Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/17pdf/16-1140_5368.pdf
Page Number: 29

Cite as:  585 U. S. ____ (2018) 

3 

BREYER, J., dissenting 

795 (1988)) (alteration in original).  “As a general matter,” 
the  majority  concludes,  such  laws  are  “presumptively 
unconstitutional”  and  are  subject  to  “stringent”  review. 
Ante, at 6–7. 

The majority recognizes exceptions to this general rule: 
It  excepts  laws  that  “require  professionals  to  disclose
factual, noncontroversial information in their ‘commercial 
speech,’ ”  provided  that  the  disclosure  “relates  to  the  ser-
vices  that  [the  regulated  entities]  provide.”  Ante,  at  8–9. 
It  also  excepts  laws  that  “regulate  professional  conduct” 
and only “incidentally burden speech.”  Ante, at 9–10. 

This constitutional approach threatens to create serious 
problems.  Because much, perhaps most, human behavior 
takes  place  through  speech  and  because  much,  perhaps
most, law regulates that speech in terms of its content, the
majority’s  approach  at  the  least  threatens  considerable 
litigation over the constitutional validity of much, perhaps
most,  government  regulation.    Virtually  every  disclosure
law  could  be  considered  “content  based,”  for  virtually 
every  disclosure  law  requires  individuals  “to  speak  a
particular  message.”    See  Reed  v.  Town  of  Gilbert,  576 
U. S. ___, ___ (2015) (BREYER, J., concurring in judgment) 
(slip  op.,  at  3)  (listing  regulations  that  inevitably  involve
content discrimination, ranging from securities disclosures 
to  signs  at  petting  zoos).    Thus,  the  majority’s  view,  if
taken  literally,  could  radically  change  prior  law,  perhaps 
placing much securities law or consumer protection law at 
constitutional  risk,  depending  on  how  broadly  its  excep-
tions are interpreted.

Many  ordinary  disclosure  laws  would  fall  outside  the 
majority’s exceptions for disclosures related to the profes-
sional’s own services or conduct.  These include numerous 
commonly  found  disclosure  requirements  relating  to  the 
medical  profession.    See,  e.g.,  Cal.  Veh.  Code  Ann. 
§27363.5  (West  2014)  (requiring  hospitals  to  tell  parents
about  child  seat  belts);  Cal.  Health  &  Safety  Code  Ann.