Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/529bv.pdf
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Cite as: 529 U. S. 765 (2000)

785

Opinion of the Court

consistent with state qui tam liability in light of the pre-
sumption against imposition of punitive damages on govern-
mental entities. See, e. g., Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc.,
453 U. S. 247, 262–263 (1981).15 Although this Court sug-
gested that damages under an earlier version of the FCA
were remedial rather than punitive, see Bornstein, 423 U. S.,
at 315; but see Smith v. Wade, 461 U. S. 30, 85 (1983) (Rehn-
quist, J., dissenting), that version of the statute imposed
only double damages and a civil penalty of $2,000 per claim,
see 31 U. S. C. § 231 (1976 ed.); the current version, by con-
trast, generally imposes treble damages and a civil pen-
alty of up to $10,000 per claim, see 31 U. S. C. § 3729(a).16
Cf. Marcus, 317 U. S., at 550 (noting that double damages in

15 The dissent attempts to distinguish Newport on the basis of a single
sentence in that opinion stating that “courts vie[w] punitive damages
[against governmental bodies] as contrary to sound public policy, because
such awards would burden the very taxpayers and citizens for whose bene-
ﬁt the wrongdoer was being chastised.” Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc.,
453 U. S., at 263. The dissent contends that Newport is inapplicable
where, as here, “[t]he taxpaying ‘citizens for whose beneﬁt’ the [statute] is
designed are the citizens of the United States, not the citizens of any
individual State that might violate the [statute].” Post, at 801. The
problem with this is that Rev. Stat. § 1979, 42 U. S. C. § 1983—the statute
at issue in Newport—is, like the FCA, a federal law designed to beneﬁt
“the citizens of the United States, not the citizens of any individual State
that might violate the [statute].” A better reading of Newport is that we
were concerned with imposing punitive damages on taxpayers under any
circumstances.
“ ‘[Punitive damages], being evidently vindictive, cannot,
in our opinion, be sanctioned by this court, as they are to be borne by
widows, orphans, aged men and women, and strangers, who, admitting
that they must repair the injury inﬂicted by the Mayor on the plaintiff,
cannot be bound beyond that amount, which will be sufﬁcient for her in-
demniﬁcation.’ ” Newport, supra, at 261 (quoting McGary v. President &
Council of City of Lafayette, 12 Rob. 668, 677 (La. 1846)).

16 As the dissent correctly points out, see post, at 801, n. 11, treble dam-
ages may be reduced to double damages in certain cases, see § 3729(a).
This exception, however, applies only in some of those (presumably few)
cases involving defendants who provide information concerning the vio-
lation before they have knowledge that an investigation is underway.
See ibid.