Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/19pdf/19-635_o7jq.pdf
Page Number: 3.0

Cite as:  591 U. S. ____ (2020) 

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Syllabus 

impairment  of  the  Executive’s  ability  to  perform  its  constitutionally 
mandated functions.”  Clinton v. Jones, 520 U. S. 681, 702–703.  But 
the President claims that state criminal subpoenas necessarily pose a 
unique threat of impairment and thus require absolute immunity.  His 
categorical argument focuses on three burdens: diversion, stigma, and 
harassment.  Pp. 10–17. 

(i) The President contends that complying with state criminal sub-
poenas would necessarily distract the Chief Executive from his duties.  
He  grounds  that  concern  on  Nixon  v.  Fitzgerald,  which  recognized  a 
President’s “absolute immunity from damages liability predicated on 
his official acts.”  457 U. S. 731, 749.  But, contrary to the President’s 
suggestion,  that  case  did  not  hold  that  distraction  was  sufficient  to 
confer  absolute  immunity.    Indeed,  the  Court  expressly  rejected  im-
munity based on distraction alone 15 years later in Clinton v. Jones, 
when President Clinton sought absolute immunity from civil liability 
for private acts.  As the Court explained, Fitzgerald’s “dominant con-
cern”  was  not  mere  distraction  but  the  distortion  of  the  Executive’s 
“decisionmaking process.”  520 U. S., at 694, n. 19.  The prospect that 
a  President  may  become  “preoccupied  by  pending  litigation”  did  not 
ordinarily implicate constitutional concerns.  Id., at 705, n. 40.  Two 
centuries of experience likewise confirm that a properly tailored crim-
inal subpoena will not normally hamper the performance of a Presi-
dent’s constitutional duties.   
   The President claims this case is different.  He believes that he is 
under investigation and argues that the toll will necessarily be heavier 
in that circumstance.  But the President is not seeking immunity from 
the  diversion  occasioned  by  the  prospect  of  future  criminal  liability.  
He concedes that he may be investigated while in office.  His objection 
is instead limited to the additional distraction caused by the subpoena 
itself.  That argument, however, runs up against the 200 years of prec-
edent establishing that Presidents, and their official communications, 
are subject to judicial process, see Burr, 25 F. Cas., at 34, even when 
the  President  is  under  investigation,  see  Nixon,  418  U. S.,  at  706.  
Pp. 12–14. 

(ii) The President next claims that the stigma of being subpoenaed 
will undermine his leadership at home and abroad.  But even if a tar-
nished reputation were a cognizable impairment, there is nothing in-
herently stigmatizing about a President performing “the citizen’s nor-
mal  duty  of  . . .  furnishing  information  relevant”  to  a  criminal 
investigation.  Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U. S. 665, 691.  Nor can the 
risk of association with persons or activities under criminal investiga-
tion absolve a President of such an important public duty.  The conse-
quences for a President’s public standing will likely increase if he is