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RIVAS-VILLEGAS v. CORTESLUNA 

Per Curiam 

here was excessive.”  Id., at 664 (internal quotation marks 
omitted).

We agree and therefore reverse.  Even assuming that con-
trolling  Circuit  precedent  clearly  establishes  law  for  pur-
poses of §1983, LaLonde did not give fair notice to Rivas-
Villegas.  He is thus entitled to qualified immunity. 

“Qualified immunity attaches when an official’s conduct
does  not  violate  clearly  established  statutory  or  constitu-
tional  rights  of  which  a  reasonable  person  would  have 
known.”  White v. Pauly, 580 U. S. ___, ___ (2017) (per cu-
riam) (slip op., at 6) (internal quotation marks omitted).  A 
right is clearly established when it is “sufficiently clear that
every reasonable official would have understood that what 
he is doing violates that right.”  Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U. S. 
7,  11  (2015)  (per  curiam)  (internal  quotation  marks  omit-
ted).  Although “this Court’s case law does not require a case
directly on point for a right to be clearly established, exist-
ing precedent must have placed the statutory or constitu-
tional  question  beyond  debate.”    White,  580  U. S.,  at  ___ 
(slip  op.,  at  6)  (alterations  and  internal  quotation  marks
omitted).  This inquiry “must be undertaken in light of the
specific context of the case, not as a broad general proposi-
tion.”  Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U. S. 194, 198 (2004) (per 
curiam) (internal quotation marks omitted).   

“[S]pecificity  is  especially  important  in  the  Fourth
Amendment context, where . . . it is sometimes difficult for 
an officer to determine how the relevant legal doctrine, here 
excessive force, will apply to the factual situation the officer 
confronts.”  Mullenix, 577 U. S., at 12 (alterations and in-
ternal  quotation  marks  omitted).  Whether  an  officer  has 
used  excessive  force  depends  on  “the  facts  and  circum-
stances of each particular case, including the severity of the
crime  at  issue,  whether  the  suspect  poses  an  immediate 
threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he
is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by
flight.”  Graham v. Connor, 490 U. S. 386, 396 (1989); see