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Page Number: 16.0

Cite as:  590 U. S. ____ (2020) 

1 

SOTOMAYOR, J., concurring 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

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No. 18–1048 
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GE ENERGY POWER CONVERSION FRANCE SAS, 
CORP., FKA CONVERTEAM SAS, PETITIONER v. 
OUTOKUMPU STAINLESS USA, LLC, ET AL. 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT 

[June 1, 2020]

 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR, concurring. 
I agree with the Court that the Convention on the Recog-
nition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June
10, 1958, 21 U. S. T. 2517, T. I. A. S. No. 6997 (New York 
Convention), does not categorically prohibit the application
of domestic doctrines, such as equitable estoppel, that may 
permit nonsignatories to enforce arbitration agreements.  I 
note,  however,  that  the  application  of  such  domestic  doc-
trines is subject to an important limitation: Any applicable 
domestic doctrines must be rooted in the principle of con-
sent to arbitrate. 

This limitation is part and parcel of the Federal Arbitra-
tion Act (FAA) itself.  It is a “basic precept,” Stolt-Nielsen 
S. A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U. S. 662, 681 (2010), 
that “[a]rbitration under the [FAA] is a matter of consent, 
not  coercion,”  Volt  Information  Sciences,  Inc.  v.  Board  of 
Trustees  of  Leland  Stanford  Junior  Univ.,  489  U. S.  468, 
479  (1989);  see  also,  e.g.,  Lamps  Plus,  Inc.  v.  Varela,  587 
U. S.  ___,  ___  (2019)  (slip  op.,  at  7)  (“Consent  is  essential 
under the FAA”); Granite Rock Co. v. Teamsters, 561 U. S. 
287, 299 (2010) (“[T]he first principle that underscores all 
of our arbitration decisions” is that “[a]rbitration is strictly 
‘a matter of consent’ ”).  “We have emphasized th[is] ‘foun-
dational  FAA  principle’  many  times,”  Lamps  Plus,  587