Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/23pdf/23-175_19m2.pdf
Page Number: 22

Cite as:  603 U. S. ____ (2024) 

17 

Opinion of the Court 

park.  Only those who later violate an order like that may
face a criminal punishment of up to 30 days in jail and a
larger fine.  See Part I–C, supra.  None of the city’s sanc-
tions  qualifies  as  cruel  because  none  is  designed  to  “su-
perad[d]” “terror, pain, or disgrace.”  Bucklew, 587 U. S., at 
130 (internal quotation marks omitted).  Nor are the city’s
sanctions unusual, because similar punishments have been 
and  remain  among  “the  usual  mode[s]”  for  punishing  of-
fenses throughout the country.  Pervear v. Commonwealth, 
5 Wall. 475, 480 (1867); see 4 Blackstone 371–372; Timbs v. 
Indiana, 586 U. S. 146, 165 (2019) (Thomas J., concurring 
in  judgment)  (describing  fines  as  “ ‘the  drudge-horse  of 
criminal justice, probably the most common form of punish-
ment’ ” (some internal quotation marks omitted)).  In fact, 
large numbers of cities and States across the country have
long employed, and today employ, similar punishments for 
similar  offenses.  See  Part  I–A,  supra;  Brief  for  Professor 
John F. Stinneford as Amicus Curiae 7–13 (collecting his-
torical and contemporary examples).  Notably, neither the 
plaintiffs nor the dissent meaningfully contests any of this. 
See Brief for Respondents 40.4 

B 

Instead, the plaintiffs and the dissent pursue an entirely 
different theory.  They do not question that, by its terms,
the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause speaks to the
question what punishments may follow a criminal convic-
tion,  not  to  antecedent  questions  like  what  a  State  may 
criminalize  or  how  it  may  go  about  securing  a  conviction.
Yet,  echoing  the  Ninth  Circuit  in  Martin,  they  insist  one
notable exception exists. 

—————— 

4 This Court has never held that the Cruel and Unusual Punishments 
Clause extends beyond criminal punishments to civil fines and orders, 
see Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U. S. 651, 666–668 (1977), nor does this case
present  any  occasion  to  do  so  for  none  of  the  city’s  sanctions  defy  the 
Clause.