Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/529bv.pdf
Page Number: 497

529US2

Unit: $U47

[10-04-01 09:34:47] PAGES PGT: OPIN

422

WILLIAMS v. TAYLOR

Syllabus

importance, yet failed to investigate in anything but a cursory manner,
this Court is not satisﬁed with petitioner’s explanation that, although
an investigator for his federal habeas counsel discovered the report in
Cruse’s court ﬁle, his state counsel had not seen the report when he
reviewed the same ﬁle. Because this constitutes a failure to develop
the factual basis of petitioner’s Brady claim in state court, this Court
must determine if the requirements in the balance of § 2254(e)(2) are
satisﬁed so that petitioner’s failure is excused. Subparagraph (B) of
§ 2254(e)(2) conditions a hearing upon a showing, by clear and convincing
evidence, that no reasonable factﬁnder would have found petitioner
guilty of capital murder but for the alleged constitutional error. Peti-
tioner concedes he cannot make this showing, and the case has been
presented to this Court on that premise. Accordingly, the Fourth
Circuit’s judgment barring an evidentiary hearing on this claim is af-
ﬁrmed. Pp. 437–440.

(d) However, petitioner has met the burden of showing he was dili-
gent in efforts to develop the facts supporting his juror bias and prose-
cutorial misconduct claims in state court. Those claims are based on
two questions posed by the trial judge at voir dire. First, the judge
asked prospective jurors whether any of them was related to, inter
alios, Deputy Sheriff Meinhard, who investigated the crime scene, inter-
rogated Cruse, and later became the prosecution’s ﬁrst witness. Venire
member Stinnett, who had divorced Meinhard after a 17-year marriage
and four children, remained silent, thereby indicating the answer to the
question was “no.” Second, the judge asked whether any prospective
juror had ever been represented by any of the attorneys in the case,
including prosecutor Woodson. Stinnett again said nothing, although
Woodson had represented her during her divorce from Meinhard.
Later, Woodson admitted he knew Stinnett and Meinhard had been mar-
ried and divorced, but stated that he did not consider divorced people
to be “related” and that he had no recollection of having been involved
as a private attorney in the divorce. Stinnett’s silence after the ﬁrst
question could suggest to the factﬁnder an unwillingness to be forth-
coming; this in turn could bear on her failure to disclose that Woodson
had been her attorney. Moreover, her failure to divulge material infor-
mation in response to the second question was misleading as a matter
of fact because Woodson was her counsel. Coupled with Woodson’s own
reticence, these omissions as a whole disclose the need for an evidentiary
hearing. This Court disagrees with the Fourth Circuit’s conclusion that
petitioner’s state habeas counsel should have discovered Stinnett’s rela-
tionship to Meinhard and Woodson. The trial record contains no evi-
dence which would have put a reasonable attorney on notice that Stin-
nett’s nonresponse was a deliberate omission of material information,