Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/20pdf/19-251_p86b.pdf
Page Number: 42.0

Cite as:  594 U. S. ____ (2021) 

13 

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting 

cherry-picked a less helpful quote.  By its own terms, Shel-
ton held that an end must be “more narrowly achieved” only 
if  the  means  “broadly  stifle”  First  Amendment  liberties, 
that is, only if the means impose a severe burden on associ-
ational rights.5 

In any event, the Court need not read a few isolated sen-
tences from that opinion to divine Shelton’s meaning.  As 
described, see Part II–B–1, supra, the Court in Shelton con-
cluded that a reasonable “fear of public disclosure” and an
asymmetric  power  dynamic  with  hiring  authorities  would 
result  in  a  “constant  and  heavy”  pressure  on  teachers  “to 
avoid  any  ties  which  might  displease  those  who  control 
[their] professional destin[ies].”  364 U. S., at 486.  Recall 
that a witness had testified that his white supremacist or-
ganization  would  seek  to  obtain  the  identities  of  teachers
working  on  civil  rights  issues  in  order  to  eradicate  them 
from the school system, and that just a year after Arkansas
enacted its disclosure law, it enacted a law prohibiting the 
hiring of members of the NAACP as public school teachers.
The problem was not the breadth of the inquiry; it was the 
significant risk that teachers would face serious repercus-
sions for their disclosed associations.6 

—————— 

5 The  Court  claims  that  “broadly  stifle”  refers  “to  the  scope  of  chal-
lenged restrictions” rather than “the severity of any demonstrated bur-
den.”  Ante, at 11.  That reading ignores the verb “stifle” and its object, 
“fundamental  personal  liberties.”    The  Court  wishes  the  sentence  said 
that  a  government  interest  “cannot  be  pursued  by  [broad]  means.”    It 
does not. 

The Court also finds meaning in the fact that Shelton criticized Arkan-
sas’ challenged disclosure regime for not being narrowly tailored.  Ante, 
at 11.  But the Shelton Court had already explained why the failure to 
narrowly tailor was problematic: because the statute significantly bur-
dened Arkansas teachers’ associational rights.  See Shelton, 364 U. S., at 
485–487.    In  no  way  did  the  Court  suggest  that  narrow  tailoring  was 
necessary in the absence of a significant burden on associational rights. 
6 The statement the Court cites from Baird v. State Bar of Ariz., 401 
U. S. 1, 6 (1971) (plurality opinion), must be read in a similar context.