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16 

GOOGLE LLC v. ORACLE AMERICA, INC. 

Opinion of the Court 

499  U. S.,  at  349  (noting  that  “the  copyright  in  a  factual
compilation is thin”); see also  Experian Information Solu-
tions,  Inc.  v.  Nationwide  Marketing  Servs.  Inc.,  893  F. 3d 
1176, 1186 (CA9 2018) (“In the context of factual compila-
tions, . . . there can be no infringement unless the works are
virtually identical” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 

Generically  speaking,  computer  programs  differ  from 
books, films, and many other “literary works” in that such 
programs almost always serve functional purposes.  These 
and other differences have led at least some judges to com-
plain that “applying copyright law to computer programs is 
like assembling a jigsaw puzzle whose pieces do not quite
fit.”  Lotus Development Corp. v. Borland Int’l, Inc., 49 F. 
3d 807, 820 (CA1 1995) (Boudin, J., concurring). 

These  differences  also  led  Congress  to  think  long  and
hard about whether to grant computer programs copyright 
protection.  In 1974, Congress established a National Com-
mission on New Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works 
(CONTU)  to  look  into  the  matter.    §§201–208,  88  Stat. 
1873–1875.  After several years of research, CONTU con-
cluded that the “availability of copyright protection for com-
puter  programs  is  desirable.”  Final  Report  11  (July  31, 
1978).  At the same time, it recognized that computer pro-
grams had unique features.  Mindful of not “unduly burden-
ing users of programs and the general public,” it wrote that 
copyright  “should  not  grant  anyone  more  economic  power 
than is necessary to achieve the incentive to create.”  Id., at 
12.  And it believed that copyright’s existing doctrines (e.g., 
fair  use),  applied  by  courts  on  a  case-by-case  basis,  could 
prevent  holders  from  using  copyright  to  stifle  innovation. 
Ibid. (“Relatively few changes in the Copyright Act of 1976
are  required  to  attain  these  objectives”).    Congress  then 
wrote computer program protection into the law.  See §10,
94 Stat. 3028. 

The upshot, in our view, is that fair use can play an im-
portant role in determining the lawful scope of a computer