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34  NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSN. v. ALSTON 

Opinion of the Court 

academic  and  graduation  awards.  So,  once  more,  if  the 
NCAA  believes  certain  criteria  are  needed  to  ensure  that 
academic awards are legitimately related to education, it is 
presently free to propose such rules—and individual confer-
ences may adopt even stricter ones.

Third, the NCAA contends that allowing schools to pro-
vide in-kind educational benefits will pose a problem.  This 
relief  focuses  on  allowing  schools  to  offer  scholarships  for
“graduate  degrees”  or  “vocational  school”  and  to  pay  for 
things  like  “computers”  and  “tutoring.”  App.  to  Pet.  for
Cert. in No. 20–512, at 167a–168a, ¶2.  But the NCAA fears 
schools might exploit this authority to give student-athletes
“ ‘luxury cars’ ” “to get to class” and “other unnecessary or
inordinately valuable items” only “nominally” related to ed-
ucation.  Brief for Petitioner in No. 20–512, at 48–49. 

Again, however, this over-reads the injunction in ways we
have seen and need not belabor.  Under the current decree, 
the NCAA is free to forbid in-kind benefits unrelated to a 
student’s actual education; nothing stops it from enforcing 
a “no Lamborghini” rule.  And, again, the district court in-
vited the NCAA to specify and later enforce rules delineat-
ing which benefits it considers legitimately related to edu-
cation.  To  the  extent  the  NCAA  believes  meaningful
ambiguity  really  exists  about  the  scope  of  its  authority—
regarding  internships,  academic  awards,  in-kind  benefits, 
or anything else—it has been free to seek clarification from 
the district court since the court issued its injunction three 
years ago.  The NCAA remains free to do so today.  To date, 
the  NCAA  has  sought  clarification  only  once—about  the 
precise amount at which it can cap academic awards—and
the question was quickly resolved.  Before conjuring hypo-
thetical  concerns  in  this  Court,  we  believe  it  best  for  the 
NCAA to present any practically important question it has
in district court first. 

When  it  comes  to  fashioning  an  antitrust  remedy,  we
acknowledge  that  caution  is  key.    Judges  must  resist  the