Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/558bv.pdf
Page Number: 616

Cite as: 558 U. S. 310 (2010) 

455 

Opinion of Stevens, J. 

or harm a particular candidate, these nominally independent 
expenditures began to corrupt the political process in a very 
direct  sense.  The  sponsors  of  these  ads  were  routinely 
granted  special  access  after  the  campaign  was  over;  “candi­
dates and ofﬁcials knew who their friends were,” McConnell, 
540  U. S.,  at  129.  Many  corporate  independent  expendi­
tures,  it  seemed,  had  become  essentially  interchangeable 
with  direct  contributions  in  their  capacity  to  generate  quid 
pro quo arrangements.  In an age in which money and tele­
vision  ads  are  the  coin  of  the  campaign  realm,  it  is  hardly 
surprising  that  corporations  deployed  these  ads  to  curry 
favor with, and to gain inﬂuence over, public ofﬁcials. 

The  majority  appears  to  think  it  decisive  that  the  BCRA 
record  does  not  contain  “direct  examples  of  votes  being  ex­
changed for . . .  expenditures.”  Ante, at 360 (internal quota­
tion  marks  omitted).  It  would  have  been  quite  remarkable 
if Congress  had created a  record detailing such  behavior by 
its  own  Members.  Proving  that  a  speciﬁc  vote  was  ex­
changed  for  a  speciﬁc  expenditure  has  always  been  next  to 
impossible: Elected ofﬁcials have diverse motivations, and no 
one will acknowledge that he sold a vote.  Yet, even if “[i]n­
gratiation  and  access  .  .  .  are  not  corruption”  themselves, 
ibid.,  they  are  necessary  prerequisites to  it;  they  can  create 
both  the  opportunity  for,  and  the  appearance  of,  quid  pro 
quo arrangements.  The inﬂux of unlimited corporate money 
into  the  electoral  realm  also  creates  new  opportunities  for 
the mirror image of quid pro quo deals: threats, both explicit 
and  implicit.  Starting  today,  corporations  with  large  war 
chests  to  deploy  on  electioneering  may  ﬁnd  democratically 
elected  bodies  becoming  much  more  attuned  to  their  inter­
ests.  The  majority  both  misreads  the  facts  and  draws  the 
wrong  conclusions  when  it  suggests  that  the  BCRA  record 
provides “only scant evidence that independent expenditures 
. . . ingratiate,” and that, “in any event,” none of it matters. 
Ibid.