Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/558bv.pdf
Page Number: 322.0

Cite as: 558 U. S. 139 (2010) 

161 

Opinion of Stevens, J. 

The untenable choice Spisak describes is perfectly analogous 
to the quandary, discussed above, that we described in Beck. 
See  also  447  U. S.,  at  644  (“It  is  extremely  doubtful  that  ju­
ries will understand the full implications of a mistrial or will 
have  any  conﬁdence  that  their  choice  of  the  mistrial  option 
will  ultimately  lead  to  the  right  result.  Thus,  they  could 
have  no  assurance  that  a  second  trial  would  end  in  the 
conviction  of  the  defendant  on  a  lesser  included  offense” 
(footnote  omitted)).  Spisak  and  the  Court  of  Appeals  both 
correctly  assailed  the  jury  instructions  at  issue  in  this  case, 
but  in  my  view  Beck  provides  the  proper  basis  in  clearly 
established  federal  law  to  conclude  the  instructions  were 
unconstitutional. 

II 

Petitioner  defends  Spisak’s  counsel’s  closing  argument  as 
a reasonable strategic decision “to draw the sting out of the 
prosecution’s argument and gain credibility with the jury by 
conceding  the  weaknesses  of  his  own  case.”  Brief  for  Peti­
tioner  37.  I  agree  that  such  a  strategy  is  generally  a  rea­
sonable one and, indeed, was a reasonable strategy under the 
difﬁcult  circumstances  of  this  case.  Even  Spisak  concedes 
that his counsel “faced an admittedly difﬁcult case in closing 
argument  in  the  penalty  phase.”  Brief  for  Respondent  43. 
But, surely, a strategy can be executed so poorly as to render 
even the most reasonable of trial tactics constitutionally de­
ﬁcient under Strickland v.  Washington, 466 U. S. 668 (1984). 
And this is such a case. 

It is difﬁcult to convey how thoroughly egregious counsel’s 
closing  argument  was  without  reproducing  it  in  its  entirety. 
The  Court’s  assessment  of  the  closing  as  “lengthy  and  ram­
bling”  and  its  brief  description  of  its  content,  see  ante,  at 
150, does not accurately capture the catastrophe of counsel’s 
failed  strategy.  Sufﬁce  it  to  say  that  the  argument  shares 
far  more  in  common  with  a  prosecutor’s  closing  than  with  a 
criminal  defense  attorney’s.  Indeed,  the  argument  was  so 
outrageous that it would have rightly subjected a prosecutor