Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/21pdf/21-418_i425.pdf
Page Number: 26.0

Cite as:  597 U. S. ____ (2022) 

21 

Opinion of the Court 

over the others.  See Everson v. Board of Ed. of Ewing, 330 
U. S. 1, 13, 15 (1947).

The  District  arrived  at  a  different  understanding  this 
way.  It  began  with  the  premise  that  the  Establishment
Clause is offended whenever a “reasonable observer” could 
conclude  that  the  government  has  “endorse[d]”  religion.
App. 81.  The District then took the view that a “reasonable 
observer” could think it “endorsed Kennedy’s religious ac-
tivity by not stopping the practice.”  991 F. 3d, at 1018; see 
also  App.  80–81;  Parts  I  and  II,  supra.  On  the  District’s 
account, it did not matter whether the Free Exercise Clause 
protected Mr. Kennedy’s prayer.  It did not matter if his ex-
pression was private speech protected by the Free Speech 
Clause.  It did not matter that the District never actually
endorsed Mr. Kennedy’s prayer, no one complained that it
had,  and  a  strong  public  reaction  only  followed  after  the 
District  sought  to  ban  Mr.  Kennedy’s  prayer.   Because  a 
reasonable observer could (mistakenly) infer that by allow-
ing  the  prayer  the  District  endorsed  Mr.  Kennedy’s  mes-
sage, the District felt it had to act, even if that meant sup-
pressing  otherwise  protected  First  Amendment  activities. 
In this way, the District effectively created its own “vise be-
tween the Establishment Clause on one side and the Free 
Speech and Free Exercise Clauses on the other,” placed it-
self in the middle, and then chose its preferred way out of 
its self-imposed trap.  See Pinette, 515 U. S., at 768 (plural-
ity  opinion);  Shurtleff  v.  Boston,  596  U. S.  ___,  ___–___ 
(2022) (GORSUCH, J., concurring in judgment) (slip op., at 
4–5).

To defend its approach, the District relied on Lemon and 
its  progeny.    See  App.  43–45.    In  upholding  the  District’s
actions,  the  Ninth  Circuit  followed  the  same  course.    See 
Part II–C, supra.  And, to be sure, in Lemon this Court at-
tempted  a  “grand  unified  theory”  for  assessing  Establish-
ment Clause claims.  American Legion v. American Human-
ist Assn., 588 U. S. ___, ___ (2019) (plurality opinion) (slip