Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/17pdf/16-1454_5h26.pdf
Page Number: 49

Cite as:  585 U. S. ____ (2018) 

25 

BREYER, J., dissenting 

own product.  A television-set manufacturer, for example, 
will insist that its dealers not cut prices for the manufac­
turer’s  own  televisions  below  a  particular  level.  Why
might  a  manufacturer  want  its  dealers  to  refrain  from 
price  competition  in  the  manufacturer’s  own  products? 
Perhaps because, for example, the manufacturer wants to
encourage the dealers to develop the market for the manu­
facturer’s  brand,  thereby  increasing  interbrand  competi­
tion  for  the  same  ultimate  product,  namely  a  television 
set.  This  type  of  reasoning  does  not  appear  to  apply  to
American  Express’  nondiscrimination  provisions,  which 
seek to control the terms on which merchants accept other 
brands’ cards, not merely American Express’ own. 

Regardless,  I  would  not  now  hold  that  an  agreement 
such  as  the  one  before  us  can  never  be  justified  by  pro-
competitive  benefits  of  some  kind.  But  the  Court  of  Ap­
peals would properly consider procompetitive justifications 
not  at  step  1,  but  at  steps  2  and  3  of  the  “rule  of  reason” 
inquiry.  American  Express  would  need  to  show  just  how 
this  particular  anticompetitive  merchant-related  agree­
ment  has  procompetitive  benefits  in  the  shopper-related
market.    In  doing  so,  American  Express  would  need  to
overcome  the  District  Court’s  factual  findings  that  the 
agreement  had  no  such  effects.  See  88  F. Supp. 3d,  at 
224–238. 

B 
The  majority  charts  a  different  path.    Notwithstanding
its purported acceptance of the three-step, burden-shifting
framework  I  have  described,  ante,  at  9–10,  the  majority
addresses American Express’ procompetitive justifications
now, at step 1 of the analysis, see ante, at 18–20.  And in 
doing  so,  the  majority  inexplicably  ignores  the  District
Court’s factual findings on the subject. 

The  majority  reasons  that  the  challenged  nondiscrimi­
nation provisions “stem negative externalities in the credit­