modifiedor relaxed in Texa.5by'the provisionof the Penal Code which directs that every law upon the subjectof crime be construed'according to the plain import of the languagein which it is written'. Under this provision,a penal statutewill not be construed so strictlyas to defeatthe legislativeintention,when that intentionis plainly manifestor Is fairly deduciblefrom the languageof the act. In construingsuch a statute,the Supreme Court has said that 'theproper course is to search out and to follow the true intentof the Legislature,and to adopt that sense which harmonizesbest with the context,and pro-' motes,'in the fullestmanner,the apparentpolicy and objects of the.Legislature.'
"Bevertheless,the rule of strict constructionstill obtains, both in civil and criminalcases, in the sense that a statute of a penal nature will not be extendedby constructionbeyond the necessitiesof the case or the plain import of its t9rms. Thus it is settledby numerousdecisionsthat a statute im- posing a penalty must be strictlyCOnStNed, and that one who seeks to recover a penaltymust bring himself clearlywith- in the terms of the statute. The more severethe penalty, and the more disastrousthe consequencesto the persons subjected to the provisionsof the statute,the more rigid will be the constNction." Hon. A. W. Walker, Page 3 (~~-1056)
Article 7 of the Penal Code provides:
"This code and every other law upon the subjectof crime which may be enacted shall be construedaccordingto the plain importof the language in which it is written,with- out regard to the distinctionusually made betweenthe con- structionof penal laws and laws upon other subjects;and no person shallbe punished for an offensewhich is no=de penal by the plain import of the words of a law." (Emphasis added)
From an examinationof the cases directlyin point we find very few in Texas that can be reliedupon as authority. The only case we have found which directlydeals with this questionis that of Butler v. State, 194 S.W. 166, (Tei. Grim. 1917). The facts before that court related to the com- pulsory attendanceof a child that had reachedthe age of fourteen (14) years before the schoolterm started. (Fourteen(141 years was the maximum age at the time of this decision). The court seemedto base its reversal in its conclu5ionon the fact that the child was more then fourteen (14) years of age the instantafter its fourteenthbirthdayand the court cites many authoritiesto supportits position. However,in the conclusionthe opinion of the court left the impressionthat its decisionmight have been based, at least in part, on the fact that the child became fourteenbefore the beginningof the schoolterm. The court used this language:
"In our opinion,under the facts of this case, appellant's son having attainedthe age of 14 years before the compulsory term began, the law compellingthe attendanceof children under 14 years of age was not applicableto him..."
Another case followingis Cotterlyv. Muirhead,244 S.W.2d 920 (Civ. App. Error Ref. n.r.e.1951)which Is not In point on the questionbefore us but simply statesthat it is the legal duty of parentsto require their children16 years of age or under to attend schoolas providedin Article 297 V.P.C. Since we do not find decisionsIn our