Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/21pdf/21-954_7l48.pdf
Page Number: 4.0

4 

BIDEN v. TEXAS 

Syllabus 

alternative  means  of  processing  applicants  for  admission,  see  8 
U. S. C. §1182(d)(5)(A), additionally makes clear that the Court of Ap-
peals erred in holding that the INA required the Government to con-
tinue implementing MPP.  Pp. 13–18. 

(c) The Court of Appeals also erred in holding that “[t]he October 29
Memoranda did not constitute a new and separately reviewable ‘final 
agency action.’ ”  20 F. 4th, at 951.  Once the District Court vacated 
the June 1 Memorandum and remanded to DHS for further consider-
ation, DHS had two options: elaborate on its original reasons for taking 
action or “ ‘deal with the problem afresh’ by taking new agency action.” 
Department of Homeland Security v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 591 U. S. 
___, ___.  The Secretary selected the second option from Regents: He 
accepted  the  District  Court’s  vacatur  and  dealt  with  the  problem 
afresh.  The October 29 Memoranda were therefore final agency action
for the same reasons that the June 1 Memorandum was final agency 
action:  Both  “mark[ed]  the  ‘consummation’  of  the  agency’s  deci-
sionmaking process” and resulted in “rights and obligations [being] de-
termined.”  Bennett v. Spear, 520 U. S. 154, 178.   

The various rationales offered by respondents and the Court of Ap-
peals in support of the contrary conclusion lack merit.  First, the Court 
of Appeals erred to the extent it understood itself to be reviewing an 
abstract decision apart from the specific agency actions contained in 
the  June  1  Memorandum  and  October  29  Memoranda.    Second,  and 
relatedly, the October 29 Memoranda were not a mere post hoc ration-
alization of the June 1 Memorandum.  The prohibition on post hoc ra-
tionalization applies only when the agency proceeds by the first option 
from Regents.  Here, the Secretary chose the second option from Re-
gents and “issue[d] a new rescission bolstered by new reasons absent 
from the [June 1] Memorandum.”  591 U. S., at ___.  Having returned 
to  the  drawing  table,  the  Secretary  was  not  subject  to  the  charge  of 
post hoc rationalization.   

Third,  respondents  invoke  Department  of  Commerce  v.  New  York, 
588 U. S. ___.  But nothing in this record suggests a “significant mis-
match between the decision the Secretary made and the rationale he 
provided.”  Id., at ___.  Relatedly, the Court of Appeals charged that
the Secretary failed to proceed with a sufficiently open mind.  But this 
Court  has  previously  rejected  criticisms  of  agency  closemindedness 
based on an identity between proposed and final agency action.  See 
Little Sisters of the Poor Saints Peter and Paul Home v. Pennsylvania, 
591 U. S. ___, ___.  Finally, the Court of Appeals erred to the extent it
viewed  the  Government’s  decision  to  appeal  the  District  Court’s  in-
junction  as  relevant  to  the  question  of  the  October  29  Memoranda’s 
status as final agency action.  Nothing prevents an agency from under-
taking new agency action while simultaneously appealing an adverse