Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/17pdf/16-1466_2b3j.pdf
Page Number: 80.0

Cite as:  585 U. S. ____ (2018) 

25 

KAGAN, J., dissenting 

as well.  See Brief for Governor Tom Wolf et al. 11.6 

The  majority,  though,  offers  another  reason  for  not
worrying  about  reliance:  The  parties,  it  says,  “have  been 
on notice for years regarding this Court’s misgivings about 
Abood.”  Ante,  at  45.    Here,  the  majority  proudly  lays
claim  to  its  6-year  crusade  to  ban  agency  fees.    In  Knox, 
the  majority  relates,  it  described  Abood  as  an  “anomaly.” 
Ante, at 45 (quoting 567 U. S., at 311).  Then, in Harris, it 
“cataloged  Abood’s  many  weaknesses.”  Ante,  at  45. 
Finally, in Friedrichs, “we granted a petition for certiorari 
asking  us  to”  reverse  Abood,  but  found  ourselves  equally 
divided.  Ante,  at  45.  “During  this  period  of  time,”  the 
majority  concludes,  public-sector  unions  “must  have  un-
derstood  that  the  constitutionality  of  [an  agency-fee]
provision was uncertain.”  Ibid.  And so, says the majority, 
they should have structured their affairs accordingly.

But  that  argument  reflects  a  radically  wrong  under-
standing of how stare decisis operates.  Justice Scalia once 
confronted a similar argument for “disregard[ing] reliance
interests”  and  showed  how  antithetical  it  was  to  rule-of-
law principles.  Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U. S. 298, 
320  (1992)  (concurring  opinion).  He  noted  first  what  we 
always tell lower courts: “If a precedent of this Court has
direct application in a case, yet appears to rest on reasons 
rejected  in  some  other  line  of  decisions,  [they]  should
follow  the  case  which  directly  controls,  leaving  to  this
Court the prerogative of overruling its own decisions.”  Id., 

—————— 

6 In  a  single,  cryptic  sentence,  the  majority  also  claims  that  argu-
ments about reliance “based on [Abood’s] clarity are misplaced” because 
Abood  did  not  provide  a  “clear  or  easily  applicable  standard”  to  sepa-
rate  fees  for  collective  bargaining  from  those  for  political  activities. 
Ante,  at  45.  But  to  begin,  the  standard  for  separating  those  activities
was clear and workable, as I have already shown.  See supra, at 21–22. 
And in any event, the reliance Abood engendered was based not on the
clarity  of  that  line,  but  on  the  clarity  of  its  holding  that  governments 
and unions could generally agree to fair-share arrangements.