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2 

UZUEGBUNAM v. PRECZEWSKI 

ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting 

I 

In urging the ratification of the Constitution, Alexander 
Hamilton famously wrote that “the judiciary, from the na-
ture of its functions, will always be the least dangerous” of 
“the  different  departments  of  power.”  The  Federalist 
No. 78, p. 465 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).  This was so, Hamilton 
explained, because the Judiciary “will be least in a capacity 
to annoy or injure” “the political rights of the Constitution.” 
Ibid.  Whereas “[t]he executive not only dispenses the hon-
ors but holds the sword of the community,” and “[t]he legis-
lature  not  only  commands  the  purse  but  prescribes  the
rules by which the duties and rights of every citizen are to
be regulated,” the Judiciary “may truly be said to have nei-
ther FORCE nor WILL but merely judgment.”  Ibid. 

But that power of judgment can nonetheless bind the Ex-
ecutive and Legislature—and the States.  It is modest only 
if confined to its proper sphere.  As John Marshall empha-
sized during his one term in the House of Representatives, 
“[i]f the judicial power extended to every question under the 
constitution” or “to every question under the laws and trea-
ties  of  the  United  States,”  then  “[t]he  division  of  power 
[among the branches of Government] could exist no longer,
and the other departments would be swallowed up by the
judiciary.”  4  Papers  of  John  Marshall  95  (C. Cullen  ed. 
1984) (quoted in DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U. S. 
332, 341 (2006)).  To maintain adequate separation between
the Judiciary, on the one hand, and the political branches 
and the States, on the other, Article III of the Constitution 
authorizes  federal  courts  to  decide  only  “Cases”  and 
“Controversies”—that  is,  “cases  of  a  Judiciary  nature.”
2  Records  of  the  Federal  Convention  of  1787,  p. 430 
(M. Farrand ed. 1966) (J. Madison). 

The case-or-controversy requirement imposes fundamen-
tal restrictions on who can invoke federal jurisdiction and
what types of disputes federal courts can resolve.  As perti-
nent  here, “when  it  is impossible for  a  court to  grant  any