Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/558bv.pdf
Page Number: 373

212 

PRESLEY  v.  GEORGIA 

Per Curiam 

applicable  to  the  States  via  the  Due  Process  Clause  of  the 
Fourteenth Amendment.  The Sixth Amendment directs, in 
relevant part, that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused 
shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial . . . .”  The 
Court in In re Oliver, 333 U. S. 257, 273 (1948), made it clear 
that  this  right  extends  to  the  States.  The  Sixth  Amend­
ment  right,  as  the  quoted  language  makes  explicit,  is  the 
right of the accused. 

The  Court  has  further  held  that  the  public  trial  right  ex­
tends beyond the accused and can be invoked under the First 
Amendment.  Press-Enterprise  Co.  v.  Superior  Court  of 
Cal.,  Riverside  Cty.,  464  U. S.  501  (1984)  (Press-Enterprise 
I).  This  requirement,  too,  is  binding  on  the  States.  Ibid. 
The case now before the Court is brought under the Sixth 
Amendment, for it is the accused who invoked his right to a 
public  trial.  An  initial  question  is  whether  the  right  to  a 
public  trial  in  criminal  cases  extends  to  the  jury  selection 
phase  of  trial,  and  in  particular  the  voir  dire  of  prospective 
jurors.  In the First Amendment context that question was 
answered  in  Press-Enterprise  I.  Id.,  at  510.  The  Court 
there  held  that  the  voir  dire  of  prospective  jurors  must  be 
open  to  the  public  under  the  First  Amendment.  Later  in 
the  same Term  as  Press-Enterprise I,  the Court  considered 
a Sixth Amendment case concerning whether the public trial 
right  extends  to  a  pretrial  hearing  on  a  motion  to  suppress 
certain  evidence.  Waller  v.  Georgia,  467  U. S.  39  (1984). 
The Waller Court relied heavily upon Press-Enterprise I in 
ﬁnding that the Sixth Amendment right to a public trial ex­
tends beyond the actual proof at trial.  It ruled that the pre­
trial suppression hearing must be open to the public because 
“there can be little doubt that the explicit Sixth Amendment 
right of the accused is no less protective of a public trial than 
the implicit First Amendment right of the press and public.” 
467 U. S., at 46. 

While Press-Enterprise I was heavily relied upon in Wal­
ler,  the  jury  selection  issue  in  the  former  case  was  re­