in regard to the complaints which may be raised and is subject to the conditions that workers’ representatives should
         first have raised objections and that the worker concerned has informed the employer in advance of his intention to challenge
         compliance with the information and consultation procedure, is compatible with fundamental rights, in particular with the
         right to effective judicial protection enshrined in Article 6 of the ECHR.
      
      47      It is to be noted at the outset that, according to settled case-law, the principle of effective judicial protection is a general
         principle of Community law stemming from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States, which has been enshrined
         in Articles 6 and 13 of the ECHR and which has also been reaffirmed by Article 47 of the Charter of fundamental rights of
         the European Union, proclaimed on 7 December 2000 in Nice (OJ 2000 C 364, p. 1) (see, in particular, Case C‑432/05 Unibet [2007] ECR I‑2271, paragraph 37, and Joined Cases C‑402/05 P and C‑415/05 P Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council and Commission [2008] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 335).
      
      48      Moreover, the Court has consistently held that, in the absence of Community rules governing the matter, it is for the domestic
         legal system of each Member State to designate the courts and tribunals having jurisdiction and to lay down the detailed procedural
         rules governing actions for safeguarding rights which individuals derive from Community law but the Member States, however,
         are responsible for ensuring that those rights are effectively protected in each case (Case C‑268/06 Impact [2008] ECR I‑2483, paragraphs 44 and 45 and the case-law cited therein).
      
      49      Thus, whilst it is, in principle, for national law to determine an individual’s standing and legal interest in bringing proceedings,
         Community law nevertheless requires, in addition to observance of the principles of equivalence and effectiveness, that the
         national legislation does not undermine the right to effective judicial protection (see, to that effect, Joined Cases C‑87/90
         to C‑89/90 Verholen and Others [1991] ECR I‑3757, paragraph 24; Case C‑13/01 Safalero [2003] ECR I‑8679, paragraph 50; and Unibet, paragraph 42).
      
      50      With regard to the right of information and consultation laid down in Directive 98/59, it should be pointed out that, as is
         clear from paragraphs 38 to 42 of the present judgment, that right is intended to benefit workers collectively and is therefore
         collective in nature. The fact that Article 6 of Directive 98/59 permits the Member States to establish procedures in favour
         of workers individually does not change the collective nature of the right.
      
      51      Under those circumstances, a national system such as that at issue in the main proceedings which provides a procedure whereby
         workers’ representatives can ensure compliance by the employer with all the information and consultation obligations set out
         in Directive 98/59 and which also grants an individual right of action to workers, subject to limits and specific conditions,
         is of such a nature as to ensure effective judicial protection of the collective information and consultation rights enshrined
         in the directive.
      
      52      Having regard to the foregoing, the answer to the second question must be that the fact that national rules, establishing
         procedures which permit workers’ representatives to ensure that the employer has complied with all the information and consultation
         obligations set out in Directive 98/59, impose limits and conditions on the individual right of action which it also grants
         to every worker affected by collective redundancy is not of such a nature as to infringe the principle of effective judicial
         protection.
      
       The third question 
      53      In view of the answers given to the first and second questions, it is unnecessary to reply to the third question since the
         latter was put forward by the national court for the situation in which Directive 98/59 precluded a national provision such
         as Article 67 of the 1998 Law.
      
       The first part of the fourth question
      54      By this question, the national court is asking whether Article 2 of Directive 98/59 precludes a provision such as the first
         subparagraph of Article 66(1) of the 1998 Law, in so far as it reduces the obligations of an employer who intends to proceed
         with collective redundancies.
      
      55      It should be pointed out, as the Advocate General has done in point 73 of his Opinion, that there is no doubt but that the
         obligations imposed on employers in the second subparagraph of Article 66(1) of the 1998 Law do not include the totality of
         those prescribed by Article 2 of Directive 98/59.
      
      56      Consequently, Article 2 of Directive 98/59 must be interpreted as precluding a national provision which, like the second subparagraph
         of Article 66(1) of the 1998 Law, taken in isolation, reduces the information and consultation obligations of an employer
         who intends to proceed with collective redundancies, as compared with the obligations laid down in Article 2 of the directive.
      
      57      It must be pointed out, however, that it is apparent from the first subparagraph of Article 66(1) of the 1998 Law that an
         employer who intends to proceed with collective redundancies must observe the procedure for informing and consulting provided
         for in the event of collective redundancies, as laid down in the applicable collective labour agreements. According to the
         information provided by the national court, Collective Agreement No 24 reproduces in their entirety the obligations which
         Article 2 of Directive 98/59 requires to be imposed on such an employer.
      
      58      Under those circumstances, it is for the national court to assess whether the second subparagraph of Article 66(1) of the
         1998 Law is, in the light of the subparagraph which precedes it, capable of being interpreted as meaning, in so far as it
         refers to Collective Agreement No 24, that such an employer is not dispensed from complying with all the obligations laid
         down in Article 2 of Directive 98/59.
      
