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Page Number: 22.0

18 

GOOGLE LLC v. ORACLE AMERICA, INC. 

Opinion of the Court 

those  applicable  to  other  sorts  of  works,  ibid.  (accepting
that copying as part of “reverse engineer[ing] a system to
ensure compatibility” could be a valid purpose).  And we are 
told that our fair use analysis must prioritize certain factors
over  others,  post,  at  9,  n.  5,  even  though  our  case  law  in-
structs that fair use depends on the context, see Campbell, 
510 U. S., at 577–578. 

We  do  not  understand  Congress,  however,  to  have
shielded computer programs from the ordinary application 
of  copyright’s  limiting  doctrines  in  this  way.  By  defining
computer  programs  in  §101,  Congress  chose  to  place  this
subject matter within the copyright regime.  Like other pro-
tected works, that means that the owners of computer pro-
grams enjoy the exclusive rights set forth in the Act, includ-
ing  the  right  to  “reproduce  [a]  copyrighted  work”  or  to 
“prepare derivative works.”  17 U. S. C. §106.  But that also 
means that exclusive rights in computer programs are lim-
ited  like  any  other  works.  Just  as  fair  use  distinguishes
among books and films, which are indisputably subjects of
copyright, so too must it draw lines among computer pro-
grams.  And just as fair use takes account of the market in
which  scripts  and  paintings  are  bought  and  sold,  so  too
must it consider the realities of how technological works are
created  and  disseminated.    We  do not  believe that  an  ap-
proach close to “all or nothing” would be faithful to the Cop-
yright Act’s overall design. 

V 
At the outset, Google argues that “fair use” is a question
for a jury to decide; here the jury  decided the question in
Google’s favor; and we should limit our review to determin-
ing whether “substantial evidence” justified the jury’s deci-
sion.  The  Federal  Circuit  disagreed.    It  thought  that  the
“fair  use”  question  was  a  mixed  question  of  fact  and  law;
that  reviewing  courts  should  appropriately  defer  to  the 
jury’s  findings  of  underlying  facts;  but  that  the  ultimate