Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/529bv.pdf
Page Number: 413.0

529US2

Unit: $U44

[09-26-01 10:00:50] PAGES PGT: OPIN

338

BOND v. UNITED STATES

Opinion of the Court

about their carry-on luggage; they generally use it to trans-
port personal items that, for whatever reason, they prefer to
keep close at hand.

Here, petitioner concedes that, by placing his bag in the
overhead compartment, he could expect that it would be ex-
posed to certain kinds of touching and handling. But peti-
tioner argues that Agent Cantu’s physical manipulation of
his luggage “far exceeded the casual contact [petitioner]
could have expected from other passengers.” Brief for Pe-
titioner 18–19. The Government counters that it did not.

Our Fourth Amendment analysis embraces two questions.
First, we ask whether the individual, by his conduct, has
exhibited an actual expectation of privacy; that is, whether
he has shown that “he [sought] to preserve [something] as
private.” Smith v. Maryland, 442 U. S. 735, 740 (1979) (in-
ternal quotation marks omitted). Here, petitioner sought to
preserve privacy by using an opaque bag and placing that
bag directly above his seat. Second, we inquire whether the
individual’s expectation of privacy is “one that society is pre-
pared to recognize as reasonable.”
Ibid. (internal quotation
marks omitted).2 When a bus passenger places a bag in an
overhead bin, he expects that other passengers or bus em-
ployees may move it for one reason or another. Thus, a bus
passenger clearly expects that his bag may be handled. He
does not expect that other passengers or bus employees will,

2 The parties properly agree that the subjective intent of the law en-
forcement ofﬁcer is irrelevant in determining whether that ofﬁcer’s actions
violate the Fourth Amendment. Brief for Petitioner 14; Brief for United
States 33–34; see Whren v. United States, 517 U. S. 806, 813 (1996) (stating
that “we have been unwilling to entertain Fourth Amendment challenges
based on the actual motivations of individual ofﬁcers”); California v. Cira-
olo, 476 U. S. 207, 212 (1986) (rejecting respondent’s challenge to “the au-
thority of government to observe his activity from any vantage point or
place if the viewing is motivated by a law enforcement purpose, and not
the result of a casual, accidental observation”). This principle applies to
the agent’s acts in this case as well; the issue is not his state of mind, but
the objective effect of his actions.