NAME OF AN UNVERIFIED PLAINTIFF WHILE ACTUALLY
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UNDERWRITTEN BY THE NONPARTY DEBT COLLECTOR?
3. WAS THE SHERIFF SALE ACTUALLY ILLEGAL OR UNLAWFUL BY "SHORTING" THE WRIT OF EXECUTION AT HAND AND SELLING THE PROPERTY FOR LESS THAN THE TOTAL OF "THE JUDGMENT, INTERESTS AND COSTS" AS ESTABLISHED IN KAIB V. SMITH, 684 A.2D 630, 632 (PA.SUPER. 1996), AND DID THIS "SHORT SALE" THEREFORE FAIL TO DIVEST THE MORTGAGOR OF HIS TITLE AS AN "INCOMPLETE PAYMENT"?
4. DOES THE FAILURE OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW TO REQUIRE "ADEQUATE COMPENSATION" AT "FAIR PRICE" FOR THE "PUBLIC TAKING" BY A "PUBLIC OFFICER" IN A "SHERIFF SALE" MAKE AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL BREACH OF SUBSTANTIVE PROPERTY AND DUE PROCESS RIGHTS?
5. WAS [BANK]'S MORTGAGE JUDGMENT A CLOG ON THE EQUITY OF REDEMPTION FOR BEING TWICE THE SALE PRICE AND THE COURT MUST THEREFORE SET ASIDE THE SHERIFF SALE AND THE FAILURE TO DO SO WAS A MANIFEST ABUSE OF DISCRETION?
6. DOES THE FAILURE OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW TO GUARANTEE SALE PRICE REDEMPTION MAKE AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL BREACH OF SUBSTANTIVE PROPERTY AND DUE PROCESS RIGHTS, AND THAT THE COURT MUST THEREFORE ORDER SALE PRICE REDEMPTION AS A MATTER OF LAW ANALOG TO THE PROCEDURE FOR "JUDICIAL TAX SALES" IN THIS STATE?
7. DID THE COURT ERR AS A MATTER OF LAW IN REFUSING TO VACATE THE MORTGAGE JUDGMENT WHERE THE UNDERLYING COMPLAINT FAILED TO STATE ANY "GROUNDS" FOR A MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE REMEDY AS UNDER PA.R.C.P. 1146?
8. WAS [BANK]'S FAILURE TO FIRST PRESENT THE MORTGAGE NOTE FOR EXCHANGE AT THE "PLACE OF PAYMENT" OR TO OBTAIN A DISCHARGE AS UNDER GERBER V. PIERGROSSI[, 142 A.3D 854 (PA.SUPER. 2016), APPEAL DENIED, 641 PA. 179, 166 A.3D 1215 (2017)] A FATAL DEFECT PRIMA FACIE IN THE UNDERLYING COMPLAINT WHERE NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS ARE
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PERSONAL CLAIMS BARRED IN FORECLOSURE CASES UNDER RULES 1141, 1146 & 1148?
9. "[M]ORTGAGE FORECLOSURE" BEING THE WRONG FORM OF ACTION FOR "NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS" ("IN REM VS. IN PERSONAM"), THEREFORE DID THE COURT ERR AS A MATTER OF LAW BY REFUSING TO STRIKE THE "IN REM" MORTGAGE JUDGMENT THAT [WAS] OBTAINED ON A FICTITIOUS AND ILLEGAL PERSONAL OBLIGATION INSTEAD OF SETTING FORTH THE "ASSIGNMENTS OF MORTGAGE DEBT" AS THE "REAL INTERESTED PARTY"?
10. IS IT AN ERROR AS A MATTER OF LAW WHERE REAL ESTATE IS INHERENTLY EXCLUDED FROM NEGOTIABLE COLLATERAL BY DEFINITION AND THEREFORE IMPOSSIBLE TO STATE A CLAIM FOR WHICH RELIEF COULD BE GRANTED, RELATING TO BOTH THE "UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE" IN THE SAME CAUSE OF ACTION AS FOR "IN REM MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE AGAINST LAND PARCELS" ESPECIALLY WHERE LAND IS AN IMMOVABLE THING AND NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS RELATE TO TOKENS OF EXCHANGE FOR THINGS WHICH ARE ACTUALLY MOVABLE?
11. IS A PENNSYLVANIA TRIAL COURT BOUND BY THE SUPREMACY CLAUSE OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION TO "MAKE NOTHING BUT GOLD OR SILVER TENDER FOR DEBT" AS UNDER ARTICLE 1, SECTION 10 UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, AND THAT THEREFORE UNDER THE PREVAILING CIRCUMSTANCES IN THIS DAY, ALL DEBTS ARE FICTITIOUS ACCOUNT ENTRIES THAT CANNOT BE GIVEN THE SUBSTANCE OF LAW