Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/558bv.pdf
Page Number: 544

Cite as: 558 U. S. 310 (2010) 

383 

Roberts, C. J., concurring 

a  precedent  of  the  Court.  The  Government  concedes  that 
Austin “is not the most lucid opinion,” yet asks us to reafﬁrm 
its  holding.  Tr.  of  Oral  Arg.  62  (Sept.  9,  2009).  But  while 
invoking  stare  decisis  to  support  this  position,  the  Govern­
ment never once even mentions the compelling interest that 
Austin  relied  upon  in  the  ﬁrst  place:  the  need  to  diminish 
“the  corrosive  and  distorting  effects  of  immense  aggrega­
tions  of  wealth  that  are  accumulated  with  the  help  of  the 
corporate  form  and  that  have  little  or  no  correlation  to  the 
public’s  support  for  the  corporation’s  political  ideas.”  494 
U. S., at 660. 

Instead of endorsing Austin on its own terms, the Govern­
ment  urges  us  to  reafﬁrm  Austin’s  speciﬁc  holding  on  the 
basis  of  two  new  and  potentially  expansive  interests—the 
need to prevent actual or apparent quid pro quo corruption, 
and  the  need  to  protect  corporate  shareholders.  See  Supp. 
Brief for Appellee 8–10, 12–13.  Those interests may or may 
not  support  the  result  in  Austin,  but  they  were  plainly  not 
part of the reasoning on which Austin relied. 

To  its  credit,  the  Government  forthrightly  concedes  that 
Austin  did  not  embrace  either  of  the  new  rationales  it  now 
urges upon us.  See, e. g., Supp. Brief for Appellee 11 (“The 
Court  did  not  decide  in  Austin  .  .  .  whether  the  compelling 
interest in preventing actual or apparent corruption provides 
a  constitutionally  sufﬁcient  justiﬁcation  for  prohibiting  the 
use of corporate treasury funds for independent electioneer­
ing”);  Tr.  of  Oral  Arg.  45  (Sept.  9,  2009)  (“Austin  did  not 
articulate  what  we  believe  to  be  the  strongest  compelling 
interest”);  id.,  at  61  (“[The  Court:]  I  take  it  we  have  never 
accepted  your  shareholder  protection  interest.  This  is  a 
new argument. 
[The Government:] I think that that’s fair”); 
id., at 64 (“[The Court:] In other words, you are asking us to 
uphold Austin on the basis of two arguments, two principles, 
two compelling interests we have never accepted, in [the con­
text of limits on political expenditures]. 
[The Government:] 
[I]n this particular context, fair enough”).