Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/04pdf/04-278.pdf
Page Number: 8.0

Cite as:  545 U. S. ____ (2005) 

5 

Opinion of the Court 

spondent  brought  an  action  under  Rev.  Stat.  §1979,  42 
U. S. C.  §1983,  claiming  that  the  town  violated  the  Due 
Process  Clause  because  its  police  department  had  “an 
official  policy  or  custom  of  failing  to  respond  properly  to 
complaints of restraining order violations” and “tolerate[d]
the  non-enforcement  of  restraining  orders  by  its  police 
officers.”  App. to Pet. for Cert. 129a.3  The complaint also 
alleged  that  the  town’s  actions  “were  taken  either  will-
fully,  recklessly  or  with  such  gross  negligence  as  to  indi-
cate  wanton  disregard  and  deliberate  indifference  to” 
respondent’s civil rights.  Ibid. 

Before  answering  the  complaint,  the  defendants  filed  a 
motion  to  dismiss  under  Federal  Rule  of  Civil  Procedure 
12(b)(6).  The District  Court granted the motion, conclud-
ing that,  whether construed as making a substantive due 
process  or  procedural  due  process  claim,  respondent’s 
complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be 
granted.

A panel of the Court of Appeals affirmed the rejection of 
a  substantive  due  process  claim,  but  found  that  respon-
dent  had  alleged  a  cognizable  procedural  due  process 
claim.  307  F. 3d  1258  (CA10  2002).    On  rehearing  en
banc,  a  divided  court  reached  the  same  disposition,  con-
cluding that respondent had a “protected property interest
in  the  enforcement  of  the  terms  of  her  restraining  order” 
and that the town had deprived her of due process because 
“the  police  never  ‘heard’  nor  seriously  entertained  her 
request  to  enforce  and  protect  her  interests  in  the  re-
straining  order.”  366  F. 3d,  at  1101,  1117.  We  granted
certiorari.  543 U. S. ___ (2004). 

—————— 

3 Three  police  officers  were  also  named  as  defendants  in  the  com-
plaint,  but  the  Court  of  Appeals  concluded  that  they  were  entitled  to 
qualified  immunity,  366  F. 3d  1093,  1118  (CA10  2004)  (en  banc). 
Respondent  did  not  file  a  cross-petition  challenging  that  aspect  of  the 
judgment.