TAKING OFF FROM LYON-BRON AIRPORT AT 14.30 HOURS LOCAL TIME IN 29 APRIL 1978 AND THE ACCIDENT EVINCE MANIFEST RECKLESSNESS .
6 THE FIRST EVIDENCE TO WHICH THE DEFENDANT POINTS IN THIS REGARD IS THE PILOT ' S DECISION TO TAKE THE DIRECT ROUTE TO CANNES - ALONG THE RHONE VALLEY FROM LYON TO A POINT ABREAST OF MONTELIMAR-CARPENTRAS AND THEN BRANCHING OFF DIRECTLY TO THE ST TROPEZ AREA - IN THE ADVERSE WEATHER CONDITIONS WHICH PREVAILED OVER THAT PART OF FRANCE AND WHICH HAD BEEN REPORTED TO HIM AT LYON-BRON AIRPORT . AFTER STUDYING THE SAME WEATHER INFORMATION MR VAN KASTEEL ' S TWO COLEAGUES WHO WERE IN THE SAME GROUP OF TOURISTS TRAVELLING IN TOURING AIRCRAFT FROM BRUSSELS TO THE GREEK ISLANDS AND WERE ALSO FLYING LIGHT AIRCRAFT PREFERRED INSTEAD TO FLY DOWN THE RHONE VALLEY AS FAR AS MARSEILLE AND THEN TO FOLLOW THE COAST .
7 THE COURT HAS BEEN PROVIDED WITH A SUMMARY OF THE WEATHER INFORMATION GIVEN BY THE REGIONAL WEATHER CENTRE AT LYON-BRON AIRPORT BETWEEN 14.00 AND 14.30 HOURS ON 29 APRIL 1978 TO THE CREWS FLYING TO CANNES AND HAS ORDERED AN EXPERT REPORT ON THE CONCLUSIONS WHICH AN AIRMAN OUGHT TO HAVE DEDUCED FROM THAT INFORMATION . THE COURT HAS ALSO HEARD THE EVIDENCE OF THE TWO PILOTS WHO TOOK THE LYON-MARSEILLE ROUTE IN ORDER TO ASCERTAIN THE REASONS WHICH LED THEM TO DECIDE AGAINST TAKING THE DIRECT ROUTE TO CANNES .
8 AFTER THE TECHNICAL EXPERTS AND WITNESSES HAD BEEN EXAMINED THE DEFENDANT INDICATED THAT AS A RESULT OF THE EXPLANATIONS GIVEN IT NO LONGER PERSISTED IN ITS CONTENTION THAT THE DECISION TO TAKE THE DIRECT ROUTE TO CANNES WAS IN ITSELF EVIDENCE OF MANIFEST RECKLESSNESS .
9 THE DEFENDANT ' S SECOND REASONS FOR CONTENDING THAT MR VAN KASTEEL ' S ACTIONS WERE RECKLESS IS THE DECISION WHICH HE IS ALLEGED TO HAVE TAKEN WHEN HIS AIRCRAFT FLEW INTO THE DISTURBANCE AND VISIBILITY WAS SUDDENLY REDUCED , TO DESCEND FROM AN ALTITUDE OF 1 500 METRES TO LESS THAN 1 000 METRES .
10 IT IS COMMON GROUND THAT AT 16.52 HOURS , THE TIME OF HIS LAST RADIO CONTACT WITH MARSEILLE-MARIGNANE AIRPORT , MR VAN KASTEEL REPORTED HIS AIRCRAFT AT AN ALTITUDE OF 4 500 FEET OR ROUGHLY 1 500 METRES AND THAT APPROXIMATELY 10 MINUTES LATER IT CRASHED INTO THE NORTH SLOPE OF MONT SAINTE-VICTOIRE AT A HEIGHT OF SOME 960 METRES .
11 HOWEVER , IT IS NOT CLEAR FROM THE WRITTEN EVIDENCE , SUCH AS THE PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION REPORT DRAWN UP BY MR GRIMAUD FOR THE FRENCH MINISTRY OF TRANSPORT OR THE REPORT OF THE GENDARMERIE NATIONALE INCLUDING THEIR VARIOUS APPENDICES , THAT THE AIRCRAFT ' S LOSS OF ALTITUDE WAS DUE TO A DELIBERATE DECISION OF THE PILOT TO ATTEMPT TO DESCEND BELOW THE CLOUD . NEITHER MR GRIMAUD , WHO WAS EXAMINED BY THE COURT , NOR THE TECHNICAL EXPERTS APPOINTED BY THE PARTIES , COULD STATE WITH CERTAINTY THAT THE LOSS OF