Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/524bv.pdf
Page Number: 214.0

524US1

Unit: $U81

[09-06-00 20:27:26] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 524 U. S. 156 (1998)

169

Opinion of the Court

Finally, petitioners argue that the interest income trans-
ferred to the TEAJF is not “private property” because the
client funds held in IOLTA accounts “cannot reasonably be
expected to generate interest income on their own.” Brief
for Petitioners 18. As an initial matter, petitioners’ asser-
tion that client funds held in IOLTA accounts cannot be ex-
pected to generate interest income is plainly incorrect under
the express terms of the Texas IOLTA rules. Texas IOLTA
Rule 6 requires that client funds held by an attorney be de-
posited in an IOLTA account “if the interest which might be
earned” is insufﬁcient to offset the “cost of establishing and
maintaining the account, service charges, accounting costs
and tax reporting costs which would be incurred in attempt-
ing to obtain the interest on such funds for the client.”
In
other words, it is not that the client funds to be placed in
IOLTA accounts cannot generate interest, but that they can-
not generate net interest.

Whether client funds held in IOLTA accounts could gener-
ate net interest is a matter of some dispute. As written,
the Texas IOLTA program requires the calculation as to net
interest to be made “without regard to funds of other clients
which may be held by the attorney.” Texas IOLTA Rule 6.
This provision would deny to an attorney the traditional
practice of pooling funds of several clients in one account, a
practice which might produce net interest when opening an
account for each client would not. But in the District Court,
petitioners agreed that this portion of the rule was not to
be enforced, and that an attorney could make the necessary
calculation on the basis of pooled accounts. Petitioners
made a similar concession during oral argument here. Tr. of
Oral Arg. 13–16. We accept this concession but ﬁnd that it
does not avail petitioners.

We have never held that a physical item is not “property”
simply because it lacks a positive economic or market value.
For example, in Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV