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Page Number: 18.0

10 

TRUMP v. UNITED STATES 

Opinion of the Court 

person  who  alone  composes  a  branch  of  government,” 
Trump v. Mazars USA, LLP, 591 U. S. 848, 868 (2020).  The 
Framers “sought to encourage energetic, vigorous, decisive, 
and speedy execution of the laws by placing in the hands of 
a single, constitutionally indispensable, individual the ulti-
mate authority that, in respect to the other branches, the 
Constitution divides among many.”  Clinton v. Jones, 520 
U. S. 681, 712 (1997) (Breyer, J., concurring in judgment).
They “deemed an energetic executive essential to ‘the pro-
tection  of  the  community  against  foreign  attacks,’  ‘the
steady administration of the laws,’ ‘the protection of prop-
erty,’ and ‘the security of liberty.’ ”  Seila Law, 591 U. S., at 
223–224  (quoting  The  Federalist  No.  70,  p. 471  (J.  Cooke 
ed. 1961) (A. Hamilton)).  The purpose of a “vigorous” and 
“energetic”  Executive,  they  thought,  was  to  ensure  “good
government,” for a “feeble executive implies a feeble execu-
tion of the government.”  Id., at 471–472. 

The Framers accordingly vested the President with “su-
pervisory  and  policy  responsibilities  of  utmost  discretion 
and  sensitivity.”  Fitzgerald,  457  U. S.,  at  750.    He  must 
make  “the  most  sensitive  and  far-reaching  decisions  en-
trusted to any official under our constitutional system.”  Id., 
at 752.  There accordingly “exists the greatest public inter-
est” in providing the President with “ ‘the maximum ability 
to deal fearlessly and impartially with’ the duties of his of-
fice.”  Ibid. (quoting Ferri v. Ackerman, 444 U. S. 193, 203 
(1979)).  Appreciating  the  “unique  risks  to  the  effective
functioning of government” that arise when the President’s 
energies are diverted by proceedings that might render him
“unduly cautious in the discharge of his official duties,” we 
have  recognized  Presidential  immunities  and  privileges 
“rooted in the constitutional tradition of the separation of 
powers  and  supported  by  our  history.”    Fitzgerald,  457 
U. S., at 749, 751, 752, n. 32. 

In  Nixon v.  Fitzgerald, for instance, we recognized that
as “a functionally mandated incident of [his] unique office,”