Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/19pdf/17-1618_hfci.pdf
Page Number: 33.0

Cite as:  590 U. S. ____ (2020) 

29 

Opinion of the Court 

Whatever his reasons, 

of )  broad  language  with  wide-ranging  effect.   Not  neces-
sarily because he was interested in rooting out sex discrim-
ination in all its forms, but because he may have hoped to 
scuttle the whole Civil Rights Act and thought that adding
language covering sex discrimination would serve as a poi-
son pill.  See C. Whalen & B. Whalen, The Longest Debate:
A Legislative History of the 1964 Civil Rights Act 115–118
(1985).  Certainly nothing in the meager legislative history 
of this provision suggests it was meant to be read narrowly.
thanks  to  the  broad  language
Representative Smith  introduced, many, maybe most, ap-
plications of Title VII’s sex provision were “unanticipated”
at the time of the law’s adoption.  In fact, many now-obvious 
applications  met  with  heated  opposition  early  on,  even
among those tasked with enforcing the law.   In the years
immediately  following  Title  VII’s  passage,  the  EEOC  offi-
cially opined that listing men’s positions and women’s posi-
tions separately in job postings was simply helpful rather
than discriminatory.  Franklin, 125 Harv. L. Rev., at 1340 
(citing Press Release, EEOC (Sept. 22, 1965)).  Some courts 
held that Title VII did not prevent an employer from firing 
an  employee  for  refusing  his  sexual  advances.    See,  e.g., 
Barnes v. Train, 1974 WL 10628, *1 (D DC, Aug. 9, 1974).
And courts held that a policy against hiring mothers but not 
fathers of young children wasn’t discrimination because of 
sex.  See Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 411 F. 2d 1 (CA5 
1969), rev’d, 400 U. S. 542 (1971) (per curiam).

Over time, though, the breadth of the statutory language
proved too difficult to deny.  By the end of the 1960s, the
EEOC  reversed  its  stance  on  sex-segregated  job  advertis-
ing.  See Franklin, 125 Harv. L. Rev., at 1345.  In 1971, this 
Court  held  that  treating  women  with  children  differently
from  men  with  children  violated  Title  VII.  Phillips,  400 
U. S., at 544.  And by the late 1970s, courts began to recog-
nize that sexual harassment can sometimes amount to sex 
discrimination.  See, e.g., Barnes  v. Costle, 561 F. 2d 983,