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6  FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N v. TED CRUZ FOR SENATE 

KAGAN, J., dissenting 

the  limit  is  so  low  as  to  preclude  effective  advocacy.    See 
supra, at 3–4.  There is no reason to treat Section 304 dif-
ferently.  In  fact,  its  restriction  on  post-election  contribu-
tions for loan repayment probably has much smaller indi-
rect effects on a campaign’s or candidate’s speech than the
contribution ceilings this Court has approved.  (Again, just
think of all the multi-million-dollar donations those ceilings
prevent.)  So the majority’s view cannot be right.

And more fundamentally, the majority fails to appreciate
what Section 304 has an indirect effect on: lending, rather 
than  spending,  money.  In  the  majority’s  view,  those  two 
activities count as one and the same.  See ante, at 10–11. 
But  they  are  not,  in  an  obvious  way.    The  expenditure  of 
“personal  funds”  for  speech,  this  Court  has  observed,  “re-
duces the candidate’s dependence” on donors—precisely be-
cause he is not trying to speak on their dime.  Buckley, 424 
U. S.,  at  53.    The loan  of  personal  funds  has  the  opposite
effect, as further shown in this opinion’s next part.  When a 
candidate  lends  substantial  funds  to  his  campaign,  he
wants  (maybe  desperately  needs)  them  returned;  he  thus
risks—indeed,  invites—dependence  on  donors,  who  alone
can make him financially whole.  Section 304 responds to
that  difference  in  whether  a  candidate  is  speaking  inde-
pendently, or instead relying on others’ largesse.  The pro-
vision at most deters a single mechanism for financing elec-
toral  activities,  because  it  carries  a  heightened  threat  of
corruption. 

II
  Preventing quid pro quo corruption or its appearance is a
compelling interest by any measure.  See Federal Election 
Comm’n v. National Conservative Political Action Comm., 
470 U. S. 480, 496–497 (1985).  Quid pro quo corruption—
which extends beyond criminal bribery to “less blatant and 
specific”  arrangements—“subver[ts]  the  political  process”
and threatens “the integrity of our system of representative