Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/20pdf/19-123_g3bi.pdf
Page Number: 51

Cite as:  593 U. S. ____ (2021) 

29 

ALITO, J., concurring in judgment
ALITO, J., concurring in judgment 

of adoption to have defined dimensions.  But in doing so, we
must  keep  in  mind  that  there  is  a  presumption  that  the 
words  of  the  Constitution  are  to  be  interpreted  in  accord-
ance  with  their  “normal  and  ordinary”  sense.  Id.,  at  576 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  Anyone advocating a
different reading must overcome that presumption. 

B 
1 
What  was  the  free-exercise  right  understood  to  mean
when the Bill of Rights was ratified?  And in particular, was
it clearly understood that the right simply required equal 
treatment for religious and secular conduct?  When Smith 
was  decided,  scholars  had  not  devoted  much  attention  to 
the original meaning of the Free Exercise Clause, and the
parties’ briefs ignored this issue, as did the opinion of the 
Court.  Since then, however, the historical record has been 
plumbed in detail,34 and we are now in a good position to 

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34 See,  e.g.,  McConnell,  The Origins  and  Historical  Understanding  of 
Free Exercise of Religion, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 1409 (1990) (McConnell, Or-
igins); McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism 1109; McConnell, Freedom
From Persecution or Protection of the Rights of Conscience?: A Critique
of Justice Scalia’s Historical Arguments in City of Boerne v. Flores, 39 
Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 819 (1998) (McConnell, Freedom From Persecution); 
Hamburger, A Constitutional Right of Religious Exemption: An Histori-
cal Perspective, 60 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 915 (1992) (Hamburger, Religious
Exemption); Hamburger, More Is Less, 90 Va. L. Rev. 835 (2004) (Ham-
burger, More Is Less); Laycock, Religious Liberty as Liberty, 7 J. Con-
temp. Legal Issues 313 (1996); Bradley, Beguiled: Free Exercise Exemp-
tions and the Siren Song of Liberalism, 20 Hofstra L. Rev. 245 (1991);
Campbell, Note, A New Approach to Nineteenth Century Religious Ex-
emption Cases, 63 Stan. L. Rev. 973 (2011) (Campbell, A New Approach); 
Kmiec, The Original Understanding of the Free Exercise Clause and Re-
ligious Diversity, 59 UMKC L. Rev. 591 (1991); Lash, The Second Adop-
tion of the Free Exercise Clause: Religious Exemptions Under the Four-
teenth  Amendment,  88  Nw.  U.  L.  Rev.  1106  (1994);  Lombardi,
Nineteenth-Century Free Exercise Jurisprudence and the Challenge of