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Page Number: 8.0

6 

TERRY v. UNITED STATES 

Opinion of the Court 

distribute,  (2)  crack,  of  (3)  at  least  50  grams.    §§841(a), 
(b)(1)(A)(iii).  This subparagraph (A) offense was punisha-
ble by 10 years to life, in addition to financial penalties and 
supervised  release.    The  elements  of  the  second  offense 
were  (1)  knowing  or  intentional  possession  with  intent  to 
distribute,  (2)  crack,  of  (3)  at  least  5  grams.   §§841(a),
(b)(1)(B)(iii).  This subparagraph (B) offense was punisha-
ble by 5-to-40 years, in addition to financial penalties and 
supervised release.  And the elements of the third offense 
were  (1)  knowing  or  intentional  possession  with  intent  to 
distribute, (2) some unspecified amount of a schedule I or II 
drug.  §§841(a), (b)(1)(C).

Petitioner  was  convicted  of  the  third  offense—subpara-
graph (C).  Before 2010, the statutory penalties for that of-
fense  were  0-to-20  years,  up  to  a  $1  million  fine,  or  both, 
and a period of supervised release.3  After 2010, these stat-
utory penalties remain exactly the same.  The Fair Sentenc-
ing Act thus did not modify the statutory penalties for peti-
tioner’s offense.  

Petitioner’s offense is starkly different from the offenses 
that triggered mandatory minimums.  The Fair Sentencing 
Act plainly “modified” the “statutory penalties” for those.  It 
did so by increasing the triggering quantities from 50 grams
to 280 in subparagraph (A) and from 5 grams to 28 in sub-
paragraph (B).  Before 2010, a person charged with the orig-
inal elements of subparagraph (A)—knowing or intentional 
possession  with  intent  to  distribute  at  least  50  grams  of 
crack—faced  a  prison  range  of  between  10  years  and  life. 

—————— 

3 All  three  subparagraphs  carried,  and continue  to  carry,  heightened
penalties if an offense caused death or serious bodily injury or if the de-
fendant was a repeat offender.  Petitioner’s actual sentencing range un-
der  subparagraph  (C)  was  0-to-30  years  because  he  had  a  prior  felony 
drug offense.  828 Fed. Appx. 563, 565 (CA11 2020).  Because these en-
hancements are identical before and after 2010, they make no difference
to the analysis.  Petitioner’s enhancement for his prior conviction is thus
omitted from the body of the opinion for the sake of simplicity.