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Page Number: 14.0

10 

MATAL v. TAM 

Opinion of the Court 

lege or rendered liable under the provisions of this chapter 
includes  a  juristic  person  as  well  as  a  natural  person.” 
§1127.  Because  racial  and  ethnic  groups  are  neither 
natural  nor  “juristic”  persons,  Tam  asserts,  these  groups
fall outside this definition.  Brief for Respondent 46–48.

Tam’s  argument  is  refuted  by  the  plain  terms  of  the 
disparagement  clause.    The  clause  applies  to  marks  that 
disparage  “persons.”  A  mark  that  disparages  a  “substan-
tial” percentage of the members of a racial or ethnic group, 
Trademark Manual §1203.03(b)(i), at 1200–150, necessar- 
ily  disparages  many  “persons,”  namely,  members  of  that 
group.  Tam’s argument would fail even if the clause used 
the singular term “person,” but Congress’ use of the plural
“persons” makes the point doubly clear.4 

Tam’s narrow reading of the term “persons” also clashes
with  the  breadth  of  the  disparagement  clause.  By  its 
terms, the clause applies to marks that disparage, not just
“persons,” but also “institutions” and “beliefs.”  15 U. S. C. 
§1052(a).  It  thus  applies  to  the  members  of  any  group 
whose  members  share  particular  “beliefs,”  such  as  politi-
cal, ideological, and  religious groups.  It applies to marks
that denigrate “institutions,” and on Tam’s reading, it also
reaches  “juristic”  persons  such  as  corporations,  unions,
and other unincorporated associations.  See §1127.  Thus, 
the clause is not limited to marks that disparage a partic-
ular  natural  person.    If  Congress  had  wanted  to  confine 
—————— 

4 Tam  advances  a  convoluted  textual  argument  that  goes  as  follows.
The  definition  of  a  “person”  in  15  U.  S.  C.  §1127  does  not  include  a
“non-juristic person,” i.e., a group that cannot sue or be sued in its own 
right.    Brief  for  Respondent  46–47.    Such  groups  consist  of  multiple 
natural  persons.    Therefore,  the  members  of  such  groups  are  not 
“persons” under the disparagement clause.  Id., at 46–48. 

This argument leads to the absurd result that no person is a “person”
within  the  meaning  of  the  disparagement  clause.    This  is  so  because 
every person is a member of a “non-juristic” group, e.g., right-handers,
left-handers,  women,  men,  people  born  on  odd-numbered  days,  people
born on even-numbered days.