Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/21pdf/21-418_i425.pdf
Page Number: 64

24 

KENNEDY v. BREMERTON SCHOOL DIST. 

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting 

sel[s] mutual respect and tolerance,” the Constitution’s vi-
sion  of  how  to  achieve  this  end  does  in  fact  involve  some 
“singl[ing] out” of religious speech by the government.  Ante, 
at 1.  This is consistent with “the lesson of history that was 
and is the inspiration for the Establishment Clause, the les-
son that in the hands of government what might begin as a
tolerant expression of religious views may end in a policy to
indoctrinate and coerce.”  Lee, 505 U. S., at 591–592. 

Second, the Court contends that the lower courts erred by
introducing a false tension between the Free Exercise and
Establishment  Clauses.    See  ante,  at  20–21.  The  Court, 
however, has long recognized that these two Clauses, while
“express[ing] complementary values,” “often exert conflict-
ing pressures.”  Cutter, 544 U. S., at 719.  See also Locke v. 
Davey, 540 U. S. 712, 718 (2004) (describing the Clauses as
“frequently  in  tension”).  The  “absolute  terms”  of  the  two 
Clauses  mean  that  they  “tend  to  clash”  if  “expanded  to  a
logical extreme.”  Walz, 397 U. S., at 668–669. 

The Court inaccurately implies that the courts below re-
lied  upon  a  rule  that  the  Establishment  Clause  must  al-
ways “prevail” over the Free Exercise Clause.  Ante, at 20. 
In  focusing  almost  exclusively  on  Kennedy’s  free  exercise
claim,  however,  and  declining  to  recognize  the  conflicting
rights at issue, the Court substitutes one supposed blanket 
rule for another.  The proper response where tension arises
between  the  two  Clauses  is  not  to  ignore  it,  which  effec-
tively silently elevates one party’s right above others.  The 
proper response is to identify the tension and balance the 
interests based on a careful analysis of “whether [the] par-
ticular acts in question are intended to establish or inter-
fere with religious beliefs and practices or have the effect of
doing so.”  Walz, 397 U. S., at 669.  As discussed above, that 
inquiry leads to the conclusion that permitting Kennedy’s
desired religious practice at the time and place of his choos-
ing, without regard to the legitimate needs of his employer,
violates the Establishment Clause in the particular context