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Page Number: 44.0

38 

MCCUTCHEON v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N 

Opinion of ROBERTS, C. J. 

particular candidate’s benefit” (emphasis added)).

Of  course  a  candidate  would  be  pleased  with  a  donor 
who contributed not only to the candidate himself, but also
to other candidates from the same party, to party commit-
tees,  and  to  PACs  supporting  the  party.    But  there  is  a 
clear,  administrable  line  between  money  beyond  the  base
limits funneled in an identifiable way to a candidate—for 
which  the  candidate  feels  obligated—and  money  within
the  base  limits  given  widely  to  a  candidate’s  party—for
which  the  candidate,  like  all  other  members  of  the  party,
feels grateful.

When  donors  furnish  widely  distributed  support  within
all  applicable  base  limits,  all  members  of  the  party  or 
supporters of the cause may benefit, and the leaders of the
party  or  cause  may  feel  particular  gratitude.    That  grati-
tude  stems  from  the  basic  nature  of  the  party  system,  in
which  party  members  join  together  to  further  common 
political beliefs, and citizens can choose to support a party 
because they share some, most, or all of those beliefs.  See 
Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn., 479 U. S. 208, 214– 
216  (1986).  To  recast  such  shared  interest,  standing
alone, as an opportunity for quid pro quo corruption would 
dramatically  expand  government  regulation  of  the  politi-
cal process.  Cf. California Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 
U. S.  567,  572–573  (2000)  (recognizing  the  Government’s
“role  to  play  in  structuring  and  monitoring  the  election 
process,”  but  rejecting  “the  proposition  that  party  affairs
are public affairs, free of First Amendment protections”). 

The  Government  suggests  that  it  is  the  solicitation  of 
large  contributions  that  poses  the  danger  of  corruption,
see Tr. of Oral Arg. 29–30, 38–39, 50–51; see also post, at 
15–16, 20, but the aggregate limits are not limited to any 
direct  solicitation  by  an  officeholder  or  candidate.    Cf. 
McConnell,  supra,  at  298–299,  308  (opinion  of  KENNEDY, 
J.)  (rejecting  a  ban  on  “soft  money”  contributions  to  na-
tional  parties,  but  approving  a  ban  on  the  solicitation  of