Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/19pdf/18-587_5ifl.pdf
Page Number: 62

24 

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY v. 
REGENTS OF UNIV. OF CAL. 

Opinion of THOMAS, J. 

to  Pet.  for  Cert.  in  No.  18–587,  at  104a  (DACA  and  ex-
panded DACA); 8 CFR §214.11(j)(3) (T visas); §214.14(d)(2) 
(U  visas);  62  Fed.  Reg.  63249,  63253  (1997)  (discussing 
Exec.  Order  No.  12711  for  certain  citizens  of  the  People’s
Republic of China).  The Government has made clear time 
and again that, because “deferred action is not an immigra-
tion status, no alien has the right to deferred action.  It is 
used solely in the discretion of the [Government] and con-
fers no protection or benefit upon an alien.”  DHS Immigra-
tion and Customs Enforcement Office of Detention and Re-
moval,  Detention  and  Deportation  Officers’  Field  Manual
§20.8 (Mar. 27, 2006); see also Memorandum from D. Meiss-
ner,  Comm’r,  INS,  to  Regional  Directors  et al.,  pp. 11–12
(Nov. 17, 2000); Memorandum from W. Yates, Assoc. Direc-
tor  of  Operations,  DHS,  Citizenship  and  Immigration 
Servs., to Director, Vt. Serv. Center, p. 5 (2003).  Thus, con-
trary to the majority’s unsupported assertion, ante, at 23, 
this longstanding administrative treatment of deferred ac-
tion provides strong evidence and authority for the proposi-
tion that an agency need not consider reliance interests in
this context.16 

Finally, it is inconceivable to require DHS to study reli-
ance interests before rescinding DACA considering how the
program  was  previously  defended.    DHS  has  made  clear 
since DACA’s inception that it would not consider such re-
liance interests.  Contemporaneous with the DACA memo,
DHS stated that “DHS can terminate or renew deferred ac-
tion at any time at the agency’s discretion.”  Consideration 

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16 The majority’s approach will make it far more difficult to change
deferred-action programs going forward, which is hardly in keeping with 
this  Court’s  own  understanding  that  deferred  action  is  an  “exercise  in 
administrative discretion” used for administrative “convenience.”  Reno 
v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U. S. 471, 484 (1999).
Agencies will likely be less willing to grant deferred action knowing that 
any attempts to undo it will require years of litigation and time-consuming
rulemakings.