Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/21pdf/21a145_gfbi.pdf
Page Number: 13

Cite as:  595 U. S. ____ (2021) 

13 

GORSUCH, J., dissenting 

that  our  Constitution  is  intended  to  prevail  over  the  pas-
sions of the moment, and that the unalienable rights rec-
orded in its text are not matters to “be submitted to vote; 
they depend on the outcome of no elections.”  319 U. S., at 
638.  Instead, it is this Court’s duty to “apply the limitations
of the Constitution with no fear that freedom to be intellec-
tually and spiritually diverse or even contrary will disinte-
grate  the  social  organization.”    Id.,  at  641.    The  First 
Amendment  protects  against  “coercive  elimination  of  dis-
sent”  and  “was  designed  to  avoid  these  ends  by  avoiding
these beginnings.”  Ibid. 

Today, our Nation faces not a world war but a pandemic.
Like  wars,  though,  pandemics  often  produce  demanding 
new social rules aimed at protecting collective interests— 
and with those rules can come fear and anger at individuals
unable to conform for religious reasons.  If cases like Gobitis 
bear any good, it is in their cautionary tale.  They remind
us  that,  in  the  end,  it  is  always  the  failure  to  defend  the 
Constitution’s promises that leads to this Court’s greatest 
regrets.  They remind us, too, that in America, freedom to 
differ  is  not  supposed  to  be  “limited  to  things  that  do  not 
matter  much.  That  would  be  a  mere  shadow  of  freedom. 
The test of its substance is the right to differ as to things 
that touch the heart of the existing order.”  Barnette, 319 
U. S., at 642.  The test of this Court’s substance lies in its 
willingness to defend more than the shadow of freedom in 
the trying times, not just the easy ones.

We have already lived through the Gobitis-Barnette cycle 
once in this pandemic.  At first, this Court permitted States 
to shutter houses of worship while allowing casinos, movie
theaters,  and  other  favored  businesses  to  remain  open.
Falling prey once more to the “judicial impulse to stay out 
of the way in times of crisis,” the Court allowed States to do 
all this even when religious institutions agreed to follow the 
same occupancy limits and protective measures considered 
safe  enough  for  comparable  gatherings  in  secular  spaces.