"the culpablementalstate sof
knowledge and recklessnessapply only to the duty-to-registerelement" of the
failure-to-complyoffense. Robinson, 2015 WL 4068109 at *4. Thus, the
requirementof a culpable mental state applies only to the circumstancesof the
conduct-the duty to register, not the conduct of failing to do so. Id. The statute requiresonly that the offender"( 1) knew or was recklessaboutwhetherhe had a
duty to registeras a sex offender,and (2) failedto report"his new address. Id. at
*5
Febus arguesthat the Statepresentedinsufficient evidenceto prove that his
mental statewas intentionalor knowing when failing to give the correct address.
He contendsthat he provided affirmative evidencethat conclusivelyestablisheda
reasonabledoubt about his mental state.Based on the alleged lack of mens rea
juror could find him guilty beyonda evidencefor his failure, he saysno reasonable
reasonabledoubt.
This argumentis effectively renderedmoot by the holding of the Court of
Criminal Appeals in Robinson. The evidencepermitted a jury to conclude that
Febuswas fully aware of the registrationrequirements,basedon the forms he had
to sign upon releaseand reregistration,six yearsof maintaininghis registration,as
well as his own testimony.This constitutessufficient evidenceto show knowledge
for the duty-to-registerelement.SeeitJ. at*6 (testimonythat offenderwas awareof
the need to register was sufficient evidence to satisfy the first element of the
offense).
Basedon Robinson'sinterpretationof Article 62)02, the Statedid not have
to prove that Febushad a culpablemental statewhen failing to provide the correct
address.The evidence shows that the required documents listed the incorrect addressand that Febussignedthem. That is sufficientevidenceto satisflzthe
secondelement,failure to comply with the requirementsof the statute.The
evidencethereforewas sufficientfor a rationalfactfinderto find Febusguilty of
failureto complywith the registration requirement.
The holding in Robinsonis dispositiveof this case.Viewing the evidencein
the light most favorableto the verdict, we concludethat a rational factfindercould
have found Febusguilty of failing to comply with the requirementsof Article 62.
TEx. CooE CRIM.Pnoc. art. 62; see.lackson,443 U.S. at 319, 99 S. Ct. at 2789:
Merritt,368 S.W.3d at 525.Accordingly,we overruleFebus'ssole issue.
Conclusion
We affirmthejudgmentof thelrial court.
MichaelMassengale Justice
and Lloyd. Panelconsistsof JusticesKeyes,Massengale,
D o n o t p u b l i sh .T n x. R . A p p .P . 47.2( b) .