Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/20pdf/19-1434_ancf.pdf
Page Number: 53.0

6 

UNITED STATES v. ARTHREX, INC. 

THOMAS, J., dissenting 

Presidential  nomination  with  advice  and  consent  of  the 
Senate.”  Id., at 663.  Because neither side asks us to over-
rule our precedent, I would apply this two-part guide.

There  can  be  no  dispute  that  administrative  patent
judges  are,  in  fact,  inferior:  They  are  lower  in  rank  to  at 
least two different officers.  As part of the Board, they serve 
in the Patent and Trademark Office, run by a Director “re-
sponsible  for  providing  policy  direction  and  management
supervision  for  the  Office  and  for  the  issuance  of  patents
and the registration of trademarks.”  35 U. S. C. §3(a)(2)(A).
That  Office,  in  turn,  is  “[w]ithin  the  Department  of  Com-
merce” and “subject to the policy direction of the Secretary
of Commerce.”  §1(a).  The Secretary, in consultation with
the Director, appoints administrative patent judges.  §6(a).
As a comparison to the facts in Edmond illustrates, the 
Director  and  Secretary  are  also  functionally  superior  be-
cause they supervise and direct the work administrative pa-
tent judges perform.  In Edmond, the Court focused on the 
supervision  exercised  by  two  different  entities:  the  Judge 
Advocate General and the Court of Appeals for the Armed 
Forces (CAAF).  The Judge Advocate General exercised gen-
eral administrative oversight over  the court on which  the 
military  judges  sat.  Edmond,  520  U. S.,  at  664.    He  pos-
sessed the power to prescribe uniform rules of procedure for 
the court and to formulate policies and procedure with re-
spect to the review of court-martial cases in general.  Ibid. 
And  he  could  remove  a  Court  of  Criminal  Appeals  judge 
from his judicial assignment without cause, a “powerful tool 
for control.”  Ibid. 

The  Court  noted,  however,  that  “[t]he  Judge  Advocate
General’s control over Court of Criminal Appeals judges is 
. . . not complete.”  Ibid.  This was so for two reasons.  He 
could “not attempt to influence (by threat of removal or oth-
erwise) the outcome of individual proceedings.”  Ibid.  And, 
he had “no power to reverse decisions of the court.”  Ibid.