Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/529bv.pdf
Page Number: 861.0

529US3

Unit: $U59

[09-26-01 12:32:42] PAGES PGT: OPIN

786

VERMONT AGENCY OF NATURAL RESOURCES v.
UNITED STATES ex rel. STEVENS
Opinion of the Court

original FCA were not punitive, but suggesting that treble
damages, such as those in the antitrust laws, would have
been).
“The very idea of treble damages reveals an intent
to punish past, and to deter future, unlawful conduct, not to
ameliorate the liability of wrongdoers.” Texas Industries,
Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U. S. 630, 639 (1981).

Third, the Program Fraud Civil Remedies Act of 1986
(PFCRA), a sister scheme creating administrative reme-
dies for false claims—and enacted just before the FCA was
amended in 1986—contains (unlike the FCA) a deﬁnition
of “persons” subject to liability, and that deﬁnition does not
include States. See 31 U. S. C. § 3801(a)(6) (deﬁning “per-
son” as “any individual, partnership, corporation, associa-
tion, or private organization”).
It would be most peculiar
to subject States to treble damages and civil penalties in
qui tam actions under the FCA, but exempt them from
the relatively smaller damages provided under the PFCRA.
See § 3802(a)(1).17

17 The dissent attempts to distinguish the PFCRA on the ground that
it is a separate and subsequently enacted statute. See post, at 799–800,
and n. 10. But it is well established that a court can, and should, in-
terpret the text of one statute in the light of text of surrounding statutes,
even those subsequently enacted. See FDA v. Brown & Williamson
Tobacco Corp., ante, at 133; United States v. Fausto, 484 U. S. 439, 453
(1988). Moreover, there is no question that the PFCRA was designed to
operate in tandem with the FCA. Not only was it enacted at virtually
the same time as the FCA was amended in 1986, but its scope is virtually
identical to that of the FCA. Compare § 3729(a) (FCA) (“Any person
who . . . knowingly presents, or causes to be presented, to an ofﬁcer or
employee of the United States Government . . . a false or fraudulent claim
for payment or approval . . .”) with § 3802(a)(1) (PFCRA) (“Any person
who makes, presents, or submits, or causes to be made, presented, or sub-
mitted, a claim that the person knows or has reason to know . . . is false,
ﬁctitious, or fraudulent . . .”). The dissent would, in any event, subject
States to suit under the PFCRA no less than under the FCA—despite its
detailed deﬁnition of “person” that does not include States.
In justiﬁca-
tion of this the dissent again cites California v. United States, 320 U. S.,