Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/21pdf/19-1392_6j37.pdf/19-1392_6j37.pdf
Page Number: 121.0

Cite as:  597 U. S. ____ (2022) 

5 

THOMAS, J., concurring 

abortion  because  it  “fe[lt]”  that  “the  Fourteenth  Amend-
ment’s concept of personal liberty” included a “right of pri-
vacy” that “is broad enough to encompass a woman’s deci-
sion  whether  or  not  to  terminate  her  pregnancy.”    Id.,  at 
153.  In Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 
505 U. S. 833 (1992), the Court likewise identified an abor-
tion guarantee in “the liberty protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment,”  but,  rather  than  a  “right  of  privacy,”  it  in-
voked an ethereal “right to define one’s own concept of ex-
istence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of 
human life.”  Id., at 851.  As the Court’s preferred manifes-
tation of “liberty” changed, so, too, did the test used to pro-
tect it, as Roe’s author lamented.  See Casey, 505 U. S., at 
930  (Blackmun,  J.,  concurring  in  part  and  dissenting  in
part) (“[T]he Roe framework is far more administrable, and 
far less manipulable, than the ‘undue burden’ standard”).

Now,  in  this  case,  the  nature  of  the  purported  “liberty”
supporting  the  abortion  right  has  shifted  yet  again.    Re-
spondents  and  the  United  States  propose  no  fewer  than 
three  different  interests  that  supposedly  spring  from  the 
Due Process Clause.  They include “bodily integrity,” “per-
sonal  autonomy  in  matters  of  family,  medical  care,  and
faith,”  Brief  for  Respondents  21,  and  “women’s  equal  citi-
zenship,” Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 24.  That 
50 years have passed since Roe and abortion advocates still 
cannot  coherently  articulate  the  right  (or  rights)  at  stake
proves the obvious: The right to abortion is ultimately a pol-
icy goal in desperate search of a constitutional justification. 
Second,  substantive  due  process  distorts  other  areas  of
constitutional law.  For example, once this Court identifies 
a “fundamental” right for one class of individuals, it invokes 
the Equal Protection Clause to demand exacting scrutiny of
statutes that deny the right to others.  See, e.g., Eisenstadt 
v.  Baird,  405  U. S.  438,  453–454  (1972)  (relying  on  Gris-
wold to  invalidate a state statute  prohibiting  distribution