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Page Number: 36

28 

LOPER BRIGHT ENTERPRISES v. RAIMONDO 

Opinion of the Court 

West  Virginia  v.  EPA,  597  U. S.  697,  723  (2022)  (quoting 
Whitman v. American Trucking Assns., Inc., 531 U. S. 457, 
468  (2001);  alteration  in  original).  Nor  have  we  applied 
Chevron to agency interpretations of judicial review provi-
sions, see Adams Fruit Co., 494 U. S., at 649–650, or to stat-
utory schemes not administered by the agency seeking def-
erence, see Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis, 584 U. S. 497, 519– 
520  (2018).   And  we  have  sent  mixed  signals  on  whether 
Chevron applies when a statute has criminal applications. 
Compare  Abramski  v.  United  States,  573  U. S.  169,  191 
(2014), with Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter, Communities 
for Great Ore., 515 U. S. 687, 704, n. 18 (1995). 

Confronted with this byzantine set of preconditions and 
exceptions,  some  courts  have  simply  bypassed  Chevron, 
saying  it  makes  no  difference  for  one  reason  or  another.7 
And even when they do invoke  Chevron, courts do not al-
ways heed the various steps and nuances of that evolving 
doctrine.  In one of the cases before us today, for example, 
the First Circuit both skipped “step zero,” see 62 F. 4th, at
628, and refused to “classify [its] conclusion as a product of 
Chevron  step  one  or  step  two”—though  it  ultimately  ap-
pears to have deferred under step two, id., at 634. 

—————— 

7 See, e.g., Guedes v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explo-
sives, 45 F. 4th 306, 313–314 (CADC 2022), abrogated by Garland v. Car-
gill,  602  U. S.  ___  (2024);  County  of  Amador  v.  United  States  Dept.  of 
Interior,  872  F. 3d  1012,  1021–1022  (CA9  2017);  Estrada-Rodriguez  v. 
Lynch,  825  F. 3d  397,  403–404  (CA8  2016);  Nielsen  v.  AECOM  Tech. 
Corp.,  762  F. 3d  214,  220  (CA2  2014);  Alaska  Stock,  LLC  v.  Houghton 
Mifflin Harcourt Publishing Co., 747 F. 3d 673, 685, n. 52 (CA9 2014); 
Jurado-Delgado v. Attorney Gen. of U. S., 498 Fed. Appx. 107, 117 (CA3
2009);  see  also  D.  Brookins,  Confusion  in  the  Circuit  Courts:  How  the
Circuit Courts Are Solving the Mead-Puzzle by Avoiding It Altogether, 
85  Geo.  Wash.  L. Rev.  1484,  1496–1499  (2017)  (documenting  Chevron 
avoidance by the lower courts); A. Vermeule, Our Schmittian Adminis-
trative Law, 122 Harv. L. Rev. 1095, 1127–1129 (2009) (same); L. Bress-
man,  How  Mead  Has  Muddled  Judicial  Review  of  Agency  Action,  58
Vand. L. Rev. 1443, 1464–1466 (2005) (same).