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Page Number: 11.0

8 

THOMPSON v. CLARK 

Opinion of the Court 

prerequisite is only that the particular prosecution be dis-
posed of in such a manner” that it “cannot be revived.”  Id., 
at 347; Bacon v. Waters, 84 Mass. 400, 401–402 (1861); M.
Newell,  Law  of  Malicious  Prosecution  327–328  (1892) 
(Newell).

On that point, American courts as of 1871 were largely in 
agreement.  To take one example, the Supreme Court of In-
diana ruled that a dismissal satisfied the favorable termi-
nation  requirement  because  it  marked  “an  end  to  further 
proceedings against the defendant” on the charges.  Chap-
man v. Woods, 6 Blackf. 504, 505–506 (1843).  Similarly, the
Supreme  Court  of  Tennessee  concluded  that  a  suit  was 
proper  when  “the  prosecution  was  at  an  end.”  Pharis  v. 
Lambert, 33 Tenn. 228, 232 (1853). 

For  that  reason,  a  plaintiff  could  maintain  a  malicious
prosecution claim when, for example, the prosecutor aban-
doned  the  criminal  case  or  the  court  dismissed  the  case 
without  providing  a  reason.    See,  e.g.,  Fay  v.  O’Neill,  36 
N. Y. 11, 13 (1867); Murray v. Lackey, 6 N. C. 368, 368–369 
(1818); Driggs v. Burton, 44 Vt. 124, 143–144 (1871); Brown 
v. Randall, 36 Conn. 56, 61–63 (1869); Chapman, 6 Blackf., 
at 505–506; Sayles v. Briggs, 45 Mass. 421, 425–426 (1842); 
Yocum v. Polly, 40 Ky. 358, 359 (1841); Burhans v. Sanford, 
19 Wend. 417, 418 (N. Y. 1838); Cotton v. Wilson, Minor 203 
(Ala. 1824).

Several courts explicitly added, moreover, that a favora-
ble termination did not require an acquittal or a dismissal 
accompanied  by  some  affirmative  indication  of  innocence.
In the words of one court, it “is not to be understood, that 
an  action,  for  a  malicious  prosecution,  will  not  lie,  unless
the party has been acquitted by a jury on trial.”  Thomas v. 
DeGraffenreid,  11  S. C. L.  143,  144–145  (1819).    “On  the 
contrary, a person may have his action after a bill rejected 
by the grand jury, or even where no bill has been preferred, 
if there is a final end of the prosecution, and the party dis-
charged.”  Id., at 145; see also Chapman, 6 Blackf., at 505–