Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/05pdf/04-1084.pdf
Page Number: 20

Cite as:  546 U. S. ____ (2006) 

15 

Opinion of the Court 

ent; it rests not so much on the particular statutory program 
at issue as on slippery-slope concerns that could be invoked 
in response to any RFRA claim for an exception to a gener-
ally applicable law.  The Government’s argument echoes the 
classic  rejoinder  of  bureaucrats  throughout  history:  If  I 
make an exception for you, I’ll have to make one for every-
body,  so  no  exceptions.    But  RFRA  operates  by  mandating 
consideration,  under  the  compelling  interest  test,  of  excep-
tions  to  “rule[s]  of  general  applicability.”    42  U. S. C. 
§2000bb–1(a).  Congress determined that the legislated test 
“is  a  workable  test  for  striking  sensible  balances  between 
religious  liberty  and  competing  prior  governmental  inter-
ests.”  §200bb(a)(5).  This determination finds support in our 
cases;  in  Sherbert,  for  example,  we  rejected  a  slippery-
slope  argument  similar  to  the  one  offered  in  this  case,
dismissing  as  “no  more  than  a  possibility”  the  State’s 
speculation  “that  the  filing  of  fraudulent  claims  by  un-
scrupulous  claimants  feigning  religious  objections  to  Sat-
urday work” would drain the unemployment benefits fund. 
374 U. S., at 407. 

We  reaffirmed  just  last  Term  the  feasibility  of  case-by-
case  consideration  of  religious  exemptions  to  generally 
applicable  rules.  In  Cutter  v.  Wilkinson,  544  U. S.  ___ 
(2005),  we  held  that  the  Religious  Land  Use  and  Institu-
tionalized  Persons  Act  of  2000,  which  allows  federal  and 
state prisoners to seek religious accommodations pursuant 
to  the  same  standard  as  set  forth  in  RFRA,  does  not  vio-
late  the  Establishment  Clause.    We  had  “no  cause  to  be-
lieve”  that  the  compelling  interest  test  “would  not  be 
applied  in  an  appropriately  balanced  way”  to  specific 
claims  for  exemptions  as  they  arose.  Id.,  at  ___  (slip  op., 
at 12).  Nothing in our opinion suggested that courts were 
not up to the task.

We do not doubt that there may be instances in which a 
need for uniformity precludes the recognition of exceptions 
to  generally  applicable  laws  under  RFRA.    But  it  would