Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/524bv.pdf
Page Number: 594

524US2

Unit: $U94

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Cite as: 524 U. S. 498 (1998)

549

Opinion of Kennedy, J.

As a consequence, due process protection for property must
be understood to incorporate our settled tradition against
retroactive laws of great severity. Groups targeted by ret-
roactive laws, were they to be denied all protection, would
have a justiﬁed fear that a government once formed to pro-
tect expectations now can destroy them. Both stability of
investment and conﬁdence in the constitutional system, then,
are secured by due process restrictions against severe retro-
active legislation.

The case before us represents one of the rare instances
where the Legislature has exceeded the limits imposed by
due process. The plurality opinion demonstrates in convinc-
ing fashion that the remedy created by the Coal Act bears
no legitimate relation to the interest which the Government
asserts in support of the statute. Ante, at 529–537.
In our
tradition, the degree of retroactive effect is a signiﬁcant
determinant in the constitutionality of a statute. United
States v. Carlton, supra, at 32; United States v. Darusmont,
449 U. S. 292, 296–297 (1981) (per curiam); see also Dunbar
v. Boston & P. R. Corp., 181 Mass. 383, 386, 63 N. E. 916, 917
(1902) (Holmes, C. J.). As the plurality explains today, in
creating liability for events which occurred 35 years ago the
Coal Act has a retroactive effect of unprecedented scope.
Ante, at 532.

While we have upheld the imposition of liability on former
employers based on past employment relationships, the stat-
utes at issue were remedial, designed to impose an “actual,
measurable cost of [the employer’s] business” which the em-
ployer had been able to avoid in the past. Turner Elkhorn,
supra, at 19; accord, Concrete Pipe, 508 U. S., at 638; Ro-
mein, supra, at 191–192; R. A. Gray, supra, at 733–734. As
Chancellor Kent noted: “Such statutes have been held valid
when clearly just and reasonable, and conducive to the gen-
eral welfare, even though they might operate in a degree
upon existing rights.”
1 Kent, Commentaries on American
Law, at *455–*456. The Coal Act, however, does not serve