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12 

HOLLYFRONTIER CHEYENNE REFINING, LLC v. 
RENEWABLE FUELS ASSN. 
Opinion of the Court 

to seek and obtain extensions forever.  See Brief for Federal 
Respondent 43, n. 7; Brief for Industry Respondents 39. 

Additionally, even assuming (without granting) that sub-
paragraph (B) really did represent only some sort of excep-
tion to a general 2013 deadline, we still don’t see how that
would help.  The respondents urge us to construe statutory 
exceptions  narrowly.  But  this  Court  has  made  clear  that 
statutory exceptions are to be read fairly, not narrowly, for 
they “are no less part of Congress’s work than its rules and 
standards—and  all  are  worthy  of  a  court’s  respect.”    BP 
p.l.c.  v.  Mayor  and  City  Council  of  Baltimore,  ante,  at  6. 
And fairly read, the key phrase at issue before us—“A small 
refinery may at any time petition the Administrator for an 
extension of the exemption under subparagraph (A) for the 
reason  of  disproportionate  economic  hardship”—simply 
does not contain the continuity requirement the court of ap-
peals supposed.  Instead, more naturally, it means exactly 
what it says:  A small refinery can apply for (if not always 
receive) a hardship extension “at any time.”3 

Everything  else  the  respondents  offer  in  defense  of  the 

III 

—————— 

3 Rather than argue subparagraph (B)(i) is an exception that should be
construed narrowly, the dissent imagines some weakness in our position
when we observe above that the word extension “can” or “may” be used 
to refer to an increase in time after a lapse.  Supra, at 6.  From this, the 
dissent  supposes  that  we  mean  to  say  “HollyFrontier  wins  because  its 
reading is [merely] possible.”  Post, at 3.  That is mistaken.  As we have 
sought to explain, we simply recognize that the term “extension” may or 
may not convey a continuity requirement depending on context—much
as the dissent acknowledges the term can sometimes tolerate a lapse of 
some sort.  See supra, at 10, n. 2 (discussing subparagraph (A)(1)).  Our 
holding today, too, should be clear.  Rather than rule for HollyFrontier 
because it has advanced a permissible reading, and rather than offer as-
sertions about “common sense” or what seems “more natural” to us, post, 
at  3–5,  we  have  sought  to  explain  why  this  particular  statute’s  usage,
context, and structure persuade us that continuity is not required here.