Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/17pdf/16-980_f2q3.pdf
Page Number: 46.0

Cite as:  584 U. S. ____ (2018) 

19 

BREYER, J., dissenting 

itself considers qualified.  Unlike the concurrence, I do not 
read our precedent as holding to the contrary.  But see id., 
at 26 (THOMAS, J., dissenting).  And, our precedent strongly 
suggests that, given the importance of voting in a democ-
racy, a State’s effort (because of failure to vote) to remove 
from  a  federal  election  roll  those  it  considers  otherwise 
qualified  is  unreasonable.    Cf.  Carrington  v.  Rash,  380 
U. S.  89,  91–93,  96  (1965)  (State  can  impose  “reasonable 
residence restrictions on the availability of the ballot” but 
cannot  forbid  otherwise  qualified  members  of  military  to 
vote);  see  also  Kramer  v.  Union  Free  School  Dist.  No.  15, 
395  U. S.  621,  625  (1969)  (“States  have  the  power  to  im-
pose  reasonable  citizenship,  age,  and  residency  require-
ments on the availability of the ballot” (emphasis added)); 
Harper  v.  Virginia  Bd.  of  Elections,  383  U. S.  663,  668 
(1966)  (“To  introduce  wealth  or  payment  of  a  fee  as  a 
measure of a voter’s qualifications is to introduce a capri-
cious or irrelevant factor”). 
  For these reasons, with respect, I dissent.