Appellantscomplain of the court's inteqpretation of Te;rasPropertyCode $ 29 as
being the recor,'eringsums owed for ad valorem taxesby a
cotenantand the court's failure to recognizerecent opinions from the various courts of appeal
recognizing and affirming the equitable cause of action for reimb,ursementby a cotenanr,a
remedy separatefrom that afforded by Chapter29. Casso v. Fullerton, 2006 WL 2612600,3
(Tex. App. - San Antonio 2006, pet. denied);Hill v. Jarvis, 2008 WL 2511753(Tex. App. -
Tyler 2008,pet.denied);Wheelerv. Phillips,20lI WL 4011455,11(Tex. App. - Austin 2011,
pet. denied);seee.g.Bailey Masonv. Mason,334 S.W.3d39,45 (Tex. App. - Dallas2008,pet.
L.P. v. Clilf Hoskins,Inc., 345 S.\l/.3d 537 (Tex. App. - San denied);Prize linergy Resources,
Antcrnio2011, no pet.). It is well establishedthat a trial courl has no discretionto determine
wha1. the law is or in applyingthe law to the facts. Walkerv. Packer,827S.W.2d833, 840 (Tex.
1992). Misapplicationof the law, as we have here, is by definition an abuseof discretionand is
subjectto reversal. Orix Capital Markets,LLC v. Lu Villita Motor Inns, J.V., 329 S.W.3d 30,44
(Tex. App. - San A.ntonio2010, pet. denied)(a trial court abusesits discretionand is subjectto reversalwhen it actswithout referenceto guidingrulesor principles of law or misappliesthe law).
REPLY TO A TO Appellantsdid not rely on Chapter29 ofthe TexasProperly Code and any findinlgby the trial court to threcontrary, is simply not supportedby the record. Appellants can only assume that the "support" referred to by the trial court in its final judgment was Appellants, a'gument that the may languagein $ 29.002(a) of the Texas Properly code clearly indicates that the provision was not intended to be mandatoryor exclusive and did not usurp the comrrLonlaw
causeof action relied on by the Appellants.Tex. Prop. Code 29.002(a) $ (Vernon Z0l4). It is
undeniablethat Appellantsfervently arguedat trial, and on appeal,that Chapte 'Iexas r 29 ofthe PropertyCode'wasjust one of severalmeansto obtainreimbursement. (V RR. 30-32;C.R,291-
308)' A cursonrreview of Appellants'pleadingsand the trial transcriptclearlyindicate t:his.Id. Becauseof the sheernumber of potentialheirs ol Tomasaand Narciso Gonzalezprecluded
Appellantsfrom complying with Chapter29, Appellantsrelied on the common law ciiuseof
actionof equitablereimbursement only.
Furthernlore,Appelleesarguethat Appellantsfailed to avail themselvesto the remedy of
citationby publicationunderTexasRule of Civil Procedure116 & ll7. Tex. R. Civ. p. 116 & 117. However,Appelleesare mistaken. The unknownheirs of Tornasaand NarcisoG<'tnzalez
werein fact citedby publication.(C.R. 5-16). Any errorin the citationin this matterwas'waived
by the subsequentappearances o1'theparties,including the appearances of the two attorrreysad
litem appointed to representthe unknown heirs. The trial court's finding that Chapter 29
controlledthe clispositionof this matter is far from "academic"as urged by the Apeellees.
(Appellees' Brief at 17). Furthermore,citation by publication of the unknown heirs does not that it was impossiblefor Appellantsto comply with severalof the specific
Section29.002(b)tor that the trial court misappliedthe law to the facts.Tex.
Prop.Codeg .002(b)(Vernon2014).
PRAYEB,
Appel ts praythe court will reversethejudgmentof the trial courtandrenderjudgment
in Appellantsfavor. Appellantspray that all costsof this appealwill be taxed againstAppellees.
Appellants y for general
I exas Code$ 29.002(b)statesasfollows:
(b) The petition contain:
(l) a descriptionofthe property; (2) the name ofeach known owner ofthe propefty; (3) the interest held by each known owner ofthe property; (4) the total amount paid by the petitioner