Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/19pdf/18-5924_n6io.pdf
Page Number: 86.0

Cite as:  590 U. S. ____ (2020) 

25 

ALITO, J., dissenting 

310  (2010),  where  we  overruled  precedent  allowing  laws
that  prohibited  corporations’  election-related  speech,  we 
found that “[n]o serious reliance interests” were implicated, 
id., at 365, since the only reliance asserted by the dissent 
was the time and effort put in by federal and state lawmak-
ers  in  adopting  the  provisions  at  issue,  id.,  at  411–412 
(Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  In 
this case, by contrast, what is at stake is not the time and 
effort of Louisiana and Oregon lawmakers but a monumen-
tal  litigation  burden  and  the  potential  inability  to  retry
cases that might well have ended with a unanimous verdict 
if that had been required. 
  Finally,  in  Janus  v.  State,  County,  and  Municipal  Em-
ployees, 585 U. S. ___ (2018), where we overruled Abood v. 
Detroit Bd. of Ed., 431 U. S. 209 (1977), we carefully consid-
ered and addressed the question of reliance, and whatever
one may think about the extent of the legitimate reliance in
that case, it is not in the same league as that present here. 
Abood had held that a public sector employer may require
non-union members to pay a portion of the dues collected 
from union members.  431 U. S., at 235–236.  In overruling
that  decision,  we  acknowledged  that  existing  labor  con-
tracts might have been negotiated in reliance on Abood, but 
we  noted  that  most  labor  contracts  are  of  short  duration, 
that unions had been on notice for some time that the Court 
had serious misgivings about Abood, and that unions could 
have insisted on contractual provisions to protect their in-
terests if Abood later fell.  Janus, supra, at ___–___ (slip op., 
at 44–47).33 

—————— 

33 The reliance in this case also far exceeds that in Arizona v. Gant, 556 
U. S. 332 (2009), where the Court effectively overruled a decision, New 
York v. Belton, 453 U. S. 454 (1981), that allowed a police officer to search 
the  entire  passenger  compartment  of  a  car  if  the  officer  had  probable 
cause to arrest the driver or a passenger.  556 U. S., at 335.  Police de-
partments had trained officers in reliance on the Belton rule, see Gant, 
supra,  at  358–360  (ALITO, J.,  dissenting),  but  the  burden  of  retraining