Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/22pdf/22-105_5536.pdf
Page Number: 17

4 

COINBASE, INC. v. BIELSKI 

JACKSON, J., dissenting 

Given  all  this,  it  is  no  surprise  that  Congress’s  enact-
ments barely figure into the majority opinion.  The manda-
tory-general-stay  rule  is  so  untethered  from  §16  that  the 
statutory text has no role in the Court’s reasoning. 

And  when  Congress’s  work  finally  does  take  the  stage
near the end of the Court’s analysis, it plays a minor part.
See ante, at 6–7.  The Court notes that other statutes ex-
pressly provide that appeals do not automatically stay dis-
trict court proceedings.  Ante, at 7, and n. 6.  From this, the 
Court tries to draw an across-the-board inference that, un-
less  Congress  expressly  disavows  the  majority’s  manda-
tory-general-stay rule, that rule applies.  

The Court’s inference fails.  The statutes that the major-

—————— 
U. S. C. §1292(d)(4) also makes no sense.  According to the majority, Con-
gress usually remains silent when it intends to mandate a stay.  Ante, at 
6–7, 8–9.  Congress expressly imposed a mandatory stay in §1292(d)(4),
the  majority  says,  only  because  a  pre-existing  provision,  §1292(d)(3), 
would otherwise have made stays in §1292(d)(4) appeals discretionary. 
Ante, at 8–9. 

But that last point holds no water.  Paragraph (3) has no bearing on
paragraph (4), because these two provisions govern different kinds of ap-
peals.

Specifically,  paragraph  (3)  governs  certain  appeals  by  permission, 
while paragraph (4) governs a separate set of appeals as of right.  Para-
graph  (3)  addresses  events  unique  to permissive  appeals:  “Neither  the 
application for nor the granting of an appeal” stays trial court proceed-
ings.  §1292(d)(3) (emphasis added).  Paragraph (3) thus corresponds to 
paragraphs (1) and (2), which authorize permissive appeals “if applica-
tion is made” and granted.  §§1292(d)(1)–(2).  Meanwhile, paragraph (4) 
separately authorizes certain as-of-right appeals, §1292(d)(4)(A), and it
imposes mandatory stays in such appeals, §1292(d)(4)(B).  In an appeal 
as  of  right  under  paragraph  (4),  paragraph  (3) never  kicks  in,  because 
there is no “application for” or “granting of ” an appeal, §1292(d)(3). 

Thus,  the  majority’s  story—that  Congress  needed  express  stay  lan-
guage  to  avoid  overlap  with  paragraph  (3)—turns  on  a  red  herring. 
There is no such overlap.  Instead, only the more straightforward expla-
nation  remains:  Congress  imposed  a  mandatory  general  stay  in 
§1292(d)(4)—but not 9 U. S. C. §16—because it intended such a stay un-
der the former but not the latter.