Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/529bv.pdf
Page Number: 672

529US2

Unit: $U53

[09-26-01 10:37:28] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 529 U. S. 576 (2000)

597

Breyer, J., dissenting

deference is inapplicable—e. g., where one has doubt that
Congress actually intended to delegate interpretive author-
ity to the agency (an “ambiguity” that Chevron does not
presumptively leave to agency resolution)—I believe that
Skidmore nonetheless retains legal vitality.
If statutes are
to serve the human purposes that called them into being,
courts will have to continue to pay particular attention in
appropriate cases to the experience-based views of expert
agencies.

I agree with Justice Stevens that, when “thoroughly
considered and consistently observed,” an agency’s views,
particularly in a rather technical case such as this one,
“meri[t] our respect.” Ante, at 595 (dissenting opinion).
And, of course, I also agree with Justice Stevens that,
for the reasons he sets forth, ante, at 592–594, the Labor
Department’s position in this matter is eminently reasonable,
hence persuasive, whether one views that decision through
Chevron’s lens, through Skidmore’s, or through both.