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CHICAGO v. FULTON 

Syllabus 

filed.  Respondents’ alternative reading would create at least two seri-
ous problems.  First, reading §362(a)(3) to cover mere retention of prop-
erty would render §542’s central command—that an entity in posses-
sion  of  certain  estate  property  “shall  deliver  to  the  trustee  . . .  such 
property”—largely  superfluous,  even  though  §542  appears  to  be  the
provision governing the turnover of estate property.  Second, respond-
ents’ reading would render the commands of §362(a)(3) and §542 con-
tradictory.    Section  542  carves  out  exceptions  to  the  turnover  com-
mand.    Under  respondents’  reading,  an  entity  would  be  required  to
turn over property under §362(a)(3) even if that property were exempt 
from turnover under §542.  The history of the Bankruptcy Code con-
firms the better reading.  The Code originally included both §362(a)(3)
and §542(a), but the former provision lacked the phrase “or to exercise 
control over property of the estate.”  When that phrase was later added
by amendment, Congress made no mention of transforming §362(a)(3)
into an affirmative turnover obligation.  It is unlikely that Congress 
would  have  made  such  an  important  change  simply  by  adding  the 
phrase  “exercise  control,”  rather  than  by  adding  a  cross-reference  to 
§542(a) or some other indication that it was so transforming §362(a)(3).
Pp. 3–7. 

 926 F. 3d 916, vacated and remanded. 

ALITO, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which all other Mem-
bers joined, except BARRETT, J., who took no part in the consideration or 
decision of the case.  SOTOMAYOR, J., filed a concurring opinion.