Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/529bv.pdf
Page Number: 981.0

529US3

Unit: $U62

[09-26-01 12:54:02] PAGES PGT: OPIN

906

GEIER v. AMERICAN HONDA MOTOR CO.

Stevens, J., dissenting

pre-emption of state laws that allegedly frustrate federal
purposes: it has not demonstrated that allowing a common-
law no-airbag claim to go forward would impose an obligation
on manufacturers that directly and irreconcilably contradicts
any primary objective that the Secretary set forth with clar-
ity in Standard 208. Gade v. National Solid Wastes Man-
agement Assn., 505 U. S., at 110 (Kennedy, J., concurring in
part and concurring in judgment); id., at 111 (“A freewheel-
ing judicial inquiry into whether [state law] is in tension with
federal objectives would undercut the principle that it is
Congress [and federal agencies,] rather than the courts[,]
that pre-emp[t] state law”). Furthermore, it is important to
note that the text of Standard 208 (which the Court does not
even bother to quote in its opinion), unlike the regulation we
reviewed in Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn. v. De la Cuesta,
458 U. S., at 158, does not contain any expression of an intent
to displace state law. Given our repeated emphasis on the
importance of the presumption against pre-emption, see,
e. g., CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U. S., at 663–664;
Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U. S. 218, 230 (1947),
this silence lends additional support to the conclusion that
the continuation of whatever common-law liability may exist
in a case like this poses no danger of frustrating any of the
Secretary’s primary purposes in promulgating Standard 208.
See Hillsborough County v. Automated Medical Labora-
tories, Inc., 471 U. S., at 721; Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp.,
464 U. S., at 251 (“It is difﬁcult to believe that [the Secretary]
would, without comment, remove all means of judicial re-
course for those injured by illegal conduct”).

The Court apparently views the question of pre-emption
in this case as a close one. Ante, at 883 (relying on Secre-
tary’s interpretation of Standard 208’s objectives to bolster
its ﬁnding of pre-emption). Under “ordinary experience-
proved principles of conﬂict pre-emption,” ante, at 874,
therefore, the presumption against pre-emption should con-
Instead, the Court simply ignores the presumption,
trol.