Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/19pdf/18-1150_new_d18e.pdf
Page Number: 36

Cite as:  590 U. S. ____ (2020) 

15 

THOMAS, J., dissenting 

was even more essential in the 19th century before the pro-
liferation of federal and state regulatory law fundamentally 
altered  the  role  that  common-law  judging  played  in  ex-
pounding upon the law.  See also post, at 2 (GINSBURG, J., 
dissenting).

These differences provide crucial context for Banks’ rea-
soning.  Specifically, to ensure that judicial “exposition and 
interpretation of the law”  remains “free for publication to 
all,” the word “author” must be read to encompass all judi-
cial duties.  Banks, 128 U. S., at 253.  But these differences 
also demonstrate that the same rule does not a fortiori ap-
ply to all legislative duties.8 

C 
In addition to being flawed as a textual and precedential 

—————— 
Without briefing on this issue, I am not willing to make that leap.  See 
Hixson v. Burson, 54 Ohio St. 470, 485, 43 N. E. 1000, 1003 (1896) (“re-
luctantly overrul[ing] the second syllabus” of a previous decision); Hol-
liday v. Brown, 34 Neb. 232, 234, 51 N. W. 839, 840 (1892) (“It is an un-
written  rule  of  this  court  that  members  thereof  are  bound  only  by  the 
points as stated in the syllabus of each case”); see also Frazier v. State, 
15 Ga. App. 365, 365–367, 83 S. E. 273,  273–274 (1914) (clarifying the
meaning  of  a  court-written  headnote  and  emphasizing  that  to  under-
stand an opinion’s meaning, the headnote and opinion must be read to-
gether);  United  States v.  Detroit  Timber &  Lumber  Co.,  200  U. S.  321, 
337 (1906) (acknowledging that some state statutes rendered headnotes
the work of the court carrying legal force).

8 Although legislative history is not at issue in this case, the majority
also contends that its rule is necessary to fend off the possibility that “[a]
State could monetize its entire suite of legislative history.”  Ante, at 17. 
Putting aside the jurisprudential debate over the use of such materials 
in interpreting federal statutes, many States can, and have, specifically 
authorized  courts  to  consider  legislative  history  when  construing  stat-
utes.  See, e.g., Colo. Rev. Stat. §2–4–203(1)(c) (2019); Iowa Code §4.6(3) 
(2019); Minn. Stat. §645.16(7) (2018); N. M. Stat. Ann. §12–2A–20(C)(2) 
(2019); N. D. Cent. Code Ann. §1–02–39(3) (2019); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. 
§1.49(C)  (Lexis  2019);  1  Pa.  Cons.  Stat.  §1921(c)(7)  (2016).    Given  the 
direct role that legislative history plays in the construction of statutes in
these States, it is hardly clear that such States could subject their legis-
lative histories to copyright.