Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/22pdf/21-857_4357.pdf
Page Number: 31

Cite as:  599 U. S. ____ (2023) 

1 

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting
SOTOMAYOR and KAGAN, JJ., dissenting 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

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No. 21–857 
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MARCUS DEANGELO JONES, PETITIONER v. 
DEWAYNE HENDRIX, WARDEN 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT 

[June 22, 2023] 

JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR and JUSTICE KAGAN, dissenting. 
We respectfully dissent.  As JUSTICE JACKSON explains,
today’s decision yields disturbing results.  See post, at 23– 
25  (dissenting  opinion).    A  prisoner  who  is  actually  inno-
cent,  imprisoned  for  conduct  that  Congress  did  not  crimi-
nalize, is forever barred by 28 U. S. C. §2255(h) from raising 
that claim, merely because he previously sought postconvic-
tion relief.  It does not matter that an intervening decision 
of  this  Court  confirms  his  innocence.    By  challenging  his
conviction once before, he forfeited his freedom.  

Though we agree with JUSTICE JACKSON that this is not 
the scheme Congress designed, we see the matter as the So-
licitor General does.  As all agree, Congress enacted §2255
to “afford federal prisoners a remedy identical in scope to 
federal habeas corpus.”  Davis v.  United States, 417 U. S. 
333, 343 (1974).  To ensure that equivalence, Congress built 
in  a  saving  clause,  allowing  recourse  to  habeas  when  the 
“remedy by motion” under §2255 is “inadequate or ineffec-
tive”  compared  to  the  remedy  it  replaced:  an  “application
for a writ of habeas corpus.”  §2255(e).  So, as this Court has 
explained, if §2255 bars a claim cognizable at habeas, such
that  the  remedies  are  not  “commensurate,”  the  saving
clause  kicks  in,  and  the  prisoner  may  “proceed  in  federal
habeas corpus.”  Sanders v. United States, 373 U. S. 1, 14– 
15 (1963); see United States v. Hayman, 342 U. S. 205, 223