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Cite as: 524 U. S. 721 (1998)

729

Opinion of the Court

cases in which fairness calls for deﬁning a fact as a sentenc-
ing factor. A defendant might not, for example, wish to si-
multaneously profess his innocence of a drug offense and dis-
pute the amount of drugs allegedly involved. Cf. Gregg v.
Georgia, 428 U. S. 153, 190–195 (1976) ( joint opinion of Stew-
art, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.) (discussing the beneﬁts of
bifurcated proceedings in capital cases).
In part for that
reason, the Court has rejected an absolute rule that an
enhancement constitutes an element of the offense any time
that it increases the maximum sentence to which a defendant
is exposed. See Almendarez-Torres, supra. Under Cali-
fornia law, the maximum sentence applicable to a ﬁrst of-
fender who uses a minor to sell drugs is 7 years, and a judge
may double that sentence to 14 years where the offender has
previously been convicted of a qualifying felony. See Cal.
Health & Safety Code Ann. § 11361(a) (West 1991). That in-
crease falls well within the range that the Court has found
to be constitutionally permissible. See Almendarez-Torres,
supra (upholding a potential 18-year increase to a 2-year
sentence). Thus, the sentencing determination here did not
place petitioner in jeopardy for an “offense.”

Sentencing decisions favorable to the defendant, moreover,
cannot generally be analogized to an acquittal. We have
held that where an appeals court overturns a conviction on
the ground that the prosecution proffered insufﬁcient evi-
dence of guilt, that ﬁnding is comparable to an acquittal, and
the Double Jeopardy Clause precludes a second trial. See
Burks v. United States, 437 U. S. 1, 16 (1978). Where a simi-
lar failure of proof occurs in a sentencing proceeding, how-
ever, the analogy is inapt. The pronouncement of sentence
simply does not “have the qualities of constitutional ﬁnality
that attend an acquittal.” United States v. DiFrancesco,
449 U. S. 117, 134 (1980); see also Bullington, supra, at 438
(“The imposition of a particular sentence usually is not re-
garded as an ‘acquittal’ of any more severe sentence that
could have been imposed”).