Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/10pdf/10-10.pdf
Page Number: 3.0

Cite as:  564 U. S. ____ (2011) 

3 

Syllabus 

(1)  the  nature  of  “the  private  interest  that  will  be  affected,”  (2)  the
comparative “risk” of an “erroneous deprivation” of that interest with
and without “additional or substitute procedural safeguards,” and (3) 
the  nature  and  magnitude  of  any  countervailing  interest  in  not  pro-
viding “additional or substitute procedural requirement[s].”  Ibid. 

The “private interest that will  be affected” argues strongly for the 
right  to  counsel  here.    That  interest  consists  of  an  indigent  defen-
dant’s loss of personal liberty through imprisonment.  Freedom “from 
bodily restraint” lies  “at  the core of the liberty protected by the Due 
Process Clause.”  Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U. S. 71, 80.  Thus, accu-
rate decisionmaking as to the “ability to pay”—which marks a divid-
ing line between civil and criminal contempt, Hicks, supra, at 635, n. 
7—must  be  assured  because  an  incorrect  decision  can  result  in  a 
wrongful  incarceration.    And  because  ability  to  comply  divides  civil
and  criminal  contempt  proceedings,  an  erroneous  determination 
would also deprive a defendant of the procedural protections a crimi-
nal  proceeding  would  demand.  Questions  about  ability  to  pay  are
likely to arise frequently in child custody cases.  On the other hand, 
due  process  does  not  always  require  the  provision  of  counsel  in  civil
proceedings where incarceration is threatened.  See Gagnon v. Scar-
pelli,  411  U. S.  778.  To  determine  whether  a  right  to  counsel  is  re-
quired here, opposing interests and the probable value of “additional
or  substitute  procedural  safeguards”  must  be  taken  into  account. 
Mathews, supra, at 335. 

Doing so reveals three related considerations that, taken together, 
argue  strongly  against  requiring  counsel  in  every  proceeding  of  the 
present  kind.   First,  the  likely  critical  question  in  these  cases  is  the
defendant’s  ability  to  pay,  which  is  often  closely  related  to  his  indi-
gence  and  relatively  straightforward.    Second,  sometimes,  as  here, 
the  person  opposing  the  defendant  at  the  hearing  is  not  the  govern-
ment represented by counsel but the custodial parent unrepresented
by counsel.  A requirement that the State provide counsel to the non-
custodial  parent  in  these  cases  could  create  an  asymmetry  of  repre-
sentation  that  would  “alter  significantly  the  nature  of  the  proceed-
ing,”  Gagnon,  supra,  at  787,  creating  a  degree  of  formality  or  delay
that  would  unduly  slow  payment  to  those  immediately  in  need  and 
make  the  proceedings  less  fair  overall.  Third,  as  the  Federal  Gov-
ernment  points  out,  an  available  set  of  “substitute  procedural  safe-
guards,”  Mathews,  supra,  at  335,  if  employed  together,  can  signifi-
cantly  reduce the  risk  of  an  erroneous  deprivation  of  liberty.    These 
include (1) notice to the defendant that his “ability to pay” is a critical
issue in the contempt proceeding; (2) the use of a form (or the equiva-
lent)  to  elicit  relevant  financial  information  from  him;  (3)  an  oppor-
tunity at the hearing for him to respond to statements and questions