Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/21pdf/20-843_7j80.pdf
Page Number: 5.0

Cite as:  597 U. S. ____ (2022) 

5 

Syllabus 

Common-Law Offenses.  As during the colonial and founding peri-
ods, the common-law offenses of “affray” or going armed “to the terror
of the people” continued to impose some limits on firearm carry in the 
antebellum period.  But there is no evidence indicating that these com-
mon-law  limitations  impaired  the  right  of  the  general  population  to
peaceable public carry. 

Statutory  Prohibitions.  In  the  early  to  mid-19th  century,  some
States began enacting laws that proscribed the concealed carry of pis-
tols  and  other  small  weapons.    But  the  antebellum  state-court  deci-
sions  upholding  them  evince  a  consensus  view  that  States  could  not 
altogether prohibit the public carry of arms protected by the Second
Amendment or state analogues. 

Surety Statutes.  In the mid-19th century, many jurisdictions began 
adopting  laws  that  required  certain  individuals  to  post  bond  before 
carrying weapons in public.  Contrary to respondents’ position, these 
surety statutes in no way represented direct precursors to New York’s 
proper-cause requirement.  While New York presumes that individu-
als have no public carry right without a showing of heightened need, 
the  surety  statutes  presumed  that  individuals  had  a  right  to  public
carry that could be burdened only if another could make out a specific
showing of “reasonable cause to fear an injury, or breach of the peace.” 
Mass. Rev. Stat., ch. 134, §16 (1836).  Thus, unlike New York’s regime, 
a  showing  of  special  need  was  required  only  after  an  individual  was 
reasonably accused of intending to injure another or breach the peace.
And, even then, proving special need simply avoided a fee. 

In  sum,  the  historical  evidence  from  antebellum  America  does 
demonstrate that the manner of public carry was subject to reasonable 
regulation, but none of these limitations on the right to bear arms op-
erated to prevent law-abiding citizens with ordinary self-defense needs
from carrying arms in public for that purpose.  Pp. 42–51.

(iv) Evidence  from  around  the  adoption  of  the  Fourteenth 
Amendment also does not support respondents’ position.  The “discus-
sion  of  the  [right  to  keep  and  bear  arms]  in  Congress  and  in  public
discourse, as people debated whether and how to secure constitutional
rights  for  newly  free  slaves,”  Heller,  554  U. S.,  at  614,  generally 
demonstrates that during Reconstruction the right to keep and bear
arms had limits that were consistent with a right of the public to peace-
ably  carry  handguns  for  self-defense.    The  Court  acknowledges  two 
Texas cases—English v. State, 35 Tex. 473 and State v. Duke, 42 Tex. 
455—that  approved  a  statutory  “reasonable  grounds”  standard  for 
public carry analogous to New York’s proper-cause requirement.  But 
these decisions were outliers and therefore provide little insight into
how postbellum courts viewed the right to carry protected arms in pub-
lic.  See Heller, 554 U. S., at 632.  Pp. 52–58.