CELEX: 61960CJ0025
Language: en
Date: 1962-03-01 00:00:00
Title: Judgment of the Court (First Chamber) of 1 March 1962. # Mrs Leda De Bruyn v European Parliament. # Case 25/60.

Avis juridique important

|

61960J0025

Judgment of the Court (First Chamber) of 1 March 1962.  -  Mrs Leda De Bruyn v European Parliament.  -  Case 25/60.  

European Court reports French edition Page 00039 Dutch edition Page 00043 German edition Page 00045 Italian edition Page 00041 English special edition Page 00021 Danish special edition Page 00289 Greek special edition Page 00659 Portuguese special edition Page 00005

SummaryPartiesSubject of the caseGroundsDecision on costsOperative part
Keywords

++++1 . SERVANTS - DISMISSAL - REASONS VALID IN LAW - COURT'S RULING  2 . SERVANTS - INSTALLATION ALLOWANCE - REFUSAL BASED ON AN IRREGULAR DECISION OF DISMISSAL - ILLEGALITY  

Summary

1 . AS WAS RECOGNIZED BY THE COURT IN JOINED CASES 43, 45 AND 48/59 AND IN CASE 44/59, THE ACTS OF AN AUTHORITY, IN THE CONTRACTUAL AS WELL AS IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE FIELD, ARE ALWAYS SUBJECT  TO THE DICTATES OF PUBLIC INTEREST; THEREFORE EVERY DECISION OF DISMISSAL MUST BE BASED ON REASONS AFFECTING THE INTERESTS OF THE SERVICE AND MUST EXCLUDE ANYTHING OF AN ARBITRARY NATURE .  THIS REQUIREMENT EXISTS FROM THE DATE OF THE CREATION OF A LEGAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE ADMINISTRATION AND ITS SERVANTS .  IN CONSEQUENCE, IT IS NOT NECESSARY IN THE PRESENT CASE TO SETTLE THE QUESTION WHETHER A DECISION OF DISMISSAL, COMING AT THE END OF A PERIOD OF PROBATION OF A SERVANT RECRUITED UNDER THE BRUSSELS RULES SHOULD OR SHOULD NOT STATE THE REASONS UNDERLYING IT, BECAUSE THERE ARE GROUNDS FOR CONCLUDING THAT SUCH A DECISION MUST IN ANY CASE BE FOUNDED ON REASONS VALID IN LAW .  HENCE THE COURT MUST RULE THAT IT HAS NOT BEEN SUFFICIENTLY ESTABLISHED THAT THE IMPUGNED DECISION IS FOUNDED ON A GROUND VALID IN LAW .  2 . IF THE  CONDITIONS FOR PAYMENT OF THE INSTALLATION ALLOWANCE HAVE BEEN FULFILLED, THAT ALLOWANCE CANNOT BE REFUSED ON THE BASIS OF AN IRREGULAR DECISION OF DISMISSAL .  

Parties

IN CASE 25/60  LEDA DE BRUYN, THE WIFE OF GIORGIO GERIONI, REPRESENTED BY FERNAND PROBST, ADVOCATE OF THE LUXEMBOURG BAR, WITH AN ADDRESS FOR SERVICE IN LUXEMBOURG AT THE LATTER'S CHAMBERS, 26 AVENUE DE LA LIBERTE, APPLICANT,  V  EUROPEAN PARLIAMENTARY ASSEMBLY, REPRESENTED BY JACQUES FAYAUD, HEAD OF THE PERSONNEL DEPARTMENT OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENTARY ASSEMBLY, ACTING AS AGENT, ASSISTED BY JEAN COUTARD, ADVOCATE AT THE CONSEIL D'ETAT AND THE COUR DE CASSATION IN PARIS, WITH AN ADDRESS FOR SERVICE IN LUXEMBOURG AT THE OFFICES OF THE ASSEMBLY, 19A RUE BEAUMONT, DEFENDANT,  

Subject of the case

APPLICATION FOR :  - ANNULMENT OF A DECISION OF DISMISSAL DATED 3 JULY 1959;  - COMPENSATION FOR DISMISSAL;  - PAYMENT OF THE INSTALLATION ALLOWANCE;  - DAMAGES;  

