Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/20pdf/19-783_k53l.pdf
Page Number: 21

Cite as:  593 U. S. ____ (2021) 

17 

Opinion of the Court 

of  purpose  in  defining  “exceeds  authorized  access”—like-
wise covers insiders like Van Buren who use their computer 
access  for  an  unauthorized  purpose.11   The  Government’s 
argument gets things precisely backward.  “When Congress 
amends  legislation,  courts  must  presume  it  intends  the 
change to have real and substantial effect.”  Ross v. Blake, 
578  U. S.  632,  641–642  (2016)  (internal  quotation  marks
and brackets omitted).  Congress’ choice to remove the stat-
ute’s  reference  to  purpose  thus  cuts  against  reading  the
statute  “to  capture  that  very  concept.”    Brief  for  United 
States  22.    The  statutory  history  thus  hurts  rather  than
helps the Government’s position. 

III 
To  top  it  all  off,  the  Government’s  interpretation  of  the 
statute would attach criminal penalties to a breathtaking
amount  of  commonplace  computer  activity.  Van  Buren 
frames the far-reaching consequences of the Government’s
reading  as  triggering  the  rule  of  lenity  or  constitutional
avoidance.  That is not how we see it: Because the text, con-
text, and structure support Van Buren’s reading, neither of 
these  canons  is  in  play.    Still,  the fallout  underscores  the 
implausibility of the Government’s interpretation.  It is “ex-
tra icing on a cake already frosted.”  Yates v. United States, 
574 U. S. 528, 557 (2015) (KAGAN, J., dissenting). 

If  the  “exceeds  authorized  access”  clause  criminalizes 
every  violation  of  a  computer-use  policy,  then  millions  of 

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11 While  the  Government  insists  that  Congress  made  this  change 
“ ‘merely to clarify the language’ ” of §1030(a)(2), Brief for United States
28,  the  dissent  has  a  different  take.    In  the  dissent’s  telling,  the  1986 
amendment in fact “expand[ed]” the provision to reach “time and man-
ner” restrictions on computer access—not just purpose-based ones.  Post, 
at 10–11.  The dissent’s distinct explanation for why Congress removed 
§1030(a)(2)’s reference to “purpose” requires accepting that the “exceeds 
authorized access” definition supports a circumstance-specific approach. 
We  reject  the  dissent’s  premise  for  the  textual  and  structural  reasons 
already discussed.