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BRYAN v. UNITED STATES

Scalia, J., dissenting

textual basis for that conclusion other than the notoriously
Instead, it seems to fall
malleable word “willfully” itself.
back on a presumption (apparently derived from the rule
that ignorance of the law is no excuse) that even where igno-
rance of the law is an excuse, that excuse should be con-
strued as narrowly as the statutory language permits.

I do not believe that the Court’s approach makes sense
of the statute that Congress enacted.
I have no quarrel
with the Court’s assertion that “willfully” in § 924(a)(1)(D)
requires only “general” knowledge of illegality—in the sense
that the defendant need not be able to recite chapter and
verse from Title 18 of the United States Code.
It is enough,
in my view, if the defendant is generally aware that the
actus reus punished by the statute—dealing in ﬁrearms
without a license—is illegal. But the Court is willing to ac-
cept a mens rea so “general” that it is entirely divorced from
the actus reus this statute was enacted to punish. That ap-
proach turns § 924(a)(1)(D) into a strange and unlikely crea-
ture. Bryan would be guilty of “willfully” dealing in ﬁre-
arms without a federal license even if, for example, he had
never heard of the licensing requirement but was aware that
he had violated the law by using straw purchasers or ﬁling
the serial numbers off the pistols. Ante, at 189, n. 8. The
Court does not even limit (for there is no rational basis to
limit) the universe of relevant laws to federal ﬁrearms stat-
utes. Bryan would also be “act[ing] with an evil-meaning
mind,” and hence presumably be guilty of “willfully” dealing
in ﬁrearms without a license, if he knew that his street-
corner transactions violated New York City’s business licens-
ing or sales tax ordinances.
(For that matter, it ought to
sufﬁce if Bryan knew that the car out of which he sold the
guns was illegally double-parked, or if, in order to meet the
appointed time for the sale, he intentionally violated Penn-
sylvania’s speed limit on the drive back from the gun pur-
chase in Ohio.) Once we stop focusing on the conduct the
defendant is actually charged with (i. e., selling guns without