Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/10pdf/09-751.pdf
Page Number: 3

Cite as:  562 U. S. ____ (2011) 

3 

Syllabus 

Snyder from liability.  Westboro had been actively engaged in speak-
ing  on  the  subjects  addressed  in  its  picketing  long  before  it  became 
aware of Matthew Snyder, and there can be no serious claim that the 
picketing did not represent Westboro’s honestly held beliefs on public
issues.    Westboro  may  have  chosen  the  picket  location  to  increase 
publicity  for  its  views,  and  its  speech  may  have  been  particularly 
hurtful to Snyder.  That does not mean that its speech should be af-
forded  less  than  full  First  Amendment  protection  under  the  circum-
stances of this case.  Pp. 8–10.

That said, “ ‘[e]ven protected speech is not equally permissible in all
places  and  at  all  times.’ ”    Frisby  v.  Schultz,  487  U. S.  474,  479. 
Westboro’s  choice  of  where  and  when  to  conduct  its  picketing  is  not
beyond  the  Government’s  regulatory  reach—it  is  “subject  to  reason-
able  time,  place,  or  manner  restrictions.”    Clark  v.  Community  for 
Creative  Non-Violence,  468  U. S.  288,  293.    The  facts  here  are  quite 
different,  however,  both  with  respect  to  the  activity  being  regulated
and  the  means  of  restricting  those  activities,  from  the  few  limited
situations  where  the  Court  has  concluded  that  the  location  of  tar-
geted  picketing  can  be  properly  regulated  under  provisions  deemed
content  neutral.    Frisby,  supra,  at  477;  Madsen  v.  Women’s  Health 
Center, Inc., 512 U. S. 753, 768, distinguished.  Maryland now has a
law restricting funeral picketing but that law was not in effect at the 
time  of  these  events,  so  this  Court  has  no  occasion  to  consider 
whether  that  law  is  a  “reasonable  time,  place,  or  manner  restric-
tio[n]”  under  the  standards  announced  by  this  Court.    Clark,  supra,
at 293.  Pp. 10–12.

The  “special  protection”  afforded  to  what  Westboro  said,  in  the
whole context of how and where it chose to say it, cannot be overcome
by a jury finding that the picketing was “outrageous” for purposes of 
applying  the  state  law  tort  of  intentional  infliction  of  emotional  dis-
tress.  That would pose too great a danger that the jury would punish
Westboro  for  its  views  on  matters  of  public  concern.    For  all  these 
reasons, the jury verdict imposing tort liability on Westboro for inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress must be set aside.  Pp. 12–13. 

(b) Snyder also may not recover for the tort of intrusion upon seclu-
sion.    He  argues  that  he  was  a  member  of  a  captive  audience  at  his 
son’s funeral, but the captive audience doctrine—which has been ap-
plied  sparingly,  see  Rowan  v.  Post  Office  Dept.,  397  U. S.  728,  736– 
738;  Frisby,  supra,  at  484–485—should  not  be  expanded  to  the  cir-
cumstances here.  Westboro stayed well away from the memorial ser-
vice,  Snyder could  see  no  more  than the  tops  of  the  picketers’  signs, 
and  there  is  no  indication  that  the  picketing  interfered  with  the  fu-
neral service itself.  Pp. 13–14. 

(c) Because the First Amendment bars Snyder from recovery for in-