Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/529bv.pdf
Page Number: 792.0

529US3

Unit: $U56

[09-28-01 09:22:19] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 529 U. S. 694 (2000)

717

Scalia, J., dissenting

As to the ﬁrst: The usual, ordinary-English deﬁnition of
“revoke” is already amply distinguishable from “terminate,”
and does not have to be tortured into Old English (or actu-
ally, transliteration from Old Latin) in order to explain the
choice of words.
“Terminate” connotes completion rather
than cancellation. See American Heritage Dictionary 1852
(3d ed. 1992) (deﬁning “terminate” as “[t]o bring to an end
or a halt” or “[t]o occur at or form the end of; conclude or
ﬁnish”); Webster’s New International Dictionary 2605 (2d ed.
1942) (deﬁning “terminate” as “[t]o put an end to; to make to
cease; to end . . . to form the conclusion of . . .”). Using
“terminate” in subsection (e)(1) and “revoke” (in its ordinary
sense) in subsection (e)(3) is not only not inexplicable; it re-
ﬂects an admirably precise use of language.
In subsection
(e)(1),
the term of supervised release is “terminated”
(“brought to an end”) because termination is warranted “by
the conduct of the defendant released and the interest of jus-
tice.” The supervised release is treated as fulﬁlled, and the
sentence is complete.
In subsection (e)(3), by contrast, the
supervised release term is not merely brought to an end; it
is annulled and treated as though it had never existed, the
defendant receiving no credit for any supervised release
served.
It would be hard to pick two words more clearly
connoting these distinct consequences than “terminate” and
“revoke.” 2

2 The Court is correct, ante, at 705, n. 7, that my suggested explanation
of the difference between “terminate” and “revoke” does not comport with
the use of “terminate” in § 3583(g). But the use of the term in that sub-
section also contradicts the Court’s explanation of the difference between
the two terms—viz., that “terminate,” unlike in its view “revoke,” “con-
clude[s] any possibility of supervised release later,” ante, at 704. For the
Court evidently believes (contrary to the use of “terminate” in § 3583(g))
that further supervised release is available when a supervisee is reimpris-
oned for possession of a controlled substance.
It would be “fundamentally
contrary” to the congressional scheme, the Court asserts, if supervised
release following reimprisonment were not available for “one who has al-
ready tried liberty and failed,” ante, at 709. But the use of “terminate” in