Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/14pdf/13-7451_m64o.pdf
Page Number: 46

Cite as:  574 U. S. ___ (2015) 

19 

KAGAN, J., dissenting 

is assuredly true of acts obstructing justice.  Compare this
case with the following, all of which properly come within, 
but now fall outside, §1519: McRae, 702 F. 3d, at 834–838 
(burning  human  body  to  thwart  murder  investigation); 
Maury,  695  F. 3d,  at  243–244  (altering  cement  mixer  to 
impede  inquiry  into  amputation  of  employee’s  fingers); 
United  States  v.  Natal,  2014  U.  S.  Dist.  LEXIS  108852, 
*24–*26  (D  Conn.,  Aug.  7,  2014)  (repainting  van  to  cover 
up  evidence  of  fatal  arson).  Most  district  judges,  as  Con-
gress knows, will recognize differences between such cases
and  prosecutions  like  this  one,  and  will  try  to  make  the
punishment fit the crime.  Still and all, I tend to think, for 
the reasons the plurality gives, that §1519 is a bad law—
too  broad  and  undifferentiated,  with  too-high  maximum 
penalties,  which  give  prosecutors  too  much  leverage  and 
sentencers  too  much  discretion.    And  I’d  go  further:  In
those  ways,  §1519  is  unfortunately  not  an  outlier,  but  an
emblem of a deeper pathology in the federal criminal code. 
But  whatever  the  wisdom  or  folly  of  §1519,  this  Court 
does  not  get  to  rewrite  the  law.    “Resolution  of  the  pros 
and  cons  of  whether  a  statute  should  sweep  broadly  or 
narrowly is for Congress.”   Rodgers, 466 U. S., at 484.  If 
judges  disagree  with  Congress’s  choice,  we  are  perfectly 
entitled to say so—in lectures, in law review articles, and 
even in dicta.  But we are not entitled to replace the stat-
ute  Congress  enacted  with  an  alternative  of  our  own 
design.

I respectfully dissent.