Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/14pdf/13-1034_3dq4.pdf
Page Number: 26.0

Cite as:  575 U. S. ____ (2015) 

9 

THOMAS, J., dissenting 

§1227(a)(2)(B)(i) after the analysis in Moncrieffe, which, as 
explained  above,  keyed  removal  to  the  characteristics  of
the offense). 

Section 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) requires only that the state law 
itself, not the “generic” offense defined by the law, “relat[e] 
to” a federally controlled substance.  The majority has not
offered a textual argument capable of supporting a differ-
ent conclusion. 

* 

* 

* 
The  statutory  text  resolves  this  case.    True,  faithfully
applying  that  text  means  that  an  alien  may  be  deported 
for committing an offense that does not involve a federally 
controlled  substance.  Nothing  about  that  consequence, 
however,  is  so  outlandish  as  to  call  this  application  into
doubt.  An alien may be removed only if he is convicted of
violating a law, and I see nothing absurd about removing 
individuals  who  are  unwilling  to  respect  the  drug  laws  of
the jurisdiction in which they find themselves.

The majority thinks differently, rejecting the only plau-
sible reading of this provision and adopting an interpreta-
tion  that  finds  no  purchase  in  the  text.    I  fail  to  under-
stand  why  it  chooses  to  do  so,  apart  from  a  gut  instinct
that  an  educated  professional  engaged  to  an  American
citizen  should  not  be  removed  for  concealing  unspecified 
orange  tablets  in  his  sock.    Or  perhaps  the  majority  just 
disapproves  of  the  fact  that  Kansas,  exercising  its  police
powers, has decided to criminalize conduct that Congress,
exercising its limited powers, has decided not to criminal-
ize, ante, at 4–5.  Either way, that is not how we should go
about interpreting statutes, and I respectfully dissent.