Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/529bv.pdf
Page Number: 173.0

529US1

Unit: $U35

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UNITED STATES v. LOCKE

Opinion of the Court

Although the United States declined to intervene when
the case was in the District Court, the governments of 13
ocean-going nations expressed concerns through a diplomatic
note directed to the United States.
Intertanko lodged a
copy of the note with the District Court. The concerned
governments represented that “legislation by the State of
Washington on tanker personnel, equipment and operations
would cause inconsistency between the regulatory regime of
the US Government and that of an individual State of the
US. Differing regimes in different parts of the US would
create uncertainty and confusion. This would also set an
unwelcome precedent for other Federally administered coun-
tries.” Note Verbale from the Royal Danish Embassy to
the U. S. Dept. of State 1 (June 14, 1996).

The District Court rejected all of Intertanko’s arguments
and upheld the state regulations.
International Assn. of
Independent Tanker Owners (Intertanko) v. Lowry, 947
F. Supp. 1484 (WD Wash. 1996). The appeal followed, and
at that stage the United States intervened on Intertanko’s
behalf, contending that the District Court’s ruling failed to
give sufﬁcient weight to the substantial foreign affairs inter-
ests of the Federal Government. The United States Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the State could
enforce its laws, save the one requiring the vessels to install
certain navigation and towing equipment. 148 F. 3d 1053
(1998). The Court of Appeals reasoned that this require-
ment, found in WAC § 317–21–265, was “virtually identical
to” requirements declared pre-empted in Ray v. Atlantic
Richﬁeld Co., 435 U. S. 151 (1978). 148 F. 3d, at 1066. Over
Judge Graber’s dissent, the Court of Appeals denied peti-
tions for rehearing en banc.
159 F. 3d 1220 (1998). Judge
Graber, although unwilling, without further analysis, to con-
clude that the panel reached the wrong result, argued that
the opinion was “incorrect in two exceptionally important
respects: (1) The opinion places too much weight on two
clauses in Title I of OPA 90 [The Oil Pollution Act of 1990]