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4 

JESNER v. ARAB BANK, PLC 

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting 

conduct.  For  example,  Sosa  commands  that  “federal 
courts  should  not  recognize  private  claims  under  federal
common  law  for  violations  of  any  international  law  norm
with  less  definite  content  and  acceptance  among  civilized
nations  than  the  historical  paradigms  familiar  when 
§1350  was  enacted.”    542  U. S.,  at  732.    That  statement 
would  make  little  sense  if  “norm”  encompassed  enforce­
ment  mechanisms  like  “corporate  liability.”    Unlike  “the 
prohibition  on  genocide,”  “corporate  liability”  cannot  be 
violated.  Moreover,  “the  historical  paradigms  familiar
when §1350 was enacted” are all prohibitions on conduct, 
and Sosa clearly contemplated that courts should compare
the charged conduct with the historical conduct.  See ibid. 
(quoting  Filartiga  v.  Pena-Irala,  630  F. 2d  876  (1980),
where  the  Court  of  Appeals  for  the  Second  Circuit  com­
pared a “ ‘torturer’ ” to “ ‘the pirate and slave trader before 
him,’ ” id., at 890, and Judge Edwards’ concurrence in Tel-
Oren  v.  Libyan  Arab  Republic,  726  F. 2d  774  (CADC 
1984),  which  suggested  that  the  “ ‘limits  of  section  1350’s
reach’ ” be defined by “ ‘a handful of heinous actions—each
of  which  violates  definable,  universal  and  obligatory 
norms,’ ”  id.,  at  781).  There  is  no  indication  in  Sosa  that 
the Court also intended for courts to undertake the apples-
to-oranges  comparison  of  the  conduct  proscribed  under
customary  international  law  and  the  forms  of  liability 
available under domestic law. 

The text of the ATS also reflects this distinction between 
prohibiting  conduct  and  determining  enforcement.    The 
statute  provides:  “The  district  courts  shall  have  original 
jurisdiction  of  any  civil  action  by  an  alien  for  a  tort  only,
committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of
the United States.”  28 U. S. C. §1350.  The phrase “of the 
law of nations” modifies “violation,” not “civil action.”  The 
statutory text thus requires only that the alleged conduct 
be  specifically  and  universally  condemned  under  interna­
tional  law,  not  that  the  civil  action  be  of  a  type  that  the