Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/19pdf/18-1195_g314.pdf
Page Number: 69

8 

ESPINOZA v. MONTANA DEPT. OF REVENUE 

BREYER, J., dissenting 

to  prevent  them  from  using  taxpayer-supported  scholar-
ships  to  attend  the  schools  of  their  choosing.    In  other 
words,  the  problem,  as  in  Locke,  is  what  petitioners
“ ‘propos[e] to do—use the funds to’ ” obtain a religious edu-
cation.  Ante, 13 (quoting Trinity Lutheran, 582 U. S., at ___ 
(slip op., at 12)).

Even  if  the  schools’  status  were  relevant,  I  do  not  see 
what  bearing  the  majority’s  distinction  could  have  here. 
There is no dispute that religious schools seek generally to 
inspire  religious  faith  and  values  in  their  students.    How 
else could petitioners claim that barring them from using 
state aid to attend these schools violates their free exercise 
rights?  Thus, the question in this case—unlike in Trinity 
Lutheran—boils  down  to  what  the  schools  would  do  with 
state support.  And the upshot is that here, as in Locke, we 
confront a State’s decision not to fund the inculcation of re-
ligious truths.

The majority next contends that there is no “ ‘historic and
substantial’  tradition  against  aiding”  religious  schools
“comparable to the tradition against state-supported clergy
invoked by Locke.”  Ante, at 16.  But the majority ignores 
the reasons for the founding era bans that we relied upon
in Locke. 

“Perhaps the most famous example,” Locke, 540 U. S., at 
722, n. 6, is the 1786 defeat of a Virginia bill (often called 
the Assessment Bill) that would have levied a tax in sup-
port of “learned teachers” of “the Christian Religion.”  A Bill 
Establishing a Provision for Teachers of the Christian Reli-
gion, reprinted in Everson, 330 U. S., at 72 (supplemental
appendix to dissent of Rutledge, J.).  In his Memorial and 
Remonstrance  against  that  proposal,  James  Madison  ar-
gued  that  compelling  state  sponsorship  of  religion  in  this
way was “a signal of persecution” that “degrades from the 
equal rank of citizens all those whose opinions in religion
do not bend to those of the Legislative authority.”  Id., at 
68–69.  Even among those who might benefit from such a