Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/07pdf/07-290.pdf
Page Number: 61.0

58 

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA v. HELLER 

Opinion of the Court 

lar  weapon  chosen  by  Americans  for  self-defense  in  the 
home, and a complete prohibition of their use is invalid. 

We  must  also  address  the  District’s  requirement  (as
applied  to  respondent’s  handgun)  that  firearms  in  the 
home  be  rendered  and  kept  inoperable  at  all  times.  This 
makes  it  impossible  for  citizens  to  use  them  for  the  core
lawful  purpose  of  self-defense  and  is  hence  unconstitu­
tional.  The  District  argues  that  we  should  interpret  this
element  of  the  statute  to  contain  an  exception  for  self-
defense.  See  Brief  for  Petitioners  56–57.    But  we  think 
that  is  precluded  by  the  unequivocal  text,  and  by  the
presence  of  certain  other  enumerated  exceptions:  “Except 
for  law  enforcement  personnel  . . . ,  each  registrant  shall 
keep  any  firearm  in  his  possession  unloaded  and  disas­
sembled or bound by a trigger lock or similar device unless 
such  firearm  is  kept  at  his  place  of  business,  or  while
being  used  for  lawful  recreational  purposes  within  the
District  of  Columbia.”    D. C.  Code  §7–2507.02.    The  non­
existence  of  a  self-defense  exception  is  also  suggested  by 
the  D. C.  Court  of  Appeals’  statement  that  the  statute 
forbids  residents  to  use  firearms  to  stop  intruders,  see 
McIntosh v. Washington, 395 A. 2d 744, 755–756 (1978).28 
Apart  from  his  challenge  to  the  handgun  ban  and  the
trigger-lock  requirement  respondent  asked  the  District
Court  to  enjoin  petitioners  from  enforcing  the  separate 
licensing  requirement  “in  such  a  manner  as  to  forbid  the
carrying of a firearm within one’s home or possessed land 
without  a  license.”  App.  59a.    The  Court  of  Appeals  did
not  invalidate  the  licensing  requirement,  but  held  only 

—————— 

28 McIntosh upheld the law against a claim that it violated the Equal 
Protection Clause by arbitrarily distinguishing between residences and
businesses.  See 395 A. 2d, at 755.  One of the rational bases listed for 
that  distinction  was  the  legislative  finding  “that  for  each  intruder 
stopped  by  a  firearm  there  are  four  gun-related  accidents  within  the 
home.”  Ibid.    That  tradeoff  would  not  bear  mention  if  the  statute  did 
not prevent stopping intruders by firearms.