Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/23pdf/22-704_4246.pdf
Page Number: 52.0

10 

VIDAL v. ELSTER 

SOTOMAYOR, J., concurring in judgment 

public who is responsible for a particular product, that is,
to serve as a source identifier.  Jack Daniel’s Properties, Inc. 
v. VIP Products LLC, 599 U. S. 140, 146 (2023).  Although
trademarks may also communicate a “message,” that mes-
sage is only incidental to “what a trademark is and does.” 
Id., at 145–146.  Second, “federal law does not create trade-
marks.”  B&B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Industries, Inc., 575 
U. S. 138, 142 (2015).  Rather, by virtue of common law, the 
first  person  to  use  a  “distinct  mark  in  commerce  . . .  ac-
quires rights to that mark,” including exclusivity rights to
“preven[t] others from using the mark.”  Ibid.  Third, fed-
eral  registration  provides  increased  trademark  protection
only  by  conferring  additional  benefits  on  trademark  hold-
ers.  See ibid.  For example, it (1) provides “nationwide con-
structive notice of the registrant’s claim of ownership of the 
mark,” which forecloses some defenses in infringement ac-
tions;  and  (2)  constitutes  “prima  facie  evidence”  of  the
mark’s validity and exclusivity in commerce.  Ante, at 2 (cit-
ing 15 U. S. C. §§1072, 1115(a)).  To be sure, nothing in the 
Constitution  requires  these  predominantly  commercial
benefits. 

One  conclusion  follows  from  these  three  principles:  By 
prohibiting  trademark  registration  for  viewpoint-neutral, 
content-based  reasons,  Congress  simply  denies  an  appli-
cant the opportunity to include his mark on a list and secure
“certain  benefits”  that  are  “useful  in  infringement  litiga-
tion.”  Jack Daniel’s, 599 U. S., at 146.  The risk of speech
suppression  is  therefore  “attenuated”  because  denying  a 
trademark holder these ancillary benefits does not prevent 
him  from  using  his  mark  in  commerce  or  communicating
any message incidental to the mark.  Davenport, 551 U. S., 
at  188;  see  Brunetti,  588  U. S.,  at  421–422  (opinion  of
SOTOMAYOR,  J.);  id.,  at  401  (opinion  of  ROBERTS,  C. J.) 
(“Whether . . . marks can be registered does not affect the
extent to which their owners may use them in commerce to
identify goods.  No speech is being restricted; no one is being