Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/529bv.pdf
Page Number: 148.0

529US1

Unit: $U34

[09-26-01 08:14:00] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 529 U. S. 61 (2000)

73

Opinion of the Court

interested-witness instruction, after the defense has closed—
is in a long tradition that continues to the present day. See,
e. g., United States v. Jones, 587 F. 2d 802 (CA5 1979); United
States v. Hill, 470 F. 2d 361 (CADC 1972); 2 C. Wright, Fed-
Indeed,
eral Practice and Procedure § 501, and n. 1 (1982).
the instruction was given in this very case. See Tr. 834 (“A
defendant is of course an interested witness since he is inter-
ested in the outcome of the trial. You may as jurors wish
to keep such interest in mind in determining the credibility
and weight to be given to the defendant’s testimony”).4
There is absolutely nothing to support the dissent’s conten-
tion that for purposes of determining the validity of generic
attacks upon credibility “the distinction between cross-
examination and summation is critical,” post, at 87.

In sum, we see no reason to depart from the practice of
treating testifying defendants the same as other witnesses.
A witness’s ability to hear prior testimony and to tailor his
account accordingly, and the threat that ability presents to
the integrity of the trial, are no different when it is the de-
fendant doing the listening. Allowing comment upon the
fact that a defendant’s presence in the courtroom provides
him a unique opportunity to tailor his testimony is appro-
priate—and indeed, given the inability to sequester the
defendant, sometimes essential—to the central function of
the trial, which is to discover the truth.

4 It is hard to understand how Justice Stevens reconciles the unques-
tionable propriety of the standard interested-witness instruction with his
conclusion that comment upon the opportunity to tailor, although it is con-
stitutional, “demean[s] [the adversary] process” and “should be discour-
aged.” Post, at 76 (opinion concurring in judgment). Our decision, in
any event, is addressed to whether the comment is permissible as a con-
stitutional matter, and not to whether it is always desirable as a matter
of sound trial practice. The latter question, as well as the desirability
of putting prosecutorial comment into proper perspective by judicial in-
struction, are best left to trial courts, and to the appellate courts which
routinely review their work.