Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/558bv.pdf
Page Number: 467.0

306 

WOOD  v.  ALLEN 

Stevens, J., dissenting 

Wood’s claim the state court also had to reasonably conclude 
that  such  a  decision  was  borne  of  strategy.  And  whether 
counsel’s  decision  was  the  product  of  strategy  is  a  question 
of fact for purposes of 28 U. S. C. § 2254(d)(2).1  Cf. Wiggins 
v.  Smith,  539  U. S.  510,  526–527  (2003)  (observing  that  “the 
‘strategic  decision’  the  state  courts  and  respondents  all  in­
voke  to  justify  counsel’s  limited  pursuit  of  mitigating  evi­
dence  resembles  more  a  post  hoc  rationalization  of  counsel’s 
conduct  than  an  accurate  description  of  their  deliberations 
prior to sentencing”); Carr  v.  Schoﬁeld, 364 F. 3d 1246, 1264 
(CA11  2004)  (identifying  “whether  counsel’s  decisions  were 
tactical  or  strategic”  as  a  question  of  fact  (citing  Horton  v. 
Zant, 941 F. 2d 1449, 1462 (CA11 1991))); 2  Berryman v.  Mor­
ton, 100 F. 3d 1089, 1095 (CA3 1996) (same).  In other words, 
the  Court  correctly  concludes  that  the  record  reasonably 
supports  a  ﬁnding  that  counsel  decided  not  to  investigate 
Wood’s mental retardation further, but the Court fails to en­
gage with the requisite second question: Does the record rea­
sonably support ﬁnding that counsel’s  decision was a strate­
gic  one?  The  answer  to  this  question  is  unequivocally  no. 
Before petitioner’s trial, his counsel learned that Wood had 
an  “IQ  in  the  borderline  range  of  intellectual  functioning,” 

1 The  Court  explains:  “Whether  the  state  court  reasonably  determined 
that there was a strategic decision under § 2254(d)(2) is a different question 
from  whether  the  strategic  decision  itself  was  a  reasonable  exercise  of 
professional  judgment  under  Strickland  or  whether  the  application  of 
Strickland  was  reasonable  under  § 2254(d)(1).”  Ante,  at  304.  I  agree 
with  the  majority  that  whether  a  particular  strategic  decision  is  reason­
able or not is the Strickland question we would address were we review­
ing Wood’s claim for habeas relief under § 2254(d)(1). 

2 Indeed,  the  law  in  the  Eleventh  Circuit  on  this  point  is  well  settled: 
“ ‘The question of whether an attorney’s actions were actually the product 
of a tactical or strategic decision is an issue of fact . . . .’ ”   Fotopoulos v. 
Secretary, Dept. of Corrections, 516 F. 3d 1229, 1233 (CA11 2008) (quoting 
Provenzano v.  Singletary, 148 F. 3d 1327, 1330 (CA11 1998)); see also La­
marca  v.  Secretary,  Dept.  of  Corrections,  568  F.  3d  929,  938  (CA11  2009) 
(same).  Thus, it is quite understandable that Wood framed the questions 
presented in his petition for certiorari as arising under § 2254(d)(2).