Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/22pdf/20-1199_hgdj.pdf
Page Number: 179.0

40  STUDENTS FOR FAIR ADMISSIONS, INC. v. PRESIDENT 

AND FELLOWS OF HARVARD COLLEGE 
SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting 

To the extent the Court suggests national security interests 
are  “distinct,”  those  interests  cannot  explain  the  Court’s
narrow  exemption,  as  national  security  interests  are  also
implicated at civilian universities.  See infra, at 64–65.  The 
Court also attempts to justify its carveout based on the fact 
that “[n]o military academy is a party to these cases.”  Ante, 
at 22, n. 4.  Yet the same can be said of many other institu-
tions that are not parties here, including the religious uni-
versities supporting respondents, which the Court does not
similarly exempt from its sweeping opinion.  See Brief for 
Georgetown  University  et al.  as  Amici  Curiae  18–29 
(Georgetown Brief ) (Catholic colleges and universities not-
ing that they rely on the use of race in their holistic admis-
sions to further not just their academic goals, but also their
religious missions); see also Harvard II, 980 F. 3d, at 187, 
n. 24 (“[S]chools that consider race are diverse on numerous 
dimensions, including in terms of religious affiliation, loca-
tion, size, and courses of study offered”).  The Court’s carve-
out only highlights the arbitrariness of its decision and fur-
ther  proves  that  the  Fourteenth  Amendment  does  not 
categorically prohibit the use of race in college admissions. 
The concurring opinions also agree that the Constitution
tolerates  some  racial  classifications.    JUSTICE  GORSUCH 
agrees with the majority’s conclusion that racial classifica-
tions are constitutionally permissible if they advance a com-
pelling  interest  in  a  narrowly  tailored  way.    Ante,  at  23. 
JUSTICE KAVANAUGH, too, agrees that the Constitution per-
mits the use of race if it survives strict scrutiny.  Ante, at 
2.32  JUSTICE THOMAS offers an “originalist defense of the 

—————— 

32 JUSTICE KAVANAUGH agrees that the effects from the legacy of slav-
ery  and  Jim  Crow  continue  today,  citing  Justice  Marshall’s  opinion  in 
Bakke.  Ante,  at  7  (citing  438  U. S.,  at  395–402).    As  explained  above, 
Justice  Marshall’s  view  was  that  Bakke  covered  only  a  portion  of  the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s sweeping reach, such that the Court’s higher
education precedents must be expanded, not constricted.  See 438 U. S.,