Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/558bv.pdf
Page Number: 379

218 

PRESLEY  v.  GEORGIA 

Thomas, J., dissenting 

question  summarily  without  the  beneﬁt  of  full  brieﬁng  and 
argument. 

Second,  I  am  also  unwilling  to  join  the  Court  in  reading 
the “ ‘alternatives  to closure’ ” language it  quotes from Wal­
ler  and  Press  Enterprise  I  as  squarely  foreclosing  the  deci­
sion  of  the  Supreme  Court  of  Georgia.  See  ante,  at  214. 
The  Court  chides  the  Supreme  Court  of  Georgia  for  “con­
clud[ing],  despite  our  explicit  statements  to  the  contrary, 
that  trial  courts  need  not  consider  alternatives  to  closure 
absent  an  opposing  party’s  proffer  of  some  alternatives.” 
Ibid.  (emphasis added).  But neither Waller  nor Press-
Enterprise  I  expressly  holds  that  jury  voir  dire  is  covered 
by  the  Sixth  Amendment’s  “[P]ublic  [T]rial”  Clause.  Ac­
cordingly, it is not obvious that the “alternatives to closure” 
language in those opinions governs this case. 

Even  assuming  the  Court  correctly  extends  Waller  and 
Press-Enterprise I to this (Sixth Amendment voir dire) con­
text,  neither  opinion  “explicit[ly]”  places  on  trial  courts  the 
burden  of  sua  sponte  suggesting  alternatives  to  closure 
“absent  an  opposing  party’s  proffer  of  some  alternatives.” 
Ante,  at  214.  The  statement  that  a  “ ‘trial  court  must  con­
sider  reasonable  alternatives  to  closing  the  proceeding,’ ” 
ibid.  (quoting Waller,  supra,  at 48),  does  not deﬁnitively  es­
tablish  who  must  suggest  alternatives  to  closure  that  the 
trial court must then consider, nor does it expressly address 
whether the trial court must suggest such alternatives in the 
absence of a proffer.  I concede that the language can easily 

dence  required  to  meet  this  ‘substantial  probability’  test,  or  can  general­
ized fears that would apply equally to nearly every trial sufﬁce? 
“II.  This  Court  has  repeatedly  held  that  a  trial  court  must  consider  rea­
sonable alternatives to closing a proceeding before it can exclude the pub­
lic.  But  who  bears  the  burden  of  suggesting  such  alternatives?  Must 
the  proponent  of  closure  establish  that  closure  is  necessary,  in  that  there 
are  no  reasonable  alternatives  available?  Or  to  overcome  a  closure  mo­
tion must an opponent of closure establish that reasonable alternatives do 
exist?”  Pet. for Cert. i.