Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/19pdf/17-1618_hfci.pdf
Page Number: 28

24 

BOSTOCK v. CLAYTON COUNTY 

Opinion of the Court 

This Court has explained many times over many years that,
when the meaning of the statute’s terms is plain, our job is
at  an  end.    The  people  are  entitled  to  rely  on  the  law  as 
written,  without  fearing  that  courts  might  disregard  its 
plain terms based on some extratextual consideration.  See, 
e.g., Carcieri v. Salazar, 555 U. S. 379, 387 (2009); Connect-
icut Nat. Bank v. Germain, 503 U. S. 249, 253–254 (1992); 
Rubin  v.  United  States,  449  U. S.  424,  430  (1981).    Of 
course, some Members of this Court have consulted legisla-
tive  history  when  interpreting  ambiguous  statutory  lan-
guage.  Cf. post, at 40 (ALITO, J., dissenting).  But that has 
no bearing here.  “Legislative history, for those who take it
into account, is meant to clear up ambiguity, not create it.” 
Milner  v.  Department  of  Navy,  562  U. S.  562,  574  (2011).
And as we have seen, no ambiguity exists about how Title 
VII’s  terms  apply  to  the  facts  before  us.    To  be  sure,  the 
statute’s  application  in  these  cases  reaches  “beyond  the
principal evil” legislators may have intended or expected to
address.  Oncale,  523  U. S.,  at  79.    But  “ ‘the  fact  that  [a
statute] has been applied in situations not expressly antic-
ipated  by  Congress’ ”  does  not  demonstrate  ambiguity;  in-
stead, it simply “ ‘demonstrates [the] breadth’ ” of a legisla-
tive command.  Sedima, S. P. R. L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U. S. 
479,  499  (1985).    And  “it  is  ultimately  the  provisions  of ” 
those legislative commands “rather than the principal con-
cerns of our legislators by which we are governed.”  Oncale, 
523  U. S.,  at  79;  see  also  A.  Scalia  &  B.  Garner,  Reading 
Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 101 (2012) (noting 
that unexpected applications of broad language reflect only 
Congress’s “presumed point [to] produce general coverage—
not to leave room for courts to recognize ad hoc exceptions”).
Still, while legislative history can never defeat unambig-
uous  statutory  text,  historical  sources  can  be  useful  for  a 
different purpose:  Because the law’s ordinary meaning at 
the time of enactment usually governs, we must be sensi-
tive to the possibility a statutory term that means one thing