Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/20pdf/20-297_4g25.pdf
Page Number: 46.0

Cite as:  594 U. S. ____ (2021) 

15 

THOMAS, J., dissenting 

so, publishes matter defamatory to another in such a man-
ner as to make the publication a libel is liable to the other,” 
even though “no special harm or loss of reputation results 
therefrom.”  Restatement of Torts §569, p. 165 (1938). 

The  question  this  Court  has  identified  as  key,  then,  is 
whether  a  plaintiff  established  “a  degree  of  risk”  that  is
“sufficient to meet the concreteness requirement.”  Spokeo,
578  U. S.,  at  343.    Here,  in  a  7-month  period,  it  is  undis-
puted that nearly 25 percent of the class had false OFAC-
flags sent to potential creditors.  Twenty-five percent over
just a 7-month period seems, to me, “a degree of risk suffi-
cient  to  meet  the  concreteness  requirement.”  Ibid.  If  25 
percent is insufficient, then, pray tell, what percentage is?
The majority deflects this line of analysis by all but elim-
inating the risk-of-harm analysis.  According to the major-
ity, an elevated risk of harm simply shows that a concrete
harm  is  imminent  and  thus  may  support  only  a  claim  for 
injunctive  relief.  Ante,  at  20,  26.  But  this  reworking  of 
Spokeo fails for two reasons.  First, it ignores what Spokeo
said:  “[Our opinion] does not mean . . . that the risk of real 
harm  cannot  satisfy  the  requirement  of  concreteness.” 
Spokeo, 578 U. S., at 341.  Second, it ignores what Spokeo
did.  The Court in Spokeo remanded the respondent’s claims
for  statutory  damages  to  the  Ninth  Circuit  to  consider 
“whether the . . . violations alleged in this case entail a de-
gree  of  risk  sufficient  to  meet  the  concreteness  require-
ment.”  Id., at 342–343.  The theory that risk of harm mat-
ters only for injunctive relief is thus squarely foreclosed by 
Spokeo itself. 

But  even  if  risk  of  harm  is  out,  the  Ninth  Circuit  indi-
cated that every class member may have had an OFAC alert 
disclosed.  According  to  the  court  below,  TransUnion  not 
only published this information to creditors for a quarter of 
the class but also “communicated about the database infor-
mation and OFAC matches” with a third party.  951 F. 3d, 
at  1026;  cf.  Cortez,  617  F. 3d,  at  711  (TransUnion  cannot