Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/524bv.pdf
Page Number: 591

524US2

Unit: $U94

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546

EASTERN ENTERPRISES v. APFEL

Opinion of Kennedy, J.

ration, 475 U. S. 211, 223 (1986); Concrete Pipe & Products
of Cal., Inc. v. Construction Laborers Pension Trust for
Southern Cal., 508 U. S. 602, 641 (1993).
In Connolly, the
Court said the deﬁnition of a taking was not controlled by
“any set formula,” but was dependent “on ad hoc, factual
inquiries into the circumstances of each particular case.”
475 U. S., at 224. The Court then applied the three-factor
regulatory takings analysis set forth in Penn Central, which
examines the economic impact of the regulation, the extent
to which it interferes with investment-backed expectations,
and the character of the governmental action.
475 U. S., at
225. This analysis did not result in a ﬁnding of a taking.
The Court, moreover, prefaced the entire takings discussion
with the admonition it would be surprising to discover that
there had been a taking in the instance where a due process
attack had been rejected. See id., at 223; see also Concrete
Pipe, supra, at 641 (“Given that [the] due process arguments
are unavailing, ‘it would be surprising indeed to discover’
the challenged statute nonetheless violating the Takings
Clause”) (quoting Connolly, supra, at 223). At best, Con-
nolly is equivocal on the question whether we should apply
the regulatory takings analysis to instances like the one now
before us. My reading of Connolly, and Concrete Pipe, is
that we should proceed ﬁrst to general due process prin-
ciples, reserving takings analysis for cases where the gov-
ernmental action is otherwise permissible. See Connolly,
supra, at 224 (“[H]ere, the United States has taken nothing
for its own use, and only has nulliﬁed a contractual provision
limiting liability by imposing an additional obligation that is
otherwise within the power of Congress to impose”); see also
Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group,
Inc., 438 U. S. 59, 94, n. 39 (1978) (upholding on due process
grounds the Price-Anderson Act, 42 U. S. C. § 2210 (1970 ed.,
Supp. V), which placed a cap on civil liability for nuclear acci-
dents, but declining to address petitioner’s request that the
Act be declared a taking because compensation would be
available under the Tucker Act, 28 U. S. C. § 1491(a)(1) (1976