Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/23pdf/22-277_d18f.pdf
Page Number: 3

Cite as:  603 U. S. ____ (2024) 

3 

Syllabus 

tected editorial discretion.  And for the individualized-explanation pro-
visions, it means asking, again as to each thing covered, whether the 
required  disclosures  unduly  burden  expression.    See  Zauderer,  471 
U. S., at 651. 

Because this is “a court of review, not of first view,” Cutter v. Wil-
kinson,  544  U. S.  709,  718,  n. 7,  this  Court  cannot  undertake  the 
needed inquiries.  And because neither the Eleventh nor the Fifth Cir-
cuit  performed  the  facial  analysis  in  the  way  described  above,  their 
decisions must be vacated and the cases remanded.  Pp. 9–12. 

(b) It is necessary to say more about how the First Amendment re-
lates to the laws’ content-moderation provisions, to ensure that the fa-
cial analysis proceeds on the right path in the courts below.  That need 
is especially stark for the Fifth Circuit, whose decision rested on a se-
rious misunderstanding of First Amendment precedent and principle. 
Pp. 12–29. 

(1) The Court has repeatedly held that ordering a party to provide
a forum for someone else’s views implicates the First Amendment if, 
though  only  if,  the  regulated  party  is  engaged  in  its  own  expressive
activity, which the mandated access would alter or disrupt.  First, in 
Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U. S. 241, the Court held 
that a Florida law requiring a newspaper to give a political candidate 
a  right  to  reply  to  critical  coverage  interfered  with  the  newspaper’s 
“exercise of editorial control and judgment.”  Id., at 243, 258.  Florida 
could  not,  the  Court  explained,  override  the  newspaper’s  decisions
about the “content of the paper” and “[t]he choice of material to go into” 
it,  because  that  would  substitute  “governmental  regulation”  for  the 
“crucial process” of editorial choice.  Id., at 258.  The next case, Pacific 
Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Util. Comm’n of Cal., 475 U. S. 1, involved 
California’s attempt to force a private utility to include material from 
a  certain  consumer-advocacy  group  in  its  regular  newsletter  to  con-
sumers.    The  Court  held  that  an  interest  in  “offer[ing]  the  public  a 
greater  variety  of  views”  could  not  justify  compelling  the  utility  “to
carry speech with which it disagreed” and thus to “alter its own mes-
sage.”  Id., at 11, n. 7, 12, 16.  Then in Turner Broadcasting System, 
Inc. v. FCC, 512 U. S. 622, the Court considered federal “must-carry” 
rules,  which  required  cable  operators  to  allocate  certain  channels  to 
local  broadcast  stations.    The  Court  had  no  doubt  the  First  Amend-
ment  was  implicated,  because  the  rules  “interfere[d]”  with  the  cable
operators’ “editorial discretion over which stations or programs to in-
clude in [their] repertoire.”  Id., at 636, 643–644.  The capstone of this 
line of precedents, Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisex-
ual Group of Boston, Inc., 515 U. S. 557, held that the First Amend-
ment prevented Massachusetts from compelling parade organizers to 
admit  as  a  participant  a  gay  and  lesbian  group  seeking  to  convey  a