Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/14pdf/13-1041_0861.pdf
Page Number: 41

Cite as:  575 U. S. ____ (2015) 

17 

THOMAS, J., concurring in judgment 

These  cases  provide  a  classic  example  of  the  problem. 
The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 establishes federal 
minimum  wage  and  overtime  requirements,  but  exempts
from these requirements “any employee engaged in a bona
fide  executive,  administrative,  or  professional  capac- 
ity . . . ,  or  in  the  capacity  of  outside  salesman  (as  such 
terms  are  defined  and  delimited  from  time  to  time  by
regulations of the Secretary).”  29 U. S. C. §213(a)(1).  The 
Department of Labor has accordingly promulgated regula-
tions  providing  that  “an  employee  whose  primary  duty  is 
selling financial products does not qualify for the adminis-
trative exemption.”  29 CFR §541.203(b) (2015).

Unsure whether certain mortgage-loan officers qualified 
as  employees  whose  primary  duty  is  selling  financial 
products,  the  Mortgage  Bankers  Association  asked  the 
Department of Labor for advice.  In 2006, the Department 
concluded  that  the  officers  are  not  employees  whose  pri-
mary  duty  is  selling  financial  products.    But  in  2010,  the 
Department reversed course, concluding exactly the oppo-
site.  If courts accord “controlling weight” to both the 2006
and  2010  interpretations,  the  regulated  entities  are  sub-
ject  to  two  opposite  legal  rules  imposed  under  the  same 
regulation.

This  practice  turns  on  its  head  the  principle  that  the
United  States  is  “a  government  of  laws,  and  not  of  men.” 
Marbury,  supra,  at  163.    Regulations  provide  notice  to
regulated  parties  in  only  a  limited  sense  because  their 
meaning will ultimately be determined by agencies rather 
than by the “strict rules and precedents” to which Alexan-
der Hamilton once referred.5 

—————— 

5 The  notice  problem  is  exacerbated  by  agency  departures  from  the 
procedures established for rulemaking in the APA.  Although almost all
rulemaking  is  today  accomplished  through  informal  notice  and  com-
ment,  the  APA  actually  contemplated  a  much  more  formal  process  for
most  rulemaking.    To  that  end,  it  provided  for  elaborate  trial-like
hearings  in  which  proponents  of  particular  rules  would  introduce