Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/529bv.pdf
Page Number: 256.0

529US1

Unit: $U36

[09-26-01 08:36:39] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 529 U. S. 120 (2000)

181

Breyer, J., dissenting

to require the ban of a device that has no “safe” thera-
peutic purpose where a ban is the most dangerous remedial
alternative.

In my view, where linguistically permissible, we should
interpret the FDCA in light of Congress’ overall desire to
protect health. That purpose requires a ﬂexible interpreta-
tion that both permits the FDA to take into account the real-
ities of human behavior and allows it, in appropriate cases,
to choose from its arsenal of statutory remedies. A statute
so interpreted easily “ﬁt[s]” this, and other, drug- and
device-related health problems.

III

In the majority’s view, laws enacted since 1965 require us
to deny jurisdiction, whatever the FDCA might mean in
their absence. But why? Do those laws contain language
barring FDA jurisdiction? The majority must concede that
they do not. Do they contain provisions that are inconsist-
ent with the FDA’s exercise of
jurisdiction? With one
exception, see infra, at 184–185, the majority points to no
such provision. Do they somehow repeal the principles of
law (discussed in Part II, supra) that otherwise would lead
to the conclusion that the FDA has jurisdiction in this area?
The companies themselves deny making any such claim.
See Tr. of Oral Arg. 27 (denying reliance on doctrine of “par-
tial repeal”). Perhaps the later laws “shape” and “focus”
what the 1938 Congress meant a generation earlier. Ante,
at 143. But this Court has warned against using the views
of a later Congress to construe a statute enacted many years
before. See Pension Beneﬁt Guaranty Corporation v. LTV
Corp., 496 U. S. 633, 650 (1990) (later history is a “ ‘hazardous
basis for inferring the intent of an earlier’ Congress” (quot-
ing United States v. Price, 361 U. S. 304, 313 (1960))). And,
while the majority suggests that the subsequent history
“control[s] our construction” of the FDCA, see ante, at 143
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted), this Court