Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/558bv.pdf
Page Number: 210.0

Cite as: 558 U. S. 45 (2009) 

49 

Per Curiam 

Even  a  casual  review  of  Brigham  City  reveals  the  ﬂaw 
in  this  reasoning.  Ofﬁcers  do  not  need  ironclad  proof  of 
“a likely serious, life-threatening” injury to invoke the emer­
gency  aid  exception.  The  only  injury  police  could  conﬁrm 
in  Brigham  City  was  the  bloody  lip  they  saw  the  juvenile 
inﬂict  upon  the  adult.  Fisher  argues  that  the  ofﬁcers  here 
could  not  have  been  motivated  by  a  perceived  need  to  pro­
vide  medical  assistance,  since  they  never  summoned  emer­
gency  medical  personnel.  This  would  have  no  bearing,  of 
course, upon their need to ensure that Fisher was not endan­
gering  someone  else  in  the  house.  Moreover,  even  if  the 
failure to summon medical personnel conclusively established 
that  Goolsby  did  not  subjectively  believe,  when  he  entered 
the house, that Fisher or someone else was seriously injured 
(which  is  doubtful),  the  test,  as  we  have  said,  is  not  what 
Goolsby believed, but whether there was “an objectively rea­
sonable  basis  for  believing”  that  medical  assistance  was 
needed, or persons were in danger, Brigham City, supra, at 
406; Mincey, supra, at 392. 

It was error for the Michigan Court of Appeals to replace 
that objective inquiry into appearances with its hindsight de­
termination  that  there  was  in  fact  no  emergency.  It  does 
not  meet  the  needs  of  law  enforcement  or  the  demands  of 
public safety to require ofﬁcers to walk away from a situation 
like the one they encountered here.  Only when an apparent 
threat has become an actual harm can ofﬁcers rule out innoc­
uous  explanations  for  ominous  circumstances.  But  “[t]he 
role  of  a  peace  ofﬁcer  includes  preventing  violence  and  re­
storing  order,  not  simply  rendering  ﬁrst  aid  to  casualties.” 
Brigham City, supra, at 406.  It sufﬁced to invoke the emer­
gency  aid  exception  that  it  was  reasonable  to  believe  that 
Fisher had hurt himself (albeit nonfatally) and needed treat­
ment  that  in  his  rage  he  was  unable  to  provide,  or  that 
Fisher was about to hurt, or had already hurt, someone else. 
The Michigan Court of Appeals required more than what the 
Fourth Amendment demands.