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4 

AT&T MOBILITY LLC v. CONCEPCION 

THOMAS, J., concurring 

successfully asserts a defense concerning the formation of 
the  agreement  to  arbitrate,  such  as  fraud,  duress,  or  mu-
tual  mistake.  See  Prima  Paint  Corp.  v.  Flood  &  Conklin 
Mfg. Co., 388 U. S. 395, 403–404 (1967) (interpreting §4 to 
permit federal courts to adjudicate claims of “fraud in the 
inducement  of  the  arbitration  clause  itself”  because  such 
claims “g[o] to the ‘making’ of the agreement to arbitrate”).
Contract  defenses  unrelated  to  the  making  of  the  agree-
ment—such  as  public  policy—could  not  be  the  basis  for 
declining to enforce an arbitration clause.* 
—————— 

* The  interpretation  I  suggest  would  be  consistent  with  our  prece-
dent.  Contract formation is based on the consent of the parties, and we
have  emphasized  that  “[a]rbitration  under  the  Act  is  a  matter  of  con-
sent.”  Volt  Information  Sciences,  Inc.  v.  Board  of  Trustees  of  Leland 
Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U. S. 468, 479 (1989). 

The  statement  in  Perry  v.  Thomas,  482  U. S.  483  (1987),  suggesting 
that  §2  preserves  all  state-law  defenses  that  “arose  to  govern  issues
concerning  the  validity,  revocability,  and  enforceability  of  contracts
generally,”  id.,  at  493,  n. 9,  is  dicta.    This  statement  is  found  in  a 
footnote concerning a claim that the Court “decline[d] to address.”  Id., 
at 392, n. 9.  Similarly, to the extent that statements in Rent-A-Center, 
West, Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U. S. ___, ___ n. 1 (2010) (slip op. at ___, n. 1), 
can  be  read  to  suggest  anything  about  the  scope  of  state-law  defenses 
under  §2,  those  statements  are  dicta,  as  well.    This  Court  has  never 
addressed  the  question  whether  the  state-law  “grounds”  referred  to  in
§2 are narrower than those applicable to any contract. 

Moreover,  every  specific  contract  defense  that  the  Court  has  ac-
knowledged  is  applicable  under  §2  relates  to  contract  formation.    In 
Doctor’s  Associates,  Inc.  v.  Casarotto,  517  U. S.  681,  687  (1996),  this
Court said that fraud, duress, and unconscionability “may be applied to 
invalidate  arbitration agreements without contravening §2.”  All three 
 See Morgan 
defenses historically concern the making of an agreement.
Stanley Capital Group Inc. v. Public Util. Dist. No. 1 of Snohomish Cty., 
554  U. S.  527,  547  (2008)  (describing  fraud  and  duress  as  “traditional
grounds for the abrogation of [a] contract” that speak to “unfair dealing 
at the contract formation stage”); Hume v. United States, 132 U. S. 406, 
411, 414 (1889) (describing an unconscionable contract as one “such as
no man in his senses and not under delusion would make” and suggest-
ing that there may be “contracts so extortionate and unconscionable on 
their  face  as  to  raise  the  presumption  of  fraud  in  their  inception”
(internal quotation marks omitted)).