Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/529bv.pdf
Page Number: 530.0

529US2

Unit: $U48

[09-26-01 10:25:49] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 529 U. S. 446 (2000)

455

Breyer, J., concurring in judgment

See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U. S. 72, 81–88 (1977). One
“state ground” often asserted as an adequate, independent
basis for holding a state prisoner in custody is a state-law
“procedural default,” such as the prisoner’s failure to raise
his federal claim at the proper time. However, under cer-
tain conditions the State’s assertion of such a ground is
not “adequate” (and consequently does not bar assertion of
the federal-law claim). There are three situations in which
an otherwise valid state ground will not bar federal claims:
(1) where failure to consider a prisoner’s claims will result
in a “fundamental miscarriage of
justice,” Coleman v.
Thompson, 501 U. S. 722, 750 (1991); (2) where the state
procedural rule was not “ ‘ﬁrmly established and regularly
followed,’ ” Ford v. Georgia, 498 U. S. 411, 423–424 (1991);
James v. Kentucky, 466 U. S. 341, 348–349 (1984); and
(3) where the prisoner had good “cause” for not following
the state procedural rule and was “prejudice[d]” by not
having done so, Sykes, supra, at 87.

Ordinarily, a federal habeas judge, while looking to state
law to determine the potential existence of a procedural
ground that might bar consideration of the prisoner’s fed-
eral claim, decides whether such a ground is adequate as a
matter of federal law. See Ford, supra; James, supra; Cole-
man, supra. Thus the Court has applied federal standards
to determine whether there has been a “fundamental mis-
carriage of justice.” See, e. g., Schlup v. Delo, 513 U. S. 298,
314–317 (1995). And the Court has also looked to state
practice to determine the factual circumstances surround-
ing the application of a state procedural rule, while deter-
mining as a matter of federal law whether that rule is “ﬁrmly
established [and] regularly followed.” Ford, supra, at 424–
425. Federal habeas courts would normally determine
whether “cause and prejudice” excuse a “procedural default”
in the same manner. Murray v. Carrier, 477 U. S. 478, 489
(1986) (“[T]he question of cause” is “a question of federal
law”).