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Page Number: 25.0

8 

COUNTERMAN v. COLORADO 

SOTOMAYOR, J., concurring
Opinion of SOTOMAYOR, J. 

ment would not, however, present an uncommon or insur-
mountable barrier to true-threats prosecutions.3  Nonethe-
less, under such a standard, there will be some speech that 
some  find  threatening  that  will  not  and  should  not  land 
anyone in prison. 

III 
These high First Amendment stakes are further reason 
for caution when delineating the boundaries of what consti-
tutes a true threat.  In undertaking that analysis, the Court 
and I part ways on the order of operations.  The Court be-
gins by defining true threats as all objectively threatening
speech,  entirely  independent  of  whether  the  speaker  in-
tended  to  be  threatening,  ante,  at  6,  and  the  lead  dissent 
agrees, post, at 2–3 (opinion of BARRETT, J.).  The Court gets
there by relying on this Court’s interpretation of the word
“threat”  in  a  federal  statute.    Ante,  at  6  (citing  Elonis  v. 
United  States,  575  U. S.  723,  733  (2015)).    The  Court  de-
clares all such speech categorically unprotected, and then
asks what “buffer zone” is needed in order to protect other, 
unthreatening speech.  See ante, at 4–7. 

Respectfully, I see the analysis differently.  The first step
in the analysis should instead be to ask about the scope of 
the well-defined and narrow category of “true threats” as a
constitutional  matter.  This  Court  has  already  warned
about the danger of creating new categories of “unprotected
speech” exempt from the ordinary First Amendment frame-
work for balancing our society’s commitment to free expres-
sion  with  other  interests.  Stevens,  559  U. S.,  at  470.  If 
courts were at liberty to redefine what counts as a “threat” 

—————— 

3 Intent  requirements  are  common,  including  for  incitement  that  re-
sults in actual violence, not just the threat of it.  See infra, at 15–17.  For 
that  reason  there  are  longstanding  frameworks  for  determining  when
someone is not guilty by reason of insanity, and when delusions do (and
do not) defeat a showing of intent.  See, e.g., 1 W. LaFave, Substantive 
Criminal Law §§7.1(a), (b) (3d ed. 2018); 2 id., §9.2.