Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/21pdf/20-659_3ea4.pdf
Page Number: 17

2 

THOMPSON v. CLARK 

ALITO, J., dissenting 

What the Court has done is to recognize a novel hybrid
claim of uncertain scope that has no basis in the Constitu-
tion and is almost certain to lead to confusion. 

I 
The Court asserts that malicious prosecution is the com-
mon-law tort that is most analogous to petitioner’s Fourth
Amendment claim, ante, at 5, but in fact the Fourth Amend-
ment  and  malicious  prosecution  have  almost  nothing  in 
common. 

A 

The  Fourth  Amendment  prohibits 

“unreasonable 
searches  and  seizures.”  And  a  Fourth  Amendment  claim 
based  on  an  unreasonable  seizure  has  two  indispensable
elements: (i) there must have been a “seizure,” i.e., an arrest 
or some other use of “ ‘physical force’ or a ‘show of authority’ 
that  ‘in  some  way  restrain[s]  the  liberty’  of  [a]  person,” 
Torres v. Madrid, 592 U. S. ___, ___ (2021) (slip op., at 3), 
and (ii) the seizure must have been “unreasonable,” which
means, in the case of a full-blown arrest, that the officers 
making the arrest must have lacked probable cause.  Dis-
trict  of  Columbia  v.  Wesby,  583  U. S.  ___,  ___  (2018)  (slip 
op., at 7).

Malicious prosecution, on the other hand, requires proof 
that “(i) the suit or proceeding was ‘instituted without any
probable cause;’ (ii) the ‘motive in instituting’ the suit ‘was
malicious . . . ; and (iii) the prosecution ‘terminated in the
acquittal or discharge of the accused.’ ”  Ante, at 6 (quoting
T. Cooley, Law of Torts 180 (1880) (Cooley)); see also Ma-
nuel v. Joliet, 580 U. S. 357, 378 (2017) (ALITO, J., dissent-
ing).

A comparison of the elements of the malicious-prosecution
tort with the elements of a Fourth Amendment unreasona-
ble-seizure claim shows that there is no overlap.  That is, a 
plaintiff suing for unreasonable seizure need not prove any