Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/14pdf/13-1034_3dq4.pdf
Page Number: 15.0

12 

MELLOULI v. LYNCH 

Opinion of the Court 

substance  so  long  as  there  is  “nearly  a  complete  overlap” 
between the drugs controlled under state and federal law.
719  F. 3d,  at  1000.10    The  Eighth  Circuit’s  analysis,  how-
ever, scarcely explains or ameliorates the BIA’s anomalous
separation of paraphernalia possession offenses from drug 
possession and distribution offenses.

Apparently  recognizing  this  problem,  the  Government
urges, as does the dissent, that the overlap between state
and federal drug schedules supports the removal of aliens 
convicted  of  any  drug  crime,  not  just  paraphernalia  of-
fenses.  As noted, §1227(a)(2)(B)(i) authorizes the removal
of any alien “convicted of a violation of . . . any law or reg-
ulation  of  a  State,  the  United  States,  or  a  foreign 
country  relating  to  a  controlled  substance  (as  defined  in
[§802]).”  According to the Government, the words “relating to”
modify  “law  or  regulation,”  rather  than  “violation.”  Brief 
for  Respondent  25–26  (a  limiting  phrase  ordinarily  modi-
fies  the  last  antecedent).  Therefore,  the  Government 
argues,  aliens  who  commit  “drug  crimes”  in  States  whose
drug schedules substantially overlap the federal schedules 
are  removable,  for  “state  statutes  that  criminalize  hun-
dreds of federally controlled drugs and a handful of similar 
substances,  are  laws  ‘relating  to’  federally  controlled 
substances.”  Brief for Respondent 17.

We  do  not  gainsay  that,  as  the  Government  urges,  the
last  reasonable  referent  of  “relating  to,”  as  those  words
appear  in  §1227(a)(2)(B)(i),  is  “law  or  regulation.”    The 
removal provision is thus satisfied when the elements that 
make up the state crime of conviction relate to a federally
controlled  substance.    As  this  case  illustrates,  however, 
the  Government’s  construction  of  the  federal  removal 

—————— 

10 The BIA posited, but did not rely on, a similar rationale in Martinez 
Espinoza.  See  25  I. & N.  Dec.,  118,  121  (2009)  (basing  decision  on  a
“distinction between crimes involving the possession or distribution of a 
particular  drug  and  those  involving  other  conduct  associated  with  the
drug trade in general”).