Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/529bv.pdf
Page Number: 837

529US3

Unit: $U58

[09-26-01 12:26:35] PAGES PGT: OPIN

762

OHLER v. UNITED STATES

Souter, J., dissenting

dence was erroneously admitted.” Ante, at 755. But this
is no more support for today’s holding than Luce is, for the
common sense that approves the rule also limits its reach to
a point well short of this case. The general rule makes
sense, ﬁrst, when a party who has freely chosen to introduce
evidence of a particular fact later sees his opponent’s evi-
dence of the same fact erroneously admitted. He suffers no
prejudice. See Mercer v. Theriot, 377 U. S. 152, 154 (1964)
(per curiam); 21 C. Wright & K. Graham, Federal Practice
and Procedure § 5039, p. 203 (1977). The rule makes sense,
second, when the objecting party takes inconsistent posi-
tions, ﬁrst requesting admission and then assigning error
to the admission of precisely the same evidence at his op-
ponent’s behest.
“The party should not be permitted ‘to
blow hot and cold’ in this way.” 1 J. Strong, McCormick on
Evidence § 55, p. 246, n. 14 (5th ed. 1999).

Neither of these reasons applies when (as here) the de-
fendant has opposed admission of the evidence and intro-
duced it herself only to mitigate its effect in the hands of her
adversary. Such a case falls beyond the scope of the general
principle, and the scholarship almost uniformly treats it as
exceptional. See, e. g., 1 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 18, p. 836
(P. Tillers rev. 1983) (“[A] party who has made an unsuc-
cessful motion in limine to exclude evidence that he expects
the proponent to offer may be able to ﬁrst offer that same
evidence without waiving his claim of error”); M. Graham,
Handbook of Federal Evidence § 103.4, p. 17 (1981) (“How-
ever, the party may . . . himself bring out evidence ruled
admissible over his objection to minimize its effect without
it constituting a waiver of his objection”); 1 McCormick,
supra, § 55, at 246 (“[W]hen [a party’s] objection is made
and overruled, he is entitled to treat this ruling as the ‘law
of the trial’ and to explain or rebut, if he can, the evidence
admitted over his protest”); D. Louisell & C. Mueller, Fed-
eral Evidence § 11, p. 65 (1977) (“Having done his best by
objecting, the adversary would be indeed ill treated if then