Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/21pdf/20-1459_n7ip.pdf
Page Number: 3.0

Cite as:  596 U. S. ____ (2022) 

3 

Syllabus 

that a defendant used, attempted to use, or threatened to use physical
force.  But while many who commit the crime of attempted Hobbs Act
robbery do use, attempt to  use, or threaten to use force, the govern-
ment’s problem is that no element of attempted Hobbs Act robbery re-
quires the government to prove such facts beyond a reasonable doubt.
The government maintains that anyone who takes a substantial step
toward completing Hobbs Act robbery always or categorically poses a 
“threatened  use”  of  force  because  the  word  “threat”  can  be  used  to 
speak of an abstract risk.  The government submits that the elements 
clause uses the term to require only an objective, if uncommunicated,
threat  to  community  peace  and  order.    But  when  Congress  uses  the 
word “threat” in such an abstract and predictive (rather than commu-
nicative) sense, it usually makes its point plain.  The textual clues in 
the statute point in the opposite direction of the government’s reading.
Moreover, the government’s view of the elements clause would have it 
effectively  replicate  the  work  formerly  performed  by  the  residual
clause.  Under usual rules of statutory interpretation, the Court does 
not lightly assume Congress adopts two separate clauses in the same 
law to perform the same work.  See, e.g., Mackey v. Lanier Collection 
Agency & Service, Inc., 486 U. S. 825, 839, n. 14.  Pp. 7–10.

(3) The government’s final theory accepts that a conviction under 
the elements clause requires a communicated threat of force and con-
tends that most attempted Hobbs Act robbery prosecutions involve ex-
actly that.  But whatever this argument proves, the theory cannot be
squared with the statute’s terms.  Congress in the elements clause did 
not mandate an empirical inquiry into how crimes are usually commit-
ted, let alone impose a burden on the defendant to present proof about 
the government’s own prosecutorial habits.  Attempted Hobbs Act rob-
bery does not categorically require proof of the elements § 924(c)(3)(A)
demands.  That ends the inquiry, and nothing in Gonzales v. Duenas-
Alvarez, 549 U. S. 183, suggests otherwise.  Pp. 10–13. 

979 F. 3d 203, affirmed. 

GORSUCH,  J.,  delivered  the  opinion  of  the  Court,  in  which  ROBERTS, 
C. J., and BREYER, SOTOMAYOR, KAGAN, KAVANAUGH, and BARRETT, JJ., 
joined.  THOMAS, J., and ALITO, J., filed dissenting opinions.