Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/558bv.pdf
Page Number: 535

374  CITIZENS  UNITED  v.  FEDERAL  ELECTION  COMM’N 

Roberts, C. J., concurring 

But  I  cannot  agree  with  my  dissenting  colleagues  on  how 
these principles apply in this case. 

The  majority’s  step-by-step  analysis  accords  with  our 
standard  practice  of  avoiding  broad  constitutional  questions 
except  when  necessary  to  decide  the  case  before  us.  The 
majority  begins  by  addressing—and  quite  properly  reject-
ing—Citizens  United’s  statutory  claim  that  2  U. S. C.  § 441b 
does  not  actually  cover  its  production  and  distribution  of 
Hillary:  The  Movie  (hereinafter  Hillary).  If  there  were 
a  valid  basis  for  deciding  this  statutory  claim  in  Citizens 
United’s favor (and thereby avoiding constitutional adjudica­
tion),  it would  be proper  to do  so.  Indeed, that  is precisely 
the  approach  the  Court  took  just  last  Term  in  Northwest 
Austin  Municipal  Util.  Dist.  No.  One  v.  Holder,  557  U. S. 
193  (2009),  when  eight  Members  of  the  Court  agreed  to  de­
cide  the  case  on  statutory  grounds  instead  of  reaching  the 
appellant’s  broader  argument  that  the  Voting  Rights  Act  is 
unconstitutional. 

It  is  only  because  the  majority  rejects  Citizens  United’s 
statutory claim that it proceeds to consider the group’s vari­
ous  constitutional  arguments,  beginning  with  its  narrowest 
claim  (that  Hillary  is  not  the  functional  equivalent  of  ex­
press  advocacy)  and  proceeding  to  its  broadest  claim  (that 
Austin  v.  Michigan  Chamber  of  Commerce,  494  U. S.  652 
(1990), should be overruled).  This is the same order of oper­
ations  followed  by  the  controlling  opinion  in  Federal  Elec­
tion  Comm’n  v.  Wisconsin  Right  to  Life,  Inc.,  551  U. S.  449 
(2007) (WRTL).  There  the appellant was  able to  prevail on 
its  narrowest  constitutional  argument  because  its  broadcast 
ads  did  not  qualify  as  the  functional  equivalent  of  express 
advocacy;  there  was  thus  no  need  to  go  on  to  address  the 
broader  claim  that  McConnell  v.  Federal  Election  Comm’n, 
540  U. S.  93  (2003),  should  be  overruled.  WRTL,  551  U. S., 
at  482;  id.,  at  482–483  (Alito,  J.,  concurring).  This  case  is 
different—not, as the dissent suggests, because the approach 
taken  in  WRTL  has  been  deemed  a  “failure,”  post,  at  402,