Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/21pdf/20-1263diff_868c.pdf
Page Number: 14.0

Cite as:  596 U. S. ____ (2022) 

9 

Opinion of the Court 

plan.”  It does not specify the purpose for which those pay-
ments must be made.  On that score, the prefatory clause 
refers  to  “medical  support”  and  “medical  care”  payments, 
consistent with the adjacent language in §1396k(a)(1)(A).

With  little  support  in  the  text  of  §1396k(a)(1)(A),  Gal-
lardo proposes that we read the assignment provision to in-
corporate §1396a(a)(25)(H)’s more limited language.  But as 
explained above, see supra, at 7, we must give effect to, not
nullify,  Congress’  choice  to  include  limiting  language  in
some provisions but not others, see Russello, 464 U. S., at 
23.  Gallardo responds that our decision in Ahlborn elimi-
nated  any  daylight  between  §1396a(a)(25)(H)  and 
§1396k(a)(1)(A),  because  we  said  there  that  these  provi-
sions  “reiterat[e],”  “reinforc[e],”  and  “ech[o]”  each  other.
547  U. S.,  at  276,  280,  281.    But  Ahlborn  was  clear  that 
these two provisions “ech[o]” or “reinforc[e]” each other in-
sofar as they both involve “recovery of payments for medical 
care,”  id.,  at  282,  and  not  “payment  for,  for  example,  lost 
wages,” id., at 280.  Ahlborn did not suggest that we must
otherwise interpret these provisions in lockstep. 

Conceding the provisions’ scope could differ, Gallardo ar-
gues  that  the  later  enacted  §1396a(a)(25)(H)  should  “pre-
vai[l]”  over  the  earlier  enacted  §1396k(a)(1)(A).    Brief  for 
Petitioner 34.  But Gallardo does not identify any conflict
requiring one of the provisions to prevail.  Both provisions 
require the State to obtain rights—either by assignment or 
by statute—to certain third-party payments.  Because they
concern different requirements, they do not conflict just be-
cause one is broader in scope than the other.  In fact, the 
provisions complement each other.  Section 1396k(a)(1)(A)
provides  a  broad,  but  not  foolproof,  contractual  right  to 
third-party  payments  for  medical  care.  See  Brief  for  Re-
spondent 33–34 (explaining circumstances when an assign-
ment under §1396k(a)(1)(A) might be ineffective).  By con-
trast, §1396a(a)(25)(H) provides a more targeted statutory 
right  for  when  the  assignment  might  fail.    See  Brief  for