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Page Number: 12.0

8 

MASLENJAK v. UNITED STATES 

Opinion of the Court 

naturalization,  in  other  words,  are  subject  to  the  same
rules of language usage as laws concerning other subjects. 
And  under  those  rules,  as  we  have  shown,  §1425(a)  de-
mands  a  means-end  connection  between  a  legal  violation 
and  naturalization.    See  supra,  at  5–6.    Take  §1015(a)’s 
bar  on  making  false  statements  in  connection  with  natu-
ralization—the  prototypical  §1425(a)  predicate,  and  the 
one  at  issue  here.    If  such  a  statement  (in  an  interview, 
say) has no bearing at all on the decision to award citizen-
ship,  then  it  cannot  render  that  award—as  §1425(a)  re-
quires—illegally gained.

The  broader  statutory  context  reinforces  that  point,
because  the  Government’s  reading  would  create  a  pro-
found mismatch between the requirements for naturaliza-
tion on the one hand and those for denaturalization on the 
other.  See  West  Virginia  Univ.  Hospitals,  Inc.  v.  Casey, 
499  U. S.  83,  101  (1991)  (“[I]t  is  our  role  to  make  sense
rather than nonsense out of the corpus juris”).  The immi-
gration  statute  requires  all  applicants  for  citizenship  to
have “good moral character,” and largely defines that term
through  a  list  of  unlawful  or  unethical  behaviors.  8 
  On  the  Government’s 
U. S. C.  §§1427(a)(3),  1101(f ).3
theory,  some  legal  violations  that  do  not  justify  denying
citizenship under that definition would nonetheless justify 
revoking  it  later.    Again,  false  statements  under  §1015(a) 
offer an apt illustration.  The statute’s description of “good 
moral character” singles out a specific class of lies—“false 
testimony  for  the  purpose  of  obtaining  [immigration]
benefits”—as  a  reason  to  deny  naturalization.    8  U. S. C. 
§1101(f )(6).    By  contrast,  “[w]illful  misrepresentations 
made for other reasons, such as embarrassment, fear, or a 
desire for privacy, were not deemed sufficiently culpable to 

—————— 

3 The list of disqualifying conduct is wide-ranging.  See, e.g., 8 U. S. C. 
§1101(f)(4) (illegal gambling); §1101(f)(8) (aggravated felony conviction); 
§1101(f)(9) (participation in genocide).