Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/21pdf/20-1459_n7ip.pdf
Page Number: 38.0

Cite as:  596 U. S. ____ (2022) 

7 

ALITO, J., dissenting 

That  is  more  than  sufficient  to  show  that  Taylor’s  actual 
crime  “ha[d]  as  an  element  the  . . .  use  of  physical  force 
against the person . . . of another.”  §924(c)(3)(A).

For these reasons, I believe that the Court’s approach and
ultimate holding in this case are misguided.  I would hold 
that  Taylor  committed  a  “crime  of  violence”  within  the 
meaning  of  §924(c)(3)(A)  and  reverse  the  judgment  of  the 
Fourth Circuit below.  But there is a silver lining in the ma-
jority opinion.  Because the Court assumes—and does not 
hold—that alternative elements do not qualify as independ-
ent  elements  of  a  crime  for  purposes  of  applying
§924(c)(3)(A), the Government remains free to advance the
correct interpretation of that provision in a future case.  For 
my  purposes,  however,  the  text  of  the  statute  is  clear
enough  to  support  reversal  here  and  now.    As  a  result,  I  
respectfully dissent.