Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/22pdf/21-476_c185.pdf
Page Number: 25.0

Cite as:  600 U. S. ____ (2023) 

19 

Opinion of the Court 

the dissemination of purely factual and uncontroversial in-
formation,”  particularly  in  the  context  of  “commercial  ad-
vertising.”  Hurley,  515  U. S.,  at  573  (internal  quotation
marks omitted); see also NIFLA, 585 U. S., at ___ (slip op., 
at  8);  Riley  v.  National  Federation  of  Blind  of  N. C.,  Inc., 
487 U. S. 781, 795–796 (1988).  But this case involves noth-
ing  like  that.  Here,  Colorado  does  not  seek  to  impose  an
incidental burden on speech.  It seeks to force an individual 
to “utter what is not in [her] mind” about a question of po-
litical  and  religious  significance.  Barnette,  319  U. S.,  at 
634.  And  that,  FAIR  reaffirmed,  is  something  the  First 
Amendment does not tolerate.  No government, FAIR rec-
ognized, may affect a “speaker’s message” by “forc[ing]” her
to “accommodate” other views, 547 U. S., at 63; no govern-
ment  may  “ ‘alter’ ”  the  “ ‘expressive  content’ ”  of  her  mes-
sage, id., at 63–64 (alteration omitted); and no government
may “interfer[e] with” her “desired message,” id., at 64. 

V 
It is difficult to read the dissent and conclude we are look-
ing at the same case.  Much of it focuses on the evolution of 
public accommodations laws, post, at 7–13, and the strides 
gay  Americans  have  made  towards  securing  equal  justice
under law, post, at 14–17.  And, no doubt, there is much to 
applaud  here.  But  none  of  this  answers  the  question  we 
face  today:  Can  a  State  force  someone  who  provides  her 
own  expressive  services  to  abandon  her  conscience  and 
speak its preferred message instead?

When the dissent finally gets around to that question—
more than halfway into its opinion—it reimagines the facts 
of this case from top to bottom.  The dissent claims that Col-
orado  wishes  to  regulate  Ms.  Smith’s  “conduct,”  not  her 
speech.  Post, at 24–29.  Forget Colorado’s stipulation that 
Ms. Smith’s activities are “expressive,” App. to Pet. for Cert.
181a,  and  the  Tenth  Circuit’s  conclusion  that  the  State