Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/21pdf/21-147_g31h.pdf
Page Number: 24.0

Cite as:  596 U. S. ____ (2022) 

3 

GORSUCH, J., concurring in judgment 

matter less in this context because of “likely” national-secu-
rity  risks.  Ante,  at  11–12.  So  once  more,  we  tote  up  for 
ourselves the costs and benefits of a private right of action 
in this or that setting and reach a legislative judgment.  To 
atone  for  Bivens,  it  seems  we  continue  repeating  its  most 
basic mistake. 

Of course, the Court’s real messages run deeper than its
case-specific analysis.  If the costs and benefits do not jus-
tify a new Bivens action on facts so analogous to Bivens it-
self, it’s hard to see how they ever could.  And if the only 
question is whether a court is “better equipped” than Con-
gress to weigh the value of a new cause of action, surely the
right  answer  will  always  be  no.    Doubtless,  these  are  the 
lessons  the  Court  seeks  to  convey.    I  would  only  take  the 
next step and acknowledge explicitly what the Court leaves
barely implicit.  Sometimes, it seems, “this Court leaves a 
door ajar and holds out the possibility that someone, some-
day  might  walk  through  it”  even  as  it  devises  a  rule  that
ensures  “no  one  . . .  ever  will.”  Edwards  v.  Vannoy,  593 
U. S.  ___,  ___  (2021)  (GORSUCH,  J.,  concurring)  (slip  op., 
at 1).  In fairness to future litigants and our lower court col-
leagues, we should not hold out that kind of false hope, and 
in  the  process  invite  still  more  “protracted  litigation  des-
tined to yield nothing.”  Nestlé, 593 U. S., at ___ (GORSUCH, 
J., concurring) (slip op., at 7).  Instead, we should exercise 
“the truer modesty of ceding an ill-gotten gain,” ibid., and 
forthrightly return the power to create new causes of action 
to the people’s representatives in Congress.