Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/19pdf/19-402_o75p.pdf
Page Number: 3

Cite as:  589 U. S. ____ (2020) 

3 

THOMAS, J., dissenting 

As I have previously explained, “the judicial power, as orig-
inally understood, requires a court to exercise its independ-
ent  judgment  in  interpreting  and  expounding  upon  the 
laws.”  Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Assn., 575 U. S. 92, 119 
(2015) (opinion concurring in judgment).  The Framers an-
ticipated  that  legal  texts  would  sometimes  be  ambiguous,
and  they  understood  the  judicial  power  “to  include  the 
power  to  resolve  these  ambiguities  over  time”  in  judicial
proceedings.  Ibid.  The Court’s decision in Chevron, how-
ever,  “precludes  judges  from  exercising  that  judgment.” 
Michigan  v.  EPA,  576  U. S.  743,  ___  (2015)  (THOMAS, J., 
concurring)  (slip  op.,  at  2)  (quoting  Perez,  supra,  at  119 
(THOMAS, J., concurring in judgment)). 

Chevron  also  gives  federal  agencies  unconstitutional 
power.  Executive  agencies  enjoy  only  “the  executive
Power.”  Art. II, §1.  But when they receive Chevron defer-
ence,  they  arguably  exercise  “[t]he  judicial  Power  of  the 
United States,” which is vested in the courts.  Chevron can-
not  be  salvaged  by saying  instead  that  agencies  are  “en-
gaged in the ‘formulation of policy.’ ”   Michigan, supra, at 
___ (THOMAS, J., concurring) (slip op., at 3) (quoting Chev-
ron, supra, at 843).  If that is true, then agencies are uncon-
stitutionally exercising “legislative Powers” vested in Con-
gress.  See Art. I, §1.

This  apparent  abdication  by  the  Judiciary  and  usurpa-
tion by the Executive is not a harmless transfer of power.
The  Constitution  carefully  imposes  structural  constraints
on all three branches, and the exercise of power free of those 
accompanying restraints subverts the design of the Consti-
tution’s  ratifiers.    The  Constitution  shielded  judges  from
both  the  “external  threats”  of  politics  and  “the  ‘internal
threat’ of ‘human will’ ” by providing tenure and salary pro-
tections during good behavior and by insulating judges from
the process of writing the laws they are asked to interpret. 
Perez, supra, at 120 (THOMAS, J., concurring in judgment) 
(quoting  P.  Hamburger,  Law  and  Judicial  Duty  507,  508