Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/529bv.pdf
Page Number: 259

529US1

Unit: $U36

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184

FDA v. BROWN & WILLIAMSON TOBACCO CORP.

Breyer, J., dissenting

In addition, at least one post-1938 statute reveals quite a
different congressional intent than the majority infers. See
note following 21 U. S. C. § 321 (1994 ed., Supp. III) (FDA
Modernization Act of 1997) (law “shall [not] be construed to
affect the question of whether the [FDA] has any authority
to regulate any tobacco product,” and “[s]uch authority, if
any, shall be exercised under the [FDCA] as in effect on the
day before the date of [this] enactment”). Consequently, it
appears that the only interpretation that can reconcile all of
the subsequent statutes is the inference that Congress did
not intend, either explicitly or implicitly, for its later laws to
answer the question of the scope of the FDA’s jurisdictional
authority. See 143 Cong. Rec. S8860 (Sept. 5, 1997) (the
Modernization Act will “not interfere or substantially nega-
tively affect any of the FDA tobacco authority”).

The majority’s historical perspective also appears to be
shaped by language in the Federal Cigarette Labeling and
Advertising Act (FCLAA), 79 Stat. 282, 15 U. S. C. § 1331
et seq. See ante, at 148–149. The FCLAA requires manu-
facturers to place on cigarette packages, etc., health warn-
ings such as the following:

“SURGEON GENERAL’S WARNING: Smoking
Causes Lung Cancer, Heart Disease, Emphysema, And
May Complicate Pregnancy.” 15 U. S. C. § 1333(a).

The FCLAA has an express pre-emption provision which
says that “[n]o statement relating to smoking and health,
other than the statement required by [this Act], shall be re-
quired on any cigarette package.” § 1334(a). This pre-
emption clause plainly prohibits the FDA from requiring on
“any cigarette package” any other “statement relating to
smoking and health,” but no one contends that the FDA has
failed to abide by this prohibition. See, e. g., 61 Fed. Reg.
44399 (1996) (describing the other regulatory prescriptions).
Rather, the question is whether the FCLAA’s pre-emption