Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/14pdf/13-1041_0861.pdf
Page Number: 3

Cite as:  575 U. S. ____ (2015) 

3 

Syllabus 

that  significantly  alters  the  agency’s  prior  interpretation  effectively
amends the underlying regulation.  That assertion conflicts with the 
ordinary meaning of the words “amend” and “interpret,” and it is im-
possible to reconcile with the longstanding recognition that interpre-
tive  rules  do  not  have  the  force  and  effect  of  law.    MBA’s  theory  is
particularly odd in light of the limitations of the Paralyzed Veterans
doctrine, which applies only when an agency has previously adopted
an interpretation of its regulation.  MBA fails to explain why its ar-
gument  regarding  revised  interpretations  should  not  also  extend  to
the  agency’s  first  interpretation.    Christensen  v.  Harris  County,  529 
U. S. 576, and Shalala v. Guernsey Memorial Hospital, 514 U. S. 87, 
distinguished.  Pp. 9–12.

(2) MBA also contends that the Paralyzed Veterans doctrine re-
inforces the APA’s goal of procedural fairness.  But the APA already
provides  recourse  to  regulated  entities  from  agency  decisions  that
skirt  notice-and-comment  provisions  by  placing  a  variety  of  con-
straints on agency decisionmaking, e.g., the arbitrary and capricious 
standard.    In  addition,  Congress  may  include  safe-harbor  provisions
in legislation to shelter regulated entities from liability when they re-
ly on previous agency interpretations.  See, e.g., 29 U. S. C. §§259(a), 
(b)(1).  Pp. 12–13.

(3) MBA  has  waived  its  argument  that  the  2010  Administra-
tor’s  Interpretation  should  be  classified  as  a  legislative  rule.    From 
the beginning, this suit has been litigated on the understanding that 
the  Administrator’s  Interpretation  is  an  interpretive  rule.    Neither 
the District Court nor the Court of Appeals addressed this argument
below, and MBA did not raise it here in opposing certiorari.  P. 14. 

720 F. 3d 966, reversed. 

SOTOMAYOR, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, 
C. J., and KENNEDY, GINSBURG, BREYER, and KAGAN, JJ., joined, and in
which ALITO, J., joined except for Part III–B.  ALITO, J., filed an opinion 
concurring  in  part  and  concurring  in  the  judgment.    SCALIA,  J.,  and 
THOMAS, J., filed opinions concurring in the judgment.