124 F.3d 210
NOTICE: Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3 provides that dispositions other than opinions or orders designated for publication are not precedential and should not be cited except when relevant under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel.
BELLEVUE MANOR ASSOCIATES, Plaintiff-Appellant,
and
BOUNDARY VILLAGE APARTMENTS; BRANDT NORWEST COMPANY;
BURIEN HOUSE ASSOCIATES; MARY CARPINITO; CASHMERE MANOR
ASSOCIATES; CEDAR HEIGHTS PARTNERSHIP; CEDARWOOD APARTMENT
INVESTORS; CENTRALIA MANOR ASSOCIATES; CHARTER HOUSE
ASSOCIATES; CHEHALIS MANOR ASSOCIATES; EASTWOOD SQUARE
ASSOCIATES; EMERSON MANOR ASSOCIATES; ENTIAT GARDENS
LIMITED PARTNERSHIP; FERNDALE VILLA LIMITED PARTNERSHIP;
HARBOR MANOR ASSOCIATES; GORDON HENDRICKSON; JOANNE
HENDRICKSON; HERITAGE ASSOCIATES; WOODLAKE MANOR III;
HOMESTEAD ASSOCIATES; KENNEWICK GARDEN COURT ASSOCIATES;
ANACORTES MANOR ASSOCIATES; LAKEVIEW MANOR; WOODLAND GLEN
ASSOCIATES; MAGNOLIA APARTMENT INVESTORS; KURTIS R. MAYER;
PAMELA MAYER; MCKINLEY TERRANCE ASSOCIATES; MEADOW PARK
GARDEN COURT ASSOCIATES; MONROE APARTMENT ASSOCIATES;
MONTESANO HARBOR ANNEX CO.; NORTHWOOD SQUARE ASSOCIATES;
OLYMPIAN ASSOCIATES; PATRICIA HARRIS MANOR ASSOCIATES;
PINE GARDEN PROPERTIES; SKAGIT VILLAGE ASSOCIATES;
SOUTHHILL ASSOCIATES; SOUTHWOOD SQUARE ASSOCIATES; TACOMA
PARTNERSHIP; MARIANNE UCHIMURA; MINORU UCHIMURA; VASHON
TERRACE ASSOCIATES; WENATCHEE HOUSE ASSOCIATES; WILBUR
MANOR ASSOCIATES, Plaintiff-Intervenor-Appellants.
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Acting Through the Department of
Housing and Urban Development, Defendant-Appellee.
No. 95-35929.
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
Argued and Submitted Aug. 9, 1996.
Decided Sept. 8, 1997.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington Barbara J. Rothstein, Magistrate Judge, Presiding. Argued and Submitted August 9, 1996 Seattle, Washington
Before: ALARCN, NORRIS, and KLEINFELD, Circuit Judges.
MEMORANDUM*
Bellevue argues that the district court did not have the power to vacate a final declaratory judgment and that res judicata applies to protect the judgment. We need not decide whether that is so, because, as the government concedes, the district court did not vacate the declaratory judgment.
Bellevue argues that the district court erred in vacating the permanent injunction. The only reason the district court gave for vacating the injunction was that "it is no longer equitable to maintain prospective injunctive relief in place when the substantive law on which the relief was based has been disapproved by the highest court in a very similar case involving virtually the same contract provisions." We understand the reference to the equities to mean only that the law on which the injunction had been based had changed.
The district court was correct that the law had changed. But under our prior decisions, a change in the law is not sufficient reason to vacate a permanent injunction incorporated in a final judgment. "[A] change in the applicable law after judgment has become final in all respects is not a sufficient basis for vacating a judgment." Clifton v. Attorney General of the State of California, 997 F.2d 660, 665 (9th Cir.1993) (quoting Tomlin v. McDaniel, 865 F.2d 209, 210 (9th Cir.1989)).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(5) permits relief when "a prior judgment upon which [the judgment to be vacated] has been reversed or otherwise vacated" itself, but this applies only to a prior judgment with preclusive effect on