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10 

LUCIA v. SEC 

BREYER, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part 
Opinion of BREYER, J. 

respect  is  often  highly  relevant.    Congress’  leeway  is  not,
of  course,  absolute—it  may  not,  for  example,  say  that
positions the Constitution itself describes as “Officers” are 
not “Officers.”  But given the constitutional language, the 
Court, when deciding whether other positions are “Officers 
of  the  United  States”  under  the  Appointments  Clause, 
should give substantial weight to Congress’ decision.

How  is  the  Court  to  decide  whether  Congress  intended 
that the holder of a particular Government position count 
as an “Office[r] of the United States”?  Congress might, of
course, write explicitly into the statute that the employee
“is an officer of the United States under the Appointments 
Clause,”  but  an  explicit  phrase  of  this  kind  is  unlikely  to 
appear.  If it does not, then I would approach the question
like  any  other  difficult  question  of  statutory  interpreta-
tion.  Several  considerations,  among  others,  are  likely  to
be  relevant.  First,  as  the  Court  said  in  Freytag  v.  Com-
missioner,  501  U. S.  868,  881  (1991),  and  repeats  today, 
ante,  at  6,  where  Congress  grants  an  appointee  “ ‘signifi-
cant authority pursuant to the laws to the United States,’ ” 
that supports the view that (but should not determinatively 
decide that) Congress made that appointee an “Office[r] of
the United States.”  Freytag, supra, at 881 (quoting Buck-
ley, 424 U. S., at 126); see also United States v. Germaine, 
99  U. S.  508,  511  (1879)  (holding  that  the  term  “officer” 
“embraces  the  ideas  of  tenure,  duration,  emolument,  and 
duties”).  The means of appointment that Congress chooses 
is  also  instructive.    Where  Congress  provides  a  method
of  appointment  that  mimics  a  method  the  Appointments 
Clause  allows  for  “Officers,”  that  fact  too  supports  the 
view that (but does not determinatively decide that) Con-
gress viewed the position as one to be held by an “Officer,” 
and  vice  versa.  See  id.,  at  509–511.  And  the  Court’s 
decision  in  Free  Enterprise  Fund  suggests  a  third  indica- 
tion of “Officer” status—did Congress provide the position 
with removal protections that would be unconstitutional if