Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/18pdf/17-1026_2c83.pdf
Page Number: 1

(Slip Opinion) 

OCTOBER  TERM,  2018 

1 

Syllabus 

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is 
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued. 
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been 
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader. 
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337. 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

Syllabus 

GARZA v. IDAHO 

CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF IDAHO 

No. 17–1026.  Argued October 30, 2018—Decided February 27, 2019 

Petitioner Gilberto Garza, Jr., signed two plea agreements, each arising
from state criminal charges and each containing a clause stating that
Garza  waived  his  right  to  appeal.    Shortly  after  sentencing,  Garza 
told his trial counsel that he wished to appeal.  Instead of filing a no-
tice of appeal, counsel informed Garza that an appeal would be “prob-
lematic” given Garza’s appeal waiver.  After the time period for Gar-
za to preserve an appeal lapsed, he sought state postconviction relief,
alleging that his trial counsel had rendered ineffective assistance by
failing  to  file  a  notice  of  appeal  despite  his  repeated  requests.  The 
Idaho  trial  court  denied  relief,  and  the  Idaho  Court  of  Appeals  af-
firmed.  Also  affirming,  the  Idaho  Supreme  Court  held  that  Garza 
could not show the requisite deficient performance by counsel and re-
sulting prejudice.  In doing so, the court concluded that the presump-
tion  of  prejudice  recognized  in  Roe  v.  Flores-Ortega,  528  U. S.  470, 
when trial counsel fails to file an appeal as instructed does not apply
when the defendant has agreed to an appeal waiver. 

Held: Flores-Ortega’s  presumption  of  prejudice  applies  regardless  of 

whether a defendant has signed an appeal waiver.  Pp. 3–14.

(a) Under  Strickland  v.  Washington,  466  U. S.  668,  a  defendant 
who  claims  ineffective  assistance  of  counsel  must  prove  (1)  “that 
counsel’s  representation  fell  below  an  objective  standard  of  reasona-
bleness,” id., at 687–688, and (2) that any such deficiency was “preju-
dicial to the defense,” id., at 692.  However, “prejudice is presumed” 
in “certain Sixth Amendment contexts,” ibid., such as “when counsel’s 
constitutionally deficient performance deprives a defendant of an ap-
peal  that  he  otherwise  would  have  taken,”  Flores-Ortega,  528  U. S., 
at 484.  Pp. 3–4.

(b) This case hinges on two procedural devices: appeal waivers and 
notices of appeal.  No appeal waiver serves as an absolute bar to all