Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/19pdf/19-46_8n59.pdf
Page Number: 1

(Slip Opinion) 

OCTOBER  TERM,  2019 

1 

Syllabus 

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is 
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued. 
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been 
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader. 
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337. 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

Syllabus 

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE 
ET AL. v. BOOKING.COM B. V. 

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR 
THE FOURTH CIRCUIT 

No. 19–46.  Argued May 4, 2020—Decided June 30, 2020 

A generic name—the name of a class of products or services—is ineligible
for federal trademark registration.  Respondent Booking.com, an en-
terprise  that  maintains  a  travel-reservation  website  by  the  same 
name, sought federal registration of marks including the term “Book-
ing.com.”  Concluding that “Booking.com” is a generic name for online 
hotel-reservation  services,  the  U.  S.  Patent  and  Trademark  Office 
(PTO) refused registration.  Booking.com sought judicial review, and 
the  District  Court  determined  that  “Booking.com”—unlike  the  term
“booking”  standing  alone—is  not  generic.    The  Court  of  Appeals  af-
firmed, finding no error in the District Court’s assessment of how con-
sumers perceive the term “Booking.com.”  The appellate court also re-
jected the PTO’s contention that, as a rule, combining a generic term
like “booking” with “.com” yields a generic composite.   

Held: A term styled “generic.com” is a generic name for a class of goods
or services only if the term has that meaning to consumers.  Pp. 6–14.
(a) Whether a compound term is generic turns on whether that term,
taken as a whole, signifies to consumers a class of goods or services. 
The  courts  below  determined,  and  the  PTO  no  longer  disputes,  that 
consumers  do  not  in  fact  perceive  the  term  “Booking.com”  that  way. 
Because “Booking.com” is not a generic name to consumers, it is not 
generic.  Pp. 6–7.

(b) Opposing that determination, the PTO urges a nearly per se rule: 
When  a  generic  term  is  combined  with  a  generic  Internet-domain-
name suffix like “.com,” the resulting combination is generic.  The rule 
the PTO proffers is not borne out by the PTO’s own past practice and 
lacks support in trademark law or policy.  Pp. 7–14.

(1) The PTO’s proposed rule does not follow from Goodyear’s India