Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/21pdf/20-1459_n7ip.pdf
Page Number: 35

4 

UNITED STATES v. TAYLOR 

ALITO, J., dissenting 

because multiple elements involve “the use, attempted use, 
or  threatened  use  of  physical  force  against  the  person  or 
property of another.”  Elements (5) thorough (8) obviously 
qualify, and it is possible that element (4) does as well.

The  offense  of  attempted  Hobbs  Act  robbery  also  quali-
fies.  A person commits a criminal attempt if he or she takes 
a  “ ‘substantial  step’  toward  completing”  an  intended  of-
fense.  United States v. Resendiz-Ponce, 549 U. S. 102, 106– 
107  (2007)  (quoting  2  W.  LaFave,  Substantive  Criminal
Law §11.4) (2d ed. 2003)).  In other words, a defendant must 
intend to commit some combination of elements that is suf-
ficient to constitute Hobbs Act robbery and must take a sub-
stantial step toward the commission of such a combination
of elements.  If we label these combinations as A, B, C . . . , 
then the elements of attempted Hobbs Act robbery are (1)
intending  to  commit  at  least  one  qualifying  combination, 
i.e., A, B, C . . . , and (2) taking a substantial step toward 
the commission of A, B, C . . . .  Each such combination con-
stitutes an “offense” within the meaning of §924(c)(3), and 
several combinations satisfy the definition of a “crime of vi-
olence.” 

Here  is  a  straightforward  example:  A  hypothetical  de-
fendant (let’s call her “Eve”) intends to take or obtain per-
sonal property from the person of another unlawfully and 

—————— 
violence,  and  fear  of  injury  are  only  “means”  of  committing  Hobbs  Act
robbery  and  not  elements  of  the  offense  under  the  logic  of  the  Court’s 
decision in Mathis v. United States, 579 U. S. 500.  Distinct “means” of 
carrying out an offense are “alternative means of satisfying one (or more) 
of its elements.”  Id., at 503.  In other words, the “means” of carrying out 
an offense are ways of carrying out an element of that offense.  But there 
is no overarching element of Hobbs Act robbery of which actual or threat-
ened force, violence, or fear of injury could be subordinate means of per-
forming.  And in any case, a jury must find that the prosecution proved 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant took or obtained property 
from the person of another by way of force, threatened force, violence, or
fear of injury, which entails that these ways of effectuating robbery con-
stitute elements of the offense.  See id., at 504–506.