SECOND SENTENCE OF THAT ARTICLE, CONSTITUTE A MEANS OF ARBITRARY DISCRIMINATION OR A DISGUISED RESTRICTION ON TRADE BETWEEN MEMBER STATES .
8 THAT MAY BE THE CASE WITH FORMALITIES, REQUIRED BY A MEMBER STATE FOR THE PURPOSE OF PROVING THE ORIGIN OF A PRODUCT, WHICH ONLY DIRECT IMPORTERS ARE REALLY IN A POSITION TO SATISFY WITHOUT FACING SERIOUS DIFFICULTIES .
9 CONSEQUENTLY, THE REQUIREMENT BY A MEMBER STATE OF A CERTIFICATE OF AUTHENTICITY WHICH IS LESS EASILY OBTAINABLE BY IMPORTERS OF AN AUTHENTIC PRODUCT WHICH HAS BEEN PUT INTO FREE CIRCULATION IN A REGULAR MANNER IN ANOTHER MEMBER STATE THAN BY IMPORTERS OF THE SAME PRODUCT COMING DIRECTLY FROM THE COUNTRY OF ORIGIN CONSTITUTES A MEASURE HAVING AN EFFECT EQUIVALENT TO A QUANTITATIVE RESTRICTION AS PROHIBITED BY THE TREATY .
10 BY THE SECOND QUESTION IT IS ASKED WHETHER AN AGREEMENT THE EFFECT OF WHICH IS TO RESTRICT COMPETITION AND ADVERSELY TO AFFECT TRADE BETWEEN MEMBER STATES WHEN TAKEN IN CONJUNCTION WITH A NATIONAL RULE WITH REGARD TO CERTIFICATES OF ORIGIN IS VOID WHEN THAT AGREEMENT MERELY AUTHORIZES THE EXCLUSIVE IMPORTER TO EXPLOIT THAT RULE FOR THE PURPOSE OF PREVENTING PARALLEL IMPORTS OR DOES NOT PROHIBIT HIM FROM DOING SO .
11 AN EXCLUSIVE DEALING AGREEMENT FALLS WITHIN THE PROHIBITION OF ARTICLE 85 WHEN IT IMPEDES, IN LAW OR IN FACT, THE IMPORTATION OF THE PRODUCTS IN QUESTION FROM OTHER MEMBER STATES INTO THE PROTECTED TERRITORY BY PERSONS OTHER THAN THE EXCLUSIVE IMPORTER .
12 MORE PARTICULARLY, AN EXCLUSIVE DEALING AGREEMENT MAY ADVERSELY AFFECT TRADE BETWEEN MEMBER STATES AND CAN HAVE THE EFFECT OF HINDERING COMPETITION IF THE CONCESSIONAIRE IS ABLE TO PREVENT PARALLEL IMPORTS FROM OTHER MEMBER STATES INTO THE TERRITORY COVERED BY THE CONCESSION BY MEANS OF THE COMBINED EFFECTS OF THE AGREEMENT AND A NATIONAL LAW REQUIRING THE EXCLUSIVE USE OF A CERTAIN MEANS OF PROOF OF AUTHENTICITY .
13 FOR THE PURPOSE OF JUDGING WHETHER THIS IS THE CASE, ACCOUNT MUST BE TAKEN NOT ONLY OF THE RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS FLOWING FROM THE PROVISIONS OF THE AGREEMENT, BUT ALSO OF THE LEGAL AND ECONOMIC CONTEXT IN WHICH IT IS SITUATED AND, IN PARTICULAR, THE POSSIBLE EXISTENCE OF SIMILAR AGREEMENTS CONCLUDED BETWEEN THE SAME PRODUCER AND CONCESSIONAIRES ESTABLISHED IN OTHER MEMBER STATES .
14 IN THIS CONNEXION, THE MAINTENANCE WITHIN A MEMBER STATE OF PRICES APPRECIABLY HIGHER THAN THOSE IN FORCE IN ANOTHER MEMBER STATE MAY PROMPT AN EXAMINATION AS TO WHETHER THE EXCLUSIVE DEALING AGREEMENT IS BEING USED FOR THE PURPOSE OF PREVENTING IMPORTERS FROM OBTAINING THE MEANS OF PROOF OF AUTHENTICITY OF THE PRODUCT IN QUESTION, REQUIRED BY NATIONAL RULES OF THE TYPE ENVISAGED BY THE QUESTION .
15 HOWEVER, THE FACT THAT AN AGREEMENT MERELY AUTHORIZES THE CONCESSIONAIRE TO EXPLOIT SUCH A NATIONAL RULE OR DOES NOT PROHIBIT HIM FROM DOING SO, DOES NOT SUFFICE, IN ITSELF, TO RENDER THE AGREEMENT NULL AND VOID .
Decision on costs
16 THE COSTS INCURRED BY THE GOVERNMENTS OF BELGIUM AND OF THE UNITED KINGDOM AS WELL