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Page Number: 29

24 

JONES v. HENDRIX 

Opinion of the Court 

Statutes  of  limitations  merely  govern  the  timeframe  for 
bringing  a  claim.  AEDPA’s  second-or-successive  re-
strictions,  by  contrast,  “constitute  a  modified  res  judicata 
rule,” Felker v. Turpin, 518 U. S. 651, 664 (1996), and thus
embody  Congress’  judgment  regarding  the  central  policy
question  of  postconviction  remedies—the  appropriate  bal-
ance between finality and error correction.  Insisting on a
heightened standard of clarity in this context would effec-
tively  mean  adopting  a  presumption  against  finality  as  a 
substantive  value.  We  decline  to  do  so.    “[T]he  United 
States has an interest in the finality of sentences imposed 
by its own courts,” Johnson v. United States, 544 U. S. 295, 
309 (2005), and how to balance that interest against error 
correction  is  a  “judgmen[t]  about  the  proper  scope  of  the
writ” that is “ ‘normally for Congress to make.’ ”  Felker, 518 
U. S.,  at  664  (quoting  Lonchar  v.  Thomas,  517  U. S.  314, 
323 (1996)).

Accepting  the  Government’s  proposal  to  apply  a  clear-
statement rule would be particularly anomalous in light of
the precise question this case presents.  Typically, we find
clear-statement  rules  appropriate  when  a  statute  impli-
cates historically or constitutionally grounded norms that
we would not expect Congress to unsettle lightly.  See, e.g., 
Alabama Assn. of Realtors v. Department of Health and Hu-
man Servs., 594 U. S. ___, ___ (2021) (per curiam) (slip op.,
at 6) (presumption that Congress does not casually assign
executive  agencies  “powers  of  vast  economic  and  political
significance” or “significantly alter the balance between fed-
eral and state power” (internal quotation marks omitted)); 
Landgraf  v.  USI  Film  Products,  511  U. S.  244,  265–266 
(1994) (presumption against statutory retroactivity); Atas-
cadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 473 U. S. 234, 243 (1985)
(presumption against abrogation of state sovereign immun-
ity).  But, as shown above in discussing Jones’ Suspension
Clause  argument,  there  is  no  historical  or  constitutional
norm  of  permitting  one  convicted  of  a  crime  by  a  court  of