Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/23pdf/22-277_d18f.pdf
Page Number: 19

Cite as:  603 U. S. ____ (2024) 

13 

Opinion of the Court 

held, Texas’s interest in better balancing the marketplace 
of ideas would satisfy First Amendment scrutiny.  See 49 
F. 4th,  at  482.    If  we  said  nothing  about  those  views,  the 
court presumably would repeat them when it next considers
NetChoice’s challenge.  It would thus find that significant 
applications  of  the  Texas  law—and  so  significant  inputs
into the appropriate facial analysis—raise no First Amend-
ment difficulties.  But that conclusion would rest on a seri-
ous misunderstanding of First Amendment precedent and 
principle.  The Fifth Circuit was wrong in concluding that
Texas’s  restrictions  on  the  platforms’  selection,  ordering, 
and labeling of third-party posts do not interfere with ex-
pression.  And the court was wrong to treat as valid Texas’s
interest in changing the content of the platforms’ feeds.  Ex-
plaining why that is so will prevent the Fifth Circuit from 
repeating its errors as  to Facebook’s and YouTube’s main 
feeds.  (And  our  analysis  of  Texas’s  law  may  also  aid  the
Eleventh  Circuit,  which  saw  the  First  Amendment  issues 
much  as  we  do,  when  next  considering  NetChoice’s  facial
challenge.)  But a caveat: Nothing said here addresses any 
of the laws’ other applications, which may or may not share
the First Amendment problems described below.3 

A 
Despite the relative novelty of the technology before us, 
the main problem in this case—and the inquiry it calls for—
is not new.  At bottom, Texas’s law requires the platforms
to  carry  and  promote  user  speech  that  they  would  rather 

—————— 

3 Although the discussion below focuses on Texas’s content-moderation
provisions,  it  also  bears  on  how  the  lower  courts  should  address  the 
individualized-explanation provisions in the upcoming facial inquiry.  As 
noted,  requirements  of  that  kind  violate  the  First  Amendment  if  they
unduly burden expressive activity.  See Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary 
Counsel of Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U. S. 626, 651 (1985); supra, at 
11.  So  our  explanation  of  why  Facebook  and  YouTube  are  engaged  in 
expression  when  they  make  content-moderation  choices  in  their  main 
feeds should inform the courts’ further consideration of that issue.