Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/20pdf/19-511_p86b.pdf
Page Number: 14

Cite as:  592 U. S. ____ (2021) 

11 

Opinion of the Court 

number generator).  See Encino Motorcars, 584 U. S., at ___ 
(slip op., at 8) (“[T]he distributive canon has the most force 
when the statute allows for one-to-one matching”).  As just
explained,  the  consequent  “using  a  random  or  sequential 
number generator” properly relates to both antecedents. 

Duguid next turns to legislative purpose, but he merely 
gestures  at  Congress’  “broad  privacy-protection  goals.”
Brief for Respondents 28 (emphasizing that Congress pro-
hibited calls made using an autodialer without “ ‘prior ex-
press  consent  of  the  called  party’ ”  (quoting  47  U. S. C.
§227(b)(1)(A))).  That  Congress  was  broadly  concerned
about intrusive telemarketing practices, however, does not
mean it adopted a broad autodialer definition.  Congress ex-
pressly found that the use of random or sequential number 
generator technology caused unique problems for business,
emergency, and cellular lines.  See supra, at 2.  Unsurpris-
ingly, then, the autodialer definition Congress employed in-
cludes only devices that use such technology, and the auto-
dialer  prohibitions  target  calls  made  to  such  lines.  See 
§227(b)(1)(A).8   The  narrow  statutory  design,  therefore,
does not support Duguid’s broad interpretation. 

Duguid last warns that accepting Facebook’s interpreta-
tion  will  “unleash”  a  “torrent  of  robocalls.”  Brief  for  Re-
spondents 38 (quotation modified).  As Duguid sees it, the 
thrust of congressional action since the TCPA’s enactment
has  been  to  restrict  nuisance  calls.    Because  technology
“adapt[s]  to  change,”  Duguid  argues,  the  TCPA  must  be 
treated  as  an  “ ‘agile  tool.’ ”    Id.,  at  38,  41.  To  this  end, 
Duguid asks this Court to focus not on whether a device has
the “senescent technology,” id., at 41, of random or sequen-
tial number generation but instead on whether it has the
“capacity to dial numbers without human intervention,” id., 
—————— 

8 By contrast, Congress did impose broader prohibitions elsewhere in
the TCPA.  See, e.g., 47 U. S. C. §§227(b)(1)(A) and (B) (prohibiting “ar-
tificial or prerecorded voice” calls, irrespective of the type of technology 
used).