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2 

GILL v. WHITFORD 

Syllabus 

particularized injury to their equal protection rights. 

Held:  The  plaintiffs  have  failed  to  demonstrate  Article  III  standing. 

Pp. 8–22.

(a) Over the past five decades this Court has repeatedly been asked 
to  decide  what  judicially  enforceable  limits,  if  any,  the  Constitution
sets  on  partisan  gerrymandering.    Previous  attempts  at  an  answer
have  left  few  clear  landmarks  for  addressing  the  question  and  have
generated conflicting views both of how to conceive of the injury aris-
ing from partisan gerrymandering and of the appropriate role for the
Federal  Judiciary  in  remedying  that  injury.    See  Gaffney  v.  Cum-
mings, 412 U. S. 735, Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U. S. 109, Vieth v. Ju-
belirer, 541 U. S. 267, and League of United Latin American Citizens 
v. Perry, 548 U. S. 399.  Pp. 8–12.

(b) A  plaintiff  may  not  invoke  federal-court  jurisdiction  unless  he 
can show “a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy,” Baker 
v.  Carr,  369  U. S.  186,  204.    That  requirement  ensures  that  federal
courts  “exercise  power  that  is  judicial  in  nature,”  Lance  v.  Coffman, 
549 U. S. 437, 439, 441.  To meet that requirement, a plaintiff must
show  an  injury  in  fact—his  pleading  and  proof  that  he  has  suffered 
the  “invasion  of  a  legally  protected  interest”  that  is  “concrete  and 
particularized,”  i.e.,  which  “affect[s]  the  plaintiff  in  a  personal  and 
individual  way.”  Lujan  v.  Defenders  of  Wildlife,  504  U. S.  555,  560, 
and n. 1. 

The right to vote is “individual and personal in nature,” Reynolds v. 
Sims, 377 U. S. 533, 561, and “voters who allege facts showing disad-
vantage to themselves as individuals have standing to sue” to remedy
that  disadvantage,  Baker,  369  U. S.,  at  206.    The  plaintiffs  here  al-
leged  that  they  suffered  such  injury  from  partisan  gerrymandering, 
which works through the “cracking” and “packing” of voters.  To the 
extent that the plaintiffs’ alleged harm is the dilution of their votes, 
that  injury  is  district  specific.    An  individual  voter  in  Wisconsin  is 
placed in a single district.  He votes for a single representative.  The 
boundaries  of  the  district,  and  the  composition  of  its  voters,  deter-
mine  whether  and  to  what  extent  a  particular  voter  is  packed  or 
cracked.  A plaintiff who complains of gerrymandering, but who does 
not  live  in  a  gerrymandered  district,  “assert[s]  only  a  generalized 
grievance against governmental conduct of which he or she does not 
approve.”  United States v. Hays, 515 U. S. 737, 745. 

The  plaintiffs  argue  that  their  claim,  like  the  claims  presented  in 
Baker  and  Reynolds,  is  statewide  in  nature.  But  the  holdings  in
those  cases  were  expressly  premised  on  the  understanding  that  the
injuries  giving  rise  to  those  claims  were  “individual  and  personal  in 
nature,” Reynolds, 377 U. S., at 561, because the claims were brought 
by  voters  who  alleged  “facts  showing  disadvantage  to  themselves  as