Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/529bv.pdf
Page Number: 452

529US2

Unit: $U46

[10-07-01 17:18:24] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 529 U. S. 362 (2000)

377

Opinion of Stevens, J.

law.9

We are convinced that that interpretation of the amend-
It would impose a test for determining
ment is incorrect.
when a legal rule is clearly established that simply cannot
It
be squared with the real practice of decisional
would apply a standard for determining the “reasonableness”
of state-court decisions that is not contained in the statute
itself, and that Congress surely did not intend. And it
would wrongly require the federal courts,
including this
Court, to defer to state judges’ interpretations of federal law.
As the Fourth Circuit would have it, a state-court judg-
ment is “unreasonable” in the face of federal law only if all
reasonable jurists would agree that the state court was un-
reasonable. Thus, in this case, for example, even if the Vir-
ginia Supreme Court misread our opinion in Lockhart, we
could not grant relief unless we believed that none of the
judges who agreed with the state court’s interpretation of
that case was a “reasonable jurist.” But the statute says

clearly established federal law. Brief for Respondent 14–15. The ﬁrst,
“contrary to” exception, in his view, applies only to “starkly unreasonable”
errors of law. The ﬁrst category thus imposes “a standard of review far
more limited than ‘de novo,’
Id., at
24. The state-court judgment must thus be so far aﬁeld “as to make the
‘unlawfulness’ of the state court decision ‘apparent.’ ”
Id., at 25. The
second exception likewise replaces the “de novo” standard of reviewing
mixed questions of law and fact with the standard of “objective reason-
ableness” as formulated by the Court of Appeals.

‘independent’ or ‘plenary’ review.”

Id., at 30–31.

9 Although we explain our understanding of “clearly established law,”
infra, at 379–384, we note that the Fourth Circuit’s construction of the
It sepa-
amendment’s inquiry in this respect is especially problematic.
rates cases into those for which a “controlling decision” exists and those
for which no such decision exists. The former category includes very few
cases, since a rule is “controlling” only if it matches the case before the
court both “as to law and fact,” and most cases are factually distinguish-
able in some respect. A literal application of the Fourth Circuit test
would yield a particularly perverse outcome in cases involving the Strick-
land rule for establishing ineffective assistance of counsel, since that case,
which established the “controlling” rule of law on the issue, contained
facts insufﬁcient to show ineffectiveness.