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854

JONES v. UNITED STATES

Opinion of the Court

We now confront a question that was not before the Court
in Russell: Does § 844(i) cover property occupied and used
by its owner not for any commercial venture, but as a private
residence.
Is such a dwelling place, in the words of § 844(i),
“used in . . . any activity affecting . . . commerce”?

In support of its argument that § 844(i) reaches the arson
of an owner-occupied private residence, the Government
relies principally on the breadth of the statutory term
“affecting . . . commerce,” see Brief for United States 10,
16–17, words that, when unqualiﬁed, signal Congress’ intent
to invoke its full authority under the Commerce Clause.
But § 844(i) contains the qualifying words “used in” a
commerce-affecting activity. The key word is “used.”
“Congress did not deﬁne the crime described in § 844(i) as
the explosion of a building whose damage or destruction
might affect interstate commerce . . . .” United States v.
Mennuti, 639 F. 2d 107, 110 (CA2 1981) (Friendly, J.).6 Con-
gress “require[d] that the damaged or destroyed property
must itself have been used in commerce or in an activity
Ibid. The proper inquiry, we agree,
affecting commerce.”
“is into the function of the building itself, and then a determi-
nation of whether that function affects interstate commerce.”

members indicated that they thought the provision should apply to the
bombings of schools, police stations, and places of worship, the words
“for business purposes” were omitted.
Id., at 860–861. The House
Report accompanying the ﬁnal bill, we further noted in Russell, described
§ 844(i) as “ ‘a very broad provision covering substantially all business
property.’ ”
Id., at 861, and n. 8 (citing H. R. Rep. No. 91–1549, pp. 69–70
(1970)).

6 The defendants in Mennuti destroyed two buildings. One was the
residence of the owner and her family, the other was a rental property.
See 639 F. 2d, at 108–109, n. 1. The Second Circuit afﬁrmed the District
Court’s dismissal of the entire indictment. Our decision in Russell v.
United States, 471 U. S. 858 (1985), supersedes Mennuti with respect to
the building held for rental. Regarding the family residence, we ﬁnd
Mennuti’s reasoning persuasive.