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Page Number: 12.0

8 

FULTON v. PHILADELPHIA 

Opinion of the Court 

when setting rules for contractors than when regulating the
general public.  The government, they observe, commands
heightened powers when managing its internal operations.
See NASA v. Nelson, 562 U. S. 134, 150 (2011); Engquist v. 
Oregon Dept. of Agriculture, 553 U. S. 591, 598–600 (2008).
And when individuals enter into government employment 
or contracts, they accept certain restrictions on their free-
dom as part of the deal.  See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U. S. 
410, 418–420 (2006); Board of Comm’rs, Wabaunsee Cty. v. 
Umbehr, 518 U. S. 668, 677–678 (1996).  Given this context, 
the  City  and  intervenor-respondents  contend,  the  govern-
ment should have a freer hand when dealing with contrac-
tors like CSS. 

These considerations cannot save the City here.  As Phil-
adelphia  rightly  acknowledges,  “principles  of  neutrality
and general applicability still constrain the government in
its capacity as manager.”  Brief for City Respondents 11– 
12.  We have never suggested that the government may dis-
criminate  against  religion  when  acting  in  its  managerial 
role.  And Smith itself drew support for the neutral and gen-
erally  applicable  standard  from  cases  involving  internal 
government affairs.  See 494 U. S., at 883–885, and n. 2 (cit-
ing  Lyng  v.  Northwest  Indian  Cemetery  Protective  Assn., 
485  U. S.  439  (1988);  Roy,  476  U. S.  693).    The  City  and
intervenor-respondents accordingly ask only that courts ap-
ply a more deferential approach in determining whether a
policy is neutral and generally applicable in the contracting 
context.  We  find  no  need  to  resolve  that  narrow  issue  in 
this case.  No matter the level of deference we extend to the 
City, the inclusion of a formal system of entirely discretion-
ary exceptions in section 3.21 renders the contractual non-
discrimination requirement not generally applicable.

Perhaps all this explains why the City now contends that 
section 3.21 does not apply to CSS’s refusal to certify same-
sex couples after all.  Contrast App. to Pet. for Cert. 167a–
168a with Brief for City Respondents 35–36.  Instead, the