Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/558bv.pdf
Page Number: 296.0

Cite as: 558 U. S. 120 (2010) 

135 

Per Curiam 

tion  of  the  claim  was  “contrary  to,  or  involved  an  unreason­
able  application  of,  clearly  established  Federal  law.”  28 
U. S. C.  § 2254(d)(1).  The  clearly  established  law  he  points 
us  to  is  Manson  v.  Brathwaite,  432  U. S.  98,  114  (1977),  in 
which  we  held  that  when  the  police  have  used  a  suggestive 
eyewitness  identiﬁcation  procedure,  “reliability  is  the  linch­
pin  in  determining”  whether  an  eyewitness  identiﬁcation 
may  be  admissible,  with  reliability  determined  according  to 
factors  set  out  in  Neil  v.  Biggers,  409  U. S.  188  (1972).  Re­
spondent  argues  that  the  admission  of  the  inaccurate  DNA 
testimony  violated  Brathwaite  because  the  testimony  was 
“identiﬁcation testimony,” 432 U. S., at 114, was “unnecessar­
ily suggestive,” id., at 113, and was unreliable. 

Respondent  has  forfeited  this  claim,  which  he  makes  for 
the  very  ﬁrst  time  in  his  brief  on  the  merits  in  this  Court. 
Respondent  did  not  present  his  new  “DNA  due  process” 
claim in his federal habeas  petition, but instead consistently 
argued that Romero’s testimony should be excluded from the 
Jackson analysis simply because it was “unreliable” and that 
the due process violation occurred because the remaining ev­
idence was insufﬁcient to convict.  See App. to Pet. for Cert. 
157a (“[Respondent] asserts . . . that the DNA evidence was 
unreliable and should not have been admitted at his trial.  If 
so, then, . . . the state presented insufﬁcient evidence at trial 
to prove [respondent] guilty”).  In the Ninth Circuit, too, re­
spondent  presented  only  his  Jackson  claim,7  and  it  is,  at 
the  least,  unclear  whether  respondent  presented  his  newly 

7 The  Court  of  Appeals  did  reason  that  Romero’s  testimony  must  be 
excluded  from  the  Jackson  analysis  on  due  process  grounds.  525  F.  3d, 
at  797.  But  that  decision  was  inextricably  intertwined  with  the  claim 
respondent  did  make  in  his  federal  habeas  petition  under  Jackson.  It  is 
clear  the  Ninth  Circuit  was  never  asked  to  consider—and  did  not  pass 
upon—the  question  whether  the  Nevada  Supreme  Court  entered  a  deci­
sion  on  direct  appeal  that  was contrary  to  or  an  unreasonable  application 
of  Manson  v.  Brathwaite,  432  U. S.  98  (1977),  or  any  other  clearly  estab­
lished law regarding due process other than Jackson.