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Page Number: 18.0

14 

TORRES v. TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY 

Opinion of the Court 

The  dissent  makes  two  further  points.    First,  it  quotes 
Alden v. Maine for the proposition that “ ‘the powers dele-
gated to Congress under Article I of the United States Con-
stitution do not include the power to subject nonconsenting 
States to private suits for damages in state courts.’ ”  Post, 
at 1, 8–9 (quoting 527 U. S., at 712; emphasis deleted).  But 
the  dissent  would  give  this  sentence  more  weight  than  it 
can bear.  The quoted passage appears in the introduction
to the Court’s opinion, and it refers summarily to Article I’s
general  delegations  (i.e.,  Congress’  broad  authority  under 
the  Supremacy  Clause  and  the  Necessary  and  Proper
Clause).  See Alden, 527 U. S., at 712; see also id., at 731– 
733  (discussing  same).  Alden  did  not,  in  this  sentence or 
elsewhere,  suggest  that  there  were  no  exceptions  under
which  Congress  could  authorize  private  suits  against
States.  In  fact,  Alden  said  the  opposite.  The  Court  ex-
pressly  embraced  “ ‘the  postulate  that  States  . . .  shall  be 
immune from suits, without their consent, save where there 
has  been  “a  surrender  of  this  immunity  in  the  plan  of  the 
convention.” ’ ” Id., at 730 (quoting Principality of Monaco, 
292 U. S., at 322–323, in turn quoting The Federalist No. 
81; emphasis added).  So, Alden made clear: “In exercising 
its Article I powers Congress may subject the States to pri-
vate suits in their own courts . . . if there is ‘compelling ev-
idence’  that  the  States  were  required  to  surrender  this
power to Congress pursuant to the Constitutional design.” 
527 U. S., at 730–731 (quoting Blatchford, 501 U. S., at 781; 
emphasis  added).    As  we  have  discussed,  PennEast  and 
Katz  recognize  such  exceptions  as  to  the  federal  eminent
domain power and the Bankruptcy Clause.  And they estab-
lish the test for what constitutes “compelling evidence” of 
structural waiver. 

The dissent next implies that PennEast and Katz create 
special  rules  regarding  waivers  of  sovereign  immunity  in 
federal courts that do not apply in state courts.  See post, at