Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/558bv.pdf
Page Number: 282.0

Cite as: 558 U. S. 120 (2010) 

121 

Per Curiam 

no warrant for entirely excluding the DNA evidence or Romero’s testi­
mony  from  that  court’s  consideration.  The  report  did  not  contest  that 
the  DNA  evidence  matched  respondent,  and  a  rational  jury  could  con­
sider that evidence to be powerful evidence of guilt.  Furthermore, the 
Ninth  Circuit’s  discussion  of  the  non-DNA  evidence  departed  from  the 
deferential  review  demanded  by  Jackson  and  28  U. S. C.  § 2254(d)(1), 
which permits a federal habeas court to set aside a state-court decision 
only if it is “an unreasonable application of . . . clearly established Fed­
eral  law.”  While  the  Ninth  Circuit  acknowledged  that  it  must  review 
the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, its recitation 
of inconsistencies in the testimony shows it failed to do that.  Although 
the  court’s  Jackson  analysis  relied  substantially  upon  the  State’s  post-
conviction concession that there was insufﬁcient evidence to convict re­
spondent absent the DNA ﬁndings, the concession posited a situation in 
which  there  was  no  DNA  evidence  at  all,  not  one  in  which  some  testi­
mony  regarding  such  evidence  was  called  into  question.  Pp.  130–134. 
2.  Respondent’s claim that the admission of Romero’s inaccurate DNA 
testimony denied him a fair trial under Manson v.  Brathwaite, 432 U. S. 
98, 114, is forfeited because he makes it for the ﬁrst time in his brief on 
the merits in this Court.  Pp. 134–136. 

525 F. 3d 787, reversed and remanded. 

Per Curiam. 

In  Jackson  v.  Virginia,  443  U. S.  307  (1979),  we  held  that 
a state prisoner is entitled to habeas corpus relief if a federal 
judge  ﬁnds  that  “upon  the  record  evidence  adduced  at  the 
trial  no  rational  trier  of  fact  could  have  found  proof  of  guilt 
beyond  a  reasonable  doubt.”  Id.,  at  324.  A  Nevada  jury 
convicted  respondent  of  rape;  the  evidence  presented  in­
cluded  DNA  evidence  matching  respondent’s  DNA  proﬁle. 
Nevertheless, relying upon a report prepared by a DNA ex­
pert over 11 years after the trial, the Federal District Court 
applied  the  Jackson  standard  and  granted  the  writ.  A  di­
vided  Court  of  Appeals  afﬁrmed.  Brown  v.  Farwell,  525 
F.  3d  787  (CA9  2008).  We  granted  certiorari  to  consider 
whether those courts misapplied Jackson.  Because the trial 
record includes both the DNA evidence and other convincing 
evidence of guilt, we conclude that they clearly did.