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Page Number: 56

14 

COUNTERMAN v. COLORADO 

BARRETT, J., dissenting 

soaked  in  blood  and  dying  from  all  the  little  cuts”).    Civil 
orders can also keep individuals away from particular geo-
graphic areas.  Imagine someone who threatens to bomb an 
airport, State v. Johnston, 156 Wash. 2d 355, 358–359, 127 
P. 3d  707,  708–709  (2006),  or  “shoot  up  [a]  courthous[e],” 
State  v.  Draskovich,  2017  S. D.  76,  ¶3,  904  N. W.  2d  759, 
761.  The speaker might well end up barred from the loca-
tion in question—for good reason.  Yet after today, such or-
ders  cannot  be  obtained  without  proof—not  necessarily 
easy to secure—that the person who issued the threat an-
ticipated that it would elicit fear.  See Tr. of Oral Arg. 92– 
93. 

The government can also opt to counteract true threats
by  means  of  civil  enforcement  actions.  For  instance,  18 
U. S. C. §248 prohibits “threat[s] of force” against any per-
son “obtaining or providing reproductive health services” or 
“seeking to exercise the First Amendment right of religious 
freedom  at a  place  of  religious  worship.”    The  statute  im-
poses a range of civil penalties, and it allows enforcement 
suits by both private persons and government officials.  See, 
e.g.,  United  States  v.  Dillard,  795  F. 3d  1191,  1196–1197 
(CA10  2015)  (Government  brought  §248  action  after  de-
fendant warned a health provider, “[y]ou will be checking 
under your car everyday—because maybe today is the day
someone places an explosive under it”); McCullen v. Coak-
ley,  573  U. S.  464,  491  (2014)  (noting  that  several  States
have similar laws).  After today, these civil enforcement ac-
tions face a higher constitutional hurdle. 

In  addition,  employers  and  school  administrators  often
discipline individuals who make true threats.  Consider the 
student  who  was  expelled  after  “draft[ing]  two  violent,
misogynic, and obscenity-laden rants expressing a desire to 
molest, rape, and murder” his ex-girlfriend.  Doe v. Pulaski 
Cty. Special School Dist., 306 F. 3d 616, 619 (CA8 2002) (en 
banc).  Or the one who was suspended after “ ‘talking about 
taking  a  gun  to  school’  to  ‘shoot  everyone  he  hates.’ ”