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Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: # The President's Daily Brief
Secret 27 December 1967
---
# DAILY BRIEF 27 DECEMBER 1967
1. Communist China: Civil disorder and violence are spreading. In some areas, local conditions appear to be as bad as last summer. There are reports of increasing number of Guards using guns and machine weapons. The army seems to be doing little to prevent military outbreaks, only keeping the violence from spreading.
2. Communist China
3. Cambodia: The International Control Commission was unimpressed by its reported investigation of two American correspondents. Camp
---
Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C0597 4192
3.3(h)(2)
---
# TOP SECRET
4. Soviet Union
Recent glimpse satellite photography has shown a huge space booster expected to launch in 1968. The vehicle is about 320 feet tall and 50 feet in diameter, resembling the Saturn V. One of the two pads under construction at Tyuratam is likely for this vehicle.
The engineering pads suggest that the Soviets are close to completing the structural check of the launch vehicle before wasting time in readying these facilities.
5. Yemen
6. Aden
# TOP SECRET
---
Approved for Relea~e: 2019/0~/29 C0597 4192
Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C0597 4192
---
# Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C0597 4192
FOR THE PRESIDENT'S EYES ONLY
Special Daily Report on North Vietnam
3.5(c)
27 December 1967
Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C0597 4192
---
# Special Daily Report on North Vietnam for the President's Eyes
27 December 1967
# I. NOTES ON THE SITUATION
Giap Fails to Show: Preliminary news accounts of the attendance of the 23 December in Hanoi indicate that Defense Minister General Vo Nguyen Giap was not present. Defense Army Day is an occasion for which Giap is expected to attend.
---
# General
returning Giap's normally unusual. ported he not speaks, reported Giap and not on his only from absence the activities anniversary on has Soviet is attends, since but Hanoi he was celebrations in mid-November.
Communists. Hanoi Chary are still Contacts cautious on maintaining a The Vietnamese silence on President Johnson's contacts press interview comments about possible Hanoi Front between two the Thieu occasions government and the Liberation On recent have when authoritative on this itself. spokesmen and this Front avoided specific comment particular subject the occasion presented Hanoi in in issued which two propaganda President's attacks past weekend the five points were condemned general terms and his joint statement travels Thieu with in Australia and his pre-Christmas were described as tricks was and not peace frauds. The issue reluctance of Thieu-Front contacts discussed. The same between to openly discuss the issue of contacts the Liberation Front and the Thieu government was demonstrated French newspaper representative a Front in an interview for a
# NORTH VIETNAMESE REFLECTIONS OF US POLITICAL ATTITUDES ON THE WAR
Antiwar Protests Reported broadcast, Hanoi: by In a 26 December English number language Hanoi noted that without comment a of antiwar activities took
---
Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C05974192
place demonstration during Christmas well the week building US. UN press the in "stirring was reported as near as a conference December on 21 by Harvard Professor Hughes H. called Stuart for Hughes "immediate on the same end date, the in which Vietnam." an to bombings of North
Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C05974192
---
# Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C0597 4192 "THE PRESIDENTS DAILY BRIE[15602472].pdf" | {
"Who": "President, Soviet Union, North Vietnam",
"What": "Civil disorder in Communist China, Soviet Union's space booster, North Vietnam's Defense Minister attendance, Antiwar protests in North Vietnam",
"When": "27 December 1967",
"Where": ["China", "Cambodia", "Soviet Union", "Yemen", "Aden", "North Vietnam"],
"Security Clearance": "TOP SECRET"
} |
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: # CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Intelligence Information Cable
3 PAGES
PAGE 1
|STATE/INR|NMCC/MC|SECDEF|JCS|ARMY|NAVY|AIR|CIA/NMCC|NIC|NSA|SOO|CNS|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|STATE/INR|NMCC/MC|SECDEF|JCS|ARMY|NAVY|AIR|CIA/NMCC|NIC|NSA|SOO|CNS|
|ghia réigkteriaé 794 the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.| | | | | | | | | | | |
NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.
THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT.
|COUNTRY|BULGARIA/VIETNAM|
|---|---|
|DATE|LATE-MARCH 1968|
SUBJECT: BULGARIAN REACTION TO THE WAR IN VIETNAM
ACQ T
SOURCE - 3.3(h)(2)
IN BULGARIA TODAY THERE IS MUCH TALK ABOUT THE WAR IN VIETNAM BY THE "MAN ON THE STREET." THE CONFLICT IS ALSO A FREQUENT TOPIC OF CONVERSATION AMONG A LARGE NUMBER OF WRITERS AND INTELLECTUALS SUCH AS PAVEL VEZHNOV AND PETUR NEZNAKOMOV OF STURSHEL; LUDMIL STOYANOV, THE POET LAMAR, EMIL MANOV AND ORLIN VASILEV.
THERE IS A STRONG GENERAL FEELING AGAINST THE VIETCONG TET OFFENSIVE AS STUPID BLOODLETTING WHICH KILLED MANY PEOPLE AND ACHIEVED NO CONCRETE RESULTS FOR NORTH VIETNAM.
---
# ALTHOUGH IN FACT THE BULGARIAN MATERIAL CONTRIBUTION TO THE NORTH VIETNAM WAR EFFORT IS NOT LARGE, MANY BULGARIANS THINK IT IS
RESPONSIBLE FOR THE RECENT SEVERE PRICE INCREASES. THEY BELIEVE THAT BULGARIA HAS NO BUSINESS BEING INVOLVED IN THIS WAR AND THAT THE AMERICANS ARE JUSTIFIED IN DEFENDING SOUTH VIETNAM AGAINST AGGRESSION FROM THE NORTH. THEY ACCEPT THE PREMISE THAT SOUTH VIETNAM IS A CLIENT STATE OF THE UNITED STATES AND THEY DO NOT MORALIZE ABOUT IT. BULGARIA IS ESSENTIALLY A LAND OF PEASANTS AND MOST OF THESE PEOPLE TRANSLATE A STRONG SENSE OF VALUE OF LAND INTO SIMPLE TERMS OF DEFENSE OF THE TERRITORY. THUS, THE AMERICANS HAVE EVERY RIGHT TO FIGHT TO HOLD THE LAND AGAINST INCURSIONS FROM THE NORTH.
BULGARIAN WRITERS DO NOT ACCEPT THE CONCEPT OF "WAR OF LIBERATION" AND ONLY WISH FOR THE WAR IN VIETNAM TO BE FINISHED. THEY DO NOT THINK NORTH VIETNAM WILL WIN AND THEY SEE A LONG FRUITLESS STRUGGLE AHEAD. ALTHOUGH NOT NECESSARILY CONNECTED WITH THE VIETNAMESE WAR, THE MORALE OF NEW ARMY CONSCRIPTS IS POOR AND IN THE PAST THREE MONTHS NEW HARSH DISCIPLINARY MEASURES HAVE BEEN PUT INTO EFFECT TO QUELL THE RESTLESSNESS AND INCIPIENT ECOLOGISM IN THE BARRACKS.
---
THE BULGARIAN AUTHORITIES HAVE THE SITUATION WELL IN HAND AND THAT THERE IS LITTLE LIKELIHOOD OF SERIOUS DISTURBANCES
1. ID.ISSEM: NONE BULGARIAN_REACTION_TO_THE[15617765].pdf | {
"Who": "Central Intelligence Agency",
"What": "Bulgarian reaction to the war in Vietnam",
"When": "Late-March 1968",
"Where": ["Bulgaria", "Vietnam"],
"Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL"
} |
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C06786616 c"L<’"_~ "‘~;.‘
I s.5(¢)
xéx
CQXXTRAL ‘I~31\r2I0‘<T U Y- °$T1nEs orN‘\€$\° DIRECTORATE OF MEMORANDUM INTELLIGENCE The Situation in w- —'Eop—Secre=t—N 126 ll February 1968 s.5(¢)
Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C06786616
---
# Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C06786616
Information 1968 as of 1200 ll February
# HIGHLIGHTS
Around cities and towns easing of enemy pressure. There has been an increase in some areas, but new fighting has broken out in the delta. Fighting continues. Developments in South Vietnam: Military in areas near Saigon and the. The situation in the Mekong Delta (Paras. 1-3).
Four corps areas is summarized (Paras. 4-15).
# Political Developments in South Vietnam:
Internal bickering and red of the task force set up ing the efficient operation tape appears to be hampering to handle civilian problems (Paras. 1—3). The militant Buddhists have sent Ambassador Bunker an insulting letter accusing the US of firing indiscriminantly on the An Quang Pagoda (Paras. 4-6).
# North Vietnamese Military Developments:
The North Vietnamese moved their IL-28 bombers Phuc Yen Airfield to Gia Lam Airfield and orbit them near the DRV/Chinese border to avoid damage from aircraft have been detected making flights to US air strikes (Para. 1). Additional transport and could have gone on into South Vietnam Vinh (Para 2).
# Other Communist Military Developments:
There is nothing of significance to report.
# Communist Political Developments:
Liberation Front officials abroad continue to maximize their publicity opportunities. The Front man in Phnom Penh discusses a possible coalition government (Paras 1-3). In Djakarta, Communist spokesmen emphasize the political successes of the Tet offensive (Paras. talk offer (Para. 6). in Hanoi endorses Trinh's will-5) The Front man Foreign Communist support (Para. 7).
---
# Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C06786616
I. THE MILITARY SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM
Around cities and towns:
There has been in some areas of pe country an easing of enemy pressure during pe weekend, alpough pe delta has been pe scene of new attacks. Soup of Da Nang appear to be forces concentrated. Elements of pe Communist wipdrawing to pe soupwest, but indications of imminent enemy activity near Dak To continue. The situation at Khe Sanh, Hue, and Da Lat has undergone no significant change in pe past 48 hours.
There are persistent low-level reports of Viet against Saigon to launch "large-scale attacks". Cong intentions some time before 13 February. The Viet Cong 5p and 9p divisions or pe NVA-Some of pese reports allege pat elements of Divisions-located norp of pe capital wipin 7p striking distance-will be engaged in or support such attacks.
Bien Hoa Air Base was pe target of a 122-mm. rocket attack on pe night of 10 February, in which one American was killed, 60 wounded, and aircraft were destroyed or damaged. The same evening, a US battalion had a sharp engagement wip a Communist force near Tan Son Nhut Air Base which resulted in 165 enemy killed. A fire started by Communist rockets in pat area of a bunker containing pe Communists 105-mm. ammunition. In pe delta of Bac Lieu and Kien Giang provinces, new activity in Kien Phong and Phong-Dinh provinces has increased.
Khe Sanh received sporadic mortar attacks proughout 10 February and a heavy mortar and rocket barrage around noon on 11 February, but shelling had become sporadic by early afternoon. The Lao battalion in pe area is being evacuated to Da Nang, and preparations are being made to ferry it back to Laos.
11 February 1968
---
# Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C06786616
1 T; s.5(¢)
'5. \ has reflected 3.3(h)(2) the shipment of large quantities-of-heavy caliber ammunition—-up to 152-mm.¥eto points just north of the DMZ within the past week. \ 3jflhX2)
Eg:;::]l8 on 8 February. .There are also indications- e iveredtruckloads of 130-mm. ammunition were being in\ ithat-at-least one mak-bat— 3XXhX2) talion of preparations suggest that the Tri Province, Messages of ll February in coastal Quang lst Battalion Viet River into-Trieu active. ing attackthe North Vietnamese 8l3th Regiment is of the regiment.may be preparing to where.other.Phong District,cross the Cua enemy units have been.
6. In Hue, newly reinforced South Vietnamese- troopsgare.continuing their efforts to dislodge enemy forces-from the citadel area. The Communists still hold the Imperial Palace, a portion along the citadel's southwest wall, and a section immediately east of the citadel.South of the Perfume River, where US MarinesSnipers are still prevalent throughout the_ had city.gained control earlier, widespread.looting is becoming a major problem.
II Corps
7. There have been no major changes in the situaw tion-throughout-II Corps, despite a continued-threat to- the Dak To area. In Da Lat the Communists still control a hamlet on the western outskirts of the city.. In Darlac Province, elements of the NVA 33rd Regiment are still believed to be located about 20 kilometers southeast of Ban-Me Thuot.
Saigon and III Corps
8. In addition to the major skirmish north-north-. west of Saigon and the harassment.at Tan-Son Nhut Air Base, sporadic smallescale fire fights-persisted in the Cholon section of the capital.where ARVN troops are still engaged in clearing efforts.
ll February 1968
I-2 s.5(¢)
8-5<c> " Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C06786616
---
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9. Preliminary interrogation of a field commander and political officer from a Viet Cong unit which participated in the recent attacks on Saigon has revealed additional information on enemy plans, the prisoners, the seize and the cost. The main mission of the two-company strike force near Saigon was to hold Chi Hoa prison. They were absolutely forbidden to retreat and were told that if the attack on the prison failed, they would be executed. The field commander near Saigon stated that a total of 30 battalions were in or around Saigon with one to two divisions in reserve and artillery units to come later. The political officer claimed that there were some 25 battalions of artillery in the area, and that Divisions 5, 7, and 9 were programmed for reserve attack, the "second to provide support" phase of forces.
10. Elements of the Viet Cong 5th and 9th Light Infantry divisions and the NVA 7th Division continue to be located within striking distance of the capital.
IV Corps
11. Communist actions in the delta during the past few days have emphasized continued attacks by fire against ground assaults against lightly interspersed provincial and district towns, defended rural outposts. The overall intensity of ground attacks has declined sharply, although several Viet Cong units in IV Corps remain deployed in close proximity to heavily populated areas. Bac Lieu city was attacked on 10 February by a Viet Cong force within the town. Some of the attackers have attempted to exfiltrate, using women and children as shields. Thirty-three persons were killed or wounded, and a large portion of the city has been destroyed by fire.
11 February 1968
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---
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Province, came under rocket attack of Kien Giang. Rach Gia, the capital, came under attack during the early morning hours of 11-February. The 30-minute bombardment resulted in 19 friendly casualties and total destruction to the CORDS building and the city. There apparently was no follow-up ground attack and it is now reported quiet.
An estimated 500-man Viet Cong force has surrounded Cao Lanh, the capital of Kien Phong Province. This strike force, supported by some 400 laborers, has constructed bunker complexes 1,000 to 1,500 meters from the city proper. Due to eroding security in the rural areas, all Revolutionary Development teams in Kien Phong have been withdrawn from their hamlets and pulled into the capital or district towns.
The Headquarters of Military Region (MR) 3, a major Viet Cong command authority, has made an unprecedented move. On 8 February, Headquarters, MR 3, was identified outside its normal operating area for the first time since July 1963, some 50 miles to the southwest. The relocation of this headquarters into Phong Dinh Province, coupled with the recent identification of three Viet Cong main force battalions in the immediate area of Can Tho, may portend renewed enemy offensive activity in and around the provincial capital.
ll February 1968
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---
# POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN SOUTH VIETNAM
1. The task force established to cope with Vietthe- massive problems arising in the aftermath of the Cong Tet offensive is apparently running into serious difficulty tape,/because of internal bickering and bureaucratic red. In a frustration, on the task General Nguyen Duc Thang, Vice President Ky's deputy was resigning. He has declared on 9 February that he meetings. force, failed to appear for subsequent.
2. Many of the cabinet members on the task force, most notably the ministers of health and refugees, have been unable or unwilling to work together and insist on following normal ministerial procedures. The result is that needed services are not being provided for the people in a timely and efficient manner.
3. Vice President Ky urged to have the constitution amended so that he could be appointed prime minister. Several Lower House deputies, some senators, Ky's own advisers, and General Thang have all reportedly approached Ky with the proposition. Ky has apparently put them all off, at least so that he is doing his best to improve Prime Minister Loc's image and to include him in the task force's plans and activities.
4. The militant Buddhists of An Quang Pagoda have sent Ambassador Bunker an insulting letter accusing the US of attacking the pagoda "both militarily and politically." An Quang director, Thich Thien Hoa, charged that the US was careless in defending Saigon, attacked the population indiscriminately and fired on the pagoda even though there were no Communists inside.
Militant Buddhists Attack Alleged US Actions
Date: 11 February 1968
---
Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C06786616
5. The Americans were charged also with slandering of America that the Viet Cong the Buddhist church-by were in the pagoda. broadcasting over Voice The letter concluded with a "request" that the ambassador order a halt to the "calumny" and with charge that the US alone is responsible for the deteriorating relations between the Americans and the Buddhist church. during the 1 February Pagoda suffered little damage. The An Quang attack to rout the Viet Cong force entrenched there. No American troops joined in the attack, except possibly as advisers to the Vietnamese Rangers who carried it out. as the one militant Buddhists have stood out thus far. The significant group which has not denounced the Viet Cong attacks and has not voiced a "modicum of support for the government.
11 February 1968
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---
# NORTH VIETNAMESE MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS
In an effort to protect their IL-28 bombers from US bombing raids, the North Vietnamese moved the planes on 9 February from Phuc Yen to Hanoi/Gia Lam. This airfield is Hanoi's international air terminal and has not yet been struck. On at least four occasions since their transfer to Gia Lam, the IL-28s left the airspace over the field and circled in while US strike aircraft were in the Hanoi area.
At least four transport aircraft completed a Hanoi to Vinh flight during the February. The purpose of the flights is not yet known, but the aircraft could have continued on of late afternoon of 11 into northern South Vietnam.
Date: 11 February 1968
---
# Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C06786616
IV. OTHER COMMUNIST MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS
1. There is noping of significance to report
ll February 1968
---
# COMMUNIST POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
Liberation Front officials abroad are continuing to make every effort to be seen and heard. Twice last week, Nguyen Van Hieu, the most authoritative Front's representative in Phnom Penh and one of its representative spokesmen on foreign affairs, discussed Viet Cong plans for a coalition government. Radio propaganda and prisoners captured in the Tet offensive have indicated that the Front intends to establish unilaterally a coalition government in opposition to Saigon; Nguyen Van Hieu, however, is the first responsible Front official to comment publicly on this issue.
In an apparent effort to drum up some support for such a government (if it should ever be established), Hieu gave a press conference on 8 February, and on the 9th reportedly held a special briefing for neutral diplomats in the Cambodian capital.
According to Wilfred Burchette, who the Front planned to establish a coalition government consultation with South Vietnamese Government after to replace the "other revolutionary forces." According to a Burmese diplomat who attended the briefing on 9 February, same thing. Hieu told his diplomatic colleagues virtually the intended to convene a national conference of the "peace and democracy forces for the purpose of forming a provisional government" and would hold negotiations with the US for a cease-fire and the withdrawal of US troops. Hieu also told the diplomats that the Front would seek "recognition and respect for the territorial integrity of Vietnam from the world and especially from Cambodia, Laos, India, Burma, Ceylon, Pakistan, and Japan."
At home, the Communists are taking the same possible coalition government and are continuing to pump up the "democratic and peace alliances.
11 February 1968
---
# Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C06786616
"119-P*SETCiI§"? y 3-5
W ) 35/\/\ OO\/\/
\
The Front central Committee-issued a statement on February, and the Tri-Thien-Hue Liberation Front issued a similar statement on the 5th, offering to hold discussions with the new peace alliances out-"to work out the best solution for getting the US of Vietnam and restoring peace." Both statements dramatize the intent of the new peace alliances to "set up a government of the people."
Communist officials in Djakarta also discussed Viet Cong intentions on several occasions in recent days in private forums. Prior to the Tet offensive in late January, the office told Indonesian Government officials that last attended a Front central committee meeting and had come away a rare admission of past optimism on the war. In with renewed confidence difficulties, the official admitted that US forces had had some success in the past two "dry seasons" (the winters of 65-66 and 66-67). He boasted that Communist units how had new weaponry and much greater experience and the US would not do so well this year. The Viet Cong intended to strike "several blows" this year, he said.
