Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/19pdf/18-260_jifl.pdf
Page Number: 34

Cite as:  590 U. S. ____ (2020) 

1 

ALITO, J., dissenting 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

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No. 18–260 
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COUNTY OF MAUI, HAWAII, PETITIONER v. HAWAII 
WILDLIFE FUND, ET AL. 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT 

[April 23, 2020] 

JUSTICE ALITO, dissenting. 
If the Court is going to devise its own legal rules, instead 
of  interpreting  those  enacted  by  Congress,  it  might  at 
least  adopt  rules  that  can  be  applied  with  a  modicum  of
consistency.  Here,  however,  the  Court  makes  up  a  rule
that provides no clear guidance and invites arbitrary and 
inconsistent application. 

The text of the Clean Water Act generally requires a per-
mit  when  a  discharge  “from”  a  “point  source”  (such  as  a 
pipe) “add[s]” a pollutant “to” navigable waters (such as the
Pacific Ocean).  33 U. S. C. §1362(12).  There are two ways 
to read this text.  A pollutant that reaches the ocean could 
be  understood  to  have  been  added  “from”  a  pipe  if  the
pipe originally discharged the pollutant and the pollutant
eventually made its way to the ocean by flowing over or un-
der the surface of the ground.  Or a pollutant that reaches 
the ocean could be understood to have come “from” a pipe if 
the pollutant is discharged from the pipe directly into the 
ocean. 

There  is  no  comprehensible  alternative  to  these  two
interpretations,  but  the  Court  refuses  to  accept  either.
Both alternatives, it believes, lead to unacceptable results,
and it therefore tries to find a middle way.  It holds that a 
permit is required “when there is a direct discharge from a
point  source  into  navigable  waters  or  when  there  is  the