Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/10pdf/09-893.pdf
Page Number: 12.0

Cite as:  563 U. S. ____ (2011) 

9 

Opinion of the Court 

We largely agree.  Although §2’s saving clause preserves
generally  applicable  contract  defenses,  nothing  in  it  sug-
gests  an  intent  to  preserve  state-law  rules  that  stand  as
an obstacle to the accomplishment of the FAA’s objectives. 
Cf. Geier v. American Honda Motor Co., 529 U. S. 861, 872 
(2000);  Crosby  v.  National  Foreign  Trade  Council,  530 
U. S.  363,  372–373  (2000).    As  we  have  said,  a  federal 
statute’s saving clause “ ‘cannot in reason be construed as
[allowing] a common law right, the continued existence of 
which would be absolutely inconsistent with the provisions 
of  the  act. 
In  other  words,  the  act  cannot  be  held  to 
destroy  itself.’ ”    American  Telephone  &  Telegraph  Co.  v. 
Central  Office  Telephone,  Inc.,  524  U. S.  214,  227–228 
(1998)  (quoting  Texas  &  Pacific  R.  Co.  v.  Abilene  Cotton 
Oil Co., 204 U. S. 426, 446 (1907)).

We differ with the Concepcions only in the application of 
this analysis to the matter before us.  We do not agree that
rules  requiring  judicially  monitored  discovery  or  adher-
ence  to  the  Federal  Rules  of  Evidence  are  “a  far  cry  from 
this  case.”  Brief  for  Respondents  32.  The  overarching
purpose  of  the  FAA,  evident  in  the  text  of  §§2,  3,  and  4, 
is  to  ensure  the  enforcement  of  arbitration  agreements 
according  to  their  terms  so  as  to  facilitate  streamlined 
proceedings.  Requiring  the  availability  of  classwide  arbi-
tration  interferes  with  fundamental  attributes  of  arbitra-
tion and thus creates a scheme inconsistent with the FAA. 

B 
The  “principal  purpose”  of  the  FAA  is  to  “ensur[e]  that
private  arbitration  agreements  are  enforced  according  to 

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sion.  It says that to its knowledge “we have not . . . applied the Act to 
strike down a state statute that treats arbitrations on par with judicial 
and administrative proceedings,” post, at 10 (opinion of BREYER, J.), and 
that  “we  should  think  more  than  twice  before  invalidating  a  state  law
that . . . puts agreements to arbitrate and agreements to litigate ‘upon
the same footing’ ” post, at 4–5.