Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/20pdf/20-297_4g25.pdf
Page Number: 41.0

10 

TRANSUNION LLC v. RAMIREZ 

THOMAS, J., dissenting 

426 U. S. 26, 39 (1976).  A plaintiff could now invoke a fed-
eral court’s judicial power by establishing injury by virtue 
of  a  violated  legal  right  or  by  alleging  some  other  type  of 
“personal interest.”  Ibid. 

In the context of public rights, the Court continued to re-
quire more than just a legal violation.  In Lujan v. Defend-
ers of Wildlife, 504 U. S. 555 (1992), for example, the Court 
concluded that several environmental organizations lacked
standing to challenge a regulation about interagency com-
munications, even though the organizations invoked a citi-
zen-suit  provision  allowing  “ ‘any  person  [to]  commence  a 
civil suit . . . to enjoin any person . . . who is alleged to be in
violation of ’ ” the law.  See id., at 558, 571–572; 16 U. S. C. 
§1540(g).  Echoing the historical distinction between duties
owed to individuals and those owed to the community, the
Court explained that a plaintiff must do more than raise “a
generally available grievance about government—claiming 
only harm to his and every citizen’s interest in proper ap-
plication of the Constitution and laws.”  504 U. S., at 573. 
“Vindicating the public interest (including the public inter-
est in Government observance of the Constitution and laws)
is the function of Congress and the Chief Executive.”  Id., 
at 576.  “ ‘The province of the court,’ ” in contrast, “ ‘is, solely,
to decide on the rights of individuals.’ ”  Ibid. (quoting Mar-
bury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 170 (1803)).

The same public-rights analysis prevailed in Summers v. 
Earth Island Institute, 555 U. S. 488 (2009).  There, a group
of organizations sought to prevent the United States Forest 
Service from enforcing regulations that exempt certain pro-
jects  from  notice  and  comment.  Id.,  at  490.    The  Court, 
again,  found  that  the  mere  violation  of  the  law  “without
some concrete interest that is affected by the deprivation—
a procedural right in vacuo—is insufficient to create Article 
III standing.”  Id., at 496.  But again, this was rooted in the 
context of public rights: “ ‘It would exceed Article III’s limi-
tations if, at the behest of Congress and in the absence of