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64  DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN’S HEALTH ORGANIZATION 

BREYER, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ., dissenting
Appendix to opinion of BREYER, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ. 

out core testimonial evidence, and overruling Ohio v. Rob-
erts, 448 U. S. 56 (1980)); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643, 651– 
652  (1961)  (holding  that  the  exclusionary  rule  under  the
Fourth  Amendment  applies  to  the  States,  and  overruling
the contrary rule of Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U. S. 25 (1949), 
after considering and rejecting “the current validity of the
factual grounds upon which Wolf was based”).

Some cited overrulings involved both significant doctrinal
developments  and  changed  facts  or  understandings  that
had together undermined a basic premise of the prior deci-
sion.  See Janus v. State, County, and Municipal Employ-
ees, 585 U. S. ___, ___, ___–___ (2018) (slip op., at 42, 47–49) 
(holding that requiring public-sector union dues from non-
members  violates  the  First  Amendment,  and  overruling 
Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Ed., 431 U. S. 209 (1977), based on
“both factual and legal” developments that had “eroded the
decision’s  underpinnings  and  left  it  an  outlier  among  our 
First  Amendment  cases”  (internal  quotation  marks  omit-
ted));  Obergefell  v.  Hodges,  576  U. S.  644,  659–663  (2015) 
(holding that the Fourteenth Amendment protects the right
of same-sex couples to marry in light of doctrinal develop-
ments,  as  well  as  fundamentally  changed  social  under-
standing); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U. S. 558, 572–578 (2003) 
(overruling Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U. S. 186 (1986), after 
finding anti-sodomy laws to be inconsistent with the Four-
teenth  Amendment  in  light  of  developments  in  the  legal
doctrine, as well as changed social understanding of sexu-
ality); United States v. Scott, 437 U. S. 82, 101 (1978) (over-
ruling United States v. Jenkins, 420 U. S. 358 (1975), three
years after it was decided, because of developments in the 
Court’s double jeopardy case law, and because intervening 
practice had shown that government appeals from midtrial 
dismissals requested by the defendant were practicable, de-
sirable, and consistent with double jeopardy values); Craig 
v. Boren, 429 U. S. 190, 197–199, 210, n. 23 (1976) (holding
that  sex-based  classifications  are  subject  to  intermediate