Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/22pdf/22-58_i425.pdf
Page Number: 33.0

16 

UNITED STATES v. TEXAS 

 GORSUCH, J., concurring
GORSUCH, J., concurring in judgment 

St. Louis Independent Packing Co., 249 U. S. 479, 486–487 
(1919); The Assigned Car Cases, 274 U. S. 564, 584 (1927).
In a third case, the plaintiff sought “to enjoin enforcement
of ” an order of the Federal Communications Commission. 
Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. United States, 316 
U. S. 407, 408 (1942).  That is a claim for traditional equi-
table relief, and indeed, the Court held that the complaint
“state[d] a cause of action in equity” and remanded for fur-
ther proceedings.  Id., at 425.  A fourth case, involving an
order of the Interstate Commerce Commission, seems of a 
piece.  There, a district court held the Commission’s order 
invalid and “restrain[ed] . . . enforcement” of it.  Baltimore 
&  Ohio  R.  Co.  v.  United  States,  5  F. Supp.  929,  936  (ND 
Ohio 1933).  This Court affirmed.  See United States v. Bal-
timore & Ohio R. Co., 293 U. S. 454 (1935).  True, this Court 
described the case as an “appeal from [a] decree . . . setting
aside”  the  Commission’s  order.  Id.,  at  455.  But  the  fact 
that the lower court had only restrained enforcement of the 
order goes to show that “set aside” did not then (and does
not now) necessarily translate to “vacate.”

At the end of the day, the States fall back on other lower 
court decisions.  “For more than 30 years,” they say, “vaca-
tur has been the ordinary result when the D. C. Circuit de-
termines that agency regulations are unlawful.”  Brief for 
Respondents  42  (internal  quotation  marks  omitted).
Doubtless, to the extent those decisions are carefully rea-
soned,  they  merit  respectful  consideration.    But,  equally,
they do not bind us.  Cf. post, at 14, n. 7 (ALITO, J., dissent-
ing) (observing that this Court has only ever “assumed” that 
the APA authorizes vacatur).

In raising questions about the district court’s claim that 
§706(2)  authorizes  vacatur  of  agency  action,  I  do  not  pre-
tend  that  the  matter  is  open  and  shut.  Thoughtful  argu-
ments  and  scholarship  exist  on  both  sides  of  the  debate. 
Nor do I mean to equate vacatur of agency action with uni-
versal injunctions.  Despite some similarities, courts can at