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Page Number: 27.0

8  MANHATTAN COMMUNITY ACCESS CORP. v. HALLECK 

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting 

518–520  (1971).    Similarly,  if  the  wires  were  a  theater, 
there would be no question that a government’s long-term 
lease  to  use  it  would  be  sufficient  for  public-forum  pur- 
poses.  Southeastern Promotions, 420 U. S., at 547, 555.  But 
some  may  find  this  case  more  complicated  because  the 
wires  are  not  a  road  or  a  theater  that  one  can  physically 
occupy;  they  are  a  conduit  for  transmitting  signals  that 
appear  as  television  channels.    In  other  words,  the  ques-
tion  is  how  to  understand  the  right  to  place  content  on 
those channels using those wires. 
  The  right  to  convey  expressive  content  using  someone 
else’s physical infrastructure is not new.  To give another 
low-tech  example,  imagine  that  one  company  owns  a 
billboard  and  another  rents  space  on  that  billboard.    The 
renter  can  have  a  property  interest  in  placing  content  on 
the  billboard  for  the  lease  term  even  though  it  does  not 
own the billboard itself.  See, e.g., Naegele Outdoor Adver-
tising  Co.  of  Minneapolis  v.  Lakeville,  532  N. W.  2d  249, 
253  (Minn.  1995); see  also  Matter  of  XAR  Corp.  v. Di Do-
nato,  76  App.  Div.  2d  972,  973,  429  N. Y. S.  2d  59,  60 
(1980)  (“Although  invariably  labeled  ‘leases,’  agreements 
to  erect  advertising  signs  or  to  place  signs  on  walls  or 
fences are easements in gross”). 
  The  same  principle  should  operate  in  this  higher  tech 
realm.    Just  as  if  the  channels  were  a  billboard,  the  City 
obtained  rights  for  exclusive  use  of  the  channels  by  the 
public for the foreseeable future; no one is free to take the 
channels  away,  short  of  a  contract  renegotiation.    Cf. 
Craft, 535 U. S., at 283.  The City also obtained the right 
to administer, or delegate the administration of, the chan-
nels.    The  channels  are  more  intangible  than  a  billboard, 
but no one believes that a right must be tangible to qualify 
as  a  property  interest.    See,  e.g.,  Armstrong  v.  United 
States, 364 U. S. 40, 48–49 (1960) (treating destruction of 
valid  liens  as  a  taking);  Adams  Express  Co.  v.  Ohio  State 
Auditor,  166  U. S.  185,  219  (1897)  (treating  “privileges,