Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/22pdf/22-138_43j7.pdf
Page Number: 32

Cite as:  600 U. S. ____ (2023) 

15 

SOTOMAYOR, J., concurring
Opinion of SOTOMAYOR, J. 

to intimidate’ . . . and nonintimidating cross burning [that] 
cannot be prohibited.”  538 U. S., at 372 (opinion of Scalia, 
J.).  Given  the  violent  history  of  the  symbol,  it  is  hard  to
imagine that any politically motivated cross burning done
within  view  of  the  public  could  be  carried  out  without 
awareness  of  some  risk  a  reasonable  spectator  would  feel
threatened.  See id., at 388–391 (THOMAS, J., dissenting).
Recklessness, which turns so heavily on an objective person 
standard, would not have been enough. 

As to the history, it is true that over time courts have of-
ten used a wide variety of terms to describe mental states. 
See,  e.g.,  Morissette  v.  United  States,  342  U. S.  246,  252 
(1952).  Yet “[t]he element of intent in the criminal law has
traditionally been viewed as a bifurcated concept embrac-
ing either the specific requirement of purpose or the more
general one of knowledge or awareness.”  United States v. 
United  States  Gypsum  Co.,  438  U. S.  422,  445  (1978);  see 
also Tison, 481 U. S., at 150; Carter v. United States, 530 
U. S. 255, 270 (2000) (describing “feloniously” as equivalent 
to “ ‘intent’ ”).  And at the very least, there is no well-settled
history  showing  that  it  is  enough  for  a  defendant  to  be
merely aware of some risk that their statements could be
threatening.  See, e.g.,  Borden v.  United  States, 593 U. S. 
___, ___ (2021) (plurality opinion) (slip op., at 5) (reckless-
ness  requires  awareness  of  a  level  of  risk  that  “need  not 
come  anywhere  close  to  a  likelihood”).    The history  is,  in-
stead, replete with the enduring and commonsense pairing 
of threats and intent. 

D 
  The Court, eschewing Black and history, instead reaches
its  result  based  on  the  need  for  a  “buffer  zone”  drawn  by
analogy to other categories of unprotected speech.  Ante, at 
4.  For the reasons above, I do not think we can leap ahead
to this question.  With that caveat, I agree with the Court
that  precedent  in  other  areas  of  unprotected  speech  and