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Page Number: 30

2 

BARR v. AMERICAN ASSN. OF POLITICAL  
CONSULTANTS, INC. 
SOTOMAYOR, J., concurring in judgment 

n. 10; see also §227(b)(1)(A).  Nor has the Government “suf-
ficiently justified the differentiation between government-
debt collection speech and other important categories of ro-
bocall speech, such as political speech, charitable fundrais-
ing, issue advocacy, commercial advertising, and the like.” 
Ante, at 9. 

Nevertheless, I agree that the offending provision is sev-
erable.  See ante, at 2; post, at 11–12 (opinion of BREYER, 
J.);  see  also  City  of  Ladue  v.  Gilleo,  512  U. S.  43,  51–53 
(1994) (explaining that an appropriate “solution” to a law
that  covers  “too  little  speech  because  its  exemptions  dis-
criminate on the basis of [the speaker’s] messages” could be 
to “remove” the discrimination).

With those understandings, I concur in the judgment.