Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/21pdf/21-12_m6hn.pdf
Page Number: 34

Cite as:  596 U. S. ____ (2022) 

7 

KAGAN, J., dissenting 

democracy.”  Nixon  v.  Shrink  Missouri  Government  PAC, 
528  U. S.  377,  388–389  (2000)  (internal  quotation  marks
omitted).  And  the  appearance  of  that  corruption  (though 
scarcely mentioned in the majority opinion) is “[o]f almost 
equal  concern.”  Id.,  at  388.    Avoiding  that  appearance  is
“critical” if public “confidence in the system of representa-
tive Government is not to be eroded to a disastrous extent.” 
Id., at 389. 

Serious dangers of actual and apparent quid pro quo cor-
ruption  attend  the  transactions  Section  304  regulates—
again, the use of post-election contributions to repay a can-
didate’s  personal  loans.    Consider  a  simple  comparison.
When a campaign uses a donation to fund routine electoral 
activities (including speech), the money marginally aids the 
candidate’s  electoral  odds,  but  in  no  way  adds  to  his  per-
sonal wealth.  By contrast, when a campaign uses a dona-
tion to repay the candidate’s loan, every dollar given goes
straight into the candidate’s pocket.  With each such contri-
bution, his assets increase; he can now buy a car or make 
tuition payments or join a country club—all with his donors’ 
dollars.  So contributions going to loan repayment have ex-
ceptional  value  to  the  candidate—which  his  donors  of 
course realize.  And when the contributions occur after the 
election,  their  corrupting  potential  further  increases.    At 
that  time,  a  campaign  can  use  donations  only  to  repay 
loans,  of  which  some  97%  come  from  candidates.  See  11 
CFR 110.1(b)(3)(i) (2017); A. Ovtchinnikov & P. Valta, Self-
Funding of Political Campaigns, Management Science, Ar-
ticles in Advance 5 (Apr. 7, 2022) (Ovtchinnikov, Self-Fund-
ing).  So post-election donors can be confident their money
will enrich a candidate personally.  And those donors have 
of  course  learned  which  candidate  won.  When  they  give
money  to  repay  the  victor’s  loan,  they  know—not  merely
hope—he will be in a position to perform official favors.  The 
recipe for quid pro quo corruption is thus in place: a dona-
tion to enhance the candidate’s own wealth (the quid), made