Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/11pdf/10-545.pdf
Page Number: 3.0

Cite as:  565 U. S. ____ (2012) 

3 

Syllabus 

gress to legislate perpetual copyright terms by instituting successive
“limited”  terms  as  prior  terms  expire.    But  as  in  Eldred,  such  hypo-
thetical  misbehavior  is  far  afield  from  this  case.    In  aligning  the
United States with other nations bound by Berne, Congress can hard-
ly  be  charged  with  a  design  to  move  stealthily  toward  a  perpetual
copyright regime.  Pp. 13–15.

(b) Historical practice corroborates the Court’s reading of the Copy-
right  Clause  to  permit  the  protection  of  previously  unprotected
works.    In  the  Copyright  Act  of  1790,  the  First  Congress  protected
works that had been freely reproducible under State copyright laws.
Subsequent  actions  confirm  that  Congress  has  not  understood  the 
Copyright  Clause  to  preclude  protection  for  existing  works.    Several 
private bills restored the copyrights and patents of works and inven-
tions previously in the public domain.  Congress has also passed gen-
erally applicable legislation granting copyrights and patents to works 
and inventions that had lost protection.  Pp. 15–19. 

(c) Petitioners also argue that §514 fails to “promote the Progress of 
Science”  as  contemplated  by  the  initial  words  of  the  Copyright 
Clause.  Specifically, they claim that because §514 affects only works 
already  created,  it  cannot  meet  the  Clause’s  objective.    The  creation 
of  new  works,  however,  is  not  the  sole  way  Congress  may  promote
“Science,” i.e., knowledge and learning.  In Eldred, this Court rejected
a nearly identical argument, concluding that the Clause does not de-
mand  that  each  copyright  provision,  examined  discretely,  operate  to
induce new works.  Rather the Clause “empowers Congress to deter-
mine  the  intellectual  property  regimes  that,  overall,  in  that  body’s 
judgment,  will  serve  the  ends  of  the  Clause.”    537  U. S.,  at  222. 
Nothing in the text or history of the Copyright Clause, moreover, con-
fines the “Progress of Science” exclusively to “incentives for creation.” 
Historical  evidence,  congressional  practice,  and  this  Court’s  deci-
sions,  in  fact,  suggest  that  inducing  the  dissemination  of  existing
works is an appropriate means to promote science.  Pp. 20–22. 

(d) Considered against this backdrop, §514 falls comfortably within
Congress’  Copyright  Clause  authority.    Congress  had  reason  to  be-
lieve  that  a  well-functioning  international  copyright  system  would 
encourage  the  dissemination  of  existing  and  future works.    And  tes-
timony informed Congress that full compliance with Berne would ex-
pand  the  foreign  markets  available  to  U. S.  authors  and  invigorate 
protection against piracy of U. S. works abroad, thus benefitting cop-
yright-intensive industries stateside and inducing greater investment 
in the creative process.  This Court has no warrant to reject Congress’ 
rational  judgment  that  exemplary  adherence  to  Berne  would  serve 
the objectives of the Copyright Clause.  Pp. 22–23. 

2. The  First  Amendment  does  not  inhibit  the  restoration  author-