Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/08pdf/07-588.pdf/07-588.pdf
Page Number: 3

Cite as:  556 U. S. ____ (2009) 

3 

Syllabus 

(b) Considering §1326(b)’s text, and comparing it with the text and
statutory  factors  applicable  to  parallel  Clean  Water  Act  provisions, 
prompts the conclusion that it was well within the bounds of reason-
able interpretation for the EPA to conclude that cost-benefit analysis
is not categorically forbidden.  In the Phase II rules the EPA sought 
only to avoid extreme disparities between costs and benefits, limiting
variances  from  Phase  II’s  “national  performance  standards”  to  cir-
cumstances where the costs are “significantly greater than the bene-
fits”  of  compliance.    40  CFR  §125.94(a)(5)(ii).    In  defining  “national
performance  standards”  the  EPA  assumed  the  application  of  tech-
nologies  whose  benefits  approach  those  estimated  for  closed-cycle
cooling systems at a fraction of the cost.  That the EPA has for over 
thirty years interpreted §1326(b) to permit a comparison of costs and 
benefits, while not conclusive, also tends to show that its interpreta-
tion  is  reasonable  and  hence  a  legitimate  exercise  of  its  discretion.
Even  respondents  and  the  Second  Circuit  ultimately  recognize  that
some comparison of costs and benefits is permitted.  The Second Cir-
cuit held that §1326(b) mandates only those technologies whose costs 
can  be  reasonably  borne  by  the  industry.    But  whether  it  is  reason-
able  to  bear  a  particular  cost  can  very  well  depend  on  the  resulting 
benefits.  Likewise,  respondents  concede  that  the  EPA  need  not  re-
quire  that  industry  spend  billions  to  save  one  more  fish.    This  con-
cedes  the  principle,  and  there  is  no  statutory  basis  for  limiting  the 
comparison of costs and benefits to situations where the benefits are 
de minimis rather than significantly disproportionate.  Pp. 9–16. 

475 F. 3d 83, reversed and remanded. 

SCALIA,  J.,  delivered  the  opinion  of  the  Court,  in  which  ROBERTS, 
C. J.,  and  KENNEDY, THOMAS,  and  ALITO, JJ.,  joined.    BREYER, J.,  filed 
an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part.  STEVENS, J., filed 
a dissenting opinion, in which SOUTER and GINSBURG, JJ., joined.