CELEX: 62002CC0409
Language: en
Date: 2004-07-08 00:00:00
Title: Opinion of Mr Advocate General Léger delivered on 8 July 2004. # Jan Pflugradt v European Central Bank. # Appeal - Staff of the European Central Bank - Contractual nature of the employment relationship - Alteration of responsibilities laid down in the employment contract. # Case C-409/02 P.

OPINION OF ADVOCATE GENERALLÉGERdelivered on 8 July 2004(1)
         Case C-409/02 PJan PflugradtvEuropean Central Bank
            (Appeal  –  Article 36.1 of the ESCB Statute  –  Article 9(c) of the Conditions of Employment of ECB Staff  –  ECB Staff  –  ECB's discretion to organise its departments and assign its staff  –  Alteration of a contract of employment  –  Performance appraisal)
            
      
         
        1.        This appeal was brought by Mr Jan Pflugradt against the judgment of the Court of First Instance of the European Communities
      (Fifth Chamber) of 22 October 2002 
         			(2)
         		 dismissing his application for annulment of both his performance appraisal for 1999 
         			(3)
         		 and the note of 28 June 2000 from the Director-General of the Directorate-General for Information Systems (DG IS) of the
      European Central Bank (‘ECB’) concerning the duties allocated to him.
      
      
      I –  Legal framework
        2.        The Protocol on the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank (ECB) annexed to the
      EC Treaty (‘the ESCB Statute’) provides that the Governing Council, on a proposal from the Executive Board, are to lay down
      the conditions of employment of the staff of the ECB. Those conditions of employment were adopted by Decision 1999/330/EC
      
         			(4)
         		 (‘the Conditions of Employment’).
      
      
        3.        The Conditions of Employment provide inter alia as follows:
      
      
               ‘9.
                     (a)
                  
            
               Employment relations between the ECB and its members of staff shall be governed by employment contracts issued in conjunction
                        with these Conditions of Employment. The Staff Rules adopted by the Executive Board shall further specify the application
                        of these Conditions of Employment.
                     
                  
         
      
      ...
      
      
         
            (c)
               No specific national law governs these Conditions of Employment. The ECB shall apply (i) the general principles of law common
                  to the Member States, (ii) the general principles of European Community (EC) law, and (iii) the rules contained in the EC
                  regulations and directives concerning social policy which are addressed to the Member States. Whenever necessary, these legal
                  instruments will be implemented by the ECB. EC recommendations in the area of social policy will be given due consideration.
                  In interpreting the rights and obligations under the present Conditions of Employment, due regard shall be shown for the authoritative
                  principles of the regulations, rules and case-law which apply to the staff of the EC institutions. 
               
            
      
      
      
               10.
                     (a)
                  
            
               Employment contracts between the ECB and its members of staff shall take the form of letters of appointment which shall be
                        countersigned by members of staff. The letters of appointment shall specify the terms of employment as required by Council
                        Directive 91/533/EEC of 14 October 1991 …’. 
                           			(5)
                           		
                  
         
      
      
        4.        Also pursuant to the ESCB Statute, the Governing Council adopted the Rules of Procedure of the ECB, as amended on 22 April
      1999, 
         			(6)
         		 which provide inter alia as follows: 
      
       ‘Article 11 
      
      11.1
         Each member of the staff of the ECB shall be informed of his/her position within the structure of the ECB, his/her reporting
            line and his/her professional responsibilities. 
         
      
      
      ...
      
      
      Article 21, Conditions of Employment
      
      
      21.1
         The employment relationship between the ECB and its staff shall be determined by the Conditions of Employment and the Staff
            Rules.
         
      
      
      21.2
         The Conditions of Employment shall be approved and amended by the Governing Council upon a proposal from the Executive Board.
            The General Council shall be consulted under the procedure laid down in these Rules of Procedure. 
         
      
      
      21.3
         The Conditions of Employment shall be implemented by Staff Rules, which shall be adopted and amended by the Executive Board.’
      
      
      
      II –  Facts and procedure before the Court of First Instance
        5.        Mr Pflugradt has been employed by the ECB since 1 July 1998. He was appointed to the Directorate-General for Information Systems
      (DG IS), where he has worked as ‘UNIX Coordinator’. After he had agreed on 9 October 1998 to the terms of a document entitled
      ‘UNIX coordinator responsibilities’ containing a list of his various responsibilities, he received four days later a letter
      of appointment, agreed with retroactive effect to the date on which he took up his duties. 
      
