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16  NATIONAL RIFLE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA v. VULLO 

Opinion of the Court 

of this Court’s precedents.  Cf. Iqbal, 556 U. S., at 678–679; 
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U. S. 544, 570 (2007).

For  example,  the  Second  Circuit  failed  to  analyze  the
Guidance Letters and press release against the backdrop of
other  allegations  in  the  complaint,  including  the  Lloyd’s
meeting.  Moreover, as discussed above, the complaint al-
leges  that  Vullo  made  a  not-so-subtle,  sanctions-backed
threat to Lloyd’s to cut all business ties with the NRA and
other  gun-promotion  groups,  although  there  was  no  sign
that other gun groups also had unlawful insurance policies. 
See supra, at 13.  It is also relevant that Vullo made this 
alleged threat in a meeting where she presented her “desire
to leverage [her] powers to combat the availability of fire-
arms, including specifically by weakening the NRA.”  App.
to Pet. for Cert. 221, Complaint ¶67; id., at 223, ¶69 (alleg-
ing Vullo hoped to enlist DFS-regulated entities in “aid[ing]
DFS’s campaign against gun groups”).  Given the obligation
to draw reasonable inferences in the NRA’s favor and con-
sider the allegations as a whole, the Second Circuit erred in 
reading  the  complaint  as  involving  only  individual  in-
stances of “permissible government speech” and the execu-
tion  of  Vullo’s  “regulatory  responsibilities.”    49  F.  4th,  at 
717–719. 

For  the  same  reasons,  this  Court  cannot  simply  credit
Vullo’s assertion that “pursuing conceded violations of the 
law,”  Brief  for  Respondent  29,  is  an  “ ‘obvious  alternative 
explanation’ ” for her actions that defeats the plausibility of 
any coercive threat raising First Amendment concerns, id., 
at 37, 40, 42 (quoting Iqbal, 556 U. S., at 682).  Of course, 
discovery in this case might show that the allegations of co-
ercion  are  false,  or  that  certain  actions  should  be  under-
stood  differently  in  light  of  newly  disclosed  evidence.    At 
this stage, though, the Court must assume the well-pleaded