Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/529bv.pdf
Page Number: 480.0

529US2

Unit: $U46

[10-07-01 17:18:24] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 529 U. S. 362 (2000)

405

Opinion of the Court

established Federal
Court of the United States.”

law, as determined by the Supreme
(Emphases added.)

The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit properly ac-
corded both the “contrary to” and “unreasonable application”
clauses independent meaning. The Fourth Circuit’s inter-
pretation of § 2254(d)(1) in Williams’ case relied, in turn, on
that court’s previous decision in Green v. French, 143 F. 3d
865 (1998), cert. denied, 525 U. S. 1090 (1999). See 163 F. 3d
860, 866 (CA4 1998) (“[T]he standard of review enunciated in
Green v. French continues to be the binding law of this Cir-
cuit”). With respect to the ﬁrst of the two statutory clauses,
the Fourth Circuit held in Green that a state-court decision
can be “contrary to” this Court’s clearly established prece-
dent in two ways. First, a state-court decision is contrary
to this Court’s precedent if the state court arrives at a con-
clusion opposite to that reached by this Court on a question
of law. Second, a state-court decision is also contrary to this
Court’s precedent if the state court confronts facts that are
materially indistinguishable from a relevant Supreme Court
precedent and arrives at a result opposite to ours. See 143
F. 3d, at 869–870.

The word “contrary” is commonly understood to mean “di-
ametrically different,” “opposite in character or nature,” or
“mutually opposed.” Webster’s Third New International
Dictionary 495 (1976). The text of § 2254(d)(1) therefore
suggests that the state court’s decision must be substantially
different from the relevant precedent of this Court. The
Fourth Circuit’s interpretation of the “contrary to” clause
accurately reﬂects this textual meaning. A state-court deci-
sion will certainly be contrary to our clearly established
precedent if the state court applies a rule that contradicts
the governing law set forth in our cases. Take, for example,
our decision in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668
(1984).
If a state court were to reject a prisoner’s claim
of ineffective assistance of counsel on the grounds that the