Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/23pdf/22-1008_1b82.pdf
Page Number: 16.0

Cite as:  603 U. S. ____ (2024) 

11 

Opinion of the Court 

Hobbs Act, for example, requires persons aggrieved by cer-
tain final orders and regulations of the Federal Communi-
cations  Commission,  Secretary  of  Agriculture,  and  Secre-
tary of Transportation, among others, to petition for review
“within 60 days after [the] entry” of the final agency action.
28 U. S. C. §§2342, 2344; see also, e.g., 29 U. S. C. §655(f ) 
(suits challenging Occupational Safety and Health Admin-
istration standards must be filed “prior to the sixtieth day
after such standard is promulgated”).  The Board contends 
that  such  statutes  reflect  a  standard  administrative-law 
practice of starting the limitations period when “any proper
plaintiff ”  can  challenge  the  final agency  action.    Brief  for 
Respondent 9.  There is “no sound basis,” it insists, “for in-
stead applying a challenger-by-challenger approach to cal-
culate the limitations period on APA claims.”  Ibid.; see also 
post, at 9–10 (JACKSON, J., dissenting). 

1 
This argument hits the immutable obstacle of §2401(a)’s 
text.  Unlike the specific review provisions that the Board
cites, §2401(a) does not refer to the date of the agency ac-
tion’s  “entry”  or  “promulgat[ion]”;  it  says  “right  of  action
first accrues.”  That textual difference matters.  To begin, 
the latter language reflects a statute of limitations and the 
former  a  statute  of  repose.    Moreover,  the  specific  review
provisions  actually  undercut  the  Board’s  argument,  be-
cause  they  illustrate  that  Congress  has  sometimes  em-
ployed the Board’s preferred final-agency-action rule—but 
did  not  do  so  in  §2401(a).    As  we  observed  in  Rotkiske  v. 
Klemm, it is “particularly inappropriate” to read language
into a statute of limitations “when, as here, Congress has 
shown that it knows how to adopt the omitted language or
provision.”  589 U. S. 8, 14 (2019).

In arguing to the contrary, post, at 12–16, the dissent ig-
nores the textual differences between §2401(a) and finality-