Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/07pdf/07-290.pdf
Page Number: 138

Cite as:  554 U. S. ____ (2008) 

25 

BREYER, J., dissenting 

Miller,  Azrael,  &  Hemenway,  Household  Firearm  Owner-
ship and Suicide Rates in the United States, 13 Epidemi-
ology  517  (2002).  Still  others  suggest  that  the  defensive
uses  of  handguns  are  not  as  great  in  number  as  respon-
dent’s  amici  claim.  See,  e.g.,  Brief  for  American  Public 
Health  Assn.  et al.  as  Amici  Curiae  17–19  (hereinafter 
APHA Brief) (citing studies).

Respondent and his amici reply to these responses; and 
in  doing  so,  they  seek  to  discredit  as  methodologically
flawed  the  studies  and  evidence  relied  upon  by  the  Dis-
trict.  See, e.g., Criminologists’ Brief 9–17, 20–24; Brief for
Assn.  Am.  Physicians  and  Surgeons,  Inc.  as  Amicus  Cu-
riae  12–18;  SLF  Brief  17–22;  Britt,  Kleck,  &  Bordua,  A 
Reassessment  of  the  D.C.  Gun  Law,  30  Law  &  Soc.  Rev. 
361  (1996)  (criticizing  the  Loftin  study).    And,  of  course, 
the  District’s  amici  produce  counter-rejoinders,  referring
to articles that defend their studies.  See, e.g., APHA Brief 
23, n. 5 (citing McDowall, Loftin, & Wiersema et al., Using 
Quasi-Experiments  to  Evaluate  Firearm  Laws,  30  Law  & 
Soc. Rev. 381 (1996)). 

The  upshot  is  a  set  of  studies  and  counterstudies  that,
at  most,  could  leave  a  judge  uncertain  about  the  proper 
policy  conclusion.  But  from  respondent’s  perspective  any
such  uncertainty  is  not  good  enough.  That  is  because 
legislators,  not  judges,  have  primary  responsibility  for 
drawing policy conclusions from empirical fact.  And, given
that  constitutional  allocation  of  decisionmaking  responsi-
bility,  the  empirical  evidence  presented  here  is  sufficient
to allow a judge to reach a firm legal conclusion. 

In  particular  this  Court,  in  First  Amendment  cases
applying  intermediate  scrutiny,  has  said  that  our  “sole 
obligation”  in  reviewing  a  legislature’s  “predictive  judg-
ments”  is  “to  assure  that,  in  formulating  its  judgments,” 
the legislature “has drawn reasonable inferences based on
substantial evidence.”  Turner, 520 U. S., at 195 (internal 
quotation  marks  omitted).    And  judges,  looking  at  the