Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/23pdf/22-704_4246.pdf
Page Number: 4

4 

VIDAL v. ELSTER 

Syllabus 

has long recognized that a trademark protects the markholder’s repu-
tation, and the connection is even stronger when the mark contains a 
person’s name. 

Applying these principles, the Court has also recognized that a party
has no First Amendment right to piggyback off the goodwill another 
entity has built in its name.  See San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. 
v. United States Olympic Comm., 483 U. S. 522, 528.  By protecting a 
person’s use of his name, the names clause “secur[es] to the producer 
the benefits of [his] good reputation.”  Park ’N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park 
& Fly, Inc., 469 U. S. 189, 198.  Pp. 12–19.

(2) A tradition of restricting the trademarking of names has coex-
isted with the First Amendment, and the names clause fits within that 
tradition.  The names clause reflects the common-law tradition by pro-
hibiting  a  person  from  obtaining  a  trademark  of  another  living  per-
son’s name without consent, thereby protecting the other’s reputation 
and goodwill.  A firm grounding in traditional trademark law is suffi-
cient  to  justify  the  content-based  trademark  restriction  here,  but  a 
case presenting a content-based trademark restriction without a his-
torical analog may require a different approach.  In this case, the Court 
sees no reason to disturb this longstanding tradition, which supports
the restriction of the use of another’s name in a trademark.  P. 19–20. 
(d) This decision is narrow.  It does not set forth a comprehensive 
framework for judging whether all content-based but viewpoint-neu-
tral trademark restrictions are constitutional.  Nor does it suggest that 
an  equivalent  history  and  tradition  is  required  to  uphold  every  con-
tent-based trademark restriction.  The Court holds only that history 
and tradition establish that the particular restriction here, the names
clause in §1052(c), does not violate the First Amendment.  P. 22. 

26 F. 4th 1328, reversed. 

THOMAS, J., announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the 
opinion  of  the  Court,  except  as  to  Part  III.   ALITO  and  GORSUCH,  JJ., 
joined that opinion in full; ROBERTS, C. J., and KAVANAUGH, J., joined all 
but Part III; and BARRETT, J., joined Parts I, II–A, and II–B.  KAVANAUGH, 
J., filed an opinion concurring in part, in which ROBERTS, C. J., joined. 
BARRETT,  J.,  filed  an  opinion  concurring  in  part,  in  which  KAGAN,  J., 
joined, in which SOTOMAYOR, J., joined as to Parts I, II, and III–B, and in 
which JACKSON, J., joined as to Parts I and II.  SOTOMAYOR, J., filed an 
opinion concurring in the judgment, in which KAGAN and JACKSON, JJ., 
joined.