Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/23pdf/23-939_e2pg.pdf
Page Number: 35

Cite as:  603 U. S. ____ (2024) 

27 

Opinion of the Court 

is  running  for  re-election.  Cf.  Hawaii,  585  U. S.,  at  701. 
Similarly,  the  President  may  speak  on  and  discuss  such 
matters with state officials—even when no specific federal
responsibility  requires  his  communication—to  encourage
them to act in a manner that promotes the President’s view 
of the public good. 

As the Government sees it, however, these allegations en-
compass nothing more than Trump’s “private scheme with
private  actors.”  Brief  for  United  States  44.    In  its  view, 
Trump  can  point  to  no  plausible  source  of  authority  ena-
bling the President to not only organize alternate slates of
electors but also cause those electors—unapproved by any 
state official—to transmit votes to the President of the Sen-
ate for counting at the certification proceeding, thus inter-
fering with the votes of States’ properly appointed electors.  
Indeed, the Constitution commits to the States the power
to  “appoint”  Presidential  electors  “in  such  Manner  as  the
Legislature thereof may direct.”  Art. II, §1, cl. 2; see Bur-
roughs v. United States, 290 U. S. 534, 544 (1934).  “Article 
II,  §1’s  appointments  power,”  we  have  said,  “gives  the
States far-reaching authority over presidential electors, ab-
sent  some  other  constitutional  constraint.”    Chiafalo  v. 
Washington,  591  U. S.  578,  588–589  (2020).  By  contrast,
the Federal Government’s role in appointing electors is lim-
ited.  Congress  may  prescribe  when  the  state-appointed 
electors shall meet, and it counts and certifies their votes. 
Art.  II,  §1,  cls.  3,  4.    The  President,  meanwhile,  plays  no 
direct role in the process, nor does he have authority to con-
trol  the  state  officials who  do.    And  the  Framers,  wary  of 
“cabal, intrigue and corruption,” specifically excluded from
service  as  electors  “all those  who  from  situation  might  be 
suspected of too great devotion to the president in office.” 
The Federalist No. 68, at 459 (A. Hamilton); see Art. II, §1,
cl. 2. 

Determining whose characterization may be correct, and
with respect to which conduct, requires a close analysis of