Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/19pdf/17-1618_hfci.pdf
Page Number: 169

Cite as:  590 U. S. ____ (2020) 

25 

KAVANAUGH, J., dissenting 

  To be sure, as Judge Lynch appropriately recognized, it 
is “understandable” that those seeking legal protection for 
gay  people  “search  for  innovative  arguments  to  classify 
workplace  bias  against  gays  as  a  form  of  discrimination 
that  is  already  prohibited  by  federal  law.    But  the  argu-
ments advanced by the majority ignore the evident mean-
ing of the language of Title VII, the social realities that dis-
tinguish between the kinds of biases that the statute sought 
to exclude from the workplace from those it did not, and the 
distinctive nature of anti-gay prejudice.”  883 F. 3d, at 162 
(dissenting opinion). 
  The majority opinion insists that it is not rewriting or up-
dating Title VII, but instead is just humbly reading the text 
of the statute as written.  But that assertion is tough to ac-
cept.    Most  everyone  familiar  with  the  use  of  the  English 
language in America understands that the ordinary mean-
ing of sexual orientation discrimination is distinct from the 
ordinary meaning of sex discrimination.  Federal law dis-
tinguishes the two.  State law distinguishes the two.  This 
Court’s cases distinguish the two.  Statistics on discrimina-
tion  distinguish  the  two.    History  distinguishes  the  two.  
Psychology distinguishes the two.  Sociology distinguishes 
the two.  Human resources departments all over America 
distinguish  the  two.    Sports  leagues  distinguish  the  two.  
Political groups distinguish the two.  Advocacy groups dis-
tinguish the two.  Common parlance distinguishes the two.  
Common sense distinguishes the two. 
  As a result, many Americans will not buy the novel inter-
pretation  unearthed  and  advanced  by  the  Court  today.  
Many will no doubt believe that the Court has unilaterally 
rewritten American vocabulary and American law—a “stat-
utory  amendment  courtesy  of  unelected  judges.”    Hively, 
853 F. 3d, at 360 (Sykes, J., dissenting).  Some will surmise 
that  the  Court  succumbed  to  “the  natural  desire  that  be-
guiles judges along with other human beings into imposing 
their own views of goodness, truth, and justice upon others.”