Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/17pdf/16-712_87ad.pdf
Page Number: 3.0

Cite as:  584 U. S. ____ (2018) 

3 

Syllabus 

sembles  inter  partes  review.   The  parties  have  cited  nothing  to  sug-
gest that the Framers were not aware of this common practice when 
writing  the  Patent  Clause,  or  that  they  excluded  the  practice  from 
the  scope  of  the  Clause.      Relatedly,  the  fact  that  American  courts 
have traditionally adjudicated patent validity in this country does not 
mean  that  they  must  forever  do  so.    See  post,  at  8–10.    Historical 
practice is not decisive here because matters governed by the public-
rights doctrine may be assigned to the Legislature, the Executive, or 
the Judiciary.  Ex parte Bakelite Corp., supra, at 451.  That Congress 
chose  the  courts  in  the  past  does  not  foreclose  its  choice  of  the  PTO 
today.  Pp. 12–15. 

(d) Finally, the similarities between the various procedures used 
in  inter  partes  review  and  procedures  typically  used  in  courts  does 
not lead to the conclusion that inter partes review violates Article III.  
This  Court  has  never  adopted  a  “looks  like”  test  to  determine  if  an 
adjudication  has  improperly  occurred  outside  an  Article  III  court.  
See, e.g., Williams v. United States, 289 U. S. 553, 563.  Pp. 15–16. 

(e) This holding is narrow.  The Court addresses only the consti-
tutionality of inter partes review and the precise constitutional chal-
lenges  that  Oil  States  raised  here.    The  decision  should  not  be  mis-
construed as suggesting that patents are not property for purposes of 
the Due Process Clause or the Takings Clause.  Pp. 16–17. 
  2. Inter  partes  review  does  not  violate  the  Seventh  Amendment.  
When  Congress  properly  assigns  a  matter  to  adjudication  in  a  non-
Article  III  tribunal,  “the  Seventh  Amendment  poses  no  independent 
bar to the adjudication of that action by a nonjury factfinder.”  Gran-
financiera, S. A. v. Nordberg, 492 U. S. 33, 52–53.  Thus, the rejection 
of  Oil  States’  Article  III  challenge  also  resolves  its  Seventh  Amend-
ment challenge.  P. 17. 

639 Fed. Appx. 639, affirmed. 

  THOMAS,  J.,  delivered  the  opinion  of  the  Court,  in  which  KENNEDY, 
GINSBURG, BREYER, ALITO, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ., joined.  BREYER, 
J., filed  a  concurring  opinion,  in which  GINSBURG and  SOTOMAYOR, JJ., 
joined.  GORSUCH, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which ROBERTS, C. J., 
joined.