Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/558bv.pdf
Page Number: 170.0

Cite as: 558 U. S. 4 (2009) 

9 

Per Curiam 

539  U. S.  510,  524  (2003).  What  we  have  said  of  state  re­
quirements is a fortiori true of standards set by private or­
ganizations: “[W]hile States are free to impose whatever spe­
ciﬁc rules they see ﬁt to ensure that criminal defendants are 
well represented, we have held that the Federal Constitution 
imposes  one  general  requirement:  that  counsel  make  objec­
tively  reasonable  choices.”  Roe  v.  Flores-Ortega,  528  U. S. 
470, 479 (2000). 

B 

Van Hook insists that the Sixth Circuit’s missteps made no 
difference  because  his  counsel  were  ineffective  even  under 
professional standards prevailing at the time.  He is wrong. 
Like  the  Court  of  Appeals,  Van  Hook  ﬁrst  contends  that 
his  attorneys  began  their  mitigation  investigation  too  late, 
waiting until he was found guilty—only days before the sen­
tencing hearing—to dig into his background.  See 560 F. 3d, 
at  528.  But  the  record  shows  they  started  much  sooner. 
Between Van Hook’s indictment and his trial less than three 
months  later,  they  contacted  their  lay  witnesses  early  and 
often:  They  spoke  nine  times  with  his  mother  (beginning 
within a week after the indictment), once with both parents 
together,  twice  with  an  aunt  who  lived  with  the  family  and 
often  cared  for  Van  Hook  as  a  child,  and  three  times  with  a 
family  friend  whom  Van  Hook  visited  immediately  after  the 
crime.  App. to Pet. for Cert. 380a–383a, 384a–387a.  As for 
their  expert  witnesses,  they  were  in  touch  with  one  more 
than  a  month  before  trial,  and  they  met  with  the  other  for 
two  hours  a  week  before  the  trial  court  reached  its  verdict. 
Id.,  at  382a,  386a.  Moreover,  after  reviewing  his  military 
history,  they  met with  a  representative  of the  Veterans  Ad­
ministration  seven  weeks  before  trial  and  attempted  to  ob­

“standard practice,” Wiggins v.  Smith, 539 U. S. 510, 524 (2003), and must 
not  be  so  detailed  that  they  would  “interfere  with  the  constitutionally 
protected  independence  of  counsel  and  restrict  the  wide  latitude  counsel 
must  have  in  making  tactical  decisions,”  Strickland,  supra,  at  689.  We 
express no views on whether the 2003 Guidelines meet these criteria.