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Page Number: 75

14 

ESPINOZA v. MONTANA DEPT. OF REVENUE 

BREYER, J., dissenting 

Although the majority refers in passing to the “play in the
joints”  between  that  which  the  Establishment  Clause  for-
bids and that which the Free Exercise Clause requires, its
holding  leaves  that  doctrine  a  shadow  of  its  former  self. 
See, e.g., Cutter, 544 U. S., at 719; Walz, 397 U. S., at 669. 
Having concluded that there is no obstacle to subsidizing a 
religious education under our Establishment Clause prece-
dents, the majority says little more about Montana’s anti-
establishment  interests  or  the  reasoning  that  underlies
them.  It does not engage with the State’s concern that its 
funds  not  be  used  to  support  religious  teaching.    Instead, 
the  Court  holds  that  it  need  not  consider  how  Montana’s 
funds would be used because, in its view, all distinctions on 
the  basis  of  religion—whether  in  respect  to  playground
grants or devotional teaching—are similarly and presump-
tively unconstitutional.  See ante, at 10. 

Setting aside the problems with the majority’s character-
ization  of  this  case,  supra,  at  7–8,  I  think  the  majority  is 
wrong  to  replace  the  flexible,  context-specific  approach  of 
our precedents with a test of “strict” or “rigorous” scrutiny.
And it is wrong to imply that courts should use that same 
heightened  scrutiny  whenever  a  government  benefit  is  at 
issue.  See ante, at 9, 11–12. 

Experience  has  taught  us  that  “we  can  only  dimly  per-
ceive the boundaries of permissible government activity in
this sensitive area of constitutional adjudication.”  Tilton v. 
Richardson,  403  U. S.  672,  678  (1971)  (plurality  opinion); 
see  also  Schempp,  374  U. S.,  at  306  (opinion  of  Goldberg,
J., joined by Harlan, J.) (there is “no simple and clear meas-
ure which by precise application can readily and invariably 
demark  the  permissible  from  the  impermissible”);  Walz, 
397 U. S., at 669 (“[R]igidity could well defeat the basic pur-
pose of these provisions, which is to insure that no religion 
be sponsored or favored, none commanded, and none inhib-
ited”).  If the Court has found it possible to walk what we 
have  called  the  “ ‘tight  rope’ ”  between  the  two  Religion