Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/529bv.pdf
Page Number: 580

529US2

Unit: $U51

[09-26-01 10:31:04] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 529 U. S. 494 (2000)

505

Opinion of the Court

and, accordingly, understand RICO to adopt the common-law
Interpreting the statute in a way
principles we have cited.
that is most consistent with these principles, we conclude
that injury caused by an overt act that is not an act of rack-
eteering or otherwise wrongful under RICO, see n. 7, supra,
is not sufﬁcient to give rise to a cause of action under
§ 1964(c) for a violation of § 1962(d). As at common law, a
civil conspiracy plaintiff cannot bring suit under RICO based
on injury caused by any act in furtherance of a conspiracy
that might have caused the plaintiff injury. Rather, consist-
ency with the common law requires that a RICO conspiracy
plaintiff allege injury from an act that is analogous to an
“ac[t] of a tortious character,” see 4 Restatement (Second) of
Torts § 876, Comment b, meaning an act that is independ-

make clear that recovery was denied because the defendants had com-
mitted no actionable tort, regardless of whether they agreed to commit
any such act. See ibid. Likewise, Justice Stevens reads J. & C. Orna-
mental Iron Co. v. Watkins, 114 Ga. App. 688, 691, 152 S. E. 2d 613, 615
(1966), to deny recovery because the plaintiff had suffered no injury.
However, in that case, the plaintiff ’s conspiracy claim was predicated on
several alleged torts including fraud, trespass, and malicious interference.
Ibid. While the court held that the plaintiff could not recover for conspir-
acy to maliciously interfere because he had suffered no injury, the plain-
tiff ’s remaining conspiracy allegations were insufﬁcient because the plain-
tiff did not allege “all the elements of a cause of action for the tort the
same as would be required if there were no allegation of a conspiracy.”
Ibid. Further, Justice Stevens chides us for citing cases in which the
court allowed recovery. But in two of these cases the court explicitly
grounded its decision on the fact that the plaintiff had identiﬁed an action-
able independent tort on which the conspiracy claim could be based. See
Cohen v. Bowdoin, 288 A. 2d 106, 110 (Me. 1972) (“[I]f [the plaintiff ’s con-
spiracy claim] is to be upheld as stating a claim upon which relief can be
granted, it must be on the ground that the complaint sufﬁciently alleges
the actual commission of the separate and independent tort of defamation
against the plaintiff ”); Middlesex Concrete Products & Excavating Corp.
v. Carteret Indus. Assn., 37 N. J. 507, 516, 181 A. 2d 774, 779 (1962) (holding
that the plaintiffs stated a claim for conspiracy because they alleged an
actionable tort).
In short, we think that there is ample evidence of the
common-law rule we have cited.