Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/20pdf/19-840_6jfm.pdf
Page Number: 7

4 

CALIFORNIA v. TEXAS 

Opinion of the Court 

and the District of Columbia (state intervenors), intervened
in order to defend the Act’s constitutionality, see App. 12–
13, as did the U. S. House of Representatives at the appel-
late stage, see id., at 3. 

After taking evidence, the District Court found that the 
individual plaintiffs had standing to challenge the constitu-
tionality  of  the  minimum  essential  coverage  provision, 
§5000A(a).  See Texas v. United States, 340 F. Supp. 3d 579,
593–595 (ND Tex. 2018).  The court held that the minimum 
essential  coverage  provision  is  unconstitutional  and  not 
severable from the rest of the Act.  It granted relief in the 
form of a declaration stating just that.  Id., at 595–619.  It 
then  stayed  its  judgment  pending  appeal.  See  Texas  v. 
United States, 352 F. Supp. 3d 665 (ND Tex. 2018). 

On  appeal,  a  panel  majority  agreed  with  the  District
Court  that  the  plaintiffs  had  standing  and  that  the  mini-
mum  essential  coverage  provision  was  unconstitutional.
See  Texas  v.  United  States,  945  F.  3d  355,  377–393  (CA5 
2019).  It found that the District Court’s severability anal-
ysis, however, was “incomplete.”  Id., at 400.  It wrote that 
“[m]ore  [wa]s  needed  to  justify”  the  District  Court’s  order
striking down the entire Act.  Id., at 401.  And it remanded 
the case for further proceedings.  Id., at 402–403. 

The state intervenors, defending the Act, asked us to re-
view the lower court decision.  We granted their petition for 
certiorari. 

II 
We proceed no further than standing.  The Constitution 
gives  federal  courts  the  power  to  adjudicate  only  genuine
“Cases” and “Controversies.”  Art. III, §2.  That power in-
cludes  the  requirement  that  litigants  have  standing.  A 
plaintiff has standing only if he can “allege personal injury
fairly traceable to the defendant’s allegedly unlawful con-
duct  and  likely  to  be  redressed  by  the  requested  relief.” 
DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U. S. 332, 342 (2006)