Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/19pdf/18-1195_g314.pdf
Page Number: 88

Cite as:  591 U. S. ____ (2020) 

7 

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting 

state court to order a state legislature to fund religious ex-
ercise, overruling centuries of contrary precedent and his-
torical  practice?    See  Cutter  v.  Wilkinson,  544  U. S.  709 
(2005); Locke v. Davey, 540 U. S. 712 (2004); see also Trinity 
Lutheran, 582 U. S., at ___–___, and nn. 7–11 (SOTOMAYOR, 
J., dissenting) (slip op., at 12–20, and nn. 7–11) (describing 
States’  religious  disestablishment  movements  near  the
founding and cataloging state constitutional provisions de-
clining  to  aid  religious  ministry).   Indeed,  it appears  that 
the  Court  has  declared  that  once  Montana  created  a  tax 
subsidy,  it  forfeited  the  right  to  eliminate  it  if  doing  so 
would harm religion.  This is a remarkable result, all the 
more so because the Court strains to reach it. 

The  Court  views  its  decision  as  “simply  restor[ing]  the
status quo established by the Montana Legislature.”  Ante 
at  22,  n. 4.    But  it  overlooks  how  that  status  quo  allowed 
the State Supreme Court to cure any disparate treatment
of religion while still giving effect to a state constitutional
provision ratified by the citizens of Montana.  Today’s deci-
sion replaces a remedy chosen by representatives of Mon-
tanans and designed to honor the will of the electorate with
one that the Court prefers instead.

In sum, the decision below neither upheld a program that
“disqualif[ies] some private schools solely because they are
religious,”  ante,  at  20,  nor  otherwise  decided  the  case  on 
federal grounds.  The Court’s opinion thus turns on a coun-
terfactual hypothetical it is powerless (and unwise) to de-
cide. 

II 
Even  on  its  own  terms,  the  Court’s  answer  to  its  hypo-
thetical question is incorrect.  The Court relies principally 
on Trinity Lutheran, which found that disqualifying an en-
tity from a public benefit “solely because of [the entity’s] re-
ligious character” could impose “a penalty on the free exer-
cise  of  religion.”  582  U. S.,  at  ___–___  (slip  op.,  at  9–10).