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Page Number: 10

10 

SHOOP v. CASSANO 

THOMAS, J., dissenting 

U. S.,  at  101  (quoting  Yarborough  v.  Alvarado,  541  U. S. 
652, 664 (2004)).  As discussed above, supra, at 7, the Su-
preme Court of Ohio’s  decision that Cassano’s tepid April 
1999 question on the eve of trial “was not an explicit and
unequivocal  demand  for  self-representation,”  Cassano,  96 
Ohio St. 3d, at 100, 772 N. E. 2d, at 91, was “at least debat-
able,” 562 U. S., at 110. 

Perhaps  recognizing  that  the  substance  of  Cassano’s
April 1999 motion—a single question—did not suffice, the 
Court  of  Appeals  emphasized  the  “context”  in  which  the 
question was asked.  1 F. 4th, at 474.  It noted that, at the 
earlier  September  1998  hearing,  the  trial  court  had  told
Cassano  that  he  was  “ ‘not  going  to  represent  [himself]  in 
this matter,’ ” and that the law did not require the court to 
allow him to represent himself.  Ibid.; see App. to Pet. for 
Cert.  260a.  Taking  into  account  that  statement  and  the
court’s “stern admonishment” during the September hear-
ing “that Cassano would never be allowed to even speak in 
the  courtroom,”  the  Court  of  Appeals  held  that  “no  fair-
minded  jurist  could  conclude”  that  Cassano’s  April  1999
question “was unclear or equivocal.”  1 F. 4th, at 474. 

The Court of Appeals’ analysis is obviously wrong.  First, 
the Court of Appeals ignored the more immediate context
of  the  April  1999  hearing,  which  supports  the  Supreme 
Court of Ohio’s reasoned decision.  Cassano equivocated at 
the April hearing.  He first demanded counsel’s presence at 
the trial, then asked about self-representation, and then ac-
cepted counsel’s help.  That context suggests equivocation 
just as much as his tepid question does.

Second, the “context” that the Court of Appeals chose to 
highlight  does  not  help  Cassano’s  cause.    The  state  trial 
court made the September 1998 comments at a hearing in
which it rejected Cassano’s request to be appointed co-coun-
sel with his attorneys, which (as the Court of Appeals itself 
recognized) he had no right to demand.  See id., at 471; see 
McKaskle  v.  Wiggins,  465  U. S.  168,  183  (1984)  (“Faretta