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Page Number: 15.0

12 

GARZA v. IDAHO 

Opinion of the Court 

Id.,  at  484;  see  also  id.,  at  486.  In  Rodriquez  v.  United 
States, 395 U. S. 327 (1969), similarly, the Court rejected a
rule  that  required  a  defendant  whose  appeal  had  been
forfeited  by  counsel  “to  specify  the  points  he  would  raise
were  his  right  to  appeal  reinstated.”    Id.,  at  330.  So  too 
here. 

Moreover, while it is the defendant’s prerogative whether 
to  appeal,  it  is  not  the  defendant’s  role  to  decide  what 
arguments  to  press.  See  Barnes,  463  U. S.,  at  751,  754. 
That  makes  it  especially  improper  to  impose  that  role 
upon  the  defendant  simply  because  his  opportunity  to 
appeal  was  relinquished  by  deficient  counsel.    “Those 
whose right to appeal has been frustrated should be treated 
exactly  like  any  other  appellants;  they  should  not  be
given  an  additional  hurdle  to  clear  just  because  their
rights  were  violated  at  some  earlier  stage  in  the  proceed-
ings.”  Rodriquez,  395  U. S.,  at  330.    We  accordingly  de-
cline to place a pleading barrier between a defendant and 
an opportunity to appeal that he never should have lost.

Meanwhile,  the  Government’s  assumption  that  un-
waived  claims  can  reliably  be  distinguished  from  waived 
claims through case-by-case postconviction review is dubi-
ous.  There  is  no  right  to  counsel  in  postconviction  pro-
ceedings,  see  Pennsylvania  v.  Finley,  481  U. S.  551,  555 
(1987), and most applicants proceed pro se.12  That means 
that  the  Government  effectively  puts  its  faith  in  asking 
“an  indigent,  perhaps  pro se,  defendant  to  demonstrate 
that his hypothetical appeal might have had  merit before
any  advocate  has  ever  reviewed  the  record  in  his  case  in
search  of  potentially  meritorious  grounds  for  appeal,” 
Flores-Ortega,  528  U. S.,  at  486.    We  have  already  ex-

—————— 

12 For  example,  researchers  have  found  that  over  90%  of  noncapital 
federal habeas petitioners proceed without counsel.  See N. King et al.,
Final  Technical  Report:  Habeas  Litigation  in  U.  S.  District  Courts  23  
(2007).