Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/13pdf/12-536_e1pf.pdf
Page Number: 58.0

Cite as:  572 U. S. ____ (2014) 

7 

BREYER, J., dissenting 

nance Reform and the Constitution 7–16, 80–94 (forthcom­
ing  2014)  (arguing  that  the  efficacy  of  American  democ- 
racy depends on “electoral integrity” and the responsiveness 
of public officials to public opinion). 

The “appearance of corruption” can make matters worse.  

It  can  lead  the  public  to  believe  that  its  efforts  to  com­
municate  with  its  representatives  or  to  help  sway  public
opinion have little purpose.  And a cynical public can lose
interest in political participation altogether.  See Nixon v. 
Shrink  Missouri  Government  PAC,  528  U. S.  377,  390 
(2000)  (“[T]he  cynical  assumption  that  large  donors  call 
the tune could jeopardize the willingness of voters to take 
part  in  democratic  governance”).   Democracy,  the  Court
has  often  said,  cannot  work  unless  “the  people  have  faith 
in those who govern.”  United States v. Mississippi Valley 
Generating Co., 364 U. S. 520, 562 (1961).

The  upshot  is  that  the  interests  the  Court  has  long
described as preventing “corruption” or the “appearance of
corruption”  are  more  than  ordinary  factors  to  be  weighed 
against the constitutional right to political speech.  Rather, 
they  are  interests  rooted  in  the  First  Amendment  it-
self.  They are rooted in the constitutional effort to create
a  democracy  responsive  to  the  people—a  government
where  laws  reflect  the  very  thoughts,  views,  ideas,  and 
sentiments, the expression of which the First Amendment 
protects.  Given  that  end,  we  can  and  should  understand 
campaign  finance  laws  as  resting  upon  a  broader  and 
more  significant  constitutional  rationale  than  the  plural- 
ity’s limited definition of “corruption” suggests.  We should 
see these laws as seeking in significant part to strengthen, 
rather than weaken, the First Amendment.  To say this is 
not to deny the potential for conflict between (1) the need
to permit contributions that pay for the diffusion of ideas, 
and (2) the need to limit payments in order to help main­
tain the integrity of the electoral process.  But that conflict 
takes  place  within,  not  outside,  the  First  Amendment’s