Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/10pdf/09-1233.pdf
Page Number: 69.0

Cite as:  563 U. S. ____ (2011) 

11 

SCALIA, J., dissenting 

C 

My  general  concerns  associated  with  judges’  running 
social  institutions  are  magnified  when  they  run  prison 
systems,  and  doubly  magnified  when  they  force  prison
officials to release convicted criminals.  As we have previ-
ously recognized: 

“[C]ourts are ill equipped to deal with the increasingly
urgent  problems  of  prison  administration  and  re- 
form. . . .  [T]he  problems  of  prisons  in  America  are
complex and intractable, and, more to the point, they
are not readily susceptible of resolution by decree. . . . 
Running  a  prison  is  an  inordinately  difficult  under-
taking that requires expertise, planning, and the com-
mitment  of  resources,  all  of  which  are  peculiarly
within  the  province  of  the  legislative  and  executive 
branches  of  government.    Prison  is,  moreover,  a  task 
that has been committed to the responsibility of those 
branches, and separation of powers concerns counsel a
policy  of  judicial  restraint.  Where  a  state  penal  sys-
tem  is  involved,  federal  courts  have  . . .  additional 
reason  to  accord  deference  to  the  appropriate  prison 
authorities.”  Turner  v.  Safley,  482  U. S.  78,  84–85 
(1987) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

These  principles  apply  doubly  to  a  prisoner-release 
order.  As  the  author  of  today’s  opinion  explained  earlier 
this Term, granting a writ of habeas corpus “ ‘disturbs the 
State’s  significant  interest  in  repose  for  concluded  litiga-
tion,  denies  society  the  right  to  punish  some  admitted 
offenders,  and  intrudes  on  state  sovereignty  to  a  degree 
matched  by  few  exercises  of  federal  judicial  authority.’ ” 
Harrington v. Richter, 562 U. S. ___, ___ (2011) (slip op., at 
13)  (quoting  Harris  v.  Reed,  489  U. S.  255,  282  (1989) 
(KENNEDY, J., dissenting)).  Recognizing that habeas relief
must  be  granted  sparingly,  we  have  reversed  the  Ninth
Circuit’s  erroneous  grant  of  habeas  relief  to  individual