Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/19pdf/18-9526_9okb.pdf
Page Number: 51.0

6 

MCGIRT v. OKLAHOMA 

ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting 

and the State of Oklahoma.  The tribal leadership acknowl-
edged that its only remaining power was to parcel out the 
last  of  its  land,  and  the  State  assumed  jurisdiction  over 
criminal cases that, if a reservation had continued to exist, 
would have belonged in federal court. 

A century of practice confirms that the Five Tribes’ prior
domains were extinguished.  The State has maintained un-
questioned  jurisdiction  for  more  than  100  years.    Tribe 
members make up less than 10%–15% of the population of
their former domain, and until a few years ago the Creek 
Nation itself acknowledged that it no longer possessed the
reservation the Court discovers today.  This on-the-ground
reality  is  enshrined  throughout  the  U. S.  Code,  which  re-
peatedly terms the Five Tribes’ prior holdings the “former”
Indian reservations in Oklahoma.  As the Tribes, the State, 
and Congress have recognized from the outset, those “res-
ervations  were  destroyed”  when  “Oklahoma  entered  the 
Union.”  S. Rep. No. 101–216, pt. 2, p. 47 (1989). 

II 
Much  of  this  important  context  is  missing  from  the
Court’s opinion, for the Court restricts itself to viewing each 
of the statutes enacted by Congress in a vacuum.  That ap-
proach is wholly inconsistent with our precedents on reser-
vation disestablishment, which require a highly contextual
inquiry.  Our “touchstone” is congressional “purpose” or “in-
tent.”  South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, 522 U. S. 329, 
343 (1998).  To “decipher Congress’ intention” in this spe-
cialized area, we are instructed to consider three categories
of evidence: the relevant Acts passed by Congress; the con-
temporaneous understanding of those Acts and the histori-
cal context surrounding their passage; and the subsequent 
understanding of the status of the reservation and the pat-
tern of settlement there.  Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U. S. 463, 
470–472 (1984).  The Court resists calling these “steps,” be-