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12 

CHIAFALO v. WASHINGTON 

Opinion of the Court 

tem allowing proxy voting (a common practice in the found-
ing era), the proxy acts on clear instructions from the prin-
cipal, with  no freedom of choice.  Still, we might  well say 
that he cast a “ballot” or “voted,” though the preference reg-
istered  was  not  his own.  For  that  matter,  some  elections 
give the voter no real choice because there is only one name
on a ballot (consider an old Soviet election, or even a down-
ballot race in this country).  Yet if the person in the voting
booth  goes  through  the  motions,  we  consider  him  to  have
voted.  The point of all these examples is to show that alt-
hough voting and discretion are usually combined, voting is
still  voting  when  discretion  departs.    Maybe  most  telling, 
switch from hypotheticals to the members of the Electoral 
College.  For centuries now, as we’ll later show, almost all 
have considered themselves bound to vote for their party’s 
(and the state voters’) preference.  See infra, at 13–17.  Yet 
there is no better description for what they do in the Elec-
toral  College  than  “vote”  by  “ballot.”  And  all  these  years
later, everyone still calls them “electors”—and not wrongly, 
because even though they vote without discretion, they do 
indeed elect a President. 

The Electors and their amici object that the Framers us-
ing those words expected the Electors’ votes to reflect their
own judgments.  See Brief for Petitioners 18–19; Brief for 
Independence Institute as Amicus Curiae 11–15.  Hamilton 
praised  the  Constitution  for  entrusting  the  Presidency  to
“men  most  capable  of  analyzing  the  qualities”  needed  for 
the  office,  who  would  make  their  choices  “under  circum-
stances favorable to deliberation.”  The Federalist No. 68, 
p.  410  (C.  Rossiter  ed.  1961).    So  too,  John  Jay  predicted 
that the Electoral College would “be composed of the most 
enlightened and respectable citizens,” whose choices would 
reflect “discretion and discernment.”  Id., No. 64, at 389. 

But even assuming other Framers shared that outlook, it 
would not be enough.  Whether by choice or accident, the