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10 

UNITED STATES v. HANSEN 

Opinion of the Court 

cluster of ideas that were attached to each borrowed word.”  
Morissette v. United States, 342 U. S. 246, 263 (1952); see 
also,  e.g.,  United  States  v.  Shabani,  513  U. S.  10,  13–14 
(1994). 
  To  see  how  this  works,  consider  the  word  “attempts,” 
which  appears  in  clause  (iv)’s  next-door  neighbors.    See 
§§1324(a)(1)(A)(i)–(iii).  In a criminal prohibition, we would 
not  understand  “attempt”  in  its  ordinary  sense  of  “try.”  
Webster’s  New  Universal  Unabridged  Dictionary  133  (2d 
ed. 2001).  We would instead understand it to mean taking 
“a substantial step” toward the completion of a crime with 
the  requisite  mens  rea.    United  States  v.  Resendiz-Ponce, 
549 U. S. 102, 107 (2007).  “Encourages or induces” likewise 
carries a specialized meaning.  After all, when a criminal-
law term is used in a criminal-law statute, that—in and of 
itself—is a good clue that it takes its criminal-law meaning.  
And the inference is even stronger here, because clause (iv) 
prohibits “encouraging”  and  “inducing” a  violation  of law.  
See §1324(a)(1)(A)(iv).  That is the focus of criminal solici-
tation and facilitation too. 
  In  concluding  otherwise,  the  Ninth  Circuit  stacked  the 
deck in favor of ordinary meaning.  See 25 F. 4th, at 1109–
1110;  see  also  United  States  v.  Hernandez-Calvillo,  39 
F. 4th  1297,  1304  (CA10  2022)  (“Our  construction  of  [the 
verbs in clause (iv)] begins with their ordinary meaning, not 
their specialized meaning in criminal law”).  But it should 
have given specialized meaning a fair shake.  When words 
have  several  plausible  definitions,  context  differentiates 
among  them.    That  is  just  as  true  when  the  choice  is  be-
tween ordinary and specialized meanings, see, e.g., Corning 
Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U. S. 188, 202 (1974) (“While 
a  layman  might  well  assume  that  time  of  day  worked  re-
flects one aspect of a job’s ‘working conditions,’ the term has 
a different and much more specific meaning in the language 
of industrial relations”), as it is when a court must choose 
among multiple ordinary meanings, see, e.g., Muscarello v.