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Page Number: 25

12 

RODRIGUEZ v. UNITED STATES 

THOMAS, J., dissenting 

officer also recognized heavy use of air freshener, which, in 
his experience, indicated the presence of contraband in the 
vehicle.  “[C]ommonsense judgments and inferences about 
human  behavior”  further  support  the  officer’s  conclusion 
that  Pollman’s  story  about  their  trip  was  likely  a  cover 
story for illegal activity.  Id., at 125.  Taking into account
all the relevant facts, Officer Struble possessed reasonable 
suspicion of criminal activity to conduct the dog sniff. 

Rodriguez  contends  that  reasonable  suspicion  cannot 
exist because each of the actions giving rise to the officer’s
suspicions could be entirely innocent, but our cases easily 
dispose of that argument.  Acts that, by themselves, might 
be innocent can, when taken together, give rise to reason-
able  suspicion.    United  States  v.  Arvizu,  534  U. S.  266, 
274–275 (2002).  Terry is a classic example, as it involved
two individuals repeatedly walking back and forth, looking 
into  a  store  window,  and  conferring  with  one  another  as
well  as  with  a  third  man.    392  U. S.,  at  6.   The  Court 
reasoned  that  this  “series  of  acts,  each  of  them  perhaps 
innocent in itself, . . . together warranted further investi-
gation,” id., at 22, and it has reiterated that analysis in a 
number  of  cases,  see,  e.g.,  Arvizu,  supra,  at  277;  United 
States v. Sokolow, 490 U. S. 1, 9–10 (1989).  This one is no 
different. 

* 

* 

* 
I  would  conclude  that  the  police  did  not  violate  the
Fourth Amendment here.  Officer Struble possessed prob-
able  cause  to  stop  Rodriguez  for  driving  on  the  shoulder, 
and  he  executed  the  subsequent  stop  in  a  reasonable 
manner.  Our decision in Caballes requires no more.  The 
majority’s  holding  to  the  contrary  is  irreconcilable  with 
Caballes  and  a  number  of  other  routine  police  practices,
distorts  the  distinction  between  traffic  stops  justified  by
probable cause and those justified by reasonable suspicion,
and  abandons  reasonableness  as  the  touchstone  of  the 
Fourth Amendment.  I respectfully dissent.