Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/16pdf/15-1358_6khn.pdf
Page Number: 66

22 

ZIGLAR v. ABBASI 

BREYER, J., dissenting 

And the Court has protected high-level officials in particu-
lar  by  requiring  that  plaintiffs  plead  that  an  official  was 
personally  involved  in  the  unconstitutional  conduct;  an
official cannot be vicariously liable for another’s misdeeds. 
Id., at 676. 

Finally,  where  such  a  claim  is  filed,  courts  can,  and
should,  tailor  discovery  orders  so  that  they  do  not  unnec-
essarily  or  improperly  interfere  with  the  official’s  work. 
The Second Circuit has emphasized the “need to vindicate
the purpose of the qualified immunity defense by dismiss-
ing  non-meritorious  claims  against  public  officials  at  an
early  stage  of  litigation.”    Iqbal  v.  Hasty,  490  F. 3d  143, 
158 (2007).  Where some of the defendants are “current or 
former  senior  officials  of  the  Government,  against  whom
broad-ranging  allegations  of  knowledge  and  personal
involvement  are  easily  made,  a  district  court”  not  only
“may,  but  ‘must  exercise  its  discretion  in  a  way  that  pro-
tects  the  substance  of  the  qualified  immunity  defense  . . . 
so that’ ” those officials “ ‘are not subjected to unnecessary 
and  burdensome  discovery  or  trial  proceedings.’ ”    Id.,  at 
158–159.  The  court  can  make  “all  such  discovery  subject 
to prior court approval.”  Id., at 158.  It can “structure . . . 
limited discovery by examining written responses to inter-
rogatories and requests to admit before authorizing depo-
sitions,  and  by  deferring  discovery  directed  to  high-level 
officials  until  discovery  of  front-line  officials  has  been 
completed  and  has  demonstrated  the  need  for  discovery
higher  up  the  ranks.”  Ibid.  In  a  word,  a  trial  court  can 
and should so structure the proceedings with full recogni-
tion  that  qualified  immunity  amounts  to  immunity  from
suit as well as immunity from liability. 

Given  these  safeguards  against  undue  interference  by
the  Judiciary  in  times  of  war  or  national-security  emer-
gency,  the  Court’s  abolition,  or  limitation  of,  Bivens  ac-
tions  goes  too  far.    If  you  are  cold,  put  on  a  sweater,  per-
haps  an  overcoat,  perhaps  also  turn  up  the  heat,  but  do