Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/10pdf/10-10.pdf
Page Number: 23

Cite as:  564 U. S. ____ (2011) 

3 

THOMAS, J., dissenting 

any  evidence  that  courts  appointed  counsel  in  those  pro-
ceedings.  See Mine Workers v. Bagwell, 512 U. S. 821, 831 
(1994)  (describing  courts’  traditional  assumption  of  “in-
herent  contempt  authority”);  see  also  4  W.  Blackstone,
Commentaries  on  the  Laws  of  England  280–285  (1769) 
(describing the “summary proceedings” used to adjudicate
contempt).  Indeed,  Turner  concedes  that  contempt  pro-
ceedings  without  appointed  counsel  have  the  blessing  of 
history.  See Tr. of Oral Arg. 15–16 (admitting that there
is no historical support for Turner’s rule); see also Brief for 
Respondents 47–48. 

B 

Even  under  the  Court’s  modern  interpretation  of  the 
Constitution,  the  Due  Process  Clause  does  not  provide  a 
right  to  appointed  counsel  for  all  indigent  defendants
facing  incarceration  in  civil  contempt  proceedings.  Such 
a  reading  would  render  the  Sixth  Amendment  right  to
counsel—as 
is  currently  understood—superfluous.
Moreover, it appears that even cases applying the Court’s
modern interpretation of due process have not understood 
it  to  categorically  require  appointed  counsel  in  circum-
stances  outside  those  otherwise  covered  by  the  Sixth 
Amendment. 

it 

1 
Under  the  Court’s  current  jurisprudence,  the  Sixth
Amendment entitles indigent defendants to appointed coun- 
sel  in  felony  cases  and  other  criminal  cases  resulting 
in a sentence of imprisonment.  See Gideon v. Wainwright, 
372 U. S. 335, 344–345 (1963); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 
U. S. 25, 37 (1972); Scott v. Illinois, 440 U. S. 367, 373–374 
(1979);  Alabama  v.  Shelton,  535  U. S.  654,  662  (2002). 
Turner  concedes  that,  even  under  these  cases,  the  Sixth 
Amendment  does  not  entitle  him  to  appointed  counsel.
See  Reply  Brief  for  Petitioner  12  (acknowledging  that