Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/529bv.pdf
Page Number: 334.0

529US1

Unit: $U40

[10-04-01 09:23:11] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 529 U. S. 244 (2000)

259

Scalia, J., concurring in part in judgment

any reason (except, of course, an unlawful one such as race),
or for no reason. And where, as here, the length of the re-
consideration period is entrusted to the discretion of the
same body that has discretion over the ultimate parole de-
termination, any risk engendered by changes to the length
of that period is merely part of the uncertainty which was
inherent in the discretionary parole system, and to which
respondent subjected himself when he committed his crime.
It makes no more sense to freeze in time the Board’s dis-
cretion as to procedures than it does to freeze in time the
Board’s discretion as to substance. Just as the Ex Post
Facto Clause gives respondent no cause to complain that the
Board in place at the time of his offense has been replaced
by a new, tough-on-crime Board that is much more parsimo-
nious with parole, it gives him no cause to complain that it
has been replaced by a new, big-on-efﬁciency Board that cuts
back on reconsiderations without cause. And the change in
policy is irrelevant, in my view, whether or not the pre-
existing policy happens to have been embodied in a policy
statement or regulation. To make the constitutional prohi-
bition turn upon that feature would be to ignore reality and
to discourage measures that promote fairness and consist-
ency. Such a policy statement or regulation, in the context
of a system conferring complete discretion as to substance
and as to the timing of hearings upon the Board, simply cre-
ates no reasonable expectation of entitlement, except per-
haps among prisoners whose parole hearings are held (or are
scheduled to be held) while the regulation is in effect. This
is not an expectation of the sort that can give rise to ex post
facto concerns.

In essence, respondent complains that by exercising its
discretion (as to the frequency of review), the Board has de-
prived him of the exercise of its discretion (as to the question
of his release).
In my view, these are two sides of the same
coin—two aspects of one and the same discretion—and re-
spondent can have no valid grievance.