Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/13pdf/12-536_e1pf.pdf
Page Number: 33.0

Cite as:  572 U. S. ____ (2014) 

27 

Opinion of ROBERTS, C. J. 

CFR §102.17(c)(5).  Under no circumstances may a contri-
bution to a joint fundraising committee result in an alloca-
tion  that  exceeds  the  contribution  limits  applicable  to 
its  constituent  parts;  the  committee  is  in  fact  required 
to  return  any  excess  funds  to  the  contributor.    See 
§102.17(c)(6)(i).

The District Court assumed compliance with the specific
allocation  rules  governing  joint  fundraising  committees,
but it expressly based its example on the premise that the
donor would telegraph his desire to support one candidate 
and that “many separate entities would willingly serve as 
conduits for a single contributor’s interests.”  893 F. Supp. 
2d,  at  140.  Regardless  whether  so  many  distinct  entities
would  cooperate  as  a  practical  matter,  the  earmarking
provision  prohibits  an  individual  from  directing  funds
“through  an  intermediary  or  conduit”  to  a  particular  can-
didate.  2  U. S. C.  §441a(8).    Even  the  “implicit[  ]”  agree-
ment  imagined  by  the  District  Court,  893  F. Supp.  2d,  at
140, would trigger the earmarking provision.  See 11 CFR 
§110.6(b)(1).  So  this  circumvention  scenario  could  not 
succeed  without  assuming  that  nearly  50  separate  party
committees would engage in a transparent violation of the 
earmarking  rules  (and  that  they  would  not  be  caught  if 
they did).

Moreover, the District Court failed to acknowledge that
its $500,000 example cannot apply to most candidates.  It 
crafted  the  example  around  a  presidential  candidate,  for 
whom donations in the thousands of dollars may not seem
remarkable—especially  in  comparison  to  the  nearly  $1.4
billion  spent  by  the  2012  presidential  candidates.    The 
same  example  cannot,  however,  be  extrapolated  to  most 
House and Senate candidates.  Like contributions, coordi-
nated  expenditures  are  limited  by  statute,  with  different 
limits  based  on  the  State  and  the  office.    See  2  U. S. C. 
§441a(d)(3).  The  2013  coordinated  expenditure  limit  for 
most  House  races  is  $46,600,  well  below  the  $500,000  in