Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/17pdf/17-459_1o13.pdf
Page Number: 12.0

8 

PEREIRA v. SESSIONS 

Opinion of the Court 

appear”  that  fails  to  specify  “the 
listed” 
§1229(a)(1) trigger the stop-time rule?4  Pet. for Cert. i. 

items 

in 

As a threshold matter, the Court notes that the question 
presented by Pereira, which focuses on all “items listed” in 
§1229(a)(1),  sweeps  more  broadly  than  necessary  to  re-
solve  the  particular  case  before  us.    Although  the  time-
and-place information in a notice to appear will vary from
case  to  case,  the  Government  acknowledges  that  “[m]uch 
of  the  information  Section  1229(a)(1)  calls  for  does  not”
change  and  is  therefore  “included  in  standardized  lan-
guage  on  the  I–862  notice-to-appear  form.”  Brief  for  Re-
spondent  36  (referencing  8  U. S. C.  §§1229(a)(1)(A)–(B),
(E)–(F), and (G)(ii)).  In fact, the Government’s 2006 notice 
to  Pereira  included  all  of  the  information  required  by
§1229(a)(1), except it failed to specify the date and time of 
Pereira’s  removal  proceedings.  See  App.  10–12.  Accord-
ingly,  the  dispositive  question  in  this  case  is  much  nar-
rower, but no less vital: Does a “notice to appear” that does
not  specify  the  “time  and  place  at  which  the  proceedings 
will  be  held,”  as  required  by  §1229(a)(1)(G)(i),  trigger  the 
stop-time rule?5 

—————— 

4 Compare  Orozco-Velasquez  v.  Attorney  General  United  States,  817 
F. 3d 78, 83–84 (CA3 2016) (holding that the stop-time rule unambigu-
ously  requires  service  of  a  “notice  to  appear”  that  meets  §1229(a)(1)’s
requirements), with Moscoso-Castellanos v. Lynch, 803 F. 3d 1079, 1083 
(CA9  2015)  (finding  the  statute  ambiguous  and  deferring  to  the  BIA’s
interpretation);  O’Garro  v.  United  States  Atty.  Gen.,  605  Fed.  Appx. 
951,  953  (CA11  2015)  (per  curiam)  (same);  Guaman-Yuqui  v.  Lynch, 
786  F. 3d  235,  239–240  (CA2  2015)  (per  curiam)  (same);  Gonzalez-
Garcia  v.  Holder,  770  F. 3d  431,  434–435  (CA6  2014)  (same);  Yi  Di 
Wang v. Holder, 759 F. 3d  670,  674–675  (CA7  2014) (same); Urbina  v. 
Holder, 745 F. 3d 736, 740 (CA4 2014) (same). 

5 The  Court  leaves  for  another  day  whether  a  putative  notice  to  ap-
pear that omits any of the other categories of information enumerated
in  §1229(a)(1)  triggers  the  stop-time  rule.    Contrary  to  the  dissent’s 
assertion, this exercise of judicial restraint is by no means “tantamount 
to  admitting”  that  the  Government’s  (and  dissent’s)  atextual  interpre-