atteinptingto create liabilityon the part of the State for action6founded ia tort, or a cuamis- sioners'court contractingthat the county shall be subjectto tort liabil- ity. The lack of authorityin such izmtanceswculd semn to be fundamental.
No cases directlyin point have cone to our attentionupon the ques- tion of whethera schoolboard nay enter a contractwhereby the districtbe- collies an indamitor of a third partyforhis own torts. It has been held how ever that a sumlcipalcorporationmay not beccaae a guarantorin the absenceof legislativeauthority. In Dillon,MunicipalCorporations,5th ed., Vol. II, g 8111,it is stated:
"A municipalcorporationcannot, withoutlegislative authority,becaae suretyfor another corporation or an indi- vidual;cannotguaranteethe bonds or obligation6of another, or make accommodation indorsernents. Such an authoritycan- not be iaplledor deductedfrom the generaland usual powers conferredupon such corporations. Although such a oorpora- tion may have power directlyto acoanplisha certainobjwt, I -. .
,
Hon. T. H. Trimble,page 3 (0-33L6)
and itself expend its revenuesor money therefor,yet this do66 not give or includethe power to lend it6 creditto anotherwho may be empoweredto effect the same object. &pending money by a city council,as agent6 or atiinistra- tors of their constituents,is a very differentthing fraa binding their constituentsby a contractof suretyship,. . . 'a contractwhich carrieswith it a lesion by its very M- ture.' Thus the indorsementof the bonds of a streetrail- road compaw in a city, by the city authorities,is not within the ordinaryadministrative powers of the corporation, and requiresexpresslegislativegrant.c
While there is a decideddistinctionbetweencontractsof surety- ship and indemnity,they are somewhatsimilar in naturewhen considering authorityfor their execution. Neithercan be said to be of the character ordinarilyor necessarilycontemplatedin the usual artninistration and managementof the governmentalfunctioncommittedto school districts. We find no expressauthorityin our statutesfor school districtsto become indemnitorsfor the torts of third parties. The well establishedrule by which trusteeshave only limitedauthorityto bind their districts,is par- ticularlyappli&le to obligationsof this nature and authorityto bind the districtin contractsof this nature cannot be inferredfrcanthe general grant of authorityin Article 2780, R.C.S.,192.5,to manage and controlthe affairsof the district.
It is also well settledthat a board of tmstees is limited in its authorityto expend the funds of its districtand may not bind the dis- trict in excess of availablerevenuesfor the currentyear. The nature and extent of the obligationrecitedin the above quoted contractwould seem to be wholly incompatiblewith the policy and purpose of this limitation.
It is our opinionthat a board of trusteesof a school district does not~have authorityto bind the districtin the manuer set out in the above quoted agreement.
Yours very truly
APPROVEDAF% 5, 19i41 ATTORKKXGKKKRALOFTKKAS /s/ Gerald C. Mann ATTORNKY GENERAL OF TEKAS By /a/ Cecil C. Caaauack Cecil C. Camnsck,Assistant BY: BWB, CHAlRMhN
O.K. GKL