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2 

BROWN v. PLATA 

Syllabus 

Held: 

1. The court-mandated population limit is necessary to remedy the 
violation  of  prisoners’  constitutional  rights  and  is  authorized  by  the
PLRA.  Pp. 12–41.

(a) If  a  prison  deprives  prisoners  of  basic  sustenance,  including 
adequate medical care, the courts have a responsibility to remedy the
resulting  Eighth  Amendment  violation.  See  Hutto  v.  Finney,  437 
U. S. 678, 687, n. 9.  They must consider a range of options, including
the  appointment  of  special  masters  or  receivers,  the  possibility  of
consent decrees, and orders limiting a prison’s population.  Under the 
PLRA,  only  a  three-judge  court  may  limit  a  prison  population.    18 
U. S. C.  §3626(a)(3).    Before  convening  such  a  court,  a  district  court 
must  have  entered  an  order  for  less  intrusive  relief  that  failed  to 
remedy  the  constitutional  violation  and  must  have  given  the  defen-
dant  a  reasonable 
its  prior  orders. 
§3626(a)(3)(A).    Once  convened,  the  three-judge  court  must  find  by
clear and convincing evidence that “crowding is the primary cause of 
the  violation”  and  “no  other  relief  will  remedy  [the]  violation,” 
§3626(a)(3)(E); and that the relief is “narrowly drawn, extends no fur-
ther than necessary. . . , and is the least intrusive means necessary to 
correct the violation,” §3626(a)(1)(A).  The court must give “substan-
tial weight to any adverse impact on public safety or the operation of
a criminal justice system caused by the relief.”  Ibid.  Its legal deter-
minations are reviewed de novo, but its factual findings are reviewed 
for clear error.  Pp. 12–15.

to  comply  with 

time 

(b) The Coleman and Plata courts acted reasonably in convening 

a three-judge court.  Pp. 15–19.

(1) The  merits  of  the  decision  to  convene  are  properly  before 
this  Court,  which  has  exercised  its  28  U. S. C.  §1253  jurisdiction  to
determine the authority of a court below, including whether a three-
judge court was properly constituted.  Gonzalez v. Automatic Employ-
ees Credit Union, 419 U. S. 90, 95, n. 12.  Pp. 15–16. 

(2) Section  3626(a)(3)(A)(i)’s  previous  order  requirement  was 
satisfied  in  Coleman  by  the  Special  Master’s  1995  appointment  and 
in Plata by the 2002 approval of a consent decree and stipulated in-
junction.    Both  orders  were  intended  to  remedy  constitutional  viola-
tions  and  were  given  ample  time  to  succeed—12  years  in  Coleman, 
and  5  years 
the  State’s  claim, 
§3626(a)(3)(A)(ii)’s  reasonable  time  requirement  did  not  require  the 
District  Courts  to  give  more  time  for  subsequent  remedial  efforts  to
succeed.    Such  a  reading  would  in  effect  require  courts  to  impose  a 
moratorium on new remedial orders before issuing a population limit,
which  would  delay  an  eventual  remedy,  prolong  the  courts’  involve-
ment,  and  serve  neither  the  State  nor  the  prisoners.    The  Coleman 

  Contrary 

in  Plata. 

to