Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/20pdf/21a8_3fb4.pdf
Page Number: 5

Cite as:  594 U. S. ____ (2021) 

5 

BREYER, J., dissenting 

from barring its enforcement. 
  Third,  the  public  interest  weighs  in  favor  of  respecting 
New  York’s  “especially  broad”  latitude  “to  act  in  areas 
fraught  with  medical  and  scientific  uncertainties.”    Mar-
shall v. United States, 414 U. S. 417, 427 (1974).  The New 
York  Legislature  is  responsible  for  responding  to  a  grave 
and unpredictable public health crisis.  It must combat the 
spread of a virulent disease, mitigate the financial suffering 
caused  by  business closures,  and minimize  the  number  of 
unnecessary evictions.  The legislature does not enjoy un-
limited discretion in formulating that response, but in this 
case  I  would  not  second-guess  politically  accountable  offi-
cials’ determination of how best to “guard and protect” the 
people of New York.  South Bay United Pentecostal Church, 
590 U. S., at ___ (ROBERTS, C. J., concurring) (slip op., at 2) 
(quoting  Jacobson  v.  Massachusetts,  197  U. S.  11,  38 
(1905)). 
  For  these  reasons,  I  would  not  grant  relief  now,  and 
therefore respectfully dissent.  Of course, if New York ex-
tends  CEEFPA’s  provisions  in  their  current  form,  appli-
cants can renew their request for an injunction.