Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/16pdf/15-1358_6khn.pdf
Page Number: 46

2 

ZIGLAR v. ABBASI 

BREYER, J., dissenting 

died  as  a  result  of  prison  official’s  deliberate  indifference
to  his  medical  needs,  in  violation  of  the  Amendment’s 
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. 

It  is  by  now  well  established  that  federal  law  provides
damages actions at least in similar contexts, where claims
of  constitutional  violation  arise.    Congress  has  ratified 
Bivens  actions,  plaintiffs  frequently  bring  them,  courts 
accept them, and scholars defend their importance.  See J. 
Pfander,  Constitutional  Torts  and  the  War  on  Terror 
(2017)  (canvassing  the  history  of  Bivens  and  cataloguing 
cases).  Moreover,  the  courts,  in  order  to  avoid  deterring
federal officials from properly performing their work, have 
developed  safeguards  for  defendants,  including  the  re-
quirement that plaintiffs plead “plausible” claims, Ashcroft 
v. Iqbal, 556 U. S. 662, 679 (2009), as well as the defense 
of  “qualified  immunity,”  which  frees  federal  officials  from 
both  threat  of  liability  and  involvement  in  the  lawsuit, 
unless  the  plaintiffs  establish  that  officials  have  violated 
“ ‘clearly established . . . constitutional rights,’ ” id., at 672 
(quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U. S. 800, 818 (1982)). 
“[This] Court has been reluctant to extend Bivens liability
‘to any new context or new category of defendants.’ ”  Iqbal, 
supra,  at  675  (quoting  Correctional  Services  Corp.  v. 
Malesko, 534 U. S. 61, 68 (2001)).  But the Court has made 
clear that it would not narrow Bivens’ existing scope.  See 
FDIC  v.  Meyer,  510  U. S.  471,  485  (1994)  (guarding 
against “the evisceration of the Bivens remedy” so that its
“deterrent effects . . . would [not] be lost”). 

The  plaintiffs  before  us  today  seek  damages  for  uncon-
stitutional  conditions  of  confinement.    They  alleged  that
federal  officials  slammed  them  against  walls,  shackled 
them,  exposed  them  to  nonstop  lighting,  lack  of  hygiene, 
and  the  like,  all  based  upon  invidious  discrimination  and 
without penological justification.  See ante, at 4–5.  In my
view,  these  claims  are  well-pleaded,  state  violations  of 
clearly  established  law,  and  fall  within  the  scope  of