Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/524bv.pdf
Page Number: 764

524US2

Unit: $U97

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Cite as: 524 U. S. 666 (1998)

719

Breyer, J., dissenting

the Government would lose little information, and even
fewer cases, were the privilege recognized here.

In those rare instances where the need for testimony was
sufﬁciently great, a grant of de facto “immunity” remains a
possibility. The Government need only take steps sufﬁcient
to make the threat of foreign prosecution insubstantial.
Thus, a promise by the United States that deportation will
not take place, or that deportation to a different country will
ensue, would seem sufﬁcient. A further promise by the for-
eign nation that prosecution will not take place, or will not
make use of the elicited testimony, will obviate the need even
for such a deportation promise. And were a foreign sover-
eign to later seek extradition of the witness, the Govern-
ment, under existing law, might retain the discretion to de-
cline such a request. See 18 U. S. C. § 3186 (“Secretary of
State may order” extraditable person “delivered to . . . for-
eign government”); § 3196 (giving Secretary of State discre-
tion whether to extradite United States citizens provided
treaty does not obligate her to do so).

I do not want to minimize the potential difﬁculties inher-
It might require
ent in providing this kind of “immunity.”
a change in domestic law, or in a given case, an adjustment
in an understanding reached with a foreign government.
In
unusual circumstances, as Justice Stevens recognizes, see
ante, at 701, it might require adjusting the legal rules that
express the privilege in order to prevent a foreign govern-
ment’s efforts to stop its citizens from testifying in American
courts. But I do not see these difﬁculties as creating over-
whelming obstacles to the legitimate application of the privi-
lege in instances such as the one present here. Nor do I
see these difﬁculties as signiﬁcantly greater than those that
inhere in the ordinary grant of immunity, which also requires
legislation, and which also can create friction among compet-
ing jurisdictions. At worst, granting de facto “immunity” in
this type of case would mean more potentially deportable
criminal aliens will remain in the United States, just as to-