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FACEBOOK, INC. v. DUGUID 

Syllabus 

(a) This  case  turns  on  whether  the  clause  “using  a  random  or  se-
quential number generator” in §227(a)(1)(A) modifies both of the two 
verbs that precede it (“store” and “produce”), as Facebook contends, or
only the closest one (“produce”), as maintained by Duguid.  The most 
natural reading of the text and other aspects of §227(a)(1)(A) confirm 
Facebook’s  view.  First,  in  an  ordinary  case,  the  “series-qualifier 
canon” instructs that a modifier at the end of a series of nouns or verbs 
applies to the entire series.  Here, that canon indicates that the modi-
fying phrase “using a random or sequential number generator” quali-
fies both antecedent verbs, “store” and “produce.”  Second, the modify-
ing phrase immediately follows a concise, integrated clause (“store or 
produce telephone numbers to be called”), which uses the word “or” to 
connect two verbs that share a common direct object (“telephone num-
bers to be called”).  Given this structure, it would be odd to apply the 
modifier to just one part of the cohesive clause.  Third, the comma in 
§227(a)(1)(A)  separating  the  modifying  phrase  from  the  antecedents 
suggests that the qualifier applies to all of the antecedents, instead of
just the nearest one.  Pp. 4–6. 

Duguid’s insistence that a limiting clause should ordinarily be read 
as modifying only the phrase that it immediately follows (the so-called
“rule of the last antecedent”) does not help his cause for two reasons. 
First, the Court has declined to apply that rule in the specific context
where, as here, the modifying clause appears after an integrated list. 
Jama v. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 543 U. S. 335, 344, n. 
4.  Second,  the  last  antecedent  before  the  clause  at  issue  in 
§227(a)(1)(A) is not “produce,” as Duguid argues, but rather “telephone 
numbers to be called.”  Pp. 6–7.

(b) The statutory context confirms that the TCPA’s autodialer defi-
nition excludes equipment that does not use a random or sequential 
number generator.  Congress found autodialer technology harmful be-
cause  autodialers  can  dial  emergency lines  randomly  or  tie  up  all  of
the sequentially numbered phone lines at a single entity.  Facebook’s 
interpretation of §227(a)(1)(A) better matches the scope of the TCPA
to these specific concerns.  Duguid’s interpretation, on the other hand, 
would encompass any equipment that stores and dials telephone num-
bers.  Pp. 7–8.

(c)  Duguid’s other counterarguments do not overcome the clear com-
mands of the statute’s text and broader context.  First, he claims that 
his interpretation best accords with the “sense” of the text.  It would 
make  little  sense  however,  to  classify  as  autodialers  all  equipment
with the capacity to store and dial telephone numbers, including vir-
tually all modern cell phones.  Second, Duguid invokes the “distribu-
tive  canon,”  which  provides  that  a  series  of  antecedents  and  conse-
quents should be distributed to one another based on how they most