Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/22pdf/21-887_k53m.pdf
Page Number: 2.0

2 

LUNA PEREZ v. STURGIS PUBLIC SCHOOLS 

Syllabus 

Those provisions provide children and families the right to a “due pro-
cess hearing” before local or state administrators, §1415(f)(1)(A), fol-
lowed by an “appeal” to the state education agency, §1415(g)(1).  Mr. 
Perez reads §1415(l)’s “seeking relief” clause as applying only if he pur-
sues remedies that are also available under IDEA.  And because IDEA 
does  not  provide  compensatory  damages,  §1415(l)  does  not  foreclose
his ADA claim.  Sturgis reads the provision as requiring exhaustion of
§1415(f) and (g) so long as a plaintiff seeks some form of redress for the
underlying  harm  addressed  by  IDEA.    And  because  Mr.  Perez  com-
plains  about  Sturgis’s  education-related  shortcomings,  his  failure  to 
exhaust is fatal.  Pp. 3–4.

(b) Mr. Perez’s reading better comports with the statute’s terms.  Be-
cause  §1415(l)’s  exhaustion  requirement  applies  only  to  suits  that 
“see[k] relief . . . also available under” IDEA, it poses no bar where a
non-IDEA plaintiff sues for a remedy that is unavailable under IDEA. 
This interpretation admittedly treats “remedies” as synonymous with 
the  “relief”  a plaintiff  “seek[s].”    But  that  is  how  an  ordinary  reader 
would interpret the provision, based on a number of contextual clues. 
Section  1415(l)  begins  by  directing  a  reader  to  the  subject  of  “reme-
dies,” offering first a general rule then a qualifying exception.  IDEA 
treats 
“relief”  as  synonyms  elsewhere,  see 
§1415(i)(2)(C)(iii),  (3)(D)(i)(III),  as  do  other  provisions  in  the  U. S. 
Code, see 18 U. S. C. §3626(d); 28 U. S. C. §3306(a)(2)–(3).  The second 
clause in §1415(l), moreover, refers to claims “seeking relief” available 
under IDEA.  In law that phrase (or some variant) often refers to the 
remedies a plaintiff requests.  Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(3), 
for  example,  says  a  plaintiff’s  complaint  must  include  a  list  of  re-
quested remedies—i.e., “a demand for the relief sought.”  Likewise, this 
Court often speaks of the “relief” a plaintiff “seeks” as the remedies he 
requests.  See, e.g., South Carolina v. North Carolina, 558 U. S. 256, 
260.  Pp. 4–6.

“remedies”  and 

(c) Sturgis suggests this interpretation is foreclosed by Fry v. Napo-
leon Community Schools, 580 U. S. 154.  But the Court in Fry went out 
of its way to reserve rather than decide this question.  What the Court 
did say in Fry about the question presented there does not advance the
school district’s cause here.  Finally, Sturgis says the Court’s interpre-
tation will frustrate Congress’s wish to route claims about educational
services to administrative experts.  It is unclear what this proves, as 
either  party’s  interpretation  of  §1415(l)  would  preclude  some  unex-
hausted claims.  In any event, it is the not the job of this Court to “ ‘re-
place the actual text with speculation as to Congress’s intent.’ ”  Hen-
son v. Santander Consumer USA Inc., 582 U. S. 79, 89.  Pp. 6–7. 

3 F. 4th 236, reversed and remanded. 

GORSUCH, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.