Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/19pdf/19-631_2d93.pdf
Page Number: 29.0

Cite as:  591 U. S. ____ (2020) 

1 

SOTOMAYOR, J., concurring in judgment 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

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No. 19–631 
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WILLIAM P. BARR, ATTORNEY GENERAL, ET AL., 
PETITIONERS v. AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF 
POLITICAL CONSULTANTS, INC., ET AL. 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT 

[July 6, 2020]

 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR, concurring in the judgment. 
I  agree  with  much  of  the  partial  dissent’s  explanation
that  strict  scrutiny  should  not  apply  to  all  content-based
distinctions.  Cf.  post,  at  5–9  (BREYER,  J.,  concurring  in 
judgment  with  respect  to  severability  and  dissenting  in 
part).  In my view, however, the government-debt exception 
in  47  U. S. C.  §227(b)  still  fails  intermediate  scrutiny  be-
cause it is not “narrowly tailored to serve a significant gov-
ernmental  interest.”  Ward  v.  Rock  Against  Racism,  491 
U. S.  781,  791  (1989)  (internal  quotation  marks  omitted). 
Even under intermediate scrutiny, the Government has not
explained  how  a  debt-collection  robocall  about  a  govern-
ment-backed debt is any less intrusive or could be any less
harassing than a debt-collection robocall about a privately 
backed debt.  As the Fourth Circuit noted, the government-
debt  exception  is  seriously  underinclusive  because  it  per-
mits  “many  of  the  intrusive  calls  that  the  automated  call 
ban was enacted to prohibit.”  American Assn. of Political 
Consultants,  Inc.  v.  FCC,  923  F. 3d  159,  168  (2019)  (case 
below).  The Government could have employed far less re-
strictive  means  to  further  its  interest  in  collecting  debt,
such as “secur[ing] consent from the debtors to make debt-
collection  calls”  or  “plac[ing]  the  calls  itself.”  Id.,  at  169,