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Page Number: 8.0

8 

STUDENTS FOR FAIR ADMISSIONS, INC. v. PRESIDENT 
AND FELLOWS OF HARVARD COLLEGE 
Syllabus 

570 U. S., at 311.  Respondents’ second proffered end point—when stu-
dents receive the educational benefits of diversity—fares no better.  As 
explained, it is unclear how a court is supposed to determine if or when
such goals would be adequately met.  Third, respondents suggest the 
25-year  expectation  in  Grutter  means  that  race-based  preferences 
must be allowed to continue until at least 2028.  The Court’s statement 
in Grutter, however, reflected only that Court’s expectation that race-
based preferences would, by 2028, be unnecessary in the context of ra-
cial diversity on college campuses.  Finally, respondents argue that the 
frequent reviews they conduct to determine whether racial preferences
are  still  necessary  obviates  the  need  for  an  end  point.  But  Grutter 
never suggested that periodic review can make unconstitutional con-
duct constitutional.  Pp. 29–34.

(f) Because  Harvard’s  and  UNC’s  admissions  programs  lack  suffi-
ciently focused and measurable objectives warranting the use of race,
unavoidably employ race in a negative manner, involve racial stereo-
typing,  and  lack  meaningful  end  points,  those  admissions  programs 
cannot  be  reconciled  with  the  guarantees  of  the  Equal  Protection 
Clause.  At the same time, nothing prohibits universities from consid-
ering an applicant’s discussion of how race affected the applicant’s life, 
so long as that discussion is concretely tied to a quality of character or 
unique ability that the particular applicant can contribute to the uni-
versity.  Many universities have for too long wrongly concluded that
the  touchstone  of  an  individual’s  identity  is  not  challenges  bested,
skills built, or lessons learned, but the color of their skin.  This Nation’s 
constitutional history does not tolerate that choice.  Pp. 39–40. 

No. 20–1199, 980 F. 3d 157; No. 21–707, 567 F. Supp. 3d 580, reversed.

 ROBERTS, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which THOMAS, 
ALITO,  GORSUCH,  KAVANAUGH,  and  BARRETT,  JJ.,  joined.  THOMAS,  J., 
filed  a  concurring  opinion.  GORSUCH,  J.,  filed  a  concurring  opinion,  in 
which  THOMAS,  J.,  joined.  KAVANAUGH,  J.,  filed  a  concurring  opinion. 
SOTOMAYOR, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which KAGAN, J., joined, and
in  which  JACKSON,  J.,  joined  as  it  applies  to  No.  21–707.  JACKSON,  J., 
filed a dissenting opinion in No. 21–707, in which SOTOMAYOR and KA-
GAN, JJ., joined.  JACKSON, J., took no part in the consideration or deci-
sion of the case in No. 20–1199.