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Page Number: 33.0

16 

FISHER v. UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN 

THOMAS, J., concurring 

been  in  bondage.  And  there  was  and  there  still  is  an 
intention by the Congress to see that these children shall 
be  educated  in  a  healthful  atmosphere,  in  a  wholesome
atmosphere, in a place where they are wanted, in a place
where  they  will  not  be  looked  upon  with  hostility,  in  a 
place where there will be a receptive atmosphere for learn-
ing  for  both  races  without  the  hostility  that  undoubtedly 
Congress thought might creep into these situations”).  And 
they  even  appealed  to  the  fact  that  many  blacks  agreed 
that  separate  schools  were  in  the  “best  interests”  of  both 
races.  See,  e.g.,  Brief  for  Appellees  in  Davis  24–25  (“ ‘It
has  been  my  experience,  in  working  with  the  people  of 
Virginia,  including  both  white  and  Negro,  that  the  cus-
toms and the habits and the traditions of Virginia citizens
are such that they believe for the best interests of both the 
white and the Negro that the separate school is best’ ”).

Following in these inauspicious footsteps, the University
would  have  us  believe  that  its  discrimination  is  likewise 
benign. 
I  think  the  lesson  of  history  is  clear  enough: 
Racial  discrimination  is  never  benign.  “ ‘[B]enign’  carries
with  it  no  independent  meaning,  but  reflects  only  ac-
ceptance  of  the  current  generation’s  conclusion  that  a 
politically  acceptable  burden,  imposed  on  particular  citi-
zens on the basis of race, is reasonable.”  See Metro Broad­
casting, 497 U. S., at  610 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).  It is 
for  this  reason  that  the  Court  has  repeatedly  held  that
strict  scrutiny  applies  to  all  racial  classifications,  regard-
less  of  whether  the  government  has  benevolent  motives.
See, e.g., Johnson, 543 U. S., at 505 (“We have insisted on
strict scrutiny in every context, even for so-called ‘benign’ 
racial  classifications”);  Adarand,  515  U. S.,  at  227  (“[A]ll 
racial  classifications,  imposed  by  whatever  federal,  state,
or local governmental actor, must be analyzed by a review-
ing court under strict scrutiny”); J. A. Croson, 488 U. S., at 
500  (“Racial  classifications  are  suspect,  and  that  means
that simple legislative assurances of good intention cannot