Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/22pdf/22-138_43j7.pdf
Page Number: 20

Cite as:  600 U. S. ____ (2023) 

3 

SOTOMAYOR, J., concurring
Opinion of SOTOMAYOR, J. 

unprotected category of “true threats.”  Yet such statements 
can  also  be  punished  if  they  fall  into  another  category  of
unprotected speech, such as speech integral to criminal con-
duct.  Or they might warrant less First Amendment protec-
tion for other reasons.  On the other hand, there is the ques-
tion of what constitutes the well-defined and longstanding
category of unprotected true threats.  It is with this latter 
question  that  I  do  not  see  the  need  to  address  whether  a 
mens rea of recklessness is sufficient across the board. 

First, the courts below did not address whether reckless-
ness was sufficient to prosecute true threats and neither of 
the actual parties have advocated a recklessness standard.
Colorado  disclaimed  the  idea  that  recklessness  was  re-
quired, and petitioner asserted, correctly, that recklessness 
had  not  been  raised  under  traditional  principles  of  party
presentation.  The briefing on recklessness consists almost
entirely of a few pages of an argument in the alternative at
the tail end of an amicus brief filed by the United States.

Second,  because  petitioner  was  prosecuted  for  stalking
involving threatening speech, this case does not require re-
sort to the true-threats exemption to the First Amendment.
True-threats doctrine covers content-based prosecutions 
for single utterances of “pure speech,” which need not even
be  communicated  to  the  subject  of  the  threat.  Watts  v. 
United States, 394 U. S. 705, 707 (1969) (per curiam).  The 
First  Amendment  would  normally  place  strict  limits  on
such prosecutions.  So there is typically a need to determine
whether the speech in question falls within the tradition-
ally unprotected category of true threats. 

This  is  not  such  a  case,  however.    Petitioner  was  con-
victed for “stalking [causing] serious emotional distress” for 
a combination of threatening statements and repeated, un-
wanted,  direct  contact  with  C.  W.  497  P. 3d  1039,  1043