Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/22pdf/22-58_i425.pdf
Page Number: 52.0

10 

UNITED STATES v. TEXAS 

ALITO, J., dissenting 

the District Court did here.  It vacated the Final Memoran-
dum pending further action by DHS, id., at 499, but it de-
clined to issue injunctive or declaratory relief, id., at 501– 
502. 

The Government asked the Court of Appeals to stay the
District Court’s order vacating the Final Memorandum, but
that court refused to do so and observed that the Govern-
ment had not “come close” to showing “ ‘clear error’ ” in the 
District Court’s factual findings on the injuries that Texas
had already incurred and would continue to incur because 
of  the  Final  Memorandum.    40  F. 4th  205,  216–217  (CA5 
2022). 

II 

Before I address the Court’s inexplicable break from our 
ordinary standing analysis, I will first explain why Texas
easily met its burden to show a concrete, particularized in-
jury  that  is  traceable  to  the  Final  Memorandum  and  re-
dressable by the courts.  Lujan, 504 U. S., at 560–561. 

A 
Injury  in  fact.  The  District  Court’s  factual  findings,
which  must  be  accepted  unless  clearly  erroneous,  quanti-
fied  the  cost  of  criminal  supervision  of  aliens  who  should 
have  been  held  in  DHS  custody  and  also  identified  other 
burdens that Texas had borne and would continue to bear 
going forward.  These findings sufficed to establish a con-
crete injury that was specific to Texas.  TransUnion LLC v. 
Ramirez, 594 U. S. ___, ___ (2021) (slip op., at 9); see ante, 
at 4 (conceding that such costs are “of course an injury”). 

Traceability.  The District Court found that each category
of cost would increase “because of the Final Memorandum,” 
rather than decisions that DHS personnel would make ir-
respective  of  the  directions  that  memorandum  contains.
606 F. Supp. 3d, at 460, 464, 465 (emphasis added).

The majority does not hold—and in my judgment, could