Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/14pdf/13-352_c0n2.pdf
Page Number: 18

Cite as:  575 U. S. ____ (2015) 

15 

Opinion of the Court 

IV 

At last we turn to whether there is a categorical reason 
why  registration  decisions  can  never  meet  the  ordinary 
elements of issue preclusion, e.g., those elements set out in 
§27 of the Restatement (Second) of Judgments.  Although
many  registrations  will  not  satisfy  those  ordinary  ele-
ments, that does not mean that none will.  We agree with
Professor  McCarthy  that  issue  preclusion  applies  where
“the  issues  in  the  two  cases  are  indeed  identical  and  the 
other rules of collateral estoppel are carefully observed.”  6 
McCarthy  §32:99,  at  32–244;  see  also  3  Gilson 
§11.08[4][i][iii][B], p. 11–319 (“Ultimately, Board decisions
on  likelihood  of  confusion  . . .  should  be  given  preclusive 
effect on a case-by-case basis”). 

A 
The  Eighth  Circuit’s  primary  objection  to  issue  preclu-
sion was that the TTAB considers different factors than it 
does.  Whereas  the  TTAB  employs  some  or  all  of  the 
DuPont  factors  to  assess  likelihood  of  confusion,  the 
Eighth  Circuit  looks  to  similar,  but  not  identical,  factors
identified  in  SquirtCo  v.  Seven-Up  Co.,  628  F.  2d  1086, 
1091  (CA8  1980).    The  court’s  instinct  was  sound: 
“[I]ssues  are  not  identical  if  the  second  action  involves
application  of  a  different  legal  standard,  even  though  the
factual  setting  of  both  suits  may  be  the  same.”    18  C. 
Wright, A. Miller, & E. Cooper, Federal Practice & Proce-
dure  §4417,  p.  449  (2d  ed.  2002)  (hereinafter  Wright  & 
Miller).  Here,  however,  the  same  likelihood-of-confusion 
standard applies to both registration and infringement. 

To  begin  with,  it  does  not  matter  that  registration  and 
infringement  are  governed  by  different  statutory  provi-
sions.  Often a single standard is placed in different stat-
utes;  that  does  not  foreclose  issue  preclusion.    See,  e.g., 
Smith v. Bayer Corp., 564 U. S. ___, ___ (2011) (slip op., at 
7).  Neither does it matter that the TTAB and the Eighth