Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/558bv.pdf
Page Number: 293

132 

McDANIEL  v.  BROWN 

Per Curiam 

Even if the Court of Appeals could have considered it, the 
Mueller  Report  provided  no  warrant  for  entirely  excluding 
the  DNA  evidence  or  Romero’s  testimony  from  that  court’s 
consideration.  The  Report  did  not  contest  that  the  DNA 
evidence  matched  Troy.  That  DNA  evidence  remains  pow­
erful  inculpatory  evidence  even  though  the  State  concedes 
Romero  overstated  its  probative  value  by  failing  to  dispel 
the  prosecutor’s  fallacy.  And  Mueller’s  claim  that  Romero 
used faulty assumptions and underestimated the probability 
of a DNA match between brothers indicates that two experts 
do  not  agree  with  one  another,  not  that  Romero’s  estimates 
were unreliable.5 

Mueller’s opinion that “the chance that among four broth­
ers  one  or  more  would  match  is  1  in  66,”  App.  1583,  is  sub­
stantially  different  from  Romero’s  estimate  of  a  1  in  6,500 
chance that one brother would match.  But even if Romero’s 
estimate  is  wrong,  our  conﬁdence  in  the  jury  verdict  is  not 
undermined.  First,  the  estimate  that  is  more  pertinent  to 
this  case  is  1  in  132—the  probability  of  a  match  among  two 
brothers—because two of Troy’s four brothers lived in Utah. 
Second, although Jane Doe mentioned Trent as her assailant, 
and  Travis  lived  in  a  nearby  trailer,  the  evidence  indicates 
that both (unlike Troy) were sober and went to bed early on 
the  night  of  the  crime.  Even  under  Mueller’s  odds,  a  ra­
tional jury could consider the DNA evidence to be powerful 
evidence of guilt. 

Furthermore, the Court of Appeals’ discussion of the non-
DNA  evidence  departed  from  the  deferential  review  that 
Jackson  and  § 2254(d)(1)  demand.  A  federal  habeas  court 

be  convinced  of  guilt  unless  it  found  each  element  satisﬁed  beyond  a  rea­
sonable doubt. 

5 The  State has  called our  attention to  cases  in which  courts have  criti­
cized  opinions  rendered  by  Professor  Mueller  in  the  past.  See  Brief  for 
Petitioners  53–54.  We  need  not  pass  on  the  relative  credibility  of  the 
two  experts  because  even  assuming  that  Mueller’s  estimate  is  correct, 
respondent’s claim fails.