Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/19pdf/17-1618_hfci.pdf
Page Number: 43

6 

BOSTOCK v. CLAYTON COUNTY 

ALITO, J., dissenting 

The Court tries to cloud the issue by spending many pages 
discussing matters that are beside the point.  The Court ob-
serves  that  a  Title  VII  plaintiff  need  not  show  that  “sex” 
was  the  sole  or  primary  motive  for  a  challenged  employ-
ment decision or its sole or primary cause; that Title VII is
limited to discrimination with respect to a list of specified 
actions  (such  as  hiring,  firing,  etc.);  and  that  Title  VII 
protects individual rights, not group rights.  See ante, at 5– 
9, 11. 

All that is true, but so what?  In cases like those before 
us, a plaintiff must show that sex was a “motivating factor” 
in the challenged employment action, 42 U. S. C. §2000e–
2(m), so the question we must decide comes down to this: if
an individual employee or applicant for employment shows 
that his or her sexual orientation or gender identity was a
“motivating factor” in a hiring or discharge decision, for ex-
ample,  is  that  enough  to  establish  that  the  employer  dis-
criminated “because of . . . sex”?  Or, to put the same ques-
tion in different terms, if an employer takes an employment 
action  solely  because  of  the  sexual  orientation  or  gender 
identity of an employee or applicant, has that employer nec-
essarily discriminated because of biological sex?

The  answers  to  those  questions  must  be  no, unless  dis-
crimination because of sexual orientation or gender identity 
inherently constitutes discrimination because of sex.  The 
Court  attempts  to  prove  that  point,  and  it  argues,  not
merely that the terms of Title VII can be interpreted that 
way  but  that  they  cannot  reasonably  be  interpreted  any 
other way.  According to the Court, the text is unambiguous. 
See ante, at 24, 27, 30. 

The arrogance of this argument is breathtaking.  As I will 
show, there is not a shred of evidence that any Member of 
Congress interpreted the statutory text that way when Ti-
tle VII was enacted.  See Part III–B, infra.  But the Court 
apparently thinks that this was because the Members were
not  “smart  enough  to  realize”  what  its  language  means.