Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/19pdf/18-1023_m64o.pdf
Page Number: 40

Cite as:  590 U. S. ____ (2020) 

5 

ALITO, J., dissenting 

calls the “money-mandating” test, ante, at 26–27, and our 
recent decisions regarding the recognition of private rights
of action.  Take the statute at issue in our Comcast decision. 
That provision, 42 U. S. C. §1981(a), states: 

“All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States 
shall have the same right in every State and Territory 
to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give 
evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws
and proceedings for the security of persons and prop-
erty  as  is  enjoyed  by  white  citizens.” 
(Emphasis
added.) 

Our opinion in Comcast suggested that we might not find 
this “shall have” language sufficient to justify the recogni-
tion of a damages claim if the question came before us today 
as a matter of first impression.  See 589 U. S., at ___–___ 
(slip op., at 5–6).  But if that is so, how can we reach a dif-
ferent conclusion with respect to the “shall pay” language
in §1342 of the Affordable Care Act?  Similarly, the Fourth
Amendment  provides  that  “[t]he  right  of  the  people  to  be 
secure . . . against unreasonable . . . seizures . . . shall not 
be violated.”  (Emphasis added.)  Can this rights-mandating 
language  be  distinguished  from  what  the  Court  describes 
as the “money-mandating” language found in §1342?  See 
Hernández, 589 U. S., at ___, ___–___ (slip op., at 8, 19–20) 
(rejecting extension of Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcot-
ics  Agents,  403  U. S.  388  (1971),  to  Fourth  Amendment 
claim arising in a “new context”).

One might argue that the assumptions underlying the en-
actment of the Tucker Act justify our exercising more lee-
way in inferring rights of action that may be asserted under
that Act.  When the Tucker Act was enacted in 1887, Con-
gress  undoubtedly  assumed  that  the  federal  courts  would 
“ ‘[r]ais[e] up causes of action,’ ” Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 
U. S. 275, 287 (2001), in the manner of a common-law court.
At that time, federal courts often applied general common