Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/558bv.pdf
Page Number: 637

476  CITIZENS  UNITED  v.  FEDERAL  ELECTION  COMM’N 

Opinion of Stevens, J. 

holders; it also curbs the rent seeking behavior of executives 
and  respects  the  views  of  dissenters.  Austin’s  acceptance 
of  restrictions  on  general  treasury  spending  “simply  allows 
people  who  have  invested  in  the  business  corporation  for 
purely  economic  reasons”—the  vast  majority  of  investors, 
one  assumes—“to  avoid  being  taken  advantage  of,  with­
out sacriﬁcing their economic objectives.”  Winkler, Beyond 
Bellotti, 32 Loyola (LA) L. Rev. 133, 201 (1998). 

The  concern  to  protect  dissenting  shareholders  and  union 
members has a long history in campaign ﬁnance reform.  It 
provided  a  central  motivation  for  the  Tillman  Act  in  1907 
and  subsequent  legislation,  see  Pipeﬁtters  v.  United  States, 
407  U. S.  385,  414–415  (1972);  Winkler,  92  Geo.  L.  J.,  at  887– 
900, and it has been endorsed in a long line of our cases, see, 
e. g.,  McConnell, 540  U. S., at  204–205; Beaumont,  539 U. S., 
at  152–154;  MCFL,  479  U. S.,  at  258;  NRWC,  459  U. S.,  at 
207–208;  Pipeﬁtters,  407  U. S.,  at  414–416;  see  also  n.  60, 
supra.  Indeed,  we  have  unanimously  recognized  the  gov­
ernmental interest in “protect[ing] the individuals who have 
paid  money  into  a  corporation  or  union  for  purposes  other 
than the support of candidates from having that money used 
to  support  political  candidates  to  whom  they  may  be  op­
posed.”  NRWC, 459 U. S., at 207–208. 

The  Court  dismisses  this  interest  on  the  ground  that 
abuses  of  shareholder  money  can  be  corrected  “through  the 
procedures  of  corporate  democracy,”  ante,  at  362  (internal 
quotation  marks  omitted),  and,  it  seems,  through  Internet-
based  disclosures,  ante,  at  370–371.76  I  fail  to  understand 

76 I  note  that,  among  the  many  other  regulatory  possibilities  it  has  left 
open, ranging from new versions of § 203 supported by additional evidence 
of quid  pro quo  corruption or  its appearance  to any  number of  tax incen­
tive  or  public  ﬁnancing  schemes,  today’s  decision  does  not  require  that  a 
legislature rely solely on these mechanisms to protect shareholders.  Leg­
islatures  remain  free  in  their  incorporation  and  tax  laws  to  condition  the 
types of activity in which corporations may engage, including electioneer­
ing  activity,  on  speciﬁc  disclosure  requirements  or  on  prior  express  ap­
proval by shareholders or members.