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Page Number: 28.0

8 

LUCIA v. SEC 

BREYER, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part 
Opinion of BREYER, J. 

295 U. S. 602, 629 (1935)).  But the Solicitor General has 
nevertheless  argued  strongly  that  we  should  now  decide 
the  constitutionality  of  the  administrative  law  judges’ 
removal  protections  as  well  as  their  means  of  appoint-
ment.  And  in  his  view,  the  administrative  law  judges’
statutory  removal  protections  violate  the  Constitution  (as
interpreted  in  Free  Enterprise  Fund),  unless  we  construe 
those  protections  as  giving  the  Commission  substantially 
greater power to remove administrative law judges than it
presently has.  See Merits Brief for Respondent 45–55.

On  the  Solicitor  General’s  account,  for  the  administra-
tive  law  judges’  removal  protections  to  be  constitutional, 
the  Commission  itself  must  have  the  power  to  remove 
administrative  law  judges  “for  failure  to  follow  lawful 
instructions or perform adequately.”  Id., at 48.  The Merit 
Systems  Protection  Board  would  then  review  only  the 
Commission’s  factfinding,  and  not  whether  the  facts  (as 
found)  count  as  “good  cause”  for  removal.  Id.,  at  52–53. 
This  technical-sounding  standard  would  seem  to  weaken
the administrative law judges’ “for cause” removal protec-
tions  considerably,  by  permitting  the  Commission  to  re-
move an administrative law judge with whose judgments it
disagrees—say, because the judge did not find a securities-
law  violation  where  the  Commission  thought  there 
was  one,  or  vice  versa.    In  such  cases,  the  law  allows  the 
Commission  to  overrule  an  administrative  law  judge’s
findings,  for  the  decision  is  ultimately  the  Commission’s.
See 15 U. S. C. §78d–1(b).  But it does not allow the Com-
mission  to  fire  the  administrative  law  judge.    See  5 
U. S. C. §7521.

And  now  it  should  be  clear  why  the  application  of  Free 
Enterprise  Fund  to  administrative  law  judges  is  im-
portant.  If that decision does not limit or forbid Congress’ 
statutory  “for  cause”  protections,  then  a  holding  that  the
administrative  law  judges  are  “inferior  Officers”  does  not
conflict  with  Congress’  intent  as  revealed  in  the  statute.