Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/19pdf/18-9526_9okb.pdf
Page Number: 56

Cite as:  591 U. S. ____ (2020) 

11 

ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting 

Our  precedents  disagree.    They  explain  that  disestablish-
ment can occur “[e]ven in the absence of a clear expression 
of congressional purpose in the text of [the] Act.”  Yankton 
Sioux Tribe, 522 U. S., at 351.  The “notion” that “express 
language  in  an  Act  is  the  only  method  by  which  congres-
sional action may result in disestablishment” is “quite in-
consistent”  with  our  precedents.    Rosebud  Sioux  Tribe  v. 
Kneip, 430 U. S. 584, 586, 588, n. 4 (1977); see Solem, 465 
U. S., at 471 (intent may be discerned from a “widely held,
contemporaneous  understanding,”  “notwithstanding  the 
presence  of  statutory  language  that  would  otherwise  sug-
gest  reservation  boundaries  remained  unchanged”);  see
also DeCoteau v. District County Court for Tenth Judicial 
Dist., 420 U. S. 425, 444 (1975); Mattz v. Arnett, 412 U. S. 
481, 505 (1973).

These are not “stiche[d] together quotes” but rather plain
language reflecting a consistent theme running through our
precedents.  Ante,  at  20,  n. 9.    They  make  clear  that  the 
Court  errs  in  focusing  on  whether  “a  statute”  alone  “re-
quired”  disestablishment,  ante,  at  20;  under  these  prece-
dents, we cannot determine what Congress “required” with-
out  first  considering  evidence  in  addition  to  the  relevant 
statutes.  Oddly, the Court claims these precedents actually 
support  its  new  approach  because  they  “emphasize  that
‘[t]he focus of our inquiry is congressional intent.’ ”  Ante, at 
20–21, n. 9 (quoting Rosebud Sioux Tribe, 430 U. S., at 588, 
n. 4, and citing Yankton Sioux Tribe, 522 U. S., at 343).  But 
in  this  context  that  intent  is  determined  by  examining  a
broad array of evidence—“all the circumstances.”  Parker, 
577 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 6) (quoting Hagen, 510 U. S., 
at  412).  Unless  the  Court  is  prepared  to  overrule  these 
precedents, it should follow them. 

The Court appears skeptical of these precedents, but does 
not address the compelling reasons they give for consider-
ing extratextual evidence.  At the turn of the century, the 
possibility that a reservation might persist in the absence