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Page Number: 28.0

24 

MATAL v. TAM 

Opinion of the Court 
Opinion of ALITO, J. 

trademarks  are  commercial  speech.    They  note  that  the
central  purposes  of  trademarks  are  commercial  and  that
federal  law  regulates  trademarks  to  promote  fair  and
orderly  interstate  commerce.  Tam  and  his  amici,  on  the 
other  hand,  contend  that  many,  if  not  all,  trademarks
In  other  words,  these 
have  an  expressive  component. 
trademarks do not simply identify the source of a product 
or  service  but  go  on  to  say  something  more,  either  about 
the  product  or  service  or  some  broader  issue.   The  trade-
mark  in  this  case  illustrates  this  point.    The  name  “The 
Slants”  not  only  identifies  the  band  but  expresses  a  view 
about social issues. 

We  need  not  resolve  this  debate  between  the  parties
because  the  disparagement  clause  cannot  withstand  even 
Central  Hudson  review.17    Under  Central  Hudson,  a  re-
striction of speech must serve “a substantial interest,” and 
it  must  be  “narrowly  drawn.”    Id.,  at  564–565  (internal
quotation  marks  omitted).    This  means,  among  other 
things,  that  “[t]he  regulatory  technique  may  extend  only
as  far  as  the  interest  it  serves.”  Id.,  at  565.  The  dispar-
agement clause fails this requirement.

It  is  claimed  that  the  disparagement  clause  serves  two
interests.  The first is phrased in a variety of ways in the 
briefs.  Echoing language in one of the opinions below, the
Government  asserts  an  interest  in  preventing  “ ‘un-
derrepresented  groups’ ”  from  being  “ ‘bombarded  with
demeaning  messages  in  commercial  advertising.’ ”  Brief 
for  Petitioner  48  (quoting  808  F. 3d,  at  1364  (Dyk,  J., 
concurring  in  part  and  dissenting  in  part)).    An  amicus 
supporting  the  Government  refers  to  “encouraging  racial 

—————— 

17 As with the framework discussed in Part  III–C of  this opinion, we 
leave  open  the  question  whether  Central  Hudson  provides  the  appro-
priate  test  for  deciding  free  speech  challenges  to  provisions  of  the 
Lanham  Act.    And  nothing  in  our  decision  should  be  read  to  speak  to 
the validity of state unfair competition provisions or product libel laws 
that are not before us and differ from §1052(d)’s disparagement clause.