HIS COUNSEL'S REPRESENTATIONS FALLING WELL BELOW A COMPETENT
OR REASONABLY ACCEPTABLE STANDARD, GUARANTEED THROUGH THE SIXTH AND FOURTEENTH
AMENDM,ENTS TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION. i.e. IN THEIR MERE FAILURES
TO PERFORM EVEN BASIC RESEARCH THAT WOULD HAVE EXPOSED THE DEAD-BANG WINNING
ISSUES (i.e. LEGITIMATE ISSUES THAT WOULD HAVE GUARANTEED A REVERSAL, AS
A MATTER OF LAW) THAT WOULD HAVE RESULTED IN AN AUTOMATIC MISTRIAL AND REVER-
SAL HAD HIS COUNSEL'S BROUGHT SUCH PREJUDICIAL ISSUE TO THE COURT'S ATTENTION.
(APPELLATE AND TRIAL, BASED ON THE CONTOLLING AUTHORITY WHICH PROHIBITS SUCH
PREJUDICE. CERTAINLY RESULTING IN A DIFFERENT OUTCOME OF THE PROCEEDINGS.
SEE STRICKLAND 466 U.S. AT 687-688 (1984).
THE STANDARD OF REVIEW TO DETERMINE WHETHER A DEFENDANT WAS CONSTRUCTIVELY
DENIED HIS RIGHT TO COUNSEL, IS A MIXED QUESTION OF FACT AND LAW, REVIEWED
DENOVOREVIEW. SEE CHILDRESS v. JOHNSON, 103 F.3d 1221 (5th Cir. 1997). A
CRIMINAL DEFENDANT IS GUARANTEED THROUGH THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE, TO A TRIAL
FREE FROM FUNDAMENTAL UNFAIRNESS, ENEN UNFAIRNESS WHICH STEMS FROM BLATANTLY
INCOMPETENT COUNSEL. CLARK v. BLACKBURN, 619 F.2d 431 (5th Cir. lgRO); HEALY
v. CABANA, 764 F.2d 1173 (5th Cir. 1985).
BOTH COUNSEL'S PERFORMANCES IN FAILING TO DO THE BASIC RESEARCH AND KNOW
THE LAWS THAT HE IS EXPECTED TO KNOW TO DICLOSE AND PRESENT TO THE COURT'S
THE FOLLOWING PREJUDICE CAUSED FROM THE PRIOR CONVICTIONS NOT BEING ADMITTED
INTO EVIDENCE, AS LEGITIMATE NON-FRIVOLOUS ISSUE THAT WOULD HAVF. PRODUCED
DIFFERENT RESIJLTS IN THE OUTCOME OF THE JUDGMENTS. C~LL'S HIS COUNSEL'S PERFOR-
MANCES INTO SERIOUS QUESTION. NELSON v. HARGETT, 989 F.2d 847 (5th Cir. 1993)
HAD HIS COUNSEL'S INVESTIGATED ANJ APPLIED THE FOLLOWING LAW TO THE FACTS,
CERTAINLY THIS COURT WOULD HAVE NO DIFFICULTY IN CONCLUDING THAT THE OUTCOMg
OF THE PROCEEDINGS WOULD HAVE BEEN DIFFERENT. HAD THEY INVESTIGATED, TnEY
WOULD HAVE DISCOVERED THE FACT THAT THE PRIOR CO~ICriONS HAD NOT BEEN OFFERED
AS EVIDENCE OR ADMITTED FOR ~t PURPOSES, EVEN TO DETERMINE THE CREDIBILITY
OF THE DEFENDANT, CAUSING A SUBSTANTIAL PREJUDICE TO THE MOVANT WHEN H[S COUN-
SEL ALLOWED THE STATE TO USE EVIDENCE IN HIS SUMMATION THA WAS NOT PART ' OF THE RECORD , AND THAT NOTHING COULD CURE ONCE THE JUROR'S WERE EXPOSED
TO THE FACTS. HAD HIS COUNSEL AT TRIAL MERELY REQUESTED A SPECIAL INSTRUCriON
TO THE JURY THAT IT MUST DISREGARD THE PRIOR CONVICTIONS FOR ANY PURPOSES
IN THE STATES ATTACKING OF THE MOVANT'S CREDIBILITY OR OTHERWISE, MAY HAVE RE-
ASONABLY LED THE JURY TO BELIEVE THE MOVANT'S VERSION OF WHAT TRANSPIRED
AND NOTED TO ACQUIT HIM. HOWEVER, BEING THE JURY WAS EXPOSED TO SU2H HARMFUL
EVIDENCE DURING SUMMATION OF THE STATES, WOULD BE MOST EGREGIOUSLY PREJUDICIAL
, AND CAUSE THE JURY TO VATE TO FIND GUILT, AT SUCH PIVITOL MOMENTS OF THE
PROCEEDINGS, MUST NOT BE DEEMED AS A REASONABLE TRIAL STRATEGY.
A~ STATES SUMMATION OF EVIDENCE [REFERRING TO PRIOR CONVICTIONSl NOT IN RECORD: ·----~-~---~-~------~·------ ----·------------ -· ------------- ~----------- ·-
(PROSECUTOR'S CLOSING): "BUT LOJK AT IT FURTHER LADIES AND GENTLEMEN.
LOOK WHO HAS THE MOST TO LOSE IN THIS CASE