Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/19pdf/18-587_5ifl.pdf
Page Number: 70

4 

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY v. 
REGENTS OF UNIV. OF CAL. 
Opinion of KAVANAUGH, J. 

DACA, and clarified that even if DACA were lawful, the De-
partment  would  still rescind DACA  for  a  variety  of  policy 
reasons.    The  Nielsen  Memorandum  also  expressly  ad-
dressed  the  reliance  interests  of  DACA  recipients.    The 
question  under  the  APA’s  deferential  arbitrary-and-capri-
cious  standard  is  not  whether  we  agree  with  the  Depart-
ment’s decision to rescind DACA.  The question is whether 
the  Nielsen  Memorandum  reasonably  explained  the  deci-
sion  to  rescind  DACA.    Under  ordinary  application  of  the 
arbitrary-and-capricious  standard,  the  Nielsen  Memoran-
dum—with its alternative and independent rationales and 
its discussion of reliance—would pass muster as an expla-
nation for the Executive Branch’s action. 
  The Nielsen Memorandum was issued nine months after 
the Duke Memorandum.  Under the Administrative Proce-
dure Act, the Nielsen Memorandum is itself a “rule” setting 
forth “an agency statement of general . . . applicability and 
future effect designed to implement . . . policy.”  5 U. S. C. 
§551(4).  Because it is a rule, the Nielsen Memorandum con-
stitutes  “agency  action.”    §551(13).    As  the  Secretary  of 
Homeland Security, Secretary Nielsen had the authority to 
decide  whether  to  stick  with  Secretary  Duke’s  decision  to 
rescind DACA, or to make a different decision.  Like Secre-
tary Duke, Secretary Nielsen chose to rescind DACA, and 
she  provided  additional  explanation.    Her  memorandum 
was akin to common forms of agency action that follow ear-
lier agency action on the same subject—for example, a sup-
plemental or new agency statement of policy, or an agency 
order with respect to a motion for rehearing or reconsider-
ation.  Courts often consider an agency’s additional expla-
nations of policy or additional explanations made, for exam-
ple, on agency rehearing or reconsideration, or on remand 
from a court, even if the agency’s bottom-line decision itself 
does not change. 
  Yet the Court today jettisons the Nielsen Memorandum 
by  classifying  it  as  a  post  hoc  justification  for  rescinding