Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/22pdf/22-166_8n59.pdf
Page Number: 18

Cite as:  598 U. S. ____ (2023) 

1 

GORSUCH, J., concurring 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

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No. 22–166 
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GERALDINE TYLER, PETITIONER v. HENNEPIN 
COUNTY, MINNESOTA, ET AL. 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT 

[May 25, 2023] 

JUSTICE  GORSUCH,  with  whom  JUSTICE  JACKSON  joins,

concurring. 

The Court reverses the Eighth Circuit’s dismissal of Ger-
aldine Tyler’s suit and holds that she has plausibly alleged 
a  violation  of  the  Fifth  Amendment’s  Takings  Clause.    I 
agree.  Given its Takings Clause holding, the Court under-
standably  declines  to  pass  on  the  question  whether  the 
Eighth Circuit committed a further error when it dismissed 
Ms. Tyler’s claim under the Eighth Amendment’s Excessive
Fines Clause.  Ante, at 14.  But even a cursory review of the
District Court’s excessive-fines analysis—which the Eighth
Circuit  adopted  as  “well-reasoned,”  26  F.  4th  789,  794 
(2022)—reveals that it too contains mistakes future lower 
courts should not be quick to emulate. 

First,  the  District  Court  concluded  that  the  Minnesota 
tax-forfeiture scheme is not punitive because “its primary 
purpose” is “remedial”—aimed, in other words, at “compen-
sat[ing]  the  government  for  lost  revenues  due  to  the  non-
payment of taxes.”  505 F. Supp. 3d 879, 896 (Minn. 2020).
That primary-purpose test finds no support in our law.  Be-
cause “sanctions frequently serve more than one purpose,” 
this Court has said that the Excessive Fines Clause applies 
to  any  statutory  scheme  that  “serv[es]  in  part  to  punish.” 
Austin v. United States, 509 U. S. 602, 610 (1993) (emphasis 
added).  It matters not whether the scheme has a remedial