Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/20pdf/19-1434_ancf.pdf
Page Number: 3

Cite as:  594 U. S. ____ (2021) 

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Syllabus 

through the threat of removal from federal service entirely because she 
can fire them only “for such cause as will promote the efficiency of the
service.”  5 U. S. C. §7513(a); see Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Finan-
cial  Protection  Bureau,  591  U. S.  ___,  ___.    And  the  possibility  of  an 
appeal to the Federal Circuit does not provide the necessary supervi-
sion.  APJs exercise executive power, and the President must be ulti-
mately responsible for their actions.  See Arlington v. FCC, 569 U. S. 
290, 305, n. 4. 

Given the insulation of PTAB decisions from any executive review,
the President can neither oversee the PTAB himself nor “attribute the 
Board’s failings to those whom he can oversee.”  Free Enterprise Fund 
v. Public Company Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U. S. 477, 496.  APJs 
accordingly  exercise  power  that  conflicts  with  the  design  of  the  Ap-
pointments Clause “to preserve political accountability.”  Edmond, 520 
U. S., at 663.  Pp. 8–14.

(c) History reinforces the conclusion that the unreviewable executive 
power exercised by APJs is incompatible with their status as inferior 
officers. Founding-era congressional statutes and early decisions from 
this  Court  indicate  that  adequate supervision  entails  review  of  deci-
sions issued by inferior officers.  See, e.g., 1 Stat. 66–67; Barnard v. 
Ashley, 18 How. 43, 45.  Congress carried that model of principal officer 
review  into  the  modern  administrative  state.    See,  e.g.,  5  U. S. C. 
§557(b). 

According  to  the  Government  and  Smith  &  Nephew,  heads  of  de-
partment appoint a handful of contemporary officers who purportedly
exercise  final  decisionmaking  authority.    Several  of  their  examples,
however, involve inferior officers whose decisions a superior executive 
officer can review or implement a system for reviewing.  See, e.g., Frey-
tag  v.  Commissioner,  501  U. S.  868.    Nor  does  the  structure  of  the 
PTAB draw support from the predecessor Board of Appeals, which de-
termined the patentability of inventions in panels composed of exam-
iners-in-chief without an appeal to the Commissioner.  44 Stat. 1335– 
1336.  Those Board decisions could be reviewed by the Court of Cus-
toms and Patent Appeals—an executive tribunal—and may also have
been subject to the unilateral control of the agency head.  Pp. 14–18.

(d) The  Court does  not  attempt  to  “set  forth  an  exclusive criterion 
for distinguishing between principal and inferior officers for Appoint-
ments Clause purposes.”  Edmond, 520 U. S., at 661.  Many decisions 
by inferior officers do not bind the Executive Branch to exercise exec-
utive power in a particular manner, and the Court does not address 
supervision outside the context of adjudication.  Here, however, Con-
gress  has  assigned  APJs  “significant  authority”  in  adjudicating  the 
public  rights  of  private  parties,  while  also  insulating  their  decisions
from review and their offices from removal.  Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S.