Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/21pdf/20-601_bq7c.pdf
Page Number: 22.0

Cite as:  595 U. S. ____ (2022) 

5 

THOMAS, J., concurring 

as Devlin did, that merely being bound by a judgment trans-
formed  a  nonnamed  class  member  into  a  “party,”  surely 
“c[a]me as news to law students everywhere.”  Id., at 18; see 
also Marino, 484 U. S., at 304 (previously rejecting that in-
dividuals  become  “parties”  merely  because  they  have  “an 
interest that is affected by the trial court’s judgment”).  Af-
ter all, “[t]here are any number of persons who are not par-
ties to a judgment yet are nonetheless bound by it.”  Devlin, 
536 U. S., at 18.  For example, as pertinent here, when “ ‘[a] 
person agrees to be bound by the determination of issues in 
an action between others,’ ” we call application of claim or 
issue preclusion to  that  person “nonparty  preclusion”  pre-
cisely because agreeing to be bound by a judgment does not 
alone make one a “party” to it.  Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U. S. 
880,  893  (2008)  (quoting  Restatement  (Second)  of  Judg-
ments §40, at 390; emphasis added). 
  Devlin  was  demonstrably  erroneous  for  the  reasons  set 
forth in Justice Scalia’s dissent, and we should overrule it 
in an appropriate case.  That said, Devlin does not control 
here.  Several years after Devlin, in Eisenstein, we unani-
mously reiterated the principle that “[a] ‘party’ to litigation 
is  ‘[o]ne  by  or  against  whom  a  lawsuit  is  brought.’ ”    556 
U. S., at 933 (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 1154 (8th ed. 
2004)).  Relying on Devlin’s reasoning, the petitioner there 
argued that the United States must be a “party” within the 
meaning  of  Rule  4(a)(1)(B)  because  the  Government  is 
“bound  by  the  judgment”  in  all  actions  under  the  False 
Claims Act “regardless of its participation in the case.”  556 
U. S., at 936.  Consistent with our pre-Devlin cases, we re-
iterated  that  this  fact  was  “not  determinative”  because 
“nonparties may be bound by a judgment for a host of dif-
ferent reasons,” 556 U. S., at 936, none of which suffices to 
transform  them  into  parties.    We  distinguished  Devlin’s 
contrary reasoning by invoking the specific “class-action na-
ture  of  the  suit”  there,  556  U. S.,  at  934,  n. 3,  essentially 
cabining that precedent to class actions alone.  And, true to