Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/20pdf/19-783_k53l.pdf
Page Number: 33.0

Cite as:  593 U. S. ____ (2021) 

9 

THOMAS, J., dissenting 

4 
Were there any remaining doubt about which interpreta-
tion  better  fits  the  statute,  the  defined  term  settles  it. 
When a definition is susceptible of more than one reading, 
the one that best matches the plain meaning of the defined 
term ordinarily controls.  See, e.g., Bond v. United States, 
572 U. S. 844, 861 (2014) (considering the “ordinary mean-
ing of a defined term”); id., at 870 (Scalia, J., concurring in 
judgment) (courts may “us[e] the ordinary meaning of the 
term being defined for the purpose of resolving an ambigu-
ity in the definition” (emphasis deleted)).  That is because 
“there  is  a  presumption  against”  reading  a  provision  con-
trary  to  the  ordinary  meaning  of  the  term  it  defines.  A. 
Scalia & B. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Le-
gal Texts 232 (2012); see also id., at 228 (“[T]he meaning of 
the definition is almost always closely related to the ordi-
nary meaning of the word being defined”).

The majority instead resolves supposed ambiguity in the 
definition against the plain meaning of the defined term.  It 
adopts  a  “favor[ed]”  interpretation  of  the  definition  and 
then asks whether the defined term can be interpreted in a 
way  “consistent”  with  this  “favor[ed]”  view.  Ante,  at  11. 
But “[i]t should take the strongest evidence to make us be-
lieve that Congress has defined a term in a manner repug-
nant to its ordinary and traditional sense.”  Babbitt v. Sweet 
Home Chapter, Communities for Great Ore., 515 U. S. 687, 
719 (1995) (Scalia, J., dissenting).  The majority identifies
no such evidence.  The most it says is that my reading of 
“exceeds  authorized  access”  is  not  “necessarily”  best  be-
cause “access” can have a technical meaning: entering the
computer system or a part of the computer system.  Ante, at 
11,  12,  n.  6.    But  whatever  meaning  “access”  might  have,
“authority”—like  “entitled”—is  circumstance  dependent. 
The majority’s reading of “access” confirms that point.  The 
definitions the majority cites reference not mere entry, but 
using entry to obtain specific data.  Ante, at 12, n. 6.  That