Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/524bv.pdf
Page Number: 439

524US2

Unit: $U91

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394 WISCONSIN DEPT. OF CORRECTIONS v. SCHACHT

Kennedy, J., concurring

its. See Florida Dept. of State v. Treasure Salvors, Inc.,
458 U. S. 670, 683, n. 18 (1982) (plurality opinion); see also
Calderon v. Ashmus, 523 U. S. 740, 745, n. 2 (1998); Penn-
hurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U. S. 89,
99, n. 8 (1984); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S. 651, 678 (1974);
Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury of Ind., 323 U. S.
459, 467 (1945).

I have my doubts about the propriety of this rule.

In per-
mitting the belated assertion of the Eleventh Amendment
bar, we allow States to proceed to judgment without facing
any real risk of adverse consequences. Should the State
prevail, the plaintiff would be bound by principles of res judi-
If the State were to lose, however, it could void the
cata.
entire judgment simply by asserting its immunity on appeal.
This departure from the usual rules of waiver stems from
the hybrid nature of the jurisdictional bar erected by the
In certain respects, the immunity
Eleventh Amendment.
bears substantial similarity to personal jurisdiction require-
ments, since it can be waived and courts need not raise the
issue sua sponte. See Patsy v. Board of Regents of Fla.,
457 U. S. 496, 516, n. 19 (1982). Permitting the immunity to
be raised at any stage of the proceedings, in contrast, is more
consistent with regarding the Eleventh Amendment as a
limit on the federal courts’ subject-matter jurisdiction. See
Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de
Guinee, 456 U. S. 694, 702–704 (1982) (comparing personal
jurisdiction with subject-matter jurisdiction). We have
noted the inconsistency. Although the text is framed in
terms of the extent of the “Judicial power of the United
States,” U. S. Const., Amdt. 11, our precedents have treated
the Eleventh Amendment as “enact[ing] a sovereign im-
munity from suit, rather than a nonwaivable limit on the fed-
eral judiciary’s subject-matter jurisdiction.”
Idaho v. Coeur
d’Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U. S. 261, 267 (1997); see also
E. Chemerinsky, Federal Jurisdiction § 7.6, p. 405 (2d ed.
1994) (noting that allowing waiver of the immunity “seems