Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/558bv.pdf
Page Number: 372.0

Cite as: 558 U. S. 209 (2010) 

211 

Per Curiam 

box and the remaining 28 could have ﬁt entirely on one side 
of  the  courtroom,  leaving  adequate  room  for  the  public. 
App.  to  Pet.  for  Cert.  E–37,  E–41.  The  trial  court  denied 
the  motion,  commenting  that  it  preferred  to  seat  jurors 
throughout the entirety of the courtroom, and “it’s up to the 
individual  judge  to  decide  .  .  .  what’s  comfortable.”  Id.,  at 
E–38.  The court continued: “It’s totally up to my discretion 
whether  or  not  I  want  family  members  in  the  courtroom  to 
intermingle with the jurors and sit directly behind the jurors 
where  they  might  overhear  some  inadvertent  comment  or 
conversation.”  Id., at E–42 to E–43.  On appeal, the Court 
of  Appeals  of  Georgia  agreed,  ﬁnding  “[t]here  was  no  abuse 
of  discretion  here,  when  the  trial  court  explained  the  need 
to  exclude  spectators  at  the  voir  dire  stage  of  the  proceed­
ings and when members of the public were invited to return 
afterward.”  290  Ga.  App.  99,  100–101,  658  S.  E.  2d  773, 
775 (2008). 

The  Supreme  Court  of  Georgia  granted  certiorari  and  af­
ﬁrmed,  with  two  justices  dissenting.  After  ﬁnding  “the 
trial  court  certainly  had  an  overriding  interest  in  ensuring 
that potential jurors heard no inherently prejudicial remarks 
from  observers  during  voir  dire,”  the  Supreme  Court  of 
Georgia rejected Presley’s argument that the trial court was 
required  to  consider  alternatives  to  closing  the  courtroom. 
285 Ga., at 272, 273, 674 S. E. 2d, at 911.  It noted that “the 
United States Supreme Court [has] not provide[d] clear guid­
ance  regarding  whether  a  court  must,  sua  sponte,  advance 
its  own  alternatives  to  [closure],”  and  the  court  ruled  that 
“Presley  was  obliged  to  present  the  court  with  any  alterna­
tives that he wished the court to consider.”  Id., at 273, 674 
S.  E.  2d,  at  911,  912.  When  no  alternatives  are  offered,  it 
concluded, “there is no abuse of discretion in the court’s fail­
ure to sua sponte advance its own alternatives.”  Id., at 274, 
674 S. E. 2d, at 912. 

This  Court’s  rulings  with  respect  to  the  public  trial  right 
rest upon two different provisions of the Bill of Rights, both