Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/17pdf/16-1466_2b3j.pdf
Page Number: 15

10  JANUS v. STATE, COUNTY, AND MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES 

Opinion of the Court 

Because  the  compelled  subsidization  of  private  speech 
seriously  impinges  on  First  Amendment  rights,  it  cannot
be casually allowed.  Our free speech cases have identified
“levels of scrutiny” to be applied in different contexts, and
in  three  recent  cases,  we  have  considered  the  standard 
that  should  be  used  in  judging  the  constitutionality  of 
agency fees.  See Knox, supra; Harris, supra; Friedrichs v. 
California  Teachers  Assn.,  578  U. S.  ___  (2016)  (per  cu-
riam) (affirming decision below by equally divided Court).

In Knox, the first of these cases, we found it sufficient to 
hold  that  the  conduct  in  question  was  unconstitutional 
under even the test used for the compulsory subsidization 
of  commercial  speech.    567  U. S.,  at  309–310,  321–322. 
Even though commercial speech has been thought to enjoy 
a lesser degree of protection, see, e.g., Central Hudson Gas 
&  Elec.  Corp.  v.  Public  Serv.  Comm’n  of  N. Y.,  447  U. S. 
557, 562–563 (1980), prior precedent in that area, specifi­
cally United Foods, supra, had applied what we character­
ized as “exacting” scrutiny, Knox, 567 U. S., at 310, a less 
demanding  test  than  the  “strict”  scrutiny  that  might  be
thought  to  apply  outside  the  commercial  sphere.    Under 
“exacting”  scrutiny,  we  noted,  a  compelled  subsidy  must
“serve a compelling state interest that cannot be achieved
through  means  significantly  less  restrictive  of  associa- 
tional freedoms.”  Ibid. (internal quotation marks and altera- 
tions omitted).

In Harris, the second of these cases, we again found that
an agency-fee requirement failed “exacting scrutiny.”  573 
U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 33).   But we questioned whether 
that  test  provides  sufficient  protection  for  free  speech
rights, since “it is apparent that the speech compelled” in 
agency-fee  cases  “is  not  commercial  speech.”  Id.,  at  ___ 
(slip op., at 30).

Picking  up  that  cue,  petitioner  in  the  present  case  con­
tends that the Illinois law at issue should be subjected to 
“strict  scrutiny.”    Brief  for  Petitioner  36.    The  dissent,  on