Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/23pdf/22-451_7m58.pdf
Page Number: 85

4 

LOPER BRIGHT ENTERPRISES v. RAIMONDO 

KAGAN, J., dissenting 

way to remind judges that wisdom often lies in what prior 
judges have done.  It is a brake on the urge to convert “every 
new judge’s opinion” into a new legal rule or regime.  Dobbs 
v.  Jackson  Women’s  Health  Organization,  597  U. S.  215, 
388  (2022)  (joint  opinion  of  Breyer,  SOTOMAYOR,  and 
KAGAN,  JJ.,  dissenting)  (quoting  1  W.  Blackstone,  Com-
mentaries on the Laws of England 69 (7th ed. 1775)).  Chev-
ron  is  entrenched  precedent,  entitled  to  the  protection  of 
stare decisis, as even the majority acknowledges.  In fact, 
Chevron is entitled to the supercharged version of that doc-
trine because Congress could always overrule the decision,
and because so many governmental and private actors have 
relied  on  it  for  so  long.    Because  that  is  so,  the  majority
needs a “particularly special justification” for its action.  Ki-
sor  v.  Wilkie,  588  U. S.  558,  588  (2019)  (opinion  of  the 
Court).  But the majority has nothing that would qualify.  It 
barely tries to advance the usual factors this Court invokes
for  overruling  precedent.    Its  justification  comes  down,  in 
the  end,  to  this:  Courts  must  have  more  say  over  regula-
tion—over the provision of health care, the protection of the
environment, the safety of consumer products, the efficacy
of transportation systems, and so on.  A longstanding prec-
edent  at  the  crux  of  administrative  governance  thus  falls 
victim to a bald assertion of judicial authority.  The major-
ity disdains restraint, and grasps for power. 

I 
Begin  with  the  problem  that  gave  rise  to  Chevron  (and
also to its older precursors): The regulatory statutes Con-
gress  passes  often  contain  ambiguities  and  gaps.  Some-
times they are intentional.  Perhaps Congress “consciously
desired”  the  administering  agency  to  fill  in  aspects  of  the 
legislative scheme, believing that regulatory experts would
be “in a better position” than legislators to do so.  Chevron, 
467 U. S., at 865.  Or “perhaps Congress was unable to forge
a coalition on either side” of a question, and the contending