Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/19pdf/19-715_febh.pdf
Page Number: 2.0

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TRUMP v. MAZARS USA, LLP 

Syllabus 

and violated the separation of powers.  The President did not, however, 
argue  that  any  of  the requested  records  were  protected  by  executive 
privilege.

In Mazars, the District Court granted judgment for the House and 
the  D. C.  Circuit  affirmed,  finding  that  the  subpoena  issued  by  the 
Oversight  Committee  served  a  valid  legislative  purpose  because  the
requested information was relevant to reforming financial disclosure 
requirements for Presidents and presidential candidates.  In Deutsche 
Bank, the District Court denied a preliminary injunction and the Sec-
ond Circuit affirmed in substantial part, holding that the Intelligence 
Committee properly issued its subpoena to Deutsche Bank as part of
an investigation into alleged foreign influence in the U. S. political pro-
cess,  which  could  inform  legislation  to  strengthen  national  security 
and combat foreign meddling.  The court also concluded that the sub-
poenas issued by the Financial Services Committee to Deutsche Bank 
and  Capital  One  were  adequately  related  to  potential  legislation  on 
money laundering, terrorist financing, and the global movement of il-
licit funds through the real estate market. 

Held: The courts below did not take adequate account of the significant
separation of powers concerns implicated by congressional subpoenas 
for the President’s information.  Pp. 7–20.

(a) Historically, disputes over congressional demands for presiden-
tial documents have been resolved by the political branches through
negotiation and compromise without involving this Court.  The Court 
recognizes that this dispute is the first of its kind to reach the Court; 
that such disputes can raise important issues concerning relations be-
tween the branches; that similar disputes recur on a regular basis, in-
cluding  in  the  context  of  deeply  partisan  controversy;  and  that  Con-
gress  and  the  Executive  have  nonetheless  managed  for  over  two 
centuries  to  resolve  these  disputes  among  themselves  without  Su-
preme Court guidance.  Such longstanding practice “ ‘is a consideration 
of great weight’ ” in cases concerning “the allocation of power between 
[the] two elected branches of Government,” and it imposes on the Court 
a duty of care to ensure that it does not needlessly disturb “the com-
promises  and  working  arrangements”  reached  by  those  branches. 
NLRB  v.  Noel  Canning,  573  U. S.  513,  524–526  (quoting  The  Pocket 
Veto Case, 279 U. S. 655, 689).  Pp. 7–11.

(b) Each House of Congress has the power “to secure needed infor-
mation”  in  order  to  legislate.    McGrain  v.  Daugherty,  273  U. S.  135, 
161.  This power is “indispensable” because, without information, Con-
gress  would  be  unable  to  legislate  wisely  or  effectively.    Watkins  v. 
United  States,  354  U. S.  178,  215.    Because  this  power  is  “justified 
solely as an adjunct to the legislative process,” it is subject to several
limitations.  Id., at 197.  Most importantly, a congressional subpoena