Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/14pdf/13-7451_m64o.pdf
Page Number: 28

Cite as:  574 U. S. ___ (2015) 

1 

KAGAN, J., dissenting 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

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No. 13–7451 
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JOHN L. YATES, PETITIONER v. UNITED STATES 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 

APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
 

[February 25, 2015]

 JUSTICE  KAGAN,  with  whom  JUSTICE  SCALIA,  JUSTICE 

KENNEDY, and JUSTICE THOMAS join, dissenting. 

A  criminal  law,  18  U.  S.  C.  §1519,  prohibits  tampering 
with  “any  record,  document,  or  tangible  object”  in  an
attempt  to  obstruct  a  federal  investigation.    This  case 
raises  the  question  whether  the  term  “tangible  object”
means  the  same  thing  in  §1519  as  it  means  in  everyday
language—any  object  capable  of  being  touched.    The  an-
swer  should  be  easy:  Yes.    The  term  “tangible  object”  is 
broad,  but  clear.    Throughout  the  U. S.  Code  and  many
States’  laws,  it  invariably  covers  physical  objects  of  all
kinds.  And  in  §1519,  context  confirms  what  bare  text 
says:  All  the  words  surrounding  “tangible  object”  show 
that Congress meant the term to have a wide range.  That 
fits with Congress’s evident purpose in enacting §1519: to 
punish  those  who  alter  or  destroy physical  evidence—any
physical  evidence—with  the  intent  of  thwarting  federal 
law enforcement. 

The  plurality  instead  interprets  “tangible  object”  to
cover  “only  objects  one  can  use  to  record  or  preserve  in-
formation.”  Ante, at 7.  The concurring opinion similarly,
if  more  vaguely,  contends  that  “tangible  object”  should 
refer to “something similar to records or documents”—and
shouldn’t  include  colonial  farmhouses,  crocodiles,  or  fish. 
Ante, at 1 (ALITO, J., concurring in judgment).  In my view,
conventional  tools  of  statutory  construction  all  lead  to  a