Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/21pdf/21-459_6k47.pdf
Page Number: 1.0

Cite as:  595 U. S. ____ (2022) 

1 

Statement of THOMAS, J. 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

JANE DOE v. FACEBOOK, INC. 

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE 
SUPREME COURT OF TEXAS 

No. 21–459.  Decided March 7, 2022 

The petition for a writ of certiorari is denied. 

  Statement  of  JUSTICE  THOMAS  respecting  the  denial  of 
certiorari. 

In 2012, an adult, male sexual predator used Facebook to 
lure 15-year-old Jane Doe to a meeting, shortly after which
she  was  repeatedly  raped,  beaten,  and  trafficked  for  sex.
Doe eventually escaped and sued Facebook in Texas state 
court, alleging that Facebook had violated Texas’ anti-sex-
trafficking statute and committed various common-law of-
fenses.  Facebook petitioned the Texas Supreme Court for a 
writ  of  mandamus  dismissing  Doe’s  suit.  The  court  held 
that a provision of the Communications Decency Act known
as §230 bars Doe’s common-law claims, but not her statu-
tory sex-trafficking claim. 

Section 230(c)(1) states that “[n]o provider or user of an
interactive  computer  service  shall  be  treated  as  the  pub-
lisher  or  speaker  of  any  information  provided  by  another 
information content provider.”  47 U. S. C. §230(c)(1).  The 
Texas  Supreme  Court  emphasized  that  courts  have  uni-
formly  treated  internet  platforms  as  “publisher[s]”  under
§230(c)(1), and thus immune, whenever a plaintiff ’s claim 
“ ‘stem[s]  from  [the  platform’s]  publication  of  information
created by third parties.’ ”  In re Facebook, Inc., 625 S. W. 
3d  80,  90  (Tex.  2021)  (quoting  Doe  v.  MySpace,  Inc.,  528 
F. 3d 413, 418 (CA5 2008)).  As relevant here, this expan-
sive understanding of publisher immunity requires dismis-
sal of claims against internet companies for failing to warn
consumers of product defects or failing to take reasonable