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10 

PEREZ v. MORTGAGE BANKERS ASSN. 

THOMAS, J., concurring in judgment 

Legem  Naturalem  Libri  Duo  83–86  (1682)  (F.  Moore
transl. 1927); see also 1 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on
the Laws of England 59–61 (1765). 

One of the key elements of the Federalists’ arguments in 
support  of  the  allocation  of  power  to  make  binding  inter-
pretations  of  the  law  was  that  Article  III  judges  would 
exercise  independent  judgment.    Although  “judicial  inde-
pendence”  is  often  discussed  in  terms  of  independence
from external threats, the Framers understood the concept 
to also require independence from the “internal threat” of 
“human will.”  P. Hamburger, Law and Judicial Duty 507, 
508  (2008);  see  also  The  Federalist  No.  78,  at  465  (A. 
Hamilton)  (“The  judiciary  .  .  .  may  truly  be  said  to  have
neither  FORCE  nor  WILL  but  merely  judgment  . . .  ”).
Independent  judgment  required  judges  to  decide  cases  in
accordance  with  the  law  of  the  land,  not  in  accordance 
with  pressures  placed  upon  them  through  either  internal 
or  external  sources.    Internal  sources  might  include  per-
sonal  biases,  while  external  sources  might  include  pres-
sure  from  the  political  branches,  the  public,  or  other
interested parties.  See Hamburger, supra, at 508–521. 

The Framers made several key decisions at the Conven-
tion  with  these  pressures  in  mind.    For  example,  they
rejected  proposals  to  include  a  federal  council  of  revision
after  several  participants  at  the  Convention  expressed 
concern that judicial involvement in such a council would 
foster internal biases.  Rufus King of Maryland, for exam-
ple, asserted that “the Judges ought to be able to expound 
the law as it should come before them, free from the bias 
of having participated  in its formation.”  1 Records of the 
Federal  Convention  of  1787,  at  98.  Alexander  Hamilton 
repeated  these  concerns  in  The  Federalist,  arguing    that 
“the  judges,  who  are  to  be  interpreters  of  the  law,  might
receive  an  improper  bias  from  having  given  a  previous 
opinion  in  their  revisionary  capacities”  or  “be  induced  to
embark  too  far  in  the  political  views  of  [the  Executive]”