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Page Number: 20

2 

GEORGE v. MCDONOUGH 

GORSUCH, J., dissenting 

(Ct. Vet. App.),  p.  1275.    Later,  after  a  period  of  resumed 
training, Mr. George again required medical attention and 
a  military  psychiatrist  diagnosed  him  with  “Paranoid
Schizophrenia” that was “Aggravated by Service.”  App. to
Brief  for  Petitioner  3a.    A  military  medical  board  agreed, 
concluding that Mr. George’s condition predated his service 
but was “aggrav[a]ted by a period of active duty.”  Id., at 8a. 
Ultimately,  at  the  medical  board’s  recommendation,  Mr.
George was discharged.

When Mr. George filed a claim for veteran benefits a few
months later, he had cause for optimism.  Congress has pro-
vided that veterans are entitled to “compensation” for any
“disability resulting from [the] aggravation of a preexisting 
injury suffered or disease contracted in [the] line of duty.”
38 U. S. C. § 1110.  Congress has bolstered that right with
a  presumption  that  individuals  are  in  “sound  condition”
when  they  enter  service  and  are  entitled  to  benefits  later
unless the government demonstrates by “clear and unmis-
takable  evidence  . . .  that  [their]  injury  or  disease  existed 
before acceptance and enrollment and was not aggravated 
by such service.”  § 1111 (emphasis added).  Relying on those
provisions, Mr. George claimed that his military service ag-
gravated his schizophrenia, meaning the government had
the burden to disprove his claim.

The  Veterans  Administration,  the  precursor  to  today’s
Department of Veterans Affairs (together, the Department
or VA), denied Mr. George’s application.  In the process, the
agency neglected to apply § 1111’s statutory presumption of 
soundness that attached to his entry into military service.
It  also  failed  to  follow  § 1111’s  command  requiring  the 
agency to prove that Mr. George’s condition “was not aggra-
vated  by  such  service.”    Instead,  the  VA  relied  on  a  very
different set of rules of its own creation.  Under them, the 
agency said, all it had to show was that Mr. George suffered
“an  injury  or  disease  [that]  existed  prior  [to  service].” 
38 CFR § 3.304(b) (1976).  And after determining that Mr.