Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/21pdf/21-147_g31h.pdf
Page Number: 33

Cite as:  596 U. S. ____ (2022) 

9 

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting
Opinion of SOTOMAYOR, J. 

It is of course well established that a Bivens suit involv-
ing  an  entirely  “ ‘new  category  of  defendants’ ”  arises  in  a 
“ ‘new context.’ ”   Ziglar, 582 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 11); 
see also Hernández, 589 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 7).  The 
Court, however, has never relied on this principle to draw 
artificial  distinctions  between  line-level  officers  of  the  83 
different federal law enforcement agencies with authority 
to make arrests and provide police protection.  See Dept. of
Justice,  C.  Brooks,  Federal  Law  Enforcement  Officers, 
(NCJ  251922,  Oct.  2019), 
2016—Statistical  Tables 
https://bjs.ojp.gov/content/pub/pdf/fleo16st.pdf. 
Indeed,  if 
the “new context” inquiry were defined at such a fine level 
of  granularity,  every  case  would  raise  a  new  context,  be-
cause the Federal Bureau of Narcotics no longer exists.  See 
National Archives, Records of the Drug Enforcement Admin-
istration [DEA] (Aug. 15, 2016), https://www.archives.gov/
research/guide-fed-records/groups/170.html. 

Moreover,  the  “new  category  of  defendants”  language
traces back to a different concern raised in the Court’s de-
cision in Correctional Services Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U. S. 
61,  68  (2001).  That  case  involved  an  Eighth  Amendment 
claim brought by a federal prisoner against a private corpo-
ration  under  contract  with  the  federal  Bureau  of  Prisons. 
The Court observed that “the threat of suit against an indi-
vidual’s employer,” rather than “the individual directly re-
sponsible for the alleged injury,” “was not the kind of deter-
rence  contemplated  by  Bivens.”  Id.,  at  70–71.  Applying 
Bivens to a corporate defendant would amount to a “marked 
extension of Bivens . . . to contexts that would not advance 
Bivens’  core  purpose  of  deterring  individual  officers  from
engaging  in  unconstitutional  wrongdoing.”    Malesko,  534 
U. S.,  at  74;  see  also  FDIC  v.  Meyer,  510  U. S.  471,  485 
(1994) (declining to allow a Bivens claim to proceed against
a  federal  agency  for  similar  reasons).    Here,  by  contrast,
Boule’s  suit  against  Agent  Egbert  directly  advances  that 
core purpose.