Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/23pdf/22-451_7m58.pdf
Page Number: 98.0

Cite as:  603 U. S. ____ (2024) 

17 

KAGAN, J., dissenting 

Section 706’s references to standards of review in other 
contexts  only  further  undercut  the  majority’s  argument.
The majority notes that Section 706 requires deferential re-
view for agency fact-finding and policy-making (under, re-
spectively,  a  substantial-evidence  standard  and  an  arbi-
trary-and-capricious standard).  See ante, at 14.  Congress,
the majority claims, “surely would have articulated a simi-
larly  deferential  standard  applicable  to  questions  of  law 
had  it  intended  to  depart”  from  de novo  review. 
Ibid.  
Surely?  In another part of Section 706, Congress explicitly 
referred to de novo review.  §706(2)(F).  With all those ref-
erences to standards of review—both deferential and not— 
running around Section 706, what is “telling” (ante, at 14) 
is  the  absence  of  any  standard  for  reviewing  an  agency’s 
statutory  constructions.    That  silence  left  the  matter,  as 
noted above, “generally indeterminate”: Section 706 neither 
mandates  nor  forbids  Chevron-style  deference.   Vermeule 
207.3 
—————— 
rather than agencies to decide in the last analysis.”  H. R. Rep. No. 1980,
79th Cong., 2d Sess., 44 (1946); S. Rep. No. 752, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., 28
(1945).  But that statement also does not address the standard of review 
that courts should then use.  When a court defers under Chevron, it re-
views the agency’s construction for reasonableness “in the last analysis.”
The views of Representative Walter, which the majority also cites, fur-
ther demonstrate my point.  He stated that the APA would require courts
to “determine independently all relevant questions of law,” but he also
stated that courts would be required to “exercise . . . independent judg-
ment”  in  applying  the  substantial-evidence  standard  (a  deferential 
standard if ever there were one).  92 Cong. Rec. 5654 (1946).  He therefore 
did  not  equate  “independent”  review  with  de novo  review;  he  thought 
that a court could conduct independent review of agency action using a 
deferential standard. 

3 In  a  footnote  responding  to  the  last  two  paragraphs,  the  majority
raises the white flag on Section 706’s text.  See ante, at 15, n. 4.  Yes, it 
finally concedes, Section 706 does not say that de novo review is required 
for an agency’s statutory construction.  Rather, the majority says, “some 
things go without saying,” and de novo review is such a thing.  See ibid. 
But why?  What extra-textual considerations force us to read Section 706 
the majority’s way?  In its footnote, the majority repairs only to history.