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8 

LOPER BRIGHT ENTERPRISES v. RAIMONDO 

Syllabus 

hard to see how anyone could reasonably expect a court to rely on Chev-
ron in any particular case or expect it to produce readily foreseeable 
outcomes.  And rather than safeguarding reliance interests, Chevron 
affirmatively  destroys  them  by  allowing  agencies  to  change  course 
even when Congress has given them no power to do so. 

The only way to “ensure that the law will not merely change errati-
cally, but will develop in a principled and intelligible fashion,” Vasquez 
v. Hillery, 474 U. S. 254, 265, is for the Court to leave Chevron behind. 
By overruling Chevron, though, the Court does not call into question 
prior  cases  that  relied  on  the  Chevron  framework.  The  holdings  of
those  cases  that  specific  agency  actions  are  lawful—including  the 
Clean Air Act holding of Chevron itself—are still subject to statutory 
stare decisis despite  the Court’s change in interpretive methodology. 
See CBOCS West, Inc. v. Humphries, 553 U. S. 442, 457.  Mere reliance 
on Chevron cannot constitute a “ ‘special justification’ ” for overruling 
such a  holding.  Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 573 U. S. 
258, 266 (quoting Dickerson v. United States, 530 U. S. 428, 443).  Pp.
29–35. 

No.  22–451,  45  F.  4th  359  &  No.  22–1219,  62  F.  4th  621,  vacated  and 

remanded. 

ROBERTS, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which THOMAS, 
ALITO, GORSUCH, KAVANAUGH, and BARRETT, JJ., joined.  THOMAS, J., and 
GORSUCH,  J.,  filed  concurring  opinions.  KAGAN,  J.,  filed  a  dissenting 
opinion, in which SOTOMAYOR, J., joined, and in which JACKSON, J., joined 
as it applies to No. 22–1219.  JACKSON, J., took no part in the considera-
tion or decision of the case in No. 22–451.