Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/20pdf/19-1039_8n5a.pdf
Page Number: 22

Cite as:  594 U. S. ____ (2021) 

17 

Opinion of the Court 

the eminent domain power from the power to bring condem-
nation  actions—and  then  argue  that  the  latter,  so  carved
out, cannot be delegated to private parties with respect to
state-owned lands.  But the eminent domain power is inex-
tricably intertwined with the ability to condemn.  We have 
even at times equated the eminent domain power with the 
power  to  bring  condemnation  proceedings.    See  Agins  v. 
City of Tiburon, 447 U. S. 255, 258, n. 2 (1980), abrogated 
on  other  grounds  by  Lingle  v.  Chevron  U. S. A.  Inc.,  544 
U. S.  528,  532  (2005).    Separating  the  eminent  domain 
power  from  the  power  to  condemn—when  exercised  by  a 
delegatee  of  the  Federal  Government—would  violate  the 
basic principle that a State may not diminish the eminent
domain  authority  of  the  federal  sovereign.    See  Kohl,  91 
U. S., at 374 (“If the United States have the power, it must 
be complete in itself.  It can neither be enlarged nor dimin-
ished by a State.”).

If private parties authorized by the Federal Government 
were  unable  to  condemn  States’  property  interests,  then 
that would leave delegatees with only one constitutionally
permissible way of exercising the federal eminent domain
power:  Take  property  now  and  require  States  to  sue  for
compensation later.*  It is difficult to see how such an ar-
rangement would vindicate the principles underlying state 
sovereign immunity.  Whether the purpose of that doctrine 
is to “shield[ ] state treasuries” or “accord the States the re-
spect  owed  them  as  joint  sovereigns,”  Federal  Maritime 
Comm’n v. South Carolina Ports Authority, 535 U. S. 743, 
—————— 

*In  addition,  all  agree  that  Congress  could  authorize  FERC  itself  to
condemn the exact same property interests, pursuant to the exact same
certificate of public convenience and necessity, and then transfer those 
interests to PennEast following a legal proceeding in which the Govern-
ment  would  presumably  act  in  concert  with  PennEast.    See  post,  at  7 
(opinion  of  BARRETT,  J.);  Brief  for  Petitioner  40;  Brief  for  Respondent 
New  Jersey  et al.  43–46.    This  further  highlights  the  counterintuitive 
nature of the constitutional scheme envisioned by the respondents and 
the dissent.