Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/19pdf/18-1195_g314.pdf
Page Number: 85

4 

ESPINOZA v. MONTANA DEPT. OF REVENUE 

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting 

subsidy that Montana law does not permit, there is nothing 
for this Court to do.2 

—————— 
School Bd. of Prince Edward Cty., 377 U. S. 218 (1964), for the proposi-
tion that eliminating a public benefit does not always remedy discrimi-
nation.  See Reply Brief 5.  But Griffin is inapposite.  There, a Virginia 
county closed its public schools and so-called “private schools” were set 
up in their place to avoid a court desegregation order.  See 377 U. S., at 
223.  These so-called private schools “were open to whites only and . . . 
were  in  fact run  by  a  practical  partnership  between  State  and  county, 
designed to preserve segregated education.”  Palmer v. Thompson, 403 
U. S. 217, 221–222 (1971).  That is nothing like what the Montana Su-
preme Court’s remedy achieved here.  Nor have petitioners said other-
wise; there is no allegation that Montana confers clandestine tax credits 
solely to secular schools. 

2 Petitioners here have not asserted a free exercise claim on a theory 
that they were victims of religious animus, either.  Cf. Church of Lukumi 
Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U. S. 520, 533 (1993).  Instead, one con-
currence seeks to make the argument for them while attempting to com-
pare the state constitutional provision here with a nonunanimous jury 
rule rooted in racial animus.  Ante, at 1 (opinion of ALITO, J.) (citing the 
dissent in Ramos v. Louisiana, 590 U. S. ___ (2020)).  But those questions 
are not before the Court. 

In any case, the concurrence’s arguments are as misguided as they are 
misplaced.  Citing the Court’s opinion in Ramos, the concurrence main-
tains that a law’s “ ‘uncomfortable past’ must still be ‘[e]xamined.’ ” Ante, 
at 10 (opinion of ALITO, J.).  But as previously explained: “Where a law 
otherwise  is  untethered  to  [discriminatory]  bias—and  perhaps  also 
where a legislature actually confronts a law’s tawdry past in reenacting 
it—the new law may well be free of discriminatory taint.”  Ramos, 590 
U. S.,  at  ___  (SOTOMAYOR,  J.,  concurring  in  part)  (slip  op.,  at  4).    That 
could not “be said of the laws at issue” in Ramos.  Ibid.  It can be here. 
See Part II, infra. 

The concurrence overlooks the starkly different histories of these state 
laws.  Also  missing  from  the  concurrence  (and  the  amicus  briefs  it  re-
peats) is the stubborn fact that the constitutional provision at issue here 
was adopted in 1972 at a convention where it was met with overwhelm-
ing support by religious leaders (Catholic and non-Catholic), even those 
who examined the history of prior no-aid provisions.  See Brief for Re-
spondents 16–27; 6 Montana Constitutional Convention 1971–1972 Pro-
ceedings and Transcript, pp. 2012–2013, 2016–2017 (Mont. Legislature 
and Legislative Council); see also ante, at 12–13 (BREYER, J., dissenting);