Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/16pdf/15-1358_6khn.pdf
Page Number: 23.0

18 

ZIGLAR v. ABBASI 

Opinion of the Court 

governmental  acts  being  challenged.    These  consequences 
counsel against allowing a Bivens action against the Exec-
utive  Officials,  for  the  burden  and  demand  of  litigation 
might  well  prevent  them—or,  to  be  more  precise,  future
officials  like  them—from  devoting  the  time  and  effort
required  for  the  proper  discharge  of  their  duties.    See 
Cheney  v.  United  States  Dist.  Court  for  D.  C.,  542  U. S. 
367,  382  (2004)  (noting  “the  paramount  necessity  of  pro-
tecting  the  Executive  Branch  from  vexatious  litigation 
that might distract it from the energetic performance of its 
constitutional duties”).

A  closely  related  problem,  as  just  noted,  is  that  the
discovery  and  litigation  process  would  either  border  upon
or directly implicate the discussion and deliberations that 
led to the formation of the policy in question.  See Federal 
Open Market  Comm. v. Merrill, 443 U. S. 340, 360 (1979) 
(noting  that  disclosure  of  Executive  Branch  documents
“could  inhibit  the  free  flow  of  advice,  including  analysis,
reports,  and  expression  of  opinion  within  an  agency”). 
Allowing  a  damages  suit  in  this  context,  or  in  a  like  con-
text in other circumstances, would require courts to inter-
fere  in  an  intrusive  way  with  sensitive  functions  of  the 
Executive  Branch.    See  Clinton  v.  Jones,  520  U. S.  681, 
701  (1997)  (recognizing  that  “ ‘[e]ven  when  a  branch  does 
not  arrogate  power  to  itself  . . .  the  separation-of-powers
doctrine requires that a branch not impair another in the 
performance  of  its  constitutional  duties’ ”  (quoting  Loving 
v.  United  States,  517  U. S.  748,  757  (1996))).    These  con-
siderations also counsel against allowing a damages claim
to  proceed  against  the  Executive  Officials.    See  Cheney, 
supra, at 385 (noting that “special considerations control”
when  a  case  implicates  “the  Executive  Branch’s  interests
in maintaining the autonomy of its office and safeguarding 
the confidentiality of its communications”).

In  addition  to  this  special  factor,  which  applies  to  the 
claims  against  the  Executive  Officials,  there  are  three