Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/529bv.pdf
Page Number: 937

529US3

Unit: $U62

[09-26-01 12:54:01] PAGES PGT: OPIN

862

GEIER v. AMERICAN HONDA MOTOR CO.

Syllabus

bar a defense that compliance with a federal standard automatically ex-
empts a defendant from state law, whether the Federal Government
meant that standard to be an absolute, or a minimum, requirement.
This interpretation does not conﬂict with the purpose of the saving pro-
vision, for it preserves actions that seek to establish greater safety than
the minimum safety achieved by a federal regulation intended to pro-
vide a ﬂoor. Moreover, this Court has repeatedly declined to give
broad effect to saving clauses where doing so would upset the careful
regulatory scheme established by federal law, a concern applicable here.
The pre-emption provision and the saving provision, read together, re-
ﬂect a neutral policy, not a specially favorable or unfavorable one,
toward the application of ordinary conﬂict pre-emption. The pre-
emption provision itself favors pre-emption of state tort suits, while the
saving clause disfavors pre-emption at least some of the time. How-
ever, there is nothing in any natural reading of the two provisions that
would favor one policy over the other where a jury-imposed safety
standard actually conﬂicts with a federal safety standard. Pp. 869–874.
(c) This lawsuit actually conﬂicts with FMVSS 208 and the Act itself.
DOT saw FMVSS 208 not as a minimum standard, but as a way to
provide a manufacturer with a range of choices among different passive
restraint systems that would be gradually introduced, thereby lowering
costs, overcoming technical safety problems, encouraging technological
development, and winning widespread consumer acceptance—all of
which would promote FMVSS 208’s safety objectives. The standard’s
history helps explain why and how DOT sought these objectives. DOT
began instituting passive restraint requirements in 1970, but it always
permitted passive restraint options. Public resistance to an ignition
interlock device that in effect forced occupants to buckle up their manual
belts inﬂuenced DOT’s subsequent initiatives. The 1984 version of
FMVSS 208 reﬂected several signiﬁcant considerations regarding the
effectiveness of manual seatbelts and the likelihood that passengers
would leave their manual seatbelts unbuckled, the advantages and dis-
advantages of passive restraints, and the public’s resistance to the in-
stallation or use of then-available passive restraint devices. Most im-
portantly,
it deliberately sought variety, rejecting an “all airbag”
standard because perceived or real safety concerns threatened a back-
lash more easily overcome with a mix of several different devices. A
mix would also help develop data on comparative effectiveness, allow
the industry time to overcome safety problems and high production
costs associated with airbags, and facilitate the development of alter-
native, cheaper, and safer passive restraint systems, thereby building
public conﬁdence necessary to avoid an interlock-type ﬁasco. The
1984 standard also deliberately sought to gradually phase in passive