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Page Number: 15

12 

YATES v. UNITED STATES 

Opinion of GINSBURG, J. 

more limited than the Government’s.4 

The contemporaneous passage of §1512(c)(1), which was
contained  in  a  section  of  the  Sarbanes-Oxley  Act  discrete 
from  the  section  embracing  §1519  and  §1520,  is  also  in-
structive.  Section 1512(c)(1) provides:
“(c) Whoever corruptly— 
“(1) alters, destroys, mutilates, or conceals a record,
document,  or  other  object,  or  attempts  to  do  so,  with
the intent to impair the object’s integrity or availabil-
ity for use in an official proceeding 

.

 .

 .
“shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more
than 20 years, or both.” 

 . 

 .

The legislative history reveals that §1512(c)(1) was drafted 
and  proposed  after  §1519.    See  148  Cong.  Rec.  12518, 
13088–13089  (2002).  The  Government  argues,  and  Yates
does  not  dispute,  that  §1512(c)(1)’s  reference  to  “other
object”  includes  any  and  every  physical  object.    But  if 
§1519’s  reference  to  “tangible  object”  already  included  all
physical  objects,  as  the  Government  and  the  dissent  con-
tend,  then  Congress  had  no  reason  to  enact  §1512(c)(1): 
Virtually  any  act  that  would  violate  §1512(c)(1)  no  doubt 
would  violate  §1519  as  well,  for  §1519  applies  to  “the 

—————— 

4 The dissent contends that nothing can be drawn from the placement
of  §1519  because,  before  and  after  Sarbanes-Oxley,  “all  of  Chapter  73
was  ordered  chronologically.”  Post,  at  9.  The  argument  might  have
some  force  if  the  factual  premise  were  correct.    In  Sarbanes-Oxley, 
Congress  directed  insertion  of  §1514A  before  §1518,  then  the  last 
section  in  Chapter  73.    If,  as  the  dissent  argues,  Congress  adopted 
§1519 to fill out §1512, post, at 6–7, it would have made more sense for 
Congress  to  codify  the  substance  of  §1519  within  §1512  or  in  a  new 
§1512A,  rather  than  placing  §1519  among  specialized  provisions. 
Notably,  in  Sarbanes-Oxley,  Congress  added  §1512(c)(1),  “a  broad  ban
on  evidence-spoliation,”  cf.  post,  at  9,  n.  2,  to  §1512,  even  though 
§1512’s  preexisting  title  and  provisions  all  related  to  witness-
tampering.