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Cite as: 529 U. S. 848 (2000)

855

Opinion of the Court

United States v. Ryan, 9 F. 3d 660, 675 (CA8 1993) (Arnold,
C. J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).7

The Government urges that the Fort Wayne, Indiana,
residence into which Jones tossed a Molotov cocktail was
constantly “used” in at least three “activit[ies] affecting
commerce.” First, the homeowner “used” the dwelling as
collateral to obtain and secure a mortgage from an Oklahoma
lender; the lender, in turn, “used” the property as security
for the home loan. Second, the homeowner “used” the resi-
dence to obtain a casualty insurance policy from a Wisconsin
insurer. That policy, the Government points out, safe-
guarded the interests of the homeowner and the mortgagee.
Third, the homeowner “used” the dwelling to receive natural
gas from sources outside Indiana. See Brief for United
States 19–23.

The Government correctly observes that § 844(i) excludes
no particular type of building (it covers “any building”); the
provision does, however, require that the building be “used”
in an activity affecting commerce. That qualiﬁcation is most
sensibly read to mean active employment for commercial
purposes, and not merely a passive, passing, or past connec-
tion to commerce. Although “variously deﬁned,” the word
“use,” in legislation as in conversation, ordinarily signiﬁes
“active employment.” Bailey v. United States, 516 U. S.
137, 143, 145 (1995); see also Asgrow Seed Co. v. Winterboer,
513 U. S. 179, 187 (1995) (“When terms used in a statute are
undeﬁned, we give them their ordinary meaning.”).

7 In Ryan, Chief Judge Arnold dissented from a panel decision holding
that the arson of a permanently closed ﬁtness center fell within § 844(i)’s
prohibition. The panel majority considered adequate either of two inter-
state commerce connections: the building was owned and leased by out-of-
state parties, and received natural gas from across state borders. The
panel added, however, that it would not extend the decision “to property
which is purely private in nature, such as a privately owned home, used
solely for residential purposes.”
9 F. 3d, at 666–667. Sitting en banc,
the Eighth Circuit afﬁrmed the panel’s judgment. See United States v.
Ryan, 41 F. 3d 361 (1994), cert. denied, 514 U. S. 1082 (1995).