Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/13pdf/12-536_e1pf.pdf
Page Number: 78

Cite as:  572 U. S. ____ (2014) 

27 

BREYER, J., dissenting 

hole, how can it possibly plug a large one? 

IV 

The plurality concludes that even if circumvention were 
a  threat,  the  aggregate  limits  are  “poorly  tailored”  to  ad- 
dress  it.  Ante,  at  30.  The  First  Amendment  requires  “ ‘a
fit that is . . . reasonable,’ ” and there is no such “fit” here 
because there are several alternative ways Congress could 
prevent evasion of the base limits.  Ibid. (quoting Fox, 492 
U. S., at 480).  For instance, the plurality posits, Congress
(or  the  FEC)  could  “tighten  . . .  transfer  rules”;  it  could 
require  “contributions  above  the  current  aggregate  limits 
to  be  deposited  into  segregated,  nontransferable  accounts
and  spent  only  by  their  recipients”;  it  could  define  “how 
many  candidates  a  PAC  must  support  in  order  to  ensure
that ‘a substantial portion’ of a donor’s contribution is not 
rerouted  to  a  certain  candidate”;  or  it  could  prohibit  “do­
nors  who  have  contributed  the  current  maximum  sums 
from further contributing to political committees that have
indicated they will support candidates to whom the donor 
has already contributed.”  Ante, at 33–35 (quoting 11 CFR
§110.1(h)(2)).

The  plurality,  however,  does  not  show,  or  try  to  show, 
that  these  hypothetical  alternatives  could  effectively
replace aggregate contribution limits.  Indeed, it does not 
even  “opine  on  the  validity  of  any  particular  proposal,” 
ante,  at  35—presumably  because  these  proposals  them­
selves  could  be  subject  to  constitutional  challenges.  For 
the  most  part,  the  alternatives  the  plurality  mentions
were  similarly  available  at  the  time  of  Buckley.  Their 
hypothetical  presence  did  not  prevent  the  Court  from
upholding  aggregate  limits  in  1976.    How  can  their  con­
tinued  hypothetical  presence  lead  the  plurality  now  to
conclude  that  aggregate  limits  are  “poorly  tailored?”    See 
ante,  at  30.    How  can  their  continued  hypothetical  pres­
ence lead the Court to overrule Buckley now?