Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/524bv.pdf
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Cite as: 524 U. S. 308 (1998)

309

Opinion of the Court

congressional intent. Congress, believing that existing state laws pro-
vided less than positive assurance that a repeat violent offender no
longer poses an unacceptable risk of dangerousness, intended to keep
guns away from all offenders who might cause harm, even if they were
not deemed dangerous by the States. Dickerson v. New Banner Insti-
tute, Inc., 460 U. S. 103, 119, 120. To provide the missing assurance,
federal law must reach primary conduct not covered by state law. The
fact that state law determines the restoration of civil rights does not
mean that state law also controls the unless clause: As to weapons pos-
session, the Federal Government has an interest in a single, national,
protective policy, broader than required by state law. The rule of lenity
does not apply here, since petitioner relies on an implausible reading
of the congressional purpose. See United States v. Shabani, 513 U. S.
10, 17. Pp. 312–317.

Afﬁrmed.

Kennedy, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist,
C. J., and Stevens, O(cid:146)Connor, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., joined.
Thomas, J., ﬁled a dissenting opinion, in which Scalia and Souter, JJ.,
joined, post, p. 317.

Owen S. Walker argued the cause for petitioner. With

him on the briefs was Bjorn R. Lange.

Jonathan E. Nuechterlein argued the cause for the United
States. On the brief were Solicitor General Waxman, Act-
ing Assistant Attorney General Keeney, Deputy Solicitor
General Dreeben, Edward C. DuMont, and Nina Goodman.

18 U. S. C. § 922(g)(1).

Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion of the Court.
Under federal law, a person convicted of a crime punish-
able by more than one year in prison may not possess any
If he has three violent
ﬁrearm.
felony convictions and violates the statute, he must receive
an enhanced sentence.
§ 924(e). A previous conviction is a
predicate for neither the substantive offense nor the sen-
tence enhancement if the offender has had his civil rights
restored, “unless such . . . restoration of civil rights expressly
provides that the person may not . . . possess . . . ﬁrearms.”
§ 921(a)(20). This is the so-called “unless clause” we now
must interpret. As the ellipses suggest, the statute is more