Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/19pdf/18-916_f2ah.pdf
Page Number: 16

Cite as:  590 U. S. ____ (2020) 

13 

Opinion of the Court 

Click-to-Call homes in on a single sentence from SAS In-
stitute’s  reviewability  discussion:  “Cuozzo  concluded  that 
§314(d) precludes judicial review only of the Director’s ‘ini-
tial determination’ under §314(a) that ‘there is a “reason-
able  likelihood”  that  the  claims  are  unpatentable  on  the 
grounds asserted’ and review is therefore justified.”  Id., at 
___ (slip op., at 13) (quoting Cuozzo, 579 U. S., at ___ (slip 
op., at 9)).  But that sentence’s account of Cuozzo is incom-
plete.  Recall that Cuozzo itself applied §314(d)’s appeal bar 
to a challenge on grounds other than §314(a).  See supra, at 
10.  To understand how far beyond §314(a) the bar on judi-
cial review extends, we look to the statute and Cuozzo; for 
the reasons stated above, they establish that §314(d) bars 
challenges resting on §315(b).6 

—————— 

6 Defending Click-to-Call’s interpretation, the dissent takes a view of
our  precedent  that  neither  Click-to-Call  nor  the  Federal  Circuit  ad-
vances.  See post, at 15–18.  The dissent does not consider itself bound 
by  Cuozzo’s  conclusion  that  §314(d)  bars  appeal  of  “questions  that  are 
closely  tied  to  the  application  and  interpretation  of  statutes  related  to
the Patent Office’s decision to initiate inter partes review,” 579 U. S., at
___  (slip  op.,  at  11).    According  to  the  dissent,  that  statement  is  dicta 
later repudiated in SAS Institute Inc. v. Iancu, 584 U. S. ___ (2018).

But  Cuozzo  concerned  an  appeal  resting  on  a  “related  statutory  sec-
tion”:  §312(a)(3).    579  U. S.,  at  ___  (slip  op.,  at  7).    That  §312(a)(3) 
challenge was tied to institution, the Court explained, for two reasons: 
first,  because  it  “attack[ed]  a  ‘determination  . . .  whether  to  institute’ 
review,” id., at ___–___ (slip op., at 7–8); second, because the §312(a)(3)
challenge was related to invoking §314(a)’s condition on institution, id., 
at ___ (slip op., at 12).  Cuozzo’s recognition that §314(d) can bar chal-
lenges rooted in provisions other than §314(a) was hardly “dicta,” post, 
at 16—it was the Court’s holding.  And SAS Institute purported to adhere 
to Cuozzo, not to overrule it.  584 U. S., at ___–___ (slip op., at 13–14). 
The Court in SAS Institute said, specifically, that it discerned “nothing 
in  . . .  Cuozzo”  inconsistent  with  its  conclusion.  Id.,  at  ___  (slip  op.,
at 14).

We do not so lightly treat our determinations as dicta and our decisions
as overruling others sub silentio.  Nor can we countenance the dissent’s 
dangerous insinuation that today’s decision is not “really” binding prec-
edent.  Post, at 17–18 (“[W]ho can say?”); post, at 18 (“Litigants and lower