Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/05pdf/04-1084.pdf
Page Number: 23.0

18 

GONZALES v. O CENTRO ESPIRITA BENEFICENTE 
UNIAO DO VEGETAL 
Opinion of the Court 

Gary  T.  Sheridan  (Jan.  24,  2001),  App.  G  to  App.  to  Pet. 
for  Cert.  261a;  Declaration  of  Robert  E.  Dalton  (Jan.  24, 
2001), App. H, id., at 265a.  We do not doubt the validity of 
these interests, any more than we doubt the general inter-
est in promoting public health and safety by enforcing the 
Controlled Substances Act, but under RFRA invocation of 
such general interests, standing alone, is not enough.2 

* 

* 

* 
The  Government  repeatedly  invokes  Congress’  findings 
and  purposes  underlying  the  Controlled  Substances  Act, 
but  Congress  had  a  reason  for  enacting  RFRA,  too.    Con-
gress  recognized  that  “laws  ‘neutral’  toward  religion  may 
burden  religious  exercise  as  surely  as  laws  intended  to 
interfere  with  religious  exercise,”  and  legislated  “the
compelling  interest  test”  as  the  means  for  the  courts  to 
“strik[e]  sensible  balances  between  religious  liberty  and 
competing  prior  governmental  interests.”    42  U. S. C. 
§§2000bb(a)(2), (5). 

We  have  no  cause  to  pretend  that  the  task  assigned  by 
Congress  to  the  courts  under  RFRA  is  an  easy  one.    In-
deed,  the  very  sort  of  difficulties  highlighted  by  the  Gov-
ernment here were cited by this Court in deciding that the 
approach  later  mandated  by  Congress  under  RFRA  was 
not  required  as  a  matter  of  constitutional  law  under  the 
Free  Exercise  Clause.  See  Smith,  494  U. S.,  at  885–890. 
But  Congress  has  determined  that  courts  should  strike 
sensible  balances,  pursuant  to  a  compelling  interest  test 
that  requires  the  Government  to  address  the  particular
practice at issue.  Applying that test, we conclude that the 
courts  below  did  not  err  in  determining  that  the  Govern-
ment failed to demonstrate, at the preliminary injunction 
stage,  a  compelling  interest  in  barring  the  UDV’s  sacra-
—————— 

2 In light of the foregoing, we do not reach the UDV’s argument that 
Art.  22,  ¶5,  of  the  Convention  should  be  read  to  accommodate  excep-
tions under domestic laws such as RFRA.