Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/19pdf/19-431_5i36.pdf
Page Number: 37

Cite as:  591 U. S. ____ (2020) 

7 

ALITO, J., concurring 

Our  answer  to  the  second  question  was  also  perfectly
clear.  If an employer has a religious objection to the use of 
a covered contraceptive, and if the employer has a sincere
religious belief that compliance with the mandate makes it 
complicit in that conduct, then RFRA requires that the be-
lief be honored.  Id., at 724–725.  We noted that the objec-
tion raised by the employers in Hobby Lobby “implicate[d]
a difficult and important question of religion and moral phi-
losophy, namely, the circumstances under which it is wrong 
for a person to perform an act that is innocent in itself but
that has the effect of enabling or facilitating the commission 
of an immoral act by another.”  Id., at 724.  We noted that 
different individuals have different beliefs on this question,
but we were clear that “federal courts have no business ad-
dressing . . . whether the religious belief asserted in a RFRA
case is reasonable.”  Ibid.  Instead, the “function” of a court 
is  “ ‘narrow’ ”:  “ ‘to  determine’  whether  the  line  drawn  re-
flects ‘an honest conviction.’ ”  Id., at 725 (quoting Thomas 
v. Review Bd. of Ind. Employment Security Div., 450 U. S. 
707, 716 (1981)).

Applying this holding to the Little Sisters yields an obvi-
ous answer.  It is undisputed that the Little Sisters have a 
sincere religious objection to the use of contraceptives and 
that they also have a sincere religious belief that utilizing 
the accommodation would make them complicit in this con-
duct.  As in Hobby Lobby, “it is not for us to say that their
religious beliefs are mistaken or insubstantial.”  573 U. S., 
at 725. 

In reaching a contrary conclusion, the Court of Appeals 
adopted the reasoning of a prior Third Circuit decision hold-

—————— 
476 U. S. 693 (1986).  See post, at 18–19 (opinion of GINSBURG, J.) (relying 
on Bowen to conclude that accommodation was unnecessary).  In Bowen, 
the objecting individuals were not faced with penalties or “coerced by the 
Governmen[t] into violating their religious beliefs.”  Lyng v. Northwest 
Indian Cemetery Protective Assn., 485 U. S. 439, 449 (1988).