CLAIMANT SHALL ALSO BE FURNISHED AN ITEMIZED STATEMENT OF REPAIR AT THE TIME OF ACCEPTANCE OF THE REPAIRED MOTOR VEHICLE. (EMPHASIS ADDED)."
ANOTHER PART OF 36 O.S. 1257 PROVIDES THAT AN INSURER "SHALL NOT REQUIRE A CLAIMANT TO TRAVEL UNREASONABLY . . . TO . . . HAVE THE MOTOR VEHICLE REPAIRED AT A SPECIFIC REPAIR SHOP." 36 O.S. 1257(D). (EMPHASIS ADDED)."
THE FOREGOING STATUTORY LANGUAGE HAS NOT BEEN THE SUBJECT OF CONSTRUCTION BY THE COURTS IN OKLAHOMA. ORDINARILY, RESORT TO LONG-RECOGNIZED RULES OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION WOULD THEREFORE BE NECESSARY TO DETERMINE THE LEGISLATIVE INTENT BEHIND THE PASSAGE OF 36 O.S. 1257(H) AND 36 O.S. 1257(D). HOWEVER, THERE IS NO ROOM FOR CONSTRUCTION OF A PROVISION OR FURTHER INQUIRY WHEN THE STATUTE PLAINLY SPEAKS AND ITS EVIDENT MEANING MUST BE ACCEPTED. MINDEMANN V. IND. SCHOOL DIST. NO. 6 OF CADDO COUNTY, 771 P.2D 996 (OKLA. 1989).
THE PLAIN LANGUAGE WHICH IS EMPHASIZED ABOVE CLEARLY AND UNEQUIVOCALLY INDICATES THAT THE LEGISLATURE WAS FULLY AWARE OF THE POSSIBILITY OF AN INSURER'S PRACTICE OF DESIGNATING SPECIFIC SHOPS FOR MOTOR VEHICLE REPAIRS AND REQUIRING THE INSURED TO HAVE THE REPAIRS PERFORMED THERE. CERTAINLY, THERE IS NO EXPRESS PROHIBITION AGAINST SUCH A PRACTICE FOUND THERE OR ANYWHERE ELSE IN THE CODE. IN FACT, LEGISLATIVE INACTION OR SILENCE AS TO PROHIBITION OF THE PRACTICE WHEN IT IS CLEARLY AWARE OF THE OCCURRENCE OF SUCH A PRACTICE WOULD BE INDICATIVE OF LEGISLATIVE INTENT THAT THE PRACTICE NOT BE PROHIBITED. CITY OF DUNCAN V. BINQHAM, 394 P.2D 456 (OKLA. 1964).
ANOTHER SUBSECTION OF 36 O.S. 1257 EXPRESSLY ALLOWS AN INSURER TO FURNISH A CLAIMANT WITH THE NAMES OF ONE OR MORE CONVENIENTLY LOCATED REPAIR SHOPS, IF REQUESTED BY THE CLAIMANT. A FAIR READING OF 1257 IN ITS ENTIRETY CLEARLY INDICATES THAT THE PRACTICE WITH WHICH YOU ARE CONCERNED IS NOT PROHIBITED, BUT RATHER, IS REGULATED SO AS TO ENSURE THAT NO UNREASONABLE BURDEN IS PLACED ON THE CLAIMANT BY SUCH A PRACTICE AND TO ENSURE THAT THE CLAIMANT'S VEHICLE IS PROPERLY REPAIRED.