Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/529bv.pdf
Page Number: 403.0

529US1

Unit: $U42

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ERIE v. PAP’S A. M.

Stevens, J., dissenting

Erie’s ordinance, however, comes to us in a much different
In an earlier proceeding in this case, the Court of
posture.
Common Pleas asked Erie’s counsel “what effect would this
ordinance have on theater . . . productions such as Equus,
Hair, O[h!] Calcutta[!]? Under your ordinance would these
things be prevented . . . ?” Counsel responded: “No, they
wouldn’t, Your Honor.” App. 53.12
Indeed, as stipulated in
the record, the city permitted a production of Equus to pro-
ceed without prosecution, even after the ordinance was in
effect, and despite its awareness of the nudity involved in
Id., at 84.13 Even if, in light of its broad
the production.
applicability, the statute in Barnes was not aimed at a partic-
ular form of speech, Erie’s ordinance is quite different. As
presented to us, the ordinance is deliberately targeted at
Kandyland’s type of nude dancing (to the exclusion of plays
like Equus), in terms of both its applicable scope and the
city’s enforcement.14

12 In my view, Erie’s categorical response forecloses Justice Scalia’s
assertion that the city’s position on Equus and Hair was limited to “[o]ne
instance,” where “the city was [not] aware of the nudity,” and “no one had
complained.” Ante, at 308 (opinion concurring in judgment). Nor could
it be contended that selective applicability by stipulated enforcement
should be treated differently from selective applicability by statutory text.
See Barnes, 501 U. S., at 574 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment) (selec-
tive enforcement may affect a law’s generality). Were it otherwise, con-
stitutional prohibitions could be circumvented with impunity.

13 The stipulation read: “The play, ‘Equus’ featured frontal nudity and
was performed for several weeks in October/November 1994 at the Road-
house Theater in downtown Erie with no efforts to enforce the nudity
prohibition which became effective during the run of the play.”

14 Justice Scalia argues that Erie might have carved out an exception
for Equus and Hair because it guessed that this Court would consider
them protected forms of expression, see Southeastern Promotions, Ltd.
v. Conrad, 420 U. S. 546, 550, 557–558 (1975) (holding that Hair, including
the “group nudity and simulated sex” involved in the production, is pro-
tected speech); in his view, that makes the distinction unobjectionable and
renders the ordinance no less of a general law. Ante, at 309 (opinion con-
curring in judgment). This argument appears to contradict his earlier
deﬁnition of a general law: “A law is ‘general’ . . . if it regulates conduct