Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/23pdf/23-5572_l6hn.pdf
Page Number: 20.0

16 

FISCHER v. UNITED STATES 

Opinion of the Court 

crimes,  giving  prosecutors  broad  discretion  to  seek  a  20-
year maximum sentence for acts Congress saw fit to punish 
only with far shorter terms of imprisonment—for example, 
three years for harassment under §1512(d)(1), or ten years
for threatening a juror under §1503. 

For  all  these  reasons,  subsection  (c)(2)’s  “surrounding
words” suggest that we should not give this “otherwise” pro-
vision the broadest possible meaning.  Yates, 574 U. S., at 
536 (plurality opinion).  Although the Government’s all-en-
compassing  interpretation  may  be  literally  permissible,  it
defies the most plausible understanding of why (c)(1) and 
(c)(2) are conjoined, and it renders an unnerving amount of 
statutory  text  mere  surplusage.    Given  that  subsection 
(c)(2) was enacted to address the Enron disaster, not some
further flung set of dangers, it is unlikely that Congress re-
sponded with such an unfocused and “grossly incommensu-
rate patch.”  64 F. 4th, at 376 (Katsas, J., dissenting).  We 
therefore decline to adopt the Government’s interpretation, 
which is inconsistent with “the context from which the stat-
ute arose.”  Bond v. United States, 572 U. S. 844, 860 (2014). 

* 

* 

* 
To  prove  a  violation  of  Section  1512(c)(2),  the  Govern-
ment must establish that the defendant impaired the avail-
ability or integrity for use in an official proceeding of rec-
ords, documents, objects, or as we earlier explained, other 
things used in the proceeding, or attempted to do so.  See 
supra, at 9.  The judgment of the D. C. Circuit is therefore 
vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion.  On remand, the D. C. Circuit 
may assess the sufficiency of Count Three of Fischer’s in-
dictment in light of our interpretation of Section 1512(c)(2). 

It is so ordered.