Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/558bv.pdf
Page Number: 413.0

252 

KUCANA  v.  HOLDER 

Opinion of the Court 

“well-settled,”  Catholic  Social  Services,  Inc.,  509  U. S.,  at 
63–64 (quoting McNary, 498 U. S., at 496), the Court assumes 
that  “Congress  legislates  with  knowledge  of ”  the  presump­
tion,  id.,  at  496.  It  therefore  takes  “clear  and  convincing 
evidence” to dislodge the presumption.  Catholic  Social 
Services,  Inc.,  509  U. S.,  at  64  (internal  quotation  marks 
omitted).  There is no such evidence here. 

Finally,  we  stress  a  paramount  factor  in  the  decision  we 
render today.  By deﬁning the various jurisdictional bars by 
reference to other provisions in the INA itself, Congress en­
sured  that  it,  and  only  it,  would  limit  the  federal  courts’  ju­
risdiction.  To  read  § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii)  to  apply  to  matters 
where  discretion  is  conferred  on  the  Board  by  regulation, 
rather  than  on  the  Attorney  General  by  statute,  would  ig­
nore that congressional design.  If the Seventh Circuit’s con­
struction of § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) were to prevail, the Executive 
would  have  a  free  hand  to  shelter  its  own  decisions  from 
abuse-of-discretion  appellate court  review  simply by  issuing 
a regulation declaring those decisions “discretionary.”  Such 
an extraordinary delegation of authority cannot be extracted 
from the statute Congress enacted. 

V 

A statute affecting federal jurisdiction “must be construed 
both  with  precision  and  with  ﬁdelity  to  the  terms  by  which 
Congress  has  expressed  its  wishes.”  Cheng  Fan  Kwok  v. 
INS, 392 U. S. 206, 212 (1968).  As we have noted, see supra, 
at  249,  and  as  amicus  emphasizes,  “many  provisions  of 
IIRIRA  [we]re  aimed  at  protecting  [from  court  review  ex­
ercises of] the Executive’s discretion.”  American-Arab 
Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U. S., at 486 (emphasis de­
leted).  But “no law pursues its purpose at all costs, and . . .  
the  textual  limitations  upon  a  law’s  scope  are  no  less  a  part 
of  its  ‘purpose’  than  its  substantive  authorizations.”  Ra­
panos  v.  United  States,  547  U. S.  715,  752  (2006)  (plurality 
opinion).  While  Congress  pared  back  judicial  review  in