Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/14pdf/13-7451_m64o.pdf
Page Number: 16.0

Cite as:  574 U. S. ____ (2015) 

13 

Opinion of GINSBURG, J. 

investigation  or  proper  administration  of  any  matter 
within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of the
United States . . . or in relation to or contemplation of any 
such matter,” not just to “an official proceeding.”5 

The  Government  acknowledges  that,  under  its  reading,
§1519  and  §1512(c)(1)  “significantly  overlap.”  Brief  for
United States 49.  Nowhere does the Government explain
what  independent  function  §1512(c)(1)  would  serve  if  the 
Government  is  right  about  the  sweeping  scope  of  §1519. 
We  resist  a  reading  of  §1519  that  would  render  superflu-
ous an entire provision passed in proximity as part of the 
same Act.6  See Marx v. General Revenue Corp., 568 U. S. 
___,  ___  (2013)  (slip  op.,  at  14)  (“[T]he  canon  against  sur-
plusage is strongest when an interpretation would render 
superfluous another part of the same statutory scheme.”). 
The words immediately surrounding “tangible object” in
§1519—“falsifies, or makes a false entry in any record [or] 
—————— 

5 Despite this sweeping “in relation to” language, the dissent remark-
ably  suggests  that  §1519  does  not  “ordinarily  operate  in  th[e]  context 
[of]  federal  court[s],”  for  those  courts  are  not  “department[s]  or 
agenc[ies].”  Post, at 10.  That suggestion, which, as one would expect, 
lacks the Government’s endorsement, does not withstand examination. 
The  Senate  Committee  Report  on  §1519,  on  which  the  dissent  else-
where relies, see post, at 6, explained that an obstructive act is within
§1519’s scope if “done ‘in contemplation’ of or in relation to a matter or
investigation.”    S. Rep.  107–146,  at  15.    The  Report  further  informed 
that §1519 “is . . . meant to do away with the distinctions, which some 
courts  have  read  into  obstruction  statutes,  between  court  proceedings, 
investigations,  regulatory  or  administrative  proceedings  (whether
formal or not), and less formal government inquiries, regardless of their 
title.”  Ibid.  If any doubt remained about the multiplicity of contexts in
which  §1519  was  designed  to  apply,  the  Report  added,  “[t]he  intent  of 
the  provision  is  simple;  people  should  not  be  destroying,  altering,  or 
falsifying documents to obstruct any government function.”  Ibid. 

6 Furthermore,  if  “tangible  object”  in  §1519  is  read  to  include  any
physical  object,  §1519  would  prohibit  all  of  the  conduct  proscribed  by
§2232(a), which imposes a maximum penalty of five years in prison for
destroying  or  removing  “property”  to  prevent  its  seizure  by  the  Gov-
ernment.  See supra, at 1–2.