Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/13pdf/13a1284_ap6c.pdf
Page Number: 16

16 

WHEATON COLLEGE v. BURWELL 

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting 

party administrator nationwide?  And, putting that aside,
why wouldn’t Wheaton’s claim be exactly the same under 
the Court’s newly-fashioned system?  Either way, the end 
result will be that a third-party administrator will provide 
contraceptive  coverage.    Surely  the  Court  and  Wheaton 
are  not  just  objecting  to  the  use  of  one  stamp  instead  of 
two in order to avail itself of the accommodation. 

The Court’s actions in this case create unnecessary costs
and layers of bureaucracy, and they ignore a simple truth:
The  Government  must  be  allowed  to  handle  the  basic 
tasks of public administration in a manner that comports
with common sense.  It is not the business of this Court to 
ensnare itself in the Government’s ministerial handling of
its affairs in the manner it does here. 

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* 

* 
I have deep respect for religious faith, for the important
and  selfless  work  performed  by  religious  organizations, 
and for the values of pluralism protected by RFRA and the 
Free Exercise Clause.  But the Court’s grant of an injunc-
tion in this case allows Wheaton’s beliefs about the effects 
of its actions to trump the democratic interest in allowing
the Government to enforce the law.  In granting an injunc-
tion  concerning  this  religious  nonprofit  accommodation,
the  availability  of  which  served  as  the  premise  for  the 
Court’s decision in Hobby Lobby, the Court cannot possibly
be  applying  our  longstanding  requirement  that  a  party’s 
entitlement to relief be indisputably clear. 

Our  jurisprudence  has  over  the  years  drawn  a  careful
boundary  between  majoritarian  democracy  and  the  right
of  every  American  to  practice  his  or  her  religion  freely. 
We should not use the extraordinary vehicle of an injunc-
tion  under  the  All  Writs  Act  to  work  so  fundamental  a 
shift  in  that  boundary.   Because  Wheaton  cannot  justify
the  relief  it  seeks,  I  would  deny  its  application  for  an
injunction,  and  I  respectfully  dissent  from  the  Court’s 
refusal to do so.