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Page Number: 57.0

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AMERICAN LEGION v. AMERICAN HUMANIST ASSN. 

GORSUCH, J., concurring in judgment 

Association  suggests,  is  enough  to  allow  it  to  insist  on  a 
federal  judicial  decree  ordering  the  memorial’s  removal.  
Maybe,  the  Association  concedes,  others  who  are  less 
offended lack standing to sue.  Maybe others still who are 
equally  affected  but  who  come  into  contact  with  the  me-
morial  too  infrequently  lack  standing  as  well.    See  Tr.  of 
Oral  Arg.  48–49.    But,  the  Association  assures  us,  its 
members  are  offended  enough—and  with  sufficient  fre-
quency—that they may sue. 
  This “offended observer” theory of standing has no basis 
in  law.    Federal  courts  may  decide  only  those  cases  and 
controversies  that  the  Constitution  and  Congress  have 
authorized them to hear.  And to establish standing to sue 
consistent  with  the  Constitution,  a  plaintiff  must  show: 
(1) injury-in-fact, (2) causation, and (3) redressability.  The 
injury-in-fact test requires a plaintiff to prove “an invasion 
of  a  legally  protected  interest  which  is  (a)  concrete  and 
particularized  . . .  and  (b)  actual  or  imminent,  not  conjec-
tural or hypothetical.”  Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 
U. S. 555, 560 (1992) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
  Unsurprisingly,  this  Court  has  already  rejected  the 
notion  that  offense  alone  qualifies  as  a  “concrete  and 
particularized”  injury  sufficient  to  confer  standing.    We 
could  hardly  have  been  clearer:  “The  presence  of  a  dis- 
agreement,  however  sharp  and  acrimonious  it  may  be,  is 
insufficient  by  itself  to  meet  Art.  III’s  requirements.”  
Diamond v. Charles, 476 U. S. 54, 62 (1986).  Imagine if a 
bystander disturbed by a police stop tried to sue under the 
Fourth  Amendment.    Suppose  an  advocacy  organization 
whose  members  were  distressed  by  a  State’s  decision  to 
deny  someone  else  a  civil  jury  trial  sought  to  complain 
under  the  Seventh  Amendment.    Or  envision  a  religious 
group  upset  about  the  application  of  the  death  penalty 
trying  to  sue  to  stop  it.    Does  anyone  doubt  those  cases 
would  be  rapidly  dispatched  for  lack  of  standing?    Cf. 
Whitmore  v. Arkansas, 495  U. S.  149,  151  (1990)  (holding