Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/21pdf/20-1650_3dq3.pdf
Page Number: 27

4 

CONCEPCION v. UNITED STATES 

KAVANAUGH, J., dissenting 

crack-cocaine  offender  such  as  Concepcion  who  was  sen-
tenced before August 3, 2010, may now obtain the benefit
of  the  non-retroactive  2016  change  to  the  career-offender 
guideline.  But a crack-cocaine offender who was sentenced 
from August 3, 2010, to July 31, 2016, will not be able to
obtain the benefit of the non-retroactive 2016 change to the 
career-offender  guideline.  What  sense  does  that  make? 
That  anomalous  outcome  will  amount  to  a  “haphazard
windfall” for crack-cocaine offenders sentenced before Au-
gust 3, 2010.  United States v. Lancaster, 997 F. 3d 171, 180 
(CA4 2021) (Wilkinson, J., concurring in judgment). 

Still more inequities will ensue because the Court affords
district  courts  blanket  discretion  to  choose  between  two 
vastly  different  approaches  to  First  Step  Act  proceedings.
To  be  sure,  the  Court  properly  notes  that  district  courts
must begin a First Step Act proceeding by calculating the 
new  Guidelines  range  based  solely  on  the  changes  to  the 
crack-cocaine sentencing ranges.  See ante, at 14, n. 6.  So 
far, so good.  But district courts then have free rein either 
to take into account—or to completely disregard—other in-
tervening changes since the original sentencing. 

Needless to say, different district courts will choose dif-
ferent approaches.  The Court’s decision will therefore pro-
duce massive inequities in how the First Step Act is imple-
mented on the ground.  Those inequities further illustrate
why today’s decision is wrong as a matter of statutory in-
terpretation:  Congress enacted the First Step Act to pro-
vide a targeted retroactive reduction in crack-cocaine sen-
tencing ranges, not to unleash a sentencing free-for-all in 
the lower courts. 

The Court’s disregard of the text of the First Step Act is
especially audacious because the Act was a heavily negoti-
ated  and  vigorously  debated  piece  of  legislation.  The  Act 
reflects a compromise among competing interests.  Not for 
the first time in a sentencing case, the Court’s decision to-
day  unravels  the  legislative  compromise  reflected  in  the