Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/558bv.pdf
Page Number: 604.0

Cite as: 558 U. S. 310 (2010) 

443 

Opinion of Stevens, J. 

speak  on issues  of  general public  interest  implies no  compa­
rable  right  in  the  quite  different  context  of  participation  in 
a political campaign for election to public ofﬁce.”  435 U. S., 
at 788, n. 26; see also id., at 787–788 (acknowledging that the 
interests in preserving public conﬁdence in Government and 
protecting  dissenting  shareholders  may  be  “weighty  .  .  .  in 
the  context  of  partisan  candidate  elections”).  Bellotti,  in 
other words, did not touch the question presented in Austin 
and  McConnell,  and  the  opinion  squarely  disavowed  the 
proposition for which the majority cites it. 

The majority attempts to explain away the distinction Bel­
lotti drew—between general corporate speech and campaign 
speech intended to promote or prevent the election of speciﬁc 
candidates  for  ofﬁce—as  inconsistent  with  the  rest  of  the 
opinion  and  with  Buckley.  Ante,  at  347,  357–360.  Yet  the 
basis  for  this  distinction  is  perfectly  coherent:  The  anticor­
ruption  interests  that  animate  regulations  of  corporate  par­
ticipation  in  candidate  elections,  the  “importance”  of  which 
“has  never  been  doubted,”  435  U. S.,  at  788,  n.  26,  do  not 
apply equally to regulations of corporate participation in ref­
erenda.  A referendum cannot owe a political debt to a cor­
poration,  seek to  curry favor  with  a corporation,  or fear  the 
corporation’s retaliation.  Cf. Austin, 494 U. S., at 678 (Ste­
vens,  J.,  concurring);  Citizens  Against  Rent  Control/Coali­
tion  for  Fair  Housing  v.  Berkeley,  454  U. S.  290,  299  (1981). 
The  majority  likewise  overlooks  the fact  that,  over  the  past 
30  years,  our  cases  have  repeatedly  recognized  the  candi­
date/issue  distinction.  See,  e. g.,  Austin,  494  U. S.,  at  659; 
NCPAC, 470 U. S., at 495–496; FCC v.  League of Women Vot­
ers of Cal.,  468  U. S.  364,  371,  n.  9  (1984);  NRWC,  459  U. S., 
at  210,  n.  7.  The  Court’s  critique  of  Bellotti’s  footnote  26 
puts it in the strange position of trying to elevate Bellotti to 
canonical  status,  while  simultaneously  disparaging  a  critical 
piece  of  its  analysis  as  unsupported  and  irreconcilable  with 
Buckley.  Bellotti, apparently, is both the font of all wisdom 
and internally incoherent.