Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/07pdf/07-290.pdf
Page Number: 125

12 

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA v. HELLER 

BREYER, J., dissenting 

gun-law  decisions  issued  in  the  last  half-century  by  Su-
preme Courts in 42 States, which courts with “surprisingly 
little variation,” have adopted a standard more deferential 
than  strict  scrutiny).  While  these  state  cases  obviously 
are not controlling, they are instructive.  Cf., e.g., Bartkus 
v.  Illinois,  359  U. S.  121,  134  (1959)  (looking  to  the  “ex-
perience of state courts” as informative of a constitutional 
question).  And they thus provide some comfort regarding
the  practical  wisdom  of  following  the  approach  that  I 
believe  our  constitutional  precedent  would  in  any  event 
suggest. 

IV 
The  present  suit  involves  challenges  to  three  separate
District  firearm  restrictions.  The  first  requires  a  license
from the District’s Chief of Police in order to carry a “pis-
tol,”  i.e.,  a  handgun,  anywhere  in  the  District.    See  D.  C. 
Code  §22–4504(a)  (2001);  see  also  §§22–4501(a),  22–4506. 
Because  the  District  assures  us  that  respondent  could
obtain  such  a  license  so  long  as  he  meets  the  statutory 
eligibility  criteria,  and  because  respondent  concedes  that
those criteria are facially constitutional, I, like the major-
ity,  see  no  need  to  address  the  constitutionality  of  the
licensing requirement.  See ante, at 58–59. 

The  second  District  restriction  requires  that  the  lawful
owner of a firearm keep his weapon “unloaded and disas-
sembled  or  bound  by  a  trigger  lock  or  similar  device” 
unless it is kept at his place of business or being used for 
lawful  recreational  purposes.  See  §7–2507.02.    The  only 
dispute regarding this provision appears to be whether the
Constitution requires an exception that would allow some-
one  to  render  a  firearm  operational  when  necessary  for
self-defense  (i.e.,  that  the  firearm  may  be  operated  under
circumstances  where  the  common  law  would  normally
permit  a  self-defense  justification  in  defense  against  a 
criminal charge).  See Parker v. District of Columbia, 478