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2 

ESPINOZA v. MONTANA DEPT. OF REVENUE 

THOMAS, J., concurring 

nonreligion.  As this Court stated in its first case applying 
the  Establishment  Clause  to  the  States,  the  government
cannot “pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions,
or  prefer  one  religion  over  another.”    Everson  v.  Board  of 
Ed.  of  Ewing,  330  U. S.  1,  15  (1947);  see  also  post,  at  3 
(BREYER, J., dissenting).  This “equality principle,” the the-
ory  goes,  prohibits  the  government  from  expressing  any 
preference for religion—or even permitting any signs of re-
ligion  in  the  governmental  realm.    Thus,  when  a  plaintiff 
brings a free exercise claim, the government may defend its
law, as Montana did here, on the ground that the law’s re-
strictions are required to prevent it from “establishing” re-
ligion.

This  understanding  of  the  Establishment  Clause  is  un-
moored from the original meaning of the First Amendment. 
As I have explained in previous cases, at the founding, the
Clause  served  only  to  “protec[t]  States,  and  by  extension 
their citizens, from the imposition of an established religion 
by the Federal Government.”  Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 
536 U. S. 639, 678 (2002) (THOMAS, J., concurring) (empha-
sis added); see also, e.g., Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 
U. S. 565, 604–607 (2014) (THOMAS, J., concurring in part
and  concurring  in  judgment);  Elk  Grove  Unified  School 
Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U. S. 1, 49–50 (2004) (THOMAS, J., con-
curring in judgment).  Under this view, the Clause resists 
incorporation against the States.  See Town of Greece, 572 
U. S., at 604 (opinion of THOMAS, J.).

There  is  mixed  historical  evidence  concerning  whether 
the Establishment Clause was understood as an individual 
right at the time of the Fourteenth Amendment’s ratifica-
tion.  Id., at 607–608.  Even assuming that the Clause cre-
ates  a  right  and  that  such  a  right  could  be  incorporated, 
however, it would only protect against an “establishment”
of religion as understood at the founding, i.e., “ ‘coercion of 
religious orthodoxy and of financial support by force of law 
and threat of penalty.’ ”  Id., at 608 (quoting Lee v. Weisman,