Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/529bv.pdf
Page Number: 488

529US2

Unit: $U46

[10-07-01 17:18:24] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 529 U. S. 362 (2000)

413

Opinion of O’Connor, J.

clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state
court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by this
Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a
case differently than this Court has on a set of materially
indistinguishable facts. Under the “unreasonable applica-
tion” clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the
state court identiﬁes the correct governing legal principle
from this Court’s decisions but unreasonably applies that
principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.

III
Although I disagree with Justice Stevens concerning
the standard we must apply under § 2254(d)(1) in evaluating
Terry Williams’ claims on habeas, I agree with the Court
that the Virginia Supreme Court’s adjudication of Williams’
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel resulted in a deci-
sion that was both contrary to and involved an unreasonable
application of this Court’s clearly established precedent.
Speciﬁcally, I believe that the Court’s discussion in Parts III
and IV is correct and that it demonstrates the reasons that
the Virginia Supreme Court’s decision in Williams’ case, even
under the interpretation of § 2254(d)(1) I have set forth
above, was both contrary to and involved an unreasonable
application of our precedent.

First, I agree with the Court that our decision in Strick-
land undoubtedly qualiﬁes as “clearly established Federal
law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United
States,” within the meaning of § 2254(d)(1). See ante, at
390–391. Second, I agree that the Virginia Supreme Court’s
decision was contrary to that clearly established federal law
to the extent it held that our decision in Lockhart v. Fretwell,
506 U. S. 364 (1993), somehow modiﬁed or supplanted the
rule set forth in Strickland. See ante, at 391–395, 397.
Speciﬁcally, the Virginia Supreme Court’s decision was con-
trary to Strickland itself, where we held that a defendant
demonstrates prejudice by showing “that there is a reason-