Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/12pdf/11-697_d1o2.pdf
Page Number: 39

2 

KIRTSAENG v. JOHN WILEY & SONS, INC. 

KAGAN, J., concurring 

That said, John Wiley is right that the Court’s decision, 
when  combined  with  Quality  King,  substantially  narrows 
§602(a)(1)’s  ban  on  unauthorized  importation.    Quality 
King  held  that  the  importation  ban  does  not  reach  any 
copies  receiving  first-sale  protection  under  §109(a).    See 
523  U. S.,  at  151–152.  So  notwithstanding  §602(a)(1),  an 
“owner  of  a  particular  copy  . . .  lawfully  made  under  this 
title”  can  import  that  copy  without  the  copyright  owner’s 
permission.  §109(a).  In now holding that copies “lawfully 
made  under  this  title”  include  copies  manufactured 
abroad,  we  unavoidably  diminish  §602(a)(1)’s  scope—
indeed, limit it to a fairly esoteric set of applications.  See 
ante, at 26–27. 

But  if  Congress  views  the  shrinking  of  §602(a)(1)  as  a
problem,  it  should  recognize  Quality  King—not  our  deci-
sion  today—as  the  culprit.  Here,  after  all,  we  merely
construe §109(a); Quality King is the decision holding that 
§109(a)  limits  §602(a)(1).    Had  we  come  out  the  opposite
way in that case, §602(a)(1) would allow a copyright owner 
to  restrict  the  importation  of  copies  irrespective  of  the
first-sale  doctrine.1   That  result  would  enable  the  copy-
right  owner  to  divide  international  markets  in  the  way 
John  Wiley  claims  Congress  intended  when  enacting
§602(a)(1).    But  it  would  do  so  without  imposing  down-

—————— 

1 Although  Quality  King  concluded  that  the  statute’s  text  foreclosed 
that outcome, see 523 U. S., at 151–152, the Solicitor General offered a 
cogent  argument  to  the  contrary.  He  reasoned  that  §109(a)  does  not
limit  §602(a)(1)  because  the  former  authorizes  owners  only  to  “sell”  or
“dispose”  of  copies—not  to  import  them:  The  Act’s  first-sale  provision 
and  its  importation  ban  thus  regulate  separate,  non-overlapping 
spheres  of  conduct.  See  Brief  for  United  States  as  Amicus  Curiae  in 
Quality  King,  O.  T.  1996,  No.  96–1470,  pp.  5,  8–10.    That  reading
remains the Government’s preferred way of construing the statute.  See 
Tr. of Oral Arg. 44 (“[W]e think that we still would adhere to our view
that  section  109(a)  should  not  be  read  as  a  limitation  on  section 
602(a)(1)”);  see  also  ante,  at  32–33;  post,  at  21,  n. 15  (GINSBURG,  J., 
dissenting).