Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/14pdf/13-7120_p86b.pdf
Page Number: 15.0

Cite as:  576 U. S. ____ (2015) 

13 

Opinion of the Court 

from vagueness by interpreting it to refer to the risk posed
by the particular conduct in which the defendant engaged,
not the risk posed by the ordinary case of the defendant’s
crime.  See  post,  at  9–13.    In  other  words,  the  dissent 
suggests  that  we  jettison  for  the  residual  clause  (though
not  for  the  enumerated  crimes)  the  categorical  approach
adopted  in  Taylor,  see  495  U. S.,  at    599–602,  and  reaf­
firmed  in  each  of  our  four  residual-clause  cases,  see 
James, 550 U. S., at 202; Begay, 553 U. S., at 141; Cham-
bers, 555 U. S., at 125; Sykes, 564 U. S., ___ (slip op., at 5). 
We decline the dissent’s invitation.  In the first place, the
Government  has  not  asked  us  to  abandon  the  categorical
approach in residual-clause cases.  In addition, Taylor had 
good  reasons  to  adopt  the  categorical  approach,  reasons 
that  apply  no  less  to  the  residual  clause  than  to  the  enu­
merated  crimes.    Taylor  explained  that  the  relevant  part
of the Armed Career Criminal Act “refers to ‘a person who 
. . . has three previous convictions’ for—not a person who 
has  committed—three  previous  violent  felonies  or  drug 
offenses.”  495 U. S., at 600.  This emphasis on convictions
indicates  that  “Congress  intended the  sentencing  court  to 
look only to the fact that the defendant had been convicted
of  crimes  falling  within  certain  categories,  and  not  to  the 
facts underlying the prior convictions.”  Ibid.  Taylor also 
pointed  out  the  utter  impracticability  of  requiring  a  sen­
tencing court to reconstruct, long after the original convic­
tion, the conduct underlying that conviction.  For example,
if the original conviction rested on a guilty plea, no record
“[T]he  only
of  the  underlying  facts  may  be  available. 
plausible  interpretation”  of  the  law,  therefore,  requires 
use of the categorical approach.  Id., at 602. 

C 

That brings us to stare decisis.  This is the first case in 
which the Court has received briefing and heard argument
from the parties about whether the residual clause is void