Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/19pdf/17-1498_8mjp.pdf
Page Number: 44.0

Cite as:  590 U. S. ____ (2020) 

9 

Opinion of GORSUCH, J. 

port its position, Atlantic Richfield resorts to this odd argu-
ment.  Maybe  the  terms  “[c]overed  persons”  and  “poten-
tially responsible party” are different and the statute uses
them  in  different  places  to  do  different  things.  But,  the 
company insists, we must conflate them now because this 
Court  has  conflated  them  before.    In  particular,  Atlantic
Richfield points to language in United States v. Atlantic Re-
search Corp., 551 U. S. 128 (2007), where the Court spoke 
of “Section 107(a) [as] defin[ing] four categories of PRPs [po-
tentially responsible parties].”  Id., at 131–132. 

That may be so but it does not make it so.  The relation-
ship between the terms “[c]overed persons” under §107 and 
“potentially responsible part[ies]” under §122 is of critical
importance in this case, but it was not briefed, argued, or
decided  in  Atlantic  Research.  Instead,  the  only  question
there  concerned  the  meaning  of  the  term  “[c]overed  per-
sons”  under  §107.  Though  the  Court  employed  the  term 
“PRP”  to  describe  “[c]overed  persons,”  nothing  turned  on
the use or meaning of the acronym:  Replace every reference
to  “PRP”  with  “[c]overed  person”  and  the  Court’s  holding
and  reasoning  remains  the  same.  This  Court  has  long
warned  that  matters  “ ‘lurk[ing]  in  the  record,  neither 
brought  to  the  attention  of  the  court  nor  ruled  upon,’ ” 
should not be read as having decided anything.  Cooper In-
dustries,  Inc.  v.  Aviall  Services,  Inc.,  543  U. S.  157,  170 
(2004) (quoting Webster v. Fall, 266 U. S. 507, 511 (1925)).
We have warned, too, against reading our judicial opinions 
as if they were some sort of legislative code because, other-
wise, innocent and inconsequential judicial remarks might 
mistakenly  come  to  trump  democratically  adopted  laws. 
See Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U. S. 330, 341 (1979).  At-
lantic Richfield would have us ignore these teachings and 
confuse a stray remark with a rule of law. 

In the end, the company’s case cannot help but be seen 
for what it really is:  an appeal to policy.  On its view, things
would be so much more orderly if the federal government