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Page Number: 5

4 

GALLARDO v. MARSTILLER 

of the mandatory assignment.

Syllabus 

Finally, Gallardo’s two policy arguments for her preferred interpre-
tation  both  fail.    First,  citing  a  footnote  from  Ahlborn,  she  contends 
that  it  would  be  “ ‘absurd  and  fundamentally  unjust’ ”  for  a  State  to 
“ ‘share in damages for which it has provided no compensation.’ ” 547 
U. S., at 288, n. 19.  But the Court’s holding there was dictated by the
Medicaid Act’s “text,” not by the Court’s sense of fairness.  Id., at 280. 
Second,  Gallardo 
reading  of 
§1396k(a)(1)(A) would authorize a “lifetime assignment” covering not 
only the rights an individual has while a Medicaid beneficiary but also 
any rights acquired in the future when the individual is no longer a 
Medicaid beneficiary.  Not so.  The provision is most naturally read as 
covering  those  rights  “the  individual”  possesses  while  on  Medicaid. 
And given background legal principles about the scope of assignments,
§1396k(a)(1)(A)  cannot  be  read  to  cover  the  sort  of  “lifetime  assign-
ment” Gallardo invokes.  Pp. 8–12. 

the  Court’s 

speculates 

that 

963 F. 3d 1167, affirmed. 

THOMAS, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C. J., 
and ALITO, KAGAN, GORSUCH, KAVANAUGH and BARRETT, JJ., joined.  SO-
TOMAYOR, J., filed dissenting opinion in which, BREYER, J., joined.