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Cite as: 529 U. S. 277 (2000)

289

Opinion of O’Connor, J.

74 (1997). Although the issue is close, we conclude that the
case is not moot, and we turn to the merits.

III

Being “in a state of nudity” is not an inherently expressive
condition. As we explained in Barnes, however, nude danc-
ing of the type at issue here is expressive conduct, although
we think that it falls only within the outer ambit of the First
Amendment’s protection. See Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc.,
501 U. S., at 565–566 (plurality opinion); Schad v. Mount
Ephraim, 452 U. S. 61, 66 (1981).

To determine what level of scrutiny applies to the ordi-
nance at issue here, we must decide “whether the State’s
regulation is related to the suppression of expression.”
Texas v. Johnson, 491 U. S. 397, 403 (1989); see also United
States v. O’Brien, 391 U. S., at 377.
If the governmental
purpose in enacting the regulation is unrelated to the sup-
pression of expression, then the regulation need only satisfy
the “less stringent” standard from O’Brien for evaluating
restrictions on symbolic speech. Texas v. Johnson, supra,
If the gov-
at 403; United States v. O’Brien, supra, at 377.
ernment interest is related to the content of the expression,
however, then the regulation falls outside the scope of the
O’Brien test and must be justiﬁed under a more demanding
standard. Texas v. Johnson, supra, at 403.

In Barnes, we analyzed an almost identical statute, holding
that Indiana’s public nudity ban did not violate the First
Amendment, although no ﬁve Members of the Court agreed
on a single rationale for that conclusion. We now clarify
that government restrictions on public nudity such as the
ordinance at issue here should be evaluated under the frame-
work set forth in O’Brien for content-neutral restrictions on
symbolic speech.

The city of Erie argues that the ordinance is a content-
neutral restriction that is reviewable under O’Brien because
the ordinance bans conduct, not speech; speciﬁcally, public