Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/529bv.pdf
Page Number: 166.0

529US1

Unit: $U35

[09-26-01 09:32:43] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 529 U. S. 89 (2000)

91

Syllabus

gress, in PWSA Title I, preserved state authority to regulate the peculi-
arities of local waters, such as depth and narrowness, if there is no
conﬂict with federal regulatory determinations, see 435 U. S., at 171–
172, 178, but further held that Congress, in PWSA Title II, mandated
uniform federal rules on the subjects or matters there speciﬁed, id., at
168. Thus, under Ray’s interpretation of the Title II provision now
found at 46 U. S. C. § 3703(a), only the Federal Government may regulate
the design, construction, alteration, repair, maintenance, operation,
equipping, personnel qualiﬁcation, and manning of tankers. The Court
today reafﬁrms Ray’s holding on this point. Congress has left no room
for state regulation of these matters. See Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan
Assn. v. De la Cuesta, 458 U. S. 141. Although the Ray Court acknowl-
edged that the existence of some overlapping coverage between the two
PWSA titles may make it difﬁcult to determine whether a pre-emption
question is controlled by conﬂict pre-emption principles, applicable gen-
erally to Title I, or by ﬁeld pre-emption rules, applicable generally to
Title II, the Court declined to resolve every question by the greater
pre-emptive force of Title II. Thus, conﬂict pre-emption will be appli-
cable in some, although not all, cases. Useful inquiries in determining
which title governs include whether the regulation in question is justi-
ﬁed by conditions unique to a particular port or waterway, see Ray, 435
U. S., at 175, or whether it is of limited extraterritorial effect, not requir-
ing the tanker to modify its primary conduct outside the speciﬁc body
of water purported to justify the local rule, see id., at 159–160, 171.
Pp. 103–112.

(c) The ﬁeld pre-emption rule surrounding PWSA Title II and 46
U. S. C. § 3703(a) and the superseding effect of additional federal stat-
utes are illustrated by the pre-emption of four of Washington’s tanker
regulations, the attempted reach of which is well demonstrated by the
briefs and record. First, the imposition of a series of training require-
ments on a tanker’s crew does not address matters unique to Washing-
ton waters, but imposes requirements that control the stafﬁng, opera-
tion, and manning of a tanker outside of those waters. The training
and drill requirements pertain to “operation” and “personnel qualiﬁ-
cations” and so are pre-empted by § 3703(a). That training is a ﬁeld
reserved to the Federal Government is further conﬁrmed by the cir-
cumstance that the STCW Convention addresses crew “training” and
“qualiﬁcation” requirements, and that the United States has enacted
crew training regulations. Second, the imposition of English language
proﬁciency requirements on a tanker’s crew is not limited to governing
local trafﬁc or local peculiarities.
It is pre-empted by § 3703(a) as a
“personnel qualiﬁcation” and by 33 U. S. C. § 1228(a)(7), which requires
that any vessel operating in United States waters have at least one