Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/12pdf/11-345_l5gm.pdf
Page Number: 28

Cite as:  570 U. S. ____ (2013) 

11 

THOMAS, J., concurring 

vant  whether  the  University’s  racial  discrimination  in-
creases or decreases tolerance. 

Finally, while the University admits that racial discrim-
ination  in  admissions  is  not  ideal,  it  asserts  that  it  is  a 
temporary  necessity  because  of  the  enduring  race  con-
sciousness of our society.  See Brief for Respondents 53–54
(“Certainly all aspire for a colorblind society in which race 
does  not  matter  . . . .    But  in  Texas,  as  in  America,  ‘our 
highest  aspirations  are  yet  unfulfilled’ ”).    Yet  again,  the
University  echoes  the  hollow  justifications  advanced  by
the segregationists.  See, e.g., Brief for State of Kansas on 
Reargument  in  Brown  v.  Board  of  Education,  O. T.  1953, 
No.  1,  p.  56  (“We  grant  that  segregation  may  not  be  the 
ethical  or  political  ideal.    At  the  same  time  we  recognize
that  practical  considerations  may  prevent  realization  of 
the ideal”); Brief for Respondents in Sweatt 94 (“The racial 
consciousness and feeling which exists today in the minds
of  many  people  may  be  regrettable  and  unjustified.    Yet 
they are a reality which must be dealt with by the State if 
it is to preserve harmony and peace and at the same time 
furnish equal education to both groups”); id., at 96 (“ ‘[T]he 
mores  of  racial  relationships  are  such  as  to  rule  out,  for
the  present  at  least,  any  possibility  of  admitting  white 
persons  and  Negroes  to  the  same  institutions’ ”);  Brief  for 
Appellees in Briggs 26–27 (“[I]t would be unwise in admin-
istrative  practice  . . .  to  mix  the  two  races  in  the  same 
schools at the present time and under present conditions”); 
Brief  for  Appellees  on  Reargument  in  Briggs  v.  Elliott, 
O. T. 1953, No. 2, p. 79 (“It is not ‘racism’ to be cognizant
of the fact that mankind has struggled with race problems 
and  racial  tensions  for  upwards  of  sixty  centuries”).    But 
these  arguments  too  were  unavailing.    The  Fourteenth 
Amendment views racial bigotry as an evil to be stamped
out,  not  as  an  excuse  for  perpetual  racial  tinkering  by
the  State.  See  DeFunis  v.  Odegaard,  416  U. S.  312,  342 
(1974)  (Douglas,  J.,  dissenting)  (“The  Equal  Protection
Clause  commands  the  elimination  of  racial  barriers,  not