CELEX: 51992PC0318
Language: en
Date: 1992-07-09
Title: Proposal for a COUNCIL REGULATION (EEC) imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of silicon metal originating in Brazil and definitively collecting the amounts secured by way of the provisional anti-dumping duty

COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMLFNITIES
                                         C0M(92) 318 final
                                         Brussels,  9 JuIy 1992
                              Proposal for a
                         COUNCIL REGULATION (EEC)
   imposlng a deflnitive anti-dumping duty on imports of silicon metal
      origlnatlng in Brazil and definltively collecting the amounts
           secured by way of the provisional anti-dumping duty
                      (presented by the Commission)
 ---pagebreak---                             EXPLANATORY MEMO
 Procedure
 Commisslon Regulation (EEC) No 906/92 of 30 March 1992 imposed a
 provisional anti-dumping duty of 42.1% on imports of silicon metal
 originating   in Brazil. 1 The following rates of duty were applied to
 the companies below:
 -  Ligas de Aluminio SA (LIASA)                       42.1%
 -  Rlma Eletrometalurgia SA                           37.7%
 -  Eletroila SA                                       33.0%
 -  Minasligas                                          40.1%
 -  Camargo Correia Metais                             28.3%
 -  Companhia Brasileira Carboreto de Calcio           18.5%
After provisional duties were imposed, those parties concerned who had
 requested  it were heard by the Commission and submitted written
 comments on the investigation's provisional    findings.
These oral and/or written comments were examined and, where
appropriate, taken into account     in the Commission's final conclusions.
0J No L 96, 10.4.1992, p.17
 ---pagebreak---                                     - 2 -
II.   DumpIng
     The arguments put forward by the Brazilian exporters were not
     considered to warrant a change in the method used to make a
     provisional assessment of dumping.   Certain specific corrections to
      factual errors or mistakes in the interpretation of existing data did,
     however, lead the Commission to alter slightly the normal value and
     export prlce of Brazilian silicon metal.   Other adjustments were made
     to ensure the comparabiIity of the prices actually paid at different
     marketing stages in domestic and export transactions.
     The overall result of these adjustments was a small change in the
     dumping margins established for the above Brazilian exporters.
     The dumping of Brazilian silicon metal  is therefore confirmed.
III. Inlurv
     The provisional findings regarding injury are confirmed since none of
     the arguments presented cast doubt on their Justification.
IV.  Community  Interest
     Comments by certain industrial users in the Community regarding the
     soundness of imposing anti-dumping measures were not considered
     sufficient to warrant reconsidering the Community  interest as
     provisionally defined.
 ---pagebreak---                                      — 3 -
V.   Undertafcinos
     Undertakings QfferQd   by the Brazilian producers were not Judged an
     approprfate sotution in this c&se and were therefore rejected.
VI. peffnitfve naa^ura^
    The CoasaTssrion concludes that a 36.S3S anti-dumplng duty should be
     imposed on silicon metal iraports origlnating in Brazil and that tne
    foilowfng rates of duty should be appjied to compam'es beiow;
    -   Rima Eletrometalurgia SA                          34.6%
    -    eietroiia SA                                     29.8%
    ~   MinasTigas                                        26,4%
    -   Canrargo Correia Uetais                           20*4%
    -   Companhia Brasfleira Carboreio de Calelo          18-35*
    The Coovnission is therefore submitting to the CouncII a proposal for a
    Council Regufatfon:
        imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of silicon metai
        originating In Brazil;
    -   definrtively collecting. amounts secured by way of the provisional
        antl-duroping duty at the rates definitlveiy imposed.
 ---pagebreak---  ---pagebreak---                        Council Regulation (EEC) No .../92
                                     of ...
      imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of silicon metal
         originating in Brazil and definitively collecting the amounts
              secured by way of the provisional anti-dumping duty
 THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES,
 Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community,
 Having regard to Council Regulation (EEC) No 2423/88 of 11 July 1988 on
 protection against dumped or subsidized imports originating in countries
 not members of the European Economic Community,1 and in particular
 Article 12 thereof,
 Having regard to the proposal submitted by the Commission after
consultations within the Advisory Committee as provided for by the above
Regulation,
Whereas:
                            A. PROVISIONAL MEASURES
 (1)  Commission Regulation (EEC) No 906/92 of 30 March 1992 imposed a
      provisional anti-dumping duty on imports into the Community of silicon
      metal falling within CN code 2804 69 00 originating in Brazil. 2
1     0J No L 209, 2.8.1988, p.1.
