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20 

ZIGLAR v. ABBASI 

Opinion of the Court 

Executive  under  Article  II  of  the  Constitution  and  in  the 
powers authorized by congressional enactments, even with 
respect to matters of national security.  See, e.g., Hamdi v. 
Rumsfeld,  542  U. S.  507,  527,  532–537  (2004)  (plurality 
opinion) (“Whatever power the United States Constitution 
envisions for the Executive . . . in times of conflict, it most 
assuredly  envisions  a  role  for  all  three  branches  when 
individual  liberties  are  at  stake”);  Boumediene  v.  Bush, 
553  U. S.  723,  798  (2008)  (“Liberty  and  security  can  be
reconciled;  and  in  our  system  they  are  reconciled  within 
the  framework  of  the  law”).    And  national-security  con-
cerns must not become a talisman used to ward off incon-
venient  claims—a  “label”  used  to  “cover  a  multitude  of 
sins.”  Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U. S. 511, 523 (1985).  This 
“ ‘danger  of  abuse’ ”  is  even  more  heightened  given  “ ‘the 
difficulty of defining’ ” the “ ‘security interest’ ” in domestic 
cases.  Ibid.  (quoting  United  States  v.  United  States  Dist. 
Court  for  Eastern  Dist.  of  Mich.,  407  U. S.  297,  313–314 
(1972)).

Even  so,  the  question  is  only  whether  “congressionally 
uninvited  intrusion”  is  “inappropriate”  action  for  the 
Judiciary to take.  Stanley, 483 U. S., at 683.  The factors 
discussed  above  all  suggest  that  Congress’  failure  to  pro-
vide  a  damages  remedy  might  be  more  than  mere  over-
sight,  and  that  congressional  silence  might  be  more  than
“inadvertent.”  Schweiker, 487 U. S., at 423.  This possibil-
ity  counsels  hesitation  “in  the  absence  of  affirmative  ac-
tion by Congress.”  Bivens, 403 U. S., at 396. 

Furthermore,  in  any  inquiry  respecting  the  likely  or
probable  intent  of  Congress,  the  silence  of  Congress  is 
relevant; and here that silence is telling.  In the almost 16 
years  since  September  11,  the  Federal  Government’s 
responses  to  that  terrorist  attack  have  been  well  docu-
mented.  Congressional  interest  has  been  “frequent  and 
intense,” Schweiker, supra, at 425, and some of that inter-
est  has  been  directed  to  the  conditions  of  confinement  at