Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/19pdf/17-1618_hfci.pdf
Page Number: 56.0

Cite as:  590 U. S. ____ (2020) 

19 

ALITO, J., dissenting 

The main issue in Price Waterhouse––the proper alloca-
tion of the burdens of proof in a so-called mixed motives Ti-
tle VII case—is not relevant here, but the plurality opinion,
endorsed  by  four  Justices,  commented  on  the  issue  of  sex 
stereotypes.  The  plurality  observed  that  “sex  stereotypes
do not inevitably prove that gender played a part in a par-
ticular employment decision” but “can certainly be evidence 
that gender played a part.”  Id., at 251.17  And the plurality 
made it clear that “[t]he plaintiff must show that the em-
ployer actually relied on her gender in making its decision.” 
Ibid. 

Plaintiffs who allege that they were treated unfavorably 
because  of  their  sexual  orientation  or  gender  identity  are
not  in  the  same  position  as  the  plaintiff  in  Price  Water-
house.  In  cases  involving  discrimination  based  on  sexual
orientation  or  gender  identity,  the  grounds  for  the  em-
ployer’s  decision—that  individuals  should  be  sexually  at-
tracted  only  to  persons  of  the  opposite  biological  sex  or
should identify with their biological sex—apply equally to
men and women.  “[H]eterosexuality is not a female stereo-
is  not  a  sex- 
type; 
specific stereotype at all.”  Hively, 853 F. 3d, at 370 (Sykes, 
J., dissenting).

it  not  a  male  stereotype; 

it 

To be sure, there may be cases in which a gay, lesbian, or 
transgender  individual  can  make  a  claim  like  the  one  in 
Price Waterhouse.  That is, there may be cases where traits 
or behaviors that some people associate with gays, lesbians, 
or transgender individuals are tolerated or valued in per-
sons of one biological sex but not the other.  But that is a 

—————— 

17 Two other Justices concurred in the judgment but did not comment 
on the issue of stereotypes.  See id., at 258–261 (opinion of White, J.); id., 
at 261–279 (opinion of O’Connor, J.).  And Justice Kennedy reiterated on 
behalf of the three Justices in dissent that “Title VII creates no independ-
ent cause of action for sex stereotyping,” but he added that “[e]vidence of 
use by decisionmakers of sex stereotypes is, of course, quite relevant to
the question of discriminatory intent.”  Id., at 294.