Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/23pdf/22-1008_1b82.pdf
Page Number: 13.0

8 

CORNER POST, INC. v. BOARD OF GOVERNORS, FRS 

Opinion of the Court 

§2401(a), it was well understood that a claim does not “ac-
crue” as soon as the defendant acts, but only after the plain-
tiff suffers the injury required to press her claim in court. 

Our  precedent  treats  this  definition  of  accrual  as  the 
“standard rule for limitations periods.”  Green, 578 U. S., at 
554.  “We have repeatedly recognized that Congress legis-
lates against the ‘standard rule that the limitations period 
commences when the plaintiff has a complete and present 
cause of action.’ ”  Graham County Soil & Water Conserva-
tion Dist. v. United States ex rel. Wilson, 545 U. S. 409, 418 
(2005) (quoting Bay Area Laundry, 522 U. S., at 201).  It is 
“unquestionably  the  traditional  rule”  that  “[a]bsent  other 
indication, a statute of limitations begins to run at the time 
the plaintiff ‘has the right to apply to the court for relief.’ ”  
TRW  Inc.  v.  Andrews,  534  U. S.  19,  37  (2001)  (Scalia,  J., 
concurring in judgment) (quoting 1 H. Wood, Limitation of 
Actions  §122a,  p.  684  (rev.  4th  ed.  1916)  (Wood)).    Con-
versely, we have “reject[ed]” the possibility that a “limita-
tions period commences at a time when the [plaintiff] could
not yet file suit” as “inconsistent with basic limitations prin-
ciples.”  Bay Area Laundry, 522 U. S., at 200. 

This traditional rule constitutes a strong background pre-
sumption.  While the “standard rule can be displaced such
that the limitations period begins to run before a plaintiff
can file a suit,” we “ ‘will not infer such an odd result in the 
absence of any such indication’ in the text of the limitations 
period.”  Green, 578 U. S., at 554 (quoting Reiter v. Cooper, 
507  U. S.  258,  267  (1993)).    “Unless  Congress  has  told  us
otherwise in the legislation at issue, a cause of action does 
not become ‘complete and present’ for limitations purposes 
until the plaintiff can file suit and obtain relief.”  Bay Area 
Laundry, 522 U. S., at 201. 

There is good reason to conclude that Congress codified
the  traditional  accrual  rule  in  §2401(a).    Nothing  “in  the
text of [§2401(a)’s] limitations period” gives any indication 
that it begins to run before the plaintiff has a complete and