Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/21pdf/20-1088_dbfi.pdf
Page Number: 29.0

Cite as:  596 U. S. ____ (2022) 

7 

BREYER, J., dissenting 

not. 

We  have  previously  found,  as  the  majority  points  out, 
that “a neutral benefit program in which public funds flow 
to religious organizations through the independent choices 
of private benefit recipients does not offend the Establish-
ment Clause.”  Ante, at 10 (citing Zelman, 536 U. S., at 652– 
653).  We have thus concluded that a State may, consistent 
with the Establishment Clause, provide funding to religious 
schools  through  a  general  public  funding  program  if  the
“government aid . . . reach[es] religious institutions only by 
way of the deliberate choices of . . . individual [aid] recipi-
ents.”  Id., at 652. 

But  the  key  word  is  “may.”    We  have  never  previously
held what the Court holds today, namely, that a State must 
(not may) use state funds to pay for religious education as
part of a tuition program designed to ensure the provision
of free statewide public school education. 

What  happens  once  “may”  becomes  “must”?    Does  that 
transformation  mean  that  a  school  district  that  pays  for
public  schools  must  pay  equivalent  funds  to  parents  who 
wish  to  send  their  children  to  religious  schools?    Does  it 
mean  that  school  districts  that  give  vouchers  for  use  at
charter schools must pay equivalent funds to parents who 
wish  to  give  their  children  a  religious  education?  What 
other social benefits are there the State’s provision of which
means—under the majority’s interpretation of the Free Ex-
ercise Clause—that the State must pay parents for the re-
ligious equivalent of the secular benefit provided?  The con-
cept of “play in the joints” means that courts need not, and
should  not,  answer  with  “must”  these  questions  that  can
more appropriately be answered with “may.”

The majority also asserts that “[t]he ‘unremarkable’ prin-
ciples applied in Trinity Lutheran and Espinoza suffice to 
resolve  this  case.”  Ante,  at  9.  Not  so.  The  state-funded 
program at issue in Trinity Lutheran provided payment for