Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/16pdf/15-827_0pm1.pdf
Page Number: 3.0

Cite as: 580 U. S. ____ (2017) 

3 

Syllabus 

These provisions reflect what the Court said in Rowley by focusing on
“progress  in  the  general  education  curriculum.”    §§1414(d)(1)(A)(i) 
(I)(aa), (II)(aa), (IV)(bb). 

Rowley  did  not  provide  concrete  guidance  with  respect  to  a  child
who  is  not  fully  integrated  in  the  regular  classroom  and  not  able  to
achieve on grade level.  A child’s IEP need not aim for grade-level ad-
vancement if that is not a reasonable prospect.  But that child’s edu-
cational program must be appropriately ambitious in light of his cir-
cumstances, 
is 
appropriately  ambitious  for  most  children  in  the  regular  classroom. 
The goals may differ, but every child should have the chance to meet 
challenging objectives.

just  as  advancement 

from  grade 

to  grade 

This  standard  is  more  demanding  than  the  “merely  more  than  de 
minimis”  test  applied  by  the  Tenth  Circuit.    It  cannot  be  right  that 
the  IDEA  generally  contemplates  grade-level  advancement  for  chil-
dren  with  disabilities  who  are  fully  integrated  in  the  regular  class-
room, but is satisfied with barely more than de minimis progress for 
children who are not.  Pp. 9–15.

(b) Endrew’s  parents  argue  that  the  Act  goes  even  further  and  re-
quires States to provide children with disabilities educational oppor-
tunities  that  are  “substantially  equal  to  the  opportunities  afforded
children without disabilities.”  Brief for Petitioner 40.  But the lower 
courts  in  Rowley  adopted  a  strikingly  similar  standard,  and  this
Court rejected it in clear terms.  Mindful that Congress has not ma-
terially changed the statutory definition of a FAPE since Rowley was 
decided,  this  Court  declines  to  interpret  the  FAPE  provision  in  a
manner  so  plainly  at  odds  with  the  Court’s  analysis  in  that  case.
P. 15. 

(c) The adequacy of a given IEP turns on the unique circumstances 
of  the  child  for  whom  it  was  created.    This  absence  of  a  bright-line
rule should not be mistaken for “an invitation to the courts to substi-
tute  their  own  notions  of  sound  educational  policy  for  those  of  the
school authorities which they review.”  Rowley, 458 U. S., at 206.  At 
the same time, deference is based on the application of expertise and
the exercise of judgment by school authorities.  The nature of the IEP 
process ensures that parents and school representatives will fully air
their  respective  opinions  on  the  degree  of  progress  a  child’s  IEP 
should  pursue;  thus,  by  the  time  any  dispute  reaches  court,  school
authorities  will  have  had  the  chance  to  bring  their  expertise  and 
judgment to bear on areas of disagreement.  See §§1414, 1415; Row-
ley, 458 U. S., at 208–209.  At that point, a reviewing court may fairly
expect  those  authorities  to  be  able  to  offer  a  cogent  and  responsive 
explanation for their decisions that shows the IEP is reasonably cal-
culated  to  enable  the  child  to  make  progress  appropriate  in  light  of