Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/22pdf/22-179_o75q.pdf
Page Number: 19

Cite as:  599 U. S. ____ (2023) 

15 

Opinion of the Court 

offense.    But  a  prosecutor  who  tried  to  bring  such  a  case 
would not succeed.  Why?  Because aiding and abetting im-
plicitly carries a mens rea requirement—the defendant gen-
erally must intend to facilitate the commission of a crime.  
LaFave  §13.2(b).    Since  “encourages  or  induces”  in  clause 
(iv) draws on the same common-law principles, it too incor-
porates them implicitly.2 
  Still,  Hansen reiterates  that  if  Congress  had wanted  to 
require intent, it could easily have said so—as it did else-
where  in  clause  (iv).    The  provision  requires  that  the  de-
fendant encourage or induce an unlawful act and that the 
defendant “kno[w]” or “reckless[ly] disregard” the fact that 
the  act  encouraged  “is  or  will  be  in  violation  of  law.”  
§1324(a)(1)(A)(iv).  Yet while Congress spelled out this re-
quirement, it included no express mens rea element for “en-
courages or induces.”  Indeed, Hansen continues, the stat-
ute used to require that the encouragement or inducement 
be committed “willfully or knowingly,” but Congress deleted 
those words in 1986.  Brief for Respondent 30.  Taken to-
gether,  Hansen  says,  this  evidence  reflects  that  Congress 
aimed to make a defendant liable for “encouraging or induc-
ing” without respect to her state of mind. 
  But there is a simple explanation for why “encourages or 
induces”  is  not  modified  by  an  express  mens  rea  require-
ment: There is no need for it.  At the risk of sounding like a 
broken  record,  “encourage”  and  “induce,”  as  terms  of  art, 
carry the usual attributes of solicitation and facilitation—
including, once again, the traditional mens rea.  Congress 
—————— 

2 The  Ninth  Circuit  believed  that  the  Government’s  “solicitation  and 
facilitation” reading of clause (iv) would create impermissible surplusage 
with the aiding-and-abetting provision in clause (v)(II).  25 F. 4th 1103, 
1108–1109  (2022).    Hansen  does  not  press  that  argument  before  this 
Court—for good reason. Clause (iv) criminalizes the aiding and abetting 
of an immigration violation, whereas clause (v)(II) prohibits the aiding 
and abetting of “any of the preceding acts.”  In other words, clause (v)(II) 
applies to aiding and abetting a first-line facilitator.  Another difference: 
Clause (iv) criminalizes not only facilitation, but solicitation too.