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Page Number: 19

16 

BRUESEWITZ v. WYETH LLC 

Opinion of the Court 

litigate.  Taxing  vaccine  manufacturers’  product  to  fund
the compensation program, while leaving their liability for 
design  defect  virtually  unaltered,  would  hardly  coax 
manufacturers back into the market. 

The  dissent  believes  the  Act’s  mandates  are  irrelevant 
because they do not spur innovation in precisely the same
way  as  state-law  tort  systems.66    That  is  a  novel  sugges-
tion.  Although  we  previously  have  expressed  doubt  that 
Congress  would  quietly  preempt  product-liability  claims
without providing a federal substitute, see Medtronic, Inc. 
v. Lohr, 518 U. S. 470, 486–488 (1996) (plurality opinion),
we have never suggested we would be skeptical of preemp-
tion  unless  the  congressional  substitute  operated  like  the 
tort  system.    We  decline  to  adopt  that  stance  today.    The 
dissent’s  belief  that  the  FDA  and  the  National  Vaccine 
Program cannot alone spur adequate vaccine innovation is
probably questionable, but surely beside the point. 

IV 

Since  our  interpretation  of  §300aa–22(b)(1)  is  the  only 
interpretation  supported  by  the  text  and  structure  of  the
NCVIA, even those of us who believe legislative history is 
a  legitimate  tool  of  statutory  interpretation  have  no  need 
to resort to it.  In any case, the dissent’s contention that it
would contradict our conclusion is mistaken. 

The  dissent’s  legislative  history  relies  on  the  following 
syllogism:  A  1986  House  Committee  Report  states  that
§300aa–22(b)(1)  “sets  forth  the  principle  contained  in
Comment  k  of  Section  402A  of  the  Restatement  of  Torts 
(Second);”67  in  1986  comment  k  was  “commonly  under-
stood”  to  require  a  case-specific  showing  that  “no  feasible 
alternative design” existed; Congress therefore must have 
intended  §300aa–22(b)(1)  to  require  that  showing.68    The  

—————— 

66 See post, at 21–24. 

67 H. R. Rep. No. 99–908, pt. 1, p. 25 (1986) (hereinafter 1986 Report). 

68 Post, at 7–8.