Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/22pdf/22-10_ifjn.pdf
Page Number: 2.0

2 

DUBIN v. UNITED STATES 

Syllabus 

Section 1028A(a)(1) would thus apply automatically any time a name
or other means of identification happens to be part of the payment or 
billing  method  used  in  the  commission  of  a  long  list  of  predicate  of-
fenses.  Dubin’s more targeted reading requires that the use of a means 
of identification have “a genuine nexus” to the predicate offense.  When 
the  underlying  crime  involves  fraud  or  deceit,  as  many  of  §1028A’s
predicates do, this entails using a means of identification specifically
in a fraudulent or deceitful manner, not as a mere ancillary feature of 
a payment or billing method.  A careful examination of §1028A(a)(1)’s
text and structure points to a narrower reading.  Pp. 4–5. 

(b) The  terms  “uses”  and  “in  relation  to”  have  been  singled  out  by 
this Court as being particularly sensitive to context.  The “various def-
initions  of  ‘use’  imply  action  and  implementation.”  Bailey  v.  United 
States,  516  U. S.  137,  145.    Beyond  that  general  concept,  however, 
“ ‘use’ takes on different meanings depending on context.”  Id., at 143. 
This requires looking “not only to the word itself, but also to the statute
and the [surrounding] scheme, to determine the meaning Congress in-
tended.”  Ibid.  “In  relation  to”  is  similarly  context  sensitive.    If  ex-
tended to its furthest reach, “relate to” would be practically limitless.
The phrase clearly refers to a relationship or nexus of some kind, but 
the nature and strength of this relationship or nexus will be informed 
by context.  Because the presence of two such context-dependent terms 
renders §1028A(a)(1) doubly attuned to its surroundings, resort to con-
text is especially necessary.  Pp. 5–7.

(c) Section 1028A(a)(1)’s title and terms both point toward reading
the provision to capture the ordinary understanding of identity theft, 
where misuse of a means of identification is at the crux of the crimi-
nality.  Pp. 8–15.

(1) Section 1028A is a focused, standalone provision, and its title—
“Aggravated identity theft”—suggests that identity theft is at the core
of  §1028A(a)(1).    A  statute’s  title  has  long  been  considered  a  “ ‘too[l]
available for the resolution of a doubt’ about the meaning of a statute.” 
Almendarez-Torres  v.  United  States,  523  U. S.  224,  234.    Section 
1028A’s title is especially valuable here because it does not summarize
a list of “complicated and prolific” provisions, Trainmen v. Baltimore 
& Ohio R. Co., 331 U. S. 519, 528, and also “reinforces what the text’s 
nouns and verbs independently suggest,”  Yates v. United States, 574 
U. S. 528, 552 (ALITO, J., concurring in judgment). The Court has pre-
viously observed the contrast between §1028A’s targeted title and the 
broad title of neighboring provision §1028: “ ‘Fraud and related activity
in connection with identification documents, authentication features, 
and  information.’ ”  Flores-Figueroa  v.  United  States,  556  U. S.  646, 
655.  That  “Congress  separated  the  [identity]  fraud  crime  from  the 
[identity] theft crime in” §1028A suggests that §1028A is focused on