Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/18pdf/17-1026_2c83.pdf
Page Number: 11.0

8 

GARZA v. IDAHO 

Opinion of the Court 

Idaho  maintains  that  the  risk  of  breaching  the  defend-
ant’s  plea  agreement  renders  counsel’s  choice  to  override 
the  defendant’s  instructions  a  strategic  one.    See  Strick-
land,  466  U. S.,  at  690–691  (“[S]trategic  choices  made 
after  thorough  investigation  of  law  and  facts  relevant  to 
plausible options are virtually unchallengeable . . . ”).  That 
is  not  so.  While  we  do  not  address  what  constitutes  a 
defendant’s breach of an appeal waiver or any responsibil-
ity counsel may have to discuss the potential consequences
of such a breach, it should be clear from the foregoing that
simply filing a notice of appeal does not necessarily breach 
a plea agreement, given the possibility that the defendant 
will end up raising claims beyond the waiver’s scope.  And 
in  any  event,  the  bare  decision  whether  to  appeal  is  ulti-
mately  the  defendant’s,  not  counsel’s,  to  make.8    See  
McCoy, 584 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 6); Barnes, 463 U. S., 
at  751.  Where,  as  here,  a  defendant  has  expressly  re-
quested  an  appeal,  counsel  performs  deficiently  by  disre-
garding the defendant’s instructions.9 

D 
We  now  address  the  crux  of  this  case:  whether  Flores-
Ortega’s  presumption  of  prejudice  applies  despite  an  ap-
peal  waiver.  The  holding,  principles,  and  facts  of  Flores-

—————— 

8 That  does  not  mean,  of  course,  that  appellate  counsel  must  then
make  unsupportable  arguments.    After  an  appeal  has  been  preserved
and  counsel  has  reviewed  the  case,  counsel  may  always,  in  keeping
with longstanding precedent, “advise the court and request permission 
to  withdraw,”  while  filing  “a  brief  referring  to  anything  in  the  record 
that  might  arguably  support  the  appeal.”  Anders  v.  California,  386 
U. S. 738, 744 (1967).  The existence of this procedure reinforces that a
defendant’s  appellate  rights  should  not  hinge  “on  appointed  counsel’s
bare assertion that he or she is of the opinion that there is no merit to 
the appeal.”  Penson v. Ohio, 488 U. S. 75, 80 (1988). 

9 We  leave  undisturbed  today  Flores-Ortega’s  separate  discussion  of
how to approach situations in which a defendant’s wishes are less clear.
See 528 U. S., at 478–481.