2781,2788-89,61L.Ed.2d560 (1979). As chargedin the indictment
and the jury charge, a person can commit murder if he (1) intentionally or
knowingly causesthe death of an individual or (2) intends to causeserious
bodily ittjuty and commits an act clearly dangerousto human life that causes
the deathof an individual.Tex. Pen.Code g 19.02(bX1),(2). An intentional
killing occurswhen the person's consciousdesireor objective is to causethe deathof another. A knowing kilting occurswhen the personknows that death
is reasonablycertain. Tex. Pen. Code $ 6.03(a), (b). Thus a knowing killing
contemplatesthe commissionof an act that is objectively dangerousto human
rife.Lugo-Lugov. state,650s.w.2d72,81 (Tex.crim. App. 1983).To prove
murder under this theory, the statemust prove that the defendantintentionally
or knowingly engagedin an actthat causedthe death and intendedor knew
that deathwould resultfrom that act.Leal v. State,800s.w.2d346,34g (Tex.
App., Corpus Christi 1990, pet ref.). Intentional and knowing murder under
$19.02(b)(l),(2) is a result-of-conduct offense.Cookv.State,884S.W.2d485
(Tex. Crim. App. 1994). Thus, the culpable mental state is focused on the
defendant'sintent to achievethe result, ratherthan the defendant'sknowledge
regardingthe conduct.Lugo-Lugov. State,650S.W.2dat 81.
In this case,at the close of the State's case-in-chief appellantmade a
motion for an instructedverdict of not guilty. The motion was deniedby the
trial judge. (RR IV 80). The trial judge erred by not granting appellant's
motion for an instructedverdict of not guilty sincethe state'scase-in-chiefdid
not prove the essentialelementsof murder. The stateonly proved that (1) the
complainant died from blunt force trauma to his head erndneck area, (2)
appellanttold his fatherthat the complainant"wasn't going to make it to work
the next day becausehe was dead in a blanket in the motel room," and (3) appellant waslocatedandarrested outsideat a nearbyhotel.(RRIII 49,236,
IV 13-14,34).Therewasnoevidence directlyor indirectlylinkingthedeathof
the complainantto appellant.The fact that appellantand the complainantwere
sharinga motel room is not any evidencethat appellantwas the actualperson
who causedthe death.Furthermore,there was no evidencepresentedthrough
appellant'sfather that appellantadmittedto the killing. Thus, the evidenceis
legally insufficient to support a finding that appellant either intentionally or
knowingly causedthe death of the complainantor intendedto causeserious
bodily inj,rry to the complainant,ffid the trial judge erred by not granting
appellant's motion for an instructedverdict of not guilty at the close of the
stateoscase-in-chief.Thus, the Court of Appeals erredin fitndingthe evidence
sufficientto supportthe verdict. Appellant shouldbe acquitrtedby this Court.
Ground for Review Number Two:
The evidenceis legally insufficient since no rational trier of fact could
have found beyond a reasonabledoubt that appellant did not act in self-
defense.There is no evidencein this caseto disprovethat appellantdid not act
in self-defense.Self-defenseis the only logical explanationfor what happened.
Appellant assertsthere was insufficient evidence to disprove self-
defensebeyonda reasonabledoubt.The jury was instructedlto acquit appellant
unlessit believedbeyonda reasonabledoubtthat he did not act in self-defense.
(CR 89-93). In reviewing the legal sufficiency of evidence,courtsconsiderall
of the evidence in the light most favorable to the ver