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Page Number: 61.0

10 

MCCUTCHEON v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N 

BREYER, J., dissenting 

record  consisted  of  over  100,000  pages  of  material  and 
included  testimony  from  more  than  200  witnesses.  See 
251 F. Supp. 2d 176, 209 (DC 2003) (per curiam).  What it 
showed,  in  detail,  was  the  web  of  relationships  and  un- 
derstandings among parties, candidates, and large donors
See 
that  underlies  privileged  access  and  influence. 
McConnell, 540 U. S., at 146–152, 154–157, 167–171, 182– 
184.  The  District  Judges  in  McConnell  made  clear  that 
the record did “not contain any evidence of bribery or vote
buying  in  exchange  for  donations  of  nonfederal  money.” 
251  F. Supp.  2d,  at  481  (opinion  of  Kollar-Kotelly,  J.) 
(emphasis added).  Indeed, no one had identified a “single
discrete  instance  of  quid  pro  quo  corruption”  due  to  soft 
money.  Id.,  at  395  (opinion  of  Henderson,  J.).  But  what 
the record did demonstrate was that enormous soft money 
contributions,  ranging  between  $1  million  and  $5  million 
among the largest donors, enabled wealthy contributors to
gain  disproportionate  “access  to  federal  lawmakers”  and
the ability to “influenc[e] legislation.”  Id., at 481 (opinion 
of  Kollar-Kotelly,  J.).    There  was  an  indisputable  link 
between  generous  political  donations  and  opportunity 
after opportunity to make one’s case directly to a Member 
of Congress.

Testimony by elected officials supported this conclusion. 
See, e.g., ibid. (“ ‘Large donors of both hard and soft money 
receive  special  treatment’ ”  (Sen.  Simpson));  id.,  at  482 
(“ ‘Donations,  including  soft  money  donations  to  political
parties, do affect how Congress operates. It’s only natural, 
and  happens  all  too  often,  that  a  busy  Senator  with  10
minutes  to  spare  will  spend  those  minutes  returning  the
call of a large soft money donor’ ” (Sen. Boren)); id., at 496 
(“ ‘At a minimum, large soft money donations purchase an
opportunity  for  the  donors  to  make  their  case  to  elected
officials  .  .  .’ ”  (Sen.  McCain)).  Furthermore,  testimony 
from  party  operatives  showed  that  national  political  par­
ties  had  created  “major  donor  programs,”  through  which