Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/524bv.pdf
Page Number: 816.0

524US2

Unit: $U99

[09-15-00 14:41:05] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 524 U. S. 742 (1998)

771

Thomas, J., dissenting

Under a negligence standard, Burlington cannot be held
liable for Slowik’s conduct. Although respondent alleged a
hostile work environment, she never contended that Burling-
ton had been negligent in permitting the harassment to
occur, and there is no question that Burlington acted reason-
ably under the circumstances. The company had a policy
against sexual harassment, and respondent admitted that she
was aware of the policy but nonetheless failed to tell anyone
with authority over Slowik about his behavior. See ante, at
748. Burlington therefore cannot be charged with knowl-
edge of Slowik’s alleged harassment or with a failure to
exercise reasonable care in not knowing about it.

II

Rejecting a negligence standard, the Court instead im-
poses a rule of vicarious employer liability, subject to a
vague afﬁrmative defense, for the acts of supervisors who
wield no delegated authority in creating a hostile work envi-
ronment. This rule is a whole-cloth creation that draws no
support from the legal principles on which the Court claims
it is based. Compounding its error, the Court fails to ex-
plain how employers can rely upon the afﬁrmative defense,
thus ensuring a continuing reign of confusion in this impor-
tant area of the law.

In justifying its holding, the Court refers to our comment
in Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U. S. 57 (1986),
that the lower courts should look to “agency principles” for
guidance in determining the scope of employer liability, id.,
at 72. The Court then interprets the term “agency princi-
ples” to mean the Restatement (Second) of Agency (1957).
The Court ﬁnds two portions of the Restatement to be rele-
vant: § 219(2)(b), which provides that a master is liable for
his servant’s torts if the master is reckless or negligent, and
§ 219(2)(d), which states that a master is liable for his serv-
ant’s torts when the servant is “aided in accomplishing the
tort by the existence of the agency relation.” The Court