Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/11pdf/10-1121c4d6.pdf
Page Number: 40.0

Cite as:  567 U. S. ____ (2012) 

7 

BREYER, J., dissenting 

Objecting nonmembers therefore paid 56% of normal fees, 
even  though  the  chargeable  share  that  year  was  69%.
That  is  to  say,  they  paid  less  than  what  the  Constitution 
considers  to  be  their  fair  share.    See  Abood,  431  U. S.,  at 
236–237. 

Even  were  the  underlying  facts  different,  I  can  find  no
constitutional  basis  for  charging  an  objecting  nonmember 
less  than  the  56%  that  the  preceding  year’s  audit  showed 
was  appropriate.  In  general,  any  effort  to  send  a  new 
notice  and  then  apply  special  percentages  to  a  special
midyear  assessment  fee  runs  into  administrative  difficul-
ties that, as explained above, are avoided with a retrospec-
tive system.  See supra, at 6.  And, of course, requiring the
use of some special proportion based on predicted expendi-
tures  would  contradict  Hudson’s  determination  that  prior 
year, not present year, expenditures can form the basis for 
the determination of that proportion.  See Hudson, supra, 
at 307, n. 18. 

In the particular example before us these general prob-
lems are camouflaged by the fact that the union itself said 
that the assessment was to be used for political purposes. 
Hence  it  is  tempting  to  say  that  100%  of  the  assessment 
is  not  chargeable.  But  future  cases  are  most  unlikely  to 
be so clear; disputes will arise over union predictions (say,
that  only  20%  of  the  special  assessment  will  be  used  for 
political  purposes);  and  the  Court  will  then  perhaps  un-
derstand  the  wisdom  of  Hudson’s  holding.    In  any  event, 
we have made clear in other cases that money is fungible. 
Retail  Clerks  v.  Schermerhorn,  373  U. S.  746,  753  (1963).
Whether  a  particular  expenditure  was  funded  by  regular 
dues  or  the  special  assessment  is  “of  bookkeeping  signifi-
cance only  rather than a matter of real substance.”  Ibid. 
And,  the  Court’s  focus  on  the  announced  purposes  of  the
special assessment, rather than yearly expenditures taken 
as a whole, is beside the point. 

The Court’s response to these problems, particularly the