Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/20pdf/19-251_p86b.pdf
Page Number: 23

Cite as:  594 U. S. ____ (2021) 

19 

Opinion of the Court 

terest  in  administrative  convenience  is  sufficiently  im-
portant.  We therefore hold that the up-front collection of 
Schedule Bs is facially unconstitutional, because it fails ex-
acting scrutiny in “a substantial number of its applications 
. . . judged in relation to [its] plainly legitimate sweep.”  Ste-
vens, 559 U. S., at 473 (internal quotation marks omitted).
The dissent concludes by saying that it would be “sympa-
thetic” if we “had simply granted as-applied relief to peti-
tioners based on [our] reading of the facts.”  Post, at 25.  But 
the pertinent facts in these cases are the same across the 
board: Schedule Bs are not used to initiate investigations. 
That  is  true  in  every  case.    California  has  not  considered 
alternatives to indiscriminate up-front disclosure.  That is 
true  in  every  case.  And  the  State’s  interest  in  amassing
sensitive information for its own convenience is weak.  That 
is true in every case.  When it comes to the freedom of asso-
ciation,  the  protections  of  the  First  Amendment  are  trig-
gered not only by actual restrictions on an individual’s abil-
ity to join with others to further shared goals.  The risk of a 
chilling  effect  on  association  is  enough,  “[b]ecause  First
Amendment  freedoms  need  breathing  space  to  survive.” 
Button, 371 U. S., at 433. 

* 

* 

* 
The District Court correctly entered judgment in favor of 
the  petitioners  and  permanently  enjoined  the  Attorney 
General from collecting their Schedule Bs.  The Ninth Cir-
cuit erred by vacating those injunctions and directing entry
of judgment for the Attorney General.  The judgment of the 
Ninth Circuit is reversed, and the cases are remanded for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

It is so ordered.