Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/558bv.pdf
Page Number: 180.0

Cite as: 558 U. S. 15 (2009) 

19 

Per Curiam 

exclude  the  evidence,  arguing  that  the  State  should  be  al­
lowed to tell the jury only that Belmontes had been convicted 
of being an accessory after the fact to voluntary manslaugh­
ter—nothing  more.  Record  2240–2254.  Schick  succeeded 
in keeping the prosecution from presenting the damaging ev­
idence in its sentencing case in chief, but his client remained 
at risk: The trial court indicated the evidence would come in 
for rebuttal or impeachment if Schick opened the door.  Id., 
at 2256. 

This  was  not  an  empty  threat.  In  one  instance,  Schick 
elicited  testimony  that  Belmontes  was  not  a  violent  person. 
The  State  objected  and,  out  of  earshot  of  the  jury,  argued 
that  it  should  be  able  to  rebut  the  testimony  with  the 
Howard  murder  evidence.  Id.,  at  2332–2334.  The  court 
warned Schick that it was “going to have to allow [the prose­
cution] to go into the whole background” if Schick continued 
his line of questioning.  Id., at 2334.  Schick acquiesced, and 
the court struck the testimony.  Ibid. 

The  court’s  warning  reinforced  Schick’s  understanding 
that  he  would  have  to  tailor  his  mitigation  case  carefully  to 
preserve  his  success  in  excluding  the  Howard  murder  evi­
dence.  With  that  cautionary  note  in  mind,  Schick  put  on 
nine  witnesses  he  thought  could  advance  a  case  for  mitiga­
tion, without opening the door to the prior murder evidence. 
See id., at 2312–2417. 

The  Court  of  Appeals  determined  that  in  spite  of  these 
efforts,  Schick’s  performance  was  constitutionally  deﬁcient 
under Circuit precedent.  529 F. 3d, at 862–863.  The State 
challenges that conclusion, but we need not resolve the point, 
because  we  agree  with  the  District  Court  that  Belmontes 
cannot establish prejudice. 

II 

To  establish  prejudice,  Belmontes  must  show  “a  reason­
able probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, 
the  result  of  the  proceeding  would  have  been  different.” 
Strickland,  466  U. S.,  at  694.  That  showing  requires  Bel­