Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/06pdf/05-1120.pdf
Page Number: 43

Cite as:  549 U. S. ____ (2007) 

5 

ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting 

sovereign interests as parens patriae must still show that 
its  citizens  satisfy  Article  III.  Focusing  on  Massachu-
setts’s  interests  as  quasi-sovereign  makes  the  required
showing  here  harder,  not  easier.    The  Court,  in  effect, 
takes what has always been regarded as a necessary condi-
tion  for  parens  patriae  standing—a  quasi-sovereign  inter-
est—and converts it into a sufficient showing for purposes 
of Article III. 

What  is  more,  the  Court’s  reasoning  falters  on  its  own 
terms.  The  Court  asserts  that  Massachusetts  is  entitled 
to  “special  solicitude”  due  to  its  “quasi-sovereign  inter-
ests,” ante, at 17, but then applies our Article III standing 
test  to  the  asserted  injury  of  the  State’s  loss  of  coastal 
property.  See ante, at 19 (concluding that Massachusetts
“has  alleged  a  particularized  injury  in  its  capacity  as  a 
landowner”  (emphasis  added)).    In  the  context  of  parens 
patriae  standing,  however,  we  have  characterized  state 
ownership of land as a “nonsovereign interes[t]” because a
State  “is  likely  to  have  the  same  interests  as  other  simi-
larly situated proprietors.”  Alfred L. Snapp & Son, supra, 
at 601. 

On  top  of  everything  else,  the  Court  overlooks  the  fact 
that our cases cast significant doubt on a State’s standing 
to assert a quasi-sovereign interest—as opposed to a direct 
injury—against  the  Federal  Government.    As  a  general
rule, we have held that while a State might assert a quasi-
sovereign right as parens patriae “for the protection of its
citizens, it is no part of its duty or power  to enforce their
rights  in  respect  of  their  relations  with  the  Federal  Gov-
ernment.  In that field it is the United States, and not the 
State,  which  represents  them.”  Massachusetts  v.  Mellon, 
262  U. S.  447,  485–486  (1923)  (citation  omitted);  see  also 
Alfred L. Snapp & Son, supra, at 610, n. 16. 

All  of  this  presumably  explains  why  petitioners  never 
cited Tennessee Copper in their briefs before this Court or 
the  D. C.  Circuit.    It  presumably  explains  why  not  one  of