Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/12pdf/11-345_l5gm.pdf
Page Number: 12.0

Cite as:  570 U. S. ____ (2013) 

9 

Opinion of the Court 

“the  attainment  of  a  diverse  student  body  . . .  is  a  consti-
tutionally  permissible  goal  for  an  institution  of  higher 
education.”  438  U. S.,  at  311–312  (separate  opinion). 
Thus,  under  Grutter,  strict  scrutiny  must  be  applied
to  any  admissions  program  using  racial  categories  or
classifications. 
  According  to  Grutter,  a  university’s  “educational  judg-
ment  that  such  diversity  is  essential  to  its  educational 
mission  is  one  to  which  we  defer.”    539  U. S.,  at  328. 
Grutter  concluded  that  the  decision  to  pursue  “the  educa-
tional benefits that flow from student body diversity,” id., 
at  330,  that  the  University  deems  integral  to  its  mission
is, in substantial measure, an academic judgment to which
some, but not complete, judicial deference is proper under 
Grutter.  A  court, of course, should ensure that there is a 
reasoned,  principled  explanation  for  the  academic  deci-
sion.  On  this  point,  the  District  Court  and  Court  of
Appeals  were  correct  in  finding  that  Grutter  calls  for  de-
ference  to  the  University’s  conclusion,  “ ‘based  on  its 
experience and expertise,’ ” 631 F. 3d, at 230 (quoting 645
F. Supp. 2d 587, 603 (WD Tex. 2009)), that a diverse stu-
dent  body  would  serve  its  educational  goals.    There  is 
disagreement  about  whether  Grutter  was  consistent  with 
the principles of equal protection in approving this compel-
ling  interest  in  diversity.  See  post,  at  1  (SCALIA,  J.,  con-
curring); post, at 4–5 (THOMAS, J., concurring); post, at 1–2 
(GINSBURG,  J.,  dissenting).    But  the  parties  here  do  not 
ask the Court to revisit that aspect of Grutter’s holding.

A  university  is  not  permitted  to  define  diversity  as
“some  specified  percentage  of  a  particular  group  merely
because  of  its  race  or  ethnic  origin.”    Bakke,  supra,  at 
307  (opinion  of  Powell,  J.).    “That  would  amount  to  out-
right racial balancing, which is patently unconstitutional.” 
Grutter,  supra,  at  330. 
“Racial  balancing  is  not  trans-
formed  from  ‘patently  unconstitutional’  to  a  compelling
state  interest  simply  by  relabeling  it  ‘racial  diversity.’ ”