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VIKING RIVER CRUISES, INC. v. MORIANA 

Syllabus 

specifying that if the waiver was found invalid, such a dispute would 
presumptively be litigated in court.  Under the severability clause, any
“portion” of the waiver that remained valid would be “enforced in arbi-
tration.”  Viking moved to compel arbitration of Moriana’s individual
PAGA claim and to dismiss her other PAGA claims.  Applying Califor-
nia’s  Iskanian  precedent,  the  California  courts  denied  that  motion,
holding that categorical waivers of PAGA standing are contrary to Cal-
ifornia policy and that PAGA claims cannot be split into arbitrable “in-
dividual”  claims  and  nonarbitrable  “representative”  claims.    This 
Court granted certiorari to decide whether the FAA preempts the Cal-
ifornia rule. 

Held: The FAA preempts the rule of Iskanian insofar as it precludes di-
vision  of  PAGA  actions  into  individual  and  non-individual  claims 
through an agreement to arbitrate.  Pp. 7–21.

(a) Based on the principle that “[a]rbitration is strictly ‘a matter of 
consent,’ ” Granite Rock Co. v. Teamsters, 561 U. S. 287, 299, this Court 
has held that “a party may not be compelled under the FAA to submit
to class arbitration unless there is a contractual basis for concluding 
that the party agreed to do so,” Stolt-Nielsen S. A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l 
Corp., 559 U. S. 662, 684.  Because class-action arbitration mandates 
procedural changes that are inconsistent with the individualized and
informal mode of bilateral arbitration contemplated by the FAA, see 
AT&T  Mobility  LLC  v.  Concepcion,  563  U. S.  333,  347,  class  proce-
dures  cannot  be  imposed  by  state  law  without  presenting  unwilling
parties with an unacceptable choice between being compelled to arbi-
trate using such procedures and forgoing arbitration all together.  
Viking contends that the Court’s FAA precedents require enforcement 
of contractual provisions waiving the right to bring PAGA actions be-
cause PAGA creates a form of class or collective proceeding.  If this is 
correct, Iskanian’s prohibition on PAGA waivers presents parties with
an impermissible choice: Either arbitrate disputes using a form of class
procedures,  or  do  not  arbitrate  at  all.    Moriana  maintains  that  any 
conflict between Iskanian and the FAA is illusory because PAGA cre-
ates nothing more than a substantive cause of action. 

This Court disagrees with both characterizations of the statute.  Mo-
riana’s premise that PAGA creates a unitary private cause of action is
irreconcilable with the structure of the statute and the ordinary legal 
meaning of the word “claim.”  A PAGA action asserting multiple viola-
tions under California’s Labor Code affecting a range of different em-
ployees does not constitute “a single claim” in even the broadest possi-
ble  sense.  Viking’s  position,  on  the  other  hand,  elides  important
structural  differences  between  PAGA  actions  and  class  actions.    A 
class-action plaintiff can raise a multitude of claims because he or she