Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/19pdf/19-635_o7jq.pdf
Page Number: 38

6 

TRUMP v. VANCE 

THOMAS, J., dissenting 

were immune from judicial process.  Ibid.; see also ante, at 
5–6. 

Based on the evidence of original meaning and Chief Jus-
tice Marshall’s early interpretation in Burr, the better read-
ing of the text of the Constitution is that the President has
no  absolute  immunity  from  the  issuance  of  a  grand  jury
subpoena. 

II 
In  addition  to  contesting  the  issuance  of  the  subpoena,
the  President  also  seeks  injunctive  and  declaratory  relief 
against its enforcement.  The majority recognizes that the 
President can seek relief from enforcement, but it does not 
vacate  and  remand  for  the  lower  courts  to  address  this 
question.  I  would  do  so  and  instruct  them  to  apply  the
standard articulated by Chief Justice Marshall in Burr: If 
the President is unable to comply because of his official du-
ties, then he is entitled to injunctive and declaratory relief. 

A 
In Burr, after explaining that the President was not ab-
solutely immune from issuance of a subpoena, Chief Justice 
Marshall proceeded to explain that the President might be
excused from the enforcement of one.  As he put it, “[t]he
guard, furnished to this high officer, to protect him from be-
ing harassed by vexatious and unnecessary subpoenas, is to
be looked for in the conduct of a court after those subpoenas 
have  issued;  not  in  any  circumstance  which  is  to  precede 
their  being  issued.”  25  F. Cas.,  at  34  (emphasis  added). 
Chief Justice Marshall set out the pertinent standard: To
avoid  enforcement  of  the  subpoena,  the  President  must 
“sho[w]”  that  “his  duties  as  chief  magistrate  demand  his
whole time for national objects.”  Ibid.2 

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2 This standard appears to be something that Chief Justice Marshall