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2  FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N v. TED CRUZ FOR SENATE 

Syllabus 

justification, and dismissed as moot their challenges to the regulation. 

Held: 

1. Appellees have standing to challenge the threatened enforcement

of Section 304.  Pp. 3–10.

(a) The Government recognizes that the Committee’s present ina-
bility to repay the final $10,000 of Cruz’s loans constitutes an injury 
in fact both to Cruz and his Committee.  It maintains, however, that 
appellees lack Article III standing because these injuries are not trace-
able  to  the  threatened  enforcement  of  Section  304,  see  Lujan  v.  De-
fenders of Wildlife, 504 U. S. 555, 560–561.  First, the Government ar-
gues  that  appellees  knowingly  triggered  the  application  of  the  loan-
repayment  limitation  and  thus  their  injuries  are  traceable  to  them-
selves, not the Government.  This Court has never recognized an ex-
ception  to  Article  III  standing’s  traceability  requirement  for  injuries 
that a party purposely incurs.  Moreover, this Court has made clear 
that an injury resulting from the application or threatened application
of an unlawful enactment remains fairly traceable to such application,
even  if  the  injury  could  be  described  in  some  sense  as  willingly  in-
curred.  See Evers v. Dwyer, 358 U. S. 202, 204 (per curiam).  Cases 
cited  by  the  Government—Clapper  v.  Amnesty  Int’l  USA,  568  U. S. 
398, and Pennsylvania v. New Jersey, 426 U. S. 660 (per curiam)—do
not alter that conclusion.  In contrast to those cases, here the appellees’ 
injuries are directly inflicted by the FEC’s threatened enforcement of
the  provisions  they  now  challenge.    That  appellees  chose  to  subject
themselves to those provisions does not change the fact that they are 
subject  to  them,  and  will  face  genuine  legal  penalties  if  they  do  not 
comply.  Finally, the Government’s observation that it should not be
blamed  for  appellees’  injuries  because  the  Committee  had  a  legally 
available alternative—i.e., repaying Cruz’s loans in full with pre-elec-
tion funds, within 20 days of the election—misses the point.  Demand-
ing that the Committee do so would require it to forgo the exercise of
the  First  Amendment  right  the  Court  must  assume  it  has  when  as-
sessing standing—the right to repay its campaign debts in full, at any 
time.  Pp. 3–6.

(b) The  Government  next  argues  that  although  appellees  would 
have  standing  to  challenge  the  FEC’s  implementing  regulation, 
§116.11, they do not have standing to challenge Section 304 itself.  The 
Government contends that the Committee used pre-election funds to 
repay the first $250,000, and thus Section 304’s cap on using post-elec-
tion funds to repay a candidate’s loan does not prohibit repayment of
the final $10,000 here.  Instead, it is the agency’s regulation—with its 
20-day  limit—that  prevents  repayment.  Appellees  insist  that  they 
used post-election funds—in the form of overlimit contributions to the
2018 campaign that were “redesignated” as contributions to the 2024