Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/12pdf/11-345_l5gm.pdf
Page Number: 30.0

Cite as:  570 U. S. ____ (2013) 

13 

THOMAS, J., concurring 

the equal-protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
to use race as a factor in affording educational opportuni-
ties  among  its  citizens.”    Tr.  of  Oral  Arg.  in  Brown  v. 
Board of Education, O. T. 1952, No. 8, p. 7; see also Juris. 
Statement  in  Davis  v.  School  Bd.  of  Prince  Edward  Cty.,
O. T. 1952, No. 191, p. 8 (“[W]e take the unqualified posi-
tion that the Fourteenth Amendment has totally stripped
the  state  of  power  to  make  race  and  color  the  basis  for
governmental  action”);  Brief  for  Appellants  in  Brown  v. 
Board  of  Education,  O. T.  1952,  No.  8,  p. 5  (“The  Four-
teenth  Amendment  precludes  a  state  from  imposing  dis-
tinctions  or  classifications  based  upon  race  and  color
alone”);  Brief  for  Appellants  in  Nos.  1,  2,  and  4,  and  for 
Respondents in No. 10 on Reargument in Brown v. Board 
of  Education,  O. T.  1953,  p.  65  (“That  the  Constitution  is 
color blind is our dedicated belief ”).  The Constitution does 
not pander to faddish theories about whether race mixing 
is  in  the  public  interest.    The  Equal  Protection  Clause 
strips  States  of  all  authority  to  use  race  as  a  factor  in 
providing education.  All applicants must be treated equally 
under the law, and no benefit in the eye of the beholder can 
justify racial discrimination. 

This principle is neither new nor difficult to understand.
In  1868,  decades  before  Plessy,  the  Iowa  Supreme  Court
held that schools may not discriminate against applicants
based on their skin color.  In Clark v. Board  of Directors, 
24 Iowa 266 (1868), a school denied admission to a student 
because  she  was  black,  and  “public  sentiment  [was]  op-
posed to the intermingling of white and colored children in
the same schools.”  Id., at 269.  The Iowa Supreme Court 
rejected  that  flimsy  justification,  holding  that  “all  the
youths are equal before the law, and there is no discretion
vested  in  the  board  . . .  or  elsewhere,  to  interfere  with  or 
disturb  that  equality.”    Id.,  at  277.    “For  the  courts  to 
sustain  a  board  of  school  directors  . . .  in  limiting  the 
rights  and  privileges  of  persons  by  reason  of  their  [race],