Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/23pdf/23-411_3dq3.pdf
Page Number: 58.0

24 

MURTHY v. MISSOURI 

ALITO, J., dissenting 

claim.18  Government efforts to “dictat[e] the subjects about 
which persons may speak,” First Nat. Bank of Boston v. Bel-
lotti, 435 U. S. 765, 784–785 (1978), or to suppress protected 
speech are “ ‘presumptively unconstitutional,’ ” Rosenberger 
v.  Rector  and  Visitors  of  Univ.  of  Va.,  515  U. S.  819,  830 
(1995).  And  that  is  so  regardless  of  whether  the  Govern-
ment carries out the censorship itself or uses a third party
“ ‘to  accomplish  what  . . .  is  constitutionally  forbidden.’ ”  
Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U. S. 455, 465 (1973). 

As  the  Court  held  more  than  60  years  ago  in  Bantam 
Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U. S. 58 (1963), the Government 
may  not  coerce  or  intimidate  a  third-party  intermediary
into suppressing someone else’s speech.  Id., at 67.  Earlier 
this  Term,  we  reaffirmed  that  important  principle  in  Na-
tional Rifle Association v. Vullo, 602 U. S., at 187–191.  As 
we  said  there,  “a  government  official  cannot  do  indirectly 
what  she  is  barred  from  doing  directly,”  id.,  at  190,  and 
while  an  official  may  forcefully  attempt  to  persuade,
“[w]hat she cannot do . . . is use the power of the State to 
punish or suppress disfavored expression,” id., at 188. 

In Vullo, the alleged conduct was blunt.  The head of the 
state commission with regulatory authority over insurance
companies allegedly told executives at Lloyd’s directly and 
in no uncertain terms that she would be “ ‘less interested’ ” 
in  punishing  the  company’s  regulatory  infractions  if  it
ceased doing business with the National Rifle Association. 
Id.,  at  183.    The  federal  officials’  conduct  here  was  more 

—————— 

18 To obtain a preliminary injunction, Hines was required to establish 
that she is likely to succeed on the merits, that she would otherwise suf-
fer irreparable harm, and that the equities cut in her favor.  Winter v. 
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 555 U. S. 7, 20 (2008).  In a First 
Amendment case, the equities are bound up in the merits.  See Elrod v. 
Burns,  427  U. S.  347,  373  (1976)  (plurality  opinion)  (“The  loss  of  First
Amendment freedoms, for even minimal periods of time, unquestionably
constitutes irreparable injury”).  So I focus on Hines’s likelihood of suc-
cess.