Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/19pdf/19-431_5i36.pdf
Page Number: 21

Cite as:  591 U. S. ____ (2020) 

17 

Opinion of the Court 

The dissent resists this conclusion, asserting that the De-
partments’ interpretation thwarts Congress’ intent to pro-
vide  contraceptive  coverage  to  the  women  who  are  inter-
ested in receiving such coverage.  See post, at 1, 21 (opinion
of GINSBURG, J.).  It also argues that the exemptions will 
make it significantly harder for interested women to obtain 
seamless access to contraception without cost sharing, post, 
at 15–17, which we have previously “assume[d]” is a com-
pelling governmental interest, Hobby Lobby, 573 U. S., at 
728; but see post, at 10–12 (ALITO, J., concurring).  The De-
partments dispute that women will be adversely impacted
by the 2018 exemptions.  82 Fed. Reg. 47805.  Though we
express no view on this disagreement, it bears noting that 
such a policy concern cannot justify supplanting the text’s
plain meaning.  See Gitlitz v. Commissioner, 531 U. S. 206, 
220 (2001).  “It is not for us to rewrite the statute so that it 
covers only what we think is necessary to achieve what we
think  Congress  really  intended.”  Lewis  v.  Chicago,  560 
U. S. 205, 215 (2010).

Moreover, even assuming that the dissent is correct as an
empirical matter, its concerns are more properly directed at 

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to  create  the  exemptions.    As  respondents  acknowledged  at  oral  argu-
ment, accepting their interpretation of the ACA would require us to con-
clude that the Departments had no authority under the ACA to promul-
gate the initial church exemption, see Tr. of Oral Arg. 69–71, 91, which 
by extension would mean that the Departments lacked authority for the 
2013 self-certification accommodation.  That reading of the ACA would 
create serious tension with Hobby Lobby, which pointed to the self-certi-
fication accommodation as an example of a less restrictive means avail-
able  to  the  Government,  573  U. S.,  at  730–731,  and  Zubik,  which  ex-
pressly  directed  the  Departments  to  “accommodat[e]”  petitioners’
religious exercise, 578 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 4).  It would be passing
strange for this Court to direct the Departments to make such an accom-
modation if it thought the ACA did not authorize one.  In addition, we 
are not aware of, and the dissent does not point to, a single case predat-
ing Hobby Lobby or Zubik in which the Departments took the position 
that they could not adopt a different approach because they lacked the
statutory authority under the ACA to do so.