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10 

AMERICAN EXPRESS CO. v. ITALIAN COLORS 

RESTAURANT 
KAGAN, J., dissenting 

meritorious  federal  claims.  Those  provisions  might  deny
entry  to  the  forum  in  the  first  instance.    Or  they  might 
deprive  the  claimant  of  any  remedy.    Or  they  might  pre-
vent  the  claimant  from  offering  the  necessary  proof  to
prevail,  as  in  my  “no  economic  testimony”  hypothetical—
and in the actual circumstances of this case.  See supra, at 
3.  The variations matter not at all.  Whatever the precise
mechanism, each “operate[s] . . . as a prospective waiver of
a party’s [federal] right[s]”—and so confers immunity on a
wrongdoer.  Mitsubishi, 473 U. S., at 637, n. 19.  And that 
is what counts under our decisions.4 

Nor can the majority escape the principle we have estab-
lished  by  observing,  as  it  does  at  one  point,  that  Amex’s
agreement  merely  made  arbitration  “not  worth  the  ex-
pense.”  Ante, at 7.  That suggestion, after all, runs smack 
into Randolph, which likewise involved an allegation that 
arbitration,  as  specified  in  a  contract,  “would  be  prohibi-
tively  expensive.”    531  U. S.,  at  92.    Our  decision  there 
made clear that a provision raising a plaintiff ’s costs could 
foreclose consideration of federal claims, and so run afoul 
of  the  effective-vindication  rule.  The  expense  at  issue  in 
Randolph came from a filing fee combined with a per-diem 
payment  for  the  arbitrator.  But  nothing  about  those 
particular costs is distinctive; and indeed, a rule confined
to them would be weirdly idiosyncratic.  Not surprisingly, 
then, Randolph gave no hint of distinguishing among the
different ways an arbitration agreement can make a claim 

—————— 

4 Gilmer and Vimar Seguros, which the majority relies on, see ante, at 
8,  fail  to  advance  its  argument.    The  plaintiffs  there  did  not  claim,  as
Italian  Colors  does,  that  an  arbitration  clause  altogether  precluded 
them  from  vindicating  their  federal  rights.    They  averred  only  that
arbitration  would  be  less  convenient  or  effective  than  a  proceeding  in 
court.  See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U. S. 20, 31– 
32  (1991);  Vimar  Seguros  y  Reaseguros,  S.  A.  v.  M/V  Sky  Reefer,  515 
U. S.  528,  533  (1995).    As  I  have  explained,  that  kind  of  showing  does
not meet the effective-vindication rule’s high bar.  See supra, at 6.