Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/16pdf/15-1358_6khn.pdf
Page Number: 58.0

14 

ZIGLAR v. ABBASI 

BREYER, J., dissenting 

detainees  to  punitive  conditions  of  confinement  and  to
target them based solely on their race, religion, or national 
origin, the defendants are not entitled to qualified immun-
ity  on  the  constitutional  claims.    See  Bell  v.  Wolfish,  441 
U. S.  520,  535–539,  and  n. 20  (1979);  Davis,  442  U. S.,  at 
236  (“It  is  equally  clear  . . .  that  the  Fifth  Amendment 
confers on petitioner a constitutional right to be free from
illegal  discrimination”).    (Similarly,  I  would  affirm  the 
judgment  of  the  Court  of  Appeals  with  respect  to  the
plaintiffs’  statutory  claim,  namely,  that  the  defendants 
conspired  to  deprive  the  plaintiffs  of  equal  protection  of
the laws in violation of 42 U. S. C. §1985(3).  See Turkmen 
v. Hasty, 789 F. 3d 218, 262–264 (CA2 2015).  I agree with
the Court of Appeals that the defendants are not entitled
to qualified immunity on this claim.  See ibid.) 

2 
Even  were  I  wrong  and  were  the  context  here  “funda-
mentally  different,”  Malesko,  534  U. S.,  at  70,  the  plain-
tiffs’ claims would nonetheless survive Step Two and Step 
Three  of  the  Court’s  framework  for  determining  whether 
Bivens applies, see supra, at 9.  Step Two consists of ask-
ing whether “any alternative, existing process for protect-
ing  the  interest  amounts  to  a  convincing  reason  for  the 
Judicial Branch to refrain from providing a new and free-
standing remedy in damages.”  Wilkie, 551 U. S., at 550.  I 
can find no such “alternative, existing process” here. 

The Court does not claim that the PLRA provides plain-
tiffs with a remedy.  Ante, at 25–26.  Rather, it says that 
the  plaintiffs  may  have  “had  available  to  them”  relief  in 
the form of a prospective injunction or an application for a 
writ of habeas corpus.  Ante, at 22.  Neither a prospective
injunction nor a writ of habeas corpus, however, will nor-
mally provide plaintiffs with redress for harms they have 
already suffered.  And here plaintiffs make a strong claim
that  neither  was  available  to  them—at  least  not  for  a