Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/23pdf/22-915_8o6b.pdf
Page Number: 59

24 

UNITED STATES v. RAHIMI 

KAVANAUGH, J., concurring 

jurisprudence is still in the relatively early innings, unlike 
the  First,  Fourth,  and  Sixth  Amendments,  for  example. 
That is because the Court did not have occasion to recognize
the  Second  Amendment’s  individual  right  until  recently. 
See generally Heller v. District of Columbia, 670 F. 3d 1244, 
1269–1296  (CADC  2011)  (Kavanaugh,  J.,  dissenting). 
Deciding  constitutional  cases  in  a  still-developing  area  of
this Court’s jurisprudence can sometimes be difficult.  But 
that is not a permission slip for a judge to let constitutional 
analysis morph into policy preferences under the guise of a
balancing  test  that  churns  out  the  judge’s  own  policy
beliefs. 

* 

* 

today, 

constitutional 

* 
As  exemplified  by  Heller,  McDonald,  Bruen,  and  the 
Court’s  opinion 
interpretation
properly  takes  account  of  text,  pre-ratification  and  post-
ratification history, and precedent.  Those are the tools of 
the trade for an American judge interpreting the American 
Constitution.  Of course, difficult subsidiary questions can 
arise about how to apply those tools, both generally and in 
particular  cases.  And  in  some  cases,  text,  history,  and 
precedent may point in somewhat different directions.  In 
law as in life, nothing is perfect.  But in Second Amendment 
cases  as  in  other  constitutional  cases,  text,  history,  and 
precedent must remain paramount.