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PENNEAST PIPELINE CO. v. NEW JERSEY 

GORSUCH, J., dissenting 

The  first—“structural  immunity”—derives  from  the 
structure of the Constitution.  See Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. 
v. Hyatt, 587 U. S. ___, ___ (2019) (slip op., at 16).  Because 
structural  immunity  is  a  constitutional  entitlement  of  a 
sovereign State, it applies in both federal tribunals, Semi-
nole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U. S. 44, 51–52 (1996), and 
in state tribunals, Alden, 527 U. S., at 712.  And it applies 
regardless of whether the plaintiff is a citizen of the same
State, Allen v. Cooper, 589 U. S. ___, ___ (2020) (slip op., at
2), a citizen of a different State, or a non-citizen—like a for-
eign nation, Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U. S. 
313, 330 (1934), or an Indian tribe, Blatchford v. Native Vil-
lage of Noatak, 501 U. S. 775, 781 (1991).  Structural im-
munity sounds in personal jurisdiction, so the sovereign can 
waive that immunity by “consent” if it wishes.  Hyatt, 587 
U. S.,  at  ___–___  (slip  op.,  at  6–7);  see  Wisconsin  Dept.  of 
Corrections v. Schacht, 524 U. S. 381, 394 (1998) (Kennedy, 
J., concurring). 

The second—what is properly termed “Eleventh Amend-
ment  immunity”—derives  from  the  text  of  the  Eleventh 
Amendment.  In  light  of  its  swift  adoption  in  response  to 
Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 Dall. 419 (1793), this Court has read
the  Eleventh  Amendment  as  pointing  to  the  structural 
principle just discussed.  See Allen, 589 U. S., at ___ (slip 
op., at 4).  But the Eleventh Amendment can do two things 
at once.  See Federal Maritime Comm’n v. South Carolina 
Ports Authority, 535 U. S. 743, 753 (2002).  In addition to 
pointing us back to the States’ structural immunity, it also
provides an ironclad rule for a particular category of diver-
sity suits: 

“The Judicial power of the United States shall not be 

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is why this Court has found that state-law immunity provides an ade-
quate  and  independent  state  ground  for  affirming  a  state-court  judg-
ment.  E.g., Georgia R. & Banking Co. v. Musgrove, 335 U. S. 900 (1949) 
(per curiam); Palmer v. Ohio, 248 U. S. 32, 34 (1918).  Because PennEast 
sued in federal court, state-law immunity is not implicated here.