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4 

VIDAL v. ELSTER 

Opinion of the Court 

enforcing  this  prohibition,  our  precedents  distinguish  be-
tween  content-based  and  content-neutral  regulations  of 
speech.”  National Institute of Family and Life Advocates v. 
Becerra, 585 U. S. 755, 766 (2018).  A content-based regula-
tion “target[s] speech based on its communicative content,”
restricting discussion of a subject matter or topic.  Reed v. 
Town of Gilbert, 576 U. S. 155, 163 (2015).  “As a general
matter,” a content-based regulation is “ ‘presumptively un-
constitutional and may be justified only if the government
proves  that  [it  is]  narrowly  tailored  to  serve  compelling 
state interests.’ ”  National Institute of Family and Life Ad-
vocates, 585 U. S., at 766.  Our precedents distinguish fur-
ther  a  particularly  “egregious  form  of  content  discrimina-
tion”—viewpoint discrimination.  Rosenberger v. Rector and 
Visitors  of  Univ.  of  Va.,  515  U. S.  819,  829  (1995).    A 
viewpoint-based  regulation  targets  not  merely  a  subject
matter, “but particular views taken by speakers on a sub-
ject.”  Ibid.  It is also generally subject to heightened scru-
tiny,  though  viewpoint  discrimination’s  “violation  of  the
First Amendment is . . . more blatant.”  Ibid.  Because our 
precedents  dictate  that  these  distinctions  inform  our  as-
sessment under the First Amendment, we start with them 
to evaluate the names clause. 

In the trademark context, we have twice concluded that 
trademark  restrictions  that  discriminate  based  on  view-
point violate the First Amendment.  In Matal v. Tam, 582 
U. S. 218, 223 (2017), we held that the Lanham Act’s bar on
disparaging trademarks violated the First Amendment.  All 
Justices in Tam agreed that this bar was viewpoint based 
because it prohibited trademarks based only on one view-
point: “[g]iving offense.”  Id., at 243 (plurality opinion); see 
also  id.,  at  248–249  (Kennedy,  J.,  concurring  in  part  and
concurring in judgment).  And, in Brunetti, we held that the 
Lanham  Act’s  bar  on  trademarks  containing  immoral  or 
scandalous matter likewise violated the First Amendment. 
588 U. S., at 390.  We concluded that the bar was viewpoint