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Page Number: 30.0

26 

BOSTOCK v. CLAYTON COUNTY 

Opinion of the Court 

gregate.    Rather  than  suggesting  that  the  statutory  lan-
guage  bears  some  other  meaning,  the  employers  and  dis-
sents merely suggest that, because few in 1964 expected to-
day’s  result,  we  should  not  dare  to  admit  that  it  follows 
ineluctably from the statutory text.  When a new applica-
tion emerges that is both unexpected and important, they
would seemingly have us merely point out the question, re-
fer the subject back to Congress, and decline to enforce the 
plain terms of the law in the meantime.

That is exactly the sort of reasoning this Court has long
rejected.  Admittedly,  the  employers  take  pains  to  couch
their  argument  in  terms  of  seeking  to  honor  the  statute’s 
“expected  applications”  rather  than  vindicate  its  “legisla-
tive intent.”  But the concepts are closely related.  One could 
easily contend that legislators only intended expected ap-
plications or that a statute’s purpose is limited to achieving 
applications  foreseen  at  the  time  of  enactment.    However 
framed,  the  employer’s  logic  impermissibly  seeks  to  dis-
place  the  plain  meaning  of  the  law  in  favor  of  something 
lying beyond it.

If  anything,  the  employers’  new  framing  may  only  add
new problems.  The employers assert that “no one” in 1964
or for some time after would have anticipated today’s result. 
But is that  really true?  Not long after the law’s passage, 
gay and transgender employees began filing Title VII com-
plaints, so at least some people foresaw this potential appli-
cation.  See,  e.g.,  Smith  v.  Liberty  Mut.  Ins.  Co.,  395  F. 
Supp.  1098,  1099  (ND  Ga.  1975)  (addressing  claim  from
1969); Holloway v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 566 F. 2d 659, 
661  (CA9  1977)  (addressing  claim  from  1974).    And  less 
than a decade after Title VII’s passage, during debates over 
the  Equal  Rights  Amendment,  others  counseled  that  its 
language—which  was  strikingly  similar  to  Title  VII’s— 
might also protect homosexuals from discrimination.  See, 
e.g., Note, The Legality of Homosexual Marriage, 82 Yale L.
J. 573, 583–584 (1973).