Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/22pdf/22-10_ifjn.pdf
Page Number: 13.0

Cite as:  599 U. S. ____ (2023) 

9 

Opinion of the Court 

title Congress chose is among those terms.  Even the Gov-
ernment acknowledged that if the terms in §1028A(a)(1) are
unclear, “the title is a useful clue.”  Tr. of Oral Arg. 80.

Two  additional  points  bolster  this  approach.  First,  the 
title here is not serving the unenviable role of pithily sum-
marizing  a  list  of  “complicated  and  prolific”  provisions. 
Trainmen,  331  U. S.,  at  528.    Section  1028A  is  a  focused, 
standalone provision.  Second, a title is “especially valuable 
[where] it reinforces what the text’s nouns and verbs inde-
pendently suggest.”  Yates v. United States, 574 U. S. 528, 
552  (2015)  (ALITO,  J.,  concurring  in  judgment).  As  ex-
plained  below,  §1028A(a)(1)’s  text  independently  suggests
a focus on identity theft.  See infra, at 12–15. 

Indeed, this Court has already once used §1028A’s title
and place in the statutory scheme to shed light on its text.
In  Flores-Figueroa  v.  United  States,  556  U. S.  646  (2009),
this Court pointed out that a neighboring provision, §1028, 
carries the broad title “ ‘Fraud and related activity in con-
nection with identification documents, authentication fea-
tures, and information.’ ”  Id., at 655.  Section 1028A, in con-
trast,  is  far  more  targeted,  “us[ing]  the  words  ‘identity 
theft.’ ”  Ibid.  That “Congress separated the [identity] fraud 
crime  from  the  [identity]  theft  crime  in”  §1028A  suggests
that §1028A is focused on identity theft specifically, rather 
than all fraud involving means of identification.  Ibid.5 

Given that, it is abundantly clear  why  the Government 
urges the Court to ignore the title.  The Government’s broad 
reading, covering any time another person’s means of iden-
tification  is  employed  in  a  way  that  facilitates  a  crime, 

—————— 

5 Flores-Figueroa held that under §1028A(a)(1) a defendant must know 
“that the ‘means of identification’ he or she unlawfully transferred, pos-
sessed, or used, in fact, belonged to ‘another person.’ ”  556 U. S., at 647. 
The Court not only looked to §1028A(a)(1)’s theft-focused title and role 
in the statutory structure, but also drew on an understanding that the 
provision covers “classic identity theft.”  Id., at 655–656.