Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/22pdf/598us1r3_j4ek.pdf
Page Number: 10

Cite as:  598 U. S. 17 (2023) 

25 

Opinion of the Court 

“ `some  transformative  event,  a  clear  break  from  the  past.' ” 
Id.,  at  206,  487  P.  3d,  at  994  (quoting  State  v.  Shrum,  220 
Ariz. 115, 118, 203 P. 3d 1175, 1178 (2009)).  “ `The archetype 
of  such  a  change  occurs  when  an  appellate  court  overrules 
previously binding case law.' ”  Ibid.  Nevertheless, the Ar-
izona  Supreme  Court  held  that  Lynch  was  not  a  signifcant 
change  in  the  law  because  “the  law  relied  upon  by  the  Su-
preme Court in [Lynch]—Simmons—was clearly established 
at  the  time  of  Cruz's  trial  .  .  .  despite  the  misapplication  of 
that law by the Arizona courts.”  251 Ariz., at 206, 203 P. 3d, 
at 994. 

In so holding, the Arizona Supreme Court rejected Cruz's 
argument  that  Lynch  should  qualify  as  a  signifcant  change 
in  the  law  under  Rule  32.1(g)  “because  it  signifcantly 
changed  how  Arizona  applied  federal  law.”  251  Ariz.,  at 
207,  487  P.  3d,  at  995.  The  Arizona  Supreme  Court  re-
sponded, without citation to any of its prior cases, that Rule 
32.1(g)  requires  “a  signifcant  change  in  the  law,  whether 
state or federal—not a signifcant change in the application 
of the law.”  Ibid. (emphasis in original). 

This  Court  granted  Cruz's  petition  for  certiorari,  596 
U. S. ––– (2022), limited to the question whether the Arizona 
Supreme  Court's  holding  that  Rule  32.1(g)  precluded  post-
conviction  relief  is  an  adequate  and  independent  state-law 
ground for the judgment. 

II 

“This Court will not take up a question of federal law in a 
case  `if  the  decision  of  [the  state]  court  rests  on  a  state  law 
ground  that  is  independent  of  the  federal  question  and  ade-
quate  to  support  the  judgment.' ”  Lee  v.  Kemna,  534  U. S. 
362, 375 (2002) (quoting Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U. S. 722, 
729 (1991) (emphasis added in Kemna)).  Here the Court fo-
cuses on the second of these requirements: adequacy. 

“The  question  whether  a  state  procedural  ruling  is  ade-
quate is itself a question of federal law.”  Beard v. Kindler, 
558 U. S. 53, 60 (2009).  Ordinarily, a violation of a state pro-

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