Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/21pdf/20-637_10n2.pdf
Page Number: 19.0

Cite as:  595 U. S. ____ (2022) 

1 

ALITO, J., concurring 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

_________________ 

No. 20–637 
_________________ 

DARRELL HEMPHILL, PETITIONER v. NEW YORK 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS 
OF NEW YORK 

[January 20, 2022]

 JUSTICE  ALITO,  with  whom  JUSTICE  KAVANAUGH  joins,

concurring. 

I agree with the Court’s conclusion that—assuming Mor-
ris’s statement was testimonial—its admission violated the 
Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment.  I write sep-
arately to address the conditions under which a defendant 
can be deemed to have validly waived the right to confront
adverse witnesses. 

“The question of a waiver of a federally guaranteed con-
stitutional right is, of course, a federal question controlled 
by federal law.”  Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U. S. 1, 4 (1966). 
Waiver consists in the “intentional relinquishment or aban-
donment of a known right or privilege.”  Johnson v. Zerbst, 
304 U. S. 458, 464 (1938).  But a valid waiver need not be 
express.  Implied  waiver  can  be  established  through  “ ‘a 
course  of  conduct’ ”  even  “absent  formal  or  express  state-
ments  of  waiver.”    Berghuis  v.  Thompkins,  560  U. S.  370, 
383–384 (2010) (quoting North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U. S. 
369, 373 (1979)).  In the prototypical case of implied waiver, 
the relevant course of conduct signals an intention to relin-
quish the right at issue.  But “[a]s a general proposition, the 
law can presume that an individual who, with a full under-
standing of his or her rights, acts in a manner inconsistent 
with  their  exercise  has  made  a  deliberate  choice  to  relin-
quish  the  protection  those  rights  afford.”  Berghuis,  560 
U. S., at 385.