Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/558bv.pdf
Page Number: 564

Cite as: 558 U. S. 310 (2010) 

403 

Opinion of Stevens, J. 

The  majority  suggests  that,  even  though  it  expressly  dis­
missed its facial challenge, Citizens United nevertheless pre­
served  it—not  as  a  freestanding  “claim,”  but  as  a  potential 
argument  in  support  of  “a  claim  that  the  FEC  has  violated 
its  First  Amendment  right  to  free  speech.”  Ante,  at  330; 
see also ante, at 376 (Roberts, C. J., concurring) (describing 
Citizens  United’s  claim  as:  “[T]he  Act  violates  the  First 
Amendment”).  By this novel logic, virtually any submission 
could  be  reconceptualized  as  “a  claim  that  the  Government 
has  violated  my  rights,”  and  it  would  then  be  available  to 
the  Court  to  entertain  any  conceivable  issue  that  might  be 
relevant to that claim’s disposition.  Not only the as-applied/ 
facial distinction, but the basic relationship between litigants 
and  courts,  would  be  upended  if  the  latter  had  free  rein  to 
construe the former’s claims at such high levels of generality. 
There  would  be  no  need  for  plaintiffs  to  argue  their  case; 
they  could  just  cite  the  constitutional  provisions  they  think 
relevant, and leave the rest to us.9 

Finally, the majority suggests that though the scope of Cit­
izens  United’s  claim  may  be  narrow, a  facial  ruling  is  neces­
sary as a matter of remedy.  Relying on a law review article, 
it  asserts  that  Citizens  United’s  dismissal  of  the  facial  chal­
lenge does not prevent us “ ‘from making broader pronounce­
ments  of  invalidity  in  properly  “as-applied”  cases.’ ”  Ante, 
at 331 (quoting Fallon, As-Applied and Facial Challenges and 

press  advocacy,  there  has  been  little  doubt  about  what  counts  as  express 
advocacy since the “magic words” test of Buckley v.  Valeo, 424 U. S. 1, 44, 
n. 52 (1976) (per curiam).  Yet even though Citizens United’s briefs never 
once  mention  § 441b’s  restriction  on  express  advocacy;  even  though  this 
restriction  does  not  generate  chilling  concerns;  and  even  though  no  one 
has suggested that Hillary counts as express advocacy; the majority none­
theless  reaches  out  to  opine  that  this  statutory  provision  is  “invalid”  as 
well.  Ante, at 365. 

9 The  majority  adds  that  the  distinction  between  facial  and  as-applied 
challenges  does  not  have  “some  automatic  effect”  that  mechanically  con­
trols the judicial task.  Ante, at 331.  I agree, but it does not follow that 
in any given case we should ignore the distinction, much less invert it.