Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/22pdf/21-857_4357.pdf
Page Number: 42.0

10 

JONES v. HENDRIX 

JACKSON, J., dissenting 

§§2255(h)(1)  and  (2).    Congress  has  expressly  overridden
operation of the saving clause with respect to those two pro-
visions, because it has clearly expressed its intent to narrow 
the scope of postconviction relief where a federal prisoner
brings a successive petition raising a claim of new evidence 
or new constitutional law.4  “A legislature may adopt a pol-
icy different from that embodied in the general saving stat-
ute.”  M.  Ruud,  The  Savings  Clause—Some  Problems  in 
Construction  and  Drafting,  33  Texas  L.  Rev.  285,  299 
(1955).  And here, no one questions that, with §§2255(h)(1) 
and (2), Congress clearly did so.  Brief for Respondent 26– 
28.  But the majority now reasons that, merely by omitting
statutory innocence claims from that authorized-filings list, 
Congress should be deemed to have exhibited a narrowing 
intent with respect to those claims as well.  See ante, at 1– 
2, 12. 

I disagree.  Indeed, in my view, it is precisely because the 
text of §§2255(h)(1) and (2) speaks unequivocally to the nar-
rowing Congress wished to effect with respect to new-evi-
dence and new-constitutional claims that we should not as-
certain  that  Congress  meant  for  the  second  or  successive
bar to have the same effect with respect to legal innocence 

—————— 

4 Prior to AEDPA, an individual who wished to file a successive petition
claiming factual innocence on the basis of new evidence needed only to 
show that it was “more likely than not” that the jury would have acquit-
ted him.  Schlup v. Delo, 513 U. S. 298, 327 (1995).  But, with AEDPA, 
Congress  narrowed  the  scope  of  available  relief  for  factual  innocence 
claims by requiring prisoners to make their showing by the more strin-
gent  “clear  and  convincing  evidence”  standard.    §2255(h)(1);  see  also 
§2244(b)(2)(B)(ii); 141 Cong. Rec. 15040, 15042 (1995) (statement of Sen. 
Levin).  Similarly, before AEDPA, an intervening change of circuit prec-
edent arguably could warrant a successive petition raising a new consti-
tutional argument.  See Davis, 417 U. S., at 339–341, 346–347; Sanders 
v. United States, 373 U. S. 1, 17 (1963); United States v. Nolan, 571 F. 2d 
528,  530  (CA10  1978);  see  also  Hertz  &  Liebman  §28.3[c][ii],  at  1709–
1710, and n. 108.  Yet AEDPA permits successive petitions raising new 
constitutional claims only when premised on retroactive Supreme Court 
opinions.  §§2255(h)(2), 2244(b)(2)(A).