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2 

GARZA v. IDAHO 

Syllabus 

appellate claims.  Because a plea agreement is essentially a contract, 
it  does  not  bar  claims  outside  its  scope.    And,  like  any  contract,  the 
language  of  appeal  waivers  can  vary  widely,  leaving  many  types  of 
claims  unwaived.    A  waived  appellate  claim  may  also  proceed  if  the
prosecution  forfeits  or  waives  the  waiver  or  if  the  Government
breaches the agreement.  Separately, some claims are treated as un-
waiveable.  Most fundamentally, courts agree that defendants retain
the  right  to  challenge  whether  the  waiver  itself  was  knowing  and 
voluntary.

The  filing  of  a  notice  of  appeal  is  “a  purely  ministerial  task  that 
imposes  no  great  burden  on  counsel.”    Flores-Ortega,  528  U. S.,  at 
474.  Filing requirements reflect that appellate claims are likely to be 
ill defined or unknown at the filing stage.  And within the division of 
labor between defendants and their attorneys, the “ultimate authori-
ty”  to  decide  whether  to  “take  an  appeal”  belongs  to  the  accused. 
Jones v. Barnes, 463 U. S. 745, 751.  Pp. 4–7.

(c) Garza’s attorney rendered deficient performance by not filing a 
notice of appeal in light of Garza’s clear requests.  Given the possibil-
ity  that  a  defendant  will  end  up  raising  claims  beyond  an  appeal
waiver’s  scope,  simply  filing  a  notice  of  appeal  does  not  necessarily 
breach a plea agreement.  Thus, counsel’s choice to override Garza’s 
instructions was not a strategic one.  In any event, the bare decision 
whether to appeal is ultimately the defendant’s to make.  Pp. 7–8.

(d) Because  there  is  no  dispute  that  Garza  wished  to  appeal,  a  di-
rect  application  of  Flores-Ortega’s  language  resolves  this  case.  Flo-
res-Ortega reasoned that because a presumption of prejudice applies 
whenever  “ ‘the  accused  is  denied  counsel  at  a  critical  stage,’ ”  it 
makes  greater  sense  to  presume  prejudice  when  counsel’s  deficiency 
forfeits an “appellate proceeding altogether.”  528 U. S., at 483.  Be-
cause  Garza  retained  a  right  to  appeal  at  least  some  issues  despite 
his waivers, he had a right to a proceeding and was denied that pro-
ceeding  altogether  as  a  result  of  counsel’s  deficient  performance.
That he surrendered many claims by signing appeal waivers does not 
change things.  First, the presumption of prejudice does not bend be-
cause a particular defendant seems to have had poor prospects.  See, 
e.g.,  Jae  Lee  v.  United  States,  582  U. S.  ___,  ___.    Second,  while  the 
defendant  in  Flores-Ortega  did  not  sign  an  appeal  waiver,  he  did 
plead  guilty,  which  “reduces  the  scope  of  potentially  appealable  is-
sues” on its own.  528 U. S., at 480.  Pp. 8–10. 

(e) Contrary  to  the  argument  by  Idaho  and  the  U. S. Government, 
as amicus, that Garza never “had a right” to his appeal and thus that
any deficient performance by counsel could not have caused the loss 
of any such appeal, Garza did retain a right to his appeal; he simply
had fewer possible claims than some other appellants.  The Govern-