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10 

BALDWIN v. UNITED STATES 

THOMAS, J., dissenting 

effectively  overrule  judicial  precedents.  Chevron  with-
draws a crucial check on the Executive from the separation 
of powers, see supra, at 4; Brand X gives the Executive the
ability to neutralize a previously exercised check by the Ju-
diciary.  But,  with  this  said,  there  is  no  need  to  question 
Chevron in order to recognize the heightened constitutional
harms wrought by Brand X. 

B 
Brand  X  also  seems  to  be  strongly  at  odds  with  tradi-
tional tools of statutory interpretation.  As discussed above, 
early federal courts afforded weight to longstanding execu-
tive interpretations of a law that were made contemporane-
ously with its passage and that were uniformly maintained. 
See supra, at 5–8.  Brand X, however, mandates deference 
to an executive interpretation that is neither contempora-
neous nor settled. 

Under  traditional  rules  of  statutory  interpretation,  this 
Court declined to give weight to late-arising or inconsistent
statutory  interpretations  by  the  Executive.  In  Merritt  v. 
Cameron, for example, the Court rejected an interpretation
offered by the Executive because there was no “long and un-
interrupted . . . departmental construction . . . as will bring
the case within the rule announced at an early day in this
court, and followed in very many cases.”  137 U. S., at 552; 
see also United States v. Alabama Great Southern R. Co., 
142 U. S. 615, 621 (1892).  Even if only to resolve the ten-
sion with our traditional approach to statutory interpreta-
tion, we should revisit Brand X. 

III
  Regrettably, Brand X has taken this Court to the preci-
pice  of  administrative  absolutism.    Under  its  rule  of 
deference, agencies are free to invent new (purported) inter-
pretations  of  statutes  and  then  require  courts  to  reject
their own prior interpretations.  Brand X may well follow from