Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/20pdf/19-123_g3bi.pdf
Page Number: 13

Cite as:  593 U. S. ____ (2021) 

9 

Opinion of the Court 

City says that section 3.21 addresses only “an agency’s right 
to  refuse  ‘referrals’  to  place  a  child  with  a  certified  foster 
family.”  Brief for City Respondents 36.  We think the City
had  it  right  the  first  time.    Although  the  section  is  titled 
“Rejection of Referral,” the text sweeps more broadly, for-
bidding the rejection of “prospective foster . . . parents” for
“Services,” without limitation.  Supp. App. to Brief for City 
Respondents  16.    The  City  maintains  that  certification  is
one of the services foster agencies are hired to perform, so
its attempt to backtrack on the reach of section 3.21 is un-
availing.  See A. Scalia & B. Garner, Reading Law: The In-
terpretation of Legal Texts 222 (2012) (“[A] title or heading 
should  never  be  allowed  to  override  the  plain  words  of  a
text.”).  Moreover, the City adopted the current version of 
section  3.21  shortly  after  declaring  that  it  would  make 
CSS’s obligation to certify same-sex couples “explicit” in fu-
ture contracts, App. to Pet. for Cert. 170a, confirming our 
understanding of the text of the provision.

The City and intervenor-respondents add that, notwith-
standing  the  system of  exceptions  in section 3.21,  a sepa-
rate provision in the contract independently prohibits dis-
crimination  in  the  certification  of  foster  parents.  That 
provision, section 15.1, bars discrimination on the basis of 
sexual orientation, and it does not on its face allow for ex-
ceptions.  See Supp. App. to Brief for City Respondents 31. 
But state law makes clear that “one part of a contract can-
not be so interpreted as to annul another part.”  Shehadi v. 
Northeastern Nat. Bank of Pa., 474 Pa. 232, 236, 378 A. 2d 
304, 306 (1977); see Commonwealth ex rel. Kane v. UPMC, 
634 Pa. 97, 135, 129 A. 3d 441, 464 (2015).  Applying that 
“fundamental”  rule  here,  Shehadi,  474  Pa.,  at  236,  378 
A. 2d, at 306, an exception from section 3.21 also must gov-
ern the prohibition in section 15.1, lest the City’s reserva-
tion of the authority to grant such an exception be a nullity. 
As a result, the contract as a whole contains no generally 
applicable non-discrimination requirement.