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DAVIS v. ERMOLD 

Statement of THOMAS, J. 

religious beliefs “as bigots,” id., at 741 (opinion of ALITO, J.).
Those predictions did not take long to become reality. 

Kim Davis, a former county clerk in the Commonwealth 
of  Kentucky,  was  responsible  for  authorizing  marriage  li-
censes.  Davis is also a devout Christian.  When she began
her tenure as clerk, Davis’ sincerely held religious beliefs—
that  marriage  exists  between  one  man  and  one  woman—
corresponded  with  the  definition  of  marriage  under  Ken-
tucky law.  See Ky. Rev. Stat. §402.005 (1998); Ky. Const.
§233A (2004).  Within weeks of this Court granting certio-
rari in Obergefell, Davis began lobbying for amendments to
Kentucky law that would protect the free exercise rights of 
those  who  had  religious  objections  to  same-sex  marriage.
But those efforts were cut short by this Court’s decision in 
Obergefell. 

As a result of this Court’s alteration of the Constitution, 
Davis  found  herself  faced  with  a  choice  between  her  reli-
gious  beliefs  and  her  job.    When  she  chose  to  follow  her 
faith, and without any statutory protection of her religious 
beliefs, she was sued almost immediately for violating the
constitutional rights of same-sex couples.

Davis  may  have  been  one  of  the  first  victims  of  this 
Court’s cavalier treatment of religion in its Obergefell deci-
sion, but she will not be the last.  Due to Obergefell, those 
with  sincerely  held  religious  beliefs  concerning  marriage 
will  find  it  increasingly  difficult  to  participate  in  society
without running afoul of Obergefell and its effect on other 
antidiscrimination laws.  It would be one thing if recogni-
tion for same-sex marriage had been debated and adopted 
through  the  democratic  process,  with  the  people  deciding
not to provide statutory protections for religious liberty un-
der  state  law.*  But  it  is  quite  another  when  the  Court 

—————— 

* Under this Court’s precedents, “the right of free exercise does not re-
lieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a valid and neutral 
law of general applicability on the ground that the law proscribes (or pre-