Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/20pdf/19-840_6jfm.pdf
Page Number: 18.0

Cite as:  593 U. S. ____ (2021) 

15 

Opinion of the Court 

operate  without  §5000A(a).  See  §§6055(b)(1)(B)(iii)(II), 
(c)(1) (requiring certification as to whether the beneficiary’s 
plan qualifies for cost-sharing or premium tax credits under
§36B);  §§6056(b)(2)(B),  (c)(1)  (requiring  certification  as  to 
whether  the  plan  qualifies  as  an  “eligible  employer-spon-
sored  plan”  that  satisfies  §4980H’s  employer  mandate).
These provisions refer to §5000A only to pick up a different
subsection’s  definition  of  “minimum  essential  coverage.”
See  26  U. S. C.  §§6055(e),  6056(b)(2)(B)  (incorporating
§5000A(f)’s definition of “minimum essential coverage”).  To 
show that the minimum essential coverage requirement is
unconstitutional would not show that enforcement of any of
these other provisions violates the Constitution.  The state 
plaintiffs do not claim the contrary.  The Government’s con-
duct  in  question  is  therefore  not  “fairly  traceable”  to  en-
forcement of the “allegedly unlawful” provision of which the
plaintiffs complain—§5000A(a).  Allen, 468 U. S., at 751. 

The state plaintiffs complain of other pocketbook injuries. 
They say, for example, that, in order to avoid a “substantial
tax penalty,” they will have to “offer their full-time employ-
ees (and qualified dependents) minimum essential coverage 
under an eligible employer-sponsored plan.”  Brief for Re-
spondent/Cross-Petitioner  States  23  (internal  quotation
marks  omitted).    They  say  that  the  Act’s  insistence  that 
they “expand Medicaid eligibility” has led to “increas[ed] . . . 
Medicaid  expenditures.”    Ibid.    And  they  argue  that  “the
[Act]’s vast and complex rules and regulations” will require
additional  expenditures.  Id.,  at  22–23  (citing  App.  152– 
153, 174, 190–191).  They seem to argue that they will have
to pay more to expand coverage for employees who work 30–
39 hours per week, see App. 174, and for those who become 
too old to remain in foster care, see id., at 152–153. 

Again,  the  problem  for  the  state  plaintiffs  is  that  these 
other  provisions  also  operate  independently  of  §5000A(a). 
See 26 U. S. C. §4980H(a) (establishing an employer man-
date);  §4980H(c)(4)  (establishing  employee  eligibility  for