Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/23pdf/22-704_4246.pdf
Page Number: 29.0

2 

VIDAL v. ELSTER 

BARRETT, J., concurring in part 

missible so long as they are reasonable in light of the trade-
mark system’s purpose of facilitating source identification. 

I 
Content-based speech regulations are, as a general mat-
ter, “presumptively unconstitutional.”  Reed v. Town of Gil-
bert, 576 U. S. 155, 163 (2015).  “The rationale of the gen-
eral  prohibition,”  we  have  explained,  “is  that  content 
discrimination ‘raises the specter that the Government may
effectively drive certain ideas or viewpoints from the mar-
ketplace.’ ”    R. A. V.  v. St.  Paul,  505  U. S.  377,  387  (1992) 
(quoting Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N. Y. State 
Crime Victims Bd., 502 U. S. 105, 116 (1991)).  But we have 
also recognized that in certain situations, this presumption
is inapplicable, as “ ‘there is no realistic possibility that of-
ficial suppression of ideas is afoot.’ ”  Davenport v. Washing-
ton Ed. Assn., 551 U. S. 177, 189 (2007) (quoting R. A. V., 
505 U. S., at 390).

I agree with the Court that content-based trademark reg-
istration restrictions do not trigger the presumption of un-
constitutionality.  See  ante,  at  6.  Because  federal  trade-
mark  law  did  not  exist  at  the  founding—and  American
trademark  law  did  not  develop  in  earnest  until  the  mid-
19th century—I do not take the Court to be making a claim
about the original meaning of the Free Speech Clause.  But, 
as the Court implicitly recognizes, the absence of founding-
era evidence does not mean that content-based trademark 
registration restrictions are inherently suspect.  More than 
a century’s worth of precedent reflects that trademark law 
has  always  been  content  based  without  functioning  as  a 
ready  tool  of  Government  censorship.    The  First  Amend-
ment does not require us to upend this longstanding, stable 
system  by  treating  trademark  restrictions  as  “presump-
tively unconstitutional.”  Reed, 576 U. S., at 163.