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524US2

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PENNSYLVANIA BD. OF PROBATION
AND PAROLE v. SCOTT
Opinion of the Court

in this country and noting the incompatibility of the rule
with the civil, administrative nature of those proceedings.
Id., at 1050.

As in Calandra, Janis, and Lopez-Mendoza, we are asked
to extend the operation of the exclusionary rule beyond the
criminal trial context. We again decline to do so. Applica-
tion of the exclusionary rule would both hinder the function-
ing of state parole systems and alter the traditionally ﬂexi-
ble, administrative nature of parole revocation proceedings.
The rule would provide only minimal deterrence beneﬁts in
this context, because application of the rule in the criminal
trial context already provides signiﬁcant deterrence of un-
constitutional searches. We therefore hold that the federal
exclusionary rule does not bar the introduction at parole rev-
ocation hearings of evidence seized in violation of parolees’
Fourth Amendment rights.

Because the exclusionary rule precludes consideration of
reliable, probative evidence, it imposes signiﬁcant costs: It
undeniably detracts from the truthﬁnding process and allows
many who would otherwise be incarcerated to escape the
consequences of their actions. See Stone v. Powell, supra,
at 490. Although we have held these costs to be worth bear-
ing in certain circumstances,4 our cases have repeatedly em-
phasized that the rule’s “costly toll” upon truth-seeking and
law enforcement objectives presents a high obstacle for those

4 As discussed above, we have generally held the exclusionary rule to
apply only in criminal trials. We have, moreover, signiﬁcantly limited its
application even in that context. For example, we have held that the rule
does not apply when the ofﬁcer reasonably relied on a search warrant that
was later deemed invalid, United States v. Leon, 468 U. S. 897, 920–922
(1984); when the ofﬁcer reasonably relied on a statute later deemed uncon-
stitutional, Illinois v. Krull, 480 U. S. 340, 349–350 (1987); when the de-
fendant seeks to assert another person’s Fourth Amendment rights, Alder-
man v. United States, 394 U. S. 165, 174–175 (1969); and when the illegally
obtained evidence is used to impeach a defendant’s testimony, United
States v. Havens, 446 U. S. 620, 627–628 (1980); Walder v. United States,
347 U. S. 62, 65 (1954).