Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/21pdf/21-12_m6hn.pdf
Page Number: 28

Cite as:  596 U. S. ____ (2022) 

1 

KAGAN, J., dissenting 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

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No. 21–12 
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FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, APPELLANT v. 
TED CRUZ FOR SENATE, ET AL. 

ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR 
THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 

[May 16, 2022] 

JUSTICE  KAGAN,  with  whom  JUSTICE  BREYER  and 

JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR join, dissenting. 

A candidate for public office extends a $500,000 loan to
his  campaign  organization,  hoping  to  recoup  the  amount 
from benefactors’ post-election contributions.  Once elected, 
he devotes himself assiduously to recovering the money; his
personal bank account, after all, now has a gaping half-mil-
lion-dollar  hole.  The  politician  solicits  donations  from 
wealthy individuals and corporate lobbyists, making clear 
that the money they give will go straight from the campaign 
to him, as repayment for his loan.  He is deeply grateful to
those  who  help,  as  they  know  he  will  be—more  grateful 
than for ordinary campaign contributions (which do not in-
crease his personal wealth).  And as they paid him, so he 
will pay them.  In the coming months and years, they re-
ceive  government  benefits—maybe  favorable  legislation,
maybe  prized  appointments,  maybe  lucrative  contracts. 
The  politician  is  happy;  the  donors  are  happy.  The  only
loser is the public.  It inevitably suffers from government 
corruption.

The campaign finance measure at issue here has for two 
decades checked the crooked exchanges just described.  The 
provision, Section 304 of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform
Act of 2002, prohibited a candidate from using post-election
donations to repay loans exceeding $250,000 that he made