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Page Number: 15

12 

FISHER v. UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN 

Opinion of the Court 

These  expressions  of  the  controlling  standard  are  at 
odds  with  Grutter’s  command  that  “all  racial  classifica-
tions  imposed  by  government  ‘must  be  analyzed  by  a 
reviewing  court  under  strict  scrutiny.’ ”  539  U. S.,  at  326 
(quoting  Adarand  Constructors,  Inc.  v.  Peña,  515  U. S. 
200, 227 (1995)).  In Grutter, the Court approved the plan 
at  issue  upon  concluding  that  it  was  not  a  quota,  was 
sufficiently  flexible,  was  limited  in  time,  and  followed 
“serious, good faith consideration of workable race-neutral 
alternatives.”  539  U. S.,  at  339.    As  noted  above,  see 
supra,  at  1,  the  parties  do  not  challenge,  and  the  Court 
therefore  does  not  consider,  the  correctness  of  that 
determination. 

Grutter  did  not  hold  that  good  faith  would  forgive  an
impermissible  consideration  of  race.  It  must  be  remem-
bered  that  “the  mere  recitation  of  a  ‘benign’  or  legitimate 
purpose for a racial classification is entitled to little or no 
weight.”  Croson,  488  U. S.,  at  500.    Strict  scrutiny  does
not  permit  a  court  to  accept  a  school’s  assertion  that  its
admissions process uses race in a permissible way without 
a  court  giving  close  analysis  to  the  evidence  of  how  the
process works in practice. 

The  higher  education  dynamic  does  not  change  the
narrow  tailoring  analysis  of  strict  scrutiny  applicable  in 
other  contexts.  “[T]he  analysis  and  level  of  scrutiny  ap-
plied to determine the validity of [a racial] classification do 
not  vary  simply  because  the  objective  appears  acceptable 
. . . .    While  the  validity  and  importance  of  the  objective 
may affect the outcome of the analysis, the analysis itself 
does not change.”  Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 
458 U. S. 718, 724, n. 9 (1982). 

The  District  Court  and  Court  of  Appeals  confined  the 
strict  scrutiny  inquiry  in  too  narrow  a  way  by  deferring
to the University’s good faith in its use of racial classifica-
tions  and  affirming  the  grant  of  summary  judgment  on
that basis.  The Court vacates that judgment, but fairness