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FINANCIAL OVERSIGHT AND MANAGEMENT BD. FOR 
PUERTO RICO v. AURELIUS INVESTMENT, LLC 
Opinion of the Court 

this reading.  Before the writing of the Constitution, Con-
gress  had  enacted  an  ordinance  that  allowed  Congress  to
appoint officers to govern the Northwest Territory.  As soon 
as  the  Constitution  became  law,  the  First  Congress
“adapt[ed]”  that  ordinance  “to  the present  Constitution  of 
the United States,” Act of Aug. 7, 1789, 1 Stat. 51, in large 
part  by  providing  for  an  appointment  process  consistent
with the constraints of the Appointments Clause.  In par-
ticular, it provided for a Presidential-appointment, Senate-
confirmation  process  for  high-level  territorial  appointees 
who assumed federal, as well as local, duties.  See id., at 52, 
n. (a); §1, id., at 53 (appointment by President, and confir-
mation by Senate, of Governor, secretary, and members of
the upper house); Act of Sept. 11, 1789, ch. 13, §1, 1 Stat. 
68 (Governor “discharg[ed]” the federal “duties of superin-
tendent of Indian affairs”).  Later Congresses took a similar 
approach to later territorial Governors with federal duties.
See Act of June 6, 1900, §10, 31 Stat. 325 (appointment of
Governor  of  Territory  of  Alaska  by  President  with  confir-
mation by Senate); §2, id., at 322 (federal duties of Alaska 
territorial Governor include entering into contracts in name 
of the United States and granting reprieves for federal of-
fenses); Act of Mar. 2, 1819, §§3, 10, 3 Stat. 494, 495 (similar
for Governor of Arkansas).  We do not mean to suggest that
every time Congress chooses to require advice and consent 
procedures it does so because they are constitutionally re-
quired.  At times, Congress may wish to require Senate con-
firmation for policy reasons.  Even so, Congress’ practice of
requiring advice and consent for these Governors with im-
portant federal duties supports the inference that Congress
expected the Appointments Clause to apply to at least some
officials with supervisory authority over the Territories. 

Given the Constitution’s structure, this history, roughly
analogous case law, and the absence of any conflicting au-
thority,  we  conclude  that  the  Appointments  Clause  con-
strains  the  appointments  power  as  to  all  “Officers  of  the