Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/05pdf/05-130.pdf
Page Number: 9

Cite as:  547 U. S. ____ (2006) 

1 

ROBERTS, C. J., concurring 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

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No. 05–130 
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EBAY INC., ET AL., PETITIONERS v.

MERCEXCHANGE, L. L. C. 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT

[May 15, 2006] 

CHIEF  JUSTICE  ROBERTS,  with  whom  JUSTICE  SCALIA 

and JUSTICE GINSBURG join, concurring. 

I  agree  with  the  Court’s  holding  that  “the  decision 
whether to grant or deny injunctive relief rests within the 
equitable  discretion  of  the  district  courts,  and  that  such
discretion  must  be  exercised  consistent  with  traditional 
principles  of  equity,  in  patent  disputes  no  less  than  in
other cases governed by such standards,” ante, at 5, and I 
join the opinion of the Court.  That opinion rightly rests on 
the  proposition  that  “a  major  departure  from  the  long
tradition of equity practice should not be lightly implied.” 
Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U. S. 305, 320 (1982); see 
ante, at 3. 

From  at  least  the  early  19th  century,  courts  have
granted injunctive relief upon a finding of infringement in
the  vast  majority  of  patent  cases.  This  “long  tradition  of
equity  practice”  is  not  surprising,  given  the  difficulty  of
protecting  a  right  to  exclude  through  monetary  remedies 
that  allow  an  infringer  to  use  an  invention  against  the
patentee’s  wishes—a  difficulty  that  often  implicates  the
first  two  factors  of  the  traditional  four-factor  test.    This 
historical  practice,  as  the  Court  holds,  does  not  entitle  a 
patentee to a permanent injunction or justify a general rule 
that  such  injunctions  should  issue.    The  Federal  Circuit 
itself so recognized in Roche Products, Inc. v. Bolar Pharma-