Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/17pdf/16-402_h315.pdf
Page Number: 33

6 

CARPENTER v. UNITED STATES 

KENNEDY, J., dissenting 

And, of course, it was urgent that the Government take all 
necessary  steps  to  stop  the  ongoing  and  dangerous  crime 
spree.

Cell-site records were uniquely suited to this task.  The 
geographic dispersion of the robberies meant that, if Car-
penter’s  cell  phone  were  within  even  a  dozen  to  several 
hundred city blocks of one or more of the stores when the 
different  robberies  occurred,  there  would  be  powerful 
circumstantial  evidence  of  his  participation;  and  this
would  be  especially  so  if  his  cell  phone  usually  was  not 
located  in  the  sectors  near  the  stores  except  during  the
robbery times.

To  obtain  these  records,  the  Government  applied  to
federal magistrate judges for disclosure orders pursuant to
§2703(d)  of  the  Stored  Communications  Act.    That  Act 
authorizes a  magistrate  judge  to  issue  an order  requiring 
disclosure  of  cell-site  records  if  the  Government  demon-
strates  “specific  and  articulable  facts  showing  that  there
are  reasonable  grounds  to  believe”  the  records  “are  rele-
vant  and  material  to  an  ongoing  criminal  investigation.” 
18  U. S. C.  §§2703(d),  2711(3).    The  full  statutory  provi-
sion is set out in the Appendix, infra. 

From  Carpenter’s  primary  service  provider,  MetroPCS,
the Government obtained records from between December 
2010 and April 2011, based on its understanding that nine 
robberies  had  occurred  in  that  timeframe.    The  Govern-
ment  also  requested  seven  days  of  cell-site  records  from
Sprint,  spanning  the  time  around  the  robbery  in  Warren,
Ohio.  It obtained two days of records.

These records confirmed that Carpenter’s cell phone was
in the general vicinity of four of the nine robberies, includ-
ing the one in Ohio, at the times those robberies occurred. 

The first Clause of the Fourth Amendment provides that 
“the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 

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