Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/20pdf/19-123_g3bi.pdf
Page Number: 93.0

Cite as:  593 U. S. ____ (2021) 

71 

ALITO, J., concurring in judgment
ALITO, J., concurring in judgment 

shown otherwise. 

D 

Subsequent  developments.  Developments  since  Smith 
provide additional reasons for changing course.  The Smith 
majority  thought  that  adherence  to  Sherbert  would  invite 
“anarchy,” 494 U. S., at 888, but experience has shown that 
this fear was not well founded.  Both RFRA and RLUIPA 
impose essentially the same requirements as Sherbert, and 
we have observed that the courts are well “up to the task”
of applying that test.  Gonzales v. O Centro Espírita Benef-
icente União do Vegetal, 546 U. S. 418, 436 (2006).  See also 
Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U. S. 709, 722 (2005) (noting “no 
cause to believe” the test could not be “applied in an appro-
priately balanced way”).

Another  significant  development  is  the  subsequent  pro-
fusion of studies on the original meaning of the Free Exer-
cise Clause.  When Smith was decided, the available schol-
arship was thin, and the Court received no briefing on the
subject.  Since then, scholars have explored the subject in
great depth.81 

* 
Multiple  factors  strongly  favor  overruling  Smith.  Are 

* 

* 

there countervailing factors? 

E 
None is apparent.  Reliance is often the strongest factor
favoring  the  retention  of  a  challenged  precedent,  but  no
strong reliance interests are cited in any of the numerous 

—————— 

81 See, e.g., McConnell, Origins 1409; McConnell, Free Exercise Revi-
sionism 1109; McConnell, Freedom From Persecution 819; Hamburger,
Religious Exemption 915; Hamburger, More Is Less 835; Laycock, 7 J. 
Contemp. Legal Issues 313; Bradley, 20 Hofstra L. Rev. 245; Campbell, 
A New Approach 973; Kmiec, 59 UMKC L. Rev. 591; Lash, 88 Nw. U. L. 
Rev. 1106; Lombardi, Free Exercise 369; Muñoz, Original Meaning 1083; 
Nestor 971; Nussbaum, Liberty of Conscience, at 120–130; Walsh 1.