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Page Number: 56.0

24 

SEC v. JARKESY 

GORSUCH, J., concurring 

many other contexts where we seek to honor the Constitu-
tion’s demands—including, notably, when we seek to ascer-
tain  the  scope  of  the  criminal  jury-trial  right  and  the  de-
fendant’s  attendant  right  to  confront  his  accusers.  See 
Erlinger, 602 U. S., at ___–___ (slip op., at 19–20); Crawford 
v. Washington, 541 U. S. 36, 50 (2004).  What’s more, this 
approach has the virtue of “keep[ing] judges in their proper
lane” by “seeking to honor the supreme law the people have 
ordained  rather  than  substituting  our  will  for  theirs.” 
Rahimi,  602  U. S.,  at  ___–___  (GORSUCH,  J.,  concurring)
(slip op., at 4–5); see Crawford, 541 U. S., at 67. 

It is hard, as well, to take seriously the dissent’s charges
of unworkability and unpredictability.  At least until today,
the dissenters supported procedural protections for those in 
the government’s sights in civil as well as criminal cases.
What kind of protections?  Often, they have argued, it de-
pends  on  a  judicial  balancing  test.    One  that  is  “flexible,” 
defies “technical conception,” lacks “fixed content,”  and will
“not  always  yield  the  same  result”  even  when  applied  in 
similar circumstances.  Culley, 601 U. S., at 413 (opinion of 
SOTOMAYOR, J.) (internal quotation marks omitted).  As we 
have  seen,  that  was  essentially  the  course  some  pursued, 
too, when it came to the public rights exception in the fall-
out  from  Atlas  Roofing.  See  Part  III–B,  supra.  But  that 
kind of “ ‘we know it when we see it’ ” approach to constitu-
tional rights, post, at 21, can hardly claim any serious ad-
vantages when it comes to workability or predictability. 

Failing all else, the dissent retreats to Atlas Roofing.  At 
least that decision, it insists, supports its nearly boundless 
conception  of  public  rights.  The  dissent  goes  so  far  as  to 
accuse the Court of undermining “stare decisis and the rule 
of law,” post, at 15, and engaging in “a power grab,” post, at 
37, by failing to give Atlas Roofing its broadest possible con-
struction.  It’s a “disconcerting” accusation indeed, post, at 
36, and a misdirected one at that.  Construed as broadly as 
the dissent proposes, Atlas Roofing’s view of public rights