Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/21pdf/21-147_g31h.pdf
Page Number: 3.0

Cite as:  596 U. S. ____ (2022) 

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Syllabus 

has national security implications.”  Id., at ___.  That reasoning applies
with full force here.  The Court of Appeals disagreed because it viewed
Boule’s  Fourth  Amendment  claim  as  akin  to  a  “conventional”  exces-
sive-force claim, as in Bivens, and less like the cross-border shooting 
in Hernández.  But that does not bear on the relevant point: Permitting
suit against a Border Patrol agent presents national security concerns
that  foreclose  Bivens  relief.    Further,  the  Court  of  Appeals’  analysis
betrays the pitfalls of applying the special-factors analysis at too gran-
ular a level.  A court should not inquire whether Bivens relief is appro-
priate in light of the balance of circumstances in the “particular case.” 
United  States  v.  Stanley,  483  U. S.  669,  683.    Rather,  it  should  ask 
“[m]ore  broadly”  whether  there  is  any  reason  to  think  that  “judicial
intrusion” into a given field might be “harmful” or “inappropriate,” id., 
at  681.    The  proper  inquiry  here  is  whether  a  court  is  competent  to
authorize a damages action not just against Agent Egbert, but against
Border Patrol agents generally.  The answer is no.  Pp. 9–12.

(2) Second,  Congress  has  provided  alternative  remedies  for  ag-
grieved  parties  in  Boule’s  position  that  independently  foreclose  a 
Bivens  action  here.    By  regulation,  Border  Patrol  must  investigate
“[a]lleged  violations”  and  accept  grievances  from  “[a]ny  persons.”    8 
CFR §§287.10(a)–(b).  Boule claims that this regulatory grievance pro-
cedure  was  inadequate,  but  this  Court  has  never held  that  a Bivens 
alternative  must  afford  rights  such  as  judicial  review  of  an  adverse 
determination.  Bivens “is concerned solely with deterring the uncon-
stitutional acts of individual officers.”  Correctional Services Corp. v. 
Malesko,  534  U. S.  61,  71.  And,  regardless,  the  question  whether  a
given remedy is  adequate  is  a  legislative  determination.   As  in Her-
nández, this Court has no warrant to doubt that the consideration of 
Boule’s grievance secured adequate deterrence and afforded Boule an 
alternative remedy.  See 589 U. S., at ___.  Pp. 12–13.

(c) There is no Bivens cause of action for Boule’s First Amendment 
retaliation claim.  That claim presents a new Bivens context, and there 
are many reasons to think that Congress is better suited to authorize
a damages remedy.  Extending Bivens to alleged First Amendment vi-
olations would pose an acute “risk that fear of personal monetary lia-
bility and harassing litigation will unduly inhibit officials in the dis-
charge of their duties.”  Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U. S. 635, 638.  In 
light of these costs, “Congress is in a better position to decide whether 
or not the public interest would be served” by imposing a damages ac-
tion.  Bush, 462 U. S., at 389.  The Court of Appeals’ reasons for ex-
tending Bivens in this context—that retaliation claims are “well-estab-
lished” and that Boule alleges that Agent Egbert “was not carrying out 
official duties” when the retaliation occurred—lack merit.  Also lacking