Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/21pdf/21-418_i425.pdf
Page Number: 14.0

Cite as:  597 U. S. ____ (2022) 

9 

(slip op., at 4). 

Opinion of the Court 

B 

After the case returned to the District Court, the parties 
engaged in discovery and eventually brought cross-motions 
for summary judgment.  At the end of that process, the Dis-
trict Court found that the “ ‘sole reason’ ” for the District’s 
decision to suspend Mr. Kennedy was its perceived “risk of 
constitutional liability” under the Establishment Clause for 
his  “religious  conduct”  after  the  October  16,  23,  and  26 
games.  443 F. Supp. 3d, at 1231.

The  court  found  that  reason  persuasive  too.  Rejecting
Mr. Kennedy’s free speech claim, the court concluded that
because Mr. Kennedy “was hired precisely to occupy” an “in-
fluential role for student athletes,” any speech he uttered
was offered in his capacity as a government employee and 
unprotected by the First Amendment.  Id., at 1237.  Alter-
natively, even if Mr. Kennedy’s speech qualified as private
speech,  the  District  Court  reasoned,  the  District  properly
suppressed  it.  Had  it  done  otherwise,  the  District  would 
have  invited  “an  Establishment  Clause  violation.”  Ibid. 
Turning to Mr. Kennedy’s free exercise claim, the District
Court held that, even if the District’s policies restricting his
religious exercise were not neutral toward religion or gen-
erally applicable, the District had a compelling interest in
prohibiting his postgame prayers, because, once more, had 
it  “allow[ed]”  them  it  “would  have  violated  the  Establish-
ment Clause.”  Id., at 1240. 

C 

The Ninth Circuit affirmed.  It agreed with the District 
Court that Mr. Kennedy’s speech qualified as government 
rather than private speech because “his expression on the 
field—a location that he only had access to because of his 
employment—during a time when he was generally tasked