2     0J No L 96, 10.4.1992, p.17.
 ---pagebreak---                                    - 2 -
                          B. SUBSEQUENT PROCEEDING
(2) After provisional duties were imposed, those concerned who had
     requested it were heard by the Commission.  They also made known in
    writing their views on the provisional findings of the investigation.
(3) At their request, the parties known to be concerned were informed of
     the essential facts and considerations on which it was intended to
    base the recommendation to impose definitive duties and def.init ively
    collect the amounts provisionally lodged.   They were then allowed a
    period in which to make known their views.
(4) The parties' oral and written comments were examined and, where
    appropriate, incorporated in the Commission's findings.
                      C. THE PRODUCT AND LIKE PRODUCT
(5) A trade association representing the interests of the Community
    chemical  industry claimed that the definition of the product given in
    recital 8 of Regulation (EEC) No 906/92 contained  inaccuracies
    regarding the chemical composition of the silicon metal used as a raw
    material for the manufacture of silicons.
(6) The above trade association claimed furthermore that silicon metal for
    chemical uses could not be considered a Iike product to silicon metal
    for metallurgical uses for the reasons given in recital 10 of
    Regulation (EEC) No 906/92.
 ---pagebreak---                                         - 3 -
(7)  It should be polnted out that trace elements, such as lead, found in
    sllicon metal constltute impurlties Inasmuch as they prevent the
    Rochow chemlcal synthesis and thus the productlon of chlorosllanes, a
    precursor of the siloxanes used In the manufacture of slllcones.
    Slmilarly, alumlnlum productlon is also governed, albelt to a lesser
    degree, by speciflcatlons relating to the content of trace elements,
    such as phosphorus which must be kept to a mlnimum.
(8) While seeing no need to repeat the answer given in the above
    Regulation, the Commission thlnks it necessary to emphaslze that ail
    grades of silicon metal are the product of the initlal manufacturing
    process described in recital 6 of Regulation (EEC) No 906/92.        The
    fact that standard-grade silicon metal may subsequently be further
    refined to the specifications of a given user , especially in the field
    of silicon chemicals, by the addition or removal of trace elements
    does not make chemical-grade silicon metal a different product from
    other grades, since ail have extremely slmilar physical properties,
    come from the same factories and pass through the same distribution
    networks, differing onIy insignificantIy in their production costs.
(9) The Commission also stresses that the list of uses of silicon metal
    given in recital 8 of Regulation (EEC) No 906/92 is not exhaustive,
    and that the procedure covers ail grades of silicon metal with a
    silicon content of less than 99.99% by weight, regardless of its
    content in trace elements.       The Commission confirms that it is
    technically posslble to use the silicon metal usually       intended for the
    chcni i c.i I imlu'.try for t h>s alumlnlum Industry, provlded Its phouphoruo
    content does not exceed a certain threshold.
 ---pagebreak---                                        4 -
(10) The Council consequently confirms that all grades of silicon metal are
      manufactured by the Community industry and possess technical
      properties comparable to those of the Brazilian industry as indicated
      in recital 11 of Regulation (EEC) No 906/92.   The Council likewise
      confirms the Commission's conclusions in recital 7 of Regulation (EEC)
      No 906/92 that all grades of silicon metal should be regarded as a
      single product for the purposes of this procedure to assess dumping
      and the resulting injury to the Community  Industry.
                                  D. DUMPING
1
  •   Normal value
(11) For the purposes of the definitive conclusions, normal vaiue was
     generally established by the same methods as the provisional dumping
     margin, account being taken, where necessary, of the new circumstances
     and arguments presented by the parties.
{12} One Brazilian producer claimed that its domestic sales did not reach
     the 5% threshold for export sales to the Community    in any two
     consecutive months of the investigation period and could not therefore
     De aeemea a sufficient basis for the calculation of normal value.
     The Commission considers that the representativeness of an exporter's
     aomestic sales should generally be tested on the basis of the entire
      investigation period and not monthly, even if normal value was
     aetermined on a monthly basis to eliminate as far possible the impact
     of infiation in Brazil.   The sales concerned must therefore be
     inciuded in the calculation of normal value according to tne method
     aescribed in recital 14 of Regulation (EEC) No 906/92.
 ---pagebreak---                                     - 5 -
     The Council confirms these conclusions.
