Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/22pdf/22-58_i425.pdf
Page Number: 38.0

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UNITED STATES v. TEXAS 

 BARRETT, J., concurring
BARRETT, J., concurring in judgment 

too broadly.  Consider the facts.  The “mother of an illegiti-
mate child” sued in federal court, “apparently seek[ing] an
injunction running against the district attorney forbidding
him from declining prosecution” of the child’s father for fail-
ure  to  pay child  support.    410  U. S.,  at  614–616.    She ob-
jected, on equal protection grounds, to the State’s view that
“fathers of illegitimate children” were not within the ambit 
of the relevant child-neglect statute.  Id., at 616. 

We agreed that the plaintiff “suffered an injury stemming 
from the failure of her child’s father to contribute support
payments.”  Id., at 618.  But if the plaintiff “were granted
the requested relief, it would result only in the jailing of the 
child’s  father.”    Ibid.  Needless  to  say,  the  prospect  that
prosecution would lead to child-support payments could, “at 
best, be termed only speculative.”  Ibid.  For this reason, we 
held that the plaintiff lacked standing.  Only then, after re-
solving the standing question on redressability grounds, did
we add that “a private citizen lacks a judicially cognizable 
interest  in  the  prosecution  or  nonprosecution  of  another.” 
Id., at 619.  In short, we denied standing in Linda R. S. be-
cause it was speculative that the plaintiff ’s requested relief
would redress her asserted injury, not because she failed to
allege one.  See Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental 
Study Group, Inc., 438 U. S. 59, 79, n. 24 (1978). 
  Viewed properly, Linda R. S. simply represents a specific 
application of the general principle that “when the plaintiff 
is not himself the object of the government action or inac-
tion he challenges, standing is not precluded, but it is ordi-
narily ‘substantially more difficult’ to establish” given the
causation and redressability issues that may arise.  Lujan 
v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U. S. 555, 562 (1992).  That is 
true for the States here.  I see little reason to seize on the 
case’s bonus discussion of whether “a private citizen” has a
“judicially  cognizable  interest  in  the  prosecution  or 
nonprosecution of another” to establish a broad rule of Ar-
ticle III standing.  Linda R. S., 410 U. S., at 619.