Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/17pdf/16-402_h315.pdf
Page Number: 89.0

18 

CARPENTER v. UNITED STATES 

ALITO, J., dissenting 

We  have  set  forth  the  relevant  Fourth  Amendment 
standard  for  subpoenaing  business  records  many  times 
over.  Out  of  those  dozens  of  cases,  the  majority  cannot 
find even one that so much as suggests an exception to the 
Oklahoma  Press  standard  for  sufficiently  personal  infor-
mation.  Instead, we have always “described the constitu-
tional  requirements”  for  compulsory  process  as  being 
“ ‘settled’ ” and as applying categorically to all “ ‘subpoenas
[of]  corporate  books  or  records.’ ”    Lone  Steer,  Inc.,  464 
U. S.,  at  415  (internal  quotation  marks  omitted).    That 
standard,  we  have  held,  is  “the  most”  protection  the 
Fourth  Amendment  gives  “to  the  production  of  corporate
records  and  papers.”    Oklahoma  Press,  327  U. S.,  at  208 
(emphasis added).2 

Although  the  majority  announces  its  holding  in  the
context  of  the  Stored  Communications  Act,  nothing  stops 
its  logic  from  sweeping  much  further.    The  Court  has 
offered  no  meaningful  limiting  principle,  and  none  is 
apparent.  Cf.  Tr.  of  Oral  Arg.  31  (Carpenter’s  counsel 
admitting  that  “a  grand  jury  subpoena  . . .  would  be  held 
to the same standard as any other subpoena or subpoena-
like request for [cell-site] records”).

Holding  that  subpoenas  must  meet  the  same  standard 
as  conventional  searches  will  seriously  damage,  if  not
destroy, their utility.  Even more so than at the founding, 
today  the  Government  regularly  uses  subpoenas  duces 
tecum and other forms of compulsory process to carry out
its  essential  functions.    See,  e.g.,  Dionisio,  410  U. S.,  at 
11–12  (grand  jury  subpoenas);  McPhaul,  364  U. S.,  at 
382–383  (legislative  subpoenas);  Oklahoma  Press,  supra, 
at 208–209 (administrative subpoenas).  Grand juries, for 
—————— 

2 All that the Court can say in response is that we have “been careful
not  to  uncritically  extend  existing  precedents”  when  confronting  new 
technologies.  Ante, at 20.  But applying a categorical rule categorically 
does not “extend” precedent, so the Court’s statement ends up sounding 
a lot like a tacit admission that it is overruling our precedents.