Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/21pdf/19-1392_6j37.pdf/19-1392_6j37.pdf
Page Number: 210.0

Cite as:  597 U. S. ____ (2022) 

63 

BREYER, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ., dissenting
Appendix to opinion of BREYER, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ. 

455  (1942));31  Smith  v.  Allwright,  321  U. S.  649,  659–662 
(1944)  (recognizing  all-white  primaries  are  unconstitu-
tional after reconsidering in light of “the unitary character 
of the electoral process” recognized in United States v. Clas-
sic,  313  U. S.  299  (1941),  and  overruling  Grovey  v.  Town-
send, 295 U. S. 45 (1935)); United States v. Darby, 312 U. S. 
100,  115–117  (1941)  (recognizing  Congress’s  Commerce
Clause  power  to  regulate  employment  conditions  and  ex-
plaining as “inescapable” the “conclusion . . . that Hammer 
v. Dagenhart, [247 U. S. 251 (1918)],” and its contrary rule 
had  “long  since  been”  overtaken  by  precedent  construing 
the Commerce Clause power more broadly); Erie R. Co. v. 
Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64, 78–80 (1938) (applying state sub-
stantive law in diversity actions in federal courts and over-
ruling Swift v. Tyson, 16 Pet. 1 (1842), because an interven-
ing  decision  had  “made  clear”  the  “fallacy  underlying  the
rule”).

Additional cases the majority cites involved fundamental
factual changes that had undermined the basic premise of 
the prior precedent.  See Citizens United v. Federal Election 
Comm’n,  558  U. S.  310,  364  (2010)  (expanding  First 
Amendment  protections  for  campaign-related  speech  and
citing  technological  changes  that  undermined  the  distinc-
tions of the earlier regime and made workarounds easy, and
overruling Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 
U. S. 652 (1990), and partially overruling McConnell v. Fed-
eral  Election  Comm’n,  540  U. S.  93  (2003));  Crawford  v. 
Washington, 541 U. S. 36, 62–65 (2004) (expounding on the 
Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses and rejecting
the prior framework, based on its practical failing to keep 

—————— 

31 We have since come to understand Gideon as part of a larger doctri-
nal  shift—already  underway  at  the  time  of  Gideon—where  “the  Court 
began to hold that the Due Process Clause fully incorporates particular
rights contained in the first eight Amendments.”  McDonald v. Chicago, 
561 U. S. 742, 763 (2010); see also id., at 766.