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Page Number: 17

12 

JUNE MEDICAL SERVICES L. L. C. v. RUSSO 

Opinion of BREYER, J. 

abortion.  The State contends that the proper parties to as-
sert  these  rights  are  the  patients  themselves.    We  think 
that the State has waived that argument. 

The State’s argument rests on the rule that a party can-
not ordinarily “ ‘rest his claim to relief on the legal rights or 
interests of third parties.’ ”  Kowalski v. Tesmer, 543 U. S. 
125, 129 (2004) (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U. S. 490, 499 
(1975)).  This rule is “prudential.”  543 U. S., at 128–129.  It 
does not involve the Constitution’s “case-or-controversy re-
quirement.”  Id., at 129; see Craig v. Boren, 429 U. S. 190, 
193  (1976);  Singleton  v.  Wulff,  428  U. S.  106,  112  (1976). 
And  so,  we  have  explained,  it  can  be  forfeited  or  waived.
See Craig, 429 U. S., at 193–194. 

As we pointed out, supra, at 4–5, the State’s memoran-
dum opposing the plaintiffs’ TRO request urged the District 
Court to proceed swiftly to the merits of the plaintiffs’ un-
due-burden  claim.  It  argued  that  there  was  “no  question
that the physicians had standing to contest” Act 620.  App.
44.  And it told the District Court that the Fifth Circuit had 
found that doctors challenging Texas’ “identical” law “had 
third-party standing to assert their patients’ rights.”  Id., at 
43–44.  Noting  that  the  Texas  law  had  “already  been  up-
held,” the State asserted that it had “a keen interest in re-
moving any cloud upon the validity of its law.”  Id., at 45. 
It insisted that this suit was “the proper vehicle to do so.” 
Ibid.  The State did not mention its current objection until 
it filed its cross-petition—more than five years after it ar-
gued that the plaintiffs’ standing was beyond question.

The State’s unmistakable concession of standing as part 
of  its  effort  to  obtain  a  quick  decision  from  the  District 
Court on the merits of the plaintiffs’ undue-burden claims 
bars our consideration of it here.  See Wood v. Milyard, 566 
U. S. 463, 474 (2012); cf. post, at 24–25 (ALITO, J., dissent-
ing)  (addressing  the  Court’s  approach  to  claims  forfeited,
rather than waived); post, at 7–8 (GORSUCH, J., dissenting)