Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/20pdf/19-1434_ancf.pdf
Page Number: 64

Cite as:  594 U. S. ____ (2021) 

17 

THOMAS, J., dissenting 

violation.  But, the Court does not vacate the Board’s deci-
sion.  In fact, it expressly disavows the existence of an ap-
pointments violation.  Ante, at 23 (plurality opinion).

The quasi-separation-of-powers view fares no better.  If 
we  accept  as  true  the  Court’s  position  that  the  Appoint-
ments  Clause  inherently  grants  the  Director  power  to  re-
verse Board decisions, then another problem arises: No con-
stitutional violation  has  occurred  in  this  suit.    The  Board 
had the power to decide and lawfully did decide the dispute
before it.  The Board did not misinterpret its statutory au-
thority or try to prevent direct review by the Director.  Nor 
did  the  Director  wrongfully  decline  to  rehear  the  Board’s
decision.  Moreover, Arthrex has not argued that it sought 
review by the Director.  So to the extent “the source of the 
constitutional  violation  is  the  restraint  on  the  review  au-
thority  of  the  Director,”  ibid.,  his  review  was  not  con-
strained.  Without any constitutional violation in this suit
to correct, one wonders how the Court has the power to is-
sue  a  remedy.    See  Carney  v.  Adams,  592  U. S.  ___,  ___ 
(2020) (slip op., at 4) (Article III prevents “the federal courts 
from issuing advisory opinions”). 

Perhaps the majority thinks Arthrex should receive some 
kind  of  bounty  for  raising  an  Appointments  Clause  chal-
lenge and almost identifying a constitutional violation.  But 
the Constitution allows us to award judgments, not partic-
ipation trophies. 

IV 

Although unnecessary to resolve this suit, at some point 
it may be worth taking a closer look at whether the func-
tional  element  of  our  test  in  Edmond—the  part  that  the 
Court  relies  on  today—aligns  with  the  text,  history,  and
structure of the Constitution.  The founding era history sur-
rounding the Inferior Officer Clause points to at least three 
different definitions of an inferior officer, none of which re-
quires a case-by-case functional examination of exactly how