Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/23pdf/22-915_8o6b.pdf
Page Number: 100.0

Cite as:  602 U. S. ____ (2024) 

29 

THOMAS, J., dissenting 

13. 

As it does today, the Court should continue to rebuff the 
Government’s attempts to rewrite the Second Amendment 
and the Court’s precedents interpreting it. 

B 
The Government’s “law-abiding, dangerous citizen” the-
ory is also antithetical to our constitutional structure.  At 
bottom, its test stems from the idea that the Second Amend-
ment  points  to  general  principles,  not  a  historically
grounded  right.  And,  it  asserts  that  one  of  those  general
principles  is  that  Congress  can  disarm  anyone  it  deems 
“dangerous,  irresponsible,  or  otherwise  unfit  to  possess 
arms.”  Brief for United States 7.  This approach is wrong
as a matter of constitutional interpretation, and it under-
mines the very purpose and function of the Second Amend-
ment. 

The  Second  Amendment  recognizes  a  pre-existing  right 
and that right was “enshrined with the scope” it was “un-
derstood  to  have  when  the  people  adopted  [the  Amend-
ment].”  Heller, 554 U. S., at 634–635.  Only a subsequent
constitutional  amendment  can  alter  the  Second  Amend-
ment’s  terms,  “whether  or  not  future  legislatures  or  . . . 
even future judges think [its original] scope [is] too broad.” 
Id., at 635. 

Yet,  the  Government’s  “law-abiding,  dangerous  citizen” 
test—and  indeed  any  similar,  principle-based  approach—
would hollow out the Second Amendment of any substance. 
Congress could impose any firearm regulation so long as it 
targets “unfit” persons.  And, of course, Congress would also 
dictate  what  “unfit”  means  and  who  qualifies.    See  Tr.  of 
Oral Arg. 7, 51.  The historical understanding of the Second
Amendment right would be irrelevant.  In fact, the Govern-
ment  posits  that  Congress  could  enact  a  law  that  the 
Founders explicitly rejected.  See id., at 18 (agreeing that