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14 

MASSACHUSETTS v. EPA 

Opinion of the Court 

court so largely depends for illumination.”  Baker v. Carr, 
369 U. S. 186, 204 (1962).  As JUSTICE KENNEDY explained
in his Lujan concurrence: 

“While  it  does  not  matter  how  many  persons  have 
been injured by the challenged action, the party bring-
ing  suit  must  show  that  the  action  injures  him  in  a 
concrete  and  personal  way.    This  requirement  is  not 
just  an  empty  formality.  It  preserves  the  vitality  of
the adversarial process by assuring both that the par-
ties before the court have an actual, as opposed to pro-
fessed, stake in the outcome, and that the legal ques-
tions presented . . . will be resolved, not in the rarified 
atmosphere  of  a  debating  society,  but  in  a  concrete 
factual context conducive to a realistic appreciation of 
the consequences of judicial action.”  504 U. S., at 581 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 

To  ensure  the  proper  adversarial  presentation,  Lujan
holds that a litigant must demonstrate that it has suffered
a  concrete  and  particularized  injury  that  is  either  actual
or  imminent,  that  the  injury  is  fairly  traceable  to  the
defendant,  and  that  it  is  likely  that  a  favorable  decision
will redress that injury.  See id., at 560–561.  However, a 
litigant  to  whom  Congress  has  “accorded  a  procedural
right  to  protect  his  concrete  interests,”  id.,  at  572,  n.  7— 
here,  the  right  to  challenge  agency  action  unlawfully
withheld,  §7607(b)(1)—“can  assert  that  right  without 
meeting  all  the  normal  standards  for  redressability  and 
immediacy,” ibid.  When a litigant is vested with a proce-
dural  right,  that  litigant  has  standing  if  there  is  some
possibility that the requested relief will prompt the injury-
causing  party  to  reconsider  the  decision  that  allegedly 
harmed  the  litigant.  Ibid.;  see  also  Sugar  Cane  Growers 
Cooperative  of  Fla.  v.  Veneman,  289  F.  3d  89,  94–95 
(CADC  2002)  (“A  [litigant]  who  alleges  a  deprivation  of  a
procedural protection to which he is entitled never has to