Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/17pdf/16-1466_2b3j.pdf
Page Number: 44

Cite as:  585 U. S. ____ (2018) 

39 

Opinion of the Court 

mane’ ”  to  collective  bargaining,  (2)  be  “justified”  by  the 
government’s  labor-peace  and  free-rider  interests,  and  (3) 
not  add  “significantly”  to  the  burden  on  free  speech,  500
U. S., at 519, but the Court splintered over the application 
of  this  test,  see  id.,  at  519–522  (plurality  opinion);  id.,  at 
533–534  (Marshall,  J.,  concurring  in  part  and  dissenting 
in part).  That division was not surprising.  As the Lehnert 
dissenters aptly  observed,  each  part  of  the majority’s  test
“involves a substantial judgment call,” id., at 551 (opinion
of Scalia, J.), rendering the test “altogether malleable” and 
“no[t]  principled,”  id.,  at  563  (KENNEDY,  J.,  concurring  in
judgment in part and dissenting in part).

Justice  Scalia  presciently  warned  that  Lehnert’s  amor­
phous  standard  would  invite  “perpetua[l]  give-it-a-try 
litigation,”  id.,  at  551,  and  the  Court’s  experience  with
union lobbying expenses illustrates the point.  The Lehnert 
plurality held that money spent on lobbying for increased 
education  funding  was  not  chargeable.    Id.,  at  519–522. 
But  Justice  Marshall—applying  the  same  three-prong
test—reached  precisely  the  opposite  conclusion. 
Id.,  at 
533–542.  And  Lehnert  failed  to  settle  the  matter;  States 
and unions have continued to “give it a try” ever since. 

In Knox, for example, we confronted a union’s claim that 
the  costs  of  lobbying  the  legislature  and  the  electorate 
about  a  ballot  measure  were  chargeable  expenses  under 
Lehnert.  See  Brief  for  Respondent  in  Knox  v.  Service 
Employees, O. T. 2011, No. 10–1121, pp. 48–53.  The Court 
rejected this claim out of hand, 567 U. S., at 320–321, but 
the dissent refused to do so, id., at 336 (opinion of BREYER, 
J.).  And in the present case, nonmembers are required to 
pay 
for 
“[s]ervices” that “may ultimately inure to the benefit of the 
members  of  the  local  bargaining  unit.”    App.  to  Pet.  for 
Cert.  31a–32a.  That  formulation  is  broad  enough  to  en­
compass just about anything that the union might choose 
to do. 

“[l]obbying”  expenses  and 

for  unspecified