Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/12pdf/11-556_11o2.pdf
Page Number: 49.0

Cite as:  570 U. S. ____ (2013) 

15 

GINSBURG, J., dissenting 

of  supervisor  decreed  today,  the  Court  insists,  is  “clear,”
“readily  applied,”  and  “easily  workable,”  ante,  at  10,  20, 
when  compared  to  the  EEOC’s  vague  standard,  ante,  at 
22. 

There is reason to doubt just how “clear” and “workable”
the Court’s definition is.  A supervisor, the Court holds, is
someone empowered to “take tangible employment actions 
against  the  victim,  i.e.,  to  effect  a  ‘significant  change
in  employment  status,  such  as  hiring,  firing,  failing  to
promote, reassignment with significantly different responsi-
bilities, or a decision causing a significant change in bene-
fits.’ ”  Ante,  at  9  (quoting  Ellerth,  524  U. S.,  at  761).
Whether reassignment authority makes someone a super-
visor  might  depend  on  whether  the  reassignment  carries
economic  consequences.  Ante,  at  16,  n. 9.    The  power  to
discipline  other  employees,  when  the  discipline  has  eco-
nomic consequences, might count, too.  Ibid.  So might the
power to initiate or make recommendations about tangible
employment  actions.    Ante,  at  15,  n. 8.    And  when  an 
employer  “concentrates  all  decisionmaking  authority  in  a
few  individuals”  who  rely  on  information  from  “other
workers who actually interact with the affected employee,” 
the other workers may rank as supervisors (or maybe not;
the  Court  does  not  commit  one  way  or  the  other).    Ante, 
at 26. 

Someone in search of a bright line might well ask, what 
counts  as  “significantly  different  responsibilities”?  Can 
any  economic  consequence  make  a  reassignment  or 
disciplinary  action  “significant,”  or  is  there  a  minimum
threshold?  How  concentrated  must  the  decisionmaking
authority be to deem those not formally endowed with that 
authority  nevertheless  “supervisors”?    The  Court  leaves 
these  questions  unanswered,  and  its  liberal  use  of 
“mights”  and  “mays,”  ante,  at  15,  n. 8,  16,  n. 9,  26,  dims