Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/20pdf/19-309_4f15.pdf
Page Number: 1

(Slip Opinion) 

OCTOBER  TERM,  2020 

1 

Syllabus 

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is 
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued. 
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been 
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader. 
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337. 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

Syllabus 

CARNEY, GOVERNOR OF DELAWARE v. ADAMS 

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR 
THE THIRD CIRCUIT 

No. 19–309.  Argued October 5, 2020—Decided December 10, 2020 

Delaware’s Constitution contains a political balance requirement for ap-
pointments to the State’s major courts.  No more than a bare majority
of judges on any of its five major courts “shall be of the same political
party.”  Art. IV, §3.  In addition, on three of those courts, those mem-
bers  not  in  the  bare  majority  “shall  be  of  the  other  major  political
party.”  Ibid.    Respondent  James  R.  Adams,  a  Delaware  lawyer  and  
political  independent,  sued  in  Federal  District  Court,  claiming  that 
Delaware’s “bare majority” and “major party” requirements violate his
First Amendment right to freedom of association by making him inel-
igible to become a judge unless he joins a major political party.  The 
District Court held that Adams had standing to challenge both require-
ments  and  that  Delaware’s  balancing  scheme  was  unconstitutional. 
The Third Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part.  It held that 
Adams did have standing to challenge the major party requirement, 
because it categorically excludes independents from becoming judges 
on three courts, but that he lacked standing to challenge the bare ma-
jority requirement, which does not preclude independents from eligi-
bility for any vacancy. 

Held: Because Adams has not shown that he was “able and ready” to ap-
ply for a judicial vacancy in the  imminent future, he has failed to show 
a  “personal,”  “concrete,”  and  “imminent”  injury necessary  for  Article 
III standing.  Pp. 4–13.

(a) Two aspects of standing doctrine are relevant here.  First, stand-
ing requires an “ ‘injury in fact’ ” that must be “concrete and particu-
larized,” as well as “ ‘actual or imminent.’ ”  Lujan v. Defenders of Wild-
life, 504 U. S. 555, 560.  Second, a grievance that amounts to nothing 
more than an abstract and generalized harm to a citizen’s interest in 
the proper application of the law does not count as an “injury in fact”