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Page Number: 4.0

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KNOX v. SERVICE EMPLOYEES 

Syllabus 

decrease  would  not  fully  recompense  nonmembers,  who  would  not 
have  paid  to  support  the  special  assessment  if  given  the  choice.    In 
any  event,  even  a  full  refund  would  not  undo  the  First  Amendment 
violations, since the First Amendment does not permit a union to ex-
tract  a  loan  from  unwilling  nonmembers  even  if  the  money  is  later 
paid back in full.  Pp. 14−17. 

(d) The  SEIU’s  treatment  of  nonmembers  who  opted  out  when 
the  initial  Hudson  notice  was  sent  also  ran  afoul  of  the  First 
Amendment.    They  were  required  to  pay  56.35%  of  the  special  as-
sessment  even  though  all  the  money  was  slated  for  nonchargeable, 
electoral  uses.    And  the  SEIU’s  claim  that  the  assessment  was  a 
windfall because chargeable expenses turned out to be 66.26% is un-
persuasive.    First,  the  SEIU’s  understanding  of  the  breadth  of
chargeable expenses is so expansive that it is hard to place much re-
liance  on  its  statistics.    “Lobbying  the  electorate,”  which  the  SEIU 
claims is chargeable, is nothing more than another term for support-
ing  political  causes  and  candidates.    Second,  even  if  the  SEIU’s  sta-
tistics are accurate, it does not follow that it was proper to charge ob-
jecting  nonmembers  any  particular  percentage  of  the  special 
assessment.    If,  as  the  SEIU  argues,  it  is  not  possible  to  accurately
determine in advance the percentage of union funds that will be used 
for an upcoming year’s chargeable purposes, there is  a  risk that un-
consenting  nonmembers  will  have  paid  too  much  or  too  little.    That 
risk  should  be  borne  by  the  side  whose  constitutional  rights  are  not
at  stake.  If  the  nonmembers  pay  too  much,  their  First  Amendment 
rights are infringed.  But, if they pay too little, no constitutional right 
of  the  union  is  violated  because  it  has  no  constitutional  right  to  re-
ceive any payment from those employees.  Pp. 17−23. 

628 F. 3d 1115, reversed and remanded. 

ALITO, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C. J., 
and SCALIA, KENNEDY, and THOMAS, JJ., joined.  SOTOMAYOR, J., filed an 
opinion  concurring  in  the  judgment,  in  which  GINSBURG,  J.,  joined. 
BREYER, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which KAGAN, J., joined.