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Page Number: 8.0

6 

ROTKISKE v. KLEMM 

Opinion of the Court 

in  effect,  an  enlargement  of  it  by  the  court.’ ”  Nichols  v. 
United States, 578 U. S. ___, ___ (2016) (slip op., at 6) (quot-
ing Iselin v. United States, 270 U. S. 245, 251 (1926)).  

Atextual  judicial  supplementation  is  particularly  inap-
propriate when, as here, Congress has shown that it knows 
how to adopt the omitted language or provision.  Congress
has  enacted  statutes  that  expressly  include  the  language 
Rotkiske asks us to read in, setting limitations periods to
run from the date on which the violation occurs or the date 
of discovery of such violation.  See, e.g., 12 U. S. C. §3416; 
15  U. S. C.  §1679i.    In  fact,  at  the  time  Congress  enacted 
the FDCPA, many statutes included provisions that, in cer-
tain  circumstances,  would  begin  the  running  of  a  limita-
tions  period  upon  the  discovery  of  a  violation,  injury,  or
some other event.  See, e.g., 15 U. S. C. §77m (1976 ed.); 19 
U. S. C. §1621 (1976 ed.); 26 U. S. C. §7217(c) (1976 ed.); 29 
U. S. C. §1113 (1976 ed.).

It is not our role to second-guess Congress’ decision to in-
clude a “violation occurs” provision, rather than a discovery 
provision, in §1692k(d).  The length of a limitations period 
“reflects  a  value  judgment  concerning  the  point  at  which
the  interests  in  favor  of  protecting  valid  claims  are  out-
weighed by the interests in prohibiting the prosecution of
stale ones.”  Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 
U. S. 454, 463–464 (1975).  It is Congress, not this Court,
that balances those interests.  We simply enforce the value 
judgments made by Congress. 

B 

Narrowing  his  initial  assertion  and  moving  away  from 
the question on which we granted certiorari, Rotkiske also 
contends that his filing should be treated as timely under 
an equitable, fraud-specific discovery rule, relying on a line 
of decisions beginning with Bailey v. Glover, 21 Wall. 342 
(1875).  Rotkiske claims that Bailey and its progeny apply
an equitable doctrine that delays the commencement of the