Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/20pdf/19-416_i4dj.pdf
Page Number: 27.0

Cite as:  593 U. S. ____ (2021) 

7 

SOTOMAYOR, J., concurring
Opinion of SOTOMAYOR, J. 

international law supplied the substantive contours of ac-
tionable torts, and domestic law indisputably incorporated 
international law.  See Sosa, 542 U. S., at 729.  Neither of 
those premises changed after Erie.  JUSTICE THOMAS  thus 
misconceives  the  judicial  task  in  asking  whether  courts 
may “create” causes of action under the ATS.  Ante, at 6; see 
also  post,  at  4–5  (GORSUCH,  J.,  concurring).    The  assign-
ment is much more modest: Courts must, based on their in-
terpretation of international law, identify those norms that 
are so specific, universal, and obligatory that they give rise 
to a “tort” for which Congress expects federal courts to en-
tertain “causes”—or,  in modern  parlance,  “civil  action[s],” 
28 U. S. C. §1350—for redress. 

Implicitly  acknowledging  his  departure  from  Sosa, 
JUSTICE THOMAS  argues that “precedents since Sosa have 
substantially narrowed the circumstances in which ‘judicial 
discretion’ ”  to  recognize  ATS  causes  of  action  “is  permit-
ted.”  Ante, at 11.  But the case on which he principally re-
lies, Hernández v. Mesa, 589 U. S. ___, is wholly inapposite. 
Hernández cautions that “finding that a damages remedy is 
implied by a provision that makes no reference to that rem-
edy may upset the careful balance of interests struck by the 
lawmakers.”  Id., at ___ (slip op., at 5).  The ATS, however, 
is  not  a  statute  that  “makes  no  reference  to  [a]  remedy.” 
Ibid.  Just  the  opposite:  The  ATS  expressly  contemplates 
that federal courts will hear “civil action[s]” for “tort[s] . . . 
committed  in violation of  the law  of  nations.”  28  U. S. C. 
§1350.  As such, “a federal court’s authority to recognize a 
damages remedy” under the ATS very much “rest[s] at bot-
tom  on  a statute  enacted  by  Congress.”3  Hernández,  589 

—————— 

3 For  similar  reasons,  JUSTICE  THOMAS’  reliance  on  Ziglar  v.  Abbasi, 
582  U. S.  ___  (2017),  is  misplaced.    There,  this  Court  explained  that, 
“when deciding whether to recognize an implied cause of action, the ‘de-
terminative’ question is one of statutory intent.”  Id., at ___ (slip op., at 
9) (quoting Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U. S. 275, 286 (2001)).  The ATS