Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/21pdf/20-603_o758.pdf
Page Number: 37.0

Cite as:  597 U. S. ____ (2022) 

15 

THOMAS, J., dissenting 

strongest here, for private damages actions were precisely 
“the  type  of  proceedings  from  which  the  Framers  would
have thought the States possessed immunity.”  Id., at 756. 
The Framers would have “thought it an impermissible af-
front to a State’s dignity” to require it “to defend itself in an
adversarial  proceeding  against  a  private  party.”  Id.,  at 
760–761. 

To overcome that presumption, Torres and the Court in-
voke  some  historical  sources  that  generally  discuss  the 
scope and importance of Congress’ war-related powers.  See 
Brief for Petitioner 26–37; ante, at 8–9.  But virtually none 
of  them  addresses  directly  the  central  question  here:
whether the States understood that they had surrendered
their  sovereign  immunity  from  suit  in  their  own  courts
when  delegating  those  powers  to  Congress.  Instead,  the 
founding-era history is largely silent on this question, and 
that “silence is most instructive” in confirming that “no one 
conceived that [state sovereign immunity] would be altered 
by  the  new  Constitution[’s]”  distribution  of  war  powers. 
Alden,  527  U. S.,  at  741.    “[T]he  Founders’  silence  is  best
explained by the simple fact that no one . . . suggested the
document might strip the States of [their] immunity” under 
the war powers.  Ibid. 

More specifically, Torres (but not the Court) points to the 
1783  Treaty  of  Paris.  He  maintains  that  private  actions
would  not  have  been  anomalous  to  the  Founders  because 
they  expected  British  creditors  to  sue  States  under  the 
treaty in order to collect on their debts.  See Brief for Peti-
tioner 27–31.  But it is not likely that the Founders did, in 
fact, expect foreign creditor suits against States; “it is more 
likely  that  they  expected  creditors  to  sue  their  individual 

—————— 
PennEast holding turned on the unique connection between the eminent 
domain power, the ability to initiate condemnation proceedings, and the 
long history of Congress delegating its eminent domain to private par-
ties.  See also infra, at 19–20.