Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/16pdf/16-992_868c.pdf
Page Number: 7

2 

PAVAN v. SMITH 

GORSUCH, J., dissenting 

many  analogues  across  the  country  and  throughout  his- 
tory,  offends  the  Constitution.    To  the  contrary,  to  the 
extent they speak to the question at all, this Court’s prec-
edents  suggest  just  the  opposite  conclusion.    See,  e.g., 
Michael  H.  v.  Gerald  D.,  491  U. S.  110,  124–125  (1989); 
Tuan Anh Nguyen v. INS, 533 U. S. 53, 73 (2001).  Neither 
does  anything  in  today’s  opinion  purport  to  identify  any
constitutional problem with a biology based birth registra-
tion regime.  So whatever else we might do with this case,
summary  reversal  would  not  exactly  seem  the  obvious 
course. 

What,  then,  is  at  work  here?  If  there  isn’t  a  problem
with  a  biology  based  birth  registration  regime,  perhaps
the concern lies in this particular regime’s exceptions.  For 
it  turns  out  that  Arkansas’s  general  rule  of  registration
based on biology does admit of certain more specific excep-
tions.  Most  importantly  for  our  purposes,  the  State
acknowledges  that  §9–10–201  of  the  Arkansas  Code  con-
trols how birth certificates are completed in cases of artifi-
cial  insemination  like  the  one  before  us.
  The  State 
acknowledges,  too,  that  this  provision,  written  some  time
ago,  indicates  that  the  mother’s  husband  generally  shall 
be treated as the father—and in this way seemingly antic-
ipates only opposite-sex marital unions.

But if the artificial insemination statute is the concern, 
it’s  still  hard  to  see  how  summary  reversal  should  follow 
for at least a few reasons.  First, petitioners didn’t actually
challenge §9–10–201 in their lawsuit.  Instead, petitioners
sought  and  the  trial  court  granted  relief  eliminating  the 
State’s  authority  under  §20–18–401  to  enforce  a  birth
registration regime generally based on biology.  On appeal,
the  state  supreme  court  simply  held  that  this  overbroad 
remedy  wasn’t  commanded  by  Obergefell  or  the  Constitu-
tion.  And, again, nothing in today’s opinion for the Court 
identifies anything wrong, let alone clearly wrong, in that 
conclusion.  Second,  though  petitioners’  lawsuit  didn’t