Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/23pdf/22-859new_kjfm.pdf
Page Number: 81.0

Cite as:  603 U. S. ____ (2024) 

21 

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting 

application of the doctrine.”  Ante, at 17.7 

The  majority  also  attacks  a  strawman  when  it  asserts
that “precedents foreclose th[e] argument” that the public-
rights doctrine “applies whenever a statute increases gov-
ernmental  efficiency.”  Ante,  at  26;  see  also  ante,  at  19 
(GORSUCH, J., concurring).  No one has made that argument
in this case; not the Government and certainly not this dis-
sent.  The fact that certain rights might be susceptible to 
speedy and expert resolution through non-Article III adju-
dication is not what makes them “rights of the public—that 
is,  rights  pertaining  to  claims  brought  by  or  against  the 
United  States.”  Granfinanciera,  492  U. S.,  at  68–69 
(Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
It is not clear what else, if anything, might qualify as a
public right, or what is even left of the doctrine after today’s
opinion.  Rather  than  recognize  the  long-settled  principle
that  a  statutory  right  belonging  to  the  Government  in  its
sovereign capacity falls within the public-rights exception 
to Article III, the majority opts for a “we know it when we 
see  it”  formulation.  This  Court’s  precedents  and  our  coe-
qual branches of Government deserve better. 

B 
Rather than relying on Atlas Roofing or the relevant pub-
lic-rights cases, the majority instead purports to follow Tull 
and Granfinanciera.  The former involved a suit in federal 
court and the latter involved a dispute between private par-
ties.  So,  just  like  that,  the  majority  ventures  off  on  the
wrong path.  Indeed, as explained below, both the majority 
and the concurrence miss the critical distinction drawn in 

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7 Among other things, the concurrence accuses this dissent of behaving 
like a “picky child at the dinner table.”  Ante, at 21 (opinion of GORSUCH, 
J.).  The precedents, though, speak for themselves.  It is the majority and 
concurrence that pick and choose among public-rights cases, excluding 
broad strands of precedent constituting the doctrine.