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MCCUTCHEON v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N 

Opinion of ROBERTS, C. J. 

Club’s  Freedom  Club  PAC  v.  Bennett,  564  U. S.  ___,  ___ 
(2011) (slip op., at 24–25). 

Many  people  might  find  those  latter  objectives  attrac-
tive: They would be delighted to see fewer television com-
mercials touting a candidate’s accomplishments or dispar-
aging  an  opponent’s  character.  Money  in  politics  may  at 
times  seem  repugnant  to  some,  but  so  too  does  much  of 
what  the  First  Amendment  vigorously  protects.    If  the 
First  Amendment  protects  flag  burning,  funeral  protests,
and  Nazi  parades—despite  the  profound  offense  such 
spectacles  cause—it  surely  protects  political  campaign
speech despite popular opposition.  See Texas v. Johnson, 
491  U. S.  397  (1989);  Snyder  v.  Phelps,  562  U. S.  ___ 
(2011); National Socialist Party of America v.  Skokie, 432 
U. S.  43  (1977)  (per  curiam).  Indeed,  as  we  have  empha-
sized,  the  First  Amendment  “has  its  fullest  and  most 
urgent  application  precisely  to  the  conduct  of  campaigns 
for  political  office.”  Monitor  Patriot  Co.  v.  Roy,  401  U. S. 
265, 272 (1971).

In  a  series  of  cases  over  the  past  40  years,  we  have 
spelled  out  how  to  draw  the  constitutional  line  between
the permissible goal of avoiding corruption in the political
process and the impermissible desire simply to limit polit-
ical  speech.    We  have  said  that  government  regulation 
may not target the general gratitude a candidate may feel 
toward those who support him or his allies, or the political
access  such  support  may  afford.  “Ingratiation  and  access 
. . .  are  not  corruption.”    Citizens  United  v.  Federal  Elec-
tion  Comm’n,  558  U. S.  310,  360  (2010).    They  embody  a
central  feature  of  democracy—that  constituents  support
candidates  who  share  their  beliefs  and  interests,  and 
candidates  who  are  elected  can  be  expected  to  be  respon-
sive to those concerns. 

Any regulation must instead target what we have called 
“quid  pro  quo”  corruption  or  its  appearance.  See  id.,  at 
359.  That  Latin  phrase  captures  the  notion  of  a  direct