Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/10pdf/09-751.pdf
Page Number: 32

10 

SNYDER v. PHELPS 

ALITO, J., dissenting 

reasons, but none is sound. 

First—and  most  important—the  Court  finds  that  “the
overall  thrust  and  dominant  theme  of  [their]  demonstra-
tion  spoke  to”  broad  public  issues.  Ante,  at  8.    As  I  have  
attempted  to  show,  this  portrayal  is  quite  inaccurate;
respondents’  attack  on  Matthew  was  of  central  impor-
tance.  But  in  any  event,  I  fail  to  see  why  actionable
speech  should  be  immunized  simply  because  it  is  inter-
spersed  with  speech  that  is  protected.  The  First  Amend-
ment  allows  recovery  for  defamatory  statements  that  are
interspersed  with  nondefamatory  statements  on  matters 
of public concern, and there is no good reason why respon-
dents’ attack on Matthew Snyder and his family should be
treated differently.

Second,  the  Court  suggests  that  respondents’  personal
attack on Matthew Snyder is entitled to First Amendment 
protection  because  it  was  not  motivated  by  a  private
grudge,  see  ante,  at  9,  but  I  see  no  basis  for  the  strange
distinction that the Court appears to draw.  Respondents’ 
motivation—“to increase publicity for its views,” ibid.—did 
not  transform  their  statements  attacking  the  character
of  a  private  figure  into  statements  that  made  a  contri-
bution  to  debate  on  matters  of  public  concern.    Nor  did 
their publicity-seeking motivation soften the sting of their 
attack.  And as far as  culpability  is concerned, one might 
well  think  that  wounding  statements  uttered  in  the  heat 
of  a  private  feud  are  less,  not  more,  blameworthy  than
similar  statements  made  as  part  of  a  cold  and  calculated
strategy to slash a stranger as a means of attracting pub-
lic attention. 

Third,  the  Court  finds  it  significant  that  respondents’ 
protest  occurred  on  a  public  street,  but  this  fact  alone
should  not  be  enough  to  preclude  IIED  liability.    To  be 
sure,  statements  made  on  a  public  street  may  be  less 
likely  to  satisfy  the  elements  of  the  IIED  tort  than  state-
ments  made  on  private  property,  but  there  is  no  reason