Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/23pdf/23-5572_l6hn.pdf
Page Number: 3

Cite as:  603 U. S. ____ (2024) 

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Syllabus 

(c)(2) also ensures that liability is still imposed for impairing the avail-
ability or integrity of other things used in an official proceeding beyond
the  “record[s],  document[s],  or  other  object[s]”  enumerated  in  (c)(1), 
such as witness testimony or intangible information. 

(2)  It makes sense to read (c)(2) as limited by (c)(1) in light of the
history of the provision.  The Enron accounting scandal exposed a loop-
hole in §1512.  At that time, the statute imposed liability on anyone
who, among other things, corruptly persuaded another person to shred
documents.  But it curiously failed to impose liability on a person who 
destroyed records himself.   The parties agree that Congress enacted 
§1512(c) as part of the broader Sarbanes-Oxley Act to plug this loop-
hole.  It would be peculiar to conclude that in closing the Enron gap, 
Congress created a catch-all provision that reaches beyond the scenar-
ios that prompted the legislation. 

(b)  The broader context of §1512 in the criminal code confirms that
(c)(2) is limited by the scope of (c)(1).  Federal obstruction law consists 
of numerous provisions that target specific criminal acts and settings, 
much of which would be unnecessary if (c)(2) criminalized essentially 
all obstructive conduct.  Given the Court’s obligation to give meaning 
where  possible  to  each  word  and  provision  in  the  Code,  Taylor,  529 
U. S., at 404, the Court’s narrower interpretation of subsection (c)(2) 
is the superior one.

An unbounded interpretation of subsection (c)(2) would also render 
superfluous  the  careful  delineation  of  different  types  of  obstructive 
conduct  in  §1512  itself.    That  section  provides  a  reticulated  list  of 
nearly  two  dozen  means  of  committing  obstruction  with  penalties
ranging from three years to life in prison, or even death.  The Govern-
ment’s  reading  would  lump  together  under  (c)(2)  disparate  types  of 
conduct for which Congress had assigned proportionate sentences. 

(c)  The Government’s theory would also criminalize a broad swath 
of prosaic conduct, exposing activists and lobbyist to decades in prison. 
Our usual approach in obstruction cases has been to “resist reading” 
particular  sub-provisions  “to  create  a  coverall  statute.”  Yates,  574 
U. S., at 549 (plurality opinion).  Nothing in the text or statutory his-
tory gives the Court a reason to depart from that practice today.  And 
the Government’s interpretation would give prosecutors broad discre-
tion to seek a 20-year maximum sentence for acts Congress saw fit to
punish with far shorter sentences.  By reading (c)(2) in light of (c)(1), 
the Court affords proper respect to “the prerogatives of Congress” in
carrying out the quintessentially legislative act of defining crimes and 
setting the penalties for them.  United States v. Aguilar, 515 U. S. 593, 
600. 

64 F. 4th 329, vacated and remanded.