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Cite as: 529 U. S. 598 (2000)

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Opinion of the Court

ings of the Commerce Clause and the scope of federal power
that would permit Congress to exercise a police power”),
596–597, and n. 6 (noting that the ﬁrst Congresses did not
enact nationwide punishments for criminal conduct under
the Commerce Clause).

III

Because we conclude that the Commerce Clause does not
provide Congress with authority to enact § 13981, we address
petitioners’ alternative argument that the section’s civil rem-
edy should be upheld as an exercise of Congress’ remedial
power under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. As noted
above, Congress expressly invoked the Fourteenth Amend-
ment as a source of authority to enact § 13981.

The principles governing an analysis of congressional leg-
islation under § 5 are well settled. Section 5 states that
Congress may “ ‘enforce’ by ‘appropriate legislation’ the con-
stitutional guarantee that no State shall deprive any person
of ‘life, liberty, or property, without due process of law,’
nor deny any person ‘equal protection of the laws.’ ” City
of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U. S. 507, 517 (1997). Section 5 is
“a positive grant of legislative power,” Katzenbach v. Mor-
gan, 384 U. S. 641, 651 (1966), that includes authority to
“prohibi[t] conduct which is not itself unconstitutional and
[to] intrud[e] into ‘legislative spheres of autonomy previ-
ously reserved to the States.’ ” Flores, supra, at 518 (quot-
ing Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U. S. 445, 455 (1976)); see also
Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U. S. 62, 81 (2000).
However, “[a]s broad as the congressional enforcement
power is, it is not unlimited.” Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U. S.
112, 128 (1970); see also Kimel, supra, at 81.
In fact, as we
discuss in detail below, several limitations inherent in § 5’s
text and constitutional context have been recognized since
the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted.

Petitioners’ § 5 argument is founded on an assertion that
there is pervasive bias in various state justice systems
against victims of gender-motivated violence. This asser-