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Page Number: 36.0

2 

SACKETT v. EPA 

THOMAS, J., concurring 

Court leaves off. 

I 

The CWA’s jurisdictional terms have a long pedigree and 
are bound up with Congress’ traditional authority over the 
channels  of  interstate  commerce.  Solid  Waste  Agency  of 
Northern Cook Cty. v. Army Corps of Engineers, 531 U. S. 
159, 168, and n. 3, 172, 173–174 (2001) (SWANCC).  That 
traditional  authority  was  limited  in  two  ways.  First,  the 
water had to be capable of being used as a highway for in-
terstate or foreign commerce.  Second, Congress could reg-
ulate such waters only for purposes of their navigability—
by, for example, regulating obstructions hindering naviga-
ble capacity.  By the time of the CWA’s enactment, the New 
Deal era arguably had relaxed the second limitation; Con-
gress could regulate navigable waters for a wider range of 
purposes.  But,  critically,  the  statutory  terms  “navigable 
waters,” “navigable waters of the United States,” and “wa-
ters of the United States” were still understood as invoking
only  Congress’  authority  over  waters  that  are,  were,  or 
could  be  used  as  highways  of  interstate  or  foreign  com-
merce.  The  CWA  was  enacted,  and  must  be  understood, 
against that key backdrop. 

A 
As the Court correctly states, “land and water use lies at
the core of traditional state authority.”  Ante, at 23; see also 
ante, at 2.  Prior to Independence, the Crown possessed sov-
ereignty over navigable waters in the Colonies, sometimes 
held in trust by colonial authorities.  See R. Adler, The An-
cient  Mariner  of  Constitutional  Law:  The  Historical,  Yet 
Declining  Role  of  Navigability,  90  Wash.  U. L. Rev.  1643, 
1656–1659 (2013); R. Walston, The Federal Commerce and 
Navigation  Powers:  Solid  Waste  Agency  of  Northern  Cook 
County’s  Undecided  Constitutional  Issue,  42  Santa  Clara 
L. Rev. 699, 721 (2002) (Walston).  Upon Independence, this