Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/23pdf/22-859new_kjfm.pdf
Page Number: 84.0

24 

SEC v. JARKESY 

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting 

federal court of law instead of an administrative agency.”
430 U. S., at 455.  Although “the Government could commit
the enforcement of statutes and the imposition and collec-
tion of fines to the judiciary, in which event jury trial would
be required,” the Government “could also validly opt for ad-
ministrative  enforcement,  without  judicial  trials.”    Id.,  at 
460 (citing Stranahan, 214 U. S., at 339; Hepner v. United 
States,  213  U. S.  103  (1909);  United  States  v.  Regan,  232 
U. S. 37 (1914); Helvering, 303 U. S., at 402–403; Crowell, 
285  U. S.,  at  50–51);  Curtis,  415  U. S.,  at  195  (explaining 
that Congress can “entrust [the]  enforcement of statutory 
rights to an administrative process . . . free from the stric-
tures of the Seventh Amendment,” but must abide by the 
Amendment when it does so “in an ordinary civil action in
the district courts”).

It would have been quite remarkable for Tull, which in-
volved  a  claim  in  federal  court,  to  overrule  silently  more
than a century of caselaw involving non-Article III adjudi-
cations of the Government’s rights to civil penalties for stat-
utory  violations.  Of  course,  Tull  did  no  such  thing.  Tull 
even reaffirmed Atlas Roofing by emphasizing that the Sev-
enth Amendment depends on the forum, not just the rem-
edy, because it “is not applicable to administrative proceed-
ings.”  481 U. S., at 418, n. 4 (citing Atlas Roofing, 430 U. S., 
at 454; Pernell, 416 U. S., at 383).  For the majority to pre-
tend otherwise is wishful thinking at best. 

2 
The majority next argues that the “close relationship” be-
tween  the  federal-securities  laws  and  common-law  fraud 
“confirms that this action is ‘legal in nature,’ ” and entitles 
respondents  to  a  jury  trial.  Ante,  at  13.  That  argument
does  not  fare  any  better  than  the  argument  on  remedy.
Again, the majority bends inapposite case law to an illogical 
thesis.  Granfinanciera,  on  which  the  majority  relies  to 
make  its  cause-of-action  argument,  set  forth  the  public-