Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/529bv.pdf
Page Number: 388

529US1

Unit: $U42

[10-11-01 11:58:08] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 529 U. S. 277 (2000)

313

Opinion of Souter, J.

discloses a factual basis” supporting the efﬁcacy of Detroit’s
In Renton, the city similarly
chosen remedy, id., at 71.
enacted a zoning ordinance requiring speciﬁed distances be-
tween adult theaters and residential zones, churches, parks,
or schools. See 475 U. S., at 44. The city “held public hear-
ings, reviewed the experiences of Seattle and other cities,
and received a report from the City Attorney’s Ofﬁce advis-
ing as to developments in other cities.”
Ibid. We found
that Renton’s failure to conduct its own studies before enact-
ing the ordinance was not fatal; “[t]he First Amendment does
not require a city . . . to conduct new studies or produce
evidence independent of that already generated by other
cities, so long as whatever evidence the city relies upon is
reasonably believed to be relevant to the problem that the
city addresses.”

Id., at 51–52.

The upshot of these cases is that intermediate scrutiny
requires a regulating government to make some demonstra-
tion of an evidentiary basis for the harm it claims to ﬂow
from the expressive activity, and for the alleviation expected
from the restriction imposed.2 See, e. g., Edenﬁeld v. Fane,
507 U. S. 761, 770–773 (1993) (striking down regulation of
commercial speech for failure to show direct and material
efﬁcacy). That evidentiary basis may be borrowed from the
records made by other governments if the experience else-
where is germane to the measure under consideration and
actually relied upon.
I will assume, further, that the reli-
ance may be shown by legislative invocation of a judicial
opinion that accepted an evidentiary foundation as sufﬁcient

2 The plurality excuses Erie from this requirement with the simple ob-
servation that “it is evident” that the regulation will have the required
efﬁcacy. Ante, at 300. The ipse dixit is unconvincing. While I do agree
that evidentiary demands need not ignore an obvious ﬁt between means
It is not
and ends, see n. 1, supra, it is not obvious that this is such a case.
apparent to me as a matter of common sense that establishments featuring
dancers with pasties and G-strings will differ markedly in their effects on
neighborhoods from those whose dancers are nude.
If the plurality does
ﬁnd it apparent, we may have to agree to disagree.