Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/20pdf/19-1039_8n5a.pdf
Page Number: 14

Cite as:  594 U. S. ____ (2021) 

9 

Opinion of the Court 

upheld  an  Act  of  Congress  authorizing  construction  of  a 
dam  and  a  reservoir  that  would  inundate  thousands  of 
acres of state-owned land.  There, we made explicit a point 
that was implicit in Kohl’s reasoning: “The fact that land is
owned by a state is no barrier to its condemnation by the
United States.”  313 U. S., at 534. 

B 
For as long as the eminent domain power has been exer-
cised by the United States, it has also been delegated to pri-
vate  parties.    It  was  commonplace  before  and  after  the 
founding for the Colonies and then the States to authorize
the  private  condemnation  of  land  for  a  variety  of  public 
works.  See Bell, 76 U. Chi. L. Rev., at 545; see generally, 
e.g.,  Hart,  The  Maryland  Mill  Act,  1669–1766,  39  Am.  J. 
Legal Hist. 1 (1995).  The Federal Government was no dif-
ferent.  As early as 1809, Congress authorized private par-
ties  to  exercise  the  eminent  domain  power—including
through  the  initiation  of  direct  condemnation  proceed-
ings—within areas subject to federal jurisdiction.  See su-
pra, at 8; see also Act of Mar. 2, 1831, 4 Stat. 477. 

In the years following Kohl, the Court confirmed that pri-
vate  delegatees  can  exercise  the  federal  eminent  domain
power within the States as well.  Our decision in Luxton v. 
North River Bridge Co., 153 U. S. 525 (1894), is clear on this 
point.  Congress authorized a corporation to build a bridge
between New York and New Jersey, and to condemn prop-
erty as necessary along the way.  Id., at 525–528 (statement 
of the case); see Act of July 11, 1890, ch. 669, 26 Stat. 268.
Luxton—who  owned  land  in  Hoboken  against  which  the 
corporation  had  brought  condemnation  proceedings—ob-
jected on the ground that Congress had unconstitutionally 
delegated its eminent domain power to the corporation.  153 
U. S., at 527–528 (statement of the case).  We rejected Lux-
ton’s challenge, explaining that Congress “may, at its dis-