Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/558bv.pdf
Page Number: 502.0

Cite as: 558 U. S. 310 (2010) 

341 

Opinion of the Court 

standing,  and  respect  for  the  speaker’s  voice.  The  Govern­
ment may not by these means deprive the public of the right 
and privilege to determine for itself what speech and speak­
ers are worthy of consideration.  The First Amendment pro­
tects speech and speaker, and the ideas that ﬂow from each. 
The Court has upheld a narrow class of speech restrictions 
that  operate  to  the  disadvantage  of  certain  persons,  but 
these rulings  were based on  an interest in  allowing govern­
mental entities to perform their functions.  See, e. g., Bethel 
School Dist. No. 403 v.  Fraser, 478 U. S. 675, 683 (1986) (pro­
tecting  the  “function  of  public  school  education”);  Jones  v. 
North Carolina Prisoners’ Labor Union, Inc., 433 U. S. 119, 
129 (1977) (furthering “the legitimate penological objectives 
of  the  corrections  system”  (internal  quotation  marks  omit­
ted));  Parker  v.  Levy,  417  U. S.  733,  759  (1974)  (ensuring 
“the  capacity  of  the  Government  to  discharge  its  [military] 
responsibilities”  (internal  quotation  marks  omitted));  Civil 
Service Comm’n v.  Letter Carriers, 413 U. S. 548, 557 (1973) 
(“[F]ederal  service  should  depend  upon  meritorious  per­
formance  rather  than  political  service”).  The  corporate  in­
dependent expenditures at issue in this case, however, would 
not interfere with governmental functions, so these cases are 
inapposite.  These precedents stand only for the proposition 
that  there  are  certain  governmental  functions  that  cannot 
operate  without  some  restrictions  on  particular  kinds  of 
speech.  By contrast, it is inherent in the nature of the polit­
ical  process  that  voters  must  be  free  to  obtain  information 
from diverse sources in order to determine how to cast their 
votes.  At  least  before  Austin,  the  Court  had  not  allowed 
the  exclusion  of  a  class  of  speakers  from  the  general  public 
dialogue. 

We ﬁnd no basis for the proposition that, in the context of 
political speech, the Government may impose restrictions on 
certain disfavored speakers.  Both history and logic lead us 
to this conclusion.