Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/10pdf/09-893.pdf
Page Number: 31.0

4 

AT&T MOBILITY LLC v. CONCEPCION 

BREYER, J., dissenting 

hostility  to  arbitration,  for  example  by  refusing  to  order 
specific  performance  of  agreements  to  arbitrate.    See 
S. Rep.  No.  536,  68th  Cong.,  1st  Sess.,  2  (1924).    The  Act 
sought to eliminate that hostility by placing agreements to
arbitrate  “ ‘upon  the  same  footing  as  other  contracts.’ ”  
Scherk  v.  Alberto-Culver  Co.,  417  U. S.  506,  511  (1974)
(quoting H. R. Rep. No. 96, at 2; emphasis added). 

Congress was fully aware that arbitration could provide
procedural  and  cost  advantages.    The  House  Report  em­
phasized  the  “appropriate[ness]”  of  making  arbitration
agreements  enforceable  “at  this  time  when  there  is  so
much agitation against the costliness and delays of litiga­
tion.”  Id.,  at  2.  And  this  Court  has  acknowledged  that 
parties may enter into arbitration agreements in order to
expedite the resolution of disputes.  See Preston v. Ferrer, 
552  U. S.  346,  357  (2008)  (discussing  “prime  objective  of 
an  agreement  to  arbitrate”).  See  also  Mitsubishi  Motors 
Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U. S. 614, 628 
(1985).

But  we  have  also  cautioned  against  thinking  that  Con­
gress’ primary objective was to guarantee these particular 
procedural  advantages.    Rather,  that  primary  objective 
was  to  secure  the  “enforcement”  of  agreements  to  arbi­
trate.  Dean Witter, 470 U. S., at 221.  See also id., at 219 
(we  “reject  the  suggestion  that  the  overriding  goal  of  the 
Arbitration Act was to promote the expeditious resolution 
of claims”); id., at 219, 217–218 (“[T]he intent of Congress” 
requires  us  to  apply  the  terms  of  the  Act  without  regard
to  whether  the  result  would  be  “possibly  inefficient”);  cf. 
id.,  at  220  (acknowledging  that  “expedited  resolution  of 
disputes”  might  lead  parties  to  prefer  arbitration).    The 
relevant  Senate  Report  points  to  the  Act’s  basic  purpose 
when  it  says  that  “[t]he  purpose  of  the  [Act]  is clearly  set 
forth in section 2,” S. Rep. No. 536, at 2 (emphasis added), 
namely,  the  section  that  says  that  an  arbitration  agree­
ment  “shall  be  valid,  irrevocable,  and  enforceable,  save