Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/22pdf/21-1164_7li8.pdf
Page Number: 24

Cite as:  598 U. S. ____ (2023) 

9 

THOMAS, J., dissenting 

already effectively allowed for equitable tolling.”  Id., at 48 
(citing  Irwin,  498  U. S.,  at  96).    “Given  this  fact,  and  the 
unusually  generous  nature  of  the  [Act]’s  limitations  time 
period,”  the  Court  concluded  that  “extension  of  the  statu-
tory period by additional equitable tolling would be unwar-
ranted.”  524 U. S., at 48–49.  Thus, while Beggerly might
be read to view the Act’s time bar as potentially susceptible 
to  tolling  (and  thus,  by  inference,  nonjurisdictional),  the
Court did not hold that the bar actually could be tolled.  Ra-
ther, the Court held the opposite.  Beggerly is therefore, at 
best, ambiguous with respect to the jurisdictional nature of
the time bar.  As such, it does not overcome the Court’s clear 
prior view set out in both Block and Mottaz. 

For  the  majority,  the  Court’s  statements  in  Block  and 
Mottaz  are  not  “definitiv[e]”  enough  to  satisfy  John  R. 
Sand.  Ante, at 11.  But, the import of the Court’s references 
to “jurisdiction” in Block and Mottaz would have been clear 
at the time.  A court in the 1980s discussing a provision of 
a  statute  as  a  waiver  of  sovereign  immunity,  citing  Sher-
wood (and, later, Block), invoked a well-known set of ideas
that readers at the time unmistakably associated with the 
concept  of  jurisdiction.    In  fact,  the  Court  in  Dalm  cited 
Block and Mottaz—and no other cases—for the proposition
that  conditions  on  waivers  of  sovereign  immunity  “define 
th[e] court’s jurisdiction to entertain the suit.”  494 U. S., at 
608  (emphasis  added;  internal  quotation  marks  omitted). 
The Court’s precedents must be understood in that context. 

* 

* 

* 

The Quiet Title Act’s statute of limitations functions as a 
condition on a waiver of sovereign immunity, and is there-
fore jurisdictional.  This Court has repeatedly characterized 
the Act’s time bar as jurisdictional, and that interpretation 
remains authoritative under John R. Sand.  Accordingly, I 
respectfully dissent.