Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/23pdf/23-5572_l6hn.pdf
Page Number: 37.0

Cite as:  603 U. S. ____ (2024) 

9 

BARRETT, J., dissenting 

themselves destroyed documents.  Ante, at 9–10.  Congress
enacted §1512(c) to close this “Enron gap.”  Subsection (c)(1) 
deals with the particular problem at hand—document de-
struction.  Subsection  (c)(2)  reflects  Congress’s  desire  to
avoid future surprises: It is “a catchall for matters not spe-
cifically  contemplated—known  unknowns.”  Republic  of 
Iraq v. Beaty, 556 U. S. 848, 860 (2009).

So contrary to the Court’s suggestion, it would not be “pe-
culiar” for (c)(2) to cover conduct “far beyond the document
shredding and similar scenarios that prompted the legisla-
tion in the first place.”  Ante, at 10.  Enron exposed more 
than  the  need  to  prohibit  evidence  spoliation—it  also  ex-
posed the need to close statutory gaps.  And in any event,
statutes  often  reach  beyond  the  “principal  evil”  that  ani-
mated them.  Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 
523 U. S. 75, 79 (1998).  That is not grounds for narrowing
them,  because  “it  is  ultimately  the  provisions  of  our  laws
rather  than  the  principal  concerns  of  our  legislators  by
which we are governed.”  Ibid. 

4 

While the Court insists that (c)(1) limits (c)(2), it cannot 
seem to settle on the “common attribute” in the first subsec-
tion that cabins the second.  See Ali, 552 U. S., at 225.  On 
one  hand,  the  Court  says  that  “(c)(2)  makes  it  a  crime  to 
impair the availability or integrity of records, documents, or 
objects used in an official proceeding.”  Ante, at 8 (emphasis
added).  This “physical evidence” limitation tracks the Dis-
trict Court’s interpretation.  See United States v. Miller, 589 
F. Supp. 3d 60, 78 (DC 2022).  On the other hand, the Court 
says that (c)(2) prohibits “impairing the availability or in-
tegrity of other things used in an official proceeding,” such 
as “witness testimony” or “intangible information.”  Ante, at 
9.  This  broader  “evidence  impairment”  theory  resembles 
Judge Katsas’s interpretation.  64 F. 4th 329, 363 (CADC 
2023) (dissenting opinion).