Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/20pdf/19-251_p86b.pdf
Page Number: 38.0

Cite as:  594 U. S. ____ (2021) 

9 

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting 

named  “exacting  scrutiny.”    See  ante,  at  7–8  (opinion  of 
ROBERTS, C. J.).

Exacting scrutiny requires two things: first, there must 
be “ ‘a “substantial relation” between the disclosure require-
ment and a “sufficiently important” government interest,’ ” 
and  second,  “ ‘the  strength  of  the  governmental  interest 
must reflect the seriousness of the actual burden on First 
Amendment  rights.’ ”    Reed,  561  U. S.,  at  196.    Exacting
scrutiny  thus  incorporates  a  degree  of  flexibility  into  the 
means-end analysis.  The more serious the burden on First 
Amendment rights, the more compelling the government’s 
interest must be, and the tighter must be the fit between
that  interest  and  the  government’s  means  of  pursuing  it.
By  contrast,  a  less  substantial  interest  and  looser  fit  will 
suffice  where  the  burden  on  First  Amendment  rights  is 
weaker  (or  nonexistent).    In  other  words,  to  decide  how 
closely  tailored  a  disclosure  requirement  must  be,  courts
must ask an antecedent question: How much does the dis-
closure requirement actually burden the freedom to associ-
ate? 

This approach reflects the longstanding principle that the 
requisite level of scrutiny should be commensurate to the
burden  a  government  action  actually  imposes  on  First 
Amendment rights.  See, e.g., Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U. S. 
428, 434 (1992) (“[T]he rigorousness of our inquiry . . . de-
pends upon the extent to which a challenged regulation bur-
dens” First Amendment rights); Board of Trustees of State 
Univ. of N. Y. v. Fox, 492 U. S. 469, 477 (1989) (“[C]ommer-
cial speech enjoys a limited measure of protection, commen-
surate  with  its  subordinate  position  in  the  scale  of  First 
Amendment values, and is [thus] subject to modes of regu-
lation that might be impermissible in the realm of noncom-
mercial expression” (internal quotation marks and altera-
tions  omitted));  see also  Fulton  v.  Philadelphia,  593  U. S. 
___, ___ (2021) (BARRETT, J., concurring) (slip op., at 2) (not-
ing the “nuanced” approach the Court generally takes in the