Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/23pdf/23-108_8n5a.pdf
Page Number: 39

Cite as:  603 U. S. ____ (2024) 

17 

JACKSON, J., dissenting 

“ ‘corruptly’ ”  is  “normally  associated  with  wrongful,  im-
moral, depraved, or evil” conduct.  Id., at 705.  We therefore 
related the term with “consciousness of wrongdoing.”  Id., 
at  706.  Applying  that  standard  definition  to  §666’s  mens 
rea requirement appears to heave an imposing burden onto 
the Government.  Prosecutors must prove not only that  a 
state,  local,  or  tribal  official  did,  in  fact,  act  wrongfully
when accepting the gift or payment, but also that she knew 
that accepting the gift or payment was wrongful.7  The ma-
jority worries that it may be unclear to an official whether 
accepting a gift is, in fact, “wrongful.”  See ante, at 12.  But 
if “corruptly” is read to require knowledge of wrongfulness, 
any  lack  of  clarity  benefits  the  official.    In  such  circum-
stances, a prosecutor is almost certain to be unable to meet
her  burden  of  proof—as  the  Government  acknowledges. 
See, e.g., Tr. of Oral Arg. 59–60, 107.8 

The bottom line is that §666 is not unique or special.  Like 
other  criminal  statutes—and  especially  other  anti-public-
corruption  statutes—§666  has  various  elements,  some  of 
which  may  benefit  from  further  clarification.  Down  the 
road, this Court could have had that opportunity with re-
spect to §666 if it had chosen to engage in our usual method 
of parsing statutes.  See, e.g., Fischer v. United States, 529 
U. S. 667, 677, 681 (2000) (clarifying the meaning of federal 
“benefits”  under  §666);  Sun-Diamond,  526  U. S.,  at  414 
(holding that to establish a violation of §201(c), “the Gov-
ernment  must  prove  a  link  between  a  thing  of  value  con-
ferred upon a public official and a specific ‘official act’ for or 
—————— 

7 At oral argument, the Government acknowledged that “consciousness 
of wrongdoing” roughly translates to knowledge of unlawfulness.  Tr. of 
Oral Arg. 74–76. 

8 Thus, defining “corruptly” in the same way we have in the past would
not rely on a prosecutor’s discretion to limit the scope of the statute.  See 
ante, at 13; cf. Marinello v. United States, 584 U. S. 1, 11 (2018).  Indeed, 
though the Government could attempt to launch unwarranted prosecu-
tions under §666, that is as true for §666 as it is for any other federal 
criminal statute.