Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/17pdf/17-130_4f14.pdf
Page Number: 33.0

Cite as:  585 U. S. ____ (2018) 

13 

BREYER, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part 
Opinion of BREYER, J. 

likely  that  interpreting  the  Administrative  Procedure  Act
as  conferring  such  status  would  not  run  contrary  to  Con-
gress’  intent.    In  such  a  case,  I  would  more  likely  hold 
that, given the other features of the Administrative Proce-
dure Act, Congress did intend to make administrative law 
judges inferior “Officers of the United States.” 

III 
Separately,  I  also  disagree  with  the  majority’s  conclu-
sion that the proper remedy in this case requires a hearing
before  a  different  administrative  law  judge.    Ante,  at  12– 
13.  The  Securities  and  Exchange  Commission  has  now 
itself  appointed  the  Administrative  Law  Judge  in  ques-
tion, and I see no reason why he could not rehear the case.
After  all,  when  a  judge  is  reversed  on  appeal  and  a  new
trial  ordered,  typically  the  judge  who  rehears  the  case  is 
the  same  judge  who  heard  it  the  first  time.  The  reversal 
here  is  based  on  a  technical  constitutional  question,  and 
the reversal implies no criticism at all of the original judge
or his ability to conduct the new proceedings.  For him to 
preside  once  again  would  not  violate  the  structural  pur-
poses that we have said the Appointments Clause serves, 
see Freytag, 501 U. S., at 878, nor would it, in any obvious
way, violate the Due Process Clause.  

Regardless,  this  matter  was  not  addressed  below  and
has  not  been  fully  argued  here.  I  would,  at  a  minimum, 
ask the  Court of Appeals to examine it on remand rather
than decide it here now.  That is especially so because the 
majority  seems  to  state  a  general  rule  that  a  different
“Officer”  must  always  preside  after  an  Appointments 
Clause violation.  In a case like this one, that is a relatively
minor  imposition,  because  the  Commission  has  other 
administrative law judges.  But in other cases—say, a case
adjudicated  by  an  improperly  appointed  (but  since  reap- 
pointed) Commission itself—the “Officer” in question may 
be  the  only  such  “Officer,”  so  that  no  substitute  will  be