Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/21pdf/20-1459_n7ip.pdf
Page Number: 33.0

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UNITED STATES v. TAYLOR 

ALITO, J., dissenting 

to  disregard  the  real  world  and  base  its  decisions  in  this
area on a strict reading of the text, the “offense” for which
Taylor  was  convicted—attempted  Hobbs  Act  robbery—
meets the definition in §924(c)(3)(A).  That definition pro-
vides that an “offense” qualifies as a “ ‘crime of violence’ ” if
it is a felony and “has as an element the use, attempted use,
or threatened use of physical force against the person . . . of 
another.”  (Emphasis added.)

The  key  point  is  the  meaning  of  “an  element”  of  an  of-
fense.  This is a fundamental criminal law concept, and we 
must  therefore  presume  that  §924(c)(3)(A)  employs  the 
term in its usual and established sense.  See A. Scalia & B. 
Garner, Reading Law 320–321 (2012).  And the usual and 

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approach  was  concern  that  allowing  the  enhancement  of  a  sentence 
based on facts found by a judge would violate the Sixth Amendment jury-
trial right as interpreted in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U. S. 466 (2000), 
and later related cases.  It is questionable whether those cases are con-
sistent with the original meaning of the Sixth Amendment.  See Alleyne 
v.  United  States,  570  U. S.  99,  132–134  (2013)  (ALITO, J.,  dissenting); 
Cunningham v. California, 549 U. S. 270, 298, n. 1 (2007) (ALITO, J., dis-
senting); see also M. McConnell, The Booker Mess, 83 Denver U. L. Rev. 
665, 679 (2006) (explaining that “fully discretionary sentencing” was the 
norm “when the Sixth Amendment was adopted”); J. Mitchell, Apprendi’s 
Domain, 2006 S. Ct. Rev. 297, 298–299 (“Apprendi’s historical claim that 
sentencing enhancements were treated as ‘elements’ . . . whenever they
increased  a  defendant’s  maximum  punishment  is  demonstrably  mis-
taken”);  R.  Little  &  T.  Chen,  The  Lost  History  of  Apprendi  and  the 
Blakely Petition for Rehearing, 17 Fed. Sentencing Rep. 69, 69–70 (2004)
(arguing that Apprendi was “undoubtedly founded on an erroneous his-
torical  understanding”);  S.  Bibas,  Judicial  Fact-Finding  and  Sentence 
Enhancements  in  a  World  of  Guilty  Pleas,  110  Yale  L. J.  1097,  1123–
1132 (2001) (arguing that discretionary sentencing was characteristic of
18th-century misdemeanor sentencing and no fixed rule emerged even in 
the 19th century).  But even if the approach were necessary when a court
is determining a defendant’s sentence, no Sixth Amendment concern is 
implicated under §924(c), and the Court thus erred in holding that the 
categorical  approach  applied  to  the  residual  clause  of  that  statute  in 
United  States  v.  Davis,  588  U. S.  ___,  ___–___  (2019)  (slip  op.,  16–17) 
(KAVANAUGH, J., dissenting).