Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/17pdf/17-965_h315.pdf
Page Number: 83.0

Cite as:  585 U. S. ____ (2018) 

19 

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting 

Ignoring  all  this,  the  majority  empowers  the  President
to  hide  behind  an  administrative  review  process  that  the 
Government refuses to disclose to the public.  See IRAP II, 
883  F. 3d,  at  268  (“[T]he  Government  chose  not  to  make 
the  review  publicly  available”  even  in  redacted  form); 
IRAP v. Trump, No. 17–2231 (CA4), Doc. 126 (Letter from 
S.  Swingle,  Counsel  for  Defendants-Appellants,  to  P.
Connor,  Clerk  of  the  United  States  Court  of  Appeals  for 
the  Fourth  Circuit  (Nov.  24,  2017))  (resisting  Fourth 
Circuit’s  request  that  the  Government  supplement  the 
record  with  the  reports  referenced  in  the  Proclamation).
Furthermore, evidence of which we can take judicial notice 
indicates  that  the  multiagency  review  process  could  not 
have  been  very  thorough.    Ongoing  litigation  under  the 
Freedom  of  Information  Act  shows  that  the  September 
2017  report  the  Government  produced  after  its  review
process  was  a  mere  17  pages.    See  Brennan  Center  for 
Justice  v.  United States  Dept.  of  State,  No.  17–cv–7520 
(SDNY),  Doc.  No.  31–1,  pp.  2–3.   That  the  Government’s 
analysis  of  the  vetting  practices  of  hundreds  of  countries
boiled down to such a short document raises serious ques­
tions  about  the  legitimacy  of  the  President’s  proclaimed 
national-security rationale.

Beyond  that,  Congress  has  already  addressed  the 
national-security  concerns  supposedly  undergirding  the 
Proclamation  through  an  “extensive  and  complex”  frame­
work  governing  “immigration  and  alien  status.”    Arizona 
v. United States, 567 U. S. 387, 395 (2012).7  The Immigra­

—————— 

7 It  is  important  to  note,  particularly  given  the  nature  of  this  case, 
that  many  consider  “using  the  term  ‘alien’  to  refer  to  other  human
beings”  to  be  “offensive  and  demeaning.”    Flores  v.  United States 
Citizenship  &  Immigration  Servs.,  718  F.  3d  548,  551–552,  n. 1  (CA6 
2013).  I use the term here only where necessary “to be consistent with 
the  statutory  language”  that  Congress  has  chosen  and  “to  avoid  any
confusion  in  replacing  a  legal  term  of  art  with  a  more  appropriate
term.”  Ibid.