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Page Number: 49

12 

MASTERPIECE CAKESHOP, LTD. v. COLORADO 
CIVIL RIGHTS COMM’N
 
Opinion of THOMAS, J. 

one  of  the  asserted  justifications  for  Colorado’s  law.    Ac­
cording  to  the  individual  respondents,  Colorado  can  com­
pel Phillips’ speech to prevent him from “ ‘denigrat[ing] the 
dignity’ ” of same-sex couples, “ ‘assert[ing] [their] inferior- 
ity,’ ” and subjecting them to “ ‘humiliation, frustration, and 
embarrassment.’ ”    Brief  for  Respondents  Craig  et al.  39 
(quoting  J.  E.  B.  v.  Alabama  ex  rel.  T.  B.,  511  U. S.  127, 
142  (1994);  Heart  of  Atlanta  Motel,  Inc.  v.  United  States, 
379  U. S.  241,  292  (1964)  (Goldberg,  J.,  concurring)).
These  justifications  are  completely  foreign  to  our  free-
speech jurisprudence.

States  cannot  punish  protected  speech  because  some
group  finds  it  offensive,  hurtful,  stigmatic,  unreasonable, 
or undignified.  “If there is a bedrock principle underlying
the  First  Amendment,  it  is  that  the  government  may  not 
prohibit  the  expression  of  an  idea  simply  because  society 
finds  the  idea  itself  offensive  or  disagreeable.”    Johnson, 
supra,  at  414.    A  contrary  rule  would  allow  the  govern­
ment to stamp out virtually any speech at will.  See Morse 
v.  Frederick,  551  U. S.  393,  409  (2007)  (“After  all,  much
political and religious speech might be perceived as offen­
sive to some”).  As the Court reiterates today, “it is not . . .
the role of the State or its officials to prescribe what shall
be  offensive.”  Ante,  at  16.    “ ‘Indeed,  if  it  is  the  speaker’s 
opinion that gives offense, that consequence is a reason for 
according it constitutional protection.’ ”  Hustler Magazine, 
Inc.  v.  Falwell,  485  U. S.  46,  55  (1988);  accord,  Johnson, 
supra,  at  408–409. 
If  the  only  reason  a  public-
accommodations  law  regulates  speech  is  “to  produce  a 
society  free  of  . . .  biases”  against  the  protected  groups, 
that purpose is “decidedly fatal” to the law’s constitution­
ality,  “for  it  amounts  to  nothing  less  than  a  proposal  to 
limit  speech  in  the  service  of  orthodox  expression.”    Hur-
ley,  515  U. S.,  at  578–579;  see  also  United  States  v.  Play-
boy  Entertainment  Group,  Inc.,  529  U. S.  803,  813  (2000) 
(“Where  the  designed  benefit  of  a  content-based  speech