Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/22pdf/21-806_2dp3.pdf
Page Number: 51.0

Cite as:  599 U. S. ____ (2023) 

19 

THOMAS, J., dissenting 

Act To Establish a Bank (Feb. 23, 1791), in 8 Papers of Al-
exander Hamilton 97 (H. Syrett ed. 1965).  He discussed the 
General Welfare Clause only as a limitation: “It is true, that
[Congress] cannot without breach of trust, lay taxes for any 
other purpose than the general welfare.”  Id., at 129.  In his 
view, the spending power was emphatically limited to “the 
application of money.”  Ibid. (emphasis in original).  Jeffer-
son and Hamilton could agree that it was no independent 
font of legislative power. 

In sum, the Framers and Ratifiers understood the Taxing 
and  General  Welfare  Clause  as  granting  only  a  power  to 
tax.  What  our  modern  cases  refer  to  as  the  “Spending
Clause”—in fact, the General Welfare Clause—was under-
stood by the Framers and the ratifying public as granting 
no regulatory authority.  One thing that the opposing men
and  factions  of  the  founding  generation  agreed  upon  was 
that  the  Federal  Government’s  power  to  spend  was  just
that—a power to spend, involving no regulatory authority.
Instead, the power to bind with the force of law must come
from Congress’ enumerated legislative powers rather than
its spending power. 

that 

federal 

C 
Though the scope and source of the spending power con-
tinued to be vigorously contested into the 19th century, the 
fundamental  understanding 
spending
measures  could  not  bind  with  the  force  of  law  remained 
common ground.  For example, in his last official act, Pres-
ident Madison vetoed an internal improvements bill in part 
because the “train of powers incident” to constructing and 
maintaining  such  improvements  were  beyond  Congress’ 
enumerated  powers.  30  Annals  of  Cong.  211,  212  (1817). 
The General Welfare Clause could not provide the needed 
regulatory authority, as such an interpretation “would have
the effect of giving to Congress a general power of legisla-
tion,” thus rendering the Constitution’s “special and careful