Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/22pdf/22-506_nmip.pdf
Page Number: 67

20 

BIDEN v. NEBRASKA 

KAGAN, J., dissenting 

you think appropriate.”  Otherwise said, the phrase extends
from minor changes all the way up to major ones.

The majority fares no better in claiming that the phrase
“waive or modify” somehow limits the Secretary’s ability “to 
add to existing law.”  Ante, at 18 (emphasis in original).  The 
majority’s explanation of that idea oscillates a fair bit.  At 
times the majority tries to convey that “additions” as a class
are somehow suspect.  See ante, at 17–18 (looking askance
at “add[ing] new terms,” “adding back in,” “filling the empty 
space,”  “augment[ing],”  and  “draft[ing]  new”  language). 
But that is mistaken.  Change often (usually?) involves or 
necessitates replacements.  So when the Secretary uses his 
statutory power to remove some conditions on loan cancel-
lation,  he  can  under  that  same  power  replace  them  with
others.  The  majority  itself  must  ultimately  concede  that 
point.  See ante, at 13, 17–18.  So it falls back on arguing 
that  the  “additions”  allowed  cannot  be  “substantial[ ]”  be-
cause the statute uses the word “modify.”  Ante, at 16; see 
ante, at 17–18.  But that just doubles down on the majority’s 
most  basic  error:  extracting  “modify”  from  the  “waive  or
modify” phrase in order to confine the Secretary to making
minor changes.  As just shown, the phrase as a whole says
the opposite—tells the Secretary that he can make changes 
along a spectrum, from modest to substantial.  See supra, 
at 19.  And so he can make additions along that spectrum
as well.  In particular, if he entirely removes existing con-
ditions  on  loan  discharge,  he  can  substitute  new  ones;  he
does not have to leave gaping holes. 

Indeed, other language in the statute makes that substi-
tution authority perfectly clear.  As noted earlier, the stat-
ute refers expressly to “the terms and conditions to be ap-
plied  in  lieu  of  such  [modified  or  waived]  statutory  and 
regulatory provisions.”  §1098bb(b)(2); see supra, at 16.  In 
other  words,  the  statute  expects  the  Secretary’s  waivers
and modifications to involve replacing the usual provisions
with different ones.  The majority rejoins that the “in lieu