Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/10pdf/10-10.pdf
Page Number: 27.0

Cite as:  564 U. S. ____ (2011) 

7 

THOMAS, J., dissenting 

have  never  raised:  The  family  court’s  procedures  “were
in  adequate  to  ensure  an  accurate  determination  of 
[Turner’s] present ability to pay.”  Brief for United States 
as  Amicus  Curiae  19  (capitalization  and  boldface  type 
deleted); see ante, at 14–16.  I would not reach this issue. 

There are good reasons not to consider new issues raised 
for  the  first  and  only  time  in  an  amicus  brief.    As  here,  
the new issue may be outside the question presented.3  See 
Pet. for Cert. i (“Whether . . . an indigent defendant has no
constitutional  right  to  appointed  counsel  at  a  civil  con-
tempt  proceeding  that  results  in  his  incarceration”);  see 
also  ante,  at  4–5  (identifying  the  conflict  among  lower 
courts  as  regarding  “the  right  to  counsel”).  As  here,  the 
new  issue  may  not  have  been  addressed  by,  or  even  pre-
sented  to,  the  state  court.  See  387  S. C.  142,  144,  691 
S. E.  2d  470,  472  (2010)  (describing  the  only  question  as 
whether  “the  Sixth  and  Fourteenth  Amendments  of  the 
United  States  Constitution  guarantee  [Turner],  as  an
indigent defendant in family court, the right to appointed
counsel”).  As here, the parties may not have preserved the 
issue, leaving the record undeveloped.  See Tr. of Oral Arg.
49,  43  (“The  record  is  insufficient”  regarding  alternative
procedures  because  “[t]hey  were  raised  for  the  very  first
time at the merits stage here; so, there’s been no develop-
ment”);  Brief  for  Respondents  63.    As  here,  the  parties
may  not  address  the  new  issue  in  this  Court,  leaving  its 
boundaries  untested.    See  Brief  for  Petitioner  27,  n. 15 
(reiterating  that  “[t]he  particular  constitutional  violation 

—————— 

3 Indeed, the new question is not one that would even merit certiorari.  
See  this  Court’s  Rule  10.  Because  the  family  court  received  a  form 
detailing  Turner’s  finances  and  the  judge  could  not  hold  Turner  in
contempt  without  concluding  that  he  could  pay,  the  due  process  ques-
tion that the majority answers reduces to a factbound assessment of the
family  court’s  performance.    See  ante,  at  14–16;  Reply  Brief  for  Peti-
tioner  14–15  (“[I]n  advance  of  his  hearing,  Turner  supplied  to  the
family court just such a form”).