Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/23pdf/22-915_8o6b.pdf
Page Number: 24

2 

UNITED STATES v. RAHIMI 

SOTOMAYOR, J., concurring 

wholly consistent with the Nation’s history and tradition of
firearm regulation. 

The Court correctly concludes that “the Second Amend-
ment  permits  the  disarmament  of  individuals  who  pose  a
credible threat to the physical safety of others.”  Ante, at 8. 
That conclusion finds historical support in both the surety
laws, which “provided a mechanism for preventing violence 
before it occurred” by requiring an individual who posed a
credible threat of violence to another to post a surety, and 
the “going armed” laws, which “provided a mechanism for
punishing  those  who  had  menaced  others  with  firearms” 
through  forfeiture  of  the  arms  or imprisonment.  Ante,  at 
12.  “Taken together, the surety and going armed laws con-
firm  what  common  sense  suggests:  When  an  individual
poses  a  clear  threat  of  physical  violence  to  another,  the 
threatening individual may be disarmed.”  Ante, at 13.  Sec-
tion 922(g)(8)’s prohibition on gun possession for individu-
als subject to domestic violence restraining orders is part of
that “tradition of firearm regulation allow[ing] the Govern-
ment to disarm individuals who present a credible threat to 
the physical safety of others,” ante, at 16, as are the similar 
restrictions that have been adopted by 48 States and Terri-
tories, see Brief for United States 34–35, and nn. 22–23 (col-
lecting statutes).

The Court’s opinion also clarifies an important methodo-
logical  point  that  bears  repeating:  Rather  than  asking 
whether a present-day gun regulation has a precise histor-
ical  analogue,  courts  applying  Bruen  should  “conside[r]
whether  the  challenged  regulation  is  consistent  with  the 
principles that underpin our regulatory tradition.”  Ante, at 
7  (emphasis  added);  see  also  ante,  at  7–8  (“The  law  must 
comport with the principles underlying the Second Amend-
ment, but it need not be a ‘dead ringer’ or a ‘historical twin’ ” 
(quoting  Bruen,  597  U. S.,  at  30)).    Here,  for  example,
the  Government  has  not  identified  a  founding-era  or 
Reconstruction-era law that specifically disarmed domestic