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ARIZONA v. NAVAJO NATION 

THOMAS, J., concurring 

should be construed against the drafting party.  See, e.g., 
Patterson v. Jenks, 2 Pet. 216, 229 (1829); Worcester v. Geor-
gia, 6 Pet. 515, 552 (1832); The Kansas Indians, 5 Wall. 737, 
760 (1867); Restatement (Second) of Contracts §206 (1979);
Restatement (First) of Contracts §505 (1932).  These canons 
then “jumped without discussion from the interpretation of
treaties to the interpretation of statutes” in the 20th cen-
tury.  A. Barrett, Substantive Canons and Faithful Agency,
90  B.  U.  L. Rev.  109,  152  (2010).    To  this  day,  it  remains
unclear how the “trust relationship” could justify freestand-
ing pro-Indian canons that authorize courts to depart from
the ordinary rules of statutory interpretation.

Next, the Court has also suggested that the “trust rela-
tionship”  provides  the  Federal  Government  with  an  addi-
tional power, not enumerated in the Constitution, to “do all
that [is] required” to protect Indians.  Morton v. Mancari, 
417 U. S. 535, 552 (1974) (internal quotation marks omit-
ted); see also Board of County Comm’rs v. Seber, 318 U. S. 
705, 715–716 (1943).  In doing so, the Court has apparently 
used the trust relationship to feed into the so-called plenary
power that Congress supposedly enjoys over Indian affairs. 
But the Court has also approved the use of that power to, 
among other things, restrict tribal sovereignty and “elimi-
nate  tribal  rights.”    See  South  Dakota  v.  Yankton  Sioux 
Tribe, 522  U. S. 329, 343 (1998); Washington  v. Confeder-
ated Bands and Tribes of Yakima Nation, 439 U. S. 463, 501 
(1979); Haaland, 599 U. S., at ___ (THOMAS, J., dissenting) 
(slip op., at 35).  Accordingly, it is difficult to see how such
a plenary power could be rooted in a trust relationship with
Indians.  And it seems at least slightly incongruous to use
Indians’  trust  in  the  Government  as  both  the  basis  for  a 
power that can restrict tribal rights and canons of interpre-
tation that favor Indians. 

The  influence  of  the  “trust  relationship”  idea  on  these
doctrinal  areas  is  troubling,  as  the  trust  relationship  ap-
pears to lack any real support in our constitutional system.