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Page Number: 2.0

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KANSAS v. GLOVER 

Syllabus 

to  justify  the  officer’s  inference,  empirical  studies  demonstrate  that 
drivers  with  suspended  or  revoked  licenses  frequently  continue  to 
drive.  And  Kansas’  license-revocation  scheme,  which  covers  drivers 
who have already demonstrated a disregard for the law or are categor-
ically unfit to drive, reinforces the reasonableness of the inference that 
an individual with a revoked license will continue to drive.  Pp. 4–6. 

(c) Glover’s counterarguments are unpersuasive.  He argues that the 
deputy’s inference was unreasonable because it was not grounded in 
his law enforcement training or experience.  Such a requirement, how-
ever,  is  inconsistent  with  this  Court’s  Fourth  Amendment  jurispru-
dence.  See, e.g., Navarette, 572 U. S., at 402.  It would also place the 
burden  on  police  officers  to  justify  their  inferences  by  referring  to 
training materials or experience, and it would foreclose their ability to
rely on common sense obtained outside of their work duties.  Glover’s 
argument that Kansas’ view would permit officers to base reasonable 
suspicion exclusively on probabilities also carries little force.  Officers, 
like jurors, may rely on probabilities in the reasonable suspicion con-
text.  See, e.g., United States v. Sokolow, 490 U. S. 1, 8–9.  Moreover, 
the deputy here did more than that: He combined facts obtained from
a database and commonsense judgments to form a reasonable suspi-
cion that a specific individual was potentially engaged in specific crim-
inal activity.  Pp. 6–8.

(d) The  scope  of  this  holding  is  narrow.  The  reasonable  suspicion 
standard  “ ‘takes  into  account  the  totality  of  the  circumstances.’ ”  
Navarette, 572 U. S., at 397.  The presence of additional facts might 
dispel reasonable suspicion, but here, the deputy possessed no infor-
mation  sufficient  to  rebut  the  reasonable  inference  that  Glover  was 
driving his own truck.  P. 9. 

308 Kan. 590, 422 P. 3d 64, reversed and remanded. 

THOMAS, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C. J., 
and  GINSBURG, BREYER, ALITO, KAGAN, GORSUCH, and  KAVANAUGH, JJ., 
joined.  KAGAN, J., filed  a  concurring  opinion,  in  which  GINSBURG, J., 
joined.  SOTOMAYOR, J., filed a dissenting opinion.