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8 

ZIGLAR v. ABBASI 

Opinion of the Court 

B 
  To understand Bivens and the two other cases implying
a damages remedy under the Constitution, it is necessary 
to understand the prevailing law when they were decided. 
In  the  mid-20th  century,  the  Court  followed  a  different 
approach  to  recognizing  implied  causes  of  action  than  it 
follows  now.  During  this  “ancien  regime,”  Alexander  v. 
Sandoval, 532 U. S. 275, 287 (2001), the Court assumed it 
to  be  a  proper  judicial  function  to  “provide  such  remedies 
as  are  necessary  to  make  effective”  a  statute’s  purpose, 
J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U. S. 426, 433 (1964).  Thus, as 
a routine matter with respect to statutes, the Court would
imply  causes  of  action  not  explicit  in  the  statutory  text 
itself.  See, e.g., id., at 430–432; Allen v. State Bd. of Elec-
tions, 393 U. S. 544, 557 (1969); Sullivan v. Little Hunting 
Park,  Inc.,  396  U. S.  229,  239  (1969)  (“The  existence  of  a 
statutory  right  implies  the  existence  of  all  necessary  and
appropriate remedies”). 

These  statutory  decisions  were  in  place  when  Bivens 
recognized  an  implied  cause  of  action  to  remedy  a  consti-
tutional  violation.  Against  that  background,  the  Bivens 
decision held that courts must “adjust their remedies so as 
to  grant  the  necessary  relief ”  when  “federally  protected 
rights have been invaded.”  403 U. S., at 392 (quoting Bell, 
supra, at 678); see also 403 U. S., at 402 (Harlan, J., con-
curring)  (discussing  cases  recognizing  implied  causes  of
action under federal statutes).  In light of this interpretive
framework,  there  was  a  possibility  that  “the  Court  would 
keep  expanding  Bivens  until  it  became  the  substantial 
equivalent  of  42  U. S. C.  §1983.”    Kent,  Are  Damages 
Different?:  Bivens  and  National  Security,  87  S. Cal. 
L. Rev. 1123, 1139–1140 (2014). 

C 
Later,  the  arguments  for  recognizing  implied  causes  of
action  for  damages  began  to  lose  their  force.    In  cases