Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/22pdf/22-58_i425.pdf
Page Number: 64

22 

UNITED STATES v. TEXAS 

ALITO, J., dissenting 

party to seek legal redress for an injury turn on the number
of  others  harmed  by  the  challenged  enforcement  policy? 
Standing is assessed plaintiff by plaintiff.  The majority has
no  answers,  and  in  the  end,  it  cannot  even  bring  itself  to
commit  to  this  complete-abandonment  exception.    It  says
only that “the standing calculus might” or “arguably could” 
change.  Ibid. (emphasis added). 

Fourth, the Court says that a plaintiff might have stand-
ing to challenge an “Executive Branch’s arrest or prosecu-
tion priorities and the Executive Branch’s provision of legal 
benefits  or  legal  status  . . .  because  the  challenged  policy 
might  implicate  more  than  simply  the  Executive’s  tradi-
tional  enforcement  discretion.”    Ibid.   Exactly  what  this 
means is not easy to ascertain.  One possibility is that the 
majority is talking about a complaint that asserts separate
claims based on the grant or denial of benefits, the grant or 
denial  of  legal  status,  and  harms  resulting  from  non-en-
forcement of a statutory mandate.  In that event, standing 
with respect to each claim would have to be analyzed sepa-
rately.  Another possibility is that the majority is referring 
to a claim asserting that non-enforcement of a statutory re-
quirement requiring the arrest or prosecution of third par-
ties resulted in the plaintiff ’s loss of benefits or legal status.
Such  a  situation  is  not  easy  to  imagine,  and  the  majority 
cites no case that falls within this category.  But if such a 
case were to arise, there is no reason why it should not be 
analyzed under our standard three-pronged test. 

Fifth, and finally, the majority states that “policies gov-
erning the continued detention of noncitizens who have al-
ready been arrested arguably might raise a different stand-
ing question than arrest or prosecution policies.”  Ante, at 
12 (emphasis added).  The majority provides no explanation 
for this (noncommittal) distinction, and in any event, as the 
majority acknowledges, the States in this case challenged 
noncompliance with the §1231(a)(2) detention mandate in 
addition to the §1226(c) arrest requirement.  Ante, at 2, 13.