Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/12pdf/11-345_l5gm.pdf
Page Number: 14

Cite as:  570 U. S. ____ (2013) 

11 

Opinion of the Court 

The  reviewing  court  must  ultimately  be  satisfied  that  no
workable race-neutral alternatives would produce the edu-
cational  benefits  of  diversity.  If  “ ‘a  nonracial  approach
. . .  could  promote  the  substantial  interest  about  as  well 
and  at  tolerable  administrative  expense,’ ”  Wygant  v. 
Jackson Bd. of Ed., 476 U. S. 267, 280, n. 6 (1986) (quoting 
Greenawalt,  Judicial  Scrutiny  of  “Benign”  Racial  Prefer-
ence  in  Law  School  Admissions,  75  Colum.  L. Rev.  559, 
578–579  (1975)),  then  the  university  may  not  consider 
race.  A plaintiff, of course, bears the burden of placing the
validity of a university’s adoption of an affirmative action 
plan  in  issue.  But  strict  scrutiny  imposes  on  the  univer-
sity the ultimate burden of demonstrating, before turning to
racial classifications, that available, workable race-neutral 
alternatives do not suffice. 

Rather  than  perform  this  searching  examination,  how-
ever, the Court of Appeals held petitioner could challenge
only  “whether  [the  University’s]  decision  to  reintroduce 
race  as  a  factor  in  admissions  was  made  in  good  faith.”
631  F. 3d,  at  236.    And  in  considering  such  a  challenge, 
the  court  would  “presume  the  University  acted  in  good 
faith” and place on petitioner the burden of rebutting that
presumption. 
Id.,  at  231–232.  The  Court  of  Appeals 
held  that  to  “second-guess  the  merits”  of  this  aspect  of
the University’s decision was a task it was “ill-equipped to
perform”  and  that  it  would  attempt  only  to  “ensure  that 
[the  University’s]  decision  to  adopt  a  race-conscious  ad-
missions  policy  followed  from  [a  process  of]  good  faith 
consideration.”  Id.,  at  231.  The  Court  of  Appeals  thus
concluded  that  “the  narrow-tailoring  inquiry—like  the 
compelling-interest  inquiry—is  undertaken  with  a  degree
of deference to the Universit[y].”  Id., at 232.  Because “the 
efforts of the University have been studied, serious, and of
high  purpose,”  the  Court  of  Appeals  held  that  the  use  of
race in the admissions program fell within “a constitution-
ally protected zone of discretion.”  Id., at 231.