Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/08pdf/07-588.pdf/07-588.pdf
Page Number: 10.0

Cite as:  556 U. S. ____ (2009) 

7 

Opinion of the Court 

37107  (2007).  We  then  granted  certiorari  limited  to  the 
following question: “Whether [§1326(b)] . . . authorizes the 
[EPA]  to  compare  costs  with  benefits  in  determining  ‘the
best  technology  available  for  minimizing  adverse  envi-
ronmental  impact’  at  cooling  water  intake  structures.”
552 U. S. ___ (2008). 

II 
In setting the Phase II national performance standards
and  providing  for  site-specific  cost-benefit  variances,  the 
EPA  relied  on  its  view  that  §1326(b)’s  “best  technology 
available”  standard  permits  consideration  of  the  technol-
ogy’s  costs,  69  Fed.  Reg.  41626,  and  of  the  relationship 
between  those  costs  and  the  environmental  benefits  pro-
duced,  id.,  at  41603.  That  view  governs  if  it  is  a  reason-
able interpretation of the statute—not necessarily the only
possible 
interpretation 
deemed  most  reasonable  by  the  courts.  Chevron  U. S. A. 
Inc.  v.  Natural  Resources  Defense  Council,  Inc.,  467  U. S. 
837, 843–844 (1984).4 

interpretation,  nor  even  the 

As we have described, §1326(b) instructs the EPA to set 
standards  for  cooling  water  intake  structures  that  reflect
“the  best  technology  available  for  minimizing  adverse 
environmental  impact.”  The  Second  Circuit  took  that 

—————— 

4 The dissent finds it “puzzling” that we invoke this proposition (that
a  reasonable  agency  interpretation  prevails)  at  the  “outset,”  omitting
the supposedly prior inquiry of “ ‘whether Congress has directly spoken
to the precise question at issue.’ ”  Post, at 6, n. 5 (opinion of STEVENS, 
J.)  (quoting  Chevron,  467  U. S.,  at  842).    But  surely  if  Congress  has
directly  spoken  to  an  issue  then  any  agency  interpretation  contradict-
ing what Congress has said would be unreasonable. 

What  is  truly  “puzzling”  is  the  dissent’s  accompanying  charge  that
the  Court’s  failure  to  conduct  the  Chevron  step-one  inquiry  at  the
outset  “reflects  [its]  reluctance  to  consider  the  possibility  . . .  that
Congress’  silence  may  have  meant  to  foreclose  cost-benefit  analysis.” 
Post,  at  6,  n. 5.    Our  discussion  of  that  issue,  infra,  at  11,  speaks  for 
itself.