Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/19pdf/17-1498_8mjp.pdf
Page Number: 32

6 

ATLANTIC RICHFIELD CO. v. CHRISTIAN 

Opinion of ALITO, J. 

a district court’s jurisdiction in diversity cases.  If the juris-
diction  granted  by  §113(b)  is  limited  to  claims  based  on 
CERCLA, why would anyone think that it had any impact 
on state-law claims?2 
  Third, if the jurisdiction conferred by §113(b) is limited to 
claims based on CERCLA, it is unclear how a district court 
could entertain a claim “under State law which is applicable 
or  relevant  and  appropriate  under  [§121]  (relating  to 
cleanup  standards).”    Yet  §113(h)  exempts  such  a  claim 
from its general withdrawal of jurisdiction over challenges 
to removal or remedial action.  It seems clear that Congress 
did not regard these claims as claims under CERCLA itself, 
since it describes them as “under State law” and did not in-
clude them on the list of claims under CERCLA that it like-
wise exempted from §113(h)’s general withdrawal of juris-
diction  over  challenges  to  removal  or  remedial  action.  
§§113(h)(1)–(5).  These three problems raise serious doubt 
about the correctness of the Court’s interpretation.3 
—————— 

2

 The  Court  answers  that  §§113(b)  and  (h),  though  partially  overlap-
ping,  are  “independent”  of  each  other.    Ante,  at  13,  and n. 6.   But  this 
conclusion  rests  on  an  uneasy  premise:  that  §113(b)  pertains  only  to 
causes of action based on CERCLA.  There is reason to doubt that this is 
the best reading of the statute.  See supra, at 4–5 and this page. 

3

 The  Court  chalks  up  §113(b)’s  references  to  amount  in  controversy 
and party citizenship to a “belt and suspenders” approach.  Ante, at 10, 
n. 5.  As the Court sees it, Congress must have wanted to make especially 
clear that “all CERCLA lawsuits,” no matter the amount in dispute or 
the citizenship of the parties, would be welcome in (and limited to) those 
courts.  Ibid. 
  It  is  true  that  “instances  of  surplusage  are  not  unknown”  in  federal 
statutes.  Arlington Central School Dist. Bd. of Ed. v. Murphy, 548 U. S. 
291, 299, n. 1 (2006).  But it is also the case that the Court usually seeks 
to  “avoid  a  reading  which  renders  some  words  altogether  redundant.”  
Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U. S. 561, 574 (1995).  In interpreting §113, 
one way to avoid redundancy is to acknowledge the interlocking relation-
ship between §§113(b) and (h).  Section 113(b) refers to the hallmarks of 
diversity jurisdiction (amount in controversy and diversity), and §113(h) 
makes clear that its clawback of jurisdiction over some “challenges” to 
EPA plans does not affect state-law claims that satisfy 28 U. S. C. §1332.