Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/524bv.pdf
Page Number: 306.0

524US1

Unit: $U85

[09-14-00 16:49:41] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 524 U. S. 236 (1998)

261

Scalia, J., dissenting

Of course even if one accepts that the two factors the
Court alludes to (procedural ruling plus absence of full
brieﬁng or argument) reduce House’s stare decisis effect, one
must still acknowledge that its stare decisis effect is in-
creased by the fact that it was a statutory holding. The
Court does not contend that stare decisis is utterly inappli-
cable, and so it must come up with some reason for ignoring
it.
Its reason is that we have “disregarded” House in prac-
tice. Ante, at 252. The opinions it cites for this proposi-
tion, however, not only fail to mention House; they fail to
mention the jurisdictional issue to which House pertains.
And “we have repeatedly held that the existence of unad-
dressed jurisdictional defects has no precedential effect.”
Lewis v. Casey, 518 U. S. 343, 352, n. 2 (1996) (emphasis
added). Surely it constitutes “precedential effect” to reduce
the stare decisis effect of one of the Court’s holdings.
It is
signiﬁcant, moreover, that when Members of the Court have
discussed House or the jurisdictional effect of a COA denial,
they have agreed that jurisdiction is not available under
§ 1254. See Davis v. Jacobs, 454 U. S. 911, 912 (1981) (Ste-
vens, J., respecting denial of certiorari); id., at 916–917
(Rehnquist, J., joined by Burger, C. J., and Powell, J., dis-
senting); Jeffries v. Barksdale, 453 U. S. 914, 915–916 (1981)
(Rehnquist, J., joined by Burger, C. J., and Powell, J., dis-
senting). The Court’s new approach to unaddressed juris-
dictional defects is perhaps the second point for which the
present opinion will be remembered.

While there is scant reason for denying stare decisis effect
to House, there is special reason for according it: the reliance
of Congress upon an unrepudiated decision central to the
procedural scheme it was creating. Section 102 of AEDPA
continues a long tradition of provisions enacted by Congress
that limit appellate review of petitions.
In 1908, Congress
required a certiﬁcate of probable cause in habeas corpus
cases involving state prisoners before an appeal would lie to