Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/529bv.pdf
Page Number: 557.0

529US2

Unit: $U50

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482

SLACK v. McDANIEL

Opinion of the Court

States, 524 U. S. 236, 241 (1998); Mackenzie v. A. Engel-
hard & Sons Co., 266 U. S. 131 (1924). We have described
proceedings in the courts of appeals as “appellate cases.”
E. g., Order of Apr. 30, 1991, 500 U. S. 1009 (amendments to
Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure “shall govern all pro-
ceedings in appellate cases thereafter commenced”). Under
AEDPA, an appellate case is commenced when the applica-
tion for a COA is ﬁled. Hohn, supra, at 241. When Con-
gress instructs us (as Lindh says it has) that application of
a statute is triggered by the commencement of a case, the
relevant case for a statute directed to appeals is the one initi-
ated in the appellate court. Thus, § 2253(c) governs appel-
late court proceedings ﬁled after AEDPA’s effective date.
We see no indication that Congress intended to tie appli-
cation of the provisions to the date a petition was ﬁled in
the district court. The COA statute establishes procedural
rules and requires a threshold inquiry into whether the cir-
cuit court may entertain an appeal. Hohn, supra, at 248;
cf. Lindh, supra, at 327. Because Slack sought appellate
review two years after AEDPA’s effective date, § 2253(c)
governs his right to appeal.

We further note that we applied § 2253 in our post-Lindh
decision in Hohn, a case which arrived in the same posture
as this case. Like Slack, Hohn argued § 2253(c) did not apply
because his petition had been ﬁled in the District Court be-
fore AEDPA’s effective date. Brief for Petitioner in Hohn
v. United States, O. T. 1997, No. 96–8986, pp. 40–44. Though
our opinion did not discuss whether § 2253(c) applied to Hohn,
we would have had no reason to reach the issue we did re-
solve, that we had statutory certiorari jurisdiction to review
the denial of a COA, if AEDPA did not apply at all. Our
disposition today is consistent with Hohn. AEDPA governs
the conditions of Slack’s appeal, and so he was required to
seek a COA to obtain appellate review of the dismissal of his
habeas petition.