Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/524bv.pdf
Page Number: 437.0

524US2

Unit: $U91

[09-06-00 17:16:26] PAGES PGT: OPIN

392 WISCONSIN DEPT. OF CORRECTIONS v. SCHACHT

Opinion of the Court

because we do not read the statute in this way. An ordinary
reading of the language indicates that the statute refers to
an instance in which a federal court “lacks subject matter
jurisdiction” over a “case,” and not simply over one claim
within a case. Cf. § 1441(c) (permitting “the entire case” to
be removed or remanded, when one or more “non-removable
claims or causes of action” is joined with a federal question
“claim or cause of action”). Conceivably, one might also
read the statute’s reference to “case” to include a claim
within a case as well as the entire case. But neither reading
helps Schacht. The former reading would make the provi-
sion inapplicable here; the latter would make it applicable,
but requires remand only of the relevant claims, and not the
entire case as Schacht contends.

Nor does the statute’s purpose favor Schacht’s interpreta-
tion. The statutory section that contains the provision
deals, not with the question of what is removable, but with
the procedures that a federal court is to follow after removal
It is entitled: “Procedure after removal generally.”
occurs.
§ 1447.
In substance, the section differentiates between re-
movals that are defective because of lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction and removals that are defective for some other
reason, e. g., because the removal took place after relevant
time limits had expired. For the latter kind of case, there
must be a motion to remand ﬁled no later than 30 days after
the ﬁling of the removal notice.
§ 1447(c). For the former
kind of case, remand may take place without such a motion
Ibid. The provision, then, helps to specify
and at any time.
a procedural difference that ﬂows from a difference in the
kinds of reasons that could lead to a remand. That objective
is irrelevant to the kind of problem presented in this case.
We repeat our conclusion: A State’s proper assertion of an
Eleventh Amendment bar after removal means that the fed-
eral court cannot hear the barred claim. But that circum-
stance does not destroy removal jurisdiction over the re-
maining claims in the case before us. A federal court can