Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/558bv.pdf
Page Number: 274

Cite as: 558 U. S. 100 (2009) 

113 

Opinion of the Court 

trol  the  discovery  process”);  cf.  Cunningham  v.  Hamilton 
County,  527  U. S.  198,  209  (1999)  (expressing  concern  that 
allowing immediate appeal as of right from orders ﬁning at­
torneys  for  discovery  violations  would  result  in  “the  very 
sorts  of  piecemeal  appeals  and  concomitant  delays  that  the 
ﬁnal judgment rule was designed to prevent”).  Attempting 
to  downplay  such  concerns,  Mohawk  asserts  that  the  three 
Circuits  in  which  the  collateral  order  doctrine  currently  ap­
plies to adverse privilege rulings have seen only a trickle of 
appeals.  But this may be due to the fact that the practice in 
all three Circuits is relatively new and not yet widely known. 
Were  this  Court  to  approve  collateral  order  appeals  in  the 
attorney-client privilege context, many more litigants would 
likely choose that route.  They would also likely seek to ex­
tend  such  a  ruling  to  disclosure  orders  implicating  many 
other categories of sensitive information, raising an array of 
line-drawing difﬁculties.4 

C 

In  concluding  that  sufﬁciently  effective  review  of  adverse 
attorney-client privilege rulings can be had without resort to 
the Cohen doctrine, we reiterate that the class of collaterally 
appealable  orders  must  remain  “narrow  and  selective  in  its 
membership.”  Will, 546 U. S., at 350.  This admonition has 
acquired special force in recent years with the enactment of 
legislation  designating  rulemaking,  “not  expansion  by  court 
decision,”  as  the  preferred  means  for  determining  whether 
and  when  prejudgment  orders  should  be  immediately  ap­
pealable.  Swint,  514  U. S.,  at  48.  Speciﬁcally,  Congress  in 
1990  amended  the  Rules  Enabling  Act,  28  U. S. C.  § 2071 
et  seq.,  to  authorize  this  Court  to  adopt  rules  “deﬁn[ing] 

4 Participating  as  amicus  curiae  in  support  of  respondent  Carpenter, 
the  United  States  contends  that  collateral  order  appeals  should  be  avail­
able for rulings involving certain governmental privileges “in light of their 
structural  constitutional  grounding  under  the  separation  of  powers,  rela­
tively rare invocation, and unique importance to governmental functions.” 
Brief for United States 28.  We express no view on that issue.