Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/558bv.pdf
Page Number: 520

Cite as: 558 U. S. 310 (2010) 

359 

Opinion of the Court 

206.  NRWC thus involved contribution limits, see NCPAC, 
supra,  at  495–496,  which,  unlike  limits  on  independent  ex­
penditures,  have  been  an  accepted  means  to  prevent  quid 
pro  quo  corruption,  see  McConnell,  540  U. S.,  at  136–138, 
and  n.  40;  MCFL,  supra,  at  259–260.  Citizens  United  has 
not  made  direct  contributions  to  candidates,  and  it  has  not 
suggested  that  the  Court  should  reconsider  whether  contri­
bution  limits  should  be  subjected  to  rigorous  First  Amend­
ment scrutiny. 

When  Buckley  identiﬁed  a  sufﬁciently  important  govern­
mental  interest  in  preventing  corruption  or  the  appearance 
of corruption, that interest was limited to quid pro quo cor­
ruption.  See McConnell, supra, at 296–298 (opinion of Ken­
nedy,  J.)  (citing  Buckley,  supra,  at  26–28,  30,  46–48); 
NCPAC, 470 U. S., at 497 (“The hallmark of corruption is the 
ﬁnancial  quid  pro  quo:  dollars  for  political  favors”);  id.,  at 
498.  The fact  that speakers  may have  inﬂuence over  or ac­
cess  to  elected  ofﬁcials  does  not  mean  that  these  ofﬁcials 
are corrupt: 

“Favoritism and inﬂuence are not . . .  avoidable in repre­
sentative politics.  It is in the nature of an elected rep­
resentative  to  favor  certain  policies,  and,  by  necessary 
corollary, to  favor the voters  and contributors  who sup­
port  those  policies.  It  is  well  understood  that  a  sub­
stantial and legitimate reason, if not the only reason, to 
cast  a  vote  for,  or  to  make  a  contribution  to,  one  candi­
date  over  another  is  that  the  candidate  will  respond  by 
producing those political outcomes the supporter favors. 
Democracy  is  premised  on  responsiveness.”  McCon­
nell, 540 U. S., at 297 (opinion of Kennedy, J.). 

Reliance  on  a  “generic  favoritism  or  inﬂuence  theory . . . is  
at odds with standard First Amendment analyses because it 
is  unbounded  and  susceptible  to  no  limiting  principle.”  Id., 
at 296.