Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/23pdf/22-859new_kjfm.pdf
Page Number: 24

Cite as:  603 U. S. ____ (2024) 

19 

Opinion of the Court 

Article III.”  Stern, 564 U. S., at 484. 

2 
This is not the first time we have considered whether the 
Seventh Amendment guarantees the right to a jury trial “in
the face of Congress’ decision to allow a non-Article III tri-
bunal to adjudicate” a statutory “fraud claim.”  492 U. S., at 
37,  50.  We  did  so  in  Granfinanciera,  and  the  principles
identified in that case largely resolve this one. 

Granfinanciera involved a statutory action for fraudulent 
conveyance.  As codified in the Bankruptcy Code, the claim 
permitted a trustee to void a transfer or obligation made by
the  debtor  before  bankruptcy  if  the  debtor  “received  less
than  a  reasonably  equivalent  value  in  exchange  for  such 
transfer or obligation.”  11 U. S. C. §548(a)(2)(A) (1982 ed., 
Supp.  V).  Actions  for  fraudulent  conveyance  were  well
known at common law.  492 U. S., at 43.  Even when Con-
gress added these claims to the Bankruptcy Code in 1978,
see 92 Stat. 2600, it preserved parties’ rights to a trial by 
jury, 492 U. S., at 49–50.  In 1984, however, Congress des-
ignated  fraudulent  conveyance  actions  “core  [bankruptcy] 
proceedings”  and  authorized  non-Article  III  bankruptcy
judges to hear them without juries.  Id., at 50. 

The  issue  in  Granfinanciera  was  whether  this  designa-
tion  was  permissible  under  the  public  rights  exception. 
Ibid.  We explained that it was not.  Although Congress had
assigned  fraudulent  conveyance  claims  to  bankruptcy
courts, that assignment was not dispositive.  See id., at 52. 
What  mattered,  we  explained,  was  the  substance  of  the
suit.  “[T]raditional legal claims” must be decided by courts,
“whether  they  originate  in  a  newly  fashioned  regulatory
scheme  or  possess  a  long  line  of  common-law  forebears.” 
Ibid.  To determine whether the claim implicated the Sev-
enth Amendment, the Court applied the principles distilled 
in Tull.  We examined whether the matter was “from [its]
nature subject to ‘a suit at common law.’ ”  492 U. S., at 56