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Hon. Homer Garrison,Jr., Director Departmentof Public Safety Austin,Texas OpinionNo. V-580.
Ile: Interpretation of Article1, Subdivision1, Section2 (a), of the UniformAct Regulating Dear Sir: Traffic on Highways.
You have requestedof this office an interpretation of Article 1, Subdivision1, Section2 (a) of the UniformAct RegulatingTrafficon Highways,which reads as follows:
"AuthorizedEmergencyVehicles. Vehiclesof the fire department(firepatrol),police vehicles, and such ambulancesand emergencyvehiclesof munic- ipal departmentsor public servicecorporationsas are deeignatedor authorizedby the police commis- sioneror the chief of police of an incorporated city."
Before a consideration of the specificquestionsare undertaken,it shouldbe specifically pointedout that that por- tion of the above articleinsofaras it appliesto public serv- ice corporationsis unconstitutional.In the case of Walsh v. Dallas Railwayand TerminalCompany,167 S.w.213.1018, the very same languagewas in questionin the form of a city ordinanceof the City of Dallas. In placinghis interpretationupon the or- dinance,Chief JusticeAlexandersaid:
"It will be noted, however,that while the or- dinanceattemptsto grant permissionto the chief of police to designatewhat vehiclesshall have the privilegeof an 'authorized emergencyvehicle',and thus be exemptedfrom many of the provisionsof the ordinancesregulatingothers,it sets up no stand- ard by which the chief of police is to be guided in making such a designation. It is left to his uubrid- led discretionto say to whom the law shall be appli- cable,and to whom it shall not be applicable. For that reason,Section1 of said ordinance,insofaras it appliesto public servicecorporationsto be des- ignatedby the chief of police is invalid. crossman Hon. Homer Garrison,Jr., Page 2, v-580.
v. City of Galveston,112 Tex. 303, 247 S.W. 810, Spann v. City of Dallas,111 Tex. 350, 235 S.W. 513; ContinentalOil Co. v. City of WichitaFalls, Tex.Com.App.,42 S.W. (2d) 236; 30 Tex.Jur.117, n. 18; 37 ~m.~ur.,page 778, sec. SO; annotations in 54 A.L,R. 1104."
There can be no doubt but that the reasons invalidat- ing the city ordinancein turn invalidatethat portionof the act herein in question. Under its savingclause,however,the remainingportionof the sectionunder considerationis consti- tutional;and all questionshere answeredare viewed in light of this interpretation.
(1) Are vehicleswhich are recognizedas po- lice vehiclesrequiredto be design&ed as authorizedemergencyvehiclesin order to make emergencyruns under the state highwaylaws?
(2) Are automobilesoperatedby the United States ImmigrationBorder Patrol recog- nized as or consideredto be police ve- hicles?
(3) If automobilesoperatedby the United States Immigrationi?order Patrol are rec- ognizedas police vehiclesunder the state law, would they stillbe requiredto be designdtedas authorizedemergencyvehic- les by a police commissioneror a chief of police in order to make emergency runs with- in the limits of an incorporatedcity?
Question1 is answeredin the negative. The clear importof the statuteis that authorizedemergencyvehiclesin- clude police vehicles. Had the Legislatureintendedthat the Police Commissioneror Chief of Police place his authorization upon policevehicles,it would have so declared. As the statute now reads,the authorization and designationare applicableonly to ambulancesand emergencyvehiclesof municipaldepartments. By the same token, it is inconceivablethat our State Legislature intendedonly State and local peace officersto enjoy this spe- cial sanctionin attemptingto keep the peace and enforcethe law of the land. For State or local authoritiesto interferewith the Federal arm of justicewould be to overridea principlere- garded as establishedsinceMcCullochv. Maryland,17