Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/529bv.pdf
Page Number: 473.0

529US2

Unit: $U46

[10-07-01 17:18:24] PAGES PGT: OPIN

398

WILLIAMS v. TAYLOR

Opinion of Stevens, J.

ceeding—in reweighing it against the evidence in aggrava-
tion. See Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U. S. 738, 751–752
(1990). This error is apparent in its consideration of the ad-
ditional mitigation evidence developed in the postconviction
proceedings. The court correctly found that as to “the
factual part of the mixed question,” there was “really . . .
n[o] . . . dispute” that available mitigation evidence was not
presented at trial. 254 Va., at 24, 487 S. E. 2d, at 198. As
to the prejudice determination comprising the “legal part” of
its analysis, id., at 23–25, 487 S. E. 2d, at 198–199, it correctly
emphasized the strength of the prosecution evidence sup-
porting the future dangerousness aggravating circumstance.
But the state court failed even to mention the sole argu-
ment in mitigation that trial counsel did advance—Williams
turned himself in, alerting police to a crime they otherwise
would never have discovered, expressing remorse for his ac-
tions, and cooperating with the police after that. While
this, coupled with the prison records and guard testimony,
may not have overcome a ﬁnding of future dangerousness,
the graphic description of Williams’ childhood, ﬁlled with
abuse and privation, or the reality that he was “borderline
mentally retarded,” might well have inﬂuenced the jury’s ap-
praisal of his moral culpability. See Boyde v. California,
494 U. S. 370, 387 (1990). The circumstances recited in his
several confessions are consistent with the view that in each
case his violent behavior was a compulsive reaction rather
than the product of cold-blooded premeditation. Mitigating
evidence unrelated to dangerousness may alter the jury’s se-
lection of penalty, even if it does not undermine or rebut the
prosecution’s death-eligibility case. The Virginia Supreme
Court did not entertain that possibility.
It thus failed to
accord appropriate weight to the body of mitigation evidence
available to trial counsel.

V

In our judgment, the state trial judge was correct both in
his recognition of the established legal standard for deter-