Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/10pdf/09-893.pdf
Page Number: 11

8 

AT&T MOBILITY LLC v. CONCEPCION 

Opinion of the Court 

agreements;  but  it  would  presumably  apply  to  contracts
purporting to restrict discovery in litigation as well. 

Other  examples  are  easy  to  imagine.    The  same  argu-
ment  might  apply  to  a  rule  classifying  as  unconscionable 
arbitration  agreements  that  fail  to  abide  by  the  Federal 
Rules of Evidence, or that disallow an ultimate disposition
by  a  jury  (perhaps  termed  “a  panel  of  twelve  lay  arbitra-
tors”  to  help  avoid  preemption).    Such  examples  are  not
fanciful,  since  the  judicial  hostility  towards  arbitration
that  prompted  the  FAA  had  manifested  itself  in  “a  great 
variety”  of  “devices  and  formulas”  declaring  arbitration
against  public  policy.  Robert  Lawrence  Co.  v.  Devonshire 
Fabrics,  Inc.,  271  F. 2d  402,  406  (CA2  1959).    And  al-
though  these  statistics  are  not  definitive,  it  is  worth  not-
ing  that  California’s  courts  have  been  more  likely  to  hold
contracts to arbitrate unconscionable than other contracts. 
Broome,  An  Unconscionable  Application  of  the  Uncon-
scionability  Doctrine:  How  the  California  Courts  are  Cir-
cumventing  the  Federal  Arbitration  Act,  3  Hastings  Bus.
L. J. 39, 54, 66 (2006); Randall, Judicial Attitudes Toward
Arbitration  and  the  Resurgence  of  Unconscionability,  52 
Buffalo L. Rev. 185, 186–187 (2004).

The Concepcions suggest that all this is just a parade of
horribles, and no genuine worry.  “Rules aimed at destroy-
ing  arbitration”  or  “demanding  procedures  incompatible
with  arbitration,”  they  concede,  “would  be  preempted  by
the  FAA  because  they  cannot  sensibly  be  reconciled  with
Section  2.”  Brief  for  Respondents  32.    The  “grounds”
available under §2’s saving clause, they admit, “should not 
be construed to include a State’s mere preference for pro-
cedures that are incompatible with arbitration and ‘would 
wholly  eviscerate  arbitration  agreements.’ ”    Id.,  at  33 
(quoting  Carter  v.  SSC  Odin  Operating  Co.,  LLC,  237  Ill. 
2d 30, 50, 927 N. E. 2d 1207, 1220 (2010)).4 

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4 The dissent seeks to fight off even this eminently reasonable conces-