Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/20pdf/19-1434_ancf.pdf
Page Number: 42.0

Cite as:  594 U. S. ____ (2021) 

3 

BREYER, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part
Opinion of BREYER, J. 

(PTO).  Even were I to assume, with the majority, that the 
Director must have power to “control” the APJs, the stat-
utes grant the Director considerable control.  As the Court 
recognizes, the Director “fixes” their “rate[s] of pay,” decides
“whether  to  institute  inter  partes  review,”  “selects  the 
APJ’s”  who  will  preside  at  each  particular  proceeding, 
“promulgates  regulations  governing  inter  partes  review,”
“issues  prospective  guidance  on  patentability  issues,”  and 
“designates past PTAB decisions as ‘precedential’ for future
panels.”  Ante, at 10.  All told, the Director maintains con-
trol of decisions insofar as they determine policy.  The Di-
rector cannot rehear and decide an individual case on his 
own; but Congress had good reason for seeking independent 
Board determinations in those cases—cases that will apply, 
not create, Director-controlled policy.

Finally,  Congress’  judgment  is  unusually  clear  in  this
suit, as there is strong evidence that Congress designed the
current structure specifically to address constitutional con-
cerns.  See In re DBC, 545 F. 3d 1373, 1377–1380 (CA Fed. 
2008)  (explaining  amendment  to  address  defects  in  prior 
appointment process). 

Second, I believe the Court, when deciding cases such as 
these,  should  conduct  a  functional  examination  of  the  of-
fices  and  duties  in  question  rather  than  a  formalist,  judi-
cial-rules-based approach.  In advocating for a “functional 
approach,” I mean an approach that would take account of, 
and  place  weight  on,  why  Congress  enacted  a  particular 
statutory  limitation.  It  would  also  consider  the  practical
consequences that are likely to follow from Congress’ cho-
sen scheme. 

Wiener v. United States, 357 U. S. 349 (1958), provides a 
good  example  of  the  role  that  purposes  and  consequences 
can play.  In that case, the Court considered whether, in the 
face  of  congressional  silence  on  the  matter,  the  President
had  the  constitutional  or  statutory  authority  to  remove 
without  cause  a  member  of  the  War  Claims  Commission.