Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/13pdf/12-536_e1pf.pdf
Page Number: 43.0

Cite as:  572 U. S. ____ (2014) 

37 

Opinion of ROBERTS, C. J. 

Buckley’s anticircumvention rationale to an argument that
the  aggregate  limits  deter  corruption  regardless  of  their
ability to prevent circumvention of the base limits.  See Tr. 
of  Oral  Arg.  29–30,  50–52.  The  Government  argued  that 
there  is  an  opportunity  for  corruption  whenever  a  large 
check is given to a legislator, even if the check consists of
contributions  within  the  base  limits  to  be  appropriately 
divided among numerous candidates and committees.  The 
aggregate limits, the argument goes, ensure that the check 
amount does not become too large.  That new rationale for 
the aggregate limits—embraced by the dissent, see post, at 
15–17—does  not  wash.  It  dangerously  broadens  the  cir-
cumscribed  definition  of  quid  pro  quo  corruption  articu- 
lated  in  our  prior  cases,  and  targets  as  corruption  the 
general, broad-based support of a political party.

In  analyzing  the  base  limits,  Buckley  made  clear  that 
the  risk  of  corruption  arises  when  an  individual  makes 
large  contributions  to  the  candidate  or  officeholder  him-
self.  See  424  U. S.,  at  26–27.  Buckley’s  analysis  of  the 
aggregate limit under FECA was  similarly confined.  The 
Court  noted  that  the  aggregate  limit  guarded  against  an
individual’s  funneling—through  circumvention—“massive
amounts  of  money  to  a  particular  candidate.”  Id.,  at  38 
(emphasis added).  We have reiterated that understanding 
several  times.  See,  e.g.,  National  Conservative  Political 
Action  Comm.,  470  U. S.,  at  497  (quid  pro  quo  corruption
occurs  when  “[e]lected  officials  are  influenced  to  act  con-
trary to their obligations of office by the prospect of finan-
cial  gain  to  themselves  or  infusions  of  money  into  their 
campaigns”  (emphasis  added));  Citizens  Against  Rent 
Control/Coalition  for  Fair  Housing  v.  Berkeley,  454  U. S. 
290, 297 (1981) (Buckley’s holding that contribution limits
are  permissible  “relates  to  the  perception  of  undue  influ-
ence of large contributors to a candidate”); McConnell, 540 
U. S.,  at  296  (opinion  of  KENNEDY, J.)  (quid  pro  quo  cor-
ruption in Buckley involved “contributions that flowed to a