Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/18pdf/18-302_e29g.pdf
Page Number: 31

6 

IANCU v. BRUNETTI 

Opinion of SOTOMAYOR, J. 

and proli[x],” Bruesewitz v. Wyeth LLC, 562 U. S. 223, 236 
(2011), using two synonyms in rapid-fire succession when
one  would  have  done  fine. 
Instead,  “scandalous”  and 
“immoral”  are  separated  by  an  unrelated  word  (“decep-
tive”)  and  mixed  in  with  a  lengthy  series  of  other,  unre- 
lated concepts.  The two therefore need not be interpreted as 
mutually  reinforcing  under  the  Court’s  precedents.    See 
Graham  County  Soil  and  Water  Conservation  Dist.  v. 
United States ex rel. Wilson, 559 U. S. 280, 288 (2010).

For  that  reason,  while  the  majority  offers  a  reasonable 
reading  of  “scandalous,”  it  also  unnecessarily  and  ill-
advisedly collapses the words “scandalous” and “immoral.”
Instead,  it  should  treat  them  as  each  holding  a  distinct, 
nonredundant  meaning,  with  “immoral”  covering  marks
that  are  offensive  because  they  transgress  social  norms, 
and  “scandalous”  covering  marks  that  are  offensive  be-
cause of the mode in which they are expressed. 

What  would  it  mean  for  “scandalous”  in  §1052(a)  to
cover only offensive modes of expression?  The most obvi-
ous ways—indeed, perhaps the only conceivable ways—in 
which  a  trademark  can  be  expressed  in  a  shocking  or 
offensive manner are when the speaker employs obscenity,
vulgarity,  or  profanity.3    Obscenity  has  long  been  defined 
by  this  Court’s  decision  in  Miller  v.  California,  413  U. S. 
15  (1973).  See  id.,  at  24–26.  As  for  what  constitutes 
“scandalous”  vulgarity  or  profanity,  I  do  not  offer  a  list,
but  I  do  interpret  the  term  to  allow  the  PTO  to  restrict 
(and potentially promulgate guidance to clarify) the small 
group of lewd words or “swear” words that cause a visceral 
reaction, that are not commonly used around children, and 
that  are  prohibited  in  comparable  settings.4    Cf.  18  
—————— 

3 Other modes of expression, such as fighting words or extremely loud 
noises, could also be called shocking or offensive in certain contexts, see 
R. A. V. v. St. Paul, 505 U. S. 377, 386 (1992), but it is hard to see how 
they would apply in the context of a trademark. 

4 Although the Government represents, and case law and scholarship