Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/13pdf/13a1284_ap6c.pdf
Page Number: 13.0

Cite as:  573 U. S. ____ (2014) 

13 

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting 

gious liberty.”  Ante, at 3 (majority opinion); see also ante, 
at  4  (“The  effect  of  the  [Dept.  of  Health  and  Human  Ser-
vices  (HHS)]-created  accommodation  on  the  women  em-
ployed by Hobby Lobby and the other companies involved 
in  these  cases  would  be  precisely  zero.    Under  that  ac-
commodation,  these  women  would  still  be  entitled  to  all 
FDA-approved contraceptives without cost sharing”); ante, 
at  44  (“At  a  minimum  . . .  [the  accommodation]  does  not
impinge  on  the  plaintiffs’  religious  belief  that  providing 
insurance  coverage  for  the  contraceptives  at  issue  here 
violates their religion, and it serves HHS’s stated interests 
equally  well”);  see  also  ante,  at  4  (KENNEDY,  J.,  concur-
ring) (“[I]t is the Court’s understanding that an accommo-
dation  may  be  made  to  the  employers  without  imposition 
of a whole new program or burden on the Government.  As 
the  Court  makes  clear,  this  is  not  a  case  where  it  can  be 
established that it is difficult to accommodate the govern-
ment’s interest, and in fact the mechanism for doing so is
already  in  place”).  Today’s  grant  of  injunctive  relief  sim- 
ply  does  not  square  with  the  Court’s  reasoning  in  Hobby 
Lobby. 

It  should  by  now  be  clear  just  how  far  the  Court  has
strayed  in  granting  Wheaton  an  interlocutory  injunction
against the enforcement of the law and regulations before
the courts below have adjudicated Wheaton’s RFRA claim.
To  warrant  an  injunction  under  the  All  Writs  Act,  the 
Court  must  have  more  than  a  bare  desire  to  suspend  the 
existing  state  of  affairs;  Wheaton’s  entitlement  to  relief
must  be  indisputably  clear.    While  Wheaton’s  religious
conviction  is  undoubtedly  entitled  to  respect,  it  does  not
come close to affording a basis for relief under the law. 

C 
The  Court’s  approach  imposes  an  unwarranted  and 
unprecedented  burden  on  the  Government’s  ability  to
administer  an  important  regulatory  scheme.  The  Execu-