Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/23pdf/22-704_4246.pdf
Page Number: 36.0

Cite as:  602 U. S. ____ (2024) 

9 

BARRETT, J., concurring in part 

necessarily identify its source.  See supra, at 4–5.  The bar 
on  registering  “deceptive”  marks  likewise  prevents  regis-
tered  marks  from  misidentifying  the  source  of  the  goods. 
§1052(a).

The names clause passes muster under this test.  A trade-
mark  that  includes  another  living  person’s  name  without 
her consent has the obvious potential to create source con-
fusion.  Further, the clause helps protect producer goodwill. 
By  freely  using  another  person’s  name  in  her  mark,  the
markowner can unfairly capitalize on the reputation of the 
named individual, who may be a producer in her own right.
Conversely,  if  the  markowner’s  goods  or  services  are
shoddy, she might jeopardize the named individual’s repu-
tation. 

Elster  protests  that  consumers  would  not  assume  that
Donald  Trump  is  responsible  for  the  mark  “ ‘Trump  too 
small.’ ”  Brief for Respondent 35.  Thus, he argues that even
if the names clause generally guards against source confu-
sion, refusing to register his proposed mark does not.  But 
Congress is entitled to make categorical judgments, partic-
ularly where heightened scrutiny does not apply.  The Gov-
ernment can reasonably determine that, on the whole, pro-
tecting  marks  that  include  another  living  person’s  name 
without consent risks undermining the goals of trademark.
The names clause is therefore constitutional, both facially
and as applied to Elster’s mark. 

III 
Rather  than  adopt  a  generally  applicable  principle,  the
Court assesses the names clause in isolation, treating the 
supposed history and tradition of the clause as determina-
tive.  In my view, the historical record does not alone suffice
to  demonstrate  the  clause’s  constitutionality.    For  one 
thing,  the  record  does  not  support  the  Court’s  conclusion. 
For another, I disagree with its choice to treat tradition as 
dispositive of the First Amendment issue.