Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/524bv.pdf
Page Number: 844.0

524US2

Unit: U100

[09-15-00 14:43:08] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 524 U. S. 775 (1998)

799

Opinion of the Court

shortcomings in harsh or vulgar terms. A third example
might be the supervisor who, as here, expresses his sexual
interests in ways having no apparent object whatever of
serving an interest of the employer.
If a line is to be drawn
between scope and frolic, it would lie between the ﬁrst two
examples and the third, and it thus makes sense in terms of
traditional agency law to analyze the scope issue, in cases
like the third example, just as most federal courts addressing
that issue have done, classifying the harassment as beyond
the scope of employment.

The second reason goes to an even broader unanimity of
views among the holdings of District Courts and Courts of
Appeals thus far. Those courts have held not only that the
sort of harassment at issue here was outside the scope of
supervisors’ authority, but, by uniformly judging employer
liability for co-worker harassment under a negligence stand-
ard, they have also implicitly treated such harassment as
outside the scope of common employees’ duties as well. See
Blankenship v. Parke Care Centers, Inc., 123 F. 3d 868, 872–
873 (CA6 1997), cert. denied, 522 U. S. 1110 (1998); Fleming
v. Boeing Co., 120 F. 3d 242, 246 (CA11 1997); Perry v. Ethan
Allen, Inc., 115 F. 3d 143, 149 (CA2 1997); Yamaguchi v.
United States Dept. of Air Force, 109 F. 3d 1475, 1483 (CA9
1997); Varner v. National Super Markets, Inc., 94 F. 3d 1209,
1213 (CA8 1996), cert. denied, 519 U. S. 1110 (1997); McKen-
zie v. Illinois Dept. of Transp., 92 F. 3d 473, 480 (CA7 1996);
Andrade, 88 F. 3d, at 261; Waymire v. Harris County, 86 F.
3d 424, 428–429 (CA5 1996); Hirase-Doi v. U. S. West Com-
munications, Inc., 61 F. 3d 777, 783 (CA10 1995); Andrews
v. Philadelphia, 895 F. 2d 1469, 1486 (CA3 1990); cf. Mor-
rison v. Carleton Woolen Mills, Inc., 108 F. 3d 429, 438 (CA1
1997) (applying “knew or should have known” standard to
claims of environmental harassment by a supervisor); see
also 29 CFR § 1604.11(d) (1997) (employer is liable for co-
worker harassment if it “knows or should have known of
the conduct, unless it can show that it took immediate and ap-