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4 

BIDEN v. NEBRASKA 

Syllabus 

obligation to report any waivers and modifications he has made.  The 
Secretary’s ability to add new terms “in lieu of” the old is limited to his
authority to “modify” existing law.  As with any other modification is-
sued  under  the  Act,  no  new  term  or  condition  reported  pursuant  to 
§1098bb(b)(2) may distort the fundamental nature of the provision it
alters. 

In sum, the Secretary’s comprehensive debt cancellation plan is not 
a waiver because it augments and expands existing provisions dramat-
ically.    It  is  not  a  modification  because  it  constitutes  “effectively  the 
introduction of a whole new regime.”  MCI, 512 U. S., at 234.  And it 
cannot be some combination of the two, because when the Secretary 
seeks to add to existing law, the fact that he has “waived” certain pro-
visions does not give him a free pass to avoid the limits inherent in the 
power to “modify.”  However broad the meaning of “waive or modify,” 
that language cannot authorize the kind of exhaustive rewriting of the
statute that has taken place here.  Pp. 13–18. 

(b) The Secretary also appeals to congressional purpose, arguing 
that Congress intended “to grant substantial discretion to the Secre-
tary to respond to unforeseen emergencies.”  On this view, the unprec-
edented nature of the Secretary’s debt cancellation plan is justified by
the  pandemic’s  unparalleled  scope.    But  the  question  here  is  not 
whether something should be done; it is who has the authority to do it. 
As  in  the  Court’s  recent  decision  in  West  Virginia  v.  EPA,  given  the 
“ ‘history and the breadth of the authority’ ” asserted by the Executive 
and  the  “ ‘economic  and  political  significance’  of  that  assertion,”  the 
Court has “ ‘reason to hesitate before concluding that Congress’ meant 
to confer such authority.”  597 U. S. ___, ___ (quoting FDA v. Brown & 
Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U. S. 120, 159–160). 

This case implicates many of the factors present in past cases rais-
ing  similar  separation  of  powers  concerns.    The  Secretary has  never 
previously claimed powers of this magnitude under the HEROES Act;
“[n]o regulation premised on” the HEROES Act “has even begun to ap-
proach the size or scope” of the Secretary’s program.  Alabama Assn. 
of Realtors v. Department of Health and Human Servs., 594 U. S. ___, 
___ (per curiam).  The “ ‘economic and political significance’ ” of the Sec-
retary’s action is staggering.  West Virginia, 597 U. S., at ___ (quoting 
Brown & Williamson, 529 U. S., at 160).  And the Secretary’s assertion 
of administrative authority has “conveniently enabled [him] to enact a 
program” that Congress has chosen not to enact itself.  West Virginia, 
597 U. S., at ___.  The Secretary argues that the principles explained 
in West Virginia and its predecessors should not apply to cases involv-
ing government benefits.  But major questions cases “have arisen from 
all corners of the administrative state,” id., at ___, and this is not the 
first such case to arise in the context of government benefits.  See King