Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/19pdf/18-1048_8ok0.pdf
Page Number: 17.0

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GE ENERGY POWER CONVERSION FRANCE SAS 
v. OUTOKUMPU STAINLESS USA, LLC 
SOTOMAYOR, J., concurring 

U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 7) (quoting Stolt-Nielsen, 559 U. S., 
at  684)  (citing  cases),  and  even  the  parties  find  common
ground on the point, see Tr. of Oral Arg. 7, 49; Brief for Re-
spondents 2.

Because  this  consent  principle  governs  the  FAA  on  the
whole, it constrains any domestic doctrines under Chapter 
1 of the FAA that might “appl[y]” to Convention proceedings
(to the extent they do not “conflict with” the Convention).  9 
U. S. C.  §208;  cf.  ante,  at  5–6.  Parties  seeking  to  enforce
arbitration agreements under Article II of the Convention 
thus may not rely on domestic nonsignatory doctrines that
fail to reflect consent to arbitrate. 

While the FAA’s consent principle itself is crystalline, it 
is admittedly difficult to articulate a bright-line test for de-
termining whether a particular domestic nonsignatory doc-
trine reflects consent to arbitrate.  That is in no small part
because  some  domestic  nonsignatory  doctrines  vary  from
jurisdiction to jurisdiction.  With equitable estoppel, for in-
stance,  one  formulation  of  the  doctrine  may  account  for  a 
party’s  consent  to  arbitrate  while  another  does  not.    Cf. 
Brief  for  Respondents  45  (maintaining  that  courts  have 
applied  at  least  “three  different  versions”  of  GE  Energy’s 
equitable-estoppel theory, including one that allegedly “al-
lows a non-party to force arbitration even of claims wholly
unconnected to the agreement”).  Lower courts must there-
fore determine, on a case-by-case basis, whether applying a
domestic nonsignatory doctrine would violate the FAA’s in-
herent consent restriction.* 

—————— 

* In this case, however, I am skeptical that any domestic nonsignatory 
doctrines need come into play at all, because Outokumpu appears to have
expressly agreed to arbitrate disputes under the relevant contract with 
subcontractors like GE Energy.  The contract provided that disputes aris-
ing between the buyer and seller in connection with the contract were 
subject to arbitration.  App. 171.  It also specified that the seller in the 
contract “shall be understood” to include “[s]ub-contractors.”  Id., at 88– 
89.  And it appended a list of potential subcontractors, one of which was