Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/04pdf/04-278.pdf
Page Number: 14

Cite as:  545 U. S. ____ (2005) 

11 

Opinion of the Court 

intent “to alter the fact that the police were not enforcing 
domestic  abuse  retraining  orders,”  and  thus  its  intent 
“that  the  recipient  of  a  domestic  abuse  restraining  order 
have  an  entitlement  to  its  enforcement.”  366  F. 3d,  at 
1108.  Any  other  result,  it  said,  “would  render  domestic 
abuse restraining orders utterly valueless.”  Id., at 1109. 

This last statement is sheer hyperbole.  Whether or not 
respondent had a right to enforce the restraining order, it 
rendered certain otherwise lawful conduct by her husband 
both  criminal  and  in  contempt  of  court.    See  §§18–6– 
803.5(2)(a), (7).  The creation of grounds on which he could 
be  arrested,  criminally  prosecuted,  and  held  in  contempt 
was  hardly  “valueless”—even  if  the  prospect  of  those 
sanctions  ultimately  failed  to  prevent  him  from  commit-
ting three murders and a suicide.

We do not believe that these provisions of Colorado law 
truly  made  enforcement  of  restraining  orders  mandatory. 
A  well  established  tradition  of  police  discretion  has  long
coexisted with apparently mandatory arrest statutes. 

“In  each  and  every  state  there  are  long-standing 
statutes that, by their terms, seem to preclude nonen-
forcement by the police. . . .  However, for a number of 
reasons,  including  their  legislative  history,  insuffi-
cient  resources,  and  sheer  physical  impossibility,  it 
has  been  recognized  that  such  statutes  cannot  be  in-
terpreted  literally. . . .    [T]hey  clearly  do  not  mean 
that a police officer may not lawfully decline to make 
an arrest.  As to third parties in these states, the full-
enforcement statutes simply have no effect, and their 
significance is further diminished.”  1 ABA Standards 
for Criminal Justice 1–4.5, commentary, pp. 1–124 to 
1–125 (2d ed. 1980) (footnotes omitted). 

—————— 

unless  he  acted  “in  bad  faith  and  with  malice”  or  violated  “rules 
adopted by the Colorado supreme court.”