Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/529bv.pdf
Page Number: 482.0

529US2

Unit: $U46

[10-07-01 17:18:24] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 529 U. S. 362 (2000)

407

Opinion of the Court

Justice Stevens would instead construe § 2254(d)(1)’s
“contrary to” clause to encompass such a routine state-court
decision. That construction, however, saps the “unreason-
able application” clause of any meaning.
If a federal habeas
court can, under the “contrary to” clause, issue the writ
whenever it concludes that the state court’s application of
clearly established federal law was incorrect, the “unreason-
able application” clause becomes a nullity. We must, how-
ever, if possible, give meaning to every clause of the statute.
Justice Stevens not only makes no attempt to do so, but
also construes the “contrary to” clause in a manner that en-
sures that the “unreasonable application” clause will have no
independent meaning. See ante, at 385–386, 388–390. We
reject that expansive interpretation of the statute. Read-
ing § 2254(d)(1)’s “contrary to” clause to permit a federal
court to grant relief in cases where a state court’s error is
limited to the manner in which it applies Supreme Court
precedent is suspect given the logical and natural ﬁt of the
neighboring “unreasonable application” clause to such cases.
The Fourth Circuit’s interpretation of the “unreasonable
application” clause of § 2254(d)(1) is generally correct. That
court held in Green that a state-court decision can involve an
“unreasonable application” of this Court’s clearly established
precedent in two ways. First, a state-court decision in-
volves an unreasonable application of this Court’s precedent
if the state court identiﬁes the correct governing legal rule
from this Court’s cases but unreasonably applies it to the
facts of the particular state prisoner’s case. Second, a
state-court decision also involves an unreasonable applica-
tion of this Court’s precedent if the state court either unrea-
sonably extends a legal principle from our precedent to a
new context where it should not apply or unreasonably re-
fuses to extend that principle to a new context where it
should apply. See 143 F. 3d, at 869–870.

A state-court decision that correctly identiﬁes the govern-
ing legal rule but applies it unreasonably to the facts of a