Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/524bv.pdf
Page Number: 590.0

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Unit: $U94

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Cite as: 524 U. S. 498 (1998)

545

Opinion of Kennedy, J.

ples of fairness”). The imprecision of our regulatory tak-
ings doctrine does open the door to normative considerations
about the wisdom of government decisions. See, e. g., Agins
v. City of Tiburon, 447 U. S., at 260 (zoning constitutes a
taking if it does not “substantially advance legitimate state
interests”). This sort of analysis is in uneasy tension with
our basic understanding of the Takings Clause, which has not
been understood to be a substantive or absolute limit on the
government’s power to act. The Clause operates as a con-
ditional limitation, permitting the government to do what
it wants so long as it pays the charge. The Clause pre-
supposes what the government intends to do is otherwise
constitutional:

“As its language indicates, and as the Court has fre-
quently noted, [the Takings Clause] does not prohibit the
taking of private property, but instead places a condition
on the exercise of that power. This basic understand-
ing of the Amendment makes clear that it is designed
not to limit the governmental interference with prop-
erty rights per se, but rather to secure compensation
in the event of otherwise proper interference amount-
ing to a taking.” First English Evangelical Lutheran
Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U. S.
304, 314–315 (1987) (emphasis and citations omitted).

Given that the constitutionality of the Coal Act appears to
turn on the legitimacy of Congress’ judgment rather than on
the availability of compensation, see ante, at 521 (“[I]n a case
such as this one,
it cannot be said that monetary relief
against the Government is an available remedy”), the more
appropriate constitutional analysis arises under general due
process principles rather than under the Takings Clause.

It should be acknowledged that there are passages in some
of our cases on the imposition of retroactive liability for an
employer’s withdrawal from a pension plan which might give
some support to the plurality’s discussion of the Takings
Clause. See Connolly v. Pension Beneﬁt Guaranty Corpo-