Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/22pdf/598us1r3_j4ek.pdf
Page Number: 22.0

Cite as:  598 U. S. 17 (2023) 

37 

Barrett, J., dissenting 

considered whether Miller v. Alabama, 567 U. S. 460 (2012), 
constituted  a  signifcant  change  in  law.  241  Ariz.,  at  208, 
386 P. 3d, at 394.  The court observed that pre-Miller, “Ari-
zona  law”  allowed  trial  courts  to  impose  life  sentences  on 
juveniles  “without  distinguishing  crimes  that  refected  `ir-
reparable  corruption'  rather  than  the  `transient  immaturity 
of  youth.' ”  Valencia,  241  Ariz.,  at  209,  386  P.  3d,  at  395. 
Miller, in holding that trial courts must weigh such consider-
ations  before  imposing  a  life  sentence  on  juveniles,  changed 
Eighth  Amendment  doctrine  and  therefore  changed  the  law 
in  Arizona.  241  Ariz.,  at  209,  386  P.  3d,  at  395;  see  also 
Montgomery  v.  Louisiana,  577  U. S.  190,  208,  212  (2016). 
Lynch, by contrast, did not change the content of federal law 
and therefore did not change the law in Arizona. 

If  the  Arizona  Supreme  Court's  distinction  between  a 
change  in  law  and  a  change  in  the  application  of  law  seems 
familiar,  it  should—federal  habeas  law  draws  the  same  line. 
Take  everything about  this  case and  transplant  it to  federal 
court:  A  federal  defendant  is  wrongfully  denied  a  Simmons 
instruction,  the  Court  of  Appeals's  understanding  of  Sim-
mons is later summarily reversed in Lynch, and the defend-
ant (now a prisoner) then tries to obtain the beneft of Lynch 
through  a  successive  or  delayed  motion  for  postconviction 
relief.*  In this scenario, the federal prisoner faces the same 
dilemma that  Cruz faces  in Arizona.  Pre-Lynch,  the Court 
of  Appeals  was  unreceptive  to  the  Simmons  claim.  Post-
Lynch, the prisoner's claim is procedurally barred: Lynch is 
not  “a  new  rule  of  constitutional  law”  or  a  “newly  recog-
nized” right because it merely applies an old rule, Simmons. 
28 U. S. C. §§ 2255(f)(3), (h)(2).  If federal law limits a prison-
er's  Simmons  claim  to  an  initial,  timely  motion,  we  should 
not  be  surprised  that  Arizona  has  made  a  similar  choice. 

*This hypothetical is inapposite to Cruz's pending federal habeas action, 
which appears to be a timely, initial federal fling.  See Cruz v. Ryan, 2018 
WL 1524026, *3 (D Ariz., Mar. 28, 2018), appeal docketed sub nom.  Cruz 
v. Credio, No. 21–99005 (CA9, Apr. 22, 2021). 

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