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Page Number: 48

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CHRISTIAN LEGAL SOC. CHAPTER OF UNIV. OF CAL., 

HASTINGS COLLEGE OF LAW v. MARTINEZ 

KENNEDY, J., concurring

intellectual contexts.  A vibrant dialogue is not possible if 
students wall themselves off from opposing points of view. 
The school’s objectives thus might not be well served if, 
as a condition to membership or  participation in a  group, 
students were required to avow particular personal beliefs 
or  to  disclose  private,  off-campus  behavior.    Students 
whose views are in the minority at the school would likely 
fare  worse  in  that  regime.    Indeed,  were  those  sorts  of 
requirements to become prevalent, it might undermine the 
principle  that  in  a  university  community—and  in  a  law 
school  community  specifically—speech  is  deemed  persua-
sive  based  on  its  substance,  not  the  identity  of  the 
speaker.    The  era  of  loyalty  oaths  is  behind  us.    A  school 
quite  properly  may  conclude  that  allowing  an  oath  or 
belief-affirming  requirement,  or  an  outside  conduct  re-
quirement,  could  be  divisive  for  student  relations  and 
inconsistent  with  the  basic  concept  that  a  view’s  validity
should  be  tested  through  free  and  open  discussion.    The 
school’s  policy  therefore  represents  a  permissible effort  to 
preserve the value of its forum. 

In addition to a circumstance, already noted, in which it
could  be  demonstrated  that  a  school  has  adopted  or  en-
forced its policy with the intent or purpose of discriminat-
ing  or  disadvantaging  a  group  on  account  of  its  views,
petitioner also would have a substantial case on the merits
if  it  were  shown  that  the  all-comers  policy  was  either 
designed  or  used  to  infiltrate  the  group  or  challenge  its 
leadership  in  order  to  stifle  its  views.    But  that  has  not 
been  shown  to  be  so  likely  or  self-evident  as  a  matter  of 
group dynamics in this setting that the Court can declare
the school policy void without more facts; and if there were 
a showing that in a particular case the purpose or effect of 
the policy was to stifle speech or make it ineffective, that, 
too, would present a case different from the one before us. 

These  observations  are  offered  to  support  the  analysis 

set forth in the opinion of the Court, which I join.