Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/22pdf/22-506_nmip.pdf
Page Number: 40

Cite as:  600 U. S. ____ (2023) 

9 

BARRETT, J., concurring 

but  context  can  also  do  the  trick.  Surrounding  circum-
stances, whether contained within the statutory scheme or 
external to it, can narrow or broaden the scope of a delega-
tion to an agency.

This expectation of clarity is rooted in the basic premise 
that Congress normally “intends to make major policy deci-
sions itself, not leave those decisions to agencies.”  United 
States  Telecom  Assn.  v.  FCC,  855  F. 3d  381,  419  (CADC 
2017)  (Kavanaugh,  J.,  dissenting  from  denial  of  reh’g  en 
banc).  Or,  as  Justice  Breyer  once  observed,  “Congress  is 
more  likely  to  have  focused  upon,  and  answered,  major
questions, while leaving interstitial matters [for agencies] 
to answer themselves in the course of a statute’s daily ad-
ministration.”  S.  Breyer,  Judicial  Review  of  Questions  of
Law and Policy, 38 Admin. L. Rev. 363, 370 (1986); see also 
A. Gluck & L. Bressman, Statutory Interpretation From the 
Inside—An  Empirical  Study  of  Congressional  Drafting,
Delegation,  and  the  Canons:  Part  I,  65  Stan.  L. Rev.  901, 
1003–1006  (2013).  That  makes  eminent  sense  in  light  of
our constitutional structure, which is itself part of the legal 
context framing any delegation.  Because the Constitution 
vests Congress with “[a]ll legislative Powers,” Art. I, §1, a 
reasonable interpreter would expect it to make the big-time
policy calls itself, rather than pawning them off to another 
branch.  See West Virginia, 597 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 19) 
(explaining that the major questions doctrine rests on “both
separation of powers principles and a practical understand-
ing of legislative intent”). 

Crucially, treating the Constitution’s structure as part of 
the context in which a delegation occurs is not the same as 
using a clear-statement rule to overenforce Article I’s non-
delegation principle (which, again, is the rationale behind
the  substantive-canon  view  of  the  major  questions  doc-
trine).  My  point  is  simply  that  in  a  system  of  separated
powers,  a  reasonably  informed  interpreter  would  expect