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Page Number: 11.0

6 

RUCHO v. COMMON CAUSE 

Opinion of the Court 

voters  out  of  the  Sixth  District  and  moving  350,000  new 
voters in.  Overall, the Plan reduced the number of regis-
tered  Republicans  in  the  Sixth  District  by  about  66,000 
and  increased  the  number  of  registered  Democrats  by 
about 24,000.  Id., at 499–501.  The map was adopted by a 
party-line vote.  Id., at 506.  It was used in the 2012 elec-
tion and succeeded in flipping the Sixth District.  A Demo-
crat has held the seat ever since. 

In  November  2013,  three  Maryland  voters  filed  this 
lawsuit.  They  alleged  that  the  2011  Plan  violated  the
First Amendment, the Elections Clause, and Article I, §2,
of  the  Constitution.  After  considerable  procedural  skir-
mishing and litigation over preliminary relief, the District 
Court  entered  summary  judgment  for  the  plaintiffs.  348 
F. Supp.  3d  493.  It  concluded  that  the  plaintiffs’  claims
were  justiciable,  and  that  the  Plan  violated  the  First 
Amendment  by  diminishing  their  “ability  to  elect  their 
candidate  of  choice”  because  of  their  party  affiliation  and 
voting  history,  and  by  burdening  their  associational
rights.  Id.,  at  498.  On  the  latter  point,  the  court  relied
upon findings that Republicans in the Sixth District “were
burdened in fundraising, attracting volunteers, campaign-
ing, and generating interest in voting in an atmosphere of 
general confusion and apathy.”  Id., at 524. 

The District Court permanently enjoined the State from 
using  the  2011  Plan  and  ordered  it  to  promptly  adopt  a 
new  plan  for  the  2020  election.    Id.,  at  525.    The  defend-
ants  appealed  directly  to  this  Court  under  28  U. S. C.
§1253.  We postponed jurisdiction.  586 U. S. ___ (2019). 

II 
A 

Article  III  of  the  Constitution  limits  federal  courts  to 
deciding  “Cases”  and  “Controversies.”    We  have  under-
stood  that  limitation  to  mean  that  federal  courts  can 
address  only  questions  “historically  viewed  as  capable  of