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Page Number: 4.0

4 

UNITED STATES v. HANSEN 

Syllabus 

Amendment at all, e.g., smuggling noncitizens into the country.  Be-
cause these types of cases are heartland clause (iv) prosecutions, the 
“plainly legitimate sweep” of the provision is extensive.  To the extent 
clause (iv) reaches any speech, it stretches no further than speech in-
tegral to unlawful conduct, which is unprotected.  See, e.g., Giboney v. 
Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U. S. 490, 502.  Hansen, on the other 
hand, fails to identify a single prosecution for ostensibly protected ex-
pression in the 70 years since Congress enacted clause (iv)’s immediate 
predecessor.  Instead, he offers a string of hypotheticals, all premised 
on  the  expansive  ordinary  meanings  of  “encourage”  and  “induce.”  
None of these examples are filtered through the traditional elements 
of  solicitation  and  facilitation—most  importantly,  the  requirement 
that a defendant intend to bring about a specific result.  Because clause 
(iv)  does  not  have  the  scope  Hansen  claims,  it  does  not  produce  the 
horribles he parades.  Hansen also resists the idea that Congress can 
criminalize speech that solicits or facilitates a civil violation, and some 
immigration violations are only civil.  But even assuming that clause 
(iv) reaches some protected speech, and even assuming that its appli-
cation to all of that speech is unconstitutional, the ratio of unlawful-
to-lawful applications is not lopsided enough to justify facial invalida-
tion for overbreadth.  Pp. 17–20. 

25 F. 4th 1103, reversed and remanded. 

  BARRETT,  J.,  delivered  the  opinion  of  the  Court,  in  which  ROBERTS, 
C. J., and THOMAS, ALITO, KAGAN, GORSUCH, and KAVANAUGH, JJ., joined.  
THOMAS, J., filed a concurring opinion.  JACKSON, J., filed a dissenting 
opinion, in which SOTOMAYOR, J., joined.