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18 

LOPER BRIGHT ENTERPRISES v. RAIMONDO 

GORSUCH, J., concurring 

United  States  v.  Hansen,  599  U. S.  762,  786–791  (2023) 
(THOMAS, J., concurring).  All of this served to ensure the 
same thing: “A fair trial in a fair tribunal.”  In re Murchi-
son,  349  U. S.  133,  136  (1955).    One  in  which  impartial
judges, not those currently wielding power in the political 
branches,  would  “say  what  the  law  is”  in  cases  coming  to 
court.  Marbury, 1 Cranch, at 177. 

Chevron  deference  undermines  all  that.    It  precludes
courts from exercising the judicial power vested in them by 
Article III to say what the law is.  It forces judges to aban-
don  the  best  reading  of  the  law  in  favor  of  views  of  those 
presently holding the reins of the Executive Branch.  It re-
quires judges to change, and change again, their interpre-
tations of the law as and when the government demands.
And  that  transfer  of  power  has  exactly  the  sort  of  conse-
quences one might expect.  Rather than insulate adjudica-
tion from power and politics to ensure a fair hearing “with-
out respect to persons” as the federal judicial oath demands,
28  U. S. C.  §453,  Chevron  deference  requires  courts  to
“place a finger on the scales of justice in favor of the most 
powerful of litigants, the federal government.”  Buffington, 
598  U. S.,  at  ___  (slip  op.,  at  9).    Along  the  way,  Chevron 
deference  guarantees  “systematic  bias”  in  favor  of  which-
ever political party currently holds the levers of executive 
power.  P. Hamburger, Chevron Bias, 84 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 
1187, 1212 (2016). 

Chevron deference undermines other aspects of our set-
tled law, too.  In this country, we often boast that the Con-
stitution’s promise of due process of law, see Amdts. 5, 14,
means that “ ‘no man can be a judge in his own case.’ ”  Wil-
liams  v.  Pennsylvania,  579  U. S.  1,  8–9  (2016);  Calder  v. 
Bull,  3  Dall.  386,  388  (1798)  (opinion  of  Chase,  J.).    That 
principle, of course, has even deeper roots, tracing far back 
into  the  common  law  where  it  was  known  by  the  Latin
maxim nemo iudex in causa sua.  See 1 E. Coke, Institutes