Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/10pdf/09-1233.pdf
Page Number: 63

Cite as:  563 U. S. ____ (2011) 

5 

SCALIA, J., dissenting 

the  notion  that  the  plaintiff  class  can  allege  an  Eighth 
Amendment  violation  based  on  “systemwide  deficiencies” 
is  assuredly  wrong.  It  follows  that  the  remedy  decreed
here  is  also  contrary  to  law,  since  the  theory  of  systemic 
unconstitutionality  is  central  to  the  plaintiffs’  case.  The 
PLRA requires plaintiffs to establish that the systemwide
injunction  entered  by  the  District  Court  was  “narrowly 
drawn” and “extends no further than necessary” to correct 
“the violation of the Federal right of a particular plaintiff 
or  plaintiffs.”  If  (as  is  the  case)  the  only  viable  constitu-
tional  claims  consist  of  individual  instances  of  mistreat-
ment, then a remedy reforming the system as a whole goes 
far beyond what the statute allows.

It  is  also  worth  noting  the  peculiarity  that  the  vast
majority  of  inmates  most  generously  rewarded  by  the  re-
lease order—the 46,000 whose incarceration will be ended— 
do  not  form  part  of  any  aggrieved  class  even  under  the
Court’s expansive notion of constitutional violation.  Most 
of  them  will  not  be  prisoners  with  medical  conditions  or
severe  mental  illness;  and  many  will  undoubtedly  be  fine 
physical  specimens  who  have  developed  intimidating 
muscles pumping iron in the prison gym. 

B 
Even  if  I  accepted  the  implausible  premise  that  the
plaintiffs  have  established  a  systemwide  violation  of 
the  Eighth  Amendment,  I  would  dissent  from  the  Court’s
endorsement  of  a  decrowding  order.    That  order  is  an 
example  of  what  has  become  known  as  a  “structural  in-
junction.”  As  I  have  previously  explained,  structural 
injunctions  are  radically  different  from  the  injunctions
traditionally  issued  by  courts  of  equity,  and  presumably 
part of “the judicial Power” conferred on federal courts by
Article III: 

“The  mandatory  injunctions  issued  upon  termination 
of litigation usually required ‘a single simple act.’  H.