Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/13pdf/12-536_e1pf.pdf
Page Number: 49

Cite as:  572 U. S. ____ (2014) 

3 

THOMAS, J., concurring in judgment 

limits  entail  only  a  “marginal”  speech  restriction  because 
“[a] contribution serves as a general expression of support 
for the candidate and his views, but does not communicate 
the  underlying  basis  for  the  support.”    424  U. S.,  at  20, 
21.  But this Court has never required a speaker to explain
the  reasons  for  his  position  in  order  to  obtain  full  First
Amendment  protection. 
Instead,  we  have  consistently 
held  that  speech  is  protected  even  “when  the  underlying 
basis for a position is not given.”  Shrink Missouri, supra, 
at  415,  n. 3  (THOMAS,  J.,  dissenting);  see,  e.g.,  City  of 
Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U. S. 43, 46 (1994) (sign reading “For
Peace in the Gulf ”); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U. S. 397, 415– 
416 (1989) (flag burning); Tinker v. Des Moines Independ-
ent  Community  School  Dist.,  393  U. S.  503,  510–511 
(1969)  (black  armband  signifying  opposition  to  Vietnam
War);  see  also  Colorado  I,  supra,  at  640  (opinion  of 
THOMAS, J.) (“Even a pure message of support, unadorned
with reasons, is valuable to the democratic process”)

Equally  unpersuasive  is  Buckley’s  suggestion  that  con-
tribution  limits  warrant  less  stringent  review  because
“[t]he  quantity  of  communication  by  the  contributor  does
not increase perceptibly with the size of his contribution,” 
and “[a]t most, the size of the contribution provides a very 
rough  index  of  the  intensity  of  the  contributor’s  support
for the candidate.”  424 U. S., at 21.  Contributions do in-
crease  the  quantity  of  communication  by  “amplifying  the 
voice  of  the  candidate”  and  “help[ing]  to  ensure  the  dis-
semination of the messages that the contributor wishes to 
convey.”  Shrink  Missouri,  supra,  at  415  (THOMAS,  J., 
dissenting).  They  also  serve  as  a  quantifiable  metric  of 
the  intensity  of  a  particular  contributor’s  support,  as 
demonstrated  by  the  frequent  practice  of  giving  different
amounts to different candidates.  Buckley simply failed to
recognize  that  “we  have  accorded  full  First  Amendment
protection  to  expressions  of  intensity.”    Id.,  at  415,  n.  3; 
see  also  Cohen  v.  California,  403  U. S.  15,  25–26  (1971)