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524US2

Unit: $U96

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662

BRAGDON v. ABBOTT

Opinion of Rehnquist, C. J.

afﬁrmed the judgment of the District Court granting sum-
mary judgment to respondent on this issue. The Court va-
cates this portion of the Court of Appeals’ decision, and re-
mands the case to the lower court, presumably so that it may
“determine whether our analysis of some of the studies cited
by the parties would change its conclusion that petitioner
presented neither objective evidence nor a triable issue of
fact on the question of risk.” Ante, at 655.
I agree that
the judgment should be vacated, although I am not sure I
understand the Court’s cryptic direction to the lower court.
“[D]irect threat” is deﬁned as a “signiﬁcant risk to the
health or safety of others that cannot be eliminated by a
modiﬁcation of policies, practices, or procedures or by the
provision of auxiliary aids or services.”
§ 12182(b)(3). This
statutory deﬁnition of a direct threat consists of two parts.
First, a court must ask whether treating the infected patient
without precautionary techniques would pose a “signiﬁcant
risk to the health or safety of others.”
Ibid. Whether a
particular risk is signiﬁcant depends on:

“ ‘(a) the nature of the risk (how the disease is transmit-
ted), (b) the duration of the risk (how long is the carrier
infectious), (c) the severity of the risk (what is the poten-
tial harm to third parties) and (d) the probabilities the
disease will be transmitted and will cause varying de-
grees of harm.’ ” School Bd. of Nassau Cty. v. Arline,
480 U. S. 273, 288 (1987).

Even if a signiﬁcant risk exists, a health practitioner will still
be required to treat the infected patient if “a modiﬁcation
of policies, practices, or procedures” (in this case, universal
precautions) will “eliminat[e]” the risk.

§ 12182(b)(3).

I agree with the Court that “[t]he existence, or nonexist-
ence, of a signiﬁcant risk must be determined from the stand-
point of the person who refuses the treatment or accommoda-
tion,” as of the time that the decision refusing treatment is
I disagree with the Court, however,
made. Ante, at 649.