found in [Section] 15A-1343(b)(1) or [Section] 15A-1343(b)(3a) to also serve, without the State showing more, as a violation of [Section] 15A-1343(b)(1) or [Section] 15A-1343(b)(3a) would result in revocation of probation without following the mechanism the General Assembly expressly provided in [Section] 15A-1344(d2).
Id. at 146, 783 S.E.2d at 26 (emphasis added).
However, in our case, the State did not merely allege violations of Section 15A-
1343(b)(3). Where a violation report alleges that willful violations of Section 15A-
1343(b)(3) together amount to the defendant "willfully avoiding supervision" or
"willfully making the defendant's whereabouts unknown" in violation of Section 15A-
- 11 - STATE V. CROMPTON
Opinion of the Court
1343(b)(3a), and the State subsequently proffers sufficient evidence to establish those
willful violations, then revocation of the defendant's probation should be left to the
sound discretion of the trial court. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1344(a); State v. Mills,
___ N.C. App. ___, ___ S.E.2d ___, ___, COA 19-597, 2020 N.C. App. LEXIS 142, **7-
8 (considering violations of Section 15A-1343(b)(3) in determining a defendant
absconded in violation of Section 15A-1343(b)(3a)). In this case, the State
undoubtedly made that additional showing required by Section 15A-1343(b)(3a) and
contemplated by this Court in Johnson. Therefore, this case plainly falls beyond the
scope of Williams.
Not only would the dissent's expanded reading of Williams fail to align with
the plain language of Sections 15A-1343(b) and 15A-1344(a), it would also operate to
eliminate absconding as a ground for probation revocation. As a practical matter,
those conditions laid out in Section 15A-1343(b)(3) make up the necessary elements
of "avoiding supervision" or "making [one's] whereabouts unknown." A defendant
cannot avoid supervision without failing to report as directed to his probation officer
at reasonable times and places. Neither can a defendant make his whereabouts
unknown without failing to answer reasonable inquiries or notify his probation officer
of a change of address.
Accordingly, should we adopt a reading of Williams that prevents the State
from using the language of Section 15A-1343(b)(3) to describe violations of Section
- 12 - STATE V. CROMPTON
Opinion of the Court
15A-1343(b)(3a), then it is unclear what exactly would continue to constitute
"absconding" within the meaning of Section 15A-1343(b)(3a). As a result, violations
of Section 15A-1343(b)(3a) would likely cease to be allowed as a ground for probation
revocation.
Alternatively, our dissenting colleague relies upon Melton to argue that the
State has failed to sufficiently show that Defendant acted "willfully" in violation of
Section 15A-1343(b)(3a).
In Melton, this Court held that the State failed to present competent evidence
that a defendant willfully violated Section 15A-1343(b)(3a) where "the probation
officer could not testify with any specificity" and "the State's evidence only include[d]
that a defendant failed to attend scheduled meetings, and the probation officer [was]
unable to reach a defendant after merely two days of attempts, only leaving messages
with a defendant's relatives." 258 N.C. App. 134, 140, 811 S.E.2d 678, 682-83 (2018).
Relying on Melton, the dissent contends that the evidence produced by the
State was