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Page Number: 52.0

14 

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY v. 
REGENTS OF UNIV. OF CAL. 

Opinion of THOMAS, J. 

symmetrical and coherent regulatory scheme,” Gustafson v. 
Alloyd  Co.,  513  U. S.  561,  569  (1995),  these  grants  of  au-
thority must be read alongside the express limits contained 
within the statute.  Basing the Secretary’s ability to com-
pletely overhaul immigration law on these general grants
of  authority  would  eviscerate  that  deliberate  statutory 
scheme by “allow[ing the Secretary of DHS] to grant lawful 
presence  . . .  to  any  illegal  alien  in  the  United States.” 
Texas, 809 F. 3d, at 184.  Not only is this “an untenable po-
sition  in  light  of  the  INA’s  intricate  system,”  ibid.,  but  it 
would also render many of those provisions wholly super-
fluous  due  to  DHS’  authority  to  disregard  them  at  will, 
Duncan v. Walker, 533 U. S. 167, 174 (2001).  And in addi-
tion  to  these  fatal  problems,  adopting  a  broad  interpreta-
tion of these general grants of authority would run afoul of 
the presumption that “Congress . . . does not alter the fun-
damental details of a regulatory scheme in vague terms or
ancillary  provisions.”  Whitman  v.  American  Trucking 
Assns., Inc., 531 U. S. 457, 468 (2001).  And it would also 
conflict with the major questions doctrine, which is based
on the expectation that Congress speaks clearly when it del-
egates the power to make “decisions of vast economic and 
political significance.”  Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA, 
573  U. S.  302,  324  (2014)  (UARG)  (internal  quotation
marks omitted); see also Texas, 787 F. 3d, at 760–761. 

Read together, the detailed statutory provisions govern-
ing temporary and lawful permanent resident status, relief 
from removal, and classwide deferred-action programs lead
ineluctably to the conclusion that DACA is “inconsisten[t]
with  the  design  and  structure  of  the  statute  as  a  whole.” 
University of Tex. Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar, 
570 U. S. 338, 353 (2013).  As the District Court stated in 
the DAPA litigation and as then-Attorney General Sessions
agreed,  “[i]nstead  of  merely  refusing  to  enforce  the  INA’s 
removal laws against an individual, the DHS has enacted a 
wide-reaching  program  that  awards  legal  presence  . . .  to