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Page Number: 64

4 

TRUMP v. UNITED STATES 

BARRETT, J., concurring in part 

cuting him for crimes committed when dealing with the Ar-
izona House Speaker would unconstitutionally intrude on 
executive power.

This  two-step  analysis—considering  first  whether  the 
statute applies and then whether its application to the par-
ticular  facts  is  constitutional—is  similar  to  the  approach
that  the  Special  Counsel  presses  in  this  Court.    Brief  for 
United States 24–30.  It is also our usual approach to con-
sidering the validity of statutes in situations raising a con-
stitutional question.  See, e.g., Seila Law LLC v. Consumer 
Financial  Protection  Bureau,  591  U. S.  197,  213,  229 
(2020).3  An important difference in this context is that the
President is entitled to an interlocutory appeal of the trial
court’s ruling.  See ante, at 36.  A criminal defendant in fed-
eral court normally must wait until after trial to seek re-
view  of  the  trial  court’s  refusal  to  dismiss  charges.  See 
United States v. MacDonald, 435 U. S. 850, 853–854 (1978); 
see also 18 U. S. C. §3731.  But where trial itself threatens 
certain  constitutional  interests,  we  have  treated  the  trial 
court’s resolution of the issue as a “final decision” for pur-
poses  of  appellate  jurisdiction.  MacDonald,  435  U. S.,  at 
854–856; see 28 U. S. C. §1291; see also §1257. 

—————— 

3 The  Court  has  sometimes  applied  an  avoidance  canon  when  inter-
preting a statute that would interfere with the President’s prerogatives. 
See, e.g., Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U. S. 788, 800–801 (1992); Pub-
lic Citizen v. Dept. of Justice, 491 U. S. 440, 465–467 (1989); see also Sale 
v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc., 509 U. S. 155, 188 (1993).  The Office of 
Legal Counsel has advocated for a clear-statement rule if applying a stat-
ute  would  “raise  serious  constitutional  questions  relating  to  the  Presi-
dent’s constitutional authority.”  See Application of 28 U. S. C. §458 to
Presidential Appointments of Federal Judges, 19 Op. OLC 350, 350–357
(1995).  In my view, neither canon applies in this circumstance.  Courts 
should instead determine the statute’s ordinary meaning and, if it covers 
the alleged official acts, assess whether prosecution would intrude on the
President’s  constitutional  authority.   See  Public  Citizen,  491  U. S.,  at 
481–482  (Kennedy,  J., concurring  in  judgment)  (declining  to  apply  the
avoidance  canon  and  concluding  that  the  Federal  Advisory  Committee 
Act is unconstitutional as applied).