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Page Number: 22.0

14 

HAALAND v. BRACKEEN 

Opinion of the Court 

even a sizeable sphere has borders.3 

B 

Petitioners  contend  that  ICWA  exceeds  Congress’s 
power.  Their principal theory, and the one accepted by both 
JUSTICE  ALITO  and  the  dissenters  in  the  Fifth  Circuit,  is 
that ICWA treads on the States’ authority over family law.
Domestic  relations  have  traditionally  been  governed  by 
state  law;  thus,  federal  power  over  Indians  stops  where
state  power  over  the  family  begins.    Or  so  the  argument 
goes.

It  is  true  that  Congress  lacks  a  general  power  over  do-
mestic  relations,  In  re  Burrus,  136  U. S.  586,  593–594 
(1890), and, as a result, responsibility for regulating mar-
riage and child custody remains primarily with the States, 
Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U. S. 393, 404 (1975).  See also Moore v. 
Sims, 442 U. S. 415, 435 (1979).  But the Constitution does 
not  erect  a  firewall  around  family  law.  On  the  contrary,
when  Congress  validly  legislates  pursuant  to  its  Article  I 
powers,  we  “ha[ve]  not  hesitated”  to  find  conflicting  state 
family  law  preempted,  “[n]otwithstanding  the  limited  ap-
plication  of  federal  law  in  the  field  of  domestic  relations 
generally.”  Ridgway  v.  Ridgway,  454  U. S.  46,  54  (1981) 
(federal  law  providing  life  insurance  preempted  state 
family-property law); see also Hillman v. Maretta, 569 U. S. 
483, 491 (2013) (“state laws ‘governing the economic aspects
of domestic relations . . . must give way to clearly conflicting 
federal  enactments’ ”  (alteration  in  original)).  In  fact,  we 
have  specifically  recognized  Congress’s  power  to  displace 

—————— 

3 JUSTICE ALITO’s dissent criticizes the Court for “violating one of the 
most basic laws of logic” with our conclusion that “Congress’s power over 
Indian affairs is ‘plenary’ but not ‘absolute.’ ”  Post, at 3–4.  Yet the dis-
sent goes on to make that very same observation.  Post, at 4 (“[E]ven so-
called  plenary  powers  cannot  override  foundational  constitutional  con-
straints”).