Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/23pdf/22-915_8o6b.pdf
Page Number: 61.0

2 

UNITED STATES v. RAHIMI 

BARRETT, J., concurring 

fully altered,” S. Sachs, Originalism: Standard and Proce-
dure, 135 Harv. L. Rev. 777, 782 (2022).  So for an original-
ist, the history that matters most is the history surrounding
the  ratification  of  the  text;  that  backdrop  illuminates  the
meaning of the enacted law.  History (or tradition) that long
postdates  ratification does  not  serve  that  function.    To be 
sure, postenactment history can be an important tool.  For 
example, it can “reinforce our understanding of the Consti-
tution’s original meaning”; “liquidate ambiguous constitu-
tional provisions”; provide persuasive evidence of the origi-
nal  meaning;  and,  if  stare  decisis  applies,  control  the 
outcome.  See Vidal v. Elster, 602 U. S. ___, ___–___ (2024) 
(BARRETT, J., concurring in part) (slip op., at 13–14).  But 
generally  speaking,  the  use  of  postenactment  history  re-
quires some justification other than originalism simpliciter. 
In Bruen, the Court took history beyond the founding era,
considering gun regulations that spanned the 19th century.
597  U. S.,  at  50–70.    I  expressed  reservations  about  the 
scope of that inquiry but concluded that the timing question
did not matter to Bruen’s holding.  Id., at 81–83 (concurring 
opinion).    It  bears  emphasis,  however,  that  my  questions
were about the time period relevant to discerning the Sec-
ond Amendment’s original meaning—for instance, what is 
the post-1791 cutoff for discerning how the Second Amend-
ment was originally understood?  Id., at 82 (“How long after
ratification  may  subsequent  practice  illuminate  original
public meaning?”).  My doubts were not about whether “tra-
dition,” standing alone, is dispositive.  Id., at 83 (“[T]oday’s 
decision should not be understood to endorse freewheeling 
reliance  on  historical  practice  from  the  mid-to-late  19th 
century  to  establish  the  original  meaning  of  the  Bill  of 
Rights”).  As I have explained elsewhere, evidence of “tradi-
tion” unmoored from original meaning is not binding law. 
Vidal,  602  U. S.,  at  ___–___  (BARRETT,  J.,  concurring  in
part) (slip op., at 13–15).  And scattered cases or regulations
pulled from history may have little bearing on the meaning