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10 

THOMPSON v. CLARK 

Opinion of the Court 

courts concluded that a prosecution ended when the prose-
cutor dismissed the case, even if the court had not yet taken 
action.  See, e.g., Woodman v. Prescott, 66 N. H. 375, 376– 
377 (1890); see also 1 F. Hilliard, The Law of Torts or Pri-
vate  Wrongs  475  (1874);  Newell  327–328;  Cooley  186.
Other  courts  said  that  a  prosecution  did  not  end  until  a 
judge discharged, or formally released, the defendant from
the case.  See, e.g., DeGraffenreid, 11 S. C. L., at 145; Pau-
kett v. Livermore, 5 Iowa 277, 282 (1857). 

But those cases did not purport to alter the basic favora-
ble termination principle—namely, that a malicious prose-
cution  claim  could  proceed  when  the  prosecution  termi-
nated without a conviction. 

Respondent  also  seizes  on  a  comment  in  the  American 
Law Institute’s 1976 Second Restatement of Torts (as have
most of the Courts of Appeals that have sided with respond-
ent’s position on this issue).  See Jordan, 943 F. 3d, at 545– 
546; Lanning, 908 F. 3d, at 26; Salley v. Myers, 971 F. 3d 
308,  312–313  (CA4  2020);  Jones  v.  Clark  Cty.,  959  F. 3d 
748, 763–765 (CA6 2020); Cordova, 816 F. 3d, at 651.  The 
comment in the Second Restatement opined that, for pur-
poses of a malicious prosecution claim, a criminal case ter-
minates “in favor of the accused” when the prosecution ends 
in a way “as to indicate the innocence of the accused.”  Re-
statement (Second) of Torts §660, and Comment a (1976).

But  respondent’s  reliance  on  the  1976  Restatement  is
flawed because the Restatement did not purport to describe 
the consensus of American law as of 1871, at least on that 
question.  The status of American law as of 1871 is the rel-
evant inquiry for our purposes.  See Manuel, 580 U. S., at 
370; Nieves, 587 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 12); Laskar, 972 
F. 3d, at 1286.  And in the overwhelming majority of Amer-
ican jurisdictions that had considered the issue as of 1871, 
a  plaintiff  alleging  malicious  prosecution  did  not  need  to 
show that his prosecution had ended with some affirmative
indication of innocence.