Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/14pdf/13-7120_p86b.pdf
Page Number: 5

Cite as:  576 U. S. ____ (2015) 

3 

Opinion of the Court 

zation that the Bureau suspected was planning to commit 
acts  of  terrorism.  During  the  investigation,  Johnson
disclosed  to  undercover  agents  that  he  had  manufactured 
explosives  and  that  he  planned  to  attack  “the  Mexican
consulate”  in  Minnesota,  “progressive  bookstores,”  and 
“ ‘liberals.’ ”    Revised  Presentence  Investigation  in  No.
0:12CR00104–001 (D. Minn.), p. 15, ¶16.  Johnson showed 
the  agents  his  AK–47  rifle,  several  semiautomatic  fire­
arms, and over 1,000 rounds of ammunition. 

After  his  eventual  arrest,  Johnson  pleaded  guilty  to
being  a  felon  in  possession  of  a  firearm  in  violation  of 
§922(g).  The  Government  requested  an  enhanced  sen­
tence  under  the  Armed  Career  Criminal  Act.    It  argued
that  three  of  Johnson’s  previous  offenses—including  un­
lawful  possession  of  a  short-barreled  shotgun,  see  Minn. 
Stat.  §609.67  (2006)—qualified  as  violent  felonies.    The 
District Court agreed and sentenced Johnson to a 15-year 
prison term under the Act.  The Court of Appeals affirmed.
526 Fed. Appx. 708 (CA8 2013) (per curiam).  We granted
certiorari to decide whether Minnesota’s offense of unlaw­
ful  possession  of  a  short-barreled  shotgun  ranks  as  a
violent  felony  under  the  residual  clause.    572  U. S.  ___ 
(2014).  We later asked the parties to present reargument
addressing  the  compatibility  of  the  residual  clause  with 
the Constitution’s prohibition of vague criminal laws.  574 
U. S. ___ (2015). 

II 

The  Fifth  Amendment  provides  that  “[n]o  person  shall 
. . .  be  deprived  of  life,  liberty,  or  property,  without  due
process of law.”  Our cases establish that the Government 
violates  this  guarantee  by  taking  away  someone’s  life,
liberty,  or  property  under  a  criminal  law  so vague  that  it
fails  to  give  ordinary  people  fair  notice  of  the  conduct  it 
punishes,  or  so  standardless  that  it  invites  arbitrary  en­
forcement.  Kolender  v.  Lawson,  461  U. S.  352,  357–358