Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/04pdf/04-278.pdf
Page Number: 33

6 

CASTLE ROCK v. GONZALES 

STEVENS, J., dissenting 

n. 16  (1978)  (sua  sponte  certifying  a  question  of  state  law 
because  it  is  “one  in  which  state  governments  have  the 
highest  interest”);  cf.  Arizonans  for  Official  English  v. 
Arizona, 520 U. S. 43, 77 (1997) (“Through certification of 
novel or unsettled questions of state law for authoritative 
answers  by  a  State’s  highest  court,  a  federal  court  may 
save ‘time, energy, and resources, and hel[p] build a coop-
erative  judicial  federalism’ ”  (brackets  in  original)).5    Sec-
ond, by certifying a potentially dispositive state-law issue, 
the  Court  would  adhere  to  its  wise  policy  of  avoiding  the 
unnecessary adjudication of difficult questions of constitu-
tional  law.  See  Elkins,  435  U. S.,  at  661–662  (citing  con-
stitutional  avoidance  as  a  factor  supporting  certification). 
Third,  certification  would  promote  both  judicial  economy
and  fairness  to  the  parties.  After  all,  the  Colorado  Su-
preme  Court  is  the  ultimate  authority  on  the  meaning  of 
Colorado  law,  and  if  in  later  litigation  it  should  disagree 
with this Court’s provisional state-law holding, our efforts 
will  have  been  wasted  and  respondent  will  have  been 
deprived  of  the  opportunity  to  have  her  claims  heard 
under the authoritative view of Colorado law.  The unique
facts  of  this  case  only  serve  to  emphasize  the  importance 

—————— 

Court  would  have  better  access  to  (and  greater  facility  with)  relevant 
pieces of legislative history beyond those that we have before us.  That 
court  may  also  choose  to  give  certain  evidence  of  legislative  intent 
greater weight than would be customary for this Court.  See, e.g., Brief 
for  Peggy  Kerns  et al.  as  Amici  Curiae  in  Support  of  Respondent  (bill 
sponsor  explaining  the  Colorado  General  Assembly’s  intent  in  passing 
the domestic restraining order statute). 

5 Citing similar considerations, the Second Circuit certified questions 
of state law to the Connecticut Supreme Court when it was faced with a 
procedural  due  process  claim  involving  a  statute  that  arguably  man-
dated the removal of children upon probable cause of child abuse.  See 
Sealed v. Sealed, 332 F. 3d 51 (2003).  The Connecticut Supreme Court 
accepted certification and held that the provision was discretionary, not 
mandatory.    See  Teresa  T.  v.  Ragaglia,  272  Conn.  734,  865  A. 2d  428 
(2005).