Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/19pdf/17-1618_hfci.pdf
Page Number: 70

Cite as:  590 U. S. ____ (2020) 

33 

ALITO, J., dissenting 

duty is to understand what the terms of Title VII were un-
derstood to mean when enacted, and in doing so, we must
take into account the societal norms of that time.  We must 
therefore  ask  whether  ordinary  Americans  in  1964  would
have  thought  that  discrimination because  of “sex”  carried 
some exotic meaning under which private-sector employers 
would be prohibited from engaging in a practice that repre-
sented  the  official  policy  of  the  Federal  Government  with 
respect to its own employees.  We must ask whether Amer-
icans at that time would have thought that Title VII banned 
discrimination against an employee for engaging in conduct 
that  Congress  had  made  a  felony  and  a  ground  for  civil 
commitment. 

The questions answer themselves.  Even if discrimination 
based  on  sexual  orientation  or  gender  identity  could  be
squeezed into some arcane understanding of sex discrimi-
nation,  the  context  in  which  Title  VII  was  enacted  would 
tell us that this is not what the statute’s terms were under-
stood to mean at that time.  To paraphrase something Jus-
tice Scalia once wrote, “our job is not to scavenge the world
of English usage to discover whether there is any possible 
meaning”  of  discrimination  because  of  sex  that  might  be 
broad enough to encompass discrimination because of sex-
ual orientation or gender identity.  Chisom v. Roemer, 501 
U. S. 380, 410 (1991) (dissenting opinion).  Without strong
evidence to the contrary (and there is none here), our job is
to ascertain and apply the “ordinary meaning” of the stat-
ute.  Ibid.  And in 1964, ordinary Americans most certainly 
would not have understood Title VII to ban discrimination 
because of sexual orientation or gender identity. 

The  Court  makes  a  tiny  effort  to  suggest  that  at  least
some people in 1964 might have seen what Title VII really 
means.  Ante, at 26.  What evidence does it adduce?  One 
complaint  filed  in  1969,  another  filed  in  1974,  and  argu-
ments  made  in  the  mid-1970s  about  the  meaning  of  the
Equal  Rights  Amendment.    Ibid.  To  call  this  evidence