Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/19pdf/18-1323_c07d.pdf
Page Number: 66.0

Cite as:  591 U. S. ____ (2020) 

5 

THOMAS, J., dissenting 

most of the cases he cites frame the matter in terms of the 
Court’s jurisdiction and authority; none of them invoke pru-
dential justifications.  See, e.g., Tyler v. Judges of Court of 
Registration,  179  U. S.  405,  407–410  (1900);  Hendrick  v. 
Maryland,  235  U. S.  610,  621  (1915);  Massachusetts  v. 
Mellon, 262 U. S. 447, 480 (1923).  Thus, the “prudential”
label for the rule against third-party standing remains a bit 
of a mystery.

It is especially puzzling that a majority of the Court in-
sists  on  continuing  to  treat  the  rule  against  third-party 
standing  as  prudential  when  our  recent  decision  in 
Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 
U. S. 118 (2014), questioned the validity of our prudential
standing  doctrine  more  generally.    In  that  case,  we 
acknowledged that requiring a litigant who has Article III 
standing  to  also  demonstrate  “prudential  standing”  is  in-
consistent  “with  our  recent  reaffirmation  of  the  principle
that ‘a federal court’s “obligation” to hear and decide’ cases
within  its  jurisdiction  ‘is  “virtually  unflagging.” ’ ”  Id.,  at 
125–126  (quoting  Sprint  Communications,  Inc.  v.  Jacobs, 
571 U. S. 69, 77 (2013)).  The Court therefore suggested that
the  “prudential”  label  for  these  doctrines  was  “inapt.” 
Lexmark, 572 U. S., at 127, n. 3.  As an example, it noted 
that the Court previously considered the rule against gen-
eralized  grievances  to  be  “prudential”  but  now  recognizes
that rule to be a part of Article III’s case-or-controversy re-
quirement.  Ibid.  The Court specifically questioned the pru-
dential label for the rule against third-party standing, but 
because  Lexmark  did  not  involve  any  questions  of  third-
party standing, the Court stated that “consideration of that
doctrine’s  proper  place  in  the  standing  firmament  [could]
await another day.”  Id., at 128, n. 3. 

The  Court’s  previous  statements  on  the  rule  against 
third-party standing have long suggested that the “proper 
place” for that rule is in Article III’s case-or-controversy re-