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Page Number: 40

Cite as:  584 U. S. ____ (2018) 

5 

THOMAS, J., concurring 

it  seems  unlikely  that  the  enacting  Congress  had  any
intent  on  this  question;  Congress  typically  does  not  pass 
statutes with the expectation that some part will later be
deemed  unconstitutional.  See  Walsh  740–741;  Stern, 
Separability  and  Separability  Clauses  in  the  Supreme 
Court, 51 Harv. L. Rev. 76, 98 (1937) (Stern).  Without any 
actual evidence of intent, the severability doctrine invites 
courts  to  rely  on  their  own  views  about  what  the  best
statute  would  be.    See  Walsh  752–753;  Stern  112–113. 
More  fundamentally,  even  if  courts  could  discern  Con-
gress’  hypothetical  intentions,  intentions  do  not  count 
unless they are enshrined in a text that makes it through
the  constitutional  processes  of  bicameralism  and  present-
ment.  See Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U. S. 555, 586–588 (2009) 
(THOMAS,  J.,  concurring  in  judgment).    Because  we  have 
“ ‘a Government of laws, not of men,’ ” we are governed by
“legislated  text,”  not  “legislators’  intentions”—and  espe-
cially not legislators’ hypothetical intentions.  Zuni Public 
School Dist. No. 89 v. Department of Education, 550 U. S. 
81,  119  (2007)  (Scalia,  J.,  dissenting).  Yet  hypothetical
intent  is  exactly  what  the  severability  doctrine  turns  on,
at  least  when  Congress  has  not  expressed  its  fallback
position in the text. 

Second, the severability doctrine often requires courts to 
weigh in on statutory provisions that no party has stand-
ing  to  challenge,  bringing  courts  dangerously  close  to
issuing  advisory  opinions.  See  Stern  77;  Lea,  Situational 
Severability, 103 Va. L. Rev. 735, 788–803 (2017) (Lea).  If 
one provision of a statute is deemed unconstitutional, the 
severability doctrine places every other provision at risk of 

—————— 

v.  Mayor  and  Aldermen  of  Charlestown,  68  Mass.  84,  99  (1854).    This 
Court  adopted  the  Warren  formulation  in  the  late  19th  century,  see 
Allen  v.  Louisiana,  103  U. S.  80,  84  (1881),  an  era  when  statutory 
interpretation  privileged  Congress’  unexpressed  “intent”  over  the 
enacted  text,  see,  e.g.,  Church  of  Holy  Trinity  v.  United  States,  143 
U. S. 457, 472 (1892); United States v. Moore, 95 U. S. 760, 763 (1878).