Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/13pdf/12-536_e1pf.pdf
Page Number: 51

Cite as:  572 U. S. ____ (2014) 

5 

THOMAS, J., concurring in judgment 

plurality purports to rely.  Under the plurality’s analysis,
limiting  the  amount  of  money  a  person  may  give  to  a 
candidate  does  impose  a  direct  restraint  on  his  political
communication; if it did not, the aggregate limits at issue 
here would not create “a special burden on broader partic-
ipation  in  the  democratic  process.”  Ibid.  I  am  wholly  in
agreement  with  the  plurality’s  conclusion  on  this  point:
“[T]he  Government  may  not  penalize  an  individual  for 
‘robustly  exercis[ing]’  his  First  Amendment  rights.”    Ibid. 
(quoting Davis v. Federal Election Comm’n, 554 U. S. 724, 
739  (2008)). 
I  regret  only  that  the  plurality  does  not
acknowledge  that  today’s  decision,  although  purporting
not  to  overrule  Buckley,  continues  to  chip  away  at  its 
footings.

In  sum,  what  remains  of  Buckley  is  a  rule  without  a 
rationale.    Contributions  and  expenditures  are  simply 
“two sides of the same First Amendment coin,” and our ef- 
forts  to  distinguish  the  two  have  produced  mere  “word
games”  rather  than  any  cognizable  principle  of  constitu-
tional  law.  Buckley,  supra,  at  241,  244  (Burger,  C. J.,
concurring  in  part  and  dissenting  in  part).    For  that  rea-
son,  I  would  overrule  Buckley  and  subject  the  aggregate
limits in BCRA to strict scrutiny, which they would surely 
fail.  See  Colorado  I,  518  U. S.,  at  640–641  (opinion  of 
THOMAS, J.) (“I am convinced that under traditional strict
scrutiny,  broad  prophylactic  caps  on  both  spending  and
giving in the political process . . . are unconstitutional”). 

This  case  represents  yet  another  missed  opportunity  to
right the course of our campaign finance jurisprudence by
restoring  a  standard  that  is  faithful  to  the  First  Amend-
ment.  Until we undertake that reexamination, we remain 
in a “halfway house” of our own design.  Shrink Missouri, 
528  U. S.,  at  410  (KENNEDY,  J.,  dissenting).    For  these 
reasons, I concur only in the judgment.