Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/18pdf/18-481_5426.pdf
Page Number: 14

Cite as:  588 U. S. ____ (2019) 

11 

Opinion of the Court 

USA,  Inc.,  586  U. S.  ___,  ___  (2019)  (slip  op.,  at  7).    And 
Congress  has  never  reenacted  Exemption  4.  So  whether 
Congress’s  use  of similar  language  in other  statutes  after 
National  Parks  might  (or  might  not)  tell  us  what  later 
Congresses  understood  those  other  statutes  to  mean,  it 
tells  us  nothing  about  Congress’s  understanding  of  the 
language it enacted in Exemption 4 in 1966.

Finally, Argus urges us to adopt a “substantial competi-
tive  harm”  requirement  as  a  matter  of  policy  because  it
believes  FOIA  exemptions  should  be  narrowly  construed.
But  as  we  have  explained  in  connection  with  another 
federal statute, we normally “have no license to give [stat-
utory]  exemption[s]  anything  but  a  fair  reading.”    Encino 
Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 584 U. S. ___, ___ (2018) (slip 
op., at 9).  Nor do we discern a reason to depart from that 
rule  here:  FOIA  expressly  recognizes  that  “important
interests [are] served by [its] exemptions,” FBI v. Abram-
son,  456  U. S.  615,  630–631  (1982),  and  “[t]hose  exemp-
tions  are  as  much  a  part  of  [FOIA’s]  purpose[s  and  poli-
cies]  as  the  [statute’s  disclosure]  requirement,”  Encino 
Motorcars, 584 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 9).  So, just as we 
cannot  properly  expand  Exemption  4  beyond  what  its
terms  permit,  see,  e.g.,  Milner,  562  U. S.,  at  570–571,  we 
cannot arbitrarily constrict it either by adding limitations 
found nowhere in its terms. 

Our  dissenting  colleagues  appear  to  endorse  something 
like this final argument.  They seem to agree that the law
doesn’t  demand  proof  of  “substantial”  or  “competitive” 
harm, but they think it would be a good idea to require a 
showing  of  some  harm.    Neither  side,  however,  has  advo-
cated  for  such  an  understanding  of  the  statute’s  terms. 
And  our  colleagues’  brief  brush  with  the  statutory  text
doesn’t help; they cite exclusively from specialized diction-
ary definitions lifted from the national security classifica-
tion context that have no bearing on Exemption 4.  Really,
our colleagues’ submission boils down to a policy argument