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WILLIAMS v. TAYLOR

Opinion of the Court

their companions”). Cf. also United States v. Locke, ante, at
In these two parallel provisions Congress has given
105.
prisoners who fall within § 2254(e)(2)’s opening clause an op-
portunity to obtain an evidentiary hearing where the legal
or factual basis of the claims did not exist at the time of
state-court proceedings.

We are not persuaded by the Commonwealth’s further ar-
gument that anything less than a no-fault understanding of
the opening clause is contrary to AEDPA’s purpose to fur-
ther the principles of comity, ﬁnality, and federalism. There
is no doubt Congress intended AEDPA to advance these doc-
trines. Federal habeas corpus principles must inform and
shape the historic and still vital relation of mutual respect
and common purpose existing between the States and the
federal courts.
In keeping this delicate balance we have
been careful to limit the scope of federal intrusion into state
criminal adjudications and to safeguard the States’ interest
in the integrity of their criminal and collateral proceedings.
See, e. g., Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U. S. 722, 726 (1991)
(“This is a case about federalism.
It concerns the respect
that federal courts owe the States and the States’ procedural
rules when reviewing the claims of state prisoners in federal
habeas corpus”); McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U. S. 467, 493 (1991)
(“[T]he doctrines of procedural default and abuse of the writ
are both designed to lessen the injury to a State that results
through reexamination of a state conviction on a ground that
the State did not have the opportunity to address at a prior,
appropriate time; and both doctrines seek to vindicate the
State’s interest in the ﬁnality of its criminal judgments”).

It is consistent with these principles to give effect to Con-
gress’ intent to avoid unneeded evidentiary hearings in fed-
eral habeas corpus, while recognizing the statute does not
equate prisoners who exercise diligence in pursuing their
claims with those who do not. Principles of exhaustion are
premised upon recognition by Congress and the Court that
state judiciaries have the duty and competence to vindicate