Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/16pdf/15-1358_6khn.pdf
Page Number: 16.0

Cite as:  582 U. S. ____ (2017) 

11 

Opinion of the Court 

the Court’s general approach to recognizing implied dam-
ages  remedies,  it  is  possible  that  the  analysis  in  the 
Court’s  three  Bivens  cases  might  have  been  different  if 
they  were  decided  today.    To  be  sure,  no  congressional
enactment  has  disapproved  of  these  decisions.    And  it 
must  be  understood  that  this  opinion  is  not  intended  to
cast doubt on the continued force, or even the necessity, of 
Bivens in the search-and-seizure context in which it arose. 
Bivens  does  vindicate  the  Constitution  by  allowing  some
redress  for  injuries,  and  it  provides  instruction  and  guid-
ance  to  federal  law  enforcement  officers  going  forward.
The  settled  law  of  Bivens  in  this  common  and  recurrent 
sphere  of  law  enforcement,  and  the  undoubted  reliance
upon  it  as  a  fixed  principle  in  the  law,  are  powerful  rea-
sons to retain it in that sphere.

Given  the  notable  change  in  the  Court’s  approach  to
recognizing  implied  causes  of  action,  however,  the  Court 
has made clear that expanding the Bivens remedy is now a 
“disfavored”  judicial  activity. 
Iqbal,  556  U. S.,  at  675. 
This  is  in  accord  with  the  Court’s  observation  that  it  has 
“consistently refused to extend Bivens to any new context
or  new  category  of  defendants.”  Correctional  Services 
Corp.  v.  Malesko,  534  U. S.  61,  68  (2001).    Indeed,  the 
Court has refused to do so for the past 30 years. 

For  example,  the  Court  declined  to  create  an  implied
damages  remedy  in  the  following  cases:  a  First  Amend-
ment  suit  against  a  federal  employer,  Bush  v.  Lucas,  462 
U. S.  367,  390  (1983);  a  race-discrimination  suit  against 
military  officers,  Chappell  v.  Wallace,  462  U. S.  296,  297, 
304–305  (1983);  a  substantive  due  process  suit  against
military  officers,  United  States  v.  Stanley,  483  U. S.  669, 
671–672,  683–684  (1987);  a  procedural  due  process  suit
against Social Security officials, Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 
U. S.  412,  414  (1988);  a  procedural  due  process  suit 
against a federal agency for wrongful termination, FDIC v. 
Meyer,  510  U. S.  471,  473–474  (1994);  an  Eighth  Amend-