Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/10pdf/10-277.pdf
Page Number: 17

Cite as:  564 U. S. ____ (2011) 

13 

Opinion of the Court 

could  justify  a  class  of  both  applicants  and  employees
if  the  discrimination  manifested  itself  in  hiring  and  pro-
motion  practices  in  the  same  general  fashion,  such  as 
through  entirely  subjective  decisionmaking  processes.” 
Ibid.  We think that statement precisely describes respon-
dents’  burden  in  this  case.    The  first  manner  of  bridging
the  gap  obviously  has  no  application  here;  Wal-Mart  has 
no  testing  procedure  or  other  companywide  evaluation 
method that can be charged with bias.  The whole point of 
permitting discretionary decisionmaking is to avoid evalu-
ating employees under a common standard. 

The second manner of bridging the gap requires “signifi-
cant  proof ”  that  Wal-Mart  “operated  under  a  general 
policy  of  discrimination.”  That  is  entirely  absent  here. 
Wal-Mart’s  announced  policy  forbids  sex  discrimination,
see  App.  1567a–1596a,  and  as  the  District  Court  recog-
nized  the  company  imposes  penalties  for  denials  of  equal
employment  opportunity,  222  F. R. D.,  at  154.    The  only
evidence  of  a  “general  policy  of  discrimination”  respon-
dents  produced  was  the  testimony  of  Dr.  William  Bielby, 
their  sociological  expert.  Relying  on  “social  framework” 
analysis,  Bielby  testified  that  Wal-Mart  has  a  “strong
corporate culture,” that makes it “ ‘vulnerable’ ” to “gender
bias.”  Id., at 152.  He could not, however, “determine with 
any specificity how regularly stereotypes play a meaning-
ful  role  in  employment  decisions  at  Wal-Mart.    At  his 
deposition . . . Dr. Bielby conceded that he could not calcu-
late whether 0.5 percent or 95 percent of the employment
decisions at Wal-Mart might be determined by stereotyped
thinking.”    222  F. R. D.  189,  192  (ND  Cal.  2004).    The 
parties  dispute  whether  Bielby’s  testimony  even  met  the
standards  for  the  admission  of  expert  testimony  under
Federal  Rule  of  Evidence  702  and  our  Daubert  case, 
see  Daubert  v.  Merrell  Dow  Pharmaceuticals,  Inc.,  509