Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/529bv.pdf
Page Number: 463.0

529US2

Unit: $U46

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388

WILLIAMS v. TAYLOR

Opinion of Stevens, J.

Our disagreement with the Court about the precise
meaning of the phrase “contrary to,” and the word “unrea-
sonable,” is, of course, important, but should affect only a
narrow category of cases. The simplest and ﬁrst deﬁnition
of “contrary to” as a phrase is “in conﬂict with.” Webster’s

AEDPA’s “unreasonable application of ” has the same meaning as Justice
Thomas’ “ ‘patently unreasonable’ ” standard mentioned in his dictum in
Wright.
505 U. S., at 291 (quoting Butler v. McKellar, 494 U. S. 407, 422
(1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting)). To the extent the “broader debate” in
Wright touched upon the Court’s novel distinction today between what is
“wrong” and what is “unreasonable,” it was in the context of a discussion
not about the standard of review habeas courts should use for law-
application questions, but about whether a rule is “new” or “old” such
that Teague’s retroactivity rule would bar habeas relief; Justice Thomas
contended that Teague barred habeas “whenever the state courts have
interpreted old precedents reasonably, not [as Justice O’Connor sug-
gested] only when they have done so ‘properly.’ ”
505 U. S., at 291–292,
n. 8. Teague, of course, as Justice O’Connor correctly pointed out, “did
not establish a standard of review at all,” 505 U. S., at 303–304; rather
than instructing a court how to review a claim, it simply asks, in absolute
terms, whether a rule was clear at the time of a state-court decision. We
thus do not think Wright “conﬁrms” anything about the meaning of
§ 2254(d)(1), which is, as our division reﬂects, anything but “clear.” Post,
at 412.

As for the other bases for the Court’s view, the only two speciﬁc cita-
tions to the legislative history upon which it relies, post, at 408, do no
more than beg the question. One merely quotes the language of the stat-
ute without elaboration, and the other goes to slightly greater length in
stating that state-court judgments must be upheld unless “unreasonable.”
Neither sheds any light on what the content of the hypothetical category
of “decisions” that are wrong but nevertheless not “unreasonable.” Fi-
nally, while we certainly agree with the Court, post, at 403, that AEDPA
wrought substantial changes in habeas law, see supra, at 386; see also,
e. g., 28 U. S. C. § 2244(b) (1994 ed., Supp. III) (strictly limiting second or
successive petitions); § 2244(d) (1-year statute of limitations for habeas
petitions); § 2254(e)(2) (limiting availability of evidentiary hearings on
habeas); §§ 2263, 2266 (strict deadlines for habeas court rulings), there is
an obvious fallacy in the assumption that because the statute changed
pre-existing law in some respects, it must have rendered this speciﬁc
change here.