Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/16pdf/15-1358_6khn.pdf
Page Number: 67.0

Cite as:  582 U. S. ____ (2017) 

23 

BREYER, J., dissenting 

not set fire to the house. 

At  the  same  time,  there  may  well  be  a  particular  need
for  Bivens  remedies  when  security-related  Government 
actions  are  at  issue.  History  tells  us  of  far  too  many  in-
stances  where  the  Executive  or  Legislative  Branch  took 
actions  during  time  of  war  that,  on  later  examination, 
turned  out  unnecessarily  and  unreasonably  to  have  de-
prived  American  citizens  of  basic  constitutional  rights.
We have read about the Alien and Sedition Acts, the thou-
sands  of  civilians  imprisoned  during  the  Civil  War,  and 
the suppression of civil liberties during World War I.  See 
W.  Rehnquist,  All  the  Laws  but  One:  Civil  Liberties  in
Wartime  209–210,  49–50,  173–180,  183  (1998);  see  also 
Ex parte Milligan, 4 Wall. 2 (1866) (decided after the Civil 
War was over).  The pages of the U. S. Reports themselves 
recite  this  Court’s  refusal  to  set  aside  the  Government’s 
World War II action removing more than 70,000 American
citizens  of  Japanese  origin  from  their  west  coast  homes
and  interning  them  in  camps,  see  Korematsu  v.  United 
States, 323 U. S. 214 (1944)—an action that at least some 
officials  knew  at  the  time  was  unnecessary,  see  id.,  at 
233–242 (Murphy, J., dissenting); P. Irons, Justice at War 
202–204,  288  (1983).  President  Franklin  Roosevelt’s 
Attorney  General,  perhaps  exaggerating,  once  said  that
“[t]he  Constitution  has  not  greatly  bothered  any  wartime 
President.”  Rehnquist, supra, at 191. 

Can we, in respect to actions taken during those periods, 
rely  exclusively,  as  the  Court  seems  to  suggest,  upon
injunctive remedies or writs of habeas corpus, their retail 
equivalent?  Complaints  seeking  that  kind  of  relief  typi- 
cally come during the emergency itself, when emotions are 
strong,  when  courts  may  have  too  little  or  inaccurate
information, and when courts may well prove particularly
reluctant  to  interfere  with  even  the  least  well-founded 
Executive Branch activity.  That reluctance may itself set 
an  unfortunate  precedent,  which,  as  Justice  Jackson