Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/19pdf/19-631_2d93.pdf
Page Number: 27

BARR v. AMERICAN ASSN. OF POLITICAL  
CONSULTANTS, INC. 
Opinion of KAVANAUGH, J. 

24 

Court).

Moreover,  JUSTICE  GORSUCH’s  approach  to  this  case 
would  not  solve  the  problem  of  harming  strangers  to  this
suit; it would just create a different and much bigger prob-
lem.  His  proposed  remedy  of  injunctive  relief,  plus  stare 
decisis, would in effect allow all robocalls to cell phones—
notwithstanding Congress’s decisive choice to prohibit most 
robocalls to cell phones.  That is not a judicially modest ap-
proach but is more of a wolf in sheep’s clothing.  That ap-
proach  would  disrespect  the  democratic  process,  through 
which the people’s representatives have made crystal clear 
that robocalls must be restricted.  JUSTICE GORSUCH’s rem-
edy would end up harming a different and far larger set of 
strangers  to  this  suit—the  tens  of  millions  of  consumers
who would be bombarded every day with nonstop robocalls 
notwithstanding  Congress’s  clear  prohibition  of  those  ro-
bocalls. 

JUSTICE GORSUCH suggests more broadly that severabil-
ity  doctrine  may  need  to  be  reconsidered.    But  when  and 
how?  As  the  saying  goes,  John  Marshall  is  not  walking 
through that door.  And this Court, in this and other recent 
decisions, has clarified and refined severability doctrine by
emphasizing  firm  adherence  to  the  text  of  severability 
clauses, and underscoring the strong presumption of sever-
ability.  The doctrine as so refined is constitutionally well-
rooted, see, e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137 (Mar-
shall, C. J.), and can be predictably applied.  True, there is 
no magic solution to severability that solves every conun-
drum, especially in equal-treatment cases, but the Court’s
current approach as reflected in recent cases such as Free 
Enterprise  Fund  and  Seila  Law  is  constitutional,  stable, 
predictable, and commonsensical.