Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/09pdf/08-1529.pdf
Page Number: 14.0

Cite as:  559 U. S. ____ (2010) 

11 

Opinion of the Court 

We  agree  with  petitioners  that  there  is  no  reason  to
think that scope certification by the Attorney General is a
prerequisite to immunity under §233(a).  To be sure, that 
immunity  is  contingent  upon  the  alleged  misconduct 
having  occurred  in  the  course  of  the  PHS  defendant’s
duties, but a defendant may make that proof pursuant to
the ordinary rules of evidence and procedure.  As petition-
ers  observe,  proof  of  scope  is  in  most  §233(a) cases  estab-
lished by a declaration affirming that the defendant was a
PHS  official  during  the  relevant  time  period.    See  Reply 
Brief  for  Petitioner  Hui  6–7,  and  n. 1.    Thus,  while  scope
certification  may  provide  a  convenient  mechanism  for 
establishing  that  the  alleged  misconduct  occurred  within
the  scope  of  the  employee’s  duties,  the  procedure  author-
ized  by  §2679(d)  is  not  necessary  to  effect  substitution  of
the United States.  Finally, that the FTCA’s scope certifi-
cation  procedure  was  enacted  almost  two  decades  after
§233(a)  confirms  that  Congress  did  not  intend  to  make
that  procedure  the  exclusive  means  for  PHS  personnel  to
invoke the official immunity provided by §233(a). 

Respondents’  argument  based  on  §233(f)  is  similarly 
unavailing.  That  subsection  authorizes  the  Secretary  of 
Health  and  Human  Services  to  “hold  harmless  or  provide
liability  insurance”  for  a  PHS  officer  or  employee  for  per-
sonal  injuries  caused  by  conduct  occurring  “within  the 
scope  of  his  office  or  employment  . . .  if  such  employee  is
assigned to a foreign country . . . and if the circumstances 
are  such  as  are  likely  to  preclude  the  remedies  of  third 
persons  against  the  United  States  described  in  section
2679(b).”  Noting  that  the  FTCA  precludes  recovery 
against  the  United  States  for  “[a]ny  claim  arising  in  a 
foreign country,” §2680(k), respondents urge that §233(f)’s
authorization  of  insurance  or  indemnification  in  those 
circumstances anticipates that an injured party without a