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Cite as:  603 U. S. ____ (2024) 

3 

Opinion of the Court 

A  divided  panel  of  the  D.  C.  Circuit  reversed  and  re-
manded for further proceedings.  Judge Pan, writing for the
court, held that the word “otherwise” in Section 1512(c)(2) 
means that the provision  unambiguously covers “all forms
of corrupt obstruction of an official proceeding, other than
the  conduct  that  is  already  covered  by  §1512(c)(1).”  64 
F. 4th 329, 336 (2023).  Judge Walker concurred in part and 
concurred  in  the  judgment  because  he  read  the  mens  rea 
element of the statute—“corruptly”—as requiring a defend-
ant to act with “an intent to procure an unlawful benefit.” 
Id., at 361 (internal quotation marks omitted).

Judge Katsas dissented.  In his view, the language in sub-
section  (c)(1)  narrows  the  language  that  comes  after  the
word  “otherwise”  in  subsection  (c)(2).    He  therefore  con-
strued  Section  1512(c)(2)  as  applying  “only  to  acts  that,” 
like the ones specified in (c)(1), “affect the integrity or avail-
ability of evidence” at an official proceeding.  Id., at 363. 

We granted certiorari. 601 U. S. ___ (2023). 

II 
The controversy before us is about the scope of the resid-
ual  “otherwise”  clause  in  Section  1512(c)(2).    On  the  one 
hand, Fischer contends that (c)(2) “applies only to acts that
affect the integrity or availability of evidence.”  Brief for Pe-
titioner 8.  On the other, the Government argues that (c)(2) 
“capture[s] all forms of obstructive conduct beyond Section 
1512(c)(1)’s  focus  on  evidence  impairment.”  Brief  for 
United States 13. 

Resolving  such  a  dispute  requires  us  to  determine  how 
the  residual  clause  is  linked  to  its  “surrounding  words.” 
Yates v. United States, 574 U. S. 528, 536 (2015) (plurality 
opinion); see, e.g., United States v. Hansen, 599 U. S. 762, 
774–775 (2023).  In doing so, “we must ‘give effect, if possi-
ble, to every clause and word of [the] statute.’ ”  Williams v. 
Taylor, 529 U. S. 362, 404 (2000) (quoting United States v. 
Menasche, 348 U. S. 528, 538–539 (1955)).  To that end, we