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Page Number: 11.0

6 

TRUMP v. VANCE 

Opinion of the Court 

court.”  Id., at 34.  But, as Marshall explained, a king is born 
to power and can “do no wrong.”  Ibid.  The President, by
contrast, is “of the people” and subject to the law.  Ibid.  Ac-
cording to Marshall, the sole argument for exempting the 
President from testimonial obligations was that his “duties 
as chief magistrate demand his whole time for national ob-
jects.”  Ibid.  But, in Marshall’s assessment, those demands 
were “not unremitting.”  Ibid.  And should the President’s 
duties  preclude  his  attendance  at  a  particular  time  and
place, a court could work that out upon return of the sub-
poena.  Ibid. 

Marshall  also  rejected  the  prosecution’s  argument  that
the  President  was  immune  from  a  subpoena  duces  tecum 
because  executive  papers  might  contain  state  secrets.    “A 
subpoena duces tecum,” he said, “may issue to any person
to whom an ordinary subpoena may issue.”  Ibid.  As he ex-
plained, no “fair construction” of the Constitution supported 
the conclusion that the right “to compel the attendance of
witnesses[ ] does not extend” to requiring those witnesses to
“bring[ ] with them such papers as may be material in the
defence.”  Id., at 35.  And, as a matter of basic fairness, per-
mitting such information to be withheld would “tarnish the
reputation of the court.”  Id., at 37.  As for “the propriety of 
introducing any papers,” that would “depend on the charac-
ter  of  the  paper,  not  on  the  character  of  the  person  who 
holds it.”  Id., at 34.  Marshall acknowledged that the pa-
pers sought by Burr could contain information “the disclo-
sure of which would endanger the public safety,” but stated
that, again, such concerns would have “due consideration” 
upon the return of the subpoena.  Id., at 37. 

While  the  arguments  unfolded,  Jefferson,  who  had  re-
ceived word of the motion, wrote to the prosecutor indicat-
ing  that  he  would—subject  to  the  prerogative  to  decide
which executive communications should be withheld—“fur-
nish on all occasions, whatever the purposes of justice may 
require.”  Letter  from  T.  Jefferson  to  G.  Hay  (June  12,