Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/524bv.pdf
Page Number: 650

524US2

Unit: $U95

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Cite as: 524 U. S. 569 (1998)

605

Souter, J., dissenting

constitutional reading of the statute. See Edward J. DeBar-
tolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Building & Constr. Trades
Council, 485 U. S. 568, 575 (1988).

A

The Court says, ﬁrst, that because the phrase “general
standards of decency and respect for the diverse beliefs and
values of the American public” is imprecise and capable of
multiple interpretations, “the considerations that the provi-
sion introduces, by their nature, do not engender the kind
of directed viewpoint discrimination that would prompt this
Court to invalidate a statute on its face.” Ante, at 583.
Unquestioned case law, however, is clearly to the contrary.
“Sexual expression which is indecent but not obscene is
protected by the First Amendment,” Sable Communica-
tions of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U. S. 115, 126 (1989), and ex-
cept when protecting children from exposure to indecent ma-
terial, see FCC v. Paciﬁca Foundation, 438 U. S. 726 (1978),
the First Amendment has never been read to allow the gov-
ernment to rove around imposing general standards of de-
cency, see, e. g., Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union,
521 U. S. 844 (1997) (striking down on its face a statute that
regulated “indecency” on the Internet). Because “the nor-
mal deﬁnition of ‘indecent’ . . . refers to nonconformance with
accepted standards of morality,” FCC v. Paciﬁca Founda-
tion, supra, at 740, restrictions turning on decency, espe-
cially those couched in terms of “general standards of de-
cency,” are quintessentially viewpoint based: they require
discrimination on the basis of conformity with mainstream
mores. The Government’s contrary suggestion that the
NEA’s decency standards restrict only the “form, mode, or
style” of artistic expression, not the underlying viewpoint
or message, Brief for Petitioners 39–41, may be a tempting
abstraction (and one not lacking in support, cf. Bolger v.
Youngs Drug Products Corp., 463 U. S. 60, 83–84 (1983)
(Stevens, J., concurring in judgment)). But here it sufﬁces
to realize that “form, mode, or style” are not subject to ab-