Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/558bv.pdf
Page Number: 368

Cite as: 558 U. S. 183 (2010) 

207 

Breyer, J., dissenting 

perience,  will  be  sufﬁcient  to  address  any  possible  harm, 
either to the witnesses or to the integrity of the trial. 

Fourth, no fair balancing of the equities (including harm to 
the  public interest)  could support  issuance of  the stay.  See 
Times-Picayune  Publishing  Corp.  v.  Schulingkamp,  419 
U. S. 1301, 1305 (1974) (Powell,  J., in chambers) (recognizing 
“signiﬁcant  public  and  private  interests  balanced  on  both 
sides”  when  “present[ed  with]  a  fundamental  confrontation 
between  the  competing  values  of  free  press  and  fair  trial”). 
As  I  have  just  explained,  the  applicants’  equities  consist  of 
potential harm to witnesses—harm that is either nonexistent 
or that can be cured through protective measures by the Dis­
trict  Court  as  the  circumstances  warrant.  The  competing 
equities  consist  of  not  only  the  respondents’  interest  in  ob­
taining the  courthouse-to-courthouse transmission  that they 
desire,  but  also  the  public’s  interest  in  observing  trial  pro­
ceedings to learn about this case and about how courts work. 
See Nebraska Press Assn. v.  Stuart, 427 U. S. 539, 587 (1976) 
(Brennan, J., concurring in judgment); see also Exh. 2, at 42, 
App.  to  Pet.  (statement  of  Chief  Judge  Walker)  (“[I]f  the 
public  could  see  how  the  judicial  process  works,  they  would 
take  a  somewhat  different  view  of  it.”  “I  think  the  only 
time that you’re going to draw sufﬁcient interest in the legal 
process  is  when  you  have  an  issue  such  as  the  issues  here, 
that  people  think  about,  talk  about,  debate  about  and  con­
sider”).  With these considerations in the balance, the scales 
tip heavily against, not in favor of, issuing the stay. 

The  majority’s  action  today  is  unusual.  It  grants  a  stay 
in  order  to  consider  a  mandamus  petition,  with  a  view  to 
intervening  in  a  matter  of  local  court  administration  that  it 
would  not  (and  should  not)  consider.  It  cites  no  precedent 
for doing so.  It identiﬁes no real harm, let alone “irrepara­
ble harm,” to justify its issuance of this stay.  And the public 
interest  weighs  in  favor  of  providing  access  to  the  courts. 
To  justify  this  extraordinary  intervention,  the  majority  in­