9908, contrary to Rule 30.03, 30.12, RSMo; and Canon 3(C)(1); Supreme Court Rule 51.05.
FINDING COUNT 9. THE CASE OF STATE OF MISSOURI V. OSWALD, CUNNINGHAM, AND GOINGS INVOLVED WENDELL CROW OF KENNETT, MISSOURI AND THE LOCAL PROSECUTOR, LELAND NEEGARD. THE CHARGE WAS FILED ON DECEMBER 4, 1974 AND SET FOR TRIAL ON DECEMBER 26, 1974. ON DECEMBER 17, 1974, LELAND NEEGARD PRESENTED A DISQUALIFICATION MOTION ON BEHALF OF WENDELL CROW. RESPONDENT DID NOT RULE ON THE MOTION, BUT INSTEAD TOLD THE CLERK TO HAVE A JURY READY ON DECEMBER 26, 1974. WENDELL CROW WAS FORCED TO OBTAIN A PRELIMINARY WRIT OF PROHIBITION (STATE EX REL. OSWALD V. BUFORD, 518 S.W.2d 690 (MO.APP.1975)), BEFORE RESPONDENT FOLLOWED THE SUPREME COURT RULES AND SUSTAINED THE MOTION TO DISQUALIFY.
CONCERNING HIS FAILURE TO DISQUALIFY, JUDGE BUFORD ADMITTED THAT HE KNEW A MOTION WAS PENDING BUT EXPLAINED, " . . . I DIDN'T KNOW WHETHER THE LAWYER WAS SERIOUS OR NOT." THE SUPREME COURT RULES 30.03, 30.12, 51.05 CLEARLY DICTATE THAT A JUDGE SHOULD IMMEDIATELY SUSTAIN A MOTION TO DISQUALIFY. HOWEVER, JUDGE BUFORD DOES NOT FOLLOW THESE SUPREME COURT RULES BECAUSE HE IS NOT SURE WHETHER A MOTION IS "SERIOUS." HE STATES: "SO, I HAVE FOR THE LAST THREE OR FOUR YEARS HAD GREAT DIFFICULTY IN DETERMINING WHICH MOTIONS TO DISQUALIFY ARE SERIOUS."
THERE EXISTS A REGULAR AND CONSISTENT PATTERN OF THE RESPONDENT IN FAILING TO RULE ON MOTIONS TO DISQUALIFY BECAUSE OF HIS DIFFICULTY IN DETERMINING IF THESE MOTIONS ARE "SERIOUS." THIS IS CONTRARY TO SUPREME COURT RULE 30.30, 30.12, 51.05; CANON 3C(1).
CHARGE COUNT 10. That during your term of office, you have permitted private arguments and ex parte communications with in-circuit attorneys, regarding the dismissal of lawsuits pending in your court and have encouraged oral "Motions to Dismiss" and regularly sustained same, without prior notice *847 to opposing counsel, contrary to Canon 3(A)(4).
FINDING COUNT 10. THERE APPEARS A REGULAR AND CONSISTENT PATTERN OF PERMITTING PRIVATE ARGUMENTS AND EX PARTE COMMUNICATIONS WITH IN-CIRCUIT ATTORNEYS. ALSO, NUMEROUS LAWSUITS WERE DISMISSED BY RESPONDENT, OFTEN UPON ORAL MOTION MADE BY IN-CIRCUIT ATTORNEYS AND MORE OFTEN THAN NOT, ON THE COURT'S OWN MOTION. THESE DISMISSALS WERE USUALLY WITHOUT PRIOR NOTICE AND RESULTED IN PREJUDICE TO OUT-OF-CIRCUIT ATTORNEYS. THIS FINDING IS SUPPORTED BY THE TESTIMONY OF SEVERAL LAWYERS AND JUDGE BUFORD'S OWN ADMISSIONS:
"AND I SAY NOW TO THIS COMMISSION, I DID BECOME TOO ZEALOUS IN KEEPING MY DOCKET CLEAN; I DID BECOME TOO CONCERNED; I DID - I THINK I DID GO BEYOND PROPRIETY AND THE LAWYERS SOON LET ME KNOW AND I DID BACK OFF." IN FRIGIDAIRE v. LUNA, JOHN PRATT, AN ATTORNEY FROM SPRINGFIELD REPRESENTED THE PLAINTIFF AND DON HENRY, A LOCAL ATTORNEY, WAS THE OPPOSING COUNSEL. ON AUGUST 8, 1976 MR. PRATT FILED A REQUEST FOR ADMISSIONS WHICH WAS NEVER ANSWERED. THE ATTORNEYS AGREED TO HAVE THE CASE SET FOR TRIAL BUT THE NEXT NOTICE MR. PRATT RECEIVED WAS A DOCKET SHEET STATING THE CASE HAD BEEN DISMISSED ON DECEMBER 17, 1976, AT PLAINTIFF'S