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14 

TWITTER, INC. v. TAAMNEH 

Opinion of the Court 

“affirmative act” “with the intent of facilitating the offense’s 
commission.”  Rosemond, 572 U. S., at 71.  Such intentional 
participation can come in many forms, including abetting,
inducing,  encouraging,  soliciting,  or  advising  the  commis-
sion of the offense, such as through words of encouragement 
or driving the getaway car.  2 LaFave §13.2(a), at 457–460; 
see also J. Hawley & M. McGregor, The Criminal Law 81 
(3d ed. 1899).  Regardless of the particulars, however, it is
clear that some culpable conduct is needed.  See Rosemond, 
572 U. S., at 73, 77.9 

Similar principles and concerns have shaped aiding-and-
abetting doctrine in tort law, with numerous cases directly
employing them to help articulate the standard for tortious
aiding and abetting.  See, e.g., Zoelsch v. Arthur Andersen 
& Co., 824 F. 2d 27, 35–36 (CADC 1987); Woodward, 522 
F. 2d, at 95, n. 23; Landy, 486 F. 2d, at 163–164 (all relying 
on Nye & Nissen, 336 U. S., at 619); see also Camp v. Dema, 
948 F. 2d 455, 459 (CA8 1991) (relying on People v. Terman, 
4 Cal. App. 2d 345, 346–347 (1935), another criminal case).
Similar to the criminal-law rule, some cases have required
that the defendant’s assistance “must have had a direct re-
lation  to  the  trespass,  and  have  been  calculated  and  in-
tended to produce it” to warrant liability for the resulting 
tort.  Bird, 49 Ky., at 423; see also Smith v. Thompson, 103 
Idaho 909, 911, 655 P. 2d 116, 118 (App. 1982); Brown, 83 
Mass.,  at  98.    Other  cases  have  emphasized  the  need  for
some  “culpable  conduct”  and  “some  degree  of  knowledge 
that [a defendant’s] actions are aiding the primary violator” 
before holding the defendant secondarily liable.  Camp, 948 
F. 2d, at 460.  Still others have explained that “[c]ulpability 

—————— 

9 Conversely, conspiracy liability could be premised on a “more attenu-
ated relation with the principal violation” because the defendant and the 
principal wrongdoer had agreed to a wrongful enterprise.  Halberstam, 
705 F. 2d, at 485; see also Restatement (Second) of Torts §876, Comment 
a, p. 316 (1979) (“The theory of the early common law was that there was
a mutual agency of each to act for the others”).