Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/09pdf/08-964.pdf
Page Number: 56.0

36 

BILSKI v. KAPPOS 

STEVENS, J., concurring in judgment 

(1999).41  The fact that Congress decided it was appropri-
ate to create a new defense to claims that business method 
patents  were  being  infringed  merely  demonstrates  recog-
nition  that  such  claims  could  create  a  significant  new 
problem for the business community.

The  Court  nonetheless  states  that  the  1999  Act  “ac-
knowledges  that  there  may  be  business  method  patents,” 
thereby “clarify[ing]” its “understanding” of §101.  Ante, at 
11.  More specifically, the Court worries that if we were to
interpret  the  1952  Act  to  exclude  business  methods,  our 
interpretation  “would  render  §273  meaningless.”    Ibid.  I 
agree that “[a] statute should be construed so that effect is 
given  to  all  its  provisions.”  Corley  v.  United  States,  556 
U. S.  ___,  ___  (2009)  (slip  op.,  at  9)  (internal  quotation 
marks  omitted).  But  it  is  a  different  matter  altogether
when  the  Court  construes  one  statute,  the  1952  Act,  to 
give effect to a different statute, the 1999 Act.  The canon 
on which the Court relies is predicated upon the idea that
“[a]  statute  is  passed  as  a  whole.”    2A  N.  Singer  &  J.
Singer, Statutes and Statutory Construction §46:5, p. 189
(7th ed. 2007).  But the two statutes in question were not 
passed as a whole. 

Put  another  way,  we  ordinarily  assume,  quite  sensibly, 
that Congress would not in one statute include two provi-
sions  that  are  at  odds  with  each  other.    But  as  this  case 
shows,  that  sensible  reasoning  can  break  down  when 

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41 See  also  145  Cong.  Rec.  30985  (1999)  (remarks  of  Sen.  Schumer) 
(explaining that “[i]n State Street, the Court did away with the so-called 
‘business  methods’  exception  to  statutory  patentable  subject  matter,”
and  “[t]he  first  inventor  defense  will  provide  . . .  important,  needed
protections  in  the  face  of  the  uncertainty  presented  by  . . .  the  State 
Street case”); id., at 31007 (remarks of Sen. DeWine) (“Virtually no one 
in  the  industry  believed  that  these  methods  or  processes  were  pat-
entable”);  id.,  at  19281  (remarks  of  Rep.  Manzullo)  (“Before  the  State
Street  Bank  and  Trust  case  . . .  it  was  universally  thought  that  meth-
ods of doing or conducting business were not patentable items”).