Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/558bv.pdf
Page Number: 311.0

150 

SMITH  v.  SPISAK 

Opinion of the Court 

sent counsel’s alleged errors, the jury would have concluded 
that the balance of aggravating and mitigating circumstances 
did  not  warrant  death. ”  Spisak  v.  Coyle,  Case  No. 
1:95CV2675  (ND  Ohio,  Apr.  18,  2003), App.  to  Pet.  for  Cert. 
204a.  The  Court  of  Appeals,  however,  reached  a  contrary 
conclusion.  It  held  that  counsel’s  closing  argument,  meas­
ured  by  “ ‘an  objective  standard  of  reasonableness,’ ”  was 
inadequate,  and  it  asserted  that  “a  reasonable  probability 
exists”  that  adequate  representation  would  have  led  to  a 
different  result.  Spisak  v.  Mitchell,  465  F.  3d,  at  703,  706 
(quoting  Strickland,  supra,  at  688).  Responding  to  the 
State’s petition for certiorari, we agreed to review the Court 
of Appeals’ terse ﬁnding of a “reasonable probability” that a 
more adequate argument would have changed a juror’s vote. 
In  his  closing  argument  at  the  penalty  phase,  Spisak’s 
counsel  described  Spisak’s  killings  in  some  detail.  He  ac­
knowledged  that  Spisak’s  admiration  for  Hitler  inspired  his 
crimes.  He portrayed Spisak as “sick,” “twisted,” and “de­
mented.”  8  Tr.  2896  (July  19,  1983).  And  he  said  that 
Spisak  was  “never  going  to  be  any  different.”  Ibid.  He 
then pointed out that all the experts had testiﬁed that Spisak 
suffered  from  some  degree  of  mental  illness.  And,  after  a 
fairly  lengthy  and  rambling  disquisition  about  his  own  deci­
sions  about  calling  expert  witnesses  and  preparing  them, 
counsel argued that, even if Spisak was not legally insane so 
as  to  warrant  a  verdict  of  not  guilty  by  reason  of  insanity, 
he nonetheless was sufﬁciently mentally ill to lessen his cul­
pability  to  the  point  where  he  should  not  be  executed. 
Counsel also told the jury that, when weighing Spisak’s men­
tal illness against the “substantial” aggravating factors pres­
ent  in  the  case,  id.,  at  2924,  the  jurors  should  draw  on  their 
own  sense  of  “pride”  for  living  in  “a  humane  society”  made 
up of “a humane people,” id., at 2897–2900, 2926–2928.  That 
humanity,  he  said,  required  the  jury  to  weigh  the  evidence 
“fairly”  and  to  be  “loyal  to  that  oath”  the  jurors  had  taken 
to uphold the law.  Id., at 2926.