Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/21pdf/20-843_7j80.pdf
Page Number: 21

Cite as:  597 U. S. ____ (2022) 

15 

Opinion of the Court 

In sum, the Courts of Appeals’ second step is inconsistent
with Heller’s historical approach and its rejection of means-
end scrutiny.  We reiterate that the standard for applying
the  Second  Amendment  is  as  follows:  When  the  Second 
Amendment’s plain text covers an individual’s conduct, the 
Constitution presumptively protects that conduct.  The gov-
ernment must then justify its regulation by demonstrating
that it is consistent with the Nation’s historical tradition of 
firearm  regulation.  Only  then  may  a  court  conclude  that
the  individual’s  conduct  falls  outside  the  Second  Amend-
ment’s  “unqualified  command.”  Konigsberg,  366  U. S.,  at 
50, n. 10. 

C 
This Second Amendment standard accords with how we 
protect other constitutional rights.  Take, for instance, the 
freedom of speech in the First Amendment, to which Heller 
repeatedly compared the right to keep and bear arms.  554 
U. S.,  at  582,  595,  606,  618,  634–635.    In  that  context, 
“[w]hen the Government restricts speech, the Government
bears the burden of proving the constitutionality of its ac-
tions.”  United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc., 
529  U. S.  803,  816  (2000);  see  also  Philadelphia  Newspa-
pers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U. S. 767, 777 (1986).  In some cases, 
that burden includes showing whether the expressive con-
duct falls outside of the category of protected speech.  See 
Illinois  ex rel.  Madigan  v.  Telemarketing  Associates,  Inc., 
538 U. S. 600, 620, n. 9 (2003).  And to carry that burden, 
the government must generally point to historical evidence 
about the reach of the First Amendment’s protections.  See, 

—————— 
heightened  “standar[d]  of  scrutiny”  did  not  supplant  Heller’s  focus  on 
constitutional text and history.  Rather, Heller’s comment “was more of 
a  gilding-the-lily  observation  about  the  extreme  nature  of  D.C.’s  law,” 
Heller v. District of Columbia, 670 F. 3d 1244, 1277 (CADC 2011) (Ka-
vanaugh,  J.,  dissenting),  than  a  reflection  of  Heller’s  methodology  or 
holding.