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10 

RUCHO v. COMMON CAUSE 

Opinion of the Court 

member  districts  for  the  first  time,  specified  that  those
districts be “composed of contiguous territory,” Act of June 
25,  1842,  ch.  47,  5  Stat.  491,  in  “an  attempt  to  forbid  the 
practice of the gerrymander,” Griffith, supra, at 12.  Later 
statutes  added  requirements  of  compactness  and  equality 
of  population.  Act  of  Jan.  16,  1901,  ch.  93,  §3,  31  Stat.
733; Act of Feb. 2, 1872, ch. 11, §2, 17 Stat. 28.  (Only the
single  member  district  requirement  remains  in  place
today.  2 U. S. C. §2c.)  See Vieth, 541 U. S., at 276 (plurality 
opinion).  Congress also used its Elections Clause power in 
1870,  enacting  the  first  comprehensive  federal  statute
dealing  with  elections  as  a  way  to  enforce  the  Fifteenth 
Amendment.  Force  Act  of  1870,  ch.  114,  16  Stat.  140. 
Starting in the 1950s, Congress enacted a series of laws to
protect  the  right  to  vote  through  measures  such  as  the 
suspension of literacy tests and the prohibition of English-
only elections.  See, e.g., 52 U. S. C. §10101 et seq.

Appellants  suggest  that,  through  the  Elections  Clause, 
the  Framers  set  aside  electoral  issues  such  as  the  one 
before us as questions that only Congress can resolve.  See 
Baker, 369 U. S., at 217.  We do not agree.  In two areas— 
one-person,  one-vote  and  racial  gerrymandering—our
cases  have  held  that  there  is  a  role  for  the  courts  with 
respect  to  at  least  some  issues  that  could  arise  from  a 
State’s drawing of congressional districts.  See Wesberry v. 
Sanders,  376  U. S.  1  (1964);  Shaw  v.  Reno,  509  U. S.  630 
(1993) (Shaw I ).

But  the  history  is  not  irrelevant.    The  Framers  were 
aware  of  electoral  districting  problems  and  considered 
what  to  do  about  them.    They  settled  on  a  characteristic
approach,  assigning  the  issue  to  the  state  legislatures, 
expressly  checked  and  balanced  by  the  Federal  Congress.
As  Alexander  Hamilton  explained,  “it  will  . . .  not  be  de-
nied  that  a  discretionary  power  over  elections  ought  to 
exist somewhere.  It will, I presume, be as readily conceded 
that there were only three ways in which this power could