Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/22pdf/22-535_i3kn.pdf
Page Number: 2.0

2 

DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION v. BROWN 

Syllabus 

rejected their argument regarding the scope of the HEROES Act’s pro-
cedural  exemptions,  but  nevertheless  vacated  the  Plan  as  substan-
tively unauthorized.  This Court granted certiorari before judgment to
consider this case alongside Biden v. Nebraska, No. 22–506, which pre-
sents a similar challenge to the Plan. 

Held: Because respondents fail to establish that any injury they suffer 
from not having their loans forgiven is fairly traceable to the Plan, they 
lack Article III standing, so the Court has no jurisdiction to address 
their procedural claim.  Pp. 6–15. 

(a)  “This  case  begins  and  ends  with  standing.”  Carney  v.  Adams, 
592  U. S.  ___,  ___.    The  Court’s  authority  under  the  Constitution  is 
limited  to  resolving  “Cases”  or  “Controversies.”    Art. III,  §2.    The 
Court’s  jurisprudence  has  “established  that  the  irreducible  constitu-
tional minimum of standing contains three elements” that a plaintiff
must  plead  and—ultimately—prove.    Lujan  v.  Defenders  of  Wildlife, 
504 U. S. 555, 560.  Those elements are: (1) a “concrete and particular-
ized” injury that is (2) “fairly traceable” to the challenged action of the
defendant and (3) “likely” to be “redressed by a favorable decision.”  Id., 
at 560–561 (alterations and internal quotation marks omitted).  But 
where,  as  here,  the  plaintiff  alleges  that  she  has  been  deprived  of  a 
procedural  right  to  protect  her  concrete  interest,  she  need  not  show 
that observing the contested procedure would necessarily lead to a dif-
ferent substantive result.  Id., at 572, n. 7.  Pp. 6–8.

(b) As  articulated  in  this  Court,  respondents’  claim  and  theory  of 
standing  are  twofold:  First,  because  the  HEROES  Act  does  not  sub-
stantively  authorize  the  Plan,  the  Secretary  was  obligated  to  follow
typical negotiated-rulemaking and notice-and-comment requirements.
Second, if the Secretary had observed those procedures, respondents 
might have used those opportunities to convince him not only that pro-
ceeding under the HEROES Act is unlawful, but also that he should 
instead adopt a different loan-forgiveness program under the Higher
Education Act of 1965 (HEA), and to make that program more gener-
ous to respondents than the Plan.  Respondents assert there is at least
a chance that this series of events will come to pass now if this Court 
vacates the Plan.  Pp. 8–9.

(c) Respondents’  standing  claim  most  clearly  fails  on  traceability: 
They cannot show that their purported injury of not receiving loan re-
lief under the HEA is fairly traceable to the Department’s (allegedly
unlawful) decision to grant loan relief under the HEROES Act.  Pp. 9–
15. 

(1) Significantly,  respondents  are  not  claiming  that  they  are  in-
jured by not being sufficiently included among the Plan’s beneficiaries: 
They think the Plan is substantively unlawful and instead seek debt 
forgiveness under the HEA.  But a decision regarding the lawfulness