Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/22pdf/21-476_c185.pdf
Page Number: 58.0

26 

303 CREATIVE LLC v. ELENIS 

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting 

any speech compulsion was “plainly incidental to the Solo-
mon Amendment’s regulation of conduct.”  Ibid. 

2 
The same principle resolves this case.  The majority tries
to  sweep  under  the  rug  petitioners’  challenge  to  CADA’s
Communication Clause, so I will start with it.  Recall that 
Smith wants to post a notice on her company’s homepage 
that the company will refuse to sell any website for a same-
sex  couple’s  wedding.  This  Court,  however,  has  already 
said that “a ban on race-based hiring may require employ-
ers to remove ‘White Applicants Only’ signs.”  Sorrell, 564 
U. S., at 567 (quoting FAIR, 547 U. S., at 62; some internal 
quotation marks omitted); see Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pitts-
burgh  Comm’n  on  Human  Relations,  413  U. S.  376,  389 
(1973).  So petitioners concede that they are not entitled to 
an exemption from the Communication Clause unless they
are also entitled to an exemption from the Accommodation 
Clause.  Brief for Petitioners 34–35.  That concession is all 
but  fatal  to  their  argument,  because  it  shows  that  even 
“pure speech” may be burdened incident to a valid regula-
tion of conduct.10 

CADA’s Accommodation Clause and its application here
are  valid  regulations  of  conduct.    It  is  well  settled  that  a 
public accommodations law like the Accommodation Clause 
does not “target speech or discriminate on the basis of its
content.”  Hurley, 515 U. S., at 572.  Rather, “the focal point 
of  its  prohibition”  is  “on  the  act  of  discriminating  against 

—————— 

10 The majority appears to find this discussion of the Communication 
Clause upsetting.  See ante, at 20–21, and n. 5.  It is easy to understand 
why: The Court’s prior First Amendment cases clearly explain that a ban
on discrimination may require a business to take down a sign that ex-
presses the business owner’s intent to discriminate.  See, e.g., FAIR, 547 
U. S., at 62.  This principle is deeply inconsistent with the majority’s po-
sition.  Thus, a “straight couples only” notice, like the one the Court today
allows, see App. to Pet. for Cert. 188a–189a, is itself a devastating indict-
ment of the majority’s logic.