Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/12pdf/11-556_11o2.pdf
Page Number: 50.0

16 

VANCE v. BALL STATE UNIV. 

GINSBURG, J., dissenting 

the light it casts.5 

That  the  Court  has  adopted  a  standard,  rather  than  a
clear  rule,  is  not  surprising,  for  no  crisp  definition  of  su-
pervisor  could  supply  the  unwavering  line  the  Court  de-
sires.  Supervisors, like the workplaces they manage, come 
in  all  shapes  and  sizes.  Whether  a  pitching  coach  super-
vises  his  pitchers  (can  he  demote  them?),  or  an  artistic 
director supervises her opera star (can she impose signifi-
cantly  different  responsibilities?),  or  a  law  firm  associate 
supervises  the  firm’s  paralegals  (can  she  fire  them?)  are
matters  not  susceptible  to  mechanical  rules  and  on-off
switches.  One  cannot  know  whether  an  employer  has 
vested supervisory authority in an employee, and whether 
harassment is aided by that authority, without looking to
the  particular  working  relationship  between  the  harasser
and the victim.  That is why Faragher and Ellerth crafted 
an  employer  liability  standard  embracive  of  all  whose 
authority  significantly  aids  in  the  creation  and  perpetua-
tion of harassment. 

The  Court’s  focus  on  finding  a  definition  of  supervisor 
capable  of  instant  application  is  at  odds  with  the  Court’s 
ordinary emphasis on the importance of particular circum-
stances in Title VII cases.  See, e.g., Burlington Northern, 
548  U. S.,  at  69  (“[T]he  significance  of  any  given  act  of 
retaliation  will  often  depend  upon  the  particular  circum-
stances.”);  Harris,  510  U. S.,  at  23  (“[W]hether  an  envi-
ronment is ‘hostile’ or ‘abusive’ can be determined only by 
—————— 

5 Even  the  Seventh  Circuit,  whose  definition  of  supervisor  the  Court 
adopts  in  large  measure,  has  candidly  acknowledged  that,  under  its
definition, supervisor status is not a clear and certain thing.  See Doe v. 
Oberweis Dairy, 456 F. 3d 704, 717 (2006) (“The difficulty of classifica-
tion in this case arises from the fact that Nayman, the shift supervisor, 
was in between the paradigmatic classes [of supervisor and co-worker].
He had supervisory responsibility in the sense of authority to direct the
work  of  the  [ice-cream]  scoopers,  and  he  was  even  authorized  to  issue 
disciplinary  write-ups,  but  he  had  no  authority  to  fire  them.    He  was  
either an elevated coworker or a diminished supervisor.”).