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2  CAMERON v. EMW WOMEN’S SURGICAL CENTER, P. S. C. 

KAGAN, J., concurring in judgment 

to intervene in an appeal timely brought by Kentucky’s sec-
retary  for  health  (after  the  secretary  decided  to  forgo  en 
banc or Supreme Court review).  And the provisions setting 
out  the  timely-appeal  rule  do  not  address  that  situation.  
See ante, at 5–6. 
  The majority goes on to deny the existence of a “claims-
processing” rule preventing the attorney general’s interven-
tion,  see  ante,  at  6–7,  but  I  think  that  terminology  mis-
placed and distracting.  We often consider whether timing 
requirements are “jurisdictional” rules or else “claims-pro-
cessing” rules.  See, e.g., United States v. Kwai Fun Wong, 
575 U. S. 402, 409–410 (2015).  (The question comes up be-
cause only the latter may be waived or overcome by equita-
ble  considerations;  the  former  are  absolute  bars  to  enter-
taining a matter.  See ibid.)  But here we know the answer 
to that frequent question.  As just stated, the timely-appeal 
rule—the  only  rule  anyone  thinks  relevant—is  jurisdic-
tional.  There is not a claims-processing rule in sight.  And 
EMW nowhere suggests otherwise; it never asserts the ex-
istence of a claims-processing rule barring the attorney gen-
eral’s motion. 
  The  argument  EMW  makes—and  it  is  a  serious  one—
rests on the idea that litigants should not be allowed to use 
intervention  procedures  to  end-run  jurisdictional  rules.  
Consider a hypothetical to illustrate the problem.  Suppose 
a party (or a non-party having a right to appeal) misses the 
30-day deadline to file a notice of appeal from a judgment.  
On the 31st day, he regrets his negligence and attempts to 
intervene  in  another  party’s  appeal  in  the  same  case.  
Should  the  appellate  court  allow  the  intervention?    Our 
precedent,  along  with  common  sense,  suggests  not—even 
though the timely-appeal rule, as noted above, does not ad-
dress issues of intervention.  That is because permitting in-
tervention  there  would  effectively  “vitiate[ ]”  the  “manda-
tory  nature  of  the  [appellate]  time  limits.”    Torres  v.