Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/558bv.pdf
Page Number: 590

Cite as: 558 U. S. 310 (2010) 

429 

Opinion of Stevens, J. 

C. J.) (“A corporation is an artiﬁcial being, invisible, intangi­
ble,  and  existing  only  in  contemplation  of  law.  Being  the 
mere  creature  of  law,  it  possesses  only  those  properties 
which the charter of its creation confers upon it”); Eule, Pro­
moting  Speaker  Diversity:  Austin  and  Metro  Broadcasting, 
1990 S. Ct. Rev. 105, 129 (“The framers of the First Amend­
ment  could  scarcely  have  anticipated  its  application  to  the 
corporation  form.  That,  of  course,  ought  not  to  be  disposi­
tive.  What  is  compelling,  however,  is  an  understanding  of 
who  was  supposed  to  be  the  beneﬁciary  of  the  free  speech 
guaranty—the  individual”).  In  light  of  these  background 
practices  and  understandings,  it  seems  to  me  implausible 
that  the  Framers  believed  “the  freedom  of  speech”  would 
extend  equally  to  all  corporate  speakers,  much  less  that  it 
would preclude legislatures from taking limited measures to 
guard against corporate capture of elections. 

The Court observes that the Framers drew on diverse in­
tellectual  sources,  communicated  through  newspapers,  and 
aimed to provide greater freedom of speech than had existed 
in  England.  Ante,  at  353.  From  these  (accurate)  observa­
tions, the Court concludes that “[t]he First Amendment was 
certainly not understood to condone the suppression of politi­
cal speech in society’s most salient media.”  Ibid.  This con­
clusion is far from certain, given that many historians believe 
the Framers were focused on prior restraints on publication 
and  did  not  understand  the  First  Amendment  to  “prevent 
the  subsequent  punishment  of  such  [publications]  as  may  be 
deemed contrary to the public welfare.”  Near v.  Minnesota 
ex  rel.  Olson,  283  U. S.  697,  714  (1931)  (internal  quotation 
marks omitted).  Yet, even if the majority’s conclusion were 
correct, it would tell us only that the First Amendment was 
understood  to  protect  political  speech  in  certain  media.  It 
would  tell  us  little  about  whether  the  Amendment  was  un­
derstood to protect general treasury electioneering expendi­
tures by corporations, and to what extent.