Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/17pdf/17-459_1o13.pdf
Page Number: 40.0

Cite as:  585 U. S. ____ (2018) 

13 

ALITO, J., dissenting 

§1229(a)(2)(A)(i).  “By  allowing  for  a  ‘change  or  postpone-
ment’  of  the  proceedings  to  a  ‘new  time  or  place,’ ”  the 
Court  reasons,  “paragraph  (2)  presumes  that  the  Govern-
ment has already served a ‘notice to appear . . .’ that speci-
fied a time and place as required.”  Ante, at 10. 

That is entirely correct—and entirely irrelevant.  No one 
doubts  that  §1229(a)(1)  requires  that  a  notice  to  appear 
include  the  “time  and  place”  of  the  removal  proceeding. 
See  §1229(a)(1)(G)(i).    Indeed,  that  is  common  ground 
between  the  two  parties.    See  Brief  for  Petitioner  10–11; 
Brief  for  Respondent  3.  Paragraph  (2)  undoubtedly  as-
sumes  that  notices  to  appear  will  state  the  “time  and 
place”  of  the  removal  proceeding  as  required  by
§1229(a)(1),  but  it  has  nothing  to  say  about  whether  the 
failure to include that information affects the operation of
the stop-time rule.  By suggesting otherwise, the Court is
merely reasoning backwards from its conclusion. 

The other provision cited by the Court, §1229(b)(1), is no
more helpful.  As the Court explains, §1229(b)(1) generally 
precludes the Government from scheduling a hearing date
“ ‘earlier  than  10  days  after  the  service  of  the  notice  to
appear’ ”  in  order  to  give  the  alien  “ ‘the  opportunity  to 
secure  counsel.’ ”    Ante,  at  11.    Unless  a  notice  to  appear
includes the time and place of the hearing, the Court frets, 
“the Government could serve a document labeled ‘notice to 
appear’  without  listing  the  time  and  location  of  the  hear-
ing  and  then,  years  down  the  line,  provide  that  infor-
mation a day before the removal hearing when it becomes 
available.”  Ibid.    But  that  remote  and  speculative  possi-
bility  depends  entirely  on  the  Immigration  Court’s  allow-
ing a removal proceeding to go forward only one day after 
an alien (and the Government) receives word of a hearing 
date.  See  8  CFR  §1003.18(a).    Even  assuming  that  such
an unlikely event were to come to pass, the court’s decision
would surely be subject to review on appeal.  See generally
8  CFR  §1003.1,  8  U. S. C.  §1252.  Regardless,  the  Court’s