Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/529bv.pdf
Page Number: 238

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Unit: $U36

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Cite as: 529 U. S. 120 (2000)

163

Breyer, J., dissenting

tobacco-related jurisdiction and considered together
with Congress’ failure explicitly to grant the agency
tobacco-speciﬁc authority, demonstrate that Congress
did not intend for the FDA to exercise jurisdiction over
tobacco, ante, at 155–156.

In my view, neither of these propositions is valid. Rather,
the FDCA does not signiﬁcantly limit the FDA’s remedial
alternatives. See infra, at 174–181. And the later statutes
do not tell the FDA it cannot exercise jurisdiction, but sim-
ply leave FDA jurisdictional law where Congress found it.
See infra, at 181–186; cf. Food and Drug Administration
Modernization Act of 1997, 111 Stat. 2380 (codiﬁed at note fol-
lowing 21 U. S. C. § 321 (1994 ed., Supp. III)) (statute “shall”
not “be construed to affect the question of whether” the FDA
“has any authority to regulate any tobacco product”).

The bulk of the opinion that follows will explain the basis
for these latter conclusions.
In short, I believe that the
most important indicia of statutory meaning—language and
purpose—along with the FDCA’s legislative history (de-
scribed brieﬂy in Part I) are sufﬁcient to establish that the
FDA has authority to regulate tobacco. The statute-speciﬁc
arguments against jurisdiction that the tobacco companies
and the majority rely upon (discussed in Part II) are based
on erroneous assumptions and, thus, do not defeat the
jurisdiction-supporting thrust of the FDCA’s language and
purpose. The inferences that the majority draws from later
legislative history are not persuasive, since (as I point out in
Part III) one can just as easily infer from the later laws that
Congress did not intend to affect the FDA’s tobacco-related
authority at all. And the fact that the FDA changed its
mind about the scope of its own jurisdiction is legally insig-
niﬁcant because (as Part IV establishes) the agency’s reasons
for changing course are fully justiﬁed. Finally, as I explain
in Part V, the degree of accountability that likely will attach
to the FDA’s action in this case should alleviate any concern