Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/22pdf/22-138_43j7.pdf
Page Number: 36.0

Cite as:  600 U. S. ____ (2023) 

19 

SOTOMAYOR, J., concurring
Opinion of SOTOMAYOR, J. 

compensate for the ambiguities inherent in the definition of 
obscenity.’ ”    Hamling  v.  United  States,  418  U. S.  87,  123 
(1974).  This is in line with this Court’s more general obser-
vation  that  “vagueness”  of  “content-based  regulation  of
speech”  is  of  “special  concern”  when  it  comes  to  “criminal 
statute[s].”  Reno  v.  American  Civil  Liberties  Union,  521 
U. S. 844, 871–872 (1997).7 

Specifically, the Court has held that a “knowledge” mens 
rea  is  sufficient  for  obscenity:  “It  is  constitutionally  suffi-
cient  that  the  prosecution  show  that  a  defendant  had
knowledge of the contents of the materials he distributed, 
and that he knew the character and nature of the materi-
als.”  Hamling,  418  U. S.,  at  123.    This  ensures  that  “not 
innocent but calculated purveyance of filth . . . is exorcised.” 
Id., at 122 (internal quotation marks omitted).  While the 
Court today asserts that this Court has “never determined
the  precise  mens  rea”  for  obscenity,  ante,  at  13,  n. 6,  the 
Court has cited a knowledge standard approvingly for half 
a century, see Hamling, 418 U. S., at 123; Elonis, 575 U. S., 
at 739.8  Applying that standard to threats, the “ ‘calculated 

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7 Analogously,  the  Court’s  civil  defamation  case  law  recognizes  that 
heightened liability can require a heightened mens rea; even as to non-
public figures, a higher standard must be met for punitive damages in 
certain cases.  See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U. S. 323, 349– 
350 (1974). 

8 The Court has held, however, that recklessness is sufficient for child 
pornography.  See Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U. S. 103, 115 (1990).  This Court 
has emphasized time and again how child pornography is “a special case”
because “[t]he market for child pornography [is] ‘intrinsically related’ to
the  underlying  abuse”  and  thus  “ ‘an  integral  part  of  the  production  of
such  materials,  an  activity  illegal  throughout  the  Nation.’ ”    United 
States v. Stevens, 559 U. S. 460, 471 (2010) (quoting New York v. Ferber, 
458 U. S. 747, 759, 761 (1982)); see also Osborne, 495 U. S., at 110–111. 
Child pornography, with its integral ties to separate criminal conduct, is 
not  a  strong  analogue  for  threats,  which  can  be  fleeting  statements  in 
total isolation from any other criminality (though it is a stronger analogy 
to  threats  as  part  of  an  unlawful  course  of  stalking).  Yet  the  Court’s 
decision today puts child pornography on a First Amendment par with