Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/22pdf/21-1086_1co6.pdf
Page Number: 43

2 

ALLEN v. MILLIGAN 

KAVANAUGH, J., concurring 
KAVANAUGH, J., concurring in part 

Court  has  ordinarily  left  the  updating  or  correction  of 
erroneous statutory precedents to the legislative process.”  
Ramos v. Louisiana, 590 U. S. ___, ___ (2020) (KAVANAUGH, 
J., concurring in part) (slip op., at 4); see also, e.g., Kimble 
v.  Marvel  Entertainment,  LLC,  576  U. S.  446,  456  (2015); 
Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U. S. 164, 172–173 
(1989);  Flood  v.  Kuhn,  407  U. S.  258,  283–284  (1972); 
Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U. S. 393, 406 (1932) 
(Brandeis, J., dissenting).1 
  Second,  Alabama  contends  that  Gingles  inevitably 
requires  a  proportional  number  of  majority-minority 
districts,  which  in  turn  contravenes  the  proportionality 
disclaimer  in  §2(b)  of  the  Voting  Rights  Act.    52  U. S. C. 
§10301(b).  But Alabama’s premise is wrong.  As the Court’s 
precedents  make  clear,  Gingles  does  not  mandate  a 
proportional  number  of  majority-minority  districts.  
Gingles requires the creation of a majority-minority district 
only  when,  among  other  things,  (i)  a  State’s  redistricting 
map cracks or packs a large and “geographically compact” 
(ii)  a  plaintiff ’s  proposed 
minority  population  and 
alternative  map  and  proposed  majority-minority  district 
are 
“reasonably  configured”—namely,  by  respecting 
compactness  principles  and  other  traditional  districting 
criteria  such  as  county,  city,  and  town  lines.    See,  e.g., 
Cooper v. Harris, 581 U. S. 285, 301–302 (2017); Voinovich 
v.  Quilter,  507  U. S.  146,  153–154  (1993);  ante,  at  10–12, 
18–22. 
—————— 

1 Unlike  ordinary  statutory  precedents,  the  “Court’s  precedents 
applying  common-law  statutes  and  pronouncing  the  Court’s  own 
interpretive  methods  and  principles  typically  do  not  fall  within  that 
category of stringent statutory stare decisis.”  Ramos, 590 U. S., at ___, 
n. 2 (opinion of KAVANAUGH, J.) (slip op., at 5, n. 2); see also, e.g., Kisor 
v.  Wilkie,  588  U. S.  ___,  ___–___  (2019)  (GORSUCH,  J.,  concurring  in 
judgment) (slip op., at 34–36); id., at ___–___ (KAVANAUGH, J., concurring 
in judgment) (slip op., at 1–2); Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. 
PSKS, Inc., 551 U. S. 877, 899–907 (2007); Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 
U. S. 500, 510–516 (2006).