Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/17pdf/16-499_1a7d.pdf
Page Number: 64.0

Cite as:  584 U. S. ____ (2018) 

7 

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting 

norm-specific inquiry, not a categorical one, it is irrelevant 
to the categorical question presented here.  Assuming the 
prohibition  against  financing  of  terrorism  is  sufficiently 
“specific, universal, and obligatory” to satisfy the first step
of Sosa, a question on which I would remand to the Court 
of Appeals, nothing in international law suggests a corpo­
ration may not violate it.2 

—————— 

2 At  present,  the  norm-specific  query  contemplated  by  footnote  20  is
likely  resolved  simply  by  considering  whether  the  given  international-
law  norm  binds  only  state  actors  or  state  and  nonstate  actors  alike, 
because  there  does  not  appear  to  be  an  international-law  norm  that
contemplates  a  finer  distinction  between  types  of  private  actors.    See 
Brief  for  United  States  as  Amicus  Curiae  in  Kiobel  v.  Royal  Dutch 
Petroleum Co., O. T. 2012, No. 10–1491, p. 20 (“At the present time, the
United States is not aware of any international-law norm, accepted by
civilized nations and defined with the degree of specificity required by 
Sosa, that requires, or necessarily contemplates, a distinction between
natural  and  juridical  actors”);  Dodge,  Corporate  Liability  Under  Cus­
tomary International Law, 43 Geo. J. Int’l L. 1045, 1050 (2012) (“None
of  the  norms  that  are  actionable  under  Sosa  distinguish  between 
natural and juridical persons”). 

Sosa  itself  supports  the  proposition  that  international  law  does  not 
distinguish  between  types  of  private  actors,  but  rather  treats  natural
persons  and  corporations  alike.    Footnote  20  groups  corporations  and
individuals together under the larger category of “private actor.”  Sosa, 
542  U. S.,  at  732,  n. 20  (“if  the  defendant  is  a  private  actor  such  as  a 
corporation or an individual”); see  also id., at  760 (BREYER, J., concur­
ring  in  part  and  concurring  in  judgment)  (“The  norm  must  extend 
liability  to  the  type  of  perpetrator  (e.g.,  a  private  actor)  the  plaintiff 
seeks  to  sue”  (citing  id.,  at  732,  n. 20)).    Sosa  also  describes  the  two 
Court  of  Appeals  decisions  on  which  it  relies  as  having  considered 
whether  there  was  sufficient  consensus  that  particular  conduct— 
torture or genocide—“violates international law” when undertaken “by 
private  actors.”    Id.,  at  732,  n. 20  (discussing  Tel-Oren  v.  Libyan  Arab 
Republic,  726  F. 2d  774,  791–795  (CADC  1984)  (Edwards,  J.,  concur­
ring), and Kadic v. Karadžić, 70 F. 3d 232, 239–241 (CA2 1995)).  Even 
though  the  defendant  in  Kadic  was  a  natural  person,  see  id.,  at  237, 
and the defendants in Tel-Oren were juridical entities, see 726 F. 2d, at 
775–776, Sosa refers to them all as “private actors,” 542 U. S., at 732, 
n. 20.