Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/17pdf/16-1454_5h26.pdf
Page Number: 3

Cite as:  585 U. S. ____ (2018) 

3 

Syllabus 

cise of market power.  Instead, plaintiffs must prove that Amex’s an-
tisteering  provisions  increased  the  cost  of  credit-card  transactions
above a competitive level, reduced the number of credit-card transac-
tions,  or  otherwise  stifled  competition  in  the  two-sided  credit-card 
market.  They failed to do so.  Pp. 15–20.

(1) The plaintiffs offered no evidence that the price of credit-card
transactions was higher than the price one would expect to find in a 
competitive market.  Amex’s increased merchant fees reflect increas-
es in the value of its services and the cost of its transactions, not an 
ability to charge above a competitive price.  It uses higher merchant
fees to offer its cardholders a more robust rewards program, which is
necessary  to  maintain  cardholder  loyalty  and  encourage  the  level  of
spending that makes it valuable to merchants.  In addition, the evi-
dence that does exist cuts against the plaintiffs’ view that Amex’s an-
tisteering provisions are the cause of any increases in merchant fees: 
Visa  and  MasterCard’s  merchant  fees  have  continued  to  increase, 
even at merchant locations where Amex is not accepted.  Pp. 16–17.

(2) The  plaintiffs’  evidence  that  Amex’s  merchant-fee  increases 
between  2005  and  2010  were  not  entirely  spent  on  cardholder  re-
wards does not prove that Amex’s antisteering provisions gave it the
power  to  charge  anticompetitive  prices.    This  Court  will  “not  infer 
competitive injury from price and output  data  absent some evidence
that tends to prove that output was restricted or prices were above a
competitive level.”  Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobac-
co Corp., 509 U. S. 209, 237.  There is no such evidence here.  Output
of credit-card transactions increased during the relevant period, and
the plaintiffs did not show that Amex charged more than its competi-
tors.  P. 17. 

(3) The  plaintiffs  also  failed  to  prove  that  Amex’s  antisteering
provisions have stifled competition among credit-card companies.  To 
the contrary, while they have been in place, the market experienced 
expanding output and improved quality.  Nor have Amex’s antisteer-
ing  provisions  ended  competition  between  credit-card  networks  with 
respect  to  merchant  fees.  Amex’s  competitors  have  exploited  its 
higher merchant fees to their advantage.  Lastly, there is nothing in-
herently  anticompetitive  about  the  provisions.    They  actually  stem
negative  externalities  in  the  credit-card  market  and  promote  inter-
brand  competition.    And  they  do  not  prevent  competing  credit-card 
networks  from  offering  lower  merchant  fees  or  promoting  their 
broader merchant acceptance.  Pp. 18–20. 

 838 F. 3d 179, affirmed. 

THOMAS,  J.,  delivered  the  opinion  of  the  Court,  in  which  ROBERTS, 
C. J., and KENNEDY, ALITO, and GORSUCH, JJ., joined.  BREYER, J., filed a