Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/21pdf/20-601_bq7c.pdf
Page Number: 28.0

Cite as:  595 U. S. ____ (2022) 

5 

KAGAN, J., concurring in judgment 

Circuit  ruled;  but  he  then  decided  to  abandon  the  argu-
ment.  If the attorney general could not assume the defense, 
and thus continue contesting EMW’s claim, Kentucky could 
no longer enforce its statute.  And it is of course true, as the 
majority says, that a State has a significant interest in en-
forcing its own laws.  See ante, at 8.  As a practical matter, 
then, the attorney general belonged in the suit, absent some 
good cause to exclude him. 
  And as the Court concludes, no such cause was present.  
See ante, at 10–13.  The intervention motion, though com-
ing late in the suit, was still timely.  The attorney general 
intervened as soon as he had a reason to do so—more spe-
cifically, two days after he learned that the secretary would 
no longer defend the challenged law.  See United Airlines, 
Inc. v. McDonald, 432 U. S. 385, 394 (1977) (holding that a 
motion  to  intervene  was  timely  because  it  was  made  “as 
soon as it became clear” that the movant’s interests “would 
no longer be protected” by existing parties).  And the motion 
was  filed  within  the  14-day  window  for  requesting  an  en 
banc rehearing—so did nothing to delay the suit’s normal 
progress.  See Fed. Rules App. Proc. 35(c) and 40(a)(1).  Nor 
did  the  motion  otherwise  prejudice  EMW.    The  attorney 
general sought to pursue only the usual next steps of appel-
late  review—what  the  secretary  would  have  done  had  he 
not ceased defending the law.  Of course, EMW would have 
preferred the secretary’s action to bring the case to an end.  
But an unrealized gain of that kind does not count as a le-
gally  cognizable  harm.    See  McDonald,  432  U. S.,  at  394 
(holding that a litigant cannot claim “unfair[ ] prejudice[ ]” 
when one person takes over an appeal from another).  Noth-
ing, then, counterbalances the reasons for enabling the at-
torney general’s inclusion. 

  * 
  So I arrive, if via a somewhat different path, at the same 
endpoint as the Court.  In my view, the attorney general’s 

  * 

*