Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/12pdf/11-556_11o2.pdf
Page Number: 51.0

Cite as:  570 U. S. ____ (2013) 

17 

GINSBURG, J., dissenting 

looking  at  all  the  circumstances.”).6    The  question  of 
supervisory status, no less than the question whether retali-
ation or harassment has occurred, “depends on a constella-
tion  of  surrounding  circumstances,  expectations,  and 
relationships.”  Oncale,  523  U. S.,  at  81–82.  The  EEOC’s 
Guidance so perceives. 

B 

As a consequence of the Court’s truncated conception of 
supervisory  authority,  the  Faragher  and  Ellerth  frame-
work  has  shifted  in  a  decidedly  employer-friendly  direc-
tion.  This  realignment  will  leave  many  harassment
victims  without  an  effective  remedy  and  undermine  Title 
VII’s capacity to prevent workplace harassment. 

The negligence standard allowed by the Court, see ante, 
at  24,  scarcely  affords  the  protection  the  Faragher  and 
Ellerth  framework  gave  victims  harassed  by  those  in
control  of  their  lives  at  work.    Recall  that  an  employer  is
negligent  with  regard  to  harassment  only  if  it  knew  or
should  have  known  of  the  conduct  but  failed  to  take  ap-
propriate  corrective  action.  See  29  CFR  §1604.11(d);
EEOC  Guidance  405:7652  to  405:7653.    It  is  not  uncom-
mon for employers to lack actual or constructive notice of a
harassing  employee’s  conduct.  See  Lindemann  &  Gross-
man 1378–1379.  An employee may have a reputation as a
harasser  among  those  in  his  vicinity,  but  if  no  complaint
makes  its  way  up  to  management,  the  employer  will  es-
cape liability under a negligence standard.  Id., at 1378. 
—————— 

6 The  Court  worries  that  the  EEOC’s  definition  of  supervisor  will
confound  jurors  who  must  first  determine  whether  the  harasser  is  a 
supervisor  and  second  apply  the  correct  employer  liability  standard. 
Ante, at 22–24, and nn. 13, 14.  But the Court can point to no evidence
that jury instructions on supervisor status in jurisdictions following the 
EEOC Guidance have in fact proved unworkable or confusing to jurors. 
Moreover,  under  the  Court’s  definition  of  supervisor,  jurors  in  many
cases will be obliged to determine, as a threshold question, whether the
alleged harasser possessed supervisory authority.  See supra, at 15–16.