Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/22pdf/21-1086_1co6.pdf
Page Number: 53

8 

ALLEN v. MILLIGAN 

THOMAS, J., dissenting 

§2.”  Holder, 512 U. S., at 881 (plurality opinion). 
  Given  the  diverse  circumstances  of  different  jurisdic-
tions, it would be fanciful to expect a one-size-fits-all defi-
nition  of  the  appropriate  benchmark.    Cf.  Thornburg  v. 
Gingles, 478 U. S. 30, 79 (1986) (explaining that the vote-
dilution inquiry “is peculiarly dependent upon the facts of 
each case and requires an intensely local appraisal” (cita-
tion and internal quotation marks omitted)).  One overrid-
ing principle, however, should be obvious.  A proper district-
ing benchmark must be race neutral: It must not assume, 
a priori, that an acceptable plan should include any partic-
ular number or proportion of minority-controlled districts. 
  I begin with §2’s text.  As relevant here, §2(a) prohibits a 
State from “impos[ing] or appl[ying]” any electoral rule “in 
a manner which results in a denial or abridgement of the 
right  . . .  to  vote  on  account  of  race  or  color.”    §10301(a).  
Section 2(b) then provides that §2(a) is violated 

“if, based on the totality of circumstances, . . . the polit-
ical processes leading to nomination or election in the 
State . . . are not equally open to participation by mem-
bers of [a protected class] in that its members have less 
opportunity  than  other  members  of  the  electorate  to 
participate  in  the  political  process  and  to  elect  repre-
sentatives  of their  choice.   The extent  to which  mem-
bers of a protected class have been elected to office in 
the State . . . is one circumstance which may be consid-
ered: Provided, That nothing in this section establishes 
a right to have members of a protected class elected in 
numbers equal to their proportion in the population.”  
§10301(b). 

  As we held two Terms ago in Brnovich, the “equal open-
ness”  requirement  is  “the  core”  and  “touchstone”  of  §2(b),