Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/22pdf/22-138_43j7.pdf
Page Number: 15.0

12 

COUNTERMAN v. COLORADO 

Opinion of the Court 

harms,  to  both  individuals  and  society,  that  attend  true
threats of violence—as evidenced in this case.  See supra, 
at 2, 6.  The injury associated with those statements caused 
history  long  ago  to  place  them  outside  the  First  Amend-
ment’s bounds.  When despite that judgment we require use
of  a  subjective  mental-state  standard,  we  necessarily  im-
pede some true-threat prosecutions.  And as we go up the 
subjective  mens  rea  ladder,  that  imposition  on  States’  ca-
pacity  to  counter  true  threats  becomes  still  greater—and, 
presumably, with diminishing returns for protected expres-
sion.  In advancing past recklessness, we make it harder for 
a  State  to  substantiate  the  needed  inferences about mens 
rea (absent, as is usual, direct evidence).  And of particular
importance, we prevent States from convicting morally cul-
pable defendants.  See Elonis, 575 U. S., at 745 (opinion of 
ALITO, J.).  For  reckless  defendants  have  done  more  than 
make a bad mistake.  They have consciously accepted a sub-
stantial risk of inflicting serious harm. 

Using a recklessness standard also fits with the analysis 
in  our  defamation  decisions.  As  noted  earlier,  the  Court 
there  adopted  a  recklessness  rule,  applicable in  both  civil
and criminal contexts, as a way of accommodating compet-
ing  interests.  See  supra,  at  7–8.  In  the  more  than  half-
century in which that standard has governed, few have sug-
gested that it needs to be higher—in other words, that still 
more  First  Amendment  “breathing  space”  is  required. 
Gertz,  418  U. S.,  at  342.    And  we  see  no  reason  to  offer 
greater insulation to threats than to defamation.  See Elo-
nis,  575  U. S.,  at  748  (opinion  of  ALITO, J.).  The  societal 
interests in countering the former are at least as high.  And 
the  protected  speech  near  the  borderline  of  true  threats 
(even  though  sometimes  political,  as  in  Rogers)  is,  if  any-
thing, further from the First Amendment’s central concerns 
than the chilled speech in Sullivan-type cases (i.e., truthful 
reputation-damaging statements about public officials and
figures).