Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/524bv.pdf
Page Number: 431.0

524US2

Unit: $U91

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386 WISCONSIN DEPT. OF CORRECTIONS v. SCHACHT

Opinion of the Court

1986). We now conclude, contrary to the Seventh Circuit,
that the presence in an otherwise removable case of a claim
that the Eleventh Amendment may bar does not destroy re-
moval jurisdiction that would otherwise exist.

II

The governing provision of the federal removal statute au-
thorizes a defendant to remove “any civil action brought in
a State court of which the district courts of the United States
have original jurisdiction.”
28 U. S. C. § 1441(a). See also
Judiciary Act of 1789, § 12, 1 Stat. 79–80 (original removal
statute); Act of Mar. 3, 1887, 24 Stat. 552, corrected by Act
of Aug. 13, 1888, 25 Stat. 433 (setting forth removal power
in terms roughly similar to present law). The language of
this section obviously permits the removal of a case that con-
tains only claims that “arise under” federal law. That is be-
cause a federal statute explicitly grants the federal courts
“original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the
Constitution,
laws, or treaties of the United States,” 28
U. S. C. § 1331. This case, however, requires us to consider
what happens if one, or more, of those claims is subject to an
Eleventh Amendment bar. Does that circumstance destroy
removal jurisdiction that would otherwise exist?

The primary argument that it does destroy removal juris-
diction has several parts. First, the argument distinguishes
a case with federal-law claims that include one or more Elev-
enth Amendment claims from a case with both federal-law
claims and state-law claims. See 116 F. 3d, at 1152. We
have suggested that the presence of even one claim “arising
under” federal law is sufﬁcient to satisfy the requirement
that the case be within the original jurisdiction of the dis-
trict court for removal. See Chicago v. International Col-
In Chicago,
lege of Surgeons, 522 U. S. 156, 163–166 (1997).
for example, we wrote:

“[The] federal claims sufﬁce to make the actions ‘civil
actions’ within the ‘original jurisdiction’ of the district