Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/529bv.pdf
Page Number: 632.0

529US2

Unit: $U52

[09-26-01 10:36:40] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 529 U. S. 513 (2000)

557

Ginsburg, J., dissenting

(N. D. 1989) (“The purpose of corroborating evidence is to
show that accomplices are reliable witnesses and worthy of
credit.”); Holladay v. State, 709 S. W. 2d 194, 196 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1986) (“Because such a witness [i. e., an accomplice] is
usually deemed to be corrupt, his testimony is always looked
upon with suspicion.”); Fleming v. State, 760 P. 2d 208, 209–
210 (Okla. Crim. App. 1988) (“The purpose behind the re-
quirement of corroboration is to protect an accused from
being falsely implicated by another criminal in the hope of
clemency, a desire for revenge, or for any other reason.”).

I make no judgment here as to the propriety of the Texas
Legislature’s decision to view the testimony of certain sex-
ual assault victims in the same light as that of accomplices.
Ex post facto analysis does not depend on an assessment
of a statute’s wisdom. For current purposes it sufﬁces to
note that Article 38.07’s corroboration requirement rests on
the same rationale that underpins accomplice corroboration
requirements: the notion that a particular witness, because
of his or her role in the events at issue, might not give trust-
worthy testimony. See Reed v. State, 991 S. W. 2d 354, 361
(Tex. App. 1999) (“Generally speaking, the need to corrobo-
rate the testimony of a sexual assault victim stems from the
notion that the victim, if over the age of consent, could be
an accomplice rather than a victim.”); Hernandez v. State,
651 S. W. 2d 746, 751 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983) (concurring opin-
ion adopted on rehearing) (Article 38.07’s corroboration re-
quirement “was meant to deal only with testimony of a vic-
tim of a sexual offense who, for one reason or another, was
held to be an ‘accomplice witness’ and, perforce, whose testi-
mony must be corroborated.”).

The history of Article 38.07 bears out the view that its
focus has always been on the competency and credibility of
the victim as witness. The origins of the statute could be
traced to the fact that in Texas, “for many years a seduced
female was an incompetent witness as a matter of law.”
Holladay, 709 S. W. 2d, at 200. See, e. g., Cole v. State, 40