Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/12pdf/11-556_11o2.pdf
Page Number: 31.0

28 

VANCE v. BALL STATE UNIV. 

Opinion of the Court 

Feb.  2,  2013),  Dkt.  No.  380,  Exh.  1,  ¶1,  notwithstanding 
the fact that the court in that case applied the definition of 
“supervisor” that we adopt today, see EEOC v. CRST Van 
Expedited, Inc., 679 F. 3d 657, 684 (CA8 2012). 

In  any  event,  the  dissent  is  wrong  in  claiming  that  our
holding  would  preclude  employer  liability  in  other  cases 
with  facts  similar  to  these.    Assuming  that  a  harasser  is
not a supervisor, a plaintiff could still prevail by showing 
that  his  or  her  employer  was  negligent  in  failing  to  pre­
vent  harassment  from  taking  place.    Evidence  that  an 
employer did not monitor the workplace, failed to respond
to  complaints,  failed  to  provide  a  system  for  registering
complaints,  or  effectively  discouraged  complaints  from
being filed would be relevant.  Thus, it is not true, as the 
dissent  asserts,  that  our  holding  “relieves  scores  of  em­
ployers of responsibility” for the behavior of workers they
employ.  Post, at 14. 

The standard we adopt is not untested.  It has been the 
law for quite some time in the First, Seventh, and Eighth
Circuits, see, e.g., Noviello v. Boston, 398 F. 3d 76, 96 (CA1 
2005);  Weyers  v.  Lear  Operations  Corp.,  359  F. 3d  1049, 
1057 (CA8 2004); Parkins v. Civil Constructors of Ill., Inc., 
163  F. 3d  1027,  1033–1034,  and  n. 1  (CA7  1998)—i.e.,  in 
Arkansas,  Illinois,  Indiana,  Iowa,  Maine,  Massachusetts, 
Minnesota,  Missouri,  Nebraska,  New  Hampshire,  North 
Dakota, Rhode Island, South Dakota, and Wisconsin.  We 
are aware of no evidence that this rule has produced dire 
consequences in these 14 jurisdictions.

Despite  its  rhetoric,  the  dissent  acknowledges  that 
Davis,  the  alleged  harasser  in  this  case,  would  probably
not  qualify  as  a  supervisor  even  under  the  dissent’s  pre­
ferred  approach.    See  post,  at  20  (“[T]here  is  cause  to
anticipate  that  Davis  would  not  qualify  as Vance’s  super­
visor”).  On  that  point,  we  agree.    Petitioner  did  refer  to 
Davis as a “supervisor” in some of the complaints that she 
filed,  App.  28;  id.,  at  45,  and  Davis’  job  description  does