Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/17pdf/16-1140_5368.pdf
Page Number: 15.0

Cite as:  585 U. S. ____ (2018) 

11 

Opinion of the Court 

described  the  Pennsylvania  law  as  “a  requirement  that  a
doctor give a woman certain information as part of obtain-
ing  her  consent  to  an  abortion,”  which  “for  constitutional 
purposes,  [was]  no  different  from  a  requirement  that  a
doctor give certain specific information about any medical 
procedure.”  Ibid.  The joint opinion explained that the law 
regulated speech only “as part of the practice of medicine, 
subject  to  reasonable  licensing  and  regulation  by  the 
State.”  Ibid.  (emphasis  added).  Indeed,  the  requirement 
that a doctor obtain informed consent to perform an opera-
tion is “firmly entrenched in American tort  law.”   Cruzan 
v. Director, Mo. Dept. of Health, 497 U. S. 261, 269 (1990); 
see,  e.g.,  Schloendorff  v.  Society  of  N. Y.  Hospital,  211 
N. Y.  125,  129–130,  105  N. E.  92,  93  (1914)  (Cardozo,  J.) 
(explaining  that  “a  surgeon  who  performs  an  operation
without his patient’s consent commits an assault”). 

The  licensed  notice  at  issue  here  is  not  an  informed-
consent requirement or any other regulation of professional 
conduct.  The notice does not facilitate informed consent to 
a medical procedure.  In fact, it is not tied to a procedure 
at  all.  It  applies  to  all  interactions  between  a  covered 
facility  and  its  clients,  regardless  of  whether  a  medical
procedure  is  ever  sought,  offered,  or  performed.    If  a  cov-
ered  facility  does  provide  medical  procedures,  the  notice
provides  no  information  about  the  risks  or  benefits  of 
those  procedures.  Tellingly,  many  facilities  that  provide 
the  exact  same  services  as  covered  facilities—such  as 
general  practice  clinics,  see  §123471(a)—are  not  required 
to  provide  the  licensed  notice.  The  licensed  notice  regu-
lates speech as speech. 

3 

the 

Outside  of 

two  contexts  discussed  above— 
disclosures under Zauderer and professional conduct—this
Court’s  precedents  have  long  protected  the  First  Amend-
ment rights of professionals.  For example, this Court has