Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/529bv.pdf
Page Number: 94.0

529US1

Unit: $U32

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Cite as: 529 U. S. 1 (2000)

19

Opinion of the Court

added). That language refers to particular features of the
Medicare Part B program—“private carriers” and “amount
determinations”—which are not here before us. And its ref-
erence to “foreclosure” of review quite obviously cannot be
taken to refer to § 1395ii because, as we have explained,
§ 1395ii is a channeling requirement, not a foreclosure pro-
vision—of “amount determinations” or anything else.
In
short, it is difﬁcult to reconcile Justice Thomas’ character-
ization of Michigan Academy as a holding that § 1395ii is
“trigger[ed]” only by “challenges to . . . particular determi-
nations,” post, at 40, with the Michigan Academy language
to which he points.

Regardless, it is more plausible to read Michigan Acad-
emy as holding that § 1395ii does not apply § 405(h) where
application of § 405(h) would not simply channel review
through the agency, but would mean no review at all. And
contrary to Justice Scalia’s suggestion, post, at 31–32 (dis-
senting opinion), that single rule applies to Medicare Part A
as much as to Medicare Part B. This latter holding, as we
have said, has the virtues of consistency with Michigan
Academy’s actual language; consistency with the holdings
of earlier cases such as Ringer; and consistency with the dis-
tinction that this Court has often drawn between a total
preclusion of review and postponement of review. See, e. g.,
Salﬁ, supra, at 762 (distinguishing § 405(h)’s channeling re-
quirement from the complete preclusion of judicial review
at issue in Robison, supra, at 373); Thunder Basin Coal Co.
v. Reich, 510 U. S. 200, 207, n. 8 (1994) (strong presumption
against preclusion of review is not implicated by provision
postponing review); Haitian Refugee Center, 498 U. S., at
496–499 (distinguishing between Ringer and Michigan Acad-
emy and ﬁnding the case governed by the latter because the
statute precluded all meaningful judicial review). Justice
Thomas refers to an “antichanneling” presumption (a “pre-
sumption in favor of preenforcement review,” post, at 46–47).
But any such presumption must be far weaker than a pre-