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Page Number: 87

20 

TRUMP v. UNITED STATES 

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting 

strong with regard to officials who are granted some degree 
of civil immunity because of their duties.  It is in those cases 
where the public can see that officials exercising power un-
der public trust remain on equal footing with their fellow
citizens under the criminal law.  See, e.g., O’Shea v. Little-
ton, 414 U. S. 488, 503 (1974) (“[W]e have never held that 
the performance of the duties of judicial, legislative, or ex-
ecutive officers, requires or contemplates the immunization 
of  otherwise  criminal  deprivations  of  constitutional 
rights”); Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U. S. 24, 31 (1980) (“[J]udi-
cial  immunity  was  not  designed  to  insulate  the  judiciary
from  all  aspects  of  public  accountability.  Judges  are  im-
mune from §1983 damages actions, but they are subject to 
criminal  prosecutions  as  are  other  citizens”);  Imbler  v. 
Pachtman, 424 U. S. 409, 428–429 (1976) (“We emphasize 
that the [civil] immunity of prosecutors . . . does not leave 
the public powerless to deter misconduct or to punish that
which occurs.  This Court has never suggested that the pol-
icy considerations which compel civil immunity for certain
governmental officials also place them beyond the reach of 
the criminal law.  Even judges, cloaked with absolute civil 
immunity for centuries, could be punished criminally”).

The public interest in the federal criminal prosecution of 
a former President alleged to have used the powers of his 
office to commit crimes may be greater still.  “[T]he Presi-
dent . . . represent[s] all the voters in the Nation,” and his
powers are given by the people under our Constitution.  An-
derson v. Celebrezze, 460 U. S. 780, 795 (1983).  When Pres-
idents use the powers of their office for personal gain or as
part of a criminal scheme, every person in the country has 
an interest in that criminal prosecution.  The majority over-
looks that paramount interest entirely.

Finally, the question of federal criminal immunity for a 
former President “involves a countervailing Article II con-
sideration  absent  in  Fitzgerald”:  recognizing  such  an  im-