Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/19pdf/18-587_5ifl.pdf
Page Number: 73

Cite as:  591 U. S. ____ (2020) 

7 

Opinion of KAVANAUGH, J. 

of  the  Nielsen Memorandum,  perhaps  with some  elabora-
tion as suggested in the Court’s opinion.  Ante, at 23–26.*

* 

  * 

  * 
  The Court’s resolution of this narrow APA issue of course 
cannot eliminate the broader uncertainty over the status of 
the DACA recipients.  That uncertainty is a result of Con-
gress’s  inability  thus  far  to  agree  on  legislation,  which  in 
turn  has  forced  successive  administrations  to  improvise, 
thereby triggering many rounds of relentless litigation with 
the prospect of more litigation to come.  In contrast to those 
necessarily 
stopgap  administrative 
measures, the Article I legislative process could produce a 
sturdy and enduring solution to this issue, one way or the 
other,  and  thereby  remove  the  uncertainty  that  has  per-
sisted  for  years  for  these  young  immigrants  and  the  Na-

short-lived  and 

—————— 

* Because I conclude that the Executive Branch satisfied the APA’s ar-
bitrary-and-capricious standard, I need not consider whether its prose-
cutorial enforcement policy was “committed to agency discretion by law” 
and therefore not subject to APA arbitrary-and-capricious review in the 
first  place.   5  U. S. C.  §701(a)(2).   Several  judges have  advanced  argu-
ments  suggesting  that  DACA—at  least  to  the  extent  it  was  simply  an 
exercise of forbearance authority—and the repeal of DACA are decisions 
about  whether  and  to  what  extent  to  exercise  prosecutorial  discretion 
against a class of offenses or individuals, and are therefore unreviewable 
under  the  APA  as  “committed  to  agency  discretion  by  law.”    Ibid.;  see 
Casa De Maryland v. United States Dept. of Homeland Security, 924 F. 
3d 684, 709–715 (CA4 2019) (Richardson, J., concurring in part and dis-
senting in part); Regents of Univ. Cal. v. United States Dept. of Homeland 
Security, 908 F. 3d 476, 521–523 (CA9 2018) (Owens, J., concurring in 
judgment); see also Texas v. United States, 809 F. 3d 134, 196–202 (CA5 
2015) (King, J., dissenting); Texas v. United States, 787 F. 3d 733, 770–
776  (CA5  2015)  (Higginson,  J.,  dissenting);  cf.  Heckler  v.  Chaney,  470 
U. S. 821, 831–835 (1985); ICC v. Locomotive Engineers, 482 U. S. 270, 
277–284 (1987); United States v. Nixon, 418 U. S. 683, 693 (1974) (“the 
Executive Branch has exclusive authority and absolute discretion to de-
cide  whether  to  prosecute  a  case”);  In re  Aiken  County,  725  F. 3d  255, 
262–264 (CADC 2013).