Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/21pdf/21-234_2b8e.pdf
Page Number: 10.0

Cite as:  596 U. S. ____ (2022) 

7 

Opinion of the Court 

payment of benefits when,” as in this case, a court later “in-
validates a VA interpretation or regulation” after a benefits
decision  becomes  final.  VA  Op.  9–94,  ¶6,  p.  5  (Mar.  25, 
1994).  Under this practice and the statute codifying it, the
Board is instead simply “performing its assigned task when 
it applies a regulation as promulgated by the [VA],” because
that regulation legally binds agency adjudicators.  VA Op.
25–95, ¶4, p. 2 (Dec. 6, 1995); see 38 U. S. C. §7104(c) (“The 
Board shall be bound in its decisions by the regulations of 
the Department”).  To be sure, when a previously applied
regulation is later invalidated, relief may be warranted for 
“error”  in  a  case  still on  direct  appeal.    E.g., Wagner,  370 
F. 3d, at 1092, 1097.  But on collateral review of a final de-
cision, the more limited category of “[c]lear and unmistaka-
ble error does not include the otherwise correct application
of a statute or regulation where, subsequent to the Board 
decision challenged, there has been a change in the inter-
pretation  of  the  statute  or  regulation.” 
38  CFR 
§20.1403(e).1  The applicability of this principle does not de-
pend  on  the  reason  why  the  agency  changed  course:  A 
change based on the conclusion that a prior interpretation
was wrong is still a changed interpretation.

Defined  by  this  regulatory  history,  the  statutory  term 
“clear and unmistakable error” does not encompass a claim
like George’s.  When the Board decided George’s appeal in 
1977, it followed the then-applicable 1961 regulation, as it 
was  statutorily  obligated  to  do.    See  38  U. S. C.  §7104(c). 
Decades later, the VA and the Federal Circuit rejected that 

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1 As  should  be  clear  from  our  explanation,  the  principal  dissent  is
wrong to attribute to the Court the view that an agency decision in these 
circumstances is “infected by no error of any kind.”  Post, at 4 (opinion of
GORSUCH, J.).  The issue in this case is the distinction between “errors” 
cognizable on direct appeal and clear and unmistakable errors cognizable 
on  collateral  review.  Throughout  his  opinion,  JUSTICE GORSUCH  elides 
that distinction.