Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/17pdf/16-111_new2_22p3.pdf
Page Number: 16.0

Cite as:  584 U. S. ____ (2018) 

13 

Opinion of the Court 

state.”  Tr.  23.  A  few  moments  later,  the  commissioner 
restated  the  same  position:  “[I]f  a  businessman  wants  to 
do  business  in  the  state  and  he’s  got  an  issue  with  the—
the law’s impacting his personal belief system, he needs to 
look  at  being  able  to  compromise.”    Id.,  at  30.    Standing
alone,  these  statements  are  susceptible  of  different  inter-
pretations.  On  the  one  hand,  they  might  mean  simply 
that a business cannot refuse to provide services based on
sexual  orientation,  regardless  of  the  proprietor’s  personal 
views.  On the other hand, they might be seen as inappro-
priate  and  dismissive  comments  showing  lack  of  due
consideration  for  Phillips’  free  exercise  rights  and  the
dilemma he faced.  In view of the comments that followed, 
the latter seems the more likely.

On  July  25,  2014,  the  Commission  met  again.    This 
meeting,  too,  was  conducted  in  public  and  on  the  record.
On  this  occasion  another  commissioner  made  specific
reference to the previous meeting’s discussion but said far 
more  to  disparage  Phillips’  beliefs.    The  commissioner 
stated: 

“I  would  also  like  to  reiterate  what  we  said  in  the 
hearing or the last meeting.  Freedom of religion and 
religion has been used to justify all kinds of discrimi-
nation  throughout  history,  whether  it  be  slavery, 
whether  it  be  the  holocaust,  whether  it  be—I  mean, 
we—we can list hundreds of situations where freedom 
of  religion  has  been  used  to  justify  discrimination.
And  to  me  it  is  one  of  the  most  despicable  pieces  of 
rhetoric  that  people  can  use  to—to  use  their  religion
to hurt others.”  Tr. 11–12.  

To  describe  a  man’s  faith  as  “one  of  the  most  despicable 
pieces  of  rhetoric  that  people  can  use”  is  to  disparage  his
religion  in  at  least  two  distinct  ways:  by  describing  it  as 
despicable, and also by characterizing it as merely rhetori-