In two conversations in early February (after Vietnamese Embassy denied current press speculation the opening of the Tet offensive), lower North officials of both the Front mission and the ranking of Viet-Khe Sanh was to be a second Dien Bien Phu. There would be no When asked what could be considered a large-scale attack on Khe Sanh "now," they said. battle in the current military campaign, decisive Nhut Airfield. the two officials pointed to the fight at Tan Sonbe-"They boasted that communications between the field and Saigon were broken and that international civil traffic had been disrupted. The Front man claimed that the Communists intended a "long fight against this base." Both officials emphasized the political significance of the Tet attacks. They said that one of the major objectives of the first phase of the fighting was to increase
ll February 1968
---
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the Front's political support and that this aim was as important as any military results. In these post-Tet conversations
Q:
Front Endorses Trinh Statement
6. In Hanoi this weekend, the Front spokesman issued an unequivocal endorsement of the recent North Vietnamese offer to talk with the US in exchange for a bombing cessation. on this island in general has avoided comment Front propaganda, but on 9 February Front representative Nguyen Van Tien, in an interview with a Hungarian (the ist, said the Front "entirely agrees with journal- North Vietnamese foreign minister's) statement and fully supports its contents.". The Front representative also used the interview to boast that "revolutionary forces" controlled three out of eight districts in Saigon. The Viet Cong, he said, intended to mobilize the young people of towns and villages and arm them to help defeat any possible American "counterattack."
Foreign Communist Support
7. In Moscow and Prague, the Front representatives were received by prominent Communist party tion, issued a special Tass the North Vietnamese leaders amid much publicity statement supporting The Soviets, in addition the Viet Cong offensive and offer to talk. They are also staging mass rallies.
ll February 1968 THE_SITUATION_IN_VIETNAM[15617786].pdf | {
"Who": "Directorate of Intelligence",
"What": "Military situation updates in South Vietnam and North Vietnamese military developments",
"When": "11 February 1968",
"Where": ["South Vietnam", "Mekong Delta", "Saigon", "Hue", "Da Nang", "Phuc Yen Airfield", "Hanoi", "Gia Lam Airfield", "DMZ", "Da Lat", "Ban Me Thuot", "Can Tho", "Kien Phong Province", "Phong Dinh Province"],
"Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL"
} |
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: Intelligence Information Cable
Central Intelligence Agency
Intelligence Information Cable
Page 1 of 14 Pages
This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
|DATE|13 February 1968|
|---|---|
|COUNTRY|SOUTH VIETNAM|
|COVERAGE OF THE SOURCE|VIETNAM, SAIGON 7 FEBRUARY 1968 - 9 FEBRUARY 1968|
SOURCE
The following chronology of events was posted at the Combined Security Committee as the events were reported. Subsequent reporting indicated that a few of these entries contained some inaccuracies. The chronology is presented, however, since it gives a good picture of how the VC attack on Saigon-Gia Dinh developed during the period covered.
3 FEB
0000H - THE CURFEW IS LIFTED FROM DSPMH TO 0600H TODAY IN SAIGON AREA. IT IS ONLY IN EFFECT FROM THE 1ST PRECINCT TO THE 5TH PRECINCT, EXCEPT THE 9TH PRECINCT AND GIA DINH AREA. VEHICLES AND BICYCLES ARE NOT ALLOWED MOVING ON THE STREETS.
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---
Approved for Release 2019/04/17 C06786606.
PAGE 1 OF 54 PAGES
THE VC ARE CONCENTRATING AT WAREHOUSES LOCATED AT COORDINATES XS 790369 AND XS 789859, ALONG THE COC CANAL
REQUEST AIRSTRIKES TO BE DIRECTED ON THESE COORDINATES.
FRIENDLY FORCES REMOVED. BODIES OF THREE VN DEAD POLICEMEN AND ONE NEWS REPORTER ON LY THAI TO STREET
DEAD CIVILIANS AND VC ARE REMOVED BY THE SAIGON FIRE BRIGADE.
A VN RANGER UNIT IS ORDERED TO CROSS THE NHI THIE DUONG BRIDGE /8TH PRECINCT/ TO CLEAR A VC MACHINE GUN CELL.
A VC PLATOON IS APPEARING AT THE NGUYEN VAN TO POLICE STATION /5TH PRECINCT/.
MSS/CMD INFORMED THAT APPROXIMATELY 50 VC FULLY ARMED ARE APPEARING AT A ROW OF TEN HOUSES NO 322 ON SU VANS HANH STREET /5TH PRECINCT/.
REQUEST TO CROSSCHECK THIS INFORMATION REPORTED BY LOCAL POPULATION.
AN ARVN JEEP BEARING PLATE NO. 123415 WAS SEIZED BY THE VC. IN THE VICINITY OF NO. 30 PETRUS KY STREET /5TH PRECINCT/.
THO T ARMED VC ARE APPEARING AT HOUSE NO 194 TU DUC STREET /1ST PRECINCT/.
A NUMBER OF VC ARE PENETRATING INTO THE CHILDREN'S HOSPITAL LOCATED AT THE CORNER OF SU VAN HANH AND LY THAI O STREETS.
Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C06786606.
---
# PHOTOGRAPHIC DISSEMINATION
|1|5TH PRECINCT|SEVERAL NFOICS NORVING THERE ESCAPED|
|---|---|---|
|IGSOH|FEARFULLY| |
|THE 5D PRECINCT POLICE APPREHENDED TWO VC AT FY VIEN TU|PAGODA LOCATED at THE conwzn or PHAN nlwd PHUNG AND RAN ce|STREETS /SD PRECINCT/|
|TEN SUSPECTS ARE FPOTTED ENTERING A CATHOLIC cunacn LOCAFFO| |AT NO. as KY DONG sgnzsr /so PRECINCT/..|
|IT IS CONFIRMED THAT THE ARUN VEHICLE STOLEN "Y THERVC THIS|AFTERNOON IS AN AWRULANCE JEEP BEARING LICEN§E PLATE NO‘~.|l934I5.|
|vc WEAPONS ARE RFPCQTLDLY ear ur AT TH? mac n1wn cu! CEMETERN|FACING rue u.s. AMBASSADOR'S RESIDENCE;| |
|A VC GROUP IS APPEARING AT NO. 16/1 HOANG DIEU STREET /TAN| |BINH DISTRICT/.|
|vc FIRED APPROXIOUR ROUNDS or B-40 ROCKETS INTO THE srn|PRECINCT PoL1gE srnrxou.| |
|A RICE WAREHOUSE LOCATEQ,ON LE OUANG LIEM OUAY /6TH§ERECINCT/| |was uuosn vc PRESSURE.|
|A VC BATTALION IS REPORTEQLY APPEARING IN THE VICINITY OF A ROKFV|ANMO DUMP AT COORDINATES XS 792884 IN THE 6TH PRECINCT.|““i§§§§E?%$§§§§&§|
---
|HE|flO9flOH|A NIINRER OF VC APPEAR ON THE ROOF OF THE RIHH TAY ALCOHOL PLANT LOCATED ON LE OUANQ LIEM OUAY /6TH PPECINCT/‘EACING|
|---|---|---|
| |093BH|THREE VC APPEAR AT THE BINH TIEN BRIDGE /6TH PRECINCT/|
| |OSSSH|THE VC /STRENGTH UNKNOWN/ CONCENTRATED IN THE VINH 'KHANH MOVIE THEATER LOCATED ON LE QUANG LIEM OUAY /6TH PRECINCTI APPROX. 70 METERS FROM|
| |lOSAH|APPROX. ONE VC COMPANY WAS SPOTTED AT THE REAR OF THE BINH TAY ALCOHOL PLANT LOCATED ON LE OUANG LIEM QUAY /GT1] PRECINCT /.|
| |lO55H|A VN RANGER UNIT CLASHED WITH THE VC AT THE BINH TAY ALCOHOL PLANT /sTH PRECINCT/|
| |l>58H|THE 6TH PRECINCT POLICE REQUESTED THAT REINFORCEMENTS BE PROVIDED TO NGUYEN VAN TO POLICE SUB-STATION?|
| |lll5H|A VN RANGER UNIT OPERATING AT THE BINH TAY ALCOHoL PLANT AsHEo|
| |I25 DH|A POLICE JEEP BEARING LICENSE PLATE Ho. vA 9469, PAINTED LIGHT BROWN, WAS STOLEN BY THE VCQ|
---
Tia
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PAGE 5 OF 14 PAGES
ABOUT 15 VC WERE SPOTTED AT THE VUNG BOT ALLEY
TRAN NHAN TON STREET /5TH PRECINCT/, BETWEEN HUNTINGTON AND VINH VIEN STREETS.
SNIPER FIRED ON THE 5TH PRECINCT POLICE FORCE THAT WAS OPERATING ON SU VAN HANH AND HUNG HANA STREETS, AT VUON LOI WARD /5TH PCT/.
THE VC ATTACKED AN ARVN JEEP MOVING ON BINH TIEN HETNSE /6TH
IT WAS REPORTED THAT VC RETURNEES WHO WERE STATIONED AT A RETURNEES' CENTER LOCATED AT THE CORNER OF TRAN NHAN TON AND VINH VIEN STREETS /5TH PRECINCT/, HAVE LEFT THEIR CENTER.
LOCAL PEOPLE DISCLOSED THAT APPROXIMATELY 15 VC WEARING VARIOUS CLOTHES, FULLY ARMED, WERE SPOTTED CONGREGATING IN CAY XOAI MARKET LOCATED ON THE ROAD LINKING TRUNG MILITARY TRAINING CENTER AND SAIGON.
TONIGHT A COMPANY-SIZED VC UNIT WOULD PROBABLY CONDUCT AN ATTACK ON A FRIENDLY UNIT STATIONED AT COORD. XS 866958.
---
PAGE 6 OF 14 PAGES
THE VC WILL ALSO SHELL THE TAN SON NHUT AIRBASE AS WELL AS THE SENSITIVE INSTALLATIONS LOCATED IN SAIGON CITY;
IT IS KNOWN THAT THERE ARE TWO PAGODAS WHERE THE VC ARE REPORTEDLY HIDING—
1. THICH CA TU PAGODA LOCATED ON TRAN HUNG DAO STREET
2. PHAP VAW PAGODA LOCATED ON TRUONG MINH GIANG STREET
IN THE 7TH PRECINCT.
THE VC, USING A MEGAPHONE, APPEALED TO THE OWNER OF BINH TAY ALCOHOL PLANT IN THE 7TH PRECINCT TO LET THEM IN.
AN ESTIMATED 40 VC HAVE PENETRATED INTO THE STORAGE AREA OF THE SAIGON HARBOR LOCATED IN THE TRIANGULAR AREA COVERING LY THAI TO PETRUS KY AND HUNG VUONG STREETS (5TH PRECINCT). SEVEN HARBOR PERSONNEL ON DUTY HAVE FLED.
THE VC HAVE CUT BARBED WIRE AND BROKEN INTO HOUSE NO. 341-
THE PETRUS KY STREET (5TH PRECINCT).
HOUSES IN THE VICINITY OF NGUYEN VAN TO POLICE SUB-STATION (6TH PCT) HAVE BEEN SET ON FIRE BY THE VC.
-
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---
|25OH|TEN U/I PERSONS, WEARING BLACK PAJAMAS, HAVE REPORTEDLY MOVED INTO AN AREA COVERING NGUYEN CANH CHAN, CHUONG DUONG, PHAT DIEM AND TRAN HUNG DAO STREETS, 2D PRECINCT.|
|---|---|
|ZSASH|A NUMBER OF U/I PERSONS HAVE APPEARED AT A VACANT HOUSE NO "KI" LOAN" 152VC BUI THI XUAN STREET /2D PRECINCT/. A SIGN FACTORY IS IN FRONT OF THE HOUSE;|
|ZSASH|A NUMBER OF VC HAVE REPORTEDLY APPEARED IN AN AREA COVERING PHAN DINH PHUNG, NGUYEN THIEN THUAT, PHAN THANH GIAN AND LY MU TO STREETS.|
|OODSH|OUR FRIENDLY FORCES HAVE EXCHANGED FIRE WITH THE VC IN THE ABOVE RECTANGULAR AREA;|
|DO25H|A VC PLATOON HAS REPORTEDLY MOVED FROM PHU LAM AREA TOWARD SAIGON, PASSING BY LO SIEU HANLET /6TH PRECINCT/;|
|fl93mH|A COMPANY-SIZED VC UNIT HAS INFILTRATED INTO HOUSES LOCATED AT THE REAR OF TRAN VAN CHAU POLICE SUB-STATION /8TH PRECINCT/, AND TWO OR THREE OF THEM WERE KILLED BY THE POLICE;|
|O325H|THE ENEMY HAVE CONDUCTED AN INTENSIVE GROUND ATTACK ON TRAN VAN; CRIM POLICE SUB-STATION.|
|O425H|THE VC HAVE ATTACKED A RF GUARD POST LOCATED AT NHI THIEN DUONG.|
---
# A
Approved for Release: 2019/04/17
.T.
;‘.itT
V awn‘-unnani 7'
H-»-_____ _____-_-____‘_‘;~— V
rgnu ~ 1094-; -; u-,1 u-mvwu-\ 15-00 |,n||l|'H.
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PAGE H OF ]4PAGES
1- . (¢;,,.=.,¢|¢-.,m~¢n conrxn (dI'w"| r',r"1I_'~'"f_"_ Wrnmwm,.,--_J. flu W-
{'71- i
kl .4 BRIDGF IN TTH rwscwwcf.
04 3 am THE TRAN VAN CHAU POLICE $UR~STATION HAS PARTLY COLLAPFED,
THE VC HAVE STAYED CLOSE TO THE FENCEQQE
THE VC HAVE ATTAC HE KIEU cows mun! POLICE SUP-QTATION.
THE POLICE JEEP as s LICENSE PLATE no cs 1-12, Enurékzn
JITH A MACHINE nun s ssxzsn av THE vc AT wrap AN aprons
an PHAH THE HIEN H PRECINCT/:
GTOEH REQUEST FRIENDLY IRE RE DIRECTED AT CODRD. Y? 77535.
GTIOH SAIGON HARBOR POLI MAKING A SEARCH OF THE STORAGE
AREA LOCATFD at Tna’q‘HNER or PETRUS KY AND uus vuoub srnesrs
/5TH PRECINCT/.
B722H REQUEST FRIENDLY ARTY RE DIRECTED AT CDORD. YS 777R37.
lO27H VN POLICE FORCES ARRESTED ONE SUSPECT WHO CROFSED THE
HUNG THAP TU AND NGUYEN THIEN THUAT INTERFECTION
/SD PRECINCT/.
ABOUT 260 VC REPORTEDLY INFILTRATED INTO THE VICINITY OF PHU
THO HIPPODROME /5TH PRECINCT/.
l225H THE VC ARE RECEIVING AMMUNITION AT THE ESSO GAS STATION LOCATED
AT THE conusn or HAI an rnuowc gnu TRAN cao van STREETS
/asr
s/qor‘cour1RmEn/.
ponrzns(dmem controla) rm onmmm $'59 y7
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---
# for Réiease: 2019/04/17 006786606 T*M’TI:_E
|VIN|um i-mymua|
|---|---|
|-~00|u-nmww J;|
|*#fi$HP| |
4
3.5(c)
PAGE 9 or 1/1PAGES
0
'u
-'~_ (Classification)
CONFIl11TI*Tjdlsarm matron)
mrmmwnmnu
1
1325H ABOUT FIVE TO TEN VC ARE SIGHTED AT THE CORNER OF NHAN' YI AND HUNG VUONG STREETS /5TH PRECINCT/2
1330? THE VC ARE ESCAPING FROM NGUYEN THIEN THUAT STRFET TOWARD A
A'
THE ROKFV BILLET LOCATED ON PHAN THANH GIAN STREET /3D PCT/.
15 mm A SIZEABLE vc UNIT 1s REPORTEDLY smzurznmc "AT THE QUANG noxc
CEMETERY LOCATE‘) IN THE VICINITY or PHI! mo RACE “Timex mm PCT/.
TWO UC COMPANIES HAVE FEPOHTEDLY PENETRATED INTO THE
ORPHANF' HOUSE LOCATED IN THE VICINITY OF CONG HOD MILITARYvI
OHOSPITAL IN 5Q VAP DISTRICT /CIA DINH PQOU./ TO GET FOOD.
AN ARMED VC MNIT /QTPENGTH UNFNOWN/ I9 REPORTEDLY LOCATED IN
THE VICINITY OF THE BINH LOI BRIDGE ON NATIONAL HOBO “O E THU DUC DISTRICT /CIA DINH PROVINCE/.
AN ESTIMATED gflm ADMED vc FROM BLOCK no 5, cav PAT wano, wawv E5
REPORTEDLY movzo ALONG A cwzsx TO srnriow ruimsaybzs or fitncw W.I
no 5 or THE same wnno /3TH PRECINCT/.
LAST NIGHT , 4 Fan Qq. Tvn vc COMPANIEF, FWJ.Y nwmxn, STA?T1FG Q
FROM BINH TIEN wano, arrncvso THE ncuvam van TO POLICE sup- 4’-,11,1-
STATION /6TH PRECINCT/.
ANOTHER VC PLATOON ARMED WITH THREE AUTOMATIC RIFLES HAVE REPORTEDLY‘PENETRATED INTO DO SIEU HARD-0' l 3
IN THE VICINITY OF CAY MAI ARVN MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SCHOOL /srn PRECINCT/.
O I’
__LCJl4F¥*i-B11T1FI A L IKJFORRIONIMESEM
(clanvlflcallorqy ,_Jdl:.Iem controls)
---
TWO VC $~'T)!!4!DS ARE i'§I!‘~.~.‘iTF;D APPE.A"I‘JG AT THE HONC LAC HIGH SCHOOL OPPOSITE THE NATIONAL ADf.ZI,'\'IS'l'iM'l‘IOT\' l.\S'l'lTU'l'l-.' L()(lA'I'T-J)
ON TRAN ""!OC TO‘\N STREET}/3D PRECINCT/. IT IS REPORTED THAT THE VC HAVE CONCEALED THEIR WEAPONS AT LAN THY NGHIA PAGOUA LOCATED AT ALLEYWAY NO I3 TRUONGE MINH GIANG STREET SD PRECINCT/z. AN ESTIMATED l,flflfl VC HAVE APPEARED AT THE HIEP AN BRIDGE IN THE VICINITY OF TRAN VAN CHAU POLICE SUB-STATION IN AN ATTEMPT TO ACONDUCT AN ATTACK ON THE 8TH PRECINCT POLICE STATION TONIGHT.
TOYOTA SEDAN, LICENSE PLATE EH 3533, IS BEING USED TO TRANSPORT VC WEAPONS. IT HAS FREQUENTLY MOVED AROUND MINH MANG, PHAN THANH GIAN, FHA" OINH PHUNG STREETS /SD AND 5TH PRECINCTS/.
THE TRAN VAN CHAU POLICE SUB-STATION HAS BEEN OVERRUN BY THE VC. SUBSEQUENTLY THE VC ARE CROSSING THE RIVER TO ATTACN THE 8TH PRECINCT POLICE STATION. NOW THE 5TH PRECINCT POLICE ARE EXCHANGING FIRE WITH THE VC.
THE 8TH PRECINCT POLICE STATION HAS BEEN SET ON FIRE BY THE VC. POLICEMEN_NHQ ARE STATIONED THERE HAVE MOVED TO THE BRIGADE STATION OPPOSITE IT.
Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 CO6786606
---
L-_\ 7
It
_ c o1vs~1 n 2 n T xanxsssu °
if "1
|7_| L (dlurm rormnli) M
| _.
