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Page Number: 20

16 

GILL v. WHITFORD 

Opinion of the Court 

packed  or  cracked—to  carry  less  weight  than  it  would 
carry  in  another,  hypothetical  district.    Remedying  the 
individual  voter’s  harm,  therefore,  does  not  necessarily 
require restructuring all of the State’s legislative districts.
It requires revising only such districts as are necessary to
reshape  the  voter’s  district—so  that  the  voter  may  be 
unpacked or uncracked, as the case may be.  Cf. Alabama 
Legislative Black Caucus, 575 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 7).
This fits the rule that a “remedy must of course be limited
to the inadequacy that produced the injury in fact that the
plaintiff has established.”  Lewis, 518 U. S., at 357. 

The plaintiffs argue that their legal injury is not limited 
to the injury that they have suffered as individual voters,
but extends also to the statewide harm to their interest “in 
their  collective  representation  in  the  legislature,”  and  in 
influencing  the  legislature’s  overall  “composition  and 
policymaking.”    Brief  for  Appellees  31.    But  our  cases  to 
date  have  not  found  that  this  presents  an  individual  and
personal  injury  of  the  kind  required  for  Article  III  stand­
ing.  On  the  facts  of  this  case,  the  plaintiffs may  not  rely
on  “the  kind  of  undifferentiated,  generalized  grievance
about  the  conduct  of  government  that  we  have  refused  to
countenance  in  the  past.”  Lance,  549  U. S.,  at  442.    A 
citizen’s  interest  in  the  overall  composition  of  the  legisla­
ture is embodied in his right to vote for his representative. 
And  the  citizen’s  abstract  interest  in  policies  adopted  by
the  legislature  on  the  facts  here  is  a  nonjusticiable  “gen­
eral  interest  common  to  all  members  of  the  public.” 
Ex parte Lévitt, 302 U. S. 633, 634 (1937) (per curiam).

We leave for another day consideration of other possible 
theories  of  harm  not  presented  here  and  whether  those
theories  might  present  justiciable  claims  giving  rise  to
statewide remedies.  JUSTICE KAGAN’S concurring opinion 
endeavors to address “other kinds of constitutional harm,” 
see  post,  at  8,  perhaps  involving  different  kinds  of  plain­
tiffs,  see  post,  at  9,  and  differently  alleged  burdens,  see