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Page Number: 14.0

10 

PATEL v. GARLAND 

Opinion of the Court 

for purposes of subparagraph (D).  Id., at ___–___ (slip op., 
at 3–4).  In holding that it does, we explained that subpar-
agraph  (D)  “will  still  forbid  appeals  of  factual  determina-
tions” themselves under subparagraph (C).  Id., at ___–___ 
(slip op., at 12–13).  Had we thought otherwise, we would 
simply  have  said  that  questions  of  fact,  like  questions  of 
law, are reviewable—end of story. 
  Nasrallah v. Barr, 590 U. S. ___ (2020), addresses Patel’s 
situation even more directly.  There, we held that a court 
has  jurisdiction  to  review  a  factual  challenge  to  an  order 
denying  relief  under  the  Convention  Against  Torture,  be-
cause that order falls outside of subparagraph (C)’s prohi-
bition  on  reviewing  final  orders  of  removal.    In  reaching 
that  conclusion,  we  emphasized  that  our  decision  would 
have “no effect” on those orders that do fall within a juris-
diction-stripping provision—including “orders denying dis-
cretionary relief ” under §1252(a)(2)(B).  Id., at ___ (slip op., 
at 12).  And so, we explained, a noncitizen “may not bring a 
factual challenge to orders denying discretionary relief, in-
cluding . . . adjustment of status.”  Ibid.  We adhere to that 
view today. 

B 
  In  contrast  to  amicus’  straightforward  interpretation, 
both  the  Government’s  and  Patel’s  arguments  read  like 
elaborate efforts to avoid the most natural meaning of the 
text. 

1 
  We  begin  with  the  Government’s  argument  that  “judg-
ment” refers exclusively to a “discretionary” decision, which 
the Government describes as a decision that is “subjective 
or evaluative.”  Brief for Respondent 12.  According to the 
Government, this requirement is evident in definitions like 
this one: “ ‘the mental or intellectual process of forming an 
opinion  or  evaluation  by  discerning  and  comparing,’ ”  or