(13) Claiming that the Brazilian government's economic recovery programme
      (the "Collor Plan") had led to an abnormal increase in energy costs
     and to the US dollar being undervalued against the cruzeiro from March
     to June 1990, several Brazilian producers asked that production costs
     for those months be excluded from the calculation of constructed
     normal value.
     The Commission, however, sees no reason to exclude the data for the
     period of the "Collor Plan".   In the first place, a dumping case must
     be based on real and exhaustive data, such as a company's costs and
     sales during the investigation period as confirmed by examination of
     the evidence and on-site inspections.
     Secondly, the alleged impact of the "Collor Plan" does not mean that
     the Commission's findings regarding such production cost components as
     energy misrepresent Brazil's general economic situation in that period
     or that those components were not calculated in the course of normal
     trading on the Brazilian market.
    Thirdly, even if the "Collor Plan" did cause the cruzeiro to be
     temporarily overvalued in comparison with the US dollar, it is not for
     the Community to question either the soundness or the impact of the
    Brazilian government's monetary policy.    The Commission has therefore
     followed established practice in the matter and used the official
    exchange rates applied wherever transactlons involved the conversion
    of currency.
    The Council confirms these conclusions.
 ---pagebreak---                                       6 -
(14) Several Brazilian producers asked that interest earned on currency
      operations be fully deductible from a firm's financing costs, and that
      any net financial profit be deducted from the production costs of the
      f irm concerned.
      The Commission, however, takes the view that such profits may be taken
      into account only if connected with a firm's main production activity
      and the ensuing sales, and then only to offset financial costs
      resulting directly from that production and those sales.   This net
      financial profit may in no circumstances be offset against the firm's
     production costs.
     The Council confirms these conclusions.
(15) Claiming the availability of stocks, one Brazilian producer asked that
     constructed normal value be based on production costs for the first
     haIf of the investigation period since transactions in the latter half
     of that period involved materials manufactured earlier at much lower
     costs.
     The Commission refuses to comply with this request because the figures
     provided do not corroborate the alleged availability of stocks and
     because the firm in question failed to support  its request with data
     known to be available on its production costs calculated on the basis
     of updated costs.
     The Council confirms these concluslons.
 ---pagebreak---                                       - 7 -
 (16) Another Brazilian producer asked that the export of a sample to an
       American company, mistakenly recorded as a domestic transaction, be
       excluded from the calculation of normal value.
      The Council confirms the Commission's agreement to exclude that
       transaction from the scope of this procedure.
 (17) Yet another Brazilian producer asked for a review of the method used
       to calculate its average profit margin: the margin seemed to have been
      overestimated because the provisional constructed normal value did not
       take proper account of some of the company's domestic sales of silicon
      metal.
      After examining the matter, the Commission accepted this request and
      adjusted the company's average profit margin accordingly.
(18) The Council confirms these conclusions and those of recitals 14 to 16
      of Regulation (EEC) No 906/92.
2.    Export prices
(19) For the purposes of the definitive conclusions, the export price was
      generally established in the same way as the provisional dumping
     margin, due account being taken of new circumstances and arguments
      presented by the parties with appropriate supporting evidence.
(20) In view of the above and recitals 17 and 18 of Regulation (EEC)
     No 906/92, the Council confirms the Commission's findings and
     conclusions in the matter.
 ---pagebreak---                                      - 8-
3.     Comoarison
 (21) A Brazilian producer submitted several requests regarding adjustments
       to the transport and packaging costs of certain exports to the
      Commun11 y.
      The Council confirms the Commission's refusal to accede to these
       requests on the grounds that they were not supported by evidence
       conclusive enough to cast doubt on the data gathered and verified
      during inquiries at the premises of the company concerned.
(22) Some Brazilian producers claimed there was a need to adjust the normal
      value based on domestic sales to take account of the impact on price
      comparabiIity of differing sales costs caused by differences in the
      quantities sold on the domestic market and exports to the Community.
      The Council confirms the rejection of this request on the grounds of
      the applicants' inability to show that their request was, in this
       instance, weIl-founded.
       In the absence of other comments, the Council confirms the
      Commission's conclusions as set out in recitals 19 and 20 of
      Regulation (EEC) No 906/92.
