Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/19pdf/17-1618_hfci.pdf
Page Number: 164

20 

BOSTOCK v. CLAYTON COUNTY 

KAVANAUGH, J., dissenting 

  That common usage in the States underscores that sex-
ual orientation discrimination is commonly understood as a 
legal concept distinct from sex discrimination. 
  And it is the common understanding in this Court as well.  
Since 1971, the Court has employed rigorous or heightened 
constitutional scrutiny of laws that classify on the basis of 
sex.  See United States v. Virginia, 518 U. S. 515, 531–533 
(1996); J. E. B. v. Alabama ex rel. T. B., 511 U. S. 127, 136–
137 (1994); Craig v. Boren, 429 U. S. 190, 197–199 (1976); 
Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U. S. 677, 682–684 (1973) (plu-
rality  opinion);  Reed  v.  Reed,  404  U. S.  71,  75–77  (1971).  
Over  the  last  several  decades,  the Court  has  also  decided 
many  cases  involving  sexual  orientation.    But  in  those 
cases,  the  Court  never  suggested  that  sexual  orientation 
discrimination is just a form of sex discrimination.  All of 
the  Court’s  cases  from  Bowers  to  Romer  to  Lawrence  to 
Windsor to Obergefell would have been far easier to analyze 
and decide if sexual orientation discrimination were just a 
form of sex discrimination and therefore received the same 
heightened scrutiny as sex discrimination under the Equal 
Protection Clause.  See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U. S. 186 
(1986); Romer v. Evans, 517 U. S. 620 (1996); Lawrence v. 
Texas, 539 U. S. 558 (2003); United States v. Windsor, 570 
U. S. 744 (2013); Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U. S. 644 (2015). 
  Did the Court in all of those sexual orientation cases just 
miss that obvious answer—and overlook the fact that sex-
ual orientation discrimination is actually a form of sex dis-
crimination?    That  seems  implausible.    Nineteen  Justices 
have participated in those cases.  Not a single Justice stated 
or even hinted that sexual orientation discrimination was 
just a form of sex discrimination and therefore entitled to 
the same heightened scrutiny under the Equal Protection 
Clause.  The opinions in those five cases contain no trace of 
such reasoning.  That is presumably because everyone on 
this Court, too, has long understood that sexual orientation