Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/14pdf/13-9972_p8k0.pdf
Page Number: 9

6 

RODRIGUEZ v. UNITED STATES 

Opinion of the Court 

not  measurably  extend  the  duration  of  the  stop.”  555 
U. S., at 333.  See also Muehler v. Mena, 544 U. S. 93, 101 
(2005)  (because  unrelated  inquiries  did  not  “exten[d]  the 
time  [petitioner]  was  detained[,]  . . .  no  additional  Fourth
Amendment justification . . . was required”).  An officer, in 
other words, may conduct certain unrelated checks during
an otherwise lawful traffic stop.  But contrary to JUSTICE 
ALITO’s suggestion, post, at 4, n. 2, he may not do so in  a
way  that  prolongs  the  stop,  absent  the  reasonable  suspi­
cion  ordinarily  demanded  to  justify  detaining  an  individ­
ual.  But see post, at 1–2 (ALITO, J., dissenting) (premising 
opinion on the  dissent’s  own  finding  of  “reasonable  suspi­
cion,”  although  the  District  Court  reached  the  opposite 
conclusion,  and  the  Court  of  Appeals  declined  to  consider
the issue).

Beyond determining whether to issue a traffic ticket, an
officer’s  mission  includes  “ordinary  inquiries  incident  to
[the  traffic]  stop.”    Caballes,  543  U. S.,  at  408.    Typically
such  inquiries  involve  checking  the  driver’s  license,  de­
termining  whether  there  are  outstanding  warrants 
against  the  driver,  and  inspecting  the  automobile’s  regis­
tration  and  proof  of  insurance.    See  Delaware  v.  Prouse, 
440  U. S.  648,  658–660  (1979).    See  also  4  W.  LaFave, 
Search  and  Seizure  §9.3(c),  pp.  507–517  (5th  ed.  2012). 
These  checks  serve  the  same  objective  as  enforcement  of 
the  traffic  code:  ensuring  that  vehicles  on  the  road  are 
operated safely and responsibly.  See Prouse, 440 U. S., at 
658–659;  LaFave,  Search  and  Seizure  §9.3(c),  at  516  (A 
“warrant  check  makes  it  possible  to  determine  whether
the  apparent  traffic  violator  is  wanted  for  one  or  more
previous traffic offenses.”).

A  dog  sniff,  by  contrast,  is  a  measure  aimed  at  “de­
tect[ing]  evidence  of  ordinary  criminal  wrongdoing.” 
Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U. S. 32, 40–41 (2000).  See 
also  Florida  v.  Jardines,  569  U. S.  1,  ___–___  (2013)  (slip 
op.,  at  7–8).  Candidly,  the  Government  acknowledged  at