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6 

NATIONAL PORK PRODUCERS COUNCIL v. ROSS 

Opinion of the Court 

state laws.  See Art. VI, cl. 2.  But everyone also agrees that 
we have nothing like that here.  Despite the persistent ef-
forts of certain pork producers, Congress has yet to adopt
any statute that might displace Proposition 12 or laws reg-
ulating pork production in other States.  See, e.g., H. R. 272, 
116th Cong., 1st Sess., §2 (2019); H. R. 4879, 115th Cong., 
2d  Sess.,  §2(a)  (2018);  H. R.  3599,  115th  Cong.,  1st  Sess., 
§2(a) (2017); H. R. 687, 114th Cong., 1st Sess., §2(a) (2015).
That  has  led  petitioners  to  resort  to  litigation,  pinning
their hopes on what has come to be called the dormant Com-
merce  Clause.  Reading  between  the  Constitution’s  lines, 
petitioners observe, this Court has held that the Commerce
Clause not only vests Congress with the power to regulate
interstate trade; the Clause also “contain[s] a further, neg-
ative command,” one effectively forbidding the enforcement
of  “certain  state  [economic  regulations]  even  when  Con-
gress has failed to legislate on the subject.”  Oklahoma Tax 
Comm’n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U. S. 175, 179 (1995).

This view of the Commerce Clause developed gradually. 
In  Gibbons  v.  Ogden,  Chief  Justice  Marshall  recognized
that  the  States’  constitutionally  reserved  powers  enable 
them  to  regulate  commerce  in  their  own  jurisdictions  in 
ways sure to have “a remote and considerable influence on
commerce” in other States.  9 Wheat. 1, 203 (1824).  By way
of  example,  he  cited  “[i]nspection  laws,  quarantine  laws,
[and] health laws of every description.”  Ibid.  At the same 
time, however, Chief Justice Marshall saw “great force in 
th[e] argument” that the Commerce Clause might impliedly 
bar certain types of state economic regulation.  Id., at 209. 
Decades later, in Cooley v. Board of Wardens of Port of Phil-
adelphia  ex rel.  Soc.  for  Relief  of  Distressed  Pilots,  this 
Court again recognized that the power vested in Congress
to regulate interstate commerce leaves the States substan-
tial leeway to adopt their own commercial codes.  12 How. 
299, 317–321 (1852).  But once more, the Court hinted that 
the Constitution may come with some restrictions on what