Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/19pdf/18-916_f2ah.pdf
Page Number: 22.0

Cite as:  590 U. S. ____ (2020) 

3 

GORSUCH, J., dissenting 

had done just about everything one can do to a patent ex-
cept invent it. 

Thryv responded by opening another new litigation front
of  its  own.    One  year  after  CTC  filed  its  federal  lawsuit, 
Thryv lodged another administrative petition with the Pat-
ent Office, this time seeking inter partes review.  Echoing
some  of  the  same  arguments  that  led  to  its  push  for  an 
ex parte  administrative  reexamination  nine  years  earlier, 
and adding other arguments too, Thryv (again) asked the 
agency to cancel Mr. DuVal’s patent on the grounds that it 
lacked novelty and was obvious.  At the same time, Thryv
sought  to  stay  proceedings  in  CTC’s  infringement  suit. 
Thryv  argued  that  the  district  court  should  defer  to  the 
newly  initiated  inter  partes  review.    Like  many  district 
courts  facing  the  prospect  of  parallel  administrative  pro-
ceedings, this one obliged. 

Why at this late hour did Thryv prefer to litigate before 
the  agency  rather  than  a  federal  district  court?    The 
agency’s ex parte reexamination years earlier hadn’t helped 
Thryv  much.    But  since  then,  Congress  had  adopted  the
Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (AIA), 35 U. S. C. §100 
et seq.    That  law  created  the  inter  partes  review  process,
which provides a number of benefits to accused infringers
such  as  Thryv.    Like  federal  court  litigation,  inter  partes 
review holds the advantage of allowing a private party at-
tacking a patent’s validity to participate in adversarial pro-
ceedings, rather than rely on the agency to direct its own 
investigation  as  it  does  in  ex parte  reexamination.    Com-
pare  35  U. S. C.  §316  with  §§302,  304,  305.    Inter  partes 
review also allows a party challenging a patent all manner 
of discovery, including depositions and the presentation of 
expert testimony.  §316; 37 CFR §§42.51–42.65 (2019).  At 
the same time, the burden of proof is lower—requiring chal-
lengers like Thryv to prove unpatentability only by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence, §316(e), rather than under the 
clear and convincing standard that usually applies in court.