Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/524bv.pdf
Page Number: 544

524US2

Unit: $U94

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Cite as: 524 U. S. 498 (1998)

499

Syllabus

Ultimately, Congress passed the Coal Industry Retiree Health Beneﬁt
Act of 1992 (Coal Act) to stabilize funding and provide for beneﬁts to
retirees by merging the 1950 and 1974 Beneﬁt Plans into a new fund
(Combined Fund) that provides substantially the same beneﬁts as pro-
vided by the 1950 and 1974 Plans and is funded by premiums assessed
against coal operators that signed any NBCWA or other agreement re-
quiring contributions to the 1950 or 1974 Beneﬁt Plans. Respondent,
Commissioner of Social Security, assigns retirees to signatory coal oper-
ators according to the following allocation formula: First, to the most
recent signatory to the 1978 or a subsequent NBCWA to employ the
retiree in the coal industry for at least two years, 26 U. S. C. § 9706(a)(1);
second, to the most recent signatory to the 1978 or a subsequent
NBCWA to employ the retiree in the coal industry, § 9706(a)(2); and
third, to the signatory operator that employed the retiree in the coal
industry for the longest period of time prior to the effective date of the
1978 NBCWA, § 9706(a)(3).

Petitioner Eastern Enterprises (Eastern) was a signatory to every
NBCWA executed between 1947 and 1964.
It is “in business” within
the Coal Act’s meaning, although it left the coal industry in 1965, after
transferring its coal operations to a subsidiary (EACC) and ultimately
selling its interest in EACC to respondent Peabody Holding Company,
Inc. (Peabody). Under the Coal Act, the Commissioner assigned East-
ern the obligation for Combined Fund premiums respecting over 1,000
retired miners who had worked for the company before 1966. Eastern
sued the Commissioner and other respondents, claiming that the Coal
Act violates substantive due process and constitutes a taking in viola-
tion of the Fifth Amendment. The District Court granted respondents
summary judgment, and the First Circuit afﬁrmed.

Held: The judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded.

110 F. 3d 150, reversed and remanded.

Justice O(cid:146)Connor, joined by The Chief Justice, Justice Scalia,

and Justice Thomas, concluded:

1. The declaratory judgment and injunction petitioner seeks are an
appropriate remedy for the taking alleged in this case, and it is within
the district courts’ power to award such equitable relief. The Tucker
Act may require that a just compensation claim under the Takings
Clause be ﬁled in the Court of Federal Claims, but petitioner does not
In situations analogous to
seek compensation from the Government.
the one here, this Court has assumed the lack of a compensatory remedy
and has granted equitable relief for Takings Clause violations without
discussing the Tucker Act’s applicability. See, e. g., Babbitt v. Youpee,
519 U. S. 234, 234–235. Pp. 519–522.