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YSLETA DEL SUR PUEBLO v. TEXAS 

Syllabus 

ration Act’s directions superseded IGRA’s and guaranteed that the en-
tirety of “Texas’ gaming laws and regulations” would “operate as sur-
rogate  federal  law  on  the  Tribe’s  reservation.”    36  F. 3d  1325,  1326, 
1334 (Ysleta I).  In 2016, the Tribe began to offer bingo, including “elec-
tronic bingo” machines, on the view that IGRA treats bingo as a class
II game for which no state permission is required so long as the State 
permits the game to be played on some terms by some persons.  The 
State  then  sought  to  shut  down  all  of  the  Tribe’s  bingo  operations. 
Bound by Ysleta I, the District Court sided with Texas and enjoined
the Tribe’s bingo operations, but the court stayed the injunction pend-
ing  appeal.    The  Fifth  Circuit  reaffirmed  Ysleta  I  and  held  that  the 
Tribe’s bingo operations were impermissible because they did not con-
form to Texas’s bingo regulations. 

Held: The Restoration Act bans as a matter of federal law on tribal lands 

only those gaming activities also banned in Texas.  Pp. 8–20. 

(a) Section 107 of the Restoration Act directly addresses gaming on 
the lands of the Ysleta del Sur Pueblo.  It provides in subsection (a)
that “gaming activities which are prohibited by [Texas law] are hereby 
prohibited on the reservation and on lands of the tribe.”  Subsection 
(b) insists that the statute does not grant Texas “civil or criminal reg-
ulatory  jurisdiction”  with  respect  to  matters  covered  by  §107.    The 
State  reads  the  Act  as  effectively  subjecting  the  Tribe  to  the  entire
body of Texas gaming laws and regulations.  The Tribe, however, un-
derstands the Act to bar it from offering only those gaming activities 
the State fully prohibits, and that if Texas merely regulates bingo, the 
Tribe may also offer that game subject only to federal-law, not state-
law, limitations. 

The language of §107—particularly its dichotomy between prohibi-
tion and regulation—presents Texas with a problem.  Texas concedes 
that its laws do not “forbid,” “prevent,” “effectively stop,” or “make im-
possible” bingo operations in the State.  Webster’s Third International 
Dictionary 1813 (defining “prohibit”).  Instead, the State admits that 
it allows the game “according to rule[s]” that “fix the time,” place, and 
manner  in  which  it  may  be conducted.  Id.,  at  1913  (defining  “regu-
late”).  From this alone, Texas’s bingo laws appear to fall on the regu-
latory rather than prohibitory side of the line.  In response, Texas de-
scribes  its  laws  as  “prohibiting”  bingo  unless  the  State’s  regulations
are followed and insists that it is merely seeking to do what subsection
(a) allows.

Texas’s understanding of the word “prohibit” would risk turning the 
Restoration Act’s terms into an indeterminate mess.  In Texas’s view, 
laws regulating gaming activities become laws prohibiting gaming ac-
tivities—an interpretation that violates the rule against “ascribing to
one word a meaning so broad” that it assumes the same meaning as