Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/22pdf/22-506_nmip.pdf
Page Number: 42

Cite as:  600 U. S. ____ (2023) 

11 

BARRETT, J., concurring 

to 

(or 

even 

choose 

permission) 

obligation 
an 
inferior-but-tenable alternative that curbs the agency’s au-
thority—and that marks a key difference between my view
and the “clear statement” view of the major questions doc-
trine.  In some cases, the court’s initial skepticism might be
overcome by text directly authorizing the agency action or
context  demonstrating  that  the  agency’s  interpretation  is
convincing.    (And  because  context  can  suffice,  I  disagree 
with  JUSTICE  KAGAN’s  critique  that  “[t]he  doctrine  forces 
Congress to delegate in highly specific terms.”  Post, at 24.)
If so, the court must adopt the agency’s reading despite the 
“majorness” of the question.4  In other cases, however, the 
court might conclude that the agency’s expansive reading,
even if “plausible,” is not the best.  West Virginia, 597 U. S., 
at ___ (slip op., at 19).  In that event, the major questions
doctrine  plays  a  role,  because  it  helps  explain  the  court’s
conclusion that the agency overreached. 

Consider Brown & Williamson, in which we rejected the 
Food  and  Drug  Administration’s  (FDA’s)  determination 
that tobacco products were within its regulatory purview.
529  U. S.,  at  131.    The  agency’s  assertion  of  authority—
which depended on the argument that nicotine is a “ ‘drug’ ” 
and that cigarettes and smokeless tobacco are “ ‘drug deliv-
ery  devices’ ”—would  have  been  plausible  if  the  relevant 
statutory text were read in a vacuum.  Ibid.  But a vacuum 
is no home for a textualist.  Instead, we stressed that the 
“meaning”  of  a  word  or  phrase  “may  only  become  evident 
when placed in context.”  Id., at 132 (emphasis added).  And 
the  critical  context  in  Brown  &  Williamson  was  tobacco’s 

—————— 

4 I am dealing only with statutory interpretation, not the separate ar-
gument  that  a  statutory  delegation  exceeds  constitutional  limits.    See 
Whitman  v.  American  Trucking  Assns.,  Inc.,  531  U. S.  457,  474  (2001)
(describing a delegation held unconstitutional because it “conferred au-
thority  to  regulate  the  entire  economy  on  the  basis  of ”  an  imprecise 
standard).