Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/12pdf/12-96_6k47.pdf
Page Number: 62

Cite as:  570 U. S. ____ (2013) 

31 

GINSBURG, J., dissenting 

evils  which  have  subsequently  appeared.”    383  U. S.,  at 
328–329 (emphasis added). 

Katzenbach,  the  Court  acknowledges,  “rejected  the
notion that the [equal sovereignty] principle operate[s] as
a bar on differential treatment outside [the] context [of the
admission of new States].”  Ante, at 11 (citing 383 U. S., at 
328–329)  (emphasis  omitted).  But  the  Court  clouds  that 
once clear understanding by citing dictum from Northwest 
Austin  to  convey  that  the  principle  of  equal  sovereignty 
“remains highly pertinent in assessing subsequent dispar­
ate treatment of States.”  Ante, at  11 (citing 557 U. S., at 
203).  See  also  ante,  at  23  (relying  on  Northwest  Austin’s 
“emphasis  on  [the]  significance”  of  the  equal-sovereignty
If  the  Court  is  suggesting  that  dictum  in 
principle). 
Northwest  Austin  silently  overruled  Katzenbach’s  limita­
tion of the equal sovereignty doctrine to “the admission of 
new  States,”  the  suggestion  is  untenable.  Northwest 
Austin  cited  Katzenbach’s  holding  in  the  course  of  declin-
ing to decide whether the VRA was constitutional or even 
what  standard  of  review  applied  to  the  question.    557 
U. S., at 203–204.  In today’s decision, the Court ratchets
up what was pure dictum in Northwest Austin, attributing
breadth  to  the  equal  sovereignty  principle  in  flat  contra­
diction  of  Katzenbach.  The  Court  does  so  with  nary  an
explanation  of  why  it  finds  Katzenbach  wrong,  let  alone
any  discussion  of  whether  stare  decisis  nonetheless  coun­
sels  adherence  to  Katzenbach’s  ruling  on  the limited  “sig­
nificance” of the equal sovereignty principle. 

Today’s  unprecedented  extension  of  the  equal  sover­
eignty principle outside its proper domain—the admission
of new States—is capable of much mischief.  Federal statutes 
that  treat  States  disparately  are  hardly  novelties.    See, 
e.g.,  28  U. S. C.  §3704  (no  State  may  operate  or  permit  a
sports-related  gambling  scheme,  unless  that  State  con­
ducted  such  a  scheme  “at  any  time  during  the  period
beginning January 1, 1976, and ending August 31, 1990”);