Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/529bv.pdf
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UNITED STATES v. PLAYBOY ENTERTAINMENT
GROUP, INC.
Opinion of the Court

321 (1988) (opinion of O’Connor, J.). This is the essence of
content-based regulation.

Not only does § 505 single out particular programming con-
tent for regulation, it also singles out particular program-
mers. The speech in question was not thought by Congress
to be so harmful that all channels were subject to restriction.
Instead, the statutory disability applies only to channels
“primarily dedicated to sexually-oriented programming.”
47 U. S. C. § 561(a) (1994 ed., Supp. III). One sponsor of the
measure even identiﬁed appellee by name. See 141 Cong.
Rec. 15587 (1995) (statement of Sen. Feinstein) (noting the
statute would apply to channels “such as the Playboy and
Spice channels”). Laws designed or intended to suppress or
restrict the expression of speciﬁc speakers contradict basic
First Amendment principles. Section 505 limited Playboy’s
market as a penalty for its programming choice, though other
channels capable of transmitting like material are alto-
gether exempt.

The effect of the federal statute on the protected speech
is now apparent.
It is evident that the only reasonable way
for a substantial number of cable operators to comply with
the letter of § 505 is to time channel, which silences the pro-
tected speech for two-thirds of the day in every home in a
cable service area, regardless of the presence or likely pres-
ence of children or of the wishes of the viewers. According
to the District Court, “30 to 50% of all adult programming is
viewed by households prior to 10 p.m.,” when the safe-harbor
30 F. Supp. 2d, at 711. To prohibit this
period begins.
much speech is a signiﬁcant restriction of communication be-
tween speakers and willing adult listeners, communication
which enjoys First Amendment protection.
It is of no mo-
ment that the statute does not impose a complete prohibi-
tion. The distinction between laws burdening and laws ban-
ning speech is but a matter of degree. The Government’s
content-based burdens must satisfy the same rigorous scru-
tiny as its content-based bans.