Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/21pdf/20-1650_3dq3.pdf
Page Number: 10

Cite as:  597 U. S. ____ (2022) 

5 

Opinion of the Court 

reentry plan.  He also submitted a letter from a Bureau of 
Prisons  chaplain  who  attested  to  Concepcion’s  spiritual
growth while incarcerated. 

The  District  Court  denied  Concepcion’s  motion.    It 
adopted the Government’s argument that if the Court “con-
sidered  only  the  changes  in  law  that  the  Fair  Sentencing
Act  enacted,  [Concepcion’s]  sentence  would  be  the  same.” 
App. to Pet. for Cert. 71a.  The court declined to consider 
that  Concepcion  would  no  longer  qualify  as  a  career  of-
fender on the ground that the First Step Act “does not au-
thorize such relief.”  Id., at 72a.  In doing so, the District 
Court adopted the reasoning of the Fifth Circuit, which un-
derstood  the  First  Step  Act  to  require  a  district  court  to 
“ ‘plac[e] itself in the time frame of the original sentencing, 
altering  the  relevant  legal  landscape  only  by  the  changes
mandated  by  the  2010  Fair  Sentencing  Act.’ ”    Id.,  at  74a 
(quoting United States v. Hegwood, 934 F. 3d 414, 418 (CA5 
2019)).  The District Court did not address Concepcion’s ev-
idence of rehabilitation or the Government’s countervailing 
evidence of Concepcion’s disciplinary record. 

The Court of Appeals affirmed in a divided opinion.  The 
court interpreted the First Step Act as requiring a “two-step
inquiry.”  991 F. 3d 279, 289 (CA1 2021).  At the first step
of that inquiry, a district court decides whether a movant 
should be resentenced at all, considering only the changes
wrought by the Fair Sentencing Act.  Ibid.  If the district 
court  answers  in  the  affirmative  at  the  first  step,  it  may
then, in its discretion, consider new factual or legal devel-
opments in determining how to resentence the movant.  Id., 
at 289–290.  Judge Barron dissented, rejecting the panel’s 
bifurcated  approach.  In  his  view,  the  First  Step  Act  re-
quires  only  one  step  of  analysis,  at  which  district  courts 
have “substantial discretion” to consider evidence of reha-
bilitation and Guidelines changes.  Id., at 293, 309–310. 

The Court of Appeals opinion added to the disagreement 
among the Circuits as to whether a district court deciding a