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Page Number: 36.0

8 

FISCHER v. UNITED STATES 

BARRETT, J., dissenting 

the interpreter should read back to find some limit.  See id., 
at 142–143.  Subsection (c)(2)’s “otherwise” clause, by con-
trast, stands on its own. 

Postscript: Seven years after Begay was decided, we held 
ACCA’s  residual  clause  void  for  vagueness.  Johnson  v. 
United States, 576 U. S. 591, 597 (2015).  So the clause is 
not only distinguishable, but also a poor model for statutory 
interpretation. 

3 

The Court argues that “there would have been scant rea-
son for Congress to provide any specific examples” in (c)(1) 
if (c)(2) covered all forms of obstructive conduct.  Ante, at 8. 
Conduct like destroying and concealing records “obstructs, 
influences, or impedes a[n] official proceeding,” so Congress
could have enacted just (c)(2) and been done with it.  On the 
Government’s interpretation, the Court asserts, the second
prohibition swallows the first.  If (c)(1) has any function, it
must be to cast light (and impose limits) on (c)(2).

What the Court does not say is that its rewrite also elim-
inates the need for (c)(1)’s examples.  The Court’s interpre-
tation assumes that Congress used a convoluted, two-step
approach to enact a prohibition on “impair[ing] the integ-
rity  or  availability  of  records,  documents,  or  other  objects
for use in an official proceeding.”  So why didn’t Congress 
just say that?  And if the Court is right about what (c)(2)
means,  why  do  we  need  the  specific  examples  in  (c)(1)? 
Those acts are already covered.  The problem of (c)(2) sub-
suming (c)(1) is therefore not unique to my theory.

It bears emphasis, though, that the broad overlap makes
sense, given the statute’s backstory.  When the Enron scan-
dal occurred, Congress (along with the general public) was
taken  aback  to  discover  that  seemingly  criminal  conduct 
was actually not a federal crime.  As it then existed, §1512
had a loophole: It imposed liability on those who persuaded 
others  to  destroy  documents,  but  not  on  the  people  who