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JAM v. INTERNATIONAL FINANCE CORP. 

BREYER, J., dissenting 

was  when  the  statute  was  written?    Or  is  their  reference 
to that subject matter “dynamic,” changing in scope as the
subject matter changes over time?  It is hardly surprising,
given  the  thousands  of  different  statutes  containing  an 
untold  number  of  different  words,  that  there  is  no  single,
universally applicable answer to this question.

Fairly  recent  cases  from  this  Court  make  that  clear.
Compare  New  Prime  Inc.  v.  Oliveira,  586  U. S.  ___,  ___ 
(2019) (slip op., at 7) (adopting the interpretation of “ ‘con-
tracts  of  employment’ ”  that  prevailed  at  the  time  of  the 
statute’s  adoption  in  1925);  Wisconsin  Central  Ltd.  v. 
United  States,  585  U. S.  ___,  ___  (2018)  (slip  op.,  at  2) 
(adopting  the  meaning  of  “ ‘money’ ”  that  prevailed  at  the 
time of the statute’s enactment in 1937); Carcieri v. Sala-
zar,  555  U.  S.  379,  388  (2009)  (interpreting  the  statutory 
phrase  “ ‘now  under  Federal  jurisdiction’ ”  to  cover  only
those  tribes  that  were  under  federal  jurisdiction  at  the 
time  of  the  statute’s  adoption  in  1934);  and  Republic  of 
Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U. S. 607, 612–613 (1992)
(adopting  the  meaning  of  “ ‘commercial’ ”  that  was  “at-
tached to that term under the restrictive theory” when the
Foreign  Sovereign  Immunities  Act  was  enacted  in  1976), 
with Kimble v. Marvel Entertainment, LLC, 576 U. S. ___, 
___  (2015)  (slip  op.,  at  14)  (noting  that  the  words  “ ‘re-
straint of trade’ ” in the Sherman Act have been interpreted 
dynamically);  West  v.  Gibson,  527  U. S.  212,  218  (1999) 
(interpreting  the  term  “ ‘appropriate’ ”  in  Title  VII’s  reme-
dies  provision  dynamically);  and  Allied-Bruce  Terminix 
Cos.  v.  Dobson,  513  U. S.  265,  275–276  (1995)  (interpret-
ing  the  term  “ ‘involving  commerce’ ”  in  the  Federal  Arbi-
tration Act dynamically). 

The Court, like petitioners, believes that the language of 
the  statute  itself  helps  significantly  to  answer  the  stat-
ic/dynamic  question.    See  ante,  at  7–9.  I  doubt  that  the 
language itself helps in this case.  Petitioners point to the
words  “as  is”  in  the  phrase  that  grants  the  international