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14 

CHRISTIAN LEGAL SOC. CHAPTER OF UNIV. OF CAL., 
HASTINGS COLLEGE OF LAW v. MARTINEZ 
Opinion of the Court 

equivalent  of  speech  itself”). 
It  therefore  makes  little 
sense  to  treat  CLS’s  speech  and  association  claims  as 
discrete.  See  Citizens  Against  Rent  Control/Coalition  for 
Fair  Housing  v.  Berkeley,  454  U. S.  290,  300  (1981).    In­
stead,  three  observations  lead  us  to  conclude  that  our 
limited-public-forum  precedents  supply  the  appropriate 
framework  for  assessing  both  CLS’s  speech  and  associa­
tion rights.

First, the same considerations that have led us to apply 
a  less  restrictive  level  of  scrutiny  to  speech  in  limited 
public  forums  as  compared  to  other  environments,  see 
supra,  at  12–13,  and  n.  11,  apply  with  equal  force  to  ex­
pressive association occurring in limited public forums.  As 
just  noted,  speech  and  expressive-association  rights  are
closely  linked.    See  Roberts,  468  U. S.,  at  622  (Associa­
tional freedom is “implicit in the right to engage in activi­
ties  protected  by  the  First  Amendment.”).    When  these 
intertwined  rights  arise  in  exactly  the  same  context,  it
would be anomalous for a restriction on speech to survive
constitutional  review  under  our  limited-public-forum  test
only to be invalidated as an impermissible infringement of
expressive association.  Accord Brief for State Universities 
and  State  University  Systems  as  Amici  Curiae  37–38. 
That result would be all the more anomalous in this case, 
for  CLS  suggests  that  its  expressive-association  claim
plays a part auxiliary to speech’s starring role.  See Brief 
for Petitioner 18. 

Second,  and  closely  related,  the  strict  scrutiny  we  have
applied  in  some  settings  to  laws  that  burden  expressive 
association would, in practical effect, invalidate a defining 
characteristic  of  limited  public  forums—the  State  may
“reserv[e]  [them]  for  certain  groups.”  Rosenberger,  515 
U. S.,  at  829.    See  also  Perry  Ed.  Assn.,  460  U. S.,  at  49 
(“Implicit  in  the  concept”  of  a  limited  public  forum  is  the 
State’s “right to make distinctions in access on the basis of 
. . .  speaker  identity.”);  Cornelius,  473  U. S.,  at  806  (“[A]