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TRUMP v. VANCE 

Syllabus 

Burr, 25 F. Cas. 30, 33–34.  The sole argument for an exemption was 
that a President’s “duties as chief magistrate demand his whole time 
for national objects.”  Ibid.  But, in Marshall’s assessment, those duties 
were “not unremitting,” ibid., and any conflict could be addressed by 
the court upon return of the subpoena.  Marshall also concluded that 
the  Sixth  Amendment’s  guarantee  extended  to  the  production  of  pa-
pers.  “[T]he propriety of introducing any papers,” he explained, would 
“depend on the character of the paper, not the character of the person 
who holds it,” and would have “due consideration” upon the return of 
the  subpoena.    Id.,  at  34,  37.    Jefferson  agreed  to  furnish  whatever 
justice required, subject to the prerogative to decide whether particu-
lar executive communications should be withheld. 
   In the two centuries since Burr, successive Presidents from Monroe 
to Clinton have accepted Marshall’s ruling that the Chief Executive is 
subject to subpoena and have uniformly agreed to testify when called 
in criminal proceedings.   
   In  1974,  the  question  whether  to  compel  the  disclosure  of  official 
communications  over  the  President’s  objection  came  to  a  head  when 
the Watergate Special Prosecutor secured a subpoena duces tecum di-
recting President Nixon to produce, among other things, tape record-
ings of Oval Office meetings.  This Court rejected Nixon’s claim of an 
absolute  privilege  of  confidentiality  for  all  presidential  communica-
tions.  Recognizing that “compulsory process” was imperative for both 
the prosecution and the defense, the Court held that the President’s 
“generalized assertion of privilege must yield to the demonstrated, spe-
cific need for evidence in a pending criminal trial.”  United States v. 
Nixon,  418  U. S.  683,  713.    President  Nixon  dutifully  released  the 
tapes.  Pp. 3–10. 

(b) This history all involved federal criminal proceedings.  Here, the 
President claims that the Supremacy Clause gives a sitting President 
absolute immunity from state criminal subpoenas because compliance 
with such subpoenas would categorically impair the performance of his 
Article  II  functions.    The  Solicitor  General,  arguing  on  behalf  of  the 
United  States,  claims  that  a  state  grand  jury  subpoena  for  a  sitting 
President’s personal records must, at the very least, meet a heightened 
standard of need.  Pp. 10–22.  

(1)  The President’s unique duties as head of the Executive Branch 
come  with  protections  that  safeguard  his  ability  to  perform  his  vital 
functions.  The Constitution also guarantees “the entire independence 
of the General Government from any control by the respective States.”  
Farmers and Mechanics Sav. Bank of Minneapolis v. Minnesota, 232 
U. S. 516, 521.  Marshall’s ruling in Burr, entrenched by 200 years of 
practice and this Court’s decision in Nixon, confirms that federal crim-
inal  subpoenas  do  not  “rise  to  the  level  of  constitutionally  forbidden