Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/22pdf/21-476_c185.pdf
Page Number: 23

Cite as:  600 U. S. ____ (2023) 

17 

Opinion of the Court 

created  with  an  expectation  of  compensation.  Nor,  this 
Court  has  held,  do  speakers  shed  their  First  Amendment
protections by employing the corporate form to disseminate 
their speech.  This fact underlies our cases involving every-
thing from movie producers to book publishers to newspa-
pers.  See, e.g., Joseph Burstyn, Inc., 343 U. S., at 497–503; 
Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N. Y. State Crime Vic-
tims Bd., 502 U. S. 105, 114–116 (1991); Grosjean v. Amer-
ican Press Co., 297 U. S. 233, 240–241, 249 (1936).

Colorado next urges us to focus on the reason Ms. Smith 
refuses to offer the speech it seeks to compel.  She refuses, 
the State insists, because she objects to the “protected char-
acteristics” of certain customers.  Brief for Respondents 16; 
see  also  post,  at  26–27,  31–32  (opinion  of  SOTOMAYOR, J.) 
(reciting the same argument).  But once more, the parties’ 
stipulations speak differently.  The parties agree that Ms.
Smith “will gladly create custom graphics and websites for
gay, lesbian, or bisexual clients or for organizations run by
gay,  lesbian,  or  bisexual  persons  so  long  as  the  custom
graphics and websites” do not violate her beliefs.  App. to
Pet.  for  Cert.  184a.  That  is  a  condition,  the  parties
acknowledge,  Ms.  Smith  applies  to  “all  customers.”    Ibid.  
Ms. Smith stresses, too, that she has not and will not create 
expressions that defy any of her beliefs for any customer, 
whether that involves encouraging violence, demeaning an-
other person, or promoting views inconsistent with her re-
ligious commitments.  See Tr. of Oral Arg. 18–20.  Nor, in 
any  event,  do  the  First  Amendment’s  protections  belong 
only to speakers whose motives the government finds wor-
thy;  its  protections  belong  to  all,  including  to  speakers
whose  motives  others  may  find  misinformed  or  offensive.
See  Federal  Election  Comm’n  v.  Wisconsin  Right  to  Life, 
Inc.,  551  U. S.  449,  468–469  (2007)  (opinion  of  ROBERTS, 
C. J.) (observing that “a speaker’s motivation is entirely ir-
relevant” (internal quotation marks omitted)); National So-
cialist  Party  of  America  v.  Skokie,  432  U. S.  43,  43–44