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524US2

Unit: $U99

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Cite as: 524 U. S. 742 (1998)

769

Thomas, J., dissenting

858 F. 2d 345, 349 (CA6 1988), cert. denied, 490 U. S. 1110
(1989). Liability has thus been imposed only if the employer
is blameworthy in some way. See, e. g., Davis v. Monsanto
Chemical Co., supra, at 349; Snell v. Suffolk Cty., supra, at
1104; DeGrace v. Rumsfeld, 614 F. 2d 796, 805 (CA1 1980).
This distinction applies with equal force in cases of sexual
harassment.2 When a supervisor inﬂicts an adverse employ-
ment consequence upon an employee who has rebuffed his
advances, the supervisor exercises the speciﬁc authority
granted to him by his company. His acts, therefore, are the
company’s acts and are properly chargeable to it. See 123
F. 3d 490, 514 (CA7 1997) (Posner, C. J., dissenting); ante,
at 762 (“Tangible employment actions fall within the special
province of the supervisor. The supervisor has been em-
powered by the company as a distinct class of agent to make
economic decisions affecting other employees under his or
her control”).

If a supervisor creates a hostile work environment, how-
ever, he does not act for the employer. As the Court con-
cedes, a supervisor’s creation of a hostile work environment
is neither within the scope of his employment, nor part of
his apparent authority. See ante, at 755–760.
Indeed, a
hostile work environment is antithetical to the interest of the
employer.
In such circumstances, an employer should be li-
able only if it has been negligent. That is, liability should
attach only if the employer either knew, or in the exercise of

2 The Courts of Appeals relied on racial harassment cases when analyz-
ing early claims of discrimination based upon a supervisor’s sexual harass-
ment. For example, when the Court of Appeals for the District of Colum-
bia Circuit held that a work environment poisoned by a supervisor’s
“sexually stereotyped insults and demeaning propositions” could itself vio-
late Title VII, its principal authority was Judge Goldberg’s opinion in Rog-
ers v. EEOC, 454 F. 2d 234 (CA5 1971). See Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F. 2d
934, 944 (CADC 1981); see also Henson v. Dundee, 682 F. 2d 897, 901 (CA11
1982). So, too, this Court relied on Rogers when in Meritor Savings
Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U. S. 57 (1986), it recognized a cause of action
under Title VII for sexual harassment. See id., at 65–66.