Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/19pdf/19-431_5i36.pdf
Page Number: 69.0

Cite as:  591 U. S. ____ (2020) 

13 

GINSBURG, J., dissenting 

F. 3d, at 570, n. 26, the latter exemption is not attributable 
to  the  ACA’s  text;  it  was  justified  on  First  Amendment 
grounds. 
See  Hosanna-Tabor  Evangelical  Lutheran 
Church and School v. EEOC, 565 U. S. 171, 188 (2012) (the
First Amendment’s “ministerial exception” protects “the in-
ternal governance of [a] church”); 80 Fed. Reg. 41325 (2015) 
(the exemption “recogni[zes] [the] particular sphere of au-
tonomy [afforded to] houses of worship . . . consistent with 
their special status under longstanding tradition in our so-
ciety”).15  Even if the house-of-worship exemption extends 
beyond what the First Amendment would require, see ante, 
at 3, n. 1 (opinion of KAGAN, J.), that extension, as just ex-
plained, cannot be extracted from the ACA’s text.16 

III 

Because I conclude that the blanket exemption gains no 
aid from the ACA, I turn to the Government’s alternative 
argument.  The religious exemption, if not the moral exemp-
tion,  the  Government  urges,  is  necessary  to  protect  reli-
gious freedom.  The Government does not press a free exer-
cise argument, see supra, at 2, and n. 1, instead invoking 
RFRA.  Brief for HHS et al. 20–31.  That statute instructs 
that the “Government shall not substantially burden a per-
son’s exercise of religion even if the burden results from a 

—————— 

15 On the broad scope the Court today attributes to the “ministerial ex-
ception,” see Our Lady of Guadalupe School v. Morrissey-Berru, 591 U. S. 
___ (2020). 

16 The Government does not argue that my view of the limited compass 
of §300gg–13(a)(4) imperils the self-certification accommodation.  Brief 
for  HHS  et al.  19–20.    But  see  ante,  at  18,  n. 9  (opinion  of  the  Court). 
That  accommodation  aligns  with  the  Court’s  decisions  under  the  Reli-
gious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA).  See infra, at 14–15.  It 
strikes  a  balance  between  women’s  health  and  religious  opposition  to
contraception, preserving women’s access to seamless, no-cost contracep-
tive coverage, but imposing the obligation to provide such coverage di-
rectly on insurers, rather than on the objecting employer.  See supra, at 
6;  infra,  at  18–20.  The  blanket  exemption,  in  contrast,  entirely  disre-
gards women employees’ preventive care needs.