Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/09pdf/08-1371.pdf
Page Number: 41

Cite as:  561 U. S. ____ (2010) 

3 

STEVENS, J., concurring 

of  secular  or  spiritual  feeling,  hateful  or  benign  motives,
all  acts  of  religious  discrimination  are  equally  covered.
The discriminator’s beliefs are simply irrelevant.  There is, 
moreover, no evidence that the policy was adopted because 
of any reason related to the particular views that religious 
individuals  or  groups  might  have,  much  less  because  of  a
desire  to  suppress  or  distort  those  views.    The  policy’s
religion  clause  was  plainly  meant  to  promote,  not  to  un-
dermine, religious freedom.

To be sure, the policy may end up having greater conse-
quence  for  religious  groups—whether  and  to  what  extent
it  will  is  far  from  clear  ex  ante—inasmuch  as  they  are
more  likely  than  their  secular  counterparts  to  wish  to
exclude students of particular faiths.  But there is likewise 
no evidence that the policy was intended to cause harm to 
religious  groups,  or  that  it  has  in  practice  caused  signifi-
cant  harm  to  their  operations.  And  it  is  a  basic  tenet  of 
First  Amendment  law  that  disparate  impact  does  not,  in
itself,  constitute  viewpoint  discrimination.2    The  dissent 

—————— 

ual conduct,” App. 226, does not discriminate on the basis of status  or 
identity,  post,  at  22–23.)    Our  First  Amendment  doctrine  has  never 
required university administrators to undertake the impossible task of
separating out belief-based from status-based religious discrimination. 

2 See, e.g., Madsen v. Women’s Health Center, Inc., 512 U. S. 753, 763 
(1994); R. A. V. v. St. Paul, 505 U. S. 377, 385 (1992); Board of Directors 
of  Rotary  Int’l  v.  Rotary  Club  of  Duarte,  481  U. S.  537,  549  (1987); 
Roberts  v.  United  States  Jaycees,  468  U. S.  609,  623,  628  (1984);  cf. 
Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Ore. v. Smith, 494 U. S. 
872, 878–879 (1990) (“We have never held that an individual’s religious
beliefs excuse him from compliance with an otherwise valid law prohib-
iting conduct that the State is free to regulate”).  Courts and commen-
tators  have  applied  this  insight  to  the  exact  situation  posed  by  the
Nondiscrimination Policy.  See, e.g., Christian Legal Society v. Walker, 
453 F. 3d 853, 866 (CA7 2006) (stating that “[t]here can be little doubt
that”  comparable  nondiscrimination  policy  “is  viewpoint  neutral  on  its
face”);  Truth  v.  Kent  School  Dist.,  542  F. 3d  634,  649–650  (CA9  2008) 
(similar);  Volokh,  Freedom  of  Expressive  Association  and  Government
Subsidies, 58 Stan. L. Rev. 1919, 1930–1938 (2006).