Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/558bv.pdf
Page Number: 310

Cite as: 558 U. S. 139 (2010) 

149 

Opinion of the Court 

eral law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United 
States” in Mills.  28 U. S. C. § 2254(d)(1). 

We  add that  the Court  of  Appeals found  the jury  instruc­
tions  unconstitutional  for  an  additional  reason,  that  the  in­
structions “require[d] the jury to unanimously reject a death 
sentence  before  considering  other  sentencing  alternatives.” 
465  F.  3d,  at  709  (citing  Mapes  v.  Coyle,  171  F.  3d  408,  416– 
417  (CA6  1999)).  We  have  not,  however,  previously  held 
jury  instructions  unconstitutional  for  this  reason.  Mills 
says nothing about the matter.  Neither the parties nor the 
courts  below  referred  to  Beck  v.  Alabama,  447  U. S.  625 
(1980), or identiﬁed any other precedent from this Court set­
ting  forth  this  rule.  Cf.  Jones  v.  United  States,  527  U. S. 
373,  379–384  (1999)  (rejecting  an  arguably  analogous  claim). 
But see post, at 158–160 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and 
concurring  in  judgment).  Whatever  the  legal  merits  of  the 
rule  or  the  underlying  verdict  forms  in  this  case  were  we 
to  consider  them  on  direct  appeal,  the  jury  instructions  at 
Spisak’s trial  were not contrary  to “clearly  established Fed­
eral law.”  28 U. S. C. § 2254(d)(1). 

III 

Spisak’s second claim is that his counsel’s closing argument 
at  the  sentencing  phase  of  his  trial  was  so  inadequate  as 
to  violate  the  Sixth  Amendment.  To  prevail,  Spisak  must 
show both that “counsel’s representation fell below an objec­
tive  standard  of  reasonableness,”  Strickland,  466  U. S.,  at 
688, and that there is a “reasonable probability that, but for 
counsel’s  unprofessional  errors,  the  result  of  the  proceeding 
would have been different,” id., at 694. 

The Ohio Supreme Court held that Spisak’s claim was “not 
well-taken  on  the  basis  of  our  review  of  the  record.”  State 
v.  Spisak,  36  Ohio  St.  3d,  at  82,  521  N.  E.  2d,  at  802  (citing, 
inter  alia,  Strickland,  supra).  The  District  Court  con­
cluded  that  counsel  did  a  constitutionally  adequate  job  and 
that  “[t]here  simply  is  not  a  reasonable  probability  that,  ab­