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Page Number: 23

8 

WILKINS v. UNITED STATES 

THOMAS, J., dissenting 

of limitations as a “central condition of the consent given by 
the Act.”  Id., at 843 (citing Block, 461 U. S., at 283–285). 
As  in  Block,  this  reasoning  was  a  critical  and  substantial
part of the Court’s opinion.  The Court ultimately concluded 
that the plaintiff ’s claim was untimely and thus barred un-
der the Act.  476 U. S., at 844.  The Court further concluded 
that no other statute “conferred jurisdiction” on the lower 
courts to adjudicate her claim.  Id., at 841; see also id., 844– 
851.  In deciding the case, the Court noticeably did not en-
gage  in  a  forfeiture  analysis,  underscoring  that  it  under-
stood  the  Government’s  late-raised  statute-of-limitations 
argument  to  be  jurisdictional  and,  thus,  capable  of  being 
raised at any point in the proceedings.  See Arbaugh v. Y & 
H Corp., 546 U. S. 500, 514 (2006) (explaining that jurisdic-
tional arguments cannot be forfeited).3 

United States v. Beggerly, 524 U. S. 38 (1998), on which 
the majority relies, see ante, at 10–11, is not to the contrary.
In that case, the Court considered whether the Quiet Title 
Act’s  time  bar  may  be  equitably  tolled.    After  noting  that
the Court of Appeals had considered the statute of limita-
tions jurisdictional, see Beggerly, 524 U. S., at 42, the Court 
turned to the language of the Act.  The Court emphasized 
that the 12-year statute of limitations began to accrue when
the litigants knew or should have known of the claim of the
United States, and it observed that the provision’s text “has 

—————— 

3 The  majority  suggests  that  United  States  v.  Mottaz,  476  U. S.  834, 
may  have  (sub  silentio)  concluded  that  forfeiture  did  not  apply  in  that 
case.  See ante, at 10, and n. 5.  But, presumably, such a conclusion would 
have merited mention in the Court’s opinion.  To be sure, the majority
notes that the Government had raised the statute of limitations “ ‘appar-
ently for the first time’ ” in a petition for rehearing.  Ante, at 9 (quoting 
Mottaz,  476  U. S.,  at  840  (emphasis  added)).    However,  the  use  of  the 
word “apparently” does not indicate that the Court “did not pause over
its passing remark,” as the majority contends.  See ante, at 9–10.  To the 
contrary, it suggests that the Court did not need to conduct a forfeiture
analysis, because the provision was jurisdictional in any event (and thus 
not subject to forfeiture).