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Page Number: 65

26 

RUCHO v. COMMON CAUSE 

KAGAN, J., dissenting 

any  measure,  a  map  that  produces  a  greater  partisan
skew than any of 3,000 randomly generated maps (all with
the State’s political geography and districting criteria built 
in)  reflects  “too  much”  partisanship.    Think  about  what  I 
just said: The absolute worst of 3,001 possible maps.  The 
only one that could produce a 10–3 partisan split even  as 
Republicans  got  a  bare  majority  of  the  statewide  vote. 
And  again:  How  much  is  too  much?  This  much  is  too 
much:  A  map  that  without  any  evident  non-partisan  dis-
tricting reason (to the contrary) shifted the composition of 
a  district  from  47%  Republicans  and  36%  Democrats  to 
33% Republicans and 42% Democrats.  A map that in 2011
was  responsible  for  the  largest  partisan  swing  of  a  con-
gressional  district  in  the  country.  See  Lamone,  348 
F. Supp. 3d, at 519.  Even the majority acknowledges that 
“[t]hese  cases  involve  blatant  examples  of  partisanship 
driving districting decisions.”  Ante, at 27.  If the majority 
had  done  nothing  else,  it  could  have  set  the  line  here. 
How much is too much?  At the least, any gerrymanders as 
bad as these. 

And  if  the  majority  thought  that  approach  too  case-
specific,  see  ante,  at  28,  it  could  have  used  the  lower 
courts’  general  standard—focusing  on  “predominant”
purpose  and  “substantial”  effects—without  fear  of  inde-
terminacy.    I  do  not  take  even  the  majority  to  claim  that 
courts  are  incapable  of  investigating  whether  legislators
mainly intended to seek partisan advantage.  See ante, at 
19–20  (focusing  on  the  difficulty  of  measuring  effects). 
That is for good reason.  Although purpose inquiries carry
certain hazards (which courts must attend to), they are a
common form of analysis in constitutional cases.  See, e.g., 
Miller  v.  Johnson,  515  U. S.  900,  916  (1995);  Church  of 
Lukumi  Babalu  Aye,  Inc.  v.  Hialeah,  508  U. S.  520,  533 
(1993);  Washington  v.  Davis,  426  U. S.  229,  239  (1976). 
Those  inquiries  would  be  no  harder  here  than  in  other 
contexts.