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14 

KNOX v. SERVICE EMPLOYEES 

Opinion of the Court 

IV 

By authorizing a union to collect fees from nonmembers
and permitting the use of an opt-out system for the collec-
tion  of  fees  levied  to  cover  nonchargeable  expenses,  our 
prior  decisions  approach,  if  they  do  not  cross,  the  limit  of
what the First Amendment can tolerate.  The SEIU, how-
ever, asks us to go farther.  It asks us to approve a proce-
dure  under  which  (a)  a  special  assessment  billed  for  use 
in  electoral  campaigns  was  assessed  without  providing  a
new  opportunity  for  nonmembers  to  decide  whether  they
wished  to  contribute  to  this  effort  and  (b)  nonmembers
who  previously  opted  out  were  nevertheless  required  to 
pay  more  than  half  of  the  special  assessment  even
though  the  union  had  said  that  the  purpose  of  the  fund 
was  to  mount  a  political  campaign  and  that  it  would  not 
be used for ordinary union expenses.  This aggressive use
of  power  by  the  SEIU  to  collect  fees  from  nonmembers  is
indefensible. 

A 
First,  we  see  no  justification  for  the  union’s  failure  to
provide a fresh Hudson notice.  Hudson rests on the prin-
ciple  that  nonmembers  should  not  be  required  to  fund  a
union’s political and ideological projects unless they choose 
to do so after having “a fair opportunity” to assess the im- 
pact  of  paying  for  nonchargeable  union  activities.    475 
U. S., at 303.  Giving employees only one opportunity per 
year to make this choice is tolerable if employees are able 
at  the  time  in  question  to  make  an  informed  choice.    But 

—————— 

U. S.  347,  363  (1976)  (government  means  must  be  ‘least  restrictive
of freedom of belief and association’); Kusper v.  Pontikes, 414 U. S. 51, 
58–59 (1973) (‘[E]ven when pursuing a legitimate interest, a State may
not choose means that unnecessarily restrict constitutionally protected 
liberty’); NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S. 415, 438 (1963) (‘Precision of reg-
ulation  must  be  the  touchstone’  in  the  First  Amendment  context).” 
Hudson, 475 U. S., at 303, n. 11.