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Page Number: 36.0

30  NEW YORK STATE RIFLE & PISTOL ASSN., INC. v. BRUEN 

Opinion of the Court 

prohibiting the public carry of commonly used firearms for 
self-defense.  Nor is there any such historical tradition lim-
iting  public  carry  only  to  those  law-abiding  citizens  who 
demonstrate a special need for self-defense.9  We conclude 
that respondents have failed to meet their burden to iden-
tify  an  American  tradition  justifying  New  York’s  proper-
cause requirement.  Under Heller’s text-and-history stand-
ard, the proper-cause requirement is therefore unconstitu-
tional. 

1 
Respondents’ substantial reliance on English history and 
custom  before  the  founding  makes  some  sense  given  our
statement in Heller that the Second Amendment “codified 
a right ‘inherited from our English ancestors.’ ”  554 U. S., 
at  599  (quoting  Robertson  v.  Baldwin,  165  U. S.  275,  281 
(1897));  see  also  Smith  v.  Alabama,  124  U. S.  465,  478 

—————— 

9 To be clear, nothing in our analysis should be interpreted to suggest 
the unconstitutionality of the 43 States’ “shall-issue” licensing regimes, 
under  which  “a  general  desire  for  self-defense  is  sufficient  to  obtain  a 
[permit].”  Drake v. Filko, 724 F. 3d 426, 442 (CA3 2013) (Hardiman, J., 
dissenting).  Because these licensing regimes do not require applicants
to show an atypical need for armed self-defense, they do not necessarily
prevent “law-abiding, responsible citizens” from exercising their Second
Amendment  right  to  public  carry.    District  of  Columbia  v.  Heller,  554 
U. S. 570, 635 (2008).  Rather, it appears that these shall-issue regimes,
which often require applicants to undergo a background check or pass a 
firearms  safety  course,  are  designed  to  ensure  only  that  those  bearing 
arms in the jurisdiction are, in fact, “law-abiding, responsible citizens.” 
Ibid.  And they likewise appear to contain only “narrow, objective, and
definite standards” guiding licensing officials, Shuttlesworth v. Birming-
ham, 394 U. S. 147, 151 (1969), rather than requiring the “appraisal of 
facts, the exercise of judgment, and the formation of an opinion,” Cant-
well  v.  Connecticut,  310  U. S.  296,  305  (1940)—features  that  typify 
proper-cause standards like New York’s.  That said, because any permit-
ting scheme can be put toward abusive ends, we do not rule out constitu-
tional challenges to shall-issue regimes where, for example, lengthy wait
times in processing license applications or exorbitant fees deny ordinary
citizens their right to public carry.