AN ERROR IN DETERMINING THAT TRANSFERRING CUSTODY TO THE CHILDREN'S FATHER [ ] WOULD BE MORE DISRUPTIVE THAT [SIC] TRANSFERRING CUSTODY TO A CHILD CARE GIVER?
14. WAS THE TRIAL COURT IN ERROR WHEN IT CLAIMED THAT IT IS A FACT THAT THERE WAS CORROBORATED MANIPULATIVE BEHAVIOR BETWEEN [FATHER] AND WITNESS [T.F.] TO REMOVE [MOTHER'S WITNESS, C.C.] FROM A RESIDENTIAL FACILITY?
15. DID THE TRAIL [SIC] COURT COMMIT AN ERROR WHEN IT MADE THE DETERMINATION THAT THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE CONTEMPT ALLEGATIONS MADE BY [FATHER] AND TO FURTHER COMMENT THAT IT IS VIEWED THAT SUCH CLAIMS WERE PUNITIVE IN NATURE AND WERE BEING USED TO MANIPULATE THE TRIAL COURT TO GAIN FAVOR?
16. DID THE TRIAL COURT COMMIT AN ERROR WHEN IT'S [SIC] DETERMINATION THAT THE CURRENT LEVELS OF THE CHILDREN'S STRESS WERE NOT EXCESSIVE ENOUGH TO WARRANT A CHANGE IN VISITATION[,] WHICH SUGGESTS THAT LIVING WITH THESE SYMPTOMS, WHICH WERE NOT A CONCERN PRIOR TO SEPARATION, ARE NOW AN ACCEPTABLE STANDARD OF LIVING?
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17. WAS THE TRIAL COURT IN ERROR WHEN, ON MORE THAN ONE OCCASION, IT RUSHED [FATHER'S] TESTIMONY AND QUESTIONING OF WITNESSES, WARNING OF EXCESSIVE DELAYS IN SCHEDULING THE CONTINUANCE?
18. DID THE TRIAL COURT COMMIT AN ERROR NOT ONLY WHEN IT FAILED TO RECOGNIZE THE MULTIPLE INSTANCES WHERE [MOTHER] HAS TAKEN SOLE ACTION TO MAKE MAJOR MEDICAL AND EDUCATION DECISIONS FOR THE CHILDREN WITHOUT INFORMING OR OBTAINING INPUT FROM [FATHER], BUT ALSO BY CONFUSING THE SITUATIONS WHICH WERE PRESENTED BY [FATHER] TO SUPPORT SUCH ALLEGATIONS?
19. DID THE TRIAL COURT COMMIT AN ERROR WHEN IT DETERMINED THAT THE MISINFORMATION PROVIDED BY [MOTHER] ON MEDICAL INTAKE FORMS TO THREE (3) DIFFERENT MEDICAL PROVIDERS WAS GIVEN IN GOOD FAITH?
Father's Brief at 5-11.
As the custody trial in this matter was held in June of 2014, the Child
Custody Act, ("the Act"), 23 Pa.C.S. §§ 5321 to 5340, is applicable. C.R.F.
v. S.E.F., 45 A.3d 441, 445 (Pa. Super. 2012) (holding that, if the custody
evidentiary proceeding commences on or after the effective date of the Act,
i.e., January 24, 2011, the provisions of the Act apply).
We apply the standard of review, as follows, in matters involving a
trial court's decision on a contempt petition.
When we review a trial court's finding of contempt, we are limited to determining whether the trial court committed a clear abuse of discretion. This Court must place great reliance on the sound discretion of the trial judge when reviewing an order of contempt. This [C]ourt also has
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stated that each court is the exclusive judge of contempts against its process.
G.A. v. D.L., 72 A.3d 264, 269 (Pa. Super. 2013), (citations and quotation
marks omitted).
To sustain a finding of civil contempt, the complainant must prove certain distinct elements by a preponderance of the evidence: (1) that the contemnor had notice of the specific order or decree which he is alleged to have disobeyed; (2) that the act constituting the contemnor's violation was volitional; and (3)