Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/23pdf/22-529_1b7d.pdf
Page Number: 17

Cite as:  602 U. S. ____ (2024) 

13 

Opinion of the Court 

In  analyzing  the  New  York  interest-on-escrow  law  at
issue here, the Court of Appeals did not conduct that kind
of  nuanced  comparative  analysis.    Instead,  the  Court  of 
Appeals relied on a line of cases going back to McCulloch v. 
Maryland  to  distill  a  categorical  test  that  would  preempt
virtually  all  state  laws  that  regulate  national  banks,  at 
least  other  than  generally  applicable  state  laws  such  as 
contract  or  property  laws.    Bank  of  America  supports  the
Court  of  Appeals’  approach.    By  contrast,  the  plaintiffs 
would  yank  the  preemption  standard  to  the  opposite 
extreme,  and  would  preempt  virtually  no  non-
discriminatory  state  laws  that  apply  to  both  state  and 
national banks. 

We  appreciate  the  desire  by  both  parties  for  a  clearer
preemption  line  one  way  or  the  other.  But  Congress 
expressly  incorporated  Barnett  Bank  into  the  U. S.  Code. 
And in determining whether the Florida law at issue there 
was  preempted,  Barnett  Bank  did  not  draw  a  bright  line.
Instead, Barnett Bank sought to carefully account for and
navigate  this  Court’s  prior  bank  preemption  cases. 
Applying those precedents, Barnett Bank  ruled that some 
(but  not  all)  non-discriminatory  state  laws  that  regulate
national  banks  are  preempted.    Under  Dodd-Frank,  as 
relevant here, courts may find a state law preempted “only 
if,”  “in  accordance  with  the  legal  standard”  from  Barnett 
Bank, the law “prevents or significantly interferes with the 
exercise by the national bank of its powers.”  §25b(b)(1)(B).
Because the Court of Appeals did not analyze preemption
in a manner consistent with Dodd-Frank and Barnett Bank, 
we vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand 

—————— 
their deposits to “unusual” California law); Anderson National Bank v. 
Luckett, 321 U. S. 233, 247–248 (1944) (determining that no “word in the 
national banking laws . . . expressly or by implication conflicts with the 
provisions  of   the  Kentucky  statutes”);  id.,  at  249–252  (comparing  the 
likely effect of the Kentucky law to the likely effect of the California law
in First National Bank of San Jose).