Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/17pdf/16-111_j4el.pdf
Page Number: 45

8 

MASTERPIECE CAKESHOP, LTD. v. COLORADO 
CIVIL RIGHTS COMM’N
 
Opinion of THOMAS, J. 

sex  weddings,  Colorado’s  public-accommodations 
law 
“alter[s]  the  expressive  content”  of  his  message.    Hurley, 
515 U. S., at 572.  The meaning of expressive conduct, this
Court  has  explained,  depends  on  “the  context  in  which  it 
occur[s].”  Johnson, 491 U. S., at 405.  Forcing Phillips to
make  custom  wedding  cakes  for  same-sex  marriages  re­
quires  him  to,  at  the  very  least,  acknowledge  that  same-
sex weddings are “weddings” and suggest that they should 
be  celebrated—the  precise  message  he  believes  his  faith
forbids.  The  First  Amendment  prohibits  Colorado  from
requiring  Phillips  to  “bear  witness  to  [these]  fact[s],” 
Hurley,  515  U. S.,  at  574,  or  to  “affir[m]  . . .  a  belief  with
which [he] disagrees,” id., at 573. 

B 
The  Colorado  Court  of  Appeals  nevertheless  concluded
that  Phillips’  conduct  was  “not  sufficiently  expressive”  to 
be protected from state compulsion.  370 P. 3d, at 283.  It 
noted that  a reasonable observer would not view Phillips’ 
conduct  as  “an  endorsement  of  same-sex  marriage,”  but 
rather  as  mere  “compliance”  with  Colorado’s  public-
accommodations  law.  Id.,  at  286–287  (citing  Rumsfeld  v. 
Forum  for  Academic  and  Institutional  Rights,  Inc.,  547 
U. S.  47,  64–65  (2006)  (FAIR);  Rosenberger  v.  Rector  and 
Visitors  of  Univ.  of  Va.,  515  U. S.  819,  841–842  (1995); 
PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U. S. 74, 76–78 
(1980)).  It also emphasized that Masterpiece could “disas­
sociat[e]” itself from same-sex marriage by posting a “dis­
claimer”  stating  that  Colorado  law  “requires  it  not  to
discriminate” or that “the provision of its services does not 
constitute an endorsement.”  370 P. 3d, at 288.  This rea­
soning is badly misguided. 

1 
The  Colorado  Court  of  Appeals  was  wrong  to  conclude
that  Phillips’  conduct  was  not  expressive  because  a  rea­