Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/22pdf/22-138_43j7.pdf
Page Number: 8.0

Cite as:  600 U. S. ____ (2023) 

5 

Opinion of the Court 

statements’ threatening character.  The second issue here 
concerns  what  precise  mens  rea  standard  suffices  for  the 
First  Amendment  purpose  at  issue.   Again  guided  by  our
precedent, we hold that a recklessness standard is enough. 
Given  that  a  subjective  standard  here  shields  speech  not 
independently  entitled  to  protection—and  indeed  posing 
real  dangers—we  do  not  require  that  the  State  prove  the 
defendant had any more specific intent to threaten the vic-
tim. 

A 
“From  1791  to  the  present,”  the  First  Amendment  has
“permitted restrictions upon the content of speech in a few 
limited areas.”  United States v. Stevens, 559 U. S. 460, 468 
(2010).  These “historic and traditional categories” are “long 
familiar  to  the  bar”  and  perhaps,  too,  the  general  public. 
Ibid.  One is incitement—statements “directed [at] produc-
ing imminent lawless action,” and likely to do so.  Branden-
burg v. Ohio, 395 U. S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam).  An-
other  is  defamation—false  statements  of  fact  harming
another’s reputation.  See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 
U. S. 323, 340, 342 (1974).  Still a third is obscenity—value-
less material “appeal[ing] to the prurient interest” and de-
scribing “sexual conduct” in “a patently offensive way.”  Mil-
ler  v.  California,  413  U. S.  15,  24  (1973).    This  Court  has 
“often described [those] historically unprotected categories
of  speech  as  being  of  such  slight  social  value  as  a  step  to
truth  that  any  benefit  that  may  be  derived  from  them  is
clearly outweighed by the social interest” in their proscrip-
tion.  Stevens, 559 U. S., at 470 (internal quotation marks
omitted; emphasis deleted). 

“True  threats”  of  violence  is  another  historically  unpro-
tected category of communications.  Virginia v. Black, 538 
U. S. 343, 359 (2003); see United States v. Alvarez, 567 U. S. 
709, 717–718 (2012) (plurality opinion).  The “true” in that 
term distinguishes what is at issue from jests, “hyperbole,”