Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/21pdf/20-1800_7lho.pdf
Page Number: 19.0

Cite as:  596 U. S. ____ (2022) 

1 

KAVANAUGH, J., concurring 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

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No. 20–1800 
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HAROLD SHURTLEFF, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. CITY 
OF BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS, ET AL. 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT 

[May 2, 2022]

 JUSTICE KAVANAUGH, concurring. 
This dispute arose only because of a government official’s
mistaken  understanding  of  the  Establishment  Clause.  A 
Boston official believed that the City would violate the Es-
tablishment Clause if it allowed a religious flag to briefly 
fly outside of City Hall as part of the flag-raising program 
that the City had opened to the public.  So Boston granted 
requests  to  fly  a  variety  of  secular  flags,  but  denied  a  re-
quest to fly a religious flag.  As this Court has repeatedly
made clear, however, a government does not violate the Es-
tablishment Clause merely because it treats religious per-
sons,  organizations,  and  speech  equally  with  secular  per-
sons,  organizations,  and  speech  in  public  programs, 
benefits,  facilities,  and  the  like.    See,  e.g.,  Zelman  v. 
Simmons-Harris, 536 U. S. 639 (2002).  On the contrary, a 
government violates the Constitution when (as here) it ex-
cludes  religious  persons,  organizations,  or  speech  because 
of religion from public programs, benefits, facilities, and the 
like.  See, e.g., Espinoza v. Montana Dept. of Revenue, 591 
U. S. ___ (2020); Good News Club v. Milford Central School, 
533 U. S. 98 (2001); McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U. S. 618 (1978).
Under the Constitution, a government may not treat reli-
gious  persons,  religious  organizations,  or  religious  speech 
as second-class.