Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/21pdf/20-1800_7lho.pdf
Page Number: 46.0

Cite as:  596 U. S. ____ (2022) 

11 

 GORSUCH, J., concurring
GORSUCH, J., concurring in judgment 

contains some helpful hallmarks that localities and lower
courts can rely on.

Beyond a formal declaration that a religious denomina-
tion  was  in  fact  the  established  church,  it  seems  that 
founding-era  religious  establishments  often  bore  certain
other telling traits.  See M. McConnell, Establishment and 
Disestablishment at the Founding, Part I:  Establishment 
of Religion, 44 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 2105, 2110–2112, 2131
(2003)  (Establishment  and  Disestablishment).    First,  the 
government exerted control over the doctrine and personnel 
of  the  established  church.  Second,  the  government  man-
dated  attendance  in  the  established  church  and  punished
people  for  failing  to  participate.    Third,  the  government
punished dissenting churches and individuals for their re-
ligious exercise.  Fourth, the government restricted political 
participation by dissenters.  Fifth, the government provided
financial support for the established church, often in a way 
that  preferred  the  established  denomination  over  other 
churches.  And sixth, the government used the established 
church to carry out certain civil functions, often by giving
the established church a monopoly over a specific function.
See  id.,  at  2131–2181.  Most  of  these  hallmarks  reflect 
forms of “coerc[ion]” regarding “religion or its exercise.”  Lee 
v. Weisman, 505 U. S. 577, 587 (1992); id., at 640 (Scalia,
J., dissenting); Van Orden, 545 U. S., at 693 (THOMAS, J., 
concurring).

These  traditional  hallmarks  help  explain  many  of  this
Court’s  Establishment  Clause  cases,  too.    This  Court,  for 
example, has held unlawful practices that restrict political 
participation by dissenters, including rules requiring public 
officials to proclaim a belief in God.  See Torcaso v. Watkins, 
367 U. S. 488, 490 (1961).  It has checked government ef-
forts to give churches monopolistic control over civil func-
tions.  See Larkin v. Grendel’s Den, Inc., 459 U. S. 116, 127 
(1982).  At the same time, it has upheld nondiscriminatory 
public financial support for religious institutions alongside