Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/21pdf/21-499_gfbh.pdf
Page Number: 17

Cite as:  597 U. S. ____ (2022) 

13 

Opinion of the Court 

This was a bold and controversial claim of authority,5 but 
we do not think that Dickerson can be understood any other
way  without  (1)  taking  the  insupportable  position  that  a 
Miranda violation is tantamount to a violation of the Fifth 
Amendment,  (2)  calling  into  question  the  prior  decisions 
that were predicated on the proposition that a Miranda vi-
olation is not the same as a constitutional violation, and (3) 
excising  from  the  United  States  Reports  a  mountain  of 
statements describing the Miranda rules as prophylactic.

Subsequent cases confirm that Dickerson did not upend
the Court’s understanding of the Miranda rules as prophy-
lactic.  See,  e.g.,  supra,  at  6–7  (collecting  post-Dickerson 
cases).

In sum, a violation of Miranda does not necessarily con-
stitute a violation of the Constitution, and therefore such a 
violation does not constitute “the deprivation of [a] right . . . 
secured by the Constitution.”  42 U. S. C. §1983. 

III 
This conclusion does not necessarily dictate reversal be-
cause a §1983 claim may also be based on “the deprivation
of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the . . . 
laws.”  (Emphasis added.)  It may thus be argued that the 
Miranda rules constitute federal “law” and that an abridg-
ment of those rules can therefore provide the ground for a 

—————— 

5 Whether this Court has the authority to create constitutionally based
prophylactic rules that bind both federal and state courts has been the 
subject of debate among jurists and commentators.  See, e.g., Dickerson, 
530 U. S., at 445–446, 457–461 (Scalia, J., joined by THOMAS, J., dissent-
ing); D. Strauss, The Ubiquity of Prophylactic Rules, 55 U. Chi. L. Rev. 
190 (1988); J. Grano, Prophylactic Rules in Criminal Procedure: A Ques-
tion  of  Article  III  Legitimacy,  80  Nw.  U. L.  Rev.  100  (1985);  H.  Mona-
ghan, Foreword: Constitutional Common Law, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1975).
But that is what the Court did in Miranda, and we do not disturb that 
decision in any way.  Rather, we accept it on its own terms, and for the 
purpose of deciding this case, we follow its rationale.