Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/12pdf/12-133_19m1.pdf
Page Number: 20.0

Cite as:  570 U. S. ____ (2013) 

7 

KAGAN, J., dissenting 

And  that  expert  report  would  cost  between  several  hun-
dred  thousand  and  one  million  dollars.1   So  the  expense 
involved  in  proving  the  claim  in  arbitration  is  ten  times 
what Italian Colors could hope to gain, even in a best-case 
scenario.  That  counts  as  a  “prohibitive”  cost,  in  Ran-
dolph’s  terminology,  if  anything  does.    No  rational  actor 
would  bring  a  claim  worth  tens  of  thousands  of  dollars
if  doing  so  meant  incurring  costs  in  the  hundreds  of 
thousands. 

An  arbitration  agreement  could  manage  such  a  mis-
match  in  many  ways,  but  Amex’s  disdains  them  all.    As 
the  Court  makes  clear,  the  contract  expressly  prohibits
class  arbitration.  But  that  is  only  part  of  the  problem.2 
The  agreement  also  disallows  any  kind  of  joinder  or  con-
solidation of claims or parties.  And more:  Its confidential-
ity  provision  prevents  Italian  Colors  from  informally
arranging  with  other  merchants  to  produce  a  common 
expert  report.    And  still  more:  The  agreement  precludes
any  shifting  of  costs  to  Amex,  even  if  Italian  Colors  pre-
vails.  And beyond all that: Amex refused to enter into any
stipulations  that  would  obviate  or  mitigate  the  need  for 

—————— 

1 The evidence relating to these costs comes from an affidavit submit-
ted  by  an  economist  experienced  in  proving  similar  antitrust  claims. 
The  Second  Circuit  found  that  Amex  “ha[d]  brought  no  serious  chal-
lenge”  to  that  factual  showing.    See,  e.g.,  667  F. 3d  204,  210  (2012). 
And  in  this  Court,  Amex  conceded  that  Italian  Colors  would  need  an 
expert  economic  report  to  prevail  in  arbitration.    See  Tr.  of  Oral  Arg. 
15.  Perhaps that is not really true.  A hallmark of arbitration is its use 
of procedures tailored to the type of dispute and amount in controversy;
so arbitrators might properly decline to demand such a rigorous eviden-
tiary  showing  in  small  antitrust  cases.    But  that  possibility  cannot
disturb the factual premise on which this case comes to us, and which 
the  majority  accepts:  that  Italian  Colors’s  tying  claim  is  an  ordinary 
kind  of  antitrust  claim;  and  that  it  is  worth  about  a  tenth  the  cost  of 
arbitration. 

2 The  majority  contends  that  the  class-action  waiver  is  the  only  part 
we  should  consider.  See  ante,  at  7–8,  n. 4.  I  explain  below  why  that 
assertion is wrong.  See infra, at 11–12.