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Page Number: 26.0

22 

KNOX v. SERVICE EMPLOYEES 

Opinion of the Court 

rather  than  opt-in  schemes  when  annual  dues  are  billed, 
our  cases  have  substantially  impinged  upon  the  First
Amendment  rights  of  nonmembers.    In  the  new  situation 
presented  here,  we  see  no  justification  for  any  further 
impingement.  The  general  rule—individuals  should  not 
be compelled to subsidize private groups or private speech—
should prevail.

Public-sector  unions  have  the  right  under  the  First
Amendment  to  express  their  views  on  political  and  social
issues without government interference.  See, e.g., Citizens 
United  v.  Federal  Election  Comm’n,  558  U. S.  ___  (2010). 
But  employees  who  choose  not  to  join  a  union  have  the 
same  rights.    The  First  Amendment  creates  a  forum  in 
which  all  may  seek,  without  hindrance  or  aid  from  the 
State,  to  move  public  opinion  and  achieve  their  political
goals.  “First Amendment values [would be] at serious risk
if the government [could] compel a particular citizen, or a
discrete  group  of  citizens,  to  pay  special  subsidies  for 
speech on the side that [the government] favors.”  United 
Foods, 533 U. S., at 411.  Therefore, when a public-sector
union  imposes  a  special  assessment  or  dues  increase,  the 
union  must  provide  a  fresh  Hudson  notice  and  may  not 
exact  any  funds  from  nonmembers  without  their  affirma-
tive consent.9 

—————— 

9 Contrary  to  JUSTICE  SOTOMAYOR’s  suggestion,  our  holding  does  not
venture beyond the scope of the questions on which we granted review 
or  the  scope  of  the  parties’  dispute.    The second  question  on which  we 
granted  review  broadly  asks  us  to  determine  the  circumstances  under 
which a State may deduct from the pay of nonunion employees money 
that is used by a union for general electioneering.  See Pet. for Cert. (i) 
(“May a State, consistent with the First and Fourteenth Amendments, 
condition  continued  public  employment  on  the  payment  of  union
agency  fees  for  purposes  of  financing  political  expenditures  for  ballot
measures?”).    Our  holding—that  this  may  be  done  only  when  the  em- 
ployee affirmatively consents—falls within that question.

Our  holding  also  addresses  the  primary  remaining  dispute  between
the parties, namely, the particular procedures that must be followed on