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Page Number: 67

16 

MCCUTCHEON v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N 

BREYER, J., dissenting 

the same corruption concerns posed by contributions made 
directly to the candidate or officeholder”); id., at 308 (opin­
ion  of  KENNEDY,  J.)  (“The  making  of  a  solicited  gift  is  a 
quid both to the recipient of the money and to the one who
solicits the payment”); Colorado II, 533 U. S., at 460, n. 23 
(explaining  how  a  candidate  can  “become  a  player  [in  his 
party] beyond his own race” by “directing donations to the 
party  and  making  sure  that  the  party  knows  who  raised
the money,” and that “the donor’s influence is multiplied” 
in  such  instances).  And,  as  the  statements  collected  in 
Appendix A, infra, make clear, we have believed this with 
good reason. 

Example Two: Donations to Individual Candidates (The 
$3.6  Million  Check).  The  first  example  significantly  un-
derstates  the  problem.    That  is  because  federal  election 
law also allows a single contributor to give $5,200 to each 
party candidate over a 2-year election cycle (assuming the 
candidate  is  running  in  both  a  primary  and  a  general
election).  §441a(a)(1)(A);  78  Fed.  Reg.  8532.  There  are 
435 party candidates for House seats and 33 party candi­
dates  for  Senate  seats  in  any  given  election  year.    That 
makes  an  additional  $2.4  million  in  allowable  contribu­
tions.  Thus,  without  an  aggregate  limit,  the  law  will
permit a wealthy individual to write a check, over a 2-year
election  cycle,  for  $3.6  million—all  to  benefit  his  political 
party  and  its  candidates.    See  Appendix  B,  Table  2(a), 
infra, at 39. 

To make it easier for a wealthy donor to make a contri­
bution  of  this  size,  the  parties  can  simply  enlarge  the 
composition  of  the  Joint  Party  Committee  described  in 
Example  One,  so  that  it  now  includes  party  candidates.
And  a  party  can  proliferate  such  joint  entities,  perhaps 
calling the first the “Smith Victory Committee,” the second
the “Jones Victory Committee,” and the like.  See 11 CFR 
§102.17(c)(5)  (2012).  (I  say  “perhaps”  because  too  trans­
parent  a  name  might  call  into  play  certain  earmarking