Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/22pdf/22-138_43j7.pdf
Page Number: 49

Cite as:  600 U. S. ____ (2023) 

7 

BARRETT, J., dissenting 

with  high  social  value  (because  of  its  proximity  to  public
discourse) and low potential for injury (because public fig-
ures can engage in counterspeech). 

Sullivan’s  rationale  does  not  justify  a  heightened  mens 
rea for true threats.  Because true threats are not typically 
proximate  to  debate  on  matters  of  public  concern,  the 
Court’s newly erected buffer zone does not serve the end of 
protecting heated political commentary.  Nor can public fig-
ures  use  counterspeech  in  the  public  square  to  protect 
themselves from serious threats of physical violence.  And 
perversely,  private  individuals  now  have  less  protection
from true threats than from defamation—even though they
presumably value their lives more than their reputations.
See Gertz, 418 U. S., at 347–350.  The Court has therefore 
extended Sullivan in a way that makes no sense on Sulli-
van’s own terms. 

I  will  give  the  Court  this  much:  Speakers  must  specifi-
cally intend to incite violence before they lose First Amend-
ment protection.  Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U. S. 444, 447 
(1969)  (per curiam)  (defining  incitement  as  “advocacy  . . . 
directed  to  inciting  or  producing  imminent  lawless  action 
and likely to incite or produce such action”); see also Hess 
v.  Indiana,  414  U. S.  105,  108–109  (1973)  (per  curiam).
Once more, however, our precedent itself explains the dif-
ference.  Incitement, as a form of “advocacy,” often arises in
the political arena.  See Brandenburg, 395 U. S., at 447 (Ku 
Klux  Klan  rally  held  to  plan  a  “ ‘marc[h]  on  Congress’ ”); 
Hess, 414 U. S., at 106 (antiwar demonstration); Abrams v. 
United States, 250 U. S. 616, 620 (1919) (pamphlets about
the  President’s  “ ‘shameful,  cowardly  silence about  the  in-
tervention in Russia’ ”).  A specific intent requirement helps 
draw the line between incitement and “political rhetoric ly-
ing  at  the  core  of  the  First  Amendment.”  NAACP  v. 
Claiborne  Hardware  Co.,  458  U. S.  886,  926–927  (1982).
The Court does not contend that targeted threats and polit-
ical commentary share a similarly close relationship.