Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/22pdf/21-857_4357.pdf
Page Number: 35

Cite as:  599 U. S. ____ (2023) 

3 

JACKSON, J., dissenting 

the contrary, the enactment history of §2255 plainly estab-
lishes  that  Congress  wanted  to  ensure  that  a  prisoner’s 
claim was “saved” in at least one additional set of circum-
stances: Where the prisoner would have been able to bring
such a claim prior to the enactment of §2255 (or any subse-
quent  changes,  like  those  made  by  the  Antiterrorism  and 
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA)), but some-
how cannot bring that claim after a change to the statutory 
framework  (unless  Congress  has  clearly  expressed  its  in-
tent  to  restrict  the  scope  of  relief  in  that  regard).    As  the 
majority has interpreted §2255(h), that is precisely the sit-
uation here. 

A 
To understand why Congress meant for Jones to be able 
to  invoke  the  saving  clause  and  bring  his  statutory  inno-
cence claim in a habeas petition filed under §2241, a firm
grasp  of  the  text,  history,  and  intended  operation  of 
§2255(e) is required. 

1 
The  saving  clause  is  the  latter  part  of  §2255(e),  which

states in full: 

“An application for a writ of habeas corpus [o]n be-
half of a prisoner who is authorized to apply for relief
by motion pursuant to this section, shall not be enter-
tained if it appears that the applicant has failed to ap-
ply for relief, by motion, to the court which sentenced 
him, or that such court has denied him relief, unless it 
also appears that the remedy  by motion is inadequate 
or  ineffective  to  test  the  legality  of  his  detention.” 
§2255(e)  (emphasis  added);  see  also  §2255  (1946  ed., 
Supp. II) (§2255 (1948)). 

Before §2255 was enacted in 1948, federal prisoners collat-
erally attacked their convictions by filing a habeas petition. 
See  United  States  v.  Hayman,  342  U. S.  205,  210–213