Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/558bv.pdf
Page Number: 635.0

474  CITIZENS  UNITED  v.  FEDERAL  ELECTION  COMM’N 

Opinion of Stevens, J. 

tion  of  information  and  its  dissemination  to  the  public,”  494 
U. S.,  at  667.  Our  colleagues  have  raised  some  interesting 
and difﬁcult questions about Congress’ authority to regulate 
electioneering  by  the  press,  and  about  how  to  deﬁne  what 
constitutes  the  press.  But  that  is  not  the  case  before  us. 
Section  203  does  not  apply  to  media  corporations,  and  even 
if  it  did,  Citizens  United  is  not  a  media  corporation.  There 
would be absolutely no reason to consider the issue of media 
corporations if the majority did not, ﬁrst, transform Citizens 
United’s as-applied challenge into a facial challenge and, sec­
ond,  invent  the  theory  that  legislatures  must  eschew  all 
“identity”-based distinctions and treat a local nonproﬁt news 
outlet  exactly  the  same  as  General  Motors.75  This  calls  to 
mind  George  Berkeley’s  description  of  philosophers:  “[W]e 
have  ﬁrst  raised  a  dust,  and  then  complain  we  cannot  see.” 
Principles of  Human Knowledge/Three  Dialogues 38,  ¶ 3 (R. 
Woolhouse ed. 1988). 

It  would  be  perfectly  understandable  if  our  colleagues 
feared that a campaign ﬁnance regulation such as § 203 may 
be  counterproductive  or  self-interested,  and  therefore  at­
tended  carefully  to  the  choices  the  Legislature  has  made. 
But  the  majority  does  not  bother  to  consider  such  practical 
matters, or even to consult a record; it simply stipulates that 
“enlightened  self-government” can  arise only  in the  absence 
of regulation.  Ante, at 339.  In light of the distinctive fea­
tures  of  corporations  identiﬁed  in  Austin,  there  is  no  valid 
basis  for  this  assumption.  The  marketplace  of  ideas  is  not 
actually  a  place  where  items—or  laws—are  meant  to  be 
bought  and  sold,  and  when  we  move  from  the  realm  of  eco­

75 Under  the  majority’s  view,  the  legislature  is  thus  damned  if  it  does 
and  damned  if  it  doesn’t.  If  the  legislature  gives  media  corporations  an 
exemption  from  electioneering  regulations  that  apply  to  other  corpora­
tions,  it  violates  the  newly  minted  First  Amendment  rule  against 
identity-based distinctions.  If the legislature does not give media corpo­
rations an exemption, it violates the First Amendment rights of the press. 
The only way out of this invented bind: no regulations whatsoever.