Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/23pdf/23-50_n648.pdf
Page Number: 13.0

Cite as:  602 U. S. ____ (2024) 

3 

THOMAS, J., dissenting 

cases in which defendants charged with nonviolent crimes 
agree  to  appear  for  arraignment  and  are  then  released 
pending trial on their own recognizance.  These defendants 
. . . may bring a common-law suit for malicious prosecution 
. . . , but they are not seized.”  Thompson, 596 U. S., at 52– 
53.  And, “since a malicious-prosecution claim does not re-
quire a seizure, it obviously does not require proof that the
person  bringing  suit  was  seized  without  probable  cause.” 
Id., at 53. 

Malicious prosecution is therefore not an appropriate tort 
analog for a §1983 claim alleging a seizure in violation of
the Fourth Amendment.  The Court has never provided a 
fulsome  explanation  for  why  it  has  concluded  otherwise. 
When  the  Court  first  recognized  a  malicious-prosecution
claim under the Fourth Amendment in Thompson, it essen-
tially adopted the holdings of certain lower courts.  Id., at 
43.  The Court offered two meager sentences to justify doing 
so.  It reasoned that “the gravamen of the Fourth Amend-
ment claim for malicious prosecution . . . is the wrongful in-
itiation of charges without probable cause.  And the wrong-
ful initiation of charges without probable cause is likewise 
the  gravamen  of  the  tort  of  malicious  prosecution.”  Ibid. 
That  is  incorrect.  A  malicious-prosecution  claim  protects
against the malicious initiation of charges, but the Fourth 
Amendment  protects  against  unreasonable  searches  and 
seizures—it does not matter whether the official acted with 
malice or charges are ever initiated.  See id., at 54–55 (opin-
ion of ALITO, J.).  Today, the Court rests solely on Thomp-
son’s  mistaken  reasoning  to  conclude  that  Chiaverini  can
raise his claim.  See ante, at 4–5. 

The Court’s decision to forge ahead with combining the
malicious-prosecution and Fourth Amendment frameworks
will  inevitably  create  confusion.    As  I  have  explained,  an 
unreasonable  seizure  under  the  Fourth  Amendment  re-
quires  a  seizure;  a  malicious-prosecution  claim  does  not.