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Page Number: 26.0

18 

TRUMP v. UNITED STATES 

Opinion of the Court 

F. 4th 1, 13 (CADC 2023) (internal quotation marks omit-
ted); see Fitzgerald, 457 U. S., at 755–756 (noting that we
have  “refused  to  draw  functional  lines  finer  than  history 
and reason would support”).

In  dividing  official  from  unofficial  conduct,  courts  may 
not inquire into the President’s motives.  Such an inquiry
would risk exposing even the most obvious instances of of-
ficial conduct to judicial examination on the mere allegation 
of improper purpose, thereby intruding on the Article II in-
terests that immunity seeks to protect.  Indeed, “[i]t would 
seriously cripple the proper and effective administration of
public  affairs  as  entrusted  to  the  executive  branch  of  the
government” if “[i]n exercising the functions of his office,”
the President was “under an apprehension that the motives 
that control his official conduct may, at any time, become
the subject of inquiry.”  Fitzgerald, 457 U. S., at 745 (quot-
ing Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U. S. 483, 498 (1896)).  We thus 
rejected  such  inquiries  in  Fitzgerald.  The  plaintiff  there
contended that he was dismissed from the Air Force for re-
taliatory reasons.  See 457 U. S., at 733–741, 756.  The Air 
Force responded that the reorganization that led to Fitzger-
ald’s dismissal was undertaken to promote efficiency.  Ibid. 
Because  under  Fitzgerald’s  theory  “an  inquiry  into  the
President’s motives could not be avoided,” we rejected the 
theory,  observing  that  “[i]nquiries  of  this  kind  could  be 
highly intrusive.”  Id., at 756.  “[B]are allegations of malice 
should not suffice to subject government officials either to
the costs of trial or to the burdens of broad-reaching discov-
ery.”  Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U. S. 800, 817–818 (1982).

Nor may courts deem an action unofficial merely because 
it  allegedly  violates  a  generally  applicable  law.  For  in-
stance, when Fitzgerald contended that his dismissal vio-
lated various congressional statutes and thus rendered his
discharge “outside the outer perimeter of [Nixon’s] duties,”
we rejected that contention.  457 U. S., at 756.  Otherwise, 
Presidents  would  be  subject  to  trial  on  “every  allegation