Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/21pdf/20-1459_n7ip.pdf
Page Number: 36.0

Cite as:  596 U. S. ____ (2022) 

5 

ALITO, J., dissenting 

against  his  or  her  will  by  means  of  actual  force.  Eve  is 
guilty of the “offense” of attempted Hobbs Act robbery, and
her offense “has as an element the use . . . of physical force
against the person . . . of another.”  That is where the Court 
must end up if it looks at only the text of §924(c)(3)(A) and 
the Hobbs Act. 

It is no answer to this argument that Taylor is not Eve.
He is also not Adam.  The whole point of the categorical ap-
proach that the Court dutifully follows is that the real world
must be scrupulously disregarded.

The Court reaches the opposite conclusion only because
it accepts the proposition—which the Government did not
contest—that  a  felony  “has  as  an  element  the  use,  at-
tempted use, or threatened use of physical force” only if the 
felony “always requires the government to prove” the use, 
attempted use, or threatened use of force “beyond a reason-
able doubt, as an element of its case.”  Ante, at 3 (emphasis
added); see Brief for Respondent 13–18.  In other words, the 
Court assumes that an offense X has an element A if and 
only if convicting a defendant of X requires the Government 
to prove A in every prosecution for offense X.  Based on this 
assumption, the Court infers that attempted Hobbs Act rob-
bery is not a “crime of violence” under §924(c)(3)(A) because 
it is possible to commit that offense without attempting to 
use force. 

There is no textual basis for this reading, and I would not 
adopt an erroneous interpretation that will govern a multi-
tude of cases just because the Government has made an im-
provident concession in this case.  If the Court wants to hold 
the Government to the position it has taken here, it can dis-
miss the case and give Taylor the benefit of the judgment 
in his favor below.  But a party’s mistaken argument should 
not be permitted to alter the meaning of the law Congress
enacted. 

Nothing in our precedent suggests that we should deviate
from §924(c)(3)(A)’s plain text.  We have never interpreted