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312  CITIZENS  UNITED  v.  FEDERAL  ELECTION  COMM’N 

Syllabus 

lating  political  speech  is  chilled.  The  regulatory  scheme  at  issue  may 
not be a prior restraint in the strict sense.  However, given its complex­
ity  and  the  deference  courts  show  to  administrative  determinations, 
a  speaker  wishing  to  avoid  criminal  liability  threats  and  the  heavy 
costs  of  defending  against  FEC  enforcement  must  ask  a  governmental 
agency for prior permission to speak.  The restrictions thus function as 
the  equivalent  of  a  prior  restraint,  giving  the  FEC  power  analogous 
to  the  type  of  government  practices  that  the  First  Amendment  was 
drawn  to  prohibit.  The  ongoing  chill  on  speech  makes  it  necessary  to 
invoke  the  earlier  precedents  that  a  statute  that  chills  speech  can  and 
must  be  invalidated  where  its  facial  invalidity  has  been  demonstrated. 
Pp. 329–336. 

2.  Austin  is  overruled,  and  thus  provides  no  basis  for  allowing  the 
Government to limit corporate independent expenditures.  Hence, 
§ 441b’s restrictions  on such expenditures are  invalid and cannot  be ap­
plied  to  Hillary.  Given  this  conclusion,  the  part  of  McConnell  that 
upheld  BCRA  § 203’s  extension  of  § 441b’s  restrictions  on  independent 
corporate expenditures is also overruled.  Pp. 336–366. 

(a)  Although  the  First  Amendment  provides  that  “Congress  shall 
make  no  law . . . abridging  the  freedom  of  speech,”  § 441b’s  prohibition 
on  corporate  independent  expenditures  is  an  outright  ban  on  speech, 
backed by criminal sanctions.  It is a ban notwithstanding the fact that 
a PAC created by a corporation can still speak, for a PAC is a separate 
association from the corporation.  Because speech is an essential mech­
anism of democracy—it is the means to hold ofﬁcials accountable to the 
people—political  speech  must  prevail  against  laws  that  would  suppress 
it by design or inadvertence.  Laws burdening such speech are subject 
to strict scrutiny, which requires the Government to prove that the re­
striction  “furthers  a  compelling  interest  and  is  narrowly  tailored  to 
achieve that interest.”  WRTL, supra, at 464.  This language provides 
a  sufﬁcient  framework  for  protecting  the  interests  in  this  case.  Pre­
mised on mistrust of governmental power, the First Amendment stands 
against attempts to disfavor certain subjects or viewpoints or to distin­
guish  among  different  speakers,  which  may  be  a  means  to  control  con­
tent.  The  Government  may  also  commit  a  constitutional  wrong  when 
by  law  it  identiﬁes  certain  preferred  speakers.  There  is  no  basis  for 
the  proposition  that,  in  the  political  speech  context,  the  Government 
may  impose  restrictions  on  certain  disfavored  speakers.  Both  history 
and logic lead to this conclusion.  Pp. 336–341. 

(b)  The Court has recognized that the First Amendment applies to 
corporations,  e. g.,  First  Nat.  Bank  of  Boston  v.  Bellotti,  435  U. S.  765, 
778, n. 14, and extended this protection to the context of political speech, 
see,  e. g.,  NAACP  v.  Button,  371  U. S.  415,  428–429.  Addressing  chal­
lenges to the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, the Court in Buck­