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10 

NESTLE USA, INC. v. DOE 

SOTOMAYOR, J., concurring
Opinion of SOTOMAYOR, J. 

opinion) (slip op., at 12) (quoting Sosa, 542 U. S., at 732). 
After all, “[f]or two centuries” this Court has “affirmed that 
the domestic law of the United States recognizes the law of 
nations.”  Id., at 729.  There is nothing so mysterious about 
a  law’s  international  origins  that  would  prevent  courts— 
bodies specifically tasked with, and particularly capable of, 
interpreting and  applying  laws—from ably  adjudicating  a 
suit for damages arising out of a “tort . . . committed in vio-
lation of the law of nations.”5  28 U. S. C. §1350. 

Finally,  pointing  to  the  Trafficking  Victims  Protection 
Reauthorization  Act  (TVPRA),  JUSTICE  THOMAS  argues 
that Congress’ decision to impose criminal and civil liability 
on human traffickers indicates that “Congress might doubt” 
the wisdom of recognizing a cause of action for torts other 
than  the  violation  of  safe  conducts,  infringement  of  the 
rights of ambassadors, and piracy.  Ante, at 9.  It is hard to 
understand  why  that  would  be  true.   That  Congress  has 
chosen to legislate against certain abhorrent conduct does 
not make that conduct any less tortious under international 
law.  Nor does it increase the likelihood that negative “prac-
tical consequences” will arise from allowing foreign citizens 

—————— 

5 While  international  law  supplies  the  substantive  prohibitions  that 
give rise to actionable torts under the ATS (e.g., the prohibition against 
child slavery), domestic law provides the answer to any subsidiary ques-
tions regarding “how a particular actor is held liable for a given law-of-
nations violation.”  Jesner, 584 U. S., at ___ (SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting) 
(slip  op.,  at  2).  To  the  extent  JUSTICE THOMAS  is  worried  that  federal 
courts are incapable of identifying such rules of liability in the absence 
of statutory direction, his concern is belied by the Federal Judiciary’s ex-
tensive record of doing just that.  See, e.g., Boyle v. United Technologies 
Corp.,  487  U. S.  500,  512–513  (1988)  (recognizing  a  “Government  con-
tractor  defense”  to  state-law  product-liability  suits);  Consolidated  Rail 
Corporation v. Gottshall, 512 U. S. 532, 541–557 (1994) (recognizing and 
defining the scope of liability for negligent infliction of emotional distress 
under  the  Federal  Employers’  Liability  Act);  Agency  Holding  Corp.  v. 
Malley-Duff & Associates, Inc., 483 U. S. 143, 156 (1987) (borrowing the 
Clayton Act’s statute of limitations for purposes of civil actions brought 
under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act).