Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/19pdf/18-1059_e2p3.pdf
Page Number: 10.0

8 

KELLY v. UNITED STATES 

Opinion of the Court 

The  Government  acknowledges  this  much,  but  thinks
Baroni’s and Kelly’s convictions remain valid.  According to
the Government’s theory of the case, Baroni and Kelly “used
a lie about a fictional traffic study” to achieve their goal of 
reallocating the Bridge’s toll lanes.  Brief for United States 
43.  The  Government  accepts  that  the  lie  itself—i.e.,  that 
the lane change was part of a traffic study, rather than po-
litical payback—could not get the prosecution all the way 
home.  See id.,  at  43–44.    As  the Government  recognizes,
the deceit must also have had the “object” of obtaining the 
Port Authority’s money or property.  Id., at 44.  The scheme 
met  that  requirement,  the  Government  argues,  in  two 
ways.  First, the Government claims that Baroni and Kelly
sought to “commandeer[ ]” part of the Bridge itself—to “take
control” of its “physical lanes.”  Tr. of Oral Arg. 58–59.  Sec-
ond, the Government asserts that the two defendants aimed 
to deprive the Port Authority of the costs of compensating 
the  traffic  engineers  and  back-up  toll  collectors  who  per-
formed  work  relating  to  the  lane  realignment.    On  either 
theory,  the  Government  insists,  Baroni’s  and  Kelly’s
scheme targeted “a  ‘species of valuable right [or] interest’ 
that constitutes ‘property’ under the fraud statutes.”  Brief 
for United States 22 (quoting Pasquantino v. United States, 
544 U. S. 349, 356 (2005)).

We cannot agree.  As we explain below, the Government
could not have proved—on either of its theories, though for 
different  reasons—that  Baroni’s  and  Kelly’s  scheme  was
“directed  at  the  [Port  Authority’s]  property.”    Brief  for 
United States 44.  Baroni and Kelly indeed “plotted to re-
duce [Fort Lee’s] lanes.”  Id., at 34.  But that realignment
was a quintessential exercise of regulatory power.  And this 
Court has already held that a scheme to alter such a regu-
latory  choice  is  not  one  to  appropriate  the  government’s 
property.  See Cleveland, 531 U. S., at 23.  By contrast, a 
scheme to usurp a public employee’s paid time is one to take
the government’s property.  But Baroni’s and Kelly’s plan