Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/558bv.pdf
Page Number: 556

Cite as: 558 U. S. 310 (2010) 

395 

Opinion of Stevens, J. 

permissible  assessment  of  the  dangers  posed  by  those  enti­
ties  to  the  electoral  process,”  FEC  v.  National  Right  to 
Work  Comm.,  459  U. S.  197,  209  (1982)  (NRWC),  and  have 
accepted  the  “legislative  judgment  that  the  special  charac­
teristics of the corporate structure require particularly care­
ful  regulation,”  id.,  at  209–210.  The  Court  today  rejects  a 
century of history when it treats the distinction between cor­
porate and individual campaign spending as an invidious nov­
elty born of Austin v.  Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 
U. S.  652  (1990).  Relying  largely  on  individual  dissenting 
opinions,  the  majority  blazes  through  our  precedents,  over­
ruling  or  disavowing  a  body  of  case  law  including  FEC  v. 
Wisconsin  Right to  Life,  Inc., 551  U. S.  449 (2007)  (WRTL), 
McConnell  v.  FEC,  540  U. S.  93  (2003),  FEC  v.  Beaumont, 
539 U. S. 146 (2003), FEC v.  Massachusetts Citizens for Life, 
Inc., 479 U. S. 238 (1986) (MCFL), NRWC, 459 U. S. 197, and 
California Medical Assn. v.  FEC, 453 U. S. 182 (1981). 

In  his  landmark  concurrence  in  Ashwander  v.  TVA,  297 
U. S.  288,  346  (1936),  Justice  Brandeis  stressed  the  impor­
tance  of  adhering  to  rules  the  Court  has  “developed  . . . for  
its own governance” when deciding constitutional questions. 
Because  departures  from  those  rules  always  enhance  the 
risk  of  error,  I  shall  review  the  background  of  this  case  in 
some detail before explaining why the Court’s analysis rests 
on  a  faulty  understanding  of  Austin  and  McConnell  and  of 
our  campaign  ﬁnance  jurisprudence  more  generally.1  I  re­
gret the length of what follows, but the importance and nov­
elty of the Court’s opinion require a full response.  Although 

1 Speciﬁcally, Part I, infra, at 396–408, addresses the procedural history 
of  the  case  and  the  narrower  grounds  of  decision  the  majority  has  by­
passed.  Part  II,  infra,  at  408–414,  addresses  stare  decisis.  Part  III, 
infra,  at  414–446,  addresses  the  Court’s  assumptions  that  BCRA  “bans” 
corporate speech, that identity-based distinctions may not be drawn in the 
political realm, and that Austin and McConnell were outliers in our First 
Amendment  tradition.  Part  IV,  infra,  at  447–478,  addresses  the  Court’s 
treatment of the anticorruption, antidistortion, and shareholder protection 
rationales for regulating corporate electioneering.