Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/05pdf/04-1084.pdf
Page Number: 16

Cite as:  546 U. S. ____ (2006) 

11 

Opinion of the Court 

B 
Under the  more focused inquiry  required by  RFRA and 
the compelling interest test, the Government’s mere invo-
cation  of  the  general  characteristics  of  Schedule  I  sub-
stances,  as  set  forth  in  the  Controlled  Substances  Act, 
cannot carry the day.  It is true, of course, that Schedule I 
substances  such  as  DMT  are  exceptionally  dangerous. 
See, e.g., Touby v. United States, 500 U. S. 160, 162 (1991). 
Nevertheless, there is no indication that Congress, in classi-
fying DMT, considered the harms posed by the particular 
use  at  issue  here—the  circumscribed,  sacramental  use  of 
hoasca  by  the  UDV.  The  question  of  the  harms  from  the 
sacramental  use  of  hoasca  by  the  UDV  was  litigated  be-
low.  Before the District Court found that the Government 
had  not  carried  its  burden  of  showing  a  compelling  inter-
est in preventing such harms, the court noted that it could 
not  “ignore  that  the  legislative  branch  of  the  government
elected  to  place  materials  containing  DMT  on  Schedule  I 
of the [Act], reflecting findings that substances containing
DMT  have  ‘a  high  potential  for  abuse,’  and  ‘no  currently 
accepted  medical  use  in  treatment  in  the  United  States,’ 
and  that  ‘[t]here  is  a  lack  of  accepted  safety  for  use  of 
[DMT]  under  medical  supervision.’ ”  282  F. Supp.  2d,  at 
1254.  But  Congress’  determination  that  DMT  should  be 
listed under Schedule I simply does not provide a categori-
cal answer that relieves the Government of the obligation 
to shoulder its burden under RFRA. 

This  conclusion  is  reinforced  by  the  Controlled  Sub-
stances Act itself.  The Act contains a provision authoriz-
ing  the  Attorney  General  to  “waive  the  requirement  for 
registration  of  certain  manufacturers,  distributors,  or 
dispensers  if  he  finds  it  consistent  with  the  public  health 
and  safety.”  21  U. S. C.  §822(d).    The  fact  that  the  Act 
itself contemplates that exempting certain people from its 
requirements  would  be  “consistent  with  the  public  health 
and  safety”  indicates  that  congressional  findings  with