Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/529bv.pdf
Page Number: 378.0

529US1

Unit: $U42

[10-11-01 11:58:08] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 529 U. S. 277 (2000)

303

Scalia, J., concurring in judgment

Petitioners do not contest these representations, but offer
in response only that Pap’s could very easily get back into
the nude dancing business. The Court adopts petitioners’
line, concluding that because respondent is still incorporated
in Pennsylvania, it “could again decide to operate a nude
dancing establishment in Erie.” Ante, at 287. That plainly
does not sufﬁce under our cases. The test for mootness we
have applied in voluntary-termination cases is not whether
the action originally giving rise to the controversy could not
conceivably reoccur, but whether it is “absolutely clear that
the . . . behavior could not reasonably be expected to recur.”
United States v. Concentrated Phosphate Export Assn., Inc.,
393 U. S. 199, 203 (1968) (emphasis added). Here I think
that test is met. According to Panos’ uncontested sworn af-
ﬁdavit, Pap’s ceased doing business at Kandyland, and the
premises were sold to an independent developer, in 1998—
the year before the petition for certiorari in this case was
ﬁled.
It strains credulity to suppose that the 72-year-old
Mr. Panos shut down his going business after securing his
victory in the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, and before the
city’s petition for certiorari was even ﬁled, in order to in-
crease his chances of preserving his judgment in the statisti-
cally unlikely event that a (not yet ﬁled) petition might be
granted. Given the timing of these events, given the fact
that respondent has no existing interest in nude dancing (or
in any other business), given Panos’ sworn representation
that he does not intend to invest—through Pap’s or other-
wise—in any nude dancing business, and given Panos’ ad-

ment. The only fact mentioned by the Court to justify regarding it as
perjurious is that respondent failed to raise mootness in its brief in opposi-
tion to the petition for certiorari. That may be good basis for censure, but
it is scant basis for suspicion of perjury—particularly since respondent, far
from seeking to “insulate a favorable decision from review,” ante, at 288,
asks us in light of the mootness to vacate the judgment below. Reply to
Brief in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss 5.