Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/04pdf/04-278.pdf
Page Number: 12

Cite as:  545 U. S. ____ (2005) 

9 

Opinion of the Court 

simply to accept the Court of Appeals’ conclusion, we would 
necessarily  have  to  decide  conclusively  a  federal  constitu-
tional  question  (i.e.,  whether  such  an  entitlement  consti-
tuted  property  under  the  Due  Process  Clause  and,  if  so, 
whether  petitioner’s  customs  or  policies  provided  too  little 
process to protect it).  We proceed, then, to our own analysis 
of  whether  Colorado  law  gave  respondent  a  right  to  en-
forcement of the restraining order.5 

B 
The  critical  language  in  the  restraining  order  came  not
from any part of the order itself (which was signed by the 
state-court trial judge and directed to the restrained party,
respondent’s  husband),  but  from  the  preprinted  notice  to
law-enforcement  personnel  that  appeared  on  the  back  of 
the  order.  See  supra,  at  2–3.  That  notice  effectively  re-
stated  the  statutory  provision  describing  “peace  officers’ 
duties”  related  to  the  crime  of  violation  of  a  restraining 
order.  At the time of the conduct at issue in this case, that 
provision read as follows: 

“(a) Whenever a restraining order is issued, the pro-
tected person shall be provided with a copy of such or-
der.  A peace officer shall use every reasonable means 
to enforce a restraining order.

“(b)  A  peace  officer  shall  arrest,  or,  if  an  arrest 
would  be  impractical  under  the  circumstances,  seek  a 

—————— 

that do not involve restraining orders. 

5 In something of an anyone-but-us approach, the dissent simultane-
ously  (and  thus  unpersuasively)  contends  not  only  that  this  Court 
should  certify  a  question  to  the  Colorado  Supreme  Court,  post,  at  5–7 
(opinion  of  STEVENS,  J.),  but  also  that  it  should  defer  to  the  Tenth 
Circuit (which itself did not certify any such question), post, at 3–4.  No 
party  in  this  case  has  requested  certification,  even  as  an  alternative 
disposition.  See Tr. of Oral Arg. 56 (petitioner’s counsel “disfavor[ing]” 
certification);  id.,  at  25–26  (counsel  for  the  United  States  arguing 
against  certification).  At  oral  argument,  in  fact,  respondent’s  counsel 
declined JUSTICE STEVENS’ invitation to request it.  Id., at 53.