Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/17pdf/16-1161_dc8f.pdf
Page Number: 30.0

4 

GILL v. WHITFORD 

KAGAN, J., concurring 

asserting  a  vote  dilution  claim—in  the  one-person,  one-
vote context or any other—always alleges.

To  have  standing  to  bring  a  partisan  gerrymandering
claim  based  on  vote  dilution,  then,  a  plaintiff  must  prove
that  the  value  of  her  own  vote  has  been  “contract[ed].” 
Wesberry, 376 U. S., at 7.  And that entails showing, as the
Court  holds,  that  she  lives  in  a  district  that  has  been 
either  packed  or  cracked.  See  ante,  at  17.  For  packing 
and cracking are the ways in which a partisan gerryman­
der dilutes votes.  Cf. Voinovich v. Quilter, 507 U. S. 146, 
153–154  (1993)  (explaining  that  packing  or  cracking  can
also  support  racial  vote  dilution  claims).    Consider  the 
perfect  form  of  each  variety.    When  a  voter  resides  in  a 
packed district, her preferred candidate will win no matter 
what; when a voter lives in a cracked district, her chosen 
candidate stands no chance of prevailing.  But either way,
such  a  citizen’s  vote  carries  less  weight—has  less  conse­
quence—than it would under a neutrally drawn map.  See 
ante,  at  14,  16.    So  when  she  shows  that  her  district  has 
been packed or cracked, she proves, as she must to estab­
lish  standing,  that  she  is  “among  the  injured.”    Lujan  v. 
Defenders  of  Wildlife,  504  U. S.  555,  563  (1992)  (quoting 
Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U. S. 727, 735 (1972)); see ante, 
at 17. 

In many partisan gerrymandering cases, that threshold
showing  will  not  be  hard  to  make.   Among  other  ways  of
proving  packing  or  cracking,  a  plaintiff  could  produce  an
alternative  map  (or  set  of  alternative  maps)—comparably 
consistent  with  traditional  districting  principles—under
which  her  vote  would  carry  more  weight.    Cf.  Ante,  at  20 
(suggesting  how  an  alternative  map  may  shed  light  on
vote dilution or its absence); Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U. S. 
234, 258 (2001) (discussing the use of alternative maps as
evidence in a racial gerrymandering case); Cooper v. Har-
ris,  581  U. S.  ___,  ___–___  (2017)  (slip  op.,  at  28–34) 
(same);  Brief  for  Political  Geography  Scholars  as  Amici