Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/21pdf/21-5726_5iel.pdf
Page Number: 1.0

(Slip Opinion) 

OCTOBER  TERM,  2021 

1 

Syllabus 

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is 
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued. 
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been 
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader. 
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337. 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

Syllabus 

KEMP v. UNITED STATES 

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR 
THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT 

No. 21–5726.  Argued April 19, 2022—Decided June 13, 2022 

Petitioner Dexter Kemp and seven codefendants were convicted of vari-
ous drug and gun crimes.  The Eleventh Circuit consolidated their ap-
peals  and,  in  November  2013,  affirmed  their  convictions  and  sen-
tences.   In  April  2015,  Kemp  moved  the District  Court  to vacate  his 
sentence  under  28  U. S. C.  §2255.    The  District  Court  dismissed 
Kemp’s motion as untimely because it was not filed within one year of
“the  date  on  which  [his]  judgment  of  conviction  [became]  final.” 
§2255(f)(1).  Kemp did not appeal.  Then, in June 2018, Kemp sought
to reopen his §2255 proceedings under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
60(b), which authorizes a court to reopen a final judgment under cer-
tain enumerated circumstances.  As relevant here, a party may seek 
relief within one year under Rule 60(b)(1) based on “mistake, inadvert-
ence,  surprise,  or  excusable  neglect.”   A  party  may  also  seek  relief 
“within a reasonable time” under Rule 60(b)(6) for “any other reason 
that  justifies  relief,”  but  relief  under  Rule  60(b)(6)  is  available  only 
when  the  other  grounds  for  relief  specified  in  Rules  60(b)(1)–(5)  are 
inapplicable.  Kemp’s motion to reopen his §2255 proceedings invoked 
Rule 60(b)(6), but his motion sought reopening based on a “mistake” 
covered  by  Rule  60(b)(1).    Specifically,  Kemp  argued  that  the  1-year 
limitations period on his §2255 motion did not begin to run until his 
codefendants’  rehearing  petitions  were  denied  in  May  2014,  making 
his April 2015 motion timely.  The Eleventh Circuit agreed with Kemp 
that  his  §2255  motion  was  timely  but  concluded  that  because  Kemp 
alleged judicial mistake, his Rule 60(b) motion fell under Rule 60(b)(1),
was subject to Rule 60(c)’s 1-year limitations period, and was therefore 
untimely. 

Held: The  term  “mistake”  in  Rule  60(b)(1)  includes  a  judge’s  errors  of