Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/17pdf/16-476_dbfi.pdf
Page Number: 13.0

Cite as:  584 U. S. ____ (2018) 

9 

Opinion of the Court 

“selectively  remove[s]  a  prohibition  on  sports  wagering  in
a manner that permissively channels wagering activity to 
particular  locations  or  operators.”  Id.,  at  397,  401.  The 
court  disavowed  some  of  the  reasoning  in  the  Christie  I 
opinion, finding its discussion of “the relationship between 
a  ‘repeal’  and  an  ‘authorization’  to  have  been  too  facile.” 
832 F. 3d, at 401.  But the court declined to say whether a 
repeal  that  was  more  complete  than  the  2014  Act  would 
still amount to an authorization.  The court observed that 
a  partial  repeal  that  allowed  only  “de  minimis  wagers
between friends and family would not have nearly the type
of authorizing effect” that it found in the 2014 Act, and it
added: “We need not . . . articulate a line whereby a partial
repeal of a sports wagering ban amounts to an authoriza­
tion under PASPA, if indeed such a line could be drawn.” 
Id., at 402 (emphasis added). 

Having found that the 2014 Act violates PASPA’s prohi­
bition  of  state  authorization  of  sports  gambling  schemes,
the  court  went  on  to  hold  that  this  prohibition  does  not
contravene  the  anticommandeering  principle  because  it 
“does  not  command  states  to  take  affirmative  actions.” 
Id., at 401. 

We granted review to decide the important constitutional
question  presented  by  these  cases,  sub nom.  Christie  v. 
National Collegiate Athletic Assn., 582 U. S. ___ (2017). 

II 
Before  considering  the  constitutionality  of  the  PASPA
provision  prohibiting  States  from  “author[izing]”  sports
gambling,  we  first  examine  its  meaning.    The  parties
advance  dueling  interpretations,  and  this  dispute  has  an
important  bearing  on  the  constitutional  issue  that  we 
must decide.  Neither  respondents nor the United States, 
appearing  as  an  amicus  in  support  of  respondents,  con­
tends that the provision at issue would be constitutional if 
petitioners’  interpretation  is  correct.    Indeed,  the  United