Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/19pdf/18-1323_c07d.pdf
Page Number: 54

Cite as:  591 U. S. ____ (2020) 

9 

ROBERTS, C. J., concurring
ROBERTS, C. J., concurring in judgment 

at 893 (opinion of the Court).  In addition to “physical vio-
lence” and “child abuse,” women justifiably feared “verbal 
harassment,  threats  of  future  violence,  the  destruction  of 
possessions,  physical  confinement  to  the  home,  the  with-
drawal of financial support, or the disclosure of the abortion
to family and friends.”   Ibid.  The spousal notification re-
quirement was “thus likely to prevent a significant number 
of  women  from  obtaining  an  abortion.”    Ibid.    It  did  not  
“merely make abortions a little more difficult or expensive 
to obtain; for many women, it [imposed] a substantial ob-
stacle.”  Id.,  at  893–894.  The  Court  emphasized  that  it
would not “blind [itself] to the fact that the significant num-
ber  of  women  who  fear  for  their  safety  and  the  safety  of
their children are likely to be deterred from procuring an
abortion  as  surely  as  if  the  Commonwealth  had  outlawed 
abortion in all cases.”  Id., at 894. 

The upshot of Casey is clear: The several restrictions that 
did not impose a substantial obstacle were constitutional, 
while the restriction that did impose a substantial obstacle
was unconstitutional. 

To be sure, the Court at times discussed the benefits of 
the regulations, including when it distinguished spousal no-
tification  from  parental  consent.
  See  Whole  Woman’s 
Health, 579 U. S., at ___–___ (slip op., at 19–20) (citing Ca-
sey, 505 U. S., at 887–898 (opinion of the Court); id., at 899– 
901 (joint opinion).  But in the context of Casey’s governing
standard, these benefits were not placed on a scale opposite
the law’s burdens.  Rather, Casey discussed benefits in con-
sidering  the  threshold  requirement  that  the  State  have  a
“legitimate  purpose”  and  that  the  law  be  “reasonably  re-
lated to that goal.”  Id., at 878 (plurality opinion); id., at 882 
(joint opinion). 

So long as that showing is made, the only question for a
court is whether a law has the “effect of placing a substan-
tial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion of 
a  nonviable  fetus.”  Id.,  at  877  (plurality  opinion).  Casey