Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/529bv.pdf
Page Number: 623

529US2

Unit: $U52

[09-26-01 10:36:40] PAGES PGT: OPIN

548

CARMELL v. TEXAS

Opinion of the Court

law, demonstrates that Texas perceived the issue of witness
trustworthiness as both an admissibility issue and as a sufﬁ-
ciency question; that it long ago abandoned its rule that vic-
tims of these types of crimes are incompetent as witnesses;
and that Article 38.07 codiﬁes Texas’ sufﬁciency of the evi-
dence solution to the trustworthiness issue.

Next, the dissent argues that under Texas’ law “the prose-
cution need not introduce the victim’s testimony at all, much
In-
less any corroboration of that testimony.” Post, at 559.
stead, “[u]nder both the old and new versions of the statute,
a conviction could be sustained on the testimony of a single
third-party witness, on purely circumstantial evidence, or
Ibid. Because other ave-
in any number of other ways.”
nues of prosecution—besides the victim’s testimony (with or
without corroboration or outcry)—remain available to the
State, Article 38.07 “did not change the quantity of proof
necessary to convict in every case.” Post, at 560 (emphasis
added in part and deleted in part); see also post, at 561 (“Ar-
ticle 38.07 has never dictated what it takes in all cases . . .
for evidence to be sufﬁcient to convict” (emphasis added)).
Accordingly, the dissent urges, more evidence (in the form
of corroboration) is not really required under Article 38.07.
See post, at 560–561, 574.
It is unclear whether the dissent’s
argument is that laws cannot be sufﬁciency of the evidence
rules unless they apply to every conviction for a particular
crime, or whether the dissent means that sufﬁciency rules
not applicable in every prosecution for a particular crime do
not fall within Calder’s fourth category, which refers to less
testimony “required . . . in order to convict the offender.”
3 Dall., at 390 (emphasis added in part and deleted in part).
Either way, the argument fails.

Fenwick’s case once again provides the guide. The dis-
sent agrees that “[t]he treason statute in effect at the time
like the Treason Clause of
of John Fenwick’s conspiracy,
our Constitution, embodied .
. a quantitative sufﬁciency
.
[of the evidence] rule.” Post, at 573. But, it argues, Fen-