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Page Number: 55.0

52 

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA v. HELLER 

Opinion of the Court 

members were expected to possess, id., at 178–182.  Not a 
word (not a word) about the history of the Second Amend­
ment.  This  is  the  mighty  rock  upon  which  the  dissent
rests its case.24 

We may as well consider at this point (for we will have 
to  consider  eventually)  what  types  of  weapons  Miller 
permits.  Read  in  isolation,  Miller’s  phrase  “part  of  ordi­
nary  military  equipment”  could  mean  that  only  those
weapons useful in warfare are protected.  That would be a 
startling reading of the opinion, since it would mean that
the  National  Firearms  Act’s  restrictions  on  machineguns 
(not  challenged  in  Miller)  might  be  unconstitutional,
machineguns  being  useful  in  warfare  in  1939.    We  think 
that Miller’s “ordinary military equipment” language must 
be  read  in  tandem  with  what  comes  after:  “[O]rdinarily 
when  called  for  [militia]  service  [able-bodied]  men  were
expected  to  appear  bearing  arms  supplied  by  themselves 
and of the kind in common use at the time.”  307 U. S., at 
179.  The  traditional  militia  was  formed  from  a  pool  of
men bringing arms “in common use at the time” for lawful
purposes  like  self-defense.    “In  the  colonial  and  revolu­
tionary war era, [small-arms] weapons used by militiamen
and weapons used in defense of person and home were one 
and  the  same.”  State  v.  Kessler,  289  Ore.  359,  368,  614 
P. 2d  94,  98  (1980)  (citing  G.  Neumann,  Swords  and 
Blades of the American Revolution 6–15, 252–254 (1973)). 
Indeed,  that  is  precisely  the  way  in  which  the  Second 

—————— 

24 As  for  the  “hundreds  of  judges,” post,  at  2,  who  have relied  on  the 
view of the Second Amendment JUSTICE STEVENS claims we endorsed in 
Miller:  If so, they overread Miller.  And their erroneous reliance upon 
an  uncontested  and  virtually  unreasoned  case  cannot  nullify  the
reliance of millions of Americans (as our historical analysis has shown)
upon  the  true  meaning  of  the  right  to  keep  and  bear  arms.    In  any 
event,  it  should  not  be  thought  that  the  cases  decided  by  these  judges 
would necessarily have come out differently under a proper interpreta­
tion of the right.