Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/17pdf/16-111_new2_22p3.pdf
Page Number: 46.0

Cite as:  584 U. S. ____ (2018) 

9 

Opinion of THOMAS, J. 

sonable observer would think he is merely complying with 
Colorado’s  public-accommodations  law.  This  argument 
would  justify  any  law  that  compelled  protected  speech. 
And,  this  Court  has  never  accepted  it.  From  the  begin­
ning,  this  Court’s  compelled-speech  precedents  have  re­
jected arguments that “would resolve every issue of power 
in favor of those in authority.”  Barnette, 319 U. S., at 636. 
Hurley,  for  example,  held  that  the  application  of  Massa­
chusetts’  public-accommodations 
[the
organizers]  to  alter  the  expressive  content  of  their  pa­
rade.”  515 U. S., at 572–573.  It did not hold that reason­
able  observers  would  view  the  organizers  as  merely  com­
plying with Massachusetts’ public-accommodations law. 

law  “requir[ed] 

The  decisions  that  the  Colorado  Court  of  Appeals  cited
for this proposition are far afield.  It cited three decisions 
where  groups  objected  to  being  forced  to  provide  a  forum
for  a  third  party’s  speech.    See  FAIR,  supra,  at  51  (law
school  refused  to  allow  military  recruiters  on  campus); 
Rosenberger,  supra,  at  822–823  (public  university  refused
to provide funds to a religious student paper); PruneYard, 
supra, at 77 (shopping center refused to allow individuals 
to  collect  signatures  on  its  property).    In  those  decisions, 
this  Court  rejected  the  argument  that  requiring  the 
groups  to  provide  a  forum  for  third-party  speech  also 
required them to endorse that speech.  See FAIR, supra, at 
63–65; Rosenberger, supra, at 841–842; PruneYard, supra, 
at  85–88.  But  these  decisions  do  not  suggest  that  the 
government can force speakers to alter their own message.
See Pacific Gas & Elec., 475 U. S., at 12 (“Notably absent 
from  PruneYard  was  any  concern  that  access  . . .  might 
affect  the  shopping  center  owner’s  exercise  of  his  own 
right to speak”); Hurley, supra, at 580 (similar). 

The  Colorado  Court  of  Appeals  also  noted  that  Master­
piece is a “for-profit bakery” that “charges its customers.” 
370 P. 3d, at 287.  But this Court has repeatedly rejected 
the  notion  that  a  speaker’s  profit  motive  gives  the  gov­