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Page Number: 30.0

26 

KIRTSAENG v. JOHN WILEY & SONS, INC. 

Opinion of the Court 

349–350. 

We  also  explained  why  we  rejected  the  claim  that  our 
interpretation  would  make  §602(a)(1)  pointless.    Those 
advancing that claim had pointed out that the 1976 Copy­
right  Act  amendments  retained  a  prior  anti-piracy  provi­
sion,  prohibiting  the  importation  of  pirated  copies.  Qual­
ity  King,  supra,  at  146.  Thus,  they  said,  §602(a)(1)  must 
prohibit  the  importation  of  lawfully  made  copies,  for  to
allow the importation of those lawfully made copies after a 
first sale, as Quality King’s holding would do, would leave 
§602(a)(1)  without  much  to  prohibit.    It  would  become 
superfluous, without any real work to do. 

We  do  not  believe  that  this  argument  is  a  strong  one.
Under Quality King’s interpretation, §602(a)(1) would still 
forbid  importing  (without  permission,  and  subject  to  the
exceptions  in  §602(a)(3))  copies  lawfully  made  abroad,  for 
example,  where  (1)  a  foreign  publisher  operating  as  the 
licensee of an American publisher  prints copies of a book 
overseas  but,  prior  to  any  authorized  sale,  seeks  to  send 
them  to  the  United  States;  (2)  a  foreign  printer  or  other
manufacturer  (if  not  the  “owner”  for  purposes  of  §109(a), 
e.g., before an authorized sale) sought to send copyrighted 
goods  to  the  United  States;  (3)  “a  book  publisher  trans­
ports  copies  to  a  wholesaler”  and  the  wholesaler  (not  yet 
the owner) sends them to the United States, see Copyright 
Law  Revision,  pt.  4,  at  211  (giving  this  example);  or  (4) 
a  foreign  film  distributor,  having  leased  films  for  distri-
bution, or any other licensee, consignee, or bailee sought to
send  them  to  the  United  States.    See,  e.g.,  2  Nimmer  on 
Copyright  §8.12[B][1][a],  at  8–159  (“Section  109(a)  pro­
vides  that  the  distribution  right  may  be  exercised  solely
with  respect  to  the  initial  disposition  of  copies  of  a  work, 
not to prevent or restrict the resale or other further trans­
fer  of  possession  of  such  copies”).    These  examples  show
that §602(a)(1) retains significance.  We concede it has less 
significance than the dissent believes appropriate, but the