Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/12pdf/12-96_6k47.pdf
Page Number: 15

Cite as:  570 U. S. ____ (2013) 

11 

Opinion of the Court 

States  is  essential  to  the  harmonious  operation  of  the
scheme  upon  which  the  Republic  was  organized.”    Id.,  at 
580.  Coyle  concerned  the  admission  of  new  States,  and 
Katzenbach rejected the notion that the principle operated 
as  a  bar  on  differential  treatment  outside  that  context. 
383 U. S., at 328–329.  At the same time, as we made clear 
in  Northwest  Austin,  the  fundamental  principle  of  equal 
sovereignty  remains  highly  pertinent  in  assessing  subse-
quent disparate treatment of States.  557 U. S., at 203. 

The Voting Rights Act sharply departs from these basic
principles.  It suspends “all changes to state election law—
however  innocuous—until  they  have  been  precleared
by  federal  authorities  in  Washington,  D.  C.”    Id.,  at  202. 
States  must  beseech  the  Federal  Government  for  permis-
sion  to  implement  laws  that  they  would  otherwise  have
the  right  to  enact  and  execute  on  their  own,  subject  of 
course  to  any  injunction  in  a  §2  action.    The  Attorney
General  has  60  days  to  object  to  a  preclearance  request,
longer  if  he  requests  more  information.  See  28  CFR 
§§51.9, 51.37.  If a State seeks preclearance from a three-
judge court, the process can take years.   

And  despite  the  tradition  of  equal  sovereignty,  the  Act 
applies  to  only  nine  States  (and  several  additional  coun-
ties).  While one State waits months or years and expends 
funds  to  implement  a  validly  enacted  law,  its  neighbor
can  typically  put  the  same  law  into  effect  immediately, 
through the normal legislative process.  Even if a noncov-
ered  jurisdiction  is  sued,  there  are  important  differences
between  those  proceedings  and  preclearance  proceedings; 
the preclearance proceeding “not only switches the burden 
of  proof  to  the  supplicant  jurisdiction,  but  also  applies 
substantive  standards  quite  different  from  those  govern-
ing the rest of the nation.”  679 F. 3d, at 884 (Williams, J., 
dissenting) (case below).   

All  this  explains  why,  when  we  first  upheld  the  Act  in
1966, we described it as “stringent” and “potent.”  Katzen-