Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/19pdf/18-1150_new_d18e.pdf
Page Number: 30

Cite as:  590 U. S. ____ (2020) 

9 

THOMAS, J., dissenting 

The  majority  resists  this  conclusion,  suggesting  that
without access to the annotations, readers of Georgia law 
will be unable to fully understand the true meaning of Geor-
gia’s statutory provisions, such as provisions that have been 
undermined  or  nullified  by  court  decisions.  Ante,  at  17. 
That is simply incorrect.  As the majority tacitly concedes,
a  person  seeking  information  about  changes  in  Georgia
statutory  law  can  find  that  information  by  consulting  the 
original source for the change in the law’s status—the court 
decisions themselves.  See ante, at 17.  The inability to ac-
cess the OCGA merely deprives a researcher of one specific 
tool, not to the underlying factual or legal information sum-
marized in that tool.  See also post, at 4 (GINSBURG, J., dis-
senting).2 

C 
The text of the Copyright Act supports my reading of the 

—————— 

2 The  majority  contends  that,  rather  than  seeking  to  understand  the 
origins of our precedents, we should simply accept the text of the opinions 
that the Justices “voted on and committed to writing.”  Ante, at 16–17, 
n. 4.  But that begs the question: What does the text of the relevant opin-
ions tell us?  The answer is not much.  It is precisely this lack of explica-
tion that makes it necessary to explore the “judicial consensus” and pub-
lic policy referred to in Banks v. Manchester, 128 U. S. 244, 253 (1888).
Instead, the majority attempts to dissect the language of our prior opin-
ions in the same way it would interpret a statute, an approach we have
repeatedly cautioned against.  See St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 
U. S. 502, 515 (1993); Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U. S. 330, 341 (1979).
The proper approach is to “read general language in judicial opinions . . . 
as  referring  in  context  to  circumstances  similar  to  the  circumstances 
then before the Court and not referring to quite different circumstances 
that the Court was not then considering.”  Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U. S. 
419,  424  (2004);  see  also  Cohens  v. Virginia,  6  Wheat.  264,  399  (1821) 
(Marshall, C. J., for the Court) (“[G]eneral expressions, in every opinion, 
are to be taken in connection with the case in which those expressions 
are used.  If they go beyond the case, they may be respected, but ought
not to control the judgment in a subsequent suit when the very point is
presented for decision”).