Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/20pdf/20-334_5h26.pdf
Page Number: 2.0

2 

SAN ANTONIO v. HOTELS.COM, L. P. 

Syllabus 

the outcome of an appeal and provides that these default rules apply
unless the court “orders otherwise.”  Nothing in the broad language of 
Rule 39(a) suggests that a court of appeals may not divide up costs in
such an order.  Quite the opposite, Rule 39(a)(4) suggests that a court 
of appeals may apportion costs based on each party’s relative success 
when the results of the appeal are something other than complete af-
firmance  or  reversal.    Rule 39(e)  points  in  the  same  direction;  it  ad-
dresses appellate costs taxable in the district court for the benefit of 
“the party entitled to costs” under the rule (not to a party entitled to 
seek costs).  The court of appeals’ determination that a party is “enti-
tled” to a certain percentage of costs would mean little if the district
court could take a second look at the equities.  San Antonio contends 
that the plain text of subsection (e) providing for costs “taxable in the
district court” vests district courts with discretion over cost allocations, 
but that interpretation reads too much into the term “taxable” and ig-
nores the history of the Rule.  The real work done by the phrase “tax-
able in the district court” is in specifying the court in which these costs 
are to be taxed.  Pp. 5–9.

(b) The Court is not persuaded that applying the plain text of Rule 
39 will create the problems that San Antonio envisions.  First, award-
ing  costs  incurred  prior  to  appeal  is  different  from  taxing  appellate 
costs.  Limiting a district court’s discretion to allocate appellate costs 
will  not  cause  confusion  with  the  equitable  discretion  district  courts
exercise with respect to certain costs incurred in the district court that
are  customarily  taxed  under  Federal  Rule  of  Civil  Procedure  54(d).
Second,  there  is  no  evidence  to  suggest  that  appellate  courts  have 
struggled to allocate appellate costs due to factual disputes better han-
dled by the district court.  And nothing in the Court’s decision should
be read to cast doubt on the approach taken by some courts of appeals
to delegate this responsibility to the district court.  See, e.g., Emmeneg-
ger v. Bull Moose Tube Co., 324 F. 3d 616, 626.  Third, it makes sense 
for the district court to tax the costs in Rule 39(e) because those costs 
relate to events in that court.  This process requires more than a “min-
isterial order,” as San Antonio would have it, because the district court 
will ensure that the amount of appellate costs requested is “correct,”
28 U. S. C. §1924, and that the cost submissions otherwise comply with 
the  relevant rules  and  statutes.    Finally,  that  the  current  rules  and 
relevant statutes could specify more clearly the procedure that a party 
should follow to obtain review of their objections to Rule 39(e) costs in 
the court of appeals does not mean that a district court can reallocate 
those costs.  A simple motion “for an order” under Rule 27 should suf-
fice to seek an order under Rule 39(a), and the Court does not foreclose 
parties from raising their arguments through other procedural vehi-
cles.  Pp. 9–13.