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Page Number: 179

18 

WONG  v.  BELMONTES 

Per Curiam 

montes  had  confessed  to  the  murder.  A  police  informant 
told detectives that Belmontes “bragged” about the murder, 
stating that he was “mad” at Howard because “the night be­
fore,  he  had  quite  a  [lot]  of  dope  and  wouldn’t  share  it  with 
him.”  After  double  jeopardy  protection  set  in  and  he  had 
been released on parole, Belmontes admitted his responsibil­
ity  for  the  murder  to  his  counselor  at  the  California  Youth 
Authority, Charles Sapien.  During his time in conﬁnement, 
Belmontes  had  “always  denied  that  he  was  the  [one]  who 
shot Jerry Howard.”  But because Sapien “had been square 
with  [Belmontes],”  Belmontes  decided  to  level  with  Sapien 
upon  his  release,  telling  Sapien  that  he  had  “ ‘wasted’  that 
guy.”  Record  2240;  Deposition  of  John  Schick,  Exhs.  62, 
63, 64. 

Schick  understood  the  gravity  of  this  aggravating  evi­
dence, and  he built  his mitigation  strategy around  the over­
riding  need  to  exclude  it.  California  evidentiary  rules, 
Schick  knew,  offered  him  an  argument  to  exclude  the  evi­
dence,  but  those  same  rules  made  clear  that  the  evidence 
would come in for rebuttal if Schick opened the door.  Rec­
ord  2256;  see  also  People  v.  Rodriguez,  42  Cal.  3d  730,  791– 
792, 726 P. 2d 113, 153 (1986); People v. Harris, 28 Cal. 3d 935, 
960–962,  623  P.  2d  240,  254  (1981).  Schick  thus  had  “grave 
concerns”  that,  even  if  he  succeeded  initially  in  excluding 
the  prior  murder  evidence,  it  would  still  be  admitted  if  his 
mitigation  case  swept  too  broadly.  Accordingly,  Schick  de­
cided to proceed cautiously, structuring his mitigation argu­
ments and witnesses to limit that possibility.  Deposition of 
John Schick 301, 309–310; see Strickland, supra, at 699 (“Re­
stricting  testimony  on  respondent’s  character  to  what  had 
come in at the plea colloquy ensured that contrary character 
and psychological evidence and respondent’s criminal history, 
which  counsel had  successfully  moved  to exclude,  would  not 
come in”). 

As  Schick  expected,  the  prosecution  was  ready  to  admit 
this evidence during the sentencing phase.  Schick moved to