Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/21pdf/20-659_3ea4.pdf
Page Number: 23

8 

THOMPSON v. CLARK 

ALITO, J., dissenting 

cause.  Id., at 268, 275 (plurality opinion); id., at 282 (opin-
ion  of  Kennedy,  J.);  id.,  at  286  (Souter,  J.,  concurring  in 
judgment).  That is all that Albright actually decided. 

The terse plurality opinion did make comments about the
Fourth  Amendment  and  malicious  prosecution,  and  those 
comments have led to confusion in the lower courts.  But a 
careful reading of the plurality opinion shows that it in no 
way  suggested  that  the  Fourth  Amendment  protects 
against malicious prosecution.

When  the  plurality  commented  on  the  Fourth  Amend-
ment,  it  was  addressing  Albright’s  prosecution-without-
probable-cause  claim,  not  malicious  prosecution.  And  in 
connection  with  the  prosecution-without-probable-cause
claim, the plurality made the following two points.  First, 
the plurality noted that “[w]here a particular Amendment
‘provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protec-
tion’ against a particular sort of government behavior, ‘that 
Amendment, not the more generalized notion of “substan-
tive  due  process,”  must  be  the  guide  for  analyzing  [the] 
claims.’ ”  Id., at 273.  Second, the plurality observed that
the Fourth Amendment is the constitutional provision that
deals with “pretrial deprivations of liberty.”  Id., at 274. 

What this discussion suggested was that if any provision
of  the  Constitution  provided  a  home  for  Albright’s  prosecu-
tion-without-probable-cause claim, the Fourth Amendment 
was  a  better  bet  than  the  Fourteenth  Amendment’s  Due 
Process Clause.  But the plurality did not conclude or even
suggest  that  a  prosecution-without-probable-cause  claim
could be brought under the Fourth Amendment.  See id., at 
274–275 (expressly declining to express a view on the ques-
tion).  Indeed, the plurality expressly reiterated that “the
accused is not ‘entitled to judicial oversight or review of the
decision to prosecute,’ ” suggesting instead that the harm to
Albright—if  any—was  that  he  was  “not  merely  charged”
but also “submitted himself to arrest.”  Id., at 274 (quoting 
Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U. S. 103, 114 (1975)).