Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/20pdf/20-382_869d.pdf
Page Number: 12.0

Cite as:  593 U. S. ____ (2021) 

9 

Opinion of the Court 

tightly unified interpretation of these provisions would cre-
ate surplusage problems.  The United States argues, for ex-
ample,  that  a  reading  of  §113(f )(3)(B)  that  does  nothing 
more than allow a party to seek contribution after settling 
a  CERCLA  liability  would  be  redundant  with  §113(f )(1),
which  already  permits  contribution  “during  or  following
any civil action under [§§106 and 107].”  But there is legiti-
mate reason for separate provisions, even if both allow con-
tribution  only  for  a  CERCLA  liability.    For  example,
§113(f )(3)(B) specifies the consequences of a particular type
of resolution (i.e., settlement), explaining that an “adminis-
trative or judicially approved settlement” is sufficient and
reinforcing that a contribution claim will not extend to par-
ties  who  have  already  settled.    This  sort  of  belt-and-sus-
penders  approach  hardly  compels  an  all-encompassing
reading  of  §113(f )(3)(B).    Cf.  Rimini  Street,  Inc.  v.  Oracle 
USA,  Inc.,  586  U. S.  ___,  ___  (2019)  (slip  op.,  at  11)  (“We
have recognized that some redundancy is hardly unusual in
statutes addressing costs” (internal quotation marks omit-
ted)).  Rather than try “to avoid surplusage at all costs,” At-
interpret
lantic  Research,  551  U. S.,  at  137,  we 
§113(f )(3)(B) in light of its text and place within a compre-
hensive statutory scheme. 

* 

* 

* 
The most natural reading of §113(f )(3)(B) is that a party 
may seek contribution under CERCLA only after settling a
CERCLA-specific liability.  We thus reverse the judgment
of the Court of Appeals and remand the case for further pro-
ceedings consistent with this opinion. 

It is so ordered.