Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/21pdf/20-601_bq7c.pdf
Page Number: 38

Cite as:  595 U. S. ____ (2022) 

9 

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting 

and let another state officer take the lead, and later sought 
to reenter when that officer decided not to pursue further 
appeals. 
  Moreover, this is not the first time a governmental office 
has  changed  hands  in  the  middle  of  a  protracted  lawsuit, 
and it certainly will not be the last.  Elections have conse-
quences not just for the public but also for state officers who 
may  find  themselves  bound  by  strategic  litigation  choices 
made by their predecessors in office.  Shifts in the political 
winds  do  not  support  a  special  carveout  to  longstanding 
principles of estoppel.  Rules that protect reliance and final-
ity  exist  for  good  reason:  Courts,  litigants,  and  the public 
must be able to trust representations made in court.  If an-
ything, that reliance is only heightened when a government 
official  represented  that  he  had  no  interest  in  defending 
state law. 

* 

  * 

  * 
  The question in this case is not whether a state attorney 
general may intervene, after a federal court of appeals al-
ready has rendered its judgment, for the purpose of defend-
ing  a  state  law  where  no  other  state  actor  will  do  so.    At 
issue is a more specific question: whether the Court of Ap-
peals  acted  within  its  discretion  by  denying  this  attorney 
general leave to intervene when his office previously stipu-
lated  to  dismissal  on  grounds  that  contradicted  his  argu-
ment for intervention.  Under these circumstances, I would 
not  disturb  the  “sound  discretion”  of  the  court  below.  
NAACP, 413 U. S., at 366.  I respectfully dissent.