Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/11pdf/10-1121c4d6.pdf
Page Number: 47.0

14 

KNOX v. SERVICE EMPLOYEES 

BREYER, J., dissenting 

which,  and  the  circumstances  under  which  a  union  that 
represents  nonmembers  in  collective  bargaining  can  re-
quire  those  nonmembers  to  help  pay  for  the  union’s  (con-
stitutionally  chargeable)  collective-bargaining  expenses.
Twenty-three  States  have  enacted  “right  to  work”  laws,
which,  in  effect,  prevent  unions  from  requiring  nonmem-
bers  to  pay  any  of  those  costs.    See  Dept.  of  Labor,  Wage
and Hour Division, State Right-to-Work Laws (Jan. 2009), 
online  at  http://www.dol.gov/whd/state/righttowork.htm  (as
visited  June  18,  2012,  and  available  in  Clerk  of  Court’s 
case  file).  Other  States  have  rejected  the  “right  to  work”
approach and permit unions to require contributions from 
nonmembers,  while  protecting  those  nonmembers’  right 
to  opt  out  of  supporting  the  union’s  political  activities. 
E.g., Cal. Govt. Code Ann. §§3502.5(a), 3515.8.  Still others 
have enacted compromise laws that assume a nonmember 
does not wish to pay the nonchargeable portion of the fee
unless  he  or  she  affirmatively  indicates  a  desire  to  do  so.
See Wash. Rev. Code §42.17A.500 (2010) (providing that a
union  cannot  use  a  nonmember’s  agency  fee  for  political 
purposes  “unless  affirmatively  authorized  by  the  individ-
ual”).  The debate about public unions’ collective-bargaining
rights is currently intense. 

The question of how a nonmember indicates a desire not 
to pay constitutes an important part of this debate.  Must 
the union assume that the nonmember does not intend to 
pay unless he affirmatively indicates his desire to pay, by
“opting in”?  Or, may the union assume that the nonmem-
ber  is  willing  to  pay  unless  the  nonmember  indicates  a 
desire  not  to  pay,  by  “opting  out”?    Where,  as  here,  non-
chargeable political expenses are at issue, there may be a 
significant number of represented nonmembers who do not 
feel strongly enough about the union’s politics to indicate a 
choice either way.  That being so, an “opt-in” requirement
can  reduce  union  revenues  significantly,  a  matter  of  con-
siderable  importance  to  the  union,  while  the  additional