Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/23pdf/23-939_e2pg.pdf
Page Number: 105.0

8 

TRUMP v. UNITED STATES 

JACKSON, J., dissenting 

dentally, courts must make without considering the Presi-
dent’s  motivations,  ante,  at  18),  the  President  is  not  im-
mune.4 

2 

The  majority’s  multilayered,  multifaceted  threshold 
parsing of the character of a President’s criminal conduct
differs from the individual accountability model in several
crucial respects.  For one thing, it makes it next to impossi-
ble to know ex ante when and under what circumstances a 
President will be subject to accountability for his criminal 
acts.  For  every  allegation,  courts  must  run  this  gauntlet 
first—no matter how well documented or heinous the crim-
inal act might be.

Thus, even a hypothetical President who admits to hav-
ing ordered the assassinations of his political rivals or crit-
ics, see, e.g., Tr. of Oral Arg. 9, or one who indisputably in-
stigates an unsuccessful coup, id., at 41–43, has a fair shot 
at getting immunity under the majority’s new Presidential 
accountability  model.  That  is  because  whether  a  Presi-
dent’s conduct will subject him to criminal liability turns on
the court’s evaluation of a variety of factors related to the
character of that particular act—specifically, those charac-
teristics  that  imbue  an  act  with  the  status  of  “official”  or 
“unofficial” conduct (minus motive).  In the end, then, under 
the majority’s new paradigm, whether the President will be 
exempt from legal liability for murder, assault, theft, fraud, 

—————— 

4 JUSTICE  BARRETT’s  version  of  the  Presidential  accountability  para-
digm works slightly differently; she would have us ask, first, “whether 
the  relevant  criminal  statute  reaches  the  President’s  official  conduct.” 
Ante, at 2.  But, again, what is at issue here are statutes of general ap-
plicability—they only “reach” the President’s conduct to the extent that
he chooses to engage in the prohibited behavior.  See n. 3, supra.  JUSTICE 
BARRETT’s framing, thus, sidesteps the fact that, when immunity is being 
considered, what is actually at issue is whether the President is exempt 
from  punishment  if  he  opts  to  exercise  his  official  duties  using  means
that violate criminal law.