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TRANSUNION LLC v. RAMIREZ 

Syllabus 

class definition.  The internal credit files of the other 6,332 class mem-
bers were not provided to third parties during the relevant time period. 
The District Court ruled that all class members had Article III stand-
ing on each of the three statutory claims.  The jury returned a verdict 
for the plaintiffs and awarded each class member statutory damages 
and punitive damages.  A divided panel of the Ninth Circuit affirmed 
in relevant part. 

Held: Only plaintiffs concretely harmed by a defendant’s statutory viola-
tion have Article III standing to seek damages against that private de-
fendant in federal court.  Pp. 6–27.

(a) Article III confines the federal judicial power to the resolution of
“Cases” and “Controversies” in which a plaintiff has a “personal stake.” 
Raines v. Byrd, 521 U. S. 811, 819–820.  To have Article III standing 
to sue in federal court, a plaintiff must show, among other things, that 
the  plaintiff  suffered  concrete  injury  in  fact.    Lujan  v.  Defenders  of 
Wildlife, 504 U. S. 555, 560–561.  Central to assessing concreteness is
whether the asserted harm has a “close relationship” to a harm “tradi-
tionally”  recognized  as  providing  a  basis  for  a  lawsuit  in  American 
courts.  Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U. S. 330, 340.  That inquiry asks 
whether plaintiffs have identified a close historical or common-law an-
alogue for their asserted injury.  Physical or monetary harms readily
qualify  as  concrete  injuries under Article III,  and  various  intangible
harms—like reputational harms—can also be concrete.  Ibid. 

“Article III standing requires a concrete injury even in the context 
of a statutory violation.”  Ibid.  The Court has rejected the proposition 
that “a plaintiff automatically satisfies the injury-in-fact requirement 
whenever a statute grants a person a statutory right and purports to 
authorize that person to sue to vindicate that right.”  Id., at 341.  An 
injury in law is not an injury in fact.  Pp. 6–14.

(b) The Court applies the fundamental standing requirement of con-

crete harm to this case.  Pp. 15–27.

(1) In their reasonable-procedures claim, all 8,185 class members
maintain that TransUnion did not do enough to ensure that mislead-
ing  OFAC  alerts  labeling  them  as  potential  terrorists  were  not  in-
cluded in their credit files.  See §1681e(b).  TransUnion provided third 
parties  with  credit  reports  containing  OFAC  alerts  for  1,853  class 
members (including the named plaintiff Ramirez).  Those 1,853 class 
members therefore suffered a harm with a “close relationship” to the
harm associated with the tort of defamation.  Spokeo, 578 U. S., at 341. 
Under longstanding American law, a person is injured when a defam-
atory statement “that would subject him to hatred, contempt, or ridi-
cule” is published to a third party.  Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 
497 U. S. 1, 13.  The Court has no trouble concluding that the 1,853
class members suffered a concrete harm that qualifies as an injury in