Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/529bv.pdf
Page Number: 789

529US3

Unit: $U56

[09-28-01 09:22:19] PAGES PGT: OPIN

714

JOHNSON v. UNITED STATES

Kennedy, J., concurring in part

as the court speciﬁes. This was the convincing analysis
adopted by the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in
reaching the same conclusion, and it sufﬁces to resolve the
case. See United States v. O’Neil, 11 F. 3d 292 (1993). The
analysis, moreover, is no less fair than Justice Scalia’s,
post, at 722, n. 5 (dissenting opinion), which, after explaining
at length that the only possible meaning of “revoke a term”
is “ ‘to annul’ ” it, post, at 715, to “ ‘cancel’ ” it, post, at 716,
and to treat it “as though it had never existed,” post, at 717,
explains away the statute’s later inconvenient reference to
“the term of supervised release” as “describ[ing] the length
of the permitted imprisonment by reference to that now-
defunct term of supervised release,” post, at 721. This, of
course,
Indeed, for support
Justice Scalia turns to Congress’ use of “terminate” in
§ 3583(g)—which Justice Scalia elsewhere concedes “was
a mistake.” Post, at 718, n. 2. Faced with a choice between
two difﬁcult readings of what all must admit is not optimal
statutory text, the Court is correct to adopt the interpreta-
tion that makes the most sense.

is not what the text says.

I would not go on to suggest, as the Court does, that a
court could extend a term of supervised release pursuant
to § 3583(e)(2) prior to revoking the term under § 3583(e)(3).
Ante, at 712. The subparts of § 3583(e) are phrased in the
disjunctive; and § 3583(e)(3) must stand on its own. This
suggests the term of imprisonment plus any further term of
supervised release imposed under § 3583(e)(3) may not ex-
ceed the original term of supervised release that had been
imposed and then violated.

Nor would I invoke 18 U. S. C. § 3583(a), ante, at 708, which
raises more issues than it resolves, not the least of which is
the description of the District Court’s action as “imposing a
sentence.” Petitioner’s sentence was imposed upon convic-
tion. What is at issue in this case is the appropriate adjust-
ment to make to that sentence when the prisoner has vio-
lated the conditions of supervised release.