Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/19pdf/18-280_ba7d.pdf
Page Number: 11.0

8 

NEW YORK STATE RIFLE & PISTOL ASSN., INC. v. 
CITY OF NEW YORK 
ALITO, J., dissenting 

Plaintiff Efrain Alvarez has had a firearms license for ap-
proximately  30  years,  and  plaintiff  Jose  Anthony  Irizarry
has been licensed for 15 years.  Both men would like to take 
their handguns to ranges and competitions outside the City,
but they have not done so because of the same ordinance. 
See id., at 29, 32–33.  After the hosts of the previously noted 
competition  in  New  Jersey  advised  them  that  their  New 
York City premises licenses barred them from taking their
handguns outside the City, they both decided not to attend. 
Id.,  at  32–33.    For  the  same  reason,  Alvarez  also  did  not 
participate  in  the  International  Defensive  Pistol  Associa-
tion  Postal  Matches  in  Simsbury,  Connecticut.  Ibid.  All 
three individual petitioners aver that they regularly trav-
eled outside the City  to ranges and championships before 
learning of the restriction imposed by §5–23.  Id., at 32–33. 
Petitioners’ amended complaint maintained that the Sec-
ond Amendment requires “unrestricted access to gun ranges
and  shooting  events  in  order  to  practice  and  perfect  safe
gun handling skills.”  Id., at 36 (emphasis added).  The com-
plaint  asserts  that  practice  is  necessary  for  “the  safe  and
responsible use of firearms for . . . self-defense, and the de-
fense of one’s home.”  Id., at 33.  And a New York City ordi-
nance backs this up, providing that a licensee “should en-
deavor  to  engage  in  periodic  handgun  practice  at  an
authorized small arms range/shooting club.”  §5–22(a)(14).
According to the complaint, the City, by limiting licensees
like petitioners to the seven ranges in the City, imposed a 
serious burden on the exercise of their Second Amendment 
right.  App. 36. 

The  amended  complaint’s  prayer  for  relief  sought
an injunction against enforcement of the travel restriction, 
as well as attorney’s fees, costs of suit, declaratory relief . . . 
and “[a]ny such further relief as the [c]ourt deems just and 
proper.”  Id., at 47–48 (emphasis added).