Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/16pdf/15-577_khlp.pdf
Page Number: 37.0

Cite as:  582 U. S. ____ (2017) 

11 

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting 

1 
This  Court  has  consistently  looked  to  history  for  guid-
ance  when  applying  the  Constitution’s  Religion  Clauses.
Those  Clauses  guard  against  a  return  to  the past,  and  so 
that past properly informs their meaning.  See, e.g., Ever-
son, 330 U. S., at 14–15; Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U. S. 488, 
492 (1961).  This case is no different. 

This Nation’s early experience with, and eventual rejec-
tion  of,  established  religion—shorthand  for  “sponsorship, 
financial support, and active involvement of the sovereign 
in religious activity,”  Walz, 397 U. S., at 668—defies easy 
summary.  No two States’ experiences were the same.  In 
some  a  religious  establishment  never  took  hold.    See  T. 
Curry,  The  First  Freedoms  19,  72–74,  76–77,  159–160 
(1986) (Curry).  In others establishment varied in terms of 
the sect (or sects) supported, the nature and extent of that
support,  and  the  uniformity  of  that  support  across  the
State.  Where establishment did take hold, it lost its grip 
at  different  times  and  at  different  speeds.  See  T.  Cobb, 
The  Rise  of  Religious  Liberty  in  America  510–511  (1970
ed.) (Cobb).

Despite  this  rich  diversity  of  experience,  the  story  rele-
vant here is one of consistency.  The use of public funds to
support  core  religious  institutions  can  safely  be  described 
as  a  hallmark  of  the  States’  early  experiences  with  reli-
gious establishment.  Every state establishment saw laws 
passed to raise public funds and direct them toward houses
of  worship  and  ministers.  And  as  the  States  all  dises-
tablished, one by one, they all undid those laws.5 
—————— 

5 This  Court  did  not  hold  that  the  Religion  Clauses  applied,  through 
the  Fourteenth  Amendment,  to  the  States  until  the  1940’s.    See Cant-
well v. Connecticut, 310  U. S. 296 (1940) (Free Exercise Clause); Ever-
son  v.  Board  of  Ed.  of  Ewing,  330  U. S.  1  (1947)  (Establishment 
Clause).  When the States dismantled their religious establishments, as
all had by the 1830’s, they did so on their own accord, in response to the
lessons taught by their experiences with religious establishments.