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4 

WHOLE WOMAN’S HEALTH v. JACKSON 

THOMAS, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part 
Opinion of THOMAS, J. 

Later on, S. B. 8 reiterates: “Any person, other than an of-
ficer or employee of a state or local governmental entity in 
this state, may bring a civil action.”  §171.208(a) (emphasis 
added).  In short, the Act repeatedly confirms that respond-
ent licensing officials, like any other governmental officials, 
“hav[e] no duty at all with regard to the act,” and therefore 
cannot  “be  properly  made  parties  to  the  suit.”    Ex parte 
Young, 209 U. S., at 158. 
  The  principal  opinion  does  not  dispute  the  meaning  of 
these provisions.  Instead, it finds residual enforcement au-
thority for the licensing officials elsewhere in S. B. 8.  In its 
saving clause, the Act provides that no court may construe 
S. B. 8  as  “limit[ing]  the  enforceability  of  any  other  laws 
that regulate or prohibit abortion.”  §171.207(b)(3).  If one 
of these “other laws” permits a governmental official to en-
force  S. B. 8,  the  principal  opinion  reasons,  the  saving 
clause preserves that enforcement authority.  The principal 
opinion  then  proposes  that  the  Texas  Medical  Board  may 
enforce  S. B. 8  under  §164.055  of  the  Texas  Occupations 
Code.    Thus,  on  that  view,  S. B. 8  permits  the  Medical 
Board to discipline physicians for violating the statute de-
spite the Act’s command that “the requirements of this sub-
chapter  shall  be  enforced  exclusively  through  . . .  private 
civil actions,” “[n]otwithstanding . . . any other law.”  Tex. 
Health & Safety Code Ann. §171.207(a) (emphasis added). 
  Rather than introduce competing instructions in S. B. 8, 
I would read the Act as a “ ‘harmonious whole.’ ”  Roberts v. 
Sea-Land  Services,  Inc.,  566  U. S.  93,  100  (2012).    By  its 
terms, S. B. 8’s saving clause preserves enforcement only of 
laws  that  “regulate  or  prohibit  abortion.”    §171.207(b)(3) 
(emphasis  added).    Such  laws  include,  for  example,  re-
strictions  on  late-term  or  partial-birth  abortions.    See 
§§171.044, 174.102.  Section 164.055 of the Texas Occupa-
tions Code, by contrast, does not “regulate or prohibit abor-
tion.”    As  the  principal  opinion  explains,  that  provision