Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/20pdf/20-472_0pm1.pdf
Page Number: 22.0

Cite as:  594 U. S. ____ (2021) 

3 

BARRETT, J., dissenting 

embrace this interpretation.  Id., at 31. 

One might think that this argument is an uphill climb—
after  all,  we  do  not  usually  pin  an  interpretation  to  “the 
outer limits of a word’s definitional possibilities” at the ex-
pense of its ordinary or common meaning.1  FCC v. AT&T 
Inc.,  562  U. S.  397,  407  (2011)  (alterations  omitted).    But 
the Court takes HollyFrontier’s framing and runs with it. 
The  Court  points  out  that  the  word  “extension”  “can”  or
“may” be used to refer to post-lapse renewals.  Ante, at 6. 
And  because  the  statute  thus  “commands”  no  “continuity
requirement,” ante, at 16, the Court concludes that Holly-
Frontier’s reading must be right—which means that EPA 
can provide an “extension” of an exemption that is no longer 
in effect. 

Boiled  down,  the  Court’s  position  is  that  HollyFrontier
wins because its reading is possible.  But I would ask, as we 
typically  do,  how  the  term  “extension”  “is  most  naturally 
read.”  Florida  Dept.  of  Revenue  v.  Piccadilly  Cafeterias, 
Inc., 554 U. S. 33, 39 (2008) (emphasis added); see also Ro-
mag Fasteners, Inc. v. Fossil Group, Inc., 590 U. S. ___, ___ 
(2020) (slip op., at 4).  The Tenth Circuit’s answer to that 
question is spot on: The “ordinary definitions of ‘extension,’ 
along with common sense, dictate that the subject of an ex-
tension must be in existence before it can be extended.”  Re-
newable Fuels Assn. v. EPA, 948 F. 3d 1206, 1245 (2020). 

1 
In assessing the best reading of the phrase “extension of 
the exemption,” the Court is of course correct that context 
matters.  Here,  though,  context  cuts  respondents’  way.
Subparagraph (B)(i) does not use “extension” in a vacuum; 

—————— 

1 To be sure, in some contexts we have asked whether a term can “per-
missib[ly]” bear an asserted meaning.  E.g., Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Nat-
ural  Resources  Defense  Council,  Inc.,  467  U. S.  837,  843  (1984).    The 
Court avoids express reliance on that argument here.