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FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N v. AKINS

Opinion of the Court

the scope of the Act’s term “political committee” and the
Act’s disclosure provisions, which that deﬁnition triggers.
The FEC nonetheless held that AIPAC was not subject
to the disclosure requirements, but for a different reason.
In the FEC’s view, the Act’s deﬁnition of “political com-
mittee” includes only those organizations that have as a
“major purpose” the nomination or election of candidates.
Cf. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S., at 79. AIPAC, it added,
was fundamentally an issue-oriented lobbying organization,
not a campaign-related organization, and hence AIPAC fell
outside the deﬁnition of a “political committee” regardless.
App. 146. The FEC consequently dismissed respondents’
complaint.

Respondents ﬁled a petition in Federal District Court
seeking review of the FEC’s determination dismissing their
complaint. See §§ 437g(a)(8)(A), 437g(a)(8)(C). The Dis-
trict Court granted summary judgment for the FEC, and a
divided panel of the Court of Appeals afﬁrmed.
66 F. 3d
348 (CADC 1995). The en banc Court of Appeals reversed,
however, on the ground that the FEC’s “major purpose” test
improperly interpreted the Act’s deﬁnition of a “political
committee.”
101 F. 3d 731 (CADC 1997). We granted the
FEC’s petition for certiorari, which contained the following
two questions:

“1. Whether respondents had standing to challenge the
Federal Election Commission’s decision not to bring an
enforcement action in this case.
“2. Whether an organization that spends more than
$1,000 on contributions or coordinated expenditures in a
calendar year, but is neither controlled by a candidate
nor has its major purpose the nomination or election of
candidates, is a ‘political committee’ within the meaning
of the [Act].” Brief for Petitioner I.

We shall answer the ﬁrst of these questions, but not the
second.