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Cite as: 524 U. S. 417 (1998)

485

Breyer, J., dissenting

such law or . . . the best available information . . . .”
2 U. S. C. § 691(b) (1994 ed., Supp. II).

The second is purposive. The clear purpose behind the
Act, conﬁrmed by its legislative history,
is to promote
“greater ﬁscal accountability” and to “eliminate wasteful
federal spending and . . . special tax breaks.” H. R. Conf.
Rep. No. 104–491, p. 15 (1996).

The third is substantive. The President must determine
that, to “prevent” the item or amount “from having legal
force or effect” will “reduce the Federal budget deﬁcit; . . .
not impair any essential Government functions; and . . . not
harm the national interest.”
2 U. S. C. § 691(a)(A) (1994 ed.,
Supp. II).

The resulting standards are broad. But this Court has
upheld standards that are equally broad, or broader. See,
e. g., National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U. S.
190, 225–226 (1943) (upholding delegation to Federal Commu-
nications Commission to regulate broadcast licensing as
“public interest, convenience, or necessity” require) (internal
quotation marks omitted); FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320
U. S. 591, 600–603 (1944) (upholding delegation to Federal
Power Commission to determine “just and reasonable”
rates); United States v. Rock Royal Co-operative, Inc., 307
U. S. 533, 577 (1939) (if milk prices were “unreasonable,” Sec-
retary of Agriculture could “ﬁ[x]” prices to a level that was
“in the public interest”). See also Lichter v. United States,
334 U. S. 742, 785–786 (1948) (delegation of authority to de-
termine “excessive” proﬁts); American Power & Light Co. v.
SEC, 329 U. S. 90, 104–105 (1946) (delegation of authority to
Securities and Exchange Commission to prevent “unfairly or
inequitably” distributing voting power among security hold-
ers); Yakus v. United States, 321 U. S. 414, 427 (1944) (up-
holding delegation to Price Administrator to ﬁx commodity
prices that would be “fair” and “equitable”).

Indeed, the Court has only twice in its history found that
a congressional delegation of power violated the “nondele-