Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/21pdf/21-5726_5iel.pdf
Page Number: 13.0

10 

KEMP v. UNITED STATES 

Opinion of the Court 

principle applies only when a term’s meaning was “well-set-
tled”  before  the  transplantation,  Neder  v.  United  States, 
527 U. S. 1, 22 (1999).  Here, it was not. 

Finally, Kemp invokes Rule 60(b)’s 1946 amendments re-
placing “bills of review” and other traditional, postjudgment 
reopening mechanisms with Rules 60(b)(2) through (b)(6). 
See  Fed.  Rule  Civ.  Proc.  60(b)  (1946).  He  argues  that
Rule 60(b)(6) alone was intended to afford relief for judicial 
legal errors that had previously been remedied by bills of
review,  because  such  errors  were  not  cognizable  under
Rule 60(b)’s  “mistake”  provision  or  its  predecessor  state 
rules prior to the 1946 amendments.  But, as noted, the pre-
amendment Rule 60(b) covered only a party’s mistakes, see 
supra, at 5–6, and for that reason could not be grounds to
correct a judge’s legal mistake.  By eliminating that party-
specific  qualifier,  the  1946  amendments  opened  Rule 
60(b)(1)  to  judicial  mistakes  of  law  previously  remediable
only by bills of review. 

* 

* 

* 
In  sum,  nothing  in  the  text,  structure,  or  history  of
Rule 60(b) persuades us to narrowly interpret the otherwise
broad term “mistake” to exclude judicial errors of law.  Be-
cause Kemp’s Rule 60(b) motion alleged such a legal error,
we affirm the Eleventh Circuit’s judgment that the motion 
was cognizable under Rule 60(b)(1), subject to a 1-year lim-
itations period, and, therefore, untimely. 

It is so ordered.