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AMERICAN EXPRESS CO. v. ITALIAN COLORS 
RESTAURANT 
Opinion of the Court 

Trustees  of  Leland  Stanford  Junior  Univ.,  489  U. S.  468, 
479 (1989).  That holds true for claims that allege a viola-
tion  of  a  federal  statute,  unless  the  FAA’s  mandate  has 
been “ ‘overridden by a contrary congressional command.’ ” 
CompuCredit  Corp.  v.  Greenwood,  565  U. S.  ___,  ___ 
(2012)  (slip  op.,  at  2–3)  (quoting  Shearson/American 
Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U. S. 220, 226 (1987)). 

III 
No  contrary  congressional  command  requires  us  to 
reject the waiver of class arbitration here.  Respondents argue
that requiring them to litigate their claims individually—
as  they  contracted  to  do—would  contravene  the  policies 
of  the  antitrust  laws.    But  the  antitrust  laws  do  not 
guarantee  an  affordable  procedural  path  to  the  vindi- 
cation of every claim.  Congress has taken some measures 
to facilitate the litigation of antitrust claims—for example, 
it  enacted  a  multiplied-damages  remedy.    See  15  U. S. C. 
§15  (treble  damages).  In  enacting  such  measures,  Con-
gress  has  told  us  that  it  is  willing  to  go,  in  certain  re-
spects,  beyond  the  normal  limits  of  law  in  advancing  its
goals of deterring and remedying unlawful trade practice. 
But  to  say  that  Congress  must  have  intended  whatever
departures  from  those  normal  limits  advance  antitrust 
goals  is  simply  irrational.    “[N]o  legislation  pursues  its
purposes  at  all  costs.”  Rodriguez  v.  United  States,  480 
U. S. 522, 525–526 (1987) (per curiam). 

The  antitrust  laws  do  not  “evinc[e]  an  intention  to  pre-
clude  a  waiver”  of  class-action  procedure.  Mitsubishi 
Motors  Corp.  v.  Soler  Chrysler-Plymouth,  Inc.,  473  U. S. 
614, 628 (1985).  The Sherman and Clayton Acts make no
mention  of  class  actions.    In  fact,  they  were  enacted  dec-
ades before the advent of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
23, which was “designed to allow an exception to the usual 
rule  that  litigation  is  conducted  by  and  on  behalf  of  the
individual  named  parties  only.”    Califano  v.  Yamasaki,