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Page Number: 10

6 

KNOX v. SERVICE EMPLOYEES 

Opinion of the Court 

typical  spending  regime  and  to  focus  on  activities  that 
were political or ideological in nature.”  Id., at *8.  In light
of  this  fact,  the  court  held  that  it  would  be  inappropriate 
for  the  union  to  rely  on  previous  annual  expenditures  to 
estimate  that  56.35%  of  the  new  fee  would  go  toward 
chargeable expenses.  The court ordered the SEIU to send 
out a new notice giving all class members 45 days to object
and  to  provide  those  who  objected  with  a  full  refund  of 
their  contributions  to  the  Political  Fight-Back  Fund.    Id., 
at *12. 

A  divided  panel  of  the  Ninth  Circuit  reversed.    Knox 
v.  California  State  Employees  Assn.,  Local  1000,  628  F. 
3d 1115 (2010).  According to the panel majority, Hudson 
prescribed the use of a balancing test.  628 F. 3d, at 1119– 
1120.  The majority therefore inquired whether the proce-
dure  that  the  SEIU  employed  reasonably  accommodated
the  interests  of  the  union,  the  employer,  and  nonmember 
employees.  Id.,  at  1120–1123.    Judge  Wallace  dissented, 
arguing that the majority had misinterpreted Hudson and 
sanctioned the abridgment of the First Amendment rights
of nonmembers.  628 F. 3d, at 1123–1139. 

We granted certiorari.  564 U. S. ___ (2011). 

II 

The  SEIU  argues  that  we  should  dismiss  this  case  as 
moot.  In  opposing  the  petition  for  certiorari,  the  SEIU
defended the decision below on the merits.  After certiorari 
was granted, however, the union sent out a notice offering
a  full  refund  to  all  class  members,  and  the  union  then 
promptly moved for dismissal of the case on the ground of 
mootness.  Such  postcertiorari  maneuvers  designed  to
insulate  a  decision  from  review  by  this  Court  must  be
viewed with a critical eye.  See City News & Novelty, Inc. 
v.  Waukesha,  531  U. S.  278,  283–284  (2001).    The  vol-
untary  cessation  of  challenged  conduct  does  not  ordinar- 
ily  render  a  case  moot  because  a  dismissal  for  mootness