      
        6.        The ECB prepared a report appraising Mr Pflugradt’s performance in 1999; the latter challenged the report through various
      ECB in-house appeals, without success. He claims in essence that that report contains unfair and unfounded comments. It was
      following this that he brought an action before the Court of First Instance seeking annulment of that appraisal, which is
      the document contested in Case T-178/00.
      
      
        7.        By note of 28 June 2000 the Director-General of DG IS sent Mr Pflugradt a new list of his responsibilities as UNIX Coordinator.
      As he was dissatisfied with the alteration of his responsibilities as set out in that note Mr Pflugradt instituted several
      internal ECB appeals but did not achieve any positive result. He then referred the matter to the Court of First Instance,
      seeking annulment of that note, which is the document contested in Case T-341/00.
      
      
        8.        It is against that background that, by applications lodged at the Registry of the Court of First Instance on 4 July and 10
      November 2000, Mr Pflugradt brought two actions, one seeking annulment of his performance appraisal for 1999 and the other
      annulment of the note of 28 June 2000.
      
      
      III –  The judgment under appeal
        9.        The Court of First Instance joined 
         			(7)
         		 Cases T-178/00 and T-341/00 in the judgment it delivered on 22 October 2002 dismissing both applications.
      
      
       A – The action in Case T-178/00 
        10.      In his action for annulment in Case T-178/00 Mr Pflugradt contended that his performance appraisal for 1999 withdrew certain
      of his responsibilities with regard to personnel matters, namely responsibility for appraising members of the UNIX team. The
      report also contained various assessments of his work which were based on factual errors.
      
      
        11.      The Court of First Instance rejected both pleas on the basis of the following reasoning; it pointed out first that the ESCB
      Statute confers functional autonomy on the ECB but that relations between the ECB and its staff are governed by employment
      contracts, which take the form of letters of appointment sent by the ECB to members of its staff and countersigned by them.
      The letters set out the essential elements of the contract, namely the title, grade and a brief description of the work. The
      Court mentioned that the ECB also gave Mr Pflugradt a document containing a list of the duties specifically attaching to his
      job. However, the Court stated, the ECB may alter those duties only in respect of non-essential elements of the contract.
      
      
      
        12.      The Court of First Instance added:
      
      ‘54 
         The ECB, like any other institution or undertaking, has management powers in the organisation of its services and in the management
            of its staff. As a Community institution it even enjoys wide discretion in the organisation of its services and in the assignment
            of its staff to perform its public service responsibilities (see, by analogy, the judgments of the Court of Justice in Case
            69/83 Lux v Court of Auditors [1984] ECR 2447, paragraph 17, and Case C-294/95 P Ojha v Commission [1996] ECR I‑5863, paragraph 40; and the judgments of the Court of First Instance in Case T-33/90 Von Bonkewitz-Lindner v Parliament [1991] ECR II-1251, paragraph 88, and Case T-176/97 Hick v ESC [1998] ECR-SC I-A-281 and II-845, paragraph 36). It may therefore over time develop its employment relationships with its
            staff in the best interests of the service in order to arrive at an effective organisation of work and a consistent allocation
            of the various duties among members of the staff and to adapt to varying needs. A member of staff recruited to a post for
            an indefinite period which might last until he reached the age of 65 cannot reasonably expect that every aspect of internal
            organisation will remain unchanged for his entire career or that he will retain throughout his career the responsibilities
            allocated to him at the time of his appointment. 
         
      
      
      55
         In that regard, it should be noted that the applicant was recruited and the job description of 5 October 1998 drawn up in
            the general context of the setting up of the ECB’s services during its first year of operation. That is illustrated in particular
            by the fact that the allocation of the duties and responsibilities which appear in that job description was provisional. For
            nine of those duties and responsibilities the job description indicates that the applicant may be assisted by a colleague
            “during the initial start-up of Stage Three”. In addition, the ECB states in that document that it recommends a review of
            the allocation of all the duties and responsibilities: “If it were to be seen after the first quarter of 1999 that the overall
            workload within the UNIX area decreases, it is recommended that all of the UNIX Coordinator duties should be reviewed (hopefully
            with a mapping to an appropriate ECB job family description), taking into account any ECB circumstances and policies applicable
            at this time”. 
         
