Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/11pdf/10-9646.pdf
Page Number: 38.0

2 

MILLER v. ALABAMA 

ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting 

Brief );  Brief  for  Respondent  in  No.  10–9646,  p.  30  (Ala-
bama  Brief ).  The  Court  accepts  that  over  2,000  of  those 
prisoners received that sentence because it was mandated 
by  a  legislature.    Ante,  at  22,  n. 10.    And  it  recognizes
that the Federal Government and most States impose such
mandatory sentences.  Ante, at 19–20.  Put simply, if a 17-
year-old is convicted of deliberately murdering an innocent 
victim,  it  is  not  “unusual”  for  the  murderer  to  receive  a 
mandatory  sentence  of  life  without  parole.  That  reality
should preclude finding that mandatory life imprisonment 
for juvenile killers violates the Eighth Amendment. 

Our  precedent  supports  this  conclusion.    When  deter-
mining  whether  a  punishment  is  cruel  and  unusual,  this 
Court  typically  begins  with  “ ‘objective  indicia  of  society’s 
standards,  as  expressed  in  legislative  enactments  and
state  practice.’ ”    Graham  v.  Florida,  560  U. S.  ___,  ___ 
(2010) (slip op., at 10); see also, e.g., Kennedy v. Louisiana, 
554  U. S.  407,  422  (2008);  Roper  v.  Simmons,  543 
U. S. 551, 564 (2005).  We look to these “objective indicia” to
ensure that we are not simply following our own subjective
values  or  beliefs.  Gregg  v.  Georgia,  428  U. S.  153,  173 
(1976) (joint opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.).
Such tangible evidence of societal standards enables us to
determine whether there is a “consensus against” a given 
sentencing  practice.  Graham,  supra,  at  ___  (slip  op.,  at 
10).  If there is, the punishment may be regarded as “un- 
usual.”  But  when,  as  here,  most  States  formally  require 
and  frequently  impose  the  punishment  in  question,  there 
is no objective basis for that conclusion.

Our  Eighth  Amendment  cases  have  also  said  that  we
should take guidance from “evolving standards of decency
that mark the progress of a maturing society.”  Ante, at 6 
(quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U. S. 97, 102 (1976); inter-
nal  quotation  marks  omitted).    Mercy  toward  the  guilty 
can  be  a  form  of  decency,  and  a  maturing  society  may 
abandon  harsh  punishments  that  it  comes  to  view  as