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Page Number: 11.0

8 

COUNTERMAN v. COLORADO 

Opinion of the Court 

standard for criminal libel).  That rule is based on fear of 
“self-censorship”—the worry that without such a subjective
mental-state requirement, the uncertainties and expense of
litigation  will  deter  speakers  from  making  even  truthful 
statements.  Sullivan, 376 U. S., at 279.  The First Amend-
ment,  we  have  concluded,  “requires  that  we  protect  some
falsehood in order to protect speech that matters.”  Gertz, 
418 U. S., at 341. 

The same idea arises in the law respecting obscenity and 
incitement  to  unlawful  conduct.  Like  threats,  incitement 
inheres in particular words used in particular contexts: Its
harm can arise even when a clueless speaker fails to grasp 
his  expression’s  nature  and  consequence.  But  still,  the 
First  Amendment  precludes  punishment,  whether  civil  or
criminal, unless the speaker’s words were “intended” (not 
just likely) to produce imminent disorder.  Hess v. Indiana, 
414  U. S.  105,  109  (1973)  (per  curiam);  see  Brandenburg, 
395 U. S., at 447; NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 
U. S. 886, 927–929 (1982).  That rule helps prevent a law 
from  deterring  “mere  advocacy”  of  illegal  acts—a  kind  of
speech  falling  within  the  First  Amendment’s  core.    Bran-
denburg, 395 U. S., at 449.  And for a similar reason, the 
First Amendment demands proof of a defendant’s mindset 
to  make  out  an  obscenity  case.  Obscenity  is  obscenity, 
whatever the purveyor’s mental state.  But we have repeat-
edly  recognized  that  punishment  depends  on  a  “vital  ele-
ment  of  scienter”—often  described  as  the  defendant’s 
awareness of “the character and nature” of the materials he 
distributed.  Hamling v. United States, 418 U. S. 87, 122– 
123 (1974); see Elonis, 575 U. S., at 739 (reiterating Ham-
ling).  The rationale should by now be familiar.  Yes, “ob-
scene speech and writings are not protected.”  Smith v. Cal-
ifornia,  361  U. S.  147,  152  (1959).    But  punishing  their 
distribution without regard to scienter would “have the col-
lateral effect of inhibiting” protected expression.  Id., at 151.