Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/17pdf/17-459_1o13.pdf
Page Number: 11

Cite as:  585 U. S. ____ (2018) 

7 

Opinion of the Court 

initial  2006  notice  because  the  document  lacked  infor-
mation about the time and date of his removal hearing.

The Immigration Court disagreed, finding the law “quite
settled that DHS need not put a date certain on the Notice 
to Appear in order to make that document effective.”  App.
to  Pet.  for  Cert.  23a.    The  Immigration  Court  therefore 
concluded that Pereira could not meet the 10-year physical-
presence  requirement  under  §1229b(b),  thereby  render-
ing  him  statutorily  ineligible  for  cancellation  of  removal,
and  ordered  Pereira  removed  from  the  country.  The 
BIA dismissed Pereira’s appeal.  Adhering to its precedent
in Camarillo, the BIA agreed with the Immigration Court 
that the 2006 notice triggered the stop-time rule and that 
Pereira thus failed to satisfy the 10-year physical-presence
requirement and was ineligible for cancellation of removal. 
The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit denied Perei-
ra’s  petition  for  review  of  the  BIA’s  order.  866  F. 3d  1 
(2017).  Applying  the  framework  set  forth  in  Chevron 
U. S. A.  Inc.  v.  Natural  Resources  Defense  Council,  Inc., 
467 U. S. 837 (1984), the Court of Appeals first found that
the stop-time rule in §1229b(d)(1) is ambiguous because it
“does  not  explicitly  state  that  the  date  and  time  of  the 
hearing must be included in a notice to appear in order to 
cut  off  an  alien’s  period  of  continuous  physical  presence.”
866  F. 3d,  at  5.    Then,  after  reviewing  the  statutory  text 
and  structure,  the  administrative  context,  and  pertinent 
legislative  history,  the  Court  of  Appeals  held  that  the 
BIA’s interpretation of the stop-time rule was a permissi-
ble reading of the statute.  Id., at 6–8. 

II
 
A 

The  Court  granted  certiorari  in  this  case,  583  U. S.  ___
(2018), to resolve division among the Courts of Appeals on
a  simple,  but  important,  question  of  statutory  interpreta-
tion:  Does  service  of  a  document  styled  as  a  “notice  to