Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/558bv.pdf
Page Number: 272

Cite as: 558 U. S. 100 (2009) 

111 

Opinion of the Court 

prompt resolution of which “may materially advance the ulti­
mate  termination  of  the  litigation”—are  most  likely  to  be 
satisﬁed  when  a  privilege  ruling  involves  a  new  legal  ques­
tion  or  is  of  special  consequence,  and  district  courts  should 
not hesitate to certify an interlocutory appeal in such cases. 
Second, in extraordinary circumstances—i. e., when a disclo­
sure  order  “amount[s]  to  a  judicial  usurpation  of  power  or 
a  clear  abuse  of  discretion,”  or  otherwise  works  a  manifest 
injustice—a  party  may  petition  the  court  of  appeals  for  a 
writ of mandamus.  Cheney v.  United States Dist. Court for 
D. C., 542 U. S. 367, 390 (2004) (citation and internal quotation 
marks  omitted);  see  also  Firestone,  449  U. S.,  at  378–379, 
n. 13.3  While these discretionary review mechanisms do not 
provide  relief  in  every  case,  they  serve  as  useful  “safety 
valve[s]”  for  promptly  correcting  serious  errors.  Digital 
Equipment, 511 U. S., at 883. 

Another  long-recognized  option  is  for  a  party  to  defy  a 
disclosure  order  and  incur  court-imposed  sanctions.  Dis­
trict  courts have  a range  of sanctions  from which  to choose, 
including  “directing  that  the  matters  embraced  in  the  order 
or  other  designated  facts  be  taken  as  established  for  pur­
poses of the action,” “prohibiting the disobedient party from 
supporting  or  opposing  designated  claims  or  defenses,”  or 
“striking  pleadings  in  whole  or  in  part.”  Fed.  Rules  Civ. 
Proc. 37(b)(2)(A)(i)–(iii).  Such sanctions allow a party to ob­
tain postjudgment review without having to reveal its privi­
leged  information.  Alternatively,  when  the  circumstances 
warrant  it,  a  district  court  may  hold  a  noncomplying  party 
in  contempt.  The  party  can  then  appeal  directly  from  that 
ruling, at least when the contempt citation can be character­
ized  as  a  criminal  punishment.  See,  e. g.,  Church  of  Scien­
tology  of  Cal.  v.  United  States,  506  U. S.  9,  18,  n.  11  (1992); 
Firestone, 449 U. S., at 377; Cobbledick v.  United States, 309 

3 Mohawk itself petitioned the Eleventh Circuit for a writ of mandamus. 
See  supra,  at  105.  It  has  not  asked  us  to  review  the  Court  of  Appeals’ 
denial of that relief.