Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/558bv.pdf
Page Number: 404

Cite as: 558 U. S. 233 (2010) 

243 

Opinion of the Court 

ify that prescription,9  and does not otherwise “specif[y]” that 
reopening  decisions  are  “in  the  discretion  of  the  Attorney 
General.” 10 

III
 
A
 

1
 
The  Board’s  discretionary  authority  to  act  on  a  motion  to 
reopen,  we  have  thus  far  explained,  is  “speciﬁed”  not  in  a 
statute, but only in the Attorney General’s regulation, which 

9 As earlier noted, see supra, at 240–241, n. 6, the Seventh Circuit stated 
that  the  regulation  specifying  the  Board’s  discretion  over  motions  to  re­
open,  8  CFR  § 1003.2(a),  “draw[s]  [its]  force  from  provisions  in  the  Act.” 
533 F. 3d, at 536 (citing 8 U. S. C. § 1229a(c)(7)).  It is hard to see how the 
regulation  could  draw  force  from  § 1229a(c)(7),  for  the  regulation  was  al­
ready  in  force  when  that  statutory  provision  was  enacted.  The  regula­
tion, 8  CFR § 1003.2(a), was published  April 29, 1996, 61  Fed. Reg. 18900, 
18904;  8  U. S. C.  § 1229a(c)(7)  was  enacted  September  30,  1996,  § 304,  110 
Stat. 3009–593. 

10 The  only  statutory  reference  to  discretion  respecting  motions  to  re­
open appears in § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(iv)(III), which gives the Attorney General 
“discretion”  to  waive  one  of  the  statute’s  time  limitations  in  extraordi­
nary circumstances. 

Amicus  urges  that  “the  statutory  language  governing  motions  to  re­
open anticipates an exercise of Attorney General discretion when it states, 
‘[t]he  motion  to  reopen  shall  state  the  new  facts  that  will  be  proven  at  a 
hearing to be held if the motion is granted.’ ”  Brief for Court-Appointed 
Amicus  Curiae  in  Support  of  Judgment  Below  19,  n.  8  (quoting 
§ 1229a(c)(7)(B)).  One  can  demur  to  the  argument  that  Congress  antici­
pated  that  decisions on  reopening  motions  would be  discretionary.  Even 
so, the statutory proscription Congress enacted, § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii), speaks 
of  authority  “speciﬁed”—not  merely  assumed  or  contemplated—to  be  in 
the  Attorney  General’s  discretion.  “Speciﬁed”  is  not  synonymous  with 
“implied”  or  “anticipated.”  See  Webster’s  New  Collegiate  Dictionary 
1116  (1974)  (“specify”  means  “to  name  or  state  explicitly  or  in  detail”). 
See  also  Soltane  v.  U. S.  Dept.  of  Justice,  381  F.  3d  143,  147  (CA3  2004) 
(Alito,  J.)  (“[W]e  do  not  think  .  .  .  that  the  use  of  marginally  ambiguous 
statutory language, without more, is adequate to ‘specif[y]’ that a particu­
lar  action  is  within  the  Attorney  General’s  discretion  for  the  purposes 
of § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii).”).