Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/22pdf/21-1164_7li8.pdf
Page Number: 21.0

6 

WILKINS v. UNITED STATES 

THOMAS, J., dissenting 

(reaffirming  John  R.  Sand’s  rule).  And,  we  have  empha-
sized that Irwin “does not imply revisiting past precedents.” 
John R. Sand, 552 U. S., at 137. 

The  John  R.  Sand  standard  is  amply  met  here.  This 
Court concluded in Block v. North Dakota ex rel. Board of 
Univ. and School Lands, 461 U. S. 273 (1983), and again in 
United States v. Mottaz, 476 U. S. 834 (1986), that compli-
ance with the Quiet Title Act’s 12-year time bar is a juris-
dictional prerequisite.
  Block considered whether the Act’s statute of limitations 
applied to state litigants.2  There, the Government had ar-
gued  that  the  plaintiffs’  failure  to  sue  within  the  12-year
deadline established by the statute meant that the “district 
court lacked jurisdiction” to consider the plaintiffs’ claims.
Brief  for  the  Petitioners  in  Block  v.  North  Dakota  ex  rel. 
Board of Univ. and School Lands, O. T. 1982, No. 81–2337, 
p. 5.  In assessing this argument, the Court made clear that
it understood the Act’s statute of limitations to arise in the 
context  of  a  waiver  of  sovereign  immunity,  discussing  at 
some length the tradeoffs proposed as Congress deliberated 
over the scope of the Act.  See 461 U. S., at 280–285.  The 
Court  also  prominently  invoked  Sherwood  and  Lehman, 
cases 
of 
sovereign-immunity waivers, to explain why the limitations
provision must be “strictly observed.”  Block, 461 U. S., at 
287.  After concluding that States were not exempt from the
time bar, the Court stated that, “[i]f North Dakota’s suit is 
barred by [the statute of limitations], the courts below had 

jurisdictional 

discussing 

nature 

the 

—————— 

2 At  the  time  of  the  Court’s  decision,  the  Act’s  statute  of  limitations 
read as follows: “Any civil action under this section shall be barred unless 
it is commenced within twelve years of the date upon which it accrued.
Such action shall be deemed to have accrued on the date the plaintiff or 
his predecessor in interest knew or should have known of the claim of 
the  United  States.”    28  U. S. C.  §2409a(f )  (1982  ed.).    Congress  subse-
quently amended the provision to add its current language excepting ac-
tions brought by States.