Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/18pdf/18-422_9ol1.pdf
Page Number: 64.0

Cite as:  588 U. S. ____ (2019) 

25 

KAGAN, J., dissenting 

ideal  of  proportional  representation  commanded  another
Republican  seat.  It  invalidated  that  district  because  the 
quest  for  partisan  gain  made  the  State  override  its  own 
political  geography  and  districting  criteria.  So  much, 
then, for the impossibility of neutrality.

The  majority’s  sole  response  misses  the  point.    Accord-
ing  to  the  majority,  “it  does  not  make  sense  to  use”  a 
State’s own (non-partisan) districting criteria as the base-
line  from  which  to  measure  partisan  gerrymandering 
because  those  criteria  “will  vary  from  State  to  State  and
year  to  year.”    Ante,  at  27.  But  that  is  a  virtue,  not  a 
vice—a  feature,  not  a  bug.  Using  the  criteria  the  State
itself has chosen at the relevant time prevents any judicial 
predilections from affecting the analysis—exactly what the 
majority  claims  it  wants.    At  the  same  time,  using  those
criteria enables a court to measure just what it should: the 
extent  to  which  the  pursuit  of  partisan  advantage—by 
these legislators at this moment—has distorted the State’s 
districting decisions.  Sure, different non-partisan criteria
could  result,  as  the  majority  notes,  in  different  partisan 
distributions  to  serve  as  the  baseline.  Ante,  at  28.  But 
that  in  itself  raises  no  issue:  Everyone  agrees  that  state 
officials using non-partisan criteria (e.g., must counties be 
kept  together?  should  districts  be  compact?)  have  wide 
latitude  in  districting.    The  problem  arises  only  when
legislators  or  mapmakers  substantially  deviate  from  the 
baseline  distribution  by  manipulating  district  lines  for 
partisan  gain.  So  once  again,  the  majority’s  analysis
falters  because  it  equates  the  demand  to  eliminate  parti-
san  gerrymandering  with  a  demand  for  a  single  partisan
distribution—the  one  reflecting  proportional  representa-
tion.  See  ante,  at  16–17.    But  those  two  demands  are 
different, and only the former is at issue here.

The majority’s “how much is too much” critique fares no 
better  than  its  neutrality  argument.    How  about  the  fol-
lowing for a first-cut answer: This much is too much.  By