Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/524bv.pdf
Page Number: 72.0

524US1

Unit: $U72

[09-06-00 17:28:15] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 524 U. S. 11 (1998)

27

Opinion of the Court

of a candidate or the major purpose of which is the nomi-
nation or election of a candidate.’ ”

The FEC here interpreted this language as narrowing the
scope of the statutory term “political committee,” wherever
applied. And, as we have said, the FEC’s General Coun-
sel found that AIPAC fell outside that deﬁnition because
the nomination or election of a candidate was not AIPAC’s
“major purpose.” App. 146.

The en banc Court of Appeals disagreed with the FEC.
It read this Court’s narrowing construction of the term “po-
litical committee” as turning on the First Amendment prob-
lems presented by regulation of “independent expenditures”
(i. e., “an expenditure by a person expressly advocating the
election or defeat of a clearly identiﬁed candidate which is
made without cooperation or consultation with any candi-
date,” § 431(17)).
101 F. 3d, at 741. The Court of Appeals
concluded that the language in this Court’s prior decisions
narrowing the deﬁnition of “political committee” did not
apply where the special First Amendment “independent
expenditure” problem did not exist.

Id., at 742–743.

The Solicitor General argues that this Court’s narrowing
deﬁnition of “political committee” applies not simply in the
context of independent expenditures, but across the board.
We cannot squarely address that matter, however, because
of the unusual and complex circumstances in which this case
arises. As we previously mentioned, supra, at 16–17, the
FEC considered a related question, namely, whether AIPAC
was exempt from § 441b’s prohibition of corporate campaign
expenditures, on the grounds that the so-called “expendi-
tures” involved only AIPAC’s communications with its mem-
bers. The FEC held that the statute’s exception to the “ex-
penditure” deﬁnition for communications by a “membership
organization” did not apply because many of the persons who
belonged to AIPAC were not “members” as deﬁned by FEC
regulation. The FEC acknowledged, however, that this was
a “close question.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 98a; see also App.