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Page Number: 27.0

14  AGENCY FOR INT’L DEVELOPMENT v. ALLIANCE FOR 

OPEN SOCIETY INT’L, INC. 
BREYER, J., dissenting 

the state court had ordered a previously invited marcher (or 
worse  still,  all  previously  invited  marchers)  to  display
GLIB’s banner, the Veterans Council would have prevailed 
all the same.  By compelling speech from an existing affili-
ate (or all of them), that order would have required, even 
more brazenly, that the Veterans Council “alter the expres-
sive  content  of  their  parade”  in  violation  of  the  Veterans 
Council’s First Amendment rights.  515 U. S., at 572–573. 
So  too  if  the  state  court  had  decreed  that  GLIB’s  banner 
must  adorn  a  horse,  oxen,  or  for  that  matter  R2–D2,  a 
robot—even  though  those  entities  lack  their  own  First
Amendment rights.  Whether the transmitter of a speaker’s 
protected  message  does  (or  does  not)  have  its  own  First 
Amendment  rights  is  beside  the  point.    Cf.  Wooley,  430 
U. S.,  at  717  (prohibiting  New  Hampshire  from  requiring 
that the state motto adorn a driver’s car, even though cars
do not have First Amendment rights). 

There is a reason why, until today, we had not confronted
a case like the one just described.  Cf. ante, at 6.  Requiring
someone to host another person’s speech is often a perfectly 
legitimate thing for the Government to do.  See, e.g., FAIR, 
547 U. S., at 65 (holding that the Government may require
law schools to host speech from military recruiters); Prune-
Yard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U. S. 74, 87–88 (1980) 
(holding that the Government may require the owner of a
private  shopping  mall  to  host  speech  from  politically 
minded  pamphleteers).  Even  the  court  order  at  issue  in 
Hurley  was  an  understandable  (though  unconstitutional)
application of a “venerable” civil rights law.  See 515 U. S., 
at 571.  But because compelling people to profess a belief
they  do  not  hold  is  almost  always  unconstitutional,  see 
AOSI I, 570 U. S., at 213, the Government rarely dares try. 
The Government’s well-founded reticence in the past is no
reason to bless its boldness at present. 

Bottom line: The critical question here, as in Hurley, is