Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/19pdf/18-5924_n6io.pdf
Page Number: 20.0

Cite as:  590 U. S. ____ (2020) 

17 

Opinion of the Court 
Opinion of GORSUCH, J. 

requirement.    The  ninth  Justice  agrees  that  the  Fourth
Amendment requires a warrant, but takes an idiosyncratic
view  of  the  consequences  of  violating  that  right.    In  her 
view,  the  exclusionary  rule  has  gone  too  far,  and  should 
only apply when the defendant is prosecuted for a felony. 
Because the case before her happens to involve only a mis-
demeanor, she provides the ninth vote to affirm a conviction
based  on  evidence  secured  by  a  warrantless  search.    Of 
course, this Court has longstanding precedent requiring the 
suppression  of  all  evidence  obtained  in  unconstitutional
searches and seizures.  Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643 (1961).
But  like  Justice  Powell,  our  hypothetical  ninth  Justice
sticks to her view and expressly rejects this Court’s prece-
dent.  Like Justice Powell, this Justice’s vote would be es-
sential to the judgment.  So if, as the dissent suggests, that 
is enough to displace precedent, would Mapp’s exclusionary
rule now be limited to felony prosecutions? 

Admittedly,  this  example  comes  from  our  imagination.
It has to, because no case has before suggested that a single
Justice may overrule precedent.  But if the Court were to 
embrace the dissent’s view of stare decisis, it would not stay
imaginary for long.  Every occasion on which the Court is
evenly  split  would  present  an  opportunity  for  single  Jus-
tices to overturn precedent to bind future majorities.  Rather 
than  advancing  the  goals  of  predictability  and  reliance 
lying behind the doctrine of stare decisis, such an approach
would impair them.

The dissent contends that, in saying this much, we risk 
defying  Marks  v.  United  States.48   According  to  Marks, 
when “a fragmented Court decides a case and no single ra-
tionale explaining the result enjoys the assent of five Jus-
tices, ‘the holding of the Court may be viewed as that posi-
tion  taken  by  those  Members  who  concurred  in  the 

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48 430 U. S. 188 (1977).