Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/20pdf/19-251_p86b.pdf
Page Number: 34

Cite as:  594 U. S. ____ (2021) 

5 

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting 

will impact associational rights, this Court requires plain-
tiffs to demonstrate that a requirement is likely to expose
their supporters to concrete repercussions in order to estab-
lish an actual burden.  It then applies a level of means-end
tailoring proportional to that burden.  The Court abandons 
that approach here, instead holding that narrow tailoring
applies to disclosure requirements across the board, even if
there is no evidence that they burden anyone at all. 

A 
Before today, to demonstrate that a reporting or disclo-
sure  requirement  would  chill  association,  litigants  had  to
show  “a  reasonable  probability  that  the  compelled  disclo-
sure of . . . contributors’ names will subject them to threats, 
harassment, or reprisals from either Government officials
or private parties.”  Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1, 74 (1976) 
(per curiam).  Proof could include “specific evidence of past
or  present  harassment  of  members  due  to  their  associa-
tional ties, or of harassment directed against the organiza-
tion itself,” ibid., as well as evidence that “fear of commu-
nity  hostility  and  economic  reprisals  that  would  follow
public  disclosure  . . .  had  discouraged  new  members  from
joining”  an  organization  or  caused  “former  members  to 
withdraw,”  Bates,  361  U. S.,  at  524.    Although  the  Court
has  never  imposed  an  “unduly  strict  requiremen[t]  of 
proof,” Buckley, 424 U. S., at 74, it has consistently required 
at least some record evidence demonstrating a risk of such
objective harms.  See Bates, 361 U. S., at 523–524; Patter-
son, 357 U. S., at 462–463. 

Indeed, the Court has expressly held that parties do not
have  standing  to  bring  claims  where  they  assert  nothing 
more than that government action will cause a “subjective
‘chill.’ ”  Laird v. Tatum, 408 U. S. 1, 13–14 (1972).  It does 
not matter if an individual perceives a government regula-
tion “as inappropriate,” or believes “it is inherently danger-
ous for the [government] to be concerned with” a particular