Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/558bv.pdf
Page Number: 610.0

Cite as: 558 U. S. 310 (2010) 

449 

Opinion of Stevens, J. 

byist  testiﬁes  that  these  organizations  use  issue  ad­
vocacy  as  a  means  to  inﬂuence  various  Members  of 
Congress. 

“The Findings also demonstrate that Members of Con­
gress  seek  to  have  corporations  and  unions  run  these 
advertisements  on  their  behalf.  The  Findings  show 
that  Members  suggest  that  corporations  or  individuals 
make donations to interest groups with the understand­
ing  that  the  money  contributed  to  these  groups  will 
assist  the  Member  in  a  campaign.  After  the  elec­
tion,  these  organizations  often  seek  credit  for  their 
support. . . . Finally, a  large majority of Americans (80%) 
are  of  the  view  that  corporations  and  other  organiza­
tions  that  engage  in  electioneering  communications, 
which  beneﬁt  speciﬁc  elected  ofﬁcials,  receive  special 
consideration  from  those  ofﬁcials  when  matters  arise 
that  affect  these  corporations  and  organizations.”  Id., 
at 623–624 (citations and footnote omitted). 

Many  of  the  relationships  of  dependency  found  by  Judge 
Kollar-Kotelly  seemed  to  have  a  quid  pro  quo  basis,  but 
other  arrangements  were  more  subtle.  Her  analysis  shows 
the great difﬁculty in delimiting the precise scope of the quid 
pro  quo  category,  as  well  as  the  adverse  consequences  that 
all such arrangements may have.  There are threats of cor­
ruption that are far more destructive to a democratic society 
than the odd bribe.  Yet the majority’s understanding of cor­
ruption  would  leave  lawmakers  impotent  to  address  all  but 
the most discrete abuses. 

Our  “undue  inﬂuence”  cases  have  allowed  the  American 
people  to  cast  a  wider  net  through  legislative  experiments 
designed  to  ensure,  to  some  minimal  extent,  “that  ofﬁce­
holders will decide issues . . . on the  merits or the  desires of 
their  constituencies,”  and  not  “according  to  the  wishes  of 
those  who  have  made  large  ﬁnancial  contributions”—or  ex­
penditures—“valued  by  the  ofﬁceholder.”  McConnell,  540