Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/21pdf/20-1530_n758.pdf
Page Number: 54

Cite as:  597 U. S. ____ (2022) 

17 

GORSUCH, J., concurring 

ingful say in the laws that govern them.  Cf. Rucho v. Com-
mon Cause, 588 U. S. ___, ___ (2019) (KAGAN, J., dissenting)
(slip op., at  7) (“Republican liberty demands not only, that 
all power should be derived from the people; but that those
entrusted with it should be kept in dependence on the peo-
ple” (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted)).6 

So what is our real point of disagreement?  The dissent 
next suggests that the Court strays from its commitment to
textualism by relying on a clear-statement rule (the major
questions doctrine) to resolve today’s case.  Post, at 28.  But 
our law is full of clear-statement rules and has been since 
the founding.  Our colleagues do not dispute the point.  In 
fact, they have regularly invoked many of these rules.7 

—————— 

6 In the course of its argument, the dissent leans heavily on two recent 
academic articles.  Post, at 29.  But if a battle of law reviews were the 
order of the day, it might be worth adding to the reading list.  See, e.g., 
I. Wurman, Nondelegation at the Founding, 130 Yale L. J. 1490, 1493–
1494 (2021); D. Candeub, Preference and Administrative Law, 72 Admin.
L.  Rev.  607,  614–628  (2020);  P.  Hamburger,  Delegation  or  Divesting?, 
115 Nw. L. Rev. Online 88, 91–110 (2020); M. McConnell, The President 
Who Would Not Be King 326–335 (2020); A. Gordon, Nondelegation, 12 
N. Y. U. J. L. & Liberty 718, 719 (2019); R. Cass, Delegation Reconsid-
ered:  A  Delegation  Doctrine  for  the  Modern  Administrative  State,  40 
Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol’y 147, 155–161 (2017); G. Lawson & G. Seidman,
“A Great Power of Attorney:” Understanding the Fiduciary Constitution
104–129 (2017); P. Hamburger, Is Administrative Law Unlawful? 377– 
402  (2014);  L.  Alexander  &  S.  Prakash,  Reports  of  the  Nondelegation 
Doctrine’s  Death  are  Greatly  Exaggerated,  70  U.  Chi.  L. Rev.  1297, 
1298–1299 (2003); G. Lawson, Delegation and Original Meaning, 88 Va.
L.  Rev.  327,  335–343  (2002);  D.  Schoenbrod,  The  Delegation  Doctrine: 
Could the Court Give It Substance? 83 Mich. L. Rev. 1223, 1252–1255, 
1260–1261 (1985); see generally P. Wallison & J. Yoo, The Administra-
tive State Before the Supreme Court: Perspectives on the Nondelegation
Doctrine (2022). 

7 See, e.g., United States v. Washington, 596 U. S. ___, ___ (2022) (slip 
op.,  at  6)  (intergovernmental  immunity);  Rehaif  v.  United  States,  588 
U. S.  ___,  ___  (2019)  (slip  op.,  at  3)  (mens  rea);  Michigan  v.  Bay  Mills 
Indian Community, 572 U. S. 782, 790–791 (2014) (sovereign immunity); 
Vartelas  v.  Holder,  566  U. S.  257,  261,  266–267  (2012)  (retroactivity); 
Gonzalez v. Thaler, 565 U. S. 134, 141–142 (2012) (presumption against