Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/558bv.pdf
Page Number: 466.0

Cite as: 558 U. S. 290 (2010) 

305 

Stevens, J., dissenting 

§ 2254(e)(1) applies in challenges to a state court’s factual de­
terminations  under  § 2254(d)(2).  We  hold  simply  that,  even 
under  petitioner’s  reading  of  § 2254(d)(2),  the  state  court’s 
conclusion that Wood’s counsel made a strategic decision not 
to pursue or present evidence of his mental deﬁciencies was 
not  an  unreasonable  determination  of  the  facts.  Accord­
ingly,  we  afﬁrm  the  judgment  of  the  Court  of  Appeals  for 
the Eleventh Circuit. 

It is so ordered. 

Justice  Stevens,  with  whom  Justice  Kennedy  joins, 

dissenting. 

There  is  a  world  of  difference  between  a  decision  not  to 
introduce  evidence at  the  guilt phase  of a  trial  and a  failure 
to  investigate  mitigating  evidence  that  might  be  admissible 
at  the  penalty  phase.  Wood’s  experienced  counsel  made  a 
perfectly sensible decision not to introduce Dr. Kirkland’s re­
port  into  evidence  or  to  call  him  as  a  witness.  That  was  a 
strategic decision based on their judgment that the evidence 
would do more harm than good.  But it does not follow from 
this single strategic decision that counsel also made a strate­
gic  decision  to  forgo  investigating  powerful  mitigating  evi­
dence  of  Wood’s  mental  deﬁcits  for  the  penalty  phase.  On 
the  contrary,  the  only  reasonable  factual  conclusion  I  can 
draw from this record is that counsel’s decision to do so was 
the  result  of  inattention  and  neglect.  Because  such  a  deci­
sion is the antithesis of a “strategic” choice, I would reverse 
the decision of the Court of Appeals. 

Assuming  that  the  Court  is  correct  to  decline  to  consider 
whether the state court’s application of Strickland v.  Wash­
ington, 466 U. S. 668 (1984), was reasonable, see ante, at 303– 
304, the question whether the decision itself was the product 
of a strategy is still before us.  The Court may well be cor­
rect  that  the  state  court  reasonably  concluded  that  counsel 
made a decision not to pursue Dr. Kirkland’s report for either 
guilt or penalty phase purposes, ante, at 301–303, but to reject