Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/13pdf/12-536_e1pf.pdf
Page Number: 76.0

Cite as:  572 U. S. ____ (2014) 

25 

BREYER, J., dissenting 

pp.  8–9  (FEC,  Nov.  27,  2006)  (similar);  First  General 
Counsel’s  Report,  In  re:  Nesbitt,  MUR  5445,  pp.  11–12 
(FEC,  Feb.  2,  2005)  (similar);  First  General  Counsel’s
Report, In re: Keystone Corp., MUR 5019, pp. 23–29 (FEC,
Feb. 5, 2001) (similar); General Counsel’s Report #2,  In re: 
Boston  Capital  Corp.,  MUR  4538,  pp.  17–18  (FEC,  Mar.
10,  2000)  (recommending  the  FEC  take  no  action  with
respect  to  the  §110.1(h)  issue).  Given  this  record  of  FEC 
(in)activity,  my  reaction  to  the  plurality’s  reliance  upon
agency enforcement of this rule (as an adequate substitute
for  Congress’  aggregate  limits)  is  like  Oscar  Wilde’s  after 
reading Dickens’ account of the death of Little Nell: “One
must have a heart of stone,” said Wilde, “to read [it] with­
out laughing.”  Oxford Dictionary of Humorous Quotations
86 (N. Sherrin 2d ed. 2001).

I have found one contrary example—the single example
to which the plurality refers.  Ante, at 25 (citing Concilia­
tion Agreement, In re Riley, MURs 4568, 4633, 4634, 4736 
(FEC, Dec. 19, 2001)).  In that case, the FEC found prob­
able cause to believe that three individual contributors to 
several PACs had the requisite “knowledge” that the PACs
would use a “substantial portion” of their contributions to
support a candidate to whom they had already contributed—
Sam  Brownback,  a  candidate  for  the  Senate  (for  two  of 
the  contributors),  and  Robert  Riley,  a  candidate  for  the 
House (for the third).  The individuals had made donations 
to  several  PACs  operating  as  a  network,  under  the  direc­
tion of a single political consulting firm.  The two contribu­
tors  to  Sam  Brownback  were  his  parents-in-law,  and  the 
FEC  believed  they  might  be  using  the  PAC  network  to 
channel  extra  support  to  him.    The  contributor  to  Robert 
Riley was his son, and the FEC believed he might be doing 
the same.  The facts in this case are unusual, for individ- 
ual contributors are not typically relatives of the candidates 
they  are  seeking  to  support,  and  ordinary  PACs  do  not 
tend to work in coordination under the direction of a con­