Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/19pdf/18-9526_9okb.pdf
Page Number: 52.0

Cite as:  591 U. S. ____ (2020) 

7 

ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting 

cause “the only ‘step’ proper for a court of law” is interpret-
ing the laws enacted by Congress.  Ante, at 17–18.  Any la-
bel is fine with us.  What matters is that these are catego-
ries of evidence that our precedents “direct[ ] us” to examine 
in determining whether the laws enacted by Congress dis-
established  a  reservation.    Hagen  v.  Utah,  510  U. S.  399, 
410–411 (1994).  Because those precedents are not followed 
by  the  Court  today,  it  is  necessary  to  describe  several  at 
length.2
  In Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U. S. 463 (1984), a unanimous 
Court  summarized  the  appropriate  methodology.    “Con-
gress [must] clearly evince an intent to change boundaries
before  diminishment  will  be  found.”    Id.,  at  470  (internal 
quotation  marks  and  alterations  omitted).  This  inquiry
first considers the “statutory language used to open the In-
dian lands,” which is the “most probative evidence of con-
gressional  intent.”  Ibid.  “Explicit  reference  to  cession  or
other language evidencing the present and total surrender
of all tribal interests strongly suggests that Congress meant 
to divest from the reservation all unallotted opened lands.” 
Ibid.    But  “explicit  language  of  cession  and  unconditional 
compensation are not prerequisites” for a finding of dises-
tablishment.  Id., at 471. 

Second, we consider “events surrounding the passage of 

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2 Our  precedents  have  generally  considered  whether  Congress  dises-
tablished  or  diminished  a  reservation  by  enacting  “surplus  land  Acts” 
that  opened  land  to  non-Indian  settlement.    Here  Congress  did  much 
more  than  that,  as  I  will  explain.    Even  so,  there  is  broad  agreement
among  the  parties,  the  United  States,  the  Creek  Nation,  and  even  the
Court  that  our  precedents  on  surplus  land  Acts  provide  the  governing 
framework for this case, so I proceed on the same course.  See Brief for 
Petitioner 1; Brief for Respondent 29, 35, 40; Brief for United States as 
Amicus Curiae 4–5; Brief for Muscogee (Creek) Nation as Amicus Curiae 
1–2; ante, at 7–8, 18–19.