Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/10pdf/10-277.pdf
Page Number: 11.0

Cite as:  564 U. S. ____ (2011) 

7 

Opinion of the Court 

to satisfy Rule 23(a)(3), and that they could serve as ade-
quate class representatives, see Rule 23(a)(4).  Id., at 614– 
615.  With respect to the Rule 23(b)(2) question, the Ninth
Circuit  held  that  respondents’  backpay  claims  could  be
certified  as  part  of  a  (b)(2)  class  because  they  did  not 
“predominat[e]”  over  the  requests  for  declaratory  and
injunctive  relief,  meaning  they  were  not  “superior  in 
strength,  influence,  or  authority”  to  the  nonmonetary 
claims.  Id., at 616 (internal quotation marks omitted).4 

Finally, the Court of Appeals determined that the action
could  be  manageably  tried  as  a  class  action  because  the
District Court could adopt the approach the Ninth Circuit 
approved in Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 103 F. 3d 767, 782– 
787  (1996).  There  compensatory  damages  for  some  9,541 
class  members  were  calculated  by  selecting  137  claims  at 
random,  referring  those  claims  to  a  special  master  for
valuation, and then extrapolating the validity and value of
the untested claims from the sample set.  See 603 F. 3d, at 
625–626.  The  Court  of  Appeals  “s[aw]  no  reason  why  a 
similar  procedure  to  that  used  in  Hilao  could  not  be  em-
ployed in this case.”  Id., at 627.  It would allow Wal-Mart 
“to  present  individual  defenses  in  the  randomly  selected
‘sample cases,’ thus revealing the approximate percentage 
of class members whose unequal pay or nonpromotion was
due  to  something  other  than  gender  discrimination.” 
Ibid., n. 56 (emphasis deleted). 
—————— 

4 To enable that result, the Court of Appeals trimmed the (b)(2) class 
in  two  ways:  First,  it  remanded  that  part  of  the  certification  order 
which included respondents’ punitive-damages claim in the (b)(2) class,
so that the District Court might consider whether that might cause the 
monetary relief to predominate.  603 F. 3d, at 621.  Second, it accepted
in  part  Wal-Mart’s  argument  that  since  class  members  whom  it  no 
longer  employed  had  no  standing  to  seek  injunctive  or  declaratory
relief, as to them monetary claims must predominate.  It excluded from 
the  certified  class  “those  putative  class  members  who  were  no  longer
Wal-Mart employees at the time Plaintiffs’ complaint was filed,” id., at 
623 (emphasis added).