Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/18pdf/18-302_e29g.pdf
Page Number: 22.0

Cite as:  588 U. S. ____ (2019) 

5 

Opinion of BREYER, J. 

words  do  not  typically  convey  any  particular  viewpoint. 
See FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U. S. 726, 746, n. 22 
(1978) (noting that the Government’s regulation of vulgar 
words was based not on “point of view,” but on “the way in 
which  [speech]  is  expressed”).  Moreover,  while  a  re-
striction  on  the  registration  of  highly  vulgar  words  argu-
ably places a content-based limit on trademark registration,
it  is  hard  to  see  why  that  label  should  be  outcome-
determinative  here,  for  regulations  governing  trademark
registration  “inevitably  involve  content  discrimination.” 
Reed, 576 U. S., at ___ (opinion of BREYER, J.) (slip op., at 
3);  see  Tam,  582  U. S.,  at  ___  (opinion  of  Kennedy,  J.) 
(slip  op.,  at  6)  (noting  that  the  constitutionality  of  some
content-based  trademark  restrictions  is  “well  settled”);
Katyal,  Trademark  Intersectionality,  57  UCLA  L.  Rev. 
1601, 1602 (2010) (noting that trademark law is “indelibly 
rooted in content-based considerations”).

In  short,  the  trademark  statute  does  not  clearly  fit
within  any  of  the  existing  outcome-determinative  catego-
ries.  Why, then, should we rigidly adhere to these catego-
ries?  Rather  than  puzzling  over  categorization,  I  believe 
we  should  focus  on  the  interests  the  First  Amendment 
protects  and  ask  a  more  basic  proportionality  question:
Does  “the  regulation  at  issue  wor[k]  harm  to  First 
Amendment  interests  that  is  disproportionate  in  light  of
the relevant regulatory objectives”?  Reed, 576 U. S., at ___ 
(opinion of BREYER, J.) (slip op., at 4). 

II 
Based on this proportionality analysis, I would conclude
that  the  statute  at  issue  here,  as  interpreted  by  JUSTICE 
SOTOMAYOR, does not violate the First Amendment. 

How  much  harm  to  First  Amendment  interests  does  a 
bar  on  registering  highly  vulgar  or  obscene  trademarks 
work?  Not  much.  The  statute  leaves  businesses  free  to 
use highly vulgar or obscene words on their products, and