Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/10pdf/10-10.pdf
Page Number: 25.0

Cite as:  564 U. S. ____ (2011) 

5 

THOMAS, J., dissenting 

J.,  concurring  in  judgment)  (“I  agree  with  the  plurality 
that  an  allegation  of  arrest  without  probable  cause  must 
be  analyzed  under  the  Fourth  Amendment  without  refer-
ence to more general considerations of due process”); Stop 
the  Beach  Renourishment,  Inc.  v.  Florida  Dept.  of  Envi-
ronmental Protection, 560 U. S. ___, ___ (2010) (opinion of 
SCALIA, J.) (slip  op.,  at  16)  (applying  Albright  to  the  Tak-
ings Clause). 

2 

Moreover,  contrary  to  Turner’s  assertions,  the  holdings 
in this Court’s due process decisions regarding the right to
counsel  are  actually  quite  narrow.  The  Court  has  never 
found  in  the  Due  Process  Clause  a  categorical  right  to
appointed  counsel  outside  of  criminal  prosecutions  or
proceedings  “functionally  akin  to  a  criminal  trial.”    Gag-
non  v.  Scarpelli,  411  U. S.  778,  789,  n.  12  (1973)  (dis-
cussing In re Gault, 387 U. S. 1 (1967)).  This is consistent 
with the conclusion that the Due Process Clause does not 
expand the right to  counsel beyond the boundaries set by 
the Sixth Amendment. 

After  countless  factors  weighed,  mores  evaluated,  and
practices surveyed, the Court has not determined that due 
process  principles  of  fundamental  fairness  categorically
require  counsel  in  any  context  outside  criminal  proceed-
ings.  See,  e.g.,  Lassiter  v.  Department  of  Social  Servs.  of 
Durham Cty., 452 U. S. 18, 31–32 (1981); Wolff v. McDon-
nell,  418  U. S.  539,  569–570  (1974);  see  also  Walters  v. 
National Assn. of Radiation Survivors, 473 U. S. 305, 307– 
308,  320–326  (1985);  Goss  v.  Lopez,  419  U. S.  565,  583 
(1975).  Even when the defendant’s liberty is at stake, the 
Court  has  not  concluded  that  fundamental  fairness  re-
quires that counsel always be appointed if the proceeding 
is not criminal.2  See, e.g., Scarpelli, supra, at 790 (proba-

—————— 

2 “Criminal  contempt  is  a  crime  in  the  ordinary  sense”;  therefore,