FILED WITHIN A REASONABLE TIME.
{¶ 14} WE FIND NO ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN THE TRIAL COURT'S CONCLUSION. AT THE HEARING, BYRON SHEPARD TESTIFIED THAT THERE WAS A DELAY IN FILING THE CIV.R. 60(B) MOTION BECAUSE "IT TOOK US A LONG TIME TO GET THE PAPERS TOGETHER, AND THIS WAS THE FIRST TIME FOR US. IT WAS LIKE INVENTING THE WHEEL. * * * IMMEDIATELY WE WENT TO WORK TO GET THE PAPERS TO UNDERSTAND IT, TO READ IT, AND TRY TO FIGURE OUT WHAT WE WANTED TO DO, AND WHEN WE FINALLY DID, WE DID IT." (SHEPARD AT 10.) ALTHOUGH SHEPARD ACKNOWLEDGED THAT HE RELIED ON HIS ATTORNEY, HIS SON, AND THE OTHER OFFICERS OF SHEPARD GRAIN TO RESPOND TO FIFTH THIRD'S COMPLAINT, THE TRIAL COURT WAS FREE TO CREDIT HIS EXPLANATION FOR THE DELAY. MOREOVER, THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT FOUND THAT THE APPOINTMENT OF THE RECEIVER DID NOT AFFECT THE REASONABLENESS OF SHEPARD GRAIN'S DELAY. THE RECEIVER WAS APPOINTED FIVE DAYS AFTER FIFTH THIRD OBTAINED A JUDGMENT AGAINST SHEPARD GRAIN AND THE INDIVIDUAL GUARANTORS. IN OUR JUDGMENT, SHEPARD GRAIN WAS NOT REQUIRED TO FILE ITS MOTION WITHIN THAT FIVE DAY PERIOD IN ORDER TO BE TIMELY. WE THEREFORE CONCLUDE THAT THE TRIAL COURT ACTED WITHIN ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT CONCLUDED THAT THE CIV.R. 60(B) MOTION WAS TIMELY.
{¶ 15} FIFTH THIRD'S THIRD ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR IS OVERRULED.
{¶ 16} "THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN OVERRULING FIFTH THIRD'S MOTION IN LIMINE AND ALLOWING SHEPARD TO INTRODUCE PAROLE [SIC] EVIDENCE IN THE FORM OF TESTIMONY AT TRIAL AND THROUGH AFFIDAVITS OF BYRON M. SHEPARD AND MARK B. SHEPARD."
{¶ 17} IN ITS FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR, FIFTH THIRD CHALLENGES THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION TO PERMIT SHEPARD GRAIN TO OFFER PAROL EVIDENCE REGARDING ITS AGREEMENTS WITH FIFTH THIRD AT THE CIV.R. 60(B) HEARING. FIFTH THIRD STATES THAT THE 1994 AGREEMENT, AS AMENDED IN 2002, CLEARLY SETS FORTH THE MATURITY DATE AND THE TERMS OF DEFAULT. SPECIFICALLY, THE BANK INDICATES THAT THE NOVEMBER AND DECEMBER 2002 AGREEMENTS STATE THAT THE LOAN WAS EXTENDED THROUGH APRIL 1, 2003, AND THE AGREEMENTS DID NOT ALTER THE DEFAULT PROVISIONS CONTAINED IN THE ORIGINAL 1994 AGREEMENT. FIFTH THIRD ASSERTS THAT SHEPARD GRAIN IMPERMISSIBLY OFFERED PAROL EVIDENCE IN AN ATTEMPT TO ALTER THE TERMS OF SUBSEQUENT WRITTEN, INTEGRATED AGREEMENTS, I.E., THE NOVEMBER AND DECEMBER 2002 AGREEMENTS.
{¶ 18} "THE PAROL EVIDENCE RULE IS A RULE OF SUBSTANTIVE LAW THAT PROHIBITS PARTIES TO A CONTRACT FROM LATER CONTRADICTING THE EXPRESS TERMS OF THE CONTRACT WITH EVIDENCE OF OTHER ALLEGED OR ACTUAL AGREEMENTS. ABSENT CLAIMS OF FRAUD, MISTAKE OR SOME OTHER INVALIDATING CAUSE, THE PARTIES' WRITTEN AGREEMENT MAY THEREFORE NOT BE VARIED, CONTRADICTED, OR SUPPLEMENTED BY OR ON ACCOUNT OF EVIDENCE OF PRIOR OR CONTEMPORANEOUS ORAL AGREEMENTS, OR BY WRITTEN AGREEMENTS WHICH THE TERMS OF THE PRINCIPAL CONTRACT DO NOT EXPRESSLY AUTHORIZE." EVILSIZOR V. BECRAFT SONS GEN. CONTRACTORS, LTD., CLARK APP. NO. 03-CA-0069, 2004-OHIO-1306 (CITATIONS OMITTED). IN GENERAL, THE MEANING OF A CONTRACT