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Page Number: 31.0

6 

MASTERPIECE CAKESHOP, LTD. v. COLORADO 

CIVIL RIGHTS COMM’N
 
GORSUCH, J., concurring
 

then  the  bakers’  objection  in  Mr.  Jack’s  case  must  be
“inextricably  tied”  to  one  as  well.  For  just  as  cakes  cele-
brating  same-sex  weddings  are  (usually)  requested  by 
persons of a particular sexual orientation, so too are cakes 
expressing  religious  opposition  to  same-sex  weddings 
(usually)  requested  by  persons  of  particular  religious
faiths.  In both cases the bakers’ objection would (usually) 
result  in  turning  down  customers  who  bear  a  protected 
characteristic.    In  the  end,  the  Commission’s  decisions 
simply  reduce  to  this:  it  presumed  that  Mr.  Phillip  har-
bored an intent to discriminate against a protected class in
light  of  the  foreseeable  effects  of  his  conduct,  but  it  de-
clined to presume the same intent in Mr. Jack’s case even 
though  the  effects  of  the  bakers’  conduct  were  just  as 
foreseeable.    Underscoring  the  double  standard,  a  state 
appellate  court  said  that  “no  such  showing”  of  actual 
“animus”—or  intent  to  discriminate  against  persons  in  a
protected  class—was  even  required  in  Mr.  Phillips’s  case. 
370 P. 3d, at 282. 

The  Commission  cannot  have  it  both  ways.  The  Com-
mission  cannot  slide  up  and  down  the  mens  rea  scale, 
picking a mental state standard to suit its tastes depend-
ing  on  its  sympathies.    Either  actual  proof  of  intent  to
discriminate  on  the  basis  of  membership  in  a  protected 
class  is  required  (as  the  Commission  held  in  Mr.  Jack’s
case), or it is sufficient to “presume” such intent from the
knowing  failure  to  serve  someone  in  a  protected  class  (as
the Commission held in Mr. Phillips’s case).  Perhaps the
Commission  could  have  chosen  either  course  as  an  initial 
matter.  But  the  one  thing  it  can’t  do  is  apply  a  more 
generous  legal  test  to  secular  objections  than  religious 
ones.  See  Church  of  Lukumi  Babalu  Aye,  508  U. S.,  at 
543–544.  That  is  anything  but  the  neutral  treatment  of 
religion.

The  real  explanation  for  the  Commission’s  discrimina-
tion soon comes clear, too—and it does anything but help