Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/18pdf/17-1026_2c83.pdf
Page Number: 23.0

6 

GARZA v. IDAHO 

THOMAS, J., dissenting 

faulted  the  Ninth  Circuit  for  “fail[ing]  to  engage  in  the
circumstance-specific  reasonableness  inquiry  required  by 
Strickland.”    528  U. S.,  at  478.    We  concluded  that  this 
failure “alone mandates vacatur and remand.”  Ibid. 

We  further  explained  that  counsel’s  failure  to  consult 
with  the  client  about  an  appeal  constitutes  deficient  per-
formance only when counsel should have consulted.  Id., at 
479.  The Court was clear: “We cannot say, as a constitu-
tional  matter,  that  in  every  case  counsel’s  failure  to  con-
sult  with  the  defendant  about  an  appeal  is  necessarily
unreasonable.”  Ibid.  In determining whether counsel has
a duty to consult, we stated that “a highly relevant factor 
in  this  inquiry  will  be  whether  the  conviction  follows  a 
trial or guilty plea, both because a guilty plea reduces the
scope  of  potentially  appealable issues  and  because  such  a 
plea  may  indicate  that  the  defendant  seeks  an  end  to
judicial proceedings.”  Id., at 480.  Finally, “[e]ven in cases
when the defendant pleads guilty, the court must consider
such  factors  as  whether  the  defendant  received  the  sen-
tence  bargained  for  as  part  of  the  plea  and  whether  the 
plea  expressly  reserved  or  waived  some  or  all  appeal 
rights.”  Ibid.  We rejected the argument that choosing not 
to  consult  was  outside  the  scope  of  valid,  strategic  deci-
sionmaking,  as  “we  have  consistently  declined  to  impose
mechanical  rules  on  counsel.”  Id.,  at  481.   In  sum,  we 
“reject[ed]  a  bright-line  rule  that  counsel  must  always
consult  with  the  defendant  regarding  an  appeal”  and 
instructed  courts  to  evaluate  whether  the  decision  to 
consult was “reasonable” under the circumstances.  Id., at 
480–481. 

We  also  rejected  the  Ninth  Circuit’s  “per se  prejudice
rule”  because  it  “ignore[d]  the  critical  requirement  that
counsel’s  deficient  performance  must  actually  cause  the
forfeiture of the defendant’s appeal.”  Id., at 484.  We held 
that, “to show prejudice in these circumstances, a defend-
ant must demonstrate that there is a reasonable probabil-