Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/19pdf/19a1070_08l1.pdf
Page Number: 19

Cite as:  591 U. S. ____ (2020) 

7 

KAVANAUGH, J., dissenting 

justified the basis for the distinction. 
  To be clear, the Court’s precedents do not require that re-
ligious organizations be treated more favorably than all sec-
ular organizations.  Rather, the First Amendment requires 
that  religious  organizations  be  treated  equally  to  the  fa-
vored or exempt secular organizations, unless the State can 
sufficiently justify the differentiation. 
  Stated otherwise, in these kinds of cases, the Court’s re-
ligion  precedents  require  a  basic  two-step  inquiry.    First, 
does the law create a favored or exempt class of organiza-
tions  and,  if  so,  do  religious  organizations  fall  outside  of 
that class?  That threshold question does not require judges 
to decide whether a church is more akin to a factory or more 
like a museum, for example.  Rather, the only question at 
the start is whether a given law on its face favors certain 
organizations  and,  if  so,  whether  religious  organizations 
are  part  of  that  favored  group.    If  the  religious  organiza-
tions  are  not,  the  second  question  is  whether  the  govern-
ment has provided a sufficient justification for the differen-
tial treatment and disfavoring of religion.  Cf. Smith, 494 
U. S., at 884. 
  In  seeking  to  justify  the  differential  treatment  in  those 
kinds of cases, it is not enough for the government to point 
out that other secular organizations or individuals are also 
treated unfavorably.  The point “is not whether one or a few 
secular analogs are regulated.  The question is whether a 
single secular analog is not regulated.”  Laycock & Collis, 
Generally  Applicable  Law  and  the  Free  Exercise  of  Reli-
gion, 95 Neb. L. Rev. 1, 22 (2016).  To that end, the govern-
ment must articulate a sufficient justification for treating 
some  secular  organizations  or  individuals  more  favorably 
than religious organizations or individuals.  See Smith, 494 
U. S.,  at  884.   That  point  is subtle  but  absolutely  critical.  
And if that point is not fully understood, then cases of this 
kind will be wrongly decided.