Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/17pdf/17-130_4f14.pdf
Page Number: 3

Cite as:  585 U. S. ____ (2018) 

3 

Syllabus 

eral trial judges.  The Commission’s ALJs, like the Tax Court’s STJs, 
“take  testimony,”  “conduct  trials,”  “rule  on  the  admissibility  of  evi-
dence,” and “have the power to enforce compliance with discovery or-
ders.”  Id.,  at  881–882.    So  point  for  point  from  Freytag’s  list,  SEC 
ALJs  have  equivalent  duties  and  powers  as  STJs  in  conducting  ad-
versarial inquiries.

Moreover,  at  the  close  of  those  proceedings,  SEC  ALJs  issue  deci-
sions much like that in Freytag.  STJs prepare proposed findings and
an  opinion  adjudicating  charges  and  assessing  tax  liabilities.    Simi-
larly, the Commission’s ALJs issue initial decisions containing factu-
al  findings,  legal  conclusions,  and  appropriate  remedies.    And  what 
happens  next  reveals  that  the  ALJ  can  play  the  more  autonomous 
role.  In a major Tax Court case, a regular Tax Court judge must al-
ways review an STJ’s opinion, and that opinion comes to nothing un-
less  the  regular  judge  adopts  it.    By  contrast,  the  SEC  can  decide
against  reviewing  an  ALJ’s  decision,  and  when  it  does  so  the  ALJ’s
decision itself “becomes final” and is “deemed the action of the Com-
mission.”  17 CFR §201.360(d)(2); 15 U. S. C. §78d–1(c).  Pp. 5–11.

(b) Judge Elliot heard and decided Lucia’s case without a constitu-
tional appointment.  “[O]ne who makes a timely challenge to the con-
stitutional  validity  of  the  appointment  of  an  officer  who  adjudicates 
his case”  is entitled to relief.  Ryder v. United States, 515 U. S. 177, 
182.  Lucia made just such a timely challenge.  And the “appropriate”
remedy for an adjudication tainted with an appointments violation is
a new “hearing before a properly appointed” official.  Id., at 183, 188. 
In  this  case,  that  official  cannot  be  Judge  Elliot,  even  if  he  has  by 
now  received  a  constitutional  appointment.    Having  already  both 
heard  Lucia’s  case  and  issued  an  initial  decision  on  the  merits,  he 
cannot be expected to consider the matter as though he had not adju-
dicated  it  before.    To  cure  the  constitutional  error,  another  ALJ  (or 
the Commission itself) must hold the new hearing.  Pp. 12–13. 

 868 F. 3d 1021, reversed and remanded. 

KAGAN,  J.,  delivered  the  opinion  of  the  Court,  in  which  ROBERTS, 
C. J., and KENNEDY, THOMAS, ALITO, and GORSUCH, JJ., joined.  THOM-
AS, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which GORSUCH, J., joined.  BREYER, 
J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
part,  in  which  GINSBURG  and  SOTOMAYOR,  JJ.,  joined  as  to  Part  III. 
SOTOMAYOR,  J.,  filed  a  dissenting  opinion,  in  which  GINSBURG,  J., 
joined.