Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/13pdf/12-536_e1pf.pdf
Page Number: 66

Cite as:  572 U. S. ____ (2014) 

15 

BREYER, J., dissenting 

gifts  of  this  size,  each  party  could  create  a  “Joint  Party
Committee,” comprising all of its national and state party 
committees.  The titular heads could be the Speaker of the
House  of  Representatives  and  the  Minority  Leader  of  the
House.  A  contributor  could  then  write  a  single  check  to 
the Joint Party Committee—and its staff would divide the
funds so that each constituent unit receives no more than 
it could obtain from the contributor directly ($64,800 for a 
national  committee  over  two  years,  $20,000  for  a  state
committee  over  the  same).  Before  today’s  decision,  the 
total size of Rich Donor’s check to the Joint Party Commit­
tee  was  capped  at  $74,600—the  aggregate  limit  for  dona­
tions  to  political  parties  over  a  2-year  election  cycle.    See 
§441a(a)(3)(B);  78  Fed.  Reg.  8532.    After  today’s  decision, 
Rich  Donor  can  write  a  single  check  to  the  Joint  Party
Committee in an amount of about $1.2 million. 

Will political parties seek these large checks?  Why not?
The recipient national and state committees can spend the
money to buy generic party advertisements, say television 
commercials  or  bumper  stickers  saying  “Support  Republi­
cans,”  “Support  Democrats,”  or  the  like.    They  also  can 
transfer  the  money  to  party  committees  in  battleground
States  to  increase  the  chances  of  winning  hotly  contested 
seats.  See  §441a(a)(4)  (permitting  national  or  state  po- 
litical  committees  to  make  unlimited  “transfers”  to  other 
committees “of the same political party”). 

Will  party  officials  and  candidates  solicit  these  large
contributions from wealthy donors?  Absolutely.  Such con- 
tributions  will  help  increase  the  party’s  power,  as  well 
as the candidate’s standing among his colleagues.

Will elected officials be particularly grateful to the large
donor,  feeling  obliged  to  provide  him  special  access  and 
influence,  and  perhaps  even  a  quid  pro  quo  legislative
favor?   That  is  what  we  have  previously  believed.  See 
McConnell, 540 U. S., at 182 (“Large soft-money donations 
at  a  candidate’s  or  officeholder’s  behest  give  rise  to  all  of