Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/21pdf/20-1263diff_868c.pdf
Page Number: 28.0

Cite as:  596 U. S. ____ (2022) 

11 

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting 

that the anti-lien provision “also” limits States’ recovery ef-
forts.  Ante,  at  2.  In  fact,  the  anti-lien  and  anti-recovery
provisions  establish  a  general  rule,  and  the  subsequently 
enacted third-party liability provision and its companions
create a limited exception.  That exception, in turn, should
not be construed “to the farthest reach of [its] linguistic pos-
sibilit[y] if that result would contravene the statutory de-
sign.”  Maracich  v.  Spears,  570  U. S.  48,  60  (2013).    The 
Court’s misframing, however, causes it to displace the back-
ground  principle  of  the  anti-lien  and  anti-recovery  provi-
sions  by  relying  on  language  in  the  assignment  provision 
that is vague at best. 

The Court places great weight on the assignment provi-
sion’s use of the word “any” in its reference to “rights . . . to 
payment for medical care.”  §1396k(a)(1)(A); see ante, at 6. 
The Court presumes that “ ‘[t]he word “any” has an expan-
sive meaning.’ ”  Ibid.  But whether the word “any” indicates
an intent to sweep broadly “necessarily depends on the stat-
utory  context.”  National  Assn.  of  Mfrs.  v.  Department  of 
Defense, 583 U. S. ___, ___ (2018) (slip op., at 11).  Here, as 
explained, statutory context establishes that the word “does
not bear the heavy weight the [Court] puts upon it.”  Ibid.  
To the extent the Court suggests the word “any” supersedes
all other contrary contextual indications, it ignores prece-
dent.  See, e.g., United States v. Alvarez-Sanchez, 511 U. S. 
350, 356–358 (1994) (relying on context to interpret “ ‘any
law-enforcement  officer  or  law-enforcement  agency’ ”  as 
limited to those making arrests under federal law). 

The Court also repeatedly relies on the fact that the ac-
quisition  provision  and  third-party  liability  provision  use
specific language to limit the pool from which a State may 
recover to funds that compensate for expenses Medicaid has 
paid, whereas the assignment provision uses different lan-
guage.  See  ante,  at  7,  9,  11.    The  Court  invokes  the  pre-
sumption that “ ‘[w]here Congress includes particular lan-
guage  in  one  section  of  a  statute  but  omits  it  in  another