Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/22pdf/22-179_o75q.pdf
Page Number: 37.0

Cite as:  599 U. S. ____ (2023) 

5 

JACKSON, J., dissenting 

context in particular, the Court “may impose a limiting con-
struction  on  a  statute  only  if  it  is  ‘readily  susceptible’  to 
such a construction.”  Ibid. (some internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
  Application of our ordinary principles of statutory inter-
pretation here reveals that the encouragement provision is 
not susceptible to the narrow solicitation or facilitation con-
struction  that  the  majority  adopts,  as  explained  below.  
Thus,  this  statute  is  overbroad  and  facially  invalid  under 
the First Amendment. 

II 
  The majority contends that the encouragement provision 
in  a  “specialized,  
uses  “ ‘encourage’ ”  and  “ ‘induce’ ” 
criminal-law  sense,”  under  which  those  words  are  essen-
tially  synonymous  with  solicitation  and  facilitation  and 
carry certain narrowing features of those crimes.  Ante, at 
9.  But that construction of the statute is untenable for the 
reasons that follow. 

A 
  The  majority  starts  its  interpretation  of  the  encourage-
ment provision “with some background on solicitation and 
facilitation,”  ante,  at  6,  instead  of  addressing  any  of  the 
terms  in  the  encouragement  provision  itself.    This  is  the 
first clue that the majority’s statutory analysis is unusual.  
Ordinarily, we start with the text of the statute being inter-
preted.    Yet  the  words  “solicitation”  and  “facilitation”  ap-
pear nowhere in the encouragement provision.  (As the ma-
jority notes, facilitation is “also called aiding and abetting,” 
ibid.—another term that is absent from the encouragement 
provision.) 
  The  majority  goes  on  to  explain  that  the  terms  that  do 
appear  in  the  encouragement  provision—“encourage”  and 
“induce”—are also often used (with other words) to define 
“solicitation” and “facilitation.”  Ante, at 6–8.  For example,