Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/16pdf/15-577_khlp.pdf
Page Number: 42

16 

TRINITY LUTHERAN CHURCH OF COLUMBIA, INC. v.
COMER 
SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting
 

ments in 1833.  See Cobb 515.6 

The  course  of  this  history  shows  that  those  who  lived 
under the laws and practices that formed religious estab-
lishments  made  a  considered  decision  that  civil  govern-
ment  should  not  fund  ministers  and  their  houses  of  wor-
ship.  To  us,  their  debates  may  seem  abstract  and  this 
history  remote.  That  is  only  because  we  live  in  a  society 
that has long benefited from decisions made in response to 
these  now  centuries-old  arguments,  a  society  that  those
not so fortunate fought hard to build. 

2 
In Locke, this Court expressed an understanding of, and 
respect for, this history.  Locke involved a provision of the 
State  of  Washington’s  Constitution  that,  like  Missouri’s 
nearly  identical  Article  I,  §7,  barred  the  use  of  public 
funds for houses of worship or ministers.  Consistent with 
this denial of funds to ministers, the State’s college schol-
arship  program  did  not  allow  funds  to  be  used  for  devo-
tional theology degrees.  When asked whether this violated 
the  would-be  minister’s  free  exercise  rights,  the  Court 
invoked  the  play  in  the  joints  principle  and  answered  no. 
The Establishment Clause did not require the prohibition
because “the link between government funds and religious
training  [was]  broken  by  the  independent  and  private 
choice  of  [scholarship]  recipients.”    540  U. S.,  at  719;  see 
also  supra,  n.  2.  Nonetheless,  the  denial  did  not  violate 
the Free Exercise Clause because a “historic and substan-
tial  state  interest”  supported  the  constitutional  provision. 

—————— 

6 To this, some might point out that the Scrap Tire Program at issue 
here  does  not  impose  an  assessment  specifically  for  religious  entities 
but  rather  directs  funds  raised  through  a  general  taxation  scheme  to
the  Church.  That  distinction  makes  no  difference.    The  debates  over 
religious  assessment  laws  focused  not  on  the  means  of  those  laws  but
on their ends: the turning over of public funds to religious entities.  See, 
e.g., Locke v. Davey, 540 U. S. 712, 723 (2004).