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Page Number: 27

12 

THOMPSON v. CLARK 

ALITO, J., dissenting 

nothing more than the absence of probable cause.  See ibid., 
n. 3. 

If that turns out to be so, it is hard to see even the slight-
est connection between the Court’s new tort and common-
law  malicious  prosecution.  Malice  is  the  hallmark  of  a 
malicious-prosecution  claim.    Even  if  a  prosecution  is
brought  and  maintained  without  probable  cause,  a 
malicious-prosecution  claim  cannot  succeed  without  proof 
of malice.  See supra, at 6.  And if the Court’s new tort has 
nothing to do with malicious prosecution, what possible rea-
son can there be for borrowing that tort’s favorable-termi-
nation element? 

IV 

Instead of creating a new hybrid claim, we should simply 
hold that a malicious-prosecution claim may not be brought 
under  the  Fourth  Amendment.  Such  a  holding  would  not 
leave a person in petitioner’s situation without legal protec-
tion.  Petitioner brought Fourth Amendment claims against
respondents for false arrest, excessive force, and unlawful 
entry, but after trial a jury ruled against him on all those 
claims.  See  App.  142–146.  Petitioner  could  have  also 
sought relief under state law.  See, e.g., Cordova, 816 F. 3d, 
at 662 (opinion of Gorsuch, J.).  New York law appears to
recognize a malicious-prosecution tort with an element very
much like the favorable-termination element that the Court 
adopts today, see Lanning v. Glens Falls, 908 F. 3d 19, 24– 
25  (CA2  2018),  but  petitioner  chose  not  to  bring  such  a
claim.  See Tr. of Oral Arg. 40–41.

For  these  reasons,  I  would  affirm  the  judgment  below,

and I therefore respectfully dissent.