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Page Number: 17

12 

AXON ENTERPRISE, INC. v. FTC 

Opinion of the Court 

Thunder Basin, 510 U. S., at 212–213.  Thunder Basin and 
Elgin  both  make  clear that  adequate  judicial review  does 
not usually demand a district court’s involvement.  Review 
of agency action in a court of appeals can alone “meaning-
fully address[ ]” a party’s claims.  Thunder Basin, 510 U. S., 
at  215; see  Elgin, 567 U. S.,  at  21 (holding  that  Congress 
provided  “meaningful  review”  in  authorizing  the  Federal 
Circuit  “to  consider  and  decide  petitioners’  constitutional 
claims”).2  Still more, we agree with the Government that 
the  reason  Free  Enterprise  Fund  gave  for  departing  from 
Thunder Basin and Elgin on the judicial review issue does 
not apply to the cases before us.  See Brief for Federal Par-
ties 39–40.  As just described, Free Enterprise Fund’s anal-
ysis  on  that  score  relied  on  the  separation  between  the 
Board and the SEC.  See supra, at 10.  The accounting firm, 
recall, was enmeshed in  a Board investigation.  But some 
Board  actions  never  go  to  the  SEC—and  the  statutory 
scheme, we explained, “provides only for judicial review of 
Commission action.”  561 U. S., at 490 (emphasis in origi-
nal).  That meant the accounting firm, absent district court 
jurisdiction,  might  never  have  had  judicial recourse.  But 
no such worry exists here.  Cochran and Axon are parties 
in ongoing SEC and FTC proceedings, and the statutes at 
issue  provide  for  judicial  review  of  SEC  and  FTC  action. 
See 15 U. S. C. §§45(c), 78y(a).  Under those statutes, Axon 
and Cochran can (eventually) obtain review of their consti-
tutional claims through an appeal from an adverse agency 

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2 That is so, as both decisions held, even if the agency itself could not 
have  considered or remedied the party’s  claim—for example, when the 
agency  lacks  the  power  to  “declare  a  statute unconstitutional.”  Elgin, 
567 U. S., at 17; see Thunder Basin, 510 U. S., at 215.  It is also so, as 
Thunder  Basin  illustrates,  regardless  of  whether  the  claim  involves  a 
matter of substance (e.g., the coal company’s alleged right to exclude un-
ion officials) or one of procedure (e.g., the company’s asserted entitlement 
to an earlier hearing).  See id., at 214–215; supra, at 8–9.