Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/17pdf/17-965_h315.pdf
Page Number: 28.0

Cite as:  585 U. S. ____ (2018) 

23 

Opinion of the Court 

past,  current,  or  expected  beliefs,  statements,  or  associa-
tions”  (emphasis  added)).  “The  fact  that  [Congress]  did
not  adopt  [a]  readily  available  and  apparent  alternative 
strongly supports” the conclusion that §1152(a)(1)(A) does 
not  limit  the  President’s  delegated  authority  under 
§1182(f ).    Knight  v.  Commissioner,  552  U. S.  181,  188 
(2008).

Common sense and historical practice confirm as much. 
Section  1152(a)(1)(A)  has  never  been  treated  as  a  con-
straint  on  the  criteria  for  admissibility  in  §1182.    Presi-
dents have repeatedly exercised their authority to suspend
entry  on  the  basis  of  nationality.    As  noted,  President 
Reagan  relied  on  §1182(f )  to  suspend  entry  “as  immi-
grants  by  all  Cuban  nationals,”  subject  to  exceptions.
Proclamation  No.  5517,  51  Fed.  Reg.  30470  (1986).    Like-
wise,  President  Carter  invoked  §1185(a)(1)  to  deny  and 
revoke visas to all Iranian nationals.  See Exec. Order No. 
12172, 3 CFR 461 (1979), as amended by Exec. Order No.
12206, 3 CFR 249 (1980); Public Papers of the Presidents,
Jimmy  Carter,  Sanctions  Against  Iran,  Vol.  1,  Apr.  7,
1980, pp. 611–612 (1980); see also n. 1, supra. 

On  plaintiffs’  reading,  those  orders  were  beyond  the
President’s  authority.  The  entry  restrictions  in  the  Proc-
lamation  on  North  Korea  (which  plaintiffs  do  not  chal-
lenge in this litigation) would also be unlawful.  Nor would 
the President be permitted to suspend entry from particu-
lar foreign states in response to an epidemic confined to a
single  region,  or  a  verified  terrorist  threat  involving  na-
tionals  of  a  specific  foreign  nation,  or  even  if  the  United 
States were on the brink of war. 

In  a  reprise  of  their  §1182(f )  argument,  plaintiffs  at-
tempt to soften their position by falling back on an implicit 
exception for Presidential actions that are “closely drawn” 
to  address  “specific  fast-breaking  exigencies.”    Brief  for 
Respondents 60–61.  Yet the absence of any textual basis
for such an exception  more likely indicates that Congress