Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/23pdf/22-704_4246.pdf
Page Number: 37.0

10 

VIDAL v. ELSTER 

BARRETT, J., concurring in part 

A 

First, the Court’s history.  It is true that “a tradition of 
restricting  the  trademarking  of  names”  arose  in  the  late
19th century.  Ante, at 19.  As the Court says, a personal 
name  by  itself,  without  any  accompanying  words  or  sym-
bols, did not typically qualify as a trademark.  See McLean 
v. Fleming, 96 U. S. 245, 252–253 (1878); ante, at 13.  And 
a  person  could  not  always  enforce  a  trademark  including
her own name against another with the same name.  See 
Brown  Chemical  Co.  v.  Meyer,  139  U. S.  540,  542  (1891); 
ante, at 14.3  The first federal trademark statute reflected 
these principles, prohibiting the registration of a mark that
was “merely the name of a person, firm, or corporation only, 
unaccompanied by a mark sufficient to distinguish it from
the same name when used by other persons.”  §79, 16 Stat.
211.  Today, the Lanham Act continues to bar the registra-
tion  of  a  mark  that  is  “primarily  merely  a  surname.”    15 
U. S. C. §1052(e)(4).

But the Court also claims that the common law did not 
afford protection to a person seeking a trademark including 
another living person’s name (in other words, a rule akin to 
the names clause).  Ante, at 14.  I am less sure.  In Thaddeus 
Davids  Co.  v.  Davids  Mfg.  Co.,  233  U. S.  461  (1914),  this 
Court  explained  that  the  1905  federal  trademark  statute 
contained “a fairly complete list of the marks used by deal-
ers in selling their goods, which are not valid trademarks 
at  common  law.”  Id.,  at  467  (internal  quotation  marks 
omitted).  Notably, this statute did not include the names 
clause or any rough equivalent.4  And if such a common-law 

—————— 

3 By  the  early-20th  century, however,  courts  enforced  personal-name 
marks even against “newcomer[s] with the same name when confusion 
over source [was] the likely result.”  2 McCarthy §13:8; see L. E. Water-
man Co. v. Modern Pen Co., 235 U. S. 88, 94 (1914). 

4 The Thaddeus Court referred specifically to the statute’s prohibition 
on the registration of marks that “consis[t] merely of individual, firm or