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6  MAINE COMMUNITY HEALTH OPTIONS v. UNITED STATES 

ALITO, J., dissenting 

law.  But since Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64 (1938), 
the federal courts have lacked this power.  Yet the “money-
mandating” test that the Court applies today, ante, at 26– 
27, and n. 13, bears a disquieting resemblance to the sort of 
test  that  a  common-law  court  might  use  in  deciding
whether to create a new cause of action.  To be sure, some 
of the claims asserted under the Tucker Act, most notably
contract claims, are governed by the new federal common
law that applies in limited areas involving “ ‘uniquely fed-
eral  interests.’ ”    Boyle  v.  United  Technologies  Corp.,  487 
U. S.  500,  504  (1988);  see  also  Testan,  424  U. S.,  at  400. 
And the recognition of an implied right to recover on such
claims is thus easy to reconcile with the post-Erie regime. 
There  may  also  be  some  sharply  defined  categories  of 
claims3 that may be properly asserted simply as a matter of
precedent.4  But the exercise of common-law power in cases
like the ones now before us is a different matter. 

An argument based on Congress’s assumptions in enact-
ing the Tucker Act would present a question that is similar 
to  one  we  have  confronted  under  the  Alien  Tort  Statute 

—————— 

3 Takings  claims  are  an  example.  During  the  period  when  federal
courts applied general common law, such claims were brought under the 
Tucker Act, apparently on the theory of implied contract.  See, e.g., Hur-
ley v. Kincaid, 285 U. S. 95, 104 (1932); United States v. Lynah, 188 U. S. 
445, 458–459 (1903).  But the Court rejected the argument that a takings
claim could be based “exclusively on the Constitution, without reference 
to any statute of the United States, or to any contract arising under an 
act of Congress.”  Hooe v. United States, 218 U. S. 322, 335 (1910). 

4 Compare Testan, 424 U. S., at 400 (suggesting that private remedies
might  be  available  for  contract  claims);  United  States  v.  Mitchell,  463 
U. S.  206,  224–228  (1983)  (relying  on  “fiduciary  relationship  . . .  [that] 
arises when the Government assumes . . . control over forests and prop-
erty belonging to Indians” to create cause of action); Bell v. United States, 
366 U. S. 393 (1961) (adjudicating suit brought by former service mem-
bers for compensation while they were prisoners of war), with Bowen v. 
Massachusetts, 487 U. S. 879, 905, n. 42 (1988) (rejecting cause of action
cognizable under the Tucker Act based on “shall pay” requirement under
the Medicaid Act, 42 U. S. C. §1396b(a)).