Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/20pdf/19-123_g3bi.pdf
Page Number: 94

72 

FULTON v. PHILADELPHIA 

ALITO, J., concurring in judgment
ALITO, J., concurring in judgment 

briefs  urging  us  to  preserve  Smith.  Indeed,  the  term  is 
rarely even mentioned.

All that the City has to say on the subject is that overrul-
ing Smith would cause “substantial regulatory . . . disrup-
tion” by displacing RFRA, RLUIPA, and related state laws, 
Brief  for  City  Respondents  51  (internal  quotation  marks
omitted), but this is a baffling argument.  How would over-
ruling  Smith  disrupt  the  operation  of  laws  that  were  en-
acted to abrogate Smith? 

One of the City’s amici, the New York State Bar Associa-
tion,  offers  a  different  reliance  argument.    It  claims  that 
some  individuals,  relying  on  Smith,  have  moved  to  juris-
dictions  with  anti-discrimination  laws  that  do  not  permit
religious exemptions.  Brief for New York State Bar Associ-
ation  as  Amicus  Curiae  11.  The  bar  association  does  not 
cite  any  actual  examples  of  individuals  who  fall  into  this 
category, and there is reason to doubt that many actually 
exist. 

For the hypothesized course of conduct to make sense, all 
of the following conditions would have to be met.  First, it 
would be necessary for the individuals in question to believe
that a religiously motivated party in the jurisdiction they
left or avoided might engage in conduct that harmed them.  
Second, this conduct would have to be conduct not already
protected by Smith in that it (a) did not violate a generally 
applicable state law, (b) that law did not allow individual
exemptions, and (c) there was insufficient proof of religious 
targeting.  Third, the feared conduct would have to fall out-
side the scope of RLUIPA.  Fourth, the conduct, although
not protected by Smith, would have to be otherwise permit-
ted  by  local  law,  for  example,  through  a  state  version  of 
RFRA.  Fifth, this fear of harm at the hands of a religiously 
motivated actor would have to be a but-for cause of the de-
cision to move.  Perhaps there are individuals who fall into
the category that the bar association hypothesizes, but we
should not allow violations of the Free Exercise Clause in 
perpetuity based on such speculation.