Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/17pdf/16-1140_5368.pdf
Page Number: 31.0

Cite as:  585 U. S. ____ (2018) 

5 

BREYER, J., dissenting 

regulation, striking down disclosure laws that judges may 
disfavor,  while  upholding  others,  all  without  grounding 
their decisions in reasoned principle.

Notably,  the  majority  says  nothing  about  limiting  its
language  to  the  kind  of  instance  where  the  Court  has 
traditionally found the First Amendment wary of content-
based  laws,  namely,  in  cases  of  viewpoint  discrimination. 
“Content-based  laws  merit  this  protection  because  they
present,  albeit  sometimes  in  a  subtler  form,  the  same
dangers as laws that regulate speech based on viewpoint.” 
Reed, 576 U. S., at ___ (ALITO, J., concurring) (slip op., at 
1).  Accordingly,  “[l]imiting  speech  based  on  its  ‘topic’  or 
‘subject’ ” can favor “those who do not want to disturb the 
status  quo.”  Ibid.  But  the  mine  run  of  disclosure  re-
quirements do nothing of that sort.  They simply alert the
public about child seat belt laws, the location of stairways, 
and  the  process  to  have  their  garbage  collected,  among
other things.

Precedent does not require a test such as the majority’s.
Rather, in saying the Act is not a longstanding health and
safety  law,  the  Court  substitutes  its  own  approach—
without  a  defining  standard—for  an  approach  that  was 
reasonably clear.  Historically, the Court has been wary of
claims  that  regulation  of  business  activity,  particularly
health-related  activity,  violates  the  Constitution.    Ever 
since this Court departed from the approach it set forth in 
Lochner  v.  New  York,  198  U. S.  45  (1905),  ordinary  eco-
nomic  and  social  legislation  has  been  thought  to  raise 
little  constitutional  concern.  As  Justice  Brandeis  wrote, 
typically  this  Court’s  function  in  such  cases  “is  only  to
determine the reasonableness of the Legislature’s belief in 
the existence of evils and in the effectiveness of the remedy
provided.”  New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U. S. 262, 
286–287 (1932) (dissenting opinion); see Williamson v. Lee 
Optical  of  Okla.,  Inc.,  348  U. S.  483,  486–488  (1955) 
(adopting the approach of Justice Brandeis).