Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/558bv.pdf
Page Number: 401.0

240 

KUCANA  v.  HOLDER 

Opinion of the Court 

withholding of removal in 1996.  An IJ determined that Ku­
cana was removable and scheduled a hearing to evaluate his 
eligibility for asylum.  When Kucana failed to appear for the 
hearing, the IJ immediately ordered his removal in absentia. 
Kucana  ﬁled  a  motion  to  reopen,  explaining  that  he  had 
missed his hearing because he had overslept.  The IJ denied 
the  motion,  and  the  BIA  afﬁrmed  in  2002.  Kucana  did  not 
seek judicial review, nor did he leave the United States. 

Kucana  ﬁled  a  second  motion  to  reopen  his  removal  pro­
ceedings  in  2006,  contending  that  conditions  in  Albania  had 
worsened.5  The  BIA  denied  relief;  it  concluded  that  condi­
tions  in  Albania  had  actually  improved  since  1997.  Argu­
ing  that  the  BIA  had  abused  its  discretion  in  denying  his 
motion,  Kucana  ﬁled  a  petition  for  review  in  the  Seventh 
Circuit. 

In a  fractured decision, the Seventh  Circuit dismissed the 
petition  for  lack  of  jurisdiction.  Kucana  v.  Mukasey,  533 
F.  3d  534,  539  (2008).  The  court  held  that  8  U. S. C. 
§ 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) bars judicial review not only of administra­
tive decisions made discretionary by statute, but also “when 
the  agency’s  discretion  is  speciﬁed  by  a  regulation  rather 
than  a  statute.”  533  F.  3d,  at  536.6  In  so  ruling,  the  Sev­

5 The  statute  “guarantees  to  each  alien  the  right  to  ﬁle  ‘one  motion  to 
reopen  proceedings.’ ”  Dada  v.  Mukasey,  554  U. S.  1,  15  (2008)  (quoting 
§ 1229a(c)(7)(A)).  Attorney  General  regulations  permit  further  motions 
to  reopen  to  seek  asylum  or  withholding  of  removal  based  on  changed 
conditions  in  the  country  of  nationality  or  removal.  See  8  CFR 
§ 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) (2009). 

6 While recognizing that a regulation, rather than the INA itself, confers 
on the Board discretion to grant or deny a motion to reopen, the Court of 
Appeals said that the regulation, § 1003.2(a), “draw[s] . . . force from provi­
sions  in  the  Act  allowing  immigration  ofﬁcials  to  govern  their  own  pro­
ceedings.”  533 F. 3d, at 536.  The “force,” according to the Seventh Cir­
cuit,  comes  from  8  U. S. C.  § 1229a(c)(7),  which  it  described  as  providing 
“authority  for  reopening  by  [the]  Board.”  533  F.  3d,  at  536.  Section 
1229a(c)(7), however, is not directed to the agency’s discretion to grant or 
deny  motions  to  reopen.  In  the  main,  “it  simply  lays  out  the  require­