Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/23pdf/23-939_e2pg.pdf
Page Number: 52

Cite as:  603 U. S. ____ (2024) 

1 

THOMAS, J., concurring 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

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No. 23–939 
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DONALD J. TRUMP, PETITIONER v. 
UNITED STATES 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT 

[July 1, 2024]

 JUSTICE THOMAS, concurring. 
Few things would threaten our constitutional order more
than criminally prosecuting a former President for his offi-
cial acts.  Fortunately, the Constitution does not permit us
to chart such a dangerous course.  As the Court forcefully
explains,  the  Framers “deemed  an  energetic  executive  es-
sential to . . . the security of liberty,” and our “system of sep-
arated  powers”  accordingly  insulates  the  President  from 
prosecution  for  his  official  acts.    Ante,  at  10,  42  (internal 
quotation  marks  omitted).    To  conclude  otherwise  would 
hamstring the vigorous Executive that our Constitution en-
visions.  “While  the  separation  of  powers  may  prevent  us 
from righting every wrong, it does so in order to ensure that 
we do not lose liberty.”  Morrison v. Olson, 487 U. S. 654, 
710–711 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).

I write separately to highlight another way in which this
prosecution  may  violate  our  constitutional  structure.    In 
this case, the Attorney General purported to appoint a pri-
vate citizen as Special Counsel to prosecute a former Presi-
dent on behalf of the United States.  But, I am not sure that 
any office for the Special Counsel has been “established by 
Law,” as the Constitution requires.  Art. II, §2, cl. 2.  By re-
quiring  that  Congress  create  federal  offices  “by  Law,”  the 
Constitution imposes an important check against the Pres-
ident—he cannot create offices at his pleasure.  If there is