Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/524bv.pdf
Page Number: 320.0

524US2

Unit: $U87

[09-15-00 14:31:25] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 524 U. S. 274 (1998)

275

Syllabus

should lie. Petitioners, relying on standards developed in the context
of Title VII, contend that damages are available in an implied action
under Title IX based on principles of respondeat superior and construc-
tive notice, i. e., without actual notice to ofﬁcials of discrimination in
school programs. Whether an educational institution can be said to vio-
late Title IX based on principles of respondeat superior and construc-
In this case,
tive notice has not been resolved by the Court’s decisions.
moreover, petitioners seek damages based on theories of respondeat
superior and constructive notice. Unlike Title IX, Title VII contains
an express cause of action for a damages remedy. Title IX’s private
action is judicially implied, however, and so contains no legislative ex-
pression of the scope of available remedies. Pp. 280–284.

(b) Because the private right of action is judicially implied, this Court
must infer how Congress would have addressed the issue of monetary
damages had the action been expressly included in Title IX.
It does
not appear that Congress contemplated unlimited damages against a
funding recipient that is unaware of discrimination in its programs.
When Title IX was enacted, the principal civil rights statutes containing
an express right of action did not allow monetary damages, and when
Title VII was amended to allow such damages, Congress limited the
amount recoverable in any individual case. Title IX was modeled after
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibits race discrim-
ination in programs receiving federal funds. Both statutes condition
federal funding on a recipient’s promise not to discriminate, in what
amounts essentially to a contract between the Government and the
recipient.
In contrast, Title VII is framed as an outright prohibition.
Title IX’s contractual nature has implications for the construction of
the scope of available remedies. When Congress conditions the award
of federal funds under its spending power, the Court closely examines
the propriety of private actions holding recipients liable in damages
for violating the condition.
It is sensible to assume that Congress did
not envision a recipient’s liability in damages where the recipient was
unaware of the discrimination.

Title IX contains important clues that this was Congress’

intent.
Title IX’s express means of enforcement requires actual notice to ofﬁ-
cials of the funding recipient and an opportunity for voluntary com-
pliance before administrative enforcement proceedings can commence.
The presumable purpose is to avoid diverting education funding from
beneﬁcial uses where a recipient who is unaware of discrimination in
its programs is willing to institute prompt corrective measures. Allow-
ing recovery of damages based on principles of respondeat superior
or constructive notice in cases of teacher-student sexual harassment
would be at odds with that basic objective, as liability would attach