Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/529bv.pdf
Page Number: 702

529US3

Unit: $U54

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Cite as: 529 U. S. 598 (2000)

627

Thomas, J., concurring

was directed only to the State where the evil found by Con-
gress existed, and in South Carolina v. Katzenbach, supra,
the remedy was directed only to those States in which Con-
gress found that there had been discrimination.

For these reasons, we conclude that Congress’ power

under § 5 does not extend to the enactment of § 13981.

IV

Petitioner Brzonkala’s complaint alleges that she was the
victim of a brutal assault. But Congress’ effort in § 13981
to provide a federal civil remedy can be sustained neither
under the Commerce Clause nor under § 5 of the Fourteenth
If the allegations here are true, no civilized
Amendment.
system of justice could fail to provide her a remedy for the
conduct of respondent Morrison. But under our federal
system that remedy must be provided by the Commonwealth
of Virginia, and not by the United States. The judgment of
the Court of Appeals is

Afﬁrmed.

Justice Thomas, concurring.
The majority opinion correctly applies our decision in
United States v. Lopez, 514 U. S. 549 (1995), and I join it
I write separately only to express my view that
in full.
the very notion of a “substantial effects” test under the
Commerce Clause is inconsistent with the original under-
standing of Congress’ powers and with this Court’s early
Commerce Clause cases. By continuing to apply this root-
less and malleable standard, however circumscribed, the
Court has encouraged the Federal Government to persist in
its view that the Commerce Clause has virtually no limits.
Until this Court replaces its existing Commerce Clause
jurisprudence with a standard more consistent with the
original understanding, we will continue to see Congress
appropriating state police powers under the guise of regu-
lating commerce.