Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/19pdf/17-1618_hfci.pdf
Page Number: 50.0

Cite as:  590 U. S. ____ (2020) 

13 

ALITO, J., dissenting 

sex.”14    Similarly,  Stephens  argues  that  sex  and  gender 
identity  are  necessarily  intertwined:  “By  definition,  a 
transgender  person  is  someone  who  lives  and  identifies 
with a sex different than the sex assigned to the person at
birth.”15 

It is curious to see this argument in an opinion that pur-
ports to apply the purest and highest form of textualism be-
cause the argument effectively amends the statutory text. 
Title VII prohibits discrimination because of sex itself, not 
everything that is related to, based on, or defined with ref-
erence to, “sex.”  Many things are related to sex.  Think of 
all  the  nouns  other  than  “orientation”  that  are  commonly 
modified by the adjective “sexual.”  Some examples yielded 
by a quick computer search are “sexual harassment,” “sex-
ual  assault,  “sexual  violence,”  “sexual  intercourse,”  and 
“sexual content.” 

Does the Court really think that Title VII prohibits dis-
crimination on all these grounds?  Is it unlawful for an em-
ployer to refuse to hire an employee with a record of sexual 
harassment in prior jobs?  Or a record of sexual assault or 
violence? 

To be fair, the Court does not claim that Title VII prohib-
its  discrimination  because  of  everything  that  is  related  to 
sex.  The Court draws a distinction between things that are
“inextricably”  related  and  those  that  are  related  in  “some 
vague  sense.”  Ante,  at  10.  Apparently  the  Court  would
graft  onto  Title  VII  some  arbitrary  line  separating  the 
things  that  are  related  closely  enough  and  those  that  are 
not.16  And it would do this in the name of high textualism. 

—————— 

14 Brief for American Psychological Association et al. as Amici Curiae 

11. 

15 Reply Brief for Respondent Aimee Stephens in No. 18–107, p. 5. 
16 Notably, Title VII itself already suggests a line, which the Court ig-
nores.  The statute specifies that the terms “because of sex” and “on the 
basis  of  sex”  cover  certain  conditions  that  are  biologically  tied  to  sex,