Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/529bv.pdf
Page Number: 874

529US3

Unit: $U59

[09-26-01 12:32:42] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 529 U. S. 765 (2000)

799

Stevens, J., dissenting

clude any deﬁnition of “person” at all. The negative infer-
ence drawn by the Court, if taken seriously, would therefore
prove too much. The deﬁnition of “person” in § 3733 in-
cludes not only States, but also “any natural person, part-
nership, corporation, association, or other legal entity.”
If the premise of the Court’s argument were
§ 3733(l)(4).
correct—that the inclusion of certain items as a “person” in
§ 3733 implies their exclusion as a “person” in § 3729—then
there would be absolutely no one left to be a “person” under
§ 3729.9
It is far more reasonable to assume that Congress
simply saw no need to add a deﬁnition of “person” in § 3729
because (as both the legislative history, see supra, at 791–
795, and the deﬁnitions in the CID provisions demonstrate)
the meaning of the term “person” was already well under-
stood. Congress likely thought it unnecessary to include a
deﬁnition in § 3729 itself.

The Court also relies on the deﬁnition of “person” in a
separate, but similar, statute, the Program Fraud Civil Rem-
edies Act of 1986 (PFCRA). Ante, at 786. The deﬁnition
of “person” found in that law includes “any individual, part-
nership, corporation, association, or private organization.”
31 U. S. C. § 3801(a)(6).
It is ﬁrst worth pointing out the
obvious: Although the PFCRA sits next to the FCA in the
United States Code, they are separate statutes.
It is there-
fore not altogether clear why the former has much bearing
on the latter.10 Regardless, the Court’s whole argument

9 Not so, the Court says, because natural persons and other entities,
unlike States, are presumed to be included within the term “person.”
Ante, at 784, n. 14.
In other words, this supposedly independent tex-
tual argument does nothing on its own without relying entirely on
the presumption already discussed. See supra, at 797–798; ante, at 780–
784. The negative inference adds nothing on its own.

10 Indeed, reliance on the PFCRA seems to contradict the Court’s cen-
tral premise—that in 1863 the word “person” did not include States and
that scattered intervening amendments have done nothing to change that.
If that were so, the relevant meaning of the word
Ante, at 781–782.