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Page Number: 2

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BOECHLER v. COMMISSIONER 

Syllabus 

Section  6330(d)(1)  provides  that  a  “person  may,  within  30  days  of  a 
determination under this section, petition the Tax Court for review of 
such  determination  (and  the  Tax  Court  shall  have  jurisdiction  with 
respect to such matter).”  Whether this provision limits the Tax Court’s 
jurisdiction to petitions filed within the 30-day timeframe depends on 
the meaning of “such matter,” the phrase marking the bounds of the 
Tax Court’s jurisdiction.  Boechler contends that it refers only to the
immediately preceding phrase: a “petition [to] the Tax Court for review 
of such determination,” making the filing deadline independent of the
jurisdictional grant.  The Commissioner, by contrast, argues that “such 
matter” refers to the entire first clause of the sentence, sweeping in the
deadline and granting jurisdiction only over petitions filed within that 
time, making the deadline jurisdictional.

The text does not clearly mandate the jurisdictional reading.  It is 
hard to see how it could, given that “such matter” lacks a clear ante-
cedent.  Moreover,  Boechler’s  interpretation  has  a  small  edge  under
the last-antecedent rule, which instructs that the correct antecedent is 
usually the closest reasonable one.  There are also other plausible ways 
to read “such matter.”  For example, “such matter” might refer to “such 
determination”  or  the  preceding  subsection’s  list  of  “[m]atters”  that 
may  be  considered  during  the  collection  due  process  hearing,  see
§6330(c), but neither possibility ties the Tax Court’s jurisdiction to the 
filing deadline.  And it is difficult to make the case that the jurisdic-
tional reading is clear where multiple plausible, nonjurisdictional in-
terpretations  exist.    Nothing  else  in  the  provision’s  text  or  structure 
advances the case for jurisdictional clarity.  Finally, other tax provi-
sions enacted around the same time as §6330(d)(1) much more clearly 
link their jurisdictional grants to a filing deadline—see §§6404(g)(1),
6015(e)(1)(A)—accentuating  the 
in 
§6330(d)(1).  Pp. 2–6.

lack  of  comparable  clarity 

(b) The  Commissioner’s  counterarguments  fall  short.    In  this  con-
text, it is not enough that his interpretation of the statute is plausible,
or that some might even think it better than Boechler’s.  To satisfy the 
clear-statement rule, the Commissioner’s interpretation must be clear,
and  it  is  not.  A  requirement  “does  not  become  jurisdictional  simply
because it is placed in a section of a statute that also contains jurisdic-
tional provisions.”  Auburn, 568 U. S., at 155.  Rather than proximity,
what  is  needed  is  a  clear  tie  between  the  deadline  and  the  jurisdic-
tional grant.  The Commissioner also contends that a neighboring pro-
vision, §6330(e)(1), clarifies the jurisdictional effect of §6330(d)(1)’s fil-
ing  deadline.    Section  6330(e)(1)  plainly  conditions  the  Tax  Court’s 
jurisdiction to grant an injunction to enforce the suspension of levy ac-
tions during collection due process hearings on a timely filing under