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Page Number: 3.0

Cite as:  582 U. S. ____ (2017) 

3 

Syllabus 

it was required to give the day before.  And by so unmooring the rev-
ocation of citizenship from its award, the Government opens the door 
to a world of disquieting consequences—which this Court would need 
far stronger textual support to believe Congress intended.  The stat-
ute Congress passed, most naturally read, strips a person of citizen-
ship  not  when  she  committed  any  illegal  act  during  the  naturaliza-
tion  process,  but  only  when  that  act  played  some  role  in  her 
naturalization.  Pp. 4–9.

2. When the underlying illegality alleged in a §1425(a) prosecution
is  a  false  statement  to  government  officials,  a  jury  must  decide
whether the false statement so altered the naturalization process as 
to have influenced an award of citizenship.  Because the entire natu-
ralization process is set up  to provide little room for subjective pref-
erences or personal whims, that inquiry is properly framed in objec-
tive  terms:  To  decide  whether  a  defendant  acquired  citizenship  by
means of a lie, a jury must evaluate how knowledge of the real facts 
would have affected a reasonable government official properly apply-
ing naturalization law.

If  the  facts  the  defendant  misrepresented  are  themselves  legally
disqualifying  for  citizenship,  the  jury  can  make  quick  work  of  that
inquiry.  In such a case, the defendant’s lie must have played a role
in  her  naturalization.  But  that  is  not  the  only  time  a  jury  can  find
that a defendant’s lies had the requisite  bearing on a naturalization
decision, because lies can also throw investigators off a trail leading
to  disqualifying  facts.    When  relying  on  such  an  investigation-based
theory,  the  Government  must  make  a  two-part  showing.    Initially,
the  Government  must  prove  that  the  misrepresented  fact  was  suffi-
ciently  relevant  to  a  naturalization  criterion  that  it  would  have 
prompted reasonable officials, “seeking only evidence concerning citi-
zenship  qualifications,”  to  undertake  further  investigation.    Kungys,
485 U. S., at 774, n. 9.  If that much is true, the inquiry turns to the 
prospect  that  such  an  investigation  would  have  borne  disqualifying 
fruit.  The Government need not show definitively that its investiga-
tion  would  have  unearthed  a  disqualifying  fact.    It  need  only  estab-
lish  that  the  investigation  “would  predictably  have  disclosed”  some
legal disqualification.  Id., at 774.  If that is so, the defendant’s mis-
representation  contributed  to  the  citizenship  award  in  the  way
§1425(a)  requires.    This  demanding  but  still  practicable  causal
standard reflects the real-world attributes of cases premised on what 
an unhindered investigation would have found.

When the Government can make its two-part showing, the defend-
ant  may  overcome  it  by  establishing  that  she  was  qualified  for  citi-
zenship  (even  though  she  misrepresented  facts  that  suggested  the 
opposite).  Thus,  whatever  the  Government  shows  with  respect  to  a