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18 

FINANCIAL OVERSIGHT AND MANAGEMENT BD. FOR 
PUERTO RICO v. AURELIUS INVESTMENT, LLC 
Opinion of the Court 

test they might enunciate.  Each of the cases considered an 
Appointments  Clause  problem  concerning  the  importance
or  significance  of  duties  that  were  indisputably  federal  or 
national in nature.  In Buckley, the question was whether 
members of the Federal Election Commission—appointees 
carrying out federal-election related duties—were “officers” 
for Appointments Clause purposes.  In Freytag, the Court 
asked the same question about special federal trial judges 
serving on federal tax courts.  And in Lucia the Court asked 
the same question about federal administrative law judges 
carrying out Securities and Exchange Commission duties. 

Here, PROMESA, a federal law, creates the Board and its 
duties, and no one doubts their significance.  But we cannot 
stop there.  To do so would ignore the history we have dis-
cussed—history stretching back to the founding.  See supra, 
at 10–13.  And failing to take account of the nature of an
appointee’s federally created duties, i.e., whether they are 
primarily local versus primarily federal, would threaten in-
terference with democratic (or local appointment) selection
methods  in  numerous  Article  IV  Territories  and  perhaps
the District of Columbia as well.  See, e.g., 48 U. S. C. §1422
(providing for an elected Governor of Guam); §1591 (same 
for  Virgin  Islands);  District  of  Columbia  Self-Government
Act, §421, 87 Stat. 789 (same for D. C. Mayor); §422(2), 87
Stat.  790  (describing  D. C.  Mayor’s  appointment  powers); 
48  U. S. C.  §1422c  (same  for  Guam’s  Governor);  §1597(c)
(same for Virgin Islands).  There is no reason to understand 
the Appointments Clause—which, at least in part, seeks to
advance  democratic  accountability  and  broaden  appoint-
ments-related responsibility, see supra, at 6–7—as making
it significantly more difficult for local residents of such ar-
eas to share responsibility for the implementation of (stat-
utorily created) primarily local duties.  Neither the text nor 
the history of the Clause commands such a result. 
  Neither do Lebron v. National Railroad Passenger Corpo-
ration, 513 U. S. 374 (1995), or MWAA, 501 U. S. 252, help