Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/23pdf/22-915_8o6b.pdf
Page Number: 48.0

Cite as:  602 U. S. ____ (2024) 

13 

KAVANAUGH, J., concurring 

national  bank  had  “been  recognised  by  many  successive 
legislatures,”  and  an  “exposition  of  the  constitution, 
deliberately established by legislative acts, on the faith of 
which an immense property has been advanced, ought not 
to  be  lightly  disregarded.”    Ibid.   Marshall  added:  The 
“respective  powers  of  those  who  are  equally  the 
representatives of the people, are to be adjusted; if not put 
at rest by the practice of the government, ought to receive a 
considerable impression from that practice.”  Ibid. 

In relying on post-ratification history as a proper tool to
discern  constitutional  meaning,  Madison  and  Marshall 
make for a formidable duo.  Moving from distant American
history  to  more  recent  times,  one  can  add  Justice  Scalia. 
Throughout his consequential 30-year tenure on this Court, 
Justice  Scalia  repeatedly  emphasized  that  constitutional 
interpretation  must  take  account  of  text,  pre-ratification
history, and post-ratification history—the last of which he 
often referred to as “tradition.”  In his words, when judges
interpret vague or broadly worded constitutional text, the 
“traditions  of  our  people”  are  “paramount.”    McDonald  v. 
Chicago, 561 U. S. 742, 792 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring).
Constitutional interpretation should reflect “the principles 
adhered to, over time, by the American people, rather than
those  favored  by  the  personal  (and  necessarily  shifting)
philosophical  dispositions  of  a  majority  of  this  Court.” 
Rutan  v.  Republican  Party  of  Ill.,  497  U. S.  62,  96  (1990) 
(Scalia, J., dissenting).

The U. S. Reports are well stocked with Scalia opinions 
looking to post-ratification history and tradition.5  In Heller, 

—————— 

5 Justice  Scalia’s  opinions  “made  extensive  use  of  post-ratification
history,”  and  “his  assessment  of  post-ratification  history”  in  those 
opinions  extended  “far  beyond  the  time  of  enactment.”    M.  Ramsey, 
Beyond the Text: Justice Scalia’s Originalism in Practice, 92 Notre Dame
L. Rev. 1945, 1957, 1960 (2017).  Justice Scalia did not necessarily “use[ ] 
tradition as an independent source of interpretive authority; rather, he 
had a very broad view of what traditions might be indicative of original