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SLACK v. McDANIEL

Opinion of the Court

court after an initial habeas petition was unadjudicated on
its merits and dismissed for failure to exhaust state remedies
is not a second or successive petition.

Slack commenced this habeas proceeding in the District
Court in 1995, before AEDPA’s effective date. Because the
question whether Slack’s petition was second or successive
implicates his right to relief in the trial court, pre-AEDPA
law governs, see Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U. S. 320 (1997),
though we do not suggest the deﬁnition of second or succes-
sive would be different under AEDPA. See Stewart v.
Martinez-Villareal, 523 U. S. 637 (1998) (using pre-AEDPA
law to interpret AEDPA’s provision governing “second or
successive habeas applications”). The parties point us to
Rule 9(b) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the
United States District Courts as controlling the issue. The
Rule incorporates our prior decisions regarding successive
petitions and abuse of the writ, McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U. S.
467, 487 (1991), and states: “A second or successive petition
[alleging new and different grounds] may be dismissed if . . .
the judge ﬁnds that the failure of the petitioner to assert
those grounds in a prior petition constituted an abuse of the
writ.” As the text demonstrates, Rule 9(b) applies only to
“a second or successive petition.”

The phrase “second or successive petition” is a term of
art given substance in our prior habeas corpus cases. The
Court’s decision in Rose v. Lundy, 455 U. S., at 510, instructs
us in reaching our understanding of the term. Rose v.
Lundy held that a federal district court must dismiss habeas
corpus petitions containing both exhausted and unexhausted
claims. The opinion, however, contemplated that the pris-
oner could return to federal court after the requisite exhaus-
Id., at 520 (“Those prisoners who . . . submit mixed
tion.
petitions nevertheless are entitled to resubmit a petition
with only exhausted claims or to exhaust the remainder of
their claims”).
It was only if a prisoner declined to return
to state court and decided to proceed with his exhausted