Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/09pdf/08-769.pdf
Page Number: 29.0

Cite as:  559 U. S. ____ (2010) 

5 

ALITO, J., dissenting 

videos and depictions of deadly animal fights.  See ante, at 
10, 19.  Instead, the Court tacitly assumes for the sake of 
argument that §48 is valid as applied to these depictions, 
but  the  Court  concludes  that  §48  reaches  too  much  pro-
tected  speech  to  survive.    The  Court  relies  primarily  on
depictions of hunters killing or wounding game and depic-
tions of animals being slaughtered for food.  I address the 
Court’s examples below. 

A 

I turn first to depictions of hunting.  As the Court notes, 
photographs  and  videos  of  hunters  shooting  game  are 
common.  See  ante,  at  13–14.  But  hunting  is  legal  in  all
50  States,  and  §48  applies  only  to  a  depiction  of  conduct 
that is illegal in the jurisdiction in which the depiction is
created,  sold,  or  possessed.    §§48(a),  (c).    Therefore,  in  all 
50  States,  the  creation,  sale,  or  possession  for  sale  of  the 
vast  majority  of  hunting  depictions  indisputably  falls
outside §48’s reach. 

Straining  to  find  overbreadth,  the  Court  suggests  that
§48  prohibits  the  sale  or  possession  in  the  District  of  Co-
lumbia  of  any  depiction  of  hunting  because  the  District—
undoubtedly  because  of  its  urban  character—does  not 
permit  hunting  within  its  boundaries.    Ante,  at  13.    The 
Court  also  suggests  that,  because  some  States  prohibit  a 
particular  type  of  hunting  (e.g.,  hunting  with  a  crossbow
or “canned” hunting) or the hunting of a particular animal 
(e.g.,  the  “sharp-tailed  grouse”),  §48  makes  it  illegal  for 
persons  in  such  States  to  sell  or  possess  for  sale  a  depic-
tion  of  hunting  that  was  perfectly  legal  in  the  State  in
which the hunting took place.  See ante, at 12–14. 

The Court’s interpretation is seriously flawed.  “When a 
federal  court  is  dealing  with  a  federal  statute  challenged 
as  overbroad,  it  should,  of  course,  construe  the  statute  to 
avoid  constitutional  problems,  if  the  statute  is  subject  to
such  a  limiting  construction.”    Ferber,  458  U. S.,  at  769,