Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/19pdf/18-5924_n6io.pdf
Page Number: 31

2 

RAMOS v. LOUISIANA 

SOTOMAYOR, J., concurring in part 

agrees with” it.  Alleyne, 570 U. S., at 133 (ALITO, J., dis-
senting).  Rather, Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U. S. 464 (1972), 
was on shaky ground from the start.  That was not because 
of the functionalist analysis of that Court’s plurality: Rea-
sonable minds have disagreed over time—and continue to
disagree—about the best mode of constitutional interpreta-
tion.  That the plurality in Apodaca used different interpre-
tive tools from the majority here is not a reason on its own 
to discard precedent.

What  matters  instead  is  that,  as  the  majority  rightly 
stresses, Apodaca is a universe of one—an opinion uniquely
irreconcilable with not just one, but two, strands of consti-
tutional  precedent  well  established  both  before  and  after 
the decision.  The Court has long recognized that the Sixth
Amendment requires unanimity.  Ante, at 11, 20–22.  Five 
Justices  in  Apodaca  itself  disagreed  with  that  plurality’s
contrary  view  of  the  Sixth  Amendment.    Justice  Powell’s 
theory of dual-track incorporation also fared no better: He
recognized  that  his  argument  on  that  score  came  “late  in
the day.”  Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U. S. 356, 375 (1972) 
(concurring opinion).

Moreover,  “[t]he  force  of  stare  decisis  is  at  its  nadir  in 
cases concerning [criminal] procedur[e] rules that implicate 
fundamental  constitutional  protections.”  Alleyne,  570 
U. S., at 116, n. 5.  And the constitutional protection here
ranks among the most essential: the right to put the State 
to its burden, in a jury trial that comports with the Sixth
Amendment,  before  facing  criminal  punishment.  See 
Codispoti  v.  Pennsylvania,  418  U. S.  506,  515–516  (1974) 
(“The Sixth Amendment represents a deep commitment of 
the Nation to the right of jury trial in serious criminal cases 
as  a  defense  against  arbitrary  law  enforcement”  (internal
quotation marks omitted)).  Where the State’s power to im-
prison those like Ramos rests on an erroneous interpreta-
tion of the jury-trial right, the Court should not hesitate to
reconsider its precedents.