Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/20pdf/19-357_6k47.pdf
Page Number: 4.0

2 

CHICAGO v. FULTON 

Opinion of the Court 

any property made available to the estate by  other provi-
sions  of  the  Bankruptcy  Code.”  United  States  v.  Whiting 
Pools, Inc., 462 U. S. 198, 205 (1983).  One such provision,
§542, is important for present purposes.  Titled “Turnover 
of property to the estate,” §542 provides, with just a few ex-
ceptions, that an entity (other than a custodian) in posses-
sion of property of the bankruptcy estate “shall deliver to 
the trustee, and account for” that property.

A second automatic consequence of the filing of a bank-
ruptcy petition is that, with certain exceptions, the petition 
“operates as a stay, applicable to all entities,” of efforts to 
collect  from  the  debtor  outside  of  the  bankruptcy  forum.
§362(a).    The  automatic  stay  serves  the  debtor’s  interests
by protecting the estate from dismemberment, and it also
benefits creditors as a group by preventing individual cred-
itors from pursuing their own interests to the detriment of 
the others.  Under the Code, an individual injured by any 
willful violation of the stay “shall recover actual damages, 
including costs and attorneys’ fees, and in appropriate cir-
cumstances, may recover punitive damages.”  §362(k)(1).

Among the many collection efforts prohibited by the stay 
is “any act to obtain possession of property of the estate or
of property from the estate or to exercise control over prop-
erty of the estate.”  §362(a)(3) (emphasis added).  The prohi-
bition against exercising control over estate property is the
subject of the present dispute.

In  the  case  before  us,  the  city  of  Chicago  (City)  im-
pounded each respondent’s vehicle for failure to pay fines 
for  motor  vehicle  infractions.    Each  respondent  filed  a 
Chapter 13 bankruptcy petition and requested that the City 
return his or her vehicle.  The City refused, and in each case 
a bankruptcy court held that the City’s refusal violated the
automatic  stay.  The  Court  of  Appeals  affirmed  all  of  the
judgments  in  a  consolidated  opinion.    In re  Fulton,  926 
F. 3d 916 (CA7 2019).  The court concluded that “by retain-
ing  possession  of  the  debtors’  vehicles  after  they  declared