Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/10pdf/09-530.pdf
Page Number: 14.0

10 

NASA v. NELSON 

Opinion of the Court 

v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 (1968)).8 

The Court announced the decision in Nixon in the wan-
ing days of October Term 1976.  Since then, the Court has 
said  little else  on  the  subject  of  an  “individual  interest  in
avoiding  disclosure  of  personal  matters.”    Whalen,  supra, 
at  599;  Nixon,  supra,  at  457.  A  few  opinions  have  men-
tioned  the  concept  in  passing  and  in  other  contexts.    See 
Department  of  Justice  v.  Reporters  Comm.  for  Freedom  of 
Press, 489 U. S. 749, 762–763 (1989); New York v. Ferber, 
458 U. S. 747, 759, n. 10 (1982).  But no other decision has 
squarely addressed a constitutional right to informational 
privacy.9 

—————— 

8 The Court continued its discussion of Fourth Amendment principles 
throughout  the  “Privacy”  section  of  the  opinion.    See  433  U. S.,  at  459 
(citing  United  States  v.  Miller,  425  U. S.  435  (1976),  United  States  v. 
Dionisio,  410  U. S.  1  (1973),  and  Katz,  389  U. S.  347));  433  U. S.,  at
460–462  (addressing  the  former  President’s  claim  that  the  Act  was
“tantamount  to  a  general  warrant”  under  Stanford v. Texas,  379  U. S. 
476  (1965));  433  U. S.,  at  463–465,  and  n. 26  (concluding  that  the 
challenged law was analogous to the wiretapping provisions of Title III 
of  the  Omnibus  Crime  Control  and  Safe  Streets  Act  of  1968,  notwith-
standing the lack of a “warrant requirement”). 

9 State  and  lower  federal  courts  have  offered  a  number  of  different 
interpretations of Whalen and Nixon over the years.  Many courts hold
that disclosure of at least some kinds of personal information should be
subject  to  a  test  that  balances  the  government’s  interests  against  the 
individual’s  interest  in  avoiding  disclosure.    E.g.,  Barry  v.  New  York, 
712 F. 2d 1554, 1559 (CA2 1983); Fraternal Order of Police v. Philadel-
phia,  812  F. 2d  105,  110  (CA3  1987);  Woodland  v.  Houston,  940  F. 2d 
134,  138  (CA5  1991)  (per  curiam);  In  re  Crawford,  194  F. 3d  954,  959 
(CA9  1999);  State  v.  Russo,  259  Conn.  436,  459–464,  790  A. 2d  1132, 
1147–1150  (2002).    The  Sixth  Circuit  has  held  that  the  right  to  infor-
mational  privacy  protects  only  intrusions  upon  interests  “that  can  be 
deemed fundamental or implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.”  J. P. 
v.  DeSanti,  653  F. 2d  1080,  1090  (1981)  (internal  quotation  marks 
omitted).    The  D. C.  Circuit  has  expressed  “grave  doubts”  about  the
existence  of  a  constitutional  right  to  informational  privacy.  American 
Federation of Govt. Employees v. HUD, 118 F. 3d 786, 791 (1997).