Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/14pdf/13-1041_0861.pdf
Page Number: 23

4 

PEREZ v. MORTGAGE BANKERS ASSN. 

SCALIA, J., concurring in judgment 

interpretive  rules,  we  have  allowed  agencies  to  make 
rules  unhampered  by  notice-and-comment 
binding 
procedures.

The  problem  is  bad  enough,  and  perhaps  insoluble  if 
Chevron is not to be uprooted, with respect to interpretive
rules  setting  forth  agency  interpretation  of  statutes.    But 
an  agency’s  interpretation  of  its  own  regulations  is  an-
other matter.  By giving that category of interpretive rules 
Auer deference, we do more than allow the agency to make
binding regulations without notice and comment.  Because 
the  agency  (not  Congress)  drafts  the  substantive  rules 
that  are  the  object  of  those  interpretations,  giving  them
deference  allows  the  agency  to  control  the  extent  of  its 
notice-and-comment-free domain.  To expand this domain, 
the  agency  need  only  write  substantive  rules  more 
broadly and vaguely, leaving plenty of gaps to be filled in
later,  using  interpretive  rules  unchecked  by  notice  and 
comment.  The  APA  does  not  remotely  contemplate  this 
regime.

Still and all, what are we to do about the problem?  The 
Paralyzed  Veterans  doctrine  is  a  courageous  (indeed,
brazen)  attempt  to  limit  the  mischief  by  requiring  an
interpretive  rule  to  go  through  notice  and  comment  if  it 
revises an earlier definitive interpretation of a regulation. 
That  solution  is  unlawful  for  the  reasons  set  forth  in  the 
Court’s  opinion:  It  contradicts  the  APA’s  unqualified  ex-
emption  of  interpretive  rules  from  notice-and-comment 
rulemaking. 

But  I  think  there  is  another  solution—one  unavailable 
to the D. C. Circuit since it involves the overruling of one 
this Court’s decisions (that being even a greater fault than
merely ignoring the APA).  As I have described elsewhere, 
the rule of Chevron, if it did not comport with the APA, at
least  was  in  conformity  with  the  long  history  of  judicial 
review  of  executive  action,  where  “[s]tatutory  ambiguities 
. . .  were  left  to  reasonable  resolution  by  the  Executive.”