Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/19pdf/18-1323_c07d.pdf
Page Number: 122.0

Cite as:  591 U. S. ____ (2020) 

7 

GORSUCH, J., dissenting 

(CA5 1986); see also Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 
579 U. S. ___, ___ (2016) (THOMAS, J., dissenting) (slip op.,
at 4) (collecting additional examples).  And no one suggests
this  suit  differs  from  those  cases  in  any  meaningful  way. 
The truth is transparent:  The plaintiffs hardly try to carry 
their burden of showing a hindrance because they can’t.

Separately and additionally, the abortion providers can-
not  claim  a  “close  relationship”  with  the  women  whose 
rights they assert.  Normally, the fact that the plaintiffs do
not  even  know  who  those  women  are  would  be  enough  to
preclude third-party standing.  This Court has held, for ex-
ample, that a future “hypothetical attorney-client relation-
ship” (as opposed to an “existing” one) cannot confer third-
party standing.  Kowalski, 543 U. S., at 131.  Likewise, this 
Court has held that a pediatrician lacks standing to defend 
a  State’s  abortion  laws  on  the  theory  that  fetuses  are  his 
future  potential  patients.  Diamond  v.  Charles,  476  U. S. 
54, 66 (1986).  If standing isn’t present in cases like those,
it is hard to see how it might be present in this one.

Nor is that the end of the plaintiffs’ standing problems. 
Even when a plaintiff can identify an actual and close rela-
tionship, this Court will normally refuse third-party stand-
ing if the plaintiff has a potential conflict of interest with 
the person whose rights are at issue.  See Elk Grove Unified 
School Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U. S. 1, 15, 17–18 (2004).  And 
it’s pretty hard to ignore the potential for conflict here.  Af-
ter  all,  Louisiana’s  law  expressly  aims  to  protect  women
from  the  unsafe  conditions  maintained  by  at  least  some
abortion  providers  who,  like  the  plaintiffs,  are  either  un-
willing or unable to obtain admitting privileges.  Cf. ante, 
at 25–27 (ALITO, J., dissenting).

Seeking to set all these difficulties aside, today’s decision 
contends that Louisiana has waived its prudential standing 
arguments.  But in doing so, today’s decision mistakes three 
more legal principles.  First, what the plurality character-