Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/11pdf/10-9646.pdf
Page Number: 53.0

Cite as:  567 U. S. ____ (2012) 

7 

THOMAS, J., dissenting 

possessing  a  large  quantity  of  drugs.    501  U. S.,  at  961 
(opinion  of  SCALIA,  J.).    In  accordance  with  Michigan
law, he was sentenced to a mandatory term of life in prison
without  the  possibility  of  parole.  Ibid.   Citing  the  same
line of death penalty precedents on which the Court relies 
today,  the  defendant  argued  that  his  sentence,  due  to  its 
mandatory  nature,  violated  the  Cruel  and  Unusual  Pun-
ishments Clause.  Id., at 994–995 (opinion of the Court). 

The  Court  rejected  that  argument,  explaining  that
“[t]here  can  be  no  serious  contention  . . .  that  a  sentence 
which is not otherwise cruel and unusual becomes so sim-
ply  because  it  is  ‘mandatory.’ ”    Id.,  at  995.  In  so  doing,
the  Court  refused  to  analogize  to  its  death  penalty  cases.
The Court noted that those cases had “repeatedly suggested
that  there  is  no  comparable  [individualized-sentencing] 
requirement  outside  the  capital  context,  because  of  the
qualitative  difference  between  death  and  all  other  penal-
ties.”  Ibid.    The  Court  observed  that,  “even  where  the 
difference”  between  a  sentence  of  life  without  parole  and 
other  sentences  of  imprisonment  “is  the  greatest,”  such 
a sentence “cannot be compared  with death.”   Id., at 996. 
Therefore,  the  Court  concluded  that  the  line  of  cases  re-
quiring individualized sentencing had been drawn at cap-
ital  cases,  and  that  there  was  “no  basis  for  extending  it
further.”  Ibid. 

Harmelin’s  reasoning  logically  extends  to  these  cases. 
Obviously,  the  younger  the  defendant,  “the  great[er]”  the
difference  between  a  sentence  of  life  without  parole  and 
other terms of imprisonment.  Ibid.  But under Harmelin’s 
rationale, the defendant’s age is immaterial to the Eighth
Amendment  analysis.  Thus,  the  result  in  today’s  cases
should be the same as that in Harmelin.  Petitioners, like 
the  defendant  in  Harmelin,  were  not  sentenced  to  death. 
Accordingly, this Court’s cases “creating and clarifying the
individualized  capital  sentencing  doctrine”  do  not  apply. 
Id., at 995 (internal quotation marks omitted).