Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/524bv.pdf
Page Number: 582.0

524US2

Unit: $U94

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Cite as: 524 U. S. 498 (1998)

537

Opinion of O(cid:146)Connor, J.

Finally, the nature of the governmental action in this case
is quite unusual. That Congress sought a legislative remedy
for what it perceived to be a grave problem in the funding
of retired coal miners’ health beneﬁts is understandable;
complex problems of that sort typically call for a legislative
solution. When, however, that solution singles out certain
employers to bear a burden that is substantial in amount,
based on the employers’ conduct far in the past, and un-
related to any commitment that the employers made or to
any injury they caused, the governmental action implicates
fundamental principles of fairness underlying the Takings
Clause. Eastern cannot be forced to bear the expense of
lifetime health beneﬁts for miners based on its activities dec-
ades before those beneﬁts were promised. Accordingly, in
the speciﬁc circumstances of this case, we conclude that the
Coal Act’s application to Eastern effects an unconstitutional
taking.

D

Eastern also claims that the manner in which the Coal Act
imposes liability upon it violates substantive due process.
To succeed, Eastern would be required to establish that its
liability under the Act is “arbitrary and irrational.” Turner
Elkhorn, supra, at 15. Our analysis of legislation under the
Takings and Due Process Clauses is correlated to some ex-
tent, see Connolly, supra, at 223, and there is a question
whether the Coal Act violates due process in light of the
Act’s severely retroactive impact. At the same time, this
Court has expressed concerns about using the Due Process
Clause to invalidate economic legislation. See Ferguson v.
Skrupa, 372 U. S. 726, 731 (1963) (noting “our abandonment
of the use of the ‘vague contours’ of the Due Process Clause
to nullify laws which a majority of the Court believ[e] to be
economically unwise” (footnote omitted)); see also William-
son v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U. S. 483, 488 (1955)
(“The day is gone when this Court uses the Due Process
Clause . . . to strike down . . . laws, regulatory of business