Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/14pdf/13-1041_0861.pdf
Page Number: 36.0

12 

PEREZ v. MORTGAGE BANKERS ASSN. 

THOMAS, J., concurring in judgment 

purely executive powers of government must be within the
full  control  of  the  President.    The  Constitution  prescribes 
that they all are”).

Given these structural distinctions between the branches, 
it  is  no  surprise  that  judicial  interpretations  are  defini- 
tive  in  cases  and  controversies  before  the  courts.    Courts 
act  as  “an  intermediate  body  between  the  people  and  the 
legislature,  in  order,  among  other  things,  to  keep  the 
latter within the limits assigned to their authority.”  Fed-
eralist No. 78, at 467 (A. Hamilton).  The Legislature and
Executive  may  be  swayed  by  popular  sentiment  to  aban-
don the strictures of the Constitution or other rules of law. 
But the Judiciary, insulated from both internal and exter-
nal sources of bias, is duty bound to exercise independent 
judgment in applying the law. 

Interpreting agency regulations calls for that exercise of
independent  judgment.    Substantive  regulations  have  the 
force  and  effect  of  law.  See,  e.g.,  United  States  v.  Mead 
Corp.,  533  U. S.  218,  231–232  (2001).4   Agencies  and  pri-

—————— 

4 These cases also raise constitutional questions about the distinction
in  administrative  law  between  “substantive”  (or  “legislative”)  and 
interpretative rules.  The United States Court of Appeals for the D. C.
Circuit  has  defined  a  legislative  rule  as  “[a]n  agency  action  that  pur-
ports to impose legally binding obligations or prohibitions on regulated
parties”  and  an  interpretative  rule  as  “[a]n  agency  action  that  merely
interprets  a  prior  statute  or  regulation,  and  does  not  itself  purport  to
impose  new  obligations  or  prohibitions  or  requirements  on  regulated 
parties.”  National  Mining  Assn.  v.  McCarthy,  758  F. 3d  243,  251–252 
(2014).  And  our  precedents  make  clear  that  administrative  agencies 
must  exercise  only  executive  power  in  promulgating  these  rules. 
Arlington  v.  FCC,  569  U. S.  ___,  ___,  n. 4  (2013)  (slip  op.,  at  13,  n. 4). 
But  while  it  is  easy  to  see  the  promulgation  of  interpretative  rules  as
an  “executive”  function—executive  officials  necessarily  interpret  the 
laws  they  enforce—it  is  difficult  to  see  what  authority  the  President 
has  “to  impose  legally  binding  obligations  or  prohibitions  on  regulated
parties.”  That definition suggests something much closer to the legisla-
tive  power,  which  our  Constitution  does  not  permit  the  Executive  to 
exercise  in  this  manner.    Because  these  troubling  questions  are  not