Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/21pdf/20-826_p702.pdf
Page Number: 32

Cite as:  596 U. S. ____ (2022) 

3 

KAGAN, J., dissenting 

18 How. 307 (1856), for example, only the dissent thought 
that the fact of a conviction and sentence precluded grant-
ing habeas relief (as today’s opinion says was the firm rule).
See id., at 330 (Curtis, J., dissenting) (asserting that habeas
could not aid a person “imprisoned under a [circuit court’s]
criminal sentence”).  The majority, ignoring that objection,
scrutinized the merits of the claim in detail before deciding
that no constitutional violation had occurred and the appli-
cant should remain in prison.  Id., at 315; see id., at 309– 
315.  And in Ex parte Lange, 18 Wall. 163 (1874), the Court 
(again acting under the original habeas law) went further:
It granted relief to a convicted prisoner after finding a vio-
lation of the Double Jeopardy Clause.  The Court explained
that  it  was  carrying  out  a  “sacred  duty”  in  declaring  that
the prisoner was being held “without authority, and [that]
he should therefore be discharged.”  Id., at 178. 

When Congress amended the Judiciary Act after the Civil
War,  the  scope  of  federal  habeas  review—including  over
post-conviction  claims—grew  far  larger.    The  text  of  the 
amendment (similar to current law) gave federal courts ex-
pansive power: “to grant writs of habeas corpus in all cases
where any person may be restrained of his or her liberty” in
violation of the Federal Constitution.  Act of Feb. 5, 1867, 
14 Stat. 385; see 28 U. S. C. §§2241(a), (c)(3).  And “any per-
son” in “all cases” meant just that: State prisoners, not just 
federal ones, could now apply for habeas relief.  Those state 
cases of course involved separate sovereigns, acting under
their  own  laws.    But  even  in  that  sphere,  the  Court  soon 
decided  that  the  federal  judiciary’s  authority  extended  to
hearing constitutional challenges to final convictions.  Un-
der the new statute, the Court explained, “a single [federal] 
judge on habeas corpus” could free “a prisoner, after convic-
tion in a State court,” upon finding him unconstitutionally 
restrained.  Ex parte Royall, 117 U. S. 241, 253 (1886).  Or 
as held in another decision, a “party [was] entitled to a [writ