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Page Number: 3

Cite as:  598 U. S. ____ (2023) 

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Syllabus 

not by itself preclude a finding of scienter under the FCA.  Even if the 
phrase is ambiguous, respondents could have learned its correct mean-
ing.  Indeed, petitioners argue that the companies received notice that
the phrase referred to their discounted prices, comprehended those no-
tices, and then tried to hide their discounted prices.  

Second,  the  companies’  reliance  on  Safeco’s  interpretation  of  the 
common-law definitions of “knowing” and “reckless” is misplaced, be-
cause Safeco interpreted a different statute with a different mens rea 
standard.  551 U. S., at 52.  In any event, Safeco did not purport to set
forth the purely objective safe harbor that respondents invoke.  “Noth-
ing in Safeco suggests that [one] should look to facts”—or, here, legal 
interpretations—“that the defendant neither knew nor had reason to 
know at the time he acted.”  Halo Electronics, Inc. v. Pulse Electronics, 
Inc., 579 U. S. 93, 106. 

Finally, respondents contend their conduct is not actionable accord-
ing to the common law of fraud incorporated by the FCA because com-
mon  law  fraud  does  not  encompass  misrepresentations  of  law.    Re-
spondents then posit that their alleged claims were false only because 
their claims’ falsity turned in part on the meaning of the phrase “usual
and customary”—which, they argue, means that their claims would be 
false only as misrepresentations of law.  But that does not follow.  Even 
assuming  that  the  FCA  incorporates  some  version  of  this  rule,  re-
spondents did not make a pure misrepresentation of law; they did not
say, for example, “this is what ‛usual and customary’ means.’ ”  Rather, 
they  made  a  statement  that  implied  facts  about  their  prices,  essen-
tially saying “this is what our ‛usual and customary’ prices are.” Peti-
tioners’ case thus makes out a valid fraud theory even under respond-
ents’ common-law rule.  Pp. 11–16. 

No.  21–1326,  9  F. 4th  455;  No.  22–111,  30  F. 4th  649,  vacated  and  re-

manded.

 THOMAS, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.