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~.,
Ԥ_5'i' {f s FEB 1
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\“‘ UBISH AN ESTIMATFD sm vc HAVE REPORTEDLY novzo FRON "INH LAY
Ԥ'_ i
..
1,,139-. a
-3--',_ I
ml MARKET PLACE T0 CAY MAI MILITAPY INTELLIGENCE §CHOOL LOCATED
ow PHAM oxnu HO §TREET /srn PRECINCT/6 "
THE VC HAVE REPORTEDLY APPEARED ON TONG DOC PHUONG STREET AND
AT CHA TAM CATHOLIC cnuncn LOCATED AT THE srn PRECINCT.
As wazsn
AN ESTIMATED |@w vc HAVE(REPORTEDLY movzo rnom CAY MAI INF.
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE QCHOOL TOWARD SAIGON:
THE CHOLON POWER PLANT LOCATED ON TAN HUNG STREET /5TH PRECINCT/
WAS DAMAGED BY AN EXPLOSION OF UNKNOWN LYPE AND A NUMBEROOFUV J
wonxsns on uurv wens wouwosn.
THE VC ARE CONDUCTING A GROUND ATTACK ON BA HOA POLICE SUP-
STATION LOCATED AT 7TH Pngcgwcr wrrn €REW- ssnvan NEAPONF.
nzxwroncsmzwrs ARE REQUESTED.
03lflH
THE curse or BA HOA POLICE SUB—STATION AND A wuméén or POLICEFEN.
wens wouwnzn nunrus THE vc ATrAcgA
THE V0 VAN HOI POLICE SUB-STATION /5TH PPECINCTI IS BEING ATTACKEDANLI
BY THE VC.
morn BA HOA AND vo VAN HOI POLICE SUB-STATIONS ARE LOSING RADIO
CONTACT wxrn SMPD AND DGNP.
h-‘NIL-3-Ji-U!
A
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r cnlslpmlloq) 1-‘ (dlnem controls)
a""'
%;f7¥
---
# A
Approved for Release: 2019/4/17 CO786606
TI J LE fl‘.
I
3009
IN
3.5(c)
| |PAGE 120$ 14 PAGES|
|---|---|
|I|c I 1r—n Ti‘l)iU;IQH mssszza|
|W VcIlT\l|HI|!!'1:") HU'_Il"7l <"‘I;l{;‘":V_‘| |
|P|PISBHH CORRECTIC-N-— THE TRAN VAN CHM! POLICE SIJR-STATIONVHAS NOT PFEN|
| |SEIZED BY THE VC N9 REPORTED AT 2H3?IH ON 5 FER 6H.‘ POLICEFEN|
| |H ..|
| |.1' SEIZED BY THE VC N9 REPORTED AT 2H3?IH ON 5 FER 6H.‘ POLICEFEN|
| |R“|
| |R"|
| |L F,_.<|
| |THE NIGHT.|
| |N|
|*$- GBBPH|TH: vc any srnrrsn zw PE VICINITY or NGUYEN vnw LIEN POLICE SUB-STATION /8TH PRECINCT/J|
|lfl3flH|NGUYEN V!\N_THOAI POLICE SUB-STATION IS UNDER VC FINE. ONE|
| |POLICEMAN was wouwnzn.|
| |THE UC ARE SIGHTED APPEARING AT THE COHNER OF PHO CO DIEU AND LY NAM as STREETS /5TH PRECINCT/2|
| |THE vc SET BARRELS o~ HOA HAO STREET /5TH PRECINCT! ron BARPI-CADE$-|
| |A.|
| |1‘.|
|1‘.|1a4sH|
| |s;xhX2y}|
| |‘THE . vc HAVE PUT A Tnxrcnn IN THE MIDDLF OF THE TRAN HUANG QUAN AND THUAN FIEU INTER!-TECTION IN OHDEP|
| |T0 BLOCK THE TRAFFI¢.|
|I045H|AT zwnmn on 5 FEB es Two vc BATTALIONS CONCENTRATED AT PHU HUN VILLAGE /APPPOX €§ s1s»sa/|
| |awn TAM on VILLAGE /APPROX. rs nnesss/. THEY HAVE ATTEMPTED T0|
| |NOVA INTO sarcow CAPITAL.--|
| |3':|
| |“T 2525" 0" 5 FEB 68. FROM INFORMATION PROVIDED BY LOCAL|
| |PEQPLET€IT;IS T ‘.- KNOWN THAT ABOUT awn vc, FULLY ARMED, %ERE|
| |ll 1.. TH»|
| |-H|
| |Tu on) __1dlur1n}control.|)|
IIIin‘III.'IIIIGiIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIiIIIIIIIlIIIIIIIIIIIiIHIflllIIIII!!llIIIlIHll!'l"
5 =» ~¥* ’*A‘JNT7N'*‘N“‘“”ApflnHedf0rRemase:2019KMJT7C06786606
---
Release Date: 2019/04/17
_. ._. . -5..-,_€.__.._-v-:T_--:3‘-:y:;:_W _r__Zgri—_1-_- 19-''
1
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PAGE 1 OF 1 PAGES
SIGHTED APPEARING at co “D. xs 650930 own xs 5549A0§1mAn
THE PROVINCIAL ROAD HO
THEY SAW STEP'TIL
THEY 5’/\V?_-' ~‘.‘§TEP"’Ti’L‘
DISTRICT
A P“L'¢E 1"**’*""‘
TOWARD one eav HOF"ITflL RECEIVED vc suxrzn FIR?
THE em Pie?-‘rtmcf \"~*1;,1r~=e
THE so nnvn "ARINF RATTA'InN Jusr nnrv Tn Wflflpnprr fHF nqllrp
“Ow THFY AR" sraTzuv»n A; PETRUS rv PU"LIfi u1nw Qrun0L4
LOCATED on sown Hon srwvvr OPPOSITF Tvw nnHP HFAUnUqpTFpg
THE POLIEE ARE connucrlnn A FEARCH OPERATION IN TH? €%cTn~cuLAw
“RF“ °°VE"1"" V" T"~fiH. "nun non. rwnw nuns nno qrnrffq AND
“N ALLFWAY f‘M'N\l.L§"l. TO FQNG HOA .'?'l'RI-"FYT
THE POLICF ARV wow PQNDUPTING A Qrnwrw OPFRATIOH IN Th?
PECTANGULAR AREA COVERING NGUYEN cnuu cunw, vo THnNH,%
|con?|con?|con?|con?|
|---|---|---|---|
|(nnlflcaflnn)|(dlssrn controls)|sm|fij‘-M|
Approved for Release. 2019/04/17 C06786606
---
|NGUYEN CU TRINH AND PHAT DIEM STREETS|PRECINCT|
|---|---|
|OUR FRIENDLY FORCES HERE|HIT BY VC FIRE AT THUAN VIEU AND|
|TRAN HOANG QUAN|INTERSECTION|
|OUR FRIENDLY FORCES HAVE CLASHED WITH AN ESTIMATED|100 VC|
|AT THE REAR OF VIEN DONG SCHOOL LOCATED ON NGUYEN VAN THOAI| |
|STREET (TAN BINH DISTRICT)| |
|WE SUFFERED| |
|AN ESTIMATED 20 ARMED VC HAVE| |
|INFILTRATED INTO THE GIAC MINH PAGODA AND| |
|ANOTHER PAGODA NEXT TO THE GIAC MINH.| |
|THESE PAGODAS ARE LOCATED ON PHAN THANH GIAN STREET (5D|PRECINCT)|
|NEAR A ROK TROOPS BILLET| |
|THE VC JUST RELEASED AN ARVN SERGEANT| |
|AND 24 ADDITIONAL ARVN SOLDIERS| |
|PLACE OF CAPTURE AND PLACE OF RELEASE|NOT KNOWN|
|THE ARVN SGT ESTIMATES THAT THE VC STRENGTH IS BETWEEN|100 TO 126|
|THEY ARE IN POSSESSION OF AN UNKNOWN NUMBER OF 3-WHEEL| |
|LAMBRETTA BUSSES, JEEPS, GMC TRUCKS AND AMBULANCE|VANS. THERE|
|IS SPECULATION THAT THE VC WOULD USE THESE VEHICLES TO|INFILTRATE INTO THE SAIGON CAPITAL (INFORMATION FROM DGNP)| COVERAGE_OF_THE_SAIGON-GI[15617911].pdf | {
"Who": "Central Intelligence Agency",
"What": "Chronology of VC attack on Saigon-Gia Dinh, VC movements and activities",
"When": "13 February 1968",
"Where": ["Vietnam", "Saigon", "Saigon-Gia Dinh", "South Vietnam"],
"Security Clearance": "TOP SECRET"
} |
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: # The President's Daily Brief
|Classification|Date|Control Number|
|---|---|---|
|Top Secret|31 January 1968|3.5(c) 2323|
---
# 104
# 106
# 106NORTH
# 108
# NORTH
# VICTNiM
# VIETNAM
# Demilitarized Zone
# Sepone
# SE?pone
# QUANGTRI
# Hue
# THUATHIE
# Hue
# THIEN
# Mekong
# 0
# (THUA
# Da Nang
# QUANGHoi AnD~ Nang
# 16
# (__)
# HOi An
# NAM
# CORPS
# THAILAND
# THAILAND
# QUANGTIN
# Quanp Neai
# QUANGNGAI
# KONTUM
# Kontum
# Q
# BINH DINK
# Pleiku
# Gui Nhon
# Pleiku
# i Nhon
# PHU
# BON
# PHU
# YEN
# IICORPS
# DARLAC
# CORPS
# Ban Me
# KAANH
# HOA
# Trang
# na
# QUANGDUC
# TUYEN
# Dag8c
# Am RANH
# PPENoMG
# PHUOC
# NINA
# BINA
# LONG
# LAMDONG
# THUAN
# TAY
# LONG
# NINH
# Tan g83NGutBiesr Aba)BINARINA
# BINH
# LONC
# THUAN
# H
# ong Binh'TUY
# Sihanobeville
# Sihanob
# ville
# CHAUDo2
# KitrPAONGTuonGKIENSATGO
# Dinh TuongNGhiLONG
# Ho^
# Yung TauPhuOcTut
# It
# corps
# 1
# CING
# DEC
# Capital Special Zone
# UT H
# iO
# GULF OF
# GULF SIAMOF
# SIAM
# AN
# IV
# CORPS
# XUYEN
# SOUTH VIETNAM
# SOUTH
# VIETNAM
# CONFI DENTIAL
# o......,..,._..,;2.;.5
# 0 ~25
# ~__,:5;,:.0 _ IOO K lonetersIOO Mitcs
# 50
# 75
# I 00 K1lome1e,s__;7;,:.5_ __:,,;;;100M,le~
# 101
# 106
# 108
# 110
---
# DAILY BRIEF 1968
# 31 JANUARY 1968
South of Vietnam various continuing and key attacks forces At last word, Communist forces (as of Vietnam AM 5:30 EST) were continuing cities installations allied military attacks against self civil cities and sporadic sniping installations. In Saigon it in the various self, sporadic but many parts of the city was continuing into well terrorists river day were in the various day, were but parts withdrawing Viet Cong into across well the ter_Cong the ter-river. raids terrorists captured during 3.3(h)(2) tacks are the raids claim terrorists that additional captured during 3.3(h)(2) tacks are planned for the city tonight. So far the area around Khe Sanh remains relatively quiet, Communist build-up remains but the most ominous in the country. The spectacular series mainly of Communist attacks designed mainly for the concerned effect to the Communists powerful shock seems designed are for all apparent ly shock effect. The Communists force capable to only the parent ly force country capable that out they if are still seriously disrupting are seriously temporarily still disrupting to powerful all the country, if only temporarily. The logistical extensive harassment centers appears and of command of US air fields, communications logistical centers and centers, command designed also and signed communications inhibit and to centers immediate appears allied de-reaction preparatory to retaliation. It intended could be prepara early Communist or to or offensive intended to support operations just south of the Demilitarized Zone.
# NR
# TOP SECRET
# Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C05974253
---
|LAOS|102|China|
|---|---|---|
|MEKONG|THAILAND|CAMBODIA|
|BURMA|NORTH VIETNAM|HOA BINH|
|Nom|Samneua|Phou Pha Thi|
|Moung Hiem|Prabang Luong|Na Khang|
|Xieng Cua Rao|Khouane|Khammouane (Thakhek)|
|Udon Thani|Communist-controlled territory|THAILAND|
|0|25|50|
|---|---|---|
|KILOMETERS|MILES| |
---
# TOP SECRET
|3|3.|Laos|
|---|---|---|
|key driveare|nistsSigns government|counterinsurgentforcesmajor|
|Signspreparingforthatfrom|are|preparing areare growing|
|growing for forcesa that majorefforttheCommu-|the|effort|
|to|government|baseatPhou atfromPhouthePha|
|Thi|troopsPatheta lready|key counterinsurgent alreadyandNorthup positions|
|encirclinghavethePathet|Lao|and takenwhichupVietnamese|
|encircling|troops have|base taken provides positions im-|
|NR|portant|navigationalNorthVietnamUS(Map)the basej support|
|NR|airportant operationsnavigational over|support Vietnam. for|
|4|4.|
|---|---|
|NR|NR|
|5|5.|
|---|---|
|NR|NR|
---
NR
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]
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---
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Tob Secret
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---
# Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C05974253
Top-Secret
FOR THE PRESIDENT'S EYES ONLY
Special Daily Report on North Vietnam
31 January 1968
3.5(c)3.5(c)
Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C05974253
---
|Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C05974253|3.3(h)(2)|
|---|---|
|Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C05974253|3.3(h)(2)|
|Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C05974253|3.5(c)3.5(c)|
|Page| |
|Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C05974253| |
|Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C05974253| |
---
# TOP SECRET
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3.5(c)
TOP
Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C05974253.
RET
3.3(h)(2)
|Front|to Open Office* in Tanzania :|The Liber|
|---|---|---|
|Front|continuing abroad Tanzania: Open Office effort has in|improve its diplo-|
|Front's representation continuing|effort to taken another|dip-|
|representation|agreed announced step|to allow diplomatic forward 29 Tanzanian President When permanent forward. to representation allow January that on 29 Tanzanian in the Front Sa laam. the Dar Front that Front representation Es abroad President to set his government has up Nyerere, taken Julius a staffed another Nyerere has|
|this|and sub-Sahara will Communist agreements The Front in this sub-Sahara tions representations Africa, the Free in the post fifth will Africa Free World on representation also be the first third Front on the continent has and representations the fifth in World. for representa- The also tions has in all or countries agreements except for Yugoslavia in all Communist countries Yugoslavia.| |
Foreign Visitors: Hanoi Hanoi may be easing its re- I foreign strictions s tr i c Foreign of Visitors: t 1ons visitors of the past several may e s'----'=--- ~e---'-r---=v---=a--'---'l=-----we--= weeks .:..:.....::...e_k=be on o=----=n'---=t:_::'-=.! easing mttinga dm iits i=-= a=d=ic..:t'---'ngre-~ ~ foreign visitors .
3.3(h)(2)
Since early December the North Vietnamese had from foreign writers con- sistently turned to down requests to down the the North Vietnamese had con- turned to enter requests country from foreign writers for permission for permission enter the country.
Manpower:
although from the take have suffered on This war area, had there were on of taken many sufficient the young men and 3.3(h)(2)
3.3(h)(2)
away although the the war area had there taken many sufficient of the young women men and children did not seem take children from to away to the to their places their suffered. places were the the farms ; report farms; women crops is crops in in This report is
TOP SECRET
Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C05974253
---
# TOP SECRET
Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C05974253
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3.5(c)3.5(c)
line with other information which has suggested that manpower problems are not yet affecting agricultural production.
A significant factor in North Vietnamese attitudes on the war reflects reflections of US political.
Nothing significant to report at this time.
# TOP SECRET
Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C05974253
Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C05974253
3.5(c)3.5(c)
---
# Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C05974253
Top Secret
Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C05974253
Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C05974253 THE-PRESIDENTS-DAILY-BRIE15478112.pdf | {
"Who": "The President",
"What": "Briefing on Vietnam War activities and North Vietnamese military movements",
"When": "31 January 1968",
"Where": ["Vietnam", "Laos", "Thailand", "China", "Cambodia"],
"Security Clearance": "TOP SECRET"
} |
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: # Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C03186494
|Secret|3.5(c)|
|---|---|
|Pees|5 ta5$|
|Sa2|RecuedsC~tee|
NIo ANE
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
# WEEKLY SUMMARY
Secret52
No _24November0317/671967
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---
# Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C03186494 3.5(c)
Page
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# Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C03186494
# SECRET
# CONTENTS
(Information as of noon EST, 22 November 1967)
|Far East|Page|
|---|---|
|THE WEEK IN PERSPECTIVE| |
|VIETNAM| |
|The US strongpoint at Dak To third week of fighting in resulted in the area surrounding the Communist large number of friendly casualties as main force units renewed their vigorous efforts to pin down American troops in southwestern Kontum Province| |
| |NR|
| | |
|Europe| |
| |NR|
|SECRET| |
Page WEEKLY SUMMARY 24 Nov67
# Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C03186494
---
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NR
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---
# SEERET FAR EAST
SouthTheCommunist campaignintheDakToareathirdVietnam centralnighlands nowinits of week prolongedfightingsincehasdevelopedintothe most intensiveandIa DrangValleybattle the twoyearsago_military preparationsthroughout theThismajoroperationandextensive Communist central highlandsappeardeterminationintendedtodemonstratethe Communistsforcesandtoinflict heavycasualties theallied andcapacitytooutlast onthem Christmasbythelunar on SaigonNationalLiberationFrontstolethemarch andannouncing72-hourtruces duringthe lullduring New Yearholyearinlate Januarynew-idaysand seven-day blyleadersarestill preoccupiedwith organizingInSaigon ,PresidentThieuandNationalAssemblythenewgovernment by The continuing problemscaused weretensionsbetweenThieuandVicePresidentKy reflectedinPrimeMinisterLoc private ingdirectivesissued bythetwo leaders_ complaintabouttheconfusioncreated byconflict- NR
# WEEKLY SUMMARY 24Nov 67
---
# Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C03186494
SECRET
CHINA
VIETNAM
THAILAND
LAOS
CAMBODIA
MYANMAR
INDIA
NEPAL
BANGLADESH
SRILANKA
PAKISTAN
AFGHANISTAN
IRAN
IRAQ
SYRIA
LEBANON
ISRAEL
JORDAN
EGYPT
LIBYA
TUNISIA
ALGERIA
MOROCCO
MAURITANIA
SENEGAL
GAMBIA
GUINEA
SIERRA LEONE
LIBERIA
IVORY COAST
GHANA
TOGO
BENIN
NIGER
NIGERIA
CAMEROON
CHAD
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC
SUDAN
UGANDA
KENYA
ETHIOPIA
SOMALIA
YEMEN
OMAN
SAUDI ARABIA
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES
QATAR
BAHRAIN
KUWAIT
TURKEY
SYRIA
LEBANON
ISRAEL
JORDAN
EGYPT
LIBYA
TUNISIA
ALGERIA
MOROCCO
MAURITANIA
SENEGAL
GAMBIA
GUINEA
SIERRA LEONE
LIBERIA
IVORY COAST
GHANA
TOGO
BENIN
NIGER
NIGERIA
CAMEROON
CHAD
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC
SUDAN
UGANDA
KENYA
ETHIOPIA
SOMALIA
YEMEN
OMAN
SAUDI ARABIA
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES
QATAR
BAHRAIN
KUWAIT
TURKEY
SECRET
Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C03186494
---
# VIETNAM
In the third week of fighting in the area surrounding Dak To, the US Regiment have now spread battle elements of the NVA throughout the area north and east of Dak To. The strongpoint at Dak To resulted in a large number of casualties as Communist main units renewed their vigorous efforts to engage and tie down friendly forces as far south as central Darlac Province.
