Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/19pdf/18-9526_9okb.pdf
Page Number: 57.0

12 

MCGIRT v. OKLAHOMA 

ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting 

of “tribal ownership” of the underlying lands was “unfamil-
iar,” and the prevailing “assumption” was that “Indian res-
ervations  were  a  thing  of  the  past.”    Solem,  465  U. S.,  at 
468.  Congress  believed  “to  a  man”  that  “within  a  short 
time” the “Indian tribes would enter traditional American 
society  and  the  reservation  system  would  cease  to  exist.” 
Ibid.  As a result, Congress—while intending disestablish-
ment—did not always “detail” precise changes to reserva-
tion  boundaries.    Ibid.   Recognizing  this  distinctive  back-
drop,  our  precedents  determine  Congress’s  intent  by
considering a broader variety of evidence than we might for 
more run-of-the-mill questions of statutory interpretation. 
See id., at 468–469; Parker, 577 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 6); 
Yankton  Sioux  Tribe,  522  U. S.,  at  343.    See  also  Cohen 
§2.02(1), at 113 (“The theory and practice of interpretation
in  federal  Indian  law  differs  from  that  of  other  fields  of 
law.”).

The Court next claims that Parker “clarif[ied]” that evi-
dence of the subsequent treatment of the disputed land by 
government  officials  “ ‘has  limited  interpretive  value.’ ”  
Ante,  at  19  (quoting  Parker,  577  U. S.,  at  ___  (slip  op.,  at 
11)).  But Parker held that the subsequent evidence in that 
case “ha[d] ‘limited interpretive value,’ ” as in the case that 
Parker relied on.  577 U. S., at ___–___ (slip op., at 11–12) 
(quoting Yankton Sioux Tribe, 522 U. S., at 355).  The ade-
quacy  of  evidence  in  a particular  case  says  nothing  about 
whether  our  precedents  require  us  to  consider  such  evi-
dence in others.3 

—————— 

3 The  Court  rejects  this  reading  of  Parker  based  on  a  quotation  that 
ends  with  what  sounds  like  a  general  principle  that  “[e]vidence  of  the 
subsequent treatment of the disputed land by Government officials like-
wise has ‘limited interpretive value.’ ”  Ante, at 19, n. 8 (quoting Parker, 
577  U. S.,  at  ___  (slip  op.,  at  11)).   But  that  sentence  was  actually  the 
topic sentence of a new paragraph that addressed the particular evidence 
of subsequent treatment of the particular land by the particular govern-
ment officials in that case.  Id., at ___–___ (slip op., at 11–12).  It is clear