Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/12pdf/12-133_19m1.pdf
Page Number: 14

Cite as:  570 U. S. ____ (2013) 

1 

KAGAN, J., dissenting 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

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No. 12–133 
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AMERICAN EXPRESS COMPANY, ET AL., PETITIONERS 
v. ITALIAN COLORS RESTAURANT ET AL. 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 

APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
 

[June 20, 2013] 

JUSTICE  KAGAN,  with  whom  JUSTICE  GINSBURG  and 

JUSTICE BREYER join, dissenting. 

Here  is  the  nutshell  version  of  this  case,  unfortunately 
obscured  in  the  Court’s  decision.    The  owner  of  a  small 
restaurant  (Italian  Colors)  thinks  that  American  Express
(Amex) has used its monopoly power to force merchants to
accept  a  form  contract  violating  the  antitrust  laws.    The 
restaurateur  wants  to  challenge  the  allegedly  unlawful
provision  (imposing  a  tying  arrangement),  but  the  same 
contract’s  arbitration  clause  prevents  him  from  doing  so. 
That term imposes a variety of procedural bars that would 
make  pursuit  of  the  antitrust  claim  a  fool’s errand.    So  if 
the  arbitration  clause  is  enforceable,  Amex  has  insulated 
itself from antitrust liability—even if it has in fact violated 
the law.  The monopolist gets to use its monopoly power to
insist  on  a  contract  effectively  depriving  its  victims  of  all 
legal recourse.

And  here  is  the  nutshell  version  of  today’s  opinion,
admirably  flaunted  rather  than  camouflaged:  Too  darn 
bad. 

That  answer  is  a  betrayal  of  our  precedents,  and  of
federal  statutes  like  the  antitrust  laws.  Our  decisions 
have  developed  a  mechanism—called  the  effective-
vindication  rule—to  prevent  arbitration  clauses  from
choking  off  a  plaintiff ’s  ability  to  enforce  congressionally