Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/17pdf/17-965_h315.pdf
Page Number: 37.0

32 

TRUMP v. HAWAII 

Opinion of the Court 

lack  of  competence  on  the  part  of  the  courts  is  marked.” 
Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U. S., at 34. 

The  upshot  of  our  cases  in  this  context  is  clear:  “Any
rule of constitutional law that would inhibit the flexibility”
of  the  President  “to  respond  to  changing  world  conditions 
should be adopted only with the greatest caution,” and our 
inquiry  into  matters  of  entry  and  national  security  is
highly  constrained.    Mathews,  426  U. S.,  at  81–82.    We 
need not define the precise contours of that inquiry in this 
case.  A  conventional  application  of  Mandel,  asking  only
whether  the  policy  is  facially  legitimate  and  bona  fide,
would put an end to our review.  But the Government has 
suggested that it may be appropriate here for the inquiry
to extend beyond the facial neutrality of the order.  See Tr. 
of  Oral  Arg.  16–17,  25–27  (describing  Mandel  as  “the 
starting  point”  of  the  analysis).    For  our  purposes  today,
we assume that we may look behind the face of the Proc-
lamation  to  the  extent  of  applying  rational  basis  review.
That  standard  of  review  considers  whether  the  entry
policy  is  plausibly  related  to  the  Government’s  stated
objective  to  protect  the  country  and  improve  vetting  pro-
cesses.  See  Railroad  Retirement  Bd.  v.  Fritz,  449  U. S. 
166,  179  (1980).    As  a  result,  we  may  consider  plaintiffs’ 
extrinsic evidence, but will uphold the policy so long as it
can reasonably be understood to result from a justification
independent of unconstitutional grounds.5 
—————— 

5 The  dissent  finds  “perplexing”  the  application  of  rational  basis  re-
view in this context.  Post, at 15.  But what is far more problematic is
the  dissent’s  assumption  that  courts  should  review  immigration  poli-
cies,  diplomatic  sanctions,  and  military  actions  under  the de novo 
“reasonable  observer”  inquiry  applicable  to  cases  involving  holiday
displays and graduation ceremonies.  The dissent criticizes application
of a more constrained standard of review as “throw[ing] the Establish-
ment Clause out the window.”  Post, at 16, n. 6.  But as the numerous 
precedents  cited  in  this  section  make  clear,  such  a  circumscribed 
inquiry  applies  to  any  constitutional  claim  concerning  the  entry  of
foreign  nationals.    See  Part  IV–C,  supra.  The  dissent  can  cite  no