Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/558bv.pdf
Page Number: 522

Cite as: 558 U. S. 310 (2010) 

361 

Opinion of the Court 

money,”  were  made  to  gain  access  to  elected  ofﬁcials.  Mc­
Connell,  supra,  at  125,  130–131,  146–152;  see  McConnell  I, 
251  F.  Supp.  2d,  at  471–481,  491–506  (opinion  of  Kollar-
Kotelly,  J.);  id.,  at  842–843,  858–859  (opinion  of  Leon,  J.). 
This  case,  however,  is  about  independent  expenditures,  not 
soft money.  When Congress ﬁnds that a problem exists, we 
must give that ﬁnding due deference; but Congress may not 
choose  an  unconstitutional  remedy.  If  elected  ofﬁcials  suc­
cumb to improper inﬂuences from independent expenditures; 
if they surrender their best judgment; and if they put expedi­
ency before principle, then surely there is cause for concern. 
We  must  give  weight  to  attempts  by  Congress  to  seek  to 
dispel  either  the  appearance  or  the  reality  of  these  inﬂu­
ences.  The remedies enacted by law, however, must comply 
with  the  First  Amendment;  and  it  is  our  law  and  our  tradi­
tion  that  more  speech,  not  less,  is  the  governing  rule.  An 
outright ban on corporate political speech during the critical 
preelection  period  is  not  a  permissible  remedy.  Here  Con­
gress has created categorical bans on speech that are asym­
metrical to preventing quid pro quo corruption. 

3 

The  Government  contends  further  that  corporate  inde­
pendent  expenditures  can  be  limited  because  of  its  interest 
in  protecting  dissenting  shareholders  from  being  compelled 
to  fund  corporate  political  speech.  This  asserted  interest, 
like  Austin’s  antidistortion  rationale,  would  allow  the  Gov­
ernment  to  ban  the  political  speech  even  of  media  corpora­
tions.  See supra, at 352–354.  Assume, for example, that a 
shareholder  of  a  corporation  that  owns  a  newspaper  dis­
agrees  with  the  political  views  the  newspaper  expresses. 
See Austin, 494 U. S., at 687 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  Under 
the  Government’s  view,  that  potential  disagreement  could 
give the Government the authority to restrict the media cor­
poration’s  political  speech.  The  First  Amendment  does  not 
allow  that  power.  There  is,  furthermore,  little  evidence  of