Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/558bv.pdf
Page Number: 570

Cite as: 558 U. S. 310 (2010) 

409 

Opinion of Stevens, J. 

over and  above the belief  that a  prior case was  wrongly de­
cided.”  Planned Parenthood  of Southeastern Pa.  v.  Casey, 
505 U. S. 833, 864 (1992).  No such justiﬁcation exists in this 
case, and to the contrary there are powerful prudential rea­
sons to keep faith with our precedents.17 

The  Court’s  central  argument  for  why  stare  decisis  ought 
to  be  trumped  is  that  it  does  not  like  Austin.  The  opin­
ion  “was  not  well  reasoned,”  our  colleagues  assert,  and  it 
conﬂicts  with  First  Amendment  principles.  Ante,  at  363. 
This,  of  course,  is  the  Court’s  merits  argument,  the  many 
defects in which we will soon consider.  I am perfectly will­
ing to concede that if one of our precedents were dead wrong 
in  its  reasoning  or  irreconcilable  with  the  rest  of  our  doc­
trine,  there  would  be  a  compelling  basis  for  revisiting  it. 
But neither is true of Austin, as I explain at length in Parts 
III  and  IV,  infra,  at  414–478,  and  restating  a  merits  argu­
ment  with  additional  vigor  does  not  give  it  extra  weight  in 
the stare decisis calculus. 

Perhaps  in  recognition  of  this  point,  the  Court  supple­
ments  its merits  case  with  a smattering  of  assertions.  The 
Court  proclaims  that  “Austin  is  undermined  by  experience 
since  its  announcement.”  Ante,  at  364.  This  is  a  curious 
claim  to make  in a  case  that lacks  a developed  record.  The 
majority has  no empirical evidence with  which to substanti­
ate the claim; we just have its ipse dixit that the real world 
has not been kind to Austin.  Nor does the majority bother 
to specify in what sense Austin has been “undermined.”  In­
stead  it  treats  the  reader  to  a  string  of  non  sequiturs:  “Our 
Nation’s speech dynamic is changing,” ante, at 364; “[s]peak­
ers  have  become  adept  at  presenting  citizens  with  sound 
bites, talking points, and scripted messages,” ibid.; “[c]orpo­
rations . . . do not  have  monolithic  views,”  ibid.  How  any 

17 I will have  more  to  say  shortly  about  the  merits—about  why  Austin 
and McConnell are not doctrinal outliers, as the Court contends, and why 
their  logic  is  not  only  defensible  but  also  compelling.  For  present  pur­
poses, I limit the discussion to stare-decisis-speciﬁc considerations.