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Page Number: 10.0

8 

INTEL CORP. INVESTMENT POLICY COMM. v. SULYMA 

Opinion of the Court 

both forms of knowledge in a provision limiting ERISA ac-
tions, it has done so explicitly.  We cannot assume that it 
meant to do so by implication in §1113(2).  Instead we “gen-
erally presum[e] that Congress acts intentionally and pur-
posely when it includes particular language in one section
of  a  statute  but  omits  it  in  another.”    BFP  v.  Resolution 
Trust Corporation, 511 U. S. 531, 537 (1994) (internal quo-
tation marks omitted).

Petitioners dispute the characterization of anything less 
than actual knowledge as constructive knowledge, arguing 
that  the  latter  term  usually  refers  to  information  that  a 
plaintiff must seek out rather than information that is sent 
to him.  But if a plaintiff is not aware of a fact, he does not
have “actual knowledge” of that fact however close at hand 
the fact might be.  §1113(2).  And Congress has never added 
to §1113(2) the language it has used in other ERISA limita-
tions provisions to encompass both what a plaintiff actually
knows and what he reasonably could know.

As  presently  written,  therefore,  §1113(2)  requires  more
than evidence of disclosure alone.  That all relevant infor-
mation was disclosed to the plaintiff is no doubt relevant in 
judging whether he gained knowledge of that information. 
See Part III, infra.  To meet §1113(2)’s “actual knowledge”
requirement,  however,  the  plaintiff  must  in  fact  have  be-
come aware of that information. 

B 
Petitioners  offer  arguments  for  a  broader  reading  of
§1113(2) based on text, context, purpose, and statutory his-
tory.  All founder on Congress’s choice of the word “actual.” 
As for text, petitioners do not dispute the normal defini-
tions of “actual,” “knowledge,” or “actual knowledge.”  They
focus  instead  on  the  least  conspicuous  part  of  the  phrase 
“had actual knowledge”: the word “had.”  §1113(2).  Once a 
plaintiff  receives  a  disclosure,  they  argue,  he  “ha[s]”  the 
knowledge  that  §1113(2)  requires  because  he  effectively