Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/558bv.pdf
Page Number: 395

234 

KUCANA  v.  HOLDER 

Syllabus 

(1)  The  amicus  defending  the  Seventh  Circuit’s  judgment  urges 
that regulations sufﬁce to trigger § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii)’s proscription.  She 
comprehends “under” in “authority . . . speciﬁed under this subchapter” 
to  mean,  e. g.,  “pursuant  to,”  “subordinate  to.”  Administrative  regula­
tions  count  for  § 1252(a)(2)(B)  purposes,  she  submits,  because  they  are 
issued “pursuant to,” and are measures “subordinate to,” the legislation 
they serve to implement.  On that reading, § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) would bar 
judicial review of any decision that an executive regulation places within 
the BIA’s discretion, including the decision to deny a motion to reopen. 
The  parties,  on  the  other  hand,  read  the  statutory  language  to  mean 
“speciﬁed  in,”  or  “speciﬁed  by,”  the  subchapter.  On  their  reading, 
§ 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii)  precludes  judicial  review  only  when  the  statute  itself 
speciﬁes  the  discretionary  character  of  the  Attorney  General’s  author­
ity.  Pp. 243–244. 

(2)  The  word  “under”  “has  many  dictionary  deﬁnitions  and  must 
draw  its  meaning  from  its  context.”  Ardestani  v.  INS,  502  U. S.  129, 
135.  Examining the provision at issue in statutory context, the parties’ 
position  stands  on  ﬁrmer  ground.  Section  1252(a)(2)(B)(ii)  is  far  from 
IIRIRA’s  only  jurisdictional  limitation.  It  is  sandwiched  between  two 
subsections, § 1252(a)(2)(A) and § 1252(a)(2)(C), both dependent on statu­
tory  provisions,  not  on  any  regulation,  to  deﬁne  their  scope.  Given 
§ 1252(a)(2)(B)’s  statutory  placement,  one  would  expect  that  it,  too, 
would cover statutory provisions alone.  Pp. 245–246. 

(3)  Section 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) places within the no-judicial-review cat­
egory  “any  judgment  regarding  the  granting  of  relief  under  section 
1182(h),  1182(i),  1229b,  1229c,  or  1255.”  Each  of  the  referenced  statu­
tory  provisions  addresses  a  different  form  of  discretionary  relief  from 
removal and contains language indicating that the decision is entrusted 
to  the  Attorney  General’s  discretion.  Clause  (i)  does  not  refer  to  any 
regulatory  provision.  The  proximity  of  clause  (i)  and  the  clause  (ii) 
catchall,  and  the  words  linking  them—“any  other  decision”—suggests 
that Congress had in mind decisions of the same genre, i. e., those made 
discretionary  by  legislation.  Read  harmoniously,  both  clauses  convey 
that Congress barred court review of discretionary decisions only when 
Congress  itself  set  out  the  Attorney  General’s  discretionary  authority 
in the statute.  Pp. 246–247. 

(4)  Also signiﬁcant  is the character  of the decisions  insulated from 
judicial review in § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i).  The listed determinations are sub­
stantive decisions the Executive makes involving whether or not aliens 
can  stay  in  the  country.  Other  decisions  speciﬁed  by  statute  “to  be  in 
the  discretion  of  the  Attorney  General,”  and  therefore  shielded  from 
court  oversight  by  § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii),  are  of  a  like  kind.  See,  e. g., 
§ 1157(c)(1).  Decisions  on  reopening  motions  made  discretionary  by