Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/558bv.pdf
Page Number: 257.0

96 

ALVAREZ  v.  SMITH 

Opinion of the Court 

issues in those six cases were issues solely of state substan­
tive law: Were the cars and the cash forfeitable or not?  And 
court  docket  sheets  suggest  that  the  six  state  cases  termi­
nated on substantive grounds in the ordinary course of such 
state proceedings.  In the three automobile cases, the State 
voluntarily dismissed the proceedings and returned the cars 
between 11 and 40 months after the seizures, a long enough 
time  for  the  State  to  have  investigated  the  matters  and  to 
have determined (after the termination of any related crimi­
nal proceedings) for evidentiary reasons that it did not wish 
to  claim  the  cars.  See  Dockets  in  People  v.  2004  Chevrolet 
Impala,  No.  2006–COFO–000296  (Cir.  Ct.  Cook  Cty.,  Ill.) 
(Brunston’s  car  returned  on  July  27,  2009);  People  v.  Smith, 
No. 2006–COFO–000036 (Cir. Ct. Cook Cty., Ill.) (Smith’s car 
returned on May 5, 2008); and People v.  1999 Chevrolet Mal­
ibu, No. 2006–COFO–000288 (Cir. Ct. Cook Cty., Ill.) (Perez’s 
car  returned  on  Jan.  29,  2007).  In  the  remaining  contested 
case, involving cash, the State voluntarily dismissed the pro­
ceedings  after  14  months,  again  a  long  enough  time  for  the 
State to have weighed the evidence and found a compromise 
settlement appropriate on the merits.  See Docket in People 
v.  $1,500 in U. S. Currency, No. 2006–COFO–000201 (Cir. Ct. 
Cook  Cty.,  Ill.)  (Waldo’s  cash  returned  on  Mar.  19,  2007). 
The  disparate  dates  at  which  the  plaintiffs’  forfeiture  pro­
ceedings terminated—11, 14, 27, and 40 months after the sei­
zures—indicate that  the State’s Attorney  did not coordinate 
the resolution of the plaintiffs’ state-court cases, either with 
each  other  or  with  the  plaintiffs’  federal  civil  rights  case. 
Cf. Munsingwear, supra, at 39–40 (stating that a lower court 
judgment would have been vacated even though an action of 
the  party  seeking  review  had  brought  about  the  mootness 
because that action—a commodity being decontrolled by Ex­
ecutive Order—was basically unrelated); see also Fleming v. 
Munsingwear, Inc., 162 F. 2d 125, 127 (CA8 1947). 

For  these  reasons,  we  believe  that  the  presence  of  this 
federal  case  played  no  signiﬁcant  role  in  the  termination  of