Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/20pdf/19-1434_ancf.pdf
Page Number: 44

Cite as:  594 U. S. ____ (2021) 

5 

BREYER, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part
Opinion of BREYER, J. 

§314(a).  Given the technical nature of patents, the need for
expertise, and the importance of avoiding political interfer-
ence,  Congress  chose  to  grant  the  APJs  a  degree  of  inde-
pendence.  These considerations set forth a reasonable leg-
islative  objective  sufficient  to  justify  the  restriction  upon 
the  Director’s  authority  that  Congress  imposed.    And,  as 
JUSTICE THOMAS thoroughly explains, there is no reason to 
believe this scheme will prevent the Director from exercis-
ing policy control over the APJs or will break the chain of 
accountability that is needed to hold the President respon-
sible for bad nominations.  Post, at 7–10 (dissenting opin-
ion).

The Court does not take these realities into account.  In-
stead, for the first time, it examines the APJs’ office func-
tion by function and finds, in Edmond, a judicially created
rule: “Only an officer properly appointed to a principal office 
may issue a final decision binding the Executive Branch in
[inter partes review] proceeding[s].”  Ante, at 19.  As an in-
itial  matter,  I  agree  with  JUSTICE  THOMAS  that  this  rule 
has no foundation in Edmond or our Appointments Clause
precedents.  Post, at 10–11. 

More broadly, I see the Court’s decision as one part of a 
larger shift in our separation-of-powers jurisprudence.  The 
Court  applied  a  similarly  formal  approach  in  Free  Enter-
prise  Fund  v.  Public  Company  Accounting  Oversight  Bd., 
561 U. S. 477 (2010), where it considered the constitutional 
status of the members of an accounting board appointed by 
the Securities and Exchange Commission.  It held that Con-
gress could not limit the SEC’s power to remove those mem-
bers without cause.  The Court also applied a formalist ap-
proach in Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Financial Protection 
Bureau, 591 U. S. ___ (2020), where it held that Congress 
could  not  protect  from  removal  without  cause  the  (single) 
head of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau.  My dis-
sent  in  the first  case  and  JUSTICE KAGAN’s  dissent  in  the 
second explain in greater detail why we believed that this