Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/11pdf/10-9646.pdf
Page Number: 49.0

Cite as:  567 U. S. ____ (2012) 

3 

THOMAS, J., dissenting 

bail  shall  not  be  required,  nor  excessive  fines  imposed,
nor  cruel  and  unusual  punishments  inflicted.”    As  I  have 
previously  explained,  “the  Cruel  and  Unusual  Punish-
ments  Clause  was  originally  understood  as  prohibiting 
torturous  methods  of  punishment—specifically  methods
akin to those that had been considered cruel and unusual 
at  the  time  the  Bill  of  Rights  was  adopted.”  Graham, 
supra,  at  ___  (dissenting  opinion)  (slip  op.,  at  3)  (internal 
quotation marks and citations omitted).2  The clause does 
not  contain  a  “proportionality  principle.”  Ewing  v.  Cali-
fornia,  538  U. S.  11,  32  (2003)  (THOMAS, J., concurring  in 
judgment); see generally Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U. S. 
957,  975–985  (1991)  (opinion  of  SCALIA,  J.).    In  short,  it  
does  not  authorize  courts  to  invalidate  any  punishment
they  deem  disproportionate  to  the  severity  of  the  crime
or  to  a  particular  class  of  offenders.  Instead,  the  clause 
“leaves the unavoidably moral question of who ‘deserves’ a 
particular  nonprohibited  method  of  punishment  to  the 
judgment  of  the  legislatures  that  authorize  the  penalty.” 
Graham,  supra,  at  ___  (THOMAS,  J.,  dissenting)  (slip  op., 
at 5).

The legislatures of Arkansas and Alabama, like those of 
27  other  jurisdictions,  ante,  at  19–20,  have  determined 

—————— 

2 Neither  the  Court  nor  petitioners  argue  that  petitioners’  sentences 
would  have  been  among  “the  ‘modes  or  acts  of  punishment  that  had 
been  considered  cruel  and  unusual  at  the  time  that  the  Bill  of  Rights 
was adopted.’ ”  Graham, 560 U. S., at ___ (THOMAS, J., dissenting) (slip 
op., at 10, n. 3) (quoting Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U. S. 399, 405 (1986)). 
Nor could they.  Petitioners were 14 years old at the time they commit-
ted  their  crimes.    When  the  Bill  of  Rights  was  ratified,  14-year-olds
were subject to trial and punishment as adult offenders.  See Roper v. 
Simmons,  543  U. S.  551,  609,  n. 1  (2005)  (SCALIA,  J.,  dissenting).
Further,  mandatory  death  sentences  were  common  at  that  time.    See 
Harmelin  v.  Michigan,  501  U. S.  957,  994–995  (1991).    It  is  therefore 
implausible  that  a  14-year-old’s  mandatory  prison  sentence—of  any 
length,  with  or  without  parole—would  have  been  viewed  as  cruel  and
unusual.