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4 

SEC v. JARKESY 

Syllabus 

the bounds of federal jurisdiction,” an Article III court must decide it, 
with a jury if the Seventh Amendment applies.  Stern v. Marshall, 564 
U. S. 462, 484.  On that basis, this Court has repeatedly explained that
matters concerning private rights may not be removed from Article III 
courts.  See, e.g., Murray’s Lessee, 18 How., at 284.  If a suit is in the 
nature  of  an  action  at  common  law,  then  the  matter  presumptively
concerns  private  rights,  and  adjudication  by  an  Article  III  court  is 
mandatory.  Stern, 564 U. S., at 484. 

The Court also recognizes a class of cases concerning “public rights.” 
Such matters “historically could have been determined exclusively by
[the executive and legislative] branches.”  Id., at 493 (internal quota-
tion  marks  omitted).    No  involvement  by  an  Article  III  court  in  the
initial adjudication of public rights claims is necessary.  Certain cate-
gories  that  have  been  recognized  as  falling  within  the  exception  in-
clude matters concerning: the collection of revenue; aspects of customs 
law; immigration law; relations with Indian tribes; the administration
of public lands; and the granting of public benefits.  The Court’s opin-
ions governing this exception have not always spoken in precise terms.
But “even with respect to matters that arguably fall within the scope 
of the ‘public rights’ doctrine, the presumption is in favor of Article III 
courts.”  Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 
U. S. 50, 69, n. 23 (plurality opinion).  Pp. 13–18.

(2) In  Granfinanciera,  this Court  previously  considered  whether 
the  Seventh  Amendment  guarantees  the  right  to  a  jury trial  “in  the
face of Congress’ decision to allow a non-Article III tribunal to adjudi-
cate” a statutory “fraud claim.”  492 U. S., at 37, 50.  There the issue 
was whether Congress’s designation of fraudulent conveyance actions 
as  “core  [bankruptcy]  proceedings”  authorized  non-Article  III  bank-
ruptcy judges to hear them without juries.  Id., at 50.  The Court held 
that the designation was not permissible, even under the public rights 
exception.  To  determine  whether  the  claim  implicated  the  Seventh 
Amendment, the Court applied the principles distilled in Tull.  Sur-
veying English cases and considering the remedy these suits provided,
the  Court  concluded  that  fraudulent  conveyance  actions  were  “quin-
tessentially suits at common law.”  Granfinanciera, 492 U. S., at 56. 
Because these actions were akin to “suits  at common law” and were 
not “closely intertwined” with the bankruptcy process, the Court held 
that the public rights exception did not apply, and a jury was required. 
Id., at 54, 56.  Pp. 19–20. 

(3) Granfinanciera effectively decides this case.  The action here 
was brought under the “anti-fraud provisions” of the federal securities 
laws and provide civil penalties that can “only be enforced in courts of 
law.”  Tull, 481 U. S., at 422.  They target the same basic conduct as