Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/13pdf/12-158_6579.pdf
Page Number: 54

Cite as:  572 U. S. ____ (2014) 

13 

THOMAS, J., concurring in judgment 

usually  been  made  subjects  of  negotiation  and  treaty”); 
Holden v. Joy, 17 Wall. 211, 242–243 (1872) (“[T]he fram-
ers  of  the  Constitution  intended  that  [the  Treaty  Power] 
should extend to all those objects which in the intercourse 
of  nations  had  usually  been  regarded  as  the  proper  sub-
jects of negotiation and treaty, if not inconsistent with the
nature  of  our  government  and  the  relation  between  the 
States and the United States”).  Cf. Power Auth. of N. Y. v. 
Federal  Power  Comm’n,  247  F. 2d  538,  542–543  (CADC 
1957)  (Bazelon,  J.)  (“No  court  has  ever  said  . . .  that  the 
treaty power can be exercised without limit to affect mat-
ters  which  are  of  purely  domestic  concern  and  do  not
pertain  to  our  relations  with  other  nations”),  vacated  as
moot, 355 U. S. 64 (1957) (per curiam).

A  common  refrain  in  these  cases  is  that  the  Treaty
Power  “extends  to  all  proper  subjects  of  negotiation  with
foreign  governments.”    In  re  Ross,  140  U. S.  453,  463 
(1891); see also Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U. S. 258, 266 (1890) 
(same);  Asakura  v.  Seattle,  265  U. S.  332,  341  (1924) 
(same).  Those  cases  identified  certain  paradigmatic  in-
stances  of  “intercourse”  that  were  “proper  negotiating 
subjects”  fit  for  treaty.   See,  e.g.,  Holmes,  supra,  at  569 
(“[T]he  treaty-making  power  must  have  authority  to  de-
cide how far the right of a foreign nation . . . will be recog-
nised and enforced, when it demands the surrender of any 
[fugitive]  charged  with  offences  against  it”);  Geofroy,  su-
pra,  at  266  (“It  is  also  clear  that  the  protection  which
should  be  afforded  to  the  citizens  of  one  country  owning 
property  in  another,  and  the  manner  in  which  that  prop- 
erty  may  be  transferred,  devised  or  inherited,  are  fitting
subjects  for  such  negotiation  and  of  regulation  by  mutual
stipulations  between  the  two  countries”);  Asakura,  supra, 
at 341 (“Treaties for the protection of citizens of one coun-
try residing in the territory of another are numerous, and 
make  for  good  understanding  between  nations”  (footnote
omitted)).  Nothing  in  our  cases,  on  the  other  hand,  sug-