Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/21pdf/20-1410_1an2.pdf
Page Number: 27

Cite as:  597 U. S. ____ (2022) 

7 

ALITO, J., concurring
ALITO, J., concurring in judgment 

affirmative  defense  that  excuses  or  justifies  conduct  that
otherwise would fall within §841(a)(1)’s general prohibition. 
The mens rea canon does not speak to the constituents of
that defense. 

B 
While the Court does not claim that the “[e]xcept as au-
thorized” proviso is an element of a §841(a)(1) offense, the 
Court  argues  that  the  proviso  is  “sufficiently  like  an  ele-
ment in respect to the matter at issue here” for the mens 
rea  canon  to  apply,  ante,  at  12.  The  Court  provides  four
reasons for this conclusion: “[T]he language of §841 (which
explicitly includes a ‘knowingly or intentionally’ provision); 
the crucial role authorization (or lack thereof ) plays in dis-
tinguishing  morally  blameworthy  conduct  from  socially
necessary conduct; the serious nature of the crime and its 
penalties;  and  the  vague,  highly  general  language  of  the 
regulation  defining  the  bounds  of  prescribing  authority.” 
Ibid.  Not one of these reasons withstands scrutiny. 

“[T]he language of §841.”  The Court notes that this pro-
vision expressly sets out a mens rea that applies to the ele-
ments  of  the  offense,  ante,  at  13, but  the  vast  majority  of 
criminal statutes share this characteristic.  Therefore, this 
feature does not set §841 apart. 

“[T]he crucial role authorization (or lack thereof ) plays in 
distinguishing morally blameworthy conduct from socially 
necessary  conduct.”  The  Court  claims  that  authorization 
separates out morally  blameworthy innocent  conduct; but 
something very similar may be said about most, if not all,
affirmative defenses.  Take the common-law defense of du-
ress.  Duress  “excuse[s]  criminal  conduct  where  the  actor
was under an unlawful threat of imminent death or serious 
bodily injury” and the “threat caused the actor to engage in 
conduct  violating  the  literal  terms  of  the  criminal  law.” 
United  States  v.  Bailey,  444  U. S.  394,  409  (1980).    But  a