Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/23pdf/22-915_8o6b.pdf
Page Number: 99.0

28 

UNITED STATES v. RAHIMI 

THOMAS, J., dissenting 

only “law-abiding, responsible citizens” is specious at best.7 
See ante, at 17. 

At argument, the Government invented yet another posi-
tion.  It explained that when it used the term “responsible”
in its briefs, it really meant “not dangerous.”  See Tr. of Oral 
Arg. 10–11.  Thus, it posited that the Second Amendment 
protects only law-abiding and non-dangerous citizens.  No 
matter  how  many  adjectives  the  Government  swaps  out, 
the fact remains that the Court has never adopted anything
akin to the Government’s test.  In reality, the “law-abiding,
dangerous citizen” test is the Government’s own creation,
designed to justify every one of its existing regulations.  It 
has no doctrinal or constitutional mooring.

The Government finally tries to cram its dangerousness 
test into our precedents.  It argues that §922(g)(8) and its 
proffered historical laws have a shared justification of dis-
arming  dangerous  citizens.  The  Government,  however, 
does not draw that conclusion by examining the historical 
justification  for  each  law  cited.    Instead,  the  Government 
simply looks—from a modern vantage point—at the mix of 
laws and manufactures a possible connection between them 
all.  Yet,  our  task  is  to  “assess  whether  modern  firearms 
regulations  are  consistent  with  the  Second  Amendment’s 
text and historical understanding.”  Bruen, 597 U. S., at 26 
(emphasis added).  To do so, we must look at the historical 
law’s  justification  as  articulated  during  the  relevant  time 
period—not at modern post-hoc speculations.  See, e.g., id., 
at 41–42, 48–49; Heller, 554 U. S., at 631–632.  As I have 
explained, a historically based study of the evidence reveals 
that the Government’s position is untenable.  Supra, at 7– 

—————— 

7 The only conceivably relevant language in our precedents is the pass-
ing reference in Heller to laws banning felons and others from possessing 
firearms.  See 554 U. S., at 626–627, and n. 26.  That discussion is dicta. 
As for Bruen, the Court used the phrase “ordinary, law-abiding citizens” 
merely to describe those who were unable to publicly carry a firearm in 
New York.  See, e.g., 597 U. S., at 9, 15, 31–32, 71.