Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/23pdf/22-842_6kg7.pdf
Page Number: 3.0

Cite as:  602 U. S. ____ (2024) 

3 

Syllabus 

the distinction between permissible attempts to persuade and imper-
missible  attempts  to  coerce.    The  Court  explained  that  the  First
Amendment prohibits government officials from relying on the “threat 
of invoking legal sanctions and other means of coercion . . . to achieve 
the suppression” of disfavored speech.  Id., at 67.  Although the defend-
ant in Bantam Books, a state commission that blacklisted certain pub-
lications,  lacked  the  “power  to  apply  formal  legal  sanctions,”  the  co-
erced  party  “reasonably  understood”  the  commission  to  threaten 
adverse action, and thus its “compliance with the [c]ommission’s direc-
tives was not voluntary.”  Id., at 66–68.  To reach this conclusion, the 
Court considered things like: the commission’s authority; the commis-
sion’s communications; and the coerced party’s reaction to the commu-
nications.  Id.,  at  68.    The  Courts  of  Appeals  have  since  considered 
similar  factors  to  determine  whether  a  challenged  communication  is 
reasonably  understood  to  be  a  coercive  threat.    Ultimately,  Bantam 
Books  stands  for  the  principle  that  a  government  official  cannot  di-
rectly or indirectly coerce a private party to punish or suppress disfa-
vored speech on her behalf.  Pp. 8–11.

(b) To state a claim that the government violated the First Amend-
ment through coercion of a third party, a plaintiff must plausibly allege
conduct that, viewed in context, could be reasonably understood to con-
vey a threat of adverse government action in order to punish or sup-
press speech.  See Bantam Books, 372 U. S., at 67–68.  Here, the NRA 
plausibly alleged that Vullo violated the First Amendment by coercing
DFS-regulated  entities  into  disassociating  with  the  NRA  in  order  to
punish or suppress gun-promotion advocacy.

As  DFS  superintendent,  Vullo  had  direct  regulatory  and  enforce-
ment authority over all insurance companies and financial service in-
stitutions doing business in New York.  She could initiate investiga-
tions, refer cases for prosecution, notice civil charges, and enter into 
consent decrees.  Vullo’s communications with the DFS-regulated en-
tities, particularly with Lloyd’s, must be considered against the back-
drop of Vullo’s authority.  Vullo made clear she wanted Lloyd’s to dis-
associate from all gun groups, although there was no indication that 
such  groups  had  unlawful  insurance  policies  similar  to  the  NRA’s. 
Vullo  also  told  the  Lloyd’s  executives  she  would  “focus”  her  enforce-
ment actions “solely” on the syndicates with ties to the NRA, “and ig-
nore other syndicates writing similar policies.”  App. to Pet. for Cert. 
223, ¶69.  The message was loud and clear: Lloyd’s “could avoid liabil-
ity for [unrelated] infractions” if it “aided DFS’s campaign against gun
groups” by terminating its business relationships with them.  Ibid.  As 
the reaction from Lloyd’s further confirms, Vullo’s alleged communica-
tions—whether seen as a threat or as an inducement—were reasona-
bly understood as coercive.  Other allegations concerning the Guidance