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Page Number: 63

2 

ESPINOZA v. MONTANA DEPT. OF REVENUE 

BREYER, J., dissenting 

doctrine here.  It holds that the Free Exercise Clause for-
bids  a  State  to  draw  any  distinction  between  secular  and 
religious uses of government aid to private schools that is
not required by the Establishment Clause.  The majority’s
approach and its conclusion in this case, I fear, risk the kind
of entanglement and conflict that the Religion Clauses are
intended to prevent.  I consequently dissent. 

I 
In 2015, Montana’s Legislature enacted a statute giving
a $150 tax credit to any person who contributes at least that 
amount  to  an  organization  that  provides  scholarships  for 
students  who  attend  non-public  schools.  See  Mont.  Code 
Ann.  §15–30–3111  (2019).    The  overwhelming  majority  of 
these  schools  are  religious.  (In  2018,  94%  of  the  scholar-
ships awarded helped to pay religious-school tuition.  393 
Mont. 446, 466, 478–479, and n. 6, 435 P. 3d 603, 613, 621, 
and n. 6; App to Pet. for Cert. 123, 125.)  The Montana Su-
preme Court held that this program violated a state consti-
tutional provision that forbids the legislature to make “any
direct  or  indirect  appropriation  or  payment”  for  “any  sec-
tarian  purpose  or  to  aid  any  church,  school,  academy  . . . 
controlled in whole or in part by any church, sect, or denom-
ination.”  Mont. Const., Art. X, §6.

Petitioners are the parents of students who attend one of
Montana’s Christian private schools.  They believe that the 
tenets of their faith require them to send their children to a
religious school.  And they claim that, by preventing them
from  using  state-supported  scholarships  at  those  schools,
the Montana Supreme Court’s interpretation of Montana’s
Constitution  violates  their  First Amendment  right  to  free 
exercise.  I shall assume, for purposes of this opinion, that 
petitioners’  free  exercise  claim  survived  the  Montana  Su-
preme Court’s wholesale invalidation of the tax credit pro-
gram.  Cf. ante, at 2 (GINSBURG, J., dissenting); post, at 2– 
3 (SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting).