Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/21pdf/20-603_o758.pdf
Page Number: 4

4 

TORRES v. TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY 

Syllabus 

limits, or eliminates in any manner any right or benefit provided by 
this chapter, including the establishment of additional prerequisites to
the  exercise  of  any  such  right  or  the  receipt  of  any  such  benefit.” 
§4302(b).  Neither Seminole Tribe nor Alden compels a different result. 
Congress’  commerce  powers,  at  issue  in  Seminole  Tribe,  are  distin-
guishable  from  its  war  powers  under  PennEast’s  “complete  in  itself” 
inquiry.  And in Alden, the Court expressly embraced “ ‘the postulate 
that States . . . shall be immune from suits, without their consent, save 
where there has been “a surrender of this immunity in the plan of the 
convention.” ’ ”  527 U. S., at 730 (emphasis added).  That “save where” 
proviso recognizes exceptions for structural waivers, supplying the ba-
sis for the Court’s decisions in PennEast and Katz, as well as the deci-
sion today.   Finally, the idea that PennEast and Katz involved in rem 
actions  and  the  fact  that  USERRA  suits  lack  a  certain  founding-era 
pedigree do not make a difference under PennEast’s basic reasoning.

The Court therefore holds that, in joining together to form a Union, 
the States agreed to sacrifice their sovereign immunity for the good of 
the common defense.  Pp. 12–16. 

583 S. W. 3d 221, reversed and remanded. 

BREYER, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C. J., 
and SOTOMAYOR, KAGAN, and KAVANAUGH, JJ., joined.  KAGAN, J., filed a 
concurring  opinion.  THOMAS,  J.,  filed  a  dissenting  opinion,  in  which 
ALITO, GORSUCH, and BARRETT, JJ., joined.