Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/10pdf/10-10.pdf
Page Number: 19.0

Cite as:  564 U. S. ____ (2011) 

15 

Opinion of the Court 

example,  that  sometimes  assistance  other  than  purely 
legal assistance (here, say, that of a neutral social worker) 
can prove constitutionally sufficient.  Cf. Vitek, 445 U. S., 
at  499–500  (Powell,  J.,  concurring  in  part)  (provision  of 
mental  health  professional).    But  the  Government  does 
claim that these alternatives can assure the “fundamental 
fairness” of the proceeding even where the State does not 
pay for counsel for an indigent defendant. 

While  recognizing  the  strength  of  Turner’s  arguments,
we  ultimately  believe  that  the  three  considerations  we 
have  just  discussed  must  carry  the  day.  In  our  view,  a 
categorical  right  to  counsel  in  proceedings  of  the  kind
before us would carry with it disadvantages (in the form of 
unfairness  and  delay)  that,  in  terms  of  ultimate  fairness, 
would deprive it of significant superiority over the alterna-
tives that we have mentioned.  We consequently hold that 
the Due Process Clause does not automatically require the
provision  of  counsel  at  civil  contempt  proceedings  to  an 
indigent individual who is subject to a child support order,
even  if  that  individual  faces  incarceration  (for  up  to  a
In  particular,  that  Clause  does  not  require  the 
year). 
provision  of  counsel  where  the  opposing  parent  or  other 
custodian (to whom support funds are owed) is not repre-
sented  by  counsel  and  the  State  provides  alternative 
procedural  safeguards  equivalent  to  those  we  have  men-
tioned (adequate notice of the importance of ability to pay, 
fair  opportunity  to  present,  and  to  dispute,  relevant  in-
formation, and court findings). 

We do not address civil contempt proceedings where the
underlying child support payment is owed to the State, for 
example,  for  reimbursement  of  welfare  funds  paid  to  the
parent with custody.  See supra, at 10.  Those proceedings
more  closely  resemble  debt-collection  proceedings.    The 
government is likely to have counsel or some other compe-
tent representative.  Cf. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U. S. 458, 
462–463  (1938)  (“[T]he  average  defendant  does  not  have