Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/10pdf/09-1233.pdf
Page Number: 73.0

Cite as:  563 U. S. ____ (2011) 

15 

SCALIA, J., dissenting 

medical  treatment,  then  the  court  can  order  his  release; 
but  a  court  may  not  order  the  release  of  prisoners  who
have  suffered  no  violations  of  their  constitutional  rights,
merely to make it less likely that that will happen to them 
in the future. 

This view follows from the PLRA’s text that I discussed 
at  the  outset,  18  U. S. C.  §3626(a)(1)(A).    “[N]arrowly
drawn” means that the relief applies only to the “particu-
lar  [prisoner]  or  [prisoners]”  whose  constitutional  rights
are  violated;  “extends  no  further  than  necessary”  means
that prisoners whose rights are not violated will not obtain
relief; and “least intrusive means necessary to correct the 
violation of the Federal right” means that no other relief is 
available.* 

I  acknowledge  that  this  reading  of  the  PLRA  would  se-
verely  limit  the  circumstances  under  which  a  court  could
issue  structural  injunctions  to  remedy  allegedly  unconsti-
tutional prison conditions, although it would not eliminate 
them  entirely.  If,  for  instance,  a  class  representing  all
prisoners in a particular institution alleged that the tem-
perature in their cells was so cold as to violate the Eighth
Amendment,  or  that  they  were  deprived  of  all  exercise 
time, a court could enter a prisonwide injunction ordering 
that  the  temperature  be  raised  or  exercise  time  be  pro-
vided.  Still, my approach may invite the objection that the 
PLRA  appears  to  contemplate  structural  injunctions  in 
general  and  mass  prisoner-release  orders  in  particular.
The  statute  requires  courts  to “give  substantial  weight  to 

—————— 

* Any  doubt  on  this  last  score,  at  least  as  far  as  prisoner-release  or-
ders are concerned, is eliminated by §3626(a)(3)(E) of the statute, which 
provides that to enter a prisoner-release order the court must find  

“by clear and convincing evidence that— 
(i)  crowding  is  the  primary  cause  of  the  violation  of  a  Federal  right; 

and 

(ii) no other relief will remedy the violation of the Federal right.”