Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/16pdf/16-309_h31i.pdf
Page Number: 23

Cite as:  582 U. S. ____ (2017) 

1 

ALITO, J., concurring in judgment 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

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No. 16–309 
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DIVNA MASLENJAK, PETITIONER v.
 
UNITED STATES
 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 

APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
 

[June 22, 2017]

 JUSTICE ALITO, concurring in the judgment. 
We  granted  review  in  this  case  to  decide  whether  “a
naturalized  American  citizen  can  be  stripped  of  her  citi-
zenship  in  a  criminal  proceeding  based  on  an  immaterial
false  statement.”  Pet.  for  Cert.  i.    The  answer  to  that 
question  is  “no.”    Although  the  relevant  criminal  statute, 
18  U. S. C.  §1425(a),  does  not  expressly  refer  to  the  con-
cept  of  materiality,  the  critical  statutory  language  effec-
tively requires proof of materiality in a case involving false 
statements.  The statute makes it a crime for a person to
“procure” naturalization “contrary to law.”  In false state-
ment  cases,  then,  the  statute  essentially  imposes  the 
familiar  materiality  requirement  that  applies  in  other 
contexts.  That is, a person violates the statute by procur-
ing  naturalization  through  an  illegal  false  statement 
which has a “natural tendency to influence” the outcome—
that is, the obtaining of naturalization.  Kungys v. United 
States, 485 U. S. 759, 772 (1988). 

Understood in this way, Section 1425(a) does not require
proof  that  a  false  statement  actually  had  some  effect  on
the  naturalization  decision.  The  operative  statutory  lan-
law”— 
guage—“procure”  naturalization 
imposes no such requirement. 

“contrary 

to 

Here  is  an  example.    Eight  co-workers  jointly  buy  two
season  tickets  to  see  their  favorite  football  team  play.