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XIULU RUAN v. UNITED STATES 

Syllabus 

588 U. S. ___, ___.  This culpable mental state, known as scienter, re-
fers to the degree of knowledge necessary to make a person criminally
responsible for his or her acts.  See ibid.  The presumption of scienter 
applies even when a statute does not include a scienter provision, and
when a statute does “includ[e] a general scienter provision,” “the pre-
sumption applies with equal or greater force” to the scope of that pro-
vision.  Ibid.   The  Court  has  accordingly  held  that  a  word  such  as 
“knowingly” modifies not only the words directly following it, but also 
those  other  statutory  terms  that  “separate  wrongful  from  innocent 
acts.”  Id., at ___.  

Here, §841 contains a general scienter provision—“knowingly or in-
tentionally.”  And in §841 prosecutions, authorization plays a “crucial” 
role  in  separating  innocent  conduct  from  wrongful  conduct.    United 
States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U. S. 64, 73.  Moreover, the regu-
latory  language  defining  an  authorized  prescription  is  “ambiguous” 
and “open to varying constructions,” Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U. S. 243, 
258, meaning that prohibited conduct (issuing invalid prescriptions) is
“often difficult to distinguish” from acceptable conduct (issuing valid
prescriptions).  United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U. S. 
422, 441.  A strong scienter requirement helps reduce the risk of “over-
deterrence,” i.e., punishing conduct that lies close to, but on the per-
missible side of, the criminal line.  Ibid. 

The statutory provisions at issue here are also not the kind to which 
the Court has held the presumption of scienter does not apply.  Section 
841 does not define a regulatory or public welfare offense that carries
only minor penalties.  Cf. Rehaif, 588 U. S., at ___; Staples v. United 
States,  511  U. S.  600,  618–619.    Nor  is  the  “except  as  authorized” 
clause a jurisdictional provision.  Cf. Rehaif, 588 U. S., at ___.  Pp. 5– 
8. 

(b) Analogous precedent reinforces the Court’s conclusion here.  In 
Liparota v. United States, 471 U. S. 419, United States v. X-Citement 
Video,  513  U. S.  64,  and  Rehaif  v.  United  States,  588  U. S.  ___,  the 
Court  interpreted  statutes  containing  a  general  scienter  provision
(“knowingly”), and considered what mental state applied to a statutory 
clause that did not immediately follow the “knowingly” provision.  In 
all three cases, the Court held that “knowingly” modified the statutory
clause in question because that clause played a critical role in separat-
ing a defendant’s wrongful from innocent conduct.  See Liparota, 471 
U. S., at 426; X-Citement Video, 513 U. S., at 72–73; Rehaif, 588 U. S., 
at ___.  As in those cases, the Court today concludes that §841’s mens 
rea applies to the “[e]xcept as authorized” clause, which serves to sep-
  Pp. 8–9. 
arate  a  defendant’s  wrongful  from  proper  conduct. 
(c) Neither  the  Government’s  nor  the concurrence’s  contrary  argu-