Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/14pdf/13-352_c0n2.pdf
Page Number: 33.0

Cite as:  575 U. S. ____ (2015) 

7 

THOMAS, J., dissenting 

not  truly  be  understood  to  involve  an  application  of  res
judicata  or  collateral  estoppel—for,  after  all,  administra-
tive  agencies  are  not  courts—but  rather  a  “species  of 
equitable  estoppel.”    Cooper,  supra,  at  242;  see  also  2  A. 
Freeman,  Law  of  Judgments  §633,  p.  1335  (5th  ed.  rev.
1925) (explaining that “the immunity from judicial review”
for  certain  administrative  decisions  was  “not  based  upon 
the doctrine of res judicata nor . . . governed by exactly the 
same  rules”).    As  one  commentator  put  it,  res  judicata
could  “not  apply,  in  any  strict  or  technical  sense,  to  the 
decisions  of  administrative  agencies.”    Cooper,  supra,  at 
241. 

This  history  undercuts  any  suggestion  in  Utah  Con-
struction  that  administrative  preclusion  was  widely  ac-
cepted  at  common  law.    Accordingly,  at  least  for  statutes 
passed  before  Astoria,  I  would  reject  the  presumption  of 
administrative preclusion.3 

II 
In light of this history, I cannot agree with the majority’s
decision to apply administrative preclusion in the context
of  the  Lanham  Act.4  To  start,  the  Lanham  Act  was  en- 

—————— 

3 I  have  no  occasion  to  consider  whether  the  discussion  in  Astoria, 
Elliott,  or  Utah  Construction  could  be  understood  to  create  a  back-
ground principle in favor of administrative preclusion that would apply, 
as  a  matter  of  statutory  interpretation,  to  statutes  passed  after  those
decisions. 

4 The majority insists that we must apply the presumption of admin-
istrative  preclusion  because  the  Court  has  “repeatedly  endorsed  Utah 
Construction” and the parties do not challenge “its historical accuracy.” 
Ante,  at  12,  n.  2.  But  regardless  of  whether  the  Court  has  endorsed 
Utah Construction’s dictum, the Court has never applied the presump-
tion  of  administrative  preclusion  to  the  Lanham  Act.    Even  if  the 
Court’s description of the presumption were not dictum, no principle of 
stare  decisis  requires  us  to  extend  a  tool  of  statutory  interpretation
from  one  statute  to  another  without  first  considering  whether  it  is 
appropriate for that statute.  Cf. CBOCS West, Inc. v. Humphries, 553 
U. S.  442,  469–470  (2008)  (THOMAS,  J.,  dissenting)  (“[S]tare  decisis,