Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/20pdf/20-297_4g25.pdf
Page Number: 25

Cite as:  594 U. S. ____ (2021) 

21 

Opinion of the Court 

Arg. 36.7  TransUnion contends that if an individual is ex-
posed to a risk of future harm, time will eventually reveal 
whether the risk materializes in the form of actual harm. 
If the risk of future harm materializes and the individual 
suffers a concrete harm, then the harm itself, and not the 
pre-existing risk, will constitute a basis for the person’s in-
jury and for damages.  If the risk of future harm does not 
materialize, then the individual cannot establish a concrete 
harm sufficient for standing, according to TransUnion. 

Consider  an  example.   Suppose  that  a  woman  drives 
home from work a quarter mile ahead of a reckless driver 
who  is  dangerously  swerving  across  lanes.  The  reckless 
driver has exposed the woman to a risk of future harm, but
the risk does not materialize and the woman makes it home 
safely.  As counsel for TransUnion stated, that would ordi-
narily be cause for celebration, not a lawsuit.  Id., at 8.  But 
if the reckless driver crashes into the woman’s car, the sit-
uation would be different, and (assuming a cause of action)
the woman could sue the driver for damages.

The  plaintiffs  note  that  Spokeo  cited  libel  and  slander 
per se as examples of cases where, as the plaintiffs see it, a 
mere  risk  of  harm  suffices  for  a  damages  claim.  But  as 
Judge Tatel explained for the D. C. Circuit, libel and slan-
der per se “require evidence of publication.”  Owner-Opera-
tor,  879  F. 3d,  at  345.    And  for  those  torts,  publication  is 

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7 For  example,  a  plaintiff ’s  knowledge  that  he  or  she  is  exposed  to  a 
risk of future physical, monetary, or reputational harm could cause its 
own current  emotional  or  psychological  harm.   We  take no  position  on 
whether or how  such  an emotional or  psychological harm  could  suffice
for Article III purposes—for example, by analogy to the tort of intentional 
infliction of emotional distress.  See Reply Brief 14; Tr. of Oral Arg. 30. 
The plaintiffs here have not relied on such a theory of Article III harm.
They have not claimed an emotional distress injury from the risk that a
misleading  credit  report  might  be  sent  to  a  third-party  business.    Nor 
could they do so, given that the 6,332 plaintiffs have not established that
they were even aware of the misleading information in the internal credit
files maintained at TransUnion.