Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/21pdf/20-979_h3ci.pdf
Page Number: 32

Cite as:  596 U. S. ____ (2022) 

11 

GORSUCH, J., dissenting 

III 
A 
To the extent doubt remains about the proper construc-
tion of subparagraph (B)(i), it dissipates quickly with a look 
to the larger statutory context.  Here the clues are many—
yet the majority pauses to consider almost none of them.

Take first a neighboring statutory provision.  After deny-
ing courts the power to review “any judgment regarding the 
granting  of  relief ”  in  subparagraph  (B)(i),  Congress  pro-
ceeded in the very next clause to deny courts jurisdiction to
entertain another category of cases:  “any other decision . . . 
the authority for which is specified . . . to be in the discretion 
§ 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii)  (emphasis 
of  the  Attorney  General.” 
added).  That phrasing has a clear implication:  “The prox-
imity of clauses (i) and (ii), and the words linking them—
‘any  other  decision’—suggests  that  Congress  had  in  mind
decisions of the same genre, i.e., those made discretionary 
by legislation.”  Kucana v. Holder, 558 U. S. 233, 246–247 
(2010).  And  as  we  have  seen,  the  only  judgment  under
§ 1255 that fits that description is the Attorney General’s 
second-step decision to grant or deny adjustment of status
“in his discretion.”  §§ 1255(a), (i)(2); see also St. Cyr, 533 
U. S., at 308 (noting that second-step decisions to grant re-
lief are “a matter of grace”). 

Next, consider the other statutes subparagraph (B)(i) ad-
dresses.  It doesn’t just bar review of “judgments regarding 
—————— 
Ante, at 9–10.  But neither case speaks to, much less resolves, the ques-
tion before us.  Guerrero-Lasprilla does not even discuss subparagraph 
(B)(i).  As for Nasrallah’s passing observation that an individual “may
not bring a factual challenge to orders denying discretionary relief, in-
cluding . . . adjustment of status,” 590 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 12), noth-
ing about that statement conflicts with a correct reading of subparagraph
(B)(i).  By its terms, Nasrallah’s observation is explicitly limited to “de-
terminations  made  discretionary  by  statute”—that  is,  step-two  judg-
ments “regarding the granting of relief,” not judgments regarding statu-
tory eligibility.  Ibid. (internal quotation marks omitted).  Once more, the 
majority’s arguments fold quickly under pressure.