Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/558bv.pdf
Page Number: 559

398  CITIZENS  UNITED  v.  FEDERAL  ELECTION  COMM’N 

Opinion of Stevens, J. 

sel for Citizens United conceding that § 203 could be applied 
to  General  Motors);  id.,  at  55  (counsel  for  Citizens  United 
stating that “we accept the Court’s decision in [WRTL]”). 

“ ‘It is only in exceptional cases coming here from the fed­
eral courts that questions not pressed or passed upon below 
are reviewed,’ ” Youakim  v.  Miller, 425 U. S. 231, 234 (1976) 
(per  curiam)  (quoting  Duignan  v.  United  States,  274  U. S. 
195, 200 (1927)), and it is “only in the most exceptional cases” 
that we will consider issues outside the questions presented, 
Stone v.  Powell, 428 U. S. 465, 481, n. 15 (1976).  The appel­
lant  in  this  case  did  not  so  much  as  assert  an  exceptional 
circumstance,  and  one  searches  the  majority  opinion  in  vain 
for  the  mention  of  any.  That  is  unsurprising,  for  none 
exists. 

Setting  the  case  for  reargument  was  a  constructive  step, 
but  it  did  not  cure  this  fundamental  problem.  Essentially, 
ﬁve  Justices  were  unhappy  with  the  limited  nature  of  the 
case  before  us,  so  they  changed the  case  to  give  themselves 
an opportunity to change the law. 

As-Applied and Facial Challenges 

This  Court  has  repeatedly  emphasized  in  recent  years 
that “[f]acial challenges are disfavored.”  Washington State 
Grange  v.  Washington  State  Republican  Party,  552  U. S. 
442,  450  (2008);  see  also  Ayotte  v.  Planned  Parenthood  of 
Northern New Eng., 546 U. S. 320, 329 (2006) (“[T]he ‘normal 
rule’  is  that  ‘partial,  rather  than  facial,  invalidation  is  the 
required  course,’  such  that  a  ‘statute  may  . . . be  declared 
invalid  to  the  extent  that  it  reaches  too  far,  but  otherwise 
left  intact’ ” (quoting  Brockett  v.  Spokane Arcades,  Inc.,  472 
U. S.  491,  504  (1985);  alteration  in  original)).  By  declaring 
§ 203 facially unconstitutional, our colleagues have turned an 
as-applied  challenge  into  a  facial  challenge,  in  deﬁance  of 
this principle. 

This  is  not  merely  a  technical  defect  in  the  Court’s  deci­
sion.  The unnecessary resort to a facial inquiry “run[s] con­