Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/558bv.pdf
Page Number: 382.0

Cite as: 558 U. S. 220 (2010) 

221 

Per Curiam 

learn  that  there  had  been  unreported  ex  parte  contacts  be­
tween  the  jury  and  the  judge,  that  jurors  and  a  bailiff  had 
planned  a  reunion,  and  that  “either  during  or  immediately 
following  the  penalty  phase,  some  jury  members  gave  the 
trial judge chocolate shaped as male genitalia and the bailiff 
chocolate  shaped  as  female  breasts,”  554  F.  3d  923,  930 
(CA11  2009).  The  judge  had  not  reported  any  of  this  to 
the defense. 

Neither  Wellons  nor  any  court  has  ascertained  exactly 
what  went  on  at  this  capital  trial  or  what  prompted  such 
“gifts.”  Wellons has repeatedly tried, in both state and fed­
eral  court,  to  ﬁnd  out  what  occurred,  but  he  has  found  him­
self  caught  in  a  procedural  morass:  He  raised  the  issue  on 
direct appeal but was constrained by the nonexistent record, 
and  the  State  Supreme  Court  afﬁrmed  his  conviction  and 
sentence.  Wellons v.  State, 266 Ga. 77, 88, 463 S. E. 2d 868, 
880 (1995).  He sought state habeas relief and moved to de­
velop evidence.  But the court held that the matter had been 
decided on appeal and thus was res judicata.  See 554 F. 3d, 
at 932.  He raised the issue again in his federal habeas peti­
tion, seeking discovery and an evidentiary hearing.  But the 
District Court “concluded that Wellons’s claims . . . were pro­
cedurally  barred,  and  accordingly  denied  his  motion  for  an 
evidentiary  hearing  on  these  claims.”  Id.,  at  933.1  Before 

1 Although  the  District  Court  found  most  of  petitioner’s  claims  to  be 
procedurally  barred,  it  alternatively  declined  to  permit  an  evidentiary 
hearing  because  Wellons did  not  have  enough  evidence  of bias  or  miscon­
duct.  Justice  Alito  wrongly  suggests  that  the  District  Court  reached 
that  conclusion  by  reviewing  a  proffer  that  Wellons’  attorneys  assembled 
by  “contacting  all  but  1  of  the  jurors,”  many  of  whom  “spoke  freely.” 
Post, at 230 (dissenting opinion).  Even apart from the fact that these inter­
views were informal and unsworn, they shed almost no light on what had 
occurred.  The juror who allegedly “gave the penis to the judge,” App. C 
to  Pet.  for  Cert.  36,  was  “hostile  and  refused  to  talk,”  id.,  at  37;  one  “re­
fused  to  talk  about  the  trial,”  id.,  at  36;  another  “did  not  want  to  talk 
about  the  case,”  id.,  at  37;  and  one  “conferr[ed]”  with  his  wife  who  then 
“slammed  and  bolted  the  door,”  ibid.  Of  those  jurors  who  were  willing