Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/23pdf/22-451_7m58.pdf
Page Number: 45.0

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LOPER BRIGHT ENTERPRISES v. RAIMONDO 

THOMAS, J., concurring 

I  write  separately  to  underscore  a  more  fundamental 
problem: Chevron deference also violates our Constitution’s 
separation  of  powers,  as  I  have  previously  explained  at 
length.  See Baldwin, 589 U. S., at ___–___ (dissenting opin-
ion) (slip op., at 2–4); Michigan v. EPA, 576 U. S. 743, 761– 
763 (2015) (concurring opinion); see also Perez v. Mortgage 
Bankers Assn., 575 U. S. 92, 115–118 (2015) (opinion con-
curring in judgment).  And, I agree with JUSTICE GORSUCH 
that  we  should  not  overlook  Chevron’s  constitutional  de-
fects in overruling it.*  Post, at 15–20 (concurring opinion).
To provide “practical and real protections for individual lib-
erty,” the Framers drafted a Constitution that divides the
legislative,  executive,  and  judicial  powers  between  three
branches of Government.  Perez, 575 U. S., at 118 (opinion 
of THOMAS, J.).  Chevron deference compromises this sepa-
ration of powers in two ways.  It curbs the judicial power
afforded  to  courts,  and  simultaneously  expands  agencies’ 
executive power beyond constitutional limits. 

Chevron compels judges to abdicate their Article III “ju-
dicial Power.”  §1.  “[T]he judicial power, as originally un-
derstood, requires a court to exercise its independent judg-
ment  in  interpreting  and  expounding  upon  the  laws.” 
Perez, 575 U. S., at 119 (opinion of THOMAS, J.); accord, post, 
at  17–18  (opinion  of  GORSUCH, J.).  The  Framers  under-
stood that “legal texts . . . often contain ambiguities,” and
that the judicial power included “the power to resolve these 
ambiguities over time.”  Perez, 575 U. S., at 119 (opinion of 
THOMAS, J.);  accord,  ante,  at  7–9.  But,  under  Chevron,  a 
judge must accept an agency’s interpretation of an ambigu-
ous law, even if he thinks another interpretation is correct. 
Ante, at 19.  Chevron deference thus prevents judges from 

—————— 

*There is much to be commended in JUSTICE GORSUCH’s careful consid-
eration from first principles of the weight we should afford to our prece-
dent.  I  agree  with  the  lion’s  share  of  his  concurrence.    See  generally 
Gamble v. United States, 587 U. S. 678, 710 (2019) (THOMAS, J., concur-
ring).