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6 

SMITH v. ARIZONA 

ALITO, J., concurring in judgment 

of the case.”  Ibid.  As a result, experts either provided an-
swers  that  were  entirely  disconnected  from  “the  actual
case,” 1 Wigmore 2d §686, at 1095, or else they ignored the 
hypothetical altogether, White 87.

Because  opposing  counsel  often  disagreed  for  strategic
reasons about which facts should be included in a hypothet-
ical, constructing a hypothetical that the judge would per-
mit was often a tricky and contentious business.  If counsel 
did not include enough facts to satisfy opposing counsel, the 
hypothetical would be met with an objection, and its suffi-
ciency would provide grist for an appeal.  F. Rossi, Expert 
Witnesses 114 (1991).  The threat of dragging out litigation 
led  counsel  to  make  their  hypotheticals  even  longer  and
more confusing.  Ibid. 

By  the  early-20th  century,  this  form  of  testimony  was 
scorned.  In  the  second  edition  of  his  treatise,  issued  in 
1923, Wigmore proclaimed the hypothetical question “that 
feature which does most to disgust men of science with the 
law of Evidence.”  1 Wigmore 2d §686, at 1094.  Around the 
same time, Judge Learned Hand labeled hypotheticals “the 
most horific and grotesque wen upon the fair face of justice.” 
Address of L. Hand: The Deficiencies of Trials to Reach the 
Heart  of  the  Matter,  in  Lectures  on  Legal  Topics,  1921–
1922,  p.  104  (1926).    Professor  Charles  T.  McCormick  de-
scribed hypotheticals as “an obstruction to the administra-
tion of justice.”  Some Observations Upon the Opinion Rule
and  Expert  Testimony,  23  Texas  L.  Rev.  109,  128  (1945) 
(McCormick).  Experts shared these concerns; one lamented 
that lawyers’ use of hypothetical questions was often “so un-
fair and confusing and degrading that it does not clarify the
issue nor help achieve justice.”  H. Hulbert, Psychiatric Tes-
timony  in  Probate  Proceedings,  2  Law  &  Contemp.  Prob. 
448, 455 (1935).  Eventually, the use of hypothetical ques-
tions was “nearly universally recognized as a practical dis-
aster” by lawyers, judges, and witnesses alike.  Kaye §4.4,
at 189.