Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/23pdf/23-939_e2pg.pdf
Page Number: 110

Cite as:  603 U. S. ____ (2024) 

13 

JACKSON, J., dissenting 

Congress’s laws, passed by the representatives of the Peo-
ple,  bound  the  People  and  their  elected  officials  just  the 
same.  Law, we have explained, “is the only supreme power 
in our system of government, and every man who by accept-
ing  office  participates  in  its  functions  is  only  the  more
strongly bound to submit to that supremacy, and to observe
the  limitations  which  it  imposes  upon  the  exercise  of  the 
authority which it gives.”  Lee, 106 U. S., at 220.  With its 
adoption of a paradigm that sometimes exempts the Presi-
dent from the dictates of the law (when the Court says so),
this Court has effectively snatched from the Legislature the 
authority to bind the President (or not) to Congress’s man-
dates, and it has also thereby substantially augmented the
power of both the Office of the Presidency and itself.

As to the former, it should go without saying that the Of-
fice of the Presidency, the apex of the Executive Branch, is 
made significantly more powerful when the constraints of 
the criminal law are lifted with respect to the exercise of a
President’s official duties.  After today’s ruling, the Presi-
dent must still “take Care that the Laws be faithfully exe-
cuted,” Art. II, §3; yet, when acting in his official capacity,
he has no obligation to follow those same laws himself.

But whatever additional power the majority’s new Presi-
dential  accountability  model  gives  to  the  Presidency,  it 
gives doubly to the Court itself, for the majority provides no
meaningful guidance about how to apply this new paradigm
or how to categorize a President’s conduct.  For instance, its 
opinion  lists  some  examples  of  the  “core”  constitutional 
powers with respect to which the President is now entitled
to absolute immunity—a list that apparently includes the 
removal power, the power to recognize foreign nations, and 
the  pardon  power.    Ante,  at  6–9.    However,  the  majority 
does not—and likely cannot—supply any useful or admin-
istrable definition of the scope of that “core.”  For what it’s 
worth,  the  Constitution’s  text  is  no  help  either;  Article  II