Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/14pdf/14-556_3204.pdf
Page Number: 59.0

20 

OBERGEFELL v. HODGES 

ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting 

adopted  in  Lochner.    See  198  U. S.,  at  61  (“We  do  not 
believe  in  the  soundness  of  the  views  which  uphold  this
law,”  which  “is  an  illegal  interference  with  the  rights  of
individuals  . . .  to  make  contracts  regarding  labor  upon 
such terms as they may think best”). 

The  majority  recognizes  that  today’s  cases  do  not  mark 
“the  first  time  the  Court  has  been  asked  to  adopt  a  cau-
tious approach to recognizing and protecting fundamental 
rights.”  Ante, at 25.  On that much, we agree.  The Court 
was  “asked”—and  it  agreed—to  “adopt  a  cautious  ap-
proach”  to  implying  fundamental  rights  after  the  debacle
of  the  Lochner  era.    Today,  the  majority  casts  caution
aside and revives the grave errors of that period. 

One  immediate  question  invited  by  the  majority’s  posi-
tion  is  whether  States  may  retain  the  definition  of  mar-
riage as a union of two people.  Cf. Brown v. Buhman, 947 
F. Supp.  2d  1170  (Utah  2013),  appeal  pending,  No.  14-
4117 (CA10).  Although the majority randomly inserts the 
adjective “two” in various places, it offers no reason at all 
why the two-person element of the core definition of mar-
riage  may  be  preserved  while  the  man-woman  element 
may not.  Indeed, from the standpoint of history and tradi-
tion,  a  leap  from  opposite-sex  marriage  to  same-sex  mar-
riage is much greater than one from a two-person union to 
plural  unions,  which  have  deep  roots  in  some  cultures 
around the world.  If the majority is willing to take the big 
leap, it is hard to see how it can say no to the shorter one.

It  is  striking  how  much  of  the  majority’s  reasoning
would apply with equal force to the claim of a fundamental
right to plural marriage.  If “[t]here is dignity in the bond
between two men or two women who seek to marry and in
their  autonomy  to  make  such  profound  choices,”  ante,  at 
13,  why  would  there  be  any  less  dignity  in  the  bond  be-
tween  three  people  who,  in  exercising  their  autonomy, 
seek to make the profound choice to marry?  If a same-sex 
couple has the constitutional right to marry because their