Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/17pdf/17-130_4f14.pdf
Page Number: 19

Cite as:  585 U. S. ____ (2018) 

3 

THOMAS, J., concurring 

synonym for “federal,” and the word “Office[r]” carried its 
ordinary  meaning.    See  id.,  at  471–479.    The  ordinary
meaning of “officer” was anyone who performed a continu-
ous public duty.  See id., at 484–507; e.g., United States v. 
Maurice, 26 F. Cas. 1211, 1214 (No. 15,747) (CC Va. 1823) 
(defining  officer  as  someone  in  “ ‘a  public  charge  or  em-
ployment’ ”  who  performed  a  “continuing”  duty);  8  Annals 
of  Cong.  2304–2305  (1799)  (statement  of  Rep.  Harper) 
(explaining that the word officer “is derived from the Latin 
word  officium”  and  “includes  all  persons  holding  posts
which require the performance of some public duty”).  For 
federal officers, that duty is “established by Law”—that is,
by  statute.    Art. II,  §2,  cl.  2.    The  Founders  considered 
individuals  to  be  officers  even  if  they  performed  only 
ministerial  statutory  duties—including  recordkeepers, 
clerks,  and  tidewaiters  (individuals  who  watched  goods 
land  at  a  customhouse).    See  Mascott  484–507.    Early 
congressional practice reflected this understanding.  With 
exceptions  not  relevant  here,2  Congress  required  all  fed-
eral officials with ongoing statutory duties to be appointed 
in  compliance  with  the  Appointments  Clause.    See  id.,  at 
507–545. 

Applying the original meaning here, the administrative
law  judges  of  the  Securities  and  Exchange  Commission 
easily  qualify  as  “Officers  of  the  United  States.”    These 
judges  exercise  many  of  the  agency’s  statutory  duties,
including  issuing  initial  decisions  in  adversarial  proceed-
ings.  See 15 U. S. C. §78d–1(a); 17 CFR §§200.14, 200.30–
9  (2017).  As  explained,  the  importance  or  significance  of 
these  statutory  duties  is  irrelevant.    All  that  matters  is 
that  the  judges  are  continuously  responsible  for  perform-
—————— 

2 The  First  Congress  exempted  certain  officials  with  ongoing  statu- 
tory duties, such as deputies and military officers, from the requirements
of  the  Appointments  Clause.    But  these  narrow  exceptions  do  not 
disprove the rule, as background principles of founding-era law explain 
each of them.  See Mascott 480–483, 515–530.