Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/19pdf/19-267_1an2.pdf
Page Number: 7.0

Cite as:  591 U. S. ____ (2020) 

3 

Opinion of the Court 

No.  17–56624  (CA9)  (OLG).1   For  many  years,  Morrissey-
Berru  was  employed  at  OLG  as  a  lay  fifth  or  sixth  grade
teacher.  Like most elementary school teachers, she taught 
all subjects, and since OLG is a Catholic school, the curric-
ulum included religion.  App. 23, 75.  As a result, she was 
her students’ religion teacher.

Morrissey-Berru  earned  a  B. A.  in  English  Language
Arts, with a minor in secondary education, and she holds a
California teaching credential.  Id., at 21–22.  While on the 
faculty at OLG, she took religious education courses at the 
school’s request, ER 41–ER 42, ER 44–ER 45, ER 276, and 
was expected to attend faculty prayer services, App. to Pet.
for Cert. in No. 19–267, p. 87a.2 

—————— 

1 A major theme of the dissent is that we do not heed the rule that, in 
deciding  whether  summary judgment is  proper,  a  court must  view  the
facts  in  the  light  most  favorable  to  the  party  against  whom  summary
judgment is sought.  See post, at 1–2, 8, 10–11, 14 (opinion of SOTOMAYOR, 
J.).  But  the  dissent,  which  approves  of  the  Ninth  Circuit’s  reasoning, 
seems to forget that the Ninth Circuit in effect granted summary judg-
ment in favor of the teachers on the issue of the applicability of the so-
called ministerial exception.  It did not remand for a trial on that issue 
but instead held that the exception did not apply.  769 Fed. Appx. 460, 
460–461 (2019); 911 F. 3d 603, 605, 611, n. 6 (2018).  Therefore, if any
material facts were genuinely in dispute, the relevant parts of the record
would have to be viewed in the light most favorable to the schools.  The 
dissent, however, does exactly the opposite. 

In any event, the dissent’s comments about summary judgment are so
much smoke.  It does not identify any disputed fact that is essential to 
our  holding,  and,  although  there  are  differences  of  opinion  on  certain 
facts, neither party takes the position that any material fact is genuinely 
in dispute. 

2 After bringing suit, Morrissey-Berru filed a declaration stating that 
she is “not currently a practicing Catholic.”  ER 248.  It is unclear what 
Morrissey-Berru means by “practicing.”  There is, however, no hint in the 
record that Morrissey-Berru considered herself a non-practicing Catholic 
during her employment at OLG.  See infra, at 5 (describing religious ob-
servation).