Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/529bv.pdf
Page Number: 786.0

529US3

Unit: $U56

[09-28-01 09:22:19] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 529 U. S. 694 (2000)

711

Opinion of the Court

to supervised release following imprisonment was parole,
which by deﬁnition was a release under supervision of a pa-
role ofﬁcer following service of some term of incarceration.
Courts have commented on the similarity. See, e. g., Meeks,
25 F. 3d, at 1121 (“[S]upervised release is essentially similar
to parole”); United States v. Paskow, 11 F. 3d 873, 881 (CA9
1993) (“Supervised release and parole are virtually identical
systems”).

In thinking about this case, it is striking that the provi-
sions of the former parole scheme dealing with the conse-
quences of violating parole conditions repeatedly used the
verb “revoke.” See, e. g., 18 U. S. C. § 4214(d)(5) (1982 ed.)
(repealed 1984, Pub. L. 98–473, §§ 218(a)(5), 235, 98 Stat.
2027, 2031) (revocation of parole); 21 U. S. C. § 841(c) (1982
ed.) (repealed 1984) (revocation of special parole). And yet
there seems never to have been a question that a new term
of parole could follow a prison sentence imposed after revo-
cation of an initial parole term.11 See, e. g., 28 CFR § 2.52(b)

11 The same is true of special parole, part of the required sentence for
certain drug offenses. Though the special parole statute did not explicitly
authorize reimposition of special parole after revocation of the initial term
and reimprisonment, the Parole Commission required it. See 28 CFR
§ 2.57(c) (1999). Some courts have recently decided that this regulation is
inconsistent with 21 U. S. C. § 841(c) (1982 ed.), see, e. g., Evans v. United
States Parole Comm’n, 78 F. 3d 262 (CA7 1996), but this does not affect
the backdrop against which Congress legislated in 1984.

As for probation, the sentencing court’s power to order a new term
following revocation was the subject of some disagreement. The pre-
Guidelines statute authorized the court to “revoke the probation and . . .
impose any sentence which might originally have been imposed.”
18
U. S. C. § 3653 (1982 ed.) (repealed). The statute thus clearly speciﬁed
that the options for postrevocation sentencing were those available at the
original sentencing; courts disputed only whether probation was a “sen-
tence” that could be imposed. See O’Neil, 11 F. 3d, at 298–299 (collecting
cases). The dispute over what counted as a sentence does not affect the
broader point that a court’s powers at the original sentencing are the
baseline from which powers at resentencing are determined. Nor is our