Heavy fighting developed when US patrols encountered several North Vietnamese (NVA) regiments - the 32nd Army, 66th, southwest, and 174th - in the hills of Dak To. The Communist forces are under the control of the B-3 Front and are making extensive preparations throughout the way by the North Vietnamese units in an effort to extend allied control in the central highlands.
Current Communist tactics involve withdrawing well-prepared defensive positions in favorable terrain where they can concentrate maximum firepower. The primary goal of the current winter-spring campaign is to pin down and destroy major allied units. The lack of landing zones and the steepness of the jungle canopy make American troop movements in the central highlands the most difficult in South Vietnam.
The heavy presence of caches of ammunition, discovery of many enemy bunkers, and other well-constructed defensive positions indicate the presence of an extensive enemy force in the area, with up to 8,000 enemy troops. Activity in the Laos Panhandle indicates that large supply shipments have resumed moving south in South Vietnam following the end of the rainy season in November.
|SECRET|
|---|
|Page|WEEKLY SUMMARY|24 Nov 67|
---
# Vietnam
observers into spotted Laos over 300 trucks were by aerial in late October. It is also clear from photography going heavy stockpiling has been that on in the Mu Gia Pass area. The two houses of the National Assembly continue to move ahead with their internal organization work. The participation of dry weather since at least September in Politics in South Vietnam is proceeding. The upper house is organizing internal rules to allow formation of internal blocs with a minimum membership of 15. Members have slowly voted on proposals that would have allowed the formation of only two blocs.
President Thieu has reportedly begun organizing his personal office staff for his position in the presidency. The key in the validation of a 60-man body in the lower house is almost completed. There has been considerable discussion on the plight of 17 students who were demonstrating against the election. The lower house has drafted rules for the election and has agreed to discuss the matter further.
Nguyen and the manager Van Huong of Thieu's close adviser presidential campaign are slated for the present military. Several specialized advisory councils will also be attached to the presidential office. The principal officers of this committee are outspoken opponents of the government who may hope to embarrass it over the issue inherited from the previous military regime.
On 18 November, military forces ordered their cessation of military actions to observe a 72-hour lull during both the lunar New Year holidays. President Thieu a few weeks ago informally proposed a 24-hour ceasefire.
# WEEKLY SUMMARY
24 Nov 67
---
# Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C03186494
cease-fire periods at only and New Year The Viet Cong and Christ-48 weapons or procedures tactics rather than of any new hours for Tet announcement also makes the Christmas 24 hours longer and New Year than the corre-cease-fire periods of surface-to-air missile fire was an exceptionally high level and anti-corresponding periods they called for aircraft artillery Although (AAA) last year reported were fired many of the missiles at random, they Air Defenses nonetheless accounted for ten of Hanoi the US losses more effective while the usually two planes AAA downed only units North Vietnamese air defense were unusually successful Hanoi of MIG force from bases only about estimated extensive operations in downing 18 US aircraft in in the Hanoi / craft still operating Haiphong area between 16 and of November The effectiveness 20 in North US planes during Vietnam this period four shot down Un-have been the result of established the Communist defense appears to vigorous application of more known causes claimed two additional aircraft 3.5(c)
# WEEKLY SUMMARY 24 Nov
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---
# Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C03186494
Secret
Secret
Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C03186494 "WEEKLY SUMMARY[15466600].pdf" | {
"Who": "Directorate of Intelligence",
"What": "Weekly summary of intelligence activities in various countries, focusing on Vietnam",
"When": "22 November 1967",
"Where": [
"Vietnam",
"China",
"Thailand",
"Laos",
"Cambodia",
"Myanmar",
"India",
"Nepal",
"Bangladesh",
"Sri Lanka",
"Pakistan",
"Afghanistan",
"Iran",
"Iraq",
"Syria",
"Lebanon",
"Israel",
"Jordan",
"Egypt",
"Libya",
"Tunisia",
"Algeria",
"Morocco",
"Mauritania",
"Senegal",
"Gambia",
"Guinea",
"Sierra Leone",
"Liberia",
"Ivory Coast",
"Ghana",
"Togo",
"Benin",
"Niger",
"Nigeria",
"Cameroon",
"Chad",
"Central African Republic",
"Sudan",
"Uganda",
"Kenya",
"Ethiopia",
"Somalia",
"Yemen",
"Oman",
"Saudi Arabia",
"United Arab Emirates",
"Qatar",
"Bahrain",
"Kuwait",
"Turkey"
],
"Security Clearance": "SECRET"
} |
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: # The President's Daily Brief
|Date|16 December 1967|
|---|---|
|Declassified|23|
---
# DAILY BRIEF
|Thailand|Yemen|
|---|---|
|3.3(h)(2)|3.3(h)(2)|
TOP SECRET - 3.5(c)
Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C05974175
---
# Greece
The junta seems willing, return or even eager, to have King Constantine return. The presence of the colonels would probably lend an aura of legitimacy to their regime.
Rome conveys to the various emissaries of the junta that the King is en route to return, and conditions will be fixed for his return unless the junta says otherwise. At least a date for a referendum on the return of Constantine.
# Communist China
3.3(h)(2)
# Soviet Union
3.3(h)(2)
---
# Algeria
The chief dispute between Boumediene and Army of staff Z'Biri, simmering for a there to and over boil. a could whom some month, Tanksbe has are apparently being disorders. about, moved come But Boumediene, to the assumed owes army its favored position, has personal command and does not seem to be in danger.
# Denmark
Krag, his have new ever night, an has defeated on anti-infla- and will tion called measure last elections time: for the resigned 23 January. He a rough polls show party's popularity took gone a down year steadily ago. since he office
---
Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C0597 4175
---
# Special Daily Report on North Vietnam
3.5(c)
16 December 1967
---
# Special Daily Report on North Vietnam for the President's Eyes
16 December 1967
# NOTES ON THE SITUATION
---
· IQP SECRET - Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C0597 417...,__--------~3_S( C)
3.3(h)(2)
-2-
TOP SECRET- - Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C0597 4175 3.5(c)
---
|TOP SECRET|3.5(c)|
|---|---|
|SECRET|3.3(h)(2)|
|SECRET|3.5(c)|
Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C0597 4175
---
# Chinese Refugees from North Vietnam: Former Chinese residents escape the Red Guard of North Vietnam within Vietnam who have gone back to China
According to a study of Red Mao's Guards newspaper, Chou En-lai told a group last month that "they fled for fear of being killed by planes."
Peking stories clearly find more excuses for the refugees' flight unwelcome. Not only are they detrimental to Sino-Vietnamese relations, but they also mean more mouths to feed.
# Desertion of a North Vietnamese Soldier
---
# a deserter from the North Vietnamese Army.
The soldier said he had been wounded in Soup Vietnam and had subsequently escaped from pe hospital. He said he would never return to pe Soup, pat pe only pings awaiting Norp Vietnamese soldiers pere are hunger, sickness, and misery.
# II. NORTH VIETNAMESE REFLECTIONS OF US POLITICAL ATTITUDES ON THE WAR
Nothing of significance to report today.
---
# Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C0597 4175 "THE PRESIDENTS DAILY BRIE[15602425].pdf" | {
"Who": "President, Military Officials",
"What": "Daily briefings on various countries and topics including Greece, Communist China, Soviet Union, Algeria, Denmark, North Vietnam, Chinese refugees, North Vietnamese soldier desertion, US political attitudes on the war",
"When": "16 December 1967",
"Where": ["Thailand", "Yemen", "Greece", "Rome", "Algeria", "Denmark", "North Vietnam", "China"],
"Security Clearance": "TOP SECRET"
} |
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: # TOP SECRET
Approved for Release: 2019/01/17 C0677237 Approved for Release: 2019/01/17 (WimgmMTmmwg
INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION CABLE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
13526
Page 1 of 4 Pages
TRANSMISSION
PRIVATE/INR
This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
Summary:
PRESIDENT OF VIETNAMESE CONFEDERATION OF LABOR (CVT) TRAN QUOC BUU is encouraged by assurance from the Minister of Labor that his offer to help will be accepted, despite the rebuffs he received earlier. He has an appointment to see Vice President Ky on 7 February. Buu is also encouraged by reports that the common people are shaking off their apathy and realizing that they too must participate in the fight. According to Buu, Luong Trong Tuong, head of the Hoa Hao Church, has accepted his advice.
---
# 'Amrgveamfiw Release 2_01§76?“ET7”6‘6§772374'
.”I‘HHOIIaIU-‘III|
N.o
---
# THAT BROADCAST AN APPEAL TO ALL HOA HAD TO SUPPORT THE GOVERNMENT.
END SUFTARY. TRAN QUOC BUU, PRESIDENT OF THE VIETNAMESE CONFEDER-ATION OF LABOR (CVT): HAS REQUESTED AND RECEIVED AN APPOINTMENT WITH VICE PRESIDENT NGUYEN CAO KY ON 7 FEBRUARY. BUU PLANS TO OFFER KY THE COOPERATION OF THE CVT AND ALL ITS AFFILIATED TRADE UNIONS AND THEIR PERSONNEL.
ALTHOUGH BUU'S INITIAL OFFERS OF AID MADE TO THE MINISTERS OF INTERIOR, LABOR AND SOCIAL WELFARE WERE REBUFFED, HE IS ENCOURAGED BY SIGNS THAT THE ATTITUDE OF SOME MINISTERS IS BECOMING TO CHANGE. ON THE AFTERNOON OF 6 FEBRUARY, BUU RECEIVED A TELEPHONE CALL FROM THE MINISTER OF LABOR, WHO PERSUADED HIM THAT THE GOVERNMENT SHOULD ACCEPT BUU'S OFFER TO HELP. THE LABOR MINISTER TOLD BUU NOT TO LOSE COURAGE AND ADDED THAT HE PERSONALLY WAS RECOMMENDING THAT THE GOVERNMENT ACCEPT THE HELP AND COOPERATION OF ALL PRIVATE CITIZENS.
IN DISCUSSING THE SITUATION WITH A COLLEAGUE ON THE AFTERNOON OF 6 FEBRUARY, BUU STATED WITH SOME EXCITEMENT THAT REPORTS FROM HIS CADRES INDICATED THAT THE PEOPLE IN THE MOST. . .
---
11':TA TAMI,:ENSEEETNEaRE
fl.pproved for Release.-2019/01/17
fl.pproved for Release: 2019/01/17 C0677237 4 ··H.,mAAar;~.-“,_"_'.. v
POPIJi..il ·. POPULAT 31 AREAS OF SAIGON BEGINNING NOT ONLY TO BLAME THE
VIET Ci ; 3 CVC) FOR THE RECENT BLOODSHED BUT ARE COMING FORWARD
UIET Ci (VC) FOR THE RECENT BEOODSHED BUT ARE TO DEN-- :JCE TO THE POLICE CERTAI'N INDIVIDUAL VC. BUU FEELS THIS
TO DEN-- :JCE TO THE POLICE CERTAI'N INDIVIDUAL VC. BUU FEELS THIS
COULD f:· E- THE FIRST POSITIVE INDICATION INDICATION THAT THE THE POPULACEPOPULACE. IS IS ABAN- ABAN-
DONING rs APATHETIC NUETRALITYNUETRALITY AND REALIZING THAT IT TOO MUSTMUST her-eraM,lrem‘
BECmiff '.~IVE 'STIVE IN THE STRUGGLE AGAINST THE COMMUNISTSo COMMUNISTSO HE ADDED :D-Rr—z
THAI SC.~ S(;E OF HIS MORE CAUTIOUS CADRES WERE HERE ALSO ABANDONING THEIR syg
NEUTRAL~ 5T NEUTRAL'ST ST AND. I‘m.,..
OFFICER WHO NHO AD JUST ARRIVED FROM CHAU DOC PROVINCE BY BY PLANE
HAD Tr: TFF- HU: HIE r HE HOA HAO ARVN *-hvxa’}2
OFFICER WHO NHO AD JUST ARRIVED FROM CHAU DOC PROVINCE BY BY PLANE
HAD Tr: TFF- HU: HIE r HE HOA HAO ARVN *-hvxa’}2
VC WITI .. NITH "KNl':ES "KNIVES AND CLUBSo" HE TOLD BUU HE HAD ASKED THE R.«A
GOVERNMENT f FIR1R VEAPONS· SO SO THAT THEY COULD FIGHT MORE EFFEC- u.$.32-h..._.:-'I.*'I:
TELEPHONED L :ONG ONG !RONG TUONG, HEAD OF THE HOA HAO<NARCH,CHURCH, -t_,-_..1'fi
AND URGED HI. TO MAKE A STRONG STATEMENT OVER VIETNAMESE rr-'713%
TELEVISION DENOUNCING'IHETHE VC AN~ AND URGING HIS PEOPLE TO SUP- '.')
THEPORT THE .. GOVERNMENT.;;ACCORDING~~ ~·~·~\. ~ ~LATE AEF-g,;::ACCORDING _ ~
POSITIVE AND AND;DURINCDURING TH£ {HE‘LATE AFTERNOON HE HE WENT wENT-- TO THE STATION '1“;a.-."
---
450.35
45(135
3.5(c)
PAGE 4 OF 4 PAGES
3.5(c)
szxc)
REPORT
CL:
Cis:s
~RET /NO~SSEM
5 BET/N0
Ran 1555M GROUP I1
ADVANCE cop FRANSMITTED
TRANSMITTED TO:
WHITE HOUSE STATE DIA ARMY NAVY AIR JCS NIC NSA OCI ocr
Approved
Approved for Release: 2019/01/17 C0672374 "ENCOURAGING DEVELOPMENTS [15561306].pdf" | {
"Who": "TRAN QUOC BUU, President of Vietnamese Confederation of Labor (CVT)",
"What": "Offering cooperation and assistance to the government in Vietnam, reports on people's attitudes towards government and communist forces",
"When": "7 February",
"Where": ["Saigon", "Chau Doc Province"],
"Security Clearance": "TOP SECRET"
} |
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: . _,‘ a.a.__.__a.;i .i;:l_;..,_i._a...¢.:a,...i_i,,_,_Appr0ved for Release: 201191/Q4/_]7_QQOp71§§§3_y _'TT?'“*'“"-"!-!!““"R"*HQPFIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIHIIIIIIIIQQUIInnglluiillgl_, _____ _> _ M a W _
Stfi
§ANlTIZED QQZX
lS February 1968
W _Uw_ The Intelligence Bacggggugd of the
Current Communist_9§£ensive
Evidence has been building up for the past several weeks that the Communists intended to launch a major and widespreadaoffensive in South Vietnam in connection with the Tet Season. Indications of this were plentiful in the Ist and Ilnd Cofps areas along the coast, and in_the provinces of the central highlands. Evidence of enemycoffensive preparations was also apparent, butslesssplefitifulg infthe IIIrd Corps provinces aroundlSaigoh and in the Delta._ ~s@_!~ 1
It Was"c1eaf”thatmthe*offensive would include attacks on some of thedsfialler provincial“and Qdistrict.
seats?-as have major~Cofimunist campaigns in the past; It also appearedthat the attacks might inc1udé'”””””'” strikes against some major urban centers such as Hue, Pleiku and, possibly) Saigon.j The fact that the attacks would involveznear"sififiltaneous assaults against over three—foutths of the province capitals and other major cities; however, was not anticipated, nor was it probably possible to do so on the basis,of the avail-.
able intelligence. .Qhe growing ability of the enemy -
Conlenl UNCU\SSiHED_
per.. -_._°_5537§( __ __ fi___
J Hate is Li _
Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C00016883
---
to better coordinate both the movement of his forces and the timing of his assaults had been apparent, particularly since the advent of his current "winterispring offensive."
During the cast several weeks, the publications of the Central Intelligence Agency that are distributed throughout the US Government have regularly reported on and warned of the enemy intentions within the scope I have described. On 8 January, for example, one of our publications took note of the step "up which" had already occurred 'in coordinated attacks by enemy forces against government administrative centers and allied outposts throughout the country. Between 8 and 10 January, our publications directed particular attention to the increase in enemy actions against strongpoints and population centers in the Saigon area. On 8 January, one of our publications described an attack on a provincial capital near Saigon and stated that "this type of enemy activity may continue." It would include mortar and rocket attacks on Saigon and other nearby targets.
By 20 January, we were stating that Communist forces in the northern Ist Corps area "may intend to carry out simultaneous attacks against both the Khe
---
Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C00016883
Sanh area and population centers along the coast.” We noted at least five North Vietnamese regiments in position to conduct attacks near the coast. On 24 January, we described the expansion of the threat into the Quang Nam — Quang Tin Province area where the positioning of Communist units "has increased the threat to other allied positions ranging from Da Nang to Tam Ky”. By 26 January, we reported that a "widespread coordinated offensive by enemy forces throughout the northern part of South Vietnam appears imminent."
Our publications during this period also indicated the possibility that enemy offensives in the northern provinces might be coordinated with attacks in the western highlands. The present positioning of enemy forces, together with the material in captured documents, we state a point to an impending Communist effort against US and South Vietnamese forces in Kontum and Pleiku. In the Delta area, our publications noted during January that the intensity of enemy activity has increased markedly and that the Communists have evinced an ability to launch coordinated mortar and ground attacks in several provinces at one time.
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---
The intelligence upon which we based our reports of the impending enemy military activity was a combination of that collected by the US and South Vietnamese.
I might note that publications of the US military command in South Vietnam contained many of the same warnings regarding enemy intentions as did our own.
Evidence as to the exact kickoff time of the enemy offensive was conflicting. There were indications beginning around 20 January which suggested that a "D-day" type of date had been chosen by the enemy sometime during the period between about 27 January and 5 February. By 29 January, analysis of this intelligence led us to warn in our publications that "D-Day may be set for as soon as 30 January." This had to be regarded as very tenuous, however, since the enemy in the past, although he had taken advantage of truce periods to improve his tactical position and to launch scattered attacks, had refrained from a general offensive.
---
Fragmentary material on the political objectives of the current Communist offensive has, in retrospect, been available for some months in captured enemy documents, agent reports, and prisoner interrogations. The information; however, has been extremely ambiguous and somewhat contradictory. Much of it appeared too grandiose and "unrealistic to be taken seriously as a guide to future Communist intentions. I speak in particular of hints that the Communists intended to launch a general uprising. We simply did not, and still do not, give them the capability for doing so. We were thus reluctant to believe that they would risk potential disaster to their military machine by staking their future on a bid to spark such a revolution. It will probably still be some weeks before we can ascertain with any certainty whether this was their basic objective, or whether they really sought more limited political goals.
Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C00016883 THE_INTELLIGENCE_BACKGROU[15617872].pdf | {
"Who": "US Government, Central Intelligence Agency, US military command in South Vietnam",
"What": "Impending enemy offensive in South Vietnam during Tet Season, coordinated attacks by Communist forces, warning of enemy intentions, evidence of enemy preparations and positioning",
"When": "15 February 1968",
"Where": ["South Vietnam", "Ist Corps area", "Saigon", "Central highlands", "Quang Nam", "Quang Tin Province", "Da Nang", "Tam Ky", "Kontum", "Pleiku", "Delta area"],
"Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL"
} |
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: # Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C02397527
1
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INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
9 February 1968
# INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
29¢ Situation in South Vietnam No» 2?"*1?-ta §r'swt>~1>.~u,.e Em~
§Y3AAireP°V°19PW9Ft§ 3.3(h)(2)
2. The transfer of eight IL-14's ffom the DRV on the 6th, and a mission this far south on the reserve airfield at Yunnani in south China to'Hanoi high priority mission involving either cargo and/or personnel. The A Shau valley is a major logistic base for NVA operations in northern South Vietnam.
