Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/11pdf/10-9646.pdf
Page Number: 34

Cite as:  567 U. S. ____ (2012) 

3 

BREYER, J., concurring 

murder  doctrine  traditionally  attributes  death  caused  in
the  course  of  a  felony  to  all  participants  who  intended  to
commit  the  felony,  regardless  of  whether  they  killed  or 
intended  to  kill.  See  2  W.  LaFave,  Substantive  Criminal 
Law  §§14.5(a)  and  (c)  (2d  ed.  2003).    This  rule  has  been 
based  on  the  idea  of  “transferred  intent”;  the  defendant’s 
intent  to  commit  the  felony  satisfies  the  intent  to  kill 
required  for  murder.  See  S.  Kadish,  S.  Schulhofer,  &  C. 
Steiker, Criminal Law  and  Its  Processes  439  (8th  ed.
2007); 2 C. Torcia, Wharton’s Criminal Law §147 (15th ed. 
1994).

But  in  my  opinion,  this  type  of  “transferred  intent”  is
not  sufficient  to  satisfy  the  intent  to  murder  that  could
subject a juvenile to a sentence of life without parole.  As 
an  initial  matter,  this  Court  has  made  clear  that  this 
artificially  constructed  kind  of  intent  does  not  count  as 
intent for purposes of the Eighth Amendment.  We do not 
rely on transferred intent in determining if an adult may
receive the death penalty.  Thus, the Constitution forbids 
imposing capital punishment upon an aider and abettor in
a robbery, where that individual did not intend to kill and 
simply was “in the car by the side of the road . . . , waiting
to  help  the robbers  escape.”    Enmund,  supra,  at  788.  Cf. 
Tison,  supra,  at  157–158  (capital  punishment  permissi-
ble  for  aider  and  abettor  where  kidnaping  led  to  death
because  he  was  “actively  involved”  in  every  aspect  of  the
kidnaping  and  his  behavior  showed  “a  reckless  disregard 
for  human  life”).    Given  Graham,  this  holding  applies  to
juvenile  sentences  of  life  without  parole  a fortiori.  See 
ante, at 12–13.  Indeed, even juveniles who meet the Tison 
standard of “reckless disregard” may not be eligible for life
without parole.  Rather, Graham dictates a clear rule: The 
only  juveniles  who  may  constitutionally  be  sentenced  to
life without parole are those convicted of homicide offenses
who  “kill  or  intend  to  kill.”  560  U. S.,  at  ___  (slip  op., 
at 18).