Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/23pdf/22-1008_1b82.pdf
Page Number: 57

Cite as:  603 U. S. ____ (2024) 

11 

JACKSON, J., dissenting 

Ante, at 10.  But the same is true of statutes of limitations. 
“The very purpose of a period of limitation is that there may 
be, at some definitely ascertainable period, an end to litiga-
tion.”  Reading, 271 U. S., at 65; see also Gabelli, 568 U. S., 
at 448 (repose is a “ ‘basic polic[y] of all limitations provi-
sions’ ”).  In fact, according to one of the dictionaries the ma-
jority cites, “[s]tatutes of limitation are statutes of repose.”
Black’s Law Dictionary, at 1077 (emphasis added).  The dif-
ference is that unlike statutes of repose, statutes of limita-
tions have more than one purpose:  they bring finality for
defendants  and  prevent  plaintiffs  from  sleeping  on  their 
rights.  Understanding these dual functions sheds no light
whatsoever on what to do when those competing purposes 
point in different directions.4 

III 
Because  different  claims  accrue  at  different  times,  we 
must look to the specific types of claims that the plaintiffs
have brought and consider the context in which the limita-
tions  period  operates.    “Cases  under  [one  statute]  do  not 
necessarily rule . . . claims” brought under another.  Crown 
Coat, 386 U. S., at 517.  And our understanding of accrual
for  limitations  purposes  has  always  been  context  specific.
See, e.g., Wallace, 549 U. S., at 389 (relying on torts trea-
tises to explain the “distinctive rule” for commencement of 
limitations period for false imprisonment suits); Franconia 
Associates v. United States, 536 U. S. 129, 142–144 (2002) 
(citing contracts treatises to explain that contract claims ac-
crue  at  the  moment  of  breach);  Merck  &  Co.  v.  Reynolds, 

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4 Here, these purposes are at odds because repose favors starting the 
clock at the moment of final agency action, whereas a plaintiff-specific
limitations rule would be targeted at a plaintiff’s injury to ensure plain-
tiffs don’t sleep on their rights.  In the administrative-law context, one 
has to choose between those objectives; no one rule can equally achieve 
both of these ends.