Grounds

P . 26  ON THE ADMISSIBILITY OF THE APPLICATION  1 . THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENTARY ASSEMBLY IS AN INSTITUTION COMMON TO THE THREE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES AND AS SUCH IS SUBJECT TO THE SIMULTANEOUS APPLICATION OF THE THREE TREATIES .  NEVERTHELESS, WITH REGARD TO THE BASIC TEXTS APPLYING TO SERVANTS RECRUITED BETWEEN THE TIME WHEN THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENTARY ASSEMBLY TOOK THE PLACE OF THE OLD COMMON ASSEMBLY AND THE TIME OF THE ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THE STAFF REGULATIONS PROVIDED FOR IN ARTICLE 212 OF THE EEC TREATY AND IN ARTICLE 186 OF THE EAEC TREATY, THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENTARY ASSEMBLY AGREED TO BE GOVERNED BY THE SO-CALLED BRUSSELS RULES, WHICH ARE DEPENDENT ON THE TWO TREATIES OF ROME .  P . 27  IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, THE JURISDICTION OF THE COURT SHOULD BE ASSESSED SOLELY ON THE BASIS OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE SAID TREATIES .  BY VIRTUE OF THOSE PROVISIONS, AND BEARING IN MIND THE PRINCIPLES LAID DOWN BY THE COURT IN JOINED CASES 43, 45 AND 48/59 AND IN CASE 44/59, THIS JURISDICTION IS BASED ON ARTICLES 179 OF THE EEC TREATY AND 152 OF THE EAEC TREATY, EACH OF WHICH PROVIDES THAT 'THE COURT OF JUSTICE SHALL HAVE JURISDICTION IN ANY DISPUTE BETWEEN THE COMMUNITY AND ITS SERVANTS WITHIN THE LIMITS AND UNDER THE CONDITIONS LAID DOWN IN THE STAFF REGULATIONS OR THE CONDITIONS OF EMPLOYMENT .'  ACCORDINGLY, THE COURT HAS JURISDICTION TO HEAR THE PRESENT DISPUTE .  2 . THE APPLICANT CLAIMS THAT THE COURT SHOULD BOTH ANNUL THE DECISION OF DISMISSAL AND ORDER THE ASSEMBLY TO PAY TO THE APPLICANT :  ( A ) A SUM OF 60 000 BELGIAN FRANCS BY WAY OF NON-MATERIAL DAMAGES;  ( B ) THE INSTALLATION ALLOWANCE; AND  ( C ) A SUM EQUAL TO THREE MONTHS' SALARY IN LIEU OF NOTICE .  AS FAR AS THE CONCLUSIONS REGARDING ANNULMENT ARE CONCERNED, THE APPLICANT STATED IN HER APPLICATION : 'THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENTARY ASSEMBLY IS IN BREACH OF CONTRACT ON THE GROUND OF THE ABSENCE OF REASONING IN THE DISPUTED DECISION AND, AS TERMINATION OF THE CONTRACT HAS BECOME FINAL, THE ASSEMBLY'S LIABILITY MUST BE DISCHARGED BY WAY OF DAMAGES .'  IT FOLLOWS FROM THIS STATEMENT THAT THE CONCLUSIONS IN FACT CONTEMPLATE ONLY COMPENSATION FOR THE NON-MATERIAL DAMAGE SUFFERED BY THE APPLICANT .  