Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/06pdf/05-1120.pdf
Page Number: 17

Cite as:  549 U. S. ____ (2007) 

11 

Opinion of the Court 

Administrator  properly  exercised  his  discretion  under 
§202(a)(1) in denying the petition for rule making.”  415 F. 
3d  50,  58  (2005).  The  court  therefore  denied  the  petition
for review. 

In  his  opinion  announcing  the  court’s  judgment,  Judge
Randolph  avoided  a  definitive  ruling  as  to  petitioners’
standing,  id.,  at  56,  reasoning  that  it  was  permissible  to
proceed to the merits because the standing and the merits
inquiries “overlap[ped],” ibid.  Assuming without deciding 
that  the  statute  authorized  the  EPA  Administrator  to 
regulate greenhouse gas emissions that “in his judgment” 
may “reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health 
or  welfare,”  42  U. S. C.  §7521(a)(1),  Judge  Randolph  con-
cluded  that  the  exercise  of  that  judgment  need  not  be
based  solely  on  scientific  evidence,  but  may  also  be  in-
formed  by  the  sort  of  policy  judgments  that  motivate
congressional action.  415 F. 3d, at 58.  Given that frame-
work,  it  was  reasonable  for  EPA  to  base  its  decision  on 
scientific uncertainty as well as on other factors, including 
the  concern  that  unilateral  regulation  of  U. S.  motor-
vehicle  emissions  could  weaken  efforts  to  reduce  green-
house gas emissions from other countries.  Ibid. 

Judge  Sentelle  wrote  separately  because  he  believed 
petitioners  failed  to  “demonstrat[e]  the  element  of  injury
necessary to establish standing under Article III.”  Id., at 
59  (opinion  dissenting  in  part  and  concurring  in  judg-
ment).  In his view, they had alleged that global warming 
is  “harmful  to  humanity  at  large,”  but  could  not  allege 
“particularized  injuries”  to  themselves.    Id.,  at   60  (citing 
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U. S. 555, 562 (1992)). 
While he dissented on standing, however, he accepted the 
contrary  view  as  the  law  of  the  case  and  joined  Judge 
Randolph’s  judgment  on  the  merits  as  the  closest  to  that
which he preferred.  415 F. 3d, at 60–61. 

Judge Tatel dissented.  Emphasizing that EPA nowhere
challenged  the  factual  basis  of  petitioners’  affidavits,  id.,