Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/21pdf/20-843_7j80.pdf
Page Number: 120

Cite as:  597 U. S. ____ (2022) 

37 

BREYER, J., dissenting 

it was “enacted . . . more than 450 years before the ratifica-
tion of the Constitution.”  Ante, at 32.  The statute, however, 
remained in force for hundreds of years, well into the 18th 
century.  See  4  W.  Blackstone,  Commentaries  148–149 
(1769) (“The offence of riding or going armed, with danger-
ous or unusual weapons, is a crime against the public peace,
by terrifying the good people of the land; and is particularly 
prohibited by the Statute of Northampton” (first emphasis
in original, second emphasis added)).  It was discussed in 
the writings of Blackstone, Coke, and others. See ibid.; W. 
Hawkins,  1  Pleas  of  the  Crown  135  (1716)  (Hawkins);  E. 
Coke, The Third Part of the Institutes of the Laws of Eng-
land 160 (1797).  And several American Colonies and States 
enacted restrictions modeled on the statute.  See infra, at 
40–42.  There is thus every reason to believe that the Fram-
ers  of  the  Second  Amendment  would  have  considered  the 
Statute of Northampton a significant chapter in the Anglo-
American tradition of firearms regulation.

The Court also believes that, by the end of the 17th cen-
tury,  the  Statute  of  Northampton  was  understood  to  con-
tain an extratextual intent element: the intent to cause ter-
ror in others.  Ante, at 34–38, 41.  The Court relies on two 
sources  that  arguably  suggest  that  view:  a  1686  decision, 
Sir John Knight’s Case, and a 1716 treatise written by Ser-
jeant William Hawkins.  Ante, at 34–37.  But other sources 
suggest that carrying arms in public was prohibited because 
it naturally tended to terrify the people.  See, e.g., M. Dal-
ton, The Country Justice 282–283 (1690) (“[T]o wear Armor, 
or Weapons not usually worn, . . . seems also be a breach, 
or means of breach of the Peace . . . ; for they strike a fear
and terror in the People” (emphasis added)).  According to
these sources, terror was the natural consequence—not an
additional element—of the crime. 

I find this view more persuasive in large part because it
is not entirely clear that the two sources the Court relies on