Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/22pdf/21-1086_1co6.pdf
Page Number: 78.0

Cite as:  599 U. S. ____ (2023) 

33 

THOMAS, J., dissenting 

statutory  text  and  its  “equal  openness”  requirement,  the 
majority  asserts  that  “[a]  district  is  not  equally  open  . . . 
when  minority  voters  face—unlike  their  majority  peers—
bloc voting along racial lines, arising against the backdrop 
of substantial racial discrimination within the State, that 
renders a minority vote unequal to a vote by a nonminority 
voter.”  Ante, at 17.  But again, we have held that dilution 
cannot  be  shown  without  an  objective,  undiluted  bench-
mark, and this verbiage offers no guidance for how to deter-
mine  it.16    Later,  the  majority  asserts  that  “the  Gingles 
framework  itself  imposes  meaningful  constraints  on  pro-
portionality.”  Ante, at 18–19.  But the only constraint on 
proportionality  the  majority  articulates  is  that  it  is  often 
difficult to achieve—which, quite obviously, is no principled 
limitation at all.  Ante, at 20–22. 
  Thus, the end result of the majority’s reasoning is no dif-
ferent from the District Court’s: The ultimate benchmark is 
a  racially  proportional  allocation  of  seats,  and  the  main 
question on which liability turns is whether a closer approx-
imation to proportionality is possible under any reasonable 
application  of  traditional  districting  criteria.17    This  ap-

—————— 

16 To the extent it is any sort of answer to the benchmark question, it 
tends inevitably toward proportionality.  By equating a voting minority’s 
inability to win elections with a vote that has been “render[ed] . . . une-
qual,” ante, at 17, the majority assumes “that members of [a] minority 
are denied a fully effective use of the franchise unless they are able to 
control seats in an elected body.”  Holder, 512 U. S., at 899 (opinion of 
THOMAS, J.).  That is precisely the assumption that leads to the pro-
portional-control benchmark.  See id., at 902, 937. 

17 Indeed, the majority’s attempt to deflect this analysis only confirms 
its  accuracy.    The  majority  stresses  that  its  understanding  of  Gingles 
permits the rejection of “plans that would bring States closer to propor-
tionality when those plans violate traditional districting criteria.”  Ante, 
at  21,  n. 4  (emphasis  added).    JUSTICE  KAVANAUGH,  similarly,  defends 
Gingles  against  the  charge  of  “mandat[ing]  a  proportional  number  of