Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/17pdf/16-111_new2_22p3.pdf
Page Number: 56

Cite as:  584 U. S. ____ (2018) 

5 

GINSBURG, J., dissenting 

to Craig and Mullins, for no reason other than their sexual
orientation, a cake of the kind he regularly sold to others. 
When  a  couple  contacts  a  bakery  for  a  wedding  cake,  the 
product  they  are  seeking  is  a  cake  celebrating  their  wed-
ding—not  a  cake  celebrating  heterosexual  weddings  or 
same-sex  weddings—and  that  is  the  service  Craig  and 
Mullins were denied.  Cf. ante, at 3–4, 9–10 (GORSUCH, J., 
concurring).  Colorado, the Court does not gainsay, prohib-
its precisely the discrimination Craig and Mullins encoun-
tered.  See supra, at 1.  Jack, on the other hand, suffered 
no service refusal on the basis of his religion or any other 
protected  characteristic.    He  was  treated  as  any  other
customer would have been treated—no better, no worse.3 

The fact that Phillips might sell other cakes and cookies
to  gay  and  lesbian  customers4  was  irrelevant  to  the  issue 
Craig  and  Mullins’  case  presented.    What  matters  is  that 
Phillips would not provide a good or service to a same-sex 
—————— 

3 JUSTICE  GORSUCH  argues  that  the  situations  “share  all  legally  sa-
lient  features.”    Ante,  at  4  (concurring  opinion).    But  what  critically 
differentiates  them  is  the  role  the  customer’s  “statutorily  protected 
trait,” ibid., played in the denial of service.  Change Craig and Mullins’
sexual orientation (or sex), and Phillips would have provided the cake. 
Change  Jack’s  religion,  and  the  bakers  would  have  been  no  more 
willing  to  comply  with  his  request.    The  bakers’  objections  to  Jack’s 
cakes  had  nothing  to  do  with  “religious  opposition  to  same-sex  wed-
dings.”  Ante,  at  6  (GORSUCH,  J.,  concurring).    Instead,  the  bakers 
simply refused to make cakes bearing statements demeaning to people
protected by CADA.  With respect to Jack’s second cake, in particular, 
where  he  requested  an  image  of  two  groomsmen  covered  by  a  red  “X” 
and the lines “God loves sinners” and “While we were yet sinners Christ
died for us,” the bakers gave not the slightest indication that religious
words, rather than the demeaning image, prompted the objection.  See 
supra,  at  3.  Phillips  did,  therefore,  discriminate  because  of  sexual 
orientation;  the  other  bakers  did  not  discriminate  because  of  religious
belief;  and  the  Commission  properly  found  discrimination  in  one  case
but not the other.  Cf. ante, at 4–6 (GORSUCH, J., concurring). 

4 But  see  ante,  at  7  (majority  opinion)  (acknowledging  that  Phillips
refused  to  sell  to  a  lesbian  couple  cupcakes  for  a  celebration  of  their 
union).