Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/21pdf/21-499_gfbh.pdf
Page Number: 19

Cite as:  597 U. S. ____ (2022) 

15 

Opinion of the Court 

ments obtained in violation of Miranda and by the applica-
tion of that decision in other recognized contexts.  Allowing
the victim of a Miranda violation to sue a police officer for 
damages  under  §1983  would  have  little  additional  deter-
rent value, and permitting such claims would cause many 
problems.

Allowing  a  claim  like  Tekoh’s  would  disserve  “judicial
economy,” Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U. S. 322, 326 
(1979), by requiring a federal judge or jury to adjudicate a 
factual question (whether Tekoh was in custody when ques-
tioned) that had already been decided by a state court.  This 
re-adjudication would not only be wasteful; it would under-
cut the “ ‘strong judicial policy against the creation of two 
conflicting  resolutions’ ”  based  on  the  same  set  of  facts. 
Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U. S. 477, 484 (1994).  And it could 
produce  “unnecessary  friction”  between  the  federal  and
state  court  systems  by  requiring  the  federal  court  enter-
taining the §1983 claim to pass judgment on legal and fac-
tual issues already settled in state court.  See Preiser v. Ro-
driguez, 411 U. S. 475, 490–491 (1973). 

Allowing §1983 suits based on Miranda claims could also 
present many procedural issues, such as whether a federal 
court considering a §1983 claim would owe any deference to 
a trial court’s factual findings; whether forfeiture and plain
error  rules  carry  over  from  the  criminal  trial;  whether 
harmless-error rules apply; and whether civil damages are 
available in instances where the unwarned statement had 
no impact on the outcome of the criminal case.

We therefore refuse to extend Miranda in the way Tekoh 
requests.  Miranda, Dickerson, and the other cases in that 
line provide sufficient protection for the Fifth Amendment 
right against compelled self-incrimination.  “The identifica-
tion of a Miranda violation and its consequences . . . ought
to  be  determined  at  trial.”    Chavez  v.  Martinez,  538  U. S. 
760,  790  (2003)  (Kennedy,  J.,  concurring  in  part  and  dis-
senting in part).  And except in unusual circumstances, the