Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/20pdf/19-123_g3bi.pdf
Page Number: 104

Cite as:  593 U. S. ____ (2021) 

5 

GORSUCH, J., concurring in judgment 

is that the majority’s attempt to cloak itself in CSS’s argu-
ment introduces more questions than answers. 

* 

Still  that’s  not  the  end  of  it.    Even  now,  the  majority’s 
circumnavigation of Smith remains only half complete.  The 
City argues that, in addition to the FPO, another generally
applicable nondiscrimination rule can be found in §15.1 of 
its  contract  with  CSS.    That  provision  independently  in-
structs that foster service providers “shall not discriminate
or permit discrimination against any individual on the ba-
sis of . . . sexual orientation.”  Supp. App. to Brief for City 
Respondents  31.  This  provision,  the  City  contends, 
amounts to a second and separate rule of general applica-
bility exempt from First Amendment scrutiny under Smith. 
Once  more,  the  majority  must  find  some  way  around  the 
problem.  Its attempt to do so proceeds in three steps. 

First, the majority directs our attention to another provi-
sion of the contract—§3.21.  See ante, at 7–9.  Entitled “Re-
jection of Referral,” this provision prohibits discrimination 
based on sexual orientation, race, religion, or other grounds 
“unless an exception is granted” in the government’s “sole
discretion.”  Supp. App. to Brief for City Respondents 16– 
17.  Clearly, the majority says, that provision doesn’t state 
a generally applicable rule against discrimination because 
it expressly contemplates “exceptions.”  Ante, at 8. 

But  how  does  that  help?    As  §3.21’s  title  indicates,  the 
provision  contemplates  exceptions  only  when  it  comes  to 
the referral stage of the foster process—where the govern-
ment seeks to place a particular child with an available fos-
ter family.  See A. Scalia & B. Garner, Reading Law:  The 
Interpretation  of  Legal  Texts  221  (2012)  (“The  title  and 
headings are permissible indicators of meaning” (boldface
deleted)).  So, for example, the City has taken race into ac-
count when placing a child who “used racial slurs” to avoid 
placing him with parents “of that race.”  Tr. of Oral Arg. 61.