Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/19pdf/18-1195_g314.pdf
Page Number: 2.0

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ESPINOZA v. MONTANA DEPT. OF REVENUE 

Syllabus 

Id.,  at  ___.  Here,  the  application  of  Montana’s  no-aid  provision  ex-
cludes religious schools from public benefits solely because of religious 
status.  As a result, strict scrutiny applies.  Pp. 6–12.

(b) Contrary  to  the  Department’s  contention,  this  case  is  not  gov-
erned  by  Locke  v.  Davey,  540  U. S.  712.    The  plaintiff  in  Locke  was 
denied  a  scholarship  “because  of  what  he  proposed  to  do—use  the 
funds to prepare for the ministry,” an essentially religious endeavor. 
Trinity Lutheran, 582 U. S., at ___.  By contrast, Montana’s no-aid pro-
vision does not zero in on any essentially religious course of instruction 
but rather bars aid to a religious school “simply because of what it is”—
a religious school.  Id., at ___.  Locke also invoked a “historic and sub-
stantial” state interest in not funding the training of clergy, 540 U. S., 
at  725,  but  no  comparable  tradition  supports  Montana’s  decision  to 
disqualify religious schools from government aid.  Pp. 12–16.

(c) The proposed alternative approach involving a flexible case-by-
case analysis is inconsistent with Trinity Lutheran.  The protections of 
the Free Exercise Clause do not depend on a varying case-by-case anal-
ysis  regarding  whether  discrimination  against  religious  adherents 
would serve ill-defined interests.  Pp. 16–18. 

(d) To satisfy strict scrutiny, government action “must advance ‘in-
terests of the highest order’ and must be narrowly tailored in pursuit 
of those interests.”  Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 
U. S.  520,  546.    Montana’s  interest  in  creating  greater separation  of 
church and State than the Federal Constitution requires “cannot qual-
ify as compelling” in the face of the infringement of free exercise here. 
Trinity Lutheran, 582 U. S., at ___.  The Department’s argument that 
the no-aid provision actually promotes religious freedom is unavailing 
because an infringement of First Amendment rights cannot be justi-
fied by a State’s alternative view that the infringement advances reli-
gious liberty.  The Department’s argument is especially unconvincing 
because  the  infringement  here  broadly  burdens  not  only  religious 
schools but also the families whose children attend them.  The Depart-
ment suggests that the no-aid provision safeguards public education
by ensuring that government support is not diverted to private schools, 
but that interest does not justify a no-aid provision that requires only 
religious private schools to bear its weight.  Pp. 18–20.

(e) Because the Free Exercise Clause barred the application of the 
no-aid provision here, the Montana Supreme Court had no authority 
to invalidate the program on the basis of that provision.  The Depart-
ment argues that the invalidation of the entire program prevented a 
free exercise violation, but the Department overlooks the Montana Su-
preme Court’s threshold error of federal law.  Had the Montana Su-
preme  Court  recognized  that  the  application  of  the  no-aid  provision 
was barred by the Free Exercise Clause, the Court would have had no