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10  FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N v. TED CRUZ FOR SENATE 

KAGAN, J., dissenting 

even  when  their  amounts  are  too  small  to  trigger  Section
304’s restrictions.  See Ovtchinnikov, Self-Funding 11; see 
also Brief for Campaign Legal Center et al. as Amici Curiae 
12–13  (summarizing  research  “show[ing]  that  most  cam-
paigns  fail  to  pay  off  candidates’  personal  loans  in  any 
amount at any time,” in confirmation of the “[c]onventional 
wisdom” that post-election fundraising is “notoriously diffi-
cult”).  So a candidate with a loan outstanding has plenty of 
reason to feel anxious—and to see the loan’s repayment as 
a gratitude-inducing personal benefit.  The donor takes him 
off a sharp hook.  And even a candidate who expects repay-
ment  is  far  from  impervious  to  corruption.    He  may  have 
that confidence exactly because he knows that a raft of lob-
byists will be eager to pay for political benefits.  And with 
his bank account depleted, he has a great temptation to per-
form his part in such an exchange.2 

The common sense of Section 304—the obviousness of the 
theory behind it—lessens the need for the Government to
identify past cases of quid pro quo corruption involving can-
didate  loan  repayments.    As  this  Court  has  made  clear, 
“[t]he quantum of empirical evidence needed” to sustain a 
campaign finance law “var[ies] up or down with the novelty 
and plausibility of the [law’s] justification.”  McConnell v. 
Federal Election Comm’n, 540 U. S. 93, 144 (2003).  There 

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2 The majority also fails to recognize that post-election contributions can 
go toward interest payments, enabling a candidate to turn a tidy profit 
on top of recovering the amount loaned.  Consider the case of one member 
of the U. S. House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee.  She 
loaned her campaign $150,000 at an 18% interest rate (no, that is not a 
typo), and over time collected more than $200,000 in interest payments.
Much of that money came from fundraising events hosted by a lobbying 
firm representing members of the transportation industry.  See A. Zajac,
Interest on Campaign Loan Pays, L. A. Times, Feb. 14, 2009, p. B1.  The 
example is extreme, but the FEC typically allows candidates to charge
their campaigns—which then tap contributors for—a commercially rea-
sonable  rate  of  interest.    See  FEC,  Campaign  Guide  for  Congressional
Candidates and Committees 101 (2021).