Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/17pdf/16-1466_2b3j.pdf
Page Number: 70

Cite as:  585 U. S. ____ (2018) 

15 

KAGAN, J., dissenting 

anything  like  that—and  for  that  reason,  the  standard 
First  Amendment  rule  is  that  the  “difference  between 
compelled  speech  and  compelled  silence”  is  “without  con-
stitutional  significance.”  Riley  v.  National  Federation  of 
Blind of N. C., Inc., 487 U. S. 781, 796 (1988); see Wooley 
v.  Maynard,  430  U. S.  705,  714  (1977)  (referring  to  “[t]he 
right  to  speak  and  the  right  to  refrain  from  speaking”  as
“complementary  components”  of  the  First  Amendment).
And if anything, the First Amendment scales tip the oppo-
site way when (as here) the government is not compelling
actual  speech,  but  instead  compelling  a  subsidy  that  oth-
ers  will  use  for  expression.    See  Brief  for  Eugene  Volokh 
et al.  as  Amici  Curiae  4–5  (offering  many  examples  to
show  that  the  First  Amendment  “simply  do[es]  not  guar-
antee that one’s hard-earned dollars will never be spent on 
speech  one  disapproves  of ”).3    So  when  a  government
mandates a speech subsidy from a public employee—here, 
we might think of it as levying a tax to support collective
bargaining—it  should  get  at  least  as  much  deference  as 
when  it  restricts  the  employee’s  speech.    As  this  case 
shows,  the  former  may  advance  a  managerial  interest  as 
well  as  the  latter—in  which  case  the  government’s  “freer
hand”  in  dealing  with  its  employees  should  apply  with 
equal (if not greater) force.  NASA, 562 U. S., at 148. 

Third  and  finally,  the  majority  errs  in  thinking  that
under  the  usual  deferential  approach,  the  government 
should  lose  this  case.  The  majority  mainly  argues  here 

—————— 

3 That’s why this Court has blessed the constitutionality of compelled 
speech subsidies in a variety of cases beyond Abood, involving a variety
of  contexts  beyond  labor  relations.   The  list  includes  mandatory  fees
imposed on state bar members (for professional expression); university 
students (for campus events); and fruit processors (for generic advertis-
ing).  See  Keller  v.  State  Bar  of  Cal.,  496  U. S.  1,  14  (1990);  Board  of 
Regents  of  Univ.  of  Wis.  System  v.  Southworth,  529  U. S.  217,  233 
(2000); Glickman v. Wileman Brothers & Elliott, Inc., 521 U. S. 457, 474 
(1997); see also infra, at 20.