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Page Number: 28

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MCCUTCHEON v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N 

Opinion of ROBERTS, C. J. 

ruptible if given a dime.  And if there is no risk that addi-
tional  candidates  will  be  corrupted  by  donations  of  up  to 
$5,200,  then  the  Government  must  defend  the  aggregate 
limits  by  demonstrating  that  they  prevent  circumvention
of the base limits. 

The  problem  is  that  they  do  not  serve  that  function  in
any  meaningful  way.    In  light  of  the  various  statutes 
and regulations currently in effect, Buckley’s  fear that an 
individual might “contribute massive amounts of money to
a  particular  candidate  through  the  use  of  unearmarked 
contributions”  to  entities  likely  to  support  the  candi-
date,  424  U. S.,  at  38,  is  far  too  speculative.    And— 
importantly—we “have never accepted mere conjecture as
adequate  to  carry  a  First  Amendment  burden.”  Nixon  v. 
Shrink  Missouri  Government  PAC,  528  U. S.  377,  392 
(2000).

As  an  initial  matter,  there  is  not  the  same  risk  of  quid 
pro  quo  corruption  or  its  appearance  when  money  flows 
through  independent  actors  to  a  candidate,  as  when  a 
donor  contributes  to  a  candidate  directly.  When  an  indi-
vidual contributes to a candidate, a party committee, or a
PAC,  the  individual  must  by  law  cede  control  over  the 
funds.  See  2  U. S. C.  §441a(a)(8);  11  CFR  §110.6.    The 
Government admits that if the funds are subsequently re-
routed to a particular candidate, such action occurs at the 
initial recipient’s discretion—not the donor’s.  See Brief for 
Appellee  37.  As  a  consequence,  the  chain  of  attribution 
grows  longer,  and  any  credit  must  be  shared  among  the 
various actors along the way.  For those reasons, the risk 
of  quid  pro  quo  corruption  is  generally  applicable  only  to 
“the  narrow  category  of  money  gifts  that  are  directed,  in 
some manner, to a candidate or officeholder.”  McConnell, 
540 U. S., at 310 (opinion of KENNEDY, J.). 

Buckley  nonetheless  focused  on  the  possibility  that 
“unearmarked  contributions”  could  eventually  find  their 
way  to  a  candidate’s  coffers.  424  U. S.,  at  38.    Even  ac-