Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/14pdf/13-534_19m2.pdf
Page Number: 25

2 

NORTH CAROLINA STATE BD. OF DENTAL
EXAMINERS v. FTC 
ALITO, J., dissenting 

them  in  this  way.1    Nor  is  there  anything  new  about  the
suspicion that the North Carolina Board—in attempting to 
prevent  persons  other  than  dentists  from  performing 
teeth-whitening  procedures—was  serving  the  interests  of
dentists and not the public.  Professional and occupational 
licensing  requirements  have  often  been  used  in  such  a 
way.2    But  that  is  not  what  Parker  immunity  is  about.
Indeed,  the  very  state  program  involved  in  that  case  was
unquestionably designed to benefit the regulated entities, 
California raisin growers.

The  question  before  us  is  not  whether  such  programs
serve the public interest.  The question, instead, is whether 
this  case  is  controlled  by  Parker,  and  the  answer  to  that 
question  is  clear.    Under  Parker,  the  Sherman  Act  (and 
the Federal Trade Commission Act, see FTC v. Ticor Title 
Ins.  Co.,  504  U. S.  621,  635  (1992))  do  not  apply  to  state
agencies;  the  North  Carolina  Board  of  Dental  Examiners
is  a  state  agency;  and  that  is  the  end  of  the  matter.    By
straying  from  this  simple  path,  the  Court  has  not  only 
distorted Parker; it has headed into a morass.  Determin-
ing  whether  a  state  agency  is  structured  in  a  way  that
militates  against  regulatory  capture  is  no  easy  task,  and 
there  is  reason  to  fear  that  today’s  decision  will  spawn 
confusion.  The Court has veered off course, and therefore 
I cannot go along. 

—————— 

1 S.  White,  History  of  Oral  and  Dental  Science  in  America  197–
214  (1876)  (detailing  earliest  American  regulations  of  the  practice  of 
dentistry). 

2 See, e.g., R. Shrylock, Medical Licensing in America 29 (1967) (Shry-
lock)  (detailing  the  deterioration  of  licensing  regimes  in  the  mid-19th
century,  in  part  out  of  concerns  about  restraints  on  trade);  Gellhorn, 
The  Abuse  of  Occupational  Licensing,  44  U.  Chi.  L.  Rev.  6  (1976); 
Shepard, Licensing Restrictions and the Cost of Dental Care, 21 J. Law 
& Econ. 187 (1978).