Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/22pdf/21-857_4357.pdf
Page Number: 45

Cite as:  599 U. S. ____ (2023) 

13 

JACKSON, J., dissenting 

in light of §2255(h)’s successive-petition bar.  Prost v. An-
derson, 636 F. 3d 578, 605 (CA10 2011) (Seymour, J., con-
curring in part and dissenting in part).6  The majority also 
fails to grapple with this Court’s own opinions that suggest 
a broader interpretation of the saving clause is proper.  See 
Swain v. Pressley, 430 U. S. 372, 381–382 (1977); Sanders, 
373  U. S.,  at  14–15;  Hayman,  342  U. S.,  at  223;  Brief  for 
Respondent 17–18.

It appears the majority’s interpretation of §2255(e) is pri-
marily attributable to its concern that interpreting the sav-
ing clause to permit Jones to file a habeas petition might 
authorize an “end-run” around §2255’s procedures.  Ante, at 
10–11, 14.  I think those fears are vastly overblown. 

Properly interpreted, a §2255 motion is only “inadequate
or ineffective” when the potential procedural bar does not 
provide a prisoner with any meaningful opportunity to pre-
sent a claim.  And that circumstance does not exist any time
a procedural limitation in §2255 screens out a claim.  For 
example, if an individual does not raise his legal innocence 
claim in a §2255 motion in a timely fashion, see §2255(f ), 
he cannot resort to the saving clause to file a habeas peti-
tion; that individual did have a meaningful opportunity to
raise his claim pursuant to the §2255 process, but missed
the window of opportunity.  Similarly, where Congress has 
clearly  narrowed  the  scope  of  postconviction  relief—as  it
has done for claims of new evidence and new constitutional 
rules—it  has  overridden  the  equivalence  aim  that  would 
otherwise render §2255 inadequate or ineffective, such that 

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6 See  also,  e.g.,  Triestman  v.  United  States,  124  F.  3d  361,  363  (CA2
1997); In re Dorsainvil, 119 F. 3d 245, 250–252 (CA3 1997); In re Jones, 
226 F. 3d 328, 333–334 (CA4 2000); Reyes-Requena v. United States, 243 
F. 3d 893, 904 (CA5 2011); Hill v. Masters, 836 F. 3d 591, 599–600 (CA6 
2016); In re Davenport, 147 F. 3d 605, 610–611 (CA7 1998); Stephens v. 
Herrera, 464 F. 3d 895, 898 (CA9 2006); Wofford v. Scott, 177 F. 3d 1236, 
1245 (CA11 1999), overruled by McCarthan v. Director of Goodwill In-
dustries-Suncoast Inc., 851 F. 3d 1076 (CA11 2017) (en banc).