Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/22pdf/21-857_4357.pdf
Page Number: 18

Cite as:  599 U. S. ____ (2023) 

13 

Opinion of the Court 

clause  that,  if  accepted,  would  convert  §2255(e)  into  a  li-
cense for unbounded error correction.  He argues that §2255
is necessarily “inadequate or ineffective to test” a prisoner’s
claim if the §2255 court fails to apply the correct substan-
tive law.  This argument ignores that the saving clause is 
concerned with the adequacy or effectiveness of the reme-
dial  vehicle  (“the  remedy  by  motion”),  not  any  court’s  as-
serted errors of law.  Cf. Swain v. Pressley, 430 U. S. 372, 
383  (1977)  (holding  a  District  of  Columbia-court  remedy 
modeled on §2255 not to be “ ‘inadequate or ineffective’ ” be-
cause  the  D. C.  courts  were  “competent  to  decide  all  is-
sues”).  Even when “circuit law is inadequate or deficient” 
because a Court of Appeals’ precedents have resolved a le-
gal issue incorrectly, that is not a fault in “the §2255 reme-
dial vehicle” itself.4  Prost, 636 F. 3d, at 590. 

Next, Jones offers a wide-ranging discussion of the con-
cept of “inadequacy” as a term of art in traditional equity 
jurisprudence.  While Jones demonstrates that courts of eq-
uity would afford relief from “inadequate” legal remedies in 

—————— 

4 Despite  occasional  gestures  in  its  direction,  and  despite  its  critical 
role  in  persuading  the  Courts  of  Appeals  to  expand  the  saving  clause, 
Jones’  textual  arguments  place  relatively  little  emphasis  on  whether 
binding precedent foreclosed a prisoner’s statutory argument at trial, on 
appeal, and in an initial §2255 motion.  See In re Davenport, 147 F. 3d 
605, 610–611 (CA7 1998) (making such foreclosure an express precondi-
tion  of  saving-clause  relief );  see  also  Triestman  v.  United  States,  124 
F. 3d 361, 380 (CA2 1997) (emphasizing that the prisoner “had no [prior]
effective opportunity to raise his [Bailey] claim”); In re Dorsainvil, 119 
F. 3d 245, 251 (CA3 1997) (similar).  Rather, under Jones’ interpretation
of “test,” it appears that §2241 would be available to correct any asserted 
error of law by a §2255 court, even on an issue of first impression.  Un-
tenable as that consequence is, the erroneous-foreclosure approach fares 
no better.  To hold that binding precedent renders a judicial proceeding 
“ ‘inadequate or ineffective’ to test the rights of parties” would be a shock
for  “our  entire  justice  system,”  in  which  “precedent  is  ubiquitous.” 
Wright v. Spaulding, 939 F. 3d 695, 709 (CA6 2019) (Thapar, J., concur-
ring).  Nothing in the text or history of the saving clause suggests that it
uniquely embodies that far-reaching proposition.