Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/558bv.pdf
Page Number: 595.0

434  CITIZENS  UNITED  v.  FEDERAL  ELECTION  COMM’N 

Opinion of Stevens, J. 

Over  the  years,  the  limitations  on  corporate  political 
spending  have  been  modiﬁed  in  a  number  of  ways,  as  Con­
gress  responded  to  changes  in  the  American  economy  and 
political  practices  that  threatened  to  displace  the  common­
weal.  Justice Souter recently traced these developments at 
length.59  WRTL,  551  U. S.,  at  507–519  (dissenting  opinion); 
see  also  McConnell,  540  U. S.,  at  115–133;  McConnell,  251 
F. Supp.  2d, at 188–205.  The  Taft-Hartley Act of 1947  is of 
special  signiﬁcance  for  this  case.  In  that  Act  passed  more 
than 60 years ago, Congress extended the prohibition on cor­
porate support of candidates to cover not only direct contri­
butions, but independent expenditures as well.  Labor Man­
agement Relations Act, 1947, § 304, 61 Stat. 159.  The bar on 
contributions “was being so narrowly construed” that corpo­
rations  were  easily  able  to  defeat  the  purposes  of  the  Act 
by supporting candidates through other means.  WRTL, 551 
U. S., at 511 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing S. Rep. No. 1, 80th 
Cong., 1st Sess., 38–39 (1947)). 

Our colleagues emphasize that in two cases from the mid­
dle  of  the  20th  century, several  Justices  wrote  separately  to 
criticize  the  expenditure  restriction  as  applied  to  unions, 
even though the Court declined to pass on its constitutional­
ity.  Ante,  at  343–344.  Two  features  of  these  cases  are  of 
far  greater  relevance.  First,  those  Justices  were  writing 
separately;  which  is to  say,  their  position failed  to  command 
a majority.  Prior to today, this was a fact we found signiﬁ­

59 As  the  majority  notes,  there  is  some  academic  debate  about  the  pre­
cise  origins  of  these  developments.  Ante,  at  363–364;  see  also  n.  19, 
supra.  There is always some academic debate about such developments; 
the  motives  of  legislatures  are  never  entirely  clear  or  unitary.  Yet  the 
basic  shape  and  trajectory  of  20th-century  campaign  ﬁnance  reform  are 
clear,  and  one  need  not  take  a  naive  or  triumphalist  view  of  this  history 
to ﬁnd it highly relevant.  The Court’s skepticism does nothing to mitigate 
the absurdity of its claim that Austin and McConnell were outliers.  Nor 
does it alter the fact that ﬁve Justices today destroy a longstanding Ameri­
can practice.