Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/558bv.pdf
Page Number: 619.0

458  CITIZENS  UNITED  v.  FEDERAL  ELECTION  COMM’N 

Opinion of Stevens, J. 

The  insight  that  even  technically  independent  expendi­
tures can be corrupting in much the same way as direct con­
tributions is bolstered by our decision last year in Caperton 
v.  A. T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U. S. 868 (2009).  In that case, 
Don Blankenship, the chief executive ofﬁcer of a corporation 
with  a lawsuit  pending before  the West  Virginia high  court, 
spent  large  sums  on  behalf  of  a  particular  candidate,  Brent 
Benjamin,  running  for  a  seat  on  that  court.  “In  addition 
to contributing the $1,000 statutory maximum to Benjamin’s 
campaign  committee,  Blankenship  donated  almost  $2.5  mil­
lion to ‘And For The Sake Of The Kids,’ ” a § 527 corporation 
that  ran  ads  targeting  Benjamin’s  opponent.  Id.,  at  873. 
“This was not all.  Blankenship spent, in addition, just over 
$500,000  on  independent  expenditures  .  .  .  ‘  “to  support  .  .  . 
Brent  Benjamin.” ’ ”  Ibid.  (second  alteration  in  original). 
Applying its common sense, this Court accepted petitioners’ 
argument  that  Blankenship’s  “pivotal role  in  getting  Justice 
Benjamin elected created a constitutionally intolerable prob­
ability of actual bias” when Benjamin later declined to recuse 
himself  from  the  appeal  by  Blankenship’s  corporation.  Id., 
at  882.  “Though  n[o]  . . . bribe or  criminal inﬂuence”  was 
involved, we recognized that “Justice Benjamin would never­
theless  feel  a  debt  of  gratitude  to  Blankenship  for  his  ex­
traordinary  efforts  to  get  him  elected.”  Ibid.  “The  difﬁ­
culties  of  inquiring  into  actual  bias,”  we  further  noted, 
“simply  underscore  the  need  for  objective  rules,”  id.,  at 
883—rules  which  will  perforce  turn  on  the  appearance  of 
bias rather than its actual existence. 

In  Caperton, then,  we  accepted  the  premise  that,  at  least 
in  some  circumstances,  independent  expenditures  on  candi­
date  elections  will  raise  an  intolerable  specter  of  quid  pro 
quo  corruption.  Indeed,  this  premise  struck  the  Court  as 
so  intuitive  that  it  repeatedly  referred  to  Blankenship’s 
spending  on  behalf  of  Benjamin—spending  that  consisted  of 

take  much  imagination  to  perceive  why  this  type  of  advocacy  might  be 
especially apt to look like or amount to a deal or a threat.