Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/14pdf/13-7451_m64o.pdf
Page Number: 18

Cite as:  574 U. S. ____ (2015) 

15 

Opinion of GINSBURG, J. 

obstructive intent.  (Emphasis added.)  The last two verbs, 
“falsif[y]”  and  “mak[e]  a  false  entry  in,”  typically  take  as 
grammatical objects records, documents, or things used to 
record  or  preserve  information,  such  as  logbooks  or  hard
drives.  See,  e.g.,  Black’s  Law  Dictionary  720  (10th  ed. 
2014)  (defining  “falsify”  as  “[t]o  make  deceptive;  to  coun-
terfeit,  forge,  or  misrepresent;  esp.,  to  tamper  with  (a
document,  record,  etc.)”).    It  would  be  unnatural,  for  ex-
ample,  to  describe  a  killer’s  act  of  wiping  his  fingerprints
from  a  gun  as  “falsifying”  the  murder  weapon.  But  it 
would not be strange to refer to “falsifying” data stored on
a hard drive as simply “falsifying” a hard drive.  Further-
more,  Congress  did  not  include  on  §1512(c)(1)’s  list  of 
prohibited  actions  “falsifies”  or  “makes  a  false  entry  in.” 
See  §1512(c)(1)  (making  it  unlawful  to  “alte[r],  destro[y], 
mutilat[e], or concea[l] a record, document, or other object”
with  the  requisite  obstructive  intent).    That  contempora-
neous  omission  also  suggests  that  Congress  intended 
“tangible  object”  in  §1519  to  have  a  narrower  scope  than
“other object” in §1512(c)(1).7 

A  canon  related  to  noscitur  a  sociis,  ejusdem  generis, 
counsels: “Where general words follow specific words in  a 

—————— 

7 The  dissent  contends  that  “record,  document,  or  tangible  object”  in 
§1519  should  be  construed  in  conformity  with  “record,  document,  or 
other  object”  in  §1512(c)(1)  because  both  provisions  address  “the  same 
basic  problem.”    Post,  at  11–12.    But  why  should  that  be  so  when
Congress  prohibited  in  §1519  additional  actions,  specific  to  paper  and
electronic  documents  and  records,  actions  it  did  not  prohibit  in 
§1512(c)(1)?    When  Congress  passed  Sarbanes-Oxley  in  2002,  courts
had already interpreted the phrase “alter, destroy, mutilate, or conceal 
an  object”  in  §1512(b)(2)(B)  to  apply  to  all  types  of  physical  evidence. 
See,  e.g.,  United  States  v.  Applewhaite,  195  F. 3d  679,  688  (CA3  1999) 
(affirming  conviction  under  §1512(b)(2)(B)  for  persuading  another
person  to  paint  over  blood  spatter).    Congress’  use  of  a  formulation  in 
§1519 that did not track the one used in §1512(b)(2)(B) (and repeated in
§1512(c)(1))  suggests  that  Congress  designed  §1519  to  be  interpreted
apart from §1512, not in lockstep with it.