Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/06pdf/05-1120.pdf
Page Number: 63.0

10 

MASSACHUSETTS v. EPA 

SCALIA, J., dissenting 

gations  conducted  before  formal  accusation.”    Certainly
this  provision  would  not  encompass  criminal  investiga-
tions  underway  in  a  domestic  tribunal.    See  also,  e.g.,  2 
U. S. C. §54(a) (“The Clerk of the House of Representatives 
shall,  at  the  request  of  a  Member  of  the  House  of  Repre-
sentatives, furnish to the Member, for official use only, one 
set  of  a  privately  published  annotated  version  of  the 
United  States  Code,  including  supplements  and  pocket 
parts”);  22  U. S. C.  §2304(b)(1)  (“the  relevant  findings  of 
appropriate  international  organizations,  including  non-
governmental organizations”).

In  short,  the  word  “including”  does  not  require  the
Court’s  (or  the  petitioners’)  result.    It  is  perfectly  reason-
able to view the definition of “air pollutant” in its entirety:
An  air  pollutant  can  be  “any  physical,  chemical,  . . .  sub-
stance or matter which is emitted into or otherwise enters 
the ambient air,” but only if it retains the general charac-
teristic  of  being  an  “air  pollution  agent  or  combination  of
such  agents.”  This  is  precisely  the  conclusion  EPA 
reached: “[A] substance does not meet the CAA definition 
of ‘air pollutant’ simply because it is a ‘physical, chemical,
. . . substance or matter which is emitted into or otherwise 
enters  the  ambient  air.’  It  must  also  be  an  ‘air  pollution 
agent.’ ”    68  Fed.  Reg.  52929,  n. 3.    See  also  id.,  at  52928 
(“The  root  of  the  definition  indicates  that  for  a  substance
to  be  an  ‘air  pollutant,’  it  must  be  an  ‘agent’  of  ‘air  pollu-
tion’ ”).    Once  again,  in  the  face  of  textual  ambiguity,  the
Court’s  application  of  Chevron  deference  to  EPA’s  inter-
pretation of the word “including” is nowhere to be found.2 

—————— 

2 Not only is EPA’s interpretation reasonable, it is far more plausible
than  the  Court’s  alternative.    As  the  Court  correctly  points  out,  “all
airborne  compounds  of  whatever  stripe,”  ante,  at  26,  would  qualify  as
“physical, chemical, . . . substance[s] or matter which [are] emitted into
or  otherwise  ente[r]  the  ambient  air,”  42  U. S. C.  §7602(g).    It  follows  
that  everything  airborne,  from  Frisbees  to  flatulence,  qualifies  as  an 
“air pollutant.”  This reading of the statute defies common sense.