Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/17pdf/17-965_h315.pdf
Page Number: 20

Cite as:  585 U. S. ____ (2018) 

15 

Opinion of the Court 

lamation  does  not  exceed  any  textual  limit  on  the  Presi-
dent’s authority. 

B 
Confronted with this “facially broad grant of power,” 878
F. 3d,  at  688,  plaintiffs  focus  their  attention  on  statutory 
structure  and  legislative  purpose.    They  seek  support  in, 
first,  the  immigration  scheme  reflected  in  the  INA  as  a
whole, and, second, the legislative history of §1182(f) and
historical  practice.  Neither  argument  justifies  departing 
from the clear text of the statute. 

1 

Plaintiffs’  structural  argument  starts  with  the  premise 
that  §1182(f )  does  not  give  the  President  authority  to 
countermand  Congress’s  considered  policy  judgments.
The President, they say, may supplement the INA, but he
cannot  supplant  it.  And  in  their  view,  the  Proclamation 
falls  in  the  latter  category  because  Congress  has  already
specified  a  two-part  solution  to  the  problem  of  aliens 
seeking  entry  from  countries  that  do  not  share  sufficient
information  with  the  United  States.    First,  Congress  de-
signed  an  individualized  vetting  system  that  places  the
burden on the alien to prove his admissibility.  See §1361.
Second,  instead  of  banning  the  entry  of  nationals  from
particular  countries,  Congress  sought  to  encourage  infor-
mation  sharing  through  a  Visa  Waiver  Program  offering
fast-track admission for countries that cooperate with the 
United States.  See §1187. 

We may assume that §1182(f ) does not allow the Presi-
dent  to  expressly  override  particular  provisions  of  the 
INA.  But  plaintiffs  have  not  identified  any  conflict  be-
tween the statute and the Proclamation that would implic-
itly  bar  the  President  from  addressing  deficiencies  in  the
Nation’s vetting system. 

To  the  contrary,  the  Proclamation  supports  Congress’s