Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/19pdf/18-877_dc8f.pdf
Page Number: 16.0

Cite as:  589 U. S. ____ (2020) 

13 

Opinion of the Court 

evidence  that  any  instance  of  infringement  by  States 
crossed  constitutional  lines.  Congress,  we  observed,  “did
not  focus”  on  intentional  or  reckless  conduct;  to  the  con-
trary, the legislative record suggested that “most state in-
fringement was innocent or at worst negligent.”  Id., at 645. 
And similarly, Congress “barely considered the availability 
of state remedies for patent infringement.”  Id., at 643.  So, 
we  concluded,  nothing  could  support  the  idea  that  States
were  more  than  sporadically  (if  that)  “depriving  patent
owners of property without due process of law.”  Id., at 646. 
Given that absence of evidence, Florida Prepaid held, the 
Patent Remedy Act swept too far.  Recall what the Patent 
Remedy Act did—and did not.  It abrogated sovereign im-
munity  for  any  and  every  patent  suit,  thereby  “plac[ing]
States on the same footing as private parties.”  Id., at 647. 
It did not set any limits.  It did not, for example, confine the
abrogation to suits alleging “nonnegligent infringement or 
infringement authorized [by] state policy.”   Ibid.  Neither 
did it target States refusing to offer alternative remedies to
patent holders.  No, it exposed all States to the hilt—on a 
record that failed to show they had caused any discernible
constitutional harm (or, indeed, much harm at all).  That 
imbalance made it impossible to view the legislation “as re-
sponsive to, or designed to prevent, unconstitutional behav-
ior.”  Id.,  at  646  (quoting  Boerne,  521  U. S.,  at  532).    The 
statute’s “indiscriminate scope” was too “out of proportion”
to any due process problem.  527 U. S., at 646–647.  It aimed 
not  to  correct  such  a  problem,  but  to  “provide  a  uniform
remedy  for  patent  infringement”  writ  large.  Id.,  at  647. 
The Patent Remedy Act, in short, did not “enforce” Section 
1  of  the  Fourteenth  Amendment—and  so  was  not  “appro-
priate” under Section 5. 

Could,  then,  this  case  come  out  differently?    Given  the 
identical scope of the CRCA and Patent Remedy Act, that
could happen only if the former law responded to materially