Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/20pdf/19-357_6k47.pdf
Page Number: 10.0

Cite as:  592 U. S. ____ (2021) 

1 

SOTOMAYOR, J., concurring 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

_________________ 

No. 19–357 
_________________ 

CITY OF CHICAGO, ILLINOIS, PETITIONER v. 
ROBBIN L. FULTON, ET AL. 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT 

[January 14, 2021]

 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR, concurring. 
Section  362(a)(3)  of  the  Bankruptcy  Code  provides  that
the  filing  of  a  bankruptcy  petition  “operates  as  a  stay”  of 
“any act . . . to exercise control over property of the [bank-
ruptcy]  estate.”  11  U. S. C.  §362(a)(3).    I  join  the  Court’s
opinion  because  I  agree  that,  as  used  in  §362(a)(3),  the
phrase  “exercise  control  over”  does  not  cover  a  creditor’s
passive  retention  of  property  lawfully  seized  prebank-
ruptcy.  Hence, when a creditor has taken possession of a 
debtor’s property, §362(a)(3) does not require the creditor to 
return the property upon the filing of a bankruptcy petition.
I  write  separately  to  emphasize  that  the  Court  has  not
decided whether and when §362(a)’s other provisions may 
require a creditor to return a debtor’s property.  Those pro-
visions stay, among other things, “any act to create, perfect,
or enforce any lien against property of the estate” and “any 
act to collect, assess, or recover a claim against [a] debtor” 
that arose prior to bankruptcy proceedings.  §§362(a)(4), (6); 
see, e.g., In re Kuehn, 563 F. 3d 289, 294 (CA7 2009) (hold-
ing that a university’s refusal to provide a transcript to a
student-debtor “was an act to collect a debt” that violated 
the  automatic  stay).  Nor  has  the  Court  addressed  how 
bankruptcy courts should go about enforcing creditors’ sep-
arate obligation to “deliver” estate property to the trustee 
or debtor under §542(a).  The City’s conduct may very well