Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/20pdf/19-357_6k47.pdf
Page Number: 1.0

(Slip Opinion) 

OCTOBER  TERM,  2020 

1 

Syllabus 

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is 
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued. 
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been 
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader. 
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337. 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

Syllabus 

CITY OF CHICAGO, ILLINOIS v. FULTON ET AL. 

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR 
THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT 

No. 19–357.  Argued October 13, 2020—Decided January 14, 2021 

The filing of a petition under the Bankruptcy Code automatically “cre-
ates an estate” that, with some exceptions, comprises “all legal or eq-
uitable interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement of 
the  case.”    11  U. S. C.  §541(a).    Section  541  is  intended  to  include 
within the estate any property made available by other provisions of 
the Bankruptcy Code.  Section 542 is one such provision, as it provides 
that an entity in possession of property of the bankruptcy estate “shall
deliver to the trustee, and account for” that property.  The filing of a
petition also automatically “operates as a stay, applicable to all enti-
ties,” of efforts to collect prepetition debts outside the bankruptcy fo-
rum, §362(a), including “any act to obtain possession of property of the 
estate or of property from the estate or to exercise control over property 
of  the  estate,”  §362(a)(3).    Here,  each  respondent  filed  a  bankruptcy 
petition and requested that the city of Chicago (City) return his or her 
vehicle, which had been impounded for failure to pay fines for motor 
vehicle infractions.  In each case, the City’s refusal was held by a bank-
ruptcy  court  to  violate  the  automatic  stay.    The  Seventh  Circuit  af-
firmed, concluding that by retaining possession of the vehicles the City
had acted “to exercise control over” respondents’ property in violation
of §362(a)(3). 

Held: The  mere  retention  of  estate  property  after  the  filing  of  a  bank-
ruptcy  petition  does  not  violate  §362(a)(3)  of  the  Bankruptcy  Code. 
Under that provision, the filing of a bankruptcy petition operates as a
“stay” of “any act” to “exercise control” over the property of the estate.
Taken  together,  the  most  natural  reading  of  these  terms  is  that 
§362(a)(3) prohibits affirmative acts that would disturb the status quo
of  estate  property  as  of  the  time  when  the  bankruptcy  petition  was