Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/21pdf/21-954_7l48.pdf
Page Number: 51.0

18 

BIDEN v. TEXAS 

ALITO, J., dissenting 

decided in its favor.7 

Even if the Fifth Circuit had somehow concluded that the 
October 29 Memoranda constituted final agency action with 
some future legal consequences, the Court does not explain
what the Fifth Circuit should have done differently in the 
circumstances it faced.  The Fifth Circuit had little ability 
to  review  whether  the  agency  had  acted  reasonably.    See 
Motor  Vehicle  Mfrs.  Assn.  of  United  States,  Inc.  v.  State 
Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co., 463 U. S. 29 (1983).  And 
the Fifth Circuit provided a reasonable explanation for its
actions. 

With these three options off the table, the Fifth Circuit
reasonably chose the fourth option.  It correctly concluded
that the October 29 Memoranda did not affect its ability to
review the District Court judgment.  To find fault with pro-
ceeding in that fashion, the majority seems to assume that 
an administrative agency may obviate a district court deci-
sion setting aside agency action under §706 of the APA by
pursing  the  following  course  of  conduct:  first,  appeal  the 
—————— 

7 The  majority  concludes  that  the  October  29  Memoranda  had  legal
consequences because they represented DHS’s “final determination of its
employees’ obligation” to terminate MPP, even if that “ ‘determination’ ” 
could not generate any obligations until the agency “obtained vacatur of
the  District  Court’s  injunction.”  Ante,  at  20,  n. 7  (emphasis  deleted). 
This expansive, formalist approach to the second Bennett factor is at odds 
with  the  usual  “ ‘pragmatic’  approach  we  have  long  taken  to  finality.” 
Army Corps of Engineers v. Hawkes Co., 578 U. S. 590, 599 (2016) (quot-
ing Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U. S. 136, 149 (1967)).  “To de-
termine when an agency action is final, we have looked to, among other 
things, whether its impact ‘is sufficiently direct and immediate’ and has 
a ‘direct effect on . . . day-to-day business.’ ”  Franklin v. Massachusetts, 
505 U. S. 788, 796–797 (1992) (quoting Abbott Laboratories, 387 U. S., at 
152).  By their own terms, as the majority acknowledges, the October 29
Memoranda had no direct or immediate effect on the day-to-day business 
of DHS employees. To conclude that such future agency intentions may 
nevertheless meet the formal definition of final agency action may result 
in  many  agencies  facing  judicial  scrutiny  over  interim  rules,  guidance
documents, letters, and informal opinions that may not bind anyone now
or even later.