Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/21pdf/20-1088_dbfi.pdf
Page Number: 22

18 

CARSON v. MAKIN 

Opinion of the Court 

op.,  at  13);  Locke,  540  U. S.,  at  725.    Funds  could  be  and 
were used for theology courses; only pursuing a “vocational 
religious” degree was excluded.  Ibid.; see also Trinity Lu-
theran, 582 U. S., at ___–___ (slip op., at 12–13) (explaining 
narrow reach of Locke); Espinoza, 591 U. S., at ___–___ (slip 
op., at 13–14) (same). 

Locke’s reasoning expressly turned on what it identified 
as the “historic and substantial state interest” against us-
ing “taxpayer funds to support church leaders.”  540 U. S., 
at 722, 725.  But as we explained at length in Espinoza, “it 
is clear that there is no ‘historic and substantial’ tradition 
against aiding [private religious] schools comparable to the 
tradition against state-supported clergy invoked by Locke.” 
591 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 16).  Locke cannot be read be-
yond its narrow focus on vocational religious degrees to gen-
erally authorize the State to exclude religious persons from 
the enjoyment of public benefits on the basis of their antic-
ipated religious use of the benefits. 

* 

* 

* 
Maine’s  “nonsectarian”  requirement  for  its  otherwise
generally  available  tuition  assistance  payments  violates 
the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.  Regard-
less  of  how  the  benefit  and  restriction  are  described,  the 
program operates to identify and exclude otherwise eligible 
schools on the basis of their religious exercise.  The judg-
ment  of  the  Court  of  Appeals  is  reversed,  and  the  case  is
remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opin-
ion. 

It is so ordered.