Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/21pdf/21-463_3ebh.pdf
Page Number: 42.0

Cite as:  595 U. S. ____ (2021) 

7 

SOTOMAYOR, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part 
Opinion of SOTOMAYOR, J. 

for the active intervention of the state courts, supported by 
the full panoply of state power,” the covenants would be un-
enforceable.  Id., at 19.  Here, there is more.  S. B. 8’s for-
midable chilling effect, even before suit, would be nonexist-
ent  if  not  for  the  state-court  officials  who  docket  S.  B.  8 
cases with lopsided  procedures  and  limited  defenses.   Be-
cause these state actors are necessary components of that 
chilling  effect  and  play  a  clear  role  in  the  enforcement  of 
S. B. 8, they are proper defendants.  
  These longstanding precedents establish how, and why, 
the Court should authorize relief against these officials as 
well.  The Court instead hides behind a wooden reading of 
Young,  stitching  out-of-context  quotations  into  a  cover  for 
its  failure  to  act  decisively.    The  Court  relies  on  dicta  in 
Young  stating  that  “the  right  to  enjoin  an  individual  . . . 
does not include the power to restrain a court from acting 
in  any  case  brought  before  it”  and  that  “an  injunction 
against  a  state  court  would  be  a  violation  of  the  whole 
scheme  of  our  Government.”    209  U. S.,  at  163.    Modern 
cases,  however,  have  recognized  that  suit  may  be  proper 
even  against  state-court  judges,  including  to  enjoin  state-
court  proceedings.    See  Mitchum  v.  Foster,  407  U. S.  225, 
243  (1972);  see  also  Pulliam  v.  Allen,  466  U. S.  522,  525 
(1984).    The  Court  responds  that  these  cases  did  not  ex-
pressly address sovereign immunity or involve court clerks.  
Ante, at 8–9.  If language in Young posed an absolute bar to 
injunctive  relief  against  state-court  proceedings  and  offi-
cials, however, these decisions would have been purely ad-
visory.   
  Moreover, the Court has emphasized that “the principles 
undergirding the Ex parte Young doctrine” may “support its 
application” to new circumstances, “novelty notwithstand-
ing.”    Stewart,  563  U. S.,  at  261.    No  party  has  identified 
any prior circumstance in which a State has delegated an 
enforcement  function  to  the  populace,  disclaimed  official 
enforcement authority, and skewed state-court procedures