Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/21pdf/20-1088_dbfi.pdf
Page Number: 2

2 

CARSON v. MAKIN 

Syllabus 

against “indirect coercion or penalties on the free exercise of religion, 
not  just  outright  prohibitions.”    Lyng  v.  Northwest  Indian  Cemetery 
Protective Assn., 485 U. S. 439, 450.  The Court recently applied this
principle in the context of two state efforts to withhold otherwise avail-
able public benefits from religious organizations.  In Trinity Lutheran 
Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 582 U. S. ___, the Court considered 
a Missouri program that offered grants to qualifying nonprofit organi-
zations that installed cushioning playground surfaces, but denied such
grants to any applicant that was owned or controlled by a church, sect, 
or other religious entity.  The Court held that the Free Exercise Clause 
did not permit Missouri to “expressly discriminate[ ] against otherwise
eligible  recipients  by  disqualifying  them  from  a  public  benefit  solely 
because  of  their  religious  character.”    582  U. S.,  at  ___–___.    And  in 
Espinoza v. Montana Department of Revenue, 591 U. S. ___, the Court 
held that a provision of the Montana Constitution barring government 
aid to any school “controlled in whole or in part by any church, sect, or
denomination” violated the Free Exercise Clause by prohibiting fami-
lies  from  using  otherwise  available  scholarship  funds  at  religious
schools.  591 U. S., at ___.  “A State need not subsidize private educa-
tion,” the Court concluded, “[b]ut once a State decides to do so, it can-
not disqualify some private schools solely because they are religious.” 
Id., at ___.  Pp. 6–8. 

(b) The principles applied in Trinity Lutheran and Espinoza suffice 
to resolve this case.  Maine offers its citizens a benefit: tuition assis-
tance payments for any family whose school district does not provide
a public secondary school.  Just like the wide range of nonprofit organ-
izations  eligible  to  receive  playground  resurfacing  grants  in  Trinity 
Lutheran, a wide range of private schools are eligible to receive Maine
tuition assistance payments here.  And like the daycare center in Trin-
ity  Lutheran,  the  religious  schools  in  this  case  are  disqualified  from
this generally available benefit “solely because of their religious char-
acter.”  582  U. S.,  at  ___.  Likewise,  in Espinoza,  as  here,  the  Court 
considered a state benefit program that provided public funds to sup-
port  tuition  payments  at  private  schools  and  specifically  carved  out 
private religious schools from those eligible to receive such funds.  Both 
that program and this one disqualify certain private schools from pub-
lic funding “solely because they are religious.”  591 U. S., at ___.  A law 
that operates in that manner must be subjected to “the strictest scru-
tiny.”  Id., at ___–___. 

Maine’s program cannot survive strict scrutiny.  A neutral benefit 
program in which public funds flow to religious organizations through 
the  independent  choices  of  private  benefit  recipients  does  not  offend 
the Establishment Clause.  See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U. S. 
639, 652–653.  Maine’s decision to continue excluding religious schools