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4 

FISCHER v. UNITED STATES 

Opinion of the Court 

consider both “the specific context” in which (c)(2) appears 
“and the broader context of the statute as a whole.”  Robin-
son v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U. S. 337, 341 (1997); see, e.g., Pul-
sifer v. United States,  601 U. S. 124, 133 (2024) (choosing 
between  “two  grammatically  permissible  ways”  to  read  a 
sentencing statute “by reviewing text in context”). 

A 
1 

Section 1512 provides: 

“(c) Whoever corruptly— 

“(1) alters, destroys, mutilates, or conceals a record, 
document, or other object, or attempts to do so, with the
intent to impair the object’s integrity or availability for 
use in an official proceeding; or 

“(2) otherwise obstructs, influences, or impedes any 

official proceeding, or attempts to do so, 
“shall  be  fined  . . .  or  imprisoned  not  more  than  20 
years, or both.” 

Subsection  (c)(1)  describes  particular  types  of  criminal 
conduct in specific terms.  To ensure the statute would not 
be read as excluding substantially similar activity not men-
tioned, (c)(2) says it is also illegal to engage in some broader 
range of unenumerated conduct.

The purpose of the “otherwise” clause is therefore, as the
parties agree, to cover some set of “matters not specifically
contemplated” by (c)(1).  Republic of Iraq v. Beaty, 556 U. S. 
848, 860 (2009); see Brief for Petitioner 12; Brief for United
States 12–13.  The problem is defining what exactly Con-
gress left for (c)(2).  Perhaps Congress sought to criminalize 
all obstructive acts in Section 1512(c), and having named a
few examples in (c)(1), devised (c)(2) to prohibit the rest in 
one go.  The point of (c)(1) would then be to illustrate just
one type of conduct among many (c)(2) prohibits; it would 
be subsidiary to the overarching prohibition in (c)(2).  But