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Page Number: 12.0

8 

VIKING RIVER CRUISES, INC. v. MORIANA 

Opinion of the Court 

such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation 
of any contract.”  9 U. S. C. §2.3  As we have interpreted it,
this provision contains two clauses: An enforcement man-
date, which renders agreements to arbitrate enforceable as
a matter of federal law, and a saving clause, which permits 
invalidation of arbitration clauses on grounds applicable to 
“any contract.”  See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 
U. S. 333, 339–340 (2011); Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis, 584 
U. S. ___, ___–___ (2018) (slip op., at 5–6).  These clauses 
jointly establish “an equal-treatment principle: A court may 
invalidate an arbitration agreement based on ‘generally ap-
plicable contract defenses’ like fraud or unconscionability, 
but not on legal rules that ‘apply only to arbitration or that 
derive their meaning from the fact that an agreement to ar-
bitrate is at issue.’ ”  Kindred Nursing Centers L. P. v. Clark, 
581 U. S. 246, 251 (2017) (quoting Concepcion, 563 U. S., at 
339).  Under that principle, the FAA “preempts any state
rule discriminating on its face against arbitration—for ex-
ample, a law ‘prohibit[ing] outright the arbitration of a par-
ticular type of claim.’ ”  Kindred Nursing, 581 U. S., at 251 
(quoting Concepcion, 563 U. S., at 341). 

But under our decisions, even rules that are generally ap-
plicable as a formal matter are not immune to preemption 

—————— 

3 As  we  have  noted,  common-law  hostility  to  arbitration  “manifested 
itself in a great variety of devices and formulas.”  AT&T Mobility LLC v. 
Concepcion,  563  U. S.  333,  342  (2011)  (internal  quotation  marks  omit-
ted).  Two important devices were the doctrines of ouster and revocabil-
ity, which, respectively, invalidated arbitration clauses as impermissible
attempts  to  “oust”  courts  of  their  jurisdiction  and  permitted  parties  to
revoke consent to arbitrate until the moment the arbitrator entered an 
award.  See, e.g., Kill v. Hollister, 1 Wils. K. B. 129, 95  Eng. Rep. 532
(K.  B.  1746);  Vynior’s  Case,  77  Co.  Rep.  80a,  77  Eng.  Rep.  597  (K.  B. 
1609).  Another was the rule barring specific performance as a remedy 
for  breach  of  an  arbitration  clause.    See 21  R.  Lord,  Williston  on  Con-
tracts §57:2 (4th ed. 2017).  Section 2 abrogated these doctrines by mak-
ing arbitration agreements presumptively “valid,” “irrevocable,” and “en-
forceable.”