Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/558bv.pdf
Page Number: 617

456  CITIZENS  UNITED  v.  FEDERAL  ELECTION  COMM’N 

Opinion of Stevens, J. 

In  her  analysis  of  the  record,  Judge  Kollar-Kotelly  docu­
mented  the  pervasiveness  of  this  ingratiation  and  explained 
its  signiﬁcance  under  the  majority’s  own  touchstone  for  de­
ﬁning  the  scope  of  the  anticorruption  rationale,  Buckley. 
See McConnell, 251 F. Supp. 2d, at 555–560, 622–625.  Wit­
nesses  explained  how  political  parties  and  candidates  used 
corporate  independent  expenditures  to  circumvent  FECA’s 
“hard-money”  limitations.  See,  e. g.,  id.,  at  478–479.  One 
former Senator candidly admitted to the District Court that 
“ ‘[c]andidates  whose  campaigns  beneﬁt  from  [phony  “issue 
ads”]  greatly  appreciate  the  help  of  these  groups.  In  fact, 
Members will also be favorably disposed to those who ﬁnance 
these groups when they later seek access to discuss pending 
legislation.’ ”  Id.,  at  556  (quoting  declaration  of  Sen.  Dale 
Bumpers).  One  prominent  lobbyist  went  so  far  as  to  state, 
in  uncontroverted  testimony,  that  “ ‘unregulated  expendi­
tures—whether soft money donations to the parties or issue 
ad  campaigns—can  sometimes  generate  far  more  inﬂuence 
than  direct  campaign  contributions.’ ”  Ibid.  (quoting  decla­
ration of Wright Andrews; emphasis added).  In sum, Judge 
Kollar-Kotelly  found,  “[t]he  record  powerfully  demonstrates 
that electioneering communications paid for with the general 
treasury  funds  of  labor  unions  and  corporations  endears 
those entities  to elected ofﬁcials  in a  way that could  be per­
ceived  by  the  public  as  corrupting.”  Id.,  at  622–623.  She 
concluded  that  the  Government’s  interest  in  preventing  the 
appearance  of  corruption,  as  that  concept  was  deﬁned  in 
Buckley,  was  itself  sufﬁcient  to  uphold  BCRA  § 203.  251 
F.  Supp.  2d,  at  622–625.  Judge  Leon  agreed.  See  id.,  at 
804–805  (dissenting  only  with  respect  to  the  Wellstone 
Amendment’s coverage of MCFL corporations). 

When  the  McConnell  Court  afﬁrmed the  judgment  of  the 
District  Court  regarding  § 203,  we  did  not  rest  our  holding 
on a narrow notion of quid pro quo corruption.  Instead we 
relied on the governmental interest in combating the unique 
forms  of  corruption  threatened  by  corporations,  as  recog­