Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/22pdf/21-806_2dp3.pdf
Page Number: 61.0

Cite as:  599 U. S. ____ (2023) 

29 

THOMAS, J., dissenting 

The challenge to the Social Security Act in Steward Ma-
chine Co. v. Davis, 301 U. S. 548 (1937), followed a similar 
pattern but reached the opposite result based on a different 
level of perceived coercion.  As in Butler, the Federal Gov-
ernment defended a federal statute—here, the Social Secu-
rity  Act—by  representing  that  conditions  on  the  grant  of 
federal  funds  “are  not  regulatory”  in  nature  and  are  thus
within the spending power.  Brief for United States in Stew-
ard Machine Co. v. Davis, O. T. 1936, No. 837, p. 135.  Seek-
ing to avoid a repeat of its loss in Butler, the Government 
argued that the program was also not regulatory in fact be-
cause it did not coerce States to take or refrain from taking
any  actions.  Brief  for  United  States  in  Steward  Machine 
Co. 100, 105–106. 

This time, the Court agreed with the Government, find-
ing that the Act was not coercive and thus did not “go be-
yond  the  bounds  of ”  Congress’  spending  power.  Steward 
Machine  Co.,  301  U. S.,  at  591–592.    Then,  in  rejecting  a
federalism  challenge  to  the  measure,  the  Court  observed
that once the State accepted the federal conditions, it was
bound with even lesser force than an ordinary contract.  Id., 
at 594–595.  The State was “still free, without breach of an 
agreement, to change her system over night.”  Id., at 595. 
“No  officer  or  agency  of  the  national  Government  [could] 
force a compensation law upon her or keep it in existence,” 

—————— 
id., at 677–678 (joint dissent).  Indeed, the anticoercion rule supplements 
those doctrines through its recognition of the practical realities of Con-
gress’ modern spending power: Because the Federal Government’s over-
whelming fiscal resources enable it to create “gun to the head” situations
in which there is no practical possibility of opting out, the rule prevents 
the Government from purchasing the States’ regulatory powers to imple-
ment  federal  goals  that  it  cannot  attain  through  its  own  more  limited 
powers.  Id., at 581 (opinion of ROBERTS, C. J.); accord, id., at 677 (joint
dissent) (“Congress effectively engages in this impermissible compulsion
when state participation in a federal spending program is coerced, so that 
the  States’  choice  whether  to  enact  or  administer  a  federal  regulatory 
program is rendered illusory”).