Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/16pdf/15-577_khlp.pdf
Page Number: 32.0

6 

TRINITY LUTHERAN CHURCH OF COLUMBIA, INC. v.
COMER 
SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting
 

Committee  for  Public  Ed.  &  Religious  Liberty  v.  Nyquist, 
413 U. S. 756, 774 (1973) (“No attempt is made to restrict 
payments  to  those  expenditures  related  to  the  upkeep  of 
facilities  used  exclusively  for  secular  purposes,  nor  do  we 
think  it  possible  within  the  context  of  these  religion-
oriented  institutions  to  impose  such  restrictions”).    The 
Church  has  a  religious  mission,  one  that  it  pursues
through  the  Learning  Center.    The  playground  surface
cannot  be  confined  to  secular  use  any  more  than  lumber 
used  to  frame  the  Church’s  walls,  glass  stained  and  used 
to form its windows, or nails used to build its altar. 

B 
The Court may simply disagree with this account of the
facts  and  think  that  the  Church  does  not  put  its  play-
ground to religious use.  If so, its mistake is limited to this 
case.  But  if  it  agrees  that  the  State’s  funding  would  fur-
ther  religious  activity  and  sees  no  Establishment  Clause
problem,  then  it  must  be  implicitly  applying  a  rule  other 
than the one agreed to in our precedents.

When  the  Court  last  addressed  direct  funding  of  reli-
gious  institutions,  in  Mitchell,  it  adhered  to  the  rule  that 
the  Establishment  Clause  prohibits  the  direct  funding  of
religious  activities.  At  issue  was  a  federal  program  that
helped state and local agencies lend educational materials
to  public  and  private  schools,  including  religious  schools. 
See 530 U. S., at 801–803 (plurality opinion).  The control-
ling concurrence assured itself that the program would not 
lead to the public funding of religious activity.  It pointed
out  that  the  program  allocated  secular  aid,  that  it  did  so
“on  the  basis  of  neutral,  secular  criteria,”  that  the  aid 
would  not  “supplant  non-[program]  funds,”  that  “no  . . .
funds  ever  reach  the  coffers  of  religious  schools,”  that
“evidence of actual diversion is de minimis,” and that the 

—————— 

has not offered any such assurances to this Court.