Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/23pdf/23-411_3dq3.pdf
Page Number: 4.0

4 

MURTHY v. MISSOURI 

Syllabus 

(3) To obtain forward-looking relief, the plaintiffs must establish 
a substantial risk of future injury that is traceable to the Government 
defendants and likely to be redressed by an injunction against them. 
The  plaintiffs  who  have  not  pointed  to  any  past  restrictions  likely 
traceable  to  the  Government  defendants  (i.e.,  everyone  other  than 
Hines) are ill suited to the task of establishing their standing to seek
forward-looking relief.  But even Hines, with her superior showing on 
past harm, has not shown enough to demonstrate likely future harm 
at the hands of these defendants.  On this record, it appears that the 
frequent, intense communications that took place in 2021 between the 
Government defendants and the platforms had considerably subsided
by 2022, when Hines filed suit.  Thus it is “no more than conjecture” 
to assume that Hines will be subject to Government-induced content 
moderation.  Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U. S. 95, 108. 

The plaintiffs’ counterarguments are unpersuasive.  First, they ar-
gue  that  they  suffer  “continuing,  present  adverse  effects”  from  their 
past  restrictions,  as  they  must  now  self-censor  on  social  media. 
O’Shea,  414  U. S.,  at  496.    But  the  plaintiffs  “cannot  manufacture
standing merely by inflicting harm on themselves based on their fears
of hypothetical future harm that is not certainly impending.”  Clapper, 
568  U. S.,  at  416.    Second,  the  plaintiffs  suggest  that  the  platforms 
continue  to  suppress  their  speech  according  to  policies  initially
adopted  under  Government  pressure.    But  the  plaintiffs  have  a  re-
dressability problem.  Without evidence of continued pressure from the
defendants,  the  platforms  remain  free  to  enforce,  or  not  to  enforce, 
their  policies—even  those  tainted  by  initial  governmental  coercion. 
And the available evidence indicates that the platforms have contin-
ued to enforce their policies against COVID–19 misinformation even 
as  the  Federal  Government  has  wound  down  its  own  pandemic  re-
sponse measures.  Enjoining the Government defendants, therefore, is 
unlikely to affect the platforms’ content-moderation decisions.  Pp. 21– 
27. 

(c) The plaintiffs next assert a “right to listen” theory of standing. 
The  individual  plaintiffs  argue  that  the  First  Amendment  protects 
their interest in reading and engaging with the content of other speak-
ers on social media.  This theory is startlingly broad, as it would grant
all social-media users the right to sue over someone else’s censorship—
at least so long as they claim an interest in that person’s speech.  While 
the Court has recognized a “First Amendment right to receive infor-
mation  and  ideas,”  the  Court  has  identified  a  cognizable  injury  only 
where the listener has a concrete, specific connection to the speaker. 
Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U. S. 753, 762.  Attempting to satisfy this 
requirement, the plaintiffs emphasize that hearing unfettered speech