Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/529bv.pdf
Page Number: 145.0

529US1

Unit: $U34

[09-26-01 08:14:00] PAGES PGT: OPIN

70

PORTUONDO v. AGARD

Opinion of the Court

him.”
Id., at 236. The Court noted that it was not clear
whether the Fifth Amendment protects prearrest silence,
id., at 236, n. 2, but held that, assuming it does, the prosecu-
tor’s comments were constitutionally permissible.
“[T]he
Constitution does not forbid ‘every government-imposed
choice in the criminal process that has the effect of discour-
aging the exercise of constitutional rights.’ ”
Id., at 236
(quoting Chafﬁn v. Stynchcombe, 412 U. S. 17, 30 (1973)).
Once a defendant takes the stand, he is “ ‘subject to cross-
examination impeaching his credibility just like any other
witness.’ ” Jenkins, supra, at 235–236 (quoting Grunewald
v. United States, 353 U. S. 391, 420 (1957)).

Indeed, in Brooks v. Tennessee, 406 U. S. 605 (1972), the
Court suggested that arguing credibility to the jury—which
would include the prosecutor’s comments here—is the pre-
ferred means of counteracting tailoring of the defendant’s
In that case, the Court found unconstitutional
testimony.
Tennessee’s attempt to defeat tailoring by requiring defend-
ants to testify at the outset of the defense or not at all. This
requirement, it said, impermissibly burdened the defendant’s
right to testify because it forced him to decide whether to
do so before he could determine that it was in his best inter-
est.
Id., at 610. The Court expressed its awareness, how-
ever, of the danger that tailoring presented. The antidote,
it said, was not Tennessee’s heavy-handed rule, but the more
nuanced “adversary system[, which] reposes judgment of the
Id., at 611. The
credibility of all witnesses in the jury.”
it requires—
adversary system surely envisions—indeed,
that the prosecutor be allowed to bring to the jury’s atten-
tion the danger that the Court was aware of.

Respondent and the dissent also contend that the prose-
cutor’s comments were impermissible because they were
“generic” rather than based upon any speciﬁc indication of
tailoring. Such comment, the dissent claims, is unconstitu-
tional because it “does not serve to distinguish guilty defend-
ants from innocent ones.” Post, at 77. But this Court has