Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/20pdf/20-512_gfbh.pdf
Page Number: 2.0

2 

NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSN. v. ALSTON 

Syllabus 

“struck the right balance in crafting a remedy that both prevents anti-
competitive  harm  to  Student-Athletes  while  serving  the  procompeti-
tive purpose of preserving the popularity of college sports.”  958 F. 3d 
1239, 1263.  Unsatisfied with that result, the NCAA asks the Court to 
find that all of its existing restraints on athlete compensation survive 
antitrust  scrutiny.    The  student-athletes  have  not  renewed  their 
across-the-board challenge and the Court thus does not consider the 
rules  that  remain  in  place.    The  Court  considers  only  the  subset  of 
NCAA  rules  restricting  education-related  benefits  that  the  district 
court enjoined.  The Court does so based on the uncontested premise 
that  the  NCAA  enjoys  monopsony  control  in  the  relevant  market—
such that it is capable of depressing wages below competitive levels for 
student-athletes and thereby restricting the quantity of student-ath-
lete labor.     

Held: The district court’s injunction is consistent with established anti-

trust principles.  Pp. 15–36. 

(a) The  courts  below  properly  subjected  the  NCAA’s  compensation 
restrictions to antitrust scrutiny under a “rule of reason” analysis.  In 
the Sherman Act, Congress tasked courts with enforcing an antitrust 
policy of competition on the theory that market forces “yield the best 
allocation”  of  the  Nation’s  resources.    National  Collegiate  Athletic 
Assn. v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U. S. 85, 104, n. 27.  
The Sherman Act’s prohibition on restraints of trade has long been un-
derstood to prohibit only restraints that are “undue.”  Ohio v. American 
Express Co., 585 U. S. ___, ___.  Whether a particular restraint is un-
due “presumptively” turns on an application of a “rule of reason anal-
ysis.”  Texaco, Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U. S. 1, 5.  That manner of analysis 
generally  requires  a  court  to  “conduct  a  fact-specific  assessment  of 
market power and market structure” to assess a challenged restraint’s 
“actual  effect  on  competition.”    American  Express,  585  U.  S.,  at  ___.  
Pp. 15–24. 

(1) The NCAA maintains the courts below should have analyzed 
its compensation restrictions under an extremely deferential standard 
because it is a joint venture among members who must collaborate to 
offer consumers the unique product of intercollegiate athletic competi-
tion.  Even assuming the NCAA is a joint venture, though, it is a joint 
venture with monopoly power in the relevant market.  Its restraints 
are appropriately subject to the ordinary rule of reason’s fact-specific 
assessment  of  their  effect  on  competition.    American  Express,  585 
U. S., at ___.  Circumstances sometimes allow a court to determine the 
anticompetitive effects of a challenged restraint (or lack thereof) under 
an abbreviated or “quick look.”  See Dagher, 547 U. S., at 7, n. 3; Board 
of Regents, 468 U. S., at 109, n. 39.  But not here.  Pp. 15–19. 

(2) The NCAA next contends that the Court’s decision in Board of