Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/22pdf/21-869_87ad.pdf
Page Number: 43.0

Cite as:  598 U. S. ____ (2023) 

37 

Opinion of the Court 

than the U. S. Code or the U. S. Reports, but as a court, we
do not have that luxury.

The dissent thus misses the forest for a tree.  Its single-
minded focus on the value of copying ignores the value of 
original works.  It ignores the statute’s focus on the specific 
use  alleged  to  be  infringing.    See  n. 10,  supra.  It  waves 
away the statute’s concern for derivative works.  Supra, at 
28–29, and n. 17.  It fails to appreciate Campbell’s nuance. 
Supra, at 29–30, 34, n. 21.  And it disregards this Court’s
repeated emphasis on justification.  Supra, at 29–30, and 
n. 18, 34, n. 21. 

The result of these omissions is an account of fair use that 
is  unbalanced  in  theory  and,  perhaps  relatedly,  in  tone. 
The  dissent’s  conclusion—that  whenever  a  use  adds  new 
meaning or message, or constitutes creative progress in the
opinion of a critic or judge, the first fair use factor weighs
in  its  favor—does  not  follow  from  its  basic  premise.  Fair 
use  instead  strikes  a  balance  between  original  works  and 
secondary uses based in part on objective indicia of the use’s 
purpose and character, including whether the use is com-
mercial and, importantly, the reasons for copying.

Finally, copyright law is replete with escape valves: the
idea–expression distinction; the general rule that facts may
not  receive  protection;  the  requirement  of  originality;  the 
legal standard for actionable copying; the limited duration
of copyright; and, yes, the defense of fair use, including all 
its factors, such as whether the amount taken is reasonable 
in relation to the purpose of the use.  These doctrines (and
others) provide ample space for artists and other creators 
to  use  existing  materials  to  make  valuable  new  works. 
They account for most, if not all, of the examples given by 
the dissent, as well as the dissent’s own copying (and the
Court’s, too).  If the last century of American art, literature, 
music,  and  film  is  any  indication,  the  existing  copyright
law, of which today’s opinion is a continuation, is a powerful 
engine of creativity.