Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/12pdf/12-71_7l48.pdf
Page Number: 27.0

Cite as:  570 U. S. ____ (2013) 

3 

THOMAS, J., dissenting 

perjury.

Arizona has had a citizenship requirement for voting since 
it  became  a  State  in  1912.    See  Ariz.  Const.,  Art.  VII, 
§2.  In 2004, Arizona citizens enacted Proposition 200, the 
law  at  issue  in  this  case.  Proposition  200  provides  that
“[t]he  county  recorder  shall  reject  any  application  for
registration  that  is  not  accompanied  by  satisfactory  evi-
dence of United States citizenship.”  Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. 
§16–166(F).  The law sets forth several examples of satis-
factory  evidence,  including  driver’s  license  number,  birth 
certificate,  U. S.  passport,  naturalization  documents,  and 
various  tribal  identification  documents  for  Indians.    §16–
166(F)(1)–(6).

Respondents, joined by the United States, allege that these
state  requirements  are  pre-empted  by  the  NVRA’s  man- 
date  that  all  States  “accept  and  use”  the  federal  form
promulgated by the EAC.  §1973gg–4(a)(1).  They contend 
that  the  phrase  “accept  and  use”  requires  a  State  pre- 
sented with a completed federal form to register the individ-
ual to vote without requiring any additional information. 

Arizona  advances  an  alternative  interpretation.    It  ar-
gues that §1973gg–4(a)(1) is satisfied so long as the State 
“accepts  and  use[s]”  the  federal  form  as  part  of  its  voter 
qualification  process.  For  example,  a  State  “accepts  and
use[s]”  the  federal  form  by  allowing  individuals  to  file  it, 
even  if  the  State  requires  additional  identifying  infor-
mation  to  establish  citizenship.  In  Arizona’s  view,  it  “ac-
cepts  and  uses”  the  federal  form  in  the  same  way  that 
an  airline  “accepts  and  uses”  electronic  tickets  but  also 
requires an individual seeking to board a plane to demon-
strate that he is the person named on the ticket.  Brief for 
State  Petitioners  40.    See  also  677  F. 3d  383,  446  (CA9 
2012) (Rawlinson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (“[M]erchants may accept and use credit cards, but a 
customer’s production of a credit card in and of itself may
not  be  sufficient.    The  customer  must  sign  and  may  have