Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/529bv.pdf
Page Number: 273.0

529US1

Unit: $U37

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198

CORTEZ BYRD CHIPS, INC. v. BILL HARBERT
CONSTR. CO.
Opinion of the Court

correcting the award upon the application of any party
to the arbitration.”

The precise issue raised in the District Court was whether
venue for Cortez Byrd’s motion under §§ 10 and 11 was prop-
erly laid in the southern district of Mississippi, within which
the contract was performed.
It was clearly proper under
the general venue statute, which provides, among other
things, for venue in a diversity action in “a judicial district
in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving
rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of property
that is the subject of the action is situated.” 28 U. S. C.
§ 1391(a)(2).
If §§ 10 and 11 are permissive and thus supple-
ment, but do not supplant, the general provision, Cortez
Byrd’s motion to vacate or modify was properly ﬁled in Mis-
sissippi, and under principles of deference to the court of ﬁrst
ﬁling, the Alabama court should have considered staying its
hand. Cf. Kerotest Mfg. Co. v. C-O-Two Fire Equipment Co.,
342 U. S. 180, 185 (1952); Landis v. North American Co., 299
U. S. 248, 254 (1936); 5A C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Prac-
tice and Procedure § 1360 (1990). But if §§ 10 and 11 are
restrictive, there was no Mississippi venue for Cortez Byrd’s
action, and the Northern District of Alabama correctly pro-
ceeded with the litigation to conﬁrm. Although § 9 is not
directly implicated in this action, since venue for Harbert’s
motion to conﬁrm was proper in the northern district of Ala-
bama under either a restrictive or a permissive reading of
§ 9, the three venue sections of the FAA are best analyzed
together, owing to their contemporaneous enactment and the
similarity of their pertinent language.

Enlightenment will not come merely from parsing the lan-
guage, which is less clear than either party contends. Al-
though “may” could be read as permissive in each section, as
Cortez Byrd argues, the mere use of “may” is not necessarily
conclusive of congressional intent to provide for a permissive
or discretionary authority. United States v. Rodgers, 461
U. S. 677, 706 (1983) (“The word ‘may,’ when used in a stat-