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529US3

Unit: $U61

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Cite as: 529 U. S. 848 (2000)

849

Syllabus

passing, or past connection to commerce. See, e. g., Bailey v. United
It surely is not the common perception
States, 516 U. S. 137, 143, 145.
that a private, owner-occupied residence is “used” in the “activity” of
receiving natural gas, a mortgage, or an insurance policy. Cf. id., at
145. The Government does not allege that the residence here served
as a home ofﬁce or the locus of any commercial undertaking. The
home’s only “active employment,” so far as the record reveals, was for
the everyday living of Jones’s cousin and his family. Russell v. United
States, 471 U. S. 858, 862—in which the Court held that particular prop-
erty was being used in an “activity affecting commerce” under § 844(i)
because its owner was renting it to tenants at the time he attempted to
destroy it by ﬁre—does not warrant a less “use”-centered reading of
§ 844(i) in this case. The Court there observed that “[b]y its terms,”
§ 844(i) applies only to “property that is ‘used’ in an ‘activity’ that affects
commerce,” and ruled that “the rental of real estate” ﬁts that descrip-
tion, ibid. Here, the homeowner did not use his residence in any trade
or business. Were the Court to adopt the Government’s expansive in-
terpretation, hardly a building in the land would fall outside § 844(i)’s
domain, and the statute’s limiting language, “used in,” would have
Judges should hesitate to treat statutory terms in any set-
no ofﬁce.
ting as surplusage, particularly when the words describe an element
of a crime. E. g., Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U. S. 135, 140–141.
Pp. 852–857.

(b) The foregoing reading is in harmony with the guiding principle
that where a statute is susceptible of two constructions, by one of which
grave and doubtful constitutional questions arise and by the other of
which such questions are avoided, the Court’s duty is to adopt the latter.
See, e. g., Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Building &
Constr. Trades Council, 485 U. S. 568, 575.
In holding that a statute
making it a federal crime to possess a ﬁrearm within 1,000 feet of a
school exceeded Congress’ power to regulate commerce, this Court, in
United States v. Lopez, 514 U. S. 549, stressed that the area was one of
traditional state concern, see, e. g., id., at 561, n. 3, and that the legis-
lation aimed at activity in which neither the actors nor their conduct
had a commercial character, e. g., id., at 560–562. Given the concerns
brought to the fore in Lopez, it is appropriate to avoid the constitutional
question that would arise were the Court to read § 844(i) to render the
traditionally local criminal conduct in which Jones engaged a matter for
federal enforcement. United States v. Bass, 404 U. S. 336, 350. The
Court’s comprehension of § 844(i) is additionally reinforced by other in-
terpretive guides. Ambiguity concerning the ambit of criminal stat-
utes should be resolved in favor of lenity, Rewis v. United States, 401
U. S. 808, 812, and when choice must be made between two readings of