Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/558bv.pdf
Page Number: 321

160 

SMITH  v.  SPISAK 

Opinion of Stevens, J. 

nity to consider and embrace the equivalent of a life sentence 
when the evidence supports such an option. 

The  acquittal-ﬁrst  jury  instructions  used  during  Spisak’s 
penalty  phase  interposed  before  the  jury  the  same  false 
choice  that  our  holding  in  Beck  prohibits.  By  requiring 
Spisak’s  jury  to  decide  ﬁrst  whether  the  State  had  met  its 
burden with respect to the death sentence, and to reach that 
decision unanimously, the instructions deprived the jury of a 
meaningful opportunity to consider the third option that was 
before it, namely, a life sentence.  Indeed, these instructions 
are every bit as pernicious as those at issue in Beck because 
they would have led individual jurors (falsely) to believe that 
their failure to agree might have resulted in a new trial and 
that, in any event, they could not give effect to their determi­
nation  that  a  life  sentence  was  appropriate  unless  and  until 
they  had  ﬁrst  convinced  each  of  their  peers  on  the  jury  to 
reject the death sentence. 

Admittedly, Spisak has never identiﬁed Beck as the source 
of  the  constitutional  inﬁrmity  at  issue  in  this  case,  nor  did 
the  courts  below  cite  or  rely  upon  it.  But  Spisak  has  con­
sistently  pressed  his  argument  in  terms  that  are  wholly 
consistent  with  Beck.  On  direct  appeal  he  contended,  for 
example, that he 

“was  severely  prejudiced  by  the  erroneous  jury  forms 
because  the  jurors  were  never  informed  of  what  would 
happen  if  they  were  unable  to  reach  a  unanimous  deci­
sion.  That may have led to irreparable speculation that 
if  they  failed  to  agree,  Frank  Spisak  would  be  freed  or 
have a new trial or sentencing hearing.  Such improper 
speculation  may  have  led  those  not  in  agreement  with 
death  to  go  along  with  a  majority.  The  jury  should 
have been instructed  that if they were  unable to unani­
mously agree to death they must return a verdict of one 
of  the  life  sentences  or  in  the  alternative,  the  court 
would impose a life sentence.”  Exh. 28D, 16 Record 391 
(Merit Brief of Appellant).