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4 

CALVARY CHAPEL DAYTON VALLEY v. SISOLAK 

ALITO, J., dissenting 

yet discriminatory treatment of places of worship. 

II 
  Calvary Chapel argues that the Governor’s directive vio-
lates  both  the  Free  Exercise  Clause  and  the  Free  Speech 
Clause of the First Amendment, and I agree that Calvary 
Chapel  has  a  very  high  likelihood  of  success  on  these 
claims. 

A 
  Under the Free Exercise Clause, restrictions on religious 
exercise that are not “neutral and of general applicability” 
must  survive  strict  scrutiny.    Church  of  Lukumi  Babalu 
Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U. S. 520, 531 (1993).  “[T]he min-
imum requirement of neutrality is that a law not discrimi-
nate on its face,” id., at 533, and “[t]he Free Exercise Clause 
bars even ‘subtle departures from neutrality’ on matters of 
religion.”    Masterpiece  Cakeshop,  Ltd.  v.  Colorado  Civil 
Rights  Comm’n,  584  U. S.  ___,  ___  (2018)  (slip  op.,  at  17) 
(quoting Church of Lukumi, 508 U. S., at 534).  Here, the 
departure is hardly subtle.  The Governor’s directive specif-
ically treats worship services differently from other activi-
ties  that  involve  extended,  indoor  gatherings  of  large 
groups of people. 
  The face of the directive provides many examples.  While 
“houses of worship” may admit “no more than fifty persons,” 
ECF Doc. 38–2, §11, many favored facilities that host indoor 
activities may operate at 50% capacity.  Privileged facilities 
include  bowling  alleys,  §20,  breweries,  §26,  fitness  facili-
ties, §28, and most notably, casinos, which have operated at 
50%  capacity  for  over  a  month,  §35;  ECF  Doc.  38–3,  p. 5, 
sometimes featuring not only gambling but live circus acts 
and shows. 
  For  Las  Vegas  casinos,  50%  capacity  often means  thou-
sands  of  patrons,  and  the  activities  that  occur  in  casinos 
frequently  involve  far  less  physical  distancing  and  other