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Page Number: 32

8 

UNITED STATES v. STEVENS 

ALITO, J., dissenting 

contribution  to  the  exchange  of  ideas.    Accordingly,  I
would hold that hunting depictions fall comfortably within
the exception set out in §48(b). 

I  do  not  have  the  slightest  doubt  that  Congress,  in  en-
acting  §48,  had  no  intention  of  restricting  the  creation, 
sale, or possession of depictions of hunting.  Proponents of 
the law made this point clearly.  See H. R. Rep. No. 106–
397,  p. 8  (1999)  (hereinafter  H. R.  Rep.)  (“[D]epictions  of 
ordinary  hunting  and  fishing  activities  do  not  fall  within
the  scope  of  the  statute”);  145  Cong.  Rec.  25894  (Oct.  19,
1999)  (Rep.  McCollum)  (“[T]he  sale  of  depictions  of  legal
activities, such as hunting and fishing, would not be illegal
under  this  bill”);  id.,  at  25895  (Rep.  Smith)  (“[L]et  us  be
clear  as  to  what  this  legislation  will  not  do.    It  will  in no 
way prohibit hunting, fishing, or wildlife videos”).  Indeed, 
even  opponents  acknowledged  that  §48  was  not  intended 
to  reach  ordinary  hunting  depictions.    See  ibid.  (Rep.
Scott); id., at 25897 (Rep. Paul). 

For these reasons, I am convinced that §48 has no appli-
cation to depictions of hunting.  But even if §48 did imper-
missibly reach the sale or possession of depictions of hunt-
ing  in  a  few  unusual  situations  (for  example,  the  sale  in
Oregon  of  a  depiction  of  hunting  with  a  crossbow  in  Vir-
ginia  or  the  sale  in  Washington  State  of  the  hunting  of  a 
sharp-tailed  grouse  in  Idaho,  see  ante,  at  14),  those  iso-
lated  applications  would  hardly  show  that  §48  bans  a 
substantial amount of protected speech. 

B 
Although the Court’s overbreadth analysis rests primar-
ily  on  the  proposition  that  §48  substantially  restricts  the
sale  and  possession  of hunting  depictions,  the  Court  cites 
a few additional examples, including depictions of methods
of slaughter and the docking of the tails of dairy cows.  See 
ante, at 14–15. 

Such examples do not show that the statute is substan-