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2  TC HEARTLAND LLC v. KRAFT FOODS GROUP BRANDS LLC 

Syllabus 

titioner resided in Delaware under §1391(c), it also resided there un-
der §1400(b). 

Held: As applied to domestic corporations, “reside[nce]” in §1400(b) re-
fers only to the State of incorporation.  The amendments to §1391 did
not modify the meaning of §1400(b) as interpreted by Fourco.  Pp. 3– 
10. 

(a) The venue provision of the Judiciary Act of 1789 covered patent
cases  as  well  as  other  civil  suits.  Stonite  Products  Co.  v.  Melvin 
Lloyd  Co.,  315  U. S.  561,  563.    In  1897,  Congress  enacted  a  patent 
specific  venue  statute.    This  new  statute  (§1400(b)’s  predecessor)
permitted suit in the district of which the defendant was an “inhabit-
ant” or in which the defendant both maintained a “regular and estab-
lished  place  of  business”  and  committed  an  act  of  infringement.  29 
Stat. 695.  A corporation at that time was understood to “inhabit” on-
ly  the  State  of  incorporation.    This  Court  addressed  the  scope  of 
§1400(b)’s  predecessor  in  Stonite,  concluding  that  it  constituted  “the
exclusive provision controlling venue in patent infringement proceed-
ings” and thus was not supplemented or modified by the general ven-
ue provisions.  315 U. S., at 563. 

In 1948, Congress recodified the patent venue statute as §1400(b).
That  provision,  which  remains  unaltered  today,  uses  “resides”  in-
stead  of  “inhabit[s].”    At  the  same  time,  Congress  also  enacted  the 
general venue statute, §1391, which defined “residence” for corporate 
defendants.  In  Fourco,  this  Court  reaffirmed  Stonite’s  holding,  ob-
serving  that  Congress  enacted  §1400(b)  as  a  standalone  venue  stat-
ute and that nothing in the 1948 recodification evidenced an intent to 
alter that status, even the fact that §1391(c) by “its terms” embraced
“all  actions,”  353  U. S.,  at  228.    The  Court  also  concluded  that  “re-
sides” in the recodified version bore the same meaning as “inhabit[s]”
in the pre-1948 version.  See id., at 226. 

This  landscape  remained  effectively  unchanged  until  1988,  when
Congress amended the general venue statute, §1391(c).  The revised 
provision  stated  that  it  applied  “[f]or  purposes  of  venue  under  this 
chapter.”   In  VE  Holding  Corp.  v.  Johnson  Gas  Appliance  Co.,  917 
F. 2d  1574,  1578,  the  Federal  Circuit  held  that,  in  light  of  this
amendment,  §1391(c)  established  the  definition  for  all  other  venue 
statutes under the same “chapter,” including §1400(b).  In 2011, Con-
gress  adopted  the  current  version  of  §1391,  which  provides  that  its
general  definition  applies  “[f]or  all  venue  purposes.”  The  Federal 
Circuit reaffirmed VE Holding in the case below.  Pp. 3–7.

(b) In Fourco, this Court definitively and unambiguously held that 
the  word  “reside[nce]”  in  §1400(b),  as  applied  to  domestic  corpora-
tions, refers only to the State of incorporation.  Because Congress has 
not amended §1400(b) since Fourco, and neither party asks the Court