Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/21pdf/20-826_p702.pdf
Page Number: 28.0

24 

BROWN v. DAVENPORT 

Opinion of the Court 

the  wisdom  of  extending  old  precedents  in  new  ways.
AEDPA permits relief only when a state court acts contrary
to  or  unreasonably  applies  this  Court’s  preexisting  and 
clearly  established  rules.  See,  e.g.,  Marshall  v.  Rodgers, 
569 U. S. 58, 64 (2013) (per curiam); Woodall, 572 U. S., at 
424–426; Lopez, 574 U. S., at 6. 

As a backup, Mr. Davenport suggests that the Michigan
Court of Appeals committed an independent error by unrea-
sonably  applying  Chapman.  But  Chapman  merely  an-
nounced the default burden of proof for evaluating consti-
tutional  errors  on  direct  appeal:    The  prosecution  must 
prove harmlessness beyond a reasonable doubt.  386 U. S., 
at 24.  And this Court has repeatedly explained that, when
it comes to AEDPA, “the more general the [federal] rule[,] 
. . .  the  more  leeway  [state]  courts  have  in  reaching  out-
comes  in  case-by-case  determinations”  before  their  deci-
sions can be fairly labeled unreasonable.  Renico v. Lett, 559 
U. S. 766, 776 (2010) (internal quotation marks and altera-
tion omitted).

The case before us does not come close to exceeding that
leeway.  The Michigan Court of Appeals properly identified
the controlling standard.  2012 WL 6217134, at *1.  It then 
proceeded to find that the prosecution had established Mr.
Davenport’s  shackling  was  harmless  beyond  a  reasonable
doubt  in  light  of  the  jurors’  testimony  and  the  “over-
whelmin[g]”  evidence  that  “established  defendant’s  guilt 
and belied his contention that he killed the 103 pound vic-
tim in self-defense, a theory that was explicitly disputed by 
expert medical testimony.”  Id., at *1–*2, and n. 2.  Even if 
some  fairminded  jurist  applying  Chapman  could  reach  a 
different  conclusion,  we  cannot  say  that  every  fairminded 
jurist must.

Finally,  in  a  variation  on  his  Chapman  argument,  Mr.
Davenport faults the Michigan Court of Appeals for unrea-
sonably  focusing  on  a  “false  choice  between  first-degree
murder and self-defense.”  Brief for Respondent 45.  In his