Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/06pdf/05-1120.pdf
Page Number: 52.0

14 

MASSACHUSETTS v. EPA 

ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting 

quotation marks omitted).  In my view, the Court today—
addressing  Article  III’s  “core  component  of  standing,” 
Defenders  of  Wildlife,  supra,  at  560—fails  to  take  this 
limitation seriously. 

To be fair, it is not the first time the Court has done so. 
Today’s  decision  recalls  the  previous  high-water  mark  of 
diluted  standing  requirements,  United  States  v.  Students 
Challenging  Regulatory  Agency  Procedures  (SCRAP),  412 
U. S.  669  (1973).  SCRAP  involved  “[p]robably  the  most 
attenuated injury conferring Art. III standing” and “surely 
went  to  the  very  outer  limit  of  the  law”—until  today. 
Whitmore,  495  U. S.,  at  158–159;  see  also  Lujan  v.  Na-
tional  Wildlife  Federation,  497  U. S.  871,  889  (1990) 
(SCRAP  “has  never  since  been  emulated  by  this  Court”). 
In  SCRAP,  the  Court  based  an  environmental  group’s
standing to challenge a railroad freight rate surcharge on
the  group’s  allegation  that  increases  in  railroad  rates 
would cause an increase in the use of nonrecyclable goods, 
resulting  in  the  increased  need  for  natural  resources  to 
produce such goods.  According to the group, some of these
resources  might  be  taken  from  the  Washington  area,
resulting  in  increased  refuse  that  might  find  its  way  into
area  parks,  harming  the  group’s  members.    412  U. S.,  at 
688. 
  Over time, SCRAP became emblematic not of the loose-
ness  of  Article  III  standing  requirements,  but  of  how 
utterly  manipulable  they  are  if  not  taken  seriously  as  a 
matter  of  judicial  self-restraint.  SCRAP  made  standing 
seem  a  lawyer’s  game,  rather  than  a  fundamental  limita-
tion  ensuring  that  courts  function  as  courts  and  not  in-
trude  on  the  politically  accountable  branches.    Today’s
decision is SCRAP for a new generation.2 

—————— 

2 The difficulty with SCRAP, and the reason it has not been followed, 
is not the portion cited by the Court.  See ante, at 23–24, n. 24.  Rather, 
it  is  the  attenuated  nature  of  the  injury  there,  and  here,  that  is  so