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Page Number: 38.0

16 

SNYDER v. UNITED STATES 

JACKSON, J., dissenting 

Ibid.  Last, and perhaps most important, the statute specif-
ically  requires  that  the  official  who  solicits,  accepts,  or
agrees  to  accept  the  payment  do  so  “corruptly”  (the  mens 
rea).  §666(a)(1)(B).  This series of carefully delineated cir-
cumstances—all  of  which  appear  in  the  text  of  §666—
means that payments or gifts to officials will not always be
captured by §666 under any and all circumstances, but only 
if the violator acts in the ways described and with the re-
quired intent.

Notably, the majority takes the last statutory check I de-
scribe—the “corruptly” mens rea requirement—and trans-
forms  it  into  a  reason  to  read  the  statute  to  cover  only
bribes.  See ante, at 7–8, 15.  The majority maintains that 
“corruptly”  signals  that  §666  is  a  bribery  statute  because
§201(b), the federal-official bribery statute, uses that term. 
Ibid.  But, as I have already explained, the bribery statute
for federal officials is not the blueprint the majority makes 
it out to be.  See Part II–B, supra.  And while the majority
suggests that “corruptly” just means quid pro quo, see ante, 
at 8, it can give no reason why that must be so in this stat-
ute. 

Instead, the majority gives a practical justification for its
preferred  interpretation.    It  suggests  that  if  §666  is  read 
generally to apply to gratuities, and “corruptly” is read as a
narrowing  mens  rea  element,  then  the  statute  still  might
sweep  in  all  sorts  of  innocuous  gifts.  See  ante,  at  12–13. 
Maybe.  Maybe not.  Again, the precise meaning of the term
“corruptly” is not the question before us today.  Nor does it 
really  matter  here  because,  whatever  “corruptly”  means, 
Snyder’s  behavior  clearly  fits  the  bill,  making  this  case  a 
poor one to explore the contours of that term.  See Part III– 
A, supra. 

In any event, any uncertainty we might have about “cor-
ruptly” seems unwarranted considering the Court’s previ-
ous  definitions  of  that  word.    In  Arthur  Andersen  LLP  v. 
United States, 544 U. S. 696 (2005), we wrote that the term