Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/529bv.pdf
Page Number: 934.0

529US3

Unit: $U61

[11-02-00 07:34:21] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 529 U. S. 848 (2000)

859

Stevens, J., concurring

IV

We conclude that § 844(i) is not soundly read to make virtu-
ally every arson in the country a federal offense. We hold
that the provision covers only property currently used in
commerce or in an activity affecting commerce. The home
owned and occupied by petitioner Jones’s cousin was not so
used—it was a dwelling place used for everyday family liv-
ing. As we read § 844(i), Congress left cases of this genre
to the law enforcement authorities of the States.

Our holding that § 844(i) does not cover the arson of an
owner-occupied dwelling means that Jones’s § 844(i) convic-
tion must be vacated. Accordingly, the judgment of the
Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

Justice Stevens, with whom Justice Thomas joins,

concurring.

Part II of the Court’s opinion convincingly explains why
its construction of 18 U. S. C. § 844(i) better ﬁts the text and
context of the provision than the Government’s expansive
reading.
It also seems appropriate, however, to emphasize
the kinship between our well-established presumption
against federal pre-emption of state law, see Ray v. Atlantic
Richﬁeld Co., 435 U. S. 151, 157 (1978), and our reluctance to
“believe Congress intended to authorize federal intervention
in local law enforcement in a marginal case such as this.”
United States v. Altobella, 442 F. 2d 310, 316 (CA7 1971).
The fact that petitioner received a sentence of 35 years in
prison when the maximum penalty for the comparable state
offense was only 10 years, Ind. Code §§ 35–43–1–1, 35–50–
2–5 (1993), illustrates how a criminal law like this may effec-
tively displace a policy choice made by the State. Even
when Congress has undoubted power to pre-empt local law,