Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/21pdf/20-979_h3ci.pdf
Page Number: 3.0

Cite as:  596 U. S. ____ (2022) 

3 

Syllabus 

context  indicate  that  only  discretionary  judgments  are  covered  by 
§1252(a)(2)(B)(i).  Rather than delineating a special category of discre-
tionary determinations, the cited definitions—none of which expressly 
references  discretion—simply  describe  the  decisionmaking  process, 
which might involve a matter that the Government treats as “subjec-
tive” or one that it deems “objective.”  Using the word “judgment” to 
describe the fact determinations at issue in this case is perfectly natu-
ral.  See,  e.g.,  Teva  Pharmaceuticals  USA,  Inc.  v.  Sandoz,  Inc.,  574 
U. S. 318, 327.  To succeed, the Government must show that in context, 
the kind of judgment to which §1252(a)(2)(B)(i) refers is discretionary.
But the text of that provision applies to “any judgment.”  Had Congress
intended to limit the jurisdictional bar to “discretionary judgments,” it
could easily have used that language, as it did elsewhere in the immi-
gration  code.    The  Government’s  reliance  on  Kucana  v.  Holder,  558 
U. S. 233, is inapposite.  That case said or implied nothing about re-
view of nondiscretionary decisions.  Pp. 10–13.

(3) Neither does Patel’s interpretation square with the text or con-
text of §1252(a)(2)(B)(i).  He claims that the phrase “any judgment re-
garding the granting of relief” refers only to the ultimate grant or de-
nial of relief, leaving all eligibility determinations reviewable.  Patel’s 
interpretation reads “regarding” out of the statute entirely.  Patel also 
fails to explain why subparagraph (B)’s bar should be read differently 
from  subparagraph  (C)’s  prohibition  on  reviewing  final  orders  of  re-
moval for certain criminal offenses.  Given the similarities of those two 
provisions—each precludes judicial review in the same way and bears
the same relationship to subparagraph (D)—there is no reason to think
that subparagraph (B) would allow a court to review the factual un-
derpinnings of a decision when subparagraph (C) prohibits just that. 
Pp. 13–14. 

(b) Patel and the Government object that this Court’s interpretation
would arbitrarily prohibit review of some factual determinations made
in  the  discretionary-relief  context  that  would  be  reviewable  if  made 
elsewhere in removal proceedings.  But the distinction simply reflects 
Congress’  choice  to  provide reduced  procedural  protection  for  discre-
tionary relief.  And while this Court does not decide what effect, if any, 
its decision has on review of discretionary-relief determinations made 
outside of removal proceedings, the Court rejects Patel’s and the Gov-
ernment’s  contention  that  the  risk  of  foreclosing  such  review  should
change  its  interpretation  here.  As  the  Court  has  emphasized  many
times before, policy concerns cannot trump the best interpretation of 
the statutory text.  Pp. 15–17. 

(c) As a last resort, Patel and the Government argue that the statute
is ambiguous enough to trigger the presumption that Congress did not
intend to foreclose judicial review.  Here, however, the text and context