- MAY 7, 1975 TIME FRAME.
THE CARDINAL RULE OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION IS TO ASCERTAIN THE INTENT OF THE LEGISLATURE, AND IF POSSIBLE TO GIVE EFFECT TO THAT INTENT. WALKER V. ST. LOUIS S.F. RY. CO., 671 P.2D 672 (OKLA. 1983). IN SO DOING, ALL RELEVANT STATUTORY PROVISIONS MUST BE CONSTRUED TOGETHER, SO THAT FORCE AND MEANING IS GIVEN TO EACH. DANA P. V. STATE, 656 P.2D 253 (OKLA. 1982).
UTILIZING THESE WELL ESTABLISHED RULES OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, AND REVIEWING THE TERMS OF THE THREE RELEVANT STATUTES TOGETHER, RATHER THAN IN ISOLATION FROM ONE ANOTHER, IT IS EVIDENT THAT THE LEGISLATURE HAS LIMITED THESE MILITARY PARTICIPATING SERVICE CREDITS AVAILABLE TO OPERS MEMBERS TO TIME SERVED IN ACTIVE MILITARY SERVICE BETWEEN THE DATES OF AUGUST 5, 1964 AND MAY 7, 1975. PERIODS OF ACTIVE MILITARY SERVICE SERVED OUTSIDE THE LIMITS OF THIS TIME PERIOD, EITHER BEFORE OR AFTER SAME, IS NOT ELIGIBLE FOR USE BY OPERS FOR THE CREDITING OF PARTICIPATING SERVICE.
YOU STATE IN YOUR LETTER THAT THIS LIMITATION MIGHT BE CONSIDERED UNREASONABLE BY MANY PERSONS, GIVEN THAT THE DATES SET FORTH ARE ARBITRARY IN THE SENSE THAT PERSONS SERVED IN VIETNAM CONFLICT IN VERY REAL COMBAT SITUATIONS BOTH BEFORE AND AFTER THE DATES SET FORTH. I CERTAINLY CANNOT DISAGREE THAT SUCH SERVICE WAS NO DOUBT ENGAGED IN BY SOME PERSONS. HOWEVER, AS WITH THE OTHER TIME FRAMES ESTABLISHED IN 72 O.S. 67.13A, SUCH AS THOSE RELATIVE TO SERVICE IN WORLD WARS I AND II, THE LEGISLATURE CERTAINLY HAS THE POWER TO PROVIDE FOR SUCH TIME LIMITS. BY THE SAME TOKEN, IF THE LEGISLATURE TODAY FEELS THAT SOME CHANGES IN THE STATUES IS APPROPRIATE, IT CERTAINLY HAS THE POWER TO ALTER SAME.
(MICHAEL SCOTT FERN)