Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/11pdf/10-1121c4d6.pdf
Page Number: 31.0

4 

KNOX v. SERVICE EMPLOYEES 

SOTOMAYOR, J., concurring in judgment 

do  not  sit  as  self-directed  boards  of  legal  inquiry  and 
research, but essentially as arbiters of legal questions pre-
sented  and  argued  by  the  parties  before  them.’ ”  NASA 
v. Nelson, 562 U. S. ___, ___, n. 10 (2011) (opinion for the 
Court  by  ALITO,  J.)  (slip  op.,  at  11,  n. 10)  (quoting  Car-
ducci v. Regan, 714 F. 2d 171, 177 (CADC 1983) (opinion for
the  court  by  Scalia,  J.));  see  also  Jefferson  v.  Upton,  560 
U. S. ___, ___ (SCALIA, J., joined by THOMAS, J., dissenting) 
(slip op., at 8) (The majority’s “refusal to abide by standard 
rules  of  appellate  practice  is  unfair  to  the  . . .  Circuit,”
which did not pass on this question, “and especially to the
respondent  here,  who  suffers  a  loss  in  this  Court  without 
ever having an opportunity to address the merits of the . . .
question  the  Court  decides”).  The  imperative  of  judicial
restraint  is  at  its  zenith  here,  with  respect  to  an  issue  of 
such  constitutional  magnitude,  for  “[i]f  there  is  one  doc-
trine more deeply rooted than any other in the process of 
constitutional adjudication, it is that we ought not to pass
on questions of constitutionality . . . unless such adjudica-
tion is unavoidable.”  Clinton v. Jones, 520 U. S. 681, 690, 
n. 11 (1997) (internal quotation marks omitted).2 

—————— 

2 The  majority  contends  that  its  holding  “does  not  venture  beyond
the scope of the questions on which we granted review,” pointing to the 
second question presented.  Ante, at 22, n. 9.  The majority is mistaken. 
That  question  concerns  the  chargeability  of  political  and  lobbying 
activities  under  Lehnert  v.  Ferris  Faculty  Assn.,  500  U. S.  507,  522 
(1991),  not  the  procedures  by  which  a  union  may  collect  fees.    See 
Pet. for Cert. (i); id., at 20–27 (describing scope of second question pre-
sented);  id.,  at  23  (“There  is  a  serious  split,  and  confusion,  among  the 
circuits on the chargeability of union political and lobbying activities”). 
Indeed,  it  is  only  petitioners’  first  question  presented  that  deals  with 
fee-collection  procedures.  And  in  that  question,  petitioners  ask  this 
Court to hold that SEIU may not collect its special assessment without
providing  a  Hudson  notice  that  offers  “an  opportunity  to  object  to”  the 
deduction of fees for the assessment.  Id., at (i) (emphasis added). 

The  phrase  “opt  in”  appears  not  once  in  petitioners’  briefing.  The 
majority  protests  that  it  cannot  but  hold  that  an  opt-in  regime  is 
required, seeing as the opt-out regime the petitioners advocate is, in the