Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/529bv.pdf
Page Number: 970.0

529US3

Unit: $U62

[09-26-01 12:54:02] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 529 U. S. 861 (2000)

895

Stevens, J., dissenting

When a federal statute contains an express pre-emption
provision, “the task of statutory construction must in the
ﬁrst instance focus on the plain wording of [that provision],
which necessarily contains the best evidence of Congress’
pre-emptive intent.” CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood, 507
U. S. 658, 664 (1993). The Safety Act contains both an ex-
press pre-emption provision, 15 U. S. C. § 1392(d), and a
saving clause that expressly preserves common-law claims,
§ 1397(k). The relevant part of the former provides:

“Whenever a Federal motor vehicle safety standard es-
tablished under this subchapter is in effect, no State or
political subdivision of a State shall have any authority
either to establish, or to continue in effect, with respect
to any motor vehicle or item of motor vehicle equip-
ment[,] any safety standard applicable to the same as-
pect of performance of such vehicle or item of equipment
which is not identical to the Federal standard.” 10

The latter states:

“Compliance with any Federal motor vehicle safety
standard issued under this subchapter does not exempt
any person from any liability under common law.” 11

10 This provision is now codiﬁed at 49 U. S. C. § 30103(b)(1). Because
both federal and state opinions construing this provision have consistently
referred to it as “§ 1392(d),” I shall follow that practice. Section 1392(d)
contains these additional sentences: “Nothing in this section shall be con-
strued as preventing any State from enforcing any safety standard which
is identical to a Federal safety standard. Nothing in this section shall be
construed to prevent the Federal Government or the government of any
State or political subdivision thereof from establishing a safety require-
ment applicable to motor vehicles or motor vehicle equipment procured
for its own use if such requirement imposes a higher standard of perform-
ance than that required to comply with the otherwise applicable Federal
standard.”

11 This provision is now codiﬁed at 49 U. S. C. § 30103(e). See nn. 1 and

10, supra.