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STUDENTS FOR FAIR ADMISSIONS, INC. v. PRESIDENT 
AND FELLOWS OF HARVARD COLLEGE 
Syllabus 

quotation marks omitted).  The second risk is that race would be used 
not as a plus, but as a negative—to discriminate against those racial 
groups that were not the beneficiaries of the race-based preference.  A 
university’s use of race, accordingly, could not occur in a manner that
“unduly harm[ed] nonminority applicants.”  Id., at 341. 

To manage these concerns, Grutter imposed one final limit on race-
based admissions programs: At some point, the Court held, they must 
end.  Id., at 342.  Recognizing that “[e]nshrining a permanent justifi-
cation for racial preferences would offend” the Constitution’s unambig-
uous guarantee of equal protection, the Court expressed its expecta-
tion that, in 25 years, “the use of racial preferences will no longer be
necessary to further the interest approved today.”  Id., at 343.  Pp. 19– 
21. 

(e) Twenty  years  have  passed  since  Grutter,  with  no  end  to  race-
based college admissions in sight.  But the Court has permitted race-
based  college  admissions  only  within  the  confines  of  narrow  re-
strictions: such admissions programs must comply with strict scrutiny,
may  never  use  race  as  a  stereotype  or  negative,  and  must—at  some
point—end.  Respondents’ admissions systems fail each of these crite-
ria  and  must  therefore  be  invalidated  under  the  Equal  Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  Pp. 21–34. 

(1) Respondents  fail  to  operate  their  race-based  admissions  pro-
grams in a manner that is “sufficiently measurable to permit judicial 
[review]”  under  the  rubric  of  strict  scrutiny.    Fisher  v.  University  of 
Tex. at Austin, 579 U. S. 365, 381.  First, the interests that respondents
view as compelling cannot be subjected to meaningful judicial review. 
Those  interests  include  training  future  leaders,  acquiring  new 
knowledge based on diverse outlooks, promoting a robust marketplace
of ideas, and preparing engaged and productive citizens.  While these 
are commendable goals, they are not sufficiently coherent for purposes 
of strict scrutiny.  It is unclear how courts are supposed to measure 
any  of  these  goals,  or  if  they  could,  to  know  when  they  have  been 
reached so that racial preferences can end.  The elusiveness of respond-
ents’ asserted goals is further illustrated by comparing them to recog-
nized compelling interests.  For example, courts can discern whether 
the temporary racial segregation of inmates will prevent harm to those
in the prison, see Johnson v. California, 543 U. S. 499, 512–513, but 
the question whether a particular mix of minority students produces
“engaged and productive citizens” or effectively “train[s] future lead-
ers” is standardless. 

Second, respondents’ admissions programs fail to articulate a mean-
ingful connection between the means they employ and the goals they 
pursue.  To achieve the educational benefits of diversity, respondents 
measure the racial composition of their classes using racial categories