Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/19pdf/18-1150_new_d18e.pdf
Page Number: 20.0

Cite as:  590 U. S. ____ (2020) 

17 

Opinion of the Court 

Georgia  minimizes  the  OCGA  annotations  as  non-bind-
ing and non-authoritative, but that description undersells 
their practical significance.  Imagine a Georgia citizen in-
terested in learning his legal rights and duties.  If he reads 
the  economy-class  version  of  the  Georgia  Code  available 
online, he will see laws requiring political candidates to pay 
hefty qualification fees (with no indigency exception), crim-
inalizing  broad  categories  of  consensual  sexual  conduct,
and  exempting  certain  key  evidence  in  criminal  trials 
from  standard  evidentiary  limitations—with  no  hint 
that important aspects of those laws have been held uncon-
stitutional  by  the  Georgia  Supreme  Court.  See  OCGA 
§§21–2–131,  16–6–2,  16–6–18,  16–15–9  (available  at 
www.legis.ga.gov).  Meanwhile,  first-class  readers  with
access  to  the  annotations  will  be  assured  that  these  laws 
are, in crucial respects, unenforceable relics that the legis-
lature has not bothered to narrow or repeal.  See §§21–2–
131,  16–6–2,  16–6–18,  16–15–9  (available  at  https://store.
lexisnexis.com/products/official-code-of-georgia-annotated-
skuSKU6647 for $412.00). 

If  everything  short  of  statutes  and  opinions  were  copy-
rightable, then States would be free to offer a whole range
of premium legal works for those who can afford the extra 
benefit.  A State could monetize its entire suite of legislative 
history.  With  today’s  digital  tools,  States  might  even 
launch a subscription or pay-per-law service.

There is no need to assume inventive or nefarious behav-
ior  for  these  concerns  to  become  a  reality.    Unlike  other 
forms of intellectual property, copyright protection is both
instant and automatic.  It vests as soon as a work is cap-
tured in a tangible form, triggering a panoply of exclusive 
—————— 
creating binding materials from qualifying as an “author.”  Regardless, 
it is more “[ ]consistent with the judicial role” to  apply the reasoning and 
results the Court voted on and committed to writing than to speculate 
about  what  practical  considerations  our  predecessors  “may  have  had 
. . . in  mind,”  what  history  “may  [have] suggest[ed],”  or  what  constitu-
tional concerns “may have animated” our government edicts precedents. 
Ibid.