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22  ANDY WARHOL FOUNDATION FOR VISUAL ARTS, INC. 

v. GOLDSMITH 
KAGAN, J., dissenting 

image”).  That issue is no doubt important in the fair-use 
inquiry.  But  it  is  the  stuff  of  factor  4:  how  Warhol’s  use 
affected  the  “value  of ”  or  “market  for”  Goldsmith’s  photo. 
Factor 1 focuses on the other side of the equation: the new 
expression, meaning, or message that may come from some-
one else using the original.  Under the statute, courts are 
supposed to strike a balance between the two—and thus be-
tween  rewarding  original  creators  and  enabling  others  to 
build on their works.  That cannot happen when a court, à 
la the majority, double-counts the first goal and ignores the
second. 

Is it possible I overstate the matter?  I would like for that 
to be true.  And a puzzling aspect of today’s opinion is that
it occasionally acknowledges the balance that the fair-use 
provision contemplates.  So, for example, the majority notes
after reviewing the relevant text that “the central question 
[the first factor] asks” is whether the new work “adds some-
thing  new”  to  the  copyrighted  one.    Ante,  at  15  (internal
quotation  marks  omitted).  Yes,  exactly.  And  in  other 
places, the majority suggests that a court should consider
in the factor 1 analysis not merely the commercial context 
but also the copier’s addition of “new expression,” including 
new meaning or message.  Ante, at 12; see ante, at 18, 24– 
25, n. 13, 25, 32.  In that way, the majority opinion differs 
from JUSTICE GORSUCH’s concurrence, which would exclude 
all inquiry into whether a follow-on work is transformative. 
See ante, at 2, 4.  And it is possible lower courts will pick up 
on that difference, and ensure that the “newness” of a fol-
low-on work will continue to play a significant role in the 
factor  1  analysis.  If  so,  I’ll  be  happy  to  discover  that  my 
“claims [have] not age[d] well.”  Ante, at 36.  But that would 
require courts to do what the majority does not: make a se-
rious  inquiry  into  the  follow-on  artist’s  creative  contribu-
tions.  The  majority’s  refusal  to  do  so  is  what  creates  the 
oddity at the heart of today’s opinion.  If “newness” matters 
(as the opinion sometimes says), then why does the majority