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Page Number: 23.0

18 

JONES v. HENDRIX 

Opinion of the Court 

acknowledged Watkins and took pains to reconcile its hold-
ing  with  the  traditional  rule.    See  100  U. S.,  at  375–377. 
And,  when  asked  to  review  convicting  courts’  substantive
errors  of  statutory  law  in  habeas  corpus  proceedings,  this
Court consistently held that it could not do so.8  It was not 

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re-try the issues, whether of law, constitutional or otherwise, or of fact.” 
Id., at 429 (emphasis added). 

8 See, e.g., Knewel v. Egan, 268 U. S. 442, 446 (1925) (“It is fundamen-
tal that a court upon which is conferred jurisdiction to try an offense has 
jurisdiction  to  determine  whether  or  not  that  offense  is  charged  or 
proved”);  In re  Gregory,  219  U. S.  210,  213  (1911)  (“[W]e  are  not  con-
cerned  with  the  question  whether  the  information  was  sufficient  or 
whether the acts set forth in the agreed statement constituted a crime,
that is to say, whether the court properly applied the law, if it be found
that the court had jurisdiction to try the issues and to render the judg-
ment”); In re Eckart, 166 U. S. 481, 483 (1897) (explaining that habeas
would  not  offer  relief  from  “a  trial  and  conviction  upon an  indictment, 
the facts averred in which are asserted to be insufficient to constitute an 
offence against the statute claimed to have been violated”); Ex parte Yar-
brough, 110 U. S. 651, 654 (1884) (“Whether the indictment sets forth in
comprehensive terms the offence which the statute describes and forbids 
. . . is in every case a question of law . . . within [the trial court’s] juris-
diction”); Ex parte Parks, 93 U. S. 18, 20–21 (1876) (“It would be an as-
sumption of authority for this court, by means of the writ of habeas cor-
pus, to review every case in which the defendant attempts to controvert
the criminality of the offence charged in the indictment”). 

Ignoring this authority, JUSTICE JACKSON’s dissent cites a handful of 
inapposite  cases  to  suggest  that  19th-century  American  courts  would 
have treated claims such as Jones’ as cognizable in habeas.  See post, at 
31–32, n. 19, 34, 36–37, n. 25.  Grant v. United States, 58 F. 694 (CA9 
1893), was a case on a writ of error, not habeas corpus.  Ex parte D’Oli-
vera, 7 F. Cas. 853 (No. 3,967) (CC Mass. 1813), was another justice-of-
the-peace case.  Ex parte Randolph, 20 F. Cas. 242, 254 (No. 11,558) (CC
Va. 1833), involved detention unsupported by any “judgment” or “judicial 
process” whatsoever.  United States v. Bainbridge, 24 F. Cas. 946 (No.
14,497) (CC Mass. 1816), involved a collateral attack on a sentence im-
posed by a naval court martial; Justice Story’s opinion turned on the va-
lidity of the petitioner’s contract of enlistment, which, in turn, went to 
the court martial’s jurisdiction.  Id., at 949–952; see also Ex parte Wat-
kins, 3 Pet 193, 209 (1830); Wise v. Withers, 3 Cranch 331, 337 (1806). 
Ex parte Bollman, 4 Cranch 75 (1807), relieved two alleged traitors from