Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/558bv.pdf
Page Number: 244.0

Cite as: 558 U. S. 67 (2009) 

83 

Opinion of the Court 

Slocum v.  Delaware, L. & W. R. Co., 339 U. S. 239, 240 (1950) 
(quoting  § 153  First  (i)).  True,  the  RLA  instructs  that,  be­
fore  any  reference  to  arbitration,  the  dispute  “shall  be  han­
dled in the usual manner up to and including the [designated] 
chief  operating  ofﬁcer.”  § 153  First  (i).  And  when  the 
CBA’s  grievance  procedure  has  not  been  followed,  resort  to 
the  Board  would  ordinarily  be  objectionable  as  premature. 
The additional requirement of a conference, we note, is in­
dependent  of  the  CBA  process.  Rather,  the  conference  re­
quirement  is  stated  in  the  “[g]eneral  duties”  section  of  the 
RLA,  § 152,  a  section  that  is  not  moored  to  the  “[e]stablish­
ment[,] . . .  powers[,]  and duties”  of  the  NRAB  set  out  next 
in  § 153  First.  Rooted  in  § 152  and  often  informal  in  prac­
tice, see supra, at 73–74, conferencing is surely no more “ju­
risdictional”  than  is  the  presuit  resort  to  the  EEOC  held 
forfeitable  in  Zipes,  455  U. S.,  at  393.8  And  if  the  require­
ment  to  conference  is  not  “jurisdictional,”  then  failure  ini­
tially to submit proof of conferencing cannot be of that genre. 
See Part III–B, infra. 

In  defense  of  the  Board’s  characterization  of  conferencing 
and proof thereof as jurisdictional, the Carrier points to the 
NRAB’s  Circular  One  procedural  regulations,  see  supra,  at 
73,  which  provide:  “No  petition  shall  be  considered  by  any 
division of the Board unless the subject matter has been han­
dled  in  accordance  with  the  provisions  of  the  [RLA].”  29 
CFR  § 301.2(b).  But  that  provision,  as  other  prescriptions 
in  Circular  One,  is  a  claim-processing  rule.  Congress  gave 

8 The RLA states, in § 152 First, a general duty “to settle all disputes,” 
and,  in  § 152  Second,  a  more  speciﬁc  duty  to  “conference.”  These  provi­
sions apply to all disputes in the railroad industry, major as well as minor. 
They also apply to disputes in the airline industry, over which the NRAB 
has  no  jurisdiction.  § 181.  Neither  provision  “speak[s]  in  jurisdictional 
terms  or  refer[s]  in  any  way  to  the  jurisdiction  of  the”  NRAB.  Zipes  v. 
Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U. S. 385, 394 (1982).