Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/20pdf/20a87_4g15.pdf
Page Number: 32

4 

ROMAN CATHOLIC DIOCESE OF BROOKLYN v. CUOMO 

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting 

stitutions for preferential treatment in comparison to secu-
lar gatherings, not because it discriminates against them. 
Surely  the  Diocese  cannot  demand  laxer  restrictions  by
pointing  out  that  it  is  already  being  treated  better  than
comparable secular institutions.2 

Finally, the Diocese points to certain statements by Gov-
ernor Cuomo as evidence that New York’s regulation is im-
permissibly  targeted  at  religious  activity—specifically,  at 
combatting  heightened  rates  of  positive  COVID–19  cases
among New York’s Orthodox Jewish community.  Applica-
tion 24.  The Diocese suggests that these comments supply
“an independent basis for the application of strict scrutiny.”
Reply Brief in No. 20A87, p. 9.  I do not see how.  The Gov-
ernor’s comments simply do not warrant an application of 
strict  scrutiny  under  this  Court’s  precedents.  Just  a  few 
Terms ago, this Court declined to apply heightened scrutiny
to  a  Presidential  Proclamation  limiting  immigration  from
Muslim-majority countries, even though President Trump 
had described the Proclamation as a “Muslim Ban,” origi-
nally  conceived  of  as  a  “ ‘total  and  complete  shutdown  of 
Muslims entering the United States until our country’s rep-
resentatives  can  figure  out  what  is  going  on.’ ”  Trump  v. 
Hawaii,  585  U. S.  ___,  ___  (2018)  (slip  op.,  at  27).    If  the 
—————— 

2 JUSTICE KAVANAUGH cites Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hia-
leah, 508 U. S. 520, 537–538 (1993), and Employment Div., Dept. of Hu-
man Resources of Ore. v. Smith, 494 U. S. 872, 884 (1990), for the propo-
sition  that  states  must  justify  treating  even  noncomparable  secular 
institutions more favorably than houses of worship.  Ante, at 2 (concur-
ring opinion).  But those cases created no such rule.  Lukumi struck down 
a law that allowed animals to be killed for almost any purpose other than
animal sacrifice, on the ground that the law was a “ ‘religious gerryman-
der’ ”  targeted  at  the  Santeria  faith.    508  U. S.,  at  535.  Smith is  even 
farther afield, standing for the entirely inapposite proposition that “the 
right of free exercise does not relieve an individual of the obligation to
comply  with  a  valid  and  neutral  law  of  general  applicability  on  the 
ground that the law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his religion 
prescribes (or proscribes).”  494 U. S., at 879 (internal quotation marks 
omitted).