Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/21pdf/20-601_bq7c.pdf
Page Number: 36.0

Cite as:  595 U. S. ____ (2022) 

7 

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting 

interest in taking up the defense of HB 454.”  Ante, at 9.  All 
agree  that  States  and  their  authorized  officials  have  sub-
stantial  sovereign  interests  in  defending  their  laws.    The 
Office of the Attorney General, however, previously repre-
sented that it had no interest in these proceedings.  Had the 
attorney  general  been  a  private  litigant,  that  decision 
would have been binding: This Court regularly “has . . . re-
fused  to  consider  a  party’s  argument  that  contradicted  a 
joint ‘stipulation [entered] at the outset of th[e] litigation.’ ”  
Christian Legal Soc. Chapter of Univ. of Cal., Hastings Col-
lege of Law v. Martinez, 561 U. S. 661, 677 (2010) (quoting 
Board of Regents of Univ. of Wis. System v. Southworth, 529 
U. S. 217, 226 (2000); alterations in original).  Respect for 
state  sovereignty  does  not  entitle  a  state  official  to  evade 
these  well-established  consequences.    Given  the  attorney 
general’s change in position and the deferential standard of 
review, the Court of Appeals did not abuse its discretion by 
denying his motion for intervention. 
  Further, as the Court acknowledges, Kentucky law pro-
vides that the attorney general and other authorized state 
officials, including the secretary, “shar[e ] . . . authority” to 
defend the constitutionality of state laws, or to decline to do 
so.    Ante,  at  8;  see  Ky.  Rev.  Stat.  Ann.  §12.210(1)  (West 
2021).  The Court makes much of the attorney general’s role 
in  defending  Kentucky  law,  but  gives  short  shrift  to  the 
manner in which Kentucky has structured its law to allow 
other  state  officers  to  represent  the  State’s  interests  in 
court.    When the  attorney  general  stipulated to  dismissal 
from the case, he acquiesced to the secretary’s right under 
state law to represent Kentucky’s interests in the manner 
that the secretary saw fit. 
  Notably, the Court’s decision to allow intervention on ap-
peal is without precedent.  Before the Court of Appeals, the 
attorney  general  was  able  to  identify  only  two  instances, 
both from the Ninth Circuit, in which a federal court of ap-
peals  granted  a  post-decision  motion  to  intervene,  a  fact