Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/21pdf/21-147_g31h.pdf
Page Number: 20.0

16 

EGBERT v. BOULE 

Opinion of the Court 

interest, actually “requires [the defendant’s] conduct.”  Ibid. 
Instead,  we  “ask  whether  the  Judiciary  should  alter  the
framework  established  by  the  political  branches  for  ad-
dressing” any such conduct that allegedly violates the Con-
stitution.  Ibid.  With respect to that question, the foregoing 
discussion shows that the Judiciary is ill equipped to alter 
that framework generally, and especially so when it comes 
to First Amendment claims. 

Boule  responds  that  any  hesitation  is  unwarranted  be-
cause  this  Court  in  Passman  already  identified  a  Bivens 
cause  of  action  under  allegedly  similar  circumstances.
There, the Court permitted a congressional staffer to sue a 
congressman for sex discrimination under the Fifth Amend-
ment.  See 442 U. S., at 231.  In Boule’s view, Passman, like 
this  case,  permitted  a  damages  action  to  proceed  even
though it required the factfinder to probe a federal official’s 
motives for taking an adverse action against the plaintiff.

(Congress  can 

Even assuming the factual parallels are as close as Boule
claims,  Passman  carries  little  weight  because  it  predates 
our  current  approach  to  implied  causes  of  action  and  di-
verges  from  the  prevailing  framework  in  three  important 
ways.  First,  the  Passman  Court  concluded  that  a  Bivens 
action must be available if there is “no effective means other 
than the judiciary to vindicate” the purported Fifth Amend-
ment right.  442 U. S., at 243; see also Carlson, 446 U. S., 
at  18–19 
foreclose  Bivens  relief  by
“provid[ing]  an  alternative  remedy  which  it  explicitly  de-
clared to be a substitute for recovery directly under the Con-
stitution and viewed as equally effective”).  Since then, how-
ever, we have explained that the absence of relief “does not 
by any means necessarily imply that courts should award 
money  damages.”  Schweiker,  487  U. S.,  at  421.    Second, 
Passman indicated that a damages remedy is appropriate 
unless Congress “explicit[ly]” declares that a claimant “may 
not recover money damages.”  442 U. S., at 246–247 (inter-
nal  quotation  marks  omitted;  emphasis  deleted).    Now,