Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/18pdf/18-422_9ol1.pdf
Page Number: 54.0

Cite as:  588 U. S. ____ (2019) 

15 

KAGAN, J., dissenting 

be striking down maps left, right, and center, on the view 
that  every  smidgen  of  politics  is  a  smidgen  too  much. 
Respect  for  state  legislative  processes—and  restraint  in 
the exercise of judicial authority—counsels intervention in
only egregious cases.

But in throwing up its hands, the majority misses some-
thing under its nose: What it says can’t be done has been 
done.  Over  the  past  several  years,  federal  courts  across
the  country—including,  but  not  exclusively,  in  the  deci-
sions  below—have  largely  converged  on  a  standard  for 
adjudicating  partisan  gerrymandering  claims  (striking
down both Democratic and Republican districting plans in
the process).  See also Ohio A. Philip Randolph Inst., 373 
F. Supp.  3d  978;  League  of  Women  Voters  of  Michigan  v. 
Benson,  373  F. Supp.  3d  867  (ED  Mich.  2019).    And  that 
standard  does  what  the  majority  says  is  impossible.    The 
standard  does  not  use  any  judge-made  conception  of  elec-
toral  fairness—either  proportional  representation  or  any 
other; instead, it takes as its baseline a State’s own crite-
ria of fairness, apart from partisan gain.  And by requiring 
plaintiffs  to  make  difficult  showings  relating  to  both  pur-
pose  and  effects,  the  standard  invalidates  the  most  ex-
treme, but only the most extreme, partisan gerrymanders.
Below, I first explain the framework  courts have devel-
oped,  and  describe  its  application  in  these  two  cases. 
Doing  so  reveals  in  even  starker  detail  than  before  how 
much  these  partisan  gerrymanders  deviated  from  demo-
cratic  norms.    As  I  lay  out  the  lower  courts’  analyses,  I
consider  two  specific  criticisms  the  majority  levels—each 
of which reveals a saddening nonchalance about the threat 
such  districting  poses  to  self-governance.  All  of  that  lays 
the  groundwork  for  then  assessing  the  majority’s  more
general view, described above, that judicial policing in this 
area  cannot  be  either  neutral  or  restrained.    The  lower 
courts’ reasoning, as I’ll show, proves the opposite.