Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/23pdf/22-277_d18f.pdf
Page Number: 46

2 

MOODY v. NETCHOICE, LLC 

THOMAS, J., concurring in judgment 

whether each statute’s “full range of applications” are con-
stitutional.  See ante, at 10, 12.  But, the Court repeats that 
very same error.  Out of the sea of “variegated and complex”
functions  that  platforms  perform,  ante,  at  11,  the  Court 
plucks  out  two  (Facebook’s  News  Feed  and  YouTube’s 
homepage), and declares that they may be protected by the 
First  Amendment.  See  ante,  at  26  (opining  on  what  the 
“current record suggests”).  The Court does so on a record 
that  it  itself  describes  as  “incomplete”  and  “underdevel-
oped,” ante, at 12, 20, and by sidestepping several pressing
factual  and  legal  questions,  see  post,  at  29–32  (ALITO,  J., 
concurring in judgment).  As JUSTICE ALITO explains, the 
Court’s approach is both unwarranted and mistaken.  See 
ibid. 

I agree with JUSTICE ALITO’s analysis and join his opin-
ion in full.  I write separately to add two observations on
the  merits  and  to  highlight  a  more  fundamental  jurisdic-
tional problem.  The trade associations have brought facial 
challenges alleging that H. B. 20 and S. B. 7072 are uncon-
stitutional  in  many  or  all  of  their  applications.    But,  Art-
icle III of the Constitution permits federal courts to exercise 
judicial power only over “Cases” and “Controversies.”  Ac-
cordingly,  federal  courts  can  decide  whether  a  statute  is
constitutional only as applied to the parties before them—
they lack authority to deem a statute “facially” unconstitu-
tional. 

I 
  As JUSTICE ALITO explains, the trade associations have
failed to provide many of the basic facts necessary to evalu-
ate their challenges to H. B. 20 and S. B. 7072.  See post, at 
22–29.  I make two additional observations. 

First, with respect to certain provisions of H. B. 20 and
S. B. 7072, the Court assumes that the framework outlined 
in  Zauderer  v.  Office  of  Disciplinary  Counsel  of  Supreme 
Court of Ohio, 471 U. S. 626 (1985), applies.  See ante, at