Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/23pdf/22-915_8o6b.pdf
Page Number: 91.0

20 

UNITED STATES v. RAHIMI 

THOMAS, J., dissenting 

of ammunition—many of which are parts with no danger-
ous function on their own.  See 18 U. S. C. §921(a)(17)(A).

These sweeping prohibitions are criminally enforced.  To 
violate the statute is a felony, punishable by up to 15 years. 
§924(a)(8).  That felony conviction, in turn, triggers a per-
manent,  life-long  prohibition  on  exercising  the  Second
Amendment right.  See §922(g)(1). 

The  combination  of  the  Government’s  sweeping  view  of 
the  firearms  and  ammunition  within  its  regulatory  reach
and the broad prohibition on any conduct regarding covered 
firearms  and  ammunition  makes  §922(g)(8)’s  burden  un-
mistakable: The statute revokes a citizen’s Second Amend-
ment right while the civil restraining order is in place.  And, 
that  revocation  is  absolute.    It  makes  no  difference  if  the 
covered  individual  agrees  to  a  no-contact  order,  posts  a 
bond, or even moves across the country from his former do-
mestic partner—the bar on exercising the Second Amend-
ment right remains.  See United States v. Wilkey, 2020 WL 
4464668, *1 (D Mont., Aug. 4, 2020) (defendant agreed to 
Florida protection order so he could “ ‘just walk away’ ” and
was prosecuted several years later for possessing firearms 
in Montana).

That combination of burdens places §922(g)(8) in an en-
tirely different stratum from surety laws.  Surety laws pre-
serve  the  Second  Amendment  right,  whereas  §922(g)(8) 
strips an individual of that right.  While a breach of a surety
demand was punishable by a fine, §922(g)(8) is punishable
by a felony conviction, which in turn permanently revokes 
an individual’s Second Amendment right.  At base, it is dif-
ficult  to  imagine  how  surety  laws  can  be  considered  rele-
vantly similar to a complete ban on firearm ownership, pos-
session, and use. 

This observation is nothing new; the Court has already 
recognized that surety laws impose a lesser relative burden 
on the Second Amendment right.  In Bruen, the Court ex-