Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/16pdf/15-577_khlp.pdf
Page Number: 23.0

2 

TRINITY LUTHERAN CHURCH OF COLUMBIA, INC. v.

COMER 
GORSUCH, J., concurring in part
 

be described both ways. 

Neither do I see why the First Amendment’s Free Exer-
cise Clause should care.  After all, that Clause guarantees 
the  free  exercise  of  religion,  not  just  the  right  to  inward
belief  (or  status).    Employment  Div.,  Dept.  of  Human 
Resources of Ore. v. Smith, 494 U. S. 872, 877 (1990).  And 
this  Court  has  long  explained  that  government  may  not
“devise mechanisms, overt or disguised, designed to perse-
cute  or  oppress  a  religion  or  its  practices.”  Church  of 
Lukumi  Babalu  Aye,  Inc.  v.  Hialeah,  508  U. S.  520,  547 
(1993).  Generally the government may not force people to
choose  between  participation  in  a  public  program  and 
their  right  to  free  exercise  of  religion.    See  Thomas  v. 
Review  Bd.  of  Indiana  Employment  Security  Div.,  450 
U. S.  707,  716  (1981);  Everson  v.  Board  of  Ed.  of  Ewing, 
330  U. S.  1,  16  (1947).    I  don’t  see  why  it  should  matter 
whether we describe that benefit, say, as closed to Luther-
ans  (status)  or  closed  to  people  who  do  Lutheran  things 
(use).  It is free exercise either way. 

For these reasons, reliance on the status-use distinction 
does not suffice for me to distinguish  Locke v. Davey, 540 
U. S. 712 (2004).  See ante, at 12.  In that case, this Court 
upheld a funding restriction barring a student from using 
a  scholarship  to  pursue  a  degree  in  devotional  theology.
But  can  it  really  matter  whether  the  restriction  in  Locke 
was phrased in terms of use instead of status (for was it a 
student  who  wanted  a  vocational  degree  in  religion?  or
was it a religious student who wanted the necessary edu-
cation for his chosen vocation?).  If that case can be correct 
and distinguished, it seems it might be only because of the 
opinion’s claim of a long tradition against the use of public 
funds  for  training  of  the  clergy,  a  tradition  the  Court
correctly explains has no analogue here.  Ante, at 13. 

Second and for similar reasons, I am unable to join the
footnoted  observation,  ante,  at  14,  n. 3,  that  “[t]his  case 
involves express discrimination based on religious identity