Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/558bv.pdf
Page Number: 198.0

Cite as: 558 U. S. 30 (2009) 

37 

Per Curiam 

come  of  the  case,  id.,  at  1210.  He  discounted  the  evidence 
of Porter’s alcohol abuse because it was inconsistent and dis­
counted  the  evidence  of  Porter’s  abusive  childhood  because 
he  was  54  years  old  at  the  time  of  the  trial.  He  also  con­
cluded that Porter’s periods of being AWOL would have re­
duced  the  impact  of  Porter’s  military  service  to  “inconse­
quential  proportions.”  Id.,  at  1212.  Finally,  he  held  that 
even  considering  all  three  categories  of  evidence  together, 
the  “trial  judge  and  jury  still  would  have  imposed  death.” 
Id., at 1214. 

The  Florida  Supreme  Court  afﬁrmed.  It  ﬁrst  accepted 
the  trial  court’s  ﬁnding  that  Porter  could  not  have  estab­
lished  any  statutory  mitigating  circumstances,  based  on  the 
trial court’s acceptance of the State’s experts’ conclusions in 
that regard.  Porter v.  State, 788 So. 2d 917, 923 (2001) (per 
curiam).  It  then  held  the  trial  court  was  correct  to  ﬁnd 
“the  additional  nonstatutory  mitigation  to  be  lacking  in 
weight because of the speciﬁc facts presented.”  Id., at 925. 
Like  the  postconviction  court,  the  Florida  Supreme  Court 
reserved  judgment  regarding  counsel’s  deﬁciency.  Ibid.6 
Two justices dissented, reasoning that counsel’s failure to in­
vestigate  and  present  mitigating  evidence  was  “especially 
harmful”  because of  the  divided  vote afﬁrming  the  sentence 
on  direct  appeal—“even  without  the  substantial  mitigation 
that  we  now  know  existed”—and  because  of  the  reversal  of 

6 The  postconviction  court  stated  defense  counsel  “was  not  ineffective 
for  failing  to  pursue  mental  health  evaluations  and  .  .  .  [Porter]  has  thus 
failed to show sufﬁcient evidence that any statutory mitigators could have 
been  presented.”  Record  1210.  It  is  not  at  all  clear  whether  this  stray 
comment  addressed  counsel’s  deﬁciency.  If  it  did,  then  it  was  at  most 
dictum,  because  the  court  expressly  “decline[d]  to  make  a  determination 
regarding  whether  or  not  Defense  Counsel  was  in  fact  deﬁcient  here.” 
Id., at 1206.  The Florida Supreme Court simply paraphrased the postcon­
viction court when it stated “trial counsel’s decision not to pursue mental 
evaluations did  not exceed the  bounds for competent  counsel.”  Porter v. 
State,  788  So.  2d  917,  923–924  (2001)  (per  curiam).  But  that  court  also 
expressly declined to answer the question of deﬁciency.  Id., at 925.