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Page Number: 2.0

2 

UNITED STATES v. STEVENS 

Syllabus 

duct—that  “have  never  been  thought  to  raise  any  Constitutional 
problem,” Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U. S. 568, 572.  Depic-
tions  of  animal  cruelty  should  not  be  added  to  that  list.    While  the 
prohibition  of  animal  cruelty  has  a  long  history  in  American  law,
there  is  no  evidence  of  a  similar  tradition  prohibiting  depictions  of 
such cruelty.  The Government’s proposed test would broadly balance
the  value  of  the  speech  against  its  societal  costs  to  determine
whether  the  First  Amendment  even  applies.    But  the  First  Amend-
ment’s  free  speech  guarantee  does  not  extend  only  to  categories  of 
speech  that  survive  an  ad hoc  balancing  of  relative  social  costs  and
benefits.  The Amendment itself reflects a judgment by the American
people  that  the  benefits  of  its  restrictions  on  the  Government  out-
weigh  the  costs.  New  York  v.  Ferber,  458  U. S.  747,  distinguished. 
Pp. 5–9.

(b) Stevens’s  facial  challenge  succeeds  under  existing  doctrine. 

Pp. 9–20.

(1) In the First Amendment context, a law may be invalidated as
overbroad  if  “a  ‘substantial  number’  of  its  applications  are  unconsti-
tutional,  ‘ “judged  in  relation  to  the  statute’s  plainly  legitimate
sweep.” ’ ”  Washington  State  Grange  v.  Washington  State  Republican 
Party,  552  U. S.  442,  449,  n. 6.    Stevens  claims  that  common  depic-
tions of ordinary and lawful activities constitute the vast majority of 
materials subject to §48.  The Government does not defend such ap-
plications,  but  contends  that  the  statute  is  narrowly  limited  to  spe-
cific  types  of  extreme  material.    Section  48’s  constitutionality  thus
turns on how broadly it is construed.  Pp. 9–10.

(2) Section 48 creates a criminal prohibition of alarming breadth.
The  statute’s  definition  of  a  “depiction  of  animal  cruelty”  does  not 
even  require  that  the  depicted  conduct  be  cruel.    While  the  words 
“maimed,  mutilated,  [and]  tortured”  convey  cruelty,  “wounded”  and 
“killed” do not.  Those words have little ambiguity and should be read
according to their ordinary meaning.  Section 48 does require that the 
depicted  conduct  be  “illegal,”  but  many  federal  and  state  laws  con-
cerning  the  proper  treatment  of  animals  are  not  designed  to  guard 
against animal cruelty.  For example, endangered species protections 
restrict even the humane wounding or killing of animals.  The statute 
draws no distinction based on the reason the conduct is made illegal. 
Moreover,  §48  applies  to  any  depiction  of  conduct  that  is  illegal
in the State in which the depiction is created, sold, or possessed, “re-
gardless of whether the . . . wounding . . . or killing took place” there, 
§48(c)(1).  Depictions of entirely lawful conduct may run afoul of the 
ban  if  those  depictions  later  find  their  way  into  States  where  the 
same conduct is unlawful.  This greatly expands §48’s scope, because 
views  about  animal  cruelty  and  regulations  having  no  connection  to