Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/11pdf/10-545.pdf
Page Number: 61.0

16 

GOLAN v. HOLDER 

BREYER, J., dissenting 

ers,  who  hoped  that  passage  of  the  statute  would  enable 
them  to  benefit  from  reciprocal  treatment  of  American
authors  abroad,  infra,  at  21,  I  cannot  say  that  even  here
the problem, while much diminished, was nonexistent.

I agree with the majority that, in  doing so, this statute
does  not  discriminate  among  speakers  based  on  their 
viewpoints or subject matter.  Ante, at 27.  But such con­
siderations  do  not  exhaust  potential  First  Amendment 
problems.  Cf.  Sorrell  v.  IMS  Health  Inc.,  564  U. S.  ___, 
___ (2011) (slip op., at 8) (finding First Amendment prob­
lem  in  statute  that  prohibits  drug  manufacturers  from
using publicly available prescriber-identifying information
in  their  marketing  efforts  in  part  because  it  “disfavor[ed]
specific  speakers”);  Turner  Broadcasting  System,  Inc.  v. 
FCC, 512 U. S. 622, 659 (1994) (“Regulations that discrim­
inate among media, or among different speakers within a 
single  medium,  often  present  serious  First  Amendment 
concerns”).

Taken  together,  these  speech-related  harms  (e.g.,  re­
stricting  use  of  previously  available  material;  reversing
payment  expectations;  rewarding  rent-seekers  at  the 
public’s  expense)  at  least  show  the  presence  of  a  First 
Amendment  interest.    And  that  is  enough.    For  present 
purposes,  I  need  not  decide  whether  the  harms  to  that
interest show a violation of the First Amendment.  I need 
only point to the importance of interpreting the Constitu­
tion as a single document—a document that we should not 
read  as  setting  the  Copyright  Clause  and  the  First 
Amendment  at  cross-purposes.    Nor  need  I  advocate  the 
application here of strict or specially heightened review.  I 
need  only  find  that  the  First  Amendment  interest  is  im­
portant  enough  to  require  courts  to  scrutinize  with  some
care  the  reasons  claimed  to  justify  the  Act  in  order  to 
determine  whether  they  constitute  reasonable  copyright­
related  justifications  for  the  serious  harms,  including
speech-related  harms,  which  the  Act  seems  likely  to