Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/21pdf/20-1530_n758.pdf
Page Number: 56.0

Cite as:  597 U. S. ____ (2022) 

19 

GORSUCH, J., concurring 

In the end, our disagreement really seems to center on a 
difference  of  opinion  about  whether  the  statute  at  issue
here clearly authorizes the agency to adopt the CPP.  The 
dissent even complains that I have failed to conduct an ex-
haustive analysis of the relevant statutory language.  See 
post, at 28, n. 8.  But in this concurrence, I have sought to 
provide some observations about the underlying doctrine on
which today’s decision rests.  On the merits of the case be-
fore us, I join the Court’s opinion, which comprehensively 
sets forth why Congress did not clearly authorize the EPA
to engage in a “generation shifting approach” to the produc-
tion of energy in this country.  Ante, at 28.  In reaching its
judgment,  the  Court  hardly  professes  to  “appoin[t]  itself”
“the  decision-maker  on  climate  policy.”  Post,  at  33.  The 
Court acknowledges only that, under our Constitution, the 
people’s  elected  representatives  in  Congress  are  the  deci-
sionmakers  here—and  they  have  not  clearly  granted  the 
agency the authority it claims for itself.  Ante, at 31. 

* 
When Congress seems slow to solve problems, it may be
only natural that those in the Executive Branch might seek 
to take matters into their own hands.  But the Constitution 
does  not  authorize  agencies  to  use  pen-and-phone  regula-
tions as substitutes for laws passed by the people’s repre-
sentatives.  In our Republic, “[i]t is the peculiar province of
the  legislature  to  prescribe  general  rules  for  the  govern-
ment of society.”  Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch 87, 136 (1810).
Because today’s decision helps safeguard that foundational 
constitutional promise, I am pleased to concur. 

—————— 
Case, American Enterprise Institute, J. on Govt. & Soc., July–Aug. 1980, 
pp. 27–28.