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B&B HARDWARE, INC. v. HARGIS INDUSTRIES, INC. 

Opinion of the Court 

same usages as a district court does, it does not follow that 
the  Board  applies  a  different  standard  to  the  usages  it 
does  consider.4    If  a  mark  owner  uses  its  mark  in  ways
that are materially the same as the usages included in its 
registration  application,  then  the  TTAB  is  deciding  the
same  likelihood-of-confusion  issue  as  a  district  court  in 
infringement litigation.  By contrast, if a mark owner uses
its mark in ways that are materially unlike the usages in 
its  application,  then  the  TTAB  is  not  deciding  the  same 
issue.    Thus,  if  the  TTAB  does  not  consider  the  market-
place  usage  of  the  parties’  marks,  the  TTAB’s  decision 
should  “have  no  later  preclusive  effect  in  a  suit  where 
actual  usage  in  the  marketplace  is  the  paramount  issue.” 
6 McCarthy §32:101, at 32–246. 

Materiality,  of  course,  is  essential—trivial  variations
between  the  usages  set  out  in  an  application  and  the  use 
of  a  mark  in  the  marketplace  do  not  create  different  “is-
sues,”  just  as  trivial  variations  do  not  create  different
“marks.”  See  generally  4  id.,  §23:50,  at  23–265  (explain-
ing  that  “adding  descriptive  or  non-distinctive”  elements 
to  another’s  mark  generally  will  not  negate  confusion). 
Otherwise, a party could escape the preclusive effect of an 
adverse judgment simply by adding an immaterial feature
to  its  mark.  That  is  not  the  law.  See,  e.g.,  Restatement 
(Second)  of  Judgments  §27,  Comment  c,  at  252–253  (ex-
plaining  that  “issue”  must  be  understood  broadly  enough
“to prevent repetitious litigation of what is essentially the 
same  dispute”);  United  States  v.  Stauffer  Chemical  Co., 
464 U. S. 165, 172 (1984) (applying issue preclusion where 
a  party  sought  to  “litigate  twice  . . .  an  issue  arising  . . . 
from  virtually  identical  facts”  because  the  “factual  differ-
—————— 

4 The  parties  dispute  whether  and  how  often  the  TTAB  considers
usages  beyond  those  listed  in  the  application  and  registration.    We  do 
not  resolve  that  dispute  here.    Suffice  it  to  say  that  when  the  TTAB 
adjudicates  a  usage  within  its  authority,  that  adjudication  can  ground 
issue preclusion.  See Restatement (Second) of Judgments §11 (1980).