Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/22pdf/21-1449_d9eh.pdf
Page Number: 20

Cite as:  598 U. S. ____ (2023) 

1 

ALITO, J., concurring
ALITO, J., concurring in judgment 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

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No. 21–1449 
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GLACIER NORTHWEST, INC., DBA CALPORTLAND, 
PETITIONER v. INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD 
OF TEAMSTERS LOCAL UNION NO. 174 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF 
WASHINGTON 

[June 1, 2023]

 JUSTICE  ALITO,  with  whom  JUSTICE  THOMAS  and 

JUSTICE GORSUCH join, concurring in the judgment. 

I  agree  with  the  Court  that  the  Washington  Supreme
Court erred in holding that Glacier Northwest’s complaint 
is preempted under San Diego Building Trades Council v. 
Garmon, 359 U. S. 236 (1959).  The National Labor Rela-
tions Act (NLRA) protects the right to strike, but that right
is  subject  to  certain  limitations  and  qualifications,  see  29
U. S. C. §163, and this Court’s decisions make clear that the 
Act does not protect striking employees who engage in the
type of conduct alleged here. 

This Court has long recognized that the Act does not “in-
vest  those  who  go  on  strike  with  an  immunity  from  dis-
charge  for  acts  of  trespass  or  violence  against  the  em-
ployer’s property.”  NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 
306  U. S.  240,  255  (1939).    To  justify  “despoiling  [an  em-
ployer’s]  property”  or  “the  seizure  and  conversion  of  its 
goods,” we have reasoned, “would be to put a premium on 
resort  to  force  instead  of  legal  remedies.”    Id.,  at  253.  It 
follows  that  Garmon  preemption  does  not  prevent  States
from imposing liability on employees who intentionally de-
stroy  their  employer’s  property.    See,  e.g.,  Machinists  v. 
Wisconsin  Employment  Relations  Comm’n,  427  U. S.  132, 
136 (1976) (“Policing . . . destruction of property has been