Texas Courts which might simpli- fy our constructionof the meaning of the articlewe thereforemust turn to decisionsof the courtsof other states. One case of particularinterest and in point is the case of Gingerichv. State, 93 N.E.2d 180 (1950). The IndianaSupremeCourt cited the rule which is similarlyestablishedin Texas, that "penal statutesare to be strictlyconstrued,and may not be extended by intent..." .
In the syllabusof the Gingerichcase, supra, it is said:
"Under compulsoryschool attendancestatuteprovidingthat > ._. .
Hon. A. W. Walker,Page 4 (~~-1056)
as used in act word "child"shall mean and includeevery child in state between ages of seven and fifteenyears 'inclusive', quotedword means years between seventhand fifteenthyears, and includesseventhanniversaryof a child*sbirth and fifteenthanniversaryof his birth and does not includeperiod between child'sfifteenthand six- teenth year. Bums' Ann. St. $5 28-505b,28-5o5f."
Furtherthe IndianaCourt stated as follows:
"This court has held that it is fundamentalthat penal statutesare to be strictlyconstrued,and may not be ex- tended by intent. Loftus v. State, 1944, 222 Ind. 139, 52 N.E.2d 488; Caudillv. State, 1946, 224 Ind. 531, 69 N.E. 2d 549. And, as said in Mannersv. State, 1936, 210 Ind. 648, 654,3 N.E.2d 300, 303: 'It is fundamentalthat penal statutesare to be strictlyconstrued;that a statute in derogationof a common right and highly penal in character is only to be appliedto cases clearlywithin its pro- vi5ions; that penaltiesmay not be createdby construction, but must be avoidedby construction,unless they are brought within the letterand the necessarymeaning of the act creat- ing thenpenalty. This requiresthat where there is ambiguity it must be resolvedagainstthe penalty,and only those cases broughtwithin the statutethat are clearlywithin its mean- ing and intention.'"
The decisionsare uniformthroughoutthe cases reviewed in holding that "a child when born is in its first year and at the end of that year is one year old, so when he arrivesat his fourteenthanniversaryand is then in his fifteenthyear he is over 14'pars of age....Thestatute is not amblgiousin designatingthe age limit between7 and 15 years." Ginge-. rich v. State, swa.
The Court of CriminalAppeals of Texas in the Butler case, supra, quoted from a ColoradoSupreme Court opinionin Glbsoxeople, 99 Pac. 333 (1909)* The act here reviewedwas one relatingto delinquentchildren but the court held that the opinion~55 in point on the questionbefore it. In this decisionthe court goes at lengthto distinguishbetween a child 16 years of age or over and 16 years of age and under and concludedin this paragraphthe following:
"...Thealleged delinquentjuvenilebeing sixteenyears and four months old at the time defendantis said to have contributedto his delinquencywas 'sixteenyears and older, not sixteenyears or under,' hence was not a juvenilede- linquentperson within the meaningof the statute." Hon. A. W. Walker, Page 5 (~~-1056)
Cited in the Butler case was that of Rogers v. &Craw, 61 MO. App. 407, construinga statutegivingthe privilegeof attendancebetween six and 20 years and holdingthat one over 20 years of age and under 21 was excluded.
The.SupremeCourt of LouisianaIn State v. Lanassa,125 La. 687, 51 So. 688 (1910),in construinga statutein which childrenare definedas persons "17 years of age and under" held:
"It