Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/21pdf/20-1800_7lho.pdf
Page Number: 32.0

Cite as:  596 U. S. ____ (2022) 

13 

ALITO, J., concurring in judgment 

party expressive content.  The flags flown reflected a dizzy-
ing and contradictory array of perspectives that cannot be 
understood to express the message of a single speaker.  For 
example, the City allowed parties to fly the gay pride flag,
App. to Pet. for Cert. 142a, but it allowed others to fly the
flag of Ethiopia, id., at 174a, a country in which “homosex-
ual  act[s]”  are  punishable  by  “imprisonment  for  not  less
than one year.”  The Crim. Code of Fed. Democratic Repub-
lic  of  Eth.  2004,  Arts.  629  and  630,  Proclamation  No. 
414/2004.  Indeed,  the  City  disclaimed  virtually  all  mes-
sages expressed by characterizing the flagpoles as a “public 
forum” and adopting access criteria consistent with gener-
alized  public  use.  The  City’s  policy  and  practice  thus
squarely indicate an intent to open a public forum for any 
private speakers who met the City’s basic criteria.  The re-
quirement of viewpoint neutrality applies to any forum of 
this kind.  Cornelius, 473 U. S., at 802. 

As the Court rightly holds, denying Shurtleff ’s applica-
tion to use that forum constituted impermissible viewpoint 
discrimination.  Ante,  at  12–13.  The  City’s  stated  reason
for  rejecting  Camp  Constitution’s  application  was  an  un-
written  “policy  and  practice”  of  “ ‘refrain[ing]  from  flying
non-secular flags on the City Hall flagpoles.’ ”  App. to Pet.
for Cert. 153a–154a.  But as we  have recognized, religion
constitutes  a  viewpoint,  and  “speech  discussing  otherwise
permissible subjects cannot be excluded from a limited pub-
lic forum on the ground that the subject is discussed from a
religious point of view.”  Good News Club v. Milford Central 
School, 533 U. S. 98, 112 (2001); Rosenberger, 515 U. S., at 
835. 

The City’s decision was grounded in a belief that “[e]stab-
lished First Amendment jurisprudence” prohibits a govern-
ment from allowing a private party to “fly a [r]eligious flag
on public property.”  App. to Pet. for Cert. 153a–154a.  But 
“[m]ore  than  once,”  this  Court  has  “rejected  the  position