Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/23pdf/22-451_7m58.pdf
Page Number: 48.0

Cite as:  603 U. S. ____ (2024) 

1 

GORSUCH, J., concurring 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

_________________ 

Nos. 22–451 and 22–1219 
_________________ 

22–451 

LOPER BRIGHT ENTERPRISES, ET AL., 
PETITIONERS 
v. 
GINA RAIMONDO, SECRETARY OF 
COMMERCE, ET AL. 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT 

22–1219 

RELENTLESS, INC., ET AL., PETITIONERS 
v. 
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, ET AL. 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT 

[June 28, 2024]

 JUSTICE GORSUCH, concurring. 
In  disputes  between  individuals  and  the  government 
about the meaning of a federal law, federal courts have tra-
ditionally  sought  to  offer  independent  judgments  about 
“what the law is” without favor to either side.  Marbury v. 
Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 177 (1803).  Beginning in the mid-
1980s, however, this Court experimented with a radically
different approach.  Applying Chevron deference, judges be-
gan  deferring  to  the  views  of  executive  agency  officials 
about the meaning of federal statutes.  See Chevron U. S. A. 
Inc.  v.  Natural  Resources  Defense  Council,  Inc.,  467  U. S. 
837 (1984).  With time, the error of this approach became 
widely appreciated.  So much so that this Court has refused 
to  apply  Chevron  deference  since 2016.    Today,  the  Court 
places a tombstone on Chevron no one can miss.  In doing