Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/23pdf/22-704_4246.pdf
Page Number: 50

8 

VIDAL v. ELSTER 

SOTOMAYOR, J., concurring in judgment 

dissenting in part).  Indeed, this Court has recognized re-
peatedly that the First Amendment permits governmental 
bodies  to  rely  on  reasonable,  viewpoint-neutral,  content-
based criteria when deciding to benefit certain communica-
tive  activities.    See,  e.g.,  National  Endowment  for  Arts  v. 
Finley, 524 U. S. 569, 587–588 (1998) (“[T]he Government
may allocate competitive funding according to criteria that
would be impermissible were direct regulation of speech or
a criminal penalty at stake”).

As I explained in Brunetti, and the Solicitor General ar-
gues in this case, various strands of precedent support this 
point, ranging from cases about limited public (or nonpub-
lic) forums to those involving monetary subsidies and non-
cash governmental programs (such as the collection of fees 
by  public-sector  labor  unions).    See  588  U. S.,  at  422–424 
(collecting  cases);  Brief  for  Petitioner  16–21  (same).1    In  
these cases, content discrimination was necessarily a part
of  the  governmental  initiative  at  issue,  yet  the  initiative
was not subject to the constitutional straitjacket of height-
ened scrutiny.  See, e.g., Perry Ed. Assn. v. Perry Local Ed-
ucators’ Assn., 460 U. S. 37, 49 (1983) (noting that content 
discrimination is “[i]mplicit in the concept of the nonpublic 
forum,” yet declining to apply heightened scrutiny).  That 
was so because each “initiative . . . supported some forms of 
expression without restricting others.  Some speakers were
better off, but no speakers were worse off.”  Brunetti, 588 
U. S., at 423 (opinion of SOTOMAYOR, J.).

These  cases  “may  not  be  controlling  [here]  in  a  strict 

—————— 

1 According to JUSTICE THOMAS (who is joined by two Justices), I focus
primarily  on  cash-subsidy  and  union-dues  cases.  A  closer  look  at  this 
opinion and the cases that I cite will reveal that is not exactly true.  As I 
mentioned in Brunetti, and both the Government and JUSTICE BARRETT 
assert in this case, limited public (or nonpublic) forum cases also consti-
tute helpful analogies for arriving at the generally applicable principles
that  should  apply  to  this  kind  of  case.    See  Brief  for  Petitioner  18–19; 
accord, ante, at 7–9, and n. 2 (opinion of BARRETT, J.).