INTERPRETATION WERE TO BE ADOPTED, IT WOULD FOLLOW THAT MEMBER STATES COULD IGNORE DECISIONS TAKEN AGAINST THEM BY THE HIGH AUTHORITY AND WAIT UNTIL PROCEEDINGS UNDER ARTICLE 88 WERE INITIATED AGAINST THEM, AND THEN IN THEIR TURN BRING PROCEEDINGS AGAINST THE SAID DECISIONS EVERY TIME IT APPEARED TO THEM EXPEDIENT TO DO SO .
MOREOVER, WHILE ARTICLE 88 DOES NOT PERMIT DISPUTES CONCERNING PREVIOUS DECISIONS, AS IS STATED ABOVE, NEVERTHELESS ARTICLE 37 OFFERS MEMBER STATES THE POSSIBILITY OF DISPUTING DECISIONS IN THE SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES MENTIONED THEREIN .
THE APPLICANT BASES ITS INTERPRETATION ON THE JUDGMENT OF THE COURT IN CASE 9/56, BUT IN DOING SO FAILS TO UNDERSTAND THE MEANING AND SCOPE OF IT . THAT JUDGMENT DID NOT INTERPRET THE THIRD PARAGRAPH OF ARTICLE 36 AS MEANING THAT APPLICANTS MAY CONTEST NOT ONLY THE LEGALITY OF GENERAL DECISIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS, BUT ALSO THE LEGALITY OF DECISIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ADDRESSED TO THEM AND WHICH THEY ARE ALLEGED NOT TO HAVE OBSERVED .
MOREOVER, SUCH AN INTERPRETATION WOULD BE IN MANIFEST CONTRADICTION WITH A FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE OF LAW, CONFIRMED BY THE LAST PARAGRAPH OF ARTICLE 33 . THE LIMITATION PERIOD FOR BRINGING AN ACTION FULFILS A GENERALLY RECOGNIZED NEED, NAMELY THE NEED TO PREVENT THE LEGALITY OF ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS FROM BEING CALLED IN QUESTION INDEFINITELY, AND THIS MEANS THAT THERE IS A PROHIBITION ON REOPENING A QUESTION AFTER THE LIMITATION PERIOD HAS EXPIRED .
SINCE EVEN ARTICLE 36 DOES NOT PERMIT THE LEGALITY OF AN INDIVIDUAL DECISION OF THE HIGH AUTHORITY TO BE DISCUSSED AFRESH AFTER THE LIMITATION PERIOD HAS EXPIRED, THERE IS STILL LESS REASON TO ACCEPT THE PROPOSITION THAT IT IS PERMITTED BY ARTICLE 88 IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY PROVISION ON THE SUBJECT .
IN THE PRESENT CASE THE COURT HAS NO JURISDICTION TO EXAMINE THE COMPLAINTS PUT FORWARD BY THE APPLICANT AGAINST THE DECISIONS OF 12 FEBRUARY 1958, SINCE PROCEEDINGS MAY BE INITIATED AGAINST THOSE DECISIONS UNDER ARTICLE 33, AND SINCE, MOREOVER, AS THE PARTIES ACCEPT, THE APPLICANT HAS INITIATED SUCH PROCEEDINGS WITHIN DUE TIME .
5 . FINALLY, THE APPLICANT ALLEGES THAT THE PERIOD SET BY THE CONTESTED DECISION IS SHORTER THAN THE PERIOD WITHIN WHICH PROCEEDINGS MUST BE INITIATED UNDER ARTICLE 88 .
THIS SUBMISSION IS UNFOUNDED . IT DOES NOT APPEAR FROM THE WORDING OF ARTICLE 88 THAT THE PERIOD SET FOR FULFILLING AN OBLIGATION MUST BE AT LEAST AS LONG AS THE PERIOD WITHIN WHICH PROCEEDINGS MUST BE INITIATED . SUCH A REQUIREMENT COULD NOT BE IN THE INTEREST OF THE MEMBER STATES, FOR IT CLEARLY APPEARS FROM THE THIRD PARAGRAPH OF ARTICLE 88 THAT, EVEN SUPPOSING THAT THE HIGH AUTHORITY WERE TO TAKE THE MEASURES SET OUT AT ( A ) AND ( B ) OF THE SAID THIRD PARAGRAPH PRIOR TO THE EXPIRY OF THE PERIOD WITHIN WHICH PROCEEDINGS MUST BE INITIATED, SUCH ACTION WOULD BE RENDERED NUGATORY BY A SUBSEQUENT ACTION BROUGHT WITHIN THE PRESCRIBED PERIOD .
THEREFORE THE APPLICATION AGAINST THE DECISION OF 1 DECEMBER 1958 MUST BE DISMISSED