Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/19pdf/19-631_2d93.pdf
Page Number: 22.0

Cite as:  591 U. S. ____ (2020) 

19 

Opinion of KAVANAUGH, J. 

amendment statute as the “valid expression of the legisla-
tive  intent.”  Frost  v.  Corporation  Comm’n  of  Okla.,  278 
U. S. 515, 526–527 (1929).  The Court has severed the “ex-
ception  introduced  by  amendment,”  so  that  “the  original 
law  stands  without  the  amendatory  exception.”  Truax  v. 
Corrigan, 257 U. S. 312, 342 (1921).

For example, in Eberle v. Michigan, the Court held that 
“discriminatory  wine-and-cider  amendments”  added  in 
1899  and  1903  were  severable  from  the  underlying  1889
state law generally prohibiting the manufacture of alcohol. 
232 U. S. 700, 704–705 (1914).  In Truax, the Court ruled 
that a 1913 amendment prohibiting Arizona courts from is-
suing injunctions in labor disputes was invalid and severa-
ble  from  the  underlying  1901  law  authorizing  Arizona
courts to issue injunctions generally.  257 U. S., at 341–342. 
In Frost, the Court concluded that a 1925 amendment ex-
empting  certain  corporations  from  making  a  showing  of 
“public necessity” in order to obtain a cotton gin license was
invalid and severable from the 1915 law that required that 
showing.  278  U. S.,  at  525–528.    Echoing  Marbury,  the 
Court in Frost explained that an unconstitutional statutory 
amendment “is a nullity” and “void” when enacted, and for
that reason has no effect on the original statute.  278 U. S., 
at 526–527 (internal quotation marks omitted).11 

Similarly, in 1932, Congress enacted the Federal Kidnap-
ing Act, and then in 1934, added a death penalty provision 
to the Act.  The death penalty provision was later declared
unconstitutional by this Court.  In considering severability, 
—————— 

11 The cases cited in the text above are pre-Erie decisions involving the 
constitutionality of state laws.  See Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64 
(1938).  In that era, the Court often treated severability of state laws and
federal laws in the same general way.  In the post-Erie era, severability 
of state laws can potentially pose different questions than severability of 
federal laws.  We need not address post-Erie severability of state laws.
See, e.g., Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of Northern New Eng., 546 U. S. 
320,  328–331  (2006);  Leavitt  v. Jane  L.,  518  U. S.  137, 139  (1996)  (per 
curiam) (“Severability is of course a matter of state law”).