Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/22pdf/21-454_4g15.pdf
Page Number: 5.0

Cite as:  598 U. S. ____ (2023) 

5 

Syllabus 

matter indistinguishable from waters of the United States.”  This re-
quires the party asserting jurisdiction to establish “first, that the ad-
jacent  [body  of  water  constitutes]  . . .  ‘water[s]  of  the  United  States’ 
(i.e., a relatively permanent body of water connected to traditional in-
terstate navigable waters); and second, that the wetland has a contin-
uous surface connection with that water, making it difficult to deter-
mine where the ‘water’ ends and the ‘wetland’ begins.”  Rapanos, 547 
U. S., at 755, 742.  Pp. 18–22. 

(c) The EPA asks the Court to defer to its most recent rule providing 
that  “adjacent  wetlands  are  covered  by  the  [CWA]  if  they  ‘possess  a 
significant nexus to’ traditional navigable waters” and that wetlands
are “adjacent” when they are “neighboring” to covered waters.  Brief 
for Respondents 32, 20.  For multiple reasons, the EPA’s position lacks 
merit.  Pp. 22–27.

(1) The EPA’s interpretation is inconsistent with the CWA’s text
and structure and clashes with “background principles of construction”
that  apply  to  the  interpretation  of  the  relevant  provisions.    Bond  v. 
United States, 572 U. S. 844, 857.  First, “exceedingly clear language”
is required if Congress wishes to alter the federal/state balance or the
Government’s power over private property.  United States Forest Ser-
vice v. Cowpasture River Preservation Assn., 590 U. S. ___, ___.  The 
Court has thus required a clear statement from Congress when deter-
mining  the  scope  of  “the  waters  of  the  United  States.”  Second,  the 
EPA’s interpretation gives rise to serious vagueness concerns in light
of the CWA’s criminal penalties, thus implicating the due process re-
quirement that penal statutes be defined “ ‘with sufficient definiteness 
that  ordinary  people  can  understand  what  conduct  is  prohibited.’ ” 
McDonnell v. United States, 579 U. S. 550, 576.  Where penal statutes 
could sweep broadly enough to render criminal a host of what might 
otherwise be considered ordinary activities, the Court has been wary
about going beyond what “Congress certainly intended the statute to
cover.”  Skilling v. United States, 561 U. S. 358, 404.  Under these two 
principles,  the  judicial  task  when  interpreting  “the  waters  of  the 
United States” is to ascertain whether clear congressional authoriza-
tion exists for the EPA’s claimed power.  Pp. 22–25. 

(2) The  EPA  claims  that  Congress  ratified  the  EPA’s  regulatory 
definition of “adjacent” when it amended the CWA to include the ref-
erence to “adjacent” wetlands in §1344(g)(1).  This argument fails for 
at least three reasons.  First, the text of §§1362(7) and 1344(g) shows 
that “adjacent” cannot include wetlands that are merely nearby cov-
ered waters.  Second, EPA’s argument cannot be reconciled with this 
Court’s  repeated  recognition  that  §1344(g)(1)  “ ‘does  not  conclusively
determine the construction to be placed on . . . the relevant definition 
of “navigable waters.” ’ ”  SWANCC, 531 U. S., at 171.  Third, the EPA