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6 

BALDWIN v. UNITED STATES 

THOMAS, J., dissenting 

948 (2017).

When 18th- and 19th-century courts decided questions of 
statutory  interpretation  in  common-law  actions  or  under
federal-question  jurisdiction,  they  did  not  apply  anything
resembling Chevron deference.  Judges interpreted statutes
according to their independent judgment.  For example, in
a lawsuit involving a federal land patent, the Court simply 
“inquire[d] whether the statute, rightly construed, defeated 
[the  respondent’s]  otherwise  perfect  right  to  the  patent.” 
Johnson v. Towsley, 13 Wall. 72, 88 (1871); see also id., at 
91.  When courts disagreed with the Executive’s interpreta-
tion, they gave no weight to it.  See United States v. Dick-
son, 15 Pet. 141, 161–162 (1841) (Story, J., for the Court).

Courts did apply traditional interpretive canons that ac-
corded  respect  to  certain  contemporaneous,  consistent  in-
terpretations of statutes by executive officers.  See Bamzai, 
supra, at 933–947.  In perhaps its most famous articulation,
the Court wrote that “[i]n the construction of a doubtful and 
ambiguous law, the contemporaneous construction of those
who  were  called  upon  to  act  under  the  law,  and  were  ap-
pointed to carry its provisions into effect, is entitled to very
great respect.”  Edwards’ Lessee v. Darby, 12 Wheat. 206, 
210  (1827).    The  Court  continued  to  apply  this  approach
throughout  the  19th  century.  See,  e.g.,  United  States  v. 
State Bank of N. C., 6 Pet. 29, 39–40 (1832) (“[T]he construc-
tion which we have given to the terms of the ac[t] is that
which is understood to have been practically acted upon by
the government, as well as by individuals, ever since its en-
actment. . . . We think the practice was founded in the true
exposition of the terms and intent of the act: but if it were 
susceptible  of  some  doubt,  so  long  an  acquiescence  in  it 
would justify us in yielding to it as a safe and reasonable 
exposition”); Surgett v. Lapice, 8 How. 48, 68 (1850) (simi-
lar).  And when the interpretation “has not been uniform,”