Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/16pdf/16-341_8n59.pdf
Page Number: 8

Cite as:  581 U. S. ____ (2017) 

5 

Opinion of the Court 

interpreting  it  “to  dovetail  with  the  general  provisions
relating to the venue of civil suits.”  Id., at 565–566.  The 
Court  thus  held  that  the  patent  venue  statute  “alone 
should control venue in patent infringement proceedings.” 
Id., at 566. 

In 1948, Congress recodified the patent venue statute as
§1400(b).  See  Act  of  June  25,  1948,  62  Stat.  936.    The 
recodified  provision,  which  remains  unaltered  today,
states that “[a]ny civil action for patent infringement may
be  brought  in  the  judicial  district  where  the  defendant
resides,  or  where  the  defendant  has  committed  acts  of 
infringement  and  has  a  regular  and  established  place  of 
business.”  28  U. S. C.  §1400(b)  (1952  ed.).    This  version 
differs  from  the  previous  one  in  that  it  uses  “resides” 
instead  of  “inhabit[s].”  At  the  same  time,  Congress  also 
enacted  the  general  venue  statute,  §1391,  which  defined 
“residence”  for  corporate  defendants.    That  provision
stated  that  “[a]  corporation  may  be  sued  in  any  judicial
district  in  which  it  is  incorporated  or  licensed  to  do  busi-
ness  or  is  doing  business,  and  such  judicial  district  shall
be regarded as the residence of such corporation for venue 
purposes.”  §1391(c) (1952 ed.).

Following  the  1948  legislation,  courts  reached  differing
conclusions  regarding  whether  §1400(b)’s  use  of  the  word 
“resides”  incorporated  §1391(c)’s  definition  of  “residence.” 
See Fourco, 353 U. S., at 224, n. 3 (listing cases).  In Fourco, 
this  Court  reviewed  a  decision  of  the  Second  Circuit 
holding  that  §1391(c)  defined  residence  for  purposes  of
§1400(b),  “just  as  that  definition  is  properly  . . .  incorpo-
rated  into  other  sections  of  the  venue  chapter.”    Trans-
mirra Prods. Corp. v. Fourco Glass Co., 233 F. 2d 885, 886 
(1956).  This  Court  squarely  rejected  that  interpretation, 
reaffirming Stonite’s holding that §1400(b) “is the sole and 
exclusive  provision  controlling  venue  in  patent  infringe-
ment  actions,  and  . . .  is  not  to  be  supplemented  by  . . . 
§1391(c).”  353  U. S.,  at  229.    The  Court  observed  that