Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/21pdf/21-954_7l48.pdf
Page Number: 56

4 

BIDEN v. TEXAS 

BARRETT, J., dissenting 

of  a  question  otherwise  within  its  competence.    See,  e.g., 
California v. Texas, 593 U. S. ___, ___ (2021) (slip op., at 7)
(redressability “consider[s] the relationship between ‘the ju-
dicial relief requested’ and the ‘injury’ suffered”); Los Ange-
les v. Lyons, 461 U. S. 95, 105–107 (1983) (failure to allege 
sufficient likelihood of future injury deprives a federal court
of  Article  III  “jurisdiction  to  entertain  [the  count]  of  the 
complaint” seeking injunctive relief ). 

So  it  seems  to  me  quite  possible  that  §1252(f )(1)  with-
draws  subject-matter  jurisdiction  over  cases  seeking  cer-
tain remedies.  Indeed, while the Government has a theory
for why the Court can reach the merits in this case, it char-
acterizes  §1252(f )(1)  as  imposing  “jurisdictional  limita-
tions” that “speak to ‘a court’s power’ ” and “ ‘can never be 
forfeited  or  waived.’ ”    Supplemental  Brief  for  Petitioners 
19–20; see also Miranda, 34 F. 4th, at 354 (concluding that 
“§1252(f )(1) is a jurisdiction-stripping statute” that cannot 
be  waived).  If  there  is  a  reason  to  treat  limitations  on 
subject-matter jurisdiction and limitations on remedial au-
thority as mutually exclusive—either in general or in this 
statutory scheme—the Court does not explain it.

The Court breezes past other questions too.  Most nota-
bly,  it  gives  surprisingly  little  attention  to  a  phrase  on
which  it  places  significant  weight:  §1252(f )(1)’s  parenthe-
tical exempting “the Supreme Court” from its general bar 
on  “jurisdiction  or  authority.”  The  parties  hardly  discuss 
this parenthetical, which does not appear to have an ana-
logue  elsewhere  in  the  United  States  Code.  The  Court, 
however,  takes  the  phrase  as  conclusive  evidence  that
§1252(f )(1)  does  not  deprive  district  courts  of  subject-
matter jurisdiction over “non-individual claims under [the 
covered provisions],” because if it did, “no such claims could 
ever arrive at this Court, rendering the provision’s specific
carveout  for  Supreme  Court  injunctive  relief  nugatory.” 
Ante, at 10.
  While  this  interpretation  has  some  surface  appeal,  the