Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/14pdf/13-1041_0861.pdf
Page Number: 14.0

Cite as:  575 U. S. ____ (2015) 

11 

Opinion of the Court 

Next, MBA argues that the Paralyzed Veterans doctrine 
is more consistent with this Court’s “functional” approach
to interpreting the APA.  Relying on Christensen v. Harris 
County,  529  U. S.  576  (2000),  and  Shalala  v.  Guernsey 
Memorial  Hospital,  514  U. S.  87,  MBA  contends  that  we 
have  already  recognized  that  an  agency  may  not  “avoid
notice-and-comment  procedures  by  cloaking  its  actions  in 
the mantle of mere ‘interpretation.’ ”  Brief for Respondent 
23–24. 

Neither  of  the  cases  MBA  cites  supports  its  argument.
Our  decision  in  Christensen  did  not  address  a  change  in 
agency  interpretation.  Instead,  we  there  refused  to  give
deference to an agency’s interpretation of an unambiguous
regulation,  observing  that  to  defer  in  such  a  case  would
allow the agency “to create de facto a new regulation.”  529 
U. S.,  at  588.    Put  differently,  Christensen  held  that  the 
agency  interpretation  at  issue  was  substantively  invalid 
because  it  conflicted  with  the  text  of  the  regulation  the 
agency purported to interpret.  That holding is irrelevant
to  this  suit  and  to  the  Paralyzed  Veterans  rule,  which 
assesses whether an agency interpretation is procedurally
invalid. 

—————— 

entitled to deference under Auer v.  Robbins, 519 U. S. 452 (1997), and 
Bowles  v.  Seminole  Rock  &  Sand  Co.,  325  U. S.  410  (1945).    Even  in 
cases  where  an  agency’s  interpretation  receives  Auer  deference,  how- 
ever, it is the court that ultimately decides whether a given regulation
means  what  the  agency  says.    Moreover,  Auer  deference  is  not  an 
inexorable  command  in  all  cases.    See  Christopher  v.  SmithKline 
Beecham  Corp.,  567  U. S.  ___,  ___  (2012)  (slip  op.,  at  10)  (Auer  defer-
ence  is  inappropriate  “when  the  agency’s  interpretation  is  plainly
erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation” or “when there is reason 
to suspect that the agency’s interpretation does not reflect the agency’s 
fair  and  considered  judgment”  (internal  quotation  marks  omitted)); 
Thomas  Jefferson  Univ.  v.  Shalala,  512  U. S.  504,  515  (1994)  (“[A]n 
agency’s  interpretation  of  a  . . .  regulation  that  conflicts  with  a  prior
interpretation is entitled to considerably less deference than a consist-
ently held agency view” (internal quotation marks omitted)).