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CONCEPCION v. UNITED STATES 

Syllabus 

235 months.  The Government conceded Concepcion’s eligibility for re-
lief  but  opposed  the  motion,  emphasizing  that  Concepcion’s  original
sentence of 228 months fell within the new Guidelines range of 188 to 
235 months, and citing factors in Concepcion’s prison record that the 
Government believed counseled against a sentence reduction.  In his 
reply brief, represented by counsel, Concepcion made two primary ar-
guments in support of a reduced sentence.  First, he argued that he 
would  no  longer  be  considered  a  career  offender  because  one  of  his 
prior  convictions  had  been  vacated  and  his  remaining  convictions 
would not constitute crimes of violence that trigger the enhancement. 
Without  the  enhancement,  Concepcion  contended  that  his  revised 
Guidelines  range  should  be  57  to  71  months.    Second,  Concepcion
pointed to postsentencing evidence of rehabilitation. 

The District Court denied Concepcion’s motion.  It declined to con-
sider  that  Concepcion  would  no  longer  qualify  as  a  career  offender 
based on its judgment that the First Step Act did not authorize such 
relief.  App. to Pet. for Cert. 72a.  The District Court did not address 
Concepcion’s evidence of rehabilitation or the Government’s counter-
vailing evidence of Concepcion’s disciplinary record.  The Court of Ap-
peals  affirmed  in  a  divided  opinion,  and  added  to  the  disagreement
among the Circuits as to whether a district court deciding a First Step 
Act motion must, may, or may not consider intervening changes of law 
or fact. 

Held: The  First  Step  Act  allows  district  courts  to  consider  intervening 
changes  of  law  or  fact  in  exercising  their  discretion  to reduce  a  sen-
tence.  Pp. 6–18.

(a) Federal courts historically have exercised broad discretion to 
consider all relevant information at an initial sentencing hearing, con-
sistent  with  their  responsibility  to  sentence  the  whole person  before
them.  That discretion also carries forward to later proceedings that 
may modify an original sentence.  District courts’ discretion is bounded 
only  when  Congress  or  the  Constitution  expressly  limits  the  type  of
information  a  district  court  may  consider  in  modifying  a  sentence. 
Pp. 6–11.

(1) There  is  a  “long”  and  “durable”  tradition  that  sentencing
judges “enjo[y] discretion in the sort of information they may consider”
at an initial sentencing proceeding.  Dean v. United States, 581 U. S. 
62, 66.  That unbroken tradition also characterizes federal sentencing 
history.  Indeed, “[i]t has been uniform and constant in the federal ju-
dicial  tradition  for  the  sentencing  judge  to  consider  every  convicted
person as an individual and every case as a unique study in the human
failings that sometimes mitigate, sometimes magnify, the crime and 
the punishment to ensue.”  Koon v. United States, 518 U. S. 81, 113.