Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/529bv.pdf
Page Number: 611.0

529US2

Unit: $U52

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536

CARMELL v. TEXAS

Opinion of the Court

States’ argument would run up against a more troubling ob-
stacle, namely, that neither Blackstone nor the state constitu-
tions mention Calder’s third category either (increases in
punishment). The United States, in effect, asks us to aban-
don two of Calder’s categories based on the unsupported
supposition that the Blackstonian and state constitutional
deﬁnitions were exclusive, and upon the implicit premise that
neither Wooddeson, Chase, Story, Kent, nor subsequent
courts (state and federal) realized that was so. We think
that simply stating the nature of the request demonstrates
why it must be rejected.26

Next, the United States contends Justice Chase was mis-
taken to cite the case of Sir John Fenwick as an exam-
ple of an ex post facto law, because it was actually a bill of
attainder. Fenwick was indeed convicted by a bill of at-
tainder, but it does not follow that his case cannot also be
an example of an ex post facto law. Clearly, Wooddeson
thought it was, see 2 Wooddeson 641, as did the House of
Commons, see n. 19, supra, and we are aware of no rule
stating that a single historical event can explain one, but
not two, constitutional Clauses (actually, three Clauses, see
Art. III, § 3 (Treason Clause)). We think the United States’
observation simply underscores the kinship between bills
of attainder and ex post facto laws, see Nixon v. Admin-
istrator of General Services, 433 U. S. 425, 468, n. 30 (1977);
United States v. Lovett, 328 U. S. 303, 323 (1946) (Frank-
furter, J., concurring); see also Z. Chafee, Three Human
Rights in the Constitution of 1787, pp. 92–93 (1956) (herein-

26 Nor does it help much to cite Justice Iredell’s statement that ex post
facto laws include those that “inﬂict a punishment for any act, which was
innocent at the time it was committed; [or] increase the degree of pun-
ishment previously denounced for any speciﬁc offence,” Calder v. Bull,
3 Dall. 386, 400 (1798). The argument still requires us to believe that
Justice Iredell—and only Justice Iredell—got it right, and that all other
authorities (now including Blackstone and the state constitutions) some-
how missed the point.