Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/23pdf/22-704_4246.pdf
Page Number: 1

(Slip Opinion) 

OCTOBER  TERM,  2023 

1 

Syllabus 

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is 
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued. 
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been 
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader. 
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337. 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

Syllabus 

VIDAL, UNDER SECRETARY OF COMMERCE FOR 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND DIRECTOR, 
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE 
v. ELSTER 

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR 
THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT 

No. 22–704.  Argued November 1, 2023—Decided June 13, 2024 

Drawing on a 2016 Presidential primary debate exchange between then-
candidate Donald Trump and Senator Marco Rubio, respondent Steve 
Elster sought to federally register the trademark “Trump too small” to
use on shirts and hats.  An examiner from the Patent and Trademark 
Office refused registration based on the “names clause,” a Lanham Act 
prohibition  on  the  registration  of  a  mark  that  “[c]onsists  of  or  com-
prises a name . . . identifying a particular living individual except by 
his written consent,” 15 U. S. C. §1052(c).  The Trademark Trial and 
Appeal  Board  affirmed,  rejecting  Elster’s  argument  that  the  names 
clause violates his First Amendment right to free speech.  The Federal 
Circuit reversed. 

Held: The Lanham Act’s names clause does not violate the First Amend-

ment.  Pp. 3–22.

(a) When  enforcing  the  First  Amendment’s  prohibition  against 
abridging freedom of speech, this Court “distinguish[es] between con-
tent-based and content-neutral regulations of speech.”  National Insti-
tute  of  Family  and  Life  Advocates  v.  Becerra,  585  U. S.  755,  766.    A 
content-based regulation “target[s] speech based on its communicative
content,” Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U. S. 155, 163, and is “ ‘presump-
tively unconstitutional,’ ” National Institute of Family and Life Advo-
cates,  585  U. S.,  at  766.    Viewpoint  discrimination  is  a  particularly
“egregious  form  of  content discrimination”  that  targets  not  merely  a 
subject matter “but particular views taken by speakers on the subject.” 
Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U. S. 819, 829.