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GE ENERGY POWER CONVERSION FRANCE SAS 
v. OUTOKUMPU STAINLESS USA, LLC 
Syllabus 

background  principles  of  state  contract  law  regarding  the  scope  of 
agreements (including the question of who is bound by them).”  Arthur 
Andersen LLP v. Carlisle, 556 U. S. 624, 630.  The “ ‘traditional princi-
ples’ of state law” that apply under Chapter 1 include doctrines, like 
equitable  estoppel,  authorizing  contract  enforcement  by  a  nonsigna-
tory.  Id., at 631–632.   

The New York Convention is a multilateral treaty addressing inter-
national arbitration.  One Article of the Convention addresses arbitra-
tion agreements—Article II—and one provision of Article II addresses 
the enforcement of those agreements—Article II(3).  Article II(3) pro-
vides that courts of a contracting state “shall . . . refer the parties to 
arbitration” when the parties to an action entered into a written agree-
ment to arbitrate and one of the parties requests such a referral.

Chapter 2 of the FAA grants federal courts jurisdiction over actions 
governed by the Convention.  As relevant here, Chapter 2 provides that
“Chapter 1 applies to actions and proceedings brought under this chap-
ter to the extent that [Chapter 1] is not in conflict with this chapter or
the Convention.”  9 U. S. C. §208.  Pp. 3–6.

(b) The  application  of  familiar  tools  of  treaty  interpretation  estab-
lishes that the state-law equitable estoppel doctrines permitted under
Chapter 1 do not “conflict with . . . the Convention.”  §208.  Pp. 6–11.

(1) The text of the New York Convention does not address whether 
nonsignatories  may  enforce  arbitration  agreements  under  domestic
doctrines such as equitable estoppel.  The Convention is simply silent 
on the issue of nonsignatory enforcement.  This silence is dispositive 
because nothing in the Convention’s text could be read to conflict with
the application of domestic equitable estoppel doctrines.  Article II(3)—
the only provision in the Convention addressing the enforcement of ar-
bitration agreements—contains no exclusionary language; it does not 
state that arbitration agreements shall be enforced only in the identi-
fied  circumstances.   Given  that  the  Convention  was  drafted  against 
the  backdrop  of  domestic  law,  it  would  be  unnatural  to  read  Article 
II(3)  to  displace  domestic  doctrines  in  the  absence  of  such  language.
This interpretation is especially appropriate because Article II contem-
plates using domestic doctrines to fill gaps in the Convention.  Pp. 6– 
7. 

(2) This interpretation is confirmed by the Convention’s negotia-
tion and drafting history as well as “ ‘the postratification understand-
ing’ of signatory nations,” Medellín v. Texas, 552 U. S. 491, 507. 

Cherry-picked  generalizations  from  the  negotiating  and  drafting 
history  cannot  be  used  to  create  a  rule  that  finds  no  support  in  the  
treaty’s text.  Here, to the extent that the Convention’s drafting history 
sheds any light on the treaty’s meaning, it shows only that the drafters
sought to impose baseline requirements on contracting states so that