Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/529bv.pdf
Page Number: 107.0

529US1

Unit: $U32

[10-04-01 09:20:53] PAGES PGT: OPIN

32

SHALALA v. ILLINOIS COUNCIL ON LONG
TERM CARE, INC.
Thomas, J., dissenting

of that vote: I am doubtful whether Bowen v. Michigan
Academy of Family Physicians, 476 U. S. 667 (1986), was
correctly decided, but that case being on the books, and
involving as it does a question of statutory interpretation,
I believe it requires afﬁrmance here. There is in my view
neither any basis for holding that 42 U. S. C. § 1395ii has a
different meaning with regard to Part A than with regard
to Part B, nor (since repeals by implication are disfavored)
any basis for holding that the subsequent addition of a
judicial-review provision distantly related to § 1395ii altered
the meaning we had authoritatively pronounced. See post,
at 38, n. 7 (Thomas, J., dissenting).

I do not join Part III of Justice Thomas’s opinion be-
cause its reliance upon what it calls the presumption of pre-
enforcement review suggests that Michigan Academy was
(a fortiori) correctly decided.
I might have thought, as an
original matter, that the categorical language of §§ 1395ii and
405(h) overcame even what Justice Thomas acknowledges
is the stronger presumption of some judicial review. See
post, at 45. With regard to the timing of review, I would
not even use the word “presumption” (a term which Abbott
Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U. S. 136 (1967), applies only to
the preference for judicial review at some point, see id., at
140), since that suggests that some unusually clear statement
In my view, preenforcement
is required by way of negation.
review is better described as the background rule, which can
be displaced by any reasonable implication (“persuasive rea-
son to believe,” as Abbott Laboratories put it, ibid.) from
the statute.

Justice Thomas, with whom Justice Stevens and
Justice Kennedy join, and with whom Justice Scalia
joins except as to Part III, dissenting.

Unlike the majority, I take no position on how 42 U. S. C.
§ 405(h) applies to respondent’s suit. That section is beside
the point in this case because it does not apply of its own