Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/21pdf/20-1650_3dq3.pdf
Page Number: 24.0

Cite as:  597 U. S. ____ (2022) 

1 

KAVANAUGH, J., dissenting 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

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No. 20–1650 
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CARLOS CONCEPCION, PETITIONER v. 
UNITED STATES 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT 

[June 27, 2022] 

JUSTICE  KAVANAUGH,  with  whom  THE  CHIEF  JUSTICE, 

JUSTICE ALITO, and JUSTICE BARRETT join, dissenting. 

Beginning in the mid-1980s, Congress prescribed higher
criminal sentences for crack-cocaine offenses than for pow-
der-cocaine offenses involving the same amounts of cocaine.
In 2010, Congress enacted the Fair Sentencing Act to nar-
row that crack/powder disparity by lowering the sentencing 
ranges for certain crack-cocaine offenses.  But the Act low-
ered  those  crack-cocaine  sentencing  ranges  only  prospec-
tively—that  is,  for  crack-cocaine  offenders  who  were  sen-
tenced on or after the Act’s effective date of August 3, 2010. 
The First Step Act of 2018 changed that.  It provided that
the 2010 Fair Sentencing Act’s lower crack-cocaine sentenc-
ing ranges would also apply retroactively to offenders who 
were sentenced before August 3, 2010.  But how to imple-
ment  that  change?  Congress  did  not  mandate  a  specific 
across-the-board reduction to all pre-August 3, 2010, crack-
cocaine sentences.  Instead, the First Step Act authorized 
district courts, on motion, to “impose a reduced sentence as
if ”  the  lower  sentencing  ranges  for  crack-cocaine  offenses 
“were in effect at the time the covered offense was commit-
ted.”  §404(b), 132 Stat. 5222.

The straightforward question in this case is whether dis-
trict courts in First Step Act sentence-modification proceed-
ings may reduce sentences based not only on the changes to