Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/558bv.pdf
Page Number: 270

Cite as: 558 U. S. 100 (2009) 

109 

Opinion of the Court 

after  ﬁnal  judgment  to  vindicate  valuable  rights,  includ­
ing  rights  central  to  our  adversarial  system.  See,  e. g., 
Richardson-Merrell,  472  U. S.,  at  426  (holding  an  order  dis­
qualifying counsel in a civil case did not qualify for immedi­
ate appeal  under the collateral order  doctrine); Flanagan v. 
United  States,  465  U. S.  259,  260  (1984)  (reaching  the  same 
result in a criminal case, notwithstanding the Sixth Amend­
ment  rights  at  stake).  In  Digital  Equipment,  we  rejected 
an  assertion  that  collateral  order  review  was  necessary  to 
promote  “the  public  policy  favoring  voluntary  resolution  of 
disputes.”  511 U. S., at 881.  “It deﬁes common sense,” we 
explained,  “to  maintain  that  parties’  readiness  to  settle  will 
be signiﬁcantly dampened (or the corresponding public inter­
est  impaired)  by  a  rule  that  a  district  court’s  decision  to  let 
allegedly  barred  litigation  go  forward  may  be  challenged  as 
a  matter  of  right  only  on  appeal  from  a  judgment  for  the 
plaintiff ’s favor.”  Ibid. 

We  reach  a  similar  conclusion  here.  In  our  estimation, 
postjudgment appeals generally sufﬁce to protect the rights 
of  litigants  and  ensure  the  vitality  of  the  attorney-client 
privilege.  Appellate courts can remedy the improper disclo­
sure  of  privileged  material  in  the  same  way  they  remedy  a 
host  of  other  erroneous  evidentiary  rulings:  by  vacating  an 
adverse  judgment  and  remanding  for  a  new  trial  in  which 
the  protected  material  and  its  fruits  are  excluded  from 
evidence. 

Dismissing such relief as inadequate, Mohawk emphasizes 
that the attorney-client privilege does not merely “prohibi[t] 
use  of  protected  information  at  trial”;  it  provides  a  “right 
not to disclose the privileged  information in the ﬁrst place.” 
Brief for Petitioner 25.  Mohawk is undoubtedly correct that 
an  order  to  disclose  privileged  information  intrudes  on  the 
conﬁdentiality  of  attorney-client  communications.  But  de­
ferring  review  until  ﬁnal  judgment  does  not  meaningfully 
reduce the ex ante incentives for full and frank consultations 
between clients and counsel.