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Cite as: 524 U. S. 417 (1998)

481

Breyer, J., dissenting

exercise of a particular power, such as the power to make
rules of broad applicability, American Trucking Assns., Inc.
v. United States, 344 U. S. 298, 310–313 (1953), or to adjudi-
cate claims, Crowell v. Benson, 285 U. S., at 50–51, 54; Wie-
ner v. United States, 357 U. S. 349, 354–356 (1958), can fall
within the constitutional purview of more than one branch
of Government. See Wayman v. Southard, 10 Wheat. 1, 43
(1825) (Marshall, C. J.) (“Congress may certainly delegate to
others, powers which the legislature may rightfully exercise
itself ”). The Court does not “carry out the distinction be-
tween legislative and executive action with mathematical
precision” or “divide the branches into watertight compart-
ments,” Springer v. Philippine Islands, 277 U. S. 189, 211
(1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting), for, as others have said, the
Constitution “blend[s]” as well as “separat[es]” powers in
order to create a workable government.
1 K. Davis, Admin-
istrative Law § 1.09, p. 68 (1958).

The Court has upheld congressional delegation of rule-
making power and adjudicatory power to federal agencies,
American Trucking Assns. v. United States, supra, at 310–
313; Wiener v. United States, supra, at 354–356, guideline-
writing power to a Sentencing Commission, Mistretta v.
United States, 488 U. S., at 412, and prosecutor-appointment
power to judges, Morrison v. Olson, 487 U. S. 654, 696–697
It is far easier conceptually to reconcile the power
(1988).
at issue here with the relevant constitutional description
(“executive”) than in many of these cases. And cases in
which the Court may have found a delegated power and
the basic constitutional function of another branch conceptu-
ally irreconcilable are yet more distant. See, e. g., Federal
Radio Comm’n v. General Elec. Co., 281 U. S. 464 (1930)
(power to award radio licenses not a “judicial” power).

If there is a separation-of-powers violation, then, it must
rest, not upon purely conceptual grounds, but upon some
important conflict between the Act and a significant
separation-of-powers objective.