Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/21pdf/21-147_g31h.pdf
Page Number: 40.0

16 

EGBERT v. BOULE 

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting
Opinion of SOTOMAYOR, J. 

ard as if it were always the rule.  The Court’s repeated cita-
tion to United States v. Stanley, 483 U. S. 669 (1987), is just 
one  example.  The  Court  cites  Stanley  for,  among  other
things,  the  proposition  that  the  special-factors  analysis 
must be conducted at a very broad level of generality.  Ante, 
at 11.  Stanley, however, cautioned against a case-specific 
special-factors analysis in the narrow context of “judicial in-
trusion upon military discipline.”  483 U. S., at 681.  As it 
had in previous cases seeking to raise Bivens actions in the 
military context, the Stanley Court emphasized the need to
be “protective of military concerns,” 483 U. S., at 681, and 
to avoid “call[ing] into question military discipline and de-
cisionmaking,” id., at 682.  The Court therefore determined 
that  in  the  military  sphere,  the  special-factors  analysis
should  be  applied  somewhat  more  broadly  than  the  re-
spondent urged.  Id.,  at 681.  Stanley, in other words,  re-
flected the Court’s longstanding approach to Bivens cases: 
considering  the  facts  and  the  substantive  context  of  each
case  and  determining  whether  special  factors  counseled 
hesitation.  Stanley did not purport to articulate a special-
factors framework that should apply to all Bivens cases go-
ing forward.

The Court further declares that “a plaintiff cannot justify 
a Bivens extension based on ‘parallel circumstances’ ” with
previous cases that have recognized a Bivens remedy.  Ante, 
at 17.  To the extent these statements suggest an exacting 
new-context  inquiry,  they  are  in  serious  tension  with  the 
Court’s longstanding rule that trivial differences alone do 
not create a new Bivens context.  See Ziglar, 582 U. S., at 
___ (slip op., at 26); see also ante, at 2 (GORSUCH, J., concur-
ring in judgment) (“Candidly, I struggle to see how this set 
of facts differs meaningfully from those in Bivens itself ”).  
Indeed, until today, the Court has never so much as hinted 
that courts should refuse to permit a Bivens action in a case