as follows: "prescribinga limitationof time when suitsmay be brought for taxes of schooldistriotsand road districtF
It is significantthat nearly all the Texas statutesof limitation of personalactionsare worded 80 as to providethat suit may be broughtwith- in a certainperiod of time and not thereafter. See Articles 5524 through Article 5546 of the Revised Civil Statutes. Suoh statutes,however,have always been aonstroedto operatemerely a8 statutesof limitationwhich must be specificallyplead in order to operateas a bar or a defenseto a suit broughtlaterthan withinthe period presol'ibda Ia'tie Stat&e. "r'ne%UI'Iv "limitstioa" nas defined bythe Conmri~sion of Appealsof Texas iathe case of AmsrioanNationalInsuraaoeComprryv. Hicks, 35 S.". (2d) 128. The Court stated as follows: Hon. King Fike, page 4 (O-3315)
". . . The term *limitation* has been definedto mean the time at the end of which no action at law or suit in equity oan be maintained. 37 C. J. 684, par. 1. Statutesof'limitationdo not oonferany right of a&ion, but are enaotedto restrictthe periodwithin vhichthe right, otherwiseunm, might be asserted.' Riddlesberger v. HartfordF. Ins. Co. 7 Wall. 386, 19 L. Rd. 257." (Underscoring ours).
The ReamaontCourt of CivilAppeals passed on a questionsimilarto the one under oonsideration herein in the case of Chapnanv. Tyler County,259 S. 911. 301, writ of error refusadby the SupremeCourt in a memorandumopinion reportedin 278 S.W. 1115. The Court statedas follows~
"Artiale464, RevisedCivil Statutes,provides:
"The actionupon the claim so rejectedmust be broughtwithin six months after such service.'
"This is a statuteof limitationand must be pleadedaffirmativelyin order to constitutea defense. 17 R.C. La 9841 Green v, MoCord, 204 Ala. 364, 85 South. 762~ Stanleyv. Green, 205 Ala. 226, 87 South. 356~ Sharrewv. InlandLines, 214 N. Ye 101, 108 B. E. 217, L&U. 1916E, 1192, and note, Ann. Gas. 1916D, 1236; Chapmanv. Doonsy, 257 8.W. 1106, an opinion'@ this aourt."
The same rule of law was announcedby the Gemmissionof Appeals in the case of State BankingBoardv. Pilcher,270 8.8, 1004. The Court statedas fOllowS,~ ". . . The issues beforethis oourt,are, first,as to the oorreotnessof the action of the trial oourt in reiusingto sustaindefendant'sgeneraldemurrer beoausethe petitionfailedto affirmativelyshow that the,olaimof plaintiff was presentedwiVJ.n 90 days,as providedin artiole463 of the RevisedCivil Statutes,and.thatthe aotioa upon the olah was broughtwithin 6 months after serviceof notice,as providedin article464 of the RevisedCivil Statutesl . . .
"The SuprameCourt, in refusinga writ of error in Chapmanv* Tyler County (Tex. Civ. App.) 259 8.W. 301, heldthat statuteslike said artiole463 are statutes of limitation,and must be affinaativelypleadby the defeadantin order to oonstitutea defense,and therefore,of oourse,the petitionof plaintiffwas good as againsta generaldemurrer."
The generalprinoipleapplicablewas laid dorm by the EastlandCourt of Civil Appeals in the oaee of EdwardsDfg. Co. v. SouthernSurety Co., 283 5.. W. 624. The Court statedas follows: Vhe first oontention,that a statutecreatinga right and presoribinga time withinwhich the right maybe assertedis not a Statute of limitation,does not obtain in this state. De Ham v. RailwayCo., 23 S.W. 281, 86 Tex. 68; Chap- man v. Mooney (Tex. Civ. App.) 237 S.W. 1109) Chapnanv. T lsr County (Tex. Civ. App.) 259 S.W. 3033 State Boardv. Pilcher (Tex.