Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/17pdf/17-965_h315.pdf
Page Number: 29

24 

TRUMP v. HAWAII 

Opinion of the Court 

did  not  intend  for  §1152(a)(1)(A)  to  limit  the  President’s 
flexible authority to suspend entry based on foreign policy
interests.  In  addition,  plaintiffs’  proposed  exigency  test 
would require courts, rather than the President, to deter-
mine whether a foreign government’s conduct rises to the 
level  that  would  trigger  a  supposed  implicit  exception 
to  a  federal  statute.  See  Reno  v.  American-Arab  Anti-
Discrimination Comm., 525 U. S. 471, 491 (1999) (explain-
ing  that  even  if  the  Executive  “disclose[d]  its  . . .  reasons 
for  deeming  nationals  of  a  particular  country  a  special 
threat,” courts would be “unable to assess their adequacy”).
The  text  of  §1152(a)(1)(A)  offers  no  standards  that  would
enable courts to assess, for example, whether the situation
in North Korea justifies entry restrictions while the terror-
ist threat in Yemen does not. 

* 

* 

* 
The Proclamation is squarely within the scope of Presi-
dential authority under the INA.  Indeed, neither dissent 
even  attempts  any  serious  argument  to  the  contrary,
despite  the  fact  that  plaintiffs’  primary  contention  below 
and in their briefing before this Court was that the Proc-
lamation violated the statute. 

IV 

A 

We  now  turn  to  plaintiffs’  claim  that  the  Proclamation
was  issued  for  the  unconstitutional  purpose  of  excluding
Muslims.  Because  we  have  an  obligation  to  assure  our-
selves  of  jurisdiction  under  Article  III,  we  begin  by  ad-
dressing  the  question  whether  plaintiffs  have  standing  to 
bring their constitutional challenge.

Federal courts have authority under the Constitution to
decide  legal  questions  only  in  the  course  of  resolving 
“Cases” or “Controversies.”  Art. III, §2.  One of the essen-
tial  elements  of  a  legal  case  or  controversy  is  that  the