Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/11pdf/10-9646.pdf
Page Number: 51.0

Cite as:  567 U. S. ____ (2012) 

5 

THOMAS, J., dissenting 

of  Stewart,  Powell,  and  Stevens,  JJ.).    The  Court  invali-
dated  those  statutes  in  Woodson,  Roberts,  and  Sumner. 
The  Court  reasoned  that  mandatory  capital  sentencing 
schemes  were  problematic,  because  they  failed  “to  allow 
the particularized consideration” of “relevant facets of the
character  and  record  of  the  individual  offender  or  the 
circumstances of the particular offense.”  Woodson, supra, 
at 303–304 (plurality opinion).3 

In  my  view,  Woodson  and  its  progeny  were  wrongly 
decided.  As  discussed  above,  the  Cruel  and  Unusual 
Punishments  Clause,  as  originally  understood,  prohibits
“torturous  methods  of  punishment.”  See  Graham,  560 
U. S., at ___ (THOMAS, J., dissenting) (slip op., at 3) (inter-
nal  quotation  marks  omitted).  It  is  not  concerned  with 
whether  a  particular  lawful  method  of  punishment—
whether  capital  or  noncapital—is  imposed  pursuant  to  a 
mandatory or discretionary sentencing regime.  See Gard-
ner  v.  Florida,  430  U. S.  349,  371  (1977)  (Rehnquist,  J., 
dissenting)  (“The  prohibition  of  the  Eighth  Amendment 
relates to the character of the punishment, and not to the
process  by  which  it  is  imposed”).  In  fact,  “[i]n  the  early
days of the Republic,” each crime generally had a defined
punishment  “prescribed  with  specificity  by  the  legisla-
ture.”  United  States  v.  Grayson,  438  U. S.  41,  45  (1978).
Capital  sentences,  to  which  the  Court  analogizes,  were 

—————— 

3 The  Court  later  extended  Woodson,  requiring  that  capital  defend-
ants be permitted to present, and sentencers in capital cases be permit-
ted  to  consider,  any  relevant  mitigating  evidence,  including  the  age  of
the defendant.  See, e.g., Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U. S. 586, 597–608 (1978) 
(plurality  opinion);  Eddings  v.  Oklahoma,  455  U. S.  104,  110–112 
(1982);  Skipper  v.  South  Carolina,  476  U. S.  1,  4–5  (1986);  Johnson  v. 
Texas,  509  U. S.  350,  361–368  (1993).    Whatever  the  validity  of  the 
requirement  that  sentencers  be  permitted  to  consider  all  mitigating 
evidence  when  deciding  whether  to  impose  a  nonmandatory  capital 
sentence, the Court certainly was wrong to prohibit mandatory capital 
sentences.  See  Graham  v.  Collins,  506  U. S.  461,  488–500  (1993) 
(THOMAS, J., concurring).