Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/558bv.pdf
Page Number: 317.0

156 

SMITH  v.  SPISAK 

Opinion of Stevens, J. 

standard in case involving a state court’s summary denial of 
a  claim,  though  not  a  Strickland  claim,  and  without  full 
brieﬁng  regarding  whether  or  how  § 2254(d)  applied  to  a 
summary decision); Chadwick v.  Janecka, 312 F. 3d 597, 605– 
606  (CA3  2002)  (Alito,  J.)  (relying  on  Weeks  in  holding  that 
§ 2254(d)  applies  where  a  state  court  denies  a  claim  on  the 
merits without giving any indication how it reached its deci­
sion); see generally 2 R. Hertz & J. Liebman, Federal Habeas 
Corpus  Practice  and  Procedure  § 32.2,  pp.  1574–1579  (5th 
ed.  2005  and  2008  Supp.).  However,  we  need  not  decide 
whether deference under § 2254(d)(1) is required here.  With 
or without such deference, our conclusion is the same. 

For  these  reasons,  the  judgment  of  the  Court  of  Appeals 

for the Sixth Circuit is reversed. 

It is so ordered. 

Justice  Stevens,  concurring  in  part  and  concurring  in 

the judgment. 

In my judgment the Court of Appeals correctly concluded 
that  two  errors  that  occurred  during  Spisak’s  trial  violated 
clearly  established  federal  law.  First,  the  jury  instructions 
impermissibly  required  that  the  jury  unanimously  reject  a 
death  sentence  before  considering  other  sentencing  options. 
Second,  the  closing  argument  of  Spisak’s  counsel  was  so 
egregious  that  it  was  constitutionally  deﬁcient  under  any 
standard.  Nevertheless,  for  the  reasons  set  forth  in  Part 
III of the Court’s opinion, ante, at 151–155, I agree that these 
errors  did  not  prejudice  Spisak  and  thus  he  is  not  entitled 
to relief. 

I 

The jury instructions given during Spisak’s penalty phase, 
described in  the Court’s  opinion, ante,  at 146–148,  are fairly 
read  to  require  the  jury  ﬁrst  to  consider  whether  the  death 
penalty is  warranted—i. e., whether the  aggravating factors 
outweigh  the  mitigating  factors—before  moving  on  to  con­
sider whether instead a lesser penalty—i. e., one of two avail­