Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/558bv.pdf
Page Number: 583.0

422  CITIZENS  UNITED  v.  FEDERAL  ELECTION  COMM’N 

Opinion of Stevens, J. 

ety,  Morse  v.  Frederick,  551  U. S.  393,  396–397,  404  (2007) 
(quoting Bethel School Dist. No. 403 v.  Fraser, 478 U. S. 675, 
682 (1986)). 

The  free  speech  guarantee  thus  does  not  render  every 
other  public  interest  an  illegitimate  basis  for  qualifying  a 
speaker’s  autonomy;  society  could  scarcely  function  if  it 
did.  It  is  fair  to  say  that  our  First  Amendment  doctrine 
has  “frowned  on”  certain  identity-based  distinctions,  Los 
Angeles Police Dept. v.  United Reporting Publishing Corp., 
528 U. S. 32, 47, n. 4 (1999) (Stevens, J., dissenting), particu­
larly those that may reﬂect invidious discrimination or pref­
erential  treatment  of  a  politically  powerful  group.  But  it 
is  simply  incorrect  to  suggest  that  we  have  prohibited  all 
legislative  distinctions  based  on  identity  or  content.  Not 
even close. 

The  election  context  is  distinctive  in  many  ways,  and  the 
Court,  of  course,  is  right  that  the  First  Amendment  closely 
guards political speech.  But in this context, too, the author­
ity  of  legislatures  to  enact  viewpoint-neutral  regulations 
based  on  content  and  identity  is  well  settled.  We  have,  for 
example,  allowed  state-run  broadcasters  to  exclude  inde­
pendent  candidates  from  televised  debates.  Arkansas  Ed. 
Television  Comm’n  v.  Forbes,  523  U. S.  666  (1998).48  We 
have upheld statutes that prohibit the distribution or display 
of campaign materials near a polling place.  Burson v.  Free­
man, 504 U. S. 191 (1992).49  Although we have not reviewed 

48 I dissented in Forbes because the broadcaster’s decision to exclude the 
respondent  from  its  debate  was  done  “on  the  basis  of  entirely  subjective, 
ad hoc judgments,” 523 U. S., at 690, that suggested anticompetitive view­
point discrimination, id., at 693–694, and lacked a compelling justiﬁcation. 
Needless to say, my concerns do not apply to the instant case. 

49 The  law  at  issue  in  Burson  was  far  from  unusual.  “[A]ll  50  States,” 
the Court observed, “limit access to the areas in or around polling places.” 
504  U. S.,  at  206  (plurality  opinion);  see  also  Note,  91  Ky.  L.  J.  715,  729, 
n. 89, 747–769 (2003) (collecting statutes).  I dissented in Burson because 
the evidence adduced to justify Tennessee’s law was “exceptionally thin,” 
504 U. S., at 219, and “the reason for [the] restriction [had] disappear[ed]”