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Page Number: 27.0

22 

CITY OF GRANTS PASS v. JOHNSON 

Opinion of the Court 

In  Powell  v.  Texas,  392  U. S.  514  (1968),  the  Court  con-
fronted a defendant who had been convicted under a Texas 
statute  making  it  a  crime  to  “ ‘get  drunk  or  be  found  in  a 
state of intoxication in any public place.’ ”  Id., at 517 (plu-
rality opinion).  Like the plaintiffs here, Mr. Powell argued
that his drunkenness was an “ ‘involuntary’ ” byproduct  of 
his status as an alcoholic.  Id., at 533.  Yes, the statute re-
quired proof of an act (becoming drunk or intoxicated and 
then proceeding into public), and perhaps some associated
mental  state  (for  presumably  the  defendant  knew  he  was 
drinking and maybe even knew he made his way to a public 
place).  Still, Mr. Powell contended, Texas’s law effectively 
criminalized his status as an alcoholic because he could not 
help  but  doing  as  he  did.  Ibid.    Justice  Fortas  embraced 
that  view,  but  only  in  dissent:  He  would  have  extended 
Robinson  to  cover  conduct  that  flows  from  any  “condition 
[the defendant] is powerless to change.”  392 U. S., at 567 
(Fortas, J., dissenting).

The Court did not agree.  Writing for a plurality, Justice 
Marshall  observed  that  Robinson  had  authorized  “a  very
small”  intrusion  by  courts  “into  the  substantive  criminal
law”  “under  the  aegis  of  the  Cruel  and  Unusual  Punish-
ment[s] Clause.”  392 U. S., at 533.  That small intrusion, 
Justice Marshall said, prevents States only from enforcing
laws that criminalize “a mere status.”  Id., at 532.  It does 
nothing to curtail a State’s authority to secure a conviction 
when “the accused has committed some act . . . society has 
an interest in preventing.”  Id., at 533.  That remains true, 
Justice Marshall continued, regardless whether the defend-
ant’s act “in some sense” might be described as “ ‘involun-
tary’ or ‘occasioned by’ ” a particular status.  Ibid. (emphasis
added).  In  this,  Justice  Marshall  echoed  Robinson  itself, 
where the Court emphasized that California remained free
to criminalize intentional or knowing drug use even by ad-
dicts whose conduct, too, in some sense could be considered 
involuntary.  See Robinson, 370 U. S., at 664, 666.  Based