Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/558bv.pdf
Page Number: 827

980 

OCTOBER TERM, 2009 

Roberts, C. J., dissenting 

558 U. S. 

it.  Media  reports  of  alcohol-related  death  and  mutilation  on  the 
Nation’s  roads  are  legion”).  The  imminence  of  the  danger  posed 
by  drunk  drivers  exceeds  that  at  issue  in  other  types  of  cases. 
In  a  case  like  J.  L.,  the  police  can  often  observe  the  subject  of  a 
tip  and  step  in  before  actual  harm  occurs;  with  drunk  driving, 
such  a  wait-and-see  approach  may  prove  fatal.  Drunk  driving 
is  always  dangerous,  as  it  is  occurring.  This  Court  has  in  fact 
recognized  that  the  dangers  posed  by  drunk  drivers  are  unique, 
frequently  upholding  anti-drunk-driving  policies  that  might  be 
constitutionally  problematic  in  other,  less  exigent  circumstances.1 
In  the  absence  of  controlling  precedent  on  point,  a  sharp  dis­
agreement  has  emerged  among  federal  and  state  courts  over  how 
to  apply  the  Fourth  Amendment  in  this  context.  The  majority 
of  courts  examining  the  question  have  upheld  investigative  stops 
of  allegedly  drunk  or  erratic  drivers,  even  when  the  police  did 
not personally witness any trafﬁc violations before conducting the 
stops.2  These  courts  have  typically  distinguished  J.  L.’s  general 
rule  based  on  some  combination  of  (1)  the  especially  grave  and 
imminent dangers posed by drunk driving; (2) the enhanced relia­
bility of tips alleging illegal activity in public, to which the tipster 

1 See,  e. g.,  Michigan  Dept.  of  State  Police  v.  Sitz,  496  U. S.  444,  455 
(1990) (approving use of ﬁeld-sobriety checkpoints of all approaching driv­
ers, despite fact that over 98 percent of such drivers were innocent); South 
Dakota v.  Neville, 459 U. S. 553, 554, 560 (1983) (upholding state law allow­
ing  a  defendant’s  refusal  to  take  a  blood-alcohol  test  to  be  introduced  as 
evidence  against  him  at  trial);  Mackey  v.  Montrym,  443  U. S.  1,  17–19 
(1979)  (upholding  state  law  requiring  mandatory  suspension  of  a  driver’s 
license  upon  a  drunk-driving  suspect’s  refusal  to  submit  to  a  breath-
analysis test); see also Indianapolis v.  Edmond, 531 U. S. 32, 37–38 (2000) 
(noting that in the Fourth Amendment context the Court has upheld gov­
ernment  measures  “aimed  at  removing  drunk  drivers  from  the  road,” 
distinguishing  such  measures  from  those  with  the  primary  purpose  of 
“detect[ing] evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing”). 

2 See,  e. g.,  United  States  v.  Wheat,  278  F.  3d  722  (CA8  2001);  People v. 
Wells, 38 Cal. 4th 1078, 136 P. 3d 810 (2006); State v.  Prendergast, 103 Haw. 
451,  83  P.  3d  714  (2004);  State  v.  Walshire,  634  N.  W.  2d  625  (Iowa  2001); 
State v.  Crawford, 275 Kan. 492, 67 P. 3d 115 (2003); Bloomingdale v.  State, 
842  A.  2d  1212  (Del.  2004);  State  v.  Golotta,  178  N.  J.  205,  837  A.  2d  359 
(2003);  State  v.  Scholl,  2004  S.  D.  85,  684  N.  W.  2d  83;  State  v.  Boyea,  171 
Vt. 401, 765 A. 2d 862 (2000); State v.  Rutzinski, 2001 WI 22, 241 Wis. 2d 
729, 623 N. W. 2d 516.