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10 

SMITH v. ARIZONA 

ALITO, J., concurring in judgment 

that basis evidence is not admitted for its truth and so in-
structs the jury, where does the Court discern a Confronta-
tion Clause problem? 

The only possible explanation is that the Court believes
that juries are incapable of following such an  instruction, 
but that conclusion is inconsistent with commonplace trial 
practice  and  with  a  whole  string  of  our  decisions.    It  is  a 
routine  matter  for  trial  judges  to  instruct  juries  that  evi-
dence  is  admitted  for  only  a  limited  purpose.    This  Court 
acknowledged as much in United States v. Abel, 469 U. S. 
45 (1984), when it noted that “there is no rule of evidence 
which provides that testimony admissible for one purpose 
and inadmissible for another purpose is thereby rendered 
inadmissible; quite the contrary is the case.”  Id., at 56.  In 
such instances, courts use limiting instructions.  See Fed. 
Rule  Evid.  105;  1  R.  Mosteller  et al.,  McCormick  on  Evi-
dence §59, pp. 481–483 (8th ed. 2020).   

And  this  Court  has  repeatedly  upheld  that  practice—
even  in  “situations  with  potentially  life-and-death  stakes
for  defendants”  and  even  with  respect  to  statements  that
are “some of the most compelling evidence of guilt available 
to a jury,” Samia v. United States, 599 U. S. 635, 646–647 
(2023).  These  decisions  “credi[t]  jurors  by  refusing  to  as-
sume that they are either ‘too ignorant to comprehend, or 
were too unmindful of their duty to respect, instructions’ of 
the court.”  Id., at 647.  Indeed, we have described the as-
sumption  “ ‘that  juries  will  follow  the  instructions  given 
them by the trial judge’ ” as “ ‘crucial’ ” to “the system of trial 
by  jury.”  Marshall  v.  Lonberger,  459  U. S.  422,  438,  n. 6 
(1983)  (quoting  Parker  v.  Randolph,  442  U. S.  62,  73 
(1979)); accord, Francis v. Franklin, 471 U. S. 307, 324–325, 
n. 9 (1985).

A  brief  survey  of  prior  decisions  shows  how  firmly  this 
Court has adhered to that practice.  In Harris v. New York, 
401  U. S.  222  (1971),  the  Court  held  that  statements  ob-
tained from a defendant in violation of Miranda v. Arizona,