Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/06pdf/05-1120.pdf
Page Number: 56

Cite as:  549 U. S. ____ (2007) 

3 

SCALIA, J., dissenting 

the Administrator’s discretion in this regard is not entirely 
unbounded—that  if  he  has  no  reasonable  basis  for  defer-
ring  judgment  he  must  grasp  the  nettle  at  once.    The 
Court, however, with no basis in text or precedent, rejects 
all of EPA’s stated “policy judgments” as not “amount[ing] 
to a reasoned justification,” ante, at 31, effectively narrow-
ing  the  universe  of  potential  reasonable  bases  to  a  single 
one:  Judgment  can  be  delayed  only  if  the  Administrator 
concludes  that  “the  scientific  uncertainty  is  [too]  pro-
found.”  Ibid.  The  Administrator  is  precluded  from  con-
cluding for other reasons “that it would . . . be better not to 
regulate  at  this  time.” 
Ibid.1   Such  other  reasons— 
perfectly  valid  reasons—were  set  forth  in  the  agency’s 
statement. 

“We do not believe . . . that it would be either effective 
or  appropriate  for  EPA  to  establish  [greenhouse  gas] 
standards  for  motor  vehicles  at  this  time.  As  de-
scribed  in  detail  below,  the  President  has  laid  out  a 
comprehensive  approach  to  climate  change  that  calls 
for  near-term  voluntary  actions  and  incentives  along
with programs aimed at reducing scientific uncertain-
ties  and  encouraging  technological  development  so 
that  the  government  may  effectively  and  efficiently 
address the climate change issue over the long term. 
 .

 . 

 .

 .

.

“[E]stablishing [greenhouse gas] emission standards
for  U. S.  motor  vehicles  at  this  time  would  . . .  result 
in  an  inefficient,  piecemeal  approach  to  addressing
the  climate  change  issue.    The  U. S.  motor  vehicle 
fleet is one of many sources of [greenhouse gas] emis-
sions both here and abroad, and different [greenhouse 

—————— 

1 The Court’s way of putting it is, of course, not quite accurate.  The 
issue is whether it would be better to defer the decision about whether to 
exercise  judgment.  This  has  the  effect  of  deferring  regulation  but  is 
quite a different determination.