Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/17pdf/16-402_h315.pdf
Page Number: 64.0

14 

CARPENTER v. UNITED STATES 

THOMAS, J., dissenting 

Telecommunications Act generally bars cell-phone compa­
nies  from  disclosing  customers’  cell  site  location  infor­
mation  to  the  public.    See  47  U. S. C.  §222(c).    This  is 
sufficient  to  make  the  records  his,  Carpenter  argues,
because  the  Fourth  Amendment  merely  requires  him  to
identify  a  source  of  “positive  law”  that  “protects  against 
access by the public without consent.”  Brief for Petitioner 
32–33  (citing  Baude  &  Stern,  The  Positive  Law  Model  of 
the  Fourth  Amendment,  129  Harv.  L.  Rev.  1821,  1825– 
1826 (2016); emphasis deleted). 

Carpenter  is  mistaken.    To  come  within  the  text  of  the 
Fourth  Amendment,  Carpenter  must  prove  that  the  cell-
site  records  are  his;  positive  law  is  potentially  relevant
only  insofar  as  it  answers  that  question.    The  text  of  the 
Fourth Amendment cannot plausibly be read to mean “any
violation of positive law” any more than it can plausibly be 
read to mean “any violation of a reasonable expectation of 
privacy.”

Thus,  the  Telecommunications  Act  is  insufficient  be­
cause  it  does  not  give  Carpenter  a  property  right  in  the
cell-site  records.  Section  222,  titled  “Privacy  of  customer
information,”  protects  customers’  privacy  by  preventing 
cell-phone companies from disclosing sensitive information 
about  them.  The  statute  creates  a  “duty  to  protect  the 
confidentiality”  of  information  relating  to  customers,
§222(a),  and  creates  “[p]rivacy  requirements”  that  limit
the  disclosure  of  that  information,  §222(c)(1).    Nothing  in
the text pre-empts state property law or gives customers a 
property  interest  in  the  companies’  business  records  (as­
suming  Congress  even  has  that  authority).9    Although  

—————— 

9 Carpenter  relies  on  an  order  from  the  Federal  Communications 

Commission  (FCC),  which  weakly  states  that  “ ‘[t]o  the  extent  [a  cus­
tomer’s location information] is property, . . . it is better understood as
belonging to the customer, not the carrier.’ ”  Brief for Petitioner 34, and 
n. 23  (quoting  13  FCC  Rcd.  8061,  8093  ¶43  (1998);  emphasis  added).