Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/14pdf/13-352_c0n2.pdf
Page Number: 31.0

Cite as:  575 U. S. ____ (2015) 

5 

THOMAS, J., dissenting 

diction.”  Hopkins, 6 Wheat., at 113.  This broad definition 
served  the  interest  in  finality  that  supports  preclusion 
doctrines,  without  which  “an  end  could  never  be  put  to 
litigation.”  Id., at 114. 

But  however  broadly  “[c]ourt  of  competent  jurisdiction”
was defined, it would require quite a leap to say that the 
concept encompasses administrative agencies, which were
recognized  as  categorically  different  from  courts.    E.g., 
Pearson  v.  Williams,  202  U. S.  281  (1906);  F.  Cooper, 
Administrative  Agencies  and  the  Courts  241–242  (1951) 
(taking  the  position  that  agencies  “are  not  courts,  and 
their determinations are not judgments”).  This distinction 
stems  from  the  Constitution  itself,  which  vests  the  “judi-
cial  Power”  not  in  administrative  agencies,  but  in  federal
courts,  whose  independence  is  safeguarded  by  certain
constitutional  requirements.  Art. III,  §1.  One  of  the 
consequences  of  this  allocation  of  judicial  power  is  that
agencies possess limited ability to act in a judicial capacity 
in  cases  resolving  traditional  disputes  between  private
parties.  See infra, at 11–12. 

It  is  therefore  unsurprising  that  federal  courts— 
including  this  Court—have  been  far  more  hesitant  than
today’s  majority  to  extend  common-law  preclusion  princi-
ples  to  decisions  of  administrative  tribunals.    In  Pearson, 
for  example,  this  Court  declined  to  recognize  any  preclu-
sive  effect  of  a  decision  of  an  immigration  board.  202 
U. S.,  at  284–285.  Writing  for  the  Court,  Justice  Holmes
explained that “[t]he board is an instrument of the execu-
tive  power,  not  a  court”;  that  it  consisted  of  officials 
“whose  duties  are  declared  to  be  administrative  by”  stat-
ute; and that “[d]ecisions of a similar type long have been
recognized  as  decisions  of  the  executive  department,  and 
cannot constitute res judicata in a technical sense.”  Ibid. 

Other  courts  likewise  declined  to  apply  general  preclu-
sion  principles  to  decisions  of  administrative  agencies. 
For example, as late as 1947, the D. C. Circuit would rely