Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/19pdf/18-556_e1pf.pdf
Page Number: 22.0

Cite as:  589 U. S. ____ (2020) 

5 

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting 

to fill the gap with its own “common sense.”  Ante, at 5.  But 
simply labeling an inference “common sense” does not make
it so, no matter how many times the majority repeats it.  Cf. 
ante, at 5, 6, 7, 8.  Whether the driver of a vehicle is likely 
to be its unlicensed owner is “by no means obvious.”  Ante, 
at  1  (KAGAN,  J.,  concurring).   And  like  the  concurrence,  I 
“doubt” that our collective judicial common sense could an-
swer  that  question,  even  if  our  Fourth  Amendment  juris-
prudence allowed us to do so.  Ante, at 3. 

Contrary  to  the  majority’s  claims,  ante,  at  3–5,  7,  the 
reasonable-suspicion  inquiry  does  not  accommodate  the 
average person’s intuition.  Rather, it permits reliance on a 
particular  type  of  common  sense—that  of  the  reasonable 
officer, developed through her experiences in law enforce-
ment.  Cortez,  449  U. S.,  at  418.  This  approach  acknowl-
edges that what may be “common sense” to a layperson may 
not  be  relevant  (or  correct)  in  a  law  enforcement  context.
Indeed, this case presents the type of geographically local-
ized inquiry where an officer’s “inferences and deductions
that might well elude an untrained person” would come in
handy.  Ibid.; see also Arvizu, 534 U. S., at 276 (prizing an 
officer’s “specialized training and familiarity with the cus-
toms of the area’s inhabitants”).  By relying on judicial in-
ferences  instead,  the  majority  promotes  broad,  inflexible
rules that overlook regional differences. 

Allowing judges to offer their own brand of common sense 
where the State’s proffered justifications for a search come 
up  short  also  shifts  police  work  to  the  judiciary.    Our 
cases—including  those  the  majority  cites—have  looked  to
officer sensibility to establish inferences about human be-
havior, even though they just as easily could have relied on 
the inferences “made by ordinary people on a daily basis.” 
Ante, at 6.  See, e.g., Navarette, 572 U. S., at 402 (pointing 
to “the accumulated experience of thousands of officers” to
identify  certain  “erratic”  behaviors  “as  sound  indicia  of