Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/19pdf/18-328_pm02.pdf
Page Number: 10

Cite as:  589 U. S. ____ (2019) 

1 

SOTOMAYOR, J., concurring 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

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No. 18–328 
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KEVIN C. ROTKISKE, PETITIONER v. 
PAUL KLEMM, ET AL. 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 

[December 10, 2019]

 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR, concurring. 
Like my colleagues in both the majority and the partial
dissent,  I  agree  that  15  U. S. C.  §1692k(d)  is  a  one-year
statute of limitations that typically begins to run when the 
alleged violation “occurs,” not when the plaintiff discovers
it.  Compare ante, at 1, with post, at 1 (GINSBURG, J., dis-
senting in part and from judgment).  The only daylight be-
tween  the  majority  and  dissenting  opinions  is  whether 
petitioner Rotkiske forfeited reliance on an “equitable, fraud-
specific discovery rule” that forgives otherwise untimely fil-
ings.  Ante, at 6–7; cf. post, at 4–5.  Because I believe the 
Court  of  Appeals  fairly  found  that  Rotkiske  failed  to  pre-
serve an equitable argument of this sort, see 890 F. 3d 422, 
429,  and  n. 5  (CA3  2018),  and  because  the  Court  did  not 
grant certiorari on that doctrine, I join the majority opinion.
I  write  separately  to  emphasize  that  this  fraud-specific
equitable principle is not the “ ‘bad wine of recent vintage’ ” 
of which my colleagues speak.  Ante, at 5 (quoting TRW Inc. 
v. Andrews, 534 U. S. 19, 37 (2001) (Scalia, J., concurring 
in  judgment)).  Rather,  the  Court  has  long  “recogni[zed]”
and  applied  this  “historical  exception  for  suits  based  on 
fraud.”  Id., at 37; see also id., at 27 (majority opinion) (not-
ing  equitable  discovery  rule  “in  cases  of  fraud  or  conceal-
ment”); Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U. S. 392 (1946); Ex-
ploration Co. v. United States, 247 U. S. 435 (1918); Bailey