      
      
      56
         Moreover, by stipulating that the Conditions of Employment “as they may read from time to time”, form an integral part of
            the applicant’s employment contract, that contract provides expressly that the terms of the employment relationship are likely
            to vary as a result of amendments to the Conditions of Employment. 
         
      
      
      57
         It is necessary to ascertain whether the responsibility of conducting the annual appraisals of the work of members of the
            UNIX team constitutes an essential element as regards the job of the team coordinator and whether withdrawal of that responsibility
            therefore affects essential elements of the applicant’s employment contract. 
         
      
      
      58
         It is common ground that despite the alteration of his responsibilities the applicant retained his job as “UNIX Coordinator”,
            falling within the category of “professionals” and Grade G, with the relevant remuneration.
         
      
      
      59
         It is clear from the job description of 5 October 1998 that the post of UNIX Coordinator is essentially of a technical nature,
            and that the staff-related and administrative duties are merely secondary. Thus, withdrawal of the duty of appraising members
            of the UNIX team did not by itself result in downgrading, as a whole, the applicant’s duties clearly below the responsibilities
            corresponding to his job. In that regard it is appropriate to point out that it is common ground that the applicant has never
            had to conduct appraisals for members of the UNIX team, as that responsibility was withdrawn from him even before the ECB
            embarked upon the first round of annual appraisals for its staff. In those circumstances the alteration in question does not
            represent a downgrading of the applicant’s job and cannot therefore be regarded as infringing an essential element of the
            employment contract.’
         
      
      
      
        13.      As regards the second plea, regarding the assessment of the applicant’s work, the Court of First Instance considers that it
      is actually being asked to question the validity of the assessments Mr Pflugradt’s superiors made of his work during 1999,
      which it is not entitled to do. The Court’s review of the legality of the assessments contained in an annual report can only
      relate to a possible misuse of powers. As the appellant had not demonstrated that there were any such circumstances the plea
      was rejected.
      
      
        14.      The Court of First Instance therefore dismissed Mr Pflugradt’s application in that first case.
      
      
       B – The application in Case T-341/00
        15.      In Mr Pflugradt’s action in the second case he sought annulment of the note of 28 June 2000 by which the ECB altered his duties.
      On the basis of the same arguments as in Case T-178/00, the applicant contended that the ECB infringed the applicant’s right
      to be appointed to a job that complied with his employment contract.
      
      
        16.      The Court of First Instance also repeated its reasoning from the first case, stating that the applicant could not expect to
      retain all the specific duties allocated to him when he was appointed by the ECB. It held that that institution did not exceed
      the limits of its organisational authority by unilaterally altering the applicant’s responsibilities, first, because it was
      not disputed that those alterations were made in the interest of the service and, secondly, because the applicant retained
      his essential duties and had not demonstrated that those alterations affected essential elements of his employment contract.
      
      
        17.      The Court of First Instance therefore also dismissed the application in the second case.
      
      
      IV –  The procedure before the Court of Justice and the forms of order sought
        18.      By application lodged at the Registry of the Court of Justice on 18 November 2002, Mr Pflugradt brought the present appeal
      against the judgment under appeal. The ECB lodged its reply on 3 March 2003.
      
      
        19.      The appellant claims that the Court should:
      
        
      –
         set aside the judgment under appeal, 
      
      
        
      –
         annul both the ECB’s decisions, and
      
      
        
      –
         order the respondent to pay the costs.
      
      
      
      
        20.      The ECB contends that the Court should:
      
        
      –
         dismiss the appeal, and
      
      
        
      –
         order the appellant to pay the costs.
      
      
      
      
      V –  The appeal
        21.      Mr Pflugradt relies on several pleas in support of his appeal. The first alleges infringement by the Court of First Instance
      of Article 36.1 of the ESCB Statute and the first sentence of Article 9(a) of the Conditions of Employment in that it failed
      to recognise the contractual nature of the legal relationship between the ECB and its staff. The ECB was therefore not entitled
      to amend his contract unilaterally.
      
      
        22.      In his second plea the appellant contends that by transposing the rules governing the Community public service to the assignment
      of the duties of ECB staff the ECB failed to comply with that principle. In particular since it did not state that the ECB
      should have provided proof that it was in the interest of the service to alter the duties assigned to the appellant. 
      
