Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/558bv.pdf
Page Number: 575

414  CITIZENS  UNITED  v.  FEDERAL  ELECTION  COMM’N 

Opinion of Stevens, J. 

subsequent rulings “have reduced the impact” of a precedent 
“while reafﬁrming the decision’s core ruling.”  Dickerson v. 
United States, 530 U. S. 428, 443 (2000).28 

In the end, the Court’s rejection of Austin and McConnell 
comes  down  to  nothing  more  than  its  disagreement  with 
their  results.  Virtually  every  one  of  its  arguments  was 
made  and  rejected  in  those  cases,  and  the  majority  opinion 
is essentially an amalgamation of resuscitated dissents.  The 
only  relevant  thing  that  has  changed  since  Austin  and  Mc­
Connell  is  the  composition  of  this  Court.  Today’s  ruling 
thus  strikes  at  the  vitals  of  stare  decisis,  “the  means  by 
which we ensure that the law will not merely change errati­
cally, but will develop in a principled and intelligible fashion” 
that “permits society to presume that bedrock principles are 
founded in the law rather than in the proclivities of individu­
als.”  Vasquez v.  Hillery, 474 U. S. 254, 265 (1986). 

III 

The  novelty  of  the  Court’s  procedural  dereliction  and  its 
approach  to  stare  decisis  is  matched  by  the  novelty  of  its 
ruling on the merits.  The ruling rests on several premises. 
First,  the  Court  claims  that  Austin  and  McConnell  have 
“banned” corporate speech.  Second, it claims that the First 
Amendment precludes regulatory distinctions based on 
speaker identity, including the speaker’s identity as a corpo­

28 Concededly, Austin and McConnell were constitutional decisions, and 
we  have  often  said  that  “claims  of  stare  decisis  are  at  their  weakest  in 
that  ﬁeld,  where  our  mistakes  cannot  be  corrected  by  Congress.”  Vieth 
v.  Jubelirer,  541  U. S.  267,  305  (2004)  (plurality  opinion).  As  a  general 
matter, this principle is a sound one.  But the principle only takes on real 
force  when  an  earlier  ruling  has  obstructed  the  normal  democratic  proc­
ess;  it  is  the  fear  of  making  “mistakes  [that]  cannot  be  corrected  by  Con­
gress,” ibid., that motivates us to review constitutional precedents with a 
more  critical  eye.  Austin  and  McConnell  did  not  obstruct  state  or  con­
gressional legislative power in any way.  Although it is unclear how high 
a  bar  today’s  decision  will  pose  to  future  attempts  to  regulate  corporate 
electioneering, it will clearly restrain much legislative action.