Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/19pdf/18-5924_n6io.pdf
Page Number: 3

Cite as:  590 U. S. ____ (2020) 

3 

Syllabus 

it comes to reliance interests, neither Louisiana nor Oregon claims any-
thing  like  the  prospective  economic,  regulatory,  or  social  disruption 
litigants seeking to preserve precedent usually invoke.  The fact that 
Louisiana and Oregon may need to retry defendants convicted of felo-
nies by nonunanimous verdicts whose cases are still pending on direct 
appeal will surely impose a cost, but new rules of criminal procedure 
usually do, see, e.g., United States v. Booker, 543 U. S. 220, and prior
convictions in only two States are potentially affected here.  Pp. 20– 
23.

 JUSTICE GORSUCH, joined by JUSTICE GINSBURG and JUSTICE BREYER, 
concluded in Part IV–A that Apodaca lacks precedential force.  Treat-
ing  that  case  as  precedential  would  require  embracing  the  dubious
proposition that a single Justice writing only for himself has the au-
thority  to  bind  this  Court  to  already  rejected  propositions.   No  prior 
case has made such a suggestion.  Pp. 16–20.

JUSTICE  GORSUCH,  joined  by  JUSTICE  GINSBURG,  JUSTICE  BREYER, 
and JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR, concluded in Parts IV–B–2 and V that Loui-
siana’s  and  Oregon’s  reliance  interests  in  the  security  of  their  final
criminal judgments do not favor upholding Apodaca.  Worries that de-
fendants whose appeals are already complete might seek to challenge 
their  nonunanimous  convictions  through  collateral  review  are  over-
stated.  Cf. Teague v. Lane, 489 U. S. 288.  Apodaca’s reliance interests 
are not boosted by Louisiana’s recent decision to bar the use of non-
unanimous  jury  verdicts.    A  ruling  for  Louisiana  would  invite  other 
States to relax their own unanimity requirements, and Louisiana con-
tinues  to  allow  nonunanimous  verdicts  for  crimes  committed  before 
2019.  Pp. 23–26.

JUSTICE THOMAS concluded that Ramos’ felony conviction by a non-
unanimous  jury  is  unconstitutional  because  the  Sixth  Amendment’s 
protection  against  nonunanimous  felony  guilty  verdicts  applies 
against the States through the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, not the Due Process Clause.  Pp. 1–9. 

GORSUCH, J., announced the judgment of the Court, and delivered the
opinion  of  the  Court  with  respect  to  Parts  I,  II–A,  III,  and  IV–B–1,  in
which GINSBURG, BREYER, SOTOMAYOR, and KAVANAUGH, JJ., joined, an
opinion with respect to Parts II–B, IV–B–2, and V, in which GINSBURG, 
BREYER, and SOTOMAYOR, JJ., joined, and an opinion with respect to Part 
IV–A, in which GINSBURG and BREYER, JJ., joined.  SOTOMAYOR, J., filed 
an opinion concurring as to all but Part IV–A.  KAVANAUGH, J., filed an 
opinion concurring in part.  THOMAS, J., filed an opinion concurring in 
the judgment.  ALITO, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which ROBERTS, 
C. J., joined, and in which KAGAN, J., joined as to all but Part III–D.