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Page Number: 225

64 

BEARD  v.  KINDLER 

Kennedy, J., concurring 

asserting  their  federal  rights,  have  in  good  faith  complied 
with  existing  state  procedural  law.  “Novelty  in  procedural 
requirements  cannot  be  permitted  to  thwart  review  in  this 
Court  applied  for  by  those  who,  in  justiﬁed  reliance  upon 
prior decisions,  seek vindication in  state courts of  their fed­
eral  constitutional  rights.”  NAACP  v.  Alabama  ex  rel. 
Patterson, 357 U. S. 449, 457–458 (1958).  We have also been 
mindful  of  the  danger  that  novel  state  procedural  require­
ments will be imposed for the purpose of evading compliance 
with  a  federal  standard.  See,  e. g., NAACP  v.  Alabama  ex 
rel. Flowers, 377 U. S. 288, 293–302 (1964). 

Neither  of  these  concerns  applies  here.  First,  no  one 
could  seriously  entertain  the  notion  that  Kindler  acted  in 
“justiﬁed  reliance”  when  he  ﬂed  beyond  the  jurisdiction  of 
the  Pennsylvania  courts.  Even  if  a  hypothetical  escapee 
studiously examined the case law before making an informed 
decision that ﬂight was worth it, that is not the reliance the 
law should be required to consider.  There is no justiﬁcation 
for  an  unlawful  escape,  which  “operates  as  an  affront  to  the 
dignity  of  [a]  court’s  proceedings.”  Ortega-Rodriguez  v. 
United  States,  507  U. S.  234,  246  (1993).  And  if  some  prior 
court rulings allowed a former escapee to reinstate forfeited 
claims, there is no convincing reason to say a future escapee 
is entitled to similar treatment.  Nor is there any indication 
that the  Supreme Court of Pennsylvania  adopted its forfeit­
ure  rule  out  of  any  hostility  toward  legitimate  constitu­
tional claims. 

It is most doubtful that, in light of its underlying purposes, 
the adequate state ground doctrine ought to prevent a State 
from adopting, and enforcing, a sensible rule that the escaped 
felon  forfeits  any  pending  postverdict  motions.  The  law  is 
entitled  to  protect  the  regularity  and  predictability  of  its 
own  processes,  and  its  own  interest  in  the  prompt  adjudica­
tion  of  disputed  issues,  by  imposing  a  rule  of  waiver  quite 
without  regard  to  some  notion  of  express  or  constructive 
reliance  by  the  one  who  escapes.  And  if  that  principle  had