Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/524bv.pdf
Page Number: 534

524US2

Unit: $U93

[09-11-00 13:25:42] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 524 U. S. 417 (1998)

489

Breyer, J., dissenting

spending in laws that mention no standard at all. See, e. g.,
Act of Mar. 3, 1809, ch. 28, § 1, 2 Stat. 535–536 (granting the
President recess authority to transfer money “appropriated
for a particular branch of expenditure in [a] department” to
be “applied [instead] to another branch of expenditure in the
same department”); Revenue and Expenditure Control Act
of 1968, §§ 202(b), 203(b), 82 Stat. 271–272; (authorizing the
President annually to reserve up to $6 billion in outlays and
$10 billion in new obligation authority); Second Supplemen-
tal Appropriations Act, 1969, § 401, 83 Stat. 82; Second Sup-
plemental Appropriations Act, 1970, §§ 401, 501, 84 Stat. 405–
407.
In this case, too, context and purpose can give meaning
to highly general language. See Federal Radio Comm’n v.
Nelson Bros., supra, at 285; Fahey v. Malonee, supra, at
250–253; cf. Lichter v. United States, 334 U. S., at 777 (Con-
gress has “at least expressed . . . satisfaction with the exist-
ing speciﬁcity of the Act”); Train v. City of New York, 420
U. S. 35, 44–47 (1975) (disallowing President Nixon’s efforts
to impound funds because Court found Congress did not in-
tend him to exercise the power in that instance).

On the other hand, I must recognize that there are impor-
tant differences between the delegation before us and other
broad, constitutionally acceptable delegations to Executive
Branch agencies—differences that argue against my conclu-
In particular, a broad delegation of authority to an
sion.
administrative agency differs from the delegation at issue
here in that agencies often develop subsidiary rules under
the statute, rules that explain the general “public interest”
language. Doing so diminishes the risk that the agency will
use the breadth of a grant of authority as a cloak for unrea-
sonable or unfair implementation. See 1 K. Davis, Adminis-
trative Law § 3:15, pp. 207–208 (2d ed. 1978). Moreover,
agencies are typically subject to judicial review, which re-
view provides an additional check against arbitrary imple-
mentation. See, e. g., Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Assn. of United