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Page Number: 19.0

14  JANUS v. STATE, COUNTY, AND MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES 

Opinion of the Court 

Amendment  does  not  permit  the  government  to  compel  a
person  to  pay  for  another  party’s  speech  just  because  the
government  thinks  that  the  speech  furthers  the  interests 
of the person who does not want to pay.4 

Those supporting agency fees contend that the situation
here is different because unions are statutorily required to
“represen[t]  the  interests  of  all  public  employees  in  the
unit,” whether or not they are union members.  §315/6(d); 
see, e.g., Brief for State Respondents 40–41, 45; post, at 7 
(KAGAN, J., dissenting).  Why might this matter?

We  can  think  of  two  possible  arguments.  It  might  be
argued that a State has a compelling interest in requiring
the  payment  of  agency  fees  because  (1)  unions  would 
otherwise  be  unwilling  to  represent  nonmembers  or  (2)  it 
would  be  fundamentally  unfair  to  require  unions  to  pro­
vide  fair  representation  for  nonmembers  if  nonmembers
were  not  required  to  pay.  Neither  of  these  arguments  is 
sound. 

First,  it  is  simply  not  true  that  unions  will  refuse  to
serve  as  the  exclusive  representative  of  all  employees  in
the  unit  if  they  are  not  given  agency  fees.    As  noted,  un­
ions represent millions of public employees in jurisdictions
that  do  not  permit  agency  fees.    No  union  is  ever  com­
pelled to seek that designation.
 On the contrary, designa­
tion as exclusive representative is avidly sought.5  Why is 

—————— 

4 The  collective-action  problem  cited  by  the  dissent,  post,  at  6,  is  not 

specific to the agency-fee context.  And contrary to the dissent’s sugges­
tion,  it  is  often  not  practical  for  an  entity  that  lobbies  or  advocates  on 
behalf of  the  members of a  group to tailor its  message  so that only its
members benefit from its efforts.  Consider how effective it would be for 
a  group  that  advocates  on  behalf  of,  say,  seniors,  to  argue  that  a  new 
measure should apply only to its dues-paying members. 

5 In order to obtain that status, a union must petition to be recognized 
and  campaign  to  win  majority  approval.    Ill.  Comp.  Stat.,  ch.  5, 
§315/9(a) (2016); see, e.g., County of Du Page v. Illinois Labor Relations 
Bd.,  231  Ill.  2d  593,  597–600,  900  N. E. 2d  1095,  1098–1099  (2008).
And unions eagerly seek this support.  See, e.g., Brief for Employees of