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Page Number: 60

28 

HEALTH AND HOSPITAL CORPORATION OF MARION 
CTY. v. TALEVSKI 
THOMAS, J., dissenting 

a manner thought beneficial by Congress, there is no
direct  exercise  of  Federal  power  on  those  affairs  and 
they remain subject to the unhampered control of the 
States.  Consequently, in a case of this nature, the ef-
fect which the Act of Congress will have in a State is 
dependent  entirely  upon  the  voluntary  action  of  that 
State and its inhabitants.”  Id., at 274, 276. 

In  deciding  the  case,  the  Court  took  the  Government’s
concessions as given, stating, “[i]t is not contended that [the
General Welfare Clause] grants power to regulate agricul-
tural production.”  Butler, 297 U. S., at 64.  The Court then 
agreed with Justice Story’s observation that “the only thing 
granted  is  the  power  to  tax  for  the  purpose  of  providing 
funds for payment of the nation’s debts and making provi-
sion  for  the  general  welfare.”    Ibid.   Congress’  spending
power, even if located in the General Welfare Clause, con-
ferred no regulatory power.

The Court proceeded to hold the Act unconstitutional pre-
cisely because it was, in reality, “a statutory plan to regu-
late  and  control  agricultural  production,  a  matter  beyond 
the powers delegated to the federal government.”  Id., at 68. 
That was because the “regulation [was] not in fact volun-
tary,” as it would lead to “financial ruin” for farmers who
refused the Act’s benefits.  Id., at  70–71.  Confirming an-
other aspect of the traditional doctrine, the Court held that
even the purely voluntary consent of private parties could
not expand Congress’ limited regulatory powers.  Id., at 74– 
75.10 

—————— 

10 The anticoercion rule reflected in Butler remains a vital part of this 
Court’s spending-power jurisprudence.  See NFIB, 567 U. S., at 575–585 
(opinion of ROBERTS, C. J.); id., at 671–678 (joint dissent of Scalia, Ken-
nedy, THOMAS, and ALITO, JJ.).  As Butler makes clear, that rule is firmly 
rooted  in  the  contractual  understanding  of  spending  conditions,  and 
NFIB further recognized the close connection between the rule and the 
anticommandeering doctrine when spending conditions involving States
are at issue.  See NFIB, 567 U. S., at 575–585 (opinion of ROBERTS, C. J.);