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Page Number: 22.0

16 

NATIONAL PORK PRODUCERS COUNCIL v. ROSS 

Opinion of the Court 

Arizona  order  requiring  cantaloupes  grown  in  state  to  be
processed and packed in state.  397 U. S., at 138–140.  The 
Court held that Arizona’s order violated the dormant Com-
merce Clause.  Id., at 146.  Even if that order could be fairly
characterized as facially neutral, the Court stressed that it
“requir[ed]  business  operations  to  be  performed  in  [state]
that could more efficiently be performed elsewhere.”  Id., at 
145.  The “practical effect[s]” of the order in operation thus
revealed a discriminatory purpose—an effort to insulate in-
state  processing  and  packaging  businesses  from  out-of-
state competition.  Id., at 140, 145. 

Other  cases  in  the  Pike  line  underscore  the  same  mes-
sage.  In Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., the Court 
found no impermissible burden on interstate commerce be-
cause, looking to the law’s effects, “there [was] no reason to
suspect  that  the  gainers”  would  be  in-state  firms  or  that 
“the losers [would be] out-of-state firms.”  449 U. S. 456, 473 
(1981); see also id., at 474–477, and n. 2 (Powell, J., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part) (asking whether the “ac-
tual purpose,” if not the “ ‘avowed purpose,’ ” of the law was
discrimination).  Similarly,  in  Exxon  Corp.  v.  Governor  of 
Maryland, the Court keyed to the fact that the effect of the 
challenged  law  was  only  to  shift  business  from  one  set  of 
out-of-state suppliers to another.  437 U. S. 117, 127 (1978). 
And in United  Haulers, a plurality upheld the challenged 
law because it could not “detect” any discrimination in favor 
of  in-state  businesses  or  against  out-of-state  competitors. 
550 U. S., at 346.  In each of these cases and many more,
the presence or absence of discrimination in practice proved
decisive. 

Once  again,  we  say  nothing  new  here.    Some  time  ago, 
Tracy  identified  the  congruity  between  our  core  dormant 
Commerce Clause precedents and the Pike line.  519 U. S., 
at 298, n. 12.  Many lower courts have done the same.  See, 
e.g., Rosenblatt v. Santa Monica, 940 F. 3d 439, 452 (CA9 
2019);  Park  Pet  Shop,  Inc.  v.  Chicago,  872  F. 3d  495,  501