Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/23pdf/22-899_97be.pdf
Page Number: 14

Cite as:  602 U. S. ____ (2024) 

11 

Opinion of the Court 

U. S. ___ (2023), and we now reject it.3 

II 
Smith’s  confrontation  claim  can  succeed  only  if  Rast’s
statements came into evidence for their truth.  As earlier 
explained,  the  Clause  applies  solely  to  “testimonial  hear-
say.”  Davis, 547 U. S., at 823 (emphasis added); see supra, 
at 3.  And that means the Clause “does not bar the use of 
testimonial  statements  for  purposes  other  than  establish-
ing the truth of the matter asserted.”  Crawford, 541 U. S., 
at 60, n. 9.  So a court analyzing a confrontation claim must
identify the role that a given out-of-court statement—here,
Rast’s statements about her lab work—served at trial.  On 
that much, indeed, the entire Williams Court agreed.  Amid 
all the fracturing that case produced, every Justice defined
its primary question in the same way: whether the absent 
analyst’s statements were introduced for their truth.  See 
567 U. S., at 57–58 (plurality opinion); id., at 104 (THOMAS, 
J., concurring in judgment); id., at 125–126 (KAGAN, J., dis-
senting).  The parties here likewise concur in that framing.
See Brief for Smith 28–29; Brief for Arizona 17–18.  If Rast’s 

—————— 

3 The question on which we granted certiorari made reference as well 
to another aspect of the Court of Appeals’ reasoning.  That question asks
whether the Confrontation Clause permits “testimony by a substitute ex-
pert conveying the testimonial statements of a nontestifying forensic an-
alyst, on the grounds that (a) the testifying expert offers some independ-
ent opinion and the analyst’s statements are offered not for their truth 
but to explain the expert’s opinion, and (b) the defendant did not inde-
pendently seek to subpoena the analyst.”  Pet. for Cert. i.  The “(b)” in
that question arises from the following sentence in the court’s opinion: 
“Had Smith sought to challenge Rast’s analysis, he could have called her 
to the stand and questioned her, but he chose not to do so.”  App. to Pet.
for Cert. 12a.  We need not spend much time on that rationale because 
the State rightly does not defend it.  As we held in Melendez-Diaz, a de-
fendant’s “ability to subpoena” an absent analyst “is no substitute for the
right of confrontation.”  557 U. S., at 324.  The Confrontation Clause “im-
poses  a  burden  on  the  prosecution  to  present  its  witnesses,  not  on  the 
defendant to bring those adverse witnesses into court.”  Ibid.