Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/14pdf/13-6827_5h26.pdf
Page Number: 22.0

2 

HOLT v. HOBBS 

SOTOMAYOR, J., concurring 

I  do  not  understand  the  Court’s  opinion  to  preclude
deferring to prison officials’ reasoning when that deference 
is  due—that  is,  when  prison  officials  offer  a  plausible 
explanation  for  their  chosen  policy  that  is  supported  by
whatever  evidence  is  reasonably  available  to  them.    But 
the  deference  that  must  be  “extend[ed  to]  the  experience 
and expertise of prison administrators does not extend so 
far  that  prison  officials  may  declare  a  compelling  govern-
mental interest by fiat.”  Yellowbear v. Lampert, 741 F. 3d 
48, 59 (CA10 2014).  Indeed, prison policies “ ‘grounded on 
mere  speculation’ ”  are  exactly  the  ones  that  motivated
Congress to enact RLUIPA.  106 Cong. Rec.  16699 (2000) 
(quoting S. Rep. No. 103–111, 10 (1993)).

Here,  the  Department’s  failure  to  demonstrate  why  the
less  restrictive  policies  petitioner  identified  in  the  course 
of the litigation were insufficient to achieve its compelling
interests—not the Court’s independent judgment concern-
ing the merit of these alternative approaches—is ultimately 
fatal  to  the  Department’s  position.    The  Court  is  appro-
priately  skeptical  of  the  relationship  between  the  De-
partment’s  no-beard  policy  and  its  alleged  compelling
interests because the Department offered little more than 
unsupported  assertions  in  defense  of  its  refusal  of  peti-
tioner’s  requested  religious  accommodation.  RLUIPA 
requires more.

[the  alleged]  compelling 

One  final  point  bears  emphasis.    RLUIPA  requires
institutions  refusing  an  accommodation  to  demonstrate
that the policy it defends “is the least restrictive means of
interest[s].”
furthering 
§2000cc–1(a)(2);  see  also  Washington  v.  Klem,  497  F. 3d 
272,  284  (CA3  2007)  (“[T]he  phrase  ‘least  restrictive
means’  is,  by  definition,  a  relative  term.    It  necessarily
implies  a  comparison  with  other  means”);  Couch  v.  Jabe, 
679 F. 3d 197, 203 (CA4 2012) (same).  But nothing in the 
Court’s  opinion  suggests  that  prison  officials  must  refute
every conceivable option to satisfy RLUIPA’s least restric-

. . .