Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/19pdf/18-587_5ifl.pdf
Page Number: 26

Cite as:  591 U. S. ____ (2020) 

21 

Opinion of the Court 

cluded  that  DAPA  “conflicted  with  the  discretion  author-
ized by Congress” because the INA “ ‘flatly does not permit
the reclassification of millions of illegal aliens as lawfully
present and thereby make them newly eligible for a host of
federal and state benefits, including work authorization.’ ”  
App.  to  Pet.  for  Cert.  114a  (quoting  Texas,  809  F.  3d,  at 
184).  Duke did not characterize the opinion as one about 
forbearance. 

In short, the Attorney General neither addressed the for-
bearance policy at the heart of DACA nor compelled DHS 
to abandon that policy.  Thus, removing benefits eligibility 
while continuing forbearance remained squarely within the 
discretion  of  Acting  Secretary  Duke,  who  was  responsible 
for “[e]stablishing national immigration enforcement poli-
cies and priorities.”  116 Stat. 2178, 6 U. S. C. §202(5).  But 
Duke’s memo offers no reason for terminating forbearance.
She  instead  treated  the  Attorney  General’s  conclusion  re-
garding the illegality of benefits as sufficient to rescind both
benefits and forbearance, without explanation. 

That reasoning repeated the error we identified in one of 
our leading modern administrative law cases, Motor Vehicle 
Manufacturers Association of the United States, Inc. v. State 
Farm  Mutual  Automobile  Insurance  Co.    There,  the  Na-
tional  Highway  Traffic  Safety  Administration  (NHTSA)
promulgated  a  requirement  that  motor  vehicles  produced
after 1982 be equipped with one of two passive restraints: 
airbags  or  automatic  seatbelts.  463  U. S.,  at  37–38,  46. 
Four  years  later,  before  the requirement  went  into  effect,
NHTSA concluded that automatic seatbelts, the restraint of 
choice for most manufacturers, would not provide effective
protection.  Based on that premise, NHTSA rescinded the
passive restraint requirement in full.  Id., at 38. 

We concluded that the total rescission was arbitrary and
capricious.  As  we  explained,  NHTSA’s  justification  sup-
ported  only  “disallow[ing]  compliance  by  means  of ”  auto-
matic seatbelts.  Id., at 47.  It did “not cast doubt” on the