Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/09pdf/08-964.pdf
Page Number: 49

Cite as:  561 U. S. ____ (2010) 

29 

STEVENS, J., concurring in judgment 

statutory designation of a new and useful art”).36  Thus in 
1952,  when  Congress  updated  the  patent  laws  as  part  of 
its  ongoing  project  to  revise  the  United  States  Code,  it 
changed  the  operative  language  in  §101,  replacing  the 
term “art” with “process” and adding a definition of “proc-
ess” as a “process, art or method,” §100(b).

That change was made for clarity and did not alter the
scope  of  a  patentable  “process.”  See  Diehr,  450  U. S.,  at 
184.  The  new  terminology  was  added  only  in  recognition
of  the  fact  that  courts  had  been  interpreting  the  category
“art”  by  using  the  terms  “process  or  method”;  Congress 
thus wanted to avoid “the necessity of explanation that the
word ‘art’ as used in this place means ‘process or method.’ ”  
S. Rep. No. 1979, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 5 (1952) (hereinafter
S. Rep.  1979);  accord,  H. R.  Rep.  No.  1923,  82d  Cong.,  2d
Sess.,  6  (1952)  (hereinafter  H. R.  Rep.  1923);  see  also  id., 
at  17  (explaining  that  “the  word  ‘art’ ”  in  §101  “has  been 
interpreted by the courts as being practically synonymous
with  process  or  method,”  and  that  the  switch  to  the  word
“[p]rocess” was intended only for clarity).37 

It appears that when Congress changed the language in 
§101  to  incorporate  the  prevailing  judicial  terminology,  it 
merely  codified  the  prevailing  judicial  interpretation  of 
that  category  of  subject  matter.    See  Diehr,  450  U. S.,  at 
184; see also Barber v. Gonzales, 347 U. S. 637, 641 (1954) 
(“While it is true that statutory language should be inter-
preted  whenever  possible  according  to  common  usage,
some  terms  acquire  a  special  technical  meaning  by  a 
process  of  judicial  construction”).   Both  the  Senate  and 
House  Committee  Reports  explained  that  the  word  “proc-

—————— 

36 For examples of such usage, see The Telephone Cases, 126 U. S., at 

533, and Burden, 15 How., at 267. 

37 See  also  98  Cong.  Rec.  A415  (1952)  (remarks  of  Rep.  Bryson)  (de-
scribing, after the fact, the 1952 Patent Act, and explaining that “[t]he 
word ‘art’ was changed to ‘process’ in order to clarify its meaning.  No 
change in substance was intended”).