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Page Number: 116

34 

HAALAND v. BRACKEEN 

THOMAS, J., dissenting 

the majority seems to do for purposes of these cases), noth-
ing  in  those  precedents  supports  ICWA.    To  be  sure,  this 
Court has repeatedly used loose language concerning a “ple-
nary power” and “trust relationship” with Indians, and that
language  has  been  taken  by  some  to  displace  the  normal
constitutional rules.  See ante, at 10–15.  But, even taken 
to their new limits, the Court’s precedents have upheld only
a variety of laws that either regulate commerce with Indi-
ans or deal with Indian tribes and their lands.  Despite cit-
ing a veritable avalanche of precedents, respondents have
failed  to  identify  a  single  case  where  this  Court  upheld  a 
federal statute comparable to ICWA.

As noted above, Kagama was careful to note that the Ma-
jor Crimes Act at issue was “confined to the acts of an In-
dian  of  some  tribe,  of  a  criminal  character,  committed 
within the limits of the reservation.”  118 U. S., at 383.  In 
that vein, the opinion cited cases arising from congressional 
regulations of Indian lands located within Federal Territo-
ries.  See id., at 380 (citing Rogers, 4 How., at 572; citing 
Murphy, 114 U. S., at 44, and 356 Bales of Cotton, 1 Pet., at 
542).  In  other  words,  it  is  possible  that  Kagama  viewed 
Congress as having the power to regulate crimes by Indians
on  Indian  lands  because  those  lands  remained  in  a  sense 
“external” to the Nation’s normal affairs and akin to quasi-
federal lands. 

Again, that would be a non sequitur.  Nevertheless, at a 
high level, it is possible to see how Kagama was rooted in 
the same foreign-affairs and territorial powers that author-
ized  much  of  the  early  Trade  and  Intercourse  Acts  (and
which  Congress  may  have  relied  upon  when  passing  the 
1817 Act).  See Cohen §5.01[4], at 390, and nn. 47, 48 (link-
ing Kagama with Curtiss-Wright, 299 U. S., at 318); United 
States v. Wheeler, 435 U. S. 313, 323 (1978) (describing In-
dian tribes as possessing a pre-existing sovereignty, apart 
from the United States).  And, viewed in that light, it would