CONSEQUENTLY, THE QUESTION WHETHER OR NOT THE PRESENT APPLICATION IS ADMISSIBLE FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF LIMITATION PERIODS SHOULD BE EXAMINED SOLELY FROM THE ANGLE OF THE ADMISSIBILITY OF AN APPLICATION FOR DAMAGES FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT . NO PROVISION OF THE EEC TREATY OR OF THE EAEC TREATY PROVIDES FOR A PERIOD OF LIMITATION FOR THE MAKING OF SUCH APPLICATIONS . IN PARTICULAR THE LIMITATION PERIODS PROVIDED FOR IN ARTICLE 43 OF THE PROTOCOL ON THE STATUTE OF THE COURT OF JUSTICE ANNEXED TO THE EEC TREATY AND IN ARTICLE 44 OF THE PROTOCOL ON THE STATUTE OF THE COURT OF JUSTICE ANNEXED TO THE EAEC TREATY DO NOT APPLY IN THE PRESENT CASE FOR THE SIMPLE REASON THAT THEY CONCERN NON - CONTRACTUAL LIABILITY .  P . 28  SINCE THE TREATIES ARE SILENT AND THERE IS NO EVIDENCE ALLOWING ONE TO CONCLUDE THAT THE APPLICANT'S DELAY IN BRINGING THE MATTER BEFORE THE COURT SHOULD BE INTERPRETED AS A WAIVER OF THE RIGHT OF ACTION, ONE MAY CONCLUDE THAT THE PRESENT PROCEEDINGS ARE ADMISSIBLE FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF LIMITATION PERIODS .  ON THE SUBSTANCE OF THE CASE  IRREGULARITY OF THE DECISION OF DISMISSAL  1 . THE DEFENDANT MAINTAINS THAT THE DECISION OF DISMISSAL WAS TAKEN AT THE END OF THE APPLICANT'S PROBATIONARY PERIOD . CONSEQUENTLY, THE FIRST QUESTION IS WHETHER THE DISPUTED CONTRACT REQUIRED THE SAID PROBATIONARY PERIOD TO BE SERVED .  THE LETTER OF APPOINTMENT MAKES NO MENTION OF THE EXISTENCE OF A PROBATIONARY PERIOD; IN THE PRESENT CASE THE SERVING OF PROBATION SEEMS DEVOID OF ALL POINT, SINCE THE DISPUTED CONTRACT WAS OF UNLIMITED DURATION AND TERMINABLE ON A MONTH'S NOTICE BY EITHER SIDE; IT WAS THEREFORE LAWFUL FOR THE ADMINISTRATION TO TERMINATE THE APPLICANT'S EMPLOYMENT EVEN IN THE FIRST MONTH, IF IT CONSIDERED THAT SHE WAS NOT FULFILLING THE REQUIREMENTS OF HER EMPLOYMENT .  NEVERTHELESS, THE DEFENDANT ALLEGES THAT THE COMPLETION OF A PERIOD OF PROBATION WAS, IN THE PRESENT CASE, IN CONFORMITY WITH THE PRACTICE IN FORCE AT THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENTARY ASSEMBLY . THE APPLICANT DOES NOT CONTRADICT THE DEFENDANT ON THIS POINT; NOR DOES SHE DENY HAVING RECEIVED, AT THE SAME TIME AS HER LETTER OF APPOINTMENT, DOCUMENT APE 926 RELATING TO THE REFUND OF REMOVAL EXPENSES AND THE INSTALLATION ALLOWANCE AND PROVIDING THAT THESE BENEFITS COULD BE ACCORDED TO SERVANTS 'OF AT LEAST TWO MONTHS' STANDING UNDER A LETTER OF EMPLOYMENT OF THE BRUSSELS TYPE, AND WHOSE PROBATION REPORT WAS FAVOURABLE '.  SHE DOES NOT CONTEST EITHER THAT SHE RECEIVED COMMUNICATION 59/13 DATED 12 MARCH 1959, POINTING OUT THE NECESSITY OF A FAVOURABLE PROBATION REPORT IN ORDER TO BE ABLE TO CLAIM THE INSTALLATION ALLOWANCE .  IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, THERE ARE GROUNDS FOR CONCLUDING THAT THE EXISTENCE OF A PROBATIONARY PERIOD IN THE CONTRACTUAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE APPLICANT AND THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENTARY ASSEMBLY APPEARS WELL ESTABLISHED .  THE DEFENDANT, IN REPLY TO QUESTION N . 