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Page Number: 6.0

6 

AMERICAN LEGION  v. AMERICAN HUMANIST ASSN. 

Syllabus 

next  step  and  overrule  the  Lemon  test in all contexts.  The test has 
no basis in the original meaning of the Constitution; it has “been ma-
nipulated  to  fit  whatever  result  the  Court  aimed  to  achieve,” 
McCreary  County  v.  American  Civil  Liberties  Union  of Ky., 545 U. S. 
844,  900  (Scalia,  J., dissenting); and it continues to cause enormous 
confusion in the States and the lower courts.  Pp. 6–7. 
  JUSTICE  GORSUCH,  joined  by JUSTICE  THOMAS, concludes that a suit 
like this one should be dismissed for lack of standing.  Pp. 1–11. 

(a) The  American  Humanist  Association  claims that its members 
come  into  regular,  unwelcome  contact  with  the  Bladensburg  Cross 
when they drive through the area, but this “offended observer” theory 
of  standing  has  no  basis  in  law.    To  establish  standing  to  sue con-
sistent with the Constitution, a plaintiff must show: (1) injury-in-fact, 
(2)  causation,  and (3) redressability.  And the injury-in-fact must be 
“concrete  and  particularized.”    Lujan  v.  Defenders  of  Wildlife,  504 
U. S.  555,  560.    This  Court  has  already  rejected  the  notion that of-
fense  alone  qualifies  as  a  “concrete  and particularized” injury suffi-
cient to confer standing, Diamond v. Charles, 476 U. S. 54, 62, and it 
has done so in the context of the Establishment Clause itself, see Val-
ley  Forge  Christian  College  v.  Americans  United  for the Separation of 
Church  and  State,  454  U. S.  464.    Offended  observer  standing  is 
deeply inconsistent, too, with many other longstanding principles and 
precedents,  including  the  rule  that  “ ‘generalized  grievances’  about 
the conduct of Government” are insufficient to confer standing to sue, 
Schlesinger  v.  Reservists  Comm.  to  Stop  the  War, 418 U. S. 208, 217, 
and “the rule that a party ‘generally must assert his own legal rights 
and interests,’ ” not those “ ‘of third parties,’ ” Kowalski v. Tesmer, 543 
U. S. 125, 129.  Pp. 1–6. 

(b) Lower  courts  invented  offended  observer  standing  for  Estab-
lishment  Clause  cases  in  response to Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 
602,  reasoning  that  if  the  Establishment  Clause  forbids  anything 
that a reasonable observer would view as an endorsement of religion, 
then  such  an  observer  must  be  able  to  sue.  Lemon, however, was a 
misadventure,  and the Court today relies on a more modest, histori-
cally sensitive approach, interpreting the Establishment Clause with 
reference to historical practices and understandings.  The monument 
here  is  clearly  constitutional  in  light  of  the  nation’s  traditions.  Al- 
though the plurality does not say it in as many words, the message of 
today’s  decision  for  the  lower  courts  must  be  this: whether a monu-
ment,  symbol,  or  practice  is old or new, apply Town of Greece v. Gal-
loway,  572  U. S.  565,  not  Lemon,  because  what  matters  when  it 
comes to assessing a monument, symbol, or practice is not its age but 
its compliance with ageless principles.  Pp. 6–9. 

(c) With  Lemon  now  shelved,  little  excuse  will  remain  for  the