Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/18pdf/18-302_e29g.pdf
Page Number: 29.0

4 

IANCU v. BRUNETTI 

Opinion of SOTOMAYOR, J. 

not  pebbles  in  alien  juxtaposition;  they  have  only  a  com-
munal  existence;  and  not  only  does  the  meaning  of  each
interpenetrate  the  other,  but  all  in  their  aggregate  take
their  purport  from  the  setting  in  which  they  are  used.’ ”  
Ibid. (quoting NLRB v. Federbush Co., 121 F. 2d 954, 957 
(CA2  1941)  (L.  Hand,  J.)).  Accordingly,  and  relatedly,
courts should, to the extent possible, read statutes so that
“ ‘no clause, sentence, or word shall be superfluous, void, or 
insignificant.’ ”  TRW  Inc.  v.  Andrews,  534  U. S.  19,  31 
(2001).1 

Here, Congress used not only the word “scandalous,” but
also  the  words  “immoral”  and  “disparage,”  in  the  same 
block  of  statutory  text—each  as  a  separate  feature  that 
could  render  a  mark  unregistrable.  See  §1052(a).    Tam 
already decided that “disparage” served to prohibit marks
that  were  offensive  because  they  derided  a  particular 
person  or  group.    See  582  U. S.,  at  ___  (opinion  of  ALITO, 
J.) (slip op., at 22) (“It denies registration to any mark that 
is offensive to a substantial percentage of the members of 
any group”); id., at ___ (opinion of Kennedy, J.) (slip op., at 
2) (“[A]n applicant may register a positive or benign mark 
but not a derogatory one”).  That defines one of the three 
words.  Meanwhile,  as  the  majority  explains,  the  word
“immoral” prohibits marks that are offensive because they 
transgress widely held moral beliefs.  See ante, at 5.  That 
defines a second of the three words. 

With marks that are offensive because they are dispar-
aging  and  marks  that  are  offensive  because  they  are  im-
moral already covered, what work did Congress intend for 

—————— 

1 For  example,  McDonnell  v.  United  States,  579  U. S.  ___  (2016),  in-
volved  a  statute  that  defined  an  “ ‘official  act’ ”  as  “ ‘any  decision  or 
action on any question, matter, cause, suit, proceeding or controversy.’ ” 
Id., at ___ (slip op., at 13).  The Court declined to read “ ‘question’ ” and 
“ ‘matter’ ”  as  covering  “a  typical  meeting,  call,  or  event  arranged  by  a 
public official” because doing so would deprive the words “ ‘cause, suit, 
proceeding or controversy’ ” of meaning.  Id., at ___ (slip op., at 16).