Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/23pdf/22-1008_1b82.pdf
Page Number: 54.0

8 

CORNER POST, INC. v. BOARD OF GOVERNORS, FRS 

JACKSON, J., dissenting 

B 

A  proper  understanding  of  the  word  “accrues”  makes 
clear that this term is far more flexible and context depend-
ent than the majority appreciates.  Crucially, the Court has
said  this  very  thing  before—more  than  once,  in  fact.  We 
have long understood that it is simply not “possible to as-
sign  the  word  ‘accrued’  any  definite  technical  meaning
which by itself would enable us to say whether the statutory 
period begins to run at one time or the other.”  Reading Co. 
v. Koons, 271 U. S. 58, 61–62 (1926); see also Crown Coat, 
386 U. S., at 517 (recognizing “the hazards inherent in at-
tempting to define for all purposes when a ‘cause of action’ 
first ‘accrues’ ”).

But, for some reason, that does not stop the majority from
trying  here.    Its  opinion  repeatedly  asserts  that  the  ordi-
nary meaning of accrual is that claims accrue only when a 
plaintiff can sue.  See ante, at 6–10.3  But even the majority
acknowledges that its preferred definition of accrual is not 
universal; it is, at most, “the ‘standard rule’ ” that “can be 
displaced.”  Ante, at 8 (quoting Green v. Brennan, 578 U. S. 
547, 554 (2016); emphasis added).

Far  from  imposing  a  one-size-fits-all  definition  of  the 
word “accrue,” this Court has traditionally taken a claim-
specific  view:  “[A]  right  accrues  when  it  comes  into  exist-
ence. ”  United States v. Lindsay, 346 U. S. 568, 569 (1954). 
For  example,  in  McMahon  v.  United  States,  342  U. S.  25 
(1951),  we  held  that,  under  the  Suits  in  Admiralty  Act,  a 
claim accrued when a seaman was injured, even though he
could not yet sue at that time.  See id., at 27–28.  In Crown 

—————— 

3 The majority insists on a single definition of “accrued,” but it cannot
keep  its  story  straight  as  to  what  that  definition  is.    Its  opinion  offers 
multiple formulations, stating that a claim accrues “when it comes into 
existence,” “when the plaintiff has a complete and present cause of ac-
tion,”  “when  a  suit  may  be  maintained  thereon,”  and,  also,  “after  the
plaintiff suffers the injury.” Ante, at 7–8 (internal quotation marks omit-
ted).  These distinctions can make a difference.