Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/22pdf/21-806_2dp3.pdf
Page Number: 26.0

22 

HEALTH AND HOSPITAL CORPORATION OF MARION 
CTY. v. TALEVSKI 
Opinion of the Court 

much less a license for us to construct and impute congres-
sional intent that the FNHRA does not embody. 

The difficulty for HHC and the United States is that im-
plicit preclusion, in this context, requires something in the 
statute that shows that permitting §1983 to operate would 
“thwar[t]  Congress’  intent”  in  crafting  the  FNHRA.    Fitz-
gerald,  555  U. S.,  at  253.    We  see  nothing  in  the  FNHRA 
that even hints at Congress’s intent in this regard; if any-
thing,  the  language  of  the  Act  confirms  otherwise,  for  it 
plainly states that “[t]he remedies provided under” its en-
forcement-process subsection are “in addition to those oth-
erwise available under State or Federal law and shall not 
be construed as limiting such other remedies.”  §1396r(h)(8)
(emphasis added).14  We will not rewrite §1396r(h)(8) in lieu
of rewriting §1983.15 

* 
At  oral  argument,  HHC’s  counsel  remarked  that  the 
“right question” is “what rights are secured by law within 

* 

* 

—————— 

14 We  found  similar  (but  not  identical)  language  to  be  insufficient  to 
preserve  the  presumption  in  Middlesex  County  Sewerage  Authority  v. 
National  Sea  Clammers  Assn.,  453  U. S.  1  (1981),  and  Rancho  Palos 
Verdes v. Abrams, 544 U. S. 113 (2005).  See id., at 125–127.  But those 
clauses did not purport to preserve “other remedies,” and were embedded
in statutes that (unlike the FNHRA) contained private judicial rights of 
action.  See ibid.; Sea Clammers, 453 U. S., at 6–7, 20, and n. 31.  The 
FNHRA’s explicitly expressed objective of preserving other remedies bol-
sters our reluctance to infer implicit displacement of the §1983 remedy. 
We think JUSTICE ALITO’s response in this regard overreads Rancho Pa-
los Verdes.  See post, at 6.  That case merely provided an unremarkable 
description of Sea Clammers’ “refus[al] to read” the saving clauses there 
as preserving §1983 actions, in light of the different (and significant) tex-
tual and contextual evidence of preclusion that the statutes at issue pro-
vided.  Rancho Palos Verdes, 544 U. S., at 127.  

15 The  United  States’  suggestion  that  §1396r(h)(8)  just  ensures  that
remedies available under non-FNHRA, non-§1983 statutes remain avail-
able  is  not  persuasive.  Brief  for  United  States  as  Amicus  Curiae  34. 
Nothing in the Act supports interpreting §1396r(h)(8)’s language in that
manner, especially given §1983’s unqualified command.