Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/529bv.pdf
Page Number: 284.0

529US1

Unit: $U38

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Cite as: 529 U. S. 205 (2000)

209

Opinion of the Court

II

The Lanham Act provides for the registration of trade-
marks, which it deﬁnes in § 45 to include “any word, name,
symbol, or device, or any combination thereof [used or in-
tended to be used] to identify and distinguish [a producer’s]
goods . . . from those manufactured or sold by others and to
indicate the source of the goods . . . .” 15 U. S. C. § 1127.
Registration of a mark under § 2 of the Lanham Act, 15
U. S. C. § 1052, enables the owner to sue an infringer under
§ 32, 15 U. S. C. § 1114; it also entitles the owner to a pre-
sumption that its mark is valid, see § 7(b), 15 U. S. C.
§ 1057(b), and ordinarily renders the registered mark incon-
testable after ﬁve years of continuous use, see § 15, 15
U. S. C. § 1065.
In addition to protecting registered marks,
the Lanham Act, in § 43(a), gives a producer a cause of action
for the use by any person of “any word, term, name, symbol,
or device, or any combination thereof . . . which . . . is likely
to cause confusion . . . as to the origin, sponsorship, or ap-
proval of his or her goods . . . .” 15 U. S. C. § 1125(a).
It is
the latter provision that is at issue in this case.

The breadth of the deﬁnition of marks registrable under
§ 2, and of the confusion-producing elements recited as ac-
tionable by § 43(a), has been held to embrace not just word
marks, such as “Nike,” and symbol marks, such as Nike’s
“swoosh” symbol, but also “trade dress”—a category that
originally included only the packaging, or “dressing,” of a
product, but in recent years has been expanded by many
Courts of Appeals to encompass the design of a product.
See, e. g., Ashley Furniture Industries, Inc. v. Sangiacomo
N. A., Ltd., 187 F. 3d 363 (CA4 1999) (bedroom furniture);
Knitwaves, Inc. v. Lollytogs, Ltd., 71 F. 3d 996 (CA2 1995)
(sweaters); Stuart Hall Co., Inc. v. Ampad Corp., 51 F. 3d 780
(CA8 1995) (notebooks). These courts have assumed, often
without discussion, that trade dress constitutes a “symbol”
or “device” for purposes of the relevant sections, and we con-
“Since human beings might use as a ‘symbol’
clude likewise.