Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/22pdf/21-468_5if6.pdf
Page Number: 43.0

Cite as:  598 U. S. ____ (2023) 

3 

Opinion of ROBERTS, C. J. 

showing that those burdens clearly outweigh the benefits of 
a state or local practice.”  Department of Revenue of Ky. v. 
Davis,  553  U. S.  328,  353  (2008);  see  also  United  Haulers 
Assn.,  Inc.  v.  Oneida-Herkimer  Solid  Waste  Management 
Authority,  550  U. S.  330,  346  (2007)  (plurality  opinion)
(Pike applies to “a nondiscriminatory statute like this one”).
Nor have our cases applied Pike only where a State regu-
lates the instrumentalities of transportation.  Pike itself ad-
dressed  an  Arizona  law  regulating  cantaloupe  packaging.
See 397 U. S., at 138.  And we have since applied Pike to 
invalidate nondiscriminatory state laws that do not concern
transportation.  Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U. S. 624, 643– 
646 (1982).  As a majority of the Court agrees, Pike extends 
beyond laws either concerning discrimination or governing 
interstate  transportation.    See  ante,  at  2  (opinion  of 
SOTOMAYOR,  J.);  post,  at  1–2  (KAVANAUGH,  J.,  concurring
in part and dissenting in part). 

Speaking  for  three  Members  of  the  Court,  JUSTICE 
GORSUCH objects that balancing competing interests under 
Pike is simply an impossible judicial task.  See ante, at 18– 
21.  I certainly appreciate the concern, see United Haulers, 
550 U. S., at 343, 347, but sometimes there is no avoiding 
the need to weigh seemingly incommensurable values.  See, 
e.g., Schneider v. State (Town of Irvington), 308 U. S. 147, 
162 (1939) (weighing “the purpose to keep the streets clean 
and of good appearance” against the “the constitutional pro-
tection of the freedom of speech and press”); Winston v. Lee, 
470 U. S. 753, 760 (1985) (“The reasonableness” under the
Fourth Amendment “of surgical intrusions beneath the skin 
depends on a case-by-case approach, in which the individ-
ual’s interests in privacy and security are weighed against 
society’s interests in conducting  the procedure.”); Adding-
ton v. Texas, 441 U. S. 418, 425 (1979) (“In considering what 
standard should govern in a civil commitment proceeding, 
we must assess both the extent of the individual’s interest 
in  not  being  involuntarily  confined  indefinitely  and  the