Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/524bv.pdf
Page Number: 314.0

524us1$86Q 02-17-99 18:23:51 PAGES OPINPGT

Cite as: 524 U. S. 266 (1998)

269

Opinion of the Court

tiorari to consider the merits of this position, and we ap-
pointed an amicus to defend the Ninth Circuit’s decision.
We now agree with Forney and the Solicitor General that
the Court of Appeals should have heard Forney’s appeal.

II

Section 1291 of Title 28 of the United States Code grants
the “courts of appeals . . . jurisdiction of appeals from all
(Emphasis added.)
ﬁnal decisions of the district courts.”
Forney’s appeal falls within the scope of this jurisdictional
grant. That is because the District Court entered its judg-
ment under the authority of the special “judicial review” pro-
vision of the Social Security Act, which says, in its fourth
sentence, that “district court[s]” (reviewing, for example,
agency denials of Social Security disability claims)

“shall have power to enter . . . a judgment afﬁrming,
modifying, or reversing the decision of the [agency] with
or without remanding the cause for a rehearing,” 42
U. S. C. § 405(g) (emphasis added),

and which adds, in its eighth sentence, that the

“judgment of the court shall be ﬁnal except that it shall
be subject to review in the same manner as a judgment
in other civil actions,” ibid. (emphases added).

This Court has previously held that this statutory language
means what it says, namely, that a district court order re-
manding a Social Security disability beneﬁt claim to the
agency for further proceedings is a “ﬁnal judgment” for
purposes of § 1291 and it is, therefore, appealable. Sullivan
v. Finkelstein, 496 U. S. 617 (1990); see also Shalala v.
Schaefer, 509 U. S. 292, 294 (1993) (statute that requires
attorney’s fees application to be ﬁled within “thirty days of
ﬁnal judgment” requires ﬁling within 30 days of entry of
§ 405(g) “sentence four” district court remand order, not
within 30 days of ﬁnal agency decision after remand).