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Page Number: 27

14 

THOLE v. U. S. BANK N. A. 

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting 

distinguish the different rights on which pension-plan ben-
eficiaries may sue.  They have a right not just to their pen-
sion benefits, but also to loyal and prudent fiduciaries.  See 
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U. S. 490, 500 (1975) (the standing in-
quiry  “turns  on  the  nature  and  source  of  the  claim  as-
serted”).  Petitioners seek relief tailored to the second cate-
gory,  including  restitution,  disgorgement,  and  injunctive 
remedies.  Cf. Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knud-
son, 534 U. S. 204, 215–216 (2002) (explaining the various 
historical bases for ERISA’s remedies).  The Court does not 
even try to explain ERISA’s (or the Plan Document’s) text 
imposing fiduciary duties, let alone this Court’s decision in 
Harris  Trust  supporting  petitioners’  standing.    And  even 
though the Court briefly mentions that petitioners seek “in-
junctive relief, including replacement of the plan’s fiduciar-
ies,” ante, at 2, it offers no analysis on that issue.  Put dif-
ferently,  the  Court  denies  petitioners  standing  to  sue 
without analyzing all their claims to relief. 

With its focus on fiscal harm, the Court seems to suggest 
that pecuniary injury is the sine qua non of standing.  The 
Court  emphasizes  that  petitioners  themselves  have  not 
“sustained  any  monetary  injury”  apart  from  their  trust 
fund’s losses.  Ante, at 2; see also ante, at 4. 

But  injury  to  a  plaintiff ’s  wallet  is  not,  and  has  never 
been, a prerequisite for standing.  The Constitution permits 
federal  courts  to  hear  disputes  over  nonfinancial  injuries 
like the harms alleged here.  Spokeo, 578 U. S., at ___ (slip 
op., at 9); see also, e.g., id., at ___–___ (THOMAS, J., concur-
ring)  (slip  op.,  at  2–3);  Tennessee  Elec.  Power  Co.  v.  TVA, 
306 U. S. 118, 137–138 (1939).6  In Heckler v. Mathews, 465 

—————— 

6 This  Court  has  found  standing  in  myriad  cases  involving  noneco-
nomic injuries.  Examples include the denial or threatened impairment 
of: equal treatment, Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515 U. S. 200, 
211  (1995);  Northeastern  Fla.  Chapter,  Associated  Gen.  Contractors  of 
America v. Jacksonville, 508 U. S. 656, 666 (1993); “truthful information