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Page Number: 31

26 

SEC v. JARKESY 

Opinion of the Court 

Even as Atlas Roofing invoked the public rights exception,
the definition it offered of the exception was circular.  The 
exception applied, the Court said, “in cases in which ‘public 
rights’ are being litigated—e. g., cases in which the Govern-
ment sues in its sovereign capacity to enforce public rights
created by statutes.”  430 U. S., at 450; see id., at 458. 

After Atlas Roofing, this Court clarified in Tull that the 
Seventh Amendment does apply to novel statutory regimes,
so long as the claims are akin to common law claims.  See 
481 U. S., at 421–423.  In addition, we have explained that
the  public  rights  exception  does  not  apply  automatically 
whenever Congress assigns a matter to an agency for adju-
dication.  See Granfinanciera, 492 U. S., at 52. 

For its part, the dissent also seems to suggest that Atlas 
Roofing establishes that the public rights exception applies 
whenever  a  statute  increases  governmental  efficiency. 
Post, at 15 (opinion of SOTOMAYOR, J.).  Again, our prece-
dents foreclose this argument.  As Stern explained, effects
like increasing efficiency and reducing public costs are not
enough to trigger the exception.  See 564 U. S., at 501; INS 
v. Chadha, 462 U. S. 919, 944 (1983).  Otherwise, evading 

—————— 
enth amendment, either in terms of precedent or the language and his-
tory of the amendment.”); M. Redish & D. La Fave, Seventh Amendment 
Right to Jury Trial in Non-Article III Proceedings: A Study in Dysfunc-
tional  Constitutional  Theory,  4  Wm.  &  Mary  Bill  of  Right  J.  407,  436 
(1995) (criticizing Atlas Roofing for failing to “provid[e] a principled basis
upon which to determine the proper scope of congressional power to re-
move the civil jury from federal adjudications”); V. Amar, Implementing
an Historical Version of the Jury in an Age of Administrative Factfinding
and Sentencing Guidelines, 47 S. Tex. L. Rev. 291, 298 (2005) (question-
ing Atlas Roofing for “invert[ing] and turn[ing] on its head the Apprendi
doctrine’s  central  insight  that  juries  are  most  important  to  check  the 
power of the state” (emphasis deleted)); C. Nelson, Adjudication in the 
Political Branches, 107 Colum. L. Rev. 559, 604–605, and n. 189 (2007) 
(describing Atlas Roofing as “misus[ing]” precedent to “deny the novelty
of its holding” and “drive a wedge” into the traditional understanding of
the  public-private  rights  distinction).    We  express  no  opinion  on  these 
various criticisms.