Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/15pdf/15-133_7l48.pdf
Page Number: 6.0

6 

FRIEDMAN v. HIGHLAND PARK 

THOMAS, J., dissenting 

concluded, the ordinance “may increase the public’s sense
of  safety,”  which  alone  is  “a  substantial  benefit.”    Id., 
at  412.  Heller,  however,  forbids  subjecting  the  Second 
Amendment’s “core protection . . . to a freestanding ‘interest-
balancing’  approach.”  Heller,  supra,  at  634.    This  case 
illustrates why.  If a broad ban on firearms can be upheld
based on conjecture that the public might feel safer (while
being  no  safer  at  all),  then  the  Second  Amendment  guar-
antees nothing. 

III 
The  Court’s  refusal  to review  a  decision  that  flouts  two 
of  our  Second  Amendment  precedents  stands  in  marked
contrast  to  the  Court’s  willingness  to  summarily  reverse
courts  that  disregard  our  other  constitutional  decisions. 
E.g.,  Maryland  v.  Kulbicki,  ante,  at  1  (per  curiam)  (sum-
marily  reversing  because  the  court  below  applied  Strick-
land v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668 (1984), “in name only”); 
Grady v. North Carolina, 575 U. S. ___ (2015) (per curiam)
(summarily  reversing  a  judgment  inconsistent  with  this
Court’s  recent  Fourth  Amendment  precedents);  Martinez 
v. Illinois, 572 U. S. ___, ___ (2014) (per curiam) (slip op.,
at  10)  (summarily  reversing  judgment  that  rested  on  an 
“understandable”  double  jeopardy  holding  that  nonethe-
less “r[an] directly counter to our precedents”).

There is no basis for a different result when our Second 
Amendment precedents are at stake.  I would grant certio-
rari  to  prevent  the  Seventh  Circuit  from  relegating  the
Second Amendment to a second-class right.