Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/21pdf/20-1530_n758.pdf
Page Number: 25

Cite as:  597 U. S. ____ (2022) 

19 

Opinion of the Court 

American  Telephone  &  Telegraph  Co.,  512  U. S.  218,  229 
(1994).  Agencies have only those powers given to them by
Congress,  and  “enabling  legislation”  is  generally  not  an
“open book to which the agency [may] add pages and change 
the plot line.”  E. Gellhorn & P. Verkuil, Controlling Chevron-
Based  Delegations,  20  Cardozo  L. Rev.  989,  1011  (1999).
We presume that “Congress intends to make major policy 
decisions  itself,  not  leave  those  decisions  to  agencies.” 
United  States  Telecom  Assn.  v.  FCC,  855  F. 3d  381,  419 
(CADC 2017) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting from denial of re-
hearing en banc).

Thus, in certain extraordinary cases, both separation of 
powers principles and a practical understanding of legisla-
tive intent make us “reluctant to read into ambiguous stat-
utory text” the delegation claimed to be lurking there.  Util-
ity  Air,  573  U. S.,  at  324.  To  convince  us  otherwise, 
something more  than a  merely  plausible  textual  basis  for 
the  agency  action  is  necessary.    The  agency  instead  must 
point to “clear congressional authorization” for the power it
claims.  Ibid.  

The dissent criticizes us for “announc[ing] the arrival” of
this major questions doctrine, and argues that each of the 
decisions just cited simply followed our “ordinary method” 
of “normal statutory interpretation,” post, at 13, 15 (opinion 
of KAGAN, J.).  But in what the dissent calls the “key case” 
in  this  area,  Brown  &  Williamson,  post,  at  15,  the  Court 
could  not  have  been  clearer:  “In  extraordinary  cases  .  .  .
there may be reason to hesitate” before accepting a reading
of  a  statute  that  would,  under  more  “ordinary”  circum-
stances, be upheld.  529 U. S., at 159.  Or, as we put it more 
recently,  we  “typically  greet”  assertions  of  “extravagant
statutory  power  over  the  national  economy”  with  “skepti-
cism.”  Utility Air, 573 U. S., at 324.  The dissent attempts
to  fit  the  analysis  in  these  cases  within  routine  statutory
interpretation, but the bottom line—a requirement of “clear