Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/21pdf/20-979_h3ci.pdf
Page Number: 36.0

Cite as:  596 U. S. ____ (2022) 

15 

GORSUCH, J., dissenting 

besides subparagraph (B)(i).  To take just one example, this
Court has already decided a case discussing subparagraph 
(D)’s implications for cases arising under subparagraph (C). 
See,  e.g.,  Guerrero-Lasprilla  v.  Barr,  589  U. S.  ___,  ___ 
(2020) (slip op., at 12) (explaining subparagraph (D)’s im-
pact on § 1252(a)(2)(C)).

The majority’s argument fails for still another reason.  It 
overlooks the “basic principle of statutory construction that 
a statute dealing with a narrow, precise, and specific sub-
ject is not submerged by a later enacted statute covering a
more generalized spectrum.”  Radzanower  v. Touche Ross 
& Co., 426 U. S. 148, 153 (1976).  Congress enacted subpar-
agraph (B)(i) in 1996 to address the narrow question of ju-
dicial review over administrative “denials of discretionary
relief.”  Meanwhile,  as  the  majority  acknowledges,  Con-
gress adopted subparagraph (D) nearly a decade later and 
did so to address a much larger problem—the potential that 
many statutes in the INA foreclosing judicial review might 
be unconstitutional in certain applications.  Ante, at 9.  Con-
gress responded to this potential problem by allowing legal 
and constitutional challenges under “any other provision of 
[an entire] chapter” of the U. S. Code.  § 1252(a)(2)(D).  In 
doing  so,  subparagraph  (D)’s  later-in-time  and  more  gen-
eral reference to “constitutional claims or questions of law” 
across a full chapter of the U. S. Code did nothing to disturb
subparagraph  (B)(i)’s  targeted  application  to  judgments
“regarding  the  granting  of  relief ”  under  § 1255.    Instead, 
the statutes work in tandem.  The majority’s approach ig-
nores  this  conclusion,  and  along  with  it  subparagraph 
(B)(i)’s specific language.3 

—————— 

3 There’s at least one more problem here yet.  The majority says sub-
paragraph  (D)  preserves  constitutional  and  legal  questions  for  judicial
review, and the majority further assumes that Mr. Patel’s petition poses
only a factual question.  Ante, at 9.  But the question Mr. Patel seeks to 
pose in court is whether the agency’s factual determinations are ones no
“reasonable adjudicator” could have adopted given the record before it.