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4 

VIDAL v. ELSTER 

BARRETT, J., concurring in part 

quality  and  class  of  medicines.”    Ibid.  In  other  words, 
whether a word or phrase could qualify for trademark pro-
tection depended on “its communicative content.”  Reed, 576 
U. S., at 163. 

Roughly 10 years later, the New York Superior Court fur-
ther  developed  this  content-based  principle  in  Amoskeag 
Mfg. Co. v. Spear & Ripley, 2 Sandf. 599 (1849), long “ ‘re-
garded as the leading American adjudication’ ” of a trade-
mark dispute.  B. Pattishall, Two Hundred Years of Amer-
ican Trademark Law, 68 Trademark Rep. 121, 125 (1978).
The court agreed that “[e]very manufacturer . . . has an un-
questionable right to distinguish the goods that he manu-
factures or sells, by a peculiar mark or device, in order that
they  may  be  known  as  his.”  Amoskeag,  2  Sandf.,  at  605. 
But the law will only “protec[t him] in the exclusive use” of
marks that “designat[e] the true origin or ownership”—i.e., 
the  source—of  the  goods.    Id.,  at  606.  The  manufacturer 
cannot claim a protectable trademark in “words, letters, fig-
ures or symbols” that indicate only the “name or quality”— 
i.e., not the source—of the goods.  Ibid.  After all, those who 
produce similar goods could use the same words or symbols
“with equal truth”—thus, they should have “an equal right 
to employ [them], for the same purpose.”  Id., at 607. 

Courts repeated and applied this rule for decades.  See, 
e.g.,  Wolfe  v.  Goulard,  18  How.  Pr.  64,  67  (N. Y.  Sup.  Ct. 
1859); Falkinburg  v. Lucy, 35 Cal. 52, 64 (1868); Filley  v. 
Fassett, 44 Mo. 168, 176–177 (1869); Congress Spring Co. v. 
High  Rock  Spring  Co.,  45  N. Y.  291,  295  (1871).    For  in-
stance,  a  gin  manufacturer  could  not  claim  an  exclusive 
right to the term “Schiedam Schnapps” if it already served 
as a common descriptor of gin.  Wolfe, 18 How. Pr., at 67. 
But a stove manufacturer could trademark the term “ ‘Char-
ter Oak,’ ” as a distinctive phrase not “merely descriptive of 
the  style,  quality,  or  character”  of  the  product.  Filley,  44 
Mo., at 176–177.  Then, as now, courts understood that a