Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/558bv.pdf
Page Number: 826.0

ORDERS 

979 

978 

Roberts, C. J., dissenting 

Court  overturned  the  conviction.  It  concluded  that  because  the 
ofﬁcer  had  failed  to  independently  verify  that  Harris  was  driving 
dangerously,  the  stop  violated  the  Fourth  Amendment’s  prohibi­
tion on unreasonable searches and seizures.  276 Va. 689, 696–698, 
668  S.  E.  2d  141,  146–147  (2008);  see  Pet.  for  Cert.  4  (citing 
record). 

I  am  not  sure  that  the  Fourth  Amendment  requires  such  inde­
pendent  corroboration  before  the  police  can  act,  at  least  in  the 
special  context  of  anonymous  tips  reporting  drunk  driving.  This 
is  an  important  question  that  is  not  answered  by  our  past  deci­
sions,  and  that  has  deeply  divided  federal  and  state  courts.  The 
Court should  grant the  petition for certiorari  to answer  the ques­
tion  and  resolve  the  conﬂict. 

On the one hand, our cases allow police to conduct investigative 
stops  based  on  reasonable  suspicion,  viewed  under  the  totality  of 
the circumstances.  Terry  v.  Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 22 (1968); Alabama 
v.  White,  496  U. S.  325,  328–331  (1990).  In  Florida  v.  J.  L.,  529 
U. S.  266,  270  (2000),  however,  we  explained  that  anonymous  tips, 
in the absence of additional corroboration, typically lack the “indi­
cia  of  reliability”  needed  to  justify  a  stop  under  the  reasonable 
suspicion  standard.  In  J.  L.,  the  Court  suppressed  evidence 
seized  by  police  after  receiving  an  anonymous  tip  alleging  that  a 
young  man,  wearing  a  plaid  shirt  and  waiting  at  a  particular  bus 
stop,  was  carrying  a  gun.  The  majority  below  relied  extensively 
on  J.  L.  in  reversing  Harris’s  conviction. 

But it is not clear that J.  L.  applies to anonymous tips reporting 
drunk  or  erratic  driving.  J.  L.  itself  suggested  that  the  Fourth 
Amendment  analysis  might  be  different  in  other  situations.  The 
Court declined “to speculate about the circumstances under which 
the  danger  alleged  in  an  anonymous  tip  might  be  so  great  as  to 
justify  a  search  even  without  a  showing  of  reliability.”  Id.,  at 
273.  It also hinted that “in quarters where the reasonable expec­
tation  of  Fourth  Amendment  privacy  is  diminished,”  it  might  be 
constitutionally permissible to “conduct protective searches on the 
basis  of  information  insufﬁcient  to  justify  searches  elsewhere.” 
Id.,  at  274. 

There  is  no  question  that  drunk  driving  is  a  serious  and  poten­
tially  deadly  crime,  as  our  cases  have  repeatedly  emphasized. 
See,  e. g.,  Michigan  Dept.  of  State  Police  v.  Sitz,  496  U. S.  444, 
451  (1990)  (“No  one  can  seriously  dispute  the  magnitude  of  the 
drunken  driving  problem  or  the  States’  interest  in  eradicating