Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/19pdf/18-1323_c07d.pdf
Page Number: 55.0

10 

JUNE MEDICAL SERVICES L. L. C. v. RUSSO 

ROBERTS, C. J., concurring
ROBERTS, C. J., concurring in judgment 

repeats that “substantial obstacle” standard nearly verba-
tim no less than 15 times.  Id., at 846, 894, 895 (opinion of 
the Court); id., at 877, 878 (plurality opinion); id., at 883, 
884, 885, 886, 887, 901 (joint opinion).2 

The only place a balancing test appears in Casey is in Jus-
tice Stevens’s partial dissent.  “Weighing the State’s inter-
est in potential life and the woman’s liberty interest,” Jus-
tice Stevens would have gone further than the plurality to
strike  down  portions  of  the  State’s  informed  consent  re-
quirements  and  24-hour  waiting  period.    Id.,  at  916–920 
(opinion  concurring  in  part  and  dissenting  in  part).    But 
that approach did not win the day. 

Mazurek v. Armstrong places this understanding of Ca-
sey’s  undue  burden  standard  beyond  doubt.    Mazurek  in-
volved a challenge to a Montana law restricting the perfor-
mance of abortions to licensed physicians.  520 U. S., at 969. 
It was “uncontested that there was insufficient evidence of 
a ‘substantial obstacle’ to abortion.”  Id., at 972.  Therefore, 
once the Court found that the Montana Legislature had not 
acted with an “unlawful motive,” the Court’s work was com-
plete.  Ibid.  In fact, the Court found the challengers’ argu-
ment—that  the  law  was  invalid  because  “all  health  evi-
dence  contradicts  the  [State’s]  claim  that  there  is  any 

—————— 

2 JUSTICE  GORSUCH  correctly  notes  that  Casey  “expressly  disavowed 
any test as strict as strict scrutiny.”  Post, at 20 (dissenting opinion).  But 
he  certainly  is  wrong  to  suggest  that  my position  is  in  any  way  incon-
sistent with that disavowal.  Applying strict scrutiny would require “any
regulation touching upon the abortion decision” to be the least restrictive 
means  to  further  a  compelling  state  interest.    Casey,  505  U. S.,  at  871 
(plurality  opinion)  (emphasis  added).    Casey  however  recognized  that
such a test would give “too little acknowledgement and implementation” 
to  the  State’s  “legitimate  interests  in  the  health  of  the  woman  and  in 
protecting  the  potential  life  within  her.”    Ibid.    Under  Casey,  abortion 
regulations are valid so long as they do not pose a substantial obstacle
and meet the threshold requirement of being “reasonably related” to a 
“legitimate purpose.”  Id., at 878; id., at 882 (joint opinion).