Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/19pdf/17-1618_hfci.pdf
Page Number: 65.0

28 

BOSTOCK v. CLAYTON COUNTY 

ALITO, J., dissenting 

added).

In short, the concept of discrimination “because of,” “on
account of,” or “on the basis of ” sex was well understood.  It 
was part of the campaign for equality that had been waged 
by women’s rights advocates for more than a century, and 
what it meant was equal treatment for men and women.22 

2 

Discrimination  “because  of  sex”  was  not  understood  as 
having anything to do with discrimination because of sex-
ual  orientation  or  transgender  status.    Any  such  notion
would have clashed in spectacular fashion with the societal 
norms of the day.

For most 21st-century Americans, it is painful to be re-
minded of the way our society once treated gays and lesbi-
ans, but any honest effort to understand what the terms of
Title VII were understood to mean when enacted must take 
into account the societal norms of that time.  And the plain
truth  is  that  in  1964  homosexuality  was  thought  to  be  a
mental disorder, and homosexual conduct was regarded as 
morally culpable and worthy of punishment. 

—————— 

22 Analysis of the way Title VII’s key language was used in books and 
articles  during  the  relevant  time  period  supports  this  conclusion.    A 
study searched a vast database of documents from that time to determine
how  the  phrase  “discriminate  against  . . .  because  of  [some  trait]”  was 
used.  Phillips, The Overlooked Evidence in the Title VII Cases: The Lin-
guistic (and Therefore Textualist) Principle of Compositionality (manu-
script,  at  3)  (May  11,  2020)  (brackets  in  original),  https://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=3585940.  The study found that the phrase was used to denote
discrimination  against  “someone  . . .  motivated  by  prejudice,  or  biased 
ideas  or  attitudes  . . .  directed  at  people  with  that  trait  in  particular.” 
Id., at 7 (emphasis deleted).  In other words, “discriminate against” was 
“associated  with  negative  treatment  directed  at  members  of  a  discrete 
group.”  Id., at 5.  Thus, as used in 1964, “discrimination because of sex” 
would have been understood to mean discrimination against a woman or
a man based on “unfair beliefs or attitudes” about members of that par-
ticular sex.  Id., at 7.