Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/21pdf/20-601_bq7c.pdf
Page Number: 14.0

10  CAMERON v. EMW WOMEN’S SURGICAL CENTER, P. S. C. 

Opinion of the Court 

B 
  The panel also erred in its evaluation of the other factors 
that bear on all applications for appellate intervention.  The 
panel  found  that  the  attorney  general’s  motion  was  not 
timely because it came after years of litigation in the Dis-
trict Court and after the panel had issued its decision, but 
its  assessment of  timeliness was  mistaken.   Timeliness  is 
an  important  consideration  in  deciding  whether  interven-
tion should be allowed, see, e.g., Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. 24 (a) 
and (b)(1), but “[t]imeliness is to be determined from all the 
circumstances,”  and  “the  point  to  which  [a]  suit  has  pro-
gressed is . . . not solely dispositive,”  NAACP v. New York, 
413 U. S. 345, 365–366 (1973). 
  Here, the most important circumstance relating to time-
liness is that the attorney general sought to intervene “as 
soon as it became clear” that the Commonwealth’s interests 
“would  no longer  be  protected”  by  the parties in  the case.  
United  Airlines,  Inc.  v.  McDonald,  432  U. S.  385,  394 
(1977).  Our decision in McDonald addressed a similar sit-
uation.  There, a member of a putative plaintiff class moved 
to  intervene  for  the  purpose  of  appealing  the  District 
Court’s denial of class certification.  Id., at 396.  The District 
Court  denied  that  request  because  the  class  member  had 
not “seen fit to come in here and seek any relief from this 
Court in any way” during “five years” of litigation.  Id., at 
390.  We held, however, that the motion was timely because 
it  was  filed  soon  after  the  movant  learned  that  the  class 
representatives would not appeal. 
  The same logic applies here.  The attorney general sought 
to  intervene  two  days  after  learning  that  the  secretary 
would not continue to defend HB 454.  The motion was also 
—————— 
209 U. S. 123, 159–160 (1908).  The attorney general now seeks to inter-
vene not to defend a right to exercise enforcement powers under HB 454, 
but in his role as the Commonwealth’s “chief law officer,” Ky. Rev. Stat. 
Ann. §15.020(1), who has the authority to defend Kentucky’s interests in 
federal court when no other official is willing to do so.