Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/17pdf/16-1454_5h26.pdf
Page Number: 47

Cite as:  585 U. S. ____ (2018) 

23 

BREYER, J., dissenting 

Group  Ltd.  v.  Brown  &  Williamson  Tobacco  Corp.,  509 
U. S.  209,  237  (1993)).    This  argument,  unlike  the  price
argument,  has  nothing  to  do  with  the  credit-card  market
being  a  “two-sided  transaction  platform,”  so  if  this  is  the 
basis  for  the  majority’s  holding,  then  nearly  all  of  the
opinion is dicta.  The argument is also wrong.  It is true as 
an economic matter that a firm exercises market power by
restricting  output  in  order  to  raise  prices.    But  the  rele­
vant restriction of output is as compared with a hypothet­
ical  world  in  which  the  restraint  was  not  present  and
prices were lower.  The fact that credit-card use in general
has  grown  over  the  last  decade,  as  the  majority  says,  see 
ante,  at  17–18,  says  nothing  about  whether  such  use 
would have grown more or less without the nondiscrimina­
tion  provisions.  And  because  the  relevant  question  is  a
comparison  between  reality  and  a  hypothetical  state  of 
affairs, to require actual proof of reduced output is often to
require  the  impossible—tantamount  to  saying  that  the
Sherman Act does not apply at all.

In any event, there are features of the credit-card mar­
ket that may tend to limit the usual relationship between 
price  and  output. 
In  particular,  merchants  generally 
spread  the  costs  of  credit-card  acceptance  across  all  their 
customers  (whatever  payment  method  they  may  use), 
while  the  benefits  of  card  use  go  only  to  the  cardholders.
See, e.g., 88 F. Supp. 3d, at 216; Brief for John M. Connor 
et al.  as  Amici  Curiae  34–35.  Thus,  higher  credit-card 
merchant  fees  may  have  only  a  limited  effect  on  credit-
card transaction volume, even as they disrupt the market­
place by extracting anticompetitive profits. 

IV 

A 

For  the  reasons  I  have  stated,  the  Second  Circuit  was 
wrong to lump together the two different services sold, at 
step 1.  But I recognize that the Court of Appeals has not