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Cite as: 524 U. S. 236 (1998)

251

Opinion of the Court

§ 1651(a). Our rule permits us to carry out our normal func-
tion of reviewing possible misapplications of law by the
courts of appeals without having to resort to extraordinary
remedies.

Our decision, we must acknowledge, is in direct conﬂict
with the portion of our decision in House v. Mayo, 324 U. S.
42, 44 (1945) (per curiam), holding that we lack statutory
certiorari jurisdiction to review refusals to issue certiﬁcates
of probable cause. Given the number and frequency of the
cases, and the difﬁculty of reconciling our practice with a
requirement that only an extraordinary writ can be used to
address them, we do not think stare decisis concerns require
Its conclusion was erroneous,
us to adhere to that decision.
and it should not be followed.

Stare decisis is “the preferred course because it promotes
the evenhanded, predictable, and consistent development of
legal principles, fosters reliance on judicial decisions, and
contributes to the actual and perceived integrity of the judi-
cial process.” Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U. S. 808, 827 (1991).
“Considerations of stare decisis have special force in the area
of statutory interpretation, for here, unlike in the context of
constitutional interpretation, the legislative power is impli-
cated, and Congress remains free to alter what we have
done.” Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U. S. 164,
172–173 (1989).

We have recognized, however, that stare decisis is a “prin-
ciple of policy” rather than “an inexorable command.”
Payne, supra, at 828. For example, we have felt less con-
strained to follow precedent where, as here, the opinion was
rendered without full brieﬁng or argument. Gray v. Missis-
sippi, 481 U. S. 648, 651, n. 1 (1987) (questioning the prece-
dential value of Davis v. Georgia, 429 U. S. 122 (1976) (per
curiam)). The role of stare decisis, furthermore, is “some-
what reduced . . . in the case of a procedural rule . . . which
does not serve as a guide to lawful behavior.” United States
v. Gaudin, 515 U. S. 506, 521 (1995) (citing Payne, supra, at