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CHRISTIAN LEGAL SOC. CHAPTER OF UNIV. OF CAL., 
HASTINGS COLLEGE OF LAW v. MARTINEZ 
ALITO, J., dissenting 

precedent, this was viewpoint discrimination.5 

It  bears  emphasis  that  permitting  religious  groups  to
limit  membership  to  those  who  share  the  groups’  beliefs
would  not  have  the  effect  of  allowing  other  groups  to  dis-
criminate on the basis of religion.  It would not mean, for 
example,  that  fraternities  or  sororities  could  exclude  stu-
dents  on  that  basis.  As  our  cases  have  recognized,  the
right of expressive association permits a group to exclude 
an applicant for membership only if the admission of that 
person  would  “affec[t]  in  a  significant  way  the  group’s 
ability  to  advocate  public  or  private  viewpoints.”    Dale, 
530 U. S., at 648.  Groups that do not engage in expressive
association have no such right.  Similarly, groups that are
dedicated to expressing a viewpoint on a secular topic (for
example,  a  political  or  ideological  viewpoint)  would  have 
no  basis  for  limiting  membership  based  on  religion  be-
cause  the  presence  of  members  with  diverse  religious
beliefs  would  have  no  effect  on  the  group’s  ability  to  ex-
press  its  views.  But  for  religious  groups,  the  situation  is 
very  different.  This  point  was  put  well  by  a  coalition  of 
Muslim,  Christian,  Jewish,  and  Sikh  groups:  “Of  course 
there is a strong interest in prohibiting religious discrimi-
nation  where  religion  is  irrelevant.  But  it  is  fundamen-
tally confused to apply a rule against religious discrimina-
tion to a religious association.”  Brief for American Islamic 
Congress et al. as Amici Curiae 3. 

Sexual  orientation.  The  Hastings  Nondiscrimination
Policy, as interpreted by the law school, also discriminated 
on the basis of viewpoint regarding sexual morality.  CLS 

—————— 

5 It is not at all clear what JUSTICE STEVENS means when he refers to 
religious  “status”  as  opposed  to  religious  belief.    See  ante,  at  2,  n. 1. 
But  if  by  religious  status  he  means  such  things  as  the  religion  into
which  a  person  was  born  or  the  religion  of  a  person’s  ancestors,  then 
prohibiting discrimination on such grounds would not involve viewpoint
discrimination.    Such  immutable  characteristics  are  quite  different 
from viewpoint.