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Page Number: 50

6 

ZIGLAR v. ABBASI 

BREYER, J., dissenting 

the Court wrote that, 

“where  federally  protected  rights  have  been  invaded,
it  has  been  the  rule  from  the  beginning  that  courts
will be alert to adjust their remedies so as to grant the
necessary relief.” 

See  also  Bivens,  403  U. S.,  at  392  (citing  opinions  of  Jus-
tices Cardozo and Holmes to similar effect). 

The  Bivens  Court  reiterated  these  principles  and  con-
firmed that the appropriate remedial “adjust[ment]” in the 
case before it was an award of money damages, the “reme-
dial mechanism normally available in the federal courts.” 
Id., at 392, 397.  Justice Harlan agreed, adding that, since
Congress’  “general”  statutory  “grant  of  jurisdiction”  au-
thorized  courts  to  grant  equitable  relief  in  cases  arising
under federal jurisdiction, courts likewise had the author- 
ity to award damages—the “traditional remedy at law”—in
order to “vindicate the interests of the individual” protected
by  the  Bill  of  Rights.    Id.,  at  405–407  (opinion  concur- 
ring in judgment).

Second, our cases have recognized that Congress’ silence
on the subject indicates a willingness to leave this matter
to the courts.  In Bivens, the Court noted, as an argument
favoring its conclusion, the absence of an “explicit congres-
sional  declaration  that  persons  injured  by  a  federal  of-
ficer’s violation of the Fourth Amendment may not recover
money damages from the agents.”  Id., at 397.  Similarly,
in  Davis  v.  Passman,  the  Court  stressed  that  there  was 
“no  evidence  . . .  that  Congress  meant  . . .  to  foreclose”  a 
damages remedy.  442 U. S., at 247.  In Carlson, the Court 
went  further,  observing  that  not  only  was  there  no  sign 
“that  Congress  meant  to  pre-empt  a  Bivens  remedy,”  but
there was also “clear” evidence that Congress intended to
preserve it.  446 U. S., at 19–20. 
  Third,  our  Bivens  cases  acknowledge  that  a  constitu-
tional  tort  may  not  lie  when  “special  factors  counse[l]