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02-22-99 22:42:40 PAGES OPINPGT

Cite as: 524 U. S. 184 (1998)

197

Opinion of the Court

ﬁed by a disregard of a known legal obligation,26 willful was
also interpreted variously to refer to “purposeful, intentional
conduct,” 27 “indifferen[ce] to the requirements of the law,” 28
or merely a “conscious, intentional, deliberate, voluntary de-
cision.” 29 Moreover, in each of the cases in which disregard
of a known legal obligation was held to be sufﬁcient to estab-
lish willfulness, it was perfectly clear from the record that
the licensee had knowledge of the law; 30 thus, while these

26 See, e. g., Perri v. Department of the Treasury, 637 F. 2d 1332, 1336
(CA9 1981); Stein’s Inc. v. Blumenthal, 649 F. 2d 463, 467–468 (CA7 1980).

27 Rich v. United States, 383 F. Supp. 797, 800 (SD Ohio 1974).
28 Lewin v. Blumenthal, 590 F. 2d 268, 269 (CA8 1979); Fin & Feather
Sport Shop v. United States Treasury Department, 481 F. Supp. 800, 807
(Neb. 1979).

29 Prino v. Simon, 606 F. 2d 449, 451 (CA4 1979) (internal quotation
marks omitted); see also Stein’s, 649 F. 2d, at 467 (“[I]f a person 1) in-
tentionally does an act which is prohibited, irrespective of evil motive
or reliance on erroneous advice, or 2) acts with careless disregard of stat-
utory requirements, the violation is willful” (internal quotation marks
omitted)).

30 Perri, 637 F. 2d, at 1336 (“The district court found Perri knew a straw-
man transaction would violate the Act”); Stein’s, 649 F. 2d, at 468 (“The
record shows that the plaintiff ’s agents were instructed on the require-
ments of the law and acknowledged an understanding of the Secre-
tary’s regulations. Nevertheless, and despite repeated warnings from the
Secretary, violations continued to occur” (footnote omitted)); Powers v.
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, 505 F. Supp. 695, 698 (ND
Fla. 1980) (“Bureau representatives inspected Powers August 31, 1976.
They pointed out his many violations, gave him a copy of the regulations,
thoroughly explained his obligations, and gave him a pamphlet explaining
his obligations. As of that date Powers knew his obligations”); Shyda v.
Director, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, 448 F. Supp. 409, 415
(MD Pa. 1977) (“[A]t the formal administrative hearing petitioner admitted
on the stand under oath that he was aware of the speciﬁc legal obligation
at issue”); Mayesh v. Schultz, 58 F. R. D. 537, 540 (SD Ill. 1973) (“The
uncontroverted evidence shows clearly that plaintiff was aware of the
above holding period requirements. Mr. Mayesh had been previously
advised on the requirements under Illinois law, and he clearly acknowl-
edged that he was aware of them”); McLemore v. United States Treasury
Department, 317 F. Supp. 1077, 1078 (ND Fla. 1970) (ﬁnding that both