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Page Number: 26

22 

MATAL v. TAM 

Opinion of the Court 
Opinion of ALITO, J. 

confer  a  substantial  non-cash  benefit  for  the  purpose  of 
furthering  activities  that  they  particularly  desired  to 
promote  but  not  to  provide  a  similar  benefit  for  the  pur-
pose  of  furthering  other  activities.   Thus,  Davenport  and 
Ysursa are no more relevant for present purposes than the 
subsidy cases previously discussed.15 

Potentially more analogous are cases in which a unit of
government  creates  a  limited  public  forum  for  private
speech.  See,  e.g.,  Good  News  Club  v.  Milford  Central 
School,  533  U. S.  98,  106–107  (2001);  Rosenberger  v.  Rec-
tor and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U. S. 819, 831 (1995); 
Lamb’s  Chapel,  508  U. S.,  at  392–393.    See  also  Legal 
Services Corporation v. Velazquez, 531 U. S. 533, 541–544 
(2001).  When government creates such a forum, in either 
a  literal  or  “metaphysical”  sense,  see  Rosenberger,  515 
U. S., at 830, some content- and speaker-based restrictions 
may  be  allowed,  see  id.,  at  830–831.  However,  even  in 
such  cases,  what  we  have  termed  “viewpoint  discrimina-
tion” is forbidden.  Id., at 831.     

Our  cases  use  the  term  “viewpoint”  discrimination  in  a
broad  sense,  see  ibid.,  and  in  that  sense,  the  disparage-
ment clause discriminates on the bases of “viewpoint.”  To 
be sure, the clause evenhandedly prohibits disparagement
of all groups.  It applies equally to marks that damn Dem-
ocrats  and  Republicans,  capitalists  and  socialists,  and
those  arrayed  on  both  sides  of  every  possible  issue.    It 
denies  registration  to  any  mark  that  is  offensive  to  a 
substantial percentage of the members of any group.  But 
in  the  sense  relevant  here,  that  is  viewpoint  discrimina-
tion: Giving offense is a viewpoint.   

We have said time and again that “the public expression 

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15 While these cases resemble subsidy cases insofar as the free speech 
rights  of  unions  and  their  members  are  concerned,  arrangements  like 
those  in  these  cases  also  implicate  the  free  speech  rights  of  non-union 
members.  Our decision here has no bearing on that issue.