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FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N v. AKINS

Opinion of the Court

fering legal wrong” or “adversely affected or aggrieved . . .
within the meaning of a relevant statute” may seek judicial
review of agency action).

Moreover, prudential standing is satisﬁed when the injury
asserted by a plaintiff “ ‘arguably [falls] within the zone of
interests to be protected or regulated by the statute . . . in
question.’ ” NCUA, supra, at 488 (quoting Data Processing,
supra, at 153). The injury of which respondents complain—
their failure to obtain relevant information—is injury of a
kind that FECA seeks to address. Buckley, supra, at 66–
67 (“political committees” must disclose contributors and
disbursements to help voters understand who provides
which candidates with ﬁnancial support). We have found
nothing in the Act that suggests Congress intended to ex-
clude voters from the beneﬁts of these provisions, or other-
wise to restrict standing, say, to political parties, candidates,
or their committees.

Given the language of the statute and the nature of the
injury, we conclude that Congress, intending to protect vot-
ers such as respondents from suffering the kind of injury
here at issue, intended to authorize this kind of suit. Conse-
quently, respondents satisfy “prudential” standing require-
ments. Cf. Raines v. Byrd, 521 U. S. 811, 820, n. 3 (1997)
(explicit grant of authority to bring suit “eliminates any pru-
dential standing limitations and signiﬁcantly lessens the risk
of unwanted conﬂict with the Legislative Branch”).

Nor do we agree with the FEC or the dissent that Con-
gress lacks the constitutional power to authorize federal
courts to adjudicate this lawsuit. Article III, of course, lim-
its Congress’ grant of judicial power to “cases” or “controver-
sies.” That limitation means that respondents must show,
among other things, an “injury in fact”—a requirement that
helps assure that courts will not “pass upon . . . abstract,
intellectual problems,” but adjudicate “concrete, living con-
test[s] between adversaries.” Coleman v. Miller, 307 U. S.
433, 460 (1939) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); see also Bennett,