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Page Number: 43.0

2 

BOND v. UNITED STATES 

THOMAS, J., concurring in judgment 

Treaties,  provided  two  thirds  of  the  Senators  present
concur.”  Art. II,  §2.   The  Constitution  does not,  however, 
comprehensively  define  the  proper  bounds  of  the  Treaty
Power,  and  this  Court  has  not  yet  had  occasion  to  do  so.
As a result, some have suggested that the Treaty Power is
boundless—that  it  can  reach  any  subject  matter,  even
those  that  are  of  strictly  domestic  concern.    See,  e.g.,  Re-
statement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United
States,  §302,  Comment  c  (1986).    A  number  of  recent 
treaties reflect that suggestion by regulating what appear
to be purely domestic affairs.  See, e.g., Bradley, The Treaty
Power  and  American  Federalism,  97  Mich.  L. Rev.  390, 
402–409 (1998) (hereinafter Bradley) (citing examples).

Yet to interpret the Treaty Power as extending to every
conceivable  domestic  subject  matter—even  matters  with-
out  any  nexus  to  foreign  relations—would  destroy  the
basic  constitutional  distinction  between  domestic  and 
foreign  powers.  See  United  States  v.  Curtiss-Wright  Ex-
port Corp., 299 U. S. 304, 319 (1936) (“[T]he federal power
over  external  affairs  [is]  in  origin  and  essential  character 
different  from  that  over  internal  affairs  . . .”).    It  would 
also lodge in the Federal Government the potential for “a 
‘police  power’  over  all  aspects  of  American  life.”    Lopez, 
supra,  at  584  (THOMAS,  J.,  concurring).  A  treaty-based
power of that magnitude—no less than a plenary power of
legislation—would  threaten  “ ‘ “the  liberties  that  derive 
from  the  diffusion  of  sovereign  power.” ’ ”  Bond  v.  United 
States,  564  U. S.  ___,  ___  (2011)  (slip  op.,  at  9).    And  a 
treaty-based  police  power  would  pose  an  even  greater 
threat  when  exercised  through  a  self-executing  treaty 
because it would circumvent the role of the House of Rep-
resentatives in the legislative process.  See The Federalist 
No. 52, p. 355 (J. Cooke ed. 1961) (J. Madison) (noting that 
the  House  has  a  more  “immediate  dependence  on,  &  an
intimate sympathy with the people”). 

I doubt the Treaty Power creates such a gaping loophole