Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/05pdf/04-1084.pdf
Page Number: 4

4 

GONZALES v. O CENTRO ESPIRITA BENEFICENTE 
UNIAO DO VEGETAL 
Syllabus 

mescaline  in  peyote,  another  Schedule  I  substance,  both  the  Execu-
tive  and  Congress  have  decreed  an  exception  from  the  Controlled 
Substances  Act  for  Native  American  religious  use  of  peyote,  see  21 
CFR  §1307.31;  42  U. S. C.  §1996a(b)(1).    If  such  use  is  permitted  in 
the  face  of  the  general  congressional  findings  for  hundreds  of  thou-
sands of Native Americans practicing their faith, those same findings 
alone cannot preclude consideration of a similar exception for the 130 
or  so  American  members  of  the  UDV  who  want  to  practice  theirs. 
See Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U. S. 520, 547. 
The  Government’s  argument  that  the  existence  of  a  congressional  ex-
emption for peyote does not indicate that the Controlled Substances Act 
is amenable to judicially crafted exceptions fails because RFRA plainly
contemplates court-recognized exceptions, see §2000bb–1(c).  Pp. 11–13. 
(c) The  peyote  exception  also  fatally  undermines  the  Govern-
ment’s broader contention that the Controlled Substances Act estab-
lishes a closed regulatory system that admits of no exceptions under 
RFRA.  The  peyote  exception  has  been  in  place  since  the  Controlled 
Substances Act’s outset, and there is no evidence that it has undercut 
the  Government’s  ability  to  enforce  the  ban  on  peyote  use  by  non-
Indians.    The  Government’s  reliance  on  pre-Smith  cases  asserting  a 
need for uniformity in rejecting claims for religious exemptions under 
the Free Exercise Clause is unavailing.  Those cases did not embrace 
the notion that a general interest in uniformity justified a substantial 
burden  on  religious  exercise,  but  instead  scrutinized  the  asserted 
need  and  explained  why  the  denied  exemptions  could  not  be  accom-
modated.  See,  e.g.,  United  States  v.  Lee,  455  U. S.  252,  258,  260. 
They show that the Government can demonstrate a compelling inter-
est  in  uniform  application  of  a  particular  program  by  offering  evi-
dence  that  granting  the  requested  religious  accommodations  would 
seriously compromise its ability to administer the program.  Here the 
Government’s uniformity argument rests not so much on the particu-
lar  statutory  program  at  issue  as  on  slippery  slope  concerns  that 
could be invoked in response to any RFRA claim for an exception to a 
generally applicable law, i.e., “if I make an exception for you, I’ll have 
to make one for everybody, so no exceptions.”  But RFRA operates by 
mandating  consideration,  under  the  compelling  interest  test,  of  ex-
ceptions to “rule[s] of general applicability.”  §2000bb–1(a).  Congress’ 
determination  that  the  legislated  test  is  “workable  . . .  for  striking 
sensible  balances between religious liberty and competing prior gov-
ernmental  interests,”  §200bb(a)(5),  finds  support  in  Sherbert,  supra, 
at 407, and Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U. S. ___, ___.  While there may 
be instances where a need for uniformity precludes the recognition of 
exceptions to generally applicable laws under RFRA, it would be sur-
prising to find that this was such a case, given the longstanding pe-