Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/21pdf/20-1459_n7ip.pdf
Page Number: 37.0

6 

UNITED STATES v. TAYLOR 

ALITO, J., dissenting 

§924(c)(3)(A)  to  require  a  version  of  the  categorical  ap-
proach  that  would  exclude  from  the  elements  that  an  of-
fense “has” those elements that may be proved as alterna-
tives  to  one  another.  The  most  we  have  said  is  that,  in 
applying the categorical approach to other statutory provi-
sions, statutes setting forth disjunctive or alternative ele-
ments should be analyzed through what we have called the 
“modified categorical approach.” See Descamps, 570 U. S., 
at 260–264 (“burglary” under Armed Career Criminal Act,
18 U. S. C. § 924(e)); Shepard v. United States, 544 U. S. 13, 
24–26 (2005) (same).  Under this approach, courts must ex-
amine  “a  limited  class  of  documents  (for  example,  the  in-
dictment,  jury  instructions,  or  plea  agreement  and  collo-
quy)” to determine which alternative element of an offense 
figured in the crime for which the defendant was convicted. 
Mathis, 579 U. S., at 505. 

As I have previously explained, the modified categorical 
approach is difficult to apply, and I would not apply it here.
See  id.,  at  536–544  (dissenting  opinion);  Descamps,  570 
U. S., at 281–296 (ALITO, J., dissenting).  Instead, I would 
simply  hold  that  because  one  of  the  elements  of  the  at-
tempted  Hobbs  Act  robbery  is  the  attempted  use  of  force, 
that offense falls within §924(c)(3)(A)’s definition of “crime
of violence.” 

But if we were to apply the modified categorical approach
in this case, the result would be the same.  In his plea agree-
ment  and  associated  statement  of  facts,  Taylor  admitted 
that he and his accomplice intended to lure Silvester into 
an alleyway, hold him at gunpoint, and take his money “by 
force” in the event that he resisted.  And Taylor and his ac-
complice took more than a substantial step toward realizing 
this  plan.  After  all,  they  ultimately  shot  and  killed  Sil-
vester.  So  in  accepting  Taylor’s  plea,  it  is  plain  that  the 
sentencing  judge  determined  that  Taylor  had  intended  to
commit Hobbs Act robbery by using force and had taken a
substantial  step  toward  the  accomplishment  of  that  end.