Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/22pdf/21-1449_d9eh.pdf
Page Number: 46.0

Cite as:  598 U. S. ____ (2023) 

25 

JACKSON, J., dissenting 

majority’s  conclusion  that  the  risk  to  the  trucks  rendered
the  drivers’  strike  unprotected  by  the  NLRA.  Instead,  I 
would have credited Glacier’s own account, and thus would 
have concluded that the Union took reasonable precautions
when  it  instructed  the  drivers  to  return  the  trucks  and 
leave them running to avoid the concrete hardening immi-
nently in the drums.  The majority reaches the opposite con-
clusion by giving far too little weight to the allegation that
the drivers returned the trucks, and also by substantially
discounting the allegations that support the Union’s claim
that the drivers left their trucks and revolving drums run-
ning.  See ante, at 11. 

Fortunately,  the  pending  Board  determination  of  what
actually happened in connection with this particular strike 
will  establish—as  a  matter  of  fact  and  not  mere  allega-
tion—what  precautions  (if  any)  the  drivers  actually  took 
and what harm (if any) the Union’s conduct actually posed 
to Glacier’s trucks.9  But our different takes on these alle-
gations only underscore the potential for variable outcomes 
when courts apply the Board’s fact-dependent principles to 
bare assertions. 

To the extent that the majority’s conclusion rests on the 
alleged fact that “by reporting for duty and pretending as if 
they  would  deliver  the  concrete,  the  drivers  prompted  the 
creation  of  the  perishable  product”  that  “put  Glacier’s
trucks in harm’s way,” ante, at 10, I see nothing aggravated
or even untoward about that conduct.  Glacier is a concrete-
delivery company whose drivers are responsible for deliver-
ing  wet  concrete,  so  it  is  unremarkable  that  the  drivers 
struck  at  a  time  when  there  was  concrete  in  the  trucks. 
While  selling  perishable  products  may  be  risky  business,
the perishable nature of Glacier’s concrete did not impose 

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9 For the same reason, the state court would not be bound by the ma-
jority’s recitation of the facts at this motion-to-dismiss stage in any fu-
ture proceedings on this matter in state court.