Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/22pdf/21-1450_5468.pdf
Page Number: 22

Cite as:  598 U. S. ____ (2023) 

3 

GORSUCH, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part
Opinion of GORSUCH, J. 

sovereign  is  not  entitled  to  immunity  when  “the  action  is 
based upon” certain “commercial activity” in or affecting the 
United States.  In this case, the indictment sufficiently al-
leges that Halkbank has engaged in just those kinds of com-
mercial activities.  See No. 15 Cr. 867 (SDNY, Oct. 1, 2020),
App. to Pet. for Cert. 36a–38a.  Of course, this case comes 
to us on a motion to dismiss the indictment, and the ques-
tion of immunity may be revisited as the case proceeds.  But 
for now, nothing in the law precludes this suit, just as the 
Second Circuit held. 

That the FSIA tells us all we need to know to resolve the 
sovereign  immunity  question  in  this  case  can  come  as  no 
surprise.  This  Court  has  long  acknowledged  that  “the
[FSIA] must be applied by the district courts in every action
against  a  foreign  sovereign.”  Verlinden  B. V.  v.  Central 
Bank of Nigeria, 461 U. S. 480, 493 (1983).  As we have put
it, “any sort of immunity defense made by a foreign sover-
eign in an American court must stand on the Act’s text.  Or 
it must fall.”  Republic of Argentina v. NML Capital, Ltd., 
573 U. S. 134, 141–142 (2014).  It’s a rule that follows di-
rectly  from  the  statutory  text  because  “Congress  estab-
lished [in the FSIA] a comprehensive framework for resolv-
ing any claim of sovereign immunity.”  Republic of Austria 
v. Altmann, 541 U. S. 677, 699 (2004). 

II 
Despite  all  this,  the  Court  declines  to  apply  the  FSIA’s
directions governing foreign sovereign immunity.  It holds 
that  the  statute’s  general  immunity  rule  in  §1604  speaks
only to civil disputes.  Any question about a foreign sover-
eign’s  immunity  from  criminal  prosecution,  the  Court  in-
sists, must therefore be resolved under common-law princi-
ples.  Ante, at 7, 15.  In aid of its conclusion, the Court offers 
three principal arguments.  But to my mind, none packs the 
punch necessary to displace the plain statutory text.