ordered to register as a sex offender. See Cal. Penal Code § 290(a)(2)(A).
On January 8, 2001, ten-and-a-half years after his misde- meanor conviction, the government began removal proceed- NICANOR-ROMERO v. MUKASEY 4315 ings against him based on the conviction under § 647.6(a). The Notice to Appear charged Nicanor-Romero as subject to removal under § 237(a)(2)(A)(iii) of the Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA" or "the Act"), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2) (A)(iii), as an alien convicted of an aggravated felony "as defined in section 101(a)(43)(A) of the Act, a law relating to sexual abuse of a minor."
The government filed an additional charge of removal in a second Notice to Appear on May 7, 2001. The second Notice contains an apparent error. It charged Nicanor-Romero as removable pursuant to
Section 237(a)(2)(A)(ii) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended, by the Immigration Act of 1990, in that [he was] an alien who has been con- victed of a crime involving moral turpitude commit- ted within five years after the date of admission.
The government almost certainly meant to rely on INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) rather than INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(ii). As codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii), INA § 237(a)(2) (A)(ii) makes an alien removable if he or she "at any time after admission is convicted of two or more crimes involving moral turpitude, not arising out of a single scheme of criminal misconduct . . . ." Yet the government never argued before the agency that Nicanor-Romero's § 647.6(a) conviction satisfied the criterion of "two or more crimes involving moral turpitude not arising out of a single scheme of criminal misconduct." Given that Nicanor-Romero's § 647.6(a) conviction was for conduct occurring on a single date, it is highly unlikely that it satisfies this criterion. On the other hand, INA § 237(a)(2) (A)(i)(I), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i)(I), makes an alien removable if he or she "is convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude committed within five years . . . after the date of admission[.]" Nicanor-Romero has made no argument against removal based on the government's charge of remov- ability under § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii) rather than § 1227(a)(2)(A) 4316 NICANOR-ROMERO v. MUKASEY (i)(I). There is no difference in the definition of "moral turpi- tude" in these two sections.
Nicanor-Romero applied for cancellation of removal pursu- ant to 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a), and for waiver of deportation pur- suant to former INA § 212(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c) (repealed 1996). After a brief hearing, an Immigration Judge ("IJ") con- cluded that a § 647.6(a) violation categorically constitutes both an "aggravated felony" and a "crime involving moral turpitude." He denied Nicanor-Romero's requested relief and issued a final order of removal. The Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA") affirmed, and this petition followed.
II. Jurisdiction
We have jurisdiction under the REAL ID Act. The jurisdiction-stripping provision of the INA provides that noth- ing in the statute "which limits or eliminates judicial review, shall be construed as precluding review of constitutional claims or questions of law . . .