Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/21pdf/20-1088_dbfi.pdf
Page Number: 44.0

4 

CARSON v. MAKIN 

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting 

of the Free Exercise Clause risks swallowing the space be-
tween the Religion Clauses that once “permit[ted] religious 
exercise to exist without sponsorship and without interfer-
ence.”  Walz, 397 U. S., at 669. 

From a practical perspective, today’s decision directs the
State of Maine (and, by extension, its taxpaying citizens) to 
subsidize institutions that undisputedly engage in religious
instruction.  See ante, at 10–11 (BREYER, J., dissenting).  In 
addition, while purporting to protect against discrimination
of one kind, the Court requires Maine to fund what many of 
its citizens believe to be discrimination of other kinds.  See 
ante, at 16 (BREYER, J., dissenting) (summarizing Bangor
Christian Schools’ and Temple Academy’s policies denying 
enrollment to students based on gender identity, sexual ori-
entation,  and  religion).    The  upshot  is  that  Maine  must 
choose between giving subsidies to its residents or refrain-
ing from financing religious teaching and practices.

Finally,  the  Court’s  decision  is  especially  perverse  be-
cause the benefit at issue is the public education to which 
all of Maine’s children are entitled under the State Consti-
tution.  As  this  Court  has  long  recognized,  the  Establish-
ment Clause requires that public education be secular and
neutral as to religion.  See ante, at 2–3, 12 (BREYER, J., dis-
senting) (collecting cases).  The Court avoids this framing
of Maine’s benefit because, it says, “Maine has decided not 
to operate schools of its own, but instead to offer tuition as-
sistance  that  parents  may  direct  to  the  public  or  private 
schools  of  their  choice.”  Ante,  at  14.    In  fact,  any  such 
“deci[sion],” ibid., was forced upon Maine by “the realities 
of remote geography and low population density,” ante, at 
2, which render it impracticable for the State to operate its 
own schools in many communities.

The  Court’s  analysis  does  leave  some  options  open  to
Maine.  For example, under state law, school administra-
tive  units  (SAUs)  that  cannot  feasibly  operate  their  own