Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/20pdf/19-351_o7jp.pdf
Page Number: 13.0

Cite as:  592 U. S. ____ (2021) 

9 

Opinion of the Court 

U. N. T. S. 277, 280.  According to the heirs, the forced sale
of their ancestors’ art constituted an act of genocide because 
the  confiscation  of  property  was  one  of  the  conditions  the 
Third  Reich  inflicted  on  the  Jewish  population  to  bring 
about their destruction. 

We need not decide whether the sale of the consortium’s 
property was an act of genocide, because the expropriation 
exception is best read as referencing the international law 
of  expropriation  rather  than  of  human  rights.    We  do  not 
look to the law of genocide to determine if we have jurisdic-
tion over the heirs’ common law property claims.  We look 
to the law of property.

And  in  1976,  the  state  of  that  body  of  law  was  clear:  A 
“taking of property” could be “wrongful under international
law” only where a state deprived “an alien” of property.  Re-
statement (Second) §185; see also Permanent Mission of In-
dia to United Nations  v. City of New York, 551 U. S. 193, 
199–200 (2007) (noting our consistent practice of interpret-
ing the FSIA in keeping with “international law at the time 
of the FSIA’s enactment” and looking to the contemporary 
Restatement  for  guidance).  As  explained  above,  this  rule
survived the advent of modern human rights law, including
the  United  Nations  Convention  on  Genocide.  Congress 
drafted the expropriation exception and its predecessor, the 
Hickenlooper Amendment, against that legal and historical 
backdrop.  See  Taggart  v.  Lorenzen,  587  U. S.  ___,  ___ 
(2019) (slip op., at 5). 

The  heirs  concede  that  at  the  time  of  the  FSIA’s  enact-
ment the international law of expropriation retained the do-
mestic takings rule.  See Restatement (Second) §192.  But 
they argue that Congress captured all of international law 
in the exception—not just the international law of expropri-
ation—and  that  other  areas  of  international  law  do  not 
shield  a  sovereign’s  actions  against  its  own  nationals.    In 
support of that assertion, they note that the exception con-
cerns  “property  taken  in  violation  of  international  law”—