Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/17pdf/17-459_1o13.pdf
Page Number: 23

Cite as:  585 U. S. ____ (2018) 

19 

Opinion of the Court 

the  Government  to  specify  the  time  and  place  of  removal
proceedings,  while  allowing  the  Government  to  change
that  information,  might  encourage  DHS  to  provide  “arbi-
trary  dates  and  times  that  are  likely  to  confuse  and  con-
found  all  who  receive  them.”    Post,  at  8.  The  dissent’s 
argument  wrongly  assumes  that  the  Government  is  ut- 
terly incapable of specifying an accurate date and time on a
notice  to  appear  and  will  instead  engage  in  “arbitrary” 
behavior.  See  ibid.    The  Court  does  not  embrace  those 
unsupported  assumptions.  As  the  Government  concedes, 
“a  scheduling  system  previously  enabled  DHS  and  the
immigration court to coordinate in setting hearing dates in 
some  cases.”    Brief  for  Respondent  50,  n. 15;  Brief  for 
National Immigrant Justice Center as Amicus Curiae 30– 
31.  Given  today’s  advanced  software  capabilities,  it  is
hard  to  imagine  why  DHS  and  immigration  courts  could 
not again work together to schedule hearings before send-
ing notices to appear.

Finally, the dissent’s related contention that including a
changeable  date  would  “mislead”  and  “prejudice”  nonciti-
zens is unfounded.  Post, at 8.  As already explained, if the 
Government changes the date of the removal proceedings,
it  must  provide  written  notice  to  the  noncitizen, 
§1229(a)(2).  This notice requirement mitigates any poten-
tial  confusion  that  may  arise  from  altering  the  hearing 
date.  In  reality,  it  is  the  dissent’s  interpretation  of  the
statute  that  would  “confuse  and  confound”  noncitizens, 
post, at 8, by authorizing the Government to serve notices
that lack any information about the time and place of the
removal proceedings. 

E 
In  a  last  ditch  effort  to  salvage  its  atextual  interpreta-
tion,  the  Government  invokes  the  alleged  purpose  and
legislative  history  of  the  stop-time  rule.    Brief  for  Re-
spondent  37–40.  Even  for  those  who  consider  statutory