Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/21pdf/20-1034_b8dg.pdf
Page Number: 9

6 

GOLAN v. SAADA 

Opinion of the Court 

his violent conduct” during his testimony and that Saada’s 
“own expert said . . . that [Saada] could not control his an-
ger or take responsibility for his behavior.”  Ibid. 

The  court  nonetheless  ordered  B. A. S.’  return  to  Italy
based on Second Circuit precedent obligating it to “ ‘exam-
ine the full range of options that might make possible the
safe return of a child to the home country’ ” before it could
“ ‘deny repatriation on the ground that a grave risk of harm
exists.’ ”  Id., at 81a (quoting Blondin II, 238 F. 3d, at 163, 
n. 11).  The Second Circuit based this rule on its view that 
the Convention requires return “if at all possible.”  Blondin 
I, 189 F. 3d, at 248.  To comply with these precedents, the
District Court had required the parties to propose “ ‘amelio-
rative  measures’ ”  that  could  enable  B. A. S.’  safe  return. 
App.  to  Pet.  for  Cert.  81a.4    Saada  had  proposed  that  he
would provide Golan with $30,000 for expenses pending a 
decision in Italian courts as to financial support, stay away
from Golan until the custody dispute was resolved, pursue
dismissal of the criminal charges he had filed against Go-
lan,  begin  cognitive  behavioral  therapy,  and  waive  any 
right to legal fees or expenses under the Convention.  The 
court  concluded  that  these  measures,  combined  with  the 
fact  that  Saada  and  Golan  would  be  living  separately, 
would “reduce the occasions for violence,” thereby amelio-
rating  the  grave  risk  to  B. A. S.  sufficiently  to  require  his 
return.  Id., at 81a–82a. 

On Golan’s appeal of this return order, the Second Circuit 

—————— 

4 Courts  of  Appeals  use  the  terms  “undertakings”  and  “ameliorative
measures” interchangeably.  See, e.g., Blondin I, 189 F. 3d 240, 248 (CA2 
1999) (referring to “ameliorative measures”); Simcox v. Simcox, 511 F. 3d 
594, 604–606 (CA6 2007) (referring to “undertakings”).  Although Saada
asserts that the latter is broader than the former, he does not argue that 
the difference is determinative in this case.  Accordingly, we use “ame-
liorative  measures,”  the  term  employed  by  the  Second  Circuit  in  this 
case.