FOR INFLUENCING THE COMMERCIAL CONDUCT OF THE COMPANIES IN QUESTION SO AS TO RESTRICT OR DISTORT COMPETITION ON THE MARKET ON WHICH THEY CARRY ON BUSINESS .
38 THAT WILL BE TRUE IN PARTICULAR WHERE, BY THE ACQUISITION OF A SHAREHOLDING OR THROUGH SUBSIDIARY CLAUSES IN THE AGREEMENT, THE INVESTING COMPANY OBTAINS LEGAL OR DE FACTO CONTROL OF THE COMMERCIAL CONDUCT OF THE OTHER COMPANY OR WHERE THE AGREEMENT PROVIDES FOR COMMERCIAL COOPERATION BETWEEN THE COMPANIES OR CREATES A STRUCTURE LIKELY TO BE USED FOR SUCH COOPERATION .
39 THAT MAY ALSO BE THE CASE WHERE THE AGREEMENT GIVES THE INVESTING COMPANY THE POSSIBILITY OF REINFORCING ITS POSITION AT A LATER STAGE AND TAKING EFFECTIVE CONTROL OF THE OTHER COMPANY . ACCOUNT MUST BE TAKEN NOT ONLY OF THE IMMEDIATE EFFECTS OF THE AGREEMENT BUT ALSO OF ITS POTENTIAL EFFECTS AND OF THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE AGREEMENT MAY BE PART OF A LONG-TERM PLAN .
40 FINALLY, EVERY AGREEMENT MUST BE ASSESSED IN ITS ECONOMIC CONTEXT AND IN PARTICULAR IN THE LIGHT OF THE SITUATION ON THE RELEVANT MARKET . MOREOVER, WHERE THE COMPANIES CONCERNED ARE MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS WHICH CARRY ON BUSINESS ON A WORLD-WIDE SCALE, THEIR RELATIONSHIPS OUTSIDE THE COMMUNITY CANNOT BE IGNORED . IT IS NECESSARY IN PARTICULAR TO CONSIDER THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE AGREEMENT IN QUESTION MAY BE PART OF A POLICY OF GLOBAL COOPERATION BETWEEN THE COMPANIES WHICH ARE PARTY TO IT .
41 IT IS IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THOSE CONSIDERATIONS THAT IT MUST BE DETERMINED WHETHER THE COMMISSION, IN EXAMINING THE 1984 AGREEMENTS, WAS WRONG TO HOLD THAT THERE WAS NO PROOF OF ANTI-COMPETITIVE OBJECT OR EFFECT .
42 WITH REGARD TO THE SITUATION ON THE MARKET FOR CIGARETTES, THE COMMISSION POINTED OUT IN ITS STATEMENT OF OBJECTIONS CONCERNING THE 1981 AGREEMENTS THAT THAT MARKET WAS STAGNANT IN VOLUME TERMS FROM 1976 TO 1980, THE PERIOD CONSIDERED BY IT . IT ALSO STATED THAT WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THE FRENCH AND ITALIAN MARKETS, WHERE THERE ARE STATE MONOPOLIES, THE COMMUNITY MARKET IS DOMINATED BY SIX GROUPS OF COMPANIES, AMONG THEM THE APPLICANTS AND INTERVENERS IN THIS CASE .
43 THE COMMISSION CONSIDERS THAT ON THE MARKET FOR CIGARETTES, WHICH IS STAGNANT AND OLIGOPOLISTIC AND ON WHICH THERE IS NO REAL COMPETITION ON PRICES OR IN RESEARCH, ADVERTISING AND CORPORATE ACQUISITION ARE THE PRINCIPAL MEANS OF INCREASING MARKET SHARE . FURTHERMORE, SINCE THE MARKET IS DOMINATED BY LARGE COMPANIES WITH CONSIDERABLE RESOURCES AND EXPERTISE, AND ADVERTISING IS OF GREAT IMPORTANCE, BARRIERS TO ENTRY ARE VERY HIGH .
44 IN THE MARKET SITUATION DESCRIBED BY THE COMMISSION, A DESCRIPTION WHICH WAS NOT DISPUTED IN ANY SUBSTANTIAL RESPECT BY THE OTHER PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS, ANY COMPANY WISHING TO INCREASE ITS MARKET SHARE WILL BE STRONGLY TEMPTED, WHERE THE OPPORTUNITY ARISES, TO TAKE CONTROL OF A COMPETITOR . IN SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES, ANY ATTEMPTED TAKE-OVER AND ANY AGREEMENT LIKELY TO PROMOTE COMMERCIAL COOPERATION BETWEEN TWO OR MORE OF THOSE DOMINANT COMPANIES IS LIABLE TO RESULT IN RESTRICTION