option is legallyin force in a precinct,made so by electionin that precinct, that a subsequentelection,held for the entire county, resultingagainstprohibition,has the effectto repeal or abrogatelocal option in that said precinct. To this propo- sitionwe cannotagree. By referenceto the variousprovi- sions of the local option statuteswe are informedthat the people of the entire county cannot expresstheir views upon this subjectso as to defeator repeallocal option in any sliodivisionof the county. Nor can the people of a precinct by a vote defeatprohibitionin any subdivisionof that pre- cinct,town or city. The countymay force prohibitionby a HOG. c. A. pounds,page 6 (v-262)
vote over precinctswhich are not in favor of it, and 80 may. precinctover cities,towns, or nubdivisionathereofthat max not be in favor of it, but cannotforce,by vote, repeal of it, in any town, city, or subdivieionthereof. The pe~ople of the county,outaideof the territoryto be affected,have no right to vote at all a8 to the law in that subdivieion.. s ." (&uphaaisours.)
The Aaron caee hae been cited frequentlyin recent caaea. The above languagewas quoted in the cane of Jacksonv. State, decidedby the Court of CriminalAppeals in 1938 and reportedin 1.18S. V. (2d) 313. Judge Graves,speakingfor the Court, eaid:
"It has long been recognizedby this court'sdecisions that when the voters of any justiceprecincthave, through the medium of an electionproperlycalledin and for such precinct,or politicalsubdivisionof any county,determined by a majorityvote that the eale of intoxicatingliquor6 ehallbe prohibitedin such precinctor other subdivieion, that it shall continueto be thue unlawfuluntil the voters of such precinctor qubdivisionmhall determineotherwiee. In other wordrr.intoxicatingliauors.once havingbeen voted out, can only be voted back-bya'majorityvote 02 the identi- cal territorythat had voted much liquor6out. To this ef- fect ie our holdingin the early case of Aaron v. State, 34 Tex. Cr. R. 103, 29 S. U. 267, in which Judge Hurt said . . . ." (Emphasisours.)
To the same effectare the ca8es of Griffinv. Tucker, decided by the SupremeCourt in 1909 and reportedin 102 Tex. 420, 118 S. W. 635; Go0dl.eGoodie Sandwich,Inc., v. State, decidedby the Dallas Court of Civil Appeals in 1940, and reportedin,138 S. U. (2d) 906; Coker,County Judge v. Kmeicik,decidedby the Commiseionof Appeals in 1935 and reported in 87 S. W. (2d) 1076; Powell ve Smith,decidedby the Fort Worth Court of Civil Appeals in 1936, and reportedin 90 S. W. (2d) 942.
It is, therefore,the opinionof thin departmentthat the county- wide local option electionof 1936 resultingin chambersCounty legalizing all alcoholicbeveragesdid not affectthe "dry" status of JusticePre- cinctX0. 1, and said precinctremained"dry'".
Your letterwith respectto JusticePrecinctNo. 2 of Chambers County is as follows:
"In the year 1916 a local option election~a8 he.1.d in JusticePrecinctNo. Two of ChambersCounty,Texas, which re- sultedin the sale of intoxicatingliquorsbeing prohibited therein;in 1933, a local option electionwas held in said PrecinctHo. Two to determinewhether or not the sale of 3.2 Hon. C. A. Pounds,page 7 (v-262)
beer shouldbe legalized,Which electionresulteti. in,legaliz- ing the sale of such beer, and in 1936 a county-w& election was held in said Chamber8Countyto determinewhether or not the sale of all alcoholicbeveragesshouldbe legalized