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Page Number: 8.0

6 

KANSAS v. GLOVER 

Opinion of the Court 

concerns motivating the State’s various grounds for revoca-
tion lend further credence to the inference that a registered
owner with a revoked Kansas driver’s license might be the
one driving the vehicle. 

IV 

Glover and the dissent respond with two arguments as to 
why Deputy Mehrer lacked reasonable suspicion.  Neither 
is persuasive. 

A 
First, Glover and the dissent argue that Deputy Mehrer’s
inference was unreasonable because it was not grounded in
his law enforcement training or experience.  Nothing in our
Fourth Amendment precedent supports the notion that, in
determining whether reasonable suspicion exists, an officer 
can  draw  inferences  based  on  knowledge  gained  only
through law enforcement training and experience.  We have 
repeatedly recognized the opposite.  In Navarette, we noted 
a  number  of  behaviors—including  driving  in  the  median,
crossing the center line on a highway, and swerving—that 
as  a  matter  of  common  sense  provide  “sound  indicia  of 
drunk driving.”  572 U. S., at 402.  In Wardlow, we made 
the  unremarkable  observation  that  “[h]eadlong  flight—
wherever it occurs—is the consummate act of evasion” and 
therefore could factor into a police officer’s reasonable sus-
picion determination.  528 U. S., at 124.  And in Sokolow, 
we recognized that the defendant’s method of payment for
an airplane ticket contributed to the agents’ reasonable sus-
picion of drug trafficking because we “fe[lt] confident” that 
“[m]ost  business  travelers  . . .  purchase  airline  tickets  by
credit card or check” rather than cash.  490 U. S., at 8–9. 
So  too  here.    The  inference  that  the  driver  of  a  car  is  its 
registered owner does not require any specialized training;
rather, it is a reasonable inference made by ordinary people 
on a daily basis.