Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/17pdf/16-1466_2b3j.pdf
Page Number: 28

Cite as:  585 U. S. ____ (2018) 

23 

Opinion of the Court 

sensitive  or  policymaking  position  may  freely  criticize  his 
superiors and the policies they espouse.”  431 U. S., at 230, 
n. 27.  That  aside  has  no  bearing  on  the  agency-fee  issue 
here.9 

Respondents’  reliance  on  Pickering  is  thus  “an  effort  to 
find a new justification for the decision in Abood.”  Harris, 
supra,  at  ___  (slip  op.,  at  34).  And  we  have  previously
taken a dim view of similar attempts to recast problematic 
First  Amendment  decisions.  See,  e.g.,  Citizens  United  v. 
Federal  Election  Comm’n,  558  U. S.  310,  348–349,  363 
(2010)  (rejecting  efforts  to  recast  Austin  v.  Michigan 
Chamber  of  Commerce,  494  U. S.  652  (1990));  see  also 
Citizens  United,  supra,  at  382–385  (ROBERTS,  C. J.,  con­
curring).  We see no good reason, at this late date, to try to 
shoehorn Abood into the Pickering framework. 

2 
Even if that were attempted, the shoe would be a pain­

ful fit for at least three reasons. 
  First, the Pickering framework was developed for use in 
a  very  different  context—in  cases  that  involve  “one  em­
ployee’s  speech  and  its  impact  on  that  employee’s  public
responsibilities.”    United  States  v.  Treasury  Employees, 
513 U. S. 454, 467 (1995).  This case, by contrast, involves 
a blanket requirement that all employees subsidize speech 
with which they may not agree.  While we have sometimes 
looked to Pickering in considering general rules that affect 
broad categories of employees, we have acknowledged that 

—————— 

9 Justice Powell’s separate opinion did invoke Pickering in a relevant 
sense,  but  he  did  so  only  to  acknowledge  the  State’s  relatively  greater 
interest  in  regulating  speech  when  it  acts  as  employer  than  when  it
acts as sovereign.  Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Ed., 431 U. S. 209, 259 (1977)
(concurring in judgment).  In the very next sentence, he explained that
“even in public employment, a significant impairment of First Amend­
ment rights must survive exacting scrutiny.”  Ibid. (internal quotation 
marks omitted).  That is the test we apply today.