Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/558bv.pdf
Page Number: 517

356  CITIZENS  UNITED  v.  FEDERAL  ELECTION  COMM’N 

Opinion of the Court 

though  smaller  corporations  may  not  have  the  resources  to 
do so.  And wealthy individuals and unincorporated associa­
tions  can  spend  unlimited  amounts  on  independent  expendi­
tures.  See,  e. g.,  WRTL,  551  U. S.,  at  503–504  (opinion  of 
Scalia, J.) (“In the 2004 election cycle, a mere 24 individuals 
contributed an astounding total of $142 million to [26 U. S. C. 
§ 527  organizations]”).  Yet  certain  disfavored  associations 
of  citizens—those  that  have  taken  on  the  corporate  form— 
are penalized for engaging in the same political speech. 

When  Government  seeks  to  use  its  full  power,  including 
the  criminal  law,  to  command  where  a  person  may  get  his 
or  her  information  or  what  distrusted  source  he  or  she  may 
not  hear,  it  uses  censorship  to  control  thought.  This  is 
unlawful.  The  First  Amendment  conﬁrms  the  freedom  to 
think for ourselves. 

2 

What we have said also shows the invalidity of other argu­
ments  made  by  the  Government.  For  the  most  part  relin­
quishing  the  antidistortion  rationale,  the  Government  falls 
back on the argument that  corporate political speech can be 
banned in order to prevent corruption or its appearance.  In 
Buckley,  the  Court  found  this  interest  “sufﬁciently  impor­
tant” to allow limits on contributions but did not extend that 
reasoning  to  expenditure  limits.  424  U. S.,  at  25.  When 
Buckley  examined  an  expenditure  ban,  it  found  “that  the 
governmental  interest  in  preventing  corruption  and  the  ap­
pearance  of  corruption  [was]  inadequate  to  justify  [the  ban] 
on independent expenditures.”  Id., at 45. 

With  regard  to  large  direct  contributions,  Buckley  rea­
soned that they could be given “to secure a political quid pro 
quo,” id., at 26, and that “the scope of such pernicious prac­
tices  can  never  be  reliably  ascertained,”  id.,  at  27.  The 
practices  Buckley  noted  would  be  covered  by  bribery  laws, 
see,  e. g.,  18  U. S. C.  § 201,  if  a  quid  pro  quo  arrangement 
were  proved.  See  Buckley,  supra,  at  27,  and  n.  28  (citing 
Buckley  v.  Valeo,  519  F.  2d  821,  839–840,  and  nn.  36–38