Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/558bv.pdf
Page Number: 612.0

Cite as: 558 U. S. 310 (2010) 

451 

Opinion of Stevens, J. 

The  cluster  of  interrelated  interests  threatened  by  such 
undue  inﬂuence  and  its  appearance  has  been  well  captured 
under  the  rubric  of  “democratic  integrity.”  WRTL,  551 
U. S.,  at  522  (Souter,  J.,  dissenting).  This  value  has  under­
lined  a  century  of  state  and  federal  efforts  to  regulate  the 
role of corporations in the electoral process.65 

Unlike the majority’s myopic focus on quid pro quo scenar­
ios  and  the  free-ﬂoating  “First  Amendment  principles”  on 
which it rests so much weight, ante, at 319, 363, this broader 
understanding  of  corruption  has  deep  roots  in  the  Nation’s 
history.  “During debates on the earliest [campaign ﬁnance] 
reform  acts,  the  terms  ‘corruption’  and  ‘undue  inﬂuence’ 
were  used  nearly  interchangeably.”  Pasquale,  Reclaiming 
Egalitarianism  in  the  Political  Theory  of  Campaign  Finance 
Reform, 2008 U. Ill. L. Rev. 599, 601.  Long before Buckley, 
we appreciated that “[t]o say that Congress is without power 
to  pass  appropriate  legislation  to  safeguard  .  .  .  an  election 
from the improper use of money to inﬂuence the result is to 
deny  to  the  nation  in  a  vital  particular  the  power  of  self 
protection.”  Burroughs v.  United States, 290 U. S. 534, 545 
(1934).  And  whereas  we  have  no  evidence  to  support  the 
notion that the Framers would have wanted corporations to 
have the same rights as natural persons in the electoral con­
text,  we  have  ample  evidence  to  suggest  that  they  would 

65 Quite  distinct  from  the  interest  in  preventing  improper  inﬂuences  on 
the  electoral  process,  I  have  long  believed  that  “a  number  of  [other]  pur­
poses,  both  legitimate  and  substantial,  may  justify  the  imposition  of  rea­
sonable  limitations  on  the  expenditures  permitted  during  the  course  of 
any  single  campaign.”  Davis  v.  FEC,  554  U. S.  724,  751  (2008)  (opinion 
concurring in part and dissenting in part).  In my judgment, such limita­
tions  may  be  justiﬁed  to  the  extent  they  are  tailored  to  “improving  the 
quality of the exposition of ideas” that voters receive, ibid., “free[ing] can­
didates and their staffs from the interminable burden of fundraising,” ibid. 
(internal  quotation  marks  omitted),  and  “protect[ing]  equal  access  to  the 
political arena,” Randall v.  Sorrell, 548 U. S. 230, 278 (2006) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting)  (internal  quotation  marks  omitted).  I  continue  to  adhere  to 
these  beliefs,  but  they  have  not  been  briefed  by  the  parties  or  amici  in 
this case, and their soundness is immaterial to its proper disposition.