Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/21pdf/20-303_6khn.pdf
Page Number: 12

4 

UNITED STATES v. VAELLO MADERO 

THOMAS, J., concurring 

suggests the phrase most likely would have been viewed in 
1791  . . .  as  guaranteeing  either  that  duly  enacted  law 
would  be  followed  or  that  certain  requisite  procedures
would be observed.”  R. Williams, The One and Only Sub-
stantive Due Process Clause, 120 Yale L. J. 408, 416 (2010). 
It is not clear why post-1791 developments should displace
more  probative  preconstitutional  and  founding-era  evi-
dence.  See, e.g., S. Calabresi & S. Prakash, The President’s 
Power  To  Execute  the  Laws,  104  Yale  L. J.  541,  550–551 
(1994)  (“[T]he  Constitution’s  postenactment  ‘legislative’
history” is “the history that is least likely to reflect the orig-
inal understanding”).

Second, Bolling reasoned that the “liberty” protected by
the  Due  Process  Clause  covers  “the  full  range  of  conduct 
which the individual is free to pursue,” 347 U. S., at 499– 
500,  and  therefore  guaranteed  freedom  from  segregated 
schooling.  That understanding of “liberty” likely sweeps too
broadly.  Given the relevant history, “it is hard to see how 
the ‘liberty’ protected by the [Due Process Clause] could be 
interpreted to include anything broader than freedom from 
physical restraint.”  Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U. S. 644, 725 
(2015) (THOMAS, J., dissenting).  And even if “liberty” en-
compasses more than that, “[i]n the American legal tradi-
tion, liberty has long been understood as individual freedom 
from governmental action, not as a right to a particular gov-
ernment entitlement.”  Id., at 726; see also C. Green, Seven 
Problems With Antidiscrimination Due Process, 11 Faulk-
ner L. Rev. 1, 32 (2019) (“Even on [a] very expansive view, 
‘liberty’ is still only freedom from interference, rather than 
positive  rights  to  receive  benefits or  participate  in  others’ 
activities”).    Consequently,  if  “liberty”  in  the  Due  Process 
Clause does not include any rights to public benefits, it is
unclear how that provision can constrain the regulation of 
access to those benefits. 

Third, although the Bolling Court claimed that its deci-
sion “d[id] not imply that [due process and equal protection]