Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/524bv.pdf
Page Number: 779.0

524US2

Unit: $U98

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734

MONGE v. CALIFORNIA

Stevens, J., dissenting

case does not mean that the Bullington decision rests on a
purely procedural rationale.

In our death penalty jurisprudence, moreover, the nature
and the consequences of capital sentencing proceedings are
intertwined. We have held that “in capital cases the funda-
mental respect for humanity underlying the Eighth Amend-
ment requires consideration of the character and record of
the individual offender and the circumstances of the particu-
lar offense as a constitutionally indispensable part of the
process of inﬂicting the penalty of death.” Woodson v.
North Carolina, 428 U. S. 280, 304 (1976) (plurality opinion)
(citation omitted). Where noncapital sentencing proceed-
ings contain trial-like protections, that is a matter of legisla-
tive grace, not constitutional command. Many States have
chosen to implement procedural safeguards to protect de-
fendants who may face dramatic increases in their sentences
as a result of recidivism enhancements. We do not believe
that because the States have done so, we are compelled to
extend the double jeopardy bar.
Indeed, were we to apply
double jeopardy here, we might create disincentives that
would diminish these important procedural protections.

*

*

*

We conclude that Bullington’s rationale is conﬁned to the
unique circumstances of capital sentencing and that the Dou-
ble Jeopardy Clause does not preclude retrial on a prior con-
viction allegation in the noncapital sentencing context. Ac-
cordingly, the judgment of the California Supreme Court is
afﬁrmed.

It is so ordered.

Justice Stevens, dissenting.

“The Double Jeopardy Clause forbids a second trial for the
purpose of affording the prosecution another opportunity to
supply evidence which it failed to muster in the ﬁrst proceed-