Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/558bv.pdf
Page Number: 260.0

Cite as: 558 U. S. 87 (2009) 

99 

Opinion of Stevens, J. 

pose or expectation of manufacturing mootness.  Neverthe­
less,  the  State’s  decision  to  return  the  automobiles  when  it 
did  appears  to  have  been  legally  discretionary,  as  was  the 
“compromise  settlement”  that  it  reached  with  respondent 
Waldo regarding her cash, ante, at 96.  In light of the State’s 
purposive  and  voluntary  action  that  caused  the  mootness— 
along  with  its  failure  to  alert  us  to  the  relevant  facts  or  to 
explain  why  vacatur  would  serve  the  public  interest—I  be­
lieve  it  has  failed  to  carry  its  burden  to  “demonstrate  .  .  . 
equitable  entitlement  to  the  extraordinary  remedy  of  vaca­
tur.”  Bancorp, 513 U. S., at 26. 

There  was  a  third  option  for  disposing  of  this  case:  We 
could have dismissed the writ of certiorari as improvidently 
granted.  Like  denying  the  petition  in  the  ﬁrst  place,  that 
disposition  would  have  preserved  the  judgment  below.  At 
the  time  we  granted  certiorari  on  February  23,  2009,  peti­
tioner  had  already  resolved  the  underlying  property  dis­
putes  for  ﬁve  of  the  six  named  respondents.  See  ante,  at 
91–92, 95–96.  It was entirely predictable that the ﬁnal set­
tlement  would  soon  follow.  Moreover,  the  brieﬁng  in  this 
case  has  revealed  a  disagreement  over  basic  descriptive 
questions of Illinois law, questions that were not passed upon 
below.  Compare  Brief  for  Petitioner  60–66  with  Brief  for 
Respondents  41–44.  And,  of  course,  we  have  no  way  of 
knowing  how  the  District  Court  would  have  applied  the 
Court  of  Appeals’  remand  order,  which  left  it  great  discre­
tion to “fashion appropriate procedural relief ” “with the help 
of  the  parties.”  Smith  v.  Chicago,  524  F.  3d  834,  838  (CA7 
2008).  It has become clear that the Court was overhasty in 
deciding  to  review  this  case;  the  improvidence  of  our  grant 
provides an additional reason why we should not vacate the 
work product of our colleagues on the Court of Appeals. 

I respectfully dissent from Part III of the Court’s opinion 

and from its judgment.