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12 

MCCUTCHEON v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N 

Opinion of ROBERTS, C. J. 

a  donor’s  contributions  to  a  political  committee  are  now
limited,  a  donor  cannot  flood  the  committee  with  “huge”
amounts of money so that each contribution the committee
makes  is  perceived  as  a  contribution  from  him.    Buckley, 
supra,  at  38.    Rather,  the  donor  may  contribute  only
$5,000 to the committee, which hardly raises the specter of
abuse  that  concerned  the  Court  in  Buckley.  Limits  on 
contributions  to  political  committees  consequently  create
an additional hurdle for a donor who seeks both to channel 
a large amount of money to a particular candidate and to
ensure that he gets the credit for doing so. 

The  1976  Amendments  also  added  an  antiprolifera- 
tion  rule  prohibiting  donors  from  creating  or  controlling
multiple  affiliated  political  committees.    See  2  U. S. C. 
§441a(a)(5);  11  CFR  §100.5(g)(4).  The  Government  ac-
knowledges  that  this  antiproliferation  rule  “forecloses 
what would otherwise be a particularly easy and effective 
means of circumventing the limits on contributions to any
particular  political committee.”  Brief for Appellee 46.  In 
effect,  the  rule  eliminates  a  donor’s  ability  to  create  and 
use his own political committees to direct funds in excess
of the individual base limits.  It thus blocks a straightfor-
ward method of achieving the circumvention that was the
underlying concern in Buckley. 

The  intricate  regulatory  scheme  that  the  Federal  Elec-
tion Commission has enacted since Buckley further limits 
the  opportunities  for  circumvention  of  the  base  limits  via 
“unearmarked  contributions  to  political  committees  likely 
to contribute” to a particular candidate.  424 U. S., at 38. 
Although the earmarking provision, 2 U. S. C. §441a(a)(8),
was in place when Buckley was decided, the FEC has since 
added  regulations  that  define  earmarking  broadly.    For 
example,  the  regulations  construe  earmarking  to  include
any  designation,  “whether  direct  or  indirect,  express  or
implied, oral or written.”  11 CFR §110.6(b)(1).  The regu-
lations specify that an individual who has contributed to a