Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/18pdf/18-302_e29g.pdf
Page Number: 11

Cite as:  588 U. S. ____ (2019) 

9 

Opinion of the Court 

concretely,  the  Government  explains  that  this  reinterpre-
tation  would  mostly  restrict  the  PTO  to  refusing  marks 
that  are  “vulgar”—meaning  “lewd,”  “sexually  explicit  or
profane.”  Id.,  at  27,  30.  Such  a  reconfigured  bar,  the
Government says, would not turn on viewpoint, and so we 
could uphold it.

But  we  cannot  accept  the  Government’s  proposal,  be-
cause the statute says something markedly different.  This 
Court,  of  course,  may  interpret  “ambiguous  statutory
language” to “avoid serious constitutional doubts.”  FCC v. 
Fox  Television  Stations,  Inc.,  556  U. S.  502,  516  (2009). 
But that canon of construction applies only when ambiguity 
exists.  “We will not rewrite a law to conform it to consti-
tutional  requirements.”  United  States  v.  Stevens,  559 
U. S. 460, 481 (2010) (internal quotation marks and alter-
ation omitted).  So even assuming the Government’s read-
ing  would  eliminate  First  Amendment  problems,  we  may 
adopt  it  only  if  we  can  see  it  in  the  statutory  language. 
And we cannot.  The “immoral or scandalous” bar stretches 
far  beyond  the  Government’s  proposed  construction. 
The  statute  as  written  does  not  draw  the  line  at  lewd, 
sexually explicit, or profane marks.  Nor does it refer only 
to  marks  whose  “mode  of  expression,”  independent  of
viewpoint, is particularly offensive.  Brief for Petitioner 28 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  It covers the universe 
of immoral or scandalous—or (to use some PTO synonyms)
offensive or disreputable—material.  Whether or not lewd 
or  profane.  Whether  the  scandal  and  immorality  comes
from  mode  or  instead  from  viewpoint.  To  cut  the  statute 
off  where  the  Government  urges  is  not  to  interpret  the 
statute Congress enacted, but to fashion a new one.* 
—————— 

*We  reject  the  dissent’s  statutory  surgery  for  the  same  reason.   Al-
though conceding that the term “immoral” cannot be saved, the dissent 
thinks  that  the  term  “scandalous”  can  be  read  as  the  Government 
proposes.  See  post,  at  1–2  (SOTOMAYOR,  J.,  concurring  in  part  and 
dissenting  in  part).    But  that  term  is  not  “ambiguous,”  as  the  dissent