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Page Number: 8

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WAL-MART STORES, INC. v. DUKES 

Opinion of the Court 

Wal-Mart  has  any  express  corporate  policy  against  the 
advancement  of  women.  Rather,  they  claim  that  their 
local  managers’  discretion  over  pay  and  promotions  is
exercised disproportionately in favor of men, leading to an
unlawful  disparate  impact  on  female  employees,  see  42
U. S. C. §2000e–2(k).  And, respondents say, because Wal-
Mart is aware of this effect, its refusal to cabin its manag-
ers’  authority  amounts  to  disparate  treatment,  see 
§2000e–2(a).    Their  complaint  seeks  injunctive  and  de-
claratory  relief,  punitive  damages,  and  backpay.    It  does 
not ask for compensatory damages.

Importantly  for  our  purposes,  respondents  claim  that 
the  discrimination  to  which  they  have  been  subjected  is 
common  to  all  Wal-Mart’s  female  employees.    The  basic 
theory of their case is that a strong and uniform “corporate 
culture”  permits  bias  against  women  to  infect,  perhaps
subconsciously,  the  discretionary  decisionmaking  of  each 
one  of  Wal-Mart’s  thousands  of  managers—thereby  mak-
ing  every  woman  at  the  company  the  victim  of  one  com-
mon discriminatory practice.  Respondents therefore wish 
to  litigate  the  Title  VII  claims  of  all  female  employees  at 
Wal-Mart’s stores in a nationwide class action. 

C 
Class  certification  is  governed  by  Federal  Rule  of  Civil
Procedure 23.  Under Rule 23(a), the party seeking certifi-
cation must demonstrate, first, that: 

“(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all mem- 

bers is impracticable,

“(2) there are questions of law or fact common to the

class, 

“(3) the claims or defenses of the representative par-
ties  are  typical  of  the  claims  or  defenses  of  the  class, 
and 

“(4)  the  representative  parties  will  fairly  and  ade-
quately  protect  the  interests  of  the  class”  (paragraph