Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/17pdf/16-111_new2_22p3.pdf
Page Number: 40

Cite as:  584 U. S. ____ (2018) 

3 

Opinion of THOMAS, J. 

and services.”  Id., at 572 (emphasis added).

Although  public-accommodations  laws  generally  regu­
late  conduct,  particular  applications  of  them  can  burden 
protected  speech.  When  a  public-accommodations  law 
“ha[s]  the  effect  of  declaring  . . .  speech  itself  to  be  the
public accommodation,” the First Amendment applies with
full  force.  Id.,  at  573;  accord,  Boy  Scouts  of  America  v. 
Dale, 530 U. S. 640, 657–659 (2000).  In Hurley, for exam­
ple,  a  Massachusetts  public-accommodations  law  prohib- 
ited  “ ‘any  distinction,  discrimination  or  restriction  on  ac­
count  of  . . .  sexual  orientation  . . .  relative  to  the  admis­
sion  of  any  person  to,  or  treatment  in  any  place  of  public
accommodation.’ ”  515  U. S.,  at  561  (quoting  Mass.  Gen.
Laws  §272:98  (1992);  ellipsis  in  original).    When  this  law 
required  the  sponsor  of  a  St.  Patrick’s  Day  parade  to
include  a  parade  unit  of  gay,  lesbian,  and  bisexual  Irish-
Americans,  the  Court  unanimously  held  that  the  law 
violated the sponsor’s right to free speech.  Parades are “a 
form of expression,” this Court explained, and the applica­
tion  of  the  public-accommodations  law  “alter[ed]  the  ex­
pressive  content”  of  the  parade  by  forcing  the  sponsor  to 
add a new unit.  515 U. S., at 568, 572–573.  The addition 
of that unit compelled the organizer to “bear witness to the
fact that some Irish are gay, lesbian, or bisexual”; “suggest 
. . .  that  people  of  their  sexual  orientation  have  as  much
claim  to  unqualified  social  acceptance  as  heterosexuals”;
and  imply  that  their  participation  “merits  celebration.” 
Id., at 574.  While this Court acknowledged that the unit’s
exclusion  might  have  been  “misguided,  or  even  hurtful,” 
ibid., it rejected the notion that governments can mandate
“thoughts  and  statements  acceptable  to  some  groups  or,
indeed, all people” as the “antithesis” of free speech, id., at 
579; accord, Dale, supra, at 660–661. 

The  parade  in  Hurley  was  an  example  of  what  this
Court has termed “expressive conduct.”  See 515 U. S., at 
568–569.  This Court has long held that “the Constitution