Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/21pdf/21-12_m6hn.pdf
Page Number: 18.0

Cite as:  596 U. S. ____ (2022) 

13 

Opinion of the Court 

from  using  this  critical  source  of  campaign  funding,  how-
ever, Section 304 raises a barrier to entry—thus abridging 
political speech.

The dissent cannot and does not claim that Section 304 
imposes  no  burden  on  candidate  speech.  See  post,  at  5 
(opinion  of KAGAN, J.)  (“every  contribution  regulation  has 
some kind of indirect effect on electoral speech”).  The dis-
sent instead dismisses that burden as minor and insignifi-
cant.  Post, at 4–6.  As just explained, the extent of the bur-
den  may  vary  depending  on  the  circumstances  of  a
particular candidate and particular election.  But there is 
no doubt that the law does burden First Amendment elec-
toral speech, and any such law must at least be justified by
a permissible interest.  See McCutcheon v. Federal Election 
Comm’n,  572  U. S.  185,  210  (2014)  (plurality  opinion) 
(“When the Government restricts speech, the Government
bears the burden of proving the constitutionality of its ac-
tions.”). 

B 
With  those First  Amendment  costs  in  mind, we  turn  to 
whether  the  loan-repayment  limitation  is  justified.    The 
parties  debate  whether  strict  or  “closely  drawn”  scrutiny
should  apply  in  answering  that  question.  Buckley,  424 
U. S., at 25.  We need not resolve this dispute because, un-
der either standard, the Government must prove at the out-
set  that  it  is  in  fact  pursuing  a  legitimate  objective.  See 
McCutcheon, 572 U. S., at 210.  It has not done so here. 

1 

This  Court  has  recognized  only  one  permissible  ground 
for restricting political speech: the prevention of “quid pro 
quo” corruption or its appearance.  See id., at 207; see also 
Federal Election Comm’n v. National Conservative Political 
Action Comm., 470 U. S. 480, 497 (1985).  We have consist-
ently rejected attempts to restrict campaign speech based