Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/10pdf/09-530.pdf
Page Number: 27.0

Cite as:  562 U. S. ____ (2011) 

23 

Opinion of the Court 

note  that  it  is  possible  that  their  personal  information
could be disclosed as a result of a similar breach.  But data 
breaches are a possibility any time the Government stores
information.  As the Court recognized in Whalen, the mere 
possibility  that  security  measures  will  fail  provides  no
“proper  ground”  for  a  broad-based  attack  on  government 
information-collection  practices.  Ibid.    Respondents  also
cite  a  portion  of  SF–85  that  warns  of  possible  disclosure
“[t]o the news media or the general public.”  App. 89.  By
its  terms,  this  exception  allows  public  disclosure  only
where  release  is  “in  the  public  interest”  and  would  not 
result  in  “an  unwarranted  invasion  of  personal  privacy.” 
Ibid.  Respondents  have  not  cited  any  example  of  such  a
disclosure, nor have they identified any plausible scenario 
in  which  their  information  might  be  unduly  disclosed 
under this exception.15 

In  light  of  the  protection  provided  by  the  Privacy  Act’s 
nondisclosure  requirement,  and  because  the  challenged
portions of the forms consist of reasonable inquiries in an
employment  background  check,  we  conclude  that  the 
Government’s  inquiries  do  not  violate  a  constitutional 
right to informational privacy.  Whalen, supra, at 605. 

* 

* 

* 

For these reasons, the judgment of the Court of Appeals 
is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceed-
ings consistent with this opinion. 

It is so ordered. 

—————— 

15 Respondents further contend that the Privacy Act’s ability to deter 
unauthorized  release  of  private  information  is  significantly  hampered 
by  the  fact  that  the  statute  provides  only  “an  ex post  money-damages 
action,”  not  injunctive  relief.    Brief  for  Respondents  44  (citing  Doe  v. 
Chao, 540 U. S. 614, 635 (2004) (GINSBURG, J., dissenting)).  Nothing in 
Whalen  or  Nixon  suggests  that  any  private  right  of  action—for  money 
damages  or  injunctive  relief—is  needed  in  order  to  provide  sufficient 
protection against public disclosure.