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Page Number: 40.0

14 

NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF FAMILY AND 
LIFE ADVOCATES v. BECERRA
 
BREYER, J., dissenting 

taking prescription drugs may not be considered a “medi-
cal  procedure.”  21  CFR  §201.56  (2017).    In  California, 
clinics  that  screen  for  breast  cancer  must  post  a  sign  in
their  offices  notifying  patients  that,  if  they  are  diagnosed 
with  breast  cancer,  their  doctor  must  provide  “a  written 
summary of alternative efficacious methods of treatment,”
a  notification  that  does  not  relate  to  the  screening  proce-
dure  at  issue.    Cal.  Health  &  Safety  Code  Ann.  §109277. 
If  even  these  disclosures  fall  outside  the  majority’s 
cramped view of Casey  and informed consent, it undoubt-
edly would invalidate the many other disclosures that are 
routine in the medical context as well.  Supra, at 3–4. 

The majority also finds it “[t]ellin[g]” that general prac-
tice  clinics—i.e.,  paid  clinics—are  not  required  to  provide 
the  licensed  notice.  Ante,  at  11.  But  the  lack-of-
information  problem  that  the  statute  seeks  to  ameliorate
is  a  problem  that  the  State  explains  is  commonly  found 
among  low-income  women.  See  Brief  for  State  Respond-
ents 5–6.  That those with low income might lack the time
to become fully informed and that this circumstance might
prove  disproportionately  correlated  with  income  is  not
intuitively surprising.  Nor is it surprising that those with
low income, whatever they choose in respect to pregnancy,
might find information about financial assistance particu-
larly  useful.  There  is  “nothing  inherently  suspect”  about 
this  distinction,  McCullen  v.  Coakley,  573  U. S.  ___,  ___ 
(2014) (slip op., at 15), which is not “based on the content 
of  [the  advocacy]  each  group  offers,”  Turner  Broadcasting 
System,  Inc.  v.  FCC,  512  U. S.  622,  658–659  (1994),  but 
upon  the  patients  the  group  generally  serves  and  the 
needs of that population. 

2 
Separately, finding no First Amendment infirmity in the
licensed  notice  is  consistent  with  earlier  Court  rulings. 
For  instance,  in  Zauderer  we  upheld  a  requirement  that