Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/558bv.pdf
Page Number: 414.0

Cite as: 558 U. S. 233 (2010) 

253 

Alito, J., concurring in judgment 

IIRIRA, it did not delegate to the Executive authority to do 
so.  Action on motions to reopen, made discretionary by the 
Attorney  General  only,  therefore  remain  subject  to  judicial 
review. 

*

*

* 

For the reasons stated, the judgment of the United States 
Court  of  Appeals  for  the  Seventh  Circuit  is  reversed,  and 
the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with 
this opinion. 

It is so ordered. 

Justice Alito, concurring in the judgment. 
I  agree  that  the  Court  of  Appeals  had  jurisdiction  to  re­
view the denial of petitioner’s motion to reopen his removal 
proceeding,  but  I  would  decide  this  case  on  narrower 
grounds.  The  controlling  statutory  provision,  8  U. S. C. 
§ 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii),  states  that  “no  court  shall  have  jurisdic­
tion to  review . . .  any . .  .  decision  .  .  .  of  the  Attorney 
General  .  .  .  the  authority  for  which  is  speciﬁed  under  this 
subchapter to be in the discretion of the Attorney General.” 
(Emphasis  added.)  The phrase  “under this  subchapter” re­
fers  to  Subchapter  II  of  Chapter  12  of  Title  8,  8  U. S. C. 
§§ 1151–1381,  see  ante,  at  239,  n.  3,  and,  as  the  Court  notes, 
no provision of Subchapter II confers discretionary authority 
on  the  Attorney  General  to  decide  motions  to  reopen,  see 
ante, at  242–243, 249–250.  The Court  of Appeals, however, 
held  that  the  Attorney  General’s  decision  in  this  case  was 
unreviewable because a regulation, 8 CFR § 1003.2(a) (2009), 
made that decision discretionary. 

If  this  regulation  had  been  promulgated  pursuant  to  au­
thority conferred by a provision of Subchapter II, we would 
have  to  confront  the  question  that  the  opinion  of  the  Court 
addresses.  But  it  seems  clear  that  § 1003.2,  at  least  insofar 
as  it  gave  the  Attorney  General  the  discretionary  authority 
that he exercised in this case, is grounded on authority con­
ferred under Subchapter I of Chapter 12 of Title 8, 8 U. S. C.