Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/11pdf/10-1121c4d6.pdf
Page Number: 13

Cite as:  567 U. S. ____ (2012) 

9 

Opinion of the Court 

ideas  that  it  approves.  See  R. A. V.  v.  St.  Paul,  505  U. S. 
377, 382 (1992); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U. S. 444, 447– 
448  (1969)  (per curiam);  West  Virginia  Bd.  of  Ed.  v.  Bar-
nette,  319  U. S.  624  (1943);  Wooley  v.  Maynard,  430  U. S. 
705, 713–715 (1977); Riley v. National Federation of Blind 
of  N. C.,  Inc.,  487  U. S.  781,  797  (1988)  (The  First 
Amendment protects “the decision of both what to say and
what  not  to  say”  (emphasis  deleted)).    And  the  ability  of
like-minded  individuals  to  associate  for  the  purpose  of 
expressing  commonly  held  views  may  not  be  curtailed.
See  Roberts  v.  United  States  Jaycees,  468  U. S.  609,  623 
(1984)  (“Freedom  of  association  . . .  plainly  presupposes  a 
freedom  not  to  associate”);  NAACP  v.  Alabama  ex rel. 
Patterson, 357 U. S. 449, 460–461 (1958). 

Closely  related  to  compelled  speech  and  compelled 
association  is  compelled  funding  of  the  speech  of  other 
private  speakers  or  groups.  See  Abood,  431  U. S.,  at 
222–223.  In United States v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U. S. 
405  (2001),  we  considered  the  constitutionality  of  a  state
scheme  that  compelled  such  funding.    The  subject  of  the
speech  at  issue—promoting  the  sale  of  mushrooms—was 
not one that is likely to stir the passions of many, but the 
mundane  commercial  nature  of  that  speech  only  high-
lights the importance of our analysis and our holding. 

The  federal  Mushroom  Promotion,  Research,  and  Con-
sumer  Information  Act  required  that  fresh  mushroom 
handlers  pay  assessments  used  primarily  to  fund  adver-
tisements  promoting  mushroom  sales.  A  large  producer
objected to subsidizing these generic ads, and even though
we  applied  the  less  demanding  standard  used  in  prior 
cases  to  judge  laws  affecting  commercial  speech,  we  held 
that the challenged scheme violated the First Amendment. 
We  made  it  clear  that  compulsory  subsidies  for  private 
speech  are  subject  to  exacting  First  Amendment  scrutiny
and  cannot  be  sustained  unless  two  criteria  are  met. 
First,  there  must  be  a  comprehensive  regulatory  scheme