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UNITED STATES v. PALOMAR-SANTIAGO 

Syllabus 

two requirements are not satisfied just because a noncitizen was re-
moved  for  an offense  that  should  not  have  rendered  him  removable. 
The  substantive  validity  of  a  removal  order  is  quite  distinct  from 
whether the noncitizen exhausted administrative remedies or was de-
prived of the opportunity for judicial review.  P. 5. 

(b) Palomar-Santiago’s counterarguments are unpersuasive.  First, 
he contends that further administrative review of a removal order is 
not “available” for purposes of §1326(a) when a noncitizen will not rec-
ognize a substantive basis to challenge an immigration judge’s conclu-
sion that a prior conviction renders the noncitizen removable.  The im-
migration judge’s error on the merits does not excuse the noncitizen’s 
failure to comply with a mandatory exhaustion requirement if further
administrative review, and then judicial review if necessary, could fix 
that very error.  Ross, 578 U. S. 632, distinguished. 

Second, Palomar-Santiago contends that §1326(d)’s prerequisites do 
not apply when a defendant argues that a removal order was substan-
tively invalid.  There can be no “challenge” to or “collateral attack” on
the validity of substantively flawed orders, he reasons, because such 
orders are invalid when entered.  This position ignores the plain mean-
ing of both “challenge” and “collateral attack.” 

Lastly, Palomar-Santiago invokes the canon of constitutional avoid-
ance.  But this canon “has no application in the absence of statutory 
ambiguity.”  United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers’ Cooperative,
532  U. S.  483,  494.    Here,  the  text  of  §1326(d)  unambiguously  fore-
closes Palomar-Santiago’s interpretation.  Pp. 5–7. 

813 Fed. Appx. 282, reversed and remanded. 

SOTOMAYOR, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.