Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/21pdf/21a90_6j37.pdf
Page Number: 9.0

8 

DOES 1–3 v. MILLS 

GORSUCH, J., dissenting 

ity of States with similar mandates provide a religious ex-
emption).  Maine’s decision to deny a religious exemption in 
these  circumstances  doesn’t  just  fail  the  least  restrictive
means test, it borders on the irrational. 

Looking to the other traditional factors also suggests re-
lief is warranted.  Before granting a stay or injunctive relief,
we ask not only whether a litigant is likely to prevail on the 
merits but also whether denying relief would lead to irrep-
arable injury and whether granting relief would harm the 
public interest.  Roman Catholic Diocese, 592 U. S., at ___– 
___ (slip op., at 5–7); see also 28 U. S. C. §1651(a).  The an-
swer to both questions is clear.  This Court has long held
that “ [t]he loss of First Amendment freedoms, for even min-
imal periods of time, unquestionably constitutes irrepara-
ble injury. ”  Elrod v. Burns, 427 U. S. 347, 373 (1976) (plu-
rality  opinion).  And  as  we  have  seen,  Maine  has  so  far 
failed  to  present  any  evidence  that  granting  religious  ex-
emptions to the applicants would threaten its stated public 
health  interests  any  more  than  its  medical  exemption  al-
ready does.

This case presents an important constitutional question,
a  serious  error,  and  an  irreparable  injury.    Where  many
other States have adopted religious exemptions, Maine has 
charted a different course.  There, healthcare workers who 
have served on the front line of a pandemic for the last 18 
months are now being fired and their practices shuttered.
All for adhering to their constitutionally protected religious
beliefs.    Their  plight  is  worthy  of  our  attention.    I  would 
grant relief.