Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/09pdf/08-964.pdf
Page Number: 67.0

Cite as:  561 U. S. ____ (2010) 

47 

STEVENS, J., concurring in judgment 

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The constitutional standard for patentability is difficult 
to  apply  with  any  precision,  and Congress  has  significant 
discretion  to  “implement  the  stated  purpose  of  the  Fram-
ers  by  selecting  the  policy  which  in  its  judgment  best 
effectuates the constitutional aim,” Graham, 383 U. S., at 
6.  But  Congress  has  not,  either  explicitly  or  implicitly, 
determined  that  patents  on  methods  of  doing  business 
would  effectuate  this  aim.  And  as  I  understand  their 
practical consequences, it is hard to see how they would. 

VII 

The  Constitution  grants  to  Congress  an  important 
power to promote innovation.  In its exercise of that power,
Congress  has  established  an  intricate  system  of  intellec-
tual  property.  The  scope  of  patentable  subject  matter 
under that system is broad.  But it is not endless.  In the 
absence of any clear guidance from Congress, we have only 
limited  textual,  historical,  and  functional  clues  on  which 
to rely.  Those clues all point toward the same conclusion:
that petitioners’ claim is not a “process” within the mean-
ing of §101 because methods of doing business are not, in
themselves, covered by the statute.  In my view, acknowl-
edging  as  much  would  be  a  far  more  sensible  and  re-
strained  way  to  resolve  this  case.    Accordingly,  while  I
concur  in  the  judgment,  I  strongly  disagree  with  the
Court’s disposition of this case.