Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/22pdf/21-454_4g15.pdf
Page Number: 53

Cite as:  598 U. S. ____ (2023) 

19 

THOMAS, J., concurring 

United States, in contradistinction from the navigable wa-
ters of the States,’ . . . distinguishes interstate from intra-
state waters.”  Albrecht & Nickelsburg 11049 (quoting The 
Daniel Ball, 10 Wall., at 563); accord, 1 A. Knauth, Benedict 
on Admiralty §44, p. 96 (6th ed. 1940) (“The inland lakes of 
various States are navigable but, having no navigable out-
let linking them with our system of water-ways, have never
been held to be public waters of the United States” (empha-
sis  added)).  The  text  of  the  CWA  extends  jurisdiction  to
“navigable  waters,”  and—precisely  tracking  The  Daniel 
Ball—clarifies  that  it  reaches  “the  waters  of  the  United 
States,” rather than the navigable waters of the States. 

Thus,  the  CWA’s  use  of  the  phrase  “the  waters  of  the 
United States” reinforces, rather than lessens, the need for 
a  water  to  be  at  least  part  of  “a  continued  highway  over
which commerce is or may be carried on with other States
or foreign countries in the customary modes in which such
commerce  is  conducted  by  water.”    The  Daniel  Ball,  10 
Wall., at 563.  At most, the omission of the word “navigable” 
signifies  that  the  CWA  adopts  the  expanded  Daniel  Ball 
test—that  includes  waters  that  are,  have  been,  or  can  be 
reasonably made navigable in fact—in its statutory provi-
sions.    The  Federal  Government’s  interpretation,  by  con-
trast, renders the use of the term “navigable” a nullity and 
involves an unprecedented and extravagant reading of the
well-understood  term  of  art  “the  waters  of  the  United 
States.”  See Albrecht & Nickelsburg 11049 (“EPA’s conclu-
sion is ahistorical as well as illogical”).7  “[T]he waters of the 
—————— 

7 To be sure, the CWA is more aggressive in regulating navigable wa-
ters than the River and Harbor Acts.  But, the increased stringency is 
not accomplished by expanding jurisdiction.  The Acts use the same ju-
risdictional terms.  Instead, the difference between them lies in the ex-
panded scope of activities that the CWA regulates and its shift from an
enforcement  and  injunctive  regime  to  a  previolation  licensing  regime. 
See Albrecht & Nickelsburg 11046.  I express no view on the constitu-
tionality of this regime as applied to navigable waters or on the Court’s 
holding in United States v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 311 U. S. 377