Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/22pdf/21-1496_d18f.pdf
Page Number: 18

12 

TWITTER, INC. v. TAAMNEH 

Opinion of the Court 

which Halberstam rested and to which JASTA’s common-
law terminology points.

As we have recognized, “[a]iding and abetting is an an-
cient  criminal  law  doctrine”  that  has  substantially  influ-
enced its analog in tort.  Central Bank of Denver, 511 U. S., 
at 181.  In one early statement of the criminal-law doctrine,
William  Blackstone  explained  that  those  who  were  “pre-
sent, aiding and abetting the fact to be done,” or “procure[d],
counsel[ed],  or  command[ed]  another  to  commit  a  crime,” 
were guilty and punishable.  4 Commentaries on the Laws 
of  England  34,  36  (1795).    Over  the  years,  many  statutes
and courts have offered variations on that basic rule.  See 
United States  v.  Peoni, 100 F. 2d  401, 402 (CA2 1938) (L. 
Hand, J., for the court) (collecting authorities).  Yet, to this 
day, the basic “view of culpability” that animates the doc-
trine is straightforward: “[A] person may be responsible for 
a crime he has not personally carried out if he helps another
to  complete  its  commission.”  Rosemond  v.  United  States, 
572 U. S. 65, 70 (2014).

Importantly, the concept of “helping” in the commission 
of a crime—or a tort—has never been boundless.  That is 
because,  if  it  were,  aiding-and-abetting  liability  could 
sweep  in  innocent  bystanders  as  well  as  those  who  gave
only tangential assistance.  For example, assume that any 
assistance of any kind were sufficient to create liability.  If 
that were the case, then anyone who passively watched a 
robbery could be said to commit aiding and abetting by fail-
ing to call the police.  Yet, our legal system generally does 
not impose liability for mere omissions, inactions, or non-
feasance;  although  inaction  can  be  culpable  in  the  face  of 
some  independent  duty  to  act,  the  law  does  not  impose  a 
generalized duty to rescue.  See 1 W. LaFave, Substantive 
Criminal  Law  §6.1  (3d  ed.  2018)  (LaFave);  W.  Keeton,  D. 
Dobbs, R. Keeton, & D. Owen, Prosser and Keeton on Law 
of Torts 373–375 (5th ed. 1984) (Prosser & Keeton).  More-
over,  both  criminal  and  tort  law  typically  sanction  only