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2 

WILKINS v. UNITED STATES 

THOMAS, J., dissenting 

I 
This Court’s skepticism of the jurisdictional character of
procedural bars does not extend to conditions on a waiver 
of sovereign immunity.  In the context of a waiver of sover-
eign immunity, the Court presumes that procedural limita-
tions are jurisdictional.  The Act’s time bar is one such pro-
vision,  and,  as  such,  this  Court  should  interpret  it  as  a 
jurisdictional bar to suit.

As a sovereign, the United States “is immune from suit 
save as it consents to be sued, . . . and the terms of its con-
sent to be sued in any court define that court’s jurisdiction
to entertain the suit.”  United States v. Sherwood, 312 U. S. 
584,  586  (1941);  see  also  Lehman  v.  Nakshian,  453  U. S. 
156,  160  (1981);  United  States  v.  Mitchell,  463  U. S.  206, 
212 (1983) (describing this principle as “axiomatic”).  Con-
sequently,  “[s]overeign  immunity  is  by  nature  jurisdic-
tional.”  Henderson  v.  United  States,  517  U. S.  654,  675 
(1996)  (THOMAS,  J.,  dissenting). 
is 
longstanding,  and  the  majority  does  not  dispute  it.    See 
ante, at 7–8. 

This  principle 

“A  necessary  corollary  of  this  rule,”  however,  “is  that 
when  Congress  attaches  conditions  to  legislation  waiving 
the sovereign immunity of the United States, those condi-
tions must be strictly observed, and exceptions thereto are
not  to  be  lightly  implied.”    Block  v.  North  Dakota  ex  rel. 
Board of Univ. and School Lands, 461 U. S. 273, 287 (1983); 
see also United States v. Nordic Village, Inc., 503 U. S. 30, 
34  (1992)  (stating  that  a  waiver  of  sovereign  immunity
“must  be  construed  strictly  in  favor  of  the  sovereign”  and 
“not enlarge[d] . . . beyond what the language requires” (in-
ternal  quotation  marks  omitted)).  Thus,  “in  many  cases
this Court has read procedural rules embodied in statutes 
waiving immunity strictly, with an eye to effectuating a re-
strictive  legislative  purpose  when  Congress  relinquishes
sovereign immunity.”  Honda v. Clark, 386 U. S. 484, 501 
(1967).  In United States v. Dalm, 494 U. S. 596 (1990), the