CELEX: 62018CN0230
Language: en
Date: 2018-03-30 00:00:00
Title: Case C-230/18: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Landesverwaltungsgericht Tirol (Austria) lodged on 30 March 2018 — PI

201806290181986332018/C 249/072302018CJC24920180716EN01ENINFO_JUDICIAL201803304521Case C-230/18: Request for a preliminary ruling from the Landesverwaltungsgericht Tirol (Austria) lodged on 30 March 2018 — PI
 ---documentbreak--- C2492018EN410120180330EN00074152Request for a preliminary ruling from the Landesverwaltungsgericht Tirol (Austria) lodged on 30 March 2018 — PI
   (Case C-230/18)2018/C 249/07Language of the case: German
      Referring court
   
   Landesverwaltungsgericht Tirol
   
      Parties to the main proceedings
   
   
      Complainant: PI
   
      Defendant authority: Landespolizeidirektion Tirol
   
      Questions referred
   
   
            1.
         
         
            Is Article 15(2) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, according to which every citizen of the Union has the freedom to seek employment, to work, to exercise the right of establishment and to provide services in any Member State, to be understood as precluding legislation of a Member State which, as in the case of Paragraph 19(3) of the Tiroler Landespolizeigesetz (Tyrol State police Law), LGBl. (State Law Gazette) No 60/1976, last amended by Law LGBl. No 56/2017, makes it possible for bodies of an authority, even without a prior administrative procedure, to be able to take measures of direct authority and coercive power, such as, in particular, the on-the-spot closure of a business establishment, without these merely being interim measures?
         
      
            2.
         
         
            From the perspective of equality of arms and the perspective of an effective legal remedy, is Article 47 of the Charter, potentially in conjunction with Articles 41 and 52 thereof, to be understood as precluding legislation of a Member State which, as laid down in Paragraph 19(3) and (4) of the Tyrol State police Law, provides for de facto measures of direct authority and coercive power, such as, in particular, closures of business establishments, without documentation and without providing confirmation to the person concerned?
         
      
            3.
         
         
            From the perspective of equality of arms, is Article 47 of the Charter, potentially in conjunction with Articles 41 and 52 thereof, to be understood as precluding legislation of a Member State which, for the purpose of annulling de facto measures of direct authority and coercive power, such as, in particular, closures of business establishments, requires a substantiated application to lift that closure from the person affected by those de facto measures, as laid down in Paragraph 19(3) and (4) of the Tyrol State police Law?
         
      
            4.
         
         
            From the perspective of an effective legal remedy, is Article 47 of the Charter, in conjunction with Article 52 thereof, to be understood as precluding legislation of a Member State which, as in the case of Paragraph 19(4) of the Tyrol State police Law, allows only for a right to apply for annulment that is restricted to specific conditions in the case of a de facto coercive measure in the form of the closure of a business establishment?