Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/17pdf/16-1454_5h26.pdf
Page Number: 26.0

2 

OHIO v. AMERICAN EXPRESS CO. 

BREYER, J., dissenting 

ual  barrier  with  anticompetitive  effects.    The  majority
rejects that effort.  But because the challenged contractual
term clearly has serious anticompetitive effects, I dissent. 

I 
I agree with the majority and the parties that this case
is properly evaluated under the three-step “rule of reason” 
that  governs  many  antitrust  lawsuits.    Ante,  at  9–10. 
Under that approach, a court looks first at the agreement 
or  restraint  at  issue  to  assess  whether  it  has  had,  or  is 
likely  to  have,  anticompetitive  effects.    FTC  v.  Indiana 
Federation of Dentists, 476 U. S. 447, 459 (1986).  In doing
so,  the  court  normally  asks  whether  the  restraint  may
tend to impede competition and, if so, whether those who 
have  entered  into  that  restraint  have  sufficient  economic 
or commercial power for the agreement to make a negative 
difference.  See  id.,  at  459–461.    Sometimes,  but  not  al­
ways, a court will try to determine the appropriate market
(the  market  that  the  agreement  affects)  and  determine 
whether  those  entering  into  that  agreement  have  the
power  to  raise  prices  above  the  competitive  level  in  that 
market.  See ibid. 

It  is  important  here  to  understand  that  in  cases  under
§1 of the Sherman Act (unlike in cases challenging a mer­
ger  under  §7  of  the  Clayton  Act,  15  U. S. C.  §18),  it  may 
well  be  unnecessary  to  undertake  a  sometimes  complex,
market power inquiry: 

“Since  the  purpose  [in  a  Sherman  Act  §1  case]  of  the 
inquiries  into  . . .  market  power  is  [simply]  to  deter­
mine  whether  an  arrangement  has  the  potential  for
genuine adverse effects on competition, ‘proof of actual 
detrimental effects, such as a reduction in output,’ can 
obviate  the  need  for  an  inquiry  into  market  power, 
which  is  but  a  ‘surrogate  for  detrimental  effects.’ ” 
Indiana  Federation  of  Dentists,  supra,  at  460–461 
(quoting 7 P. Areeda, Antitrust Law ¶1511, p. 429 (3d