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Page Number: 22

16 

303 CREATIVE LLC v. ELENIS 

Opinion of the Court 

same product to all.  Brief for Respondents 15, 20.  At bot-
tom, Colorado’s theory rests on a belief that the Tenth Cir-
cuit  erred  at  the  outset  when  it  said  this  case  implicates 
pure speech.  Id., at 19.  Instead, Colorado says, this case 
involves  only  the  sale  of  an  ordinary  commercial  product 
and  any  burden  on  Ms.  Smith’s  speech  is  purely  “inci-
dental.”  Id., at 18, 25–28; see Tr. of Oral Arg. 65, 97–98. 
On the State’s telling, then, speech more or less vanishes
from the picture—and, with it, any need for First Amend-
ment scrutiny.  In places, the dissent seems to advance the
same line of argument.  Post, at 29 (opinion of SOTOMAYOR, 
J.).

This  alternative  theory,  however,  is  difficult  to  square 
with the parties’ stipulations.  As we have seen, the State 
has stipulated that Ms. Smith does not seek to sell an ordi-
nary  commercial  good  but  intends  to  create  “customized 
and tailored” speech for each couple.  App. to Pet. for Cert. 
181a, 187a.  The State has stipulated that “[e]ach website 
303 Creative designs and creates is an original, customized 
creation for each client.”  Id., at 181a.  The State has stipu-
lated,  too,  that  Ms.  Smith’s  wedding  websites  “will  be  ex-
pressive in nature, using text, graphics, and in some cases 
videos to celebrate and promote the couple’s wedding and
unique love story.”  Id., at 187a.  As the case comes to us, 
then, Colorado seeks to compel just the sort of speech that 
it tacitly concedes lies beyond the reach of its powers.

Of course, as the State emphasizes, Ms. Smith offers her 
speech  for  pay  and  does  so  through  303  Creative  LLC,  a 
company in which she is “the sole member-owner.”  Id., at 
181a; see also post, at 33 (opinion of SOTOMAYOR, J.) (em-
phasizing Ms. Smith’s “commercial” activity).  But none of 
that makes a difference.  Does anyone think a speechwriter
loses  his  First  Amendment  right  to  choose  for  whom  he 
works if he accepts money in return?  Or that a visual artist 
who  accepts  commissions  from  the  public  does  the  same?
Many of the world’s great works of literature and art were