Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/16pdf/15-1358_6khn.pdf
Page Number: 32.0

Cite as:  582 U. S. ____ (2017) 

27 

Opinion of the Court 

all  the  petitioners—the  Executive  Officials  as  well  as  the 
Wardens—in  creating  the  conditions  of  confinement  at
issue here. 

The  civil-conspiracy  prohibition  contained  in  §1985(3) 
was enacted as a significant part of the civil rights legisla-
tion  passed  in  the  aftermath  of  the  Civil  War.  See  Car-
penters  v.  Scott,  463  U. S.  825,  834–837  (1983)  (detailing 
the legislative history of §1985(3)); Griffin v. Breckenridge, 
403  U. S.  88,  99–101  (1971)  (same);  Great  American  Fed. 
Sav.  &  Loan  Assn.  v.  Novotny,  442  U. S.  366,  379  (1979) 
(Powell,  J.,  concurring)  (describing  §1985(3)  as  a  “Civil
War Era remedial statute”).  The statute imposes liability
on two or more persons who “conspire . . . for the purpose 
of depriving . . . any person or class of persons of the equal 
protection  of  the  laws.”    §1985(3).    In  the  instant  suit, 
respondents allege that petitioners violated the statute by 
“agreeing to implement a policy” under which respondents 
would  be  detained  in  harsh  conditions  “because  of  their 
race,  religion,  ethnicity,  and  national  origin.”   Assuming
these allegations to be true and well pleaded, the question 
is whether petitioners are entitled to qualified immunity. 

A 
The  qualified  immunity  rule  seeks  a  proper  balance
between two competing interests.  On one hand, damages 
suits “may offer the only realistic avenue for vindication of
constitutional  guarantees.”  Harlow  v.  Fitzgerald,  457 
U. S.  800,  814  (1982). 
“On  the  other  hand,  permitting
damages  suits  against  government  officials  can  entail
substantial  social  costs,  including  the  risk  that  fear  of 
personal  monetary  liability  and  harassing  litigation  will
unduly  inhibit  officials  in  the  discharge  of  their  duties.” 
Anderson v.  Creighton, 483 U. S. 635, 638 (1987).  As one 
means to accommodate these two objectives, the Court has
held  that  Government  officials  are  entitled  to  qualified 
immunity  with  respect  to  “discretionary  functions”  per-