ON OR ABOUT FEBRUARY 4, 1977, AND SHORTLY THEREAFTER, CALLED TO THE ATTENTION OF RESPONDENT, IT IS CLEAR THAT FOR A PERIOD OF APPROXIMATELY THREE (3) MONTHS THEREAFTER, RESPONDENT DID NOT ACT ON THE DISQUALIFICATION. RESPONDENT'S TOTAL DISREGARD OF SUPREME COURT RULES CONCERNING DISQUALIFICATION IS REFLECTED IN THE FOLLOWING ADMISSION BY RESPONDENT: "IT WOULDN'T HAVE MADE NO DIFFERENCE IF I HAD BEEN DISQUALIFIED TEN TIMES, NO CHILD IN MY CIRCUIT IS GOING TO BE EXPOSED TO THIS KIND OF DAMAGE, MR. WAMPLER." THIS VIOLATED CANON 2A, CANON 3C(1)(a) AND SUPREME COURT RULE 51.05.
CHARGE COUNT 3. That in all matters affecting Alice F. Perkins, Jimmy F. Perkins and Jeffery A. Perkins, you did make orders and decrees affecting such person, having priorly represented Jimmy F. Perkins, and Alice F. Perkins, and having allowed Jimmy F. Perkins to contribute to your political campaign and visit you, at least twice, at your residence near Winona, Missouri, wherein your impartiality might reasonably be questioned and that you had a personal bias concerning Jimmy F. Perkins and personal knowledge of evidentiary facts concerning the proceedings, contrary to Canon 3(C)(1)
FINDING COUNT 3. THE COMMISSION FINDS THAT THE RESPONDENT HAD REPRESENTED JIMMY F. PERKINS ON THREE (3) OCCASIONS AND HAD KNOWINGLY PERMITTED JIMMY F. PERKINS TO CONTRIBUTE SERVICES TO PRIOR POLITICAL CAMPAIGNS OF RESPONDENT AND HAD ALLOWED PERSONAL VISITS OF JIMMY F. PERKINS TO HIS PERSONAL RESIDENCE. RESPONDENT'S IMPARTIALITY
MIGHT, THEREFORE, REASONABLY BE QUESTIONED IN THAT RESPONDENT HAD A PERSONAL BIAS TOWARD JIMMY F. PERKINS AND PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE OF EVIDENTIARY FACTS CONCERNING THE PROCEEDINGS. THE SUBSEQUENT ORDERS BY RESPONDENT REGARDING THE CUSTODY OF THE MINOR MADE BY RESPONDENT WERE IN FAVOR OF JIMMY PERKINS AND WERE IN VIOLATION OF CANON 3C(1).
CHARGE COUNT 4. That during your term of office and particularly in the above stated matters affecting Alice F. Perkins, Jimmy F. Perkins and Jeffery Allen Perkins, you have failed to discourage ex parte applications, contrary to Canon 3(A)(4).
FINDING COUNT 4. THE TESTIMONY IS CLEAR THAT RESPONDENT REGULARLY RULES ON EX PARTE ORAL MOTIONS TO DISMISS, EX PARTE ORAL REQUESTS FOR TRIAL SETTINGS, AND EX PARTE WRITTEN MOTIONS FOR ORDERS INVOLVING CHILD CUSTODY. THE COMMISSION FINDS THAT RESPONDENT FAILED TO DISCOURAGE SUCH PRACTICES. ONE OF THE MOST FLAGRANT MANIFESTATIONS OF THE RESPONDENT'S POLICY OF ENCOURAGING EX PARTE APPLICATIONS ARISES IN SOME OF THE CORRESPONDENCE IN THE PERKINS *844 CASES. ON SEPTEMBER 14, 1974 JOHN HOLSTEIN, ATTORNEY FOR ALICE PERKINS, IN OPPOSING EX PARTE ORDERS BY RESPONDENT, SENT HIM THE FOLLOWING LETTER (COMM. EXHIBIT 11) WHICH WAS CAPTIONED WITH THE FILE NUMBER OF THE PERKINS' CASE:
"DEAR JUDGE BUFORD:
BEFORE SIGNING ANY ORDERS WITH REGARD TO THE ABOVE MATTER GRANTING INJUNCTIVE RELIEF, WOULD YOU PLEASE CALL THIS OFFICE COLLECT. THANKING YOU FOR YOUR CONSIDERATION, I AM,
JOHN HOLSTEIN".
THE RESPONDENT'S HANDWRITTEN REPLY DATED SEPTEMBER 17, 1974, WAS AS FOLLOWS:
"DEAR MR. HOLSTEIN:
EX PARTE ORDERS WILL BE ISSUED BY THE COURT TO YOUR OFFICE AND ANY OTHER LAWYER WHEN PROPER PLEADINGS ARE PRESENTED AND