Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/524bv.pdf
Page Number: 364

524US2

Unit: $U88

[09-06-00 16:44:02] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 524 U. S. 308 (1998)

319

Thomas, J., dissenting

weapons possessions that are already illegal under state law.
And such a purpose is consistent with the statutory direction
that state law controls what constitutes a conviction for a
violent felony.

I believe that the plain meaning of the statute is that Mas-
sachusetts did not “expressly provid[e]” that petitioner “may
not . . . possess . . . ﬁrearms.” At the very least, this inter-
pretation is a plausible one.
Indeed, both the Government
and the Court concede as much. See Brief for United States
16 (“grammatically possible” to read statute to say that its
condition is not satisﬁed if the State does permit its felons
to possess some ﬁrearms); ante, at 316 (this “reading is not
plausible enough”). Accordingly, it is far from clear under
the statute that a prior state conviction counts as a violent
felony conviction for purposes of § 924(e) just because the
State imposes some restriction, no matter how slight, on
ﬁrearms possession by ex-felons. The rule of lenity must
therefore apply: “[T]he Court will not interpret a federal
criminal statute so as to increase the penalty that it places
on an individual when such an interpretation can be based
on no more than a guess as to what Congress intended.”
Ladner v. United States, 358 U. S. 169, 178 (1958). Ex-felons
cannot be expected to realize that a federal statute that
explicitly relies on state law prohibits behavior that state
law allows.

The Court rejects the rule of lenity in this case because
it thinks the purported statutory ambiguity rests on a
“grammatical possibility” and “an implausible reading of the
congressional purpose.” Ante, at 316. But the alleged am-
biguity does not result from a mere grammatical possibility;
it exists because of an interpretation that, for the reasons
I have described, both accords with a natural reading of
the statutory language and is consistent with the statutory
purpose.

The plain meaning of § 921(a)(20) is that Massachusetts
law did not “expressly provid[e] that [petitioner] may not . . .