Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/18pdf/17-1011_mkhn.pdf
Page Number: 18.0

Cite as:  586 U. S. ____ (2019) 

15 

Opinion of the Court 

And  even  if  an  international  development  bank’s  lend-
ing  activity  does  qualify  as  commercial,  that  does  not 
mean  the  organization  is  automatically  subject  to  suit.
The  FSIA  includes  other  requirements  that  must  also  be 
met.  For  one  thing,  the  commercial  activity  must  have  a
sufficient  nexus  to  the  United  States.  See  28  U. S. C. 
§§1603, 1605(a)(2).  For another, a lawsuit must be “based 
upon”  either  the  commercial  activity  itself  or  acts  per-
formed  in  connection  with  the  commercial  activity.  See 
§1605(a)(2).  Thus,  if  the  “gravamen”  of  a  lawsuit  is  tor-
tious activity abroad, the suit is not “based upon” commer-
cial activity within the meaning of the FSIA’s commercial
activity exception.  See OBB Personenverkehr AG v. Sachs, 
577 U. S. ___, ___–___ (2015); Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 
U. S. 349, 356–359 (1993).  At oral argument in this case,
the Government stated that it has “serious doubts” whether 
petitioners’ suit, which largely concerns allegedly tortious
conduct  in  India,  would  satisfy  the  “based  upon”  require-
ment.  Tr. of Oral Arg. 25–26.  In short, restrictive immun-
ity  hardly  means  unlimited  exposure  to  suit  for  interna-
tional organizations. 

* 

* 

* 
The International Organizations Immunities Act grants
international  organizations  the  “same  immunity”  from
suit  “as  is  enjoyed  by  foreign  governments”  at  any  given
time.  Today,  that  means  that  the  Foreign  Sovereign 
Immunities  Act  governs  the  immunity  of  international 
organizations.  The  International  Finance  Corporation  is
therefore not absolutely immune from suit. 

The judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the D. C. Circuit is reversed, and the case is remanded for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

It is so ordered.