Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/19pdf/18-328_pm02.pdf
Page Number: 1

(Slip Opinion) 

OCTOBER  TERM,  2019 

1 

Syllabus 

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is 
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued. 
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been 
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader. 
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337. 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

Syllabus 

ROTKISKE v. KLEMM ET AL. 

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR 
THE THIRD CIRCUIT 

No. 18–328.  Argued October 16, 2019—Decided December 10, 2019 

The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) authorizes private civil 
actions against debt collectors who engage in certain prohibited prac-
tices.  An FDCPA action must be brought “within one year from the
date on which the violation occurs.”  15 U. S. C. §1692k(d).  Respondent 
Klemm  &  Associates  (Klemm)  sued  petitioner  Rotkiske  to  collect  an 
unpaid debt and attempted service at an address where Rotkiske no 
longer lived.  An individual other than Rotkiske accepted service.  Rot-
kiske failed to respond to the summons, and Klemm obtained a default
judgment in 2009.  Rotkiske claims that he first learned of this judg-
ment in 2014 when his mortgage application was denied.  He then filed 
suit against Klemm, alleging that Klemm violated the FDCPA by con-
tacting him without lawful ability to collect.  Klemm moved to dismiss 
the action as barred by the FDCPA’s one-year statute of limitations. 
As relevant here, Rotkiske argued for the application of a “discovery 
rule” to delay the beginning of the limitations period until the date that
he knew or should have known of the alleged FDCPA violation.  Rely-
ing  on  the  statute’s  plain  language,  the  District  Court  rejected  Rot-
kiske’s approach and dismissed the action.  The Third Circuit affirmed. 

Held: Absent the application of an equitable doctrine, §1692k(d)’s statute 
of limitations begins to run when the alleged FDCPA violation occurs, 
not when the violation is discovered.  Pp. 4–7.

(a) The plain text of §1692k(d) unambiguously sets the date of the 
violation as the event that starts the FDCPA’s one-year limitations pe-
riod.  Rotkiske argues for the application of a general discovery rule as 
a principle of statutory interpretation that, in effect, would read a dis-
covery provision into §1692k(d).  But adopting this approach would re-
quire improper atextual supplementation of the statute.  Such supple-
mentation is particularly inappropriate when, as here, Congress has