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Page Number: 22.0

18 

VIDAL v. ELSTER 

Opinion of the Court 

And,  this  Court  has  long  associated  names  with  the  good 
will they may bear.  See McLean, 96 U. S., at 252; L. E. Wa-
terman Co., 235 U. S., at 96 (“He purported to transfer to 
the partnership the good will attaching to his name”).  The 
names  clause  thus  protects  “the  reputation  of  the  named
individual”  by  preventing  another  person  from  using  his 
name.  Post, at 9 (opinion of BARRETT, J.).

Applying  these  principles,  we  have  recognized  that  a 
party  has  no  First  Amendment  right  to  piggyback  off  the 
goodwill another entity has built in its name.  In San Fran-
cisco Arts & Athletics, Inc., the Court upheld a provision of 
the Amateur Sports Act of 1978 that prohibited “ ‘any per-
son’ ” from using the word “ ‘Olympic’ ” for certain purposes
“ ‘[w]ithout  the  consent’ ”  of  the  U. S.  Olympic  Committee
(USOC),  and  subjected  violations  to  “ ‘the  remedies  pro-
vided in the Lanham Act.’ ”  483 U. S., at 528 (quoting 36 
U. S. C. §380(a); alteration omitted).  The Court rejected the 
argument that the consent requirement violated the First 
Amendment because “Congress reasonably could conclude”
that the value of the word “ ‘Olympic’ was the product of the 
USOC’s ‘own talents and energy.’ ”  483 U. S., at 532–533 
(quoting Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 
U. S.  562,  575  (1977)).  Although  the  petitioner  certainly
had a First Amendment right to speak on political matters, 
it lacked the right to “exploit the commercial magnetism” of
the word “Olympic” and the USOC’s hard-won efforts in giv-
ing that word value.  483 U. S., at 539 (internal quotation 
marks omitted).  The names clause guards a similar inter-
est.  By  protecting  a  person’s  use of  his  name,  the  names 
clause “secur[es] to the producer the benefits of [his] good
reputation.”  Park  ’N  Fly,  Inc.  v.  Dollar  Park  &  Fly,  Inc., 
469 U. S. 189, 198 (1985); see also Pattishall, Two Hundred 
Years,  at  121  (explaining  how  trademark  law  protects  a 
person’s “commercial identity, thereby [allowing him] to en-
joy the fruits of his own labor”).