Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/20pdf/20-512_gfbh.pdf
Page Number: 35

Cite as:  594 U. S. ____ (2021) 

31 

Opinion of the Court 

ties, for “what we see may vary over time.”  California Den-
tal, 526 U. S., at 781.  And throughout courts must have a 
healthy  respect  for  the  practical  limits  of  judicial  admin-
istration:  “An antitrust court is unlikely to be an effective 
day-to-day enforcer” of a detailed decree, able to keep pace
with  changing  market  dynamics  alongside  a  busy  docket. 
Trinko, 540 U. S., at 415.  Nor should any court “ ‘impose a 
duty . . . that it cannot explain or adequately and reasona-
bly supervise.’ ”  Ibid.  In short, judges make for poor “cen-
tral planners” and should never aspire to the role.  Id., at 
408. 

Once again, though, we think the district court honored
these principles.  The court enjoined only restraints on ed-
ucation-related  benefits—such  as  those  limiting  scholar-
ships  for  graduate  school,  payments  for  tutoring,  and  the
like.  The court did so, moreover, only after finding that re-
laxing these restrictions would not blur the distinction be-
tween college and professional sports and thus impair de-
mand—and only after finding that this course represented 
a  significantly  (not  marginally)  less  restrictive  means  of
achieving the same procompetitive benefits as the NCAA’s
current rules.  D. Ct. Op., at 1104–1105.

Even with respect to education-related benefits, the dis-
trict court extended the NCAA considerable leeway.  As we 
have seen, the court provided that the NCAA could develop 
its  own  definition  of  benefits  that  relate  to  education  and 
seek  modification  of  the  court’s  injunction  to  reflect  that
definition.  App. to Pet. for Cert. in No. 20–512, at 168a, ¶4.
The court explained that the NCAA and its members could 
agree  on  rules  regulating  how  conferences  and  schools  go 
about providing these education-related benefits.  Ibid.  The 
court said that the NCAA and its members could continue 
fixing education-related cash awards, too—so long as those
“limits are never lower than the limit” on awards for ath-
letic performance.  D. Ct. Op., at 1104; App. to Pet. for Cert. 
in No. 20–512, at 168a–169a, ¶5.  And the court emphasized