Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/14pdf/13-534_19m2.pdf
Page Number: 26.0

Cite as:  574 U. S. ____ (2015) 

3 

ALITO, J., dissenting 

I 

In order to understand the nature of Parker state-action 
immunity,  it  is  helpful  to  recall  the  constitutional  land-
scape  in  1890  when  the  Sherman  Act  was  enacted.    At 
that time, this Court and Congress had an understanding 
of the scope of federal and state power that is very differ-
ent  from  our  understanding  today.  The  States  were  un-
derstood  to  possess  the  exclusive  authority  to  regulate 
“their purely internal affairs.”  Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U. S. 
100,  122  (1890).    In  exercising  their  police  power  in  this 
area, the States had long enacted measures, such as price
controls and licensing requirements, that had the effect of 
restraining trade.3 

The  Sherman  Act  was  enacted  pursuant  to  Congress’ 
power to regulate interstate commerce, and in passing the 
Act,  Congress  wanted  to  exercise  that  power  “to  the  ut-
most  extent.”  United  States  v.  South-Eastern  Underwrit-
ers  Assn.,  322  U. S.  533,  558  (1944).    But  in  1890,  the 
understanding  of  the  commerce  power  was  far  more  lim-
ited than it is today.  See, e.g., Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U. S. 
1, 17–18 (1888).  As a result, the Act did not pose a threat 
to traditional state regulatory activity. 

By 1943, when Parker was decided, however, the situa-
tion had changed dramatically.  This Court had held that 
the commerce power permitted  Congress to regulate even 
local  activity  if  it  “exerts  a  substantial  economic  effect  on 
interstate commerce.”  Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U. S. 111, 
125  (1942).  This  meant  that  Congress  could  regulate 
many  of  the  matters  that  had  once  been  thought  to  fall
exclusively within the jurisdiction of the States.  The new 
interpretation  of  the  commerce  power  brought  about  an 
expansion  of  the  reach  of  the  Sherman  Act.  See  Hospital 

—————— 

3 See  Handler,  The  Current  Attack  on  the  Parker  v.  Brown  State 

Action Doctrine, 76 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 4–6 (1976) (collecting cases).