Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/22pdf/21-1086_1co6.pdf
Page Number: 80

Cite as:  599 U. S. ____ (2023) 

35 

THOMAS, J., dissenting 

of  our  vote-dilution  jurisprudence.    It  guarantees  that 
courts will continue to approach vote-dilution claims just as 
the District Court here did: with no principled way of deter-
mining  how  many  seats  a  minority  “should”  control  and 
with  a  strong  temptation  to  bless  every  incremental  step 
toward a racially proportional allocation that plaintiffs can 
pass off as consistent with any reasonable map. 

III 
  As noted earlier, the Court has long recognized the need 
to avoid interpretations of §2 that “ ‘would unnecessarily in-
fuse race into virtually every redistricting, raising serious 
constitutional questions.’ ”  Bartlett, 556 U. S., at 21 (plural-
ity opinion) (quoting LULAC, 548 U. S., at 446 (opinion of 
Kennedy, J.)).  Today, however, by approving the plaintiffs’ 
racially gerrymandered maps as reasonably configured, re-
fusing  to  ground  §2  vote-dilution  claims  in  a  race-neutral 
benchmark, and affirming a vote-dilution finding that can 
only be justified by a benchmark of proportional control, the 
majority holds, in substance, that race belongs in virtually 
every  redistricting.    It  thus  drives  headlong  into  the  very 
constitutional problems that the Court has long sought to 
avoid.    The  result  of  this  collision  is  unmistakable:  If  the 
District Court’s application of §2 was correct as a statutory 
matter, §2 is unconstitutional as applied here. 
  Because the Constitution “restricts consideration of race 
and the [Voting Rights Act] demands consideration of race,” 
Abbott,  585  U. S.,  at  ___  (slip  op.,  at  4),  strict  scrutiny  is 
implicated  wherever,  as  here,  §2  is  applied  to  require  a 
State to adopt or reject any districting plan on the basis of 
race.  See Bartlett, 556 U. S., at 21–22 (plurality opinion).  
At this point, it is necessary to confront directly one of the 
more confused notions inhabiting our redistricting jurispru-
dence.    In  several  cases,  we  have  “assumed”  that  compli-
ance with §2 of the Voting Rights Act could be a compelling 
state interest, before proceeding to reject race-predominant