Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/19pdf/18-9526_9okb.pdf
Page Number: 83.0

Cite as:  591 U. S. ____ (2020) 

1 

THOMAS, J., dissenting 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

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No. 18–9526 
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JIMCY MCGIRT, PETITIONER v. OKLAHOMA 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CRIMINAL 
APPEALS OF OKLAHOMA 

[July 9, 2020]

 JUSTICE THOMAS, dissenting. 
I agree with THE CHIEF JUSTICE that the former Creek 
Nation  Reservation  was  disestablished  at  statehood  and 
Oklahoma therefore has jurisdiction to prosecute petitioner 
for sexually assaulting his wife’s granddaughter.  Ante, at 
1–2 (dissenting opinion).  I write separately to note an ad-
ditional defect in the Court’s decision: It reverses a state-
court judgment that it has no jurisdiction to review.  “[W]e
have  long  recognized  that  ‘where  the  judgment  of  a  state 
court rests upon two grounds, one of which is federal and
the other non-federal in character, our jurisdiction fails if 
the non-federal ground is independent of the federal ground 
and adequate to support the judgment.’ ”  Michigan v. Long, 
463 U. S. 1032, 1038, n. 4 (1983) (quoting Fox Film Corp. v. 
Muller, 296 U. S. 207, 210 (1935)).  Under this well-settled 
rule, we lack jurisdiction to review the Oklahoma Court of
Criminal Appeals’ decision, because it rests on an adequate 
and independent state ground.

In  his  application  for  state  postconviction  relief,  peti-
tioner claimed that Oklahoma lacked jurisdiction to prose-
cute him because his crime was committed on Creek Nation 
land  and  thus  was  subject  to  the  exclusive  jurisdiction  of
the  Federal  Government  under  the  Major  Crimes  Act,  18
U. S. C. §1153.  In support of his argument, petitioner cited 
the Tenth’s Circuit’s decision in Murphy v. Royal, 875 F. 3d 
896 (2017).