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Page Number: 9

6 

HUI v. CASTANEDA 

Opinion of the Court 

does the provision’s inclusive reference to all civil proceed-
ings  arising  out  of  “the  same  subject-matter.”    We  have 
previously  cited  §233(a)  to  support  the  contention  that 
“Congress follows the practice of explicitly stating when it 
means to make FTCA an exclusive remedy.”  Carlson, 446 
U. S.,  at  20.    The  meaning  of  §233(a)  has  become  no  less
explicit since we last made that observation. 

Our  reading  of  §233(a)’s  text  is  not  undermined  by  the
fact  that  the  provision  preceded  our  decision  in  Bivens. 
Contrary to the view of the Court of Appeals, that a Bivens 
remedy  had  not  yet  been  recognized  when  §233(a)  was
enacted does not support the conclusion that Congress, in
making  the  remedy  provided  by  the  FTCA  “exclusive  of 
any  other  civil  action,”  did  not  mean  what  it  said.    Lan-
guage  that  broad  easily  accommodates  both  known  and 
unknown causes of action. 

The  later  enacted  Federal  Employees  Liability  Reform
and  Tort  Compensation  Act  of  1988  (Westfall  Act),  102
Stat. 4563, further supports this understanding of §233(a). 
The  Westfall  Act  amended  the  FTCA  to  make  its  remedy
against  the  United  States  the  exclusive  remedy  for  most
claims against Government employees arising out of their 
official  conduct.5    In  providing  this  official  immunity, 
Congress  used  essentially  the  same  language  as  it  did  in
§233(a), stating that the remedy against the United States 
is  “exclusive  of  any  other  civil  action  or  proceeding,”
§2679(b)(1).  Notably, Congress also provided an exception
for constitutional violations.  Pursuant to §2679(b)(2), the 
immunity granted by §2679(b)(1) “does not extend or apply 
to  a  civil  action  against  an  employee  of  the  Government 

—————— 

5 Prior to the Westfall Act amendments, the FTCA authorized substi-
tution  of  the  United  States  as  a  defendant  in  suits  against  federal
employees for harms arising out of conduct undertaken in the scope of
their employment, see 28 U. S. C. §1346(b) (1982 ed.), but it made that
remedy  “exclusive”  only  for  harms  resulting  from  a  federal  employee’s
operation of a motor vehicle, §2679(b).