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MURTHY v. MISSOURI 

Syllabus 

entities  and  officials,  by  “coerc[ing]”  or  “significantly  encourag[ing]” 
the platforms’ moderation decisions, transformed those decisions into
state action.  The court then modified the District Court’s injunction 
to state that the defendants shall not coerce or significantly encourage 
social-media  companies  to  suppress  protected  speech  on  their  plat-
forms. 

Held: Neither the individual nor the state plaintiffs have established Ar-
ticle III standing to seek an injunction against any defendant.  Pp. 8– 
29. 

(a) Article III’s “case or controversy” requirement is “fundamental” 
to  the  “proper  role”  of  the  Judiciary.  Raines  v. Byrd,  521  U. S.  811, 
818.  A proper case or controversy exists only when at least one plain-
tiff “establish[es] that [she] ha[s] standing to sue,” ibid.—i.e., that she 
has suffered, or will suffer, an injury that is “concrete, particularized,
and actual or imminent; fairly traceable to the challenged action; and
redressable by a favorable ruling,” Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 
U. S. 398, 409.  Here, the plaintiffs’ theories of standing depend on the 
platforms’  actions—yet  the  plaintiffs  do  not  seek  to  enjoin  the  plat-
forms  from  restricting  any  posts  or  accounts.  Instead,  they  seek  to 
enjoin  the  Government  agencies  and  officials  from  pressuring  or  en-
couraging the platforms to suppress protected speech in the future. 

The one-step-removed, anticipatory nature of the plaintiffs’ alleged 
injuries presents two particular challenges.  First, it is a bedrock prin-
ciple that a federal court cannot redress “injury that results from the 
independent action of some third party not before the court.”  Simon 
v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Organization, 426 U. S. 26, 41–42.  Sec-
ond,  because  the  plaintiffs  request  forward-looking  relief,  they  must
face “a real and immediate threat of repeated injury.”  O’Shea v. Lit-
tleton, 414 U. S. 488, 496.  Putting these requirements together, the 
plaintiffs must show a substantial risk that, in the near future, at least
one platform will restrict the speech of at least one plaintiff in response 
to the actions of at least one Government defendant.  Here, at the pre-
liminary injunction stage, they must show that they are likely to suc-
ceed in carrying that burden.  On the record in this case, that is a tall 
order.  Pp. 8–10.

(b) The plaintiffs’ primary theory of standing involves their “direct

censorship injuries.”  Pp. 10–26.

(1) The Court first considers whether the plaintiffs have demon-
strated traceability for their past injuries.  Because the plaintiffs are 
seeking only forward-looking relief, the past injuries are relevant only 
for their predictive value.  The primary weakness in the record of past
restrictions is the lack of specific causation findings with respect to any
discrete instance of content moderation.  And while the record reflects 
that the Government defendants played a role in at least some of the