Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/11pdf/10-1121c4d6.pdf
Page Number: 30.0

Cite as:  567 U. S. ____ (2012) 

3 

SOTOMAYOR, J., concurring in judgment 

of fee collection comports with the Constitution.  See Dav-
enport  v.  Washington  Ed.  Assn.,  551  U. S.  177,  181,  185 
(2007);  Hudson,  475  U. S.,  at  306,  n.  16;  Abood  v.  De-
troit  Bd.  of  Ed.,  431  U. S.  209,  238  (1977);  see  also  ante, 
at  12–13.  They  did  not  argue  that  the  Constitution  re-
quires  an  opt-in  system  of  fee  collection  in  the  context  of 
special  assessments  or  dues  increases  or,  indeed,  in  any 
context.  Not  surprisingly,  respondents  did  not  address
such a prospect.

Under this Court’s Rule 14.1(a), “[o]nly the questions set
out in the petition, or fairly included therein, will be con-
sidered  by  the  Court.”    “[W]e  disregard  [that  rule]  ‘only
in  the  most  exceptional  cases,’  where  reasons  of  urgency 
or  economy  suggest  the  need  to  address  the  unpresented 
question  in  the  case  under  consideration.”    Yee  v.  Escon-
dido,  503  U. S.  519,  535  (1992)  (quoting  Stone  v.  Powell, 
428 U. S. 465, 481, n. 15 (1976)).  The majority does not claim 
any  such  exceptional  circumstance  here.    Yet  it  reaches 
out  to  hold  that  “when  a  public-sector  union  imposes  a 
special  assessment  or  dues  increase,  the  union  must  pro-
vide  a  fresh  Hudson  notice  and  may  not  exact  any  funds 
from nonmembers without their affirmative consent.”  Ante, 
at  22  (emphasis  added);  see  also  ante,  at  17  (“[T]he
union  should  have  sent  out  a  new  notice  allowing  non-
members to opt in to the special fee rather than requiring 
them to opt out”).  The majority thus decides, for the very
first time, that the First Amendment does require an opt-
in  system  in  some  circumstances:  the  levying  of  a  special 
assessment or dues increase.  The majority announces its 
novel rule without any analysis of potential countervailing
arguments  and  without  any  reflection  on  the  reliance
interests our old rules have engendered. 

The majority’s choice to reach an issue not presented by
the  parties,  briefed,  or  argued,  disregards  our  rules.    See 
Yee,  503  U. S.,  at  535.    And  it  ignores  a  fundamental
premise of our adversarial system: “ ‘that appellate courts