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Page Number: 22

Cite as:  588 U. S. ____ (2019) 

15 

Opinion of the Court 
Opinion of ALITO, J. 
Opinion of ALITO, J. 

  For  at  least  four  reasons,  the  Lemon  test  presents  par-
ticularly  daunting  problems  in  cases,  including  the  one 
now  before  us,  that  involve  the  use,  for  ceremonial,  cele-
bratory, or commemorative purposes, of words or symbols 
with  religious  associations.16    Together,  these  considera- 

—————— 

(criticizing  both  the  Lemon  test  and  the  endorsement  gloss);  Tushnet, 
Reflections on the Role of Purpose in the Jurisprudence of the Religion 
Clauses,  27  Wm.  &  Mary  L.  Rev.  997,  1004  (1986)  (describing  cases 
involving  “ ‘deeply  ingrained  practices’ ”  as  “not  readily  susceptible  to 
analysis  under  the  ordinary  Lemon  approach”);  Choper,  The  Endorse-
ment  Test:  Its  Status  and  Desirability,  18  J. L.  &  Politics  499  (2002) 
(criticizing both Lemon and the endorsement gloss); Paulsen, Religion, 
Equality,  and  the  Constitution:  An  Equal  Protection  Approach  to 
Establishment  Clause  Adjudication,  61  Notre  Dame  L.  Rev.  311,  315 
(1986)  (criticizing  the  Court’s  reading  of  the  Establishment  Clause  as 
“producing a schizophrenic pattern of decisions”); Marshall, “We Know 
It When We See It”: The Supreme Court and Establishment, 59 S. Cal. 
L.  Rev.  495,  526  (1986)  (explaining  that  the  purpose  prong  of  Lemon, 
“[t]aken  to  its  logical  conclusion  . . . suggests  that  laws  which  respect 
free exercise rights . . . are unconstitutional”). 

16 While  we  do  not  attempt  to  provide  an  authoritative  taxonomy  of 
the  dozens  of  Establishment  Clause  cases  that  the  Court  has  decided 
since Everson v. Board of Ed. of Ewing, 330 U. S. 1 (1947), most can be 
divided into six rough categories: (1) religious references or imagery in 
public  monuments,  symbols,  mottos,  displays,  and  ceremonies,  e.g., 
Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U. S. 668 (1984); Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U. S. 
677  (2005);  (2)  religious  accommodations  and  exemptions  from  gener- 
ally  applicable  laws,  e.g.,  Cutter  v.  Wilkinson,  544  U. S.  709  (2005); 
Corporation of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day 
Saints v. Amos, 483 U. S. 327 (1987); (3) subsidies and tax exemptions, 
e.g.,  Walz  v.  Tax  Comm’n  of  City  of  New  York,  397  U. S.  664  (1970); 
Zelman  v.  Simmons-Harris,  536  U. S.  639  (2002);  (4)  religious  expres-
sion  in  public  schools,  e.g.,  School  Dist.  of  Abington  Township  v. 
Schempp,  374  U. S.  203  (1963);  Lee  v.  Weisman,  505  U. S.  577  (1992); 
(5)  regulation  of  private  religious  speech,  e.g.,  Capitol  Square  Review 
and Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U. S. 753 (1995); and (6) state interfer-
ence  with  internal  church  affairs,  e.g.,  Hosanna-Tabor  Evangelical 
Lutheran  Church  and  School  v.  EEOC,  565  U. S.  171  (2012).    A  final, 
miscellaneous  category,  including  cases  involving  such  issues  as  Sun-
day closing laws, see McGowan, v. Maryland, 366 U. S. 420 (1961), and 
church  involvement  in  governmental  decisionmaking,  see  Larkin  v.