Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/529bv.pdf
Page Number: 439.0

529US2

Unit: $U46

[10-07-01 17:18:24] PAGES PGT: OPIN

364

WILLIAMS v. TAYLOR

Syllabus

helping to crack a prison drug ring and for returning a guard’s missing
wallet, and to discover the testimony of prison ofﬁcials who described
Williams as among the inmates least likely to act violently, dangerously,
or provocatively, and of a prison minister that Williams seemed to thrive
in a more regimented environment. Although not all of the additional
evidence was favorable to Williams, the failure to introduce the compar-
atively voluminous amount of favorable evidence was not justiﬁed by a
tactical decision and clearly demonstrates that counsel did not fulﬁll
their ethical obligation to conduct a thorough investigation of Williams’
background. Moreover, counsel’s unprofessional service prejudiced
Williams within Strickland’s meaning. The Virginia Supreme Court’s
prejudice analysis was unreasonable in at least two respects: (1) It was
not only “contrary to,” but also—inasmuch as it relied on the inapplica-
ble Lockhart exception—an “unreasonable application of,” the clear law
as established in Strickland; and (2) it failed to evaluate the totality of,
and to accord appropriate weight to, the available mitigation evidence.
Pp. 391–398.

Justice O’Connor delivered the opinion of the Court as to Part II
(except as to the footnote), concluding that § 2254(d)(1) places a new
constraint on the power of a federal habeas court to grant relief to a
state prisoner with respect to claims adjudicated on the merits in state
court: The habeas writ may issue only if the state-court adjudication (1)
“was contrary to,” or (2) “involved an unreasonable application of . . .”
clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of
the United States.” Pp. 402–413.

(a) Because Williams ﬁled his petition in 1997, his case is not gov-
erned by the pre-1996 version of the federal habeas statute, but by the
statute as amended by AEDPA. Accordingly, for Williams to obtain
federal habeas relief, he must ﬁrst demonstrate that his case satisﬁes
the condition set by § 2254(d)(1). That provision modiﬁes the previously
settled rule of independent federal review of state prisoners’ habeas
petitions in order to curb delays, to prevent “retrials” on federal habeas,
and to give effect to state convictions to the extent possible under law.
In light of the cardinal principle of statutory construction that courts
must give effect, if possible, to every clause and word of a statute, this
Court must give independent meaning to both the “contrary to” and
“unreasonable application” clauses of § 2254(d)(1). Given the commonly
understood deﬁnitions of “contrary” as “diametrically different,” “oppo-
site in character or nature,” or “mutually opposed,” § 2254(d)(1)’s ﬁrst
clause must be interpreted to mean that a federal habeas court may
grant relief if the state court (1) arrives at a conclusion opposite to that
reached by this Court on a question of law or (2) decides a case differ-