Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/16pdf/15-1293_1o13.pdf
Page Number: 29

Cite as:  582 U. S. ____ (2017) 

25 

Opinion of the Court 
Opinion of ALITO, J. 

tolerance  and  protecting  the  privacy  and  welfare  of  indi-
viduals.”  Brief  for  Native  American  Organizations  as 
Amici Curiae 21.  But no matter how the point is phrased,
its  unmistakable  thrust  is  this:  The  Government  has  an 
interest in preventing speech expressing ideas that offend. 
And, as  we have explained, that idea strikes  at the heart 
of  the  First  Amendment.   Speech  that  demeans  on  the 
basis of race, ethnicity, gender, religion, age, disability, or 
any other similar ground is hateful; but the proudest boast 
of  our  free  speech  jurisprudence  is  that  we  protect  the
freedom  to  express  “the  thought  that  we  hate.”    United 
States  v.  Schwimmer,  279  U. S.  644,  655  (1929)  (Holmes, 
J., dissenting).

The  second  interest  asserted  is  protecting  the  orderly
flow of commerce.  See 808 F. 3d, at 1379–1381 (Reyna, J., 
dissenting); Brief for Petitioner 49; Brief for Native Amer-
ican  Organizations  as  Amicus  Curiae  18–21.   Commerce, 
we  are  told,  is  disrupted  by  trademarks  that  “involv[e]
disparagement  of  race,  gender,  ethnicity,  national  origin,
religion,  sexual  orientation,  and  similar  demographic 
classification.”  808 F. 3d, at 1380–1381 (opinion of Reyna, 
J.).  Such  trademarks  are  analogized  to  discriminatory 
conduct,  which  has  been  recognized  to  have  an  adverse 
effect  on  commerce.  See  ibid.;  Brief  for  Petitioner  49; 
Brief for Native American Organizations as Amici Curiae 
18–20. 

A  simple  answer  to  this  argument  is  that  the  dispar-
agement  clause  is  not  “narrowly  drawn”  to  drive  out 
trademarks  that  support  invidious  discrimination.    The 
clause reaches any trademark that disparages any person, 
group,  or  institution.    It  applies  to  trademarks  like  the 
following:  “Down  with  racists,”  “Down  with  sexists,” 
“Down with homophobes.”  It is not an anti-discrimination 
clause; it is a happy-talk clause.  In this way, it goes much
further than is necessary to serve the interest asserted. 

The  clause  is  far  too  broad  in  other  ways  as  well.    The