Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/04pdf/04-278.pdf
Page Number: 49.0

22 

CASTLE ROCK v. GONZALES 

STEVENS, J., dissenting 

forcement of the restraining order, state officials could not 
deprive  her  of  that  interest  without  observing  fair  proce-
dures.21  Her description of the police behavior in this case 
and  the  department’s  callous  policy  of  failing  to  respond 
properly  to  reports  of  restraining  order  violations  clearly 
alleges  a  due  process  violation.    At  the  very  least,  due
process  requires  that  the  relevant  state  decisionmaker 
listen to the claimant and then apply the relevant criteria 
in  reaching  his  decision.22   The  failure  to  observe  these 
minimal  procedural  safeguards  creates  an  unacceptable
risk of arbitrary and “erroneous deprivation[s],” Mathews, 
424  U. S.,  at  335.    According  to  respondent’s  complaint— 
which we must construe liberally at this early stage in the 
litigation, see Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U. S. 506, 
514  (2002)—the  process  she  was  afforded  by  the  police 
constituted  nothing  more  than  a  “ ‘sham  or  a  pretense.’ ” 
Joint  Anti-Fascist  Refugee  Comm.  v.  McGrath,  341  U. S. 
123, 164 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 

Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. 

—————— 

21 See  Logan  v.  Zimmerman  Brush  Co.,  455  U. S.  422,  432  (1982) 
(“ ‘ “While the legislature may elect not to confer a property interest, . . . 
it  may  not  constitutionally  authorize  the  deprivation  of  such  an  inter-
est, once conferred, without appropriate procedural safeguards” ’ ”). 

22 See  Fuentes  v.  Shevin,  407  U. S.  67,  81  (1972)  (“[W]hen  a  person 
has an opportunity to speak up in his own defense, and when the State 
must  listen  to  what  he  has  to  say,  substantively  unfair  and  simply 
mistaken deprivations of property interests can be prevented” (empha-
sis  added));  Bell  v.  Burson,  402  U. S.  535,  542  (1971)  (“It  is  a  proposi-
tion  which  hardly  seems  to  need  explication  that  a  hearing  which 
excludes consideration of an element essential to the decision whether 
licenses  of  the  nature  here  involved  shall  be  suspended  does  not  meet 
[the]  standard  [of  due  process]”); Goldberg  v. Kelly,  397  U. S.  254,  271 
(1970)  (“[T]he  decisionmaker’s  conclusion  as  to  a  recipient’s  eligibility 
must  rest  solely  on  the  legal  rules  and  evidence  adduced  at  the  hear-
ing”); cf. ibid. (“[O]f course, an impartial decision maker is essential”).