Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/22pdf/22-58_i425.pdf
Page Number: 40

4 

UNITED STATES v. TEXAS 

 BARRETT, J., concurring
BARRETT, J., concurring in judgment 

II 
In addition to its reliance on Linda R. S., the Court offers 
several reasons why “federal courts have not traditionally 
entertained lawsuits of this kind.”  Ante, at 6.  I am skepti-
cal that these reasons are rooted in Article III standing doc-
trine. 

Take, for example, the Court’s discussion of Castle Rock 
v. Gonzales, 545 U. S. 748 (2005).  Ante, at 10.  There, we 
reasoned  that  given  “[t]he  deep-rooted  nature  of  law-en-
forcement  discretion,”  a  “true  mandate  of  police  action
would  require  some  stronger  indication”  from  the  legisla-
ture than, for example, the bare use of the word “ ‘shall’ ” in 
a statutory directive.  Castle Rock, 545 U. S., at 761.  The 
Court  today  concludes  that  “no  such  statute  is  present  in 
this case.”  Ante, at 10.  But Castle Rock is not a case about 
Article III standing.  It addressed “whether an individual 
who has obtained a state-law restraining order has a con-
stitutionally  protected  property  interest”  under  the  Four-
teenth  Amendment  “in  having  the  police  enforce  the  re-
straining order when they have probable cause to believe it
has been violated.”  545 U. S., at 750–751.  I see no reason 
to opine on Castle Rock’s application here, especially given
that the parties (correctly) treat Castle Rock as relevant to 
the  merits  of  their  statutory  claims  rather  than  to  the 
States’ standing to bring them.  See Brief for Petitioners 8; 
Brief for Respondents 30.

The Court also invokes “the Executive’s Article II author-
ity to enforce federal law.”  Ante, at 6.  I question whether
the President’s duty to “take Care that the Laws be faith-
fully executed,” Art. II, §3, is relevant to the standing anal-
ysis.  While it is possible that Article II imposes justiciabil-
ity  limits  on  federal  courts,  it  is  not  clear  to  me  why  any
such limit should be expressed through Article III’s defini-
tion of a cognizable injury.  Moreover, the Court works the 
same magic on the Take Care Clause that it does on Castle 
Rock: It takes an issue that entered the case on the merits