Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/558bv.pdf
Page Number: 454.0

Cite as: 558 U. S. 290 (2010) 

293 

Opinion of the Court 

Justice  Sotomayor  delivered  the  opinion  of  the  Court. 
The  Antiterrorism  and  Effective  Death  Penalty  Act  of 
1996  contains  two  provisions  governing  federal-court  re­
view  of  state-court  factual  ﬁndings.  Under  28  U. S. C. 
§ 2254(d)(2), a federal court may  not grant a state prisoner’s 
application  for  a  writ  of  habeas  corpus  based  on  a  claim  al­
ready  adjudicated  on  the  merits  in  state  court  unless  that 
adjudication  “resulted  in  a  decision  that  was  based  on  an 
unreasonable  determination  of  the  facts  in  light  of  the  evi­
dence  presented  in  the  State  court  proceeding.”  Under 
§ 2254(e)(1),  “a  determination  of  a  factual  issue  made  by  a 
State  court  shall  be  presumed  to  be  correct,”  and  the  peti­
tioner  “shall  have  the  burden  of  rebutting  the  presumption 
of  correctness  by  clear  and  convincing  evidence.”  In  this 
case,  petitioner,  a  capital  defendant,  challenges  the  key  fac­
tual ﬁnding made by the Alabama state court that denied his 
application  for  postconviction  relief:  that  his  attorneys’  fail­
ure to pursue and present mitigating evidence of his border­
line mental retardation was a strategic decision rather than a 
negligent omission.  Petitioner argues that the state court’s 
ﬁnding  was  unreasonable  under  § 2254(d)(2)  and  that,  in  de­
nying  his  federal  habeas  petition,  the  Court  of  Appeals  for 
the  Eleventh  Circuit  erroneously  conﬂated  this  standard 
with that of § 2254(e)(1), which petitioner contends is not ap­
plicable  in  cases,  such  as  this  one,  not  involving  a  separate 
federal habeas evidentiary hearing. 

We granted certiorari to address the relationship between 
§§ 2254(d)(2)  and  (e)(1).  We  conclude,  however,  that  the 
state  court’s  factual  determination  was  reasonable  even 
under  petitioner’s  reading  of  § 2254(d)(2),  and  therefore  we 
need not address that provision’s relationship to § 2254(e)(1). 
Accordingly, we afﬁrm the judgment of the Court of Appeals 
on that basis. 

Tennessee,  Greg  Abbott  of  Texas,  Mark  L.  Shurtleff  of  Utah,  William  C. 
Mims of Virginia, and Bruce A. Salzburg of Wyoming; and for the Crimi­
nal Justice Legal Foundation by Kent S. Scheidegger.