Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/524bv.pdf
Page Number: 767

524US2

Unit: $U98

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722

MONGE v. CALIFORNIA

Syllabus

Court established a “narrow exception” to the general rule that double
jeopardy principles have no application in the sentencing context.
There, after a capital defendant received a life sentence from the origi-
nal sentencing jury and then obtained a new trial, the State announced
its intention to seek the death penalty again. This Court imposed a
double jeopardy bar, ﬁnding that the ﬁrst jury’s deliberations bore the
hallmarks of a trial on guilt or innocence because the jury was presented
with a choice between two alternatives together with standards to guide
their decision, the prosecutor had to establish facts beyond a reasonable
doubt, and the evidence was introduced in a separate proceeding that
formally resembled a trial. Moreover, the Bullington Court reasoned
that the embarrassment, expense, ordeal, anxiety, and insecurity that a
capital defendant faces are at least equivalent to that faced by any de-
fendant during the guilt phase of a criminal trial. Bullington’s rule
has since been applied to a capital sentencing scheme in which a judge
made the original determination to impose a life sentence. See Ari-
zona v. Rumsey, 467 U. S. 203, 209–210. Pp. 727–731.

(b) Bullington’s rationale does not apply to California’s noncapital
sentencing proceedings. Even if those proceedings have the hallmarks
identiﬁed in Bullington, a critical component of that case’s reasoning
was the capital sentencing context.
In many respects, a capital trial’s
penalty phase is a continuation of the trial on guilt or innocence of capi-
tal murder. The death penalty is unique in both its severity and its
ﬁnality, and the qualitative difference between a capital sentence and
other penalties calls for a greater degree of reliability when it is im-
posed. That need for reliability accords with one of the central con-
cerns animating the double jeopardy prohibition: preventing States from
making repeated attempts to convict, thereby enhancing the possibility
that an innocent person may be found guilty. Moreover, this Court has
previously suggested that Bullington’s rationale is conﬁned to the
unique circumstances of a capital sentencing proceeding, Caspari v.
Bohlen, 510 U. S. 383, 392, and has cited Bullington as an example
of the heightened procedural protections accorded capital defendants,
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668, 686–687. Pp. 731–733.

(c) Petitioner attempts to minimize the relevance of the death penalty
context by arguing that the application of double jeopardy principles
turns on the nature rather than the consequences of the proceeding.
Bullington’s holding, however, turns on both the trial-like proceedings
at issue and the severity of the penalty at stake.
In this Court’s death
penalty jurisprudence, moreover, the nature and the consequences of
capital sentencing proceedings are intertwined. States’ implementa-
tion of trial-like protections in noncapital sentencing proceedings is a