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Page Number: 52

6 

TRUMP v. HAWAII 

THOMAS, J., concurring 

tion”  from  the  King).  Equity  allowed  the  sovereign  to
afford discretionary relief to parties where relief would not 
have been available under the “rigors of the common law.” 
Jenkins, supra, at 127 (opinion of THOMAS, J.).

The  English  system  of  equity  did  not  contemplate  uni-
versal injunctions.  As an agent of the King, the Chancel-
lor  had  no  authority  to  enjoin  him.    See  Bray,  Multiple
Chancellors: Reforming the National Injunction, 131 Harv.
L. Rev.  417,  425  (2017)  (Bray).    The  Chancellor  could  not 
give  “any  relief  against  the  king,  or  direct  any  act  to  be
done by him, or make any decree disposing of or affecting 
his  property;  not  even  in  cases  where  he  is  a  royal  trus-
tee.”  3  Blackstone  428.    The  Attorney  General  could  be
sued  in  Chancery,  but  not  in  cases  that  “ ‘immediately
concerned’ ” the interests of the Crown.  Bray 425 (citing 1
E. Daniell, The Practice of the High Court of Chancery 138 
(2d  ed.  1845)).    American  courts  inherited  this  tradition. 
See  J.  Story,  Commentaries  on  Equity  Pleadings  §69 
(1838) (Story).

Moreover,  as  a  general  rule,  American  courts  of  equity
did  not  provide  relief  beyond  the  parties  to  the  case.    If 
their injunctions advantaged nonparties, that benefit was
merely  incidental.  Injunctions  barring  public  nuisances 
were an example.  While these injunctions benefited third 
parties,  that  benefit  was  merely  a  consequence  of  provid-
ing  relief  to  the  plaintiff.    Woolhandler  &  Nelson,  Does 
History Defeat Standing Doctrine? 102 Mich. L. Rev. 689,
702  (2004)  (Woolhandler  &  Nelson);  see  Pennsylvania  v. 
Wheeling  & Belmont Bridge Co., 13 How. 518, 564 (1852) 
(explaining  that  a  private  “injury  makes  [a  public  nui-
sance] a private nuisance to the injured party”).

True,  one  of  the  recognized  bases  for  an  exercise  of
equitable  power  was  the  avoidance  of  “multiplicity  of 
suits.”  Bray  426;  accord,  1  Pomeroy  §243.    Courts  would 
employ “bills of peace” to consider and resolve a number of 
suits in a single proceeding.  Id., §246.  And some authori-