Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/23pdf/22-842_6kg7.pdf
Page Number: 11.0

Cite as:  602 U. S. ____ (2024) 

7 

Opinion of the Court 

threat, the court said, crossed a First Amendment line.  The 
District Court concluded that Vullo was not entitled to qual-
ified immunity at the motion-to-dismiss stage. 

The  Second  Circuit  reversed.    It  concluded  that  Vullo’s 
alleged actions constituted permissible government speech 
and legitimate law enforcement, and not unconstitutional 
coercion.  The Second Circuit determined that the Guidance 
Letters and accompanying press release were not unconsti-
tutionally coercive because they “were written in an even-
handed, nonthreatening tone and employed words intended
to persuade rather than intimidate.”  49 F. 4th, at 717.  The 
court  found  it  significant  that  Vullo  “did  not  refer  to  any
pending  investigations  or  possible  regulatory  action”  and
alluded only to business-related risks “amid growing public 
concern  over  gun  violence.”  Ibid.    As  for  Vullo’s  meeting 
with the Lloyd’s executives, the court admitted that the al-
legations presented a “closer call.”  Id., at 718.  Nonetheless, 
just as with the consent decrees, it found that Vullo “was
merely carrying out her regulatory responsibilities.”  Id., at 
718–719.  The  Second  Circuit  also  held  that,  even  if  the 
complaint stated a First Amendment violation, the law was 
not clearly established, and so Vullo was entitled to quali-
fied immunity. 

The NRA filed a petition for a writ of certiorari, seeking 
either summary reversal or review of the First Amendment
and qualified immunity holdings.  This Court granted cer-
tiorari  on  only  the  first  question  presented  whether  the 
complaint  states  a  First  Amendment  claim  against  Vullo.
See 601 U. S. ___ (2023).3 

—————— 

3 Vullo argues that the Court must dismiss the case as improvidently 
granted because the Court deprived itself of jurisdiction by limiting its
review to the First Amendment question and declining to review the Sec-
ond  Circuit’s  alternative  holding  that  Vullo  is  entitled  to  qualified  im-
munity.  See Brief for Respondent 21–24.  Not so.  In this case, “[a]n order
limiting the grant of certiorari does not operate as a jurisdictional bar.” 
Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U. S. 235, 247, n. 12 (1981).  Because the