Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/04pdf/04-278.pdf
Page Number: 18

Cite as:  545 U. S. ____ (2005) 

15 

Opinion of the Court 

identity of the alleged entitlement is vague.  See Roth, 408 
U. S., at 577 (considering  whether “certain benefits” were 
“secure[d]” by rule or understandings); cf. Natale v. Ridge-
field,  170  F. 3d  258,  263  (CA2  1999)  (“There  is  no  reason 
. . . to restrict the ‘uncertainty’ that will preclude existence 
of  a  federally  protectable  property  interest  to  the  uncer-
tainty  that  inheres  in  the  exercise  of  discretion”).    The 
dissent, after suggesting various formulations of the enti-
tlement in question,10 ultimately contends that the obliga-
tions under the statute were quite precise: either make an 
arrest  or  (if  that  is  impractical)  seek  an  arrest  warrant, 
post,  at  14.  The  problem  with  this  is  that  the  seeking  of 
an arrest warrant would be an entitlement to nothing but 
procedure—which  we  have  held  inadequate  even  to  sup-
port standing, see Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U. S. 
555  (1992);  much  less  can  it  be  the  basis  for  a  property 
interest.    See  post,  at  3–4  (SOUTER,  J.,  concurring).   After 
the warrant is sought, it remains within the discretion of a 
judge whether to grant it, and after it is granted, it remains 
within  the  discretion  of  the  police  whether  and  when  to 
execute it.11  Respondent would have been assured nothing 
but the seeking of a  warrant.  This is not the sort of  “enti-
tlement” out of which a property interest is created. 

Even if the statute could be said to have made enforce-
ment  of  restraining  orders  “mandatory”  because  of  the 
—————— 

10 See  post,  at  1  (“entitlement  to  police  protection”); post,  at  2  (“enti-
tlement  to  mandatory  individual  protection  by  the  local  police  force”); 
ibid.  (“a  right  to  police  assistance”);  post,  at  8  (“a  citizen’s  interest  in 
the government’s commitment to provide police enforcement in certain 
defined  circumstances”);  post,  at  18  (“respondent’s  property  interest  in 
the  enforcement  of  her restraining  order”); post,  at  20  (the  “service”  of 
“protection  from  her  husband”);  post,  at  21–22  (“interest  in  the  en-
forcement of the restraining order”). 

11 The  dissent  asserts  that  the  police  would  lack  discretion  in  the 
execution  of  this  warrant,  post,  at  13–14,  n. 12,  but  cites  no  statute 
mandating immediate execution.  The general Colorado statute govern-
ing  arrest  provides  that  police  “may  arrest”  when  they  possess  a  war-
rant “commanding” arrest.  Colo. Rev. Stat. §16–3–102(1) (Lexis 1999).