Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/22pdf/21-1326_6jfl.pdf
Page Number: 16.0

Cite as:  598 U. S. ____ (2023) 

13 

Opinion of the Court 

The same analysis applies here.  According to petitioners,
respondents received notice that the phrase “usual and cus-
tomary” referred to their discounted prices (in some cases, 
it  seems,  from  the  same  entities  to  which  they  reported
their  prices).  And,  according  to  petitioners,  respondents
comprehended those notices and then tried to hide their dis-
counted  prices.    If  that  is  true,  then  perhaps  respondents
actually knew what the phrase meant; or perhaps respond-
ents  were  aware  of  an  unjustifiably  high  risk  that  the 
phrase referred to their discounted prices.  And, if that is 
true, then respondents may have known that their claims
were false.  The facial ambiguity of the phrase thus does not 
by itself preclude a finding of scienter under the FCA. 

2 

Second,  like  the  Seventh  Circuit,  respondents  rely  on 
Safeco.  They contend that Safeco already interpreted the 
common-law  definitions  of  “knowing”  and  “reckless”  and 
that  it  did  so  by  looking  first  at  whether  the  defendant’s
“reading  of  the  statute”  was  “objectively  unreasonable.” 
551  U. S.,  at  69.    Accordingly,  respondents  conclude  that,
because the FCA has the same common-law terms, it should 
be read with the same, objective common-law focus.  

This argument fails twice over.  First, Safeco interpreted
a different statute, the FCRA, which had a different mens 
rea  standard,  “ ‘willfully.’ ”    Id.,  at  52  (quoting  15  U. S.  C. 
§1681n(a)).  While Safeco did reference the common law’s 
standards  for  “knowing”  and  “reckless”  conduct,  see  551
U. S.,  at  59–60,  68–69,  its  interpretation  was  ultimately 
tied to the FCRA’s particular text.  To take Safeco as estab-
lishing categorical rules for those terms would accordingly
“abandon the care we have traditionally taken to construe
such words in their particular statutory context.”  Jerman 
v. Carlisle, McNellie, Rini, Kramer & Ulrich, L. P. A., 559 
U. S. 573, 585 (2010).  And, as explained above, the FCA’s
scienter  standards  are  plainly  satisfied  by  a  defendant’s