Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/558bv.pdf
Page Number: 378

Cite as: 558 U. S. 209 (2010) 

217 

Thomas, J., dissenting 

knowledgment  should  have  eliminated  any  basis  for  dispos­
ing  of  this  case  summarily;  the  Court  should  reserve  that 
procedural  option  for  cases  that  our  precedents  govern 
squarely and directly.  See, e. g., United States v.  Haley, 358 
U. S. 644 (1959) (per curiam) (summarily reversing a federal 
court’s judgment that refused to follow, or even mention, one 
of our precedents upholding the statute in issue under identi­
cal circumstances). 

The  Court  nevertheless  concludes  that  Waller  and  Press-
Enterprise  I—in  combination—“well  settl[e]”  the  “point.” 
Ante, at 213.  It admits that “[t]he extent to which the First 
and  Sixth  Amendment  public  trial  rights  are  coextensive 
is  an  open  question,”  but,  apparently  extrapolating  from 
Press-Enterprise I, asserts that “there is no legitimate rea­
son, at least in the context of juror selection proceedings, to 
give  one  who  asserts  a  First  Amendment  privilege  greater 
rights to insist on public proceedings than the accused has.” 
Ante,  at  213.  But  this  conclusion  decides  by  implication  an 
unstated  premise:  that  jury  voir  dire  is  part  of  the  “public 
trial”  that  the  Sixth  Amendment  guarantees.  As  Justice 
Stevens recognized in Press-Enterprise I, that case did not 
decide this issue.  See 464 U. S., at 516 (concurring opinion) 
(“If  the  defendant  had  advanced  a  claim  that  his  Sixth 
Amendment  right  to  a  public  trial  was  violated  by  the  clo­
sure  of  the  voir  dire,  it  would  be  important  to  determine 
whether  the  selection  of  the  jury  was  a  part  of  the  ‘trial’ 
within the meaning of that Amendment”).  Until today, that 
question remained open; the majority certainly cites no other 
case  from  this  Court  answering  it.  Yet  the  Court  does  so 
here—even  though  the  Supreme  Court  of  Georgia  did  not 
meaningfully consider that question, and petitioner does not 
ask  us  to  do  so.*  I  am  unwilling  to  decide  this  important 

*In full, petitioner’s two questions presented state: 

“I.  This  Court  has  established  that  the  public  cannot  be  expelled  from  a 
courtroom unless the presence of the public creates a ‘substantial probabil­
ity’ of prejudice to an ‘overriding interest.’  But is some case-speciﬁc evi­