Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/558bv.pdf
Page Number: 457.0

296 

WOOD  v.  ALLEN 

Opinion of the Court 

to  the  court,  there  was  “nothing  in  the  record  to  even  re­
motely support a ﬁnding that counsel made a strategic deci­
sion  not  to  let  the  jury  at  the  penalty  stage  know  about 
Wood’s  mental  condition.”  Id.,  at  1242.  Ralph  and  Dozier, 
the  court  noted,  had  placed  the  inexperienced  Trotter  in 
charge of  the penalty phase.  At  the Rule 32  hearing, Trot­
ter testiﬁed that he had seen the references to Wood’s intel­
lectual  functioning  in  the  Kirkland  report  but  did  not  recall 
considering  whether  to  pursue  that  issue.  Trotter  further 
testiﬁed  that  he  had  unsuccessfully  attempted  to  subpoena 
Wood’s  school  records  and  that  he  did  not  recall  speaking 
to  any  of  Wood’s  teachers.  Trotter  had  also  written  to  an 
attorney  at  the  Southern  Poverty  Law  Center  explaining 
that  he  was  “ ‘stressed  out  over  this  case  and  [didn’t]  have 
anyone  with  whom  to  discuss  the  case,  including  the  other 
two  attorneys.’ ”  Id.,  at  1241.  Shortly  before  the  penalty 
phase  began,  Trotter  told  the  judge  that  he  would  request 
further  psychological  evaluation  before  the  judge’s  sentenc­
ing hearing, even though the evaluation would come too late 
to  be  considered  by  the  jury.  Id.,  at  1241–1242.  Based  on 
this  evidence,  the  District  Court  concluded  that  the  state 
court’s  ﬁnding  “that  a  strategic  decision  was  made  not  to 
investigate  or  introduce  to  the  sentencing  jury  evidence  of 
mental  retardation  [was]  an  unreasonable  determination  of 
the  facts  in  light  of  the  clear  and  convincing  evidence  pre­
sented in the record.”  Ibid. 

Having  rejected  the  state  court’s  factual  determinations, 
the District Court held that counsel’s performance was deﬁ­
cient  and  that  counsel’s  deﬁcient  performance  prejudiced 
Wood,  concluding  that  the  state  court’s  holdings  to  the  con­
trary constituted “an unreasonable application of federal law 
under  Strickland.”  Id.,  at  1245.  The  court  granted  the 
petition  on  this  claim  and  ordered  the  State  either  to  re-
sentence  Wood  to  life  without  parole  or  to  conduct  a  new 
sentencing hearing.