2 PUT BY THE COURT BEFORE THE OPENING OF THE ORAL PROCEDURE, ASSERTS THAT THE LENGTH OF SUCH A PROBATIONARY PERIOD WAS 'NORMALLY' TWO MONTHS WITHOUT GOING SO FAR AS TO STATE THE LENGTH OF THE PROBATIONARY PERIOD WHICH THE APPLICANT WAS IN FACT OBLIGED TO SERVE .  P . 29  NEVERTHELESS, SINCE THE APPLICANT WAS ENGAGED BY LETTER DATED 11 MARCH 1959 AND WAS DISMISSED BY LETTER DATED 3 JULY 1959, IT FOLLOWS THAT THE DEFENDANT BROUGHT THE PROBATIONARY PERIOD TO AN END THREE MONTHS AFTER THE DATE OF THE LETTER OF EMPLOYMENT, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT TWO PERIODS OF SICK LEAVE OF A TOTAL LENGTH OF TWENTY - TWO DAYS .  THE APPLICANT ALLEGES IN HER APPLICATION FOR LEGAL AID THAT THE CONTRACT WAS NOT TERMINATED BEFORE 11 JUNE 1959 - THE END OF THE PROBATIONARY PERIOD : SHE RECOGNIZES, THEREFORE, THAT HER PERIOD OF PROBATION WAS TO END THREE MONTHS AFTER THE DATE OF HER APPOINTMENT .  EVEN THOUGH THE APPLICANT DOES NOT TAKE INTO ACCOUNT HER TWO PERIODS OF SICK LEAVE MENTIONED ABOVE, SHE DOES NOT, AT ALL EVENTS, DENY HAVING HAD THEM .  CONSEQUENTLY, THERE ARE GROUNDS FOR ADMITTING THAT IN THE PRESENT CASE THE LENGTH OF THE PROBATIONARY PERIOD APPLICABLE WAS THREE MONTHS .  2 . THE APPLICANT MAINTAINS THAT THE DECISION OF DISMISSAL CONTAINS NO REASONS AND THAT, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE DEPARTMENTAL MEMORANDA BEARING ON HER PROBATION, ISSUED BY THE RESPONSIBLE AUTHORITIES OF THE ASSEMBLY, THIS DECISION APPEARS UNJUSTIFIED; ACCORDING TO THE APPLICANT, SUCH A CIRCUMSTANCE CONSTITUTES A BREACH OF CONTRACT BY THE DEFENDANT RENDERING IT LIABLE .  THE DEFENDANT, ON THE OTHER HAND, POINTS OUT THAT THE ADMINISTRATION'S ASSESSMENT IS PURELY DISCRETIONARY, AND THAT, BECAUSE OF THIS, IT IS NOT BOUND TO ASSIGN REASONS FOR A DECISION OF DISMISSAL MADE AT THE END OF THE PROBATIONARY PERIOD .  MOREOVER, IT IS MAINTAINED BY THE DEFENDANT THAT SUCH AN OBLIGATION WOULD ENTAIL AWKWARD CONSEQUENCES, NOT ONLY FOR THE ADMINISTRATION BUT ALSO FOR THE SERVANT, SINCE IT WOULD COMPEL THE FORMER, SHOULD THE OCCASION ARISE, TO STATE UNPLEASANT HOME TRUTHS WITH REGARD TO THE SERVANT .  AS WAS RECOGNIZED BY THE COURT IN JOINED CASES 43, 45 AND 48/59 AND IN CASE 44/59, THE ACTS OF AN AUTHORITY IN THE CONTRACTUAL AS WELL AS IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE FIELD ARE ALWAYS SUBJECT TO THE DICTATES OF PUBLIC INTEREST; CONSEQUENTLY EVERY DECISION OF DISMISSAL MUST BE BASED ON REASONS RELATED TO THE INTERESTS OF THE SERVICE AND MUST EXCLUDE ANYTHING OF AN ARBITRARY NATURE .  THIS REQUIREMENT EXISTS FROM THE MOMENT OF THE CREATION OF A LEGAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE ADMINISTRATION AND ITS SERVANTS .  P . 