Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/529bv.pdf
Page Number: 959

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Unit: $U62

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GEIER v. AMERICAN HONDA MOTOR CO.

Opinion of the Court

We have no reason to suspect that the Solicitor General’s
representation of DOT’s views reﬂects anything other than
“the agency’s fair and considered judgment on the matter.”
Auer v. Robbins, 519 U. S. 452, 461–462 (1997); cf. Hillsbor-
ough County, supra, at 721 (expressing reluctance, in the
absence of strong evidence, to ﬁnd an actual conﬂict between
state law and federal regulation where agency that promul-
gated the regulation had not, at the time the regulation was
promulgated or subsequently, concluded that such a conﬂict
existed). The failure of the Federal Register to address
pre-emption explicitly is thus not determinative.

The dissent would require a formal agency statement of
pre-emptive intent as a prerequisite to concluding that a con-
ﬂict exists.
It relies on cases, or portions thereof, that did
not involve conﬂict pre-emption. See post, at 908–909; Cali-
fornia Coastal Comm’n v. Granite Rock Co., 480 U. S. 572,
583 (1987); Hillsborough, supra, at 718. And conﬂict pre-
emption is different in that it turns on the identiﬁcation of
“actual conﬂict,” and not on an express statement of pre-
emptive intent. English, supra, at 78–79; see Hillsbor-
ough, supra, at 720–721; Jones, 430 U. S., at 540–543. While
“[p]re-emption fundamentally is a question of congressional
intent,” English, supra, at 78, this Court traditionally distin-
guishes between “express” and “implied” pre-emptive intent,
and treats “conﬂict” pre-emption as an instance of the latter.
See, e. g., Freightliner, 514 U. S., at 287; English, supra, at
78–79; see also Cipollone, supra, at 545, 547–548 (Scalia, J.,
concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part). And
though the Court has looked for a speciﬁc statement of pre-
emptive intent where it is claimed that the mere “volume
and complexity” of agency regulations demonstrate an im-
plicit intent to displace all state law in a particular area,
Hillsborough, supra, at 717; see post, at 908–909, n. 23—
so-called “ﬁeld pre-emption”—the Court has never before re-
quired a speciﬁc, formal agency statement identifying con-
ﬂict in order to conclude that such a conﬂict in fact exists.