Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/21pdf/20-603_o758.pdf
Page Number: 47

Cite as:  597 U. S. ____ (2022) 

25 

THOMAS, J., dissenting 

B 

To  the  extent  that  the  Court’s  new  “complete  in  itself ” 
standard has any definable contours, it is inconsistent with
our modern sovereign immunity doctrine and, in particular, 
Seminole Tribe. 

As I noted above, the Court does not define what it means 
for  a  federal  power  to  be  “complete  in  itself ”  under 
PennEast and Kohl.  All we are told is that eminent domain 
and the powers to raise and support armies and navies are
powers “complete” in themselves.  See ante, at 6, 11. 

The Court’s “completeness” standard is indeterminate in 
large part because the Court fails to recognize that the con-
cept of a federal power being “complete in itself ” long pre-
dates Kohl and means something quite different from what 
the Court says it does.  In fact, the phrase’s provenance in 
our jurisprudence dates back to no less seminal a decision 
than Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion in Gibbons v. Ogden, 
9 Wheat. 1 (1824).  There, the Court stated that Congress’ 
power  “[t]o  regulate  Commerce  with  foreign  Nations,  and 
among the several States,” U. S. Const., Art. I, §8, cl. 3, “like 
all others vested in Congress, is complete in itself, may be
exercised to its utmost extent, and acknowledges no limita-
tions,  other  than  are  prescribed  in  the  constitution,”  9 
Wheat., at 196 (emphasis added). 

Gibbons’ discussion is revealing.  First, unlike the Court’s 
decision today, which attempts to cabin congressional pow-
ers that are “complete in themselves” to only a few, Gibbons 
is explicit that it considered every power vested in Congress 
to be “complete in itself.”  Ibid.  That understanding would 
explain why Kohl said that “[i]f the United States have the 
power, it must be complete in itself.”  91 U. S., at 374 (em-
phasis added).  Second, unlike the Court today, Gibbons de-
fines what it means for a power to be complete in itself—
the power “may be exercised to its utmost extent” with “no 
limitations” beyond those in Constitution itself.  9 Wheat., 
at  196.  In  other  words,  the  power  is  plenary  as  to  those