Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/14pdf/13-7451_m64o.pdf
Page Number: 24.0

Cite as:  574 U. S. ____ (2015) 

1 

ALITO, J., concurring in judgment 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

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No. 13–7451 
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JOHN L. YATES, PETITIONER v. UNITED STATES 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 

APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
 

[February 25, 2015]

 JUSTICE ALITO, concurring in the judgment. 
This  case  can  and  should  be  resolved  on  narrow 
grounds.  And  though  the  question  is  close,  traditional 
tools of statutory construction confirm that John Yates has 
the better of the argument.  Three features of 18 U. S. C. 
§1519 stand out to me: the statute’s list of nouns, its list of 
verbs,  and  its  title.    Although  perhaps  none  of  these  fea-
tures  by  itself  would  tip  the  case  in  favor  of  Yates,  the 
three combined do so. 

Start  with  the  nouns.    Section  1519  refers  to  “any  rec-
ord,  document,  or  tangible  object.”  The  noscitur  a  sociis 
canon  instructs  that  when  a  statute  contains  a  list,  each 
word  in  that  list  presumptively  has  a  “similar”  meaning.
See,  e.g.,  Gustafson  v.  Alloyd  Co.,  513  U. S.  561,  576 
(1995).  A  related  canon,  ejusdem  generis   teaches  that 
general  words  following  a  list  of  specific  words  should
usually  be  read  in  light  of  those  specific  words  to  mean
something  “similar.”  See,  e.g.,  Christopher  v.  SmithKline 
Beecham Corp., 567 U. S. ___, ___  (2012) (slip op., at 18). 
Applying  these  canons  to  §1519’s  list  of  nouns,  the  term 
“tangible  object”  should  refer  to  something  similar  to 
records or documents.  A fish does not spring to mind—nor
does  an  antelope,  a  colonial  farmhouse,  a  hydrofoil,  or  an 
oil derrick.  All are “objects” that are “tangible.”  But who 
wouldn’t  raise  an  eyebrow  if  a  neighbor,  when  asked  to
identify  something  similar  to  a  “record”  or  “document,”