Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/558bv.pdf
Page Number: 524

Cite as: 558 U. S. 310 (2010) 

363 

Opinion of the Court 

decisis  include  the  antiquity  of  the  precedent,  the  reliance 
interests  at  stake,  and  of  course  whether  the  decision  was 
well  reasoned.”  Montejo  v.  Louisiana,  556  U. S.  778,  792– 
793  (2009)  (overruling  Michigan  v.  Jackson,  475  U. S.  625 
(1986)).  We  have  also  examined  whether  “experience  has 
pointed  up  the  precedent’s  shortcomings.”  Pearson  v.  Cal­
lahan,  555  U. S.  223,  233  (2009)  (overruling  Saucier  v.  Katz, 
533 U. S. 194 (2001)). 

These  considerations  counsel  in  favor  of  rejecting  Aus­
tin,  which  itself  contravened  this  Court’s  earlier  precedents 
in  Buckley  and  Bellotti.  “This  Court  has  not  hesitated 
to  overrule  decisions  offensive  to  the  First  Amendment.” 
WRTL,  551  U. S.,  at  500  (opinion  of  Scalia,  J.).  “[S]tare 
decisis  is  a  principle  of  policy  and  not  a  mechanical  formula 
of  adherence  to  the  latest  decision.”  Helvering  v.  Hallock, 
309 U. S. 106, 119 (1940). 

For  the  reasons  above,  it  must  be  concluded  that  Austin 
was  not  well  reasoned.  The  Government  defends  Austin, 
relying  almost  entirely  on  “the  quid  pro  quo  interest,  the 
corruption  interest  or  the  shareholder  interest,”  and  not 
Austin’s expressed antidistortion rationale.  Tr. of Oral Arg. 
48  (Sept.  9,  2009);  see  id.,  at  45–46.  When  neither  party 
defends the reasoning of a precedent, the principle of adher­
ing  to  that  precedent  through  stare  decisis  is  diminished. 
Austin  abandoned  First  Amendment  principles,  further­
more, by relying on language in some of our precedents that 
traces  back  to  the  Automobile  Workers  Court’s  ﬂawed  his­
torical account of campaign ﬁnance laws, see Brief for Cam­
paign Finance Scholars as Amici Curiae; Hayward, 45 Harv. 
J.  Legis.  421;  R.  Mutch,  Campaigns,  Congress,  and  Courts 
33–35,  153–157  (1988).  See  Austin,  supra,  at  659  (citing 
MCFL, 479 U. S., at 257–258; NCPAC, 470 U. S., at 500–501); 
MCFL, supra, at 257 (citing Automobile Workers, 352 U. S., 
at  585);  NCPAC,  supra,  at  500  (citing  NRWC,  459  U. S.,  at 
210);  id.,  at  208  (“The  history  of  the  movement  to  regulate 
the  political  contributions  and  expenditures  of  corporations