Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/20pdf/19-1434_ancf.pdf
Page Number: 57.0

10 

UNITED STATES v. ARTHREX, INC. 

THOMAS, J., dissenting 

that may “have been misapprehended or overlooked” in the
previous  opinion.  37  CFR  §41.79(b)(1).    This  broad  over-
sight  ensures  that  administrative  patent  judges  “have  no
power  to  render  a  final  decision  on  behalf  of  the  United
States  unless  permitted  to  do  so  by  other  Executive  offic-
ers.”  Edmond, 520 U. S., at 665. 

B 
The Court today appears largely to agree with all of this.
“In every  respect” save one, the plurality says, “[adminis-
trative patent judges] appear to be inferior officers.”  Ante, 
at 20–21.  But instead of finding it persuasive that admin-
istrative patent judges seem to be inferior officers—“an un-
derstanding  consistent  with  their  appointment”—the  ma-
jority  suggests  most  of  Edmond  is  superfluous:  All  that
matters is whether the Director has the statutory authority
to individually reverse Board decisions.  See ante, at 10; see 
also ante, at 20 (plurality opinion).

The  problem  with  that  theory  is  that  there  is  no  prece-
dential basis (or historical support)3 for boiling down “inferior-
officer” status to the way Congress structured a particular 
agency’s process for reviewing decisions.  If anything, Ed-
mond stands for the proposition that a “limitation upon re-
view does not . . . render [officers] principal officers.”  520 
U. S.,  at  665.  Recall  that  the  CAAF  could  not  reevaluate 
certain factual conclusions reached by the military judges
on  the  Court  of  Criminal  Appeals.  Ibid.   And  recall  that 
neither  CAAF  nor  the  Judge  Advocate  General  could  “at-
tempt to influence” individual proceedings.  Id., at 664.  Yet, 
those constraints on supervision and control did not matter
because the Court in Edmond considered all the means of 
supervision and control exercised by the superior officers. 
Although CAAF could not reevaluate everything, “[w]hat is
significant” is that CAAF could oversee the military judges 

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3 See Part IV, infra.