Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/22pdf/21-869_87ad.pdf
Page Number: 27

Cite as:  598 U. S. ____ (2023) 

21 

Opinion of the Court 

“for a commercial or profit-making purpose” with “private 
home use”).

Here, Goldsmith’s copyrighted photograph has been used 
in multiple ways: After Goldsmith licensed the photograph 
to Vanity Fair to serve as an artist reference, Warhol used
the  photograph  to  create  the  Vanity  Fair  illustration  and
the other Prince Series works.  Vanity Fair then used the
photograph,  pursuant  to  the  license,  when  it  published
Warhol’s illustration in 1984.  Finally, AWF used the pho-
tograph  when  it  licensed  an  image  of  Warhol’s  Orange
Prince to Condé Nast in 2016.  Only that last use, however,
AWF’s  commercial  licensing  of  Orange  Prince  to  Condé 
Nast, is alleged to be infringing.9  We limit our analysis ac-
cordingly.  In particular, the Court expresses no opinion as 
to the creation, display, or sale of any of the original Prince
Series works.10 

—————— 

9 AWF  sought  a  declaratory  judgment  that  would  cover  the  original 
Prince  Series  works,  but  Goldsmith  has  abandoned  all  claims  to  relief 
other than her claim as to the 2016 Condé Nast license and her request 
for  prospective  relief  as  to  similar  commercial  licensing.    Brief  for  Re-
spondents 3, 17–18; Tr. of Oral Arg. 80–82. 

10 The dissent, however, focuses on a case that is not before the Court. 
No, not whether Francis Bacon would have made fair use of Velásquez’s 
painting, had American copyright law applied in Europe with a term of
300 years post mortem auctoris.  But cf. post, at 32–34 (opinion of KAGAN, 
J.).    Rather,  Congress  has  directed courts  to  examine  the  purpose  and 
character of the challenged “use.”  17 U. S. C. §107(1).  Yet the dissent 
assumes that any and all uses of an original work entail the same first-
factor  analysis  based  solely  on  the  content  of  a  secondary  work.    This 
assumption contradicts the fair use statute and this Court’s precedents. 
See supra, at 20–21.  Had AWF’s use been solely for teaching purposes, 
that clearly would affect the analysis, and the statute permits no other 
conclusion.  Preferring not to focus on the specific use alleged to infringe
Goldsmith’s copyright, the dissent begins with a sleight of hand, see post, 
at 1, n. 1, and continues with a false equivalence between AWF’s com-
mercial licensing and Warhol’s original creation.  The result is a series 
of  misstatements  and  exaggerations,  from  the  dissent’s  very  first  sen-