Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/22pdf/22-138_43j7.pdf
Page Number: 18.0

Cite as:  600 U. S. ____ (2023) 

1 

SOTOMAYOR, J., concurring
Opinion of SOTOMAYOR, J. 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

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No. 22–138 
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BILLY RAYMOND COUNTERMAN, PETITIONER v. 
COLORADO 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS OF 
COLORADO 

[June 27, 2023] 

JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR, with whom JUSTICE GORSUCH joins
as to Parts I, II, III–A, and III–B, concurring in part and 
concurring in the judgment. 

When  the  government  seeks  to  punish  speech  based  on 
its content, the First  Amendment typically imposes strin-
gent  requirements.  This  ensures  that  the  government,
even when pursuing compelling objectives, does not unduly 
burden our Nation’s commitment to free expression.  “From 
1791  to  the  present,  however,  the  First  Amendment  has
permitted restrictions upon the content of speech in a few 
limited areas.”  United States v. Stevens, 559 U. S. 460, 468 
(2010)  (internal  quotation  marks  omitted).    These  catego-
ries must be “well-defined and narrowly limited” in light of 
the serious consequences that flow from carving out speech 
from ordinary First Amendment protections.  Chaplinsky v. 
New Hampshire, 315 U. S. 568, 571 (1942). 

“True threats” are one such category, and there is a tra-
dition  of  criminalizing  threats  stretching  back  centuries.
This  includes  punishing  single  utterances  based  on  the 
message  conveyed.  One  paradigmatic  example  of  this
would be writing and mailing a letter threatening to assas-
sinate  the  President.  Such  laws  are  plainly  important.
There is no longstanding tradition, however, of punishing 
speech  merely  because  it  is  unintentionally  threatening.