Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/20pdf/20-197_5ie6.pdf
Page Number: 5.0

Cite as:  593 U. S. ____ (2021) 

5 

THOMAS, J., concurring 

carriers may be justified, even for industries not historically
recognized  as  common  carriers,  when  “a  business,  by  cir-
cumstances and its nature, . . . rise[s] from private to be of 
public concern.”  See German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Lewis, 233 
U. S. 389, 411 (1914) (affirming state regulation of fire in-
surance rates).  At that point, a company’s “property is but
its  instrument,  the  means  of  rendering  the  service  which 
has become of public interest.”  Id., at 408. 

This latter definition of course is hardly helpful, for most 
things can be described as “of public interest.”  But what-
ever may be said of other industries, there is clear historical 
precedent  for  regulating  transportation  and  communica-
tions networks in a similar manner as traditional common 
carriers.  Candeub 398–405.  Telegraphs, for example, be-
cause they “resemble[d] railroad companies and other com-
mon  carriers,”  were  “bound  to  serve  all  customers  alike, 
without discrimination.”  Primrose v. Western Union Tele-
graph Co., 154 U. S. 1, 14 (1894).2 

In exchange for regulating transportation and communi-
cation industries, governments—both State and Federal—
have sometimes given common carriers special government 
favors.  Candeub 402–407.  For example, governments have
tied restrictions on a carrier’s ability to reject clients to “im-
munity from certain types of suits”3 or to regulations that
make it more difficult for other companies to compete with
the  carrier  (such  as  franchise  licenses).    Ibid.    By  giving 

—————— 

2 This Court has been inconsistent about whether telegraphs were com-
mon carriers.  Compare Primrose, 154 U. S., at 14, with Moore v. New 
York Cotton Exchange, 270 U. S. 593, 605 (1926).  But the Court has con-
sistently recognized that telegraphs were at least analogous enough to 
common carriers to be regulated similarly.  Primrose, 154 U. S., at 14. 

3 Telegraphs,  for  example,  historically  received  some  protection  from 
defamation suits.  Unlike other entities that might retransmit defama-
tory content, they were liable only if they knew or had reason to know
that a message they distributed was defamatory.  Restatement (Second) 
of Torts §581 (1976); see also O’Brien v. Western Union Tel. Co., 113 F. 2d 
539, 542 (CA1 1940).