Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/21pdf/21-147_g31h.pdf
Page Number: 29.0

Cite as:  596 U. S. ____ (2022) 

5 

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting
Opinion of SOTOMAYOR, J. 

the United States possesses a far greater capacity for harm
than an individual trespasser exercising no authority other 
than  his  own.”  Id.,  at  392.  The  Fourth  Amendment,  the 
Court  explained,  “guarantees  to  citizens  of  the  United 
States  the  absolute  right  to  be  free  from  unreasonable 
searches  and  seizures  carried  out  by  virtue  of  federal  au-
thority.”  Ibid. 

The Court ultimately held that a “violation of [the Fourth
Amendment]  by  a  federal  agent  acting  under  color  of  his
authority gives rise to a cause of action for damages.”  Id., 
at 389.  In doing so, the Court observed that existing state-
law causes of action were no substitute for a federal cause 
of  action  because  “[t]he  interests  protected  by  state  laws
regulating trespass and the invasion of privacy” and those
protected by the Fourth Amendment “may be inconsistent 
or even hostile.”  Id., at 394; see also id., at 410 (Harlan, J.,
concurring in judgment) (“For people in Bivens’ shoes, it is
damages or nothing”).1  The Court also noted that the case 
before  it  “involve[d]  no  special  factors  counselling  hesita-
tion,”  such  as  a  question  concerning  federal  fiscal  policy. 
Id., at 396. 

This  Court  has  twice  extended  the  cause  of  action  first 
articulated in Bivens: first to a Fifth Amendment due pro-
cess claim for sex discrimination, see Davis v. Passman, 442 
U. S. 228 (1979),  and then to an Eighth Amendment delib-
erate indifference claim for failure to provide proper medi-
cal attention, see Carlson v. Green, 446 U. S. 14 (1980).  In 
Davis,  Carlson,  and  subsequent  cases,  the  Court  built  on 

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1 For example, an individual “may bar the door against an unwelcome
private intruder, or call the police if he persists in seeking entrance” and
may  seek  damages  under  state  law  “for  any  consequent  trespass.” 
Bivens, 403 U. S., at 394.  By contrast, “[t]he mere invocation of federal 
power by a federal law enforcement official will normally render futile 
any attempt to resist an unlawful entry or arrest by resort to the local 
police; and a claim of authority to enter is likely to unlock the door as 
well.”  Ibid.