Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/22pdf/21-476_c185.pdf
Page Number: 65

Cite as:  600 U. S. ____ (2023) 

33 

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting 

that requires the regulated party to provide speech only if,
and to the extent, it provides such speech for others.  Supra, 
at 25–26, 29–30. 

Hurley and Dale, by contrast, involved “peculiar” applica-
tions of public accommodations laws, not to “the act of dis-
criminating . . . in the provision of publicly available goods”
by “clearly commercial entities,” but rather to private, non-
profit  expressive  associations  in  ways  that  directly  bur-
dened speech.  Hurley, 515 U. S., at 572 (private parade); 
Dale, 530 U. S., at 657 (Boy Scouts).  The Court in Hurley 
and  Dale  stressed  that  the  speech  burdens  in  those  cases
were not incidental to prohibitions on status-based discrim-
ination because the associations did not assert that “mere 
acceptance of a member from a particular group would im-
pair [the association’s] message.”  Dale, 530 U. S., at 653; 
see also ibid. (reasoning that Dale was excluded for being a 
gay rights activist, not for being gay); ibid. (explaining that
in  Hurley,  “the  parade  organizers  did  not  wish  to  exclude
the GLIB [Irish-American gay, lesbian, and bisexual group] 
members because of their sexual orientations, but because 
they wanted to march behind a GLIB banner”); Hurley, 515 
U. S., at 572–573. 

Here, the opposite is true.  303 Creative LLC is a “clearly 
commercial entit[y].”  Dale, 530 U. S., at 657.  The company
comes under the regulation of CADA only if it sells services 
to the public, and only if it denies the equal enjoyment of 
such services because of sexual orientation.  The State con-
firms that the company is free to include or not to include 
any message in whatever services it chooses to offer.  Supra, 
at 26–28.  And the company confirms that it plans to engage
in  status-based  discrimination.  Supra,  at  22–23,  31–32. 
Therefore, any burden on the company’s expression is inci-
dental to the State’s content-neutral regulation of commer-
cial conduct. 

Frustrated by this inescapable logic, the majority dials up 
the rhetoric, asserting that “Colorado seeks to compel [the