Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/22pdf/22-138_43j7.pdf
Page Number: 28

Cite as:  600 U. S. ____ (2023) 

11 

SOTOMAYOR, J., concurring
Opinion of SOTOMAYOR, J. 

and dissenting in part).  There was a constitutional need for 
a  distinction  between  cross  burning  “ ‘intended  to  intimi-
date’ ”  and  cross  burning  as  “ ‘a  statement  of  ideology.’ ”  
Ibid.  The plurality and Justice Scalia only parted ways as
to  whether  to  hold  that  the  statute  was  “facially  invalid,” 
id., at 367 (plurality opinion), or just that the jury instruc-
tions  made  it  unclear  “whether  the  jury  has  rendered  its 
verdict (as it must)” with sufficient consideration of “intent 
to intimidate,” id., at 380 (opinion of Scalia, J.) (emphasis 
added).

The  through-line  is  not  hard  to  discern.    First,  unpro-
tected  true  threats  include  a  subjective mens  rea  require-
ment.  Id., at 360 (majority opinion).  Second, as a result, 
“Virginia’s statute does not run afoul of the First Amend-
ment insofar as it bans cross burning with intent to intimi-
date.”  Id.,  at  362  (majority  opinion).  Third,  a  conviction 
could not stand if it had categorically dispensed with that
intent requirement, id., at 365–366 (plurality opinion), or if 
the jury had insufficiently considered “intent to intimidate,” 
id., at 380 (opinion of Scalia, J.).

In sum, all five Justices in the Black majority agreed that
a true-threats prosecution could not stand under the First
Amendment  without  a  sufficient  subjective  mens  rea  re-
quirement.5 

—————— 

5 According  to  the  Court  today  and  the  lead  dissent,  however,  Black 
somehow managed not to say anything about the First Amendment mens 
rea  requirement  for  true-threats  prosecutions—while  striking  down  a
true-threat  conviction  under  the  First  Amendment  for  an  insufficient 
mens rea requirement.  On this reading, Black only discussed intent be-
cause  “the  statute  involved  in  the  case  required  a  showing  of  intent.” 
Ante, at 6, n. 3; post, at 9, n. 4 (discussion of intent was “a reference to 
the  statutory  requirements  for  a  conviction,  not  the  constitutional  re-
quirements”).  This puzzling interpretation does not explain why an illu-
sory  mens  rea  requirement  in  a  Virginia  law  would  pose  any  First
Amendment problems if the Amendment did not impose a mens rea re-
quirement  of  this  kind.  After  all,  “[w]hy  would  the  First  Amendment 
care how a jury goes about finding an [intent] element that is a matter