Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/529bv.pdf
Page Number: 135

529US1

Unit: $U33

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UNITED STATES v. JOHNSON

Opinion of the Court

18 U. S. C. § 3553(a).

rectional treatment.”
In the instant
case, the transition assistance ordered by the trial court re-
quired respondent, among other conditions, to avoid possess-
ing or transporting ﬁrearms and to participate in a drug de-
pendency treatment program. These conditions illustrate
that supervised release, unlike incarceration, provides indi-
viduals with postconﬁnement assistance. Cf. Gozlon-Peretz,
supra, at 407 (describing “[s]upervised release [a]s a unique
method of postconﬁnement supervision invented by the
Congress for a series of sentencing reforms”). The Court
of Appeals erred in treating respondent’s time in prison as
interchangeable with his term of supervised release.

There can be no doubt that equitable considerations of
great weight exist when an individual is incarcerated be-
yond the proper expiration of his prison term. The statu-
tory structure provides a means to address these concerns
in large part. The trial court, as it sees ﬁt, may modify an
individual’s conditions of supervised release. § 3583(e)(2).
Furthermore, the court may terminate an individual’s super-
vised release obligations “at any time after the expiration of
one year . . . if it is satisﬁed that such action is warranted
by the conduct of the defendant released and the interest of
justice.”
§ 3583(e)(1). Respondent may invoke § 3583(e)(2)
in pursuit of relief; and, having completed one year of super-
vised release, he may also seek relief under § 3583(e)(1).

The statute, by its own necessary operation, does not re-
duce the length of a supervised release term by reason of
excess time served in prison. The judgment of the Court
of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit is reversed, and the case
is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.

It is so ordered.