Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/22pdf/22-179_o75q.pdf
Page Number: 17

Cite as:  599 U. S. ____ (2023) 

13 

Opinion of the Court 

severed  any  connection  the  prohibition  had  to  solicitation 
and  facilitation.    Brief  for  Respondent  25–26.    In  other 
words,  Hansen  claims,  the  1952  and  1986  revisions  show 
that  Congress  opted  to  make  “protected  speech,  not  con-
duct, a crime.”  Id., at 27. 
  We do not agree that the mere removal of the words “as-
sist” and “solicit” turned an ordinary solicitation and facili-
tation  offense  into  a  novel  and  boundless  restriction  on 
speech.    Hansen’s  argument  would  require  us  to  assume 
that  Congress  took  a  circuitous  route  to  convey  a  sweep-
ing—and  constitutionally  dubious—message.    The  better 
understanding  is  that  Congress  simply  “streamlined”  the 
pre-1952  statutory  language—which,  as  any  nonlawyer 
who  has  picked  up  the  U. S.  Code  can  tell  you,  is  a  com-
mendable  effort.    40  F. 4th,  at  1066  (opinion  of  Bumatay, 
J.).    In  fact,  the  streamlined  formulation  mirrors  this 
Court’s  own  description  of  the  1917  Act,  which  is  further 
evidence that Congress was engaged in a cleanup project, 
not a renovation.  See United States v. Lem Hoy, 330 U. S. 
724, 727 (1947) (explaining that the 1917 Act barred “con-
tract laborers, defined as persons induced or encouraged to 
come to this country by offers or promises of employment” 
(emphasis added)); id., at 731 (describing the 1917 Act as a 
“prohibition  against  employers  inducing  laborers  to  enter 
the country” (emphasis added)).  And critically, the terms 
that Congress retained (“encourage” and “induce”) substan-
tially overlap in meaning with the terms it omitted (“assist” 
and “solicit”).  LaFave §13.2(a).  Clause (iv) is best under-
stood as a continuation of the past, not a sharp break from 
it. 

C 
  Hansen’s primary counterargument is that clause (iv) is 
missing the necessary mens rea for solicitation and facilita-
tion.    Brief  for  Respondent  28–31.    Both,  as  traditionally 
understood, require that the defendant specifically intend