Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/19pdf/18-1116_h3cj.pdf
Page Number: 9

Cite as:  589 U. S. ____ (2020) 

7 

Opinion of the Court 

“knowledge” of a topic likely means to suggest that he actu-
ally knows a thing or two about it.  But the law will some-
times 
impute  knowledge—often  called  “constructive” 
knowledge—to a person who fails to learn something that a 
reasonably diligent person would have learned.  See id., at 
1043.  Similarly, we held in Merck & Co. v. Reynolds, 559 
U. S. 633 (2010), that the word “discovery,” when used in a
statute  of  limitations  without  qualification,  “encompasses 
not  only  those  facts  the  plaintiff  actually  knew,  but  also
those  facts  a  reasonably  diligent  plaintiff  would  have 
known.”  Id., at 648.  The addition of “actual” in §1113(2)
signals  that  the  plaintiff ’s  knowledge  must  be  more  than
“potential, possible, virtual, conceivable, theoretical, hypo-
thetical,  or  nominal.”  Black’s  Law  Dictionary  53  (4th  ed. 
1951).  Indeed, in Merck, we cited §1113(2) as evidence of 
the  “linguistic  distinction”  between  “ ‘actual  knowledge’ ” 
and the “hypothetical” knowledge that a reasonably diligent 
plaintiff  would  have.    559  U. S.,  at  646–647  (quoting 
§1113(2); emphasis in original). 

Congress  has  drawn  the  same  distinction  elsewhere  in 
ERISA.  Multiple provisions contain alternate 6-year and 3-
year limitations periods, with the 6-year period beginning
at “the date on which the cause of action arose” and the 3-
year period starting at “the earliest date on which the plain-
tiff acquired  or should have acquired actual  knowledge  of 
the existence of such cause of action.”  §§1303(e)(6), (f )(5) 
(emphasis  added);  accord,  §§1370(f )(1)–(2),  1451(f )(1)–(2).  
ERISA also requires plaintiffs challenging the suspension
of benefits under §1085 to do so within “one year after the 
earliest date on which the plaintiff acquired or should have 
acquired actual knowledge of the existence of such cause of 
action.”  §1085(e)(9)(I)(iv).  Thus, Congress has repeatedly
drawn  a  “linguistic  distinction”  between  what  an  ERISA
plaintiff actually knows and what he should actually know. 
Merck, 559 U. S., at 647.  And when Congress has included