Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/16pdf/16-254_5iel.pdf
Page Number: 10.0

Cite as:  581 U. S. ____ (2017) 

7 

Opinion of the Court 

B 

The text and structure of the Hague Service Convention, 

then,  strongly  suggest  that  Article  10(a)  pertains  to  ser­
vice  of  documents.  The  only  significant  counterargument
is  that,  unlike  many  other  provisions  in  the  Convention, 
Article 10(a) does not include the word “service” or any of
its variants.  The Article 10(a) phrase “send judicial docu­
ments,” the argument goes, should mean something differ­
ent  than  the  phrase  “effect  service  of  judicial  documents” 
in the other two subparts of Article 10. 

This argument does not win the day for several reasons.
First,  it  must  contend  with  the  compelling  structural 
considerations  discussed  above.    See  Air  France  v.  Saks, 
470 U. S. 392, 397 (1985) (treaty interpretation must take
account  of  the  “context  in  which  the  written  words  are 
used”); cf. University of Tex. Southwestern Medical Center 
v. Nassar, 570 U. S. ___, ___ (2013) (slip op., at 13) (“Just 
as Congress’ choice of words is presumed to be deliberate, 
so too are its structural choices”). 

Second,  the  argument  fails  on  its  own  terms.    Assume 
for  a  second  that  the  word  “send”  must  mean  something
other  than  “serve.”  That  would  not  imply  that  Article
10(a) must exclude service.  Instead, “send[ing]” could be a
broader concept that includes service but is not limited to 
it.  That reading of the word “send” is probably more plau­
sible  than  interpreting  it  to  exclude  service,  and  it  does 
not create the same superfluity problem.3 

Third, it must be remembered that the French version of 

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3 Another plausible explanation for the distinct terminology of Article 
10(a) is that it is the only provision in the Convention that specifically
contemplates  direct  service,  without  the  use  of  an  intermediary.    See 
Brief  for  United  States  as  Amicus  Curiae  13  (“[I]n  contrast  to  Article 
10(a), all other methods of service identified in the Convention require
the affirmative engagement of an intermediary to effect ‘service’ ”).  The 
use  of  the  word  “send”  may  simply  have  been  intended  to  reflect  that
distinction.