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Page Number: 4

Cite as:  582 U. S. ____ (2017) 

1 

Opinion of the Court 

NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
preliminary  print  of  the  United  States  Reports.  Readers  are  requested  to
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
ington,  D. C.  20543,  of  any  typographical  or  other  formal  errors,  in  order
that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press. 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

_________________ 

No. 15–1194 
_________________ 

LESTER GERARD PACKINGHAM, PETITIONER v.
 
NORTH CAROLINA
 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF 

NORTH CAROLINA
 

[June 19, 2017] 

JUSTICE KENNEDY delivered the opinion of the Court. 
In  2008,  North  Carolina  enacted  a  statute  making  it  a
felony  for  a  registered  sex  offender  to  gain  access  to  a
number  of  websites,  including  commonplace  social  media
websites  like  Facebook  and  Twitter.  The  question  pre-
sented is whether that law is permissible under the First 
Amendment’s  Free  Speech  Clause,  applicable  to  the 
States  under  the  Due  Process  Clause  of  the  Fourteenth 
Amendment. 

I 

A 

North  Carolina  law  makes  it  a  felony  for  a  registered
sex  offender  “to  access  a  commercial  social  networking 
Web  site  where  the  sex  offender  knows  that  the  site  per-
mits  minor  children  to  become  members  or  to  create  or 
maintain  personal  Web  pages.”    N. C.  Gen.  Stat.  Ann. 
§§14–202.5(a),  (e)  (2015).    A  “commercial  social  network-
ing Web site” is defined as a website that meets four crite-
ria.  First,  it  “[i]s  operated  by  a  person  who  derives  reve-
nue  from  membership  fees,  advertising,  or  other  sources 
related  to  the  operation  of  the  Web  site.”    §14–202.5(b).