Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/22pdf/22-179_o75q.pdf
Page Number: 23.0

Cite as:  599 U. S. ____ (2023) 

19 

Opinion of the Court 

of a particular piece of contraband, id., at 299, solicitation 
of unlawful employment, Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh 
Comm’n  on  Human  Relations,  413  U. S.  376,  388  (1973), 
and picketing with the “sole, unlawful [and] immediate ob-
jective” of “induc[ing]” a target to violate the law, Giboney, 
336 U. S., at 502.  It applies to clause (iv) too.5 
  Hansen has no quibble with that conclusion to the extent 
that  clause  (iv)  criminalizes  speech  that  solicits  or  facili-
tates a criminal violation, like crossing the border unlaw-
fully or remaining in the country while subject to a removal 
order.    See  §§1253(a),  1325(a),  1326(a).    He  agrees  that 
these applications of §1324(a)(1)(A)(iv) are permissible—in 
fact,  he  concedes  that  he  would  lose  if  clause  (iv)  covered 
only solicitation and facilitation of criminal conduct.  Tr. of 
Oral  Arg.  61–62.    But  he  resists  the  idea  that  the  First 
Amendment  permits  Congress  to  criminalize  speech  that 
solicits or facilitates a civil violation—and some immigra-
tion violations are only civil.  Brief for Respondent 38.  For 
instance, residing in the United States without lawful sta-
tus is subject to the hefty penalty of removal, but it gener-
ally  does  not  carry  a  criminal  sentence.    See  Arizona  v. 
United States, 567 U. S. 387, 407 (2012). 
  Call  this  the  “mismatch”  theory:  Congress  can  impose 
criminal  penalties  on  speech  that  solicits  or  facilitates  a 
criminal violation and civil penalties on speech that solicits 
or facilitates a civil violation—but it cannot impose criminal 
penalties on speech that solicits or facilitates a civil viola-
tion.  See Tr. of Oral Arg. 62–63; Brief for Eugene Volokh 
as Amicus Curiae 5–7.  If this theory is sound, then clause 

—————— 

5 Overbreadth  doctrine  trafficks  in  hypotheticals,  so  we  do  not  (and 
cannot) hold that all future applications of clause (iv) will be lawful, nor 
do we suggest that they will necessarily fall into the speech-integral-to-
conduct category.  That would require a crystal ball.  Nothing in our opin-
ion today precludes a litigant from bringing an as-applied challenge to 
clause (iv) in the future—whether based on the First Amendment or an-
other constitutional constraint.