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Page Number: 36

12 

YSLETA DEL SUR PUEBLO v. TEXAS 

ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting 

“criminal/prohibitory” ought to apply.  101 Stat. 669.  But 
§107(a) also says that both Texas’s “civil and criminal pen-
alties” apply when the Tribe engages in prohibited gaming 
activities.  Id., at 668 (emphasis added).  And §107(a) was 
enacted “in accordance with” the Tribal Resolution, id., at 
668–669, which specifies that the Restoration Act outlaws 
“all gaming, gambling, lottery, or bingo, as defined by the
laws and administrative regulations of the State of Texas,” 
App. to Pet. for Cert. 123 (emphasis added).  These express 
references  to  “civil”  penalties  and  “administrative  regula-
tions” make it unlikely that Congress intended to implicitly 
incorporate only Texas’s gaming laws that are criminal/pro-
hibitory.  To the extent Congress legislated with Cabazon 
Band’s dichotomy in mind, the crosscutting language that
Congress  used  suggests  it  intended  to  incorporate  both
types of laws. 

2 
The foregoing is confirmed by the structure of the Resto-
ration Act and its statutory history.  As noted above, §105(f ) 
incorporates  the  Public  Law  280  framework.   The  Tribe 
does not dispute this.  See Brief for Petitioners 26–27.  Sec-
tion  107(a)  then  provides  a  more  specific  rule  for  gaming 
activities.  This is thus the common case where “[a] specific
provision”—§107(a)—“controls  [over]  one  of  more  general
application.”  Gozlon-Peretz v. United States, 498 U. S. 395, 
407 (1991).

The Tribe disagrees.  It argues that while §105(f ) of the
Restoration  Act  incorporated  Public  Law  280’s  Cabazon 
Band framework, §107(a) did so as well.  See Brief for Peti-
tioners 26–28.  But if §105(f )—and its incorporation of Cab-
azon Band—already applied to gaming activities that were
generally  prohibited  in  Texas,  there  would  have  been  no 
need for Congress to enact the more specific rule of §107(a).
The Tribe’s proffered reading of the statute thus runs head-
long into the canon against surplusage.  See A. Scalia & B.