Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/558bv.pdf
Page Number: 212

Cite as: 558 U. S. 45 (2009) 

51 

Stevens, J., dissenting 

get a warrant, and that Fisher was screaming and throwing 
things.  Goolsby  also  testiﬁed  that  he  saw  “mere  drops”  of 
blood  outside  Fisher’s  home,  No.  276439,  2008  WL  786515, 
*2  (Mich.  App.,  Mar.  25,  2008)  (per  curiam)  (summarizing 
Goolsby’s testimony), and that he did not ask whether anyone 
else was inside.  Goolsby did not testify that he had any rea­
son to believe that anyone else was in the house.  Thus, the 
factual  question  was  whether  Goolsby  had  “an  objectively 
reasonable basis for believing that [Fisher was] seriously in­
jured  or  imminently  threatened  with  such  injury.”  Brig­
ham City v.  Stuart, 547 U. S. 398, 400 (2006). 

After  hearing  the  testimony,  the  trial  judge  was  “even 
more  convinced”  that  the  entry  was  unlawful.  Tr.  29  (Dec. 
19,  2006).  He  noted  the  issue  was  “whether  or  not  there 
was  a  reasonable  basis  to  [enter  the  house]  or  whether 
[Goolsby]  was  just  acting  on  some  possibilities,”  id.,  at  22, 
and  evidently  found  the  record  supported  the  latter  rather 
than  the  former.  He  found  the  police  decision  to  leave  the 
scene  and  not  return  for  several  hours—without  resolving 
any  potentially  dangerous  situation  and  without  calling  for 
medical  assistance—inconsistent  with  a  reasonable  belief 
that  Fisher  was  in  need  of  immediate  aid.  In  sum,  the  one 
judge  who  heard  Ofﬁcer  Goolsby’s  testimony  was  not  per­
suaded  that  Goolsby  had  an  objectively  reasonable  basis  for 
believing that entering Fisher’s home was necessary to avoid 
serious injury. 

The  Michigan  Court  of  Appeals  afﬁrmed,  concluding  that 
the  State  had  not  met  its  burden.  Perhaps  because  one 
judge  dissented,  the  Michigan  Supreme  Court  initially 
granted  an  application  for  leave  to  appeal.  After  consider­
ing  briefs  and  oral  argument,  however,  the  majority  of  that 
Court  vacated  its  earlier  order  because  it  was  “no  longer 
persuaded  that  the  questions  presented  should  be  reviewed 
by this Court.”  483 Mich. 1007, 765 N. W. 2d 19 (2009). 

Today,  without  having  heard  Ofﬁcer  Goolsby’s  testimony, 
this  Court  decides  that  the  trial  judge  got  it  wrong.  I  am