Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/19pdf/17-1618_hfci.pdf
Page Number: 159

Cite as:  590 U. S. ____ (2020) 

15 

KAVANAUGH, J., dissenting 

So it is here.  As demonstrated by all of the statutes cov-
ering  sexual  orientation  discrimination,  Congress  knows
how  to  prohibit  sexual  orientation  discrimination.  So 
courts should not read that specific concept into the general
words “discriminate because of sex.”  We cannot close our 
eyes to the indisputable fact that Congress—for several dec-
ades in a large number of statutes—has identified sex dis-
crimination  and  sexual  orientation  discrimination  as  two 
distinct categories. 

Where possible, we also strive to interpret statutes so as 
not to create undue surplusage.  It is not uncommon to find 
some scattered redundancies in statutes.  But reading sex
discrimination to encompass sexual orientation discrimina-
tion  would  cast  aside  as  surplusage  the  numerous  refer-
ences  to  sexual  orientation  discrimination  sprinkled 
throughout the U. S. Code in laws enacted over the last 25 
years.

In  short,  an  extensive  body  of  federal  law  both  reflects
and  reinforces  the  widespread  understanding  that  sexual
orientation discrimination is distinct from, and not a form 
of, sex discrimination. 

The  story  is  the  same  with  bills  proposed  in  Congress. 
Since  the  1970s,  Members  of  Congress  have  introduced 
many bills to prohibit sexual orientation discrimination in 
the workplace.  Until very recently, all of those bills would 
have  expressly  established  sexual  orientation  as  a  sepa-
rately proscribed category of discrimination.  The bills did 
not define sex discrimination to encompass sexual orienta-
tion discrimination.6 

—————— 

6 See, e.g., H. R. 14752, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., §§6, 11 (1974) (amending 
Title  VII  “by  adding  after  the  word  ‘sex’ ”  the  words  “ ‘sexual  orienta-
tion,’ ” defined as “choice of sexual partner according to gender”); H. R.
451, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., §§6, 11 (1977) (“adding after the word ‘sex,’ 
. . . ‘affectional or sexual preference,’ ” defined as “having or manifesting
an  emotional  or  physical  attachment  to  another  consenting  person  or 
persons of either gender, or having or manifesting a preference for such