Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/12pdf/11-1425_cb8e.pdf
Page Number: 11.0

Cite as:  569 U. S. ____ (2013) 

7 

Opinion of the Court 

(1931).3 

Our  decision  in  Schmerber  applied  this  totality  of  the 
circumstances  approach.    In  that  case,  the  petitioner  had
suffered injuries in an automobile accident and was taken 
to  the  hospital.  384  U. S.,  at  758.    While  he  was  there 
receiving treatment, a police officer arrested the petitioner
for  driving  while  under  the  influence  of  alcohol  and  or­
dered  a  blood  test  over  his  objection.    Id.,  at  758–759. 
After  explaining  that  the  warrant  requirement  applied 
generally  to  searches  that  intrude  into  the  human  body,
we  concluded  that  the  warrantless  blood  test  “in  the  pre­
sent case” was nonetheless permissible because the officer
“might  reasonably  have  believed  that  he  was  confronted 
with an emergency, in which the delay necessary to obtain 
a  warrant,  under  the  circumstances,  threatened  ‘the  de­
struction  of  evidence.’ ”    Id.,  at  770  (quoting  Preston  v. 
United States, 376 U. S. 364, 367 (1964)). 

In support of that conclusion, we observed that evidence
could have been lost because “the percentage of alcohol in
the  blood  begins  to  diminish  shortly  after  drinking  stops,
as  the  body  functions  to  eliminate  it  from  the  system.” 
384 U. S., at 770.  We added that “[p]articularly in a case
such  as  this,  where  time  had  to  be  taken  to  bring  the 
accused  to  a  hospital  and  to  investigate  the  scene  of  the 
accident,  there  was  no  time  to  seek  out  a  magistrate  and 
secure  a  warrant.”  Id.,  at  770–771.  “Given  these  special 
facts,”  we  found  that  it  was  appropriate  for  the  police  to 
—————— 

3 We  have  recognized  a  limited  class  of  traditional  exceptions  to  the 
warrant  requirement  that  apply  categorically  and  thus  do  not  require 
an  assessment  of  whether  the  policy  justifications  underlying  the  ex- 
ception,  which  may  include  exigency-based  considerations,  are  im­
plicated  in  a  particular  case.    See,  e.g.,  California  v.  Acevedo,  500 
U. S.  565,  569–570  (1991)  (automobile  exception);  United  States  v. 
Robinson, 414 U. S. 218, 224–235 (1973) (searches of a person incident
to a lawful arrest).  By contrast, the general exigency exception, which 
asks whether an emergency existed that justified a warrantless search, 
naturally calls for a case-specific inquiry.