Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/529bv.pdf
Page Number: 549

529US2

Unit: $U50

[09-26-01 10:29:49] PAGES PGT: OPIN

474

SLACK v. McDANIEL

Syllabus

a circuit Justice or judge issues a certiﬁcate of appealability (COA),
§ 2253(c)(1), and that the COA may issue only if the applicant has
made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right,
§ 2253(c)(2)—even though the habeas petition was ﬁled in the district
court before AEDPA’s effective date. Slack argues incorrectly that the
pre-AEDPA version of the statute, not § 2253(c), controls his case
because, in Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U. S. 320, 327, this Court held that
AEDPA’s § 2254 amendments governing entitlement to district court ha-
beas relief applied to cases ﬁled after AEDPA’s effective date.
In im-
plementing Lindh, it must be recognized that § 2254 is directed to dis-
trict court proceedings while § 2253 is directed to appellate proceedings.
Just as § 2254 applies to cases ﬁled in the trial court post-AEDPA, § 2253
applies to appellate proceedings initiated post-AEDPA. Although
Lindh requires a court of appeals to apply pre-AEDPA law in reviewing
the trial court’s ruling in cases commenced there pre-AEDPA, post-
AEDPA law governs the right to appeal in cases such as the present.
While an appeal is a continuation of the litigation started in the trial
court, it is a distinct step. E. g., Hohn v. United States, 524 U. S. 236,
241. Under AEDPA, an appellate case is commenced when the appli-
Ibid. When Congress instructs that ap-
cation for a COA is ﬁled.
plication of a statute is triggered by the commencement of a case, the
relevant case for a statute directed to appeals is the one initiated in
the appellate court. Because Slack sought appellate review of the dis-
missal of his habeas petition two years after AEDPA’s effective date,
§ 2253(c) governs here, and Slack must apply for a COA. The Ninth
Circuit should have treated his notice of appeal as such an application.
Pp. 480–482.

2. When the district court denies a habeas petition on procedural
grounds without reaching the prisoner’s underlying constitutional claim,
a COA should issue (and an appeal of the district court’s order may
be taken) if the prisoner shows, at least, that jurists of reason would
ﬁnd it debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial
of a constitutional right, and that jurists of reason would ﬁnd it debat-
able whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling.
Pp. 483–485.

(a) The Court rejects the State’s contentions that, because § 2253(c)
provides that a COA may issue upon the “substantial showing of the
denial of a constitutional right,” only constitutional rulings may be
appealed, and no appeal can be taken if the district court relies on pro-
cedural grounds to dismiss the petition.
In setting forth the precondi-
tions for issuance of a COA under § 2253(c), Congress expressed no
intention to allow trial court procedural error to bar vindication of sub-
stantial constitutional rights on appeal. This conclusion follows from