THE COURT OBSERVES THAT IN ORDER TO GIVE FULL EFFECT TO THOSE PROVISIONS , REFERENCE SHOULD , IN APPLYING THEM , BE MADE PRINCIPALLY TO THE GENERAL SCHEME AND THE PURPOSES OF THE CONVENTION .
13 ACCORDING TO SETTLED CASE-LAW ( JUDGMENT OF 14 DECEMBER 1976 IN CASE 24/76 , SALOTTI V RUWA , ( 1976 ) ECR 1831 ; JUDGMENT OF 14 DECEMBER 1976 IN CASE 25/76 , SEGOURA V BONAKDARIAN , ( 1976 ) ECR 1851 ; JUDGMENT OF 6 MAY 1980 IN CASE 784/79 , PORTA-LEASING V PRESTIGE INTERNATIONAL , ( 1980 ) ECR 1517 ; JUDGMENT OF 19 JUNE 1984 IN CASE 71/83 , TILLY RUSS V HAVEN EN VERVOERBEDRIJF NOVA ( 1984 ) ECR 2417 ), THE REQUIREMENTS SET OUT IN ARTICLE 17 GOVERNING THE VALIDITY OF JURISDICTION CLAUSES MUST BE STRICTLY CONSTRUED SINCE THE PURPOSE OF ARTICLE 17 IS TO ENSURE THAT THE PARTIES HAVE ACTUALLY CONSENTED TO SUCH A CLAUSE AND THAT THEIR CONSENT IS CLEARLY AND PRECISELY DEMONSTRATED .
14 IT MUST BE POINTED OUT THAT , UNLIKE THE PROVISIONS CONCERNING PERSONS DOMICILED IN LUXEMBOURG CONTAINED IN THE SECOND PARAGRAPH OF ARTICLE 1 OF THE PROTOCOL ANNEXED TO THE CONVENTION , ARTICLE 17 OF THE CONVENTION DOES NOT EXPRESSLY REQUIRE THAT THE WRITTEN CONFIRMATION OF AN ORAL ARGUMENT SHOULD BE GIVEN BY THE PARTY WHO IS TO BE AFFECTED BY THE AGREEMENT . MOREOVER , AS THE VARIOUS OBSERVATIONS SUBMITTED TO THE COURT HAVE RIGHTLY EMPHASIZED , IT IS SOMETIMES DIFFICULT TO DETERMINE THE PARTY FOR WHOSE BENEFIT A JURISDICTION AGREEMENT HAS BEEN CONCLUDED BEFORE PROCEEDINGS HAVE ACTUALLY BEEN INSTITUTED .
15 IF IT IS ACTUALLY ESTABLISHED THAT JURISDICTION HAS BEEN CONFERRED BY EXPRESS ORAL AGREEMENT AND IF CONFIRMATION OF THAT ORAL AGREEMENT BY ONE OF THE PARTIES HAS BEEN RECEIVED BY THE OTHER AND THE LATTER HAS RAISED NO OBJECTION TO IT WITHIN A REASONABLE TIME THEREAFTER , THE AFORESAID LITERAL INTERPRETATION OF ARTICLE 17 WILL ALSO , AS THE COURT HAS ALREADY DECIDED IN ANOTHER CONTEXT ( SEE JUDGMENT OF 19 JUNE 1984 , CITED ABOVE ), BE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PURPOSE OF THAT ARTICLE , WHICH IS TO ENSURE THAT THE PARTIES HAVE ACTUALLY CONSENTED TO THE CLAUSE . IT WOULD THEREFORE BE A BREACH OF GOOD FAITH FOR A PARTY WHO DID NOT RAISE ANY OBJECTION SUBSEQUENTLY TO CONTEST THE APPLICATION OF THE ORAL AGREEMENT . IT IS NOT NECESSARY IN THIS CASE TO DECIDE THE QUESTION OF WHETHER AND TO WHAT EXTENT OBJECTIONS RAISED BY THE OTHER PARTY TO THE WRITTEN CONFIRMATION OF AN ORAL AGREEMENT COULD , IN AN APPROPRIATE CASE , BE TAKEN INTO CONSIDERATION .
16 THE REPLY TO THE QUESTION REFERRED TO THE COURT MUST THEREFORE BE THAT THE FIRST PARAGRAPH OF ARTICLE 17 OF THE CONVENTION OF 27 SEPTEMBER 1968 ON JURISDICTION AND THE ENFORCEMENT OF JUDGMENTS IN CIVIL AND COMMERCIAL MATTERS MUST BE INTERPRETED AS MEANING THAT THE FORMAL REQUIREMENTS THEREIN LAID DOWN ARE SATISFIED IF IT IS ESTABLISHED THAT