Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/529bv.pdf
Page Number: 630

529US2

Unit: $U52

[09-26-01 10:36:40] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 529 U. S. 513 (2000)

555

Ginsburg, J., dissenting

tinues in force for victims aged 18 or older, with a modi-
ﬁed deﬁnition of outcry not material here. Thus, under the
version of Article 38.07 in effect at the time of Carmell’s
trial but not the version in effect at the time of the offense,
his conviction was supportable by the uncorroborated testi-
mony of K. M. The new version of Article 38.07 was applied
at Carmell’s trial, and he was convicted.2 Carmell argues
that the application of the new version of Article 38.07 to his
trial violated the Ex Post Facto Clause, U. S. Const., Art. I,
§ 10, cl. 1.

I

A proper understanding of Article 38.07 of the Texas Code
of Criminal Procedure is central to this case. Accordingly,
I turn ﬁrst to the effect and purpose of that statute.

The effect of Article 38.07 in sexual offense prosecutions is
plain.
If the victim is of a certain age, the jury, in assessing
whether the prosecution has met its burden of demonstrating
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, must give no weight to her
testimony unless that testimony is corroborated, either by
other evidence going directly to guilt or by “outcry.” 3 For
victims (such as K. M.) who were between the ages of 14 and

2 The Texas Court of Appeals did not rule on whether the State in fact
I note the testimony of K. M.’s
did corroborate K. M.’s testimony at trial.
mother that when she visited Carmell in jail and told him he needed to
confess if he was sorry for what he had done, he wrote “ ‘adultery with
[K. M.]’ ” on a piece of paper.
963 S. W. 2d 833, 835 (Tex. App. 1998).
That testimony might count as corroboration. Because this question is
outside the grant of certiorari, I (like the Court, see ante, at 519, n. 4) do
not further address it.

3 At ﬁrst glance one might object that the statute permits the jury to
give such testimony some weight, just not enough to support a conviction.
See, e. g., ante, at 546, n. 33 (contending that under the old Article 38.07,
“the victim’s testimony alone is not inadmissible, it is just insufﬁcient”).
A moment’s reﬂection should reveal, however, that this distinction is illu-
sory.
If a particular item of evidence cannot by itself support a convic-
tion, then the jury will not be permitted to consider it unless and until
corroborating evidence is introduced.