Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/22pdf/21-476_c185.pdf
Page Number: 27

Cite as:  600 U. S. ____ (2023) 

21 

Opinion of the Court 

paragraphs  in  its  free-speech  analysis.    See  Brief  for  Re-
spondents  44–45;  6  F. 4th,  at  1182–1183.)5  The  dissent 
even suggests that our decision today is akin to endorsing a 
“separate but equal” regime that would allow law firms to
refuse  women  admission  into  partnership,  restaurants  to
deny service to Black Americans, or businesses seeking em-
ployees  to  post  something  like  a  “White  Applicants  Only” 
sign.  Post, at 1, 16–21, 26, 28–29, 32, and n. 13, 37.  Pure 
fiction all. 

In some places, the dissent gets so turned around about
the facts that it opens fire on its own position.  For instance: 
While stressing that a Colorado company cannot refuse “the 
full and equal enjoyment of [its] services” based on a cus-
tomer’s protected status, post, at 27, the dissent assures us 
that a company selling creative services “to the public” does 
have a right “to decide what messages to include or not to 
include,” post, at 28.  But if that is true, what are we even 
debating?

Instead of addressing the parties’ stipulations about the
case actually before us, the dissent spends much of its time
adrift  on  a  sea  of  hypotheticals  about  photographers,  sta-
tioners,  and  others,  asking  if  they  too  provide  expressive
services covered by the First Amendment.  Post, at 27–29, 
31–32,  37.  But  those  cases  are  not  this  case.  Doubtless, 
determining what qualifies as expressive activity protected 

—————— 

5 Why does the dissent try to refocus this case around the Communica-
tion Clause?  Perhaps because the moment one acknowledges the parties’ 
stipulations—and  the  fact  Colorado  seeks  to  use  its  Accommodation 
Clause to compel speech in order to ensure conformity to its own views 
on a topic of major significance—the First Amendment implications be-
come  obvious.  As  does  the  fact  that  our  case  is  nothing  like  a  typical 
application of a public accommodations law requiring an ordinary, non-
expressive business to serve all customers or consider all applicants.  Our 
decision today does not concern—much less endorse—anything like the
“ ‘straight couples only’ ” notices the dissent conjures out of thin air.  Post, 
at 26, n. 10.  Nor do the parties discuss anything of the sort in their stip-
ulations.