Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/21pdf/21-234_2b8e.pdf
Page Number: 16

Cite as:  596 U. S. ____ (2022) 

1 

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

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No. 21–234 
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KEVIN R. GEORGE, PETITIONER v. DENIS R. 
MCDONOUGH, SECRETARY OF 
VETERANS AFFAIRS 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT 

[June 15, 2022] 

JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR, dissenting. 
I  join  all  but  Part  II–C  of  JUSTICE  GORSUCH’s  dissent. 
The Board of Veterans’ Appeals (Board) clearly and unmis-
takably violated a statutory command in its decision deny-
ing petitioner Kevin George’s application for service-related
benefits.  As JUSTICE GORSUCH explains, in the context of 
this  specific  statutory  framework,  the  mere  fact  that  the 
Board relied on a plainly invalid regulation does not shield
its final decision from review based on clear and unmistak-
able error.1 

The Court thinks otherwise.  In support of its holding, the 
Court notes that Congress, when it enacted the clear-and-
unmistakable-error statutes in 1997, codified a pre-existing
regulatory doctrine under which clear and unmistakable er-
ror did not encompass a subsequent “change in interpreta-
tion of law.”  38 CFR §3.105 (Cum. Supp. 1963); see ante, at 
5–6.  I agree that Congress incorporated this pre-existing 
—————— 

1 In my view, some invalid Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) regu-
lations might not be erroneous enough for reliance on them to constitute
clear and unmistakable error.  After all, by definition, not every error is 
clear  and  unmistakable.    The  Board’s  1977  decision  in  George’s  case, 
however,  meets  this  demanding  standard.    The  presumption-of-sound-
ness  regulation  the  Board  applied  was  clearly  and  unmistakably  con-
trary  to  the  unambiguous  terms  of  38  U. S. C.  §1111,  as  even  the  VA 
eventually conceded.  See post, at 2–3 (GORSUCH, J., dissenting).