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2 

WAL-MART STORES, INC. v. DUKES 

Syllabus 

prove  that  the  class  has  common  “questions  of  law  or  fact.”    Their 
claims must depend upon a common contention of such a nature that
it  is  capable  of  classwide  resolution—which  means  that  determina-
tion of its  truth or falsity will resolve an  issue that is central to  the
validity of each one of the claims  in one stroke.  Here, proof of com-
monality  necessarily  overlaps  with  respondents’  merits  contention 
that  Wal-Mart  engages  in  a  pattern  or  practice  of  discrimination. 
The  crux  of  a  Title  VII  inquiry  is  “the  reason  for  a  particular  em-
ployment decision,” Cooper v. Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, 467 
U. S.  867,  876,  and  respondents  wish  to  sue  for  millions  of  employ-
ment  decisions  at  once.  Without  some  glue  holding  together  the  al-
leged reasons for those decisions, it will be impossible to say that ex-
amination  of  all  the  class  members’  claims  will  produce  a  common 
answer to the crucial discrimination question.  Pp. 8–12.

(b) General Telephone Co. of Southwest v. Falcon, 457 U. S. 147, 
describes  the  proper  approach  to  commonality.    On  the  facts  of  this 
case, the conceptual gap between an individual’s discrimination claim
and  “the  existence  of  a  class  of  persons  who  have  suffered  the  same
injury,”  id.,  at  157–158,  must  be  bridged  by  “[s]ignificant  proof  that 
an  employer  operated  under  a  general  policy  of  discrimination,”  id., 
at 159, n. 15.  Such proof is absent here.  Wal-Mart’s announced pol-
icy forbids sex discrimination, and the company has penalties for de-
nials  of  equal  opportunity.    Respondents’  only  evidence  of  a  general
discrimination policy was a sociologist’s analysis asserting that Wal-
Mart’s corporate culture made it vulnerable to gender bias.  But be-
cause  he  could  not  estimate  what  percent  of  Wal-Mart  employment
decisions  might  be  determined  by  stereotypical  thinking,  his  testi-
mony was worlds away from “significant proof” that Wal-Mart “oper-
ated under a general policy of discrimination.”  Pp. 12–14.

(c) The only corporate policy that the plaintiffs’ evidence convinc-
ingly  establishes  is  Wal-Mart’s  “policy”  of  giving  local  supervisors
discretion  over  employment  matters.    While  such  a  policy  could  be 
the  basis  of  a  Title  VII  disparate-impact  claim,  recognizing  that  a
claim  “can”  exist  does  not  mean  that  every  employee  in  a  company 
with  that  policy  has  a  common  claim.    In  a  company  of  Wal-Mart’s 
size  and  geographical  scope,  it  is  unlikely  that  all  managers  would 
exercise their discretion in a common way without some common di-
rection.    Respondents’  attempt  to  show  such  direction  by  means  of 
statistical and anecdotal evidence falls well short.  Pp. 14–20.

2. Respondents’  backpay  claims  were  improperly  certified  under 

Rule 23(b)(2).  Pp. 20–27. 

(a) Claims  for  monetary  relief  may  not  be  certified  under  Rule
23(b)(2),  at  least  where  the  monetary  relief  is  not  incidental  to  the
requested injunctive or declaratory relief.  It is unnecessary to decide