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2 

SNYDER v. PHELPS 

ALITO, J., dissenting 

strong  opinions  on  certain  moral,  religious,  and  political 
issues,  and  the  First  Amendment  ensures  that  they  have
almost  limitless  opportunities  to  express  their  views. 
They  may  write  and  distribute  books,  articles,  and  other 
texts;  they  may  create  and  disseminate  video  and  audio 
recordings;  they  may  circulate  petitions;  they  may  speak 
to  individuals  and  groups  in  public  forums  and  in  any 
private venue that wishes to accommodate them; they may 
picket  peacefully  in  countless  locations;  they  may  appear
on  television  and  speak  on  the  radio;  they  may  post  mes-
sages on the Internet and send out e-mails.  And they may 
express  their  views  in  terms  that  are  “uninhibited,”  “ve-
hement,”  and  “caustic.”    New  York  Times  Co.  v.  Sullivan, 
376 U. S. 254, 270 (1964).

It does not follow, however, that they may intentionally 
inflict severe emotional injury on private persons at a time
of  intense  emotional  sensitivity  by  launching  vicious  ver-
bal attacks that make no contribution to public debate.  To 
protect  against  such  injury,  “most  if  not  all  jurisdictions”
permit  recovery  in  tort  for  the  intentional  infliction  of
emotional  distress  (or  IIED).    Hustler  Magazine,  Inc.  v. 
Falwell, 485 U. S. 46, 53 (1988).

This  is  a  very  narrow  tort  with  requirements  that  “are
rigorous, and difficult to satisfy.”  W. Keeton, D. Dobbs, R. 
Keeton,  &  D.  Owen,  Prosser  and  Keeton  on  Law  of  Torts 
§12, p. 61 (5th ed. 1984).  To recover, a plaintiff must show 
that  the  conduct  at  issue  caused  harm  that  was  truly 
severe.  See Figueiredo-Torres v. Nickel, 321 Md. 642, 653, 
584  A. 2d  69,  75  (1991)  (“[R]ecovery  will  be  meted  out 
sparingly,  its  balm  reserved  for  those  wounds  that  are
truly  severe  and  incapable  of  healing  themselves”  (inter-
nal  quotation  marks  omitted));  Harris  v.  Jones,  281  Md. 
560,  571,  380  A. 2d  611,  616  (1977)  (the  distress  must  be
“ ‘so  severe  that  no  reasonable  man  could  be  expected  to
endure  it’ ”  (quoting  Restatement  (Second)  of  Torts  §46, 
Comment j (1963–1964))).