Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/14pdf/13-6827_5h26.pdf
Page Number: 18.0

Cite as:  574 U. S. ____ (2015) 

15 

Opinion of the Court 

it cannot.  See Brief for Petitioner 24–25; Brief for United 
States  as  Amicus  Curiae  28–29.  “While  not  necessarily 
controlling, the policies followed at other well-run institu-
tions would be relevant to a determination of the need for 
a  particular  type  of  restriction.”  Procunier  v.  Martinez, 
416  U. S.  396,  414,  n. 14  (1974).    That  so  many  other
prisons  allow  inmates  to  grow  beards  while  ensuring 
prison  safety  and  security  suggests  that  the  Department
could  satisfy  its  security  concerns  through  a  means  less
restrictive  than  denying  petitioner  the  exemption  he 
seeks. 

We  do  not  suggest  that  RLUIPA  requires  a  prison  to 
grant  a  particular  religious  exemption  as  soon  as  a  few 
other jurisdictions do so.  But when so many prisons offer 
an  accommodation,  a  prison  must,  at  a  minimum,  offer 
persuasive  reasons  why  it  believes  that  it  must  take  a 
different  course,  and  the  Department  failed  to  make  that 
showing  here.  Despite  this,  the  courts  below  deferred  to
these  prison  officials’  mere  say-so  that  they  could  not
accommodate  petitioner’s  request.    RLUIPA,  however, 
demands  much  more.  Courts  must  hold  prisons  to  their
statutory burden, and they must not “assume a plausible, 
less  restrictive  alternative  would  be  ineffective.”    Playboy 
Entertainment, 529 U. S., at 824. 

We emphasize that although RLUIPA provides substan-
tial protection for the religious exercise of institutionalized 
persons,  it  also  affords  prison  officials  ample  ability  to
maintain security.  We highlight three ways in which this 
is  so.  First,  in  applying  RLUIPA’s  statutory  standard,
courts  should  not  blind  themselves  to  the  fact  that  the 
analysis  is conducted  in  the  prison  setting.    Second,  if  an 
institution  suspects  that  an  inmate  is  using  religious 
activity  to  cloak  illicit  conduct,  “prison  officials  may  ap-
propriately  question  whether  a  prisoner’s  religiosity, 
asserted  as  the  basis  for  a  requested  accommodation,  is 
authentic.”  Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U. S. 709, 725, n. 13