Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/20pdf/19-1257_g204.pdf
Page Number: 3

Cite as:  594 U. S. ____ (2021) 

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Syllabus 

abridgement of the right . . . to vote on account of race or color.”  Sec-
tion 2(b) in turn explains what must be shown to establish a §2 viola-
tion.  Section 2(b) states that §2 is violated only where “the political 
processes leading to nomination or election” are not “equally open to 
participation” by members of the relevant protected group “in that its 
members have less opportunity than other members of the electorate 
to  participate  in  the  political  process  and  to  elect  representatives  of 
their choice.” (Emphasis added.)  In §2(b), the phrase “in that” is “used 
to specify the respect in which a statement is true.”  New Oxford Amer-
ican Dictionary 851.  Thus, equal openness and equal opportunity are 
not separate requirements.  Instead, it appears that the core of §2(b) 
is the requirement that voting be “equally open.”  The statute’s refer-
ence to equal “opportunity” may stretch that concept to some degree to 
include consideration of a person’s ability to use the means that are 
equally open.  But equal openness remains the touchstone.  Pp. 14–15. 
(3) Another  important  feature  of  §2(b)  is  its  “totality  of  circum-
stances” requirement.  Any circumstance that has a logical bearing on 
whether voting is “equally open” and affords equal “opportunity” may 
be considered.  Pp. 15–21. 

(i) The  Court  mentions  several  important  circumstances  but 

does not attempt to compile an exhaustive list.  Pp. 15–19. 

(A) The  size  of  the  burden  imposed  by  a  challenged  voting 
rule  is  highly  relevant.    Voting  necessarily  requires  some  effort  and 
compliance with some rules; thus, the concept of a voting system that 
is “equally open” and that furnishes equal “opportunity” to cast a ballot 
must  tolerate  the  “usual  burdens  of  voting.”    Crawford  v.  Marion 
County Election Bd., 553 U. S. 181, 198.  Mere inconvenience is insuf-
ficient.  P. 16. 

(B) The degree to which a voting rule departs from what was 
standard practice when §2 was amended in 1982 is a relevant consid-
eration.  The burdens associated with the rules in effect at that time 
are useful in gauging whether the burdens imposed by a challenged 
rule are sufficient to prevent voting from being equally “open” or fur-
nishing an equal “opportunity” to vote in the sense meant by §2.  Wide-
spread current use is also relevant.  Pp. 17–18. 

(C) The size of any disparities in a rule’s impact on members 
of different racial or ethnic groups is an important factor to consider.  
Even neutral regulations may well result in disparities in rates of vot-
ing and noncompliance with voting rules.  The mere fact that there is 
some disparity in impact does not necessarily mean that a system is 
not equally open or that it does not give everyone an equal opportunity 
to vote.  And small disparities should not be artificially magnified.  P. 
18. 

(D) Consistent  with  §2(b)’s  reference  to  a  States’  “political