Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/11pdf/10-1121c4d6.pdf
Page Number: 3

Cite as:  567 U. S. ____ (2012) 

3 

Syllabus 

ly related to compelled speech and compelled association is compelled
funding  of  the  speech  of  private  speakers  or  groups.  Compulsory
subsidies  for  private  speech  are  thus  subject  to  exacting  First
Amendment scrutiny and cannot be sustained unless, first, there is a 
comprehensive regulatory scheme involving a “mandated association”
among  those  who  are  required  to  pay  the  subsidy,  United  States  v. 
United  Foods,  Inc.,  533  U. S.  405,  and,  second,  compulsory  fees  are 
levied  only  insofar  as  they  are  a  “necessary  incident”  of  the  “larger 
regulatory  purpose  which  justified  the  required  association,”  ibid. 
Pp. 8−10. 

(b) When  a  State  establishes  an  “agency  shop”  that  exacts  com-
pulsory  union  fees  as  a  condition  of  public  employment,  “[t]he  dis-
senting employee is forced to support financially an organization with 
whose  principles  and  demands  he  may  disagree.”    Ellis  v.  Railway 
Clerks, 466 U. S. 435, 455.  This form of compelled speech and associ-
ation  imposes  a  “significant  impingement  on  First  Amendment 
rights.”  Ibid.  The  justification  for  permitting  a  union  to  collect  fees
from  nonmembers—to  prevent  them  from  free-riding  on  the  union’s 
efforts—is  an  anomaly.    Similarly,  requiring  objecting  nonmembers
to opt out of paying the nonchargeable portion of union dues―rather 
than  exempting  them  unless  they  opt  in―represents  a  remarkable 
boon for unions, creating a risk that the fees nonmembers pay will be
used to further political and ideological ends with which they do not 
agree.  Thus, Hudson, far from calling for a balancing of rights or in-
terests,  made  it  clear  that  any  procedure  for  exacting  fees  from  un-
willing  contributors  must  be  “carefully  tailored  to  minimize  the  in-
fringement”  of  free  speech  rights,  475  U. S.  302−303,  and  it  cited 
cases  holding  that  measures  burdening  the  freedom  of  speech  or  as-
sociation  must  serve  a  compelling  interest  and  must  not  be  signifi-
cantly broader than necessary to serve that interest.  Pp. 10−13. 

(c) There  is  no  justification  for  the  SEIU’s  failure  to  provide  a 
fresh Hudson notice.  Hudson rests on the principle that nonmembers 
should not be required to fund a union’s political and ideological pro-
jects  unless  they  choose  to  do  so  after  having  “a  fair  opportunity”  to 
assess  the  impact  of  paying  for  nonchargeable  union  activities.    475 
U. S.,  at  303.  The  SEIU’s  procedure  cannot  be  considered  to  have 
met Hudson’s requirement that fee-collection procedures be carefully
tailored  to  minimize  impingement  on  First  Amendment  rights.    The 
SEIU  argues  that  nonmembers  who  objected  to  the  special  assess-
ment but were not given the opportunity to opt out would have been
given  the  chance  to  recover  the  funds  by  opting  out  when  the  next
annual notice was sent, and that the amount of dues payable the fol-
lowing  year  by  objecting  nonmembers  would  decrease  if  the  special 
assessment  were  found  to  be  for  nonchargeable  purposes.    But  this