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2 

ATLANTIC RICHFIELD CO. v. CHRISTIAN 

Syllabus 

measures found necessary to protect human health and the environ-
ment by EPA.  The trial court granted summary judgment to the land-
owners  on  the  issue  of  whether  the  Act  precluded  their  restoration
damages claim and allowed the lawsuit to continue.  After granting a
writ of supervisory control, the Montana Supreme Court affirmed, re-
jecting Atlantic Richfield’s argument that §113 stripped the Montana 
courts of jurisdiction over the landowners’ claim and concluding that
the landowners were not potentially responsible parties (or PRPs) pro-
hibited  from  taking  remedial  action  without  EPA  approval  under 
§122(e)(6).  

Held: 

1. This  Court  has  jurisdiction  to  review  the  Montana  Supreme
Court’s decision.  To qualify as a final judgment subject to review un-
der 28 U. S. C. §1257(a), a state court judgment must be “an effective 
determination of the litigation and not of merely interlocutory or in-
termediate steps therein.”  Jefferson v. City of Tarrant, 522 U. S. 75, 
81.  Under Montana law, a supervisory writ proceeding is a self-con-
tained  case,  not  an  interlocutory  appeal.  Mont.  Const.,  Art.  VII, 
§§2(1)–(2);  Mont.  Rules  App.  Proc.  6(6),  14(1),  14(3).    Thus,  the  writ 
issued in this case is a “final judgment” within this Court’s jurisdiction. 
Fisher v. District Court of Sixteenth Judicial Dist. of Mont., 424 U. S. 
382, 385, n. 7.  P. 8. 

2. The Act does not strip the Montana courts of jurisdiction over this 
lawsuit.    Section  113(b)  of  the  Act  provides  that  “the  United  States 
district courts shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over all contro-
versies  arising  under  this  chapter,”  so  state  courts  lack  jurisdiction 
over such actions.  The use of  “arising under” in §113(b) echoes Con-
gress’s more familiar use of that phrase in granting federal courts ju-
risdiction over “all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, 
or treaties of the United States.”  28 U. S. C. §1331.  In the mine run 
of cases, “[a] suit arises under the law that creates the cause of action.” 
American Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co., 241 U. S. 257, 260. 
The  landowners’  common  law  nuisance,  trespass,  and  strict  liability
claims arise under Montana law and not under the Act.  

Atlantic  Richfield  mistakenly  argues  that  §113(h)—which  states 
that “[n]o Federal court shall have jurisdiction under Federal law . . . 
to review any challenges to removal or remedial action” selected under 
the Act—implicitly broadens the scope of actions precluded from state 
court  jurisdiction  under  §113(b).    But  §113(h)  speaks  of  “Federal 
court[s],” not state courts.  There is no textual basis for Atlantic Rich-
field’s argument that Congress precluded state courts from hearing a 
category of cases in §113(b) by stripping federal courts of jurisdiction 
over those cases in §113(h).  Often the simplest explanation is the best:
Section 113(b) deprives state courts of jurisdiction over cases “arising