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66  DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN’S HEALTH ORGANIZATION 

BREYER, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ., dissenting
Appendix to opinion of BREYER, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ. 

to protect).

The rest of the cited cases were relatively minor in their
effect,  modifying  part  or  an  application  of  a  prior  prece-
dent’s test or analysis.  See Montejo v. Louisiana, 556 U. S. 
778 (2009) (citing workability and practical concerns with 
additional layers of prophylactic procedural safeguards for
defendants’  right  to  counsel,  as  had  been  enshrined  in 
Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U. S. 625 (1986)); Illinois v. Gates, 
462 U. S. 213, 227–228 (1983) (replacing a two-pronged test 
under Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U. S. 108 (1964), and Spinelli 
v. United States, 393 U. S. 410 (1969), in favor of a tradi-
tional  totality-of-the-circumstances  approach  to  evaluate
probable  cause  for  issuance  of  a  warrant);  Wesberry  v. 
Sanders, 376 U. S. 1, 4 (1964), and Baker v. Carr, 369 U. S. 
186, 202 (1962) (clarifying that the “political question” pas-
sage of the minority opinion in Colegrove v. Green, 328 U. S. 
549 (1946), was not controlling law).

In sum, none of the cases the majority cites is analogous 
to  today’s  decision  to  overrule  50-  and  30-year-old  water-
shed constitutional precedents that remain unweakened by
any changes of law or fact.