Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/20pdf/19-123_g3bi.pdf
Page Number: 30.0

8 

FULTON v. PHILADELPHIA 

ALITO, J., concurring in judgment
ALITO, J., concurring in judgment 

Smith should be revisited.”  We should confront that ques-
tion. 

Regrettably, the Court declines to do so.  Instead, it re-
verses  based  on  what  appears  to  be  a  superfluous  (and 
likely  to  be  short-lived)  feature  of  the  City’s  standard  an-
nual  contract  with  foster  care  agencies.    Smith’s  holding
about categorical rules does not apply if a rule permits in-
dividualized exemptions, 494 U. S., at 884, and the majority 
seizes on the presence in the City’s standard contract of lan-
guage giving a City official the power to grant exemptions. 
Ante, at 7.  The City tells us that it has never granted such 
an exemption and has no intention of handing one to CSS,
Brief for City Respondents 36; App. to Pet. for Cert. 168a, 
but  the  majority  reverses  the  decision  below  because  the
contract supposedly confers that never-used power.  Ante, 
at 10, 15. 

This decision might as well be written on the dissolving 
paper  sold  in  magic  shops.    The  City  has  been  adamant 
about pressuring CSS  to give in,  and if the  City  wants  to 
get  around  today’s  decision,  it  can  simply  eliminate  the 
never-used exemption power.21  If it does that, then, voilà, 
today’s  decision  will  vanish—and  the  parties  will  be  back 
where they started.  The City will claim that it is protected 
by Smith; CSS will argue that Smith should be overruled; 

—————— 

21 The Court’s decision also depends on its own contested interpretation 
of local and state law.  See post, at 2–7 (GORSUCH, J., concurring in judg-
ment).  Instead  of  addressing  whether  the  City’s  Fair  Practices  Ordi-
nance  is  generally  applicable,  the  Court  concludes  that  the  ordinance 
does not apply to CSS because CSS’s foster care certification services do 
not constitute “public accommodations” under the FPO.  Ante, at 11.  Of 
course, this Court’s interpretation of state and local law is not binding 
on state courts.  See, e.g., West v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co., 
311 U. S. 223, 236 (1940); see also Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U. S. 264, 
291 (2008) (ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting) (“State courts are the final arbi-
ters of their own state law”).  Should the Pennsylvania courts interpret 
the FPO differently, they would effectively abrogate the Court’s decision
in this case.