Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/20pdf/19-1434_ancf.pdf
Page Number: 60

Cite as:  594 U. S. ____ (2021) 

13 

THOMAS, J., dissenting 

patent  for  the  same  invention,  “shall  be  submitted  to  the 
arbitration of three persons” chosen by the Secretary or by
the parties, and that “the decision or award . . . , delivered 
to  the  Secretary  of  State  . . .  or  any  two  of  them,  shall be 
final, as far as respects the granting of the patent.”  Act of 
Feb. 21, 1793, §9, 1 Stat. 322–333.  In 1836, Congress al-
lowed applicants to appeal the denial of a patent applica-
tion to “a board of examiners, to be composed of three dis-
interested persons, who shall be appointed for that purpose 
by the Secretary of State.”  Act of July 4, 1836, §7, 5 Stat. 
119–120.  The Board had the power “to reverse the decision 
of  the  Commissioner,  either  in  whole  or  in  part,”  and  the 
decision governed “further proceedings.”  Ibid.  These two 
early examples show, at a minimum, that the final resolu-
tion of patent disputes is not the sole preserve of principal 
officers. 

More  broadly,  interpreting  the  Appointments  Clause  to 
bar any nonprincipal officer from taking “final” action poses 
serious line-drawing problems.  The majority assures that
not every decision by an inferior officer must be reviewable 
by  a  superior  officer.    Ante,  at  19.    But  this  sparks  more 
questions  than  it  answers.    Can  a  line  prosecutor  offer  a
plea deal without sign off from a principal officer?4  If faced 
with  a  life-threatening  scenario,  can  an  FBI  agent  use 
deadly force to subdue a suspect?  Or if an inferior officer 
temporarily  fills  a  vacant  office  tasked  with  making  final 
decisions,  do  those  decisions  violate  the  Appointments 

—————— 

4 And  all  this  contemplates  that  it  is  easy  to  distinguish  between  a
principal  and  inferior  officer.    But  recall  that  the  default  appointment 
scheme for all officers—inferior and principal alike—is Presidential ap-
pointment and Senate confirmation.  Senate confirmation says nothing
about  whether  an  officer  is principal  or  inferior  for  constitutional  pur-
poses.  Cf. 2 Opinion of Office of Legal Counsel 58, 59 (1978) (concluding
that United States Attorneys “can be considered to be inferior officers,” 
even  though  Congress  has  never  “exercised  its  discretionary  power  to 
vest the appointment of U. S. Attorneys in the Attorney General”).