4.    Dumpina maralns
(23) After the above adjustments to the normal value and/or export prices,
      the weighted average dumplng margin, expressed as a percentage of the
      free-at-Community-frontier cif price, not cleared through customs, for
      each of the exporters concerned is as follows:
 ---pagebreak---                                     - 9-
      -  Rima Eletrometalurgia SA                                 67.0%
      -  Ligas de Aluminio SA (LIASA)                             50.6%
     -   Eletroila SA                                             44.1%
     -   Companhia Ferroligas Minas Gerais (Minasligas)           26.4%
     -   Camargo Correia Metais                                   20.4%
     -   Companhia Braslleira Carboreto de Càlcio                 18.3%
      In the Iight of the above, the Council confirms that the above
     exporters are dumping imports of silicon metal.
(24) Where Braziiian exporters failed to answer the Commission's
     questionnaire or come forward, dumping was assessed on the basis of
     the information available in accordance with Article 7(7)(b) of
     Regulation (EEC) No 2423/88.    Given that the cooperating exporters
     account for almost all sales of Braziiian silicon metal   in the
     Community, the Commission considers the results of its investigation
     to be the most suitable basis for assessing the dumping margin.
     Failure to apply the highest dumping margin found in the course of the
      investigation, 67%, to those exporters which had not seen fit to
     cooperate would provide loopholes and an incentive not to cocperate in
     the future.   The Council confirms this approach and the resulting
     consequences for that group of exporters.
                                  E. INJURY
(25) In its preliminary findings, the Commission concluded that the
     Community silicon metal industry had suffered material  injury.  This
     view was founded mainly on the convergence of economic indicators such
     as falling sales, loss of market share, the erosion of Community
     producers' prices and the resulting flnanclal losses.
 ---pagebreak---                                     - 10 -
(26) One Brazilian producer argued that the trend in the cif price in ecus
     of imported Brazilian silicon metal had resulted in the drop in prices
     being overestimated owing to the growing parity between the US dollar
     and the ecu.   The Commission, however, finds that the price of imports
      from Brazil, whether in ecus or another Community currency, did
     actually help depress the Community market from 1986 to 1990.
(27) Several Brazilian producers cailed for account to be taken of the
     different marketing stages at which transactions were carried out,
      i.e. differences at the stages of import and end-use, when prices were
     being compared to determine undercutting and the margin of injury
     attributable to the exporters concerned.
     Where the information supplied was full, verifiable and consistent,
     allowances were systematically made to ensure fair comparison with the
     Community  industry's prices.
     The Council confirms the Commission's approach and the resulting
     findings.
(28) The Commission received no further submissions regarding the
     assessment of injury.
     The Council consequently confirms the findings set out by the
     Commission in recitals 24 to 26, 28 and 30 to 35 of Regulation (EEC)
     No 906/92 and in recitals 26 to 28 of this Regulation.
 ---pagebreak---                                     - 11 -
                             F. CAUSE AND EFFECT
(29) Seeking to show a close causal link between dumped silicon metal
     originating in Brazil and the injury to the Community     industry, the
     Commission pointed out in its provisional findings the correlation
     between the decline in the Community   industry's market share and a
     corresponding increase in that of Brazilian exporters.      This was
     further borne out by the transparency of the world silicon metal
     market, which is extremely sensitive to price fluctuations.
(30) A Brazilian producer claimed that the Community    industry had lost
     market share because it was unable to meet increased demand for high-
     quality silicon metal.   This is refuted by data in the Commission's
     possession on the Community  industry's capacity utilization and
     product range during the investigation period.
(31) Another producer claimed that prices for imports from the People's
     Republic of China were consistently lower than Brazilian exporters',
     constituting a world reference price of sorts.
     The Commission points out that imports of Chinese silicon metal are
     currently the object of another anti-dumping proceeding and dismisses
     the claim that the price of Chinese silicon metal imports could be
     considered a sort of world reference price.    Quite apart from the
 ---pagebreak---                                     - 12 -
      fact that Chinese exporters' share of the Community market is
      relatively small when compared with that of their Brazilian
      counterparts, Chinese silicon metal has a much narrower range of
      potential uses than the Brazilian product and cannot therefore be
      considered likely to determine prices.
(32) Another producer alleged that the assessment of cause and effect did
      not take sufficient account of imports from other non-member countries
      such as Argentina, Australia or China, particularly since recital 17
     of Council Regulation (EEC) No 2200/90 tended to absolve imports
     originating in Brazil of responsibiIity for the injury to the
     Community industry.
     The Commission feels that these arguments do not controvert the
     findings of recital 38 of Regulation (EEC) No 906/92, and that the
     findings of an investigation on which the Council based conclusions in
     an earlier proceeding concerning imports of the same product from the
     People's Republic of China are irrelevant to the facts of the present
     anti-dumping proceeding.   They certainly do not diminish the fact that
     the dumping in question caused material  injury to the Community
      industry and that, viewed in isolation, this injury is substantial.
