Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/13pdf/13a1284_ap6c.pdf
Page Number: 10

10 

WHEATON COLLEGE v. BURWELL 

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting 

tion  process  “substantially  burden[s]  [its]  exercise  of  reli-
gion.”  §2000bb–1(a).  “Congress no doubt meant the modi-
fier  ‘substantially’  to  carry  weight.”    Hobby  Lobby,  573 
U. S.,  at  ___  (GINSBURG,  J.,  dissenting)  (slip  op.,  at  20).
Wheaton,  for  religious  reasons,  categorically  opposes  the
provision  of  contraceptive  services.    The  Government  has 
given  it  a  simple  means  to  opt  out  of  the  contraceptive 
coverage  mandate—and  thus  avoid  any  civil  penalties  for 
failing  to  provide  contraceptive  services—and  a  simple
means  to  tell  its  third-party  administrator  of  its  claimed 
exemption.

Yet Wheaton maintains that taking these steps to avail
itself of the accommodation would substantially burden its
religious  exercise.  Wheaton  is  “religiously  opposed  to
emergency contraceptives because they may act by killing 
a  human  embryo.”    Emergency  Application  for  Injunction
Pending  Appellate  Review  11.  And  it  “believes  that  au-
thorizing  its  [third-party  administrator]  to  provide  these 
drugs in [its] place makes it complicit in grave moral evil.” 
Ibid.    Wheaton  is  mistaken—not  as  a  matter  of  religious 
faith, in which it is undoubtedly sincere, but as a matter of
law:  Not  every  sincerely  felt  “burden”  is  a  “substantial” 
one,  and  it  is  for  courts,  not  litigants,  to  identify  which 
are.  See  Hobby  Lobby,  573  U. S.,  at  ___  (GINSBURG,  J., 
dissenting)  (slip  op.,  at  21–22).  Any  provision  of  contra-
ceptive  coverage  by  Wheaton’s  third-party  administrator
would  not  result  from  any  action  by  Wheaton;  rather,  in
every meaningful sense, it would result from the relevant 
law and regulations.  The law and regulations require, in 
essence,  that  some  entity  provide  contraceptive  coverage. 
A  religious  nonprofit’s  choice  not  to  be  that  entity  may 
leave someone else obligated to provide coverage instead—
but the obligation is created by the contraceptive coverage
mandate  imposed  by  law,  not  by  the  religious  nonprofit’s