Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/524bv.pdf
Page Number: 463

524US2

Unit: $U93

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418

CLINTON v. CITY OF NEW YORK

Syllabus

cern about the dispute’s ripeness, but more importantly because the
parties have alleged a “personal stake” in having an actual injury re-
dressed, rather than an “institutional
injury” that is “abstract and
widely dispersed.” 521 U. S., at 829. There is no merit to the Govern-
ment’s contention that, in both cases, the appellees have not suffered
actual injury because their claims are too speculative and, in any event,
are advanced by the wrong parties. Because New York State now has
a multibillion dollar contingent liability that had been eliminated by
§ 4722(c), the State, and the appellees, suffered an immediate, concrete
injury the moment the President canceled the section and deprived
them of its beneﬁts. The argument that New York’s claim belongs to
the State, not appellees, fails in light of New York statutes demonstrat-
ing that both New York City and the appellee providers will be assessed
for substantial portions of any recoupment payments the State has to
make. Similarly, the President’s cancellation of § 968 inﬂicted a sufﬁ-
cient likelihood of economic injury on the Snake River appellees to es-
tablish standing under this Court’s precedents, cf. Bryant v. Yellen, 447
U. S. 352, 368. The assertion that, because processing facility sellers
would have received the tax beneﬁts, only they have standing to chal-
lenge the § 968 cancellation not only ignores the fact that the coopera-
tives were the intended beneﬁciaries of § 968, but also overlooks the fact
that more than one party may be harmed by a defendant and therefore
have standing. Pp. 428–436.

2. The Act’s cancellation procedures violate the Presentment Clause.

Pp. 436–449.

(a) The Act empowers the President to cancel an “item of new di-
rect spending” such as § 4722(c) of the Balanced Budget Act and a “lim-
ited tax beneﬁt” such as § 968 of the Taxpayer Relief Act, § 691(a), speci-
fying that such cancellation prevents a provision “from having legal
force or effect,” §§ 691e(4)(B)–(C). Thus, in both legal and practical ef-
fect, the Presidential actions at issue have amended two Acts of Con-
gress by repealing a portion of each. Statutory repeals must conform
with Art. I, INS v. Chadha, 462 U. S. 919, 954, but there is no constitu-
tional authorization for the President to amend or repeal. Under the
Presentment Clause, after a bill has passed both Houses, but “before it
become[s] a Law,” it must be presented to the President, who “shall sign
it” if he approves it, but “return it,” i. e., “veto” it, if he does not. There
are important differences between such a “return” and cancellation
under the Act: The constitutional return is of the entire bill and takes
place before it becomes law, whereas the statutory cancellation occurs
after the bill becomes law and affects it only in part. There are power-
ful reasons for construing the constitutional silence on the profoundly
important subject of Presidential repeals as equivalent to an express