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Page Number: 49.0

24 

CALIFORNIA v. TEXAS 

ALITO, J., dissenting 

see id., at 575 (opinion of ROBERTS, C. J.); see also id., at 
574 (opinion of the Court), and the House and state inter-
venors now argue that the mandate can still be sustained 
on this ground despite the fact that the “tax” it supposedly 
imposes is now set at zero.  In NFIB, I did not see how the 
mandate’s penalty could be understood as a tax, see id., at 
661–669 (joint dissent), but assuming for the sake of argu-
ment that the majority’s understanding was correct at the
time, it is now indefensible. 

The Constitution grants Congress the power to “lay and
collect Taxes” “to pay the Debts and provide for the common 
Defence and general Welfare of the United States.”  Art. I, 
§8, cl. 1.  In NFIB, the Court made clear that “the essential 
feature of any tax” is that it “produces at least some revenue 
for  the  Government.”    567  U. S.,  at  564  (opinion  of  the 
Court).  That limitation follows from the text of the provi-
sion.  A tax cannot assist in paying debts or providing for 
the general welfare or defense if it raises no money.  More-
over, the concept of laying and collecting taxes plainly en-
tails the collection of revenue.  At the founding, to “lay” in
the relevant sense meant to “assess; to charge; to impose.”
2 N. Webster, An American Dictionary of the English Lan-
guage (1828) (Webster); see also S. Johnson, A Dictionary 
of  the  English  Language  (10th  ed.  1792)  (Johnson)  (“To
charge as a payment”).  To “collect” meant to “gather money
or revenue from debtors; to demand and receive.”  1 Web-
ster; see also Johnson (“To gather together”).  And a “tax” 
was a “rate or sum of money” assessed on certain persons 
or  property.  2  Webster.  Read  together,  this  language
means that Congress is empowered to pass laws that raise 
revenue. 

In recognizing that raising revenue is an “essential fea-
ture” of any exercise of the taxing power, NFIB built on a 
substantial line of precedent.  See Department of Revenue 
of Mont. v. Kurth Ranch, 511 U. S. 767, 778 (1994); United 
States v. Kahriger, 345 U. S. 22, 28, and n. 4 (1953); United