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Page Number: 30.0

6 

BOND v. UNITED STATES 

SCALIA, J., concurring in judgment 

definition—however  expansive—is  utterly  clear:  any
“chemical  which  through  its  chemical  action  on  life  proc-
esses  can  cause  death,  temporary  incapacitation  or  per-
manent harm to humans or animals,” §229F(8)(A), unless 
the chemical is possessed or used for a “peaceful purpose,” 
§229F(1)(A), (7)(A).  The statute parses itself.  There is no 
opinion  of  ours,  and  none  written  by  any  court  or  put 
forward  by  any  commentator  since  Aristotle,  which  says,
or  even  suggests,  that  “dissonance”  between  ordinary 
meaning  and  the  unambiguous  words  of  a  definition  is  to 
be resolved in favor of ordinary meaning.  If that were the 
case, there would hardly be any use in providing a defini-
tion.  No,  the  true  rule  is  entirely  clear:  “When  a  statute
includes an explicit definition, we must follow that defini-
tion,  even  if  it  varies  from  that  term’s  ordinary  meaning.” 
Stenberg  v.  Carhart,  530  U. S.  914,  942  (2000)  (emphasis 
added).  Once  again,  contemplate  the  judge-empowering
consequences of the new interpretive rule the Court today
announces: When there is “dissonance” between the statu-
tory  definition  and  the  ordinary  meaning  of  the  defined 
word, the latter may prevail. 

But even text clear on its face, the Court suggests, must
be  read  against  the  backdrop  of  established  interpretive
presumptions.  Thus, we presume “that a criminal statute
derived  from  the  common  law  carries  with  it  the  require-
ment  of  a  culpable  mental  state—even  if  no  such  limita-
tion  appears  in  the  text.”  Ante,  at  11.  And  we  presume 
that  “federal  statutes  do  not  apply  outside  the  United
States.”  Ibid.  Both  of  those  are,  indeed,  established  in-
terpretive  presumptions  that  are  (1)  based  upon  realistic 
assessments of congressional intent, and (2) well known to
Congress—thus  furthering  rather  than  subverting  genu-
ine legislative intent.  To apply these presumptions, then, 
is not to rewrite clear text; it is to interpret words fairly, in
light  of  their  statutory  context.    But  there  is  nothing  ei-
ther (1) realistic or (2) well known about the presumption