Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/21pdf/21-418_i425.pdf
Page Number: 19.0

14 

KENNEDY v. BREMERTON SCHOOL DIST. 

Opinion of the Court 

ligious  conduct  while  permitting  secular  conduct  that  un-
dermines the government’s asserted interests in a similar
way,” or if it provides “a mechanism for individualized ex-
emptions.”  Fulton, 593 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 6).  Failing
either  the  neutrality  or  general  applicability  test  is  suffi-
cient to trigger strict scrutiny.  See Lukumi, 508 U. S., at 
546. 

In  this  case,  the  District’s  challenged  policies  were  nei-
ther  neutral  nor  generally  applicable.    By  its  own  admis-
sion, the District sought to restrict Mr. Kennedy’s actions
at least in part because of their religious character.  As it 
put  it  in  its  September  17  letter,  the  District  prohibited
“any  overt  actions  on  Mr.  Kennedy’s  part,  appearing  to  a 
reasonable observer to endorse even voluntary, student-in-
itiated  prayer.”    App.  81.    The  District  further  explained
that it could not allow “an employee, while still on duty, to
engage in religious conduct.”  Id., at 106 (emphasis added).
Prohibiting a religious practice was thus the District’s un-
questioned “object.”  The District candidly acknowledged as
much below, conceding that its policies were “not neutral”
toward religion.  991 F. 3d, at 1020. 

The District’s challenged policies also fail the general ap-
plicability test.  The District’s performance evaluation after 
the 2015 football season advised against rehiring Mr. Ken-
nedy  on  the  ground  that  he  “failed  to  supervise  student- 
athletes after games.”  App. 114.  But, in fact, this was  a 
bespoke  requirement  specifically  addressed  to  Mr.  Ken-
nedy’s  religious  exercise.    The  District  permitted  other
members of the coaching staff to forgo supervising students 
briefly after the game to do things like visit with friends or 
take personal phone calls.  App. 205; see also Part I–B, su-
pra.  Thus, any sort of postgame supervisory requirement
was  not  applied  in  an  evenhanded,  across-the-board  way.
Again recognizing as much, the District conceded before the
Ninth Circuit that its challenged directives were not “gen-
erally applicable.”  991 F. 3d, at 1020.