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HOLLYFRONTIER CHEYENNE REFINING, LLC v. 
RENEWABLE FUELS ASSN. 
Opinion of the Court 

disproportionate hardship.  The result?  A refinery may re-
ceive  an  “extension”  despite  its  exemption  having  lapsed. 
And if that’s how the term is used in subparagraph (A), we
would once again expect subparagraph (B) to follow a con-
sistent pattern of usage.  See Henson, 582 U. S., at ___ (slip 
op., at 5).2 

The refineries suggest we need to place still another point 
in their column.  They direct our attention to a regulation
EPA adopted in 2014 to clarify the bounds of “small refin-
ery” status.  When EPA first sought public comment, some 
suggested a refinery should be eligible for exemption only if 
it  constantly  remained  “small”  from  2006  onward—and 
EPA expressly rejected that view in favor of revisiting an-
nually  whether  a  refinery  falls  above  or  below  the  “small
refinery” threshold.  40 CFR §80.1441(e)(2)(iii).  Before the 
Tenth  Circuit,  the  Agency  insisted  this  regulation  sheds
light on the meaning of “extension” and underscores that it 
does  not  include  a  continuity  requirement.    Indeed,  EPA 
asked the court of appeals to defer to its understanding un-
der  Chevron  U. S. A.  Inc.  v.  Natural  Resources  Defense 
Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837 (1984).  Although the refineries 
repeat that ask here, the government does not.  With the 
recent  change  in  administrations,  “the  government  is  not 
—————— 

2 Replying to our example, the dissent posits that subparagraph (A)(i)’s
exemption “existed in the year 2010 by virtue of statute—even if a par-
ticular refinery was not in a position to take advantage of it.”  Post, at 
12.  But it’s hard to see how a refinery might have an “exemption[ ] cur-
rently in place” when it does not qualify for or receive its benefits.  Post, 
at 1.  Even putting that problem aside, following the dissent’s logic does 
not aid its cause.  What is true for subparagraph (A)(i) should likewise
be  true  for  subparagraph  (B)(i),  which  refers  to  “the  exemption  under 
subparagraph (A).”  So, following the dissent’s reasoning, one might just 
as easily conceive of a subparagraph (B)(i) exemption as “existing” even 
in a year when a small refinery “was not in a position to take advantage 
of it.”  Accordingly, on the dissent’s logic, if a small refinery lacked the 
exemption in one year (say, 2016) and then applied for it in a later year
(say, 2017), it would seem the exemption always “presently exist[ed]” and 
can be “extended.”  Post, at 4, 8.