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10  MURPHY v. NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSN. 

Opinion of the Court 

States expressly concedes that the provision is unconstitu­
tional if it means what petitioners claim.  Brief for United 
States 8, 19. 

A 
Petitioners  argue  that  the  anti-authorization  provision
requires  States  to  maintain  their  existing  laws  against 
sports  gambling  without  alteration.  One  of  the  accepted
meanings  of  the  term  “authorize,”  they  point  out,  is  “per­
mit.”  Brief  for  Petitioners  in  No.  16–476,  p. 42  (citing 
Black’s  Law  Dictionary  133  (6th  ed.  1990);  Webster’s 
Third  New  International  Dictionary  146  (1992)).    They
therefore contend that any state law that has the effect of
permitting  sports  gambling,  including  a  law  totally  or 
partially  repealing  a  prior  prohibition,  amounts  to  an 
authorization.  Brief for Petitioners in No. 16–476, at 42. 

Respondents  interpret  the  provision  more  narrowly.
They  claim  that  the  primary  definition  of  “authorize” 
requires affirmative action.  Brief for Respondents 39.  To 
authorize, they maintain, means “ ‘[t]o empower; to give a
right or authority to act; to endow with authority.’ ”  Ibid. 
(quoting  Black’s  Law  Dictionary,  at  133).    And  this,  they
say,  is  precisely  what  the  2014  Act  does:  It  empowers  a 
defined  group  of  entities,  and  it  endows  them  with  the
authority to conduct sports gambling operations. 

Respondents do not take the position that PASPA bans
all modifications of old laws against sports gambling, Brief 
for Respondents 20, but just  how far they think a modifi­
cation could go is not clear.  They write that a State “can 
also repeal or enhance [laws prohibiting sports gambling] 
without running afoul of PASPA” but that it “cannot ‘par­
tially  repeal’  a  general  prohibition  for  only  one  or  two 
preferred providers, or only as to sports-gambling schemes
conducted  by  the  state.”    Ibid.  Later  in  their  brief,  they 
elaborate on this point: 

“If, for example, a state had an existing felony prohi­