Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/19pdf/19-465_i425.pdf
Page Number: 26.0

Cite as:  591 U. S. ____ (2020) 

5 

THOMAS, J., concurring in judgment 

State  Legislature  v.  Arizona  Independent  Redistricting 
Comm’n, 576 U. S. 787, 829 (2015) (ROBERTS, C. J., dissent-
ing);  cf.  Scialabba  v.  Cuellar  de  Osorio,  573  U. S.  41,  60 
(2014) (KAGAN, J., for the Court) (“ ‘[W]ords repeated in dif-
ferent  parts  of  the  same  statute  generally  have  the  same 
meaning’ ”  (quoting  Law  v.  Siegel,  571  U. S.  415,  422 
(2014)).  While terms may not always have the exact same 
meaning  throughout  the  Constitution,  here  we  are  inter-
preting  the  same  word  (“Manner”)  in  two  provisions  that 
the  Court  has  already  stated  impose  “paralle[l]”  duties—
setting the “ ‘Manner of holding Elections’ ” and setting the 
“ ‘Manner’ ” of “ ‘appoint[ing] a Number of Electors.’ ”  U. S. 
Term  Limits,  514  U. S.,  at  804–805  (majority  opinion).
Nothing in the Constitution’s text or history indicates that 
the Court should take the strongly disfavored step of con-
cluding that the term “Manner” has two different meanings 
in these closely aligned provisions.

All the Court can point to in support of its position is a 
single sentence in Ray v. Blair, 343 U. S. 214 (1952), which
suggested  that  a  State’s  power  to  impose  a  requirement
that electors pledge to vote for their party’s nominee comes
from Article II, §1, id., at 227.  But this statement is simply
made  in  passing  in  response  to  one  of  the  parties’  argu-
ments.  It is curiously bereft of reasoning or analysis of Ar-
ticle II.  We generally look to the text to govern our analysis
rather  than  insouciantly  follow  stray,  “incomplete”  state-
ments in our prior opinions, see Thryv, Inc. v. Click-To-Call 
Technologies, LP, 590 U. S. ___, ___ (2020) (slip op., at 13).
In my view, we should be guided by the text here. 

2 

Even accepting the Court’s broad interpretation of Clause 
2 of Article II, §1, I cannot agree with its determination that
this Clause expressly authorizes the Washington law at is-
sue  here.  In  an  attempt  to  tie  Washington’s  law  to  the 
State’s  “power  to  appoint  an  elector,”  see  ante,  at  9,  the