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10 

HEALTH AND HOSPITAL CORPORATION OF MARION 
CTY. v. TALEVSKI 
Opinion of the Court 

maintain assumpsit on a promise not under seal, made to 
another for his benefit, . . . is now the prevailing rule in this 
country”).7  “[S]omething more than ‘ambiguous historical
evidence’ is required before we will ‘flatly overrule a num-
ber  of  major  decisions  of  this  Court,’ ”  Gamble  v.  United 
States,  587  U. S.  ___,  ___  (2019)  (slip  op.,  at  11),  as  HHC
essentially asks us to do here.

Second, because “[t]here is no doubt that the cause of ac-
tion created by §1983 is, and was always regarded as, a tort 
claim,” Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 
U. S. 687, 727 (1999) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and con-
curring in judgment), HHC’s particular focus on 1870s law 
governing third-party-beneficiary suits in contract is, at the 
very least, perplexing.  If there is a reason that the princi-
ples  governing  those  suits  should  be  read  to  displace  the 
plain  scope  of  §1983’s  “ ‘species  of  tort  liability,’ ”  Heck  v. 
Humphrey,  512  U. S.  477,  483  (1994),  HHC  has  utterly 
failed to identify it.

We have no doubt that HHC wishes §1983 said something 
else.  But that is “an appeal better directed to Congress.” 
Nieves v. Bartlett, 587 U. S. ___, ___ (2019) (GORSUCH, J., 
concurring  in  part  and  dissenting  in  part)  (slip  op.,  at  2). 
Hewing to §1983’s text and history (not to mention our prec-
edent and constitutional role), we reject HHC’s request, and
reaffirm  that  “laws”  in  §1983  means  what  it  says.    Thi-
boutot, 448 U. S., at 4.8 

—————— 

7 Black’s  Law  Dictionary  154  (11th  ed.  2019)  (defining  assumpsit,  as 

relevant, as a “common-law action for . . . breach of a contract”). 

8 HHC’s reply brief retreats from its initial ask, by appearing to con-
cede that Spending Clause legislation can secure individual rights under 
§1983, but (it says) only if the statutory language “giv[es] funding recip-
ients clear notice.”  Reply Brief 1.  This newly minted argument contra-
dicts the opening brief ’s categorical claims about the scope of §1983.  In 
any  event,  the  well-established  requirement  that  Congress  must  have
“unambiguously  conferred”  a  §1983-enforceable  right  in  a  Spending
Clause statute ensures the clear notice that HHC’s reply brief requests. 
Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U. S. 273, 279–280, 283 (2002); Part III, infra.