Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/19pdf/18-556_e1pf.pdf
Page Number: 17.0

Cite as:  589 U. S. ____ (2020) 

5 

KAGAN, J., concurring 

In  this  strange  case,  contested  on  a  barebones  stipula-
tion, the record contains no evidence of these kinds.  There 
is but a single, simple fact: A police officer learned from a
state database that a car on the road belonged to a person 
with a revoked license.  Given that revocations in Kansas 
nearly always stem from serious or repeated driving viola-
tions,  I  agree  with  the  Court  about  the  reasonableness  of 
the officer’s inference that the owner, “Glover[,] was driving
while  his  license  was  revoked.”  Ante,  at  9.  And  because 
Glover  offered  no  rebuttal,  there  the  matter  stands.    But 
that does not mean cases with more complete records will 
all wind up in the same place.  A defendant like Glover may 
still  be  able  to  show  that  his  case  is  different—that  the 
“presence of additional facts” and circumstances “dispel[s] 
reasonable suspicion.”  Ibid.  Which is to say that in more 
fully  litigated  cases,  the  license-revocation  alert  does  not 
(as it did here) end the inquiry.  It is but the first, though 
no  doubt  an  important,  step  in  assessing  the  reasonable-
ness of the officer’s suspicion. 

—————— 
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 21, n. 18 (1968) (“Th[e] demand for specificity 
. . . is the central teaching of this Court’s Fourth Amendment jurispru-
dence”).  But in a case like this one, the officer’s suspicion is individual-
ized:  It  arises from  the  license  status  of  the  known  owner  of  a  specific 
car.  The only question is whether that suspicion is reasonable—whether, 
in  other  words,  there  is  enough  to  back  up  the  officer’s  belief  that  the 
owner is driving the vehicle.  As to that matter, statistics may be highly
relevant, either to support or to cast doubt on the officer’s judgment.