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Page Number: 6.0

6 

WHEATON COLLEGE v. BURWELL 

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting 

istrator must provide contraceptive coverage for the organ-
ization’s  employees  and  may  not  charge  the  organization 
any  premium  or  other  fee  related  to  those  services.  The
back  of  the  self-certification  form  reminds  third-party 
administrators  that  receipt  of  the  form  constitutes  notice 
that  they  must  comply  with  their  regulatory  obligations.
See Appendix, infra. 

B 
Rather  than  availing  itself  of  this  simple  accommoda-
tion,  Wheaton  filed  suit,  asserting  that  completing  the 
form  and  submitting  it  to  its  third-party  administrator 
would  make  it  complicit  in  the  provision  of  contraceptive 
coverage,  in  violation  of  its  religious  beliefs.    On  that 
basis, it sought a preliminary injunction, claiming that the 
law and regulations at issue violate RFRA, which provides 
that  the  Government  may  not  “substantially  burden  a
person’s exercise of religion” unless the application of that 
burden  “is  the  least  restrictive  means  of  furthering  [a]
compelling governmental interest.”  42 U. S. C. §§2000bb– 
1(a) and (b).2 

The  District  Court  denied  a  preliminary  injunction  on
the ground that the regulations exempting Wheaton from 
the  contraceptive  coverage  requirement  do  not  substan-
tially  burden  its  exercise  of  religion.  App.  to  Emergency
Application for Injunction Pending Appellate Review 1–20.
Under  Circuit  precedent,  the  court  reasoned,  Wheaton’s 
act  of  “filling  out  the  form  and  sending  it  to  the  [third-
party  administrator]”  in  no  way  “triggers”  coverage  of 
contraception  costs.    Id.,  at  9  (internal  quotation  marks
omitted).  The  Seventh  Circuit  in  turn  denied  Wheaton’s 
motion for an injunction pending appeal.  See Order in No. 
14–2396  (CA7,  June  30,  2014).    In  doing  so,  it  relied  on 
—————— 

2 Wheaton  also  raised  claims  under  the  First  Amendment  and  the 
Administrative  Procedure  Act.    Because  it  does  not  press  those  claims
in this Court as a basis for injunctive relief, I do not discuss them.