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2 

TURNER v. ROGERS 

Syllabus 

tion,” Turner’s imprisonment for up to 12 months, is “in its duration
too  short  to  be  fully  litigated”  through  the  state  courts  (and  arrive
here) prior to its “expiration.”  First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 
435 U. S. 765, 774.  And there is a more than “reasonable” likelihood 
that  Turner  will  again  be  “subjected  to  the  same  action”  because  he
has  frequently  failed  to  make  his  support  payments,  has  been  the 
subject  of  several  civil  contempt  proceedings,  has  been  imprisoned
several  times,  and  is,  once  again,  the  subject  of  civil  contempt  pro-
ceedings for failure to pay.  DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U. S. 312, and 
St. Pierre v. United States, 319 U. S. 41, distinguished.  Pp. 5–7.

2. The Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause does not auto-
matically  require  the  State  to  provide  counsel  at  civil  contempt  pro-
ceedings to an indigent noncustodial parent who is subject to a child 
support order, even if that individual faces incarceration.  In particu-
lar, that Clause does not require that counsel be provided where the
opposing parent or other custodian is not represented by counsel and 
the  State  provides  alternative  procedural  safeguards  equivalent  to 
adequate notice of the importance of the ability to pay, a fair oppor-
tunity  to  present,  and  to  dispute,  relevant  information,  and  express
court findings as to the supporting parent’s ability to comply with the
support order. Pp.  7–16. 

(a) This  Court’s  precedents  provide  no  definitive  answer  to  the
question  whether  counsel  must  be  provided.    The  Sixth Amendment 
grants an indigent criminal  defendant the right to counsel, see, e.g., 
United States v. Dixon, 509 U. S. 688, 696, but does not govern civil 
cases.  Civil  and  criminal  contempt  differ.    A  court  may  not  impose 
punishment “in a civil contempt proceeding when it is clearly estab-
lished that the alleged contemnor is unable to comply with the terms
of  the  order.”  Hicks  v.  Feiock,  485  U. S.  624,  638,  n. 9.    And  once  a 
civil  contemnor  complies  with  the  underlying  order,  he  is  purged  of 
the contempt and is free.  Id., at 633.  The Due Process Clause allows 
a State to provide fewer procedural protections in civil contempt pro-
ceedings than in a criminal case.  Id., at 637–641.  Cases directly con-
cerning a right to counsel in civil cases have found a presumption of 
such a right “only” in cases involving incarceration, but have not held
that a right to counsel exists in all such cases.  See In re Gault, 387 
U. S.  1;  Vitek  v.  Jones,  445  U. S.  480;  and  Lassiter  v.  Department  of 
Social Servs. of Durham Cty., 452 U. S. 18.  Pp. 7–10.

(b) Because  a  contempt  proceeding  to  compel  support  payments
is civil, the question whether the “specific dictates of due process” re-
quire appointed counsel is determined by examining the “distinct fac-
tors”  this  Court  has  used  to  decide  what  specific  safeguards  are
needed  to  make  a  civil  proceeding  fundamentally  fair.    Mathews  v. 
Eldridge, 424 U. S. 319, 335.  As relevant here those factors include