Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/17pdf/16-402_h315.pdf
Page Number: 70.0

20 

CARPENTER v. UNITED STATES 

THOMAS, J., dissenting 

Models of Fourth Amendment Protection, 60 Stan. L. Rev. 
503, 504–505 (2007).  For example, our precedents do not
explain  who  is  included  in  “society,”  how  we  know  what 
they “recogniz[e] or permi[t],” and how much of society must 
agree before something constitutes an “understanding.” 

Here,  for  example,  society  might  prefer  a  balanced 
regime that prohibits the Government from obtaining cell-
site location information unless it can persuade a neutral 
magistrate  that  the  information  bears  on  an  ongoing 
criminal  investigation.    That  is  precisely  the  regime  Con­
gress  created  under  the  Stored  Communications  Act  and 
Telecommunications  Act.    See  47  U. S. C.  §222(c)(1);  18 
U. S. C.  §§2703(c)(1)(B),  (d).    With  no  sense  of  irony,  the 
Court  invalidates  this  regime  today—the  one  that  society
actually created “in the form of its elected representatives
in Congress.”  819 F. 3d 880, 890 (2016). 

Truth be told, this Court does not treat the Katz test as 
a descriptive inquiry.  Although the Katz test is phrased in
descriptive terms about society’s views, this Court treats it 
like  a  normative  question—whether  a  particular  practice 
should  be  considered  a  search  under  the  Fourth  Amend­
ment.  Justice  Harlan  thought  this  was  the  best  way  to
understand his test.  See White, 401 U. S., at 786 (dissent­
ing  opinion)  (explaining  that  courts  must  assess  the  “de­
sirability” of privacy expectations and ask whether courts
“should”  recognize  them  by  “balanc[ing]”  the  “impact  on
the individual’s sense of security . . . against the utility of 
the  conduct  as  a  technique  of  law  enforcement”).    And  a 
normative understanding is the only way to make sense of 
this Court’s precedents, which bear the hallmarks of sub­
jective policymaking instead of neutral legal decisionmak­
ing.  “[T]he only thing the past three decades have estab­
lished about the Katz test” is that society’s expectations of
privacy  “bear  an  uncanny  resemblance  to  those  expecta­
tions  of  privacy  that  this  Court  considers  reasonable.”