Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/19pdf/18-587_5ifl.pdf
Page Number: 27.0

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DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY v. 
REGENTS OF UNIV. OF CAL. 
Opinion of the Court 

“efficacy  of  airbag  technology”  or  upon  “the  need  for  a 
passive  restraint  standard.”  Ibid.    Given  NHTSA’s  prior
judgment that “airbags are an effective and cost-beneficial
lifesaving  technology,”  we  held  that  “the  mandatory
passive restraint rule [could] not be abandoned without any 
consideration whatsoever of an airbags-only requirement.” 
Id., at 51. 

While the factual setting is different here, the error is the 
same.  Even if it is illegal for DHS to extend work authori-
zation and other benefits to DACA recipients, that conclu-
sion supported only “disallow[ing]” benefits.  Id., at 47.  It 
did “not cast doubt” on the legality of forbearance or upon
DHS’s original reasons for extending forbearance to child-
hood  arrivals.  Ibid.    Thus,  given  DHS’s  earlier  judgment
that  forbearance  is  “especially  justified”  for  “productive 
young  people”  who  were  brought  here  as  children 
and  “know  only  this  country  as  home,”  App.  to  Pet.  for
Cert.  98a–99a,  the  DACA  Memorandum  could  not  be  re-
scinded in full “without any consideration whatsoever” of a
forbearance-only policy, State Farm, 463 U. S., at 51.6 

The  Government  acknowledges  that  “[d]eferred  action
coupled with the associated benefits are the two legs upon
which the DACA policy stands.”  Reply Brief 21.  It insists, 
however, that “DHS was not required to consider whether 
DACA’s  illegality  could  be  addressed  by  separating”  the 

—————— 

6 The three-page memorandum that established DACA is devoted en-
tirely  to  forbearance,  save  for  one  sentence  directing  USCIS  to  “deter-
mine whether [DACA recipients] qualify for work authorization.”  App. 
to Pet. for Cert. 101a.  The benefits associated with DACA flow from a 
separate  regulation.  See  8  CFR  §1.3(a)(4)(vi);  see  also  42  CFR 
§417.422(h) (cross-referencing 8 CFR §1.3).  Thus, DHS could have ad-
dressed  the  Attorney  General’s  determination  that  such  benefits  were 
impermissible under the INA by amending 8 CFR §1.3 to exclude DACA 
recipients from those benefits without rescinding the DACA Memoran-
dum  and  the  forbearance  policy  it  established.   But  Duke’s  rescission 
memo shows no cognizance of this possibility.