      59      It is certainly true that, according to settled case-law, a directive cannot of itself impose obligations on an individual
         and cannot therefore be relied upon as such against an individual, so that even a clear, precise and unconditional provision
         of a directive seeking to confer rights or impose obligations on individuals cannot of itself apply in proceedings exclusively
         between private parties (see, to that effect, Joined Cases C‑397/01 to C‑403/01 Pfeiffer and Others [2004] ECR I‑8835, paragraphs 108 and 109).
      
      60      However, when it applies domestic law, a national court is bound to interpret that law, so far as possible, in the light of
         the wording and the purpose of the directive concerned in order to achieve the result sought by the directive and consequently
         comply with the third paragraph of Article 249 EC (see, to that effect, Pfeiffer and Others, paragraph 113).
      
      61      That obligation to interpret national law in conformity with Community law concerns all the provisions of national law and
         is limited by the general principles of law, particularly those of legal certainty and non-retroactivity, and that obligation
         cannot serve as the basis for an interpretation of national law contra legem (see, to that effect, Case 80/86 Kolpinghuis Nijmegen [1987] ECR 3969, paragraph 13; Case C‑212/04 Adeneler and Others [2006] ECR I‑6057, paragraph 110; Impact, paragraph 100; and Case C‑378/07 Angelidaki and Others [2009] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 199).
      
      62      The principle of interpreting national law in conformity with Community law thus imposed by Community law requires the national
         court to consider national law as a whole in order to assess to what extent it may be applied so as not to produce a result
         contrary to that sought by the directive at issue (see, to that effect, Pfeiffer and Others, paragraph 115).
      
      63      If the application of interpretive methods recognised by national law enables, in certain circumstances, a provision of domestic
         law to be construed in such a way as to avoid conflict with another rule of domestic law or the scope of that provision to
         be restricted to that end by applying it only in so far as it is compatible with the rule concerned, the national court is
         bound to use those methods in order to achieve the result sought by the directive at issue (see, to that effect, Pfeiffer and Others, paragraph 116).
      
      64      In this instance, that principle thus requires the referring court to do whatever lies within its jurisdiction, having regard
         to the whole body of rules of national law, to ensure that Directive 98/59 is fully effective so as to avoid the obligations
         binding an employer who intends to proceed with collective redundancies being reduced below those laid down in Article 2 of
         that directive.
      
      65      In the light of the foregoing, the answer to the first part of the fourth question must be that Article 2 of Directive 98/59
         is to be interpreted as precluding national rules which reduce the obligations of an employer who intends to proceed with
         collective redundancies below those laid down in Article 2 of that directive. In applying domestic law, the national court
         is required, applying the principle of interpreting national law in conformity with Community law, to consider all the rules
         of national law and to interpret them, so far as possible, in the light of the wording and purpose of Directive 98/59 in order
         to achieve an outcome consistent with the objective pursued by the directive. Consequently, it must ensure, within the limits
         of its jurisdiction, that the obligations binding such an employer are not reduced below those laid down in Article 2 of that
         directive.
      
       Costs
      66      Since these proceedings are, for the parties to the main proceedings, a step in the action pending before the national court,
         the decision on costs is a matter for that court. Costs incurred in submitting observations to the Court, other than the costs
         of those parties, are not recoverable.
      
      On those grounds, the Court (Fourth Chamber) hereby rules:
      1.      Article 6 of Council Directive 98/59/EC of 20 July 1998 on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to
            collective redundancies, read in conjunction with Article 2 thereof, is to be interpreted as not precluding national rules
            which introduce procedures intended to permit both workers’ representatives and the workers themselves as individuals to ensure
            compliance with the obligations laid down in that directive, but which limit the individual right of action of workers in
            regard to the complaints which may be raised and makes that right subject to the requirement that workers’ representatives
            should first have raised objections with the employer and that the worker concerned has informed the employer in advance of
            his intention to query whether the information and consultation procedure has been complied with.
      2.      The fact that national rules, establishing procedures which permit workers’ representatives to ensure that the employer has
            complied with all the information and consultation obligations set out in Directive 98/59, impose limits and conditions on
            the individual right of action which it also grants to every worker affected by collective redundancy is not of such a nature
            as to infringe the principle of effective judicial protection.
      3.      Article 2 of Directive 98/59 must be interpreted as precluding national rules which reduce the obligations of an employer
            who intends to proceed with collective redundancies below those laid down in Article 2 of that directive. In applying domestic
            law, the national court is required, applying the principle of interpreting national law in conformity with Community law,
            to consider all the rules of national law and to interpret them, so far as possible, in the light of the wording and purpose
            of Directive 98/59 in order to achieve an outcome consistent with the objective pursued by the directive. Consequently, it
            must ensure, within the limits of its jurisdiction, that the obligations binding such an employer are not reduced below those
            laid down in Article 2 of that directive.
      [Signatures]
      * Language of the case: French.