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Page Number: 15

12 

LUCIA v. SEC 

Opinion of the Court 

The  only  issue  left  is  remedial.  For  all  the  reasons  we 
have  given,  and  all  those  Freytag  gave  before,  the  Com-
mission’s ALJs are “Officers of the United States,” subject 
to the Appointments Clause.  And as noted earlier, Judge 
Elliot  heard  and  decided  Lucia’s  case  without  the  kind  of 
appointment  the  Clause  requires.  See  supra,  at  5.  This 
Court has held that “one who makes a timely challenge to 
the constitutional validity of the appointment of an officer
who  adjudicates  his  case”  is  entitled  to  relief.    Ryder  v. 
United States, 515 U. S. 177, 182–183 (1995).  Lucia made 
just  such  a  timely  challenge:  He  contested  the  validity  of 
Judge  Elliot’s  appointment  before  the  Commission,  and 
continued pressing that claim in the Court of Appeals and 
this  Court.    So  what  relief  follows?    This  Court  has  also 
held  that  the  “appropriate”  remedy  for  an  adjudication
tainted  with  an  appointments  violation is  a  new  “hearing 
before a properly appointed” official.  Id., at 183, 188.  And 
we  add  today  one  thing  more.  That  official  cannot  be 
Judge  Elliot,  even  if  he  has  by  now  received  (or  receives
sometime  in  the  future)  a  constitutional  appointment.
Judge  Elliot  has  already  both  heard  Lucia’s  case  and 
issued  an  initial  decision  on  the  merits.  He  cannot  be 
expected  to  consider  the  matter  as  though  he  had  not
adjudicated  it  before.5    To  cure  the  constitutional  error, 

—————— 

5 JUSTICE  BREYER  disagrees  with  our  decision  to  wrest  further  pro-
ceedings  from  Judge  Elliot,  arguing  that  “[f]or  him  to  preside  once
again  would  not  violate  the  structural  purposes  [of]  the  Appointments 
Clause.”  Post,  at  13  (opinion  concurring  in  judgment  in  part  and  
dissenting  in  part).  But  our  Appointments  Clause  remedies  are  de-
signed  not  only  to  advance  those  purposes  directly,  but  also  to  create 
“[ ]incentive[s]  to  raise  Appointments  Clause  challenges.”    Ryder  v. 
United States, 515 U. S. 177, 183 (1995).  We best accomplish that goal
by  providing  a  successful  litigant  with  a  hearing  before  a  new  judge.
That  is  especially  so  because  (as  JUSTICE  BREYER  points  out)  the  old
judge  would  have  no  reason  to  think  he  did  anything  wrong  on  the 
merits, see post, at 13—and so could be expected to reach all the same 
judgments.  But we do not hold that a new officer is required for every