Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/22pdf/21-1449_d9eh.pdf
Page Number: 3

Cite as:  598 U. S. ____ (2023) 

3 

Syllabus 

Second,  the  Union  argues  that  workers  do  not  forfeit  the  NLRA’s 
protections simply by commencing a work stoppage when the loss of 
perishable products is foreseeable, but this case involves much more 
than that.  Given the lifespan of wet concrete, Glacier could not batch
it until a truck was ready to take it.  By reporting for duty and pre-
tending as if they would deliver the concrete, the drivers prompted the
creation of the perishable product.  Then, they waited to walk off the 
job until the concrete was mixed and poured in the trucks.  In so doing, 
they not only destroyed the concrete but also put Glacier’s trucks in 
harm’s way.   

Third, the Court acknowledges that the Union’s decision to initiate
the strike during the workday and failure to give Glacier specific notice
do not themselves render the Union’s conduct unprotected.  Still, these 
actions are relevant considerations in evaluating whether strikers took
reasonable precautions, whether harm to property was imminent, and 
whether  that  danger  was  foreseeable.    See  International  Protective 
Services, Inc., 339 N. L. R. B. 701, 702–703.  Here, the Union’s choice 
to call a strike after its drivers had loaded a large amount of wet con-
crete into Glacier’s delivery trucks strongly suggests that it failed to
take reasonable precautions to avoid foreseeable, aggravated, and im-
minent harm to Glacier’s property.

Finally, while the Union maintains that the drivers took some steps 
to protect the trucks, the Union concedes that the NLRA does not ar-
guably protect its actions if those actions posed a material risk of harm
to the trucks.  Given that Glacier alleges that the Union took affirma-
tive steps to endanger Glacier’s property rather than reasonable pre-
cautions to mitigate that risk, the NLRA does not arguably protect the 
Union’s conduct.  Pp. 8–12. 

198 Wash. 2d 768, 500 P. 3d 119, reversed and remanded.

 BARRETT,  J.,  delivered  the  opinion  of  the  Court,  in  which  ROBERTS, 
C. J., and SOTOMAYOR, KAGAN, and KAVANAUGH, JJ., joined.  THOMAS, J., 
filed  an  opinion  concurring  in  the  judgment,  in  which  GORSUCH,  J., 
joined.  ALITO, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which 
THOMAS and GORSUCH, JJ., joined.  JACKSON, J., filed a dissenting opin-
ion.