Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/23pdf/22-529_1b7d.pdf
Page Number: 3.0

Cite as:  602 U. S. ____ (2024) 

3 

Syllabus 

preemption questions in this context must do the same and likewise 
take account of those prior decisions.  §25b(b)(1)(B).  The paradigmatic
example  of  significant  interference  identified  by  Barnett  Bank 
occurred in Franklin National Bank of Franklin Square v. New York, 
347  U. S.  373,  where  a  New  York  law  prohibiting  most  banks  “from 
using  the  word  ‘saving’  or  ‘savings’  in  their  advertising  or  business” 
was  held  preempted  because  it  interfered  with  the  national  bank’s 
statutory  power  “to  receive  savings  deposits.”  Id.,  at  374,  378–379. 
The  Court  in  Franklin  found  the  New  York  law  preempted—even 
though  it  did  not  bar  national  banks  from  receiving  (or  even
advertising)  savings  deposits—because  the  New  York  law  interfered
with the banks’ ability to advertise “using the commonly understood 
description  which  Congress  has  specifically  selected.”  Id.,  at  378. 
Barnett  Bank  also  pointed  to  a  second  example  of  significant 
interference—Fidelity  Federal  Savings  &  Loan  Association  v.  De  la 
Cuesta,  458  U. S.  141—where  the  state  law  similarly  limited  a 
federally  authorized  power.    For  purposes  of  applying  Dodd-Frank’s 
preemption  standard,  Franklin,  Fidelity, and  Barnett  Bank  together 
illustrate the kinds of state laws that significantly interfere with the 
exercise of a national bank power and thus are preempted.  Pp. 7–9.

(3) The  primary  example  of  a  case  identified  in  Barnett  Bank 
where  state  law  was  not  preempted  is  Anderson  National  Bank  v. 
Luckett, 321 U. S. 233.  There, a Kentucky law required banks to turn 
over abandoned deposits to the State.  The Anderson Court held that 
the Kentucky law did not interfere with national banks’ federal power 
to  collect  deposits  because  that  power  includes  the  inseparable 
“obligation to pay” deposits to those “entitled to demand payment.”  Id., 
at 248–249.  Anderson distinguished a similar California law at issue 
in First National Bank of San Jose v. California, 262 U. S. 366, where 
the Court had found the state law to be preempted, and its reasons for 
differentiating the California law help demonstrate when a state law 
regulating  national  banks  crosses  the  line  from  permissible  to 
preempted. 
In  contrast  to  the  Kentucky  law  in  Anderson,  the 
California law in First National Bank of San Jose allowed the State to 
claim  dormant  deposits  without  proof  of  abandonment.    The  Court 
noted  that  California’s  law  could  therefore  cause  customers  to 
“hesitate”  before  depositing  funds  at  the  bank—and  thus  interfere 
with  the  “efficiency”  of  the national  bank  in  receiving deposits.    262 
U. S., at 369–370.  Barnett Bank also cited two other examples of state
laws that were not preempted, both of which regulated banks in “their
daily  course  of  business.”    See  National  Bank  v.  Commonwealth,  9 
Wall. 353; McClellan v. Chipman, 164 U. S. 347.  Pp. 9–11.

(b) The Court’s precedents applying Barnett Bank furnish content to 
the significant-interference test—and therefore also to Dodd-Frank’s