Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/21pdf/21-954_7l48.pdf
Page Number: 3.0

Cite as:  597 U. S. ____ (2022) 

3 

Syllabus 

Statutory  structure  likewise  confirms  this  conclusion.    Elsewhere  in 
section 1252, where Congress intended to deny subject matter jurisdic-
tion  over  a  particular  class  of  claims,  it  did  so  unambiguously.   See, 
e.g., §1252(a)(2) (entitled “Matters not subject to judicial review”).  Fi-
nally, this Court previously encountered a virtually identical situation
in Nielsen v. Preap, 586 U. S. ___, and proceeded to reach the merits of 
the suit notwithstanding the District Court’s apparent violation of sec-
tion 1252(f )(1).  Pp. 8–13.

(b) Turning to the merits, section 1225(b)(2)(C) provides: “In the case 
of an alien . . . who is arriving on land . . . from a foreign territory con-
tiguous to the United States, the [Secretary] may return the alien to 
that  territory  pending  a  proceeding  under  section  1229a.”  Section 
1225(b)(2)(C) plainly confers a discretionary authority to return aliens 
to Mexico.  This Court has “repeatedly observed” that “the word ‘may’ 
clearly connotes discretion.”  Opati v. Republic of Sudan, 590 U. S. ___, 
___. 

from 

inference 

Respondents and the Court of Appeals concede that point, but urge 
an 
the  statutory  structure:  because  section 
1225(b)(2)(A) makes detention mandatory, they argue, the otherwise-
discretionary return authority in section 1225(b)(2)(C) becomes man-
datory when the Secretary violates that mandate.  The problem is that 
the statute does not say anything like that.  The statute says “may.”
If Congress had intended section 1225(b)(2)(C) to operate as a manda-
tory cure of any noncompliance with the Government’s detention obli-
gations, it would not have conveyed that intention through an unspo-
ken inference in conflict with the unambiguous, express term “may.”
The  contiguous-territory  return  authority  in  section  1225(b)(2)(C)  is 
discretionary—and remains discretionary notwithstanding any viola-
tion of section 1225(b)(2)(A).   

The  historical  context  in  which  section  1225(b)(2)(C)  was  adopted
confirms the plain import of its text.  Section 1225(b)(2)(C) was added 
to  the  statute  more  than  90  years  after  the  “shall  be  detained”  lan-
guage  that  appears  in  section  1225(b)(2)(A).    And  the  provision  was 
enacted in response to a BIA decision that had questioned the legality 
of the contiguous-territory return practice.  Moreover, since its enact-
ment,  every  Presidential  administration  has  interpreted  section 
1225(b)(2)(C) as purely discretionary, notwithstanding the consistent
shortfall of funds to comply with section 1225(b)(2)(A).   

The foreign affairs consequences of mandating the exercise of con-
tiguous-territory  return  likewise  confirm  that  the  Court  of  Appeals 
erred.  Interpreting section 1225(b)(2)(C) as a mandate imposes a sig-
nificant burden upon the Executive’s ability to conduct diplomatic re-
lations  with  Mexico,  one  that  Congress  likely  did  not  intend  section 
1225(b)(2)(C) to impose.  And finally, the availability of parole as an