Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/19pdf/18-5924_n6io.pdf
Page Number: 40

6 

RAMOS v. LOUISIANA 

KAVANAUGH, J., concurring in part 

remains accurate now: In “cases involving the Federal Con-
stitution,  where  correction  through  legislative  action  is
practically  impossible,  this  Court  has  often  overruled
its  earlier  decisions.”    285  U. S.,  at  406–407  (dissenting 
opinion).

That said, in constitutional as in statutory cases, to “over-
rule an important precedent is serious business.”  Jackson, 
30  A. B. A.  J.,  at  334.  In  constitutional  as  in  statutory
cases, adherence to precedent is the norm.  To overrule a 
constitutional decision, the Court’s precedents on precedent 
still  require  a  “special  justification,”  Allen  v.  Cooper,  589 
U. S.  ___,  ___  (2020)  (slip  op.,  at  9)  (internal  quotation 
marks  omitted);  Arizona  v.  Rumsey,  467  U. S.  203,  212 
(1984), or otherwise stated, “strong grounds,”  Janus, 585 
U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 34).

In particular, to overrule a constitutional precedent, the
Court  requires  something  “over  and  above  the  belief  that 
the precedent was wrongly decided.”  Allen, 589 U. S., at ___ 
(slip op., at 9) (internal quotation marks omitted).  As Jus-
tice  Scalia  put  it,  the  doctrine  of  stare  decisis  always  re-
quires  “reasons  that  go  beyond  mere  demonstration  that
the overruled opinion was wrong,” for “otherwise the doc-
trine  would  be  no  doctrine  at  all.”    Hubbard  v.  United 
States, 514 U. S. 695, 716 (1995) (opinion concurring in part 
and  concurring  in  judgment).    To  overrule,  the  Court  de-
mands a special justification or strong grounds.

But the “special justification” or “strong grounds” formu-
lation elides a key question: What constitutes a special jus-
tification or strong grounds?3  In other words, in deciding
whether  to  overrule  an  erroneous  constitutional  decision, 

—————— 

3 The Court first used the term “special justification” in the stare deci-
sis context in 1984, without explaining what the term might entail.  See 
Arizona  v.  Rumsey,  467  U. S.  203,  212.    In  employing  that  term,  the 
Court did not suggest that it was imposing a new stare decisis require-
ment as opposed to merely describing the Court’s historical practice with 
respect to stare decisis.