Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/23pdf/22-859new_kjfm.pdf
Page Number: 32.0

Cite as:  603 U. S. ____ (2024) 

27 

Opinion of the Court 

the Seventh Amendment would become nothing more than
a  game,  where  the  Government  need  only  identify  some 
slight advantage to the public from agency adjudication to 
strip  its  target  of  the  protections  of  the  Seventh  Amend-
ment. 

The novel claims in Atlas Roofing had never been brought 
in an Article III court.  By contrast, law courts have dealt
with fraud actions since before the founding, and Congress
had authorized the SEC to bring such actions in Article III
courts and still authorizes the SEC to do so today.  See 3 
Blackstone 41–42; §§77t, 78u, 80b–9.  Given the judiciary’s
long history of handling fraud claims, it cannot be argued 
that the courts lack the capacity needed to adjudicate such
actions. 
  In short, Atlas Roofing does not conflict with our conclu-
sion.  When  a  matter  “from  its  nature,  is  the  subject  of  a
suit at the common law,” Congress may not “withdraw [it] 
from judicial cognizance.”  Murray’s Lessee, 18 How., at 284. 

* 

* 

* 

A defendant facing a fraud suit has the right to be tried 
by a jury of his peers before a neutral adjudicator.  Rather 
than  recognize  that  right,  the  dissent  would  permit  Con-
gress to concentrate the roles of prosecutor, judge, and jury 
in the hands of the Executive Branch.  That is the very op-
posite of the separation of powers that the Constitution de-
mands.  Jarkesy and Patriot28 are entitled to a jury trial in
an Article III court.  We do not reach the remaining consti-
tutional issues and affirm the ruling of the Fifth Circuit on
the Seventh Amendment ground alone.

The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
is affirmed, and the case is remanded for further proceed-
ings consistent with this opinion. 

It is so ordered.