Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/17pdf/16-1454_5h26.pdf
Page Number: 51

Cite as:  585 U. S. ____ (2018) 

27 

BREYER, J., dissenting 

sides of the [credit-card] platform.”  Id., at 231–232.  The 
majority  evidently  rejects  these  factual  findings,  even 
though no one has challenged them as clearly erroneous.

Similarly,  the  majority  refers  to  the  nondiscrimination 

provisions  as  preventing  “free  riding”  on  American  Ex­
press’  “investments  in  rewards”  for  cardholders.    Ante,  at 
19–20;  see  also  ante,  at  7  (describing  steering  in  terms
suggestive  of  free  riding).    But  as  the  District  Court  ex­
plained,  “[p]lainly  . . .  investments  tied  to  card  use  (such
as  Membership  Rewards  points,  purchase  protection,  and 
the  like)  are  not  subject  to  free-riding,  since  the  network 
does  not  incur  any  cost  if  the  cardholder  is  successfully
steered  away  from  using  his  or  her  American  Express 
card.”  88 F. Supp. 3d, at 237.  This, I should think, is an 
unassailable  conclusion:  American  Express  pays  rewards 
to  cardholders  only  for  transactions  in  which  cardholders 
use  their  American  Express  cards,  so  if  a  steering  effort
succeeds, no rewards are paid.  As for concerns about free 
riding  on  American  Express’  fixed  expenses,  including  its 
investments in its brand, the District Court acknowledged
that free-riding was in theory possible, but explained that 
American  Express  “ma[de]  no  effort  to  identify  the  fixed 
expenses  to  which  its  experts  referred  or  to  explain  how 
they are subject to free riding.”  Ibid.; see also id., at 238 
(American  Express’  own  data  showed  “that  the  network’s 
ability  to  confer  a  credentialing  benefit  trails  that  of  its
competitors, casting doubt on whether there is in fact any 
particular  benefit  associated  with  accepting  [American
Express] that is subject to free riding”).  The majority does 
not  even  acknowledge,  much  less  reject,  these  factual 
findings, despite coming to the contrary conclusion. 

Finally, the majority reasons that the nondiscrimination 
provisions  “do  not  prevent  Visa,  MasterCard,  or  Discover 
from  competing  against  [American  Express]  by  offering 
lower merchant fees or promoting their broader merchant 
acceptance.”    Ante,  at  20.    But  again,  the  District  Court’s