Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/558bv.pdf
Page Number: 592

Cite as: 558 U. S. 310 (2010) 

431 

Opinion of Stevens, J. 

if  not  also  the  very  notion  of  “corporate  speech”—was 
inconceivable.56 

Justice Scalia also emphasizes the unqualiﬁed nature of 
the First  Amendment text.  Ante, at  386, 392–393.  Yet he 
would  seemingly  read  out  the  Free  Press  Clause:  How  else 
could he claim that my purported views on newspapers must 
track  my  views  on  corporations  generally?  Ante,  at  390.57 
Like virtually all modern lawyers, Justice Scalia presum­
ably believes that the First Amendment restricts the Execu­
tive, even though its language refers to Congress alone.  In 
any  event,  the  text  only  leads  us  back  to  the  questions  who 
or  what  is  guaranteed  “the  freedom  of  speech,”  and,  just  as 
critically, what  that freedom consists  of and under  what cir­
cumstances  it  may  be  limited.  Justice  Scalia  appears  to 
believe that because corporations are created and utilized by 
individuals,  it  follows  (as  night  the  day)  that  their  election­
eering  must  be  equally  protected  by  the  First  Amendment 

56 Postratiﬁcation practice bolsters the conclusion that the First Amend­
ment,  “as  originally  understood,”  ante,  at  353,  did  not  give  corporations 
political  speech  rights  on  a  par  with  the  rights  of  individuals.  Well  into 
the  modern  era  of  general  incorporation  statutes,  “[t]he  common  law  was 
generally  interpreted  as  prohibiting  corporate  political  participation,” 
First  Nat.  Bank  of  Boston  v.  Bellotti,  435  U. S.  765,  819  (1978)  (White, 
J.,  dissenting),  and  this  Court  did  not  recognize  any  First  Amendment 
protections for corporations until the middle part of the 20th century, see 
ante, at 342 (listing cases). 

57 In  fact,  the  Free  Press  Clause  might  be  turned  against  Justice 
Scalia, for two reasons.  First, we learn from it that the drafters of the 
First  Amendment  did  draw  distinctions—explicit  distinctions—between 
types  of  “speakers,”  or  speech  outlets  or  forms.  Second,  the  Court’s 
strongest  historical  evidence  all  relates  to  the  Framers’  views  on  the 
press,  see  ante,  at  353–354;  ante,  at  388–390  (Scalia,  J.,  concurring),  yet 
while the Court tries to sweep this evidence into the Free Speech Clause, 
the  Free  Press  Clause  provides  a  more  natural  textual  home.  The  text 
and history highlighted by our colleagues suggests why one type of corpo­
ration, those that are part of the press, might be able to claim special First 
Amendment status, and therefore why some kinds of “identity”-based dis­
tinctions might be permissible after all.  Once one accepts that much, the 
intellectual ediﬁce of the majority opinion crumbles.