Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/20pdf/19-1039_8n5a.pdf
Page Number: 10

Cite as:  594 U. S. ____ (2021) 

5 

Opinion of the Court 

in which respondent New Jersey Conservation Foundation 
holds an interest. 

New Jersey moved to dismiss PennEast’s complaints on 
sovereign immunity grounds.  The District Court denied the 
motion,  holding  that  New  Jersey  was  not  immune  from 
PennEast’s exercise of the Federal Government’s eminent 
domain  power. 
In re  PennEast  Pipeline  Co.,  2018  WL 
6584893,  *12  (D  NJ,  Dec.  14,  2018).    Having  denied  New
Jersey’s motion to dismiss on immunity grounds, the Dis-
trict Court granted PennEast’s requests for a condemnation 
order and preliminary injunctive relief.  Id., at *21, *26. 

The Third Circuit vacated the District Court’s order inso-
far as it awarded PennEast relief with respect to New Jer-
sey’s  property  interests,  and  it  remanded  for  dismissal  of 
any claims against the State.  In re PennEast Pipeline Co., 
938 F. 3d 96, 113 (2019).  Although the court acknowledged
that  the  Federal  Government  can  condemn  state-owned 
property, it reasoned that this power is in fact the product 
of two separate powers: the Federal Government’s eminent
domain power, on the one hand, and its ability to sue non-
consenting States, on the other.  Id., at 104.  While the Fed-
eral Government can delegate its eminent domain power to 
private parties, the court found “reason to doubt” that it can
do the same with respect to its exemption from state sover-
eign immunity.  Id., at 100.  After expressing skepticism as
to  whether  the  Federal  Government  could  ever  delegate
this  exemption,  see  id.,  at  105–111,  the  court  determined 
that it did not need to “definitively resolve that question,” 
because  “nothing  in  the  NGA  indicates  that  Congress  in-
tended to do so,” id., at 111.  In reaching this determination,
the Third Circuit relied on this Court’s precedents holding 
that Congress cannot abrogate state sovereign immunity in 
the absence of an “ ‘unmistakably clear’ ” statement.  Ibid. 
(quoting Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak, 501 U. S. 
775, 786 (1991)).  Concluding that §717f(h) did not clearly
delegate  to  certificate  holders  the  Federal  Government’s