Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/17pdf/16-111_j4el.pdf
Page Number: 24.0

Cite as:  584 U. S. ____ (2018) 

3 

KAGAN, J., concurring 

belief.* 

I  read  the  Court’s  opinion  as  fully  consistent  with  that
view.  The Court limits its analysis to the reasoning of the 
state  agencies  (and  Court  of  Appeals)—“quite  apart  from
whether the [Phillips and Jack] cases should ultimately be 
distinguished.”  Ante, at 15.  And the Court itself recognizes 
the  principle  that  would  properly  account  for  a  difference
in  result  between  those  cases.    Colorado  law,  the  Court 
—————— 

* JUSTICE  GORSUCH  disagrees.    In  his  view,  the  Jack  cases  and  the 
Phillips case must be treated the same because the bakers in all those
cases “would not sell the requested cakes to anyone.”  Post, at 4.  That 
description perfectly fits  the Jack cases—and explains  why the bakers 
there did not engage in unlawful discrimination.  But it is a surprising
characterization of the Phillips case, given that Phillips routinely sells 
wedding cakes to opposite-sex couples.  JUSTICE GORSUCH can make the 
claim  only  because  he  does  not  think  a  “wedding  cake”  is  the  relevant
product.  As JUSTICE GORSUCH sees it, the product that Phillips refused 
to sell here—and would refuse to sell to anyone—was a “cake celebrat-
ing same-sex marriage.”  Ibid.; see post, at 3, 6, 8–9.  But that is wrong.
The  cake  requested  was  not  a  special  “cake  celebrating  same-sex
marriage.”  It  was  simply  a  wedding cake—one  that  (like  other  stand-
ard  wedding  cakes)  is  suitable  for  use  at  same-sex  and  opposite-sex
weddings  alike.  See  ante,  at  4  (majority  opinion)  (recounting  that
Phillips did not so much as discuss the cake’s design before he refused
to make it).  And contrary to JUSTICE GORSUCH’S view, a wedding cake
does  not  become  something  different  whenever  a  vendor  like  Phillips
invests  its  sale  to  particular  customers  with  “religious  significance.” 
Post, at 11.  As this Court has long held, and reaffirms today, a vendor
cannot escape a public accommodations law because his religion disap-
proves  selling  a  product  to  a  group  of  customers,  whether  defined  by 
sexual  orientation,  race,  sex,  or  other  protected  trait.    See  Newman  v. 
Piggie  Park  Enterprises,  Inc.,  390  U. S.  400,  402,  n. 5  (1968)  (per 
curiam)  (holding  that  a  barbeque  vendor  must  serve  black  customers 
even  if  he  perceives  such  service  as  vindicating  racial  equality,  in
violation  of  his  religious  beliefs);  ante,  at  9.  A  vendor  can  choose  the 
products  he  sells,  but  not  the  customers  he  serves—no  matter  the 
reason.  Phillips sells wedding cakes.  As to that product, he unlawfully 
discriminates:  He  sells  it  to  opposite-sex  but  not  to  same-sex  couples.
And  on  that  basis—which  has  nothing  to  do  with  Phillips’  religious
beliefs—Colorado could have distinguished Phillips from the bakers  in
the Jack cases, who did not engage in any prohibited discrimination.