Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/14pdf/14-7955_aplc.pdf
Page Number: 52

2 

GLOSSIP v. GROSS 

BREYER, J., dissenting 

and  Stevens,  JJ.);  Proffitt  v.  Florida,  428  U. S.  242,  247 
(1976) (joint opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.); 
Jurek v. Texas, 428 U. S. 262, 268 (1976) (joint opinion of 
Stewart,  Powell,  and  Stevens,  JJ.);  but  cf.  Woodson  v. 
North Carolina, 428 U. S. 280, 303 (1976) (plurality opin­
ion)  (striking  down  mandatory  death  penalty);  Roberts  v. 
Louisiana,  428  U. S.  325,  331  (1976)  (plurality  opinion) 
(similar).  The  circumstances  and  the  evidence  of  the 
death  penalty’s  application  have  changed  radically  since 
then.  Given those changes, I believe that it is now time to 
reopen the question.

In  1976,  the  Court  thought  that  the  constitutional  in­
firmities in the death penalty could be healed; the Court in
effect  delegated  significant  responsibility  to  the  States  to 
develop  procedures  that  would  protect  against  those  con­
stitutional problems.  Almost 40 years of studies, surveys, 
and experience strongly indicate, however, that this effort
has  failed.  Today’s  administration  of  the  death  penalty 
involves  three  fundamental  constitutional  defects:  (1)
serious  unreliability,  (2)  arbitrariness  in  application,  and 
(3)  unconscionably  long  delays  that  undermine  the  death
penalty’s  penological  purpose.    Perhaps  as  a  result,  (4) 
most  places  within  the  United  States  have  abandoned  its 
use. 

I  shall  describe  each  of  these  considerations,  emphasiz­
ing  changes  that  have  occurred  during  the  past  four  dec­
ades.  For it is those changes, taken together with my own
20  years  of  experience  on  this  Court,  that  lead  me  to  be­
lieve  that  the  death  penalty,  in  and  of  itself,  now  likely 
constitutes  a  legally  prohibited  “cruel  and  unusual  pun­
ishmen[t].”  U. S. Const., Amdt. 8. 

I 
“Cruel”—Lack of Reliability 
This  Court  has  specified  that  the  finality  of  death  cre­
ates  a  “qualitative  difference”  between  the  death  penalty