Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/529bv.pdf
Page Number: 888

529US3

Unit: $U60

[09-26-01 12:39:04] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 529 U. S. 803 (2000)

813

Opinion of the Court

Since § 505 is a content-based speech restriction, it can
stand only if it satisﬁes strict scrutiny. Sable Communica-
tions of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U. S. 115, 126 (1989).
If a
statute regulates speech based on its content, it must be nar-
rowly tailored to promote a compelling Government interest.
If a less restrictive alternative would serve the Gov-
Ibid.
ernment’s purpose, the legislature must use that alternative.
Reno, 521 U. S., at 874 (“[The CDA’s Internet indecency pro-
visions’] burden on adult speech is unacceptable if less re-
strictive alternatives would be at least as effective in achiev-
ing the legitimate purpose that the statute was enacted to
serve”); Sable Communications, supra, at 126 (“The Gov-
. regulate the content of constitutionally
ernment may . .
protected speech in order to promote a compelling interest
if it chooses the least restrictive means to further the articu-
lated interest”). To do otherwise would be to restrict
speech without an adequate justiﬁcation, a course the First
Amendment does not permit.

Our precedents teach these principles. Where the de-
signed beneﬁt of a content-based speech restriction is to
shield the sensibilities of listeners, the general rule is that
the right of expression prevails, even where no less restric-
tive alternative exists. We are expected to protect our own
sensibilities “simply by averting [our] eyes.” Cohen v. Cali-
fornia, 403 U. S. 15, 21 (1971); accord, Erznoznik v. Jackson-
ville, 422 U. S. 205, 210–211 (1975). Here, of course, we con-
sider images transmitted to some homes where they are not
wanted and where parents often are not present to give im-
mediate guidance. Cable television, like broadcast media,
presents unique problems, which inform our assessment of
the interests at stake, and which may justify restrictions
that would be unacceptable in other contexts. See Denver
Area Ed. Telecommunications Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518
U. S. 727, 744 (1996) (plurality opinion); id., at 804–805 (Ken-
nedy, J., concurring in part, concurring in judgment in part,
and dissenting in part); FCC v. Paciﬁca Foundation, 438