Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/14pdf/14-556_3204.pdf
Page Number: 3.0

Cite as:  576 U. S. ____ (2015) 

3 

Syllabus 

volving opposite-sex partners, as did Baker v. Nelson, 409 U. S. 810, a 
one-line summary decision issued in 1972, holding that the exclusion 
of same-sex couples from marriage did not present a substantial fed-
eral question.  But other, more instructive precedents have expressed 
broader  principles.  See,  e.g.,  Lawrence,  supra,  at  574.    In  assessing
whether  the  force  and  rationale  of  its  cases  apply  to  same-sex  cou-
ples, the Court must respect the basic reasons why the right to marry 
has  been  long  protected.  See,  e.g.,  Eisenstadt,  supra,  at  453–454. 
This  analysis  compels  the  conclusion  that  same-sex  couples  may  ex-
ercise the right to marry.  Pp. 10–12.

(2) Four  principles  and  traditions  demonstrate  that  the  rea-
sons  marriage  is  fundamental  under  the  Constitution  apply  with
equal force to same-sex couples.  The first premise of this Court’s rel-
evant precedents is that the right to personal choice regarding mar-
riage is inherent in the concept of individual autonomy.  This abiding 
connection  between  marriage  and  liberty  is  why  Loving  invalidated 
interracial  marriage  bans  under  the  Due  Process  Clause.    See  388 
U. S., at 12.  Decisions about marriage are among the most intimate
that  an  individual  can  make.    See  Lawrence,  supra,  at  574.    This  is 
true for all persons, whatever their sexual orientation. 

A second principle in this Court’s jurisprudence is that the right to
marry is fundamental because it supports a two-person union unlike 
any  other  in  its  importance  to  the  committed  individuals.    The  inti-
mate  association  protected  by  this  right  was  central  to  Griswold  v. 
Connecticut,  which  held  the  Constitution  protects  the  right  of  mar-
ried couples to use contraception, 381 U. S., at 485, and was acknowl-
edged in Turner, supra, at 95.  Same-sex couples have the same right
as opposite-sex couples to enjoy intimate association, a right extend-
ing  beyond  mere  freedom  from  laws  making  same-sex  intimacy  a
criminal offense.  See Lawrence, supra, at 567. 

A third basis for protecting the right to marry is that it safeguards
children and families and thus draws meaning from related rights of 
childrearing, procreation, and education.  See, e.g., Pierce v. Society of 
Sisters,  268  U. S.  510.    Without  the  recognition,  stability,  and  pre-
dictability  marriage  offers,  children  suffer  the  stigma  of  knowing 
their  families  are  somehow  lesser.    They  also  suffer  the  significant
material  costs  of  being  raised  by  unmarried  parents,  relegated  to  a 
more difficult and uncertain family life.  The marriage laws at issue
thus  harm  and  humiliate  the  children  of  same-sex  couples.    See 
Windsor, supra, at ___.  This does not mean that the right to marry is
less meaningful for those who do not or cannot have children.  Prece-
dent  protects  the  right  of  a  married  couple  not  to  procreate,  so  the 
right to marry cannot be conditioned on the capacity or commitment 
to procreate.