Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/09pdf/08-1529.pdf
Page Number: 2.0

2 

HUI v. CASTANEDA 

Syllabus 

plainly  precludes  a  Bivens  action  against  petitioners  by  limiting  re-
covery for harms arising from the conduct at issue to an FTCA action
against the United States.  The breadth of §233(a)’s words “exclusive”
and “any” supports this reading, as does the provision’s inclusive ref-
erence  to  all  civil  proceedings  arising  out  of  “the  same  subject-
matter.”  Because  the  phrase  “exclusive  of  any  other  civil  action”  is 
easily  broad  enough  to  accommodate  both  known  and  unknown 
causes  of  action,  the  Court’s  reading  is  not  undermined  by  the  fact 
that §233(a) preceded Bivens.  The later enacted Westfall Act further 
supports  this  understanding  of  §233(a).    In  amending  the  FTCA  to
make its remedy against the United States exclusive for most claims
against Government employees for their official conduct, the Westfall 
Act  essentially  duplicated  §233(a)’s  exclusivity  language,  28  U. S. C.
§ 2679(b)(1), but provided an explicit exception for constitutional vio-
lations,  §2679(b)(2).    This  shows  that  Congress  did  not  understand 
the  exclusivity  provided  by  §2679(b)(1)—or  the  substantially  similar
§233(a)—to imply such an exception.  Pp. 5–7.

(b) Respondents’  arguments  to  the  contrary  do  not  undermine  the 

Court’s conclusion.  Pp. 7–12.   

(1) Respondents’  heavy  reliance  on  Carlson  v.  Green,  446  U. S. 
14,  is  misplaced.    Carlson  is  inapposite  to  the  issue  in  this  case—
whether petitioners are immune from suit for the alleged violations—
because  the  Carlson  petitioners  invoked  no  official  immunity.    In-
stead,  the  case  considered  the  separate  question  whether  a  remedy
was available under the Eighth Amendment for alleged violations of
the  Cruel  and  Unusual  Punishments  Clause  notwithstanding  that  a
federal remedy was also available under the FTCA.  Pp. 7–8. 

(2) Contrary to respondents’ contention, §233(a) does not incorpo-
rate  a  Bivens  exception  through  its  cross-reference  to  §1346(b)  and 
that  section’s  cross-reference  to  the  FTCA,  which  includes  the 
Westfall  Act  exception  for  constitutional  claims,  §2679(b)(2)(A).    Be-
cause  §233(a)  refers  only  to  “[t]he  remedy  . . .  provided  by  sections
1346(b) and 2672” (emphasis added), only those portions of the FTCA 
that  establish  its  remedy  are  incorporated  by  §233(a)’s  reference  to 
§1346.  Section 2679(b) is not such a provision.  Pp. 8–10.

(3) Respondents’  claim  that  the  Westfall  Act’s  Bivens  exception,
§2679(b)(2)(A),  directly  preserves  a  Bivens  action  against  PHS  offi-
cers  and  employees  is  belied  by  the  fact  that  the  provision  by  its
terms applies only to the specific immunity set forth in “[p]aragraph
(1).”  Moreover, if §233(a) forecloses a Bivens action against PHS per-
sonnel, respondents’ reading of §2679(b)(2)(A) would effect an implied
repeal  of  the  more  specific  §233(a).    Repeals  by  implication  are  not
favored and will not be presumed absent a clear and manifest legisla-
tive intent to repeal.  Hawaii v. Office of Hawaiian Affairs, 556 U. S.