Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/17pdf/16-1466_2b3j.pdf
Page Number: 22

Cite as:  585 U. S. ____ (2018) 

17 

Opinion of the Court 

[an] 

“the 

interests  of 

subordinate 
individual  em-
ployee . . . to the collective interests of all employees in the 
bargaining  unit.”  Alexander  v.  Gardner-Denver  Co.,  415 
U.  S.  36,  58,  n.  19  (1974);  see  Stahulak  v.  Chicago,  184 
Ill. 2d  176,  180–181,  703  N. E.  2d  44,  46–47  (1998);  Ma-
honey v. Chicago, 293 Ill. App. 3d 69, 73–74, 687 N. E. 2d
132,  135–137  (1997)  (union  has  “ ‘discretion  to  refuse  to 
process’ ”  a  grievance,  provided  it  does  not  act  “arbi­
trar[ily]” or “in bad faith” (emphasis deleted)).

In any event, whatever unwanted burden is imposed by
the representation of nonmembers in disciplinary matters
can  be  eliminated  “through  means  significantly  less  re­
strictive of  associational freedoms” than the imposition of 
agency  fees.  Harris,  573  U. S.,  at  ___  (slip  op.,  at  30) 
(internal  quotation  marks  omitted).    Individual  nonmem­
bers  could  be  required  to  pay  for  that  service  or  could  be
denied  union  representation  altogether.6  Thus,  agency
fees cannot be sustained on the ground that unions would 
otherwise be unwilling to represent nonmembers. 

Nor  can  such  fees  be  justified  on  the  ground  that  it 
would  otherwise  be  unfair  to  require  a  union  to  bear  the 
duty  of  fair  representation.    That  duty  is  a  necessary
concomitant  of  the  authority  that  a  union  seeks  when  it 
chooses  to serve  as  the  exclusive representative  of  all  the
employees in a unit.  As explained, designating a union as
the  exclusive  representative  of  nonmembers  substantially 
restricts the nonmembers’ rights.  Supra, at 2–3.  Protec­

—————— 

6 There  is  precedent  for  such  arrangements.    Some  States  have  laws 
providing  that,  if  an  employee  with  a  religious  objection  to  paying  an
agency  fee  “requests  the  [union]  to  use  the  grievance  procedure  or
arbitration  procedure  on  the  employee’s  behalf,  the  [union]  is  author­
ized  to  charge  the  employee  for  the  reasonable  cost  of  using  such 
procedure.”    E.g.,  Cal.  Govt.  Code  Ann.  §3546.3  (West  2010);  cf.  Ill. 
Comp.  Stat.,  ch.  5,  §315/6(g)  (2016).    This  more  tailored  alternative,  if 
applied to other objectors, would prevent free ridership while imposing 
a lesser burden on First Amendment rights.