Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/17pdf/16-111_new2_22p3.pdf
Page Number: 44

Cite as:  584 U. S. ____ (2018) 

7 

Opinion of THOMAS, J. 

new marriage and to celebrate the couple.2 

Accordingly,  Phillips’  creation  of  custom  wedding  cakes
is  expressive.  The  use  of  his  artistic  talents  to  create  a 
well-recognized  symbol  that  celebrates  the  beginning  of  a
marriage  clearly  communicates  a  message—certainly 
more  so  than  nude  dancing,  Barnes  v.  Glen  Theatre,  Inc., 
501  U. S.  560,  565–566  (1991),  or  flying  a  plain  red  flag, 
Stromberg  v.  California,  283  U. S.  359,  369  (1931).3    By
forcing Phillips to create custom wedding cakes for same­
—————— 

2 The Colorado Court of Appeals acknowledged that “a wedding cake, 

in  some  circumstances,  may  convey  a  particularized  message  celebrat­
ing  same-sex  marriage,”  depending  on  its  “design”  and  whether  it  has 
“written  inscriptions.”  Craig  v.  Masterpiece  Cakeshop,  Inc.,  370  P. 3d 
272,  288  (2015).    But  a  wedding  cake  needs  no  particular  design  or
written  words  to  communicate  the  basic  message  that  a  wedding  is
occurring, a marriage has  begun, and the couple should be celebrated.
Wedding  cakes  have  long  varied  in  color,  decorations,  and  style,  but 
those differences do not prevent people from recognizing wedding cakes 
as wedding cakes.  See Charsley, Interpretation and Custom: The Case
of  the  Wedding  Cake,  22  Man  93,  96  (1987).    And  regardless,  the
Commission’s  order  does  not  distinguish  between  plain  wedding  cakes 
and  wedding  cakes  with  particular  designs  or  inscriptions;  it  requires
Phillips  to  make  any  wedding  cake  for  a  same-sex  wedding  that  he 
would make for an opposite-sex wedding. 

3 The  dissent  faults  Phillips  for  not  “submitting  . . .  evidence”  that 
wedding  cakes  communicate  a  message.  Post,  at  2,  n. 1  (opinion  of 
GINSBURG,  J.).  But  this  requirement  finds  no  support  in  our  prece­
dents.  This  Court  did  not  insist  that  the  parties  submit  evidence 
detailing the expressive nature of parades, flags, or nude dancing.  See 
Hurley  v.  Irish-American  Gay,  Lesbian  and  Bisexual  Group  of  Boston, 
Inc.,  515  U. S.  557,  568–570  (1995);  Spence,  418  U. S.,  at  410–411; 
Barnes, 501 U. S., at 565–566.  And we do not need extensive evidence 
here  to  conclude  that  Phillips’  artistry  is  expressive,  see  Hurley,  515 
U. S., at 569, or that wedding cakes at least communicate the basic fact
that  “this  is  a  wedding,”  see  id.,  at  573–575.    Nor  does  it  matter  that 
the couple also communicates a message through the cake.  More than 
one  person can  be  engaged in  protected  speech  at  the  same  time.    See 
id.,  at  569–570.    And  by  forcing  him  to  provide  the  cake,  Colorado  is
requiring Phillips to be “intimately connected” with the couple’s speech, 
which  is  enough  to  implicate  his  First  Amendment  rights.    See  id.,  at 
576.