Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/16pdf/15-1358_6khn.pdf
Page Number: 14

Cite as:  582 U. S. ____ (2017) 

9 

Opinion of the Court 

decided  after  Bivens,  and  after  the  statutory  implied
cause-of-action  cases  that  Bivens  itself  relied  upon,  the
Court  adopted  a  far  more  cautious  course  before  finding 
implied  causes  of  action.  In  two  principal  cases  under
other  statutes,  it  declined  to  find  an  implied  cause  of 
action.  See Piper v. Chris-Craft Industries, Inc., 430 U. S. 
1,  42,  45–46  (1977);  Cort  v.  Ash,  422  U. S.  66,  68–69 
(1975).  Later,  in  Cannon  v.  University  of  Chicago,  441 
U. S.  677  (1979),  the  Court  did  allow  an  implied  cause  of 
action;  but  it  cautioned  that,  where  Congress  “intends
private litigants to have a cause of action,” the “far better
course”  is  for  Congress  to  confer  that  remedy  in  explicit 
terms.  Id., at 717. 

Following  this  expressed  caution,  the  Court  clarified  in 
a series of cases that, when deciding whether to recognize 
an implied cause of action, the “determinative” question is
one of statutory intent.  Sandoval, 532 U. S., at 286.  If the 
statute  itself  does  not  “displa[y]  an  intent”  to  create  “a
private remedy,” then “a cause of action does not exist and 
courts  may  not  create  one,  no  matter  how  desirable  that 
might  be  as  a  policy  matter,  or  how  compatible  with  the 
statute.”  Id., at 286–287; see also Transamerica Mortgage 
Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U. S. 11, 15–16, 23–24 (1979); 
Karahalios  v.  Federal  Employees,  489  U. S.  527,  536–537 
(1989).  The Court held that the judicial task was instead
“limited solely to determining whether Congress intended 
to  create  the  private  right  of  action  asserted.”    Touche 
Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U. S. 560, 568 (1979).  If the 
statute does not itself so provide, a private cause of action 
will  not  be  created  through  judicial  mandate.    See 
Transamerica, supra, at 24. 

The  decision  to  recognize  an  implied  cause  of  action
under  a  statute  involves  somewhat  different  considera-
tions  than  when  the  question  is  whether  to  recognize  an
implied  cause  of  action  to  enforce  a  provision  of  the  Con-
stitution itself.  When Congress enacts a statute, there are