Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/20pdf/19-123_g3bi.pdf
Page Number: 16

12 

FULTON v. PHILADELPHIA 

Opinion of the Court 

eral public to avail themselves of that benefit if they so de-
sire.”  Blizzard  v.  Floyd,  149  Pa.  Commw.  503,  506,  613 
A. 2d 619, 621 (1992).

Certification as a foster parent, by contrast, is not readily
accessible to the public.  It involves a customized and selec-
tive assessment that bears little resemblance to staying in 
a hotel, eating at a restaurant, or riding a bus.  The process
takes  three  to  six  months.    Applicants  must  pass  back-
ground checks and a medical exam.  Foster agencies are re-
quired  to  conduct  an  intensive  home  study  during  which 
they evaluate, among other things, applicants’ “mental and
emotional  adjustment,”  “community  ties  with  family, 
friends,  and  neighbors,”  and  “[e]xisting  family  relation-
ships, attitudes and expectations regarding the applicant’s
own children and parent/child relationships.”  55 Pa. Code 
§3700.64.  Such inquiries would raise eyebrows at the local
bus  station.    And  agencies  understandably  approach  this
sensitive process from different angles.  As the City itself
explains  to  prospective  foster  parents,  “[e]ach  agency  has 
slightly  different  requirements,  specialties,  and  training 
programs.”  App. to Pet. for Cert. 197a.  All of this confirms 
that the one-size-fits-all public accommodations model is a
poor match for the foster care system. 

The  City  asks  us  to  adhere  to  the  District  Court’s  con-
trary determination that CSS qualifies as a public accom-
modation under the ordinance.  The concurrence adopts the 
City’s argument, seeing no incongruity in deeming a private
religious foster agency a public accommodation.  See post, 
at  3  (opinion  of  GORSUCH,  J.).  We  respectfully  disagree
with  the  view  of  the  City  and  the  concurrence.    Although
“we  ordinarily  defer  to  lower  court  constructions  of  state 
statutes, we do not invariably do so.”  Frisby v. Schultz, 487 
U. S.  474,  483  (1988)  (citation  omitted).    Deference  would 
be inappropriate here.  The District Court did not take into 
account  the  uniquely  selective  nature  of  the  certification