Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/16pdf/15-577_khlp.pdf
Page Number: 11

Cite as:  582 U. S. ____ (2017) 

7 

Opinion of the Court 

lics,  Lutherans,  Mohammedans,  Baptists,  Jews,  Method-
ists,  Non-believers,  Presbyterians,  or  the  members  of  any
other faith, because of their faith, or lack of it, from receiv-
ing the benefits of public welfare legislation.”  Id., at 16. 

Three  decades  later,  in  McDaniel  v.  Paty,  the  Court 
struck down under the Free Exercise Clause a Tennessee 
statute  disqualifying  ministers  from  serving  as  delegates 
to  the  State’s  constitutional  convention.    Writing  for  the 
plurality,  Chief  Justice  Burger  acknowledged  that  Ten-
nessee  had  disqualified  ministers  from  serving  as  legisla-
tors  since  the  adoption  of  its  first  Constitution  in  1796,
and  that  a  number  of  early  States  had  also  disqualified 
ministers from legislative office.  This historical tradition, 
however, did not change the fact that the statute discrimi-
nated  against  McDaniel  by  denying  him  a  benefit  solely 
because  of  his  “status  as  a  ‘minister.’ ”    435  U. S.,  at  627. 
McDaniel  could  not  seek  to  participate  in  the  convention 
while  also  maintaining  his  role  as  a  minister;  to  pursue 
the one, he would have to give up the other.  In this way,
said  Chief  Justice  Burger,  the  Tennessee  law  “effectively
penalizes  the  free  exercise  of  [McDaniel’s]  constitutional 
liberties.”  Id.,  at  626  (quoting  Sherbert  v.  Verner,  374 
U. S.  398,  406  (1963);  internal  quotation  marks  omitted).
Joined  by  Justice  Marshall  in  concurrence,  Justice  Bren-
nan added that “because the challenged provision requires 
[McDaniel] to purchase his right to engage in the ministry 
by sacrificing his candidacy it impairs the free exercise of 
his religion.”  McDaniel, 435 U. S., at 634. 

In recent years, when this Court has rejected free exer-
cise  challenges,  the  laws  in  question  have  been  neutral
and  generally  applicable  without  regard  to  religion.    We 
have been careful to distinguish such laws from those that 
single out the religious for disfavored treatment.

For  example,  in  Lyng  v.  Northwest  Indian  Cemetery 
Protective  Association,  485  U. S.  439  (1988),  we  held  that 
the Free Exercise Clause did not prohibit the Government