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OUR LADY OF GUADALUPE SCHOOL v. 
MORRISSEY-BERRU 
Syllabus 

required to comply with her school’s faculty handbook, which set out 
similar  expectations.    Each  taught  religion  in  the  classroom,  wor-
shipped with her students, prayed with her students, and had her per-
formance measured on religious bases.

Both teachers sued their schools after their employment was termi-
nated.  Morrissey-Berru claimed that OLG had demoted her and had 
failed  to  renew  her  contract  in  order  to  replace  her  with  a  younger 
teacher in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 
1967.  OLG invoked Hosanna-Tabor’s “ministerial exception” and suc-
cessfully  moved  for  summary  judgment,  but  the  Ninth  Circuit  re-
versed, holding that Morrissey-Berru did not fall within the exception 
because she did not have the formal title of “minister,” had limited for-
mal religious training, and did not hold herself out publicly as a reli-
gious leader.  Biel alleged that St. James discharged her because she 
had  requested  a  leave  of  absence  to  obtain  breast  cancer  treatment. 
Like OLG, St. James obtained summary judgment under the “minis-
terial exception.”  But the Ninth Circuit reversed, reasoning that Biel 
lacked  Perich’s  credentials,  religious  training,  and  ministerial  back-
ground. 

Held: The  First  Amendment’s  Religion  Clauses  foreclose  the  adjudica-
tion  of  Morrissey-Berru’s  and  Biel’s  employment-discrimination 
claims.  Pp. 10–27.

(a) The  independence  of  religious  institutions  in  matters  of  “faith 
and doctrine” is closely linked to independence in what the Court has
termed “ ‘matters of church government.’ ”  Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U. S., 
at 186.  For this reason, courts are bound to stay out of employment 
disputes  involving  those  holding  certain  important  positions  with 
churches and other religious institutions.  Pp. 10–11. 

(b) When the “ministerial exception” reached this Court in Hosanna-
Tabor,  the  Court  looked  to  precedent  and  the  “background”  against
which  “the  First  Amendment  was  adopted,”  565  U. S.,  at  183,  and
unanimously  recognized  that  the  Religion  Clauses  foreclose  certain 
employment-discrimination claims brought against religious organiza-
tions, id., at 188.  Pp. 11–14.

(c) In Hosanna-Tabor, the Court applied the “ministerial exception”
but declined “to adopt a rigid formula for deciding when an employee
qualifies as a minister.”  565 U. S., at 190.  Instead, the Court identi-
fied four relevant circumstances of Perich’s employment at an Evan-
gelical Lutheran school.  First, Perich’s church had given her the title 
of “minister, with a role distinct from that of most of its members.”  Id., 
at 191.  Second, her position “reflected a significant degree of religious 
training followed by a formal process of commissioning.”  Ibid.  Third, 
she “held herself out as a minister of the Church” and claimed certain 
tax benefits.  Id., at 191–192.  Fourth, her “job duties reflected a role