Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/10pdf/09-893.pdf
Page Number: 10.0

Cite as:  563 U. S. ____ (2011) 

7 

Opinion of the Court 

particular  type  of  claim,  the  analysis  is  straightforward:
The  conflicting  rule  is  displaced  by  the  FAA.  Preston  v. 
Ferrer, 552 U. S. 346, 353 (2008).  But the inquiry becomes
more  complex  when  a  doctrine  normally  thought  to  be
generally  applicable,  such  as  duress  or,  as  relevant  here, 
unconscionability,  is  alleged  to  have  been  applied  in  a
fashion  that  disfavors  arbitration.    In  Perry  v.  Thomas, 
482 U. S. 483 (1987), for example, we noted that the FAA’s
preemptive effect might extend even to grounds tradition-
ally thought to exist “ ‘at law or in equity for the revocation
of any contract.’ ”  Id., at 492, n. 9 (emphasis deleted).  We 
said  that  a  court  may  not  “rely  on  the  uniqueness  of  an
agreement  to  arbitrate  as  a  basis  for  a  state-law  holding 
that enforcement would be unconscionable, for this would 
enable  the  court  to  effect  what  . . .  the  state  legislature 
cannot.”  Id., at 493, n. 9. 

An  obvious  illustration  of  this  point  would  be  a  case
finding unconscionable or unenforceable as against public 
policy  consumer  arbitration  agreements  that  fail  to  pro-
vide  for  judicially  monitored  discovery.    The  rationaliza-
tions for such a holding are neither difficult to imagine nor 
different in kind from those articulated in Discover Bank. 
A  court  might  reason  that  no  consumer  would  knowingly 
waive  his  right  to  full  discovery,  as  this  would  enable
companies  to  hide  their  wrongdoing.  Or  the  court  might
simply  say  that  such  agreements  are  exculpatory—re-
stricting  discovery  would  be  of  greater  benefit  to  the 
company  than  the  consumer,  since  the  former  is  more
likely to be sued than to sue.  See Discover Bank, supra, at 
161,  113  P. 3d,  at  1109  (arguing  that  class  waivers  are
similarly  one-sided).  And,  the  reasoning  would  continue,
because such a rule applies the general principle of uncon-
scionability  or  public-policy  disapproval  of  exculpatory
agreements,  it  is  applicable  to  “any”  contract  and  thus 
preserved by §2 of the FAA.  In practice, of course, the rule 
would  have  a  disproportionate  impact  on  arbitration