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Page Number: 97.0

30 

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA v. HELLER 

STEVENS, J., dissenting 

not  establish  a  general  right  of  all  persons,  or  even  of  all 
Protestants,  to  possess  weapons.  Rather,  the  right  was
qualified  in  two  distinct  ways:  First,  it  was  restricted  to
those of adequate social and economic status (“suitable to
their  Condition”);  second,  it  was  only  available  subject  to
regulation by Parliament (“as allowed by Law”).31 

The  Court  may  well  be  correct  that  the  English  Bill  of 
Rights protected the right of some English subjects to use 
some  arms  for  personal  self-defense  free  from  restrictions 
by  the  Crown  (but  not  Parliament).    But  that  right—
adopted  in  a  different  historical  and  political  context  and 
framed  in  markedly  different  language—tells  us  little
about the meaning of the Second Amendment. 

Blackstone’s Commentaries 

The  Court’s  reliance  on  Blackstone’s  Commentaries  on 
the Laws of England is unpersuasive for the same reason
as its reliance on the English Bill of Rights.  Blackstone’s 
invocation  of  “ ‘the  natural  right  of  resistance  and  self-
preservation,’ ”  ante,  at  20,  and  “ ‘the  right  of  having  and 
using  arms  for  self-preservation  and  defence’ ”  ibid.,  re­
ferred  specifically  to  Article  VII  in  the  English  Bill  of 
Rights.  The excerpt from Blackstone offered by the Court, 
therefore, is, like Article VII itself, of limited use in inter­
preting  the  very  differently  worded,  and  differently  his­
torically situated, Second Amendment.
  What  is  important  about  Blackstone  is  the  instruction
he  provided  on  reading  the  sort  of  text  before  us  today.
Blackstone  described  an  interpretive  approach  that  gave
far  more  weight  to  preambles  than  the  Court  allows. 

—————— 

31 Moreover, it was the Crown, not Parliament, that was bound by the
English  provision;  indeed,  according  to  some  prominent  historians,
Article VII is best understood not as announcing any individual right to
unregulated  firearm  ownership  (after  all,  such  a  reading  would  fly  in 
the face of the text), but as an assertion of the concept of parliamentary 
supremacy.  See Brief for Jack N. Rakove et al. as Amici Curiae 6–9.