Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/529bv.pdf
Page Number: 484.0

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Unit: $U46

[10-07-01 17:18:24] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 529 U. S. 362 (2000)

409

Opinion of the Court

such “extension of legal principle” cases should be treated
under § 2254(d)(1). For now it is sufﬁcient to hold that when
a state-court decision unreasonably applies the law of this
Court to the facts of a prisoner’s case, a federal court apply-
ing § 2254(d)(1) may conclude that the state-court decision
falls within that provision’s “unreasonable application”
clause.

B

There remains the task of deﬁning what exactly qualiﬁes
as an “unreasonable application” of law under § 2254(d)(1).
The Fourth Circuit held in Green that a state-court decision
involves an “unreasonable application of . . . clearly estab-
lished Federal law” only if the state court has applied federal
law “in a manner that reasonable jurists would all agree is
unreasonable.”
143 F. 3d, at 870. The placement of this ad-
ditional overlay on the “unreasonable application” clause was
It is difﬁcult to fault the Fourth Circuit for
erroneous.
using this language given the fact that we have employed
nearly identical terminology to describe the related inquiry
undertaken by federal courts in applying the nonretroactiv-
ity rule of Teague. For example, in Lambrix v. Singletary,
520 U. S. 518 (1997), we stated that a new rule is not dictated
by precedent unless it would be “apparent to all reasonable
In Graham v. Col-
jurists.”
lins, 506 U. S. 461 (1993), another nonretroactivity case, we
employed similar language, stating that we could not say
“that all reasonable jurists would have deemed themselves
Id., at 477
compelled to accept Graham’s claim in 1984.”
(emphasis added).

Id., at 528 (emphasis added).

Deﬁning an “unreasonable application” by reference to a
“reasonable jurist,” however, is of little assistance to the
courts that must apply § 2254(d)(1) and, in fact, may be mis-
leading. Stated simply, a federal habeas court making the
“unreasonable application” inquiry should ask whether the
state court’s application of clearly established federal law
was objectively unreasonable. The federal habeas court