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24 

BOSTOCK v. CLAYTON COUNTY 

ALITO, J., dissenting 

community  apply  shared  background  conventions  for  un-
derstanding  how  particular  words  are  used  in  particular
contexts.”  Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 Harv. L. 
Rev. 2387, 2457 (2003).  Therefore, judges should ascribe to 
the  words  of  a  statute  “what  a  reasonable  person  conver-
sant with applicable social conventions would have under-
stood them to be adopting.”  Manning, 106 Colum. L. Rev.,
at  77.  Or,  to  put  the  point  in  slightly  different  terms,  a
judge  interpreting  a  statute  should  ask  “ ‘what  one  would 
ordinarily be understood as saying, given the circumstances
in which one said it.’ ”  Manning, 116 Harv. L. Rev., at 2397– 
2398. 

Judge Frank Easterbrook has made the same points: 

“Words are arbitrary signs, having meaning only to the
extent writers and readers share an understanding. . . .  
Language in general, and legislation in particular, is a 
social enterprise to which both speakers and listeners 
contribute,  drawing  on  background  understandings
and the structure and circumstances of the utterance.” 
Herrmann v. Cencom Cable Assocs., Inc., 978 F. 2d 978, 
982 (CA7 1992). 

Consequently, “[s]licing a statute into phrases while ig-
noring . . . the setting of the enactment . . . is a formula for 
disaster.”  Ibid.;  see  also  Continental  Can  Co.  v.  Chicago 
Truck Drivers, Helpers and Warehouse Workers Union (In-
dependent) Pension Fund, 916 F. 2d 1154, 1157 (CA7 1990) 
(“You don’t have to be Ludwig Wittgenstein or Hans-Georg 
Gadamer to know that successful communication depends 
on meanings shared by interpretive communities”). 

Thus, when textualism is properly understood, it calls for 
an examination of the social context in which a statute was 
enacted  because  this  may  have  an  important  bearing  on 
what its words were understood to mean at the time of en-
actment.  Textualists do not read statutes as if they were 
messages  picked  up  by  a  powerful  radio  telescope  from  a