Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/21pdf/20-1530_n758.pdf
Page Number: 6.0

6 

WEST VIRGINIA v. EPA 

Syllabus 

. . . intended to delegate . . . decision[s] of such economic and political 
significance,”  i.e.,  how  much  coal-based  generation  there  should  be 
over the coming decades, to any administrative agency.  Brown & Wil-
liamson, 529 U. S., at 160.  Nor can the Court ignore that the regula-
tory writ EPA newly uncovered in Section 111(d) conveniently enabled
it to enact a program, namely, cap-and-trade for carbon, that Congress
had already considered and rejected numerous times.  The importance
of  the  policy  issue  and  ongoing  debate  over  its  merits  “makes  the 
oblique form of the claimed delegation all the more suspect.”  Gonzales, 
546 U. S., at 267–268.  Pp. 20–28.   

(c) Given that precedent counsels skepticism toward EPA’s claim 
that Section 111 empowers it to devise carbon emissions caps based on
a generation shifting approach, the Government must point to “clear
congressional authorization” to regulate in that manner.  Utility Air, 
573 U. S., at 324.  The Government can offer only EPA’s authority to 
establish  emissions  caps  at  a  level  reflecting  “the  application  of  the
best  system  of  emission  reduction  . . .  adequately  demonstrated.” 
§7411(a)(1).    The  word  “system”  shorn  of  all  context,  however,  is  an 
empty vessel.  Such a vague statutory grant is not close to the sort of
clear authorization required.  The Government points to other provi-
sions  of  the  Clean  Air  Act—specifically  the  Acid  Rain  and  National 
Ambient  Air  Quality  Standards  (NAAQS)  programs—that  use  the
word “system” or “similar words” to describe sector-wide mechanisms 
for reducing pollution.  But just because a cap-and-trade “system” can
be used to reduce emissions does not mean that it is the kind of “system
of emission reduction” referred to in Section 111. 

Finally, the Court has no occasion to decide whether the statutory 
phrase “system of emission reduction” refers exclusively to measures 
that  improve  the  pollution  performance  of  individual  sources,  such 
that all other actions are ineligible to qualify as the BSER.  It is perti-
nent to the Court’s analysis that EPA has acted consistent with such 
a limitation for four decades.  But the only question before the Court
is more narrow: whether the “best system of emission reduction” iden-
tified  by  EPA  in  the  Clean  Power  Plan  was  within  the  authority 
granted to the Agency in Section 111(d) of the Clean Air Act.  For the 
reasons given, the answer is no.  Pp. 28–31. 

985 F. 3d 914, reversed and remanded. 

ROBERTS, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which THOMAS, 
ALITO,  GORSUCH,  KAVANAUGH,  and  BARRETT,  JJ.,  joined.    GORSUCH,  J., 
filed a concurring opinion, in which ALITO, J., joined.  KAGAN, J., filed a 
dissenting opinion, in which BREYER and SOTOMAYOR, JJ., joined.