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Page Number: 9

6 

GUAM v. UNITED STATES 

Opinion of the Court 

  This §113(f ) family of contribution provisions anticipates
a  predicate  CERCLA  liability,  especially  when  properly 
read in “sequenc[e]” as “ ‘integral parts of a whole.’ ”  New 
Prime Inc. v. Oliveira, 586 U. S. ___, ___ (2019) (slip op., at 
4); see also Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Aviall Services, Inc., 
543 U. S. 157, 167 (2004) (looking to “the whole of §113”).
The §113(f )(1) anchor  provision is especially clear on this 
point,  allowing  contribution  “during  or  following  any  civil
action under §[1]06 of this title or under §[1]07 of this title.” 
See also id., at 166 (“The natural meaning of [§113(f )(1)] is 
that contribution may only be sought . . . ‘during or follow-
ing’ a specified civil action”).  And though §§113(f )(2) and 
113(f )(3) are not quite as explicit, their phrasing and con-
text still presume that a CERCLA liability is necessary to
trigger contribution. 
  Section 113(f )(2), for example, explains that a settlement 
by one party “does not discharge any of the other potentially 
liable  persons  unless  its  terms  so  provide.” 
(Emphasis 
added.)  The highlighted phrase is a “natural referent” to 
the text of the anchor provision, United States v. Briggs, 592 
U. S.  ___,  ___  (2020)  (slip  op.,  at  3),  which  creates  a
CERCLA-specific contribution right against “any other per-
son  who  is  liable  or  potentially  liable  under  §[1]07  of
[CERCLA],” §113(f )(1) (emphasis added). 

Section  113(f )(3)(B)—the  provision  at  issue  here—also 
has language that is best “understood only with reference” 
to  the  CERCLA  regime.    Atlantic  Research,  551  U. S.,  at 
135; see also Sturgeon v. Frost, 577 U. S. 424, 438 (2016). 
The  provision’s  final  clause  explains  that  contribution  is 
available “from any person who is not party to a settlement
referred to in [§113(f )(2)].”  As discussed above, §113(f )(2) 
in  turn  mirrors  the  §113(f )(1)  anchor  provision  that  re-
quires a predicate CERCLA liability.  Section 113(f )(3)(B)’s
opening clause separately ties itself to the CERCLA regime
by  permitting  contribution  after  a  party  “has  resolved  its 
liability . . . for some or all of a response action or for some