Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/21pdf/21-234_2b8e.pdf
Page Number: 18.0

Cite as:  596 U. S. ____ (2022) 

3 

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting 

Court-created rule, not the invalidation of a regulation as
clearly contrary to the governing statute.  And although it 
was well established by 1997 that clear and unmistakable
error “must be based on . . . the law that existed at the time 
of  the  prior  . . .  decision,”  Russell  v.  Principi,  3  Vet.  App.
310,  314  (1992)  (en  banc),  this  is  not  inconsistent  with 
George’s request for review based  on the plain terms of  a 
statute as it existed in 1977, when the Board ruled against
him. 

Other authorities relied upon by the Court are equivocal. 
The VA opined in 1994 that invalidation of a regulation by
the Veterans Court constituted a “ ‘change in interpretation 
of law,’ ” but it also admitted “that VA’s historical approach 
has not been entirely consistent.”  Op. Gen. Counsel Prece-
dent 9–94, ¶¶6, 8, pp. 4–5 (Mar. 25).   Meanwhile, the Vet-
erans  Court’s  1992  decision  in  Look  v.  Derwinski,  2  Vet. 
App.  157,  while  not  a  model  of  clarity,  undeniably  “ap-
prov[ed  of]  collateral  relief ”  based  on  “a  later  invalidated
regulation,” as the Court recognizes.  Ante, at 8. 

My  takeaway  from  these  conflicting  authorities  is  that 
the  pre-existing  doctrine  Congress  incorporated  in  1997 
was unsettled as to whether judicial invalidation of a regu-
lation that squarely contravened an unambiguous statute 
constituted  a  “change  in  interpretation  of  law.”    In  other 
words, where the Court perceives  certainty, I see at most 
confusion.  Confronted  with  an  ambiguity  in  the  scheme
Congress codified into statute, I would apply the venerable 
“ ‘canon  that  provisions  for  benefits  to  members  of  the
Armed Services are to be construed in the beneficiaries’ fa-
vor.’ ”    Henderson  v.  Shinseki,  562  U. S.  428,  441  (2011) 
(quoting King v. St. Vincent’s Hospital, 502 U. S. 215, 220– 
221,  n. 9  (1991)).    Accordingly,  I  would  hold  that  George
may seek review based on clear and unmistakable error.

For these reasons, as well as others set forth by JUSTICE 

GORSUCH, I respectfully dissent.