Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/14pdf/13-7451_m64o.pdf
Page Number: 44

Cite as:  574 U. S. ___ (2015) 

17 

KAGAN, J., dissenting 

precisely to reach things that, in the concurrence’s words, 
“do[ ]  not  spring  to  mind”—to  my  mind,  to  my  neighbor’s,
or  (most  important)  to  Congress’s.    Ante,  at  1  (opinion  of 
ALITO, J.).  As this Court recently explained: “[T]he whole 
value  of  a  generally  phrased  residual  [term]  is  that  it 
serves  as  a  catchall  for  matters  not  specifically  contem-
plated—known  unknowns.”    Beaty,  556  U. S.,  at  860. 
Congress  realizes  that  in  a  game  of  free  association  with
“record”  and  “document,”  it  will  never  think  of  all  the 
other  things—including  crocodiles  and  fish—whose  de-
struction  or  alteration  can  (less  frequently  but  just  as 
effectively)  thwart  law  enforcement.    Cf.  United  States  v. 
Stubbs, 11 F. 3d 632, 637–638 (CA6 1993) (dead crocodiles 
used as evidence to support smuggling conviction).  And so 
Congress  adds  the  general  term  “or  tangible  object”—
again,  exactly  because  such  things  “do[ ]  not  spring  to
mind.”7 

The concurrence suggests that the term “tangible object” 
serves  not  as  a  catchall  for  physical  evidence  but  to  “en-
sure  beyond  question”  that  e-mails  and  other  electronic
files  fall  within  §1519’s  compass.  Ante,  at  2.    But  that 
claim  is  eyebrow-raising  in  its  own  right.    Would  a  Con-
gress  wishing  to  make  certain  that  §1519  applies  to
e-mails add the phrase “tangible object” (as opposed, say, to
“electronic  communications”)?    Would  a  judge  or  jury
member  predictably  find  that  “tangible  object”  encom-
passes  something  as  virtual  as  e-mail  (as  compared,  say, 

—————— 

7 The concurrence contends that when the noscitur and ejusdem can-
ons  are  in  play,  “ ‘known  unknowns’  should  be  similar  to  known 
knowns,  i.e.,  here,  records  and  documents.”  Ante,  at  2.  But  as  noted 
above,  records  and  documents  are  similar  to  crocodiles  and  fish  as  far 
as  §1519  is  concerned:  All  are  potentially  useful  as  evidence  in  an
investigation.  See  supra,  at  13.   The  concurrence  never  explains  why 
that  similarity  isn’t  the  relevant  one  in  a  statute  aimed  at  evidence-
tampering.