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SAN ANTONIO v. HOTELS.COM, L. P. 

Opinion of the Court 

must have the discretion to do that.  By contrast, the OTCs
argue that the appellate court has the discretion to divide
up  the  costs  as  it  deems  appropriate  and  that  a  district 
court cannot alter that allocation.  The OTCs have the bet-
ter of the argument.

The text of subdivision (a) cuts decisively in their favor. 
That provision states that the court of appeals need not fol-
low the default rules, which allocate costs based on the out-
come of the appeal, but can “orde[r] otherwise.”  This broad 
language does not limit the ways in which the court of ap-
peals  can  depart  from  the  default  rules,  and  it  certainly
does not suggest that the court of appeals may not divide 
up costs.

On the contrary, the authority of a court of appeals to do 
just that is strongly supported by the relationship between
the default rules and the court of appeals’ authority to “or-
der otherwise.”  For example, under Rule 39(a)(4), if a dis-
trict  court  judgment  is  affirmed  in  part  and  reversed  in
part, “costs are taxed only as the court [of appeals] orders.”
The most natural meaning of this provision is that a court 
of appeals may apportion costs in accordance with the par-
ties’ relative success, so that if, for example, the appellant
wins what is essentially a 75% victory, the appellant can be
awarded 75% of its costs.3  It would be strange to read this
provision  to  mean  that  the  court  of  appeals’  only  option
where a reversal is not complete is to award the appellant
all its costs or no costs at all.  Similarly, in cases that fall 
under subdivisions (a)(2) and (a)(3), where the default rules
allocate 100% of the costs to the winning party, it is natural 

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3 Both parties recognize the familiar practice of awarding some propor-
tion of the costs to the winning party.  See Tr. of Oral Arg. 15, 44, 76; see, 
e.g., Massachusetts Eye & Ear Infirmary v. QLT Phototherapeutics, Inc., 
552 F. 3d 47, 75 (CA1 2009); In re New Times Securities Servs., Inc., 371 
F. 3d 68, 88 (CA2 2004); Burrell v. Star Nursery, Inc., 170 F. 3d 951, 957 
(CA9 1999); Quaker Action Group v. Andrus, 559 F. 2d 716, 719 (CADC 
1977) (per curiam).