Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/23pdf/22-451_7m58.pdf
Page Number: 64

Cite as:  603 U. S. ____ (2024) 

17 

GORSUCH, J., concurring 

U. S. 134 (1944), the Court returned to its time-worn path.
Echoing themes that had run throughout our law from its
start,  Justice  Robert  H.  Jackson  wrote  for  the  Court  in 
Skidmore.  There,  he  said,  courts  may  extend  respectful
consideration to another branch’s interpretation of the law,
but the weight due those interpretations must always “de-
pend upon the[ir] thoroughness . . . , the validity of [their]
reasoning,  [their]  consistency  with  earlier  and  later  pro-
nouncements, and all those factors which give [them] power 
to persuade.”  Id., at 140.  In another case the same year, 
and again writing for the Court, Justice Jackson expressly 
rejected a call for a judge-made doctrine of deference much
like  Chevron,  offering  that,  “[i]f  Congress  had  deemed  it 
necessary or even appropriate” for courts to “defe[r] to ad-
ministrative construction[,] . . . it would not have been at a 
loss for words to say so.”  Davies Warehouse Co. v. Bowles, 
321 U. S. 144, 156 (1944).

To the extent proper respect for precedent demands, as it
always  has,  special  respect  for  longstanding  and  main-
stream decisions, Chevron scores badly.  It represented not 
a continuation of a long line of decisions but a break from
them.  Worse, it did not merely depart from our precedents.
More nearly, Chevron defied them. 

2 
Consider next how uneasily Chevron deference sits along-
side so many other settled aspects of our law.  Having wit-
nessed  first-hand  King  George’s  efforts  to  gain  influence 
and  control  over  colonial  judges,  see  Declaration  of  Inde-
pendence ¶ 11, the framers made a considered judgment to
build judicial independence into the Constitution’s design.
They vested the judicial power in decisionmakers with life 
tenure.  Art. III, §1.  They placed the judicial salary beyond 
political  control  during  a  judge’s  tenure.  Ibid.    And  they
rejected any proposal that would subject judicial decisions
to review by political actors.  The Federalist No. 81, at 482;