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PENNSYLVANIA BD. OF PROBATION
AND PAROLE v. SCOTT
Opinion of the Court

States, including Pennsylvania, see 548 Pa., at 427–428, 698
A. 2d, at 36; Rivenbark v. Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation
and Parole, 509 Pa. 248, 501 A. 2d 1110 (1985), have adopted
informal, administrative parole revocation procedures in
order to accommodate the large number of parole proceed-
ings. These proceedings generally are not conducted by
judges, but instead by parole boards, “members of which
need not be judicial ofﬁcers or lawyers.” Morrissey v.
Brewer, 408 U. S., at 489. And traditional rules of evidence
generally do not apply.
(“[T]he process should be
ﬂexible enough to consider evidence including letters, afﬁ-
davits, and other material that would not be admissible in an
adversary criminal trial”). Nor are these proceedings en-
tirely adversarial, as they are designed to be “ ‘predictive
and discretionary’ as well as factﬁnding.” Gagnon v. Scar-
pelli, 411 U. S. 778, 787 (1973) (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer,
supra, at 480).

Ibid.

Application of the exclusionary rule would signiﬁcantly
alter this process. The exclusionary rule frequently re-
quires extensive litigation to determine whether particular
evidence must be excluded. Cf. United States v. Calandra,
414 U. S., at 349 (noting that application of the exclusionary
rule “would delay and disrupt grand jury proceedings” be-
cause “[s]uppression hearings would halt the orderly process
of an investigation and might necessitate extended litigation
of issues only tangentially related to the grand jury’s pri-
mary objective”); INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U. S., at 1048
(noting that “[t]he prospect of even occasional invocation of
the exclusionary rule might signiﬁcantly change and compli-
cate the character of ” the deportation system). Such litiga-
tion is inconsistent with the nonadversarial, administrative
processes established by the States. Although States could
adapt their parole revocation proceedings to accommodate

does not attach to such proceedings because the introduction of counsel
would “alter signiﬁcantly the nature of the proceeding,” Gagnon v. Scar-
pelli, 411 U. S. 778, 787 (1973).