Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/21pdf/21-418_i425.pdf
Page Number: 3.0

Cite as:  597 U. S. ____ (2022) 

3 

Syllabus 

sages.  To account for the complexity associated with the interplay be-
tween free speech rights and government employment, this Court’s de-
cisions in Pickering v. Board of Ed. of Township High School Dist. 205, 
Will Cty., 391 U. S. 563, and Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U. S. 410, and 
related cases suggest proceeding in two steps.  The first step involves 
a threshold inquiry into the nature of the speech at issue.  When an 
employee “speaks as a citizen addressing a matter of public concern,” 
the  Court’s  cases  indicate  that  the  First  Amendment  may  be  impli-
cated and courts should proceed to a second step.  Id., at 423.  At this 
step,  courts  should  engage  in  “a  delicate  balancing  of  the  competing 
interests surrounding the speech and its consequences.”  Ibid.  At the 
first step of the Pickering–Garcetti inquiry, the parties’ disagreement 
centers on one question: Did Mr. Kennedy offer his prayers in his ca-
pacity as a private citizen, or did they amount to government speech 
attributable to the District?   
   When  Mr.  Kennedy uttered  the  three  prayers  that  resulted  in  his 
suspension, he was not engaged in speech “ordinarily within the scope” 
of his duties as a coach.  Lane v. Franks, 573 U. S. 228, 240.  He did 
not speak pursuant to government policy and was not seeking to con-
vey a government-created message.  He was not instructing players, 
discussing  strategy,  encouraging  better  on-field  performance,  or  en-
gaged in any other speech the District paid him to produce as a coach.  
Simply put: Mr. Kennedy’s prayers did not “ow[e their] existence” to 
Mr.  Kennedy’s  responsibilities  as  a  public  employee.    Garcetti,  547 
U. S., at 421.  The timing and circumstances of Mr. Kennedy’s pray-
ers—during  the  postgame  period  when  coaches  were  free  to  attend 
briefly to personal matters and students were engaged in other activi-
ties—confirms that Mr. Kennedy did not offer his prayers while acting 
within  the  scope  of  his  duties  as  a  coach.    It  is  not  dispositive  that 
Coach  Kennedy  served  as  a  role  model  and  remained  on  duty  after 
games.  To hold otherwise is to posit an “excessively broad job descrip-
tio[n]”  by  treating  everything  teachers  and  coaches  say  in  the  work-
place as government speech subject to government control.  Garcetti, 
547 U. S., at 424.  That Mr. Kennedy used available time to pray does 
not transform his speech into government speech.  Acknowledging that 
Mr. Kennedy’s prayers represented his own private speech means he 
has carried his threshold burden.  Under the Pickering–Garcetti frame-
work, a second step remains where the government may seek to prove 
that  its  interests  as  employer  outweigh  even  an  employee’s  private 
speech  on  a  matter  of  public  concern.    See  Lane,  573  U. S.,  at  242.  
Pp. 15–19. 

(3) Whether one views the case through the lens of the Free Exer-
cise or Free Speech Clause, at this point the burden shifts to the Dis-
trict.  Under the Free Exercise Clause, a government entity normally