Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/17pdf/16-111diff2_e1pf.pdf
Page Number: 13

Cite as:  584 U. S. ____ (2018) 

9 

Opinion of the Court 

court concluded that requiring Phillips to comply with the
statute  did  not violate his  free  exercise  rights.  The  Colo-
rado Supreme Court declined to hear the case.

Phillips  sought  review  here,  and  this  Court  granted 
certiorari.  582 U. S. ___ (2017).  He now renews his claims 
under  the  Free  Speech  and  Free  Exercise  Clauses  of  the
First Amendment. 

II
 
A
 
Our society has come to the recognition that gay persons
and gay couples cannot be treated as social outcasts or as
inferior  in  dignity  and  worth.  For  that  reason  the  laws 
and  the  Constitution  can,  and  in  some  instances  must, 
protect  them  in  the  exercise  of  their  civil  rights.    The 
exercise of their freedom on terms equal to others must be
given great weight and respect by the courts.  At the same 
time,  the  religious  and  philosophical  objections  to  gay
marriage  are  protected  views  and  in  some  instances  pro-
tected  forms  of  expression.    As  this  Court  observed  in 
Obergefell  v.  Hodges,  576  U. S.  ___  (2015),  “[t]he  First 
Amendment  ensures  that  religious  organizations  and 
persons  are  given proper  protection as  they seek  to  teach
the principles that are so fulfilling and so central to their
lives and faiths.”  Id., at ___ (slip op., at 27).  Nevertheless, 
while  those  religious  and  philosophical  objections  are 
protected,  it  is  a  general  rule  that  such  objections  do  not
allow  business  owners  and  other  actors  in  the  economy
and  in  society  to  deny  protected  persons  equal  access  to
goods and services under a neutral and generally applica-
ble  public  accommodations  law.  See  Newman  v.  Piggie 
Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U. S. 400, 402, n. 5 (1968) (per 
curiam);  see  also  Hurley  v.  Irish-American  Gay,  Lesbian 
and  Bisexual  Group  of  Boston,  Inc.,  515  U. S.  557,  572 
(1995)  (“Provisions  like  these  are  well  within  the  State’s
usual  power  to  enact  when  a  legislature  has  reason  to