Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/22pdf/21-1086_1co6.pdf
Page Number: 107

Cite as:  599 U. S. ____ (2023) 

11 

ALITO, J., dissenting 

“predominant”  factor  in  legislative  districting.    “[W]hen 
statutory  language  is  susceptible  of  multiple  interpreta-
tions, a court may shun an interpretation that raises seri-
ous constitutional doubts and instead may adopt an alter-
native that avoids those problems.”  Jennings v. Rodriguez, 
583 U. S. ___, ___ (2018) (slip op., at 2).  This same principle 
logically applies with even greater force when we interpret 
language  in  one  of  our  prior  opinions.    It  therefore  goes 
without question that we should apply the Gingles frame-
work in a way that does not set up a confrontation between 
§2 and the Constitution, and understanding the first Gin-
gles precondition in the way I have outlined achieves that 
result.3 

B 
  The  Court’s  subsidiary  criticisms  of  Alabama’s  argu-
ments are likewise inapplicable to my analysis.  The Court 
suggests that the “centerpiece” of Alabama’s argument re-
garding  the  role  race  can  permissibly  play in a  plaintiff ’s 
illustrative map seeks the imposition of “a new rule.”  Ante, 
at 15, 22.  But I would require only what our cases already 
demand:  that  all  legislative  districts  be  produced  without 
giving race a “predominant” role.4 

—————— 

3 The  second and  third  Gingles  preconditions,  which  concern  racially 
polarized voting, cannot contribute to avoiding a clash between §2 and 
the Constitution over racial predominance in the drawing of lines.  Those 
preconditions do not concern the drawing of lines in plaintiffs’ maps, and 
in any event, because voting in much of the South is racially polarized, 
they are almost always satisfied anyway.  Alabama does not contest that 
they are satisfied here. 

4 The Court appears to contend that it does not matter if race predom-
inated in the drawing of these maps because the maps could have been 
drawn  without  race  predominating.    See  ante,  at  26–27,  n. 7.    But  of 
course, many policies could be selected for race-neutral reasons.  They 
nonetheless  must  be  assessed  under  the  relevant  standard  for  inten-
tional reliance on race if their imposition was in fact motivated by race.  
See, e.g., Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U. S. 222, 227–231 (1985); Arlington 
Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 U. S. 252, 264–