Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/23pdf/22-915_8o6b.pdf
Page Number: 73.0

2 

UNITED STATES v. RAHIMI 

THOMAS, J., dissenting 

subject to the order from possessing “any firearm or ammu-
nition.”  §922(g). 

Just as important as §922(g)(8)’s express terms is what it
leaves unsaid.  Section 922(g)(8) does not require a finding 
that a person has ever committed a crime of domestic vio-
lence.  It is not triggered by a criminal conviction or a per-
son’s  criminal  history,  unlike  other  §922(g)  subsections.
See  §§922(g)(1),  (9).  And,  §922(g)(8)  does  not  distinguish
contested orders from joint orders—for example, when par-
ties voluntarily enter a no-contact agreement or when both
parties seek a restraining order.

In addition, §922(g)(8) strips an individual of his ability 
to possess firearms and ammunition without any due pro-
cess.1  Rather, the ban is an automatic, uncontestable con-
sequence of certain orders.  See §922(g) (“It shall be unlaw-
ful  for  any  [qualifying]  person  [to]  possess  in  or  affecting 
commerce, any firearm or ammunition”).  There is no hear-
ing or opportunity to be heard on the statute’s applicability, 
and a court need not decide whether a person should be dis-
armed  under  §922(g)(8).  The  only  process  §922(g)(8)  re-
quires is that provided (or not) for the underlying restrain-
ing order.

Despite  §922(g)(8)’s  broad  scope  and  lack  of  process,  it 
carries strong penalties.  Any violation of §922(g)(8) is a fel-
imprisonment.
ony  punishable  by  up  to  15  years’ 
§924(a)(8); see also ante, at 3.  And, a conviction for violat-
ing §922(g)(8) itself triggers a permanent, life-long prohibi-
tion  on  possessing  firearms  and  ammunition. 
See 
§922(g)(1).

In 2020, Zackey Rahimi and his ex-girlfriend, C. M., en-
tered into a qualifying civil restraining order.  App. 1.  C. M. 
had  requested  the  order  and  asserted  that  Rahimi  as-
saulted  her.   See  id.,  at  2.  Because  the  order  found  that 

—————— 

1 Rahimi  does  not  ask  the  Court  to  consider,  and  I  do  not  address, 

whether §922(g)(8) satisfies the Due Process Clause.