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ATLANTIC RICHFIELD CO. v. CHRISTIAN 

Opinion of ALITO, J. 

any action except one of [a list of specific CERCLA pro-
visions].”  42 U. S. C. §9613. 

For present purposes, the pertinent parts are as follows: 

  First, §113(b) sets out a general rule conferring on the 
federal district courts exclusive jurisdiction over claims
“arising under” CERCLA.  And it does so “without re-
gard to the citizenship of the parties or the amount in 
controversy.” 

  Second,  §§113(b)  and  (h),  taken  together,  reduce  this
grant  of  jurisdiction  by  taking  away  jurisdiction  over 
most claims that “challeng [e]” a “removal or remedial 
action.” 

  Third, this reduction does not apply to a challenge to 
removal  or  remedial  action  if  it  is  brought  under  the
diversity jurisdiction statute, 28 U. S. C. §1332. 

  Fourth,  this  reduction  also  does  not  apply  to  a  chal-
lenge to removal or remedial action if it is brought in
federal  court  “under  State  law  which  is  applicable  or 
relevant  and  appropriate  under  [§121]  (relating  to
cleanup  standards).”  Under  §121,  cleanup  standards
must comply with certain state-law requirements, and 
thus the thrust of this last provision seems to be that a 
removal or remedial action may be challenged in fed-
eral court for noncompliance with such requirements. 
With these pieces laid out, we may consider how the Court 
and respondents, on the one hand, and the Government and 
petitioner, on the other, try to fit them together. 

B 
The  logical  first  step  in  any  effort  to  understand  how 
§§113(b) and (h) apply to the landowners’ state-law restora-
tion damages claim is to determine whether the claim falls 
within  the  scope  of  the  exclusive  jurisdiction  that  §113(b) 
confers  on  the  federal  district  courts—in  other  words, 
whether such a claim is one that “aris[es] under” CERCLA.