Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/14pdf/13-534_19m2.pdf
Page Number: 18.0

Cite as:  574 U. S. ____ (2015) 

13 

Opinion of the Court 

turns  not  on  the  formal  designation  given  by  States  to
regulators but on the risk that active market participants
will pursue private interests in restraining trade.

State agencies controlled by active market participants,
who  possess  singularly  strong  private  interests,  pose  the 
very risk of self-dealing Midcal’s supervision requirement 
was  created  to  address.    See  Areeda  &  Hovencamp  ¶227, 
at 226.  This conclusion does not question the good faith of 
state officers but rather is an assessment of the structural 
risk  of  market  participants’  confusing  their  own  interests 
with  the  State’s  policy  goals.    See  Patrick,  486  U. S.,  at 
100–101. 

The  Court  applied  this  reasoning  to  a  state  agency  in 
Goldfarb.  There  the  Court  denied  immunity  to  a  state 
agency  (the  Virginia  State  Bar)  controlled  by  market
participants  (lawyers)  because  the  agency  had  “joined  in 
what  is  essentially  a  private  anticompetitive  activity”  for
“the benefit of its members.”  421 U. S., at 791, 792.  This 
emphasis  on  the  Bar’s  private  interests  explains  why 
Goldfarb,  though  it  predates  Midcal,  considered  the  lack 
of  supervision  by  the  Virginia  Supreme  Court  to  be  a 
principal reason for denying immunity.   See  421 U. S., at 
791;  see  also  Hoover,  466  U. S.,  at  569  (emphasizing  lack 
of  active  supervision  in  Goldfarb);  Bates  v.  State  Bar  of 
Ariz., 433 U. S. 350, 361–362 (1977) (granting the Arizona
Bar  state-action  immunity  partly  because  its  “rules  are 
subject to pointed re-examination by the policymaker”).

While  Hallie  stated  “it  is  likely  that  active  state  super­
vision would also not be required” for agencies, 471 U. S., 
at  46,  n. 10,  the  entity  there,  as  was  later  the  case  in 
Omni,  was  an  electorally  accountable  municipality  with
general  regulatory  powers  and  no  private  price-fixing 
agenda.  In  that  and  other  respects  the  municipality  was
more  like  prototypical  state  agencies,  not  specialized 
boards  dominated  by  active  market  participants.    In  im­
portant  regards,  agencies  controlled  by  market  partici­