Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/18pdf/17-1717_4f14.pdf
Page Number: 71.0

Cite as:  588 U. S. ____ (2019) 

5 

GINSBURG,  J., dissenting 

592.    The  display  fails  this  requirement  if it objectively 
“convey[s] a message that religion or a particular religious 
belief is favored or preferred.”  Id., at 593 (internal quota-
tion  marks  omitted;  emphasis  deleted).3    To  make  that 
determination, a court must consider “the pertinent facts 
and circumstances surrounding the symbol and its place-
ment.”    Buono,  559  U. S.,  at  721  (plurality  opinion);  id.,  
at  750–751  (Stevens,  J.,  dissenting)  (quoting  plurality 
opinion).4 
  As I see it, when a cross is displayed on public property, 
the government may be presumed to endorse its religious 
content.    The  venue is surely associated with the State; 
the symbol and its meaning are just as surely associated 
exclusively with Christianity.  “It certainly is not common 
for property owners to open up their property [to] monu-
ments that convey a message with which they do not wish 
to  be  associated.”   Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 
U. S.  460,  471  (2009).    To  non-Christians,  nearly  30%  of 
the population of the United States, Pew Research Center, 
America’s  Changing  Religious  Landscape  4  (2015),  the 

—————— 

3 JUSTICE  GORSUCH’s  “no  standing”  opinion  is  startling  in view of the 
many  religious-display  cases  this  Court  has  resolved  on  the  merits.  
E.g.,  McCreary  County,  545  U. S. 844; Van Orden, 545 U. S. 677; Stone 
v.  Graham,  449  U. S. 39 (1980) (per curiam).  And, if JUSTICE  GORSUCH 
is  right,  three  Members  of  the Court were out of line when they recog-
nized  that  “[t]he  [Establishment]  Clause  forbids  a  city  to  permit  the 
permanent  erection  of  a  large  Latin  cross  on  the  roof  of  city  hall,” 
Buono,  559  U. S.,  at  715  (opinion  of  Kennedy,  J.,  joined  by  ROBERTS, 
C.J.,  and  ALITO,  J.)  (quoting  County  of  Allegheny,  492  U. S.,  at  661 
(second  alteration  in  original),  for  no  one,  according  to  JUSTICE 
GORSUCH,  should  be  heard  to  complain  about  such  a  thing.    But  see 
Brief  for  Law  Professors  as  Amici  Curiae  (explaining  why  offended 
observer standing is necessary and proper). 

4 This  inquiry  has  been  described  by  some Members of the Court as 
the  “reasonable  observer”  standard.    See,  e.g.,  Capitol  Square  Review 
and  Advisory  Bd.  v.  Pinette,  515  U.  S.  753,  806  (1995)  (Stevens,  J., 
dissenting);  County  of  Allegheny,  492  U. S.,  at  630–631  (O’Connor,  J., 
concurring  in part and concurring  in judgment).