Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/20pdf/21a24_8759.pdf
Page Number: 4.0

Cite as:  594 U. S. ____ (2021) 

1 

BREYER, J., dissenting 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

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No. 21A24 
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WHOLE WOMAN’S HEALTH ET AL. v. AUSTIN REEVE 
JACKSON, JUDGE, ET AL. 

ON APPLICATION FOR INJUNCTIVE RELIEF 

[September 1, 2021]

 JUSTICE  BREYER,  with  whom  JUSTICE  SOTOMAYOR  and 

JUSTICE KAGAN join, dissenting. 

The  procedural  posture  of  this  case  leads  a  majority  of 
this  Court  to  deny  the  applicants’  request  for  provisional 
relief.  In my view, however, we should grant that request.
I  agree  with  THE  CHIEF  JUSTICE,  JUSTICE  SOTOMAYOR, 
and JUSTICE KAGAN.  Texas’s law delegates to private indi-
viduals  the  power  to  prevent  a  woman  from  obtaining  an 
abortion during the first stage of pregnancy.  But a woman 
has a federal constitutional right to obtain an abortion dur-
ing  that  first  stage.  Planned  Parenthood  of  Southeastern 
Pa.  v.  Casey,  505  U. S.  833,  846  (1992);  Roe  v.  Wade,  410 
U. S. 113, 164 (1973).  And a “State cannot delegate . . . a 
veto power [over the right to obtain an abortion] which the 
state itself is absolutely and totally prohibited from exercis-
ing  during  the  first  trimester  of  pregnancy.”  Planned 
Parenthood  of  Central  Mo.  v.  Danforth,  428  U. S.  52,  69 
(1976) (internal quotation marks omitted).  Indeed, we have 
made  clear  that  “since  the  State  cannot  regulate  or  pro-
scribe abortion during the first stage . . . the State cannot 
delegate authority to any particular person . . . to prevent
abortion  during  that  same  period.”  Ibid.  The  applicants
persuasively argue that Texas’s law does precisely that.

The  very  bringing  into  effect  of  Texas’s  law  may  well
threaten the applicants with imminent and serious harm.
One of the clinic applicants has stated on its website that