Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/22pdf/22-58_i425.pdf
Page Number: 2.0

2 

UNITED STATES v. TEXAS 

Syllabus 

the  dispute  is  “traditionally  thought  to  be  capable  of  resolution 
through the judicial process.”  Ibid.  Here, the States cite no precedent, 
history, or tradition of federal courts entertaining lawsuits of this kind. 
On the contrary, this Court has previously ruled that a plaintiff lacks
standing to bring such a suit “when he himself is neither prosecuted 
nor threatened with prosecution.”  See Linda R. S. v. Richard D., 410 
U. S. 614, 619.  The Linda R. S. Article III standing principle remains 
the law today, and the States have pointed to no case or historical prac-
tice holding otherwise.  Pp. 3–6.

(b) There are good reasons why federal courts have not traditionally
entertained lawsuits of this kind.  For one, when the Executive Branch 
elects  not  to  arrest  or  prosecute,  it  does  not  exercise  coercive  power 
over  an  individual’s  liberty  or  property,  and  thus  does  not  infringe
upon interests that courts often are called upon to protect.  Moreover, 
such  lawsuits  run  up  against  the  Executive’s  Article  II  authority  to 
decide “how to prioritize and how aggressively to pursue legal actions 
against defendants who violate the law.”  TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 
594 U. S. ___, ___.  The principle of Executive Branch enforcement dis-
cretion over arrests and prosecutions extends to the immigration con-
text.    Courts  also  generally  lack  meaningful  standards  for  assessing
the propriety of enforcement choices in this area, which are invariably 
affected by resource constraints and regularly changing public-safety 
and public-welfare needs.  That is why this Court has recognized that 
federal courts are generally not the proper forum for resolving claims
that  the  Executive  Branch  should  make  more  arrests  or  bring  more 
prosecutions.  Pp. 6–9.

(c) This holding does not suggest that federal courts may never en-
tertain cases involving the Executive Branch’s alleged failure to make 
more arrests or bring more prosecutions.  First, the Court has adjudi-
cated selective-prosecution claims under the Equal Protection Clause 
in which a plaintiff typically seeks to prevent his or her own prosecu-
tion.  Second, the standing analysis might differ when Congress ele-
vates  de facto  injuries  to  the  status  of  legally  cognizable  injuries  re-
dressable  by  a  federal  court.    Third,  the  standing  calculus  might
change if the Executive Branch wholly abandoned its statutory respon-
sibilities to make arrests or bring prosecutions.  Fourth, a challenge to 
an  Executive  Branch  policy  that  involves  both  arrest  or  prosecution
priorities and the provision of legal benefits or legal status could lead
to a different standing analysis.  Fifth, policies governing the contin-
ued detention of noncitizens who have already been arrested arguably
might  raise  a  different  standing  question  than  arrest  or  prosecution 
policies.  But this case presents none of those scenarios.  Pp. 9–12.

(d) The discrete standing question raised by this case rarely arises 
because federal statutes that purport to require the Executive Branch