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Page Number: 61.0

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ARIZONA STATE LEGISLATURE v. ARIZONA 

INDEPENDENT REDISTRICTING COMM’N
 
ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting
 

of  the  Clause  gives  Congress  the  power  to  “make  or  alter 
such Regulations.”  There is a difference between making 
or  altering  election  regulations  prescribed  by  the  state 
legislature  and  authorizing  an  entity  other  than  the  state 
legislature  to  prescribe  election  regulations.    In  essence, 
the  majority’s  proposed  reading  permits  Congress  to  use
the second part of the Elections Clause to nullify the first.
Yet this Court has expressly held that “Congress ha[s] no 
power  to  alter  Article  I,  section  4  [the  Elections  Clause].” 
Smiley,  285  U. S.,  at  372;  see  also  Clinton  v.  City  of  New 
York, 524  U. S. 417 (1998) (Congress may  not circumvent 
Article  I  constraints  on  its  lawmaking  power);  Chadha, 
462 U. S. 919 (same).

Second,  the  majority’s  interpretation  of  Section  2a(c)
would  create  a  serious  delegation  problem.  As  a  general
matter,  Congress  may  pass  statutes  that  delegate  some
discretion to those who administer the laws.  It is a well-
accepted  principle,  however,  that  Congress  may  not  dele-
gate  authority  to  one  actor  when  the  Constitution  vests 
that authority in another actor.  See Whitman v. American 
Trucking  Assns.,  Inc.,  531  U. S.  457,  472  (2001).    The 
majority’s reading of Section 2a(c) contradicts that rule by
allowing Congress to delegate federal redistricting author-
ity to a state entity other than the one in which the Elec-
tions Clause vests that authority: “the Legislature.” 

Third,  the  majority’s  interpretation  conflicts  with  our
most  recent  Elections  Clause  precedent,  Arizona  v.  Inter 
Tribal Council of Ariz., Inc., 570 U. S. 1 (2013).  There we 
explained  that  when  Congress  legislates  under  the  Elec-
tions  Clause,  it  “necessarily  displaces  some  element  of  a 
pre-existing  legal  regime  erected  by  the  States.”    Id.,  at 
___  (slip  op.,  at  11).    That  is  so  because  “the  power  the
Elections Clause confers [on Congress] is none other than
the  power  to  pre-empt.”  Id.,  at  ___–___,  (slip  op.,  at  11– 
12).  Put differently, “all action under the Elections Clause 
displaces  some  element  of  a  pre-existing  state  regulatory