Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/558bv.pdf
Page Number: 278

Cite as: 558 U. S. 100 (2009) 

117 

Opinion of Thomas, J. 

468  (1978).  The  Court  has  adhered  to  that  narrowing  ap­
proach,  principally  by  raising  the  bar  on  what  types  of  in­
terests  are  “important  enough”  to  justify  collateral  order 
appeals.  See,  e. g.,  Will,  supra,  at  352–353  (explaining  that 
an  interlocutory  order  typically  will  be  “important”  enough 
to  justify  Cohen  review  only  where  “some  particular  value 
of a high order,” such as “honoring the separation of powers, 
preserving  the  efﬁciency  of  government . . . ,  [or]  respect­
ing  a  State’s  dignitary  interests,”  is  “marshaled  in  support 
of  the  interest  in  avoiding  trial”  and  the  Court  determines 
that  denying  review  would  “imperil”  that  interest);  Digital 
Equipment,  supra,  at  878–879  (noting  that  appealability 
under  Cohen  turns  on  a  “judgment  about  the  value  of  the 
interests  that  would  be  lost  through  rigorous  application  of 
a  ﬁnal  judgment  requirement,”  and  that  an  interest  “quali­
ﬁes  as  ‘important’  in  Cohen’s  sense”  if  it  is  “weightier  than 
the  societal  interests  advanced  by the  ordinary  operation  of 
ﬁnal  judgment  principles”).  As  we  recognized  last  Term, 
however,  our  attempts  to  contain  the  Cohen  doctrine  have 
not  all  been  successful  or  persuasive.  See  Ashcroft,  supra, 
at  672  (“As  a  general  matter,  the  collateral-order  doctrine 
may have expanded beyond the limits dictated by its internal 
logic  and  the  strict  application  of  the  criteria  set  out  in 
Cohen”).  In  my  view,  this  case  presents  an  opportunity  to 
improve our approach. 

The privilege interest at issue here is undoubtedly impor­
tant,  both  in  its  own  right  and  when  compared  to  some  of 
the  interests  (e. g.,  in  bond  and  notice-cost  rulings)  we  have 
held to be appealable under Cohen.  Accordingly, the Court’s 
Cohen analysis does not rest on the privilege order’s relative 
unimportance, but instead on its effective reviewability after 
ﬁnal  judgment.  Ante,  at  108–113.  Although  I  agree  with 
the  Court’s  ultimate  conclusion,  I  see  two  difﬁculties  with 
this  approach.  First,  the  Court  emphasizes  that  the  alter­
native  avenues  of  review  it  discusses  (which  did  not  prove 
adequate in this case) would be adequate where the privilege