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Page Number: 33

16 

GARZA v. IDAHO 

THOMAS, J., dissenting 

Welch,  148  F. 2d  667,  670  (CADC  1945);  see  Bottiglio  v. 
United States, 431 F. 2d 930, 931 (CA1 1970) (per curiam); 
Williams v. Beto, 354 F. 2d 698, 704 (CA5 1965); Frand v. 
United States, 301 F. 2d 102, 103 (CA10 1962); O’Malley v. 
United  States,  285  F. 2d  733,  734  (CA6  1961);  Snead  v. 
Smyth,  273  F. 2d  838,  842  (CA4  1959);  Cofield  v.  United 
States,  263  F. 2d  686,  689  (CA9),  vacated  on  other 
grounds,  360  U. S.  472  (1959);  Johnston  v.  United  States, 
254 F. 2d 239, 240 (CA8 1958); United States ex rel. Feeley 
v.  Ragen,  166  F. 2d  976,  980–981  (CA7  1948);  United 
States v. Wight, 176 F. 2d 376, 379 (CA2 1949).

Beginning  in  1970,  the  Courts  of  Appeals  moved  from
the “farce and mockery” standard to a “reasonable compe-
tence” standard.  See Trapnell v. United States, 725 F. 2d 
149,  151–152  (CA2  1983)  (collecting  cases).  That  same 
year,  this  Court  similarly  held  that  defendants  are  “enti-
tled  to  the  effective  assistance  of  competent  counsel,”
defined as receipt of legal advice that is “within the range
of  competence  demanded  of  attorneys  in  criminal  cases.” 
McMann v. Richardson, 397 U. S. 759, 771 (1970).

Then,  in  Strickland,  the  Court  crafted  the  current 
standard  for  evaluating  claims  of  ineffective  assistance  of
counsel.    Without  discussing  the  original  meaning  of  the 
Sixth  Amendment,  the  Court  stated  that  “[t]he  Sixth
Amendment recognizes the right to the assistance of coun-
sel  because  it  envisions  counsel’s  playing  a  role  that  is
critical to the ability of the adversarial system to produce
just results.”  466 U. S., at 685.  The Court thus held that, 
to  succeed  on  an  ineffective-assistance  claim,  the  defend-
ant must show (1) “that counsel’s representation fell below
an  objective  standard  of  reasonableness”  and  (2)  “that 
there  is  a  reasonable  probability  that,  but  for  counsel’s
unprofessional  errors,  the  result  of  the  proceeding  would 
have been different.”  Id., at 688, 694.  The Court applies
this  standard  in  most  situations,  but,  as  it  does  today,  it
has  also  created  an  increasing  number  of  per se  rules  in