Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/23pdf/22-915_8o6b.pdf
Page Number: 21

Cite as:  602 U. S. ____ (2024) 

17 

man.2 

Opinion of the Court 

5 

Finally, in holding that Section 922(g)(8) is constitutional 
as  applied  to  Rahimi,  we  reject  the  Government’s  conten-
tion that Rahimi may be disarmed simply because he is not 
“responsible.”  Brief for United States 6; see Tr. of Oral Arg. 
8–11.  “Responsible”  is  a  vague  term.    It  is  unclear  what 
such a rule would entail.  Nor does such a line derive from 
our case law.  In Heller and Bruen, we used the term “re-
sponsible” to describe the class of ordinary citizens who un-
doubtedly  enjoy  the  Second  Amendment  right.  See,  e.g., 
Heller, 554 U. S., at 635; Bruen, 597 U. S., at 70.  But those 
decisions did not define the term and said nothing about the 
status of citizens who were not “responsible.”  The question
was simply not presented. 

* 

* 

* 
In Heller, McDonald, and Bruen, this Court did not “un-
dertake  an  exhaustive  historical  analysis  . . .  of  the  full 
scope of the Second Amendment.”  Bruen, 597 U. S., at 31. 
Nor do we do so today.  Rather, we conclude only this: An 
individual found by a court to pose a credible threat to the
physical  safety  of  another  may  be  temporarily  disarmed
consistent with the Second Amendment. 

The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit 

—————— 

2 Many of the potential faults that the Fifth Circuit identifies in Section
922(g)(8) appear to sound in due process rather than the Second Amend-
ment.  E.g., 61 F. 4th, at 459; id., at 465–467 (Ho, J., concurring).  As we 
have explained, unless these hypothetical faults occur in every case, they
do not justify invalidating Section 922(g)(8) on its face.  See United States 
v. Salerno, 481 U. S. 739, 745 (1987) (a facial challenge fails if the law is
constitutional in at least some of its applications).  In any event, we need 
not address any due process concern here because this challenge was not 
litigated as a due process challenge and there is no such claim before us. 
See this Court’s Rule 14.1(a).