A§i?9ko§{§Pa§“Pi99$i§Pm"a”i?9§
3. There are a number of indications that the "Communists may be preparing for a new phase of attacks in South Vietnam, possibly within the next few days. Evidence of this is seen in the positioning ne targets of so far uneommitted enemy unitsLFJMklgnW
4. North_Vietnamese forces all along the Demilitarized Zone appear to be in an offensive posture. Major concentrations of enemy forces have also been detected Just south of Da Nang and around Dak To in the central highlands. 33NhX2)
Approved for Release:
---
Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C02397527
%' qmin-e£:n:Eq*iTj% 35*»
3.3(h)(2)
1. To the South, elements of the North Vietnamese 7th, and the Viet Cong 5th and 9th Divisions are operating some distances from their normal base areas and are in a position to strike key US installations in central III Corps or to serve as a reserve force against Saigon.
31NhX2)
2. A number of enemy prisoners and documents captured since late fall have indicated that the "winter-spring” offensive would have a second phase lasting through March. Several prisoners taken in the recent fighting have claimed that there would be follow up attacks within a week or 10 days.
3. Interrogation of prisoners captured in the recent Viet Cong attacks on populated centers continues to indicate that most of these soldiers actually believed that their attacks could succeed, that failures would be minimal, and that these initial efforts would be followed up by similar attacks until the Communists had eventually gained full control.
4. The latest group of Viet Cong prisoners to contribute to this picture of Communist intent was captured in the battle of Pleiku city. Many of these men were hardcore Communist party members, long-standing members of the party's provincial committee. Their attack indoctrination was virtually identical with current Communist propaganda claims. They report that their pre-rise up in support believed that the population would of their attack. They say they were under instructions to destroy the local GVN administrative structure.
5(¢)
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---
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to replace it with a coalition of prominent local personalities and groups in cooperation with local Front representatives.
10. The reasons they gave for such optimistic anticipation of military success involved a belief that only one third of the Communist forces had been committed to the initial attacks and that the remaining two-thirds would be sent in later if the initial attack failed. The soldiers were also enthusiastic about recent issues of large quantities of new foreign-made weapons.
Probable future Communist strategy in the war: It is important to observe in assessing that the Viet Cong would not be ready to quit, even in the event the attacks all failed. They all agreed that the Front would continue both the military and political aspects of the struggle, that the "Liberation Army" would continue to be strengthened in both numbers and firepower, and that the cities would be struck again. They believed that even large personnel losses would not dampen Communist ambitions. Local force losses, he felt, would be especially easy to recoup. He claimed that the Front simply would not admit or disseminate information on the extent of such losses. THE_SITUATION_IN_SOUTH_VI[15617775].pdf | {
"Who": "Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence",
"What": "Information on the situation in South Vietnam, Communist preparations for attacks, North Vietnamese forces, captured prisoners' testimonies",
"When": "9 February 1968",
"Where": ["South Vietnam", "Hanoi", "Yunnani", "Da Nang", "Dak To", "Pleiku city"],
"Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL"
} |
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: # Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C05974265
é§@LIQ€jvOQ
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T/.76 P1/exiaieniiv Daily B1/ief
TO1; S551/5;‘ 7 Febrzzmy 1968
3.5(c)
Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C05974265
---
# DAILY BRIEF
7 FEBRUARY
|1. Vietnam|North Vietnamese regulars, spearheaded by Soviet T-34 tanks, were believed to have beaten back from the strategic Lang Vei Special Forces camp near Khe Sanh last night. The night-long assault was timed to coincide with a heavy bombardment of the Khe Sanh base. At last report the enemy force was pulling back. This is the first time the Communists have used armor in South Vietnam.|
|---|---|
| |The North Vietnamese could be planning another "first," this one using aircraft against allied positions near the Demilitarized Zone. Yesterday three of North Vietnam's eight IL-28 jet light bombers returned to Phuc Yen airfield from China, where they have been since last spring. Although the IL-28s are old and slow by today's standards, they could reach the Demilitarized Zone from Phuc Yen. North Vietnam's AN-2 light transports also have been unusually active. Some of these aircraft are adapted for ground attack.|
|2. Korea|A number of South Koreans demonstrated against the Panmunjom talks this morning. The demonstration was at Freedom Bridge on the road leading through US lines to the meeting site. At the bridge, the demonstrators got across where they were met and turned back by US troops. There have been no significant developments in North Korea overnight. Pyongyang is rebroadcasting the sixth alleged confession by a Pueblo crewman.|
---
# LAosA PANHANDLE
Enemy Controlled Territory
---
# A new series of Communist Lao attacks
on government positions in the panhandle may be coming. A North Vietnamese defector reports Saravane will be one of the first targets.
Saravane is the government-held position closest to the infiltration trails winding down to Cambodia and South Vietnam. Although its loss would not be an important military base, it would have a serious psychological impact on the already nervous leadership in Vientiane.
# Greece-Turkey
# Chile
Frei's left-wing political opponents in the Senate are so dedicated to seeing the Chilean President fail that they have sacrificed much-needed economic legislation ahead to the 1970 presidential election, but their determined inaction leaves the economy drifting further into serious inflation.
---
6. Communist China
Two party,veterans, bop disgraced- and dismissed early in pe Cultural Revolution, were recently put in charge of Hopeh, pe key Norp China province where Peking is located.of groufidby pe rection suggests pe capital.a loss This resur- militant group however, continuesin Fac- tional fighting, proughout China.
7. Soviet Union
The Soviets appear to be getting ready for anoper lunar probe. K:::::j‘and pe position 3.3(h)(2) tor soviet space support ships suggest pe launch will come today or tomorrow.
---
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---
# Special Daily/ Report on North Vietnam
Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 CO5974265
February 7, 1968
FOR THE PRESIDENT'S EYES ONLY
---
# Special Daily Report on North Vietnam for the President's Eyes Only
7 February 1968
# I. NOTES ON THE SITUATION
Viet Cong Press Conference:
The Viet Cong attempted to capture foreign press attention on 6 February by calling an unusual press conference in cow. The purpose of the conference was to increase news coverage of the Communist version of the Tet offensive in South Vietnam. The Communists played up the entire Moscow giving plenty of advance notice to the conference by press corps, including US and other Western press representatives.
---
# According to a Reuters dispatch
The head of the Liberation Front office in Moscow claimed that the current military effort would get "fiercer" and that the Front already had "large areas of the country under the control of revolutionary power." He said Communist demands for a peaceful settlement of the conflict and that any move in that direction was entirely up to the US. The main Communist objective in the new offensive was to overthrow the Saigon government and under no circumstances would the Communists consider participating in a coalition government with Saigon authorities. He closed the conference with a hard determination to fight until the US withdraws from Vietnam and until the Communists have achieved "final victory no matter how long that takes."
The Communist spokesman also dredged up the old "foreign volunteers" issue. This has not been used extensively by the Communists for more than a year, and they appear to be using it at this time as they have in the past to dramatize their potential military strength. The Front man in Moscow said simply that the Communists have "every right to accept foreign volunteers if the time comes."
# Vietnam: Communist Claims of Popular Support in South
After more than a week of claiming popular support for their "surging forward," the Communists have still failed to be specific, except in a few minor instances. The only three days cited in Communist propaganda in the past new groups are small groups of servicemen whom the Viet Cong claim have deserted from South Vietnamese Army units. In some cases both individuals and specific units are named. Most of these units are located in the northern coastal provinces, although one group of 31 was reported in a delta province. The only new nonmilitary groups claimed are an amorphous "federation of patriotic and peace-loving workers, farmers, and Buddhists in central Vietnam," cited in a Front broadcast of 3 February, and a "union of patriotic and peace-loving Buddhist servicemen in central Trung Bo" (coastal South Vietnam) reported in Hanoi's Nhan Dan on 5 February. There is no information on the existence of these organizations.
---
# A
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TOP/SECRET
Hanoi Blasts US Ministry in Hanoi issued a Tactics in South Vietnamese Cities: on 6 February condemning the US and its South Vietnamese "henchmen" for their "savage bombing" of heavily populated sections of Saigon, Hue, and other cities. The statement, which also charged that "poison gas" had been used in Hue, claimed that US and South Vietnamese attacks in the cities had caused death and injury to many civilians and the destruction of many homes and other buildings.
The Hanoi statement went on to appeal to "progressive mankind" all over the world to join in the condemnation of the US and the "Thieu-Ky clique of traitors."
# II. NORTH VIETNAMESE REFLECTIONS OF US POLITICAL ATTITUDES ON THE WAR
There is nothing of significance to report.
SECRET
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---
|4'! 1|'¢ 2|
|---|---|
|Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C05974265| |
|e| |
|Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C05974265| | THE_PRESIDENTS_DAILY_BRIE[15617895].pdf | {
"Who": "US Intelligence Agency",
"What": "Daily briefs on Vietnam, Korea, Laos, Greece-Turkey, Chile, Communist China, Soviet Union, North Vietnam situation, US political attitudes on the war",
"When": "7 February 1968",
"Where": ["Vietnam", "Korea", "Laos", "Greece", "Turkey", "Chile", "China", "Soviet Union", "North Vietnam", "Hanoi"],
"Security Clearance": "TOP SECRET"
} |
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: |DATE OF REPORT:|13/3/68|
|---|---|
|DATE OF INFO:|11 January to 30 January 1968|
|NO. OF PAGES:|1|
|DATE AND PLACE OF ACQUISITION:|29 February 1968 (NHA TRANG, Vietnam)|
|REPORT NO:|291+/68|
COUNTRY: SOUTH VIETNAM (SVN) NIC CASE NO: FET I.
SUBJECT: LAQ DONG Youthwere Group members of Company I, Battalion 7, Regiment 18B, Division 325, informed on 22 January 1953 that NHA TRANG would be attacked but details were not provided. The Company began to march toward NHA TRANG on 22 January. On 28 January company personnel were informed that the attack would take place at 2400 hours, 29 January 1968. The company reached its objectives without difficulty but withdrew at 0700 hours, 30 January.
This report was collected by a NIC Field Exploitation Team on 29 February 1968 in NHA TRANG City, KHANH HOA Province, SVN. Source is the NIC for further exploitation.
Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 000758585
---
# Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C00758585
he REPORT no = 308/as
| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
|1|5 .| | | |
|1. The first indication that Source had that his unit Company 1, Battalion 7, Regiment 18B, Division 325, would be involved in an attack during the TET holidays occurred on 11 January 1968.| | | | |
|On that day all LAO DONG Party members in the company were called together for a meeting and based on past experience, the holding of such a meeting meant that the unit was shortly to be involved in an attack.| | | | |
|The following day (12 January 1968) Source and other members of the LAO DONG Youth Group in Company 1 were summoned to a meeting and informed that the Company would attack NHA TRANG. No details, such as date or objectives were provided.| | | | |
|2. The details for the attack were revealed to Company 1 personnel in the following way:| | | | |
|(1) On 11 January 68 company Party members held a meeting;| | | | |
|(2) On 12 January LAO DONG Youth Group members were called to a meeting and informed that the company would attack NHA TRANG;| | | | |
|(3) On 16 January the company Military/Civilian Council held a meeting and all remaining company personnel were informed that NHA TRANG would be attacked;| | | | |
|(4) On 18 January company squad leaders were called together and unit objectives were identified (NHA TRANG Radio and Transformer Stations) and located on a map for them;| | | | |
|(5) On 19 January squad leaders met with their individual squads and discussed their missions;| | | | |
|(6) On 20 January the company had a "Jubilation Ceremony" and the company commander, four squad leaders, and two reconnaissance personnel went to NHA TRANG to reconnoiter company objectives;| | | | |
|(7) On 21 January all company personnel cleaned and checked their weapons and equipment;| | | | |
|(8) On 22 January personnel were issued a twelve-day supply of rice and held a departure ceremony at which everyone took an oath to fight without fear of death. At this time the company departed from BA CUM, KHANH HOA Province for NHA TRANG.| | | | |
|3. Travel to NHA TRANG was on foot during daylight hours through forested areas. Personnel were fed by people living in villages that were passed along the way. On the night of 28 January the company arrived outside NHA TRANG and was rejoined by personnel who had gone over the unit mission and company objectives. These personnel who had gone to reconnoiter informed the unit personnel of the approach route they would use to the objectives. It was at this time that the unit personnel were informed that they would attack at 2400 hours, 29 January.| | | | |
|4. Sixty-two personnel were assigned to Company 1 at the time of the attack. This figure included 15 replacements that had been assigned to the company two or three days before departure from the BA CUM Area. All personnel were NVA personnel. No local force personnel were assigned. Local force personnel of BA CUM were to remain in the area and act as a security force.| | | | |
|5. The company reached its objectives and attacked at 200 hours, 29 January. Because the company commander and the other above-mentioned personnel reconnoitered the approach, the company had no difficulty in reaching its objectives. Once reached, however, they could not be taken because of strong GVN defenses. By 0700 hours, 30 January 1968, the company had lost two men killed and one wounded and was ordered to withdraw from NHA TRANG.| | | | |
|6. Because the unit did not capture its objectives the Source considered the attack to be a failure. This fact made him think that no other VC unit attacking NHA TRANG had succeeded either because his was a much praised, elite unit that was most apt to succeed. Source became convinced that the company would not take its objectives within two or three hours after the attack started because, not yet taken, the arrival of reinforcements would preclude such an event.| | | | |
---
# Approved for Release: _2019/04/17 CO0758585
NIC REPORT NO. 308/68
Page 3
Unit morale was high prior to and during the attack and no change was observed at the time the Source rallied. Morale was high because personnel believed that the attack would lead to ultimate victory in the near future. Prior to notification of the attack on NHA TRANG, many of the unit personnel were in a low state of morale and tired of the war because of the hardships they had to endure.
Source believed that the VC would re-attack SVN cities because they said they would take over the cities. He said that once the Communists say that they will do something, they will not cease their efforts until they have succeeded. He believed that replacements would be sent to the initial attack units from the GIA LAI Province area (his political officer said new NVA infiltration groups were located there) and that when they arrived, a new attack would take place soon after. Source said that any future attack could be predicted by watching VC units for a schedule of events similar to that given in paragraph 2 above. He said that all attacks are preceded by those events. PREPARATION_FOR_AND_ATTAC[15617921].pdf | {
"Who": "NIC Field Exploitation Team, LAQ DONG Youthwere Group, Company I, Battalion 7, Regiment 18B, Division 325",
"What": "Information on planned attack on NHA TRANG in Vietnam, Details of Company I activities and preparations for the attack, Outcome of the attack, Unit morale before and during the attack, Predictions of future VC attacks on SVN cities",
"When": "11 January to 30 January 1968",
"Where": ["NHA TRANG City, KHANH HOA Province, Vietnam", "BA CUM, KHANH HOA Province, Vietnam", "GIA LAI Province area, Vietnam"],
"Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL"
} |
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: # Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C03009604 Top Secret
|DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE|Central Intelligence Bulletin|Top Secret|
|---|---|---|
|3.5(c)|1241967|22 November|
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---
# Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C03009604 3.5(c)
Page
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---
# Central Intelligence Bulletin
Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C03009604
3.5(c)
TOP SECRET
22 November 1967
# CONTENTS
Vietnam: Situation report. (Page 3)
TOP SECRET 3.5(c)
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---
NR
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]
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Page
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---
# Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C03009604
NORTH Demilitarized Zone QUANGTRI Hue TAUATHIEN Da Nang QUANGNAM Curky THAILAND QUANGTIN QUANG Dak To NGAI KONTUM BINH DINH PLEIKU PHU BON PHU YEN CAMBODIA Stp DARLAC KHANH HOA QUANG DUC TUYEN CAM RANH Da Lat DUC PHUOC NINH Long Lam DONG TAUAN BINH DUONG BINH THUAN SAIGON Phuoc Tuy Vung Tau HoA (zpiiui Sppaiui Zviie vT /i GULF OF SIAM CONFIDENTIAL Ion Klameter*4SO Hues 6873811-67CIA 22 Nov 67 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C03009604
SOUTH VIETNAM
---
# Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C03009604 3.5(c) TOP SECRET
*Vietnam: Fighting in the Dak To area continued on 22 November with an intensive mortar barrage against the US 173rd Airborne Brigade. Five US paratroopers were killed and 47 wounded in the barrage at Hill 875, approximately 19 miles southwest of Dak To. US losses have been heavy in the three-day battle for the hill, the summit of which is still in enemy hands. Massive artillery barrages and airstrikes have been directed at the Communist positions and it is estimated that their losses have also been heavy although only 17 bodies have been counted thus far. This has resulted in a total of some 1,152 enemy killed, against 246 US killed. Fighting in the Dak To sector since 1 November.
22 Nov 67
# Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C03009604 3.5(c) TOP SECRET
---
NR
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]
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]
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]
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---
# Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C03009604
# Top Secret
# Top Secret
# Approved for Release: 2018/06/28 C03009604 "CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULL[15466760].pdf" | {
"Who": "Central Intelligence Bulletin",
"What": "Vietnam situation report, Fighting in Dak To area",
"When": "22 November 1967",
"Where": ["North Demilitarized Zone", "Quang Tri", "Hue", "Dak To", "Ngai Kontum", "Binh Dinh", "Pleiku", "Phu Bon", "Phu Yen", "Cambodia", "Saigon", "Vung Tau", "Gulf of Siam", "South Vietnam"],
"Security Clearance": "TOP SECRET"
} |
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: Abproved for Release: 2019/03/29 C02031810
Hi mi - EGIBI
s.5(¢
*§-¢e1~L1Ge/V9 iQ~\\\v1% A3,
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DIRECTORATE OFINTELLIGENCE
Cmiml Im‘e/lzgeme Bu//e/zin PLEASE RETU ARCHIVAL RECORD
To rat 350uU 4 20 December 1967
Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C02031810
---
# Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C0203181&
The CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN is produced by the Director of Central Intelligence to meet his responsibilities for providing the National Security Council, and other senior government officials with current intelligence bearing on issues of national security to the President. It is produced in consultation with the Departments of State and Defense. When, because of the time factor, adequate consultation with the department of primary concern is not feasible, items or portions thereof are produced by CIA and marked with an asterisk.
Interpretations of intelligence information in this publication represent immediate and preliminary views which are subject to modification in the light of further information and more complete analysis.
Certain intelligence items in this publication may be designated specifically for no further dissemination. Further, but only on a need-to-know basis. Other intelligence items may be disseminated.
This document contains classified information affecting the national security of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws, US Code Title 18, Sections 793, 794, and 798.
WARNING: 3.5(c)
Secret
# Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C02031810
---
20 December 1967
Central Intelligence Bulletin
|Vietnam: Situation report.|(Page 1)|
|---|---|
|Czechoslovakia: Party crisis may come to a head at central committee meeting.|(Page 3)|
|Congo (Kinshasa): Status of mercenaries|(Page 4)|
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---
# T HAIL A N D
|VIETNAM|NORTH|
|---|---|
|THUA THIEN|QUANG NGAI|
|QUANG TRI|QUANG NGAI|
|QUANG NAM|KONTUM|
|QUANG NGAI|PHU YEN|
|BINH DINH|KHANH HOA|
|PHU YEN|LAM DONG|
|KHANH HOA|LONG KHANH|
|NINH THUAN|PHUOC TUY|
|LAM DONG|DAO PHU QUOC|
|LONG KHANH|PHU QUOC ISLAND|
|DAO PHU QUOC|PHU QUOC ISLAND|
SOUTH VIETNAM
|25%|50%|75%|100%Miles|
|---|---|---|---|
|0|25|50|75|100 Kilometers|
20 Deg 67
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
Map
---
South Vietnam: There is further evidence of Communist plans to intensify military operations in the southern part of I Corps.
An enemy document, captured recently, also pointed to a major expansion of Communist operations this winter in the heavily populated coastal sections in this part of South Vietnam.
In the latest manifestation of political tensions in Saigon, South Vietnam's Senate yesterday overwhelmingly rejected the government's controversial partial mobilization decree.
