Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/19pdf/19-267_1an2.pdf
Page Number: 32

Cite as:  591 U. S. ____ (2020) 

1 

THOMAS, J., concurring 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

_________________ 

Nos. 19–267 and 19–348 
_________________ 

19–267 

OUR LADY OF GUADALUPE SCHOOL, PETITIONER 
v. 
AGNES MORRISSEY-BERRU 

19–348 

ST. JAMES SCHOOL, PETITIONER 
v. 
DARRYL BIEL, AS PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE 
ESTATE OF KRISTEN BIEL 

ON WRITS OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT 

[July 8, 2020]

 JUSTICE  THOMAS,  with  whom  JUSTICE  GORSUCH  joins,

concurring. 

I agree with the Court that Morrissey-Berru’s and Biel’s 
positions fall within the “ministerial exception,”1 because, 
as  Catholic  school  teachers,  they  are  charged  with 
“carry[ing] out [the religious] mission” of the parish schools. 
Ante, at 21.  The Court properly notes that “judges have no 
warrant  to  second-guess  [the  schools’]  judgment”  of  who
should hold such a position “or to impose their own creden-
tialing requirements.”  Ante, at 24.  Accordingly, I join the 
Court’s opinion in full.  I write separately, however, to reit-
erate my view that the Religion Clauses require civil courts 

—————— 

1 As the Court acknowledges, the term “ministerial exception” is some-
what of a misnomer.  See ante, at 11.  The First Amendment’s protection 
of religious organizations’ employment decisions is not limited to mem-
bers of the clergy or others holding positions akin to that of a “minister.” 
Ibid.  Rather, as these cases demonstrate, such protection extends to the 
laity, provided they are entrusted with carrying out the religious mission 
of the organization.  Ante, at 2, 21.