Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/19pdf/19-715_febh.pdf
Page Number: 46.0

Cite as:  591 U. S. ____ (2020) 

21 

THOMAS, J., dissenting 

subpoena for private, nonofficial documents as part of those
non-impeachment inquiries.  Perhaps most strikingly, one 
proposed request for official documents from the President 
was amended after objection so that it “ ‘requested’ ” them
rather than “ ‘direct[ing]’ ” the President to provide them.  3 
id., §1895, at 193. 

Insisting  that  the  House  proceed  through  its  impeach-
ment  power  is  not  a  mere  formality.    Unlike  contempt,
which is governed by the rules of each chamber, impeach-
ment and removal constitutionally requires a majority vote 
by the House and a two-thirds vote by the Senate.  Art. I, 
§2, cl. 5; §3, cl. 6.  In addition, Congress has long thought it 
necessary to provide certain procedural safeguards to offi-
cials facing impeachment and removal.  See, e.g., 3 Annals 
of Cong. 903 (1793) (Rep. W. Smith).  Finally, initiating im-
peachment proceedings signals to the public the gravity of
seeking the removal of a constitutional officer at the head
of  a  coordinate  branch.  940  F. 3d  710,  776  (CADC  2019) 
(Rao, J., dissenting). 

* 

* 

* 
Congress’ legislative powers do not authorize it to engage
in  a  nationwide  inquisition  with  whatever  resources  it 
chooses to appropriate for itself.  The majority’s solution—
a nonexhaustive four-factor test of uncertain origin—is bet-
ter than nothing.  But the power that Congress seeks to ex-
ercise here has even less basis in the Constitution than the 
majority  supposes.    I  would  reverse  in  full  because  the 
power to subpoena private, nonofficial documents is not a
necessary  implication  of  Congress’  legislative  powers.    If 
Congress wishes to obtain these documents, it should pro-
ceed  through  the  impeachment  power.  Accordingly,  I  re-
spectfully dissent.