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Page Number: 59.0

14 

MCGIRT v. OKLAHOMA 

ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting 

of the analysis; there is no “magic words” requirement for 
disestablishment, and each individual statute may not be 
considered  in  isolation.   See  supra,  at  10–11;  Hagen,  510 
U. S., at 411, 415–416 (when two statutes “buil[d]” on one 
another in this area, “[both] statutes—as well as those that
came  in  between—must  therefore  be  read  together”);  see 
also  Rosebud  Sioux  Tribe,  430  U. S.,  at  592  (recognizing 
that a statute “cannot, and should not, be read as if it were 
the  first  time  Congress  had  addressed  itself  to”  disestab-
lishment when prior statutes also indicate congressional in-
tent).  In this area, “we are not free to say to Congress: ‘We
see what you are driving at, but you have not said it, and 
therefore  we  shall  go  on  as  before.’ ”  Id.,  at  597  (quoting 
Johnson v. United States, 163 F. 30, 32 (CA1 1908) (Holmes, 
J.)).  Rather, we recognize that the language Congress uses
to accomplish its objective is adapted to the circumstances
it confronts. 

For  example,  “cession”  is  generally  what  a  tribe  does 
when  it  conveys  land  to  a  fellow  sovereign,  such  as  the
United  States  or  another  tribe.  See  Mitchel  v.  United 
States, 9 Pet. 711, 734 (1835); e.g., 1856 Treaty, Art. I, 11
Stat. 699.  But here, given that Congress sought direct al-
lotment to tribe members in order to enable private owner-
ship by both Indians and the 300,000 settlers in the terri-
tory, it would have made little sense to “cede” the lands to
the United States or “restore” the lands to the “public do-
main,”  as  Congress  did  on other  occasions.    So  too  with  a 
“commitment” to “compensate” the Tribe.  Rather than buy-
ing land from the Creek, Congress provided for allotment to
tribe  members  who  could  then  “sell  their  land  to  Indians 
and non-Indians alike.”  Ante, at 10; see Hagen, 510 U. S., 
at 412 (a “definite payment” is not required for disestablish-
ment).  That other allotment statutes have contained vari-
ous  “hallmarks”  of  disestablishment  tells  us  little  about 
Congress’s  intent  here.  Contra,  ante,  at  12–13,  and  n. 5. 
“[W]e have never required any particular form of words” to