Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/14pdf/14-556_3204.pdf
Page Number: 73

Cite as:  576 U. S. ____ (2015) 

5 

SCALIA, J., dissenting 

dimensions . . . . ”14  One would think that sentence would 
continue: “. . . and therefore they provided for a means by 
which  the  People  could  amend  the  Constitution,”  or  per-
haps “. . . and therefore they left the creation of additional 
liberties,  such  as  the  freedom  to  marry  someone  of  the 
same sex, to the People, through the never-ending process 
of  legislation.”    But  no.    What  logically  follows,  in  the
majority’s  judge-empowering  estimation,  is:  “and  so  they
entrusted  to  future  generations  a  charter  protecting  the 
right  of  all  persons  to enjoy  liberty  as  we  learn  its  mean-
ing.”15  The “we,” needless to say, is the nine of us.  “History
and  tradition  guide  and  discipline  [our]  inquiry  but  do 
not set its outer boundaries.”16  Thus, rather than focusing 
on  the  People’s  understanding  of  “liberty”—at  the  time  of 
ratification  or  even  today—the  majority  focuses  on  four
“principles  and  traditions”  that,  in  the  majority’s  view, 
prohibit  States  from  defining  marriage  as  an  institution
consisting of one man and one woman.17 

This  is  a  naked  judicial  claim  to  legislative—indeed, 
super-legislative—power;  a  claim  fundamentally  at  odds 
with  our  system  of  government.    Except  as  limited  by  a 
constitutional  prohibition  agreed  to  by  the  People,  the 
States  are  free  to  adopt  whatever  laws  they  like,  even
those  that  offend  the  esteemed  Justices’  “reasoned  judg-
ment.”  A  system  of  government  that  makes  the  People
subordinate to a committee of nine unelected lawyers does 
not deserve to be called a democracy. 

Judges  are  selected  precisely  for  their  skill  as  lawyers;
whether  they  reflect  the  policy  views  of  a  particular  con-
stituency  is  not  (or  should  not  be)  relevant.    Not  surpris-
ingly then, the Federal Judiciary is hardly a cross-section 

—————— 

14 Ante, at 11. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Ante, at 10–11. 
17 Ante, at 12–18.