letterhead and did thereby fail to conduct your personal behavior beyond reproach and did thereby exploit your judicial position, contrary to Canons 2(A); 5(C)(1).
FINDING COUNT 12. THE COMMISSION FINDS THAT ABOUT MARCH 3, 1977 THE RESPONDENT WAS INVOLVED IN A MINOR AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENT. WHEN THE INSURANCE ADJUSTER, DON BATY, INTERVIEWED THE RESPONDENT, HE WAS TOLD THAT NO CLAIM WOULD BE FILED FOR PERSONAL INJURIES. BUT ON MARCH 29, 1977, THE RESPONDENT SENT A MONEY DEMAND FOR PERSONAL INJURIES TO THE CAMERON MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY ON OFFICIAL COURT LETTERHEAD AND STATIONERY. THIS INSURANCE COMPANY WAS A DEFENDANT IN LITIGATION BEFORE RESPONDENT AT VARIOUS TIMES. DON BATY REFERRED TO THE DEMAND LETTER AS FOLLOWS: "THE MAN WAS ALREADY AN ATTORNEY, IT WAS ON OFFICIAL STATIONERY, I SUSPECTED HE MEANT BUSINESS." MR. BATY NOTED THAT THE DEMAND WAS UNUSUAL IN THAT IT WAS NOT ACCOMPANIED BY A MEDICAL REPORT. IT WAS NOT UNTIL SEVEN WEEKS AFTER THE ACCIDENT THAT RESPONDENT SAW A DOCTOR AND OBTAINED A DOCTOR'S REPORT WHICH HE SENT TO CAMERON MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY ALONG WITH ANOTHER COURT LETTERHEAD DEMAND LETTER, DATED APRIL 21, 1977. THE DOCTOR WHO ATTESTED TO THE RESPONDENT'S INJURIES HAD RECEIVED PROBATION FROM THE RESPONDENT ON A PRIOR DRUG VIOLATION. THE COMMISSION CONCLUDES THAT THE RESPONDENT'S PERSONAL BEHAVIOR IN THIS MATTER DOES NOT PROMOTE PUBLIC CONFIDENCE IN THE INTEGRITY AND IMPARTIALITY OF THE JUDICIARY AND THAT HE USED AND EXPLOITED HIS JUDICIAL POSITION, CONTRARY TO CANONS 2 A AND 5 C (1).
CHARGE COUNT 13. That during your term of office you have discriminated against out-ofcircuit *849 attorneys and in favor of in-circuit attorneys, contrary to Canons 1; 2.
FINDING COUNT 13. RESPONDENT HAS RATHER CONSISTENTLY DISCRIMINATED AGAINST OUT-OF-CIRCUIT ATTORNEYS AND MORE OFTEN THAN NOT, ALSO IN FAVOR OF IN-CIRCUIT ATTORNEYS, CONTRARY TO CANONS 1 AND 2. THERE IS NO COURT RULE REQUIRING, NOR IS IT POSSIBLE FOR OUT-OF-CIRCUIT ATTORNEYS TO BE CONSTANTLY PRESENT ON LAW DAYS IN THE 37TH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, YET, RESPONDENT CONSISTENTLY WORKED HIS DOCKET ON THESE DAYS. AS A RESULT, CASES WERE OFTEN DISMISSED WHEN OUT-OF-CIRCUIT ATTORNEYS WERE NOT PRESENT. THE FOLLOWING ARE EXAMPLES OF THE RESPONDENT'S DISCRIMINATORY PRACTICES.
IN BREWER v. MEEKS, DONALD BONACKER AND JERRY REYNOLDS, TWO SPRINGFIELD ATTORNEYS, REPRESENTED AN INSURANCE COMPANY AND HAROLD HENRY WAS A LOCAL ATTORNEY FOR THE PLAINTIFF. DEFENDANT HAD OBTAINED THE INSURANCE POLICY NUMBER AND HAD THE FIRST AND LAST NAME AS THE POLICY HOLDER. THE DEFENDANT, HOWEVER, WAS NOT THE INSURED. DONALD BONACKER AND JERRY REYNOLDS DID NOT REALIZE THIS FRAUD UNTIL AFTER THEY HAD ENTERED THEIR APPEARANCES. JUDGE BUFORD'S DISCRIMINATION TOWARD LOCAL ATTORNEYS MANIFESTS ITSELF IN THE DIFFICULTY THAT BONACKER AND REYNOLDS HAD IN WITHDRAWING FROM THE CASE. DONALD BONACKER RELATES: ". . . [M]Y CONVERSATION WITH THE JUDGE WAS THAT IF HAROLD (HENRY) WOULD AGREE WE COULD WITHDRAW THEN HE WOULD SUSTAIN OUR MOTION." JERRY REYNOLDS APPEARED TO ARGUE THE MOTION TO WITHDRAW AND HIS DESCRIPTION OF A PRE-MOTION CONFERENCE IS AS FOLLOWS: ". . . MR. HENRY STARTED TELLING THE