Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/11pdf/10-9646.pdf
Page Number: 35.0

4 

MILLER v. ALABAMA 

BREYER, J., concurring 

Moreover,  regardless  of  our  law  with  respect  to  adults,
there  is  no  basis  for  imposing  a  sentence  of  life  without 
parole upon a juvenile who did not himself kill or intend to
kill.  At  base,  the  theory  of  transferring  a  defendant’s
intent is premised on the idea that one engaged in a dan-
gerous  felony  should  understand  the  risk  that  the  victim
of the felony could be killed, even by a confederate.  See 2 
LaFave,  supra,  §14.5(c).  Yet  the  ability  to  consider  the
full consequences of a course of action and to adjust one’s 
conduct  accordingly  is  precisely  what  we  know  juveniles
lack capacity to do effectively.  Ante, at 8–9. Justice Frank-
furter  cautioned,  “Legal  theories  and  their  phrasing  in
other  cases  readily  lead  to  fallacious  reasoning  if  uncrit-
ically  transferred  to  a  determination  of  a  State’s  duty  to- 
ward  children.”  May  v.  Anderson,  345  U. S.  528,  536 
(1953)  (concurring  opinion).  To  apply  the  doctrine  of
transferred intent here, where the juvenile did not kill, to 
sentence  a  juvenile  to  life  without  parole  would  involve
such “fallacious reasoning.”  Ibid. 

This is, as far as I can tell, precisely the situation pres- 
ent  in  Kuntrell  Jackson’s  case.    Jackson  simply  went 
along with older boys to rob a video store.  On the way, he
became aware that a confederate had a gun.  He initially
stayed outside the store, and went in briefly, saying some-
thing  like  “We  ain’t  playin’ ”  or  “ ‘I  thought  you  all  was 
playin,’ ”  before  an  older  confederate  shot  and  killed  the 
store clerk.  Jackson v. State, 359 Ark. 87, 91, 194 S. W. 3d 
757,  760  (2004).  Crucially,  the  jury  found  him  guilty  of 
first-degree  murder  under  a  statute  that  permitted  them
to  convict  if,  Jackson  “attempted  to  commit  or  committed
an  aggravated  robbery,  and,  in  the  course  of  that  of-
fense,  he,  or  an  accomplice,  caused  [the  clerk’s]  death
under circumstance manifesting extreme indifference to the
value  of  human  life.”  Ibid.  See  Ark.  Code  Ann.  §5–10– 
101(a)(1)  (1997);  ante,  at  15.  Thus,  to  be  found  guilty, 
Jackson did not need to kill the clerk (it is conceded he did