Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/529bv.pdf
Page Number: 469.0

529US2

Unit: $U46

[10-07-01 17:18:24] PAGES PGT: OPIN

394

WILLIAMS v. TAYLOR

Opinion of the Court

“ ‘The prisoner argues there ‘is a “reasonable probabil-
ity” that at least one juror would have been moved to
spare Petitioner’s life had he heard’ the mitigation evi-
dence developed at the habeas hearing that was not pre-
sented at the trial. Summarizing, he contends there ‘is
a “reasonable probability” that had at least one juror
heard any of this evidence—let alone all of this evi-
dence—the outcome of this case would have been
different.’

“We reject these contentions. The prisoner’s discus-
sion ﬂies in the face of the Supreme Court’s admonition
in Lockhart, supra, that ‘an analysis focusing solely on
mere outcome determination, without attention to
whether the result of the proceeding was fundamentally
unfair or unreliable, is defective.’ ” 254 Va., at 25, 487
S. E. 2d, at 199.

Unlike the Virginia Supreme Court, the state trial judge
omitted any reference to Lockhart and simply relied on our
opinion in Strickland as stating the correct standard for
judging ineffective-assistance claims. With respect to the
prejudice component, he wrote:

“Even if a Petitioner shows that counsel’s perform-
ance was deﬁcient, however, he must also show preju-
dice. Petitioner must show ‘that there is a reasonable
probability that but for counsel’s unprofessional errors,
the result . . . would have been different.’ Strickland,
‘A reasonable probability is a probabil-
466 U. S. at 694.
ity sufﬁcient to undermine conﬁdence in the outcome.’
Id.
Indeed, it is insufﬁcient to show only that the er-
rors had some conceivable effect on the outcome of the
proceeding, because virtually every act or omission of
counsel would meet that test.
Id. at 693. The peti-
tioner bears the ‘highly demanding’ and ‘heavy burden’
in establishing actual prejudice.” App. 417.