Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/23pdf/22-277_d18f.pdf
Page Number: 83.0

Cite as:  603 U. S. ____ (2024) 

21 

ALITO, J., concurring in judgment 

B 
A party that challenges government interference with its
curation of content cannot win without making the three-
part  showing  just  outlined,  but  such  a  showing  does  not 
guarantee  victory.    To  prevail,  the  party  must  go  on  and
show that the challenged regulation of its curation practices 
violates the applicable level of First Amendment scrutiny.
Our decision in Turner makes that clear.  Although the
television  cable  operators  in  that  case  made  the  showing 
needed to trigger First Amendment scrutiny, they did not
ultimately prevail on their facial challenge to the Cable Act.
After a remand and more than 18 months of additional fac-
tual  development,  the  Court  held  that  the  law  was  ade-
quately tailored to serve legitimate and important govern-
ment  interests,  including  “promoting  the  widespread 
dissemination  of 
information  from  a  multiplicity  of 
sources.”  Turner  Broadcasting  System,  Inc.  v.  FCC,  520 
U. S. 180, 189 (1997).  Here, the States assert a similar in-
terest in fostering a free and open marketplace of ideas.19 

C 
With these standards in mind, I proceed to the question 

—————— 
through “original programming” or television programs produced by oth-
ers.  Id., at 636 (internal quotation marks omitted).  In cases not involv-
ing core examples of expressive compilations, such as in PruneYard and 
FAIR, a compiler’s First Amendment protection has very much turned 
on the risk of misattribution. 

19 Contrary to the majority’s suggestion, ante, at 27, this is not the only
interest that Texas asserted.  Texas has also invoked its interest in pre-
venting  platforms  from  discriminating  against  speakers  who  reside  in 
Texas  or  engage  in  certain  forms  of  off-platform  speech.    Brief  for  Re-
spondent in No. 22–555, at 15.  The majority opinion does not mention
these  features,  much  less  the  interests  that  Texas  claims  they  serve. 
Texas also asserts an interest in preventing common carriers from en-
gaging in “ ‘invidious discrimination in the distribution of publicly avail-
able goods, services, and other advantages.’ ”  Id., at 18.  These are “com-
pelling state interests of the highest order” too.  Roberts v. United States 
Jaycees, 468 U. S. 609, 624 (1984).