Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/529bv.pdf
Page Number: 984.0

529US3

Unit: $U62

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Cite as: 529 U. S. 861 (2000)

909

Stevens, J., dissenting

Comm’n v. Granite Rock Co., 480 U. S. 572, 583 (1987); see
Hillsborough County v. Automated Medical Laboratories,
Inc., 471 U. S., at 717–718 (noting that too easily implying
pre-emption “would be inconsistent with the federal-state
balance embodied in our Supremacy Clause jurisprudence,”
and stating that “because agencies normally address prob-
lems in a detailed manner and can speak through a variety
of means,
interpretive
including regulations, preambles,
statements, and responses to comments, we can expect that
they will make their intentions clear if they intend for their
regulations to be exclusive”); Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan
Assn. v. De la Cuesta, 458 U. S., at 154 (noting that pre-
emption inquiry is initiated “[w]hen the administrator pro-
mulgates regulations intended to pre-empt state law”).
This expectation, which is shared by the Executive Branch,24
serves to ensure that States will be able to have a dialog

would like. Our cases ﬁrmly establish that conﬂict and ﬁeld pre-emption
are alike in that both are instances of implied pre-emption that by deﬁni-
tion do “not [turn] on an express statement of pre-emptive intent.” Ante,
at 884; see, e. g., Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U. S. 280, 287 (1995)
(quoted supra, at 899); English v. General Elec. Co., 496 U. S. 72, 79–80,
and n. 5 (1990) (noting that ﬁeld pre-emption rests on an inference of
congressional intent to exclude state regulation and that it “may be un-
derstood as a species of conﬂict pre-emption”); Fidelity Fed. Sav. &
Loan Assn. v. De la Cuesta, 458 U. S. 141, 153 (1982). Given that our
speciﬁcity requirement was adopted in cases involving implied pre-
emption, the Court cannot persuasively claim that the requirement is in-
compatible with our implied pre-emption jurisprudence in the federal reg-
ulatory context.

24 See Exec. Order No. 12612, § 4(e), 3 CFR 252, 255 (1988) (“When an
Executive department or agency proposes to act through adjudication or
rule-making to preempt State law, the department or agency shall provide
all affected States notice and an opportunity for appropriate participation
in the proceedings”); Exec. Order No. 13132, § 4(e), 64 Fed. Reg. 43255,
43257 (1999) (same); cf. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U. S. 470, 496 (1996)
(discussing 21 CFR § 808.5 (1995), an FDA regulation allowing a State
to request an advisory opinion regarding whether a particular state-law
requirement is pre-empted, or exempt from pre-emption, under the Medi-
cal Device Amendments of 1976).