Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/558bv.pdf
Page Number: 468.0

Cite as: 558 U. S. 290 (2010) 

307 

Stevens, J., dissenting 

App.  327,  and  was  “functioning,  at  most,”  in  this  borderline 
range,  id.,  at  328.  Wood  was  “reading  on  less  than  a  3rd 
grade  level.”  Id.,  at  327.  His  former  special  education 
teacher testiﬁed during postconviction review that Wood was 
classiﬁed as “educable mentally retarded” by the local school 
system.  Id., at 403.  In short, Wood has the type of signiﬁ­
cant mental deﬁcits that we recognize as “inherently mitigat­
ing,” Tennard v.  Dretke, 542 U. S. 274, 287 (2004).3 

Despite  the  powerful  mitigating  value  of  this  evidence, 
“[n]o  evidence  of  Wood’s  mental  retardation  was  ever  pre­
sented to the jury.”  542 F. 3d 1281, 1314 (CA11 2008) (Bar­
kett, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  Counsel 
was clearly aware that this evidence existed, id., at 1318, but 
chose not to investigate it beyond the conclusions outlined in 
Dr.  Kirkland’s  report,  App.  283.  In  the  Court’s  view,  the 
record  reasonably  supports  the  state  court’s  conclusion  that 
“counsel  made  a  strategic  decision  not  to  inquire  further 
into”  Wood’s  mental  deﬁciencies,  ante,  at  303.  Although  I 
agree  with  the  majority  that  the  failure  was  the  result  of  a 
“decision,”  albeit  a  hasty  one,  the  Court  regrettably  fails  to 
consider whether the decision was also “strategic” as a mat­
ter of fact. 

A decision cannot be fairly characterized as “strategic” un­
less  it  is  a  conscious  choice  between  two  legitimate  and  ra­
tional alternatives.  It must be borne of deliberation and not 
happenstance,  inattention,  or  neglect.  See  Wiggins,  539 
U. S., at 526 (concluding that counsel’s “failure to investigate 
thoroughly resulted from inattention, not reasoned strategic 
judgment”);  Strickland,  466  U. S.,  at  690–691.  Moreover, 
“a  cursory  investigation”  does  not  “automatically  justif[y]  a 

3 Although  Wood  does  not  fall  within  the  class  of  individuals  we  identi­
ﬁed  in  Atkins  v.  Virginia,  536  U. S.  304  (2002),  against  whom  the  death 
penalty may not be constitutionally imposed, “the reality that [the defend­
ant]  was  ‘borderline  mentally  retarded,’  might  well . . . inﬂuenc[e]  the 
jury’s  appraisal  of  his  moral  culpability.”  Williams  v.  Taylor,  529  U. S. 
362, 398 (2000).