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Page Number: 40

10 

BARR v. AMERICAN ASSN. OF POLITICAL  
CONSULTANTS, INC. 
Opinion of BREYER, J. 

restrictive ways of doing so.  Narrow tailoring in this con-
text,  however,  does  not  necessarily  require  the  use  of  the 
least-restrictive  means  of  furthering  those  objectives.    Cf. 
Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U. S. 781, 797–799, and 
n. 6 (1989) (explaining that outside of strict scrutiny review,
narrow  tailoring  does  not  require  the  use  of  least-restric-
tive-means analysis).  That inquiry ultimately evaluates a
restriction’s  speech-related  harms  in  light  of  its  justifica-
tions.  We have typically called this approach “intermediate 
scrutiny,”  though  we  have  sometimes  referred  to  it  as  an 
assessment  of  “fit,”  sometimes  called  it  “proportionality,” 
and  sometimes  just  applied  it  without  using  a  label.  See 
United  States  v.  Alvarez,  567  U. S.  709,  730–731  (2012) 
(BREYER,  J.,  concurring  in  judgment);  Reed,  576  U. S.,  at 
179 (BREYER, J., concurring in judgment).

Applying  this  Court’s  intermediate  scrutiny  analysis,  I 
would  begin  by  asking  just  what  the  First  Amendment 
harm is here.  As JUSTICE KAVANAUGH notes, the govern-
ment-debt exception provides no basis for undermining the
general cell phone robocall restriction.  Ante, at 10–11.  In-
deed, looking at the government-debt exception in context, 
we can see that the practical effect of the exception, taken
together with the rest of the statute, is to put non-govern-
ment debt collectors at a disadvantage.  Their speech oper-
ates  in  the  same  sphere  as  government-debt  collection 
speech, communicates comparable messages, and yet does
not have the benefit of a particular instrument of commu-
nication  (robocalls).  While  this  is  a  speech-related  harm, 
debt-collection speech is both commercial and highly regu-
lated.  See Brief for Petitioners 20–21 (describing multiple 
restrictions imposed by the Fair Debt Collection Practices 
Act on communications by debt collectors in the course of 
debt collection).  The speech-related harm at issue here—
and any related effect on the marketplace of ideas—is mod-
est.