Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/18pdf/18-422_9ol1.pdf
Page Number: 3

Cite as:  588 U. S. ____ (2019) 

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Syllabus 

(b) Any  standard  for  resolving  partisan  gerrymandering  claims
must be grounded in a “limited and precise rationale”  and be “clear, 
manageable,  and  politically  neutral.”  Vieth,  541  U. S.,  at  306–308 
(Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment).  The question is one of degree: 
How  to  “provid[e]  a  standard  for  deciding  how  much  partisan  domi-
nance is too  much.”  LULAC, 548 U. S., at  420 (opinion of Kennedy, 
J.).  Partisan gerrymandering claims rest on an instinct that groups
with a certain level of political support should enjoy a commensurate 
level of political power and influence.  Such claims invariably sound 
in a desire for proportional representation, but the Constitution does
not  require  proportional  representation,  and  federal  courts  are  nei-
ther equipped nor authorized to apportion political power as a matter 
of  fairness.  It  is  not  even clear what  fairness  looks  like  in  this  con-
text.    It  may  mean  achieving  a  greater  number  of  competitive  dis-
tricts by undoing packing and cracking so that supporters of the dis-
advantaged  party  have  a  better  shot  at  electing  their  preferred 
candidates.    But  it  could  mean  engaging  in  cracking  and  packing  to 
ensure each party its “appropriate” share of “safe” seats.  Or perhaps
it should be measured by adherence to “traditional” districting crite-
ria.    Deciding  among  those  different  visions  of  fairness  poses  basic 
questions  that  are  political,  not  legal.    There  are  no  legal  standards 
discernible in the Constitution for making such judgments.  And it is 
only after determining how to define fairness that one can even begin 
to answer the determinative question: “How much is too much?”

The fact that the Court can adjudicate one-person, one-vote claims
does  not  mean  that  partisan  gerrymandering  claims  are  justiciable. 
This Court’s one-person, one-vote cases recognize that each person is 
entitled to an equal say in the election of representatives.  It hardly
follows from that principle that a person is entitled to have his politi-
cal  party  achieve  representation  commensurate  to  its  share  of 
statewide support.  Vote dilution in the one-person, one-vote cases re-
fers  to  the  idea  that  each  vote  must  carry  equal  weight.    That  re-
quirement does not extend to political parties; it does not mean that
each party must be influential in proportion to the number of its sup-
porters.   The  racial  gerrymandering  cases  are  also  inapposite:  They 
call  for  the  elimination  of  a  racial  classification,  but  a  partisan  ger-
rymandering  claim  cannot  ask  for  the  elimination  of  partisanship. 
Pp. 15–21. 

(c) None  of  the  proposed  “tests”  for  evaluating  partisan  gerryman-
dering claims meets the need for a limited and precise standard that
is judicially discernible and manageable.  Pp. 22–30.  

(1) The Common Cause District Court concluded that all but one 
of the districts in North Carolina’s 2016 Plan violated the Equal Pro-
tection Clause by intentionally diluting the voting strength of Demo-