case, although factually was required under simular circumstance, precisely; The Courts charge authorized the jury to convict if it found that: Deputy Miller (or DETEC'J;'IVE MUNOZ) , ''whether acting as an officer or as a person who was not an officer· ( 'an other person,' in the terms of the statute), had placed the defendant under arrest without a warrant for an offense that was a felony OR AGAINST THE PUBLIC PEACE." I d.
"NO OFFENSE COMMITI'ID IN MILLER'S (or DETEC'l'IVE MUNOZ 'S) PRESENSE OR VIEW WAS A FEI.ONY," and "THE JURY WERE INSTRUCTED "..'HAT TRAFFIC VIOLATIONS WERE NOT OFFENSES AGAINST THE PUBLIC PEACE, 9J TOE OOI.Y OFFENSE FOR WHICH MILLm (or MUNOZ WAS USE OF 'NO TORN SIGNAL') LEX::M.LY aJULD HAVE ARRESTED 'nJE APPLICANT WAS DRIVING WHILE IN"'IXICATED (MUNOZ COULD NOT HAVE LEGALLY ARRESTED RElATOR FOR NOT. USING A TURN SIGNAL, TRAFFIC VIOLATION, IS NCY.r A FELONY NOR AGAINST THE PUBLIC PEACE, THEREFORE ILLEGAl. / UNJLAWFUI. ARJRES.r). Id. BEFORE HE S".roPPID HER (HIM) 1 MILLER (MUNOZ HAD MERE SUSPICION FROO UNKNOWN .MUS
UNRELIABLE INFORMNrr 1 ASSUMEDLY) HAD "NO EVIDENCE' "'mAT APPLICANT WAS Dn'OXI~Tm- Id. "If, as the Court of Appeals said, '[b]y its verdict of guilt, thejury found MILLER (or any other person) LEGALLY STOPPED APPLICANT,' and under the Courts instruction the STOP COULD HAVE ONLY BEEN LEGAL IF IT WERE FOR DWI (OFFENSE OF FELONY OR AGAINST THE PUBLIC PEACE), the jury's FINDING MUST HAVE BEEN BASED ON EVIDENCE OF IN'IDXICATION that MILLER OBTAINED AFlr'ER HE MADE 'HIE STOP. SUCH EVIDENCE axrr.D r"Y..I" JUSTIFY THE S'l'OP." Id. As in PIERCE, supra, "there was NO PROOF that DEPUTY MILLER (or DETECTIVE MUNOZ) witnessed a violation of the TRAFFIC LAWS," nor was there PROOF PRESENTED FOR ASSUMED PROBABLE CAUSE TO SEARCH OR ARREST WITHOUT WARRANT (TEX CODE CRH1 PROC ART 14.01), and RELATOR AT VERY MINIMAL WAS ENTITLED TO A SIMILAR CHARGE AND/OR REVERSAL AND REMAND. THE STOP, hereto in present case, HAS NOT BEEN JUSTIFIED, AS NO PROOF PRESENTED FOR: TRAFFIC VIOLATION (i.e. TRAFFIC TICKET, CITATION, VIDEO OF VIOLATION, NOTHING); or PROBABLE CAUSEand had there been .PROBABLE CAUSE, tDT JUST UNSUPPORTED ASSERTIONS OR
BELIEFS, the OFFICER'S MUNOZ AND PORTER CLEARLY WOULD HAVE IMMEDIATELY WENT BEFORE A MAGISTRATE TO LAWFULLY OBTAIN A WARRANT FOR ARREST AND/OR SEARCH, HOWEVER, IN NOT DOING
III
76th JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF TITUS COUNTY, TEXAS
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS ANALYSIS CONCERNING:
A. The failure to grant the defense motion to suppress: (continued)
SO STRONGLY SUGGEST THEY WERE OUT TO MAKE AN ARREST AND/OR SEARCH AND SEIZURE through the ANONYMOUS UNKNOWN UNRELIABLE INFORMANT BY "ANY MEANS NECESSARY WITBOUI' SAID WARRANTS, 'lD ARREST, SEARCH, AND/OR SEIZE, THROUGH UNCORROBORATED HEARSAY MADE BY AN ASSUMED ANONYIDUS INFORMANT. n Furthermore, the UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT, in ILLINOIS v GATES, 462 US 213, 76 LEd 2d 527, 103 S Ct 2317, reh. den. (US) 77 LEd 2d 1453, 104 S Ct 103, consistently recognized the value for corroboration of detail OF AN INFORMANT'S TIP BY INDEPENDENT POLICE WORK. Id.,