Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/524bv.pdf
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524US2

Unit: $U97

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706

UNITED STATES v. BALSYS

Breyer, J., dissenting

witness against incrimination under state . . . law.” Mur-
phy, supra, at 78. Second, it says explicitly that it “re-
ject[s]” the Murdock rule, not because of considerations of
federalism arising out of Malloy, but because it is “unsup-
ported by history or policy” and represents a “deviation”
from a “correct . . . construction” of the privilege in light of
its “history, policies and purposes.” Murphy, supra, at 77.
Third, about half of the opinion consists of an effort to dem-
onstrate that the privilege, as understood by the English
courts and by American courts prior to Murdock, protected
individuals from compelled testimony in the face of a realistic
threat of prosecution by any sovereign, not simply by the
same sovereign that compelled the testimony. See Murphy,
378 U. S., at 58–70. Fourth, the rest of the Court’s analysis
consists of a discussion of the purposes of the privilege,
which, in the Court’s view, lead to a similar conclusion. See
id., at 55–56. Fifth, the Court explicitly rejects the analysis
of commentators who argued for a “same sovereign” rule on
the ground that their understanding of the privilege’s pur-
poses was incomplete. See id., at 56–57, n. 5 (rejecting 8
J. Wigmore, Evidence § 2258, p. 345 (McNaughton rev. 1961)).
Sixth, the Court nowhere describes its rationale in “silver
platter” or similar terms that could lead one to conclude that
its rule is prophylactic, enforcement based, or rests upon any
rationale other than that the privilege is not limited to pro-
tection against prosecution by the same jurisdiction that
compels the testimony. Cf. 378 U. S., at 80–81 (Harlan, J.,
concurring in judgment).

Consequently, I believe one must read Murphy as standing
for the proposition that the privilege includes protection
against being compelled to testify by the Federal Govern-
ment where that testimony might be used in a criminal
prosecution conducted by another sovereign. And the ques-
tion the Court must consequently face is whether we should
reject the rationale of that case when we answer the ques-