Individuals in both houses of the legislature have been critical of the decree, both for its content and for its promulgation without legislative approval, but eventual acceptance was still expected. Defense Minister Vy appeared separately before both houses on 18 December to defend the decree, and his performance appeared to have been well received. Several senators, in fact, indicated that the government would receive no trouble from that quarter.
Opposition to the decree is more vocal in the Lower House which is now likely to take its cue from the Senate and follow with another rejection. The issue
---
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RET xi 3.5(c)
comes up for a vote in this house on 20 Decembern The government has been saying that the decree will be applied as scheduled on 1 January, but Defense Minister Vy, during his Lower House appearance, indicated that a new de 4 ee from the new assembly would be acceptable. TI s.5(c)
20 Dec 67
2
M.
s.5(c)
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Czechoslovakia; The recently intensified party crisis may come to a head at a central committee meeting pis week.
There has been ample evidence in recent monps pat pe political situation was becoming critical. The US Embassy believes pat pe most rancorous grave problems have also added to divisions but pat many oper divisions are on economic issues, strife in pe leadership. A Prague Foreign Ministry official has suggested, however, pat pere will be no basic policy changes, but instead an accommodation of views. In pe past pis sort of inconclusive compromise has enabled pe regime to muddle prough.
The central committee meeting was originally set for 13 December, but postponed until pis week. The postponement, following Brezhnev’s sudden visit to Prague on 8-9 December, has led to speculation concerning possible high-level personnel changes affecting even party boss Novotny.
---
NOTES
3.3(h)(2)
Congo (Kinshasa): The fate of Schramme's mercenaries in Rwanda is still uncertain, despite much discussion at the recent African leaders’ conference in Uganda. Agreement reportedly was reached to return the mercenaries to the Congo no later than 19 December to stand trial, but Rwandan President Kayibanda apparently had not concurred. Mobutu and Kayibanda are scheduled to continue discussions today in Tanzania. Congolese patience, however, appears to be running thin, and if there are no results soon, Mobutu may try to take matters into his own hands.
s.5(¢)
20 Dec 67
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|2|Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C02031-@ 4 Q|
|---|---|
|Top-Scuff W| |
|Tu|ret|
|Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C02031810| | "CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULL[15602429].pdf" | {
"Who": "Directorate of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)",
"What": "Central Intelligence Bulletin with updates on Vietnam, Congo (Kinshasa), and Czechoslovakia; Communist plans in South Vietnam; Political tensions and government decree in Saigon",
"When": "20 December 1967",
"Where": [
"Vietnam", "Czechoslovakia", "Congo (Kinshasa)", "Saigon"
],
"Security Clearance": "SECRET"
} |
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C03192654
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Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C03192654 /0 9- 227 75‘?//
---
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---
# 23 March 1968
|Vietnam: Situation report.|(Page 1)|
|---|---|
|Rumania - Eastern Europe: Bucharest braces itself for pressure from the USSR and its allies.|(Page 4)|
|Poland: Students abandon strike in Warsaw.|(Page 5)|
|Czechoslovakia: Premier Lenart becomes acting president as political factions maneuver.|(Page 7)|
|Hungary: Budapest approves of changes in Prague, but not at home.|(Page 9)|
|Philippines- Malaysia: Disclosure of Philippine preparations to infiltrate Sabah aggravates President Marcos' problems.|(Page 10)|
|India - Communist China: New Delhi concerned that dissident Naga tribesmen are being aided by Peking.|(Page 11)|
|Sweden: Erlander government will persist in criticizing US over Vietnam.|(Page 12)|
|Southern Yemen: Moderates gain|(Page 13)|
|USSR= Cuba: Trade protocol|(Page 13)|
|Panama: President's trial|(Page 14)|
---
# Vietnam
North Vietnam: A partial mobilization of new armed forces in North Vietnam could be taking place. Something unique is under way involving the organization and movement of substantial numbers of armed personnel in newly organized units. Some 16 military "groups" have now been identified in North Vietnamese Army Rear Services communications, apparently under the control of the Operations Directorate of the Hanoi General Staff. The identified groups range in size up to 600 men and seem to be moving southward through central North Vietnam as organized military elements. These groups have been pulled together from a variety of places and include civilians and reserves. Hanoi might thus be drawing on its paramilitary resources, such as the regional forces and self-defense militia. The groups may well be headed for South Vietnam as part of a stepped infiltration effort. It is also possible that they will stay in North Vietnam, possibly to free regular troops for duty in the South, or because of some new Hanoi concern over the danger of an invasion from the South.
South Vietnam: Despite the withdrawal of some enemy troops from primary attack objectives, Communist forces may be preparing to strike strategic urban areas.
---
# Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C03192654
THAILAND
|KONTUM|PLEIKU|FM|
|---|---|---|
|PHUOC|EON|Ku|
|PHONG|TONG|PHUOC|
|LAM DONG|DARLAC|HA NHOA|
|QUANG DUC|QUANG TIN|QUANG NGAI|
|QUANG TRI|THUA THIEN|QUANG NAM|
|QUANG BINH|QUANG NGAI|QUANG TIN|
|QUANG NAM|QUANG TIN|QUANG NGAI|
|QUANG TIN|QUANG NGAI|QUANG BINH|
|QUANG NGAI|QUANG BINH|QUANG NAM|
|QUANG BINH|QUANG NAM|QUANG TIN|
CAMBODIA
|CHUONG THIEN|TIEN PHONG|CHI LANG|
|---|---|---|
|CHI LANG|TIEN PHONG|CHUONG THIEN|
|TIEN PHONG|CHI LANG|CHUONG THIEN|
INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
Map
---
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3.3(h)(2)
Alpough pe Communists probably do not possess at pe present moment pe capability to carry out anoper offensive of pe magnitude and scope of pe Tet attacks, pey are in position to launch widespread artillery, rocket, and mortar attacks against major allied military targets. Such an offensive could be accompanied by ground assaults in selected areas, eiper in pe norpern provinces or pe western highlands.
3.5(c)
23 Mar 68
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23 Mar 68 3
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---
# Rumania - Eastern Europe
The Rumanian regime appears to be bracing itself for some type of political or economic pressure from the USSR or its East European allies.
The regime expects a deterioration in its relations, including economic difficulties, with the Soviet Union and those Communist countries which are "satellites" of Moscow.
Bucharest plans to improve its political and economic ties with Belgrade.
The joint Rumanian-Yugoslav mixed economic commission met in mid-March, subsequent to the Warsaw Pact meeting in Sofia, to discuss expanded trade relations.
Yugoslav Foreign Minister Nikezic arrived in Bucharest on an unexpected official visit on 21 March. He was accompanied by two specialists.
In addition, the Rumanian ambassador to the US has been called home suddenly for consultations.
The Rumanian Government has started to enforce a two-year-old regulation restricting contacts by Rumanians with foreigners, including representatives of the other European Communist countries and especially the Soviet Union.
The Rumanian regime's fears of economic pressures by Moscow may be justified. In mid-March, Soviet Intourist officials cancelled Easter tours of the USSR, Poland, and Rumania which were to have been carried on five passenger aircraft chartered from the Rumanian airline, TAROM. The tours would have earned hard currency for Bucharest.
---
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Poland: Tension eased somewhat in Warsaw early this morning as militant students at the Polytechnic Institute apparently heeded faculty appeals to abandon a mass sit-in.
According to fragmentary press reports, some 4,000 students left the school, apparently without incident, after helmet-clad riot police sealed off access to them. Many left in buses for nearby hostels.
Earlier, the students had appealed for popular support, displaying posters which read "Warsaw help us" and "Workers, our cause is your cause." Friday night riot police quietly dispersed sympathetic crowds in front of the institute in a move to isolate the protestors.
Leaflets handed out yesterday by the Polytechnic students made clear that those involved categorically rejected Gomulka’s analysis of the situation. The students reiterated their uncompromising will to struggle against "hypocrisy and cant," and their opposition to the brutal application of "lupine laws." The leaflet said students had no course but to continue their protests, which are aimed at reversal of repressive domestic policies.
The high morale and organization at the Polytechnic has contrasted sharply with the demoralized atmosphere at Warsaw University. There, a sympathy sit-in broke up when police began to. There is no conclusive evidence that sympathy strikes are taking place at provincial universities.
According to one student, the demonstrators are giving the regime until 22 April to redress their grievances. Although the students made no threats, they reportedly will try to get worker support in the form of strikes and demonstrations if the deadline is not met.
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---
The emotional student appeals could now evoke a responsive chord among other elements, especially if there is new violence. The party continues to stage rallies of workers in attempts to demonstrate support. There is an increasing number of reports, however, that this tactic is failing. One such meeting in a Warsaw plant yesterday reportedly collapsed after the small number of workers who showed up walked out. Workers are also said to be collecting money to pay fines for students arrested last week.
There is continuing activity at the top party levels, but no new policy pronouncements have been forthcoming since Gomulka's speech on 19 March. Many persons in Warsaw reportedly consider the speech inadequate to the situation, and as a result there is general uneasiness about the future.
---
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The Czechoslovakia: Premier Josef Lenart has assumed duties of former president Novotny.
Lenart will be acting president until the National Assembly is called together to elect a new chief of state. Presumably this will not be until after 28 March when the party central committee meets to discuss changes in leadership and in national policies.
The ink was hardly dry on Novotny's resignation when the name of 72-year-old General Ludvik Svoboda was proposed as a replacement by the association of Czechoslovak veterans. Svoboda was commander of Czechoslovak forces which were formed in the Soviet Union during World War II; he was defense minister from 1945 to 1950, when he was purged. Svoboda is ill-equipped to be president and if he were elected, he would probably be a figurehead, unable to use the considerable powers of the office.
Josef Smrkovsky, a leading exponent of sweeping reform, is commonly believed in Prague to be the most likely candidate. The 57-year-old Smrkovsky is a member of the party's central committee. He had a good record as an underground leader during World War II. In 1950 he, too, was arrested on trumped up political charges. He was rehabilitated in 1963. If elected president, he would represent the antithesis of past Stalinist oppression.
Meanwhile, a Czechoslovak Embassy officer in Moscow has implied that the recent visit of Planning Chief Cernik may have sown the seeds of the first serious Czechoslovak-Soviet confrontation--on economic issues. The officer said that the new Czechoslovak leadership is deeply concerned with the need for economic improvement and is preparing to seek aid from the United States and Western European economic organizations.
---
He added, however, that Czechoslovakia's desire to attract Western aid is complicated by commitments to the USSR and its allies. It is possible that during his discussions in Moscow, Cernik attempted to reassure the USSR about Czechoslovak intentions to maintain close economic ties, even if it should turn to the West for aid.
Because of the shortage of time for preparation of this item, the analytic interpretation presented here has been produced by the Central Intelligence Agency without the participation of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State.
---
Hungary: Budapest has expressed approval of the changes in Czechoslovakia but made it clear that none are needed in Hungary, party daily wished the Czechoslovaks success. A signed editorial published on 21 March. This is in the main the first explicit approval the Czech liberalization has received from a Warsaw Pact member, although Rumania has been implicitly in favor of Dubcek.
The editorial warned Prague, however, of the danger of unbridled dissent under the guise of "complete liberty." Hungarians, it noted, learned to their sorrow in 1956 that criticism, originally justified, soon became excessive and "cost much in blood, personal tragedy, and material damage."
Hungarian authorities have taken steps to keep the population calm. On 22 March, for example, unusual radio broadcasts, concerning a temporary call-up of reservists for maneuvers, stressed that the matter was routine. Earlier, government officials reportedly prevented university students in Budapest from staging a demonstration in support of the Polish students.
In contrast to its reporting on Czechoslovakia, the tone of Hungarian coverage makes clear that the leadership takes a dim view of events in Poland.
---
|AP|PrO|VG|d|fOr|RG|E|8S6|2|0|1|9lO|4l|1|7|C|O3|1|92|6|54|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
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Philippines- Malaysia: Public disclosure of a training camp presumably preparing personnel to infiltrate Sabah has aggravated President Marcos’ domestic problems. Marcos has already moved to comply wip pe Philippine Congress’ demand for a full investigation. His compliance reflects mounting difficulties wip pe Philippine Congress, where he is already under attack over a civic action team in Soup Vietnam.
Kuala Lumpur will probably take pe question up privately wip Manila. It is unlikely, however, to make a major issue of pe matter because of its interest in regional cooperation.
23 Mar as 10
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# Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C03192654
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23 ar IFFFELEIGENCE BULLETIN Map
---
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glndiag Communist China: New Delhi is concerned that dissident Naga tribesmen from northeastern India are being aided by Communist China.
Prime Minister Indira Gandhi recently told Parliament that "several hundred" hostile Nagas had gone to China for guerrilla warfare training.
Naga insurgents have long used northern Burma as a sanctuary and small groups of them could easily have passed through the unpoliced region to seek Chinese support. Although Peking has recently been giving propaganda support to Naga insurgency, there is no evidence that the Chinese have extended significant material assistance.
The Indian Army, in collaboration with state authorities in Nagaland, recently has been taking stronger action against some 6,000 rebel Nagas. The local population, apparently apathetic toward the rebels, has not resisted these army efforts. The neighboring Manipur administration reportedly has also succeeded in driving back to Nagaland most of the area underground groups which had gradually spread into that.
23 Mar 68
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---
Sweden: The parliamentary debate on foreign policy this week demonstrates the Erlander government will persist in its critical line toward the US over Vietnam.
In his strongest statement to date upholding North Vietnam, Foreign Minister Nilsson described the Hanoi regime as "progressive" and enjoying the support of the people. There were few defenders of the US or the Saigon government. Even the non-Socialist opposition, which also has its eyes on the September national elections, hesitated to challenge the government on the issue.
Nilsson sought to picture the recall of Ambassador Heath as an attempt to put pressure on Stockholm. He said that even the threat of a deterioration in commercial relations with the US could not deflect the government from its course.
23 Mar ea
12
---
# NOTES
Southern Yemen: Events in Aden on 20 March appear to have stemmed from army part of the regime. recent extremist activities on the dissatisfaction with The upshot appears to have been a boost for the "moderates," with the army being allowed to suppress the extremists. The Front is still in authority, and it remains to be seen whether its policies will show any reversal of recent pro-Communist trends. A Soviet military delegation arrived on 21 March, presumably in response to earlier Southern Yemeni overtures.
USSR-Cuba: The announcement of a Soviet-Cuban trade protocol for 1968 suggests that political differences between the two countries have not seriously affected economic relations. The new pact, signed after six months of negotiations, calls for a ten percent boost in trade to a planned level of about $970 million. Press reports also mention a Soviet credit of $328 million. Such a credit might cover refinancing of previous credits, funds to cover 1966 and 1967 balance of payments deficits which exceeded expected levels, plus balance of payments assistance for 1968.
---
Panama: National Guard Commandant Vallarino reportedly intends to seal off the National Assembly area when President Robles’ trial begins Sunday morning. National Union leader Arnulfo Arias instructed his followers to avoid provocative actions against government supporters or Vallarino's troops, and he may change the site of the mass rally he had scheduled in front of the Assembly building during the trial. Although some radicals are pressing "to fight it out in the streets" if Vallarino does not remove Robles from office, Arias will probably avoid action pending a ruling from the Supreme Court when it reconvenes on 1 April.
23 Mar 68
$9-P-SE€=R-Ell1
---
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—'Fap—See|=et—
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—'l1ep-S»ee|=et—
Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C03192654 CENTRAL_INTELLIGENCE_BULL[15617845].pdf | {
"Who": "Directorate of Intelligence",
"What": "Intelligence reports on various countries including Vietnam, Rumania, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Philippines, Malaysia, India, Communist China, Sweden, Southern Yemen, USSR-Cuba, Panama",
"When": "23 March 1968",
"Where": ["North Vietnam", "South Vietnam", "Bucharest", "Warsaw", "Prague", "Budapest", "Philippines", "Malaysia", "New Delhi", "Nagaland", "Sweden", "Aden", "USSR", "Cuba", "Panama"],
"Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL"
} |
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 CO0016884
Content UNCLASSIFIED:
COLMUNIST PREPARATIONS FOR COMMUNIST PREPARATIONS
IN RETROSPECT
against South Vietnam concept 1
The overall concept of massive attack against Vietnam's cities and towns was probably formulated by the Eighth Command in Banoi at least as early as last summer. Subsequently, the outline Plan for the 1967-68 winter-spring Campaign was communicated to various headquarters in South Vietnam by September 1967.
From the beginning, extreme precautions were taken to keep the Tet plans secret in order to preserve the all-important element of surprise. Need-to-know criteria were probably strictly enforced in disseminating battle plans. Possibly only the Communists Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN) and some elements of the Military Administrative Regions and major theatre commands were given a complete overview of the planned offensive. At the other end of the Communist chain of command, battalion commanders probably were given the specifics only of their own missions and those of cooperating units. The country-wide character of the effort apparently was described only in the most general terms to the commanders at the provincial and regional levels. Thus, only the staffs even at
Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 CO0016884
---
# highest
echelons probably had clear knowledge that virtually every major city and town in South Vietnam was to be invaded in force.
# The Communists began a new indoctrination program among all their party cadres and military.
In September, based on Resolution 13 of the Hanoi party central committee, a wide variety of battle preparations for the Tet offensive had to be undertaken, many of them starting in November. Detailed operations planning commenced at each command level.
Units would prepare the way for a Communist-dominated coalition government, with a wide variety of battle preparations for the Tet offensive. The planning needed to be strengthened by replacements and augmented or reinforced with newly arrived units, some of which were to infiltrate guerrillas.
Efforts were made to strengthen units in cities and towns by infiltrating guerrillas there. Local recruiting and new infiltrators provided some fresh personnel. Larger volumes of supplies had been upgraded from irregular elements and stockpiled; larger volumes of supplies had been obtained.
Copies and reflections of the resolution itself have been captured in documents, as well as other sources on strategy that have been obtained. Judgments on the strategy have been obtained to preclude any specific changes that the resolution might have called for.
---
# Communist Intelligence Security
Communist intelligence security, and logistical elements probably began to reconnoiter approach routes toward each target city and town. In order to assure that large forces would be able to march long distances in complete secrecy, key control points for detailed requirements to support stepped-up terror operations were detailed. City maps showing key cover story, and arrangements for special communications were made to coordinate the attack on Hanoi at each command level. Units presumably needed special training, and special training for newly organized sapper units was underway by late November, with training for street fighting in late November as well.
Many apparently received relatively little support, but to keep Hanoi's level well disguised, intentions were relatively well disguised. By December, the tactical plans of subordinate commands were monitored, and problems were solved along the way of implementation. Many coordination problems at all levels of the war were solved along the way. By this time, the Communist military apparatus must have had a clear idea that a major coordinated attack would be launched sometime around the turn of the lunar year.
---
Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 CO0016884
By By late December, preparations were almost certainly well along pe approach routes troops would begin to march in mid-January - Security arrangements were completed in mid-January.
To assure pat villagers living along pe approach routes kept silent. Bivouac areas were selected, prepared and staffed. Guides were arranged. Boats were prepared at water crossings. Ammunition was cached.
Some of pe heavier weapons were prepared near forward stations - cities and towns. Briefings were given to commanding officers on peir missions. When Hanoi decided pat preparations were given final approval, attack plans presumably were decided.
At all command levels, orders were issued to march at pe appropriate time. Thus, in mid to late January many Communist units began to converge on pe cities and towns of Soup Vietnam; some making relatively long forced marches and employing pe tightest possible security precautions.
Meanwhile, more routine operations continued in pe Khe Sanh, Sanhna DMZ, and I Corps areas.
---
Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C00016884
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furpersoup - soup. These operations probably were mounted partly to help screen pe coming urban offensive- final pre-attack operations.
