Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/13pdf/12-536_e1pf.pdf
Page Number: 13.0

Cite as:  572 U. S. ____ (2014) 

7 

Opinion of ROBERTS, C. J. 

limits  “as  a  coherent  system  rather  than  merely  a  collec-
tion of individual limits stacking prophylaxis upon prophy-
laxis.”  Ibid. 

McCutcheon  and  the  RNC  appealed  directly  to  this
Court, as authorized by law.  28 U. S. C. §1253.  In such a 
case, “we ha[ve] no discretion to refuse adjudication of the
case  on  its  merits,”  Hicks  v.  Miranda,  422  U. S.  332,  344 
(1975),  and  accordingly  we  noted  probable  jurisdiction.
568 U. S. ___ (2013). 

II
 
A 

Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1, presented this Court with
its first opportunity to evaluate the constitutionality of the 
original  contribution  and  expenditure  limits  set  forth  in
FECA.  FECA imposed a $1,000 per election base limit on
contributions from an individual to a federal candidate.  It 
also  imposed  a  $25,000  per  year  aggregate  limit  on  all 
contributions from an individual to candidates or political
committees.  18  U. S. C.  §§608(b)(1),  608(b)(3)  (1970  ed., 
Supp.  IV).    On  the  expenditures  side,  FECA  imposed
limits  on  both  independent  expenditures  and  candidates’ 
overall campaign expenditures.  §§608(e)(1), 608(c). 

Buckley  recognized  that  “contribution  and  expenditure
limitations  operate  in  an  area  of  the  most  fundamental 
First  Amendment  activities.”  424  U. S.,  at  14.    But  it 
distinguished  expenditure  limits  from  contribution  limits
based  on  the  degree  to  which  each  encroaches  upon  pro-
tected  First  Amendment  interests.    Expenditure  limits, 
the Court explained, “necessarily reduce[ ] the quantity of 
expression  by  restricting  the  number  of  issues  discussed,
the depth of their exploration, and the size of the audience
reached.”  Id.,  at  19.  The  Court  thus  subjected  expendi-
ture  limits  to  “the  exacting  scrutiny  applicable  to  lim- 
itations  on  core  First  Amendment  rights  of  political
expression.”  Id.,  at  44–45.    Under  exacting  scrutiny,  the