OTHER BENEFITS FALLING WITHIN THE STATUTORY SOCIAL SECURITY SCHEMES . THE COURT THUS ACKNOWLEDGED THAT BENEFITS TIED TO A NATIONAL SCHEME WHICH LAYS DOWN A DIFFERENT MINIMUM PENSIONABLE AGE FOR MEN AND WOMEN MAY LIE OUTSIDE THE AMBIT OF THE AFOREMENTIONED OBLIGATION .
36 HOWEVER , IN VIEW OF THE FUNDAMENTAL IMPORTANCE OF THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUALITY OF TREATMENT , WHICH THE COURT HAS REAFFIRMED ON NUMEROUS OCCASIONS , ARTICLE 1 ( 2 ) OF DIRECTIVE NO 76/207 , WHICH EXCLUDES SOCIAL SECURITY MATTERS FROM THE SCOPE OF THAT DIRECTIVE , MUST BE INTERPRETED STRICTLY . CONSEQUENTLY , THE EXCEPTION TO THE PROHIBITION OF DISCRIMINATION ON GROUNDS OF SEX PROVIDED FOR IN ARTICLE 7 ( 1 ) ( A ) OF DIRECTIVE NO 79/7 APPLIES ONLY TO THE DETERMINATION OF PENSIONABLE AGE FOR THE PURPOSES OF GRANTING OLD-AGE AND RETIREMENT PENSIONS AND THE POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCES THEREOF FOR OTHER BENEFITS .
37 IN THAT RESPECT IT MUST BE EMPHASIZED THAT , WHEREAS THE EXCEPTION CONTAINED IN ARTICLE 7 OF DIRECTIVE NO 79/7 CONCERNS THE CONSEQUENCES WHICH PENSIONABLE AGE HAS FOR SOCIAL SECURITY BENEFITS , THIS CASE IS CONCERNED WITH DISMISSAL WITHIN THE MEANING OF ARTICLE 5 OF DIRECTIVE NO 76/207 .
38 CONSEQUENTLY , THE ANSWER TO THE FIRST QUESTION REFERRED TO THE COURT BY THE COURT OF APPEAL MUST BE THAT ARTICLE 5 ( 1 ) OF DIRCTIVE NO 76/207 MUST BE INTERPRETED AS MEANING THAT A GENERAL POLICY CONCERNING DISMISSAL INVOLVING THE DISMISSAL OF A WOMAN SOLELY BECAUSE SHE HAS ATTAINED THE QUALIFYING AGE FOR A STATE PENSION , WHICH AGE IS DIFFERENT UNDER NATIONAL LEGISLATION FOR MEN AND FOR WOMEN , CONSTITUTES DISCRIMINATION ON GROUNDS OF SEX , CONTRARY TO THAT DIRECTIVE .
THE SECOND QUESTION
39 SINCE THE FIRST QUESTION HAS BEEN ANSWERED IN THE AFFIRMATIVE , IT IS NECESSARY TO CONSIDER WHETHER ARTICLE 5 ( 1 ) OF DIRECTIVE NO 76/207 MAY BE RELIED UPON BY AN INDIVIDUAL BEFORE NATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS .
40 THE APPELLANT AND THE COMMISSION CONSIDER THAT THAT QUESTION MUST BE ANSWERED IN THE AFFIRMATIVE . THEY CONTEND IN PARTICULAR , WITH REGARD TO ARTICLES 2 ( 1 ) AND 5 ( 1 ) OF DIRECTIVE NO 76/207 , THAT THOSE PROVISIONS ARE SUFFICIENTLY CLEAR TO ENABLE NATIONAL COURTS TO APPLY THEM WITHOUT LEGISLATIVE INTERVENTION BY THE MEMBER STATES , AT LEAST SO FAR AS OVERT DISCRIMINATION IS CONCERNED .
41 IN SUPPORT OF THAT VIEW , THE APPELLANT POINTS OUT THAT DIRECTIVES ARE CAPABLE OF CONFERRING RIGHTS ON INDIVIDUALS WHICH MAY BE RELIED UPON DIRECTLY BEFORE THE COURTS OF THE MEMBER STATES ; NATIONAL COURTS ARE OBLIGED BY VIRTUE OF THE BINDING NATURE OF A DIRECTIVE , IN CONJUNCTION WITH ARTICLE 5 OF THE EEC TREATY , TO GIVE EFFECT TO THE PROVISIONS OF DIRECTIVES WHERE POSSIBLE , IN PARTICULAR WHEN CONSTRUING OR APPLYING RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF NATIONAL LAW ( JUDGMENT OF 10 APRIL 1984 IN CASE 14/83 VON COLSON AND KAMANN V LAND NORDRHEIN-WESTFALEN ( 1984 ) ECR 1891