Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/22pdf/20-1199_hgdj.pdf
Page Number: 125.0

Cite as:  600 U. S. ____ (2023) 

19 

GORSUCH, J., concurring 

II 
So far, we have seen that Title VI prohibits a recipient of
federal funds from discriminating against individuals even 
in part because of race.  We have seen, too, that Harvard 
and UNC do just what the law forbids.  One might wonder,
then, why the parties have devoted years and fortunes liti-
gating  other  matters,  like  how  much  the  universities  dis-
criminate and why they do so.  The answer lies in Bakke. 

A 
Bakke concerned admissions to the medical school at the 
University of California, Davis.  That school set aside a cer-
tain number of spots in each class for minority applicants. 
See  438  U. S.,  at  272–276  (opinion  of  Powell,  J.).    Allan 
Bakke argued that the school’s policy violated Title VI and 
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Id., at 270.  The Court agreed with Mr. Bakke.  In a frac-
tured  decision  that  yielded  six  opinions,  a  majority  of  the 
Court held that the school’s set-aside system went too far. 
At the same time, however, a different coalition of five Jus-
tices ventured beyond the facts of the case to suggest that,
in other circumstances not at issue, universities may some-
times  permissibly  use  race  in  their  admissions  processes.
See ante, at 16–19 (opinion for the Court).

As important as these conclusions were some of the inter-
pretive moves made along the way.  Justice Powell (writing
only for himself ) and Justice Brennan (writing for himself 

—————— 
Post, at 26–27, n. 21 (opinion of SOTOMAYOR, J.).  It is a bewildering sug-
gestion.  SFFA sued Harvard and UNC under Title VI.  And when a party 
seeks  relief  under  a  statute,  our  task  is  to  apply  the  law’s  terms  as  a 
reasonable reader would have understood them when Congress enacted 
them.  Bostock v. Clayton County, 590 U. S. ___, ___ (2020) (slip op., at 
4).  To be sure, parties are free to frame their arguments.  But they are 
not free to stipulate to a statute’s meaning and no party may “waiv[e]” 
the proper interpretation of the law by “fail[ing] to invoke it.”  EEOC v. 
FLRA,  476  U. S.  19,  23  (1986)  (per  curiam)  (internal  quotation  marks 
omitted); see also Young v. United States, 315 U. S. 257, 258–259 (1942).