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450  CITIZENS  UNITED  v.  FEDERAL  ELECTION  COMM’N 

Opinion of Stevens, J. 

U. S.,  at  153.63  When  private  interests  are  seen  to  exert 
outsized  control  over  ofﬁceholders  solely  on  account  of  the 
money  spent  on  (or  withheld  from)  their  campaigns,  the  re­
sult can depart so thoroughly “from what is pure or correct” 
in the conduct of Government, Webster’s Third New Interna­
tional  Dictionary  512  (1966)  (deﬁning  “corruption”),  that  it 
amounts  to  a  “subversion  . . . of the . .  .  electoral  process,” 
Automobile Workers, 352 U. S., at 575.  At stake in the leg­
islative  efforts  to  address  this  threat  is  therefore  not  only 
the  legitimacy  and  quality  of  Government  but  also  the  pub­
lic’s  faith  therein,  not  only  “the  capacity  of  this  democracy 
to  represent  its  constituents  [but  also]  the  conﬁdence  of  its 
citizens  in  their  capacity  to  govern  themselves,”  WRTL, 
551  U. S.,  at  507  (Souter,  J.,  dissenting).  “Take  away  Con­
gress’  authority  to  regulate  the  appearance  of  undue  inﬂu­
ence  and  ‘the  cynical  assumption  that  large  donors  call  the 
tune  could  jeopardize  the  willingness  of  voters  to  take  part 
in  democratic  governance.’ ”  McConnell,  540  U. S.,  at  144 
(quoting Shrink Missouri, 528 U. S., at 390).64 

63 Cf.  Nixon  v.  Shrink  Missouri  Government  PAC,  528  U. S.  377,  389 
(2000) (recognizing “the broader threat from politicians too compliant with 
the wishes of large contributors”).  Though discrete in scope, these exper­
iments  must  impose  some  meaningful  limits  if  they  are  to  have  a  chance 
at  functioning  effectively  and  preserving  the  public’s  trust.  “Even  if  it 
occurs only occasionally, the potential for such undue inﬂuence is manifest. 
And unlike straight cash-for-votes transactions, such corruption is neither 
easily  detected  nor  practical  to  criminalize.”  McConnell,  540  U. S.,  at 
153.  There should be nothing controversial about the proposition that the 
inﬂuence being targeted is “undue.”  In a democracy, ofﬁceholders should 
not make public decisions with the aim of placating a ﬁnancial benefactor, 
except  to  the  extent  that  the  benefactor  is  seen  as  representative  of  a 
larger constituency or its arguments are seen as especially persuasive. 

64 The  majority  declares  by  ﬁat  that  the  appearance  of  undue  inﬂuence 
by  high-spending  corporations  “will  not cause  the  electorate  to  lose  faith 
in  our  democracy.”  Ante,  at  360.  The  electorate  itself  has  consistently 
indicated  otherwise,  both  in  opinion  polls,  see  McConnell  v.  FEC,  251 
F. Supp. 2d 176, 557–558, 623–624 (DC 2003) (opinion of Kollar-Kotelly, J.), 
and  in  the  laws  its  representatives  have  passed,  and  our  colleagues  have 
no basis for elevating their own optimism into a tenet of constitutional law.