Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/558bv.pdf
Page Number: 181

20 

WONG  v.  BELMONTES 

Per Curiam 

montes  to  establish  “a  reasonable  probability  that  a  compe­
tent  attorney,  aware  of  [the  available  mitigating  evidence], 
would  have  introduced  it  at  sentencing,”  and  “that  had  the 
jury been confronted with this . . . mitigating evidence, there 
is a reasonable probability that it would have returned with 
a different sentence.”  Wiggins v.  Smith, 539 U. S. 510, 535, 
536 (2003). 

The Ninth Circuit determined that a reasonably competent 
lawyer  would  have  introduced  more  mitigation  evidence,  on 
top of what Schick had already presented.  For purposes of 
our prejudice analysis, we accept that conclusion and proceed 
to  consider  whether  there  is  a  reasonable  probability  that 
a  jury  presented  with  this  additional  mitigation  evidence 
would have returned a different verdict. 

In evaluating that question, it is necessary to consider all 
the relevant evidence that the jury would have had before it 
if Schick had pursued the different path—not just the mitiga­
tion evidence Schick could have presented, but also the How­
ard murder evidence that almost certainly would have come 
in  with  it.  See  Strickland,  supra,  at  695–696,  700.  Thus, 
to  establish  prejudice,  Belmontes  must  show  a  reasonable 
probability  that  the  jury  would  have  rejected  a  capital  sen­
tence after it weighed the entire body of mitigating evidence 
(including  the  additional  testimony  Schick  could  have  pre­
sented) against  the entire body  of aggravating  evidence (in­
cluding  the  Howard  murder  evidence).  Belmontes  cannot 
meet this burden. 

We begin with the mitigating evidence Schick did present 
during  the  sentencing  phase.  That  evidence  was  substan­
tial.  The same Ninth Circuit panel addressing the same rec­
ord  in  Belmontes’  ﬁrst  habeas  appeal  agreed,  recognizing 
“the  substantial  nature  of  the  mitigating  evidence”  Schick 
presented.  Belmontes  v.  Woodford,  350  F.  3d  861,  907 
(2003).  It  reiterated  the  point  several  times.  See  id.,  at 
874, 901, 908.