Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/23pdf/23-175_19m2.pdf
Page Number: 26.0

Cite as:  603 U. S. ____ (2024) 

21 

Opinion of the Court 

Pass, No. 1:18–cv–01823 (D Ore.), ECF Doc. 63–4, pp. 2, 16;
Tr. of Oral Arg. 159.  In that respect, the city’s laws parallel 
those  found  in  countless  jurisdictions  across  the  country. 
See  Part  I–A,  supra.  And  because  laws  like  these  do  not 
criminalize mere status, Robinson is not implicated.5 

C 
If Robinson does not control this case, the plaintiffs and
the dissent argue, we should extend it so that it does.  Per-
haps a person does not violate ordinances like Grants Pass’s
simply by being homeless but only by engaging in certain 
acts  (actus  rei)  with  certain  mental  states  (mentes  reae).
Still,  the  plaintiffs  and  the  dissent  insist,  laws  like  these 
seek  to  regulate  actions  that  are  in  some  sense  “involun-
tary,” for some homeless persons cannot help but do what 
the law forbids.  See Brief for Respondents 24–25, 29, 32; 
post, at 16–17 (opinion of SOTOMAYOR, J.).  And, the plain-
tiffs and the dissent continue, we should extend Robinson 
to prohibit the enforcement of laws that operate this way—
laws that don’t proscribe status as such but that proscribe 
acts,  even  acts  undertaken  with  some  required  mental
state,  the  defendant  cannot  help  but  undertake.    Post,  at 
16–17.  To rule otherwise, the argument goes, would “ ‘effec-
tively’ ” allow cities to punish a person because of his status. 
Post,  at  25.  The  Ninth  Circuit  pursued  just  this  line  of 
thinking below and in Martin. 

The problem is, this Court has already rejected that view. 

—————— 

5 At  times,  the  dissent  seems  to  suggest,  mistakenly,  that  laws  like 
Grants  Pass’s  apply  only  to  the  homeless.  See post,  at  13.  That  view 
finds  no  support  in  the  laws  before  us.  Perhaps  the  dissent  means  to 
suggest that some cities selectively “enforce” their public-camping laws 
only against homeless persons.  See post, at 17–19.  But if that’s the dis-
sent’s  theory,  it  is  not  one  that  arises  under  the  Eighth  Amendment’s
Cruel  and  Unusual  Punishments  Clause.    Instead,  if  anything,  it  may 
implicate  due  process  and  our  precedents  regarding  selective  prosecu-
tion.  See,  e.g.,  United  States  v.  Armstrong,  517  U. S.  456  (1996).    No 
claim like that is before us in this case.