Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/23pdf/22-704_4246.pdf
Page Number: 42

Cite as:  602 U. S. ____ (2024) 

15 

BARRETT, J., concurring in part 

this  single  restriction  misses  the  forest  for  the  trees.    It 
gives secondary billing to what I think is the central point: 
that the names clause “reflects trademark law’s historical 
rationale of identifying the source of goods.”  Ante, at 16.  I 
see  no  reason  to  proceed  based  on  pedigree  rather  than 
principle.  Besides,  as  the  Court  admits,  its  approach
merely delays the inevitable: Eventually, the Court will en-
counter a restriction without a historical analogue and be 
forced to articulate a test for analyzing it.  Ante, at 19–20. 

* 

* 

* 
Trademark  protection  cannot  exist  without  content  dis-
crimination.  So  long  as  content-based  registration  re-
strictions  reasonably  relate  to  the  purposes  of  the  trade-
mark  system,  they  are  constitutional.    The  names  clause 
clears this bar.  I respectfully concur in part.