AND ARE USUALLY REQUIRED TO MOVE FREQUENTLY FROM ONE TERRITORY TO ANOTHER , CAN ALWAYS PURCHASE THE SAME ORIGINAL PRODUCT WITH ALL ITS TRADITIONAL FEATURES AS REGARDS BOTH COMPOSITION AND OUTWARD APPEARANCE . EVEN THOUGH QUALITY STANDARDS ARE OBSERVED , IT IS IMPOSSIBLE IN PARTICULAR TO AVOID DIFFERENCES IN TASTE BETWEEN THE PRODUCTS OF THE VARIOUS MANUFACTURERS . THIS OBLIGATION IS THUS DESIGNED TO PREVENT THESE CONSUMERS FROM TURNING TO OTHER COMPETING PRODUCTS AND TO ENSURE THAT THEY CONTINUE TO BUY BITTER CAMPARI , WITH THE FACILITY OF BEING ABLE TO OBTAIN STOCKS FROM THEIR LOCAL DEALER . FURTHER , SUCH CONSUMERS ARE NOT PREVENTED FROM FREELY OBTAINING THE LICENSEES' OWN PRODUCTS EVEN THOUGH ANY SUCH PURCHASES WOULD BE ON THE NORMAL TRADING CONDITIONS APPLICABLE TO NON-DUTYFREE PURCHASERS .
B . THE LICENSING AGREEMENTS HAVE INCREASED THE QUANTITIES OF BITTER CAMPARI AVAILABLE TO CONSUMERS AND IMPROVED DISTRIBUTION , SO THAT CONSUMERS BENEFIT DIRECTLY . THERE ARE OTHER PRODUCERS OF BITTER ON THE MARKET , AND EFFECTIVE COMPETITION WILL BE STRENGTHENED BY THE GROWING QUANTITIES PRODUCED BY CAMPARI-MILANO'S LICENSEES , SO THAT IT CAN BE ASSUMED THAT THE IMPROVEMENTS RESULTING FROM THE AGREEMENTS AND THE BENEFITS WHICH THE LICENSEES OBTAIN FROM THEM ARE SHARED BY CONSUMERS .
AS BUYERS MAY SECURE SUPPLIES OF BITTER FROM OTHER TERRITORIES THROUGH UNSOLICITED ORDERS , THEY ARE IN A POSITION TO EXERT PRESSURE ON THE PRICES CHARGED BY THE EXCLUSIVE LICENSEE IN THEIR TERRITORY IF THESE SHOULD BE TOO HIGH .
C . THE RESTRICTIONS OF COMPETITION IMPOSED ON THE PARTIES INVOLVED MUST BE CONSIDERED INDISPENSABLE TO THE ATTAINMENT OF THE BENEFITS SET OUT ABOVE . NONE OF THE RESTRICTIONS COULD BE OMITTED WITHOUT ENDANGERING THE PARTIES' OBJECT OF PROMOTING SALES OF BITTER CAMPARI BY CONCENTRATING THE ACTIVITIES OF THE LICENSEES ON THIS PRODUCT AND OFFERING THE SAME ORIGINAL PRODUCT TO CERTAIN CUSTOMERS . IN PARTICULAR , NONE OF THE LICENSEES AND IN ALL PROBABILITY NO OTHER UNDERTAKING IN THE SPIRITUOUS LIQUORS INDUSTRY WOULD HAVE BEEN PREPARED TO MAKE THE INVESTMENT NECESSARY FOR A SIGNIFICANT INCREASE IN SALES OF BITTER IF IT WERE NOT SURE OF BEING PROTECTED FROM COMPETITION FROM OTHER LICENSEES OR CAMPARI-MILANO ITSELF .
D . THE LICENSING AGREEMENTS WHICH ARE THE SUBJECT OF THIS DECISION DO NOT GIVE CAMPARI-MILANO OR ITS LICENSEES THE POSSIBILITY OF ELIMINATING COMPETITION IN RESPECT OF A SUBSTANTIAL PART OF THE BITTER PRODUCTS IN QUESTION . IN THE EEC THERE EXISTS A FAIRLY LARGE NUMBER OF OTHER WELL-KNOWN BRANDS OF BITTER , WHICH ARE ALL ABLE TO COMPETE AGAINST BITTER CAMPARI , CAMPARI-MILANO'S LICENSEES AND CAMPARI-MILANO ITSELF ARE ALSO FREE TO SELL THE CAMPARI PRODUCTS IN QUESTION WITHIN THE COMMON MARKET BUT OUTSIDE THEIR TERRITORY FOR WHICH THEY HAVE PARTICULAR RESPONSIBILITY .
AS THINGS STAND AT PRESENT , ALL THE TESTS FOR A DECISION APPLYING ARTICLE 85 ( 3 ) TO THE LICENSING AGREEMENTS ENTERED INTO BY CAMPARI-MILANO WITH OGNIBENI AND CO . , HANS PRANG , CAMPARI-FRANCE SA , SOVINAC SA AND JOHS . M .