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MATAL v. TAM 

Syllabus 

phrase  “particular  living  individual,”  which  it  used  in  neighboring 
§1052(c).  Tam contends that his interpretation is supported by legis-
lative history and by the PTO’s practice for many years of registering 
marks  that  plainly  denigrated  certain  groups.    But  an  inquiry  into 
the meaning of the statute’s text ceases when, as here, “the statutory 
language  is  unambiguous  and  the  statutory  scheme  is  coherent  and 
consistent.”  Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U. S. 438, 450 (inter-
nal  quotation  marks  omitted).    Even  if  resort  to  legislative  history
and early enforcement practice were appropriate, Tam has presented
nothing  showing  a  congressional  intent  to  adopt  his  interpretation,
and  the  PTO’s  practice  in  the  years  following  the  disparagement 
clause’s enactment is unenlightening.  Pp. 8–12.  

2. The  disparagement  clause  violates  the  First  Amendment’s  Free 
Speech  Clause.  Contrary  to  the  Government’s  contention,  trade-
marks are private, not government speech.  Because the “Free Speech
Clause  . . .  does  not  regulate  government  speech,”  Pleasant  Grove 
City v. Summum, 555 U. S. 460, 467, the government is not required 
to maintain viewpoint neutrality on its own speech.  This Court exer-
cises  great  caution  in  extending  its  government-speech  precedents, 
for  if  private  speech  could  be  passed  off  as  government  speech  by 
simply  affixing  a  government  seal  of  approval,  government  could  si-
lence or muffle the expression of disfavored viewpoints.  

The Federal Government does not dream up the trademarks regis-
tered by the PTO.  Except as required by §1052(a), an examiner may
not reject a mark based on the viewpoint that it appears to express.
If the mark meets the Lanham Act’s viewpoint-neutral requirements,
registration is mandatory.  And once a mark is registered, the PTO is 
not authorized to remove it from the register unless a party moves for
cancellation,  the  registration  expires,  or  the  Federal  Trade  Commis-
sion  initiates  proceedings  based  on  certain  grounds.    It  is  thus  far-
fetched  to  suggest  that  the  content  of  a  registered  mark  is  govern-
ment speech, especially given the fact that if trademarks become gov-
ernment speech when they are registered, the Federal Government is 
babbling  prodigiously  and  incoherently.    And  none  of  this  Court’s 
government-speech  cases  supports  the  idea  that  registered  trade-
marks  are  government  speech.  Johanns  v.  Livestock  Marketing 
Assn., 544 U. S. 550; Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U. S. 460; 
and  Walker  v.  Texas  Div.,  Sons  of  Confederate  Veterans,  Inc.,  576 
U. S.  ___,  distinguished.  Holding  that  the  registration  of  a  trade-
mark  converts  the  mark  into  government  speech  would  constitute  a
huge and dangerous extension of the government-speech doctrine, for 
other  systems  of  government  registration  (such  as  copyright)  could
easily be characterized in the same way.  Pp. 12–18. 

JUSTICE ALITO, joined by THE CHIEF JUSTICE, JUSTICE THOMAS, and