Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/558bv.pdf
Page Number: 618

Cite as: 558 U. S. 310 (2010) 

457 

Opinion of Stevens, J. 

nized  in  Austin’s  antidistortion  and  shareholder  protection 
rationales, 540 U. S., at 205 (citing Austin, 494 U. S., at 660), 
as well as the interest in preventing circumvention of contri­
bution limits, 540 U. S., at 128–129, 205, 206, n. 88.  Had we 
felt  constrained  by  the  view  of  today’s  Court  that  quid  pro 
quo corruption and its appearance are the only interests that 
count in this ﬁeld, ante, at 348–362, we of course would have 
looked  closely  at  that  issue.  And  as  the  analysis  by  Judge 
Kollar-Kotelly  reﬂects,  it  is  a  very  real  possibility  that  we 
would have found one or both of those interests satisﬁed and 
§ 203 appropriately tailored to them. 

The majority’s rejection of the Buckley anticorruption ra­
tionale  on  the  ground  that  independent  corporate  expendi­
tures  “do  not  give  rise  to  [quid  pro  quo]  corruption  or  the 
appearance of corruption,” ante, at 357, is thus unfair as well 
as unreasonable.  Congress and outside experts have gener­
ated  signiﬁcant  evidence  corroborating  this  rationale,  and 
the only reason we do not have any of the relevant materials 
before us is that the Government had no reason to develop a 
record  at  trial  for  a  facial  challenge  the  plaintiff  had  aban­
doned.  The  Court  cannot  both  sua  sponte  choose  to  reliti­
gate  McConnell  on  appeal  and  then  complain  that  the 
Government  has  failed  to  substantiate  its  case.  If  our 
colleagues were really serious about the interest in prevent­
ing  quid  pro  quo  corruption,  they  would  remand  to  the 
District  Court  with  instructions  to  commence  evidentiary 
proceedings.66 

66 In  fact,  the  notion  that  the  “electioneering  communications”  covered 
by  § 203  can  breed  quid  pro  quo  corruption  or  the  appearance  of  such 
corruption  has  only  become  more  plausible  since  we  decided  McConnell. 
Recall  that  The  Chief  Justice’s  controlling  opinion  in  WRTL  subse­
quently  limited  BCRA’s  deﬁnition  of  “electioneering  communications”  to 
those  that  are  “susceptible  of  no  reasonable  interpretation  other  than  as 
an  appeal  to  vote  for  or  against  a  speciﬁc  candidate.”  551  U. S.,  at  470. 
The upshot was that after WRTL, a corporate or union expenditure could 
be  regulated  under  § 203  only  if  everyone  would  understand  it  as  an  en­
dorsement  of  or  attack  on  a  particular  candidate  for  ofﬁce.  It  does  not