Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/21pdf/19-1392_6j37.pdf/19-1392_6j37.pdf
Page Number: 7

Cite as:  597 U. S. ____ (2022) 

7 

Syllabus 

not implicated because getting an abortion is generally “unplanned ac-
tivity,” and “reproductive planning could take virtually immediate ac-
count of any sudden restoration of state authority to ban abortions.” 
505  U. S.,  at  856.    Instead,  the  opinion  perceived  a  more  intangible 
form of reliance, namely, that “people [had] organized intimate rela-
tionships and made choices that define their views of themselves and
their places in society . . . in reliance on the availability of abortion in 
the  event  that  contraception  should  fail”  and  that  “[t]he  ability  of
women to participate equally in the economic and social life of the Na-
tion has been facilitated by their ability to control their reproductive
lives.”  Ibid.  The contending sides in this case make impassioned and 
conflicting  arguments  about  the  effects  of  the  abortion  right  on  the 
lives of women as well as the status of the fetus.  The Casey plurality’s
speculative attempt to weigh the relative importance of the interests 
of the fetus and the mother represent a departure from the “original 
constitutional  proposition”  that  “courts  do  not  substitute  their  social 
and economic beliefs for the judgment of legislative bodies.”  Ferguson 
v. Skrupa, 372 U. S. 726, 729–730. 

The Solicitor General suggests that overruling Roe and Casey would 
threaten the protection of other rights under the Due Process Clause.
The  Court  emphasizes  that  this  decision  concerns  the  constitutional 
right to abortion and no other right.  Nothing in this opinion should be
understood to cast doubt on precedents that do not concern abortion.
Pp. 63–66. 

(c)  Casey  identified  another  concern,  namely,  the  danger  that  the 
public will perceive a decision overruling a controversial “watershed”
decision, such as Roe, as influenced by political considerations or pub-
lic opinion.  505 U. S., at 866–867.  But the Court cannot allow its de-
cisions to be affected by such extraneous concerns.  A precedent of this 
Court  is  subject  to  the  usual  principles  of  stare  decisis  under  which 
adherence to precedent is the norm but not an inexorable command.  If 
the rule were otherwise, erroneous decisions like Plessy would still be 
the  law.  The Court’s  job  is  to  interpret  the  law,  apply  longstanding
principles of stare decisis, and decide this case accordingly.  Pp. 66–69.
(d) Under the Court’s precedents, rational-basis review is the appro-
priate standard to apply when state abortion regulations undergo con-
stitutional challenge.  Given that procuring an abortion is not a funda-
mental  constitutional  right,  it  follows  that  the  States  may  regulate 
abortion for legitimate reasons, and when such regulations are chal-
lenged  under the  Constitution, courts  cannot  “substitute  their  social 
and economic beliefs for the judgment of legislative bodies.”  Ferguson, 
372 U. S., at 729–730.  That applies even when the laws at issue con-
cern matters of great social significance and moral substance.  A law 
regulating abortion, like other health and welfare laws, is entitled to a