Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/20pdf/20-366_7647.pdf
Page Number: 6.0

6 

TRUMP v. NEW YORK 

Per Curiam 

6, 9 (opinion of BREYER, J.); see Reply Brief 6. 

The impact on funding is no more certain.  According to
the Government, federal funds are tied to data derived from 
the census, but not necessarily to the apportionment counts
addressed by the memorandum.  Brief for Appellants 19–
20.  Under that view, changes to the Secretary’s §141(b) re-
port or to the President’s §2a(a) statement will not inexora-
bly have the direct effect on downstream access to funds or 
other resources predicted by the dissent.  Post, at 6–7.  How 
that  question  will  be  addressed  by  the  Secretary  and  the
President is yet another fundamental uncertainty impeding
proper judicial consideration at this time.

The remedy crafted by the District Court underscores the
contingent nature of the plaintiffs’ injuries.  Its injunction
prohibits the Secretary from informing the President in his 
§141(b) report of the number of aliens without lawful sta-
tus.  In addition to implicating the President’s authority un-
der the Opinions Clause, U. S. Const., Art. II, §2, cl. 1, the 
injunction reveals that the source of any injury to the plain-
tiffs is the action that the Secretary or President might take 
in the future to exclude unspecified individuals from the ap-
portionment  base—not  the  policy  itself  “in  the  abstract,” 
Summers  v.  Earth  Island  Institute,  555  U. S.  488,  494 
(2009).  Letting the Executive Branch’s decisionmaking pro-
cess run its course not only brings “more manageable pro-
portions” to the scope of the parties’ dispute, Lujan v. Na-
tional  Wildlife  Federation,  497  U. S.  871,  891  (1990),  but 
also “ensures that we act as judges, and do not engage in
policymaking properly left to elected representatives,” Hol-
lingsworth v. Perry, 570 U. S. 693, 700 (2013).  And in the 
meantime  the  plaintiffs  suffer  no  concrete  harm  from  the 
challenged policy itself, which does not require them “to do
anything or to refrain from doing anything.”  Ohio Forestry 
Assn., Inc. v. Sierra Club, 523 U. S. 726, 733 (1998).

At the end of the day, the standing and ripeness inquiries
both lead to the conclusion that judicial resolution of this