(33) Another Brazilian producer claimed that the injury to the Community
     industry was largely attributable to the actions of Community
     producers, to competition between them or the obsolescence of their
     production apparatus, but failed to substantiate the allegatlons wlth
     evidence likely to call into question the Commission's provisional
     f indings.
 ---pagebreak---                                     - 13 -
      The Council therefore confirms the Commission's findings in
      recitals 37 and 38 of Regulation (EEC) No 906/92 and recitals 30 to 34
     of this Regulat ion.
                            G. COMMUNITY INTEREST
1.   General
(34) The Commission received no new evidence or arguments on this issue.
     The Council therefore confirms the Commission's findings in recitals
     39 and 40 of Regulation (EEC) No 906/92.
2.   The interests of the Community   industry
(35) In the absence of any new evidence, the Council  likewise confirms the
     Commission's conclusions in recitals 41 and 42 of Regulation (EEC)
     No 906/92
3.   The interests of other parties
(36) The trade association mentioned earlier as representing the interests
     of the Community chemical industry repeated its concern at the
     weakening of its members' ability to compete on the Community market
     with non-Community rivals whose inputs were not subject to anti-
     dumping dut ies.
(37) Other trade associations representing the interests of the secondary
     aluminium industry also expressed concern about the increased costs
     facing processing industries downstream on their intermediate inputs.
 ---pagebreak---                                    - 14 -
     RepresentatIves of some Internatlonal dealers speclallzlng In ferro-
     alloys made slmllar objectlons, argulng that Industrlal consumers In
     the Communlty were effectlvely loslng an attractlve source of cheap
     slllcon metal outside the Communlty.
(38) The Commlsslon Is aware of the llkely Impact of antl-dumplng measures
     on the Intermedlate Input costs of some groups of Communlty consumers.
     However, this increase concerns only the sllicon metal orlglnating in
     Brazll, whlch represented less than 15% of the Communlty market in
     1990. Other supplylng sources are also avallable and used,
     consequently, nothlng indicates that this Increase would be reflected
     In the same proportlon on the production costs of the flnlshed
     products downstream. In these clrcumstances, It cannot be concluded
     that the Impositlon of an antl-dumplng duty on imports of brazillan
     sllicon metal would lead the user industries withln the Communlty to
     suffer from a comparatlve dlsadvantage proportlonal to the amount of
     the duty imposed vls a vls their competltors In the third countrles.
     Moreover, claims that Brazillan slllcon metal  Is irreplaceable are
     contradicted by the fact that the Communlty chemlcal  Industry carries
     out Rochow synthesis uslng non-BrazIIlan sllicon metal, purchasing
     chemical-grade slllcon metal from both Communlty and non-CommunIty
     suppllers.
(39) The Council therefore confirms the Commisslon's remarks in recital 43
     together with its flndings in recitals 44 and 45 of Regulation (EEC)
     No 906/92 and recitals 35 to 39 of this Regulation, whlch show that
     the Communlty  Interest requlres an end to the injury caused to the
     Communlty  industry by the dumping found.
     However, If changed clrcumstances would occur calllng Into question
     the preceeding conclusions, the Commission would be ready, If the case
     arises, to reconsider the overall sltuatlon of the Communlty Industry
     in view of these new elements.
 ---pagebreak---                                      - 15 -
                                   H. DUTIES
 (40) The Commission provisionally found that the removal of the injury
      caused to the Community industry and the restoration of the conditions
      for normal profitabiIity required anti-dumping measures that would
      permit the industry to make sufficient profit and increase the
      proportlon of capacity in use.   The provisional duties were therefore
      calculated to cover the difference between the price of Brazilian
      silicon metal and a reference price allowlng the Community industry to
      cover costs and generate a reasonabie profit of 6.5%.
      The Council confirms the Commission s approach and the resulting
      conclusions.
(41) Several Brazilian producers claimed that the Community reference price
      used to calculate the margin of injury exceeded the level needed to
     offset the injury.
     The Commission cannot accept this argument.    The previous recital
     shows that the reference price was based on the Community industry's
     production costs plus a reasonabie profit margin guaranteeing the
     producers concerned an adequate return on investment.
     The Council confirms these findings.
