Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/558bv.pdf
Page Number: 606

Cite as: 558 U. S. 310 (2010) 

445 

Opinion of Stevens, J. 

worse, the law at issue did not make any allowance for corpo­
rations  to  spend  money  through  PACs.  Id.,  at  768,  n.  2 
(opinion of the Court).  This really was a complete ban on a 
speciﬁc, preidentiﬁed subject.  See MCFL, 479 U. S., at 259, 
n.  12  (stating  that  2  U. S. C.  § 441b’s  expenditure  restriction 
“is  of  course  distinguishable  from  the  complete  foreclosure 
of any opportunity for political speech that we invalidated in 
the  state  referendum  context  in .
 Bellotti”  (emphasis 
added)). 

.

.

The  majority  grasps  a  quotational  straw  from  Bellotti, 
that  speech  does  not  fall  entirely  outside  the  protection  of 
the First Amendment merely because it comes from a corpo­
ration.  Ante,  at  346–347.  Of  course  not,  but  no  one  sug­
gests  the  contrary,  and  neither  Austin  nor  McConnell  held 
otherwise.  They held that even though the expenditures at 
issue were subject to First Amendment scrutiny, the restric­
tions  on  those  expenditures  were  justiﬁed  by  a  compelling 
state interest.  See McConnell, 540 U. S., at 205; Austin, 494 
U. S., at 658, 660.  We acknowledged in Bellotti that numer­
ous  “interests  of  the  highest  importance”  can  justify  cam­
paign  ﬁnance  regulation.  435  U. S.,  at  788–789.  But  we 
found  no  evidence  that  these  interests  were  served  by  the 
Massachusetts law.  Id., at 789.  We left open the possibility 
that our decision might have been different if there had been 
“record  or  legislative  ﬁndings  that  corporate  advocacy 
threatened  imminently  to  undermine  democratic  processes, 
thereby  denigrating  rather  than  serving  First  Amendment 
interests.”  Ibid. 

Austin  and  McConnell,  then,  sit  perfectly  well  with  Bel­
lotti.  Indeed,  all  six  Members  of  the  Austin  majority  had 
been on the Court at the time of Bellotti, and none so much 
as  hinted  in  Austin  that  they  saw  any  tension  between  the 
decisions.  The difference between the cases is not that Aus­
tin and McConnell rejected First Amendment protection for 
corporations whereas Bellotti accepted it.  The difference is 
that  the  statute  at  issue  in  Bellotti  smacked  of  viewpoint