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Page Number: 21

18 

BARR v. AMERICAN ASSN. OF POLITICAL  
CONSULTANTS, INC. 
Opinion of KAVANAUGH, J. 

Enacted  in  2015,  the  government-debt  exception  added
an  unconstitutional  discriminatory  exception  to  the  ro-
bocall  restriction.  The  text  of  the  severability  clause
squarely  covers  the  unconstitutional  government-debt  ex-
ception and requires that we sever it.

To get around the text of the severability clause, plaintiffs 
point out that the Communications Act’s severability clause
was enacted in 1934, long before the TCPA’s 1991 robocall 
restriction and the 2015 government-debt exception.  But a 
severability  clause  must  be  interpreted  according  to  its 
terms, regardless of when Congress enacted it.   See n. 6, 
supra. 

Even if the severability clause did not apply to the gov-
ernment-debt provision at issue in this case (or even if there
were no severability clause in the Communications Act), we
would  apply  the  presumption  of  severability  as  described 
and  applied  in  cases  such  as  Free  Enterprise  Fund.  And 
under that presumption, we likewise would sever the 2015 
government-debt  exception,  the  constitutionally  offending
provision.

With  the  government-debt  exception  severed,  the  re-
mainder of the law is capable of functioning independently 
and thus would be fully operative as a law.  Indeed, the re-
mainder  of  the  robocall  restriction  did  function  inde-
pendently and fully operate as a law for 20-plus years be-
fore the government-debt exception was added in 2015.

The Court’s precedents further support severing the 2015
government-debt  exception.    The  Court  has  long  applied
severability  principles  in  cases  like  this  one,  where  Con-
gress added an unconstitutional amendment to a prior law.
In  those  cases,  the  Court  has  treated  the  original,  pre-

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meaning act June 19, 1934, ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1064, known as the Com-
munications Act of 1934, which is classified principally to this chapter.” 
Note following 47 U. S. C. §608.