Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/10pdf/09-751.pdf
Page Number: 34.0

12 

SNYDER v. PHELPS 

ALITO, J., dissenting 

vulnerable.  See National Archives and Records Admin. v. 
Favish,  541  U. S.  157,  168  (2004).    Exploitation  of  a  fu-
neral  for  the  purpose  of  attracting  public  attention  “in-
trud[es] upon their . . . grief,” ibid., and may permanently 
stain  their  memories  of  the  final  moments  before  a  loved 
one is laid to rest.  Allowing family members to have a few 
hours  of  peace  without  harassment  does  not  undermine
public debate.  I would therefore hold that, in this setting,
the  First  Amendment  permits  a  private  figure  to  recover
for  the  intentional  infliction  of  emotional  distress  caused 
by speech on a matter of private concern. 

V 
In  reversing  the  District  Court  judgment  in  favor  of
petitioner, the Court of Appeals relied on several grounds
not  discussed  in  the  opinion  of  this  Court  or  in  the  sepa-
rate opinion supporting affirmance.  I now turn briefly  to 
those issues. 

First, the Court of Appeals held that the District Court
erred by allowing the jury to decide whether respondents’ 
speech  was  “ ‘directed  specifically  at  the  Snyder  family.’ ”  
580  F. 3d,  at  221.    It  is  not  clear  whether  the  Court  of 
Appeals  thought  that  this  was  a  question  for  the  trial 
judge alone or a question on which the judge had to make 
a  preliminary  ruling  before  sending  it  to  the  jury.    In 
either  event,  however,  the  submission  of  this  question  to
the  jury  was  not  reversible  error  because,  as  explained 
above, it is clear that respondents’ statements targeted the
Snyders.

Second,  the  Court  of  Appeals  held  that  the  trial  judge
went  astray  in  allowing  the  jury  to  decide  whether  re-
spondents’  speech  was  so  “ ‘offensive  and  shocking  as  to 
not  be  entitled  to  First  Amendment  protection.’ ”    Ibid. 
This  instruction  also  did  respondents  no  harm.    Because 
their speech did not relate to a matter of public concern, it
was not protected from liability by the First Amendment,