Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/17pdf/17-130_4f14.pdf
Page Number: 21

Cite as:  585 U. S. ____ (2018) 

1 

BREYER, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part 
Opinion of BREYER, J. 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

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No. 17–130 
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RAYMOND J. LUCIA, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. 
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 

APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
 

[June 21, 2018] 

JUSTICE  BREYER,  with  whom  JUSTICE  GINSBURG  and 
JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR join as to Part III, concurring in the
judgment in part and dissenting in part. 

I agree with the Court that the Securities and Exchange
Commission  did  not  properly  appoint  the  Administrative
Law  Judge  who  presided  over  petitioner  Lucia’s  hearing. 
But I disagree with the majority in respect to two matters. 
First,  I  would  rest  our  conclusion  upon  statutory,  not 
constitutional,  grounds.  I  believe  it  important  to  do  so 
because  I  cannot  answer  the  constitutional  question  that
the  majority  answers  without  knowing  the  answer  to  a
different,  embedded  constitutional  question,  which  the 
Solicitor  General  urged  us  to  answer  in  this  case:  the
constitutionality  of  the  statutory  “for  cause”  removal 
protections that Congress provided for administrative law 
judges.  Cf.  Free  Enterprise  Fund  v.  Public  Company 
Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U. S. 477 (2010).  Second, I 
disagree with the Court in respect to the proper remedy. 

I 
The  relevant  statute  here  is  the  Administrative  Proce-
dure  Act.    That  Act  governs  the  appointment  of  adminis-
trative  law  judges.  It  provides  (as  it  has,  in  substance, 
since  its  enactment  in  1946)  that  “[e]ach  agency  shall 
appoint  as  many  administrative  law  judges  as  are  neces-