Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/20pdf/19-783_k53l.pdf
Page Number: 25

Cite as:  593 U. S. ____ (2021) 

1 

THOMAS, J., dissenting 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

_________________ 

No. 19–783 
_________________ 

NATHAN VAN BUREN, PETITIONER v. 
UNITED STATES 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT 

[June 3, 2021]

 JUSTICE  THOMAS,  with  whom  THE  CHIEF  JUSTICE  and 

JUSTICE ALITO join, dissenting. 

Both the common law and statutory law have long pun-
ished  those  who  exceed  the  scope  of  consent  when  using 
property that belongs to others.  A valet, for example, may
take possession of a person’s car to park it, but he cannot 
take it for a joyride.  The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act 
extends that principle to computers and information.  The 
Act prohibits exceeding the scope of consent when using a 
computer  that  belongs  to  another  person.    Specifically,  it
punishes  anyone  who  “intentionally  accesses  a  computer
without  authorization  or  exceeds  authorized  access,  and 
thereby  obtains”  information  from  that  computer.  18 
U. S. C. §1030(a)(2).

As a police officer, Nathan Van Buren had permission to 
retrieve license-plate information from a government data-
base,  but  only  for  law  enforcement  purposes.  Van  Buren 
disregarded  this  limitation  when,  in  exchange  for  several
thousand dollars, he used the database in an attempt to un-
mask a potential undercover officer.

The question here is straightforward: Would an ordinary 
reader  of  the  English  language  understand  Van  Buren  to 
have “exceed[ed] authorized access” to the database when
he used it under circumstances that were expressly forbid-