Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/17pdf/17-130_4f14.pdf
Page Number: 16

Cite as:  585 U. S. ____ (2018) 

13 

Opinion of the Court 

another ALJ (or the Commission itself) must hold the new 
hearing to which Lucia is entitled.6 

We  accordingly  reverse  the  judgment  of  the  Court  of 
Appeals  and  remand  the  case  for  further  proceedings
consistent with this opinion. 

It is so ordered. 

—————— 

Appointments  Clause  violation.    As  JUSTICE  BREYER  suggests,  we  can
give  that  remedy  here  because  other  ALJs  (and  the  Commission)  are 
available  to  hear  this  case  on  remand.    See  ibid.    If  instead  the  Ap-
pointments Clause problem is with the Commission itself, so that there
is no substitute decisionmaker, the rule of necessity would presumably
kick  in  and  allow  the  Commission  to  do  the  rehearing.    See  FTC  v. 
Cement  Institute,  333  U. S.  683,  700–703  (1948);  3  K.  Davis,  Adminis-
trative Law Treatise §19.9 (2d ed. 1980). 

6 While  this  case  was  on  judicial  review,  the  SEC  issued  an  order 
“ratif[ying]” the prior appointments of its ALJs.  Order (Nov. 30, 2017),
online  at  https://www.sec.gov/litigation/opinions/2017/33-10440.pdf  (as 
last visited June 18, 2018).  Lucia argues that the order is invalid.  See 
Brief  for  Petitioners  50–56.    We  see  no  reason  to  address  that  issue. 
The  Commission  has  not  suggested  that  it  intends  to  assign  Lucia’s
case on remand to an ALJ whose claim to authority rests on the ratifi-
cation  order.  The  SEC  may  decide  to  conduct  Lucia’s rehearing  itself.
Or  it  may  assign  the  hearing  to  an  ALJ  who  has  received  a  constitu-
tional appointment independent of the ratification.