Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/529bv.pdf
Page Number: 150

529US1

Unit: $U34

[09-26-01 08:14:00] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 529 U. S. 61 (2000)

75

Opinion of the Court

on to say that if he chose the former option what he said
It is possible to believe that this
could be used against him.
contained an implicit promise that his choice of the option of
silence would not be used against him.
It is not possible,
we think, to believe that a similar promise of impunity is
implicit in a statute requiring the defendant to be present
at trial.

Respondent contends that this case contains an element of
unfairness even worse than what existed in Doyle: Whereas
the defendant in that case had the ability to avoid impair-
ment of his case by choosing to speak rather than remain
silent, the respondent here (he asserts) had no choice but to
be present at the trial. Though this is far from certain, see,
e. g., People v. Aiken, 45 N. Y. 2d 394, 397, 380 N. E. 2d 272,
274 (1978) (“[A] defendant charged with a felony not punish-
able by death may, by his voluntary and willful absence from
trial, waive his right to be present at every stage of his
trial”), we shall assume for the sake of argument that it is
true. There is, however, no authority whatever for the
proposition that the impairment of credibility, if any, caused
If the
by mandatory presence at trial violates due process.
ability to avoid the accusation (or suspicion) of tailoring were
as crucial a factor as respondent contends, one would expect
criminal defendants—in jurisdictions that do not have
compulsory attendance requirements—frequently to absent
themselves from trial when they intend to give testimony.
But to our knowledge, a criminal trial without the defendant
present is a rarity. Many long established elements of crim-
inal procedure deprive a defendant of advantages he would
otherwise possess—for example, the requirement that he
plead to the charge before, rather than after, all the evidence
is in. The consequences of the requirement that he be pres-
ent at trial seem to us no worse.

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For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit is reversed, and the case