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Page Number: 60.0

16 

ZIGLAR v. ABBASI 

BREYER, J., dissenting 

gress,  though  likely  aware  of  the  “high-level  policies”
involved  in  this  suit,  did  not  “choose  to  extend  to  any 
person  the  kind  of  remedies”  that  the  plaintiffs  here
“seek.”  Ante, at 20–21 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
I doubt the strength of these two general considerations. 

The  first  consideration,  in  my  view,  is  not  relevant.    I 
concede  that  the  majority  and  concurring  opinions  in 
Bivens looked in part for support to the fact that the Court
had implied damages remedies from statutes silent on the 
subject.  See 403 U. S., at 397; id., at 402–403 (Harlan, J., 
concurring  in  judgment).    But  that  was  not  the  main 
argument  favoring  the  Court’s  conclusion.    Rather,  the 
Court drew far stronger support from the need for such a 
remedy when measured against a common-law and consti-
tutional  history  of  allowing  traditional  legal  remedies 
where  necessary.  Id.,  at  392,  396–397.  The  Court  be-
lieved such a remedy was necessary to make effective the
Constitution’s protection of certain basic individual rights. 
See  id.,  at  392;  id.,  at  407  (opinion  of  Harlan,  J.).  Simi-
larly,  as  the  Court  later  explained,  a  damages  remedy
against federal officials prevented the serious legal anom-
aly  I  previously  mentioned.    Its  existence  made  basic 
constitutional protections of the individual against Federal 
Government abuse (the Bill of Rights’ pre-Civil War objec-
tive)  as  effective  as  protections  against  abuse  by  state 
officials  (the  post-Civil  War,  post  selective-incorporation
objective).  See supra, at 7. 

Nor is the second circumstance—congressional silence—
relevant  in  the  manner  that  the  majority  opinion  de-
scribes.  The Court initially saw that silence as indicating 
an  absence  of  congressional  hostility  to  the  Court’s  exer-
cise  of  its  traditional  remedy-inferring  powers.    See 
Bivens, supra, at 397; Davis, 442 U. S., at 246–247.  Con-
gress’  subsequent  silence  contains  strong  signs  that  it 
accepted Bivens actions as part of the law.  After all, Con-
gress  rejected  a  proposal  that  would  have  eliminated