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GEISSAL v. MOORE MEDICAL CORP.

Opinion of the Court

the beneﬁciary’s other group health plan.9 See 114 F. 3d, at
1464–1465; accord, National Cos. Health Beneﬁt Plan v. St.
Joseph’s Hosp., Inc., 929 F. 2d, at 1571; Brock v. Primedica,
Inc., 904 F. 2d 295, 297 (CA5 1990). When there is such a
gap, some courts have explained, it cannot be said that the
employee is truly “covered” by his pre-existing insurance
coverage. See 114 F. 3d, at 1463; National Cos. Health Ben-
eﬁt Plan v. St. Joseph’s Hosp., Inc., supra, at 1571.

This “signiﬁcant gap” approach to § 1162(2)(D)(i) is plagued
with difﬁculties, however, beginning with the sheer absence
of any statutory support for it. Section 1162(2)(D)(i) makes
no mention of what to do when a person’s other coverage is
generally inadequate or inferior; instead, it provides merely
that coverage under a later acquired group health plan will
not terminate COBRA rights when that plan limits or ex-
cludes coverage for a pre-existing condition of the beneﬁ-
ciary. The proviso applies not when there is a “gap” or dif-
ference between the respective coverages of the two policies,
but when the later acquired group coverage excludes or lim-
its coverage speciﬁc to the beneﬁciary’s pre-existing condi-
It is this “gap” between different coverage provisions
tion.
of the non-COBRA plan, not a gap between the coverage
provisions of the COBRA plan and the non-COBRA plan,
that Congress was legislating about.

But even leaving textual inadequacy aside, there is further
trouble under the “signiﬁcant gap” approach. Needless to
say, when the proviso (as written) arguably does apply, its
applicability is easy to determine. Once the beneﬁciary’s
pre-existing condition is identiﬁed, a court need only look
among the terms of the later policy for an exclusion or limita-

9 The lower courts have disagreed about whether this “signiﬁcant gap”
interpretation should be made by evaluating the actual expenses an em-
ployee incurs as a result of COBRA cancellation, or by comparing the
policies’ provisions in light of the information available to the employer on
the day of the COBRA election. See 114 F. 3d, at 1464–1465 (comparing
approaches).