Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/20pdf/20-222_2c83.pdf
Page Number: 13.0

10  GOLDMAN SACHS GROUP, INC. v. ARKANSAS TEACHER 

RETIREMENT SYSTEM 
Opinion of the Court 

We disagree.  We have held that Rule 301 “in no way re-
stricts the authority of a court . . . to change the customary
burdens  of  persuasion”  pursuant  to  a  federal  statute. 
NLRB v. Transportation Management Corp., 462 U. S. 393, 
404, n. 7 (1983).  And we have at times exercised that au-
thority to reassign the burden of persuasion to the defend-
ant upon a prima facie showing by the plaintiff.  See, e.g., 
Teamsters  v.  United  States,  431  U. S.  324,  359,  and  n. 45 
(1977); Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U. S. 747, 772– 
773 (1976).

Goldman does not ask us to revisit these precedents.  So 
the threshold question here is not whether we have the au-
thority  to  assign  defendants  the  burden  of  persuasion  to 
prove a lack of price impact, but instead whether we already 
exercised  that  authority  in  establishing  the  Basic  frame-
work  pursuant  to  the  securities  laws.    We  conclude  that 
Basic and Halliburton II did just that. 

Basic held that defendants may rebut the presumption of 
reliance if they “show that the misrepresentation in fact did 
not lead to a distortion of price.”  485 U. S., at 248 (empha-
sis  added).   To  do  so,  Basic  said,  defendants  may  make
“[a]ny showing that severs the link between the alleged mis-
representation  and  . . .  the  price  received  (or  paid)  by  the 
plaintiff.”  Ibid. (emphasis added).  Similarly, Halliburton 
II held that defendants may rebut the Basic presumption
at  class  certification  “by  showing  . . .  that  the  particular
misrepresentation at issue did not affect the stock’s market 
price.”  573 U. S., at 279 (emphasis added). 

Goldman and JUSTICE GORSUCH argue that these refer-
ences  to  a  defendant’s  “showing”  refer  to  the  defendant’s 
burden  of  production.  Post,  at  6–8  (dissenting  opinion) 
(hereinafter the dissent).  On this reading, Basic and Halli-
burton II require a defendant merely to offer “evidence that,
if believed, would support a finding” of a lack of price im-
pact.  Post, at 5.  But Basic and Halliburton II plainly re-
quire more:  The defendant must “in fact” “seve[r] the link”