Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/18pdf/18-281_6j37.pdf
Page Number: 12

Cite as:  587 U. S. ____ (2019) 

9 

Opinion of the Court 

referendum was assailed on the ground that it permanently 
deprived the legislative plaintiffs of their role in the redis-
tricting  process.    Here,  by  contrast,  the  challenged  order 
does not alter the General Assembly’s dominant initiating 
and ongoing role in redistricting.  Compare Arizona State 
Legislature, 576 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 14) (allegation of 
nullification of “any vote by the Legislature, now or in the 
future,  purporting  to  adopt  a  redistricting  plan”  (internal 
quotation  marks  omitted)),  with  326  F. Supp.  3d,  at  227 
(recognizing the General Assembly’s “primary jurisdiction” 
over  redistricting  and  giving  the  General  Assembly  first 
crack at enacting a revised redistricting plan).5 
  Nor  does  Coleman  v.  Miller,  307  U. S.  433  (1939),  aid 
the House.  There, the Court recognized the standing of 20 
state  legislators  who  voted  against  a  resolution  ratifying 
the  proposed  Child  Labor  Amendment  to  the  Federal 
Constitution.    Id.,  at  446.    The  resolution  passed,  the 
opposing  legislators  stated,  only  because  the  Lieutenant 
Governor  cast  a  tie-breaking  vote—a  procedure  the  legis-
lators  argued  was  impermissible  under  Article  V  of  the 
Federal  Constitution.    See  Arizona  State  Legislature,  576 
U. S.,  at  ___–___  (slip  op.,  at  13–14)  (citing  Coleman,  307 
U. S., at 446).  As the Court has since observed, Coleman 
stands “at most” “for the proposition that legislators whose 
votes  would  have  been  sufficient  to  defeat  (or  enact)  a 
specific legislative Act have standing to sue if that legisla-
tive  action  goes  into  effect  (or  does  not  go  into  effect),  on 

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5 Misplaced for similar reasons is the House’s reliance on this Court’s 
statements  in  INS  v.  Chadha,  462  U. S.  919,  929–931,  and  nn.  5–6, 
939–940 (1983), that the United States House and Senate were “proper 
parties” or “adverse parties.”  First, it is far from clear that the Court 
meant  those  terms  to  refer  to  standing,  as  opposed  to  the  simple  fact 
that both Houses of Congress had intervened.  In any event, the statute 
at  issue  in  Chadha  granted  each  Chamber  of  Congress  an  ongoing 
power—to  veto  certain  Executive  Branch  decisions—that  each  House 
could exercise independent of any other body.