of § 707(b)(2)(A)(iii)(I), notwithstanding the fact that it applies specifically to Chapter 13 debtors.
*202 First, permitting deductions for payments on debts secured by collateral that a debtor intends to surrender produces leads to absurd results when § 707(b)(2)(A)(iii)(II) comes into play. One, it would be absurd to permit a Chapter 13 debtor who indicates his intent to surrender his residence to claim a deduction for his regular mortgage payments but to deny him, under § 707(b)(2)(A)(iii)(II), a deduction for any pre-petition arrearage. If the debtor cannot claim a deduction for the arrearage, he should not be entitled to claim a deduction for the regular payment. And two, disallowing a debtor's deduction for "additional" payments on his "primary residence, motor vehicle, or other property necessary for the support of the debtor and the debtor's dependents" because he intends to surrender it (them) but permitting the debtor to deduct payments on other debts secured by property to be surrendered would also be absurd.
Admittedly, these absurdities arise in the context of the determination of an above median-income Chapter 13 debtor's disposable income under 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(3), but § 1325(b)(3) incorporates § 707(b)(2)(A) and (B) without qualification, and it would be illogical to have one interpretation of § 707(b)(2)(A)(iii)(I) for Chapter 7 and a different interpretation for Chapter 13. The interpretations between chapters must be consistent, and the only interpretation that makes sense in the context of both Chapter 13 and Chapter 7 is that § 707(b)(2)(A)(iii)(I) applies only to payments on debts secured by property that a debtor intends to keep.
The second implication of § 707(b)(2)(A)(iii)(II) flows from the statute's use of the word "additional," which connotes a connection or commonality between the payments referred to in subsection I and subsection II. In parsing the short text of the statute to determine the source of that commonality, it is apparent that the only possible connection between § 707(b)(2)(A)(iii)(I) and (II) is the requirement that the payments to secured creditors be "necessary . . . to maintain possession of the property"; the other clauses, relating to filing a plan under chapter 13 and to specific property, would be non-sequiturs linked to § 707(b)(2)(A)(iii)(I). In other words, the payments which 707(b)(2)(A)(iii)(II) "adds" will never be "in a plan under chapter 13," when § 707(b)(2)(A)(iii)(I) is being applied to a Chapter 7 debtor; and the deduction claimed by a Chapter 7 debtor will not necessarily always be for payments on a debtor's primary residence, motor vehicle, or other property necessary for the support of the debtor and the debtor's dependents, because 707(b)(2)(A)(iii)(I) doesn't contain that limitation.
Thus, an examination of § 707(b)(2)(A)(iii)(I) in the context in which it appears - namely, as the conjunctive partner of § 707(b)(2)(A)(iii)(II) - reinforces the conclusion that § 707(b)(2)(A)(iii)(I) applies only to payments on debts secured by collateral that a debtor intends to keep.
III. Taking a Snapshot of a Debtor's Intentions
On a final note, the Court addresses the argument often invoked against the minority