Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/21pdf/21-404_i5ea.pdf
Page Number: 11

8 

UNITED STATES v. WASHINGTON 

Opinion of the Court 

§3172  (emphasis  added;  boldface  deleted).  The  word  “ex-
tension”  suggests  application  to  federal  premises  of  a 
State’s generally applicable workers’ compensation laws—
laws that have some independent significance beyond the 
federal context. 

Finally,  preventing  discrimination  against  the  Federal
Government lies at the heart of the Constitution’s intergov-
ernmental immunity doctrine.  See County of Fresno, 429 
U. S.,  at  462–464;  Washington,  460  U. S.,  at  545–546. 
Without the prohibition on discrimination, what prevents a
State from imposing unduly high costs on the Federal Gov-
ernment for the benefit of the State’s own citizens?  To put 
the point more specifically, if discrimination is permissible 
here, what prevents Washington from bestowing a windfall 
upon its residents through an especially generous workers’ 
compensation  scheme  financed  exclusively  by  the  Federal 
Government?  Washington’s  voters  would  not  mind;  they 
would not pay for the costs of the scheme.  And some Wash-
ington  residents—those  working  for  the  Federal  Govern-
ment—would benefit from it.  The nondiscrimination prin-
ciple  provides  a  political  check  on  the  State’s  ability  to
impose such laws by ensuring that the State’s own citizens 
shoulder  at  least  some  of  the  costs.  See  McCulloch,  4 
Wheat.,  at  428,  435–436.  Discriminatory  provisions  like
the one before us contain no such ballot-box safeguard.

That fact reinforces the need to read waivers of intergov-
ernmental  immunity  narrowly,  at  least  where  a  State 
claims that Congress has waived immunity from discrimi-
natory  state  laws.  In  our  view,  for  the  reasons  we  have 
stated, the statutory language of §3172’s waiver permits a 
reading that does not allow discrimination against the Fed-
eral Government.  The waiver thus does not “ ‘clear[ly] and
unambiguous[ly]’ ”  authorize  Washington’s  discriminatory 
law.  Goodyear Atomic, 486 U. S., at 180; cf. FAA v. Cooper, 
566  U. S.  284,  299  (2012)  (noting  that  a  statute  does  not