Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/21pdf/20-637_10n2.pdf
Page Number: 3.0

Cite as:  595 U. S. ____ (2022) 

3 

Syllabus 

procedural rules that bear on the exercise of a defendant’s confronta-
tion  right,  see,  e.g.,  Melendez-Diaz  v.  Massachusetts,  557  U.  S.  305, 
327,  the  door-opening  principle  discussed  in  Reid  is not  in  the  same 
class of procedural rules.  Reid’s door-opening principle is a substan-
tive principle of evidence that dictates what material is relevant and 
admissible in a case.  The State would have trial judges weigh the re-
liability  or  credibility  of  testimonial  hearsay  evidence,  but  that  ap-
proach would negate Crawford’s emphatic rejection of the reliability-
based approach to the Confrontation Clause guarantee.  Here, it was 
not  for  the  trial  judge  to  determine  whether  Hemphill’s  theory  that
Morris was the shooter was unreliable, incredible, or otherwise mis-
leading  in  light  of  the  State’s  proffered,  unconfronted  plea  evidence, 
nor  whether  this  evidence  was  reasonably  necessary  to  correct  that 
misleading impression.  Pp. 9–11. 

(d) The Court also rejects the State’s insistence that the Reid rule is 
necessary to safeguard the truth-finding function of courts because it 
prevents the selective and misleading introduction of evidence.  The 
Court has not allowed such considerations to override the rights the 
Constitution confers to criminal defendants.  And none of the cases the 
State relies upon for support—Kansas v. Ventris, 556 U. S. 586; Harris 
v. New York, 401 U. S. 222; Walder v. United States, 347 U. S. 62— 
involved exceptions to constitutional requirements.  Pp. 11–13.

(e) The State’s concern that a reversal will leave prosecutors without 
recourse to protect against  abuses of the confrontation right is over-
stated.  “[W]ell-established  rules”  of  evidence  “permit  trial  judges  to
exclude evidence if its probative value is outweighed by certain other 
factors such as unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or potential to 
mislead the jury.”  Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 U. S. 319, 326.  Fi-
nally, the rule of completeness does not apply here, as Morris’ plea al-
locution was not part of any statement that Hemphill introduced.  The 
Court does not address whether and under what circumstances that 
rule might allow the admission of testimonial hearsay against a crim-
inal defendant.  Pp. 13–14. 

35 N. Y. 3d 1035, 150 N. E. 3d 356, reversed and remanded. 

SOTOMAYOR, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, 
C. J., and BREYER, ALITO, KAGAN, GORSUCH, KAVANAUGH, and BARRETT, 
JJ., joined.  ALITO, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which KAVANAUGH, 
J., joined.  THOMAS, J., filed a dissenting opinion.