Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/19pdf/17-1712_0971.pdf
Page Number: 32

Cite as:  590 U. S. ____ (2020) 

19 

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting 

Congress was on well-established ground when it allowed
pension participants and beneficiaries to sue on their retire-
ment plan’s behalf. 

2 
The Court’s conflicting conclusion starts with inapposite 
cases.  It invokes Hollingsworth v. Perry, 570 U. S. 693, 708 
(2013), reasoning that “to claim ‘the interests of others, the 
litigants  themselves  still  must  have  suffered  an  injury  in
fact.’ ”    Ante,  at  4.  Perry,  a  case  about  a  California  ballot 
initiative, is a far cry from this one.  Perry found that “pri-
vate parties” with no stake in the litigation “distinguishable 
from the general interest of every citizen” were not proper
representatives of the State.  570 U. S., at 707, 710.  If an-
ything,  Perry  supports  petitioners  here:  This  Court  found 
“readily  distinguishable”  other  representational-standing 
cases  by  underscoring  their  sound  traditions.  Id.,  at  711 
(distinguishing assignee and next-friend standing).8  A tra-
ditional beneficiary-versus-trustee claim like petitioners’ is 
exactly such a suit.

Next,  the  Court  maintains  that  petitioners  “have  not 
been  legally  or  contractually  assigned”  or  “appointed”  to 

—————— 
287 (2008) (noting in the Article III standing context that “federal courts
routinely entertain suits which will result in relief for parties that are 
not  themselves  directly  bringing  suit,”  such  as  when  “[t]rustees  bring 
suits  to  benefit  their  trusts”);  see  also  id.,  at  304–305,  n. 2  (ROBERTS, 
C. J., dissenting) (“Trustees, guardians ad litem, executors, and the like
make up a settled, continuous practice ‘of the sort traditionally amenable
to, and resolved by, the judicial process’ ”). 

8 The  Court  cites  two  more  cases:  Gollust  v.  Mendell,  501  U. S.  115 
(1991), and Craig v. Boren, 429 U. S. 190 (1976).  But both endorsed ex-
pansive views of standing.  See Gollust, 501 U. S., at 125–127 (allowing 
indirect  owners  of  a  corporation  to  sue  under  federal  securities  laws); 
Craig,  429  U. S.,  at  194–195  (holding  that  a  plaintiff  had  representa-
tional standing to assert an equal protection claim on a business patron’s 
behalf ).  To the extent the Court suggests that a financial loss is neces-
sary (or that a breach of fiduciary duty is insufficient) for standing, that 
is incorrect.  See Part II–B, supra.