      
        23.      In his third plea the appellant contends that the Court of First Instance made an incorrect establishment of the facts, and
      in his fourth plea that the Court made an incorrect assessment of the facts.
      
      
        24.      The fifth and last plea alleges that the judgment of the Court of First Instance contains an incorrect statement of reasons;
      the appellant contends that he was not seeking to challenge before the Court of First Instance the appraisal made of his performance
      by the ECB in the 1999 report, but rather the facts on which the ECB based his performance appraisal, an argument on which,
      according to the applicant, the Court of First Instance failed to give a ruling.
      
      
        25.      I shall consider the pleas in the order in which they are set out above.
      
      
       A – The first plea: an error of law based on infringement of Article 36.1 of the ESCB Statute and the first sentence of Article
         9(a) of the Conditions of Employment 
        26.      The first plea challenges the position adopted by the Court of First Instance regarding the legal nature of the employment
      relations between the ECB and its staff, and the establishment by that Court of the discretion enjoyed by the ECB as regards
      the duties assigned to its staff.
      
      
        27.      According to the appellant, it is clear from the wording of the first sentence of Article 9(a) of the Conditions of Employment
      that legal relations between the ECB and members of its staff are governed by employment contracts. Their legal relationship
      is therefore contractual. 
         			(8)
         		 In his view, the judgment under appeal failed to have regard to the extent and organisation of the ECB’s functional autonomy
      in respect of that provision and of Article 36.1 of the ESCB Statute.
      
      
        28.      Mr Pflugradt states that it is necessary to distinguish between the ECB’s discretion with regard to the duties assigned to
      staff and its discretion with regard to the organisation of the institution, in respect of which the institution undoubtedly
      has broad discretion. Relations with staff members are therefore based on contractual relationships, which comply with the
      principle of contractual autonomy. It follows therefore that the ECB cannot unilaterally alter the terms of the contract agreed
      between itself and the appellant, either following the 1999 performance appraisal or following the note of 28 June 2000. In
      the appellant’s view, the job description forms an integral part of his contract of employment. That description, which contains
      his key responsibilities, was sent to him by the ECB for his approval. It was only after the content had been approved that
      the contract of employment contained in the letter of appointment was agreed between Mr Pflugradt and the ECB. 
         			(9)
         		 The job description is therefore a pre-condition for Mr Pflugradt’s approval of the contract.
      
      
        29.      In its reply the ECB contends that even though the nature of the legal relationship between the ECB and its staff is contractual
      it is not purely contractual. In particular, it is not a contract governed by private law. The contract of employment is to
      a large extent made up of staff regulations elements, which are provided for in the Conditions of Employment, whose content
      is similar to that of the Staff Regulations for Officials and Conditions of Employment of Other Staff. It is that similarity,
      moreover, which led the Court of First Instance to apply in this case the case-law which grants Community institutions broad
      discretion as regards the organisation of departments and the assignment of duties to staff.
      
      
        30.      According to the ECB, the institution’s discretion is general and declaratory and cannot depend on the nature of the employment
      relations between the ECB and its staff, whether they be officials or other staff.
       Assessment
      
      
        31.      Unlike the appellant, I do not think that the Court of First Instance committed an error of law by ascribing broad discretion
      to the ECB with regard to the assignment of duties to its staff and by approving the alteration by the ECB of some of the
      applicant’s responsibilities. 
      
      
        32.      It is common ground that the employment relationship between the ECB and its members of staff is of a contractual nature.
      
         			(10)
         		 That relationship is given concrete expression through the signing of a letter of appointment in accordance with Article
      10 of the Conditions of Employment. However, even though the nature of the relationship is contractual it should be pointed
      out that one of the parties to the contract is a Community institution and as such is responsible for the fulfilment of a
      task in the Community interest and is empowered to lay down the provisions applicable to its staff. 
         			(11)
         		
      
        33.      Therefore, relations with its contract staff, under the provisions of the Conditions of Employment, contain significant staff
      regulations elements, which are contained in the Conditions of Employment as adopted by the Governing Council.
      
