Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/22pdf/22-58_i425.pdf
Page Number: 46.0

4 

UNITED STATES v. TEXAS 

ALITO, J., dissenting 

567  U. S.  387,  401  (2012).    If  States  are  also  barred  from 
bringing suit even when they satisfy our established test for 
Article III standing, they are powerless to defend their vital 
interests.  If a President fails or refuses to enforce the im-
migration  laws,  the  States  must  simply  bear  the  conse-
quences.  That interpretation of executive authority and Ar-
ticle  III’s  case  or  controversy  requirement  is  deeply  and 
dangerously flawed. 

I 
The Court’s opinion omits much that is necessary to un-
derstand  the  significance  of  its  decision,  and  I  therefore
begin  by  summarizing  the  relevant  statutory  provisions, 
the  challenged  Department  of  Homeland  Security  (DHS) 
action,  and  the  District  Court’s  findings  of  fact  regarding
the injury faced by the State of Texas as the result of what
DHS has done. 

A 
The relevant statutory provisions have figured in several
prior decisions, and in those cases we have recounted how 
they  came  to  be  enacted  and  have  clearly  described  what
they require.  These provisions were part of the Illegal Im-
migration  Reform  and  Immigration  Responsibility  Act  of 
1996 (IIRIRA), which  was adopted “against a backdrop  of 
wholesale failure by the [Immigration and Naturalization
Service] to deal with increasing rates of criminal activity by
aliens.”  Demore v. Kim, 538 U. S. 510, 518 (2003).2  Con-
gress concluded that a central cause of that failure was the 
Attorney General’s “broad discretion to conduct individual-
ized bond hearings and to release criminal aliens from cus-
tody  during  their  removal  proceedings.”    Id.,  at  519.  To 
remedy  this  problem, Congress  “subtract[ed]  some  of  that 

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2 The Immigration and Naturalization Service was merged into DHS 

in 2003.