Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/21pdf/20-603_o758.pdf
Page Number: 43.0

Cite as:  597 U. S. ____ (2022) 

21 

THOMAS, J., dissenting 

IV 

The  Court  nevertheless  holds  that  States  surrendered 
their  sovereign  immunity  for  any  congressional  causes  of 
action  passed  pursuant  to  Article  I’s  Army  and  Navy 
Clauses.  Ante,  at  11–12.9    To  reach  that  conclusion,  the 
Court adopts a test that even Torres did not press.  Relying
exclusively on PennEast, the Court maintains that plan-of-
the-Convention waiver distills to a single question: whether 
the federal power at issue is “ ‘complete in itself.’ ”  Ante, at 
6 (quoting PennEast, 594 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 22)).  If 
so,  then  the  States  have  surrendered  their  sovereign  im-
munity against any exercises of that power.  After framing 
the inquiry this way, the Court concludes that because Con-
gress’ “power to build and maintain the Armed Forces” is 
“ ‘complete in itself,’ ” States necessarily relinquished their
sovereign  immunity  against  private  damages  actions  au-
thorized by that power.  Ante, at 6, 11. 

In my view, the Court is asking the wrong question.  It 
unjustifiably asserts that the entire plan-of-the-Convention 
inquiry  rests  on  whether  a  power  is  “complete  in  itself.” 
Further,  its  “complete  in  itself ”  standard  misreads  Penn-
East,  which  suggested  only  that  because  the  federal  emi-

—————— 

9 Although the Court lists the panoply of congressional “war powers” 
that Torres invokes, see ante, at 7, it appears to limit its holding today
only to the Army and Navy Clauses, see ante, at 11–12.  In addition, alt-
hough the Court’s “complete in itself ” inquiry is unsound, see infra, at 
22–29, its opinion at least suggests that plan-of-the-Convention waiver
may be found only if (1) the Constitution includes “many broad, interre-
lated provisions” delegating the relevant power to the Federal Govern-
ment, ante, at 7; (2) the Constitution expressly “divests the States of like
power” in Article I, §10, ante, at 7; and (3) the power at issue is “essential
to  the  survival  of  the  Union”  and  is  “itself  a  foundational  purpose”  for 
abandoning  the  Articles  of  Confederation  and  “drafting  the  Constitu-
tion,” ante, at 13.  Until the Court jettisons this erroneous decision from
its  doctrine,  plan-of-the-Convention  waiver  would  appear  to  exist  only 
under those circumstances.