Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/558bv.pdf
Page Number: 276.0

Cite as: 558 U. S. 100 (2009) 

115 

Opinion of Thomas, J. 

full respect.”  Swint v. Chambers County Comm’n, 514 U. S. 
35, 48 (1995); ante, at 114 (quoting Swint, supra; citing Cun­
ningham v.  Hamilton County, 527 U. S. 198, 210 (1999)).  It 
is  for  that  reason  that  I  do  not  join  the  remainder  of  the 
Court’s analysis. 

The  scope  of  federal  appellate  jurisdiction  is  a  matter  the 
Constitution  expressly  commits  to  Congress,  see  Art.  I,  § 8, 
cl. 9, and that Congress has addressed not only in 28 U. S. C. 
§§ 1291 and 1292, but also in the Rules Enabling Act amend­
ments to which the Court refers.  See ante, at 113–114 (cit­
ing §§ 2072–2073).  The Court recognizes that these amend­
ments  “designat[e]  rulemaking,  ‘not  expansion  by  court 
decision,’  as  the  preferred  means  for  determining  whether 
and  when  prejudgment  orders  should  be  immediately  ap­
pealable.”  Ante,  at  113  (quoting  Swint,  supra,  at  48).  Be­
cause  that  designation  is  entitled  to  our  full  respect,  and 
because  the  privilege  order  here  is  not  on  all  fours  with  or­
ders we previously have held to be appealable under the col­
lateral  order  doctrine,  see  Cohen  v.  Beneﬁcial  Industrial 
Loan Corp., 337 U. S. 541 (1949), I would afﬁrm the Eleventh 
Circuit’s judgment on the ground that any “avenue for imme­
diate  appeal”  beyond  the  three  avenues  addressed  in  the 
Court’s  opinion  must  be  left  to  the  “rulemaking  process.” 
Ante,  at  114;  see  ante,  at  110–113  (discussing  certiﬁcation 
under  28  U. S. C.  § 1292(b),  petitions  for  mandamus,  and  ap­
peals from contempt orders). 

We  need  not,  and  in  my  view  should  not,  further  justify 
our holding by applying the Cohen doctrine, which prompted 
the  rulemaking  amendments  in  the  ﬁrst  place.  In  taking 
this  path,  the  Court  needlessly  perpetuates  a  judicial  policy 
that we for many years have criticized and struggled to limit. 
See,  e. g.,  Ashcroft  v.  Iqbal,  556  U. S.  662,  671–675  (2009); 
Will  v.  Hallock,  546  U. S.  345,  349  (2006);  Sell  v.  United 
States, 539 U. S. 166, 177 (2003); Cunningham, supra, at 210; 
Digital  Equipment  Corp.  v.  Desktop  Direct,  Inc.,  511  U. S. 
863,  884  (1994);  Swint,  supra,  at  48;  Lauro  Lines  s.r.l.  v.