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Page Number: 9.0

6 

BOECHLER v. COMMISSIONER 

Opinion of the Court 

such petition is filed during the 90-day period”).  These pro-
visions  accentuate  the  lack  of  comparable  clarity  in
§6330(d)(1). 

B 
The  Commissioner’s  counterarguments  fall  short.  To 
begin with, the Commissioner repeats his refrain that “such
matter”  refers  to  the  entire  first  clause  of  the  sentence, 
thereby  conditioning  the  Tax  Court’s  jurisdiction  on  the 
deadline.  We agree that this is a plausible interpretation 
of  the  statute.    Some  might  even  think  it  better  than 
Boechler’s.  But  in  this  context,  better  is  not  enough.    To 
satisfy the clear-statement rule, the jurisdictional condition
must be just that: clear.  And as we have already explained,
the Commissioner’s interpretation is not.

What of the fact that the jurisdictional grant and filing 
deadline appear in the same provision, even the same sen-
tence?  This  does  not  render  the  Commissioner’s  reading 
clear either.  A requirement “does not become jurisdictional
simply because it is placed in a section of a statute that also 
contains  jurisdictional  provisions.”  Auburn,  568  U. S.,  at 
155.  Consequently, this is not the first time we have parsed 
a single statutory sentence to distinguish between its juris-
dictional  and  nonjurisdictional  elements.    See  Weinberger 
v. Salfi, 422 U. S. 749, 763–764 (1975).  Rather than prox-
imity, the important feature is the one that is missing here: 
a  clear  tie  between  the  deadline  and  the  jurisdictional 
grant.

The Commissioner contends that a neighboring provision
clarifies the jurisdictional effect of the filing deadline.  Sec-
tion  6330(e)(1)  provides  that  “if  a  [collection  due  process] 
hearing is requested . . . the levy actions which are the sub-
ject of the requested hearing . . . shall be suspended for the
period during which such hearing, and appeals therein, are 
pending.”  To enforce that suspension, a “proper court, in-
cluding the Tax Court,” may “enjoi[n]” a “levy or proceeding