Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/22pdf/21-806_2dp3.pdf
Page Number: 29.0

Cite as:  599 U. S. ____ (2023) 

1 

BARRETT, J., concurring 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

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No. 21–806 
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HEALTH AND HOSPITAL CORPORATION OF MARION 
COUNTY, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. IVANKA TALEVSKI, 
AS PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE 
OF GORGI TALEVSKI, DECEASED 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT 

[June 8, 2023]

 JUSTICE BARRETT, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE joins,

concurring. 

Today’s  opinion  makes  three  important  points.  First, 
Maine v. Thiboutot remains good law.  448 U. S. 1 (1980). 
Second, Gonzaga University v. Doe sets the standard for de-
termining when a Spending Clause statute confers individ-
ual  rights,  and  the  Federal  Nursing  Home  Reform  Act
(FNHRA) satisfies it.  536 U. S. 273 (2002).  Third, courts 
must  carefully  consider  whether  individual  rights  estab-
lished  by  a  Spending  Clause  statute  are  enforceable
through 42 U. S. C. §1983—in the FNHRA’s case, they are.  
As to the first point: Section 1983 provides a cause of ac-
tion against “[e]very person” who, under color of state law, 
violates  “any  rights,  privileges,  or  immunities  secured  by
the Constitution and laws.”  In Thiboutot, we held that the 
plain language of the statute was not limited to “some sub-
set of laws.”  448 U. S., at 4.  Rather, the term “laws” en-
compasses all federal laws, including those passed pursu-
ant  to  Congress’s  Spending  Clause  authority.    Ibid.  Like 
the Court, I would not abandon that holding based on peti-
tioners’ novel contract-law theory.

Second, our decision in Gonzaga establishes the standard 
for analyzing whether Spending Clause statutes give rise to