30  IN CONSEQUENCE, IT IS NOT NECESSARY IN THE PRESENT CASE TO SETTLE THE QUESTION WHETHER A DECISION OF DISMISSAL COMING AT THE END OF A PERIOD OF PROBATION OF A SERVANT RECRUITED UNDER THE BRUSSELS RULES SHOULD OR SHOULD NOT STATE THE REASONS UNDERLYING IT, BECAUSE THERE ARE GROUNDS FOR CONCLUDING THAT SUCH A DECISION MUST, IN ANY CASE, BE FOUNDED ON REASONS VALID IN LAW .  THE FIRST MONTHS CORRESPONDING TO A PERIOD OF PROBATION ARE INTENDED TO ALLOW THE PARTY CONCERNED TO SHOW HIS PROFICIENCY; AT THE END OF THIS PERIOD THE ADMINISTRATION MUST ASSESS THE ABILITY AND TEMPERAMENT OF THE PROBATIONER IN HIS DUTIES IN ORDER TO DETERMINE WHETHER HE SHOWS THE NECESSARY CAPABILITIES .  IN THE PRESENT CASE, THE DEFENDANT PRODUCED AT THE HEARING TWO DEPARTMENTAL MEMORANDA DATED 29 JUNE AND 3 JULY 1959 EMANATING RESPECTIVELY FROM MISS LILIANA MOGGIO, THE APPLICANT'S IMMEDIATE SUPERIOR, AND FROM MR EMILE NEUJEAN, DIRECTOR OF GENERAL SERVICES .  ON THE ONE HAND, THE MEMORANDUM FROM MISS MOGGIO EXPRESSES A FAVOURABLE OPINION OF THE PROBATION COMPLETED BY THE APPLICANT AND, ON THE OTHER HAND, MR NEUJEAN STATES THAT 'AN UNFAVOURABLE ASSESSMENT CANNOT BE GIVEN BY THE GENERAL SERVICE DEPARTMENT '. THE FIRST MEMORANDUM REFERS NOT ONLY TO THE ABILITY BUT ALSO TO THE TEMPERAMENT OF THE APPLICANT, REMARKING ON HER WILLINGNESS AND HER DESIRE TO MAKE HERSELF USEFUL - AS WELL AS ON HER 'VALUABLE CHARACTERISTICS FOR ESTABLISHING AND MAINTAINING THE BEST RELATIONS WITH COLLEAGUES '.  IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES ONE CANNOT FAIL TO NOTE THAT THE SUM TOTAL OF THESE MEMORANDA CONSTITUTES A GENERAL ASSESSMENT OF THE ABILITY OF THE APPLICANT AT THE END OF HER PROBATION, AND THAT THIS ASSESSMENT IS EQUIVALENT TO A PROBATION REPORT .  THE DEFENDANT, ON THE OTHER HAND, MAINTAINS THAT THE MEMORANDUM OF THE DIRECTOR OF GENERAL SERVICES, WHICH RELIES ON THAT OF THE APPLICANT'S IMMEDIATE SUPERIOR, CANNOT BE EQUATED WITH THE PROBATION REPORT PROVIDED FOR BY THE ABOVE - MENTIONED COMMUNICATION N . 59/13 .  IN THIS RESPECT THE DEFENDANT POINTS OUT THAT THIS IS A TECHNICAL MEMORANDUM : THE REAL PROBATION REPORT CAN BE MADE OUT ONLY BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL, AND SINCE THE SECRETARY-GENERAL CANNOT ADDRESS A REPORT TO HIMSELF, THE DECISION OF DISMISSAL, EVEN THOUGH GIVEN WITHOUT REASONS, SHOULD BE REGARDED AS EQUIVALENT TO THE REPORT IN QUESTION .  ALL THE SAME, IT IS PERMISSIBLE TO OBSERVE ON THIS POINT THAT EVERY PROBATION REPORT IS NORMALLY MADE OUT BY THE HEAD OF THE DEPARTMENT TO WHOM THE PARTY CONCERNED IS ANSWERABLE, IN THIS CASE THE DIRECTOR OF GENERAL SERVICES, TO WHOSE DEPARTMENT THE APPLICANT HAD BEEN ASSIGNED . THE REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF GENERAL SERVICES IS FAVOURABLE TO THE APPLICANT .  P . 