Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/21pdf/20-603_o758.pdf
Page Number: 33.0

Cite as:  597 U. S. ____ (2022) 

11 

THOMAS, J., dissenting 

Our  settled  test  for  plan-of-the-Convention  waiver  is  a
stringent  one:  We  cannot  infer  a  waiver  of  sovereign  im-
munity  unless  there  is  “compelling  evidence  that  the 
Founders thought such a surrender inherent in the consti-
tutional  compact.”  Blatchford,  501  U. S.,  at  781;  see  also 
Alden, 527 U. S., at 731.  “Compelling evidence” of this sort
includes “evidence of the original understanding of the Con-
stitution,” id., at 741, “early congressional practice,” id., at 
743,  “the  structure  of  the  Constitution”  itself,  id.,  at  748, 
and the “theory and reasoning of our earlier cases,” id., at 
745; see also id., at 754. 

Applying this test, it is clear that the States did not im-
plicitly  agree  to  surrender  their  state-court  immunity
against congressional exercises of the war powers. 

A 
Torres claims (and the Court agrees) that the original un-
derstanding  of  the  Constitution’s  text  implies  that  the 
States agreed to surrender their immunity against private 
actions  authorized  by  Congress’  “war  powers,”  which  in-
clude eight powers enumerated in Article I, §8, along with
the Necessary and Proper Clause.  See Brief for Petitioner 
4 (invoking Art. I, §8, cls. 1, 10–16, 18); see also ante, at 7 
(listing Art. I, §8, cls. 1, 11–16).   In support  of that argu-
ment, Torres and the Court point out that the war powers
delegated to Congress are sweeping, and that Article I, §10,
expressly and completely divests States of various war-re-
lated powers.  See ante, at 7–8; Brief for Petitioner 24.  This 
argument falters on at least two fronts.

First, Seminole Tribe long ago explained that the breadth
and exclusivity of a federal power does not authorize Con-
gress  to  subject  nonconsenting  States  to  private  damages 
actions.  Seminole Tribe involved a federal cause of action 
created pursuant to Congress’ authority under the Indian 
Commerce  Clause,  see  517  U. S.,  at  60,  which  this  Court 
has said grants Congress “ ‘plenary and exclusive’ ” “powers