Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/21pdf/19-896_2135.pdf
Page Number: 19.0

Cite as:  596 U. S. ____ (2022) 

3 

Opinion of BREYER, J. 

judge considers his claim that he will be persecuted or tor-
tured if he  is returned to Mexico.  Ante, at 2–3.  There is 
less reason, not more, to detain Arteaga-Martinez without 
bail.
  Second,  Zadvydas  provided  for  outright  release,  533 
U. S., at 699–700; this case involves a bail hearing.  Again,
the  Government  has  less  reason  to  detain  a  person  when
the alternative is a bail hearing (where the Government has 
an opportunity to show that that person might pose a dan-
ger to the community or a flight risk) than when the alter-
native is simply release. 

The Government argues that a later case, Jennings v. Ro-
driguez, 583 U. S. ___ (2018), dictates the result here, ra-
ther than Zadvydas.  Not at all.  That later case involved 
detention under statutes other than the one at issue here 
and in Zadvydas.  Jennings, 583 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 5) 
(“The  primary  issue  is  the  proper  interpretation  of 
§§1225(b),  1226(a),  and  1226(c)”).   The  Court  in  Jennings
did not modify or overrule Zadvydas, but rather explicitly 
distinguished  that  case.  Jennings,  583  U. S.,  at  ___  (slip 
op., at 17).  It did so on multiple grounds, including the fact 
that  almost  all  of  the  statutes  at  issue  in  Jennings  used 
words  that  mandated  detention,  such  as  “shall,”  rather 
than words of discretion, such as “may.”  Id., at ___, ___ (slip 
op., at 16, 19).  In Zadvydas, the word “may” created ambi-
guity that permitted the Court to interpret §1231(a)(6) (the 
statute  before  us)  in  a  manner  that  avoided  the  constitu-
tional problem that indefinite detention could have created.
533 U. S., at 697.  The majority in Jennings held that the 
statutory provisions at issue there were not similarly am-
biguous, and therefore did not permit the Court to reach a 
similar interpretation.  583 U. S., at ___, ___–___ (slip op., 
at 17, 22–23).

It is true that one of the statutes interpreted in Jennings, 
§1226(a), said that the Attorney General “may . . . arres[t]