Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/12pdf/12-71_7l48.pdf
Page Number: 45

4 

ARIZONA v. INTER TRIBAL COUNCIL OF ARIZ. INC. 

ALITO, J., dissenting 

sary  to  leave  the  regulation  of  [federal  elections],  in  the 
first  place,  to  the  state  governments,  as  being  best  ac-
quainted  with  the  situation  of  the  people.”  3  Records  of 
the  Federal  Convention  of  1787,  p.  312  (M.  Farrand  ed. 
1911).  Because  the  States  are  closer  to  the  people,  the 
Framers thought that state regulation of federal elections
would “in ordinary cases . . . be both more convenient and 
more  satisfactory.”  The  Federalist  No.  59,  p.  360  (C.
Rossiter ed. 1961) (A. Hamilton).

Second, as we have previously observed, the integrity of
federal elections is a subject over which the States and the
Federal  Government  “are  mutually  concerned.”    Ex  parte  
Siebold, 100 U. S. 371, 391 (1880).  By giving States a role 
in  the  administration  of  federal  elections,  the  Elections 
Clause  reflects  the  States’  interest  in  the  selection  of  the 
individuals  on  whom  they  must  rely  to  represent  their
interests  in  the  National  Legislature.  See  U.  S.  Term 
Limits,  Inc.  v.  Thornton,  514  U. S.  779,  858–859  (1995) 
(THOMAS, J., dissenting). 

Third,  the  Elections  Clause’s  default  rule  helps  to  pro-
tect  the  States’  authority  to  regulate  state  and  local  elec-
tions.  As a practical matter, it would be very burdensome 
for a State to maintain separate federal and state registra-
tion  processes  with  separate  federal  and  state  voter  rolls.
For  that  reason,  any  federal  regulation  in  this  area  is 
likely to displace not only state control of federal elections 
but also state control of state and local elections. 

Needless  to  say,  when  Congress  believes  that  some 
overriding  national  interest  justifies  federal  regulation,  it
has the power to “make or alter” state laws specifying the 
“Times,  Places  and  Manner”  of  federal  elections.    Art. I, 
§4,  cl. 1.   But  we  should  expect  Congress  to  speak  clearly
when  it  decides  to  displace  a  default  rule  enshrined  in
the  text  of  the  Constitution  that  serves  such  important 
purposes.

The  Court  answers  that  when  Congress  exercises  its