Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/19pdf/19-402_o75p.pdf
Page Number: 7.0

Cite as:  589 U. S. ____ (2020) 

7 

THOMAS, J., dissenting 

the  Court  declined  to  give  weight  to  executive  interpreta-
tions.  See Merritt v. Cameron, 137 U. S. 542, 552 (1890).2 
This practice is consistent with the more general princi-
ple  of  “liquidation,”  in  which  consistent  and  longstanding 
interpretations of an ambiguous text could fix its meaning.
See Stuart v. Laird, 1 Cranch 299, 309 (1803) (“[I]t is suffi-
cient  to  observe,  that  practice  and  acquiescence  under  [a
statute] for a period of several years, commencing with the
organization  of  the  judicial  system,  affords  an  irrefutable 
answer,  and  has  indeed  fixed  the  construction”);  see  also 
Respublica v. Roberts, 2 Dall. 124, 125 (Pa. 1791); Minnis v. 
Echols, 12 Va. 31, 36 (1808) (opinion of Roane, J.); Packard 
v. Richardson, 17 Mass. 122, 144 (1821); Nelson, Stare De-
cisis  and  Demonstrably  Erroneous  Precedents,  87  Va.
L. Rev. 1, 14–21 (2001).  Chevron is not a species of liquida-
tion  because  it  “give[s]  administrative  agencies  substan-
tially more freedom to depart from settled understandings.”
Nelson,  Originalism  and  Interpretive  Conventions,  70  U.
Chi. L. Rev. 519, 551–552, n. 137 (2003).  But the existence 
of  liquidation  by  nonexecutive  actors  confirms  that  “the
pedigree  and  contemporaneity  of  the  interpretation”  mat-
tered in the early Republic, not the mere fact that it was an
interpretation by the Executive.  Bamzai, supra, at 916. 

The standard applied in mandamus cases might appear
to be a forerunner of Chevron deference, but the comparison
dissipates  upon  close  examination.    In  mandamus  cases, 
courts  generally  would  not  second-guess  legal  interpreta-
tions made “in the discharge of any official duty, partaking 
in  any  respect  of  an  executive  character,”  but  they  would
“enforce the performance of a mere ministerial act.”  Ken-
dall v. United States ex rel. Stokes, 12 Pet. 524, 610 (1838). 

—————— 

2 The phrasing and substance of these canons vary, and I express no 
opinion on their details, such as whether congressional acquiescence in 
a longstanding interpretation was required.  See P. Hamburger, Is Ad-
ministrative Law Unlawful? 583, n. 24 (2014).