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Page Number: 52.0

20 

SEC v. JARKESY 

GORSUCH, J., concurring 

tions are no less vital than those afforded by other constitu-
tional  provisions.  As  American  colonists  learned  under 
British rule, “the right of trial” means little “when the ac-
tual administration of justice is dependent upon caprice, or 
favour, [or] the will of rulers.”  3 Story §1568, at 426; id., 
§1783, at 661.  In recognizing as much today, the Court es-
sentially follows the advice of Justices Brennan and Mar-
shall, “limit[ing] the judicial authority of non-Article III fed-
eral  tribunals  to  th[o]se  few,  long-established  exceptions” 
that bear the sanction of history, and “countenanc[ing] no
further  erosion.”    Schor,  478  U. S.,  at  859  (Brennan,  J.,
joined by Marshall, J., dissenting). 

C 
The dissent’s competing account of public rights is aston-
ishing.  On its telling, the Constitution might impose some
(undescribed) limits on the power of the government to send 
cases “involving the liability of one individual to another” 
to executive tribunals for resolution.  Post, at 22 (opinion of 
SOTOMAYOR, J.).  But, thanks to public rights doctrine, the 
dissent  insists,  the  Constitution  imposes  no  limits  on  the 
government’s power to seek civil penalties “outside the reg-
ular courts of law where there are no juries.”  Post, at 2.  In 
that field, the Constitution falls silent.  The dissent does not 
even attempt to deploy any of the contrived balancing tests
that  emerged  in  Atlas  Roofing’s  aftermath  to  rein  in  the 
government’s power.  But where in Article III, the Seventh 
Amendment, and due process can the dissent find this new 
rule?  What about founding-era practice or original mean-
ing?  And  why  would  a  Constitution  drawn  up  to  protect 
against arbitrary government action make it easier for the 
government than for private parties to escape its dictates?
The dissent offers no answers. 

To  be  sure,  the  dissent  tries  to  appeal  to  precedent.    It 
even asserts that our decisions support, “without exception,” 
its sweeping conception of public rights doctrine.  Post, at