Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/21pdf/20-637_10n2.pdf
Page Number: 14.0

Cite as:  595 U. S. ____ (2022) 

11 

Opinion of the Court 

judges from substituting their own determinations of relia-
bility  for  the  method  the  Constitution  guarantees.  The 
Clause “commands, not that evidence be reliable, but that 
reliability be assessed in a particular manner: by testing in 
the crucible of cross-examination.”  Crawford, 541 U. S., at 
61.  It “thus reflects a judgment, not only about the desira-
bility of reliable evidence (a point on which there could be 
little dissent), but about how reliability can best be deter-
mined.”  Ibid.  “[A] mere judicial determination” regarding
the reliability of evidence is no substitute for the “constitu-
tionally prescribed method of assessing reliability.”  Id., at 
62.  The upshot is that the role of the trial judge is not, for 
Confrontation Clause purposes, to weigh the reliability or 
credibility of testimonial hearsay evidence; it is to ensure
that the Constitution’s procedures for testing the reliability
of that evidence are followed. 

The trial court here violated this principle by admitting
unconfronted,  testimonial  hearsay  against  Hemphill
simply because the judge deemed his presentation to have
created a misleading impression that the testimonial hear-
say was reasonably necessary to correct.  For Confrontation 
Clause  purposes,  it  was  not  for  the  judge  to  determine
whether Hemphill’s theory that Morris was the shooter was
unreliable,  incredible,  or  otherwise  misleading  in  light  of 
the State’s proffered, unconfronted plea evidence.  Nor, un-
der  the  Clause,  was  it  the  judge’s  role  to  decide  that  this 
evidence was reasonably necessary to correct that mislead-
ing impression.  Such inquiries are antithetical to the Con-
frontation Clause. 

C 
The State next insists that the Reid rule is necessary to
safeguard  the  truth-finding  function  of  courts  because  it 
prevents  the  selective  and  misleading  introduction  of  evi-
dence.  See Reid, 19 N. Y. 3d, at 388, 971 N. E. 2d, at 357. 
The State relies on this Court’s precedents recognizing the