Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/14pdf/13-352_c0n2.pdf
Page Number: 20.0

Cite as:  575 U. S. ____ (2015) 

17 

Opinion of the Court 

just  as  they  can  adjudicate  infringement  in  suits  seeking 
judicial  review  of  registration  decisions.    See  15  U. S. C. 
§1119;  3  McCarthy  §21:20.    There  is  no  reason  to  think 
that the same district judge in the same case should apply
two separate standards of likelihood of confusion.

Hargis  responds  that  the  text  is  not  actually  the  same 
because the registration provision asks whether the marks 
“resemble”  each  other,  15  U. S. C.  §1052(d),  while  the 
infringement  provision  is  directed  towards  the  “use  in 
commerce”  of  the  marks,  §1114(1).    Indeed,  according  to 
Hargis, the distinction between “resembl[ance]” and “use” 
has been key to trademark law for over a century.  There 
is  some  force  to  this  argument.    It  is  true  that  “a  party
opposing  an  application  to  register  a  mark  before  the 
Board  often  relies  only  on  its  federal  registration,  not  on 
any  common-law  rights  in  usages  not  encompassed  by  its
registration,” and “the Board typically analyzes the marks,
goods, and channels of trade only as set forth in the appli-
cation  and  in  the  opposer’s  registration,  regardless  of
whether  the  actual  usage  of  the  marks  by  either  party 
differs.”  Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 23; see 
also id., at 5 (explaining that “the Board typically reviews
only the usages encompassed by the registration”) (citing 3
Gilson  §9.03[2][a][ii]);  3  McCarthy  §20:15,  at  20–45  (ex-
plaining  that  for  registration  “it  is  the  mark  as  shown  in
the application and as used on the goods described in the 
application  which  must  be  considered,  not  the  mark  as 
actually  used”).  This  means  that  unlike  in  infringement 
litigation, “[t]he Board’s determination that a likelihood of 
confusion does or does not exist will not resolve the confu-
sion issue with respect to non-disclosed usages.”  Brief for 
United States as Amicus Curiae 23. 

Hargis’  argument  falls  short,  however,  because  it  mis-
takes  a  reason  not  to  apply  issue  preclusion  in  some  or
even  many  cases  as  a reason  never  to  apply  issue  preclu-
sion.  Just because the TTAB does not always consider the