Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/22pdf/22-179_o75q.pdf
Page Number: 1.0

(Slip Opinion) 

OCTOBER  TERM,  2022 

1 

Syllabus 

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is 
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued. 
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been 
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader. 
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337. 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

Syllabus 

UNITED STATES v. HANSEN 

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR 
THE NINTH CIRCUIT 

No. 22–179.  Argued March 27, 2023—Decided June 23, 2023 

Respondent Helaman Hansen promised hundreds of noncitizens a path 
to  U. S.  citizenship  through “adult  adoption.”   But  that was  a  scam.  
Though there is no path to citizenship through “adult adoption,” Han-
sen  earned  nearly  $2  million  from  his  scheme.    The  United  States 
charged Hansen with, inter alia, violating 8 U. S. C. §1324(a)(1)(A)(iv), 
which forbids “encourag[ing] or induc[ing] an alien to come to, enter, 
or reside in the United States, knowing or in reckless disregard of the 
fact that such [activity] is or will be in violation of law.”  Hansen was 
convicted and moved to dismiss the clause (iv) charges on First Amend-
ment overbreadth grounds.  The District Court rejected Hansen’s ar-
gument, but the Ninth Circuit concluded that clause (iv) was unconsti-
tutionally overbroad. 

Held: Because §1324(a)(1)(A)(iv) forbids only the purposeful solicitation 
and facilitation of specific acts known to violate federal law, the clause 
is not unconstitutionally overbroad.  Pp. 4–20. 

(a)  Hansen’s First Amendment overbreadth challenge rests on the 
claim that clause (iv) punishes so much protected speech that it cannot 
be applied to anyone, including him.  A court will hold a statute facially 
invalid under the overbreadth doctrine if the law “prohibits a substan-
tial  amount  of  protected  speech”  relative  to  its  “plainly  legitimate 
sweep.”  United States v. Williams, 553 U. S. 285, 292.  In such a cir-
cumstance, society’s interest in free expression outweighs its interest 
in  the  statute’s  lawful  applications.    Otherwise,  courts  must  handle 
unconstitutional applications as they usually do—case-by-case.  Pp. 4–
5. 

(b) The  issue  here  is  whether  Congress  used  “encourage”  and  “in-
duce” in clause (iv) as terms of art referring to criminal solicitation and 
facilitation (thus capturing only a narrow band of speech) or instead