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8 

BROWN v. DAVENPORT 

Opinion of the Court 

“Great Writ.”  Id., at 131.  When English monarchs jailed
their  subjects  summarily  and  indefinitely,  common-law 
courts employed the writ as a way to compel the crown to
explain its actions—and, if necessary, ensure adequate pro-
cess, such as a trial, before allowing any further detention.
See  Petition  of  Right,  3  Car.  1,  ch.1,  ¶¶  5,  8  (1628).    The 
Great Writ was, in this way, no less than “the instrument 
by  which  due  process  could  be  insisted  upon.”    Hamdi  v. 
Rumsfeld, 542 U. S. 507, 555 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
At the same time, even this writ had its limits.  Usually,
a prisoner could not use it to challenge a final judgment of 
conviction issued by a court of competent jurisdiction.  See, 
e.g., Opinion on the Writ of Habeas Corpus, Wilm. 77, 88, 97 
Eng. Rep. 29, 36 (K. B. 1758).  If the point of the writ was
to ensure due process attended an individual’s confinement, 
a trial was generally considered proof he had received just 
that.  See,  e.g.,  Bushell’s  Case,  Vaugh.  135,  142–143,  124 
Eng. Rep. 1006, 1009–1010 (C. P. 1670). 

This  traditional  understanding  extended  from  England 
to this country and persisted through much of our history.
Asked to apply the Nation’s first habeas statute to a duly 
convicted  prisoner,  Chief  Justice  Marshall  invoked  the 
common-law rule that a judgment of conviction after trial
was “conclusive on all the world.”  Ex parte Watkins, 3 Pet. 
193, 202–203 (1830).  Acknowledging that Congress had au-
thorized  the  Court  to  “inquire  into  the  sufficiency  of ”  the 
cause of the petitioner’s detention, Marshall asked rhetori-
cally, “is not that judgment in itself sufficient cause?”  Id., 
at 202 (emphasis added); see also Ex parte Parks, 93 U. S. 
18,  21–22  (1876);  P.  Bator,  Finality  in  Criminal  Law  and 
Federal  Habeas  Corpus  for  State  Prisoners,  76  Harv.
L. Rev. 441, 465–469 (1963) (Bator).

If the answer was nearly always yes, an important excep-
tion existed in both English and American law:  A habeas 
court could grant relief if the court of conviction lacked ju-
risdiction over the defendant or his offense.  See Watkins, 3