Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/21pdf/20-603_o758.pdf
Page Number: 35.0

Cite as:  597 U. S. ____ (2022) 

13 

THOMAS, J., dissenting 

cannot, for example, “keep Troops, or Ships of War in time 
of Peace . . . unless actually invaded, or in such imminent 
Danger as will not admit of delay” without the consent of 
Congress.  Art. I, §10, cl. 3.  But to say that Congress’ much
more general authority to “raise and support Armies,” Art. 
I, §8, cl. 12, acts to completely derogate all state authority
related to the subject is inaccurate. 

States have significant residual police powers that over-
lap with Congress’ power over the military.  For example,
we  have  sustained  state  legislation  related  to  the  enlist-
ment of men in the U. S. Army and Navy against the charge
that “ ‘all power of legislation regarding the subject matter 
. . .  is  conferred  upon  Congress  and  withheld  from  the 
States.’ ”  Gilbert  v.  Minnesota,  254  U. S.  325,  327–328 
(1920).  In doing so, we rejected the idea “that a State has 
no interest or concern in the United States or its armies or 
power  of  protecting  them  from  public  enemies,”  and  es-
chewed any “[c]old and technical reasoning” that “insist[s] 
on  a  separation  of  the  sovereignties”  in  the  army-raising 
context.  Id.,  at  328–329.  Similarly,  we  have  held  that
“there is no clause of the Constitution which purports, un-
aided by Congressional enactment, to prohibit” States from
exercising their police powers in ways that arguably burden
Congress’ “power to raise and support armies.”  Penn Dair-
ies, Inc. v. Milk Control Comm’n of Pa., 318 U. S. 261, 269 
(1943).  Nor have we “implied from the relationship of the 
two governments established by the Constitution” any such
prohibition.  Ibid.   State  regulations  “inevitably  impos[e]
some burdens on the national government,” but those are 
the “normal incidents of the operation within the same ter-
ritory of a dual system of government,” and they may per-
sist “save as Congress may act to remove them.”  Id., at 271. 
Therefore, even though the Army and Navy Clauses grant 
Congress “exclusive” authority over raising and supporting 
armies and navies, that exclusivity is no different from that
which attends any other Article I power.