Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/529bv.pdf
Page Number: 142.0

529US1

Unit: $U34

[09-26-01 08:14:00] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 529 U. S. 61 (2000)

67

Opinion of the Court

at 84 (opinion of Ginsburg, J.). We think the burden is
rather upon respondent and the dissent, who assert the un-
constitutionality of the practice, to come up with a case in
which such urging was held improper. They cannot even
produce one in which the practice was so much as challenged
until after our decision in Grifﬁn. See, e. g., State v. Cas-
sidy, 236 Conn. 112, 126–127, 672 A. 2d 899, 907–908 (1996);
People v. Buckey, 424 Mich. 1, 8–15, 378 N. W. 2d 432, 436–
439 (1985); Jenkins v. United States, 374 A. 2d 581, 583–584
(D. C. 1977). This absence cuts in favor of respondent (as
the dissent asserts) only if it is possible to believe that after
reading Grifﬁn prosecutors suddenly realized that comment-
ing on a testifying defendant’s unique ability to hear prior
testimony was a good idea. Evidently, prosecutors were
making these comments all along without objection; Grifﬁn
simply sparked the notion that such commentary might be
problematic.

Lacking any historical support for the constitutional rights
that he asserts, respondent must rely entirely upon our opin-
ion in Grifﬁn. That case is a poor analogue, however, for
several reasons. What we prohibited the prosecutor from
urging the jury to do in Grifﬁn was something the jury is
not permitted to do. The defendant’s right to hold the
prosecution to proving its case without his assistance is not
to be impaired by the jury’s counting the defendant’s silence
at trial against him—and upon request the court must in-
struct the jury to that effect. See Carter v. Kentucky, 450
It is reasonable enough to expect a jury to
U. S. 288 (1981).
comply with that instruction since, as we observed in Grifﬁn,
the inference of guilt from silence is not always “natural or
irresistible.”
380 U. S., at 615. A defendant might refuse
to testify simply out of fear that he will be made to look bad
by clever counsel, or fear “ ‘that his prior convictions will
prejudice the jury.’ ”
Ibid. (quoting People v. Modesto, 62
Cal. 2d 436, 453, 398 P. 2d 753, 763 (1965) (en banc)). By
contrast, it is natural and irresistible for a jury, in evaluating