Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/17pdf/17-965_h315.pdf
Page Number: 35.0

30 

TRUMP v. HAWAII 

Opinion of the Court 

C 
For more than a century, this Court has recognized that
the admission and exclusion of foreign nationals is a “fun-
damental  sovereign  attribute  exercised  by  the  Govern-
ment’s political departments largely immune from judicial
control.”  Fiallo  v.  Bell,  430  U. S.  787,  792  (1977);  see 
Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U. S. 580, 588–589 (1952) 
(“[A]ny  policy  toward  aliens  is  vitally  and  intricately  in-
terwoven  with  contemporaneous  policies  in  regard  to  the 
conduct  of  foreign  relations  [and]  the  war  power.”).    Be-
cause  decisions  in  these  matters  may  implicate  “relations 
with foreign powers,” or involve “classifications defined in 
the light of changing political and economic circumstances,”
such  judgments  “are  frequently  of  a  character  more  ap-
propriate  to  either  the  Legislature  or  the  Executive.” 
Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U. S. 67, 81 (1976).

Nonetheless,  although  foreign  nationals  seeking  admis-
sion  have  no  constitutional  right  to  entry,  this  Court  has
engaged  in  a  circumscribed  judicial  inquiry  when  the 
denial of a visa allegedly burdens the constitutional rights
of a U. S. citizen.  In Kleindienst v. Mandel, the Attorney
General denied admission to a Belgian journalist and self-
described  “revolutionary  Marxist,”  Ernest  Mandel,  who 
had  been  invited  to  speak  at  a  conference  at  Stanford
University.    408  U. S.,  at  756–757.    The  professors  who
wished  to  hear  Mandel  speak  challenged  that  decision 
under  the  First  Amendment,  and  we  acknowledged  that 
their  constitutional  “right  to  receive  information”  was 
implicated.  Id., at 764–765.  But we limited our review to 
whether the Executive gave a “facially legitimate and bona
fide” reason for its action.  Id., at 769.  Given the authority
of  the  political  branches  over  admission,  we  held  that
“when  the  Executive  exercises  this  [delegated]  power 
negatively  on  the  basis  of  a  facially  legitimate  and  bona 
fide  reason,  the  courts  will  neither  look  behind  the  exer-
cise of that discretion, nor test it by balancing its justifica-