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PETER v. NANTKWEST, INC. 

Syllabus 

that do not limit attorney’s fees awards to prevailing parties.  See, e.g., 
id., at 254.  The presumption against fee shifting is particularly im-
portant here because reading §145 to permit an unsuccessful govern-
ment agency to recover attorney’s fees from a prevailing party “would 
be  a  radical  departure  from  longstanding  fee-shifting  principles  ad-
hered to in a wide range of contexts.”  Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 
U. S. 680, 683.  Pp. 3–6.

(b) Section 145’s plain text does not overcome the American Rule’s 
presumption against fee shifting.  Definitions of “expenses,” while ca-
pacious enough to include attorney’s fees, provide scant guidance.  The 
mere failure to foreclose a fee award “neither specifically nor explicitly 
authorizes courts to shift [fees].”  Baker Botts L. L. P. v. ASARCO LLC, 
576 U. S. 121, ___.  The complete phrase “expenses of the proceeding” 
would not have been commonly understood to include attorney’s fees 
at  the  time  §145  was  enacted.    Finally,  the  modifier  “all”  does  not 
transform  “expenses”  to  reach  an  outlay  it  would  not  otherwise  in-
clude. 

In  common  statutory  usage,  the  term  “expenses”  alone  has  never
been considered to authorize an award of attorney’s fees with sufficient 
clarity to overcome the American Rule presumption.  The appearance
of “expenses” and “attorney’s fees” together across various statutes in-
dicates that Congress understands the terms to be distinct and not in-
clusive of each other.  See, e.g., 11 U. S. C. §363(n).  Other statutes that 
refer  to  attorney’s  fees  as  a  subset  of  expenses  show  only  that  “ex-
penses”  can  include  attorney’s  fees  when  so  defined.  See,  e.g.,  28 
U. S. C. §361.  Nor do this Court’s cases further the Government’s po-
sition  that  the  Court  has  used  “expenses”  to  mean  “attorney’s  fees.” 
See, e.g., Taniguchi v. Kan Pacific Saipan, Ltd., 566 U. S. 560, 573. 

The Patent Act’s history reinforces that Congress did not intend to 
shift attorney’s fees in §145 actions.  There is no evidence that the orig-
inal Patent Office ever paid its personnel from sums collected from ad-
verse  parties.    Neither  has  the  PTO,  until  this  litigation,  sought  its 
attorney’s  fees  under  §145.  When  Congress  intended  to  provide  for 
attorney’s fees in the Patent Act, it has stated so explicitly.  See, e.g., 
35 U. S. C. §285.  Pp. 6–10. 

898 F. 3d 1177, affirmed. 

SOTOMAYOR, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.