Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/12pdf/11-697_d1o2.pdf
Page Number: 54

Cite as:  568 U. S. ____ (2013) 

13 

GINSBURG, J., dissenting 

III 
The  history  of  §602(a)(1)  reinforces  the  conclusion  I
draw  from  the  text  of  the  relevant  provisions:  §109(a) 
does  not  apply  to  copies  manufactured  abroad.    Section 
602(a)(1) was enacted as part of the Copyright Act of 1976, 
90 Stat. 2589–2590.  That Act was the product of a lengthy 
revision effort overseen by the U. S. Copyright Office.  See 
Mills Music, Inc. v. Snyder, 469 U. S. 153, 159–160 (1985). 
In  its  initial  1961  report  on  recommended  revisions,  the 
Copyright  Office  noted  that  publishers  had  “suggested 
that  the  [then-existing]  import  ban  on  piratical  copies
should  be  extended  to  bar  the  importation  of  . . .  foreign 
edition[s]”  in  violation  of  “agreements  to  divide  interna­
tional  markets  for  copyrighted  works.”    Copyright  Law
Revision:  Report  of  the  Register  of  Copyrights  on  the 
General Revision of the U. S. Copyright Law, 87th Cong.,
1st Sess., 126 (H. R. Judiciary Comm. Print 1961) (herein­
after Copyright Law Revision).  See Copyright Act of 1947, 
§106,  61  Stat.  663  (“The  importation  into  the  United
States . . . of any piratical copies of any work  copyrighted 
—————— 

§109(a)  is  consistent  with  Congress’  use  of  that  phrase  in  §104.    Fur­
thermore, §104 describes which works are entitled to copyright protec­
tion under U. S. law.  But no one disputes that Wiley’s copyrights in the 
works  at  issue  in  this  case  are  valid.    The  only  question  is  whether 
Kirtsaeng’s  importation  of  copies  of  those  works  infringed  Wiley’s
copyrights.  It is basic to copyright law that “[o]wnership of a copyright
. . . is distinct from ownership of any material object in which the work 
is  embodied.”    17  U. S. C.  §202.    See  also  §101  (“ ‘Copies’  are  material
objects,  other  than  phonorecords,  in  which  a  work  is  fixed  by  any
method now known or later developed, and from which the work can be
perceived,  reproduced,  or  otherwise  communicated,  either  directly  or 
with the aid of a machine or device.”).  Given the distinction copyright 
law draws between works and copies, §104 is inapposite to the question
here presented.  4 Patry §13:44.10, at 13–129 (“There is no connection,
linguistically or substantively, between Section[s] 104 and 109: Section
104 deals with national eligibility for the intangible work of authorship; 
Section  109(a)  deals  with  the  tangible,  physical  embodiment  of  the 
work, the ‘copy.’ ”).