Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/12pdf/11-556_11o2.pdf
Page Number: 46.0

12 

VANCE v. BALL STATE UNIV. 

GINSBURG, J., dissenting 

force  from,  and  was  facilitated  by,  the  control  reins  he
held.  Cf. Burlington N. & S. F. R. Co. v. White, 548 U. S. 
53,  70–71  (2006)  (“Common  sense  suggests  that  one  good 
way to discourage an employee . . . from bringing discrim-
ination  charges  would  be  to  insist  that  she  spend  more 
time  performing  the  more  arduous  duties  and  less  time
performing  those  that  are  easier  or  more  agreeable.”). 
Under any fair reading of Title VII, in each of the illustra-
tive cases, the superior employee should have been classi-
fied  a  supervisor  whose  conduct  would  trigger  vicarious
liability.3 

C 
Within  a  year  after  the  Court’s  decisions  in  Faragher 
and Ellerth, the EEOC defined “supervisor” to include any
employee  with  “authority  to  undertake  or  recommend
tangible  employment  decisions,”  or  with  “authority  to  di-
rect  [another]  employee’s  daily  work  activities.”    EEOC 
Guidance  405:7654.    That  definition  should  garner  “re-
spect  proportional  to  its  ‘power  to  persuade.’ ”    United 
States  v.  Mead  Corp.,  533  U. S.  218,  235  (2001)  (quoting 
Skidmore  v.  Swift  &  Co.,  323  U. S.  134,  140  (1944)).    See 
also  Crawford  v.  Metropolitan  Government  of  Nashville 
—————— 

3 The Court misses the point of the illustrations.  See ante, at 26–28, 
and nn. 15–16.  Even under a vicarious liability rule, the Court points
out,  employers  might  escape  liability  for  reasons  other  than  the  har-
asser’s status as supervisor.  For example, Rhodes might have avoided 
summary  judgment  in  favor  of  her  employer;  even  so,  it  would  have 
been  open  to  the  employer  to  raise  and  prove  to  a  jury  the  Faragher/ 
Ellerth  affirmative  defense,  see  supra,  at  3–4.  No  doubt  other  bar- 
riers  also  might  impede  an  employee  from  prevailing,  for  example,
Whitten’s and Starke’s intervening bankruptcies, see Whitten v. Fred’s 
Inc.,  No.  8:08–0218–HMH–BHH,  2010  WL  2757005  (D.  SC,  July  12,
2010);  EEOC  v.  CRST  Van  Expedited,  Inc.,  679  F. 3d  657,  678,  and 
n. 14 (CA8 2012), or Mack’s withdrawal of her complaint for reasons not
apparent from the record, see ante, at 27–28, n. 16.  That, however, is 
no  reason  to  restrict  the  definition  of  supervisor  in  a  way  that  leaves
out those genuinely in charge.