Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/529bv.pdf
Page Number: 536

529US2

Unit: $U49

[10-24-00 10:29:50] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 529 U. S. 460 (2000)

461

Syllabus

pleader’s favor. Because the propriety of allowing a pleading altera-
tion depends not only on the state of affairs prior to amendment but
also on what happens afterwards, Rule 15 both conveys the circum-
stances under which leave to amend shall be granted and directs how
the litigation will move forward following an amendment. When a
court grants leave to amend to add an adverse party after the time for
responding to the original pleading has lapsed, Rule 15(a) gives the
party so added “10 days after service of the amended pleading” to plead
in response. This opportunity to respond, fundamental to due process,
is the echo of the opportunity to respond to original pleadings secured
under Rule 12(a)(1). Thus, Rule 15 assumes an amended pleading will
be ﬁled and anticipates service of that pleading on the adverse party.
Nelson was never served with an amended pleading.
Indeed, no such
pleading was ever actually composed and ﬁled in court. Nor, after
the amendment joining Nelson, was he accorded time to state his de-
Instead, judgment
fenses against personal liability for costs and fees.
was entered against him the moment permission to amend the plead-
ing was granted. Appeal after judgment, in the circumstances this
case presents, did not provide an adequate opportunity to defend against
the imposition of liability. Cf. American Surety Co. v. Baldwin, 287
U. S. 156. Nothing in the record indicates that Nelson afﬁrmatively
relinquished his right to respond on the merits of the case belatedly
stated against him in his individual capacity. That Nelson knew as
soon as Adams moved to amend the pleading and alter the judgment
that he might ultimately be subjected to personal liability does not mean
that he in fact had a fair chance, before alteration of the judgment, to
respond and be heard. Rule 15 and the due process for which it pro-
vides demand a more reliable and orderly course. First, as Rule 15(a)
indicates, pleading in response to an amended complaint is a prerogative
of parties, and Nelson was not a party prior to the District Court’s
ruling on Adams’ motion to amend. Second, as Rule 15 further pre-
scribes, the clock on an added party’s time to respond does not start
running until the new pleading naming that party is served, just as the
clock on an original party’s time to respond does not start running
until the original pleading is served, see Rule 12(a)(1)(A). This is not to
say that Rule 15 is itself a constitutional requirement. Beyond doubt,
however, a prospective party cannot fairly be required to answer an
amended pleading not yet permitted, framed, and served. Pp. 465–468.
(b) Adams’ arguments that Nelson waived his objections to the swift
process of the District Court are rejected. First, the assertion that
Nelson waived personal jurisdiction and absence-of-service arguments
is beside the point because Nelson’s winning argument is based neither
on personal jurisdiction nor on service of process. Second, the sub-