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WILLIAMS v. TAYLOR

Opinion of the Court

ing in a broader class of cases than were covered by Keeney’s
cause and prejudice standard.

In sum, the opening clause of § 2254(e)(2) codiﬁes Keeney’s
threshold standard of diligence, so that prisoners who would
have had to satisfy Keeney’s test for excusing the deﬁciency
in the state-court record prior to AEDPA are now controlled
by § 2254(e)(2). When the words of the Court are used in a
later statute governing the same subject matter, it is re-
spectful of Congress and of the Court’s own processes to give
the words the same meaning in the absence of speciﬁc direc-
tion to the contrary. See Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U. S. 575,
581 (1978) (“[W]here . . . Congress adopts a new law incorpo-
rating sections of a prior law, Congress normally can be pre-
sumed to have had knowledge of the interpretation given to
the incorporated law, at least insofar as it affects the new
statute”). See also Cottage Savings Assn. v. Commissioner,
499 U. S. 554, 562 (1991).

Interpreting § 2254(e)(2) so that “failed” requires lack of
diligence or some other fault avoids putting it in needless
tension with § 2254(d). A prisoner who developed his claim
in state court and can prove the state court’s decision was
“contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of,
clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Su-
preme Court of the United States,” is not barred from ob-
taining relief by § 2254(d)(1). See Williams v. Taylor, ante,
at 412–413 (majority opinion).
If the opening clause of
§ 2254(e)(2) covers a request for an evidentiary hearing on a
claim which was pursued with diligence but remained unde-
veloped in state court because, for instance, the prosecution
concealed the facts, a prisoner lacking clear and convincing
evidence of innocence could be barred from a hearing on
the claim even if he could satisfy § 2254(d). See 28 U. S. C.
§ 2254(e)(2)(B). The “failed to develop” clause does not bear
this harsh reading, which would attribute to Congress a pur-
pose or design to bar evidentiary hearings for diligent pris-
oners with meritorious claims just because the prosecution’s