Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/529bv.pdf
Page Number: 670.0

529US2

Unit: $U53

[09-26-01 10:37:28] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 529 U. S. 576 (2000)

595

Stevens, J., dissenting

“[A] public employer may schedule its nonexempt em-
ployees to use their accrued FLSA compensatory time
as directed if the prior agreement speciﬁcally provides
such a provision, and the employees have knowingly and
voluntarily agreed to such provision . . . .

“Absent such an agreement, it is our position that nei-
ther the statute nor the regulations permit an employer
to require an employee to use accrued compensatory
time.” Opinion Letter from Dept. of Labor, Wage and
Hour Div. (Sept. 14, 1992), 1992 WL 845100.

The Department, it should be emphasized, does not suggest
that forced-use policies are forbidden by the statute or regu-
lations. Rather, its judgment is simply that, in accordance
with the basic rule governing compensatory time set down
by the statutory and regulatory scheme, such policies may
be pursued solely according to the parties’ agreement. Be-
cause there is no reason to believe that the Department’s
opinion was anything but thoroughly considered and consist-
ently observed, it unquestionably merits our respect. See
Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U. S. 134, 140 (1944).2

In the end, I do not understand why it should be any more
difﬁcult for the parties to come to an agreement on this term
of employment than on the antecedent question whether
compensatory time may be used at all. State employers
enjoy substantial bargaining power in negotiations with
their employees; by regulation, agreements governing the
availability and use of compensatory time can be essentially
as informal as the parties wish. See 29 CFR § 553.23(c)
(1999). And, as we have said, employers retain the ability
to “cash out” of accrued leave at any time. That simple step
is, after all, the method that the Department of Labor years
ago suggested the county should pursue here, and that would

2 I should add that I fully agree with Justice Breyer’s comments on
Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467
U. S. 837 (1984). See post, at 596–597 (dissenting opinion).