Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/23pdf/22-277_d18f.pdf
Page Number: 82

20 

MOODY v. NETCHOICE, LLC 

ALITO, J., concurring in judgment 

affected by the speech it [is] forced to accommodate.”  FAIR, 
547  U. S.,  at  63.    In  core  examples  of  expressive  compila-
tions, such as a book containing selected articles, chapters, 
stories, or poems, this requirement is easily satisfied.  But 
in other situations, it may be hard to identify any message
that would be affected by the inclusion of particular third-
party speech. 

Two precedents that the majority tries to downplay, if not 
forget,  are  illustrative.  The  first  is  PruneYard,  which  I 
have already discussed.  The PruneYard  Court rejected the 
mall’s  First  Amendment  claim  because  “[t]he  views  ex-
pressed by members of the public in passing out pamphlets
or seeking signatures for a petition [were] not likely [to] be 
identified with those of the owner.”  447 U. S., at 87.  And if 
those who perused the handbills or petitions were not likely 
to make that connection, any message that the mall owner 
intended to convey would not be affected. 

The decision in FAIR rested on similar reasoning.  In that 
case, the Court did not dispute the proposition that the law 
schools’  refusal  to  host  military  recruiters  expressed  the
message that the military should admit and retain gays and 
lesbians.  But the Court found no First Amendment viola-
tion  because,  as  in  PruneYard,  it  was  unlikely  that  the
views of the military recruiters “would be identified with” 
those of the schools themselves, and consequently, hosting 
the  military  recruiters  did  not  “sufficiently  interfere  with 
any  message  of  the  school.”  547  U. S.,  at  64–65;  contra, 
ante,  at  25  (“[T]his  Court  has  never  hinged  a  compiler’s 
First  Amendment  protection  on  the  risk  of  misattribu-
tion.”).18 

—————— 

18 To  be  sure,  in  Turner Broadcasting  System,  Inc.  v. FCC,  512  U. S. 
622, 655 (1994), we held that the First Amendment applied even though
there  was  “little  risk”  of  misattribution  in  that  case.    But  that  is  only
because the claimants in that case had already shown that the Cable Act
affected the quantity or reach of the messages that they communicated