Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/23pdf/23-5572_l6hn.pdf
Page Number: 41

Cite as:  603 U. S. ____ (2024) 

13 

BARRETT, J., dissenting 

record for an official proceeding.  18 U. S. C. §1512(a)(1)(B). 
Using  physical  force  against  a  person  to  influence  testi-
mony in an official proceeding counts as impairing the in-
tegrity  of  “other  things”  used  in  an  official  proceeding.
§1512(a)(2)(A).  And impairing the availability or integrity 
of documents for use in an official proceeding will often “in-
fluenc[e], obstruc[t], or imped[e] . . . the due administration 
of justice.”  §1503(a); see also §1515(a)(1)(A) (“ ‘official pro-
ceeding’ ” includes “a proceeding before a judge or court of 
the United States”).  Examples abound.  See, e.g., §§1505,
1512(a)(1)(A),  (a)(2)(B),  (b)(1),  (b)(2),  (d)(1).    “[T]he  canon
against surplusage merely favors that interpretation which 
avoids  surplusage”—and  on  that  score,  the  Court’s  inter-
pretation fares no better than mine.  Freeman v. Quicken 
Loans, Inc., 566 U. S. 624, 635 (2012).

In fact, the broader statutory context works against the 
Court’s  interpretation.    Congress  did  not  select  the  verbs 
“obstruct,”  “influence,”  and  “impede”  at  random.    Those 
words were already in §1503, which prohibits “corruptly or
by threats or force, or by any threatening letter or commu-
nication, influenc[ing], obstruct[ing], or imped[ing] . . . the 
due  administration  of  justice.”  We  have  described  this 
“ ‘Omnibus Clause’ ” as a “catchall,” because it follows sev-
eral specific proscriptions against coercive behavior toward
jurors and court officers.  Aguilar, 515 U. S., at 598.  Courts 
have  routinely  declined  to  “rea[d]  the  omnibus  clause”  as 
limited to “acts similar in manner to those prescribed by the 
statute’s specific language.”  United States v. Howard, 569 
F. 2d 1331, 1333, 1335 (CA5 1978) (collecting cases).  And 
Justice Scalia agreed that ejusdem generis did not apply to
limit the Omnibus Clause, “one of the several distinct and 
independent  prohibitions  contained  in  §1503  that  share 
only the word ‘Whoever,’ which begins the statute, and the
penalty provision which ends it.”  Aguilar, 515 U. S., at 615 
(opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part).  Section 
1512(c) follows the very same pattern.