Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/23pdf/23-108_8n5a.pdf
Page Number: 24.0

2 

SNYDER v. UNITED STATES 

JACKSON, J., dissenting 

only  today’s  Court  could  love.    Ignoring  the  plain  text  of 
§666—which,  again,  expressly  targets  officials  who  “cor-
ruptly” solicit, accept, or agree to accept payments “intend-
ing to be influenced or rewarded”—the Court concludes that 
the statute does not criminalize gratuities at all.  This is so, 
apparently,  because  “[s]tate  and  local  governments  often
regulate the gifts that state and local officials may accept,” 
ante,  at  1,  which,  according  to  the  majority,  means  that
§666 cannot.

The  Court’s  reasoning  elevates  nonexistent  federalism 
concerns over the plain text of this statute and is a quintes-
sential example of the tail wagging the dog.  Section 666’s 
regulation  of  state,  local,  and  tribal  governments  reflects 
Congress’s express choice to reach those and other entities 
receiving  federal  funds.  And  Congress  not  only  had  good
reasons for doing so, it also had the authority to take such
legislative action, as this Court has already recognized.  See 
Sabri v. United States, 541 U. S. 600, 605, 608 (2004). We
have long held that when Congress has appropriated fed-
eral money, it “does not have to sit by and accept the risk of 
operations thwarted by local and state improbity.”  Id., at 
605. 

Both the majority and Snyder suggest that interpreting
§666 to cover gratuities is problematic because it gives “fed-
eral prosecutors unwarranted power to allege crimes that 
should be handled at the State level.”  App. 14–15 (empha-
sis added); see also ante, at 10–11.  But woulds, coulds, and 
shoulds of this nature must be addressed across the street 
with Congress, not in the pages of the U. S.  Reports.  We 
have previously and wisely declined “to express [a] view as 
to [§666’s] soundness as a policy matter.”  Sabri, 541 U. S., 
at 608, n.  But, today, the Court can stay silent no longer. 
Its decision overrides the intent of Congress—and the pol-
icy preferences of the constituents that body represents—
as unequivocally expressed by the plain text of the statute.
Respectfully, I dissent.