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2  FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N v. TED CRUZ FOR SENATE 

KAGAN, J., dissenting 

to  his  campaign.  The  theory  of  the  legislation  is  easy  to 
grasp.  Political  contributions  that  will  line  a  candidate’s 
own pockets, given after his election to office, pose a special 
danger of corruption.  The candidate has a more-than-usual 
interest in obtaining the money (to replenish his personal 
finances), and is now in a position to give something in re-
turn.  The  donors  well  understand  his  situation,  and  are 
eager  to  take  advantage  of  it.  In  short,  everyone’s  incen-
tives are stacked to enhance the risk of dirty dealing.  At 
the very least—even if an illicit exchange does not occur—
the public will predictably perceive corruption in post-elec-
tion payments directly enriching an officeholder.  Congress
enacted Section 304 to protect against those harms. 

In striking down the law today, the Court greenlights all 
the  sordid  bargains  Congress  thought  right  to  stop.    The 
theory  of  the  decision  (unlike  of  the  statute)  is  hard  to 
fathom.  The  majority  says  that  Section  304  violates  the
candidate’s First Amendment rights by interfering with his 
ability  to  “self-fund”  his  campaign.    Ante,  at  12.  But  the 
candidate can in fact self-fund all he likes.  The law impedes
only  his  ability  to  use  other  people’s  money  to  finance  his
campaign—much  as  standard  (and  permissible)  contribu-
tion  limits  do.  And  even  that  third-party  restriction  is  a 
modest one, applying only to post- (not pre-) election dona-
tions  to  repay  sizable  (not  small)  loans.    So  the  majority
overstates  the  First  Amendment  burdens  Section  304  im-
poses.  At the same time, the majority understates the anti-
corruption  values  Section  304  serves.    In  the  majority’s
view, there is “scant” danger here of quid pro quo corrup-
tion; loan repayments produce only the “sort of ‘corruption’ ” 
in which contributors wield “greater influence” over candi-
dates than they otherwise would.  Ante, at 16–17, 21.  As-
sume away all objections to that distinction, which even the 
majority concedes is “vague,” ante, at 16; for better or worse, 
it underlies this Court’s recent campaign finance decisions.