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Page Number: 83.0

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38

OCTOBER TERM, 1997

Syllabus

UNITED STATES v. BEGGERLY et al.

certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the fifth circuit

No. 97–731. Argued April 27, 1998—Decided June 8, 1998

In 1979, the United States sued respondents and others to quiet title to
land it sought for a federal park, contending that respondents did not
have clear title because the Government had never patented the dis-
puted land after acquiring it as part of the Louisiana Purchase. Gov-
ernment ofﬁcials searched public land records during discovery, but re-
ported to respondents that they found no proof of a grant to a private
landowner. A 1982 settlement agreement quieted title in the Govern-
In 1994, respond-
ment’s favor in return for a payment to respondents.
ents sued to set aside the settlement agreement and obtain damages,
claiming that they had evidence showing that the land had been granted
to a private owner before the Louisiana Purchase, but the District Court
concluded that it had no jurisdiction to hear the case. The Fifth Circuit
reversed, ﬁnding two jurisdictional bases: (1) the suit was an “independ-
ent action” to set aside the settlement under Federal Rule of Civil Pro-
cedure 60(b); and (2) the Quiet Title Act (QTA or Act).
In reaching the
second conclusion, the court found that the QTA’s 12-year statute of
limitations was subject to equitable tolling and therefore suit was not
barred by the fact that respondents had known about the Government’s
claim since 1979. The court then vacated the settlement agreement and
instructed the District Court to quiet title in respondents’ favor.

Held: The Fifth Circuit had no jurisdiction over respondents’ suit.

Pp. 42–49.

(a) Rule 60(b)’s history and language are inconsistent with the Gov-
ernment’s position that an “independent action” to set aside a judgment
requires an independent source of jurisdiction. The original Rule 60(b)
established a new system to govern requests to reopen judgments. Be-
cause it was unclear whether that Rule provided the exclusive means
for obtaining postjudgment relief, the Rule was amended in 1946 to
clarify that nearly all of the old forms of obtaining relief from a judg-
ment were abolished but that the “independent action” survived. How-
ever, this does not mean that the requirements for a meritorious inde-
pendent action have been met here. Such actions should be available
only to prevent a grave miscarriage of justice. See Hazel-Atlas Glass
Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U. S. 238, 244. Respondents’ allegation
that the United States failed to thoroughly search its records and make