TO PROTECT HIMSELF. ACCORDINGLY, THIS ASSESSMENT IS NOT A MERE
"FINDING OF FACT," BUT RATHER AN APPLICATION OF LAW TO THE FACTS FOUND BY THE
DISTRICT COURT. IT IS THEREFORE NOT SUBJECT TO THE CLEAR-ERROR ANALYSIS OF RULE
52(A), BUT IS, RATHER, SUBJECT TO OUR RULES FOR REVIEWING ERRORS OF LAW.
THE DISTRICT COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT ACKNOWLEDGE THAT "[T]HE WORK OF THE
DRILLER, THE FLOORHANDS AND THE DERRICKMAN ARE INTERRELATED." THE FINDINGS ALSO
NOTE THAT "THE DERRICKMAN CAN STOP THE OPERATION BY REFUSING TO UNLATCH THE
ELEVATORS." THESE FINDINGS SUGGEST THAT THE DISTRICT COURT BELIEVED THAT CRAWFORD
WAS JUST AS INVOLVED IN (AND RESPONSIBLE FOR) THE PROCESS OF TRIPPING THE PIPE AS
WERE THE WORKERS ON THE DRILL FLOOR. IN LIGHT OF THE SUBSTANTIAL POSSIBILITY THAT
THE APPLICATION OF ERRONEOUS JONES ACT NEGLIGENCE STANDARDS AFFECTED THE DISTRICT
COURT'S DETERMINATION OF THE ISSUE OF CRAWFORD'S POSSIBLE CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE,
WE FIND THAT FALCON DRILLING'S DEFENSE WAS MATERIALLY PREJUDICED. WHETHER OR NOT
A RECONSIDERATION UNDER THE PROPER STANDARDS WILL ULTIMATELY RESULT IN A FINDING OF
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE, THE PRESENCE OF EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD SUGGESTING THAT
CRAWFORD'S OWN NEGLECT COULD HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO HIS ACCIDENT PERSUADES US THAT
FALCON DRILLING'S SUBSTANTIAL RIGHTS HAVE BEEN AFFECTED FOR THE PURPOSES OF PLAIN-
ERROR ANALYSIS.
D.
FINALLY, WE TURN TO THE QUESTION OF WHETHER THE ERROR IN THIS CASE SERIOUSLY
AFFECTS THE FAIRNESS, INTEGRITY, OR PUBLIC REPUTATION OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS. SEE
OLANO, 507 U.S. AT 732. THIS PART OF THE OLANO TEST ESSENTIALLY ENTRUSTS US TO
EXERCISE OUR JUDICIAL DISCRETION TO DETERMINE WHETHER OR NOT THIS IS THE KIND OF
EXCEPTIONAL CASE THAT MERITS REVERSAL ON THE BASIS OF PLAIN ERROR. SEE ID. AT
735-37; JOHNSON, 117 S. CT. AT 1550; CALVERLEY, 37 F.3D AT 164. AN ARRAY
OF FACTORS CONVINCE US THAT THIS STANDARD IS MET IN THE PRESENT CASE.
FIRST, THE SIMILARITY BETWEEN THE PROCEDURAL SETTING OF THIS CASE AND THAT
OF HORMEL V. HELVERING, 312 U.S. 552 (1941), IS COMPELLING. IN HORMEL, THE
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE ASSESSED A DEFICIENCY AGAINST MR. HORMEL FOR
FAILURE TO REPORT ON HIS INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX RETURNS THE INCOME FROM SEVERAL
TRUSTS WHICH THE COMMISSIONER DEEMED TO BE REVOCABLE (THE INCOME FROM SUCH TRUSTS
THEREFORE BEING ATTRIBUTABLE TO THE DEFENDANT). THE COMMISSIONER DEFENDED HIS
POSITION BY RELYING ON SECTIONS 166 AND 167 OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE. THE
BOARD OF TAX APPEALS RULED IN FAVOR OF MR. HORMEL ON THE QUESTION OF WHETHER HE
WAS LIABLE FOR TAXES ON THE TRUST INCOME. ON APPEAL TO THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT, THE
COMMISSIONER ABANDONED HIS RELIANCE ON SECTION 166, AND RELIED ON SECTIONS 22(A)
AND 167 TO SUPPORT THE FINDING OF DEFICIENCY. THE DEFENDANT OBJECTED TO THE
COMMISSIONER'S USE OF A NEW ARGUMENT, THAT BASED ON SECTION 22(A), ON APPEAL.
STILL, THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT REVERSED THE JUDGMENT OF THE BOARD OF TAX APPEALS,
HOLDING THAT SECTION 22(A) GOVERNED THE MATTER AND DICTATED THE RESULT ADVOCATED
BY THE COMMISSIONER. SEE HORMEL, 312 U.S. AT 553-55.
THE SUPREME COURT GRANTED CERTIORARI,