Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/20pdf/19-1257_g204.pdf
Page Number: 58.0

14 

BRNOVICH v. DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL COMMITTEE 

KAGAN, J., dissenting 

voting  right.    And  the  “denial  or  abridgement”  phrase 
speaks broadly too.  “[A]bridgment necessarily means some-
thing more subtle and less drastic than the complete denial 
of the right to cast a ballot, denial being separately forbid-
den.”   Bossier,  528 U. S.,  at  359 (Souter,  J.,  concurring in 
part and dissenting in part).  It means to “curtail,” rather 
than take away, the voting right.  American Heritage Dic-
tionary 4 (1969). 
  The “results in” language, connecting the covered voting 
rules to the prohibited voting abridgement, tells courts that 
they  are  to  focus  on  the  law’s  effects.    Rather  than  hinge 
liability on state officials’ motives, Congress made it ride on 
their  actions’  consequences.   That decision  was  as consid-
ered  as  considered  comes.    This  Court,  as  the  majority 
notes, had construed the original Section 2 to apply to fa-
cially neutral voting practices “only if [they were] motivated 
by a discriminatory purpose.”  Bolden, 446 U. S., at 62; see 
ante,  at  5.    Congress  enacted  the  current  Section  2  to  re-
verse  that  outcome—to  make  clear  that  “results”  alone 
could  lead  to  liability.    An  intent  test,  the  Senate  Report 
explained, “asks the wrong question.”  S. Rep., at 36.  If mi-
nority citizens “are denied a fair opportunity to participate,” 
then  “the  system  should  be  changed,  regardless  of ”  what 
“motives  were  in  an  official’s  mind.”    Ibid.    Congress  also 
saw  an  intent  test  as  imposing  “an  inordinately  difficult 
burden for plaintiffs.”  Ibid.  Even if state actors had pur-
posefully discriminated, they would likely be “ab[le] to offer 
a non-racial rationalization,” supported by “a false trail” of 
“official resolutions” and “other legislative history eschew-
ing any racial motive.”  Id., at 37.  So only a results-focused 
statute could prevent States from finding ways to abridge 
minority citizens’ voting rights. 
  But when to conclude—looking to effects, not purposes—
that a denial or abridgment has occurred?  Again, answer-
ing that question is subsection (b)’s function.  See supra, at 
12–13.    It  teaches  that  a  violation  is  established  when,