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REPUBLICAN PARTY OF PENNSYLVANIA v. 
DEGRAFFENREID 
THOMAS, J., dissenting 

that go to the heart of election confidence.2 

Fraud is not the only aspect of mail-in ballots that com-
plicates postelection judicial review.  Also relevant are the 
corresponding safeguards that States put in place to ame-
liorate that heightened risk of fraud.  To balance the “strong 
interest”  of  ballot  access  with  the  “ ‘compelling  interest  in 
preserving the integrity of [the] election process,’ ” Purcell, 
549 U. S., at 4, many States have expanded mail-in ballots
but sought to deter fraud—and create mechanisms to detect 
it—by requiring voters to return ballots in signed, dated se-
crecy envelopes.  Some States also require witness or notary 
signatures.  Tallying  these  ballots  tends  to  be  more  labor 
intensive,  involves  a  high  degree  of  subjective  judgment
(e.g.,  verifying  signatures),  and  typically  leads  to  a  far 
higher rate of ballot challenges and rejections.  Litigation
over these ballots can require substantial discovery and la-
bor-intensive fact review.  In some cases, it might require
sifting through hundreds of thousands or millions of ballots. 
It also may require subjective judgment calls about the va-
lidity of thousands of ballots.  Judicial review in this situa-
tion is difficult enough even when the rules are clear and 
the number of challenged ballots small.  Adding a dispute
about who can set or change the rules greatly exacerbates
the problem.

Third, and perhaps most significant, postelection litiga-
tion sometimes forces courts to make policy decisions that
they have no business making.  For example, when an offi-
cial has improperly changed the rules, but voters have al-
ready  relied  on  that  change,  courts  must  choose  between 

—————— 

2 We are fortunate that many of the cases we have seen alleged only
improper  rule  changes,  not  fraud.    But  that  observation  provides  only 
small comfort.  An election free from strong evidence of systemic fraud is 
not alone sufficient for election confidence.  Also important is the assur-
ance that fraud will not go undetected.  Cf. McCutcheon v. Federal Elec-
tion Comm’n, 572 U. S. 185, 191, 206–207 (2014) (plurality opinion).