Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/21pdf/21-429_8o6a.pdf
Page Number: 69.0

Cite as:  597 U. S. ____ (2022) 

41 

GORSUCH, J., dissenting 

Nor must Congress stand by as this Court sows needless
confusion across the country.  Even the Court acknowledges
that Congress can undo its decision and preempt state au-
thority at any time.  Ante, at 6.  And Congress could do ex-
actly that with a simple amendment to Public Law 280.  It 
might say:  A State lacks criminal jurisdiction over crimes 
by or against Indians in Indian Country, unless the State 
complies with the procedures to obtain tribal consent out-
lined in 25 U. S. C. § 1321, and, where necessary, amends 
its constitution or statutes pursuant to 25 U. S. C. § 1324.
Of  course,  that  reminder  of  the  obvious  should  hardly  be 
necessary.  But thanks to this Court’s egregious misappro-
priation  of  legislative  authority,  “the  ball  is  back  in  Con-
gress’ court.”  Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 
U. S. 618, 661 (2007) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 

* 
In  the  1830s,  this  Court  struggled  to  keep  our  Nation’s
promises  to  the  Cherokee.    Justice  Story  celebrated  the 

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the  (many)  treaties,  federal  statutes,  precedents,  and  state  laws  that 
may preclude state jurisdiction on specific tribal lands around the coun-
try.  Nor are we legislators entitled to pass new laws of general applica-
bility, but a court charged with resolving cases and controversies involv-
ing particular parties who are entitled to make their own arguments in
their own cases.  The very precedent the Court invokes as authority to
reach its decision today recognizes as much—and demands future courts
conduct any analysis sensitive to the “specific context” of each Tribe, its 
treaties, and relevant laws.  Bracker, 448 U. S., at 145.  For that matter, 
even when it comes to the Cherokee the Court leaves much unanswered. 
The Court does not confront the relevant text of the Cherokee’s treaties, 
the Oklahoma Enabling Act, or the relevant portions of our precedents 
interpreting both.  And the Court does not mention the terms of Public 
Law 280 that require Oklahoma to amend its laws before asserting ju-
risdiction.  Even more than all that, the Court ultimately retreats from 
its claim that statehood confers an “inherent” right to prosecute crimes 
by non-Indians against tribal members on tribal lands.  It rests instead 
on a “balancing test” that makes anything it does say about the “inher-
ent” right of States to try cases within Indian country dicta through and 
through.