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Page Number: 3.0

Cite as:  569 U. S. ____ (2013) 

3 

Syllabus 

years  since  Schmerber  was  decided  that  allow  for  the  more  expedi-
tious processing of warrant applications, particularly in contexts like 
drunk-driving investigations where the evidence supporting probable
cause is simple.  The natural dissipation of alcohol in the blood may
support an exigency finding in a specific case, as it did in Schmerber, 
but it does not do so categorically.  Pp. 8–13.

(c) Because the State sought a per se rule here, it did not argue that
there  were  exigent  circumstances  in  this  particular  case.    The  argu-
ments and the record thus do not provide the Court with an adequate
framework  for  a  detailed  discussion  of  all  the  relevant  factors  that 
can  be  taken  into  account  in  determining  the  reasonableness  of  act-
ing  without  a  warrant.    It  suffices  to  say  that  the  metabolization  of
alcohol  in  the  bloodstream  and  the  ensuing  loss  of  evidence  are 
among  the  factors  that  must  be  considered  in  deciding  whether  a
warrant is required.  Pp. 20–23.

JUSTICE  SOTOMAYOR,  joined  by  JUSTICE  SCALIA, JUSTICE  GINSBURG, 
and  JUSTICE  KAGAN, concluded  in  Part  III  that  other  arguments  ad-
vanced by the State and amici in support of a per se rule are unper-
suasive.  Their concern that a case-by-case approach to exigency will
not provide adequate guidance to law enforcement officers may make
the  desire  for  a  bright-line  rule  understandable,  but  the  Fourth 
Amendment will not tolerate adoption of an overly broad categorical 
approach  in  this  context.  A  fact-intensive,  totality  of  the  circum-
stances,  approach  is  hardly  unique  within  this  Court’s  Fourth 
Amendment  jurisprudence.   See,  e.g.,  Illinois  v.  Wardlow,  528  U. S. 
119, 123–125.  They also contend that the privacy interest implicated
here  is  minimal.    But  motorists’  diminished  expectation  of  privacy
does not diminish their privacy interest in preventing a government 
agent from piercing their skin.  And though a blood test conducted in 
a  medical  setting  by  trained  personnel  is  less  intrusive  than  other 
bodily invasions, this Court has never retreated from its recognition 
that any compelled intrusion into the human body implicates signifi-
cant,  constitutionally  protected  privacy  interests.    Finally,  the  gov-
ernment’s general interest in combating drunk driving does not justi-
fy departing from the warrant requirement without showing exigent
circumstances that make securing a warrant impractical in a particu-
lar case.  Pp. 15–20. 

SOTOMAYOR, J., announced  the  judgment  of  the  Court  and  delivered 
the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, II–A, II–B, and IV, in
which  SCALIA,  KENNEDY,  GINSBURG,  and  KAGAN,  JJ.,  joined,  and  an
opinion with respect to Parts II–C and III, in which SCALIA, GINSBURG, 
and  KAGAN,  JJ.,  joined.  KENNEDY,  J.,  filed  an  opinion  concurring  in 
part.  ROBERTS, C. J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting