Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/23pdf/22-1008_1b82.pdf
Page Number: 55.0

Cite as:  603 U. S. ____ (2024) 

9 

JACKSON, J., dissenting 

Coat,  we  held  the  opposite—a  claim  brought  under  28
U. S. C. §1346 did not accrue at the time of injury, but ra-
ther at the moment of final administrative action, because 
a plaintiff could not sue until the agency action was final. 
See 386 U. S., at 513–514, 517–518.  The point is not that 
these cases all point in one direction or the other with re-
spect to the meaning of accrue.  Instead, our cases illustrate 
what this Court has expressly stated:  The term “accrued” 
lacks “any definite technical meaning,” Reading, 271 U. S., 
at 61. 

The  majority  nevertheless  decrees  today  that  accrual
must always be plaintiff specific—i.e., that a claim cannot 
accrue until “this particular plaintiff ” can bring suit.  Ante, 
at 14.  But that is not what §2401(a) says.  It does not say 
that the clock starts when the plaintiff ’s right of action first
accrues; rather, §2401(a) starts the clock when “the right of 
action  first  accrues.”  (Emphasis  added.)    In  other  words, 
the  limitations  provision  here  focuses  on  the  claim  being 
brought without regard for who brings it. 

The  dictionary  definitions  on  which  the  majority  relies
further highlight this important observation.  A claim ac-
crues, according to those definitions, “ ‘when a suit may be
maintained thereon’ ” or upon the “ ‘coming or springing into 
existence of a right to sue.’ ”  Ante, at 7 (emphasis added)
(first quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 37 (4th ed. 1951), then 
quoting Ballentine’s Law Dictionary 15–16 (2d ed. 1948)).
Again,  and  notably,  these  dictionaries  speak  of  a  right  to 
sue,  not  the  plaintiff ’s  right  to  sue.    Like  §2401(a)  itself,
these  definitions  do  not  support  the  majority’s  assertion
that accrual is necessarily plaintiff specific. 

Of course, many of our cases do say that a claim accrues 
when “ ‘the plaintiff has a complete and present cause of ac-
tion.’ ”  E.g., Gabelli v. SEC, 568 U. S. 442, 448 (2013); Wal-
lace v. Kato, 549 U. S. 384, 388 (2007); Graham County Soil 
& Water Conservation Dist. v. United States ex rel. Wilson, 
545  U. S.  409,  418  (2005);  Bay  Area  Laundry  and  Dry