Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/17pdf/17-459_1o13.pdf
Page Number: 43.0

16 

PEREIRA v. SESSIONS 

ALITO, J., dissenting 

undisputed  that  the  Government  currently  lacks  the 
capability  to  do  anything  other  than  speculate  about  the 
likely  date  and  time  of  future  removal  proceedings.    See 
Tr. of Oral Arg. 47–49, 52–53.  At most, we can hope that
the  Government  develops  a  system  in  the  coming  years 
that allows it to determine likely dates and times before it 
sends out initial notices to appear.  But nothing in either 
today’s  decision  or  the  statute  can  guarantee  such  an
outcome, so the Court  is left crossing its fingers and hop-
ing for the best.  Ante, at 12, n. 6, 18–19. 

* 

* 

* 
Once  the  errors  and  false  leads  are  stripped  away,  the
most  that  remains  of  the  Court’s  argument  is  a  textually 
permissible  interpretation  consistent  with  the  Court’s 
view of “common sense.”  That is not enough to show that
the Government’s contrary interpretation is unreasonable. 
Choosing  between  these  competing  interpretations  might
have been difficult in the first instance.  But under Chev-
ron,  that  choice  was  not  ours  to  make.    Under  Chevron, 
this  Court  was  obliged  to  defer  to  the  Government’s
interpretation. 

In  recent  years,  several  Members  of  this  Court  have
questioned  Chevron’s  foundations.  See,  e.g.,  ante,  at  2–3 
(KENNEDY,  J.,  concurring);  Michigan  v.  EPA,  576  U. S. 
___,  ___–___  (2015)  (THOMAS,  J.,  concurring)  (slip  op.,  at 
1–5);  Gutierrez-Brizuela  v.  Lynch,  834  F. 3d  1142,  1149 
(CA10  2016)  (Gorsuch,  J.,  concurring).    But  unless  the 
Court has overruled Chevron in a secret decision that has 
somehow escaped my attention, it remains good law. 

I respectfully dissent.