Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/13pdf/12-536_e1pf.pdf
Page Number: 31

Cite as:  572 U. S. ____ (2014) 

25 

Opinion of ROBERTS, C. J. 

so.  See 2  U. S. C. §441a(a)(5) (“all contributions made by 
political committees established or financed or maintained
or  controlled  by  . . .  any  other  person,  or  by  any  group  of 
such persons, shall be considered to have been made by a
single political committee”). 

Moreover, if 100 PACs were to contribute to Smith and 
few  other  candidates,  and  if  specific  individuals  like  our 
ardent  Smith  supporter  were  to  contribute  to  each,  the 
FEC  could  weigh  those  “circumstantial  factors”  to  deter-
mine  whether  to  deem  the  PACs  affiliated.    11  CFR 
§100.5(g)(4)(ii).  The  FEC’s  analysis  could  take  account 
of  a  “common  or  overlapping  membership”  and  “similar 
patterns  of  contributions  or  contributors,”  among  other 
considerations.  §§100.5(g)(4)(ii)(D),  (J).    The  FEC  has  in 
the  past  initiated  enforcement  proceedings  against  con-
tributors with such suspicious patterns of PAC donations. 
See,  e.g.,  Conciliation  Agreement,  In re  Riley,  Matters 
Under  Review  4568,  4633,  4634,  4736  (FEC,  Dec.  19, 
2001).

On a more basic level, it is hard to believe that a rational 
actor would engage in such machinations.  In the example
described,  a  dedicated  donor  spent  $500,000—donating
the full $5,000 to 100 different PACs—to add just $26,000
to  Smith’s  campaign  coffers.    That  same  donor,  mean-
while,  could  have  spent  unlimited  funds  on  independent 
expenditures  on  behalf  of  Smith.    See  Buckley,  424  U. S., 
at 44–51.  Indeed, he could have spent his entire $500,000
advocating  for  Smith,  without  the  risk  that  his  selected 
PACs would choose not to give to Smith, or that he would 
have to share credit with other contributors to the PACs. 

We have said in the context of independent expenditures
that “ ‘[t]he absence of prearrangement and coordination of 
an  expenditure  with  the  candidate  or  his  agent  . . .  un-
dermines  the  value  of  the  expenditure  to  the  candidate.’ ”  
Citizens United, 558 U. S., at 357 (quoting Buckley, supra, 
at 47).  But probably not by 95 percent.  And at least from