Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/17pdf/17-459_1o13.pdf
Page Number: 2.0

2 

PEREIRA v. SESSIONS 

Syllabus 

removal hearing, instead ordering him to appear at a time and date
to be set in the future.  More than a year later, in 2007, the Immigra-
tion Court mailed Pereira a more specific notice setting the date and
time for his initial hearing, but the notice was sent to the wrong ad-
dress and was returned as undeliverable.  As a result, Pereira failed 
to appear, and the Immigration Court ordered him removed in absen-
tia. 

In  2013,  Pereira  was  arrested  for  a  minor  motor  vehicle  violation 
and detained by DHS.  The Immigration Court reopened the removal
proceedings  after  Pereira  demonstrated  that  he  never  received  the 
2007  notice.    Pereira  then  applied  for  cancellation  of  removal,  argu-
ing  that  he  had  been  continuously  present  in  the  United  States  for
more than 10 years and that the stop-time rule was not triggered by 
DHS’  initial  2006  notice  because  the  document  lacked  information 
about  the  time  and  date  of  his  removal  hearing.    The  Immigration 
Court disagreed and ordered Pereira removed.  The BIA agreed with 
the  Immigration  Court  that  the  2006  notice  triggered  the  stop-time 
rule, even though it failed to specify the time and date of Pereira’s in-
itial removal hearing.  The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit de-
nied  Pereira’s  petition  for  review  of  the  BIA’s  order.    Applying  the
framework set forth in Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources De-
fense  Council,  Inc.,  467  U. S.  837,  it  held  that  the  stop-time  rule  is
ambiguous  and  that  the  BIA’s  interpretation  of  the  rule  was  a  per-
missible reading of the statute.  

Held:  A  putative  notice  to  appear  that  fails  to  designate  the  specific
time or place of the noncitizen’s removal proceedings is not a “notice
to appear under §1229(a),” and so does not trigger the stop-time rule. 
Pp. 7–20.

(a) The Court need not resort to Chevron deference, for the unam-
biguous statutory text alone is enough to resolve this case.  Under the 
stop-time  rule,  “any  period  of  .  .  .  continuous  physical  presence”  is
“deemed to end . . . when the alien is served a notice to appear under 
section  1229(a).”    8  U.  S.  C.  §1229b(d)(1).    By  expressly  referencing 
§1229(a), the statute specifies where to look to find out what “notice
to appear” means.  Section 1229(a), in turn, clarifies that the type of
notice  “referred  to  as  a  ‘notice  to  appear’  ”  throughout  the  statutory
section  is  a  “written  notice  .  .  .  specifying,”  as  relevant  here,  “[t]he 
time  and  place  at  which  the  [removal]  proceedings  will  be  held.”
§1229(a)(1)(G)(i).    Thus,  to  trigger  the  stop-time  rule,  the  Govern-
ment  must  serve  a  notice  to  appear  that,  at  the  very  least, 
“specif[ies]” the “time and place” of the removal hearing.  

The  Government  and  dissent  point  out  that  the  stop-time  rule  re-
fers  broadly  to  a  notice  to  appear  under  “§1229(a)”—which  includes
paragraph  (1),  as  well  as  paragraphs  (2)  and  (3).    But  that  does  not