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Page Number: 40.0

34 

MCCUTCHEON v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N 

Opinion of ROBERTS, C. J. 

and spent only by their recipients.  Such a solution would 
address  the  same  circumvention  possibilities  as  the  cur-
rent aggregate limits, while not completely barring contri-
butions beyond the aggregate levels.  In addition (or as an
alternative),  if  Congress  believes  that  circumvention  is
especially likely to occur through  creation of a joint fund-
raising  committee,  it  could  require  that  funds  received 
through those committees be spent by their recipients (or
perhaps  it  could  simply  limit  the  size  of  joint  fundraising 
committees).  Such  alternatives  to  the  aggregate  limits 
properly  refocus  the  inquiry  on  the  delinquent  actor:  the 
recipient of a contribution within the base limits, who then
routes  the  money  in  a  manner  that  undermines  those 
limits.  See  Citizens  United,  supra,  at  360–361;  cf.  Bart-
nicki v. Vopper, 532 U. S. 514, 529–530 (2001). 

Indeed, Congress has adopted transfer restrictions, and 
the  Court  has  upheld  them,  in  the  context  of  state  party
spending.  See 2 U. S. C. §441i(b).  So-called “Levin funds” 
are  donations  permissible  under  state  law  that  may  be
spent  on  certain  federal  election  activity—namely,  voter
registration  and  identification,  get-out-the-vote  efforts,  or 
generic campaign activities.  Levin funds are raised directly
by  the  state  or  local  party  committee  that  ultimately
spends  them.  §441i(b)(2)(B)(iv).    That  means  that  other 
party  committees  may  not  transfer  Levin  funds,  solicit 
Levin funds on behalf of the particular state or local com-
mittee, or engage in joint fundraising of Levin funds.  See 
McConnell,  540  U. S.,  at  171–173.    McConnell  upheld
those  transfer  restrictions  as  “justifiable  anticircumven-
tion  measures,”  though  it  acknowledged  that  they  posed 
some  associational  burdens.  Id.,  at  171.  Here,  a  narrow 
transfer  restriction  on  contributions  that  could  otherwise 
be recontributed in excess of the base limits could rely on a
similar justification.

Other alternatives might focus on earmarking.  Many of
the  scenarios  that  the  Government  and  the  dissent  hy-