Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/558bv.pdf
Page Number: 614

Cite as: 558 U. S. 310 (2010) 

453 

Opinion of Stevens, J. 

of  those  with  money  to  inﬂuence  governmental  action’ ” 
(quoting 424 U. S., at 28; alteration in original)).  It has like­
wise  never  been  doubted  that  “[o]f  almost  equal  concern  as 
the danger of actual quid pro quo arrangements is the impact 
of the appearance of corruption.”  Id., at 27.  Congress may 
“legitimately  conclude  that  the  avoidance  of  the  appearance 
of  improper  inﬂuence  is  also  critical  .  .  .  if  conﬁdence  in  the 
system of representative Government is not to be eroded to 
a  disastrous  extent.”  Ibid.  (internal quotation  marks  omit­
ted; alteration in original).  A democracy cannot function ef­
fectively  when  its  constituent  members  believe  laws  are 
being bought and sold. 

In theory, our colleagues accept this much.  As applied to 
BCRA  § 203,  however,  they  conclude  “[t]he  anticorrup­
tion  interest  is  not  sufﬁcient  to  displace  the  speech  here  in 
question.”  Ante, at 357. 

Although the Court suggests that Buckley compels its con­
clusion,  ante,  at  356–360,  Buckley  cannot  sustain  this  read­
ing.  It  is  true  that,  in  evaluating  FECA’s  ceiling  on  inde­
pendent  expenditures  by  all  persons,  the  Buckley  Court 
found  the  governmental  interest  in  preventing  corruption 
“inadequate.”  424 U. S., at 45.  But Buckley did not evalu­
ate corporate expenditures speciﬁcally, nor did it rule out the 
possibility  that  a  future  Court  might  ﬁnd  otherwise.  The 
opinion  reasoned  that  an  expenditure  limitation  covering 
only  express  advocacy  (i. e.,  magic  words)  would  likely  be 
ineffectual, ibid., a problem that Congress tackled in BCRA, 
and  it  concluded  that  “the  independent  advocacy  restricted 
by  [FECA  § 608(e)(1)]  does  not  presently  appear  to  pose 
dangers  of  real  or  apparent  corruption  comparable  to  those 
identiﬁed  with  large  campaign  contributions,”  id.,  at  46 
(emphasis  added).  Buckley expressly  contemplated that  an 
anticorruption  rationale  might  justify  restrictions  on  inde­
pendent  expenditures  at  a  later  date,  “because  it  may  be 
that, in some circumstances, ‘large independent expenditures 
pose  the  same  dangers  of  actual  or  apparent  quid  pro  quo