Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/21pdf/21-147_g31h.pdf
Page Number: 31.0

Cite as:  596 U. S. ____ (2022) 

7 

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting
Opinion of SOTOMAYOR, J. 

extent of judicial guidance as to how an officer should re-
spond  to  the  problem  or  emergency  to  be  confronted;  the 
statutory  or  other  legal  mandate  under  which  the  officer
was operating; the risk of disruptive intrusion by the Judi-
ciary into the functioning of other branches; or the presence
of  potential  special  factors  that  previous  Bivens  cases  did 
not consider.”  582 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 16).  The Court 
recognized, however, that some differences “will be so triv-
ial that they will not suffice to create a new Bivens context.” 
Id., at ___ (slip op., at 26). 

If  the  differences  are  in  fact  “meaningful  ones,”  ibid., 
“then the context is new,” id., at ___ (slip op., at 16), and a 
court  “proceed[s]  to  the  second  step”  of  the  analysis,  Her-
nández, 589 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 7).  The second step 
requires courts to consider whether special factors counsel 
hesitation in recognizing a Bivens remedy in a new context. 
Ziglar,  582  U. S.,  at  ___  (slip  op.,  at  12);  Hernández,  589 
U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 7).

Importantly, even as the Ziglar Court grafted a more de-
manding  new-context  inquiry  onto  the  traditional  Bivens 
framework, the Court emphasized that its opinion was “not 
intended to cast doubt on the continued force, or even the 
necessity,  of  Bivens  in  the  search-and-seizure  context  in 
which it arose.”  582 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 11).  Quite the 
opposite: The Court recognized that Bivens “vindicate[s] the
Constitution  by  allowing  some  redress  for  injuries”  and
“provides instruction and guidance to federal law enforce-
ment officers going forward.”  582 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 
11).  Accordingly, the Court explained, there are “powerful 
reasons  to  retain  [Bivens]”  in  the  “common  and  recurrent
sphere of law enforcement.”  Ibid.  The Court further recog-
nized that “individual instances of discrimination or law en-
forcement overreach” are, by their nature, “difficult to ad-
dress except by way of damages actions after the fact.”  Id., 
at ___ (slip op., at 21).