Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/524bv.pdf
Page Number: 368

524US2

Unit: $U89

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Cite as: 524 U. S. 321 (1998)

323

Syllabus

proportionality, the Court adopts the gross disproportionality standard
articulated in, e. g., id., at 288. Pp. 334–337.

(c) The forfeiture of respondent’s entire $357,144 would be grossly
disproportional to the gravity of his offense. His crime was solely a
reporting offense.
It was permissible to transport the currency out of
the country so long as he reported it. And because § 982(a)(1) orders
currency forfeited for a “willful” reporting violation, the essence of the
crime is a willful failure to report. Furthermore, the District Court
found his violation to be unrelated to any other illegal activities. What-
ever his other vices, respondent does not ﬁt into the class of persons
for whom the statute was principally designed: money launderers, drug
trafﬁckers, and tax evaders. And the maximum penalties that could
have been imposed under the Sentencing Guidelines, a 6-month sentence
and a $5,000 ﬁne, conﬁrm a minimal level of culpability and are dwarfed
by the $357,144 forfeiture sought by the Government. The harm that
respondent caused was also minimal. The failure to report affected
only the Government, and in a relatively minor way. There was no
fraud on the Government and no loss to the public ﬁsc. Had his crime
gone undetected, the Government would have been deprived only of
the information that $357,144 had left the country. Thus, there is no
articulable correlation between the $357,144 and any Government in-
jury. Pp. 337–340.

(d) The Court rejects the contention that the proportionality of full
forfeiture is demonstrated by the fact that the First Congress, at
roughly the same time the Eighth Amendment was ratiﬁed, enacted
statutes requiring full forfeiture of goods involved in customs offenses
or the payment of monetary penalties proportioned to the goods’ value.
The early customs statutes do not support the Government’s assertion
because, unlike § 982(a)(1), the type of forfeiture they imposed was not
considered punishment for a criminal offense, but rather was civil in
rem forfeiture, in which the Government proceeded against the “guilty”
property itself. See, e. g., Harford v. United States, 8 Cranch 109.
Similarly, the early statutes imposing monetary “forfeitures” propor-
tioned to the value of the goods involved were considered not as punish-
ment for an offense, but rather as serving the remedial purpose of reim-
bursing the Government for the losses accruing from evasion of customs
duties. See, e. g., Stockwell v. United States, 13 Wall. 531, 546–547.
Pp. 340–344.

84 F. 3d 334, afﬁrmed.

Thomas, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Stevens, Sou-
ter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., joined. Kennedy, J., ﬁled a dissenting