Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/558bv.pdf
Page Number: 269.0

108 

MOHAWK  INDUSTRIES,  INC.  v.  CARPENTER 

Opinion of the Court 

two  conditions  of  the  collateral  order  doctrine—conclusive­
ness  and  separateness—but  not  the  third—effective  unre­
viewability.  Because  we  agree  with  the  Court  of  Appeals 
that  collateral  order  appeals  are  not  necessary  to  ensure 
effective  review  of  orders  adverse  to  the  attorney-client 
privilege,  we  do  not  decide  whether  the  other  Cohen  re­
quirements are met. 

Mohawk  does  not  dispute  that  “we  have  generally  denied 
review  of  pretrial  discovery  orders.”  Firestone,  449  U. S., 
at 377; see also 15B C. Wright, A. Miller, & E. Cooper, Fed­
eral  Practice  and  Procedure  § 3914.23,  p.  123  (2d  ed.  1992) 
(hereinafter  Wright  &  Miller)  (“[T]he  rule  remains  settled 
that  most  discovery  rulings  are  not  ﬁnal”).  Mohawk  con­
tends,  however,  that  rulings  implicating  the  attorney-client 
privilege differ in kind from run-of-the-mill discovery orders 
because  of  the  important  institutional  interests  at  stake. 
According  to  Mohawk,  the  right  to  maintain  attorney-client 
conﬁdences—the  sine  qua  non  of  a  meaningful  attorney-
client  relationship—is  “irreparably  destroyed  absent  im­
mediate  appeal”  of  adverse  privilege  rulings.  Brief  for 
Petitioner 23. 

We  readily  acknowledge  the  importance  of  the  attorney-
client privilege, which “is one of the oldest recognized privi­
leges for conﬁdential communications.”  Swidler & Berlin v. 
United  States,  524  U. S.  399,  403  (1998).  By  assuring  con­
ﬁdentiality, the privilege encourages clients to make “full and 
frank”  disclosures  to  their  attorneys,  who  are  then  better 
able  to  provide  candid  advice  and  effective  representation. 
Upjohn Co. v.  United States, 449 U. S. 383, 389 (1981).  This, 
in  turn,  serves  “broader  public  interests  in  the  observance 
of law and administration of justice.”  Ibid. 

The  crucial  question,  however,  is  not  whether  an  interest 
is  important  in  the  abstract;  it  is  whether  deferring  review 
until ﬁnal judgment so imperils the interest as to justify the 
cost of allowing immediate appeal of the entire class of rele­
vant  orders.  We  routinely  require  litigants  to  wait  until