Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/21pdf/20-1088_dbfi.pdf
Page Number: 43.0

Cite as:  596 U. S. ____ (2022) 

3 

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting 

from withholding funding from a religious entity “solely be-
cause of its religious character,” id., at ___ (opinion of the
Court) (slip op., at 14), but retained authority to do so on
the basis that the funding would be put to religious uses.
Two  Terms  ago,  the  Court  reprised  and  extended  Trinity 
Lutheran’s error to hold that a State could not limit a pri-
vate-school voucher program to secular schools.  Espinoza 
v. Montana Dept. of Revenue, 591 U. S. ___, ___ (2020) (slip 
op., at 9).  The Court, however, again refrained from extend-
ing Trinity Lutheran from funding restrictions based on re-
ligious status to those based on religious uses.  Espinoza, 
591 U. S., at ___–___ (2020) (slip op., at 9–12). 
  As JUSTICE BREYER explains, see ante, at 8–9, this status-
use distinction readily distinguishes this case from Trinity 
Lutheran  and  Espinoza.  I  warned  in  Trinity  Lutheran, 
however, that the Court’s analysis could “be manipulated to
call for a similar fate for lines drawn on the  basis of reli-
gious use.”  582 U. S., at ___, n. 14 (dissenting opinion) (slip
op., at 25, n. 14).  That fear has come to fruition: The Court 
now holds for the first time that “any status-use distinction”
is immaterial in both “theory” and “practice.”  Ante, at 17. 
It  reaches  that  conclusion  by  embracing  arguments  from 
prior separate writings and ignoring decades of precedent 
affording governments flexibility in navigating the tension 
between  the  Religion  Clauses.  As  a  result,  in  just  a  few 
years, the Court has upended constitutional doctrine, shift-
ing from a rule that permits States to decline to fund reli-
gious organizations to one that requires States in many cir-
cumstances  to  subsidize  religious  indoctrination  with
taxpayer dollars.

Second,  the  consequences  of  the  Court’s  rapid  transfor-
mation  of  the  Religion  Clauses  must  not  be  understated.
From  a  doctrinal  perspective,  the  Court’s  failure  to  apply 
the  play-in-the-joints  principle  here,  see  ante,  at  13–14 
(BREYER, J., dissenting), leaves one to wonder what, if any-
thing, is left of it.  The Court’s increasingly expansive view