Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/21pdf/20-493_jgko.pdf
Page Number: 32.0

8 

YSLETA DEL SUR PUEBLO v. TEXAS 

ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting 

type of activity apply on tribal land, while state laws that
simply regulate the activity do not.  And as the Tribe sees 
it, Texas does not ban the playing of bingo under all circum-
stances, so none of the State’s restrictions on the game ap-
ply.

The Court today accepts the Tribe’s position, but I am not

persuaded. 

A 
1 
I begin with the statute’s plain text.  Section 107(a) pro-

vides: 

“All  gaming  activities  which  are  prohibited  by  the 
laws of the State of Texas are hereby prohibited on the 
reservation and on lands of the tribe.  Any violation of
the prohibition provided in this subsection shall be sub-
ject  to  the  same  civil  and  criminal  penalties  that  are
provided by the laws of the State of Texas.  The provi-
sions of this subsection are enacted in accordance with 
the tribe’s request in Tribal Resolution No. T.C.–02–86
which was approved and certified on March 12, 1986.” 
101 Stat. 668–669. 

The best reading of this statute is that all of Texas’s gam-
bling rules apply in full on the Tribe’s land.  “All” gaming
activities prohibited by Texas are prohibited on the reser-
vation.  “Any” violation is subject to the same penalties that
Texas would ordinarily impose.

The Tribe posits that this plain text may be read to refer
only to the banning of entire games—such as poker, bacca-
rat, or roulette.  See Brief for Petitioners 27–28.  But had 
Congress wished to adopt this narrower definition of “gam-
ing activities,” it easily could have done so.  For example, it
could  have  referred  to  “types  of  gambling,”  or  mentioned
that the prohibition would apply only if Texas “flatly,” “cat-
egorically,”  or  “completely”  banned  a  particular  type  of