Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/22pdf/21-1086_1co6.pdf
Page Number: 81

36 

ALLEN v. MILLIGAN 

THOMAS, J., dissenting 

plans or districts as insufficiently tailored to that asserted 
interest.  See, e.g., Wisconsin Legislature, 595 U. S., at ___ 
(slip op., at 3); Cooper v. Harris, 581 U. S. 285, 292 (2017); 
Shaw II, 517 U. S., at 915; Miller, 515 U. S., at 921.  But we 
have never applied this assumption to uphold a districting 
plan that would otherwise violate the Constitution, and the 
slightest  reflection  on  first  principles  should  make  clear 
why it would be problematic to do so.18  The Constitution is 
supreme over statutes, not vice versa.  Marbury v. Madison, 
1 Cranch 137, 178 (1803).  Therefore, if complying with a 
federal statute would require a State to engage in unconsti-
tutional racial discrimination, the proper conclusion is not 
that the statute excuses the State’s discrimination, but that 
the statute is invalid. 
  If Congress has any power at all to require States to sort 
voters into congressional districts based on race, that power 
must  flow  from  its  authority  to  “enforce”  the  Fourteenth 
and  Fifteenth  Amendments  “by  appropriate  legislation.”  
Amdt.  14,  §5;  Amdt.  15,  §2.    Since  Congress  in  1982  re-
placed intent with effects as the criterion of liability, how-
ever, “a violation of §2 is no longer a fortiori a violation of ” 
either Amendment.  Bossier Parish School Bd., 520 U. S., 
at  482.    Thus,  §2  can  be  justified  only  under  Congress’ 
power to “enact reasonably prophylactic legislation to deter 
constitutional  harm.”    Allen  v.  Cooper,  589  U. S.  ___,  ___ 
(2020)  (slip  op.,  at  11)  (alteration  and  internal  quotation 
marks omitted); see City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U. S. 507, 
  Because  Congress’  prophylactic- 
517–529 

(1997). 

—————— 

18 In  Bethune-Hill  v.  Virginia  State  Bd.  of  Elections,  580  U. S.  178 
(2017),  the  Court  upheld  a  race-predominant  district  based  on  the  as-
sumed compelling interest of complying with §5 of the Voting Rights Act.  
Id., at 193–196.  There, the Court was explicit that it was still merely 
“assum[ing],  without  deciding,”  that  the  asserted interest  was  compel-
ling, as the plaintiffs “d[id] not dispute that compliance with §5 was a 
compelling interest at the relevant time.”  Id., at 193.