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Page Number: 107.0

24  NEW YORK STATE RIFLE & PISTOL ASSN., INC. v. BRUEN 

BREYER, J., dissenting 

not because I proposed using means-end scrutiny, but be-
cause, in its view, I had done the opposite.  In its own words, 
the majority faulted my dissent for proposing “a freestand-
ing ‘interest-balancing’ approach” that accorded with “none 
of the traditionally expressed levels [of scrutiny] (strict scru-
tiny,  intermediate  scrutiny,  rational  basis).”  Id.,  at  634 
(emphasis added).

The majority further made clear that its rejection of free-
standing  interest  balancing  did  not  extend  to  traditional 
forms of means-end scrutiny.  It said: “We know of no other 
enumerated constitutional right whose core protection has 
been  subjected  to  a  freestanding  ‘interest-balancing’  ap-
proach.”  Ibid.  To illustrate this point, it cited as an exam-
ple the First Amendment right to free speech.  Id., at 635. 
Judges, of course, regularly use means-end scrutiny, includ-
ing both strict and intermediate scrutiny, when they inter-
pret or apply the First Amendment.  See, e.g., United States 
v.  Playboy  Entertainment  Group,  Inc.,  529  U. S.  803,  813 
(2000) (applying strict scrutiny); Turner Broadcasting Sys-
tem, Inc. v. FCC, 520 U. S. 180, 186, 189–190 (1997) (apply-
ing intermediate scrutiny).  The majority therefore cannot
have intended its opinion, consistent with our First Amend-
ment jurisprudence, to be read as rejecting all traditional
forms of means-end scrutiny.

As  Heller’s  First  Amendment  example  illustrates,  the
Court  today  is  wrong  when  it  says  that  its  rejection  of
means-end scrutiny and near-exclusive focus on history “ac-
cords  with  how  we  protect  other  constitutional  rights.” 
Ante, at 15.  As the Court points out, we do look to history
in the First Amendment context to determine “whether the 
expressive conduct falls outside of the category of protected 
speech.”  Ibid.  But, if conduct falls within a category of pro-
tected  speech,  we  then  use  means-end  scrutiny  to  deter-
mine  whether  a  challenged  regulation  unconstitutionally 
burdens that speech.  And the degree of scrutiny we apply