Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/529bv.pdf
Page Number: 922

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Unit: $U60

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Cite as: 529 U. S. 803 (2000)

847

Breyer, J., dissenting

Case law does not mandate the Court’s result. To the
contrary, as I have pointed out, our prior cases recognize
that, where the protection of children is at issue, the First
Amendment poses a barrier that properly is high, but not
insurmountable.
It is difﬁcult to reconcile today’s decision
with our foundational cases that have upheld similar laws,
such as FCC v. Paciﬁca Foundation, 438 U. S. 726 (1978),
and Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U. S. 629 (1968).
It is not
difﬁcult to distinguish our cases striking down such laws—
either because they applied far more broadly than the nar-
row regulation of adult channels here, see, e. g., Reno v.
American Civil Liberties Union, 521 U. S. 844 (1997), im-
posed a total ban on a form of adult speech, see, e. g., Sable
Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U. S. 115 (1989);
Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp., 463 U. S. 60 (1983),
or because a less restrictive, similarly effective alternative
was otherwise available, see, e. g., Denver Area, 518 U. S.,
at 753–760.

Nor is it a satisfactory answer to say, as does Justice
Thomas, that the Government remains free to prosecute
under the obscenity laws. Ante, at 829–830. The obscenity
exception permits censorship of communication even among
adults. See, e. g., Miller v. California, 413 U. S. 15 (1973).
It must be kept narrow lest the Government improperly in-
terfere with the communication choices that adults have
freely made. To rely primarily upon law that bans speech
for adults is to overlook the special need to protect children.
Congress has taken seriously the importance of maintain-
ing adult access to the sexually explicit channels here at
issue.
It has tailored the restrictions to minimize their im-
pact upon adults while offering parents help in keeping un-
wanted transmissions from their children. By ﬁnding “ade-
quate alternatives” where there are none, the Court reduces
Congress’ protective power to the vanishing point. That is
not what the First Amendment demands.

I respectfully dissent.