Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/10pdf/09-152.pdf
Page Number: 44.0

Cite as:  562 U. S. ____ (2011) 

15 

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting 

“unavoidable” for purposes of §22(b)(1) only where there is
no  feasible  alternative  design  that  would  eliminate  the
side  effect  of  the  vaccine  without  compromising  its  cost 
and utility.  See supra, at 7.  The majority’s premise—that
side  effects  stemming  from  a  vaccine’s  design  are  always
avoidable—is thus belied by the statutory text and legisla-
tive history of §22(b)(1).  And because its starting premise 
is  invalid,  its  conclusion—that  the  design  of  a  vaccine  is
not subject to challenge in a tort action—is also necessar-
ily invalid.

The  majority’s  reading  suffers  from  an  even  more  fun-
damental  defect.  If  Congress  intended  to  exempt  vaccine
manufacturers  categorically  from  all  design  defect  liabil-
ity,  it  more  logically  would  have  provided:  “No  vaccine
manufacturer shall be liable in a civil action for damages
arising  from  a  vaccine-related  injury  or  death  associated 
with the administration of a vaccine after October 1, 1988, 
if the vaccine was properly prepared and was accompanied 
by  proper  directions  and  warnings.”    There  would  have 
been  no  need  for  Congress  to  include  the  additional  13
words  “the  injury  or  death  resulted  from  side  effects  that
were  unavoidable  even  though.”  See  TRW  Inc.  v.  An-
drews,  534  U. S.  19,  31  (2001)  (noting  “cardinal  principle 
of  statutory  construction  that  a  statute  ought,  upon  the
whole,  to  be  so  construed  that,  if  it  can  be  prevented,  no 
clause,  sentence,  or  word  shall  be  superfluous,  void,  or
insignificant” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 

In Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U. S. 431 (2005),
this  Court  considered  an  analogous  situation  where  an
express  pre-emption  provision  stated  that  certain  States
“ ‘shall  not  impose  or  continue  in  effect  any  requirements
for  labeling  or  packaging  in  addition  to  or  different  from
those required under this subchapter.’ ”  Id., at 436 (quot-
ing  7  U. S. C.  §136v(b)  (2000  ed.)).    The  Bates  Court 
stated: