Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/19pdf/18-9526_9okb.pdf
Page Number: 62

Cite as:  591 U. S. ____ (2020) 

17 

ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting 

Table 1 (1903); Depts. of Commerce and Labor, Bureau of 
Census,  Population  of  Oklahoma  and  Indian  Territory
1907, pp. 8, 30–33.

Second, Congress systematically dismantled the govern-
mental  authority  of  the  Creek  Nation,  targeting  all  three
branches.  As noted, Congress dissolved the Tribe’s judicial 
system.  Congress  also  specified  in  the  Original  Creek 
Agreement  that  the  Creek  government  would  “not  con-
tinue”  past  March  1906,  essentially  preserving  it  only  as
long  as  Congress  thought  necessary  for  the  Tribe  to  wind
up its affairs.  §46, 31 Stat. 872.  In the meantime, Congress
radically  curtailed  tribal  legislative  authority,  providing
that no statute passed by the council of the Creek Nation 
affecting the Nation’s lands, money, or property would be
valid unless approved by the President of the United States. 
§42, id., at 872.  When 1906 came around, the Five Tribes 
Act provided for the “final disposition of the affairs of the
Five  Civilized  Tribes.”  Act  of  Apr.  26,  1906,  ch.  1876,  34
Stat. 137.  Along with “abolish[ing]” all tribal taxes, the Act 
directed the Secretary of the Interior to assume control over 
the collection of the Nation’s remaining revenues and to dis-
tribute  them  among  tribe  members  on  a  per  capita  basis. 
§§11, 17, id., at 141, 143–144.  Thus, by the time Oklahoma
became the 46th State in 1907, there was little left of the 
Creek Nation’s authority:  No tribal courts.  No tribal law. 
No tribal fisc.  And any lingering authority was further re-
duced in 1908, when Congress amended the Five Tribes Act 
to require tribal officers and members to surrender all re-
maining  tribal  property,  money,  and  records.    Act  of  May 
27, 1908, §13, 35 Stat. 316. 

The  Court  stresses  that  the  Five  Tribes  Act  separately
stated that the Creek government was “continued” in “full 
force and effect for all purposes authorized by law.”  Ante, 
at 15 (quoting §28, 34 Stat. 148).  By that point, however,
such  “authorized”  purposes  were  nearly  nonexistent,  and 
the  Act’s  statement  is  readily  explained  by  the  need  to