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Page Number: 34.0

10 

ARIZONA v. INTER TRIBAL COUNCIL OF ARIZ. INC. 

THOMAS, J., dissenting 

the  States.  See  ante,  at  13  (“One  cannot  read  [Article  I, 
§4,]  as  treating  implicitly  what  [Article  I,  §2,  and  Article 
II,  §1,]  regulate  explicitly”).  As  the  Court  observed  just
last  Term,  “[a]  well  established  canon  of  statutory  in- 
terpretation  succinctly  captures  the  problem:  ‘[I]t  is  a 
commonplace  of  statutory  construction  that  the  specific
governs  the  general.’ ”  RadLAX  Gateway  Hotel,  LLC  v. 
Amalgamated Bank, 566 U. S. ___, ___ (2012) (slip op., at 
5) (quoting Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U. S. 
374, 384 (1992); second alteration in original).  The Court 
explained  that  this  canon  is  particularly  relevant  where
two  provisions  “ ‘are  interrelated  and  closely  positioned, 
both in fact being parts of [the same scheme.]’ ”  566 U. S., 
at  ___  (slip  op.,  at  5)  (quoting  HCSC-Laundry  v.  United 
States, 450 U. S. 1, 6 (1981) (per curiam)).  Here, the gen-
eral Times, Places and Manner Clause is textually limited 
by  the  directly  applicable  text  of  the  Voter  Qualification 
Clause. 

The  ratification  debates  over  the  relationship  between
Article  I,  §§2  and  4,  demonstrate  this  limitation.  Unlike 
Article  I,  §2,  the  Times,  Places  and  Manner  Clause  was
the  subject  of  extensive  ratification  controversy.    Antifed-
eralists were deeply concerned with ceding authority over
the conduct of elections to the Federal Government.  Some 
antifederalists  claimed  that  the  “ ‘wealthy  and  the  well-
born,’ ” might abuse the Times, Places and Manner Clause 
to ensure their continuing power in Congress.  The Feder-
alist  No.  60,  at  368.    Hamilton  explained  why  Article  I,
§2’s Voter Qualifications Clause foreclosed this argument: 

“The  truth  is  that  there  is  no  method  of  securing  to
the  rich  the  preference  apprehended  but  by  prescrib-
ing qualifications of property either for those who may
elect  or  be  elected.  But  this  forms  no  part  of  the
power to be conferred upon the national government.  Its 
authority would be expressly restricted to the regula-