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Page Number: 10

6 

MASLENJAK v. UNITED STATES 

Opinion of the Court 

in its acquisition.2 

The  Government’s  contrary  view—that  §1425(a)  re-
quires only a “violation[ ] of law in the course of procuring
naturalization”—falters  on  the  way  language  naturally
works.  Brief  for  United  States  14.    Return  for  a  moment 
to  our  artwork  example.    Imagine  this  time  that  John
made an illegal turn while driving to the auction house to
purchase a painting.  Would you say that he had “procured 
the painting illegally” because he happened to violate the 
—————— 

2 To be fair, the idea of “obtaining citizenship illegally” has one other 
possible meaning, but no one defends it here because it does not fit with 
the rest of §1425.   On this  alternative reading, a person would violate 
§1425(a)  by  obtaining  citizenship  without  the  requisite  legal  qualifica-
tions—regardless  of  whether  she  committed  another  illegal  act  in  the
naturalization process.  To vary our earlier example, suppose someone 
told  you  that  John  procured  a  gun  illegally.    You  might  think  that
meant John got the gun through independently unlawful conduct (e.g., 
he held up a gun store), as in the case of the painting.  But you might 
instead think that John was just not legally qualified to take possession
of  a  gun—because,  for  example,  he  once  committed  a  felony.    That 
alternative  interpretation  is  plausible  with  respect  to  goods  that  not
everyone  is  eligible  to  obtain,  like  guns—or  like  naturalization.    And 
indeed,  we  have  interpreted  a  civil  statute  closely  resembling 
§1425(a)—which authorizes denaturalization when, inter alia, citizenship 
is “illegally procured,” 8 U. S. C. §1451(a)—to cover that qualifications-
based  species  of  illegality.
  See  Fedorenko  v.  United  States,  449 
U. S. 490,  506 (1981).   But  neither party urges that reading here, and 
for  good  reason.    Unlike  its  civil  analogue,  §1425(a)  has  a  companion
provision—§1425(b)—that  makes  it  a  crime  to  “procure  or  obtain 
naturalization” for “[one]self or another person not entitled thereto.”  If 
obtaining  citizenship  without  legal  entitlement  were  enough  to  violate
§1425(a),  then  that  highly  specific  language  in  §1425(b)  would  be 
superfluous.  Rather than reading those words to do no work, in viola-
tion  of  ordinary  canons  of  statutory  construction,  we  understand 
Congress  to  have  defined  two  separate  crimes  in  §1425:  Assuming  the 
appropriate  mens  rea,  subsection  (a)  covers  illegal  means  of  procure-
ment,  as  described  above,  while  subsection  (b)  covers  simple  lack  of
qualifications.    As  we  will  explain,  however,  questions  relating  to 
citizenship  qualifications  play  a  significant  role  when  applying
§1425(a)’s  causal  standard  in  cases  (like  this  one)  predicated  on  false 
statements.  See infra, at 10–11.