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Page Number: 10

6 

FISCHER v. UNITED STATES 

Opinion of the Court 

would be implausible to assume those activities were pro-
hibited, even if literally covered by the language.  

The idea is simply that a general phrase can be given a
more focused meaning by the terms linked to it.  That prin-
ciple  ensures—regardless  of  how  complicated  a  sentence 
might appear—that none of its specific parts are made re-
dundant by a clause literally broad enough to include them. 
See  Yates,  574  U. S.,  at  545–546  (plurality  opinion).    For 
instance, a football league might adopt a rule that players 
must not “grab, twist, or pull a facemask, helmet, or other
equipment with the intent to injure a player, or otherwise 
attack, assault, or harm any player.”  If a linebacker shouts 
insults at the quarterback and hurts his feelings, has the
linebacker nonetheless followed the rule?  Of course he has. 
The  examples  of  prohibited  actions  all  concern  dangerous
physical conduct that might inflict bodily harm; trash talk
is  simply  not  of  that  kind.  See  64  F. 4th,  at  365–366 
(Katsas, J., dissenting).

Similarly  improbable  consequences  can  result  from  un-
tethering an “otherwise” provision from the rest of a crimi-
nal  statute.  Take  Begay  v.  United  States,  553  U. S.  137 
(2008)  (abrogated  on  other  grounds  by  Johnson  v.  United 
States,  576  U. S.  591  (2015)).    The  question  there  was 
whether driving under the influence qualified as a “violent
felony” under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA).  A 
“violent felony” was defined in relevant part by ACCA as a 
crime, punishable by more than a year’s imprisonment, that
“ ‘is burglary, arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives, 
or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious poten-
tial risk of physical injury to another.’ ”  553 U. S., at 139– 
140  (quoting  18  U. S. C.  §924(e)(2)(B)(ii)  (2000  ed.)).    We 
recognized that, depending on the context, “the word ‘oth-
erwise’ can”—though not “must”—“refer to a crime that is 
similar to the listed examples in some respects but different 
in others.”  553 U. S., at 144 (emphasis deleted).  And we 
held that while driving under the influence certainly may