Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/19pdf/19-431_5i36.pdf
Page Number: 23

Cite as:  591 U. S. ____ (2020) 

19 

Opinion of the Court 

B 
The Departments also contend, consistent with the rea-
soning in the 2017 IFR and the 2018 final rule establishing
the  religious  exemption,  that  RFRA  independently  com-
pelled the Departments’ solution or that it at least author-
ized it.10  In light of our holding that the ACA provided a 
basis  for  both  exemptions,  we  need  not  reach  these  argu-
ments.11  We do, however, address respondents’ argument
that  the  Departments  could  not  even  consider  RFRA  as 
they  formulated  the  religious  exemption  from  the  contra-
ceptive mandate.  Particularly in the context of these cases, 
it was appropriate for the Departments to consider RFRA.
As we have explained, RFRA “provide[s] very broad pro-
tection  for  religious  liberty.”    Hobby  Lobby,  573  U. S.,  at 
693.  In  RFRA’s  congressional  findings,  Congress  stated
that  “governments  should  not  substantially  burden  reli-
gious exercise,” a right described by RFRA as “unalienable.” 
42 U. S. C. §§2000bb(a)(1), (3).  To protect this right, Con-

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church exemption, the dissent claims that it is rooted in the First Amend-
ment’s respect for church autonomy.  See post, at 12–13.  But the dissent 
points to no case, brief, or rule in the nine years since the church exemp-
tion’s implementation in which the Departments defended its validity on 
that ground.  The most the dissent can point to is a stray comment in the
rule that expanded the self-certification accommodation to closely held
corporations  in  the  wake  of  Hobby  Lobby.  See  post,  at  13  (quoting  80 
Fed. Reg. 41325 (2015)). 

10 The  dissent  claims  that  “all  agree”  that  the  exemption  is  not  sup-
ported by the Free Exercise Clause.  Post, at 2.  A constitutional claim is 
not  presented  in  these  cases,  and  we  express  no  view  on  the  merits  of
that question. 

11 The  dissent  appears  to  agree  that  the  Departments  had  authority 
under  RFRA  to  “cure”  any  RFRA  violations  caused  by  its  regulations. 
See post, at 14, n. 16 (disclaiming the view that agencies must wait for
courts to determine a RFRA violation); see also supra, at 5 (explaining 
that the safe harbor and commitment to developing an accommodation 
occurred prior to the Guidelines going into effect).  The dissent also does 
not—as it cannot—dispute our directive in Zubik.