Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/18pdf/18-302_e29g.pdf
Page Number: 33

8 

IANCU v. BRUNETTI 

Opinion of SOTOMAYOR, J. 

B 
A  limiting  construction  like  the  one  just  discussed  is
both  appropriate  in  this  context  and  consistent  with  past
precedent.  First,  while  a  limiting  construction  must  al-
ways  be  at  least  reasonable,  there  are  contexts  in  which
imposing  such  a  construction  is  more  appropriate  than 
others.  The most obvious example of a setting where more
caution  is  required  is  in  the  realm  of  criminal  statutes, 
where  considerations  such  as  the  prohibition  against 
vagueness and the rule of lenity come into play.  See Reno 
v.  American  Civil  Liberties  Union,  521  U. S.  844,  872 
(1997)  (noting  that  “[t]he  severity  of  criminal  sanctions”
can increase First Amendment concerns); Board of Airport 
Comm’rs  of  Los  Angeles  v.  Jews  for  Jesus,  Inc.,  482  U. S. 
569,  575–576  (1987)  (declining  to  apply  a  limiting  con-
struction  to  a  provision  that  banned  “ ‘First  Amendment 
activities’ ”  from  an  airport  and  noting  that  the  limiting 
construction proposed would “ ‘confe[r] on police a virtually 
unrestrained  power  to  arrest  and  charge  persons  with  a 
violation,’ ”  leading  to  “ ‘self-evident’ ”  “ ‘opportunity  for 
abuse’ ”).  Here, however, the question is only whether the 
Government must be forced to provide the ancillary bene-
fit  of  trademark  registration  to  pre-existing  trademarks 
that  use  even  the  most  extreme  obscenity,  vulgarity,  or
profanity.  The stakes are far removed from a situation in 
which, say, Brunetti was facing a  threat to his liberty, or
even  his  right  to  use  and  enforce  his  trademark  in 
commerce. 

Second,  the  Court  has  in  the  past  accepted  or  applied
similarly  narrow  constructions  to  avoid  constitutional 

—————— 

holding  in  abeyance  trademark  applications  that  use  that  particular 
epithet.    See  Tr.  of  Oral  Arg.  61.    As  a  result  of  today’s  ruling,  the  
Government  will  now  presumably  be  compelled  to  register  marks
containing that epithet as well rather than treating it as a “scandalous”
form of profanity under §1052(a).