Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/23pdf/23-5572_l6hn.pdf
Page Number: 9.0

Cite as:  603 U. S. ____ (2024) 

5 

Opinion of the Court 

(c)(2) could well have a narrower scope if Congress designed 
it  with  the  focused  language  of  (c)(1)  in  mind.  Subsection 
(c)(1)  would  then  prohibit  particular  types  of  obstructive
conduct  and  (c)(2)  would  fill  any  inadvertent  gaps  that
might exist.

One way to discern the reach of an “otherwise” clause is 
to look for  guidance from whatever examples come before
it. Two general principles are relevant. First, the canon of 
noscitur a sociis teaches that a word is “given more precise 
content  by  the  neighboring  words  with  which  it  is  associ-
ated.”  United States v. Williams, 553 U. S. 285, 294 (2008).
That  “ avoid[s]  ascribing  to  one  word  a  meaning  so  broad 
that it is inconsistent with” “the company it keeps.”  Gus-
tafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U. S. 561, 575 (1995). And under 
the related canon of ejusdem generis, “a ‘general or collec-
tive term’ at the end of a list of specific items” is typically
“ ‘controlled and defined by reference to’ the specific classes 
. . . that precede it.”  Southwest Airlines Co. v. Saxon, 596 
U. S. 450, 458 (2022) (quoting first Ali v. Federal Bureau of 
Prisons, 552 U. S. 214, 225 (2008); then Circuit City Stores, 
Inc.  v.  Adams,  532  U. S.  105,  115  (2001));  accord,  Bis-
sonnette v. LePage Bakeries Park St., LLC, 601 U. S. 246, 
252  (2024).  These  approaches  to  statutory  interpretation 
track the common sense intuition that Congress would not 
ordinarily introduce a general term that renders meaning-
less the specific text that accompanies it.

To see why, consider a straightforward example.  A zoo 
might post a sign that reads, “do not pet, feed, yell or throw 
objects at the animals, or otherwise disturb them.”  If a vis-
itor  eats  lunch  in  front  of  a  hungry  gorilla,  or  talks  to  a 
friend  near  its  enclosure,  has  he  obeyed  the  regulation? 
Surely yes.  Although the smell of human food or the sound 
of voices might well disturb gorillas, the specific examples 
of impermissible conduct all involve direct interaction with
and harassment of the zoo animals.  Merely eating or talk-
ing is so unlike the examples that the zoo provided that it