Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/23pdf/22-451_7m58.pdf
Page Number: 14

6 

LOPER BRIGHT ENTERPRISES v. RAIMONDO 

Opinion of the Court 

opposed to the more typical 2 to 4).  As a result, they gener-
ally declare into multiple fisheries per trip so they can catch
whatever the ocean offers up.  If the vessels declare into the 
Atlantic  herring  fishery  for  a  particular  trip,  they  must 
carry an observer for that trip if NMFS selects the trip for 
coverage, even if they end up harvesting fewer herring than
other vessels—or no herring at all.

This set of petitioners, like those in the D. C. Circuit case, 
filed  a  suit  challenging  the  Rule  as  unauthorized  by  the 
MSA.  The District Court, like the D. C. Circuit, deferred to 
NMFS’s  contrary  interpretation  under  Chevron  and  thus 
granted  summary  judgment  to  the  Government.    See  561 
F. Supp. 3d 226, 234–238 (RI 2021). 

The First Circuit affirmed.  See 62 F. 4th 621 (2023).  It 
relied on a “default norm” that regulated entities must bear 
compliance costs, as well as the MSA’s sanctions provision, 
Section 1858(g)(1)(D).  See id., at 629–631.  And it rejected 
petitioners’ argument that the express statutory authoriza-
tion of three industry funding programs demonstrated that
NMFS lacked the broad implicit authority it asserted to im-
pose such a program for the Atlantic herring fishery.  See 
id.,  at  631–633.    The  court  ultimately  concluded  that  the
“[a]gency’s interpretation of its authority to require at-sea 
monitors  who  are  paid  for  by  owners  of  regulated  vessels
does not ‘exceed[ ] the bounds of the permissible.’ ”  Id., at 
633–634  (quoting  Barnhart  v.  Walton,  535  U. S.  212,  218 
(2002); alteration in original).  In reaching that conclusion, 
the First Circuit stated that it was applying Chevron’s two-
step framework.  62 F. 4th, at 628.  But it did not explain 
which  aspects  of  its  analysis  were  relevant  to  which  of 
Chevron’s  two  steps.  Similarly,  it  declined  to  decide
whether the result was “a product of Chevron step one or 
step two.”  Id., at 634. 

We granted certiorari in both cases, limited to the ques-
tion whether Chevron should be overruled or clarified.  See