Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/20pdf/20-315_q713.pdf
Page Number: 2

2 

SANCHEZ v. MAYORKAS 

Syllabus 

And his TPS does not eliminate the effect of that unlawful entry.  Sec-
tion 1254a(f)(4) provides that a TPS recipient who applies for perma-
nent  residency  will  be  treated  as  having  nonimmigrant  status—the
status  traditionally  and  generally  needed to  invoke  the LPR  process 
under  §1255.    But  that  provision  does  not  aid  the  TPS  recipient  in 
meeting §1255’s separate admission requirement.  Lawful status and 
admission are distinct concepts in immigration law, and establishing
the former does not establish the latter.  Sanchez resists this conclu-
sion, arguing that the statute’s directive that a TPS recipient “shall be
considered  .  .  .  as  a  nonimmigrant”  for  purposes  of  §1255  means  he 
must also be considered as admitted.    But the immigration laws no-
where state that admission is a prerequisite of nonimmigrant status.
So  there  is  no  reason  to  interpret  the  TPS  provision’s  conferral  of 
nonimmigrant  status  as  including  a  conferral  of  admission.    In  fact, 
contrary  to  Sanchez’s  position,  there  are  immigration  categories  in
which individuals have nonimmigrant status without admission.  See, 
e.g., §§1101(a)(10), 1101(a)(15)(U), 1182(d)(14).  Thus, when Congress 
confers nonimmigrant status for purposes of §1255, but says nothing
about admission, the Court has no basis for ruling an unlawful entrant
eligible to become an LPR.  Pp. 4–9. 

967 F. 3d 242, affirmed. 

KAGAN, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.