Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/23pdf/23-411_3dq3.pdf
Page Number: 14.0

Cite as:  603 U. S. ____ (2024) 

9 

Opinion of the Court 

U. S. 488, 492 (2009).  As this Court has explained, “[i]f a 
dispute is not a proper case or controversy, the courts have 
no business deciding it, or expounding the law in the course 
of doing so.”  DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U. S. 332, 
341 (2006).

A proper case or controversy exists only when at least one
plaintiff  “establish[es]  that  [she]  ha[s]  standing  to  sue.” 
Raines, 521 U. S., at 818; Department of Commerce v. New 
York, 588 U. S. 752, 766 (2019).  She must show that she 
has suffered, or will suffer, an injury that is “concrete, par-
ticularized, and actual or imminent; fairly traceable to the 
challenged  action;  and  redressable  by  a  favorable  ruling.” 
Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U. S. 398, 409 (2013) (in-
ternal quotation marks omitted).  These requirements help
ensure that the plaintiff has “such a personal stake in the
outcome of the controversy as to warrant [her] invocation of
federal-court jurisdiction.”  Summers, 555 U. S., at 493 (in-
ternal quotation marks omitted).

The plaintiffs claim standing based on the “direct censor-
ship” of their own speech as well as their “right to listen” to 
others  who  faced  social-media  censorship.  Brief  for  Re-
spondents  19,  22.  Notably,  both  theories  depend  on  the 
platform’s actions—yet the plaintiffs do not seek to enjoin 
the platforms from restricting any posts or accounts.  They
seek to enjoin Government agencies and officials from pres-
suring or encouraging the platforms to suppress protected 
speech in the future.

The  one-step-removed,  anticipatory  nature  of  their  al-
leged  injuries  presents  the  plaintiffs  with  two  particular
challenges.  First,  it  is  a  bedrock  principle  that  a  federal 
court cannot redress “injury that results from the independ-
ent action of some third party not before the court.”  Simon, 
426 U. S., at 41–42.  In keeping with this principle, we have 
“been  reluctant  to  endorse  standing  theories  that  require
guesswork as to how independent decisionmakers will ex-
ercise their judgment.”  Clapper, 568 U. S., at 413.  Rather