Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/21pdf/20-843_7j80.pdf
Page Number: 23

Cite as:  597 U. S. ____ (2022) 

17 

Opinion of the Court 

If  the  last  decade  of  Second  Amendment  litigation  has
taught this Court anything, it is that federal courts tasked 
with making such difficult empirical judgments regarding
firearm regulations under the banner of “intermediate scru-
tiny” often defer to the determinations of legislatures.  But 
while that judicial deference to legislative interest balanc-
ing  is  understandable—and,  elsewhere,  appropriate—it  is 
not deference that the Constitution demands here.  The Sec-
ond Amendment “is the very product of an interest balanc-
ing  by  the  people”  and  it  “surely  elevates  above  all  other 
interests  the  right  of  law-abiding,  responsible  citizens  to
use arms” for self-defense.  Heller, 554 U. S., at 635.  It is 
this balance—struck by the traditions of the American peo-
ple—that demands our unqualified deference. 

D 
The test that we set forth in Heller and apply today re-
quires  courts  to  assess  whether  modern  firearms  regula-
tions are consistent with the Second Amendment’s text and 
historical understanding.  In some cases, that inquiry will 
be fairly straightforward.  For instance, when a challenged
regulation  addresses  a  general  societal  problem  that  has
persisted since the 18th century, the lack of a distinctly sim-
ilar  historical  regulation  addressing  that  problem  is  rele-
vant evidence that the challenged regulation is inconsistent
with the Second Amendment.  Likewise, if earlier genera-
tions  addressed  the  societal  problem,  but  did  so  through
materially different means, that also could be evidence that 

—————— 
is to resolve legal questions presented in particular cases or controver-
sies.  That “legal inquiry is a refined subset” of a broader “historical in-
quiry,” and it relies on “various evidentiary principles and default rules” 
to resolve uncertainties.  W. Baude & S. Sachs, Originalism and the Law
of the Past, 37 L. & Hist. Rev. 809, 810–811 (2019).  For example, “[i]n
our adversarial system of adjudication, we follow the principle of party
presentation.”  United States v. Sineneng-Smith, 590 U. S. ___, ___ (2020) 
(slip  op.,  at  3).    Courts  are  thus  entitled  to  decide  a  case  based  on  the 
historical record compiled by the parties.