Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/19pdf/19-631_2d93.pdf
Page Number: 41.0

Cite as:  591 U. S. ____ (2020) 

11 

Opinion of BREYER, J. 

What, then, is the justification for this harm?  The pur-
pose of the exception is to further the protection of the pub-
lic fisc.  See  supra, at 2.  That protection is an important 
governmental interest.  Private debt typically involves pri-
vate  funds;  public  debt  typically  involves  funds  that,  in 
principle, belong to all of us, and help to implement numer-
ous governmental policies that the people support.

Finally,  is  the  exception  narrowly  tailored?    Its  limited 
scope shows that it is.  Congress has minimized any speech-
related harm by tying the exception directly to the Govern-
ment’s interest in preserving the public fisc.  The statutory
text makes clear that calls will only fall within the bounds 
of that exception if they are “made solely to collect” Govern-
ment debt.  47 U. S. C. §227(b)(1)(A)(iii) (emphasis added). 
Thus, the exception cannot be used to permit communica-
tions unrelated or less directly related to that public fiscal 
interest. 

The upshot is that the government-debt exception, taken
in  context,  inflicts  some  speech-related  harm.    But  the 
harm, as I have explained, is related not to public efforts to 
develop ideas or transmit them to the Government, but to
the  Government’s  response  to  those  efforts,  which  here 
takes the form of highly regulated commercial communica-
tions.  Moreover, there is an important justification for that 
harm, and the exception is narrowly tailored to further that
goal.  Given  those  facts,  the  government-debt  exception 
should survive intermediate First Amendment scrutiny. 

IV 
For  the  reasons  described  above,  I  would  find  that  the 
government-debt  exception  does  not  violate  the  First 
Amendment.  A  majority  of  the  Court,  however,  has  con-
cluded the contrary.  It must thus decide whether that pro-
vision is severable from the rest of the statute.  As to that 
question,  I  agree  with  JUSTICE  KAVANAUGH’s  conclusion 
that the provision is severable.  Accordingly, I respectfully