Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/10pdf/09-893.pdf
Page Number: 13.0

10 

AT&T MOBILITY LLC v. CONCEPCION 

Opinion of the Court 

their terms.”  Volt, 489 U. S., at 478; see also Stolt-Nielsen 
S. A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U. S. ___, ___ (2010) 
(slip op., at 17).  This purpose is readily apparent from the 
FAA’s  text.    Section  2  makes  arbitration  agreements 
“valid, irrevocable, and enforceable” as written (subject, of 
course,  to  the  saving  clause);  §3  requires  courts  to  stay
litigation  of  arbitral  claims  pending  arbitration  of  those
claims  “in  accordance  with  the  terms  of  the  agreement”;
and  §4  requires  courts  to  compel  arbitration  “in  accor-
dance with the terms of the agreement” upon the motion of
either party to the agreement (assuming that the “making
of  the  arbitration  agreement  or  the  failure  . . .  to  perform 
the  same”  is  not  at  issue).    In  light  of  these  provisions, 
we  have  held  that  parties  may  agree  to  limit  the  issues
subject  to  arbitration,  Mitsubishi  Motors  Corp.  v.  Soler 
Chrysler-Plymouth,  Inc.,  473  U. S.  614,  628  (1985),  to 
arbitrate  according  to  specific  rules,  Volt,  supra,  at  479, 
and to limit with whom a party will arbitrate its disputes, 
Stolt-Nielsen, supra, at ___ (slip op., at 19). 

The  point  of  affording  parties  discretion  in  designing
arbitration  processes  is  to  allow  for  efficient,  streamlined 
procedures tailored to the type of dispute.  It can be speci-
fied, for example, that the decisionmaker be a specialist in
the relevant field, or that proceedings be kept confidential 
to  protect  trade  secrets.    And  the  informality  of  arbitral 
proceedings  is  itself  desirable,  reducing  the  cost  and  in-
creasing  the  speed  of  dispute  resolution.  14  Penn  Plaza 
LLC  v.  Pyett,  556  U. S.  ___,  ___  (2009)  (slip  op.,  at  20); 
Mitsubishi Motors Corp., supra, at 628. 

The  dissent  quotes  Dean  Witter  Reynolds  Inc.  v.  Byrd, 
470  U. S.  213,  219  (1985),  as  “ ‘reject[ing]  the  suggestion
that  the  overriding  goal  of  the  Arbitration  Act  was  to
promote  the  expeditious  resolution  of  claims.’ ”    Post,  at  4 
(opinion of BREYER, J.).  That is greatly misleading.  After 
saying (accurately enough) that “the overriding goal of the 
Arbitration Act was [not] to promote the expeditious reso-