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Page Number: 6.0

6 

JESNER v. ARAB BANK, PLC 

Syllabus 

ATS  may  afford  federal  judges  “discretion  [to]  conside[r]  [creating] 
new cause[s] of action” if they “rest on a norm of international char-
acter  accepted  by  the  civilized  world  and  defined  with  a  specificity
comparable  to  the  features  of  the  [three  specified]  18th-century” 
torts.  Id., at 725.  This is doubtful, for the people’s elected represent-
atives, not judges, make the laws that govern them.  But even accept-
ing Sosa’s framework, a proper application of that framework would 
preclude courts from recognizing any new causes of action under the
ATS.    When  courts  are  confronted  with  a  request  to  fashion  a  new
cause of action, “separation-of-powers principles are or should be cen-
tral  to  the  analysis.”  Ziglar  v.  Abbasi,  582  U. S.  ___,  ___.    The  first 
and  most  important  question  is  whether  Congress  or  the  courts 
should  decide,  and  the  right  answer  “most  often  will  be  Congress.” 
Ibid.    There  is  no  reason  to  make  a  special  exception  for  the  ATS,
which was designed as “a jurisdictional statute creating no new caus-
es of action.”  Sosa, 542 U. S., at 724.  The context in which any Sosa 
discretion would be exercised confirms the wisdom of restraint.  The 
“practical consequences” that might follow a decision to create a new
ATS  cause  of  action,  see  id.,  at  732–733,  would  likely  involve  ques-
tions of foreign affairs and national security—matters implicating the
expertise  and  authority  not  of  the  Judiciary  but  of  the  political
branches.  Pp. 2–5.

(b) Another  independent  problem  is  that  this  suit  is  by  foreigners 
against  a  foreigner  over  the  meaning  of  international  norms.    The 
original understanding of the ATS, which was but one clause in one
section of the Judiciary Act of 1789, likely would have required a do-
mestic defendant in order to comply with the requirements of the Di-
versity-of-Citizenship Clause of Article III.  Precedent interpreting a
neighboring  provision  of  the  Judiciary  Act  confirms  that  conclusion. 
See Mossman v. Higginson, 4 Dall. 12, 14.  In any event, separation-
of-powers limits on the judicial function and deference to the political
branches  should  lead  federal  courts  to  require  a  domestic  defendant 
before agreeing to exercise any Sosa-generated discretion to entertain 
an ATS suit.  Pp. 5–14.

 KENNEDY, J., announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the
opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, II–B–1, and II–C, in which 
ROBERTS,  C. J.,  and  THOMAS,  ALITO,  and  GORSUCH,  JJ.,  joined,  and  an
opinion  with  respect  to  Parts  II–A,  II–B–2,  II–B–3,  and  III,  in  which 
ROBERTS, C. J., and THOMAS, J., joined.  THOMAS, J., filed a concurring 
opinion.  ALITO,  J.,  and  GORSUCH,  J.,  filed  opinions  concurring  in  part
and  concurring  in  the  judgment.    SOTOMAYOR,  J.,  filed  a  dissenting 
opinion, in which GINSBURG, BREYER, and KAGAN, JJ., joined.