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12 

UNITED STATES v. TAYLOR 

Opinion of the Court 

549 U. S. 183 (2007).  There, this Court sought to apply pro-
visions of the Immigration and Nationality Act.  Id., at 185. 
Under the INA, an individual with a prior state-court con-
viction that meets certain “generic” offense definitions un-
der  federal  law  may  face  deportation.    Id.,  at  186,  189; 
see  also  8 U. S. C.  §§ 1101(a)(43)(G),  1227(a)(2)(A)(iii).    In 
Duenas-Alvarez, there was no doubt that the relevant state 
offense overlapped significantly with the federal definition 
of  generic  “theft.”    549  U. S.,  at  190.    But,  Mr.  Duenas-
Alvarez  argued,  state  courts  had  interpreted  the  offense 
broadly to reach aiding and abetting conduct that fell “be-
yond generic theft.”  Id., at 190–191.  To test this assertion, 
the Court looked to state decisional law and asked whether 
a “realistic probability” existed that the State “would apply 
its statute to conduct that falls outside” the federal generic
definition.  Id., at 193. 

None  of  this  begins  to  help  the  government  for  at  least 
two  reasons.  First,  the  immigration  statute  at  issue  in 
Duenas-Alvarez  required  a  federal  court  to  make  a  judg-
ment  about  the  meaning  of  a  state  statute.    Appreciating
the respect due state courts as the final arbiters of state law 
in  our  federal  system,  this  Court  reasoned  that  it  made 
sense to consult how a state court would interpret its own 
State’s  laws.    Cf.  Estate  of  Thornton  v.  Caldor,  Inc.,  472 
U. S. 703, 709, n. 8 (1985).  Meanwhile, no such federalism 
concern  is  in  play  here.    The  statute  before  us  asks  only
whether  the  elements  of  one  federal  law  align  with  those 
prescribed 
in  Duenas-
Alvarez  the  elements  of  the  relevant  state  and  federal  of-
fenses clearly overlapped and the only question the Court 
faced was whether state courts also “appl[ied] the statute 
in  [a]  special  (nongeneric)  manner.”  549  U. S.,  at  193. 
Here,  we  do  not  reach  that  question  because  there  is  no
overlap to begin with.  Attempted Hobbs Act robbery does 
not  require  proof  of  any  of  the  elements  § 924(c)(3)(A)  de-
mands.  That  ends  the  inquiry,  and  nothing  in  Duenas-

another. 

Second, 

in