Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/558bv.pdf
Page Number: 394

OCTOBER  TERM,  2009 

233 

Syllabus 

KUCANA  v.  HOLDER,  ATTORNEY  GENERAL 

certiorari to the united states court of appeals for 
the seventh circuit 

No. 08–911.  Argued November 10, 2009—Decided January 20, 2010 

The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 
(IIRIRA) amended the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), codify­
ing certain rules, earlier prescribed by the Attorney General, that gov­
ern the process of reopening removal proceedings.  IIRIRA also added 
a  provision  stating  that  no  court  has  jurisdiction  to  review  any  action 
of the Attorney General “the authority for which is speciﬁed under this 
subchapter to be in the discretion of the Attorney General.”  8 U. S. C. 
§ 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii).  A regulation, amended just months before IIRIRA’s 
enactment,  provides  that  “[t]he  decision  to  grant  or  deny  a  motion  to 
reopen . . . is within the  discretion of the [Board of Immigration Appeals 
(BIA)],”  8  CFR  § 1003.2(a).  As  adjudicator  in  immigration  cases,  the 
BIA exercises authority delegated by the Attorney General. 

Petitioner  Kucana  moved  to  reopen  his  removal  proceedings,  assert­
ing  new  evidence  in  support  of  his  plea  for  asylum.  An  Immigration 
Judge denied the motion, and the BIA sustained that ruling.  The Sev­
enth Circuit concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to review the adminis­
trative  determination,  holding  that  § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii)  bars  judicial  re­
view not only of administrative decisions made discretionary by statute, 
but also of those made discretionary by regulation. 

Held:  Section 1252(a)(2)(B)’s proscription of judicial review applies only to 
Attorney General determinations made discretionary by statute, not to 
determinations declared discretionary by the Attorney General himself 
through regulation.  Pp. 242–253. 

(a)  The  motion  to  reopen  is  an  “important  safeguard”  intended  “to 
ensure  a  proper  and  lawful  disposition”  of  immigration  proceedings. 
Dada v.  Mukasey, 554 U. S. 1, 18.  Federal-court review of administra­
tive  decisions  denying  motions  to  reopen  removal  proceedings  dates 
back to at least 1916, with  the courts employing a deferential abuse-of­
discretion standard of review.  While the Attorney General’s regulation 
in  point,  8  CFR  § 1003.2(a),  places  the  reopening  decision  within  the 
BIA’s discretion,  the statute  does not codify  that prescription  or other­
wise “specif[y]” that such decisions are in the Attorney General’s discre­
tion.  Pp. 242–243. 

(b)  Section 1252(a)(2)(B) does not proscribe judicial review of denials 

of motions to reopen.  Pp. 243–251.