Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/558bv.pdf
Page Number: 171.0

10 

BOBBY  v.  VAN  HOOK 

Per Curiam 

tain  his  medical  records.  Id.,  at  381a,  386a.  And  they 
looked  into  enlisting  a  mitigation  specialist  when  the  trial 
was  still  ﬁve  weeks  away.  Id.,  at  386a.  The  Sixth  Circuit, 
in short, was simply incorrect in saying Van Hook’s lawyers 
waited  until  the  “last  minute.”  560  F.  3d,  at  528.  Cf.  Wil­
liams  v.  Taylor,  529  U. S.  362,  395  (2000)  (counsel  waited 
“until  a  week  before  the  trial”  to  prepare  for  the  sentenc­
ing phase). 

Nor was the scope of counsel’s investigation unreasonable.2 
The  Sixth  Circuit  said  Van  Hook’s  attorneys  found  only 
“a  little  information  about  his  traumatic  childhood  experi­
ence,”  560  F.  3d,  at  528,  but  that  is  a  gross  distortion.  The 
trial  court  learned,  for  instance,  that  Van  Hook  (whose  par­
ents were both “heavy drinkers”) started drinking as a tod­
dler, began “barhopping” with his father at age 9, drank and 
used  drugs  regularly  with  his  father  from  age  11  forward, 
and  continued  abusing  drugs  and  alcohol  into  adulthood. 
App. to Pet. for Cert. 310a–312a, 323a–326a, 328a–330a, 373a. 
The  court  also  heard  that  Van  Hook  grew  up  in  a  “ ‘combat 
zone’ ”:  He  watched  his  father  beat  his  mother  weekly,  saw 
him hold her at gunpoint and knifepoint, “observed” episodes 
of  “sexual  violence”  while  sleeping  in  his  parents’  bedroom, 
and  was  beaten  himself  at  least  once.  Id.,  at  321a,  338a– 
339a,  371a.  It  learned  that  Van  Hook,  who  had  “fantasies 
about  killing  and war”  from  an  early  age,  was  deeply  upset 
when  his  drug  and  alcohol  abuse  forced  him  out  of  the  mili­
tary, and attempted suicide ﬁve times (including a month be­
fore the murder), id., at 351a–353a, 372a.  And although the 

2 In his brief in this Court, Van Hook also alludes to his counsel’s failure 
to  obtain  an  independent  mental-health  expert  and  their  reliance  on  (and 
failure  to  object  to  harmful  evidence  in)  a  presentence  investigation  re­
port—grounds  on  which  the  Sixth  Circuit  panel  previously  relied  but 
which  it  abandoned  in  its  ﬁnal  opinion.  See  supra,  at  6.  Van  Hook 
now  concedes,  however,  that  neither  ground  is  a  “basis  for  issuing  the 
writ,”  Brief  in  Opposition  5;  see  also  id.,  at  7,  and  accordingly  we  do  not 
address them.