Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/20pdf/19-1039_8n5a.pdf
Page Number: 3.0

Cite as:  594 U. S. ____ (2021) 

3 

Syllabus 

acquisition of lands in all the States.”  Id., at 371–372.  Kohl involved 
the  condemnation  of  private  land,  but  the  Court  subsequently  made 
clear that “[t]he fact that land is owned by a state is no barrier to its 
condemnation by the United States.”  Oklahoma ex rel. Phillips v. Guy 
F. Atkinson Co., 313 U. S. 508, 534.  Pp. 7–9.

(2) For as long as the eminent domain power has been exercised 
by the United States, it has also been delegated to private parties.  The 
Colonies, the States, and the Federal Government have commonly au-
thorized the private condemnation of land for public works.  And in the 
years following Kohl, the Court confirmed that private delegatees, like
the  United  States,  can  exercise  the  federal  eminent  domain  power 
within the States.  In Luxton v. North River Bridge Co., 153 U. S. 525, 
for  example,  the  Court  rejected  a  landowner’s  claim  that  Congress
could not delegate its authority to condemn property necessary to con-
struct a bridge between New York and New Jersey.  Congress had the 
sovereign power to construct bridges for interstate commerce, and the 
Court confirmed Congress could choose to do so through a corporation. 
Id., at 530.  These powers, the Court noted, could be exercised “with or
without  a  concurrent  act  of  the  State  in  which  the  lands  lie.”    Ibid. 
Early cases also reflected the understanding that state property was 
not  immune  from  the  exercise  of  delegated  federal  eminent  domain 
power.  See Stockton v. Baltimore & N. Y. R. Co., 32 F. 9 (Bradley, Cir. 
J.).  The contrary position—that a federal delegatee could not condemn 
a State’s land without the State’s consent—would give rise to the “di-
lemma of requiring the consent of the state” in virtually every infra-
structure  project  authorized by  the  Federal  Government.  Id.,  at  17. 
The  Court  in  Cherokee  Nation  v.  Southern  Kansas  R.  Co.,  135  U.  S. 
641,  echoed  Stockton’s  explanation  of  the  superior  eminent  domain 
power of the Federal Government when it rejected a challenge to a pri-
vate railroad company’s exercise of the federal eminent domain power 
against  land  owned  by  the  Cherokees.    In  reaching  that  result,  the 
Court acknowledged that “the national government, in the execution 
of its rightful authority, could exercise the power of eminent domain in
the several States,” and the Court labeled as “strange” the notion that 
the Federal Government “could not exercise the same power in a Ter-
ritory occupied by an Indian nation or tribe.”  135 U. S., at 656–657. 
Pp. 9–11.

(3) Section  717f(h)  delegates  to  certificate  holders  the  power  to
condemn any necessary rights-of-way, including land in which a State 
holds an interest.  This delegation of the federal eminent domain au-
thority is consistent with the Nation’s history and this Court’s prece-
dents.  FERC’s issuance to a company of a certificate of public conven-
ience and necessity to build a pipeline carries with it the power—if the 
company cannot acquire the necessary rights-of-way by contract at an