Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/21pdf/20-637_10n2.pdf
Page Number: 31.0

Cite as:  595 U. S. ____ (2022) 

9 

THOMAS, J., dissenting 

to  review  state-court  decisions.    For  most  of  our  history, 
that requirement was unfailingly understood to be jurisdic-
tional.  And our cases have since departed from this princi-
ple without squaring that departure with §1257’s unquali-
fied text.  Accordingly, I would hold that this Court lacks 
jurisdiction to hear a federal claim on review from a state 
court  where  a  petitioner,  like  Hemphill,  fails  to  properly 
present his claim to the court below. 

III 
That the Court decides this case despite Hemphill’s fail-
ure to present his claim to the New York Court of Appeals 
is  not  a  mere  academic  defect.    “Federal  nullification  of  a 
state statute,” or any state rule, “is a grave matter.”  Maine 
v. Taylor, 477 U. S. 131, 135 (1986); see also Abbott v. Perez, 
585 U. S. ___, ___, n. 17 (2018) (slip op., at 21, n. 17) (“the 
inability to enforce its duly enacted plans clearly inflicts ir-
reparable harm on the State”).  And it is “unseemly in our 
dual system of government to disturb the finality of state
judgments on a federal ground that the state court did not 
have occasion to consider.”  Adams, 520 U. S., at 90 (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted).  Thus, it is “important that
state courts be given the first opportunity to  consider the 
applicability of state [rules],” particularly “in light of con-
stitutional challenge, since the [rules] may be construed in 
a way which saves their constitutionality.”  Cardinale, 394 
U. S., at 439.  A state court’s interest in deciding “whether 
to  . . .  amend  [its]  rules  to  avoid  potential  constitutional 
challenges” is “undeniable.”  Adams, 520 U. S., at 90. 

Today, the Court disregards these important “[p]rinciples
of comity.”  Webb v. Webb, 451 U. S. 493, 499 (1981).  In the 
Court of Appeals, Hemphill argued that state law required 
“an affirmative attempt to mislead the jury . . . before the 
door  can  be  opened  to  otherwise  inadmissible  evidence.” 
App. 386.  Hemphill maintained that “[t]he doctrine is not 
so capacious as to allow the admission of any evidence made