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MUSCARELLO v. UNITED STATES

Opinion of the Court

At the same time, the narrow interpretation creates its
own anomalies. The statute, for example, deﬁnes “ﬁrearm”
to include a “bomb,” “grenade,” “rocket having a propellant
charge of more than four ounces,” or “missile having an
explosive or incendiary charge of more than one-quarter
ounce,” where such device is “explosive,” “incendiary,” or de-
livers “poison gas.”
18 U. S. C. § 921(a)(4)(A). On petition-
ers’ reading, the “carry” provision would not apply to in-
stances where drug lords, engaged in a major transaction,
took with them “ﬁrearms” such as these, which most likely
could not be carried on the person.

Fourth, petitioners argue that we should construe the
word “carry” to mean “immediately accessible.” And, as we
have said, they point out that several Courts of Appeals have
limited the statute’s scope in this way. See, e. g., Foster,
supra, at 708; Giraldo, supra, at 676. That interpretation,
however, is difﬁcult to square with the statute’s language,
for one “carries” a gun in the glove compartment whether or
not that glove compartment is locked. Nothing in the stat-
ute’s history suggests that Congress intended that limita-
tion. And, for reasons pointed out above, see supra, at 137,
we believe that the words “during” and “in relation to” will
limit the statute’s application to the harms that Congress
foresaw.

Finally, petitioners and the dissent invoke the “rule of len-
ity.” The simple existence of some statutory ambiguity,
however, is not sufﬁcient to warrant application of that rule,
for most statutes are ambiguous to some degree. Cf. Smith,
508 U. S., at 239 (“The mere possibility of articulating a nar-
rower construction . . . does not by itself make the rule of
lenity applicable”).
“ ‘The rule of lenity applies only if,
“after seizing everything from which aid can be derived,” . . .
we can make “no more than a guess as to what Congress
intended.” ’ ” United States v. Wells, 519 U. S. 482, 499
(1997) (quoting Reno v. Koray, 515 U. S. 50, 65 (1995), in turn
quoting Smith, supra, at 239, and Ladner v. United States,
358 U. S. 169, 178 (1958)). To invoke the rule, we must con-