Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/529bv.pdf
Page Number: 974.0

529US3

Unit: $U62

[09-26-01 12:54:02] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 529 U. S. 861 (2000)

899

Stevens, J., dissenting

rather than a conﬂict with congressional policy or with the
text of any regulation—to demonstrate that a common-law
claim has been pre-empted.

IV

Even though the Safety Act does not expressly pre-empt
common-law claims, Honda contends that Standard 208—of
its own force—implicitly pre-empts the claims in this case.

“We have recognized that a federal statute implicitly
overrides state law either when the scope of a statute
indicates that Congress intended federal law to occupy
a ﬁeld exclusively, English v. General Elec. Co., 496 U. S.
72, 78–79 (1990), or when state law is in actual conﬂict
with federal law. We have found implied conﬂict pre-
emption where it is ‘impossible for a private party to
comply with both state and federal requirements,’ id.,
at 79, or where state law ‘stands as an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and
objectives of Congress.’ Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U. S.
52, 67 (1941).” Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U. S.
280, 287 (1995).

In addition, we have concluded that regulations “intended to
pre-empt state law” that are promulgated by an agency act-
ing nonarbitrarily and within its congressionally delegated
authority may also have pre-emptive force. Fidelity Fed.
Sav. & Loan Assn. v. De la Cuesta, 458 U. S. 141, 153–154
In this case, Honda relies on the last of the implied
(1982).
pre-emption principles stated in Freightliner, arguing that
the imposition of common-law liability for failure to install
an airbag would frustrate the purposes and objectives of
Standard 208.

Both the text of the statute and the text of the standard
provide persuasive reasons for rejecting this argument.
The saving clause of the Safety Act arguably denies the Sec-
retary the authority to promulgate standards that would