Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/18pdf/17-1717_4f14.pdf
Page Number: 64.0

Cite as:  588 U. S. ____ (2019) 

9 

GORSUCH, J., concurring in judgment 

marines  in  California  placed  in  2004  to  honor  their  com-
rades  who  fell  during  the  War  on  Terror?    And  where 
exactly  in  the  Constitution  does  this  presumption  come 
from?  The plurality does not say, nor does it even explain 
what  work  its  presumption  does.    To  the  contrary,  the 
plurality proceeds to analyze the “presumptively” constitu-
tional memorial in this case for its consistency with “ ‘his-
torical  practices  and  understandings’ ”  under  Marsh  and 
Town  of  Greece—exactly  the  same  approach  that  the 
plurality,  quoting  Town  of  Greece,  recognizes  “ ‘must  be’ ” 
used  whenever  we  interpret  the  Establishment  Clause.  
Ante, at 25; see also ante, at 2–4 (KAVANAUGH, J., concur-
ring).    Though  the  plurality  does  not  say  so  in  as  many 
words,  the  message  for  our  lower  court  colleagues  seems 
unmistakable:  Whether  a  monument,  symbol,  or  practice 
is  old  or  new,  apply  Town  of  Greece,  not  Lemon.    Indeed, 
some  of  our  colleagues  recognize  this  implication  and 
blanch at its prospect.  See ante, at 2–3 (BREYER, J., con-
curring);  ante,  at  1–2  (KAGAN,  J.,  concurring  in  part) 
(declining  to  join  Parts  II–A  &  II–D);  post,  at  2,  n. 2 
(GINSBURG, J., dissenting).  But if that’s the real message 
of  the  plurality’s  opinion,  it  seems  to  me  exactly  right—
because  what  matters when  it  comes  to  assessing  a  mon-
ument, symbol, or practice isn’t its age but its compliance 
with  ageless  principles.    The  Constitution’s  meaning  is 
fixed, not some good-for-this-day-only coupon, and a prac-
tice  consistent  with  our  nation’s  traditions  is  just  as  per-
missible whether undertaken today or 94 years ago. 

* 
  With  Lemon  now  shelved,  little  excuse  will  remain  for 
the anomaly of offended observer standing, and the gaping 
hole  it  tore  in  standing  doctrine  in  the  courts  of  appeals 
should  now  begin  to  close.    Nor  does  this  development 
mean  colorable  Establishment  Clause  violations  will  lack 
for  proper  plaintiffs.    By  way  of  example  only,  a  public