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Page Number: 36

32 

KIRTSAENG v. JOHN WILEY & SONS, INC. 

Opinion of the Court 

Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 17, 1788), in 14 id., at 
16,  21  (J.  Boyd  ed.  1958)  (arguing  for  a  limited  monopoly 
to  secure  production).  But  the  Constitution’s  language
nowhere  suggests  that  its  limited  exclusive  right  should 
include  a  right  to  divide  markets  or  a  concomitant  right 
to charge different purchasers different prices for the same
book, say to increase or to maximize gain.  Neither, to our 
knowledge,  did  any  Founder  make  any  such  suggestion.
We have found no precedent suggesting a legal preference 
for  interpretations  of  copyright  statutes  that  would  pro­
vide for market divisions.  Cf. Copyright Law Revision, pt. 
2, at 194 (statement of Barbara  Ringer, Copyright  Office) 
(division of territorial markets was “primarily a matter of 
private contract”).

To  the  contrary,  Congress  enacted  a  copyright  law  that
(through the “first sale” doctrine) limits copyright holders’
ability to divide domestic markets.  And that limitation is 
consistent  with  antitrust  laws  that  ordinarily  forbid  mar­
ket divisions.  Cf. Palmer v. BRG of Ga., Inc., 498 U. S. 46, 
49–50 (1990) (per curiam) (“[A]greements between compet­
itors  to  allocate  territories  to  minimize  competition  are
illegal”).  Whether  copyright  owners  should,  or  should
not, have more than ordinary commercial power to divide 
international  markets  is  a  matter  for  Congress  to  decide. 
We  do  no  more  here  than  try  to  determine  what  decision
Congress has taken. 

Fourth, the dissent and Wiley contend that our decision 

launches  United  States  copyright  law  into  an  unprece­
dented regime of “international exhaustion.”  Post, at 18– 
23; Brief for Respondent 45–46.  But they point to nothing 
indicative  of  congressional  intent  in  1976.  The  dissent 
also  claims  that  it  is  clear  that  the  United  States  now 
opposes adopting such a regime, but the Solicitor General 
as amicus has taken no such position in this case.  In fact, 
when  pressed  at  oral  argument,  the  Solicitor  General
stated  that  the  consequences  of  Wiley’s  reading  of  the