Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/10pdf/09-751.pdf
Page Number: 25

Cite as:  562 U. S. ____ (2011) 

3 

ALITO, J., dissenting 

A  plaintiff  must  also  establish  that  the  defendant’s
conduct  was “ ‘so outrageous in character, and so extreme 
in  degree,  as  to  go  beyond  all  possible  bounds  of  decency,
and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in 
a  civilized  community.’ ”    Id.,  at  567,  380  A. 2d,  at  614 
(quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts §46, Comment d).

Although  the  elements  of  the  IIED  tort  are  difficult  to 
meet, respondents long ago abandoned any effort to show 
that  those  tough  standards  were  not  satisfied  here.    On 
appeal,  they  chose  not  to  contest  the  sufficiency  of  the
evidence.  See  580  F. 3d  206,  216  (CA4  2009).    They  did 
not  dispute  that  Mr.  Snyder  suffered  “ ‘wounds  that  are
truly  severe  and  incapable  of  healing  themselves.’ ”    Fi-
gueiredo-Torres,  supra,  at  653,  584  A. 2d,  at  75.    Nor  did 
they  dispute  that  their  speech  was  “ ‘so  outrageous  in 
character,  and  so  extreme  in  degree,  as  to  go  beyond  all 
possible  bounds  of  decency,  and  to  be  regarded  as  atro-
cious,  and  utterly  intolerable  in  a  civilized  community.’ ” 
Harris,  supra,  at  567,  380  A. 2d,  at  614.    Instead,  they
maintained that the First Amendment gave them a license 
to engage in such conduct.  They are wrong. 

II 

It  is  well  established  that  a  claim  for  the  intentional 
infliction of emotional distress can be satisfied by speech. 
Indeed,  what  has  been  described  as  “[t]he  leading  case” 
recognizing this tort involved speech.  Prosser and Keeton, 
supra,  §12,  at  60  (citing  Wilkinson  v.  Downton,  [1897]  2 
Q. B.  57);  see  also  Restatement  (Second)  of  Torts  §46, 
illustration  1.    And  although  this  Court  has  not  decided 
the question, I think it is clear that the First Amendment 
does  not  entirely  preclude  liability  for  the  intentional
infliction of emotional distress by means of speech. 

This Court has recognized that words may “by their very
utterance  inflict  injury”  and  that  the  First  Amendment 
does  not  shield  utterances  that  form  “no  essential  part  of