Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/529bv.pdf
Page Number: 394

529US1

Unit: $U42

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Cite as: 529 U. S. 277 (2000)

319

Stevens, J., dissenting

the mandated costume change is “de minimis.” Ante, at
294. Although I suspect that the patrons of Kandyland are
more likely to share Chief Judge Posner’s view than the plu-
rality’s, for present purposes I shall accept the assumption
that the difference in the message is small. The crucial
point to remember, however, is that whether one views the
difference as large or small, nude dancing still receives First
Amendment protection, even if that protection lies only in
the “outer ambit” of that Amendment. Ante, at 289. Erie’s
ordinance, therefore, burdens a message protected by the
First Amendment.
If one assumes that the same erotic
message is conveyed by nude dancers as by those wearing
miniscule costumes, one means of expressing that message
is banned; 2 if one assumes that the messages are different,
one of those messages is banned.
In either event, the ordi-
nance is a total ban.

The plurality relies on the so-called “secondary effects”
test to defend the ordinance. Ante, at 290–296. The pres-
ent use of that rationale, however, ﬁnds no support whatso-
ever in our precedents. Never before have we approved the
use of that doctrine to justify a total ban on protected First
Amendment expression. On the contrary, we have been
quite clear that the doctrine would not support that end.

In Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U. S. 50
(1976), we upheld a Detroit zoning ordinance that placed spe-
cial restrictions on the location of motion picture theaters
that exhibited “adult” movies. The “secondary effects” of
the adult theaters on the neighborhoods where they were
located—lower property values and increases in crime (espe-
cially prostitution) to name a few—justiﬁed the burden im-

2 Although nude dancing might be described as one protected “means”
of conveying an erotic message, it does not follow that a protected message
has not been totally banned simply because there are other, similar ways
to convey erotic messages. See ante, at 292–293. A State’s prohibition
of a particular book, for example, does not fail to be a total ban simply
because other books conveying a similar message are available.