Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/17pdf/16-499_1a7d.pdf
Page Number: 88.0

Cite as:  584 U. S. ____ (2018) 

31 

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting 

friction.13 

Second,  the  plurality  expresses  concern  that  if  foreign
corporations  are  subject  to  liability  under  the  ATS,  other 
nations  could  hale  American  corporations  into  court  and 
subject  them  “to  an  immediate,  constant  risk  of  claims
seeking to impose massive liability for the alleged conduct 

—————— 

13 JUSTICE ALITO, adopting a more absolutist position than the plurality,
asserts  without  qualification  that  “federal  courts  should  not  create 
causes  of  action  under  the  ATS  against  foreign  corporate  defendants”
because doing so “would precipitate . . . diplomatic strife.”  Ante, at 1, 4 
(opinion  concurring  in  part  and  concurring  in  judgment).    The  conclu­
sion  that  ATS  suits  against  foreign  corporate  defendants  for  law-of­
nations and treaty violations always will cause diplomatic friction, and 
that such suits will never be necessary “to help the United States avoid
diplomatic friction,” ante, at 4, however, is at odds with the considered 
judgment  of  the  Executive  Branch  and  Congress  regarding  the  im­
portance of holding foreign corporations to account for certain egregious 
conduct.    As  noted,  see  Part  II–B–1,  supra,  the  Executive  Branch  has 
twice urged the Court not to foreclose the ability of foreign nationals to
sue  foreign  corporate  defendants  under  the  ATS.    The  United  States 
also  has  ratified  several  international  agreements  that  require  it  to
impose  liability on corporations, both foreign and domestic, for certain 
actions,  including  the  financing  of  terrorism.    See  supra,  at  10–11. 
Congress, too, has expressly authorized civil suits against corporations
for  acts  related  to  terrorism.    See  18  U. S. C.  §2333.    The  Executive 
Branch  and  Congress  surely  would  not  have  taken  these  positions,
entered into these obligations, or made available these causes of action
if the result were intolerable diplomatic strife. 

JUSTICE  ALITO  also  faults  the  lack  of  “real-world  examples”  of  in­
stances in which diplomatic friction has resulted from a court’s refusal 
to permit an individual to bring an ATS suit against a foreign corpora­
tion  solely  because  of  the  defendant’s  status  as  a  foreign  juridical 
entity.  Ante, at 6.  Such refusals, though, have been rare, as no other
Court  of  Appeals  besides  the  Second  Circuit  that  has  considered  the
question  has  imposed  a  bar  on  corporate  liability.    Compare  Doe  v. 
Drummond  Co.,  782  F. 3d  576,  584  (CA11  2015); Doe  I  v.  Nestle  USA, 
Inc.,  766  F. 3d  1013,  1022  (CA9  2014);  Doe  v.  Exxon  Mobil  Corp.,  654 
F. 3d 11, 39–57 (CADC 2011), vacated on other grounds, 527 Fed. Appx. 
7  (CADC  2013);  Flomo  v.  Firestone  Nat.  Rubber  Co.,  643  F. 3d  1013, 
1017–1021 (CA7 2011), with Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, 621 F. 3d 
111, 120 (CA2 2010).