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Page Number: 35

2 

KNOX v. SERVICE EMPLOYEES 

BREYER, J., dissenting 

prior  year.  Those  nonmembers  who  objected  to  the  ap-
portionment,  believing  their  fee  too  high,  could  lodge  an
objection with the union, proceed through arbitration, and
receive a rebate if they won.  The Court found this proce-
dure  constitutionally  inadequate.  It  thought  that  (1)  a
rebate “does not avoid the risk that dissenters’ funds may
be  used  temporarily  for  an  improper  purpose,”  (2)  the
union  had  not  provided  the  nonmembers  in advance  with
“sufficient  information  to  gauge  the  propriety  of  the  un-
ion’s  fee,”  and  (3)  the  union  did  not  provide  objectors
with  “a  reasonably  prompt  decision  by  an  impartial  deci-
sionmaker.”  Id., at 305–307. 

The Court then held that the Constitution requires that
a  union  collecting  a  fee  from  nonmembers  provide  “an
adequate explanation of the basis for the fee, a reasonably 
prompt  opportunity  to  challenge  the  amount  of  the  fee 
before  an  impartial  decisionmaker,  and  an  escrow  for  the 
amounts  reasonably  in  dispute  while  such  challenges  are
pending.”  Id., at 310. 

The  Court  added  that  it  “recognize[d]  that  there  are
practical reasons why ‘[a]bsolute precision’ in the calcula-
tion  of  the  charge  to  nonmembers  cannot  be  ‘expected  or 
required.’ ”  Id.,  at  307,  n. 18  (quoting  Railway  Clerks  v. 
Allen,  373  U. S.  113,  122  (1963)).    It  said  that  the  union 
retains  the  burden  of  proving  that  a  given  expense  is 
chargeable to nonmembers, the “nonmember’s ‘burden’ ” be-
ing simply that of making “his objection known.”  475 U. S., 
at  306,  n. 16.    And  it  added  that  the  union  “cannot 
be  faulted  for  calculating  its  fee  on  the  basis  of  its  ex-
penses during the preceding year.”  Id., at 307, n. 18. 

For  the  last  25  years  unions  and  employers  across
the  Nation  have  relied  upon  this  Court’s  statements  in 
Hudson  in  developing  administratively  workable  systems 
that  (1)  allow  unions  to  pay  the  costs  of  fulfilling  their 
representational  obligations  to  both  members  and  non-
members  alike,  while  (2)  simultaneously  protecting  the