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Page Number: 49.0

14 

UNITED STATES v. RAHIMI 

KAVANAUGH, J., concurring 

Justice  Scalia  wrote  for  the  Court  that  “a  critical  tool  of 
constitutional  interpretation”  is  “the  examination  of  a 
variety  of  legal  and  other  sources  to  determine  the  public 
understanding  of  a  legal  text  in  the  period  after  its
enactment or ratification.”  554 U. S., at 605 (emphasis in 
original); see also ibid. (“We now address how the Second
Amendment  was  interpreted  from  immediately  after  its
ratification through the end of the 19th century”).  

Heller  echoed  years  of  earlier  Scalia  opinions.    To  take 
one:  “Where the meaning of a constitutional text (such as
‘the freedom of speech’) is unclear, the widespread and long-
accepted  practices  of  the  American  people  are  the  best 
indication  of  what  fundamental  beliefs  it  was intended  to 
enshrine.”  McIntyre  v.  Ohio  Elections  Comm’n,  514  U. S. 
334,  378  (1995)  (Scalia,  J.,  dissenting).  Or  another:  A 
“venerable  and  accepted  tradition  is  not  to  be  laid  on  the 

—————— 
meaning.”  Id., at 1962, n. 79; see, e.g., NLRB v. Noel Canning, 573 U. S. 
513,  584–593,  602–615  (2014)  (Scalia,  J.,  concurring  in  judgment); 
District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U. S. 570, 605–619, 626–628 (2008); 
McCreary County v. American Civil Liberties Union of Ky., 545 U. S. 844, 
886–900  (2005)  (Scalia,  J.,  dissenting);  Hamdi  v.  Rumsfeld,  542  U. S. 
507, 558–563 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Crawford v. Washington, 541 
U. S. 36, 47–50 (2004); Mitchell v. United States, 526 U. S. 314, 334–336, 
and  n.  1  (1999)  (Scalia,  J.,  dissenting);  Department  of  Commerce  v. 
United  States  House  of  Representatives,  525  U. S.  316,  347–349  (1999) 
(Scalia, J., concurring in part); Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U. S. 417, 
465–469  (1998)  (Scalia,  J.,  concurring  in  part  and  dissenting  in  part); 
Printz v. United States, 521 U. S. 898, 905–918 (1997); United States  v. 
Gaudin,  515  U. S.  506,  515–519  (1995);  McIntyre  v.  Ohio  Elections 
Comm’n,  514  U. S.  334,  375–378,  and  nn.  1–2  (1995)  (Scalia,  J., 
dissenting);  Plaut  v.  Spendthrift  Farm,  Inc.,  514  U. S.  211,  223–225 
(1995); Board of Ed. of Kiryas Joel Village School Dist. v. Grumet, 512 
U. S. 687, 732, 744 (1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Herrera v. Collins, 506 
U. S.  390,  427–428  (1993)  (Scalia,  J.,  concurring);  Richmond  v.  Lewis, 
506 U. S. 40, 54 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 
U. S.  957,  979–985  (1991)  (opinion  of  Scalia,  J.);  Rutan  v.  Republican 
Party of Ill., 497 U. S. 62, 95–97 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting); McKoy v. 
North  Carolina,  494  U. S.  433,  466,  471  (1990)  (Scalia,  J.,  dissenting); 
Holland v. Illinois, 493 U. S. 474, 481–482, and n. 1 (1990).