Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/20pdf/20-472_0pm1.pdf
Page Number: 32

Cite as:  594 U. S. ____ (2021) 

13 

BARRETT, J., dissenting 

wrong.  In  all  events,  though,  it  is  not  “strange”—in  fact, 
the  Court  deems  this  account  just  as  “plausible”  as  any. 
Ante, at 15. 

Plus, the Court’s reading of subparagraph (B)(i) yields its
own odd results: It means that EPA’s exemption power co-
vers only those refineries in existence at the RFP’s outset. 
This  makes  little  sense  if  one  accepts  HollyFrontier’s  ac-
count of the provision’s “safety valve” purpose.  Ibid. (inter-
nal  quotation  marks  omitted).    If  Congress’  point  was  to 
give  leeway  to  refineries  subject  to  unpredictable  market
fluctuations and ever-increasing compliance burdens, then
it  is  hard  to  see  why  the  provision  would  distinguish  be-
tween old and new refineries facing “the same current eco-
nomic outlook” in a given year.  Brief for Federal Respond-
ent 43, n. 7. 

In the end, the parties’ dueling accounts of purpose un-
derscore  the  wisdom  of  sticking  to  the  statutory  text  and 
structure.  Because, in my view, both clearly favor respond-
ents’ reading, I respectfully dissent. 

—————— 
fewer  refineries  sought  and  received  such  extensions  as  time  went  on. 
By 2014, most small refineries, including petitioners, were meeting their
renewable-fuel  obligations.    The  number  of  exempt  refineries  later 
spiked—with EPA granting 35 petitions for compliance year 2017, and 
31 for 2018—when EPA came to a new view of how to administer sub-
paragraph (B)(i).