Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/23pdf/23-939_e2pg.pdf
Page Number: 102

Cite as:  603 U. S. ____ (2024) 

5 

JACKSON, J., dissenting 

special  privilege  that  Government  officials  sometimes  in-
voke when carrying out their official duties.1 

All of this is to say that our Government has long func-
tioned under an accountability paradigm in which no one is 
above the law; an accused person is innocent until proven
guilty; and criminal defendants may raise defenses, both le-
gal and factual, tailored to their particular circumstances, 
whether they be Government officials or ordinary citizens.
For over two centuries, our Nation has survived with these 
principles intact. 

B 
With that understanding of how our system of accounta-
bility  for  criminal  acts  ordinarily  functions,  it  becomes
much  easier  to  see  that  the  majority’s  ruling  in  this  case
breaks new and dangerous ground.  Departing from the tra-
ditional  model  of  individual  accountability,  the  majority 
has  concocted  something  entirely  different:  a  Presidential 
accountability model that creates immunity—an exemption 
from criminal law—applicable only to the most powerful of-
ficial in our Government. 

1 
So, how does this new Presidential accountability model 
work?  An  initial  problem  is  the  lack  of  clarity  regarding
what this new model entails.  The majority announces only 
its most basic contours.  See ante, at 6 (asserting that “the 

—————— 

1 See R. Perkins & R. Boyce, Criminal Law 1093 (3d ed. 1982) (“Deeds
which otherwise would be criminal, such as taking or destroying prop-
erty, taking hold of a person by force and against his will, placing him in 
confinement, or even taking his life, are not crimes if done with proper 
public authority”); see also 2 Robinson §141(a) (describing the public-au-
thority defense, under which a defendant may escape liability if he “has 
been specifically authorized to engage in the conduct constituting the of-
fense in order to protect or further a public interest”); Brief for United 
States 29–30, n. 11; ante, at 16, n. 3 (SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting) (citing 
Nardone v. United States, 302 U. S. 379, 384 (1937)).