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Page Number: 32.0

12 

LUCIA v. SEC 

BREYER, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part 
Opinion of BREYER, J. 

responsibility for administering and enforcing the” Federal
Election  Campaign  Act  of  1971,  id.,  at  109,  an  “intricate 
statutory  scheme  . . .  to  regulate  federal  election  cam-
paigns,”  id.,  at  12.  They  had  “extensive  rulemaking  and
adjudicative powers,” id., at 110; the power to enforce the 
law  through  civil  lawsuits,  id.,  at  111;  and  the  power  to
disqualify a candidate from running for federal office, id., 
at  112–113.  Federal  Election  Commissioners  thus  had 
powers  akin  to  the  “principal  Officer[s]”  of  an  Executive 
Department, whom the Constitution expressly refers to as
“Officers,”  see  Art. II,  §2,  cl. 1.  It  is  not  surprising  that
Congress  exceeded  any  leeway  the  Appointments  Clause 
granted when it deviated from the Clause’s appointments’ 
methods in respect to an office with powers very similar to
those of the Officers listed in the Constitution itself. 
  Thus,  neither  Buckley  nor  any  other  case  forecloses  an 
interpretation  of  the  Appointments  Clause  that  focuses
principally  on  whether  the  relevant  statutes  show  that
Congress  intended  that  a  particular  Government  position 
be  held  by  an  “Office[r]  of  the  United  States.”    Adopting
such an approach, I would not answer the question whether 
the Securities and Exchange Commission’s administrative
law judges are constitutional “Officers” without first decid-
ing  the  pre-existing  Free  Enterprise  Fund  question—
namely, what effect that holding would have on the statu-
tory “for cause” removal protections that Congress provided 
for administrative law judges.  If, for example, Free Enter-
prise  Fund  means  that  saying  administrative  law  judges
are  “inferior  Officers”  will  cause  them  to  lose  their  “for 
cause”  removal  protections,  then  I  would  likely  hold  that 
the administrative law judges are not “Officers,” for to say 
otherwise  would  be  to  contradict  Congress’  enactment  of
those protections in the Administrative Procedure Act.  In 
contrast,  if  Free  Enterprise  Fund  does  not  mean  that  an 
administrative  law  judge  (if  an  “Office[r]  of  the  United 
States”) would lose “for cause” protections, then it is more