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Page Number: 48

2 

MCCUTCHEON v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N 

THOMAS, J., concurring in judgment 

limits  “operate  in  an  area  of  the  most  fundamental  First
Amendment  activities”  and  “implicate  fundamental  First
Amendment interests.”  424 U. S., at 14, 23.  But instead 
of  treating  political  giving  and  political  spending  alike, 
Buckley  distinguished  the  two,  embracing  a  bifurcated 
standard of review under which contribution limits receive 
less rigorous scrutiny.  Id., at 25. 

As I have explained before, “[t]he analytic foundation of 
Buckley . . . was tenuous from the very beginning and has 
only continued to erode in the intervening years.”  Shrink 
Missouri,  supra,  at  412  (THOMAS,  J.,  dissenting).  To 
justify  a  lesser  standard  of  review  for  contribution  limits, 
Buckley  relied  on  the  premise  that  contributions  are  dif-
ferent  in  kind  from  direct  expenditures.  None  of  the 
Court’s  bases  for  that  premise  withstands  careful  review. 
The linchpin of the Court’s analysis was its assertion that 
“[w]hile contributions may result in political expression if 
spent by a candidate or an association to present views to
the voters, the transformation of contributions into politi-
cal  debate  involves  speech  by  someone  other  than  the 
contributor.”    424  U. S.,  at  21.    But  that  “ ‘speech  by 
proxy’ ”  rationale  quickly  breaks  down,  given  that  “[e]ven
in  the  case  of  a  direct  expenditure,  there  is  usually  some
go-between  that  facilitates  the  dissemination  of  the
spender’s message—for instance, an advertising agency or
a television station.”  Colorado I, supra, at 638–639 (opin-
ion of THOMAS, J.).  Moreover, we have since rejected the
“ ‘proxy  speech’ ”  approach  as  affording  insufficient  First
Amendment  protection  to  “the  voices  of  those  of  modest
means  as  opposed  to  those  sufficiently  wealthy  to  be  able 
to  buy  expensive  media  ads  with  their  own  resources.” 
Federal  Election  Comm’n  v.  National  Conservative  Politi-
cal  Action  Comm.,  470  U. S.  480,  495  (1985);  see  Shrink 
Missouri, supra, at 413–414 (THOMAS, J., dissenting).

The  remaining  justifications  Buckley  provided  are  also
flawed.  For  example,  Buckley  claimed  that  contribution