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Syllabus

MUSCARELLO v. UNITED STATES

certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the fifth circuit

No. 96–1654. Argued March 23, 1998—Decided June 8, 1998*

A person who “uses or carries a ﬁrearm” “during and in relation to” a
“drug trafﬁcking crime” is subject to a 5-year mandatory prison term.
18 U. S. C. § 924(c)(1).
In the ﬁrst case, police ofﬁcers found a handgun
locked in the glove compartment of petitioner Muscarello’s truck, which
he was using to transport marijuana for sale.
In the second case, fed-
eral agents at a drug-sale point found drugs and guns in the trunk of
petitioners’ car.
In both cases, the Courts of Appeals found that peti-
tioners had carried ﬁrearms in violation of § 924(c)(1).

Held: The phrase “carries a ﬁrearm” applies to a person who knowingly
possesses and conveys ﬁrearms in a vehicle, including in the locked
glove compartment or trunk of a car, which the person accompanies.
Pp. 127–139.

(a) As a matter of ordinary English, one can “carry ﬁrearms” in a
wagon, car, truck, or other vehicle which one accompanies. The word’s
ﬁrst, or basic, meaning in dictionaries and the word’s origin make clear
that “carry” includes conveying in a vehicle. The greatest of writers
have used “carry” with this meaning, as has the modern press. Con-
trary to the arguments of petitioners and the dissent, there is no linguis-
tic reason to think that Congress intended to limit the word to its sec-
ondary meaning, which suggests support rather than movement or
transportation, as when, for example, a column “carries” the weight of
an arch. Given the word’s ordinary meaning, it is not surprising that
the Federal Courts of Appeals have unanimously concluded that “carry”
is not limited to the carrying of weapons directly on the person but can
include their carriage in a car. Pp. 127–132.

(b) Neither the statute’s basic purpose—to combat the “dangerous
combination” of “drugs and guns,” Smith v. United States, 508 U. S. 223,
240—nor its legislative history supports circumscribing the scope of the
word “carry” by applying an “on the person” limitation. Pp. 132–134.
(c) Petitioners’ remaining arguments to the contrary—that the deﬁ-
nition adopted here obliterates the statutory distinction between
“carry” and “transport,” a word used in other provisions of the “ﬁre-

*Together with No. 96–8837, Cleveland et al. v. United States, on certio-

rari to the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit.