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Page Number: 40

18 

CARSON v. MAKIN 

BREYER, J., dissenting 

parents pay for a secular education.  After all, the Estab-
lishment Clause forbids a State from paying for the practice 
of  religion  itself.  And  state  neutrality  in  respect  to  the 
teaching of the practice of religion lies at the heart of this 
Clause.  See, e.g., Locke, 540 U. S., at 721–722 (noting that 
there are “few areas in which a State’s antiestablishment 
interests come more into play” than state funding of minis-
ters who will “lead [their] congregation[s]” in “religious en-
deavor[s]”).    There  is  no  meaningful  difference  between  a 
State’s payment of the salary of a religious minister and the 
salary of someone who will teach the practice of religion to
a person’s children.  At bottom, there is almost no area “as 
central to religious belief as the shaping, through primary 
education, of the next generation’s minds and spirits.”  Zel-
man, 536 U. S., at 725 (BREYER, J., dissenting).  The Estab-
lishment Clause was intended to keep the State out of this 
area. 

* 

* 

* 

Maine wishes to provide children within the State with a 
secular,  public  education.  This  wish  embodies,  in  signifi-
cant part, the constitutional need to avoid spending public
money to support what is essentially the teaching and prac-
tice of religion.  That need is reinforced by the fact that we
are today a Nation of more than 330 million people who as-
cribe to over 100 different religions.  In that context, state 
neutrality with respect to religion is particularly important.
The  Religion  Clauses  give  Maine  the  right  to  honor  that 
neutrality by choosing not to fund religious schools as part 
of its public school tuition program.  I believe the majority 
is wrong to hold the contrary.  And with respect, I dissent.