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SACKETT v. EPA 

Syllabus 

(a) The uncertain meaning of “the waters of the United States” has 
been a persistent problem, sparking decades of agency action and liti-
gation.  Resolving the CWA’s applicability to wetlands requires a re-
view  of  the  history  surrounding  the  interpretation  of  that  phrase. 
Pp. 6–14.

(1) During the period relevant to this case, the two federal agen-
cies  charged with  enforcement  of  the  CWA—the  EPA  and  the  Army 
Corps  of  Engineers—similarly  defined  “the  waters  of  the  United 
States” broadly to encompass “[a]ll . . . waters” that “could affect inter-
state or foreign commerce.”  40 CFR §230.3(s)(3).  The agencies like-
wise  gave  an  expansive  interpretation  of  wetlands  adjacent  to  those 
waters, defining “adjacent” to mean “bordering, contiguous, or neigh-
boring.” §203.3(b).  In United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 
474 U. S. 121, the Court confronted the Corps’ assertion of authority
under the CWA over wetlands that “actually abut[ted] on a navigable
waterway.”  Id.,  at  135.  Although  concerned  that  the  wetlands  fell 
outside  “traditional  notions  of  ‘waters,’ ”  the  Court  deferred  to  the 
Corps, reasoning that “the transition from water to solid ground is not 
necessarily or even typically an abrupt one.”  Id., 132–133.  Following 
Riverside Bayview, the agencies issued the “migratory bird rule,” ex-
tending CWA jurisdiction to any waters or wetlands that “are or would 
be used as [a] habitat” by migratory birds or endangered species.  53 
Fed. Reg. 20765.  The Court rejected the rule after the Corps sought to 
apply  it  to  several  isolated  ponds  located  wholly  within  the  State  of 
Illinois, holding that the CWA does not “exten[d] to ponds that are not
adjacent to open water.”  Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook Cty. v. 
Army Corps of Engineers, 531 U. S. 159, 168 (SWANCC) (emphasis de-
leted).  The agencies responded by instructing their field agents to de-
termine  the  scope  of  the  CWA’s  jurisdiction  on  a  case-by-case  basis.
Within  a  few  years,  the  agencies  had  “interpreted  their  jurisdiction
over ‘the waters of the United States’ to cover 270-to-300 million acres” 
of wetlands and “virtually any parcel of land containing a channel or 
conduit . . . through which rainwater or drainage may occasionally or 
intermittently flow.”  Rapanos, 547 U. S., at 722 (plurality opinion). 

Against that backdrop, the Court in Rapanos vacated a lower court 
decision  that  had  held  that  the  CWA  covered  wetlands  near  ditches 
and drains that emptied into navigable waters several miles away.  As 
to  the  rationale  for  vacating,  however,  no  position  in  Rapanos  com-
manded  a  majority  of  the  Court.  Four  Justices  concluded  that  the 
CWA’s coverage was limited to certain relatively permanent bodies of 
water connected to traditional interstate navigable waters and to wet-
lands that are “as a practical matter indistinguishable” from those wa-
ters.  Id., at 755 (emphasis deleted).  Justice Kennedy, concurring only
in the judgment, wrote that CWA jurisdiction over adjacent wetlands