Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/529bv.pdf
Page Number: 105

529US1

Unit: $U32

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SHALALA v. ILLINOIS COUNCIL ON LONG
TERM CARE, INC.
Stevens, J., dissenting

No action against the United States, the Commissioner
of Social Security, or any ofﬁcer or employee thereof
shall be brought under section 1331 or 1346 of title 28 to
recover on any claim arising under this subchapter.”

42 U. S. C. § 1395ii provides:

“The provisions of sections 406 and 416( j) of this title,
and of subsections (a), (d), (e), (h), (i), ( j), (k), and (l)
of section 405 of this title, shall also apply with respect
to this subchapter to the same extent as they are ap-
plicable with respect to subchapter II of this chapter,
except that, in applying such provisions with respect
to this subchapter, any reference therein to the Commis-
sioner of Social Security or the Social Security Admin-
istration shall be considered a reference to the Secre-
tary or the Department of Health and Human Services,
respectively.”

28 U. S. C. § 1331 provides:

“Federal question. The district courts shall have orig-
inal jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the
Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.”

Justice Stevens, dissenting.
While I join Justice Thomas’ lucid dissent without quali-
ﬁcation, I think it worthwhile to identify a signiﬁcant dis-
tinction between cases like Weinberger v. Salﬁ, 422 U. S.
749 (1975), and Heckler v. Ringer, 466 U. S. 602 (1984), on
the one hand, and cases like Bowen v. Michigan Academy
of Family Physicians, 476 U. S. 667 (1986), and this case,
on the other hand.
In the former group, the issue con-
cerned the plaintiffs’ entitlement to beneﬁts; in the latter
two, the issue concerns providers’ eligibility for reimburse-
ment. The distinction between those two types of issues
mirrors a critical distinction between the Social Security
Act, 42 U. S. C. § 405, and the Medicare Act, 42 U. S. C.
§ 1395ii.