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Page Number: 132

10 

HAALAND v. BRACKEEN 

ALITO, J., dissenting 

They  override  States’  authority  to  determine—and  imple-
ment through their courts—the child custody and welfare 
policies they deem most appropriate for their citizens.  And 
in  doing  so,  the  mandates  harm  vulnerable  children  and 
their parents.  In my view, the Constitution cannot counte-
nance this result.  The guarantee of dual sovereignty em-
bodied in the constitutional structure “is not so ephemeral 
as  to  dissipate”  simply  because  Congress  invoked  a  so-
called plenary power.  Seminole Tribe of Fla., 517 U. S., at 
72.  The challenged ICWA provisions effectively “nullify” a 
State’s authority to conduct state child custody proceedings
in accordance with its own preferred family relations poli-
cies, a prerogative that States have exercised for centuries. 
Dick,  208  U. S.,  at  353.    Congress’s  Indian  affairs  power,
broad as it is, does not extend that far.2 

The  indicators  we  previously  identified  also  signal  that 
ICWA exceeds Congress’s constitutional bounds.  See Lara, 
541 U. S., at 203–205.  First, the law has “an unusual leg-
islative objective.”  Id., at 203.  ICWA’s attempt to control 
local judicial proceedings in a core field of state concern de-
parts significantly from other Indian affairs legislation that 
we  have  sanctioned—laws  that  typically  regulated  actual
commerce,  related  to  tribal  lands  and  governance,  or  ful-
filled  treaty  obligations.    See  ante,  at  33–38  (THOMAS,  J., 
dissenting).  Second, the law brings about “radical changes
in tribal status,” effectively granting tribes veto power over 

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2 Because ICWA’s provisions comprise a comprehensive child custody 
scheme relevant only to state court proceedings, I generally do not be-
lieve they can be severed without engaging in “quintessentially legisla-
tive  work.”  Ayotte  v.  Planned  Parenthood  of  Northern  New  Eng.,  546 
U. S. 320, 329 (2006).  An exception is §1911(a), which gives Indian tribes 
exclusive  jurisdiction  over  child  custody  proceedings  involving  Indian
children living within a reservation; that section is not implicated by my 
analysis.  See also Fisher v. District Court of Sixteenth Judicial Dist. of 
Mont., 424 U. S. 382, 383, 388–389 (1976) (per curiam) (recognizing ex-
clusive tribal court jurisdiction over adoption proceedings, where all par-
ties are members of a tribe living on a reservation).