Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/558bv.pdf
Page Number: 327

166 

NRG  POWER  MARKETING,  LLC  v.  MAINE  PUB. 
UTIL.  COMM’N 
Syllabus 

to  “presume  that  the  rate  set  out  in  a  freely  negotiated  .  .  .  contract 
meets  the  ‘just  and  reasonable’  requirement”  unless  “FERC  concludes 
that the contract seriously harms the public interest.”  554 U. S., at 530. 
The Morgan Stanley opinion makes it unmistakably clear that the public 
interest  standard  is  not,  as  the  D.  C.  Circuit  suggested,  independent 
of,  and  sometimes  at  odds  with,  the  “just  and  reasonable”  standard. 
Rather,  the  public  interest  standard  deﬁnes  “what  it  means  for  a  rate 
to  satisfy  the  just-and-reasonable  standard  in  the  contract  context.” 
Id.,  at  546.  And  if  FERC  itself  must  presume  just  and  reasonable  a 
contract rate resulting from fair, arm’s-length negotiations, noncontract­
ing  parties  may  not  escape  that  presumption.  Moreover,  the  Mobile-
Sierra doctrine does not neglect third-party interests; it directs FERC 
to  reject  a  contract  rate  that  “seriously  harms  the  consuming  public.” 
554  U. S.,  at  545–546.  Finally,  the  D.  C.  Circuit’s  conﬁnement  of 
Mobile-Sierra  to  rate  challenges  by  contracting  parties  diminishes  the 
doctrine’s  animating  purpose:  promotion  of  “the  stability  of  supply  ar­
rangements  which  all  agree  is  essential  to  the  health  of  the  [energy] 
industry.”  Mobile, 350 U. S., at 344.  A presumption applicable to con­
tracting  parties  only,  and  inoperative  as  to  everyone  else—consumers, 
advocacy  groups,  state  utility  commissions,  elected  ofﬁcials  acting  pa­
rens patriae—could scarcely provide the stability Mobile-Sierra aimed 
to secure.  Pp. 171–176. 

(b)  Whether the rates at issue qualify as “contract rates” for Mobile-
Sierra  purposes,  and,  if  not,  whether  FERC  had  discretion  to  treat 
them  analogously  are  questions  raised  before,  but  not  ruled  upon  by, 
the  D.  C.  Circuit.  They  remain  open  for  that  court’s  consideration  on 
remand.  P. 176. 

520 F. 3d 464, reversed in part and remanded. 

Ginsburg,  J.,  delivered  the  opinion  of  the  Court,  in  which  Roberts, 
C.  J.,  and  Scalia,  Kennedy,  Thomas,  Breyer,  Alito,  and  Sotomayor, 
JJ., joined.  Stevens, J., ﬁled a dissenting opinion, post, p. 177. 

Jeffrey  A.  Lamken  argued  the  cause  for  petitioners. 
With  him  on  the  briefs  were  John  N.  Estes  III,  Robert  K. 
Kry, Michael R. Bramnick, and Christopher C. O’Hara. 

Eric  D.  Miller  argued  the  cause  for  the  Federal  Energy 
Regulatory  Commission  urging  reversal.  With  him  on  the 
briefs were Solicitor General Kagan, Deputy Solicitor Gen­
eral Kneedler, Cynthia A. Marlette, Robert H. Solomon, and 
Lona T. Perry.