Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/19pdf/18-1323_c07d.pdf
Page Number: 105

24 

JUNE MEDICAL SERVICES L. L. C. v. RUSSO 

ALITO, J., dissenting 

3 to leave either.  It follows that the District Court’s finding
on Act 620’s likely effects cannot stand. 

C 

The Court should remand this case for a new trial under 
the correct legal standards.  The District Court should ap-
ply  Casey’s  “substantial  obstacle”  test,  not  the  Whole 
Woman’s Health balancing test.  And it should require those 
challenging  Act  620  to  demonstrate  that  the  doctors  who 
lack admitting privileges attempted to obtain them with the 
same zeal they would have exhibited if the Act were in ef-
fect and they stood to lose by failing in those efforts. 

IV 

On  remand,  the  District  Court  should  not  permit  June 
Medical to assert the rights of women wishing to obtain an
abortion.  The court should require the joinder of a plaintiff 
whose own rights are at stake.  Our precedents rarely per-
mit a plaintiff to assert the rights of a third party, and June 
Medical cannot satisfy our established test for third-party 
standing.  Indeed,  what  June  Medical  seeks  is  something 
we  have  never  allowed.  It  wants  to  rely  on  the  rights  of
third parties whose interests conflict with its own. 

A 
The plurality holds that Louisiana waived any objection
to June Medical’s third-party standing, ante, at 12, but that 
is a misreading of the record.  The plurality relies on a pass-
ing statement in a brief filed by the State in District Court 
in  connection  with  the  plaintiffs’  request  for  a  temporary 
restraining order, but the statement is simply an accurate
statement of circuit precedent on the standing of abortion
providers.  See App. 44.  It does not constitute a waiver. 

It is true that Louisiana did not affirmatively make the 
third-party  standing  argument  until  it  filed  its  cross- 
petition for certiorari, but “[w]e may make exceptions to our