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14 

TRANSUNION LLC v. RAMIREZ 

Opinion of the Court 

(and their attorneys).  Private plaintiffs are not accountable
to the people and are not charged with pursuing the public 
interest in enforcing a defendant’s general compliance with
regulatory law.  See Lujan, 504 U. S., at 577. 

In sum, the concrete-harm requirement is essential to the 
Constitution’s  separation  of  powers.    To  be  sure,  the  con-
crete-harm  requirement  can  be  difficult  to  apply  in  some 
cases.  Some advocate that the concrete-harm requirement
be ditched altogether, on the theory that it would be more 
efficient or convenient to simply say that a statutory viola-
tion and a cause of action suffice to afford a plaintiff stand-
ing.  But as the Court has often stated, “the fact that a given
law or procedure is efficient, convenient, and useful in facil-
itating  functions  of  government,  standing  alone,  will  not 
save it if it is contrary to the Constitution.”  Chadha, 462 
U. S., at 944.  So it is here.3 

—————— 

3 The lead dissent would reject the core standing principle that a plain-
tiff  must  always  have  suffered  a  concrete  harm,  and  would  cast  aside 
decades  of  precedent  articulating  that  requirement,  such  as  Spokeo, 
Summers, and Lujan.  Post, at 9–11 (opinion of THOMAS, J.).  As we see 
it, the dissent’s theory would largely outsource Article III to Congress.
As we understand the dissent’s theory, a suit seeking to enforce “general 
compliance with regulatory law” would not suffice for Article III standing
because such a suit seeks to vindicate a duty owed to the whole commu-
nity.  Spokeo, 578 U. S., at 345 (THOMAS, J., concurring) (internal quota-
tion marks omitted).  But under the dissent’s theory, so long as Congress
frames a defendant’s obligation to comply with regulatory law as an ob-
ligation  owed  to individuals,  any  suit  to vindicate  that  obligation  sud-
denly suffices for Article III.  Suppose, for example, that Congress passes
a law purporting to give all American citizens an individual right to clean 
air and clean water, as well as a cause of action to sue and recover $100 
in damages from any business that violates any pollution law anywhere
in the United States.  The dissent apparently would find standing in such 
a case.  We respectfully disagree.  In our view, unharmed plaintiffs who 
seek to sue under such a law are still doing no more than enforcing gen-
eral  compliance  with  regulatory  law.    And  under  Article  III  and  this 
Court’s precedents, Congress may not authorize plaintiffs who have not 
suffered concrete harms to sue in federal court simply to enforce general 
compliance with regulatory law.