Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/21pdf/21-401_2cp3.pdf
Page Number: 3.0

Cite as:  596 U. S. ____ (2022) 

3 

Syllabus 

a “foreign tribunal” follows “the practice and procedure of the foreign
country.”  That the default discovery procedures for a “foreign tribu-
nal” are governmental suggests that the body is governmental too.   

Similarly, an “international tribunal” is best understood as one that 
involves or is of two or more nations, meaning that those nations have 
imbued the tribunal with official power to adjudicate disputes.  So un-
derstood, a “foreign tribunal” is a tribunal imbued with governmental
authority by one nation, and an “international tribunal” is a tribunal 
imbued with governmental authority by multiple nations.  Pp. 5–9.

(b) Section 1782’s focus on governmental and intergovernmental tri-
bunals is confirmed by both the statute’s history and a comparison to 
the Federal Arbitration Act.  From 1855 until 1964, §1782 and its an-
tecedents covered assistance only to foreign “courts.”  Congress estab-
lished the Commission on International Rules of Judicial Procedure, 
see §§1–2, 72 Stat. 1743, and charged the Commission with improving
the process of judicial assistance, specifying that the “assistance and 
cooperation” was “between the United States and foreign countries” and 
that “the rendering of assistance to foreign courts and quasi-judicial 
agencies” should be improved.  Ibid. (emphasis added).  In 1964, Con-
gress  adopted  the  Commission’s  proposed  legislation,  which  became 
the modern version of §1782.  Interpreting §1782 to reach only bodies
exercising governmental authority is consistent with Congress’ charge 
to the Commission.  The animating purpose of §1782 is comity: Per-
mitting federal courts to assist foreign and international governmental 
bodies  promotes  respect  for  foreign  governments  and  encourages re-
ciprocal assistance.  It is difficult to see how enlisting district courts to
help private bodies adjudicating purely private disputes abroad would
serve that end. 

Extending §1782 to include private bodies would also be in signifi-
cant  tension  with  the  FAA,  which  governs  domestic  arbitration,  be-
cause §1782 permits much broader discovery than the FAA allows.  In-
terpreting §1782 to reach private arbitration would therefore create a
notable  mismatch  between  foreign  and  domestic  arbitration.    Pp. 9– 
11. 

(c) The adjudicative bodies in these cases are not governmental or 
intergovernmental tribunals that fall within §1782.  The dispute be-
tween Luxshare and ZF involves private parties that agreed in a pri-
vate  contract  that  DIS,  a  private  dispute-resolution  organization, 
would  arbitrate  any  disputes  between  them.    No  government  is  in-
volved in creating the DIS panel or prescribing its procedures.  Con-
trary  to  Luxshare’s  suggestion,  a  commercial  arbitral  panel  like  the 
DIS panel does not qualify as governmental simply because the law of
the  country  in  which  it  would  sit  (here,  Germany)  governs  some  as-
pects  of  arbitration  and  courts  play  a  role  in  enforcing  arbitration