Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/23pdf/22-859new_kjfm.pdf
Page Number: 88.0

28 

SEC v. JARKESY 

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting 

the substance” of the claim.  Ante, at 21. 

By no means, though, does this case involve a “purely tax-
onomic  change.”  Granfinanciera,  492  U. S.,  at  61.    Con-
gress did not just repackage a common-law claim under a 
new label.  It created new statutory obligations and an en-
tire federal scheme.  See supra, at 14–16.10  Perhaps most
importantly, Congress created a new right unknown to the 
common law that, unlike common-law fraud, belongs to the 
public and inheres in the Government in its sovereign ca-
pacity.  That is why, when the SEC seeks to enforce the fed-
eral-securities  laws,  it does  so  to  remedy  the  harm  to  the
United States.  See supra, at 16.  It seeks to protect the in-
tegrity of the securities market as a whole through the im-
position  of  new  and  distinct  remedies  like  civil  penalties 
—————— 
matters, although the Government is a proper party.”  Northern Pipeline 
Constr.  Co.,  458  U. S.,  at  70,  n.  24  (plurality  opinion)  (citing  United 
States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U. S. 11 (1955)).  That is so not only
because this Court has held as much, but also because Article III itself 
prescribes that “[t]he trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment,
shall be by Jury.”  §2, cl. 3.  In other words, Article III requires criminal 
trials to take place before a jury in federal court, but says nothing about
civil-penalty claims brought by the Government.  Beyond criminal trials,
the Solicitor General also concedes that, under this Court’s precedents,
the public-rights doctrine does not apply when the Government brings a 
common-law claim in a proprietary capacity.  See Reply Brief 8, n. 2. 

10 The majority spills much ink on the perceived similarities between 
federal-securities fraud and common-law fraud, only to conclude that the
causes  of  action  are  not  identical.    That  conclusion  was  inevitable  be-
cause of critical differences between the two.  Even if Congress drew upon 
common-law fraud when it enacted federal-securities laws, see ante, at 
11–12,  this  Court  has  repeatedly  disclaimed  any  suggestion  that  Con-
gress federalized a common-law fraud claim.  See, e.g., Stoneridge Invest-
ment Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U. S. 148, 162 (2008)
(“Section 10(b) does not incorporate common-law fraud into federal law”); 
SEC v. Zandford, 535 U. S. 813, 820 (2002) (“[T]he statute must not be
construed so broadly as to convert every common-law fraud that happens
to involve securities into a violation of §10(b)”); Herman & MacLean v. 
Huddleston, 459 U. S. 375, 388–389 (1983) (“[T]he antifraud provisions
of the securities laws are not coextensive with common-law doctrines of 
fraud”).