Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/20pdf/19-840_6jfm.pdf
Page Number: 50.0

Cite as:  593 U. S. ____ (2021) 

25 

ALITO, J., dissenting 

States  v.  Sanchez,  340  U. S.  42,  44  (1950);  Sonzinsky  v. 
United States, 300 U. S. 506, 513–514 (1937); A. Magnano 
Co. v. Hamilton, 292 U. S. 40, 46 (1934).  Indeed, the state 
intervenors and the House have not identified any statute 
ever passed under the taxing power that did not raise reve-
nue.  Virginia Office for Protection and Advocacy v. Stewart, 
563 U. S. 247, 260 (2011) (“Lack of historical precedent can 
indicate a constitutional infirmity . . . ”); see Seila Law, 591 
U. S., at ___–___ (slip op., at 18–21); Free Enterprise Fund, 
561 U. S., at 505.  Given this text, history, and precedent,
it is no longer defensible to argue that the individual man-
date can be construed as a lawful exercise of Congress’s tax-
ing  power,  for  as  it  now  stands,  the  mandate  will  never 
“produc[e]  at  least  some  revenue  for  the  Government.” 
NFIB, 567 U. S., at 564 (opinion of the Court).  The penalty
for  noncompliance  is  set  at  0%  and  $0.    It  cannot  raise  a 
cent. 

The state intervenors and the House offer several other 
arguments  to  sustain  the  mandate,  but  each  fails.    First, 
they suggest that we should interpret the individual man-
date as an exercise of the taxing power based solely on the 
precedential effect of the Court’s decision in NFIB.  But THE 
CHIEF JUSTICE’s opinion for the Court in NFIB construed 
the mandate as a tax only because the individual mandate
“produce[d]  at  least  some  revenue  for  the  Government.” 
Ibid.  With that “essential feature” removed, this construc-
tion is foreclosed. 

Second, the state intervenors and the House argue that 
the Taxing Clause permits Congress to pass a tax and sub-
sequently  reduce  it  to  zero.    But  Congress  cannot  supple-
ment its powers through the two-step process of passing a 
tax and then removing the tax but leaving in place a provi-
sion that is otherwise beyond its enumerated powers. 

Third,  they  analogize  the  mandate  to  a  delayed  or  sus-
pended tax—one that raises no revenue now but could do so 
in the future.  But §5000A, as it currently stands, does not