Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/19pdf/17-1618_hfci.pdf
Page Number: 149.0

Cite as:  590 U. S. ____ (2020) 

5 

KAVANAUGH, J., dissenting 

considered the question.  All 30 judges said no, based on the 
text of the statute.  30 out of 30. 

But in the last few years, a new theory has emerged.  To 
end-run  the  bedrock  separation-of-powers  principle  that 
courts may not unilaterally rewrite statutes, the plaintiffs
here (and, recently, two Courts of Appeals) have advanced
a novel and creative argument.  They contend that discrim-
ination “because of sexual orientation” and discrimination 
“because of sex” are actually not separate categories of dis-
crimination after all.  Instead, the theory goes, discrimina-
tion because of sexual orientation always qualifies as dis-
crimination  because  of  sex:  When  a  gay  man  is  fired 
because he is gay, he is fired because he is attracted to men,
even though a similarly situated woman would not be fired 
just because she is attracted to men.  According to this the-
ory, it follows that the man has been fired, at least as a lit-
eral matter, because of his sex. 

Under  this  literalist  approach,  sexual  orientation  dis-
crimination  automatically  qualifies  as  sex  discrimination,
and Title VII’s prohibition against sex discrimination there-
fore also prohibits sexual orientation discrimination—and 
actually has done so since 1964, unbeknownst to everyone. 
Surprisingly,  the  Court  today  buys  into  this  approach. 
Ante, at 9–12. 

For the sake of argument, I will assume that firing some-
one because of their sexual orientation may, as a very literal
matter,  entail  making  a  distinction  based  on  sex.  But  to 
prevail in this case with their literalist approach, the plain-
tiffs must also establish one of two other points.  The plain-
tiffs must establish that courts,  when interpreting a stat-
ute,  adhere  to  literal  meaning  rather  than  ordinary 
meaning.  Or  alternatively,  the  plaintiffs  must  establish
that  the  ordinary  meaning  of  “discriminate  because  of 
sex”—not  just  the  literal  meaning—encompasses  sexual
orientation discrimination.  The plaintiffs fall short on both 
counts.