Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/11pdf/10-1121c4d6.pdf
Page Number: 27.0

Cite as:  567 U. S. ____ (2012) 

23 

Opinion of the Court 

* 

* 
The judgment of the Ninth Circuit is reversed, and the
case  is  remanded  for  further  proceedings  consistent  with
this opinion. 

* 

It is so ordered. 

—————— 

remand  in  order  to  provide  adequate  assurance  that  members  of 
the  class  are  not  compelled  to  subsidize  nonchargeable  activities  to 
which they object.  See supra, at 7–8.  Petitioners argue strenuously that
these  procedures  must  be  narrowly  tailored  to  minimize  intrusion  on 
their  free-speech  rights.    See  Brief  for  Petitioners  11–17.    We  see  no 
sensible  way  to  address  this  dispute  without  confronting  the  question
whether,  in  the  particular  context  present  here,  an  opt-out  regime
suffices. 

JUSTICE  SOTOMAYOR  would  apparently  have  us  proceed  on  the  as-
sumption that an opt-out regime is permitted.  She would then have us 
decide  what  sort  of  opt-out  procedures  would  be  sufficient  if  such  a 
regime were allowed at all.   But that is a question that simply cannot 
be answered.  It would be like asking what sort of procedural require-
ments  would  be  required  if  the  government  set  out  to  do  something
else that the First Amendment flatly prohibits—for example, requiring
prepublication approval of newspapers. 

There is also no merit in JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR’s and JUSTICE BREYER’s 
comments  about  prior  precedent.    This  case  concerns  the  procedures
that  must  be  followed  when  a  public-sector  union  announces  a  special
assessment or mid-year dues increase.  No prior decision of this Court 
has  addressed  that  question,  and  Hudson  says  not  one  word  on  the 
subject.