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Page Number: 60

2 

BROWN v. PLATA 

SCALIA, J., dissenting 

I 

A 

The  Prison  Litigation  Reform  Act  (PLRA)  states  that
“[p]rospective  relief  in  any  civil  action  with  respect  to
prison  conditions  shall  extend  no  further  than  necessary
to correct the violation of the Federal right of a particular 
plaintiff  or  plaintiffs”;  that  such  relief  must  be  “narrowly 
drawn, [and] exten[d] no further than necessary to correct 
the violation of the Federal right”; and that it must be “the
least intrusive means necessary to correct the violation of
the Federal right.”  18 U. S. C. §3626(a)(1)(A).  In deciding
whether  these  multiple  limitations  have  been  complied 
with, it is necessary to identify with precision what is the 
“violation  of  the  Federal  right  of  a  particular  plaintiff  or
plaintiffs”  that  has  been  alleged.  What  has  been  alleged
here,  and  what  the  injunction  issued  by  the  Court  is
tailored  (narrowly  or  not)  to  remedy  is  the  running  of  a 
prison  system  with  inadequate  medical  facilities.  That 
may result in the denial of needed medical treatment to “a 
particular [prisoner] or [prisoners],” thereby violating (ac-
cording  to  our  cases)  his  or  their  Eighth  Amendment
rights.  But  the  mere  existence  of  the  inadequate  system
does  not  subject  to  cruel  and  unusual  punishment  the
entire prison population in need of medical care, including
those who receive it. 

The Court acknowledges that the plaintiffs “do not base
their  case  on  deficiencies  in  care  provided  on  any  one
occasion”; rather, “[p]laintiffs rely on systemwide deficien-
cies  in  the  provision  of  medical  and  mental  health  care
that,  taken  as  a  whole,  subject  sick  and  mentally  ill  pris-
oners  in  California  to  ‘substantial  risk  of  serious  harm’ 
and cause the delivery of care in the prisons to fall below 
the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress
of  a  maturing  society.”  Ante,  at  7,  n. 3.    But  our  judge-
empowering “evolving standards of decency” jurisprudence
(with  which,  by  the  way,  I  heartily  disagree,  see,  e.g.,