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6  NEW YORK STATE RIFLE & PISTOL ASSN., INC. v. BRUEN 

Syllabus 

(v) Finally, respondents point to the slight uptick in gun regu-
lation during the late-19th century.  As the Court suggested in Heller, 
however, late-19th-century evidence cannot provide much insight into
the meaning of the Second Amendment when it contradicts earlier ev-
idence.  In addition, the vast majority of the statutes that respondents
invoke come from the Western Territories.  The bare existence of these 
localized  restrictions  cannot  overcome  the  overwhelming  evidence  of
an  otherwise  enduring  American  tradition  permitting  public  carry.
See  Heller,  554  U. S.,  at  614.    Moreover,  these  territorial  laws  were 
rarely subject to judicial scrutiny, and absent any evidence explaining
why these unprecedented prohibitions on all public carry were under-
stood to comport with the Second Amendment, they do little to inform
“the origins and continuing significance of the Amendment.”  Ibid.; see 
also  The  Federalist  No.  37,  p.  229.    Finally,  these  territorial  re-
strictions deserve little weight because they were, consistent with the
transitory  nature  of  territorial  government,  short  lived.    Some  were 
held unconstitutional shortly after passage, and others did not survive
a Territory’s admission to the Union as a State.  Pp. 58–62. 

(vi) After reviewing the Anglo-American history of public carry,
the  Court  concludes  that  respondents  have  not  met  their  burden  to 
identify an American tradition justifying New York’s proper-cause re-
quirement.  Apart from a few late-19th-century outlier jurisdictions,
American governments simply have not broadly prohibited the public
carry of commonly used firearms for personal defense.  Nor have they
generally required law-abiding, responsible citizens to “demonstrate a
special need for self-protection distinguishable from that of the general
community” to carry arms in public.  Klenosky, 75 App. Div. 2d, at 793, 
428 N. Y. S. 2d, at 257.  P. 62. 

(c) The constitutional right to bear arms in public for self-defense is
not “a second-class right, subject to an entirely different body of rules
than the other Bill of Rights guarantees.”  McDonald, 561 U. S., at 780 
(plurality opinion).  The exercise of other constitutional rights does not
require individuals to demonstrate to government officers some special
need.  The Second Amendment right to carry arms in public for self-
defense is no different.  New York’s proper-cause requirement violates
the  Fourteenth  Amendment  by  preventing  law-abiding  citizens  with 
ordinary  self-defense  needs  from  exercising  their  right  to  keep  and 
bear arms in public.  Pp. 62–63. 

818 Fed. Appx. 99, reversed and remanded. 

THOMAS, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C. J., 
and ALITO, GORSUCH, KAVANAUGH, and BARRETT, JJ., joined.  ALITO, J., 
filed a concurring opinion.  KAVANAUGH, J., filed a concurring opinion, in
which  ROBERTS,  C. J.,  joined.    BARRETT,  J.,  filed  a  concurring  opinion.
BREYER, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which SOTOMAYOR and KAGAN, 
JJ., joined.