Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/19pdf/18-1116_h3cj.pdf
Page Number: 1.0

(Slip Opinion) 

OCTOBER  TERM,  2019 

1 

Syllabus 

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is 
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued. 
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been 
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader. 
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337. 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

Syllabus 

INTEL CORPORATION INVESTMENT POLICY 
COMMITTEE ET AL. v. SULYMA 

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR 
THE NINTH CIRCUIT 

No. 18–1116.  Argued December 4, 2019—Decided February 26, 2020 

The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) requires
plaintiffs with “actual knowledge” of an alleged fiduciary breach to file
suit within three years of gaining that knowledge, 29 U. S. C. §1113(2),
rather than within the 6-year period that would otherwise apply.  Re-
spondent Sulyma worked at Intel Corporation from 2010 to 2012 and
participated in two Intel retirement plans.  In October 2015, he sued 
petitioners—administrators  of  those  plans—alleging  that  they  had 
managed the plans imprudently.  Petitioners countered that the suit 
was untimely under §1113(2) because Sulyma filed it more than three 
years after they had disclosed their investment decisions to him.  Al-
though Sulyma had visited the website that hosted many of these dis-
closures many times, he testified that he did not remember reviewing
the relevant disclosures and that he had been unaware of the allegedly 
imprudent  investments  while  working  at  Intel.    The  District  Court 
granted summary judgment to petitioners under §1113(2).  The Ninth 
Circuit  reversed.    That  court  agreed  with  petitioners  that  Sulyma 
could have known about the investments from the disclosures, but held 
that  his  testimony  created  a  dispute  as  to  when  he  gained  “actual
knowledge” for purposes of §1113(2). 

Held: A  plaintiff  does  not  necessarily  have  “actual  knowledge”  under 
§1113(2) of the information contained in disclosures that he receives 
but does not read or cannot recall reading.  To meet §1113(2)’s “actual
knowledge” requirement, the plaintiff must in fact have become aware
of that information.  Pp. 5–12.

(a) ERISA’s  “plain  and  unambiguous  statutory  language”  must  be 
enforced “according to its terms.”  Hardt v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. 
Co., 560 U. S. 242, 251.  Although ERISA does not define the phrase