Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/23pdf/22-1008_1b82.pdf
Page Number: 5.0

Cite as:  603 U. S. ____ (2024) 

5 

Syllabus 

death of the employee, not on the appointment of an estate adminis-
trator, even though the latter was the “only person authorized by the
statute to maintain the action.”  Koons, 271 U. S., at 60.  The Board 
interprets Koons to hold that a claim accrued at a time when no plain-
tiff  could  sue,  just  as  it  says  Corner  Post’s  claim  “accrued”  before  it 
could sue.  But in Koons, the beneficiaries on whose behalf any admin-
istrator would seek relief—the “real parties in interest”—had the right
to “procure the action” after the employee died.  Given this unique con-
text, Koons does not contradict the proposition that a claim generally
accrues when the plaintiff has a complete and present cause of action.
Next, the Board relies on dicta in Crown Coat to support its contention
that  the  word  “accrues”  can  take  on  different  meanings  in  different 
contexts.  But the Board misreads Crown Coat, which did not suggest 
that the words “right of action first accrues” in a single statute should 
mean different things in different contexts.  Instead, the Court inter-
preted §2401(a)—the very statute at issue here—to embody the tradi-
tional  rule  that  a  claim  accrues  when  the  plaintiff  has  the  right  to 
bring suit in court.  Pp. 16–20. 

(4) Finally, the Board raises policy concerns.  It emphasizes that
agencies and regulated parties need the finality of a 6-year cutoff, and 
that successful facial challenges filed after six years upset the reliance 
interests of those that have long operated under existing rules.  But 
“pleas  of  administrative  inconvenience  . . .  never  ‘justify  departing 
from the statute’s clear text.’ ”  Niz-Chavez v. Garland, 593 U. S. 155, 
169 (quoting Pereira v. Sessions, 585 U. S. 198, 217).  Congress could 
have chosen different language in §2401(a) or created a general statute 
of repose for agencies, but it did not.  In any event, the Board’s policy 
concerns  are  overstated  because  regulated  parties  may  always  chal-
lenge a regulation as exceeding the agency’s statutory authority in en-
forcement proceedings against them.  Moreover, there are significant 
interests  supporting  the  plaintiff-centric  accrual  rule,  including  the
APA’s “basic presumption” of judicial review, Abbott Labs., 387 U. S., 
at  140,  and  our  “deep-rooted  historic  tradition  that  everyone  should 
have  his  own  day  in  court,”  Richards  v.  Jefferson  County,  517  U. S. 
793, 798.  Pp. 20–23. 

55 F. 4th 634, reversed and remanded. 

BARRETT, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which in which ROB-
ERTS, C. J., and THOMAS, ALITO, GORSUCH, and KAVANAUGH, JJ., joined. 
KAVANAUGH, J., filed a concurring opinion.  JACKSON, J., filed a dissenting 
opinion, in which SOTOMAYOR, J., and KAGAN, J., joined.