a justice anut in a tnmncy pruxeding. Fceibly, the legislaturedeterminedthat the tramfor0fjmisdiUion to the justice courtdoe3 not implicate thelossofthc"~righuandimmunitisnthattbcSuprrmcCourtf~inK~nr,aadthatabearingis tmnecssary. You have not askedand thereforewe have not mnsidex4l. whether section 54.021 of the Family Code is amstitutional.
(a) A child may be repmsentedby an attorney at every stage of proaxdhgs uodcrthis title, including: &ii of eight kinds of pmceedings] @) Thcchild'srighttoicpresctntationbyanatt~sballnotkwaivcd in: @A of five kinds ofprooxdings] .... (d) The court shall ordera child's parentor other pexson responsiile for supportof the child to employan attomeyto representthe child, il: (1)thechildisootrepresentedbymattorney,
p. 1060 Honorable JohnB. Holmes, Jr. - Page 5 (~~-200)
und Chi&en in Need of Supervision, 21 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1747, 1772 (1990). Because a truancy proceeding is a proceeding under title 3, section 5 1.10 provides a child who is accused of engaging in truant conduct with a right to representation by an attorney.
If the child's parents are financially unable to eznploy an attorney, section 5 1.10(f) require4 the court to appoint wunsel. See id You argue that neither section 51.10 nor section 54.021 of the Family Code expressly authorize a justice of the peace to appoint an attorney for a child who is entitled to counsel under section 51.10(f). However, we understand that generally, in juvenile proceedings, the juvenile court appoints an attorney for a juvenile upon learning that the child is entitled to counsel. lhe appointed attorney then m-presents the child at alI proceedings in the case. Thus, the justice of the peace rarely will need to appoint an attorney. This is wnsistent with the scheme the legislature hss devised for waiving a child's right to wunsel: a child may waive the right to wunsel, but only in accordance with section 5 1.09, which requires the child's attorney to join in the waiver of an attorney. Fam. Code 8 5 1.10(b); Dawson, supra at 1772. Consequently, an indigent child may not waive the right to representation by an attorney in justice court unless the child already has an attorney, appointed earlier in the pmceedings.6
(footnotecontinued) support ofthe child is finahaiiy ableto employan attorneyto repment thCChOd;iUId
(3)the child'sright to representation by sn attoq, (A) hssnotbeenwaivedundexSection51.09ofthisanie[.] .... (C) The anul may enforce older6 under substaion (c) of this scction...hy appointing aunsel and ordering the patent or other pemn respoasibleforQlpport~thcchildtopayarrasonable~sfcc~dby emui. (0 ThecourtshaUappointauattorneytoqmsenttbcintemtofachild ontitledto tqmseatation by a0 attorney,if: (1)thechildisnotrepmsentedbysnattorney; (2)tbemurtdetembmthattkcMd'sparentorotherperson responsiile for supportof the child is tinan&@ unableto employ an attomeyto repmselltthe child; and (3)the child'sright to qmsentation by an attomy: (A) hssnotknwsivedmder Section51.09oftbiswde[.] %I the event that a child who is entitledto sn attorneyundet section 51.10(f) has not waived the righttoamselandisbeforethejusti~cmrtwithoutap+ted connscl,webclicvcthattbejustieeofihe peacehas implied authorityto appointan attomeyto representthe child. See gemmlly AttomeyGeneral OpinionJM-977(1988).
p. 1061 Honorable John B. Holmes, Jr. - Page 6 (DM-200)
Your third question asks whether "tardiness to class" is an unexcused voluntary absence under section 51,03(b)(2) of the Family Code. The Family Code does not define the term "unexcused voluntary absence," nor did we find any legislative history indicating the specifk mesning of the