Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/17pdf/16-1161_dc8f.pdf
Page Number: 15

Cite as:  585 U. S. ____ (2018) 

11 

Opinion of the Court 

“a  majority  of  voters  in  [Pennsylvania]  should  be  able  to
elect  a  majority  of  [Pennsylvania’s]  congressional  delega­
tion”—as a “precept” for which there is “no authority.”  Id., 
at  308.  Yet  JUSTICE  KENNEDY  recognized  the  possibility 
that  “in  another  case  a  standard  might  emerge  that  suit- 
ably demonstrates how an apportionment’s de facto incor­
poration  of  partisan  classifications  burdens”  representa­
tional rights.  Id., at 312. 

Four  Justices  dissented  in  three  different  opinions.
Justice  Stevens  would  have  permitted  the  plaintiffs’
claims  to  proceed  on  a  district-by-district  basis,  using  a
legal  standard  similar  to  the  standard  for  racial  gerry­
mandering  set  forth  in  Shaw  v.  Hunt,  517  U. S.  899 
(1996).  See 541 U. S., at 335–336, 339.  Under this stand­
ard, any district with a “bizarre shape” for which the only 
possible explanation was “a naked desire to increase parti­
san  strength”  would  be  found  unconstitutional  under  the 
Equal  Protection  Clause. 
Id.,  at  339.  Justice  Souter, 
joined by JUSTICE GINSBURG, agreed that a plaintiff alleg­
ing  unconstitutional  partisan  gerrymandering  should 
proceed on a district-by-district basis, as “we would be able 
to call more readily on some existing law when we defined
what is suspect at the district level.”  See id., at 346–347. 

JUSTICE BREYER dissented on still other grounds.  In his 
view,  the  drawing  of  single-member  legislative  districts—
even according to traditional criteria—is “rarely . . . politi­
cally  neutral.”  Id.,  at  359.  He  therefore  would  have  dis­
tinguished  between  gerrymandering  for  passing  political 
advantage and gerrymandering leading to the “unjustified 
entrenchment” of a political party.  Id., at 360–361. 

The Court last took up this question in League of United 
Latin  American  Citizens  v.  Perry,  548  U. S.  399  (2006) 
(LULAC).  The  plaintiffs  there  challenged  a  mid-decade
redistricting map passed by the Texas Legislature.  As in 
Vieth,  a  majority  of  the  Court  could  find  no  justiciable 
standard  by  which  to  resolve  the  plaintiffs’  partisan  ger­