Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/524bv.pdf
Page Number: 427.0

524US2

Unit: $U91

[09-06-00 17:16:26] PAGES PGT: OPIN

382 WISCONSIN DEPT. OF CORRECTIONS v. SCHACHT

Syllabus

Second, the argument emphasizes the “jurisdictional” nature of the
jurisdic-
difference, since neither the law permitting supplemental
tion, nor any other law, gives the federal court the power to decide a
claim barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Third, the argument looks
to removal based upon “diversity jurisdiction” for analogical authority
leading to its conclusion that the “jurisdictional” problem is so serious
that the presence of even one Eleventh Amendment barred claim de-
stroys removal jurisdiction with respect to all claims, i. e., the “case.”
The analogy is unconvincing, for this case differs signiﬁcantly from di-
versity cases with respect to original jurisdiction. The presence of a
nondiverse party automatically destroys such jurisdiction: No party
need assert the defect. No party can waive the defect, or consent to
jurisdiction. No court can ignore the defect; rather a court, notic-
ing the defect, must raise the matter on its own.
In contrast, the Elev-
enth Amendment does not automatically destroy original jurisdiction.
It grants the State a legal power to assert a sovereign immunity de-
fense. The State can waive the defense, and a court may ignore the
defect unless it is raised by the State. Since a federal court would have
original jurisdiction to hear this case had Schacht originally ﬁled it
there, the defendants may remove the case from state to federal courts.
Other conditions—e. g., the fact that removal jurisdiction is determined
as of the time a case was ﬁled in state court, which was before the
defendants ﬁled their answer in federal court—further undermine the
analogy. Pp. 386–391.

(b) Schacht’s one further argument—that, after the State asserted its
Eleventh Amendment defense, the federal court lacked subject-matter
jurisdiction over the entire case and thus had to remand it to state court
under § 1447(c)—is rejected. An ordinary reading of § 1447(c) indicates
that it refers to an instance in which a federal court “lacks subject mat-
ter jurisdiction” over a “case,” not simply over one claim within the
case. Moreover, § 1447(c)’s objective—to specify the procedures that a
federal court must follow in remanding a case after removal—is irrele-
vant to the question presented here. Pp. 391–393.

116 F. 3d 1151, vacated and remanded.

Breyer, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Kennedy, J.,

ﬁled a concurring opinion, post, p. 393.

Richard Briles Moriarty, Assistant Attorney General of
Wisconsin, argued the cause for petitioners. With him on
the briefs was James E. Doyle, Attorney General.