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Page Number: 22

16  NEW YORK STATE RIFLE & PISTOL ASSN., INC. v. BRUEN 

Opinion of the Court 

e.g., United States v. Stevens, 559 U. S. 460, 468–471 (2010) 
(placing the burden on the government to show that a type
of speech belongs to a “historic and traditional categor[y]”
of constitutionally unprotected speech “long familiar to the 
bar” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

And beyond the freedom of speech, our focus on history 
also  comports  with  how  we  assess  many  other  constitu-
tional claims.  If a litigant asserts the right in court to “be 
confronted  with  the  witnesses  against  him,”  U. S.  Const., 
Amdt. 6, we require courts to consult history to determine 
the  scope  of  that  right.  See,  e.g.,  Giles  v.  California,  554 
U. S. 353, 358 (2008) (“admitting only those exceptions [to 
the  Confrontation  Clause]  established  at  the  time  of  the 
founding” (internal quotation marks omitted)).  Similarly, 
when  a  litigant  claims  a  violation  of  his  rights  under  the 
Establishment Clause, Members of this Court “loo[k] to his-
tory for guidance.”  American Legion v. American Humanist 
Assn., 588 U. S. ___, ___ (2019) (plurality opinion) (slip op., 
at 25).  We adopt a similar approach here. 

To be sure, “[h]istorical analysis can be difficult; it some-
times  requires  resolving  threshold  questions, and  making 
nuanced  judgments  about  which  evidence  to  consult  and 
how  to  interpret  it.”  McDonald,  561  U. S.,  at  803–804 
(Scalia, J., concurring).  But reliance on history to inform
the  meaning  of  constitutional  text—especially  text  meant 
to  codify  a  pre-existing  right—is,  in  our  view,  more  legiti-
mate, and more administrable, than asking judges to “make
difficult empirical judgments” about “the costs and benefits
of firearms restrictions,” especially given their “lack [of] ex-
pertise” in the field.  Id., at 790–791 (plurality opinion).6 

—————— 

6 The dissent claims that Heller’s text-and-history test will prove un-
workable compared to means-end scrutiny in part because judges are rel-
atively ill equipped to “resolv[e] difficult historical questions” or engage
in “searching historical surveys.”  Post, at 26, 30.  We are unpersuaded.
The job of judges is not to resolve historical questions in the abstract; it