Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/11pdf/10-545.pdf
Page Number: 46.0

Cite as:  565 U. S. ____ (2012) 

1 

BREYER, J., dissenting 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

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No. 10–545 
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LAWRENCE GOLAN, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. ERIC H. 
HOLDER, JR., ATTORNEY GENERAL, ET AL. 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

[January 18, 2012]

 JUSTICE  BREYER,  with  whom  JUSTICE  ALITO  joins,

dissenting. 

In order “[t]o promote the Progress of Science” (by which 
term  the  Founders  meant  “learning”  or  “knowledge”),
the  Constitution’s  Copyright  Clause  grants  Congress  the
power  to  “secur[e]  for  limited  Times  to  Authors  . . .  the 
exclusive  Right  to  their  . . .  Writings.”    Art. I,  §8,  cl. 8. 
This  “exclusive  Right”  allows  its  holder  to  charge  a  fee  to
those who wish to use a copyrighted work, and the ability
to charge that fee encourages the production of new mate­
rial.  In this sense, a copyright is, in Macaulay’s words, a
“tax on readers for the purpose of giving a bounty to writ­
ers”—a bounty designed to encourage new production.  As 
the  Court  said  in  Eldred,  “ ‘[t]he  economic  philosophy 
behind  the  [Copyright]  [C]lause  . . .  is  the  conviction  that
encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is the 
best way to advance public welfare through the talents of 
authors and inventors.’ ”  Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U. S. 186, 
212,  n. 18  (2003)  (quoting  Mazer  v.  Stein,  347  U. S.  201, 
219  (1954)).    See  T.  Macaulay,  Speeches  on  Copyright  25
(E.  Miller  ed.  1913);  E.  Walterscheid,  The  Nature  of  the
Intellectual  Property  Clause:  A  Study  in  Historical  Per­
spective 125–126 (2002) (hereinafter Walterscheid). 

The  statute  before  us,  however,  does  not  encourage
anyone  to  produce  a  single  new  work.    By  definition,  it 
bestows monetary rewards only on owners of old works—