Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/14pdf/13-1041_0861.pdf
Page Number: 40.0

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PEREZ v. MORTGAGE BANKERS ASSN. 

THOMAS, J., concurring in judgment 

bility of agency actions with enabling statutes, Utility Air 
Regulatory  Group  v.  EPA,  573  U. S.  ___,  ___  (2014)  (slip 
op.,  at  10).  In  each  case,  the  Judiciary  is  called  upon  to
exercise its independent judgment and apply the law. 

But  we  have  not  consistently  exercised  the  judicial
check  with  respect  to  administrative  agencies.    Even 
though  regulated  parties  have  repeatedly  challenged
agency interpretations as inconsistent with existing regu-
lations,  we  have  just  as  repeatedly  declined  to  exercise 
independent  judgment  as  to  those  claims.    Instead,  we 
have  deferred  to  the  executive  agency  that  both  promul-
gated  the  regulations  and  enforced  them.    Although  an
agency’s  interpretation  of  a  regulation  might  be  the  best
interpretation, it also might not.  When courts refuse even 
to  decide  what  the  best  interpretation  is  under  the  law, 
they  abandon  the  judicial  check.  That  abandonment 
permits  precisely  the  accumulation  of  governmental  pow-
ers that the Framers warned against.  See The Federalist 
No. 47, at 302 (J. Madison). 

C 
This accumulation of governmental powers allows agen-
cies  to  change  the  meaning  of  regulations  at  their  discre-
tion  and  without  any  advance  notice  to  the  parties.  It  is 
precisely  this  problem  that  the  United  States  Court  of 
Appeals  for  the  D. C.  Circuit  attempted  to  address  by
requiring  agencies  to  undertake  notice  and  comment 
procedures  before  substantially  revising  definitive  inter-
pretations  of  regulations.  Paralyzed  Veterans,  supra. 
Though legally erroneous, the Court of Appeals’ reasoning
was  practically  sound.  When  courts  give  “controlling 
weight”  to  an  administrative  interpretation  of  a  regula-
tion—instead  of  to  the  best  interpretation  of  it—they
effectively  give  the  interpretation—and  not  the  regula-
tion—the force and effect of law.  To regulated parties, the
new interpretation might as well be a new regulation.