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AMERICAN TELEPHONE & TELEGRAPH CO.
v. CENTRAL OFFICE TELEPHONE, INC.
Opinion of the Court

force any classiﬁcations, regulations, or practices affecting
such charges” except those set forth in the tariff, § 203(c).
Unsurprisingly, the cases decided under the ICA make it
clear that discriminatory “privileges” come in many guises,
and are not limited to discounted rates.
“[A] preference or
rebate is the necessary result of every violation of [the ana-
log to § 203(c) in the ICA] where the carrier renders or pays
for a service not covered by the prescribed tariffs.” United
In
States v. Wabash R. Co., 321 U. S. 403, 412–413 (1944).
Chicago & Alton R. Co. v. Kirby, 225 U. S. 155 (1912), we
rejected a shipper’s breach-of-contract claim against a rail-
road for failure to ship a carload of race horses by a particu-
larly fast train. We held that the contract was invalid as a
matter of law because the carrier’s tariffs “did not provide
for an expedited service, nor for transportation by any par-
ticular train,” and therefore the shipper received “an undue
advantage . . . that is not one open to others in the same
situation.”
Id., at 163, 165. Similarly, in Davis v. Cornwell,
264 U. S. 560 (1924), we invalidated the carrier’s agreement
to provide the shipper with a number of railroad cars on a
speciﬁed day; such a special advantage, we said, “is illegal,
when not provided for in the tariff.”
Id., at 562. See also
Kansas City Southern R. Co. v. Carl, supra, at 653; Wight
v. United States, 167 U. S. 512, 517–518 (1897); I. Lake, Dis-
crimination by Railroads and Other Public Utilities 310–315
(1947).

III

The Ninth Circuit distinguished the Court’s ﬁled rate
cases involving claims for special services on the ground that
the services at issue there “should have been included in the
tariff and made available to all” because “the customer
would have been expected to pay a higher rate” for those
108 F. 3d, at 989, n. 9. But that is precisely the
services.
case here.
Indeed, the additional services and guarantees
that respondent claims it was entitled to by virtue of Ms.
Kisor’s representations and petitioner’s sales brochures—