Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/22pdf/21-1484_aplc.pdf
Page Number: 17.0

Cite as:  599 U. S. ____ (2023) 

1 

THOMAS, J., concurring 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

_________________ 

Nos. 21–1484 and 22–51 
_________________ 

21–1484 

ARIZONA, ET AL., PETITIONERS 
v. 
NAVAJO NATION, ET AL. 

DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, ET AL., 
PETITIONERS 
v. 
NAVAJO NATION, ET AL. 

22–51 

ON WRITS OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT 

[June 22, 2023]

 JUSTICE THOMAS, concurring. 
I join the Court’s opinion in full, but write separately to
highlight  an  additional  and  troubling  aspect  of  this  suit. 
For decades, this Court has referred to “a general trust re-
lationship between the United States and the Indian peo-
ple.”  United States v. Mitchell, 463 U. S. 206, 225 (1983); 
see  also  Seminole  Nation  v.  United  States,  316  U. S.  286, 
296–297  (1942);  Haaland  v.  Brackeen,  599  U. S.  ___,  ___ 
(2023)  (slip  op.,  at  12).    Here, in  allowing  the  Navajo  Na-
tion’s “breach of trust” claim to go forward, the Ninth Cir-
cuit appears to have understood that language as recogniz-
ing a generic legal duty of the Federal Government toward
Indian tribes or, at least, as placing a thumb on the scale in
favor of declaring that legal duties are owed to tribes.  See 
26 F. 4th 794, 813 (2022).  As the Court explains, the Nation
has pointed to no source of legally enforceable duties sup-
porting its claim in this suit.  But the Ninth Circuit’s rea-
soning reflects deeper problems with this Court’s frequent