Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/21pdf/20-1573_8p6h.pdf
Page Number: 15.0

Cite as:  596 U. S. ____ (2022) 

11 

Opinion of the Court 

We  disagree  with  both  characterizations  of  the  statute.
Moriana is correct that the FAA does not require courts to 
enforce contractual waivers of substantive rights and rem-
edies.  The FAA’s mandate is to enforce “arbitration agree-
ments.”  Concepcion,  563  U. S.,  at  344  (emphasis  added).
And as we have described it, an arbitration agreement is “a 
specialized  kind  of  forum-selection  clause  that  posits  not
only the situs of suit but also the procedure to be used in 
resolving  the  dispute.”  Scherk  v.  Alberto-Culver  Co.,  417 
U. S.  506,  519  (1974);  Mitsubishi  Motors  Corp.  v.  Soler 
Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U. S. 614, 633 (1985).  An ar-
bitration agreement thus does not alter or abridge substan-
tive rights; it merely changes how those rights will be pro-
cessed.  And  so  we  have  said  that  “ ‘[b]y  agreeing  to 
arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forgo the sub-
stantive  rights  afforded  by  the  statute;  it  only  submits  to 
their resolution in an arbitral . . . forum.’ ”  Preston v. Fer-
rer,  552  U. S.  346,  359  (2008)  (quoting  Mitsubishi  Motors 
Corp., 473 U. S., at 628).5 

—————— 
of any justiciable legal controversy between the parties under PAGA, and 
“arising out of ” language normally refers to a causal relationship.  See, 
e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 592 U. S. 
___, ___ (2021) (slip op., at 8).  And regardless of whether a PAGA action
is in some sense also a dispute between an employer and the State, noth-
ing in the FAA categorically exempts claims belonging to sovereigns from 
the scope of §2. 

5 In  briefing  before  this  Court,  Viking  argued  that  the  principle  that 
the FAA does not mandate enforcement of provisions waiving substan-
tive  rights  is  limited  to  federal  statutes.    This  argument  is  erroneous. 
The basis of this principle is not anything unique about federal statutes.
It is that the FAA requires only the enforcement of “provision[s]” to settle
a controversy “by arbitration,” §2, and not any provision that happens to
appear in a contract that features an arbitration clause.  That is why we 
mentioned this principle in Preston, which concerned claims arising un-
der state law.  See 552 U. S., at 360 (noting that under the agreement, a
party “relinquishe[d] no substantive rights . . . California law may accord 
him”).