Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/19pdf/19-635_o7jq.pdf
Page Number: 26

Cite as:  591 U. S. ____ (2020) 

21 

Opinion of the Court 

tion or impediment.”  3 J. Story, Commentaries on the Con-
stitution  of  the  United  States  §1563,  pp.  418–419  (1833).
As  a  result,  “once  the  President  sets  forth  and  explains  a
conflict between judicial proceeding and public duties,” or 
shows that an order or subpoena would “significantly inter-
fere with his efforts to carry out” those duties, “the matter
changes.”  Clinton,  520  U. S.,  at  710,  714  (opinion  of 
BREYER, J.).  At that point, a court should use its inherent
authority to quash or modify the subpoena, if necessary to 
ensure that such “interference with the President’s duties 
would not occur.”  Id., at 708 (opinion of the Court). 

* 

* 

* 
Two hundred years ago, a great jurist of our Court estab-
lished that no citizen, not even the President, is categori-
cally  above  the  common  duty  to  produce  evidence  when
called  upon  in  a  criminal  proceeding.  We  reaffirm  that 
principle today and hold that the President is neither abso-
lutely  immune  from state  criminal  subpoenas  seeking  his
private  papers  nor  entitled  to  a  heightened  standard  of 
need.  The “guard[ ] furnished to this high officer” lies where
it always has—in “the conduct of a court” applying estab-
lished legal and constitutional principles to individual sub-
poenas in a manner that preserves both the independence
of  the  Executive  and  the  integrity  of  the  criminal  justice 
system.  Burr, 25 F. Cas., at 34. 

The  arguments  presented  here  and  in  the  Court  of  Ap-
peals  were  limited  to  absolute  immunity  and  heightened 
need.  The Court of Appeals, however, has directed that the
case be returned to the District Court, where the President 
may raise further arguments as appropriate.  941 F. 3d, at 
646, n. 19.6 

—————— 

6 The daylight between our opinion and JUSTICE THOMAS’s “dissent” is 
not  as  great  as  that  label  might  suggest.  Post,  at  12.  We  agree  that 
Presidents are neither absolutely immune from state criminal subpoenas 
nor insulated by a heightened need standard.  Post, at 6, 11, n. 3.  We