Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/20pdf/19-511_p86b.pdf
Page Number: 10.0

Cite as:  592 U. S. ____ (2021) 

7 

Opinion of the Court 

conflict with the so-called “rule of the last antecedent.”  Un-
der that rule, “a limiting clause or phrase . . . should ordi-
narily be read as modifying only the noun or phrase that it 
immediately follows.”  Barnhart v. Thomas, 540 U. S. 20, 26 
(2003);  see  also  Lockhart  v.  United  States,  577  U. S.  347, 
351 (2016).  The rule of the last antecedent is context de-
pendent.  This Court has declined to apply the rule where,
like here, the modifying clause appears after an integrated 
list.  See Jama v. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 
543 U. S. 335, 344, n. 4 (2005) (collecting cases).  Moreover, 
even if the rule of the last antecedent were relevant here, it 
would provide no help to Duguid.  The last antecedent be-
fore “using a random or sequential number generator” is not 
“produce,” as Duguid needs it to be, but rather “telephone 
numbers  to  be  called.”  There  is  “no  grammatical  basis,” 
Cyan,  583  U. S.,  at  ___  (slip  op.,  at  22),  for  arbitrarily 
stretching the modifier back to include “produce,” but not 
so far back as to include “store.” 

In  sum,  Congress’  definition  of  an  autodialer  requires
that in all cases, whether storing or producing numbers to 
be called, the equipment in question must use a random or 
sequential  number  generator.    This  definition  excludes 
equipment like Facebook’s login notification system, which 
does not use such technology.5 

—————— 

5 JUSTICE ALITO notes that he “agree[s] with much of the Court’s anal-
ysis,” as well as its ultimate conclusion about the interpretive question
before us, yet he concurs in the judgment only.  Post, at 1.  His apprehen-
sion appears to stem from what he sees as the Court’s “heavy reliance” 
on  the  series-qualifier  canon.  Ibid.  Such  canons,  he  argues,  are  “not 
inflexible rules.”  Post, at 4.  On that point, we agree: Linguistic canons 
are  tools  of  statutory  interpretation  whose  usefulness  depends  on  the
particular statutory text and context at issue.  That may be all JUSTICE 
ALITO  seeks  to  prove  with  his  discussion  and  list  of  “sentences  that 
clearly go against the canon,” post, at 3.  (That the grammatical structure 
of  every  example  he  provides  is  materially  dissimilar  from  that  of  the 
clause at issue in this case proves the point.)  But to the extent that he