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Page Number: 4

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TRUMP v. MAZARS USA, LLP 

Syllabus 

Nor are separation of powers concerns less palpable because the sub-
poenas were issued to third parties.  Pp. 14–18.

(e) Neither side identifies an approach that adequately accounts for 
these weighty separation of powers concerns.  A balanced approach is 
necessary, one that takes a “considerable impression” from “the prac-
tice of the government,” McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 401, 
and  “resist[s]”  the  “pressure  inherent  within  each  of  the  separate
Branches to exceed the outer limits of its power,” INS v. Chadha, 462 
U. S. 919, 951.  In assessing whether a subpoena directed at the Pres-
ident’s personal information is “related to, and in furtherance of, a le-
gitimate task of the Congress,” Watkins, 354 U. S., at 187, courts must 
take adequate account of the separation of powers principles at stake, 
including both the significant legislative interests of Congress and the 
unique position of the President.  

Several  special  considerations  inform  this  analysis.    First,  courts 
should carefully assess whether the asserted legislative purpose war-
rants  the  significant  step  of  involving  the  President  and  his  papers. 
“ ‘[O]ccasion[s]  for  constitutional  confrontation  between  the  two 
branches’  should  be  avoided  whenever  possible.”    Cheney  v.  United 
States Dist. Court for D. C., 542 U. S. 367, 389–390 (quoting Nixon, 418 
U. S., at 692).  Congress may not rely on the President’s information if 
other  sources  could  reasonably  provide  Congress  the  information  it 
needs in light of its particular legislative objective.  Second, to narrow 
the scope of possible conflict between the branches, courts should insist 
on a subpoena no broader than reasonably necessary to support Con-
gress’s legislative objective.  The specificity of the subpoena’s request
“serves as an important safeguard against unnecessary intrusion into 
the operation of the Office of the President.”  Cheney, 542 U. S., at 387. 
Third, courts should be attentive to the nature of the evidence offered 
by Congress to establish that a subpoena advances a valid legislative 
purpose.  The more detailed and substantial, the better.  That is par-
ticularly true when Congress contemplates legislation that raises sen-
sitive  constitutional  issues,  such  as  legislation  concerning  the  Presi-
dency.    Fourth,  courts  should  assess  the  burdens  imposed  on  the 
President by a subpoena, particularly because they stem from a rival
political branch that has an ongoing relationship with the President 
and  incentives  to  use  subpoenas  for  institutional  advantage.  Other 
considerations may be pertinent as well; one case every two centuries 
does not afford enough experience for an exhaustive list.  Pp. 18–20. 

No. 19–715, 940 F. 3d 710; No. 19–760, 943 F. 3d 627, vacated and re-

manded.

 ROBERTS, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which GINSBURG, 
BREYER,  SOTOMAYOR,  KAGAN,  GORSUCH,  and  KAVANAUGH,  JJ.,  joined.