Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/10pdf/09-152.pdf
Page Number: 54.0

Cite as:  562 U. S. ____ (2011) 

25 

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting 

program,  Congress  relieved  vaccine  manufacturers  of  the
burden of compensating victims of vaccine-related injuries
in  the  vast  majority  of  cases23—an  extremely  significant 
economic  benefit  that  “functionally  creat[es]  a  valuable 
insurance policy for vaccine-related injuries.”  Reply Brief
for  Petitioners  10.  The  structure  and  legislative  history,
moreover,  point  clearly  to  Congress’  intention  to  divert
would-be  tort  claimants  into  the  compensation  program,
rather  than  eliminate  a  longstanding  category  of  tradi-
tional  tort  claims.  See  1986  Report  13  (“The  Committee 
anticipates  that  the  speed  of  the  compensation  program, 
the  low  transaction  costs  of  the  system,  the  no-fault  na-
ture  of  the  required  findings,  and  the  relative  certainty
and generosity of the system’s awards will divert a signifi-
cant  number  of  potential  plaintiffs  from  litigation”).    In-
deed, although complete pre-emption of tort claims would 
have eliminated the principal source of the “unpredictabil-
ity” in the vaccine market, Congress specifically chose not 
to pre-empt state tort claims categorically.  See 42 U. S. C. 
§300aa–22(a)  (providing  as  a  “[g]eneral  rule”  that  “State
law shall apply to a civil action brought for damages for a
vaccine-related  injury  or  death”).    That  decision  reflects 
Congress’  recognition  that  court  actions  are  essential 

—————— 

vaccines/programs/vfc/cdc-vac-price-list.htm.  Accordingly, the only way 
the vaccine manufacturers can be said to actually “fund” the compensa-
tion program is if the cost of the excise tax has an impact on the num-
ber of vaccines sold by the vaccine manufacturer.  The majority points 
to  no  evidence  that  the  excise  tax—which  ordinarily  amounts  to  75
cents per dose, 26 U. S. C. §4131(b)—has any impact whatsoever on the
demand for vaccines. 

23 See  Brief  for  United  States  as  Amicus  Curiae  28  (“Department  of
Justice  records  indicate  that  99.8%  of  successful  Compensation  Pro-
gram  claimants  have  accepted  their  awards,  foregoing  any  tort  reme-
dies  against  vaccine  manufacturers”);  S.  Plotkin,  W.  Orenstein,  &  P. 
Offit,  Vaccines  1673  (5th  ed.  2008)  (noting  that  “[v]irtually  all  . . . 
petitioners, even those who were not awarded compensation” under the
compensation program, choose to accept the program’s determination).