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16 

MISSOURI v. MCNEELY 

Opinion of the Court 
Opinion of SOTOMAYOR, J. 

of reasonableness here.7 

Next, the State and the United States contend that the 

privacy  interest  implicated  by  blood  draws  of  drunk­
driving  suspects  is  relatively  minimal.    That  is  so,  they 
claim, both because motorists have a diminished expecta­
tion  of  privacy  and  because  our  cases  have  repeatedly 
indicated that blood testing is commonplace in society and
typically  involves  “virtually  no  risk,  trauma,  or  pain.” 
Schmerber, 384 U. S., at 771.  See also post, at 3, and n. 1 
(opinion of THOMAS, J.).

But the fact that people are “accorded less privacy in . . .
automobiles  because  of  th[e]  compelling  governmental 
need  for  regulation,”  California  v.  Carney,  471  U. S.  386, 
392 (1985), does not diminish a motorist’s privacy interest 
in  preventing  an  agent  of  the  government  from  piercing 
his  skin.  As  to  the  nature  of  a  blood  test  conducted  in  a 
medical setting by trained personnel, it is concededly less 
intrusive  than  other  bodily  invasions  we  have  found  un­
reasonable.   See  Winston,  470  U. S.,  at  759–766  (surgery 
to  remove  a  bullet);  Rochin  v.  California,  342  U. S.  165, 
172–174  (1952)  (induced  vomiting  to  extract  narcotics
capsules  ingested  by  a  suspect  violated  the  Due  Process
Clause).  For  that  reason,  we  have  held  that  medically 
drawn  blood  tests  are  reasonable  in  appropriate  circum­
stances.  See  Skinner,  489  U. S.,  at  618–633  (upholding 

—————— 

7 The dissent contends that officers in the field will be unable to apply 
the traditional totality of the circumstances test in this context because
they  will  not  know  all  of  the  relevant  facts  at  the  time  of  an  arrest. 
See post, at 6.  But  because “[t]he police  are presumably familiar with
the mechanics and time involved in the warrant process in their partic­
ular jurisdiction,” post, at 8 (opinion of ROBERTS, C. J.), we expect that
officers  can  make  reasonable  judgments  about  whether  the  warrant
process  would  produce  unacceptable  delay  under  the  circumstances. 
Reviewing  courts  in  turn  should  assess  those  judgments  “ ‘from  the 
perspective  of  a  reasonable  officer  on  the  scene,  rather  than  with  the 
20/20  vision  of  hindsight.’ ”    Ryburn  v.  Huff,  565  U. S.  ___,  ___  (2012) 
(per curiam) (slip op., at 8).