Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/18pdf/17-1011_mkhn.pdf
Page Number: 20.0

Cite as:  586 U. S. ____ (2019) 

1 

BREYER, J., dissenting 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

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No. 17–1011 
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BUDHA ISMAIL JAM, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. 
INTERNATIONAL FINANCE CORPORATION 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT 

[February 27, 2019]

 JUSTICE BREYER, dissenting. 
The International Organizations Immunities Act of 1945
extends  to  international  organizations  “the  same  immu-
nity from suit and every form of judicial process as is en- 
joyed by foreign governments.”  22 U. S. C. §288a(b).  The 
majority,  resting  primarily  upon  the  statute’s  language 
and  canons  of  interpretation,  holds  that  the  statute’s
reference to “immunity” moves with the times.  As a con-
sequence,  the  statute  no  longer  allows  international  or-
ganizations  immunity  from  lawsuits  arising  from  their 
commercial  activities. 
In  my  view,  the  statute  grants 
international  organizations  that  immunity—just  as  for-
eign  governments  possessed  that  immunity  when  Con-
gress enacted the statute in 1945.  In reaching this conclu-
sion, I rest more heavily than does the majority upon the 
statute’s  history,  its  context,  its  purposes,  and  its  conse-
quences.  And  I  write  in  part  to  show  that,  in  difficult 
cases  like  this  one,  purpose-based  methods  of  interpreta-
tion  can  often  shine  a  useful  light  upon  opaque  statutory 
language,  leading  to  a  result  that  reflects  greater  legal 
coherence and is, as a practical matter, more sound. 

I 
The general question before us is familiar: Do the words
of a statute refer to their subject matter “statically,” as it