Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/21pdf/20-1530_n758.pdf
Page Number: 71

Cite as:  597 U. S. ____ (2022) 

15 

KAGAN, J., dissenting 

It announces the arrival of the “major questions doctrine,” 
which replaces normal text-in-context statutory interpreta-
tion with some tougher-to-satisfy set of rules.  Ante, at 16– 
31.  Apparently, there is now a two-step inquiry.  First, a 
court  must  decide,  by  looking  at  some  panoply  of  factors,
whether agency action presents an “extraordinary case[ ].”  
Ante, at 17; see ante, at 20–28.  If it does, the agency “must 
point to clear congressional authorization for the power it
claims,” someplace over and above the normal statutory ba-
sis we require.  Ante, at 19 (internal quotation marks omit-
ted); see ante, at 28–31.  The result is statutory interpreta-
tion of an unusual kind.  It is not until page 28 of a 31-page
opinion  that  the  majority  begins  to  seriously  discuss  the 
meaning of Section 111.  And even then, it does not address 
straight-up  what  should  be  the  question:  Does  the  text  of 
that provision, when read in context and with a common-
sense awareness of how Congress delegates, authorize the
agency action here? 

The  majority  claims  it  is  just  following  precedent,  but
that is not so.  The Court has never even used the term “ma-
jor  questions  doctrine”  before.  And  in  the  relevant  cases, 
the Court has done statutory construction of a familiar sort.
It has looked to the text of a delegation.  It has addressed 
how an agency’s view of that text works—or fails to do so—
in  the  context  of  a  broader  statutory  scheme.  And  it  has 
asked,  in  a  common-sensical  (or  call  it  purposive)  vein,
about  what  Congress  would  have  made  of  the  agency’s
view—otherwise  said,  whether  Congress  would  naturally 
have delegated authority over some important question to 
the agency, given its expertise and experience.  In short, in 
assessing the scope of a delegation, the Court has consid-
ered—without multiple steps, triggers, or special presump-
tions—the fit between the power claimed, the agency claim-
ing it, and the broader statutory design. 

The key case here is FDA v. Brown & Williamson.  There, 
the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) asserted that its