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REPUBLICAN NATIONAL COMMITTEE v. 
DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL COMMITTEE 
Per Curiam 

Court  allow  ballots  mailed  and  postmarked  after  election 
day, April 7, to be counted.  That is a critical point in the 
case.  Nonetheless, five days before the scheduled election, 
the  District  Court  unilaterally  ordered  that  absentee  bal-
lots mailed and postmarked after election day, April 7, still
be counted so long as they are received by April 13.  Extend-
ing  the  date  by  which  ballots  may  be  cast  by  voters—not 
just received by the municipal clerks but cast by voters—
for an additional six days after the scheduled election day
fundamentally alters the nature of the election.  And again,
the plaintiffs themselves did not even ask for that relief in
their preliminary injunction motions.  Our point is not that
the argument is necessarily forfeited, but is that the plain-
tiffs themselves did not see the need to ask for such relief. 
By changing the election rules so close to the election date 
and by affording relief that the plaintiffs themselves did not
ask for in their preliminary injunction motions, the District
Court contravened this Court’s precedents and erred by or-
dering such relief.  This Court has repeatedly emphasized
that  lower  federal  courts  should  ordinarily  not  alter  the
election rules on the eve of an election.  See Purcell v. Gon-
zalez, 549 U. S. 1 (2006) (per curiam); Frank v. Walker, 574 
U. S. 929 (2014); Veasey v. Perry, 574 U. S. __ (2014). 

The unusual nature of the District Court’s order allowing 
ballots  to  be  mailed  and  postmarked  after  election  day  is 
perhaps  best  demonstrated  by  the  fact  that  the  District 
Court had to issue a subsequent order enjoining the public 
release of any election results for six days after election day.
In  doing  so,  the  District  Court  in  essence  enjoined  non-
parties to this lawsuit.  It is highly questionable, moreover, 
that this attempt to suppress disclosure of the election re-
sults for six days after election day would work.  And if any
information  were  released  during  that  time,  that  would 
gravely affect the integrity of the election process.  The Dis-
trict Court’s order suppressing disclosure of election results 
showcases the unusual nature of the District Court’s order