Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/21pdf/21-429_8o6a.pdf
Page Number: 45.0

Cite as:  597 U. S. ____ (2022) 

17 

GORSUCH, J., dissenting 

(1883).  And state laws generally do not apply in federal en-
claves.  See, e.g., Fort Leavenworth R. Co. v. Lowe, 114 U. S. 
525,  532–533  (1885).  Rather  than  unambiguously  endow
States  with  any  sort  of  prosecutorial  authority  on  tribal
lands, the GCA thus makes plain that tribal lands are to be
treated  like  federal  enclaves  subject  to  federal,  not  state, 
control. 

Second, the GCA provides that the “general laws of the 
United States as to the punishment of offenses” shall apply 
on  tribal  lands.  §  1152.  Again,  nothing  here  purports  to 
extend state criminal laws to tribal lands.  Quite the con-
trary.  It would hardly make sense to apply federal general 
criminal law—to address all crimes ranging from murder to
jaywalking—if  state  general  criminal  law  already  did  the 
job.  Traditionally,  this  Court  does  not  assume  multiple 
“sets  of  [general]  criminal  laws”  apply  to  those  subject  to 
federal  protection.  Lewis  v.  United  States,  523  U. S.  155, 
163 (1998).  Instead, when Congress converts an area into
a federal enclave, we usually presume later-enacted state
law  “does  not  apply.”  Parker  Drilling  Management  Ser-
vices,  Ltd.  v.  Newton,  587  U. S.  ___,  ___  (2019)  (slip  op., 
at 9).

Third,  after  applying  the  federal  government’s  general
criminal laws to tribal lands, the GCA carves out some ex-
ceptions.  It provides that federal law “shall not extend” to
crimes involving only Indians, crimes by Indians where the
perpetrator  “has  been  punished  by  the  local  law  of  the
tribe,” or where a treaty grants a Tribe exclusive jurisdic-
tion.  § 1152.  These exceptions ensure that the federal gov-
ernment does not meddle in cases most likely to implicate 
tribal sovereignty.  And it defies the imagination to think 
Congress  would  have  taken  such  care  to  limit  federal  au-
thority over these most sensitive cases while (somewhere, 
somehow)  leaving  States,  so  often  the  Tribes’  “deadliest 
enemies,” to enjoy free rein.  United States v. Kagama, 118 
U. S. 375, 384 (1886).