Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/11pdf/10-1121c4d6.pdf
Page Number: 21

Cite as:  567 U. S. ____ (2012) 

17 

Opinion of the Court 

Amendment does not permit a union to extract a loan from
unwilling  nonmembers  even  if  the  money  is  later  paid
back  in  full.  See  Hudson,  supra,  at  305;  Ellis,  466  U. S., 
at  444.  Here,  for  nonmembers  who  disagreed  with  the 
SEIU’s  electoral  objectives,  a  refund  provided  after  the 
union’s objectives had already been achieved would be cold 
comfort.6 

To respect the limits of the First Amendment, the union 
should have sent out a new notice allowing nonmembers to
opt in to the special fee rather than requiring them to opt 
out.  Our cases have tolerated a substantial impingement 
on  First  Amendment  rights  by  allowing  unions  to  impose
an opt-out requirement at all.  Even if this burden can be 
justified during the collection of regular dues on an annual 
basis,  there  is  no  way  to  justify  the  additional  burden  of 
imposing yet another opt-out requirement to collect special
fees whenever the union desires. 

B 

1 

The  SEIU’s  treatment  of  nonmembers  who  opted  out 

—————— 

6 JUSTICE  SOTOMAYOR  contends  that  a  new  Hudson  notice  should  be  
required  only  when  a  special  assessment  is  imposed  for  political  pur-
poses.  Post,  at  2  (opinion  concurring  in  judgment).    But  as  even  the 
dissent  acknowledges,  post,  at  7,  such  a  rule  would  be  unworkable. 
First,  our  cases  have  recognized  that  a  union’s  money  is  fungible,  so
even  if  the  new  fee  were  spent  entirely  for  nonpolitical  activities,  it
would free up other funds to be spent for political purposes.  See Retail 
Clerks v. Schermerhorn, 373 U. S. 746, 753 (1963) (noting that particu-
lar  fee  earmarks  are  “of  bookkeeping  significance  only  rather  than  a
matter of real substance”).  And second, unless we can rely on unions to 
advertise the true purpose behind every special fee, it is not clear how a 
court  could  make  a  timely  determination  of  whether  each  new  fee  is
political  in  nature.    It  would  be  practically  impossible  to  require  the 
parties to litigate the purpose of every fee merely to determine whether
notice is required.