Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/22pdf/22-58_i425.pdf
Page Number: 20

Cite as:  599 U. S. ____ (2023) 

3 

 GORSUCH, J., concurring
GORSUCH, J., concurring in judgment 

concrete injur[y] under Article III.”  TransUnion, 594 U. S., 
at ___ (slip op., at 9); see also Uzuegbunam v. Preczewski, 
592 U. S. ___, ___ (2021) (slip op., at 11).  Indeed, this Court 
has  allowed  other  States  to  challenge  other  Executive 
Branch  policies  that  indirectly  caused  them  monetary
harms.  See, e.g., Department of Commerce v. New York, 588 
U. S.  ___,  ___–___  (2019)  (slip  op.,  at  9–10).    So  why  are
these States now forbidden from doing the same?

Next,  the  Court  contends  that,  “when  the  Executive 
Branch elects not to arrest or prosecute, it does not exercise
coercive  power  over  an  individual’s  liberty  or  property.” 
Ante, at 6.  Here again, in principle, I agree.  But if an ex-
ercise of coercive power matters so much to the Article III 
standing inquiry, how to explain decisions like Massachu-
setts v. EPA?  There the Court held that Massachusetts had 
standing to challenge the federal government’s decision not 
to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from new motor vehi-
cles.  See  549  U. S.,  at  516–526.    And  what  could  be  less 
coercive than a decision not to regulate?  In Massachusetts 
v. EPA, the Court chose to overlook this difficulty in part
because  it  thought  the  State’s  claim  of  standing  deserved
“special solicitude.”  Id., at 520.  I have doubts about that 
move.  Before Massachusetts v. EPA, the notion that States 
enjoy relaxed standing rules “ha[d] no basis in our jurispru-
dence.”  Id., at 536 (ROBERTS,  C. J., dissenting).  Nor has 
“special solicitude” played a meaningful role in this Court’s 
decisions in the years since.  Even so, it’s hard not to wonder 
why  the  Court  says  nothing  about  “special  solicitude”  in 
this case.  And it’s hard not to think, too, that lower courts 
should just leave that idea on the shelf in future ones.

Finally, the Court points to the fact that Article II vests 
in the President considerable enforcement discretion.  Ante, 
at 6–8.  So much so that “courts generally lack meaningful 
standards  for  assessing  the  propriety  of  [the  Executive 
Branch’s] enforcement choices.”  Ante, at 7.  But almost as