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Page Number: 17

2 

IANCU v. BRUNETTI 

Opinion of ROBERTS, C. J. 

ceptible of such a narrowing construction.  Standing alone,
the  term  “scandalous”  need  not  be  understood  to  reach 
marks that offend because of the ideas they convey; it can
be  read  more  narrowly  to  bar  only  marks  that  offend 
because  of  their  mode  of  expression—marks  that  are 
obscene,  vulgar,  or  profane.  That  is  how  the  PTO  now 
understands the term, in light of our decision in Matal v. 
Tam,  582  U. S.  ___  (2017).    See  Tr.  of  Oral  Arg.  4–5.  I 
agree  with  JUSTICE  SOTOMAYOR  that  such  a  narrowing
construction is appropriate in this context.

I  also  agree  that,  regardless  of  how  exactly  the  trade-
mark  registration  system  is  best  conceived  under  our 
precedents—a  question  we  left  open  in  Tam—refusing
registration to obscene, vulgar, or profane marks does not 
offend the First Amendment.  Whether such marks can be 
registered does not affect the extent to which their owners 
may use them in commerce to identify goods.  No speech is
being restricted; no one is being punished.  The owners of 
such  marks  are  merely  denied  certain  additional  benefits
associated with federal trademark registration.  The Gov-
ernment,  meanwhile,  has  an  interest  in  not  associating 
itself with trademarks whose content is obscene, vulgar, or 
profane.  The  First  Amendment  protects  the  freedom  of 
speech; it does not require the Government to give aid and 
comfort to those using obscene, vulgar, and profane modes 
of  expression.    For  those  reasons,  I  concur  in  part  and
dissent in part.