Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/17pdf/16-980_f2q3.pdf
Page Number: 44

Cite as:  584 U. S. ____ (2018) 

17 

BREYER, J., dissenting 

Thus  the  Failure-to-Vote  Clause  is  left with  no  independ-
ent  weight  since  complying  with  subsection  (d)  shields  a 
State  from  violating  subsection  (b).    To  repeat  the  point, 
under  the  majority’s  view,  the  Failure-to-Vote  Clause  is 
superfluous  in  respect  to  change-of-address  programs: 
subsection (d) already accomplishes everything the major- 
ity says is required of a State’s removal program—namely, 
the sending of a notice. 
  Finally, even if we were to accept the majority’s premise 
that  the  question  here  is  whether  Ohio’s  system  removes 
registered  voters  from  the  registration  list  “solely  by  rea-
son  of  a failure  to  vote,”  that  would  not  change  anything.  
As I have argued, Part II, supra, the failure to respond to 
a  forwardable  notice  is  an  irrelevant  factor  in  terms  of 
what  it  shows  about  whether  that  registrant  changed  his 
or her residence.  To add an irrelevant factor to a failure to 
vote, say,  a factor  like having  gone  on  vacation  or  having 
eaten  too  large  a  meal,  cannot  change  Ohio’s  sole  use  of 
“failure to vote” into something it is not. 

IV 
  JUSTICE THOMAS, concurring, suggests that my reading 
of  the  statute  “ ‘raises  serious  constitutional  doubts.’ ”  
Ante,  at  1  (quoting  Jennings  v.  Rodriguez,  583  U. S.  ___, 
___  (2018)  (slip  op.,  at  2)).    He  believes  that  it  “would 
seriously interfere with the States’ constitutional authority 
to set and enforce voter qualifications.”  Ante, at 2.  At the 
same  time,  the  majority  “assume[s]”  that  “Congress  has 
the  constitutional  authority  to  limit  voting  eligibility 
requirements  in  the  way  respondents  suggest.”    Ante,  at 
16, n. 5.  But it suggests possible agreement with JUSTICE 
THOMAS, for it makes this assumption only “for the sake of 
argument.”  Ibid. 
  Our  cases  indicate,  however,  that  §8  neither  exceeds 
Congress’ authority under the Elections Clause, Art. I, §4, 
nor  interferes  with  the  State’s  authority  under  the  Voter