Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/17pdf/16-402_h315.pdf
Page Number: 117

Cite as:  585 U. S. ____ (2018) 

19 

GORSUCH, J., dissenting 

“search  or  seizure”  by  the  government  implicating  the
Fourth  Amendment,  see  ante,  at  2–12  (opinion  of  ALITO, 
J.),  but  instead  as  an  act  of  compelled  self-incrimination
implicating  the  Fifth  Amendment,  see  United  States  v. 
Hubbell,  530  U. S.  27,  49–55  (2000)  (THOMAS, J.,  dissent-
ing);  Nagareda,  Compulsion  “To  Be  a  Witness”  and  the
Resurrection of Boyd, 74 N. Y. U. L. Rev. 1575, 1619, and 
n. 172  (1999).    But  the  common  law  of  searches  and  sei-
zures  does  not  appear  to  have  confronted  a  case  where
private  documents  equivalent  to  a  mailed  letter  were 
entrusted  to  a  bailee  and  then  subpoenaed.    As  a  result, 
“[t]he  common-law  rule  regarding  subpoenas  for  docu-
ments  held  by  third  parties  entrusted  with  information 
from the target is . . . unknown and perhaps unknowable.” 
Dripps,  Perspectives  on  The  Fourth  Amendment  Forty
Years Later: Toward the Realization of an Inclusive Regu-
latory Model, 100 Minn. L. Rev. 1885, 1922 (2016).  Given 
that  (perhaps  insoluble)  uncertainty,  I  am  content  to 
adhere to Jackson and its implications for now. 

To be sure, we must be wary of returning to the doctrine 
of Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616.  Boyd invoked the 
Fourth  Amendment  to  restrict  the  use  of  subpoenas  even 
for ordinary business records and, as JUSTICE ALITO notes, 
eventually proved unworkable.  See ante, at 13 (dissenting 
opinion); 3 W. LaFave, J. Israel, N. King, & O. Kerr, Crim-
inal Procedure §8.7(a), pp. 185–187 (4th ed. 2015).  But if 
we  were  to  overthrow  Jackson  too  and  deny  Fourth 
Amendment  protection  to  any  subpoenaed  materials,  we
would do well to reconsider the scope of the Fifth Amend-
ment  while  we’re  at  it.  Our  precedents  treat  the  right
against self-incrimination as applicable only to testimony,
not  the  production  of  incriminating  evidence.  See  Fisher 
v.  United  States,  425  U. S.  391,  401  (1976).    But  there  is 
substantial  evidence  that  the  privilege  against  self-
incrimination  was  also  originally  understood  to  protect  a 
person  from  being  forced  to  turn  over  potentially  incrimi-