Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/20pdf/19-251_p86b.pdf
Page Number: 3

Cite as:  594 U. S. ____ (2021) 

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Syllabus 

to California’s compelled disclosure requirement with the understand-
ing that “compelled disclosure of affiliation with groups engaged in ad-
vocacy may constitute as effective a restraint on freedom of association 
as [other] forms of governmental action.”  NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. 
Patterson, 357 U. S. 449, 462.  NAACP v. Alabama did not phrase in
precise terms the standard of review that applies to First Amendment
challenges to compelled disclosure.  In Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1, 64 
(per  curiam),  the  Court  articulated  an  “exacting  scrutiny”  standard,
which requires “a substantial relation between the disclosure require-
ment and a sufficiently important governmental interest,” Doe v. Reed, 
561 U. S. 186, 196.  The parties dispute whether exacting scrutiny ap-
plies in these cases, and if so, whether that test imposes a least restric-
tive means requirement similar to the one imposed by strict scrutiny.  
The Court concludes that exacting scrutiny requires that a govern-
ment-mandated disclosure regime be narrowly tailored to the govern-
ment’s asserted interest, even if it is not the least restrictive means of 
achieving that end.  The need for narrow tailoring was set forth early
in the Court’s compelled disclosure cases.  In Shelton v. Tucker, 364 
U. S.  479,  the  Court  considered  an  Arkansas  statute  that  required 
teachers to disclose every organization to which they belonged or con-
tributed.  The  Court  acknowledged  the  importance  of  “the  right  of  a
State to investigate the competence and fitness of those whom it hires 
to teach in its schools,” and it distinguished prior decisions that had
found “no substantially relevant correlation between the governmental
interest asserted and the State’s effort to compel disclosure.”  Id., at 
485.  But the Court invalidated the Arkansas statute because even a 
“legitimate and substantial” governmental interest “cannot be pursued
by means that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when the 
end can be more narrowly achieved.”  Id., at 488.  Shelton stands for 
the proposition that a substantial relation to an important interest is
not enough to save a disclosure regime that is insufficiently tailored.
Where exacting scrutiny applies, the challenged requirement must be
narrowly tailored to the interest it promotes.  Pp. 6–7, 9–11.

(b) California’s blanket demand that all charities disclose Schedule 

Bs to the Attorney General is facially unconstitutional.  Pp. 12–19. 

(1) The Ninth Circuit did not impose a narrow tailoring require-
ment to the relationship between the Attorney General’s demand for 
Schedule Bs and the identified governmental interest.  That was error 
under the Court’s precedents.  And properly applied, the narrow tai-
loring  requirement  is  not  satisfied  by  California’s  disclosure  regime.
In fact, a dramatic mismatch exists between the interest the Attorney
General seeks to promote and the disclosure regime that he has imple-
mented. 

The Court does not doubt the importance of California’s interest in