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529US3

Unit: $U59

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VERMONT AGENCY OF NATURAL RESOURCES v.
UNITED STATES ex rel. STEVENS
Stevens, J., dissenting

Indeed, a few federal courts had accepted jurisdiction in
qui tam cases brought by the States—thus indicating their
view that States were included among the “persons” who
may bring qui tam actions as relators under § 3730(b)(1).
See United States ex rel. Woodard v. Country View Care
Center, Inc., 797 F. 2d 888 (CA10 1986); United States ex rel.
Wisconsin v. Dean, 729 F. 2d 1100 (CA7 1984); see also
United States ex rel. Hartigan v. Palumbo Bros., Inc., 797
F. Supp. 624 (ND Ill. 1992). Not only do these cases express
the view of those federal judges who thought a State could
be a “person” under § 3730(b)(1), but the cases also demon-
strate that the States considered themselves to be statutory
In fact, in the Dean case, the United States ﬁled
“persons.”
a statement with the court explicitly stating its view that
“[t]he State is a proper relator.” 729 F. 2d, at 1103, n. 2.
And when the Seventh Circuit in that case dismissed Wis-
consin’s qui tam claim on grounds unrelated to the deﬁnition

that the Senate’s understanding was based on an analogy rather than on
controlling precedent.

Petitioner further argues that the text of the FCA as it was originally
enacted in 1863 could not have included States as “persons,” and there-
fore the Senate’s understanding of the pre-1986 Act was erroneous. See
also ante, at 778. Assuming for argument’s sake that the Senate in-
correctly ascertained what Congress meant in 1863, petitioner’s argument
is beside the point. The term “person” in § 3729(a) that we are interpret-
ing today was enacted by the 1986 Congress, not by the 1863 Congress.
See 100 Stat. 3153 (deleting entirely the previously existing introductory
clause in § 3729, including the phrase “[a] person not a member of an armed
force of the United States” and replacing it with the new phrase “[a]ny
person”). Therefore, even if the 1986 Congress were mistaken about
what a previous Legislature had meant by the word “person,” it clearly
expressed its own view that when the 1986 Congress itself enacted the
word “person” (and not merely the word “any” as the Court insists, ante,
at 783, n. 12), it meant the reference to include States. There is not the
least bit of contradiction (as the Court suggests, ibid.) in one Congress
informing itself of the general understanding of a statutory term it enacts
based on its own (perhaps erroneous) understanding of what a past Con-
gress thought the term meant.