Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/21pdf/21-499_gfbh.pdf
Page Number: 23

Cite as:  597 U. S. ____ (2022) 

3 

KAGAN, J., dissenting 

more—Miranda  sets  a  “constitutional  minimum.”  530 
U. S., at 442.  Over and over, Dickerson labels Miranda a 
rule stemming from the Constitution. 

Dickerson also makes plain that Miranda has all the sub-
stance of a constitutional rule—including that it cannot be
“abrogate[d]” by any “legislation.”  Miranda, 384 U. S., at 
491;  see  Dickerson,  530  U. S.,  at  437.    In  Dickerson,  the 
Court considered a federal statute whose obvious purpose
was to override Miranda.  Dickerson held that Miranda is 
a  “constitutional  decision”  that  cannot  be  “overruled  by” 
any “Act of Congress.”  530 U. S., at 432.  To be sure, Con-
gress may devise “legislative solutions that differ[ ] from the 
prescribed Miranda warnings,” but only if those solutions
are “ ‘at least as effective.’ ”  Id., at 440 (quoting Miranda, 
384 U. S., at 467).  Dickerson therefore instructs (as noted 
above) that Miranda sets a “constitutional minimum.”  530 
U. S., at 442.  No statute may provide lesser protection than 
that baseline.* 

And  Dickerson  makes  clear  that  the  constitutional  sub-
stance of Miranda does not end there.  Rules arising from 
“the  United  States  Constitution”  are  applicable  in  state-
court proceedings, but non-constitutional rules are not.  See 
530 U. S., at 438 (explaining that the Court “do[es] not hold 
a supervisory power over the courts of the several States”).
Too,  constitutional  rules  are  enforceable  in  federal-court 
habeas proceedings, where a prisoner is entitled to claim he
“is in custody in violation of the Constitution.”  28 U. S. C. 
—————— 

*Other constitutional rules, like Miranda, leave room for States to ex-
periment with procedures, so long as the procedures satisfy the constitu-
tionally mandated baseline.  See County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 
U. S. 44, 58 (1991) (States may adopt different procedures for providing 
probable-cause determinations for persons arrested without a warrant,
so long as those determinations are made promptly); Smith v. Robbins, 
528 U. S. 259, 276–277 (2000) (States may adopt different procedures to
ensure effective appellate review for indigent defendants’ claims, “so long
as  [the  State]  reasonably  ensures  that  an  indigent’s  appeal  will  be  re-
solved in a way that is related to the merit of that appeal”).