Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/19pdf/18-328_pm02.pdf
Page Number: 5

Cite as:  589 U. S. ____ (2019) 

3 

Opinion of the Court 

judgment.    Rotkiske  claims  that  he  was  not  aware  of 
Klemm’s  2009  debt-collection  lawsuit  until  September 
2014, when he was denied a mortgage because of the default 
judgment against him. 

On June 29, 2015, more than six years after the default
judgment, Rotkiske brought suit against Klemm under the 
FDCPA.  Rotkiske’s amended complaint alleged that equi-
table tolling excused his otherwise untimely filing because
Klemm purposely served process in a manner that ensured
he would not receive service.  The sole FDCPA claim in the 
complaint asserted that Klemm commenced the 2009 debt-
collection lawsuit after the state-law limitations period ex-
pired  and  therefore  “violated  the  FDCPA  by  contacting
[Rotkiske] without lawful ability to collect.”  First Amended 
Complaint in No. 2:15–cv–03638 (ED Pa.), Doc. 15, p. 4. 

Klemm  moved  to  dismiss  the  action  as  barred  by  the 
FDCPA’s  one-year  statute  of  limitations,  15  U. S. C. 
§1692k(d).  Rotkiske argued that the court should apply a
“discovery rule” to delay the beginning of the limitations pe-
riod  until  the  date  he  knew  or  should  have  known  of  the 
alleged FDCPA violation.  To support this contention, Rot-
kiske relied on the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Mangum v. 
Action  Collection  Serv.,  Inc.,  575  F. 3d  935  (2009).    That 
case held that, under the “discovery rule,” limitations peri-
ods in federal litigation generally begin to run when plain-
tiffs  know  or  have  reason  to  know  of  their  injury.    Id.,  at 
940–941. 

The District Court dismissed the action.  It held that the 
Ninth Circuit’s general rule does not apply to §1692k(d), re-
lying on the statute’s plain language.  The court also con-
cluded  that  Rotkiske  was  not  entitled  to  equitable  tolling
because, even accepting the truth of the allegations in the
complaint, he was not misled by Klemm’s conduct.

On appeal, the Third Circuit sua sponte reviewed the case 
en banc and unanimously affirmed.  890 F. 3d 422 (2018). 
The  court  held  that,  under  the  text  of  §1692k(d),  the