Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/19pdf/19-46_8n59.pdf
Page Number: 13.0

Cite as:  591 U. S. ____ (2020) 

11 

Opinion of the Court 

. . . , it cannot deprive competing manufacturers of the prod-
uct of the right to call an article by its name.”  Abercrombie 
&  Fitch  Co.  v.  Hunting  World,  Inc.,  537  F. 2d  4,  9  (CA2 
1976).  That  principle  presupposes  that  a  generic  term
is at issue.  But the PTO’s only legal basis for deeming 
“generic.com”  terms  generic  is  its  mistaken  reliance  on 
Goodyear. 

While  we  reject  the  rule  proffered  by  the  PTO  that
“generic.com” terms are generic names, we do not embrace 
a rule automatically classifying such terms as nongeneric.
Whether any given “generic.com” term is generic, we hold, 
depends on whether consumers in fact perceive that term 
as the name of a class or, instead, as a term capable of dis-
tinguishing among members of the class.6 

B 
The  PTO,  echoed  by  the  dissent,  post,  at  10–12,  objects
that  protecting  “generic.com”  terms  as  trademarks  would 

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6 Evidence informing that inquiry can include not only consumer sur-
veys, but also dictionaries, usage by consumers and competitors, and any 
other  source  of  evidence  bearing  on  how  consumers  perceive  a  term’s 
meaning.  Surveys can be helpful evidence of consumer perception but 
require care in their design and interpretation.  See Brief for Trademark 
Scholars  as  Amici  Curiae  18–20  (urging  that  survey  respondents  may
conflate the fact that domain names are exclusive with a conclusion that 
a given “generic.com” term has achieved secondary meaning).  Moreover, 
difficult questions may be presented when a term has multiple concur-
rent meanings to consumers or a meaning that has changed over time. 
See, e.g., 2 J. McCarthy, Trademarks and Unfair Competition §12:51 (5th
ed. 2019) (discussing terms that are “a generic name to some, a trade-
mark to others”); id., §12:49 (“Determining the distinction between ge-
neric and trademark usage of a word . . . when there are no other sellers 
of  [the  good  or  service]  is  one  of  the  most  difficult  areas  of  trademark 
law.”).  Such issues are not here entailed, for the PTO does not contest 
the  lower  courts’  assessment  of  consumer perception  in this  case.    See 
Pet. for Cert. I; Brief for Petitioners 17–18.  For the same reason, while 
the dissent questions the evidence on which the lower courts relied, post, 
at 7–8, 9, we have no occasion to reweigh that evidence.  Cf. post, at 1–2 
(SOTOMAYOR, J., concurring).