Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/524bv.pdf
Page Number: 423

524US2

Unit: $U90

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378

PENNSYLVANIA BD. OF PROBATION
AND PAROLE v. SCOTT
Souter, J., dissenting

ment issues as the police, who are necessarily charged with
responsibility for the legality of warrantless arrests, investi-
gatory stops, and searches.2

As to the beneﬁt of an exclusionary rule in revocation pro-
ceedings, the majority does not see that in the investigation
of criminal conduct by someone known to be on parole,
Fourth Amendment standards will have very little deterrent
sanction unless evidence offered for parole revocation is sub-
It is not
ject to suppression for unconstitutional conduct.
merely that parole revocation is the government’s consola-
tion prize when, for whatever reason, it cannot obtain a fur-
ther criminal conviction, though that will sometimes be true.
See, e. g., State ex rel. Wright v. Ohio Adult Parole Auth.,
75 Ohio St. 3d, at 83–89, 661 N. E. 2d, at 730 (State sought
revocation of parole when criminal prosecution was dis-
missed for insufﬁcient evidence after defendant’s motion to
suppress was successful); Anderson v. Virginia, 20 Va. App.
361, 363–364, 457 S. E. 2d 396, 397 (1995) (same); Chase v.
Maryland, 309 Md. 224, 228, 522 A. 2d 1348, 1350 (1987)
(same); Gronski v. Wyoming, 700 P. 2d 777, 778 (Wyo. 1985)
(same). What is at least equally telling is that parole revo-
cation will frequently be pursued instead of prosecution as
the course of choice, a fact recognized a quarter of a century

2 On the subject of cost, the majority also argues that the cost of apply-
ing the exclusionary rule to revocation proceedings would be high because
States have an “ ‘overwhelming interest’ ” in ensuring that its parolees
comply with the conditions of their parole, given the fact that parolees are
more likely to commit future crimes than average citizens. Ante, at 365.
I certainly do not contest the fact, but merely point out that it does not
differentiate suppression at parole hearings from suppression at trials,
where suppression of illegally obtained evidence in the prosecution’s case
in chief certainly takes some toll on the State’s interest in convicting crim-
inals in the ﬁrst place. The majority’s argument suggests not that the
exclusionary rule is necessarily out of place in parole revocation proceed-
ings, but that States should be permitted to condition parole on an agree-
ment to submit to warrantless, suspicionless searches, on the possibility of
which this case has no bearing. See infra, at 379–380.