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BARR v. EAST BAY SANCTUARY COVENANT 

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting 

federal appeals court narrowed the injunction to run only
circuit-wide, but denied the Government’s motion for a com-
plete stay.

Now the Government asks this Court to intervene and to 
stay the preliminary decisions below.  This is an extraordi-
nary  request.  Unfortunately,  the  Court  acquiesces.  Be-
cause I do not believe the Government has met its weighty 
burden for such relief, I would deny the stay.

The Attorney General and Secretary of Homeland Secu-
rity  promulgated  the  rule  at  issue  here  on  July  16,  2019. 
See 84 Fed. Reg. 33829.  In effect, the rule forbids almost 
all  Central  Americans—even  unaccompanied  children—to
apply for asylum in the United States if they enter or seek
to enter through the southern border, unless they were first
denied asylum in Mexico or another third country.  Id., at 
33835, 33840; see also 385 F. Supp. 3d 922, 929–930 (ND 
Cal. 2019).

The District Court found that the rule was likely unlaw-
ful for at least three reasons.  See id., at 938–957.  First, 
the court found it probable that the rule was inconsistent
with  the  asylum  statute,  94  Stat.  105,  as  amended,  8 
U. S. C. §1158.  See §1158(b)(2)(C) (requiring that any reg-
ulation like the rule be “consistent” with the statute).  Sec-
tion 1158 generally provides that any noncitizen “physi-
cally  present  in  the  United  States  or  who  arrives  in  the
United States . . . may apply for asylum.”  §1158(a)(1).  And 
unlike  the  rule,  the  District  Court  explained,  the  statute 
provides narrow, carefully calibrated exceptions to asylum
eligibility.  As  relevant  here,  Congress  restricted  asylum
based on the possibility that a person could safely resettle 
in  a  third  country.  See  §1158(a)(2)(A),  (b)(2)(A)(vi).    The 
rule, by contrast, does not consider whether refugees were 
safe  or  resettled  in  Mexico—just  whether  they  traveled 
through it.  That blunt approach, according to the District 
Court,  rewrote  the  statute.    See  385  F. Supp.  3d,  at  939– 
947, 959.