Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/17pdf/16-111_j4el.pdf
Page Number: 30.0

Cite as:  584 U. S. ____ (2018) 

5 

GORSUCH, J., concurring 

at home with loved ones.  The law, too, sometimes distin-
guishes  between  intended  and  foreseeable  effects.    See, 
e.g.,  ALI,  Model  Penal  Code  §§1.13,  2.02(2)(a)(i)  (1985);  1
W.  LaFave,  Substantive  Criminal  Law  §5.2(b),  pp.  460–
463 (3d ed. 2018).  Other times, of course, the law proceeds 
differently,  either  conflating  intent  and  knowledge  or 
presuming  intent  as  a  matter  of  law  from  a  showing  of
knowledge.    See,  e.g.,  Restatement  (Second)  of  Torts  §8A 
(1965); Radio Officers v. NLRB, 347 U. S. 17, 45 (1954).

The  problem  here  is  that  the  Commission  failed  to  act 
neutrally  by  applying  a  consistent  legal  rule. 
In  Mr. 
Jack’s case, the Commission chose to distinguish carefully
between  intended  and  knowingly  accepted  effects.    Even 
though the bakers knowingly denied service to someone in
a  protected  class,  the  Commission  found  no  violation
because  the  bakers  only  intended  to  distance  themselves
from  “the  offensive  nature  of  the  requested  message.” 
Craig  v.  Masterpiece  Cakeshop,  Inc.,  370  P. 3d  272,  282, 
n. 8 (Colo. App. 2015); App. 237, 247, 256; App. to Pet. for
Cert.  326a–331a;  see  also  Brief  for  Respondent  Colorado
Civil  Rights  Commission  52  (“Businesses  are  entitled  to
reject orders for any number of reasons, including because 
they deem a particular product requested by a customer to
be  ‘offensive’ ”).    Yet,  in  Mr.  Phillips’s  case,  the  Commis-
sion  dismissed  this  very  same  argument  as  resting  on  a 
“distinction  without  a  difference.”    App.  to  Pet.  for  Cert.
69a.  It  concluded  instead  that  an  “intent  to  disfavor”  a 
protected  class  of  persons  should  be  “readily  . . .  pre-
sumed”  from  the  knowing  failure  to  serve  someone  who 
belongs  to  that  class.  Id.,  at  70a.    In  its  judgment,  Mr.
Phillips’s  intentions  were  “inextricably  tied  to  the  sexual
orientation  of  the  parties  involved”  and  essentially  “irra-
tional.”  Ibid. 

Nothing  in  the  Commission’s  opinions  suggests  any 
neutral  principle  to  reconcile  these  holdings.  If  Mr.  Phil-
lips’s  objection  is  “inextricably  tied”  to  a  protected  class,