Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/20pdf/19-123_g3bi.pdf
Page Number: 61.0

Cite as:  593 U. S. ____ (2021) 

39 

ALITO, J., concurring in judgment
ALITO, J., concurring in judgment 

libel “to provoke . . . wrath, or expose [an individual] to pub-
lic  hatred,  contempt,  and  ridicule.”  Ibid.  (emphasis  de-
leted); see also McConnell, Freedom from Persecution 835–
836.  These offenses might inform what constitutes actual 
or threatened breaches of public peace or safety in the ordi-
nary sense of those terms.54  But the ordinary meaning of 
offenses  that  threaten  public  peace  or  safety  must  be
stretched beyond the breaking point to encompass all viola-
tions of any law.55 

—————— 

54 Some late 18th century and early 19th century dictionaries provided 
special definitions of the term “peace” as used in the law, and these def-
initions fit the offenses on Blackstone’s list.  See, e.g., 1 Johnson (6th ed. 
1785) (“That general security and quiet which the king warrants to his 
subjects, and of which he therefore avenges the violation; every forcible 
injury  is  a  breach  of  the  king’s  peace” (emphasis  deleted));  5  G.  Jacob, 
Law-Dictionary  (1811)  (“[P]articularly  in  law,  [‘peace’]  intends  a  quiet
behaviour towards the King and his Subjects”); Bailey (defining “peace” 
in the “Law Sense” as “quiet and inoffensive Behaviour towards King and 
Subject”).

55 Such an interpretation would also clash with the way in which the 
scope of state legislative power was understood.  If any violation of the
law had been regarded as a breach of public peace or safety, there would 
have been no need for the lawmaking authority of a state legislature to
extend any further, but there is no evidence that state legislative author-
ity  was  understood  that  way.    New  York’s  1777  Constitution  demon-
strates the point.  As noted above, it protected free exercise unless a per-
son invoked that protection to “excuse Acts of Licentiousness, or justify 
Practices  inconsistent  with  the  Peace  or  Safety  of  this  State.”    Art. 
XXXVIII, in Cogan 26.  But the New York Constitution authorized the 
legislature  to  enact  laws  to  further  broader  aims,  including  “good  gov-
ernment, welfare, and prosperity.”  Art. XIX, in 5 Federal and State Con-
stitutions 2633 (F. Thorpe ed. 1909).  That authority obviously goes well
beyond the prohibition of “Practices inconsistent with” the “Peace” and
“Safety” (or “Licentiousness”).  See McConnell, Freedom from Persecu-
tion  835–836.    In  like  manner,  State  Constitutions  and  other  declara-
tions  of  rights  commonly  proclaimed  that  government  should  pursue
broader  goals,  such  as  the  promotion  of  “prosperity”  and  “happiness.”
See Nestor, Table III: Comparing the Provisos to the Scope of Legislative
Power (online source archived at www.supremecourt.gov).