Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/21pdf/21-499_gfbh.pdf
Page Number: 11.0

Cite as:  597 U. S. ____ (2022) 

7 

Opinion of the Court 

North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U. S. 369, 374 (1979); Brown 
v.  Illinois,  422  U. S.  590,  600  (1975);  Michigan  v.  Tucker, 
417 U. S., at 439; and Michigan v. Payne, 412 U. S. 47, 53 
(1973).2 

C 
After Miranda was handed down, the Court engaged in
the process of charting the dimensions of these new prophy-
lactic rules.  As  we would later spell out, this process en-
tailed a weighing of the benefits and costs of any clarifica-
tion of the rules’ scope.  See Shatzer, 559 U. S., at 106 (“A 
judicially  crafted  rule  is  ‘justified  only  by  reference  to  its 
prophylactic purpose,’ . . . and applies only where its bene-
fits outweigh its costs”).
  Some  post-Miranda  decisions  found  that  the  balance  of 
interests  justified  restrictions  that  would  not  have  been 
possible  if  Miranda  represented  an  explanation  of  the 
meaning of the Fifth Amendment right as opposed to a set 
of rules designed to protect that right.  For example, in Har-
ris v. New York, 401 U. S. 222, 224–226 (1971), the Court 
held  that  a  statement  obtained  in  violation  of  Miranda 
could be used to impeach the testimony of a defendant, even
though  an  involuntary  statement  obtained  in  violation  of 
the Fifth Amendment could not have been employed in this 
way.  See  Mincey  v.  Arizona,  437  U. S.  385,  398  (1978) 

—————— 

2 Tekoh cites Orozco v. Texas, 394 U. S. 324 (1969), which characterized 
the admission of an unwarned statement in the prosecutor’s case-in-chief
as a “flat violation of the Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amend-
ment as construed in Miranda.”  Id., at 326 (emphasis added); Brief for 
Respondent 21, 29.  But the Court made this assertion in a three-para-
graph opinion without any additional analysis, and did not purport to go
beyond Miranda, which, as we have explained, does not support the prop-
osition that a Miranda violation equates to a Fifth Amendment violation. 
See  Orozco,  394  U. S.,  at  327  (“We  do  not  . . .  expand  or  extend  to  the 
slightest extent our Miranda decision”).  Likewise, the decision predates
the subsequent case law defining the scope of the Miranda rules.  See 
infra, this page and 8–11.