Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/09pdf/08-769.pdf
Page Number: 43

Cite as:  559 U. S. ____ (2010) 

19 

ALITO, J., dissenting 

“The  abused  dogs  used  in  fights  endure  physical  tor-
ture  and  emotional  manipulation  throughout  their
lives  to  predispose  them  to  violence;  common  tactics
include feeding the animals hot peppers and gunpow-
der,  prodding  them  with  sticks,  and  electrocution. 
Dogs are conditioned never to give up a fight, even if
they  will  be  gravely  hurt  or  killed.    As  a  result,  dog-
fights  inflict  horrific  injuries  on  the  participating
animals,  including  lacerations,  ripped  ears,  puncture
wounds and broken bones.  Losing dogs are routinely 
refused treatment, beaten further as ‘punishment’ for 
the loss, and executed by drowning, hanging, or incin-
eration.”  Id., at 5–6 (footnotes omitted). 

For  these  dogs,  unlike  the  animals  killed  in  crush  vid-
eos,  the  suffering  lasts  for  years  rather  than  minutes.  As 
with  crush  videos,  moreover,  the  statutory  ban  on  com-
merce  in  dogfighting  videos  is  also  supported  by  compel-
ling  governmental  interests  in  effectively  enforcing  the 
Nation’s  criminal  laws  and  preventing  criminals  from 
profiting from their illegal activities.  See Ferber, supra, at 
757–758; Simon & Schuster, 502 U. S., at 119. 

In sum, §48 may validly be applied to at least two broad 
real-world categories of expression covered by the statute:
crush videos and dogfighting videos.  Thus, the statute has 
a  substantial  core  of  constitutionally  permissible  applica-
tions.  Moreover,  for  the  reasons  set  forth  above,  the  re-
cord does not show that §48, properly interpreted, bans a 
substantial amount of protected speech in absolute terms. 
A  fortiori,  respondent  has  not  met  his  burden  of  demon-
strating that any impermissible applications of the statute
are  “substantial”  in  relation  to  its  “plainly  legitimate
sweep.”  Williams, 553 U. S., at 292.  Accordingly, I would
reject  respondent’s  claim  that  §48  is  facially  unconstitu-
tional under the overbreadth doctrine.