Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/22pdf/21-1043_7648.pdf
Page Number: 3

Cite as:  600 U. S. ____ (2023) 

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Syllabus 

cations of these provisions.  Under the proper test, the ultimate ques-
tion regarding permissible domestic application turns on the location 
of the conduct relevant to the focus of the statutory provisions.  But 
much of the parties’ dispute in this case misses this critical point and 
centers on the “focus” of the relevant provisions without regard to the 
“conduct  relevant  to  that  focus.”  WesternGeco,  585  U. S.,  at  ___. 
Abitron contends that §1114(1)(a) and §1125(a)(1) focus on preventing
infringing  use  of  trademarks,  while  Hetronic  argues  that  they  focus 
both on protecting the goodwill of mark owners and on preventing con-
sumer confusion.  The United States as amicus curiae argues that the 
provisions  focus  only  on  likely  consumer  confusion.   The  parties  all 
seek support for their positions in Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U. S. 
280, but because Steele implicated both domestic conduct and a likeli-
hood  of  domestic  confusion,  Steele  does  not  answer  which  one  deter-
mines the domestic applications of the provisions here.  

The  ultimate  question  regarding  permissible  domestic  application
turns  on  the  location  of  the  conduct  relevant  to  the  focus.    See,  e.g., 
RJR Nabisco, 579 U. S., at 337.  And the conduct relevant to any focus
the parties have proffered is infringing use in commerce, as defined by
the Act.  This conclusion follows from the text and context of both pro-
visions.  Both provisions prohibit the unauthorized “use in commerce” 
of a protected trademark when that use “is likely to cause confusion.”
In  other  words,  Congress  proscribed  the  use  of  a  mark  in  commerce 
under certain conditions.  This conduct, to be sure, must create a suf-
ficient risk of confusion, but confusion is not a separate requirement; 
rather, it is simply a necessary characteristic of an offending use.  Be-
cause Congress has premised liability on a specific action (a particular 
sort of use in commerce), that specific action would be the conduct rel-
evant to any focus on offer today.  WesternGeco, 585 U. S., at ___–___. 
In  sum,  §1114(1)(a)  and  §1125(a)(1)  are  not  extraterritorial,  and 
“use in commerce” provides the dividing line between foreign and do-
mestic applications of these provisions.  The proceedings below were
not in accord with this understanding of extraterritoriality.  Pp. 7–10, 
14–15. 

10 F. 4th 1016, vacated and remanded.  

ALITO, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which THOMAS, GOR-
SUCH, KAVANAUGH, and JACKSON, JJ., joined.  JACKSON, J., filed a concur-
ring  opinion.  SOTOMAYOR,  J.,  filed  an  opinion  concurring  in  the  judg-
ment, in which ROBERTS, C. J., and KAGAN and BARRETT, JJ., joined.