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Page Number: 34.0

10 

VAN BUREN v. UNITED STATES 

THOMAS, J., dissenting 

accords with the definition here, which regulates a person’s
“use” of a computer after entering it.  §1030(e)(6).  Here, as 
in other contexts of property law, a person’s authority to use
his access to property is circumstance dependent.  The ma-
jority’s focus on the term “access”—at the expense of “au-
thority” and “entitled”—harms, not helps, its argument. 

II 
What the text and established concepts of property law
make clear, statutory history reinforces. The original text
of this Act expressly prohibited accessing a computer with 
authorization and then “us[ing] the opportunity such access
provides for purposes to which such authorization does not 
extend.”  98 Stat. 2191.  The Act thus applied when persons
used computers for improper reasons—just like Van Buren 
indisputably did here.

The  majority  does  not  deny  this.  Instead,  it  notes  that 
Congress amended the text in 1986 to its present definition, 
and it says that the Court can presume that Congress’ de-
cision  to  omit  the  term  “purpose”  necessarily  eliminated
any  prohibition  against  obtaining  information  for  an  im-
proper purpose.  Ante, at 17. 

But  the  majority  cannot  so  easily  evade  this  history.
True,  the  statute  previously  included  the  term  “purpose”
and  now  does  not,  but  the  majority  fails  to  consider  how 
that change affected the statute.  Often, deleting a word ex-
pands, rather than constricts, the scope of a provision.  If a 
city changes a sign in a park from “no unleashed dogs” to 
“no dogs,” nobody would presume that unleashed dogs are 
now allowed.  The same is true when the specific is replaced
by the general (“no dogs” to “no pets”).

Congress’ change to this statute similarly broadened the
law.  The original text prohibited accessing a computer with
authorization  then  “us[ing]  the  opportunity  such  access 
provides for purposes to which such authorization does not 
extend.”  The term “purpose” limited that clause to purpose-