Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/529bv.pdf
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529US3

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GEIER v. AMERICAN HONDA MOTOR CO.

Opinion of the Court

disagreement. That provision, a “saving” clause, says that
“[c]ompliance with” a federal safety standard “does not ex-
empt any person from any liability under common law.” 15
U. S. C. § 1397(k) (1988 ed.). The saving clause assumes that
there are some signiﬁcant number of common-law liability
cases to save. And a reading of the express pre-emption
provision that excludes common-law tort actions gives actual
meaning to the saving clause’s literal language, while leaving
adequate room for state tort law to operate—for example,
where federal law creates only a ﬂoor, i. e., a minimum safety
standard. See, e. g., Brief for United States as Amicus Cu-
riae 21 (explaining that common-law claim that a vehicle is
defectively designed because it lacks antilock brakes would
not be pre-empted by 49 CFR § 571.105 (1999), a safety
standard establishing minimum requirements for brake per-
formance). Without the saving clause, a broad reading of
the express pre-emption provision arguably might pre-empt
those actions, for, as we have just mentioned, it is possible
to read the pre-emption provision, standing alone, as apply-
ing to standards imposed in common-law tort actions, as well
as standards contained in state legislation or regulations.
And if so, it would pre-empt all nonidentical state standards
established in tort actions covering the same aspect of per-
formance as an applicable federal standard, even if the fed-
eral standard merely established a minimum standard. On
that broad reading of the pre-emption clause little, if any,
potential “liability at common law” would remain. And few,
if any, state tort actions would remain for the saving clause
to save. We have found no convincing indication that Con-
gress wanted to pre-empt, not only state statutes and regula-
tions, but also common-law tort actions,
in such circum-
stances. Hence the broad reading cannot be correct. The
language of the pre-emption provision permits a narrow
reading that excludes common-law actions. Given the pres-
ence of the saving clause, we conclude that the pre-emption
clause must be so read.