Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/20pdf/19-123_g3bi.pdf
Page Number: 20.0

Cite as:  593 U. S. ____ (2021) 

1 

BARRETT, J., concurring 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

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No. 19–123 
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SHARONELL FULTON, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. 
CITY OF PHILADELPHIA, PENNSYLVANIA, ET AL. 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 

[June 17, 2021] 

JUSTICE  BARRETT,  with  whom  JUSTICE  KAVANAUGH 
joins,  and  with  whom  JUSTICE  BREYER  joins  as  to  all  but 
the first paragraph, concurring.
  In Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Ore. v. 
Smith, 494 U. S. 872 (1990), this Court held that a neutral
and generally applicable law typically does not violate the 
Free  Exercise  Clause—no  matter  how  severely  that  law 
burdens religious exercise.  Petitioners, their amici, schol-
ars,  and  Justices  of  this  Court  have  made  serious  argu-
ments  that  Smith  ought  to  be  overruled.  While  history
looms large in this debate, I find the historical record more 
silent than supportive on the question whether the found-
ing generation understood the First Amendment to require
religious  exemptions  from  generally  applicable  laws  in  at
least  some  circumstances.    In  my  view,  the  textual  and 
structural arguments against Smith are more compelling. 
As a matter of text and structure, it is difficult to see why
the  Free  Exercise  Clause—lone  among  the  First  Amend-
ment freedoms—offers nothing more than protection from
discrimination. 

Yet what should replace Smith?  The prevailing assump-
tion seems to be that strict scrutiny would apply whenever
a neutral and generally applicable law burdens religious ex-
ercise.  But I am skeptical about swapping Smith’s categor-
ical antidiscrimination approach for an equally categorical