THE CITY, AND WHERE THE ATTORNEY WAS SPECIALLY EMPLOYED FOR A PARTICULAR MATTER. THUS, THIS OPINION LEADS ONE TO BELIEVE THAT A MUNICIPAL ATTORNEY ONLY SPECIALLY EMPLOYED FOR A PARTICULAR MATTER WOULD NOT BE AN OFFICER FOR PURPOSES OF THE DUAL OFFICE HOLDING STATUTE.
IN OPINION 64-344, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL CONSIDERED AGAIN WHETHER A MUNICIPAL ATTORNEY WAS AN OFFICER. THAT OPINION FOUND THAT THE POSITION OF CITY ATTORNEY WAS CREATED FOR EACH OF THE FORMS OF GOVERNMENT, AND THAT ALTHOUGH THERE DID NOT APPEAR TO BE A STATUTE AUTHORIZING THE APPOINTMENT OF A CITY ATTORNEY, THERE WERE STATUTORY REFERENCES TO THE POSITION, NOTING 11 O.S. 541G. THE OPINION REACHED THE CONCLUSION THAT A MUNICIPAL ATTORNEY WAS AN "OFFICER", RELYING ON THE FACT THAT THE CITY ATTORNEY GENERALLY ADVISES MUNICIPAL OFFICERS, PROSECUTES THE CIVIL AND CRIMINAL ACTIONS OF THE MUNICIPALITY, AND PERFORMS OTHER DUTIES SPECIFICALLY DELEGATED TO HIM BY STATUTE.
IN OPINION 67-174, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL REASONED THAT A MUNICIPAL ATTORNEY WAS AN "OFFICER" BECAUSE OF PROVISIONS WITHIN 11 O.S. 632 (1961). THAT STATUTE PROVIDED THAT THE MAYOR APPOINT ONE CITY ATTORNEY AND OTHER CITY OFFICERS, "WHO SHALL HOLD SAID RESPECTIVE OFFICES DURING THE TERM FOR WHICH THE MAYOR SHALL HAVE BEEN ELECTED." THE ATTORNEY GENERAL ALSO REASONED THAT THE CITY ATTORNEY WAS AN OFFICER BECAUSE, STATUTORILY, HE WAS THE HEAD OF THE DEPARTMENT OF LAW WITHIN THE CITY, AND HIS DUTIES AS SUCH PROBABLY WERE SET OUT IN THE CHARTERS AND ORDINANCES OF THE PARTICULAR CITY. ADDITIONALLY, THE OPINION CITED STATUTORY AUTHORITY WHERE THE CITY ATTORNEY WAS AUTHORIZED TO PROSECUTE OR DEFEND LEGAL ACTIONS IN THE NAME OF THE PEOPLE, WAS REQUIRED TO APPROVE COMPLAINTS FOR VIOLATION OF CITY ORDINANCES FOR COMPLAINTS TO BE PROSECUTED, AND SERVED AS THE CITY'S LEGAL ADVISOR, APPEARING AT THEIR MEETINGS AND REPRESENTING THE CITY IN LAWSUITS BROUGHT BY OR AGAINST THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES.
THUS, WE MUST CONCLUDE THAT THE POSITION OF MUNICIPAL ATTORNEY WHERE THIS INDIVIDUAL SERVES IN CONTINUOUS EMPLOYMENT AS GENERAL ATTORNEY FOR THE CITY, AS DISTINGUISHED FROM SPECIAL EMPLOYMENT IN A PARTICULAR MATTER, IS AN OFFICE WITHIN THE MEANING OF 51 O.S. 6 (1990), AND IS COVERED BY THE GENERAL DUAL OFFICE HOLDING PROVISION.
YOU ALSO INQUIRED WHETHER A PERSON MAY HOLD THE POSITION OF CITY ATTORNEY FOR MORE THAN ONE MUNICIPALITY, OR ALSO SERVE AS A MUNICIPAL ATTORNEY AND SCHOOL BOARD MEMBER WITHOUT VIOLATING THE PROHIBITION AGAINST DUAL OFFICE HOLDING.
ASSUMING THAT THE CITY ATTORNEY IS ONE THAT IS IN CONTINUOUS EMPLOYMENT, SUCH AN ATTORNEY IS AN "OFFICER" WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE STATUTE. SECTION 6 OF TITLE 51 WOULD PROHIBIT A PERSON FROM SERVING AS MUNICIPAL ATTORNEY FOR MORE THAN ONE CITY, AND FROM SERVING AS A MUNICIPAL ATTORNEY AND A SCHOOL BOARD MEMBER, UNLESS AN EXCEPTION IS FOUND FROM THIS GENERAL PROHIBITION. NONE OF THE EXCEPTIONS CONTAINED WITHIN 51 O.S. 6 SECTION 6 CONTAIN AN EXCEPTION APPLICABLE TO THE INSTANT QUESTIONS. NO OTHER STATUTORY EXCEPTION WAS FOUND WHICH WILL ALLOW A MUNICIPAL ATTORNEY TO SERVE FOR MORE THAN