Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/09pdf/08-964.pdf
Page Number: 31

Cite as:  561 U. S. ____ (2010) 

11 

STEVENS, J., concurring in judgment 

141, 151 (1989).3 

The text of the Patent Act does not on its face give much
guidance  about  what  constitutes  a  patentable  process.
The statute defines the term “process” as a “process, art or
method  [that]  includes  a  new  use  of  a  known  process,
machine,  manufacture,  composition  of  matter,  or  mate-
rial.”  §100(b).  But,  this  definition  is  not  especially  help-
ful, given that it also uses the term “process” and is there-
fore somewhat circular. 

As  lay  speakers  use  the  word  “process,”  it  constitutes
any series of steps.  But it has always been clear that, as
used in §101, the term does not refer to a “ ‘process’ in the 
ordinary  sense  of  the  word,”  Flook,  437  U. S.,  at  588;  see 
also  Corning  v.  Burden,  15  How.  252,  268  (1854)  (“[T]he 
term process is often used in a more vague sense, in which 
it cannot be the subject of a patent”).  Rather, as discussed 
in some detail in Part IV, infra, the term “process” (along
with the definitions given to that term) has long accumu-
lated a distinctive meaning in patent law.  When the term 
was used in the 1952 Patent Act, it was neither intended 
nor  understood  to  encompass  any  series  of  steps  or  any 
way to do any thing. 

With  that  understanding  in  mind,  the  Government  has 

—————— 

3 The Court quotes our decision in Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U. S. 
303  (1980),  for  the  proposition  that,  “ ‘[i]n  choosing  such  expansive 
terms  . . .  modified  by  the  comprehensive  “any,”  Congress  plainly
contemplated that the patent laws would be given wide scope.’ ”  Ante, 
at 4.  But the Court fails to mention which terms we were discussing in 
Chakrabarty:  the  terms  “manufacture”  and  “composition  of  matter.”
See 447 U. S., at  308 (“In choosing such expansive terms as ‘manufac-
ture’ and ‘composition of matter,’ modified by the comprehensive ‘any,’ 
Congress  plainly  contemplated  that  the  patent  laws  would  be  given 
wide  scope”).    As  discussed  herein,  Congress’  choice  of  the  term  “proc-
ess”  reflected  a  background  understanding  of  what  sorts  of  series  of
steps  could  be  patented,  and  likely  reflected  an  intentional  design  to
codify that settled, judicial understanding.  This may not have been the 
case with the terms at issue in Chakrabarty.