Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/558bv.pdf
Page Number: 265.0

104 

MOHAWK  INDUSTRIES,  INC.  v.  CARPENTER 

Opinion of the Court 

liams v.  Mohawk Indus., Inc., No. 4:04–cv–00003–HLM (ND 
Ga.,  Jan.  6,  2004).  Company  ofﬁcials  directed  Carpenter  to 
meet  with  the  company’s  retained  counsel  in  the  Williams 
case, and counsel allegedly pressured Carpenter to recant his 
statements.  When  he  refused,  Carpenter  alleges,  Mohawk 
ﬁred him under false pretenses.  App. 57a–64a. 

After  learning  of  Carpenter’s  complaint,  the  plaintiffs  in 
the  Williams  case  sought  an evidentiary  hearing  to  explore 
Carpenter’s  allegations.  In  its  response  to  their  motion, 
Mohawk described Carpenter’s accusations as “pure fantasy” 
and  recounted  the  “true  facts”  of  Carpenter’s  dismissal. 
App.  208a.  According  to  Mohawk,  Carpenter  himself  had 
“engaged in blatant and illegal misconduct” by attempting to 
have  Mohawk  hire  an  undocumented  worker.  Id.,  at  209a. 
The company “commenced an immediate investigation,” dur­
ing  which  retained  counsel  interviewed  Carpenter.  Id.,  at 
210a.  Because Carpenter’s “efforts to cause Mohawk to cir­
cumvent  federal  immigration  law”  “blatantly  violated  Mo­
hawk policy,” the company terminated him.  Ibid. 

As these events were unfolding in the Williams case, dis­
covery  was  underway  in  Carpenter’s  case.  Carpenter  ﬁled 
a motion to compel Mohawk to produce information concern­
ing his meeting with retained counsel and the company’s ter­
mination  decision.  Mohawk  maintained  that  the  requested 
information  was  protected  by  the  attorney-client  privilege. 
The District Court agreed that the privilege applied to the 
requested information, but it granted Carpenter’s motion to 
compel  disclosure  after  concluding  that  Mohawk  had  implic­
itly  waived  the  privilege  through  its  representations  in  the 
Williams  case.  See  App.  to  Pet.  for  Cert.  51a.  The  court 
declined  to  certify  its  order  for  interlocutory  appeal  under 
28  U. S. C.  § 1292(b).  But,  recognizing  “the  seriousness  of 
its [waiver] ﬁnding,” it stayed its ruling to allow Mohawk to 
explore  other  potential  “avenues  to  appeal  .  .  .  ,  such  as  a