Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/17pdf/16-1140_5368.pdf
Page Number: 37

Cite as:  585 U. S. ____ (2018) 

11 

BREYER, J., dissenting 

ruled.”  Ibid. 

The 

joint  opinion  specifically  discussed  the  First 
Amendment,  the  constitutional  provision  now  directly
before us.  It concluded that the statute did not violate the 
First Amendment.  It wrote: 

“All that is left of petitioners’ argument is an asserted 
First  Amendment  right  of  a  physician  not  to  provide 
information  about  the  risks  of  abortion,  and  child-
birth,  in  a  manner  mandated  by  the  State.  To  be 
sure,  the  physician’s  First  Amendment  rights  not  to 
speak  are  implicated,  see  Wooley  v.  Maynard,  430 
U. S.  705  (1977),  but  only  as  part  of  the  practice  of 
medicine,  subject  to  reasonable  licensing  and  regula-
tion by the State, cf. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U. S. 589, 603 
(1977).  We  see  no  constitutional  infirmity  in  the  re-
quirement that the physician provide the information
mandated  by  the  State  here.”    Casey,  505  U. S.,  at 
884. 

Thus,  the  Court  considered  the  State’s  statutory  re-
quirements,  including  the  requirement  that  the  doctor
must inform his patient about where she could learn how 
to have the newborn child adopted (if carried to term) and 
how  she  could  find  related  financial  assistance.    Id.,  at 
881.  To  repeat  the  point,  the  Court  then  held  that  the
State’s  requirements  did  not  violate  either  the  Constitu-
tion’s protection of free speech or its protection of a wom-
an’s right to choose to have an abortion. 

C 
Taking Casey as controlling, the law’s demand for even-
handedness requires a different answer than that perhaps
suggested by Akron and Thornburgh.  If a State can law-
fully require a doctor to tell a woman seeking an abortion
about adoption services, why should it not be able, as here, 
to  require  a  medical  counselor  to  tell  a  woman  seeking