Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/22pdf/22-179_o75q.pdf
Page Number: 35

Cite as:  599 U. S. ____ (2023) 

3 

JACKSON, J., dissenting 

the plain text of the encouragement provision, there is no 
dispute  that,  “[i]n  ordinary  parlance,  ‘induce’  means  ‘[to] 
lead on; to influence; to prevail on; to move by persuasion 
or influence,’ ” and “ ‘encourage’ means to ‘inspire with cour-
age, spirit, or hope.’ ”  Ante, at 9.  Thus, on its face, the en-
couragement provision’s use of the terms “encourage” and 
“induce”  seems  to  encompass  any  and  all  speech  that 
merely  persuades,  influences,  or  inspires  a  noncitizen  to 
come to, enter, or reside in this country in violation of law. 
  If speech of this nature is, in fact, sufficient to trigger po-
tential prosecution under this statute, the provision would 
put  all  manner  of  protected  speech  in  the  Government’s 
prosecutorial crosshairs.  It would reach, for example, the 
grandmother  who  says  she  misses  her  noncitizen  grand-
child, leading the grandchild to move illegally to the United 
States.    It  would  also  apply  to  the  doctor  who  informs  a 
noncitizen  patient  that  a  necessary  medical  treatment  is 
more readily available in the United States, influencing the 
patient  to  stay  beyond  the  expiration  of  his  visa  to  await 
treatment.  The college counselor who advises an undocu-
mented student that she can obtain a private scholarship to 
attend college in the United States, inspiring the student to 
reside here, would also fall within the scope of the statute. 
  The  encouragement  provision,  on  this  broad  reading, 
would also punish abstract advocacy of illegal conduct, even 
though such speech is plainly permissible under the First 
Amendment.  For instance, the plain text of the statute ap-
pears to prohibit a person from saying to a noncitizen who 
has no authorization to reside here, “I encourage you to live 
in the United States.”  But that speech is plainly protected.  
See  United  States  v.  Williams,  553  U. S.  285,  298–300 
(2008).  In Williams, this Court explained that “abstract ad-
vocacy” of  child pornography—including the phrase  “I en-
courage you to obtain child pornography”—qualifies as pro-
tected  speech,  even  though  the  “recommendation  of  a