Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/18pdf/17-1272_7l48.pdf
Page Number: 2.0

2 

HENRY SCHEIN, INC. v. ARCHER & WHITE SALES, INC. 

Syllabus 

That conclusion follows also from this Court’s precedent.  See AT&T 
Technologies,  Inc.  v.  Communications  Workers,  475  U. S.  643,  649– 
650. 

Archer  &  White’s  counterarguments  are  unpersuasive.  First,  its 
argument  that  §§3  and  4  of  the  Act  should  be  interpreted  to  mean 
that  a  court  must  always  resolve  questions  of  arbitrability  has  al-
ready been addressed and rejected by this Court.  See, e.g., First Op-
tions  of  Chicago,  Inc.  v.  Kaplan,  514  U. S.  938,  944.    Second,  its  ar-
gument  that  §10  of  the  Act—which  provides  for  back-end  judicial 
review  of  an  arbitrator’s  decision  if  an  arbitrator  has  “exceeded”  his 
or  her  “powers”—supports  the  conclusion  that  the  court  at  the  front 
end  should  also  be  able  to  say  that  the  underlying  issue  is  not  arbi-
trable is inconsistent with the way Congress designed the Act.  And it 
is  not  this  Court’s  proper  role  to  redesign  the  Act.    Third,  its  argu-
ment that it would be a waste of the parties’ time and money to send 
wholly groundless arbitrability questions to an arbitrator ignores the 
fact  that  the  Act  contains  no  “wholly  groundless”  exception.    This 
Court  may  not  engraft  its  own  exceptions  onto  the  statutory  text. 
Nor is it likely that the exception would save time and money system-
ically even if it might do so in some individual cases.  Fourth, its ar-
gument that the exception is necessary to deter frivolous motions  to
compel arbitration overstates the potential problem.  Arbitrators are 
already  capable  of  efficiently  disposing  of  frivolous  cases  and  deter-
ring  frivolous  motions,  and  such  motions  do  not  appear  to  have 
caused  a  substantial  problem  in  those  Circuits  that  have  not  recog-
nized a “wholly groundless” exception.

The Fifth Circuit may address the question whether the contract at
issue in fact delegated the  arbitrability question to an arbitrator, as 
well as other properly preserved arguments, on remand.  Pp. 4–8. 

 878 F. 3d 488, vacated and remanded. 

KAVANAUGH, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.