un- til a majorityof the qualifiedvoters in such countyor poli- tical subdivisionthereofvoting in an electionheld for such purpose shall determinesuch to be lawful;providedthat this subsectionshall not prohibitthe sale of alcoholicbeverages containingnot more than 3.2 per cent alcoholby weight in cities,countiesor politicalsubdivision8 thereof in which the qualifiedrotere have voted to legalizesuch sale under the provisionsof Chapter1.16,Act# of the Regular Sessionof the 43rd Legislature."
This amendment,commonlyreferredto as the repealamendment, is the conetitdionalproviuionwith reepectto local optionwhich ia in effect at the presenttime. It is also the provisionunder which the 1936 county-wideelectionin ChambersCountywas held. We again refer to languagein the case of Flouchins v. Plainos,supra,interpretingthe amendmentof 1935:
"By the terms of this amendmentthe entire State,as such, is again made wet as to all,Wcoxicating liquors;but with certainexceptionsand limitations. In effect,this amendmentcontainsprovisionswhich make any county,jus- tice's precinct,or city, or town dry which was dry at the time it became effective. In other words, this amendment preservesthe status quo as to dry areas a8 they existed at the time it became effective. lt thereforepreserved as dry any county,justice'sprecinct,or city, or town which was dry when it went into effect. Of course,, any such area has the right to become wet by 80 voting at an electionlegallyorderedand held for that purposeunder presentlocal option statutes. In this connection,how- ever, we again note that such electionmust be held & the same area that originallyvoted dry." (Emphasis added.) Hon. c. A. Pounds,page 5 (v-262)
In November,1935, less than three months after the adoption of ArticleXVI, Section20, an non in effect,the Legislaturepassed the Texas LiquorControlAct. Article I, Section23 of this Act, codified a6 Article 666-23,Vernon'sPenal Code, defines"dry", end "wet" areas as follows:
"Wheneverthe term 'dryarea" is used in this Act it shall mean and refer to all counties,justiceprecincts, incorporatedcitiesor towns whereinthe aale of alcoholic beverageshad been prohibitedby valid local optionelec- tions held under the laws of the State in force at the time of the taking effect of Section20, ArticleXVI, Constitu- tion of Texas in the year 1919. It likewiseshallmean and refer to any such areas where sale of such alcoholicbever- ages shallbe prohibitedunder the terms of this Act.
"The term 'wet area' shall mean and refer to all other areas of the State . . . ."
Under the constitutional and statutoryprovisionsabove set out and under the Interpretation given these variousprovisionsby the courte,it appearsbeyond questionthat after the electionof 1933, JusticePrecinctNo. 1 remaineda "dry" area. The next questionfor us to determineis the effecton JusticePrecinctlo. 1 of the county-wide electionheld in 1936.
The appellatecourtsof Texas have uniformlyconstruedthe local option electionprovisionsto protectthe "dry',statusof the smallersub- divisionsof the whole. The earliestauthoritywe have found supporting this contentionis the case of Aaron v. State, decidedby the Supreme Court in 1895 and reportedin @ S. W. 267. Judge Hurt, speakingfor the court in this case, used this language:
"It appearsfrom the recordthat before the Bale was made an electionhad been held under the act of 1893 for the entire county,which resultedin the defeat of prohi- bition. It la contendedthis defeat abrogatedthe law in Precinct8. In otherwords, If local