Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/17pdf/17-965_h315.pdf
Page Number: 79

Cite as:  585 U. S. ____ (2018) 

15 

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting 

to  apply  Mandel’s  “narrow  standard  of  review”  and  “as­
sume[s] that we may look behind the face of the Proclama­
tion.”    Ante,  at  31–32.  In  doing  so,  however,  the  Court,
without  explanation  or  precedential  support,  limits  its
review  of  the  Proclamation  to  rational-basis  scrutiny. 
Ibid.  That  approach  is  perplexing,  given  that  in  other 
Establishment  Clause  cases,  including  those  involving 
claims  of  religious  animus  or  discrimination,  this  Court
has applied a more stringent standard of review.  See, e.g., 
McCreary,  545  U. S.,  at  860–863;  Larson,  456  U. S.,  at 
246; Presbyterian Church in U. S. v. Mary Elizabeth Blue 
Hull  Memorial  Presbyterian  Church,  393  U. S.  440,  449– 
452  (1969);  see  also  Colorado  Christian  Univ.  v.  Weaver, 
534 F. 3d 1245, 1266 (CA10 2008) (McConnell, J.) (noting 
that,  under  Supreme  Court  precedent,  laws  “involving 
discrimination  on  the  basis  of  religion,  including  interde­
nominational  discrimination,  are  subject  to  heightened 
scrutiny  whether  they  arise  under  the  Free  Exercise
Clause, the Establishment Clause, or the Equal Protection
Clause”  (citations  omitted)).6    As  explained  above,  the 

—————— 

6 The  majority  chides  as  “problematic”  the  importation  of  Establish­
ment Clause jurisprudence “in the national security and foreign affairs 
context.”    Ante,  at  32–33,  n. 5.    As  the  majority  sees  it,  this  Court’s
Establishment  Clause  precedents  do  not  apply  to  cases  involving
“immigration  policies,  diplomatic  sanctions,  and  military  actions.” 
Ante,  at  32,  n. 5.    But  just  because  the  Court  has  not  confronted  the 
precise situation at hand does not render these cases (or the principles 
they  announced)  inapplicable.    Moreover,  the  majority’s  complaint
regarding  the  lack  of  direct  authority  is  a  puzzling  charge,  given  that
the majority itself fails to cite any “authority for its proposition” that a
more  probing  review  is  inappropriate  in  a  case  like  this  one,  where 
United  States  citizens  allege  that  the  Executive  has  violated  the
Establishment Clause by issuing a sweeping executive order motivated
by animus.  Ante, at 33 n. 5; see supra, at 14,  and n. 5.  In any event, 
even  if  there  is  no  prior  case  directly  on  point,  it  is  clear  from  our 
precedent  that  “[w]hatever  power  the  United  States  Constitution 
envisions  for  the  Executive”  in  the  context  of  national  security  and 
foreign affairs, “it most assuredly envisions a role for all three branches