Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/558bv.pdf
Page Number: 167.0

6 

BOBBY  v.  VAN  HOOK 

Per Curiam 

Hook  v.  Anderson,  No.  C–1–94–269  (SD  Ohio,  Aug.  7,  2003), 
App. to Pet. for Cert. 123a, 163a.  A panel of the Sixth Cir­
cuit reversed, concluding that Van Hook’s confession was un­
constitutionally  obtained  under  Edwards  v.  Arizona,  451 
U. S. 477 (1981).  See Van Hook v.  Anderson, 444 F. 3d 830, 
832  (2006).  The  en  banc  Sixth  Circuit  vacated  that  ruling, 
holding the confession was proper, and it remanded the case 
to  the  panel  to  consider  Van  Hook’s  other  claims.  See  Van 
Hook v.  Anderson, 488 F. 3d 411, 428 (2007).  Van Hook peti­
tioned for a writ of certiorari, which we denied.  Van Hook 
v.  Hudson, 552 U. S. 1023 (2007). 

On  remand,  the  panel  granted  Van  Hook  habeas  relief 
again,  but  on  different  grounds,  holding  that  his  attorneys 
were  ineffective  during  the  penalty  phase  because  they  did 
not  adequately  investigate  and  present  mitigating  evidence, 
neglected  to  secure  an  independent  mental-health  expert, 
and  requested  and  relied  on  a  presentence  investigation  re­
port  without  objecting  to  damaging  evidence  it  contained. 
See  Van  Hook  v.  Anderson,  535  F.  3d  458,  461  (2008).  The 
en  banc  Sixth  Circuit  again  vacated  the  panel’s  opinion,  but 
rather  than  hearing  the  case  a  second  time  it  remanded  for 
the panel to revise its opinion.  See Van Hook v.  Anderson, 
560  F.  3d  523,  524  (2009).  In  its  third  opinion,  the  panel— 
relying on guidelines published by the American Bar Associ­
ation (ABA) in 2003—granted relief to Van Hook on the sole 
ground  that  his  lawyers  performed  deﬁciently  in  investigat­
ing  and  presenting  mitigating  evidence.  See  id.,  at  525. 
The  State  petitioned  for  a  writ  of  certiorari.  We  grant  the 
petition and reverse. 

II 

Because  Van  Hook  ﬁled  his  federal  habeas  petition  before 
April 24, 1996, the provisions of the Antiterrorism and Effec­
tive  Death  Penalty  Act  of  1996  do  not  apply.  See  Lindh  v. 
Murphy,  521  U. S.  320,  327  (1997).  Even  without  the  Act’s 
added layer of deference to state-court judgments, we cannot