Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/529bv.pdf
Page Number: 181

529US1

Unit: $U35

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106

UNITED STATES v. LOCKE

Opinion of the Court

509; duties of senior licensed ofﬁcers to relieve the master,
id., at 511; manning standards for foreign vessels, id., at 513;
reporting of marine casualties, ibid.; minimum standards for
plating thickness, id., at 515; tank vessel manning require-
ments, id., at 517; and tank vessel construction standards,
If Con-
id., at 517–518, among other extensive regulations.
gress had intended to disrupt national uniformity in all of
these matters, it would not have done so by placement of the
saving clauses in Title I.

The saving clauses are further limited in effect to “this
Act, the Act of March 3, 1851 . . . , or section 9509 of [the
Internal Revenue Code].”
§§ 2718(a) and (c). These ex-
plicit qualiﬁers are inconsistent with interpreting the saving
clauses to alter the pre-emptive effect of the PWSA or regu-
lations promulgated thereunder. The text of the statute in-
dicates no intent to allow States to impose wide-ranging reg-
ulation of the at-sea operation of tankers. The clauses may
preserve a State’s ability to enact laws of a scope similar to
Title I, but do not extend to subjects addressed in the other
titles of the Act or other acts.

Limiting the saving clauses as we have determined re-
spects the established federal-state balance in matters of
maritime commerce between the subjects as to which the
States retain concurrent powers and those over which the
federal authority displaces state control. We have upheld
state laws imposing liability for pollution caused by oil spills.
See Askew v. American Waterways Operators, Inc., 411
U. S., at 325. Our view of OPA’s saving clauses preserves
this important role for the States, which is unchallenged
here. We think it quite unlikely that Congress would use a
means so indirect as the saving clauses in Title I of OPA to
upset the settled division of authority by allowing States to
impose additional unique substantive regulation on the at-
sea conduct of vessels. We decline to give broad effect to
saving clauses where doing so would upset the careful regu-
latory scheme established by federal law. See, e. g., Morales