Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/558bv.pdf
Page Number: 461.0

300 

WOOD  v.  ALLEN 

Opinion of the Court 

tition  raised  two  additional  questions  on  which  we  declined 
to  grant  certiorari.  Ibid.  Neither  of  these  asked  us  to 
review  whether  the  state  court’s  resolution  of  Wood’s 
ineffective-assistance-of-counsel  claim  was  “contrary  to,  or 
involved  an  unreasonable  application  of,  clearly  established 
Federal law” under § 2254(d)(1) and Strickland. 

II
 
A
 

Notwithstanding statements we have made about the rela­
tionship between §§ 2254(d)(2) and (e)(1) in cases that did not 
squarely  present  the  issue,  see  Brief  for  Petitioner  37–38; 
Brief for Respondents 28–29, we have explicitly left open the 
question  whether  § 2254(e)(1)  applies  in  every  case  present­
ing  a  challenge  under  § 2254(d)(2),  see  Rice  v.  Collins,  546 
U. S.  333,  339  (2006).  The  parties  and  their  amici  have  of­
fered  a  variety  of  ways  to  read  the  relationship  between 
these  two  provisions.2  Although  we  granted  certiorari  to 
resolve  the  question  of  how  §§ 2254(d)(2)  and  (e)(1)  ﬁt  to­
gether, we ﬁnd once more that we need not reach this ques­
tion,  because  our  view  of  the  reasonableness  of  the  state 
court’s  factual  determination  in  this  case  does  not  turn  on 
any  interpretive  difference  regarding  the  relationship  be­
tween  these  provisions.  For  present  purposes,  we  assume 

2 In  Wood’s  view,  when  a  petitioner  seeks  relief  based  entirely  on  the 
state-court  record,  a  federal  court  reviews  the  state  court’s  ﬁndings  for 
reasonableness under § 2254(d)(2).  Section 2254(e)(1) comes into play, ac­
cording to Wood,  only when a petitioner  challenges individual state-court 
factual  ﬁndings  based  in  part  on  evidence  that  is  extrinsic  to  the  state-
court  record.  Brief  for  Petitioner  38–39.  According  to  respondents, 
§ 2254(e)(1)  applies  to  any  challenge  to  a  state  court’s  factual  ﬁndings 
under  § 2254(d)(2),  including  a  challenge  based  solely  on  the  state-court 
record.  Brief for Respondents 35–37.  Respondents’ amici offer still fur­
ther variations, although they all agree with respondents that § 2254(e)(1) 
applies in some fashion in every habeas case reviewing state-court factual 
ﬁndings.  Brief for  Criminal Justice  Legal Foundation  5, 10–14; Brief  for 
State of Indiana et al. 2, 12–18.