Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/11pdf/10-545.pdf
Page Number: 60

Cite as:  565 U. S. ____ (2012) 

15 

BREYER, J., dissenting 

domain, the statute, in literal terms, “abridges” a preexist­
ing freedom to speak.  In practical terms, members of the
public  might  well  have  decided  what  to  say,  as  well  as
when and how to say it, in part by reviewing with a view
to  repeating,  expression  that  they  reasonably  believed 
was,  or  would  be,  freely  available.    Given  these  speech 
implications,  it  is  not  surprising  that  Congress  has  long 
sought  to  protect  public  domain  material  when  revising
the  copyright  laws.    See  infra,  at  19  (listing  instances).
And this Court has assumed the particular importance of 
public domain material in roughly analogous circumstanc­
es.  See  Graham,  383  U. S.,  at  6  (“Congress  may  not  au­
thorize the issuance of patents whose effects are to remove 
existent knowledge from the public domain”); Kewanee Oil 
Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U. S. 470, 484 (1974) (trade secret 
protection  is  not  incompatible  with  “policy  that  matter
once  in  the  public  domain  must  remain  in  the  public  do­
main”);  Cox  Broadcasting  Corp.  v.  Cohn,  420  U. S.  469, 
496  (1975)  (First  Amendment  prohibits  sanctioning  press
for  publishing  material  disclosed  in  public  court  docu­
ments);  see  also  Dastar  Corp.  v.  Twentieth  Century  Fox 
Film Corp., 539 U. S. 23, 33 (2003) (“The right to copy . . .
once  a  copyright  has  expired  . . .  passes  to  the  public”
(internal quotation marks omitted)). 

Moreover, whereas forward-looking copyright laws tend 
to  benefit  those  whose  identities  are  not  yet  known  (the
writer  who  has  not  yet  written  a  book,  the  musician  who 
has  not  yet  composed  a  song),  when  a  copyright  law  is
primarily  backward  looking  the  risk  is  greater  that  Con­
gress is trying to help known beneficiaries at the expense 
of  badly  organized  unknown  users  who  find  it  difficult  to 
argue  and  present  their  case  to  Congress.    In  Eldred,  I 
thought this problem was severe.  See generally 537 U. S., 
at  243–266  (dissenting  opinion).  And  in  light  of  the  fact 
that Congress, with one minor exception, heard testimony 
only  from  the  representatives  of  existing  copyright  hold­