Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/05pdf/04-1084.pdf
Page Number: 14.0

Cite as:  546 U. S. ____ (2006) 

9 

Opinion of the Court 

Controlled  Substances  Act  itself.  The  Government  con-
tends  that  the  Act’s  description  of  Schedule  I  substances 
as  having  “a  high  potential  for  abuse,”  “no  currently  ac-
cepted medical use in treatment in the United States,” and 
“a lack of accepted safety for use . . . under medical super-
vision,”  21  U. S. C.  §812(b)(1),  by  itself  precludes  any 
consideration  of  individualized  exceptions  such  as  that 
sought  by  the  UDV.  The  Government  goes  on  to  argue
that  the  regulatory  regime  established  by  the  Act—a 
“closed”  system  that  prohibits  all  use  of  controlled  sub-
stances except as authorized by the Act itself, see Gonzales 
v. Raich, 545 U. S. ___, ___ (2005) (slip op., at 10)—“cannot 
function with its necessary rigor and comprehensiveness if 
subjected to judicial exemptions.”  Brief for Petitioners 18. 
According  to  the  Government,  there  would  be  no  way  to 
cabin religious exceptions once recognized, and “the public 
will  misread”  such  exceptions  as  signaling  that  the  sub-
stance at issue is not harmful after all.  Id., at 23.  Under 
the  Government’s  view,  there  is  no  need  to  assess  the 
particulars  of  the  UDV’s  use  or  weigh  the  impact  of  an 
exemption  for  that  specific  use,  because  the  Controlled
Substances  Act  serves  a  compelling  purpose  and  simply 
admits of no exceptions. 

A 
RFRA,  and  the  strict  scrutiny  test  it  adopted,  contem-
plate  an  inquiry  more  focused  than  the  Government’s 
categorical  approach.    RFRA  requires  the  Government  to 
demonstrate  that  the  compelling  interest  test  is  satisfied 
through  application  of  the  challenged  law  “to  the  per-
son”—the  particular  claimant  whose  sincere  exercise  of 
religion  is  being  substantially  burdened.    42  U. S. C. 
§2000bb–1(b).    RFRA  expressly  adopted  the  compelling 
interest  test  “as  set  forth  in  Sherbert  v.  Verner,  374  U. S. 
398 (1963) and  Wisconsin  v.  Yoder,  406  U. S.  205  (1972).” 
42  U. S. C.  §2000bb(b)(1).    In  each  of  those  cases,  this