Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/04pdf/04-278.pdf
Page Number: 34.0

Cite as:  545 U. S. ____ (2005) 

7 

STEVENS, J., dissenting 

of  employing  a  procedure  that  will  provide  the  correct 
answer to the central question of state law.  See Brockett, 
472 U. S., at 510 (O’CONNOR, J., concurring) (“Speculation 
by a federal court about the meaning of a state statute in 
the  absence  of  a  prior  state  court  adjudication  is  particu-
larly gratuitous when, as is the case here, the state courts 
stand willing to address questions of state law on certifica-
tion from a federal court”).6 

III 

Three  flaws  in  the  Court’s  rather  superficial  analysis  of 
the merits highlight the unwisdom of its decision to answer 
the  state-law  question  de  novo.  First,  the  Court  places 
undue  weight  on  the  various  statutes  throughout  the
country  that  seemingly  mandate  police  enforcement  but 
are generally understood to preserve police discretion.  As 
a result, the Court gives short shrift to the unique case of 
“mandatory  arrest”  statutes  in  the  domestic  violence 
context;  States  passed  a  wave  of  these  statutes  in  the
1980’s and 1990’s with the unmistakable goal of eliminat-
—————— 

6 The Court is correct that I would take an “anyone-but-us approach,” 
ante, at 9, n. 5, to the question of who decides the issue of Colorado law 
in  this  case.    Both  options  that  I  favor—deferring  to  the  Circuit’s 
interpretation  or,  barring  that,  certifying  to  the  Colorado  Supreme 
Court—recognize  the  comparative  expertise  of  another  tribunal  on 
questions of state law.  And both options offer their own efficiencies.  By
contrast, the Court’s somewhat overconfident “only us” approach lacks 
any cogent justification.  The fact that neither party requested certifica-
tion  certainly  cannot  be  a  sufficient  reason  for  dismissing  that  option. 
As with  abstention, the considerations that weigh in favor of certifica-
tion—federal-state  comity,  constitutional  avoidance,  judicial  efficiency, 
the  desire  to  settle  correctly  a  recurring  issue  of  state  law—transcend 
the  interests  of  individual  litigants,  rendering  it  imprudent  to  cast 
them as gatekeepers to the procedure.  See, e.g., Elkins v. Moreno, 435 
U. S.  647,  662  (1978)  (certifying  state-law  issue  absent  a  request  from 
the  parties);  Aldrich  v.  Aldrich,  375  U. S.  249  (1963)  (per  curiam) 
(same); see also 17A C. Wright, A. Miller, & E. Cooper, Federal Practice 
and  Procedure  §4248,  p.  176  (2d  ed.  1988)  (“Ordinarily  a  court  will 
order certification on its own motion”).