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Page Number: 47

20 

CASTLE ROCK v. GONZALES 

STEVENS, J., dissenting 

beneficiaries,  and  respondent  reasonably  relied  on  that 
guarantee.    As  we  observed  in  Roth,  “[i]t  is  a  purpose  of 
the ancient institution of property to protect  those claims 
upon  which  people  rely  in  their  daily  lives,  reliance  that 
must  not  be  arbitrarily  undermined.”    408  U. S.,  at  577. 
Surely,  if  respondent  had  contracted  with  a  private  secu-
rity firm to provide her and her daughters with protection 
from  her  husband,  it  would  be  apparent  that  she  pos-
sessed a property interest in such a contract.  Here, Colo-
rado undertook a comparable obligation, and respondent— 
with  restraining  order  in  hand—justifiably  relied  on  that 
undertaking.    Respondent’s  claim  of  entitlement  to  this
promised  service  is  no  less  legitimate  than  the  other 
claims our cases have upheld, and no less concrete than a 
hypothetical  agreement  with  a  private  firm.19   The  fact 
that  it  is  based  on  a  statutory  enactment  and  a  judicial 

—————— 

19 As  the  analogy  to  a  private  security  contract  demonstrates,  a  per-
son’s interest in police enforcement has “ ‘some ascertainable monetary 
value,’ ”  ante,  at  17.    Cf.  Merrill,  The  Landscape  of  Constitutional 
Property,  86  Va.  L. Rev.  885,  964,  n.  289  (2000)  (remarking,  with 
regard  to  the  property  interest  recognized  in  Goss  v.  Lopez,  419  U. S. 
565  (1975),  that  “any  parent  who  has  contemplated  sending  their 
children to private schools knows that public schooling has a monetary 
value”).  And while the analogy to a private security contract need not 
be precise to be useful, I would point out that the Court is likely incor-
rect in stating that private security guards could not have arrested the 
husband  under  the  circumstances,  see  ante,  at  17,  n. 10.    Because  the 
husband’s  ongoing  abduction  of  the  daughters  would  constitute  a 
knowing violation of the restraining order, see n. 13, supra, and there-
fore  a  crime  under  the  statute,  see  §18–6–803.5(1),  a  private  person 
who was at the scene and aware of the circumstances of the abduction 
would have authority to arrest.  See §16–3–201 (“A person who is not a 
peace officer may arrest another person when any crime has been or is 
being  committed  by  the  arrested  person  in  the  presence  of  the  person 
making  the  arrest”).  Our  cases,  of  course,  have  never  recognized  any 
requirement  that  a  property  interest  possess  “ ‘some  ascertainable 
monetary  value.’ ”    Regardless,  I  would  assume  that  respondent  would 
have paid the police to arrest her husband if that had been possible; at 
the very least, the entitlement has a monetary value in that sense.