Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/17pdf/16-402_h315.pdf
Page Number: 71.0

Cite as:  585 U. S. ____ (2018) 

21 

THOMAS, J., dissenting 

Carter,  525  U. S.,  at  97  (opinion  of  Scalia,  J.).  Yet, 
“[t]hough  we  know  ourselves  to  be  eminently  reasonable, 
self-awareness  of  eminent  reasonableness  is  not  really  a
substitute  for  democratic  election.”  Sosa  v.  Alvarez-
Machain, 542 U. S. 692, 750 (2004) (Scalia, J., concurring
in part and concurring in judgment). 

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In  several  recent  decisions,  this  Court  has  declined  to 
apply  the  Katz  test  because  it  threatened  to  narrow  the 
original  scope  of  the  Fourth  Amendment.    See  Grady  v. 
North Carolina, 575 U. S. ___, ___ (2015) (per curiam) (slip
op., at 3); Florida v. Jardines, 569 U. S. 1, 5 (2013); Jones, 
565  U. S.,  at  406–407.    But  as  today’s  decision  demon­
strates,  Katz  can  also  be  invoked  to  expand  the  Fourth 
Amendment beyond its original scope.  This Court should 
not  tolerate  errors  in  either  direction.    “The  People,
through  ratification,  have  already  weighed  the  policy
tradeoffs that constitutional rights entail.”  Luis v. United 
States, 578 U. S. ___, ___ (2016) (THOMAS, J., concurring in 
judgment)  (slip  op.,  at  10).    Whether  the  rights  they  rati­
fied  are  too  broad  or  too  narrow  by  modern  lights,  this 
Court has no authority to unilaterally alter the document
they approved.
  Because the Katz test is a failed experiment, this Court 
is  dutybound  to  reconsider  it.    Until  it  does,  I  agree  with 
my  dissenting  colleagues’  reading  of  our  precedents.
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.