Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/10pdf/09-152.pdf
Page Number: 46

Cite as:  562 U. S. ____ (2011) 

17 

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting 

renders 13 words of the statute entirely superfluous.  See 
ante, at 12 (“The intervening passage (‘the injury or death 
resulted  from  side  effects  that  were  unavoidable  even 
though’) is unnecessary.  True enough”).  Nevertheless, the 
majority contends that “the rule against giving a portion of 
text  an  interpretation  which  renders  it  superfluous  . . .
applies only if verbosity and prolixity can be eliminated by 
giving the offending passage, or the remainder of the text,
a competing interpretation.”  Ibid.  According to the major-
ity,  petitioners’  reading  of  §22(b)(1)  renders  the  “even 
though”  clause  superfluous  because,  to  reach  petitioners’ 
desired outcome, “[i]t would suffice to say ‘if the injury or 
death  resulted  from  side  effects  that  were  unavoidable’— 
full  stop.”  Ibid.   As  explained  above,  however,  the  “even
though”  clause  establishes  two  additional  prerequisites—
proper  manufacturing  and  proper  labeling—to  qualify  for 
§22(b)(1)’s  exemption  from  liability.  Contrary  to  the  ma-
jority’s  contention,  then,  the  “even  though”  clause  serves 
an  important  function  by  limiting  the  scope  of  the  pre-
emption afforded by the preceding “if ” clause.14 

The  majority’s  only  other  textual  argument  is  based  on 

—————— 

14 In this manner, the “even though” clause functions in a “concessive
subordinat[ing]” fashion, ante, at 11, in accord with normal grammati-
cal usage.  According to the majority, however, the “even though” clause 
“clarifies  the  word  that  precedes  it”  by  “delineat[ing]”  the  conditions
that  make  a  side  effect  “unavoidable”  under  the  statute.    Ante,  at  7. 
The  majority’s  interpretation  hardly  treats  the  clause  as  “concessive,” 
and  indeed  strains  the  meaning  of  “even  though.”    In  the  majority’s 
view, proper manufacturing and labeling are the sole prerequisites that 
render  a  vaccine’s  side  effects  unavoidable.    Thus,  an  injurious  side 
effect  is  unavoidable  because  the  vaccine  was  properly  prepared  and
labeled, not “even though” it was.  The two conjunctions are not equiva-
lent: The sentence “I am happy even though it is raining” can hardly be 
read to mean that “I am happy because it is raining.”  In any event, the 
more  fundamental  point  is  that  petitioners’  interpretation  actually
gives  meaning  to  the  words  “even  though,”  whereas  the  majority
concedes  that  its  interpretation  effectively  reads  those  words  entirely 
out of the statute.  See supra this page.