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14 

ENTERGY CORP. v. RIVERKEEPER, INC. 

Opinion of the Court 

41606), and (2) significant reduction in the energy output 
of  the  altered  facilities,  id.,  at  41605.    And  finally,  EPA’s
assessment  of  the  relatively  meager  financial  benefits  of
the  Phase  II  regulations  that  it  adopted—reduced  im-
pingement  and  entrainment  of  1.4  billion  aquatic  organ-
isms,  id.,  at  41661,  Exh.  XII–6,  with  annualized  use-
benefits of $83 million, id., at 41662, and non-use benefits 
of  indeterminate  value,  id.,  at  41660–41661—when  com-
pared to annual costs of $389 million, demonstrates quite 
clearly that the agency did not select the Phase II regula-
tory  requirements  because  their  benefits  equaled  their 
costs. 

While  not  conclusive,  it  surely  tends  to  show  that  the
EPA’s  current  practice  is  a  reasonable  and  hence  legiti-
mate  exercise  of  its  discretion  to  weigh  benefits  against 
costs  that  the  agency  has  been  proceeding  in  essentially 
this  fashion  for  over  30  years.    See  Alaska  Dept.  of  Envi-
ronmental Conservation v. EPA, 540 U. S. 461, 487 (2004); 
Barnhart  v.  Walton,  535  U. S.  212,  219–220  (2002).    As 
early as 1977, the agency determined that, while §1326(b) 
does not require cost-benefit analysis, it is also not reason-
able  to  “interpret  Section  [1326(b)]  as  requiring  use  of 
technology  whose  cost  is  wholly  disproportionate  to  the 
environmental  benefit  to  be  gained.”  In re  Public  Service 
Co.  of  New  Hampshire,  1  E. A. D.  332,  340  (1977).    See 
also  In re  Central  Hudson  Gas  and  Electric  Corp.,  EPA 
Decision of the General Counsel, NPDES Permits, No. 63, 
pp.  371,  381  (July  29,  1977)  (“EPA  ultimately  must  dem-
onstrate  that  the  present  value  of  the  cumulative  annual
cost  of  modifications  to  cooling  water  intake  structures  is
not wholly  out of proportion  to the magnitude of the esti-
mated  environmental  gains”);  Seacoast  Anti-Pollution 
League v. Costle, 597 F. 2d 306, 311 (CA1 1979) (rejecting 
challenge  to  an  EPA  permit  decision  that  was  based  in 
part  on  the  agency’s  determination  that  further  restric-
tions  would  be  “ ‘wholly  disproportionate  to  any  environ-
mental  benefit’ ”).  While  the  EPA’s  prior  “wholly  dispro-