Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/23pdf/22-915_8o6b.pdf
Page Number: 11.0

Cite as:  602 U. S. ____ (2024) 

7 

Opinion of the Court 

bears the burden to “justify its regulation.”  Id., at 24. 

Nevertheless, some courts have misunderstood the meth-
odology  of  our  recent  Second  Amendment  cases.  These 
precedents were not meant to suggest a law trapped in am-
ber.  As  we explained in Heller, for example,  the reach of
the  Second  Amendment  is  not  limited  only  to  those  arms 
that were in existence at the founding.  554 U. S., at 582. 
Rather, it “extends, prima facie, to all instruments that con-
stitute bearable arms, even those that were not [yet] in ex-
istence.”  Ibid.  By that same logic, the Second Amendment 
permits more than just those regulations identical to ones
that could be found in 1791.  Holding otherwise would be as 
mistaken  as  applying  the  protections  of  the  right  only  to
muskets and sabers. 

As  we  explained  in  Bruen,  the  appropriate  analysis  in-
volves  considering  whether  the  challenged  regulation  is
consistent with the principles that underpin our regulatory 
tradition.  597  U. S.,  at  26–31.    A  court  must  ascertain 
whether the new law is “relevantly similar” to laws that our 
tradition is understood to permit, “apply[ing] faithfully the 
balance  struck  by  the  founding  generation  to  modern  cir-
cumstances.”  Id., at 29, and n. 7.  Discerning and develop-
ing the law in this way is “a commonplace task for any law-
yer or judge.”  Id., at 28. 

Why and how the regulation burdens the right are cen-
tral to this inquiry.  Id., at 29.  For example, if laws at the 
founding regulated firearm use to address particular prob-
lems, that will be a strong indicator that contemporary laws
imposing similar restrictions for similar reasons fall within
a permissible category of regulations.  Even when a law reg-
ulates  arms-bearing  for  a  permissible  reason,  though,  it 
may not be compatible with the right if it does so to an ex-
tent beyond what was done at the founding.  And when a 
challenged regulation does not precisely match its histori-
cal  precursors,  “it  still  may  be  analogous  enough  to  pass 
constitutional muster.”  Id., at 30.  The law must comport