Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/21pdf/21a720_6536.pdf
Page Number: 4

4 

NETCHOICE, LLC v. PAXTON 

ALITO, J., dissenting 

App. 40a, and as neutral forums for the speech of others.2 
These representations suggest that the covered social me-
dia platforms—like the cable operators in Turner—do not 
generally  “ ‘convey  ideas  or  messages  [that  they  have]  en-
dorsed.’ ”  Hurley, 515 U. S., at 576.  Third, since HB20 is 
limited  to  companies  with  “50  million  active  users  in  the
United States,” App. 41a, Texas argues that the law applies
to only those entities that possess some measure of common 
carrier-like market power and that this power gives them 
an  “opportunity  to  shut  out  [disfavored]  speakers.”  515 
U. S., at 577; see also Biden v. Knight First Amendment In-
stitute  at  Columbia  Univ.,  593  U. S.  ___,  ___–___  (2021) 
(THOMAS, J., concurring) (slip op., at 6–7). 

If anything, Texas submits, its arguments regarding the
constitutionality  of  §2’s  disclosure  requirements  are  even 
stronger.  The State notes that we have upheld laws requir-
ing that businesses disclose “purely factual and uncontro-
versial information about the terms under which [their] ser-
vices will be available,” so long as those requirements are 
not “unjustified or unduly burdensome.”  Zauderer v. Office 
of Disciplinary Counsel of Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U. S. 
626,  651  (1985).    If  we  were  to  agree  with  the  applicants’ 

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2 Texas  also  suggests  that  applicants’  position  in  this  litigation  is  in
conflict or tension with the positions of its members in cases regarding
the interpretation of §230 of the Communications Decency Act of 1996,
47  U. S. C.  §230.    That  statute  directs,  among  other  things,  that  “[n]o 
provider  . . .  of  an  interactive  computer  service  shall  be  treated  as  the
publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information
content provider.”  §230(c)(1).  Texas claims that “[w]hen the platforms 
resort to section 230’s protections . . . they are relying on Congress’s de-
terminations that they are not the ‘publisher’ of their users’ content, 47 
U. S. C. §230(c)(1), and that they are not ‘responsible’ for that content in 
any  respect,  id.  §230(f )(3).”    Response  36.    And  Texas  suggests  that,
given  that  many  of  applicants’  members  have  emphasized  their  “ ‘neu-
tral[ity]’ ” and their function as “ ‘conduits’ ” for the speech of their users 
(see id., at 37–38, and nn. 11–18), the Court should view their assertions
of  a  First  Amendment  right  to  engage  in  “ ‘editorial  discretion’ ”  with
some skepticism.