Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/529bv.pdf
Page Number: 461

529US2

Unit: $U46

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386

WILLIAMS v. TAYLOR

Opinion of Stevens, J.

clear that habeas may issue under § 2254(d)(1) if a state-court
. clearly established Federal
.
“decision” is “contrary to .
law.” We thus anticipate that there will be a variety of
cases, like this one, in which both phrases may be implicated.
Even though we cannot conclude that the phrases establish
“a body of rigid rules,” they do express a “mood” that the
Federal Judiciary must respect. Universal Camera Corp. v.
NLRB, 340 U. S. 474, 487 (1951).
In this respect, it seems
clear that Congress intended federal judges to attend with
the utmost care to state-court decisions, including all of the
reasons supporting their decisions, before concluding that
those proceedings were infected by constitutional error suf-
ﬁciently serious to warrant the issuance of the writ. Like-
wise, the statute in a separate provision provides for the
habeas remedy when a state-court decision “was based on an
unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evi-
dence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U. S. C.
§ 2254(d)(2) (1994 ed., Supp. III) (emphasis added). While
this provision is not before us in this case, it provides rele-
vant context for our interpretation of § 2254(d)(1); in this re-
spect, it bolsters our conviction that federal habeas courts
must make as the starting point of their analysis the state
courts’ determinations of fact,
including that aspect of a
“mixed question” that rests on a ﬁnding of fact. AEDPA
plainly sought to ensure a level of “deference to the determi-
nations of state courts,” provided those determinations did
not conﬂict with federal law or apply federal law in an unrea-
sonable way. H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 104–518, p. 111 (1996).
Congress wished to curb delays, to prevent “retrials” on fed-
eral habeas, and to give effect to state convictions to the
extent possible under law. When federal courts are able to
fulﬁll these goals within the bounds of the law, AEDPA in-
structs them to do so.

On the other hand, it is signiﬁcant that the word “defer-
ence” does not appear in the text of the statute itself. Nei-
ther the legislative history nor the statutory text suggests