Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/529bv.pdf
Page Number: 415.0

529US2

Unit: $U44

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BOND v. UNITED STATES

Breyer, J., dissenting

How does the “squeezing” just described differ from the
treatment that overhead luggage is likely to receive from
strangers in a world of travel that is somewhat less gentle
than it used to be?
I think not at all. See United States v.
McDonald, 100 F. 3d 1320, 1327 (CA7 1996) (“ ‘[A]ny person
who has travelled on a common carrier knows that luggage
placed in an overhead compartment is always at the mercy of
all people who want to rearrange or move previously placed
luggage’ ”); Eagan, Familiar Anger Takes Flight with Airline
Tussles, Boston Herald, Aug. 15, 1999, p. 8 (“It’s dog-eat-dog
trying to cram half your home into overhead compart-
ments”); Massingill, Airlines Ride on the Wings of High-
Flying Economy and Travelers Pay Price in Long Lines,
Cramped Airplanes, Kansas City Star, May 9, 1999, p. F4
(“[H]undreds of passengers ﬁll overhead compartments with
bulky carry-on bags that they have to cram, recram, and then
remove”); Flinn, Confessions of a Once-Only Carry-On Guy,
San Francisco Examiner, Sept. 6, 1998, p. T2 (ﬂight attendant
“rearranged the contents of three different overhead com-
partments to free up some room” and then “shoved and
pounded until [the] bag squeezed in”). The trial court,
which heard the evidence, saw nothing unusual, unforesee-
able, or special about this agent’s squeeze.
It found that
Agent Cantu simply “felt the outside of Bond’s softside green
cloth bag,” and it viewed the agent’s activity as “minimally
intrusive touching.” App. 23 (Order Denying Motion to
Suppress). The Court of Appeals also noted that, because
“passengers often handle and manipulate other passengers’
luggage,” the substantially similar tactile inspection here
was entirely “foreseeable.” 167 F. 3d 225, 227 (CA5 1999).
The record and these factual ﬁndings are sufﬁcient to re-
solve this case. The law is clear that the Fourth Amend-
ment protects against government intrusion that upsets an
“ ‘actual (subjective) expectation of privacy’ ” that is objec-
tively “ ‘reasonable.’ ” Smith v. Maryland, 442 U. S. 735,
740 (1979) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347, 361