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Page Number: 109.0

12 

TRUMP v. UNITED STATES 

JACKSON, J., dissenting 

cuse;  the  law  simply  does  not  apply  to  him.    Unlike  a  de-
fendant who invokes an affirmative defense and relies on a 
legal  determination  that  there  was  a  good  reason  for  his
otherwise  unlawful  conduct,  a  former  President  invoking
immunity relies on the premise that he can do whatever he
wants, however he wants, so long as he uses his “ ‘official
power’ ” in doing so.  Ante, at 19.  In the former paradigm,
the  President  remains  subject  to  law;  in  the  latter,  he  is
above it. 

III
 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR has already warned of the dire con-
sequences that are likely to follow from the majority’s deci-
sion in this case.  Ante, at 29–30 (dissenting opinion).  I have 
thus far endeavored merely to explain what today’s ruling
amounts to on a theoretical level: the Court’s abandonment 
of the individual accountability model as applied to Presi-
dents, and its introduction of a new Presidential accounta-
bility model that authorizes the Judiciary to exempt Presi-
dents from punishment under law, depending on the official
or unofficial character of the criminal conduct at issue. 

Here, I will highlight just two observations about the re-
sults that follow from this paradigm shift.  First, by chang-
ing the accountability paradigm in this fashion, the Court 
has unilaterally altered the balance of power between the 
three coordinate branches of our Government as it relates 
to the Rule of Law, aggrandizing power in the Judiciary and
the  Executive,  to  the  detriment  of  Congress.    Second,  the 
majority’s  new  Presidential  accountability  model  under-
mines the constraints of the law as a deterrent for future 
Presidents who might otherwise abuse their power, to the
detriment of us all. 

Consider  the  structural  implications  of  today’s  decision 
from the standpoint of the separation of powers.  Until now, 

A