Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/14pdf/13-352_c0n2.pdf
Page Number: 14

Cite as:  575 U. S. ____ (2015) 

11 

Opinion of the Court 

we should read the Lanham Act narrowly because a broad 
reading  might  be  unconstitutional.  See,  e.g.,  Brief  for 
Respondent  37,  39,  40,  41–42.    The  likely  reason  that 
Hargis  has  not  directly  advanced  a  constitutional  argu-
ment is that, at least as to a jury trial right, Hargis did not 
even  list  the  Seventh  Amendment  as  an  authority  in  its
appellee  brief  to  the  Eighth  Circuit.    Moreover,  although
Hargis pressed an Article III argument below, in its oppo-
sition  to  certiorari  in  this  Court,  Hargis  seemingly  con-
ceded  that  TTAB  decisions  can  sometimes  ground  issue
preclusion,  though  it  now  protests  otherwise. 
See 
Supplemental Brief in Opposition 2.  To the extent, if any,
that there could be a meritorious constitutional objection, 
it  is  not  before  us.  See  Plaut  v.  Spendthrift  Farm,  Inc., 
514 U. S. 211, 231–232 (1995). 

We  reject  Hargis’  statutory  argument  that  we  should 
jettison  administrative  preclusion  in  whole  or  in  part  to 
avoid potential constitutional concerns.  As to the Seventh 
Amendment, for instance, the Court has already held that 
the  right  to  a  jury  trial  does  not  negate  the  issue-
preclusive effect of a judgment, even if that judgment was 
entered  by  a  juryless  tribunal.  See  Parklane  Hosiery  Co. 
v.  Shore,  439  U. S.  322,  337  (1979).    It  would  seem  to 
follow  naturally  that  although  the  Seventh  Amendment 
creates  a  jury  trial  right  in  suits for  trademark  damages, 
see Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U. S. 469, 477, 479–480 
(1962),  TTAB  decisions  still  can  have  preclusive  effect  in 
such suits.  Hargis disputes this reasoning even though it
admits  that  in  1791  “ ‘a  party  was  not  entitled  to  have  a
jury  determine  issues  that  had  been  previously  adjudi-
cated by a  chancellor in equity.’ ”  Brief for Respondent 39 
(quoting Parklane Hosiery, supra, at 333).  Instead, Hargis
contends  that  issue  preclusion  should  not  apply  to  TTAB 
registration  decisions  because  there  were  no  agencies  at
common  law.    But  our  precedent  holds  that  the  Seventh
Amendment  does  not  strip  competent  tribunals  of  the