Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/21pdf/20-601_bq7c.pdf
Page Number: 35.0

6  CAMERON v. EMW WOMEN’S SURGICAL CENTER, P. S. C. 

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting 

to the Act.”  ECF Doc. 42, at 1.  Based on this representa-
tion, respondents entered into a stipulation agreement with 
the attorney general, and the District Court entered its dis-
missal order. 
  As a general matter, “ ‘where a party assumes a certain 
position in a legal proceeding, and succeeds in maintaining 
that position, he may not thereafter, simply because his in-
terests  have  changed,  assume  a  contrary  position,  espe-
cially  if  it  be to the prejudice  of the party  who  has  acqui-
esced  in  the  position  formerly  taken  by  him.’ ”    New 
Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U. S. 742, 749 (2001) (quoting Da-
vis  v.  Wakelee,  156  U. S.  680,  689  (1895);  alteration omit-
ted).    This  principle  is  not  limited  to  private  litigants.  
Courts  and  other  parties  are  also  “entitled  to  rely  on  [a] 
State’s plausible interpretation of the law it is charged with 
enforcing.”  Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U. S. 552, 563 
(2011).  A state official’s late-breaking effort to change his 
theory  of  state  law  comes  with  costs  to  judicial  efficiency 
and finality, and it disrupts the expectations not only of the 
adversarial litigant but of other parties who may have liti-
gated based on their understanding of both the State’s po-
sition and who would represent the State’s interests.2 
  The Court’s failure to acknowledge the attorney general’s 
switch in position leads it to an erroneous result.  The Court 
primarily  faults  the  Court  of  Appeals  for  “fail[ing]  to  ac-
count  for  the  strength  of  the  Kentucky  attorney  general’s 

—————— 

2 In the majority’s view, the attorney general should not be held to his 
earlier representation because, although he secured his own dismissal in 
his official capacity and now seeks to intervene in his official capacity, 
his theory of his role in the litigation is different.  See ante, at 9–10, n. 5.  
The Court cites no authority for this “two hats theory,” Tr. of Oral Arg. 
29, because it cannot.  This Court’s precedents recognize, of course, the 
distinction between litigating in one’s personal capacity and one’s official 
capacity.  See, e.g., Bender v. Williamsport Area School Dist., 475 U. S. 
534, 543–544 (1986).  But the Court has never held that a state official 
can wear separate “hats” within his official capacity for distinct purposes, 
with different legal effect.