Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/22pdf/21-1271_3f14.pdf
Page Number: 52

14 

MOORE v. HARPER 

THOMAS, J., dissenting 

and Harper I was no exception.5 

Even if it were, we would still have no case or controversy 
in front of us.  A freestanding “judgment” of statutory inval-
idation—neutralizing the 2021 Act in some manner trans-
cending  the  final  determination  of  the  parties’  respective
rights in this case—would not be a judicial action within the 
meaning of Article III, and it could not be reviewed in this
Court.  See Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 211 U. S. 210, 
226–227 (1908).  “We sit as a court of law, not a council of 
revision,” and “[o]ur powers of judicial review are judicial, 
not legislative, in nature.”  Mackey, 401 U. S., at 697 (opin-
ion of Harlan, J.).  The only power that we ever could have 
exercised here was to modify the adjudicated rights and li-
abilities of the parties with respect to the claims in this ac-
tion.  Because we plainly cannot do so, no matter what we 
think about the Elections Clause, this proceeding is moot. 

—————— 

5 Nor did Harper III, despite agreeing with petitioners in all other re-
spects, anywhere endorse their belief that some “order striking down the 
2021 [Act]” would survive a decision overruling Harper I and dismissing 
this lawsuit with prejudice.  Ante, at 5 (internal quotation marks omit-
ted).  To the extent that the majority imputes that idea to Harper III, it 
again  seriously  misreads  that  decision.    See  n. 3, supra.  The  majority 
states  that  Harper  III  “did  not  reinstate  the  2021  congressional  pla[n] 
that Harper I had struck down.”  Ante, at 5 (citing Harper III, ___ N. C., 
at ___–___, 886 S. E. 2d, at 446–448).  But the part of Harper III that the 
majority  cites  had  nothing  to  do  with  North  Carolina’s  congressional 
plan.  Instead, it considered whether two state-constitutional provisions, 
which require that state-legislature districting plans “remain unaltered” 
until the next census after they have become “established,” N. C. Const.,
Art. II, §§3(4) and 5(4), prevented the Assembly from revising the 2021
state plans that Harper I had rejected.  See Harper III, ___ N. C., at ___– 
___, 886 S. E. 2d, at 446–448.  In determining that the 2021 state plans 
were never “established,” Harper III did not mean that Harper I some-
how still restrains those plans; rather, it indicated that those plans them-
selves do not restrain the Assembly going forward.  Absolutely nothing 
in  Harper  III suggests  that  the  North  Carolina  Supreme  Court’s  judg-
ments  act  directly  upon  legislative  enactments—“striking  them  down” 
today and “reinstating” them tomorrow—or that the 2021 congressional
map remains subject to any restraint left over from Harper I.