Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/529bv.pdf
Page Number: 971

529US3

Unit: $U62

[09-26-01 12:54:02] PAGES PGT: OPIN

896

GEIER v. AMERICAN HONDA MOTOR CO.

Stevens, J., dissenting

Relying on § 1392(d) and legislative history discussing Con-
gress’ desire for uniform national safety standards,12 Honda
argues that petitioners’ common-law no-airbag claims are ex-
pressly pre-empted because success on those claims would
necessarily establish a state “safety standard” not identical
It is perfectly clear, however, that the
to Standard 208.
term “safety standard” as used in these two sections refers
to an objective rule prescribed by a legislature or an admin-
istrative agency and does not encompass case-speciﬁc deci-
sions by judges and juries that resolve common-law claims.
That term is used three times in these sections; presumably
it is used consistently. Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U. S.
561, 570 (1995). The two references to a federal safety
standard are necessarily describing an objective administra-
tive rule.
15 U. S. C. § 1392(a). When the pre-emption pro-
vision refers to a safety standard established by a “State or
political subdivision of a State,” therefore, it is most natu-
rally read to convey a similar meaning.
In addition, when
the two sections are read together, they provide compelling
evidence of an intent to distinguish between legislative and
administrative rulemaking, on the one hand, and common-
law liability, on the other. This distinction was certainly a
rational one for Congress to draw in the Safety Act given
that common-law liability—unlike most legislative or admin-
istrative rulemaking—necessarily performs an important re-
medial role in compensating accident victims. Cf. Silkwood
v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U. S. 238, 251, 256 (1984).

It is true that in three recent cases we concluded that
broadly phrased pre-emptive commands encompassed
common-law claims.
In Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.,
while we thought it clear that the pre-emption provision in
the 1965 Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act
applied only to “rulemaking bodies,” 505 U. S., at 518, we
concluded that the broad command in the subsequent 1969

12 S. Rep. No. 1301, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., 2 (1966); H. R. Rep. No. 1776,

89th Cong., 2d Sess., 17 (1966).