Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/22pdf/21-857_4357.pdf
Page Number: 66.0

34 

JONES v. HENDRIX 

JACKSON, J., dissenting 

At the very least, this take on early habeas practice ap-
pears  contradicted  by  United  States  v.  Bainbridge,  24  F. 
Cas. 946 (No. 14,497) (CC Mass. 1816) (Story, J.).  There, 
Justice Story considered a statutory innocence claim on the 
merits  even  though  the  individual  had  already  pleaded
guilty.  Id.,  at  949,  951–952.  And  the  postconviction/pre-
conviction distinction also runs headlong into other prece-
dents that have looked back on history and do not subscribe 
to  such  a  narrow  view.  St.  Cyr,  533  U. S.,  at  302  (“[T]he
issuance of the writ was not limited to challenges to the ju-
risdiction of the custodian”); Fay v. Noia, 372 U. S. 391, 404 
(1963) (“Nor is it true  that at common law habeas corpus 
was available only to inquire into the jurisdiction, in a nar-
row sense, of the committing court” (citing Bushell’s Case, 
Vaughn. 135, 124 Eng. Rep. 1006 (C. P. 1670))). 
  Thus, assuming, arguendo, that the historical grounding 
of the particular type of claim Jones sought to bring even 
matters, the majority is mistaken when it contends that a 
statutory innocence claim (including one brought in a suc-
cessive petition) is not sufficiently historical to warrant ap-
plication of our clear-statement rule. 

* 

* 

* 
If the majority had applied the clear-statement rule, as it 
should have, to determine whether §2255(h) precludes suc-
cessive postconviction petitions that assert statutory inno-
cence claims, today’s interpretive task would have merely 
involved answering one simple question: Is there an unam-
biguous sign in the text of §2255 that Congress meant for 
§2255(h) to strip an incarcerated individual of any oppor-
tunity to raise a new claim of legal innocence in a motion
brought in federal court?  No such sign exists.23  Therefore, 

—————— 

23 The majority does not appear to dispute this conclusion, as it only 
engages with the clear-statement rule to categorically reject its applica-
bility.    Ante,  at  23–25.    The  majority  does  not—and  cannot—establish 
that, if applied here, the clear-statement rule is satisfied.