Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/10pdf/10-277.pdf
Page Number: 38.0

Cite as:  564 U. S. ____ (2011) 

7 

Opinion of GINSBURG, J. 

prototypical  cases  in  this  area,  Leisner  v.  New  York  Tel. 
Co., 358 F. Supp. 359, 364–365 (SDNY 1973).  In deciding
on promotions, supervisors in that case were to start with
objective  measures;  but  ultimately,  they  were  to  “look  at
the individual as a total individual.”  Id., at 365 (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  The final question they were to
ask  and  answer:  “Is  this  person  going  to  be  successful  in 
our  business?”  Ibid.  (internal  quotation  marks  omitted).
It  is  hardly  surprising  that  for  many  managers,  the  ideal
candidate  was  someone  with  characteristics  similar  to 
their own. 

We have held that “discretionary employment practices”
can give rise to Title VII claims, not only when such prac-
tices are motivated by discriminatory intent but also when
they  produce  discriminatory  results.  See  Watson  v.  Fort 
Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U. S. 977, 988, 991 (1988).  But 
see  ante,  at  17  (“[P]roving  that  [a]  discretionary  system
has produced a . . . disparity is not enough.”).  In Watson, 
as here, an employer had given its managers large author-
ity  over  promotions.    An  employee  sued  the  bank  under 
Title  VII,  alleging  that  the  “discretionary  promotion  sys-
tem”  caused  a  discriminatory  effect  based  on  race.  487 
U. S.,  at  984  (internal  quotation  marks  omitted).    Four 
different  supervisors  had  declined,  on  separate  occasions,
to promote the employee.  Id., at 982.  Their reasons were 
subjective  and  unknown.    The  employer,  we  noted  “had 
not  developed  precise  and  formal  criteria  for  evaluating 
candidates”; “[i]t relied instead on the subjective judgment
of supervisors.”  Ibid. 

Aware  of  “the  problem  of  subconscious  stereotypes  and 
prejudices,”  we  held  that  the  employer’s  “undisciplined
system of subjective decisionmaking” was an “employment 
practic[e]”  that  “may  be  analyzed  under  the  disparate 
impact  approach.”    Id.,  at  990–991.    See  also  Wards  Cove 
Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U. S. 642, 657 (1989) (recogniz-
ing  “the  use  of  ‘subjective  decision  making’ ”  as  an  “em-