Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/17pdf/16-476_dbfi.pdf
Page Number: 33

Cite as:  584 U. S. ____ (2018) 

29 

Opinion of the Court 

on  the  controversial  issue  of  gambling.  By  contrast,  if 
§3702(2)  is  severed  from  §3702(1),  it  implements  a  per­
verse policy that undermines whatever policy is favored by
the people of a State.  If the people of a State support the 
legalization  of  sports  gambling,  federal  law  would  make 
the  activity  illegal.  But  if  a  State  outlaws  sports  gam­
bling, that activity would be lawful under §3702(2).  We do 
not  think  that  Congress  ever  contemplated  that  such  a
weird result would come to pass.

PASPA’s enforcement scheme reinforces this conclusion. 
PASPA authorizes civil suits by the Attorney General and
sports organizations but does not make sports gambling a 
federal crime or provide civil penalties for violations.  This 
enforcement scheme is suited for challenging state author­
ization  or  licensing  or  a  small  number  of  private  opera­
tions, but the scheme would break down if a State broadly 
decriminalized  sports  gambling.  It  is  revealing  that  the 
Congressional Budget Office estimated that PASPA would 
impose  “no  cost”  on  the  Federal  Government,  see  S. Rep. 
No. 102–248, p. 10 (1991), a conclusion that would certainly 
be  incorrect  if  enforcement  required  a  multiplicity  of 
civil suits and applications to hold illegal bookies and other 
private parties in contempt.32 

3 

The remaining question that we must decide is whether 
the provisions of PASPA prohibiting the “advertis[ing]” of 
sports gambling are severable.  See §§3702(1)–(2).  If these 
provisions were allowed to stand, federal law would forbid 
the  advertising  of  an  activity  that  is  legal  under  both 

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32 Of  course,  one  need  not  rely  on  the  Senate  Report  for  the  com­
monsense  proposition  that  leaving  §3702(2)  in  place  could  wildly
change the fiscal calculus, “giv[ing] it an effect altogether different from
that  sought  by  the  measure  viewed  as  a  whole.”    Railroad  Retirement 
Bd. v. Alton R. Co., 295 U. S. 330, 362 (1935).