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Page Number: 5

Cite as:  596 U. S. ____ (2022) 

5 

THOMAS, J., dissenting 

2021).  Judge  Thapar  maintained  that  the  “panel  disre-
garded federal law, spurned Supreme Court precedent, and 
trampled  on  Ohio’s  state  courts”  in  order  to  “erroneously
g[i]ve  postconviction  relief  to  a  repeat  murderer.”    Id.,  at 
700. 
The  State  filed  an  application  with  JUSTICE 
KAVANAUGH for a recall and stay of the Court of Appeals’ 
mandate,  which  he  granted  pending  the  disposition  of  a 
writ of certiorari.  594 U. S. ___ (2021). 

II 

AEDPA significantly limits federal courts’ power to upset 
state criminal convictions.  When a state court adjudicates 
a  state  prisoner’s  federal  claim  on  the  merits,  a  federal 
court may not grant habeas relief unless the adjudication of 
the claim resulted in a decision (1) “contrary to, or involved
an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal
law, as determined by” this Court’s decisions, or (2) “based
on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the 
evidence  presented  in  the  State  court  proceeding.”    28 
U. S. C. §2254(d).  As relevant here, a decision is “contrary 
to” clearly established federal law if it “applies a rule differ-
ent from the governing law set forth in our cases.”  Bell v. 
Cone, 535 U. S. 685, 694 (2002).  A decision “involve[s] an
unreasonable  application  of  . . .  clearly  established  law”
only if “there is no possibility fairminded jurists could disa-
gree  that  the  state  court’s  decision  conflicts  with  this
Court’s  precedents.”    Harrington  v.  Richter,  562  U.  S.  86, 
102 (2011).

Under this Court’s precedents, a criminal defendant may
waive  his  right  to  counsel  and  instead  represent  himself.
See Faretta, 422 U. S., at 835.  To exercise that right, a de-
fendant  must  “ ‘knowingly,’ ”  “intelligently,”  “clearly[,]  and 
unequivocally”  invoke  it  before  the  trial  court.  Ibid.;  see 
also Raulerson v. Wainwright, 469 U. S. 966 (1984) (Mar-
shall, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (a defendant