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Page Number: 2

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UNITED STATES v. TAYLOR 

Syllabus 

Taylor’s §924(c) conviction and remanded the case for resentencing.  In 
reaching its judgment, the Fourth Circuit noted that other courts have
held that attempted Hobbs Act robbery does qualify as a crime of vio-
lence under the elements clause. 

Held: Attempted Hobbs Act robbery does not qualify as a “crime of vio-
lence” under §924(c)(3)(A) because no element of the offense requires 
proof that the defendant used, attempted to use, or threatened to use
force.  Pp. 3–13.

(a) The Court applies a “categorical approach” to determine whether 
a federal felony may serve as a predicate for a conviction and sentence
under the elements clause, which poses the question whether the fed-
eral felony in question “has as an element the use, attempted use, or
threatened use of physical force.”  §924(c)(3)(A) (emphasis added).  The 
relevant inquiry is not how any particular defendant may commit the 
crime but whether the federal felony at issue always requires the gov-
ernment  to  prove—beyond  a  reasonable  doubt,  as  an  element  of  its 
case—the use, attempted use, or threatened use of force.  This Court 
has  long  understood  similarly  worded  statutes  to  demand  similarly 
categorical inquiries.  See, e.g., Borden v. United States, 593 U. S. ___, 
___. 

An  attempted  Hobbs  Act  robbery  does  not  satisfy  the  elements 
clause.  To secure a conviction for attempted Hobbs Act robbery, the 
government must prove that the defendant intended to complete the
offense and that the defendant completed a “substantial step” toward
that end.  See, e.g., United States v. Resendiz-Ponce, 549 U. S. 102, 107. 
An intention is just that, no more.  And whatever a substantial step
requires, it does not require the government to prove that the defend-
ant  used,  attempted  to  use,  or  even  threatened  to  use  force  against 
another person or his property—even if the facts would allow the gov-
ernment to do so in many cases.  As the Model Penal Code explains
with respect to the Hobbs Act’s common-law robbery analogue, “there 
will be cases, appropriately reached by a charge of attempted robbery, 
where  the  actor  does  not  actually  harm  anyone  or  even  threaten 
harm.”  ALI, Model Penal Code §222.1, p. 114.  But no element of at-
tempted  Hobbs  Act  robbery  requires  proof  that  the  defendant  used,
attempted to use, or threatened to use force.  Pp. 3–6.

(b) The government’s countervailing arguments fail.  Pp. 6–13.

(1) The government first argues that the elements clause encom-
passes not only any offense that qualifies as a “crime of violence” but 
also any attempt to commit such a crime.  But the elements clause only 
asks whether the defendant did commit a crime of violence as defined 
by the statute.  Pp. 6–7.

(2) The  government  next  argues  that  the  “substantial  step”  ele-
ment of attempted Hobbs Act robbery categorically requires it to prove