Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/529bv.pdf
Page Number: 161.0

529US1

Unit: $U34

[09-26-01 08:14:00] PAGES PGT: OPIN

86

PORTUONDO v. AGARD

Ginsburg, J., dissenting

the defendant as guilty, or unless there are speciﬁc reasons
to believe that particular testimony has been altered, the
possibility that the defendant is telling the truth is surely
as good an explanation for the coherence of the defendant’s
testimony as any that involves wrongful tailoring.
I there-
fore disagree with the Court’s assertion, ante, at 68, that
the Court of Appeals’ decision in Agard’s case differs from
our decision in Grifﬁn by “requir[ing] the jury to do what
is practically impossible.” 7
It makes little sense to main-
tain that juries able to avoid drawing adverse inferences
from a defendant’s silence would be unable to avoid thinking
that only a defendant’s opportunity to spin a web of lies could
explain the seamlessness of his testimony.

The Court states in the alternative that if proscribing ge-
neric accusations of tailoring at summation does not require
the jury to do the impossible, then it prohibits prosecutors
from “inviting the jury to do what the jury is perfectly enti-
tled to do.” Ante, at 68. The Court offers no prior au-
thority, however, for the proposition that a jury may con-
stitutionally draw the inference now at issue. The Second
Circuit thought the matter open, and understandably so
in light of Grifﬁn and Carter. But even if juries were per-
mitted to draw the inference in question, it would not follow
that prosecutors could urge juries to draw it. Doyle pro-
hibits prosecutors from urging juries to draw adverse in-
ferences from a defendant’s choice to remain silent after re-

7 In fact, the Court of Appeals’ decision in Agard’s case does not tell
juries to do anything; it merely prevents prosecutors from inviting them
to do something.
I presume that the Court means to say that the Court
of Appeals’ decision prohibits prosecutors from inviting juries to do some-
thing jurors will inevitably do even without invitation.
In either case,
however, the Court’s conﬁdence that all juries will naturally regard the
defendant’s presence at trial as a reason to be suspicious of his testimony
is perplexing in light of the Court’s equal conﬁdence that allowing com-
ment on the same subject is “essential” to the truth-ﬁnding function of the
trial. See ante, at 73.
If all juries think this anyway, the pursuit of truth
will not suffer if they are not told to think it.