STATES ONLY TO AN EXTENT WHICH IS NOT APPRECIABLE .
48AS LONG AS THE UNITED KINGDOM WAS NOT A MEMBER STATE THE RESTRICTIONS ON COMPETITION ARISING OUT OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE WATTS/THEAL AGREEMENTS ONLY IN FACT AFFECTED TRADE WITHIN THE NETHERLANDS AND NOTHING IN THE COURT ' S FILE JUSTIFIES THE ASSERTION THAT THE PARTITIONING OF THIS DOMESTIC MARKET APPRECIABLY INTERFERED WITH THE PATTERN OF TRADE BETWEEN MEMBER STATES IN WATTS PRODUCTS BEFORE 1 JANUARY 1973 , THE DATE OF THE UNITED KINGDOM ' S ACCESSION TO THE COMMON MARKET .
49THEAL CONTINUED TO OPERATE THESE AGREEMENTS TO ITS ADVANTAGE AFTER THAT DATE SINCE IT OBTAINED JUDGMENTS ON 16 JANUARY AND 5 JUNE 1973 AND 30 MAY 1975 AGAINST THREE UNDERTAKINGS WHICH WERE FORBIDDEN TO IMPORT WATTS PRODUCTS DIRECTLY INTO THE NETHERLANDS AND IT CONTINUED TO WRITE TO RETAILERS IN THE NETHERLANDS WHO HAD BOUGHT WATTS PRODUCTS DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY FROM WHOLESALERS IN THE UNITED KINGDOM , POINTING OUT THAT THESE DEALINGS INFRINGED ITS TRADE-MARK RIGHTS IN THE NETHERLANDS .
50CONSIDERATION OF THE SPECIFIC EFFECTS OF THESE AGREEMENTS SHOWS THAT THEY RESTRICTED INTRA-COMMUNITY TRADE APPRECIABLY SINCE THE SALE OF APPLIANCES OF THE WATTS BRAND IN THE NETHERLANDS ACCOUNTED FOR 15 % OF THE MARKET FOR APPLIANCES FOR CLEANING GRAMOPHONE RECORDS .
51IN VIEW OF THESE FINDINGS IT IS ESTABLISHED THAT SINCE 1 JANUARY 1973 THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THEAL AND WATTS AFFECTED TRADE BETWEEN MEMBER STATES .
52A SECOND CONDITION MUST BE FULFILLED BEFORE THE PROHIBITION IN ARTICLE 85 ( 1 ) CAN APPLY , NAMELY THAT THE AGREEMENT HAS AS ITS OBJECT OR EFFECT THE PREVENTION , RESTRICTION OR DISTORTION OF COMPETITION WITHIN THE COMMON MARKET .
53THE AGREEMENTS BETWEEN THEAL AND WATTS HAD AS THEIR MAIN OBJECT AND EFFECT THE PREVENTION OF COMPETITION IN THE PROTECTED AREA WITHIN THE COMMON MARKET .
54IT IS APPARENT FROM THE PRACTICES OF THE PARALLEL IMPORTERS AND THE RISKS TO WHICH THEY EXPOSED THEMSELVES BY ENGAGING IN THEM THAT THERE WAS A SPECIFIC DEMAND FOR WATTS ' S PRODUCTS IN THE NETHERLANDS .
55THEAL ' S CONDUCT SHOWS THAT THE LATTER FEARED THE COMPETITION OF TRADERS WHO OBTAINED THEIR SUPPLIES ELSEWHERE SINCE WATTS ' S PRODUCTS ACCOUNTED FOR MORE THAN 25 % OF ITS TURNOVER .
56IT FOLLOWS FROM ALL THESE FINDINGS THAT , SINCE THE AGREEMENTS IN QUESTION HAVE AS FROM 1 JANUARY 1973 AFFECTED TRADE BETWEEN MEMBER STATES IN CLEANING APPLIANCES FOR GRAMOPHONE RECORDS AND THEIR EFFECT HAS BEEN TO DEPRIVE CONSUMERS OF THE BENEFITS FLOWING FROM EFFECTIVE COMPETITION BETWEEN PRODUCTS OF THE SAME BRAND WHICH MIGHT SPRING FROM A LARGE NUMBER OF OUTLETS AND SOURCES OF SUPPLY AND FROM LOWER PRICES , THEY ARE INCOMPATIBLE WITH THE COMMON MARKET AND FALL WITHIN THE PROHIBITION IN ARTICLE 85 ( 1 ).
57FURTHERMORE THESE AGREEMENTS , WHICH BY PREVENTING PARALLEL IMPORTS SECURED FOR THEAL ABSOLUTE TERRITORIAL PROTECTION WHICH WAS MADE STILL MORE EFFECTIVE BY THE PROHIBITION ON EXPORTS IMPOSED BY WATTS , DID NOT CONTRIBUTE EITHER TO IMPROVING THE PRODUCTION OR