Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/19pdf/18-1023_m64o.pdf
Page Number: 3

Cite as:  590 U. S. ____ (2020) 

3 

Syllabus 

context, this requires the Government to show “something more than 
the mere omission to appropriate a sufficient sum.”  United States v. 
Vulte, 233 U. S. 509, 515.  As Langston and Vulte confirm, the appro-
priations riders here did not manifestly repeal or discharge the Gov-
ernment’s uncapped obligation, see Langston, 118 U. S., at 394, and do 
not  indicate  “any  other  purpose  than  the  disbursement  of  a  sum  of 
money for the particular fiscal years,” Vulte, 233 U. S., at 514.  Nor is 
there  any  indication  that  HHS  and  CMS  thought  that  the  riders
clearly expressed an intent to repeal.  Pp. 16–19.

(b) Appropriations measures have been found irreconcilable with 
statutory obligations to pay, but the riders here did not use the kind of 
“shall not take effect” language decisive in United States v. Will, 449 
U. S. 200, 222–223, or purport to “suspen[d]” §1342 prospectively or to 
foreclose funds from “any other Act” “notwithstanding” §1342’s money-
mandating  text,  United  States  v.  Dickerson,  310  U. S.  554,  556–557. 
They also did not reference §1342’s payment formula, let alone “irrec-
oncilabl[y]” change it, United States v. Mitchell, 109 U. S. 146, 150, or 
provide that payments from profitable plans would be “ ‘in full compen-
sation’ ” of the Government’s obligation to unprofitable plans, United 
States v. Fisher, 109 U. S. 143, 150.  Pp. 19–21.

(c) The legislative history cited by the Federal Circuit is also un-

persuasive.  Pp.  22–23. 

3. Petitioners properly relied on the Tucker Act to sue for damages 

in the Court of Federal Claims.  Pp. 23–30. 

(a) The United States has waived its immunity for certain dam-
ages suits in the Court of Federal Claims through the Tucker Act.  Be-
cause  that  Act  does  not  create  “substantive  rights,”  United  States  v. 
Navajo Nation, 556 U. S. 287, 290, a plaintiff must premise her dam-
ages action on “other sources of law,” like “statutes or contracts,” ibid., 
provided those statutes “ ‘can fairly be interpreted as mandating com-
pensation  by  the  Federal  Government  for  the  damage  sustained,’ ” 
United States v. White Mountain Apache Tribe, 537 U. S. 465, 472.  The 
Act does, however, yield when the obligation-creating statute provides 
its own detailed remedies or when the Administrative Procedure Act 
provides an avenue for relief.  Pp. 23–26.

(b) Petitioners  clear  each  hurdle:  The  Risk  Corridors  statute  is 
fairly  interpreted  as  mandating compensation  for  damages,  and nei-
ther  exception  to  the  Tucker  Act  applies.    Section  1342’s  mandatory 
“ ‘shall  pay’  language”  falls  comfortably  within  the  class  of  statutes
that permit recovery of money damages in the Court of Federal Claims.
This finding is bolstered by §1342’s focus on compensating insurers for
past conduct.  And there is no separate remedial scheme supplanting
the Court of Federal Claims’ power to adjudicate petitioners’ claims.