Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/20pdf/19-123_g3bi.pdf
Page Number: 2

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FULTON v. PHILADELPHIA 

Syllabus 

The District Court denied preliminary relief.  It reasoned that the con-
tractual non-discrimination requirement and the Fair Practices Ordi-
nance were both neutral and generally applicable under Employment 
Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Ore. v. Smith, 494 U. S. 872, and 
that CSS’s free exercise claim was therefore unlikely to succeed.  The 
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed.  Given the expiration 
of the parties’ contract, the Third Circuit examined whether the City
could condition contract renewal on the inclusion of new language for-
bidding discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.  The court 
concluded that the City’s proposed contractual terms stated a neutral 
and generally applicable policy under Smith.  CSS and the foster par-
ents challenge the Third Circuit’s determination that the City’s actions 
were  permissible  under  Smith  and  also  ask  the  Court  to  reconsider 
that decision. 

Held: The refusal of Philadelphia to contract with CSS for the provision
of foster care services unless CSS agrees to certify same-sex couples as
foster parents violates the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amend-
ment.  Pp. 4–15.

(a) The City’s actions burdened CSS’s religious exercise by forcing it
either to curtail its mission or to certify same-sex couples as foster par-
ents  in  violation  of  its  religious  beliefs.  Smith  held  that  laws  inci-
dentally burdening religion are ordinarily not subject to strict scrutiny
under the Free Exercise Clause so long as they are both neutral and 
generally  applicable.    494  U.  S.,  at  878–882.    This  case  falls  outside 
Smith because the City has burdened CSS’s religious exercise through 
policies that do not satisfy the threshold requirement of being neutral 
and generally applicable.  Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hia-
leah, 508 U. S. 520, 531–532.  A law is not generally applicable  if it
invites the government to consider the particular reasons for a person’s
conduct  by  creating  a  mechanism  for  individualized  exemptions. 
Smith, 494 U. S., at 884.  Where such a system of individual exemp-
tions exists, the government may not refuse to extend that system to
cases of religious hardship without a compelling reason.  Ibid.  Pp. 4–
7. 

(1) The non-discrimination requirement of the City’s standard fos-
ter care contract is not generally applicable.  Section 3.21 of the con-
tract requires an agency to provide services defined in the contract to
prospective foster parents without regard to their sexual orientation.
But  section  3.21  also  permits  exceptions  to  this  requirement  at  the 
“sole discretion” of the Commissioner.  This inclusion of a mechanism 
for  entirely  discretionary  exceptions  renders  the  non-discrimination 
provision not generally applicable.  Smith, 494 U. S., at 884.  The City 
maintains that greater deference should apply to its treatment of pri-
vate  contractors,  but  the  result  here  is  the  same  under  any  level  of