Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/529bv.pdf
Page Number: 320

529US1

Unit: $U40

[10-04-01 09:23:11] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 529 U. S. 244 (2000)

245

Syllabus

Court that California’s law created an insigniﬁcant risk of increased pun-
ishment for covered inmates, the Court was careful not to adopt a single
formula for identifying which parole adjustments would survive an ex
post facto challenge. States must have due ﬂexibility in formulating
parole procedure and addressing problems associated with conﬁnement
and release. This case turns on the amended Rule’s operation within
the whole context of Georgia’s parole system. Georgia law gives the
Board broad discretion in determining whether an inmate should re-
ceive early release. Such discretion does not displace the Ex Post
Facto Clause’s protections, but the idea of discretion is that it has the
capacity, and the obligation, to change and adapt based on experience.
The statutory structure, its implementing regulations, and the Board’s
unrefuted representations regarding its operations do not support re-
spondent’s conclusion that the Board will not exercise its discretion in
the period between parole reviews. The Georgia law is qualiﬁed in two
important respects. First, it vests the Board with discretion as to how
often to set an inmate’s date for reconsideration, with an 8-year maxi-
mum. Second, the Board’s policies permit expedited reviews in the
event of a change in circumstance or new information. These qualiﬁca-
tions permit the Board to set reconsideration dates according to the
likelihood that a review will result in meaningful considerations as to
whether an inmate is suitable for release. The Board’s policy of provid-
ing reconsideration every eight years when it does not expect that pa-
role would be granted during the intervening years enables the Board
to ensure that those prisoners who should receive parole come to its
attention. Given respondent’s criminal history, it is difﬁcult to see how
the Board increased his risk of serving a longer time when it set an
8-year, not a 3-year, interval. Yet, even he may seek earlier review
upon showing changed circumstances or new information. The Elev-
enth Circuit’s supposition that the Rule seems certain to result in in-
creased incarceration falls short of the rigorous analysis required by the
Morales standard. When the rule does not by its own terms show a
signiﬁcant risk, the respondent must demonstrate, by evidence drawn
from the rule’s practical implementation by the agency charged with
exercising discretion, that its retroactive application will result in a
longer period of incarceration than under the earlier rule. On the rec-
ord in this case, it cannot be concluded that the change in Georgia law
lengthened respondent’s actual imprisonment time. Pp. 249–256.

2. The Eleventh Circuit erred in not considering the Board’s internal
policy statement regarding how it intends to enforce its Rule. At a
minimum, such statements, along with the Board’s actual practices, pro-
vide important instruction as to how the Board interprets its enabling