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303 CREATIVE LLC v. ELENIS 

Opinion of the Court 

film with a Zionist message,” they could compel “an atheist 
muralist  to  accept  a  commission  celebrating  Evangelical
zeal,” and they could require a gay website designer to cre-
ate websites for a group advocating against same-sex mar-
riage, so long as these speakers would accept commissions
from the public with different messages.  6 F. 4th, at 1199 
(dissenting opinion).  Perhaps the dissent finds these possi-
bilities untroubling because it trusts state governments to 
coerce only “enlightened” speech.  But if that is the calcula-
tion, it is a dangerous one indeed.7 

The  dissent  is  right  about  one  thing—“[w]hat  a  differ-
ence”  time  can  make.  See  post,  at  2  (internal  quotation
marks omitted).  Eighty years ago in Barnette, this Court 
affirmed that “no official, high or petty, can prescribe what 
shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other 
matters  of  opinion.”    319  U. S.,  at  642.    The  Court  did  so 
despite  the  fact  that  the  speech  rights  it  defended  were 
deeply  unpopular;  at  the  time,  the  world  was  at  war  and 
many thought respect for the flag and the pledge “essential 
for the welfare of the state.”  Id., at 662–663 (Frankfurter, 
J., dissenting); see also id., at 636, 640 (majority opinion).
Fifty years ago, this Court protected the right of Nazis to
march through a town home to many Holocaust survivors 
and  along  the  way  espouse  ideas  antithetical  to  those  for 

—————— 

7 Perhaps the dissent finds these possibilities untroubling for another 
reason.  It asserts that CADA does not apply to “[m]any filmmakers, vis-
ual artists, and writers” because they do not “hold out” their services to 
the public.  Post, at 27.  But the dissent cites nothing to support its claim
and instead, once more, fights the facts.  As we have seen, Colorado’s law 
today applies to “any place of business engaged in any sales to the pub-
lic.”  Colo. Rev. Stat. §24–34–601(1) (emphasis added); see also Part III, 
supra.  And the dissent can hardly dispute that many artists and writers 
accept  commissions  from  the  public.    Brief  for  Creative  Professionals 
et al. as Amici Curiae 5–21.  Certainly, Colorado does not advance any-
thing  like  the dissent’s  argument;  it calls any  exemption  to  its  law  for
“artists” and others who provide “custom” services “unworkable.”  Brief 
for Respondents 28–31 (internal quotation marks omitted).