Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/21pdf/20-1530_n758.pdf
Page Number: 81.0

Cite as:  597 U. S. ____ (2022) 

25 

KAGAN, J., dissenting 

The point is a simple one: If generation shifting can go big,
so  too  can  technological  controls  (assuming,  once  again,
that the statute’s text is ignored).  The problem (if any ex-
ists) is not with the channel, but with the volume.7 

The majority’s claim about the Clean Power Plan’s nov-
elty—the most fleshed-out part of today’s opinion, see ante, 
at 20–24—is also exaggerated.  As EPA explained when it 
issued the Clean Power Plan, an earlier Section 111(d) reg-
ulation had determined that a cap-and-trade program was
the  “best  system  of  emission  reduction”  for  mercury.  70 
Fed. Reg. 28616–28621 (2005); see 80 Fed. Reg. 64772.  In 
the majority’s view, that rule was different because the “ac-
tual  emission  cap”  for  the  contemplated  cap-and-trade
scheme  was  based  on  the  use  of  a  plant-specific  technol-
ogy—namely,  wet  scrubbers.    Ante,  at  21  (internal  quota-
tion marks omitted).  But the approval of cap and trade al-
lowed  EPA  to  make  the  emissions  limits  more  stringent
than  it  otherwise  could  have,  because  EPA  knew  that 
plants unable to cost-effectively install scrubbers could in-
stead meet the limits through generation shifting.  See 70 
Fed. Reg. 28619.  EPA could have designed the Clean Power 
Plan  in  the  same  way—say,  by  setting  emissions  limits 
based  on  carbon-capture  technology,  with  the  expectation
that  many  plants  would  avail  themselves  of  an  approved 
cap-and-trade program instead.  The majority gives no rea-
son to think Section 111(d) allows that approach but disal-
lows the Clean Power Plan.  In both, generation shifting is 
—————— 

7 The majority dismisses these hypotheticals as fantastical, protesting
that  “EPA  has  never  ordered  anything  remotely  like  [them],  and  we 
doubt it could.”  Ante, at 24, n. 3.  But that’s just the point.  EPA hasn’t 
forced  the  elimination  of  coal  plants—whether  through  technological 
controls  or  generation  shifting—because  the  statutory  constraints  pre-
vent it from doing so.  The majority offers no reason to think that those 
constraints suffice for the measures it approves (fuel switching and car-
bon capture) but not for the measure it rejects (generation shifting).  Ei-
ther  the  constraints  are  enough  or  they  are  not.    The  majority  cannot 
have it both ways.