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FRIEDMAN v. HIGHLAND PARK 

THOMAS, J., dissenting 

the  entire  field.”  554  U. S.,  at  635.    We  cautioned  courts 
against leaving the  rest of the field to the legislative pro-
cess:  “Constitutional  rights  are  enshrined  with  the  scope
they  were  understood  to  have  when  the  people  adopted 
them,  whether  or  not  future  legislatures  or  (yes)  even
future judges think that scope too broad.”  Id., at 634–635. 
Based  on  its  crabbed  reading  of  Heller,  the  Seventh 
Circuit felt free to adopt a test for assessing firearm bans 
that  eviscerates  many  of  the  protections  recognized  in 
Heller  and  McDonald.  The  court  asked  in  the  first  in-
stance whether the banned firearms “were common at the 
time  of  ratification”  in  1791.  784  F. 3d,  at  410.    But  we 
said  in  Heller  that  “the  Second  Amendment  extends, 
prima  facie,  to  all  instruments  that  constitute  bearable 
arms, even those that were not in existence at the time of 
the founding.”  554 U. S., at 582. 

The  Seventh  Circuit  alternatively  asked  whether  the
banned firearms relate “to the preservation or efficiency of
a well regulated militia.”  784 F. 3d, at 410 (internal quo-
tation marks omitted).  The court concluded that state and 
local  ordinances  never  run  afoul  of  that  objective,  since 
“states, which are in charge of militias, should be allowed 
to  decide  when  civilians  can  possess  military-grade  fire-
arms.”  Ibid.  But that ignores Heller’s fundamental prem-
ise:  The  right  to  keep  and  bear  arms  is  an  independent,
individual  right. 
Its  scope  is  defined  not  by  what  the
militia  needs,  but  by  what  private  citizens  commonly 
possess.  554  U. S.,  at  592,  627–629.    Moreover,  the  Sev-
enth  Circuit  endorsed  the  view  of  the  militia  that  Heller 
rejected.  We  explained  that  “Congress  retains  plenary
authority  to  organize  the  militia,”  not  States.    Id.,  at  600 
(emphasis  added).    Because  the  Second  Amendment  con-
fers  rights  upon  individual  citizens—not  state  govern-
ments—it  was  doubly  wrong  for  the  Seventh  Circuit  to
delegate to States and localities the power to decide which
firearms people may possess.