Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/23pdf/22-704_4246.pdf
Page Number: 33.0

6 

VIDAL v. ELSTER 

BARRETT, J., concurring in part 

to  the  content  of  the  applicant’s  mark.  See  15  U. S. C. 
§1052.  Thus, just as courts have long identified the criteria
for  trademark  protection  along  content-based  lines,  Con-
gress has defined the rules for enhanced trademark protec-
tion along content-based lines. 

B 
The upshot is that content discrimination has long been
“necessary for [trademark’s] purposes and limitations.”  See 
Legal Services Corporation v. Velazquez, 531 U. S. 533, 543 
(2001)  (considering  the  “accepted  usage”  of  a  “particular 
medium”  to  determine  the  constitutionality  of  speech  re-
strictions  within  that  medium).  The  law  protects  trade-
marks because they help consumers identify the goods that 
they  intend  to  purchase  and  allow  producers  to  “reap  the 
financial rewards associated with the[ir] product’s good rep-
utation.”  Jack  Daniel’s  Properties,  Inc.  v.  VIP  Products 
LLC, 599 U. S. 140, 146 (2023); see also Falkinburg, 35 Cal., 
at 64.  But trademarks can only fulfill these twin goals if
they actually serve as source identifiers, see Jack Daniel’s, 
599 U. S., at 146, which, as explained above, is a content-
based question, see supra, at 4–5. 

These content-based trademark rules have long coexisted
with the Free Speech Clause, and their function is generally 
compatible  with  it.  Courts  have  applied  content-based
rules not to “suppres[s] . . . ideas,” but simply to serve trade-
mark law’s purposes.  See Davenport, 551 U. S., at 189 (in-
ternal quotation marks omitted).  Indeed, these trademark 
restrictions  can  actually  help  prevent  “interfere[nce]  with
the marketplace of ideas,” id., at 188, insofar as they ensure
that a single producer cannot exclusively appropriate words
or phrases in the general domain, see Wolfe, 18 How. Pr., at 
67.  This is not to say that the Government could not abuse
content-based trademark registration restrictions—as I ex-
plain below, such restrictions are not insulated from scru-