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MURPHY v. NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSN. 

Syllabus 

PASPA.    New  Jersey  countered  that  PASPA  violates  the  Constitu-
tion’s  “anticommandeering”  principle  by  preventing  the  State  from
modifying  or  repealing  its  laws  prohibiting  sports  gambling.    The 
District Court found no anticommandeering violation, the Third Cir-
cuit affirmed, and this Court denied review. 

In  2014,  the  New  Jersey  Legislature  enacted  the  law  at  issue  in
these  cases.    Instead  of  affirmatively  authorizing  sports  gambling
schemes,  this  law  repeals  state-law  provisions  that  prohibited  such 
schemes,  insofar  as  they  concerned  wagering  on  sporting  events  by 
persons 21 years of age or older; at a horseracing track or a casino or
gambling  house  in  Atlantic  City;  and  only  as  to  wagers  on  sporting 
events not involving a New Jersey college team or a collegiate event 
taking  place  in  the  State.  Plaintiffs  in  the  earlier  suit,  respondents
here,  filed  a  new  action  in  federal  court.    They  won  in  the  District
Court, and the Third Circuit affirmed, holding that the 2014 law, no
less than the 2012 one, violates PASPA.  The court further held that 
the prohibition does not “commandeer” the States in violation of the
Constitution. 

Held: 

1. When  a  State  completely  or  partially  repeals  old  laws  banning 
sports  gambling  schemes,  it  “authorize[s]”  those  schemes  under 
PASPA.  Pp. 9–14.

(a) Pointing  out  that  one  accepted  meaning  of  “authorize”  is
“permit,” petitioners contend that any state law that has the effect of
permitting  sports  gambling,  including  a  law  totally  or  partially  re-
pealing  a  prior  prohibition,  amounts  to  authorization.    Respondents
maintain  that  “authorize”  requires  affirmative  action,  and  that  the
2014 law affirmatively acts by empowering a defined group of entities
and  endowing  them  with  the  authority  to  conduct  sports  gambling
operations.  They do not take the position that PASPA bans all modi-
fications  of  laws  prohibiting  sports  gambling  schemes,  but  just  how
far  they  think  a  modification  could  go  is  not  clear.    Similarly,  the 
United  States,  as  amicus,  claims  that  the  State’s  2014  law  qualifies 
as  an  authorization.    PASPA,  it  contends,  neither  prohibits  a  State 
from enacting a complete repeal nor outlaws all partial repeals.  But 
the United States also does not set out any clear rule for distinguish-
ing  between  partial  repeals  that  constitute  the  “authorization”  of
sports gambling and those that are permissible.  Pp. 10–11.

(b) Taking into account the fact that all forms of sports gambling
were  illegal  in  the  great  majority  of  States  at  the  time  of  PASPA’s 
enactment,  the  repeal  of  a  state  law  banning  sports  gambling  not 
only “permits” sports gambling but also gives those now free to conduct 
a sports betting operation the “right or authority to act.”  The inter-
pretation adopted by the Third Circuit and advocated by respondents