Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/23pdf/22-704_4246.pdf
Page Number: 23

Cite as:  602 U. S. ____ (2024) 

19 

Opinion of the Court 

2 
We conclude that a tradition of restricting the trademark-
ing of names has coexisted with the First Amendment, and 
the  names  clause  fits  within  that  tradition.    Though  the
particulars of the doctrine have shifted over time, the con-
sistent through line is that a person generally had a claim
only  to  his  own  name.  The  names  clause  reflects  this 
common-law tradition by prohibiting a person from obtain-
ing  a  trademark  of  another  living  person’s  name  without
consent, thereby protecting the other’s reputation and good-
will.4 

None of this is to say that the Government cannot inno-
vate when it comes to trademark law.  A firm grounding in
traditional trademark law is sufficient to justify the content-
based trademark restriction before us, but we do not opine 
on what may be required or sufficient in other cases.  To be 
sure,  as  JUSTICE  BARRETT  observes,  a  case  presenting  a 
content-based  trademark  restriction  without  a  historical 

—————— 

4 JUSTICE BARRETT takes a different approach, suggesting that a histor-
ical rule that mirrors the names clause is required.  See post, at 11.  But, 
history-focused approaches to constitutional scrutiny do not typically re-
quire a historical twin.  Cf. New York State Rifle & Pistol Assn., Inc. v. 
Bruen, 597 U. S. 1, 30 (2022).  Nor do JUSTICE BARRETT’s examples un-
dercut  the  names  clause’s  historical  grounding,  as  they  raise  different 
aspects of trademarking names.  For example, she relies upon cases that
concern trademarks containing “the name of a famous person, long since 
dead.”  Barrows  v.  Knight,  6  R. I.  434,  438  (1860);  see  also  Stephano 
Bros., Inc. v. Stamatopoulos, 238 F. 89, 93 (CA2 1916) (“In this case the 
name  adopted  is  a  famous  Egyptian  historical  character,  who  lived  at 
least 1,000 years before the Christian era”).  The part of the names clause 
that we address concerns only “a particular living individual[’s]” name. 
§1052(c) (emphasis added).  And, her other examples concern names that 
had  become  generic  or  descriptive  words.    See  Messerole  v.  Tynberg,  4 
Abb. Pr. (N. S.) 410, 414 (NY Ct. Com. Pl. 1868) (treating “the word ‘Bis-
marck’ ” as “a popular term and one in general use”); Medlar & Holmes 
Shoe Co. v. Delsarte Mfg. Co., 46 A. 1089, 1091 (CC NJ 1900) (treating
the name of the deceased French artist Delsarte as “a generic or descrip-
tive term”).