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Page Number: 41

10 

BIDEN v. NEBRASKA 

BARRETT, J., concurring 

Congress to legislate on “important subjects” while delegat-
ing  away  only  “the  details.”    Wayman  v.  Southard,  10 
Wheat. 1, 43 (1825).  That is different from a normative rule 
that discourages Congress from empowering agencies.  To 
see what I mean, return to the ambitious babysitter.  Our 
expectation  of  clearer  authorization  for  the  amusement-
park trip is not about discouraging the parent from giving
significant leeway to the babysitter or forcing the parent to 
think hard before doing so.  Instead, it reflects the intuition 
that  the  parent  is  in  charge  and  sets  the  terms  for  the 
babysitter—so  if  a  judgment  is  significant,  we  expect  the 
parent to make it.  If, by contrast, one parent left the chil-
dren with the other parent for the weekend, we would view
the same trip differently because the parents share author-
ity  over  the  children.  In  short,  the  balance  of  power  be-
tween those in a relationship inevitably frames our under-
standing  of  their  communications.    And  when  it  comes  to  
the  Nation’s  policy,  the  Constitution  gives  Congress  the
reins—a  point  of  context  that  no  reasonable  interpreter 
could ignore.

Given these baseline assumptions, an interpreter should
“typically  greet”  an  agency’s  claim  to  “extravagant  statu-
tory  power”  with  at  least  some  “measure  of  skepticism.” 
Utility  Air,  573  U. S.,  at  324.    That  skepticism  is  neither 
“made-up” nor “new.”  Post, at 24, 29 (KAGAN, J., dissent-
ing).  On the contrary, it appears in a line of decisions span-
ning at least 40 years.  E.g., King v. Burwell, 576 U. S. 473, 
485–486 (2015); Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U. S. 243, 267–268 
(2006); Brown & Williamson, 529 U. S., at 159–160; Indus-
trial  Union  Dept.,  AFL–CIO  v.  American  Petroleum  Insti-
tute, 448 U. S. 607, 645 (1980) (plurality opinion).3 

Still, this skepticism does not mean that courts have an 

—————— 

3 Indeed, the doctrine may have even deeper roots.  See ICC v. Cincin-
nati, N. O. & T. P. R. Co., 167 U. S. 479, 494–495 (1897) (explaining that
for agency assertions of “vast and comprehensive” power, “no just rule of
construction would tolerate a grant of such power by mere implication”).