do not end at the at the
courthouse courthouse door;rather, he courthouseisis properly door; rather, tthe properly the fortressooff those the fortress thoserights. Thefirst rights. The first
requirement requirement of of our standardaadvances our standard dvances from the prior holdings o fromthepriorholdings off Texas courtsthatonly Texas courts an that only an
imminent, severe harm imminent, severe can justifypriorrestraint, harm can justify prior restraint, andin thecontext and in the of gag contextof orders,that gagorders, thatharm must harm must
be thejudicial to the be to process.E judicial process. ExxParte McCormick, Parte McCormick, 129Tex.Crim.457,88 129 S.W2d104;ExParte Tex. Crim. 457, 88 S.VV.2d 104; Ex Parte
F 71S. oster,71 Foster, Wat S.W. Themandate 595.The at 595. that findings ofirreparable mandate thatfindings harm bemade of irreparable harm be made isbased is based onour state on our state
constitutional constitutional preference preference for post-speech for post-speech remedies. Onlywhen remedies. suchmeaningful nosuch Only when no remedies meaningful remedies
exist w exist illpriorrestraints will be tolerated iin prior restraints betolerated nthis this context. Thesecond context. The second p ofthe artof part testisisintended thetest to intended to
ensure tthat ensure hatno alternative noalternative existsto exists totreat thespecific treatthe specific threat thejudicial threattotothe process, judicial process, whichwould which would belessrestrictive be ofstate less restrictive of speechrights. statespeech Whiletthis rights.While element isshared hiselement is shared iinncommon common withtheruling with the ruling
in Nebraska in Nebraska P ress,427 Press, US.at 427 U.S. 563-64,we at563-64, viewthe we view federal the federal announced testannounced test thereinas therein too as too permissive permissive toward priorrestraints toward prior restraints anddecline and decline to adoptit. to adopt Thefederal it. The approach federal approach offersonly offers only limitedguidance limited guidance c oncerning concerning gag orders such gag orders such as thatinvolved as that here,which involved here, restrict which restrict to accessto access
information by prohibiting individuals information byprohibiting from discussing individuals from discussing a a case. ordersshould Suchorders case. Such shouldbe betreated like treated like
Silverado Appx. 0561 No. 1-15-567-CV 1650 any other any other priorrestraint. restraint.Theonlyother The only otherfactors factorstotoheconsidered he consideredunder under Nebraska Pressarethe are the
extentofpretrial extentof pretrialnews andtheeffectiveness newsccoverage overage and the effectivenessoftherestraining of the restrainingorder. We order. note We that note toto that the extenttthat theextent hatthisopinion this opinionccites itesany anyfederal federallaw, law,ssuch uchprecedent precedentisisusedonlyforguidance and used only for guidance and in in no way necessitates no way the result reachedby necessitates theresultreached bythis today. That standardhasbeenlargely this courttoday.Thatstandard has been largely developedin the contextof developed in thecontext criminalratherthan civilproceedings, weighingthepress'First of criminal rather than civil proceedings, weighing the press' First Amendment rightsagainst accused'sSixthAmendment rightto to Amendment rights againstanan accused's Sixth Amendment right a fair trial.SeeSherylA. a fair trial. See Sheryl A. PJ Bjork,Comment, IndirectGagOrdersandtheDoctrineof Restraint,44 U L. Bjork, Comment, Indirect Gag Orders and the Doctrine of Prior Restraint, 44 U. Miami L. Rev.165,166 (1989).For instance,the elementin this test, the extentof pretrial news Rev. 165, 166 (1989). For instance, the first element in this test, the extent of pretrial news coverage haslittlebearingona civilproceeding. Nebraska Press, splintered decision with coverage has little bearing on a