Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/19pdf/17-1618_hfci.pdf
Page Number: 166.0

22 

BOSTOCK v. CLAYTON COUNTY 

KAVANAUGH, J., dissenting 

judges.9 
  The unanimity of those 30 federal judges shows that the 
question as a matter of law, as compared to as a matter of 
policy,  was  not  deemed  close.    Those  30  judges  realized  a 
seemingly obvious point: Title VII is not a general grant of 
authority for judges to fashion an evolving common law of 
equal treatment in the workplace.  Rather, Title VII identi-
fies certain specific categories of prohibited discrimination.  
And  under  the  separation  of  powers,  Congress—not  the 
courts—possesses  the  authority  to  amend  or  update  the 
law, as Congress has done with age discrimination and dis-
ability discrimination, for example. 
  So what changed from the situation only a few years ago 
when 30 out of 30 federal judges had agreed on this ques-
tion?  Not the text of Title VII.  The law has not changed.  
Rather, the judges’ decisions have evolved. 
  To  be  sure,  the  majority  opinion  today  does  not  openly 
profess that it is judicially updating or amending Title VII.  
Cf. Hively, 853 F. 3d, at 357 (Posner, J., concurring).  But 
the majority opinion achieves the same outcome by seizing 
on literal meaning and overlooking the ordinary meaning of 
the phrase “discriminate because of sex.”  Although the ma-
jority opinion acknowledges that the meaning of a phrase 
and the meaning of a phrase’s individual words could differ, 
it dismisses phrasal meaning for purposes of this case.  The 
majority  opinion  repeatedly  seizes  on  the  meaning  of  the 

—————— 

9

 See Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc., 194 F. 3d 252, 258–
259 (CA1 1999); Simonton v. Runyon, 232 F. 3d 33, 36 (CA2 2000); Bibby 
v. Philadelphia Coca Cola Bottling Co., 260 F. 3d 257, 261 (CA3 2001); 
Wrightson v. Pizza Hut of America, Inc., 99 F. 3d 138, 143 (CA4 1996); 
Blum v. Gulf Oil Corp., 597 F. 2d 936, 938 (CA5 1979) (per curiam); Ruth 
v. Children’s Medical Center, 1991 WL 151158, *5 (CA6, Aug. 8, 1991) 
(per curiam); Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 742 F. 2d 1081, 1084–1085 
(CA7 1984); Williamson v. A. G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 876 F. 2d 69, 70 
(CA8 1989) (per curiam); DeSantis v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 608 F. 2d 
327,  329–330  (CA9  1979);  Medina  v.  Income  Support  Div.,  N. M.,  413 
F. 3d 1131, 1135 (CA10 2005).