(42) For the establishment of the definitive duties to be imposed, the
     Commission feels that the individual margins of injury specified in
     recital s 48 and 49 of Regulation (El-X) No 906/92 should also be
     expressed as a percentage of the cif value of imports.    An
 ---pagebreak---                                       - 16 -
       injury margin represents the increase in the price at Community
      frontier needed to end the injury c?msed by a given exporter.     After
      allowing for corrections and other adjustments to the weighted average
      cif prices charged by the Brazilian exporters concerned, the
       individual  injury margins are as foilows:
      -   Rima Eletrometalurgia SA                          34.6%
      -   Ligas de Aluminio SA (LIASA)                      36.8%
      -   Eletroila SA                                      29.8%
      -   Companhia Ferroligas Mlnas Gerais (Minasligas)    43.8%
      -   Camargo Correia Metais                            24.2%
      -   Companhia Brasileira Carboreto de Calcio          51.0%
(43) The Council confirms the Commission's findings in recitals 46 to 48 of
     Regulation (EEC) No 906/92 and concludes on the basis of the previous
      recital of this Regulation that the duty to be imposed should equal
      the dumping margins established for the above exporters, save where
      they exceed the individual   Injury margins, which then determine the
     duty applicable:
     -    Rima Eletrometalurgia SA                         34.6%
     -    Ligas de Aluminio SA (LIASA)                     36.8%
     -    Eletroila SA                                     29.8%
     -    Companhia Ferroligas Minas Gerais (Minasligas)   26.4%
     -    Camargo Correia" Metais                          20.4%
     -   Companhia Brasileira Carboreto de Calcio          18.3%
(44) For reasons already set out in recital 24 of this Regulation, the
     Council confirms that the maximum rate of duty, namely 36.8%, wiII be
     applied to the companies which did not reply to the Commission's
     questionnaire or failed to come forward.     To impose on those producer-
     exporters a rate of duty lower than the highest rate of anti-dumping
     duty established by the investigation would be to reward their failure
     to cooperate and create loopholes.
 ---pagebreak---                                       - 17
                       I. COLLECTION OF PROVISIONAL DUTIES
 (45) ln view of the dumping margins established and the seriousness of the
       injury to the Community industry, the Council considers that the
       amounts secured by way of the provisional anti-dumping duty imposed
       should be definitively collected in fuil.
                                 J. UNDERTAKING
 (46) After provisional anti-dumping dutios were imposed, all the Brazilian
      exporters involved Jointly offered an overall quantitative undertaking
      or, as an alternative, individual price undertakings.
      Following consultations, the Commission rejected these undertakings,
      explaining to the producers concerned that the undertakings offered
      were not such as to remove the injury and required, moreover, frequent
      adjustments owing to the fluctuating price if silicon metal on the
      world market.   The Council shares this opinion and considers it
      necessary to impose anti-dumping duties,
HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:
                                   Article 1
1.    A definitive anti-dumping duty of 36-.8% of the net free-at-Community-
      frontier price, not cleared through customs, is hereby imposed on
      imports of silicon metal falling within CN code 2804 69 00 and
     originating InBrazil (Taric additional code: 8654).
 ---pagebreak---                                     - 18
 2.   The rate of duty applicable to silicon metal produced by the following
      companies shalI be:
                                                                    Tar ic
                                                                  addit ional
                                                                     code
      Rima Eletrometalurgia SA,                           34.6%     8649
      Belo Horizonte
      EletroilaSA                                         29.8%     8650
      Belo Hor izonte
      Companhia Ferroligas Minas Gerais                   26.4%     8651
      (Minasligas) Contagem
     Camargo Correa Metals SA                             20.4%     8652
     Sao Paolo
     Companhia Brasilelra Carboreto de Calcio             18.3%     8653
      (CBCC), Rio de Janeiro
3.   The provisions in force concerning customs duties shall apply.
                                  Artlcla l
The amounts secured by way of the provisional antl-dumping duty imposed by
Regulation (EEC) No 906/92 shall be defiriitIvely collected at the rate
definitively imposed.
Sums secured in excess of the definitive rate of duty shall be released.
 ---pagebreak---                                    - 19 -
                                 A£llcle_.2
This Regulation shall enter into force on the day following its publication
in the Official Journal of the European Communities.
This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in
alI Member States.
Done at Brussels                                For the Council
                                                The President
 ---pagebreak---  ---pagebreak---  ---pagebreak---                                                                      ISSN 0254-1475
                                                              COM(92)318final
                                                      DOCUMENTS
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                                 Catalogue number : CB-CO-92-328-EN-C
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