Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/22pdf/22-535_i3kn.pdf
Page Number: 11.0

Cite as:  600 U. S. ____ (2023) 

7 

Opinion of the Court 

authority.  Carney,  592  U. S.,  at  ___  (slip  op.,  at  4).    Our 
jurisprudence has “established that the irreducible consti-
tutional  minimum  of  standing  contains  three  elements” 
that a plaintiff must plead and—ultimately—prove.  Lujan 
v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U. S. 555, 560 (1992).  “First, 
the plaintiff must have suffered an ‘injury in fact’ ” that is
both “concrete and particularized” and “actual or imminent, 
not conjectural or hypothetical.”  Ibid. (some internal quo-
tation marks omitted).  Second, the plaintiff ’s injury must 
be “fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defend-
ant,” meaning that “there must be a causal connection be-
tween the injury and the conduct complained of.”  Ibid. (in-
ternal quotation marks and alterations omitted).  “Third, it 
must be ‘likely,’ as opposed to merely ‘speculative,’ that the
injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.”  Id., at 561 
(some internal quotation marks omitted). 

We  have  found,  however,  that  when  a  statute  affords  a 
litigant  “a  procedural  right  to  protect  his  concrete  inter-
ests,”  the  litigant  may  establish  Article  III  jurisdiction
without  meeting  the  usual  “standards  for  redressability
and immediacy.”  Id., at 572, n. 7.  For example, we hypoth-
esized a person “living adjacent to the site for proposed con-
struction  of  a  federally  licensed  dam”  and  explained  that 
this  person  “has  standing  to  challenge  the  licensing
agency’s failure to prepare an environmental impact state-
ment, even though he cannot establish with any certainty
that the statement will cause the license to be withheld or 
altered.”  Ibid.  In this context, the fact that the defendant 
might well come to the same decision after abiding by the 
contested procedural requirement does not deprive a plain-
tiff of standing.

Regardless  of  the  redressability  showing  we  have  toler-
ated in the procedural-rights context, we have never held a
litigant  who  asserts  such  a  right  is  excused  from  demon-
strating that it has a “concrete interest that is affected by
the  deprivation”  of  the  claimed  right.  Summers  v.  Earth