Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/16pdf/15-1358_6khn.pdf
Page Number: 63

Cite as:  582 U. S. ____ (2017) 

19 

BREYER, J., dissenting 

jail a large group of known-innocent people.  And it should 
not apply to some highly specific actions, depending upon 
the nature of those actions.

(4)  The  extent  of  judicial  guidance.  This  factor  may  be
relevant to the existence of a constitutional violation or a 
qualified-immunity  defense.  Where  judicial  guidance  is
lacking,  it  is  more  likely  that  a  constitutional  violation  is 
not  clearly  established.  See  Anderson  v.  Creighton,  483 
U. S.  635,  640  (1987)  (Officials  are  protected  by  qualified 
immunity  unless  “[t]he  contours  of  the  right  [are]  suffi-
ciently  clear  that  a  reasonable  official  would  understand 
that  what  he  is  doing  violates  that  right”).  But  I  do  not 
see  how,  assuming  the  violation  is  clear,  the  presence  or
absence  of  “judicial  guidance”  is  relevant  to  the  existence 
of a damages remedy.

(5)  The  statutory  (or  other)  legal  mandate  under  which 
the  officer  was  operating.    This  factor  too  may  prove  rele-
vant  to  the  question  whether  a  constitutional  violation
exists or is clearly established.  But, again, assuming that 
it is, I do not understand why this factor is relevant to the 
existence of a damages remedy.  See Stanley, 483 U. S., at 
684  (the  question  of  immunity  is  “analytically  distinct” 
from the question whether a Bivens action should lie).

(6)  Risk  of  disruptive  judicial  intrusion.    All  damages
actions risk disrupting to some degree future decisionmak-
ing by members of the Executive or Legislative Branches.
Where  this  Court  has  authorized  Bivens  actions,  it  has 
found that  disruption tolerable, and it has explained why 
disruption is, from a constitutional perspective, desirable. 
See  Davis,  442  U. S.,  at  242  (Unless  constitutional  rights 
“are  to  become  merely  precatory,  . . .  litigants  who  allege
that  their  own  constitutional  rights  have  been  violated,
and  who  at  the  same  time  have  no  effective  means  other 
than the judiciary to enforce these rights, must be able to 
invoke the existing jurisdiction of the courts for . . . protec-
tion”); Malesko, supra, at 70 (“The purpose of Bivens is to