Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/17pdf/16-1140_5368.pdf
Page Number: 14.0

10 

NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF FAMILY AND 
LIFE ADVOCATES v. BECERRA
 
Opinion of the Court 

2 
In  addition  to  disclosure  requirements  under  Zauderer, 
this  Court  has  upheld  regulations  of  professional  conduct 
that incidentally burden speech.  “[T]he First Amendment
does  not  prevent  restrictions  directed  at  commerce  or
conduct  from  imposing  incidental  burdens  on  speech,” 
Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U. S. 552, 567 (2011), and 
professionals  are  no  exception  to  this  rule,  see  Ohralik, 
supra,  at  456.    Longstanding  torts  for  professional  mal-
practice,  for  example,  “fall  within  the  traditional  purview 
of  state  regulation  of  professional  conduct.”    NAACP  v. 
Button,  371  U. S.  415,  438  (1963);  but  cf.  id.,  at  439  (“[A]
State may not, under the guise of prohibiting professional 
misconduct, ignore constitutional rights”).  While drawing
the line between speech and conduct can be  difficult, this 
Court’s  precedents  have  long  drawn  it,  see,  e.g.,  Sorrell, 
supra,  at  567;  Giboney  v.  Empire  Storage  &  Ice  Co.,  336 
U. S. 490, 502 (1949), and the line is “ ‘long familiar to the 
bar,’ ”  United  States  v.  Stevens,  559  U. S.  460,  468  (2010) 
(quoting Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N. Y State 
Crime  Victims  Bd.,  502  U. S.  105,  127  (1991)  (KENNEDY, 
J., concurring in judgment)). 

In Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, for 
example,  this  Court  upheld  a  law  requiring  physicians  to
obtain  informed  consent  before  they  could  perform  an
abortion.  505  U. S.,  at  884  (joint  opinion  of  O’Connor, 
KENNEDY,  and  Souter,  JJ.).  Pennsylvania  law  required
physicians  to  inform  their  patients  of  “the  nature  of  the 
procedure, the health risks of the abortion and childbirth, 
and  the  ‘probable  gestational  age  of  the  unborn  child.’ ”  
Id.,  at  881.    The  law  also  required  physicians  to  inform
patients  of  the  availability  of  printed  materials  from  the
State,  which  provided  information  about  the  child  and 
various forms of assistance.  Ibid. 

The  joint  opinion  in  Casey  rejected  a  free-speech  chal-
lenge to this informed-consent requirement.  Id., at 884.  It