Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/19pdf/18-1323_c07d.pdf
Page Number: 64.0

Cite as:  591 U. S. ____ (2020) 

3 

THOMAS, J., dissenting 

The  plurality  feints  toward  this  doctrine,  claiming  that
third-party standing for abortionists is well settled by our
precedents.  But, ultimately, it dodges the question, claim-
ing that Louisiana’s standing challenge was waived below.
Both assertions are erroneous.  First, there is no controlling 
precedent that sets forth the blanket rule advocated for by
plaintiffs here—i.e., abortionists may challenge health and 
safety regulations based solely on their role in the abortion 
process.  Second, I agree with JUSTICE ALITO that Louisiana 
did not waive its standing challenge below.  Post, at 24–25 
(dissenting opinion).

But even if there were a waiver, it would not be relevant. 
Louisiana argues that the abortionists and abortion clinics
lack standing under Article III to assert the putative rights
of their potential clients.  No waiver, however explicit, could
relieve us of our independent obligation to ensure that we 
have jurisdiction before addressing the merits of a case.  See 
DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U. S. 332, 341 (2006).
And under a proper understanding of Article III’s case-or-
controversy requirement, plaintiffs lack standing to invoke
our  jurisdiction  because  they  assert  no  private  rights  of 

—————— 
(THOMAS, J., concurring) (slip op., at 6–9); Whole Woman’s Health v. Hel-
lerstedt, 579 U. S. ___, ___–___ (2016) (THOMAS, J., dissenting) (slip op.,
at 2–5); Kowalski, 543 U. S., at 135 (THOMAS, J., concurring).  For exam-
ple, the Court has held that attorneys cannot bring suit to vindicate the
Sixth  Amendment  rights  of  their  potential  clients  due  to  the  lack  of  a
current close relationship, id., at 130–131, but the Court permits defend-
ants to seek relief based on the Fourteenth Amendment equal protection
rights of potential jurors whom they have never met, Powers, 499 U. S., 
at 410–416; J. E. B. v. Alabama ex rel. T. B., 511 U. S. 127, 129 (1994).
And today, the plurality reaffirms our precedent allowing beer vendors 
to assert the Fourteenth Amendment rights of their potential customers. 
Ante, at 14 (citing Craig v. Boren, 429 U. S. 190, 192 (1976)).  But it is 
fair  to  wonder  whether  gun  vendors  could  expect  to  receive  the  same
privilege if they seek to vindicate the Second Amendment rights of their 
customers.  Given this Court’s ad hoc approach to third-party standing
and its tendency to treat the Second Amendment as a second-class right,
their time would be better spent waiting for Godot.