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Page Number: 20

Cite as:  582 U. S. ____ (2017) 

1 

THOMAS, J., concurring 
THOMAS, J., concurring in part 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

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No. 15–577 
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TRINITY LUTHERAN CHURCH OF COLUMBIA, INC., 

PETITIONER v. CAROL S. COMER, DIRECTOR,
 
MISSOURI DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL 

RESOURCES 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 

APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
 

[June 26, 2017] 

JUSTICE  THOMAS,  with  whom  JUSTICE  GORSUCH  joins,

concurring in part. 

The  Court  today  reaffirms  that  “denying  a  generally 
available  benefit  solely  on  account  of  religious  identity 
imposes a penalty on the free exercise of religion that can 
be justified,” if at all, “only by a state interest ‘of the high-
est  order.’ ”  Ante,  at  6.  The  Free  Exercise  Clause,  which 
generally prohibits laws that facially discriminate against 
religion, compels this conclusion.  See Locke v. Davey, 540 
U. S. 712, 726–727 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting).

Despite this prohibition, the Court in Locke permitted a
State to “disfavor . . . religion” by imposing what it deemed 
a  “relatively  minor”  burden  on  religious  exercise  to  ad-
vance the State’s antiestablishment “interest in not fund-
ing the religious training of clergy.”  Id., at 720, 722, n. 5, 
725.  The  Court  justified  this  law  based  on  its  view  that 
there  is  “ ‘play  in  the  joints’ ”  between  the  Free  Exercise 
Clause and the Establishment Clause—that is, that “there 
are  some  state  actions  permitted  by  the  Establishment
Clause but not required by the Free Exercise Clause.”  Id., 
at 719.  Accordingly, Locke did not subject the law at issue
to  any  form  of  heightened  scrutiny.  But  it  also  did  not 
suggest  that  discrimination  against  religion  outside  the