Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/529bv.pdf
Page Number: 1130

529ORD Unit: $PT3

[10-09-01 14:52:06] PGT: ORDPP (Prelim. Print)

ORDERS

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Thomas, J., dissenting

that the words on the “exemplary list” (to be drafted by the trial
court on remand) qualify as ﬁghting words, see Chaplinsky v.
New Hampshire, 315 U. S. 568, 572 (1942), obscenity, see Miller
v. California, 413 U. S. 15, 24 (1973), or some other category of
speech currently recognized as outside the scope of First Amend-
ment protection. Even if these words do constitute so-called
“low-value speech,” the content-based nature of FEHA’s restric-
tion—which bars speech based upon “race, religious creed, color,
national origin, ancestry, physical disability, mental disability,
medical condition, marital status, sex, age, or sexual orientation,”
Cal. Govt. Code Ann. § 12940(h)(1) (West Supp. 2000) but not
because of political afﬁliation, union membership, or numerous
other traits—renders it invalid under our current jurisprudence.
R. A. V. v. St. Paul, 505 U. S. 377, 391 (1992).

To uphold the application of a content-based antidiscrimination
law such as FEHA to pure speech in the workplace, then, we
would have to substantially modify our First Amendment juris-
prudence. This is not to say that there are no doctrinal bases
for such a modiﬁcation. As the concurring opinion below pointed
out, for example, we have held that public employers retain some
leeway to regulate their employees’ speech in the workplace, see
21 Cal. 4th, at 156 (Werdegar, J., concurring) (citing Connick v.
Myers, 461 U. S. 138 (1983)), and have occasionally stated that
speech may be more readily restricted when the audience is “cap-
tive” and cannot avoid the objectionable speech, see 21 Cal. 4th,
at 159 (Werdegar, J., concurring) (citing Frisby v. Schultz, 487
U. S. 474 (1988)). On the other hand, these analogies may not
quite translate to the instant problem. See, e. g., 21 Cal. 4th,
at 184–185 (Kennard, J., dissenting) (discussing captive audience
doctrine); Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Workplace Harassment,
39 UCLA L. Rev. 1791, 1821 (1992) (arguing that this Court’s
cases on speech in the workplace do not support a “workplace
speech exception” broad enough to justify harassment law).
In
light of the difﬁculty of these issues, it is not surprising that even
those commentators who conclude the First Amendment generally
permits application of harassment laws to workplace speech recog-
nize exceptions where First Amendment interests are especially
strong. See, e. g., Fallon, Sexual Harassment, Content Neutrality,

are especially suspect under the First Amendment, see, e. g., Southeastern
Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U. S. 546, 558–559 (1975).