Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/16pdf/15-1358_6khn.pdf
Page Number: 65

Cite as:  582 U. S. ____ (2017) 

21 

BREYER, J., dissenting 

in  time  of  war  or  national  emergency?    In  my  view,  they 
should. 

For  one  thing,  a  Bivens  action  comes  accompanied  by
many legal safeguards designed to prevent the courts from
interfering with Executive and Legislative Branch activity 
reasonably  believed  to  be  necessary  to  protect  national 
security. 
In  Justice  Jackson’s  well-known  words,  the 
Constitution is not “a suicide pact.”  Terminiello v. Chicago, 
337  U. S.  1,  37  (1949)  (dissenting  opinion).    The  Consti-
tution  itself  takes  account  of  public  necessity.    Thus,  for 
example, the Fourth Amendment does not forbid  all Gov-
ernment  searches  and  seizures;  it  forbids  only  those  that 
are  “unreasonable.”    Ordinarily,  it  requires  that  a  police
officer  obtain  a  search  warrant  before  entering  an  apart-
ment,  but  should  the  officer  observe  a  woman  being 
dragged  against  her  will  into  that  apartment,  he  should, 
and  will,  act  at  once.    The  Fourth  Amendment  makes 
allowances  for  such  “exigent  circumstances.”    Brigham 
City  v.  Stuart,  547  U. S.  398,  401  (2006)  (warrantless
entry  justified  to  forestall  imminent  injury).    Similarly,
the Fifth Amendment bars only conditions of confinement 
that  are  not  “reasonably  related  to  a  legitimate  govern-
mental objective.”  Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U. S., at 539.  What 
is  unreasonable  and  illegitimate  in  time  of  peace  may  be 
reasonable and legitimate in time of war.

Moreover,  Bivens  comes  accompanied  with  a  qualified-
immunity  defense.  Federal  officials  will  face  suit  only  if
they have violated a constitutional right that was “clearly 
established” at the time they acted.  Harlow, 457 U. S., at 
818. 

Further,  in  order  to  prevent  the  very  presence  of  a 
Bivens  lawsuit  from  interfering  with  the  work  of  a  Gov-
ernment  official,  this  Court  has  held  that  a  com-
plaint  must  state  a  claim  for  relief  that  is  “plausible.” 
Iqbal,  556  U. S.,  at  679.    “[C]onclusory”  statements  and
Id.,  at  678. 
“[t]hreadbare”  allegations  will  not  suffice.