Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/19pdf/19-635_o7jq.pdf
Page Number: 30

Cite as:  591 U. S. ____ (2020) 

3 

KAVANAUGH, J., concurring in judgment 

to justify an intrusion on the Article II interests of the Pres-
idency.  The Nixon standard also  reduces the risk of sub-
jecting a President to unwarranted burdens, because it pro-
vides  that  a  prosecutor  may  obtain  a  President’s 
information only in certain defined circumstances. 

Although the Court adopted the Nixon standard in a dif-
ferent Article II context—there, involving the confidential-
ity of official, privileged information—the majority opinion
today  recognizes  that  there  are  also  important  Article  II
(and  Supremacy  Clause)  interests  at  stake  here.    A  state 
criminal subpoena to a President raises Article II and Su-
premacy Clause issues because of the potential for a state 
prosecutor to use the criminal process and issue subpoenas
in  a  way  that  interferes  with  the  President’s  duties, 
through harassment or diversion.  Cf. Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 
457 U. S. 731, 751–753 (1982). 

Because this case again entails a clash between the inter-
ests of the criminal process and the Article II interests of 
the  Presidency,  I  would  apply  the  longstanding  Nixon 
“demonstrated,  specific  need”  standard  to  this  case.  The 
majority opinion does not apply the Nixon standard in this 
distinct Article II context, as I would have done.  That said, 
the  majority  opinion  appropriately  takes  account  of  some 
important concerns that also animate Nixon and the Con-
stitution’s balance of powers.  The majority opinion explains 
that a state prosecutor may not issue a subpoena for a Pres-
ident’s personal information out of bad faith, malice, or an
intent to harass a President, ante, at 16; as a result of pros-
ecutorial impropriety, ibid.; to seek information that is not 
relevant  to  an  investigation,  ante,  at  16,  19–20;  that  is 
overly broad or unduly burdensome, ante, at 19–20; to ma-
nipulate,  influence,  or  retaliate  against  a  President’s  offi-
cial acts or policy decisions, ante, at 17, 20; or in a way that
would impede, conflict with, or interfere with a President’s 
official  duties,  ante,  at  20–21.  All  nine  Members  of  the