Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/17pdf/16-111diff2_e1pf.pdf
Page Number: 21.0

Cite as:  584 U. S. ____ (2018) 

17 

Opinion of the Court 

regulations  that  are  hostile  to  the  religious  beliefs  of  af-
fected  citizens  and  cannot  act  in  a  manner  that  passes 
judgment upon or presupposes the illegitimacy of religious 
beliefs and practices.  The Free Exercise Clause bars even 
“subtle departures from neutrality” on matters of religion. 
Id., at 534.  Here, that means the Commission was obliged 
under  the  Free  Exercise  Clause  to  proceed  in  a  manner 
neutral  toward  and  tolerant  of  Phillips’  religious  beliefs. 
The  Constitution  “commits  government  itself  to  religious
tolerance,  and  upon  even  slight  suspicion  that  proposals 
for  state  intervention  stem  from  animosity  to  religion  or
distrust of its practices, all officials must pause to remem-
ber  their  own  high  duty  to  the  Constitution  and  to  the 
rights it secures.”  Id., at 547. 

Factors  relevant  to  the  assessment  of  governmental
neutrality  include  “the  historical  background  of  the  deci-
sion  under  challenge,  the  specific  series  of  events  leading 
to  the  enactment  or  official  policy  in  question,  and  the
legislative  or  administrative  history,  including  contempo-
raneous statements made by members of the decisionmak-
ing body.”  Id., at 540.  In view of these factors the record 
here demonstrates that the Commission’s consideration of 
Phillips’  case  was  neither  tolerant  nor  respectful  of  Phil-
lips’  religious  beliefs.    The  Commission  gave  “every  ap-
pearance,”  id.,  at  545,  of  adjudicating  Phillips’  religious
objection based on a negative normative “evaluation of the 
particular justification” for his objection and the religious
grounds  for  it.  Id.,  at  537.    It  hardly  requires  restating 
that  government  has  no  role  in  deciding  or  even  suggest-
ing  whether  the  religious  ground  for  Phillips’  conscience-
based  objection  is  legitimate  or  illegitimate.    On  these 
facts,  the  Court  must  draw  the  inference  that  Phillips’ 
religious objection was not considered with the neutrality
that the Free Exercise Clause requires. 

While the issues here are difficult to resolve, it must be 
concluded  that  the  State’s  interest  could  have  been