Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/21pdf/20-843_7j80.pdf
Page Number: 108.0

Cite as:  597 U. S. ____ (2022) 

25 

BREYER, J., dissenting 

often depends on the type of speech burdened and the se-
verity  of  the  burden.  See,  e.g.,  Arizona  Free  Enterprise 
Club’s  Freedom  Club  PAC  v.  Bennett,  564  U. S.  721,  734 
(2011) (applying strict scrutiny to laws that burden political 
speech); Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U. S. 781, 791 
(1989) (applying intermediate scrutiny to time, place, and 
manner restrictions); Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. 
Public Serv. Comm’n of N. Y., 447 U. S. 557, 564–566 (1980) 
(applying  intermediate  scrutiny  to  laws  that  burden  com-
mercial speech).

Additionally,  beyond  the  right  to  freedom  of speech,  we 
regularly use means-end scrutiny in cases involving other
constitutional provisions.  See, e.g., Church of Lukumi Ba-
balu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U. S. 520, 546 (1993) (apply-
ing strict scrutiny under the First Amendment to laws that
restrict free exercise of religion in a way that is not neutral 
and  generally  applicable);  Adarand  Constructors,  Inc.  v. 
Peña, 515 U. S. 200, 227 (1995) (applying strict scrutiny un-
der  the  Equal  Protection  Clause  to  race-based  classifica-
tions);  Clark  v.  Jeter,  486  U. S.  456,  461  (1988)  (applying 
intermediate scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause to
sex-based  classifications);  see  also  Virginia  v.  Moore,  553 
U. S. 164, 171 (2008) (“When history has not provided a con-
clusive  answer,  we  have  analyzed  a  search  or  seizure  in 
light of traditional standards of reasonableness”). 

The upshot is that applying means-end scrutiny to laws
that  regulate  the  Second  Amendment  right  to  bear  arms 
would not create a constitutional anomaly.  Rather, it is the 
Court’s  rejection  of  means-end  scrutiny  and  adoption  of  a 
rigid history-only approach that is anomalous. 

B 

The Court’s near-exclusive reliance on history is not only 
unnecessary, it is deeply impractical.  It imposes a task on
the  lower  courts  that  judges  cannot  easily  accomplish.
Judges understand well how to weigh a law’s objectives (its