Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/529bv.pdf
Page Number: 510.0

529US2

Unit: $U47

[10-04-01 09:34:47] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 529 U. S. 420 (2000)

435

Opinion of the Court

conduct went undetected in state court. We see no indica-
tion that Congress by this language intended to remove the
distinction between a prisoner who is at fault and one who
is not.

The Commonwealth argues a reading of “failed to de-
velop” premised on fault empties § 2254(e)(2)(A)(ii) of its
meaning. To treat the prisoner’s lack of diligence in state
court as a prerequisite for application of § 2254(e)(2), the
Commonwealth contends, renders a nullity of the statute’s
own diligence provision requiring the prisoner to show “a
factual predicate [of his claim] could not have been pre-
viously discovered through the exercise of due diligence.”
§ 2254(e)(2)(A)(ii). We disagree.

The Commonwealth misconceives the inquiry mandated
by the opening clause of § 2254(e)(2). The question is not
whether the facts could have been discovered but instead
whether the prisoner was diligent in his efforts. The pur-
pose of the fault component of “failed” is to ensure the pris-
oner undertakes his own diligent search for evidence. Dili-
gence for purposes of the opening clause depends upon
whether the prisoner made a reasonable attempt, in light of
the information available at the time, to investigate and pur-
sue claims in state court; it does not depend, as the Common-
wealth would have it, upon whether those efforts could have
been successful. Though lack of diligence will not bar an
evidentiary hearing if efforts to discover the facts would
have been in vain, see § 2254(e)(2)(A)(ii), and there is a con-
vincing claim of innocence, see § 2254(e)(2)(B), only a prisoner
who has neglected his rights in state court need satisfy these
conditions. The statute’s later reference to diligence per-
tains to cases in which the facts could not have been dis-
In this impor-
covered, whether there was diligence or not.
tant respect § 2254(e)(2)(A)(ii) bears a close resemblance to
(e)(2)(A)(i), which applies to a new rule that was not available
at the time of the earlier proceedings. Cf. Gutierrez v. Ada,
528 U. S. 250, 255 (2000) (“[W]ords and people are known by