CELEX: 61995CO0051
Language: en
Date: 1997-02-05 00:00:00
Title: Order of the Court of 5 February 1997. # Unifruit Hellas EPE v Commission of the European Communities. # Appeal - Non-contractual liability - Special surveillance measures concerning imports of apples - Countervailing charge - Applied concurrently - Products in transit to the Community - Principle of the protection of legitimate expectations. # Case C-51/95 P.

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61995O0051

Order of the Court of 5 February 1997.  -  Unifruit Hellas EPE v Commission of the European Communities.  -  Appeal - Non-contractual liability - Special surveillance measures concerning imports of apples - Countervailing charge - Applied concurrently - Products in transit to the Community - Principle of the protection of legitimate expectations.  -  Case C-51/95 P.  

European Court reports 1997 Page I-00727

Summary
Keywords

1 Agriculture - Common organization of the markets - Fruit and vegetables - Imports from non-member countries - Introduction of a countervailing charge on imports of apples - Failure to take account of the special situation of products in transit - Principle of the protection of legitimate expectations - Breach - None(EEC-Chile Framework Agreement; Council Regulations No 1035/72, Art. 25(1), and No 2707/72, Art. 3(3); Commission Regulations No 384/93 and No 846/93) 2 Appeals - Pleas in law - Mere reference back to arguments put forward in another context - Inadmissible - Dismissed (EC Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 51; Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, Art. 112(1)(c))  

Summary

3 An importer of apples originating in Chile cannot claim that there has been a breach of the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations on the ground that he has had to pay a countervailing charge pursuant to Regulation No 846/93 in respect of goods in transit when that regulation was adopted even though the Commission maintained, as a special surveillance measure laid down by Regulation No 384/93, the requirement that importers must obtain an import licence subject to the lodging of a security which is forfeit if the importation does not take place.The proviso in Article 25(1) of Regulation No 1035/72, for `exceptional circumstances' in which a countervailing charge need not be introduced, refers only to situations in which it is not necessary to levy the charge, even though all the criteria for its levying are met, because the volume of produce offered at abnormally low prices is insignificant.  Nor does the introduction of special surveillance measures preclude the Commission from subsequently introducing the countervailing charge in issue, since the aims sought by the two measures are different but not necessarily contradictory, so that their concurrent application is not such as to affect traders in a disproportionate or intolerable manner, and must be envisaged by such traders. In addition, Article 3(3) of Regulation No 2707/72, which provides that protective measures are to take account of the special position of products in transit and the effect of which is to allow traders to rely on a legitimate expectation that in the absence of an overriding public interest their products already in transit to the Community will not be refused entry on arrival in Community territory, is not applicable by analogy to the introduction of a countervailing charge.  Such a charge is not comparable to a protective measure and the reference price system would be rendered completely ineffective if goods in transit were exempted from it. Finally, the Framework Agreement for Cooperation between the Community and Chile could not give the importer concerned any legitimate expectation, since it was in no way intended to amend the provisions of Regulation No 1035/72 concerning countervailing charges. 4 The combined effect of Article 51 of the Statute of the Court of Justice and Article 112(1)(c) of the Rules of Procedure is that an appeal must indicate precisely the contested elements of the judgment which the appellant seeks to have set aside, and also the legal arguments specifically advanced in support of the appeal. A plea in law in support of an appeal in which the appellant merely refers back to arguments put forward in another context must be dismissed as insufficiently substantiated and consequently clearly inadmissible.