Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/17pdf/16-499_1a7d.pdf
Page Number: 77

20 

JESNER v. ARAB BANK, PLC 

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting 

when  others—namely,  the  individuals  and  organizations
that  carried  out  the  terrorist  attacks—were  “the  direct 
cause”  of  the  harm  petitioners  here  suffered.  Brief  for 
Respondent  41.  That  complaint,  though,  is  a  critique  of
the  imposition  of  liability  for  financing  terrorism,  not  an
argument  that  ATS  suits  against  corporations  generally 
necessarily cause diplomatic tensions.

Arab Bank further expresses concern that ATS suits are
being filed against corporations in an effort to recover for
the bad acts of foreign governments or officials.  See id., at 
40.  But  the  Bank’s  explanation  of  this  problem  reveals
that  the  true  source  of  its  grievance  is  the  availability  of 
aiding and abetting liability.  See ibid. (“[N]umerous ATS 
suits have alleged that a corporation has aided or abetted 
bad  acts  committed  by  a  foreign  government  and  its  offi-
cials”  (emphasis  in  original));  id.,  at  41  (“[A]iding  and 
abetting suits under the ATS have given plaintiffs ‘a clear 
means  for  effectively  circumventing’  critical  limits  on
foreign  sovereign  immunity”  (quoting  Brief  for  United 
States as Amicus Curiae in American Isuzu Motors, Inc. v. 
Ntsebeza,  O. T.  2007,  No.  07–919,  p. 15)).    The  plurality
too  points  to  an  aiding  and  abetting  case  to  support  its 
contention  that  plaintiffs  “use  corporations  as  surrogate
defendants  to  challenge  the  conduct  of  foreign  govern­
ments.”  Ante, at 21 (discussing Kiobel, in which plaintiffs 
sought  to  hold  a  corporate  defendant  liable  for  “ ‘aiding
and  abetting  the  Nigerian  Government  in  committing’ ” 
law-of-nations violations (quoting 569 U. S., at 114)).  Yet 
not  all  law-of-nations  violations  asserted  against  corpora­
tions  are  premised  on  aiding  and  abetting  liability;  it  is 
possible  for  a  corporation  to  violate  international-law
norms  independent  of  a  foreign  state  or  foreign  state
officials.  In this respect, too, the Court’s rule is ill fitted to 
the problem identified.

Notably,  even  the  Hashemite  Kingdom  of  Jordan  does 
not  argue  that  there  are  foreign-policy  tensions  inherent