Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/22pdf/22-506_nmip.pdf
Page Number: 58

Cite as:  600 U. S. ____ (2023) 

11 

KAGAN, J., dissenting 

id., at 383 (Amtrak “must be regarded as a Government en-
tity for First Amendment purposes”); id., at 392 (Amtrak is
“a Government entity for purposes of determining the con-
stitutional rights of citizens”); id., at 394 (Amtrak is an “in-
strumentality of the United States for the purpose of indi-
vidual rights guaranteed against the Government”); id., at 
397, 399, 400 (similar, similar, and similar).  But for other 
purposes,  a  different  rule  might,  or  would,  obtain.    Our 
holding, we said, did not mean Amtrak had sovereign im-
munity.  See id., at 392.  And most relevant here, we reaf-
firmed that “[t]he State does not, by becoming a corporator,
identify  itself  with  the  corporation”  for  purposes  of  litiga-
tion.  Id., at 398.  Or said again, the Government is “not a 
party to suits brought by or against” its corporation.  Id., at 
399.  So  what  Lebron  tells  us  about  MOHELA  is  that  it 
must comply with the Constitution.  Lebron offers no sup-
port  (more  like  the  opposite)  for  the  different  view  that 
MOHELA and Missouri are interchangeable parties in liti-
gation.1 

—————— 

1 The same goes for the majority’s other case about Amtrak, which just
“reiterate[s]” Lebron’s reasoning.  Ante, at 11; see Department of Trans-
portation  v.  Association  of  American  Railroads,  575  U. S.  43  (2015).
There too we held that Amtrak was a “governmental entity” for purposes 
of  the  “requirements  of  the  Constitution”—specifically,  the  nondelega-
tion doctrine.  Id., at 54.  And there too we kept our holding as limited as 
possible, repeatedly stating that we were treating Amtrak as the Gov-
ernment  for  that  purpose  alone.    See,  e.g.,  id.,  at  51  (“for  purposes  of
separation-of-powers  analysis  under  the  Constitution”);  id.,  at  54  (“for
purposes of the Constitution’s separation of powers provisions”); id., at 
55 (“for purposes of determining the constitutional issues presented in 
this case”).  As for any other purpose?  Not a word to suggest the same 
result.  And  as  even  the  majority  concedes,  “a  public  corporation  can 
count as part of the State for some but not other purposes.”  Ante, at 12, 
n. 3 (internal quotation marks omitted).  The Amtrak decisions, to con-
tinue borrowing the majority’s language, “said nothing about, and had 
no  reason  to  address,  whether  an  injury  to  [a]  public  corporation  is  a 
harm to the [Government].”  Ibid.