31  IT IS UNDENIABLE THAT THE APPOINTING AUTHORITY IS ALWAYS FREE TO WITHHOLD APPROVAL OF THE PROBATION REPORT MADE OUT BY THE RESPONSIBLE AUTHORITIES; HOWEVER, AS THE COURT HAS JUST ESTABLISHED, IT MUST BASE ITS DISMISSAL DECISION ON GROUNDS VALID IN LAW; THIS OBLIGATION MUST BE EVEN MORE STRICTLY INTERPRETED WHEN THE DECISION OF DISMISSAL IS IN OPEN CONTRADICTION WITH THE PROBATION ASSESSMENT BY THE RESPONSIBLE AUTHORITIES .  IN THE PRESENT CASE THIS CONTRADICTION, TAKEN WITH THE TERMS OF THE MEMORANDUM BY MR NEUJEAN ACCORDING TO WHICH 'AN UNFAVOURABLE ASSESSMENT CANNOT BE GIVEN' - TERMS WHICH SEEM TO INDICATE THAT A SIMILAR ASSESSMENT WAS PERHAPS EXPECTED AT A HIGHER LEVEL - CONSTITUTES THE BEGINNINGS OF PROOF THAT THIS DISMISSAL WAS BASED ON GROUNDS NOT VALID IN LAW . THE DEFENDANT HAS NOT, AS WAS INCUMBENT ON IT, PROVIDED PROOF TO THE CONTRARY; IT HAS NOT, FURTHERMORE, EXPLAINED THE ABOVE CONTRADICTION EITHER IN ITS STATEMENTS OF DEFENCE OR AT THE HEARING .  HENCE, THE COURT MUST CONCLUDE THAT IT HAS NOT BEEN SUFFICIENTLY ESTABLISHED IN LAW THAT THE IMPUGNED DECISION IS FOUNDED ON A GROUND VALID IN LAW . THIS OMISSION HAS CAUSED THE APPLICANT NON - MATERIAL DAMAGE FOR WHICH THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENTARY ASSEMBLY IS LIABLE IN CONTRACT .  THIS LIABILITY SHOULD, IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES, BE ASSESSED IN THE LIGHT OF THE FACT THAT THE TERMINATION OF THE CONTRACT OF SERVICE HAS BECOME FINAL, AND THE OBLIGATION OF THE DEFENDANT SHOULD BE RESOLVED IN DAMAGES .  FROM THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE, THE COURT DERIVES PRINCIPLES OF ASSESSMENT WHICH ALLOW IT TO ESTIMATE THE SUM OF THOSE DAMAGES EX AEQUO ET BONO AT 40 000 BELGIAN FRANCS .  PAYMENT OF THE INSTALLATION ALLOWANCE  COMMUNICATION N . 59/13 OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENTARY ASSEMBLY, DATED 12 MARCH 1959, INDICATES THAT PAYMENT OF THE INSTALLATION ALLOWANCE IS DUE WHEN THE FOLLOWING CONDITIONS ARE SATISFIED :  ( A ) A FAVOURABLE PROBATION REPORT;  ( B ) A FAVOURABLE MEDICAL EXAMINATION; AND  ( C ) PROOF OF INSTALLATION .  AS FAR AS THE CONDITION OF A FAVOURABLE PROBATION REPORT IS CONCERNED, IT IS PERMISSIBLE TO INTERPRET THE PROVISIONS WHICH PRESCRIBE IT AS MEANING THAT THERE SHOULD BE NOT ONLY A FAVOURABLE PROBATION REPORT BUT ALSO NO DECISION OF DISMISSAL AT THE END OF THE PROBATIONARY PERIOD . INDEED, THE INSTALLATION OF A SERVANT AT THE PLACE WHERE THE INSTITUTION IS LOCATED, AND CONSEQUENTLY THE ALLOWANCE DUE, ARE ONLY JUSTIFIED WHEN THE PROBATION IS FOLLOWED BY THE CONTINUATION OF THE SERVANT'S EMPLOYMENT .  P . 32  BUT IN THIS CASE THE DECISION OF DISMISSAL IS IRREGULAR BY VIRTUE OF THE FACT THAT IT IS NOT BASED ON REASONS VALID IN LAW; SUCH A DECISION COULD NOT, THEREFORE, BE TAKEN INTO CONSIDERATION IN THE REFUSAL TO PAY THE INSTALLATION ALLOWANCE . IT IS ALSO UNDENIABLE THAT A FAVOURABLE MEDICAL EXAMINATION TOOK PLACE .  