Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/22pdf/21-1164_7li8.pdf
Page Number: 22.0

Cite as:  598 U. S. ____ (2023) 

7 

THOMAS, J., dissenting 

no jurisdiction to inquire into the merits,” and it remanded 
for the lower courts to determine whether the suit was so 
barred.  Id., at 292–293.  This statement that the time bar 
went to “jurisdiction” was an integral part of the Court’s in-
structions  on  remand.    Moreover,  on  remand,  the  Eighth
Circuit understood the Court to have used the term “juris-
diction” to refer to a court’s authority to hear the case.  See 
North  Dakota  ex rel.  Board  of  Univ.  and  School  Lands  v. 
Block, 789 F. 2d 1308, 1310 (CA8 1986) (noting that neither 
the Eighth Circuit nor the District Court had “ ‘jurisdiction 
to inquire into the merits’ ” because the Act’s “statute of lim-
itations is jurisdictional”). 

In Mottaz, three years after Block, the Court again con-
sidered the jurisdictional nature of the Act’s time bar.  In 
the lower courts, the Government initially defended against 
a “somewhat opaque” set of claims by relying on the general 
6-year statute of limitations for actions against the United
States, 28 U. S. C. §2401(a).  Mottaz, 476 U. S., at 839.  The 
District  Court  held  that  the  suit  was  time  barred  under 
§2401(a),  but  the  Eighth  Circuit  reversed  and  remanded. 
Id., at 838–839.  The Government then argued, for the first
time, in its petition for rehearing in the Court of Appeals 
that the suit arose under the Quiet Title Act and was thus 
subject  to  the  Act’s  12-year  statute  of  limitations.    Id.,  at 
840–841.  This  Court  granted  certiorari  “to  consider 
whether [the] respondent’s claim was barred under either 
[the 6-year bar] or [the 12-year bar].”  Id., at 841. 

In  addressing  these,  the  Court  cited  Sherwood  for  the 
proposition that, “[w]hen the United States consents to be 
sued, the terms of its waiver of sovereign immunity define
the extent of the court’s jurisdiction.”  476 U. S., at 841.  It 
then quoted Block for the proposition that “ ‘[w]hen waiver 
legislation contains a statute of limitations, the limitations
provision constitutes a condition on the waiver of sovereign 
immunity,’ ”  treating  Block  as  precedential  on  this  point. 
476 U. S., at 841.  The Court also characterized the statute