Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/20pdf/19-840_6jfm.pdf
Page Number: 24

Cite as:  593 U. S. ____ (2021) 

5 

THOMAS, J., concurring 

Respondent/Cross-Petitioner  States  18–30,1  and  they  did 
not even clearly raise it in reply.2  Third, this Court has not 
addressed  standing-through-inseverability  in  any  detail,
largely relying on it through implication.  See post, at 16– 
20; Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better Environment, 523 U. S. 
83,  91  (1998)  (“We  have  often  said  that  drive-by  jurisdic-
tional rulings . . . have no precedential effect”).  And fourth, 
this Court has been inconsistent in describing whether in-
severability is a remedy or merits question.  To the extent 
the  parties  seek  inseverability  as  a  remedy,  the  Court  is
powerless to grant that relief.  See Murphy v. National Col-
legiate Athletic Assn., 584 U. S. ___, ___–___ (2018) (slip op., 
at 3–4) (THOMAS, J., concurring); see also Barr v. American 
Assn. of Political Consultants, 591 U. S. ___, ___, n. 8 (2020) 

—————— 

1 The  States  instead  raised  the  two  pocketbook  injury  theories  dis-
cussed by the Court, ante, at 10; Brief for Respondent/Cross-Petitioner
States  19–28,  along  with  another  irrelevant  theory.    Both  theories  fo-
cused only on the mandate’s unlawfulness.  The dissent points to certain
language arguably touching on standing-through-inseverability, post, at 
13–14, but I respectfully disagree.  That language addresses a different
theory—the argument that the unlawful mandate harms the States by 
increasing the cost of complying with other Act provisions, such as re-
porting requirements relating to the mandate.  Ante, at 14–16; Brief for 
Respondent/Cross-Petitioner States 20–25 (discussing how “the individ-
ual mandate itself increased the costs to state respondents in at least six
ways” (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted)).  As the Court 
notes, “[n]o one claims these other provisions violate the Constitution.” 
Ante, at 16.  And, the Court does not address the argument that these
provisions are otherwise unlawful.  Ante, at 10 (“declin[ing] to consider” 
the standing-through-inseverability theory raised by the dissent “on be-
half of the state plaintiffs”).

2 This  lack  of  legal  development  is  particularly  significant  because
standing-through-inseverability—assuming  it  is  a  legitimate  theory  of
standing—is fundamentally a merits-like exercise that requires courts to 
apply ordinary principles of statutory interpretation to determine if it is
at least “arguable” that a statute links the lawfulness of one provision to
the lawfulness of another.  See Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better Environ-
ment,  523  U. S.  83,  89  (1998).    Thus,  a  failure  to  develop  a  standing-
through-inseverability argument poses a significant obstacle to review.