Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/21pdf/20-1088_dbfi.pdf
Page Number: 9

Cite as:  596 U. S. ____ (2022) 

5 

Opinion of the Court 

they believed it offered him a high-quality education that 
aligned  with  their  sincerely  held  religious  beliefs.  Id.,  at 
78.  While  they  wished  to  send  their  daughter  to  Temple 
Academy  too,  they  could  not  afford  to  pay  the  cost  of  the
Academy’s tuition for both of their children.  Id., at 79. 

BCS  and  Temple  Academy  are  both  accredited  by  the
New England Association of Schools and Colleges (NEASC), 
and the Department considers each school a “private school 
approved for attendance purposes” under the State’s com-
pulsory attendance requirement.  Id., at 80, 90.  Yet because 
neither school qualifies as “nonsectarian,” neither is eligible 
to  receive  tuition  payments  under  Maine’s  tuition  assis-
tance program.  Id., at 80, 90.  Absent the “nonsectarian” 
requirement,  the  Carsons  and  the  Nelsons  would  have 
asked their respective SAUs to pay the tuition to send their 
children to BCS and Temple Academy, respectively.  Id., at 
79. 

In  2018,  petitioners  brought  suit  against  the  commis-
sioner of the Maine Department of Education.  Id., at 11– 
12.  They  alleged  that  the  “nonsectarian”  requirement  of 
Maine’s tuition assistance program violated the Free Exer-
cise  Clause  and  the  Establishment  Clause  of  the  First 
Amendment, id., at 23–27, as well as the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, id., at 29–30.  Their 
complaint sought declaratory and injunctive relief against 
enforcement of the requirement.  Id., at 31–32.  The parties
filed cross-motions for summary judgment on a stipulated 
record.  401 F. Supp. 3d 207, 208 (Me. 2019).  Applying Cir-
cuit  precedent  that  had  previously  upheld  the  “nonsec-
tarian” requirement against challenge, see Eulitt v. Maine 
Dept. of Ed., 386 F. 3d 344 (CA1 2004), the District Court 
rejected petitioners’ constitutional claims and granted judg-
ment to the commissioner.  401 F. Supp. 3d, at 209–212.

While petitioners’ appeal to the First Circuit was pend-
ing, this Court decided Espinoza v. Montana Department of