Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/558bv.pdf
Page Number: 365

204 

HOLLINGSWORTH  v.  PERRY 

Breyer, J., dissenting 

generally  P.  Fish,  The  Politics  of  Federal  Judicial  Adminis­
tration  152–153  (1973)  (From  their  creation,  “[t]he  councils 
constituted . . . a mechanism through which there could be a 
concentration  of  responsibility  in  the  various  Circuits—im­
mediate responsibility for the work of  the courts in the Cir­
cuits, with power and authority . . . to insure competence in 
th[eir]  work  . . . ” (internal quotation  marks  omitted)).  For 
that reason it is inappropriate as well as unnecessary for this 
Court to intervene in the procedural aspects of local judicial 
administration.  Perhaps  that  is  why  I  have  not  been  able 
to  ﬁnd  any  other  case  in  which  this  Court  has  previously 
done  so,  through  emergency  relief  or  otherwise.  Cf.  Bank 
of  Nova  Scotia  v.  United  States,  487  U. S.  250,  264  (1988) 
(Scalia, J., concurring) (“I do not see the basis for any direct 
authority to supervise lower courts” (citing Frazier v.  Heebe, 
482  U. S.  641,  651–652  (1987)  (Rehnquist,  C.  J.,  dissenting))). 
Nor am I aware of any instance in which this Court has pre­
emptively sought to micromanage district court proceedings 
as it does today. 

I recognize that the Court may see this matter not as one 
of promulgating and applying a local rule but, rather, as pre­
senting  the  larger  question  of  the  place  of  cameras  in  the 
courtroom.  But the wisdom of a camera policy is primarily 
a  matter  for  the  proper  administrative  bodies  to  determine. 
See  28  U. S. C.  § 332.  This  Court  has  no  legal  authority  to 
address  that  larger  policy  question  except  insofar  as  it  im­
plicates  a  question  of  law.  The  relevant  question  of  law 
here concerns the procedure for amending local rules.  And 
the  only  relevant  legal  principles  that  allow  us  here  to  take 
account  of  the  immediate  subject  matter  of  that  local  rule, 
namely, cameras, are those legal principles that permit us— 
indeed require us—to look to the nature of the harm at issue 
and to balance equities, including the public interest.  I con­
sequently turn to those two matters. 

Third,  consider  the  harm:  I  can  ﬁnd  no  basis  for  the 
Court’s  conclusion  that,  were  the  transmissions  to  other