Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/558bv.pdf
Page Number: 339

178 

NRG  POWER  MARKETING,  LLC  v.  MAINE  PUB. 
UTIL.  COMM’N 
Stevens, J., dissenting 

The Court held in Morgan Stanley that Mobile-Sierra es­
tablished a presumption: FERC “must presume that the rate 
set  out  in  a  freely  negotiated  wholesale-energy  contract 
meets  the  ‘just  and  reasonable’  requirement  imposed  by 
law.”  554  U. S.,  at  530.  And  that  presumption,  according 
to  the  Court,  is  a  simple  application  of  the  just-and­
reasonable standard  to contract rates, not  a different stand­
ard of review.  Id., at 535 (rejecting the “obviously indefen­
sible proposition that a standard different from the statutory 
just-and-reasonable  standard  applies  to  contract  rates”). 
But applying the presumption nonetheless sets a higher bar 
for  a  rate  challenge.1  FERC  may  abrogate  the  rate  only 
if  the  public  interest  is  seriously  harmed.  Id.,  at  550–551 
(“[U]nder  the  Mobile-Sierra  presumption,  setting  aside  a 
contract rate requires a ﬁnding of ‘unequivocal public neces­
sity,’ ”  Permian  Basin  Area  Rate  Cases,  390  U. S.  747,  822 
(1968),  “or  ‘extraordinary  circumstances,’  Arkansas  Louisi­
ana Gas Co. v.  Hall, 453 U. S. 571, 582 (1981)”). 

As I explained in my dissent in Morgan Stanley, the impo­
sition  of  this  additional  burden  on  purchasers  challenging 
rates  was  not  authorized  by  the  governing  statute.  Under 
the  Federal  Power  Act  (FPA),  all  wholesale  electricity 
rates  must  be  “just  and  reasonable.”  16  U. S. C.  § 824d(a). 
“[N]othing  in  the  statute  mandates  differing  application  of 
the  statutory  standard  to  rates  set  by  contract.”  Morgan 
Stanley,  554  U. S.,  at  557  (Stevens,  J.,  dissenting)  (inter­
nal  quotation  marks  omitted;  emphasis  deleted).  And  the 
Mobile-Sierra line of cases did not “mandate a ‘serious harm’ 
standard of review,” much less “require any assumption that 
high  rates  and  low  rates  impose  symmetric  burdens  on  the 
public  interest.”  Morgan  Stanley,  554  U. S.,  at  561–562 

1 Whether the Court explains the Mobile-Sierra doctrine as a presump­
tion  or  as  a  different  standard  of  review,  “[t]here  is  no  signiﬁcant  differ­
ence  between  requiring  a  heightened  showing  to  overcome  an  otherwise 
conclusive  presumption  and  imposing  a  heightened  standard  of  review.” 
Morgan Stanley, 554 U. S., at 557 (Stevens, J., dissenting).