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BRNOVICH v. DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL COMMITTEE 

Syllabus 

intent” and thus violated both §2 of the VRA and the Fifteenth Amend-
ment.    The  District  Court  rejected  all  of  the  plaintiffs’  claims.    The 
court found that the out-of-precinct policy had no “meaningfully dis-
parate impact” on minority voters’ opportunities to elect representa-
tives of  their  choice.    Turning  to  the ballot-collection  restriction,  the 
court found that it was unlikely to cause “a meaningful inequality” in 
minority  voters’ electoral opportunities  and  that it  had not  been  en-
acted with discriminatory intent.  A divided panel of the Ninth Circuit 
affirmed, but the en banc court reversed.  It first concluded that both 
the out-of-precinct policy and the ballot-collection restriction imposed 
a disparate burden on minority voters because they were more likely 
to be adversely affected by those rules.  The en banc court also held 
that the District Court had committed clear error in finding that the 
ballot-collection law was not enacted with discriminatory intent. 

Held: Arizona’s out-of-precinct policy and HB 2023 do not violate §2 of 
the VRA, and HB 2023 was not enacted with a racially discriminatory 
purpose.  Pp. 12–37. 

(a) Two threshold matters require the Court’s attention.  First, the 
Court rejects the contention that no petitioner has Article III standing 
to appeal the decision below as to the out-of-precinct policy.  All that 
is needed to entertain an appeal of that issue is one party with stand-
ing.  Little Sisters of the Poor Saints Peter and Paul Home v. Pennsyl-
vania, 591 U. S. ___, ___, n. 6.  Attorney General Brnovich, as an au-
thorized representative of the State (which intervened below) in any 
action in federal court, fits the bill.  See Virginia House of Delegates v. 
Bethune-Hill, 587 U. S. ___, ___.  Second, the Court declines in these 
cases to announce a test to govern all VRA §2 challenges to rules that 
specify the time, place, or manner for casting ballots.  It is sufficient 
for  present  purposes  to  identify  certain  guideposts  that  lead  to  the 
Court’s decision in these cases.  Pp. 12–13. 

(b) The Court’s statutory interpretation starts with a careful consid-

eration of the text.  Pp. 13–25. 

(1) The Court first construed the current version of §2 in Thorn-
burg v. Gingles, 478 U. S. 30, which was a vote-dilution case where the 
Court took its cue from §2’s legislative history.  The Court’s many sub-
sequent  vote-dilution  cases  have  followed  the  path  Gingles  charted.  
Because the Court here considers for the first time how §2 applies to 
generally applicable time, place, or manner voting rules, it is appro-
priate to take a fresh look at the statutory text.  Pp. 13–14. 

(2) In 1982, Congress amended the language in §2 that had been 
interpreted to require proof of discriminatory intent by a plurality of 
the Court in Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U. S. 55.  In place of that language, 
§2(a) now uses the phrase “in a manner which results in a denial or