Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/19pdf/19-631_2d93.pdf
Page Number: 20

Cite as:  591 U. S. ____ (2020) 

17 

Opinion of KAVANAUGH, J. 

thus would be “fully operative” as a law.  Seila Law, ante, 
at 33; see Murphy, 584 U. S., at ___–___ (slip op., at 25–30). 
But it is fairly unusual for the remainder of a law not to be
operative.9 

2 
We  next  apply  those  general  severability  principles  to 

this case. 

Recall how this statute came together.  Passed by Con-
gress and signed by President Franklin Roosevelt in 1934, 
the Communications Act is codified in Title 47 of the U. S. 
Code.  The TCPA of 1991 amended the Communications Act 
by  adding  the  robocall  restriction,  which  is  codified  at 
§227(b)(1)(A)(iii) of Title 47.  The Bipartisan Budget Act of 
2015 then amended the Communications Act by adding the 
government-debt exception, which is codified along with the 
robocall restriction at §227(b)(1)(A)(iii) of Title 47. 

Since 1934, the Communications Act has contained an ex-
press severability clause: “If any provision of this chapter or 
the  application  thereof  to  any  person  or  circumstance  is 
held invalid, the remainder of the chapter and the applica-
tion  of  such  provision  to  other  persons  or  circumstances 
shall not be affected thereby.”  47 U. S. C. §608 (emphasis 
added).  The “chapter” referred to in the severability clause 
is  Chapter  5  of  Title  47.    And  Chapter  5  in  turn  encom-
passes §151 to §700 of Title 47, and therefore covers §227 of 
Title 47, the provision with the robocall restriction and the
government-debt exception.10 

—————— 

9 On occasion, of course, it may be that a particular surrounding or con-
nected provision is not operative in the absence of the unconstitutional 
provision, even though the rest of the law would be operative.  That sce-
nario may require severance of somewhat more than just the offending 
provision, albeit not of the entire law.  Courts address that scenario as it 
arises. 

10 A codifier’s note explains a change in wording from the original Pub-
lic Law: “This chapter, referred to in text, was in the original ‘this Act’,