Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/22pdf/21-806_2dp3.pdf
Page Number: 39.0

Cite as:  599 U. S. ____ (2023) 

7 

THOMAS, J., dissenting 

from taking effect by rejecting a State’s application to par-
ticipate in the spending program, and it can terminate their
effect  by  cutting  off  a  State’s  participation  for  noncompli-
ance with the conditions.  In addition, States can opt out of 
spending  programs,  completely  nullifying  whatever  force
the spending conditions once had.  This alone suggests that
spending conditions do not operate with the force of federal
law, as “Congress’ legislative powers cannot be avoided by 
simply opting out.”  D. Engdahl, The Contract Thesis of the 
Federal  Spending  Power,  52  S. D.  L. Rev.  496,  498  (2007) 
(emphasis deleted); see also Townsend v. Swank, 404 U. S. 
282,  292  (1971)  (Burger,  C.  J.,  concurring  in  result)
(“[A]dherence to the provisions of [spending statutes] is in 
no  way  mandatory  upon  the  States  under  the  Supremacy 
Clause”).

Indeed, spending conditions like those in FNHRA do not
function as laws enacted under Congress’ regulatory pow-
ers,  and,  if  they  did,  they  would  unconstitutionally  com-
mandeer the States to administer federal programs ranging 
from welfare, to healthcare, to air quality, and much more.
Such conditions are thus constitutional, if at all, only if un-
derstood  as  setting  forth  the  terms  of  a  federal-state  con-
tract, rather than as binding federal law imposing legally 
enforceable  obligations  of  its  own  force.    In  holding  that 
FNHRA secures rights by federal law, the majority ignores 
the contractual understanding of spending conditions and, 
by doing so, calls their very constitutionality into question. 

A 
As  noted  earlier,  a  defining  characteristic  of  modern 
spending  legislation  is  the  imposition  of  obligations  on 
States that accept federal funds.  Understanding a State’s
breach  of  such  obligations  as  akin  to  violating  rights  se-
cured by federal law is incompatible with this Court’s anti-
commandeering  doctrine.    Under  this  bedrock  constitu-
tional  principle,  Congress  generally  cannot  directly