Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/16pdf/15-577_khlp.pdf
Page Number: 49.0

Cite as:  582 U. S. ____ (2017) 

23 

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting 

in  mind  that  “the  Court  has  unambiguously  concluded 
that the individual freedom of conscience protected by the
First  Amendment  embraces  the  right  to  select  any  reli-
gious faith or none at all.”  Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U. S. 38, 
52–53 (1985).  If the denial of a benefit others may receive 
is  discrimination  that  violates  the  Free  Exercise  Clause, 
then  the  accommodations  of  religious  entities  we  have
approved would violate the free exercise rights of nonreli-
gious  entities.  We  have,  with  good  reason,  rejected  that 
idea,  see,  e.g.,  Amos,  483  U. S.,  at  338–339,  and  instead 
focused  on  whether  the  government  has  provided  a  good 
enough  reason,  based  in  the  values  the  Religion  Clauses
protect, for its decision.13 

The Court offers no real reason for rejecting the balanc-
ing approach in our precedents in favor of strict scrutiny, 
beyond its references to discrimination.  The Court’s desire 
to  avoid  what  it  views  as  discrimination  is  understand- 
able.  But  in  this  context,  the  description  is  particularly 

—————— 

Gen. Contractors of America v. Jacksonville, 508 U. S. 656 (1993)). 

13 No surprise then that, despite the Court’s protests to the contrary, 
no  case  has  applied  its  rigid  rule.    McDaniel  v.  Paty,  435  U. S.  618 
(1978), on which the Court relies most heavily, mentioned “status” only
to  distinguish  laws  that  deprived  a  person  “of  a  civil  right  solely  be-
cause of their religious beliefs.”  Id., at 626–627 (plurality opinion).  In 
Torcaso  v.  Watkins,  367  U. S.  488  (1961),  the  Court  invalidated  a  law 
that barred persons who refused to state their belief in God from public 
office  without  “evaluat[ing]  the  interests  assertedly  justifying  it.” 
McDaniel, 435 U. S., at 626 (plurality opinion).  That approach did not 
control  in  McDaniel,  which  involved  a  state  constitutional  provision 
that  barred  ministers  from  serving  as  legislators,  because  “ministerial
status” was defined “in terms of conduct and activity,” not “belief.”  Id., 
at  627.    The  Court  thus  asked  whether  the  “anti-establishment  inter-
ests”  the  State  offered  were  strong  enough  to  justify  the  denial  of  a 
constitutional right—to serve in public office—and concluded that they 
were  not.  Id.,  at  627–629.    Other  references  to  “status”  in  our  cases 
simply recount McDaniel.  See, e.g., Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. 
v.  Hialeah,  508  U. S.  520,  533  (1993);  Employment  Div.,  Dept.  of  Hu-
man Resources of Ore. v. Smith, 494 U. S. 872, 877 (1990).