Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/19pdf/18-5924_n6io.pdf
Page Number: 13

10 

RAMOS v. LOUISIANA 

Opinion of the Court 
Opinion of GORSUCH, J. 

Fourteenth  Amendment.  So  what  could  we  possibly  de-
scribe as the “holding” of Apodaca? 

Really, no one has found a way to make sense of it.  In 
later cases, this Court has labeled Apodaca an “exception,” 
“unusual,” and in any event “not an endorsement” of Justice
Powell’s view of incorporation.34  At the same time, we have 
continued to recognize the historical need for unanimity.35 
We’ve been studiously ambiguous, even inconsistent, about
what  Apodaca  might  mean.36   To  its  credit,  Louisiana 
acknowledges the problem.  The State expressly tells us it
is not “asking the Court to accord Justice Powell’s solo opin-
ion in Apodaca precedential force.”37  Instead, in an effort 
to win today’s case, Louisiana embraces the idea that every-
thing  is  up  for  grabs.   It  contends  that  this  Court  has 

—————— 

34 McDonald  v.  Chicago,  561  U. S.  742,  766,  n. 14  (2010);  see  also 
Timbs, 586 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 3) (quoting McDonald, 561 U. S., at 
766, n. 14). 

35 Gaudin, 515 U. S., at 510; Richardson, 526 U. S., at 817; Apprendi, 
530  U. S.,  at  477;  Southern  Union  Co.,  567  U. S.,  at  356;  Blakely,  542 
U. S., at 301–302; Booker, 543 U. S., at 238; Descamps, 570 U. S., at 269; 
Haymond, 588 U. S., at ___–___ (plurality opinion) (slip op., at 6–7). 

36 See, e.g., Burch v. Louisiana, 441 U. S. 130, 136, and n. 9 (1979) (de-
scribing  both  plurality  opinion  and  Justice  Powell’s  separate  writing); 
Brown  v.  Louisiana,  447  U. S.  323,  331  (1980)  (plurality  opinion)  (de-
scribing neither); see also McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 U. S. 433, 468 
(1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (same).  On a few occasions we’ve suggested 
that  perhaps  Apodaca  means  the  Sixth  Amendment  does  not  require 
unanimity at all.  See Ludwig v. Massachusetts, 427 U. S. 618, 625 (1976) 
(quoting Apodaca plurality); Gaudin, 515 U. S., at 510, n. 2 (same); see
also Holland v. Illinois, 493 U. S. 474, 511 (1990) (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
(same).  But on another occasion, we suggested that it could make a dif-
ference whether a particular right was rooted in the Sixth Amendment’s 
jury trial guarantee or Fourteenth Amendment due process guarantee. 
See Schad v. Arizona, 501 U. S. 624, 634, n. 5 (1991) (plurality opinion). 
The dissent contends that these cases have “reiterated time and again 
what Apodaca had established.”  Post, at 6 (opinion of ALITO, J.).  More 
accurately, these “reiterations” have suggested different things at differ-
ent times. 

37 See Brief for Respondent 47; Tr. of Oral Arg. 37–38.