Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/21pdf/21-499_gfbh.pdf
Page Number: 12

8 

VEGA v. TEKOH 

Opinion of the Court 

(“[A]ny criminal trial use against a defendant of his invol-
untary statement is a denial of due process of law” (empha-
sis  deleted)).    Engaging  in  the  process  we  described  in 
Shatzer, the Harris Court considered the benefits of forbid-
ding impeachment but dismissed “the speculative possibil-
ity”  that  this  would  discourage  “impermissible  police  con-
duct,”  and  on  the  other  side  of  the  scale,  it  feared  that 
barring  impeachment  would  turn  Miranda  into  “a  license 
to use perjury by way of a defense.”  401 U. S., at 225–226. 
A similar analysis was used in Michigan v. Tucker, 417 
U. S. 443, 450–452, n. 26 (1974), where the Court held that 
the  “fruits”  of  an  un-Mirandized  statement  can  be  admit-
ted.  The  Court  noted  that  “the  ‘fruits’  of  police  conduct
which  actually  infringe[s]”  a  defendant’s  constitutional 
rights must be suppressed.  Id., at 445; see also Wong Sun 
v. United States, 371 U. S. 471 (1963) (applying the rule in
the  context  of  a  Fourth  Amendment  violation).  But  the 
Court distinguished police conduct that “abridge[s] [a per-
son’s]  constitutional  privilege  against  compulsory  self- 
incrimination”  from  conduct  that  “depart[s]  only  from  the 
prophylactic standards later laid down by this Court in Mi-
randa to safeguard that privilege.”  417 U. S., at 445–446. 
Because  there  had  been  only  a  Miranda  violation  in  that 
case, the Wong Sun rule of automatic exclusion was found 
to be inapplicable.  See 417 U. S., at 445–446.  Instead, the 
Court asked whether the Miranda rules’ prophylactic pur-
poses  justified  the  exclusion  of  the  fruits  of  the  violation,
and after “balancing the interests involved,” it held that ex-
clusion was not required.  417 U. S., at 447–452. 

In New York v. Quarles, 467 U. S. 649, 654–657 (1984),
the Court held that statements obtained in violation of Mi-
randa need not be suppressed when the questioning is con-
ducted to address an ongoing “public safety” concern.  The 
Court  reasoned  that  Miranda  warnings  are  “ ‘not  them-
selves rights protected by the Constitution’ ” and that “the 
need for answers to questions in a situation posing a threat