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PENNEAST PIPELINE CO. v. NEW JERSEY 

Syllabus 

agreed compensation—to “acquire the same by the exercise of the right 
of  eminent  domain.”    §717f(h).    This  delegation  is  categorical;  by  its
terms, §717f(h) delegates to certificate holders the power to condemn 
any necessary rights-of-way, including land in which a State holds an
interest.  Pp. 11–12. 

(c) Respondents  contend  that  sovereign  immunity  bars  condemna-
tion actions against a nonconsenting State.  Alternatively, respondents
contend that §717f(h) does not speak with sufficient clarity to author-
ize such actions.  The Court rejects each argument, for reasons stated 
below.  Pp. 13–22.

(1) “States’ immunity from suit is a fundamental aspect of the sov-
ereignty which the States enjoyed before the ratification of the Consti-
tution.”  Alden v. Maine, 527 U. S. 706, 713.  A State may be sued only
in limited circumstances, including where the State expressly consents 
or where Congress clearly abrogates the State’s immunity under the 
Fourteenth Amendment.  A State may also be sued if it has implicitly
agreed to suit in the “plan of the Convention,” which is shorthand for 
“the  structure  of  the  original  Constitution  itself.”  Id.,  at  728.    The 
Court  has  looked  to  the  plan  of  the  Convention  to  permit  actions 
against  nonconsenting  States  in  the  context  of  bankruptcy  proceed-
ings, suits by other States, and suits by the Federal Government.  Pp.
13–14. 

(2) Respondents do not dispute that the NGA empowers certificate 
holders to condemn private property, but they contend that the same 
certificate holders have no power to condemn state-owned property un-
der  §717f(h).    It  is  argued  that  the  NGA  cannot  authorize  such  con-
demnation actions under the Court’s decision in Seminole Tribe of Fla. 
v. Florida, 517 U. S. 44, which generally prohibits Congress from using
its  Article  I  powers  to  abrogate  state  sovereign  immunity.    But  con-
gressional abrogation is not the only means of subjecting States to suit.
The  States  implicitly  consented  to  private  condemnation  suits  when 
they ratified the Constitution, and respondents’ arguments to the con-
trary cannot be squared with the Court’s precedents. 

Respondents do not dispute that the Federal Government enjoys a 
power  of  eminent  domain  superior  to  that  of  the  States,  or  that  the 
Federal Government can delegate that power to private parties.  Re-
spondents instead point to the absence of founding-era evidence of pri-
vate  condemnation  suits  against  nonconsenting  States  to  maintain
that States did not consent to such suits when they entered the federal 
system.  Respondents would divorce the federal eminent domain power
from the power to bring condemnation actions—and then argue that 
the latter cannot be delegated to private parties with respect to state-
owned  lands.    But  the  eminent  domain  power  is  inextricably  inter-