Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/23pdf/22-277_d18f.pdf
Page Number: 49.0

Cite as:  603 U. S. ____ (2024) 

5 

THOMAS, J., concurring in judgment 

challenges creates practical concerns as well.  Facial chal-
lenges’  dubious  historical  roots  further  confirm  that  the 
doctrine should have no place in our jurisprudence. 

A 
1 
Article  III  empowers  federal  courts  to  exercise  “judicial
Power” only over “Cases” and “Controversies.”  This Court 
has  long  recognized  that  those  terms  impose  substantive
constraints on the authority of federal courts.  See Muskrat 
v.  United  States,  219  U. S.  346,  356–358  (1911);  see  also 
Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better Environment, 523 U. S. 83, 
102  (1998).  One  corollary  of  the  case-or-controversy  re-
quirement is that while federal courts can judge the consti-
tutionality  of  statutes,  they  may  do  so  only  to  the  extent 
necessary to resolve the case at hand.  “It is emphatically 
the  province  and  duty  of  the  judicial  department  to  say 
what the law is,” but only because “[t]hose who apply the
rule to particular cases, must of necessity expound and in-
terpret that rule.”  Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 177 
(1803); see Liverpool, New York & Philadelphia S. S. Co. v. 
Commissioners  of  Emigration,  113  U. S.  33,  39  (1885) 
(“[The Court] has no jurisdiction to pronounce any statute 
. . .  irreconcilable  with  the  Constitution,  except  as  it  is
called upon to adjudge the legal rights of litigants in actual
controversies”).  Accordingly, “[e]xcept when necessary” to
resolve a case or controversy, “courts have no charter to re-
view and revise legislative and executive action.”  Summers 
v.  Earth  Island  Institute,  555  U. S.  488,  492  (2009);  see 
United States v. Raines, 362 U. S. 17, 20–21 (1960).

These limitations on the power of judicial review play an 
essential  role  in  preserving  our  constitutional  structure. 
Our  Constitution  sets  forth  a  “tripartite  allocation  of 
power,” separating different types of powers across three co-
equal branches.  DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U. S. 
332, 341 (2006) (internal quotation marks omitted).  “[E]ach