Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/529bv.pdf
Page Number: 1129

529ORD Unit: $PT3

[10-09-01 14:52:06] PGT: ORDPP (Prelim. Print)

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OCTOBER TERM, 1999

Thomas, J., dissenting

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must be restricted to Lawrence’s speech in the workplace and
articulated in the form of an exemplary list of forbidden words,
but upheld the injunction in all other respects.
A divided California Supreme Court afﬁrmed.

21 Cal. 4th 121
(1999). The plurality opinion, at the outset, declined to entertain
petitioners’ contention that the First Amendment prohibits appli-
cation of employment discrimination laws to the sort of harassing
speech that creates a “hostile environment,” deeming the argu-
ment waived by petitioners’ decision not to challenge the jury
ﬁndings of liability and damages for their past conduct.
Id., at
131, n. 3, 136–137, n. 5. The plurality then turned to the propri-
ety of the injunctive remedy, accepting at face value the trial
court’s ﬁnding of a “ ‘substantial likelihood’ ” that Lawrence would
harass again unless restrained.
Id., at 132. The plurality re-
jected petitioners’ First Amendment objection, holding that the
injunction is not an invalid prior restraint “because the order was
issued only after the jury determined that defendants had en-
gaged in employment discrimination, and the order simply pre-
cluded defendants from continuing their unlawful activity.”
Id.,
at 138. A concurring opinion addressed the threshold question
deemed waived by the plurality, concluding that, while FEHA’s
restrictions are content based when applied to pure speech, the
First Amendment does not prohibit such application of FEHA.
Justices Mosk, Kennard,
Id., at 164, 166 (opinion of Werdegar, J.).
and Brown each ﬁled dissenting opinions. See id., at 169 (opinion
of Mosk, J.); id., at 176 (opinion of Kennard, J.); id., at 189 (opinion
of Brown, J.).

II

I would grant certiorari to address the troubling First Amend-
ment issues raised by this injunction. Attaching liability to the
utterance of words in the workplace is likely invalid for the simple
reason that this speech is fully protected speech.1 No one claims

1 Like the concurring and dissenting justices below, I do not consider this
argument waived by virtue of petitioners’ decision not to appeal the money
damages portion of the judgment. A First Amendment objection is, as a
matter of logic, available against the money damages portion, the injunction
portion, or both. Petitioners may well have thought their First Amendment
claim weaker with respect to the money damages portion because Law-
rence’s past conduct consisted of speech and conduct (whereas the injunction
prohibits pure speech independent of any conduct), cf. NLRB v. Virginia
Elec. & Power Co., 314 U. S. 469, 478 (1941), and because prior restraints