Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/21pdf/20-1459_n7ip.pdf
Page Number: 32

Cite as:  596 U. S. ____ (2022) 

1 

ALITO, J., dissenting 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

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No. 20–1459 
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UNITED STATES, PETITIONER v. JUSTIN 
EUGENE TAYLOR 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT 

[June 21, 2022] 

JUSTICE ALITO, dissenting. 

  As JUSTICE THOMAS clearly shows, the offense for which 
respondent Justin Taylor was convicted constituted a “vio-
lent felony” in the ordinary sense of the term.  Taylor and 
an accomplice met with Martin Silvester for the ostensible 
purpose of selling him marijuana, but unbeknownst to Sil-
vester, Taylor and his accomplice did not intend to complete
the  sale.    Instead,  they  had  agreed  to  threaten  Silvester 
with  a  9-millimeter  pistol  and  demand  that  he  hand  over 
his money.  When Silvester refused to comply with their de-
mand, Taylor’s accomplice shot Silvester, and he died the
next day.  Taylor was convicted of using and carrying a fire-
arm  during,  and  in  relation  to,  a  crime  of  violence,  18
U. S. C. §924(c)(3)(A).  That conviction was based on a pred-
icate act of attempted robbery in violation of the Hobbs Act,
18 U. S. C. §1951(a).

The Court holds that this violent (and, indeed, deadly) of-
fense did not constitute a “crime of violence” under the tech-
nical definition of that term in §924(c)(3)(A).  I agree with 
JUSTICE  THOMAS  that  our  cases  involving  §924(c)(3)(A)
have veered off into fantasy land.1  But if the Court is going 

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1 The major reason for this excursion was the adoption and spread of
the  so-called  categorical  approach.    Although  the  Court  originally 
adopted the “categorical approach” in Taylor v. United States, 495 U. S. 
575 (1990), for other reasons, the major impetus for the expansion of that