Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/17pdf/16-1140_5368.pdf
Page Number: 32

6 

NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF FAMILY AND 
LIFE ADVOCATES v. BECERRA
 
BREYER, J., dissenting 

The  Court  has  taken  this  same  respectful  approach  to
economic  and  social  legislation  when  a  First  Amendment 
claim  like  the  claim  present  here  is  at  issue.    See,  e.g., 
Zauderer  v.  Office  of  Disciplinary  Counsel  of  Supreme 
Court  of  Ohio,  471  U. S.  626,  651  (1985)  (upholding  rea-
sonable  disclosure  requirements  for  attorneys);  Milavetz, 
Gallop  &  Milavetz,  P. A.  v.  United  States,  559  U. S.  229, 
252–253  (2010)  (same);  cf.  Central  Hudson  Gas  &  Elec. 
Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm’n of N. Y., 447 U. S. 557, 563– 
564  (1980)  (applying  intermediate  scrutiny  to  other  re-
strictions  on  commercial  speech);  In re  R. M. J.,  455  U. S. 
191,  203  (1982)  (no  First  Amendment  protection  for  mis-
leading  or  deceptive  commercial  speech).  But  see  Sorrell 
v.  IMS  Health  Inc.,  564  U. S.  552  (2011)  (striking  down
regulation of pharmaceutical drug-related information). 

Even  during  the  Lochner  era,  when  this  Court  struck 
down numerous economic regulations concerning industry,
this  Court  was  careful  to  defer  to  state  legislative  judg-
ments concerning the medical profession.  The Court took 
the view that a State  may condition the practice of medi-
cine  on  any  number  of  requirements,  and  physicians,  in 
exchange  for  following  those  reasonable  requirements,
could receive a license to practice medicine from the State. 
Medical  professionals  do  not,  generally  speaking,  have  a 
right  to  use  the  Constitution  as  a  weapon  allowing  them
rigorously to control the content of those reasonable condi-
tions.  See, e.g., Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U. S. 114 (1889) 
(upholding  medical  licensing  requirements);  Hawker  v. 
New  York,  170  U. S.  189  (1898)  (same);  Collins  v.  Texas, 
223  U. S.  288,  297–298  (1912)  (recognizing  the  “right  of 
the  State  to  adopt  a  policy  even  upon  medical  matters 
concerning  which  there  is  difference  of  opinion  and  dis-
pute”);  Lambert  v.  Yellowley,  272  U. S.  581,  596  (1926) 
(“[T]here  is  no  right  to  practice  medicine  which  is  not 
subordinate  to  the  police  power  of  the  States”);  Graves  v. 
Minnesota, 272 U. S. 425, 429 (1926) (statutes “regulating