Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/18pdf/18-281_6j37.pdf
Page Number: 2

2 

VIRGINIA HOUSE OF DELEGATES v. BETHUNE-HILL 

Syllabus 

The  State  itself  had  standing  to  press  this  appeal,  see  Diamond  v. 
Charles, 476 U. S. 54, 62, and could have designated agents to do so, 
Hollingsworth,  570  U. S.,  at 710.    However,  the  State  did  not  desig-
nate  the  House  to  represent  its  interests  here.    Under  Virginia  law, 
authority  and  responsibility for  representing  the  State’s interests in 
civil  litigation  rest  exclusively  with  the  State’s  Attorney  General.  
Virginia state courts permitted the House to intervene to defend leg-
islation  in  Vesilind  v.  Virginia  State  Bd.  of  Elections,  295  Va.  427, 
813 S. E. 2d 739, but the House’s participation in Vesilind occurred in 
the same defensive posture as did the House’s participation in earlier 
phases of this case, when the House did not need to establish stand-
ing.  Moreover, the House pointed to nothing in the Vesilind litigation 
suggesting  that  the  Virginia  courts  understood  the  House  to be  rep-
resenting the interests of the State itself.  Karcher v. May, 484 U. S. 
72,  distinguished.    Throughout  this  litigation,  the  House  has  pur-
ported to represent only its own interests.  The House thus lacks au-
thority  to  displace  Virginia’s  Attorney  General  as  the  State’s  repre-
sentative.  Pp. 4–7. 

(c) The House also lacks standing to pursue this appeal in its own 
right.  This Court has never held that a judicial decision invalidating 
a  state  law  as  unconstitutional  inflicts  a  discrete,  cognizable  injury 
on each organ  of  government  that  participated  in  the  law’s  passage.  
Virginia’s  Constitution  allocates  redistricting  authority  to  the  “Gen-
eral Assembly,” of which the House constitutes only a part.  That fact 
distinguishes this case from Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona In-
dependent  Redistricting  Comm’n,  576  U. S.  ___,  where  Arizona’s 
House  and  Senate—acting  together—had  standing  to  challenge  the 
constitutionality  of  a  referendum  that  gave  redistricting  authority 
exclusively to an independent commission.  The Arizona referendum 
was also assailed on the ground that it permanently deprived the leg-
islative  plaintiffs  of  their  role  in  the  redistricting  process,  while  the 
order  challenged  here  does  not  alter  the  General  Assembly’s  domi-
nant initiating and ongoing redistricting role.  Coleman v. Miller, 307 
U. S.  433,  also  does  not  aid  the  House  here,  where  the  issue  is  the 
constitutionality  of  a  concededly  enacted  redistricting  plan,  not  the 
results of a legislative chamber’s poll or the validity of any counted or 
uncounted  vote.    Redrawing  district  lines  indeed  may  affect  the 
chamber’s  membership,  but  the  House  as  an  institution  has  no  cog-
nizable  interest  in  the  identity  of  its  members.    The  House  has  no 
prerogative  to  select  its  own  members.    It  is  a  representative  body 
composed of members chosen by the people.  Changes in its member-
ship brought about by the voting public thus inflict no cognizable in-
jury  on  the  House.    Sixty-seventh  Minnesota  State  Senate  v.  Beens, 
406 U. S. 187, distinguished.  Nor does a court order causing legisla-