Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/17pdf/16-499_1a7d.pdf
Page Number: 74.0

Cite as:  584 U. S. ____ (2018) 

17 

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting 

who  commit  genocide  are  now  fairly  viewed,  like  pirates, 
as “common enemies of all mankind.”  Id., at 131 (internal 
quotation  marks  omitted).    On  remand,  the  Court  of  Ap­
peals would decide whether the financiers of terrorism are
the same.  The fact that few norms have overcome Sosa’s 
high  hurdle  is  strong  evidence  that  the  carefully  consid­
ered  standard  set  forth  in  that  case  is  generating  exactly
the kind of “judicial caution” the Court stressed as neces­
sary.  See 542 U. S., at 725. 

Second,  the  concurrence  suggests  that  federal  courts
may  lack  jurisdiction  to  entertain  suits  between  aliens
based  solely  on  a  violation  of  the  law  of  nations.    It  con­
tends that ATS suits between aliens fall under neither the 
federal  courts’  diversity  jurisdiction  nor  our  federal  ques­
tion  jurisdiction.  The  Court  was  not  unaware  of  this 
argument  when  it  decided  Sosa.  As  noted,  that  case  in­
volved an ATS suit brought by a citizen of Mexico against
a  citizen  of  Mexico,  and  various  amici  argued  that  the
Court  lacked  Article  III  jurisdiction  over  such  suits.    See 
Brief  for  National  Foreign  Trade  Counsel  et al.  as  Amici 
Curiae  in  Sosa  v.  Alvarez-Machain,  O. T.  2003,  No.  03– 
339, pp. 24–25; see also Brief for Washington Legal Foun­
dation  et al.  as  Amici  Curiae  in  No.  03–339,  pp.  14–21.
The Court nonetheless proceeded to decide the case, which 
it  could  not  have  done  had  it  been  concerned  about  its 
Article  III  power  to  do  so.    See  Arbaugh  v.  Y  &  H  Corp., 
546  U. S.  500,  514  (2006).    That  decision  forecloses  the 
argument the concurrence now makes, as Sosa authorized 
courts  to  “recognize  private  claims  under  federal  common 
law  for  violations  of ”  certain  international  law  norms. 
542  U. S.,  at  732  (emphasis  added);  see  also  id.,  at  729– 
730  (explaining  that,  post-Erie  R.  Co.  v.  Tompkins,  304 
U. S. 64 (1938), there are “limited enclaves in which federal 
courts may derive from substantive law in a common law 
way,”  including  the  law  of  nations,  and  that  “it  would  be 
unreasonable  to  assume  that  the  First  Congress  would