Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/19pdf/18-1323_c07d.pdf
Page Number: 123.0

8 

JUNE MEDICAL SERVICES L.L.C. v. RUSSO 

GORSUCH, J., dissenting 

izes as a waiver arises from the State’s admission that ap-
plicable  circuit  law  allowed  the  plaintiffs  standing.    At 
worst, that reflects a forfeiture of, or a failure to pursue, a
possible  argument  against  standing,  not  an  affirmative
waiver of the argument, or an intentional relinquishment 
of any interest in the issue.  Cf. ante, at 24–25 (ALITO, J., 
dissenting).  Second, this Court typically relies on a forfei-
ture or even a waiver only if the issue was “ ‘not pressed or 
passed  upon’ ”  in  the  lower  courts.    United  States  v.  Wil-
liams,  504  U. S.  36,  41  (1992).  That  rule’s  disjunctive
phrasing is no accident—it “permit[s] review of an issue not 
pressed  so  long  as  it  has  been  passed  upon”  below.    Ibid. 
Here,  the  Fifth  Circuit  did  pass  upon  the  standing  ques-
tion—so forfeiture or waiver presents no impediment to our 
review.  See June Medical Services, L.L.C. v. Gee, 814 F. 3d 
319, 322–323 (2016).  Finally, this Court has held that even 
truly  forfeited  or  waived  arguments  may  be  entertained 
when structural concerns or third-party rights are at issue. 
Freytag  v.  Commissioner,  501  U. S.  868,  878–880  (1991). 
Both conditions are present here. 

* 
Next consider our rules about facial challenges.  Gener-
ally,  courts  decide  the  constitutionality  of  statutes  as  ap-
plied  to  specific  people  in  specific  situations  and  disfavor 
facial challenges seeking to forestall a law’s application in
every  circumstance.  The  reasons  for  this  rule  are  many.
Not least, when a court focuses on the parties before it, it is 
able  to  assess  the  law’s  application  within  a  real  factual
context, rather than left to imagine “every conceivable situ-
ation which might possibly arise in the application of com-
plex and comprehensive legislation.”  Barrows v. Jackson, 
346 U. S. 249, 256 (1953).  Importantly, too, as-applied chal-
lenges  reduce  the  risk  that  a  court  will  “short  circuit  the 
democratic  process”  by  interfering  with  legislation  any