Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/14pdf/13-1034_3dq4.pdf
Page Number: 16.0

Cite as:  575 U. S. ____ (2015) 

13 

Opinion of the Court 

statute  stretches  to  the  breaking  point,  reaching  state-
court convictions, like Mellouli’s, in which “[no] controlled
substance  (as  defined  in  [§802])”  figures  as  an  element  of 
the  offense.    We  recognize,  too,  that  the  §1227(a)(2)(B)(i) 
words  to  which  the  dissent  attaches  great  weight,  i.e., 
“relating to,” post, at 2–3, are “broad” and “indeterminate.” 
Maracich  v.  Spears,  570  U. S.  ___,  ___  (2013)  (slip  op.,  at 
9)  (internal  quotation  marks  and  brackets  omitted).11    As  
we  cautioned  in  New  York  State  Conference  of  Blue  Cross 
&  Blue  Shield  Plans  v.  Travelers  Ins.  Co.,  514  U. S.  645, 
655 (1995), those words, “extend[ed] to the furthest stretch
of  [their]  indeterminacy,  . . .  stop  nowhere.”    “[C]ontext,”
therefore,  may  “tu[g]  . . .  in  favor  of  a  narrower  reading.” 
Yates  v.  United  States,  574  U. S.  ___,  ___  (2015)  (slip  op., 
at 10).  Context does so here. 

The  historical  background  of  §1227(a)(2)(B)(i)  demon-
strates  that  Congress  and  the  BIA  have  long  required  a 
direct  link  between  an  alien’s  crime  of  conviction  and  a 
particular  federally  controlled  drug.    Supra,  at  8–9.  The 
Government’s  position  here  severs  that  link  by  authoriz-
ing  deportation  any  time  the  state  statute  of  conviction 
bears  some  general  relation  to  federally  controlled  drugs. 
—————— 

11 The  dissent  observes  that  certain  provisions  of  the  immigration
statute involving firearms and domestic violence “specif[y] the conduct 
that  subjects  an  alien  to  removal”  without  “the  expansive  phrase 
‘relating to.’ ”  Post, at 3.  From this statutory context, the dissent infers
that  Congress  must  have  intended  the  words  “relating  to”  to  have 
expansive  meaning.  Post,  at  3–4.    But  the  dissent  overlooks  another 
contextual  clue—i.e.,  that  other  provisions  of  the  immigration  statute 
immigration  consequences  to  controlled-substance  offenses 
tying 
contain no reference to §802.  See 8 U. S. C. §1357(d) (allowing detainer 
of  any  alien  who  has  been  “arrested  by  a  Federal,  State,  or  local  law 
enforcement official for a violation of any law relating to controlled sub- 
stances”);  §1184(d)(3)(B)(iii)  (allowing  Secretary  of  Homeland  Security 
to  deny  certain  visa  applications  when  applicant  has  at  least  three
convictions  of  crimes  “relating  to  a  controlled  substance  or  alcohol  not 
arising  from  a  single  act”).    These  provisions  demonstrate  that  when 
Congress seeks to capture conduct involving a “controlled substance,” it
says just that, not “a controlled substance (as defined in [§802]).”