Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/22pdf/21-1449_d9eh.pdf
Page Number: 37.0

16 

GLACIER NORTHWEST, INC. v. TEAMSTERS 

JACKSON, J., dissenting 

to the Board to address in the first instance.5 

It  is  clear  to  me  that  Congress  plainly  intended  for  the
Board’s  factfinding  function  to  be  at  the  forefront  of  this 
kind of legal evaluation.  Thus, in my view, when a court
undertakes the Garmon analysis in a context such as this
one,  it  should  take  care  to  limit  itself  to  its own  assigned 
responsibility:  the  mere  determination  of  whether,  given
the  union’s  evidence  and  legal  interpretation,  the  Board 
could possibly conclude that the union had taken reasona-
ble precautions.  If yes, the court should suspend the pend-
ing  legal  action  to  let  the  Board  decide  the  question.  To 
conclude no, given the fact-bound nature of the reasonable-
precautions analysis, a court in all but the most exceptional 
circumstances will need to be able to point to a reasonable-
precautions case from the Board that is on all fours with the 
facts of the case before it and that found the conduct unpro-
tected.  In that circumstance, the court can proceed with the 
suit, without breaking new legal ground on the scope of the 
right to strike. 

In  all  events,  then,  courts  can  properly  decide  the  Gar-
mon  issue  without  making  law  in  this  area,  precisely  as 
Congress intended.  Indeed, I think we best respect congres-
sional  intent  regarding  the  Board’s  authority  to  develop 
uniform labor law by leaving the application of the Board’s 
reasonable-precautions  principle  to  the  Board  itself.    The 
majority’s contrary approach opens up the possibility that 
courts around the country will now act on bare allegations 

—————— 

5 Justice Blackmun warned that a formulation of the Garmon test that 
directs attention to a party’s evidence might lead some courts to make 
such an errant assessment, “under the guise of weighing the sufficiency 
of the evidence.”  Longshoremen v. Davis, 476 U. S. 380, 404 (1986) (opin-
ion  concurring  in  part  and  dissenting  in  part)  (expressing  the  concern 
that a future court might misunderstand its role and mistakenly under-
take “[to] mak[e] precisely the determination that Garmon makes clear 
is for the Board, and only the Board, to make”).  That warning was pres-
cient.