Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/23pdf/23-50diff_d18f.pdf
Page Number: 15

4 

CHIAVERINI v. CITY OF NAPOLEON 

THOMAS, J., dissenting 

Supra, at 2.  To resolve this mismatch, the Court has de-
cided that a plaintiff must show that a malicious prosecu-
tion caused an unreasonable seizure.  See Thompson, 596 
U. S., at 43, n. 2; ante, at 1, 7.  While that grafting solved
one  problem,  it  created  several  more.  Because  the  Court 
has mixed two distinct legal frameworks, it is unclear what 
doctrines actually govern its requirement that a malicious 
prosecution cause a seizure.  For example, if a plaintiff has
multiple  charges,  how  does  a  court  determine  whether  a 
particular unfounded charge caused the seizure?  See ante, 
at 7 (listing three possible causation theories).  What type
of evidence is relevant?  See Brief for Petitioners 40 (argu-
ing that Chiaverini would not have been seized absent the 
unfounded charge since a similar defendant with a credible 
charge was not seized).  And, what happens if an unfounded 
charge merely changes the nature of the seizure?  See Brief 
for United States as Amicus Curiae 18 (arguing that an un-
founded charge causes a seizure if it results in a more force-
ful arrest).  The Court’s claim for malicious prosecution un-
der  the  Fourth  Amendment  requires  resolving  these 
questions  and  more.   To  date,  the  Court  has  offered  little 
guidance on how to do so.*  And, because the claim at issue 
is the Court’s own creation, lower courts cannot turn to the 
common  law  or  Fourth  Amendment  doctrine  for  answers. 
Instead, they are left to make their best guess at how the 
Court would define its novel claim. 

I  would  take  a  far  simpler  course.    Instead  of  forcing  a 
square  peg  into  a  round  hole  by  judging  an  unreasonable 

—————— 

*The  Court  purports  to  offer  some  guidance  today  by  rejecting  the 
Sixth Circuit’s “categorical rule barring a Fourth Amendment malicious-
prosecution claim if any charge is valid.”  Ante, at 6–7.  But, it is not clear 
that the Sixth Circuit even has such a rule.  See Howse v. Hodous, 953 
F. 3d  402,  409,  n. 3  (2020)  (recognizing  that  the  underlying  inquiry  is
whether an unfounded charge “change[s] the nature of the seizure”); see 
2023 WL 152477, *4 (Jan. 11, 2023) (citing Howse).  It is thus unclear 
what, if any, doctrinal progress today’s decision makes.