Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/21pdf/19-1392_6j37.pdf/19-1392_6j37.pdf
Page Number: 119.0

Cite as:  597 U. S. ____ (2022) 

3 

THOMAS, J., concurring 

381 U. S. 479 (1965) (right of married persons to obtain con-
traceptives)*; Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U. S. 558 (2003) (right 
to engage in private, consensual sexual acts); and Oberge-
fell v. Hodges, 576 U. S. 644 (2015) (right to same-sex mar-
riage),  are  not  at  issue.    The  Court’s  abortion  cases  are 
unique,  see  ante,  at  31–32,  66,  71–72,  and  no  party  has 
asked us to decide “whether our entire Fourteenth Amend-
ment jurisprudence must be preserved or revised,” McDon-
ald, 561 U. S., at 813 (opinion of THOMAS, J.).  Thus, I agree
that  “[n]othing  in  [the  Court’s]  opinion  should  be  under-
stood to cast doubt on precedents that do not concern abor-
tion.”  Ante, at 66. 

For that reason, in future cases, we should reconsider all 
of this Court’s substantive due process precedents, includ-
ing Griswold, Lawrence, and Obergefell.  Because any sub-
stantive due process decision is “demonstrably erroneous,” 
Ramos v. Louisiana, 590 U. S. ___, ___ (2020) (THOMAS, J., 
concurring in judgment) (slip op., at 7), we have a duty to 
“correct the error” established in those precedents, Gamble 
v. United States, 587 U. S. ___, ___ (2019) (THOMAS, J., con-
curring) (slip op., at 9).  After overruling these demonstra-
bly  erroneous  decisions,  the  question  would  remain
whether other constitutional provisions guarantee the myr-
iad rights that our substantive due process cases have gen-
erated.  For example, we could consider whether any of the
rights  announced  in  this  Court’s  substantive  due  process 
cases are “privileges or immunities of citizens of the United 
States”  protected  by  the  Fourteenth  Amendment.    Amdt. 
—————— 

*Griswold  v.  Connecticut  purported  not  to  rely  on  the  Due  Process
Clause,  but  rather  reasoned  “that  specific  guarantees  in  the  Bill  of 
Rights”—including rights enumerated in the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, 
and  Ninth  Amendments—“have  penumbras,  formed  by  emanations,” 
that  create  “zones  of  privacy.”    381  U. S.,  at  484.    Since  Griswold,  the 
Court, perhaps recognizing the facial absurdity of Griswold’s penumbral 
argument,  has  characterized  the  decision  as  one  rooted  in  substantive 
due process.  See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U. S. 644, 663 (2015); 
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U. S. 702, 720 (1997).