Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/21pdf/20-601_bq7c.pdf
Page Number: 24.0

Cite as:  595 U. S. ____ (2022) 

1 

KAGAN, J., concurring 
KAGAN, J., concurring in judgment 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

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No. 20–601 
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DANIEL CAMERON, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF 
KENTUCKY, PETITIONER v. EMW WOMEN’S 
SURGICAL CENTER, P. S. C., ET AL. 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT 

[March 3, 2022] 

  JUSTICE KAGAN, with whom JUSTICE BREYER joins, con-
curring in the judgment. 
  I agree with the Court that the Sixth Circuit should have 
allowed the attorney general to intervene in this suit after 
another state official ceased defending the challenged Ken-
tucky  law.    And  my  reasons  for  reaching  that  conclusion 
partly  overlap  with  the  Court’s.    But  I  would  differently 
frame  and  respond  to the  serious  threshold  issue  that re-
spondent EMW raises.  I also see no need to rely on “consti-
tutional  considerations”  to  resolve  the  intervention  ques-
tion before us.  Ante, at 7 (opinion of the Court). 

I 
  No jurisdictional rule, the Court and I agree, directly bars 
the  attorney  general’s  intervention  here.    The  rule  EMW 
relies  on  requires  a  losing  party  to  file  a  notice  of  appeal 
within  30  days  of  the  entry  of  judgment.    See  28  U. S. C. 
§2107(a);  Fed.  Rule  App.  Proc.  4(a)(1)(A).   This  Court  has 
made  clear  that  the  timely-appeal  rule  is  jurisdictional.  
See, e.g., Bowles v. Russell, 551 U. S. 205, 209 (2007).  So if 
a  party  (or  a  non-party  having  an  equivalent  right  to  ap-
peal)  files  an  appeal  on  the  31st  day  after  judgment,  the 
appellate  court  lacks  jurisdiction.    But  here  the  attorney 
general did not file such a late appeal.  He instead moved