Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/21pdf/21-5726_5iel.pdf
Page Number: 3

Cite as:  596 U. S. ____ (2022) 

3 

Syllabus 

reached only factual errors.  Courts of Appeals have well-established 
tests for distinguishing between these Rules.  And should such overlap 
ever create an irreconcilable conflict, courts may then resort to ordi-
nary  interpretive  rules  to  determine  which  Rule  to  apply.    As  for 
Kemp’s  worry  that  the  Court’s  interpretation  would  allow  parties  to
evade other time limits by, for example, repackaging a tardy motion 
under Rule 59(e), the risk Kemp identifies would exist even under his 
own interpretation.  And, in any event, the alleged specter of litigation
gamesmanship  and  strategic  delay  is  overstated  because  a  Rule 
60(b)(1) motion, like all Rule 60(b) motions, must be made “within a 
reasonable time.”  Finally, Kemp protests that this Court’s reading is 
inconsistent with the history of Rule 60(b).  But his argument is based
on the mistaken notions that Rule 60(b)(1)’s list of grounds for reopen-
ing was understood to be a “term of art” when adopted, and that Rule
60(b)(6) alone was intended to afford relief for judicial legal errors that
had previously been remedied by bills of review.  Pp. 6–10. 

857 Fed. Appx. 573, affirmed. 

THOMAS, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C. J., 
and BREYER, ALITO, SOTOMAYOR, KAGAN, KAVANAUGH, and BARRETT, JJ., 
joined.  SOTOMAYOR, J., filed a concurring opinion.  GORSUCH, J., filed a 
dissenting opinion.