Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/21pdf/21-954_7l48.pdf
Page Number: 14.0

Cite as:  597 U. S. ____ (2022) 

9 

Opinion of the Court 

(“Every federal appellate court has an obligation to satisfy
itself  not  only  of  its  own  jurisdiction,  but  also  that  of  the
lower courts in a cause under review, even though the par-
ties are prepared to concede it.” (internal quotation marks 
and alterations omitted)).

Absent section 1252(f )(1), the District Court clearly had
federal question jurisdiction over respondents’ suit, which 
asserted claims arising under two federal statutes, the INA
and  the  APA.  See  28  U. S. C.  §1331  (“The  district  courts 
shall  have  original  jurisdiction  of  all  civil  actions  arising 
under  the  Constitution,  laws,  or  treaties  of  the  United 
States.”).  The question, then, is whether section 1252(f )(1) 
strips  the  lower  courts  of  subject  matter  jurisdiction  over 
these  claims.  The  parties  agree  that  the  answer  to  that
question  is  no,  and  so  do  we.  That  is  because  section 
1252(f )(1) withdraws  a district  court’s “jurisdiction or au-
thority” to grant a particular form of relief.  It does not de-
prive the lower courts of all subject matter jurisdiction over
claims  brought  under  sections  1221  through  1232  of  the
INA. 

The  text  of  the  provision  makes  that  clear.    Section 
1252(f )(1)  deprives  courts  of  the  power  to  issue  a  specific
category of remedies: those that “enjoin or restrain the op-
eration of ” the relevant sections of the statute.  A limitation 
on  subject  matter  jurisdiction,  by  contrast,  restricts  a 
court’s “power to adjudicate a case.”  United States v. Cot-
ton, 535 U. S. 625, 630 (2002).  Section 1252(f )(1) bears no
indication that lower courts lack power to hear any claim 
brought under sections 1221 through 1232.  If Congress had 
wanted the provision to have that effect, it could have said 
so in words far simpler than those that it wrote.  But Con-
gress instead provided that lower courts would lack juris-
diction to “enjoin or restrain the operation of ” the relevant 
provisions,  and  it  included  that  language  in  a  provision 
whose title—“Limit on injunctive relief ”—makes clear the 
narrowness of its scope.