Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/529bv.pdf
Page Number: 109

529US1

Unit: $U32

[10-04-01 09:20:53] PAGES PGT: OPIN

34

SHALALA v. ILLINOIS COUNCIL ON LONG
TERM CARE, INC.
Thomas, J., dissenting

for the determination of beneﬁt amounts to be made by a
private insurance carrier designated by the Secretary, and
authorized de novo review of the initial determination by
another ofﬁcer designated by the carrier.
Id., at 203 (citing
42 U. S. C. § 1395u (1982 ed.)). But the statutory scheme
did not mention the possibility of judicial review of Part B
beneﬁt amount determinations, much less review by the
Secretary. By contrast, the statute did expressly provide
for administrative review by the Secretary and judicial re-
view in two instances: disputes concerning the claimant’s
eligibility for beneﬁts under Part A or Part B, and disputes
over beneﬁt amount determinations under Part A. 456
U. S., at 207 (citing 42 U. S. C. § 1395ff (1982 ed.)). We found
this contrast illuminating: “In the context of the statute’s
precisely drawn provisions, this omission provides per-
suasive evidence that Congress deliberately intended to
foreclose further review of [Part B beneﬁt amount deter-
456 U. S., at 208.3 The inference was strong
minations].”
enough that we had no need to discuss the Government’s
alternative contention that § 405(h) expressly precluded a
claim under general jurisdictional provisions. See id., at
206, n. 6. We therefore had no occasion to decide whether
§ 1395ii even incorporates § 405(h) into the Medicare Act.
(So too in Weinberger v. Salﬁ, 422 U. S. 749 (1975), we did
not need to interpret § 1395ii, but for a different and more
obvious reason: Salﬁ was a Social Security case, not a Medi-
care case, so § 405(h) was directly applicable.)

claims are routinely assigned to providers of services, who then seek
reimbursement.

3 Our decision in Erika illustrates the longstanding principle that a
statute whose provisions are ﬁnely wrought may support the preclu-
sion of judicial review, even though that preclusion is only by negative
implication. See, e. g., United States v. Fausto, 484 U. S. 439, 452 (1988);
Block v. Community Nutrition Institute, 467 U. S. 340, 351 (1984);
Switchmen v. National Mediation Bd., 320 U. S. 297, 305–306 (1943).