Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/22pdf/22-105_5536.pdf
Page Number: 12.0

Cite as:  599 U. S. ____ (2023) 

9 

Opinion of the Court 

stay requirement in 1988, the relevant subsection already
contained  a  provision,  §1292(d)(3),  that  expressly  made
stays of proceedings in certain courts discretionary rather
than  mandatory.  To  avoid  any  misinterpretation  of 
§1292(d)(4)  because  of  that  preexisting  language  in 
§1292(d)(3),  Congress  specified  the  right  to  an  automatic 
stay  pending  appeal  in  §1292(d)(4). 
  That  unusual 
circumstance does not diminish the operation of the Griggs 
rule in the context of arbitrability appeals. 

Third, Bielski contends that requiring an automatic stay
would  create  a  special,  arbitration-preferring  procedural 
rule.  That is incorrect.  In fact, Bielski’s proposed approach 
would disfavor arbitration.  Applying the Griggs rule here 
simply  subjects  arbitrability  appeals  to  the  same  stay
principles  that  courts  apply  in  other  analogous  contexts 
where  an  interlocutory  appeal  is  authorized,  including 
qualified  immunity  and  double  jeopardy.    Bielski  further 
points to forum selection clauses as an analogy.  But unlike 
§16(a)  arbitrability  appeals,  Congress  has  not  created  a 
right  to  an  interlocutory  appeal  for  cases  involving  forum 
selection clauses.  So a stay in the forum selection context
could  be  required  only  in  those  cases  where  there  is  a
certified  §1292(b)  interlocutory  appeal  of  the  forum 
selection issue. 

Fourth,  Bielski  suggests  that  there  is  no  need  for  an 
automatic  stay  because  the  ordinary  discretionary  stay 
factors  would  adequately  protect  parties’  rights  to  an 
interlocutory  appellate  determination  of  arbitrability.  To 
begin  with,  experience  shows  that  Bielski  is  incorrect. 
District  courts  and  courts  of  appeals  applying  the  usual
four-factor  standard  for  a  discretionary  stay  often  deny 
stays  in  §16(a)  appeals  because  courts  applying  that  test 
often do not consider litigation-related burdens (here, from
the  continued  District  Court  proceedings)  to  constitute 
irreparable harm.  See Nken v. Holder, 556 U. S. 418, 434– 
435 (2009); FTC v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 449 U. S. 232,