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Page Number: 1.0

(Slip Opinion) 

OCTOBER  TERM,  2023 

1 

Syllabus 

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is 
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued. 
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been 
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader. 
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337. 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

Syllabus 

SMITH v. ARIZONA 

CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS OF ARIZONA, 
DIVISION ONE 

No. 22–899.  Argued January 10, 2024—Decided June 21, 2024 

The Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause guarantees a criminal de-
fendant the right to confront the witnesses against him.  In operation,
the Clause protects a defendant’s right of cross-examination by limit-
ing the prosecution’s ability to introduce statements made by people 
not in the courtroom.  The Clause thus bars the admission at trial of 
an absent witness’s statements unless the witness is unavailable and 
the defendant had a prior chance to subject her to cross-examination. 
Crawford  v. Washington,  541  U. S.  36,  53–54.    This  prohibition  “ap-
plies only to testimonial hearsay,” Davis v. Washington, 547 U. S. 813, 
823,  and  in  that  two-word  phrase  are  two  limits.    First,  in  speaking
about  “witnesses”—or  “those  who  bear  testimony”—the  Clause  con-
fines itself to “testimonial statements,” a category this Court has vari-
ously  described.  Id.,  at  823,  826.    Second,  the  Clause  bars  only  the 
introduction of hearsay—meaning, out-of-court statements offered “to 
prove  the  truth  of  the  matter  asserted.”    Anderson  v.  United  States, 
417 U. S. 211, 219.  Relevant here, the Confrontation Clause applies
in full to forensic evidence.  For example, in Melendez-Diaz v. Massa-
chusetts, 557 U. S. 305, prosecutors introduced “certificates of analy-
sis” stating that lab tests had identified a substance seized from the 
defendant as cocaine.  The Court held that the defendant had a right
to  cross-examine  the  lab  analysts  who  prepared  the  certificates.    In 
Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 564 U. S. 647, the Court relied on Melen-
dez-Diaz to hold that a State could not introduce one lab analyst’s writ-
ten findings through the testimony of a substitute analyst.  Finally, in 
Williams v. Illinois, 567 U. S. 50, the Court considered a case where 
one lab analyst related an absent analyst’s findings on the way to stat-
ing her own conclusion.  The state court held that the testimony did 
not  implicate  the  Confrontation  Clause  because  the  absent  analyst’s