Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/558bv.pdf
Page Number: 254.0

Cite as: 558 U. S. 87 (2009) 

93 

Opinion of the Court 

class certiﬁcation motion.  The plaintiffs did not appeal that 
denial.  Hence the only disputes relevant here are those be­
tween these six plaintiffs and the State’s Attorney; those dis­
putes  concerned  cars  and  cash;  and  those  disputes  are  now 
over.  United  States  Parole  Comm’n  v.  Geraghty,  445  U. S. 
388, 404 (1980) (“A named plaintiff whose claim expires may 
not  continue  to  press  the  appeal  on  the  merits  until  a  class 
has been properly certiﬁed”). 

The  parties,  of  course,  continue  to  dispute  the  lawfulness 
of  the  State’s  hearing  procedures.  But  that  dispute  is  no 
longer  embedded  in  any  actual  controversy  about  the  plain­
tiffs’  particular  legal  rights.  Rather,  it  is  an  abstract  dis­
pute  about  the  law,  unlikely  to  affect  these  plaintiffs  any 
more  than  it  affects  other  Illinois  citizens.  And  a  dispute 
solely  about  the  meaning  of  a  law,  abstracted  from  any  con­
crete  actual  or  threatened  harm,  falls  outside  the  scope  of 
the constitutional words “Cases” and “Controversies.”  See, 
e. g.,  Lewis  v.  Continental  Bank  Corp.,  494  U. S.  472,  477 
(1990); North Carolina v.  Rice, 404 U. S. 244, 246 (1971) (per 
curiam);  Aetna  Life  Ins.  Co.  v.  Haworth,  300  U. S.  227,  241 
(1937); Mills v.  Green, 159 U. S. 651, 653 (1895). 

We  can  ﬁnd  no  special  circumstance  here  that  might  war­
rant  our  continuing  to  hear  the  case.  We  have  sometimes 
heard  attacks  on  practices  that  no  longer  directly  affect  the 
attacking party, but are “capable of repetition” while “evad­
ing review.”  See, e. g., Federal Election Comm’n v.  Wiscon­
sin  Right  to  Life,  Inc.,  551  U. S.  449,  462  (2007);  Southern 
Paciﬁc  Terminal  Co.  v.  ICC,  219  U. S.  498,  515  (1911).  Yet 
here, unlike those cases, nothing suggests that the individual 
plaintiffs will likely again prove subject to the State’s seizure 
procedures.  See  Los  Angeles  v.  Lyons,  461  U. S.  95,  109 
(1983)  (“[T]he  capable-of-repetition  doctrine  applies  only  in 
exceptional  situations,  and  generally  only  where  the  named 
plaintiff  can  make  a  reasonable  showing  that  he  will  again 
be subjected to the alleged illegality”); DeFunis v.  Odegaard, 
416  U. S.  312,  318–319  (1974)  (per  curiam).  And  in  any