Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/21pdf/21-499_gfbh.pdf
Page Number: 25

Cite as:  597 U. S. ____ (2022) 

5 

KAGAN, J., dissenting 

not my conclusion?  The majority’s argument is that “a vio-
lation of Miranda does not necessarily constitute a violation
of the Constitution,” because Miranda’s rules are “prophy-
lactic.”  Ante, at 13.  The idea is that the Fifth Amendment 
prohibits  the  use  only  of  statements  obtained  by  compul-
sion, whereas Miranda excludes non-compelled statements 
too.  See ante, at 4–5.  That is why, the majority says, the
Court has been able to recognize exceptions permitting cer-
tain  uses  of  un-Mirandized  statements  at  trial  (when  it 
could not do so for compelled statements).  See ante, at 7–9. 
But none of that helps the majority’s case.  Let’s assume, 
as the majority says, that Miranda extends beyond—in or-
der to safeguard—the Fifth Amendment’s core guarantee.
Still, Miranda is enforceable through §1983.  It remains a 
constitutional  rule,  as  Dickerson  held  (and  the  majority
agrees).  And it grants the defendant a legally enforceable 
entitlement—in a word, a right—to have his confession ex-
cluded.  So, to refer back to the language of §1983, Miranda 
grants a “right[ ]” “secured by the Constitution.”  Whether 
that  right  to  have  evidence  excluded  safeguards  a  yet 
deeper  constitutional  commitment  makes  no  difference  to 
§1983.  The majority has no response to that point—except 
to repeat what our argument assumes already.  See ante, at 
14, n. 6 (describing Miranda as prophylactic).

Compare the majority’s holding today to a prior decision,
in  which  the  Court  “rejected  [an]  attempt[ ]  to  limit  the 
types of constitutional rights that are encompassed within ” 
§1983.  Dennis,  498  U. S.,  at  445.    There,  the  Court  held 
that a plaintiff could sue under §1983 for a violation of the
so-called dormant Commerce Clause, which safeguards in-
terstate commerce.  To the Court, it did not matter that the 
Commerce Clause might be viewed as “merely allocat[ing]
power  between  the  Federal  and  State  Governments”  over 
interstate commerce, rather than as “confer[ring] ‘rights.’ ”  
Id., at 447.  Nor did it matter that the dormant Commerce 
Clause’s  protection  is  only  “implied”  by  the  constitutional