Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/10pdf/09-751.pdf
Page Number: 17.0

Cite as:  562 U. S. ____ (2011) 

13 

Opinion of the Court 

chose to say it, is entitled to “special protection” under the 
First Amendment, and that protection cannot be overcome 
by a jury finding that the picketing was outrageous. 

For  all  these  reasons,  the  jury  verdict  imposing  tort
liability on Westboro for intentional infliction of emotional 
distress must be set aside. 

III 

The  jury  also  found  Westboro  liable  for  the  state  law 
torts of intrusion upon seclusion and civil conspiracy.  The 
Court  of  Appeals  did  not  examine  these  torts  independ-
ently of the intentional infliction of emotional distress tort. 
Instead,  the  Court  of  Appeals  reversed  the  District  Court 
wholesale, holding  that  the  judgment  wrongly  “attache[d] 
tort  liability  to  constitutionally  protected  speech.”    580 
F. 3d, at 226. 

Snyder  argues  that  even  assuming  Westboro’s  speech 
is  entitled  to  First  Amendment  protection  generally,  the
church is not immunized from liability for intrusion upon 
seclusion because Snyder was a member of a captive audi-
ence  at  his son’s  funeral.    Brief  for  Petitioner  45–46.  We 
do  not  agree.    In  most  circumstances,  “the  Constitution 
does  not  permit  the  government  to  decide  which  types  of 
otherwise  protected  speech  are  sufficiently  offensive  to 
require  protection  for  the  unwilling  listener  or  viewer.
Rather,  . . .  the  burden  normally  falls  upon  the  viewer  to
avoid further bombardment of [his] sensibilities simply by 
averting  [his]  eyes.”  Erznoznik  v.  Jacksonville,  422  U. S. 
205,  210–211  (1975)  (internal  quotation  marks  omitted).
As  a  result,  “[t]he  ability  of  government,  consonant  with 
the  Constitution,  to  shut  off  discourse  solely  to  protect 
others  from  hearing  it  is  . . .  dependent  upon  a  showing 
that substantial privacy interests are being invaded in an
essentially intolerable manner.”  Cohen v. California, 403 
U. S. 15, 21 (1971).

As  a  general  matter,  we  have  applied  the  captive  audi-