Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/558bv.pdf
Page Number: 572

Cite as: 558 U. S. 310 (2010) 

411 

Opinion of Stevens, J. 

Although  the majority  opinion spends  several pages  mak­
ing these surprising arguments, it says almost nothing about 
the standard considerations we have used to determine stare 
decisis  value,  such  as  the  antiquity  of  the  precedent,  the 
workability  of  its  legal  rule,  and  the  reliance  interests  at 
stake.  It is also conspicuously silent about McConnell, even 
though  the  McConnell  Court’s  decision  to  uphold  BCRA 
§ 203 relied not only on the antidistortion logic of Austin but 
also  on  the  statute’s  historical  pedigree,  see,  e. g.,  540  U. S., 
at  115–132,  223–224,  and  the  need  to  preserve  the  integrity 
of federal campaigns, see id., at 126–129, 205–208, and n. 88. 
We  have  recognized  that  “[s]tare decisis  has  special  force 
when legislators or citizens ‘have acted in reliance on a previ­
ous  decision,  for  in  this  instance  overruling  the  decision 
would dislodge settled rights and expectations or require an 
extensive legislative response.’ ”  Hubbard v.  United States, 
514  U. S.  695,  714  (1995)  (plurality  opinion)  (quoting  Hilton 
v.  South  Carolina  Public  Railways  Comm’n,  502  U. S.  197, 
202  (1991)).  Stare  decisis  protects  not  only  personal  rights 
involving  property  or  contract  but  also  the  ability  of  the 
elected  branches  to  shape  their  laws  in  an  effective  and  co­
herent  fashion.  Today’s  decision  takes  away  a  power  that 
we  have  long  permitted  these  branches  to  exercise.  State 
legislatures have relied on their authority to regulate corpo­
rate  electioneering,  conﬁrmed  in  Austin,  for  more  than  a 
century.20  The  Federal  Congress  has  relied  on  this  author­
ity for a comparable stretch of time, and it speciﬁcally relied 
on  Austin  throughout  the  years  it  spent  developing  and  de­

if  the  scholarship  cited  by  the  majority  is  correct  that  certain  campaign 
ﬁnance reforms were less deliberate or less benignly motivated than Auto­
mobile  Workers  suggested,  the  point  remains  that  this  body  of  law  has 
played a signiﬁcant and broadly accepted role in American political life for 
decades upon decades. 

20 See  Brief  for  State  of  Montana  et  al.  as  Amici  Curiae  5–13;  see  also 
Supp. Brief for Senator John McCain et al. as Amici Curiae 1a–8a (listing 
24  States  that  presently  limit  or  prohibit  independent  electioneering  ex­
penditures from corporate general treasuries).