Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/22pdf/21-376_7l48.pdf
Page Number: 77

Cite as:  599 U. S. ____ (2023) 

35 

GORSUCH, J., concurring 

Doubtless,  too,  the  rise  of  the  plenary-power  theory  in-
jected  incoherence  into  our  Indian-law  jurisprudence.
Many scholars have commented on it.  See, e.g., P. Frickey,
Doctrine,  Context,  Institutional  Relationships,  and  Com-
mentary:  The Malaise of Federal Indian Law Through the 
Lens of Lone Wolf, 38 Tulsa L. Rev. 5, 9 (2002) (describing 
our  doctrine  as  “riddled  with  . . .  inconsistency”);  F.  Pom-
mersheim, A Path Near the Clearing:  An Essay on Consti-
tutional  Adjudication  in  Tribal  Courts,  27  Gonz.  L. Rev.
393, 403 (1991) (calling our doctrine “bifurcated, if not fully 
schizophrenic”).  So have Members of this Court.  JUSTICE 
THOMAS has put the problem well:  “[M]uch of the confusion 
reflected in our precedent arises from two largely incompat-
ible”  assumptions:  That  Congress  “can  regulate  virtually
every aspect of the [T]ribes”; and that “Indian [T]ribes re-
tain  inherent  sovereignty.”  Lara,  541  U. S.,  at  214–215 
(opinion concurring in judgment).  Those two propositions 
of  course  clash.  That  is  because  only  one  is  true.  Yes, 
Tribes retain the inherent sovereignty the Constitution left
for them.  But no, Congress does not possess power to “cal-
ibrate ‘the metes and bounds of tribal sovereignty.’ ”  Ibid. 
In recent years, this Court has begun to correct its mis-
take.  Increasingly, it has emphasized original meaning in
constitutional interpretation.  See, e.g., Kennedy v. Bremer-
ton School Dist., 597 U. S. ___, ___–___ (2022) (slip op., at 
23–24);  Ramos  v.  Louisiana,  590  U. S.  ___,  ___,  ___–___ 
(2020)  (slip  op.,  at  6,  11–17).    In  the  process,  it  has  come 
again  to  recognize  the  Indian  Commerce  Clause  provides
the federal government only so much “power to deal with 
the Indian Tribes.”  Mancari, 417 U. S., at 551–552.  But to 
date, these corrective steps have not yielded all they should. 
While this Court has stopped overreading its own plenary-
power  precedents,  it  has  yet  to  recover  fully  the  original
meaning of the Indian Commerce Clause. 

Today, the  Court takes further steps in the right direc-
tion.  It recognizes that Congress’s powers with respect to