Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/21pdf/21-429_8o6a.pdf
Page Number: 55

Cite as:  597 U. S. ____ (2022) 

27 

GORSUCH, J., dissenting 

1988, No. 88–603, p. 3 (Flint Amicus Brief ).  In McGirt, the 
federal  government  once  more  acknowledged  that  States
cannot  prosecute  crimes  by  or  against  tribal  members
within still-extant tribal reservations.  See Brief for United 
States as Amicus Curiae in McGirt v. Oklahoma, O. T. 2019, 
No.  18–9526,  p. 38.    In  this  case,  the  government  has  es-
poused the same view yet again.  See Brief for United States 
as Amicus Curiae 4; see also Dept. of Justice, Criminal Re-
source Manual 685 (updated Jan. 22, 2020).9 

In the past, even Oklahoma has more or less conceded the
point.  The last time Oklahoma was before us, it asked this 
Court to usurp congressional authority and disestablish the
Creek Reservation because, otherwise, the State “would not 
have jurisdiction over” “crimes committed against Indians”
within its boundaries.  See Tr. of Oral Arg. in McGirt v. Ok-
lahoma, No. 18–9526, O. T. 2019, p. 54; see also McGirt, 591 
U. S., at ___–___ (slip op., at 37–38).  In 1991, Oklahoma’s 
attorney  general  formally  resolved  that  major  “[c]rimes
committed by or against Indians . . . are under the exclusive 
province of the United States,” while Tribes retain exclusive
jurisdiction  over  “minor  crimes  committed  by  Indians.” 
Haney, 22 Okla. Opp. Atty. Gen. 71, 1991 WL 567868, *3.
And Oklahoma’s own courts have recently taken the same 
position even in the face of vehement opposition from the 
State’s  executive  branch.  See,  e.g.,  Spears,  485  P. 3d,  at 
875, 877. 

—————— 

9 As sometimes happens when the government considers a legal ques-
tion over centuries, differing views have occasionally popped up.  In 1979, 
the  Office  of  Legal  Counsel  opined—with  little  analysis—that  States
might be able to exercise concurrent criminal jurisdiction on tribal lands,
though it conceded the question was “exceedingly difficult.”  3 Op. OLC
111, 117, 120.  This kind of surface-level, hedged analysis is hardly ro-
bust evidence.  In any event, the Executive Branch reverted to its tradi-
tional position in short order.  That makes the Court’s repeated reliance 
on this isolated opinion—and its failure to acknowledge the mountain of 
contradictory evidence—especially bewildering.  See ante, at 12–16.