Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/17pdf/16-980_f2q3.pdf
Page Number: 3.0

Cite as:  584 U. S. ____ (2018) 

3 

Syllabus 

the  Court’s  interpretation  render  the  Failure-to-Vote  Clause  super-
fluous;  the  clause  retains  meaning  because  it  prohibits  States  from 
using nonvoting both as the ground for removal and as the sole evi-
dence for another ground for removal (e.g., as the sole evidence that 
someone has died).  Pp. 12–15. 

(4) Respondents’  additional  argument—that  so  many  registered 
voters discard return cards upon receipt that the failure to send cards 
back is worthless as evidence that an addressee has moved—is based 
on a dubious empirical conclusion that conflicts with the congression-
al  judgment  found  in  subsection  (d).    Congress  clearly  did  not  think 
that the failure to send back a return card was of no evidentiary val-
ue, having made that conduct one of the two requirements for remov-
al under subsection (d).  Pp. 15–16. 

(b) Nor has Ohio violated other NVRA provisions.  Pp. 16–21. 

(1) Ohio  removes  the  registrants  at  issue  on  a  permissible 
ground:  change  of  residence.    The  failure  to  return  a  notice  and  the 
failure to vote simply serve as evidence that a registrant has moved, 
not as the ground itself for removal.  Pp. 16–17. 

(2) The  NVRA  contains  no  “reliable  indicator”  prerequisite  to 
sending  notices,  requiring  States  to  have  good  information  that 
someone  has  moved  before  sending  them  a  return  card.    So  long  as 
the  trigger  for  sending  such  notices  is  “uniform,  nondiscriminatory, 
and  in  compliance  with  the  Voting  Rights  Act,”  §20507(b)(1),  States 
may  use  whatever  trigger  they  think  best,  including  the  failure  to 
vote.  Pp. 17–19. 

(3)   Ohio  has  not  violated  the  NVRA’s  “reasonable  effort”  provi-
sion, §20507(a)(4).  Even assuming that this provision authorizes fed-
eral courts to go beyond the restrictions set out in subsections (b), (c), 
and (d) and strike down a state law that does not meet some stand-
ard  of  “reasonableness,”  Ohio’s  process  cannot  be  unreasonable  be-
cause  it  uses  the  change-of-residence  evidence  that  Congress  said  it 
could:  the  failure  to  send  back  a  notice  coupled  with  the  failure  to 
vote  for  the  requisite  period.    Ohio’s  process  is  accordingly  lawful.  
Pp. 19–21. 

838 F. 3d 699, reversed. 

  ALITO, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C. J., 
and  KENNEDY,  THOMAS,  and  GORSUCH,  JJ.,  joined.    THOMAS,  J.,  filed  a 
concurring  opinion.    BREYER,  J.,  filed  a  dissenting  opinion,  in  which 
GINSBURG, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ., joined.  SOTOMAYOR, J., filed a 
dissenting opinion.