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Page Number: 41.0

8 

KNOX v. SERVICE EMPLOYEES 

BREYER, J., dissenting 

administrative  calculation  problems,  is  apparently  to  de-
part  yet  further  from  the  Court’s  earlier  holdings.    It 
seems  to  say  that  an  objector  can  withhold  100%,  not 
simply of a special assessment made for political purposes, 
but  of  any  special  assessment  whatsoever,  including  an
assessment made solely for the purpose of paying for extra
chargeable  costs,  such  as  extended  contract  negotiations, 
pension  plan  experts,  or  newly  assessed  contributions  to 
replenish  a  national  union’s  collective-bargaining  assis-
tance  funds.   See  ante,  at  21–22.    Although  this  rule  is
comparatively  simple  to  administer,  it  cannot  be  recon-
ciled  with  the  Court’s  previous  constitutional  holdings. 
Abood,  along  with  every  related  case  the  Court  has  ever 
decided, makes clear that the Constitution allows a union 
to  assess  nonmembers  a  pro  rata  share  of  fees  insofar 
as  they  are  used  to  pay  for  these  kinds  of  collective-
bargaining  expenses.    See  431  U. S.,  at  234–236;  see  also 
Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Assn., 500 U. S. 507, 524 (1991); 
Machinists  v.  Street,  367  U. S.  740,  760  (1961);  Ellis,  466 
U. S.,  at  447;  Davenport  v.  Washington  Ed.  Assn.,  551 
U. S. 177, 181 (2007); Locke v. Karass, 555 U. S. 207, 210 
(2009).  How could the majority now hold to the contrary?

If  there  are  good  reasons  for  requiring  departure  from
the  basic  Hudson-approved  administrative  system,  they 
are  not  the  reasons  the  Court  provides.  It  suggests  that 
the  basic  Hudson  administrative  system  gives  the  union 
the freedom to misclassify, arguing, for example, that the
union  has  adopted  an  overly  broad  definition  of  charge-
ability.  See ante, at 20–21.  The 2005 proportion, however,
rested  upon  audited  2004  accounts.    While  petitioners
argue  in  this  Court  that  the  union  misclassified  parts
of  the  special  assessment  (which  was  not  imposed  until 
2005),  no  brief  filed  in  this  case  (and  certainly  no  court 
below)  has challenged the  accuracy  of  the  2004  figures  or 
the  resulting  chargeable/nonchargeable  allocation.    In-
deed,  the  2004  accounts  were  audited  before  the  special