Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/21pdf/21-147_g31h.pdf
Page Number: 22

Cite as:  596 U. S. ____ (2022) 

1 

 GORSUCH, J., concurring
GORSUCH, J., concurring in judgment 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

_________________ 

No. 21–147 
_________________ 

ERIK EGBERT, PETITIONER v. ROBERT BOULE 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT 

[June 8, 2022]

 JUSTICE GORSUCH, concurring in the judgment. 
Our Constitution’s separation of powers prohibits federal 
courts  from  assuming  legislative  authority.  As  the  Court 
today acknowledges, Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics 
Agents,  403  U. S.  388  (1971),  crossed  that  line  by 
“impl[ying]” a new set of private rights and liabilities Con-
gress  never  ordained.  Ante,  at  5–6;  see  also Alexander  v. 
Sandoval,  532  U. S.  275,  286  (2001);  Nestlé  USA,  Inc.  v. 
Doe,  593  U. S.  ___,  ___–___  (2021)  (GORSUCH,  J.,  concur-
ring) (slip op., at 4–7).

Recognizing its misstep, this Court has struggled for dec-
ades  to  find  its  way  back.    Initially,  the  Court  told  lower 
courts  to  follow  a  “two  ste[p]”  inquiry  before  applying 
Bivens to any new situation.  Ante, at 7.  At the first step, a 
court had to ask whether the case before it presented a “new 
context” meaningfully different from Bivens.  Ante, at 7.  At 
the  second,  a  court  had  to  consider  whether  “ ‘special  fac-
tors’ ” counseled hesitation before recognizing a new cause 
of action.  Ibid.  But these tests soon produced their own set 
of questions:  What distinguishes the first step from the sec-
ond?  What  makes  a  context  “new”  or  a  factor  “special”?
And,  most  fundamentally,  on  what  authority  may  courts
recognize new causes of action even under these standards?
Today, the Court helpfully answers some of these linger-
ing questions.  It recognizes that our two-step inquiry really 
boils down to a “single question”:  Is there “any reason to