AS FAR AS THE THIRD CONDITION IS CONCERNED, THE DEFENDANT HAS FORMALLY DECLARED IN THE ORAL PROCEDURE THAT THE APPLICANT HAD DEPOSITED WITH THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENTARY ASSEMBLY A ONE YEAR TENANCY AGREEMENT ENTERED INTO ON 8 MAY 1959 IN LUXEMBOURG . THE FACT THAT THE DATE OF THIS AGREEMENT IS WITHIN THE PROBATIONARY PERIOD PROVIDES SIMPLE PROOF THAT THE APPLICANT RAN A CERTAIN RISK; IT FOLLOWS, THEREFORE, FROM THE EXISTENCE OF THIS AGREEMENT, THAT AT THE END OF HER PROBATION THE APPLICANT HAD PROVED HER INSTALLATION .  SINCE THE THREE ABOVEMENTIONED CONDITIONS HAVE BEEN FULFILLED, THE APPLICANT HAS A RIGHT TO PAYMENT OF THE INSTALLATION ALLOWANCE .  PAYMENT OF COMPENSATION FOR DISMISSAL  THE APPLICANT MAINTAINS THAT THE PERIOD OF NOTICE OF ONE MONTH, CONTAINED IN THE DECISION OF DISMISSAL, IS MANIFESTLY INADEQUATE, AND THAT IN THIS MATTER GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW, DERIVED FROM THE NATIONAL LAWS WHICH REFLECT THEM, ARE TO BE APPLIED . FROM THIS POINT OF VIEW A PERIOD OF NOTICE OF THREE MONTHS APPEARS REASONABLE . THEREFORE, ACCORDING TO THE APPLICANT, THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENTARY ASSEMBLY SHOULD BE ORDERED TO PAY TO THE APPLICANT THREE MONTHS' SALARY IN LIEU OF NOTICE .  BUT IN THIS CASE THE PERIOD OF NOTICE OF ONE MONTH IS THE SUBJECT OF A CONTRACTUAL CLAUSE CONTAINED IN THE LETTER OF APPOINTMENT AND ACCEPTED BY THE APPLICANT .  IT IS PROPER THEREFORE TO ABIDE BY THIS TERM UNLESS THE COURT THINKS EITHER THAT IT IS PATENTLY UNJUST OR ONEROUS, OR THAT THE APPLICANT DID NOT FREELY CONSENT TO IT .  CONCERNING THE FIRST POINT, THE COURT DOES NOT CONSIDER THAT SUCH A PERIOD OF NOTICE IS PATENTLY UNJUST OR ONEROUS IN VIEW OF THE FACT THAT THE CONTRACT OF EMPLOYMENT IS ONE OF AN INDETERMINATE PERIOD, DETERMINABLE AT ANY TIME BY EITHER SIDE .  P . 33  CONCERNING THE SECOND POINT, THE APPLICANT HAS NOT EVEN ALLEGED THAT SHE UNDERWENT ANY MORAL PRESSURE IN CONSENTING TO A PERIOD OF NOTICE OF ONE MONTH .  THE APPLICANT'S CONCLUSIONS ON THIS POINT ARE, THEREFORE, NOT WELL FOUNDED .  

Decision on costs

THE APPLICANT HAS MADE OUT HER CASE AS FAR AS HER CONCLUSIONS ON THE PRINCIPLE POINTS IN DISPUTE ARE CONCERNED . UNDER ARTICLE 69 ( 2 ) OF THE RULES OF PROCEDURE, THE DEFENDANT SHOULD BE ORDERED TO PAY THE COSTS . 

Operative part

THE COURT ( FIRST CHAMBER )  HEREBY :  1 . RULES THAT THE PRESENT APPLICATION FOR COMPENSATION IS ADMISSIBLE;  2 . ORDERS THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENTARY ASSEMBLY TO PAY TO MRS LEDA DE BRUYN THE SUM OF 40 000 BELGIAN FRANCS;  3 . ORDERS THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENTARY ASSEMBLY TO PAY TO MRS LEDA DE BRUYN THE PRESCRIBED AMOUNT OF THE INSTALLATION ALLOWANCE;  4 . ORDERS THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENTARY ASSEMBLY TO PAY THE COSTS .