Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/558bv.pdf
Page Number: 605.0

444  CITIZENS  UNITED  v.  FEDERAL  ELECTION  COMM’N 

Opinion of Stevens, J. 

The Bellotti Court confronted a dramatically different fac­
tual  situation  from  the  one  that  confronts  us  in  this  case:  a 
state statute that barred business corporations’ expenditures 
on  some  referenda  but  not  others.  Speciﬁcally,  the  statute 
barred a business corporation “from making contributions or 
expenditures  ‘for  the  purpose  of  .  .  .  inﬂuencing  or  affecting 
the vote on any question submitted to the voters, other than 
one  materially  affecting  any  of  the  property,  business  or 
assets  of  the  corporation,’ ”  435  U. S.,  at  768  (quoting  Mass. 
Gen.  Laws  Ann.,  ch.  55,  § 8  (West  Supp.  1977);  alteration  in 
original), and it went so far as to provide that referenda re­
lated  to  income  taxation  would  not  “ ‘be  deemed  materially 
to  affect  the  property,  business  or  assets  of  the  corpora­
tion,’ ”  435  U. S.,  at  768.  As  might  be  guessed,  the  legisla­
ture  had  enacted  this  statute  in  order  to  limit  corporate 
speech  on  a  proposed  state  constitutional  amendment  to 
authorize  a  graduated  income  tax.  The  statute  was  a 
transparent  attempt  to  prevent  corporations  from  spending 
money  to  defeat  this  amendment,  which  was  favored  by  a 
majority  of  legislators  but  had  been  repeatedly  rejected  by 
the  voters.  See  id.,  at  769–770,  and  n.  3.  We  said  that 
“where, as  here, the legislature’s suppression  of speech sug­
gests an attempt to give one side of a debatable public ques­
tion  an  advantage  in  expressing  its views  to  the  people,  the 
First Amendment is plainly offended.”  Id., at 785–786 (foot­
note omitted). 

Bellotti thus involved a viewpoint-discriminatory statute, 
created  to  effect  a  particular  policy  outcome.  Even  Justice 
Rehnquist,  in  dissent,  had  to  acknowledge  that  “a  very  per­
suasive  argument  could  be  made  that  the  [Massachusetts 
Legislature],  desiring  to  impose  a  personal  income  tax  but 
more  than  once  defeated  in  that  desire  by  the  combination 
of  the  Commonwealth’s  referendum provision  and  corporate 
expenditures  in  opposition  to  such  a  tax,  simply  decided  to 
muzzle corporations on this sort of issue so that it could suc­
ceed  in  its  desire.”  Id.,  at  827,  n.  6.  To  make  matters