Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/20pdf/20-645_9p6b.pdf
Page Number: 4.0

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STANDING AKIMBO, LLC v. UNITED STATES 

Statement of THOMAS, J. 

prevent disclosure of relevant records held by the State.6  In 
other words, petitioners have found that the Government’s 
willingness  to  often  look  the  other  way  on  marijuana  is 
more episodic than coherent. 

This  disjuncture  between  the  Government’s  recent  lais-
sez-faire policies on marijuana and the actual operation of
specific laws is not limited to the tax context.  Many mari-
juana-related  businesses  operate  entirely  in  cash  because 
federal  law  prohibits  certain  financial  institutions  from
knowingly accepting deposits from or providing other bank 
services to businesses that violate federal law.  Black & Ga-
leazzi, Cannabis Banking: Proceed With Caution, American
Bar Assn., Feb. 6, 2020.  Cash-based operations are under-
standably enticing to burglars and robbers.  But, if mariju-
ana-related  businesses,  in  recognition  of  this,  hire  armed 
guards for protection, the owners and the guards might run
afoul of a federal law that imposes harsh penalties for using 
a  firearm  in  furtherance  of  a  “drug  trafficking  crime.”  18
U. S. C. §924(c)(1)(A).  A marijuana user similarly can find 
himself  a  federal  felon  if  he  just  possesses  a  firearm. 
§922(g)(3).  Or petitioners and similar businesses may find
themselves on the wrong side of a civil suit under the Rack-
eteer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act.  See, e.g., 
Safe Streets Alliance v. Hickenlooper, 859 F. 3d 865, 876– 
877 (CA10 2017) (permitting such a suit to proceed). 

I could go on.  Suffice it to say, the Federal Government’s
current approach to marijuana bears little resemblance to 
—————— 

6 In their petition for a writ of certiorari, petitioners contend that the 
lack of a deduction for ordinary business expenses causes the tax to fall
outside the Sixteenth Amendment’s authorization of “taxes on incomes.” 
Therefore, they contend the tax is unconstitutional.  That argument im-
plicates several difficult questions, including the differences between “di-
rect”  and  “indirect”  taxes  and  how  to  interpret  the  Sixteenth  Amend-
ment.  Cf. National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 567 
U. S. 519, 570–571 (2012); Taft v. Bowers, 278 U. S. 470, 481–482 (1929). 
In light of the still-developing nature of the dispute below, I agree with
the Court’s decision not to delve into these questions.