Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/18pdf/17-71_omjp.pdf
Page Number: 3

Cite as:  586 U. S. ____ (2018) 

3 

Syllabus 

“may exclude any area from critical habitat if he determines that the
benefits of such exclusion outweigh the benefits of ” designation.  The 
word “may” certainly confers discretion on the Secretary, but it does 
not segregate his discretionary decision not to exclude from the man-
dated procedure to consider the economic and other impacts of desig-
nation  when  making  his  exclusion  decisions.    The  statute  is,  there-
fore, not “drawn so that a court would have no meaningful standard 
against  which  to  judge  the  [Secretary’s]  exercise  of  [his]  discretion” 
not  to  exclude.  Lincoln,  508  U. S.,  at  191.    Weyerhaeuser’s  claim— 
that the agency did not appropriately consider all the relevant statu-
tory  factors  meant  to  guide  the  agency  in  the  exercise  of  its  discre-
tion—is  the  sort  of  claim  that  federal  courts  routinely  assess  when 
determining  whether  to  set  aside  an  agency  decision  as  an  abuse  of 
discretion.  The Court of Appeals should consider in the first instance
the question whether the Service’s assessment of the costs and bene-
fits  of  designation  and  resulting  decision  not  to  exclude  Unit  1  was 
arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion.  Pp. 10–15. 

 827 F. 3d 452, vacated and remanded. 

ROBERTS, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which all other
Members joined, except KAVANAUGH, J., who took no part in the consid-
eration or decision of the case.