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303 CREATIVE LLC v. ELENIS 

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting 

public in general.”  H. R. Rep. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess.,
pt. 2, p. 9 (1963); see also S. Rep. No. 872, at 92.

Having failed to persuade Congress, opponents of Title II 
turned to the federal courts.  In Heart of Atlanta Motel, one 
of several arguments made by the plaintiff motel owner was
that  Title  II  violated  his  Fifth  Amendment  due  process
rights by “tak[ing] away the personal liberty of an individ-
ual  to  run  his  business  as  he  sees  fit  with  respect  to  the 
selection and service of his customers.”  Brief for Appellant, 
O. T. 1964, No. 515, p. 32.  This Court disagreed, based on
“a long line of cases” holding that “prohibition of racial dis-
crimination in public accommodations” did not “interfer[e]
with personal liberty.”  379 U. S., at 260. 

In  Katzenbach  v.  McClung,  379  U. S.  294  (1964),  the
owner of Ollie’s Barbecue (Ollie McClung) likewise argued
that Title II’s application to his business violated the “per-
sonal  rights  of  persons  in  their  personal  convictions”  to
deny  services  to  Black  people.    Brief  for  Appellees,  O. T. 
1964, No. 543, p. 33 (citing, inter alia, West Virginia Bd. of 
Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 624 (1943)).  Note that McClung 
did not refuse to transact with Black people.  Oh, no.  He 
was  willing  to  offer  them  take-out  service  at  a  separate 
counter.  See Brief for NAACP Legal Defense and Educa-
tional  Fund,  Inc.,  as  Amicus  Curiae  in  Katzenbach  v. 
McClung, p. 4, n. 5.  Only integrated table service, you see, 
violated McClung’s core beliefs.  So he claimed a constitu-
tional right to offer Black people a limited menu of his ser-
vices.  This Court rejected that claim, citing its decision in 
Heart of Atlanta Motel.  See 379 U. S., at 298, n. 1. 

Next  is  Newman  v.  Piggie  Park  Enterprises,  Inc.,  390 
U. S. 400 (1968) (per curiam), in which the owner of a chain
of  drive-in  establishments  asserted  that  requiring  him  to 
“contribut[e]” to racial integration in any way violated the 
First Amendment by interfering with his religious liberty.
App. to Pet. for Cert., O. T. 1967, No. 339, p. 21a.  Title II 
could not be applied to his business, he argued, because that