Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/16pdf/16-341_8n59.pdf
Page Number: 12.0

Cite as:  581 U. S. ____ (2017) 

9 

Opinion of the Court 

Court  was  not  persuaded  then,  and  the  addition  of  the
word “all” to the already comprehensive provision does not 
suggest  that  Congress  intended  for  us  to  reconsider  that
conclusion. 

This  particular  argument  is  even  weaker  under  the 
current  version  of  §1391  than  it  was  under  the  provision 
in  place  at  the  time  of  Fourco,  because  the  current  provi-
sion includes a saving clause expressly stating that it does
not apply when “otherwise provided by law.”  On its face, 
the  version  of  §1391(c)  at  issue  in  Fourco  included  no 
exceptions,  yet  this  Court  still  held  that  “resides”  in 
§1400(b)  retained 
its  original  meaning  contrary  to 
§1391(c)’s  default  definition.  Fourco’s  holding  rests  on
even  firmer  footing  now  that  §1391’s  saving  clause  ex-
pressly  contemplates  that  certain  venue  statutes  may 
retain definitions of “resides” that conflict with its default 
definition.  In  short,  the  saving  clause  makes  explicit  the 
qualification  that  this  Court  previously  found  implicit  in 
the  statute.  See  Pure  Oil,  supra,  at  205  (interpreting 
earlier  version  of  §1391  to  apply  “to  all  venue  statutes 
using  residence  as  a  criterion,  at  least  in  the  absence  of 
contrary  restrictive  indications  in  any  such  statute”). 
Respondent  suggests  that  the  saving  clause  in  §1391(a)
does  not  apply  to  the  definitional  provisions  in  §1391(c),
Brief  for  Respondent  31–32,  but  that  interpretation  is
belied by the text of §1391(a), which makes clear that the
saving  clause  applies  to  the  entire  “section.” 
See 
§1391(a)(1)  (“Except  as  otherwise  provided  by  law—  . . .
this  section  shall  govern  the  venue  of  all  civil  actions” 
(emphasis added)).

Finally,  there  is  no  indication  that  Congress  in  2011 
ratified  the  Federal  Circuit’s  decision  in  VE  Holding.  If 
anything, the 2011 amendments undermine that decision’s 
rationale.  As  petitioner  points  out,  VE  Holding  relied 
heavily—indeed,  almost  exclusively—on  Congress’  deci-
sion  in  1988  to  replace  “for  venue  purposes”  with  “[f]or