Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/09pdf/08-1371.pdf
Page Number: 15.0

Cite as:  561 U. S. ____ (2010) 

9 

Opinion of the Court 

regardless  of  [her]  status  or  beliefs.  Thus,  for  exam­
ple,  the  Hastings  Democratic  Caucus  cannot  bar  stu­
dents holding Republican political beliefs from becom­
ing  members  or  seeking  leadership  positions  in  the 
organization.”  App.  221  (Joint  Stipulation  ¶18)  (em­
phasis added; citations omitted).5 

Under the District Court’s local rules, stipulated facts are
deemed  “undisputed.”  Civil  Local  Rule  56–2  (ND  Cal. 
2010).  See also Pet. for Cert. 2 (“The material facts of this
case are undisputed.”).6 
—————— 

5 In its briefs before the District Court and the Court of Appeals, CLS
several  times  affirmed  that  Hastings  imposes  an  all-comers  rule  on 
RSOs.    See,  e.g.,  Plaintiff’s  Notice  of  Motion  for  Summary  Judgment
and Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment in No. 
C 04 4484 JSW (ND Cal.), p. 4 (“Hastings interprets the [Nondiscrimi­
nation Policy] such that student organizations must allow any student, 
regardless of their status or beliefs, to participate in the group’s activi­
ties  and  meetings  and  to  become  voting  members  and  leaders  of  the 
group.”);  Brief  for  Appellant  in  No.  06–15956  (CA9),  pp. 29–30  (“Hast­
ings  illustrates  the  application  of  the  Nondiscrimination  Policy  by
explaining  that  for  the  Hastings  Democratic  Caucus  to  gain  recogni­
tion,  it  must  open  its  leadership  and  voting  membership  to  Republi­
cans.”).  In a hearing before the District Court, CLS’s counsel reiterated 
that “it’s important to understand what Hastings’ policy is.  According 
to . . . the stipulated facts, Hastings requires . . . that registered student 
organizations  allow  any  student  to  participate,  become  a  member  or
seek leadership positions in the organization regardless of their status
or  beliefs.”  App.  438  (capitalization  and  internal  quotation  marks 
omitted).    And  at  oral  argument  in  this  Court,  counsel  for  CLS  ac­
knowledged  that  “the  Court  needs  to  reach  the  constitutionality  of  the 
all-comers  policy  as  applied  to  CLS  in  this  case.”    Tr.  of  Oral  Arg.  59  
(emphasis added).  We repeat, in this regard, that Hastings’ all-comers
policy  is  hardly  novel.  Other  law  schools  have  adopted  similar  re­
quirements.  See supra, at 4–5; Brief for Association of American Law 
Schools as Amicus Curiae 20, n. 5. 

6 The dissent spills considerable ink attempting to create uncertainty
about when the all-comers policy was adopted.  See post, at 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 
8, 10, 11.  What counts, however, is the parties’ unqualified agreement 
that the all-comers policy currently governs.  CLS’s suit, after all, seeks 
only declaratory and injunctive—that is, prospective—relief.  See App.