Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/529bv.pdf
Page Number: 873.0

529US3

Unit: $U59

[09-26-01 12:32:42] PAGES PGT: OPIN

798

VERMONT AGENCY OF NATURAL RESOURCES v.
UNITED STATES ex rel. STEVENS
Stevens, J., dissenting

“presumption” does not quite do the heavy lifting the Court
would like it to do. What’s more, the doctrinal origins of
that “presumption” meant only that the enacting sovereign
was not normally thought to be a statutory “person.” See,
e. g., United States v. California, 297 U. S., at 186 (“[T]he
canon of construction that a sovereign is presumptively
not intended to be bound by its own statute unless named
in it . . . has its historical basis in the English doctrine that
the Crown is unaffected by acts of Parliament not speciﬁcally
directed against it. The presumption is an aid to consist-
ent construction of statutes of the enacting sovereign when
their purpose is in doubt” (emphasis added)); see also United
States v. Mine Workers, 330 U. S., at 275; United States
v. Fox, 94 U. S. 315, 321 (1877); Will v. Michigan Dept.
of State Police, 491 U. S. 58, 73 (1989) (Brennan, J., dis-
senting). The reason for presuming that an enacting sov-
ereign does not intend to authorize litigation against itself
simply does not apply to federal statutes that apply equally
to state agencies and private entities. Finally, the “afﬁrm-
ative showing” the Court would require to demonstrate
is
that the word “person” includes States, ante, at 781,
plainly found in the statutory text discussed above.

The Court’s ﬁrst textual argument is based on the fact
that the deﬁnition of the term “person” included in § 3733’s
“The presence of
CID provision expressly includes States.
such a deﬁnitional provision in § 3733,” the Court argues,
“together with the absence of such a provision from the
deﬁnitional provisions contained in § 3729 . . . suggests that
States are not ‘persons’ for purposes of qui tam liability
under § 3729.” Ante, at 784. Leaving aside the fact that
§ 3733’s deﬁnition actually cuts in the opposite direction,
see supra, at 795–796, this argument might carry some
weight if the deﬁnitional provisions in § 3729 included some
deﬁnition of “person” but simply neglected to mention
States. But the deﬁnitional provisions in § 3729 do not in-