Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/18pdf/17-1026_2c83.pdf
Page Number: 18

Cite as:  586 U. S. ____ (2019) 

1 

THOMAS, J., dissenting 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

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No. 17–1026 
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GILBERTO GARZA, JR., PETITIONER v. IDAHO 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF IDAHO 

[February 27, 2019]

 JUSTICE  THOMAS,  with  whom  JUSTICE  GORSUCH  joins,
and  with  whom  JUSTICE  ALITO  joins  as  to  Parts  I  and  II, 
dissenting. 

Petitioner  Gilberto  Garza  avoided  a  potential  life  sen-
tence  by  negotiating  with  the  State  of  Idaho  for  reduced
charges  and  a  10-year  sentence.    In  exchange,  Garza
waived several constitutional and statutory rights, includ-
ing  “his  right  to  appeal.”  App.  to  Pet.  for  Cert.  44a,  49a. 
Despite  this  express  waiver,  Garza  asked  his  attorney  to 
challenge  on  appeal  the  very  sentence  for  which  he  had 
bargained.  Garza’s  counsel  quite  reasonably  declined  to
file an appeal for that purpose, recognizing that his client 
had  waived  this  right  and  that  filing  an  appeal  would 
potentially jeopardize his plea bargain.  Yet, the majority
finds  Garza’s  counsel  constitutionally  ineffective,  holding 
that  an  attorney’s  performance  is  per se  deficient  and 
per se prejudicial any time the attorney declines a criminal 
defendant’s request to appeal an issue that the defendant 
has waived.  In effect, this results in a “defendant-always-
wins”  rule  that  has  no  basis  in  Roe  v.  Flores-Ortega,  528 
U. S. 470 (2000), or our other ineffective-assistance prece-
dents,  and  certainly  no  basis  in  the  original  meaning  of 
the Sixth Amendment.  I respectfully dissent. 

In 2015, in accordance with two plea agreements, Garza 

I