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2 

RUTLEDGE v. PHARMACEUTICAL CARE 
MANAGEMENT ASSN. 
THOMAS, J., concurring 

I 
  When construing a statutory provision, we begin with the 
text.  United States v. Alvarez-Sanchez, 511 U. S. 350, 356 
(1994).    Section  1144(a)  provides  that  certain  of  ERISA’s 
provisions “shall supersede any and all State laws insofar 
as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit 
plan” with certain exceptions not relevant in this case. 
  The  term  “supersede”  precludes  reading  the  statute  as 
categorically pre-empting any state law related to employee 
benefit plans. Rather, it suggests a replacement or substi-
tution  instead  of  a  blanket  pre-emption.    See  Webster’s 
Third New International Dictionary 2295 (1976) (defining 
“supersede” to mean, among other things, “to take the place 
of  and  outmode  by  superiority”);  District  of  Columbia  v. 
Greater  Washington  Bd. of  Trade,  506  U. S.  125,  135–136 
(1992)  (Stevens,  J.,  dissenting)  (noting  the  word  “super-
sede” is “often overlooked”).   
  Where Congress seeks to pre-empt state laws without re-
placing them, it typically uses different words.  See, e.g., 84 
Stat.  88,  codified  in  15  U. S. C.  §1334(b)  (stating  in  a 
“preemption” section that “[n]o requirement or prohibition 
based on smoking and health shall be imposed under State 
law with respect to the advertising or promotion of any cig-
arettes  the  packages  of  which  are  labeled  in  conformity 
with  the  provisions  of  this  Act”);  49  U. S. C.  §41713(b)(1) 
(“[A] State . . . may not enact or enforce a law, regulation, 
or other provision having the force and effect of law related 
to  a  price,  route,  or  service  of  an  air  carrier”).    Congress 
knows how to write sweeping pre-emption statutes.  But it 
did  not  do  so  here.    Applying  the  statutory  text,  the  first 
step  is  to  ask  whether  a  provision  in  ERISA  governs  the 
same matter as the disputed state law, and thus could re-
place it.   
  The next step is to determine whether the state law “re-
late[s]  to”  employee  benefit  plans.    29  U. S. C.    §1144(a).  
The  Court  has  expressed concern that  a  literal reading  of