Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/529bv.pdf
Page Number: 118

529US1

Unit: $U32

[10-04-01 09:20:53] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 529 U. S. 1 (2000)

43

Thomas, J., dissenting

out an anticipatory challenge, did not qualify for the Michi-
gan Academy exception to § 1395ii because others in his
class could afford to pursue review by undergoing the sur-
gery and presenting a concrete claim for reimbursement.
See ante, at 12. Setting aside the peculiarity of interpreting
a statute to deny judicial review to the poor with the promise
that the rich will obtain review in their stead,10 the ma-
jority’s gloss on Ringer ignores the Ringer Court’s own de-
In rejecting plaintiff Ringer’s at-
scription of its holding.
tempt to use § 1331, the Ringer Court did not rely on some
notion that Ringer or those similarly situated to him could
as a practical matter seek judicial review through some
means other than § 1331; the Court instead reasoned that
Ringer’s claim was “essentially one requesting the payment
of beneﬁts for [a particular] surgery, a claim cognizable only
under § 405(g).”

466 U. S., at 620.

III
It would overstate matters to say that the foregoing analy-
sis demonstrates beyond question that respondent may in-
voke general federal-question jurisdiction. Any remaining
doubt is resolved, however, by the longstanding canon that
“judicial review of executive action ‘will not be cut off unless
there is persuasive reason to believe that such was the pur-
pose of Congress.’ ” Gutierrez de Martinez v. Lamagno,
515 U. S. 417, 424 (1995) (quoting Abbott Laboratories v.
Gardner, 387 U. S. 136, 140 (1967)). See also, e. g., McNary
v. Haitian Refugee Center, Inc., 498 U. S. 479, 496 (1991);

10 The majority attempts to soften the blow by explaining that “indi-
vidual hardship may be mitigated in a different way, namely, through
excusing a number of the steps in the agency process, though not the step
of presentment of the matter to the agency.” Ante, at 23 (emphasis
added). But the italicized words show why the majority’s concession pro-
vides cold comfort to a plaintiff like Ringer—or, arguably, the nursing
homes represented by respondent here, see ante, at 21–22—who cannot
afford to present a concrete claim to the agency, and thus can obtain
neither administrative nor judicial review.