Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/19pdf/19-635_o7jq.pdf
Page Number: 34

2 

TRUMP v. VANCE 

THOMAS, J., dissenting 

United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 30, 34 (No. 14,692d) (CC 
Va. 1807) (Marshall, C. J.), he is entitled to relief from en-
forcement of the subpoena. 

I 

The President first argues that he has absolute immunity 
from the issuance of grand jury subpoenas during his term
in office.  This Court has recognized absolute immunity for 
the President from “damages liability predicated on his of-
ficial acts.”  Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U. S. 731, 749 (1982). 
But we have rejected absolute immunity from damages ac-
tions for a President’s nonofficial conduct, Clinton v. Jones, 
520 U. S. 681, 684 (1997), and we have never addressed the 
question of immunity from a grand jury subpoena.

I agree with the majority that the President does not have 
absolute immunity from the issuance of a grand jury sub-
poena.  Unlike  the  majority,  however,  I  do  not  reach  this
conclusion based on a primarily functionalist analysis.  In-
stead,  I  reach  it  based  on  the  text  of  the  Constitution, 
which,  as  understood  by  the  ratifying  public  and  incorpo-
rated  into  an  early  circuit  opinion  by  Chief  Justice  Mar-
shall, does not support the President’s claim of absolute im-
munity.1 

A 
1 
The text of the Constitution explicitly addresses the priv-
ileges  of  some  federal  officials,  but  it  does  not  afford  the
President  absolute  immunity.    Members  of  Congress  are
“privileged from Arrest during their Attendance at the Ses-
sion of their respective Houses, and in going to and return-
ing from the same,” except for “Treason, Felony and Breach 
of  the  Peace.”  Art.  I,  §6,  cl. 1.    The  Constitution  further 
specifies that, “for any Speech or Debate in either House, 

—————— 

1 I  do  not  address  the  continuing  validity  of  Nixon v. Fitzgerald,  457 

U. S. 731 (1982), which no party asks us to revisit.