Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/529bv.pdf
Page Number: 544

529US2

Unit: $U49

[10-24-00 10:29:50] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 529 U. S. 460 (2000)

469

Opinion of the Court

B

Adams strongly urges, however, that Nelson waived
his objections to the swift process of the District Court.
Adams ﬁrst maintains that Nelson waived arguments based
on personal jurisdiction and the absence of service of process
by failing to raise them promptly after being added as a
party. Brief for Respondents 32–41. Nelson’s winning ar-
gument, however, is based neither on personal jurisdiction
It rests on his right to have time
nor on service of process.
and opportunity to respond to the claim once Adams gained
leave to sue Nelson in his individual capacity, and thereby
to reach beyond OCP’s corporate till into Nelson’s personal
pocket. Waiver of arguments based on personal jurisdiction
and service of process is therefore beside the point.3

In a similar vein, and this time coming closer to the dis-
positive issue, Adams submits that the Federal Circuit
“did not address the ‘due process’ issues now sought to be
presented, . . . because these issues were never raised by
Petitioner” before that court.
Id., at 47 (emphasis deleted).
It is indeed the general rule that issues must be raised in
lower courts in order to be preserved as potential grounds
of decision in higher courts. But this principle does not
demand the incantation of particular words; rather, it re-
quires that the lower court be fairly put on notice as to the
substance of the issue. See, e. g., Beech Aircraft Corp. v.
Rainey, 488 U. S. 153, 174–175 (1988). And the general rule

3 We note that a waiver of service of process does not waive a party’s
right to time in which to respond to the substance of charges that, absent
the waiver, would have been included in a served document.
It would
make little sense to penalize a party’s waiver of process, which can help
streamline litigation, by barring such a party from stating its side of
the case.
Indeed, such waiver can sometimes extend a party’s time to
respond. See Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 12(a)(1)(B) (rather than having to re-
spond within 20 days of service, a party waiving service may respond at
any time within 60 days of the request for waiver).