AGREEMENTS WHEREAS ARTICLE 3 COVERS CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH MANIFESTLY DO NOT APPLY TO BREWERY CONTRACTS OF THE TYPE REFERRED TO BY THE NATIONAL COURT .
24 ( 3 ) ALTHOUGH THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS SUGGEST THAT THE QUESTIONS RAISED BY THAT COURT SHOULD BE ANSWERED IN THE AFFIRMATIVE , IT NEVERTHELESS REMAINS TO BE DETERMINED WHETHER SUCH A REPLY WOULD NOT CONFLICT WITH CERTAIN OBJECTIONS RAISED DURING THE PROCEEDINGS .
25 ( A ) IT HAS BEEN CONTENDED THAT A RULING IN WHICH REGULATION NO 67/67 WAS HELD TO BE APPLICABLE TO AGREEMENTS SUCH AS THOSE IN QUESTION WOULD BE INCONSISTENT WITH PREVIOUS DECISIONS OF THE COURT TO THE EFFECT THAT , ALTHOUGH , TAKEN IN ISOLATION , EXCLUSIVE SUPPLY OR PURCHASE AGREEMENTS DO NOT FALL UNDER THE PROHIBITION CONTAINED IN ARTICLE 85 , THEY MAY NEVERTHELESS DO SO IF THEY FORM PART OF A SERIES OF SIMILAR AGREEMENTS WHICH , CONSIDERED AS A WHOLE , MAY SIGNIFICANTLY AFFECT TRADE BETWEEN MEMBER STATES AND COMPETITION WITHIN THE COMMON MARKET .
26 THE CASE-LAW REFERRED TO WAS CONCERNED ONLY WITH THE QUESTION WHETHER , AND IF SO IN WHAT CIRCUMSTANCES , THE ABOVEMENTIONED AGREEMENTS ARE PROHIBITED UNDER ARTICLE 85 ( 1 ) OF THE TREATY AND NOT WITH THE CONDITIONS IN WHICH , IN THOSE CIRCUMSTANCES , THEY BENEFIT OR MAY BENEFIT FROM GROUP OR INDIVIDUAL EXEMPTION UNDER THE THIRD PARAGRAPH OF THAT ARTICLE .
27 THE ONLY JUDGMENT OF THE COURT WHICH DEALT WITH AN ISSUE SIMILAR TO THAT TO BE DECIDED IN THE PRESENT CASE , NAMELY THE JUDGMENT IN ROUBAIX-WATTRELOS , SUPPORTS THE CONCLUSION THAT THE QUESTION SHOULD BE ANSWERED IN THE AFFIRMATIVE , AS IS CLEAR FROM THE CONSIDERATIONS SET OUT ABOVE .
28 IT CANNOT BE ARGUED THAT IT WOULD BE CONTRARY TO THE SPIRIT AND OBJECTIVES OF REGULATION NO 67/67 TO HOLD THAT IT APPLIES TO AGREEMENTS WHICH FALL UNDER THE PROHIBITION CONTAINED IN ARTICLE 85 ONLY BECAUSE OF THE CUMULATIVE EFFECT PRODUCED BY THE EXISTENCE OF ONE OR MORE NETWORKS OF SIMILAR AGREEMENTS .
29 ON THE CONTRARY , APART FROM THE FACT THAT THERE IS NOTHING IN THE TEXT OF THE REGULATION TO JUSTIFY THIS CONTENTION , ITS RESULT WOULD BE , TO A LARGE EXTENT , TO DEPRIVE THE REGULATION OF ANY PURPOSE , SINCE IT SPECIFICALLY RELATES TO CATEGORIES OF AGREEMENTS WHICH ARE OFTEN PART OF SUCH NETWORKS .
30 THIS VIEW IS CONFIRMED BY THE FACT THAT REGULATION NO 67/67 IS DESIGNED TO PROMOTE LEGAL CERTAINTY FOR THE BENEFIT OF PARTIES CONCERNED AND TO MAKE IT EASIER TO APPLY THE COMMUNITY PROVISIONS ON COMPETITION .
31 THERE IS , IN FACT , EVERY REASON FOR EXTENDING , IN SO FAR AS THE TREATY SO PERMITS , A GROUP EXEMPTION TO AGREEMENTS WHICH COME WITHIN THE SCOPE OF THE PROHIBITION CONTAINED IN ARTICLE 85 ONLY BECAUSE OF THE CUMULATIVE EFFECT PRODUCED BY THE EXISTENCE OF ONE OR MORE NETWORKS OF SIMILAR AGREEMENTS , THAT IS , BECAUSE OF FACTORS UNCONNECTED WITH THE AGREEMENT