Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/22pdf/21-857_4357.pdf
Page Number: 20

Cite as:  599 U. S. ____ (2023) 

15 

Opinion of the Court 

Jones’  primary  constitutional  argument  is  that  denying 
him any opportunity to seek postconviction relief based on 
Rehaif  would  violate  the  Suspension  Clause,  which  pro-
vides  that  “[t]he  Privilege  of  the  Writ  of  Habeas  Corpus
shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion 
or Invasion the public Safety may require it.”  U. S. Const., 
Art. I, §9, cl. 2.  This “Suspension Clause argument fails be-
cause it would extend the writ of habeas corpus far beyond 
its scope ‘when the Constitution was drafted and ratified.’ ” 
Department  of  Homeland  Security  v.  Thuraissigiam,  591 
U. S. ___, ___ (2020) (slip op., at 2) (quoting Boumediene v. 
Bush,  553  U. S.  723,  746  (2008)).    When  the  Suspension
Clause was adopted, and for a long time afterward, Jones’ 
Rehaif claim would not have been cognizable in habeas at 
all. 

At the founding, a sentence after conviction “by a court of
competent jurisdiction” was “ ‘in itself sufficient cause’ ” for 
a prisoner’s continued detention.  Brown v. Davenport, 596 
U. S. ___, ___ (2022) (slip op., at 8) (quoting Ex parte Wat-
kins, 3 Pet. 193, 202 (1830)).  As Chief Justice Marshall ex-
plained in the seminal case of Ex parte Watkins, the crimi-
nal  judgment,  “in  its  nature,  conclude[d]  the  subject  on 
which it [was] rendered,” “pronounce[d] the law of the case,”
and  “pu[t]  an  end  to  the  inquiry  concerning  fact.”    Id.,  at 
202–203.  Of particular relevance here, a habeas court had 
no power to “look beyond the judgment” to “re-examine the 
charges on which it was rendered” for substantive errors of 
law—even “if . . . the [sentencing] court ha[d] misconstrued
the law, and ha[d] pronounced an offence to be punishable 
criminally, which [was] not so.”  Id., at 202, 209. 

In rebuttal, Jones argues that pre-founding practice did 
allow habeas courts to “look beyond the judgment” to ensure 
that the convicting court had proved every element of the
crime for which a prisoner was committed.  But Jones fails 
to identify a single clear case of habeas being used to reliti-
gate a conviction after trial by a court of general criminal