Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/529bv.pdf
Page Number: 504.0

529US2

Unit: $U47

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Cite as: 529 U. S. 420 (2000)

429

Opinion of the Court

ber 28, we stayed petitioner’s execution and granted certio-
rari to decide whether § 2254(e)(2) precludes him from receiv-
ing an evidentiary hearing on his claims. See 528 U. S. 960
(1999). We now afﬁrm in part and reverse in part.

II
A

Petitioner ﬁled his federal habeas petition after AEDPA’s
effective date, so the statute applies to his case. See Lindh
v. Murphy, 521 U. S. 320, 326–327 (1997). The Common-
wealth argues AEDPA bars petitioner from receiving an
evidentiary hearing on any claim whose factual basis was
not developed in state court, absent narrow circumstances
not applicable here. Petitioner did not develop, or raise, his
claims of juror bias, prosecutorial misconduct, or the prose-
cution’s alleged Brady violation regarding Cruse’s psychiat-
ric report until he ﬁled his federal habeas petition. Peti-
tioner explains he could not have developed the claims
earlier because he was unaware, through no fault of his own,
of the underlying facts. As a consequence, petitioner con-
tends, AEDPA erects no barrier to an evidentiary hearing
in federal court.

Section 2254(e)(2), the provision which controls whether
petitioner may receive an evidentiary hearing in federal
district court on the claims that were not developed in the
Virginia courts, becomes the central point of our analysis.
It provides as follows:

“If the applicant has failed to develop the factual basis
of a claim in State court proceedings, the court shall
not hold an evidentiary hearing on the claim unless the
applicant shows that—

“(A) the claim relies on—
“(i) a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive
to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that
was previously unavailable; or