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GOLAN v. SAADA 

Syllabus 

insufficient.  Because  the  record  did  not  support  concluding  that  no 
sufficient ameliorative measures existed, the Second Circuit remanded 
for the District Court to consider whether such measures, in fact, ex-
isted.  After an examination over nine months, the District Court iden-
tified  new  ameliorative  measures  and  again  ordered  B. A. S.’  return. 
The Second Circuit affirmed. 

Held: A court is not categorically required to examine all possible ame-
liorative measures before denying a Hague Convention petition for re-
turn of a child to a foreign country once the court has found that return
would expose the child to a grave risk of harm.  Pp. 8–16.

(a) “The interpretation of a treaty, like the interpretation of a stat-
ute, begins with its text.”  Abbott v. Abbott, 560 U. S. 1, 10 (internal 
quotation  marks  omitted).    When  “a  child  has  been  wrongfully  re-
moved or retained” from his country of habitual residence, Article 12
of  the  Hague  Convention  generally  requires  the  deciding  authority 
(here,  a  district  court)  to  “order  the  return  of  the  child.”    T. I. A. S. 
No.  11670,  S.  Treaty  Doc.  No.  99–11,  p.  9.    But  Article  13(b)  of  the 
Convention leaves a court with the discretion to grant or deny return,
providing that a court “is not bound to order the return of the child” if
it  finds  that  the  party  opposing  return  has  established  that  return 
would  expose  the  child  to  a  “grave  risk”  of  physical  or  psychological 
harm.  Id., at 10.  Nothing in the Convention’s text either forbids or
requires consideration of ameliorative measures in exercising this dis-
cretion.  Pp. 8–11.

(1) Saada’s  primary  argument  is  that  determining  whether  a 
grave risk of harm exists necessarily requires considering whether any
ameliorative measures are available.  The two questions, however, are 
separate.  A court may find it appropriate to consider both questions
at once, but this does not mean that the Convention imposes a cate-
gorical  requirement  on  a  court  to  consider  any  or  all  ameliorative 
measures before denying return based on a grave-risk determination.
Pp. 9–10.

(2) The discretion to courts under the Convention and ICARA in-
cludes  the  discretion  to  determine  whether  to  consider  ameliorative 
measures that could ensure the child’s safe return.  The Second Cir-
cuit’s contrary rule—which imposes an atextual, categorical require-
ment that courts consider all possible ameliorative measures in exer-
cising  discretion  under  the  Convention,  regardless  of  whether  such
consideration is consistent with the Convention’s objectives—“in prac-
tice, rewrite[s] the treaty,” Lozano v. Montoya Alvarez, 572 U. S. 1, 17. 
Pp. 10–11. 

(b) A district court’s consideration of ameliorative measures must be 
guided by the legal principles and other requirements set forth in the