Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/05pdf/04-1084.pdf
Page Number: 12

Cite as:  546 U. S. ____ (2006) 

7 

Opinion of the Court 

on  the  merits.  See,  e.g.,  Mazurek  v.  Armstrong,  520  U. S. 
968, 972 (1997) (per curiam); Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 
U. S.  922,  931  (1975).  The  Government  argues  that  the
District  Court  lost  sight  of  this  principle  in  issuing  the 
injunction based on a mere tie in the evidentiary record.

A majority of the en banc Court of Appeals rejected this 
argument,  and  so  do  we.    Before  the  District  Court,  the 
Government  conceded  the  UDV’s  prima  facie  case  under 
RFRA.  See  282  F. Supp.  2d,  at  1252  (application  of  the 
Controlled Substances Act would (1) substantially burden 
(2)  a  sincere  (3)  religious  exercise).    The  evidence  the 
District  Court  found  to  be  in  equipoise  related  to  two  of 
the  compelling  interests  asserted  by  the  Government, 
which  formed  part  of  the  Government’s  affirmative  de-
fense.  See  42  U.  S.  C.  §2000bb–1(b)  (“Government  may
substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion only if 
it  demonstrates  that  application  of  the  burden  to  the  per-
son—(1)  is  in  furtherance  of  a  compelling  government 
interest . . .” (emphasis added)); §2000bb–2(3) (“[T]he term 
‘demonstrates’ means meets the burdens of going forward 
with  the  evidence  and  of  persuasion”).  Accordingly,  the 
UDV  effectively  demonstrated  that  its  sincere  exercise  of 
religion was substantially burdened, and the Government 
failed to demonstrate that the application of the burden to
the  UDV  would,  more  likely  than  not,  be  justified  by  the 
asserted  compelling  interests.    See  389  F. 3d,  at  1009 
(Seymour,  J.,  concurring  in  part  and  dissenting  in  part) 
(“[T]he balance is between actual irreparable harm to [the]
plaintiff  and  potential  harm  to  the  government  which 
does  not  even  rise  to  the  level  of  a  preponderance  of  the 
evidence”).

The  Government  argues  that,  although  it  would  bear 
the burden of demonstrating a compelling interest as part 
of  its  affirmative  defense  at  trial  on  the  merits,  the  UDV 
should  have  borne  the  burden  of  disproving  the  asserted 
compelling  interests  at  the  hearing  on  the  preliminary