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Page Number: 2.0

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FINANCIAL OVERSIGHT AND MANAGEMENT BD. FOR 
PUERTO RICO v. AURELIUS INVESTMENT, LLC 
Syllabus 

and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint . . . all 
. . . Officers of the United States . . . .”  Art. II, §2, cl. 2.  The court de-
nied the motions, but the First Circuit reversed.  It held that the Board 
members’  selection  violated  the  Appointments  Clause  but  also  con-
cluded  that  any  Board  actions  taken  prior  to  its  decision  were  valid 
under the “de facto officer” doctrine. 

Held: 

1. The Appointments Clause constrains the appointments power as 
to all officers of the United States, even those who exercise power in or 
in  relation  to  Puerto  Rico.    The  Constitution’s  structure  provides 
strong reason to believe that this is so.  The Appointments Clause re-
flects an allocation of responsibility, between President and Senate, in
cases involving appointment to high federal office.  Concerned about 
possible  manipulation  of  appointments,  the  Founders  both  concen-
trated  the  appointment  power  and  distributed  it,  ensuring  that  pri-
mary responsibility for important nominations would fall on the Pres-
ident while also ensuring that the Senate’s advice and consent power 
would provide a check on that power.  Other, similar structural con-
straints in the Constitution apply to all exercises of federal power, in-
cluding  those  related  to  Article  IV  entities.    Cf.,  e.g.,  Metropolitan 
Washington  Airports  Authority  v.  Citizens  for  Abatement  of  Aircraft 
Noise, Inc., 501 U. S. 252, 270–271 (MWAA).  The objectives advanced
by the Appointments Clause counsel strongly in favor of applying that
Clause to all officers of the United States, even those with powers and 
duties related to Puerto Rico.  Indeed, the Clause’s text firmly indicates
that it applies to the appointment of all “Officers of the United States.”
And history confirms this reading.  Congress’ longstanding practice of 
requiring  the  Senate’s  advice  and  consent  for  territorial  Governors 
with important federal duties supports the inference that Congress ex-
pected the Appointments Clause to apply to at least some officials with
supervisory authority over the Territories.  Pp. 5–9.

2. The  Appointments  Clause  does  not  restrict  the  appointment  or

selection of the Board members.  Pp. 9–21.

(a) The Appointments Clause does not restrict the appointment of 
local  officers  that  Congress  vests  with  primarily  local  duties.    The 
Clause’s language suggests a distinction between federal officers—who
exercise power of the National Government—and nonfederal officers—
who exercise power of some other government.  Pursuant to Article I, 
§8, cl. 17, and Article IV, §3, Congress has long legislated for entities 
that are not States—the District of Columbia and the Territories.  In 
so doing, Congress has both made local law directly and also created 
local government structures, staffed by local officials, who themselves 
have made and enforced local law.  This suggests that when Congress