Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/19pdf/18-1195_g314.pdf
Page Number: 57.0

2 

ESPINOZA v. MONTANA DEPT. OF REVENUE 

GINSBURG, J., dissenting 

U. S. Const., Amdt. 1.   This Court’s decisions have recog-
nized  that  a  burden  on  religious  exercise  may  occur  both
when a State proscribes religiously motivated activity and 
when a law pressures an adherent to abandon her religious
faith  or  practice.    Sherbert  v.  Verner,  374  U. S.  398,  406 
(1963); Hobbie v. Unemployment  Appeals Comm’n of Fla., 
480 U. S. 136, 140–141 (1987).  The Free Exercise Clause 
thus protects against “indirect coercion or penalties on the 
free exercise of religion.”  Lyng v. Northwest Indian Ceme-
tery Protective Assn., 485 U. S. 439, 450 (1988).  Invoking
that principle in Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. 
v. Comer, 582 U. S. ___ (2017), the Court observed that dis-
qualifying an entity from a public benefit “solely because of 
[the entity’s] religious character” can impose “a penalty on 
the free exercise of religion.”  Id., at ___–___ (slip op., at 9– 
10).  The Court then concluded that a Missouri law making
churches ineligible for a government playground-refurbish-
ing grant impermissibly burdened the church’s religious ex-
ercise by “put[ting it] to the choice between being a church
and receiving a government benefit.”  Id., at ___ (slip op., at 
13).

Petitioners argue that the Montana Supreme Court’s de-
cision fails when measured against Trinity Lutheran.  I do 
not see how.  Past decisions in this area have entailed dif-
ferential treatment occasioning a burden on a plaintiff ’s re-
ligious exercise.  Lyng, 485 U. S.,  at 450–451; Trinity Lu-
theran,  582  U. S.,  at  ___  (slip  op.,  at  11).  This  case  is 
missing that essential component.  Recall that the Montana 
court remedied the state constitutional violation by striking
the scholarship program in its entirety.  Under that decree, 
secular and sectarian schools alike are ineligible for bene-
fits,  so  the  decision  cannot  be  said  to  entail  differential 
treatment based on petitioners’ religion.  Put somewhat dif-
ferently, petitioners argue that the Free Exercise Clause re-
quires  a  State  to  treat  institutions  and  people  neutrally
when doling out a benefit—and neutrally is how Montana