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Page Number: 21

Cite as:  603 U. S. ____ (2024) 

13 

Opinion of the Court 

Nixon.  The danger is akin to, indeed greater than, what led 
us  to  recognize  absolute  Presidential  immunity  from  civil 
damages liability—that the President would be chilled from
taking the “bold and unhesitating action” required of an in-
dependent  Executive.  Fitzgerald,  457  U. S.,  at  745.    Alt-
hough  the  President  might  be  exposed  to  fewer  criminal 
prosecutions  than  the  range  of  civil  damages  suits  that 
might be brought by various plaintiffs, the threat of trial, 
judgment, and imprisonment is a far greater deterrent.  Po-
tential  criminal  liability,  and  the  peculiar  public  oppro-
brium  that  attaches  to  criminal  proceedings,  are  plainly
more likely to distort Presidential decisionmaking than the 
potential payment of civil damages.

The hesitation to execute the duties of his office fearlessly 
and fairly that might result when a President is making de-
cisions under “a pall of potential prosecution,” McDonnell v. 
United  States,  579  U. S.  550,  575  (2016),  raises  “unique 
risks  to  the  effective  functioning  of  government,”  Fitzger-
ald,  457  U. S.,  at  751.    A  President  inclined  to  take  one 
course  of  action  based  on  the  public  interest  may  instead
opt for another, apprehensive that criminal penalties may 
befall him upon his departure from office.  And if a former 
President’s official acts are routinely subjected to scrutiny
in criminal prosecutions, “the independence of the Execu-
tive Branch” may be significantly undermined.  Vance, 591 
U. S., at 800.  The Framers’ design of the Presidency did not 
envision  such  counterproductive  burdens  on  the  “vigor[]” 
and  “energy”  of  the  Executive.   The  Federalist  No.  70,  at 
471–472. 

We must, however, “recognize[ ] the countervailing inter-
ests at stake.”  Vance, 591 U. S., at 799.  Federal criminal 
laws seek to redress “a wrong to the public” as a whole, not 
just “a wrong to the individual.”  Huntington v. Attrill, 146 
U. S. 657, 668 (1892).  There is therefore a compelling “pub-
lic interest in fair and effective law enforcement.”  Vance, 
591  U. S.,  at  808.    The  President,  charged  with  enforcing