Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/16pdf/15-1293_1o13.pdf
Page Number: 3.0

Cite as:  582 U. S. ____ (2017) 

3 

Syllabus 

JUSTICE BREYER, concluded in Parts III–B, III–C, and IV: 

(a) The  Government’s  argument  that  this  case  is  governed  by  the
Court’s  subsidized-speech  cases  is  unpersuasive.    Those cases  all  in-
volved  cash  subsidies  or  their  equivalent,  e.g.,  funds  to  private  par-
ties  for  family  planning  services  in  Rust  v.  Sullivan,  500  U. S.  173, 
and cash grants to artists in National Endowment for Arts v. Finley, 
524 U. S. 569.  The federal registration of a trademark is nothing like 
these programs.  The PTO does not pay money to parties seeking reg-
istration of a mark; it requires the payment of fees to file an applica-
tion  and  to  maintain  the  registration  once  it  is  granted.    The  Gov-
ernment  responds  that  registration  provides  valuable  non-monetary 
benefits traceable to the Government’s resources devoted to register-
ing the marks, but nearly every government service requires the ex-
penditure of government funds.  This is true of services that benefit 
everyone,  like  police  and  fire  protection,  as  well  as  services  that  are 
utilized  by  only  some,  e.g.,  the  adjudication  of  private  lawsuits  and
the use of public parks and highways.  Pp. 18–20.

(b) Also  unpersuasive  is  the  Government’s  claim  that  the  dispar-
agement clause is constitutional under a “government-program” doc-
trine,  an  argument  which  is  based  on  a  merger  of  this  Court’s  gov-
ernment-speech  cases  and  subsidy  cases.    It  points  to  two  cases 
involving  a  public  employer’s  collection  of  union  dues  from  its  em-
ployees,  Davenport  v.  Washington  Ed.  Assn.,  551  U. S.  177,  and  Ys-
ursa  v.  Pocatello  Ed.  Assn.,  555  U. S.  353,  but  these  cases  occupy  a
special  area  of  First  Amendment  case  law  that  is  far  removed  from
the registration of trademarks.  Cases in which government creates a
limited  public  forum  for  private  speech,  thus  allowing  for  some  con-
tent-  and  speaker-based  restrictions,  see,  e.g.,  Good  News  Club  v. 
Milford Central School, 533 U. S. 98, 106–107; Rosenberger v. Rector 
and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U. S. 819, 831, are potentially more 
analogous.  But even in those cases, viewpoint discrimination is for-
bidden.    The  disparagement  clause  denies  registration  to  any  mark
that  is  offensive  to  a  substantial  percentage  of  the  members  of  any 
group.  That  is  viewpoint  discrimination  in  the  sense  relevant  here: 
Giving  offense  is  a  viewpoint.    The  “public  expression  of  ideas  may
not  be  prohibited  merely  because  the  ideas  are  themselves  offensive 
to  some  of  their  hearers.”    Street  v.  New  York,  394  U. S.  576,  592. 
Pp. 20–23. 

(c) The  dispute  between  the  parties  over  whether  trademarks  are
commercial speech subject to the relaxed scrutiny outlined in Central 
Hudson Gas & Elect. v. Public Serv. Comm’n of N. Y., 447 U. S. 557, 
need  not  be  resolved  here  because  the  disparagement  clause  cannot 
withstand  even  Central  Hudson  review.    Under  Central  Hudson,  a 
restriction of speech must serve “a substantial interest” and be “nar-