Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/23pdf/22-915_8o6b.pdf
Page Number: 90.0

Cite as:  602 U. S. ____ (2024) 

19 

THOMAS, J., dissenting 

Gant,  691  F. 2d  1159,  1162  (CA5  1982)  (affirming  convic-
tion of a business owner under §922(g) predecessor statute 
for briefly possessing a firearm to ward off suspected rob-
bers).  Courts  of  Appeals  have  understood  “possession”
broadly, upholding convictions where a person “picked up 
. . . three firearms for a few seconds to inspect” each, United 
States v. Matthews, 520 F. 3d 806, 807 (CA7 2008), or “made
direct  contact  with  the  firearm  by  sitting  on  it,”  United 
States v. Johnson, 46 F. 4th 1183, 1189 (CA10 2022).  They
have also construed §922(g) to bar “constructive possession”
of a firearm, including, for example, ammunition found in a 
jointly occupied home.  See, e.g., United States v. Stepp, 89 
F. 4th 826, 832–835 (CA10 2023).

Moreover,  §922(g)  captures  virtually  all  commercially 
available firearms and ammunition.  It prohibits possessing 
a  firearm  “in  or  affecting  commerce”  and  “receiv[ing]  any
firearm  or  ammunition  which  has  been  shipped  or  trans-
ported  in  interstate  or  foreign  commerce.”    §922(g).  As 
courts have interpreted that nexus, if a firearm or ammu-
nition has at any point crossed interstate lines, it is regu-
lated  by  §922(g).  See  Scarborough  v.  United  States,  431 
U. S.  563,  566–567  (1977)  (holding  §922(g)’s  predecessor 
statute covered firearm that “had previously traveled in in-
terstate  commerce”);  United  States  v.  Lemons,  302  F. 3d 
769,  772  (CA7  2002)  (affirming  conviction  under  §922(g) 
for  possessing  firearm  that  “crossed  into  Wisconsin  after
its manufacture at some indeterminate moment in time— 
possibly years before it was discovered in [the defendant’s] 
possession”).6  In fact, the statute goes even further by reg-
ulating not only ammunition but also all constituent parts 

—————— 

6 The  majority  correctly  declines  to  consider  Rahimi’s  Commerce 
Clause challenge because he did not raise it below.  See Cutter v. Wil-
kinson, 544 U. S. 709, 718, n. 7 (2005) (“[W]e are a court of review, not of 
first  view”).  That  said,  I  doubt  that  §922(g)(8)  is  a  proper  exercise  of 
Congress’s  power  under  the  Commerce  Clause.  See  United  States  v. 
Lopez, 514 U. S. 549, 585 (1995) (THOMAS, J., concurring).