Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/14pdf/14-556_3204.pdf
Page Number: 16.0

Cite as:  576 U. S. ____ (2015) 

11 

Opinion of the Court 

tion  guide  and  discipline  this  inquiry  but  do  not  set  its
outer  boundaries.  See  Lawrence,  supra,  at  572.  That 
method  respects  our  history  and  learns  from  it  without
allowing the past alone to rule the present. 

The nature of injustice is that we may not always see it 
in our own times.  The generations that wrote and ratified 
the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment did not 
presume to know the extent of freedom in all of its dimen-
sions, and so they entrusted to future generations a char-
ter protecting the right of all persons to enjoy liberty as we
learn  its  meaning.    When  new  insight  reveals  discord 
between  the  Constitution’s  central  protections  and  a  re-
ceived legal stricture, a claim to liberty must be addressed. 
Applying  these  established  tenets,  the  Court  has  long
held  the  right  to  marry  is  protected  by  the  Constitution. 
In Loving v. Virginia, 388 U. S. 1, 12 (1967), which invali-
dated bans on interracial unions, a unanimous Court held 
marriage  is  “one  of  the  vital  personal  rights  essential  to 
the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.”  The Court 
reaffirmed  that  holding  in  Zablocki  v.  Redhail,  434  U. S. 
374,  384  (1978),  which  held  the  right  to  marry  was  bur-
dened  by  a  law  prohibiting  fathers  who  were  behind  on
child  support  from  marrying.    The  Court  again  applied 
this principle in Turner v. Safley, 482 U. S. 78, 95 (1987), 
which held the right to marry was abridged by regulations 
limiting  the  privilege  of  prison  inmates  to  marry.    Over 
time  and  in  other  contexts,  the  Court  has  reiterated  that 
the right to marry is fundamental under the Due Process 
Clause.  See,  e.g.,  M.  L.  B.  v.  S. L. J.,  519  U. S.  102,  116 
(1996);  Cleveland  Bd.  of  Ed.  v.  LaFleur,  414  U. S.  632, 
639–640 (1974); Griswold, supra, at 486; Skinner v. Okla-
homa ex rel. Williamson, 316 U. S. 535, 541 (1942); Meyer 
v. Nebraska, 262 U. S. 390, 399 (1923).

It  cannot  be  denied  that  this  Court’s  cases  describing 
the  right  to  marry  presumed  a  relationship  involving 
opposite-sex partners.  The Court, like many institutions,