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CLINTON v. CITY OF NEW YORK

Opinion of the Court

favored with extensive debate about the scope of Congress’
power to delegate lawmaking authority, or its functional
equivalent, to the President. The excellent briefs ﬁled by
the parties and their amici curiae have provided us with
valuable historical information that illuminates the delega-
tion issue but does not really bear on the narrow issue that
is dispositive of these cases. Thus, because we conclude that
the Act’s cancellation provisions violate Article I, § 7, of the
Constitution, we ﬁnd it unnecessary to consider the District
Court’s alternative holding that the Act “impermissibly dis-
rupts the balance of powers among the three branches of
government.”

985 F. Supp., at 179.43

Third, our decision rests on the narrow ground that the
procedures authorized by the Line Item Veto Act are not
authorized by the Constitution. The Balanced Budget Act
of 1997 is a 500-page document that became “Public Law
105–33” after three procedural steps were taken: (1) a bill
containing its exact text was approved by a majority of the
Members of the House of Representatives; (2) the Senate
approved precisely the same text; and (3) that text was
signed into law by the President. The Constitution explic-
itly requires that each of those three steps be taken before
a bill may “become a law.” Art. I, § 7.
If one paragraph of
that text had been omitted at any one of those three stages,
If
Public Law 105–33 would not have been validly enacted.
the Line Item Veto Act were valid, it would authorize the
President to create a different law—one whose text was not
voted on by either House of Congress or presented to the
President for signature. Something that might be known as
“Public Law 105–33 as modiﬁed by the President” may or

43 We also ﬁnd it unnecessary to consider whether the provisions of the
Act relating to discretionary budget authority are severable from the Act’s
tax beneﬁt and direct spending provisions. We note, however, that the
Act contains no severability clause; a severability provision that had ap-
peared in the Senate bill was dropped in conference without explanation.
H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 104–491, at 17, 41.