Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/22pdf/21-1043_7648.pdf
Page Number: 12.0

Cite as:  600 U. S. ____ (2023) 

9 

Opinion of the Court 

ultimate question regarding permissible domestic applica-
tion turns on the location of the conduct relevant to the fo-
cus.  See, e.g., RJR Nabisco, 579 U. S., at 337.  And the con-
duct  relevant  to  any  focus  the  parties  have  proffered  is
infringing use in commerce, as the Act defines it.

This  conclusion  follows  from  the  text  and  context  of 
§1114(1)(a)  and  §1125(a)(1).  Both  provisions  prohibit  the 
unauthorized use “in commerce” of a protected trademark
when, among other things, that use “is likely to cause con-
fusion.”  §§1114(1)(a), 1125(a)(1).  In other words, Congress
proscribed  the  use  of  a  mark  in  commerce  under  certain 
conditions.    This  conduct,  to  be  sure,  must  create  a  suffi-
cient risk of confusion, but confusion is not a separate re-
quirement; rather, it is simply a necessary characteristic of
an offending use.5  Because Congress has premised liability 
on a specific action (a particular sort of use in commerce), 
that specific action would be the conduct relevant to any fo-
cus on offer today.  See, e.g., WesternGeco, 585 U. S., at ___– 
___ (slip op., at 6–8). 

In sum, as this case comes to us, “use in commerce” is the 
conduct relevant to any potential focus of §1114(1)(a) and 
§1125(a)(1) because Congress deemed a violation of either 
provision to occur each time a mark is used in commerce in 
—————— 

5 Both  provisions  “refer  to  a  ‘likelihood’  of  harm,  rather  than  a  com-
pleted  harm.”  Moseley  v.  V  Secret  Catalogue,  Inc.,  537  U. S.  418,  432 
(2003).    In  other  words,  “actual  confusion  is  not  necessary  in  order  to 
prove infringement.”  Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition §23, at 
250, Comment b (1993); accord, id., §23, at 251, Comment d; 4 J. McCar-
thy,  Trademarks  and  Unfair  Competition  §23:12,  at  23–157  (5th  ed. 
2023) (McCarthy) (“ ‘[I]t is black letter law that actual confusion need not
be  shown  to  prevail  under  the  Lanham  Act,  since  . . .  the  Act  requires 
only a likelihood of confusion’ ”).  Instead, the provisions treat confusion 
as a means to limit liability to only certain “bona fide use[s] of a mark in
the ordinary course of trade.”  15 U. S. C. §1127 (defining “use in com-
merce”); see Patent and Trademark Office v. Booking.com B. V., 591 U. S. 
___, ___ (2020) (slip op., at 12) (“[A] competitor’s use does not infringe a
mark  [under  §1114(1)(a)  and  §1125(a)(1)]  unless  it  is  likely  to  confuse 
consumers”).