Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/529bv.pdf
Page Number: 1132.0

529ORD Unit: $PT3

[10-09-01 14:52:06] PGT: ORDPP (Prelim. Print)

ORDERS

1143

1138

Thomas, J., dissenting

tory intimidation, ridicule, and insult, that is sufﬁciently severe
or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s employment
and create an abusive working environment.” Harris v. Forklift
Systems, Inc., 510 U. S. 17, 21 (1993) (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted); see 21 Cal. 4th, at 130 (plurality opinion)
(“California courts have adopted the [Harris] standard in evalu-
ating claims under the FEHA”).
It simply cannot be known in
advance whether a particular utterance will create (or recreate)
a hostile environment under this standard, and speculation simply
does not sufﬁce to rebut the heavy presumption against a prior
restraint. See Southeastern Promotions, supra, at 561; New
York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U. S. 713, 725–726 (1971)
(Brennan, J., concurring) (“[T]he First Amendment tolerates abso-
lutely no prior judicial restraints of the press predicated upon
surmise or conjecture that untoward consequences may result”).
The alternative remedy of a money damages judgment for future
violations would solve the problem. Second, there has been no
showing that the prospect of a money damages judgment for
future violations would fall short of deterring petitioners from
recreating a hostile environment, especially when a second money
damages judgment might include hefty punitive damages and
attorney’s fees. See 21 Cal. 4th, at 194 (Brown, J., dissenting).
Indeed, it appears from the transcript of the injunction hearing
held in 1994 that Lawrence had not engaged in any harassing
speech or conduct since 1992. See App. to Brief in Opposition
A9. Third, the prohibition applies without regard to whether the
utterance is directed at, or within earshot of, respondents (or, for
that matter, any Latino employee), and contains no exception for
speech that might contribute to reasoned debate.

My colleagues are perhaps dissuaded from granting certiorari
by the paucity of lower court decisions addressing the First
Amendment implications of workplace harassment law, and by the
incomplete factual record in this case. Neither is a persuasive
reason to deny certiorari. First, we must remember that we deal
here with a claim at the core of the First Amendment—that the
State is suppressing speech that it dislikes. For the same reason
that we evaluate prior restraints under a heavy presumption
against their validity (the harm from delay), we should decide the
issue now. And the thorough treatment of the issues by the
several opinions below makes it especially unnecessary to await
a split in the lower courts. Second, while it is true that the