Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/19pdf/18-260_jifl.pdf
Page Number: 29

4 

COUNTY OF MAUI v. HAWAII WILDLIFE FUND 

THOMAS, J., dissenting 

that argument because “a point source need not be the orig-
inal source of the pollutant; it need only convey the pollu-
tant to ‘navigable waters.’ ”  Id., at 105.  Although that case
did  not  involve  the  exact  question  presented  here,  the 
direct-discharge  interpretation  comports  well  with  that
previous decision. 

B 
The  Court’s  main  textual  argument  reads  the  word
“from” in isolation.  But as the Court recognizes, “the word
‘from’ necessarily draws its meaning from context.”  Ante, 
at 9–10.  The Court’s example using “arrive” instead of “ad-
dition” is thus unpersuasive, ante, at 13–14, because “from” 
takes different meanings with different verbs.  The Court’s 
culinary example also misses the mark, ante, at 14, because 
if the drippings from the meat collect in the pan before the 
chef adds them to the gravy, the drippings are added to the 
gravy from the pan, not from the meat.  This point becomes 
clear if we reorder the majority’s recipe to match the stat-
ute; the chef has not added the drippings to the gravy from
the meat.  The Court’s bathwater example, ante, at 14, suf-
fers  from  the  same  problem;  if  the  well  water  is  put  in  a 
bucket before it is put in the bathtub, it is added to the bath-
tub from the bucket.  Only by reading the phrase in its en-
tirety  can  we  interpret  the  definition  of  “discharge.”    See 
Deal v. United States, 508 U. S. 129, 132 (1993). 

The Court also asserts that a narrower reading than the
one it adopts would create a “massive loophole” in the stat-
ute.  Ante, at 15.  Far from creating a loophole, my reading 
is the most logical because it is consonant with the scope of
Congress’ power.  The CWA presumably was passed as an 
exercise of Congress’ authority “to regulate Commerce with
foreign  Nations,  and  among  the  several  States,  and  with 
the Indian Tribes.”  U. S. Const., Art. I, §8, cl. 3.  My inter-
pretation ties the statute more closely to navigable waters, 
on the theory that they are at least a channel of these kinds