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BRYAN v. UNITED STATES

Opinion of the Court

“willful” violation of a statute, “the Government must prove
that the defendant acted with knowledge that his conduct
was unlawful.” Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U. S. 135, 137
(1994).

Petitioner argues that a more particularized showing is
required in this case for two principal reasons. First, he
argues that the fact that Congress used the adverb “know-
ingly” to authorize punishment of three categories of acts
made unlawful by § 922 and the word “willfully” when it re-
ferred to unlicensed dealing in ﬁrearms demonstrates that
the Government must shoulder a special burden in cases like
this. This argument is not persuasive because the term
“knowingly” does not necessarily have any reference to a
culpable state of mind or to knowledge of the law. As Jus-
tice Jackson correctly observed, “the knowledge requisite
to knowing violation of a statute is factual knowledge as dis-
tinguished from knowledge of the law.” 14 Thus, in United

intent to do it or to omit doing it.
‘The word “wilfully,” ’ says Chief Jus-
tice Shaw, ‘in the ordinary sense in which it is used in statutes, means not
‘It
merely “voluntarily,” but with a bad purpose.’
is frequently understood,’ says Bishop, ‘as signifying an evil intent with-
out justiﬁable excuse.’ Crim. Law, vol. i. sect. 428”); 1 L. Sand, J. Siffert,
W. Loughlin, & S. Reiss, Modern Federal Jury Instructions ¶ 3A.01,
p. 3A–18 (1997) (“ ‘Willfully’ means to act with knowledge that one’s con-
duct is unlawful and with the intent to do something the law forbids, that
is to say with the bad purpose to disobey or to disregard the law”).

20 Pick. (Mass.) 220.

14 In his opinion dissenting from the Court’s decision upholding the con-
stitutionality of a statute authorizing punishment for the knowing viola-
tion of an Interstate Commerce regulation, Justice Jackson wrote:

“It is further suggested that a defendant is protected against indeﬁ-
niteness because conviction is authorized only for knowing violations.
The argument seems to be that the jury can ﬁnd that defendant knowingly
violated the regulation only if it ﬁnds that it knew the meaning of the
regulation he was accused of violating. With the exception of Screws v.
United States, 325 U. S. 91, which rests on a very particularized basis,
the knowledge requisite to knowing violation of a statute is factual knowl-
edge as distinguished from knowledge of the law.
I do not suppose the
Court intends to suggest that if petitioner knew nothing of the existence