Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/558bv.pdf
Page Number: 504

Cite as: 558 U. S. 310 (2010) 

343 

Opinion of the Court 

tected.  Corporations  and  other  associations,  like  individu­
als, contribute to the ‘discussion, debate, and the dissemina­
tion  of  information  and  ideas’  that  the  First  Amendment 
seeks  to  foster”  (quoting  Bellotti,  435  U. S.,  at  783)).  The 
Court  has  thus  rejected  the  argument  that  political  speech 
of corporations or other associations should be treated differ­
ently under the First Amendment simply because such asso­
ciations  are  not  “natural  persons.”  Id.,  at  776;  see  id.,  at 
780, n. 16.  Cf. id., at 828 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 

At least since the latter part of the 19th century, the laws 
of  some  States  and  of  the  United  States  imposed  a  ban  on 
corporate direct contributions to  candidates.  See B. Smith, 
Unfree  Speech:  The  Folly  of  Campaign  Finance  Reform  23 
(2001).  Yet  not  until  1947  did  Congress  ﬁrst  prohibit  inde­
pendent  expenditures  by  corporations  and  labor  unions  in 
§ 304 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, 61 Stat. 
159 (codiﬁed at 2 U. S. C. § 251 (1946 ed., Supp. I)).  In pass­
ing  this  Act  Congress  overrode  the  veto  of  President  Tru­
man, who warned that the expenditure ban was a “dangerous 
intrusion  on  free  speech.”  Message  from  the  President  of 
the United States, H. R. Doc. No. 334, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 
9 (1947). 

For  almost  three  decades  thereafter,  the  Court  did  not 
reach  the  question  whether  restrictions  on  corporate  and 
union expenditures are constitutional.  See WRTL, 551 
U. S.,  at  502  (opinion  of  Scalia,  J.).  The  question  was  in 
the background of United States v.  CIO, 335 U. S. 106 (1948). 
There,  a  labor  union  endorsed  a  congressional  candidate  in 
its  weekly  periodical.  The  Court  stated  that  “the  gravest 
doubt would arise in our minds as to [the federal expenditure 
prohibition’s]  constitutionality”  if  it  were  construed  to  sup­
press that writing.  Id., at 121.  The Court engaged in stat­
utory interpretation and found the statute did not cover the 
publication.  Id., at 121–122, and n. 20.  Four Justices, how­
ever,  said  they  would  reach  the  constitutional  question  and 
invalidate  the  Labor-Management  Relations  Act’s  expendi­