Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/524bv.pdf
Page Number: 445.0

524US2

Unit: $U92

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400

SWIDLER & BERLIN v. UNITED STATES

Syllabus

that the exception reﬂects a policy judgment that the interest in settling
estates outweighs any posthumous interest in conﬁdentiality; and that,
by analogy, the interest in determining whether a crime has been com-
mitted should trump client conﬁdentiality, particularly since the estate’s
ﬁnancial interests are not at stake—does not square with the case law’s
implicit acceptance of the privilege’s survival and with its treatment of
testamentary disclosure as an “exception” or an implied “waiver.” And
his analogy’s premise is incorrect, since cases have consistently rec-
ognized that the testamentary exception furthers the client’s intent,
whereas there is no reason to suppose the same is true with respect to
grand jury testimony about conﬁdential communications. Knowing
that communications will remain conﬁdential even after death serves a
weighty interest in encouraging a client to communicate fully and
frankly with counsel; posthumous disclosure of such communications
may be as feared as disclosure during the client’s lifetime. The Inde-
pendent Counsel’s suggestion that a posthumous disclosure rule will
chill only clients intent on perjury, not truthful clients or those assert-
ing the Fifth Amendment, incorrectly equates the privilege against
self-incrimination with the privilege here at issue, which serves much
broader purposes. Clients consult attorneys for a wide variety of
reasons, many of which involve conﬁdences that are not admissions of
crime, but nonetheless are matters the clients would not wish divulged.
The suggestion that the proposed exception would have minimal impact
if conﬁned to criminal cases, or to information of substantial importance
in particular criminal cases, is unavailing because there is no case law
holding that the privilege applies differently in criminal and civil cases,
and because a client may not know when he discloses information to his
attorney whether it will later be relevant to a civil or criminal matter,
let alone whether it will be of substantial importance. Balancing ex
post the importance of the information against client interests, even
limited to criminal cases, introduces substantial uncertainty into the
privilege’s application and therefore must be rejected. The argument
that the existence of, e. g., the crime-fraud and testamentary exceptions
to the privilege makes the impact of one more exception marginal fails
because there is little empirical evidence to support it, and because the
established exceptions, unlike the proposed exception, are consistent
with the privilege’s purposes.
Indications in United States v. Nixon,
418 U. S. 683, 710, and Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U. S. 665, that privileges
must be strictly construed as inconsistent with truth seeking are inap-
posite here, since those cases dealt with the creation of privileges not
recognized by the common law, whereas here, the Independent Counsel
seeks to narrow a well-established privilege. Pp. 403–411.

124 F. 3d 230, reversed.