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Page Number: 39

22 

COUNTERMAN v. COLORADO 

SOTOMAYOR, J., concurring
Opinion of SOTOMAYOR, J. 

doubts as to the threatening nature of the statement.  This 
could avoid the chilling that would arise from a more amor-
phous and easily satisfied standard. 

4 
This Court’s various frameworks for unprotected speech
do  not  speak  with  one  voice,  as  perhaps  befits  the  First
Amendment.  The above survey does not, however, give rea-
son  to  depart  from  the  traditional  understanding  of  true
threats.  To  the  contrary,  this  case  law  supports  keeping
true  threats  within  their  traditional  bounds.    Incitement 
similarly requires intent.  The same chilling concerns that 
have led this Court to approve a knowledge requirement for 
obscenity are present with true threats.  And to the extent 
the civil defamation context is relevant, at the very least, it
points to a precise and demanding form of recklessness.10 

IV 
Maintaining true threats doctrine within its traditional
boundaries will guard against the overcriminalization of a 
wide range of political, artistic, and everyday speech based 

—————— 

10 The  lead  dissent  headlines  its  analysis  by  pointing  to  this  Court’s 
case law on “fighting words.”  Post, at 3–4 (opinion of BARRETT, J.).  This 
is an unlikely candidate for a broader theory of the First Amendment.
For “nearly three-quarters of a century . . . the Court has never . . . up-
held  a  fighting  words  conviction”  and  “[t]he  cumulative  impact  of  [the
Court’s] decisions is to make it unlikely that a fighting words law could
survive.”  E. Chemerinsky, The First Amendment 1094 (6th ed. 2019).  It 
is not hard to see why such convictions would be unlikely to pass First 
Amendment muster; the leading case involved a Jehovah’s Witness dis-
tributing literature who was arrested for breach of the peace for calling
a  public  official  a  “ ‘damned  Fascist.’ ”  Chaplinsky  v.  New  Hampshire, 
315 U. S. 568, 569, 573–574 (1942).  Drawing upon a conviction like the 
one in Chaplinksy as the proper model for criminalizing political speech
is proof itself  of the serious risks with the lead dissent’s approach.  In 
any  event,  as  to  the  question  at  hand,  when  such  breach  of  the  peace 
offenses involved threats, intent to threaten was required.  See 2 R. An-
derson,  Wharton’s  Criminal  Law  and  Procedure  §803,  pp.  659–660 
(1957).