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SWIDLER & BERLIN v. UNITED STATES

Opinion of the Court

ent Counsel to show that “reason and experience” require a
departure from this rule.

The Independent Counsel contends that the testamentary
exception supports the posthumous termination of the privi-
lege because in practice most cases have refused to apply the
privilege posthumously. He further argues that the excep-
tion reﬂects a policy judgment that the interest in settling
estates outweighs any posthumous interest in conﬁdentiality.
He then reasons by analogy that in criminal proceedings, the
interest in determining whether a crime has been committed
should trump client conﬁdentiality, particularly since the ﬁ-
nancial interests of the estate are not at stake.

But the Independent Counsel’s interpretation simply does
not square with the case law’s implicit acceptance of the priv-
ilege’s survival and with the treatment of testamentary dis-
closure as an “exception” or an implied “waiver.” And the
premise of his analogy is incorrect, since cases consistently
recognize that the rationale for the testamentary exception
is that it furthers the client’s intent, see, e. g., Glover, supra.
There is no reason to suppose as a general matter that grand
jury testimony about conﬁdential communications furthers
the client’s intent.

Commentators on the law also recognize that the general
rule is that the attorney-client privilege continues after
death. See, e. g., 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2323 (McNaughton
rev. 1961); Frankel, The Attorney-Client Privilege After the
Death of the Client, 6 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 45, 78–79 (1992); 1
J. Strong, McCormick on Evidence § 94, p. 348 (4th ed. 1992).
Undoubtedly, as the Independent Counsel emphasizes, vari-
ous commentators have criticized this rule, urging that the
privilege should be abrogated after the client’s death where
extreme injustice would result, as long as disclosure would
not seriously undermine the privilege by deterring client
communication. See, e. g., C. Mueller & L. Kirkpatrick, 2
Federal Evidence § 199, pp. 380–381 (2d ed. 1994); Restate-
ment (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 127, Comment