Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/529bv.pdf
Page Number: 877.0

529US3

Unit: $U59

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802

VERMONT AGENCY OF NATURAL RESOURCES v.
UNITED STATES ex rel. STEVENS
Stevens, J., dissenting

sufﬁcient to abrogate any common-law defense of sovereign
immunity. Moreover, even if one accepts Seminole Tribe
as controlling, the State’s immunity claim would still fail.
Given the facts that (1) respondent is, in effect, suing as an
assignee of the United States, ante, at 773; (2) the Eleventh
Amendment does not provide the States with a defense to
claims asserted by the United States, see, e. g., United States
v. Mississippi, 380 U. S. 128, 140 (1965) (“[N]othing in [the
Eleventh Amendment] or any other provision of the Consti-
tution prevents or has ever been seriously supposed to pre-
vent a State’s being sued by the United States”); and (3) the
Attorney General retains signiﬁcant control over a relator’s
action, see 162 F. 3d, at 199–201 (case below), the Court of
Appeals correctly afﬁrmed the District Court’s order deny-
ing petitioner’s motion to dismiss. Compare New Hamp-
shire v. Louisiana, 108 U. S. 76 (1883), with South Dakota v.
North Carolina, 192 U. S. 286 (1904).12
I would, accordingly,
afﬁrm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.

12 The agency argues that this is essentially an “end run” around the
It is not at all clear to
Eleventh Amendment. Brief for Petitioner 33.
me, though, why a qui tam action would be considered an “end run”
around that Amendment, yet precisely the same form of action is not an
“end run” around Articles II and III.