Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/17pdf/16-1140_5368.pdf
Page Number: 45

Cite as:  585 U. S. ____ (2018) 

19 

BREYER, J., dissenting 

in  concluding  that  the  Act  is  underinclusive,  ante,  at  15– 
16.  But the key question is whether these exempt clinics 
are significantly more likely than are the pro-life clinics to
tell  or  to  have  told  their  pregnant  patients  about  the 
existence of these programs—in the absence of any statu-
tory compulsion.  If so, it may make sense—in terms of the 
statute’s informational objective—to exempt them, namely
if  there  is  no  need  to  cover  them.    See  FACT  Act,  §1(d)
(suggesting in general terms that this is so).  But, if there 
are  not  good  reasons  to  exempt  these  clinics  from  cover-
age,  i.e.,  if,  for  example,  they  too  frequently  do  not  tell
their  patients  about  the  availability  of  abortion  services,
the petitioners’ claim of viewpoint discrimination becomes
much stronger.

The  petitioners,  however,  did  not  develop  this  point  in
the  record  below.    They  simply  stated  in  their  complaint
that  the  Act  exempts  “facilities  which  provide  abortion 
services,  freeing  them  from  the  Act’s  disclosure  require-
ments,  while  leaving  pro-life  facilities  subject  to  them.”
App. to Pet. for Cert. 104a.  And in the District Court they 
relied solely on the allegations of their complaint, provided
no  supporting  declarations,  and  contended  that  discovery 
was unnecessary.  Id., at 47a, 50a, 68a.  The District Court 
concluded  that  the  reason  for  the  Act’s  exemptions  was
that those clinics “provide the entire spectrum of services 
required of the notice,” and that absent discovery, “there is
no evidence to suggest the Act burdens only” pro-life con-
duct.  Id.,  at  68a.  Similarly,  the  petitioners  pressed  the 
claim in the Court of Appeals.  Id., at 20a–22a.  But they
did  not  supplement  the  record.  Consequently,  that  court 
reached  the  same  conclusion.    Given  the  absence  of  evi-
dence in the record before the lower courts, the “viewpoint
discrimination”  claim  could  not  justify  the  issuance  of  a
preliminary injunction.