Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/22pdf/22-58_i425.pdf
Page Number: 39.0

Cite as:  599 U. S. ____ (2023) 

3 

 BARRETT, J., concurring
BARRETT, J., concurring in judgment 

Second,  even  granting  the  broad  principle  the  Court
takes from Linda R. S., I doubt that it applies with full force 
in this case.  Unlike the plaintiff in Linda R. S., the States 
do not seek the prosecution of any particular individual—
or even any particular class of individuals.  See ASARCO 
Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U. S. 605, 624 (1989) (“[F]ederal stand-
ing ‘often turns on the nature and source of the claim as-
serted’ ”).  In fact, they disclaim any interest in the prose-
cution  or  nonprosecution  of  noncitizens.  See  Brief  for 
They
Respondents  15;  Tr.  of  Oral  Arg.  124–125. 
acknowledge that 8 U. S. C. §1226(c)(1)’s detention obliga-
tion “only applies until” the Government makes “a decision
whether  or  not  to  prosecute.”    Tr.  of  Oral  Arg.  100.  And 
they readily concede that if the Government decides not to
prosecute, any detention obligation imposed by §1226(c)(1) 
“immediately ends.”  Ibid.  The States make similar conces-
sions with respect to §1231(a)(2).  They maintain, for exam-
ple, that §1231(a)(2) applies “only where the United States 
has used its prosecutorial discretion to bring a notice to ap-
pear,  to  prosecute  that  all  the  way  to  a  final  . . .  order  of 
removal.”  Id., at 130.  But if the Government for any reason
“choose[s]  to  discontinue  proceedings,”  the  alleged  deten-
tion obligation does not attach.  Id., at 131. 

The upshot is that the States do not dispute that the Gov-
ernment can prosecute whomever it wants.  They seek, in-
stead, the temporary detention of certain noncitizens dur-
ing  elective  removal  proceedings  of  uncertain  duration.
And the States’ desire to remove the Guidelines’ influence 
on the Government’s admittedly broad discretion to enforce 
immigration law meaningfully differs from the Linda R. S. 
plaintiff ’s desire to channel prosecutorial discretion toward 
a  particular  target.    Given  all  of  this,  I  would  not  treat 
Linda  R.  S.  as  the  “leading  precedent”  for  resolving  this 
case.  Ante,  at  5.  In  my  view,  the  Court  is  striking  new 
ground rather than applying settled principles.