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PUBLIC LANDS COUNCIL v. BABBITT

Opinion of the Court

agement, Rangeland Reform ’94: Final Environmental
Impact Statement 144 (1994).

Of course, the new deﬁnitions seem to tie grazing privi-
leges to land use plans more explicitly than did the old. But,
as we have pointed out, the Secretary has since 1976 had the
authority to use land use plans to determine the amount of
permissible grazing, 43 U. S. C. § 1712. The Secretary also
points out that since development of land use plans began
nearly 20 years ago, “all BLM lands in the lower 48 States
are covered by land use plans,” and “all grazing permits in
those States have now been issued or renewed in accordance
with such plans, or must now conform to them.” Brief for
Respondents 26. Yet the ranchers have not provided us
with a single example in which interaction of plan and permit
has jeopardized or might yet jeopardize permit security. An
amicus brief ﬁled by a group of Farm Credit Institutions
says that the deﬁnitional change will “threate[n]” their
“lending policies.” Brief for Farm Credit Institutions as
Amicus Curiae 3. But they do not explain why that is so,
nor do they state that the new deﬁnitions will, in fact, lead
them to stop lending to ranchers.

We recognize that a particular land use plan could change
pre-existing grazing allocation in a particular district. And
that change might arguably lead to a denial of grazing privi-
leges that the pre-1995 regulations would have provided.
But the affected permit holder remains free to challenge
such an individual effect on grazing privileges, and the
courts remain free to determine its lawfulness in context.
We here consider only whether the changes in the deﬁnitions
by themselves violate the Taylor Act’s requirement that
recognized grazing privileges be “adequately safeguarded.”
Given the leeway that the statute confers upon the Secre-
tary, the less-than-absolute pre-1995 security that permit
holders enjoyed, and the relatively small differences that the
new deﬁnitions create, we conclude that the new deﬁnitions
do not violate that law.