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Page Number: 21.0

6 

VIRGINIA HOUSE OF DELEGATES v. BETHUNE-HILL 

ALITO, J., dissenting 

expressly, what I take from its use of the term “judicially 
cognizable” injury rather than “concrete” injury is that the 
decision  here  is  not  really  based  on  the  Lujan  factors, 
which  set  out  the  “irreducible”  minimum  demanded  by 
Article  III.    504  U. S.,  at  560.    Instead,  the  argument 
seems to be that the House’s injury is insufficient for some 
other, only-hinted-at reason. 
  Both  the  United  States,  appearing  as  an  amicus,  and 
the  Commonwealth  of  Virginia  are  more  explicit.    The 
Solicitor General’s brief argues as follows: 

“In  the  federal  system,  the  Constitution  gives  Con-
gress only ‘legislative Powers,’ U. S. Const. Art. 1, §1, 
and the ‘power to seek judicial relief . . . cannot possi-
bly  be  regarded  as  merely  in  aid  of  the  legislative 
function.’    Buckley  v.  Valeo,  424  U. S.  1,  138  (1976) 
(per  curiam).    As  a  result,  ‘once  Congress  makes  its 
choice  in  enacting  legislation,  its  participation  ends.’  
Bowsher  v.  Synar,  478  U. S.  714,  733  (1986). . . .  The 
same  is  true  here.    A  branch  of  a  state  government 
that  makes  rather  than  enforces  the  law  does  not  it-
self  have  a  cognizable  Article  III  interest  in  the  de-
fense  of  its  laws.”    Brief  for  United  States  as  Amicus 
Curiae 14–15 (emphasis added). 

The Virginia Solicitor General makes a similar argument.  
See Brief for State Appellees 42–44. 
  These  arguments  are  seriously  flawed  because  the 
States  are  under  no  obligation  to  follow  the  Federal  Con-
stitution’s  model  when  it  comes  to  the  separation  of  pow-
ers.  See Whalen v. United States, 445 U. S. 684, 689, n. 4 
(1980); cf. Raines, supra, at 824, n. 8; Arizona State Legis-
lature  v.  Arizona  Independent  Redistricting  Comm’n,  576 
U. S.  ___,  ___,  n. 12  (2015)  (slip  op.,  at  14,  n. 12).    If  one 
House  of  Congress  or  one  or  more  Members  of  Congress 
attempt  to  invoke  the  power  of  a  federal  court,  the  court 
must consider whether this attempt is consistent with the