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4 

SMITH v. ARIZONA 

Opinion of the Court 

signed the certificates.  We held that a “straightforward ap-
plication”  of  Crawford  showed  a  constitutional  violation. 
557 U. S., at 312.  The certificates were testimonial: They
had  an  “evidentiary  purpose,”  identical  to  the  one  served 
had  the  analysts  given  “live,  in-court  testimony.”    Id.,  at 
311.  And the certificates were offered to prove the truth of 
what they asserted: that the seized powder was in fact co-
caine.  See id., at 310–311.  So the defendant had a right 
to  cross-examine  the  lab-analyst  certifiers.    In  reaching
that conclusion, we rejected the State’s claim that the re-
sults of so-called “neutral, scientific testing” should be sub-
ject to a different rule.  Id., at 317.  We again underscored
that  the  Confrontation  Clause  commanded  not  reliability 
but one way of testing it—through cross-examination.  See 
ibid.  And we thought that method might have plenty to do 
in cases involving forensic analysis.  After all, lab tests are 
“not  uniquely  immune  from  the  risk  of  manipulation”  or
mistake.  Id., at 318.  The defendant might have used cross-
examination to probe “what tests the analysts performed,” 
whether  those  tests  “present[ed]  a  risk  of  error,”  and
whether the analysts had the right skill set to “interpret[ ] 
their results.”  Id., at 320. 

Two  years  later,  the  Court  relied  on  Melendez-Diaz  to 
hold that a State could not introduce one lab analyst’s writ-
ten findings through the testimony of another.  In Bullcom-
ing v. New Mexico, 564 U. S. 647, 651–652 (2011), an ana-
lyst tested the blood-alcohol level of someone charged with 
drunk driving, and prepared a “testimonial certification” re-
porting  that  the  level  was  higher  than  legal.  But  by  the 
time the driver’s trial began, that analyst had been placed 
on unpaid leave.  So the State instead called a different an-
alyst from the same lab to testify as to what the certification
said.  The substitute analyst had similar qualifications, and 
knew about the type of test performed.  But the Court held 
that insufficient to satisfy the Confrontation Clause.  The