Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/17pdf/16-1466_2b3j.pdf
Page Number: 10

Cite as:  585 U. S. ____ (2018) 

5 

Opinion of the Court 

interests of Illinois citizens.”  Id., at 18a.  Therefore, if he 
had  the  choice,  he  “would  not  pay  any  fees  or  otherwise 
subsidize  [the  Union].”  Ibid.   Under  his  unit’s  collective-
bargaining agreement, however, he was required to pay an
agency fee of $44.58 per month, id., at 14a—which would 
amount to about $535 per year.

Janus’s  concern  about  Illinois’  current  financial  situa­
tion is shared by the Governor of the State, and it was the
Governor who initially challenged the statute authorizing 
the  imposition  of  agency  fees.    The  Governor  commenced 
an action in federal court, asking that the law be declared
unconstitutional,  and  the  Illinois  attorney  general  (a
respondent  here)  intervened  to  defend  the  law.    App.  41.
Janus and two other state employees also moved to inter­
vene—but on the Governor’s side.  Id., at 60. 

Respondents moved to dismiss the Governor’s challenge 
for  lack  of  standing,  contending  that  the  agency  fees  did 
not  cause  him  any  personal  injury.    E.g.,  id.,  at  48–49. 
The  District  Court  agreed  that  the  Governor  could  not
maintain  the  lawsuit,  but  it  held  that  petitioner  and  the
other individuals who had moved to intervene had stand­
ing because the agency fees unquestionably injured them.
Accordingly, “in the interest of judicial economy,” the court 
dismissed  the  Governor  as  a  plaintiff,  while  simultane- 
ously allowing petitioner and the other employees to file their 
own  complaint.    Id.,  at  112.  They  did  so,  and  the  case
proceeded on the basis of this new complaint. 

The amended complaint claims that all “nonmember fee 
deductions are coerced political speech” and that “the First 
Amendment  forbids  coercing  any  money  from  the  non­
members.”  App. to Pet. for Cert. 23a.  Respondents moved 
to  dismiss  the  amended  complaint,  correctly  recognizing
that  the  claim  it  asserted  was  foreclosed  by  Abood.  The 
District  Court  granted  the  motion,  id.,  at  7a,  and  the 
Court  of  Appeals  for  the  Seventh  Circuit  affirmed,  851 
F. 3d 746 (2017).