Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/19pdf/18-1048_8ok0.pdf
Page Number: 10.0

Cite as:  590 U. S. ____ (2020) 

7 

Opinion of the Court 

certain circumstances, but it does not prevent the applica-
tion of domestic laws that are more generous in enforcing 
arbitration agreements.  Article II(3) contains no exclusion-
ary language; it does not state that arbitration agreements 
shall  be  enforced  only  in  the  identified  circumstances. 
Given  that  the  Convention  was  drafted  against  the  back-
drop of domestic law, it would be unnatural to read Article
II(3) to displace domestic doctrines in the absence of exclu-
sionary language.  Cf. Marx v. General Revenue Corp., 568 
U. S. 371, 380–384 (2013).

This interpretation is especially appropriate in the con-
text of Article II.  Far from displacing domestic law, the pro-
visions  of  Article  II  contemplate  the  use  of  domestic  doc-
trines to fill gaps in the Convention.  For example, Article
II(1)  refers  to  disputes  “capable  of  settlement  by  arbitra-
tion,” but it does not identify what disputes are arbitrable, 
leaving  that  matter  to  domestic  law.  Mitsubishi  Motors 
Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U. S. 614, 639, 
n. 21 (1985).  Similarly, Article II(3) states that it does not
apply to agreements that are “null and void, inoperative or 
incapable  of  being  performed,”  but  it  fails  to  define  those 
terms.  Again, the Convention requires courts to rely on do-
mestic law to fill the gaps; it does not set out a comprehen-
sive regime that displaces domestic law. 

In  sum,  the  only  provision  of  the  Convention  that  ad-
dresses the enforcement of arbitration agreements is Arti-
cle II(3).  We do not read the nonexclusive language of that 
provision  to  set  a  ceiling  that  tacitly  precludes  the  use  of 
domestic  law  to  enforce  arbitration  agreements.    Thus, 
nothing in the text of the Convention “conflict[s] with” the 
application of domestic equitable estoppel doctrines permit-
ted under Chapter 1 of the FAA.  9 U. S. C. §208.  

“Because  a  treaty  ratified  by  the  United  States  is  ‘an 

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