Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/20pdf/20-197_5ie6.pdf
Page Number: 9.0

Cite as:  593 U. S. ____ (2021) 

9 

THOMAS, J., concurring 

(recognizing that a private space can become a public forum 
when leased to the government).  Common-carrier regula-
tions,  although  they  directly  restrain  private  companies,
thus may have an indirect effect of subjecting government
officials to suits that would not otherwise be cognizable un-
der our public-forum jurisprudence.

This analysis may help explain the Second Circuit’s intu-
ition that part of Mr. Trump’s Twitter account was a public
forum.  But that intuition has problems.  First, if market 
power is a predicate for common carriers (as some scholars
suggest), nothing in the record evaluates Twitter’s market 
power.  Second, and more problematic, neither the Second 
Circuit nor respondents have identified any regulation that
restricts Twitter from removing an account that would oth-
erwise be a “government-controlled space.” 

2 
Even if digital platforms are not close enough to common
carriers, legislatures might still be able to treat digital plat-
forms like places of public accommodation.  Although defi-
nitions between jurisdictions vary, a company ordinarily is
a place of public accommodation if it provides “lodging, food, 
entertainment,  or  other  services  to  the  public  . . .  in  gen-
eral.”  Black’s Law Dictionary 20 (11th ed. 2019) (defining 
“public  accommodation”);  accord,  42  U. S. C.  §2000a(b)(3) 
(covering places of “entertainment”).  Twitter and other dig-
ital  platforms  bear  resemblance  to  that  definition.    This, 
too, may explain the Second Circuit’s intuition.  Courts are 
split, however, about whether federal accommodations laws
apply  to  anything  other  than  “physical”  locations.    Com-
pare, e.g., Doe v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 179 F. 3d 557, 
559 (CA7 1999) (Title III of the Americans with Disabilities 
Act  (ADA)  covers  websites),  with  Parker  v.  Metropolitan 
Life  Ins.  Co.,  121  F. 3d  1006,  1010–1011  (CA6  1997)  (en 
banc) (Title III of the ADA covers only physical places); see 
also  42  U. S. C.  §§2000a(b)–(c)  (discussing  “physica[l]