Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/529bv.pdf
Page Number: 973.0

529US3

Unit: $U62

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898

GEIER v. AMERICAN HONDA MOTOR CO.

Stevens, J., dissenting

unambiguously expresses a decision by Congress that com-
pliance with a federal safety standard does not exempt a
manufacturer from any common-law liability.
In light of
this reference to common-law liability in the saving clause,
Congress surely would have included a similar reference in
§ 1392(d) if it had intended to pre-empt such liability. Chi-
cago v. Environmental Defense Fund, 511 U. S. 328, 338
(1994) (noting presumption that Congress acts intentionally
when it includes particular language in one section of a stat-
ute but omits it in another).

The Court does not disagree with this interpretation of the
term “safety standard” in § 1392(d). Because the meaning of
that term as used by Congress in this statute is clear, the
text of § 1392(d) is itself sufﬁcient to establish that the Safety
Act does not expressly pre-empt common-law claims.
In
order to avoid the conclusion that the saving clause is super-
ﬂuous, therefore, it must follow that it has a different pur-
pose: to limit, or possibly to foreclose entirely, the possible
pre-emptive effect of safety standards promulgated by the
Secretary. The Court’s approach to the case has the practi-
cal effect of reading the saving clause out of the statute
altogether.15

Given the cumulative force of the fact that § 1392(d) does
not expressly pre-empt common-law claims and the fact that
§ 1397(k) was obviously intended to limit the pre-emptive ef-
fect of the Secretary’s safety standards, it is quite wrong for
the Court to assume that a possible implicit conﬂict with the
purposes to be achieved by such a standard should have the
same pre-emptive effect “ ‘as an obstacle to the accomplish-
ment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of
Congress.’ ” Ante, at 873. Properly construed, the Safety
Act imposes a special burden on a party relying on an argu-
able, implicit conﬂict with a temporary regulatory policy—

15 The Court surely cannot believe that Congress included that clause in
the statute just to avoid the danger that we would otherwise fail to give
the term “safety standard” its ordinary meaning.