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Page Number: 51

14 

JOHNSON v. UNITED STATES 

ALITO, J., dissenting 

on  the  lack  of  notice,  and  hence  may  be  overcome  in  any
specific  case  where  reasonable  persons  would  know  that 
their  conduct  is  at  risk.”  Maynard  v.  Cartwright,  486 
U. S.  356,  361  (1988).    Thus,  in  a  due  process  vagueness
case, we will hold that a law is facially invalid “only if the
enactment  is  impermissibly  vague  in  all  of  its  applica­
tions.”  Hoffman Estates, 455 U. S., at 494–495 (emphasis 
added); see also Chapman, 500 U. S., at 467.2 

In concluding that the residual clause is facially void for
vagueness,  the  Court  flatly  contravenes  this  rule.  The 
Court  admits  “that  there  will  be  straightforward  cases
under the residual clause.”  Ante, at 10.  But rather than 
exercising  the  restraint  that  our  vagueness  cases  pre­
scribe,  the  Court  holds  that  the  residual  clause  is  uncon­
stitutionally vague even when its application is clear. 
The  Court’s  treatment  of  this  issue  is  startling. 

Its 
facial  invalidation  precludes  a  sentencing  court  that  is
applying  ACCA  from  counting  convictions  for  even  those 
specific  offenses  that  this  Court  previously  found  to  fall 
within the residual clause.  See James, 550 U. S., at 203– 
209 (attempted burglary); Sykes, 564 U. S., at ___–___ (slip 
op.,  at  5–9)  (flight  from  law  enforcement  in  a  vehicle). 

—————— 

2 This rule is simply an application of the broader rule that, except in 

First Amendment cases, we will hold that a statute is facially unconsti­
tutional  only  if  “no  set  of  circumstances  exists  under  which  the  Act 
would be valid.”  United States v. Salerno, 481 U. S. 739, 745 (1987).  A 
void-for-vagueness challenge is a facial challenge.  See Hoffman Estates 
v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U. S. 489, 494–495, and nn. 5, 6, 
7  (1982);  Chicago  v.  Morales,  527  U. S.  41,  79  (1999)  (SCALIA,  J.,  dis­
senting).    Consequently,  there  is  no  reason  why  the  no-set-of­
circumstances rule should not apply in this context.  I assume that the 
Court does not mean to abrogate the no-set-of-circumstances rule in its
entirety, but the Court provides no justification for its refusal to apply 
that rule here.  Perhaps the Court has concluded, for some undisclosed 
reason, that void-for-vagueness claims are different from all other facial 
challenges  not  based  on  the  First  Amendment.    Or  perhaps  the  Court 
has simply created an ACCA exception.