Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/558bv.pdf
Page Number: 316

Cite as: 558 U. S. 139 (2010) 

155 

Opinion of the Court 

We do not see how it could have made a signiﬁcant difference 
had  counsel  gone  beyond  his  actual  argument—which  em­
phasized  mental  illness  as  a  mitigating  factor  and  referred 
the jury to the experts’ testimony—by repeating the facts or 
connections that the experts had just described. 

Nor does Spisak tell us what other mitigating factors coun­
sel might have mentioned.  All those he proposes essentially 
consist  of  aspects  of  the  “mental  defect”  factor  that  the  de­
fense experts described. 

Finally,  in  light  of  counsel’s  several  appeals  to  the  jurors’ 
sense of humanity—he used the words “humane people” and 
“humane  society”  10  times  at  various  points  in  the  argu­
ment—we cannot ﬁnd that a more explicit or more elaborate 
appeal for mercy could have changed the result, either alone 
or  together  with  the  other  circumstances  just  discussed. 
Thus, we conclude that there is not a reasonable probability 
that a more adequate closing argument would have changed 
the  result,  and  that  the  Ohio  Supreme  Court’s  rejection  of 
Spisak’s  claim  was  not  “contrary  to,  or . . .  an  unreasonable 
application of,” Strickland.  28 U. S. C. § 2254(d)(1). 

Spisak  contends  that  the  deferential  standard  of  review 
under § 2254(d)(1) should not apply to this claim because the 
Ohio  Supreme  Court  may  not  have  reached  the  question 
whether counsel’s closing argument caused Spisak prejudice. 
That is, the Ohio Supreme Court’s summary rejection of this 
claim  did  not  indicate  whether  that  court  rested  its  conclu­
sion  upon  a  ﬁnding  (1)  that  counsel  was  not  ineffective,  or 
(2) that a better argument would not have made a difference, 
or  (3)  both.  See  State  v.  Spisak,  36  Ohio  St.  3d,  at  82,  521 
N.  E.  2d,  at  802.  Spisak  argues  that,  under  these  circum­
stances, a federal court should not defer to a state court that 
may  not  have  decided  a  question,  but  instead  should  decide 
the  matter  afresh.  Lower  federal  courts  have  rejected  ar­
guments  similar  to  Spisak’s.  See,  e. g.,  Hennon  v.  Cooper, 
109  F.  3d  330,  334–335  (CA7  1997);  see  also  Weeks  v.  Ange-
lone,  528  U. S.  225,  231,  237  (2000)  (applying  the  § 2254(d)