Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/524bv.pdf
Page Number: 461

524US2

Unit: $U92

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SWIDLER & BERLIN v. UNITED STATES

O(cid:146)Connor, J., dissenting

ment d; see also 2 C. Mueller & L. Kirkpatrick, Federal Evi-
dence, § 199, p. 380 (2d ed. 1994) (“[I]f a deceased client has
confessed to criminal acts that are later charged to another,
surely the latter’s need for evidence sometimes outweighs
the interest in preserving the conﬁdences”).

Where the exoneration of an innocent criminal defendant
or a compelling law enforcement interest is at stake, the
harm of precluding critical evidence that is unavailable by
any other means outweighs the potential disincentive to
forthright communication.
In my view, the cost of silence
warrants a narrow exception to the rule that the attorney-
client privilege survives the death of the client. Moreover,
although I disagree with the Court of Appeals’ notion that
the context of an initial client interview affects the applica-
bility of the work product doctrine, I do not believe that the
doctrine applies where the material concerns a client who is
no longer a potential party to adversarial litigation.

Accordingly, I would afﬁrm the judgment of the Court of
Appeals. Although the District Court examined the docu-
ments in camera, it has not had an opportunity to balance
these competing considerations and decide whether the priv-
ilege should be trumped in the particular circumstances of
this case. Thus, I agree with the Court of Appeals’ decision
to remand for a determination whether any portion of the
notes must be disclosed.

With respect, I dissent.