Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/529bv.pdf
Page Number: 1131

529ORD Unit: $PT3

[10-09-01 14:52:06] PGT: ORDPP (Prelim. Print)

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OCTOBER TERM, 1999

Thomas, J., dissenting

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and the First Amendment Dog that Didn’t Bark, 1994 S. Ct. Rev.
1, 41, 47 (exception for speech that is reasonably designed or
intended to contribute to reasoned debate on issues of public
concern).

But even assuming that some pure speech in the workplace
may be proscribed consistent with the First Amendment when it
violates a workplace harassment law, special First Amendment
problems are presented when, as here, the proscription takes the
form of a prior restraint. We have, since Near v. Minnesota ex
rel. Olson, 283 U. S. 697 (1931), evaluated injunctions against
speech as prior restraints, which entails the strictest scrutiny
known to our First Amendment jurisprudence. As we have
explained:

“The presumption against prior restraints is heavier—and
the degree of protection broader—than that against limits on
expression imposed by criminal penalties. Behind the dis-
tinction is a theory deeply etched in our law: a free society
prefers to punish the few who abuse rights of speech after
they break the law than to throttle them and all others be-
forehand.
It is always difﬁcult to know in advance what
an individual will say, and the line between legitimate and
illegitimate speech is often so ﬁnely drawn that the risks of
freewheeling censorship are formidable.” Southeastern Pro-
motions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U. S. 546, 558–559 (1975).

The instant injunction is insufﬁciently tailored in at least three
respects, raising serious doubts concerning whether “the chal-
lenged provisions of the injunction burden no more speech than
necessary to serve a signiﬁcant government interest.” Madsen
v. Women’s Health Center, Inc., 512 U. S. 753, 765 (1994).2

First, the injunction prohibits even a single utterance of a pro-
hibited word. Yet a hostile environment for purposes of FEHA
only arises “[w]hen the workplace is permeated with discrimina-

2 Although a content-neutral injunction is not treated as a prior restraint,
see Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of Western N. Y., 519 U. S. 357, 372
(1997); Madsen, 512 U. S., at 763–764, n. 2, the instant injunction is indisput-
ably content based. See 21 Cal. 4th 121, 164 (1999) (Werdegar, J., concur-
ring); id., at 172 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
I apply the Madsen standard here
because,
if the injunction fails the Madsen standard for content-neutral
injunctions, a fortiori it fails whatever standard applies to content-based
injunctions.