Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/558bv.pdf
Page Number: 200.0

Cite as: 558 U. S. 30 (2009) 

39 

Per Curiam 

professional errors,  the result of the  proceeding would have 
been  different.”  Id.,  at  694.  Finally,  Porter  is  entitled 
to  relief  only  if  the  state  court’s  rejection  of  his  claim  of  in­
effective  assistance  of  counsel  was  “contrary  to,  or  involved 
an  unreasonable  application  of,”  Strickland,  or  it  rested 
“on  an  unreasonable  determination  of  the  facts  in  light  of 
the  evidence  presented  in  the  State  court  proceeding.”  28 
U. S. C. § 2254(d). 

Because  the  state  court  did  not  decide  whether  Porter’s 
counsel  was  deﬁcient,  we  review  this  element  of  Porter’s 
Strickland claim de novo.  Rompilla v.  Beard, 545 U. S. 374, 
390 (2005).  It is unquestioned that under the prevailing pro­
fessional  norms  at  the  time  of  Porter’s  trial,  counsel  had  an 
“obligation to conduct a thorough investigation of the defend­
ant’s  background.”  Williams  v.  Taylor,  529  U. S.  362,  396 
(2000).  The  investigation  conducted  by  Porter’s  counsel 
clearly did not satisfy those norms. 

Although Porter had initially elected to represent himself, 
his standby counsel became his counsel for the penalty phase 
a  little  over  a  month  prior  to  the  sentencing  proceeding  be­
fore  the  jury.  It  was  the  ﬁrst  time  this  lawyer  had  repre­
sented  a  defendant  during  a  penalty-phase  proceeding.  At 
the postconviction hearing, he testiﬁed that he had only one 
short meeting with Porter regarding the penalty phase.  He 
did  not  obtain  any  of  Porter’s  school,  medical,  or  military 
service records or interview any members of Porter’s family. 
In  Wiggins  v.  Smith,  539  U. S.  510,  524,  525  (2003),  we  held 
counsel “fell  short of  . .  . professional  standards” for not  ex­
panding  their  investigation  beyond  the  presentence  investi­
gation  report  and  one  set  of  records  they  obtained,  particu­
larly  “in  light  of  what  counsel  actually  discovered”  in  the 
records.  Here,  counsel  did  not  even  take  the  ﬁrst  step  of 
interviewing witnesses or requesting records.  Cf. Bobby v. 
Van  Hook,  ante,  at  9–12  (holding  performance  not  deﬁcient 
when  counsel  gathered  a  substantial  amount  of  information 
and then made a reasonable decision not to pursue additional