Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/19pdf/18-1323_c07d.pdf
Page Number: 125.0

10 

JUNE MEDICAL SERVICES L.L.C. v. RUSSO 

GORSUCH, J., dissenting 

cess  to  abortions:  Any  woman  not  burdened  by  the  chal-
lenged  law  is  deemed  “irrelevant”  to  the  analysis.    So  in-
stead of asking how the law’s unconstitutional applications 
compare to its legitimate sweep, the plurality winds up ask-
ing only whether the law burdens a very large fraction of 
the people that it burdens.  The words might sound famil-
iar, but this circular test is unlike anything we apply to fa-
cial challenges anywhere else.

Abandoning  our  usual  caution  with  facial  challenges 
leads, predictably, to overbroad conclusions.  Suppose that
for a substantial number of women Louisiana’s law imposes 
no burden at all.  These women might live in an area well-
served by well-qualified abortion providers who can easily
obtain admitting privileges.  No one could dispute the law
is constitutional as applied to these women and providers. 
But suppose the law makes it difficult to obtain an abortion
on the other side of the State, where qualified providers are 
fewer and farther between.  Under the standard applied to-
day, it seems the entire law would fall statewide, notwith-
standing its undeniable constitutionality in many applica-
tions. 

Nor  is  this  possibility  farfetched.    Today’s  decision  de-
clares  the  admitting  privileges  requirement  unconstitu-
tional even as applied to Does 3 and 5, each of whom holds
admitting  privileges.  Not  a  single  woman  would  be  bur-
dened by requiring these doctors to maintain the privileges
they already have.  Yet the State may not enforce the law
even against them.  In effect, the standard for facial chal-
lenges has been flipped on its head:  Rather than requiring
that a law be unconstitutional in all its applications to fall, 
today’s decision requires that Louisiana’s law be constitu-
tional in all its applications to stand. 

*