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 603 U. S. ____ (2024) 

3 

Syllabus 

worry as to the possibility of damages actions stemming from any par-
ticular official decision.”  Clinton v. Jones, 520 U. S. 681, 694, n. 19. 

By contrast, when prosecutors have sought evidence from the Pres-
ident, the Court has consistently rejected Presidential claims of abso-
lute immunity.  During the treason trial of former Vice President Aa-
ron  Burr,  for  instance,  Chief  Justice  Marshall  rejected  President
Thomas Jefferson’s claim that the President could not be subjected to
a subpoena.  Marshall simultaneously recognized, however, the exist-
ence  of  a  “privilege”  to  withhold  certain  “official  paper[s].”  United 
States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 187, 192 (No. 14,694) (CC Va.).  And when a 
subpoena  issued  to  President  Richard  Nixon,  the  Court  rejected  his
claim  of  “absolute  privilege.”    United  States v.  Nixon,  418  U. S.  683, 
703.  But recognizing “the public interest in candid, objective, and even
blunt or harsh opinions in Presidential decisionmaking,” it held that a 
“presumptive privilege” protects Presidential communications.  Id., at 
708.  Because  that  privilege  “relates  to  the  effective  discharge  of  a 
President’s powers,” id., at 711, the Court deemed it “fundamental to 
the operation of Government and inextricably rooted in the separation
of powers under the Constitution.”  Id., at 708.  Pp. 9–12.

(ii) Criminally  prosecuting a President for official conduct un-
doubtedly poses a far greater threat of intrusion on the authority and
functions of the Executive Branch than simply seeking evidence in his
possession.  The danger is greater than what led the Court to recognize 
absolute Presidential immunity from civil damages liability—that the
President would be chilled from taking the “bold and unhesitating ac-
tion” required of an independent Executive.  Fitzgerald, 457 U. S., at 
745.  Although the President might be exposed to fewer criminal pros-
ecutions  than civil  damages  suits,  the  threat  of  trial,  judgment,  and 
imprisonment is a far greater deterrent and plainly more likely to dis-
tort  Presidential  decisionmaking  than  the  potential  payment  of  civil
damages.  The hesitation to execute the duties of his office fearlessly 
and fairly that might result when a President is making decisions un-
der “a pall of potential prosecution,” McDonnell v. United States, 579 
U. S. 550, 575, raises “unique risks to the effective functioning of gov-
ernment,” Fitzgerald, 457 U. S., at 751.  But there is also a compelling
“public  interest  in  fair  and  effective  law  enforcement.”    Vance,  591 
U. S., at 808. 

Taking into account these competing considerations, the Court con-
cludes  that  the  separation  of  powers  principles  explicated  in  the
Court’s  precedent  necessitate  at  least  a  presumptive  immunity  from
criminal prosecution for a President’s acts within the outer perimeter 
of  his  official  responsibility.    Such  an  immunity  is  required  to  safe-
guard  the  independence  and  effective  functioning  of  the  Executive