Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/524bv.pdf
Page Number: 533.0

524US2

Unit: $U93

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488

CLINTON v. CITY OF NEW YORK

Breyer, J., dissenting

“ ‘as concrete as the complicated factors for judgment in such
a ﬁeld of delegated authority permit’ ”) (quoting FCC v.
Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U. S. 134, 138 (1940)). The
statute’s language, I believe, is sufﬁcient to provide the Pres-
ident, and the public, with a fairly clear idea as to what Con-
gress had in mind. And the public can judge the merits of
the President’s choices accordingly. Cf. Yakus v. United
States, 321 U. S., at 426 (standards were “sufﬁciently deﬁnite
.
and precise to enable .
conform[ity]”).

. the public to ascertain .

.

.

Third, insofar as monetary expenditure (but not “tax ex-
penditure”) is at issue, the President acts in an area where
history helps to justify the discretionary power that Con-
gress has delegated, and where history may inform his ex-
ercise of the Act’s delegated authority. Congress has fre-
quently delegated the President the authority to spend, or
not to spend, particular sums of money. See, e. g., Act of
Sept. 29, 1789, ch. 23, 1 Stat. 95; Act of Mar. 26, 1790, ch. 4,
§ 1, 1 Stat. 104; Act of Feb. 11, 1791, ch. 6, 1 Stat. 190; Emer-
gency Relief Appropriation Act of 1935, 49 Stat. 115 (appro-
priating over $4 billion to be spent “in the discretion and
under the direction of the President” for economic relief
measures); see also ante, at 466–467 (Scalia, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part) (listing numerous examples).
Fourth, the Constitution permits Congress to rely upon
context and history as providing the necessary standard for
the exercise of the delegated power. See, e. g., Federal
Radio Comm’n v. Nelson Brothers Bond & Mortgage Co.
(Station WIBO), 289 U. S. 266, 285 (1933) (“public interest,
convenience, or necessity [standard] . . . is to be interpreted
by its context”); Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U. S. 245, 253 (1947)
(otherwise vague delegation to regulate banks was “sufﬁ-
ciently explicit, against the background of custom, to be ade-
quate”). Relying upon context, Congress has sometimes
granted the President broad discretionary authority over