Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/524bv.pdf
Page Number: 407

524US2

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PENNSYLVANIA BD. OF PROBATION
AND PAROLE v. SCOTT
Opinion of the Court

search were aware of respondent’s parole status, 548 Pa., at
428–432, 698 A. 2d, at 37–38. The court reasoned that, in
the absence of the rule, illegal searches would be undeterred
when ofﬁcers know that the subjects of their searches are
parolees and that illegally obtained evidence can be intro-
Ibid.
duced at parole hearings.

We granted certiorari to determine whether the Fourth
Amendment exclusionary rule applies to parole revocation
proceedings.

522 U. S. 992 (1997).3

II

We have emphasized repeatedly that the government’s use
of evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment
does not itself violate the Constitution. See, e. g., United
States v. Leon, 468 U. S. 897, 906 (1984); Stone v. Powell, 428
U. S. 465, 482, 486 (1976). Rather, a Fourth Amendment
violation is “ ‘fully accomplished’ ” by the illegal search or
seizure, and no exclusion of evidence from a judicial or admin-
istrative proceeding can “ ‘cure the invasion of the defendant’s
rights which he has already suffered.’ ” United States v.
Leon, supra, at 906 (quoting Stone v. Powell, supra, at 540

3 We also invited the parties to brief the question whether a search of a
parolee’s residence must be based on reasonable suspicion where the pa-
rolee has consented to searches as a condition of parole. Respondent ar-
gues that we lack jurisdiction to decide this question in this case because
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held, as a matter of Pennsylvania law,
that respondent’s consent to warrantless searches as a condition of his
state parole did not constitute consent to searches that are unreasonable
under the Fourth Amendment. Petitioner and its amici contend that the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s opinion was at least ambiguous as to
whether it relied on state or federal law to determine the extent of re-
spondent’s consent, and that we therefore have jurisdiction under Michi-
gan v. Long, 463 U. S. 1032 (1983). We need not parse the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court’s decision in an attempt to discern its intent, however,
because it is clear that we have jurisdiction to determine whether the
exclusionary rule applies to state parole revocation proceedings, and our
decision on that issue is sufﬁcient to decide the case. We therefore
express no opinion regarding the constitutionality of the search.