Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/20pdf/19-123_g3bi.pdf
Page Number: 11.0

Cite as:  593 U. S. ____ (2021) 

7 

Opinion of the Court 

not regulate hunters’ disposal of their kills or improper gar-
bage disposal by restaurants, both of which posed a similar 
hazard.  Id., at 544–545.  The Court concluded that this and 
other  forms  of  underinclusiveness  meant  that  the  ordi-
nances were not generally applicable.  Id., at 545–546. 

B 
The City initially argued that CSS’s practice violated sec-
tion 3.21 of its standard foster care contract.  We conclude, 
however, that this provision is not generally applicable as 
required by Smith.  The current version of section 3.21 spec-
ifies in pertinent part: 

“Rejection  of  Referral.  Provider  shall  not  reject  a 
child  or  family  including,  but  not  limited  to,  . . .  pro-
spective foster or adoptive parents, for Services based 
upon . . . their . . . sexual orientation . . . unless an ex-
ception is granted by the Commissioner or the Commis-
sioner’s  designee,  in  his/her  sole  discretion.”  Supp.
App. to Brief for City Respondents 16–17. 

This provision requires an agency to provide “Services,”
defined as “the work to be performed under this Contract,”
App. 560, to prospective foster parents regardless of their 
sexual orientation. 

Like the good cause provision in Sherbert, section 3.21 in-
corporates a system of individual exemptions, made availa-
ble in this case at the “sole discretion” of the Commissioner. 
The City has made clear that the Commissioner “has no in-
tention of granting an exception” to CSS.  App. to Pet. for 
Cert.  168a.  But  the  City  “may  not  refuse  to  extend  that 
[exemption] system to cases of ‘religious hardship’ without 
compelling reason.”  Smith, 494 U. S., at 884 (quoting Roy, 
476 U. S., at 708).

The  City  and  intervenor-respondents  resist  this  conclu-
sion on several grounds.  They first argue that governments 
should enjoy greater leeway under the Free Exercise Clause