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Page Number: 67

22 

ALLEN v. MILLIGAN 

THOMAS, J., dissenting 

benchmark.    All  that  might  follow  is  that  the  illustrative 
maps  were  reasonably  configured—in  other  words,  that 
they  were  consistent  with  some  reasonable  application  of 
traditional  districting  criteria  in  which  race  did  not  pre-
dominate.  See LULAC, 548 U. S., at 433.  But, in virtually 
all  jurisdictions,  there  are  countless  possible  districting 
schemes that could be considered reasonable in that sense.  
The  mere  fact  that  a  plaintiff ’s  illustrative  map  is  one  of 
them cannot justify making it the benchmark against which 
other plans should be judged.  Cf. Rucho, 588 U. S., at ___–
___  (slip  op.,  at  19–20)  (explaining  the  lack  of  judicially 
manageable standards for evaluating the relative fairness 
of different applications of traditional districting criteria). 
  That conceptual gap—between “reasonable” and “bench-
mark”—is  highly  relevant  here.    Suppose,  for  argument’s 
sake, that  Alabama reasonably  could decide  to  create  two 
majority-black  districts  by  (1)  connecting  Montgomery’s 
black  residents with Mobile’s  black  residents, (2)  dividing 
up  the rural  parts  of  the  Black  Belt between that district 
and another district with its population core in the majority-
black parts of the Birmingham area, and (3) accepting the 
extreme  disruption  to  District  1  and  the  Gulf  Coast  that 
this approach would require.  The plaintiffs prefer that ap-
proach because it allows the creation of two majority-black 
districts, which they think Alabama should have.  But even 
if that approach were reasonable, there is hardly any com-
pelling  race-neutral  reason  to  elevate  such  a  plan  to  a 
benchmark  against  which  all  other  plans  must  be  meas-
ured.    Nothing  in  Alabama’s  geography  or  demography 
makes it clearly the best way, or even a particularly attrac-
tive way, to draw three of seven equally populous districts.  
The  State  has  obvious  legitimate,  race-neutral  reasons  to 
prefer its own map—most notably, its interest in “preserv-
ing the cores of prior districts” and the Gulf Coast commu-
nity of interest in District 1.  Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U. S. 
725,  740  (1983).    And  even  discounting  those  interests