      
        34.      The appellant’s argument highlighting the difference between the legal status of officials and that of other staff of the
      ECB, which he bases on the contractual relationship and exercise of the principle of contractual autonomy, is unfounded. Although
      the terms of the Conditions of Employment form part of Mr Pflugradt’s contract, they were not negotiated between him and the
      institution. It should be pointed out that the recruitment process entails discussion and consensus which result, under the
      terms of the Conditions of Employment, in a letter of appointment. I would make the observation that this is a contract broadly
      based on staff regulations, which allows very little contractual autonomy to the potential future member of staff even at
      the time it is entered into. Moreover, the last sentence of Article 9(c) of the Conditions of Employment provides that the
      rights and obligations set out in that document are to be interpreted according to the principles laid down by the regulations
      and case-law which apply to the staff of the institutions. 
      
      
        35.      I also note that the Conditions of Employment, laid down by the Governing Council, are contained in a document drafted in
      generic terms, which may be amended over time but only to a minimal extent. The different versions of the Conditions of Employment
      show that the provisions cover all aspects of the employment relationship and are unlikely to be changed. Therefore, it should
      be stated, as the ECB did at the hearing on 18 March 2004, that the consensus element in the conclusion of the contract of
      employment was in reality simply Mr Pflugradt’s signing the letter of appointment. The conclusion of that contract of employment
      between the appellant and the ECB did not in fact involve any actual negotiation between them.
      
      
        36.      I conclude from the above that the appellant’s argument that the broad discretion enjoyed by the ECB in respect of its officials
      cannot be transposed to its relations with other members of its staff is unfounded. As an institution, the ECB must be able
      to organise its departments and assign duties to its staff in the context of its public service mission. The difference as
      regards staff regulations aspects between officials and other staff of the ECB does not warrant a different assessment in
      respect of the assignment of duties to the staff of that institution. Lastly, as was shown above, even though the nature of
      the legal relationship between the ECB and its staff is contractual it is not only contractual. The institution, in this case
      the ECB, has discretion with regard to the organisation of its services, notwithstanding the legal instrument of a contractual
      nature on which the employment relationship between it and its staff is based. 
         			(12)
         		 The argument put forward by the Court of First Instance in paragraph 54 of its judgment, granting the ECB wide discretion
      in the organisation of its services and in the assignment of its staff to perform its responsibilities, is therefore relevant.
      
      
        37.      The first plea put forward by the appellant against the judgment under appeal alleging an error of law is therefore unfounded.
      
      
       B – The second plea: incorrect application of the rules governing changes in the duties assigned to officials 
        38.      In the context of his second plea the appellant starts from the hypothesis 
         			(13)
         		 that the principles governing the assignment of duties to staff in the public service apply to the staff of the ECB. He submits
      however, that even in that hypothesis those principles were not complied with by the Court of First Instance.
      
      
        39.      The appellant states that following withdrawal of his appraisal responsibilities his post within the ECB was no longer the
      same despite the fact that his grade and pay remained unchanged. The appellant contends that by failing to declare that alteration
      invalid the Court misapplied the principles governing the assignment of duties to staff in the light of Community public service
      law. According to Mr Pflugradt, the Court of First Instance should not merely have accepted the appellant’s grading in order
      to satisfy itself that Mr Pflugradt’s post was equivalent, it should have examined the facts in order to establish whether
      it was equivalent.
      
      
        40.      According to the settled case-law of the Court, 
         			(14)
         		 reassignment of an official’s duties is possible provided it is in the interest of the service and ensures that the duties
      are equivalent. That is to say, the requirement is that the grade should correspond to the post and not to the duties the
      post involves as such.
      
      
        41.      In the present case, the Court has established, in accordance with the case-law cited above, that following the alterations
      to Mr Pflugradt’s responsibilities his post has still corresponded to the grade into which he was recruited and he has retained
      his essential duties. 
         			(15)
         		 It has not therefore been established that the rules governing changes in the duties assigned were incorrectly applied.
      
      
        42.      The plea alleging infringement of the principle of equivalence of posts is therefore unfounded.
      
      
       C – Third plea: incorrect finding of the facts
        43.      In this plea Mr Pflugradt asserts that the Court of First Instance made an incorrect finding of the facts with regard to the
      essential elements of the contract of employment, in particular, by failing to classify as a key responsibility the responsibility
      that was withdrawn from him, namely for appraising the members of the UNIX team. In the appellant’s view, it was not up to
      him to convince the Court of First Instance that essential aspects of his contract were being withdrawn. According to the
      appellant, contrary to what the Court of First Instance held in paragraph 58 of its judgment, it was a key responsibility
      that was withdrawn from him, and by taking that position the Court of First Instance therefore made an incorrect finding of
      the facts.
      
