Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/23pdf/22-915_8o6b.pdf
Page Number: 35

Cite as:  602 U. S. ____ (2024) 

7 

GORSUCH, J., concurring 

before us does not pose the question whether the challenged 
statute  is  always  lawfully  applied,  or  whether  other  stat-
utes  might  be  permissible,  but  only  whether  this  one  has 
any  lawful  scope.  Nor  should  future  litigants  and  courts
read any more into our decision than that.  As this Court 
has long recognized, what we say in our opinions must “be
taken  in  connection  with  the  case  in  which  those  expres-
sions  are  used,”  Cohens  v.  Virginia,  6  Wheat.  264,  399 
(1821),  and  may  not  be  “stretch[ed]  . . .  beyond  their  con-
text,” Brown v. Davenport, 596 U. S. 118, 141 (2022). 

Among  all  the  opinions  issued  in  this  case,  its  central 
messages should not be lost.  The Court reinforces the focus 
on text, history, and tradition, following exactly the path we
described in Bruen.  Ante, at 5–8.  And after carefully con-
sulting  those  materials,  the  Court  “conclude[s]  only  this”: 
“An individual found by a court to pose a credible threat to
the physical safety of another may be temporarily disarmed
consistent with the Second Amendment.”  Ante, at 17 (em-
phasis  added).  With  these  observations,  I  am  pleased  to 
concur.