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Page Number: 37

16 

PATEL v. GARLAND 

GORSUCH, J., dissenting 

Perhaps sensing the weakness of its main contextual ar-
gument, the majority tries another.  It insists that Mr. Patel 
“cannot explain” why subparagraph (B)(i) should be read to
allow courts to review the BIA’s factual findings when sub-
paragraph (C) prohibits courts from doing so.  Ante, at 14. 
But there is no incongruity here.  The two subparagraphs
use different language and perform different work.  Subpar-
agraph  (B)(i)  only  disallows  judicial  review  of  judgments
“regarding the granting of relief” and covers the mine run
of cases.  Subparagraph (C) speaks more broadly, preclud-
ing  review  of  “any  final  order  of  removal,”  and  addresses 
specifically those aliens who are removable because of past
criminal offenses.  And it is hardly surprising that Congress
might wish to use different language allowing greater judi-
cial  review  in  cases  involving  noncriminal  aliens  than  in
cases involving aliens who have been convicted of criminal
offenses in this country.

Tellingly too, the majority’s  contextual arguments yield 
an inexplicable anomaly.  On its view, subparagraph (B)(i) 
precludes judicial review of all adjustment-of-status appli-
cations,  whether  an  individual  seeks  to  challenge  the 
agency’s  step-one  eligibility  determination  or  its  step-two 
discretionary judgment.  Subparagraph (D) then sweeps in
to restore judicial review for legal and constitutional ques-
tions.  But by its terms, subparagraph (D) applies only to
“petition[s] for review filed with an appropriate court of ap-
peals.”

This feature of the law has profound consequences under 

—————— 
8 U. S. C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); see supra, at 6.  The majority never explains
why that question is something other than a question of law that sub-
paragraph (D) expressly preserves for judicial review.  But why wouldn’t 
it be?  Cf. Colorado Nat. Bank v. Commissioner, 305 U. S. 23, 25 (1938)
(“It is settled law that a finding of fact [made by an agency] will not be 
disturbed  on  review  if  it  is  supported  by  substantial  evidence.    But 
whether there is substantial evidence to support a finding is a question
of law”).