Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/14pdf/13-7451_m64o.pdf
Page Number: 36.0

Cite as:  574 U. S. ___ (2015) 

9 

KAGAN, J., dissenting 

chapter’s  pre-existing  sections.    And  with  the  first  18 
numbers of the chapter already taken (starting with §1501 
and continuing through §1518), the law naturally took the
19th  place.    That  is  standard  operating  procedure.    Prior 
to  the  Sarbanes-Oxley  Act  of  2002,  all  of  Chapter  73  was
ordered  chronologically:  Section  1518  was  later  enacted 
than  §1517,  which  was  later  enacted  than  §1516,  which 
was . . . well, you get the idea.  And after Sarbanes-Oxley,
Congress has continued in the same vein.  Section 1519 is 
thus right where you would expect it (as is the contempo-
raneously  passed  §1520)—between  §1518  (added  in  1996) 
and §1521 (added in 2008).2 

The  plurality’s  third  argument,  relying  on  the  surplus-
age  canon,  at  least  invokes  a  known  tool  of  statutory 
construction—but  it  too  comes  to  nothing.    Says  the  plu-
rality: If read naturally, §1519 “would render superfluous” 
§1512(c)(1),  which  Congress  passed  “as  part  of  the  same
act.”  Ante,  at  13.    But  that  is  not  so:  Although  the  two
provisions  significantly  overlap,  each  applies  to  conduct
the other does not.  The key difference between the two is
that  §1519  protects  the  integrity  of  “matter[s]  within  the
jurisdiction of any [federal] department or agency” whereas 
§1512(c)(1)  safeguards  “official  proceeding[s]”  as  defined 
in  §1515(a)(1)(A).  Section  1519’s  language  often  applies
more  broadly  than  §1512(c)(1)’s,  as  the  plurality  notes. 

—————— 

2 The  lonesome  exception  to  Chapter  73’s  chronological  order  is 
§1514A,  added  in  Sarbanes-Oxley  to  create  a  civil  action  to  protect
whistleblowers.  Congress decided to place that provision right after the
only other section in Chapter 73 to authorize a civil action (that one to 
protect  victims  and  witnesses).    The  plurality,  seizing  on  the  §1514
example, says it likewise “would have made more sense for Congress to
codify the substance of §1519 within §1512 or in a new §1512A.”  Ante, 
at 12, n. 4.  But §1512 is titled “Tampering with a witness, victim, or an
informant,” and its provisions almost all protect witnesses from intimi-
dation and harassment.  It makes perfect sense that Congress wanted a
broad  ban  on  evidence-spoliation  to  stand  on  its  own  rather  than  as
part of—or an appendage to—a witness-tampering provision.