Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/16pdf/15-577_khlp.pdf
Page Number: 9

Cite as:  582 U. S. ____ (2017) 

5 

Opinion of the Court 

antiestablishment  principle  reflected  in  its  own  Constitu-
tion.  Viewing  a  monetary  grant  to  a  religious  institution 
as  a  “ ‘hallmark[ ]  of  an  established  religion,’ ”  the  court
concluded  that  the  State  could  rely  on  an  applicant’s
religious status to deny its application.  Id., at 785 (quot-
ing  Locke,  540  U. S.,  at  722;  some  internal  quotation
marks omitted). 

Judge  Gruender  dissented.  He  distinguished  Locke  on 
the  ground  that  it  concerned  the  narrow  issue  of  funding 
for  the  religious  training  of  clergy,  and  “did  not  leave 
states  with  unfettered  discretion  to  exclude  the  religious 
from  generally  available  public  benefits.”    788  F. 3d,  at 
791 (opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part).

Rehearing  en  banc  was  denied  by  an  equally  divided 

court. 

We  granted  certiorari  sub nom.  Trinity  Lutheran 
Church  of  Columbia,  Inc.  v.  Pauley,  577  U. S.  ___  (2016), 
and now reverse.1 
—————— 

1 In  April  2017,  the  Governor  of  Missouri  announced  that  he  had 
directed  the  Department  to  begin  allowing  religious  organizations  to
compete  for  and  receive  Department  grants  on  the  same  terms  as 
secular  organizations.    That  announcement  does  not  moot  this  case. 
We  have  said  that  such  voluntary  cessation  of  a  challenged  practice 
does  not  moot  a  case  unless  “subsequent  events  ma[ke]  it  absolutely
clear  that  the  allegedly  wrongful  behavior  could  not  reasonably  be
expected to recur.”  Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental 
Services  (TOC),  Inc.,  528  U. S.  167,  189  (2000)  (internal  quotation 
marks omitted).  The Department has not carried the “heavy burden” of 
making “absolutely clear” that it could not revert to its policy of exclud-
ing  religious  organizations.   Ibid.   The  parties  agree.  See  Letter  from 
James  R.  Layton,  Counsel  for  Respondent,  to  Scott  S.  Harris,  Clerk  of
Court  (Apr.  18,  2017)  (adopting  the  position  of  the  Missouri  Attorney
General’s  Office  that  “there  is  no  clearly  effective  barrier  that  would
prevent  the  [Department]  from  reinstating  [its]  policy  in  the  future”); 
Letter  from  David  A.  Cortman,  Counsel  for  Petitioner,  to  Scott  S. 
Harris, Clerk of Court (Apr. 18, 2017) (“[T]he policy change does noth-
ing  to  remedy  the  source  of  the  [Department’s]  original  policy—the 
Missouri Supreme Court’s interpretation of Article 1, §7 of the Missouri
Constitution”).