Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/17pdf/17-130_4f14.pdf
Page Number: 14.0

Cite as:  585 U. S. ____ (2018) 

11 

Opinion of the Court 

the  proceedings—a  powerful  disincentive  to  resist  a  court
order.  See §201.180(a)(1)(i); supra, at 9.  Similarly, if the
offender  is  an  attorney,  the  ALJ  can  “[s]ummarily  sus-
pend”  him  from  representing  his  client—not  something
the typical lawyer wants to invite.  §201.180(a)(1)(ii).  And 
finally,  a  judge  who  will,  in  the  end,  issue  an  opinion 
complete  with  factual  findings,  legal  conclusions,  and 
sanctions  has  substantial  informal  power  to  ensure  the
parties  stay  in  line.  Contrary  to  the  amicus’s  view,  all 
that  is  enough  to  satisfy  Freytag’s  fourth  item  (even  sup-
posing, which we do not decide, that each of those items is
necessary for someone conducting adversarial hearings to
count as an officer).
  And  the  amicus’s  standard-of-review  distinction  fares 
just as badly.  The Freytag Court never suggested that the
deference  given  to  STJs’  factual  findings  mattered  to  its 
Appointments  Clause  analysis.  Indeed,  the  relevant  part
of  Freytag  did  not  so  much  as  mention  the  subject  (even
though  it  came  up  at  oral  argument,  see  Tr.  of  Oral  Arg.
33–41).  And  anyway,  the  Commission  often  accords  a 
similar  deference  to  its  ALJs,  even  if  not  by  regulation. 
The  Commission  has  repeatedly  stated,  as  it  did  below, 
that its ALJs are in the “best position to make findings of 
fact”  and  “resolve  any  conflicts  in  the  evidence.”    App.  to 
Pet.  for  Cert.  241a  (quoting  In re  Nasdaq  Stock  Market, 
LLC, SEC Release No. 57741 (Apr. 30, 2008)).  (That was
why  the  SEC  insisted  that  Judge  Elliot  make  factual
findings  on  all  four  allegations  of  Lucia’s  deception.    See 
supra, at 3.)  And when factfinding derives from credibility
judgments,  as  it  frequently  does,  acceptance  is  near-
automatic.  Recognizing  ALJs’  “personal  experience  with
the  witnesses,”  the  Commission  adopts  their  “credibility
finding[s] absent overwhelming evidence to the contrary.”
App.  to  Pet.  for  Cert.  241a;  In re  Clawson,  SEC  Release 
No. 48143 (July 9, 2003).  That practice erases the consti-
tutional line the amicus proposes to draw.