Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/11pdf/10-9646.pdf
Page Number: 15.0

Cite as:  567 U. S. ____ (2012) 

11 

Opinion of the Court 

punishment,  can  render  a  life-without-parole  sentence 
disproportionate.  Cf. id., at ___ (slip op., at 20–23) (gener-
ally  doubting  the  penological  justifications  for  imposing
life  without  parole  on  juveniles).  “An  offender’s  age,”  we 
made clear in Graham, “is relevant to the Eighth Amend-
ment,”  and  so  “criminal  procedure  laws  that  fail  to  take 
defendants’  youthfulness  into  account  at  all  would  be
flawed.”  Id., at ___ (slip op., at 25).  THE CHIEF JUSTICE, 
concurring  in  the  judgment,  made  a  similar  point.    Al-
though  rejecting  a  categorical  bar  on  life-without-parole 
sentences  for  juveniles,  he  acknowledged  “Roper’s  conclu-
sion that juveniles are typically less culpable than adults,” 
and  accordingly  wrote  that  “an  offender’s  juvenile  status
can play a central role” in considering a sentence’s propor-
tionality.  Id., at ___ (slip op., at 5–6); see id., at ___ (slip 
op.,  at  12)  (Graham’s  “youth  is  one  factor,  among  others, 
that  should  be  considered  in  deciding  whether  his  pun-
ishment was unconstitutionally excessive”).6 

But  the  mandatory  penalty  schemes  at  issue  here  pre-
vent  the  sentencer  from  taking  account  of  these  central
considerations.  By  removing  youth  from  the  balance—
by  subjecting  a  juvenile  to  the  same  life-without-parole 
sentence  applicable  to  an  adult—these  laws  prohibit  a
sentencing  authority  from  assessing  whether  the  law’s
harshest term of imprisonment proportionately punishes a 
juvenile  offender.    That  contravenes  Graham’s  (and  also 
Roper’s) foundational principle: that imposition of a State’s 
—————— 

6 In  discussing  Graham,  the  dissents  essentially  ignore  all  of  this 
reasoning.  See  post,  at  3–6  (opinion  of  ROBERTS,  C. J.);  post,  at  4 
(opinion  of  ALITO,  J.).    Indeed,  THE  CHIEF  JUSTICE  ignores  the  points
made in his own concurring opinion.  The only part of Graham that the 
dissents see fit to note is the distinction it drew between homicide and 
nonhomicide offenses.  See post, at 7–8 (opinion of ROBERTS, C. J.); post, 
at  4  (opinion  of  ALITO,  J.).    But  contrary  to  the  dissents’  charge,  our 
decision today retains that distinction: Graham established one rule (a
flat  ban)  for  nonhomicide  offenses,  while  we  set  out  a  different  one 
(individualized sentencing) for homicide offenses.