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8 

LOPER BRIGHT ENTERPRISES v. RAIMONDO 

Opinion of the Court 

177 (1803).  And in the following decades, the Court under-
stood  “interpret[ing]  the  laws,  in  the  last  resort,”  to  be  a 
“solemn duty” of the Judiciary.  United States v. Dickson, 
15 Pet. 141, 162 (1841) (Story, J., for the Court).  When the 
meaning of a statute was at issue, the judicial role was to
“interpret  the  act  of  Congress,  in  order  to  ascertain  the 
rights of the parties.”  Decatur v. Paulding, 14 Pet. 497, 515 
(1840).

The Court also recognized from the outset, though, that
exercising independent judgment often included according
due respect to Executive Branch interpretations of federal 
statutes.  For  example,  in  Edwards’  Lessee  v.  Darby,  12 
Wheat. 206 (1827), the Court explained that “[i]n the con-
struction of a doubtful and ambiguous law, the contempo-
raneous construction of those who were called upon to act
under the law, and were appointed to carry its provisions
into effect, is entitled to very great respect.”  Id., at 210; see 
also United States v. Vowell, 5 Cranch 368, 372 (1809) (Mar-
shall, C. J., for the Court).

Such respect was thought especially warranted when an
Executive  Branch  interpretation  was  issued  roughly  con-
temporaneously  with  enactment  of  the  statute  and  re-
mained consistent over time.  See Dickson, 15 Pet., at 161; 
United States v. Alabama Great Southern R. Co., 142 U. S. 
615,  621  (1892);  National  Lead  Co.  v.  United  States,  252 
U. S. 140, 145–146 (1920).  That is because “the longstand-
ing ‘practice of the government’ ”—like any other interpre-
tive aid—“can inform [a court’s] determination of ‘what the 
law is.’ ”  NLRB v. Noel Canning, 573 U. S. 513, 525 (2014) 
(first  quoting  McCulloch  v.  Maryland,  4  Wheat.  316,  401 
(1819); then quoting Marbury, 1 Cranch, at 177).  The Court 
also gave “the most respectful consideration” to Executive 
Branch  interpretations  simply  because  “[t]he  officers  con-
cerned [were] usually able men, and masters of the subject,” 
who were “[n]ot unfrequently . . . the draftsmen of the laws 
they  [were]  afterwards  called  upon  to  interpret.”    United