Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/17pdf/17-459_1o13.pdf
Page Number: 37.0

10 

PEREIRA v. SESSIONS 

ALITO, J., dissenting 

definitional  and  sets  out  the  essential  characteristics  of  a 
notice to appear, then the omission of any required item of 
information  makes  a  putative  notice  to  appear  a  nullity. 
So if the Court means what it says—that its interpretation
of  §1229(a)(1)’s  language  leaves  open  the  consequences  of 
omitting  other  categories  of  information—that  is  tanta-
mount to admitting that §1229(a)(1) itself cannot foreclose
the Government’s interpretation.4 

In  any  event,  the  Government’s  interpretation  can
easily be squared with the text of §1229(a)(1).  That provi-
sion states that a “written notice (in this section referred to 
as a ‘notice to appear’) shall be given in person to the alien 
. . . specifying” 10 categories of information, including the
“time  and  place”  of  the  removal  proceeding.    §1229(a)(1) 
(emphasis  added).  According  to  Pereira,  that  language
cinches the case against the Government’s interpretation: 
By equating a “notice to appear” with a “written notice . . . 
[that]  specif[ies]”  the  relevant  categories  of  information, 
§1229(a)(1)  establishes  that  a  notice  lacking  any  of  those
10  pieces  of  information  cannot  qualify  as  a  “notice  to 
appear”  and  thus  cannot  trigger  the  stop-time  rule.    In 
Pereira’s eyes, §1229(a)(1) defines what a notice to appear 
is, and most of the Court’s opinion is to the same effect.

This  may  be  a  plausible  interpretation  of  §1229(a)(1)’s
language, but it is not the only one.  It is at least as rea-
sonable to read that language as simply giving a name to
the  new  type  of  notice  to  which  that  provision  refers.    Or 
to  put  the  point  another  way,  §1229(a)(1)’s  language  can
be  understood  to  define  what  makes  a  notice  to  appear 
complete.  See In re Camarillo, supra, at 647.  Under that 

—————— 

4 Nor  can  the  Court  get  away  with  labeling  its  self-contradictions  as
“judicial  restraint.”    Ante,  at  8,  n. 5.    Either  §1229(a)(1)  sets  out  the 
essential characteristics of  a notice  to appear or it does not; the Court
cannot stop at a halfway point unsupported by either text or logic while 
maintaining  that  its  resting  place  is  “clear”  in  light  of  the  statutory 
text.  Ante, at 9.