Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/17pdf/16-1140_5368.pdf
Page Number: 1

(Slip Opinion) 

OCTOBER  TERM,  2017 

1 

Syllabus 

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader. 
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337. 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

Syllabus 

NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF FAMILY AND LIFE 

ADVOCATES, DBA NIFLA, ET AL. v. BECERRA, 

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CALIFORNIA, ET AL. 

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR 
THE NINTH CIRCUIT 

No. 16–1140.  Argued March 20, 2018—Decided June 26, 2018 

The  California  Reproductive  Freedom,  Accountability,  Comprehensive 
Care, and Transparency Act (FACT Act) was enacted to regulate cri-
sis  pregnancy  centers—pro-life  centers  that  offer  pregnancy-related
services.    The  FACT  Act  requires  clinics  that  primarily  serve  preg-
nant  women  to  provide  certain  notices.    Clinics  that  are  licensed 
must notify women that California provides free or low-cost services, 
including abortions, and give them a phone number to call.  Its stated 
purpose  is  to  make  sure  that  state  residents  know  their  rights  and
what  health  care  services  are  available  to  them.    Unlicensed  clinics 
must notify women that California has not licensed the clinics to pro-
vide medical services.  Its stated purpose is to ensure that pregnant 
women know when they are receiving health care from licensed pro-
fessionals.    Petitioners—two  crisis  pregnancy  centers,  one  licensed
and one unlicensed, and an organization of crisis pregnancy centers—
filed suit.  They alleged that both the licensed and the unlicensed no-
tices  abridge  the  freedom  of  speech  protected  by  the  First  Amend-
ment.  The  District  Court  denied  their  motion  for  a  preliminary  in-
junction,  and  the  Ninth  Circuit  affirmed.    Holding  that  petitioners 
could  not  show  a  likelihood  of  success  on  the  merits,  the  court  con-
cluded that the licensed notice survived a lower level of scrutiny ap-
plicable  to  regulations  of  “professional  speech,”  and  that  the  unli-
censed notice satisfied any level of scrutiny.  

Held: 

1. The licensed notice likely violates the First Amendment.  Pp. 6– 

17. 

(a) Content-based  laws  “target  speech  based  on  its  communica-