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Page Number: 4.0

4 

VEGA v. TEKOH 

Syllabus 

constitute federal “law” that can provide the ground for a §1983 claim 
cannot succeed unless Tekoh can persuade the Court that this “law” 
should  be  expanded  to  include  the  right  to  sue  for  damages  under 
§1983.    “A  judicially  crafted”  prophylactic  rule  should  apply  “only 
where its benefits outweigh its costs,” Shatzer, 559 U. S., at 106.  Here, 
while the benefits of permitting the assertion of Miranda claims under 
§1983 would be slight, the costs would be substantial.  For example, 
allowing a claim like Tekoh’s would disserve “judicial economy,” Park-
lane  Hosiery Co.  v. Shore, 439  U. S.  322,  326,  by  requiring  a  federal 
judge or jury to adjudicate a factual question (whether Tekoh was in 
custody  when  questioned)  that  had  already  been  decided  by  a  state 
court.  Allowing §1983 suits based on Miranda claims could also pre-
sent many procedural issues.  Miranda and its progeny provide suffi-
cient protection for the Fifth Amendment right against compelled self-
incrimination.  Pp. 13–16. 

985 F. 3d 713, reversed and remanded. 

ALITO, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C. J., 
and THOMAS, GORSUCH, KAVANAUGH, and BARRETT, JJ., joined.  KAGAN, 
J.,  filed  a  dissenting  opinion,  in  which  BREYER  and  SOTOMAYOR,  JJ., 
joined.