Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/21pdf/20-1650_3dq3.pdf
Page Number: 12

Cite as:  597 U. S. ____ (2022) 

7 

Opinion of the Court 

back  to  before  the  founding:  “[B]oth  before  and  since  the 
American colonies became a nation, courts in this country 
and in England practiced a policy under which a sentencing 
judge  could  exercise  a  wide  discretion  in  the  sources  and
types of evidence used to assist him in determining the kind 
and extent of punishment to be imposed within limits fixed 
by law.”  Williams, 337 U. S., at 246.  Early state and Eng-
lish courts broadly recognized this discretion.  See, e.g., Rex 
v.  Bunts,  2  T.  R.  683,  100  Eng.  Rep.  368  (K.  B.  1788) 
(“[W]hen any defendant shall be brought up for sentence on
any indictment” the court shall hear evidence from the pros-
ecution and the defense in determining an appropriate sen-
tence); State v. Summers, 98 N. C. 702, 705, 4 S. E. 120, 121 
(1887) (“It was competent for [the trial judge] to hear such 
evidence as he might deem necessary and proper to aid his 
judgment and discretion in determining the punishment to
be imposed”); State v. Reeder, 79 S. C. 139, 141, 60 S. E. 434, 
435 (1908) (rejecting claim that trial court erred in consid-
ering  aggravating  evidence  at  sentencing,  and  explaining 
that “[t]he circuit judge merely permitted himself to be in-
formed as to the character of the accused and the circum-
stances of the crime, so that he might be able to exercise his
discretion intelligently and pronounce a just sentence”).

That unbroken tradition characterizes federal sentencing 
history as well.  “Federal judges exercising sentencing dis-
cretion have always considered a wide variety of aggravat-
ing and mitigating factors relating to the circumstances of 
both the offense and the offender.”  Stith & Cabranes 14. 
Indeed, “[i]t has been uniform and constant in the federal 
judicial tradition for the sentencing judge to consider every 
convicted  person  as  an  individual  and  every  case  as  a 

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“finality of criminal judgments.”  Post, at 2 (opinion of KAVANAUGH, J.).
No one doubts the importance of finality.  Here, however, the Court in-
terprets a statute whose very purpose is to reopen final judgments.