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Cite as: 529 U. S. 362 (2000)

415

Opinion of O’Connor, J.

however, see ante, at 393, Williams’ case did not implicate
the unusual circumstances present in cases like Lockhart or
Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U. S. 157 (1986). Accordingly, for the
very reasons I set forth in my Lockhart concurrence, the
emphasis on outcome was entirely appropriate in Williams’
case.

Third, I also agree with the Court that, to the extent the
Virginia Supreme Court did apply Strickland, its applica-
tion was unreasonable. See ante, at 395–398. As the Court
correctly recounts, Williams’ trial counsel failed to conduct
an investigation that would have uncovered substantial
amounts of mitigation evidence. See ante, at 395–396. For
example, speaking only of that evidence concerning Williams’
“nightmarish childhood,” ante, at 395, the mitigation evi-
dence that trial counsel failed to present to the jury showed
that “Williams’ parents had been imprisoned for the criminal
neglect of Williams and his siblings, that Williams had been
severely and repeatedly beaten by his father, that he had
been committed to the custody of the social services bureau
for two years during his parents’ incarceration (including one
stint in an abusive foster home), and then, after his parents
were released from prison, had been returned to his parents’
custody,” ibid. (footnote omitted). See also ante, at 395,
n. 19. The consequence of counsel’s failure to conduct the
requisite, diligent investigation into his client’s troubling
background and unique personal circumstances manifested
itself during his generic, unapologetic closing argument,
which provided the jury with no reasons to spare petitioner’s
life. More generally, the Virginia Circuit Court found that
Williams’ trial counsel failed to present evidence showing
that Williams “had a deprived and abused upbringing; that
he may have been a neglected and mistreated child; that he
came from an alcoholic family; . . . that he was borderline
mentally retarded;” and that “[his] conduct had been good
in certain structured settings in his life (such as when he
In addition, the Circuit
was incarcerated).” App. 422–423.