18 PROVIDES IN PERTINENT PART:
"THE COMMISSION SHALL HAVE THE POWER AND AUTHORITY AND BE CHARGED WITH THE DUTY OF SUPERVISING, REGULATING AND CONTROLLING ALL TRANSPORTATION AND TRANSMISSION COMPANIES DOING BUSINESS IN THIS STATE, IN ALL MATTERS RELATING TO THE PERFORMANCE OF THEIR PUBLIC DUTIES AND THEIR CHARGES THEREFOR, AND OF CORRECTING ABUSES AND PREVENTING UNJUST DISCRIMINATION AND EXTORTION BY SUCH COMPANIES; AND TO THAT END THE COMMISSION SHALL, FROM TIME TO TIME, PRESCRIBE AND ENFORCE AGAINST SUCH COMPANIES, IN THE MANNER HEREINAFTER AUTHORIZED, . . ."
(EMPHASIS ADDED)
TITLE 17 O.S. 1 ET SEQ, AS AMENDED, ESTABLISHES THE COMMISSION'S REGULATORY JURISDICTION OVER THE FOLLOWING TYPES OF ENTITIES: COTTON GINS, OIL AND GAS, RAILROAD COMPANIES, TELEPHONE COMPANIES, WATER, HEAT, LIGHT AND POWER COMPANIES, AND THE PUBLIC UTILITIES.
YOUR INQUIRY, HOWEVER, REFERS TO THOSE INDIVIDUALS WHO MERELY CONSUME PRODUCTS OR USE SERVICES WHICH ARE, IN TURN, PROVIDED BY COMPANIES THAT ARE REGULATED BY THE CORPORATION COMMISSION. THE LEGISLATURE HAS CLEARLY DISTINGUISHED BETWEEN THE INDIVIDUAL CONSUMER AND THOSE WHO ACTUALLY OWN STOCK IN OR OPERATE COMPANIES AND CORPORATIONS WHICH ARE REGULATED BY THE COMMISSION. THE FORMER WOULD INCLUDE VIRTUALLY EVERYONE IN THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA WHO HAS PHONE, GAS, AND/OR ELECTRICAL SERVICES PROVIDED TO THEIR HOME. IT IS IMPLAUSIBLE THAT 177, AS AMENDED BY S.B. 384, WAS INTENDED TO ENCOMPASS THE INDIVIDUAL RATE PAYERS OF PUBLIC UTILITIES WHO DO NOT OWN STOCK IN OR OPERATE SUCH CORPORATIONS. FOR THESE REASONS, IT IS MY VIEW THAT CONSUMERS WHO MERELY USE PRODUCTS AND SERVICES PROVIDED BY COMPANIES REGULATED BY THE CORPORATION COMMISSION DO NOT FALL WITHIN THE REGULATORY PURVIEW OF 177 AS AMENDED BY S.B. 384, AND THUS WOULD BE ELIGIBLE TO MAKE CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS TO INDIVIDUAL COMMISSIONERS OUTSIDE THE ONE HUNDRED TWENTY (120) DAY WINDOW PERIOD AS PROVIDED BY THE ACT.
IN YOUR SECOND QUESTION YOU INQUIRE WHETHER A DISCLAIMER ON FUND RAISING MATERIAL, TO BE MAILED BY A CORPORATION COMMISSIONER, THAT PROVIDES A WARNING TO THOSE INDIVIDUALS WHO ARE SUBJECT TO REGULATION BY THE CORPORATION COMMISSION, OR WHO OWN STOCK IN BUSINESSES REGULATED BY THE COMMISSION, WOULD SATISFY THE 177 PROHIBITION AGAINST A CORPORATION COMMISSIONER "KNOWINGLY" ACCEPTING CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS IN VIOLATION OF THE ACT. THE ANSWER TO THIS QUESTION HINGES ON THE MEANING OF THE PHRASE "KNOWINGLY ACCEPT" US IT IS USED IN 177, AS AMENDED, AND UPON OTHER FACTS SURROUNDING EACH INDIVIDUAL CONTRIBUTION, WHICH CANNOT, OF COURSE, BE ANTICIPATED IN A LETTER OF THIS TYPE. TITLE 17 PROVIDES NO DEFINITION OF THE TERM "KNOWINGLY," AND THUS IT SHOULD BE INTERPRETED ACCORDING TO THE STANDARD AND ACCEPTED MEANING OF THAT TERM. IN HUTCHMAN V. STATE, 61 OKL. CR. 117, 66 P.2D 99, 102 (1937), THE COURT STATED THAT AN ACT COMMITTED "WILLFULLY" IS THE SAME AS KNOWINGLY COMMITTING AN ACT, AND THAT BOTH KNOWINGLY AND WILLFULLY CONVEY THE SAME MEANING. IN MORE RECENT DECISIONS, OTHER JURISDICTIONS HAVE RULED ON THE MEANING OF "KNOWINGLY". IN U.S. V. LOVEKNIT MFQ. CO., 90 F. SUPP. 679, 680 (D.C. TEX. 1950), THE COURT RULED THAT IN