Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/529bv.pdf
Page Number: 633.0

529US2

Unit: $U52

[09-26-01 10:36:40] PAGES PGT: OPIN

558

CARMELL v. TEXAS

Ginsburg, J., dissenting

.

Tex. 147 (1874); see also Hernandez, 651 S. W. 2d, at 751–752
(tracing the current Article 38.07 to the earlier seduction
victim competency rule).
In 1891, this common-law disabil-
ity was lifted by statute and replaced by a corroboration re-
quirement: “In prosecutions for seduction .
. the female
alleged to have been seduced shall be permitted to testify;
but no conviction shall be had upon the testimony of the said
female, unless the same is corroborated by other evidence
tending to connect the defendant with the offense charged.”
Tex. Rev. Crim. Stat., Tit. 8, ch. 7, Art. 789 (1911). The ap-
plication of this statute to offenses committed before its
enactment was upheld by the Texas courts on the authority
of Hopt v. Territory of Utah, 110 U. S. 574 (1884). See
Mrous v. State, 31 Tex. Crim. App. 597, 21 S. W. 764 (1893).
The corroboration requirement for seduction prosecutions,
recodiﬁed in 1965 at Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann., Art. 38.07,
remained in effect until 1973, when the entire 1925 Penal
Code (including the offense of seduction) was repealed.

In 1975, Article 38.07 was enacted substantially in its pres-
ent form. As revised, the article covered all sexual offenses
in Chapter 21 of the Texas Penal Code; however, it contained
no express exemption from the corroboration requirement
for the testimony of the youngest victims. Tex. Code Crim.
Proc. Ann., Art. 38.07 (Vernon 1979). The exemption for
victims under the age of 14 was added in 1983, and extended
in 1993 to cover those under the age of 18, as already de-
scribed. As initially proposed, the 1993 change would have
eliminated the corroboration/outcry requirement altogether.
House Research Organization, Texas House of Representa-
tives, Daily Floor Report 13 (Mar. 15, 1993), Lodging of
Petitioner. Supporters of the proposal maintained that
“[v]ictims in sexual assault cases are no more likely to fanta-
size or misconstrue the truth than the victims of most other
crimes, which do not require corroboration of testimony or
previous ‘outcry.’
Juries can decide if a witness is credi-
ble. . . . Most states no longer require this type of corrobora-