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Page Number: 40

Cite as:  602 U. S. ____ (2024) 

5 

KAVANAUGH, J., concurring 

role than an approach where judges subtly (or not so subtly) 
impose their own policy views on the American people.

Judges are like umpires, as THE CHIEF JUSTICE has aptly
explained.  And in a constitutional system that counts on
an independent Judiciary, judges must act like umpires.  To 
be an umpire, the judge “must stick close to the text and the
history,  and  their  fair  implications,”  because  there  “is  no 
principled way” for a neutral judge “to prefer any claimed 
human value to any other.”  R. Bork, Neutral Principles and 
Some First Amendment Problems, 47 Ind. L. J. 1, 8 (1971). 
History  establishes  a  “criterion  that  is  conceptually  quite 
separate  from  the  preferences  of  the  judge  himself.”  A. 
Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. Cin. L. Rev. 849,
864  (1989).  When  properly  applied,  history  helps  ensure
that  judges  do  not  simply  create  constitutional  meaning 
“out of whole cloth.”  A. Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of 
Rules, 56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1175, 1183 (1989).2 

Absent  precedent, 

therefore,  history  guides 

the 
interpretation of vague constitutional text.  Of course, this 
Court has been deciding constitutional cases for about 230 
years,  so  relevant  precedent  often  exists.  As  the  Court’s 
opinions over time amply demonstrate, precedent matters
a great deal in constitutional interpretation. 

I now turn to explaining how courts apply pre-ratification 

—————— 

2 The historical approach applies when the text is vague.  But the text 
of the Constitution always controls.  So history contrary to clear text is 
not  to  be  followed.    See,  e.g.,  INS  v.  Chadha,  462  U. S.  919,  945–959 
(1983); Powell v. McCormack, 395 U. S. 486, 546–547 (1969); Brown v. 
Board of Education, 347 U. S. 483, 490–495, and n. 5 (1954); cf. Sedition 
Act of 1798, ch. 74, 1 Stat. 596.  In some cases, there may be debate about 
whether  the  relevant  text  is  sufficiently  clear  to  override  contrary 
historical practices.  See, e.g., NLRB v. Noel Canning, 573 U. S. 513, 613 
(2014) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment) (“What the majority needs to 
sustain its judgment is an ambiguous text and a clear historical practice.
What it has is a clear text and an at-best-ambiguous historical practice”).
The  basic  principle  remains:    Text  controls  over  contrary  historical 
practices.