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RUCHO v. COMMON CAUSE 

Syllabus 

ples, or political questions that must find their resolution elsewhere. 
See Gill v. Whitford, 585 U. S. ___, ___. 

Partisan gerrymandering was known in the Colonies prior to Inde-
pendence,  and  the  Framers  were  familiar  with  it  at  the  time  of  the
drafting  and  ratification  of  the  Constitution.  They  addressed  the 
election  of  Representatives  to  Congress  in  the  Elections  Clause, 
Art. I, §4, cl. 1, assigning to state legislatures the power to prescribe
the “Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections” for Members of 
Congress,  while  giving  Congress  the  power  to  “make  or  alter”  any
such  regulations.    Congress  has  regularly  exercised  its  Elections 
Clause  power,  including  to  address  partisan  gerrymandering.  But 
the  Framers  did  not  set  aside  all  electoral  issues  as  questions  that 
only  Congress  can  resolve.    In  two  areas—one-person,  one-vote  and 
racial  gerrymandering—this  Court  has  held  that  there  is  a  role  for 
the courts with respect to at least some issues that could arise from a
State’s drawing of congressional districts.  But the history of partisan 
gerrymandering is not irrelevant.  Aware of electoral districting prob-
lems,  the  Framers  chose  a  characteristic  approach,  assigning  the  is-
sue  to  the  state  legislatures,  expressly  checked  and  balanced  by  the 
Federal  Congress,  with  no  suggestion  that  the  federal  courts  had  a 
role to play.

Courts  have  nonetheless  been  called  upon  to  resolve  a  variety  of
questions surrounding districting.  The claim of population inequality 
among districts in Baker v. Carr, for example, could be decided under 
basic equal protection principles.  369 U. S., at 226.  Racial discrimi-
nation in districting also raises constitutional issues that can be ad-
dressed  by  the  federal  courts.    See  Gomillion  v.  Lightfoot,  364  U. S. 
339, 340.  Partisan gerrymandering claims have proved far more dif-
ficult  to  adjudicate,  in  part  because  “a  jurisdiction  may  engage  in 
constitutional  political  gerrymandering.”  Hunt  v.  Cromartie,  526 
U. S. 541, 551.  To hold that legislators cannot take their partisan in-
terests  into  account  when  drawing  district  lines  would  essentially
countermand  the  Framers’  decision  to  entrust  districting  to  political
entities.  The  “central  problem”  is  “determining  when  political  ger-
rymandering has gone too far.”  Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U. S. 267, 296 
(plurality  opinion).  Despite  considerable  efforts  in  Gaffney  v.  Cum-
mings,  412  U. S.  735,  753;  Davis  v.  Bandemer,  478  U. S.  109,  116– 
117; Vieth, 541 U. S., at 272–273; and League of United Latin Ameri-
can Citizens v. Perry, 548 U. S. 399, 414 (LULAC), this Court’s prior 
cases have left “unresolved whether . . . claims [of legal right] may be 
brought  in  cases  involving  allegations  of  partisan  gerrymandering,” 
Gill,  585  U. S.,  at  ___.    Two  “threshold  questions”  remained:  stand-
ing, which was addressed in Gill, and “whether [such] claims are jus-
ticiable.”  Ibid.  Pp. 6–14.