Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/13pdf/12-536_e1pf.pdf
Page Number: 54.0

Cite as:  572 U. S. ____ (2014) 

3 

BREYER, J., dissenting 

dates  and  political  committees,  aggregate  limits  do  not 
further any independent governmental objective worthy of
protection.  And  that  is  because,  given  the  base  limits,
“[s]pending  large  sums  of  money  in  connection  with  elec­
tions”  does  not  “give  rise  to  .  .  .  corruption.”    Ante,  at  19. 
In making this argument, the plurality relies heavily upon 
a  narrow  definition  of  “corruption”  that  excludes  efforts
to  obtain  “ ‘influence  over  or  access  to’  elected  officials  or 
political parties. ”  Ibid. (quoting Citizens United, supra, at 
359); accord, ante, at 18–20, 22–29. 

Second,  the  plurality  assesses  the  instrumental  objec­
tive of the aggregate limits, namely, safeguarding the base
limits.  It finds that they “do not serve that function in any
meaningful  way.”  Ante,  at  22.    That  is  because,  even 
without  the  aggregate  limits,  the  possibilities  for  circum­
venting  the  base  limits  are  “implausible”  and  “divorced 
from reality.”  Ante, at 23, 24, 28. 

Third,  the  plurality  says  the  aggregate  limits  are  not  a
“ ‘reasonable’ ” policy tool.  Rather, they are “poorly tailored
to the Government’s interest in preventing circumvention
of the base limits.”  Ante, at 30 (quoting Board of Trustees 
of  State  Univ.  of  N.  Y.  v.  Fox,  492  U. S.  469,  480  (1989)). 
The  plurality  imagines  several  alternative  regulations
that it says might just as effectively thwart circumvention. 
Accordingly,  it  finds,  the  aggregate  caps  are  out  of  “ ‘pro­
portion  to  the  [anticorruption]  interest  served.’ ”    Ante,  at 
30 (quoting Fox, supra, at 480). 

II 
The  plurality’s  first  claim—that  large  aggregate  contri­
butions do not “give rise” to “corruption”—is plausible only 
because  the  plurality  defines  “corruption”  too  narrowly. 
The  plurality  describes  the  constitutionally  permissible 
objective  of  campaign  finance  regulation  as  follows:  “Con­
gress  may  target  only  a  specific  type  of  corruption—‘quid 
pro quo’ corruption.”  Ante, at 19.  It then defines quid pro