Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/17pdf/16-476_dbfi.pdf
Page Number: 48.0

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MURPHY v. NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSN. 

GINSBURG, J., dissenting 

In particular, the Court holds that the prohibition on state 
“operat[ion]”  of  sports-gambling  schemes  cannot  survive, 
because  it  does  not  believe  Congress  would  have  “wanted 
to  prevent  States  from  running  sports  lotteries”  “had  [it] 
known that States would be free to authorize sports gam-
bling in privately owned casinos.”  Ante, at 26.  In so rea-
soning,  the  Court  shutters  §3702(2),  under  which  private 
parties  are  prohibited  from  operating  sports-gambling 
schemes  precisely  when  state  law  authorizes  them  to  do 
so.4 

 This  plain  error  pervasively  infects  the  Court’s  severa-
bility  analysis.    The  Court  strikes  Congress’  ban  on  state 
“sponsor[ship]”  and  “promot[ion]”  of  sports-gambling 
schemes  because  it  has  (mistakenly)  struck  Congress’ 
prohibition  on  state  “operat[ion]”  of  such  schemes.    See 
ante,  at  27.    It  strikes  Congress’  prohibitions  on  private 
“sponsor[ship],”  “operat[ion],”  and  “promot[ion]”  of  sports-
gambling  schemes  because  it  has  (mistakenly)  struck 
those same prohibitions on the States.  See ante, at 27–28.  
And  it  strikes  Congress’  prohibition  on  “advertis[ing]” 
sports-gambling schemes because it has struck everything 
else.  See ante, at 29–30. 

* 

  * 

  * 

  In  PASPA,  shorn  of  the  prohibition  on  modifying  or 
repealing  state  law,  Congress  permissibly  exercised  its 
authority to regulate commerce by instructing States and 
private  parties  to  refrain  from  operating  sports-gambling 
schemes.  On no rational ground can it be concluded that 
Congress would have preferred no statute at all if it could 

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 As  earlier  indicated,  see  supra,  at  2,  direct  federal  regulation  of 
sports-gambling schemes nationwide, including private-party schemes, 
falls within Congress’ power to regulate activities having a substantial 
effect  on  interstate  commerce.    See  Gonzales  v.  Raich,  545  U. S.  1,  17 
(2005).    Indeed,  according  to  the  Court,  direct  regulation  is  precisely 
what the anticommandeering doctrine requires.  Ante, at 14–18.