Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/558bv.pdf
Page Number: 386.0

Cite as: 558 U. S. 220 (2010) 

225 

Per Curiam 

Our dissenting colleagues allege that the Court is “degrad­
[ing] . . . our traditional requirements for a GVR.”  Post, at 
228 (opinion of Scalia, J.); see post, at 232 (opinion of Alito, 
J.).  But the standard for an order granting certiorari, vacat­
ing  the  judgment  below,  and  remanding  the  case  (GVR)  re­
mains  as  it  always  has  been:  A  GVR  is  appropriate  when 
“intervening developments . . .  reveal a  reasonable probabil­
ity  that  the  decision  below  rests  upon  a  premise  that  the 
lower court would reject if given the opportunity for further 
consideration, and where it appears that such a redetermina­
tion  may  determine  the  ultimate  outcome”  of  the  matter. 
Lawrence  v.  Chater,  516  U. S.  163,  167  (1996)  (per  curiam). 
As already discussed, there is, at least, a “reasonable proba­
bility,” ibid., that the denial of discovery and an evidentiary 
hearing  rested  in  part  on  the  Cone  error.  And  in  light  of 
the unusual facts of the case, a “redetermination may deter­
mine  the  ultimate  outcome,”  516  U. S.,  at  167;  cf.  Williams 
v.  Taylor,  529  U. S.  420,  442  (2000)  (holding  that  several 
“omissions  as  a  whole  disclose  the  need  for  an  evidentiary 
hearing”); Smith v.  Phillips, 455 U. S. 209, 215 (1982) (“This 
Court has long held that the remedy for allegations of juror 
partiality is a hearing in which the defendant has the oppor­
tunity to prove actual bias”).  The Eleventh Circuit’s opinion 
is ambiguous in signiﬁcant respects.  It would be highly in­
appropriate  to  assume  away  that  ambiguity  in  respondent’s 
favor.  That  is  especially  so  in  a  case  in  which  petitioner’s 
allegations  and  the  unusual  facts  raise  a  serious  question 
about the fairness of a capital trial. 

Both  dissenting  opinions  suggest  that  if  there  is  a  strong 
case for discovery and an evidentiary hearing, then the Court 
“should  summarily  reverse  or  set  the  case  for  argument.” 
Post, at 227 (opinion of Scalia, J.); see also post, at 232 (opin­
ion of Alito,  J.).  But  as  we  have  explained,  “a  GVR  order 
conserves  the  scarce  resources  of  this  Court,”  “assists  the 
court  below  by  ﬂagging  a  particular  issue  that  it  does  not 
appear  to  have  fully  considered,”  and  “assists  this  Court  by