Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/12pdf/11-556_11o2.pdf
Page Number: 30.0

Cite as:  570 U. S. ____ (2013) 

27 

Opinion of the Court 

Whitten  v.  Fred’s,  Inc.,  No.  8:08–0218–HMH–BHH,  2010 
WL 2757005, *3 (D SC, July 12, 2010).  And although the 
dissent suggests that Donna Rhodes’ employer would have 
been  liable  under  the  dissent’s  definition  of  “supervisor,” 
that  is  pure  speculation:  It  is  not  clear  that  Rhodes  suf­
fered  any  tangible  employment  action,  see  Rhodes  v.  Illi-
nois  Dept.  of  Transp.,  243  F. Supp.  2d  810,  817  (ND  Ill. 
2003),  and  no  court  had  occasion  to  determine  whether 
the employer could have established the affirmative defense 
(a  prospect  that  is  certainly  feasible  given  that  there 
was  evidence  that  the  employer  had  an  “adequate  anti­
harassment  policy  in  place,”  that  the  employer  promptly 
addressed  the  incidents  about  which  Rhodes  complained, 
and that “Rhodes failed to take advantage of the preventa­
tive  or  corrective  opportunities  provided,”  Rhodes  v.  Illi-
nois  Dept.  of  Transp.,  359  F. 3d,  at  507).15  Finally,  the 
dissent’s  reliance  on  Monika  Starke’s  case  is  perplexing 
given  that  the  EEOC  ultimately  did  obtain  relief  (in  the 
amount  of  $50,000)  for  the  harassment  of  Starke,16  see 
Order  of  Dismissal  in  No.  1:07–cv–0095–LRR  (ND  Iowa, 

—————— 

15 Similarly,  it  is  unclear  whether  Yasharay  Mack  ultimately  would 
have prevailed even under the dissent’s definition of “supervisor.”   The 
Second  Circuit  (adopting  a  definition  similar  to  that  advocated  by  the 
dissent) remanded the case for the District Court to determine whether 
Mack  “ ‘unreasonably  failed  to  take  advantage  of  any  preventative  or 
corrective  opportunities  provided  by  the  employer  or  to  avoid  harm 
otherwise.’ ”  Mack v. Otis Elevator Co., 326 F. 3d 116, 127–128 (2003) 
(quoting Ellerth, 524 U. S., at 765).  But before it had an opportunity to 
make  any  such  determination,  Mack  withdrew  her  complaint  and  the 
District  Court  dismissed  her  claims  with  prejudice.    See  Stipulation
and  Order  of  Dismissal  in  No.  1:00–cv–7778–LAP  (SDNY,  Oct.  21, 
2004), Dkt. No. 63. 

16 Starke  herself  lacked  standing  to  pursue  her  claims,  see  EEOC  v. 
CRST  Van  Expedited,  Inc.,  679  F.  3d  657,  678,  and  n. 14  (CA8  2012), 
but the Eighth Circuit held that the EEOC could sue in its own name to
remedy the sexual harassment against Starke and other CRST employ­
ees, see id., at 682.