Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/22pdf/22-49_d18e.pdf
Page Number: 2.0

2 

LORA v. UNITED STATES 

Syllabus 

(a) Sections 924(c) and 924(j) criminalize the use, carrying, and pos-
session of firearms in connection with certain crimes.  Subsection (c) 
lays  out  a  set  of  offenses  and  their  corresponding  penalties.   It  also 
mandates  that  a  “term  of  imprisonment  imposed  on  a  person  under 
this  subsection”  must  run  consecutively  with  other  sentences. 
§924(c)(1)(D)(ii).  Subsection (j) likewise lays out offense elements and 
corresponding penalties.  Unlike subsection (c), subsection (j) contains 
no consecutive-sentence mandate.  Pp. 3–4.

(b) Subsection (c)’s consecutive-sentence mandate applies only to the
terms  of  imprisonment  prescribed  within  subsection  (c).  A  sentence 
imposed under subsection (j) does not qualify.  Subsection (j) is located
outside subsection (c) and does not call for imposing any sentence from
subsection (c).  And while subsection (j) references subsection (c), that 
reference is limited to offense elements, not penalties.   Pp. 4–5.

(c) Congress  did  not,  as  the  Government  maintains,  incorporate 
§924(c) as a whole into §924(j) such that a §924(j) defendant faces sub-
section (j)’s penalties plus subsection (c)’s penalties.  Subsection (j) no-
where  mentions—let  alone  incorporates—subsection  (c)’s  penalties.
Moreover, as subsections (c) and (j) are written, a sentencing court can-
not always obey both sets of penalties.  To avert potential conflict be-
tween subsections (c) and (j), the Government points to another provi-
sion, §924(c)(5), as a model.  But assuming without deciding whether
§924(c)(5) operates as the Government says, Congress did not imple-
ment that design in subsection (j).  Equally unavailing is the Govern-
ment’s argument that, under double jeopardy principles, a defendant 
cannot receive both subsection (c) and subsection (j) sentences for the 
same conduct.  That view of double jeopardy can easily be squared with 
the conclusion that subsection (j) neither incorporates subsection (c)’s 
penalties nor triggers the consecutive-sentence mandate.  Pp. 5–8.

(d) It is not “implausible,” as the Government asserts, for Congress 
to have imposed the harsh consecutive-sentence mandate under sub-
section  (c)  but  not  subsection  (j),  which  covers  more  serious  offense 
conduct.  That result is consistent with the statute’s design.  Unlike 
subsection (c), subsection (j) generally eschews mandatory penalties in 
favor of sentencing flexibility.  Of a piece, subsection (j) permits flexi-
bility to choose between concurrent and consecutive sentences.  Con-
gress chose a different approach to punishment in subsection (j) than 
in subsection (c), and the Court must implement the design Congress 
chose.  Pp. 8–10. 

Vacated and remanded. 

JACKSON, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.