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Page Number: 64.0

18 

CORNER POST, INC. v. BOARD OF GOVERNORS, FRS 

JACKSON, J., dissenting 

fore  the  addition  of  Corner  Post,  the  arbitrary-and-capri-
cious  claim  said  that  the  Board  failed  to  consider  certain 
congressional instructions, relied on factors that Congress 
did not intend for it to consider, and ran counter to evidence 
before the Board.  See ECF Doc. 1, at 34–36.  Those claims, 
too, were unchanged after the addition of Corner Post.  See 
App. to Pet. for Cert. 82–84.  

From the pleadings filed in this case, three observations 
stand out.  First, these APA claims, like all APA claims, are 
about what the agency itself did, so the logical point to start
the  clock  is  the  moment  the  agency  acted.    Second,  the 
claims that Corner Post brings are not specific to it—they 
are  identical  to  the  untimely  claims  the  coplaintiff  trade
groups brought before.  And, finally, although the majority
puts  procedural  challenges  to  the  side—asserting  that  its
holding does not extend to those, see ante, at 21, n. 8—the 
claims  in  this  case  are  procedural,  so  the  majority’s  line-
drawing exercise is meaningless. 

B 
On the matter of congressional intent, the consistent ac-
crual rule in the administrative-law context (the limitations 
period starts running at the time of the final agency action) 
is  patently  superior  to  the  majority’s  reading  of  §2401(a). 
Congress enacts statutes of limitations to achieve basic pol-
icy goals: “repose, elimination of stale claims, and certainty 
about  a  plaintiff ’s  opportunity  for  recovery  and  a  defend-
ant’s  potential  liabilities.”  Rotella  v.  Wood,  528  U. S.  549, 
555  (2000);  see  also  Gabelli,  568  U. S.,  at  448.    For  APA 
claims, where rulemakings apply to the public writ large, 
repose  and  certainty  would  never  exist  if  any  and  every
newly formed entity can challenge every agency regulation 
in  existence.  Stated  simply,  the  majority  has  adopted  an
implausible  reading  of  §2401(a),  because,  as  I  explain  be-
low,  a  plaintiff-specific  accrual  rule  operating  in  this  con-
text undermines each of the central goals of all limitations