Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/558bv.pdf
Page Number: 624

Cite as: 558 U. S. 310 (2010) 

463 

Opinion of Stevens, J. 

empirical  case  for  skepticism,  as  the  Court’s  failure  to  cite 
any empirical research attests.  Nor does the legislative his­
tory  give  reason  for  concern.  Congress  devoted  years  of 
careful study to the issues underlying BCRA; “[f]ew legisla­
tive  proposals  in  recent  years  have  received  as  much  sus­
tained public commentary or news coverage”; “[p]olitical sci­
entists  and  academic  experts  .  .  .  with  no  self-interest  in 
incumbent  protectio[n]  were  central  ﬁgures  in  pressing  the 
case  for  BCRA”;  and  the  legislation  commanded  bipartisan 
support  from  the  outset.  Pildes,  The  Supreme  Court  2003 
Term  Foreword:  The  Constitutionalization  of  Democratic 
Politics,  118  Harv.  L.  Rev.  28,  137  (2004).  Finally,  it  is  im­
portant  to  remember  just  how  incumbent-friendly  congres­
sional races were prior to BCRA’s passage.  As the Solicitor 
General aptly  remarked at the  time, “the  evidence supports 
overwhelmingly that incumbents were able to get re-elected 
under the old system just ﬁne.”  Tr. of Oral Arg. in McCon­
nell  v.  FEC,  O.  T.  2003,  No.  02–1674,  p.  61.  “It  would  be 
hard  to  develop  a  scheme  that  could  be  better  for  incum­
bents.”  Id., at 63. 

In  this  case,  then,  “there  is  no  convincing  evidence  that 
th[e]  important  interests  favoring  expenditure  limits  are 
fronts  for  incumbency  protection.”  Randall,  548  U. S.,  at 
279  (Stevens,  J.,  dissenting).  “In  the  meantime,  a  legisla­
tive  judgment  that  ‘enough  is  enough’  should  command  the 
greatest  possible  deference  from  judges  interpreting  a  con­
stitutional  provision  that,  at  best,  has  an  indirect  relation­
ship  to  activity  that  affects  the  quantity . . . of  repetitive 
speech  in  the  marketplace  of  ideas.”  Id.,  at  279–280.  The 
majority cavalierly ignores Congress’ factual ﬁndings and its 
constitutional judgment:  It acknowledges the  validity of the 
interest in preventing corruption, but it effectively discounts 
the  value  of  that  interest  to  zero.  This  is  quite  different 
from  conscientious  policing  for  impermissibly  anticompeti­
tive motive or effect in a sensitive First Amendment context.