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524US1

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OCTOBER TERM, 1997

11

Syllabus

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION v. AKINS et al.

certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the district of columbia circuit

No. 96–1590. Argued January 14, 1998—Decided June 1, 1998

The Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA) seeks to remedy
corruption of the political process. As relevant here, it imposes exten-
sive recordkeeping and disclosure requirements upon “political commit-
tee[s],” which include “any committee, club, association or other group
of persons which receives” more than $1,000 in “contributions” or “which
makes” more than $1,000 in “expenditures” in any given year, 2 U. S. C.
§ 431(4)(A) (emphasis added), “for the purpose of inﬂuencing any election
for Federal ofﬁce,” §§ 431(8)(A)(i), (9)(A)(i). Assistance given to help a
particular candidate will not count toward the $1,000 “expenditure” ceil-
ing if it takes the form of a “communication” by a “membership organi-
zation or corporation” “to its members”—as long as the organization is
not “organized primarily for the purpose of inﬂuencing [any individual’s]
§ 431(9)(B)(iii). Respondents, voters with
nomination . . . or election.”
views often opposed to those of the American Israel Public Affairs Com-
mittee (AIPAC), ﬁled a compliant with petitioner Federal Election Com-
mission (FEC), asking the FEC to ﬁnd that AIPAC had violated FECA
and, among other things, to order AIPAC to make public the information
that FECA demands of political committees.
In dismissing the com-
plaint, the FEC found that AIPAC’s communications fell outside FECA’s
membership communications exception. Nonetheless, it concluded,
AIPAC was not a “political committee” because, as an issue-oriented
lobbying organization, its major purpose was not the nomination or
election of candidates. The District Court granted the FEC summary
judgment when it reviewed the determination, but the en banc Court
of Appeals reversed on the ground that the FEC’s major purpose test
improperly interpreted FECA’s deﬁnition of a political committee. The
case presents this Court with two questions: (1) whether respondents
had standing to challenge the FEC’s decision, and (2) whether an organi-
zation falls outside FECA’s deﬁnition of a “political committee” because
“its major purpose” is not “the nomination or election of candidates.”

Held:

1. Respondents, as voters seeking information to which they believe
FECA entitles them, have standing to challenge the FEC’s decision not
to bring an enforcement action. Pp. 19–26.