Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/558bv.pdf
Page Number: 541.0

380  CITIZENS  UNITED  v.  FEDERAL  ELECTION  COMM’N 

Roberts, C. J., concurring 

tions  of  wealth”  in  the  marketplace  of  ideas.  494  U. S., 
at 660.  Austin’s reasoning was—and remains—inconsistent 
with Buckley’s explicit repudiation of any government inter­
est  in  “equalizing  the  relative  ability  of  individuals  and 
groups  to  inﬂuence  the  outcome  of  elections.”  424  U. S.,  at 
48–49. 

Austin was also inconsistent with Bellotti’s clear rejection 
of  the idea  that “speech  that otherwise  would be  within the 
protection of the First Amendment loses that protection sim­
ply  because  its  source  is  a  corporation.”  435  U. S.,  at  784. 
The dissent correctly points out that Bellotti involved a ref­
erendum  rather  than  a  candidate  election,  and  that  Bellotti 
itself  noted  this  factual  distinction,  id.,  at  788,  n.  26;  post, 
at 442–443.  But this distinction does not explain why corpo­
rations may be subject to prohibitions on speech in candidate 
elections when individuals may not. 

Second,  the  validity  of  Austin’s  rationale—itself  adopted 
over  two  “spirited  dissents,”  Payne,  501  U. S.,  at  829—has 
proved  to  be  the  consistent  subject  of  dispute  among  Mem­
bers of this Court ever since.  See, e. g., WRTL, 551 U. S., at 
483 (Scalia, J., joined by Kennedy and Thomas, JJ., concur­
ring  in  part  and  concurring  in  judgment);  McConnell,  540 
U. S., at 247, 264, 286 (opinions of Scalia, Thomas, and Ken­
nedy, JJ.); Beaumont, 539 U. S., at 163, 164 (opinions of Ken­
nedy  and  Thomas,  JJ.).  The  simple  fact  that  one  of  our 
decisions  remains  controversial  is,  of  course,  insufﬁcient  to 
justify overruling it.  But it does undermine the precedent’s 
ability  to  contribute  to  the  stable  and  orderly  development 
of the law.  In such circumstances, it is entirely appropriate 
for the Court—which in this case is squarely asked to recon­
sider Austin’s validity for the ﬁrst time—to address the mat­
ter  with  a  greater  willingness  to  consider  new  approaches 
capable of restoring our doctrine to sounder footing. 

Third,  the  Austin  decision  is  uniquely  destabilizing  be­
cause it threatens to subvert our Court’s decisions even out­
side  the  particular  context  of  corporate  express  advocacy.