Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/558bv.pdf
Page Number: 464.0

Cite as: 558 U. S. 290 (2010) 

303 

Opinion of the Court 

that  it  does  not  sufﬁce  to  demonstrate  that  the  ﬁnding  was 
unreasonable.3 

Reviewing  all  of  the  evidence,  we  agree  with  the  State 
that even if it is debatable, it is not unreasonable to conclude 
that,  after  reviewing  the  Kirkland  report,  counsel  made  a 
strategic  decision  not  to  inquire  further  into  the  informa­
tion  contained  in  the  report  about  Wood’s  mental  deﬁcien­
cies and not to present to the jury such information as coun­
sel  already  possessed  about  these  deﬁciencies.  Cf.  Rice, 
546  U. S.,  at  341–342.  For  that  reason,  we  agree  with  the 
Court  of  Appeals  that  the  District  Court  erred  in  holding 
to the contrary. 

B 

Wood  also  argues  that  the  state-court  decision  involved 
an  unreasonable  application  of  Strickland  under  § 2254(d)(1) 

3 The dissent suggests that counsel could not have made a strategic deci­
sion  not  to  pursue  evidence  of  Wood’s  mental  deﬁciencies  because  there 
could be no reasonable justiﬁcation for doing so.  Post, at 307–309 (opinion 
of Stevens, J., joined by Kennedy, J.).  This interpretation conﬂates the 
question  whether  a  decision  was  strategic  with  the  question  whether  a 
strategic decision was reasonable.  Cf. post, at 306, n. 1.  Without express­
ing  a  view  on  the  ultimate  reasonableness  of  the  decision  not  to  pursue 
this evidence further, we note that the Eleventh Circuit majority observed 
that  the  state  court  could  reasonably  have  determined  that  counsel  had 
strategic grounds for their decision.  In particular, evidence about Wood’s 
mental deﬁciencies may have led to rebuttal testimony about the capabili­
ties he demonstrated through his extensive criminal history, an extraordi­
narily limited amount of which was actually admitted at the penalty phase 
of  the  trial.  Counsel’s  decision  successfully  thwarted  the  prosecutor’s 
efforts  to  admit  evidence  that  Wood  murdered  his  ex-girlfriend  while  on 
parole  for  an  attempted  murder  of  a  different  ex-girlfriend  that  was 
strikingly similar in execution to the subsequent successful murder.  App. 
23–24.  Moreover,  as  the  Eleventh  Circuit  majority  noted,  evidence  of 
Wood’s  mental  deﬁciencies  also  could  have  undercut  the  defense’s  argu­
ment  that  he  left  school  to  support  his  family,  suggesting  instead  that  he 
left  school  because  of  educational  difﬁculties.  542  F.  3d,  at  1305–1306. 
Counsel’s decision about which avenues to investigate can therefore plausi­
bly be described as strategic rather than necessarily being the product of 
“happenstance, inattention, or neglect,” post, at 307.