Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/20pdf/20-927_i42k.pdf
Page Number: 4.0

4 

UNITED STATES v. HIGGS 

BREYER, J., dissenting 

an execution, takes time.  That time means delay.  The re-
cent federal executions are again illustrative.  The Federal 
Government  executed  Lee  21  years  after  his  conviction; 
Brandon Bernard 20 years after his conviction; Alfred Bour-
geois 16 years after his conviction; Wesley Purkey 16 years 
after  his  conviction;  and  Lisa  Montgomery  12  years  after 
her conviction.  Today, the Government executes Higgs 20 
years after his conviction.  The longer the delay, the weaker 
the  basic penological justifications for imposing the death 
penalty in the first place become, and the greater the psy-
chological suffering inflicted on the death row inmate.  I re-
main  convinced  that  this  dilemma  arises  out  of  efforts  to 
impose  the  death  penalty.   Together  with  other  problems 
that I have previously described, it calls into question the 
constitutionality  of  the  death  penalty  itself.  See  Glossip, 
supra, at 945–946 (BREYER, J., dissenting). 

But  this  case  involves  a  procedural  issue.   The  Fourth 
Circuit  issued  a  stay  of  the  execution  and  has  not  yet  re-
solved the Government’s appeal.  It is rare for us to consider 
a question before the Circuit has decided it.  And I would 
not  depart  from  ordinary  practice  here.   Consequently,  I 
dissent.