Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/21pdf/21a375_d18f.pdf
Page Number: 20.0

Cite as:  595 U. S. ____ (2022) 

11 

KAGAN, J., dissenting 

the court issued its order.  See ibid.  This Court has previ-
ously  denied  stays  of  districting  orders  issued  at  similar 
times.    See,  e.g.,  Harris  v.  McCrory,  159  F. Supp.  3d  600 
(MDNC) (enjoining a State from using its  enacted map in 
February of an election year, despite mid-March primary), 
stay  denied,  577  U. S.  1129  (2016);  Personhuballah  v.  Al-
corn, 155 F. Supp. 3d 552 (ED Va.) (imposing a new reme-
dial map in January of an election year, despite mid-June 
primary), stay denied, 577 U. S. 1125 (2016).  I see no rea-
son to do otherwise here.  The plaintiffs “commenced their 
lawsuits  within  hours  or  days  of  the  enactment”  of  Ala-
bama’s plan in November 2021.  App. 203.  And the District 
Court immediately expedited its proceedings; indeed, con-
sistent  with  everything  else  the  court  did  right,  it  moved 
with  astonishing  speed.    The  only  delay  (of  a  few  weeks) 
came  “at the  request”  of the  State.   Ibid.   Alabama is  not 
entitled to keep violating Black Alabamians’ voting rights 
just because the court’s order came down in the first month 
of an election year. 

* 

  * 

  * 
  Today’s decision is one more in a disconcertingly long line 
of cases in which this Court uses its shadow docket to signal 
or make changes in the law, without anything approaching 
full  briefing  and  argument.    Here,  the  District  Court  ap-
plied  established  legal  principles  to  an  extensive  eviden-
tiary  record.    Its  reasoning  was  careful—indeed,  exhaus-
tive—and  justified  in  every  respect.    To  reverse  that 
decision  requires  upsetting  the  way  Section  2  plaintiffs 
have  for  decades—and  in  line  with  our  caselaw—proved 
vote-dilution claims.  That is a serious matter, which cannot 
properly occur without thorough consideration.  Yet today 
the Court skips that step, staying the District Court’s order 
based on the untested and unexplained view that the law 
needs to change.  That decision does a disservice to our own 
appellate  processes,  which  serve  both  to  constrain  and  to