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Page Number: 27

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TRUMP v. NEW YORK 

BREYER, J., dissenting 

Thus, the touchstone for counting persons in the decen-
nial census is their usual residence, not their immigration 
status.  That alone is enough to resolve this case, because 
the memorandum seeks to exclude anywhere between tens 
of thousands and millions of persons from the census count 
based solely on their immigration status, and it does so for 
the stated goal of changing the apportionment total at the 
expense of the plaintiffs.  The Government seems to believe 
that its policy can stand so long as any alien without lawful 
status is excludable on some other basis.  However reason-
able such an ad hoc approach might be in theory, that is not 
the policy the memorandum announces, nor does it support 
excluding  aliens  without  lawful  status  as  a  class.  To  the 
extent there is some overlap between aliens without lawful 
status and persons who would not be counted under the or-
dinary census procedures, that cannot justify the exclusion
of aliens simply on account of their immigration status.  It 
is  our  task  to  review  the  policy  as  promulgated,  and  that
policy draws a distinction that the statute does not allow. 

III 
It is worth considering the costs of the Presidential mem-
orandum’s departure from settled law.  The modern census 
emerged from periods of intense political conflict, whereby
politicians sought to exploit census procedures to their ad-
vantage.  See Evans, 536 U. S., at 497 (THOMAS, J., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part); Montana, 503 U. S., at 
451–452,  and  n.  25.  In  enacting  the  1929  Act,  Congress 
sought  to  address  that  problem  by  using  clear  and  broad 
language that would cabin discretion and remove opportu-
nities for political gamesmanship.  History shows that, all
things considered, that approach has served us fairly well. 
Departing from the text is an open invitation to use discre-
tion to increase an electoral advantage.  This produces the
hostility that the 1929 Congress sought to resolve.

Because I believe plaintiffs’ claims are justiciable, ripe for