Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/12pdf/11-697_d1o2.pdf
Page Number: 70.0

Cite as:  568 U. S. ____ (2013) 

29 

GINSBURG, J., dissenting 

a  copyright  owner’s  exclusive  right  under  §106(5)  to
publicly  display  the  owner’s  work.    Because  §109(c),  like
§109(a),  applies  only  to  copies  “lawfully  made  under  this
title,”  amici  contend  that  a  ruling  in  Wiley’s  favor  would 
prevent  museums  from  invoking  §109(c)  with  respect  to 
foreign-made works of art.  Id., at 11–13.24 

Limiting §109(c) to U. S.-made works, however, does not 
bar art museums from lawfully displaying works made in 
other  countries.    Museums  can,  of  course,  seek  the  copy­
right owner’s permission to display a work.  Furthermore, 
the sale of a work of art to a U. S. museum may carry with
it  an  implied  license  to  publicly  display  the  work.    See  2 
Patry §5:131, at 5–280 (“[C]ourts have noted the potential 
availability  of  an  implied  nonexclusive  licens[e]  when  the
circumstances  . . .  demonstrate  that  the  parties  intended 
that  the  work  would  be  used  for  a  specific  purpose.”).
Displaying  a  work  of  art  as  part  of  a  museum  exhibition
might  also  qualify  as  a  “fair  use”  under  17  U. S. C.  §107.
Cf.  Bouchat  v.  Baltimore  Ravens  Ltd.  Partnership,  619 
F. 3d 301, 313–316 (CA4 2010) (display of copyrighted logo
in museum-like exhibition constituted “fair use”).

The  Court  worries  about  the  resale  of  foreign-made
consumer  goods  “contain[ing]  copyrightable  software  pro­
grams or packaging.”  Ante, at 21.  For example, the Court
observes  that  a  car  might  be  programmed  with  diverse 
forms  of  software,  the  copyrights  to  which  might  be
owned  by  individuals  or  entities  other  than  the  manu- 
facturer  of  the  car.  Ibid.    Must  a  car  owner,  the  Court 
asks, obtain permission from all of these various copyright 
owners  before  reselling  her  car? 
  Although  this
question strays far from the one presented in this case and
briefed  by  the  parties,  principles  of  fair  use  and  implied 

Ibid.

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24 The word “copy,” as it appears in §109(c), applies to the original of a
work  of  art  because  the  Copyright  Act  defines  the  term  “copies”  to
“includ[e] the material object . . . in which the work is first fixed.”  §101.