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Page Number: 10

6 

DUBIN v. UNITED STATES 

Opinion of the Court 

have been singled out by this Court as particularly sensitive 
to context, and they do not, standing alone, conclusively re-
solve this case. 

Start with “uses.”  As the Court has observed more than 
once, “the word ‘use’ poses some interpretational difficulties 
because of the different meanings attributable to it.”  Bailey 
v. United States, 516 U. S. 137, 143 (1995); see also Leocal 
v. Ashcroft, 543 U. S. 1, 9 (2004).  The “ ‘ordinary or natural
meaning’ ” of “ ‘use’ ” is “variously defined as ‘[t]o convert to
one’s service,’ ‘to employ,’ ‘to avail oneself of,’ and ‘to carry 
out a purpose or action by means of.’ ”  Bailey, 516 U. S., at 
145.  “These various definitions of ‘use’ imply action and im-
plementation.”    Ibid.  Beyond  that  general  concept,  how-
ever, “ ‘use’ takes on different meanings depending on con-
text,” and because it “draws meaning from its context, . . . 
we will look not only to the word itself, but also to the stat-
ute and the [surrounding] scheme, to determine the mean-
ing  Congress  intended.”    Id.,  at  143;  see  also  Leocal,  543 
U. S., at 9 (“Particularly when interpreting a statute that
features as elastic a word as ‘use,’ we construe language in
its context and in light of the terms surrounding it”).

For  example,  the  federal  arson  statute  only  applies  to
buildings “ ‘used in’ commerce or commerce-affecting activ-
ity.”  Jones v. United States, 529 U. S. 848, 850–851 (2000). 
In that statutory context, the Court distinguished between 
uses of a building as “the locus of any commercial undertak-
ing,” and noncovered “passive,” “passing,” or ancillary uses
of a building “as collateral to obtain and secure a mortgage” 
or to obtain an insurance policy.  Id., at 855–856.  It is stat-
utory context, therefore, that determines what kind of ac-
tive  employment  or  conversion  to  one’s  service  triggers 
§1028A(a)(1)’s harsh penalty.

“In relation to” is similarly context sensitive.  If “ ‘relate 
to’ were taken to extend to the furthest stretch of its inde-
terminacy, then for all practical purposes” there would be