Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/11pdf/10-9646.pdf
Page Number: 4

4 

MILLER v. ALABAMA 

Syllabus 

against a sentence for a particular class of offenders.  But where, as 
here, this Court does not categorically bar a penalty, but instead re-
quires  only  that  a  sentencer  follow  a  certain  process,  this  Court  has
not  scrutinized  or  relied  on  legislative  enactments  in  the  same  way.
See, e.g., Sumner v. Schuman, 483 U. S. 66. 

In any event, the “objective indicia of society’s standards,” Graham, 
560 U. S., at ___, that the States offer do not distinguish these cases 
from  others  holding  that  a  sentencing  practice  violates  the  Eighth 
Amendment.  Fewer  States  impose  mandatory  life-without-parole
sentences on juvenile homicide offenders than authorized the penalty 
(life-without-parole for nonhomicide offenders) that this Court invali-
dated in Graham.  And as Graham and Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 
U. S.  815,  explain,  simply  counting  legislative  enactments  can  pre-
sent  a  distorted  view.  In  those  cases,  as  here,  the  relevant  penalty
applied  to  juveniles  based  on  two  separate  provisions:  One  allowed
the transfer of certain juvenile offenders to adult court, while another
set out penalties for any and all individuals tried there.  In those cir-
cumstances, this Court reasoned, it was impossible to say whether a 
legislature had endorsed a given penalty for children (or would do so
if presented with the choice).  The same is true here. Pp. 18–25. 

(2) The  States  next  argue  that  courts  and  prosecutors  suffi-
ciently consider a juvenile defendant’s age, as well as his background
and the circumstances of his crime, when deciding whether to try him 
as an adult.  But this argument ignores that many States use manda-
tory  transfer  systems.    In  addition,  some  lodge  the  decision  in  the 
hands of the prosecutors, rather than courts.  And even where judges 
have transfer-stage discretion, it has limited utility, because the deci-
sionmaker typically will have only partial information about the child 
or  the  circumstances  of  his  offense.    Finally,  because  of  the  limited
sentencing options in some juvenile courts, the transfer decision may
present a choice between a light sentence as a juvenile and standard
sentencing  as  an  adult.    It  cannot  substitute  for  discretion  at  post-
trial sentencing.  Pp. 25−27. 

No. 10−9646, 63 So. 3d 676, and No. 10−9647, 2011 Ark. 49, ___ S. W. 

3d ___, reversed and remanded. 

KAGAN,  J.,  delivered  the  opinion  of  the  Court,  in  which  KENNEDY, 
GINSBURG, BREYER, and SOTOMAYOR, JJ., joined.  BREYER, J., filed a con-
curring opinion, in which SOTOMAYOR, J., joined.  ROBERTS, C. J., filed a 
dissenting  opinion,  in  which  SCALIA,  THOMAS,  and  ALITO,  JJ.,  joined. 
THOMAS,  J.,  filed  a  dissenting  opinion,  in  which  SCALIA,  J.,  joined.  
ALITO, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which SCALIA, J., joined.