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Page Number: 22

2 

MASLENJAK v. UNITED STATES 

Opinion of GORSUCH, J. 

lower courts have not had a chance to pass on any of these 
questions  in  the  first  instance.    Most  cited  by  the  Court
have  (again)  focused  only  on  the  materiality  (not  causa-
tion)  question;  none  has  tested  the  elaborate  operational 
details  advanced  today;  and  at  least  one  has  found  our 
prior unilateral and fractured foray into a related statute
in Kungys v. United States, 485 U. S. 759 (1988), “madden-
ing[ ].”  See ante, at 10, n. 4 (collecting cases). 

Respectfully, it seems to me at least reasonably possible 
that the crucible of adversarial testing on which we usually 
depend,  along  with  the  experience  of  our  thoughtful  col-
leagues  on  the  district  and  circuit  benches,  could  yield 
insights  (or  reveal  pitfalls)  we  cannot  muster  guided  only 
by  our  own  lights.    So  while  I  agree  with  the  Court  that
the  parties  will  need  guidance  about  the  details  of  the
statute’s causation requirement, see ibid., I have no doubt 
that  the  Court  of  Appeals,  with  aid  of  briefing  from  the 
parties,  can  supply  that  on  remand.    Other  circuits  may 
improve  that  guidance  over  time  too.    And  eventually  we
can  bless  the  best  of  it.    For  my  part,  I  believe  it  is  work 
enough  for  the  day  to  recognize  that  the  statute  requires 
some proof of causation, that the jury instructions here did 
not, and to allow the parties and courts of appeals to take 
it from there as they usually do.  This Court often speaks 
most wisely when it speaks last.