Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/14pdf/14-7955_aplc.pdf
Page Number: 121.0

Cite as:  576 U. S. ____ (2015) 

25 

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting 

constitutional.  553  U. S.,  at  94  (THOMAS,  J.,  concurring 
in  judgment).    But  this  understanding  of  the  Eighth
Amendment’s intent requirement is unrelated to, and thus
not  any  broader  or  narrower  than,  the  requirement  the
Court now divines from Baze.  Because the position that a 
plaintiff  challenging  a  method  of  execution  under  the
Eighth  Amendment  must  prove  the  availability  of  an 
alternative  means  of  execution  did  not  “represent  the
views of a majority of the Court,” it was not the holding of 
the Baze Court.  CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 
481 U. S. 69, 81 (1987).

In  any  event,  even  the  Baze  plurality  opinion  provides
no  support  for  the  Court’s  proposition.    To  be  sure,  that 
opinion contains the following sentence: “[The condemned] 
must show that the risk is substantial when compared to
the  known  and  available  alternatives.”    553  U. S.,  at  61. 
But the meaning of that key sentence and the limits of the
requirement  it  imposed  are  made  clear  by  the  sentence 
directly  preceding  it:  “A  stay  of  execution  may  not  be 
granted on grounds such as those asserted here unless the 
condemned  prisoner  establishes  that  the  State’s  lethal 
injection  protocol  creates  a  demonstrated  risk  of  severe
pain.”  Ibid. (emphasis added).  In Baze, the very premise
of the petitioners’ Eighth Amendment claim was that they
had  “identified  a  significant  risk  of  harm  [in  Kentucky’s 
protocol]  that  [could]  be  eliminated  by  adopting  alterna­
tive  procedures.”  Id.,  at  51.  Their  basic  theory  was  that 
even if the risk of pain was only, say, 25%, that risk would 
be  objectively  intolerable  if  there was  an  obvious  alterna­
tive that would reduce the risk to 5%.  See Brief for Peti­
tioners in Baze v. Rees, O. T. 2007, No. 07–5439, p. 29 (“In
view  of  the  severity  of  the  pain  risked  and  the  ease  with 
which  it  could  be  avoided,  Petitioners  should  not  have 
been  required  to  show  a  high  likelihood  that  they  would 
suffer  such  pain  . . . ”).    Thus,  the  “grounds  . . .  asserted” 
for relief in Baze were that the State’s protocol was intol­