Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/529bv.pdf
Page Number: 532.0

529US2

Unit: $U48

[09-26-01 10:25:49] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 529 U. S. 446 (2000)

457

Breyer, J., concurring in judgment

effective assistance”) for not following the state procedural
rule that happened itself independently to constitute a viola-
tion of the Federal Constitution. After all, were the pris-
oner to prove his claim (i. e., show “ineffective assistance”),
the State might want to take action ﬁrst. Ordinary exhaus-
tion rules assure States an initial opportunity to pass upon
claims of violation of the Federal Constitution. Why should
a State not have a similar opportunity in this situation? As
the Carrier Court pointed out, it would be “anomalous” for
a federal habeas court to “adjudicat[e] an unexhausted con-
stitutional claim for which state court review might still be
available.”

Ibid.

The anomaly disappears, however, once the prisoner has
exhausted his “ineffective-assistance” claim (which appeared
in the guise of a “cause”). And there is no other anomaly
that requires the majority’s result. Once a claim of in-
effective assistance of counsel has been exhausted—either
through presentation in the state courts or through proce-
dural default—there is no difference between that claim
and any other claim of “cause” for the prisoner’s original
procedural default. The federal habeas court is no longer
in the “anomalous position” of considering as cause an in-
dependent claim that might yet be considered by the state
courts, for there is no longer any possibility that the state
courts will consider the claim. There is thus no more reason
to hold that procedural default of an ineffective-assistance
claim bars the prisoner from raising that ineffective-
assistance claim as a “cause” (excusing a different proce-
dural default asserted as a bar to a basic constitutional claim)
than there is to bar any other claim of “cause” on grounds
of procedural default. The majority creates an anomaly; it
does not cure one.

The added complexity resulting from the Court’s opinion is
obvious. Consider a prisoner who wants to assert a federal
constitutional claim (call it FCC). Suppose the State asserts