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KEMP v. UNITED STATES 

Syllabus 

law.  Because Kemp’s motion alleged such a legal error, it was cogniza-
ble under Rule 60(b)(1) and untimely under Rule 60(c)’s 1-year limita-
tions period.  Pp. 3–10.

(a) As  a  matter  of  text,  structure,  and  history,  a  “mistake”  under 
Rule  60(b)(1)  includes  a  judge’s  errors  of  law.    When  the  Rule  was 
adopted in 1938 and revised in 1946, the word “mistake” applied to any 
“misconception,”  “misunderstanding,”  or  “fault  in  opinion  or  judg-
ment.”  Webster’s New International Dictionary 1383.  Likewise, in its 
legal  usage,  “mistake”  included  errors  “of  law  or  fact.”   Black’s  Law 
Dictionary 1195.  Thus, regardless whether “mistake” in Rule 60(b)(1) 
carries  its  ordinary  meaning  or  legal  meaning,  it  includes  a  judge’s
mistakes of law.  Rule 60(b)(1)’s drafters could have used language to
connote a narrower understanding of “mistake,” yet they chose not to 
qualify that term.  Similarly, the Rule’s drafters could have excluded 
mistakes  by  judges  from  the  Rule’s  reach.    In  fact,  the  Rule  used  to 
read that way.  When adopted in 1938, Rule 60(b) initially referred to 
“his”—i.e.,  a  party’s—“mistake,”  so  judicial  errors  were  not  covered. 
The 1946 revision to the Rule deleted the word “his,” thereby removing
any limitation on whose mistakes could qualify.  Pp. 4–6.

(b) Neither the Government nor Kemp offers a reason to depart from 

this reading of Rule 60(b)(1).  Pp. 6–10.

(1) The  Government  contends  that  the  term  “mistake”  encom-
passes only so-called “obvious” legal errors.  This contention—also held 
by several Courts of Appeals—is unconvincing.  None of the dictionar-
ies from the time the Rule was adopted and revised suggests this “ob-
viousness” gloss.  Nor does the text or history of Rule 60(b)(1) limit its
reach only to flagrant cases that would have historically been corrected
by courts sitting in equity.  Finally, requiring courts to decide not only
whether there was a mistake but also whether that mistake was suffi-
ciently “obvious” raises questions of administrability.  P. 6. 

(2) Kemp’s  arguments  for  limiting  Rule  60(b)(1)  to  non-judicial, 
non-legal errors are also unconvincing.  He claims that Rule 60(b)(1)’s 
other  grounds  for  relief—“inadvertence,”  “surprise,”  and  “excusable 
neglect”—involve exclusively non-legal, non-judicial errors, and thus 
“mistake” should be similarly limited.  But courts have found that ex-
cusable neglect may involve legal error, see, e.g., Lenaghan v. Pepsico, 
Inc.,  961  F. 2d  1250,  1254–1255,  and  they  have  a  similar  history  of 
granting  relief  based  on  “judicial  inadvertence,”  Larson  v.  Heritage 
Square  Assocs.,  952  F. 2d  1533,  1536.    Kemp  argues  that  Rule  60’s 
structure favors interpreting the term “mistake” narrowly to include 
only  non-legal  errors,  and  the  Court’s  contrary  interpretation  would 
create confusing overlap between Rule 60(b)(1) and relief available un-
der other parts of Rule 60 not subject to Rule 60(c)’s 1-year limitations 
period.  But the overlap Kemp suggests would exist even if “mistake”