Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/17pdf/16-402_h315.pdf
Page Number: 40.0

Cite as:  585 U. S. ____ (2018) 

13 

KENNEDY, J., dissenting 

being reimbursed by the customers . . . for the costs asso-
ciated with making such disclosures.”  H. R. Rep. No. 104– 
204,  pt.  1,  p.  90  (1995).  So  in  every  legal  and  practical 
sense  the  “network  information”  regulated  by  §222  is,
under  that  statute,  “proprietary”  to  the  service  providers, 
not Carpenter.  The Court does not argue otherwise.

Because  Carpenter  lacks  a  requisite  connection  to  the 
cell-site records, he also may not claim a reasonable expec-
tation  of  privacy  in  them.  He  could  expect  that  a  third
party—the  cell  phone  service  provider—could  use  the 
information  it  collected,  stored,  and  classified  as  its  own 
for a variety of business and commercial purposes.

All this is not to say that Miller and Smith are without 
limits.  Miller  and  Smith  may  not  apply  when  the  Gov-
ernment  obtains  the  modern-day  equivalents  of  an  indi-
vidual’s own “papers” or “effects,” even when those papers 
or effects are held by a third party.  See Ex parte Jackson, 
96  U. S.  727,  733  (1878)  (letters  held  by  mail  carrier); 
United  States  v.  Warshak,  631  F. 3d  266,  283288  (CA6
2010)  (e-mails  held  by  Internet  service  provider).    As 
already  discussed,  however,  this  case  does  not  involve 
property  or  a  bailment  of  that  sort.    Here  the  Govern-
ment’s  acquisition  of  cell-site  records  falls  within  the 
heartland of Miller and Smith. 

In  fact,  Carpenter’s  Fourth  Amendment  objection  is
even  weaker  than  those  of  the  defendants  in  Miller  and 
Smith.  Here  the  Government  did  not  use  a  mere  sub-
poena to obtain the cell-site records.  It acquired the records
only  after  it  proved  to  a  Magistrate  Judge  reasonable
grounds  to  believe  that  the  records  were  relevant  and
material  to  an  ongoing  criminal  investigation.    See  18 
U. S. C.  §2703(d).  So  even  if  §222  gave  Carpenter  some 
attenuated  interest  in  the  records,  the  Government’s 
conduct  here  would  be  reasonable  under  the  standards 
governing subpoenas.  See Donovan, 464 U. S., at 415. 

Under Miller and Smith, then, a search of the sort that