Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/22pdf/21-1449_d9eh.pdf
Page Number: 32.0

Cite as:  598 U. S. ____ (2023) 

11 

JACKSON, J., dissenting 

The majority’s reason for declining to address this argu-
ment is noteworthy.  It explains that, because the General
Counsel’s  complaint  was  filed  after  the  Washington  Su-
preme  Court  had  affirmed  the  dismissal  of  Glacier’s  com-
plaint on Garmon grounds, “[t]he lower courts have not ad-
dressed  the  significance,  if  any,  of  the  Board’s  complaint 
with respect to Garmon preemption.”  Ante, at 11, n. 3.  And 
since  we  are  “ ‘a  court  of  review,  not  of  first  view,’ ”  ibid. 
(quoting  Cutter  v.  Wilkinson,  544  U. S.  709,  718,  n. 7 
(2005)), the majority declines to “do so in the first instance.” 
Ante, at 11, n. 3. 

This rationale is inconsistent with the broader approach
that the majority takes in this case.  It would be one thing 
if the Court simply noted the filing of the General Counsel’s
complaint and authorized the lower courts to evaluate the 
impact  of  that  complaint  on  the  Garmon  question  in  the 
first instance.  But it goes further: The majority also inserts
itself into the midst of this labor dispute now (despite the
General  Counsel’s  complaint),  proceeding  to  apply  the
Board’s cases to novel and difficult line-drawing questions
and  ultimately  concluding  that  the  strike  conduct  alleged
in Glacier’s complaint is not even arguably protected.

The majority cannot have it both ways.  A concern about 
the Court’s institutional role justifies, at most, vacating the 
judgment below and remanding for the lower court to con-
sider the import of the General Counsel’s complaint.  The 
same  observation  that  compels  the  majority  to  allow  for 
such lower-court consideration—that we are “ ‘a court of re-
view, not of first view,’ ” ante, at 11, n. 3—should have like-
wise led it to decline to intrude into this labor dispute while 
it is pending before the Board. 

For  the  reasons  discussed  above,  I  would  have  vacated 
the Washington Supreme Court’s judgment and remanded 

III