Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/17pdf/17-965_h315.pdf
Page Number: 90.0

26 

TRUMP v. HAWAII 

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting 

U. S.,  at  ___  (KAGAN,  J.,  concurring)  (slip  op.,  at  1)
(“[S]tate  actors  cannot  show  hostility  to  religious  views; 
rather, they must give those views ‘neutral and respectful
consideration’ ”).  Those  principles  should  apply  equally 
here.  In  both  instances,  the  question  is  whether  a  gov­
ernment actor exhibited tolerance and neutrality in reach­
ing  a  decision  that  affects  individuals’  fundamental  reli­
gious  freedom.  But  unlike  in  Masterpiece,  where  a  state 
civil  rights  commission  was  found  to  have  acted  without
“the  neutrality  that  the  Free  Exercise  Clause  requires,” 
id.,  at  ___  (slip  op.,  at  17),  the  government  actors  in  this 
case  will  not  be  held  accountable  for  breaching  the  First 
Amendment’s  guarantee  of  religious  neutrality  and  toler­
ance.  Unlike  in  Masterpiece,  where  the  majority  consid­
ered the state commissioners’ statements about religion to 
be  persuasive  evidence  of  unconstitutional  government 
action,  id.,  at  ___–___  (slip  op.,  at  12–14),  the  majority 
here  completely  sets  aside  the  President’s  charged  state­
ments  about  Muslims  as  irrelevant.    That  holding  erodes 
the  foundational  principles  of  religious  tolerance  that  the 
Court elsewhere has so emphatically protected, and it tells
members  of  minority  religions  in  our  country  “ ‘that  they
are  outsiders,  not  full  members  of  the  political  commu­
nity.’ ”  Santa Fe, 530 U. S., at 309. 

Today’s holding is all the more troubling given the stark 
parallels  between  the  reasoning  of  this  case  and  that  of 
Korematsu  v.  United  States,  323  U. S.  214  (1944).  See 
Brief  for  Japanese  American  Citizens  League  as  Amicus 
In  Korematsu,  the  Court  gave  “a  pass  [to]  an
Curiae. 
odious,  gravely  injurious  racial  classification”  authorized
by  an  executive  order.  Adarand  Constructors,  Inc.  v. 
Peña, 515 U. S. 200, 275 (1995) (GINSBURG, J., dissenting).
As  here,  the  Government  invoked  an  ill-defined  national-
security  threat  to  justify  an  exclusionary  policy  of  sweep­
ing proportion.  See Brief for Japanese American Citizens 
League  as  Amicus  Curiae  12–14.  As  here,  the  exclusion