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Page Number: 37.0

24 

THOLE v. U. S. BANK N. A. 

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting 

the allegations: Respondents misused a pension plan’s as-
sets  to  invest  in  their  own  mutual  funds,  pay  themselves 
excessive fees, and swell the employer’s income and stock 
prices.  Nor is the Court’s suggestion workable in the mine
run of cases.  The reason the Court gives for trusting em-
ployers and shareholders to look out for beneficiaries—“be-
cause the employers are entitled to the plan surplus and are
often  on  the  hook  for  plan  shortfalls,”  ante,  at  6—is  what 
commentators call a conflict of interest.12 

Neither is the Federal Government’s enforcement power
a palliative.  “ERISA makes clear that Congress did not in-
tend for Government enforcement powers to lessen the re-
sponsibilities of plan fiduciaries.”  Central States, 472 U. S., 
at 578.  The Secretary of Labor, moreover, signed a brief (in 
support  of  petitioners)  verifying  that  the  Federal  Govern-
ment cannot “monitor every [ERISA] plan in the country.”
Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 26.  Even when 
the Government can sue (in a representational capacity, of 
course),  it  cannot  seek  all  the  relief  that  a  participant  or
beneficiary  could.  Compare  29  U. S. C.  §1132(a)(2)  with 
§1132(a)(3).  At bottom, the Court rejects ERISA’s private-
enforcement scheme and suggests a preference that taxpay-
ers  fund  the  monitoring  (and  perhaps  the  bailing  out)  of 
pension plans.  See ante, at 6–8, and n. 2. 

Finally, in justifying today’s outcome, the Court discusses
attorney’s fees.  Twice the Court underlines that attorneys
have a “$31 million” “stake” in this case.  Ante, at 2, 3.  But 
no one in this litigation has suggested attorney’s fees as a 
—————— 

12 E.g., Fischel & Langbein, ERISA’s Fundamental Contradiction: The
Exclusive Benefit Rule, 55 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1105, 1121 (1988).  This con-
flict exists because, contrary to the Court’s assertion, the employer and 
its shareholders are not “entitled to the plan surplus” until after the plan
terminates  and after all vested benefits have been paid from the trust 
fund’s assets.  Compare ante, at 6, with 29 U. S. C. §1103(c)(1) (ERISA 
plan assets “shall never inure to the benefit of any employer” while the
trust exists); see also App. 61; Record in No. 13–cv–2687 (D Minn.), Doc. 
107–1, p. 75.