Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/22pdf/20-1199_hgdj.pdf
Page Number: 109

Cite as:  600 U. S. ____ (2023) 

3 

GORSUCH, J., concurring 

From this, we can safely say that Title VI forbids a recipient
of  federal  funds  from  intentionally  treating  one  person
worse than another similarly situated person on the ground
of race, color, or national origin.

What  does  the  statute’s  second  critical  phrase—“on  the
ground of ”—mean?  Again, the answer is uncomplicated:  It 
means  “because  of.”  See,  e.g.,  Webster’s  New  World  Dic-
tionary 640 (1960) (“because of ”); Webster’s Third New In-
ternational  Dictionary,  at  1002  (defining  “grounds”  as  “a
logical  condition,  physical  cause,  or  metaphysical  basis”).
“Because of ” is a familiar phrase in the law, one we often 
apply in cases arising under the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
and one that we usually understand to invoke “the ‘simple’ 
and  ‘traditional’  standard  of  but-for  causation.”    Bostock, 
590 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 5) (quoting University of Tex. 
Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar, 570 U. S. 338, 346, 
360 (2013); some internal quotation marks omitted).  The 
but-for-causation  standard  is  a  “sweeping”  one  too.    Bos-
tock, 590 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 5).  A defendant’s actions 
need not be the primary or proximate cause of the plaintiff ’s
injury to qualify.  Nor may a defendant avoid liability “just
by citing some other factor that contributed to” the plain-
tiff ’s loss.  Id., at ___ (slip op., at 6).  All that matters is that 
the plaintiff ’s injury would not have happened but for the 
defendant’s conduct.  Ibid. 

Now  put  these  pieces  back  together  and  a  clear  rule
emerges.  Title VI prohibits a recipient of federal funds from 
intentionally treating one person worse than another simi-
larly situated person because of his race, color, or national 
origin.  It does not matter if the recipient can point to “some 
other . . . factor” that contributed to its decision to disfavor 
that individual.  Id., at ___–___ (slip op., at 14–15).  It does 
not matter if the recipient discriminates in order to advance 
some further benign “intention” or “motivation.”  Id., at ___ 
(slip  op.,  at  13);  see  also  Automobile  Workers  v.  Johnson 
Controls, Inc., 499 U. S. 187, 199 (1991) (“the absence of a