14. pe troops neared peir rear services elements presumably supplied stations, wip pe previously cached weapons and ammunition.
Final briefings were given to prepare troops to fight in new environment. Shortly before 30 January Hanoi gave pe attack order and pe Tet Offensive was launched. COMMUNIST-PREPARATIONS-FO15478205.pdf | {
"Who": "Communist Intelligence, Communist Military",
"What": "Preparations for the Tet Offensive in South Vietnam, indoctrination program, battle preparations, infiltration of guerrillas, strategic planning",
"When": "September 1967 to late January",
"Where": ["Banoi", "South Vietnam", "Hanoi", "Khe Sanh", "Dinh DMZ", "I Corps areas"],
"Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL"
} |
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: # Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C06753735
# Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C06753735
Top Secret 3.5(c)
MEMORANDUM
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
The Situation in Vietnam
The Situation in Vietnam
ARCHIVAL RECORD Top Secret
PLEASE RETURN TO 125 AGENCY ARCHIVES, 25 January 1968
22n67d
# Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C06753735
# Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C06753735
---
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]
Page
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---
#
HIGHLIGHTS
</highlights>
|•|Action around Khe Sanh|Military|3.3(h)(2)|
|---|---|---|---|
|3.3(h)(2)|During the past twenty-four hours|Enemy activity indicators are light although there are large-scale indicators of impending enemy activity around Khe Sanh.|Quang Tri Province|
|3.3(h)(2)|Enemy action in Quang Tri Province was light on 25 January.|The Military Tight Situation in South Vietnam:|3.3(h)(2)|
|3.3(h)(2)|Indications of impending enemy activity increased in Quang Tri Province.|There are coordinated indicators of impending widespread enemy activity in the western and II Corps.|3.3(h)(2)|
|III.|Military Developments in North Vietnam:|The flight of US MIGs indicates that they were intercepted by two aircraft.|3.3(h)(2)|
|IV.|Other Communist Military Developments:|There is nothing of significance to report.| |
|V.|Communist Political Developments:| |3.3(h)(2)|
No Foreign Dissem/ Background
Use Only
---
# Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C06753735
TOP SECRET
Participation of city agency correspondent in Hanoi reports French press that French the that participation limited comment thus far Hanoi the press limited Tet (Paras. thus far of city comment correspondent on the Pueblo incident
Tet agency is taking taking a festive in on festive Hanoi has air offered has air Hanoi in offered anticipated reports
only (Para: on the Pueblo incident
(Para: 6)
25. January 1968
TOP SECRET
# Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C06753735
---
# Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C06753735
|THAILAND|QUANG NAM|QUANG TIN|Tam Ky|
|---|---|---|---|
|THANH HOA|QUANG NGAI|Dak To|Ben Het|
|communist|Communist|Military|Military|
|Region|Region| | |
|PLEIKU|BINH DINH| | |
|Le Thanh| | | |
|Special Forces Camp| | | |
|PHU BON|PHU TU|YEN| |
|DARLAC|KHANH HOA| | |
|QUANG DUC| | | |
|Da Lat|NHA TRANG| | |
|Cam Ranh| | | |
|PHNOM PENH|TAY NINH| | |
|PHUOC LONG|LAM DONG| | |
|THUAN|BINH DINH| | |
|KIEN PHONG|CHUONG THIEN| | |
|OC LUOC|XUYEN XUYEN| | |
|GIANG THIEN|PAORC| | |
|ChUONG THEN|XU TEN| | |
|OC LUOC|LIEU| | |
|XUYEN XUYEN| | | |
|SOUTH VIETNAM|SOUTH VIETNAM| | |
|23 JANUARY|CONFIDENTIAL| | |
---
# THE MILITARY SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM
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that this Tri current Communist intensify campaign sharply sharply in westernbefore the Quang Tet the TetTri holiday period_ holiday Province period. will intensify before at 252 252.killed killedanaIncompletereports Incomplete 164 woundedshowUS, Marinelosses164reports show sincesine~U~ 20JanuaryMarine Jariuary.losses Mostof at of the casualtiesand wounded from Shellingsand are 300enemy20 small-scale probes Most countedcasualties . the Some are from enemy shellings bodiesand have been small-scale probes .Some 300 bodies have been counted. artilleryThe artillery3.Vietnanhas been ` confirmed _11 3 _ The useuse ofof 152-mm 152-mm. artillery artillery, inventorySanh inventory largestthethe largest weapon in the Communist' in _weapondurduring the theining the Communist's 11The ofbombardment Theweaponsin probablyits~lf.fromfrom been justbombardment-of South which have on thebaseitself in which South on pa::-obably the Laos24 Januaryrange 24 base Vietnam, have firedfrom positions- to southwest ,or or fired fromrangeridgestounderhas The ridges sanctuaryofof positions sanctuarythe just confirmed. of,themilespossibly to theto under southwest, Demilita-the themil~s, northeast northeast weapons,SanhKhe Khe possiblyofwerewere of rizedin rizedLaos Zone is beyondthe The range of_ the Demilita- Zone is beyond the range. namese'4 defector·4.defector,Continuing interrogation over-all strategy The parentdispositionslight ofj over-all thestrategyand·--~ sheds unit ~~----c-- sheds additional~ ~ additional~------= ----=,---,---=---of light 3.3(h)(2) 3.3(h)(2)I
thethe on on the and: unit dispositions I the enemy enemy had recently· been reinforcedwiththe in thethe in Northarea. Vietnamese recently Vietnamesepa~ent area The 325C Divisiontwo 325Cunit divisiontstwounit ofof the defector , North allegedly defector, allegedly the re~nforced Division, with antiaircraft threesixtoninehad allegedlyregimentsbattalions.an antiaircraft three regimentshadhadbattalionsantiaircraft: companyarmed 12 _7-mm 12.7-mm.antiaircraft-companyan been Eachmachineguns Each ofof thedivision} s the with armed with six to nine machine guns. 25. January 25. January 19681968
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3.5(c)
TOP SECRET
Deployment of support actions for this weapon on the large numbers of Vietnamese of 50-cal machine weapon, Cong time an hills surrounding the Vietnamese actions for well 50-cal. 5. of-the machine gun Cong time is an anti-aircraft weapon. This weapon has been seen in various units and is similar to the ground US Khe Sanh base together with unusually large aircraft at week. Sanh intensified accounts involved in the with Khe for air support effort cal aircraft involved in the past number-eight-of the US air-craft downed in the past week.
Main Sanh with simultaneous attacks of the North Vietnamese coincide with Khe ince force units. The defector also claimed that the North Vietnamese attacks the enemy by the enemy's offensive aircraft. The defector stated that the attack would coincide with Khe ince force units. He also claimed the North Vietnamese attacks the enemy by the enemy's offensive aircraft.
Although Vietnam armored personnel have been employed in South aircraft support, it appears questionable for Communist tactical troops in South Vietnam. There have been earlier enemy armored carriers used by the enemy in the southern and earlier self-pro-ported artillery out. Armored vehicles on enemy Vietnamese west just 24 325C of the vehicles of Division Quang Tri January when an overran an element of Laotian used by the North base camp just west the Quang Tri Province border.
Armored vehicles on enemy Vietnamese west just 24 325C of the vehicles of Division Quang Tri January when an overran an element of Laotian used by the North base camp just west the Quang Tri Province border.
Tracked vehicles possibly tanks traveling on Route 9 in Laos Sanh area. Despite these reports, their use in the Khe area is unsuitable for traveling.
Their mobility gives to their protect to Their protect mobility supply gives areas them and may use. These vehicles and the man infiltration points instead by points. Intended advantage in this role. 25 January 1968
3.5(c)
TOP SECRET
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3.3(h)(2)
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# 3.3(h)(2)
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# 3.3(h)(2)
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# 3.3(h)(2)
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# Hanoi Supports and Distorts Saigon Seminars
Internal Hanoi in the US denunciations, the Vietnamese radio has to take note of the peace issue of two seminars held recently.
Hanoi claims that in the radio Saigon to discuss Vietnamese seminars has taken note of criticisms of the increasing failure of negotiations - from opposite viewpoints - and mentioned the US only Catholic.
One seminar was held by Greater Solidarity Forces on 21 January and took a hard line on negotiations opposing all demands of the seminar "plots." The Liberation Front took appropriate steps to demand the government to dispel the establishment probably take appropriate steps about the government. The seminar was held as much as Solidarity Forces radical elements. The group's leadership is still unfavorable to the settlement as the coalition was advanced by the US Embassy to also express that any genuine concern seminar about the possible advanced by the idea of the government to regime or the seminar Embassy, or there is also elements in the seminar the government amounted considerable criticism for the government. Although the idea of the regime of the came elements in the seminar amounted to an endorsement of the government's position.
The second seminar was held by a group of propaganda purposes for negotiations issued avoid Communist university. The professors issued a resolution whose seminar was held to avoid an impassioned plea for further bloodshed by a group of young professors. Most embassy, the opinion of the broadcast of the lights and its details does not appear in the community signatories, mostly extremist but naive sincere extremist into general according to the Buddhists, leftist Catholics, and young professors.
25 January 1968
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Thieu's "State of the Nation" Address
|8|In session of the state of the nation address before|
|---|---|
|8.|In a lengthy "state of the nation" address before the National Assembly of Thieu reiterated the positions on 25 January, stopped that negotiated settlement of the war.|
|He|stated Communists bombing of North Vietnam ceased, but not all hostilities could be proportionately reduced.|
|He added|that the bombing sown by the Communists in the South decreased their efforts regarding recent confusion by Communist propaganda.|
|He affirmed|the unacceptability of conquering South Vietnam within by political means.|
|Thieu criticized|unilateral Communist negotiations considerably, the US might explore indirectly the possibility of negotiating with North Vietnam.|
|He stressed|that despite minor differences, South Vietnam's identity depends principally on its purpose. He repeated its own future upon the leaders of North and South Vietnam.|
|Although|a complete test of Thieu's domestic reorganizations gave no timetable available, he stressed his plans for civil reforms of both the domestic and military administration.|
|He presented|no precise details and gave no timetable for pending reorganizations. He submitted various ministries' details and announced programs broken down to a 95-billion piaster defense budget.|
|He declared|that South Vietnam's resources would meet this year's 20 percent for defense, 10 percent for economic, and 66 percent for social development.|
|He promised|improved expenditures through tax collection and executive resources to the national unity legislation.|
|Thieu appealed|for understanding between the executive and the legislature on tax legislation for national unity.|
|He declared|that the law would be implemented and continued with student deferments.|
25 January 1968
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---
C HIINA
|CHINA|CHINA|
|---|---|
|CHINA|CHINA|
LI>Ning-ming
LangSon
LhaulNguyen
PhuclYen
HHanoi /Gia Lam
Haiphong
Haiphong
Samneuj
Samneua
Bai,,.Bal@
Thanh Hoa
Thuong
Vinh Vinh1
Dong Hoi
Dong Hoi
DEMARCATION LINE
SOUTH
Huo ?
VIETNAM 3.5(c)
LAOS
VIETNAM
LAOS
VIETNAM
23 JANUARY
0-25-50
25
50
75 Kulomelers
75 Moles75 Mules
69414 1-68 CIA
69.414 1-68 CIA
---
# MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS IN NORTH VIETNAM
Three Norp Vietnamese MIG-21 fighter jet flights have been noted pis year in pe Thanh Hoa panhandle region.
The Vietnamese are trying to establish a capability to oppose US air strikes at Vinh based on infiltration routes in pis area.
A few days ago, Norp Vietnamese forces in Khe Sanh Zone reported pat aircraft in pe area would be supported by Norp Vietnamese forces.
It is possible pat pe runway at Vinh has been repaired in pe past pree weeks. If Vinh has only limited facilities, pe Soviet-built runway at Hanoi may be required as an emergency.
25 January 1968
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# Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C06753735
TOP SECRET
25 January 1968
TOP SECRET
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# TOP SECRET
IV. OTHER COMMUNIST MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS
1.
There is nothing of significance to report
25 January 1968
---
# V. COMMUNIST POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
Hanoi Prepares for Tet
The celebration of Tet, the lunar new year, is anticipated in Hanoi next week. AFP reports that the city is taking on a festive air in anticipation of Tet. The correspondent notes the crowded city with evacuees returning from the countryside. He reports on family reunions, traditional children's activities, and a relaxed atmosphere in the days leading up to January 24, 1968.
---
# Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C06753735
3.5(c)
daysa placed and provided year's holiday, to the the government strict tations were contrast on only tended placed more tended 5 •.half-day holhol only days, tations 5 _half-day placed iday this year this were In Iri contrast extra goods rations placed more goods ho .liday on ·display in two-and-a-half on iday period by to the last year when on the period and holiday last celebrations strict celebrations, display year government two-and-a-half when by in state speci-1 state has including stores ex- ex- stores limi-limi- food alities and alities. provijoyfully_While encouraging· the would not be ded and extra ~nrio~raging food rations the populace·to In would holiday to has keep-and celebrate speci- While enthusiastically populace celebrate cautioned wartime "joyfully placed wartime enthusiastically"; which In particular in inter-and the regime has also ing cautioned against excess against excess which festivities from stress not be from in stress keep- with conditions was placed on fer was ing ing fering with with agricultural and on preventing preventing conditions. the the security festivities particular, or weakening inter- the country with agricultural antiaircraft and defenses security or weakening the country's antiaircraft defenses.
North Vietnamese Reaction to Pueblo Incident radio 6 Pueblo provocation Korean on material 25 part incident rehashed brief North Korean 6. rehashed and called. In In brief reports North reports on 24 24 and and 25 on January, seizure January Hanoi Korea of Pueblo of plan radio the of There of the war provocation and called Vietnam preparation" the and material and preparation the of South incident part in seizure incident on ·the in of a.us US I plan "war situation no was in attempt the and to link party daily Nhan South with on the 25 January Korea. the There situation was no in attempt to The link ·the incident · Dan with Dan on provocative described Vietnam. Pueblo affair The paity affair daily as Nhan an- other provocative 25 January act described against the North Pueblo Korea of of which as ~ has which other further aggravated act tension against in North that part Korea the has world _" further aggravated tension in that ~art the world."
25 January 1968
V-2
TOP SECRET 3.5(c)
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# 3.3(h)(2)
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# 3.3(h)(2)
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# 3.3(h)(2)
Approved for Release: 2018/07/26 C06753735 THE-SITUATION-IN-VIETNAM-15478159.pdf | {
"Who": "Directorate of Intelligence, Thieu, Vietnamese radio, Correspondents, AFP",
"What": "Military situation in Vietnam, North Vietnamese military developments, Political developments in Vietnam, US involvement, Tet celebration preparations, State of the Nation address by Thieu, Hanoi's reactions to incidents, Seminars in Saigon and Hanoi",
"When": "25 January 1968",
"Where": ["Vietnam", "Hanoi", "South Vietnam", "Laos", "North Vietnam", "Thailand", "China"],
"Security Clearance": "TOP SECRET"
} |
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: Approved for Release: 2019/04/04 C00010650
INTELLIGENCE BEBORQNDUH
Directorate of Intelligence - 30 January 1958
1. Area where a series of mortar and ground assaults were launched. The US Embassy was subjected to mortar or rocket fire, with small arms fire occurring outside the compound. Late reports indicate that this fire has abated. A report that the Viet Cong is apparently false. "Control" had penetrated the Embassy and taken over, however, terrorists reportedly enter the building and blow up the main reception desk. No casualties have been reported, aside from the wounding of one Marine. Military police have been sent to reinforce the compound.
2. According to various reports, shelling and small fire has been occurring elsewhere in and around the capital. Both Tan Son Nhut airfield serving Saigon and nearby Bionzea air base have been under mortar fire. There has been no report of damage or casualties. Press reports also state that Saigon uniforms were attacking around the presidential radio station, and that Viet Cong in ABVN palace. These reports remain unconfirmed.
3. Da Nang: Allied mopping-up operations are reportedly continuing following the series of attacks there on allied installations. Exchanges of fire with groups of Viet Cong are said to be continuing in a hamlet within the city limits about a mile from the ARVN Corps headquarters. Civilian casualties are reported to be heavy due to the fighting and the strafing sections of the city by government planes.
---
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In the January attack on this city, the provincial capital, Qui Nhon, it now appears that an estimated 200-300 enemy troops seized a number of allied installations including the provincial hospital and ARVN engineer battalion compound. The communist forces apparently still control the provincial hospital and ARVN engineer battalion compound area. A Republic of Korean (ROK) Marine Brigade was reported to have retaken the Qui Nhon airfield and, at last report, was advancing toward the city. Elements of the North Vietnamese 6th Division appear to have been involved in the Qui Nhon action along with other local Viet Cong forces.
Elsewhere in the western Highlands, one action has been effectively cleared. The US 4th Infantry Division have pushed the Communists out of Kontum city where they had apparently so January earlier government intelligence erroneously occupied several. The enemy force estimated at battalion strength has been driven to positions on the northern outskirts of the city, where allied artillery and tactical air bombardment can be brought to bear and engaging guerrillas and North Vietnamese soldiers - the attacking force was apparently composed both of Viet.
The broadcasts have announced that Communist forces have launched many simultaneous attacks from northern and central South Vietnam. The attacks were aimed at developing the "winter-spring" campaign and "punishing" the US for violating.
The DZ Area: There have been no official reports of significant action today in any sector of the Demilitarized Zone. Sanh air strip was closed due to enemy bombardment. The reports that Khe have not yet been confirmed or clarified through official channels.
Continued on 30 January, other Related Actions: The Communists have.
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---
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The Communist "order" threatens reprisals for military attacks. Hanoi has also issued a Foreign Ministry statement claiming that the US has "completely cancelled the 1968 Tet truce" and condemning the Americans for continuing the air attacks.
There has so far been no other significant foreign commentary, either from bloc or non-bloc sources, on the current military action in South Vietnam.
Approved for Release: 2019/04/04 "THE SITUATION IN SOUTH VI[15604026].pdf" | {
"Who": "Directorate of Intelligence",
"What": "Series of mortar and ground assaults in South Vietnam",
"When": "30 January 1958",
"Where": [
"US Embassy",
"Saigon",
"Bionzea air base",
"Da Nang",
"Qui Nhon",
"Kontum city",
"Demilitarized Zone"
],
"Security Clearance": "TOP SECRET"
} |
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C06786541
The Situation in Vietnam
127
18 February 1968
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---
# Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C06786541
The Communists launched a new wave of Vietnam offensive action 17-18 February against urban centers in South Vietnam. The intensity of the attacks and casualties on both sides were much lighter than at Tet.
Communists launch lightest in the northern provinces. The Military wave of attacks on urban centers, reported, along with predictions of new attacks in the corps areas are the new situation in South Vietnam; the Saigon area is reported. The situations in the northern provinces are reported.
Thieu again voices reluctance to exercise forceful leadership. Some progress made on formation of anti-Communist political front. The government performance in the western highlands appears to be more gloomy. The picture in the delta is somewhat creditable.
North Vietnamese aircraft return from China with unusual air activity. Two IL-28s again engaged in fly south.
There is nothing of significance to report in other Communist military developments. Communist hierarchy in South Vietnam met on 12 February to review the situation and to prepare for the offensive. Communist propaganda continues to focus on the northern part of South Vietnam and to imply that the Communists are taking over administrative control of that part of the country.
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---
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# I. THE MILITARY SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM
1. In what appears to be the start of a second phase of their offensive against urban centers, the Communists and-coordinated mortar and rocket attacks,on the night of 17-18 February launched widespread accompanied by scattered ground attacks, against more than 30 towns and airfields in South Vietnam.
