Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/09pdf/08-964.pdf
Page Number: 59

Cite as:  561 U. S. ____ (2010) 

39 

STEVENS, J., concurring in judgment 

Thus,  although  it  is  for  Congress  to  “implement  the 
stated  purpose  of  the  Framers  by  selecting  the  policy 
which  in  its  judgment  best  effectuates  the  constitutional 
aim,”  Graham,  383  U. S.,  at  6,  we  interpret  ambiguous
patent laws as a set of rules that “wee[d] out those inven-
tions  which  would  not  be  disclosed  or  devised  but  for  the 
inducement  of  a  patent,”  id.,  at  11,  and  that  “embod[y]” 
the “careful balance between the need to promote innova-
tion  and  the  recognition  that  imitation  and  refinement 
through  imitation  are  both  necessary  to  invention  itself
and  the  very  lifeblood  of  a  competitive  economy,”  Bonito 
Boats,  489  U. S.,  at  146.    And  absent  a  discernible  signal
from  Congress,  we  proceed  cautiously  when  dealing  with 
patents  that  press  on  the  limits  of  the  “ ‘standard  written
into the constitution,’ ” Graham, 383 U. S., at 6, for at the 
“fringes  of  congressional  power,”  “more  is  required  of
legislatures  than  a  vague  delegation  to  be  filled  in  later,” 
Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U. S. 109, 139–140 (1959) 
(Black,  J.,  dissenting);  see  also  Greene  v.  McElroy,  360 
U. S.  474,  507  (1959)  (“[D]ecisions  of  great  constitutional 
import  and  effect”  “requir[e]  careful  and  purposeful  con-
sideration  by  those  responsible  for  enacting  and  imple-
menting our laws”).  We should not casually risk exceeding
the constitutional limitation on Congress’ behalf. 

The  Court  has  kept  this  “constitutional  standard”  in
mind  when  deciding  what  is  patentable  subject  matter 
under  §101.  For  example,  we  have  held  that  no  one  can 
patent  “laws  of  nature,  natural  phenomena,  and  abstract
ideas.”  Diehr, 450 U. S., at 185.  These “are the basic tools 
of scientific and technological work,” Benson, 409 U. S., at 
67,  and  therefore,  if  patented,  would  stifle  the  very  pro-
gress  that  Congress  is  authorized  to  promote,  see,  e.g., 
O’Reilly,  15  How.,  at  113  (explaining  that  Morse’s  patent
on  electromagnetism  for  writing  would  preempt  a  wide 

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technology”).