Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/19pdf/18-1195_g314.pdf
Page Number: 76.0

Cite as:  591 U. S. ____ (2020) 

15 

BREYER, J., dissenting 

Clauses,  it  is  only  by  “preserving  doctrinal  flexibility  and 
recognizing the need for a sensible and realistic application” 
of those provisions.  Yoder, 406 U. S., at 221. 

The Court proceeded in just this way in Locke.  It consid-
ered the same precedents the majority today cites in sup-
port of its presumption of unconstitutionality.  But it found 
that  applying  the  presumption  set  forth  in  those  cases  to 
Washington’s decision not to fund devotional degrees would
“extend”  them  “well  beyond  not  only  their  facts  but  their
reasoning.”  540  U. S.,  at  720.    In  my  view,  that  analysis 
applies equally to this case. 

Montana’s  law  does  not  punish  religious  exercise. 
Cf. Locke, 540 U. S., at 720 (citing Church of Lukumi Ba-
balu  Aye,  Inc.  v.  Hialeah,  508  U. S.  520,  535  (1993));  see 
ante, at 11.  It does not deny anyone, because of their faith, 
the right to participate in political affairs of the community.
Cf. Locke, 540 U. S., at 720–721 (citing McDaniel v. Paty, 
435 U. S. 618, 626 (1978)); see ante, at 11–12.  And it does 
not require students to choose between their religious be-
liefs and receiving secular government aid such as unem-
ployment benefits.  Cf. Locke, 540 U. S., at 720 (citing Sher-
bert v. Verner, 374 U. S. 398, 403–404 (1963)); see ante, at 
11–12.  The State has simply chosen not to fund programs
that, in significant part, typically involve the teaching and 
practice of religious devotion.  And “a legislature’s decision 
not to subsidize the exercise of a fundamental right does not 
infringe the right, and thus is not subject to strict scrutiny.” 
Regan v. Taxation With Representation of Wash., 461 U. S. 
540, 549 (1983); see also Lyng v. Automobile Workers, 485 
U. S. 360, 368 (1988).

I disagree, then, with what I see as the majority’s doctri-
nal omission, its misplaced application of a legal presump-
tion, and its suggestion that this presumption is appropri-
ate in many, if not all, cases involving government benefits.
As I see the matter, our differences run deeper than a sim-
ple disagreement about the application of prior case law.