Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/20pdf/20-297_4g25.pdf
Page Number: 40.0

Cite as:  594 U. S. ____ (2021) 

9 

THOMAS, J., dissenting 

C 
The  Court  chooses  a  different  approach.    Rejecting  this
history, the majority holds that the mere violation of a per-
sonal legal right is not—and never can be—an injury suffi-
cient to establish standing.  What matters for the Court is 
only that the “injury in fact be ‘concrete.’ ” Ante, at 8.  “No 
concrete harm, no standing.”  Ante, at 1, 27. 

That may be a pithy catchphrase, but it is worth pausing 
to ask why “concrete” injury in fact should be the sole in-
quiry.  After all, it was not until 1970—“180 years after the 
ratification of Article III”—that this Court even introduced 
the “injury in fact” (as opposed to injury in law) concept of 
standing.  Sierra v. Hallandale Beach, 996 F. 3d 1110, 1117 
(CA11  2021)  (Newsom,  J.,  concurring).    And  the  concept
then  was  not  even  about  constitutional  standing;  it  con-
cerned a statutory cause of action under the Administrative 
Procedure Act.  See Association of Data Processing Service 
Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U. S. 150, 153 (1970) (ex-
plaining  that  the  injury-in-fact  requirement  “concerns, 
apart  from  the  ‘case’  or  ‘controversy’  test,  the  question 
whether  the  interest  sought  to  be  protected  by  the  com-
plainant is arguably within the zone of interests to be pro-
tected or regulated by the statute or constitutional guaran-
tee in question”).

The Court later took this statutory requirement and be-
gan  to  graft  it  onto  its  constitutional  standing  analysis.
See, e.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U. S. 490 (1975).  But even 
then, injury in fact served as an additional way to get into 
federal court.  Article III injury still could “exist solely by
virtue  of  ‘statutes  creating  legal  rights,  the  invasion  of 
which creates standing.’ ”  Id., at 500 (quoting Linda R. S. 
v. Richard D., 410 U. S. 614, 617, n. 3 (1973)).  So the intro-
duction  of  an  injury-in-fact  requirement,  in  effect,  “repre-
sented  a  substantial  broadening  of  access  to  the  federal
courts.”  Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Organization,