Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/04pdf/04-278.pdf
Page Number: 43

16 

CASTLE ROCK v. GONZALES 

STEVENS, J., dissenting 

some  bite  were  we  faced  with  a  broadly  drawn  statute 
directing,  for  example,  that  the  police  “shall  suppress  all 
riots,” there is little doubt that the statute at issue in this 
case  conferred  a  benefit  “on  a  specific  class  of  people”— 
namely,  recipients  of  domestic  restraining  orders.    Here, 
respondent  applied  for  and  was  granted  a  restraining
order  from  a  Colorado  trial  judge,  who  found  a  risk  of
“irreparable injury” and found that “physical or emotional 
harm” would result if the husband were not excluded from 
the family home.  366 F. 3d, at 1143 (appendix to dissent 
of  O’Brien,  J.).  As  noted  earlier,  the  restraining  order 
required  that  the  husband  not  “molest  or  disturb”  the 
peace  of  respondent  and  the  daughters,  and  it  ordered 
(with  limited  exceptions)  that  the  husband  stay  at  least 
100  yards  away  from  the  family  home.    Ibid.14    It  also  
directed  the  police  to  “use  every  reasonable  means  to 
enforce  this  . . .  order,”  and  to  arrest  or  seek  a  warrant 
upon  probable  cause  of  a  violation.  Id.,  at  1144.  Under 
the  terms  of  the  statute,  when  the  order  issued,  respon-
dent  and  her  daughters  became  “ ‘protected  person[s].’ ” 
§18–6–803.5(1.5)(a)  (“ ‘Protected  person’  means  the  person 
or persons identified in the restraining order as the person 
or  persons  for  whose  benefit  the  restraining  order  was 
issued”).15  The statute criminalized the knowing violation 
of  the  restraining  order,  §18–6–803.5(1),  and,  as  already 

—————— 

14 The  order  also  stated:  “If  you  violate  this  order  thinking  that  the 
other party or child named in this order has given you permission, you 
are wrong, and can be arrested and prosecuted.  The terms of this order 
cannot  be  changed  by  agreement  of  the  other  party  or  the  child(ren), 
only the court can change this order.”  366 F. 3d, at 1144 (appendix to 
dissent of O’Brien, J.). 

15 A  concern  for  the  “ ‘protected  person’ ”  pervades  the  statute.  For 
example,  the  statute  provides  that  a  “peace  officer  may  transport,  or 
obtain  transportation  for,  the  alleged  victim  to  shelter.
  Upon  the
request of the protected person, the peace officer may also transport the 
minor child of the protected person, who is not an emancipated minor, 
to the same shelter . . . .”  §18–6–803.5(6)(a).