Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/21pdf/20-843_7j80.pdf
Page Number: 31

Cite as:  597 U. S. ____ (2022) 

25 

Opinion of the Court 

that  claim,  the  burden  falls  on  respondents  to  show  that
New  York’s  proper-cause  requirement  is  consistent  with
this  Nation’s  historical  tradition  of  firearm  regulation. 
Only if respondents carry that burden can they show that
the  pre-existing  right  codified  in  the  Second  Amendment, 
and made applicable to the States through the Fourteenth, 
does not protect petitioners’ proposed course of conduct. 

Respondents appeal to a variety of historical sources from
the late 1200s to the early 1900s.  We categorize these pe-
riods  as  follows:  (1)  medieval  to  early  modern  England; 
(2) the American Colonies and the early Republic; (3) ante-
bellum  America;  (4)  Reconstruction;  and  (5)  the  late-19th
and early-20th centuries.

We  categorize  these  historical  sources  because,  when  it
comes to interpreting the Constitution, not all history is cre-
ated equal.  “Constitutional rights are enshrined with the
scope  they  were  understood  to  have  when  the  people 
adopted  them.”  Heller,  554  U. S.,  at  634–635  (emphasis 
added).  The Second Amendment was adopted in 1791; the 

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much discretion licensing officers in New York possess, or whether the 
proper cause standard differs across counties.”  Post, at 20.  We disagree. 
The dissent does not dispute that any applicant for an unrestricted con-
cealed-carry license in New York can satisfy the proper-cause standard 
only if he has “ ‘ “a special need for self-protection distinguishable from
that  of  the  general  community.” ’ ”  Post,  at  13  (quoting  Kachalsky  v. 
County of Westchester, 701 F. 3d 81, 86 (CA2 2012)).  And in light of the
text of the Second Amendment, along with the Nation’s history of firearm 
regulation, we conclude below that a State may not prevent law-abiding
citizens from publicly carrying handguns because they have not demon-
strated a special need for self-defense.  See infra, at 62.  That conclusion 
does not depend upon any of the factual questions raised by the dissent.
Nash  and  Koch  allege  that  they  were  denied  unrestricted  licenses  be-
cause they had not “demonstrate[d] a special need for self-defense that 
distinguished [them] from the general public.”  App. 123, 125.  If those 
allegations are proven true, then it simply does not matter whether li-
censing  officers  have  applied  the  proper-cause  standard  differently  to 
other  concealed-carry  license  applicants;  Nash’s  and  Koch’s  constitu-
tional rights to bear arms in public for self-defense were still violated.