Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/23pdf/22-704_4246.pdf
Page Number: 49.0

Cite as:  602 U. S. ____ (2024) 

7 

SOTOMAYOR, J., concurring in judgment 

longstanding practice of government can inform the mean-
ing  of  constitutional  provisions  in  appropriate  cases.  See 
ante,  at  13–15  (opinion  of  BARRETT, J.);  cf.  Consumer  Fi-
nancial Protection Bureau v. Community Financial Services 
Assn. of America, Ltd., 601 U. S. 416, 442 (2024) (KAGAN, 
J.,  concurring);  The  Pocket  Veto  Case,  279  U. S.  655,  689 
(1929).  That is not how the five-Justice majority is using 
history,  however.  The  majority  instead  treats  a  disputed 
(and  isolated)  account  of  the  history  and  tradition  of  the 
names clause as determinative of its constitutionality.  Cf. 
ante, at 12–20 (applying new history-and-tradition test).  It 
is  that  “judge-made  test”  that  is  unmoored  from  constitu-
tional text and precedent, and which I repudiate as unhelp-
ful.  Ante, at 14 (opinion of BARRETT, J.).

Even  then,  history  does  not  give  us  the  full  story.    The 
assertion that content-based distinctions in trademark law 
have long played well with the First Amendment, although
true, requires a more fulsome explanation, particularly as
applied to the trademark registration system.  The primary
reason why viewpoint-neutral trademark registration crite-
ria easily coexist with the Free Speech Clause is that they 
do not burden expression.  Instead, a denial of registration
withholds  ancillary  benefits  that  might  bolster  someone’s
expression.  When a government confers a benefit that sup-
ports some forms of expressive activity, the decision to with-
hold that benefit on viewpoint-neutral grounds “ ‘cannot be
equated with the imposition of a “penalty” on that activity,’ ” 
which would trigger heightened scrutiny.  Rust v. Sullivan, 
500  U. S.  173,  193  (1991)  (quoting  Harris  v.  McRae,  448 
U. S. 297, 317, n. 19 (1980)). 

1 

“The First Amendment protects the freedom of speech; it 
does not require the Government to give aid and comfort to
those  using”  particular  “modes  of  expression.”  Brunetti, 
588  U. S.,  at  401  (ROBERTS,  C. J.,  concurring  in  part  and