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Page Number: 96

74 

FULTON v. PHILADELPHIA 

ALITO, J., concurring in judgment
ALITO, J., concurring in judgment 

here because Philadelphia’s ouster of CSS from foster care
work simply does not further any interest that can properly
be  protected  in  this  case.  As  noted,  CSS’s  policy  has  not 
hindered  any  same-sex  couples  from  becoming  foster  par-
ents, and there is no threat that it will do so in the future. 
CSS’s policy has only one effect: It expresses the idea that 
same-sex couples should not be foster parents because only 
a man and a woman should marry.  Many people today find
this idea not only objectionable but hurtful.  Nevertheless, 
protecting against this form of harm is not an interest that
can justify the abridgment of First Amendment rights.

We  have  covered  this  ground  repeatedly  in  free  speech 
cases.  In an open, pluralistic, self-governing society, the ex-
pression  of  an  idea  cannot  be  suppressed  simply  because 
some  find  it  offensive,  insulting,  or  even  wounding.    See 
Matal v. Tam, 582 U. S. ___, ___–___ (2017) (slip op., at 1–
2)  (“Speech  may  not  be  banned  on  the  ground  that  it  ex-
presses ideas that offend”); Hurley, 515 U. S., at 579 (“[T]he 
law . . . is not free to interfere with speech for no better rea-
son than promoting an approved message or discouraging a
disfavored  one,  however  enlightened  either  purpose  may
strike  the  government”);  Johnson,  491  U. S.,  at  414  (“If
there  is  a  bedrock  principle  underlying  the  First  Amend-
ment,  it  is  that  the  government  may  not  prohibit  the  ex-
pression of an idea simply because society finds the idea it-
self offensive or disagreeable”); FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 
438 U. S. 726, 745 (1978) (opinion of Stevens, J.) (“[T]he fact 
that society may find speech offensive is not a sufficient rea-
son for suppressing it.  Indeed, if it is the speaker’s opinion 
that gives offense, that consequence is a reason for accord-
ing  it  constitutional  protection”);  Street  v.  New  York,  394 
U. S. 576, 592 (1969) (“[T]he public expression of ideas may 
not be prohibited merely because the ideas are themselves
offensive to some of their hearers”); Cf. Coates v. Cincinnati, 
402  U. S.  611,  615  (1971)  (“Our  decisions  establish  that 
mere public intolerance or animosity cannot be the basis for