Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/10pdf/09-530.pdf
Page Number: 33.0

Cite as:  562 U. S. ____ (2011) 

5 

SCALIA, J., concurring in judgment 

decisis  is  simply  irrelevant  when  the  pertinent  precedent 
assumed,  without  deciding,  the  existence  of  a  constitu-
tional right.  “Stare decisis reflects a policy judgment that 
in  most  matters  it  is  more  important  that  the  applicable
rule  of  law  be  settled  than  that  it  be  settled  right.”  State 
Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U. S. 3, 20 (1997) (internal quotation
marks  omitted). 
“It  is  the  preferred  course  because  it
promotes  the  evenhanded,  predictable,  and  consistent
development of legal principles.”  Ibid. (internal quotation
marks omitted).  Here, however, there is no applicable rule
of law that is settled.  To the contrary, Whalen and Nixon 
created  an  uncertainty  that  the  text  of  the  Constitution
did not contain and that today’s opinion perpetuates. 

A  further  reason  Whalen  and  Nixon  are  not  entitled  to 
stare  decisis  effect  is  that  neither  opinion  supplied  any 
coherent  reason  why  a  constitutional  right  to  informa-
tional  privacy  might  exist.  As  supporting  authority, 
Whalen  cited  Stanley  v.  Georgia,  394  U. S.  557  (1969),  a 

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failure  to  address  whether  there  is  a  right  to  informational  privacy
cannot be blamed upon the Government’s concession that such a right 
exists,  and  indeed  the  Government’s  startling  assertion  that  Whalen 
and Nixon (which decided nothing on the constitutional point, and have
not  been  so  much  as  cited  in  our  later  opinions)  were  “seminal”— 
seminal!—decisions.    Reply  Brief  for  Petitioner  22.    We  are  not  bound 
by  a  litigant’s  concession  on  an  issue  of  law.    See,  e.g.,  Grove  City 
College  v.  Bell,  465  U. S.  555,  562,  n. 10  (1984).    And  it  should  not  be 
thought  that  the  concession  by  the  United  States  is  an  entirely  self-
denying  act.    To  be  sure,  it  subjects  the  Executive  Branch  to  constitu-
tional  limitations  on  the  collection  and  use  of  information;  but  the 
Privacy Act, 5 U. S. C. §552a (2006 ed. and Supp. III), already contains
extensive  limitations  not  likely  to  be  surpassed  by  constitutional 
improvisation.    And  because  Congress’s  power  under  §5  of  the  Four-
teenth Amendment extends to the full scope of the Due Process Clause, 
see  City  of  Boerne  v.  Flores,  521  U.  S.  507  (1997),  the  United  States
has  an  incentive  to  give  that  Clause  a  broad  reading,  thus  expanding
the  scope  of  federal  legislation  that  it  justifies.    Federal  laws  prevent-
ing  state  disregard  of  “informational  privacy”  may  be  a  twinkle  in  the
Solicitor General’s eye.