Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/20pdf/19-123_g3bi.pdf
Page Number: 58

36 

FULTON v. PHILADELPHIA 

ALITO, J., concurring in judgment
ALITO, J., concurring in judgment
ALITO, J., concurring in judgment 

The predominance of this model is highlighted by its use
in  the  laws  governing  the  Northwest  Territory.    In  the 
Northwest  Ordinance  of  1787,  the  Continental  Congress
provided that “[n]o person, demeaning himself in a peacea-
ble and orderly manner, shall ever be molested on account 
of his mode of worship, or religious sentiments, in the said
territory.”  Art. I (emphasis added).  After the ratification 
of  the  Constitution,  the  First  Congress  used  similar  lan-
guage in the Northwest Ordinance of 1789.  See Act of Aug. 
7,  1789,  1  Stat.  52  (reaffirming  Art.  I  of  Northwest  Ordi-
nance of 1787).  Since the First Congress also framed and 
approved the Bill of Rights, we have often said that its ap-
parent understanding of the scope of those rights is entitled 
to great respect.  See, e.g., Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 
U. S. 565, 575–578 (2014); Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U. S. 
957, 980 (1991) (opinion of Scalia, J.); Marsh v. Chambers, 
463 U. S. 783, 786–792 (1983); Carroll v. United States, 267 
U. S. 132, 150–151 (1925). 

3 
The  model  favored  by  Congress  and  the  state  legisla-
tures—providing broad protection for the free exercise of re-
ligion except where public “peace” or “safety” would be en-
dangered—is antithetical to Smith.  If, as Smith held, the 
free-exercise  right  does  not  require  any  religious  exemp-
tions from generally applicable laws, it is not easy to imag-
ine  situations  in  which  a  public-peace-or-safety  carveout
would be necessary.  Legislatures enact generally applica-
ble laws to protect public peace and safety.  If those laws 
are thought to be sufficient to address a particular type of
conduct  when  engaged  in  for  a  secular  purpose,  why
wouldn’t they also be sufficient to address the same type of 
conduct when carried out for a religious reason? 

Smith’s defenders have no good answer.  Their chief re-
sponse  is  that  the  free-exercise  provisions  that  included 
these carveouts were tantamount to the Smith rule because