Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/14pdf/13-1041_0861.pdf
Page Number: 21.0

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PEREZ v. MORTGAGE BANKERS ASSN. 

SCALIA, J., concurring in judgment 

administrators  whose  zeal  might  otherwise  have  carried 
them  to  excesses  not  contemplated  in  legislation  creating
their offices.”  United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U. S. 
632, 644 (1950).  The Act guards against excesses in rule-
making  by  requiring  notice  and  comment.    Before  an 
agency makes a rule, it normally must notify the public of
the proposal, invite them to comment on its shortcomings, 
consider  and  respond  to  their  arguments,  and  explain  its
final  decision  in  a  statement  of  the  rule’s  basis  and  pur-
pose.  5 U. S. C. §553(b)–(c); ante, at 2. 

The  APA  exempts  interpretive  rules  from  these  re-
quirements.   §553(b)(A).  But  this  concession  to  agencies
was meant to be more modest in its effects than it is today.
For  despite  exempting  interpretive  rules  from  notice  and
comment,  the  Act  provides  that  “the  reviewing  court 
shall . . . interpret constitutional and statutory provisions,
and determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of 
an agency action.”  §706 (emphasis added).  The Act thus 
contemplates that courts, not agencies, will authoritatively 
resolve  ambiguities  in  statutes  and  regulations.    In  such 
a regime, the exemption for interpretive rules does not add
much  to  agency  power.    An  agency  may  use  interpretive 
rules  to  advise  the  public  by  explaining  its  interpretation 
of the law.  But an agency may not use interpretive rules 
to bind the public by  making law, because it remains the
responsibility  of  the  court  to  decide  whether  the  law 
means what the agency says it means.

Heedless  of  the  original  design  of  the  APA,  we  have 
developed an elaborate law of deference to agencies’ inter-
pretations of statutes and regulations.  Never mentioning
§706’s directive that the “reviewing court . . . interpret . . .
statutory  provisions,”  we  have  held  that  agencies  may 
authoritatively  resolve  ambiguities  in  statutes.    Chevron 
U. S. A.  Inc.  v.  Natural  Resources  Defense  Council,  Inc., 
467  U. S.  837,  842–843  (1984).    And  never  mentioning
§706’s  directive  that  the  “reviewing  court  . . .  determine