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JOHNSON v. ARTEAGA-MARTINEZ 

Syllabus 

Judge  considered  Arteaga-Martinez’s  flight  risk  and  dangerousness 
and ultimately authorized his release pending resolution of his appli-
cation for withholding of removal. 

Held: Section  1231(a)(6)  does  not  require  the  Government  to  provide 
noncitizens detained for six months with bond hearings in which the 
Government bears the burden of proving, by clear and convincing evi-
dence, that a noncitizen poses a flight risk or a danger to the commu-
nity.  Pp. 4–10. 

(a) Section 1231(a)(6) cannot be read to require the hearing proce-
dures  imposed  below.    After  the  entry  of  a  final  order  of  removal 
against  a  noncitizen,  the  Government  generally  must  secure  the 
noncitizen’s removal during a 90-day removal period, during which the
Government “shall” detain the noncitizen.  8 U. S. C. §§1231(a)(1), (2). 
Beyond  the  removal  period,  §1231(a)(6)  defines  four  categories  of
noncitizens who “may be detained . . . and, if released, shall be subject
to [certain] terms of supervision.”  There is no plausible construction 
of the text of §1231(a)(6) that requires the Government to provide bond
hearings  with  the  procedures  mandated  by  the  Third  Circuit.    The 
statute says nothing about bond hearings before immigration judges
or burdens of proof, nor does it provide any other indication that such 
procedures  are  required.  Faithfully  applying  precedent,  the  Court 
cannot  discern  the  bond  hearing  procedures  required  below  from 
§1231(a)(6)’s text.  Pp. 4–6.

(b) Arteaga-Martinez  argues  that  §1231(a)(6)’s  references  to  flight
risk,  dangerousness,  and  terms  of  supervision,  support  the  relief  or-
dered below.  Similarly, respondents in the companion case, see Gar-
land v. Gonzalez, 594 U. S. ___, analogize the text of §1231(a)(6) to that
of 8 U. S. C. §1226(a), noting that noncitizens detained under §1226(a) 
have long received bond hearings at the outset of detention.  Assuming 
without deciding that an express statutory reference to “bond” (as in
§1226(a)) might be read to require an initial bond hearing, §1231(a)(6)
contains  no  such  reference,  and  §1231(a)(6)’s  oblique  reference  to 
terms of supervision does not suffice.  The parties agree that the Gov-
ernment  possesses  discretion  to  provide  bond  hearings  under 
§1231(a)(6)  or  otherwise,  but  this  Court  cannot  say  the  statute  re-
quires them.

Finally, Arteaga-Martinez argues that Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U. S. 
678, which identified ambiguity in §1231(a)(6)’s permissive language, 
supports  a  view  that  §1231(a)(6)  implicitly  incorporates  the  specific 
bond  hearing  requirements  and  procedures  imposed  by  the  Court  of 
Appeals.  In Zadvydas, this Court construed §1231(a)(6) “in light of the 
Constitution’s  demands”  and  determined  that  §1231(a)(6)  “does  not
permit  indefinite  detention”  but  instead  “limits  an  alien’s  post-re-
moval-period detention to a period reasonably necessary to bring about