Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/21pdf/21-309_o758.pdf
Page Number: 8.0

Cite as:  596 U. S. ____ (2022) 

5 

Opinion of the Court 

and  by  sea.”    Black’s  Law  Dictionary  220  (2d  ed.  1910) 
(Black’s); see also, e.g., Webster’s 448 (commerce: “the ex-
change  of  merchandise  on  a  large  scale  between  different 
places  or  communities”).  Thus,  any  class  of  workers  di-
rectly involved in transporting goods across state or inter-
national borders falls within §1’s exemption.

Airplane  cargo  loaders  are  such  a  class.  We  have  said 
that it is “too plain to require discussion that the loading or 
unloading of an interstate shipment by the employees of a 
carrier is so closely related to interstate transportation as
to be practically a part of it.”  Baltimore & Ohio Southwest-
ern R. Co. v. Burtch, 263 U. S. 540, 544 (1924).  We think it 
equally  plain  that  airline  employees  who  physically  load
and unload cargo on and off planes traveling in interstate 
commerce are, as a practical matter, part of the interstate
transportation of goods.  They form “a class of workers en-
gaged in foreign or interstate commerce.”2 

Context confirms this reading.  In Circuit City Stores, Inc. 
v. Adams, 532 U. S. 105 (2001), we considered whether §1
exempts all employment contracts or only those contracts 
involving “transportation workers.”  Id., at 109.  In conclud-
ing that §1 exempts only transportation-worker contracts, 
we relied on two well-settled canons of statutory interpre-
tation.  First, we applied the meaningful-variation canon. 
See,  e.g.,  A.  Scalia  &  B.  Garner,  Reading  Law  170  (2012) 
(“[W]here [a] document has used one term in one place, and 
a materially different term in another, the presumption is 

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2 We recognize that the answer will not always be so plain when the
class of workers carries out duties further removed from the channels of 
interstate  commerce  or  the  actual  crossing  of  borders.  Compare,  e.g., 
Rittmann v. Amazon.com, Inc., 971 F. 3d 904, 915 (CA9 2020) (holding 
that  a  class  of  “last  leg”  delivery  drivers  falls  within  §1’s  exemption), 
with, e.g., Wallace v. Grubhub Holdings, Inc., 970 F. 3d 798, 803 (CA7
2020) (holding that food delivery drivers do not).  In any event, we need 
not address those questions to resolve this case.