Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/529bv.pdf
Page Number: 381

529US1

Unit: $U42

[10-11-01 11:58:08] PAGES PGT: OPIN

306

ERIE v. PAP’S A. M.

Scalia, J., concurring in judgment

of Art. III to adjudication of actual disputes between adverse
parties,” Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U. S. 24, 36 (1974), and
that this limitation applies “at all stages of review,” Preiser
v. Newkirk, 422 U. S. 395, 401 (1975) (quoting Steffel v.
Thompson, 415 U. S. 452, 459, n. 10 (1974)) (internal quota-
tion marks omitted).

Which brings me to the Court’s second reason for holding
that this case is still alive: The Court concludes that because
petitioners have an “ongoing injury” caused by the state
court’s invalidation of its duly enacted public nudity provi-
sion, our ability to hear the case and reverse the judgment
below is itself “sufﬁcient to prevent the case from being
moot.” Ante, at 288. Although the Court does not cite any
authority for the proposition that the burden of an adverse
decision below sufﬁces to keep a case alive, it is evidently
relying upon our decision in ASARCO, which held that Arti-
cle III’s standing requirements were satisﬁed on writ of cer-
tiorari to a state court even though there would have been
no Article III standing for the action producing the state
judgment on which certiorari was sought. We assumed ju-
risdiction in the case because we concluded that the party
seeking to invoke the federal judicial power had standing to
challenge the adverse judgment entered against them by the
state court. Because that judgment,
if left undisturbed,
would “caus[e] direct, speciﬁc, and concrete injury to the par-
ties who petition for our review,” ASARCO, 490 U. S., at
623–624, and because a decision by this Court to reverse the
State Supreme Court would clearly redress that injury, we
concluded that the original plaintiffs’ lack of standing was
not fatal to our jurisdiction, id., at 624.

I dissented on this point in ASARCO, see id., at 634
(Rehnquist, C. J., concurring in part and dissenting in part,
joined by Scalia, J.), and remain of the view that it was
incorrectly decided. But ASARCO at least did not purport
to hold that the constitutional standing requirements of in-
jury, causation, and redressability may be satisﬁed solely by