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Page Number: 17.0

12 

NORTH CAROLINA STATE BD. OF DENTAL
EXAMINERS v. FTC 

Opinion of the Court 

segments of the society and harms others” and may in that
sense be seen as “ ‘corrupt.’ ”  499 U. S., at 377.  Omni also 
rejected  subjective  tests  for  corruption  that  would  force  a 
“deconstruction  of  the  governmental  process  and  probing
of  the  official  ‘intent’  that  we  have  consistently  sought  to
avoid.”  Ibid.    Thus,  whereas  the  cases  preceding  it  ad­
dressed  the  preconditions  of  Parker  immunity  and  en­
gaged  in  an  objective,  ex  ante  inquiry  into  nonsovereign
actors’  structure  and  incentives,  Omni  made  clear  that 
recipients  of  immunity  will  not  lose  it  on  the  basis  of 
ad hoc and ex post questioning of their motives for making 
particular decisions. 

Omni’s  holding  makes  it  all  the  more  necessary  to  en­
sure  the  conditions  for  granting  immunity  are  met  in  the 
first  place.    The  Court’s  two  state-action  immunity  cases 
decided after Omni reinforce this point.  In Ticor the Court 
affirmed  that  Midcal’s  limits  on  delegation  must  ensure
that  “[a]ctual  state  involvement,  not  deference  to  private
price-fixing  arrangements  under  the  general  auspices  of
state  law,  is  the  precondition  for  immunity  from  federal 
law.”  504 U. S., at 633.  And in Phoebe Putney the Court 
observed that Midcal’s active supervision requirement, in 
particular, is an essential condition of state-action immun­
ity when a nonsovereign actor has “an incentive to pursue
[its]  own  self-interest  under  the  guise  of  implementing 
state  policies.”  568  U. S.,  at  ___  (slip  op.,  at  8)  (quoting 
Hallie,  supra,  at  46–47).  The  lesson  is  clear:  Midcal’s 
active  supervision  test  is  an  essential  prerequisite  of 
Parker  immunity  for  any  nonsovereign  entity—public  or 
private—controlled by active market participants. 

C 

The  Board  argues  entities  designated  by  the  States  as 
agencies  are  exempt  from  Midcal’s  second  requirement.
That  premise,  however,  cannot  be  reconciled  with  the
Court’s  repeated  conclusion  that  the  need  for  supervision