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6  CAMERON v. EMW WOMEN’S SURGICAL CENTER, P. S. C. 

Opinion of the Court 

law.  We therefore see no basis for holding that petitioner’s 
motion was jurisdictionally barred. 

C 
  What  respondents  ask  us  to  recognize  is  essentially  a 
mandatory  claims-processing  rule.   Such  rules  are  not  ju-
risdictional,  and  if  a  non-jurisdictional  argument  was  not 
raised below, we generally will not consider it as an alter-
native  ground  for  affirmance.    See,  e.g.,  Granfinanciera,  
S. A. v. Nordberg, 492 U. S. 33, 38 (1989).  In this case, how-
ever, we do not rest our decision on respondents’ failure to 
raise this argument in the Court of Appeals.  Even if that 
argument had been preserved, we would not find it persua-
sive. 
  Assuming for the sake of argument that parties bound by 
a  judgment  are  generally  permitted  to  appeal  that  judg-
ment, we do not think it follows that a party may do so re-
gardless of the ground on which the party is bound.  Here, 
respondents  rely  on  the  proposition  that  “[t]he  Attorney 
General, like any other ‘person who agrees to be bound by 
the determination of issues in an action between others is 
bound  in  accordance  with  the  terms  of  his  agreement.’ ”  
Brief  for  Respondents  15  (quoting  Taylor  v.  Sturgell,  553 
U. S. 880, 893 (2008); emphasis added and alteration omit-
ted).  And when a non-party is bound by a judgment for this 
reason, it is hard to see why the non-party should be pre-
cluded  from  seeking  intervention  on  appeal  if  the  agree-
ment preserves that opportunity. 
  That is the situation here.  In agreeing to be bound, the 
attorney  general  specifically “reserve[d]  all  rights, claims, 
and defenses . . . in any appeals arising out of this action,” 
App.  28–29,  and  this  language  easily  covers  the  right  to 
seek rehearing en banc and the right to file a petition for a 
writ of certiorari.  In addition, the stipulation of dismissal 
made clear that the judgment to which the attorney general 
agreed to be bound was the judgment that emerged after all