CELEX: 62014CA0169
Language: en
Date: 2014-07-17 00:00:00
Title: Case C-169/14: Judgment of the Court (First Chamber) of 17 July 2014 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Audiencia Provincial de Castellón (Spain)) — Juan Carlos Sánchez Morcillo, María del Carmen Abril García v Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria, SA (Reference for a preliminary ruling — Directive 93/13/EEC — Article 7 — Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union — Article 47 — Consumer contracts — Mortgage loan agreement — Unfair terms — Mortgage enforcement proceedings — Right to an appeal)

15.9.2014   
            
            
               EN
            
            
               Official Journal of the European Union
            
            
               C 315/25
            
         Judgment of the Court (First Chamber) of 17 July 2014 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Audiencia Provincial de Castellón (Spain)) — Juan Carlos Sánchez Morcillo, María del Carmen Abril García v Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria, SA
   (Case C-169/14) (1)
   
   ((Reference for a preliminary ruling - Directive 93/13/EEC - Article 7 - Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union - Article 47 - Consumer contracts - Mortgage loan agreement - Unfair terms - Mortgage enforcement proceedings - Right to an appeal))
   2014/C 315/38
   Language of the case: Spanish
   
      Referring court
   
   Audiencia Provincial de Castellón
   
      Parties to the main proceedings
   
   
      Applicants: Juan Carlos Sánchez Morcillo, María del Carmen Abril García
   
      Defendant: Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria, SA
   
      Operative part of the judgment
   
   Article 7(1) of Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts, read in conjunction with Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, must be interpreted as precluding a system of enforcement, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, which provides that mortgage enforcement proceedings may not be stayed by the court of first instance, which, in its final decision, may at most award compensation in respect of the damage suffered by the consumer, inasmuch as the latter, the debtor against whom mortgage enforcement proceedings are brought, may not appeal against a decision dismissing his objection to that enforcement, whereas the seller or supplier, the creditor seeking enforcement, may bring an appeal against a decision terminating the proceedings or ordering an unfair term to be disapplied.
   
      (1)  OJ C 175, 10.6.2014.