Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/22pdf/21-869_87ad.pdf
Page Number: 41

Cite as:  598 U. S. ____ (2023) 

35 

Opinion of the Court 

Here,  the  circumstances  of  AWF’s  2016  licensing  out-
weigh its diminished claim to fairness in copying under the 
first  factor.    Like  satire  that  does  not  target  an  original 
work,  AWF’s  asserted  commentary  “can  stand  on  its  own
two feet and so requires justification for the very act of bor-
rowing.”  Id., at 581.  Moreover, because AWF’s commercial 
use  of  Goldsmith’s  photograph  to  illustrate  a  magazine 
about Prince is so similar to the photograph’s typical use, a 
particularly  compelling  justification  is  needed.  Yet  AWF 
offers  no  independent  justification,  let  alone  a  compelling
one, for copying the photograph, other than to convey a new 
meaning  or  message.  As  explained,  that  alone  is  not 
enough for the first factor to favor fair use. 

Copying might have been helpful to convey a new mean-
ing or message.  It often is.  But that does not suffice under 
the first factor.  Nor does it distinguish AWF from a long 
list of would-be fair users: a musician who finds it helpful
to  sample  another  artist’s  song  to  make  his  own,  a  play-
wright who finds it helpful to adapt a novel, or a filmmaker 
who would prefer to create a sequel or spinoff, to name just 
a few.22  As Judge Leval has explained, “[a] secondary au-
thor is not necessarily at liberty to make wholesale takings
of  the  original  author’s  expression  merely  because  of  how 
well the original author’s expression would convey the sec-
ondary  author’s  different  message.”  Authors  Guild,  804 
F. 3d, at 215. 

—————— 

22 The dissent oddly suggests that under the Court’s opinion, the first 
fair use factor favors such uses.  See post, at 12, n. 5.  This ignores, well,
pretty much the entire opinion.  See supra, at 14–17, 22–24, 26–27, 28– 
29, 32–33 (degree of difference in purpose and character); supra, at 18, 
24 (commercial nature); supra, at 17–19, 27, 30, 34–35 (justification).  In 
particular, the Court does not hold that the first factor favors any user 
who “wants to reach different buyers, in different markets, consuming 
different products.”  Post, at 13, n. 5 (opinion of KAGAN, J.).  The dissent 
apparently deduces this proposition from its inverse, which is a common 
logical fallacy.