OF THE TREATY , WHICH IS BASED ON A DISTINCT SEPARATION OF FUNCTIONS BETWEEN NATIONAL COURTS AND THE COURT OF JUSTICE , DOES NOT ALLOW THE LATTER TO CRITICIZE THE REASONS FOR THE REFERENCE . CONSEQUENTLY , A REQUEST FROM A NATIONAL COURT MAY BE REJECTED ONLY IF IT IS QUITE OBVIOUS THAT THE INTERPRETATION OF COMMUNITY LAW OR THE EXAMINATION OF THE VALIDITY OF A RULE OF COMMUNITY LAW SOUGHT BY THAT COURT BEARS NO RELATION TO THE ACTUAL NATURE OF THE CASE OR TO THE SUBJECT-MATTER OF THE MAIN ACTION .
7 HOWEVER , THAT IS NOT SO IN THIS CASE . IN THE FIRST PLACE , THE FACT THAT THE PARTIES TO THE MAIN ACTION FAILED TO RAISE A POINT OF COMMUNITY LAW BEFORE THE NATIONAL COURT DOES NOT PRECLUDE THE LATTER FROM BRINGING THE MATTER BEFORE THE COURT OF JUSTICE . IN PROVIDING THAT REFERENCE FOR A PRELIMINARY RULING MAY BE SUBMITTED TO THE COURT WHERE ' ' A QUESTION IS RAISED BEFORE ANY COURT OR TRIBUNAL OF A MEMBER STATE ' ' , THE SECOND AND THIRD PARAGRAPHS OF ARTICLE 177 OF THE TREATY ARE NOT INTENDED TO RESTRICT THIS PROCEDURE EXCLUSIVELY TO CASES WHERE ONE OR OTHER OF THE PARTIES TO THE MAIN ACTION HAS TAKEN THE INITIATIVE OF RAISING A POINT CONCERNING THE INTERPRETATION OR THE VALIDITY OF COMMUNITY LAW , BUT ALSO EXTEND TO CASES WHERE A QUESTION OF THIS KIND IS RAISED BY THE NATIONAL COURT OR TRIBUNAL ITSELF WHICH CONSIDERS THAT A DECISION THEREON BY THE COURT OF JUSTICE IS ' ' NECESSARY TO ENABLE IT TO GIVE JUDGMENT ' ' .
8 SIMILARLY , THE FACT THAT NEITHER THE PLAINTIFF NOR THE DEFENDANTS TO THE MAIN ACTION ARE PARTIES TO THE NATIONAL AGREEMENT FORMING THE SUBJECT-MATTER OF THE QUESTIONS ON THE INTERPRETATION OF THE TREATY REFERRED TO THE COURT OF JUSTICE BY THE NATIONAL COURT DOES NOT CALL IN QUESTION THE COURT ' S JURISDICTION SINCE THE APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 177 OF THE TREATY IS SUBJECT TO THE SOLE REQUIREMENT THAT NATIONAL COURTS MUST BE PROVIDED WITH ALL THE RELEVANT ELEMENTS OF COMMUNITY LAW WHICH ARE NECESSARY TO ENABLE THEM TO GIVE JUDGMENT .
9 FINALLY , ALTHOUGH IT IS TRUE THAT THE AGREEMENT IN QUESTION WAS REPUDIATED BY ONE OF THE PARTIES WITH EFFECT FROM 31 MARCH 1977 , WITH THE RESULT THAT IT WAS NO LONGER IN FORCE AT THE TIME WHEN THE FACTS GIVING RISE TO THE CASE OCCURRED , OR WHEN THE MAIN ACTION WAS COMMENCED , THAT IS TO SAY ON 21 AND 22 SEPTEMBER 1978 , NEVERTHELESS THE DEFENDANTS IN THE MAIN ACTION THEMSELVES DID NOT RULE OUT , IN THEIR ORAL ARGUMENT , THE POSSIBILITY THAT CERTAIN CLAUSES OF THE AGREEMENT MIGHT HAVE CONTINUED TO BE APPLIED IN PRACTICE AFTER 31 MARCH 1977 . FURTHERMORE , IT IS CLEAR FROM THE ORDER REFERRING THE MATTER TO THE COURT THAT IN THE MAIN ACTION THE DEFENDANTS HAD RELIED ON THE PROVISIONS OF THE