Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/19pdf/18-1195_g314.pdf
Page Number: 62.0

Cite as:  591 U. S. ____ (2020) 

1 

BREYER, J., dissenting 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

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No. 18–1195 
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KENDRA ESPINOZA, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. 
MONTANA DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, ET AL. 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF 
MONTANA 

[June 30, 2020] 

JUSTICE BREYER, with whom JUSTICE KAGAN  joins as to

Part I, dissenting. 

The First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause guarantees 
the  right  to  practice  one’s  religion.    At  the  same  time,  its  
Establishment Clause forbids government support for reli-
gion.  Taken together, the Religion Clauses have helped our 
Nation  avoid  religiously  based  discord  while  securing  lib-
erty for those of all faiths. 

This Court has long recognized that an overly rigid appli-
cation of the Clauses could bring their mandates into con-
flict and defeat their basic purpose.  See, e.g., Walz v. Tax 
Comm’n of City of New York, 397 U. S. 664, 668–669 (1970).
And this potential conflict is nowhere more apparent than
in cases involving state aid that serves religious purposes 
or  institutions.  In  such  cases,  the  Court  has  said,  there 
must  be  constitutional  room,  or  “ ‘play  in  the  joints,’ ”  be-
tween  “what  the  Establishment  Clause  permits  and  the
Free Exercise Clause compels.”  Trinity Lutheran Church of 
Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 582 U. S. ___, ___ (2017) (slip op., 
at  6)  (quoting  Locke  v.  Davey,  540  U. S.  712,  718  (2004)). 
Whether a particular state program falls within that space 
depends upon the nature of the aid at issue, considered in
light of the Clauses’ objectives.

The majority barely acknowledges the play-in-the-joints