Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/19pdf/17-1712_0971.pdf
Page Number: 11.0

Cite as:  590 U. S. ____ (2020) 

1 

THOMAS, J., concurring 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

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No. 17–1712 
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JAMES J. THOLE, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. 
U. S. BANK N. A., ET AL. 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT 

[June 1, 2020]

 JUSTICE  THOMAS,  with  whom  JUSTICE  GORSUCH  joins,

concurring. 

I agree with the Court’s opinion, which correctly applies
our  precedents  and  concludes  that  petitioners  lack  stand-
ing.  I also agree that “[c]ourts sometimes make standing 
law  more  complicated  than  it  needs  to  be.”  Ante,  at  8.  I 
write separately to observe that by requiring us to engage
with petitioners’ analogies to trust law, our precedents un-
necessarily complicate this case.

The historical restrictions on standing provide a simpler 
framework.    Article  III  vests  “[t]he  judicial  Power  of  the 
United  States”  in  the  federal  courts  and  specifies  that  it
shall extend to enumerated categories of “Cases” and “Con-
troversies.”  §§1, 2.  “To understand the limits that standing 
imposes on ‘the judicial Power,’ . . . we must ‘refer directly 
to the traditional, fundamental limitations upon the powers 
of common-law courts.’ ”  Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U. S. 
___,  ___  (2016)  (THOMAS,  J.,  concurring)  (slip  op.,  at  2) 
(quoting Honig v. Doe, 484 U. S. 305, 340 (1988) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting));  see  also  Muskrat  v.  United  States,  219  U. S. 
346,  356–357  (1911)  (observing  that  the  “judicial  power 
with the right to determine ‘cases’ and ‘controversies’ ” has 
long referred to “suit[s] instituted according to the regular
course of judicial procedure”).

“Common-law  courts  imposed  different  limitations  on  a