Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/558bv.pdf
Page Number: 582.0

Cite as: 558 U. S. 310 (2010) 

421 

Opinion of Stevens, J. 

When such restrictions are justiﬁed by a legitimate govern­
mental  interest,  they  do  not  necessarily  raise  constitutional 
problems.46  In  contrast  to  the  blanket  rule  that  the  major­
ity  espouses,  our  cases  recognize  that  the  Government’s  in­
terests  may  be  more  or  less  compelling  with  respect  to  dif­
ferent classes of speakers,47  cf. Minneapolis Star & Tribune 
Co.  v.  Minnesota  Comm’r  of  Revenue,  460  U. S.  575,  585 
(1983)  (“[D]ifferential  treatment”  is  constitutionally  suspect 
“unless justiﬁed by some special characteristic” of the regu­
lated  class  of  speakers  (emphasis  added)),  and  that  the  con­
stitutional  rights  of  certain  categories  of  speakers,  in  cer­
tain  contexts,  “ ‘are  not  automatically  coextensive  with  the 
rights’ ”  that are  normally accorded  to members  of our  soci­

(internal quotation marks omitted)); Public Workers v.  Mitchell, 330 U. S. 
75 (1947) (same); United States v.  Wurzbach, 280 U. S. 396, 398 (1930) (up­
holding  statute  prohibiting  federal  employees  from  making  contributions 
to  Members  of  Congress  for  “any  political  purpose  whatever”  (internal 
quotation marks omitted)); Ex parte Curtis, 106 U. S. 371 (1882) (upholding 
statute prohibiting certain federal employees from giving money to other 
employees for political purposes). 

46 The majority states that the cases just cited are “inapposite” because 
they  “stand  only  for  the  proposition  that  there  are  certain  governmental 
functions  that  cannot  operate  without  some  restrictions  on  particular 
kinds of  speech.”  Ante, at  341.  The majority’s creative  suggestion that 
these  cases  stand  only  for  that  one  proposition  is  quite  implausible.  In 
any  event,  the  proposition  lies  at  the  heart  of  this  case,  as  Congress  and 
half  the  state  legislatures  have  concluded,  over  many  decades,  that  their 
core  functions  of  administering  elections  and  passing  legislation  cannot 
operate  effectively  without  some  narrow  restrictions  on  corporate  elec­
tioneering paid for by general treasury funds. 

47 Outside of the law, of course, it is a commonplace that the identity and 
incentives of the speaker might be relevant to an assessment of his speech. 
See Aristotle, Poetics § 11.2(vi), pp. 43–44 (M. Heath transl. 1996) (“In eval­
uating  any  utterance  or  action,  one  must  take  into  account  not  just  the 
moral  qualities  of  what  is  actually  done  or  said,  but  also  the  identity  of 
the agent or speaker, the addressee, the occasion, the means, and the mo­
tive”).  The  insight  that  the  identity  of  speakers  is  a  proper  subject  of 
regulatory  concern,  it  bears  noting,  motivates  the  disclaimer  and  disclo­
sure provisions that the Court today upholds.