Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/19pdf/18-1323_c07d.pdf
Page Number: 57.0

12 

JUNE MEDICAL SERVICES L. L. C. v. RUSSO 

ROBERTS, C. J., concurring
ROBERTS, C. J., concurring in judgment 

at  2)  (citing  Casey,  505  U. S.,  at  878  (plurality  opinion)).3 
Because  Louisiana’s  admitting  privileges  requirement
would restrict women’s access to abortion to the same de-
gree as Texas’s law, it also cannot stand under our prece-
dent.4 

To begin, the two laws are nearly identical.  Prior to en-
actment of the Texas law, abortion providers were required
either  to  possess  local  hospital  admitting  privileges  or  to
have a transfer agreement with a physician who had such
privileges.  Tex.  Admin.  Code,  tit.  25,  §139.56(a)  (2009). 
The new law, adopted in 2013, eliminated the option of hav-
ing  a  transfer  agreement.    Providers  were  required  to
“[h]ave active admitting privileges at a hospital . . . located 
not  further  than  30  miles  from  the  location  at  which  the 
abortion  is  performed.”  Tex.  Health  &  Safety  Code  Ann. 
§171.0031(a)(1)(A).

Likewise,  Louisiana  law  previously  required  abortion 
providers to have either admitting privileges or a transfer 
agreement.  La.  Admin.  Code,  tit.  48,  pt.  I,  §4407(A)(3) 

—————— 

3 JUSTICE GORSUCH considers this is a “nonexistent ruling” nowhere to 
be found in Whole Woman’s Health.  Post, at 19 (dissenting opinion).  I 
disagree.  Whole Woman’s Health first surveyed the benefits of Texas’s 
admitting privileges requirement.  579 U. S., at ___–___ (slip op., at 23– 
24).  The Court then transitioned to examining the law’s burdens: “At the 
same  time,  the  record  evidence  indicates  that  the  admitting-privileges 
requirement  places  a  substantial  obstacle  in  the  path  of  a  woman’s 
choice.”  Id., at ___ (slip op., at 24) (internal quotation  marks omitted; 
emphasis added).  And the Court made clear that a law which has the 
purpose or effect of placing “a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman 
seeking an abortion before the fetus attains viability” imposes an “undue
burden” and therefore violates the Constitution.  Id., at ___ (slip op., at 
1) (internal quotation marks omitted; emphasis deleted).  Thus the dis-
cussion  of  benefits  in  Whole  Woman’s  Health  was  not  necessary  to  its 
holding. 

4 For the reasons the plurality explains, ante, at 11–16, I agree that the 
abortion providers in this case have standing to assert the constitutional
rights of their patients.