Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/21pdf/20-603_o758.pdf
Page Number: 19

Cite as:  597 U. S. ____ (2022) 

15 

Opinion of the Court 

9–10, and n. 4, 16–17, and n. 7.  But those opinions’ reason-
ing about our constitutional structure is not so limited, as 
Alden reflects.  Alden held that Article I did not, in general,
give Congress the power to set aside States’ immunity from 
suit in their own courts, despite the Eleventh Amendment’s 
silence  on  the  subject  of  state  courts.    (The  Amendment’s
text  refers  only  to  federal  courts—“The  Judicial  power  of
the United States.”)  Like our other state sovereign immun-
ity  cases,  Alden  “understood  the  Eleventh  Amendment  to 
stand not so much for what it says, but for the presupposi-
tion  of  our  constitutional  structure  which  it  confirms.” 
Blatchford, 501 U. S., at 779; see Alden, 527 U. S., at 755 
(explaining  its  holding  is  “implicit  in  the  constitutional 
principle  of  state  sovereign  immunity”).  It  follows  that  a 
waiver pursuant to the plan of the Convention, as we found 
in PennEast and Katz, displaces the background principles 
of state sovereign immunity wherever those suits proceed. 
Neither Alden nor any other case holds to the contrary.

The  dissent  would  leave  us  with  a  constitutional  struc-
ture that allows Congress to authorize private suits against 
States  only  by  abrogation  under  the  Fourteenth  Amend-
ment, by legislation under the Bankruptcy Clause (but only 
for suits in federal courts), or by delegation of the federal
eminent domain power (but, again, only in federal courts).
The logic of that constitutional design is anything but clear. 
Texas  tries  another  tack  to  distinguish  PennEast  and 
Katz, focusing on a technical aspect of those cases.  Texas 
says  that  both  eminent  domain  and  bankruptcy  involved 
in rem proceedings, which are “ ‘inextricably intertwined’ ” 
with the exercise of those federal powers.  See Brief for Re-
spondent 40 (quoting PennEast, 594 U. S., at ___ (slip op., 
at 17)); see also post, at 23–24.  The proceeding before us, 
Texas adds, is not in rem or so intertwined.  We agree, of
course,  that  PennEast  discussed  the  close  connection  be-
tween  the  exercise  of  eminent  domain  and  condemnation 
actions.  See 594 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 17); see also Katz,