Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/20pdf/19-1039_8n5a.pdf
Page Number: 5

Cite as:  594 U. S. ____ (2021) 

5 

Syllabus 

twined  with  condemnation  authority.    Separating  the  two  would  di-
minish the eminent domain power of the federal sovereign, which the 
State  may  not  do.  See  Kohl,  91  U.  S.,  at  374.    Absent  the  power  to 
condemn States’ property interests, the only constitutionally permis-
sible way of exercising the federal eminent domain power would be to 
take  property  up  front  and  require  States  to  sue  for  compensation 
later.  State sovereign immunity would not be served by favoring pri-
vate or Government-supported invasions of state-owned lands over ju-
dicial proceedings.

The Court held in United States v. Texas, 143 U. S. 621, that it “does 
no violence to the inherent nature of sovereignty” for a State to be sued 
by “the government established for the common and equal benefit of
the people of all the States.”  Id., at 646.  In so holding, the Court did 
not insist upon examples from the founding era of federal suits against
States.  Similar structural considerations support the conclusion that
States consented to the federal eminent domain power, whether that 
power is exercised by the Government or its delegatees.  The absence 
of a perfect historical analogue to the proceedings PennEast initiated
below does not suggest otherwise.  Pp. 14–21.

(3) Finally,  respondents  argue  that  even  if  States  agreed  in  the
plan of the Convention to condemnation suits by Federal Government
delegatees, the NGA does not authorize such suits with the clarity re-
quired by the Court’s precedents.  There is no requirement, however, 
that the Federal Government speak with “unmistakable clarity” when 
authorizing a private party to exercise its eminent domain power.  Pp.
21–22. 

938 F. 3d 96, reversed and remanded. 

ROBERTS, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BREYER, 
ALITO,  SOTOMAYOR,  and  KAVANAUGH,  JJ.,  joined.  GORSUCH,  J.,  filed  a 
dissenting opinion, in which THOMAS, J., joined.  BARRETT, J., filed a dis-
senting opinion, in which THOMAS, KAGAN, and GORSUCH, JJ., joined.