Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/17pdf/17-130_4f14.pdf
Page Number: 31.0

Cite as:  585 U. S. ____ (2018) 

11 

BREYER, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part 
Opinion of BREYER, J. 

provided for an “Officer”?  See 561 U. S., at 514.  That fact 
would  support  (but  again  not  be  determinative  of)  the 
opposite  view—that  Congress  did  not  intend  to  confer
“inferior Officer” status on the position. 

As  I  said,  these  statutory  features,  while  highly  rele-
vant,  need  not  always  prove  determinative.  The  vast 
number  of  different  civil  service  positions,  with  different
tasks,  different  needs,  and  different  requirements  for
independence, mean that this is not the place to lay down
bright-line  rules.  Rather,  as  this  Court  has  said,  “[t]he
versatility  of  circumstances  often  mocks  a  natural  desire
for definitiveness” in this area.  Wiener, 357 U. S., at 352. 
No  case  from  this  Court  holds  that  Congress  lacks  this
sort  of  constitutional  leeway  in  determining  whether  a
particular  Government  position  will  be  filled  by  an  “Of-
fice[r]  of  the  United  States.”  To  the  contrary,  while  we 
have repeatedly addressed whether particular officials are
“Officers,”  in  all  cases  but  one,  we  have  upheld  the  ap-
pointment procedures Congress enacted as consistent with 
the  Appointments  Clause.  See,  e.g.,  Edmond  v.  United 
States,  520  U. S.  651,  666  (1997)  (holding  that  Congress’ 
appointment  procedure  for  military  court  judges  “is  in
conformity with the Appointments Clause of the Constitu-
tion”); Freytag, supra, at 888–891 (same as to special trial 
judges of the Tax Court); Rice v. Ames, 180 U. S. 371, 378 
(1901)  (same  as  to  district  court  “commissioners”);  Ex 
parte  Siebold,  100  U. S.  371,  397–398  (1880)  (same  as 
to  “supervisors  of  election”).    But  see  Buckley,  supra,  at 
124–137. 

The one exception was Buckley, 424 U. S., at 124–137, in 
which  the  Court  set  aside  Congress’  prescribed  appoint-
ment  method  for  some  members  of  the  Federal  Election 
Commission—appointment  by  Congress  itself—as  incon-
sistent  with  the  Appointments  Clause.    But  Buckley  in-
volved  Federal  Election  Commission  members  with  enor-
They  had  “primary  and  substantial 
mous  powers.