Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/558bv.pdf
Page Number: 518.0

Cite as: 558 U. S. 310 (2010) 

357 

Opinion of the Court 

(CADC 1975) (en banc) (per curiam)).  The Court, in conse­
quence,  has  noted  that  restrictions  on  direct  contributions 
are  preventative,  because  few  if  any  contributions  to  candi­
dates  will  involve  quid  pro  quo  arrangements.  MCFL,  479 
U. S.,  at  260;  NCPAC,  470  U. S.,  at  500;  Federal  Election 
Comm’n  v.  National  Right  to  Work  Comm.,  459  U. S.  197, 
210 (1982) (NRWC).  The Buckley Court, nevertheless, sus­
tained  limits  on  direct  contributions  in  order  to  ensure 
against  the  reality  or  appearance  of  corruption.  That  case 
did  not  extend  this  rationale  to  independent  expenditures, 
and the Court does not do so here. 

“The  absence  of  prearrangement  and  coordination  of  an 
expenditure with the candidate or his agent not only under­
mines the value of the expenditure to the candidate, but also 
alleviates  the  danger  that  expenditures  will  be  given  as  a 
quid pro quo for improper commitments from the candidate.” 
Buckley, 424 U. S., at 47; see ibid. (independent expenditures 
have a “substantially diminished potential for abuse”).  Lim­
its on independent expenditures, such as § 441b, have a chill­
ing  effect  extending  well  beyond  the  Government’s  interest 
in  preventing  quid  pro  quo  corruption.  The  anticorruption 
interest is not sufﬁcient to displace the speech here in ques­
tion.  Indeed, 26 States do not restrict independent expendi­
tures  by  for-proﬁt  corporations.  The  Government  does  not 
claim  that  these  expenditures  have  corrupted  the  political 
process  in  those  States.  See  Supp.  Brief  for  Appellee  18, 
n.  3;  Supp.  Brief  for  Chamber  of  Commerce  of  the  United 
States of America as Amicus Curiae 8–9, n. 5. 

A  single  footnote  in  Bellotti  purported  to  leave  open  the 
possibility that corporate independent expenditures could be 
shown to cause corruption.  435 U. S., at 788, n. 26.  For the 
reasons explained above, we  now conclude that independent 
expenditures,  including  those  made  by  corporations,  do  not 
give  rise  to  corruption  or  the  appearance  of  corruption. 
Dicta  in  Bellotti’s  footnote  suggested  that  “a  corporation’s 
right to speak on issues of general public interest implies no