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Page Number: 13.0

8 

AXON ENTERPRISE, INC. v. FTC 

Opinion of the Court 

208,  212.   The  Court  identified  three  considerations  de-
signed to aid in that inquiry, commonly known now as the 
Thunder  Basin  factors.  First,  could  precluding  district 
court jurisdiction “foreclose all meaningful judicial review” 
of the claim?  Id., at  212–213.  Next, is the claim “wholly 
collateral to [the] statute’s review provisions”?  Id., at 212 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  And last, is the claim 
“outside the agency’s expertise”?  Ibid.  When the answer to 
all three questions is yes, “we presume that Congress does 
not intend to limit jurisdiction.”  Free Enterprise Fund, 561 
U. S., at 489.  But the same conclusion might follow if the 
factors point in different directions.  The ultimate question 
is  how  best  to  understand  what  Congress  has  done— 
whether  the  statutory  review  scheme,  though  exclusive 
where it applies, reaches the claim in question.  The  first 
Thunder  Basin  factor  recognizes  that  Congress  rarely  al-
lows claims about agency action to escape effective judicial 
review.  See,  e.g.,  Bowen  v.  Michigan  Academy  of  Family 
Physicians, 476 U. S. 667, 670 (1986).  The second and third 
reflect  in  related  ways  the  point  of  special  review  provi-
sions—to give the agency a heightened role in the matters 
it customarily handles, and can apply distinctive knowledge 
to. 

This Court has twice held specific claims to fit within a 
statutory review scheme, based on the Thunder Basin fac-
tors.  In Thunder Basin itself, a coal company subject to the 
Mine Act filed suit in district court instead of asserting its 
claims—as  a  statutory  scheme  prescribed—before  a  mine 
safety commission and then (if needed) a court of appeals.  
The crux of the dispute concerned the company’s refusal to 
provide employee-designated union officials with access to 
the workplace, as the Mine Act apparently required.  The 
company claimed a right to exclude the officials under an-
other statute; it also objected on due process grounds to the 
agency’s imposing a fine before holding a hearing.  See 510 
U. S., at 205; see also Elgin, 567 U. S., at 17, n. 6.  We held