Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/18pdf/17-1702_h315.pdf
Page Number: 22

Cite as:  587 U. S. ____ (2019) 

3 

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting 

appears to have been incorporated in 1991 for that precise 
purpose, with seven initial board members selected by the 
borough  president  (though  only  two  thus  selected  today).  
See  App.  23;  Brief  for  Respondents  7,  n. 1.    The  City  ar-
ranged  for  MNN  to  receive  startup  capital  from  Time 
Warner  and  to  be  funded  through  franchise  fees  from 
Time  Warner  and  other  Manhattan  cable  franchisees.  
App.  23;  Brief  for  New  York  County  Lawyers  Association 
(NYCLA)  as  Amicus  Curiae  27;  see  also  App.  to  Brief  for 
Respondents  19a.    As  the  borough  president  announced 
upon MNN’s formation in 1991, MNN’s “central charge is 
to administer and manage all the public access channels of 
the cable television systems in Manhattan.”  App. to Brief 
for NYCLA as Amicus Curiae 1. 
  As  relevant  here,  respondents  DeeDee  Halleck  and 
Jesus  Papoleto  Melendez  sued  MNN  in  U. S.  District 
Court  for  the  Southern  District  of  New  York  under  42 
U. S. C.  §1983.    They  alleged  that  the  public-access  chan-
nels,  “[r]equired  by  state  regulation  and  [the]  local  fran-
chise  agreements,”  are  “a  designated  public  forum  of 
unlimited character”; that the City had “delegated control 
of that public forum to MNN”; and that MNN had, in turn, 
engaged  in  viewpoint  discrimination  in  violation  of  re-
spondents’ First Amendment rights.  App. 39. 
  The  District  Court  dismissed  respondents’  First 
Amendment  claim  against  MNN.    The  U. S.  Court  of 
Appeals  for  the  Second  Circuit  reversed  that  dismissal, 
concluding  that  the  public-access  channels  “are  public 
forums  and  that  [MNN’s]  employees  were  sufficiently 
alleged to be state actors taking action barred by the First 
Amendment.”    882  F. 3d  300,  301–302  (2018).      Because 
the  case  before  us  arises  from  a  motion  to  dismiss,  re-
spondents’  factual  allegations  must  be  accepted  as  true.  
Hernandez v. Mesa, 582 U. S. ___, ___ (2017) ( per curiam) 
(slip op., at 1).