Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/524bv.pdf
Page Number: 271

524US1

Unit: $U84

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226

AMERICAN TELEPHONE & TELEGRAPH CO.
v. CENTRAL OFFICE TELEPHONE, INC.
Opinion of the Court

The Ninth Circuit distinguished respondent’s claims from
those in our ﬁled-rate cases involving special services in one
other respect: according to respondent, the “special services”
that it sought were provided by petitioner, without charge,
to other customers, 108 F. 3d, at 989, n. 9. Even if that were
so, the claim for these services would still be pre-empted
under the ﬁled rate doctrine. To the extent respondent is
asserting discriminatory treatment, its remedy is to bring
suit under § 202 of the Communications Act.1 To the extent
petitioner is claiming that its own claims for special services
are not really special because other companies get the same
preferences, “that would only tend to show that the practice
was unlawful [with regard to] the others as well.” United
States v. Wabash R. Co., supra, at 413. Because respondent
asks for privileges not included in the tariff, its state-law
claims are barred in either case.

IV

Our analysis applies with equal force to respondent’s
tortious-interference claim because that is wholly deriva-
tive of the contract claim for additional and better services.
Respondent contended that the tort claim was based on
“AT&T’s refusal to provide [respondent] with certain types
of service” and the Magistrate Judge agreed, noting that
“ ‘the claims in this case, even the tort claim, . . . stem from
the alleged failure of AT&T to comply with its contractual
relationship.’ ” 2 Brief for Appellant in Nos. 94–36116, 94–

1 Eight months after the close of discovery (and well after the 2-year
statute of limitations in the Communications Act, § 415), respondent
sought leave to ﬁle a second amended complaint to add a § 202 claim. The
Magistrate Judge denied the request. Respondent did not appeal that
ruling.

2 The dissent argues that “the jury’s verdict on respondent’s tort claim
is supported by evidence that went well beyond, and differed in nature
from, the contract claim,” post, at 231, which the dissent asserts requires
us to remand this case rather than reverse the judgment. This issue of
noncontract evidence neither was included within the question presented