Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/14pdf/13-1421_p8k0.pdf
Page Number: 2.0

2 

BANK OF AMERICA, N. A. v. CAULKETT 

Syllabus 

interest  here  is  zero,  a  straightforward reading  of  the  statute  would 
seem to favor the debtors.  This Court’s construction of §506(d)’s term 
“secured  claim”  in  Dewsnup  v.  Timm,  502  U. S.  410,  however,  fore-
closes that reading and resolves the question presented here.  In de-
clining  to  permit  a  Chapter  7  debtor  to  “strip  down”  a  partially  un-
derwater  lien  under  §506(d)  to  the  value  of  the  collateral,  the  Court
in Dewsnup concluded that an allowed claim “secured by a lien with
recourse  to  the  underlying  collateral  . . .  does  not  come  within  the 
scope  of  §506(d).”  Id.,  at  415.  Thus,  under  Dewsnup,  a  “secured 
claim” is a claim supported by a security interest in property, regard-
less of whether the value of that property would be sufficient to cover 
the claim.  Pp. 2–4.

(b) This  Court  declines  to  limit  Dewsnup  to  partially  underwater 
liens.  Dewsnup’s definition did not depend on such a distinction.  Nor 
is this distinction supported by Nobelman v. American Savings Bank, 
508 U. S. 324, which addressed the interaction between the meaning
of the term “secured claim” in §506(a)—a definition that Dewsnup de-
clined to use for purposes of §506(d)—and an entirely separate provi-
sion,  §1322(b)(2).    See  508  U. S.,  at  327–332.    Finally,  the  debtors’
suggestion that the historical and policy concerns that motivated the 
Court  in  Dewsnup  do  not  apply  in  the  context  of  wholly  underwater 
liens  is  an  insufficient  justification  for  giving  the  term  “secured 
claim” a different definition depending on the value of the collateral.
Ultimately,  the  debtors’  proposed  distinction  would  do  nothing  to 
vindicate §506(d)’s original meaning and would leave an odd statuto-
ry framework in its place.  Pp. 5–7. 

No. 13–1421, 566 Fed. Appx. 879, and No. 14–163, 556 Fed. Appx. 911, 

reversed and remanded. 

THOMAS,  J.,  delivered  the  opinion  of  the  Court,  in  which  ROBERTS, 
C. J.,  and  SCALIA,  GINSBURG,  ALITO,  and  KAGAN,  JJ.,  joined,  and  in
which  KENNEDY,  BREYER,  and  SOTOMAYOR,  JJ.,  joined  except  as  to  the 
footnote.