Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/21pdf/20-1650_3dq3.pdf
Page Number: 3

Cite as:  597 U. S. ____ (2022) 

3 

Syllabus 

Accordingly, a federal judge in deciding to impose a sentence “may ap-
propriately conduct an inquiry broad in scope, largely unlimited either 
as to the kind of information he may consider, or the source from which
it may come.”  United States v. Tucker, 404 U. S. 443, 446.  Pp. 6–8.

(2) The  discretion  federal  judges  hold  at  initial  sentencings  also 
characterizes sentencing modification hearings.  The Court in Pepper 
v. United States, 562 U. S. 476, found it “clear that when a defendant’s 
sentence has been set aside on appeal and his case remanded for re-
sentencing, a district court may consider evidence of a defendant’s re-
habilitation since his prior sentencing.”  Id., at 490.  Accordingly, fed-
eral courts resentencing individuals whose sentences were vacated on
appeal regularly consider evidence of rehabilitation, or evidence of rule
breaking in prison, developed after the initial sentencing.  Where dis-
trict courts must calculate new Guidelines ranges as part of resentenc-
ing proceedings, courts have also exercised their discretion to consider 
nonretroactive Guidelines changes.  In some cases, a district court is 
prohibited from recalculating a Guidelines range to account for non-
retroactive  Guidelines  amendments,  but  the  court  may  nevertheless 
find those amendments to be germane when deciding whether to mod-
ify a sentence at all, and if so, to what extent.  Pp. 8–9.

(3) The only limitations on a court’s discretion to consider relevant 
materials  at  an  initial  sentencing  or  in  modifying  that  sentence  are
those set forth by Congress in a statute or by the Constitution.  See 
Pepper,  562  U. S.,  at  489,  n. 8;  Mistretta  v.  United  States,  488  U. S. 
361, 364.  Congress has placed such limits where it deems them appro-
priate.  See 18 U. S. C. §§3582(a), 3583(c).  Congress has further im-
posed express statutory limitations on one type of sentencing modifi-
cation  proceeding,  expressly  cabining  district  courts’  discretion  by
requiring courts to abide by the Sentencing Commission’s policy state-
ments.  See also §3582(c)(1)(A) (compassionate release).  Pp. 9–11.

(b) Congress in the First Step Act did not contravene well-estab-

lished sentencing practices.  Pp. 11–18. 

(1) Nothing  in  the  text  and  structure  of  the  First  Step  Act  ex-
pressly, or even implicitly, overcomes the established tradition of dis-
trict courts’ sentencing discretion.  The text of the First Step Act does
not so much as hint that district courts are prohibited from considering
evidence of rehabilitation, disciplinary infractions, or unrelated Guide-
lines changes.  The only two limitations on district courts’ discretion 
appear in §404(c): A district court may not consider a First Step Act 
motion if the movant’s sentence was already reduced under the Fair 
Sentencing Act or if the court considered and rejected a motion under 
the  First  Step  Act.    Neither  limitation  applies  here.    By  its  terms,
§404(c)  does  not  prohibit  district  courts  from  considering  any  argu-
ments in favor of, or against, sentence modification.  In fact, §404(c)