Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/21pdf/19-1392_6j37.pdf/19-1392_6j37.pdf
Page Number: 208.0

Cite as:  597 U. S. ____ (2022) 

61 

BREYER, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ., dissenting
Appendix to opinion of BREYER, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ. 

APPENDIX 
This Appendix analyzes in full each of the 28 cases the
majority  says  support  today’s  decision  to  overrule  Roe  v. 
Wade,  410  U. S.  113  (1973),  and  Planned  Parenthood  of 
Southeastern  Pa.  v.  Casey,  505  U. S.  833  (1992).    As  ex-
plained herein, the Court in each case relied on traditional 
stare decisis factors in overruling. 

A great many of the overrulings the majority cites involve 
a prior precedent that had been rendered out of step with 
or effectively abrogated by contemporary case law in light 
of intervening developments  in the broader doctrine.  See 
Ramos v. Louisiana, 590 U. S. ___, ___ (2020) (slip op., at 
22) (holding  the  Sixth  Amendment  requires  a  unanimous
jury verdict in state prosecutions for serious offenses, and 
overruling  Apodaca  v.  Oregon,  406  U. S.  404  (1972),  be-
cause “in the years since Apodaca, this Court ha[d] spoken
inconsistently about its meaning” and had undercut its va-
lidity  “on  at  least  eight  occasions”);  Ring  v.  Arizona,  536 
U. S. 584, 608–609 (2002) (recognizing a Sixth Amendment 
right to have a jury find the aggravating factors necessary
to impose a death sentence and, in so doing, rejecting Wal-
ton v. Arizona, 497 U. S. 639 (1990), as overtaken by and 
irreconcilable with Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U. S. 466 
(2000));  Agostini  v.  Felton,  521  U. S.  203,  235–236  (1997) 
(considering the Establishment Clause’s constraint on gov-
ernment aid to religious instruction, and overruling Aguilar 
v.  Felton,  473  U. S.  402  (1985),  in  light  of  several  related 
doctrinal  developments  that  had  so  undermined  Aguilar
and  the  assumption  on  which  it  rested  as  to  render  it  no 
longer good law); Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U. S. 79, 93–96 
(1986) (recognizing that a defendant may make a prima fa-
cie showing of purposeful racial discrimination in selection
of  a  jury  venire  by  relying  solely  on  the  facts  in  his  case, 
and, based on subsequent developments in equal protection 
law,  rejecting  part  of  Swain  v.  Alabama,  380  U. S.  202 
(1965), which had imposed a more demanding evidentiary