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GEIER v. AMERICAN HONDA MOTOR CO.

Opinion of the Court

tential creation of the kind of “safety standard” to which the
Safety Act’s express pre-emption provision refers. But it
declined to resolve that question because it found that peti-
tioners’ state-law tort claims posed an obstacle to the accom-
plishment of FMVSS 208’s objectives. For that reason, it
found that those claims conﬂicted with FMVSS 208, and that,
under ordinary pre-emption principles, the Act consequently
pre-empted the lawsuit. The Court of Appeals thus af-
ﬁrmed the District Court’s dismissal. 166 F. 3d 1236, 1238–
1243 (CADC 1999).

Several state courts have held to the contrary, namely, that
neither the Act’s express pre-emption nor FMVSS 208 pre-
empts a “no airbag” tort suit. See, e. g., Drattel v. Toyota
Motor Corp., 92 N. Y. 2d 35, 43–53, 699 N. E. 2d 376, 379–386
(1998); Minton v. Honda of America Mfg., Inc., 80 Ohio
St. 3d 62, 70–79, 684 N. E. 2d 648, 655–661 (1997); Munroe v.
Galati, 189 Ariz. 113, 115–119, 938 P. 2d 1114, 1116–1120
(1997); Wilson v. Pleasant, 660 N. E. 2d 327, 330–339 (Ind.
1995); Tebbetts v. Ford Motor Co., 140 N. H. 203, 206–207,
665 A. 2d 345, 347–348 (1995). All of the Federal Circuit
Courts that have considered the question, however, have
found pre-emption. One rested its conclusion on the Act’s
express pre-emption provision. See, e. g., Harris v. Ford
Motor Co., 110 F. 3d 1410, 1413–1415 (CA9 1997). Others,
such as the Court of Appeals below, have instead found pre-
emption under ordinary pre-emption principles by virtue of
the conﬂict such suits pose to FMVSS 208’s objectives, and
thus to the Act itself. See, e. g., Montag v. Honda Motor
Co., 75 F. 3d 1414, 1417 (CA10 1996); Pokorny v. Ford Motor
Co., 902 F. 2d 1116, 1121–1125 (CA3 1990); Taylor v. General
Motors Corp., 875 F. 2d 816, 825–827 (CA11 1989); Wood v.
General Motors Corp., 865 F. 2d 395, 412–414 (CA1 1988).
We granted certiorari to resolve these differences. We now
hold that this kind of “no airbag” lawsuit conﬂicts with the
objectives of FMVSS 208, a standard authorized by the Act,
and is therefore pre-empted by the Act.