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524US2

Unit: $U88

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318

CARON v. UNITED STATES

Thomas, J., dissenting

sessing only certain ﬁrearms (handguns) in only certain
places (outside his home or ofﬁce), Massachusetts law did not
expressly provide that petitioner could not possess ﬁrearms.
The plain meaning of § 921(a)(20) thus resolves this case.
The Court, however, rejects this plain meaning on the basis
of “a likely, and rational, congressional policy” of prohibiting
ﬁrearms possession by all ex-felons whose ability to possess
certain ﬁrearms is in any way restricted by state law. Ante,
at 315. According to the Court, Congress could not have
intended the “bizarre result” that a conviction would not
count as a violent felony if a State only partially restricts
the possession of ﬁrearms by the ex-felon. But this would
not be a bizarre result at all. Under § 921(a)(20), state-law
limitations on ﬁrearms possession are only relevant once it
has been established that an ex-felon’s other civil rights, such
as the right to vote, the right to seek and to hold public
ofﬁce, and the right to serve on a jury, have been restored.
See 77 F. 3d 1, 2 (CA1 1996).
In restoring those rights, the
State has presumably deemed such ex-felons worthy of par-
ticipating in civic life. Once a State makes such a decision,
it is entirely rational (and certainly not bizarre) for Congress
to authorize the increased sentences in § 924(e) only when the
State additionally prohibits those ex-felons from possessing
ﬁrearms altogether.

Moreover, as the Court concedes, its own interpretation
creates “incongruities.” Ante, at 315. Under the statute,
whether a prior state conviction qualiﬁes as a violent felony
conviction under § 924(e) turns entirely on state law. Given
the primacy of state law in the statutory scheme, it is bizarre
to hold that the legal possession of ﬁrearms under state law
subjects a person to a sentence enhancement under federal
law. That, however, is precisely the conclusion the Court
reaches in this case.
It is simply not true, as the Court
reasons, that federal law “must reach primary conduct not
covered by state law.”
It is entirely plausible that
Congress simply intended to create stiffer penalties for

Ibid.