Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/524bv.pdf
Page Number: 138.0

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Unit: $U76

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Cite as: 524 U. S. 88 (1998)

93

Opinion of the Court

preme Court followed Clemons, independently reweighed
the applicable aggravating and mitigating factors, and reaf-
ﬁrmed respondent’s sentences. State v. Reeves, 239 Neb.
419, 476 N. W. 2d 829 (1991), cert. denied, 506 U. S. 837 (1992).
Respondent then ﬁled a petition for a writ of habeas cor-
pus in Federal District Court. He raised 44 claims, includ-
ing a claim that the trial court’s failure to give his requested
instructions was unconstitutional under Beck. The District
Court rejected the Beck claim but granted relief on an un-
related ground.
871 F. Supp. 1182, 1202, 1205–1206 (Neb.
1994). After the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
reversed the latter determination and remanded the case,
76 F. 3d 1424, 1427–1431 (1996), the District Court again
granted respondent’s petition, ﬁnding a due process viola-
tion arising out of the reafﬁrmance of his sentences by the
Nebraska Supreme Court. See 928 F. Supp. 941, 959–965
(Neb. 1996).

On the State’s appeal, the Court of Appeals held that al-
though respondent was not entitled to relief on his due proc-
ess claim, the Nebraska trial court had committed constitu-
tional error in failing to give the requested second-degree
murder and manslaughter instructions.
102 F. 3d 977
(1997). The Court of Appeals reasoned that the constitu-
tional error was the same as that in Beck, despite the fact
that there are no lesser included homicide offenses to felony
murder under Nebraska law: In both cases, state law “pro-
hibited instructions on noncapital murder charges in cases
102
where conviction made the defendant death-eligible.”
F. 3d, at 983 (emphasis in original). Because respondent
“could have been convicted and sentenced for either second
degree murder or manslaughter,” the Court of Appeals con-
cluded that he was constitutionally entitled to his proposed
instructions. See id., at 984.
It further stated that denial
of the instructions could not be justiﬁed by the fact that fel-
ony murder in Nebraska does not require a culpable mental
state with respect to the killing, because in Enmund v. Flor-