Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/17pdf/16-402_h315.pdf
Page Number: 88

Cite as:  585 U. S. ____ (2018) 

17 

ALITO, J., dissenting 

It decides that a “search” of Carpenter occurred within the 
meaning  of  the  Fourth  Amendment,  but  then  it  leaps
straight to imposing requirements that—until this point—
have  governed  only  actual  searches  and  seizures.    See 
ante,  at  18–19.    Lost  in  its  race  to  the  finish  is  any  real
recognition of the century’s worth of precedent it jeopard-
izes.  For the majority, this case is apparently no different
from one in which Government agents raided Carpenter’s 
home and removed records associated with his cell phone. 
Against centuries of precedent and practice, all that the
Court  can  muster  is  the  observation  that  “this  Court  has 
never  held  that  the  Government  may  subpoena  third 
parties  for  records  in  which  the  suspect  has  a  reasonable
expectation  of  privacy.”    Ante,  at  19.  Frankly,  I  cannot
imagine  a  concession  more  damning  to  the  Court’s  argu-
ment than that.  As the Court well knows, the reason that 
we have never seen such a case is because—until today—
defendants categorically had no “reasonable expectation of 
privacy”  and  no  property  interest  in  records  belonging  to 
third  parties.    See  Part  II,  infra.    By  implying  otherwise,
the Court tries the nice trick of seeking shelter under the
cover of precedents that it simultaneously perforates.

Not  only  that,  but  even  if  the  Fourth  Amendment  per-
mitted someone to object to the subpoena of a third party’s 
records,  the  Court  cannot  explain  why  that  individual
should  be  entitled  to  greater  Fourth  Amendment  protec-
tion  than  the  party  actually  being  subpoenaed.    When 
parties are subpoenaed to turn over their records, after all,
they will at most receive the protection afforded by Okla-
homa Press even though they will own and have a reason-
able expectation of privacy in the records at issue.  Under 
the Court’s decision, however, the Fourth Amendment will 
extend  greater  protections  to  someone  else  who  is  not 
being  subpoenaed  and  does  not  own  the  records.    That 
outcome  makes  no  sense,  and  the  Court  does  not  even 
attempt to defend it.