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424  CITIZENS  UNITED  v.  FEDERAL  ELECTION  COMM’N 

Opinion of Stevens, J. 

from  those  of  their  members  and  of  the  public  in  receiving 
information,” Beaumont, 539 U. S., at 161, n. 8 (citation omit­
ted).  Campaign  ﬁnance  distinctions  based  on  corporate 
identity  tend  to  be  less  worrisome,  in  other  words,  because 
the  “speakers”  are  not  natural  persons,  much  less  members 
of  our  political  community,  and  the  governmental  interests 
are  of  the  highest  order.  Furthermore,  when  corporations, 
as a class, are distinguished from noncorporations, as a class, 
there is a lesser risk that regulatory distinctions will reﬂect 
invidious discrimination or political favoritism. 

If  taken  seriously,  our  colleagues’  assumption  that  the 
identity  of  a  speaker  has  no  relevance  to  the  Government’s 
ability  to  regulate  political  speech  would  lead  to  some  re­
markable  conclusions.  Such  an  assumption  would  have  ac­
corded  the  propaganda  broadcasts  to  our  troops  by  “Tokyo 
Rose”  during  World  War  II  the  same  protection  as  speech 
by  Allied  commanders.  More  pertinently,  it  would  appear 
to  afford  the  same  protection  to  multinational  corporations 
controlled  by  foreigners  as  to  individual  Americans:  To  do 
otherwise,  after  all,  could  “ ‘enhance  the  relative  voice’ ”  of 
some (i. e., humans) over others (i. e., nonhumans).  Ante, at 
349–350  (quoting  Buckley,  424  U. S.,  at  49).51  Under  the 

51 The  Court  all  but  confesses  that  a  categorical  approach  to  speaker 
identity  is  untenable  when  it  acknowledges  that  Congress  might  be  al­
lowed to take measures aimed at “preventing foreign individuals or associ­
ations  from  inﬂuencing  our  Nation’s  political  process.”  Ante,  at  362. 
Such  measures  have  been  a  part  of  U. S.  campaign  ﬁnance  law  for  many 
years.  The  notion  that  Congress  might  lack  the  authority  to  distinguish 
foreigners from citizens in the regulation of electioneering would certainly 
have  surprised  the  Framers,  whose  “obsession  with  foreign  inﬂuence  de­
rived from a fear that foreign powers and individuals had no basic invest­
ment  in  the  well-being  of  the  country.”  Teachout,  The  Anti-Corruption 
Principle, 94 Cornell L. Rev. 341, 393, n. 245 (2009) (hereinafter Teachout); 
see  also  U. S.  Const.,  Art.  I,  § 9,  cl.  8  (“[N]o  Person  holding  any  Ofﬁce  of 
Proﬁt  or  Trust  .  .  .  shall,  without  the  Consent  of  the  Congress,  accept  of 
any  present,  Emolument,  Ofﬁce,  or  Title,  of  any  kind  whatever,  from  any 
King, Prince, or foreign State”).  Professor Teachout observes that a cor­