Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/10pdf/09-152.pdf
Page Number: 30

Cite as:  562 U. S. ____ (2011) 

1 

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

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No. 09–152 
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RUSSELL BRUESEWITZ, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. 

WYETH LLC, FKA WYETH, INC., FKA WYETH

LABORATORIES, ET AL. 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

 [February 22, 2011] 

JUSTICE  SOTOMAYOR,  with  whom  JUSTICE  GINSBURG 

joins, dissenting. 

Vaccine manufacturers have long been subject to a legal
duty, rooted in basic principles of products liability law, to 
improve the designs of their vaccines in light of advances 
in  science  and  technology.    Until  today,  that  duty  was
enforceable through a  traditional  state-law tort action for
defective design.  In holding that §22(b)(1) of the National
Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986 (Vaccine Act or Act),
42  U. S. C.  §300aa–22(b)(1),  pre-empts  all  design  defect 
claims for injuries stemming from vaccines covered under
the Act, the Court imposes its own bare policy preference 
over  the  considered  judgment  of  Congress.  In  doing  so, 
the  Court  excises  13  words  from  the  statutory  text,  mis-
construes  the  Act’s  legislative  history,  and  disturbs  the 
careful  balance  Congress  struck  between  compensating
vaccine-injured  children  and  stabilizing  the  childhood
vaccine  market.    Its  decision  leaves  a  regulatory  vacuum
in  which  no  one  ensures  that  vaccine  manufacturers  ade-
quately  take  account  of  scientific  and  technological  ad-
vancements when designing or distributing their products.
Because  nothing  in  the  text,  structure,  or  legislative  his-
tory  of  the  Vaccine  Act  remotely  suggests  that  Congress 
intended such a result, I respectfully dissent.