Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/12pdf/11-1425_cb8e.pdf
Page Number: 32.0

Cite as:  569 U. S. ____ (2013) 

3 

Opinion of ROBERTS, C. J. 

assistance to an injured occupant or to protect an occupant 
from  imminent  injury.”  There  is  also  a  fire  exception  to 
the warrant requirement.  In Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U. S. 
499, 509 (1978), we held that “[a] burning building clearly 
presents  an  exigency  of  sufficient  proportions  to  render 
a warrantless entry ‘reasonable.’ ”  And there is a hot pur-
suit  exception  to  the  warrant  requirement  as  well.    In 
United  States  v.  Santana,  427  U. S.  38  (1976),  and  War-
den, Md. Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U. S. 294 (1967), we 
recognized “the right of police, who had probable cause to 
believe  that  an  armed  robber  had  entered  a  house  a  few 
minutes before, to make a warrantless entry to arrest the 
robber and to search for weapons.”  Santana, supra, at 42. 
In  each  of  these  cases,  the  requirement  that  we  base  our 
decision  on  the  “totality  of  the  circumstances”  has  not 
prevented us from spelling out a general rule for the police 
to follow. 

The exigency exception most on point here is the one for 
imminent  destruction  of  evidence.    We  have  affirmed  on 
several occasions that “law enforcement officers may make 
a  warrantless  entry  onto  private  property  . . .  to  prevent 
the  imminent  destruction  of  evidence.”    Brigham  City, 
supra,  at  403  (citing  Ker  v.  California,  374  U. S.  23,  40 
(1963)  (plurality  opinion));  see  also,  e.g.,  King,  supra,  at 
___  (slip  op.,  at  6).    For  example,  in  Ker,  the  police  had 
reason  to  believe  that  the  defendant  was  in  possession  of 
marijuana  and  was  expecting  police  pursuit.  We  upheld
the  officers’  warrantless  entry  into  the  defendant’s  home, 
with  the  plurality  explaining  that  the  drugs  “could  be 
quickly  and  easily  destroyed”  or  “distributed  or  hidden
before a warrant could be obtained at that time of night.” 
374 U. S., at 40, 42. 

As  an  overarching  principle,  we  have  held  that  if  there
is  a  “compelling  need  for  official  action  and  no  time  to 
secure  a  warrant,”  the  warrant  requirement  may  be  ex-