Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/22pdf/22-58_i425.pdf
Page Number: 13

10 

UNITED STATES v. TEXAS 

Opinion of the Court 

against  other  possible  defendants.  See,  e.g.,  Wayte,  470 
U. S., at 604; Armstrong, 517 U. S., at 459, 463. 

Second, as the Solicitor General points out, the standing 
analysis  might  differ  when  Congress  elevates  de facto 
injuries  to  the  status  of  legally  cognizable  injuries
redressable by a federal court.  See Brief for Petitioners 20, 
n. 3; cf. TransUnion LLC, 594 U. S., at ___–___ (slip op., at 
10–11); Federal Election Comm’n v. Akins, 524 U. S. 11, 20 
(1998); Raines, 521 U. S., at 820, n. 3; Lujan, 504 U. S., at 
578;  Linda  R. S.,  410  U. S.,  at  617,  n. 3.    For  example, 
Congress might (i) specifically authorize suits against the 
Executive  Branch  by  a  defined  set  of  plaintiffs  who  have
suffered concrete harms from executive under-enforcement 
and  (ii)  specifically  authorize  the  Judiciary  to  enter 
appropriate  orders  requiring  additional  arrests  or 
prosecutions by the Executive Branch.

Here, however, the relevant statutes do not supply such
specific authorization.  The statutes, even under the States’ 
own reading, simply say that the Department “shall” arrest
certain noncitizens.  Given the “deep-rooted nature of law-
enforcement  discretion,”  a  purported  statutory  arrest
mandate,  without  more,  does  not  entitle  any  particular 
plaintiff  to  enforce  that  mandate  in  federal  court.    Castle 
Rock, 545 U. S., at 761, 764–765, 767, n. 13; cf. Heckler, 470 
U. S., at 835.  For an arrest mandate to be enforceable in 
federal court, we would need at least a “stronger indication”
judicial  review  of  enforcement 
from  Congress  that 
discretion 
specific
authorization for particular plaintiffs to sue and for federal 
courts  to  order  more  arrests  or  prosecutions  by  the 
Executive.  Castle Rock, 545 U. S., at 761.  We do not take 
a  position  on  whether  such  a  statute  would  suffice  for 
Article III purposes; our only point is that no such statute 
is present in this case.4 

appropriate—for 

example, 

is 

—————— 

4 As the Solicitor General noted, those kinds of statutes, by infringing