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4  TC HEARTLAND LLC v. KRAFT FOODS GROUP BRANDS LLC 

Opinion of the Court 

Stat. 552; see also Stonite, supra, at 563–564. 

This  Court’s  decision  in  In  re  Hohorst,  150  U. S.  653, 
661–662 (1893), arguably suggested that the 1887 Act did 
not apply to patent cases.  As a result, while some courts 
continued to apply the Act to patent cases, others refused
to  do  so  and  instead  permitted  plaintiffs  to  bring  suit  (in
line  with  the  pre-1887  regime)  anywhere  a  defendant 
could be found for service of process.  See Stonite, supra, at 
564–565. 
In  1897,  Congress  resolved  the  confusion  by
enacting a patent specific venue statute.  See Act of Mar. 
3, 1897, ch. 395, 29 Stat. 695.  In so doing, it “placed pat-
ent  infringement  cases  in  a  class  by  themselves,  outside
the scope of general venue legislation.”  Brunette Machine 
Works, Ltd. v. Kockum Industries, Inc., 406 U. S. 706, 713 
(1972).  This  new  statute  (§1400(b)’s  predecessor)  permit-
ted  suit  in  the  district  of  which  the  defendant  was  an 
“inhabitant,”  or  a  district  in  which  the  defendant  both 
maintained  a  “regular  and  established  place  of  business” 
and  committed  an  act  of  infringement.    29  Stat.  695.  At 
the  time,  a  corporation  was  understood  to  “inhabit”  only
the  State  in  which  it  was  incorporated.    Shaw  v.  Quincy 
Mining Co., 145 U. S. 444, 449–450 (1892). 

The Court addressed the scope of §1400(b)’s predecessor 
in  Stonite.  In  that  case,  the  two  defendants  inhabited 
different  districts  within  a  single  State.    The  plaintiff
sought  to  sue  them  both  in  the  same  district,  invoking  a 
then  governing  general  venue  statute  that,  if  applicable, 
permitted  it  to  do  so.  315  U. S.,  at  562–563.  This  Court 
rejected the plaintiff ’s venue choice on the ground that the
patent  venue  statute  constituted  “the  exclusive  provision 
controlling venue in patent infringement proceedings” and
thus  was  not  supplemented  or  modified  by  the  general 
venue  provisions.  Id.,  at  563.    In  the  Court’s  view,  the 
patent  venue  statute  “was  adopted  to  define  the  exact 
jurisdiction  of  the  federal  courts  in  actions  to  enforce 
patent  rights,”  a  purpose  that  would  be  undermined  by