Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/16pdf/15-1358_6khn.pdf
Page Number: 5.0

Cite as:  582 U. S. ____ (2017) 

5 

Syllabus 

must be regarded as a new one.  Pp. 23–26.

4. Petitioners are entitled to qualified immunity with respect to re-

spondents’ claims under 42 U. S. C. §1985(3).  Pp. 26–32. 

(a) Assuming  that  respondents’  allegations  are  true  and  well 
pleaded,  the  question  is  whether  a  reasonable  officer  in  petitioners’ 
position would have known the alleged conduct was an unlawful con-
spiracy.  The qualified-immunity inquiry turns on the “objective legal
reasonableness” of the official’s acts, Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U. S. 
800, 819, “assessed in light of the legal rules that were ‘clearly estab-
lished’  at  the  time  [the  action]  was  taken,”  Anderson  v.  Creighton, 
483 U. S. 635, 639.  If it would have been clear to a reasonable officer 
that  the  alleged  conduct  “was  unlawful  in  the  situation  he  confront-
ed,”  Saucier  v.  Katz,  533  U. S.  194,  202,  the  defendant  officer  is  not 
entitled to qualified immunity.  But if a reasonable officer might not
have  known  that  the  conduct  was  unlawful,  then  the  officer  is  enti-
tled to qualified immunity.  Pp. 27–29. 

(b) Here,  reasonable  officials  in  petitioners’  positions  would  not 
have  known  with  sufficient  certainty  that  §1985(3)  prohibited  their
joint consultations and the resulting policies.  There are two reasons. 
First,  the  conspiracy  is  alleged  to  have  been  among  officers  in  the 
same Department of the Federal Government.  And there is no clear-
ly established law on the issue whether agents of the same executive
department are distinct enough to “conspire” with one another within 
the meaning of 42 U. S. C. §1985(3).  Second, open discussion among
federal officers should be encouraged to help those officials reach con-
sensus  on  department  policies,  so  there  is  a  reasonable  argument 
that  §1985(3)  liability  should  not  extend  to  cases  like  this  one.    As 
these  considerations  indicate,  the  question  whether  federal  officials 
can  be  said  to  “conspire”  in  these  kinds  of  situations  is  sufficiently
open  that  the  officials  in  this  suit  would  not  have  known  that 
§1985(3) applied to their discussions and actions.  It follows that rea-
sonable  officers  in  petitioners’  positions  would  not  have  known  with 
any  certainty  that  the  alleged  agreements  were  forbidden  by  that 
statute.  Pp. 29–32. 

KENNEDY, J., delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts
I, II, III, IV–A, and V, in which ROBERTS, C. J., and THOMAS and ALITO, 
JJ.,  joined,  and  an  opinion  with  respect  to  Part  IV–B,  in  which  ROB-
ERTS, C. J., and ALITO, J., joined.  THOMAS, J., filed an opinion concur-
ring  in  part  and  concurring  in  the  judgment.    BREYER,  J.,  filed  a  dis-
senting  opinion,  in  which  GINSBURG,  J.,  joined.    SOTOMAYOR,  KAGAN, 
and  GORSUCH,  JJ.,  took  no  part  in  the  consideration  or  decision  of  the 
cases.