Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/558bv.pdf
Page Number: 319

158 

SMITH  v.  SPISAK 

Opinion of Stevens, J. 

of  this  constitutional  inﬁrmity,  the  court  decided,  was  our 
decision in Mills v.  Maryland, 486 U. S. 367 (1988).  For the 
reasons  cogently  examined  in  the  Court’s  opinion,  ante,  at 
145–149,  I  agree  that  Mills  does  not  clearly  establish  that 
the  instructions  at  issue  were  unconstitutional.  But,  in  my 
view,  our  decision  in  Beck  v.  Alabama,  447  U. S.  625  (1980), 
does.2 

In  Beck,  we  held  that  the  death  penalty  may  not  be  im­
posed “when the jury was not permitted to consider a verdict 
of guilt of a lesser included non-capital offense, and when the 
evidence would have supported such a verdict.”  Id., at 627 
(internal  quotation  marks  omitted).  At  that  time,  the  Ala­
bama death penalty statute had been “consistently construed 
to preclude any lesser included offense instructions in capital 
cases.”  Id.,  at  629,  n.  3.  Thus,  the  Alabama  jury  was 
“given  the  choice  of  either  convicting  the  defendant  of  the 
capital  crime,  in  which  case  it  [was]  required  to  impose  the 
death penalty, or acquitting him, thus allowing him to escape 
all penalties for his alleged participation in the crime.”  Id., 
at  628–629.  Because  of  the  unique  features  of  Alabama’s 
capital punishment system,3  Beck’s jury believed that either 
it  had  to  convict  Beck,  thus  sending  him  to  his  death,  or 
acquit  him,  thus  setting  him  free.  The  jury  was  not  pre­
sented with the “third option” of convicting him of a noncapi­
tal offense, thus ensuring that he would receive a substantial 

2 Notably, Beck substantially predates Spisak’s trial and thus my applica­
tion of Beck obviates any discussion on when federal law is established for 
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 purposes, see ante, 
at 143.  Regardless, in accordance with the view I expressed in Williams 
v.  Taylor,  529  U. S.  362,  379–380  (2000)  (opinion  of  Stevens,  J.),  I  would 
conclude that our decision in Mills, decided before Spisak’s conviction be­
came ﬁnal, is also available to him. 

3 Under Alabama law, the judge conducts a separate penalty-phase pro­
ceeding  after  the  jury  has  returned  a  conviction  on  a  capital  offense. 
Beck, 447 U. S., at 629.  Thus, the jury reasonably believed that its verdict 
would set the defendant’s punishment at death.