Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/529bv.pdf
Page Number: 614

529US2

Unit: $U52

[09-26-01 10:36:40] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 529 U. S. 513 (2000)

539

Opinion of the Court

The better understanding of Collins’ discussion of the
Ex Post Facto Clause is that it eliminated a doctrinal hitch
that had developed in our cases, which purported to deﬁne
the scope of the Clause along an axis distinguishing be-
tween laws involving “substantial protections” and those
that are merely “procedural.” Both Kring v. Missouri, 107
U. S. 221 (1883), and Thompson v. Utah, 170 U. S. 343
(1898)—the two cases Collins overruled—relied on just
In overruling them, the Court correctly
that distinction.
pointed out, “the prohibition which may not be evaded is
the one deﬁned by the Calder categories.”
497 U. S., at 46.
Accordingly, Collins held that it was a mistake to stray be-
yond Calder’s four categories, not that the fourth category
was itself mistaken.28

VII

Texas next argues that even if the fourth category exists,
it is limited to laws that retrospectively alter the burden
of proof (which Article 38.07 does not do). See also post, at
572 (dissenting opinion).
It comes to this conclusion on the
basis of two pieces of evidence. The ﬁrst is our decision in
Cummings v. Missouri, 4 Wall. 277 (1867). The second con-
cerns Texas’ historical understanding of Fenwick’s case.

28 The dissent would have us dismiss our numerous and repeated invo-
cations of the fourth category, see supra, at 525, because they were merely
“mechanical . . . recitation[s]” in cases that did not depend on the fourth
category. Post, at 568.
Instead, the dissent would glean original mean-
ing from Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U. S. 167 (1925), and Collins v. Youngblood,
497 U. S. 37 (1990). Post, at 567–568. First of all, the dissent is factually
mistaken; Cummings v. Missouri, 4 Wall. 277 (1867), relied on the fourth
category in invalidating the laws at issue there. See infra this page and
540–541. And Hopt v. Territory of Utah, 110 U. S. 574 (1884) (discussed
infra, at 542–547), speciﬁcally distinguished category four. See post, at
570–571 (“Hopt .
. retain[ed] Calder’s fourth category”). Second, as
mentioned above, neither Beazell nor Collins relied on the fourth category,
so it is not apparent why the dissent would place so much emphasis on
those two cases that did not depend on category four.

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