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Page Number: 54

12 

COUNTERMAN v. COLORADO 

BARRETT, J., dissenting 

Where does recklessness come from?  It was not raised by 
the parties.  Only the Solicitor General noted this possibil-
ity—and briefly at that.  Brief for United States as Amicus 
Curiae 28–31.  Nor did the courts below address reckless-
ness; indeed, very few courts (of the many that have taken 
up the question) have settled on recklessness as the consti-
tutional floor for true threats.  See, e.g., State v. Mrozinski, 
971 N. W. 2d 233, 243–245 (Minn. 2022); In re J. J. M., 265 
A. 3d 246, 269–270 (Pa. 2021).  Still, the Court adopts reck-
lessness as “the right path forward.”  Ante, at  11.  Its ra-
tionale is, at best, unclear. 

The  Court  begins  by  acknowledging  the  “ ‘competing 
value[s]’ ” of “free expression” on one hand, and “profound 
harms  . . .  to  both  individuals  and  society”  on  the  other. 
Ante, at 11–12.  But why do these considerations point to 
recklessness?  A knowledge or purpose standard would al-
low  more  free  expression,  so  maybe  we  should  go  higher. 
See ante, at 16 (SOTOMAYOR, J., concurring in part and con-
curring  in  judgment)  (“chilling  concerns  only  further  but-
tress the conclusion that true threats should be limited to 
intentionally threatening speech”).  An objective standard
would cause less harm to victims, so perhaps lower is bet-
ter.  The optimal balance strikes me as a question best left 
to the legislature, which could calibrate the mens rea to the 
circumstance—for example, higher for the criminal context 
and lower for the civil.  See Brief for Illinois et al. as Amici 
Curiae 28–30 (States “have a range of policy reasons for us-
ing subjective standards for penalizing threats of violence” 
and many “choose to require proof of a speaker’s subjective 
mental state” in some situations but not others). 

Nor  does  our  First  Amendment  precedent  buttress  the
Court’s  preferred  standard.  A  recklessness  requirement
currently  applies  only  to  public-figure  defamation  claims. 
Incitement to violence calls for more.  Fighting words, pri-
vate-figure  defamation,  false  commercial  speech,  and  ob-
scenity require less.  I fail to see why, of all these categories