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Cite as: 529 U. S. 598 (2000)

663

Breyer, J., dissenting

also Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U. S. 452, 460–461 (1991) (in-
sisting upon a “plain statement” of congressional intent when
Congress legislates “in areas traditionally regulated by the
States”); cf. Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U. S. 88, 103–
105, 114–117 (1976); Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U. S. 448,
548–554 (1980) (Stevens, J., dissenting).

Commentators also have suggested that the thoroughness
of legislative procedures—e. g., whether Congress took a
“hard look”—might sometimes make a determinative differ-
ence in a Commerce Clause case, say, when Congress legis-
lates in an area of traditional state regulation. See, e. g.,
Jackson, Federalism and the Uses and Limits of Law: Printz
and Principle?, 111 Harv. L. Rev. 2180, 2231–2245 (1998);
Gardbaum, Rethinking Constitutional Federalism, 74 Texas
L. Rev. 795, 812–828, 830–832 (1996); Lessig, Translating
Federalism: United States v. Lopez, 1995 S. Ct. Rev. 125,
194–214 (1995); see also Treaty Establishing the European
Community Art. 5; Bermann, Taking Subsidiarity Seriously:
Federalism in the European Community and the United
States, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 331, 378–403 (1994) (arguing for
similar limitation in respect to somewhat analogous principle
of subsidiarity for European Community); Gardbaum, supra,
at 833–837 (applying subsidiarity principles to American
federalism). Of course, any judicial
insistence that Con-
gress follow particular procedures might itself intrude upon
congressional prerogatives and embody difﬁcult deﬁnitional
problems. But the intrusion, problems, and consequences
all would seem less serious than those embodied in the
majority’s approach. See supra, at 656–659.

I continue to agree with Justice Souter that the Court’s
traditional “rational basis” approach is sufﬁcient. Ante, at
628 (dissenting opinion); see also Lopez, 514 U. S., at 603–615
(Souter, J., dissenting); id., at 615–631 (Breyer, J., dis-
senting). But I recognize that the law in this area is un-
stable and that time and experience may demonstrate both
the unworkability of the majority’s rules and the superiority