Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/23pdf/23-175_19m2.pdf
Page Number: 55.0

Cite as:  603 U. S. ____ (2024) 

11 

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting 

punishment grossly disproportionate to the severity of the 
crime; and third, it imposes substantive limits on what can 
be  made  criminal  and  punished  as  such.”  Ingraham  v. 
Wright, 430 U. S. 651, 667 (1977) (citations omitted). 

In  Robinson  v.  California,  this  Court  detailed  one  sub-
stantive  limitation  on  criminal  punishment.    Lawrence 
Robinson  was  convicted  under  a  California  statute  for 
“ ‘be[ing] addicted to the use of narcotics’ ” and faced a man-
datory 90-day jail sentence.  370 U. S., at 660.  The Califor-
nia statute did not “punis[h] a person for the use of narcot-
ics, for their purchase, sale or possession, or for antisocial 
or disorderly behavior resulting from their administration.” 
Id., at 666.  Instead, it made “the ‘status’ of narcotic addic-
tion a criminal offense, for which the offender may be pros-
ecuted ‘at any time before he reforms.’ ”  Ibid. 

The Court held that, because it criminalized the “ ‘status’ 
of narcotic addiction,” ibid., the California law “inflict[ed] a 
cruel and unusual punishment in violation” of the Punish-
ments Clause, id., at 667.  Importantly, the Court did not 
limit that holding to the status of narcotic addiction alone. 
It began by reasoning that the criminalization of the “men-
tally ill, or a leper, or [those] afflicted with a venereal dis-
ease” “would doubtless be universally thought to be an in-
fliction of cruel and unusual punishment.”  Id., at 666.  It 
extended that same reasoning to the status of being an ad-
dict, because “narcotic addiction is an illness” “which may
be contracted innocently or involuntarily.”  Id., at 667. 

Unlike  the  majority,  see  ante,  at  15–17,  the  Robinson 
Court did not rely on the harshness of the criminal penalty 
itself.  It understood that “imprisonment for ninety days is
not, in the abstract, a punishment which is either cruel or
unusual.”  370 U. S., at 667.  Instead, it reasoned that, when 
imposed  because  of  a  person’s  status,  “[e]ven  one  day  in
prison would be a cruel and unusual punishment.”  Ibid. 

Robinson did not prevent States from using a variety of 
tools,  including  criminal  law,  to  address  harmful  conduct