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2 

HEALTH AND HOSPITAL CORPORATION OF MARION 
CTY. v. TALEVSKI 
BARRETT, J., concurring 

individual  rights.  Under  Gonzaga,  courts  must  ask 
whether “text and structure” indicate that the statute “un-
ambiguously” confers federal rights.  536 U. S., at 283, 286. 
Relevant  considerations  include  whether  the  statute  is 
“ ‘phrased  in  terms  of  the  persons  benefited,’ ”  whether  it
uses “explicit rights-creating terms,” and whether it has an
“individual,” rather than an “aggregate,” focus.  Id., at 284, 
290. 

This  bar  is  high,  and  although  the  FNHRA  clears  it,
many  federal  statutes  will  not.  As  the  Court  explains,
§1983  actions  are  the  exception—not  the  rule—for  viola-
tions of Spending Clause statutes.  Ante, at 13.  This is be-
cause “the typical remedy for state noncompliance with fed-
erally imposed conditions is not a private cause of action for 
noncompliance  but  rather  action  by  the  Federal  Govern-
ment  to  terminate  funds  to  the  State.”  Pennhurst  State 
School and Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U. S. 1, 28 (1981). 
Indeed,  since  Pennhurst,  we  have  interpreted  only  two
Spending Clause statutes to be enforceable through §1983.
See Wright v. Roanoke Redevelopment and Housing Author-
ity, 479 U. S. 418, 432 (1987); Wilder v. Virginia Hospital 
Assn., 496 U. S. 498, 522–523 (1990).

The  third  point  is  that  even  when  a  statute  unambigu-
ously  confers  rights,  Congress  can  “supplant  any  remedy
that otherwise would be available under §1983.”  Middlesex 
County  Sewerage  Authority  v.  National  Sea  Clammers 
Assn., 453 U. S. 1, 21 (1981).  At this step of the analysis,
courts should apply ordinary interpretive tools to determine 
whether the statute allows access to §1983.  Ante, at 18; see 
Sea  Clammers,  453  U. S.,  at  13,  20–21  (“We  look  first,  of 
course, to the statutory language, particularly to the provi-
sions made therein for enforcement and relief ”).  In some 
cases, the text may expressly forbid §1983 actions.  In oth-
ers, context may point to the same result.  It is especially
telling, for example, if the statute “ ‘creat[es] a comprehen-