Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/21pdf/20-915_pol1.pdf
Page Number: 11

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UNICOLORS, INC. v. H&M HENNES & MAURITZ, L. P. 

Opinion of the Court 

III 
  H&M  argues  that  our  interpretation  of  the  statute  will 
make it too easy for copyright holders, by claiming lack of 
knowledge, to avoid the consequences of an inaccurate ap-
plication.  But courts need not automatically accept a copy-
right holder’s claim that it was unaware of the relevant le-
gal requirements of copyright law.  We have recognized in 
civil cases that willful blindness may support a finding of 
actual  knowledge.    Intel  Corp.,  589  U. S.,  at  ___–___  (slip 
op., at 11–12).  Circumstantial evidence, including the sig-
nificance of the legal error, the complexity of the relevant 
rule,  the  applicant’s  experience  with  copyright  law,  and 
other  such  matters,  may  also  lead  a  court  to  find  that  an 
applicant was actually aware of, or willfully blind to, legally 
inaccurate information.  See id., at ___ (slip op., at 11). 
  H&M also argues that our interpretation is foreclosed by 
the  legal  maxim  that  “ignorance  of  the  law  is  no  excuse.”  
See Brief for Respondent 41–43.  This maxim “normally ap-
plies where a defendant has the requisite mental state in 
respect  to  the  elements  of [a]  crime  but  claims  to  be  una-
ware of the existence of a statute proscribing his conduct.”  
Rehaif v. United States, 588 U. S. ___, ___ (2019) (slip op., 
at 8) (internal quotation marks omitted).  It does not apply 
in this civil case concerning the scope of a safe harbor that 
arises from ignorance of collateral legal requirements.  See 
ibid. 
  Finally, H&M claims that neither Unicolors’ petition for 
certiorari  nor  the  Ninth  Circuit’s  opinion  addressed  the 
question we decide here.  The petition, however, asked us 
to decide whether a registration may be invalidated under 
§411(b) even though there are no “indicia of fraud . . . as to 
the work at issue in the subject copyright registration.”  Pet. 
for Cert. i.  Fraud typically requires “[a] knowing misrepre-
sentation  . . .  of  a  material  fact.”    Black’s  Law  Dictionary 
802 (11th ed. 2019) (emphasis added).  If, as the Ninth Cir-
cuit concluded, §411(b)(1)(A) does not require “knowledge”