Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/16pdf/15-827_0pm1.pdf
Page Number: 1.0

(Slip Opinion) 

OCTOBER  TERM,  2016 

1 

Syllabus 

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader. 
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337. 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

Syllabus 

ENDREW F., A MINOR, BY AND THROUGH HIS PARENTS AND 

NEXT FRIENDS, JOSEPH F. ET AL. v. DOUGLAS COUNTY 

SCHOOL DISTRICT RE–1 

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR 
THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

No. 15–827.  Argued January 11, 2017—Decided March 22, 2017 

The  Individuals  with  Disabilities  Education  Act  (IDEA)  offers  States
federal  funds  to  assist  in  educating  children  with  disabilities.  The 
Act conditions that funding on compliance with certain statutory re-
quirements, including the requirement that States provide every eli-
gible child a “free appropriate public education,” or FAPE, by means
of a uniquely tailored “individualized education program,” or IEP.  20 
U. S. C. §§1401(9)(D), 1412(a)(1). 

This Court first addressed the FAPE requirement in Board of Ed. 
of Hendrick Hudson Central School Dist., Westchester Cty. v. Rowley, 
458 U. S. 176.  The Court held that the Act guarantees a substantive-
ly  adequate  program  of  education  to  all  eligible  children,  and  that
this requirement is satisfied if the child’s IEP sets out an educational
program that is “reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive 
educational  benefits.”    Id.,  at  207.    For  children  fully  integrated  in
the regular classroom, this would typically require an IEP “reasona-
bly  calculated  to  enable  the  child  to  achieve  passing  marks  and  ad-
vance from grade to grade.”  Id., at 204.  Because the IEP challenged 
in Rowley plainly met this standard, the Court declined “to establish
any  one  test  for  determining  the  adequacy  of  educational  benefits 
conferred  upon  all  children  covered  by  the  Act,”  instead  “confin[ing]
its analysis” to the facts of the case before it.  Id., at 202. 

Petitioner Endrew F., a child with autism, received annual IEPs in 
respondent  Douglas  County  School  District  from  preschool  through
fourth  grade.    By  fourth  grade,  Endrew’s  parents  believed  his  aca-
demic and functional progress had stalled.  When the school district 
proposed a fifth grade IEP that resembled those from past years, En-