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Page Number: 6

6 

HAALAND v. BRACKEEN 

Syllabus 

them to apply the placement preferences in making custody determi-
nations.  §§1915(a), (b).  But Congress can require state courts, unlike
state executives and legislatures, to enforce federal law.  See New York 
v. United States, 505 U. S. 144, 178–179.  Petitioners draw a distinc-
tion between requiring state courts to entertain federal causes of ac-
tion and requiring them to apply federal law to state causes of action, 
but this argument runs counter to the Supremacy Clause.  When Con-
gress enacts a valid statute, “state law is naturally preempted to the 
extent of any conflict with a federal statute.”  Crosby v. National For-
eign Trade Council, 530 U. S. 363, 372.  That a federal law modifies a 
state law cause of action does not limit its preemptive effect.  See, e.g., 
Hillman v. Maretta, 569 U. S. 483, 493–494 (federal law establishing
order  of  precedence  for  life  insurance  beneficiaries  preempted  state
law).  Pp. 23–25.

(c) Finally,  petitioners  insist  that  Congress  cannot  force  state
courts to maintain or transmit records of custody proceedings involv-
ing Indian children.  But the anticommandeering doctrine applies “dis-
tinctively” to a state court’s adjudicative responsibilities.  Printz, 521 
U. S.,  at  907.    The  Constitution  allows  Congress  to  require  “state 
judges to enforce federal prescriptions, insofar as those prescriptions
relat[e] to matters appropriate for the judicial power.”  Ibid. (emphasis
deleted).  In Printz, the Court indicated that this principle may extend 
to tasks that are “ancillary” to a “quintessentially adjudicative task”—
such as “recording, registering, and certifying” documents.  Id., at 908, 
n. 2.  Printz described numerous historical examples of Congress im-
posing  recordkeeping  and  reporting  requirements  on  state  courts. 
These early congressional enactments demonstrate that the Constitu-
tion does not prohibit the Federal Government from imposing adjudi-
cative tasks on state courts.  Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U. S. 714, 723.  The 
Court now confirms what Printz suggested: Congress may impose an-
cillary recordkeeping requirements related to state-court proceedings 
without violating the Tenth Amendment.  Here, ICWA’s recordkeeping 
requirements are comparable to the historical examples.  The duties 
ICWA imposes are “ancillary” to the state court’s obligation to conduct 
child custody proceedings in compliance with ICWA.  Printz, 521 U. S., 
at 908, n. 2.  Pp. 25–29. 

3. The Court does not reach the merits of petitioners’ two additional 
claims—an  equal  protection  challenge  to  ICWA’s  placement  prefer-
ences and a nondelegation challenge to §1915(c), the provision allow-
ing tribes to alter the placement preferences—because no party before
the Court has standing to raise them.  Pp. 29–34. 

(a) The  individual  petitioners  argue  that  ICWA’s  hierarchy  of
preferences injures them by placing them on unequal footing with In-