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Page Number: 27.0

10 

FISHER v. UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN 

THOMAS, J., concurring 

repeats  arguments  once  marshaled  in  support  of  segrega-
tion.  See,  e.g.,  Brief  for  Appellees  in  Davis  17  (“Virginia
has  established  segregation  in  certain  fields  as  a  part  of
her  public  policy  to  prevent  violence  and  reduce  resent-
ment.  The result, in the view of an overwhelming Virginia 
majority,  has  been  to  improve  the  relationship  between
the different races”); id., at 25 (“If segregation be stricken
down,  the  general  welfare  will  be  definitely  harmed 
. . . there  would  be  more  friction  developed”  (internal 
quotation  marks  omitted));  Brief  for  Respondents  in 
Sweatt  93  (“Texas  has  had  no  serious  breaches  of  the 
peace  in  recent  years  in  connection  with  its  schools.    The 
separation  of  the  races  has  kept  the  conflicts  at  a  mini-
mum”);  id.,  at  97–98  (“The  legislative  acts  are  based  not 
only on the belief that it is the best way to provide educa-
tion  for  both  races,  and  the  knowledge  that  separate
schools are necessary to keep public support for the public 
schools,  but  upon  the  necessity  to  maintain  the  public
peace,  harmony,  and  welfare”);  Brief  for  Appellees  in 
Briggs  32  (“The  southern  Negro,  by  and  large,  does  not 
want  an  end  to  segregation  in  itself  any  more  than  does 
the  southern  white  man.  The  Negro  in  the  South  knows
that  discriminations,  and  worse,  can  and  would  multiply 
in  such  event”  (internal  quotation  marks  omitted)).  We 
flatly rejected this line of arguments in McLaurin v. Okla­
homa  State  Regents  for  Higher  Ed.,  339  U. S.  637  (1950),
where we held that segregation would be unconstitutional 
even if white students never tolerated blacks.  Id., at 641 
(“It  may  be  argued  that  appellant  will  be  in  no  better
position  when  these  restrictions  are  removed,  for  he  may
still  be  set  apart  by  his  fellow  students.    This  we  think 
irrelevant.  There  is  a  vast  difference—a  Constitutional 
difference—between  restrictions  imposed  by  the  state 
which  prohibit  the  intellectual  commingling  of  students,
and  the  refusal  of  individuals  to  commingle  where  the 
state  presents  no  such  bar”).  It  is,  thus,  entirely  irrele-