Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/12pdf/12-133_19m1.pdf
Page Number: 16.0

Cite as:  570 U. S. ____ (2013) 

3 

KAGAN, J., dissenting 

(1985).  The  same  rule  applies  to  other  important  federal
statutory  rights.  See  14  Penn  Plaza  LLC  v.  Pyett,  556 
U. S. 247, 273 (2009) (Age Discrimination in Employment 
Act); Brooklyn Savings Bank v. O’Neil, 324 U. S. 697, 704 
(1945)  (Fair  Labor  Standards  Act).  But  its  necessity  is
nowhere  more  evident  than  in  the  antitrust  context. 
Without the rule, a company could use its monopoly power
to  protect  its  monopoly  power,  by  coercing  agreement  to 
contractual terms eliminating its antitrust liability. 

If  the  rule  were  limited  to  baldly  exculpatory  provi-
sions, however, a monopolist could devise numerous ways 
around  it.  Consider  several  alternatives  that  a  party 
drafting  an  arbitration  agreement  could  adopt  to  avoid 
antitrust liability, each of which would have the identical
effect.  On  the  front  end:  The  agreement  might  set  out-
landish  filing  fees  or  establish  an  absurd  (e.g.,  one-day)
statute  of  limitations,  thus  preventing  a  claimant  from
gaining access to the arbitral forum.  On the back end: The 
agreement  might  remove  the  arbitrator’s  authority  to 
grant  meaningful  relief,  so  that  a  judgment  gets  the 
claimant  nothing  worthwhile.  And  in  the  middle:  The 
agreement  might  block  the  claimant  from  presenting  the 
kind of proof that is necessary to establish the defendant’s
liability—say,  by  prohibiting  any  economic  testimony
(good  luck  proving  an  antitrust  claim  without  that!).    Or 
else  the  agreement  might  appoint  as  an  arbitrator  an
obviously  biased  person—say,  the  CEO  of  Amex.    The 
possibilities  are  endless—all  less  direct  than  an  express
exculpatory  clause,  but  no  less  fatal.  So  the  rule  against 
prospective  waivers  of  federal  rights  can  work  only  if  it
applies  not  just  to  a  contract  clause  explicitly  barring  a
claim, but to others that operate to do so.

And  sure  enough,  our  cases  establish  this  proposition:
An arbitration clause will not be enforced if it prevents the 
effective vindication of federal statutory rights, however it
achieves  that  result.  The  rule  originated  in  Mitsubishi,