Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/21pdf/20-843_7j80.pdf
Page Number: 49

Cite as:  597 U. S. ____ (2022) 

43 

Opinion of the Court 

made, as an “independent ground of affray,” the mere arm-
ing of oneself with firearms, the Tennessee Constitution’s 
Second  Amendment  analogue  had  “completely  abrogated 
it.”  Id., at 360.  At least in light of that constitutional guar-
antee, the court did not think that it could attribute to the 
mere carrying of arms “a necessarily consequent operation
as terror to the people.”  Ibid. 

Perhaps  more  telling  was  the  North  Carolina  Supreme
Court’s decision in State v. Huntly, 25 N. C. 418 (1843) (per 
curiam).  Unlike the Tennessee Supreme Court in Simpson, 
the Huntly court held that the common-law offense codified 
by the Statute of Northampton was part of the State’s law. 
See  25  N. C.,  at  421–422.    However,  consistent  with  the 
Statute’s  long-settled  interpretation,  the  North  Carolina 
Supreme Court acknowledged “that the carrying of a gun” 
for a lawful purpose “per se constitutes no offence.”  Id., at 
422–423.  Only carrying for a “wicked purpose” with a “mis-
chievous result . . . constitute[d a] crime.”  Id., at 423; see 
also J. Haywood, The Duty and Office of Justices of Peace 
10 (1800); H. Potter, The Office and Duties of a Justice of 
the  Peace  39  (1816).15    Other  state  courts  likewise  recog-
nized that the common law did not punish the carrying of 

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15 The dissent concedes that Huntly, 25 N. C. 418, recognized that citi-
zens were “ ‘at perfect liberty’  to carry for ‘lawful purpose[s].’ ”  Post, at 
42 (quoting Huntly, 25 N. C., at 423).  But the dissent disputes that such
“lawful  purpose[s]”  included  self-defense,  because  Huntly  goes  on  to 
speak  more  specifically  of  carrying  arms  for  “business  or  amusement.” 
Id., at 422–423.  This is an unduly stingy interpretation of Huntly.  In 
particular, Huntly stated that “the citizen is at perfect liberty to carry 
his gun” “[f]or any lawful purpose,” of which “business” and “amusement” 
were then mentioned.  Ibid. (emphasis added).  Huntly then contrasted 
these  “lawful  purpose[s]”  with  the  “wicked  purpose  . . .  to  terrify  and 
alarm.”  Ibid.  Because there is no evidence that Huntly considered self-
defense a “wicked purpose,” we think the best reading of Huntly would 
sanction public carry for self-defense, so long as it was not “in such [a] 
manner as naturally will terrify and alarm.”  Id., at 423.