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Page Number: 14

8 

MCCUTCHEON v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N 

Opinion of ROBERTS, C. J. 

Government  may  regulate  protected  speech  only  if  such 
regulation promotes a compelling interest and is the least 
restrictive  means  to  further  the  articulated  interest.    See 
Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U. S. 115, 
126 (1989).

By  contrast,  the  Court  concluded  that  contribution 
limits impose a lesser restraint on political speech because
they  “permit[  ]  the  symbolic  expression  of  support  evi-
denced by a contribution but do[ ] not in any way infringe
the  contributor’s  freedom  to  discuss  candidates  and  is-
sues.”  Buckley,  424  U. S.,  at  21.    As  a  result,  the  Court 
focused  on  the  effect  of  the  contribution  limits  on  the 
freedom  of  political  association  and  applied  a  lesser  but 
still “rigorous standard of review.”  Id., at 29.  Under that 
standard,  “[e]ven  a  ‘ “significant  interference”  with  pro-
tected  rights  of  political  association’  may  be  sustained  if 
the  State  demonstrates  a  sufficiently  important  interest
and  employs  means  closely  drawn  to  avoid  unnecessary 
abridgement  of  associational  freedoms.”    Id.,  at  25  (quot-
ing Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U. S. 477, 488 (1975)).

The primary purpose of FECA was to limit quid pro quo
corruption  and  its  appearance;  that  purpose  satisfied  the 
requirement  of  a  “sufficiently  important”  governmental
interest.  424  U. S.,  at  26–27.    As  for  the  “closely  drawn” 
component,  Buckley  concluded  that  the  $1,000  base  limit 
“focuses  precisely  on  the  problem  of  large  campaign  con-
tributions  . . .  while  leaving  persons  free  to  engage  in
independent  political  expression,  to  associate  actively 
through  volunteering  their  services,  and  to  assist  to  a 
limited  but  nonetheless  substantial  extent  in  supporting
candidates and committees with financial resources.”  Id., 
at  28.  The  Court  therefore  upheld  the  $1,000  base  limit 
under the “closely drawn” test.  Id., at 29. 

The  Court  next  separately  considered  an  overbreadth 
challenge  to  the  base  limit.    See  id.,  at  29–30.  The  chal-
lengers  argued  that  the  base  limit  was  fatally  overbroad