Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/558bv.pdf
Page Number: 201

40 

PORTER  v.  McCOLLUM 

Per Curiam 

sources);  Strickland,  466  U. S.,  at  699  (“[Counsel’s]  decision 
not  to  seek  more  character  or  psychological  evidence  than 
was  already  in  hand  was . . .  reasonable”).  Beyond  that, 
like  the  counsel  in  Wiggins,  he  ignored  pertinent  avenues 
for  investigation  of  which  he  should  have  been  aware.  The 
court-ordered  competency  evaluations,  for  example,  collec­
tively reported Porter’s very few years of regular school, his 
military  service  and  wounds  sustained  in  combat,  and  his 
father’s  “over-disciplin[e].”  Record  904,  902–906.  As  an 
explanation, counsel described Porter  as fatalistic and unco­
operative.  But  he  acknowledged  that  although  Porter  in­
structed him not to speak with Porter’s ex-wife or son, Por­
ter  did  not  give  him  any  other  instructions  limiting  the 
witnesses he could interview. 

Counsel  thus  failed  to  uncover  and  present  any  evidence 
of  Porter’s  mental  health  or  mental  impairment,  his  family 
background, or his military service.  The decision not to in­
vestigate  did  not  reﬂect  reasonable  professional  judgment. 
Wiggins,  supra,  at  534.  Porter  may  have  been  fatalistic  or 
uncooperative, but that does not obviate the need for defense 
counsel  to  conduct  some  sort  of  mitigation  investigation. 
See Rompilla, supra, at 381–382. 

III 

Because we ﬁnd Porter’s counsel deﬁcient, we must deter­
mine  whether  the  Florida  Supreme  Court  unreasonably  ap­
plied  Strickland  in  holding  Porter  was  not  prejudiced  by 
that  deﬁciency.  Under  Strickland,  a  defendant  is  preju­
diced  by  his  counsel’s  deﬁcient  performance  if  “there  is  a 
reasonable  probability  that,  but  for  counsel’s  unprofessional 
errors,  the  result  of  the  proceeding  would  have  been  differ­
ent.”  466  U. S.,  at  694.  In  Florida,  the  sentencing  judge 
makes  the  determination  as  to  the  existence  and  weight  of 
aggravating  and  mitigating  circumstances  and  the  punish­
ment,  Fla.  Stat.  § 921.141(3),  but  he  must  give  the  jury  ver­
dict  of  life  or  death  “great  weight,”  Tedder  v.  State,  322