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Page Number: 25

20 

TRUMP v. VANCE 

Opinion of the Court 

permitted by state law, which usually include bad faith and
undue burden or breadth.  See, e.g., Virag, 54 N. Y. 2d, at 
442–445, 430 N. E. 2d, at 1252–1253; In re Grand Jury Sub-
poenas, 72 N. Y. 2d 307, 315–316, 528 N. E. 2d 1195, 1200 
(1988) (recognizing that grand jury subpoenas can be chal-
lenged  as  “overly  broad”  or  “unreasonably  burdensome” 
(internal  quotation  marks  omitted)).  And,  as  in  federal 
court,  “[t]he  high  respect  that  is  owed  to  the  office  of  the 
Chief Executive . . . should inform the conduct of the entire 
proceeding,  including  the  timing  and  scope  of  discovery.” 
Clinton, 520 U. S., at 707.  See id., at 724 (BREYER, J., con-
curring in judgment) (stressing the need for courts presid-
ing over suits against the President to “schedule proceed-
ings  so  as  to  avoid  significant  interference  with  the
President’s  ongoing  discharge  of  his  official  responsibili-
ties”); Nixon, 418 U. S., at 702 (“[W]here a subpoena is di-
rected to a President . . . appellate review . . . should be par-
ticularly meticulous.”). 

Furthermore, although the Constitution does not entitle 
the Executive to absolute immunity or a heightened stand-
ard, he is not “relegate[d]” only to the challenges available 
to  private  citizens.    Post,  at  17  (opinion  of  ALITO,  J.).  A 
President  can  raise  subpoena-specific  constitutional  chal-
lenges,  in  either  a  state  or  federal  forum.    As  previously 
noted, he can challenge the subpoena as an attempt to in-
fluence the performance of his official duties, in violation of 
the Supremacy Clause.  See supra, at 17.  This avenue pro-
tects against local political machinations “interposed as an
obstacle to the effective operation of a federal constitutional 
power.”  United States v. Belmont, 301 U. S. 324, 332 (1937).
In  addition,  the  Executive  can—as  the  district  attorney
concedes—argue  that  compliance  with  a  particular  sub-
poena would impede his constitutional duties.  Brief for Re-
spondent Vance 42.  Incidental to the functions confided in 
Article II is “the power to perform them, without obstruc-