Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/22pdf/21-1271_3f14.pdf
Page Number: 5.0

Cite as:  600 U. S. ____ (2023) 

5 

Syllabus 

bound by state constitutional restraints when exercising authority un-
der the Elections Clause.  Two state constitutional provisions adopted 
shortly  after  the  founding  expressly  constrained  state  legislative  ac-
tion under the Elections Clause.  See Del. Const., Art. VIII, §2 (1792); 
Md. Const., Art. XIV (1810).  In addition, multiple state constitutions 
at the time of the founding regulated the “manner” of federal elections 
by requiring that “elections shall be by ballot.”  See, e.g., Ga. Const., 
Art. IV, §2.  Moreover, the Articles of Confederation—from which the 
Framers  borrowed—provided  that  “delegates  shall  be  annually  ap-
pointed in such manner as the legislature of each state shall direct.”  
Art. V.    Around  the  time  the  Articles  were  adopted,  multiple  States 
regulated the appointment of delegates, suggesting that the Framers 
did not understand that language to insulate state legislative action 
from  state  constitutional  provisions.    See,  e.g.,  Del.  Const.,  Art.  XI 
(1776).  Pp. 24–26. 
  3. Although the Elections Clause does not exempt state legislatures 
from  the  ordinary  constraints  imposed  by  state  law,  federal  courts 
must not abandon their duty to exercise judicial review.  This Court 
has an obligation to ensure that state court interpretations of state law 
do not evade federal law.  For example, States “may not sidestep the 
Takings Clause by disavowing traditional property interests.”  Phillips 
v. Washington Legal Foundation, 524 U. S. 156, 167.  While the Court 
does not adopt a test by which state court interpretations of state law 
can  be  measured  in  cases  implicating  the  Elections  Clause,  state 
courts may not transgress the ordinary bounds of judicial review such 
that they arrogate to themselves the power vested in state legislatures 
to regulate federal elections. 
  The  Court  need  not  decide  whether  the  North  Carolina  Supreme 
Court strayed beyond the limits derived from the Elections Clause, as 
petitioners did not meaningfully present the issue in this Court.  Pp. 
26–29. 

380 N. C. 317, 868 S. E. 2d 499, affirmed. 

  ROBERTS,  C. J.,  delivered  the  opinion  of  the  Court,  in  which  SO-
TOMAYOR,  KAGAN,  KAVANAUGH,  BARRETT,  and  JACKSON,  JJ.,  joined. 
KAVANAUGH, J., filed a concurring opinion.  THOMAS, J., filed a dissenting 
opinion in which GORSUCH, J., joined, and in which ALITO, J., joined as to 
Part I.