Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/12pdf/12-71_7l48.pdf
Page Number: 33.0

Cite as:  570 U. S. ____ (2013) 

9 

THOMAS, J., dissenting 

entire  election  process.  Natelson,  The  Original  Scope  of
the  Congressional  Power  to  Regulate  Elections,  13  U. Pa. 
J. Constitutional L. 1, 10–18 (2010) (citing examples).  But 
there  are  good  reasons  for  concluding  that  Article  I,  §4’s
use  of  “Manner”  is  considerably  more  limited.    Id.,  at  20. 
The  Constitution  does  not  use  the  word  “Manner”  in  iso- 
lation;  rather,  “after  providing  for  qualifications,  times,
and places, the Constitution described the residuum as ‘the
Manner  of  holding  Elections.’    This  precise  phrase  seems
to have been newly coined to denote a subset of traditional 
‘manner’  regulation.”    Ibid.    (emphasis  deleted;  footnote 
omitted).  Consistent  with  this  view,  during  the  state 
ratification debates, the “Manner of holding Elections” was
construed  to  mean  the  circumstances  under  which  elec-
tions  were  held  and  the  mechanics  of  the  actual  election. 
See  4  Debates  in  the  Several  State  Conventions  on  the 
Adoption  of  the  Federal  Constitution  71  (J.  Elliot  2d
ed. 1863) (hereafter Elliot’s Debates) (“The power over the 
manner  of  elections  does  not  include  that  of  saying  who 
shall  vote  . . .  the  power  over  the  manner  only  enables
them to determine how those electors shall elect—whether 
by ballot, or by vote, or by any other way” (John Steele at 
the North Carolina ratification debates)); A Pennsylvanian
to the New York Convention, Pennsylvania Gazette, June 
11,  1788,  in  20  Documentary  History  1145  (J.  Kaminski,
G.  Saladino,  R.  Leffler,  &  C.  Schoenleber  eds.  2004) 
(same);  Brief  for  Center  for  Constitutional  Jurisprudence 
as  Amicus  Curiae  6–7  (same,  citing  state  ratification  de-
bates).  The text of the Times, Places and Manner Clause, 
therefore, cannot be read to authorize Congress to dictate
voter eligibility to the States. 

2 
Article  I,  §4,  also  cannot  be  read  to  limit  a  State’s  au-
thority to set voter qualifications because the more specific
language of Article I, §2, expressly gives that authority to