Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/558bv.pdf
Page Number: 222

Cite as: 558 U. S. 53 (2009) 

61 

Opinion of the Court 

and  “regularly  followed”—even  if  the  appropriate  exercise 
of  discretion  may  permit  consideration  of  a  federal  claim  in 
some  cases  but  not  others.  See  Meltzer,  State  Court  For­
feitures of Federal Rights, 99 Harv. L. Rev. 1128, 1140 (1986) 
(“[R]efusals  to  exercise  discretion  do not  form  an  important 
independent  category  under  the  inadequate  state  ground 
doctrine”). 

A  contrary  holding  would  pose  an  unnecessary  dilemma 
for  the  States:  States  could  preserve  ﬂexibility  by  granting 
courts discretion to excuse procedural errors, but only at the 
cost  of  undermining  the  ﬁnality  of  state  court  judgments. 
Or  States  could  preserve  the  ﬁnality  of  their  judgments  by 
withholding  such  discretion,  but  only  at  the  cost  of  preclud­
ing any ﬂexibility in applying the rules. 

We  are  told  that,  if  forced  to  choose,  many  States  would 
opt  for  mandatory  rules  to  avoid  the  high  costs  that  come 
with  plenary  federal  review.  See,  e. g.,  Brief  for  State  of 
California et al. as Amici Curiae 19; Brief for Criminal Jus­
tice Legal Foundation as Amicus Curiae 14.  That would be 
unfortunate  in  many  cases,  as  discretionary  rules  are  often 
desirable.  In  some  circumstances,  for  example,  the  factors 
facing trial courts “are so numerous, variable and subtle that 
the  fashioning  of  rigid  rules  would  be  more  likely  to  impair 
[the trial judge’s] ability to deal fairly with a particular prob­
lem than to lead to a just result.”  United States v.  McCoy, 
517  F.  2d  41,  44  (CA7)  (Stevens,  J.),  cert.  denied,  423  U. S. 
895  (1975);  see  also  Friendly,  Indiscretion  About  Discretion, 
31  Emory  L.  J.  747,  760–761  (1982).  The  result  would  be 
particularly unfortunate for criminal defendants, who would 
lose  the  opportunity  to  argue  that  a  procedural  default 
should be excused through the exercise of judicial discretion. 
See Henry v.  Mississippi, 379 U. S. 443, 463, n. 3 (1965) (Har­
lan, J., dissenting) (“If, in order to insulate its decisions from 
reversal  by  this  Court,  a  state  court  must  strip  itself  of  the 
discretionary  power  to  differentiate  between  different  sets