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Page Number: 36

4 

PENNEAST PIPELINE CO. v. NEW JERSEY 

BARRETT, J., dissenting 

immunity  from  the  federal  government’s  eminent-domain
power in the plan of the convention” implies that eminent
domain occupies a unique place in the constitutional struc-
ture.  Brief for Petitioner 23; accord, ante, at 14–16 (opinion 
of the Court).  But as just explained, a taking is a garden-
variety exercise of an enumerated power like the Commerce 
Clause.  The Federal Government can exercise that power 
to take state land.  Oklahoma ex rel. Phillips v. Guy F. At-
kinson Co., 313 U. S. 508, 534 (1941).  And it can take that 
land  via  a  condemnation  action  against  a  nonconsenting
State  not  because  eminent  domain  is  special,  but  for  the
same reason it can sue a nonconsenting State in any other 
proceeding: “States have no sovereign immunity as against
the Federal Government.”  West Virginia v. United States, 
479 U. S. 305, 311 (1987) (citing United States v. Texas, 143 
U. S. 621, 646 (1892)).  The special structural principles the 
Court conjures are illusory. 

So  while  the  Court  casts  the  inquiry  as  one  about  the
scope  of  the  States’  consent  to  the  Federal  Government’s
“eminent-domain  power,”  that  is  the  wrong  way  to  think 
about the problem.  Here is the right way: Title 15 U. S. C.
§717f(h) is an exercise of Congress’ power to regulate inter-
state  commerce.  Congress  cannot  authorize  private  suits 
against  a  nonconsenting  State  pursuant  to  its  Commerce
Clause  power.  Seminole  Tribe,  517  U. S.,  at  72–73.    Nor 
does the Commerce Clause itself abrogate state sovereign 
immunity.  Cf. Allen, 589 U. S., at ___–___ (slip op., at 8–9). 
Therefore,  Congress  cannot  enable  a  private  party  like  Penn-
East to institute a condemnation action against a noncon-
senting State like New Jersey. 

B 
The  Court’s  proposed  escape  route  from  this  analysis—
that  the  States  relinquished  their  immunity  from  private
condemnation  suits  in  the  plan  of  the  Convention—is  a 
dead end.  There is no “Eminent Domain Clause” on which