Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/13pdf/12-536_e1pf.pdf
Page Number: 34

28 

MCCUTCHEON v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N 

Opinion of ROBERTS, C. J. 

coordinated expenditures envisioned by the District Court.
The  limit  for  Senate  races  varies  significantly  based  on
state population.  See 78 Fed. Reg. 8531 (2013).  A scheme 
of the magnitude imagined by the District Court would be
possible  even  in  theory  for  no  House  candidates  and  the 
Senate candidates from just the 12 most populous States. 
Ibid. 

Further, to the extent that the law does not foreclose the 
scenario  described  by  the  District  Court,  experience  and 
common sense do.  The Government provides no reason to
believe that many state parties would willingly participate 
in a scheme to funnel money to another State’s candidates.
A review of FEC data of Republican and Democratic state 
party  committees  for  the  2012  election  cycle  reveals  just 
12  total  instances  in  which  a  state  party  committee  con-
tributed to a House or Senate candidate in another State. 
No surprise there.  The Iowa Democratic Party, for exam-
ple,  has  little  reason  to  transfer  money  to  the  California 
Democratic  Party,  especially  when  the  Iowa  Democratic
Party  would  be  barred  for  the  remainder  of  the  election 
cycle from receiving another contribution for its own activ-
ities from the particular donor.

These  scenarios,  along  with  others  that  have  been  sug-
gested,  are  either  illegal  under  current  campaign  finance 
laws  or  divorced  from  reality.  The  three  examples  posed 
by  the  dissent  are  no  exception.    The  dissent  does  not 
explain  how  the  large  sums  it  postulates  can  be  legally 
rerouted  to  a  particular  candidate,  why  most  state  com-
mittees would participate in a plan to redirect their dona-
tions  to  a  candidate  in  another  State,  or  how  a  donor  or 
group  of  donors  can  avoid  regulations  prohibiting  con-
tributions  to  a  committee  “with  the  knowledge  that  a 
substantial  portion”  of  the  contribution  will  support  a
candidate  to  whom  the  donor  has  already  contributed,
11 CFR §110.1(h)(2).

The dissent argues that such knowledge may be difficult