Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/10pdf/09-751.pdf
Page Number: 35.0

Cite as:  562 U. S. ____ (2011) 

13 

ALITO, J., dissenting 

and  the  only  question  for  the  jury  was  whether  the  ele-
ments of the IIED tort were met. 

Third,  the  Court  of  Appeals  appears  to  have  concluded
that the First Amendment does not permit an IIED plain-
tiff  to  recover  for  speech  that  cannot  reasonably  be  inter-
preted as stating actual facts about an individual.  See id., 
at 222.  In reaching this conclusion, the Court of Appeals
relied  on  two  of  our  cases—Milkovich  v.  Lorain  Journal 
Co.,  497  U. S.  1  (1990),  and  Hustler,  485  U. S.  46—but 
neither  supports  the  broad  proposition  that  the  Court  of
Appeals adopted. 

Milkovich  was  a  defamation  case,  and  falsity  is  an  ele-
ment of defamation.  Nothing in Milkovich even hints that 
the  First  Amendment  requires  that  this  defamation  ele-
ment be engrafted onto the IIED tort. 
  Hustler  did  involve  an  IIED  claim,  but  the  plaintiff 
there  was  a  public  figure,  and  the  Court  did  not  suggest
that  its  holding  would  also  apply  in  a  case  involving  a
private figure.  Nor did the Court suggest that its holding
applied  across  the  board  to  all  types  of  IIED  claims.  In-
stead, the holding was limited to “publications such as the 
one  here  at  issue,”  namely,  a  caricature  in  a  magazine. 
485 U. S., at 56.  Unless a caricature of a public figure can 
reasonably  be  interpreted  as  stating  facts  that  may  be 
proved to be wrong, the caricature does not have the same 
potential  to  wound  as  a  personal  verbal  assault  on  a  vul-
nerable private figure.

Because  I  cannot  agree  either  with  the  holding  of  this
Court or the other grounds on which the Court of Appeals
relied, I would reverse the decision below and remand for 
further proceedings.17 
—————— 

17 The Court affirms the decision of the Fourth Circuit with respect to 
petitioner’s claim of intrusion upon seclusion on a ground not addressed 
by  the  Fourth  Circuit.    I  would  not  reach  out  to  decide  that  issue  but 
would  instead  leave  it  for  the  Fourth  Circuit  to  decide  on  remand.    I 
would  likewise  allow  the  Fourth  Circuit  on  remand  to  decide  whether