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Cite as: 524 U. S. 184 (1998)

201

Scalia, J., dissenting

ambiguity in a criminal statute, doubts are resolved in favor
of the defendant.’ ” Adamo Wrecking Co. v. United States,
434 U. S. 275, 284–285 (1978), quoting United States v. Bass,
404 U. S. 336, 348 (1971).

Title 18 U. S. C. § 922(a)(1)(A) makes it unlawful for any
person to engage in the business of dealing in ﬁrearms with-
out a federal license. That provision is enforced criminally
through § 924(a)(1)(D), which imposes criminal penalties on
whoever “willfully violates any other provision of this chap-
ter.” The word “willfully” has a wide range of meanings,
and “ ‘its construction [is] often . . . inﬂuenced by its con-
text.’ ” Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U. S. 135, 141 (1994),
In
quoting Spies v. United States, 317 U. S. 492, 497 (1943).
some contexts it connotes nothing more than “an act which
is intentional, or knowing, or voluntary, as distinguished
from accidental.” United States v. Murdock, 290 U. S. 389,
inasmuch
394 (1933).
as the preceding three subparagraphs of § 924 specify a
mens rea of “knowingly” for other ﬁrearms offenses, see
§§ 924(a)(1)(A)–(C), a “willful” violation under § 924(a)(1)(D)
must require some mental state more culpable than mere
intent to perform the forbidden act. The United States con-
cedes (and the Court apparently agrees) that the violation is
not “willful” unless the defendant knows in a general way
that his conduct is unlawful. Brief for United States 7–9;
ante, at 193 (“The jury must ﬁnd that the defendant acted
with an evil-meaning mind, that is to say, that he acted with
knowledge that his conduct was unlawful”).

In the present context, however,

That concession takes this case beyond any useful appli-
cation of the maxim that ignorance of the law is no excuse.
Everyone agrees that § 924(a)(1)(D) requires some knowledge
of the law; the only real question is which law? The Court’s
answer is that knowledge of any law is enough—or, put an-
other way, that the defendant must be ignorant of every law
violated by his course of conduct to be innocent of willfully
violating the licensing requirement. The Court points to no