Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/529bv.pdf
Page Number: 438.0

529US2

Unit: $U46

[10-07-01 17:18:24] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 529 U. S. 362 (2000)

363

Syllabus

Held: The judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded.

163 F. 3d 860, reversed and remanded.

Justice Stevens delivered the opinion of the Court as to Parts I,
III, and IV, concluding that Williams was denied his constitutionally
guaranteed right to the effective assistance of counsel, as deﬁned in
Strickland, when his trial lawyers failed to investigate and to present
substantial mitigating evidence to the sentencing jury. Pp. 390–398.

(a) The threshold question under AEDPA—whether Williams seeks
to apply a rule of law that was clearly established at the time his state-
court conviction became ﬁnal—is easily answered because the merits of
his claim are squarely governed by Strickland. To establish ineffective
assistance of counsel, the defendant must prove: (1) that counsel’s per-
formance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, 466 U. S.,
at 688; and (2) that the deﬁcient performance prejudiced the defense,
which requires a showing that there is a reasonable probability that,
but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding
would have been different, id., at 694. Because the Strickland test
qualiﬁes as “clearly established Federal
law, as determined by the
Supreme Court,” this Court’s precedent “dictated” that the Virginia
Supreme Court apply that test in entertaining Williams’ ineffective-
assistance claim. See Teague v. Lane, 489 U. S. 288, 301. Pp. 390–391.
(b) Williams is entitled to relief because the Virginia Supreme Court’s
decision rejecting his ineffective-assistance claim both is “contrary to,
[and] involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Fed-
eral law.” Strickland provides sufﬁcient guidance for resolving virtu-
ally all ineffective-assistance claims, and the Virginia Supreme Court
erred in holding that Lockhart modiﬁed or in some way supplanted
Strickland. Although there are a few situations in which the overrid-
ing focus on fundamental fairness may affect the analysis, see Strick-
land, 466 U. S., at 692, cases such as Lockhart and Nix v. Whiteside,
475 U. S. 157, do not justify a departure from a straightforward applica-
tion of Strickland when counsel’s ineffectiveness deprives the defendant
of a substantive or procedural right to which the law entitles him.
Here, Williams had a constitutionally protected right to provide mitigat-
ing evidence that his trial counsel either failed to discover or failed to
offer. Moreover, the Virginia trial judge correctly applied both compo-
nents of the Strickland standard to Williams’ claim. The record estab-
lishes that counsel failed to prepare for sentencing until a week before-
hand, to uncover extensive records graphically describing Williams’
nightmarish childhood, to introduce available evidence that Williams
was “borderline mentally retarded” and did not advance beyond sixth
grade, to seek prison records recording Williams’ commendations for