Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/19pdf/19-431_5i36.pdf
Page Number: 75

Cite as:  591 U. S. ____ (2020) 

19 

GINSBURG, J., dissenting 

beliefs of particular citizens.”  Id., at 699.22 

Roy signals a critical distinction in the Court’s religious
exercise  jurisprudence:  A  religious  adherent  may  be  enti-
tled to religious accommodation with regard to her own con-
duct, but she is not entitled to “insist that . . . others must 
conform  their  conduct  to  [her]  own  religious  necessities.’ ”  
Caldor,  472  U. S.,  at  710  (quoting  Otten  v.  Baltimore  & 
Ohio  R. Co.,  205  F. 2d  58,  61  (CA2  1953)  (Hand,  J.);  (em-
phasis  added).23    Counsel  for  the  Little  Sisters  acknowl-
edged as much when he conceded that religious “employers
could [not] object at all” to a “government obligation” to pro-
vide contraceptive coverage “imposed directly on the insur-
ers.”  Tr. of Oral Arg. 41.24 

But that is precisely what the self-certification accommo-
dation  does.  As  the  Court  recognized  in  Hobby  Lobby: 
“When a group-health-insurance issuer receives notice that 
[an employer opposes coverage for some or all contraceptive
services for religious reasons], the issuer must then exclude 
[that] coverage from the employer’s plan and provide sepa-
rate  payments  for  contraceptive  services  for  plan  partici-
pants.”  573 U. S., at 698–699; see also id., at 738 (Kennedy, 
—————— 

22 JUSTICE ALITO disputes the relevance of Roy, asserting that the reli-
gious adherent in that case faced no penalty for noncompliance with the 
legal requirement under consideration.  See ante, at 6, n. 5.  As JUSTICE 
ALITO  acknowledges,  however,  the  critical  inquiry  has  two  parts.    See 
ante, at 6–7.  It is not enough to ask whether noncompliance entails “sub-
stantial  adverse  practical  consequences.”    One  must  also  ask  whether 
compliance substantially burdens religious exercise.  Like Roy, my dis-
sent homes in on the latter question.  

23 Even if RFRA sweeps more broadly than the Court’s pre-Smith ju-
risprudence in some respects, see Hobby Lobby, 573 U. S., at 695, n. 3; 
but see id., at 749–750 (GINSBURG, J., dissenting), there is no cause to 
believe that Congress jettisoned this fundamental distinction. 

24 JUSTICE ALITO  ignores  the  distinction  between  (1)  a  request  for  an 
accommodation with regard to one’s own conduct, and (2) an attempt to
require  others  to  conform  their  conduct  to  one’s  own  religious  beliefs. 
This  distinction  is  fatal  to  JUSTICE  ALITO’s  argument  that  the  self-
certification accommodation violates RFRA.  See ante, at 6–10.