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4 

MCCUTCHEON v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N 

Syllabus 

the  appearance  of  corruption.    See  Davis,  supra,  at  741.  Moreover, 
the only type of corruption that Congress may target is quid pro quo 
corruption.    Spending  large  sums  of  money  in  connection  with  elec-
tions, but not in connection with an effort to control the exercise of an 
officeholder’s official duties, does not give rise to quid pro quo corrup-
tion.  Nor  does  the  possibility  that  an  individual  who  spends  large
sums may garner “influence over or access to” elected officials or po-
litical parties.  Citizens United v. Federal Election Comm’n, 558 U. S. 
310, 359.  The line between quid pro quo corruption and general in-
fluence  must  be  respected  in  order  to  safeguard  basic  First  Amend-
ment rights, and the Court must “err on the side of protecting politi-
cal  speech  rather  than  suppressing  it.”  Federal  Election  Comm’n  v. 
Wisconsin  Right  to  Life,  551  U. S.  449,  457  (opinion  of  ROBERTS, 
C. J.).  Pp. 18–21.

(2) The Government argues that the aggregate limits further the
permissible objective of preventing quid pro quo corruption.  The dif-
ficulty is that once the aggregate limits kick in, they ban all contribu-
tions of any amount, even though Congress’s selection of a base limit
indicates  its  belief  that  contributions  beneath  that  amount  do  not 
create  a  cognizable  risk  of  corruption.    The  Government  must  thus 
defend  the  aggregate  limits  by  demonstrating  that  they  prevent  cir-
cumvention  of  the  base  limits,  a  function  they  do  not  serve  in  any
meaningful way.  Given the statutes and regulations currently in ef-
fect,  Buckley’s  fear  that  an  individual  might  “contribute  massive
amounts  of  money  to  a  particular  candidate  through  . . .  unear-
marked contributions” to entities likely to support the candidate, 424 
U. S., at 38, is far too speculative.  Even accepting Buckley’s circum-
vention theory, it is hard to see how a candidate today could receive
“massive amounts of money” that could be traced back to a particular
donor uninhibited by the aggregate limits.  The Government’s scenar-
ios offered in  support of that possibility  are either illegal under cur-
rent campaign finance laws or implausible.  Pp. 21–30.

(3) The  aggregate  limits  also  violate  the  First  Amendment  be-
cause they are not “closely drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgment of 
associational freedoms.”  Buckley, supra, at 25.  The Government ar-
gues  that  the  aggregate  limits  prevent  an  individual  from  giving  to
too  many  initial  recipients  who  might  then  recontribute  a  donation, 
but  experience  suggests  that  the  vast  majority  of  contributions  are 
retained and spent by their recipients.  And the Government has pro-
vided no reason to believe that candidates or party committees would
dramatically  shift  their  priorities  if  the  aggregate  limits  were  lifted.
The indiscriminate ban on all contributions above the aggregate lim-
its is thus disproportionate  to the Government’s interest in prevent-
ing circumvention.