Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/13pdf/12-417_9okb.pdf
Page Number: 6

Cite as:  571 U. S. ____ (2014) 

3 

Opinion of the Court 

the  protective  gear  constituted  “changing  clothes”  within
the  meaning  of  §203(o).   No.  2:07–CV–443  RM,  2009  WL 
3430222,  *4–*10  (ND  Ind.,  Oct.  15,  2009).    The  District 
Court  further  assumed  that  even  if  certain  items—the 
hardhat,  glasses,  and  earplugs—were  not  “clothes,”  the 
time  spent  donning  and  doffing  them  was  “de  minimis” 
and  hence  noncompensable. 
Id.,  at  *6.  The  Court  of 
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit upheld those conclusions. 
678 F. 3d 590, 593–595 (2012).4 

We  granted  certiorari,  568  U. S.  ___  (2013),  and  now 

affirm. 

II. Legal Background 

The Fair Labor Standards Act, enacted in 1938, governs 
minimum  wages  and  maximum  hours  for  non-exempt
“employees  who  in  any  workweek  [are]  engaged  in  com-
merce or in the production of goods for commerce, or [are]
employed in an enterprise engaged in commerce or in the
production  of  goods  for  commerce.”    29  U. S. C.  §206(a) 
(minimum  wages);  §207(a)  (maximum  hours);  see  §213
(exemptions).  The Act provides that “employee” generally 
means  “any 
individual  employed  by  an  employer,”
§203(e)(1),  and,  in  turn,  provides  that  to  “employ”  is  “to
suffer or permit to work,” §203(g).

The  Act  did  not,  however,  define  the  key  terms  “work”
and  “workweek”—an  omission  that  soon  let  loose  a  land-
slide  of  litigation.    See  IBP,  Inc.  v.  Alvarez,  546  U. S.  21, 
25–26 (2005).  This Court gave those terms a broad read-
ing, culminating in its holding in Anderson v. Mt. Clemens 
Pottery  Co.,  328  U. S.  680  (1946),  that  “the  statutory 

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4 Petitioners also sought, inter alia, backpay for time spent traveling
between the locker rooms where they don and doff at least some of the
protective gear and their workstations.  The District Court denied that 
portion  of  respondent’s  motion  for  summary  judgment,  2009  WL
3430222, *11, and the Seventh Circuit reversed, 678 F. 3d, at 595–598. 
That issue is not before this Court, so we express no opinion on it.