Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/23pdf/23a349_0813.pdf
Page Number: 30.0

8 

OHIO v. EPA 

BARRETT, J., dissenting 

  Second, even putting aside this aspect of §7607(d)(7)(B), 
it is not clear that any commenter raised with “reasonable 
specificity”  the  underlying  substantive  issue:  that  the  ex-
clusion  of  some  States  from  the  FIP  would  undermine 
EPA’s  cost-effectiveness  analyses  and  resulting  emissions 
controls.    §7607(d)(7)(B);  see  ante,  at  13.    The  Court  con-
cludes  otherwise  only  by  putting  in  the  commenters’ 
mouths words they did not say.  It first cites a bevy of com-
ments  arguing  that  EPA’s  “disapprovals  of  the  SIPs  were 
legally flawed” and noting the obvious point that EPA can-
not “include a State in its FIP” unless it validly disapproves 
the State’s SIP.  Ante, at 6.  These comments do not address 
the  continued  efficacy  of a  FIP  that  applies to a subset  of 
the originally covered States. 
  Another collection of the Court’s inapposite comments re-
lates to the inclusion of specific sources, emissions controls, 
and industries in the proposed plan—not States.  See ante, 
at  7,  n. 4.    For  example,  one  commenter  argued  that  the 
“cost effectiveness of the requirement to employ SNCR will 
be  highly  variable,  and  is  unlikely  to  meet  EPA  expecta-

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§7607(d)(7)(B)’s  procedural  bar.    Ante,  at  17.    It  simply  quotes 
§7607(d)(7)(B) and asserts without support that it means that a plaintiff 
“need not go back to the agency and insist on an explanation a second 
time.”  Ibid.  The Court fails to engage with the logic of this argument: 
The objection that the final rule did not contain sufficient explanation 
was not and could not have been raised during the comment period, so it 
must be raised in a petition for reconsideration.  EME Homer, 795 F. 3d, 
at  137.    The  Court  claims  that  its  theory  is  different  from  the  logical-
outgrowth challenge the D. C. Circuit considered in EME Homer.  Ante, 
at 17.  But the Court ignores the fact that its failure-to-explain challenge 
and logical-outgrowth challenges are both “objection[s] to the notice and 
comment  process  itself ”  that  depend  on  the  content  of  the  final  rule.  
EME Homer, 795 F. 3d, at 137.  Even if the public raised an “important 
problem . . . during the comment period,” ante, at 17, the Court’s basis 
for  enjoining  the  FIP’s  enforcement  is  not  that  the  alleged  problem  is 
real, but that the final rule did not address it.