Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/14pdf/14-556_3204.pdf
Page Number: 2.0

2 

OBERGEFELL v. HODGES 

Syllabus 

titioners’ own experiences.  Pp. 3–6.

(2) The history of marriage is one of both continuity and change. 
Changes,  such  as  the  decline  of  arranged  marriages  and  the  aban-
donment  of  the  law  of  coverture,  have  worked  deep  transformations 
in  the  structure  of  marriage,  affecting  aspects  of  marriage  once 
viewed  as  essential.  These  new  insights  have  strengthened,  not 
weakened, the institution.  Changed understandings of marriage are 
characteristic  of  a  Nation  where  new  dimensions  of  freedom  become 
apparent to new generations.

This dynamic can be seen in the Nation’s experience with gay and 
lesbian  rights.    Well  into  the  20th  century,  many  States  condemned 
same-sex intimacy as immoral, and homosexuality was treated as an
illness.  Later in the century, cultural and political developments al-
lowed same-sex couples to lead more open and public lives.  Extensive 
public and private dialogue followed, along with shifts in public atti-
tudes.  Questions about the legal treatment of gays and lesbians soon
reached the courts, where they could be discussed in the formal dis-
course of the law.  In 2003, this Court overruled its 1986 decision in 
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U. S. 186, which upheld a Georgia law that
criminalized certain homosexual acts, concluding laws making same-
sex  intimacy  a  crime  “demea[n]  the  lives  of  homosexual  persons.” 
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U. S. 558, 575.  In 2012, the federal Defense 
of Marriage Act was also struck down.  United States v. Windsor, 570 
U. S.  ___.  Numerous  same-sex  marriage  cases  reaching  the  federal
courts and state supreme courts have added to the dialogue.  Pp. 6– 
10. 

(b) The  Fourteenth  Amendment  requires  a  State  to  license  a  mar-

riage between two people of the same sex.  Pp. 10–27. 

(1) The  fundamental  liberties  protected  by  the  Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause extend to certain personal choices 
central to individual dignity and autonomy, including intimate choic-
es  defining  personal  identity  and  beliefs.    See,  e.g.,  Eisenstadt  v. 
Baird,  405  U. S.  438,  453;  Griswold  v.  Connecticut,  381  U. S.  479, 
484–486.  Courts must exercise reasoned judgment in identifying in-
terests of the person so fundamental that the State must accord them
its  respect.  History  and  tradition  guide  and  discipline  the  inquiry
but  do  not  set  its  outer  boundaries.    When  new  insight  reveals  dis-
cord between the Constitution’s central protections and a received le-
gal stricture, a claim to liberty must be addressed.

Applying these tenets, the Court has long held the right to marry is 
protected by the Constitution.  For example, Loving v. Virginia, 388 
U. S.  1,  12,  invalidated  bans  on  interracial  unions,  and  Turner  v. 
Safley,  482  U. S.  78,  95,  held  that  prisoners  could  not  be  denied  the
right  to  marry.    To  be  sure,  these  cases  presumed  a  relationship  in-