Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/22pdf/21-1326_6jfl.pdf
Page Number: 12

Cite as:  598 U. S. ____ (2023) 

9 

Opinion of the Court 

§3729(b)(1)(A)(iii).  In short, either actual knowledge, delib-
erate ignorance, or recklessness will suffice.3 

That  three-part  test  largely  tracks  the  traditional  com-
mon-law scienter requirement for claims of fraud.  See Re-
statement  (Second)  of  Torts  §526  (1976);  Restatement 
(Third)  of  Torts:  Liability  for  Economic  Harm  §10  (2018).
For  example,  one  widely  cited  English  decision,  Derry  v. 
Peek,  [1889]  14  App.  Cas.,  articulated  the  rule  as  follows: 
“[F]raud is proved when it is shewn that a false representa-
tion has been made (1) knowingly, or (2) without belief in
its  truth,  or  (3)  recklessly,  careless  whether  it  be  true  or 
false.”  Id., at 374 (judgment of Lord Herschell).  And, cap-
turing  the  FCA’s  use  of  the  term  “deliberate  ignorance,”
that decision noted that an action for fraud would lie if “a 
person making a false statement had shut his eyes to the 
facts,  or  purposely  abstained  from  inquiring  into  them.” 
Id.,  at  376.  Those  standards  have  been  cited  and  widely 
adopted by American courts in the century since.  See 3 D. 
Dobbs, P. Hayden, & E. Bublick, Law of Torts §665, p. 645
(2d ed. 2011) (Dobbs); Restatement (Second) of Torts, App. 
§526, Reporter’s Note.

That the text of the FCA tracks the common law is un-
surprising  because,  as  we  have  recognized,  the  FCA  is 
largely a fraud statute.  See Escobar, 579 U. S., at 187–188, 
and  n. 2.    Indeed,  the  FCA  was  first  enacted  in  1863  to 
“ ‘sto[p] the massive frauds perpetrated by large contractors
during the Civil War.’ ”  Id., at 181.  To this day, the FCA
refers to “ ‘false or fraudulent’ ” claims, pointing directly to
“the common-law meaning of fraud.”  Id., at 187 (emphasis 
added).  In the absence of statutory text to the contrary, we 
would  assume  that  “ ‘Congress  intends  to  incorporate  the 
well-settled  meaning’ ”  of  such  a  common-law  term.    See 

—————— 

3 The FCA also specifies  that the term “ ‘knowingly’ . . . require[s] no 

proof of specific intent to defraud.”  §3729(b)(1)(B).