Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/17pdf/16-402_h315.pdf
Page Number: 119.0

Cite as:  585 U. S. ____ (2018) 

21 

GORSUCH, J., dissenting 

requires  the  carrier  to  disclose  CPNI  “upon  affirmative
written request by the customer, to any person designated 
by  the  customer.”  §222(c)(2).  Congress  even  afforded
customers  a  private  cause  of  action  for  damages  against 
carriers  who  violate  the  Act’s  terms.    §207.  Plainly,  cus-
tomers  have  substantial  legal  interests  in  this  infor-
mation,  including  at  least  some  right  to  include,  exclude,
and control its use.  Those interests might even rise to the
level of a property right. 

The  problem  is  that  we  do  not  know  anything  more. 
Before the district court and court of appeals, Mr. Carpen-
ter  pursued  only  a  Katz  “reasonable  expectations”  argu-
ment.  He did not invoke the law of property or any analo-
gies to the common law, either there or in his petition for 
certiorari.  Even in his merits brief before this Court, Mr. 
Carpenter’s discussion of his positive law rights in cell-site 
data was cursory.  He offered no analysis, for example, of 
what  rights  state  law  might  provide  him  in  addition  to
those  supplied  by  §222.  In  these  circumstances,  I  cannot 
help  but  conclude—reluctantly—that  Mr.  Carpenter  for-
feited perhaps his most promising line of argument. 

Unfortunately, too, this case marks the second time this
Term  that  individuals  have  forfeited  Fourth  Amendment 
arguments  based  on  positive  law  by  failing  to  preserve 
them.  See Byrd, 584 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 7).  Litigants
have  had  fair  notice  since  at  least  United  States  v.  Jones 
(2012) and Florida v. Jardines (2013) that arguments like
these  may  vindicate  Fourth  Amendment  interests  even 
where  Katz  arguments  do  not.  Yet  the  arguments  have
gone  unmade,  leaving  courts  to  the  usual  Katz  hand- 
waving.  These  omissions  do  not  serve  the  development 
of  a  sound  or  fully  protective  Fourth  Amendment 
jurisprudence.