Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/558bv.pdf
Page Number: 888

ORDERS 

1041 

1039 

Scalia, J., dissenting 

that  preceded  the  decision  vacated,  see,  e. g.,  Grier  v.  United 
States,  419  U. S.  989  (1974),  I  have  acquiesced  in  this  expansion 
of “intervening-factor” GVRs only when (as in Grier) our decision 
came  so  soon  before  the  judgment  in  question  “that  the  lower 
court  might  have  been  unaware  of  it,”  Lawrence,  supra,  at  181 
(Scalia,  J.,  dissenting).  This  is  not  such  a  case:  We  decided 
Jimenez  on  January  13,  2009,  more  than  two  months  before  the 
Fifth  Circuit  denied  the  certiﬁcate.  There  is  thus  no  basis  for 
regarding  that  decision  as  an  “intervening”  factor—that  is,  one 
that  the  Court  of  Appeals  did  not  have  before  it. 

This  is  not,  of  course,  the  ﬁrst  time  the  Court  has  GVR’d  on 
the basis of a case decided long before the Court of Appeals ruled, 
see,  e. g.,  Robinson  v.  Story, 469  U. S.  1081  (1984)  (three  months), 
nor  the  ﬁrst  time  I  have  protested,  see  Lawrence,  supra,  at  184 
(Scalia,  J.,  dissenting)  (more  than  a  year).  This  practice  has 
created  a  new  mode  of  disposition,  a  sort  of  ersatz  summary  re­
versal.  We  do  not  say  that  the  judgment  below  was  wrong,  but 
since  we  suspect  that  it  may be  wrong  and  do  not  want  to  waste 
our  time  ﬁguring  it  out,  we  instruct  the  Court  of  Appeals  to  do 
the  job  again,  with  a  particular  issue  prominently  in  mind. 

It  surely  suggests  something  is  amiss  that  this  case  would  be 
over,  and  petitioner  would  be  worse  off,  if  he  had  asked  us  to 
reverse  the  judgment  below  on  the  basis  of  Jimenez.  Since  he 
did not argue that ground to the Court of Appeals, and since that 
court  did  not  address  it,  we  would  almost  certainly  deny  certio­
rari.  See  Adarand  Constructors,  Inc.  v.  Mineta,  534  U. S.  103, 
108–109  (2001)  (per  curiam)  (dismissing  a  writ  as  improvidently 
granted because the question at issue was not raised or considered 
below).  Have  we  established  a  new  system  in  which  a  party’s 
repetition  before  this  Court  of  his  failure  below  (here,  the  failure 
to  invoke  Jimenez)  cures—and  causes  us  to  reward—his  earlier 
failure?  Or  perhaps  we  are  developing  a  new  system  in  which 
all  arguably  valid  points  not  raised  and  not  discussed  below— 
whether  or  not  belatedly  raised  here—will  be  sent  back  for  a 
redo  by  the  Court  of  Appeals.  And  if  we  can  apply  this  failure-
friendly  practice  to  a  neglected  precedent  two  months  old,  there 
is  no  reason  in  principle  not  to  apply  it  to  a  neglected  precedent 
two  years  old. 

In  my  view  we  have  no  power  to  set  aside  the  duly  recorded 
judgments  of  lower  courts  unless  we  ﬁnd  them  to  be  in  error,  or 
unless  they  are  cast  in  doubt  by  a  factor  arising  after  they  were