Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/529bv.pdf
Page Number: 564.0

529US2

Unit: $U50

[09-26-01 10:29:49] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 529 U. S. 473 (2000)

489

Opinion of the Court

would become a problem, however, it can be countered with-
out upsetting the established meaning of a second or succes-
sive petition.

First, the State remains free to impose proper procedural
bars to restrict repeated returns to state court for postcon-
viction proceedings. Second, provisions of AEDPA may
bear upon the question in cases to which the Act applies.
AEDPA itself demonstrates that Congress may address mat-
ters relating to exhaustion and mixed petitions through
means other than rules governing “second or successive” pe-
titions. E. g., 28 U. S. C. § 2254(b)(2) (1994 ed., Supp. III).
Third, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, applicable as a
general matter to habeas cases, vest the federal courts with
due ﬂexibility to prevent vexatious litigation. As Slack con-
cedes, in the habeas corpus context it would be appropriate
for an order dismissing a mixed petition to instruct an appli-
cant that upon his return to federal court he is to bring only
exhausted claims. See Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. 41(a) and (b).
Once the petitioner is made aware of the exhaustion require-
ment, no reason exists for him not to exhaust all potential
claims before returning to federal court. The failure to com-
ply with an order of the court is grounds for dismissal with
prejudice. Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 41(b).
In this case, how-
ever, the initial petition was dismissed without condition and
without prejudice. We reject the State’s argument that re-
fusing to give a new meaning to the established term “second
or successive” opens the door to the abuses described.

IV

Slack has demonstrated that reasonable jurists could con-
clude that the District Court’s abuse of the writ holding was
wrong, for we have determined that a habeas petition ﬁled
after an initial petition was dismissed under Rose v. Lundy
without an adjudication on the merits is not a “second or
successive” petition. Whether Slack is otherwise entitled to
the issuance of a COA is a question to be resolved ﬁrst upon