Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/19pdf/17-1618_hfci.pdf
Page Number: 23

Cite as:  590 U. S. ____ (2020) 

19 

Opinion of the Court 

men  for  being  attracted  to  men  and  women  for  being  at-
tracted to women.  By discriminating against transgender 
persons,  the  employer  unavoidably  discriminates  against 
persons with one sex identified at birth and another today.
Any way you slice it, the employer intentionally refuses to 
hire applicants in part because of the affected individuals’ 
sex, even if it never learns any applicant’s sex.   

Next,  the  employers  turn  to  Title  VII’s  list  of  protected
characteristics—race,  color,  religion,  sex,  and  national
origin.  Because  homosexuality  and  transgender  status
can’t be found on that list and because they are conceptu-
ally  distinct  from  sex, the  employers  reason, they  are  im-
plicitly excluded from Title VII’s reach.  Put another way, if 
Congress had wanted to address these matters in Title VII,
it would have referenced them specifically.  Cf. post, at 7–8 
(ALITO, J., dissenting); post, at 13–15 (KAVANAUGH, J., dis-
senting).

But that much does not follow.  We agree that homosex-
uality  and  transgender  status  are  distinct  concepts  from 
sex.  But, as we’ve seen, discrimination based on homosex-
uality or transgender status necessarily entails discrimina-
tion based on sex; the first cannot happen without the sec-
ond.  Nor is there any such thing as a “canon of donut holes,” 
in  which  Congress’s  failure  to  speak  directly  to  a  specific
case that falls within a more general statutory rule creates
a  tacit  exception.    Instead,  when  Congress  chooses  not  to 
include  any  exceptions  to  a  broad  rule,  courts  apply  the 
broad rule.  And that is exactly how this Court has always
approached Title VII.  “Sexual harassment” is conceptually
distinct from sex discrimination, but it can fall within Title 
VII’s sweep.  Oncale, 523 U. S., at 79–80.  Same with “moth-
erhood  discrimination.”    See  Phillips,  400  U. S.,  at  544. 
Would  the  employers  have  us  reverse  those  cases  on  the 
theory that Congress could have spoken to those problems 
more specifically?  Of course not.  As enacted, Title VII pro-
hibits  all  forms  of  discrimination  because  of sex,  however