Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/20pdf/19-1257_g204.pdf
Page Number: 31.0

Cite as:  594 U. S. ____ (2021) 

25 

Opinion of the Court 

have noted, differences in employment, wealth, and educa-
tion may make it virtually impossible for a State to devise 
rules that do not have some disparate impact.  But under 
the dissent’s interpretation of §2, any “statistically signifi-
cant”  disparity—wherever  that  is  in  the  statute—may  be 
enough to take down even facially neutral voting rules with 
long pedigrees that reasonably pursue important state in-
terests.  Post, at 15, n. 4, 19–20, 32–33.17 
  Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act provides vital protec-
tion  against  discriminatory  voting  rules,  and  no  one  sug-
gests that discrimination in voting has been extirpated or 
that the threat  has  been  eliminated.    But  §2  does  not  de-
prive the States of their authority to establish non-discrim-
inatory voting rules, and that is precisely what the dissent’s 
radical interpretation would mean in practice.  The dissent 
is correct that the Voting Rights Act exemplifies our coun-
try’s commitment to democracy, but there is nothing demo-
cratic about the dissent’s attempt to bring about a whole-
sale  transfer  of  the  authority  to  set  voting  rules  from  the 
States to the federal courts. 

—————— 

17 We do not think §2 is so procrustean.  Statistical significance may 
provide “evidence that something besides random error is at work,” Fed-
eral  Judicial  Center,  Reference  Manual on  Scientific  Evidence 252  (3d 
ed. 2011), but it does not necessarily determine causes, and as the dissent 
acknowledges, post, at 15, n. 4, it is not the be-all and end-all of dispar-
ate-impact analysis.  See Federal Judicial Center, Reference Manual, at 
252 (“[S]ignificant differences . . . are not evidence that [what is at work] 
is legally or practically important.  Statisticians distinguish between sta-
tistical and practical significance to make the point.  When practical sig-
nificance is lacking—when the size of a disparity is negligible—there is 
no  reason  to  worry  about  statistical  significance”);  ibid.,  n. 102  (citing 
authorities).  Moreover, whatever might be “standard” in other contexts, 
post,  at  15,  n. 4,  we  have  explained  that  VRA  §2’s  focus  on  equal 
“open[ness]” and equal “opportunity” does not impose a standard dispar-
ate-impact regime.