Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/17pdf/16-402_h315.pdf
Page Number: 37

10 

CARPENTER v. UNITED STATES 

KENNEDY, J., dissenting 

cannot  claim  that  his  ‘property’  was  invaded”).    The  rec-
ords were the business entities’ records, plain and simple.
The defendants had no reason to believe the records were 
owned  or  controlled  by  them  and  so  could  not  assert  a
reasonable expectation of privacy in the records. 

The second principle supporting Miller and Smith is the 
longstanding  rule  that  the  Government  may  use  compul-
sory  process  to  compel  persons  to  disclose  documents  and 
other  evidence  within  their  possession  and  control.    See 
United States v. Nixon, 418 U. S. 683, 709 (1974) (it is an
“ancient proposition of law” that “the public has a right to
every  man’s  evidence”  (internal  quotation  marks  and
alterations  omitted)).  A  subpoena  is  different  from  a
warrant in its force and intrusive power.  While a warrant 
allows  the  Government  to  enter  and  seize  and  make  the 
examination itself, a subpoena simply requires the person
to whom it is directed to make the disclosure.  A subpoena,
moreover,  provides  the  recipient  the  “opportunity  to  pre-
sent objections” before complying, which further mitigates 
the intrusion.  Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 
327 U. S. 186, 195 (1946).

For  those  reasons  this  Court  has  held  that  a  subpoena
for  records,  although  a  “constructive”  search  subject  to
Fourth Amendment constraints, need not comply with the 
procedures applicable to warrants—even when challenged 
by  the  person  to  whom  the  records  belong.    Id.,  at  202, 
208.  Rather,  a  subpoena  complies  with  the  Fourth
Amendment’s reasonableness requirement so long as it is 
“ ‘sufficiently  limited  in  scope,  relevant  in  purpose,  and 
specific  in  directive  so  that  compliance  will  not  be  unrea-
sonably  burdensome.’ ”    Donovan  v.  Lone  Steer,  Inc.,  464 
U. S.  408,  415  (1984).    Persons  with  no  meaningful  inter-
ests in the records sought by a subpoena, like the defend-
ants  in  Miller  and  Smith,  have  no  rights  to  object  to  the
records’  disclosure—much  less  to  assert  that  the  Govern-
ment  must  obtain  a  warrant  to  compel  disclosure  of  the