Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/529bv.pdf
Page Number: 366

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Cite as: 529 U. S. 277 (2000)

291

Opinion of O’Connor, J.

391 U. S., at 382.

As Justice Souter noted in Barnes, “on its face, the gov-
ernmental interest in combating prostitution and other crim-
inal activity is not at all inherently related to expression.”
501 U. S., at 585 (opinion concurring in judgment).
In that
sense, this case is similar to O’Brien. O’Brien burned his
draft registration card as a public statement of his antiwar
views, and he was convicted under a statute making it a
crime to knowingly mutilate or destroy such a card. This
Court rejected his claim that the statute violated his First
Amendment rights, reasoning that the law punished him for
the “noncommunicative impact of his conduct, and for noth-
ing else.”
In other words, the Govern-
ment regulation prohibiting the destruction of draft cards
was aimed at maintaining the integrity of the Selective Serv-
ice System and not at suppressing the message of draft re-
sistance that O’Brien sought to convey by burning his draft
card. So too here, the ordinance prohibiting public nudity
is aimed at combating crime and other negative secondary
effects caused by the presence of adult entertainment es-
tablishments like Kandyland and not at suppressing the
erotic message conveyed by this type of nude dancing. Put
another way, the ordinance does not attempt to regulate the
primary effects of the expression, i. e., the effect on the audi-
ence of watching nude erotic dancing, but rather the second-
ary effects, such as the impacts on public health, safety, and
welfare, which we have previously recognized are “caused
by the presence of even one such” establishment. Renton
v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U. S. 41, 47–48, 50 (1986); see
also Boos v. Barry, 485 U. S. 312, 321 (1988).

Although the Pennsylvania Supreme Court acknowledged
that one goal of the ordinance was to combat the negative
secondary effects associated with nude dancing establish-
ments, the court concluded that the ordinance was never-
theless content based, relying on Justice White’s position in
dissent in Barnes for the proposition that a ban of this type
necessarily has the purpose of suppressing the erotic mes-