Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/22pdf/21-869_87ad.pdf
Page Number: 31

Cite as:  598 U. S. ____ (2023) 

25 

Opinion of the Court 

Taken  together,  these  two  elements—that  Goldsmith’s 
photograph  and  AWF’s  2016  licensing  of  Orange  Prince 
share substantially the same purpose, and that AWF’s use 
of Goldsmith’s photo was of a commercial nature—counsel 
against fair use, absent some other justification for copying.
That is, although a use’s transformativeness may outweigh 
its commercial character, here, both elements point in the 
same direction.14 

The  foregoing  does  not  mean,  however,  that  derivative 
works  borrowing  heavily  from  an  original  cannot  be  fair 

—————— 
inquiry “should disregard Warhol’s creative contributions because he li-
censed his work”; or that an artist may not “market even a transforma-
tive follow-on work.”  Post, at 3, 19, 34 (opinion of KAGAN, J.).  Instead, 
consistent with the statute, “whether [a] use is of a commercial nature 
or is for nonprofit educational purposes” is one element of the first factor, 
§107(1); it does not dispose of that factor, much less the fair use inquiry.
As this opinion makes clear, the commercial character of a secondary use 
should be weighed against the extent to which the use is transformative
or otherwise justified.  Supra, at 18 (citing Campbell, 510 U. S., at 579– 
580, 585); see also supra, at 12, 19–20, and n. 8, 25; infra, at 34–35. 

14 The  dissent  contends  that  the  Court  gives  “little  role”  to  “the  key 
term ‘character.’ ”  Post, at 19 (opinion of KAGAN, J.).  This is somewhat 
puzzling, as the Court has previously employed “character” to encompass 
exactly what the dissent downplays: “ ‘the commercial or nonprofit char-
acter of an activity.’ ”  Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, 
Inc., 464 U. S. 417, 448–449 (1984) (quoting H. R. Rep. No. 94–1476, at
66); see also Campbell, 510 U. S., at 572, 584–585 (repeatedly referring 
to  “commercial  character”).    Rather  than  looking  to  this  case  law,  the 
dissent  looks  up  the word  “character”  in a  dictionary.  See post,  at  13. 
But the dissent’s preferred definition—“a thing’s ‘main or essential na-
ture[,] esp[ecially] as strongly marked and serving to distinguish,’ ” post, 
at  20  (quoting  Webster’s  Third  New  International  Dictionary  376 
(1976))—helps Goldsmith, not AWF.  Even this definition does not sup-
port the implication that “character” is determined by any aesthetic dis-
tinctiveness, such as the addition of any new expression.  Instead, it is 
the “main or essential nature” that must be “strongly marked and serv[e] 
to distinguish.”  So return to Orange Prince on the cover of the Condé 
Nast issue commemorating Prince, see fig. 5, supra, and ask, what is the 
main or essential nature of the secondary use of Goldsmith’s photograph
in that context?