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Page Number: 24

20 

MISSOURI v. MCNEELY 

Opinion of the Court 

(2011)  (slip  op.,  at  3)  (noting  that  the  blood  test  was  ob­
tained pursuant to a warrant after the petitioner refused a 
breath test).  We are aware of no evidence indicating that 
restrictions  on  nonconsensual  blood  testing  have  compro­
mised drunk-driving enforcement efforts in the States that 
have them.  And in fact, field studies in States that permit 
nonconsensual  blood  testing  pursuant  to  a  warrant  have 
suggested  that,  although  warrants  do  impose  administra­
tive  burdens,  their  use  can  reduce  breath-test-refusal 
rates  and  improve  law  enforcement’s  ability  to  recover 
BAC  evidence.    See  NHTSA,  Use  of  Warrants  for  Breath 
Test Refusal: Case Studies 36–38 (No. 810852, Oct. 2007).
To  be  sure,  “States  [may]  choos[e]  to  protect  privacy
beyond  the  level  that  the  Fourth  Amendment  requires.” 
Virginia  v.  Moore,  553  U. S.  164,  171  (2008).    But  wide­
spread  state  restrictions  on  nonconsensual  blood  testing 
provide further support for our recognition that compelled 
blood draws implicate a significant privacy interest.  They
also  strongly  suggest  that  our  ruling  today  will  not  “se­
verely  hamper  effective  law  enforcement.”    Garner,  471 
U. S., at 19. 

IV 
The  State  argued  before  this  Court  that  the  fact  that
alcohol  is  naturally  metabolized  by  the  human  body  cre­
ates an exigent circumstance in every case.  The State did 
not  argue  that  there  were  exigent  circumstances  in  this 
particular  case  because  a  warrant  could  not  have  been
obtained  within  a  reasonable  amount  of  time.    In  his 
testimony  before  the  trial  court,  the  arresting  officer  did 

—————— 

(2012);  W. Va.  Code  Ann.  §17C–5–7  (Supp.  2012)  (as  interpreted  in
 
State v. Stone, 229 W. Va. 271, ___, 728 S. E. 2d 155, 167–168 (2012)); 

Wyo.  Stat.  Ann.  §31–6–102(d)  (2011);  see  also  State  v.  Harris,  763  

N. W. 2d 269, 273–274 (Iowa 2009) (per curiam) (recognizing that Iowa
law  imposes  a  warrant  requirement  subject  to  a  limited  case-specific 
exigency exception).