Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/20pdf/18-956_d18f.pdf
Page Number: 51.0

8 

GOOGLE LLC v. ORACLE AMERICA, INC. 

THOMAS, J., dissenting 

stance in which declaring code will remain protected by cop-
yright.

I agree with the majority that, under our precedent, fair 
use is a mixed question of fact and law and that questions
of law predominate.3  Because the jury issued a finding of
fair use in favor of Google, we must construe all factual dis-
putes and inferences in Google’s favor and ask whether the
evidence  was  sufficient  as  a  matter  of  law  to  support  the 
jury’s verdict.  See Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 50(b).  But whether 
a statutory fair-use factor favors one side or the other is a 
legal question reviewed de novo.  Congress has established
four statutory fair-use factors for courts to weigh.4  Three 
decisively  favor  Oracle.    And  even  assuming  that  the  re-
maining  factor  favors  Google,  that  factor,  without  more, 
cannot legally establish fair use in this context.

The majority holds otherwise—concluding that every fac-
tor favors Google—by relying, in large part, on a distinction 
it draws between declaring and implementing code, a dis-
tinction  that  the  statute  rejects.  Tellingly,  the  majority 

—————— 

3 I would not, however, definitively resolve Google’s argument that the 
Seventh Amendment commits the question of fair use to a jury.  I tend 
to agree with the Court that fair use was not “itself necessarily a jury
issue” when the Constitution was ratified.  Markman v. Westview Instru-
ments, Inc., 517 U. S. 370, 376–377 (1996).  Google cites cases about “fair
abridgment,” but Congress has since made clear that copyright holders 
have “exclusive rights” over any “abridgment.”  17 U. S. C. §§101, 106.
And  in  any  event,  judges  often  declined  to  refer  these  issues  to  juries. 
See, e.g., Gyles v. Wilcox, 2 Atk. 141, 144, 26 Eng. Rep. 489, 490–491 (Ch. 
1740);  Folsom  v.  Marsh,  9 F. Cas.  342,  345–349  (No.  4,901)  (CC  Mass. 
1841)  (Story,  J).    Still,  we  should  not  so  casually  decide  this  question
when the parties barely addressed it. 

4 The factors are: “(1) the purpose and character of the use, including 
whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational 
purposes; (2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and sub-
stantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a 
whole; and (4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value 
of the copyrighted work.”  §§107(1)–(4).