Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/22pdf/21-857_4357.pdf
Page Number: 28

Cite as:  599 U. S. ____ (2023) 

23 

Opinion of the Court 

not lie for errors of state law.’ ”  Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U. S. 
62, 67 (1991) (quoting Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U. S. 764, 780 
(1990)).  As  a  result,  it  is  unclear what  work  the  Govern-
ment’s  state-prisoner-habeas  benchmark  is  even  doing  in 
its answer to the question presented here.

Rather, the narrow base on which the Government’s top-
heavy  theory  ultimately  turns  out  to  rest  is  its  assertion 
that §2255(h) is simply not clear enough to support the in-
ference that Congress entirely closed the door on pure stat-
utory  claims  not  brought  in  a  federal  prisoner’s  initial
§2255 motion.  See Brief for Respondent 28–29, 39.  That 
assertion is unpersuasive for the reasons we have already 
explained:  §2255(h)  specifies  the  two  circumstances  in 
which a second or successive collateral attack on a federal 
sentence  is  available,  and  those  circumstances  do  not  in-
clude an intervening change in statutory interpretation. 

The  Government  asserts  that  we  require  “the  clearest
command” before construing AEDPA to “close [the] court-
house doors” on “a strong equitable claim” for relief.  Hol-
land  v.  Florida,  560  U. S.  631,  646,  649  (2010)  (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  The only two cases the Govern-
ment relies on for its clear-statement rule do not sweep as 
broadly as it suggests.  In Holland, we applied the general
presumption of equitable tolling to AEDPA’s 1-year statute 
of  limitations  for  state  prisoners’  habeas  claims.  Id.,  at 
645–649.  Afterward,  in  McQuiggin  v.  Perkins,  569  U. S. 
383 (2013), we held that “a convincing showing of actual in-
nocence” could enable a prisoner to evade AEDPA’s statute 
of limitations entirely.  Id., at 386.
  Undoubtedly, McQuiggin’s assertion of equitable author-
ity to override clear statutory text was a bold one.  But even 
taking Holland and McQuiggin for all they are worth, there
is a significant difference between reading equitable excep-
tions into a statute of limitations, on the one hand, and de-
manding a clear statement before foreclosing workarounds
to AEDPA’s second-or-successive restrictions, on the other.