Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/21pdf/21-429_8o6a.pdf
Page Number: 14.0

Cite as:  597 U. S. ____ (2022) 

11 

Opinion of the Court 

country as the equivalent of a federal enclave for jurisdic-
tional purposes.  Nor does the Act make federal jurisdiction 
exclusive or preempt state law in Indian country. 

Second,  Castro-Huerta  contends  that,  regardless  of  the 
statutory text, Congress implicitly intended for the General 
Crimes Act to provide the Federal Government with exclu-
sive  jurisdiction  over  crimes  committed  by  non-Indians
against Indians in Indian country.

The fundamental problem with Castro-Huerta’s implicit
intent argument is that the text of the General Crimes Act
says  no  such  thing.  Congress  expresses  its  intentions
through  statutory  text  passed  by  both  Houses  and  signed 
by  the  President  (or  passed  over  a  Presidential  veto).    As 
this Court has repeatedly stated, the text of a law controls
over  purported  legislative  intentions  unmoored  from  any 
statutory text.  The Court may not “replace the actual text
with speculation as to Congress’ intent.”  Magwood v. Pat-
terson, 561 U. S. 320, 334 (2010).  Rather, the Court “will 
presume more modestly” that “the legislature says what it 
means and means what it says.”  Henson v. Santander Con-
sumer  USA  Inc.,  582  U. S.  79,  ___  (2017)  (slip  op.,  at  10) 
(internal  quotation  marks  and  alterations  omitted);  see, 
e.g., McGirt, 591 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 12) (“[W]ishes are 
not laws”); Virginia Uranium, Inc. v. Warren, 587 U. S. ___, 
___  (2019)  (lead  opinion) (slip  op.,  at  14)  (The  Supremacy
Clause cannot “be deployed” “to elevate abstract and unen-
acted  legislative  desires  above  state  law”);  Alexander  v. 
Sandoval,  532  U. S.  275,  287–288  (2001)  (The  Court  does 
not give “dispositive weight to the expectations that the en-
acting Congress had formed in light of the contemporary le-
gal context,” because we “begin (and find that we can end) 
our search for Congress’s intent with . . . text and structure” 
(internal quotation marks omitted)); Central Bank of Den-
ver, N. A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N. A., 511 U. S. 
164, 173 (1994) (“[T]he text of the statute controls our deci-
sion”).