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4 

CARSON v. MAKIN 

BREYER, J., dissenting 

to  worship  God  in  their  own  way  and  to  teach  their  chil-
dren” in that way.  C. Radcliffe, The Law & Its Compass 71 
(1960).  We  have  historically  interpreted  the  Religion
Clauses  with  these  basic  principles  in  mind.    See,  e.g., 
Nyquist, 413 U. S., at 771–772, 794–796; Walz, 397 U. S., at 
668–670; Engel, 370 U. S., at 429–432. 

And in applying these Clauses, we have often said that
“there is room for play in the joints” between them.  Walz, 
397 U. S., at 669; see, e.g., Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U. S. 
455, 469 (1973); Cutter, 544 U. S., at 719; Locke, 540 U. S., 
at 718–719; Trinity Lutheran, 582 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 
6); Espinoza, 591 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 6).  This doctrine 
reflects the fact that it may be difficult to determine in any
particular case whether the Free Exercise Clause requires
a  State  to  fund  the  activities  of  a  religious  institution,  or 
whether the Establishment Clause prohibits the State from 
doing so.  Rather than attempting to draw a highly reticu-
lated  and  complex  free-exercise/establishment  line  that 
varies  based  on  the  specific  circumstances  of  each  state-
funded  program,  we  have  provided  general  interpretive
principles that apply uniformly in all Religion Clause cases. 
At the same time, we have made clear that States enjoy a 
degree of freedom to navigate the Clauses’ competing pro-
hibitions.  See, e.g., Cutter, 544 U. S., at 713, 719–720.  This 
includes  choosing  not  to  fund  certain  religious  activity
where  States  have  strong,  establishment-related  reasons 
for  not  doing  so.  See,  e.g.,  Locke,  540  U. S.,  at  719–722. 
And,  States  have  freedom  to  make  this  choice  even  when 
the Establishment Clause does not itself prohibit the State 
from funding that activity.  Id., at 719 (“[T]here are some
state  actions  permitted  by  the  Establishment  Clause  but 
not required by the Free Exercise Clause”).  The Court to-
day nowhere mentions, and I fear effectively abandons, this 
longstanding doctrine.