Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/22pdf/21-857_4357.pdf
Page Number: 59

Cite as:  599 U. S. ____ (2023) 

27 

JACKSON, J., dissenting 

and  thereby  eschew  statutory  interpretations  that  would
(perhaps unintentionally) foreclose judicial review of post-
conviction claims, even where the text of the statute might 
(sometimes even strongly) suggest otherwise.15 

Furthermore, and significantly for present purposes, we 
have  already  determined  that  the  necessary  “clear  state-
ment”  here—i.e.,  the  signal  from  Congress  that  justifies
reading  a  statute  as  foreclosing  access  to  venerated  post-
conviction review processes—cannot be derived from nega-
In  Ex parte 
tive  inferences  drawn  from  statutory  text. 
Yerger, for instance, we declared that interpreting a statute
to “[r]epea[l] by implication” habeas jurisdiction is “not fa-
vored.”  8 Wall., at 105.  More recently, we warned (again) 
that  “[i]mplications  from  statutory  text  or  legislative  his-
tory are not sufficient to repeal habeas jurisdiction; instead, 
Congress must articulate specific and unambiguous statu-
tory directives to effect a repeal.”  St. Cyr, 533 U. S., at 299 
(citing Ex parte Yerger, 8 Wall., at 105).  And, again, in Hol-
land,  this  Court  explained  that  the  clear-statement  rule 
—————— 

15 For  example,  we  cited  the  clear-statement  rule  when  declining  to
read §2244(b)(2), which generally prohibits second or successive habeas 
petitions  filed  by  state  prisoners,  as  blocking  a  second-in-time  habeas 
petition that raised an incompetent-to-be-executed claim, even though, 
literally read, the statute could have done so.  Panetti, 551 U. S., at 942– 
943, 945–946.  Similarly, in Holland, the Court relied on the clear-state-
ment rule when evaluating AEDPA’s 1-year statute of limitations, hold-
ing  that  the  unequivocal  statutory  limitations  period  can  be  equitably
tolled, even though the text of AEDPA did not include equitable tolling 
among the enumerated exceptions.  560 U. S., at 646–649.  Likewise, in 
Castro, the Court used the clear-statement rule to reject the argument 
that  §2244(b)(3)(E)—which  prohibits  habeas  petitioners  from  seeking 
certiorari review of a “ ‘grant or denial of an authorization by a court of 
appeals to file a second or successive application’ ”—prevented this Court
from reviewing whether the lower courts had mistakenly concluded that
the federal prisoner’s petition was in fact a “second or successive” peti-
tion.  540 U. S., at 379–381.  Finally, in St. Cyr, the Court utilized the 
clear-statement  rule  to  dispense  with  the  contention  that  AEDPA 
stripped federal courts of jurisdiction to review a noncitizen’s habeas pe-
tition raising a pure question of law.  533 U. S., at 298–299, 314.