Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/529bv.pdf
Page Number: 769.0

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Unit: $U56

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OCTOBER TERM, 1999

Syllabus

JOHNSON v. UNITED STATES

certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the sixth circuit

No. 99–5153. Argued February 22, 2000—Decided May 15, 2000

18 U. S. C. § 3583(e)(3).

The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 replaced most forms of parole with
supervised release overseen by the sentencing court.
If release con-
ditions are violated, that court may “revoke [the] release, and require
the person to serve in prison all or part of the [supervised release]
. without credit for time previously served on postrelease
term .
.
supervision . . . .”
In March 1994, the District
Court sentenced petitioner Johnson to imprisonment followed by a term
of supervised release. After beginning supervised release in 1995,
Johnson violated two conditions of his release. The District Court re-
voked his release and ordered him to serve an 18-month prison term to
be followed by an additional 12 months of supervised release. The
court cited no authority for ordering additional supervised release, but,
under Circuit law, it might have relied on 18 U. S. C. § 3583(h), a subsec-
tion added to the statute in 1994, which explicitly gave district courts
that power.
Johnson appealed, arguing that § 3583(e)(3) did not give
the district courts power to order a new supervised release term follow-
ing reimprisonment, and that applying § 3583(h) to him violated the Ex
Post Facto Clause. Although the Sixth Circuit had previously taken
the same position as Johnson with regard to § 3583(e)(3), it afﬁrmed his
sentence, reasoning that § 3583(h)’s application was not retroactive
because revocation of supervised release was punishment for John-
son’s violation of his release conditions, which occurred after the 1994
amendments.

Held:

1. Section 3583(h) does not apply retroactively, so no ex post facto
issue arises in this case. To prevail on his ex post facto claim, Johnson
must show, inter alia, that the law operates retroactively. Contrary to
the Sixth Circuit’s reasoning, postrevocation penalties are attributable
to the original conviction, not to defendants’ new offenses for violating
their supervised release conditions. Thus, to sentence Johnson under
§ 3583(h) would be to apply that section retroactively. However, absent
a clear statement of congressional intent, § 3583(h) applies only to cases
in which the initial offense occurred after the amendment’s effective
date, September 13, 1994. The Government offers nothing indicating a
contrary intent. The decision to alter § 3583(e)(3)’s supervised release