Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/19pdf/17-1618_hfci.pdf
Page Number: 46.0

Cite as:  590 U. S. ____ (2020) 

9 

ALITO, J., dissenting 

and of itself entail discrimination because of sex.  We can 
see this because it is quite possible for an employer to dis-
criminate on those grounds without taking the sex of an in-
dividual applicant or employee into account.  An employer
can have a policy that says: “We do not hire gays, lesbians,
or transgender individuals.”  And an employer can imple-
ment  this  policy  without  paying  any  attention  to  or  even 
knowing the biological sex of gay, lesbian, and transgender
applicants.  In  fact,  at  the  time  of  the  enactment  of  Title 
VII, the United States military had a blanket policy of re-
fusing to enlist gays or lesbians, and under this policy for 
years thereafter, applicants for enlistment were required to 
complete a form that asked whether they were “homosex-
ual.”  Appendix D, infra, at 88, 101. 

At oral argument, the attorney representing the employ-
ees, a prominent professor of constitutional law, was asked 
if  there  would  be  discrimination  because  of  sex  if  an  em-
ployer with a blanket policy against hiring gays, lesbians, 
and transgender individuals implemented that policy with-
out knowing the biological sex of any job applicants.  Her 
candid answer was that this would “not” be sex discrimina-
tion.10  And she was right.

The attorney’s concession was necessary, but it is fatal to 
the Court’s interpretation, for if an employer discriminates 
against  individual  applicants  or  employees  without  even
knowing whether they are male or female, it is impossible 
to argue that the employer intentionally discriminated be-
cause of sex.  Contra, ante, at 19.  An employer cannot in-
tentionally discriminate on the basis of a characteristic of
which the employer has no knowledge.  And if an employer 
does not violate Title VII by discriminating on the basis of 

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10 See Tr. of Oral Arg. in Nos. 17–1618, 17–1623, pp. 69–70 (“If there 
was that case, it might be the rare case in which sexual orientation dis-
crimination is not a subset of sex”); see also id., at 69 (“Somebody who 
comes in and says I’m not going to tell you what my sex is, but, believe
me, I was fired for my sexual orientation, that person will lose”).