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6 

BIDEN v. NEBRASKA 

BARRETT, J., concurring 

Harv. L. Rev. 2387, 2457 (2003) (Manning).  To strip a word
from its context is to strip that word of its meaning. 

Context is not found exclusively “ ‘within the four corners’ 
of a statute.”  Id., at 2456.  Background legal conventions,
for  instance,  are  part  of  the  statute’s  context.  F.  Easter-
brook,  The  Case  of  the  Speluncean  Explorers:  Revisited, 
112  Harv.  L. Rev.  1876,  1913  (1999)  (“Language  takes
meaning from its linguistic context,” as well as “historical 
and  governmental  contexts”).    Thus,  courts  apply  a  pre-
sumption  of mens  rea  to  criminal statutes,  Xiulu  Ruan  v. 
United States, 597 U. S. ___, ___ (2022) (slip op., at 5), and 
a presumption of equitable tolling to statutes of limitations, 
Irwin v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 498 U. S. 89, 95– 
96 (1990).  It is also well established that “[w]here Congress
employs a term of art obviously transplanted from another
legal  source,  it  brings  the  old  soil  with  it.”  George  v. 
McDonough, 596 U. S. ___, ___ (2022) (slip op., at 5) (inter-
nal  quotation  marks  omitted).  I  could  go  on.  See,  e.g., 
Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 
U. S. 118, 132 (2014) (federal causes of action are construed 
“to  incorporate  a  requirement  of  proximate  causation”); 
Wisconsin Dept. of Revenue v. William Wrigley, Jr., Co., 505 
U. S.  214,  231  (1992)  (“de  minimis  non  curat  lex”).    As  it 
happens, “[t]he notion that some things ‘go without saying’ 
applies to legislation just as it does to everyday life.”  Bond 
v. United States, 572 U. S. 844, 857 (2014). 

Context  also  includes  common  sense,  which  is  another 
thing that “goes without saying.”  Case reporters and case-
books brim with illustrations of why literalism—the antith-
esis of context-driven interpretation—falls short.  Consider 
the classic example of a statute imposing criminal penalties 
on “ ‘whoever drew blood in the streets.’ ”  United States v. 
Kirby, 7 Wall. 482, 487 (1869).  Read literally, the statute
would cover a surgeon accessing a vein of a person in the 
street.  But “common sense” counsels otherwise, ibid., be-