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Page Number: 60.0

14 

CORNER POST, INC. v. BOARD OF GOVERNORS, FRS 

JACKSON, J., dissenting 

agency  action.6    Then,  as  now,  Congress  decided  that  the 
deadline for reviewing agency actions should be pegged to 
the action under review.  Second, the majority misses the 
broader  point:  Whenever  Congress  imposes  a  deadline  to 
challenge an agency decision, the limitations period always 
starts at the moment of the last agency action.  We should 
pay attention to the uniformly expressed judgment of Con-
gress, and read §2401(a) accordingly. 

Somehow, the majority draws the opposite conclusion.  In 
its view, either Congress’s consistently expressed intention 
is irrelevant to what §2401(a) means, or Congress’s failure 
to  explicitly  express  that  intention  in  the  text  of §2401(a) 
indicates that Congress decided otherwise in this particular 
statute (after all, Congress could have expressly pegged ac-
crual to final agency action in §2401(a) but did not do so). 
See ante, at 8–10. 7  But mechanically drawing these sorts 

—————— 

6 See,  e.g.,  42  Stat.  162  (1921)  (codified  at  7  U. S. C.  §194(a))  (meat-
packers must appeal agency orders within 30 days after service of order);
48 Stat. 1093 (1934) (codified as amended at 47 U. S. C. §402(c)) (Federal 
Communications Commission orders must be challenged in court “within 
twenty days after the decision complained of is effective”); 49 Stat. 860 
(1935)  (codified  at  16  U. S. C.  §825l(b))  (orders  issued  by  the  Federal 
Power Commission pursuant to the Public Utility Act of 1935 must be
challenged  in  court  “within  sixty  days  after  the  order  of  the  Commis-
sion”); 49 Stat. 980 (1935) (codified at 27 U. S. C. §204(h)) (orders related 
to alcohol permits must be challenged “within sixty days after the entry
of such order”); 52 Stat. 112 (1938) (codified at 15 U. S. C. §45) (Federal 
Trade Commission cease-and-desist orders must be challenged “within 
sixty days from the date of the service of such order”); 52 Stat. 831 (1938)
(codified  at  15  U. S. C.  §717r(b))  (orders  issued  by  the  Federal  Power
Commission  pursuant  to  the  Natural  Gas  Act  must  be  challenged  in 
court  “within  sixty  days  after  the  order  of  the  Commission”);  52  Stat.
1053 (1938) (codified at 21 U. S. C. §355(h)) (orders related to new drug
applications must be challenged in court “within sixty days after the en-
try of such order”); 54 Stat. 501 (1940) (orders apportioning costs for cer-
tain  bridge  projects  must  be  challenged  in  court  “within  three  months
after the date such order is issued”).

7 The majority criticizes my review of congressional action in this area,
but  fails  to  adequately  explore  the  record  itself.    Ante,  at  12–14.    The