Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/22pdf/21-1086_1co6.pdf
Page Number: 45

4 

ALLEN v. MILLIGAN 

KAVANAUGH, J., concurring 
KAVANAUGH, J., concurring in part 

and  geographically  compact  minority  populations.    See 
Abbott,  585  U. S.,  at  ___  (slip  op.,  at  4);  Johnson  v.  De 
Grandy, 512 U. S. 997, 1006–1007, 1020 (1994); Voinovich, 
507 U. S., at 153–154; see generally Brnovich v. Democratic 
National Committee, 594 U. S. ___, ___ (2021) (slip op., at 
22) (“§2 does not demand proof of discriminatory purpose”); 
Reno v. Bossier Parish School Bd., 520 U. S. 471, 482 (1997) 
(Congress “clearly expressed its desire that §2 not have an 
intent component”); Holder v. Hall, 512 U. S. 874, 923–924 
(1994)  (THOMAS,  J.,  concurring  in  judgment)  (§2  adopts  a 
“ ‘results’  test,  rather  than  an  ‘intent’  test”);  Chisom  v. 
Roemer, 501 U. S. 380, 394, 404 (1991) (“proof of intent is 
no  longer  required  to  prove  a  §2  violation”  as  “Congress 
made  clear  that  a  violation  of  §2  could  be  established  by 
proof of  discriminatory results  alone”);  Gingles, 478  U. S., 
at  71,  n.  34  (plurality  opinion)  (§2  does  not  require 
“ ‘purpose of racial discrimination’ ”). 
  Fourth, Alabama asserts that §2, as construed by Gingles 
to require race-based redistricting in certain circumstances, 
exceeds Congress’s remedial or preventive authority under 
the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments.  As the Court 
explains,  the  constitutional  argument  presented  by 
Alabama  is  not  persuasive  in  light  of  the  Court’s 
precedents.    See  ante,  at  33–34;  see  also  City  of  Rome  v. 
United  States,  446  U. S.  156,  177–178  (1980).    JUSTICE 
THOMAS notes, however, that even if Congress in 1982 could 
constitutionally authorize race-based redistricting under §2 
for some period of time, the authority to conduct race-based 
redistricting cannot extend indefinitely into the future.  See 
post,  at  44–45  (dissenting  opinion).   But  Alabama did  not 
raise that temporal argument in this Court, and I therefore 
would not consider it at this time. 
  For those reasons, I vote to affirm, and I concur in all but 
Part III–B–1 of the Court’s opinion.