Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/23pdf/22-704_4246.pdf
Page Number: 56

14 

VIDAL v. ELSTER 

SOTOMAYOR, J., concurring in judgment 

Jorge Posada to capitalize on their goodwill to promote the 
products.  So, the manufacturer lands on JETER OUT OF 
THE  PARK  and  CATCH  LIKE  POSADA  as  marks.    The  
names clause bars registration of these phrases without the 
named individuals’ written consent.  It does so for good rea-
son:  Jeter  and  Posada  may  not  want  consumers  to 
misattribute these products to them, just as consumers may 
not  want  to  buy  products  under  the  false  pretense  that 
these goods somehow are connected to the players.3  Source 
identification  is  especially  important  when,  for  example, 
the  named  individual  produces  similar  products—say,
Jeter  and  Posada  sell  their  own  baseball  goods  under  the 
marks MR. NOVEMBER BATS BY JETER and CHAMP’S 
MITTS BY POSADA.  They would not want manufacturers 
to  dilute  the  commercial  value  of  their  name  and  reputa-
tion.  Nor would Jeter and Posada want a Boston Red Sox 
fan to manufacture cheaper goods and use their names to
promote second-rate products.  The names clause prevents 
that from happening. 

Congress was entitled to make this legislative judgment. 
The Government, after all, “has a reasonable interest in re-
fraining from lending its ancillary support to marks” that 
use an unconsenting individual’s name for commercial gain. 
Brunetti, 588 U. S., at 425 (opinion of SOTOMAYOR, J.); cf. 
id.,  at  401  (opinion  of  ROBERTS,  C. J.)  (“The  Government,
meanwhile,  has  an  interest  in  not  associating  itself  with 

—————— 

3 Other Lanham Act provisions prohibit the registration of marks that
deceive  or  falsely  suggest  a  connection  to  a  person  or  entity.    See  15 
U. S. C.  §1052(a).    That  there  is  some  overlap  between  the  false-
suggestion and names clauses does not change the fact that the names 
clause  reasonably  serves  the  purpose  of  source  identification.    When 
heightened scrutiny is not in play, Congress is free to use belts and sus-
penders  to  support  an  asserted  interest.    I  therefore  also  agree  with 
JUSTICE  BARRETT  that  “Congress  is  entitled  to  make  [the]  categorical 
judgmen[t] . . . that, on the whole, protecting marks that include another 
living  person’s  name  without  consent  risks  undermining  the  goals  of 
trademark.”  Ante, at 9.