Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/19pdf/19-177_b97c.pdf
Page Number: 24.0

Cite as:  591 U. S. ____ (2020) 

11 

BREYER, J., dissenting 

imposed  on  a  nonprofit’s  §501(c)(3)  organization  because 
the nonprofit could still speak through a separate §501(c)(4)
organization.  See  461  U. S.,  at  544.    Put  simply,  one
speaker (the nonprofit) could act (and speak) through two
legally  separate  entities  (the  §501(c)(3)  and  §501(c)(4)  or-
ganizations).

Recall also our similar observation in League of Women 
Voters.  There we noted that a funding condition’s ban on 
editorializing would have been constitutional if, in contrast
to  the  law  at  issue,  the  statute  let  noncommercial  broad-
casters “make known” their “views on matters of public im-
portance” by speaking through legally separate “editorial-
izing affiliate[s].”  468 U. S., at 400.  Once again, we made
clear that a single speaker can act (and speak) through two 
legally  separate  entities.  But  because  the  speaker  in 
League of Women Voters was not free to do so, we held that 
the  Government’s  funding  condition  violated  the  First 
Amendment.  Id., at 400–401. 

Regan and League of Women Voters are far from our only 
precedents  recognizing  this 
firmly  entrenched  First 
Amendment  principle.  See  Legal  Services  Corporation  v. 
Velazquez, 531 U. S. 533, 546 (2001) (observing that organ-
izational affiliates may provide “alternative channel[s] for 
expression” by a single speaker); Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U. S. 
173, 196–198 (1991) (similar).  We reiterated that rule once 
again in AOSI I.  See 570 U. S., at 215–217, 219. 

Thus, in the First Amendment context, the corporate veil
is  not  an  iron  curtain.    Just  the  opposite.    We  attribute 
speech across corporate lines all the time.

Rightly  so.  When  a  funding  condition  restricts  speech,
this  familiar  framework  often  avoids  First  Amendment 
problems by allowing “alternative channel[s]” for speakers
to express themselves.  Velazquez, 531 U. S., at 546.  And 
when  a  funding  condition  compels  speech,  the  same  logic 
leads to a similarly sensible result: The Government may 
not  require  you  to  speak  out  of  both  sides  of  your  mouth,