Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/17pdf/16-1161_dc8f.pdf
Page Number: 17.0

Cite as:  585 U. S. ____ (2018) 

13 

Opinion of the Court 

York, 524 U. S. 417, 449 (1998) (KENNEDY, J., concurring).
Our power as judges to “say what the law is,” Marbury v. 
Madison,  1  Cranch  137,  177  (1803),  rests  not  on  the  de­
fault  of  politically  accountable  officers,  but  is  instead
grounded  in  and  limited  by  the  necessity  of  resolving,
according to legal principles, a plaintiff ’s particular claim
of legal right.

Our  considerable  efforts  in  Gaffney,  Bandemer,  Vieth, 
and LULAC leave unresolved whether such claims may be
brought  in  cases  involving  allegations  of  partisan  gerry­
mandering. 
In  particular,  two  threshold  questions  re­
main: what is necessary to show standing in a case of this
sort, and whether those claims are justiciable.  Here we do 
not decide the latter question because the plaintiffs in this 
case  have  not  shown  standing  under  the  theory  upon
which they based their claims for relief. 

To  ensure  that  the  Federal  Judiciary  respects  “the
proper—and  properly  limited—role  of  the  courts  in  a 
democratic  society,”  Allen  v.  Wright,  468  U. S.  737,  750 
(1984), a plaintiff may not invoke federal-court jurisdiction
unless he can show “a personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy.”  Baker, 369 U. S., at 204.  A federal court is 
not “a forum for generalized grievances,” and the require­
ment  of  such  a  personal  stake  “ensures  that  courts  exer­
cise power that is judicial in nature.”  Lance, 549 U. S., at 
439, 441.  We enforce that requirement by insisting that a
plaintiff  satisfy  the  familiar  three-part  test  for  Article  III 
standing: that he “(1) suffered an injury in fact, (2) that is
fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of the defendant,
and (3) that is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial
decision.”  Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U. S. ___, ___ (2016) 
(slip  op.,  at  6).  Foremost  among  these  requirements  is 
injury in fact—a plaintiff ’s pleading and proof that he has
suffered the “invasion of a legally protected interest” that
is  “concrete  and  particularized,”  i.e.,  which  “affect[s]  the
plaintiff  in  a  personal  and  individual  way.”  Lujan  v.