Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/11pdf/10-1062.pdf
Page Number: 11.0

Cite as:  566 U. S. ____ (2012) 

9 

Opinion of the Court 

consumers.    467  U. S.,  at  345–348.    Where  a  statute  pro­
vides  that  particular  agency  action  is  reviewable  at  the
instance of one party, who must first exhaust administra­
tive remedies, the inference that it is not reviewable at the 
instance of other parties, who are not subject to the admin­
istrative process, is strong.  In United States v. Erika, Inc., 
456  U. S.  201  (1982),  we  held  that  the  Medicare  statute, 
which  expressly  provided  for  judicial  review  of  awards
under  Part  A,  precluded  review  of  awards  under  Part  B. 
Id.,  at  206–208.    The  strong  parallel  between  the  award 
provisions  in  Part  A  and  Part  B  of  the  Medicare  statute 
does not exist between the issuance of a compliance order 
and the assessment of administrative penalties under the 
Clean  Water  Act.  And  in  United  States  v.  Fausto,  484 
U. S.  439  (1988),  we  held  that  the  Civil  Service  Reform
Act,  which  expressly  excluded  certain  “nonpreference”
employees  from  the  statute’s  review  scheme,  precluded 
review  at  the  instance  of  those  employees  in  a  separate
Claims  Court  action.  Id.,  at  448–449.  Here,  there  is  no 
suggestion  that  Congress  has  sought  to  exclude  compli­
ance-order  recipients  from  the  Act’s  review  scheme;  quite 
to the contrary, the Government’s case is premised on the 
notion that the Act’s primary review mechanisms are open 
to the Sacketts. 

Finally, the Government notes that Congress passed the
Clean Water Act in large part to respond to the inefficien­
cy  of  then-existing  remedies  for  water  pollution.    Compli­
ance orders, as noted above, can obtain quick remediation
through  voluntary  compliance.    The  Government  warns 
that  the  EPA  is  less  likely  to  use  the  orders  if  they  are 
subject to judicial review.  That may be true—but it will be
true  for  all  agency  actions  subjected  to  judicial  review. 
The APA’s presumption of judicial review is a repudiation 
of  the  principle  that  efficiency  of  regulation  conquers  all.
And there is no reason to think that the Clean Water Act 
was  uniquely  designed  to  enable  the  strong-arming  of