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2 

IANCU v. BRUNETTI 

Opinion of BREYER, J. 

clothing  line  that  includes  apparel  for  children  and  in-
fants.  Like  JUSTICE  SOTOMAYOR,  I  believe  the  answer  is 
“yes,” though my reasons differ slightly from hers. 

I 
A 

In  my  view,  a  category-based  approach  to  the  First 
Amendment cannot adequately resolve the problem before 
us.  I would place less emphasis on trying to decide whether 
the  statute  at  issue  should  be  categorized  as  an  exam- 
ple of “viewpoint discrimination,” “content discrimination,”
“commercial  speech,”  “government  speech,”  or  the  like. 
Rather,  as  I  have  written  before,  I  believe  we  would  do 
better to treat this Court’s speech-related categories not as 
outcome-determinative  rules,  but  instead  as  rules  of 
thumb.  See  Reed  v.  Town  of  Gilbert,  576  U. S.  ___,  ___ 
(2015) (opinion concurring in judgment) (slip op., at 1). 

After  all,  these  rules  are  not  absolute.  The  First 
Amendment  is  not  the  Tax  Code.  Indeed,  even  when  we 
consider a regulation that is ostensibly “viewpoint discrim-
inatory”  or  that  is  subject  to  “strict  scrutiny,”  we  some-
times find the regulation to be constitutional after weigh-
ing  the  competing  interests  involved.    See,  e.g.,  Morse  v. 
Frederick,  551  U. S.  393,  397  (2007)  (“[S]chools  may  take
steps  to  safeguard  those  entrusted  to  their  care  from 
speech  that  can  reasonably  be  regarded  as  encouraging 
illegal drug use”); Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar, 575 U. S. 
433,  ___  (2015)  (slip  op.,  at  8)  (explaining  that  although 
“ ‘it  is  the  rare  case’ ”  when  a  statute  satisfies  strict  scru-
tiny, “those cases do arise” (quoting Burson v. Freeman, 504 
U. S. 191, 211 (1992) (plurality opinion))).

Unfortunately,  the  Court  has  sometimes  applied  these 
rules—especially  the  category  of  “content  discrimina-
tion”—too  rigidly.  In  a  number  of  cases,  the  Court  has 
struck down what I believe are ordinary, valid regulations 
that pose little or no threat to the speech interests that the