Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/22pdf/21-86_l5gm.pdf
Page Number: 30.0

Cite as:  598 U. S. ____ (2023) 

7 

THOMAS, J., concurring 

eral judiciary on a broad array of statutory claims, includ-
ing claims for monetary relief.”  Nelson 602.3 

II 
As I have previously explained, “[b]ecause federal admin-
istrative agencies are part of the Executive Branch, it is not 
clear that  they have power to adjudicate claims involving
core private rights.”  B&B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus-
tries,  Inc.,  575  U. S.  138,  171  (2015)  (dissenting  opinion).
The  “appellate  review  model”  of  agency  adjudication  thus
raises  serious  constitutional  concerns.  It  may  violate  the
separation of powers by placing adjudicatory authority over
core  private  rights—a  judicial  rather  than  executive 
power—within  the  authority  of  Article  II  agencies.  See 
ibid.  (“To  the  extent  that  administrative  agencies  could,
consistent  with  the  Constitution,  function  as  courts,  they 
might only be able to do so with respect to claims involving
public or quasi-private rights”).  It may violate Article III
by compelling the Judiciary to defer to administrative agen-
cies regarding matters within the core of the Judicial Vest-
ing Clause.  See P. Hamburger, Is Administrative Law Un-
lawful?  297 
that, 
traditionally,  “even  at  the  behest  of  Congress,  the  judges 
could not defer to the executive record or the facts suppos-
edly established by it, lest they abandon their office of inde-
pendent  judgment  and  the  office  of  juries  to  decide  the 

(Hamburger) 

(explaining 

(2014) 

—————— 

3 The  Court  has  further  blurred  the  line  between  adjudications  that
require Article III courts and those that do not by equating mere Gov-
ernment  benefits  and  entitlements  with  core  private  rights.    See,  e.g., 
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U. S. 254, 261–263 (1970) (holding that due pro-
cess  rights  attach  to  the  deprivation  of  Government  benefits);  see  also 
id., at 262, n. 8 (“It may be realistic today to regard welfare entitlements
as more like ‘property’ than a ‘gratuity.’ . . . It has been aptly noted that 
‘society today is built around entitlement’ ” (quoting C. Reich, Individual 
Rights  and  Social  Welfare:  The  Emerging  Legal  Issues,  74  Yale  L. J. 
1245, 1255 (1965); alteration omitted)).