Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/529bv.pdf
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Unit: $U58

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Cite as: 529 U. S. 753 (2000)

759

Opinion of the Court

But here Ohler runs into the position taken by the Court
in a similar, but not identical, situation in Luce v. United
States, 469 U. S. 38 (1984), that “[a]ny possible harm ﬂowing
from a district court’s in limine ruling permitting impeach-
ment by a prior conviction is wholly speculative.”
Id., at 41.
Only when the Government exercises its option to elicit the
testimony is an appellate court confronted with a case where,
under the normal rules of trial, the defendant can claim the
denial of a substantial right if in fact the district court’s
in limine ruling proved to be erroneous.
In our view, there
is nothing “unfair,” as Ohler puts it, about putting her to her
choice in accordance with the normal rules of trial.

Finally, Ohler argues that applying this rule to her situa-
tion unconstitutionally burdens her right to testify. She re-
lies on Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U. S. 44 (1987), where we held
that a prohibition of hypnotically refreshed testimony in-
terfered with the defendant’s right to testify. But here the
rule in question does not prevent Ohler from taking the
stand and presenting any admissible testimony which she
chooses. She is of course subject to cross-examination and
In
subject to impeachment by the use of a prior conviction.
a sense, the use of these tactics by the Government may
deter a defendant from taking the stand. But, as we said in
McGautha v. California, 402 U. S. 183, 215 (1971):

“It has long been held that a defendant who takes the
stand in his own behalf cannot then claim the privilege
against cross-examination on matters reasonably related
to the subject matter of his direct examination. . . . It is
not thought overly harsh in such situations to require
that the determination whether to waive the privilege
take into account the matters which may be brought out
It is also generally recognized
on cross-examination.
that a defendant who takes the stand in his own behalf
may be impeached by proof of prior convictions or the
like. . . . Again, it is not thought inconsistent with the
enlightened administration of criminal justice to require