Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/529bv.pdf
Page Number: 326

529US1

Unit: $U40

[10-04-01 09:23:11] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 529 U. S. 244 (2000)

251

Opinion of the Court

ation date three years hence. The change in California law
did not, however, prohibit requests for earlier reconsidera-
tion based on a change of circumstances.
Id., at 512–513.
Historical practices within the California penal system indi-
cated “about 90% of all prisoners are found unsuitable for
parole at the initial hearing, while 85% are found unsuitable
at the second and subsequent hearings.”
Id., at 510–511
(citing In re Jackson, 39 Cal. 3d 464, 473, 703 P. 2d 100, 105
(1985)). On these facts we determined the Ex Post Facto
Clause did not prohibit California from conserving and re-
allocating the resources that would otherwise be expended
to conduct annual parole hearings for inmates with little
chance of release. 514 U. S., at 511–512. The sum of these
factors illustrated that the decrease in the frequency of pa-
role suitability proceedings “create[d] only the most specula-
tive and attenuated possibility of producing the prohibited
effect of increasing the measure of punishment for covered
crimes.”

Id., at 509.

Consistent with the Court of Appeals’ analysis, respondent
stresses certain differences between Georgia’s amended pa-
role law and the California statute reviewed in Morales.
The amendment to Rule 475–3–.05(2), respondent urges, per-
mits the extension of parole reconsiderations by ﬁve years
(not just by two years); covers all prisoners serving life sen-
tences (not just multiple murderers); and affords inmates
fewer procedural safeguards (in particular, no formal hear-
ings in which counsel can be present). These differences are
not dispositive. The question is whether the amended Geor-
gia Rule creates a signiﬁcant risk of prolonging respondent’s
incarceration. See ibid. The requisite risk is not inherent
in the framework of amended Rule 475–3–.05(2), and it has
not otherwise been demonstrated on the record.

Our decision in Morales did not suggest all States must
model their procedures governing consideration for parole
after those of California to avoid offending the Ex Post Facto
Clause. The analysis undertaken in Morales did identify