Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/558bv.pdf
Page Number: 599.0

438  CITIZENS  UNITED  v.  FEDERAL  ELECTION  COMM’N 

Opinion of Stevens, J. 

far.  They would have recognized congressional authority to 
bar  general  treasury  electioneering  expenditures  even  by 
this  class  of  nonproﬁts;  they  acknowledged  that  “the  threat 
from  corporate  political  activity  will  vary  depending  on  the 
particular  characteristics  of  a  given  corporation,”  but  be­
lieved these “distinctions among corporations” were “distinc­
tions  in  degree,”  not  “in  kind,”  and  thus  “more  properly 
drawn by the Legislature than by the Judiciary.”  479 U. S., 
at 268 (opinion of Rehnquist, C. J.) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  Not  a  single  Justice  suggested  that  regulation  of 
corporate political speech could be no more stringent than of 
speech by an individual. 

Four  years  later,  in  Austin,  494  U. S.  652,  we  considered 
whether  corporations  falling  outside  the  MCFL  exception 
could  be  barred  from  using  general  treasury  funds  to  make 
independent  expenditures  in  support  of,  or  in  opposition  to, 
candidates.  We held they could be.  Once again recognizing 
the importance of “the integrity of the marketplace of politi­
cal ideas” in candidate elections, MCFL, 479 U. S., at 257, we 
noted  that  corporations  have  “special  advantages—such  as 
limited  liability,  perpetual  life,  and  favorable  treatment  of 
the  accumulation  and  distribution  of  assets,”  494  U. S.,  at 
658–659—that allow them to spend prodigious general treas­
ury sums on campaign messages that have “little or no corre­
lation”  with  the  beliefs  held  by  actual  persons,  id.,  at  660. 
In  light  of  the  corrupting  effects  such  spending  might  have 
on  the  political  process,  ibid.,  we  permitted  the  State  of 
Michigan  to  limit  corporate  expenditures  on  candidate  elec­
tions  to corporations’  PACs,  which  rely on  voluntary  contri­
butions and thus “reﬂect actual public support for the politi­
cal ideas espoused by corporations,” ibid.  Notwithstanding 
our  colleagues’ insinuations  that Austin  deprived the  public 
of  general  “ideas,”  “facts,”  and  “ ‘knowledge,’ ”  ante,  at  354, 
355,  the  decision  addressed  only  candidate-focused  expendi­
tures  and  gave  the  State  no  license  to  regulate  corporate 
spending on other matters.