Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/10pdf/09-893.pdf
Page Number: 28

Cite as:  563 U. S. ____ (2011) 

1 

BREYER, J., dissenting 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

_________________ 

No. 09–893 
_________________ 

AT&T MOBILITY LLC, PETITIONER v. VINCENT 

CONCEPCION ET UX. 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 

APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

[April 27, 2011] 

JUSTICE  BREYER,  with  whom  JUSTICE  GINSBURG,  JUS-

TICE SOTOMAYOR, and JUSTICE KAGAN join, dissenting. 

The  Federal  Arbitration  Act  says  that  an  arbitration
agreement  “shall  be  valid,  irrevocable,  and  enforceable, 
save  upon  such  grounds  as  exist  at  law  or  in  equity  for 
the  revocation  of  any  contract.”  9  U. S. C.  §2  (emphasis 
added).  California law sets forth certain circumstances in 
which  “class  action  waivers”  in  any  contract  are  unen­
forceable.  In my view, this rule of state law is consistent
with the federal Act’s language and primary objective.  It 
does not “stan[d] as an obstacle” to the Act’s “accomplish­
ment  and  execution.”  Hines  v.  Davidowitz,  312  U. S.  52, 
67 (1941).  And the Court is wrong to hold that the federal 
Act pre-empts the rule of state law. 

I 
The California law in question consists of an authorita­
tive  state-court  interpretation  of  two  provisions  of  the
California Civil Code.  The first provision makes unlawful
all  contracts  “which  have  for  their  object,  directly  or  in­
directly,  to  exempt  anyone  from  responsibility  for  his 
own . . . violation of law.”  Cal. Civ. Code Ann. §1668 (West 
1985).  The second provision authorizes courts to “limit the 
application of any unconscionable clause” in a contract so
“as to avoid any unconscionable result.”  §1670.5(a).