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OCTOBER TERM, 1999

Syllabus

JONES v. UNITED STATES

certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the seventh circuit

No. 99–5739. Argued March 21, 2000—Decided May 22, 2000

Petitioner Jones tossed a Molotov cocktail into a home owned and occupied
by his cousin as a dwelling place for everyday family living. The ensu-
ing ﬁre severely damaged the home.
Jones was convicted in the Dis-
trict Court of violating, inter alia, 18 U. S. C. § 844(i), which makes it a
federal crime to “maliciously damag[e] or destro[y], . . . by means of ﬁre
or an explosive, any building . . . used in interstate or foreign commerce
or in any activity affecting interstate or foreign commerce.” The Sev-
enth Circuit afﬁrmed, rejecting Jones’s contention that § 844(i), when
applied to the arson of a private residence, exceeds the authority vested
in Congress under the Commerce Clause.

Held: Because an owner-occupied residence not used for any commercial
purpose does not qualify as property “used in” commerce or commerce-
affecting activity, arson of such a dwelling is not subject to federal
prosecution under § 844(i). Pp. 852–859.

(a) In support of its argument that § 844(i) reaches the arson of an
owner-occupied private residence, the Government relies principally on
the breadth of the statutory term “affecting . . . commerce,” words that,
when unqualiﬁed, signal Congress’ intent to invoke its full Commerce
Clause authority. But § 844(i) contains the qualifying words “used in”
a commerce-affecting activity. The key word is “used.” Congress did
not deﬁne the crime as the explosion of a building whose damage or
destruction might affect interstate commerce, but required that the
damaged or destroyed property itself have been used in commerce or in
an activity affecting commerce. The proper inquiry, therefore, is into
the function of the building itself, and then into whether that function
affects interstate commerce. The Court rejects the Government’s ar-
gument that the Indiana residence involved in this case was constantly
“used” in at least three “activit[ies] affecting commerce”: (1) it was
“used” as collateral to obtain and secure a mortgage from an Oklahoma
lender, who, in turn, “used” it as security for the loan; (2) it was “used”
to obtain from a Wisconsin insurer a casualty insurance policy, which
safeguarded the interests of the homeowner and the mortgagee; and (3)
it was “used” to receive natural gas from sources outside Indiana. Sec-
tion 844(i)’s use-in-commerce requirement is most sensibly read to mean
active employment for commercial purposes, and not merely a passive,