Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/12pdf/11-556_11o2.pdf
Page Number: 10

Cite as:  570 U. S. ____ (2013) 

7 

Opinion of the Court 

significantly  different  responsibilities,  or  a  decision  caus­
ing a significant change in benefits.”  Ellerth, 524 U. S., at 
761.  We  explained  the  reason  for  this  rule  as  follows: 
“When  a  supervisor  makes  a  tangible  employment  deci­
sion,  there  is  assurance  the  injury  could  not  have  been 
inflicted  absent  the  agency  relation.  . . .  A  tangible  em­
ployment decision requires an official act of the enterprise, 
a company act.  The decision in most cases is documented 
in  official  company  records,  and  may  be  subject  to  review 
by  higher  level  supervisors.”  Id.,  at  761–762.    In  those 
circumstances,  we  said,  it  is  appropriate  to  hold  the  em­
ployer strictly liable.  See Faragher, supra, at 807; Ellerth, 
supra, at 765. 

Second,  Ellerth  and  Faragher  held  that,  even  when 
a supervisor’s harassment does not culminate in a tangible
employment action, the employer can be vicariously liable 
for the supervisor’s creation of a hostile work environment 
if  the  employer  is  unable  to  establish  an  affirmative  de­
fense.3    We  began  by  noting  that  “a  supervisor’s  power 
and  authority  invests  his  or  her  harassing  conduct  with
a  particular  threatening  character,  and  in  this  sense,  a 

—————— 

3 Faragher and Ellerth involved hostile environment claims premised 
on sexual harassment.  Several federal courts of appeals have held that 
Faragher  and  Ellerth  apply  to  other  types  of  hostile  environment 
claims,  including  race-based  claims.    See  Spriggs  v.  Diamond  Auto 
Glass, 242 F. 3d 179, 186, n. 9 (CA4 2001) (citing cases  reflecting “the
developing  consensus  . . .  that  the  holdings  [in  Faragher  and  Ellerth]
apply with equal force to other types of harassment claims under Title 
VII”).  But see Ellerth, 524 U. S., at 767 (THOMAS, J., dissenting) (stat­
ing that, as a result of the Court’s decision in Ellerth, “employer liabil­
ity  under  Title  VII  is  judged  by  different  standards  depending  upon 
whether  a  sexually  or  racially  hostile  work  environment  is  alleged”).
Neither  party  in  this  case  challenges  the  application  of  Faragher  and 
Ellerth  to  race-based  hostile  environment  claims,  and  we  assume  that 
the framework announced in Faragher and Ellerth applies to cases such 
as this one.