Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/23pdf/22-842_6kg7.pdf
Page Number: 21

Cite as:  602 U. S. ____ (2024) 

17 

Opinion of the Court 

factual allegations in the complaint are true.5 

Moreover, the conceded illegality of the NRA-endorsed in-
surance  programs  does  not  insulate  Vullo  from  First 
Amendment scrutiny under the Bantam Books framework. 
Indeed, the commission in that case targeted the distribu-
tion and display of material that, in its view, violated the
State’s obscenity laws.  Nothing in that case turned on the
distributor’s compliance with state law.  On the contrary, 
Bantam Books held that the commission violated the First 
Amendment by invoking legal sanctions to suppress disfa-
vored publications, some of which may or may not contain
protected speech (i.e., nonobscene material).  See 372 U. S., 
at 64, 67.  Here, too, although Vullo can pursue violations
of state insurance law, she cannot do so in order to punish 
or  suppress  the  NRA’s  protected  expression.    So,  the  con-
tention that the NRA and the insurers violated New York 
law does not excuse Vullo from allegedly employing coercive
threats to stifle gun-promotion advocacy.

Vullo next argues that this case does not involve uncon-
stitutional coercion because her challenged actions in fact 
targeted business practices and relationships, which qual-
ify  as  “nonexpressive  activity.”  Brief  for  Respondent  32. 
The argument is misplaced.  That Vullo “regulate[d]” busi-
ness  activities  stemming  from  the  NRA’s  “relationships
with insurers and banks,” ibid., does not change the allega-
tions that her actions were aimed at punishing or suppress-
ing  speech.  In  Bantam  Books,  the  commission  interfered 
with the business relationship between the distributor and 

—————— 

5 Vullo  also  argues  that  she  is  entitled  to  absolute  prosecutorial  im-
munity  for  her  enforcement  actions.    See  Brief  for  Respondent  25–28. 
Putting aside whether a financial regulator like Vullo is entitled to such 
immunity in the administrative context, because Vullo did not raise this
defense below with respect to the First Amendment claim (or even with
respect  to  allegations  unrelated  to  the  consent  decrees),  the  Court  de-
clines to consider that argument here in the first instance.