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Cite as: 529 U. S. 277 (2000)

325

Stevens, J., dissenting

same, and the plurality cannot ignore their differences and
insist that both aims are equally unrelated to speech simply
because Erie might have “recogniz[ed]” that it could possibly
have had either aim in mind. See ante, at 295.8 One can
think of an apple and an orange at the same time; that does
not turn them into the same fruit.

Of course, the line between governmental interests aimed
at conduct and unrelated to speech, on the one hand, and
interests arising out of the effects of the speech, on the other,
may be somewhat imprecise in some cases.
In this case,
however, we need not wrestle with any such difﬁculty be-
cause Erie has expressly justiﬁed its ordinance with refer-
Indeed, if Erie’s concern with the
ence to secondary effects.
effects of the message were unrelated to the message itself,
it is strange that the only means used to combat those effects
is the suppression of the message.9 For these reasons, the
plurality’s argument that “this case is similar to O’Brien,”
ante, at 291; see also ante, at 294, is quite wrong, as are its

Justices Scalia and Souter adopted such strikingly different ap-
proaches in Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U. S. 560 (1991).

8 I frankly do not understand the plurality’s declaration that a State’s
interest in the secondary effects of speech that are “associated” with the
speech are not “related” to the speech. Ante, at 296. See, e. g., Web-
ster’s Third New International Dictionary 132 (1966) (deﬁning “associate”
as “closely related”). Sometimes, though, the plurality says that the sec-
ondary effects are “caused” by the speech, rather than merely “associated
with” the speech. See, e. g., ante, at 291, 293, 297, 300.
If that is the
deﬁnition of secondary effects the plurality adopts, then it is even more
obvious that an interest in secondary effects is related to the speech at
issue. See Barnes, 501 U. S., at 585–586 (Souter, J., concurring in judg-
ment) (secondary effects are not related to speech because their connection
to speech is only one of correlation, not causation).

9 As Justice Powell said in his concurrence in Young v. American Mini
Theatres, 427 U. S., at 82, n. 4: “[H]ad [Detroit] been concerned with re-
stricting the message purveyed by adult theaters, it would have tried to
close them or restrict their number rather than circumscribe their choice
as to location.” Quite plainly, Erie’s total ban evinces its concern with
the message being regulated.