      
        44.      Moreover, the appellant asserts that the ECB did not rely on the interest of the service in support of its decision to alter
      Mr Pflugradt’s responsibilities. 
         			(16)
         		 Thus the Court of First Instance could not state that the appellant was not denying that that decision was made in the interest
      of the service.
      
      
        45.      Mr Pflugradt’s post at the ECB is that of UNIX Coordinator. Appraisal of the members of that team is one of the contractual
      responsibilities contained in the document approved and signed by the appellant. That particular duty has been withdrawn from
      him.
      
      
        46.      In his appeal the appellant states that it was not up to him to convince the Court of First Instance that the alterations
      to his responsibilities related to essential aspects of the contract of employment. It is settled case-law, however, with
      regard to the general principles that the applicant must provide evidence for his assertions. It was therefore up to Mr Pflugradt
      to adduce evidence of the facts that would enable the Court of First Instance, in its capacity as the court adjudicating on
      the substance, to assess whether the characterisation was correct. The appellant did not do so at first instance and he cannot
      rely on that omission in the context of the appeal.
      
      
        47.      As to the other argument contained in the plea, that the Court of First Instance was wrong to state that the applicant did
      not deny that the alteration of his responsibilities was made in the interest of the service, I think that Mr Pflugradt’s
      plea is inadmissible. It is settled case-law that the Court of First Instance has exclusive jurisdiction to find facts brought
      to its knowledge and that that jurisdiction cannot be challenged in an appeal. 
         			(17)
         		
      
        48.      The third plea should therefore be rejected as inadmissible.
      
      
       D – The fourth plea: incorrect assessment of the facts 
        49.      Mr Pflugradt contends that the Court of First Instance made an incorrect assessment of the two contested measures, that is
      to say, the performance appraisal for 1999 and the note of 28 June 2000. 
         			(18)
         		 In his view, the ECB’s withdrawal of his responsibilities in that note is much more radical than the withdrawal of his responsibilities
      in the performance appraisal. The Court of First Instance on the other hand did not conclude from this that the applicant’s
      contractual position underwent substantial alteration.
      
      
        50.      This plea in fact relates to the challenge to the assessment of the facts by the Court of First Instance. However, as we saw
      above, the Court of Justice cannot substitute its own assessment for the unappealable assessment of the facts made by the
      Court of First Instance. The fourth plea is therefore inadmissible.
      
      
       E – The fifth plea: provision by the Court of First Instance of an incorrect statement of reasons for its judgment 
        51.      In this plea Mr Pflugradt alleges that the Court of First Instance provided an incorrect statement of reasons for its decision.
      As applicant before the Court of First Instance, the appellant put forward the argument that his performance appraisal for
      1999 was based on incorrect statements of fact, whilst in the appeal he is claiming that the Court of First Instance did not
      reply to his argument and has therefore failed to provide a correct statement of reasons for its judgment. 
         			(19)
         		
      
        52.      Mr Pflugradt contends that the Court of First Instance acted on the erroneous premiss that the appellant was seeking to challenge
      the assessment the ECB made of him in the 1999 report, although in fact he was only challenging the facts on which it based
      that performance appraisal. The Court of First Instance could not therefore reject that line of argument by considering that
      it was not for the Court to review the assessment contained in the performance appraisal, which is what the appellant is disputing.
      
      
        53.      According to the case-law of the Court of Justice, the statement of reasons which the Court of First Instance is required
      to provide must disclose its reasoning in a clear and unequivocal fashion in such a way as to enable the persons concerned
      to ascertain the reasons for the measure and to enable the Court of Justice to exercise its power of review. 
         			(20)
         		 The Court of First Instance is required to respond to the pleas actually raised by the applicant, otherwise it is infringing
      its obligation to provide a statement of reasons.
      
      
        54.      That case-law is limited by the consideration that the obligation on the Court of First Instance to give reasons for its decisions
      cannot be interpreted as meaning that it is not obliged to respond in detail to every single argument advanced by the appellant,
      particularly if the argument was not sufficiently clear and precise and was not adequately supported by evidence. 
         			(21)
         		
      
        55.      In the present case, the appellant challenged some of the factual assertions on which the ECB based its performance appraisal
      for 1999, but did not challenge the performance appraisal itself. 
         			(22)
         		 However, although he lists some of the facts contained in his performance appraisal, Mr Pflugradt does not provide any reasoned
      evidence to show that the facts are incorrect.
      
