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2  JANUS v. STATE, COUNTY, AND MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES 

Syllabus 

granted respondents’ motion to dismiss on the ground that the claim
was foreclosed by Abood.  The Seventh Circuit affirmed.   

Held: 

1. The  District  Court  had  jurisdiction  over  petitioner’s  suit.    Peti-
tioner was undisputedly injured in fact by Illinois’ agency-fee scheme
and  his injuries can  be redressed  by a favorable court decision.  For 
jurisdictional  purposes,  the  court  permissibly  treated  his  amended
complaint  in  intervention  as  the  operative  complaint  in  a  new  law-
suit.  United States ex rel. Texas Portland Cement Co. v. McCord, 233 
U. S. 157, distinguished.  Pp. 6–7.

2. The State’s extraction of agency fees from nonconsenting public-
sector employees violates the First Amendment.  Abood erred in con-
cluding  otherwise,  and  stare  decisis  cannot  support  it.    Abood  is 
therefore overruled.  Pp. 7–47.
is 

inconsistent  with  standard  First 

(a) Abood’s  holding 
Amendment principles.  Pp. 7–18. 

(1) Forcing free and independent individuals to endorse ideas they 
find  objectionable  raises  serious  First  Amendment  concerns.    E.g., 
West  Virginia  Bd.  of  Ed.  v.  Barnette,  319  U. S.  624,  633.    That  in-
cludes  compelling  a  person  to  subsidize  the  speech  of  other  private
speakers.  E.g.,  Knox  v.  Service  Employees,  567  U. S.  298,  309.    In 
Knox and Harris v. Quinn, 573 U. S. ___, the Court applied an “exact-
ing” scrutiny standard in judging the constitutionality of agency fees 
rather  than  the  more  traditional  strict  scrutiny.    Even  under  the 
more permissive standard, Illinois’ scheme cannot survive.  Pp. 7–11.
(2) Neither of Abood’s two justifications for agency fees passes mus-
ter under this standard.  First, agency fees cannot be  upheld on the
ground  that  they  promote  an  interest  in  “labor  peace.”    The  Abood 
Court’s fears of conflict and disruption if employees were represented
by more than one union have proved to be unfounded: Exclusive rep-
resentation of all the employees in a unit and the exaction of agency 
fees are not inextricably linked.  To the contrary, in the Federal Gov-
ernment  and  the  28  States  with  laws  prohibiting  agency  fees,  mil-
lions  of  public  employees  are  represented  by  unions  that  effectively
serve as the exclusive representatives of all the employees.  Whatever 
may have been the case 41  years ago when Abood was decided, it is 
thus  now  undeniable  that  “labor  peace”  can  readily  be  achieved 
through less restrictive means than the assessment of agency fees.

Second, avoiding “the risk of ‘free riders,’ ” Abood, supra, at 224, is 
not a compelling state interest.  Free-rider “arguments . . . are gener-
ally insufficient to overcome First Amendment objections,” Knox, su-
pra,  at  311,  and  the  statutory  requirement  that  unions  represent 
members and nonmembers alike does not justify different treatment.
As is evident in non-agency-fee jurisdictions, unions are quite willing