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Page Number: 3

Cite as:  584 U. S. ____ (2018) 

3 

Syllabus 

Appeals’  brief  discussion  of  this  disparity  of  treatment  does  not  an-
swer Phillips’ concern that the State’s practice was to disfavor the re-
ligious basis of his objection.  Pp. 12–16.

(c) For these reasons, the Commission’s treatment of Phillips’ case
violated the State’s duty under the First Amendment not to base laws 
or  regulations  on  hostility  to  a  religion  or  religious  viewpoint.    The 
government,  consistent  with  the  Constitution’s  guarantee  of  free  ex-
ercise, cannot impose regulations that are hostile to the religious be-
liefs  of  affected  citizens  and  cannot  act  in  a  manner  that  passes 
judgment  upon  or  presupposes  the  illegitimacy  of  religious  beliefs
and  practices.  Church  of  Lukumi  Babalu  Aye,  Inc.  v.  Hialeah,  508 
U. S.  520.  Factors  relevant  to  the  assessment  of  governmental  neu-
trality include “the historical background of the decision under chal-
lenge, the specific series of events leading to the enactment or official
policy  in  question,  and  the  legislative  or  administrative  history,  in-
cluding  contemporaneous  statements  made  by  members  of  the  deci-
sionmaking  body.”  Id.,  at  540.  In  view  of  these  factors,  the  record 
here  demonstrates  that  the  Commission’s  consideration  of  Phillips’
case was neither tolerant nor respectful of his religious beliefs.  The 
Commission gave “every appearance,” id., at 545, of adjudicating his
religious  objection  based  on  a  negative  normative  “evaluation  of  the
particular justification” for his objection and the religious grounds for
it, id., at 537, but government has no role in expressing or even sug-
gesting  whether  the  religious  ground  for  Phillips’  conscience-based
objection is legitimate or illegitimate.  The inference here is thus that 
Phillips’  religious  objection  was  not  considered  with  the  neutrality
required by the Free Exercise Clause.  The State’s interest could have 
been  weighed  against  Phillips’  sincere  religious  objections  in  a  way 
consistent with the requisite religious neutrality that must be strictly
observed.  But the official expressions of hostility to religion in some
of  the  commissioners’  comments  were  inconsistent  with  that  re-
quirement, and the Commission’s disparate consideration of Phillips’
case  compared  to  the  cases  of  the  other  bakers  suggests  the  same.
Pp. 16–18. 

370 P. 3d 272, reversed. 

KENNEDY, J., delivered  the  opinion  of  the  Court,  in  which  ROBERTS, 
C. J., and BREYER, ALITO, KAGAN, and GORSUCH, JJ., joined.  KAGAN, J., 
filed  a  concurring  opinion,  in  which  BREYER,  J.,  joined.    GORSUCH,  J., 
filed a concurring opinion, in which ALITO, J., joined.  THOMAS, J., filed 
an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, in which
GORSUCH, J., joined.  GINSBURG, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which 
SOTOMAYOR, J., joined.