Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/14pdf/13-7120_p86b.pdf
Page Number: 25.0

Cite as:  576 U. S. ____ (2015) 

7 

THOMAS, J., concurring in judgment 

subjects  ranging  from  abortion,  Colautti  v.  Franklin,  439 
U. S. 379, 390 (1979), and obscenity, Winters v. New York, 
333  U. S.  507,  517–520  (1948),  to  the  minimum  wage, 
Connally  v.  General  Constr.  Co.,  269  U. S.  385,  390–395 
(1926),  and  antitrust,  Cline  v.  Frink  Dairy  Co.,  274  U. S. 
445,  453–465  (1927).    We  have  even  struck  down  a  law 
using  a  term  that  has  been  used  to  describe  criminal 
conduct  in  this  country  since  before  the  Constitution  was 
ratified.  Chicago  v.  Morales,  527  U. S.  41,  51  (1999)  (in-
validating  a  “loitering”  law);  see  id.,  at  113,  and  n.  10 
(THOMAS,  J.,  dissenting)  (discussing  a  1764  Georgia  law 
requiring the apprehension of “all able bodied persons . . . 
who shall be found loitering”). 

That  we  have  repeatedly  used  a  doctrine  to  invalidate
laws  does  not  make  it  legitimate.    Cf.,  e.g.,  Dred  Scott  v. 
Sandford,  19  How.  393,  450–452  (1857)  (stating  that  an
Act  of  Congress  prohibiting  slavery  in  certain  Federal
Territories  violated  the  substantive  due  process  rights  of
slaveowners  and  was  therefore  void).  This  Court  has  a 
history  of  wielding  doctrines  purportedly  rooted  in  “due 
process of law” to achieve its own policy goals, substantive 
due  process  being  the  poster  child.  See  McDonald  v. 
Chicago, 561 U. S. 742, 811 (2010) (THOMAS, J., concurring
in part and concurring in judgment) (“The one theme that 
links  the  Court’s  substantive  due  process  precedents 
together is their lack of a guiding principle to distinguish 
‘fundamental’ rights that warrant protection from nonfun-
damental  rights  that  do  not”).    Although  our  vagueness
doctrine  is  distinct  from  substantive  due  process,  their 
histories have disquieting parallels. 

1 

The  problem  of  vague  penal  statutes  is  nothing  new. 

—————— 

a regulatory mandate is penal.  See National Federation of Independent 
Business  v.  Sebelius,  567  U. S.  ___,  ___–___  (2012)  (SCALIA, KENNEDY, 
THOMAS, and ALITO, JJ., dissenting) (slip op., at 16–26).