Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/558bv.pdf
Page Number: 411.0

250 

KUCANA  v.  HOLDER 

Opinion of the Court 

cation; Board “may at any time reopen . . . on its own motion 
any  case  in  which  it  has  rendered  a  decision”).  Had  Con­
gress  elected  to  insulate  denials  of  motions  to  reopen  from 
judicial  review,  it  could  have  so  speciﬁed  together  with  its 
codiﬁcation of directions on ﬁling reopening motions. 

From the Legislature’s silence on the discretion of the At­
torney  General  (or  his  delegate,  the  Board)  over  reopening 
motions,  see  supra,  at  243,  n.  10,  we  take  it  that  Congress 
left the matter where it was pre-IIRIRA: The BIA has broad 
discretion,  conferred  by  the  Attorney  General,  “to  grant  or 
deny  a  motion  to  reopen,”  8  CFR  § 1003.2(a),  but  courts  re­
tain jurisdiction to review, with due respect, the Board’s de­
cision.16  It  is  unsurprising  that  Congress  would  leave  in 
place judicial oversight of this “important [procedural] safe­
guard” designed “to ensure a proper and lawful disposition” 
of immigration proceedings, Dada, 554 U. S., at 18, where, as 
here,  the  alien’s  underlying  claim  (for  asylum)  would  itself 
be reviewable.17 

In the REAL ID Act, Congress further amended the INA. 
By  2005,  two  Courts  of  Appeals  had  already  ruled  that  8 

16 A statement in the House Conference Report on IIRIRA, amicus sug­
gests, supports her argument that Congress intended broadly to foreclose 
judicial  review  of  reopening  denials.  Brief  for  Court-Appointed  Amicus 
Curiae  in  Support  of  Judgment  Below  32–34.  The  Report  states  that 
§ 1252(a)(2)(B)  “bars  judicial  review . . .  of any  decision  or  action  of  the 
Attorney General which is speciﬁed to be in the discretion of the Attorney 
General.”  H.  R.  Conf.  Rep.  No.  104–828,  p.  219  (1996).  That  statement, 
as we read it, simply summarizes the statutory text at a general level.  It 
does  not  home  in  on  the  question  whether  decisions  made  discretionary 
only by regulation are judicially reviewable. 

17 We  do  not  reach  the  question  whether  review  of  a  reopening  denial 
would  be  precluded  if  the  court  would  lack  jurisdiction  over  the  alien’s 
underlying  claim  for  relief.  Some  courts  confronting  that  question  have 
refused  to  consider  petitions  for  review  of  a  reopening  denial  that  seeks 
to revisit the denial of the underlying claim; they have reasoned that hear­
ing  the  petition  would  end-run  the  bar  to  review  of  the  petitioner’s  core 
claim.  See,  e. g.,  Assaad  v.  Ashcroft,  378  F.  3d  471,  473–475  (CA5  2004) 
(per curiam).