Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/17pdf/17-965_h315.pdf
Page Number: 89

Cite as:  585 U. S. ____ (2018) 

25 

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting 

IV 

The  First  Amendment  stands  as  a  bulwark  against 
official religious prejudice and embodies our Nation’s deep
commitment  to  religious  plurality  and  tolerance.    That 
constitutional promise is why, “[f ]or centuries now, people 
have  come  to  this  country  from  every  corner  of  the  world 
to  share  in  the  blessing  of  religious  freedom.”  Town  of 
Greece  v.  Galloway,  572  U. S.,  at  ___  (KAGAN,  J.,  dissent­
ing) (slip op., at 1).  Instead of vindicating those principles, 
today’s  decision  tosses  them  aside.    In  holding  that  the 
First  Amendment  gives  way  to  an  executive  policy  that  a
reasonable  observer  would  view  as  motivated  by  animus 
against Muslims, the majority opinion upends this Court’s 
precedent, repeats tragic mistakes of the past, and denies
countless  individuals  the  fundamental  right  of  religious
liberty.

Just weeks ago, the Court rendered its decision in Mas­
terpiece  Cakeshop,  584  U. S.  ___,  which  applied  the  bed­
rock  principles  of  religious  neutrality  and  tolerance  in
considering  a  First  Amendment  challenge  to  government
action.  See  id.,  at  ___  (slip  op.,  at  17)  (“The  Constitution 
‘commits  government  itself  to  religious  tolerance,  and 
upon  even  slight  suspicion  that  proposals  for  state  inter­
vention  stem  from  animosity  to  religion  or  distrust  of  its 
practices,  all  officials  must  pause  to  remember  their  own
high duty to the Constitution and to the rights it secures’ ” 
(quoting  Lukumi,  508  U. S.,  at  547));  Masterpiece,  584 

—————— 

of the nationwide scope of the injunction issued by the District Court.” 
Ante, at 39.  The District Court did not abuse its discretion by granting
nationwide  relief.    Given  the  nature  of  the  Establishment  Clause 
violation and the unique circumstances of this case, the imposition of a 
nationwide injunction was “ ‘necessary to provide complete relief to the 
plaintiffs.’ ”  Madsen v. Women’s Health Center, Inc., 512 U. S. 753, 765 
(1994);  see  Califano  v.  Yamasaki,  442  U. S.  682,  702  (1979)  (“[T]he 
scope  of  injunctive  relief  is  dictated  by  the  extent  of  the  violation 
established, not by the geographical extent of the plaintiff class”).