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Page Number: 86.0

26 

SEC v. JARKESY 

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting 

id., at 43–49.  That did not resolve the case, however.  Un-
like in Tull, the proceeding at issue in Granfinanciera was 
in a non-Article III forum (i.e., a bankruptcy court).  So, to 
answer whether Congress could assign the fraudulent-con-
veyance claim to a bankruptcy judge for decision, Congress 
needed  to  decide  whether  the  “legal  cause  of  action  in-
volve[d] ‘public rights.’ ”  492 U. S., at 53. 

Granfinanciera explains that there are two ways to iden-
tify a “public right.”  First, there are the matters in which 
Congress enacts a statutory cause of action that “inheres in, 
or lies against, the Federal Government in its sovereign ca-
pacity.”  Id., at 53 (citing Atlas Roofing, 430 U. S., at 458).
These  matters  necessarily  arise  between  the  Government 
and the people in connection with the Government’s exer-
cise of its constitutional authority.  See supra, at 7–8.  In 
these cases, the Court said, Atlas Roofing controls the pub-
lic-rights analysis.  See Granfinanciera, 492 U. S., at 51, 53. 
The  Court  explained  that  “Congress  may  effectively  sup-
plant a common law cause of action carrying with it a right 
to  a  jury  trial  with  a  statutory  cause  of  action  shorn  of  a 
jury trial right if that statutory cause of action inheres in, 
or lies against, the Federal Government in its sovereign ca-
pacity.”  Id., at 53 (citing Atlas Roofing, 430 U. S., at 458).
The second kind of public right that Granfinanciera rec-
ognized  involves  “disputes  to  which  the  Federal  Govern-
ment is not a party in its sovereign capacity,” 492 U. S., at 
55, n. 10, that is, usually “[w]holly private” disputes, id., at 
51.  The  public-rights  analysis  in  these  private-dispute 
cases looks different: “The crucial question, in cases not in-
volving the Federal Government, is whether ‘Congress, act-
ing for a valid legislative purpose pursuant to its constitu-
tional  powers  under  Article  I,  has  created  a  seemingly
“private” right that is so closely integrated into a public reg-
ulatory scheme as to be a matter appropriate for agency res-
olution  with  limited  involvement  by  the  Article  III  judici-
ary.’ ”  Id.,  at  54  (quoting  Thomas,  473  U. S.,  at  593–594;