Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/17pdf/16-402_h315.pdf
Page Number: 81

10 

CARPENTER v. UNITED STATES 

ALITO, J., dissenting 

British  officers  to  rummage  through  homes  in  an  unre-
strained search for evidence of criminal activity.”  Riley v. 
California, 573 U. S. ___, ___ (2014) (slip op., at 27). 

General  warrants  and  writs  of  assistance  were  noxious 
not  because  they  allowed  the  Government  to  acquire
evidence  in  criminal  investigations,  but  because  of  the 
means by which they permitted the Government to acquire
that  evidence.  Then,  as  today,  searches  could  be  quite 
invasive.  Searches generally begin with officers “mak[ing]
nonconsensual  entries  into  areas  not  open  to  the  public.” 
Donovan  v.  Lone  Steer,  Inc.,  464  U. S.  408,  414  (1984).
Once there, officers are necessarily in a position to observe 
private  spaces  generally  shielded  from  the  public  and 
discernible  only  with  the  owner’s  consent.    Private  area 
after private area becomes exposed to the officers’ eyes as
they rummage through the owner’s property in their hunt 
for the object or objects of the search.  If they are search-
ing  for  documents,  officers  may  additionally  have  to  rifle
through  many  other  papers—potentially  filled  with  the 
most  intimate  details  of  a  person’s  thoughts  and  life—
before they find the specific information they are seeking. 
See  Andresen  v.  Maryland,  427  U. S.  463,  482,  n. 11 
(1976).  If  anything  sufficiently  incriminating  comes  into
view, officers seize it.  Horton v. California, 496 U. S. 128, 
136–137  (1990).  Physical  destruction  always  lurks  as  an
underlying possibility; “officers executing search warrants
on  occasion  must  damage  property  in  order  to  perform 
their  duty.”  Dalia  v.  United  States,  441  U. S.  238,  258 
(1979);  see,  e.g.,  United  States  v.  Ramirez,  523  U. S.  65, 
71–72  (1998)  (breaking  garage  window);  United  States  v. 
Ross,  456  U. S.  798,  817–818  (1982)  (ripping  open  car 
upholstery); Brown v. Battle Creek Police Dept., 844 F. 3d 
556,  572  (CA6  2016)  (shooting  and  killing  two  pet  dogs); 
Lawmaster  v.  Ward,  125  F. 3d  1341,  1350,  n. 3  (CA10 
1997) (breaking locks).

Compliance with a subpoena duces tecum requires none