Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/21pdf/20-637_10n2.pdf
Page Number: 27

Cite as:  595 U. S. ____ (2022) 

5 

THOMAS, J., dissenting 

the state court a “fair opportunity” to assess the claim.  Ad-
ams,  520  U. S.,  at  87  (internal  quotation  marks  omitted). 
Here, the Court highlights two statements from Hemphill’s
state-court briefing that, at best, offered a general and un-
reasoned assertion that the New  York courts  violated the 
Sixth  Amendment.    Such  an  unspecific  statement  mani-
festly failed to give the Court of Appeals a “fair opportunity” 
to assess any constitutional claim. 

The Court tacitly recognizes that its chosen excerpts from
Hemphill’s brief are inadequate.  It asserts that Hemphill,
after making those statements, “proceeded to explain” the 
basis for a Confrontation Clause claim.  Ante, at 8, n. 2.  The 
record demonstrates otherwise.  Hemphill did not cite a sin-
gle case.  He made no legal argument.  In fact, he did not 
even address the right to confront adverse witnesses.  Ra-
ther, Hemphill lamented that, “[a]s a practical matter,” the 
Appellate  Division’s  approach  “create[d]  a  minefield  for 
counsel in which the only way for the accused to rely on the 
rules of evidence or constitutional protections is to remain
mute.”  App. 388.  This general grievance about the inabil-
ity to present evidence or argument in defense says nothing 
about the Confrontation Clause.  To the contrary, under our 
precedents, the right to present a defense in a state crimi-
nal trial is guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment’s Compul-
sory Process Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due 
Process Clause.  See, e.g., Washington v.  Texas, 388 U. S. 
14,  19  (1967).  A  claim  under  those  provisions  would  not 
preserve  a  Confrontation  Clause  claim.  See  Gates,  462 
It  follows  that  Hemphill’s  assertion 
U. S.,  at  219–220. 
about the practicalities of criminal defense, with no citation
to any authority, is even more obviously inadequate. 

Ultimately, the Court all but concedes Hemphill’s failure 
to develop his claim below, but relies on Yee v. Escondido, 
503 U. S. 519 (1992), for the proposition that we may “con-
sider  any  argument  Hemphill  raises  in  support  of  his 
claim.”  Ante, at 7.  But Yee still requires a federal claim to