Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/19pdf/18-1195_g314.pdf
Page Number: 64

Cite as:  591 U. S. ____ (2020) 

3 

BREYER, J., dissenting 

A 
We all recognize that the First Amendment prohibits dis-
crimination against religion. At the same time, our history 
and federal constitutional precedent reflect a deep concern 
that state funding for religious teaching, by stirring fears of 
preference or in other ways, might fuel religious discord and 
division and thereby threaten religious freedom itself.  See, 
e.g.,  Committee  for  Public  Ed.  &  Religious  Liberty  v. 
Nyquist, 413 U. S. 756, 794–796 (1973).  The Court has con-
sequently made it clear that the Constitution commits the 
government to a “position of neutrality” in respect to reli-
gion.  School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 
U. S. 203, 226 (1963).

The  inherent  tension  between  the  Establishment  and 
Free Exercise Clauses means, however, that the “course of 
constitutional  neutrality  in  this  area  cannot  be  an  abso-
lutely straight line.”  Walz, 397 U. S., at 669.  Indeed, “ri-
gidity  could  well  defeat  the  basic  purpose  of  these  provi-
sions,  which  is  to  insure  that  no  religion  be  sponsored  or
favored, none commanded, and none inhibited.”  Ibid. 

That, in significant part, is why the Court has held that 
“there is room for play in the joints” between the Clauses’ 
express prohibitions that is “productive of a benevolent neu-
trality,” allowing “religious exercise to exist without spon-
sorship and without interference.”  Ibid.  It has held that 
there  “are  some  state  actions  permitted  by  the  Establish-
ment Clause but not required by the Free Exercise Clause.” 
Locke, 540 U. S., at 719; see Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U. S. 
709, 719 (2005).  And that “play in the joints” should, in my 
view, play a determinative role here. 

It may be that, under our precedents, the Establishment 
Clause does not forbid Montana to subsidize the education 
of petitioners’ children.  But, the question here is whether 
the Free Exercise Clause requires it to do so.  The majority
believes that the answer to that question is “yes.”  It writes 
that “once a State decides” to support nonpublic education,