Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/23pdf/22-859new_kjfm.pdf
Page Number: 46

14 

SEC v. JARKESY 

GORSUCH, J., concurring 

Whatever  their  roots,  traditionally  recognized  public 
rights have at least one feature in common:  a serious and 
unbroken historical pedigree.  See Culley v. Marshall, 601 
U. S. 377, 397–398 (2024) (GORSUCH, J., concurring); ante, 
at  14–17.  For  good  reason.  If  the  Article  III  “judicial
Power” encompasses “the stuff of the traditional actions at
common  law  tried  by  the  courts  of  Westminster  in  1789,” 
ante,  at  14  (internal  quotation  marks  omitted),  it  follows
that matters traditionally adjudicated outside those courts
might  not  fall  within  Article  III’s  ambit.  See  Stern,  564 
U. S.,  at  504–505  (Scalia, J.,  concurring)  (“[A]n  Article  III 
judge is required in all federal adjudications, unless there
is a firmly established historical practice to the contrary”).
So too with the Due Process Clause.  If that clause sets cus-
tomary  common-law  practice  as  the  ordinary  procedural 
baseline, see Part II–B, supra, clear historical evidence of a 
different  practice  might  warrant  a  departure  from  that 
baseline, see Murray’s Lessee, 18 How., at 280.  That’s why
this Court has said “ ‘a process of law . . . must be taken to 
be due process of law’ if it enjoys ‘the sanction of settled us-
age both in England and in this country.’ ”  Culley, 601 U. S., 
at 397 (GORSUCH, J., concurring) (quoting Hurtado v. Cali-
fornia, 110 U. S. 516, 528 (1884)).

With the public rights exception viewed in this light, the
government’s  invocation  of  it  in  this  case  cannot  succeed. 
Starting  with  a  “ ‘presumption  . . .  in  favor  of  Article  III 
courts’ ” and their usual attendant processes, ante, at 18, we 
look for some “deeply rooted” tradition of nonjudicial adju-
dication before permitting a case to be tried in a different 
forum under different procedures, Culley, 601 U. S., at 397 
(GORSUCH, J., concurring).  We have upheld summary pro-
cedures  for  customs  collection,  for  example,  because  they 
were consistent with both “the common and statute law of 
England prior to the emigration of our ancestors” and “the
laws of many of the States at the time of the adoption of ” 
the  Constitution.  Murray’s  Lessee,  18  How.,  at  280;  see