Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/22pdf/598us1r3_j4ek.pdf
Page Number: 16.0

Cite as:  598 U. S. 17 (2023) 

31 

Opinion of the Court 

ing  a  “ `novel  and  unforeseeable' ”  approach  to  Rule  32.1(g) 
that  lacks  “ `fair  or  substantial  support  in  prior  state  law.' ” 
Walker,  562  U. S.,  at  320  (quoting  16B  Wright  &  Miller 
§ 4026, at 386). 

The  dissent  argues  that  this  case  did  present  a  new  con-
text  because  the  Arizona  Supreme  Court  had  never  before 
applied  Rule  32.1(g)  to  a  summary  reversal.  There  was  no 
reason, however, to treat this case any differently than past 
cases.  Whereas the Arizona Supreme Court had previously 
looked  to  the  effect  of  an  intervening  federal  or  state  deci-
sion on Arizona law, supra, at 28, here it focused exclusively 
on  whether  there  had  been  a  change  in  federal  law.  The 
court  thus  disregarded  that  Lynch  overruled  “previously 
binding case law” in Arizona, the “archetype” of a signifcant 
change  in  the  law.  Shrum,  220  Ariz.,  at  118,  203  P.  3d,  at 
1178.4 

Finally,  the  dissent  attempts  to  draw  a  parallel  between 
Rule  32.1(g)  and  certain  procedural  rules  governing  federal 

4 The  Arizona Supreme  Court claims  it  was acting  consistently  with its 
Shrum  decision  in  this  case.  251  Ariz.,  at  207,  487  P.  3d,  at  995.  That 
assertion  does  not  stand  up  under  inspection.  In  Shrum,  the  Arizona 
Supreme Court held that an Arizona decision did not constitute a “signif-
cant  change  in  the  law”  because  it  “did  not  change  any  interpretation  of 
Arizona constitutional law . . . and no precedent was overruled, all of which 
meant  `the  law  remained  precisely  the  same.' ”  251  Ariz.,  at  207,  487 
P.  3d,  at  995  (quoting  Shrum,  220  Ariz.,  at  119,  203  P.  3d,  at  1179).  In 
this  case,  the  court  reasoned  it  was  acting  consistently  with  Shrum  be-
cause  Lynch  “did  not  change  any  interpretation  of  federal  constitutional 
law  .  .  .  and  no  Supreme  Court  precedent  was  overruled  or  modifed.” 
251 Ariz., at 207, 487 P. 3d, at 995.  The language used, however, reveals 
the  inconsistency.  While  in  Shrum  the  Arizona  Supreme  Court  looked 
for  a  change  in  Arizona  law,  including  whether  any  “precedent  was  over-
ruled,”  in  this  case the  court  instead  asked  only  whether federal  law  had 
changed  or  whether  federal  “Supreme  Court  precedent  was  overruled.” 
No  precedent  of  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States  was  overruled, 
but  precedent  of  the  Arizona  Supreme  Court  certainly  was.  Under  the 
Arizona Supreme Court's ordinary approach, then, there was a “signifcant 
change in the law.” 

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