Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/22pdf/21-1450_5468.pdf
Page Number: 20.0

Cite as:  598 U. S. ____ (2023) 

1 

GORSUCH, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part
Opinion of GORSUCH, J. 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

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No. 21–1450 
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TURKIYE HALK BANKASI A. S., AKA HALKBANK, 
PETITIONER v. UNITED STATES 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT 

[April 19, 2023]

 JUSTICE GORSUCH, with whom JUSTICE ALITO joins, con-

curring in part and dissenting in part. 

For almost a half century, judges have known where to
turn for guidance when deciding whether a foreign sover-
eign is susceptible to suit in an American court:  Congress’s
directions in the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976
(FSIA), 28 U. S. C. §1602 et seq.  Sometimes the FSIA au-
thorizes American courts to hear cases against foreign sov-
ereigns;  sometimes  the  statute  immunizes  foreign  sover-
eigns from suit.  Today, however, the Court holds that the 
FSIA’s rules apply only in civil cases.  To decide whether a 
foreign sovereign is susceptible to criminal prosecution, the
Court  says,  federal  judges  must  consult  the  common  law.
Respectfully, I disagree.  The same statute we routinely use
to analyze sovereign immunity in civil cases applies equally 
in criminal ones. 

I 
I begin from common ground.  Congress has vested fed-
eral  courts  with  subject-matter  jurisdiction  over  cases  in-
volving “offenses against the laws of the United States.”  18 
U. S. C. §3231.  The Court holds that this statute permits
federal courts to hear cases alleging offenses committed by 
foreign sovereigns.  I agree.  As the Court explains, §3231’s
language grants subject-matter jurisdiction in broad terms