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6 

SOUTH DAKOTA v. WAYFAIR, INC. 

Opinion of the Court 

ion  further  stated  that  Congress  had  the  exclusive  power 
to regulate commerce.  See id., at 236 (opinion of Johnson, 
J.).  Had that latter submission prevailed and States been
denied  the  power  of  concurrent  regulation,  history  might
have  seen  sweeping  federal  regulations  at  an  early  date
that foreclosed the States from experimentation with laws
and policies of their own, or, on the other hand, proposals 
to  reexamine  Gibbons’  broad  definition  of  commerce  to 
accommodate the necessity of allowing States the power to
enact laws to implement the political will of their people.

Just five years after Gibbons, however, in another opin­
ion by Chief Justice Marshall, the Court sustained what in
substance  was  a  state  regulation  of  interstate  commerce.
In  Willson  v.  Black  Bird  Creek  Marsh  Co.,  2  Pet.  245 
(1829),  the  Court  allowed  a  State  to  dam  and  bank  a 
stream  that  was  part  of  an  interstate  water  system,  an
action  that  likely  would  have  been  an  impermissible  in­
trusion  on the  national  power  over  commerce  had  it  been
the rule that only Congress could regulate in that sphere.
See  id.,  at  252.    Thus,  by  implication  at  least,  the  Court 
indicated  that  the  power  to  regulate  commerce  in  some 
circumstances  was  held  by  the  States  and  Congress  con­
currently.  And so both a broad interpretation of interstate
commerce  and  the  concurrent  regulatory  power  of  the 
States can be traced to Gibbons and Willson. 

Over  the  next  few  decades,  the  Court  refined  the  doc­
trine to accommodate the necessary balance between state 
and federal power.  In Cooley v. Board of Wardens of Port 
of  Philadelphia  ex  rel.  Soc.  for  Relief  of  Distressed  Pilots, 
12 How. 299 (1852), the Court addressed local laws regu­
lating  river  pilots  who  operated  in  interstate  waters  and
guided  many  ships  on  interstate  or  foreign  voyages.  The 
Court  held  that,  while  Congress  surely  could  regulate  on 
this  subject  had  it  chosen  to  act,  the  State,  too,  could 
regulate.  The Court distinguished between those subjects
that  by  their  nature  “imperatively  deman[d]  a  single