Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/19pdf/18-1023_m64o.pdf
Page Number: 32.0

28 MAINE COMMUNITY HEALTH OPTIONS v. UNITED STATES 

Opinion of the Court 

12.  A  plaintiff  in  that  instance  cannot  rely  on  our  “fair 
interpretation” test, and instead must stick to the money- 
mandating statute’s “own text” to “determine whether the 
damages liability Congress crafted extends to the Federal
Government.”  Id.,  at  15–16.    Examples  include  the  Fair
Credit  Reporting  Act,  84  Stat.  1127,  and  the  Agricultural 
Marketing Agreement Act of 1937, 50 Stat. 246.  The former 
superseded  the  Tucker  Act  by  creating  a  cause  of  action, 
imposing  a  statute  of  limitations,  and  providing  subject-
matter jurisdiction in federal district courts.  See 15 U. S. C. 
§§1681n, 1681o, 1681p; Bormes, 568 U. S., at 15.  And the 
latter  did  so  by  allowing  aggrieved  parties  to  petition  the 
Secretary of Agriculture and by paving a path for judicial 
review.  See  7  U. S. C.  §608c(15);  Horne  v.  Department  of 
Agriculture, 569 U. S. 513, 527 (2013). 

Unlike those statutes, however, the Affordable Care Act 
did not establish a comparable remedial scheme.  Nor has 
the  Government  identified  one.    So  this  exception  to  the 
Tucker Act is no barrier here. 

Neither does the Administrative Procedure Act bar peti-
tioners’ Tucker Act suit.  To be sure, in Bowen, this Court 
held in the Medicaid context that a State properly sued the 
HHS  Secretary  under  the  Administrative  Procedure  Act 
(not the Tucker Act) in district court (not the Court of Fed-
eral  Claims)  for  failure  to  make  statutorily  required  pay-
ments.  See 487 U. S., at 882–887, 901–905. 

But Bowen is distinguishable on several scores.  First, the 
relief  requested  there  differed  materially  from  what  peti-
tioners  pursue  here.  In  Bowen,  the  State  did  not  seek 
money damages, but instead sued for prospective declara-
tory and injunctive relief to clarify the extent of the Govern-
ment’s  ongoing  obligations  under  the  Medicaid  program.
Unlike  §1342,  which  “provide[s]  compensation  for  specific
instances of past injuries or labors,” id., at 901, n. 31, the 
pertinent Medicaid provision was a “grant-in-aid program,” 
which “direct[ed] the Secretary . . . to subsidize future state