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FULTON v. PHILADELPHIA 

Opinion of the Court 

conduct by providing “ ‘a mechanism for individualized ex-
emptions.’ ”  Smith, 494 U. S., at 884 (quoting Bowen v. Roy, 
476 U. S. 693, 708 (1986) (opinion of Burger, C. J., joined by
Powell  and  Rehnquist,  JJ.)).    For  example,  in  Sherbert  v. 
Verner, 374 U. S. 398 (1963), a Seventh-day Adventist was
fired because she would not work on Saturdays.  Unable to 
find a job that would allow her to keep the Sabbath as her 
faith required, she applied for unemployment benefits.  Id., 
at 399–400.  The State denied her application under a law 
prohibiting eligibility to claimants who had “failed, without 
good  cause  . . .  to  accept  available  suitable  work.”  Id.,  at 
401 (internal quotation marks omitted).  We held that the 
denial infringed her free exercise rights and could be justi-
fied only by a compelling interest.  Id., at 406. 

Smith  later  explained  that  the  unemployment  benefits 
law  in  Sherbert  was  not  generally  applicable  because  the 
“good cause” standard permitted the government to grant
exemptions based on the circumstances underlying each ap-
plication.  See  494  U. S.,  at  884  (citing  Roy,  476  U. S.,  at 
708;  Sherbert,  374  U. S.,  at  401,  n. 4).    Smith  went  on  to 
hold that “where the State has in place a system of individ-
ual exemptions, it may not refuse to extend that system to 
cases  of  ‘religious  hardship’  without  compelling  reason.” 
494 U. S., at 884 (quoting Roy, 476 U. S., at 708); see also 
Lukumi, 508 U. S., at 537 (same).

A law also lacks general applicability if it prohibits reli-
gious conduct while permitting secular conduct that under-
mines the government’s asserted interests in a similar way. 
See id., at 542–546.  In Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. 
v. Hialeah, for instance, the City of Hialeah adopted several
ordinances  prohibiting  animal  sacrifice,  a  practice  of  the 
Santeria faith.  Id., at 524–528.  The City claimed that the 
ordinances were necessary in part to protect public health,
which was “threatened by the disposal of animal carcasses
in open public places.”  Id., at 544.  But the ordinances did