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Page Number: 8

6 

BANK OF AMERICA, N. A. v. CAULKETT 

Opinion of the Court 

in  §506(d)  could  be  redefined  as  any  claim  that  is  backed 
by collateral with  some value.  Embracing  this reading of
§506(d),  however,  would  give  the  term  “allowed  secured 
claim”  in  §506(d)  a  different  meaning  than  its  statutory
definition  in  §506(a).    We  refuse  to  adopt  this  artificial 
definition. 

Nor  do  we  think  Nobelman  v.  American  Savings  Bank, 
508  U. S.  324  (1993),  supports  the  debtors’  proposed  dis-
tinction.  Nobelman said nothing about the meaning of the 
term “secured claim” in §506(d).  Instead, it addressed the 
interaction  between  the  meaning  of  the  term  “secured 
claim”  in  §506(a)  and  an  entirely  separate  provision,
§1322(b)(2).  See  508  U. S.,  at  327–332.  Nobelman  offers 
no  guidance  on  the  question  presented  in  these  cases
because  the  Court  in  Dewsnup  already  declined  to  apply
the  definition  in  §506(a)  to  the  phrase  “secured  claim”  in
§506(d).

The  debtors  alternatively  urge  us  to  limit  Dewsnup’s 
definition  to  the  facts  of  that  case  because  the  historical 
and policy concerns that motivated the Court do not apply 
in the context of wholly underwater liens.  Whether or not 
that  proposition  is  true,  it  is  an  insufficient  justification 
for  giving  the  term  “secured  claim”  in  §506(d)  a  different 
definition depending on the value of the collateral.  We are 
generally  reluctant  to  give  the  “same  words  a  different
meaning”  when  construing  statutes,  Pasquantino  v. 
United  States,  544  U. S.  349,  358  (2005)  (internal  quota-
tion marks omitted), and we decline to do so here based on 
policy arguments. 

Ultimately, embracing the debtors’ distinction would not 
vindicate  §506(d)’s  original  meaning,  and  it  would  leave
an odd statutory framework in its place.  Under the debt-
ors’ approach, if a court valued the collateral at one dollar
more  than  the  amount  of  a  senior  lien,  the  debtor  could 
not strip down a junior lien under Dewsnup, but if it val-
ued the property at one dollar less, the debtor could strip