Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/19pdf/17-1618_hfci.pdf
Page Number: 35

Cite as:  590 U. S. ____ (2020) 

31 

Opinion of the Court 

of  defense  for  all  failing  statutory  interpretation  argu-
ments:  naked policy appeals.  If we were to apply the stat-
ute’s plain language, they complain, any number of unde-
sirable policy consequences would follow.  Cf. post, at 44–54 
(ALITO, J., dissenting).  Gone here is any pretense of statu-
tory interpretation; all that’s left is a suggestion we should 
proceed without the law’s guidance to do as we think best. 
But that’s an invitation no court should ever take up.  The 
place to make new legislation, or address unwanted conse-
quences of old legislation, lies in Congress.  When it comes 
to statutory interpretation, our role is limited to applying 
the law’s demands as faithfully as we can in the cases that 
come before us.  As judges we possess no special expertise
or authority to declare for ourselves what a self-governing 
people should consider just or wise.  And the same judicial
humility that requires us to refrain from adding to statutes 
requires us to refrain from diminishing them. 

What  are  these  consequences  anyway?    The  employers
worry that our decision will sweep beyond Title VII to other 
federal or state laws that prohibit sex discrimination.  And, 
under Title VII itself, they say sex-segregated bathrooms, 
locker rooms, and dress codes will prove unsustainable af-
ter  our  decision  today.    But  none  of  these  other  laws  are 
before us; we have not had the benefit of adversarial testing 
about the meaning of their terms, and we do not prejudge 
any such question today.  Under  Title VII, too, we do not 
purport  to  address  bathrooms,  locker  rooms,  or  anything
else of the kind.  The only question before us is whether an 
employer  who  fires  someone  simply  for  being  homosexual 
or transgender has discharged or otherwise discriminated 
against that individual “because of such individual’s sex.” 
As used in Title VII, the term “ ‘discriminate against’ ” refers
to “distinctions or differences in treatment that injure pro-
tected individuals.”  Burlington N. & S. F. R., 548 U. S., at 
59.  Firing  employees  because  of  a  statutorily  protected 
trait  surely  counts.  Whether  other  policies  and  practices