Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/558bv.pdf
Page Number: 555.0

394  CITIZENS  UNITED  v.  FEDERAL  ELECTION  COMM’N 

Opinion of Stevens, J. 

dictates  an  afﬁrmative  answer  to  that  question  is,  in  my 
judgment,  profoundly  misguided.  Even  more  misguided  is 
the  notion  that  the  Court  must  rewrite  the  law  relating  to 
campaign expenditures by for-proﬁt corporations and unions 
to decide this case. 

The basic premise underlying the Court’s ruling is its iter­
ation,  and  constant  reiteration,  of  the  proposition  that  the 
First  Amendment  bars  regulatory  distinctions  based  on  a 
speaker’s  identity,  including  its  “identity”  as  a  corporation. 
While  that  glittering  generality  has  rhetorical  appeal,  it  is 
not a correct statement of the law.  Nor does it tell us when 
a  corporation  may  engage  in  electioneering  that  some  of  its 
shareholders  oppose.  It  does  not  even  resolve  the  speciﬁc 
question whether Citizens United may be required to ﬁnance 
some  of  its  messages  with  the  money  in  its  PAC.  The  con­
ceit  that  corporations  must  be  treated  identically  to  natural 
persons in the political sphere is not only inaccurate but also 
inadequate to justify the Court’s disposition of this case. 

In  the  context  of  election  to  public  ofﬁce,  the  distinction 
between  corporate  and  human  speakers  is  signiﬁcant.  Al­
though they make enormous contributions to our society, cor­
porations are not actually members of it.  They cannot vote 
or  run  for  ofﬁce.  Because  they  may  be  managed  and  con­
trolled by nonresidents, their interests may conﬂict in funda­
mental  respects  with  the  interests  of  eligible  voters.  The 
ﬁnancial  resources,  legal  structure,  and  instrumental  orien­
tation  of  corporations  raise  legitimate  concerns  about  their 
role in the electoral process.  Our lawmakers have a compel­
ling constitutional basis, if not also a democratic duty, to take 
measures designed to guard against the potentially deleteri­
ous effects of corporate spending in local and national races. 
The majority’s approach to corporate electioneering marks 
a  dramatic  break  from  our  past.  Congress  has  placed  spe­
cial  limitations  on  campaign  spending  by  corporations  ever 
since the passage of the Tillman Act in 1907, ch. 420, 34 Stat. 
864.  We  have  unanimously  concluded  that  this  “reﬂects  a