Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/10pdf/10-10.pdf
Page Number: 13

Cite as:  564 U. S. ____ (2011) 

9 

Opinion of the Court 

Jones,  445  U. S.  480,  496–497  (1980),  a  plurality  of  four 
Members  of  this  Court  would  have  held  that  the  Four-
teenth  Amendment  requires  representation  by  counsel  in
a proceeding to transfer a prison inmate to a state hospital
for the mentally ill.  Further, in Lassiter v. Department of 
Social  Servs.  of  Durham  Cty.,  452  U. S.  18  (1981),  a  case
that  focused  upon  civil  proceedings  leading  to  loss  of  pa-
rental rights, the Court wrote that the 

“pre-eminent  generalization  that  emerges  from  this
Court’s precedents on an indigent’s right to appointed
counsel is that such a right has been recognized to ex-
ist  only  where  the  litigant  may  lose  his  physical  lib-
erty if he loses the litigation.”  Id., at 25. 

And the Court then drew from these precedents “the pre-
sumption that an indigent litigant has a right to appointed 
counsel  only  when,  if  he  loses,  he  may  be  deprived  of  his
physical liberty.”  Id., at 26–27. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  Court  has  held  that  a  criminal 
offender  facing  revocation  of  probation  and  imprisonment 
does not  ordinarily have a right to counsel at a probation 
revocation  hearing.  Gagnon  v.  Scarpelli,  411  U. S.  778 
(1973);  see also  Middendorf  v.  Henry,  425  U. S.  25  (1976) 
(no due process right to counsel in summary court-martial
proceedings).  And,  at  the  same  time,  Gault,  Vitek,  and 
Lassiter  are  readily  distinguishable.  The  civil  juvenile
delinquency proceeding at issue in Gault was “little differ-
ent”  from,  and  “comparable  in  seriousness”  to,  a  criminal 
prosecution.  387 U. S., at 28, 36.  In Vitek, the controlling 
opinion  found  no  right  to  counsel.    445  U. S.,  at  499–500 
(Powell,  J.,  concurring  in  part)  (assistance  of  mental
health  professionals  sufficient).    And  the  Court’s  state-
ments in Lassiter constitute part of its rationale for deny-
ing  a  right  to  counsel  in  that  case.    We  believe  those 
statements  are  best  read  as  pointing  out  that  the  Court 
previously  had  found  a  right  to  counsel  “only”  in  cases