Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/558bv.pdf
Page Number: 546.0

Cite as: 558 U. S. 310 (2010) 

385 

Scalia, J., concurring 

On the contrary, it is free to do so.  And of course the Court 
is  free  to  accept  them.  But  the  Government’s  new  argu­
ments must  stand or  fall on  their own;  they are not  entitled 
to  receive  the  special  deference  we  accord  to  precedent. 
They  are,  as  grounds  to  support  Austin,  literally  unprece­
dented.  Moreover,  to  the  extent  the  Government  relies  on 
new  arguments—and  declines  to  defend  Austin  on  its  own 
terms—we  may  reasonably  infer  that  it  lacks  conﬁdence  in 
that decision’s original justiﬁcation. 

Because  continued  adherence  to  Austin  threatens  to  sub­
vert  the  “principled  and  intelligible”  development  of  our 
First  Amendment  jurisprudence,  Vasquez,  474  U. S.,  at 
265,  I  support  the  Court’s  determination  to  overrule  that 
decision. 

*

*

* 

We  have  had  two  rounds  of  brieﬁng  in  this  case,  two  oral 
arguments,  and  54  amicus  briefs  to  help  us  carry  out  our 
obligation  to  decide  the  necessary  constitutional  questions 
according to law.  We have also had the beneﬁt of a compre­
hensive  dissent  that  has  helped  ensure  that  the  Court  has 
considered  all  the  relevant  issues.  This  careful  consider­
ation convinces me that Congress violates the First Amend­
ment when it decrees that some speakers may not engage in 
political speech at election time, when it matters most. 

Justice  Scalia,  with  whom  Justice  Alito  joins,  and 

with whom Justice Thomas joins in part, concurring. 

I join the opinion of the Court.1 
I  write  separately  to  address  Justice  Stevens’  discus­
sion of “Original Understandings,” post, at 425 (opinion con­
curring in part and dissenting in part) (hereinafter referred 
to  as  the  dissent).  This  section  of  the  dissent  purports  to 
show  that  today’s  decision  is  not  supported  by  the  original 
understanding  of  the  First  Amendment.  The  dissent  at­

1 Justice Thomas does not join Part IV of the Court’s opinion.