Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/524bv.pdf
Page Number: 98.0

524US1

Unit: $U74

[09-06-00 17:54:15] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 524 U. S. 51 (1998)

53

Syllabus

of directors. Because direct liability for the parent’s operation of the
facility must be kept distinct from derivative liability for the subsid-
iary’s operation of the facility, the analysis should instead have focused
on the relationship between CPC and the facility itself, i. e., on whether
CPC “operated” the facility, as evidenced by its direct participation in
the facility’s activities. That error was compounded by the District
Court’s erroneous assumption that actions of the joint ofﬁcers and direc-
tors were necessarily attributable to CPC, rather than Ott II, contrary
to time-honored common-law principles. The District Court’s focus on
the relationship between parent and subsidiary (rather than parent and
facility), combined with its automatic attribution of the actions of dual
ofﬁcers and directors to CPC, erroneously, even if unintentionally,
treated CERCLA as though it displaced or fundamentally altered
common-law standards of limited liability. The District Court’s analy-
sis created what is in essence a relaxed, CERCLA-speciﬁc rule of deriv-
ative liability that would banish traditional standards and expectations
from the law of CERCLA liability. Such a rule does not arise from
congressional silence, and CERCLA’s silence is dispositive. Pp. 67–70.
(c) Nonetheless, the Sixth Circuit erred in limiting direct liability
under CERCLA to a parent’s sole or joint venture operation, so as to
eliminate any possible ﬁnding that CPC is liable as an operator on the
facts of this case. The ordinary meaning of the word “operate” in the
organizational sense is not limited to those two parental actions, but
extends also to situations in which, e. g., joint ofﬁcers or directors con-
duct the affairs of the facility on behalf of the parent, or agents of the
parent with no position in the subsidiary manage or direct activities at
the subsidiary’s facility. Norms of corporate behavior (undisturbed by
any CERCLA provision) are crucial reference points, both for determin-
ing whether a dual ofﬁcer or director has served the parent in conduct-
ing operations at the facility, and for distinguishing a parental ofﬁcer’s
oversight of a subsidiary from his control over the operation of the sub-
sidiary’s facility. There is, in fact, some evidence that an agent of CPC
alone engaged in activities at Ott II’s plant that were eccentric under
accepted norms of parental oversight of a subsidiary’s facility: The Dis-
trict Court’s opinion speaks of such an agent who played a conspicuous
part in dealing with the toxic risks emanating from the plant’s operation.
The ﬁndings in this regard are enough to raise an issue of CPC’s opera-
tion of the facility, though this Court draws no ultimate conclusion, leav-
ing the issue for the lower courts to reevaluate and resolve in the ﬁrst
instance. Pp. 70–73.

113 F. 3d 572, vacated and remanded.

Souter, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.