Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/22pdf/22-105_5536.pdf
Page Number: 14.0

Cite as:  599 U. S. ____ (2023) 

1 

JACKSON, J., dissenting 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

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No. 22–105 
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COINBASE, INC., PETITIONER v. ABRAHAM BIELSKI 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT 

[June 23, 2023] 

JUSTICE JACKSON, with whom JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR and 
JUSTICE KAGAN join, and with whom JUSTICE THOMAS joins
as to Parts II, III, and IV, dissenting. 

When  a  federal  court  of  appeals  conducts  interlocutory
review of a trial court order, the rest of the case remains at 
the trial court level.  Usually, the trial judge then makes a 
particularized  determination  upon  request,  based  on  the 
facts and circumstances of that case, as to whether the re-
maining  part  of  the  case  should  continue  unabated  or  be
paused  (stayed)  pending  appeal.    This  discretionary  deci-
sionmaking promotes procedural fairness because it allows
for a balancing of all relevant interests.  See Nken v. Holder, 
556 U. S. 418, 434 (2009).

Today, the Court departs from this traditional approach.
It  holds  that,  with  respect  to  an  interlocutory  appeal  of  a 
trial court order denying arbitration, a trial court must al-
ways “stay its pre-trial and trial proceedings while the in-
terlocutory appeal is ongoing.”  Ante, at 1.  In other words, 
in  this  context,  the  Court  sees  fit  to  impose  a  mandatory
general stay of trial court proceedings. 

This mandatory-general-stay rule for interlocutory arbi-
trability appeals comes out of nowhere.  No statute imposes
it.  Nor does any decision of this Court.  Yet today’s majority
invents  a  new  stay  rule  perpetually  favoring  one  class  of 
litigants—defendants  seeking  arbitration.  Those  defend-
ants  will  now  receive  a  stay  even  when,  according  to  the