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Page Number: 46

4 

COUNTERMAN v. COLORADO 

BARRETT, J., dissenting 

“fighting  words”  according  to  a  reasonable-person  stand-
ard); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296, 309–310 (1940) 
(statements  unprotected  when  they  are  “likely  to  provoke
violence and disturbance of good order, even though no such 
eventuality  be  intended”).  Instead,  we  ask  only  whether 
“the  ordinary  citizen,”  using  her  “common  knowledge,”
would  reasonably  understand  the  statement  as  a  “direct 
personal insult.”  Cohen, 403 U. S., at 20; see also Texas v. 
Johnson, 491 U. S. 397, 409 (1989). 

The Court similarly overlooks the category of “false, de-
ceptive, or misleading” commercial speech.  Zauderer v. Of-
fice of Disciplinary Counsel of Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 
U. S.  626,  638  (1985);  In  re  R. M. J.,  455  U. S.  191,  203 
(1982)  (“Truthful  advertising  . . .  is  entitled  to  the  protec-
tions of the First Amendment,” but “[m]isleading advertis-
ing may be prohibited entirely”); Ibanez v. Florida Dept. of 
Business and Professional Regulation, Bd. of Accountancy, 
512 U. S. 136, 142 (1994) (“[F]alse, deceptive, or misleading 
commercial speech may be banned”).  Here, too, our cases 
suggest that First Amendment protection depends on objec-
tive falsity rather than the speaker’s intention.  See In re 
R. M. J., 455 U. S., at 202 (“[R]egulation—and imposition of 
discipline—are permissible where the particular advertis-
ing is inherently likely to deceive or where the record indi-
cates that a particular form or method of advertising has in 
fact  been  deceptive”  (emphasis  added));  see  also  Milavetz, 
Gallop  &  Milavetz,  P. A.  v.  United  States,  559  U. S.  229, 
250–253 (2010).  Thus, the government is “free to prevent 
the dissemination of commercial speech that is false, decep-
tive, or misleading,” without regard to whether the speaker
knew that the recipient would be deceived or misled.  Zau-
derer, 471 U. S., at 638. 

Or take obscenity, which we have long held is “not pro-
tected by the freedoms of speech and press.”  Roth v. United 
States, 354  U. S. 476, 481 (1957).  Speech qualifies as ob-