Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/14pdf/13-1034_3dq4.pdf
Page Number: 22.0

Cite as:  575 U. S. ____ (2015) 

5 

THOMAS, J., dissenting 

True,  approximately  three  percent  of  the  substances
appearing  on  Kansas’  lists  of  “controlled  substances”  at
the  time  of  Mellouli’s  conviction  did  not  fall  within  the 
federal  definition,  ante,  at  3,  meaning  that  an  individual 
convicted  of  possessing  paraphernalia  may  never  have 
used  his  paraphernalia  with  a  federally  controlled  sub-
stance.  But  that  fact  does  not  destroy  the  relationship
between  the  law  and  federally  controlled  substances. 
Mellouli was convicted for violating a state law “relating to 
a  controlled  substance  (as  defined  in  section  802  of  title
21),”  so  he  was  properly  removed  under  8  U. S. C. 
§1227(a)(2)(B)(i). 

II
 
A 

The majority rejects this straightforward interpretation
because  it  “reach[es]  state-court  convictions  . . .  in  which 
‘[no] controlled substance (as defined in [§802])’ figures as
an element of the offense.”  Ante, at 13.  This assumes the 
answer  to  the  question  at  the  heart  of  this  case:  whether
the  removal  statute  does  in  fact  reach  such  convictions. 
To  answer  that  question  by  assuming  the  answer  is
circular. 

The majority hints that some more limited definition of 
“relating  to”  is  suggested  by  context.    See  ibid.    I  whole-
heartedly  agree  that  we  must  look  to  context  to  under-
stand indeterminate terms like “relating to,” which is why
I  look  to  surrounding  provisions  of  the  removal  statute. 
These  “reveal  that  when  Congress  wanted  to  define  with
greater  specificity  the  conduct  that  subjects  an  alien  to
removal, it did so by omitting the expansive phrase ‘relat-
ing  to.’ ”    Supra,  at  3.    For  its  part,  the  majority  looks  to
the  context  of  other  provisions  referring  to  “controlled 
substances”  without  a  definitional  parenthetical,  ante,  at 
13, n. 11, and rejoins that the most natural reading of the
statute  “shrinks  to  the  vanishing  point  the  words  ‘as