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Page Number: 28.0

6 

SNYDER v. UNITED STATES 

JACKSON, J., dissenting 

the  majority  has  already  characterized  §666  as  a  bribery 
statute.  And then, because we typically seek to give effect 
to  each  word  of  a  statute,  see  TRW  Inc.  v.  Andrews,  534 
U. S.  19,  31  (2001),  the  majority  must  strain  to  make  the
word “rewarded” as it appears in §666 relevant, rather than
meaningless.    It  offers  rank  speculation  as  to  why  “re-
warded” in §666 might mean something other than what it
ordinarily  does,  ultimately  assigning  the  word  some  busy 
work relating to potential defenses to bribery charges.  See 
ante, at 15.  But whatever the merits of the majority’s as-
sertions  involving  waterfronts,  belts,  and  suspenders,  its
interpretation  of  §666  finds  little  grounding  in  the  actual 
text  of  the  statute.  See  Luna  Perez  v.  Sturgis  Public 
Schools,  598  U. S.  142,  150  (2023)  (“ ‘[W]e  cannot  replace
the actual text with speculation as to Congress’ intent’ ”). 

2 
Speaking of text: The language of other statutes demon-
strates that Congress uses the word “reward” when it wants 
to criminalize gratuities.  For example, in 18 U. S. C. §1912,
Congress imposed criminal penalties on any federal officer 
“engaged in inspection of vessels” who “receives any fee or 
reward  for  his  services,  except  what  is  allowed  to  him  by 
law.”  (Emphasis  added.)    And  in  22  U. S. C.  §4202,  Con-
gress  provided  for  the  sanctioning  of  “any  consular  of-
ficer . . . who  demands  or  receives  for  any  official  ser-
vices . . . any fee or reward other than the fee provided by
law  for  such  service.”  (Emphasis  added.)    Snyder  admits
that these statutes target gratuities by virtue of Congress’s 
use of the term “reward.”  Brief for Petitioner 31. 

But  rather  than  simply  calling  a  statute  that  penalizes
accepting  a  “reward”  for  public  business  what  it  is—a 
wrongful or illegal gratuities statute—the majority insists
that,  sometimes,  when  Congress  uses  “reward,”  it  is  still 
just  criminalizing  quid  pro  quo  bribery,  mustering  up  ex-
amples  to  show  that  “bribery  statutes  sometimes  use  the