Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/18pdf/18-422_9ol1.pdf
Page Number: 31.0

26 

RUCHO v. COMMON CAUSE 

Opinion of the Court 

est in voting.”  348 F. Supp. 3d, at 523–524. 

To  begin,  there  are  no  restrictions  on  speech,  associa-
tion,  or  any  other  First  Amendment  activities  in  the  dis-
tricting plans at issue.  The plaintiffs are free to engage in
those activities no matter what the effect of a plan may be
on their district. 

The plaintiffs’ argument is that partisanship in district-
ing  should  be  regarded  as  simple  discrimination  against
supporters  of  the  opposing  party  on  the  basis  of  political 
viewpoint.  Under that theory, any level of partisanship in
districting would constitute an infringement of their First 
Amendment  rights.    But  as  the  Court  has  explained,  “[i]t 
would  be  idle  . . .  to  contend  that  any  political  considera-
tion  taken  into  account  in  fashioning  a  reapportionment
plan  is  sufficient  to  invalidate  it.”    Gaffney,  412  U. S.,  at 
752.  The  First  Amendment  test  simply  describes  the  act
of  districting  for  partisan  advantage.    It  provides  no 
standard  for  determining  when  partisan  activity  goes  too 
far. 

As  for  actual  burden,  the  slight  anecdotal  evidence 
found  sufficient  by  the  District  Courts  in  these  cases 
shows that this too is not a serious standard for separating
constitutional  from  unconstitutional  partisan  gerryman-
dering.  The  District  Courts  relied  on  testimony  about 
difficulty drumming up volunteers and enthusiasm.  How 
much of a decline in voter engagement is enough to consti-
tute a First Amendment burden?  How many door knocks 
must  go  unanswered?    How  many  petitions  unsigned? 
How  many  calls  for  volunteers  unheeded?    The  Common 
Cause  District  Court  held  that  a  partisan  gerrymander
places an unconstitutional burden on speech if it has more 
than a “de minimis” “chilling effect or adverse impact” on
any  First  Amendment  activity.    318  F. Supp.  3d,  at  930.
The court went on to rule that there would be an adverse 
effect “even if the speech of [the plaintiffs] was not in fact 
chilled”; it was enough that the districting plan “makes it