Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/23pdf/23-939_e2pg.pdf
Page Number: 44.0

36 

TRUMP v. UNITED STATES 

Opinion of the Court 

emphasis omitted).  First, it points to the Justice Depart-
ment’s “longstanding commitment to the impartial enforce-
ment of the law,” id., at 21, as well as the criminal justice
system’s  further  protections:  grand  juries,  a  defendant’s
procedural rights during trial, and the requirement that the 
Government prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt, id., 
at 22.  Next, it contends that “existing principles of statu-
tory construction and as-applied constitutional challenges” 
adequately  address  the  separation  of  powers  concerns  in-
volved in applying generally applicable criminal laws to a 
President.  Id., at 29.  Finally, the Government cites certain
defenses that would be available to the President in a par-
ticular prosecution, such as the public-authority defense or 
the advice of the Attorney General.  Id., at 29–30; see Nar-
done v. United States, 302 U. S. 379, 384 (1937); Tr. of Oral 
Arg. 107–108. 

These safeguards, though important, do not alleviate the
need for pretrial review.  They fail to address the fact that 
under  our  system  of  separated  powers,  criminal  prohibi-
tions cannot apply to certain Presidential conduct to begin 
with.  As we have explained, when the President acts pur-
suant to his exclusive constitutional powers, Congress can-
not—as  a  structural  matter—regulate  such  actions,  and
courts cannot review them.  See Part II–A, supra.  And he 
is at least presumptively immune from prosecution for his
other official actions.  See Part II–B, supra. 

Questions about whether the President may be held lia-
ble for particular actions, consistent with the separation of
powers,  must  be  addressed  at  the  outset  of  a  proceeding. 
Even if the President were ultimately not found liable for
certain official actions, the possibility of an extended pro-
ceeding alone may render him “unduly cautious in the dis-
charge of his official duties.”  Fitzgerald, 457 U. S., at 752, 
n. 32.  Vulnerability  “ ‘to  the  burden  of  a  trial  and  to  the
inevitable danger of its outcome, would dampen the ardor
of all but the most resolute.’ ”  Id., at 752–753, n. 32 (quoting