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Page Number: 16.0

12 

MISSOURI v. MCNEELY 

Opinion of the Court 

tion  to  technology-based  developments,  jurisdictions  have
found other ways to streamline the warrant process, such
as by using standard-form warrant applications for drunk­
driving investigations.5 

We  by  no  means  claim  that  telecommunications  inno­
vations  have,  will,  or  should  eliminate  all  delay  from  the
warrant-application  process.    Warrants  inevitably  take 
some time for police officers or prosecutors to complete and
for magistrate judges to review.  Telephonic and electronic 
warrants  may  still  require  officers  to  follow  time­
consuming  formalities  designed  to  create  an  adequate
record,  such  as  preparing  a  duplicate  warrant  before
calling  the  magistrate  judge.    See  Fed.  Rule  Crim.  Proc. 
4.1(b)(3).  And improvements in communications technolo­
gy do not guarantee that a magistrate judge will be avail­
able when an officer needs a warrant after making a late­
night arrest.  But technological developments that enable 
police officers to secure warrants  more quickly, and do so
without  undermining  the  neutral  magistrate  judge’s  es­
sential role as a check on police discretion, are relevant to
an assessment of exigency.  That is particularly so in this 
context,  where  BAC  evidence  is  lost  gradually  and 

—————— 

Supp.  2012);  Wash.  Super.  Ct.  Crim.  Rule  2.3(c)  (2002);  Wis.  Stat.  

§968.12(3)  (2007–2008);  Wyo.  Stat.  Ann.  §31–6–102(d)  (2011);  see 

generally  2  W.  LaFave,  Search  and  Seizure  §4.3(b),  pp.  511–516,  and
 
n.  29  (4th  ed.  2004)  (describing  oral  search  warrants  and  collecting
state laws).  Missouri requires that search warrants be in writing and 
does  not  permit  oral  testimony,  thus  excluding  telephonic  warrants.  Mo. 
Ann. Stat. §§542.276.2(1), 542.276.3 (West Supp. 2012).  State law does
permit  the  submission  of  warrant  applications  “by  facsimile  or  other 
electronic means.”  §542.276.3. 

5 During  the  suppression  hearing  in  this  case,  McNeely  entered  into
evidence  a  search-warrant  form  used  in  drunk-driving  cases  by  the 
prosecutor’s  office  in  Cape  Girardeau  County,  where  the  arrest  took
place.    App.  61–69.    The  arresting  officer  acknowledged  that  he  had
used such forms in the past and that they were “readily available.”  Id., 
at 41–42.