Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/11pdf/10-545.pdf
Page Number: 29.0

Cite as:  565 U. S. ____ (2012) 

25 

Opinion of the Court 

marks omitted)). 

The second “traditional contour,” the fair use defense, is 
codified at 17 U. S. C. §107: “[T]he fair use of a copyright-
ed work, including such use by reproduction in copies . . . , 
for  purposes  such  as  criticism,  comment,  news  reporting,
teaching  (including  multiple  copies  for  classroom  use),
scholarship,  or  research,  is  not  an  infringement  of  copy-
right.”  This limitation on exclusivity “allows the public to
use  not  only  facts  and  ideas  contained  in  a  copyrighted 
work,  but  also  [the  author’s]  expression  itself  in  certain 
circumstances.”    Eldred,  537  U. S.,  at  219;  see  id.,  at  220 
(“fair use defense affords considerable latitude for scholar-
ship  and  comment,  . . .  even  for  parody”  (internal  quota-
tion marks omitted)).

Given  the  “speech-protective  purposes  and  safeguards” 
embraced  by  copyright  law,  see  id.,  at  219,  we  concluded 
in Eldred that there was no call for the heightened review 
petitioners  sought  in  that  case.30   We  reach  the  same 
conclusion  here.31   Section  514  leaves  undisturbed  the 
“idea/expression”  distinction  and  the  “fair  use”  defense.
Moreover,  Congress  adopted  measures  to  ease  the  transi-
tion from a national scheme to an international copyright 
regime: It deferred the date from which enforcement runs,
and  it  cushioned  the  impact  of  restoration  on  “reliance
parties”  who  exploited  foreign  works  denied  protection 
before §514 took effect.  See supra, at 10–11 (describing 17 
U. S. C. §104A(c), (d), and (h)).  See also Eldred, 537 U. S., 
at  220  (describing  supplemental  allowances  and  exemp- 

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30 See  Eldred,  537  U. S.,  at  221  (“Protection  of  [an  author’s  original
expression from unrestricted exploitation] does not raise the free speech
concerns  present  when  the  government  compels  or  burdens  the  com-
munication of particular facts or ideas.”). 

31Focusing  narrowly  on  the  specific  problem  of  orphan  works, 
the  dissent  overlooks  these  principal  protections  against  “the 
dissemination-restricting harms of copyright.”  Post, at 14.