Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/14pdf/13-534_19m2.pdf
Page Number: 34.0

Cite as:  574 U. S. ____ (2015) 

11 

ALITO, J., dissenting 

engaged  in  a  conspiracy  or  corruption  or  had  acted  in  a 
way that was not in the public interest.  Id., at 374.  The 
Sherman  Act,  we  said,  is  not  an  anticorruption  or  good-
government statute.  499 U. S., at 398.  We were unwilling
in  Omni  to  rewrite  Parker  in  order  to  reach  the  allegedly 
abusive  behavior  of  city  officials.  499  U. S.,  at  374–379. 
But that is essentially what the Court has done here. 

III 
Not  only  is  the  Court’s  decision  inconsistent  with  the 
underlying  theory  of  Parker;  it  will  create  practical  prob-
lems  and  is  likely  to  have  far-reaching  effects  on  the 
States’  regulation  of  professions.
  As  previously  noted,
state  medical  and  dental  boards  have  been  staffed  by
practitioners  since  they  were  first  created,  and  there  are
obvious advantages to  this approach.  It is reasonable for 
States to decide that the individuals best able to regulate
technical  professions  are  practitioners  with  expertise  in 
those very professions.  Staffing the State Board of Dental 
Examiners  with  certified  public  accountants  would  cer-
tainly lessen the risk of actions that place the well-being of
dentists over those of the public, but this would also com-
promise the State’s interest in sensibly regulating a tech-
nical profession in which lay people have little expertise. 

As a result of today’s decision, States may find it neces-
sary  to  change  the  composition  of  medical,  dental,  and 
other  boards,  but  it  is  not  clear  what  sort  of  changes  are
needed to satisfy the test that the Court now adopts.  The 
Court  faults  the  structure  of  the  North  Carolina  Board 
because “active market participants” constitute “a control-
ling number of [the] decisionmakers,” ante, at 14, but this 
test raises many questions.

What is a “controlling number”?  Is it a majority?  And if 
so,  why  does  the  Court  eschew  that  term?  Or  does  the 
Court  mean  to  leave  open  the  possibility  that  something 
less  than  a  majority  might  suffice  in  particular  circum-