Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/16pdf/15-1293_1o13.pdf
Page Number: 15

Cite as:  582 U. S. ____ (2017) 

11 

Opinion of the Court 

the  reach  of  the  disparagement  clause  in  the  way  that 
Tam suggests, it would have been easy to do so.  A neigh-
boring provision of the Lanham Act denies registration to 
any  trademark  that  “[c]onsists  of  or  comprises  a  name, 
portrait,  or  signature  identifying  a  particular  living  indi-
vidual except by his written consent.”  §1052(c) (emphasis
added).

Tam  contends  that  his  interpretation  of  the  disparage-
ment  clause  is  supported  by  its  legislative  history  and  by 
the  PTO’s  willingness  for  many  years  to  register  marks
that  plainly  denigrated  African-Americans  and  Native
Americans.  These  arguments  are  unpersuasive.    As  al-
ways,  our  inquiry  into  the  meaning  of  the  statute’s  text
ceases when “the statutory language is unambiguous and 
the  statutory  scheme  is  coherent  and  consistent.”  Barn-
hart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U. S. 438, 450 (2002) (inter-
nal  quotation  marks  omitted).  Here,  it  is  clear  that  the 
prohibition  against  registering  trademarks  “which  may
disparage . . . persons,”  §1052(a), prohibits registration of
terms that disparage persons who share a common race or 
ethnicity.

Even  if  resort  to  legislative  history  and  early  enforce-
ment  practice  were  appropriate,  we  would  find  Tam’s
arguments  unconvincing.    Tam  has  not  brought  to  our 
attention  any  evidence  in  the  legislative  history  showing 
that Congress meant to adopt his interpretation.  And the 
practice  of  the  PTO  in  the  years  following  the  enactment
of  the  disparagement  clause  is  unenlightening.    The  ad-
mitted vagueness of the disparagement test5 and the huge 

—————— 

5 The  PTO  has  acknowledged  that  the  guidelines  “for  determining 
whether a mark is scandalous or disparaging are somewhat vague and 
the  determination  of  whether  a  mark  is  scandalous  or  disparaging  is
necessarily a highly subjective one.”  In re In Over Our Heads, Inc., 16 
USPQ 2d  1653,  1654  (TTAB  1990)  (brackets  and  internal  quotation
marks omitted).  The PTO has similarly observed that whether a mark
is disparaging “is highly subjective and, thus, general rules are difficult