Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/19pdf/17-1712_0971.pdf
Page Number: 7

Cite as:  590 U. S. ____ (2020) 

5 

Opinion of the Court 

tain some continuing financial stake in the litigation” in or-
der to have Article III standing to bring an insider trading 
suit on behalf of the corporation); Craig v. Boren, 429 U. S. 
190, 194–195 (1976) (vendor who “independently” suffered 
an Article III injury in fact could then assert the rights of 
her  customers).  The  plaintiffs  themselves  do  not  have  a 
concrete stake in this suit. 

The plaintiffs point to the Court’s decisions upholding the
Article III standing of  assignees—that is, where a party’s 
right  to  sue  has  been  legally  or  contractually  assigned  to
another party.  But here, the plan’s claims have not been
legally  or  contractually  assigned  to  Thole  or  Smith.    Cf. 
Sprint  Communications  Co.  v.  APCC  Services,  Inc.,  554 
U. S. 269, 290 (2008); Vermont Agency of Natural Resources 
v.  United  States  ex  rel.  Stevens,  529  U. S.  765,  771–774 
(2000) (qui tam statute makes a relator a partial assignee 
and “gives the relator himself an interest in the lawsuit”)
(emphasis  deleted).    The  plaintiffs’  invocation  of  cases  in-
volving  guardians,  receivers,  and  executors  falls  short  for
basically the same reason.  The plaintiffs have not been le-
gally or contractually appointed to represent the plan. 

Third,  in  arguing  for  standing,  Thole  and  Smith  stress 
that ERISA affords the Secretary of Labor, fiduciaries, ben-
eficiaries, and participants—including participants in a de-
fined-benefit plan—a general cause of action to sue for res-
toration  of  plan  losses  and  other  equitable  relief.
  See 
ERISA  §§502(a)(2),  (3),  29  U. S. C.  §§1132(a)(2),  (3).  But 
the cause of action does not affect the Article III standing 
analysis.  This  Court  has  rejected  the  argument  that  “a
plaintiff  automatically  satisfies  the  injury-in-fact  require-
ment whenever a statute grants a person a statutory right 
and  purports  to  authorize  that  person  to  sue  to  vindicate 
that right.”  Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U. S. ___, ___ (2016) 
(slip op., at 9); see Raines v. Byrd, 521 U. S. 811, 820, n. 3 
(1997).  The Court has emphasized that “Article III stand-