Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/21pdf/20-979_h3ci.pdf
Page Number: 34.0

Cite as:  596 U. S. ____ (2022) 

13 

GORSUCH, J., dissenting 

246,  263  (1952).    And  that’s  exactly  what  happened  here. 
Before  Congress  enacted  subparagraph  (B)(i),  courts  re-
viewed  both  first-step  “eligibility”  determinations  and 
second-step  “discretionary”  determinations.  Foti  v.  INS, 
375  U. S.  217,  228–230,  and  n. 15  (1963)  (holding  second-
step judgments reviewable “for arbitrariness and abuse of 
discretion”).  By adding subparagraph (B)(i) in 1996, Con-
gress clearly altered that regime.  Yet Congress did so care-
fully.  In  precluding  review  of  judgments  “regarding  the
granting of relief,” Congress used language very similar to 
the language this Court had long used to describe second-
step  discretionary  determinations. 
See,  e.g.,  INS  v. 
Doherty, 502 U. S. 314, 323 (1992) (distinguishing “the dis-
cretionary grant of relief ” from prima facie eligibility); id., 
at 333 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment in part and dis-
senting  in  part)  (distinguishing  “the  Attorney  General’s 
power to grant . . . relief ” from judgments of “statutory in-
eligibility”); INS v. Abudu, 485 U. S. 94, 105 (1988) (distin-
guishing “the ultimate grant of relief ” from prima facie eli-
gibility  in  adjustment-of-status  cases  specifically);  INS  v. 
Bagamasbad, 429 U. S. 24, 26 (1976) (per curiam) (statute
authorized “the Attorney General in his discretion to grant
relief,”  but  only  “if  certain  eligibility  requirements  are
met”).  All of which provides still one more strong indication 
that Congress used the phrase “regarding the granting  of
relief ” to target step-two discretionary decisions alone. 

B 
Not only does the majority ignore most of these contex-
tual  clues.    Its  own  arguments  from  statutory  context  do 
more to hurt than help its cause.  The majority first directs 
us to § 1252(a)(2)(D).  That provision says that “[n]othing in
subparagraph  (B)  or  (C),  or  in  any  other  provision  of  this
chapter . . . which limits or eliminates judicial review, shall
be construed as precluding review of constitutional claims 
or questions of law raised upon a petition for review filed