Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/21pdf/19-1392_6j37.pdf/19-1392_6j37.pdf
Page Number: 132.0

Cite as:  597 U. S. ____ (2022) 

9 

KAVANAUGH, J., concurring 

well-intentioned effort did not resolve the abortion debate. 
The national division has not ended.  In recent years, a sig-
nificant  number  of  States  have  enacted  abortion  re-
strictions that directly conflict with Roe.  Those laws cannot 
be dismissed as political stunts or as outlier laws.  Those 
numerous state laws collectively represent the sincere and 
deeply held views of tens of millions of Americans who con-
tinue to fervently believe that allowing abortions up to 24
weeks is far too radical and far too extreme, and does not 
sufficiently  account  for  what  Roe  itself  recognized  as  the 
State’s “important and legitimate interest” in protecting fe-
tal life.  410 U. S., at 162.  In this case, moreover, a majority 
of the States—26 in all—ask the Court to overrule Roe and 
return the abortion issue to the States. 
  In short, Casey’s stare decisis analysis rested in part on a
predictive judgment about the future development of state 
laws and of the people’s views on the abortion issue.  But 
that predictive judgment has not borne out.  As the Court 
today explains, the experience over the last 30 years con-
flicts with Casey’s predictive judgment and therefore under-
mines Casey’s precedential force.5 

In any event, although Casey is relevant to the stare de-
cisis analysis, the question of whether to overrule Roe can-
not be dictated by Casey alone.  To illustrate that stare de-
cisis point, consider an example.  Suppose that in 1924 this
Court had expressly reaffirmed Plessy v. Ferguson and up-
held the States’ authority to segregate people on the basis
of race.  Would the Court in Brown some 30 years later in 
—————— 

5 To be clear, public opposition to a prior decision is not a basis for over-
ruling (or reaffirming) that decision.  Rather, the question of whether to
overrule  a  precedent  must  be  analyzed  under  this  Court’s  traditional 
stare decisis factors.  The only point here is that Casey adopted a special 
stare decisis principle with respect to Roe based on the idea of resolving
the national controversy and ending the national division over abortion. 
The continued and significant opposition to Roe, as reflected in the laws 
and positions of numerous States, is relevant to assessing Casey on its 
own terms.