be erectedon the land.
Having the direct interestthat it doee, and the acquirementof building sites being necesearyto furtherthe Act for which the Ccamnlasionwas estab- lished,the Ccminlssion in furtheranceof the Act can employan attorneyto assist in the preparationof the proceedingsunder Article5221b-9,Vemon'e Civil Statutea,which reads as follows: m. S. Perry Brown, page 3 (Ww-713)
"(a)~Dutiesand Powers of Oommiaaiont It shall be the duty of the Conm.is~lonto administerthis Act; and It shall have power and authorityto adopt,amend, or reaoindsuch rules and reguLationa,to employ such Wr'BonB,make such expenditures, requiresuch reporta,make such lnveetlge.tions, and take such other action ae it deema necesearyor suitable to that end. . . ." (&nphaeisours.)
The legalityof the paymentof the Attorneyhas been questiomd on two grounds.
The objectionto ArticleIV, Section22 of the Texas Constitutionby the Comptrolleron the groundsthat an attorneyemployedby the Coimnieaion, not being the AttorneyGsneral,could not representthe State in a legal proceedingto 6eoum an officebuildinghas no basic since thie objection wae answeredby the Suptie Court of Texas In Camp Y. Gulf ProductionCcm- 61 S.W.2d 773. It was alao answeredin Maude v. Terrell,109 Tex. 61, F 2 5 S.W. 639 where this pdint was raised and overruled. These oaaee hold that an Act of the Legislaturewould not be held unoonatitutional unlese it clearlydeprivedthe AttorneyGeneralof his authorityto representthe State.
The secondobjectionraised ae to the legalityof the employmentby the Colmaieaionof an attorneyto aid the AttorneyGeneralis that Article 5221b-15,Vernon'sCivil Statutee,prohibitsanyone other than those attor- neye who are regularlyemployedby the Conunlsaionto aid the Attorney General. This ass-es that since this attorneywaa employedsolelyto help In one matter that he was not "regularly"employedby the Commiseion.
This cbjectionis withoutmerit since the attorneyemployedby the Com- mission to aid the AttorneyGeneral in the mentionedlitigationwas "reg&rly" employedby the Commi6alon. The word "regularly*is an adverband meana In regularmanner. The word "regular",hae been held to mean to be *agreeable to an eatabliahedlaw" (CenturyDictionaryquotingWise v. State Veterinary Bs, I.38Michigan428, 432, 101NW 562; WebetersDictionaryquoting$fers v. Resbeok,~upr~). The word has aleo been held to mean "duly authorized (VebstersDictionaryquotingMerchants' Iiational Bank v. ContinentalElational B&, 98 CaliforniaA 523, 277 Pac. 354). The word "regularly"has been held to be not eynoryrmouawith "continuously"(Ex. p. Cain, 39 Alabama 440). Since this attorneyemployedby the Commissionwas employedunder the authority of Article5221b-8Vernon'sCivil Statutes,his employmentcertainlywe,8 *regularly"made, Thie opinionoverrulesAttorneyGeneral'sOpinionO-708 insofarae the two opinionsconflict. Mr. S. Perry Brown, page 4 (WW-713)
It,18 our opinionthat the Texas Employment~Commfasion was authorized to employ an attorneyto assiatthe AttorneyGeneral in preparingfor Eminent Domain proceedingaauthorizedby the Governorfor the benefitof the Texas EmploymentCozonissfon.
The Texas EmploymentCommissionmay legally pay an attomeg for eervieea renderedin aasistingthe AttorneyCeneral in an Eminent Domafn Proceeding.
Yours very'truly,
WILL WIISOH Attorney Generalof Texas
APPROVFJh
OPIIVIOICOMMITrEE Gee. P. Blackbum, Chairman
GordonC. Caes WallaceFinfrock Riley EugeneFletcher Jay D, Howell
REVIEWEDFORTREGlTORKEY GEXERAL BY: W. V. Geppert