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Page Number: 35

14 

GEORGIA v. PUBLIC.RESOURCE.ORG, INC. 

THOMAS, J., dissenting 

standing the reasoning that animates the rule in turn pro-
vides pivotal insight into how the law will likely be applied 
in future judicial opinions.6  Thus, deprived of access to ju-
dicial opinions, individuals cannot access the primary, and 
therefore best, source of information for the meaning of the 
law.7  And as true as that is today, access to these opinions 

—————— 

6 For instance, this Court has not overruled Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 
U. S. 602 (1971), which pronounced a test for evaluating Establishment
Clause  claims.    But  a  reader  would  do  well  to  carefully  scrutinize  the 
various opinions in American Legion v. American Humanist Assn., 588 
U. S. ___ (2019), to understand the markedly different way that this prec-
edent  functions  in  our  current  jurisprudence compared  to  when  it  was 
first decided.  Moreover, sometimes a separate writing takes on canonical 
status, like Justice Jackson’s concurrence regarding the executive power 
in  Youngstown  Sheet  &  Tube  Co.  v.  Sawyer,  343  U. S.  579,  634–638 
(1952)  (opinion  concurring  in  judgment  and  opinion  of  the  Court);  see 
also  Katz  v.  United  States,  389  U. S.  347,  360–361  (1967)  (Harlan,  J.,
concurring) (reasonable expectation of privacy Fourth Amendment test). 
Still other times, the reasoning in an opinion for less than a majority of
the Court provides the explicit basis for a later majority’s holding.  See, 
e.g., McKinney v. Arizona, 589 U. S. ___, ___ (2020) (slip op., at 5) (dis-
cussing  Ring  v.  Arizona,  536  U. S.  584,  612  (2002)  (Scalia  J.,  concur-
ring)); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U. S. 97, 102 (1976) (incorporating into the 
majority  the  Eighth  Amendment  “evolving  standards  of  decency”  test 
first announced in Trop v. Dulles, 356 U. S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality opin-
ion)).  Even  “ ‘comments  in  [a]  dissenting  opinion,’ ”  ante,  at  15,  some-
times reemerge as the foundational reasoning in a majority opinion.  See, 
e.g., Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Hyatt, 587 U. S. ___ (2019) (discussing 
Nevada  v.  Hall,  440  U. S.  410,  433–439  (1979)  (Rehnquist, J.,  dissent-
ing));  Lawrence v. Texas,  539  U. S.  558,  578  (2003)  (“JUSTICE STEVENS’ 
[dissenting] analysis, in our view, should have been controlling in Bowers 
[v.  Hardwick,  478  U. S.  186  (1986),]  and  should  control  here”).    These 
examples,  and  myriad  more,  demonstrate  that  the  majority  treats  the 
role of separate judicial opinions in an overly simplistic fashion. 

7 Banks also stated that judicially prepared syllabi and headnotes can-
not be copyrighted.  128 U. S., at 253.  The majority cites these materials
as further evidence of its broad rule, because the majority finds it beyond 
cavil that “these supplementary materials do not have the force of law.” 
Ante, at 15.  The majority feels it appropriate to assume—without any 
historical inquiry—that the words “syllabus” and “headnote” carried the 
same  meaning,  or  served  the  same  function,  in  1888  as  they  do  now.