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14 

ARIZONA v. NAVAJO NATION 

GORSUCH, J., dissenting 

“assisted  by  an  interpreter  [they]  employed.”  Jones  v. 
Meehan, 175 U. S. 1, 11 (1899). 

Put together, these insights have long influenced the in-
terpretation of Indian treaties.  “The language used in trea-
ties  with  the  Indians  should  never  be  construed  to  their 
prejudice.”  Worcester  v.  Georgia,  6  Pet.  515,  582  (1832) 
(McLean,  J.,  concurring).    Rather,  when  a  treaty’s  words 
“are  susceptible  of  a  more  extended  meaning  than  their 
plain  import,”  we  must  assign  them  that  meaning.  Ibid. 
Our duty, this Court has repeatedly explained, lies in inter-
preting Indian treaties “in a spirit which generously recog-
nizes the full obligation of this [N]ation.”  Tulee v. Washing-
ton, 315 U. S. 681, 684–685 (1942); see also United States v. 
Winans, 198 U. S. 371, 380–381 (1905); Choctaw Nation v. 
United States, 119 U. S. 1, 27–28 (1886).  We sometimes call 
this interpretive maxim—really just a special application of
ordinary  contract-interpretation  principles—the  Indian 
canon.  See  F.  Cohen,  Handbook  of  Federal  Indian  Law 
§2.02, p. 119 (N. Newton ed. 2005); R. Collins, Never Con-
strued to Their Prejudice:  In Honor of David Getches, 84 
U. Colo. L. Rev. 1, 6–7 (2013).

With  time,  too,  these  interpretive  insights  have  yielded
some more concrete rules.  First, courts must “give effect to 
the  terms”  of  treaties  as  “the  Indians  themselves  would 
have understood them.”  Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of 
Chippewa Indians, 526 U. S. 172, 196 (1999); see also Tulee, 
315 U. S., at 684.   Second, to gain  a complete view of the
Tribes’  understanding,  courts  may  (and  often  must)  “look 
beyond the written words to the larger context that frames 
the Treaty.”  Mille Lacs Band, 526 U. S., at 196.  That in-
cludes taking stock of “the history of the treaty, the negoti-
ations, and the practical construction adopted by the par-
ties.”  Choctaw Nation v. United States, 318 U. S. 423, 432 
(1943).  Third,  courts  must  assume  into  those  treaties  a 
duty of “good faith” on the part of the United States to “pro-
tec[t]”  the  Tribes  and  their  ways  of  life.    See  Washington