Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/09pdf/08-964.pdf
Page Number: 33

Cite as:  561 U. S. ____ (2010) 

13 

STEVENS, J., concurring in judgment 

under other sections of the statute but are not relevant to 
§101, Flook, 437 U. S., at 588.  The placement of “process” 
next  to  other  items  thus  cannot  prove  that  the  term  is
limited to any particular categories; it does, however, give 
reason to be skeptical that the scope of a patentable “proc-
ess” extends to cover any series of steps at all. 

The Court makes a more serious interpretive error.  As 
briefly  discussed  in  Part  II,  supra,  the  Court  at  points 
appears to reject the well-settled proposition that the term
“process”  in  §101  is  not  a  “ ‘process’  in  the  ordinary  sense 
of the word,” Flook, 437 U. S., at 588.  Instead, the Court 
posits that the word “process” must be understood in light 
of its “ordinary, contemporary, common meaning,” ante, at 
6  (internal  quotation  marks  omitted).    Although  this  is  a
fine approach to statutory interpretation in general, it is a
deeply flawed approach to a statute that relies on complex 
terms  of  art  developed  against  a  particular  historical
background.4    Indeed,  the  approach  would  render  §101 
almost  comical.  A  process  for  training  a  dog,  a  series  of 
dance  steps,  a  method  of  shooting  a  basketball,  maybe
even  words,  stories,  or  songs  if  framed  as  the  steps  of
typing  letters  or  uttering  sounds—all  would  be  patent-
eligible.  I am confident that the term “process” in §101 is
not nearly so capacious.5 

—————— 

4 For example, if this Court were to interpret the Sherman Act accord-
ing  to  the  Act’s  plain  text,  it  could prohibit  “the  entire  body  of  private
contract,” National Soc. of Professional Engineers v. United States, 435 
U. S. 679, 688 (1978). 

5 The  Court  attempts  to  avoid  such  absurd  results  by  stating  that
these “[c]oncerns” “can be met by making sure that the claim meets the
requirements of §101.”  Ante, at 6.  Because the only limitation on the
plain meaning of “process” that the Court acknowledges explicitly is the
bar on abstract ideas, laws of nature, and the like, it is presumably this
limitation  that  is  left  to  stand  between  all  conceivable  human  activity
and  patent  monopolies.    But  many  processes  that  would  make  for
absurd  patents  are  not  abstract  ideas.    Nor  can  the  requirements  of
novelty,  nonobviousness,  and  particular  description  pick  up  the  slack.