Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/17pdf/16-499_1a7d.pdf
Page Number: 63

6 

JESNER v. ARAB BANK, PLC 

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting 

under international law, “the distinction between conduct 
that  does  and  conduct  that  does  not  violate  the  law  of 
nations can turn on whether the conduct is done by or on 
behalf  of  a  State  or  by  a  private  actor  independently  of  a 
State.”  Kiobel,  621  F. 3d,  at  177  (Leval,  J.,  concurring  in 
judgment).

The international-law norm against genocide, for exam­
ple,  imposes  obligations  on  all  actors.    Acts  of  genocide
thus  violate  the  norm  irrespective  of  whether  they  are 
committed  privately  or  in  concert  with  the  state.    See 
Convention  on  the  Prevention  and  Punishment  of  the 
Crime  of  Genocide,  Art.  II,  Dec.  9,  1948,  102  Stat.  3045 
(defining  “genocide”  as  “any  of  the  following  acts  commit­
ted with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national,
ethnical,  racial  or  religious  group”);  see  also  18  U. S. C. 
§1091(a) (“Whoever” commits genocide “shall be punished 
as  provided  in  subsection  (b)”).    In  contrast,  other  norms, 
like the prohibition on torture, require state action.  Con­
duct  thus  qualifies  as  torture  and  violates  the  norm  only
when done “by or at the instigation of or with the consent
or  acquiescence  of  a  public  official  or  other  person  acting
in  an  official  capacity.”    Convention  Against  Torture  and
Other  Cruel,  Inhuman  or  Degrading  Treatment  or  Pun­
ishment, Art. 1, Dec. 10, 1984, S. Treaty Doc. No. 100–20, 
1465 U. N. T. S. 114 (Torture Convention).1 

Footnote  20  in  Sosa  flags  this  distinction  and  instructs
courts  to  consider  whether  there  is  “sufficient  consensus” 
that,  with  respect  to  the  particular  conduct  prohibited
under  “a  given  norm,”  the  type  of  defendant  being  sued 
can  be  alleged  to  have  violated  that  specific  norm.  542 
U. S.,  at  732,  n. 20.    Because  footnote  20  contemplates  a 
—————— 

1 This  distinction  is  similar  to  the  state-action  doctrine  in  domestic 
law.  The prohibitions in the Bill of Rights, for instance, apply only to
state  actors,  whereas  the  Thirteenth  Amendment’s  prohibition  on 
slavery  applies  to  all  actors,  state  and  private.    See  United  States  v. 
Kozminski, 487 U. S. 931, 942 (1988).