Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/22pdf/22-506_nmip.pdf
Page Number: 28

Cite as:  600 U. S. ____ (2023) 

23 

Opinion of the Court 

v. Oregon, 546 U. S. 243, 267–268 (2006)).  As then-Speaker
of the House Nancy Pelosi explained: 

“People think that the President of the United States 
has the power for debt forgiveness.  He does not.  He 
can postpone.  He can delay.  But he does not have that 
power.  That has to be an act of Congress.”  Press Con-
ference,  Office  of  the  Speaker  of  the  House  (July  28,
2021). 

Aside  from  reiterating  its  interpretation  of  the  statute, 
the dissent offers little to rebut our conclusion that “indica-
tors from our previous major questions cases are present” 
here.  Post,  at  15  (BARRETT,  J.,  concurring).  The  dissent 
insists  that  “[s]tudent  loans  are  in  the  Secretary’s  wheel-
house.”  Post, at 26 (opinion of KAGAN, J.).  But in light of 
the sweeping and unprecedented impact of the Secretary’s 
loan forgiveness program, it would seem more accurate to
describe  the  program  as  being  in  the  “wheelhouse”  of  the 
House and Senate Committees on Appropriations.  Rather 
than dispute the extent of that impact, the dissent chooses
to  mount  a  frontal  assault  on  what  it  styles  “the  Court’s 
made-up major questions doctrine.”  Post, at 29–30.  But its 
attempt to relitigate West Virginia is misplaced.  As we ex-
plained in that case, while the major questions “label” may 
be relatively recent, it refers to “an identifiable body of law 
that has developed over a series of significant cases” span-
ning decades.  West Virginia, 597 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 
20).  At any rate, “the issue now is not whether [West Vir-
ginia] is correct.  The question is whether that case is dis-
tinguishable from this one.  And it is not.”  Collins v. Yellen, 
594 U. S. ___, ___ (2021) (KAGAN, J., concurring in part and
concurring in judgment) (slip op., at 2). 

The Secretary, for his part, acknowledges that West Vir-
ginia is the law.  Brief for United States 47–48.  But he ob-
jects  that  its  principles  apply  only  in  cases  concerning 
“agency action[s] involv[ing] the power to regulate, not the