Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/558bv.pdf
Page Number: 472.0

Cite as: 558 U. S. 310 (2010) 

311 

Held: 

Syllabus 

1.  Because  the  question  whether  § 441b  applies  to  Hillary cannot  be 
resolved  on  other,  narrower  grounds  without  chilling  political  speech, 
this Court must consider the continuing effect of the speech suppression 
upheld in Austin.  Pp. 322–336. 

(a)  Citizens  United’s  narrower  arguments—that  Hillary  is  not  an 
“electioneering communication” covered by § 441b because it is not “pub­
licly  distributed”  under  11  CFR  § 100.29(a)(2);  that  § 441b  may  not  be 
applied to Hillary under Federal Election Comm’n v.  Wisconsin Right 
to Life, Inc., 551 U. S. 449 (WRTL), which found § 441b unconstitutional 
as  applied  to  speech  that  was  not  “express  advocacy  or  its  functional 
equivalent,”  id.,  at  481  (opinion  of  Roberts,  C.  J.),  determining  that  a 
communication “is the functional equivalent of express advocacy only if 
[it] is susceptible of no reasonable interpretation other than as an appeal 
to  vote  for  or  against  a  speciﬁc  candidate,”  id.,  at  469–470;  that  § 441b 
should  be  invalidated  as  applied  to  movies  shown  through  video-on­
demand because  this delivery  system has  a lower  risk of  distorting the 
political  process  than  do  television  ads;  and  that  there  should  be  an 
exception to § 441b’s ban for nonproﬁt corporate political speech funded 
overwhelmingly by individuals—are not sustainable under a fair reading 
of the statute.  Pp. 322–329. 

(b)  Thus,  this  case  cannot  be  resolved  on  a  narrower  ground  with­
out chilling political  speech,  speech  that  is  central  to  the  First  Amend­
ment’s  meaning  and  purpose.  Citizens  United  did  not  waive  this  chal­
lenge  to  Austin  when  it  stipulated  to  dismissing  the  facial  challenge 
below, since (1) even if such a challenge could be waived, this Court may 
reconsider  Austin  and  § 441b’s  facial  validity  here  because  the  District 
Court “passed upon” the issue, Lebron v.  National Railroad Passenger 
Corporation,  513  U. S.  374,  379;  (2)  throughout  the  litigation,  Citizens 
United has asserted a claim that  the FEC has violated its right to free 
speech; and (3) the parties cannot enter into a stipulation that prevents 
the  Court  from  considering  remedies  necessary  to  resolve  a  claim  that 
has  been  preserved.  Because  Citizens  United’s  narrower  arguments 
are not sustainable, this Court must, in an exercise of its judicial respon­
sibility,  consider  § 441b’s  facial  validity.  Any  other  course  would  pro­
long the substantial, nationwide chilling effect caused by § 441b’s corpo­
rate  expenditure  ban.  This  conclusion  is  further  supported  by  the 
following: (1) the uncertainty caused by the Government’s litigating po­
sition; (2) substantial time would be required to clarify § 441b’s applica­
tion on the points raised by the Government’s position in order to avoid 
any chilling effect caused by an improper interpretation; and (3) because 
speech  itself  is  of  primary  importance  to  the  integrity  of  the  election 
process, any speech arguably within the reach of rules created for regu­