Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/20pdf/19-1434_ancf.pdf
Page Number: 23.0

Cite as:  594 U. S. ____ (2021) 

19 

Opinion of the Court 
Opinion of ROBERTS, C. J. 

during  inter  partes  review  is  incompatible  with  their  ap-
pointment by the Secretary to an inferior office.  The prin-
cipal dissent repeatedly charges that we never say whether 
APJs are principal officers who were not appointed in the 
manner  required  by  the  Appointments  Clause,  or  instead 
inferior officers exceeding the permissible scope of their du-
ties  under  that  Clause.  See  post,  at  3,  11,  16  (opinion  of 
THOMAS, J.).  But both formulations describe the same con-
stitutional violation: Only an officer properly appointed to 
a principal office may issue a final decision binding the Ex-
ecutive Branch in the proceeding before us.

In  reaching  this  conclusion,  we  do  not  attempt  to  “set
forth an exclusive criterion for distinguishing between prin-
cipal  and  inferior  officers  for  Appointments  Clause  pur-
poses.”  Edmond, 520 U. S., at 661.  Many decisions by in-
ferior officers do not bind the Executive Branch to exercise 
executive power in a particular manner, and we do not ad-
dress  supervision  outside  the  context  of  adjudication.  Cf. 
post, at 13–14 (opinion of THOMAS, J.).  Here, however, Con-
gress has assigned APJs “significant authority” in adjudi-
cating the public rights of private parties, while also insu-
lating  their  decisions  from  review  and  their  offices  from 
removal.  Buckley, 424 U. S., at 126. 

III 
We turn now to the appropriate way to resolve this dis-
pute  given  this  violation  of  the  Appointments  Clause.    In 
general, “when confronting a constitutional flaw in a stat-
ute,  we  try  to  limit  the  solution  to  the  problem”  by  disre-
garding  the  “problematic  portions  while  leaving  the  re-
mainder intact.”  Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of Northern 
New  Eng.,  546  U. S.  320,  328–329  (2006).    This  approach
derives  from  the  Judiciary’s  “negative  power  to  disregard
an unconstitutional enactment” in resolving a legal dispute. 
Massachusetts  v.  Mellon,  262  U. S.  447,  488  (1923).    In  a 
case that presents a conflict between the Constitution and