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Page Number: 32.0

14 

JOHNSON v. UNITED STATES 

THOMAS, J., concurring in judgment 

of  Okla.,  286  U. S.  210,  242–243  (1932),  a  state  antitrust 
law,  Cline,  274  U. S.,  at  453–465,  a  state  minimum-wage 
law, Connally, 269 U. S., at 390–395, and a federal price-
control statute, L. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U. S., at 89–93.5 
Around the time the Court began shifting the focus of its
substantive  due  process  (and  equal  protection)  jurispru-
dence  from  economic  interests  to  “discrete  and  insular 
minorities,”  see  United  States  v.  Carolene  Products  Co., 
304 U. S. 144, 153, n. 4 (1938), the target of its vagueness
doctrine  changed  as  well.    The  Court  began  to  use  the
vagueness doctrine to invalidate noneconomic regulations, 
such  as  state  statutes  penalizing  obscenity,  Winters,  333 
U. S.,  at  517–520,  and  membership  in  a  gang,  Lanzetta, 
306 U. S., at 458. 

Successful  vagueness  challenges  to  regulations  penaliz-
ing  commercial  conduct,  by  contrast,  largely  fell  by  the
wayside.  The Court, for instance, upheld a federal regula-
tion punishing the knowing violation of an order instruct-
ing drivers transporting dangerous chemicals to “ ‘avoid, so
far  as  practicable  . . .  driving  into  or  through  congested
thoroughfares,  places where  crowds  are  assembled,  street 
car  tracks,  tunnels,  viaducts,  and  dangerous  crossings,’ ” 
Boyce  Motor  Lines,  Inc.  v.  United  States,  342  U. S.  337, 

—————— 

5 Vagueness  challenges  to  laws  regulating  speech  during  this  period
were less successful.  Among the laws the Court found to be sufficiently
definite  included  a  state  law  making  it  a  misdemeanor  to  publish, 
among  other  things,  materials  “ ‘which  shall  tend  to  encourage  or 
advocate disrespect for law or for any court or courts of justice,’ ” Fox v. 
Washington, 236 U. S. 273, 275–277 (1915), a federal statute criminal-
izing  candidate  solicitation  of  contributions  for  “ ‘any  political  purpose
whatever,’ ” United States v. Wurzbach, 280 U. S. 396, 398–399 (1930), 
and a state prohibition on becoming a member of any organization that
advocates  using  unlawful  violence  to  effect  “ ‘any  political  change,’ ” 
Whitney v. California, 274 U. S. 357, 359–360, 368–369 (1927).  But see 
Stromberg  v.  California,  283  U. S.  359,  369–370  (1931)  (holding  state 
statute  punishing  the  use  of  any  symbol  “ ‘of  opposition  to  organized 
government’ ” to be impermissibly vague).