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Page Number: 81.0

4 

OBERGEFELL v. HODGES 

THOMAS, J., dissenting 

A 
1 

As used in the Due Process Clauses, “liberty” most likely 
refers  to  “the  power  of  loco-motion,  of  changing  situation, 
or  removing  one’s  person  to  whatsoever  place  one’s  own 
inclination may direct; without imprisonment or restraint,
unless by due course of law.”  1 W. Blackstone, Commen-
taries  on  the  Laws  of  England  130  (1769)  (Blackstone).
That  definition  is  drawn  from  the  historical  roots  of  the 
Clauses and is consistent with our Constitution’s text and 
structure. 

Both  of  the  Constitution’s  Due  Process  Clauses  reach 
back  to  Magna  Carta.  See  Davidson  v.  New  Orleans,  96 
U. S.  97,  101–102  (1878).    Chapter  39  of  the  original
Magna  Carta  provided,  “No  free  man  shall  be  taken,  im-
prisoned,  disseised,  outlawed,  banished,  or  in  any  way 
destroyed,  nor  will  We  proceed  against  or  prosecute  him, 
except by the lawful judgment of his peers and by the law 
of  the  land.”   Magna  Carta,  ch.  39, in  A.  Howard,  Magna
Carta:  Text  and  Commentary  43  (1964).    Although  the 
1215  version  of  Magna  Carta  was  in  effect  for  only  a  few 
weeks,  this  provision  was  later  reissued  in  1225  with
modest  changes  to  its  wording  as  follows:  “No  freeman 
shall  be  taken,  or  imprisoned,  or  be  disseised  of  his  free-
hold,  or  liberties,  or  free  customs,  or  be  outlawed,  or  ex-
iled, or any otherwise destroyed; nor will we not pass upon 
him,  nor  condemn  him,  but  by  lawful  judgment  of  his 
peers  or  by  the  law  of  the  land.”  1  E.  Coke,  The  Second 
Part of the Institutes of the Laws of England 45 (1797).  In 
his  influential  commentary  on  the  provision  many  years
later, Sir Edward Coke interpreted the words “by the law 
of  the  land”  to  mean  the  same  thing  as  “by  due  proces  of 
the common law.”  Id., at 50. 

After  Magna  Carta  became  subject  to  renewed  interest 
in  the  17th  century,  see,  e.g.,  ibid.,  William  Blackstone 
referred to this provision as protecting the “absolute rights