Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/20pdf/19-968_8nj9.pdf
Page Number: 19

Cite as:  592 U. S. ____ (2021) 

3 

ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting 

effectual  relief  whatever  to  the  prevailing  party,”  Chafin, 
568  U. S.,  at  172  (internal  quotation  marks  omitted),  the
case is moot, and the court has no power to decide it, see 
Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U. S. 1, 18 (1998).  To decide a moot 
case  would  be  to  give  an  advisory  opinion,  in  violation  of 
“the  oldest  and  most  consistent  thread  in  the  federal  law 
of  justiciability.”  Flast  v.  Cohen,  392  U. S.  83,  96  (1968) 
(internal quotation marks omitted).

By insisting that judges be able to provide meaningful re-
dress to litigants, Article III ensures that federal courts ex-
ercise their authority only “as a necessity in the determina-
tion  of  real,  earnest  and  vital  controversy  between 
individuals.”  Chicago & Grand Trunk R. Co. v. Wellman, 
143 U. S. 339, 345 (1892); see Valley Forge Christian Col-
lege  v.  Americans  United  for  Separation  of  Church  and 
State,  Inc.,  454  U. S.  464,  471  (1982)  (“The  constitutional 
power of federal courts cannot be defined, and indeed has
no substance, without reference to the necessity ‘to adjudge
the legal rights of litigants in actual controversies.’ ” (quot-
ing Liverpool, New York & Philadelphia S. S. Co. v. Com-
missioners of Emigration, 113 U. S. 33, 39 (1885))).  When 
plaintiffs like Uzuegbunam and Bradford allege neither ac-
tual damages nor the prospect of future injury, an award of 
nominal damages does not change their status or condition
at all.  Such an award instead represents a judicial deter-
mination  that  the  plaintiffs’  interpretation  of  the  law  is 
correct—nothing more.  The court in such a case is acting 
not  as  an  Article  III  court,  but  as  a  moot  court,  deciding 
cases  “in  the  rarified  atmosphere  of  a  debating  society.” 
Director,  Office  of  Workers’  Compensation  Programs  v. 
Perini  North  River  Associates,  459  U. S.  297,  305  (1983) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 

II 
The Court sees no problem with turning judges into ad-
vice  columnists.  In  its  view,  the  common  law  and  (to  a