Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/21pdf/21-954_7l48.pdf
Page Number: 19

14 

BIDEN v. TEXAS 

Opinion of the Court 

‘shall.’ ”).  Congress’s use of the word “may” is therefore in-
consistent  with  respondents’  proposed  inference  from  the 
statutory  structure.    If  Congress  had  intended  section
1225(b)(2)(C)  to  operate  as  a  mandatory  cure  of  any  non-
compliance with the Government’s detention obligations, it 
would not have conveyed that intention through an unspo-
ken  inference  in  conflict  with  the  unambiguous,  express
term  “may.”   It  would  surely  instead  have  coupled  that
grant of discretion with some indication of its sometimes-
mandatory  nature—perhaps  by  providing  that  the  Secre-
tary “may return” certain aliens to Mexico, “unless the gov-
ernment  fails  to  comply  with  its  detention  obligations,  in
which case the Secretary must return them.”  The statutory
grant of discretion here contains no such caveat, and we will 
not  rewrite  it  to  include  one.    See  id.,  at  341  (“We  do  not 
lightly assume that Congress has omitted from its adopted 
text requirements that it nonetheless intends to apply.”).

that 

emphasizes 

The  principal  dissent 

section 
1225(b)(2)(A) requires detention of all aliens that fall within
its terms.  See, e.g., post, at 8 (ALITO, J., dissenting) (“The 
language  of  8  U. S. C.  §1225(b)(2)(A)  is  unequivocal.”). 
While  the  Government  contests  that  proposition,  we  as-
sume  arguendo  for  purposes  of  this  opinion  that  the  dis-
sent’s interpretation of section 1225(b)(2)(A) is correct, and 
that  the  Government  is  currently  violating  its  obligations
under  that  provision.5   Even  so,  the  dissent’s  conclusions 
regarding section 1225(b)(2)(C) do not follow.  Under the ac-
tual  text  of  the  statute,  JUSTICE  ALITO’s  interpretation  is
practically  self-refuting.    He  emphasizes  that  “ ‘[s]hall  be 
—————— 

5 For this reason, JUSTICE ALITO misunderstands our analysis in insist-
ing that our opinion authorizes the Government to release aliens subject 
to detention under section 1225(b)(2)(A).  See post, at 8 (dissenting opin-
ion).  We need not and do not decide whether the detention requirement
in section 1225(b)(2)(A) is subject to principles of law enforcement discre-
tion,  as  the  Government  argues,  or  whether  the Government’s  current 
practices simply violate that provision.