Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/22pdf/21-806_2dp3.pdf
Page Number: 43

Cite as:  599 U. S. ____ (2023) 

11 

THOMAS, J., dissenting 

. . . are ‘secured’ (if at all) not by any ‘law,’ but only by the 
contract  between  the  recipient  and  the  United  States.” 
Ibid. 

This  contractual  understanding  of  conditional  spending 
legislation is much more than a mere analogy; it is the only 
possible explanation for why such legislation is not an un-
constitutional  direct  regulation  of  the  States.    To  deny  or
downplay  this  principle  is  to  seek  to  have  it  both  ways. 
Much spending legislation conditions States’ receipt of fed-
eral funds on their undertaking obligations with respect to 
third parties.  For such legislation to survive a federalism 
challenge,  it  must  not  directly  impose  obligations  on  the 
States with the force of federal law.  But, for those condi-
tions to be enforceable under §1983, they must secure third-
party rights by directly imposing correlative obligations on 
the States with the force of federal law.  Both of these things 
cannot be true. 

III 
This contractual understanding of spending conditions is
also a necessary consequence of the limited nature of Con-
gress’  spending  power,  as  consistently  understood  for 
nearly two centuries of our Nation’s history.  Indeed, this is 
one  point  on  which  the  Framers  all  seem  to  have  agreed. 
Despite heated debates over the source and scope of Con-
gress’  power  to  spend,  all  understood  that  this  power  did
not  carry  with  it  any  independent  regulatory  authority.
That  agreement  persisted  throughout  the  19th  century. 
And,  in  the  20th,  it  was  a  critical  underpinning  of  this
Court’s precedents upholding expansive uses of the spend-
ing  power  as  consistent  with  Congress’  limited  legislative 
powers and our federalist system of government. 

—————— 
houses  of  Congress  and  signed  by  the  President,  the  Medicaid  statute 
has no force of its own.  It is only when a State . . . accepts the Federal 
Government’s  offer  and  agrees  to  participate  in  the  program  that  any 
benefits accrue to eligible individuals”), rev’d, 289 F. 3d 852 (CA6 2002).