Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/12pdf/12-96_6k47.pdf
Page Number: 56

Cite as:  570 U. S. ____ (2013) 

25 

GINSBURG, J., dissenting 

neighbor  Mississippi.    679  F. 3d,  at  897  (Williams,  J., 
In  other  words,  even  while  subject  to  the 
dissenting). 
restraining  effect  of  §5,  Alabama  was  found  to  have
“deni[ed] or abridge[d]” voting rights “on account of race or
color” more frequently than nearly all other States in the
Union.  42  U. S. C.  §1973(a).    This  fact  prompted  the 
dissenting  judge  below  to  concede  that  “a  more  narrowly
tailored  coverage  formula”  capturing  Alabama  and  a 
handful  of  other  jurisdictions  with  an  established  track 
record of racial discrimination in voting “might be defensi­
ble.”  679 F. 3d, at 897 (opinion of Williams, J.).  That is an 
understatement.  Alabama’s  sorry  history  of  §2  violations
alone  provides  sufficient  justification  for  Congress’  deter­
mination  in  2006  that  the  State  should  remain  subject  to 
§5’s preclearance requirement.7 

A  few  examples  suffice  to  demonstrate  that,  at  least  in
Alabama, the “current burdens” imposed by §5’s preclear­
ance requirement are “justified by current needs.”  North-
west Austin, 557 U. S., at 203.  In the interim between the 
VRA’s  1982  and  2006  reauthorizations,  this  Court  twice 
confronted  purposeful  racial  discrimination  in  Alabama.
In  Pleasant  Grove  v.  United  States,  479  U. S.  462  (1987), 
the  Court  held  that  Pleasant  Grove—a  city  in  Jefferson 
County, Shelby County’s neighbor—engaged in purposeful 
discrimination by annexing all-white areas while rejecting
the annexation request of an adjacent black neighborhood. 
The  city  had  “shown  unambiguous  opposition  to  racial 
—————— 

7 This  lawsuit  was  filed  by  Shelby  County,  a  political  subdivision  of
Alabama, rather than by the State itself.  Nevertheless, it is appropri­
ate  to  judge  Shelby  County’s  constitutional  challenge  in  light  of  in­
stances of discrimination statewide because Shelby County is subject to
§5’s preclearance requirement by virtue of Alabama’s designation as a 
covered  jurisdiction  under  §4(b)  of  the  VRA.    See  ante,  at  7.  In  any
event, Shelby County’s recent record of employing an at-large electoral
system tainted by intentional racial discrimination is by itself sufficient
to justify subjecting the county to §5’s preclearance mandate.  See infra, 
at 26.