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CARMELL v. TEXAS

Opinion of the Court

III

As mentioned earlier, Justice Chase and Wooddeson both
cited several examples of ex post facto laws, and, in particu-
lar, cited the case of Sir John Fenwick as an example of the
fourth category. To better understand the type of law that
falls within that category, then, we turn to Fenwick’s case
for preliminary guidance.

Those who remained loyal to James II after he was de-
posed by King William III in the Revolution of 1688 thought
their opportunity for restoration had arrived in 1695, fol-
lowing the death of Queen Mary. 9 T. Macaulay, History of
England 31 (1899) (hereinafter Macaulay). Sir John Fen-
wick, along with other Jacobite plotters including George
Porter and Cardell Goodman, began concocting their scheme
in the spring of that year, and over the next several months
the original circle of conspirators expanded in number.
Id.,
at 32, 47–48, 109–110. Before the conspirators could carry
out their machinations, however, three members of the
group disclosed the plot to William.
Id., at 122–125. One
by one, the participants were arrested, tried, and convicted
Id., at 127–142. Fenwick, though, remained in
of treason.
hiding while the rest of the cabal was brought to justice.
During that time, the trials of his accomplices revealed that
there were only two witnesses among them who could
prove Fenwick’s guilt, Porter and Goodman.
Id., at 170–
171. As luck would have it, an act of Parliament proclaimed
that two witnesses were necessary to convict a person of
high treason. See An Act for Regulateing of Tryals in

(1829) (Johnson, J., concurring); Stoddart v. Smith, 5 Binn. 355, 370
(Pa. 1812) (Brackenridge, J.), was absent with respect to the four cate-
gories. Although Justice Chase’s opinion may have somewhat dampened
the appetite for further debate in the courts, that consideration would not
necessarily have an effect on scholarly discourse, nor does it explain why
judges would be reluctant to express criticism of the four categories, yet
harbor no compunction when it came to criticizing the actual holding of
the Court.