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Page Number: 37

10 

UNITED STATES v. ARTHREX, INC. 

Opinion of GORSUCH, J. 

patents  might  yet  raise  due  process  concerns.    Id.,  at  ___ 
(slip  op.,  at  17).    But  the  Court  refused  to  consider  those 
concerns in Oil States because, it said, no one had “raised a 
due process challenge.”  Ibid. 

It  was  my view  at  the  time  that  the  separation  of  pow-
ers—and its guarantee that cases involving the revocation 
of  vested  property  rights  must  be  decided  by  Article  III 
courts—is  itself  part  of  the  process  that  is  due  under  our 
Constitution.  See Chapman & McConnell, Due Process as
Separation  of  Powers,  121  Yale  L. J.  1672,  1801–1804
(2012).  Any suggestion that the neutrality and independ-
ence the framers guaranteed for courts could be replicated 
within  the  Executive  Branch  was  never  more  than  wishful 
thinking.  The Court’s decision in Oil States allowing exec-
utive  officials  to  assume  an  historic  judicial  function  was
always destined to invite familiar due process problems—
like  decisions  “favor[ing]  those  with  political  clout,  the 
powerful  and  the  popular.”    Thryv,  Inc.  v.  Click-To-Call 
Technologies,  LP,  590  U. S.  ___,  ___  (2020)  (GORSUCH,  J., 
dissenting) (slip op., at 20).  After all, “[p]owerful interests 
are capable of amassing armies of lobbyists and lawyers to 
influence  (and  even  capture)  politically  accountable  bu-
reaucracies.”  Oil States, 584 U. S., at ___ (same) (slip op., 
at 3).

Already  in  the  AIA’s  short  tenure  these  problems  have
started coming home to roost—even with supposedly “inde-
pendent” APJs.  The briefs before us highlight example af-
ter example.  I leave the interested reader to explore others. 
See, e.g., Brief for TiVo Corporation as Amicus Curiae 6–13; 
Brief  for  39  Aggrieved  Inventors  as  Amici  Curiae  14–23; 
Brief for Joshua J. Malone as Amicus Curiae 9–11.  Here 
just  consider  the  tale  of  a  patent  attorney  at  one  of  the 
world’s largest technology companies who left the company
to become an APJ.  See Brief for US Inventor Inc. as Amicus 
Curiae 12.  This private advocate-turned-APJ presided over 
dozens  of  IPRs  brought  by  his  former  company.    Ibid.  In