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8 

IANCU v. BRUNETTI 

Opinion of the Court 

2005, Serial No. 78400213.  Yet it approved registration of 
a  mark  with  the  words  WAR  ON  TERROR  MEMORIAL. 
Reg.  No.  5495362  (Jun.  19,  2018).    Of  course,  all  these 
decisions are understandable.  The rejected marks express 
opinions  that  are,  at  the  least,  offensive  to  many  Ameri-
cans.  But as the Court made clear in Tam, a law disfavor-
ing  “ideas  that  offend”  discriminates  based  on  viewpoint,
in  violation  of  the  First  Amendment.    582  U. S.,  at  ___ 
(opinion  of  ALITO,  J.)  (slip  op.,  at  2);  see  id.,  at  ___–___ 
(slip op., at 22–23); id., at ___–___ (opinion of Kennedy, J.) 
(slip op., at 2–3).

How, then, can the Government claim that the “immoral 
or scandalous” bar is viewpoint-neutral?  The Government 
basically  asks  us  to  treat  decisions  like  those  described
above as PTO examiners’ mistakes.  See Brief for Petitioner 
46.  Still  more,  the  Government  tells  us  to  ignore  how 
the  Lanham  Act’s  language,  on  its  face,  disfavors  some
ideas.  In  urging  that  course,  the  Government  does  not 
dispute  that  the  statutory  language—and  words  used  to 
define  it—have  just  that  effect.  At  oral  argument,  the 
Government  conceded:  “[I]f  you  just  looked  at  the  words 
like ‘shocking’ and ‘offensive’ on their face and gave them
their  ordinary  meanings[,]  they  could  easily  encompass
material  that  was  shocking  [or  offensive]  because  it  ex-
pressed an outrageous point of view or a point of view that 
most  members”  of  society  reject.    Tr.  of  Oral  Arg.  6.    But 
no  matter,  says  the  Government,  because  the  statute  is 
“susceptible of” a limiting construction that would remove
this  viewpoint  bias.    Id.,  at  7  (arguing  that  the  Court 
should  “attempt  to  construe  [the]  statute  in  a  way  that
would  render  it  constitutional”).    The  Government’s  idea, 
abstractly  phrased,  is  to  narrow  the  statutory  bar  to
“marks  that  are  offensive  [or]  shocking  to  a  substantial
segment of the public because of their mode of expression,
independent of any views that they may express.”  Id., at 
11 (emphasis added); see Brief for Petitioner 27–28.  More