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Page Number: 20.0

16 

NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF FAMILY AND 
LIFE ADVOCATES v. BECERRA 
Opinion of the Court 

many women who are pregnant or could become pregnant 
in  the  future,  demonstrates  the  disconnect  between  its 
stated  purpose  and  its  actual  scope.    Yet  “[p]recision  . . . 
must  be  the  touchstone”  when  it  comes  to  regulations  of 
speech,  which  “so  closely  touc[h]  our  most  precious  free-
doms.”  Button, 371 U. S., at 438. 
  Further,  California  could  inform  low-income  women 
about  its  services  “without  burdening  a  speaker  with 
unwanted  speech.”    Riley,  487  U. S.,  at  800.    Most  obvi- 
ously,  it  could  inform  the  women  itself  with  a  public-
information  campaign.    See  ibid.  (concluding  that  a  com-
pelled  disclosure  was  unconstitutional  because  the  
government could “itself publish . . . the disclosure”).  Califor- 
nia  could  even  post  the  information  on  public  property 
near  crisis  pregnancy  centers.    California  argues  that  it 
has already tried an advertising campaign, and that many 
women  who  are  eligible  for  publicly-funded  healthcare 
have  not  enrolled.    But  California  has  identified  no  evi-
dence  to  that  effect.    And  regardless,  a  “tepid  response” 
does  not  prove  that  an  advertising  campaign  is  not  a 
sufficient  alternative.    United  States  v.  Playboy  Enter-
tainment Group, Inc., 529 U. S. 803, 816 (2000).  Here, for 
example,  individuals  might  not  have  enrolled  in  Califor-
nia’s  services  because  they  do  not  want  them,  or  because 
California  spent  insufficient  resources  on  the  advertising 
campaign.    Either  way,  California  cannot  co-opt  the  li-
censed facilities to deliver its message for it.  “[T]he First 
Amendment  does  not  permit  the  State  to  sacrifice  speech 
for  efficiency.”    Riley,  supra,  at  795;  accord,  Arizona  Free 
Enterprise Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 564 U. S. 
721, 747 (2011). 
  In  short,  petitioners  are  likely  to  succeed  on  the  merits 
of  their  challenge  to  the  licensed  notice.    Contrary  to  the 
suggestion in the dissent, post, at 3–4 (opinion of BREYER, 
J.),  we  do  not  question  the  legality  of  health  and  safety 
warnings  long  considered  permissible,  or  purely  factual