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529US3

Unit: $U59

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VERMONT AGENCY OF NATURAL RESOURCES v.
UNITED STATES ex rel. STEVENS
Opinion of the Court

U. S., at 102. When combined with the theoretical justiﬁ-
cation for relator standing discussed earlier, it leaves no
room for doubt that a qui tam relator under the FCA has
Article III standing.8 We turn, then, to the merits.

III

Petitioner makes two contentions: (1) that a State (or state
agency) is not a “person” subject to qui tam liability under
the FCA; and (2) that if it is, the Eleventh Amendment bars
such a suit. The Courts of Appeals have disagreed as to
the order in which these statutory and Eleventh Amendment
immunity questions should be addressed. Compare United
States ex rel. Long v. SCS Business & Technical Institute,
Inc., 173 F. 3d 890, 893–898 (CADC 1999) (statutory question
ﬁrst), with United States ex rel. Foulds v. Texas Tech Univ.,
171 F. 3d 279, 285–288 (CA5 1999) (Eleventh Amendment
immunity question ﬁrst).

Questions of jurisdiction, of course, should be given pri-
ority—since if there is no jurisdiction there is no authority
to sit in judgment of anything else. See Steel Co., supra,
“Jurisdiction is power to declare the law, and
at 93–102.
when it ceases to exist, the only function remaining to
the court is that of announcing the fact and dismissing the

8 In so concluding, we express no view on the question whether qui tam
suits violate Article II, in particular the Appointments Clause of § 2 and
the “take Care” Clause of § 3. Petitioner does not challenge the qui tam
mechanism under either of those provisions, nor is the validity of qui tam
suits under those provisions a jurisdictional issue that we must resolve
here. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better Environment, 523 U. S. 83, 102,
n. 4 (1998) (“[O]ur standing jurisprudence, . . . though it may sometimes
have an impact on Presidential powers, derives from Article III and not
Article II”); see also Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U. S. 555, 576–
578 (1992).

The dissent implicitly attacks us for “introduc[ing] [this question] sua
sponte.” Post, at 801. We raise the question, however, only to make
clear that it is not at issue in this case.
It is only the dissent that proceeds
to volunteer an answer. See post, at 801–802.