Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/21pdf/21-248_4fc5.pdf
Page Number: 27.0

Cite as:  597 U. S. ____ (2022) 

5 

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting 

Appeals  voted  to  take  the  case  en  banc,  however,  and  af-
firmed the District Court’s denial of intervention. 

The en banc court began by stressing that its jurisdiction
was limited to reviewing the order from which petitioners 
had chosen to appeal.  Because petitioners had not appealed
the District Court’s denial of their first intervention motion 
seeking  to  “represen[t]  the  General  Assembly’s  ‘institu-
tional interest’ in enforcement of S.B. 824,” the Court of Ap-
peals determined it could not review petitioners’ claim that 
they were representing that particular institutional inter-
est.  999 F. 3d 915, 926 (CA4 2021).  The en banc court in-
stead addressed petitioners’ argument that they were man-
datorily  entitled  to  represent  the  interest  of  the  State  in 
defending the constitutionality of S. B. 824.

In  its  merits  analysis,  the  en  banc  court  observed  that 
Rule 24(a)(2) contains several requirements, including that 
a proposed intervenor demonstrate both “ ‘an interest in the
subject matter of the action’ ” and “ ‘that the [proposed in-
tervenor’s] interest is not adequately represented by exist-
ing parties to the litigation.’ ”  Id., at 927 (quoting Fed. Rule 
Civ.  Proc. 24(a)(2)).    The  court  noted  that  petitioners  had
not  asked  the  District  Court  and  the  Court  of  Appeals  to
consider whether state law was relevant to Rule 24(a)(2)’s 
adequacy  requirement,  as  opposed  to  its  interest  require-
ment.  See 999 F. 3d, at 930, n. 3.  The court concluded that 
N. C. Gen. Stat. Ann. §1–72.2, the state statute authorizing 
petitioners to intervene in cases challenging state law, bore
on only the interest requirement.  The court explained that 
“[a] state’s policy judgment about the value of legislative in-
tervention  may  bestow  a  protectable  interest  in  certain 
court cases, but it does not override [a federal court’s] nor-
mal standards for evaluating the adequacy of existing rep-
resentation in those cases.”  999 F. 3d, at 929, n. 3 (empha-
sis added).

The  court  assumed  (as  to  the  former  requirement)  that 
petitioners  had  established  a  protectable  interest  in  the