Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/12pdf/11-556_11o2.pdf
Page Number: 1.0

(Slip Opinion) 

OCTOBER  TERM,  2012 

1 

Syllabus 

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader. 
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337. 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

Syllabus 

VANCE v. BALL STATE UNIVERSITY ET AL. 

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR 
THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT 

No. 11–556.  Argued November 26, 2012—Decided June 24, 2013 

Under Title VII, an employer’s liability for workplace harassment may
depend  on  the  status  of  the  harasser.    If  the  harassing  employee  is 
the victim’s co-worker, the employer is liable only if it was negligent
in controlling working conditions.  In cases in which the harasser is a 
“supervisor,” however, different rules apply.  If the supervisor’s har-
assment  culminates  in  a  tangible  employment  action  (i.e.,  “a  signifi-
cant  change  in  employment  status,  such  as  hiring,  firing,  failing  to
promote, reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or
a  decision  causing  a  significant  change  in  benefits,”  Burlington  In-
dustries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U. S. 742, 761), the employer is  strictly 
liable.    But  if  no  tangible  employment  action  is  taken,  the  employer 
may  escape  liability  by  establishing,  as  an  affirmative  defense,  that
(1) the employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct any 
harassing  behavior  and  (2)  that  the  plaintiff  unreasonably  failed  to 
take advantage of the preventive or corrective opportunities that the
employer  provided.  Faragher  v.  Boca  Raton,  524  U. S.  775,  807; 
Ellerth, supra, at 765. 

Petitioner Vance, an African-American woman, sued her employer, 
Ball State University (BSU) alleging that a fellow employee, Saundra 
Davis, created a racially hostile work environment in violation of Ti-
tle  VII.    The  District  Court  granted  summary  judgment  to  BSU.    It 
held that BSU was not vicariously liable for Davis’ alleged actions be-
cause Davis, who could not take tangible employment actions against 
Vance, was not a supervisor.  The Seventh Circuit affirmed. 

Held: An  employee  is  a  “supervisor”  for  purposes  of  vicarious  liability 
under  Title  VII  only  if  he  or  she  is  empowered  by  the  employer  to
take tangible employment actions against the victim.  Pp. 9–30.

(a) Petitioner errs in relying on the meaning of “supervisor” in gen-