Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/524bv.pdf
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MUSCARELLO v. UNITED STATES

Ginsburg, J., dissenting

pays scant attention to a core reason for the rule of lenity:
“[B]ecause of the seriousness of criminal penalties, and be-
cause criminal punishment usually represents the moral con-
demnation of the community,
legislatures and not courts
should deﬁne criminal activity. This policy embodies ‘the
instinctive distaste against men languishing in prison unless
the lawmaker has clearly said they should.’ ” United States
v. Bass, 404 U. S. 336, 348 (1971) (quoting H. Friendly, Mr.
Justice Frankfurter and the Reading of Statutes, in Bench-
marks 196, 209 (1967)).

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The narrower “on or about [one’s] person” construction of
“carries a ﬁrearm” is consistent with the Court’s construc-
tion of “uses” in Bailey to entail an immediacy element.
It
respects the Guidelines system by resisting overbroad read-
ings of statutes that deviate from that system. See McFad-
den, 13 F. 3d, at 468 (Breyer, C. J., dissenting).
It ﬁts plau-
sibly with other provisions of the “Firearms” chapter, and it
adheres to the principle that, given two readings of a penal
provision, both consistent with the statutory text, we do not
choose the harsher construction. The Court, in my view,
should leave it to Congress to speak “ ‘in language that is
clear and deﬁnite’ ” if the Legislature wishes to impose the
sterner penalty. Bass, 404 U. S., at 347 (quoting United
States v. Universal C. I. T. Credit Corp., 344 U. S. 218, 222
(1952)). Accordingly, I would reverse the judgments of the
First and Fifth Circuits.