Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/529bv.pdf
Page Number: 331

529US1

Unit: $U40

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256

GARNER v. JONES

Opinion of the Court

The record before the Court of Appeals contained little
information bearing on the level of risk created by the
change in law. Without knowledge of whether retroactive
application of the amendment to Rule 475–3–.05(2) increases,
to a signiﬁcant degree, the likelihood or probability of pro-
longing respondent’s incarceration, his claim rests upon
speculation.

On the record in this case, we cannot conclude the change
in Georgia law lengthened respondent’s time of actual im-
prisonment. Georgia law vests broad discretion with the
Board, and our analysis rests upon the premise that the
Board exercises its discretion in accordance with its assess-
ment of each inmate’s likelihood of release between reconsid-
eration dates.
If the assessment later turns out not to hold
true for particular inmates, they may invoke the policy the
Parole Board has adopted to permit expedited consideration
in the event of a change in circumstances. App. 56.

The Court of Appeals erred in not considering the Board’s
internal policy statement. At a minimum, policy state-
ments, along with the Board’s actual practices, provide im-
portant instruction as to how the Board interprets its en-
abling statute and regulations, and therefore whether, as a
matter of fact, the amendment to Rule 475–3–.05(2) created
a signiﬁcant risk of increased punishment.
It is often the
case that an agency’s policies and practices will indicate the
manner in which it is exercising its discretion. Cf. INS v.
Yueh-Shaio Yang, 519 U. S. 26, 32 (1996) (observing that the
reasonableness of discretionary agency action can be gauged
by reference to the agency’s policies and practices). The
Court of Appeals was incorrect to say the Board’s policies
were of no relevance in this case. Absent a demonstration
to the contrary, we presume the Board follows its statutory
commands and internal policies in fulﬁlling its obligations.
Cf. United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaugnessy, 347 U. S.
260, 266–268 (1954).
In Morales, we relied upon the State’s
representation that its parole board had a practice of grant-