in law annulled by tbe coming into existence of tbe state of war between tbe United States and Germany some six months prior to tbe passage of that act. It does appear in this record that the lumber company did give to tbe alien property custodian notice of tbe making of this contract before tbe beginning of tbe war, of its executory character at that time, of what bad been done by tbe parties thereunder, and of tbe lumber company's claim that it bad been annulled by tbe entry of tbe United States into tbe war. We are not here, we think, called upon to inquire as to tbe sufficiency of that notice or its effect as between tbe alien property custodian, representing tbe United States and tbe lumber company; that, as we view it, being foreign to tbe question of tbe annulling of tbe contract by tbe coming into existence of a state of war between tbe United States and Germany before tbe passage of that act.
In view of tbe tender made by tbe lumber company to Heidner of tbe whole amount of the portion of tbe purchase price of tbe lumber, which was paid by him to tbe lumber company; bis refusal of that tender and tbe keeping of it good by the lumber company by tbe deposit of tbe amount thereof with the clerk of the superior court; and tbe annulling of tbe contract by tbe commencement of tbe war between tbe United *669States and Germany; we conclude that Heidner has not shown any cause for recovery in any sum from the lumber company.
The judgment is affirmed.
Main, C. J., Fullerton, and Tolman, JJ., concur.