Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/20pdf/19-251_p86b.pdf
Page Number: 15.0

Cite as:  594 U. S. ____ (2021) 

11 

Opinion of the Court 

into these protected areas . . . discourage citizens from ex-
ercising  rights  protected  by  the  Constitution.”  Baird  v. 
State Bar of Ariz., 401 U. S. 1, 6 (1971) (plurality opinion). 
Contrary to the dissent, we understand this Court’s discus-
sion  of  rules  that  are  “broad”  and  “broadly  stifle”  First 
Amendment freedoms to refer to the scope of challenged re-
strictions—their breadth—rather than the severity of any 
demonstrated burden.  That much seems clear to us from 
Shelton’s  statement  (in  the  sentence  following  the  one 
quoted  by  the  dissent)  that  “[t]he  breadth  of  legislative
abridgment  must  be  viewed  in  the  light  of  less  drastic 
means for achieving the same basic purpose.”  364 U. S., at 
488;  see  id.,  at  488,  n. 9  (citing  sources  that  support  this 
reading).  It also seems clear from the immediately preced-
ing  paragraph,  which  stressed  that  “[t]he  scope  of  the  in-
quiry required by [the law] is completely unlimited. . . .  It 
requires  [the  teacher]  to  list,  without  number,  every  con-
ceivable kind of associational tie—social, professional, po-
litical,  avocational,  or  religious.    Many  such  relationships
could have no possible bearing upon the teacher’s occupa-
tional competence or fitness.”  Id., at 488.  In other words, 
the law was not narrowly tailored to the State’s objective. 
Nor does our decision in Reed suggest that narrow tailor-
ing  is  required  only  for  laws  that  impose  severe  burdens. 
The  dissent  casts  Reed  as  a  case  involving  only  “ ‘modest
burdens,’ ” and therefore “a correspondingly modest level of
tailoring.”  Post,  at  12  (quoting  561  U. S.,  at  201).    But  it 
was only after we concluded that various narrower alterna-
tives  proposed  by  the  plaintiffs  were  inadequate,  see  561 
U. S., at 198–199, that we held that the strength of the gov-
ernment’s  interest  in  disclosure  reflected  the  burden  im-
posed, see id., at 201.  The point is that a reasonable assess-
ment  of  the  burdens  imposed  by  disclosure  should  begin 
with an understanding of the extent to which the burdens
are unnecessary, and that requires narrow tailoring.