Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/17pdf/16-499_1a7d.pdf
Page Number: 42

6 

JESNER v. ARAB BANK, PLC 

Opinion of ALITO, J. 

versies  if  we  created  causes  of  action  under  the  ATS 
against  foreign  corporate  defendants.  Unless  corporate
liability  would  actively  decrease  diplomatic  disputes,  we
have  no  authority  to  act.    On  that  score,  the  dissent  can 
only  speculate  that  declining  to  create  causes  of  action
against  foreign  corporate  defendants  “might”  lead  to  dip-
lomatic friction.  Post, at 30.  But the dissent has no real-
world examples to support its hunch, and that is not sur-
prising;  the  ATS  already  goes  further  than  any  other
statute  in  the  world  in  granting  aliens  the  right  to  sue 
civilly  for  violations  of  international  law,  especially  in 
light  of  the  many  other  avenues  for  relief  available.    See 
ante, at 23 (plurality opinion).  It would be rather rich for 
any other nation to complain that the ATS does not go far
enough.  Indeed, no country has. 

Finally, the dissent invokes “the considered judgment of 
the  Executive  Branch  and  Congress”  that  ATS  suits 
against  foreign  corporations  are  “necessary  ‘to  help  the 
United  States  avoid  diplomatic  friction.’ ”    Post,  at  31, 
n. 13.  Tellingly,  however,  the  dissent  cannot  muster  a
single  source  that  actually  supports  that  bold  contention.
Instead, the dissent immediately retreats to two far more 
modest  assertions.  First,  the  dissent  observes  that  the 
Executive  Branch  has  twice  suggested  that  this  Court 
should allow causes of action against corporate defendants
under  the  ATS.  But  both  times  the  Executive  Branch 
defended that perspective primarily under the first step of 
Sosa;  here,  however,  we  are  dealing  with  Sosa’s  second 
step, and with the risk of diplomatic friction in particular.
Second,  the  dissent  also  notes  that  the  Executive  Branch 
and  Congress  have  each  taken  steps  to  hold  corporations
liable  for  certain  acts  like  terrorism.    Post,  at  31,  n. 13. 
That  is,  of  course,  true,  but  it  is  also  entirely  irrelevant.
Congress  and  the  Executive  Branch  may  be  willing  to 
trade  off  the  risk  of  some  diplomatic  friction  in  exchange 
for  the  promotion  of  other  objectives  (such  as  “holding