Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/13pdf/12-536_e1pf.pdf
Page Number: 41

Cite as:  572 U. S. ____ (2014) 

35 

Opinion of ROBERTS, C. J. 

pothesize  involve  at  least  implicit  agreements  to  circum-
vent the base limits—agreements that are already prohib-
ited  by  the  earmarking  rules.    See  11  CFR  §110.6.    The 
FEC  might  strengthen  those  rules  further  by,  for  exam- 
ple,  defining  how  many  candidates  a  PAC  must  support
in  order  to  ensure  that  “a  substantial  portion”  of  a  do-
nor’s  contribution  is  not  rerouted  to  a  certain  candidate. 
§110.1(h)(2).  Congress  might  also  consider  a  modified 
version of the aggregate limits, such as one that prohibits 
donors  who  have  contributed  the current  maximum  sums 
from further contributing to political committees that have
indicated they will support candidates to whom the donor 
has already contributed.  To be sure, the existing earmark-
ing  provision  does  not  define  “the  outer  limit  of  accept-
able  tailoring.”  Colorado  Republican  Federal  Campaign 
Comm., 533 U. S., at 462.  But tighter rules could have a
significant effect, especially when adopted in concert with
other measures. 

We do not mean to opine on the validity of any particu-
lar  proposal.  The  point  is  that  there  are  numerous  al-
ternative  approaches  available  to  Congress  to  prevent
circumvention of the base limits. 

D 
Finally, disclosure of contributions minimizes the poten-
tial for abuse of the campaign finance system.  Disclosure 
requirements are in part “justified based on a governmen-
tal interest in ‘provid[ing] the electorate with information’ 
about  the  sources  of  election-related  spending.”    Citizens 
United,  558  U. S.,  at  367  (quoting  Buckley,  supra,  at  66).
They  may  also  “deter  actual  corruption  and  avoid  the
appearance  of  corruption  by  exposing  large  contributions
and  expenditures  to  the  light  of  publicity.”    Id.,  at  67. 
Disclosure  requirements  burden  speech,  but—unlike  the
aggregate  limits—they  do  not  impose  a  ceiling  on  speech. 
Citizens  United,  supra,  at  366;  but  see  McConnell,  supra,