Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/22pdf/21-1086_1co6.pdf
Page Number: 79.0

34 

ALLEN v. MILLIGAN 

THOMAS, J., dissenting 

proach, moreover, is consistent with how the majority de-
scribes the role of plaintiffs’ illustrative maps, as well as an 
unjustified  practical  asymmetry  to  which  its  rejection  of 
computer evidence gives rise.  Courts are to “focu[s] . . . on 
the specific illustrative maps that a plaintiff adduces,” ante, 
at 17–18, by which the majority means that courts should 
not “focu[s]” on statistical evidence showing those maps to 
be outliers.  Thus, plaintiffs may use an algorithm to gen-
erate  any  number  of  maps  that  meet  specified  districting 
criteria and a preferred racial target; then, they need only 
produce one of those maps to “sho[w] it is possible that the 
State’s map” is dilutive.  Ante, at 18 (emphasis in original).  
But the State may not use algorithmic evidence to suggest 
that  the  plaintiffs’  map  is  an  unsuitable  benchmark  for 
comparison—not even, apparently, if it can prove that the 
illustrative  map  is  an  outlier  among  “billion[s]”  or  “tril-
lion[s]” of concededly “adequate comparators.”  Ante, at 27, 
29;  see  also  ante,  at  29  (rejecting  sampling  algorithms).  
This arbitrary restriction amounts to a thumb on the scale 
for §2 plaintiffs—an unearned presumption that any “rea-
sonable”  map  they  put  forward  constitutes  a  benchmark 
against which the State’s map can be deemed dilutive.  And, 
once the comparison is framed in that way, the only worka-
ble rule of decision is proportionality.  See Holder, 512 U. S., 
at 941–943 (opinion of THOMAS, J.). 
  By  affirming  the  District  Court,  the  majority  thus  ap-
proves its benchmark of proportional control limited only by 
feasibility, and it entrenches the most perverse tendencies 

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majority-minority districts” by emphasizing that it requires only the cre-
ation of majority-minority districts that are compact and reasonably con-
figured.    Ante,  at  2  (opinion  concurring  in  part).    All  of  this  precisely 
tracks my point: As construed by the District Court and the majority, §2 
mandates an ever closer approach to proportional control that stops only 
when a court decides that a further step in that direction would no longer 
be consistent with any reasonable application of traditional districting 
criteria.