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Page Number: 3

Cite as:  603 U. S. ____ (2024) 

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Syllabus 

itself  is  not  limited  to  the  “common-law  forms  of  action  recognized” 
when  the  Seventh  Amendment  was  ratified.  Curtis  v.  Loether,  415 
U. S. 189, 193.  Rather, it “embrace[s] all suits which are not of equity
or  admiralty  jurisdiction,  whatever  may  be  the  peculiar  form  which 
they may assume.”  Parsons, 3 Pet., at 447.  That includes statutory 
claims that are “legal in nature.”  Granfinanciera, 492 U. S., at 53. 
To determine whether a suit is legal in nature, courts must consider
whether the cause of action resembles common law causes of action, 
and whether the remedy is the sort that was traditionally obtained in
a  court  of  law.  Of  these  factors,  the  remedy  is  the  more  important. 
And in this case, the remedy is all but dispositive.  For respondents’
alleged fraud, the SEC seeks civil penalties, a form of monetary relief.  
Such relief is legal in nature when it is designed to punish or deter the
wrongdoer  rather  than  solely  to  “restore  the  status  quo.”    Tull,  481 
U. S., at 422.  The Acts condition the availability and size of the civil 
penalties available to the SEC based on considerations such as culpa-
bility, deterrence, and recidivism.  See §§77h–1; 78u–2, 80b–3.  These 
factors go beyond restoring the status quo and so are legal in nature. 
The SEC is also not obligated to use civil penalties to compensate vic-
tims.  SEC civil penalties are thus “a type of remedy at common law 
that could only be enforced in courts of law.”  Tull, 481 U. S., at 422. 
This  suit  implicates  the  Seventh  Amendment  right  and  a  defendant
would be entitled to a jury on these claims. 

The close relationship between federal securities fraud and common
law fraud confirms that conclusion.  Both target the same basic con-
duct: misrepresenting or concealing material facts.  By using “fraud”
and other common law terms of art when it drafted the federal securi-
ties laws, Congress incorporated common law fraud prohibitions into 
those  laws.  This  Court  therefore often  considers  common  law  fraud 
principles  when  interpreting  federal  securities  law.    See,  e.g.,  Dura 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U. S. 336, 343–344.  While fed-
eral securities fraud and common law fraud are not identical, the close 
relationship between the two confirms that this action is “legal in na-
ture.”  Granfinanciera, 492 U. S., at 53.  Pp. 8–13.

(c) Because the claims at issue here implicate the Seventh Amend-
ment, a jury trial is required unless the “public rights” exception ap-
plies.  Under this exception, Congress may assign the matter for deci-
sion  to  an  agency  without  a  jury,  consistent  with  the  Seventh 
Amendment.  For  the  reasons  below,  the  exception  does  not  apply. 
Pp. 13–27. 

(1) The Constitution prevents Congress from “withdraw[ing] from
judicial cognizance any matter which, from its nature, is the subject of
a suit at the common law.”  Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Im-
provement Co., 18 How. 272, 284.  Once such a suit “is brought within