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Page Number: 17.0

14 

HEMPHILL v. NEW YORK 

Opinion of the Court 

withdraw it, strike it, or issue a limiting instruction as ap-
propriate.  See, e.g., Fed. Rule Evid. 105; New York State 
Unified  Court  System,  Guide  to  New  York  Evidence  Rule 
1.13(1)  (“Absent  undue  prejudice  to  a  party,  a  judge  may 
revisit his or her own evidentiary rulings during trial”).

Finally,  the  Court  does  not  decide  today  the  validity  of
the common-law rule of completeness as applied to testimo-
nial  hearsay.    Under  that  rule,  a  party  “ ‘against  whom  a 
part of an utterance has been put in, may in his turn com-
plement  it  by  putting  in  the  remainder.’ ”    Beech  Aircraft 
Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U. S. 153, 171 (1988) (quoting 7 J. Wig-
more, Evidence §2113, p. 653 (J. Chadbourn rev. 1978)); see 
also Fed. Rule Evid. 106.  The parties agree that the rule of
completeness does not apply to the facts of this case, as Mor-
ris’  plea  allocution  was  not  part  of  any  statement  that
Hemphill  introduced.    Whether  and  under  what  circum-
stances that rule might allow the admission of testimonial
hearsay against a criminal defendant presents different is-
sues that are not before this Court.5 

* 

* 

* 

The  Confrontation  Clause  requires  that  the  reliability 
and veracity of the evidence against a criminal defendant 
be  tested  by  cross-examination,  not  determined  by  a  trial 
court.  The trial court’s admission of unconfronted testimo-
nial hearsay over Hemphill’s objection, on the view that it 
was reasonably necessary to correct Hemphill’s misleading
argument, violated that fundamental guarantee.  The judg-
ment of the New York Court of Appeals is reversed, and the 
—————— 

5 The State also asks this Court to hold the constitutional error in this 
case  harmless  beyond  a  reasonable  doubt,  see  Chapman  v.  California, 
386 U. S. 18, 24 (1967), citing what it calls “substantial independent ev-
idence of [Hemphill’s] guilt,” Brief for Respondent 49.  It offers no reason, 
however,  for  the  Court  to  depart  from  its  “general  custom  of  allowing 
state courts initially to assess the effect of erroneously admitted evidence 
in light of substantive state criminal law.”  Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U. S. 
116, 139 (1999).