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Page Number: 41

14 

YATES v. UNITED STATES 

KAGAN, J., dissenting 

tur/ejusdem  argument.    The  same  reasoning  would  apply 
to  every  law  placing  the  word  “object”  (or  “thing”)  after
“record” and “document.”  But as noted earlier, such stat-
utes are common: The phrase appears (among other places) 
in  many  state  laws  based  on  the  Model  Penal  Code,  as
well as in multiple provisions of §1512.  See supra, at 4–5. 
The  plurality  accepts  that  in  those  laws  “object”  means
object;  its  argument  about  superfluity  positively  depends
on  giving  §1512(c)(1)  that  broader  reading.  See  ante,  at 
13, 16.  What, then, is the difference here?  The plurality
proposes that some of those statutes describe less serious 
offenses than §1519.  See ante, at 17.  How and why that 
distinction  affects  application  of  the  noscitur  a  sociis  and 
ejusdem  generis  canons  is  left  obscure:  Count  it  as 
one  more  of  the  plurality’s  never-before-propounded, 
not-readily-explained interpretive theories.  See supra, at 7, 
8–9,  11–12.  But  in  any  event,  that  rationale  cannot  sup-
port the plurality’s willingness to give “object” its natural
meaning  in  §1512,  which  (like  §1519)  sets  out  felonies
with penalties of up to 20 years.  See §§1512(a)(3)(C), (b), 
(c).  The  canons,  in  the  plurality’s  interpretive  world, 
apparently switch on and off whenever convenient.

And  the  plurality’s  invocation  of  §1519’s  verbs  does 
nothing  to  buttress  its  canon-based  argument.    See  ante, 
at 14–15; ante, at 2–3 (opinion of ALITO, J.).  The plurality
observes that §1519 prohibits “falsif[ying]” or “mak[ing] a
false  entry  in”  a  tangible  object,  and  no  one  can  do  those 
things  to,  say,  a  murder  weapon  (or  a  fish).  Ante,  at  14. 
But  of  course  someone  can  alter,  destroy,  mutilate,  con-
ceal, or cover up such a tangible object, and §1519 prohibits
those  actions  too.  The  Court  has  never  before  suggested 
that  all  the  verbs  in  a  statute  need  to  match  up  with  all
the nouns.  See Robers v. United States, 572 U. S. ___, ___ 
(2014)  (slip  op.,  at  4)  (“[T]he  law  does  not  require  legisla-
tors to write extra language specifically exempting, phrase
by  phrase,  applications  in  respect  to  which  a  portion  of  a