Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/13pdf/13a1284_ap6c.pdf
Page Number: 3.0

Cite as:  573 U. S. ____ (2014) 

3 

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting 

contraceptive  coverage  requirement.    Wheaton  nonethe-
less  asserts  that  the  exemption  itself  impermissibly  bur-
dens  Wheaton’s  free  exercise  of  its  religion  in  violation  of
the  Religious  Freedom  Restoration  Act  of  1993  (RFRA), 
107 Stat. 1488, 42 U. S. C. §2000bb et seq., on the theory
that its filing of a self-certification form will make it com-
plicit  in  the  provision  of  contraceptives  by  triggering  the
obligation  for  someone  else  to  provide  the  services  to 
which  it  objects.  Wheaton  has  not  stated  a  viable  claim 
under  RFRA.  Its  claim  ignores  that  the  provision  of  con-
traceptive  coverage  is  triggered  not  by  its  completion  of 
the self-certification form, but by federal law.

Even  assuming  that  the  accommodation  somehow  bur-
dens  Wheaton’s  religious  exercise,  the  accommodation  is
permissible under RFRA because it is the least restrictive
means  of  furthering  the  Government’s  compelling  inter-
ests in public health and women’s well-being.  Indeed, just
earlier  this  week  in  Burwell  v.  Hobby  Lobby  Stores,  Inc., 
ante, at ___, the Court described the accommodation as “a 
system  that  seeks  to  respect  the  religious  liberty  of  reli-
gious  nonprofit  corporations  while  ensuring  that  the  em-
ployees of these entities have precisely the same access to 
all  [Food  and  Drug  Administration  (FDA)]-approved  con-
traceptives as employees of companies whose owners have 
no  religious  objections to  providing  such  coverage.”    Ante, 
at  3.  And  the  Court  concluded  that  the  accommodation 
“constitutes  an  alternative  that  achieves  all  of  the  Gov-
ernment’s  aims  while  providing  greater  respect  for  reli-
gious liberty.”  Ibid.  Those who are bound by our decisions 
usually  believe  they  can  take  us  at  our  word.   Not  so  to-
day.  After  expressly  relying  on  the  availability  of  the
religious-nonprofit accommodation to hold that the contra-
ceptive coverage requirement violates RFRA as applied to
closely  held  for-profit  corporations,  the  Court  now,  as  the
dissent in Hobby Lobby feared it might, see ante, at 29–30 
(GINSBURG,  J.,  dissenting),  retreats  from  that  position.