Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/21pdf/21a375_d18f.pdf
Page Number: 7.0

Cite as:  595 U. S. ____ (2022) 

7 

KAVANAUGH, J., concurring 

oughness of the District Court’s opinion.  But if careful Dis-
trict Court consideration sufficed for an appellate court to 
deny  a  stay,  then  appellate  courts  could  usually  end  the 
stay  inquiry  right  there.    That  is  not  how  stay  analysis 
works.  Contrary to the dissent’s implication, the fact that 
the District Court here issued a lengthy opinion after con-
sidering a substantial record is the starting point, not the 
ending point, for our analysis of whether to grant a stay. 
  To sum up: In light of this Court’s many precedents ap-
plying the Purcell principle and staying lower court injunc-
tions of state election laws in the period close to an election, 
I concur in the Court’s order granting a stay of the District 
Court’s injunction here.  Contrary to the dissent’s mistaken 
rhetoric, I take no position at this time on the ultimate mer-
its of the parties’ underlying legal dispute.  And I need not 
do so until the Court receives full briefing, holds oral argu-
ment, and engages in our usual extensive internal deliber-
ations.    The  words  used  by  the  Court  in  Purcell  apply 
equally  to  this  case:  “We  underscore  that  we  express  no 
opinion  here  on  the  correct  disposition,  after  full  briefing 
and argument, of the appeals from the District Court’s . . . 
order  or  on  the  ultimate  resolution  of  these  cases.”    549 
U. S., at 5.  “Given the imminence of the election and the 
inadequate time to resolve the factual disputes, our action 
today shall of necessity allow the election to proceed with-
out an injunction.”  Id., at 5–6.