Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/524bv.pdf
Page Number: 139

524US1

Unit: $U76

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HOPKINS v. REEVES

Opinion of the Court

ida, 458 U. S. 782 (1982), and Tison v. Arizona, 481 U. S. 137
(1987), this Court held that the death penalty could not be
imposed in a felony-murder case if the defendant was a minor
participant in the crime and neither intended to kill nor had
shown reckless indifference to human life. See 102 F. 3d, at
984–985. The Court of Appeals therefore granted respond-
ent’s petition and, relying on Circuit precedent holding that
Beck applies only where the defendant is in fact sentenced
to death, gave the State the option of retrying respondent
or agreeing to modify his sentence to life imprisonment.
See 102 F. 3d, at 986.

Because the decision below conﬂicted with a prior decision
of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, see Greena-
walt v. Ricketts, 943 F. 2d 1020 (1991), cert. denied, 506 U. S.
888 (1992), we granted certiorari.

521 U. S. 1151 (1997).3

II

The Court of Appeals erred in concluding that its holding
was compelled by Beck, as the two cases differ fundamen-
tally.
In Beck, the defendant was indicted and convicted of
the capital offense of “ ‘[r]obbery or attempts thereof when
the victim is intentionally killed by the defendant.’ ”
447
U. S., at 627 (quoting Ala. Code § 13–11–2(a)(2) (1975)). Al-
though state law recognized the noncapital, lesser included
offense of felony murder, see 447 U. S., at 628–630, and al-
though lesser included offense instructions were generally
available to noncapital defendants under state law, the Ala-

3 One of the questions on which we granted certiorari was whether the
Court of Appeals’ holding was a “new rule” under Teague v. Lane, 489
U. S. 288 (1989). See Pet. for Cert. i. Because the State raised this argu-
ment for the ﬁrst time in its petition for a writ of certiorari, we choose to
decide the case on the merits. Cf. Godinez v. Moran, 509 U. S. 389, 397,
n. 8 (1993) (declining to address whether the Court of Appeals created a
“new rule” because the petitioner did not raise a Teague defense in the
lower courts or in its petition for certiorari).