Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/19pdf/19-631_2d93.pdf
Page Number: 12.0

Cite as:  591 U. S. ____ (2020) 

9 

Opinion of KAVANAUGH, J. 

dinary economic regulation of commercial activity that im-
poses  incidental  burdens  on  speech.    The  issue  before  us 
concerns only robocalls to cell phones.  Our decision today 
on that issue fits comfortably within existing First Amend-
ment precedent.  Our decision is not intended to expand ex-
isting First Amendment doctrine or to otherwise affect tra-
ditional  or  ordinary  economic  regulation  of  commercial 
activity.

In  short,  the  robocall  restriction  with  the  government-
debt exception is content-based.  Under the Court’s prece-
dents, a “law that is content based” is “subject to strict scru-
tiny.”  Reed, 576 U. S., at 165.  The Government concedes 
that it cannot satisfy strict scrutiny to justify the govern-
ment-debt exception.  We agree.  The Government’s stated 
justification for the government-debt exception is collecting
government debt.  Although collecting government debt is 
no  doubt  a  worthy  goal,  the  Government  concedes  that  it
has  not  sufficiently  justified  the  differentiation  between 
government-debt collection speech and other important cat-
egories of robocall speech, such as political speech, charita-
ble  fundraising,  issue  advocacy,  commercial  advertising,
and the like.5 

—————— 

5  In his scholarly separate opinion, JUSTICE BREYER explains how he 
would apply freedom of speech principles.  But the Court’s longstanding
precedents,  which  we  carefully  follow  here,  have  not  adopted  that  ap-
proach.   In essence, therefore, JUSTICE BREYER argues for overruling sev-
eral of the Court’s First Amendment cases, including the recent 2015 de-
cision in Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U. S. 155 (2015).  Before overruling
precedent, the Court usually requires that a party ask for overruling, or 
at least obtains briefing on the overruling question, and then the Court 
carefully evaluates the traditional stare decisis factors.  Here, no party 
has asked for overruling, and JUSTICE BREYER’s opinion does not analyze
the usual stare decisis factors.  JUSTICE BREYER’s opinion therefore dis-
counts  both  the  Court’s  precedent  and  the  Court’s  precedent  on  prece-
dent.