Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/524bv.pdf
Page Number: 348

524US2

Unit: $U87

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Cite as: 524 U. S. 274 (1998)

303

Stevens, J., dissenting

on notice that sexual harassment of a student by a teacher
constitutes an “intentional” violation of Title IX for which
damages are available, because we so held shortly before
Waldrop began abusing Gebser. See id., at 74–75. Given
the fact that our holding in Franklin was unanimous, it is
not unreasonable to assume that it could have been foreseen
by counsel for the recipients of Title IX funds. Moreover,
the nondiscrimination requirement set out in Title IX is
clear, and this Court held that sexual harassment constitutes
intentional sex discrimination long before the sexual abuse
in this case began. See Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vin-
son, 477 U. S. 57, 64 (1986). Normally, of course, we pre-
sume that the citizen has knowledge of the law.

The majority nevertheless takes the position that a school
district that accepts federal funds under Title IX should not
be held liable in damages for an intentional violation of that
statute if the district itself “was unaware of the discrimina-
tion.” Ante, at 287. The Court reasons that because ad-
ministrative proceedings to terminate funding cannot be
commenced until after the grant recipient has received notice
of its noncompliance and the agency determines that volun-
tary compliance is not possible, see 20 U. S. C. § 1682, there
should be no damages liability unless the grant recipient has
actual notice of the violation (and thus an opportunity to end
the harassment). See ante, at 288–290.

The fact that Congress has speciﬁed a particular adminis-
trative procedure to be followed when a subsidy is to be ter-
minated, however, does not illuminate the question of what
the victim of discrimination on the basis of sex must prove
in order to recover damages in an implied private right of
action.
Indeed, in Franklin, 503 U. S., at 64, n. 3, we noted
that the Department of Education’s Ofﬁce of Civil Rights had
declined to terminate federal funding of the school district
at issue—despite its ﬁnding that a Title IX violation had
occurred—because the “district [had come] into compliance”
with Title IX after the harassment at issue. See ante, at