Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/22pdf/21-1449_d9eh.pdf
Page Number: 10

Cite as:  598 U. S. ____ (2023) 

7 

Opinion of the Court 

where employees fail to take reasonable precautions to pro-
tect the employer’s plant, equipment, or products from fore-
seeable imminent danger due to sudden cessation of work”);
see also Brief for Petitioner 14, 30–31; Brief for Respondent 
28–29; Reply Brief 6–7; Tr. of Oral Arg. 68, 86.  Given this 
undisputed limitation on the right to strike, we proceed to
consider  whether  the  Union  has  demonstrated  that  the 
statute arguably protects the drivers’ conduct.  Davis, 476 
U. S., at 395.  We conclude that it has not.2 

The drivers engaged in a sudden cessation of work that 
put Glacier’s property in foreseeable and imminent danger.
The Union knew that concrete is highly perishable and that 
it can last for only a limited time in a delivery truck’s rotat-
ing  drum.  It  also  knew  that  concrete  left  to  harden  in  a 
truck’s drum causes significant damage to the truck.  The 
Union nevertheless coordinated with truck drivers to initi-
ate  the  strike  when  Glacier  was  in  the  midst  of  batching
large quantities of concrete and delivering it to customers. 
Predictably, the company’s concrete was destroyed as a re-
sult.  And though Glacier’s swift action saved its trucks in
the end, the risk of harm to its equipment was both foresee-
able and serious.  See NLRB v. Special Touch Home Care 
Services, Inc., 708 F. 3d 447, 460 (CA2 2013) (“The appro-
priate inquiry is focused on the risk of harm, not its reali-
zation”).

The Union failed to “take reasonable precautions to pro-
tect” against this foreseeable and imminent danger.  Beth-
any Medical Center, 328 N. L. R. B., at 1094.  It could have 
—————— 

2 The  Union  moved  to  dismiss  Glacier’s  claims  for  failure  to  state  a 
claim and for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.  Like the Washington
Supreme  Court,  we  treat  both  motions  together  and  accept  the  allega-
tions in the complaint as true at the motion-to-dismiss stage.  198 Wash. 
2d 768, 782–783, 500 P. 3d 119, 127 (2021); see also Kinney v. Cook, 159 
Wash. 2d 837, 842, 154 P. 3d 206, 209 (2007).  Pursuant to Washington
law, we also may consider additional factual allegations made by Glacier
that support its complaint.  See Bravo v. Dolsen Companies, 125 Wash. 
2d 745, 750, 888 P. 2d 147, 150 (1995).