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CLINTON v. CITY OF NEW YORK

Opinion of the Court

procedure.” Chadha, 462 U. S., at 951. Our ﬁrst President
understood the text of the Presentment Clause as requiring
that he either “approve all the parts of a Bill, or reject it in
toto.” 30 What has emerged in these cases from the Presi-
dent’s exercise of his statutory cancellation powers, however,
are truncated versions of two bills that passed both Houses
of Congress. They are not the product of the “ﬁnely
wrought” procedure that the Framers designed.

At oral argument, the Government suggested that the can-
cellations at issue in these cases do not effect a “repeal” of
the canceled items because under the special “lockbox” pro-
visions of the Act,31 a canceled item “retain[s] real, legal

30 33 Writings of George Washington 96 (J. Fitzpatrick ed., 1940); see
also W. Taft, The Presidency: Its Duties, Its Powers, Its Opportunities
and Its Limitations 11 (1916) (stating that the President “has no power to
veto part of a bill and let the rest become a law”); cf. 1 W. Blackstone,
Commentaries *154 (“The crown cannot begin of itself any alterations in
the present established law; but it may approve or disapprove of the alter-
ations suggested and consented to by the two houses”).

31 The lockbox procedure ensures that savings resulting from cancella-
tions are used to reduce the deﬁcit, rather than to offset deﬁcit increases
arising from other laws. See 2 U. S. C. §§ 691c(a)–(b) (1994 ed., Supp. II);
see also H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 104–491, pp. 23–24 (1996). The Ofﬁce of
Management and Budget (OMB) estimates the deﬁcit reduction resulting
from each cancellation of new direct spending or limited tax beneﬁt items
and presents its estimate as a separate entry in the “pay-as-you-go” report
submitted to Congress pursuant to § 252(d) of the Balanced Budget and
Emergency Deﬁcit Control Act of 1985 (or Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act),
2 U. S. C. § 902(d). See § 691c(a)(2)(A) (1994 ed., Supp. II); see also H. R.
Conf. Rep. No. 104–491, at 23. The “pay-as-you-go” requirement acts as
a self-imposed limitation on Congress’ ability to increase spending and/or
reduce revenue: If spending increases are not offset by revenue increases
(or if revenue reductions are not offset by spending reductions), then a
“sequester” of the excess budgeted funds is required. See 2 U. S. C.
§§ 900(b), 901(a)(1), 902(b), 906(l). OMB does not include the estimated
savings resulting from a cancellation in the report it must submit under
§§ 252(b) and 254 of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deﬁcit Control
Act of 1985, 2 U. S. C. §§ 902(b), 904. See § 691c(a)(2)(B). By providing
in this way that such savings “shall not be included in the pay-as-you-go
balances,” Congress ensures that “savings from the cancellation of new