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Page Number: 22.0

2 

VEGA v. TEKOH 

KAGAN, J., dissenting 

a “necessity for procedures which assure that the individual 
is accorded his” Fifth Amendment privilege “not to be com-
pelled to incriminate himself.”  Id., at 439.  Miranda set out 
protocols (including the now-familiar warnings) that would 
safeguard the constitutional privilege against self-incrimi-
nation.  See id., at 478–479.  And Miranda held that if po-
lice failed to follow those requirements (without substitut-
ing equally effective ones), the prosecution could not use at 
trial a statement obtained from the interrogation.  See id., 
at 479. 

The  question  in  this  case  is  whether  Miranda’s  protec-
tions  are  a  “right[ ]”  that  is  “secured  by  the  Constitution”
within the meaning of §1983.  If the answer is yes, then a 
person may sue a state actor who deprives him of the right. 
In past cases, the Court has given a broad construction to
§1983’s broad language.  See, e.g., Dennis v.  Higgins, 498 
U. S.  439,  443  (1991).  Under  §1983  (as  elsewhere),  a
“right[ ]” is anything that creates specific “obligations bind-
ing on [a] governmental unit” that an individual may ask 
the judiciary to enforce.  Id., at 449; see id., at 447, and n. 7. 
And the phrase “secured by the Constitution” also has a ca-
pacious meaning.  It refers to any right that is “protect[ed]
or  ma[de]  certain”  by  the  country’s  foundational  charter. 
Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization, 307 U. S. 
496,  527  (1939)  (opinion  of  Stone,  J.)  (internal  quotation 
marks omitted). 

Begin with whether Miranda is “secured by the Constitu-
tion.”  We know that it is, because the Court’s decision in 
Dickerson says so.  Dickerson tells us again and again that 
Miranda is a “constitutional rule.”  530 U. S., at 444.  It is 
a “constitutional decision” that sets forth “ ‘concrete consti-
tutional  guidelines.’ ”    Id.,  at  432,  435  (quoting  Miranda, 
384 U. S., at 442).  Miranda “is constitutionally based”; or 
again, it has a “constitutional basis.”  530 U. S., at 439, n. 3, 
440.  It  is  “of  constitutional  origin”;  it  has  “constitutional 
underpinnings.”  Id.,  at  439,  n. 3,  440,  n. 5.   And—one