Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/524bv.pdf
Page Number: 616.0

524US2

Unit: $U95

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Cite as: 524 U. S. 569 (1998)

571

Syllabus

but neither is the Court persuaded that, in other applications, the lan-
guage of § 954(d)(1) itself will give rise to the suppression of protected
expression. Any content-based considerations that may be taken into
account are a consequence of the nature of arts funding; the NEA has
limited resources to allocate among many “artistically excellent” proj-
ects, and it does so on the basis of a wide variety of subjective criteria.
Respondent’s reliance on Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ.
of Va., 515 U. S. 819, 837—in which the Court overturned a public uni-
versity’s objective decision denying funding to all student publications
having religious editorial viewpoints—is therefore misplaced. The
NEA’s mandate is to make esthetic judgments, and the inherently
content-based “excellence” threshold for NEA support sets it apart from
the subsidy at issue in Rosenberger. Moreover, although the First
Amendment applies in the subsidy context, Congress has wide latitude
to set spending priorities. See, e. g., Regan v. Taxation with Represen-
tation of Wash., 461 U. S. 540, 549. Unless § 954(d)(1) is applied in a
manner that raises concern about the suppression of disfavored view-
points, the Court will uphold it. Pp. 580–588.

(b) The lower courts also erred in invalidating § 954(d)(1) as unconsti-
tutionally vague. The First and Fifth Amendments protect speakers
from arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement of vague standards.
See NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S. 415, 432–433. Section 954(d)(1)’s
terms are undeniably opaque, and if they appeared in a criminal statute
or regulatory scheme, they could raise substantial vagueness concerns.
It is unlikely, however, that speakers will be compelled to steer too far
clear of any forbidden area in the context of NEA grants. As a practi-
cal matter, artists may conform their speech to what they believe to be
the NEA decisionmaking criteria in order to acquire funding. But
when the Government is acting as patron rather than sovereign, the
consequences of imprecision are not constitutionally severe.
In the con-
text of selective subsidies, it is not always feasible for Congress to legis-
late with clarity.
Indeed, to accept respondents’ vagueness argument
would be to call into question the constitutionality of the many valuable
Government programs awarding scholarships and grants on the basis of
subjective criteria such as “excellence.” Pp. 588–590.

100 F. 3d 671, reversed and remanded.

O(cid:146)Connor, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist,
C. J., and Stevens, Kennedy, and Breyer, JJ., joined, and in all but Part
II–B of which Ginsburg, J., joined. Scalia, J., ﬁled an opinion concur-
ring in the judgment, in which Thomas, J., joined, post, p. 590. Souter,
J., ﬁled a dissenting opinion, post, p. 600.