Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/558bv.pdf
Page Number: 399.0

238 

KUCANA  v.  HOLDER 

Opinion of the Court 

I
 
A
 

In  IIRIRA,  Congress  for  the  ﬁrst  time  codiﬁed  certain 
rules, earlier prescribed by the Attorney General, governing 
the reopening process.  The amended Act instructs that re­
opening  motions  “shall  state  the  new  facts  that  will  be 
proven  at  a  hearing  to  be  held  if  the  motion  is  granted, 
and  shall  be  supported  by  afﬁdavits  or  other  evidentiary 
material.”  § 1229a(c)(7)(B).  Congress  also  prescribed  that 
“the  motion  to  reopen  shall  be  ﬁled  within  90  days  of  the 
date  of  entry  of  a  ﬁnal  administrative  order  of  removal.” 
§ 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i).  Among  matters  excepted  from  the  90­
day limitation are motions to reopen asylum applications be­
cause  of  changed  conditions  in  the  country  of  nationality  or 
removal.  § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii). 

Section  1252(a)(2), captioned  “Matters not  subject to  judi­
cial review,” contains the provision on which this case turns. 
Subparagraph  (B)  of  that  paragraph,  headed  “Denials  of 
discretionary relief,” states: 

“Notwithstanding  any  other  provision  of  law  (statu­
tory or nonstatutory), . . . except as provided in subpara­
graph  (D),[1]  and  regardless  of  whether  the  judgment, 

1 Subparagraph  (D)  of  § 1252(a)(2),  enacted  in  2005,  REAL  ID  Act  of 

2005 (REAL ID Act), § 106(a), 119 Stat. 310, adds: 

“Nothing  in  subparagraph  (B)  .  .  .  or  in  any  other  provision  of  this  Act 
(other  than  this  section)  which  limits  or  eliminates  judicial  review,  shall 
be construed as precluding review of constitutional claims or questions of 
law  raised  upon  a  petition  for  review  ﬁled  with  an  appropriate  court  of 
appeals in accordance with this section.” 
The addition of 8 U. S. C. § 1252(a)(2)(D) in 2005 did not change the opera­
tive language of § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) as enacted in 1996. 

The  REAL  ID  Act  amendments  also  inserted  into  this  introduc­
tory  clause,  inter  alia,  the  words  “(statutory  or  nonstatutory). ” 
§ 106(a)(1)(A)(ii),  119  Stat.  310.  The  introductory  clause,  however,  does 
not deﬁne the scope of 8 U. S. C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii)’s jurisdictional bar.  It 
simply  informs  that  once  the  scope  of  the  bar  is  determined,  jurisdiction