Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/529bv.pdf
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Unit: $U56

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Cite as: 529 U. S. 694 (2000)

701

Opinion of the Court

nal prosecution”). For that matter, such treatment is all but
entailed by our summary afﬁrmance of Greenﬁeld v. Scafati,
277 F. Supp. 644 (Mass. 1967) (three-judge court), summarily
aff ’d, 390 U. S. 713 (1968), in which a three-judge panel for-
bade on ex post facto grounds the application of a Massachu-
setts statute imposing sanctions for violation of parole to
a prisoner originally sentenced before its enactment. We
therefore attribute postrevocation penalties to the original
conviction.

B

Since postrevocation penalties relate to the original of-
fense, to sentence Johnson to a further term of supervised
release under § 3583(h) would be to apply this section retro-
actively (and to raise the remaining ex post facto question,
whether that application makes him worse off). But before
any such application (and constitutional test), there is a ques-
tion that neither party addresses. The Ex Post Facto
Clause raises to the constitutional level one of the most basic
presumptions of our law: legislation, especially of the crimi-
nal sort, is not to be applied retroactively. See, e. g., Lynce
v. Mathis, 519 U. S. 433, 439 (1997); Landgraf v. USI Film
Products, 511 U. S. 244, 265 (1994). Quite independent of
the question whether the Ex Post Facto Clause bars retro-
active application of § 3583(h), then, there is the question
whether Congress intended such application. Absent a
clear statement of that intent, we do not give retroactive
effect to statutes burdening private interests. See id., at
270.

The Government offers nothing indicating congressional
intent to apply § 3583(h) retroactively. The legislative deci-
sion to alter the rule of law established by the majority
interpretation of § 3583(e)(3) (no authority for supervised
release after revocation and reimprisonment) does not, by
itself, tell us when or how that legislative decision was
intended to take effect. See Rivers v. Roadway Express,