Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/17pdf/16-1466_2b3j.pdf
Page Number: 16.0

Cite as:  585 U. S. ____ (2018) 

11 

Opinion of the Court 

the  other  hand,  proposes  that  we  apply  what  amounts  to
rational-basis review, that is, that we ask only whether a 
government  employer  could  reasonably  believe  that  the
exaction of agency fees serves its interests.  See post, at 4 
(KAGAN,  J.,  dissenting)  (“A  government  entity  could  rea­
sonably  conclude  that  such  a  clause  was  needed”).    This 
form  of  minimal  scrutiny  is  foreign  to  our  free-speech
jurisprudence, and we reject it here.  At the same time, we 
again  find  it  unnecessary  to  decide  the  issue  of  strict
scrutiny because the Illinois scheme cannot survive under 
even  the  more  permissive  standard  applied  in  Knox  and 
Harris. 

In the remainder of this part of our opinion (Parts III–B 

and  III–C),  we  will  apply  this  standard  to  the  justifica­
tions  for  agency  fees  adopted  by  the  Court  in  Abood. 
Then,  in  Parts  IV  and  V,  we  will  turn  to  alternative  ra­
tionales proffered by respondents and their amici. 

B 
In  Abood,  the  main  defense  of  the  agency-fee  arrange­
ment  was  that  it  served  the  State’s  interest  in  “labor 
peace,”  431  U. S.,  at  224.    By  “labor  peace,”  the  Abood 
Court meant avoidance of the conflict and disruption that
it  envisioned  would  occur  if  the  employees  in  a  unit  were
represented by more than one union.  In such a situation, 
the  Court  predicted,  “inter-union  rivalries”  would  foster 
“dissension within the work force,” and the employer could 
face  “conflicting  demands  from  different  unions.”  Id.,  at 
220–221.  Confusion would ensue if the employer entered 
into  and  attempted  to  “enforce  two  or  more  agreements
specifying different terms and conditions of employment.” 
Id.,  at  220.  And  a  settlement  with  one  union  would  be 
“subject to attack from [a] rival labor organizatio[n].”  Id., 
at 221. 

We assume that “labor peace,” in this sense of the term,
is a compelling state interest, but Abood cited no evidence