Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/524bv.pdf
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Cite as: 524 U. S. 498 (1998)

521

Opinion of O(cid:146)Connor, J.

1286 (CA9 1997); Rose Acre Farms, Inc. v. Madigan, 956
F. 2d 670, 673–674 (CA7), cert. denied, 506 U. S. 820 (1992).
On the one hand, this Court’s precedent can be read to
support the latter conclusion that regardless of the nature of
relief sought, the availability of a Tucker Act remedy renders
premature any takings claim in federal district court. See
Preseault v. ICC, 494 U. S. 1, 11 (1990); see also Monsanto,
supra, at 1016. On the other hand, in a case such as this
one, it cannot be said that monetary relief against the Gov-
ernment is an available remedy. See Brief for Federal Re-
spondent 38–39, n. 30. The payments mandated by the Coal
Act, although calculated by a Government agency, are paid
to the privately operated Combined Fund. Congress could
not have contemplated that the Treasury would compensate
coal operators for their liability under the Act, for “[e]very
dollar paid pursuant to a statute would be presumed to gen-
In re Chateau-
erate a dollar of Tucker Act compensation.”
gay Corp., 53 F. 3d, at 493. Accordingly, the “presumption
of Tucker Act availability must be reversed where the chal-
lenged statute, rather than burdening real or physical prop-
erty, requires a direct transfer of funds” mandated by the
Government.
In that situation, a claim for compen-
sation “would entail an utterly pointless set of activities.”
Student Loan Marketing Assn. v. Riley, 104 F. 3d 397, 401
Instead, as we
(CADC), cert. denied, 522 U. S. 913 (1997).
explained in Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental
Study Group, Inc., 438 U. S. 59, 71, n. 15 (1978), the Declara-
tory Judgment Act “allows individuals threatened with a
taking to seek a declaration of the constitutionality of the
disputed governmental action before potentially uncompen-
sable damages are sustained.”

Ibid.

Moreover, in situations analogous to this case, we have
assumed the lack of a compensatory remedy and have
granted equitable relief for Takings Clause violations with-
out discussing the applicability of the Tucker Act. See, e. g.,
Babbitt v. Youpee, 519 U. S. 234, 243–245 (1997); Hodel v. Ir-