Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/12pdf/11-1425_cb8e.pdf
Page Number: 42.0

2 

MISSOURI v. MCNEELY 

THOMAS, J., dissenting 

when  “ ‘the  needs  of  law  enforcement  [are]  so  compelling 
that [a] warrantless search is objectively reasonable under
the Fourth Amendment.’ ”  563 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 6) 
(quoting  Mincey  v.  Arizona,  437  U. S.  385,  394  (1978); 
second alteration in original).  Thus, when exigent circum­
stances  are  present,  officers  may  take  actions  that  would 
typically  require  a  warrant,  such  as  entering  a  home  in
hot pursuit of a fleeing suspect.  563 U. S., at ___ (slip op., 
at  6).  As  relevant  in  this  case,  officers  may  also  conduct 
a  warrantless  search  when  they  have  probable  cause  to 
believe  that  failure  to  act  would  result  in  “ ‘imminent 
destruction  of  evidence.’ ” 
Ibid.  (quoting  Brigham  City, 
supra, at 403). 

B 
Once  police  arrest  a  suspect  for  drunk  driving,  each
passing minute eliminates probative evidence of the crime. 
The human liver eliminates alcohol from the bloodstream 
at  a  rate  of  approximately  0.015  percent  to  0.020  percent 
per hour, ante, at 8, with some heavy drinkers as high as
0.022  percent  per  hour,  Brief  for  Petitioner  21  (citing
medical studies), depending on, among other things, a per- 
son’s  sex,  weight,  body  type,  and  drinking  history.    Ante, 
at  8–9;  Brief  for  United  States  as  Amicus  Curiae  23. 
The  Court  has  acknowledged  this  fact  since  Schmerber  v. 
California, 384 U. S. 757, 770 (1966) (“We are told that the 
percentage of alcohol in the blood begins to diminish shortly
after  drinking  stops,  as  the  body  functions  to  eliminate
it  from  the  system”).  In  that  case,  the  Court  recognized
that  destruction  of  evidence  is  inherent  in  drunk-driving
cases  and  held  that  an  officer  investigating  a  drunk­
driving  crime  “might  reasonably  [believe]  that  he  [is] 
confronted  with  an  emergency,  in  which  the  delay  neces­
sary to obtain a warrant, under the circumstances, threat­
en[s] ‘the destruction of evidence.’ ”  Ibid. (quoting Preston 
v.  United  States,  376  U. S.  364,  367  (1964)).    The  Court