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2 

KANSAS v. GLOVER 

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting 

dramatically  alters  both  the  quantum  and  nature  of  evi-
dence a State may rely on to prove suspicion. 

A 
The State bears the burden of justifying a seizure.  Flor-
ida v. Royer, 460 U. S. 491, 500 (1983) (plurality opinion); 
Brown v. Texas, 443 U. S. 47, 51–52 (1979).  This requires
the government to articulate factors supporting its reason-
able  suspicion,  usually  through  a  trained  agent.  See  Or-
nelas v. United States, 517 U. S. 690, 696 (1996); see also 
United States v. Sokolow, 490 U. S. 1, 10 (1989).  While the 
Court  has  not  dictated  precisely  what  evidence  a  govern-
ment must produce, it has stressed that an officer must at
least “articulate more than an ‘inchoate and unparticular-
ized suspicion or “hunch” ’ of criminal activity.”  Illinois v. 
Wardlow, 528 U. S. 119, 123–124 (2000) (quoting Terry v. 
Ohio,  392  U. S.  1,  27  (1968)).    That  articulation  must  in-
clude  both  facts  and  an  officer’s  “rational  inferences  from 
those facts.”  Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U. S., at 880, 884.  A log-
ical “gap as to any one matter” in this analysis may be over-
come by “ ‘a strong showing’ ” regarding “ ‘other indicia of 
reliability.’ ”  Florida v. Harris, 568 U. S. 237, 245 (2013). 
But gaps may not go unfilled.

Additionally, reasonable suspicion eschews judicial com-
mon sense, ante, at 5, in favor of the perspectives and infer-
ences of a reasonable officer viewing “the facts through the 
lens of his police experience and expertise.”  Ornelas, 517 
U. S., at 699; Cortez, 449 U. S., at 416–418 (explaining that 
the facts and inferences giving rise to a stop “must be seen 
and weighed . . . as understood by those versed in the field 
of law enforcement”); Heien v. North Carolina, 574 U. S. 54, 
73 (2014) (SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting) (“[O]ur enunciation 
of the reasonableness inquiry and our justification for it . . . 
have always turned on an officer’s factual conclusions and 
an  officer’s  expertise  with  respect  to  those  factual  conclu-
sions”).  It  is  the  reasonable  officer’s  assessment,  not  the