Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/22pdf/21-468_5if6.pdf
Page Number: 2

2 

NATIONAL PORK PRODUCERS COUNCIL v. ROSS 

Syllabus

 JUSTICE  GORSUCH  delivered  the  opinion  of  the  Court,  except  as  to
Parts IV–B, IV–C, and IV–D, rejecting petitioners’ theories that would 
place  Proposition  12  in  violation  of  the  dormant  Commerce  Clause
even  though  petitioners  do  not  allege  the  law  purposefully  discrimi-
nates against out-of-state economic interests.  Pp 5–17, 27–29. 

(a) The  Constitution  vests  Congress  with  the  power  to  “regulate 
Commerce . . . among the several States.”  Art. I, §8, cl. 3.  Although 
Congress  may  seek  to  exercise  this  power  to  regulate  the  interstate
trade of pork, and many pork producers have urged Congress to do so, 
Congress has yet to adopt any statute that might displace Proposition 
12 or laws regulating pork production in other States.  Petitioners’ lit-
igation  theory  thus  rests  on  the  dormant  Commerce  Clause  theory,
pursuant to which the Commerce Clause not only vests Congress with 
the power to regulate interstate trade, but also “contain[s] a further,
negative command,” one effectively forbidding the enforcement of “cer-
tain state [economic regulations] even when Congress has failed to leg-
islate on the subject.”  Oklahoma Tax Comm’n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 
514  U. S.  175,  179.    This  Court  has  held  that  state  laws  offend  this 
dormant  aspect  of  the  Commerce  Clause  when  they  seek  to  “build 
up . . . domestic commerce” through “burdens upon the industry and 
business of other States.”  Guy v. Baltimore, 100 U. S. 434, 443.  At the 
same time, though, the Court has reiterated that, absent purposeful 
discrimination, “a State may exclude from its territory, or prohibit the 
sale therein of any articles which, in its judgment, fairly exercised, are 
prejudicial to” the interests of its citizens.  Ibid. 

jurisprudence. 

The antidiscrimination principle lies at the “very core” of the Court’s 
dormant  Commerce  Clause 
Camps  New-
found/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U. S. 564, 581.  This 
Court has said that the Commerce Clause prohibits the enforcement 
of state laws “driven by . . . ‘economic protectionism—that is, regula-
tory measures designed to benefit in-state economic interests by bur-
dening out-of-state competitors.’ ”  Department of Revenue of Ky. v. Da-
vis,  553  U. S.  328,  337–338  (quoting  New  Energy  Co.  of  Ind.  v. 
Limbach, 486 U. S. 269, 273–274).  Petitioners here disavow any dis-
crimination-based  claim,  conceding  that  Proposition  12  imposes  the 
same  burdens  on  in-state  pork  producers  that  it  imposes  on  out-of-
state pork producers.  Pp 5–8.

(b) Given petitioners’ concession that Proposition 12 does not impli-
cate  the  antidiscrimination  principle,  petitioners  first  invoke  what 
they  call  the  “extraterritoriality  doctrine.”    They  contend  that  the 
Court’s  dormant  Commerce  Clause  cases  suggest  an  additional  and 
“almost per se” rule forbidding enforcement of state laws that have the 
“practical effect of controlling commerce outside the State,” even when 
those laws do not purposely discriminate against out-of-state interests.