Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/20pdf/19-1039_8n5a.pdf
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PENNEAST PIPELINE CO. v. NEW JERSEY 

Syllabus 

as it awarded PennEast relief with respect to New Jersey’s property 
interests.  The Third Circuit concluded that because §717f(h) did not 
clearly delegate to certificate holders the Federal Government’s ability
to sue nonconsenting States, PennEast was not authorized to condemn 
New Jersey’s property. 

Held: Section 717f(h) authorizes FERC certificate holders to condemn all
necessary rights-of-way, whether owned by private parties or States.
Pp. 6–23.

(a) The United States raises a threshold challenge to the Third Cir-
cuit’s jurisdiction below on the grounds that §717r(b) grants the court 
of appeals reviewing FERC’s certificate order (here, the D. C. Circuit) 
“exclusive” jurisdiction to “affirm, modify, or set aside such order.”  The 
Court  rejects  this  challenge.    New  Jersey  does  not  seek  to  modify
FERC’s order; it asserts a defense against the condemnation proceed-
ings initiated by PennEast.  The Third Circuit’s decision that §717f(h)
does not grant natural gas companies the right to bring condemnation
suits against States did not “modify” or “set aside” FERC’s order, which 
neither  purports  to  grant  PennEast  the  right  to  file  a condemnation
suit against States nor addresses whether §717f(h) grants that right.
Contrary to the argument of the United States, New Jersey’s appeal is 
not a collateral attack on the FERC order.  Pp. 6–7.

(b) The Federal Government has exercised its eminent domain au-
thority since the founding, connecting our country through turnpikes,
bridges, and railroads—and more recently through pipelines, telecom-
munications  infrastructure,  and  electric  transmission  facilities.    The 
Court  has  upheld  these  exercises  of  the  federal  eminent  domain 
power—whether by the Government or a private corporation, whether
through the upfront taking of property or a condemnation action, and 
whether against private property or state-owned land.  Section 717f(h) 
falls within this established practice.  Pp. 7–12. 

(1) Governments have long taken property for public use without
the owner’s consent.  The United States is no different.  While the Con-
stitution and Bill of Rights did not use the term “eminent domain,” the
Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment (“nor shall private property 
be taken for public use, without just compensation”) presupposed the 
existence of such a power.  Initially, the Federal Government exercised
its eminent domain authority in areas subject to exclusive federal ju-
risdiction.  The Court later confirmed that federal eminent domain ex-
tended to property within a State.  Kohl v. United States, 91 U. S. 367. 
The Court’s decision in Kohl—which upheld the power of the United 
States  to  condemn  land  in  Ohio  to  construct  a  federal  building—ob-
served that eminent domain was a “means well known when the Con-
stitution was adopted” and that “[t]he powers vested by the Constitu-
tion  in  the  general  government  demand  for  their  exercise  the