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Page Number: 9

6 

LUCIA v. SEC 

Opinion of the Court 

and  permanent.”    Id.,  at  511–512.    Stressing  “ideas  of
tenure [and] duration,” the Court there made clear that an
individual must occupy a “continuing” position established 
by law to qualify as an officer.  Id., at 511.  Buckley then 
set  out  another  requirement,  central  to  this  case.    It  de-
termined  that  members  of  a  federal  commission  were 
officers only after finding that they “exercis[ed] significant
authority pursuant to the laws of the United States.”  424 
U. S.,  at  126.    The  inquiry  thus  focused  on  the  extent  of
power  an  individual  wields  in  carrying  out  his  assigned 
functions. 
  Both the amicus and  the Government urge  us to elabo-
rate  on  Buckley’s  “significant  authority”  test,  but  another 
of  our  precedents  makes  that  project  unnecessary.  The 
standard  is  no  doubt  framed  in  general  terms,  tempting
advocates  to  add  whatever  glosses  best  suit  their  argu-
ments.  See  Brief  for  Amicus  Curiae  14  (contending  that 
an  individual  wields  “significant  authority”  when  he  has 
“(i) the power to bind the government or private parties (ii) 
in  her  own  name  rather  than  in  the  name  of  a  superior 
officer”);  Reply  Brief  for  United  States  2  (countering  that
an  individual  wields  that  authority  when  he  has  “the 
power  to  bind  the  government  or  third  parties  on  signifi-
cant  matters”  or  to  undertake  other  “important  and  dis-
tinctively  sovereign  functions”).    And  maybe  one  day  we
will  see  a  need  to  refine  or  enhance  the  test  Buckley  set 
out so concisely.  But that day is  not this one, because in 
Freytag v. Commissioner, 501 U. S. 868 (1991), we applied 
the  unadorned  “significant  authority”  test  to  adjudicative
officials  who  are  near-carbon  copies  of  the  Commission’s
ALJs.  As  we  now  explain,  our  analysis  there  (sans  any 
more detailed legal criteria) necessarily decides this case. 
The  officials  at  issue  in  Freytag  were  the  “special  trial
judges”  (STJs)  of  the  United  States  Tax  Court.    The  au-
thority of those judges depended on the significance of the 
tax  dispute  before  them.    In  “comparatively  narrow  and