Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/19pdf/18-1323_c07d.pdf
Page Number: 24

Cite as:  591 U. S. ____ (2020) 

19 

Opinion of BREYER, J. 

mate conclusion that, “[e]ven if Act 620 could be said to fur-
ther women’s health to some marginal degree, the burdens
it imposes far outweigh any such benefit, and thus the Act 
imposes an unconstitutional undue burden.”  250 F. Supp. 
3d, at 88. 

IV 
The District Court’s Substantial-Obstacle Determination 
The  District  Court  found  that  enforcing  the  admitting-
privileges requirement would “result in a drastic reduction
in the number and geographic distribution of abortion pro-
viders.”  Id., at 87.  In light of demographic, economic, and
other  evidence,  the  court  concluded  that  this  reduction 
would make it impossible for “many women seeking a safe, 
legal  abortion  in  Louisiana  . . .  to  obtain  one”  and  that  it 
would  impose  “substantial  obstacles”  on  those  who  could. 
Id., at 88.  We consider each of these findings in turn. 

A 
Act 620’s Effect on Abortion Providers 
We begin with the District Court’s findings in respect to
Act 620’s impact on abortion providers.  As we have said, 
the court found that the Act would prevent Does 1, 2, and 6
from providing abortions.  And it found that the Act would 
bar  Doe  5  from  working  in  his  Baton  Rouge-based  clinic, 
relegating him to New Orleans.  See supra, at 7–8. 

1 
In  Whole  Woman’s  Health,  we  said  that,  by  presenting
“direct testimony” from doctors who had been unable to se-
cure privileges, and “plausible inferences to be drawn from
the timing of the clinic closures” around the law’s effective
date, the plaintiffs had “satisfied their burden” to establish
that  the  Texas  admitting-privileges  requirement  caused 
the closure of those clinics.  579 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 26). 
We wrote that these inferences were bolstered by the sub-