Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/524bv.pdf
Page Number: 479

524US2

Unit: $U93

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434

CLINTON v. CITY OF NEW YORK

Opinion of the Court

As with the New York case, the Government argues that
the wrong parties are before the Court—that because the
sellers of the processing facilities would have received the
tax beneﬁts, only they have standing to challenge the cancel-
lation of § 968. This argument not only ignores the fact that
the cooperatives were the intended beneﬁciaries of § 968, but
also overlooks the self-evident proposition that more than
one party may have standing to challenge a particular action
or inaction.23 Once it is determined that a particular plain-

can itself create an Article III injury, irrespective of the end result. See
Northeastern Fla. Chapter, Associated Gen. Contractors of America v.
Jacksonville, 508 U. S. 656, 666 (1993).
In that case an association of con-
tractors challenged a city ordinance that accorded preferential treatment
to certain minority-owned businesses in the award of city contracts. The
Court of Appeals had held that the association lacked standing “because
it failed to allege that one or more of its members would have been
Id., at 664. We
awarded a contract but for the challenged ordinance.”
rejected the Court of Appeals’ position, stating that it “cannot be recon-
ciled with our precedents.”
Ibid. Even though the preference applied
to only a small percentage of the city’s business, and even though there
was no showing that any party would have received a contract absent the
ordinance, we held that the prospective bidders had standing; the “injury
in fact” was the harm to the contractors in the negotiation process, “not
the ultimate inability to obtain the beneﬁt.”

Id., at 666.

Having found that both the New York and Snake River appellees are
actually injured, traceability and redressability are easily satisﬁed—each
injury is traceable to the President’s cancellation of § 4722(c) or § 968, and
would be redressed by a declaratory judgment that the cancellations are
invalid.

23 Allen v. Wright, 468 U. S. 737 (1984), and Simon v. Eastern Ky. Wel-
fare Rights Organization, 426 U. S. 26 (1976), are distinguishable, as each
of those cases involved a speculative chain of causation quite different
from the situation here.
In Allen, parents of black public school children
alleged that, even though it was the policy of the Internal Revenue Serv-
ice (IRS) to deny tax-exempt status to racially discriminatory schools,
the IRS had “not adopted sufﬁcient standards and procedures” to enforce
this policy.
468 U. S., at 739. The parents alleged that the lax enforce-
ment caused white students to attend discriminatory private schools and,
therefore, interfered with their children’s opportunity to attend desegre-