Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/06pdf/05-1120.pdf
Page Number: 42.0

4 

MASSACHUSETTS v. EPA 

ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting 

reasoned  that  Georgia—in  its  capacity  as  a  “quasi-
sovereign”—“has  an  interest  independent  of  and  behind 
the titles of its citizens, in all the earth and air within its 
domain.”  Id.,  at  237.  The  Court  explained  that  while 
“[t]he  very  elements  that  would  be  relied  upon  in  a  suit 
between  fellow-citizens  as  a  ground  for  equitable  relief
[were]  wanting,”  a  State  “is  not  lightly  to  be  required  to
give up quasi-sovereign rights for pay.”  Ibid.  Thus while 
a complaining private litigant would have to make do with 
a  legal  remedy—one  “for  pay”—the  State  was  entitled  to 
equitable relief.  See id., at 237–238. 

In contrast to the present case, there was no question in 
Tennessee Copper about Article III injury.  See id., at 238– 
239.  There  was  certainly  no  suggestion  that  the  State 
could  show  standing  where  the  private  parties  could  not; 
there  was  no  dispute,  after  all,  that  the  private  landown-
ers had “an action at law.”  Id., at 238.  Tennessee Copper
has since stood for nothing more than a State’s right, in an
original  jurisdiction  action,  to  sue  in  a  representative
capacity as  parens  patriae.  See, e.g., Maryland v. Louisi-
ana,  451  U. S.  725,  737  (1981).    Nothing  about  a  State’s
ability to sue in that capacity dilutes the bedrock require-
ment  of  showing  injury,  causation,  and  redressability  to 
satisfy Article III.

A  claim  of  parens  patriae  standing  is  distinct  from  an 
allegation of direct injury.  See Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 
U. S.  437,  448–449,  451  (1992).    Far  from  being  a  substi-
tute  for  Article  III  injury,  parens  patriae  actions  raise  an 
additional hurdle for a state litigant: the articulation of a
“quasi-sovereign  interest”  “apart  from  the  interests  of 
particular private parties.”  Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. 
Puerto  Rico  ex  rel.  Barez,  458  U. S.  592,  607  (1982)  (em-
phasis  added)  (cited  ante,  at  16).    Just  as  an  association 
suing on behalf of its members must show not only that it 
represents  the  members  but  that  at  least  one  satisfies 
Article  III  requirements,  so  too  a  State  asserting  quasi-