Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/19pdf/19a1070_08l1.pdf
Page Number: 18.0

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CALVARY CHAPEL DAYTON VALLEY v. SISOLAK 

KAVANAUGH, J., dissenting 

F. Supp.  2d  668  (Md.  2000)  (State  may place  religious  or-
ganizations in favored zoning category along with some sec-
ular organizations). 
  The converse free-exercise or equal-treatment question is 
whether the legislature is required to place religious organ-
izations  in  the  favored  or  exempt  category  rather  than  in 
the  disfavored  or  non-exempt  category.    The  Court’s  free-
exercise and equal-treatment precedents also supply an an-
swer to that question: Unless the State provides a sufficient 
justification  otherwise,  it  must  place  religious  organiza-
tions in the favored or exempt category.  See Laycock, The 
Remnants of Free Exercise, 1990 S. Ct. Rev. 1, 49–50 (ex-
plaining  how  this  Court’s  precedents  grant  “something 
analogous to most-favored nation status” to religious organ-
izations).   
  In Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Ore. v. 
Smith,  494  U. S.  872  (1990),  for  example,  the  Court  ex-
plained that “where the State has in place a system of indi-
vidual exemptions, it may not refuse to extend that system 
to  cases  of  religious  hardship  without  compelling  reason.”  
Id.,  at  884  (internal  quotation  marks  omitted;  emphasis 
added); see also Lukumi, 508 U. S., at 537–538.  Likewise, 
then-Judge Alito stated that the First Amendment required 
a police department to exempt Sunni Muslims from its no-
beard policy because the police department made “exemp-
tions from its policy for secular reasons and has not offered 
any substantial justification for refusing to provide similar 
treatment for officers who are required to wear beards for 
religious reasons.”  Fraternal Order of Police Newark Lodge 
No. 12 v. Newark, 170 F. 3d 359, 360 (CA3 1999) (emphasis 
added). 
  Put simply, under the Court’s religion precedents, when 
a law on its face favors or exempts some secular organiza-
tions  as  opposed  to  religious  organizations,  a  court  enter-
taining a constitutional challenge by the religious organiza-
tions  must  determine  whether  the  State  has  sufficiently