Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/19pdf/19a1070_08l1.pdf
Page Number: 17.0

Cite as:  591 U. S. ____ (2020) 

5 

KAVANAUGH, J., dissenting 

Or  a  religious  organization  may  contend  that  the  facially 
neutral law was actually motivated by animus against reli-
gion and is unconstitutional on that ground.  See Lukumi, 
508 U. S. 520. 
  Fourth are laws—like Nevada’s in this case—that supply 
no  criteria  for  government  benefits  or  action,  but  rather 
divvy  up  organizations  into  a  favored  or  exempt  category 
and a disfavored or non-exempt category.  Those laws pro-
vide benefits only to organizations in the favored or exempt 
category and not to organizations in the disfavored or non-
exempt category. 
  For example, consider a zoning law that places some sec-
ular organizations (apartment buildings, small retail busi-
nesses, restaurants, banks, etc.) in a favored or exempt zon-
ing category, and places some secular organizations (office 
buildings,  large  retail  businesses,  movie  theaters,  music 
venues, etc.) in a disfavored or non-exempt zoning category.  
Suppose that religious properties arguably could be consid-
ered similar to some of the secular properties in both cate-
gories.    What,  then,  are  the  constitutional  limits  and  re-
quirements  with  respect  to  how  the  legislature  may 
categorize religious organizations? 
  In  those  circumstances,  the  Court’s  precedents  make 
clear that the legislature may place religious organizations 
in the favored or exempt category rather than in the disfa-
vored  or  non-exempt  category  without  causing  an  Estab-
lishment Clause problem.  See, e.g., Walz, 397 U. S., at 696 
(opinion of Harlan, J.) (“[T]he critical question is whether 
the  circumference  of  legislation  encircles  a  class  so  broad 
that  it  can  be  fairly  concluded  that  religious  institutions 
could  be  thought  to  fall  within  the  natural  perimeter”); 
Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U. S. 1, 14 (1989) (plu-
rality opinion) (expressing approval of subsidies “conferred 
upon  a  wide  array  of  nonsectarian  groups  as  well  as  reli-
gious  organizations  in  pursuit  of  some  legitimate  secular 
end”);  Concerned  Citizens  of  Carderock  v.  Hubbard,  84