Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/18pdf/17-1026_2c83.pdf
Page Number: 22

Cite as:  586 U. S. ____ (2019) 

5 

THOMAS, J., dissenting 

In  my  view,  a  defendant  who  has  executed  an  appeal
waiver  cannot  show  prejudice  arising  from  his  counsel’s
decision  not  to  appeal  unless  he  (1)  identifies  claims  he
would have pursued that were outside the appeal waiver; 
(2) shows that the plea was involuntary or unknowing; or 
(3)  establishes  that  the  government  breached  the  plea 
agreement.  Garza has not made any such showing, so he
cannot establish prejudice.  Furthermore, because Garza’s 
counsel  acted  reasonably,  Garza  also  cannot  establish 
deficient performance.  I would therefore affirm. 

A 

The  majority  relies  on  Flores-Ortega  to  create  its  new 
rule, but if anything, that decision undermines the majori-
ty’s  per se  approach. 
In  Flores-Ortega,  the  defendant 
pleaded  guilty  to  second-degree  murder  without  waiving 
any  of  his  appellate  rights.  528  U. S.,  at  473–474.    On 
federal  collateral  review,  the  defendant  alleged  that  his
counsel was ineffective for failing to file a notice of appeal 
after  she  promised  to  do  so.  Id.,  at  474.    The  record  con-
tained  conflicting  evidence  as  to  whether  the  defendant
had  communicated  his  desire  to  appeal,  and  the  District
Court concluded that he failed to carry his burden.  Id., at 
475.  The Ninth Circuit reversed, reasoning that “a habeas
petitioner need only show that his counsel’s failure to file
a  notice  of  appeal  was  without  the  petitioner’s  consent.” 
Id., at 475–476. 

This Court reversed.  We first concluded that the Ninth 
Circuit’s rule “effectively impose[d] an obligation on coun-
sel in all cases either (1) to file a notice of appeal, or (2) to
discuss  the  possibility  of  an  appeal  with  the  defendant, 
ascertain his wishes, and act accordingly.”  Id., at 478.  We 
rejected “this per se rule as inconsistent with Strickland’s 
holding  that  ‘the  performance  inquiry  must  be  whether
counsel’s  assistance  was  reasonable  considering  all  the 
circumstances.’ ”  Ibid. (quoting 466 U. S., at 688).  We also