Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/22pdf/22-58_i425.pdf
Page Number: 12

Cite as:  599 U. S. ____ (2023) 

9 

Opinion of the Court 

All  of  those  considerations  help  explain  why  federal 
courts  have  not  traditionally  entertained  lawsuits  of  this
kind.  By  concluding  that  Texas  and  Louisiana  lack 
standing here, we abide by and reinforce the proper role of
the Federal Judiciary under Article III.  The States’ novel 
standing  argument,  if  accepted,  would  entail  expansive
judicial direction of the Department’s arrest policies.  If the 
Court  green-lighted  this  suit,  we  could  anticipate
complaints in future years about alleged Executive Branch
under-enforcement of any similarly worded laws—whether
they be drug laws, gun laws, obstruction of justice laws, or 
the  like.  We  decline  to  start  the  Federal  Judiciary  down 
that  uncharted  path.    Our  constitutional  system  of
separation of powers “contemplates a more restricted role 
for Article III courts.”  Raines, 521 U. S., at 828. 

C 
In holding that Texas and Louisiana lack standing, we do
not suggest that federal courts may never entertain cases
involving  the  Executive  Branch’s  alleged  failure  to  make
more arrests or bring more prosecutions. 

First,  the  Court  has  adjudicated  selective-prosecution
claims under the Equal Protection Clause.  In those cases, 
however, a party typically seeks to prevent his or her own 
prosecution,  not  to  mandate  additional  prosecutions 

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against an executive agency or officer.  To be sure, States sometimes have 
standing to sue the United States or an executive agency or officer.  See, 
e.g., New York v. United States, 505 U. S. 144 (1992).  But in our system
of dual federal and state sovereignty, federal policies frequently generate 
indirect effects on state revenues or state spending.  And when a State 
asserts, for example, that a federal law has produced only those kinds of 
indirect  effects,  the  State’s  claim  for  standing  can  become  more 
attenuated.  See Massachusetts v. Laird, 400 U. S. 886 (1970); Florida v. 
Mellon, 273 U. S. 12, 16–18 (1927); cf. Lujan, 504 U. S., at 561–562.  In 
short, none of the various theories of standing asserted by the States in
this  case  overcomes  the  fundamental  Article  III  problem  with  this
lawsuit.