Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/10pdf/09-893.pdf
Page Number: 22

Cite as:  563 U. S. ____ (2011) 

1 

THOMAS, J., concurring 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

_________________ 

No. 09–893 
_________________ 

AT&T MOBILITY LLC, PETITIONER v. VINCENT 

CONCEPCION ET UX. 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 

APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

[April 27, 2011] 

JUSTICE THOMAS, concurring. 
Section 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) provides
that  an  arbitration  provision  “shall  be  valid,  irrevocable, 
and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or
in equity for the revocation of any contract.”  9 U. S. C. §2. 
The  question  here  is  whether  California’s  Discover  Bank 
rule,  see  Discover  Bank  v.  Superior  Ct.,  36  Cal.  4th  148, 
113 P. 3d 1100 (2005), is a “groun[d] . . . for the revocation 
of any contract.”

It would be absurd to suggest that §2 requires only that 
a  defense  apply  to  “any  contract.”    If  §2  means  anything, 
it is that courts cannot refuse to enforce arbitration agree-
ments because of a state public policy against arbitration,
even  if  the  policy  nominally  applies  to  “any  contract.” 
There  must  be  some  additional  limit  on  the  contract  de-
fenses  permitted  by  §2.    Cf.  ante,  at  17  (opinion  of  the 
Court) (state law may not require procedures that are “not
arbitration as envisioned by the FAA” and “lac[k] its bene-
fits”);  post,  at  5  (BREYER,  J.,  dissenting)  (state  law  may 
require  only  procedures  that  are  “consistent  with  the  use
of arbitration”).

I write separately to explain how I would find that limit 
in  the  FAA’s  text.    As  I  would  read  it,  the  FAA  requires
that an agreement to arbitrate be enforced unless a party
successfully  challenges  the  formation  of  the  arbitration