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Page Number: 21.0

16 

CORNER POST, INC. v. BOARD OF GOVERNORS, FRS 

Opinion of the Court 

absence of any such indication in the text of the limitations 
period.”  Ibid. (internal quotation marks omitted). 

B 
Turning to §2401(a)’s text, the Board draws significance
from  this  sentence:  “The  action of  any  person  under  legal 
disability or beyond the seas at the time the claim accrues 
may be commenced within three years after the disability
ceases.”  This language, the Board stresses, “necessarily re-
flects Congress’s understanding that a claim can ‘accrue[]’ 
for purposes of Section 2401(a)” even when a person is un-
able to sue.  Brief for Respondent 24.  True enough.  It is a 
mystery,  however,  why  the  Board  finds  this  helpful.    The 
tolling exception applies when the plaintiff had a complete
and present cause of action after he was injured but his le-
gal disability or absence from the country “prevent[ed] him 
from bringing a timely suit.”  Goewey v. United States, 222 
Ct.  Cl.  104,  113,  612  F. 2d  539,  544  (1979)  (per curiam).
What  matters  for  accrual  is  when  the  plaintiff  had  “the 
right to apply to the court for relief,” not whether some ex-
ternal  impediment  prevented  her  from  doing  so.    Wood 
§122a, at 684 (emphasis added).  The exception, therefore, 
sheds no light on when the clock started ticking for Corner 
Post—but it does show Congress’s concern for plaintiffs who 
might lose a cause of action through no fault of their own. 

C 

The Board also leans on our precedent—namely, Reading 
Co. v. Koons, 271 U. S. 58 (1926), and Crown Coat Front Co. 
v. United States, 386 U. S. 503 (1967)—to support its unu-
sual  interpretation  of  “accrual.”   See  also  post,  at  6–9 
(JACKSON,  J.,  dissenting).  Again,  the  Board  comes  up 
empty.

In Koons, we interpreted the statute of limitations under
the Federal Employers’ Liability Act, which barred actions