Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/558bv.pdf
Page Number: 267

106 

MOHAWK  INDUSTRIES,  INC.  v.  CARPENTER 

Opinion of the Court 

II
 
A
 

By statute, courts of appeals “have jurisdiction of appeals 
from  all  ﬁnal  decisions  of  the  district  courts  of  the  United 
States,  .  .  .  except  where  a  direct  review  may  be  had  in  the 
Supreme  Court.”  28  U. S. C.  § 1291.  A  “ﬁnal  decisio[n]”  is 
typically  one  “by  which  a  district  court  disassociates  itself 
from a case.”  Swint v. Chambers County Comm’n, 514 U. S. 
35, 42 (1995).  This Court, however,  “has long given” § 1291 
a  “practical  rather  than  a  technical  construction.”  Cohen, 
337  U. S.,  at  546.  As  we  held  in  Cohen,  the  statute  encom­
passes  not  only  judgments  that  “terminate  an  action,”  but 
also  a  “small  class”  of  collateral  rulings  that,  although  they 
do  not  end  the  litigation,  are  appropriately  deemed  “ﬁnal.” 
Id.,  at  545–546.  “That  small  category  includes  only  deci­
sions  that  are  conclusive,  that  resolve  important  questions 
separate from the merits, and that are effectively unreview­
able  on  appeal  from  the  ﬁnal  judgment  in  the  underlying 
action.”  Swint, 514 U. S., at 42. 

In  applying  Cohen’s  collateral  order  doctrine,  we  have 
stressed that it must “never be  allowed to swallow the gen­
eral  rule  that  a  party  is  entitled  to  a  single  appeal,  to  be 
deferred  until  ﬁnal  judgment  has  been  entered.”  Digital 
Equipment  Corp.  v.  Desktop  Direct,  Inc.,  511  U. S.  863,  868 
(1994)  (citation  omitted);  see  also  Will  v.  Hallock,  546  U. S. 
345, 350 (2006) (“emphasizing [the doctrine’s] modest scope”). 
Our  admonition  reﬂects  a  healthy  respect  for  the  virtues  of 
the  ﬁnal-judgment  rule.  Permitting  piecemeal,  prejudg­
ment appeals, we have recognized, undermines “efﬁcient ju­
dicial  administration”  and  encroaches  upon  the  prerogatives 
of  district  court  judges,  who  play  a  “special  role”  in  manag­
ing  ongoing  litigation.  Firestone  Tire  &  Rubber  Co.  v. 
Risjord,  449  U. S.  368,  374  (1981);  see  also  Richardson-
Merrell  Inc.  v.  Koller,  472  U. S.  424,  436  (1985)  (“[T]he  dis­
trict  judge  can  better  exercise  [his  or  her]  responsibility  [to