Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/22pdf/21-1086_1co6.pdf
Page Number: 111.0

Cite as:  599 U. S. ____ (2023) 

15 

ALITO, J., dissenting 

maps.  See ante, at 22–25.  Their conclusion, however, rests 
on a faulty view of what non-predominance means. 
  The  plurality’s  position  seems  to  be  that  race  does  not 
predominate in the creation of a districting map so long as 
the map does not violate other traditional districting crite-
ria such as compactness, contiguity, equally populated dis-
tricts, minimizing county splits, etc.  Ibid.  But this conclu-
sion is irreconcilable with our cases.  In Miller, for instance, 
we acknowledged that the particular district at issue was 
not “shape[d] . . . bizarre[ly] on its face,” but we nonetheless 
held  that  race  predominated  because  of  the  legislature’s 
“overriding  desire  to  assign  black  populations”  in  a  way 
that  would  create  an  additional  “majority-black  district.”  
515 U. S., at 917. 
  Later  cases  drove  home  the  point  that  conformity  with 
traditional districting principles does not necessarily mean 
that a district was created without giving race a predomi-
nant role.  In Cooper, we held that once it was shown that 
race was “ ‘the overriding reason’ ” for the selection of a par-
ticular  map,  “a  further  showing  of  ‘inconsistency  between 
the enacted plan and traditional redistricting criteria’ is un-
necessary to a finding of racial predominance.”  581 U. S., 
at 301, n. 3 (quoting Bethune-Hill, 580 U. S., at 190).  We 
noted that the contrary argument was “foreclosed almost as 
soon as it was raised in this Court.”  Cooper, 581 U. S., at 
301, n. 3; see also Vera, 517 U. S., at 966 (plurality opinion) 
(race may still predominate even if “traditional districting 
principle[s]  do  correlate  to  some  extent  with  the  district’s 
layout”).    “Traditional  redistricting  principles  . . .  are  nu-
merous  and  malleable.  . . .  By  deploying  those  factors  in 
various  combinations  and  permutations,  a  [mapmaker] 
could construct a plethora of potential maps that look con-
sistent with traditional, race-neutral principles.”  Bethune-
Hill, 580 U. S., at 190.  Here, a plurality allows plaintiffs to 
do precisely what we warned against in Bethune-Hill. 
  The plurality’s analysis of predominance contravenes our