Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/17pdf/16-1466_2b3j.pdf
Page Number: 18.0

Cite as:  585 U. S. ____ (2018) 

13 

Opinion of the Court 

C 

In  addition  to  the  promotion  of  “labor  peace,”  Abood 
cited  “the  risk  of  ‘free  riders’ ”  as  justification  for  agency
fees,  431  U. S.,  at  224.    Respondents  and  some  of  their 
amici endorse this reasoning, contending that agency fees
are  needed  to  prevent  nonmembers  from  enjoying  the 
benefits  of  union  representation  without  shouldering  the 
costs.  Brief  for  Union  Respondent  34–36;  Brief  for  State 
Respondents  41–45;  see,  e.g.,  Brief  for  International 
Brotherhood of Teamsters as Amicus Curiae 3–5. 

Petitioner  strenuously  objects  to  this  free-rider  label. 
He argues that he is not a free rider on a bus headed for a 
destination  that  he  wishes  to  reach  but  is  more  like  a 
person shanghaied for an unwanted voyage.

Whichever  description  fits  the  majority  of  public  em­
ployees  who  would  not  subsidize  a  union  if  given  the  op­
tion, avoiding free riders is not a compelling interest.  As 
we  have  noted,  “free-rider  arguments . . . are  generally
insufficient  to  overcome  First  Amendment  objections.” 
Knox,  567  U. S.,  at  311.    To  hold  otherwise  across  the 
board  would  have  startling  consequences.  Many  private 
groups  speak  out  with  the  objective  of  obtaining  govern­
ment  action  that  will  have  the  effect  of  benefiting  non­
members.  May all those who are thought to benefit from 
such efforts be compelled to subsidize this speech? 

Suppose that a particular group lobbies or speaks out on 
behalf of what it thinks are the needs of senior citizens or 
veterans or physicians, to take just a few examples.  Could 
the  government  require  that  all  seniors,  veterans,  or
doctors  pay  for  that  service  even  if  they  object?    It  has 
never  been  thought  that  this  is  permissible.    “[P]rivate
speech  often  furthers  the  interests  of  nonspeakers,”  but 
“that  does  not  alone  empower  the  state  to  compel  the 
speech to be paid for.”  Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Assn., 500 
U. S. 507, 556 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment in
part  and  dissenting  in  part).    In  simple  terms,  the  First