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Page Number: 98

16 

HAALAND v. BRACKEEN 

THOMAS, J., dissenting 

laws  would  take  care  of  criminal  offenses,  the  provisions’ 
proponents did not reply that state laws were disabled on 
this  point—they  instead  noted  that  citizens  might  go  be-
yond the limits of States and commit crimes.  See 3 Annals 
of Cong. 751.  And notably, Congress’ early statutes did not 
purport to regulate Indians either on or off Indian lands—
they  instead  regulated  and  penalized  only  U.  S.  citizens
who  were  trading  with  Indians  or  committing  acts  on  In-
dian lands that threatened the peace with the tribes. 

Those statutory lines reflected the early dynamic of fed-
eral-Indian relations, with Indian affairs counting as both
a  matter  of  quasi-foreign  affairs  and  of  state  jurisdiction. 
For example, the early Trade and Intercourse Acts only de-
manded  satisfaction  from  Indian  tribes  if  an  Indian  went 
onto  a  State’s  land  and  committed  a  crime.  E.g.,  1  Stat. 
472–473.  Under that regime, the Federal Government as-
serted  no  authority  over  the  acts  of  Indians  who  lived  on
tribal  lands—much  less  over  Indians  who  lived  off  tribal 
lands and within a State’s sole jurisdiction. 

That  general  jurisdictional  line  held  until  1817,  when
Congress first enacted a statute to impose penalties on an-
yone who committed a crime against a U. S. citizen while 
on Indian lands.  See 3 Stat. 383.  But Justice McLean, rid-
ing circuit, held that statute unconstitutional in 1834—at 
least as it applied to Indian lands located within the terri-
torial  limits  of  a  State.    See  United  States  v.  Bailey,  24 
F. Cas. 937 (No. 14,495) (CC Tenn.).  As Justice McLean ex-
plained,  “[t]hat  the  federal  government  is  one  of  limited 
powers, is a principle so obvious as not to admit of contro-
versy.”  Id., at 938.  Yet the Indian lands at issue were not 
located within a federal territory, and there had not been 
“any cession of jurisdiction by the state of Tennessee.”  Id., 
at 939.5  Nor was the criminal statute in any way related to 

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5 This decision thus was consistent with one issued 12 years later by
this Court—which upheld the 1834 Trade and Intercourse Act’s criminal