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Page Number: 18.0

12 

MOODY v. NETCHOICE, LLC 

Opinion of the Court 

If so, regulation of those diverse activities could well fall on 
different sides of the constitutional line.  To decide the fa-
cial challenges here, the courts below must explore the laws’ 
full range of applications—the constitutionally impermissi-
ble  and  permissible  both—and  compare  the  two  sets.
Maybe the parties treated the content-moderation choices
reflected in Facebook’s News Feed and YouTube’s homep-
age as the laws’ heartland applications because they are the 
principal  things  regulated,  and  should  have  just  that 
weight in the facial analysis.  Or maybe not: Maybe the par-
ties’ focus had all to do with litigation strategy, and there is
a  sphere  of  other  applications—and  constitutional  ones—
that would prevent the laws’ facial invalidation. 

The  problem  for  this  Court  is  that  it  cannot  undertake
the needed inquiries.  “[W]e are a court of review, not of first
view.”  Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U. S. 709, 718, n. 7 (2005). 
Neither  the  Eleventh  Circuit  nor  the  Fifth  Circuit  per-
formed the facial analysis in the way just described.  And 
even were we to ignore the value of other courts going first,
we could not proceed very far.  The parties have not briefed
the critical issues here, and the record is underdeveloped. 
So we vacate the decisions below and remand these cases. 
That  will  enable  the lower  courts  to  consider  the  scope of 
the  laws’  applications,  and  weigh  the  unconstitutional  as
against the constitutional ones. 

III 
But  it  is  necessary  to  say  more  about  how  the  First
Amendment relates to the laws’ content-moderation provi-
sions,  to  ensure  that  the  facial  analysis  proceeds  on  the 
right path in the courts below.  That need is especially stark 
for  the  Fifth  Circuit.    Recall  that  it  held  that  the  content 
choices the major platforms make for their main feeds are
“not speech” at all, so States may regulate them free of the 
First Amendment’s restraints.  49 F. 4th, at 494; see supra, 
at 8.  And even if those activities were expressive, the court