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Page Number: 40.0

32 

LOPER BRIGHT ENTERPRISES v. RAIMONDO 

Opinion of the Court 

exercise.8
  Because Chevron in its original, two-step form was so in-
determinate and sweeping, we have instead been forced to
clarify the doctrine again and again.  Our attempts to do so 
have only added to Chevron’s unworkability, transforming
the original two-step into a dizzying breakdance.  See Ad-
ams Fruit  Co., 494 U. S., at 649–650; Mead,  533 U. S., at 
226–227;  King,  576  U. S.,  at  486;  Encino  Motorcars,  579 
U. S., at 220; Epic Systems, 584 U. S., at 519–520; on and 
on.  And the doctrine continues to spawn difficult threshold
questions  that  promise  to  further  complicate  the  inquiry 
should Chevron be retained.  See, e.g., Cargill v. Garland, 
57 F. 4th 447, 465–468 (CA5 2023) (plurality opinion) (May 
the Government waive reliance on Chevron?  Does Chevron 
apply to agency interpretations of statutes imposing crimi-
nal penalties?  Does Chevron displace the rule of lenity?), 
aff ’d, 602 U. S. ___ (2024). 

Four  decades  after  its  inception,  Chevron  has  thus  be-
come an impediment, rather than an aid, to accomplishing 
the basic judicial task of “say[ing] what the law is.”  Mar-
bury,  1  Cranch,  at  177.  And  its  continuing  import  is  far
from clear.  Courts have often declined to engage with the
doctrine,  saying  it  makes  no  difference.  See  n. 7,  supra. 
And  as  noted,  we  have  avoided  deferring  under  Chevron 
since 2016.  That trend is nothing new; for decades, we have 
often declined to invoke Chevron even in those cases where 
it  might  appear  to  be  applicable.    See  W.  Eskridge  &  L.
Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme Court Treat-
ment of Agency Statutory Interpretations From Chevron to 
Hamdan, 96 Geo. L. J. 1083, 1125 (2008).  At this point, all 

—————— 

8 Citing  an  empirical  study,  the  dissent  adds  that  Chevron  “fosters 
agreement  among  judges.”    Post,  at  28.    It  is  hardly  surprising  that  a  
study might find as much; Chevron’s second step is supposed to be hos-
pitable to agency interpretations.  So when judges get there, they tend to 
agree  that  the  agency  wins.    That  proves  nothing  about  the  supposed
ease or predictability of identifying ambiguity in the first place.