Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/17pdf/17-494_j4el.pdf
Page Number: 20.0

Cite as:  585 U. S. ____ (2018) 

15 

Opinion of the Court 

sufficient  to  constitute  a  “substantial  nexus,”  id.,  at  315, 
n. 8.  But it is not clear why a single employee or a single
warehouse should create a substantial nexus while “physi­
cal”  aspects  of  pervasive  modern  technology  should  not. 
For  example,  a  company  with  a  website  accessible  in
South Dakota may be said to have a physical presence in 
the  State  via  the  customers’  computers.    A  website  may 
leave  cookies  saved  to  the  customers’  hard  drives,  or  cus­
tomers  may  download  the  company’s  app  onto  their 
phones.  Or a company may lease data storage that is per­
manently,  or  even  occasionally,  located  in  South  Dakota.
Cf.  United  States  v.  Microsoft  Corp.,  584  U. S.  ___  (2018) 
(per  curiam).  What  may  have  seemed  like  a  “clear,” 
“bright-line  tes[t]”  when  Quill  was  written  now  threatens 
to compound the arbitrary consequences that should have 
been apparent from the outset.  504 U. S., at 315. 

The  “dramatic  technological  and  social  changes”  of  our 
“increasingly  interconnected  economy”  mean  that  buyers
are  “closer  to  most  major  retailers”  than  ever  before—
“regardless  of  how  close  or  far  the  nearest  storefront.” 
Direct  Marketing  Assn.  v.  Brohl,  575  U. S.  ___,  ___,  ___ 
(2015)  (KENNEDY,  J.,  concurring)  (slip  op.,  at  2,  3).    Be­
tween  targeted  advertising  and  instant  access  to  most 
consumers  via  any  internet-enabled  device,  “a  business 
may  be  present  in  a  State  in  a  meaningful  way  without”
that  presence  “being  physical  in  the  traditional  sense  of
the term.”  Id., at ___ (slip op., at 3).  A virtual showroom 
can show far more inventory, in far more detail, and with
greater  opportunities  for  consumer  and  seller  interaction
than might be possible for local stores.  Yet the continuous 
and pervasive virtual presence of retailers today is, under 
Quill,  simply  irrelevant.  This  Court  should  not  maintain 
a rule that ignores these substantial virtual connections to
the State.