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26 

CITY OF GRANTS PASS v. JOHNSON 

Opinion of the Court 

“ran[k] as fundamental.”  589 U. S., at 279 (internal quota-
tion  marks  omitted).  But,  we  stressed,  questions  about 
whether an individual who has committed a proscribed act 
with the requisite mental state should be “reliev[ed of] re-
sponsibility,” id., at 283, due to a lack of “moral culpability,” 
id.,  at  286,  are  generally  best  resolved  by  the  people  and 
their elected representatives.  Those are questions, we said, 
“of recurrent controversy” to which history supplies few “en-
trenched”  answers,  and  on  which  the  Constitution  gener-
ally commands “no one view.”  Id., at 296. 
  The Ninth Circuit’s Martin experiment defied these les-
sons.  Under Martin, judges take from elected representa-
tives  the  questions  whether  and  when  someone  who  has 
committed  a  proscribed  act  with  a  requisite  mental  state 
should be “relieved of responsibility” for lack of “moral cul-
pability.”  598 U. S., at 283, 286.  And Martin exemplifies
much of what can go wrong when courts try to resolve mat-
ters like those unmoored from any secure guidance in the 
Constitution. 

Start with this problem.  Under Martin, cities must allow 
public camping by those who are “involuntarily” homeless.
72 F. 4th, at 877 (citing Martin, 920 F. 3d, at 617, n. 8).  But 
how are city officials and law enforcement officers to know
what  it  means  to  be  “involuntarily”  homeless,  or  whether 
any  particular  person  meets  that  standard?  Posing  the 
questions may be easy; answering them is not.  Is it enough 
that a homeless person has turned down an offer of shelter?
Or does it matter why?  Cities routinely confront individu-
als who decline offers of shelter for any number of reasons,
ranging from safety concerns to individual preferences.  See 
Part I–A, supra.  How are cities and their law enforcement 
officers on the ground to know which of these reasons are
sufficiently  weighty  to  qualify  a  person  as  “involuntarily” 
homeless? 

If  there  are  answers  to  those  questions,  they  cannot  be
found in the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause.  Nor