Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/558bv.pdf
Page Number: 305

144 

SMITH  v.  SPISAK 

Opinion of the Court 

A 

The rule the Court set forth in Mills is based on two well-
established principles.  First, the Constitution forbids impo­
sition of the death penalty if the sentencing judge or jury is 
“ ‘ “precluded  from  considering,  as  a  mitigating  factor,  any 
aspect  of  a  defendant’s  character  or  record  and  any  of  the 
circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a 
basis  for  a  sentence  less  than  death.” ’ ”  486  U. S.,  at  374 
(quoting  Eddings  v.  Oklahoma,  455  U. S.  104,  110  (1982),  in 
turn quoting Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U. S. 586, 604 (1978) (plural­
ity  opinion)).  Second,  the  sentencing  judge  or  jury  “ ‘may 
not refuse to consider or be precluded from considering “any 
relevant  mitigating  evidence.” ’ ”  Mills,  486  U. S.,  at  374– 
375 (quoting Skipper v.  South Carolina, 476 U. S. 1, 4 (1986), 
in turn quoting Eddings, supra, at 114). 

Applying  these  principles,  the  Court  held  that  the  jury 
instructions  and  verdict  forms  at  issue  in  the  case  violated 
the  Constitution  because,  read  naturally,  they  told  the  jury 
that it could not ﬁnd a particular circumstance to be mitigat­
ing  unless  all  12  jurors  agreed  that  the  mitigating  circum­
stance  had  been  proved  to  exist.  Mills,  486  U. S.,  at  380– 
381,  384.  If,  for  example,  the  defense  presents  evidence  of 
three potentially mitigating considerations, some jurors may 
believe that only the ﬁrst is mitigating, some only the second, 
and  some  only  the  third.  But  if  even  one  of  the  jurors  be­
lieves that one of the three mitigating considerations exists, 
but  that  he  is  barred  from  considering  it  because  the  other 
jurors disagree, the Court held, the Constitution forbids im­
position  of  the  death  penalty.  See  id.,  at  380,  384;  see  also 
McKoy  v.  North  Carolina,  494  U. S.  433,  442–443  (1990) 
(“Mills requires that each juror be permitted to consider and 
give  effect  to  .  .  .  all  mitigating  evidence  in  deciding  .  .  . 
whether aggravating circumstances outweigh mitigating 
circumstances  .  .  .  ”).  Because  the  instructions  in  Mills 
would  have  led  a  reasonable  juror  to  believe  the  contrary,