Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/19pdf/18-328_pm02.pdf
Page Number: 14

Cite as:  589 U. S. ____ (2019) 

3 

Opinion of GINSBURG, J. 

after  it  has  commenced.    Lozano  v.  Montoya  Alvarez,  572 
U. S. 1, 10 (2014).  A litigant qualifies for equitable tolling
only  if  he  establishes  “(1)  that  he  has  been  pursuing  his 
rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circum-
stance stood in his way and prevented timely filing.”  Me-
nominee  Tribe  of  Wis.  v.  United  States,  577  U. S.  __,  __ 
(2016)  (slip  op.,  at  5)  (internal  quotation  marks  omitted).
For  example,  in  Burnett  v.  New  York  Central  R.  Co.,  380 
U. S. 424 (1965), a plaintiff filed an action under the Fed-
eral  Employers’  Liability  Act  (FELA)  in  Ohio  state  court, 
alleging  that  he  sustained  a  workplace  injury  just  under 
three years earlier.  Ibid.  Several months later, the state 
court  dismissed  the  suit  for  improper  venue  under  state 
law.  Id., at 425.  The plaintiff promptly brought an identi-
cal action in federal district court.  That court dismissed the 
action on the ground that the FELA’s three-year statute of 
limitations began to run when the plaintiff was injured and 
had expired while his state-court action was pending.  Ibid. 
This Court reversed.  Id., at 436.  Yes, the limitations period 
began to run on the date of the plaintiff’s injury.  But, the 
Court  held,  the  clock  tolled  during  the  pendency  of  the 
plaintiff’s state-court suit.  Ibid.  Subtracting the time con-
sumed by the state-court suit, the plaintiff’s federal action 
was timely.  Id., at 426, 434–436. 

By contrast, the fraud-based discovery rule sets the time 

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Smith  Corp.,  521  U. S.  179,  192  (1997).    The  Court  has  sometimes  re-
ferred  to  Bailey  v.  Glover,  21  Wall.  342  (1875),  and  Holmberg  v.  Arm-
brecht, 327 U. S. 392 (1946), as equitable tolling decisions.  See Lampf, 
Pleva,  Lipkind,  Prupis  &  Petigrow  v.  Gilbertson,  501  U. S.  350,  363 
(1991); Lozano v. Montoya Alvarez, 572 U. S. 1, 10–11 (2014).  And it has 
described  Holmberg  as  “stand[ing]  for  the  proposition  that  equity  tolls
the statute of limitations in cases of fraud or concealment.”  TRW Inc. v. 
Andrews, 534 U. S. 19, 27 (2001).  But as this Court recently clarified, 
each doctrine has an independent office.  See Gabelli v. SEC, 568 U. S. 
442, 447, n. 2, 449 (2013) (addressing whether application of the fraud-
based discovery rule was appropriate after acknowledging that the plain-
tiff had expressly waived equitable tolling).