263,275 (1984)).
To determhte whether the Twenty-first Amendment bmmmizes a particular state statute from invalidation under the Commerce Clause, the state must demonstrate that tbe inte-rests implicated by its regulation "'are so closely related to the powers reserved by the Twenty-tirst Amendment that the regulation may prevail, notwithstandmg that its requirements directly wutlict with express federal policies.*" Id. (quoting Gpikzl Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691, 714 (1984)). The court found unpersuasive the . State's asserttons that the State's interest in investigating the background of applicants for alcoholic beverage permits and licenses by discriminating against nonresidents was within the "'core wncerns" of the Twenty-first Amendment. Id. Consequently, the court concluded that the residency requirements were subject to the Commerce Clause's nondiscrimination requirement and were, therefore, unwnstitutional.5 Id. at 555-56.
During the pendency of the appeal in Cooper, the Seventy-third Legislature amended the residency requirements throughout the code to require an applicant for a permit or license to have resided in Texas for one year prior to the date the individual submits the application.6 See Act of May 29, 1993, 73d Leg., R.S., ch. 934, $4 21, 24,
%r light of the court's conclusion in Cooper, the court did not consider the validity of the =id-Ynq uirementsmdet the privilege6and Immwities Clause,U.S.Const.art IV, g 2. Cooper, 11 F.3dat 5% 11.10.
ti Cooper court recognizedthe le&lature's actions in r&ion to its decision that the 1993 am&memstothcmdedidnotmootthecase. Id.at550-51. Thecomtstatcdthstthecnaumentofthe amendmentswouldnot preventthe legistamrefrom matotingthe three-yearresidencyrequiremutt if the court in Cooper found the requirementconstitntional. Id. at 551. Furtlxem~on,the taut said that, atthoughthe one-yearresidencyrequirementmay leasenthe hmden placedon out-of-stateapplicants.the cddecontinuesto treat applicantswho are not Texascittzensdifferentlyfrom applicantswho am Texas r&tents. Id. We assume the court did not nde on the merits of the cnrrent one-year residency mqnirementbecausethe comediscussedthe one-yearresidencyreqnirementin the contextof its threshold
p. 1942 Mr. Doyne Bailey - Page 6 (DM-361)
90, 1993 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 3954,3960-61,3962,3983-84. The legislature also added section 6.03 to the code, summa&i ng the history of the code's durational residency requirement and articulating a rationale for continuing the residency requirement, although shortening the period to one year: primarily, to keep organized crime from infiltrating the state's alcoholic beverage industry.7 See id. 3 16, at 3957-58 (codified as Alto. Bev.
(footnotemntinocd) mnch&n that the amendedlaw did not moot the cast; the court did not discussit in addmssingthe merits.Seeid. at 550-51.
%ection 6.03of the mdc providesin p&tincntpart as follows:
(a) It is the public policy of this state and a purposeof this section to sequin that, accept as providedin Subsection(k) of this sectionor othcrwiscin thiscode,apamitorliccnsemaynotbeissuedtoapeMnwhowasnotacitizm uf this state for a one-yrar periodprecedingthe date of the filing of the person's applicationfor a license or permit. In that rrgard, the lcgislatnmmakca the findingsin Subsections@I)thm& (i) of this section. : (II) Betwrm 1920and 1933,the &ion and mnmmptionof alcoholic w was pmhibited in the United States. While the idcal&ic motivca behind Pmhiition were n&k, a law enformmentntgbtInamensucd.otherwise law-abiig citizens rodnely violated the law by buying and mnanning aImbolicbeveragea. The demandfor the illegal pmduds createdan opportunity for