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ARIZONA v. INTER TRIBAL COUNCIL OF ARIZ. INC. 

Opinion of KENNEDY, J. 

its express purpose and intent to pre-empt state law.  But 
the Court has nonetheless recognized that “when the text 
of  a  pre-emption  clause  is  susceptible  of  more  than  one 
plausible reading, courts ordinarily ‘accept the reading that
disfavors  pre-emption.’ ”    Altria  Group,  Inc.  v.  Good,  555 
U. S.  70,  77  (2008)  (quoting  Bates  v.  Dow  Agrosciences 
LLC,  544  U. S.  431,  449  (2005)).    This  principle  is  best 
understood,  perhaps,  not  as  a  presumption  but  as  a  cau-
tionary  principle  to  ensure  that  pre-emption  does  not  go
beyond the strict requirements of the statutory command.
The principle has two dimensions: Courts must be careful 
not  to  give  an  unduly  broad  interpretation  to  ambiguous
or  imprecise  language  Congress  uses.  And  they  must
confine  their  opinions  to  avoid  overextending  a  federal 
statute’s pre-emptive reach.  Error on either front may put
at  risk  the  validity  and  effectiveness  of  laws  that  Con- 
gress  did  not  intend  to  disturb  and  that  a  State  has 
deemed  important  to  its  scheme  of  governance.    That  con-
cern is the same regardless of the power Congress invokes, 
whether  it  is,  say,  the  commerce  power,  the  war  power,
the  bankruptcy  power,  or  the  power  to  regulate  federal 
elections under Article I, §4. 

Whether  the  federal  statute  concerns  congressional
regulation  of  elections  or  any  other  subject  proper  for 
Congress to address, a  court must  not lightly  infer a con-
gressional directive to negate the States’ otherwise proper
exercise of their sovereign power.  This case illustrates the 
point.  The  separate  States  have  a  continuing,  essential 
interest  in  the  integrity  and  accuracy  of  the  process  used 
to  select  both  state  and  federal  officials.    The  States  pay 
the  costs  of  holding  these  elections,  which  for  practical
reasons  often  overlap  so  that  the  two  sets  of  officials  are
selected  at  the  same  time,  on  the  same  ballots,  by  the 
same voters.  It seems most doubtful to me to suggest that
States  have  some  lesser  concern  when  what  is  involved 
is  their  own  historic  role  in  the  conduct  of  elections.  As