Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/20pdf/19-123_g3bi.pdf
Page Number: 21

2 

FULTON v. PHILADELPHIA 

BARRETT, J., concurring 

strict scrutiny regime, particularly when this Court’s reso-
lution  of  conflicts  between  generally  applicable  laws  and
other  First  Amendment  rights—like  speech  and  assem-
bly—has been much more nuanced.  There would be a num-
ber of issues to work through if Smith were overruled.  To 
name a few: Should entities like Catholic Social Services— 
which is an arm of the Catholic Church—be treated differ-
ently than individuals?  Cf. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lu-
theran Church and School v. EEOC, 565 U. S. 171 (2012). 
Should  there  be  a  distinction  between  indirect  and  direct 
burdens on religious exercise?  Cf. Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 
U. S. 599, 606–607 (1961) (plurality opinion).  What forms 
of scrutiny should apply?  Compare Sherbert v. Verner, 374 
U. S. 398, 403 (1963) (assessing whether government’s in-
terest is “ ‘compelling’ ”), with Gillette v. United States, 401 
U. S. 437, 462 (1971) (assessing whether government’s in-
terest is “substantial”).  And if the answer is strict scrutiny, 
would pre-Smith cases rejecting free exercise challenges to 
garden-variety  laws  come  out  the  same  way?    See  Smith, 
494 U. S., at 888–889. 

We  need  not  wrestle  with  these  questions  in  this  case, 
though,  because  the  same  standard  applies  regardless
whether Smith stays or goes.  A longstanding tenet of our 
free  exercise  jurisprudence—one  that  both  pre-dates  and 
survives Smith—is that a law burdening religious exercise
must satisfy strict scrutiny if it gives government officials 
discretion to grant individualized exemptions.  See  id., at 
884 (law not generally applicable “where the State has in
place a system of individual exemptions” (citing Sherbert, 
374  U. S.,  at  401,  n. 4));  see  also  Cantwell  v.  Connecticut, 
310 U. S. 296, 303–307 (1940) (subjecting statute to height-
ened scrutiny because exemptions lay in discretion of gov-
ernment official).  As the Court’s opinion today explains, the 
government contract at issue provides for individualized ex-
emptions  from  its  nondiscrimination  rule,  thus  triggering
strict  scrutiny.    And  all  nine  Justices  agree  that  the  City