CHARGE
BEFORE:
THE HONORABLE WALTER M. PICKETT, JR., JUDGE, AND A JURY OF EIGHT
APPEARANCES:
CHARLES B. PRICE, ESQ. ATTORNEY FOR THE PLAINTIFF
EDWARD W. GASSER, ESQ. ATTORNEY FOR THE DEFENDANT
REPORTED BY: CT Page 602
KIMBERLY R. BECK CERTIFIED SHORTHAND REPORTER SUPERIOR COURT 15 WEST STREET - P.O. BOX 131 LITCHFIELD, CT 06759 567-4263
14 POLICY AND THAT THEY ARE ENTITLED TO RECOVER UNDER THE POLICY.
THE CONNECTICUT RULE OF CONSTRUCTION OF AN INSURANCE POLICY IS WELL SETTLED. IF THE TERMS OF INSURANCE POLICY ARE OF DOUBTFUL MEANING, THEN PERMISSIBLE CONSTRUCTION WHICH IS MOST FAVORABLE TO THE INSURED IS TO BE ADOPTED; BUT IF THEY ARE PLAIN AND UNAMBIGUOUS, THE ESTABLISHED RULE FOR CONTRACTS APPLY. THE LANGUAGE FROM WHICH THE INTENTION OF THE PARTIES IS TO BE DEDUCED MUST BE ACCORDED ITS NATURAL AND ORDINARY MEANING, AND THE COURTS CANNOT INDULGE IN A FORCED CONSTRUCTION IGNORING PROVISIONS OR SO DISTORTING THEM AS TO ACCORD A MEANING OTHER THAN THAT EVIDENTLY INTENDED BY THE PARTIES.
AS I INDICATED NO DEFINITION OF OCCURRENCE IN THIS POLICY. NOW, IN THIS INSURANCE POLICY, IS A MONETARY LIMITATION IN THE AMOUNT THAT CAN BE RECOVERED PER OCCURRENCE OF SIX HUNDRED AND FIFTY THOUSAND DOLLARS, AND IT IS FOR YOU TO DECIDE WHETHER OR NOT THE LOSSES WHICH OCCURRED WERE THE RESULT OF ONE OCCURRENCE OR MORE THAN ONE OCCURRENCE.
THE INSURANCE POLICY DOES NOT PROVIDE ANY DEFINITION OF OCCURRENCE. THE TERM OCCURRENCE ORDINARILY IS UNDERSTOOD TO DENOTE SOMETHING THAT TAKES PLACE, ESPECIALLY SOMETHING THAT HAPPENS UNEXPECTEDLY AND WITHOUT DESIGN.
THE INSURANCE POLICY INVOLVED IN THIS CASE IS A PROPERTY DAMAGE POLICY. THE GOAL OF SUCH A POLICY SIMPLY 15 STATED IS TO PROVIDE FINANCIAL PROTECTION AGAINST DAMAGE TO PROPERTY. IN ACCORDANCE WITH THIS PURPOSE, THE PARTIES HERE MUST HAVE INTENDED TO PROVIDE COVERAGE FOR PROPERTY DAMAGE EACH TIME IT OCCURRED UNEXPECTEDLY AND CT Page 603 WITHOUT DESIGN, UNLESS THE DAMAGE OCCURRING AT ONE POINT IN TIME WAS MERELY PART OF A SINGLE CONTINUOUS EVENT THAT HAD ALREADY CAUSED DAMAGE.
THE MERE FACT THAT THE VARIOUS ITEMS OF DAMAGE TO PLAINTIFF'S PROPERTY MAY HAVE BEEN CAUSED BY THE SAME STORM DOES NOT MEAN THAT THEY WERE THE RESULT OF THE SAME OCCURRENCE.
IN CONSIDERING WHETHER THE LOSSES SUSTAINED BY MOHAWK CONSTITUTED ONE OR MORE THAN ONE OCCURRENCE, YOU MAY CONSIDER ALL EVIDENCE YOU DEEM RELEVANT TO THE ISSUE. FOR EXAMPLE, IF YOU FIND THAT THE ITEMS OF DAMAGE OCCURRED AT DIFFERENT TIMES, THIS MAY BE EVIDENCE THAT THE ITEMS OF DAMAGE WERE THE RESULT OF DIFFERENT OCCURRENCES; IF YOU FIND THAT THE ITEMS OF DAMAGE WERE TWO INDEPENDENT STRUCTURES, THIS MAY BE EVIDENCE THAT THE ITEMS OF DAMAGE WERE THE RESULT OF DIFFERENT OCCURRENCES; IF YOU FIND THAT DAMAGE TO ONE STRUCTURE DID NOT CAUSE OR CONTRIBUTE TO THE DAMAGE TO ANOTHER STRUCTURE OR STRUCTURES, THIS MAY BE EVIDENCE THAT THE ITEMS OF DAMAGE WERE THE RESULT OF DIFFERENT OCCURRENCES.
IF YOU FIND THAT THE DAMAGE TO MOHAWK CONSTITUTED SEPARATE EVENTS OR INCIDENTS, THEN THERE