Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/17pdf/16-111_new2_22p3.pdf
Page Number: 39

2 

MASTERPIECE CAKESHOP, LTD. v. COLORADO 
CIVIL RIGHTS COMM’N
 
Opinion of THOMAS, J. 

resolved  this  factual  dispute  in  Phillips’  favor.    The  court 
described his conduct as a refusal to “design and create a 
cake to celebrate [a] same-sex wedding.”  Craig v. Master-
piece  Cakeshop,  Inc.,  370  P.  3d  272,  276  (2015);  see  also 
id., at 286 (“designing and selling a wedding cake”); id., at 
283  (“refusing  to  create  a  wedding  cake”).  And  it  noted 
that the Commission’s order required Phillips to sell “ ‘any
product [he] would sell to heterosexual couples,’ ” including 
custom wedding cakes.  Id., at 286 (emphasis added). 

Even after describing his conduct this way, the Court of
Appeals  concluded  that  Phillips’  conduct  was  not  expres­
sive  and  was  not  protected  speech.  It  reasoned  that  an 
outside  observer  would  think  that  Phillips  was  merely 
complying with Colorado’s public-accommodations law, not 
expressing  a  message,  and  that  Phillips  could  post  a  dis­
claimer to that effect.  This reasoning flouts bedrock prin­
ciples  of  our  free-speech  jurisprudence  and  would  justify
virtually  any  law  that  compels  individuals  to  speak.  It 
should not pass without comment. 

I 
The First Amendment, applicable to the States through
the  Fourteenth  Amendment,  prohibits  state  laws  that
abridge  the  “freedom  of  speech.”    When  interpreting  this
command,  this  Court  has  distinguished  between  regula­
tions  of  speech  and  regulations  of  conduct.    The  latter 
generally  do  not  abridge  the  freedom  of  speech,  even  if
they impose “incidental burdens” on expression.  Sorrell v. 
IMS Health Inc., 564 U. S. 552, 567 (2011).  As the Court 
explains today, public-accommodations laws usually regu­
late  conduct.  Ante,  at  9–10  (citing  Hurley  v.  Irish-
American  Gay,  Lesbian  and  Bisexual  Group  of  Boston, 
Inc.,  515  U. S.  557,  572  (1995)).    “[A]s  a  general  matter,” 
public-accommodations  laws  do  not  “target  speech”  but
instead prohibit “the act of discriminating against individ­
uals in the provision of publicly available goods, privileges,