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FISHER v. UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN 

THOMAS, J., concurring 

of  Spanish  descendancy.’ ”    Id.,  at  270–271,  and  n. 2  (plu-
rality  opinion).  We  rejected  the  interest  in  remedying 
societal  discrimination  because  it  had  no  logical  stopping
point.  Id.,  at  276.  We  similarly  rebuffed  as  inadequate
the interest in providing role models to minority students
and added that the notion that “black students are better 
off  with  black  teachers  could  lead  to  the  very  system  the 
Court  rejected  in  Brown  v.  Board  of  Education,  347  U. S. 
483 (1954).”  Ibid. 

2 
  Grutter was a radical departure from our strict-scrutiny
precedents.  In  Grutter,  the  University  of  Michigan  Law
School  (Law  School)  claimed  that  it  had  a  compelling 
reason  to  discriminate  based  on  race.    The  reason  it  ad-
vanced  did  not  concern  protecting  national  security  or 
remedying its own past discrimination.  Instead, the Law 
School argued that it needed to discriminate in admissions 
decisions in order to obtain the “educational benefits that 
flow  from  a  diverse  student  body.”    539  U.  S.,  at  317. 
Contrary to the very meaning of strict scrutiny, the Court 
deferred to the Law School’s determination that this inter-
est was sufficiently compelling to justify racial discrimina-
tion.  Id., at 325. 

I  dissented  from  that  part  of  the  Court’s  decision.    I 
explained  that  “only  those  measures  the  State  must  take
to  provide  a  bulwark  against  anarchy,  or  to  prevent  vio-
lence,  will  constitute  a  ‘pressing  public  necessity’ ”  suffi-
cient  to  satisfy  strict  scrutiny.    Id.,  at  353.   Cf.  Lee  v. 
Washington,  390  U. S.  333,  334  (1968)  (Black,  J.,  concur-
ring)  (protecting  prisoners  from  violence  might  justify 
narrowly  tailored  discrimination);  J.  A.  Croson,  supra,  at 
521  (SCALIA,  J.,  concurring  in  judgment)  (“At  least  where
state  or  local  action  is  at  issue,  only  a  social  emergency 
rising to the level of imminent danger to life and limb . . .
can justify [racial discrimination]”).  I adhere to that view