2. The bulk of the attacks were centered in South Vietnam's III and scattered actions through-IV Corps in the southern half of the country, without II Corps. I Corps has remained largely spared in the current.round, although skirmishing has been reported along the coastal areas together with shelling in the Hue — Phu Bai area and against Khe Sanh. There continue to be strong indications of impending enemy offensive action in I Corps and possibly against additional provincial capitals along the central coast.
3. Heavy mortar and rocket fire has been directed against Tan Son Nhut Airfield serving Saigon, as well as against major installations north of the capital, possibly in allied headquarters and Saigon, to cover troop no ground attacks against effort though there has been shelling of police stations there have been movements toward Saigon within the capital and sporadic sharp fighting in outlying areas to the north and south. There are ominous Communist military and political moves indications that the capital is in for further
4. eThe current wave of attacks and resulting casualties on both sides so far appear lighter than Lat Tet. would be attacked against possible enemy action. ed at provincial capitals and Saigon all 2:00 A.M. on 18 February, nearly all areas were Primary Communist reliance on heavy weapons fire in the latest assaults has tended to minimize losses to Communist forces and the chances of direct ground engagements.
18 February 1968
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---
# Saigon Area
5. Attacks in the capital area began at Tan Son Nhut Airfield shortly after midnight on 18 February, with approximately 100 rounds of 82-mm. mortar and 122-mm. rocket fire. The first use of the latter weapon in the capital area resulted in four Americans killed and 92 wounded. Six aircraft were reported destroyed and 45 damaged. Some destruction of facilities on the base was reported. There was no ground follow-up against Tan Son Nhut, but several nearby positions, including that of an ARVN airborne element, received rocket fire.
6. In the central part of Saigon, approximately 20 rounds of mortar fire hit a police compound on 18 February, killing six and wounding 33. Fighting also occurred at points around the city, including a heavy attack against an ARVN training center north of the capital and a sharp battle some miles to the south. Major POL depots just south of the city and near Bien Hoa to the north received B-40 rocket fire, as did two ships unloading ammunition about five miles northeast of the capital. At last report, attacks continued on Tan Son Nhut and certain key targets in Saigon, including the National Police headquarters and a power plant.
7. There have been numerous reports from low-level prisoners in recent days that additional large-scale attacks would be mounted against Saigon. Police Director Loan predicted that the enemy may commit two main force battalions to the city's southwestern precincts against Tan Son Nhut, and that other forces may raid the capital.
8. There are some other indications of further action around the capital. A radio terminal serving Region 4 headquarters was tentatively fixed in the Viet Cong Military area about four miles southwest of Cholon--the Chinese-quarter of Saigon--on 17 February. This location would represent a move of 20 miles southward from the headquarters' last position on 15 February.
18 February 1968
---
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W 3.5/\/'\O0)
3.5)
9. Another radio terminal believed possibly to serve an element of COSVN—the senior Viet Cong military and political headquarters in the South--was located by direction east of Saigon, or some 95 point less-than six miles finding on 16 February at a miles from its normal base area. Finally, there is tenuous evidence that a terminal serving an unidentified military "Front" headquarters in Binh Long Province, near the Cambodian border, may have begun a southward deployment. This headquarters is believed to be a coordinating authority over the three enemy divisions in III Corps, all of which have been noted closer out of their normal operating areas and in positions to Saigon since the Tet offensive.
III Corps
Saigon, at In addition to the 11 provincial capitals -10. mortar attacks around least seven of the in night of reported against. Some ground follow tion was 17-18 February. three capitals, Song Be and III Corps also received mortar attacks on up ac the Tay Ninh city north of Saigon and Bao Trai to the Song Be and used 122-mm. Some northwest. The Communists reportedly Tay-Ninh. rockets 200 enemy troops may sniper fire was noted at Be limits although only in the assaults on be within the Song last "still city" report. several US' Simultaneously with the assaults elsewhere, 11 military installations, including Bien Hoa Airfield and nearby headquarters of US brigades at rocket fire Lai Khe, Cu Chi, and Phu Loi, also received mortar or Scattered-harassment was also reported against US advisory compounds in the capital of Binh-Long Province as has been reported well as in areas east of Saigon. No major damage
18 February 1968
I-3
9’ Q /\O"|
TD-I2-'-SE€—R-ET‘ 3.5 £1
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---
IV Corps
12. Beginning about 1:00 A.M. on 18 February, coordinated mortar 16 provincial capitals in the delta and on a number of airfields and other military installations, including a US military headquarters near My attacks were launched against Can Tho. Ground Tho and major airfields around four cities, Vinh Long, Cao Lanh, My Tho and Ben Tre, but as in III Corps, the assaults appear to have been lighter than at Tet. The heaviest ground action seems to be at Vinh Long where air strikes have been called in against an estimated 700-800 enemy troops believed in the city.
13. There are unconfirmed reports of enemy concentrations in the vicinity of some provincial and district towns in the delta which have not yet been heavily attacked.
II Corps
14. Enemy action in II Corps has been somewhat scattered, with the major action against Phan Thiet on the coast and mortar harassment and ground estimated at two to three companies attacked force probes in the highlands area. An enemy Phan Thiet temporarily seizing the town jail and freeing 500 prisoners. Although allied forces have regained control of the prison, fighting reportedly continues in part of the city. Casualties so far appear to have been light.
15. Elsewhere, Communist forces conducted a mortar attack on the Kontum Airfield and a ground attack on a nearby position. Similar harassment was reported at Da Lat where, in addition, about two companies of enemy troops reportedly attacked and entered the city. No late details are available. Quang Duc Province, received mortar fire in the Farther south, the town of Gia-Nghia, capital first of enemy action reported in this province since the beginning of the year.
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# Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C06786541
16. Other major capitals in II Corps were not attacked during the weekend, but enemy concentrations are reported within striking range of both Nha Trang and Tuy Hoa on the central coast. No action has been reported in the Dak To area of Kontum Province.
17. Allied forces and positions in northern Quang Tri Province, at Hue, and at the MACV Forward Headquarters at Phu Bai were struck by mortar, and rocket, and artillery fire under daily mortar and artillery fire. Khe Sanh continues to come on 17-18 February. In addition, sharp skirmishes have continued to occur at several points along the northern coastal region between Da Nang and the DMZ, but there have been no major outbreaks of new fighting in I Corps.
18. Communist forces in this region, however, remain deployed of major targets in positions threatening a number of major targets and could renew wide offensive activity with little warning. The 803rd North Vietnamese Regiment, which recently moved southward from the DMZ to the area of Quang Tri city, suggests that attacks may have been planned which have not yet been carried out. Hanoi had ordered a general offensive in the northern half of South Vietnam to begin in the early morning hours of 18 February; however, reportedly arrived late, forcing a delay in the offensive.
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7 35/\/\ O0 \/\/
35
3.3(h)(2)
19. i _ ‘in Da Nang K::::::::] 3.3(h)(2)
been worked out, based on of attack on the city has a new plan in the initial attack at Tet. assessment of failures an No clear date for the attack was specified 3.3(h)(2) however, a further effort will be made to seize the city employing more thorough coordination between assets within the city major elements of the North the outside, including and attacking forces from Vietnamese 2nd Division. villages. be brought in from nearby Demonstrators would also If the attack fails, ‘the Communists will 3.3(h)(2) hope at a minimum to occupy surrounding villages as "stepping stones" to later attacks.’
20. In addition to the shelling of the southern half of the city of Hue, Communist action includes continued resistance by remnants within ern half. =Some evidence of the importance of Hue in Communist plans continues to be derived. from tenuous indications that one of the three regiments of the North Vietnamese 324B Division, -which has been mov- Quang A forward element of the operations in southern ing toward Quang Tri city, may Tri—Thien—Hue head- Hue. be deploying toward quarters, which controls enemy Province, has also Tri and all. of_Thua Thien been tentatively located K::::::::] in-the. Hue Citadel 3.3(h)(2) area.
18 February 1968
s.5(¢)
rd1=~»secR“E'"I" s.5(¢)
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# POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN SOUTH VIETNAM
President Thieu has again voiced his reluctance to exercise more forceful leadership.
Anti-Communist Front.
A small step forward in the effort to form a based anti-Communist front occurred on 18 February, when a large number of widely varying political hues, and one-time military figures of veteran politicians participated in a Saigon conference dubbed the "People's Congress to Save the Nation." A number of national assemblymen were present, but apparently no members of the government's executive department or figures closely associated with President Thieu attended.
18 February 1968
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# Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C06786541
1 3.5/\O0\/
5. The meeting was characterized by an uncommon sense of urgency and commitment to the nation which held expressions of political differences and carping at the current performance of the Thieu government to a minimum...A number of speakers underlined the critical need for unity in the face of the growing Communist threat, and extolled the virtue of submerging political "prejudices," so that a unified bloc could be formed to aid the government's fight against the Communists. Aside from the rhetorical flourishes, the "Congress" took the practical step of electing a standing committee to begin organizing a nongovernment Communist front.
US Official Assesses Political Situation in Western Highlands
6. The government appears to have turned in a Tet offensive in the western highlands. The Communists creditable performance in reaction to
7. According to a Me Thuot towns, morale is high, US official who recently visited Kontum, Pleiku, and Ban and there is new-found confidence in the ARVN's ability to defend the towns successfully should there be new onslaughts. Among those who praised the forceful and effective response to the Viet Cong attacks and sons relief work past had been critical of the who in the which is now in full swing the government's military and administrative performance in the highlands.
8. The US official also observed that over the there does not appear to be any popular resentment in fact that much of the considerable destruction been towns--more than 20 percent of for example--was Ban Me Thuot has completely caused by allied fire power, the most part, taking burned to the ground, believes that the civilian population is; for a philosophical attitude toward the devastation, ascribing losses to the unpleasant realities of war.
9. Although there may be a "small minority" more critical of the government's effort, many local
18 February 1968
---
# Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C06786541
Leaders are eagerly pitching in and helping with the government's relief program; and the Viet Cong failed to generate any US official also notes, situation for their effort. However, that his assessment pertains only to the situation in the towns. Access to the countryside is still extremely limited and reliable reports on the situation there have not yet filtered in.
Aftermath of Tet Offensive in Delta
A somewhat more somber picture has been painted by He reports that the destruction of Can Tho in the delta. A US official based at Can Tho city university's only permanent building during the Tet fighting has left ill-will toward the government, and by implication the US, which will probably prove difficult to erase.
He asserts that popular resentment has been fanned by the fact that Can Tho university is the only one located in the delta, and as such has been a source of pride and hope beyond the immediate confines of Can Tho. The opinion is widely held that the virtual destruction of the university by government air and artillery strikes was not justified by the small number of Viet Cong who were holed up in its science library building.
The lackluster performance of government troops during the delta attack as well as widespread ARVN looting has also contributed heavily to popular disaffection. In addition, relations between US advisers in the delta and government military and civilian officials apparently have suffered badly as a result of ex-post facto recriminations, particularly charges by some ARVN officers that US intentionally kept insufficient military support in the early fighting.
18 February 1968
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VIETNAMESE MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS
Vietnamese aircraft are again engaged in unusual activity, possibly associated with support to Communist forces in the northern part of South Vietnam.
Three IL-28s returned to Phuc Yen Airfield from China on the evening of 18 February for attack missions. One of these IL-28s was damaged by US air strikes, but the other two returned to North Vietnam. In addition, four North Vietnamese AN-2 transports took off from Hanoi on the night of 17 February for an unidentified mission in the southern Zone area. They may have been headed for the Demilitarized Zone. These transports earlier this month performed paradrop operations in the northwestern sector of South Vietnam and the adjacent area of Laos.
There are some tentative indications that elements from North Vietnam's only airborne unit are involved, or are preparing to become involved, in current military activities.
There is no other evidence bearing on the 305th or its three battalions.
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’ I-eP—s—Ec'IUfi"‘ 35 /\OO\/
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or all ‘unusualof these units could be involved with the-DRV air transport activities of the past few weeks, including paradrop operations in the Laos/DMZ area.
18 February 1968
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IV. OTHER COMMUNIST MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS
1. There is nothing of significance to report.
18 February 1968
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V. ACOMMUNIST POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
1. Vietnamese Communist propaganda has again taken on a more strident tone in support of the new wave of coordinated attacks in the South.
Vietnamese Communists Hold Meeting
2. A meeting of top members of the Communist military and political hierarchy in South Vietnam was held on 11 and 12 February, according to a Viet Cong radio announcement on 17 February. The meeting doubtless was convened to review the overall Communist situation in the wake of the first part of the Tet offensive, and probably was used to pass on Hanoi's instructions for the coming weeks. A similar meeting was held in mid-January in which instructions for the countrywide assaults at the end of the month presumably were given to high-ranking leaders. The recent meeting probably covered some of the decisions leading up to the present resurgence of Communist military activity.
3. A full text of the communique published by this so-called "extraordinary enlarged session" of the Liberation Front's central committee is not yet available, but it is unlikely to disclose much of substance anyway. A preliminary report says the conference reviewed the "current general offensive" and discussed tasks for the immediate future.
4. A Hanoi broadcast summarizing the communiqué indicates it contained the usual glowing Communist description of the results of the Tet offensive, which it claimed had created conditions favorable for achieving final victory.
Communists Focus Attention on Northern South-Vietnam
5. Despite the relative lull in new fighting so far in the northern part of South Vietnam, Vietnamese Communist propaganda continues to zero in on
18 February 1968
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that area in particular. Recent Viet Cong and Hanoi broadcasts strongly imply that new military attacks will be accompanied by efforts to take over administrative control of wide areas in that part of the country.
The North Vietnamese party daily on 18 February carried an editorial praising "initial victories" in the current "general-offensive and simultaneous uprisings" in central Vietnam (most of I and II Corps). It claimed that Communist forces have "turned the military and political tide" there and quoted a communiqué from the rural nist command in that region saying that "vast areas" had been "liberated" and a "string" of provincial capitals and towns. According to the paper, this put the Communists in a position to "overwhelm the enemy in many areas," and promised even bigger and more resounding victories in the future.
Similarly, Hanoi came down hard on 18 February with an endorsement of the establishment of a new Province. The announcement of this committee was disintegrating the administration of Thua Thien and Hue, in the process of taking over GVN authority. The new "provisional administration" allegedly has been set up under the auspices of the Hue city "National, Democratic, and Peace Alliance," a front group unveiled by the Communists at the opening of the Tet offensive. Le Van Hao, who earlier surfaced as head of a new "revolutionary committee."
Hanoi said the committee had decided to "wipe out" the South Vietnamese administration structure "at all levels," and to "recognize" new revolutionary committees allegedly being set up throughout the Thua Thien Province.
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Much of this doubtless is sheer propaganda designed to buttress Communist claims that "revolutionary elements" from all parts of South Vietnamese society are rising up to topple the Thieu—Ky regime. Continued evolution in the Thua_Thien establishment suggests the Communists are determined to- Hue their. The persistence of the claims, however, and area SE9 some sort of new political structure in this region through political agitation and organizational rural efforts now being conducted in both urban and areas.
18 February 1968
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Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C06786541 THE_SITUATION_IN_VIETNAM[15618062].pdf | {
"Who": "US Intelligence Officials",
"What": "Communists launched a new wave of offensive action in South Vietnam, focusing on urban centers",
"When": "18 February 1968",
"Where": ["South Vietnam", "Saigon", "Tan Son Nhut Airfield", "Hue", "Phu Bai", "Khe Sanh", "III Corps", "IV Corps", "Delta", "My Tho", "Ben Tre", "Vinh Long", "Da Lat", "Quang Duc Province", "Nha Trang", "Tuy Hoa", "Nothern Quang Tri Province", "MACV Forward Headquarters at Phu Bai", "Da Nang", "Dak To area of Kontum Province"],
"Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL"
} |
"
Here is some messy data parsed from a pdf. These files may contain redacted information.
Using a json format, ouput the who, what, when, and where of the document, and required security clearence
Use the following json format:
{"Who": "key names or groups", "What": "keywords or ideas from document", "When": "day/month/year", "Where": ["referenced locations"], "Security Clearance": "CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, or TOP SECRET"
} Text: # TOP SECRET
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 30 January 1968
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
The Situation (As Of 12 NOON EST) in South Vietnam
Some additional details have been received on two new enemy attacks against the coastal II Corps. Information is now available on attacks in Tuy Hoa and Ninh Hoa cities in II Corps.
In addition, enemy artillery bombardment appears quiet along the DMZ. There is no confirmation from US military sources. Otherwise, Khe Sanh airstrip has reported military bombardment.
Ground attacks in the Da Nang area included coordinated mortar and strategic rocket attacks on high-value targets such as the airbase and military headquarters on 30 January.
At about the same time, the enemy hit several installations in the Da Nang area, including the airbase, a US Army bridge, and the city's northwest area. The enemy also attacked the "Marble Mountain" facility, a US Marine facility, and Vietnamese forces guarding the strategic Hai Van Pass.
Almost five simultaneous enemy mortar barrages were directed at Operation WHEELER/WALLOWA, straddling the borders of Quang Nam and Quang Tin provinces.
Approximately 15 miles south of Da Nang, the enemy attacked a provincial capital which had a provincial artillery base.
Reports indicate that the situation in the Chu Lai and WHEELER/WALLOWA areas is quiet. Allied forces are conducting mopping up operations in Hoi An and Da Nang. The enemy appears to have been repulsed, and the situation is less clear.
# TOP SECRET
---
# TOP SECRET
pat alliedtoforces in and aroundHoi An havenotyetforced pe enemy to abandon positions
pat enemy allied to forces abandon positions and around he seized pe Hoi An have not yet forced pe enemy seized.
Qui Nhon · An estimated 44 Viet Cong sapper company and provincial has penetrated pe capital radio station facilities of Binh Dinh Province and nearby allied maintenance complex.
ports show maintenance controlling pe radio and Communist losses of five killed and 50 wounded. Preliminary casualty losses of pree US and 60 killed.
Nha Trang Sporadic fighting of Khanh Hoa wip units 55 off Hoa wip Allied casualties to date stand at 21 killed and 66 wounded.
Pleiku City provincial. Heavy fighting apparently continues wip ARVN forces attempting to block enemy routes of escape from pe Battle area. The enemy force is estimated to have total 7 killed and at least 22 wounded.
Kontum City being reported secure wip two companies employed against Communist control on pe outskirts of pe city. At least 165 enemy troops now reported under allied airstrikes.
Ban Me Thuot capital Fighting continues wipin pe city against planned casualties. Ban Me Thuot NVA Regiment captured, pe outskirts of pe city. Enemy losses of 91 killed and 28 wounded.
# TOP SECRET
---
# Ninh Hoa
Cong havetown district Sporadic coastal fighting in Khanh Hoa Province continues in this important town in killed coastal to date.
Eleven Viet killed to date.
# Tuy Hoa
Capital intercept seven 36 killed 10. 36 killed the units of enemy leaving the Yen. Heavy fighting has broken out in Phy Yen. Allied reaction attackers has while broken the city, forces, the provincial maintaining friendly have attempting thus far losses to sustain.
Of killed seven of the and attackers, 31 wounded.
# Tan Canh
ARVN regiment 11. Sporadic contact enemy continues between elements. No results of an ARVN regiment available and an force of unknown size. THE-SITUATION-IN-SOUTH-VI15478302.pdf | {
"Who": "Central Intelligence Agency",
"What": "Intelligence memorandum detailing enemy attacks in South Vietnam",
"When": "30 January 1968",
"Where": ["South Vietnam", "Tuy Hoa", "Ninh Hoa", "DMZ", "Da Nang", "Khe Sanh", "Chu Lai", "Hoi An", "Quang Nam", "Quang Tin", "Hai Van Pass", "Qui Nhon", "Binh Dinh Province", "Nha Trang", "Khanh Hoa Province", "Pleiku City", "Kontum City", "Ban Me Thuot", "Tan Canh"],
"Security Clearance": "TOP SECRET"
} |
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