Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/524bv.pdf
Page Number: 341.0

524US2

Unit: $U87

[09-15-00 14:31:25] PAGES PGT: OPIN

296 GEBSER v. LAGO VISTA INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DIST.

Stevens, J., dissenting

Because these constructions of the statute have been ac-
cepted by Congress and are unchallenged here, they have
the same legal effect as if the private cause of action seeking
damages had been explicitly, rather than implicitly, author-
ized by Congress. We should therefore seek guidance from
the text of the statute and settled legal principles rather
than from our views about sound policy.

II

We have already noted that the text of Title IX should
be accorded “ ‘a sweep as broad as its language.’ ” North
Haven Bd. of Ed. v. Bell, 456 U. S. 512, 521 (1982) (quoting
United States v. Price, 383 U. S. 787 (1966)). That sweep is
broad indeed.
“No person . . . shall, on the basis of sex, . . .
be subjected to discrimination under any education pro-
gram or activity receiving Federal ﬁnancial assistance . . . .”
20 U. S. C. § 1681(a). As Judge Rovner has correctly ob-
served, the use of passive verbs in Title IX, focusing on
the victim of the discrimination rather than the particu-
lar wrongdoer, gives this statute broader coverage than
Title VII. See Smith v. Metropolitan School Dist. Perry
Twp., 128 F. 3d 1014, 1047 (CA7 1997) (dissenting opinion).5

5 “Unlike Title VII . . . , which focuses on the discriminator, making it
unlawful for an employer to engage in certain prohibited practices (see 42
U. S. C. § 2000e–2(a)), Title IX is drafted from the perspective of the per-
son discriminated against. That statute names no actor, but using passive
verbs, focuses on the setting in which the discrimination occurred.
In
effect, the statute asks but a single question—whether an individual was
subjected to discrimination under a covered program or activity. . . . And
because Title IX as drafted includes no actor at all, it necessarily follows
that the statute also would not reference ‘agents’ of that non-existent
actor.” Smith v. Metropolitan School Dist. Perry Twp., 128 F. 3d, at
1047; see also Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U. S. 677, 691–693
(1979) (recognizing that Congress drafted Title IX “with an unmistakable
focus on the beneﬁted class,” and did not “writ[e] it simply as a ban on
discriminatory conduct by recipients of federal funds or as a prohibition