Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/22pdf/21-1271_3f14.pdf
Page Number: 47

Cite as:  600 U. S. ____ (2023) 

9 

THOMAS, J., dissenting 

Harper III did not “alter or amend in any way the judgment 
in Harper I,” ante, at 9, is both irrelevant and incorrect.  It 
is  irrelevant  because  our  jurisdiction  requires  a case,  and 
this case is over no matter what becomes of the empty husk 
of Harper I ’s interlocutory judgment.  It is incorrect because 
Harper  I ’s  judgment—reversing  the  trial  court’s  original
judgment  and  remanding  the  case—was  completely  ne-
gated  by  Harper  III ’s  affirmance  of  the  same  trial-court 
judgment.

In the same vein, the majority’s suggestion that Harper I
has any “res judicata consequences” is completely inappo-
site.  Ante,  at  9  (internal  quotation  marks  omitted).    Res 
judicata is the principle that “[a] final judgment on the mer-
its of an action” bars relitigation “in [a] second action” of the
same claim or of issues actually litigated and necessary to
the  judgment  in  the  first  action.  Federated  Department 
Stores,  Inc.  v.  Moitie,  452  U. S.  394,  398  (1981);  see  also 
Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U. S. 880, 892 (2008).  Harper I was 
not a final judgment (as the majority concedes by applying 
Cox Broadcasting), so res judicata simply has nothing to do 
with it.  Nothing decided by Harper I was res judicata in the 
second state-court appeal, see Southern R. Co. v. Clift, 260 
U. S.  316,  319  (1922), nor  would  Harper  I ’s  interlocutory
Elections Clause holding have any res judicata effect in a 
future action between these parties, see Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Judgments §27, and Comment h, and Illus. 13 and 
14  (1980)  (only  issue  determinations  essential  to  a  final 

—————— 
regarding redistricting of congressional districts.”  Id., at ___, 886 S. E. 
2d,  at  419.    To  the  extent  that  Harper  III  suggests  any  view  about 
whether  such  provisions  would  be  binding  if  they  existed,  it  seems  to 
suggest agreement with petitioners.  See ibid. (“The Federal Constitu-
tion . . . commits drawing of congressional districts to the state legisla-
tures subject to oversight by the Congress of the United States”).  But, of 
course, Harper III had no need to decide that question, because its state-
law justiciability holding fully determined the judgment in this action, 
thus mooting petitioners’ alternative Elections Clause defense.