Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/22pdf/21-806_2dp3.pdf
Page Number: 65.0

Cite as:  599 U. S. ____ (2023) 

33 

THOMAS, J., dissenting 

Amendments.  See id., at 6–8. 

But  the  Court’s  opinion  completely  missed  the  deeper
conceptual question whether spending-power statutes can 
ever  impose  obligations,  and  thus  secure  corresponding
rights,  with  the  force  of  federal  law.13   As  explained  at
length above, the limited nature of the spending power dic-
tates  a  negative  answer.    And,  a  contrary  understanding
would transform the terms of federal-state agreements into
binding regulations of state entities by federal law—violat-
ing the constitutional prohibition against directly regulat-
ing or commandeering the States.

It took less than a year after Thiboutot for the Court to 
realize  the  “ ‘constitutional  difficulties’  with  imposing  af-
firmative obligations on the States pursuant to the spend-
ing power” and to take the first step toward  ameliorating
the problems with Thiboutot.  Pennhurst, 451 U. S., at 17, 
n. 13.  In Pennhurst, the Court held that a provision of the 
Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act 
(a conditional spending Act) could not be enforced against a 
state entity under §1983.  Id., at 18.  The Court first held 
that the provision could not be considered as enforcement 
legislation under the Fourteenth Amendment.  Id., at 16– 
17.14  The Court then explained the fundamentally different 
—————— 

13 In dissent, Justice Powell set out the textual and historical case for 
interpreting §1983 to apply only to rights secured by laws enacted under
Congress’  enforcement  powers.    Thiboutot,  448  U. S.,  at  11;  see  also 
Chapman  v.  Houston  Welfare  Rights  Organization,  441  U. S.  600,  623 
(1979) (Powell, J., concurring).  However, neither the Court, the parties,
nor the dissent examined whether, even if they were considered “laws” 
for §1983 purposes, spending-power provisions could “secure” rights. 

14 The  court  below  had  recognized  but  avoided  the  spending-power 
question by holding that Congress enacted the legislation at issue pur-
suant to its power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment.  See Halder-
man v. Pennhurst State School and Hospital, 612 F. 2d 84, 98 (CA3 1979)
(“[W]e are not dealing with the implication of a private cause of action 
from a congressional enactment justified only by the spending power of 
the federal government, and we need not address the question whether 
such a statute could ever provide the predicate for private substantive