Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/529bv.pdf
Page Number: 427.0

529US2

Unit: $U45

[09-26-01 10:03:41] PAGES PGT: OPIN

352

NORFOLK SOUTHERN R. CO. v. SHANKLIN

Opinion of the Court

(same); Hester v. CSX Transp., Inc., 61 F. 3d 382 (CA5 1995)
(same), cert. denied, 516 U. S. 1093 (1996), with 173 F. 3d 386
(CA6 1999) (case below); Shots v. CSX Transp., Inc., 38 F. 3d
304 (CA7 1994) (no pre-emption until representative of Fed-
eral Government has determined that devices installed are
adequate for safety).

II

We previously addressed the pre-emptive effect of the
FHWA’s regulations implementing the Crossings Program in
CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U. S. 658 (1993).
In
that case, we explained that the language of the FRSA’s
pre-emption provision dictates that, to pre-empt state law,
the federal regulation must “cover” the same subject matter,
and not merely “ ‘touch upon’ or ‘relate to’ that subject mat-
ter.”
Id., at 664; see also 49 U. S. C. § 20106. Thus, “pre-
emption will lie only if the federal regulations substantially
subsume the subject matter of the relevant state law.” Eas-
terwood, supra, at 664. Applying this standard, we con-
cluded that the regulations contained in 23 CFR pt. 924
(1999), which “establish the general terms of the bargain be-
tween the Federal and State Governments” for the Cross-
ings Program, are not pre-emptive. 507 U. S., at 667. We
also held that § 646.214(b)(1), which requires that all trafﬁc
control devices installed under the program comply with the
MUTCD, does not pre-empt state tort actions.
Id., at 668–
670. The MUTCD “provides a description of, rather than
a prescription for, the allocation of responsibility for grade
crossing safety between Federal and State Governments and
between States and railroads,” and hence “disavows any
claim to cover the subject matter of that body of law.”
Id.,
at 669–670.

With respect to §§ 646.214(b)(3) and (4), however, we
reached a different conclusion. Because those regulations
“establish requirements as to the installation of particular
warning devices,” we held that “when they are applicable,
Id., at 670. Unlike the other
state tort law is pre-empted.”