Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/22pdf/22-10_ifjn.pdf
Page Number: 27.0

2 

DUBIN v. UNITED STATES 

 GORSUCH, J., concurring
GORSUCH, J., concurring in judgment 

listed in a later subsection, “knowingly transfers, possesses,
or uses, without lawful authority, a means of identification 
of another person shall, in addition to the punishment pro-
vided for such felony, be sentenced to a term of imprison-
ment of 2 years.”  §1028A(a)(1).  Today, the Court sets out 
to determine what conduct that law reaches.  It is, as the 
Court  acknowledges,  no  easy  task.    Both  the  term  “us[e]”
and the phrase “in relation to” can support a multitude of
possible  meanings.  Ante,  at  5–7.  They  of  course  “ ‘imply 
action and implementation.’ ”  Ante, at 6 (quoting Bailey v. 
United States, 516 U. S. 137, 145 (1995)).  Beyond that “gen-
eral  concept,”  however,  we  must  fend  for  ourselves  based 
only on limited contextual clues.  Ante, at 5–7. 

The  United  States  offers  up  a  rapacious  interpretation
that would require only “the use of th[e] means of identifi-
cation [to] ‘facilitat[e] or furthe[r]’ the predicate offense in 
some  way.”    Brief  for  United  States  10  (emphasis  added).
Admittedly, this reading “fall[s] within the range” of plau-
sible meanings the statute could support.  Ante, at 7.  But 
so too do other readings—ones that require a more demand-
ing “nexus” between the “means of identification” and the
underlying misconduct.  Ante, at 7–8.  For many of the rea-
sons  the  Court  gives  (and  more  besides),  I  agree  that  we 
must adhere to those more restrained offerings.  The United 
States’ maximalist approach has simplicity on its side, yes; 
an everybody-is-guilty standard is no challenge to adminis-
ter.  But the Constitution prohibits the Judiciary from re-
solving reasonable doubts about a criminal statute’s mean-
ing by rounding up to the most punitive interpretation its
text and context can tolerate.  See Wooden v. United States, 
595 U. S. ___, ___–___ (2022) (GORSUCH, J., concurring  in 
judgment) (slip op., at 6–9).  That insight alone means Mr. 
Dubin’s §1028A(a)(1) conviction cannot stand. 

Unfortunately, our opinion cannot end there.  Having told
lower courts how not to read the statute, we owe them some 
guidance as to how they should read it.  That is where the