Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/19pdf/18-1086_5ie6.pdf
Page Number: 13.0

Cite as:  590 U. S. ____ (2020) 

11 

Opinion of the Court 

attack a previously decided claim.3  But these principles do
not  preclude  defendants  from  asserting  defenses  to  new
claims,  which  is  precisely  what  Marcel  would  have  us  do
here. 

In  any  event,  judgment-enforcement  and  collateral-at-
tack scenarios are far afield from the circumstances of this 
case.  Lucky  Brand’s  defense  in  the  2011  Action  did  not 
threaten the judgment issued in the 2005 Action or, as Mar-
cel  argues,  “achieve  the  same  practical  result”  that  the 
above-mentioned  principles  seek  to  avoid.  Brief  for  Re-
spondent  31–32.  Indeed,  while  the  judgment  in  the  2005
Action  plainly  prohibited  Lucky  Brand  from  using  “Get
Lucky,” it did not do the same with respect to Lucky Brand’s
continued, standalone use of its own marks containing the
word “Lucky”—the only conduct at issue in the 2011 Action.
Put  simply,  Lucky  Brand’s  defense  to  new  claims  in  the 
2011 Action did not risk impairing the 2005 judgment.

Nor do cases like Beloit v. Morgan, 7 Wall. 619 (1869), aid 
Marcel.  See Brief for Respondent 32–33.  To be sure, Beloit 
held  that  a  defendant  in  a  second  suit  over  bonds  “of  the 
same issue” was precluded from raising a defense it had not 
raised in the first suit.  7 Wall., at 620.  But the Court there 

—————— 

3 One might ask: If any preclusion of defenses (under the claim-preclu-
sion rubric) requires identity of claims in two suits, how could the second 
similar  suit  have  avoided  standard  claim  preclusion  in the  first  place? 
Different contexts may yield different answers.  In a judgment-enforce-
ment context, the answer may be that claim preclusion applies only “to
a final judgment rendered in an action separate from that in which the 
doctrine is asserted.”  18 J. Moore, D. Coquillette, G. Joseph, G. Vairo, &
C. Varner, Federal Practice §131.31[1], p. 131–116 (3d ed. 2019) (empha-
sis  added).    Thus—although  claim  preclusion  does  apply  to  a  later, 
standalone suit seeking relief that could have been obtained in the first—
it  “is  not  applicable  to  . . .  efforts  to  obtain  supplemental  relief  in  the 
original  action,  or  direct  attacks  on  the  judgment.”    Ibid  (footnote  de-
leted).  The upshot is that—even if a court deems the underlying core of
operative  facts  to  be  the  same—a  plaintiff  in  that  circumstance  is  not
precluded from enforcing its rights with respect to continuing wrongful 
conduct.