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Page Number: 602.0

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Cite as: 524 U. S. 498 (1998)

557

Breyer, J., dissenting

And the Due Process Clause can offer protection against leg-
islation that is unfairly retroactive at least as readily as the
Takings Clause might, for as courts have sometimes sug-
gested, a law that is fundamentally unfair because of its ret-
roactivity is a law that is basically arbitrary. See, e. g., Pen-
sion Beneﬁt Guaranty Corporation v. R. A. Gray & Co., 467
U. S. 717, 728–730 (1984); id., at 730 (“[R]etroactive aspects
of legislation [imposing withdrawal liability on employers
participating in pension plan] must meet the test of due proc-
ess”); id., at 733 (“[R]etrospective civil legislation may offend
due process if it is particularly harsh and oppressive” (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted)); Usery v. Turner Elkhorn
Mining Co., 428 U. S. 1, 17 (1976). Cf. United States v. Carl-
ton, 512 U. S. 26, 30 (1994) (retroactive tax provision); Welch
v. Henry, 305 U. S. 134, 147 (1938) (same); National Labor
Relations Board v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 195 F. 2d 141, 149,
151 (CA9 1952) (invalidating administrative order as “arbi-
trary, capricious, an abuse of discretion,” see 5 U. S. C.
§ 706(2)(A), because “[t]he inequity of . . . retroactive policy
making . . . is the sort of thing our system of law abhors”).
Nor does application of the Due Process Clause automati-
cally trigger the Takings Clause, just because the word
“property” appears in both. That word appears in the midst
of different phrases with somewhat different objectives,
thereby permitting differences in the way in which the term
is interpreted. Compare, e. g., United States v. Martin
Linen Supply Co., 430 U. S. 564 (1977) (“person” includes cor-
porations for purposes of Fifth Amendment Double Jeopardy
Clause), with Doe v. United States, 487 U. S. 201, 206 (1988)
(“person” does not include a corporation for purposes of Fifth
Amendment Self-Incrimination Clause).

Insofar as the plurality avoids reliance upon the Due Proc-
ess Clause for fear of resurrecting Lochner v. New York,
198 U. S. 45 (1905), and related doctrines of “substantive
due process,” that fear is misplaced. Cf.
id., at 75–76
(Holmes, J., dissenting); Lincoln Fed. Union v. Northwestern