Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/23pdf/22-1008_1b82.pdf
Page Number: 32.0

4 

CORNER POST, INC. v. BOARD OF GOVERNORS, FRS 

KAVANAUGH, J., concurring 

District Court to vacate the fee rule on the ground that the 
Board  must  more  strictly  regulate  bank  fees  (in  other 
words, that the Board must set a lower cap on the fees that
banks may charge).

Corner  Post  would  not  be  able  to  obtain  relief  in  its 
lawsuit  through  any  remedy  other  than  vacatur.    Corner 
Post  could  not  obtain  relief  through  an 
injunction
forbidding  the  Board  from  enforcing  the  rule  against  it.
That is because the rule does not regulate Corner Post and 
therefore is not and cannot be enforced against Corner Post 
in  the  first  place.  Nor  could  Corner  Post  secure  relief 
through  an  injunction  against  banks;  the  APA  does  not 
authorize suits against private parties.

Corner Post instead needs a remedy that acts directly on
the  fee  rule—specifically,  by  vacating  it.    Indeed,  without 
vacatur, it is hard to imagine what kind of lawsuit Corner 
Post  could  file.  At  oral  argument,  the  Government 
ultimately  seemed  to  acknowledge  that  reality  and  the 
necessity of the vacatur remedy if Corner Post is to obtain 
any relief in this case.  See Tr. of Oral Arg. 76 (“it’s possible 
that  the  only  way  to  provide  this  party  relief  would  be 
vacatur”).1 

II 

For  Corner  Post  to  obtain  relief,  an  important  question 
therefore  is  whether  the  APA  authorizes  vacatur  of 
unlawful agency actions, including agency rules.

The answer is yes—in light of the text and history of the 

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1 A plaintiff could not challenge the fee rule by suing to “compel agency 
action” that is “unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed.”  5 U. S. C. 
§706(1).    The  remedy  of  compelling  agency  action  applies  if  an  agency
fails to issue a required rule.  But here, the Board issued a rule, and the 
question is whether the rule set a reasonable fee cap.  It would therefore 
make  little  sense  to  say  that  the  fee  rule  has  been  “withheld”  or
“delayed.”  Indeed, it seems that §706(1) has almost never been used to 
challenge extant agency rules, as opposed to challenging the absence of
required rules.