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4 

CITY OF GRANTS PASS v. JOHNSON 

Syllabus 

an “‘involuntary’” byproduct of his status as an alcoholic.  Id., at 533. 
The Court did not agree that Texas’s law effectively criminalized Pow-
ell’s status as an alcoholic.  Writing for a plurality, Justice Marshall 
observed that Robinson’s “very small” intrusion “into the substantive
criminal law” prevents States only from enforcing laws that criminal-
ize “a mere status.”  Id., at 532–533.  It does nothing to curtail a State’s 
authority  to  secure  a  conviction  when  “the  accused  has  committed 
some act . . . society has an interest in preventing.”  Id., at 533.  That 
remains true, Justice Marshall continued, even if the defendant’s con-
duct  might,  “in  some  sense”  be  described  as  “  ‘involuntary’  or  ‘occa-
sioned by’” a particular status.  Ibid. 

This case is no different.  Just as in Powell, plaintiffs here seek to 
extend Robinson’s rule beyond laws addressing “mere status” to laws 
addressing  actions  that,  even  if  undertaken  with  the  requisite  mens 
rea, might “in some sense” qualify as “ ‘involuntary.’ ”  And as in Pow-
ell, the Court can find nothing in the Eighth Amendment permitting 
that course.  Instead, a variety of other legal doctrines and constitu-
tional provisions work to protect those in the criminal justice system
from a conviction.  Pp. 21–24. 

(d) Powell not only declined to extend Robinson to “involuntary” acts 
but also stressed the dangers of doing so.  Extending Robinson to cover 
involuntary  acts  would,  Justice  Marshall  observed,    effectively 
“impe[l]” this Court “into defining” something akin to a new “insanity 
test in constitutional terms.”  Powell, 392 U. S., at 536.  That is because 
an individual like the defendant in Powell does not dispute that he has 
committed an otherwise criminal act with the requisite mens rea, yet
he seeks to be excused from “moral accountability” because of his “‘con-
dition.  ’”  Id.,  at  535–536.    Instead,  Justice  Marshall  reasoned,  such 
matters should be left for resolution through the democratic process, 
and  not  by  “freez[ing]”  any  particular,  judicially  preferred  approach 
“into a rigid constitutional mold.”  Id., at 537.  The Court echoed that 
last  point  in  Kahler  v.  Kansas,  589  U. S.  271,  in  which  the  Court 
stressed that questions about whether an individual who committed a
proscribed act with the requisite mental state should be “reliev[ed of]
responsibility,” id., at 283, due to a lack of “moral culpability,” id., at 
286, are generally best resolved by the people and their elected repre-
sentatives. 

Though doubtless well intended, the Ninth Circuit’s Martin experi-
ment defied these lessons.  Answers to questions such as what consti-
tutes  “involuntarily”  homelessness  or  when  a  shelter  is  “practically
available”  cannot  be  found  in  the  Cruel  and  Unusual  Punishments 
Clause.  Nor do federal judges enjoy any special competence to provide 
them.  Cities across the West report that the Ninth Circuit’s involun-