Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/14pdf/13-7451_m64o.pdf
Page Number: 30

Cite as:  574 U. S. ___ (2015) 

3 

KAGAN, J., dissenting 

has  ever  read  any  such  provision  to  exclude  things  that
don’t  record  or  preserve  data;  rather,  all  courts  have  ad-
hered to the statutory language’s ordinary (i.e., expansive) 
meaning.  For  example,  courts  have  understood  the
phrases  “tangible  objects”  and  “tangible  things”  in  the 
Federal  Rules  of  Criminal  and  Civil  Procedure  to  cover 
everything  from  guns  to  drugs  to  machinery  to  . . .  ani-
mals.  See,  e.g.,  United  States  v.  Obiukwu,  17  F. 3d  816, 
819  (CA6  1994)  (per  curiam)  (handgun);  United  States  v. 
Acarino, 270 F. Supp. 526, 527–528 (EDNY 1967) (heroin); 
In  re  Newman,  782  F.  2d  971,  972–975  (CA  Fed.  1986) 
(energy  generation  system);  Martin  v.  Reynolds  Metals 
Corp.,  297  F.  2d  49,  56–57  (CA9  1961)  (cattle).    No  sur-
prise,  then,  that—until  today—courts  have  uniformly
applied  the  term  “tangible  object”  in  §1519  in  the  same 
way.  See,  e.g.,  United  States  v.  McRae,  702  F.  3d  806, 
834–838 (CA5 2012) (corpse); United States v. Maury, 695 
F. 3d 227, 243–244 (CA3 2012) (cement mixer).

That  is  not  necessarily  the  end  of  the  matter;  I  agree 
with  the  plurality  (really,  who  does  not?)  that  context 
matters in interpreting statutes.  We do not “construe the 
meaning  of  statutory  terms  in  a  vacuum.”    Tyler  v.  Cain, 
533 U. S. 656, 662 (2001).  Rather, we interpret particular 
words  “in  their  context  and  with  a  view  to  their  place  in 
the overall statutory scheme.”  Davis v. Michigan Dept. of 
Treasury, 489 U. S. 803, 809 (1989).  And sometimes that 
—————— 

trust  me—in  all  that  come  between),  States  similarly  use  the  terms
“tangible  objects”  and  “tangible  things”  in  statutes  and  rules  of  all 
sorts.
  See,  e.g.,  Ala.  Code  §34–17–1(3)  (2010)  (defining  “landscape 
architecture”  to  include  the  design  of  certain  “tangible  objects  and 
features”);  Alaska  Rule  Civ.  Proc.  34(a)(1)  (2014)  (allowing  litigants  to 
“inspect,  copy,  test,  or  sample  any  tangible  things”  that  constitute  or
contain  discoverable  material);  Wis.  Stat.  §804.09(1)  (2014)  (requiring
the  production  of  “designated  tangible  things”  in  civil  proceedings); 
Wyo. Rule Crim. Proc. 41(h) (2014) (defining “property” for purposes of 
a  search-and-seizure  statute  to  include  “documents,  books,  papers  and
any other tangible objects”).