Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/529bv.pdf
Page Number: 581

529US2

Unit: $U51

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506

BECK v. PRUPIS

Opinion of the Court

ently wrongful under RICO. The speciﬁc type of act that is
analogous to an act of a tortious character may depend on
the underlying substantive violation the defendant is alleged
to have committed.9 However, respondents’ alleged overt
act in furtherance of their conspiracy is not independently
wrongful under any substantive provision of the statute.
Injury caused by such an act is not, therefore, sufﬁcient to
give rise to a cause of action under § 1964(c).10

Petitioner challenges this view of the statute under the
longstanding canon of statutory construction that terms in a
statute should not be construed so as to render any provision
of that statute meaningless or superﬂuous. He asserts that
under our view of the statute, any person who had a claim
for a violation of § 1962(d) would necessarily have a claim
for a violation of § 1962(a), (b), or (c). However, contrary to
petitioner’s assertions, our interpretation of § 1962(d) does
not render it mere surplusage. Under our interpretation, a
plaintiff could, through a § 1964(c) suit for a violation of

9 For example, most courts of appeals have adopted the so-called invest-
ment injury rule, which requires that a plaintiff suing for a violation of
§ 1962(a) allege injury from the defendant’s “use or invest[ment]” of income
derived from racketeering activity, see § 1962(a). See, e. g., Crowe v.
Henry, 43 F. 3d 198, 205 (CA5 1995); Vemco, Inc. v. Camardella, 23 F. 3d
129, 132 (CA6) (collecting cases), cert. denied, 513 U. S. 1017 (1994). Al-
though we express no view on this issue, arguably a plaintiff suing for a
violation of § 1962(d) based on an agreement to violate § 1962(a) is required
to allege injury from the “use or invest[ment]” of illicit proceeds.

10 Respondents argue that a § 1962(d) claim must be predicated on an
actionable violation of §§ 1962(a)–(c). However, the merit of this view is
a different (albeit related) issue from the one on which we granted certio-
rari, namely, whether a plaintiff can bring a § 1962(d) claim for injury ﬂow-
ing from an overt act that is not an act of racketeering. Therefore, con-
trary to Justice Stevens’ suggestion, see post, at 511–512, we do not
resolve whether a plaintiff suing under § 1964(c) for a RICO conspiracy
must allege an actionable violation under §§ 1962(a)–(c), or whether it is
sufﬁcient for the plaintiff to allege an agreement to complete a substantive
violation and the commission of at least one act of racketeering that caused
him injury.