Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/10pdf/09-530.pdf
Page Number: 34

6 

NASA v. NELSON 

SCALIA, J., concurring in judgment 

First  Amendment  case  protecting  private  possession  of 
obscenity;  the  deservedly  infamous  dictum  in  Griswold  v. 
Connecticut, 381 U. S. 479 (1965), concerning the “penum-
bra”  of  the  First  Amendment;  and  three  concurring  or
dissenting  opinions,  none  of  which  remotely  intimated 
that  there  might  be  such  a  thing  as  a  substantive  due 
process  right  to  informational  privacy.  429  U. S.,  at  599, 
n. 25.  Nixon provided even less support.  After citing the 
observation  in  Whalen  that  “[o]ne  element  of  privacy  has 
been  characterized  as  the  individual  interest  in  avoiding 
disclosure  of  personal  matters,”  Nixon,  supra,  at  457 
(quoting  Whalen,  supra,  at  599;  internal  quotation  marks
omitted), it proceeded to conduct a straightforward Fourth 
It  “assume[d]”  that  there  was  a 
Amendment  analysis. 
“legitimate  expectation  of  privacy”  in  the  materials,  and
rejected the appellant’s argument that the statute at issue 
was  “precisely  the  kind  of  abuse  that  the  Fourth  Amend-
ment was intended to prevent.”  Nixon, supra, at 457–458, 
460.  It  is  unfathomable  why  these  cases’  passing,  barely 
explained  reference  to  a  right  separate  from  the  Fourth 
Amendment—an unenumerated right that they held to be 
not applicable—should be afforded stare decisis weight.

At this point the reader may be wondering: “What, after
all,  is  the  harm  in  being  ‘minimalist’  and  simply  refusing 
to  say  that  violation  of  a  constitutional  right  of  informa-
tional privacy can never exist?  The outcome in this case is 
the same, so long as the Court holds that any such hypo-
thetical right was not violated.”  Well, there is harm.  The 
Court’s  never-say-never  disposition  does  damage  for  sev-
eral reasons. 

1.  It  is  in  an  important  sense  not  actually  minimalist. 
By  substituting  for  one  real  constitutional  question
(whether  there  exists  a  constitutional  right  to  informa-
tional privacy) a different constitutional question (whether
NASA’s  background  checks  would  contravene  a  right  to 
informational  privacy  if  such  a  right  existed),  the  Court