Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/558bv.pdf
Page Number: 286.0

Cite as: 558 U. S. 120 (2010) 

125 

Per Curiam 

time  to  get  from  the  bar  to  Jane  Doe’s  house  and  to 
assault  Jane  Doe  before  she  made  the  telephone  call  to 
her mother at approximately 1:00 a.m.  While Jane Doe 
could  not  identify  her  assailant,  her  description  of  his 
clothing was similar to what Troy was wearing; she also 
said  that  her  assailant  smelled  like  beer  or  vomit  and 
testimony  indicated  that  Troy  had  been  drinking  beer 
and  had  vomited  several  times  that  night.  Further­
more, testimony indicated that Troy got home at approx­
imately 1:30 a.m., which gave him enough time to assault 
Jane  Doe.  Additionally,  [witnesses]  testiﬁed  that  they 
saw  someone  resembling  Troy  in  a  black  jacket  and 
black  hat  stumbling  in  the  road  near  Jane  Doe’s  house 
at 1:05 a.m.  Troy also washed his pants and shirt when 
he  got  home,  arguably  to  remove  the  blood  evidence 
from  his  clothes.  Finally,  the  DNA  evidence  indicated 
that  semen  collected  from  Jane  Doe’s  underwear 
matched Troy’s and that only 1 in 3,000,000 other people 
had matching DNA (the second DNA test indicated that 
1  in  10,000  people  had  matching  DNA).”  Ibid.,  934 
P. 2d, at 241–242. 

Respondent also argued on appeal that the trial court erred 
in failing to conduct a pretrial hearing to determine whether 
the  DNA  evidence  was  reliable.  The  court  found  respond­
ent had not raised this issue in the trial court and concluded 
there was no plain error in the trial court’s failure to conduct 
a hearing.  Id., at 284, 934 P. 2d, at 241. 

In  2001,  respondent  sought  state  postconviction  relief, 
claiming,  inter  alia,  that  his  trial  counsel  was  constitution­
ally  ineffective  for  failing  to  object  to  the  admission  of  the 
DNA  evidence.  He  argued  that  there  were  a  number  of 
foundational  problems  with  the  DNA  evidence,  and  that  if 
trial counsel had objected, the evidence would have been ex­
cluded or at least its importance diminished.  He noted that 
because  trial  counsel  “totally  failed  to  challenge  the  DNA 
evidence in the case,” counsel “failed to preserve valid issues