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Page Number: 24.0

6 

JOHNSON v. UNITED STATES 

THOMAS, J., concurring in judgment

 JUSTICE ALITO shows why that analysis is wrong under 
our  precedents.  See  post,  at  13–17  (dissenting  opinion).
But  I  have  some  concerns  about  our  modern  vagueness 
doctrine itself.  Whether that doctrine is defensible under 
the  original  meaning  of  “due  process  of  law”  is  a  difficult
question  I  leave  for  the  another  day,  but  the  doctrine’s
history should prompt us at least to examine its constitu-
tional  underpinnings  more  closely  before  we  use  it  to
nullify yet another duly enacted law. 

A 

We  have  become  accustomed  to  using  the  Due  Process 
Clauses  to  invalidate  laws  on  the  ground  of  “vagueness.” 
The  doctrine  we  have  developed  is  quite  sweeping:  “A
statute can be impermissibly vague . . . if it fails to provide
people of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to
understand  what  conduct  it  prohibits”  or  “if  it  authorizes
or  even  encourages  arbitrary  and  discriminatory  enforce-
ment.”  Hill v. Colorado, 530 U. S. 703, 732 (2000).  Using
this  framework,  we  have  nullified  a  wide  range  of  enact-
ments.  We  have  struck  down  laws  ranging  from  city
ordinances,  Papachristou  v.  Jacksonville,  405  U. S.  156, 
165–171  (1972),  to  Acts  of  Congress,  United  States  v.  L. 
Cohen  Grocery  Co.,  255  U. S.  81,  89–93  (1921).    We  have 
struck down laws whether they are penal, Lanzetta v. New 
Jersey, 306 U. S. 451, 452, 458 (1939), or not, Keyishian v. 
Board of Regents of Univ. of State of N. Y., 385 U. S. 589, 
597–604  (1967).1    We  have  struck  down  laws  addressing 
—————— 

1 By “penal,” I mean laws “authoriz[ing] criminal punishment” as well
as those “authorizing fines or forfeitures . . . [that] are enforced through
civil rather than criminal process.”  Cf. C. Nelson, Statutory Interpreta-
tion  108  (2011)  (discussing  definition  of  “penal”  for  purposes  of  rule  of
lenity).  A  law  requiring  termination  of  employment  from  public  insti-
tutions,  for  instance,  is  not  penal.    See  Keyishian,  385  U. S.,  at  597– 
604.  Nor  is  a  law  creating  an  “obligation  to  pay  taxes.”    Milwaukee 
County v. M. E. White Co., 296 U. S. 268, 271 (1935).  Conversely, a law 
imposing a monetary exaction as a punishment for noncompliance with