Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/22pdf/21-806_2dp3.pdf
Page Number: 63.0

Cite as:  599 U. S. ____ (2023) 

31 

THOMAS, J., dissenting 

source in one of Congress’ enumerated powers or the legis-
lative powers of the States.  Congress’ spending power can-
not secure rights by law. 

IV 

The contractual nature of spending conditions was taken 
as a given until the second half of the 20th century, when
individuals first began to bring §1983 suits premised on vi-
olations  of  conditions  contained  within  spending  statutes
(usually, the Social Security Act).  From the enactment of 
§1983’s predecessor statute in 1871 to the Court’s decision
in Thiboutot in 1980, this Court had never held that §1983 
was  available  to  redress  any  and  all  violations  of  federal 
legislation.  Indeed, there were almost “no square holdings”
concerning the precise scope of the statutory rights vindica-
ble by §1983.  Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Organi-
zation,  441  U. S.  600,  645  (1979)  (Powell,  J.,  concurring); 
see  also  Eisen  v.  Eastman,  421  F. 2d  560,  561–566  (CA2 
1969) (Friendly, J.).  Perhaps the only such square holding 
was that of Holt v. Indiana Mfg. Co., 176 U. S. 68 (1900),
which  narrowly  construed  §1983’s  predecessor  statute  to 
“refer to civil rights only,” making it “inapplicable” in a suit 
based on the federal patent laws.  Id., at 72.12 

—————— 

12 This  civil  rights  connection  was  not  arbitrary.    Section  1983  origi-
nated in the Enforcement Act of 1871, which Congress “passed for the 
express purpose of ‘enforc[ing] the Provisions of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.’ ”  Thiboutot, 448 U. S., at 25, n. 15 (Powell, J., dissenting) (quoting 
17  Stat.  13;  alteration  in  original).    Moreover,  the  original  text  of  the 
statute referred only to rights “secured by the Constitution of the United
States,” 17 Stat. 13, the words “and laws” being added as part of the gen-
eral 1874 revision of the federal statutes.  Rev. Stat. §1979, 42 U. S. C. 
§1983.    Under  the  circumstances,  there  is  substantial  reason  to  doubt 
that  Congress  fundamentally  transformed  a  mechanism  to  enforce  the 
Reconstruction Amendments into a freestanding right of action to reme-
diate the violation of any federal statute, even those enacted beyond Con-
gress’ civil rights enforcement powers.  Importantly, if statutory §1983 
actions  were  confined  to  laws  enacted  under  Congress’  Reconstruction 
Amendments enforcement powers—under which Congress may directly