Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/19pdf/17-1618_hfci.pdf
Page Number: 158.0

14 

BOSTOCK v. CLAYTON COUNTY 

KAVANAUGH, J., dissenting 

That  longstanding  and  widespread  congressional  prac-
tice matters.  When interpreting statutes, as the Court has 
often  said,  we  “usually  presume  differences  in  language”
convey  “differences  in  meaning.”    Wisconsin  Central,  585 
U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 4) (internal quotation marks omit-
ted).  When  Congress  chooses  distinct  phrases  to  accom-
plish distinct purposes, and does so over and over again for 
decades, we may not lightly toss aside all of Congress’s care-
ful handiwork.  As Justice Scalia explained for the Court,
“it is not our function” to “treat alike subjects that different 
Congresses have chosen to treat differently.”  West Virginia 
Univ. Hospitals, Inc. v. Casey, 499 U. S. 83, 101 (1991); see 
id., at 92. 

And the Court has likewise stressed that we may not read
“a  specific  concept  into  general  words  when  precise  lan-
guage in other statutes reveals that Congress knew how to
identify that concept.”  Eskridge, Interpreting Law, at 415; 
see University of Tex. Southwestern Medical Center v. Nas-
sar,  570  U. S.  338,  357  (2013);  Arlington  Central  School 
Dist. Bd. of Ed. v. Murphy, 548 U. S. 291, 297–298 (2006); 
Jama v. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 543 U. S. 
335, 341–342 (2005); Custis v. United States, 511 U. S. 485, 
491–493  (1994);  West  Virginia  Univ.  Hospitals,  499  U. S., 
at 99. 

—————— 
(identifying  violence  motivated  by  “gender,  sexual  orientation”  as  na-
tional problem); §30503(a)(1)(C) (authorizing Attorney General to assist
state, local, and tribal investigations of crimes motivated by the victim’s
“gender, sexual orientation”); §§41305(b)(1), (3) (requiring Attorney Gen-
eral to acquire data on crimes motivated by “gender . . . , sexual orienta-
tion,”  but  disclaiming  any  cause  of  action  including  one  “based  on  dis-
crimination  due  to  sexual  orientation”);  42  U. S. C.  §294e–1(b)(2)
(conditioning  funding  on  institution’s  inclusion  of  persons  of  “different 
genders  and  sexual  orientations”);  see  also  United  States  Sentencing 
Commission, Guidelines Manual §3A1.1(a) (Nov. 2018) (authorizing in-
creased offense level if the crime was motivated by the victim’s “gender 
. . . or sexual orientation”); 2E Guide to Judiciary Policy §320 (2019) (pro-
hibiting judicial discrimination because of “sex, . . . sexual orientation”).