Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/20pdf/19-123_g3bi.pdf
Page Number: 79.0

Cite as:  593 U. S. ____ (2021) 

57 

ALITO, J., concurring in judgment
ALITO, J., concurring in judgment 

455 U. S. 252 (payment of taxes); and Gillette, 401 U. S. 437 
(denial of conscientious objector status to person with reli-
gious objection to a particular war).  To get these cases out 
of  the  way,  Smith  claimed  that,  because  they  ultimately
found no free-exercise violations, they merely “purported to 
apply  the  Sherbert  test.”  494  U. S.,  at  883  (emphasis 
added).

This  was  a  curious  observation.    In  all  those  cases,  the 
Court  invoked  the  Sherbert  test  but  found  that  it  did  not 
require relief.  See Hernandez, 490 U. S., at 699; Lee, 455 
U. S., at 257–260; Gillette, 401 U. S., at 462.  Was the Smith 
Court questioning the sincerity of these earlier opinions?  If 
not, then in what sense did those decisions merely “purport” 
to apply Sherbert? 

Finally,  having  swept  all  these  cases  from  the  board, 
Smith  still  faced  at  least  one  big  troublesome  precedent: 
Yoder.  Yoder  not  only  applied  the  Sherbert  test  but  held 
that  the  Free  Exercise  Clause  required  an  exemption  to-
tally  unrelated  to  unemployment  benefits.    406  U. S.,  at 
220–221, 236.  To dispose of Yoder, Smith was forced to in-
vent yet another special category of cases, those involving
“hybrid-rights” claims.  Yoder fell into this category because
it  implicated  both  the  Amish  parents’  free-exercise  claim 
and a parental-rights claim stemming from Pierce v. Society 
of  Sisters,  268  U. S.  510  (1925).    See  Smith,  494  U. S.,  at 
881.  And  in  such  hybrid  cases,  Smith  held,  the  Sherbert 
test survived.  See 494 U. S., at 881–882. 

It is hard to see the justification for this curious doctrine.
The idea seems to be that if two independently insufficient 
constitutional claims join forces they may merge into a sin-
gle  valid  hybrid  claim,  but  surely  the  rule  cannot  be  that
asserting two invalid claims, no matter how weak, is always
enough.  So perhaps the doctrine requires the assignment
of a numerical score to each claim.  If a passing grade is 70
and a party advances a free-speech claim that earns a grade
of 40 and a free-exercise claim that merits a grade of 31, the