Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/21pdf/21-679_f2bh.pdf
Page Number: 11.0

Cite as:  596 U. S. ____ (2022) 

11 

THOMAS, J., dissenting 

does not require a trial judge to permit ‘hybrid’ representa-
tion”).  A fairminded jurist could find that those September 
1998 comments, made in a hearing about a distinguishable 
issue  some  seven  months  before,  did  not  somehow  trans-
mogrify an ambiguous and equivocal question into a clear
and unequivocal invocation of a constitutional right.

Third,  as  for  the  trial  court’s  conduct  at  the  April  1999
hearing  itself,  it  did  not  “admonis[h]”  Cassano  against 
“even speak[ing] in the courtroom.”  1 F. 4th, at 474.  Ra-
ther, the trial court solicited questions from Cassano.  Cas-
sano took that opportunity to complain about his counsel, 
demand their presence at his trial, and inquire about self-
representation.  See  App.  to  Pet.  for  Cert.  264a–265a.    A 
fairminded jurist could find that none of his statements in-
voked his right to self-representation in clear and unequiv-
ocal terms, and that he was not coerced into silence by the 
trial court.  That is all it takes to satisfy AEDPA. 

III 
Because  the  Court  of  Appeals’  decision  was  obviously 
wrong and squarely foreclosed by our precedent, this case
merits summary reversal.   See Presley v. Georgia, 558 U. S. 
209, 217 (2010) (THOMAS, J., dissenting); S. Shapiro, K. Gel-
ler,  T.  Bishop,  E.  Hartnett,  &  D.  Himmelfarb,  Supreme 
Court Practice §5.12(c), p. 5–44 (11th ed. 2019) (Shapiro). 
In  fact,  summary  reversal  is  particularly  appropriate  be-
cause  the  Court  of  Appeals  “committed  [a]  fundamental
erro[r]  that  this  Court  has  repeatedly  admonished  [it]  to
avoid.”  Sexton v. Beaudreaux, 585 U. S. ___, ___ (2018) (per 
curiam) (slip op., at 7); Shapiro §5.12(c), at 5–45.  This is far 
from the first time that the Sixth Circuit has failed to apply
the  deference  that  AEDPA  and  our  governing  precedents
demand.  See,  e.g.,  Rapelje  v.  Blackston,  577  U. S.  1019, 
1021 (2015) (Scalia, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari)
(“The Sixth Circuit seems to have acquired a taste for dis-
regarding  AEDPA”).    Over  the  last  two  decades,  we  have