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THE ATBTORNE:P GENE- OF TirEas
HonorableA. W. Walker OpinionNo. w-1056 County Attorney Dickens County Re: Constructionof the compulsory Spur, Texas school attendancelaws in re- ferenceto childrenattaining their sixteenthbirthdayafter Dear Mr. Walker: a school term begins.
You have requestedan opinionof this Departmentrelatingto the compulsoryattendancein schoolof a child who has reachedhis sixteenth year after the schoolterm has begun, as contemplatedby Article 297, V.P.C. and Article 2892 V.C.S.
In your letter requestingan opinion,dated March 16, 1961, you have stated the specificquestionwhich reads as follows:
"Do the compulsoryschool attendancelaws of this state apply to a child and his parentsafter such child has reach- ed his sixteenthbirthdayand when such child has not com- pleted the work of the ninth grade and when such child's six- teenth birthdaycame after the opening of the schoolterm in the School Districtwhere he residesand before the end of such school term?"
Article 297, V.P.C., (and its counterpart Article 2892 V.C:S.) is quoted as follows:
"Every child in the State who is seven (7) years and not more than sixteen(16) years of age shall be requiredto- attend the public schoolsin the districtof its residence, or in some other districtto which it may be transferredas providedby law, for a period of not less than one hundred and twenty (120) days annually. The period of compulsory school attendanceat each schocl shall begin at the opening of the schoclterm unless otherwiseauthorizedby the district school trusteesand notice given by the trusteesprior to the beginningof such schoolterm; provided,that no child shall be requiredto attend school for a longer period than the maximum term of the public school in the districtwhere such child resides. Acts 1915, p. 94; Acts 1923, p. 255; Acts 1935, 44th Leg., p. 409, ch. 160, § 1; Acts 1939, 46th Leg., p. 227, so1. It (tiphasisadded) Eon. A. W. Walker, Page 2 (~-1056)
The history of Article 297, V.P.C., is traced through Acts 1915, page 94, in which.boththe penal and civil provisionswere combined as one; Acts 1923, page 225, the penal code was separatedfrom the civil statuteand in 1925 under.theRevised Civil Statute5the Legislaturerecodifledthe com- pulsory rchool laws and adoptedArticle 297 of the Penal Code and Article 2892 of the civil Statute. Subsequentamendmentsto Article 297, V;P.C., by Acts of 1935 and 1939 are of no consequencehere.
It Is the legal duty of parentsto requiretheir childrenof seven (7) years of age and under sixteen(16) years of age to attend school. Article 297, V!P.C., Article 299, V.P.C.
Apparentlywe are calledupon to interpretthe meaning of Article 297 V.P.C. and to this provisionwe must look to determinethe intention of the Legislaturein its clear and unambigiousdefinitionof which children shall come under the compulsoryattendanceprovision. The languageof the statute is susceptibleof no interpretation exceptthat it shall apply to a child seven (7) years and older and not more than sixteen (16) years of age.
39 Tex. Jur. 27.5,Statutes,Sec. 146,providesas follows:
"It is a common law rule that penal statutesare strictly conStNsd against the state or prosecutionand in favor of . the accused. But this Nle has been