Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/23pdf/22-529_1b7d.pdf
Page Number: 13

Cite as:  602 U. S. ____ (2024) 

9 

Opinion of the Court 

Barnett  Bank  also  pointed  to  a  second  example  of
significant interference—Fidelity Federal Savings & Loan 
Association  v.  De  la  Cuesta,  458  U. S.  141  (1982).    In 
Fidelity,  federal  law  allowed,  but  did  “not  compel,  federal 
savings  and  loans  to  include  due-on-sale  clauses  in  their 
contracts.”  Id.,  at  155.    But  California  law  “limited”  that 
right to circumstances where the federal savings and loan 
association could make a showing that enforcing the due-
on-sale clause was reasonably necessary.  Id., at 154–155; 
see  also  id.,  at  149.    The  federal  savings  and  loan
association  could  readily  comply  with  both  the  state  and 
federal  laws.  Id.,  at  155.  Still,  the  Court  ruled  that  the 
California law was preempted because the savings and loan
could not exercise a due-on-sale clause “solely at its option.” 
Ibid.  (internal  quotation  marks  omitted).  The  California 
law  thus  interfered  with  “the  flexibility  given”  to  the 
savings and loan by federal law.  Ibid. (internal quotation
marks omitted). 

For  purposes  of  applying  Dodd-Frank’s  preemption
standard,  Franklin,  Fidelity,  and  Barnett  Bank  together
illustrate the kinds of state laws that significantly interfere
with  the  exercise  of  a  national  bank  power  and  thus  are
preempted. 

C 
Of  course,  not  all  state  laws  regulating  national  banks
are preempted.  As relevant here, Dodd-Frank preempts a 
state  law  “only  if”  it  “prevents  or  significantly  interferes 
with” national bank powers.  §25b(b)(1)(B).  To determine 
the kinds of state-law interference that are not “significant” 
and that are therefore not preempted, Barnett Bank again
scoured this Court’s precedents. 

First,  Barnett  Bank  cited  Anderson  National  Bank  v. 
Luckett, 321 U. S. 233 (1944), as the primary example of a 
case where state law was not preempted.  There, Kentucky
law required banks to turn over abandoned deposits to the