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4 

LUCIA v. SEC 

BREYER, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part 
Opinion of BREYER, J. 

without cause.  The Court held in that case that the Exec-
utive Vesting Clause of the Constitution, Art. II, §1 (“[t]he 
executive  Power  shall  be  vested  in  a  President  of  the 
United States of America”), forbade Congress from provid-
ing members of the Board with “multilevel protection from 
removal”  by  the  President.  Free  Enterprise  Fund,  561 
U. S.,  at  484;  see  id.,  at  514  (“Congress  cannot  limit  the
President’s  authority”  by  providing  “two  levels  of  protec-
tion  from  removal  for  those  who  . . .  exercise  significant 
executive  power”).  But  see  id.,  at  514–549  (BREYER,  J., 
dissenting).  Because,  in  the  Court’s  view,  the  relevant 
statutes (1) granted the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sioners  protection  from  removal  without  cause,  (2)  gave
the  Commissioners  sole  authority  to  remove  Board  mem-
bers,  and  (3)  protected  Board  members  from  removal 
without cause, the statutes provided Board members with
two  levels  of  protection  from  removal  and  consequently 
violated the Constitution.  Id., at 495–498. 

In  addressing  the  constitutionality  of  the  Board  mem-
bers’  removal  protections,  the  Court  emphasized  that  the 
Board members were “executive officers”—more specifically,
“inferior  officers”  for  purposes  of  the  Appointments
Clause.  E.g., id., at 492–495, 504–505.  The significance of
that fact to the Court’s analysis is not entirely clear.  The 
Court said: 

“The  parties  here  concede  that  Board  members  are 
executive ‘Officers’, as that term is used in the Consti-
tution.  We  do  not  decide  the  status  of  other  Govern-
ment  employees,  nor  do  we  decide  whether  ‘lesser 
functionaries  subordinate  to  officers  of  the  United 
States’ must be subject to the same sort of control as 
those  who  exercise  ‘significant  authority  pursuant  to
the laws.’ ”  Id., at 506 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 
U. S. 1, 126, and n. 162 (1976) (per curiam); citations 
omitted).