Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/21pdf/21-954_7l48.pdf
Page Number: 30.0

Cite as:  597 U. S. ____ (2022) 

25 

Opinion of the Court 

tion on remand is entitled to “reexamine[] the problem, re-
cast its rationale and reach[ ] the same result.”  Chenery II, 
332  U. S.,  at  196;  see  also  Regents,  591  U. S.,  at  ___ 
(KAVANAUGH,  J.,  concurring  in  judgment  in  part  and  dis-
senting  in  part)  (slip  op.,  at  4)  (“Courts  often  consider  an
agency’s  . . .  additional  explanations  made  . . .  on  remand 
from a court, even if the agency’s bottom-line decision itself
does not change.”).

Finally, the Court of Appeals erred to the extent it viewed
the Government’s decision to appeal the District Court’s in-
junction as relevant to the question of the October 29 Mem-
oranda’s status as final agency action.  Nothing prevents an
agency from undertaking new agency action while simulta-
neously appealing an adverse judgment against its original 
action.  That is particularly so under the circumstances of
this case.  The second condition of the District Court’s in-
junction, which purported to bind DHS to implement MPP
in perpetuity subject only to congressional funding choices 
outside  its  control,  as  a  practical  matter  left  the  Govern-
ment no choice but to appeal.  And the agency reasonably
chose to accede to the District Court’s APA analysis of the 
June 1 Memorandum and seek to ameliorate those concerns 
in the meantime. 

* 

* 

* 

For the reasons explained, the Government’s rescission of 
MPP did not violate section 1225 of the INA, and the Octo-
ber 29 Memoranda did constitute final agency action.  We 
therefore reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and 
remand  the  case  for  further  proceedings  consistent  with 
this opinion.  On remand, the District Court should consider 
in  the  first  instance  whether  the  October  29  Memoranda 
comply with section 706 of the APA.  See State Farm, 463 
U. S., at 46–57. 

It is so ordered.