Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/19pdf/19-631_2d93.pdf
Page Number: 37.0

Cite as:  591 U. S. ____ (2020) 

7 

Opinion of BREYER, J. 

say, from a drug label, means that courts must examine all
other regulatory exceptions with strict scrutiny.  Put differ-
ently,  it  is hard  to  imagine  that such  exceptions  threaten
political speech in the marketplace of ideas, or have any sig-
nificant impact on the free exchange of ideas.  To treat those 
exceptions as presumptively unconstitutional would work a 
significant transfer of authority from legislatures and agen-
cies to courts, potentially inhibiting the creation of the very
government  programs  for  which  the  people  (after  debate) 
have voiced their support, despite those programs’ minimal 
speech-related  harms.  See  Sorrell,  564  U. S.,  at  584–585 
(BREYER, J., dissenting).  Given the values at the heart of 
the First Amendment, see supra, at 3–5, that interpretation
threatens to stand that Amendment on its head.  It could 
also lead the Court to water down the strict scrutiny stand-
ard,  which  would  limit  speech  protections  in  situations
where  strict  scrutiny’s  strong  protections  should  properly 
apply.  Reed, 576 U. S., at 178 (BREYER, J., concurring in 
judgment).

If, as I have argued, the First Amendment does not sup-
port the mechanical conclusion that content discrimination
automatically triggers strict scrutiny, what role might con-
tent discrimination play?  The plurality is correct when it 
quotes this Court as having said that the government may 
not discriminate “ ‘in the regulation of expression on the ba-
sis of the content of that expression.’ ”  Ante, at 6 (quoting 
Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U. S. 507, 520 (1976)).  If, however, 
this  Court  is  to  apply  the  First  Amendment  consistently
with the democratic values embodied within that Amend-
ment, that kind of statement must reflect a rule of thumb 
applicable  only  in  certain  circumstances.    See  Reed,  576 
U. S., at 176 (BREYER, J., concurring in judgment); id., at 
183 (KAGAN, J., concurring in judgment) (“We can adminis-
ter our content-regulation doctrine with a dose of common 
sense, so as to leave standing laws that in no way implicate
its intended function”).