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Page Number: 38.0

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B&B HARDWARE, INC. v. HARGIS INDUSTRIES, INC. 

THOMAS, J., dissenting 

To  the  extent  that  administrative  agencies  could,  con-
sistent  with  the  Constitution,  function  as  courts,  they
might only be able to do so with respect to claims involving
public  or  quasi-private  rights.  See  Northern  Pipeline 
Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U. S. 50, 68–70 
(1982)  (plurality  opinion);  see  also  Nelson  561–574;  Dick-
inson, supra, at 6.  Public rights are those belonging to the 
public  as  a  whole,  see  Nelson  566,  whereas  quasi-private
rights, or statutory entitlements, are those “ ‘privileges’ ” or
“ ‘franchises’ ”  that  are  bestowed  by  the  government  on 
individuals,  id.,  at  567;  see,  e.g.,  Ex  parte  Bakelite  Corp., 
279  U. S.  438,  451  (1929)  (discussing  claims  “arising  be-
tween  the  government  and  others,  which  from  their  na-
ture  do  not  require  judicial  determination  and  yet  are 
susceptible of it”). 

The historical treatment of administrative preclusion is
consistent  with  this  understanding.    As  discussed  above, 
most administrative adjudications that were given preclu-
sive  effect  in  Article  III  courts  involved  quasi-private
rights  like  land  grants.   See  Smelting  Co.,  104  U. S.,  at 
646.  And  in  the  context  of  land  grants,  this  Court  recog-
nized that once “title had passed from the government,” a
more  complete  form  of  judicial  review  was  available  be-
cause “the question became one of private right.”  Johnson 
v. Towsley, 13 Wall. 72, 87 (1871). 

It  is  true  that,  in  the  New  Deal  era,  the  Court  some-
times  gave  preclusive  effect  to  administrative  findings  of
fact  in  tax  cases,  which  could  be  construed  to  implicate 
private  rights.  See,  e.g.,  Sunshine  Anthracite  Coal  Co.  v. 
Adkins,  310  U. S.  381,  401–404  (1940);  Tait  v.  Western 
Maryland  R.  Co.,  289  U. S.  620,  622–624  (1933).    But 
administrative  tax  determinations  may  simply  have  en-
joyed a special historical status, in which case this practice 
might  be  best  understood  as  a  limited  deviation  from  a
general distinction between public and private rights.  See 
Nelson 588–590.