      
        56.      In my view, the Court of First Instance has not infringed the obligation to provide an adequate statement of reasons since
      it gave reasons for its judgment in accordance with the pleas and arguments submitted to it in the context of the application.
      Without a detailed explanation of the arguments put forward in support of his plea Mr Pflugradt could not subsequently rely
      on the Court of First Instance providing an inadequate statement of reasons for its judgment.
      
      
        57.      The fifth plea, alleging that the Court of First Instance provided an incorrect statement of reasons for its judgment, is
      unfounded.
      
       
      VI –  Conclusion
        58.      On the basis of all the above considerations, I propose that the Court should:
      
      (1)
         dismiss the appeal;
      
      
      (2)
         order the appellant to pay the costs. 
      
      
      
       1 –
         
         Original language: French.
      
      2 –
         
         Joined Cases T-178/00 and T-341/00 Pflugradt v ECB [2002] ECR II-4035, the ‘judgment under appeal’.
            
         
      
      3 –
         
         Of 23 November 1999.
            
         
      
      4 –
         
         Decision of the European Central Bank of 9 June 1998 on the adoption of the conditions of employment of staff of the European
            Central Bank, amended on 31 March 1999 (OJ 1999 L 125, p. 32).
            
         
      
      5 –
         
         On an employer’s obligation to inform employees of the conditions applicable to the contract or employment relationship (OJ
            1991 L 288, p. 32).
            
         
      
      6 –
         
         OJ 1999 L 125, p. 34, correction in OJ 2000 L 273, p. 40.
            
         
      
      7 –
         
         By order of 6 December 2001 the President of the Fifth Chamber of the Court of First Instance decided to join the two cases
            for the purposes of the oral procedure which resulted in the judgment under appeal.
            
         
      
      8 –
         
         Appeal (paragraph 4).
            
         
      
      9 –
         
         Under Article 10(a) of the Conditions of Employment.
            
         
      
      10 –
         
         See in particular Case T-333/99 X v ECB [2001] ECR II-3021, paragraph 61.
            
         
      
      11 –
         
         Ibid. (paragraph 63). In which the Court of Justice recognised that in the context of those contractual relations the Governing
            Council was entitled to provide in the Conditions of Employment for a disciplinary regime enabling it inter alia, in the event
            of non-compliance by one of its staff with the obligations imposed by the employment contract, to take such measures as might
            be necessary in the light of the responsibilities and objectives assigned to it. This illustrates the ECB’s broad discretion
            in the context of its relations with its staff.
            
         
      
      12 –
         
         See in particular Joined Cases 23/87 and 24/87 Aldinger and Others v Parliament [1988] ECR 4395 and Case T-102/95 Aubineau  v Commission [1996] ECR-SC I-A-357 and II-1053, paragraphs 28 to 30, which provides that the assignment of staff applies also in the case
            of the appointing authorities in respect of temporary staff, as pointed out by the ECB in its defence (paragraph 74).
            
         
      
      13 –
         
         A hypothesis which he regards as incorrect but which he takes as the premiss for his reasoning.
            
         
      
      14 –
         
         See in particular, Lux v Court of Auditors, paragraph 24 et seq; Case 19/87 Hecq v Commission [1988] ECR 1681, paragraph 6, and Ojha v Commission, paragraph 40.
            
         
      
      15 –
         
         Paragraphs 58 and 90 of the judgment under appeal.
            
         
      
      16 –
         
         Appeal (paragraph 173 et seq.).
            
         
      
      17 –
         
         See in particular Case C-136/92 P Commission v Brazzelli Lualdi and Others [1994] ECR I‑1981, paragraph 49.
            
         
      
      18 –
         
         Appeal (paragraph 171).
            
         
      
      19 –
         
         Appeal (paragraph 192 et seq.).
            
         
      
      20 –
         
         See in particular the order of 25 June 1998 in Case C-159/98 P(R) Netherlands Antilles  v Council [1998] ECR I-4147, paragraph 70.
            
         
      
      21 –
         
         See Case C-274/99 P Connolly v Commission [2001] ECR I-1611, paragraph 121.
            
         
      
      22 –
         
         Appeal (paragraph 192).