Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/558bv.pdf
Page Number: 636.0

Cite as: 558 U. S. 310 (2010) 

475 

Opinion of Stevens, J. 

nomics  to  the  realm  of  corporate  electioneering,  there  may 
be  no  “reason  to  think  the  market  ordering  is  intrinsically 
good at all,” Strauss 1386. 

The Court’s blinkered and aphoristic approach to the First 
Amendment  may  well  promote  corporate  power  at  the  cost 
of  the  individual  and  collective  self-expression  the  Amend­
ment  was  meant  to  serve.  It  will  undoubtedly  cripple  the 
ability of ordinary citizens, Congress, and the States to adopt 
even  limited  measures  to  protect  against  corporate  domina­
tion of the electoral process.  Americans may be forgiven if 
they  do  not  feel  the  Court  has  advanced  the  cause  of  self-
government today. 

2.  Shareholder Protection 

There  is  yet  another  way  in  which  laws  such  as  § 203  can 
serve  First  Amendment  values.  Interwoven  with  Austin’s 
concern  to  protect the  integrity  of  the  electoral process  is  a 
concern  to  protect  the  rights  of  shareholders  from  a  kind 
of  coerced  speech:  electioneering  expenditures  that  do  not 
“reﬂec[t] [their] support.”  494 U. S., at 660–661.  When cor­
porations  use  general  treasury  funds  to  praise  or  attack  a 
particular  candidate  for  ofﬁce,  it  is  the  shareholders,  as  the 
residual  claimants,  who  are  effectively  footing  the  bill. 
Those shareholders who disagree with the corporation’s elec­
toral  message  may  ﬁnd  their  ﬁnancial  investments  being 
used to undermine their political convictions. 

The PAC mechanism, by contrast, helps ensure that those 
who  pay  for  an  electioneering  communication  actually  sup­
port its content and that managers do not use general treas­
uries  to  advance  personal  agendas.  Ibid.  It  “ ‘allows  cor­
porate  political  participation  without  the  temptation  to  use 
corporate funds for political inﬂuence, quite possibly at odds 
with  the  sentiments  of  some  shareholders  or  members.’ ” 
McConnell,  540  U. S.,  at  204  (quoting  Beaumont,  539  U. S., 
at  163).  A  rule  that  privileges  the  use  of  PACs  thus  does 
more than facilitate the political speech of like-minded share­