Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/23pdf/23a349_0813.pdf
Page Number: 2.0

2 

OHIO v. EPA 

Syllabus 

all those States.  EPA designed its proposed FIP based on which emis-
sions-control measures would maximize cost-effectiveness in improv-
ing ozone levels downwind and on the assumption the FIP would apply 
to all covered States.  Commenters warned that the proposed SIP dis-
approvals were flawed and that a failure to achieve all the SIP disap-
provals as EPA envisioned would mean that EPA would need to reas-
sess  the  measures  necessary  to  maximize  cost-effective  ozone-level 
improvements in light of a different set of States.  EPA proceeded to 
issue its final FIP without addressing this concern.  Instead, EPA an-
nounced that its plan was severable: Should any jurisdiction drop out, 
the plan would continue to apply unchanged to the remaining jurisdic-
tions.  Ongoing litigation over the SIP disapprovals soon vindicated at 
least some of the commenters’ concerns.  Courts stayed 12 of the SIP 
disapprovals, which meant EPA could not apply its FIP to those States. 
  A number of the remaining States and industry groups challenged 
the FIP in the D. C. Circuit.  They argued that EPA’s decision to apply 
the FIP after so many other States had dropped out was “arbitrary” or 
“capricious,” and they asked the court to stay any effort to enforce the 
FIP against them while their appeal unfolded.  The D. C. Circuit de-
nied relief, and the parties renewed their request in this Court. 

Held: The applications for a stay are granted; enforcement of EPA’s rule 
against the applicants shall be stayed pending the disposition of the 
applicants’ petition for review in the D. C. Circuit and any petition for 
writ of certiorari, timely sought.  Pp. 9–20. 

(a) When  deciding  an  application  for  a  stay,  the  Court  asks  (1) 
whether the applicant is likely to succeed on the merits, (2) whether it 
will suffer irreparable injury without a stay, (3) whether the stay will 
substantially  injure  the  other  parties  interested  in  the  proceedings, 
and (4) where the public interest lies.  Nken v. Holder, 556 U. S. 418, 
434.  When States and other parties seek to stay the enforcement of a 
federal  regulation  against  them,  often  “the  harms  and equities  [will 
be] very weighty on both sides.”  Labrador v. Poe, 601 U. S. ___, ___ 
(KAVANAUGH,  J.,  concurring  in  grant  of  stay).    Because  that  is  true 
here, resolution of applicants’ stay request ultimately turns on the first 
question: Who is likely to prevail at the end.  See Nken, 556 U. S., at 
434.  Pp. 9–11. 

(b) Applicants  are  likely  to  prevail  on  their  arbitrary-or-capricious 
claim.  An agency action qualifies as “arbitrary” or “capricious” if it is 
not “reasonable and reasonably explained.”  FCC v. Prometheus Radio 
Project, 592 U. S. 414, 423.  Thus, the agency must offer “a satisfactory 
explanation  for  its  action[,]  including  a  rational  connection  between 
the facts found and the choice made” and cannot simply ignore “an im-
portant aspect of the problem.”  Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Assn. of United 
States, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co., 463 U. S. 29, 43.