Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/14pdf/13-1041_0861.pdf
Page Number: 35

Cite as:  575 U. S. ____ (2015) 

11 

THOMAS, J., concurring in judgment 

from  too  much  association  with  him.  The  Federalist  No. 
73, at 446; see also Hamburger, supra, at 508–512. 

The  Framers  also  created  structural  protections  in  the
Constitution to free judges from external influences.  They
provided,  for  example,  that  judges  should  “hold  their
Offices during good Behaviour” and receive “a Compensa-
tion, which shall not be diminished during their Continu-
ance  in  Office.”  Art. III,  §1.    Hamilton  noted  that  such 
unequivocal  language  had  been  shown  necessary  by  the 
experience of the States, where similar state constitutional
protections  for  judges  had  not  been  “sufficiently  definite 
to  preclude  legislative  evasions”  of  the  separation  of  the 
judicial  power.  The  Federalist  No.  79,  at  472.    Because 
“power over a man’s subsistence amounts to a power over 
his will,” he argued that Article III’s structural protections 
would help ensure that judges fulfilled their constitutional 
role.  Ibid. (emphasis deleted).

The  Framers  made  the  opposite  choice  for  legislators 
and the Executive.  Instead of insulating them from exter-
nal  pressures,  the  Constitution  tied  them  to  those  pres-
sures.  It provided for election of Members of the House of 
Representatives  every  two  years,  Art. I,  §2,  cl.  1;  and 
selection of Members of the Senate every six years, Art. I, 
§3, cl. 1.  It also provided for the President to be subject to
election every four years.  Art. II, §1, cl. 1.  “The President 
is [thus] directly dependent on the people, and since there 
is only one President, he is responsible.  The people know 
whom  to  blame  . . . .”    See  Morrison  v.  Olson,  487  U. S. 
654, 729 (1988) (SCALIA, J., dissenting).  To preserve that 
accountability,  we  have  held  that  executive  officers  must 
be subject to removal by the President to ensure account- 
ability  within  the  Executive  Branch.  See  Free  Enterprise 
Fund  v.  Public  Company  Accounting  Oversight  Bd.,  561 
U. S.  477,  495  (2010);  see  also  Morrison,  supra,  at  709 
(opinion of SCALIA, J.) (“It is not for us to determine, and
we  have  never  presumed  to  determine,  how  much  of  the