Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/17pdf/16-1466_2b3j.pdf
Page Number: 30

Cite as:  585 U. S. ____ (2018) 

25 

Opinion of the Court 

office.  When  a  public  employer  does  not  simply  restrict 
potentially  disruptive  speech  but  commands  that  its  em­
ployees mouth a message on its own behalf, the calculus is
very different.  Of course, if the speech in question is part 
of  an  employee’s  official  duties,  the  employer  may  insist 
that  the  employee  deliver  any  lawful  message.    See  Gar-
cetti, 547 U. S., at 421–422, 425–426.  Otherwise, however, 
it  is  not  easy  to  imagine  a  situation  in  which  a  public
employer  has  a  legitimate  need  to  demand  that  its  em­
ployees  recite  words  with  which  they  disagree.  And  we 
have never applied Pickering in such a case. 

Consider our decision in Connick.  In that case, we held 
that  an  assistant  district  attorney’s  complaints  about  the
supervisors in her office were, for the most part, matters of
only  private  concern.  461  U. S.,  at  148.    As  a  result,  we 
held, the district attorney could fire her for making those 
comments.  Id.,  at  154.  Now,  suppose  that  the  assistant 
had not made any critical comments about the supervisors
but  that  the  district  attorney,  out  of  the  blue,  demanded 
that  she  circulate  a  memo  praising  the  supervisors.
Would  her  refusal  to  go  along  still  be  a  matter  of  purely
private  concern?    And  if  not,  would  the  order  be  justified 
on  the  ground  that  the  effective  operation  of  the  office
demanded  that  the  assistant  voice  complimentary  senti­
ments  with  which  she  disagreed?    If  Pickering  applies
at  all  to  compelled  speech—a  question  that  we  do  not 
decide—it  would  certainly  require  adjustment  in  that 
context. 

Third,  although  both  Pickering  and  Abood  divided 
speech  into  two  categories,  the  cases’  categorization
schemes  do  not  line  up.    Superimposing  the  Pickering 
scheme  on  Abood  would  significantly  change  the  Abood 
regime.

Let us first look at speech that is not germane to collec­
tive  bargaining  but  instead  concerns  political  or  ideologi­
cal  issues.  Under  Abood,  a  public  employer  is  flatly  pro­