Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/558bv.pdf
Page Number: 597

436  CITIZENS  UNITED  v.  FEDERAL  ELECTION  COMM’N 

Opinion of Stevens, J. 

codiﬁed  the  option  for  corporations  and  unions  to  create 
PACs to ﬁnance contributions and expenditures forbidden to 
the corporation or union itself.  § 441b(b). 

By  the  time  Congress  passed  FECA  in  1971,  the  bar  on 
corporate  contributions  and  expenditures  had  become  such 
an accepted part of federal campaign ﬁnance regulation that 
when a large number of plaintiffs, including several nonproﬁt 
corporations,  challenged  virtually  every  aspect  of  FECA  in 
Buckley,  424  U. S.  1,  no  one  even  bothered  to  argue  that 
the bar as such was unconstitutional.  Buckley famously (or 
infamously)  distinguished  direct  contributions  from  inde­
pendent  expenditures,  id.,  at  58–59,  but  its  silence  on  cor­
porations  only  reinforced  the  understanding  that  corporate 
expenditures  could  be  treated  differently  from  individual 
expenditures.  “Since  our  decision  in  Buckley,  Congress’ 
power  to  prohibit  corporations  and  unions  from  using  funds 
in their treasuries to ﬁnance advertisements expressly advo­
cating the election or defeat of candidates in federal elections 
has  been  ﬁrmly  embedded  in  our  law.”  McConnell,  540 
U. S., at 203. 

Thus,  it  was  unremarkable,  in  a  1982  case  holding  that 
Congress  could  bar  nonproﬁt  corporations  from  soliciting 
nonmembers  for  PAC  funds,  that  then-Justice  Rehnquist 
wrote for a unanimous Court that Congress’ “careful legisla­
tive  adjustment  of  the  federal  electoral  laws,  in  a  cautious 
advance, step by step, to account for the particular legal and 
economic  attributes  of  corporations  .  .  .  warrants  consider­
able  deference,”  and  “reﬂects  a  permissible  assessment  of 
the dangers posed by those entities to the electoral process.” 
NRWC, 459 U. S., at 209 (internal quotation marks and cita­
tion  omitted).  “The  governmental  interest  in  preventing 
both  actual  corruption  and  the  appearance  of  corruption  of 
elected representatives has long been recognized,” the unan­
imous  Court  observed,  “and  there  is  no  reason  why  it  may 
not  .  .  .  be  accomplished  by  treating  .  .  .  corporations  .  .  . 
differently from individuals.”  Id., at 210–211.