Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/19pdf/18-1323_c07d.pdf
Page Number: 52.0

Cite as:  591 U. S. ____ (2020) 

7 

ROBERTS, C. J., concurring
ROBERTS, C. J., concurring in judgment 

748  (2011)  (asking  whether  a  law  “imposes  a  substantial 
burden on the speech of privately financed candidates and 
independent expenditure groups”); Murphy v. United Par-
cel  Service,  Inc.,  527  U. S.  516,  521  (1999)  (asking,  in  the
context of the Americans with Disabilities Act, whether an 
individual’s  impairment  “substantially  limits  one  or  more 
major life activities” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 

Casey’s analysis of the various restrictions that were at
issue in that case is illustrative.  For example, the opinion
recognized that Pennsylvania’s 24-hour waiting period for
abortions “has the effect of increasing the cost and risk of
delay of abortions,” but observed that the District Court did 
not  find  that  the  “increased  costs  and  potential  delays
amount  to substantial  obstacles.”    505  U. S.,  at  886  (joint 
opinion  of  O’Connor,  Kennedy,  and  Souter,  JJ.)  (internal 
quotation  marks  omitted).    The  opinion  concluded  that
“given  the  statute’s  definition  of  medical  emergency,”  the
waiting period did not “impose[ ] a real health risk.”  Ibid. 
Because the law did not impose a substantial obstacle, Ca-
sey  upheld  it.    And  it  did  so  notwithstanding  the  District 
Court’s finding that the law did “not further the state inter-
est  in  maternal  health.”  Ibid.  (internal  quotation  marks
omitted). 

Turning to the State’s various recordkeeping and report-
ing  requirements,  Casey  found  those  requirements  do  not 
“impose a substantial obstacle to a woman’s choice” because 
“[a]t  most  they  increase  the  cost  of  some  abortions  by  a 
slight amount.”  Id., at 901.  “While at some point increased
cost  could  become  a  substantial  obstacle,”  there  was  “no 
such showing on the record” before the Court.  Ibid.  The 
Court did not weigh this cost against the benefits of the law.
The same was true for Pennsylvania’s parental consent 
requirement.  Casey held that “a State may require a minor 
seeking  an  abortion  to  obtain  the  consent  of  a  parent  or
guardian, provided there is an adequate judicial bypass pro-