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Page Number: 25.0

22 

RAMOS v. LOUISIANA 

Opinion of the Court 

Sixth Amendment’s historical unanimity requirement aged 
more gracefully.  As we’ve seen, in the years since Apodaca, 
this  Court  has  spoken  inconsistently  about  its  meaning—
but  nonetheless  referred  to  the  traditional  unanimity  re-
quirement on at least eight occasions.64  In light of all this,
calling Apodaca an outlier would be perhaps too suggestive
of the possibility of company.

When it comes to reliance interests, it’s notable that nei-
ther  Louisiana  nor  Oregon  claims  anything  like  the  pro-
spective economic, regulatory, or social disruption litigants
seeking  to  preserve  precedent  usually  invoke.    No  one,  it 
seems,  has  signed  a  contract,  entered  a  marriage,  pur-
chased a home, or opened a business based on the expecta-
tion that, should a crime occur, at least the accused may be
sent away by a 10-to-2 verdict.65  Nor does anyone suggest
that nonunanimous verdicts have “become part of our na-
tional culture.”66  It would be quite surprising if they had, 
given  that  nonunanimous  verdicts  are  insufficient  to  con-
vict in 48 States and federal court. 

Instead,  the  only  reliance  interests  that  might  be  as-
serted here fall into two categories.  The first concerns the 
fact  Louisiana  and  Oregon  may  need  to  retry  defendants
convicted of felonies by nonunanimous verdicts whose cases
are still pending on direct appeal.  The dissent claims that 
this fact supplies the winning argument for retaining Apo-
daca  because  it  has  generated  “enormous  reliance  inter-
ests” and overturning the case would provoke a “crushing” 

—————— 
the entire Bill of Rights applicable to the States.  See post, at 17–18.  The 
scope of an incorporated right and whether a right is incorporated at all
are two different questions.  See Timbs, 586 U. S., at ___–___ (slip op., at 
2–3) (“[I]f a Bill of Rights protection is incorporated, there is no daylight
between the federal and state conduct it prohibits or requires”). 

64 See n. 35, supra. 
65 Cf.  Leegin  Creative  Leather  Products,  Inc.  v.  PSKS,  Inc.,  551  U. S. 

877, 925–926 (2007) (BREYER, J., dissenting). 

66 Dickerson v. United States, 530 U. S. 428, 443 (2000).