Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/23pdf/23-235_n7ip.pdf
Page Number: 35

6 

FDA v. ALLIANCE FOR HIPPOCRATIC MEDICINE 

THOMAS, J., concurring 

ican Physicians & Surgeons, 13 F. 4th, at 540 (internal quo-
tation marks omitted).3 

Our precedents have provided a workaround for this ob-
vious  remedial  problem  through  the  invention  of  the  so-
called  “universal  injunction.”  Universal  injunctions  typi-
cally “prohibit the Government from enforcing a policy with 
respect  to  anyone.”  Trump,  585  U. S.,  at  713,  n. 1 
(THOMAS, J.,  concurring).    By  providing  relief  beyond  the 
parties to the case, this remedy is “legally and historically 
dubious.”  Id., at 721; see also Labrador v.  Poe, 601 U. S. 
___, ___–___ (2024) (slip op., at 4–5) (GORSUCH, J., concur-
ring in grant of stay).  It seems no coincidence that associa-
tional standing’s “emergence in the 1960s overlaps with the 
emergence  of  [this]  remedial  phenomenon”  of  a  similarly 
questionable nature.  Association of American Physicians & 
Surgeons,  13  F. 4th,  at  541.    Because  no  party  should  be
permitted to obtain an injunction in favor of nonparties, I
have difficulty seeing why an association should be permit-
ted to do so for its members.  Associational standing thus 
seems to distort our traditional understanding of the judi-
cial power.

In addition to these Article III concerns, there is tension 
between  associational  standing  and  other  areas  of  law.
First, the availability of associational standing subverts the 
class-action  mechanism.  A  class  action  allows  a  named 
plaintiff to represent others with similar injuries, but it is
subject to the many requirements of Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure  23.    Associational  standing  achieves  that  same 
—————— 

3 This also raises the question of who should pick the remedy.  Associ-
ations  “may  have  very  different  interests  from  the  individuals  whose
rights they are raising.”  Kowalski v. Tesmer, 543 U. S. 125, 135 (2004) 
(THOMAS, J., concurring).  For example, an association might prefer an 
injunction preventing the enforcement of a law that harms its members,
while an injured member may instead want damages to compensate him
for his injuries.  Or perhaps a member would wish to settle the litigation,
whereas an association might want to continue the fight.  Our associa-
tional-standing doctrine ignores these obvious concerns.