Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/10pdf/09-1233.pdf
Page Number: 74

16 

BROWN v. PLATA 

SCALIA, J., dissenting 

any  adverse  impact  on  public  safety  or  the  operation  of  a 
criminal  justice  system  caused  by  the  relief”  and  author-
izes  them  to  appoint  Special  Masters,  §3626  (a)(1)(A),  (f),
provisions  that  seem  to  presuppose  the  possibility  of  a 
structural remedy.  It also sets forth criteria under which 
courts may issue orders that have “the purpose or effect of
reducing or limiting the prisoner population,” §3626(g)(4). 
I do not believe that objection carries the day.  In addi-
tion  to  imposing  numerous  limitations  on  the  ability  of
district  courts  to  order  injunctive  relief  with  respect  to
prison conditions, the PLRA states that “[n]othing in this
section  shall  be  construed  to  . . .  repeal  or  detract  from
otherwise applicable limitations on the remedial powers of
the  courts.”  §3626(a)(1)(C).    The  PLRA  is  therefore  best 
understood  as  an  attempt  to  constrain  the  discretion  of
courts  issuing  structural  injunctions—not  as  a  mandate 
for  their  use.  For  the  reasons  I  have  outlined,  structural 
injunctions, especially prisoner-release orders, raise grave
separation-of-powers  concerns  and  veer  significantly  from
the historical role and institutional capability of courts.  It 
is  appropriate  to  construe  the  PLRA  so  as  to  constrain
courts  from  entering  injunctive  relief  that  would  exceed 
that role and capability. 

* 

* 

* 

The District Court’s order that California release 46,000 
prisoners  extends  “further  than  necessary  to  correct  the
violation  of  the  Federal  right  of  a  particular  plaintiff  or 
plaintiffs” who have been denied needed medical care.  18 
U. S. C. §3626(a)(1)(A).  It is accordingly forbidden by the 
PLRA—besides defying all sound conception of the proper 
role of judges.