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12 

CANTERO v. BANK OF AMERICA, N. A. 

Opinion of the Court 

III 
  In sum, Barnett Bank examined this Court’s precedents 
to determine whether a state law regulating national banks 
falls on the permissible or preempted side of the significant-
interference  line.  Those  precedents  furnish  content  to 
Barnett Bank’s significant-interference test—and therefore
also  to  Dodd-Frank’s  preemption  standard  incorporating 
Barnett Bank. 

A court applying that Barnett Bank standard must make 
a  practical  assessment  of  the  nature  and  degree  of  the 
interference caused by a state law.  If the state law prevents 
or significantly interferes with the national bank’s exercise
of its powers, the law is preempted.  If the state law does 
not  prevent  or  significantly  interfere  with  the  national 
bank’s exercise of its powers, the law is not preempted.  In 
assessing  the  significance  of  a  state  law’s  interference, 
courts  may  consider  the  interference  caused  by  the  state 
laws  in  Barnett  Bank,  Franklin,  Anderson,  and  the  other 
precedents on which Barnett Bank relied.  If the state law’s 
interference with national bank powers is more akin to the 
interference in cases like Franklin, Fidelity, First National 
Bank of San Jose, and Barnett Bank itself, then the state 
law  is  preempted. 
If  the  state  law’s  interference  with 
national  bank  powers  is  more  akin  to  the  interference  in 
cases like Anderson, National Bank v. Commonwealth, and 
McClellan, then the state law is not preempted.3 
—————— 

3 In Barnett Bank and each of the earlier precedents, the Court reached
its  conclusions  about  the  nature  and  degree  of  the  state  laws’  alleged 
interference with the national banks’ exercise of their powers based on 
the text and structure of the laws, comparison to other precedents, and 
common sense.  See, e.g., Barnett Bank of Marion Cty., N. A. v. Nelson, 
517 U. S. 25, 33–35 (1996) (comparing Florida law at issue to New York
law  in  Franklin);  Franklin  National  Bank  of  Franklin  Square  v.  New 
York, 347 U. S. 373, 378 (1954) (concluding that New York law interfered
with  ability  to  use  “a  particular  label”  that  federal  law  “specifically 
selected”); First National Bank of San Jose v. California, 262 U. S. 366, 
370  (1923)  (reasoning  that  customers  “might  well  hesitate”  to  subject