Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/23pdf/23-5572_l6hn.pdf
Page Number: 19

Cite as:  603 U. S. ____ (2024) 

15 

Opinion of the Court 

derscore[ ] the implausibility of the Government’s interpre-
tation.”  Van  Buren  v.  United  States,  593  U. S.  374,  394 
(2021).

Our usual approach in obstruction cases has been to “re-
sist reading” particular sub-provisions “to create a coverall”
statute, as the Government would have us do here.  Yates, 
574 U. S., at 549 (plurality opinion); see also Marinello v. 
United States, 584 U. S. 1, 6–11 (2018); Arthur Andersen, 
544  U. S.,  at  703–704.    And  there  is  no  reason  to  depart 
from that practice today.  Nothing in the text or statutory 
history suggests that subsection (c)(2) is designed to impose
up to 20 years’ imprisonment on essentially all defendants 
who  commit  obstruction  of  justice  in  any  way  and  who
might be subject to lesser penalties under more specific ob-
struction  statutes.    See,  e.g.,  §§1503(b)(3),  1505.  If  Con-
gress had wanted to authorize such penalties for any con-
duct that delays or influences a proceeding in any way, it 
would have said so.  Instead, Section 1512 mentions “rec-
ord,” “document,” or other “object” 26 times.  See 18 U. S. C. 
§§1512(a)(1)(B), (a)(2)(B)(i), (ii), (iii), 1512(b)(2)(A), (B), (C),
1512(c)(1), 1512(f ). 

Rather  than  transforming  this  evidence-focused  statute
into a one-size-fits-all solution to obstruction of justice, we
cabin our reading of subsection (c)(2) in light of the context
of subsection (c)(1).  Doing so affords proper respect to “the 
prerogatives  of  Congress”  in  carrying  out  the  quintessen-
tially legislative act of defining crimes and setting the pen-
alties for them.  Aguilar, 515 U. S., at 600.  We have long
recognized that “the power of punishment is vested in the
legislative, not in the judicial department,” United States v. 
Wiltberger, 5 Wheat. 76, 95 (1820), and we have as a result
“ ‘traditionally exercised restraint in assessing the reach of 
a  federal  criminal  statute,’ ”   Marinello,  584  U. S.,  at  11 
(quoting  Aguilar,  515  U. S.,  at  600).    The  Government’s 
reading  of  Section  1512  would  intrude  on  that  deliberate 
arrangement  of  constitutional  authority  over  federal