Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/524bv.pdf
Page Number: 132.0

524us1$75M 02-18-99 19:35:22 PAGES OPINPGT

Cite as: 524 U. S. 74 (1998)

87

Opinion of the Court

tion peculiar to that condition.
If either is found, COBRA
continuation coverage is left undisturbed; if neither is found,
the consequence of obtaining this later insurance is auto-
matic. Applying the signiﬁcant gap rule, on the other hand,
requires a very different kind of determination, essentially
one of social policy. Once a gap is found, the court must
then make a judgment about the adequacy of medical insur-
ance under the later group policy, for this is the essence of
any decision about whether the gap between the two regimes
of coverage is “signiﬁcant” enough. This is a powerful point
against the gap interpretation for two reasons. First, the
required judgment is so far unsuitable for courts that we
would expect a clear mandate before inferring that Congress
meant to foist it on the judiciary.10 What is even more
strange, however, is that Congress would have meant to in-
ject the courts into the policy arena, evaluating the adequacy
of non-COBRA coverage that happened to be in place prior
to the COBRA election, while at the same time intending to
limit the judicial intrusion, and leave the beneﬁciary to the
unmediated legal consequences of the terms of the non-
COBRA coverage that happened to become effective after
the election. One just cannot credibly attribute such oddity
to congressional intent.

In sum, there is no justiﬁcation for disparaging the clarity
of § 1162(2)(D)(i). The judgment of the Court of Appeals is
vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

10 The unlikelihood, indeed, appears overwhelming when one considers
that the same comparison would have to be made when the beneﬁciary
was covered under Medicare, which is treated like a separate group plan
for present purposes, see § 1162(2)(D)(ii).