Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/21pdf/20-826_p702.pdf
Page Number: 27.0

Cite as:  596 U. S. ____ (2022) 

23 

Opinion of the Court 

once more asks us to turn our attention elsewhere.  In par-
ticular, he notes that the trial court in Holbrook asked po-
tential jurors at the outset of trial whether the presence of 
state  troopers  would  affect  their  ability  to  consider  fairly 
the  defendant’s  case;  they  said  no.    This  Court  indicated 
that  such  questions  and  answers  cannot  alone  “disposi-
tive[ly]”  resolve  the  question  whether  security  measures 
prejudice a defendant’s right to a fair trial.  Id., at 570.  In-
stead, the Court reasoned that “jurors will not necessarily 
be fully conscious of the effect [such measures] will have on 
their attitude toward the accused.  This will be especially 
true  when  jurors  are  questioned  at  the  very  beginning  of
the proceedings; at that point, they can only speculate on 
how  they  will  feel  after  being  exposed  to  a  practice  daily 
over the course of a long trial.”  Ibid.  Mr. Davenport high-
lights that the Court in Deck favorably quoted some of these 
passages too.  544 U. S., at 635. 

Even  bearing  all  this  in  mind,  however,  we  cannot  see 
how the Michigan Court of Appeals acted contrary to or un-
reasonably  applied  clearly  established  federal  law.    The 
Michigan court found the shackling in Mr. Davenport’s case
harmless  for  two  reasons—both  because  of  the  “over-
whelmin[g]” evidence against him, and because jurors tes-
tified that his shackling did not affect their verdict.  2012 
WL 6217134, at *1–*2, and n. 2.  Holbrook does not compel
a different ruling on the first score.  It addressed a different 
evidentiary record and affirmed the defendant’s conviction. 
Nor does the decision compel a different ruling on the sec-
ond score.  Holbrook cast doubt only on attempts to assess
prejudice based on testimony from prospective jurors spec-
ulating about how the security measures might affect their 
perceptions over the course of an upcoming trial.  Nothing 
in the decision purported to forbid courts from considering 
post-trial testimony about how trial security measures ac-
tually affected juror deliberations.  Nor may this or any fed-
eral court use an AEDPA case as an opportunity to pass on