Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/22pdf/21-857_4357.pdf
Page Number: 71

Cite as:  599 U. S. ____ (2023) 

39 

JACKSON, J., dissenting 

bar in §2255(h). 

In other words, as I see it, the negative inference that the
majority draws today rests on nothing—and certainly noth-
ing that actually derives from Congress’s intent.  Nothing
in the text of §2255, background principles concerning ha-
beas relief, or AEDPA’s enactment history compels (or even
supports)  the  conclusion  that  Congress  intended  to  com-
pletely  foreclose  claims  like  Jones’s.    And  it  is  especially 
perverse to read the statute to lead to that result when do-
ing so gives rise to legally dissonant, arbitrary, and unten-
able outcomes.  So, the majority’s “straightforward” deter-
mination  that  this  statute  does  preclude  a  prisoner  in 
Jones’s position from filing a successive petition to assert a 
legal innocence claim (which it reaches by refusing to follow 
the procedural norm that would have correctly framed the 
issue as a matter of congressional intent relative to clear-
statement principles) appears to stem from the Court’s own
views concerning finality, not the will of Congress. 

Ultimately,  of  course,  this  all  begs  the  question  of  how 
(and whether) Congress will respond to the Court’s system-
atic neutering of the balanced postconviction processes that
the Legislature has established.  It seems to me that today’s
opinion—which unjustifiably closes off all avenues for cer-
tain defendants to secure meaningful consideration of their
innocence claims—creates an opening for Congress to step
in and fix this problem.