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16  AMERICANS FOR PROSPERITY FOUNDATION v. BONTA 

Opinion of the Court 

a law may be invalidated as overbroad if a substantial num-
ber of its applications are unconstitutional, judged in rela-
tion  to  the  statute’s  plainly  legitimate  sweep.”  United 
States v. Stevens, 559 U. S. 460, 473 (2010) (internal quota-
tion marks omitted).  We have no trouble concluding here
that the Attorney General’s disclosure requirement is over-
broad.  The  lack  of  tailoring  to  the  State’s  investigative
goals is categorical—present in every case—as is the weak-
ness of the State’s interest in administrative convenience. 
Every  demand  that  might  chill  association  therefore  fails 
exacting scrutiny. 

The  Attorney  General  tries  to  downplay  the  burden  on 
donors, arguing that “there is no basis on which to conclude 
that  California’s  requirement  results  in  any  broad-based 
chill.”  Brief for Respondent 36.  He emphasizes that “Cali-
fornia’s  Schedule  B  requirement  is  confidential,”  and  he 
suggests  that  certain  donors—like  those  who  give  to  non-
controversial  charities—are  unlikely  to  be  deterred  from
contributing.  Id., at 36–37.  He also contends that disclo-
sure to his office imposes no added burdens on donors be-
cause tax-exempt charities already provide their Schedule 
Bs to the IRS.  Id., at 37. 

We are unpersuaded.  Our cases have said that disclosure 
requirements  can  chill  association  “[e]ven  if  there  [is]  no 
disclosure to the general public.”  Shelton, 364 U. S., at 486. 
In Shelton, for example, we noted the “constant and heavy” 
pressure  teachers  would  experience  simply  by  disclosing
their  associational  ties  to  their  schools.    Ibid.  Exacting
scrutiny is triggered by “state action which may have the 
effect  of  curtailing  the  freedom  to  associate,”  and  by  the 
“possible  deterrent  effect”  of  disclosure.  NAACP  v.  Ala-
bama, 357 U. S., at 460–461 (emphasis added); see Talley 
v.  California,  362  U. S.  60,  65  (1960)  (“identification  and 
fear of reprisal might deter perfectly peaceful discussions of 
public matters of importance” (emphasis added)).  While as-