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Page Number: 65.0

4 

JUNE MEDICAL SERVICES L. L. C. v. RUSSO 

THOMAS, J., dissenting 

their own, seeking only to vindicate the putative constitu-
tional rights of individuals not before the Court. 

A 

The  Court  has  previously  asserted  that  the  traditional
rule  against  third-party  standing  is  “not  constitutionally
mandated, but rather stem[s] from a salutary ‘rule of self-
restraint’ ”  motivated  by  “prudential”  concerns.    Craig  v. 
Boren, 429 U. S. 190, 193 (1976) (quoting Barrows v. Jack-
son, 346 U. S. 249, 255 (1953)).  The plurality repeats this
well-rehearsed  claim,  accepting  its  validity  without  ques-
tion.  See ante, at 12.  But support for this assertion is shal-
low, to say the least, and it is inconsistent with our more 
recent standing precedents.

As an initial matter, this Court has never provided a co-
herent  explanation  for  why  the  rule  against  third-party 
standing  is  properly  characterized  as  prudential.    Many
cases reciting this claim rely on the Court’s decision in Bar-
rows, which stated that the rule against third-party stand-
ing  is  a  “rule  of  self-restraint”  “[a]part  from  the  jurisdic-
tional  requirement”  of  Article  III,  346  U. S.,  at  255.    But 
Barrows provides no reasoning to support that distinction 
and even admits that the rule against third-party standing 
is “not always clearly distinguished from the constitutional 
limitation[s]”  on  standing.    Ibid.  The  sole  authority  Bar-
rows cites in support of the rule’s “prudential” label is a sin-
gle-Justice  concurrence  in  Ashwander  v.  TVA,  297  U. S. 
288, 346–348 (1936) (opinion of Brandeis, J.).

Justice  Brandeis’  concurrence,  however,  raises  more 
questions  than  it  answers.  The  opinion  does  not  directly
reference third-party standing.  It only obliquely refers to 
the  concept  by  invoking  the  broader  requirement  that  a 
plaintiff must “show that he is injured by [the law’s] opera-
tion.”  Id., at 347.  Justice Brandeis claims that this require-
ment was adopted by the Court “for its own governance in 
cases confessedly within its jurisdiction.”  Id., at 346.  But