Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/23pdf/22-976_e29g.pdf
Page Number: 33

Cite as:  602 U. S. ____ (2024) 

9 

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting 

the  shooter,  who  must  repeatedly  activate  the  trigger  for 
each shot.  Predictably, the House and Senate Reports re-
flect the same understanding of the phrase.  See H. R. Rep. 
No. 1780, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 2 (1934) (reporting that the 
statute “contains the usual definition of machine gun as a 
weapon designed  to shoot  more  than  one shot without  re-
loading  and  by  a  single  pull  of  the  trigger”);  S. Rep.  No. 
1444, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 2 (1934) (same). 
  The  majority  cannot  disregard  these  statements  as  evi-
dence of legislative purpose.2  They are, along with contem-
poraneous dictionary definitions, some of the best evidence 
of contemporaneous understanding.  Cf. McDonald v. Chi-
cago, 561 U. S. 742, 828 (2010) (THOMAS, J., concurring in 
part and concurring in judgment) (“Statements by legisla-
tors can assist . . . to the extent they demonstrate the man-
ner  in  which  the  public  used  or  understood  a  particular 
word  or  phrase”).    Indeed,  at  oral  argument,  when  asked 
what evidence there was “that as of 1934, the ordinary un-
derstanding of the phrase ‘function of the trigger’ referred 
to  the  mechanics  of  the  gun  rather  than  . . .  the  shooter’s 
motion,”  respondent’s  lawyer  could  not  point  to  a  single 
piece of evidence that supports the majority’s reading.  Tr. 
of  Oral  Arg.  98;  see  id.,  at  98–101.    He  even  agreed  that 
Congress used the word “function” to ensure that the stat-
ute covered a wide variety of trigger mechanisms, including 
both push and pull triggers.  Id., at 101–102.  In short, the 
majority disregards the unrefuted evidence of the text’s or-
dinary  and  contemporaneous  meaning,  substituting  in-
stead its own understanding of the internal mechanics of an 
AR–15 without looking at the actions of the shooter. 

 This Court itself has also previously read the definition 
of “machinegun” in this exact statute to refer to the action 
—————— 

2 Of course, “authoritative legislative history can be useful, even when 
the meaning can be discerned from the statute’s language, to reinforce 
or to confirm a court’s sense of the text.”  R. Katzmann, Judging Statutes 
35 (2014).