Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/23pdf/22-915_8o6b.pdf
Page Number: 55.0

20 

UNITED STATES v. RAHIMI 

KAVANAUGH, J., concurring 

the  ordinary  approach 

tests  are 
to  constitutional 
interpretation.  And I am arguing against extending those 
tests to new areas, including the Second Amendment. 

One  major  problem  with  using  a balancing  approach  to
determine  exceptions  to  constitutional  rights  is  that  it
requires  highly  subjective  judicial  evaluations  of  how 
important a law is—at least unless the balancing test itself 
incorporates history, in which case judges might as well just
continue to rely on history directly.

The  subjective  balancing  approach  forces  judges  to  act 
more  like  legislators  who  decide  what  the  law  should  be, 
rather than judges who “say what the law is.”  Marbury v. 
Madison,  1  Cranch  137,  177  (1803).    That  is  because  the 
balancing approach requires judges to weigh the benefits of
a law against its burdens—a value-laden and political task 
that is usually reserved for the political branches.  And that 
power in essence vests judges with “a roving commission to 
second-guess” 
legislators  and  administrative  officers 
“concerning  what  is  best  for  the  country.”    W.  Rehnquist,
The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 Texas L. Rev. 693,
698 (1976).  Stated otherwise, when a court “does not have 
a  solid  textual  anchor  or  an  established  social  norm  from 
which  to  derive  the  general  rule,  its  pronouncement
appears  uncomfortably  like  legislation.”    A.  Scalia,  The 
Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1175, 1185 
(1989).

Moreover,  the  balancing  approach  is  ill-defined.    Some 
judges will apply heightened scrutiny with a presumption 
in favor of deference to the legislature.  Other judges will
apply  heightened  scrutiny  with  a  presumption  in  favor  of 
the individual right in question.  Because it is unmoored, 
the  balancing  approach  presents  the  real  “danger”  that 
“judges will mistake their own predilections for the law.”  A. 
Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. Cin. L. Rev. 849,
863 (1989).  Under the balancing approach, to use Justice 
Scalia’s  characteristically  vivid  description,  if  “We  The