Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/16pdf/15-827_0pm1.pdf
Page Number: 12.0

8 

ENDREW F. v. DOUGLAS COUNTY SCHOOL DIST. RE–1 

Opinion of the Court 

such  relief,  they  were  required  to  show  that  the  school 
district  had  not  provided  Endrew  a  FAPE  in  a  timely 
manner prior to his enrollment at the private school.  See 
§1412(a)(10)(C)(ii).  Endrew’s  parents  contended  that  the 
final IEP proposed by the school district was not “reason-
ably  calculated  to  enable  [Endrew]  to  receive  educational
benefits”  and  that  Endrew  had  therefore  been  denied  a 
FAPE.  Rowley, 458 U. S., at 207.  An Administrative Law 
Judge (ALJ) disagreed and denied relief.

Endrew’s  parents  sought  review  in  Federal  District
Court.  Giving “due weight” to the decision of the ALJ, the 
District  Court  affirmed.    2014  WL  4548439,  *5  (D  Colo., 
Sept.  15,  2014)  (quoting  Rowley,  458  U. S.,  at  206).    The 
court  acknowledged  that  Endrew’s  performance  under 
past  IEPs  “did  not  reveal  immense  educational  growth.” 
2014  WL  4548439,  at  *9.  But  it  concluded  that  annual 
modifications  to  Endrew’s  IEP  objectives  were  “sufficient
to show a pattern of, at the least, minimal progress.”  Ibid. 
Because Endrew’s previous IEPs had enabled him to make
this sort of progress, the court reasoned, his latest, similar
IEP  was  reasonably  calculated  to  do  the  same  thing.    In 
the court’s view, that was all Rowley demanded.  2014 WL 
4548439, at *9. 

The Tenth Circuit affirmed.  The Court of Appeals recited 
language  from  Rowley  stating  that  the  instruction  and
services  furnished  to  children  with  disabilities  must  be 
calculated to confer “some educational benefit.”  798 F. 3d, 
at  1338  (quoting  Rowley,  458  U. S.,  at  200;  emphasis 
added by Tenth Circuit).  The court noted that it had long 
interpreted  this  language  to  mean  that  a  child’s  IEP  is 
adequate  as  long  as  it  is  calculated  to  confer  an  “educa-
tional benefit [that is] merely . . . more than de minimis.” 
798  F. 3d,  at  1338  (internal  quotation  marks  omitted).
Applying  this  standard,  the  Tenth  Circuit  held  that  En-
drew’s  IEP  had  been  “reasonably  calculated  to  enable
[him] to make some progress.”  Id., at 1342 (internal quo-