Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/558bv.pdf
Page Number: 277.0

116 

MOHAWK  INDUSTRIES,  INC.  v.  CARPENTER 

Opinion of Thomas, J. 

Chasser, 490 U. S. 495, 498–501 (1989); Van Cauwenberghe v. 
Biard, 486 U. S. 517, 527 (1988).  The Court’s choice of analy­
sis is the more ironic because applying Cohen to the facts of 
this case requires the Court to reach conclusions on, and thus 
potentially  prejudice,  the  very  matters  it  says  would  bene­
ﬁt  from  “the  collective  experience  of  bench  and  bar”  and 
the  “opportunity  for  full  airing”  that  rulemaking  provides. 
Ante, at 114. 

“Finality as a condition of review is an historic characteris­
tic  of  federal  appellate  procedure”  that  was  incorporated  in 
the ﬁrst Judiciary Act and that Congress itself has “departed 
from only when observance of it would practically defeat the 
right to any review at all.”  Cobbledick v.  United States, 309 
U. S.  323,  324–325  (1940).  Until  1949,  this  Court’s  view  of 
the appellate jurisdiction statute reﬂected this principle and 
the  statute’s  text.  See,  e. g.,  Catlin  v.  United  States,  324 
U. S.  229,  233  (1945)  (holding  that  § 128  of  the  Judicial  Code 
(now 28 U. S. C. § 1291) limits review to decisions that “en[d] 
the litigation on the merits and leav[e] nothing for the court 
to  do  but  execute  the  judgment”).  Cohen  changed  all  that 
when  it  announced  that  a  “small  class”  of  collateral  orders 
that do not meet the statutory deﬁnition of ﬁnality nonethe­
less  may  be  immediately  appealable  if  they  satisfy  certain 
criteria  that  show  they  are  “too  important  to  be  denied  re­
view.”  337 U. S., at 546. 

Cohen  and  the  early  decisions  applying  it  allowed  § 1291 
appeals  of  interlocutory  orders  concerning  the  posting  of  a 
bond, see id., at 545–547, the attachment of a vessel in admi­
ralty, see Swift & Co. Packers v.  Compania Colombiana Del 
Caribe,  S.  A.,  339  U. S.  684,  688–689  (1950),  and  the  imposi­
tion  of notice  costs  in  a class  action,  see  Eisen v.  Carlisle  & 
Jacquelin,  417  U. S.  156,  170–172  (1974).  As  the  Court’s 
opinion  notes,  later  decisions  sought  to  narrow  Cohen  lest 
its  exception  to  § 1291  “ ‘swallow’ ”  the  ﬁnal  judgment  rule. 
Ante, at 106 (quoting Digital Equipment, supra, at 868); see 
generally Coopers & Lybrand v.  Livesay, 437 U. S. 463, 467–