Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/22pdf/21-1043_7648.pdf
Page Number: 19

Cite as:  600 U. S. ____ (2023) 

1 

JACKSON, J., concurring 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

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No. 21–1043 
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ABITRON AUSTRIA GMBH, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. 
HETRONIC INTERNATIONAL, INC. 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

[June 29, 2023] 

JUSTICE JACKSON, concurring. 
I  agree  with  the  Court  that  15  U. S. C.  §1114(1)(a)  and 
§1125(a)(1) do not apply extraterritorially.  Ante, at 7.  I also 
agree that the “ ‘use in commerce’ of a trademark” that both 
statutory  sections  describe  “provides  the  dividing  line  be-
tween  foreign  and  domestic  applications”  of  these  provi-
sions.  Ante, at 14.  The Court has no need to elaborate today 
upon  what  it  means  to  “use  [a  trademark]  in  commerce,” 
§1127, nor need it discuss how that meaning guides the per-
missible-domestic-application question in a particular case.
I write separately to address those points. 

It is clear beyond cavil that what makes a trademark a 
trademark under the Lanham Act is its source-identifying 
function.  See Jack Daniel’s Properties, Inc. v. VIP Products 
LLC, 599 U. S. ___, ___ (2023) (slip op., at 3); Qualitex Co. 
v.  Jacobson  Products  Co.,  514  U. S.  159,  162–163  (1995). 
That  is,  under  the  Act,  a  trademark  is  “any  word,  name,
symbol, or device, or any combination thereof,” that “a per-
son”  “use[s]”  or  “inten[ds]  to  use”  “to  identify  and  distin-
guish his or her goods . . . from those manufactured or sold 
by others and to indicate the source of the goods.”  §1127;
see also Qualitex Co., 514 U. S., at 162–163 (emphasizing 
centrality  of  this  source-identifying  function).    Sections 
1114(1)(a) and 1125(a)(1) permit a mark owner to sue some-
one who is “us[ing that] mark in commerce” in a way “ ‘likely