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Page Number: 3

Cite as:  599 U. S. ____ (2023) 

3 

Syllabus 

Then, as now, “encourage” had a specialized meaning that channeled 
accomplice liability.  And the words “assisting” and “soliciting,” which 
appeared  alongside  “encouraging,”  reinforce  the  narrower  criminal-
law  meaning.    When  Congress  amended  that  provision  in  1917,  it 
added  “induce,”  which  also  carried  solicitation  and  facilitation  over-
tones.  39 Stat. 879.  In 1952, Congress enacted the immediate prede-
cessor for clause (iv) and also simplified the language from the 1917 
Act, dropping the words “assist” and “solicit,” and making it a crime to 
“willfully or knowingly encourag[e] or induc[e], or attemp[t] to encour-
age or induce, either directly or indirectly, the entry into the United 
States of . . . any alien . . . not lawfully entitled to enter or reside within 
the United States.”  66 Stat. 229.  Hansen believes these changes dra-
matically  broadened  the  scope  of  clause  (iv)’s  prohibition  on  encour-
agement, but accepting that argument would require the Court to as-
sume that Congress took a circuitous route to convey a sweeping—and 
constitutionally dubious—message.  The better understanding is that 
Congress simply streamlined the previous statutory language.  Criti-
cally, the terms Congress retained (“encourage” and “induce”) substan-
tially overlap in meaning with the terms it omitted (“assist” and “so-
licit”).  Clause (iv) is thus best understood as a continuation of the past.  
Pp. 11–13. 

(d) Hansen argues that the absence of an express mens rea require-
ment in clause (iv) means that the statute is not limited to solicitation 
and  facilitation.    But  when  Congress  placed  “encourages”  and  “in-
duces” in clause (iv), the traditional intent associated with solicitation 
and facilitation was part of the package.  The federal aiding and abet-
ting statute works the same way: It contains no express mens rea re-
quirement but implicitly incorporates the traditional state of mind re-
quired for aiding and abetting.  Rosemond v. United States, 572 U. S. 
65, 70–71.  Clause (iv) is situated among other provisions that function 
in the same manner.  See, e.g., §§1324(a)(1)(A)(v)(I), (II).  Since “en-
courages or induces” draws on the same common-law principles, clause 
(iv) also incorporates a mens rea requirement implicitly.  Pp. 13–16. 

(e) Finally, it bears emphasis that the canon of constitutional avoid-
ance counsels the Court to adopt the Government’s reading if it is at 
least “ ‘fairly possible.’ ”  Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U. S. ___, ___.  Pp. 
16–17. 

(f) Section 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv) reaches no further than the purposeful 
solicitation  and  facilitation  of  specific  acts  known  to  violate  federal 
law.    So  understood,  it  does  not  “prohibi[t]  a  substantial  amount  of 
protected speech” relative to its “plainly legitimate sweep.”  Williams, 
553 U. S., at 292.  It is undisputed that clause (iv) encompasses a great 
deal  of  nonexpressive  conduct,  which  does  not  implicate  the  First