Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/16pdf/16-149_6jfm.pdf
Page Number: 3.0

Cite as:  581 U. S. ____ (2017) 

3 

Syllabus 

er chose between the two readings set out in McVeigh, because doing 
so  was  not  pertinent  to  the  discrete  question  whether  federal  courts
have subject-matter jurisdiction over FEHBA reimbursement actions.
Having  decided  in  McVeigh  that  §8902(m)(1)  is  a  “choice-of-law  pre-
scription,”  not  a  “jurisdiction-conferring  provision,”  id.,  at  697,  the 
Court  had  no  cause  to  consider  §8902(m)(1)’s  text,  context,  and  pur-
pose, as it does here.  Pp. 8–9.

2. The regime Congress enacted is compatible with the Supremacy
Clause.  The statute itself, not a contract, strips state law of its force.
FEHBA contract terms have preemptive force only if they fall within 
§8902(m)(1)’s preemptive scope.  Many other federal statutes found to 
preempt state law, including the Employee Retirement Income Secu-
rity  Act  of  1974  and  the  Federal  Arbitration  Act,  leave  the  context-
specific  scope  of  preemption  to  contractual  terms.
  While 
§8902(m)(1)’s  phrasing  may  differ  from  those  other  statutes’, 
FEHBA’s express-preemption provision manifests the same intent to 
preempt state law.  Pp. 9–11.

492 S. W. 3d 918, reversed and remanded. 

GINSBURG, J., delivered  the  opinion  of  the  Court,  in  which  all  other 
Members joined, except GORSUCH, J., who took no part in the considera-
tion or decision of the case.  THOMAS, J., filed a concurring opinion.