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Page Number: 11.0

2 

MERRILL v. MILLIGAN 

KAGAN, J., dissenting 

badly wrong in granting a stay.  There may—or may not—
be  a  basis  for  revising  our  VRA  precedent  in  light  of  the 
modern  districting  technology  that  Alabama’s  application 
highlights.    But  such  a  change  can  properly  happen  only 
after full briefing and argument—not based on the scanty 
review this Court gives matters on its shadow docket.  The 
District Court here did everything right under the law ex-
isting today.  Staying its decision forces Black Alabamians 
to suffer what under that law is clear vote dilution.  With 
respect, I again dissent from a ruling that “undermines Sec-
tion  2  and  the  right  it  provides.”    Brnovich  v.  Democratic 
National Committee, 594 U. S. ___, ___ (2021) (KAGAN, J., 
dissenting) (slip op., at 2).1 

—————— 

1 Because JUSTICE KAVANAUGH claims that the Court’s stay has nothing 
to do with the merits of Alabama’s application and that the Court may 
therefore appropriately use its emergency docket to grant the State re-
lief, see ante, at 2 (concurring opinion), I note a few uncontroversial prin-
ciples about stays pending appeal. 
  A  stay  pending  appeal  is  an  “extraordinary”  remedy.    Williams  v. 
Zbaraz, 442 U. S. 1309, 1311 (1979) (Stevens, J., in chambers); see also 
Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 463 U. S. 1315, 1316 (1983) (Blackmun, J., 
in  chambers).    The  applicant  (here,  the  State)  bears  the  “especially 
heavy” burden of proving that such relief is warranted.  Packwood v. Sen-
ate Select Committee on Ethics, 510 U. S. 1319, 1320 (1994) (Rehnquist, 
C. J., in chambers).  Our stay standard asks (1) whether the applicant is 
likely to succeed on the merits, and (2) whether the likelihood of irrepa-
rable harm to the applicant, the balance of equities, and the public inter-
est weigh in favor of granting a stay.  See Nken v. Holder, 556 U. S. 418, 
426 (2009).  The inquiry thus has both a merits component and an equi-
table component. 
  That is true in election cases generally.  As JUSTICE KAVANAUGH notes, 
there is an exception: The Court has sometimes given less attention to 
the merits in cases involving eleventh-hour election changes.  See Purcell 
v.  Gonzalez,  549  U. S. 1, 4–5  (2006)  (per  curiam).    But  for  the  reasons 
given in Part III, that exception does not apply here, given that the Dis-
trict Court ruled months before anyone in the State will cast a vote.  See 
infra, at 10–12. 
  And so we return to the ordinary standard for a stay pending appeal.  
Because our discretionary power over election appeals is limited, I agree 
that  the  Court  will  need  to  hear  Alabama’s  appeal  on  our  ordinary