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Page Number: 240.0

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02-22-99 22:42:40 PAGES OPINPGT

Cite as: 524 U. S. 184 (1998)

195

Opinion of the Court

“carv[e] out an exception to the traditional rule” that igno-
rance of the law is no excuse 21 and require that the defendant
have knowledge of the law.22 The danger of convicting indi-
viduals engaged in apparently innocent activity that moti-
vated our decisions in the tax cases and Ratzlaf is not pres-
ent here because the jury found that this petitioner knew
that his conduct was unlawful.23

often arises even among taxpayers who earnestly wish to follow the law,’
and ‘ “[i]t is not the purpose of the law to penalize frank difference of
opinion or innocent errors made despite the exercise of reasonable care.” ’
United States v. Bishop, 412 U. S. 346, 360–361 (1973) (quoting Spies v.
United States, 317 U. S. 492, 496 (1943))”); Murdock, 290 U. S., at 396
(“Congress did not intend that a person, by reason of a bona ﬁde misunder-
standing as to his liability for the tax, as to his duty to make a return, or
as to the adequacy of the records he maintained, should become a criminal
by his mere failure to measure up to the prescribed standard of conduct”).
21 Cheek, 498 U. S., at 200; see also Ratzlaf, 510 U. S., at 149 (noting the
“venerable principle that ignorance of the law generally is no defense to a
criminal charge,” but concluding that Congress intended otherwise in the
“particular contex[t]” of the currency structuring statute).

22 Even before Ratzlaf was decided, then-Chief Judge Breyer explained
why there was a need for speciﬁcity under those statutes that is inapplica-
ble when there is no danger of conviction of a defendant with an innocent
state of mind. He wrote:

“I believe that criminal prosecutions for ‘currency law’ violations, of the
sort at issue here, very much resemble criminal prosecutions for tax law
violations. Compare 26 U. S. C. §§ 6050I, 7203 with 31 U. S. C. §§ 5322,
5324. Both sets of laws are technical; and both sets of laws sometimes
criminalize conduct that would not strike an ordinary citizen as immoral
or likely unlawful. Thus, both sets of laws may lead to the unfair result
of criminally prosecuting individuals who subjectively and honestly be-
lieve they have not acted criminally. Cheek v. United States, 498 U. S.
192 . . . (1991), sets forth a legal standard that, by requiring proof that the
defendant was subjectively aware of the duty at issue, would avoid such
unfair results.” United States v. Aversa, 984 F. 2d 493, 502 (CA1 1993)
(concurring opinion).
He therefore concluded that the “same standards should apply in both”
the tax cases and in cases such as Ratzlaf.

984 F. 2d, at 503.

23 Moreover, requiring only knowledge that the conduct is unlawful is
fully consistent with the purpose of FOPA, as FOPA was enacted to pro-
tect law-abiding citizens who might inadvertently violate the law. See