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LOPER BRIGHT ENTERPRISES v. RAIMONDO 

Syllabus 

because deferring to agencies purportedly promotes the uniform con-
struction of federal law; and because resolving statutory ambiguities
can  involve  policymaking  best  left  to  political  actors,  rather  than 
courts.  See Brief for Respondents in No. 22–1219, pp. 16–19.  But none 
of  these  considerations  justifies  Chevron’s  sweeping  presumption  of
congressional intent.  

As the Court recently noted, interpretive issues arising in connec-
tion with a regulatory scheme “may fall more naturally into a judge’s
bailiwick” than an agency’s.  Kisor v. Wilkie, 588 U. S. 558, 578.  Under 
Chevron’s  broad  rule  of  deference,  though,  ambiguities  of  all  stripes 
trigger  deference,  even  in  cases  having  little  to  do  with  an  agency’s 
technical subject matter expertise.  And even when an ambiguity hap-
pens to implicate a technical matter, it does not follow that Congress 
has taken the power to authoritatively interpret the statute from the 
courts and given it to the agency.  Congress expects courts to handle 
technical  statutory  questions,  and  courts  did  so  without  issue  in 
agency cases before Chevron.  After all, in an agency case in particular,
the reviewing court will go about its  task  with the agency’s “body of
experience and informed judgment,” among other information, at  its 
disposal.  Skidmore, 323 U. S., at 140.  An agency’s interpretation of a
statute “cannot bind a court,” but may be especially informative “to the
extent it rests on factual premises within [the agency’s] expertise.”  Bu-
reau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms v. FLRA, 464 U. S. 89, 98, n. 8. 
Delegating  ultimate  interpretive  authority  to  agencies  is  simply  not 
necessary to ensure that the resolution of statutory ambiguities is well
informed by subject matter expertise.

Nor does a desire for the uniform construction of federal law justify 
Chevron.  It is unclear how much the Chevron doctrine as a whole ac-
tually promotes such uniformity, and in any event, we see no reason to
presume that Congress prefers uniformity for uniformity’s sake over 
the correct interpretation of the laws it enacts.  

Finally, the view that interpretation of ambiguous statutory provi-
sions amounts to policymaking suited for political actors rather than 
courts is especially mistaken because it rests on a profound misconcep-
tion of the judicial role.  Resolution of statutory ambiguities involves 
legal  interpretation,  and  that  task  does  not  suddenly  become  policy-
making just because a court has an “agency to fall back on.”  Kisor, 588 
U. S., at 575.  Courts interpret statutes, no matter the context, based 
on the traditional tools of statutory construction, not individual policy
preferences.  To stay out of discretionary policymaking left to the po-
litical  branches,  judges  need  only  fulfill  their  obligations  under  the
APA to independently identify and respect such delegations of author-
ity, police the outer statutory boundaries of those delegations, and en-
sure that agencies exercise their discretion consistent with the APA.