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Page Number: 54.0

48  NEW YORK STATE RIFLE & PISTOL ASSN., INC. v. BRUEN 

Opinion of the Court 

the Massachusetts law.23 

Contrary  to  respondents’  position,  these  “reasonable-
cause laws” in no way represented the “direct precursor” to
the  proper-cause  requirement.  Brief  for  Respondents  27.
While New York presumes that individuals have no public
carry  right  without  a  showing  of  heightened  need,  the 
surety  statutes  presumed  that  individuals  had  a  right  to
public  carry  that  could  be  burdened  only  if  another  could 
make out a specific showing of “reasonable cause to fear an
injury, or breach of the peace.”  Mass. Rev. Stat., ch. 134, 
§16 (1836).24  As William Rawle explained in an influential 
treatise,  an  individual’s  carrying  of  arms  was  “sufficient 
cause to require him to give surety of the peace” only when
“attended with circumstances giving just reason to fear that 
he purposes to make an unlawful use of them.”  A View of 
the Constitution of the United States of America 126 (2d ed. 
1829).  Then, even on such a showing, the surety laws did 
not prohibit public carry in locations frequented by the gen-
eral community.  Rather, an accused arms-bearer “could go
on  carrying  without  criminal  penalty”  so  long  as  he 
“post[ed] money that would be forfeited if he breached the 
peace or injured others—a requirement from which he was
exempt if he needed self-defense.”  Wrenn, 864 F. 3d, at 661. 
Thus,  unlike  New  York’s  regime,  a  showing  of  special 
need was required only after an individual was reasonably
accused of intending to injure another or breach the peace. 
And, even then, proving special need simply avoided a fee
rather than a ban.  All told, therefore, “[u]nder surety laws 
—————— 

23 See 1838 Terr. of Wis. Stat. §16, p. 381; Me. Rev. Stat., ch. 169, §16 
(1840); Mich. Rev. Stat., ch. 162, §16 (1846); 1847 Va. Acts ch. 14, §16; 
Terr. of Minn. Rev. Stat., ch. 112, §18 (1851); 1854 Ore. Stat. ch. 16, §17, 
p. 220;  D. C.  Rev.  Code  ch.  141,  §16  (1857);  1860  Pa.  Laws  p.  432,  §6;
W. Va. Code, ch. 153, §8 (1868). 

24 It  is  true  that  two  of  the  antebellum  surety  laws  were  unusually 
broad in that they did not expressly require a citizen complaint to trigger
the posting of a surety.  See 1847 Va. Acts ch. 14, §16; W. Va. Code, ch. 
153, §8 (1868).