Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/09pdf/08-1529.pdf
Page Number: 13

10 

HUI v. CASTANEDA 

Opinion of the Court 

exception in §2679(b)(2)(A) impliedly repealed pre-existing 
immunity  provisions  to  the  extent  of  any  inconsistency.
“As  we  have  emphasized,  repeals  by  implication  are  not
favored  and  will  not  be  presumed  unless  the  intention  of 
the legislature to repeal is clear and manifest.”  Hawaii v. 
Office  of  Hawaiian  Affairs,  556  U. S.  ___,  ___–___  (2009)
(slip  op.,  at  10–11)  (internal  quotation  marks  and  altera-
tion  omitted).  Respondents  have  pointed  to  nothing  in 
§2679(b)’s text or drafting history that suggests that Con-
gress  intended  to  repeal  the  more  comprehensive  immu-
nity provided by §233(a). 

Finally, respondents contend that other features of §233
show that subsection (a) does not make the remedy under 
the  FTCA  exclusive  of  all  other  actions  against  PHS  per-
sonnel.  Respondents first note §233’s lack of a procedure
for “scope certification” in federal-court actions.  Under the 
FTCA,  “certification  by  the  Attorney  General  that  the
defendant  employee  was  acting  within  the  scope  of  his 
office  or  employment  at  the  time  of  the  incident  out  of
which  the  claim  arose”  transforms  an  action  against  an
individual  federal  employee  into  one  against  the  United
States.  §2679(d)(1).  Because  §233  does  not  provide  a
similar  mechanism  for  scope  certification  in  federal-court 
actions,9  respondents  contend  that  PHS  defendants  seek-
ing to invoke the immunity provided by §233(a) must rely 
on  the  FTCA’s  scope  certification  procedure,  set  forth  in 
§2679(d).  Section  2679(d),  respondents  note,  is  in  turn
subject  to  the  “limitations  and  exceptions”  applicable  to 
actions  under  the  FTCA—including  the  exception  for 
Bivens actions provided by §2679(b)(2).  See §2679(d)(4). 

—————— 

9 Section  233(c)  includes  such  a  provision  for  state-court  actions,  au-
thorizing  removal  to  federal  court  “[u]pon  a  certification  by  the  Attor-
ney General that the defendant was acting in the scope of his employ-
ment at the time of the incident out of which the suit arose,” but unlike 
§2679(d)  it  does  not  prescribe  a  particular  mechanism  for  substituting
the United States in federal-court actions.