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Page Number: 15

2 

AMERICAN EXPRESS CO. v. ITALIAN COLORS 

RESTAURANT 
KAGAN, J., dissenting 

created rights.  That doctrine bars applying such a clause 
when (but only when) it operates to confer immunity from
potentially  meritorious  federal  claims.    In  so  doing,  the
rule reconciles the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) with all 
the  rest  of  federal  law—and  indeed,  promotes  the  most 
fundamental purposes of the FAA itself.  As applied here, 
the rule would ensure that Amex’s arbitration clause does 
not  foreclose  Italian  Colors  from  vindicating  its  right  to 
redress antitrust harm. 

The  majority  barely  tries  to  explain  why  it  reaches  a
contrary  result.    It  notes  that  we  have  not  decided  this 
exact  case  before—neglecting  that  the  principle  we  have
established fits this case hand in glove.  And it concocts a 
special  exemption  for  class-arbitration  waivers—ignoring
that  this  case  concerns  much  more  than  that.    Through-
out,  the  majority  disregards  our  decisions’  central  tenet: 
An  arbitration  clause  may  not  thwart  federal  law,  ir-
respective  of  exactly  how  it  does  so.    Because  the  Court 
today prevents the effective vindication of federal statutory 
rights, I respectfully dissent. 

I 

Start  with  an  uncontroversial  proposition:  We  would 
refuse  to  enforce  an  exculpatory  clause  insulating  a  com-
pany  from  antitrust  liability—say,  “Merchants  may  bring 
no  Sherman  Act  claims”—even  if  that  clause  were  con-
tained in an arbitration agreement.  See ante, at 6.  Con-
gress  created  the  Sherman  Act’s  private  cause  of  action 
not  solely  to  compensate  individuals,  but  to  promote  “the 
public  interest  in  vigilant  enforcement  of  the  antitrust
laws.”  Lawlor v. National Screen Service Corp., 349 U. S. 
322,  329  (1955).  Accordingly,  courts  will  not  enforce  a 
prospective  waiver  of  the  right  to  gain  redress  for  an 
antitrust  injury,  whether  in  an  arbitration  agreement  or
any  other  contract.    See  Mitsubishi  Motors  Corp.  v.  Soler 
Chrysler-Plymouth,  Inc.,  473  U. S.  614,  637,  and  n.  19