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Page Number: 50.0

18 

SEC v. JARKESY 

GORSUCH, J., concurring 

treatment as a public right, for example, the Court in Gran-
financieria read Atlas Roofing as having “left the term ‘pub-
lic rights’ undefined.”  492 U. S., at 51, n. 8.  And since then 
this Court has, in one case after another, “adhere[d]” only 
to  Atlas  Roofing’s  “general  teaching”  that  Congress  may 
constitutionally  adopt  “new  statut[es] ”  assigning  matters
that indeed qualify as “public rights . . . to an administra-
tive  agency.”  492  U. S.,  at  51  (internal  quotation  marks 
omitted); see, e.g., Stern, 564 U. S., at 489–490; Oil States, 
584 U. S., at 345. 

Yet, even after the Court moved away from Atlas Roofing, 
our public rights jurisprudence remained muddled.  Since 
then, the Court has suggested that public rights might in-
clude  those  “involving  statutory  rights  that  are  integral
parts of a public regulatory scheme.”  Granfinanciera, 492 
U. S., at 55, n. 10.  We have changed course and tried our 
hand at a five-factor balancing test.  See Stern, 564 U. S., 
at 491 (describing Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. 
Schor,  478  U. S.  833  (1986)).    We  have  replaced  that  test 
with  one  that  considers  “at  least  seven  different”  factors. 
564 U. S., at 504 (Scalia, J., concurring).  And at one time 
or another, these factors have included the consideration of 
“the  concerns  that  drove  Congress  to  depart  from  the  re-
quirements of Article III.”  Schor, 478 U. S., at 851.  So, for 
example, we have asked whether insistence on “the institu-
tional integrity of the Judicial Branch” would “unduly con-
strict Congress’ ability to take needed and innovative action
pursuant to its Article I powers.”  Ibid. 

Today, the Court does much to return us to a more tradi-
tional understanding of public rights.  Adhering to Granfi-
nancieria,  the  Court  rejects  the  government’s  overbroad 
reading  of  Atlas  Roofing  and  recognizes  that  the  kind  of
atextual and ahistorical (not to mention confusing) tests it 
inspired do little more than ask policy questions the Con-
stitution settled long ago.  Yes, a limited category of public
rights  were  originally  and  even  long  before  understood  to