Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/23pdf/23-235_n7ip.pdf
Page Number: 32

Cite as:  602 U. S. ____ (2024) 

3 

THOMAS, J., concurring 

333, 343 (1977).  If an association can satisfy these require-
ments,  we  allow  the  association  to  pursue  its  members’ 
claims,  without  joining  those  members  as  parties  to  the
suit. 

Associational standing, however, is simply another form 
of  third-party  standing.    And,  the  Court  has  never  ex-
plained or justified either doctrine’s expansion of Article III
standing.  In  an  appropriate  case,  we  should  explain  just 
how the Constitution permits associational standing. 

I 

Associational standing raises constitutional concerns by 
relaxing  both  the  injury  and  redressability  requirements
for Article III standing.  It also upsets other legal doctrines.
First, associational standing conflicts with Article III by 
permitting an association to assert its members’ injuries in-
stead of its own.  The “judicial power” conferred by Article
III “is limited to cases and controversies of the sort tradi-
tionally amenable to, and resolved by, the judicial process.” 
See June Medical, 591 U. S., at 364 (opinion of THOMAS, J.)
(internal  quotation  marks  omitted).  “[T]o  ascertain  the
scope  of  Article  III’s  case-or-controversy  requirement,” 
courts  therefore  “refer  directly  to  the  traditional,  funda-
mental limitations upon the powers of common-law courts.” 
Ibid. (internal quotation marks omitted).  Traditionally, a
plaintiff had to show a violation of his own rights to have 
his  claim  considered  by  a  common-law  court.    See  id.,  at 
364–366.  So, “private parties could not bring suit to vindi-
cate the constitutional [or other legal] rights of individuals 
who are not before the Court.”  Id., at 359.  “After all, ‘[t]he
province of the court is, solely, to decide on the rights of in-
dividuals,’ ”  not  to  answer  legal  debates  in  the  abstract. 
Acheson  Hotels,  LLC  v.  Laufer,  601  U. S.  1,  10  (2023) 
(THOMAS, J., concurring in judgment) (quoting Marbury v. 
Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 170 (1803)); see also ante, at 5–7. 

Associational standing seems to run roughshod over this