Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/529bv.pdf
Page Number: 466.0

529US2

Unit: $U46

[10-07-01 17:18:24] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 529 U. S. 362 (2000)

391

Opinion of the Court

reasonableness.”
Id., at 688. To establish prejudice he
“must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but
for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceed-
ing would have been different. A reasonable probability is
a probability sufﬁcient to undermine conﬁdence in the out-
come.”

Id., at 694.

It is past question that the rule set forth in Strickland
qualiﬁes as “clearly established Federal law, as determined
by the Supreme Court of the United States.” That the
Strickland test “of necessity requires a case-by-case exami-
nation of the evidence,” Wright, 505 U. S., at 308 (Kennedy,
J., concurring in judgment), obviates neither the clarity of
the rule nor the extent to which the rule must be seen as
“established” by this Court. This Court’s precedent “dic-
tated” that the Virginia Supreme Court apply the Strickland
test at the time that court entertained Williams’ ineffective-
assistance claim. Teague, 489 U. S., at 301. And it can
hardly be said that recognizing the right to effective counsel
“breaks new ground or imposes a new obligation on the
States,” ibid. Williams is therefore entitled to relief if the
Virginia Supreme Court’s decision rejecting his ineffective-
assistance claim was either “contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of,” that established law.
It was
both.

IV

The Virginia Supreme Court erred in holding that our de-
cision in Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U. S. 364 (1993), modiﬁed
or in some way supplanted the rule set down in Strickland.
It is true that while the Strickland test provides sufﬁcient
guidance for resolving virtually all ineffective-assistance-of-
counsel claims, there are situations in which the overriding
fairness may affect the analysis.
focus on fundamental
Thus, on the one hand, as Strickland itself explained, there
are a few situations in which prejudice may be presumed.
466 U. S., at 692. And, on the other hand, there are also
situations in which it would be unjust to characterize the