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Page Number: 64.0

32 

JONES v. HENDRIX 

JACKSON, J., dissenting 

since the mid-19th century, the statutory scheme for post-
conviction review has permitted petitions based not only on 
a “violation of the constitution” but also on a “violation of 
the . . . law of the United States.”  Judiciary Act of Feb. 5, 
1867, ch. 28, §1, 14 Stat. 385; see also §2255; W. Church, 
Writ of Habeas Corpus §169, p. 249 (2d ed. 1893) (“The is-
sue raised on the hearing of a habeas corpus may be one of 
law simply”).20 

To  the  extent  the  majority’s  assessment  of  the  purport-
edly nascent nature of statutory innocence claims rests on 
its view that, at the time of the founding, habeas relief was
rarely available when a petition was brought by a convicted 
individual (as opposed to a pretrial detainee), ante, at 15– 
19, there are two additional problems.  For one thing, even
assuming  that  a  detainee-versus-convict  scope-of-habeas
distinction existed at the dawn of our Nation, Congress has 

—————— 
distinguish all of these cases.  See ante, at 18–19, and n. 8.  Still, its vig-
orous attempt falls short.  For example, the majority tries to distinguish 
Wahll  on  the  ground  that  the  court  “considered  but  rejected  a  similar 
argument for ordering pretrial release.”  Ante, at 19, n. 8.  But it ignores 
that  the  Wahll  court  still  considered  the  merits  of  the  statutory  argu-
ment; the court did not dismiss the case on the ground that such statu-
tory arguments were not cognizable after the prisoner’s conviction.  42 
F., at 825–826. 

20 This argument that statutory claims are not cognizable in the post-
conviction  or  habeas  context  has  already  been  considered—and  re-
jected—by this Court.  For example, in St. Cyr, this Court cited various 
17th- and 18th-century cases to conclude that the “issuance of the writ”
of habeas corpus “encompassed detentions based on errors of law, includ-
ing the erroneous application or interpretation of statutes.”  533 U. S., at 
302.  And, in Boumediene, the Court reiterated that it is “uncontroversial 
. . . that the privilege of habeas corpus entitles the prisoner to a mean-
ingful opportunity to demonstrate that he is being held pursuant to ‘the
erroneous application or interpretation’ of relevant law.”  553 U. S., at 
779 (quoting St. Cyr, 533 U. S., at 302; emphasis added).  Not once does 
the majority engage with the propositions stated in these cases.  Nor does 
the majority grapple with the express statutory language in both the Ju-
diciary Act of 1867 and §2255 authorizing claims premised on violations
of the “ ‘law of the United States.’ ”  Supra, at 32.