Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/23pdf/22-451_7m58.pdf
Page Number: 108

Cite as:  603 U. S. ____ (2024) 

27 

KAGAN, J., dissenting 

for  Lemon  v.  Kurtzman,  403  U. S.  602  (1971));  Shelby 
County v. Holder, 570 U. S. 529, 587–588 (2013) (Ginsburg,
J.,  dissenting)  (similar  for  South  Carolina  v.  Katzenbach, 
383 U. S. 301 (1966)).  I once remarked that this overruling-
through-enfeeblement  technique  “mock[ed]  stare  decisis.” 
Janus, 585 U. S., at 950 (dissenting opinion).  I have seen 
no reason to change my mind. 

The majority does no better in its main justification for 
overruling  Chevron—that  the  decision  is  “unworkable.” 
Ante, at 30.  The majority’s first theory on that score is that
there is no single “answer” about what “ambiguity” means: 
Some judges turn out to see more of it than others do, lead-
ing to “different results.”  Ante, at 30–31.  But even if so, 
the  legal  system  has  for  many  years,  in  many  contexts, 
dealt perfectly well with that variation.  Take contract law. 
It is hornbook stuff that when (but only when) a contract is 
ambiguous, a court interpreting it can consult extrinsic ev-
idence.  See CNH Industrial N.V. v. Reese, 583 U. S. 133, 
139  (2018)  (per  curiam).  And  when  all  interpretive  tools
still leave ambiguity, the contract is construed against the 
drafter.  See Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela, 587 U. S. 176, 186– 
187 (2019).  So I guess the contract rules of the 50 States 
are unworkable now.  Or look closer to home, to doctrines 
this Court regularly applies.  In deciding whether a govern-
ment  has  waived  sovereign  immunity,  we  construe  “[a]ny 
ambiguities in the statutory language” in “favor of immun-
ity.”  FAA v. Cooper, 566 U. S. 284, 290 (2012).  Similarly,
the rule of lenity tells us to construe ambiguous statutes in
favor  of  criminal  defendants.    See  United  States  v.  Cas-
tleman,  572  U. S.  157,  172–173  (2014).    And  the  canon  of 
constitutional  avoidance  instructs  us  to  construe  ambigu-
ous  laws  to  avoid  difficult  constitutional  questions.  See 
United  States  v.  Oakland  Cannabis  Buyers’  Cooperative, 
532  U. S.  483,  494  (2001).    I  could  go  on,  but  the  point  is 
made.  There are ambiguity triggers all over the law.  Some-
how everyone seems to get by.