Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/19pdf/19-631_2d93.pdf
Page Number: 26.0

Cite as:  591 U. S. ____ (2020) 

23 

Opinion of KAVANAUGH, J. 

and  they  have  not  received  that  relief.  But  the  First 
Amendment complaint at the heart of their suit was une-
qual treatment.  Invalidating and severing the government-
debt  exception  fully  addresses  that  First  Amendment  in-
jury.13  JUSTICE GORSUCH  further  suggests  that  plaintiffs
may lack standing to challenge the government-debt excep-
tion, because that exception merely favors others.  See ibid. 
But the Court has squarely held that a plaintiff who suffers 
unequal treatment has standing to challenge a discrimina-
tory exception that favors others.  See Heckler v. Mathews, 
465 U. S., at 737–740 (a plaintiff who suffers unequal treat-
ment has standing to seek “withdrawal of benefits from the 
favored class”); see also Northeastern Fla. Chapter, Associ-
ated Gen. Contractors of America v. Jacksonville, 508 U. S. 
656, 666 (1993) (“The ‘injury in fact’ in an equal protection 
case of this variety is the denial of equal treatment result-
ing from the imposition of the barrier, not the ultimate in-
ability to obtain the benefit”).   

JUSTICE  GORSUCH  also  objects  that  our  decision  today 
“harms  strangers  to  this  suit”  by  eliminating  favorable 
treatment for debt collectors.  Post, at 6.  But that is neces-
sarily true in many cases where a court cures unequal treat-
ment  by,  for  example,  extending  a  burden  or  nullifying  a 
benefit.  See, e.g., Morales-Santana, 582 U. S., at ___ (slip 
op., at 28) (curing unequal treatment of children born to un-
wed U. S.-citizen fathers by extending a burden to children
of unwed U. S.-citizen mothers); Orr v. Orr, 374 So. 2d 895, 
896–897  (Ala.  Civ.  App.  1979)  (extending  alimony  obliga-
tions  to  women  after  a  male  plaintiff  successfully  chal-
lenged  Alabama’s  discriminatory  alimony  statute  in  this 

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13 Plaintiffs suggest that parties will not have incentive to sue if the 
cure for challenging an unconstitutional exception to a speech restriction
is to eliminate the exception and extend the restriction.  But many indi-
viduals  and  organizations  often  have  incentive  to  challenge  unequal
treatment of speech, especially when a competitor is regulated less heav-
ily.