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Page Number: 24.0

20 

GOOGLE LLC v. ORACLE AMERICA, INC. 

Opinion of the Court 

extremely close question of fact”).  In this case the Federal 
Circuit carefully applied the fact/law principles we set forth
in  U.  S.  Bank,  leaving  factual  determinations  to  the  jury
and  reviewing  the  ultimate  question,  a  legal  question,  de 
novo. 

Next, Google argues that the Federal Circuit’s approach
violates  the  Seventh  Amendment.    The  Amendment  both 
requires  that  “the  right  of  trial  by  jury  . . .  be  preserved”
and  forbids  courts  to  “re-examin[e ]”  any  “fact  tried  by  a 
jury.”  U. S. Const., Amdt. 7; see also Gasperini v. Center for 
Humanities, Inc., 518 U. S. 415, 432–433 (1996).  The Reex-
amination Clause is no bar here, however, for, as we have 
said, the ultimate question here is one of law, not fact.  It 
does not violate the Reexamination Clause for a court to de-
termine  the  controlling  law  in  resolving  a  challenge  to  a 
jury verdict, as happens any time a court resolves a motion
for judgment as a matter of law.  See, e.g., Neely v. Martin 
K. Eby Constr. Co., 386 U. S. 317, 322 (1967).

Nor is Google correct that “the right of trial by jury” in-
cludes  the  right  to  have  a  jury  resolve  a  fair  use  defense. 
That Clause is concerned with “the particular trial decision”
at issue.  Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U. S. 
370, 376 (1996).  Even though it is possible to find pre-Rev-
olutionary English cases in which a judge sent related ques-
tions  like  fair  abridgment  to  a  jury,  those  questions  were 
significantly different from the “fair use” doctrine as courts 
apply it today.  See, e.g., Gyles v. Wilcox, 2 Atk. 141, 142– 
144,  26  Eng.  Rep.  489,  490–491  (Ch.  1740)  (asking  the
Court to resolve the narrow question whether a shortened 
work  could  be  considered  a  new  work);  Sayre  v.  Moore,  1 
East 361, n., 102 Eng. Rep. 138, 139, n. (K. B. 1785) (dis-
cussing the jury’s role in resolving whether copying consti-
tuted infringement).  As far as contemporary fair use is con-
cerned,  we  have  described  the  doctrine  as  an  “equitable,” 
not a “legal,” doctrine.  We have found no case suggesting
that application of U. S. Bank here would fail “to preserve