Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/23pdf/22-704_4246.pdf
Page Number: 15

Cite as:  602 U. S. ____ (2024) 

11 

Opinion of the Court 

Amendment from the beginning.  That longstanding, har-
monious  relationship  suggests  that  heightened  scrutiny 
need not always apply in this unique context. 

The content-based nature of trademark protection is com-
pelled  by  the  historical  rationales  of  trademark  law.   A 
trademark has generally served two functions: “indicating 
ownership of the goods to which it [is] affixed” and “indicat-
ing  the  source  or  origin  of  manufacture.”    Schechter  122. 
Indicating ownership of a good was needed in part to “fi[x]
responsibility for defective merchandise.”  Restatement §9,
Comment b.  And, indicating the source of the good helped 
“prospective  purchasers  . . .  make  their  selections  based 
upon the reputation, not merely of the immediate vendor,
but also of the manufacturer.”  Ibid.  Both goals thus reflect 
that trademarks developed historically to identify for con-
sumers who sold the goods (the vendor) and who made the 
goods (the manufacturer).  See ibid.  In that vein, a basic 
function  of  trademark  law  has  always  been  to  “prohibi[t] 
confusion as to the source of good or services.”  Pattishall, 
Constitutional Foundations, at 458; see also Jack Daniel’s 
Properties,  Inc.  v.  VIP  Products  LLC,  599  U. S.  140,  147 
(2023)  (“Confusion  as  to  source  is  the  bête  noire  of  trade-
mark law”).  Indicating ownership and the manufacturing
source touch on the content of the mark—i.e., from whom 
the  product  came.  And,  as  we  have  explained,  policing
trademarks  so  as  to  prevent  confusion  over  the  source  of
goods requires looking to the mark’s content.  Supra, at 10. 
Because  of  the  uniquely  content-based  nature  of  trade-
mark regulation and the longstanding coexistence of trade-
mark  regulation  with  the  First  Amendment,  we  need  not 
evaluate  a  solely  content-based  restriction  on  trademark
registration  under  heightened  scrutiny.  See  R. A. V.,  505 
U. S., at 387 (“Even the prohibition against content discrim-
ination that we assert the First Amendment requires is not
absolute”); Jack Daniel’s, 599 U. S., at 159 (explaining that,
in some circumstances, “trademark law [can] prevai[l] over