Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/19pdf/18-556_e1pf.pdf
Page Number: 1

(Slip Opinion) 

OCTOBER  TERM,  2019 

1 

Syllabus 

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is 
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued. 
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been 
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader. 
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337. 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

Syllabus 

KANSAS v. GLOVER 

CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF KANSAS 

No. 18–556.  Argued November 4, 2019—Decided April 6, 2020 

A Kansas deputy sheriff ran a license plate check on a pickup truck, dis-
covering  that  the  truck  belonged  to  respondent  Glover  and  that 
Glover’s  driver’s  license  had  been  revoked.    The  deputy  pulled  the
truck over because he assumed that Glover was driving.  Glover was 
in fact driving and was charged with driving as a habitual violator.  He 
moved to suppress all evidence from the stop, claiming that the deputy
lacked reasonable suspicion.  The District Court granted the motion, 
but the Court of Appeals reversed.  The Kansas Supreme Court in turn 
reversed, holding that the deputy violated the Fourth Amendment by
stopping Glover without reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. 

Held: When the officer lacks information negating an inference that the 
owner is driving the vehicle, an investigative traffic stop made after 
running  a  vehicle’s  license  plate  and  learning  that  the  registered 
owner’s  driver’s  license  has  been  revoked  is  reasonable  under  the 
Fourth Amendment.  Pp. 3–10.

(a) An officer may initiate a brief investigative traffic stop when he 
has “a particularized and objective basis” to suspect legal wrongdoing. 
United States v. Cortez, 449 U. S. 411, 417.  The level of suspicion re-
quired is less than that necessary for probable cause and “depends on
‘ “the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which rea-
sonable  and  prudent  men,  not  legal  technicians,  act.” ’ ”  Prado 
Navarette v. California, 572 U. S. 393, 402.  Courts must therefore per-
mit  officers  to  make  “commonsense  judgments  and  inferences  about
human behavior.”  Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U. S. 119, 125.  P. 3. 

(b) Here,  the  deputy’s  commonsense  inference  that  the  owner  of  a 
vehicle was likely the vehicle’s driver provided more than reasonable
suspicion to initiate the stop.  That inference is not made unreasonable 
merely because a vehicle’s driver is not always its registered owner or 
because Glover had a revoked license.  Though common sense suffices