Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/09pdf/08-1371.pdf
Page Number: 77

Cite as:  561 U. S. ____ (2010) 

29 

ALITO, J., dissenting 

out  students  with  disfavored  beliefs.    Asked  at  oral  argu-
ment whether CLS could require applicants to pass a test
on  the  Bible,  Hastings’  attorney  responded:  “If  it  were
truly an objective knowledge test, it would be okay.”  Tr. of 
Oral  Arg.  52.  The  long  history  of  disputes  about  the
meaning  of  Bible  passages  belies  any  suggestion  that  it 
would be an easy task to determine whether the grading of
such a test was “objective.” 

Third,  the  Court  argues  that  the  accept-all-comers 
policy,  by  bringing  together  students  with  diverse  views, 
encourages  tolerance,  cooperation,  learning,  and  the  de-
velopment of conflict-resolution skills.  Ante, at 23.  These 
are  obviously  commendable  goals,  but  they  are  not  un-
dermined by permitting a religious group to restrict mem-
bership  to  persons  who  share  the  group’s  faith.    Many
religious  groups  impose  such  restrictions.  See,  e.g.,  Brief 
for  Agudath  Israel  of  America  as  Amicus  Curiae  3 
(“[B]ased  upon  millennia-old  Jewish  laws  and  traditions,
Orthodox  Jewish  institutions  . . .  regularly  differentiate 
between  Jews  and  non-Jews”).  Such  practices  are  not 
manifestations  of  “contempt”  for  members  of  other  faiths.
Cf.  ante,  at  6  (opinion  of  STEVENS,  J.)  (invoking  groups 
that  have  “contempt  for  Jews,  blacks,  and  women”).    Nor 
do they thwart the objectives that Hastings endorses.  Our 
country  as  a  whole,  no  less  than  the  Hastings  College  of 
Law,  values  tolerance,  cooperation,  learning,  and  the
amicable  resolution  of  conflicts.    But  we  seek  to  achieve 
those goals through “[a] confident pluralism that conduces 
to  civil  peace  and  advances  democratic  consensus-
building,” not by abridging First Amendment rights.  Brief 
for  Gays  and  Lesbians  for  Individual  Liberty  as  Amicus 
Curiae 35. 

Fourth, the Court observes that Hastings’ policy “incor-
porates—in  fact,  subsumes—state-law  proscriptions  on
discrimination.”  Ante,  at  23.    Because  the  First  Amend-
ment  obviously  takes  precedence  over  any  state  law,  this