Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/14pdf/14-556_3204.pdf
Page Number: 26.0

Cite as:  576 U. S. ____ (2015) 

21 

Opinion of the Court 

ture, see supra, at 6, invidious sex-based classifications in 
marriage  remained  common  through  the  mid-20th  cen-
tury.  See App. to Brief for Appellant in Reed v. Reed, O. T. 
1971, No. 70–4, pp. 69–88 (an extensive reference to laws
extant  as  of  1971  treating  women  as  unequal  to  men  in
marriage).  These  classifications  denied  the  equal  dignity
of  men  and  women.  One  State’s  law,  for  example,  pro- 
vided in 1971 that “the husband is the head of the family 
and  the  wife  is  subject  to  him;  her  legal  civil  existence  is
merged in the husband, except so far as the law recognizes
her  separately,  either  for  her  own  protection,  or  for  her 
benefit.”  Ga. Code Ann. §53–501 (1935).  Responding to a 
new  awareness,  the  Court  invoked  equal  protection  prin-
ciples to invalidate laws imposing sex-based inequality on 
marriage.  See,  e.g.,  Kirchberg  v.  Feenstra,  450  U. S.  455 
(1981);  Wengler  v.  Druggists  Mut.  Ins.  Co.,  446  U. S.  142 
(1980);  Califano  v.  Westcott,  443  U. S.  76  (1979);  Orr  v. 
Orr, 440 U. S. 268 (1979); Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U. S. 
199  (1977)  (plurality  opinion);  Weinberger  v.  Wiesenfeld, 
420  U. S.  636  (1975);  Frontiero  v.  Richardson,  411  U. S. 
677  (1973).  Like  Loving  and  Zablocki,  these  precedents
show  the  Equal  Protection  Clause  can  help  to  identify
and  correct  inequalities  in  the  institution  of  marriage,
vindicating  precepts  of  liberty  and  equality  under  the 
Constitution. 

Other  cases  confirm  this  relation  between  liberty  and
equality.  In  M.  L.  B.  v.  S. L. J.,  the  Court  invalidated 
under  due  process  and  equal  protection  principles  a  stat-
ute  requiring  indigent  mothers  to  pay  a  fee  in  order  to
appeal  the  termination  of  their  parental  rights.    See  519 
U. S.,  at  119–124.  In  Eisenstadt  v.  Baird,  the  Court  in-
voked  both  principles  to  invalidate  a  prohibition  on  the 
distribution  of  contraceptives  to  unmarried  persons  but 
not  married  persons.    See  405  U. S.,  at  446–454.    And  in 
Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, the Court invali-
dated  under  both  principles  a  law  that  allowed  steriliza-