Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/19pdf/18-1195_g314.pdf
Page Number: 20

Cite as:  591 U. S. ____ (2020) 

17 

Opinion of the Court 

JUSTICE BREYER, building on his solo opinion in Trinity Lu-
theran, would adopt a “flexible, context-specific approach” 
that “may well vary” from case to case.  Post, at 14, 16; see 
Trinity Lutheran, 582 U. S., at ___ (BREYER, J., concurring 
in judgment).  As best we can tell, courts applying this ap-
proach  would  contemplate  the  particular  benefit  and  re-
striction at issue and discern their relationship to religion
and society, taking into account “context and consequences
measured in light of [the] purposes” of the Religion Clauses. 
Post, at 16–17, 19 (quoting Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U. S. 
677,  700  (2005)  (BREYER,  J.,  concurring  in  judgment)). 
What  is  clear  is  that  JUSTICE BREYER  would  afford  much 
freer rein to judges than our current regime, arguing that 
“there is ‘no test-related substitute for the exercise of legal 
judgment.’ ”  Post, at 19 (quoting Van Orden, 545 U. S., at 
700 (opinion of BREYER, J.)).

The simplest response is that these dissents follow from
prior  separate  writings,  not  from  the  Court’s  decision  in 
Trinity  Lutheran  or  the  decades  of  precedent  on  which  it 
relied.  These precedents have “repeatedly confirmed” the
straightforward rule that we apply today:  When otherwise 
eligible  recipients  are  disqualified  from  a  public  benefit 
“solely because of their religious character,” we must apply 
strict scrutiny.  Trinity Lutheran, 582 U. S., at ___–___ (slip 
op., at 6–10).  This rule against express religious discrimi-
nation is no “doctrinal innovation.”  Post, at 13 (opinion of 
BREYER, J.).  Far from it.  As Trinity Lutheran explained,
the  rule  is  “unremarkable  in  light  of  our  prior  decisions.” 
582 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 10). 

For  innovation,  one  must  look  to  the  dissents.    Their 
“room[y]” or “flexible” approaches to discrimination against
religious organizations and observers would mark a signif-
icant departure from our free exercise precedents.  The pro-
tections  of  the  Free  Exercise  Clause  do  not  depend  on  a 
“judgment-by-judgment  analysis”  regarding  whether  dis-
crimination  against  religious  adherents  would  somehow