Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/17pdf/17-130_4f14.pdf
Page Number: 35

Cite as:  585 U. S. ____ (2018) 

1 

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

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No. 17–130 
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RAYMOND J. LUCIA, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. 
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 

APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
 

[June 21, 2018] 

JUSTICE  SOTOMAYOR,  with  whom  JUSTICE  GINSBURG 

joins, dissenting. 

The  Court  today  and  scholars  acknowledge  that  this
Court’s  Appointments  Clause  jurisprudence  offers  little 
guidance  on  who  qualifies  as  an  “Officer  of  the  United 
States.”  See,  e.g.,  ante,  at  6  (“The  standard  is  no  doubt
framed in general terms, tempting advocates to add what-
ever  glosses  best  suit  their  arguments”);  Plecnik,  Officers 
Under  the  Appointments  Clause,  11  Pitt.  Tax  Rev.  201,
204  (2014).    The  lack  of  guidance  is  not  without  conse-
quence.  “[Q]uestions  about  the  Clause  continue  to  arise
regularly  both  in  the  operation  of  the  Executive  Branch
and in proposed legislation.”  31 Opinion of Office of Legal 
Counsel  73,  76  (2007)  (Op.  OLC).    This  confusion  can 
undermine  the  reliability  and  finality  of  proceedings  and 
result in wasted resources.  See ante, at 12–13 (opinion of 
the Court) (ordering the Commission to grant petitioners a
new administrative hearing).

As  the  majority  notes,  see  ante,  at  5–6,  this  Court’s 
decisions  currently  set  forth  at  least  two  prerequisites  to 
officer  status:  (1)  an  individual  must  hold  a  “continuing” 
office  established  by  law,  United  States  v.  Germaine,  99 
U. S.  508,  511–512  (1879),  and  (2)  an  individual  must 
wield “significant authority,” Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1, 
126 (1976) (per curiam).  The first requirement is relatively