Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/558bv.pdf
Page Number: 469.0

308 

WOOD  v.  ALLEN 

Stevens, J., dissenting 

tactical decision with respect to sentencing strategy.”  Wig­
gins,  539  U. S.,  at  527.  Although  we  afford  deference  to 
counsel’s  strategic  decisions,  Strickland,  466  U. S.,  at  690– 
691, for this deference to apply there must be some evidence 
that the decision was just that: strategic. 

The  lawyers’  duty  to  conduct  a  thorough  investigation  of 
possible mitigating evidence is well established by our cases, 
Porter v.  McCollum, ante, at  39–40  (per curiam); Rompilla 
v.  Beard, 545 U. S. 374, 387 (2005); Wiggins, 539 U. S., at 522– 
523;  Williams  v.  Taylor,  529  U. S.  362,  396  (2000);  Strick­
land,  466  U. S.,  at  688.  These  cases  also  make  clear  that 
counsel’s unconsidered decision to fail to discharge that duty 
cannot  be  strategic.  The  only  conceivable  strategy  that 
might  support  forgoing  counsel’s  ethical  obligations  under 
these circumstances would be a reasoned conclusion that fur­
ther investigation is futile and thus a waste of valuable time. 
Cf. id., at 691 (recognizing that counsel’s decision to abandon 
an  investigation  is  entitled  to  deference  “when  a  defendant 
has given counsel reason to believe that pursuing certain in­
vestigations would be fruitless or even harmful”).  There is 
no  evidence  in  the  record  to  suggest  that  Wood’s  counsel 
reached  such  a  conclusion.4  See  542  F.  3d,  at  1321–1322 
(Barkett,  J.,  concurring  in  part  and  dissenting  in  part).  On 
the  contrary,  the  Court  recognizes  that  Wood  has  pointed 
to  substantial  evidence  that  Trotter,  the  attorney  who  had 

4 The  Court  conﬂates  the  strategic  decision  to  present  mitigating  evi­
dence  to  the  jury  with  the  strategic  decision  to  investigate  avenues  of 
mitigating  evidence  fully,  see  ante,  at  303,  n.  3.  My  concern  is  that 
there  is  no  evidence  to  support  a  conclusion  that  there  was  a  strategic 
decision  on  the  latter,  which  is  a  necessary  prerequisite  for  counsel  to 
make reasoned choices with respect to what evidence should go before the 
jury  during  the  penalty  phase  of  a  capital  trial.  See,  e. g.,  Wiggins,  539 
U. S., at 522 (explaining that “counsel’s failure to uncover and present volu­
minous mitigating evidence at sentencing could not be justiﬁed as a tacti­
cal  decision to  focus on  [defendant’s] voluntary  confessions, because  coun­
sel  had not  ‘fulﬁll[ed]  their obligation  to  conduct  a thorough  investigation 
of the defendant’s background’ ” (quoting Williams, 529 U. S., at 396)).