Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/22pdf/21-468_5if6.pdf
Page Number: 15

Cite as:  598 U. S. ____ (2023) 

9 

Opinion of the Court 

cases suggest an additional and “almost per se” rule forbid-
ding enforcement of state laws that have the “practical ef-
fect of controlling commerce outside the State,” even when 
those  laws  do  not  purposely  discriminate  against  out-of-
state  economic  interests.    Ibid.   Petitioners  further  insist 
that Proposition 12 offends this “almost per se” rule because 
the  law  will  impose  substantial  new  costs  on  out-of-state 
pork producers who wish to sell their products in California. 

A 
This  argument  falters  out  of  the  gate.    Put  aside  what 
problems may attend the minor (factual) premise of this ar-
gument.  Focus just on the major (legal) premise.  Petition-
ers say the “almost per se” rule they propose follows ineluc-
tably  from  three  cases—Healy  v.  Beer  Institute,  491  U. S. 
324  (1989);  Brown-Forman  Distillers  Corp.  v.  New  York 
State Liquor Authority, 476 U. S. 573 (1986); and Baldwin 
v. G. A. F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U. S. 511 (1935).  A close look at 
those cases, however, reveals nothing like the rule petition-
ers posit.  Instead, each typifies the familiar concern with 
preventing  purposeful  discrimination  against  out-of-state
economic interests. 
  Start with Baldwin.  There, this Court refused to enforce 
New York laws that barred out-of-state dairy farmers from 
selling  their  milk  in  the  State  “unless  the  price  paid  to” 
them matched the minimum price New York law guaran-
teed in-state producers.  Id., at 519.  In that way, the chal-
lenged laws deliberately robbed out-of-state dairy farmers 
of  the  opportunity  to  charge  lower  prices  in  New  York 
thanks  to  whatever  “natural  competitive  advantage”  they 
might have enjoyed over in-state dairy farmers—for exam-
ple,  lower  cost  structures,  more  productive  farming  prac-
tices, or “lusher pasturage.”  D. Regan, The Supreme Court 
and  State  Protectionism:  Making  Sense  of  the  Dormant 
Commerce Clause, 84 Mich. L. Rev. 1091, 1248 (1986).  The 
problem  with  New  York’s  laws  was  thus  a  simple  one: