Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/21pdf/21-5726_5iel.pdf
Page Number: 11

8 

KEMP v. UNITED STATES 

Opinion of the Court 

take”  reached  only  factual  errors.    And  the  Courts  of  Ap-
peals  have  well-established  rules  for  determining  when
Rule 60(a), rather than Rule 60(b), should apply.  See, e.g., 
United States v. Griffin, 782 F. 2d 1393, 1397 (CA7 1986).

Kemp  alleges  that  our  interpretation  of  Rule  60(b)(1) 
to 
would  create  a  similar  problem  with  respect 
Rules 60(b)(4) and (b)(5), which authorize relief from voided
judgments  and  judgments  that  lack  legal  effect.    Specifi-
cally, Kemp contends that a legal “mistake” could warrant
relief  under  both  Rule  60(b)(1)  and  Rule  60(b)(4)  or
Rule (b)(5),  and  a  conflict  could  then  arise  given  that  the 
latter  Rules  are  not  subject  to  a  1-year  time  limit.  But, 
again, that could occur even if only factual errors count as 
“mistake[s],” since factual errors, too, may justify relief un-
der Rules 60(b)(4) and (b)(5).  And, regardless, should this 
overlap  ever  create  an  irreconcilable  conflict,  courts  may
then resort to ordinary rules of statutory construction when
selecting which provision would govern in a particular case. 
See,  e.g.,  RadLAX  Gateway  Hotel,  LLC  v.  Amalgamated 
Bank, 566 U. S. 639, 645 (2012) (“ ‘the specific governs the 
general’ ”).

Kemp  also  worries  that  our  interpretation  would  allow 
parties to evade other time limits set forth in the Federal 
Rules.  For instance, Rule 59(e) motions to alter or amend 
a judgment must be filed within 28 days, and appeals must
generally be filed within 30 days, see Fed. Rule App. Proc. 
4(a)(1)(a).  Kemp suggests that our interpretation would al-
low  someone  to  repackage  a  tardy  Rule  59(e) motion  as  a 
timely Rule 60(b)(1) motion, or to generate a right to an un-
timely appeal by filing a Rule 60(b)(1) motion and appealing 
once it is denied.  We are unpersuaded because, yet again, 
the  risk  Kemp  identifies  would  exist  even  under  his  own 
interpretation.    For  example,  Kemp  provides  no  explana-
tion  why,  under  his  interpretation  of  Rule  60(b),  parties
could not repackage tardy Rule 59(e) motions based on legal 
errors  as  motions  under  Rule  60(b)(6),  or  recharacterize