Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/17pdf/16-1161_dc8f.pdf
Page Number: 21.0

Cite as:  585 U. S. ____ (2018) 

17 

Opinion of the Court 

ibid.    But  the  opinion  of  the  Court  rests  on  the  under­
standing  that  we  lack  jurisdiction  to  decide  this  case, 
much  less  to  draw  speculative  and  advisory  conclusions 
regarding  others.    See  Public  Workers  v.  Mitchell,  330 
U. S.  75,  90  (1947)  (noting  that  courts  must  “respect  the 
limits of [their] unique authority” and engage in “[j]udicial 
exposition  . . .  only  when  necessary  to  decide  definite
issues  between  litigants”).    The  reasoning  of  this  Court 
with  respect  to  the  disposition  of  this  case  is  set  forth  in 
this opinion and none other.  And the sum of the standing 
principles articulated here, as applied to this case, is that
the  harm  asserted  by  the  plaintiffs  is  best  understood  as
arising  from  a  burden  on  those  plaintiffs’  own  votes.    In 
this gerrymandering context that burden arises through a 
voter’s placement in a “cracked” or “packed” district. 

Four  of  the  plaintiffs 

C 
in  this  case—Mary  Lynne
Donohue,  Wendy  Sue  Johnson,  Janet  Mitchell,  and  Je­
rome  Wallace—pleaded  a  particularized  burden  along
such  lines.  They  alleged  that  Act  43  had  “dilut[ed]  the
influence” of their votes as a result of packing or cracking
in their legislative districts.  See 1 App. 34–36, Complaint 
¶¶20,  23,  24,  26.  The  facts  necessary  to  establish  stand­
ing,  however,  must  not  only  be  alleged  at  the  pleading 
stage,  but  also  proved  at  trial.  See  Defenders  of  Wildlife, 
504 U. S., at 561.  As the proceedings in the District Court 
progressed  to  trial,  the  plaintiffs  failed  to  meaningfully 
pursue their allegations of individual harm.  The plaintiffs
did  not  seek  to  show  such  requisite  harm  since,  on  this 
record,  it  appears  that  not  a  single  plaintiff  sought  to 
prove that  he or she lives in a cracked or packed district. 
They  instead  rested  their  case  at  trial—and  their  argu­
ments  before  this  Court—on  their  theory  of  statewide 
injury  to  Wisconsin  Democrats,  in  support  of  which  they
offered three kinds of evidence.