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Page Number: 19.0

16 

MCGIRT v. OKLAHOMA 

Opinion of the Court 

in 1936, Congress authorized the Creek to adopt a constitu-
tion and bylaws, see Act of June 26, 1936, §3, 49 Stat. 1967, 
enabling the Creek government to resume many of its pre-
viously  suspended  functions.    Muscogee  (Creek)  Nation  v. 
Hodel, 851 F. 2d 1439, 1442–1447 (CADC 1988).6 

The Creek Nation has done exactly that.  In the interven-
ing years, it has ratified a new constitution and established
three  separate  branches  of  government.    Ibid.;  see  Mus-
cogee Creek Nation (MCN) Const., Arts. V, VI, and VII.  To-
day the Nation is led by a democratically elected Principal
Chief, Second Chief, and National Council; operates a police
force and three hospitals; commands an annual budget of 
more  than  $350  million;  and  employs  over  2,000  people.
Brief for Muscogee (Creek) Nation as Amicus Curiae 36–39. 
In 1982, the Nation passed an ordinance reestablishing the
criminal and civil jurisdiction of its courts.  See Hodel, 851 
F. 2d, at 1442, 1446–1447 (confirming Tribe’s authority to 
do so).  The territorial jurisdiction of these courts extends
to any Indian country within the Tribe’s territory as defined
by the Treaty of 1866.  MCN Stat. 27, §1–102(A).  And the 
State of Oklahoma has afforded full faith and credit to its 
judgments since at least 1994.  See Barrett v. Barrett, 878 

—————— 

6 The dissent calls it “fantasy” to suggest that Congress evinced “any 
unease  about  extinguishing  the  Creek  domain”  because  Congress  “did 
what it set out to do: transform a reservation into a State.”  Post, at 22– 
23.  The dissent stresses, too, that the Creek were afforded U. S. citizen-
ship and the right to vote.  Post, at 20.  But the only thing implausible 
here is the suggestion that “creat[ing] a new State” or enfranchising Na-
tive Americans implies an “intent to terminate” any and all reservations
within  a  State’s  boundaries.    Post,  at  15.  This  Court  confronted—and 
rejected—that sort of argument long ago in United States v. Sandoval, 
231  U. S.  28,  47–48  (1913).    The  dissent  treats  that  case  as  a  one-off: 
special because “the tribe in Sandoval, the Pueblo Indians of New Mex-
ico, retained a rare communal title to their lands.”  Post, at 21, n. 4.  But 
Sandoval is not only a case about the Pueblos; it is a foundational prec-
edent recognizing that Congress can welcome Native Americans to par-
ticipate in a broader political community without sacrificing their tribal
sovereignty.