Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/07pdf/07-290.pdf
Page Number: 139.0

26 

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA v. HELLER 

BREYER, J., dissenting 

evidence  before  us,  should  agree  that  the  District  legisla-
ture’s  predictive  judgments  satisfy  that  legal  standard.
That is to say, the District’s judgment, while open to ques-
tion, is nevertheless supported by “substantial evidence.”   
There  is  no  cause  here  to  depart  from  the  standard  set 
forth  in  Turner,  for  the  District’s  decision  represents  the 
kind  of  empirically  based  judgment  that  legislatures,  not 
courts,  are  best  suited  to  make.    See  Nixon,  528  U. S.,  at 
402 (BREYER, J., concurring).  In fact, deference to legisla-
tive judgment seems particularly appropriate here, where
the  judgment  has  been  made  by  a  local  legislature,  with
particular  knowledge  of  local  problems  and  insight  into 
appropriate  local  solutions.    See  Los  Angeles  v.  Alameda 
Books,  Inc.,  535  U. S.  425,  440  (2002)  (plurality  opinion)
(“[W]e must acknowledge that the Los Angeles City Coun-
cil  is  in  a  better  position  than  the  Judiciary  to  gather  an
evaluate  data  on  local  problems”);  cf.  DC  Rep.,  at  67
(statement  of  Rep.  Gude)  (describing  District’s  law  as  “a 
decision made on the local level after extensive debate and 
deliberations”).  Different  localities  may  seek  to  solve 
similar  problems  in  different  ways,  and  a  “city  must  be 
allowed  a  reasonable  opportunity  to  experiment  with 
solutions  to  admittedly  serious  problems.”  Renton  v. 
Playtime  Theatres,  Inc.,  475  U. S.  41,  52  (1986)  (internal 
quotation  marks  omitted).    “The  Framers  recognized  that 
the most effective democracy occurs at local levels of gov-
ernment,  where  people  with  firsthand  knowledge  of  local 
problems  have  more  ready  access  to  public  officials  re-
sponsible  for  dealing  with  them.”  Garcia  v.  San  Antonio 
Metropolitan  Transit  Authority,  469  U. S.  528,  575,  n.  18 
(1985)  (Powell,  J.,  dissenting)  (citing  The  Federalist  No.
17, p. 107 (J. Cooke ed. 1961) (A. Hamilton)).  We owe that 
democratic process some substantial weight in the consti-
tutional calculus. 

For these reasons, I conclude that the District’s statute 
properly  seeks  to  further  the  sort  of  life-preserving  and