Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/22pdf/20-1199_l6gn.pdf
Page Number: 34

26  STUDENTS FOR FAIR ADMISSIONS, INC. v. PRESIDENT 

AND FELLOWS OF HARVARD COLLEGE 
Opinion of the Court 

diverse.’ ”  Parents Involved, 551 U. S., at 724 (quoting Grut-
ter, 539 U. S., at 329).  And given the mismatch between the
means respondents employ and the goals they seek, it is es-
pecially  hard  to  understand  how  courts  are  supposed  to 
scrutinize the admissions programs that respondents use. 
The universities’ main response to these criticisms is, es-
sentially,  “trust  us.”  None  of  the  questions  recited  above
need  answering,  they  say,  because  universities  are  “owed 
deference” when using race to benefit some applicants but 
not others.  Brief for University Respondents in No. 21–707, 
at 39 (internal quotation marks omitted).  It is true that our 
cases have recognized a “tradition of giving a degree of def-
erence to a university’s academic decisions.”  Grutter, 539 
U. S.,  at  328.    But  we  have  been unmistakably  clear  that
any  deference  must  exist  “within  constitutionally  pre-
scribed  limits,”  ibid.,  and  that  “deference  does  not  imply
abandonment or abdication of judicial review,” Miller–El v. 
Cockrell, 537 U. S. 322, 340 (2003).  Universities may define
their  missions  as  they  see  fit.  The  Constitution  defines 
ours.  Courts  may  not  license  separating  students  on  the 
basis of race without an exceedingly persuasive justification 
that is measurable and concrete enough to permit judicial
review.  As this Court has repeatedly reaffirmed, “[r]acial 
classifications are simply too pernicious to permit any but 
the most exact connection between justification and classi-
fication.”  Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U. S. 244, 270 (2003) (in-
ternal  quotation  marks  omitted).  The  programs  at  issue
here do not satisfy that standard.5 

—————— 

5 For that reason, one dissent candidly advocates abandoning the de-
mands of strict scrutiny.  See post, at 24, 26–28 (opinion of JACKSON, J.) 
(arguing the Court must “get out of the way,” “leav[e] well enough alone,” 
and defer to universities and “experts” in determining who should be dis-
criminated  against).    An  opinion  professing  fidelity  to  history  (to  say 
nothing of the law) should surely see the folly in that approach.