Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/09pdf/08-1371.pdf
Page Number: 3.0

Cite as:  561 U. S. ____ (2010) 

3 

Syllabus 

(a) The  Court’s  limited  public  forum  decisions  supply  the  appro-
priate  framework  for  assessing  both  CLS’s  free-speech  and  expres-
sive-association  claims;  those  decisions  recognize  that  a  governmen-
tal  entity,  in  regulating  property  in  its  charge,  may  impose
restrictions on speech that are reasonable in light of the purposes of
the forum and viewpoint neutral, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rector and Visi-
tors of Univ. of Va., 515 U. S. 819, 829.  CLS urges the Court to apply
to its expressive-association claim a different line of cases—decisions
in  which  the  Court  has  rigorously  reviewed  restrictions  on  associa-
tional freedom in the context of public accommodations, e.g., Roberts 
v. United States Jaycees, 468 U. S. 609, 623.  But, because CLS’s ex-
pressive-association  and  free-speech  arguments  merge—who  speaks
on its behalf, CLS reasons, colors what concept is conveyed—it makes 
little  sense  to  treat  the  claims  as  discrete.    Instead,  three  observa-
tions  lead  the  Court  to  analyze  CLS’s  arguments  under  limited-
public-forum precedents. 

First,  the  same  considerations  that  have  led  the  Court  to  apply  a
less restrictive level of scrutiny to speech in limited public forums, as 
compared to other environments, apply with equal force to expressive
association  occurring  in  a  limited public  forum.    Speech  and  expres-
sive-association  rights  are  closely  linked.    See  id.,  at  622.  When 
these  intertwined  rights  arise  in  exactly  the  same  context,  it  would 
be anomalous for a speech restriction to survive constitutional review
under  the  limited-public-forum  test  only  to  be  invalidated  as  an  im-
permissible infringement of expressive association.  Second, the strict 
scrutiny the Court has applied in some settings to laws that burden
expressive association would, in practical effect, invalidate a defining
characteristic  of  limited  public  forums—the  State’s  authority  to  “re-
serv[e]  [them]  for  certain  groups.”    Rosenberger,  515  U. S.,  at  829. 
Third,  this  case  fits  comfortably  within  the  limited-public-forum 
category, for CLS may exclude any person for any reason if it forgoes
the benefits of official recognition.  The Court’s expressive-association
decisions, in contrast, involved regulations that compelled a group to
include unwanted members, with no choice to opt out.  See, e.g., Boy 
Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U. S. 640, 648.  Application of the less-
restrictive  limited-public-forum  analysis  better  accounts  for  the  fact 
that  Hastings,  through  its  RSO  program,  is  dangling  the  carrot  of 
subsidy, not wielding the stick of prohibition.  Pp. 12–17.

(b) In  three  cases,  this  Court  held  that  public  universities  had
unconstitutionally  singled  out  student  groups  for  disfavored  treat-
ment because of their points of view.  See Healy v. James, 408 U. S. 
169;  Widmar  v.  Vincent,  454  U. S.  263;  and  Rosenberger.  Most  re-
cently  and  comprehensively,  in  Rosenberger,  the  Court  held  that  a 
university  generally  may  not  withhold  benefits  from  student  groups