Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/21pdf/21-401_2cp3.pdf
Page Number: 15

Cite as:  596 U. S. ____ (2022) 

11 

Opinion of the Court 

Extending §1782 to include private bodies would also be 
in significant tension with the FAA, which governs domes-
tic arbitration, because §1782 permits much broader discov-
ery than the FAA allows.  Among other differences, the FAA 
permits only the arbitration panel to request discovery, see 
9 U. S. C. §7, while district courts can entertain §1782 re-
quests from foreign or international tribunals or any “inter-
ested person,” 28 U. S. C. §1782(a).  In addition, prearbitra-
tion  discovery  is  off  the  table  under  the  FAA  but  broadly 
available under §1782.  See Intel, 542 U. S., at 259 (holding 
that  discovery  is  available  for  use  in  proceedings  “within 
reasonable  contemplation”).    Interpreting  §1782  to  reach
private  arbitration  would  therefore  create  a  notable  mis-
match  between  foreign  and  domestic  arbitration.    And  as 
the  Seventh  Circuit  observed,  “[i]t’s  hard  to  conjure  a  ra-
tionale  for  giving  parties  to  private  foreign  arbitrations
such  broad  access  to  federal-court  discovery  assistance  in 
the  United  States  while  precluding  such  discovery  assis-
tance  for  litigants  in  domestic  arbitrations.”    Rolls-Royce, 
975 F. 3d, at 695. 

* 

* 

* 
In sum, we hold that §1782 requires a “foreign or inter-
national tribunal” to be governmental or intergovernmen-
tal.  Thus, a “foreign tribunal” is one that exercises govern-
mental  authority  conferred  by  a  single  nation,  and  an
“international tribunal” is one that exercises governmental
authority conferred by two or more nations.  Private adju-
dicatory bodies do not fall within §1782. 

III 
That leaves the question whether the adjudicative bodies
in the cases before us are governmental or intergovernmen-
tal.  They are not. 

A 
Analyzing  the  status  of  the  arbitral  panel  involved  in