Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/18pdf/17-1702_h315.pdf
Page Number: 14

Cite as:  587 U. S. ____ (2019) 

11 

Opinion of the Court 

C 
  Next,  the  producers  retort  that  this  case  differs  from 
Hudgens  because  New York  City  has  designated  MNN  to 
operate the public access channels on Time Warner’s cable 
system,  and  because  New  York  State  heavily  regulates 
MNN  with  respect  to  the  public  access  channels.    Under 
this  Court’s  cases,  however,  those  facts  do  not  establish 
that MNN is a state actor. 
  New  York  City’s  designation  of  MNN  to  operate  the 
public  access  channels  is  analogous  to  a  government  li-
cense,  a  government  contract,  or  a  government-granted 
monopoly.    But  as  the  Court  has  long  held,  the  fact  that 
the  government  licenses,  contracts  with,  or  grants  a  mo-
nopoly  to  a  private  entity  does  not  convert  the  private 
entity  into  a  state  actor—unless  the  private  entity  is 
performing  a  traditional,  exclusive  public  function.    See, 
e.g., San Francisco Arts & Athletics, 483 U. S., at 543–544 
(exclusive-use  rights  and  corporate  charters);  Blum,  457 
U. S., at 1011 (licenses); Rendell-Baker, 457 U. S., at 840–
841  (contracts);  Polk  County,  454  U. S.,  at  319,  n. 9,  and 
320–322  (law  licenses);  Jackson,  419  U. S.,  at  351–352 
(electric monopolies); Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. 
v.  Democratic  National  Committee,  412  U. S. 94,  120–121 
(1973)  (broadcast  licenses);  Moose  Lodge  No.  107  v.  Irvis, 
407 U. S. 163, 176–177 (1972) (liquor licenses); cf. Trustees 
—————— 

this  Court  said  in  passing  dicta  that  “a  speaker  must  seek  access  to 
public property or to private property dedicated to public use to evoke 
First Amendment concerns.”  473 U. S. 788, 801 (1985).  But Cornelius 
dealt with government-owned property.  As JUSTICE THOMAS explained 
in  Denver  Area  Educational  Telecommunications  Consortium,  Inc.  v. 
FCC,  the  Court’s  admittedly  imprecise  and  overbroad  phrase  in  Cor-
nelius  is  not  consistent  with  this  Court’s  case  law  and  should  not  be 
read  to  suggest  that  private  property  owners  or  private  lessees  are 
subject  to  First  Amendment  constraints  whenever  they  dedicate  their 
private  property  to  public  use  or  otherwise  open  their  property  for 
speech.  518 U. S. 727, 827–828 (1996) (opinion concurring in judgment 
in part and dissenting in part).