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2  DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN’S HEALTH ORGANIZATION 

Syllabus 

was based.  The Court therefore turns to the question that the Casey
plurality did not consider.  Pp. 8–32.

(1) First,  the  Court  reviews  the  standard  that  the  Court’s  cases 
have used to determine whether the Fourteenth Amendment’s refer-
ence to “liberty” protects a particular right.  The Constitution makes 
no express reference to a right to obtain an abortion, but several con-
stitutional provisions have been offered as potential homes for an im-
plicit constitutional right.  Roe held that the abortion right is part of a
right to privacy that springs from the First, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and
Fourteenth Amendments.  See 410 U. S., at 152–153.  The Casey Court 
grounded its decision solely on the theory that the right to obtain an
abortion is  part of the “liberty” protected  by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment’s Due Process Clause.  Others have suggested that support can 
be found in the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause, but 
that theory is squarely foreclosed by the Court’s precedents, which es-
tablish that a State’s regulation of abortion is not a sex-based classifi-
cation and is thus not subject to the heightened scrutiny that applies 
to  such  classifications.   See  Geduldig  v.  Aiello,  417  U. S.  484,  496, 
n. 20; Bray v. Alexandria Women’s Health Clinic, 506 U. S. 263, 273– 
274.  Rather, regulations and prohibitions of abortion are governed by
the  same  standard  of  review  as  other  health  and  safety  measures. 
Pp. 9–11.

(2) Next, the Court examines whether the right to obtain an abor-
tion is rooted in the Nation’s history and tradition and whether it is an
essential  component  of  “ordered  liberty.”    The  Court  finds  that  the 
right to abortion is not deeply rooted in the Nation’s history and tradi-
tion.    The  underlying  theory  on  which  Casey  rested—that  the  Four-
teenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause provides substantive, as well 
as procedural, protection for “liberty”—has long been controversial.  

The  Court’s  decisions  have  held  that  the  Due  Process  Clause  pro-
tects two categories of substantive rights—those rights guaranteed by
the  first  eight  Amendments  to  the  Constitution  and  those  rights
deemed fundamental that are not mentioned anywhere in the Consti-
tution.  In deciding whether a right falls into either of these categories,
the question is whether the right is “deeply rooted in [our] history and
tradition”  and  whether  it  is  essential  to  this  Nation’s  “scheme  of  or-
dered liberty.”  Timbs v. Indiana, 586 U. S. ___, ___ (internal quotation 
marks  omitted).    The  term  “liberty”  alone  provides  little  guidance. 
Thus, historical inquiries are essential whenever the Court is asked to
recognize  a  new  component of  the  “liberty”  interest  protected  by  the 
Due Process Clause.  In interpreting what is meant by “liberty,” the 
Court  must  guard  against  the  natural  human  tendency  to  confuse 
what the Fourteenth Amendment protects with the Court’s own ardent
views about the liberty that Americans should enjoy.  For this reason,