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Page Number: 2.0

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SHOOP v. TWYFORD 

Syllabus 

appropriate in aid of” the District Court’s jurisdiction because Twyford 
failed to show that the evidence he hoped to find would be useful to his
habeas case.  Because this Court agrees with the State’s second argu-
ment, it does not address the first. 

In habeas cases such as this, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death 
Penalty Act (AEDPA) restricts a federal court’s authority to grant re-
lief.  AEDPA provides that a federal habeas court cannot grant relief 
in a case adjudicated on the merits in state court unless the state court
(1) contradicted or unreasonably applied this Court’s precedents, or (2)
handed down a decision “based on an unreasonable determination of 
the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceed-
ing.”  §§2254(d)(1)–(2).  AEDPA also restricts the ability of a federal
habeas court to develop and consider new evidence, limiting review of 
factual determinations under §2254(d)(2) to “the evidence presented in
the  State  court  proceeding,”  and  review  of  legal  claims  under 
§2254(d)(1) “to the record that was before the state court.”  Cullen v. 
Pinholster,  563  U. S.  170,  181.    A  federal  court  may  admit  new  evi-
dence only in two limited situations: Either the claim must rely on a 
“new” and “previously unavailable” “rule of constitutional law” made
retroactively  applicable  by  this  Court,  or  it  must  rely  on  “a  factual
predicate that could not have been previously discovered through the
exercise of due diligence.”  §2254(e)(2)(A).  But before a federal court 
may decide whether to grant an evidentiary hearing or “otherwise con-
sider  new  evidence”  under  §2254(e)(2),  it  must  first  determine  that
such evidence could be legally considered in the prisoner’s case.  Shinn 
v. Martinez Ramirez, 596 U. S. ___, ___.  That is because a federal court 
“may  never  needlessly  prolong  a  habeas  case,  particularly  given  the 
essential need to promote the finality of state convictions.”  Id., at ___ 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 

Twyford’s transportation request was granted under the All Writs 
Act.  This Court has held that the All Writs Act cannot be used to cir-
cumvent  statutory  requirements  or  otherwise  binding  procedural 
rules.  See Pennsylvania Bureau of Correction v. United States Mar-
shals Service, 474 U. S. 34, 43.  In federal habeas proceedings, AEDPA 
provides the governing rules.  And this Court’s precedents explain that
a district court must consider AEDPA’s requirements before facilitat-
ing the development of new evidence.  By the same token, if an order
issued under the All Writs Act enables a prisoner to fish for unusable 
evidence, such a writ would not be “necessary or appropriate in aid of” 
the federal court’s jurisdiction, as all orders issued under the Act must 
be.  §1651(a).    “[G]uided  by  the  general  principles  underlying  [this 
Court’s]  habeas  corpus  jurisprudence,”  Calderon  v.  Thompson,  523 
U. S. 538, 554, a writ that enables a prisoner to gather evidence that 
would not be admissible would “needlessly prolong” resolution of the