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56  DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN’S HEALTH ORGANIZATION 

BREYER, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ., dissenting 

danger that the public will perceive a decision as hav-
ing been made for unprincipled reasons when the Court 
overrules a controversial ‘watershed’ decision, such as 
Roe.  A decision overruling Roe would be perceived as
having  been  made  ‘under  fire’  and  as  a  ‘surrender  to 
political pressure.’ ”  Ante, at 66–67 (citations omitted). 

That  seems  to  us  a  good  description.    And  it  seems  to  us 
right.  The majority responds (if we understand it correctly):
well, yes, but we have to apply the law.  See ante, at 67.  To 
which  Casey  would  have  said:  That  is  exactly  the  point.
Here,  more  than  anywhere,  the  Court  needs  to  apply  the 
law—particularly the law of stare decisis.  Here, we know 
that  citizens  will  continue  to  contest  the  Court’s  decision, 
because “[m]en and women of good conscience” deeply disa-
gree about abortion.  Casey, 505 U. S., at 850.  When that 
contestation takes place—but when there is no legal basis 
for  reversing  course—the  Court  needs  to  be  steadfast,  to 
stand  its  ground.  That  is  what  the  rule  of  law  requires.
And that is what respect for this Court depends on. 

“The promise of constancy, once given” in so charged an
environment, Casey explained, “binds its maker for as long 
as” the “understanding of the issue has not changed so fun-
damentally as to render the commitment obsolete.”  Id., at 
868.  A breach of that promise is “nothing less than a breach 
of faith.”  Ibid.  “[A]nd no Court that broke its faith with the
people could sensibly expect credit for principle.”  Ibid.  No 
Court breaking its faith in that way would deserve credit for 
principle.  As one of Casey’s authors wrote in another case, 
“Our legitimacy requires, above all, that we adhere to stare 
decisis”  in  “sensitive  political  contexts”  where  “partisan 
controversy  abounds.”  Bush  v.  Vera,  517  U. S.  952,  985 
(1996) (opinion of O’Connor, J.).

Justice Jackson once called a decision he dissented from 
a “loaded weapon,” ready to hand for improper uses.  Kore-
matsu v. United States, 323 U. S. 214, 246 (1944).  We fear