Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/22pdf/22-506_nmip.pdf
Page Number: 30

Cite as:  600 U. S. ____ (2023) 

25 

Opinion of the Court 

program  “are  ones  that  Congress  would  likely  have  in-
tended for itself.”  West Virginia, 597 U. S., at ___ (slip op., 
at 26).  In such circumstances, we have required the Secre-
tary to “point to ‘clear congressional authorization’ ” to jus-
tify the challenged program.  Id., at ___, ___ (slip op., at 19, 
28) (quoting Utility Air, 573 U. S., at 324).  And as we have 
already shown, the HEROES Act provides no authorization 
for the Secretary’s plan even when examined using the or-
dinary  tools  of  statutory  interpretation—let  alone  “clear 
congressional authorization” for such a program.9 

* 

* 

* 
It has become a disturbing feature of some recent opin-
ions to criticize the decisions with which they disagree as 
going  beyond  the  proper  role  of  the  judiciary.    Today,  we 
have  concluded  that  an  instrumentality  created  by  Mis-
souri, governed by Missouri, and answerable to Missouri is
indeed part of Missouri; that the words “waive or modify”
do not mean “completely rewrite”; and that our precedent—
old and new—requires that Congress speak clearly before a 
Department Secretary can unilaterally alter large sections
of  the  American  economy.    We  have  employed  the  tradi-
tional tools of judicial decisionmaking in doing so.  Reason-
able minds may disagree with our analysis—in fact, at least 
three do.  See post, p. ___ (KAGAN, J., dissenting).  We do 

—————— 

9 The dissent complains that our application of the major questions doc-
trine is a “tell” revealing that “ ‘normal’ statutory interpretation cannot 
sustain [our] decision.”  Post, at 23, 30.  Not so.  As we have explained, 
the statutory text alone precludes the Secretary’s program.  Today’s opin-
ion  simply  reflects  this  Court’s  familiar  practice  of  providing  multiple
grounds to support its conclusions.  See, e.g., Kucana v. Holder, 558 U. S. 
233, 243–252 (2010) (interpreting the text of a federal immigration stat-
ute in the first instance, then citing the “presumption favoring judicial
review of administrative action” as an additional sufficient basis for the 
Court’s decision).  The fact that multiple grounds support a result is usu-
ally regarded as a strength, not a weakness.