Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/07pdf/07-290.pdf
Page Number: 70.0

Cite as:  554 U. S. ____ (2008) 

3 

STEVENS, J., dissenting 

we  ourselves  affirmed  it  in  1980.    See  Lewis  v.  United 
States, 445 U. S. 55, 65–66, n. 8 (1980).3  No new evidence 
has  surfaced  since  1980  supporting  the  view  that  the
Amendment was intended to curtail the power of Congress
to  regulate  civilian  use  or  misuse  of  weapons.    Indeed,  a 
review  of  the  drafting  history  of  the  Amendment  demon­
strates  that  its  Framers  rejected  proposals  that  would 
have broadened its coverage to include such uses.

The opinion the Court announces today fails to identify 

any  new  evidence  supporting  the  view  that  the  Amend­
ment was intended to limit the power of Congress to regu­
late civilian uses of weapons.  Unable to point to any such 
evidence,  the  Court  stakes  its  holding  on  a  strained  and 
—————— 

Gillespie  v.  Indianapolis,  185  F. 3d  693,  710–711  (CA7  1999);  United 
States  v.  Scanio,  No.  97–1584,  1998  WL  802060,  *2  (CA2,  Nov.  12, 
1998)  (unpublished  opinion);  United  States  v.  Wright,  117  F. 3d  1265, 
1271–1274 (CA11 1997); United States v. Rybar, 103 F. 3d 273, 285–286 
(CA3 1996); Hickman v. Block, 81 F. 3d 98, 100–103 (CA9 1996); United 
States v. Hale, 978 F. 2d 1016, 1018–1020 (CA8 1992); Thomas v. City 
Council  of  Portland,  730  F. 2d  41,  42  (CA1  1984)  (per  curiam);  United 
States v. Johnson, 497 F. 2d 548, 550 (CA4 1974) (per curiam); United 
States v. Johnson, 441 F. 2d 1134, 1136 (CA5 1971); see also Sandidge 
v.  United  States,  520  A. 2d  1057,  1058–1059  (DC  App.  1987).  And  a 
number of courts have remained firm in their prior positions, even after
considering  Emerson.    See,  e.g.,  United  States  v.  Lippman,  369  F. 3d 
1039,  1043–1045  (CA8  2004);  United  States  v.  Parker,  362  F. 3d  1279, 
1282–1284  (CA10  2004);  United  States  v.  Jackubowski,  63  Fed.  Appx. 
959,  961  (CA7  2003)  (unpublished  opinion);  Silveira  v.  Lockyer,  312 
F. 3d  1052,  1060–1066  (CA9  2002);  United  States  v.  Milheron,  231 
F. Supp.  2d  376,  378  (Me.  2002);  Bach  v.  Pataki,  289  F. Supp.  2d  217, 
224–226 (NDNY 2003); United States v. Smith, 56 M. J. 711, 716 (C. A. 
Armed Forces 2001). 

3 Our discussion in Lewis was brief but significant.  Upholding a con­
viction  for  receipt  of  a  firearm  by  a  felon,  we  wrote:  “These  legislative
restrictions on the use of firearms are neither based upon constitution­
ally  suspect  criteria,  nor  do  they  entrench  upon  any  constitutionally
protected  liberties.    See  United  States  v.  Miller,  307  U. S.  174,  178 
(1939) (the Second Amendment guarantees no right to keep and bear a
firearm that does not have ‘some reasonable relationship to the preser­
vation or efficiency of a well regulated militia’).”  445 U. S., at 65, n. 8.