Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/22pdf/21-857_4357.pdf
Page Number: 25.0

20 

JONES v. HENDRIX 

Opinion of the Court 

Next, Jones points to Fiore v. White, 531 U. S. 225 (2001) 
(per  curiam),  which  applied  the  rule  that  due  process  re-
quires that the prosecution prove every element of a crime 
beyond a reasonable doubt.  See id., at 228–229.  Whether 
a due process error has occurred at trial, however, is an en-
tirely different issue from Congress’ power to restrict collat-
eral  review.  Due  process  does  not  guarantee  a  direct  ap-
peal,  McKane  v.  Durston,  153  U. S.  684,  687  (1894),  let 
alone the opportunity to have legal issues redetermined in
successive collateral attacks on a final sentence. 

Jones’  last  constitutional  contention—that  the  Eighth
Amendment’s  prohibition  on  cruel  and  unusual  punish-
ments  may  entitle  him  to  another  round  of  collateral  re-
view—fails for a similar reason.  By its terms, the Cruel and
Unusual Punishments Clause expresses a substantive con-
straint on the kinds of punishments governments may “in-
flic[t].”  It creates no freestanding entitlement to a second
or  successive  round  of  postconviction  review,  and  thus  it 
adds nothing to Jones’ unavailing Suspension Clause argu-
ment. 

B 
The  Government  agrees  with  the  Eighth  Circuit  that
Jones is not entitled to relief, but, somewhat surprisingly,
it asks us to adopt a novel, alternative interpretation of the 
saving clause, which it constructs  via a roundabout argu-
ment.  It  begins  with  the  premise  that  the  words  “inade-
quate  or  ineffective”  imply  reference  to  a  “benchmark”  of
adequacy  and  effectiveness.  It  proceeds  to  identify  that
benchmark as the ability to test the types of claims cogniza-
ble  under  the  general  habeas  statutes—specifically,  those
governing federal habeas petitions by state prisoners.  The 
Government  then  reasons  that  §2255(h)’s  limitations  on
second or successive motions asserting newly discovered ev-
idence or new rules of constitutional law do not trigger the