Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/558bv.pdf
Page Number: 203

42 

PORTER  v.  McCOLLUM 

Per Curiam 

recommendation  of  a  death  sentence  for  the  murder  of  Wil­
liams but rejected the jury’s death-sentence recommendation 
for  the  murder  of  Burrows.  The  sentencing  judge  believed 
that  there  were  four  aggravating  circumstances  related  to 
the  Williams  murder  but  only  two  for  the  Burrows  murder. 
Accordingly, the judge must have reasoned that the two ag­
gravating  circumstances  that  were  present  in  both  cases 
were  insufﬁcient  to  warrant  a  death  sentence  but  that  the 
two  additional  aggravating  circumstances  present  with  re­
spect  to  the  Williams  murder  were  sufﬁcient  to  tip  the  bal­
ance in favor of a death sentence.  But the Florida Supreme 
Court  rejected  one  of  these  additional  aggravating  circum­
stances,  i. e.,  that  Williams’  murder  was  especially  heinous, 
atrocious, or cruel, ﬁnding the murder “consistent with . . . a  
crime of passion” even though premeditated to a heightened 
degree.  564  So.  2d,  at  1063–1064.  Had  the  judge  and  jury 
been  able  to  place  Porter’s  life  history  “on  the  mitigating 
side  of  the  scale,”  and  appropriately  reduced  the  ballast  on 
the  aggravating  side  of  the  scale,  there  is  clearly  a  reason­
able  probability  that  the  advisory  jury—and  the  sentencing 
judge—“would  have  struck  a  different  balance,”  Wiggins, 
supra,  at  537,  and  it  is  unreasonable  to  conclude  otherwise. 
The Florida Supreme Court’s decision that Porter was not 
prejudiced by his counsel’s failure to conduct a thorough—or 
even  cursory—investigation  is  unreasonable.  The  Florida 
Supreme  Court  either  did  not  consider  or  unreasonably  dis­
counted  the  mitigation  evidence  adduced  in  the  postconvic­
tion  hearing.  Under  Florida  law,  mental  health  evidence 
that  does  not  rise  to  the  level  of  establishing  a  statutory 
mitigating  circumstance  may  nonetheless  be  considered  by 
the sentencing judge and jury as mitigating.  See, e. g., Hos-
kins  v.  State,  965  So.  2d  1,  17–18  (Fla.  2007)  (per  curiam). 
Indeed, the Constitution requires that “the sentencer in capi­
tal cases must be permitted to consider any relevant mitigat­
ing factor.”  Eddings v.  Oklahoma, 455 U. S. 104, 112 (1982). 
Yet neither the postconviction trial court nor the Florida Su­