Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/17pdf/16-111_j4el.pdf
Page Number: 36.0

Cite as:  584 U. S. ____ (2018) 

11 

GORSUCH, J., concurring 

Smith, it must be applied in a manner that treats religion 
with  neutral  respect.    That  means  the  government  must 
apply  the  same  level  of  generality  across  cases—and  that
did not happen here.

There is another problem with sliding up the generality 
scale: it risks denying constitutional protection to religious 
beliefs  that  draw  distinctions  more  specific  than  the  gov-
ernment’s  preferred  level  of  description.    To  some,  all 
wedding  cakes may appear indistinguishable.  But  to Mr. 
Phillips that is not the case—his faith teaches him other-
wise.  And  his  religious  beliefs  are  entitled  to  no  less
respectful  treatment  than  the  bakers’  secular  beliefs  in
Mr.  Jack’s  case.    This  Court  has  explained  these  same 
points  “[r]epeatedly  and  in  many  different  contexts”  over 
many  years.  Smith,  494  U. S.  at  887.    For  example,  in 
Thomas a faithful Jehovah’s Witness and steel mill worker 
agreed  to  help  manufacture  sheet  steel  he  knew  might 
find its way into armaments, but he was unwilling to work
on a fabrication line producing tank turrets.  450 U. S., at 
711.  Of course, the line Mr. Thomas drew wasn’t the same 
many others would draw and it wasn’t even the same line 
many other members of the same faith would draw.  Even 
so, the Court didn’t try to suggest that making steel is just 
making  steel.    Or  that  to  offend  his  religion  the  steel 
needed  to  be  of  a  particular  kind  or  shape.    Instead,  it 
recognized  that  Mr.  Thomas  alone  was  entitled  to  define
the  nature  of  his  religious  commitments—and  that  those
commitments,  as  defined  by  the  faithful  adherent,  not  a
bureaucrat  or  judge,  are  entitled  to  protection  under  the
First Amendment.  Id., at 714–716; see also United States 
v. Lee, 455 U. S. 252, 254–255 (1982); Smith, supra, at 887 
(collecting  authorities).  It  is  no  more  appropriate  for  the 
United  States  Supreme  Court  to  tell  Mr.  Phillips  that  a 
wedding cake is just like any other—without regard to the
religious  significance  his  faith  may  attach  to  it—than  it 
would  be  for  the  Court  to  suggest  that  for  all  persons