Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/20pdf/19-840_6jfm.pdf
Page Number: 57

32 

CALIFORNIA v. TEXAS 

ALITO, J., dissenting 

provisions are inextricably linked to the mandate, the fed-
eral defendants cannot enforce those provisions against the 
state  plaintiffs.    And  the  state  plaintiffs  are  entitled  to  a 
judgment providing as much.  That answer comports with 
the reasoning of the NFIB joint dissent, which made clear 
that  the  state  plaintiffs  should  not  be  required  to  comply 
with the provisions of the ACA that burden them.  See 567 
U. S., at 697–707.  And it comports with the remedial ap-
proach others have advocated in recent years.  See Murphy, 
584  U. S.,  at  ___  (THOMAS,  J.,  concurring)  (slip  op.,  at  3); 
Seila Law, 591 U. S., at ___ (opinion of THOMAS, J.) (slip op., 
at 24); Barr v. American Assn. of Political Consultants, Inc., 
591 U. S. ___, ___ (2020) (GORSUCH, J., concurring in judg-
ment in part and dissenting in part) (slip op., at 5).  Thus, 
under either the framework used in the NFIB joint dissent 
or  the  alternative  framework  advocated  in  subsequent 
cases, the state plaintiffs are entitled to relief freeing them 
from  compliance  with  the  ACA  provisions  that  burden 
them. 

* 

  * 

  * 

  No one can fail to be impressed by the lengths to which 
this Court has been willing to go to defend the ACA against 
all threats.  A penalty is a tax.  The United States is a State.  
And 18 States who bear costly burdens under the ACA can-
not even get a foot in the door to raise a constitutional chal-
lenge.  So a tax that does not tax is allowed to stand and 
support one of the biggest Government programs in our Na-
tion’s history.  Fans of judicial inventiveness will applaud 
once again. 
  But I must respectfully dissent.