Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/10pdf/09-893.pdf
Page Number: 14.0

Cite as:  563 U. S. ____ (2011) 

11 

Opinion of the Court 

lution  of  claims,”  but  to  “ensure  judicial  enforcement  of
privately made agreements to arbitrate,” 470 U. S., at 219, 
Dean  Witter  went  on  to  explain:  “This  is  not  to  say  that
Congress was blind to  the potential benefit of the legisla-
tion for expedited resolution of disputes.  Far from it . . . .” 
Id.,  at  220.   It  then  quotes  a  House  Report  saying  that
“the  costliness  and  delays  of  litigation  . . .  can  be  largely 
eliminated  by  agreements  for  arbitration.”    Ibid.  (quoting
H. R.  Rep.  No.  96,  68th  Cong.,  1st  Sess.,  2  (1924)).    The 
concluding  paragraph  of  this  part  of  its  discussion  begins
as follows: 

“We  therefore  are  not  persuaded  by  the  argument
that the conflict between two goals of the Arbitration 
Act—enforcement  of  private  agreements  and  encour-
agement  of  efficient  and  speedy  dispute  resolution—
must be resolved in favor of the latter in order to real-
ize the intent of the drafters.”  470 U. S., at 221. 

In  the  present  case,  of  course,  those  “two  goals”  do  not
conflict—and  it  is  the  dissent’s  view  that  would  frustrate 
both of them. 

Contrary to the dissent’s view, our cases place it beyond 
dispute that the FAA was designed to promote arbitration. 
They  have  repeatedly  described  the  Act  as  “embod[ying] 
[a]  national  policy  favoring  arbitration,”  Buckeye  Check 
Cashing,  546  U. S.,  at  443,  and  “a  liberal  federal  policy 
favoring  arbitration  agreements,  notwithstanding  any 
state  substantive  or  procedural  policies  to  the  contrary,” 
Moses  H.  Cone,  460  U. S.,  at  24;  see  also  Hall  Street  As-
socs., 552 U. S., at 581.  Thus, in Preston v. Ferrer, holding
preempted a state-law rule requiring exhaustion of admin-
istrative  remedies  before  arbitration,  we  said:  “A  prime
objective  of  an  agreement  to  arbitrate  is  to  achieve 
‘streamlined  proceedings  and  expeditious  results,’ ”  which
objective would be “frustrated” by requiring a dispute to be
heard  by  an  agency  first.  552  U. S.,  at  357–358.    That