Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/12pdf/12-96_6k47.pdf
Page Number: 40.0

Cite as:  570 U. S. ____ (2013) 

9 

GINSBURG, J., dissenting 

The  basis  for  this  deference  is  firmly  rooted  in  both 

constitutional  text  and  precedent.    The  Fifteenth  Amend­
ment,  which  targets  precisely  and  only  racial  discrimina­
tion in voting rights, states that, in this domain, “Congress 
shall  have  power  to  enforce  this  article  by  appropriate 
legislation.”2  In choosing this language, the Amendment’s
framers  invoked  Chief  Justice  Marshall’s  formulation  of 
the  scope  of  Congress’  powers  under  the  Necessary  and
Proper Clause: 

“Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of
the constitution, and all means which are appropriate, 
which  are  plainly  adapted  to  that  end,  which  are  not 
prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the 
constitution,  are  constitutional.”  McCulloch  v.  Mary-
land, 4 Wheat. 316, 421 (1819) (emphasis added).   

It cannot tenably be maintained that the VRA, an Act of
Congress  adopted  to  shield  the  right  to  vote  from  racial
discrimination,  is  inconsistent  with  the  letter  or  spirit  of
the Fifteenth Amendment, or any provision of the Consti­
tution  read  in  light  of  the  Civil  War  Amendments.    No­
where in today’s opinion, or in Northwest Austin,3 is there 

—————— 

2 The  Constitution  uses  the  words  “right  to  vote”  in  five  separate
places:  the  Fourteenth,  Fifteenth,  Nineteenth,  Twenty-Fourth,  and
Twenty-Sixth  Amendments.    Each  of  these  Amendments  contains  the 
same  broad  empowerment  of  Congress  to  enact  “appropriate  legisla­
tion”  to  enforce  the  protected  right.    The  implication  is  unmistakable:
Under  our  constitutional  structure,  Congress  holds  the  lead  rein  in 
making  the  right  to  vote  equally  real  for  all  U. S.  citizens.    These 
Amendments  are  in  line  with  the  special  role  assigned  to  Congress  in
protecting  the  integrity  of  the  democratic  process  in  federal  elections. 
U. S. Const., Art. I, §4 (“[T]he Congress may at any time by Law make
or  alter”  regulations  concerning  the  “Times,  Places  and  Manner  of
holding Elections for Senators and Representatives.”); Arizona v. Inter 
Tribal Council of Ariz., Inc., ante, at 5–6. 

3 Acknowledging  the  existence  of  “serious  constitutional  questions,” 
see  ante,  at  22  (internal  quotation  marks  omitted),  does  not  suggest 
how those questions should be answered.