Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/20pdf/19-1039_8n5a.pdf
Page Number: 37.0

Cite as:  594 U. S. ____ (2021) 

5 

BARRETT, J., dissenting 

the Court can rely.  Cf. Katz, 546 U. S., at 372–373 (holding 
that “those who crafted the Bankruptcy Clause” understood 
it to “operat[e] free and clear of the State’s claim of sover-
eign  immunity”);  Fitzpatrick  v.  Bitzer,  427  U. S.  445,  456 
(1976)  (holding  that  state  sovereign  immunity  is  neces-
sarily  limited  by  the  enforcement  provision  of  the  Four-
teenth Amendment); South Dakota v. North Carolina, 192 
U. S. 286, 314–318 (1904) (holding that Article 3, §2, gives
the Supreme Court jurisdiction over a suit brought by one 
State against another); Texas, 143 U. S., at 642–646 (hold-
ing that Article 3, §2, gives the Supreme Court jurisdiction 
over a suit brought by the United States against a State). 
Nor, as discussed, does the constitutional structure single 
out eminent domain for special treatment.  And while the 
Court claims the support of history, the evidence it cites is 
beside the point.

The Court relies exclusively on the fact that Congress and
the States, like the Colonies before them, have consistently 
authorized private parties to exercise the right of eminent
domain to obtain property for mills, roads, and other public
improvements.  See ante, at 9–11.  As the Court notes, Con-
gress did so in the early days of the Republic only within 
“areas subject to exclusive federal jurisdiction,” though we
later  held  that  Congress  could  take  property  within  state
boundaries as well.  Ante, at 8–9.  This history is long and 
undisputed,  and  the  Court  presents  it  as  conclusive  evi-
dence on PennEast’s side of the ledger. 

But the question before us is not whether Congress can
authorize  a  private  party  to  exercise  the  right  of  eminent
domain against another private party, which is the propo-
sition this history supports.  Nor is it whether Congress can
authorize  a  private  entity  to  take  state  property  through 
means  other  than  a  condemnation  suit.    The  question  is
whether Congress can authorize a private party to bring a 
condemnation suit against a State.  And on that score, the 
Court comes up dry.