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Page Number: 9

6 

COUNTERMAN v. COLORADO 

Opinion of the Court 

or other statements that when taken in context do not con-
vey  a  real  possibility  that  violence  will  follow  (say,  “I  am 
going  to  kill  you  for  showing  up  late”).    Watts  v.  United 
States, 394 U. S. 705, 708 (1969) (per curiam).  True threats 
are “serious expression[s]” conveying that a speaker means 
to “commit an act of unlawful violence.”  Black, 538 U. S., 
at  359.  Whether  the  speaker  is  aware  of,  and  intends  to 
convey, the threatening aspect of the message is not part of
what  makes  a  statement  a  threat,  as  this  Court  recently
explained.  See Elonis v. United States, 575 U. S. 723, 733 
(2015).  The existence of a threat depends not on “the men-
tal  state  of  the  author,”  but  on  “what  the  statement  con-
veys” to the person on the other end.  Ibid.  When the state-
ment is understood as a true threat, all the harms that have 
long  made  threats  unprotected  naturally  follow.    True 
threats subject individuals to “fear of violence” and to the 
many kinds of “disruption that fear engenders.”  Black, 538 
U. S., at 360 (internal quotation marks omitted).  The facts 
of this case well illustrate how.3 

Yet the First Amendment may still demand a subjective
mental-state requirement shielding some true threats from 
liability.  The  reason  relates  to  what  is  often  called  a 
chilling effect.  Prohibitions on speech have the potential to
chill, or deter, speech outside their boundaries.  A speaker
may be unsure about the side of a line on which his speech 

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3 The concurrence relies on Virginia v. Black, 538 U. S. 343 (2003), to
argue that the category of true threats itself incorporates a mens rea el-
ement.  See post, at 9–11, 14 (SOTOMAYOR, J., concurring in part and con-
curring  in  judgment).    But  that  claim  is  based  on  a  misreading.    The 
statements  the  concurrence  quotes  merely  reflect  that  the  statute  in-
volved in the case required a showing of intent.  Black did not address 
whether the First Amendment demands such a showing, or why it might 
do so.  See United States v. Jeffries, 692 F. 3d 473, 479–480 (CA6 2012) 
(Sutton, J.); see also post, at 9–10, and n. 4 (BARRETT, J., dissenting) (ex-
plaining that Black concerned a different part of the statute, preventing 
consideration of contextual factors in assessing whether a statement was
a threat).