Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/16pdf/16-309_h31i.pdf
Page Number: 21.0

Cite as:  582 U. S. ____ (2017) 

1 

Opinion of GORSUCH, J. 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

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No. 16–309 
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DIVNA MASLENJAK, PETITIONER v.
 
UNITED STATES
 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 

APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
 

[June 22, 2017] 

JUSTICE  GORSUCH,  with  whom  JUSTICE  THOMAS  joins,

concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. 

The Court holds that the plain text and structure of the
statute before us require the Government to prove causa-
tion  as  an  element  of  conviction:  The  defendant’s  illegal 
conduct  must,  in  some  manner,  cause  her  naturalization. 
I  agree  with  this  much  and  concur  in  Part  II–A  of  the 
Court’s opinion to the extent it so holds.  And because the 
jury  wasn’t  instructed  at  all  about  causation,  I  agree  too 
that reversal is required. 

But,  respectfully,  there  I  would  stop.    In  an  effort  to 
“operational[ize]” the statute’s causation requirement, the 
Court  says  a  great  deal  more,  offering,  for  example,  two 
newly  announced  tests,  the  second  with  two  more  sub-
parts, and a new affirmative defense—all while indicating
that some of these new tests and defenses may apply only
in  some  but  not  all  cases.    See,  e.g.,  ante,  at  10–15.    The 
work  here  is  surely  thoughtful  and  may  prove  entirely
sound.  But the question presented and the briefing before
us  focused  primarily  on  whether  the  statute  contains  a 
materiality  element,  not  on  the  contours  of  a  causation 
requirement.    So  the  parties  have  not  had  the  chance  to 
join  issue  fully  on  the  matters  now  decided.   Compare 
ante,  at  10,  n. 4,  with  Brief  for  Petitioner,  pp.  i,  18–38;
Brief  for  United  States,  pp.  i,  12–51.    And,  of  course,  the