Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/524bv.pdf
Page Number: 593

524US2

Unit: $U94

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EASTERN ENTERPRISES v. APFEL

Opinion of Kennedy, J.

the presumption of constitutionality, “[i]t does not follow . . .
that what Congress can legislate prospectively it can leg-
islate retrospectively. The retrospective aspects of [eco-
nomic] legislation, as well as the prospective aspects, must
meet the test of due process, and the justiﬁcations for the
Id., at 16–17. We
latter may not sufﬁce for the former.”
have repeated this formulation in numerous recent decisions
and given serious consideration to retroactivity-based due
process challenges, all without questioning the validity of the
underlying due process principle. United States v. Carlton,
512 U. S. 26, 31 (1994); Concrete Pipe, supra, at 636–641;
General Motors Corp. v. Romein, 503 U. S. 181, 191 (1992);
United States v. Sperry Corp., 493 U. S. 52, 64 (1989); United
States v. Hemme, 476 U. S. 558, 567–572 (1986); Pension Ben-
eﬁt Guaranty Corporation v. R. A. Gray & Co., 467 U. S.
717, 729–730 (1984). These decisions treat due process chal-
lenges based on the retroactive character of the statutes in
question as serious and meritorious, thus conﬁrming the vi-
tality of our legal tradition’s disfavor of retroactive economic
legislation.
Indeed, it is no accident that the primary retro-
activity precedents upon which today’s plurality opinion re-
lies in its takings analysis were grounded in due process.
Ante, at 524–528 (citing Turner Elkhorn, R. A. Gray, and
Concrete Pipe).

These cases reﬂect our recognition that retroactive law-
making is a particular concern for the courts because of the
legislative “tempt[ation] to use retroactive legislation as a
means of retribution against unpopular groups or individu-
als.” Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U. S. 244, 266
(1994); see also Hochman, The Supreme Court and the Con-
stitutionality of Retroactive Legislation, 73 Harv. L. Rev.
692, 693 (1960) (a retroactive law “may be passed with an
exact knowledge of who will beneﬁt from it”).
If retroactive
laws change the legal consequences of transactions long
closed, the change can destroy the reasonable certainty and
security which are the very objects of property ownership.