Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/22pdf/22-506_nmip.pdf
Page Number: 65.0

18 

BIDEN v. NEBRASKA 

KAGAN, J., dissenting 

the  Secretary’s  waiver/modification  powers  kick  in.    And 
the Secretary used them just as described in the hypothet-
ical  above.  For  purposes  of  the  COVID  program,  he 
scratched  the  conditions  for  loan  discharge  contained  in 
several  provisions.    See  App.  261–262  (citing  §§1087, 
1087dd(g);  34  CFR  §§682.402,  685.212).    He  then  altered 
those  provisions  by  specifying  different  conditions,  which 
opened  up  loan  forgiveness  to  more  borrowers.  So  he 
“waive[d]” and “modif[ied]” pre-existing law and, in so do-
ing, applied new “terms and conditions” “in lieu of ” the old.
§§1098bb(a)(1),  (b)(2);  see  87  Fed.  Reg.  61514.    As  in  the 
prior  hypothetical,  then,  he  used his  statutory  emergency 
powers in the manner Congress designed. 

How does the majority avoid this conclusion?  By picking 
the  statute  apart,  and  addressing  each  segment  of  Con-
gress’s authorization as if it had nothing to do with the oth-
ers.  For  the  first  several  pages—really,  the  heart—of  its
analysis, the majority proceeds as though the statute con-
tains only the word “modify.”  See ante, at 13–15.  It even-
tually gets around to the word “waive,” but similarly spends 
most of its time treating that word alone.  See ante, at 15– 
16.  Only when that discussion is over does the majority in-

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expresses doubt about that finding, though says that its skepticism plays
no role in its decision.  See ante, at 18–19, n. 6.  Far better if the majority 
had ruled on that alternative ground.  Then, the Court’s invalidation of 
the Secretary’s plan would not have neutered the statute for all future 
uses.  But in any event, the skepticism is unwarranted.  All the majority 
says to support it is that the current “paus[e]” on “interest accrual and 
loan repayments” could achieve the same end.  Ibid.  But the majority
gives no reason for concluding that the pause would work just as well to 
ensure that borrowers are not “placed in a worse position financially in 
the  COVID  emergency.
relation 
§1098bb(a)(2)(A).    How  could  it  possibly  know?    And  in any  event,  the 
majority’s  view  of  the  statute  would  also  make  the  pause  unlawful,  as 
later  discussed.   See infra, at  21.  So  the  availability  of  the  pause  can
hardly provide a basis for the majority’s questioning of the Secretary’s 
finding that cancellation is necessary. 

loans  because  of 

their 

to”