Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/529bv.pdf
Page Number: 137

529US1

Unit: $U34

[09-26-01 08:14:00] PAGES PGT: OPIN

62

PORTUONDO v. AGARD

Syllabus

other witness—a rule that serves the trial’s truth-seeking function,
Perry v. Leeke, 488 U. S. 272, 282. That the comments here were ge-
neric rather than based upon a speciﬁc indication of tailoring does not
render them inﬁrm. Nor does the fact that they came at summation
rather than at a point earlier in the trial.
In Reagan v. United States,
157 U. S. 301, 304, the Court upheld the trial court’s recitation of an
interested-witness instruction that directed the jury to consider the de-
fendant’s deep personal interest in the case when evaluating his credibil-
ity. The instruction in Reagan, like the prosecutor’s comments in this
case, did not rely on any speciﬁc evidence of actual fabrication for its
application, nor did it come at a time when the defendant could respond.
Nevertheless, the Court considered the instruction to be perfectly
proper. Pp. 65–73.

2. The prosecutor’s comments also did not violate respondent’s right
to due process. To the extent his due process claim is based upon an
alleged burdening of his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights, it has been
disposed of by the determination that those Amendments were not di-
rectly infringed. Respondent also argues, however, that it was im-
proper to comment on his presence at trial because New York law re-
quires him to be present. Respondent points to the Court’s decision in
Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U. S. 610, for support. The Court held in Doyle that
the prosecution may not impeach a defendant with his post-Miranda
warnings silence because those warnings carry an implicit “assurance
that silence will carry no penalty.”
Id., at 618. No promise of impu-
nity is implicit in a statute requiring a defendant to be present at trial,
and there is no authority whatever for the proposition that the impair-
ment of credibility, if any, caused by mandatory presence at trial violates
due process. Pp. 74–75.

117 F. 3d 696, reversed and remanded.

Scalia, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist,
C. J., and O’Connor, Kennedy, and Thomas, JJ., joined. Stevens, J.,
ﬁled an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Breyer, J., joined,
post, p. 76. Ginsburg, J., ﬁled a dissenting opinion, in which Souter, J.,
joined, post, p. 76.

Andrew A. Zwerling argued the cause for petitioner.
With him on the briefs were Richard A. Brown, John M.
Castellano, and Ellen C. Abbot.

Jonathan E. Nuechterlein argued the cause for the United
States as amicus curiae urging reversal. With him on the
brief were Solicitor General Waxman, Assistant Attorney