Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/20pdf/19-1257_g204.pdf
Page Number: 59.0

Cite as:  594 U. S. ____ (2021) 

15 

KAGAN, J., dissenting 

“based on the totality of circumstances,” a State’s electoral 
system is “not equally open” to members of a racial group.  
And then the subsection tells us what that means.  A sys-
tem is not equally open if members of one race have “less 
opportunity” than others to cast votes, to participate in pol-
itics, or to elect representatives.  The key demand, then, is 
for equal political opportunity across races. 
  That equal “opportunity” is absent when a law or practice 
makes it harder for members of one racial group, than for 
others, to cast ballots.  When Congress amended Section 2, 
the  word  “opportunity”  meant  what  it  also  does  today:  “a 
favorable  or  advantageous  combination  of  circumstances” 
for some action.  See American Heritage Dictionary, at 922.  
In  using  that  word,  Congress  made  clear  that  the  Voting 
Rights Act does not demand equal outcomes.  If members of 
different races have the same opportunity to vote, but go to 
the ballot box at different rates, then so be it—that is their 
preference, and Section 2 has nothing to say.  But if a law 
produces  different  voting  opportunities  across  races—if  it 
establishes  rules  and  conditions  of  political  participation 
that  are  less  favorable  (or  advantageous)  for  one  racial 
group than for others—then Section 2 kicks in.  It applies, 
in short, whenever the law makes it harder for citizens of 
one race than of others to cast a vote.4 
  And that is so even if (as is usually true) the law does not 

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4 I agree with the majority that “very small differences” among racial 
groups do not matter.  Ante, at 18.  Some racial disparities are too small 
to support a finding of unequal access because they are not statistically 
significant—that is, because they might have arisen from chance alone.  
See Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, 563 U. S. 27, 39 (2011).  The 
statistical significance test is standard in all legal contexts addressing 
disparate impact.  See Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U. S. 557, 587 (2009).  In 
addition, there may be some threshold of what is sometimes called “prac-
tical significance”—a level of inequality that, even if statistically mean-
ingful, is just too trivial for the legal system to care about.  See Federal 
Judicial  Center,  Reference  Manual  on  Scientific  Evidence  252  (3d  ed. 
2011) (discussing differences that are not “practically important”).