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529US2

Unit: $U52

[09-26-01 10:36:40] PAGES PGT: OPIN

514

CARMELL v. TEXAS

Syllabus

the case of Sir John Fenwick as an example of the fourth category.
England charged Fenwick with high treason in the late 17th century,
but, under an Act of Parliament, he could not be convicted without
the testimony of two witnesses. Parliament passed a bill of attainder
making the two-witness rule inapplicable, and Fenwick was convicted
on the testimony of only one witness. Pp. 521–530.

(b) Article 38.07 plainly ﬁts within Calder’s fourth category. Requir-
ing only the victim’s testimony to convict, rather than that testimony
plus corroborating evidence, is surely “less testimony required to con-
vict” in any straightforward sense of those words.
Indeed, the cir-
cumstances here parallel those of Fenwick’s case. That Article 38.07
neither increases the punishment for, nor changes the elements of, the
offense simply shows that the amendment does not ﬁt within Calder’s
ﬁrst or third categories. Pp. 530–531.

(c) The fourth category resonates harmoniously with one of the prin-
cipal interests that the Ex Post Facto Clause was designed to serve,
fundamental justice. A law reducing the quantum of evidence required
to convict is as grossly unfair as retrospectively eliminating an element
of the offense, increasing punishment for an existing offense, or lowering
In each instance, the government refuses, after
the burden of proof.
the fact, to play by its own rules, altering them in a way that is advanta-
geous only to the State, to facilitate an easier conviction. There is
plainly a fundamental fairness interest in having the government abide
by the rules of law it establishes to govern the circumstances under
Indeed, Fen-
which it can deprive a person of his or her liberty or life.
wick’s case itself illustrates this principle. Pp. 531–534.

(d) None of the reasons that the United States as amicus advances
for abandoning the fourth category is persuasive.
It asserts that the
fact that neither Blackstone nor ex post facto clauses in Ratiﬁcation-era
state constitutions mention the fourth category shows that Justice
Chase simply got it wrong. Accepting this assertion would require the
Court to abandon the third category as well, for it is also not mentioned
in any of those sources. And it does not follow from the fact that Fen-
wick was convicted by a bill of attainder that his case cannot also be an
example of an ex post facto law.
In fact, all of the speciﬁc examples
that Justice Chase listed in Calder were passed as bills of attainder.
Nor, as the United States and Texas argue, was the fourth category
effectively cast out in Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U. S. 37, which actually
held that it was a mistake to stray beyond Calder’s four categories, not
that the fourth category was itself mistaken. Pp. 534–539.

(e) Texas’ additional argument that the fourth category is limited
to laws that retrospectively alter the burden of proof is also rejected.