Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/21pdf/20-659_3ea4.pdf
Page Number: 9

6 

THOMPSON v. CLARK 

Opinion of the Court 

question have determined, the most analogous tort to this 
Fourth  Amendment  claim  is  malicious  prosecution.    See 
Kossler,  564  F. 3d,  at  186;  Sykes,  625  F. 3d,  at  308–309; 
Durham, 690 F. 3d, at 188; Myers, 738 F. 3d, at 1194; Lan-
ning, 908 F. 3d, at 28; Jordan, 943 F. 3d, at 545.  That is 
because the gravamen of the Fourth Amendment claim for 
malicious prosecution, as this Court has recognized it, is the 
wrongful initiation of charges without probable cause.  And 
the wrongful initiation of charges without probable cause is 
likewise the gravamen of the tort of malicious prosecution. 
  In American courts as of 1871, the malicious prosecution 
tort generally allowed recovery against an individual who 
had initiated or caused the initiation of criminal proceed-
ings despite having “no good reason to believe” that crimi-
nal  charges  were  “justified  by  the  facts  and  the  law.”    T. 
Cooley, Law of Torts 180 (1880) (Cooley); see also 1 F. Hil-
liard, The Law of Torts or Private Wrongs 412–414 (1866) 
(Hilliard).  The malicious prosecution tort protected against 
“injury  to  the  person,  as  connected  with  false  imprison-
ment” and against “a wrong to character or reputation.”  Id., 
at 412 (emphasis deleted). 
  American courts described the elements of the malicious 
prosecution  tort  as  follows:  (i)  the  suit  or  proceeding  was 
“instituted without any probable cause”; (ii) the “motive in 
instituting”  the  suit  “was  malicious,”  which  was  often  de-
fined  in  this  context  as  without  probable  cause  and  for  a 
purpose other than bringing the defendant to justice; and 
(iii)  the  prosecution  “terminated  in  the  acquittal  or  dis-
charge of the accused.”  Cooley 181.3 
  That third requirement—a favorable termination of the 
underlying criminal prosecution—is the focus of the parties’ 
dispute in this case. 

—————— 

3 We  need  not  decide  whether  a  plaintiff  bringing  a  Fourth  Amend-
ment claim under §1983 for malicious prosecution must establish malice 
(or some other mens rea) in addition to the absence of probable cause.