Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/19pdf/17-1618_hfci.pdf
Page Number: 161.0

Cite as:  590 U. S. ____ (2020) 

17 

KAVANAUGH, J., dissenting 

Like the relevant federal statutes, the 1998 Clinton Ex-
ecutive Order expressly added sexual orientation as a new,
separately  prohibited  form  of  discrimination.  As  Judge
Lynch cogently spelled out, “the Clinton Administration did
not argue that the prohibition of sex discrimination in” the
prior 1969 Executive Order “already banned, or henceforth
would  be  deemed  to  ban,  sexual  orientation  discrimina-
tion.”  883 F. 3d, at 152, n. 22 (dissenting opinion).  In short, 
President Clinton’s 1998 Executive Order indicates that the 
Executive Branch, like Congress, has long understood sex-
ual orientation discrimination to be distinct from, and not 
a form of, sex discrimination. 

Federal  regulations  likewise  reflect  that  same  under-
standing.  The Office of Personnel Management is the fed-
eral agency that administers and enforces personnel rules 
across the  Federal Government.   OPM has issued regula-
tions that “govern . . . the employment practices of the Fed-
eral Government generally, and of individual agencies.”  5 
CFR §§300.101, 300.102 (2019).  Like the federal statutes 
and the Presidential Executive Orders, those OPM regula-
tions separately prohibit sex discrimination and sexual ori-
entation discrimination. 

The States have proceeded in the same fashion.  A major-
ity  of  States  prohibit  sexual  orientation  discrimination  in