Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/11pdf/10-1150.pdf
Page Number: 3.0

Cite as:  566 U. S. ____ (2012) 

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Syllabus 

activity  is  normally  not  sufficient  to  transform  an  unpatentable  law 
of  nature  into  a  patent-eligible  application  of  such  a  law.    Parker  v. 
Flook, 437 U. S. 584, 590.  Finally, considering the three steps as an
ordered  combination  adds  nothing  to  the  laws  of  nature  that  is  not
already present when the steps are considered separately.  Pp. 8–11.

(b) A more detailed consideration of the controlling precedents rein-

forces this conclusion.  Pp. 11–19. 

(1) Diehr  and  Flook,  the  cases  most  directly  on  point,  both  ad-
dressed processes using mathematical formulas that, like laws of na-
ture,  are  not  themselves  patentable.    In  Diehr,  the  overall  process 
was patent eligible because of the way the additional steps of the pro-
cess integrated the equation into the process as a whole.  450 U. S., at 
187.  These  additional  steps  transformed  the  process  into  an  in-
ventive application of the formula.  But in Flook, the additional steps
of the process did not limit the claim to a particular application, and
the  particular  chemical  processes  at  issue  were  all  “well  known,”  to 
the  point  where,  putting  the  formula  to  the  side,  there  was  no  “in-
ventive concept” in the claimed application of the formula.  437 U. S., 
at  594.    Here,  the  claim  presents  a  case  for  patentability  that  is
weaker  than  Diehr’s  patent-eligible  claim  and  no  stronger  than 
Flook’s unpatentable one.  The three steps add nothing specific to the
laws  of  nature  other  than  what  is  well-understood,  routine,  conven-
tional activity, previously engaged in by those in the field.  Pp. 11–13.
(2) Further  support  for  the  view  that  simply  appending  conven-
tional steps, specified at a high level of generality, to laws of nature, 
natural  phenomena,  and  abstract  ideas  cannot  make  those  laws,
phenomena, and ideas patentable is provided in O’Reilly v. Morse, 15 
How.  62,  114–115;  Neilson  v.  Harford,  Webster’s  Patent  Cases  295, 
371;  Bilski,  supra,  at  ___–___;  and  Benson,  supra,  at  64,  65,  67. 
Pp. 14–16. 

(3) This Court has repeatedly emphasized  a concern that patent
law  not  inhibit  future  discovery  by  improperly  tying  up  the  use  of
laws  of  nature  and  the  like.   See,  e.g.,  Benson,  409  U. S.,  at  67,  68. 
Rewarding with patents those who discover laws of nature might en-
courage  their  discovery.    But  because  those  laws  and  principles  are 
“the basic tools of scientific and technological work,” id., at 67, there 
is a danger that granting patents that tie up their use will inhibit fu-
ture  innovation,  a  danger  that  becomes  acute  when  a  patented  pro-
cess is no more than a general instruction to “apply the natural law,”
or  otherwise  forecloses  more  future  invention  than  the  underlying 
discovery could reasonably justify.  The patent claims at issue impli-
cate  this  concern.  In  telling  a  doctor  to  measure  metabolite  levels
and  to  consider  the  resulting  measurements  in  light  of  the  correla-
tions they describe, they tie up his subsequent treatment decision re-