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Page Number: 4.0

4 

OBERGEFELL v. HODGES 

Syllabus 

Finally,  this  Court’s  cases  and  the  Nation’s  traditions  make  clear 
that  marriage  is  a  keystone  of  the  Nation’s  social  order.    See 
Maynard v. Hill, 125 U. S. 190, 211.  States have contributed to the 
fundamental  character  of  marriage  by  placing  it  at  the  center  of 
many facets of the legal and social order.  There is no difference be-
tween  same-  and  opposite-sex  couples  with  respect  to  this  principle,
yet same-sex couples are denied the constellation of benefits that the
States  have  linked  to  marriage  and  are  consigned  to  an  instability
many opposite-sex couples would find intolerable.  It is demeaning to 
lock same-sex couples out of a central institution of the Nation’s soci-
ety, for they too may aspire to the transcendent purposes of marriage. 
The  limitation  of  marriage  to  opposite-sex  couples  may  long  have 
seemed natural and just, but its inconsistency with the central mean-
ing of the fundamental right to marry is now manifest.  Pp. 12–18. 

(3) The right of same-sex couples to marry is also derived from
the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of equal protection.  The Due 
Process  Clause  and  the  Equal  Protection  Clause  are  connected  in  a 
profound way.  Rights implicit in liberty and rights secured by equal 
protection  may  rest  on  different  precepts  and  are  not  always  co-
extensive, yet each may be instructive as to the meaning and reach of 
the  other.  This  dynamic  is  reflected  in  Loving,  where  the  Court  in-
voked both the Equal Protection Clause and the Due Process Clause;
and in Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U. S. 374, where the Court invalidat-
ed a law barring fathers delinquent on child-support payments from
marrying.  Indeed, recognizing that new insights and societal under-
standings can reveal unjustified inequality within fundamental insti-
tutions that once passed unnoticed and unchallenged, this Court has
invoked  equal  protection  principles  to  invalidate  laws  imposing  sex-
based  inequality  on  marriage,  see,  e.g.,  Kirchberg  v.  Feenstra,  450 
U. S.  455,  460–461,  and  confirmed  the  relation  between  liberty  and 
equality, see, e.g., M. L. B. v. S. L. J., 519 U. S. 102, 120–121.  

The Court has acknowledged the interlocking nature of these con-
stitutional  safeguards  in  the  context  of  the  legal  treatment  of  gays
and  lesbians.   See  Lawrence,  539  U. S.,  at  575.    This  dynamic  also 
applies to same-sex marriage.  The challenged laws burden the liber-
ty of same-sex couples, and they abridge central precepts of equality.
The marriage laws at issue are in essence unequal: Same-sex couples
are denied benefits afforded opposite-sex couples and are barred from 
exercising a fundamental right.  Especially against  a long history of 
disapproval of their relationships, this denial works a grave and con-
tinuing  harm,  serving  to  disrespect  and  subordinate  gays  and  lesbi-
ans.  Pp. 18–22. 

(4)  The right to marry is a fundamental right inherent in the
liberty  of  the  person,  and  under  the  Due  Process  and  Equal  Protec-