Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/22pdf/22-138_43j7.pdf
Page Number: 37.0

20 

COUNTERMAN v. COLORADO 

SOTOMAYOR, J., concurring
Opinion of SOTOMAYOR, J. 

purveyance’  of  a  threat  would  require  that  [a  defendant] 
know the threatening nature of his communication.”  Id., at 
739. 

The  considerations  that  drove  this  Court  to  approve  a 
higher mens rea for obscenity apply here as well.  With ob-
scenity,  the  ambiguity  comes  partly  from  the  reliance  on 
“ ‘contemporary  community  standards’ ”  to  define  what  is 
obscene.  Hamling, 418 U. S., at 129.  Such a standard is 
notoriously  amorphous,  and  will  change  a  great  deal  be-
tween communities and over time.  The same chilling con-
cerns apply to true threats.  A recklessness standard based 
on what a reasonable person could find threatening will de-
pend  on  ever-shifting  community  norms  around  language 
and when heated speech crosses the line from overly aggres-
sive to criminal.  See supra, at 5–7.9 

3 
Finally, the Court relies heavily upon this Court’s frame-
work for defamation.  Specifically, the Court analogizes to
the “reckless disregard” standard for defamation of public 
figures or punitive damages for certain claims involving pri-
vate  figures.  New  York  Times  Co.  v.  Sullivan,  376  U. S. 
254, 279–280 (1964). 

Yet while civil defamation may be “the best known and
best theorized example” of unprotected speech, ante, at 8, 
the same does not go for criminal prosecution of defamation. 
It is true that this Court in 1964 invalidated a prosecution 

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overheated political speech or violent song lyrics. 

9 There is a further safeguard in obscenity cases.  Something is obscene 
if “taken as a whole, [it] lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scien-
tific value.”  Ashcroft v. American Civil Liberties Union, 535 U. S. 564, 
574 (2002) (internal quotation marks omitted).  An intent requirement 
can provide a similar safeguard for threats.  As Virginia v. Black, 538 
U. S.  343  (2003),  explained,  requiring  intent  distinguishes  between
speech intended to intimidate and speech intended to express a political 
statement.  Id.,  at  365–366  (plurality  opinion);  id.,  at  372  (opinion  of 
Scalia, J.).