Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/14pdf/13-1041_0861.pdf
Page Number: 27

Cite as:  575 U. S. ____ (2015) 

3 

THOMAS, J., concurring in judgment 

The  Court  then  concluded  that  the  rule  “clearly”  favored
the  Administrator’s  interpretation,  rendering  this  discus-
sion dictum.  Id., at 415–417. 

From  this  unsupported  rule  developed  a  doctrine  of
deference that has taken on a life of its own.1  It has been 
broadly applied to regulations issued by agencies across a
broad spectrum of subjects.  See, e.g., Robertson v. Methow 
Valley  Citizens  Council,  490  U. S.  332,  358–359  (1989) 
(forests);  Ehlert  v.  United  States,  402  U. S.  99,  104–105 
(1971) (Selective Service); INS v. Stanisic, 395 U. S. 62, 72 
(1969) (deportation); Udall v. Tallman, 380 U. S. 1, 16–17 
(1965) (oil and gas leases).  It has even been applied to an 
agency’s  interpretation  of  another  agency’s  regulations. 
See Pauley v. BethEnergy Mines, Inc., 501 U. S. 680, 696– 
699  (1991).  And,  it  has  been  applied  to  an  agency  inter-
pretation  that  was  inconsistent  with  a  previous  interpre-
tation  of  the  same  regulation.  See  Long  Island  Care  at 
Home, Ltd. v. Coke, 551 U. S. 158, 170–171 (2007).  It has 
been applied to formal and informal interpretations alike, 
including those taken during litigation.  See Auer v. Rob-
bins,  519  U. S.  452,  462  (1997).    Its  reasoning  has  also
been  extended  outside  the  context  of  traditional  agency
regulations  into  the  realm  of  criminal  sentencing.    See 
Stinson v.  United  States, 508 U. S. 36, 44–45 (1993) (con-
cluding that the Sentencing Commission’s commentary on 
its  Guidelines  is  analogous  to  an  agency  interpretation  of 
its own regulations, entitled to Seminole Rock deference).

The  Court  has  even  applied  the  doctrine  to  an  agency
interpretation  of  a  regulation  cast  in  such  vague  aspira-
tional  terms  as  to  have  no  substantive  content.    See 

—————— 

1 Although  the  Court  has  appeared  to  treat  our  agency  deference 
regimes  as  precedents  entitled  to  stare  decisis  effect,  some  scholars 
have  noted  that  they  might  instead  be  classified  as  interpretive  tools.
See,  e.g.,  C.  Nelson,  Statutory  Interpretation  701  (2011).    Such  tools 
might not be entitled to such effect.  Because resolution of that issue is 
not necessary to my conclusion here, I leave it for another day.