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420  CITIZENS  UNITED  v.  FEDERAL  ELECTION  COMM’N 

Opinion of Stevens, J. 

The  case on  which  it relies  for this  proposition  is First  Nat. 
Bank  of  Boston  v.  Bellotti,  435  U. S.  765  (1978).  As  I  shall 
explain,  infra,  at  442–446,  the  holding  in  that  case  was  far 
narrower than  the Court implies.  Like its  paeans to unfet­
tered  discourse,  the  Court’s  denunciation  of  identity-based 
distinctions  may  have  rhetorical  appeal  but  it  obscures 
reality. 

“Our  jurisprudence  over  the  past  216  years  has  rejected 
an absolutist interpretation” of the First Amendment. 
WRTL,  551  U. S.,  at  482  (opinion  of  Roberts,  C.  J.).  The 
First Amendment provides that “Congress shall make no law 
. . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press.”  Apart 
perhaps  from  measures  designed  to  protect  the  press,  that 
text  might seem  to permit  no distinctions  of any  kind.  Yet 
in  a  variety  of  contexts,  we  have  held  that  speech  can  be 
regulated  differentially  on  account  of  the  speaker’s  identity, 
when  identity  is  understood  in  categorical  or  institutional 
terms.  The  Government  routinely  places  special  restric­
tions on the speech rights of students,41  prisoners,42  members 
of the Armed Forces,43  foreigners,44  and its own employees.45 

41 See,  e. g.,  Bethel  School  Dist.  No.  403  v.  Fraser,  478  U. S.  675,  682 
(1986)  (“[T]he  constitutional  rights  of  students  in  public  school  are  not 
automatically coextensive with the rights of adults in other settings”). 

42 See,  e. g.,  Jones  v.  North  Carolina  Prisoners’  Labor  Union,  Inc.,  433 
U. S. 119, 129 (1977) (“In a prison context, an inmate does not retain those 
First Amendment rights that are inconsistent with his status as a prisoner 
or  with  the  legitimate  penological  objectives  of  the  corrections  system” 
(internal quotation marks omitted)). 

43 See,  e. g.,  Parker  v.  Levy,  417  U. S.  733,  758  (1974)  (“While  the  mem­
bers  of  the  military  are  not  excluded  from  the  protection  granted  by 
the  First  Amendment,  the  different  character  of  the  military  community 
and  of  the  military  mission  requires  a  different  application  of  those 
protections”). 

44 See,  e. g.,  2  U. S. C.  § 441e(a)(1)  (foreign  nationals  may  not  directly  or 
indirectly  make  contributions  or  independent  expenditures  in  connection 
with a U. S. election). 

45 See, e. g., Civil Service Comm’n v.  Letter Carriers, 413 U. S. 548, 550 
(1973)  (upholding  statute  prohibiting  Executive  Branch  employees  from 
taking  “an  active  part  in  political  management  or  in  political  campaigns”