Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/529bv.pdf
Page Number: 840

529US3

Unit: $U59

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OCTOBER TERM, 1999

765

Syllabus

VERMONT AGENCY OF NATURAL RESOURCES v.
UNITED STATES ex rel. STEVENS

certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the second circuit

No. 98–1828. Argued November 29, 1999—Decided May 22, 2000

Under the False Claims Act (FCA), a private person (the relator) may
bring a qui tam civil action “in the name of the [Federal] Government,”
31 U. S. C. § 3730(b)(1), against “[a]ny person” who, inter alia, “know-
ingly presents . . . to . . . the . . . Government . . . a false or fraudulent
claim for payment,” § 3729(a). The relator receives a share of any pro-
ceeds from the action. §§ 3730(d)(1)–(2). Respondent Stevens brought
such an action against petitioner state agency, alleging that it had
submitted false claims to the Environmental Protection Agency in con-
nection with federal grant programs the EPA administered. Petitioner
moved to dismiss, arguing that a State (or state agency) is not a “per-
son” subject to FCA liability and that a qui tam action in federal court
against a State is barred by the Eleventh Amendment. The District
Court denied the motion, and petitioner ﬁled an interlocutory appeal.
Respondent United States intervened in the appeal in support of re-
spondent Stevens. The Second Circuit afﬁrmed.

Held: A private individual may not bring suit in federal court on behalf
of the United States against a State (or state agency) under the FCA.
Pp. 771–788.

(a) A private individual has standing to bring suit in federal court
on behalf of the United States under the FCA. Stevens meets the re-
In particular,
quirements necessary to establish Article III standing.
he has demonstrated “injury in fact”—a harm that is both “concrete”
and “actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.” Whitmore
v. Arkansas, 495 U. S. 149, 155. He contends he is suing to remedy
injury in fact suffered by the United States—both the injury to its
sovereignty arising from violation of its laws and the proprietary in-
jury resulting from the alleged fraud. The concrete private interest
that Stevens has in the outcome of his suit, in the form of the bounty
he will receive if the suit is successful, is insufﬁcient to confer stand-
ing, since that interest does not consist of obtaining compensation for,
or preventing, the violation of a legally protected right. An adequate
basis for Stevens’ standing, however, is found in the doctrine that the
assignee of a claim has standing to assert the injury in fact suffered by
the assignor. Because the FCA can reasonably be regarded as effect-