Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/10pdf/10-277.pdf
Page Number: 29

Cite as:  564 U. S. ____ (2011) 

25 

Opinion of the Court 

by  Wal-Mart  lack  standing  to  seek  injunctive  or  declara-
tory relief against its employment practices.  The Court of 
Appeals’  response  to  that  difficulty,  however,  was  not  to 
eliminate  all  former  employees  from  the  certified  class,
but  to  eliminate  only  those  who  had  left  the  company’s
employ by the date the complaint was filed.  That solution 
has  no  logical  connection  to  the  problem,  since  those  who 
have left their Wal-Mart jobs since the complaint was filed
have  no  more  need  for  prospective  relief  than  those  who 
left beforehand.  As a consequence, even though the valid-
ity  of  a  (b)(2)  class  depends  on  whether  “final  injunctive
relief  or  corresponding  declaratory  relief  is  appropriate
respecting  the  class  as  a  whole,”  Rule  23(b)(2)  (emphasis
added),  about  half  the  members  of  the  class  approved  by
the Ninth Circuit have no claim for injunctive or declara-
tory  relief  at  all.  Of  course,  the  alternative  (and  logical) 
solution of excising plaintiffs from the class as they leave
their  employment  may  have  struck  the  Court  of  Appeals 
as  wasteful  of  the  District  Court’s  time.    Which  indeed  it 
is,  since  if  a  backpay  action  were  properly  certified  for 
class treatment under (b)(3), the ability to litigate a plain-
tiff ’s backpay claim as part of the class would not turn on 
the  irrelevant  question  whether  she  is  still  employed  at 
Wal-Mart.    What  follows  from  this,  however,  is  not  that 
some  arbitrary  limitation  on  class  membership  should  be 
imposed  but  that  the  backpay  claims  should  not  be  certi-
fied under Rule 23(b)(2) at all.

Finally,  respondents  argue  that  their  backpay  claims
are appropriate for a (b)(2) class action because a backpay 
award is equitable in nature.  The latter may be true, but 
it  is  irrelevant.  The  Rule  does  not  speak  of  “equitable” 
remedies  generally  but  of  injunctions  and  declaratory 
judgments.  As  Title  VII  itself  makes  pellucidly  clear,
backpay  is  neither.    See  42  U. S. C.  §2000e–5(g)(2)(B)(i) 
and  (ii)  (distinguishing  between  declaratory  and  injunc-
tive  relief  and  the  payment  of  “backpay,”  see  §2000e–