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4 

MURPHY v. NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSN. 

Syllabus 

actors.  There is no way that the PASPA anti-authorization provision
can be understood as a regulation of private actors.  It does not confer 
any  federal  rights  on  private  actors  interested  in  conducting  sports
gambling operations or impose any federal restrictions on private ac-
tors.  Pp. 21–24. 

3. PASPA’s  provision  prohibiting  state  “licens[ing]”  of  sports 
gambling  schemes  also  violates  the  anticommandeering  rule.  It  is-
sues a direct order to the state legislature and suffers from the same
defect  as  the  prohibition  of  state  authorization.    Thus,  this  Court 
need not decide whether New Jersey’s 2014 law violates PASPA’s anti-
licensing provision.  Pp. 24–25. 

4. No provision of PASPA is severable from the provisions direct-

ly at issue.  Pp. 26–30.

(a) Section  3702(1)’s  provisions  prohibiting  States  from  “op-
erat[ing],”  “sponsor[ing],”  or  “promot[ing]”  sports  gambling  schemes 
cannot  be  severed.    Striking  the  state  authorization  and  licensing 
provisions while leaving the state operation provision standing would 
result in a scheme sharply different from what Congress contemplat-
ed  when  PASPA  was  enacted.  For  example,  had  Congress  known 
that  States  would  be  free  to  authorize  sports  gambling  in  privately
owned  casinos,  it  is  unlikely  that  it  would  have  wanted  to  prevent
States from operating sports lotteries.  Nor is it likely that Congress
would  have  wanted  to  prohibit  such  an  ill-defined  category  of  state
conduct as sponsorship or promotion.  Pp. 26–27.

(b) Congress  would  not  want  to  sever  the  PASPA  provisions 
that  prohibit  a  private  actor  from  “sponsor[ing],”  “operat[ing],”  or 
“promot[ing]”  sports  gambling  schemes  “pursuant  to”  state  law. 
§3702(2).    PASPA’s  enforcement  scheme  makes  clear  that  §3702(1)
and  §3702(2)  were  meant  to  operate  together.   That  scheme—suited 
for challenging state authorization or licensing or a small number of
private operations—would break down if a State broadly decriminal-
ized sports gambling.  Pp. 27–29. 

(c) PASPA’s provisions prohibiting the “advertis[ing]” of sports
gambling are also not severable.  See §§3702(1)–(2).  If they were al-
lowed to stand, federal law would forbid the advertising of an activity 
that is legal under both federal and state law—something that Con-
gress has rarely done.  Pp. 29–30. 

 832 F. 3d 389, reversed. 

ALITO, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C. J., 
and KENNEDY, THOMAS, KAGAN, and GORSUCH, JJ., joined, and in which 
BREYER, J., joined as to all but Part VI–B.  THOMAS, J., filed a concur-
ring  opinion.  BREYER,  J.,  filed  an  opinion  concurring  in  part  and  dis-
senting in part.  GINSBURG, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which SO-
TOMAYOR, J., joined, and in which BREYER, J., joined in part.