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8 

NESTLE USA, INC. v. DOE 

SOTOMAYOR, J., concurring
Opinion of SOTOMAYOR, J. 

U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 6).  Respect for the separation of 
powers is hardly served by refusing a legislatively assigned 
task. 

II 

Applying  the  wrong  standard  at  Sosa’s  second  step, 
JUSTICE THOMAS reaches the wrong answer.  He announces 
that, except for “the three historical torts likely on the mind 
of the First Congress,” “there always is a sound reason” for 
courts  to  refuse  to  recognize  actionable  torts  under  the 
ATS.4  Ante, at 11.  He offers three reasons for this dramatic 
curtailment of the ATS.  None is persuasive. 

First, JUSTICE THOMAS  argues that “creating a cause of 
action to enforce international law beyond three historical 
torts invariably gives rise to foreign-policy concerns.”  Ante, 
at  9.  He  offers  no  meaningful  support  for  that  sweeping 
assertion, nor does he explain why an ATS suit for the tort 
of  piracy,  for  example,  would  categorically  present  fewer 
foreign-policy concerns than a suit for aiding and abetting 
child slavery.  That said, JUSTICE THOMAS is correct insofar 
as he observes that, in some subset of cases, the diplomatic 
costs of allowing an ATS suit to proceed may outweigh the 
benefits of providing redress to an injured foreign citizen. 
“[W]hen international friction” does arise, however, “a court 
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leaves  no  room  to  doubt  that  Congress  intended  foreign  citizens  to  be 
able to bring “civil action[s]” for “tort[s] . . . committed in violation of the 
law of nations.”  28 U. S. C. §1350. 

4 Notably, JUSTICE THOMAS’ alternative disposition would not answer 
the  question  this  Court  granted  certiorari  to  address,  i.e.,  whether  do-
mestic corporations are immune from suit under the ATS (regardless of 
the kind of torts for which they are sued).  See Pet. for Cert. in No. 19– 
416, at i; Pet. for Cert. in No. 19–453, at i.  For reasons similar to those 
articulated in my dissent in Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 584 U. S. ___, ___ 
(2018),  I  would  answer  this  question  in  the  negative.    (So  would  four 
other Justices.)  As JUSTICE GORSUCH ably explains, there is no reason to 
insulate domestic corporations from liability for law-of-nations violations 
simply because they are legal rather than natural persons.  See post, at 
1–4 (concurring opinion).