Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/19pdf/17-1618_hfci.pdf
Page Number: 62.0

Cite as:  590 U. S. ____ (2020) 

25 

ALITO, J., dissenting 

distant and utterly unknown civilization.  Statutes consist 
of  communications  between  members  of  a  particular  lin-
guistic  community,  one  that  existed  in  a  particular  place 
and at a particular time, and these communications must 
therefore  be  interpreted  as  they  were  understood  by  that
community at that time. 

For this reason, it is imperative to consider how Ameri-
cans in 1964 would have understood Title VII’s prohibition
of discrimination because of sex.  To get a picture of this, we 
may imagine this scene.  Suppose that, while Title VII was
under consideration in Congress, a group of average Amer-
icans  decided  to  read  the  text  of  the  bill  with  the  aim  of 
writing  or  calling  their  representatives  in  Congress  and 
conveying their approval or disapproval.  What would these 
ordinary  citizens  have  taken  “discrimination  because  of 
sex” to mean?  Would they have thought that this language
prohibited discrimination because of sexual orientation or 
gender identity? 

B 
The answer could not be clearer.  In 1964, ordinary Amer-
icans reading the text of Title VII would not have dreamed
that discrimination because of sex meant discrimination be-
cause of sexual orientation, much less gender identity.  The 
ordinary  meaning  of  discrimination  because  of  “sex”  was 
discrimination because of a person’s biological sex, not sex-
ual orientation or gender identity.  The possibility that dis-
crimination  on  either  of  these  grounds  might  fit  within
some exotic understanding of sex discrimination would not 
have crossed their minds. 

1 
In  1964,  the  concept  of  prohibiting  discrimination  “be-
cause of sex” was no novelty.  It was a familiar and well-
understood  concept,  and  what  it  meant  was  equal  treat-
ment for men and women.