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Page Number: 15.0

30 

CRUZ v. ARIZONA 

Opinion of the Court 

or  federal  law.”  Brief  for  Respondent  12.  As  the  dissent 
puts  the  argument:  Lynch  “did  not  change  the  law  in  Ari-
zona.”  Post, at 37 (opinion of Barrett, J.). 

These  arguments  miss  the  point.  While  Lynch  did  not 
change this Court's interpretation of Simmons, it did change 
the  operative  (and  mistaken)  interpretation  of  Simmons  by 
Arizona  courts.  Lynch  thus  changed  the  law  in  Arizona  in 
the  way  that  matters  for  purposes  of  Rule  32.1(g):  It  over-
ruled  previously  binding  Arizona  Supreme  Court  precedent 
preventing  capital  defendants  from  informing  the  jury  of 
their parole ineligibility.3 

Contrary to the dissent, post, at 34–35, it makes no differ-
ence  that  Lynch  did  not  alter  federal  law.  While  Arizona 
Supreme Court decisions applying Rule 32.1(g) to federal de-
cisions such as Ring and Padilla have understandably noted 
the  effect those  decisions had  on  both federal  and state  law, 
the  analytic  focus  of  Arizona  courts  has  always  been  on  the 
impact  to  Arizona  law.  See  supra,  at  28;  see  also  Towery, 
204 Ariz., at 390, 64 P. 3d, at 832 (Ring “imposes a new bur-
den on the state.  Thus we conclude that Ring [satisfes Rule 
32.1(g)]”).  That  focus  is  unsurprising  given  that  Rule 
32.1(g)  is  a  state  procedural  rule  governing  the  availability 
of state postconviction relief in state court. 

The  State  next  objects  that  a  decision  against  it  would 
forestall Arizona's ability to “fesh out” its Rule 32.1(g) juris-
prudence in new contexts.  Tr. of Oral Arg. 40.  That is in-
correct.  The  Arizona  Supreme  Court  is  free  to  extend  its 
prior  Rule  32.1(g)  jurisprudence,  including  by  applying  the 
Rule to new situations as they arise.  What the Arizona Su-
preme Court cannot do is foreclose federal review by adopt-

3 At oral argument, the State also argued that Lynch, at the very least, 
was  not  a  “signifcant”  change  in  the  law.  Tr.  of  Oral  Arg.  34–36.  By 
any  measure,  though,  Lynch  was  a  “transformative  event,”  State  v. 
Shrum, 220 Ariz. 115, 118, 203 P. 3d 1175, 1178 (2009), in Arizona.  In fact, 
the  State  conceded  Lynch  was  a  “clear  break”  from  the  past  in  Arizona 
courts.  Tr. of Oral Arg. 36. 

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