Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/17pdf/16-111_j4el.pdf
Page Number: 48.0

Cite as:  584 U. S. ____ (2018) 

11 

Opinion of THOMAS, J. 

curring  in  part  and  concurring  in  judgment)).    States 
cannot  put  individuals  to  the  choice  of  “be[ing]  compelled
to affirm someone else’s belief ” or “be[ing] forced to speak 
when [they] would prefer to remain silent.”  Id., at 99. 

III 
Because Phillips’ conduct (as  described by  the Colorado 
Court  of  Appeals)  was  expressive,  Colorado’s  public-
accommodations  law  cannot  penalize  it  unless  the  law
withstands  strict  scrutiny.    Although  this  Court  some­
times reviews regulations of expressive conduct under the 
more lenient test articulated in O’Brien,4 that test does not 
apply  unless  the  government  would  have  punished  the 
conduct regardless of its expressive component.  See, e.g., 
Barnes, 501 U. S., at 566–572 (applying O’Brien to evalu­
ate  the  application  of a  general  nudity  ban  to  nude  danc­
ing); Clark, 468 U. S., at 293 (applying O’Brien to evaluate 
the application of a general camping ban to a demonstra­
tion  in  the  park).  Here,  however,  Colorado  would  not  be 
punishing  Phillips  if  he  refused  to  create  any  custom 
wedding  cakes;  it  is  punishing  him  because  he  refuses  to
create  custom  wedding  cakes  that  express  approval  of
same-sex marriage.  In cases like this one, our precedents 
demand  “ ‘the  most  exacting  scrutiny.’ ”    Johnson,  491 
U. S., at 412; accord, Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 
561 U. S. 1, 28 (2010).

The  Court  of  Appeals  did  not  address  whether  Colo­
rado’s law survives strict scrutiny, and I will not do so in
the first instance.  There is an obvious flaw, however, with 

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4 “[A]  government  regulation  [of  expressive  conduct]  is  sufficiently
justified if it is within the constitutional power of the Government; if it 
furthers  an  important  or  substantial  governmental  interest;  if  the 
governmental  interest  is  unrelated  to  the  suppression  of  free  expres­
sion;  and  if  the  incidental  restriction  on  alleged  First  Amendment 
freedoms  is  no  greater  than  is  essential  to  the  furtherance  of  that
interest.”  United States v. O’Brien, 391 U. S. 367, 377 (1968).