Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/529bv.pdf
Page Number: 417

529US2

Unit: $U44

[09-26-01 10:00:50] PAGES PGT: OPIN

342

BOND v. UNITED STATES

Breyer, J., dissenting

(“[T]he issue is not [the agent’s] state of mind, but the objec-
tive effect of his actions”); see also Whren v. United States,
517 U. S. 806, 813 (1996); United States v. Dunn, 480 U. S.
294, 304–305 (1987). Few individuals with something to
hide wish to expose that something to the police, however
careless or indifferent they may be in respect to discovery
by other members of the public. Hence, a Fourth Amend-
ment rule that turns on purpose could prevent police alone
from intruding where other strangers freely tread. And the
added privacy protection achieved by such an approach
would not justify the harm worked to law enforcement—at
least that is what this Court’s previous cases suggest. See
Greenwood, supra, at 41 (“[T]he police cannot reasonably be
expected to avert their eyes from evidence of criminal activ-
ity that could have been observed by any member of the
public”); Ciraolo, supra, at 212–213 (rejecting respondent’s
argument that the police should be restricted solely because
their actions are “motivated by a law enforcement purpose,
and not the result of a casual, accidental observation”).

Nor can I accept the majority’s effort to distinguish
“tactile” from “visual” interventions, see ante, at 337, even
assuming that distinction matters here. Whether tactile
manipulation (say, of the exterior of luggage) is more intru-
sive or less intrusive than visual observation (say, through
a lighted window) necessarily depends on the particular
circumstances.

If we are to depart from established legal principles, we
should not begin here. At best, this decision will lead to a
constitutional jurisprudence of “squeezes,” thereby compli-
cating further already complex Fourth Amendment law, in-
creasing the difﬁculty of deciding ordinary criminal matters,
and hindering the administrative guidance (with its potential
for control of unreasonable police practices) that a less com-
plicated jurisprudence might provide. Cf. Whren, supra, at
815 (warning against the creation of trivial Fourth Amend-
ment distinctions). At worst, this case will deter law en-