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HOLLYFRONTIER CHEYENNE REFINING, LLC v. 
RENEWABLE FUELS ASSN. 
Syllabus 

Sometimes it can refer to an increase in time.  5 Oxford English Dic-
tionary 597.  Other times it can refer to the act of offering or making 
something  available,  such  as  the  granting  of  a  benefit.    Id.,  at  595. 
Here, three textual clues show subparagraph (B)(i) uses “extension” in
its  temporal  sense.    First,  subparagraph  (A)(i)’s  initial  exemption  is
described temporally (as lasting “until calendar year 2011”).  Second, 
subparagraph  (A)(ii)’s  exemption  is  also  described  temporally—au-
thorizing EPA to “extend the exemption under clause (i) . . . for a period
of  not  less  than  2  years.”    Finally,  subparagraphs  (A)(ii)  and  (B)(i)
share an identical title—“Extension of exemption”—underscoring the 
likelihood  that  the  two  neighboring  provisions  use  the  term  “exten-
sion” in one consistent sense.  Pp. 4–5.

(b) Subparagraph (B)(i)’s temporal use of “extension,” however, does 
not require unbroken continuity.  The Tenth Circuit erred by imposing 
such a requirement here and concluding that a small refinery is per-
manently ineligible for an extension once an exemption lapses.  Pp. 6– 
12. 

(1)  The  plain  meaning  of  “extension”  does  not  require unbroken 
continuity.    Dictionary  definitions  contemplate  the  possibility  of  re-
sumption after an interruption.  Federal rules permit litigants to seek
(and courts to grant) an “extension” of time even after a lapse.  See 28 
U. S. C. §2107(c); Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 6(b)(1).  And recent federal stat-
utes provide an “extension” of benefits that previously expired months
or even years earlier.  See Pub. L. 116–260, §203, 134 Stat. 1182; Pub.
L. 116–136, §2114, 134 Stat. 281.  Pp. 6–8.

(2) A different statutory context might make for a different out-
come, for example, where Congress uses modifying language requiring 
an extension to be “consecutive” or “successive.”  See, e.g., 8 U. S. C. 
§1184(g)(8)(D).  But the statutory context here confirms the best read-
ing of subparagraph (B)(i) does not require unbroken continuity.  The 
absence of any “consecutive” or “successive” language suggests exemp-
tions need not follow one another without interruption.  By authorizing
small refineries to seek a hardship exemption “at any time,” subpara-
graph (B)(i) points to an expansive meaning that invites small refiner-
ies to seek hardship exemptions in different years as market conditions
change.  And subparagraph (A), the immediately preceding paragraph, 
contemplates extension of exemption coverage even after interruption. 
See  42  U. S. C.  §7545(o)(1)(K),  (o)(9)(A)(i),  (o)(9)(A)(ii).  Before  the 
Tenth Circuit, EPA pressed a similar argument by pointing to a 2014
regulation, 40 CFR §80.1441(e)(2)(iii), and asking for deference under 
Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 
U. S. 837.  Because “the government is not invoking Chevron” now, the 
Court declines to consider whether any deference is due.  Pp. 8–11.

(3) Respondents contend the statute establishes a general sunset