Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/20pdf/19-123_g3bi.pdf
Page Number: 45.0

Cite as:  593 U. S. ____ (2021) 

23 

ALITO, J., concurring in judgment
ALITO, J., concurring in judgment 

“shall  make,”  “no  law,”28  and  “religion”29—do  not  require
discussion for present purposes, and we can therefore focus
on  what  remains:  the  term  “prohibiting”  and  the  phrase 
“the free exercise of religion.” 

Those words had essentially the same meaning in 1791 

—————— 

28 The phrase “no law” applies to the freedom of speech and the freedom 
of the press, as well as the right to the free exercise of religion, and there
is no reason to believe that its meaning with respect to all these rights is
not the same.  With respect to the freedom of speech, we have long held 
that “no law” does not mean that every restriction on what a person may
say or write is unconstitutional.  See, e.g., Miller v. California, 413 U. S. 
15,  23  (1973);  see  also  Federal  Election  Comm’n  v.  Wisconsin  Right  to 
Life,  Inc.,  551  U. S.  449,  482  (2007)  (opinion  of  ROBERTS,  C. J.);  Times 
Film Corp. v. Chicago, 365 U. S. 43, 47–49 (1961).  Many restrictions on 
what a person could lawfully say or write were well established at the 
time of the adoption of the First Amendment and have continued to this 
day.  Fraudulent speech, speech integral to criminal conduct, speech so-
liciting bribes, perjury, speech threatening physical injury, and obscenity 
are examples.  See, e.g., Donaldson v. Read Magazine, Inc., 333 U. S. 178, 
190–191 (1948) (fraud); Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U. S. 
490, 498 (1949) (speech integral to criminal conduct); McCutcheon v. Fed-
eral Election Comm’n, 572 U. S. 185, 191–192 (2014) (plurality opinion) 
(quid  pro  quo  bribes);  United  States  v.  Dunnigan,  507  U. S.  87,  96–97 
(1993) (perjury); Virginia v. Black, 538 U. S. 343, 359 (2003) (threats); 
Miller,  413  U. S.,  at  23  (obscenity).    The  First  Amendment  has  never 
been  thought to  have  done away  with  all  these  rules.    Alexander  Mei-
klejohn reconciled this conclusion with the constitutional text: The First
Amendment “does not forbid the abridging of speech.  But, at the same 
time, it does forbid the abridging of the freedom of speech.”  Free Speech
and  Its  Relation  to  Self-Government  19  (1948)  (emphasis  deleted).    In 
other words, the Free Speech Clause protects a right that was understood
at the time of adoption to have certain defined limits.  See Konigsberg v. 
State Bar of Cal., 366 U. S. 36, 49, and n. 10 (1961).  As explained below, 
the same is true of the Free Exercise Clause.  See infra, at 28–36.  No 
one  has  ever  seriously  argued  that  the  Free  Exercise  Clause  protects 
every  conceivable  religious  practice  or  even  every  conceivable  form  of 
worship, including such things as human sacrifice.

29 Whatever the outer boundaries of the term “religion” as used in the 
First Amendment, there can be no doubt that CSS’s contested policy rep-
resents an exercise of “religion.”