Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/19pdf/18-801_o758.pdf
Page Number: 1

(Slip Opinion) 

OCTOBER  TERM,  2019 

1 

Syllabus 

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is 
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued. 
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been 
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader. 
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337. 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

Syllabus 

PETER, DEPUTY DIRECTOR, PATENT AND 
TRADEMARK OFFICE v. NANTKWEST, INC. 

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR 
THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT 

No. 18–801.  Argued October 7, 2019—Decided December 11, 2019 

The Patent Act provides two mutually exclusive methods for challenging
an adverse decision by the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO).  A dis-
satisfied  applicant  may  appeal  directly  to  the  Federal  Circuit,  35 
U. S. C. §141, or, as relevant here, may file a new civil action against
the PTO Director in the United States District Court for the Eastern 
District of Virginia, §145.  Under this second proceeding, the applicant
must pay “[a]ll the expenses of the proceedings.”  Ibid. 

Respondent NantKwest, Inc., filed a §145 civil action after its patent
application  was  denied.    The  District  Court  granted  summary  judg-
ment to the PTO, and the Federal Circuit affirmed.  The PTO moved 
for reimbursement of expenses, including the pro rata salaries of PTO
attorneys and a paralegal who worked on the case.  The District Court 
denied the motion, concluding that the statutory language referencing
expenses was not sufficient to rebut the “American Rule” presumption
that parties are responsible for their own attorney’s fees.  The en banc 
Federal Circuit affirmed. 

Held: The PTO cannot recover the salaries of its legal personnel under 

§145.  Pp. 3–10. 

(a) The “American Rule”—the bedrock principle that “[e]ach litigant 
pays his own attorney’s fees, win or lose, unless a statute or contract 
provides  otherwise,”  Hardt  v.  Reliance  Standard  Life  Ins.  Co.,  560 
U. S. 242, 253—provides the starting point for assessing whether §145
authorizes payment of the PTO’s legal fees.  Contrary to the Govern-
ment’s view, this Court has never suggested that any statute is exempt 
from the presumption against fee shifting or limited its American Rule 
inquiries to prevailing party statutes.  Rather, it has developed a line
of precedents addressing statutory deviations from the American Rule