Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/22pdf/22-138_43j7.pdf
Page Number: 47.0

Cite as:  600 U. S. ____ (2023) 

5 

BARRETT, J., dissenting 

scene if the “ ‘average person, applying contemporary com-
munity standards,’ ” would conclude that “the work, taken
as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest.”  Miller v. Cal-
ifornia, 413 U. S. 15, 24 (1973).  The jury must also make
an objective judgment about whether the speech “depicts or 
describes” sexual conduct “in a patently offensive way,” and 
whether it “lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or sci-
entific value.”  Ibid.  The speaker’s “ ‘belief as to the obscen-
ity or non-obscenity of the material is irrelevant.’ ”  Hamling 
v. United States, 418 U. S. 87, 120–121 (1974).  So long as 
the defendant has “knowledge of the contents of the mate-
rials,” her speech may be constitutionally regulated.  Id., at 
123.  An objective, reasonable-person standard applies.

In an effort to bolster its position, the Court floats a dif-
ferent standard for obscenity laws, asserting that “the First
Amendment  demands  proof  of  a  defendant’s  mindset  to 
make out an obscenity case.”  Ante, at 8.  By “mindset,” the
Court  apparently  means  that  the  defendant  must  have 
some awareness that an average person would consider the
materials  obscene.  But  the  Court  draws  this  conclusion 
from  cases  rejecting  a  strict  liability  standard—for  exam-
ple, we have held that the proprietor of a bookstore cannot 
be  liable  for  possessing  an  obscene  book  unless  he  knew 
what was in it.  Smith v. California, 361 U. S. 147, 149, 155 
(1959); Mishkin v. New York, 383 U. S. 502, 510–512 (1966); 
see  also  Ginsberg  v.  New  York,  390  U. S.  629,  643–644 
(1968).2  Knowing what the material depicts is not the same 
as knowing how the average person would react to it—just 

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2 The Court also cites Elonis v. United States, ante, at 8, 9, n. 4, which 
Counterman argues puts a “gloss” on obscenity doctrine, Tr. of Oral Arg. 
6–7.  While Elonis briefly discusses the necessary mens rea for a convic-
tion under a federal obscenity statute, it does so only in dicta.  575 U. S. 
723, 739–740 (2015).  Elonis does not alter the doctrinal framework for 
assessing the constitutionality of obscenity laws: That case involves true 
threats, not obscenity, and it interprets a federal statute, not the Consti-
tution.