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524US2

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OCTOBER TERM, 1997

357

Syllabus

PENNSYLVANIA BOARD OF PROBATION AND
PAROLE v. SCOTT

certiorari to the supreme court of pennsylvania

No. 97–581. Argued March 30, 1998—Decided June 22, 1998

A condition of respondent’s Pennsylvania parole was that he refrain from
owning or possessing weapons. Based on evidence that he had violated
this and other such conditions, parole ofﬁcers entered his home and
found ﬁrearms, a bow, and arrows. At his parole violation hearing, re-
spondent objected to the introduction of this evidence on the ground
that the search was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. The
hearing examiner rejected the challenge and admitted the evidence.
As a result, petitioner parole board found sufﬁcient evidence to support
the charges and recommitted respondent. The Commonwealth Court
of Pennsylvania reversed, and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court afﬁrmed
the reversal, holding, inter alia, that although the federal exclusionary
rule, which prohibits the introduction at criminal trial of evidence ob-
tained in violation of a defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights, does not
generally apply in parole revocation hearings, it applied in this case
because the ofﬁcers who conducted the search were aware of respond-
ent’s parole status. The court reasoned that, otherwise, illegal searches
would be undeterred when ofﬁcers know that their subjects are pa-
rolees and that illegally obtained evidence can be introduced at parole
hearings.

Held: The federal exclusionary rule does not bar the introduction at
parole revocation hearings of evidence seized in violation of parolees’
Fourth Amendment rights. The State’s use of such evidence does not
itself violate the Constitution. See, e. g., United States v. Leon, 468
U. S. 897, 906. Rather, a violation is “fully accomplished” by the illegal
search or seizure, and no exclusion of evidence can cure the invasion
of rights the defendant has already suffered. E. g., id., at 906. The
exclusionary rule is instead a judicially created means of deterring ille-
gal searches and seizures. United States v. Calandra, 414 U. S. 338,
348. As such, it does not proscribe the introduction of illegally seized
evidence in all proceedings or against all persons, Stone v. Powell, 428
U. S. 465, 486, but applies only in contexts where its remedial objectives
are thought most efﬁcaciously served, e. g., Calandra, supra, at 348.
Moreover, because the rule is prudential rather than constitutionally
mandated, it applies only where its deterrence beneﬁts outweigh the
substantial social costs inherent in precluding consideration of reliable,