Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/18pdf/17-1011_mkhn.pdf
Page Number: 24

Cite as:  586 U. S. ____ (2019) 

5 

BREYER, J., dissenting 

as  it  appeared  more  than  75  years  ago  in  Sutherland’s 
book on statutory construction, says that “when a statute 
refers  to  a  general  subject,  the  statute  adopts  the  law  on 
that  subject  as  it  exists  whenever  a  question  under  the 
statute  arises.”  Ante,  at  9  (citing  2  J.  Sutherland,  Statu-
tory  Construction  §§5207–5208  (3d  ed.  1943);  emphasis 
added).

But a canon is at most a rule of thumb.  Indeed, Suther-
land himself says that “[n]o single canon of interpretation 
can  purport  to  give  a  certain  and  unerring  answer.”  2 
Sutherland,  supra,  §4501,  p. 316.    And  hornbooks,  sum-
marizing  case  law,  have  long  explained  that  whether  a 
reference statute adopts the law as it stands on the date of
enactment  or  includes  subsequent  changes  in  the  law  to
which  it  refers  is  “fundamentally  a  question of  legislative 
intent and purpose.”  Fox, Effect of Modification or Repeal
of Constitutional or Statutory Provision Adopted by Refer-
ence  in  Another  Provision,  168  A. L. R.  627,  628  (1947); 
see  also  82  C. J. S.,  Statutes  §485,  p. 637  (2009)  (“The
question  of  whether  a  statute  which  has  adopted  another 
statute by reference will be affected by amendments made 
to  the  adopted  statute  is  one  of  legislative  intent  and 
purpose”);  id.,  at  638  (statute  that  refers  generally  to
another  body  of  law  will  ordinarily  include  subsequent
changes in the adopted law only “as far as the changes are
consistent with the purpose of the adopting statute”).

Thus,  all  interpretive  roads  here  lead  us  to  the  same 
place,  namely,  to  context,  to  history,  to  purpose,  and  to 
consequences.    Language  alone  cannot  resolve  the  stat-
ute’s linguistic ambiguity. 

II
  “Statutory  interpretation,”  however,  “is  not  a  game  of 
blind  man’s  bluff.”  Dole  Food  Co.,  538  U. S.,  at  484 
(BREYER,  J.,  concurring  in  part  and  dissenting  in  part). 
We  are  “free  to  consider  statutory  language  in  light  of  a