Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/529bv.pdf
Page Number: 328.0

529US1

Unit: $U40

[10-04-01 09:23:11] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 529 U. S. 244 (2000)

253

Opinion of the Court

See also § 42–9–43 (listing information the Board should con-
including wardens’ reports, results of physical and
sider,
mental examinations, and reports regarding prisoners’ per-
formance in educational programs). These provisions illus-
trate the broad discretion the Parole Board possesses in de-
termining whether an inmate should receive early release.
Accord, Sultenfuss v. Snow, 35 F. 3d 1494, 1501–1502 (CA11
1994) (en banc) (describing the discretion Georgia law vests
with Parole Board). Only upon a showing that the Board
engaged in a “gross abuse of discretion” can a prisoner chal-
lenge a parole denial in the Georgia courts. Lewis v. Grif-
ﬁn, 258 Ga. 887, 888, n. 3, 376 S. E. 2d 364, 366, n. 3 (1989).
The presence of discretion does not displace the protec-
tions of the Ex Post Facto Clause, however. Cf. Weaver, 450
U. S., at 30–31. The danger that legislatures might disfavor
certain persons after the fact is present even in the parole
context, and the Court has stated that the Ex Post Facto
Clause guards against such abuse. See Miller v. Florida,
482 U. S. 423, 429 (1987) (citing Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 386,
389 (1798) (Chase, J.)). On the other hand, to the extent
there inheres in ex post facto doctrine some idea of actual or
constructive notice to the criminal before commission of the
offense of the penalty for the transgression, see Weaver,
supra, at 28–29, we can say with some assurance that where
parole is concerned discretion, by its very deﬁnition, is sub-
ject to changes in the manner in which it is informed and
then exercised. The idea of discretion is that it has the
capacity, and the obligation, to change and adapt based on
experience. New insights into the accuracy of predictions
about the offense and the risk of recidivism consequent upon
the offender’s release, along with a complex of other factors,
inform parole decisions. See, e. g., Justice v. State
will
Board of Pardons and Paroles, 234 Ga. 749, 751–752, 218
S. E. 2d 45, 46–47 (1975) (explaining, by illustration to one
prisoner’s circumstances, that parole decisions rest upon the