Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/20pdf/19-1434_ancf.pdf
Page Number: 16.0

12 

UNITED STATES v. ARTHREX, INC. 

Opinion of the Court 

Brief for United States 6–7, 31–32.  The Government insists 
that  the  Director,  by  handpicking  (and,  if  necessary,  re-
picking)  Board  members,  can  indirectly  influence  the 
course of inter partes review. 

That is not the solution.  It is the problem.  The Govern-
ment  proposes  (and  the  dissents  embrace)  a  roadmap  for 
the  Director  to  evade  a  statutory  prohibition  on  review
without having him take responsibility for the ultimate de-
cision.  See post, at 2–3 (BREYER, J., concurring in judgment 
in  part  and  dissenting  in  part);  post,  at  8–10  (opinion  of 
THOMAS, J.).  Even if the Director succeeds in procuring his
preferred outcome, such machinations blur the lines of ac-
countability demanded by the Appointments Clause.  The 
parties  are  left  with  neither  an  impartial  decision  by  a 
panel of experts nor a transparent decision for which a po-
litically accountable officer must take responsibility.  And 
the public can only wonder “on whom the blame or the pun-
ishment  of  a  pernicious  measure,  or  series  of  pernicious
measures  ought  really  to  fall.”    The  Federalist  No.  70,  at 
476 (A. Hamilton).

The Government contends that the Director may respond
after the fact by removing an APJ “from his judicial assign-
ment without cause” and refusing to designate that APJ on 
future PTAB panels.  Edmond, 520 U. S., at 664.  Even as-
suming that is true, reassigning an APJ to a different task
going forward gives the Director no means of countermand-
ing the final decision already on the books.  Nor are APJs 
“meaningfully controlled” by the threat of removal from fed-
eral service entirely, Seila Law, 591 U. S., at ___ (slip op., 
at 23), because the Secretary can fire them after a decision
only  “for  such  cause  as  will  promote  the  efficiency  of  the 
service,” 5 U. S. C. §7513(a).  In all the ways that matter to
the  parties  who  appear  before  the  PTAB,  the  buck  stops 
with the APJs, not with the Secretary or Director. 

Review outside Article II—here, an appeal to the Federal 
Circuit—cannot provide the necessary supervision.  While