Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/17pdf/16-402_h315.pdf
Page Number: 72

Cite as:  585 U. S. ____ (2018) 

1 

ALITO, J., dissenting 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

_________________ 

No. 16–402 
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TIMOTHY IVORY CARPENTER, PETITIONER v.
 
UNITED STATES
 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 

APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
 

[June 22, 2018] 

JUSTICE  ALITO,  with  whom  JUSTICE  THOMAS  joins,

dissenting. 

I share the Court’s concern about the effect of new tech-
nology on personal privacy, but I fear that today’s decision
will  do  far  more  harm  than  good.    The  Court’s  reasoning 
fractures  two  fundamental  pillars  of  Fourth  Amendment 
law, and in doing so, it guarantees a blizzard of litigation 
while threatening many legitimate and valuable investiga-
tive  practices  upon  which  law  enforcement  has  rightfully
come to rely.

First, the Court ignores the basic distinction between an
actual  search  (dispatching  law  enforcement  officers  to
enter  private  premises  and  root  through  private  papers
and effects) and an order merely requiring a party to look
through its own records and produce specified documents. 
The  former,  which  intrudes  on  personal  privacy  far  more
deeply,  requires  probable  cause;  the  latter  does  not. 
Treating  an  order  to  produce  like  an  actual  search,  as
today’s decision does, is revolutionary.  It violates both the 
original  understanding  of  the  Fourth  Amendment  and 
more than a century of Supreme Court precedent.  Unless 
it  is  somehow  restricted  to  the  particular  situation  in  the 
present case, the Court’s move will cause upheaval.  Must 
every  grand  jury  subpoena  duces  tecum  be  supported  by 
probable cause?  If so, investigations of terrorism, political