Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/19pdf/17-1618_hfci.pdf
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BOSTOCK v. CLAYTON COUNTY 

Syllabus 

that an employer could refuse to hire a gay or transgender individual
without learning that person’s sex.  By intentionally setting out a rule 
that makes hiring turn on sex, the employer violates the law, whatever 
he might know or not know about individual applicants.  The employ-
ers also stress that homosexuality and transgender status are distinct
concepts from sex, and that if Congress wanted to address these mat-
ters in Title VII, it would have referenced them specifically.  But when 
Congress  chooses  not  to  include  any  exceptions  to  a  broad  rule,  this 
Court applies the broad rule.  Finally, the employers suggest that be-
cause  the  policies  at  issue  have  the  same  adverse  consequences  for 
men  and  women,  a  stricter  causation  test  should  apply.    That  argu-
ment  unavoidably  comes  down  to  a  suggestion  that  sex  must  be  the 
sole or primary cause of an adverse employment action under Title VII,
a suggestion at odds with the statute.  Pp. 16–23.

(2) The employers contend that few in 1964 would have expected
Title  VII  to  apply  to  discrimination  against  homosexual  and 
transgender  persons.   But  legislative  history  has  no  bearing  here, 
where  no  ambiguity  exists  about  how  Title  VII’s  terms  apply  to  the 
facts.  See Milner v. Department of Navy, 562 U. S. 562, 574.  While it 
is possible that a statutory term that means one thing today or in one 
context might have meant something else at the time of its adoption
or might mean something different in another context, the employers
do not seek to use historical sources to illustrate that the meaning of 
any of Title VII’s language has changed since 1964 or that the statute’s
terms ordinarily carried some missed message.  Instead, they seem to
say when a new application is both unexpected and important, even if 
it is clearly commanded by existing law, the Court should merely point 
out the question, refer the subject back to Congress, and decline to en-
force the law’s plain terms in the meantime.  This Court has long re-
jected  that  sort  of  reasoning.    And  the  employers’  new  framing  may
only add new problems and leave the Court with more than a little law 
to overturn.  Finally, the employers turn to naked policy appeals, sug-
gesting that the Court proceed without the law’s guidance to do what
it thinks best.  That is an invitation that no court should ever take up. 
Pp. 23–33. 

No. 17–1618, 723 Fed. Appx. 964, reversed and remanded; No. 17–1623,

883 F. 3d 100, and No. 18–107, 884 F. 3d 560, affirmed. 

GORSUCH, J., delivered  the  opinion  of  the  Court,  in  which  ROBERTS, 
C. J., and GINSBURG, BREYER, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ., joined.  ALITO, 
J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which THOMAS, J., joined.  KAVANAUGH, 
J., filed a dissenting opinion.