Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/22pdf/598us1r3_j4ek.pdf
Page Number: 20

Cite as:  598 U. S. 17 (2023) 

35 

Barrett, J., dissenting 

nifcantly  changed  Arizona  law.  E. g.,  State  v.  Shrum,  220 
Ariz. 115, 119–120, 203 P. 3d 1175, 1179–1180 (2009); State v. 
Slemmer, 170  Ariz. 174, 179,  182, 823 P.  2d 41, 46,  49 (1991); 
State v. Rendon, 161 Ariz. 102, 104, 776 P. 2d 353, 355 (1989). 
Cruz's case, however, raised a question of frst impression: 
whether  a  “signifcant  change”  occurs  when  an  intervening 
decision reaffrms existing law, but rectifes an erroneous ap-
plication  of  that  law.  That  was  the  effect  of  Lynch  v.  Ari-
zona, 578 U. S. 613 (2016) (per curiam), which corrected the 
Arizona  Supreme  Court's  application  of  Simmons  v.  South 
Carolina,  512  U. S.  154  (1994),  and  its  progeny.  An  inter-
vening  decision  like  Lynch,  which  undisputedly  did  not 
change  any  legal  doctrine,  has  no  analog  in  Arizona's  Rule 
32.1(g) jurisprudence.  See ante, at 24 (Lynch “reaffrm[ed] 
that  Simmons  applies  in  Arizona”  (emphasis  added)).  So 
the Arizona Supreme Court devised a rule: “Rule 32.1(g) re-
quires  a  signifcant  change  in  the  law,  whether  state  or  fed-
eral—not a signifcant change in the application of the law.” 
251 Ariz. 203, 207, 487 P. 3d 991, 995 (2021).  By that stand-
ard,  Lynch  did  not  satisfy  Rule  32.1(g).  251  Ariz.,  at  207, 
487 P. 3d, at 995. 

The Court criticizes the “novelty” of the Arizona Supreme 
Court's  law  versus  application-of-law  distinction,  as  it  does 
not appear in any other Arizona precedent.  Ante, at 27–28. 
A  point  that  deserves  emphasis  at  the  outset:  Novelty  does 
not  mean  that  a  rule  is  inadequate  merely  because  a  state 
court  announced  it  for  the  frst  time  in  the  decision  under 
review, and I do not understand the Court to suggest other-
wise.  Legal systems based on precedent depend on cases to 
present novel fact patterns, which enable courts to articulate 
new principles of law or to clarify old ones with greater pre-
cision.  Beard  v.  Kindler,  558  U. S.  53,  65  (2009)  (Kennedy, 
J.,  concurring).  We  do  a  disservice  to  that  mode  of  legal 
development  when  we  “disregard a  state  procedural  ground 
that  was  not  in  all  respects  explicit  before  the  case  when  it 
was frst announced”—unless, of course, the decision demon-

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