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Page Number: 2

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THOMPSON v. CLARK 

Syllabus 

split among the Courts of Appeals over how to apply the favorable ter-
mination  requirement  of  the  Fourth  Amendment  claim  under  §1983
for malicious prosecution. 

Held: To demonstrate a favorable termination of a criminal prosecution
for  purposes  of  the  Fourth  Amendment  claim  under  §1983  for  mali-
cious prosecution, a plaintiff need not show that the criminal prosecu-
tion ended with some affirmative indication of innocence.  A plaintiff 
need  only  show  that  his  prosecution  ended  without  a  conviction. 
Thompson has satisfied that requirement here.  Pp. 4–12.

(a) To determine the elements of a constitutional claim under §1983,
this Court’s practice is to first look to the elements of the most analo-
gous tort as of 1871 when §1983 was enacted, so long as doing so is
consistent with “the values and purposes of the constitutional right at
issue.”    Manuel  v.  Joliet,  580  U.  S.  357,  370.  Here,  as  most  of  the 
Courts of Appeals to consider the question have determined, the most
analogous tort to this Fourth Amendment claim is malicious prosecu-
tion.  Pp. 4–7.

(b) In accord with the elements of the malicious prosecution tort, a 
Fourth  Amendment  claim  under  §1983  for  malicious  prosecution  re-
quires the plaintiff to show a favorable termination of the underlying 
criminal case against him.  The parties to this case, as well as the lower 
courts, disagree about what a favorable termination entails, i.e., is it 
sufficient to show that Thompson’s prosecution ended without a con-
viction or must he also show that his prosecution ended with some af-
firmative indication of innocence?  To resolve that disagreement, the
Court looks to American malicious prosecution tort law as of 1871.  At 
that time, most American courts agreed that the favorable termination
element of a malicious prosecution claim was satisfied so long as the 
prosecution ended without a conviction.  A plaintiff could maintain a 
malicious prosecution claim when, for example, the prosecutor aban-
doned the criminal case or the court dismissed the case without provid-
ing a reason. 

The American tort-law consensus as of 1871 did not require a plain-
tiff in a malicious prosecution suit to show that his prosecution ended 
with an affirmative indication of innocence, and this Court similarly
construes Thompson’s Fourth Amendment claim under §1983 for ma-
licious prosecution.  Doing so is consistent with “the values and pur-
poses” of the Fourth Amendment.  Manuel, 580 U. S., at 370.  Ques-
tions concerning whether a criminal defendant was wrongly charged,
or whether an individual may seek redress for a wrongful prosecution, 
cannot  reasonably  depend  on  whether  the  prosecutor  or  court  hap-
pened to explain why charges were dismissed.  And requiring a plain-
tiff to show that his prosecution ended with an affirmative indication
of innocence is not necessary to protect officers from unwarranted civil