Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/21pdf/21-5726_5iel.pdf
Page Number: 17.0

2 

KEMP v. UNITED STATES 

GORSUCH, J., dissenting 

neither party saw fit to advance.  Going forward, every ju-
dicial legal error—not just an inadvertent or obvious “mis-
take”—is  fodder  for  collateral  attack  under  Rule  60(b)(1). 
And  what  is  the  basis  for  all  this?  A  mysterious  1946
amendment deleting the word “ ‘his.’ ”  See ante, at 5–6. 

Respectfully, I would have dismissed the writ of certiorari 
as  improvidently  granted.  Not  only  does  this  case  fail  to 
meet our usual standards for review.  See Supreme Court
Rule 10.  At bottom, this dispute presents a policy question 
about the proper balance between finality and error correc-
tion.  Should a district court be able to clean up a legal error
through a collateral proceeding on any reasonable timeline 
within a year of judgment?  Or do Rule 59(e) and the appel-
late  process  provide  the  necessary  corrective  measures  in 
ordinary cases, with Rule 60(b)(6) as a last, narrow avenue 
to relief?  Questions like these are best resolved not through
a  doubtful  interpretive  project  focused  on  a  pronoun
dropped  in  1946,  but  through  the  rulemaking  process.
There,  policy  interests on  both  sides  can  be  accounted  for
and weighed in light of the “collective experience of bench
and bar.”  Mohawk Industries, Inc. v. Carpenter, 558 U. S. 
100, 114 (2009).