Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/17pdf/16-1140_5368.pdf
Page Number: 35.0

Cite as:  585 U. S. ____ (2018) 

9 

BREYER, J., dissenting 

(1977)) (alteration in original).

Several  years  later,  in Thornburgh  v.  American  College 
of  Obstetricians  and  Gynecologists,  476  U. S.  747  (1986),
the  Court  considered  a  Pennsylvania  statute  that  “pre-
scribe[d]  in  detail  the  method  for  securing  ‘informed  con-
sent’ ” to an abortion.  Id., at 760.  The statute required the 
doctor  to  tell  the  patient  about  health  risks  associated
with abortion, possibly available benefits for prenatal care,
childbirth, and neonatal care, and agencies offering alter-
natives  to  abortion.    Id.,  at  760–761.    In  particular  it 
required  the  doctor  to  give  the  patient  printed  materials
that, among other things, said: 

“ ‘ “There are many public and private agencies willing 
and able to help you to carry your child to term, and to 
assist  you  and  your  child  after  your  child  is  born, 
whether you choose to keep your child or place her or 
him  for  adoption.  The  Commonwealth  of  Pennsylva-
nia strongly urges you to contact them before making 
a final decision about abortion.  The law requires that
your  physician  or  his  agent  give  you  the  opportunity 
to call agencies like these before you undergo an abor-
tion.” ’ ” 
Id.,  at  761  (quoting  18  Pa.  Cons.  Stat.
§3208(a)(1) (1982)). 

The  Court,  as  in  Akron,  held  that  the  statute’s  infor-
mation  requirements  violated  the  Constitution.    They
were  designed  “ ‘not  to  inform  the  woman’s  consent  but 
rather to persuade her to withhold it altogether.’ ”  Thorn-
burgh,  supra,  at  762  (quoting  Akron,  supra,  at  444).  In 
the  Court’s  view,  insistence  on  telling  the  patient  about 
the  availability  of  “medical  assistance  benefits”  if  she 
decided  against  an  abortion  was  a  “poorly  disguised  ele-
men[t]  of  discouragement  for  the  abortion  decision,”  and
the  law  was  the  “antithesis of  informed  consent.”    Thorn-
burgh, supra, at 763–764. 

These cases, however, whatever support they may have