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Page Number: 4.0

4 

TRUMP v. UNITED STATES 

Syllabus 

Branch, and to enable the President to carry out his constitutional du-
ties  without  undue  caution.    At  a  minimum,  the  President  must  be 
immune from prosecution for an official act unless the Government can
show  that  applying  a  criminal  prohibition  to  that  act  would  pose  no 
“dangers of intrusion on the authority and functions of the Executive 
Branch.”  Fitzgerald, 457 U. S., at 754.  Pp. 12–15. 

(3) As for a President’s unofficial acts, there is no immunity.  Alt-
hough Presidential immunity is required for official actions to ensure 
that the President’s decisionmaking is not distorted by the threat of 
future litigation stemming from those actions, that concern does not 
support immunity for  unofficial conduct.  Clinton, 520 U. S., at 694, 
and n. 19.  The separation of powers does not bar a prosecution predi-
cated on the President’s unofficial acts.  P. 15. 

(b) The first step in deciding whether a former President is entitled
to immunity from a particular prosecution is to distinguish his official
from unofficial actions.  In this case, no court thus far has drawn that 
distinction, in general or with respect to the conduct alleged in partic-
ular.  It is therefore incumbent upon the Court to be mindful that it is
“a court of final review and not first view.”  Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 566 
U. S. 189, 201.  Critical threshold issues in this case are how to differ-
entiate between a President’s official and unofficial actions, and how 
to do so with respect to the indictment’s extensive and detailed allega-
tions covering a broad range of conduct.  The Court offers guidance on
those issues.  Pp. 16–32. 

(1) When the President acts pursuant to “constitutional and stat-
utory authority,” he takes official action to perform the functions of his 
office.  Fitzgerald, 456 U. S., at 757.  Determining whether an action 
is covered by immunity thus begins with assessing the President’s au-
thority to take that action.  But the breadth of the President’s “discre-
tionary responsibilities” under the Constitution and laws of the United 
States frequently makes it “difficult to determine which of [his] innu-
merable ‘functions’ encompassed a particular action.”  Id., at 756.  The 
immunity the Court has recognized therefore extends to the “outer pe-
rimeter” of the President’s official responsibilities, covering actions so 
long as they are “not manifestly or palpably beyond [his] authority.” 
Blassingame v. Trump, 87 F. 4th 1, 13 (CADC). 

In dividing official from unofficial conduct, courts may not inquire
into the President’s motives.  Such a “highly intrusive” inquiry would
risk exposing even the most obvious instances of official conduct to ju-
dicial examination on the mere allegation of improper purpose.  Fitz-
gerald,  457  U. S.,  at  756.    Nor  may  courts  deem  an  action  unofficial 
merely because it allegedly violates a generally applicable law.  Oth-
erwise, Presidents would be subject to trial on “every allegation that 
an  action  was  unlawful,”  depriving  immunity  of  its  intended  effect.