Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/21pdf/20-1573_8p6h.pdf
Page Number: 13.0

Cite as:  596 U. S. ____ (2022) 

9 

Opinion of the Court 

by the FAA.  See Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela, 587 U. S. ___, 
___ (2019) (slip op., at 6); Concepcion, 563 U. S., at 343. Sec-
tion  2’s  mandate  protects  a  right  to  enforce  arbitration 
agreements.  That right would not be a right to arbitrate in 
any  meaningful  sense  if  generally applicable principles  of 
state law could be used to transform “traditiona[l] individ-
ualized . . . arbitration” into the “litigation it was meant to
displace” through the imposition of procedures at odds with
arbitration’s informal nature.  Epic Systems, 584 U. S., at 
___ (slip op., at 8).  See also Concepcion, 563 U. S., at 351. 
And that right would not be a right to arbitrate based on an 
agreement if generally applicable law could be used to coer-
cively impose arbitration in contravention of the “first prin-
ciple”  of  our  FAA  jurisprudence:  that  “[a]rbitration  is 
strictly ‘a matter of consent.’ ”  Granite Rock Co. v. Team-
sters,  561  U. S.  287,  299  (2010)  (quoting  Volt  Information 
Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Jun-
ior Univ., 489 U. S. 468, 479 (1989)); see also Lamps Plus, 
587 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 7); Stolt-Nielsen S. A. v. Ani-
malFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U. S. 662, 685 (2010).

Based on these principles, we have held that “a party may 
not be compelled under the FAA to submit to class arbitra-
tion unless there is a contractual basis for concluding that 
the party agreed to do so.”  Id., at 684.  See also Lamps Plus, 
587 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 1); Epic Systems, 584 U. S., at 
___–___ (slip op., at 6–8); Concepcion, 563 U. S., at 347–348. 
The “ ‘shift from bilateral arbitration to class-action arbitra-
tion’ ”  mandates  procedural  changes  that  are  inconsistent 
with  the  individualized  and  informal  mode  of  arbitration 
contemplated  by  the  FAA. 
Id.,  at  347  (quoting  Stolt-
Nielsen,  559  U. S.,  at  686).  As  a  result,  class  procedures
cannot be imposed by state law without presenting unwill-
ing parties with an unacceptable choice between being com-
pelled  to  arbitrate  using  procedures  at  odds  with  arbitra-
tion’s traditional form and forgoing arbitration altogether.
Putting parties to that choice is inconsistent with the FAA.