Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/22pdf/22-58_i425.pdf
Page Number: 61

Cite as:  599 U. S. ____ (2023) 

19 

ALITO, J., dissenting 

the  relief  requested  would  redress  appellant’s  claimed  in-
jury.”  Duke  Power  Co.  v.  Carolina  Environmental  Study 
Group,  Inc.,  438  U. S.  59,  79,  n. 24  (1978);  see  ante,  at  2 
(opinion concurring in judgment).

The Court notes in a quick parenthetical that the “Linda 
R.  S.  principle”  was  once  “cit[ed]  . . .  in  [the]  immigration
context”  in  Sure-Tan,  Inc.  v.  NLRB,  467  U. S.  883,  897 
(1984), ante, at 5.  But Sure-Tan’s single “[c]f.” cite to Linda 
R. S. provides the Court no help.  467 U. S., at 897.  Sure-
Tan  only  rejected  (quite  reasonably)  any  standalone  “cog-
nizable interest in procuring enforcement of the immigra-
tion  laws”  by  a  party  who  lacked  any  “personal  interest.” 
Ibid. (emphasis added).  And it did so, not as part of a stand-
ing analysis, but as part of its explanation for rejecting two
employers’ attempt to assert that seeking to have employ-
ees deported as retaliation for union activity was “an aspect 
of their First Amendment right ‘to petition the Government
for a redress of grievances.’ ”  Id., at 896. 

After these two inapposite precedents, the majority’s au-
thority  gets  even  weaker.    I  agree  with  JUSTICE BARRETT 
that neither Heckler, nor Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U. S. 
748 (2005), has real relevance here.  Ante, at 4–5.  Castle 
Rock  considered  the  “deep-rooted  nature  of  law-enforce-
ment discretion” as a tool for interpreting a statute, not as
a constitutional standing rule.  545 U. S., at 761.  And as 
explained  above,  Heckler  is  not  about  standing  and  only 
states a presumptive rule.  The Court’s remaining authori-
ties  are  likewise  consistent  with  the  understanding  that
prosecution  decisions  are  “generally  committed  to  an 
agency’s absolute discretion” unless the relevant law rebuts
the  “presumption.”  Heckler,  470  U. S.,  at  831  (emphasis 
added).  For  example,  TransUnion  states  that  it  is  only
when “unharmed plaintiffs” are before the Court that Arti-
cle III forecloses interference with the “discretion of the Ex-
ecutive Branch.”  594 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 13) (emphasis 
deleted).