Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/22pdf/22-138_43j7.pdf
Page Number: 53

Cite as:  600 U. S. ____ (2023) 

11 

BARRETT, J., dissenting 

threaten speech.  That is not surprising at the federal level, 
because  the  Federal  Government  did  not  prohibit  threats
until  the  early  20th  century.  Elonis,  575  U. S.,  at  760 
(THOMAS, J., dissenting).  Some States, however, both reg-
ulated  threats  and  guaranteed  the  right  to  free  speech in
their own constitutions.  Id., at 760–761.  Yet even at the 
state  level,  there  was  apparently  no  discussion  about  the
implications of these statutes for the constitutional right. 

That void notwithstanding, the state threat statutes are
the evidence on which Counterman seizes.  He argues that 
they imposed a subjective mens rea, demonstrating that the 
founding generation thought that threats could be punished 
on no less.  But as JUSTICE THOMAS has already discussed 
in detail, this is incorrect.  See id., at 760–765.  Rather than 
a  subjective  mens  rea,  these  statutes  used  an  objective
standard resembling Colorado’s. 

Even if they did require a heightened mens rea, though,
these  statutes  would  not  carry  the  day  for  Counterman. 
The enactment of a statute against the backdrop of a free
speech  guarantee  tends  to  show  that  the  legislature
thought the statute consistent with that guarantee.  Thus, 
if  the  question  were  whether  such  statutes  violated  the 
First Amendment, their existence would be evidence to the 
contrary.  But the question here is whether a subjective in-
tent requirement is the constitutional floor.  And because 
the legislature is always free to exceed the floor, the enact-
ment of legislation does not necessarily reflect the legisla-
ture’s view of the constitutional minimum. 

At  the  end  of  the  day,  then,  the  best  historical  case  for 
Counterman  does  not  add  up  to  much.    He  is  plainly  not 
asking the Court to enforce a historically sanctioned rule,
but rather to fashion a new one. 

D 
Even  if  a  subjective  test  had  a  historical  pedigree,  the
Court’s chosen standard of recklessness certainly does not.