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B&B HARDWARE, INC. v. HARGIS INDUSTRIES, INC. 

Syllabus 

does not compel a different conclusion.  Pp. 8–12.

(b) Neither  the  Lanham  Act’s  text  nor  its  structure  rebuts  the
“presumption”  in  favor  of  giving  preclusive  effect  to  TTAB  decisions
where  the  ordinary  elements  of  issue  preclusion  are  met.    Astoria, 
501 U. S., at 108.  This case is unlike Astoria.  There, where exhaust-
ing the administrative process was a prerequisite to suit in court, giv-
ing  preclusive  effect  to  the  agency’s  determination  in  that  very  ad-
ministrative  process  could  have  rendered  the  judicial  suit  “strictly 
pro forma.” Id., at 111.  By contrast, registration involves a separate 
proceeding to decide separate rights.  Pp. 12–14. 

(c) There  is  no  categorical  reason  why  registration  decisions  can
never  meet  the  ordinary  elements  of  issue  preclusion.  That  many
registrations  will not satisfy those ordinary elements does not mean
that none will.  Pp. 15–22.

(1) Contrary  to  the  Eighth  Circuit’s  conclusion,  the  same  likeli-
hood-of-confusion standard applies to both registration and infringe-
ment.  The  factors  that  the  TTAB  and  the  Eighth  Circuit  use  to  as-
sess  likelihood  of  confusion  are  not  fundamentally  different,  and, 
more important, the operative language of each statute is essentially
the same. 

Hargis claims that the standards are different, noting that the reg-
istration provision asks whether the marks “resemble” each other, 15 
U. S. C.  §1052(d),  while  the  infringement  provision  is  directed  to-
wards the “use in commerce” of the marks, §1114(1).  That the TTAB 
and a district court do not always consider the same usages, however, 
does not mean that the TTAB applies a different standard to the us-
ages  it  does  consider.  If  a  mark  owner  uses  its  mark  in  materially
the same ways as the usages included in its registration application, 
then the TTAB is deciding the same likelihood-of-confusion issue as a 
district  court  in  infringement  litigation.    For  a  similar  reason,  the 
Eighth Circuit erred in holding that issue preclusion could not apply
because  the  TTAB  relied  too  heavily  on  “appearance  and  sound.”
Pp. 15–19. 

(2) The fact that the TTAB and district courts use different pro-
cedures  suggests  only  that  sometimes  issue  preclusion  might  be  in-
appropriate, not that it always is.  Here, there is no categorical “rea-
son  to  doubt  the  quality,  extensiveness,  or  fairness,”  Montana  v. 
United  States,  440  U. S.  147,  164,  n. 11,  of  the  agency’s  procedures. 
In large part they are exactly the same as in federal court.  Also con-
trary to the Eighth Circuit’s conclusion, B&B, the party opposing reg-
istration, not Hargis, bore the burden of persuasion before the TTAB, 
just as it did in the infringement suit.  Pp. 19–21. 

(3)   Hargis  is  also  wrong  that  the  stakes  for  registration  are  al-
ways  too  low  for  issue  preclusion  in  later  infringement  litigation.