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Page Number: 21

4 

COUNTERMAN v. COLORADO 

SOTOMAYOR, J., concurring
Opinion of SOTOMAYOR, J. 

(Colo.  App.  2021).1    This  kind  of  prosecution  raises  fewer 
First Amendment concerns for a variety of reasons.  Stalk-
ing  can  be  carried  out  through  speech  but  need  not  be,
which requires less First Amendment scrutiny when speech
is swept in.  See, e.g., Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and 
Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U. S. 47, 62 (2006).  The con-
tent of the repeated communications can sometimes be ir-
relevant, such as persistently calling someone and hanging 
up, or a stream of “utterly prosaic” communications.  Ante, 
at 1.  Repeatedly forcing intrusive communications directly
into the personal life of “an unwilling recipient” also enjoys 
less protection.  Rowan v. Post Office Dept., 397 U. S. 728, 
738 (1970).  Finally, while there is considerable risk with a
single  intemperate  utterance  that  a  speaker  will  “acci-
dentally or erroneously incur liability,” ante, at 7 (internal 
quotation marks  and  alterations omitted),  that  risk  is  far
reduced with a course of repeated unwanted contact.  Take, 
for  example,  petitioner  continuously  contacting  C.  W.  de-
spite her blocking him.

Given this, prosecuting threatening statements made as
part  of  a  course  of  stalking  does  not  squarely  present  the
hardest questions about the mens rea required to prosecute 
isolated  utterances  based  solely  on  their  content.2    True-
threats  doctrine  came up  below  only  because  of  the  lower
courts’ doubtful assumption that petitioner could be prose-
cuted only if his actions fell under the true-threats excep-
tion.  I  do  not  think  that  is  accurate,  given  the  lessened 

—————— 

1 The  statute  of  conviction  applies  to  someone  who  “[r]epeatedly  fol-
lows, approaches, contacts, places under surveillance, or makes any form 
of communication with another person . . . in a manner that would cause 
a reasonable person to suffer serious emotional distress and does cause 
that  person  . . .  serious  emotional  distress.”    Colo.  Rev.  Stat.  §18–3– 
602(1)(c) (2022). 

2 For these reasons, stalking prosecutions that do not rely on the con-
tent  of  communications  would  raise  even  fewer  First  Amendment  con-
cerns.