Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/22pdf/598us1r3_j4ek.pdf
Page Number: 12.0

Cite as:  598 U. S. 17 (2023) 

27 

Opinion of the Court 

law.”  Arizona  courts  have  interpreted  that  phrase  to  re-
quire a “transformative event, a `clear break from the past.' ” 
Shrum, 220 Ariz., at 118, 203 P. 3d, at 1178 (quoting State v. 
Slemmer,  170  Ariz.  174,  182,  823  P.  2d  41,  49  (1991)  (some 
internal quotation marks omitted)).  “The archetype of such 
a  change  occurs  when  an  appellate  court  overrules  pre-
viously  binding  case  law.”  Shrum,  220  Ariz.,  at  118,  203 
P. 3d, at 1178. 

Straightforward  application  of  these  principles  should 
have  led  to  the  conclusion  that  Lynch  was  a  “signifcant 
change  in  the  law”  under  Rule  32.1(g).  Lynch  overruled 
binding  Arizona  precedent.  Before  Lynch,  Arizona  courts 
held  that  capital  defendants  were  not  entitled  to  inform  the 
jury  of  their  parole  ineligibility.  After  Lynch,  Arizona 
courts  recognize  that  capital  defendants  have  a  due  process 
right to provide the jury  with that information when future 
dangerousness  is  at  issue.  It  is  hard  to  imagine  a  clearer 
break from the past. 

Instead  of  reaching  that  conclusion,  however,  the  Arizona 
Supreme  Court  held  that  Lynch  was  not  “a  signifcant 
change  in  the  law.”  251  Ariz.,  at  207,  487  P.  3d,  at  995.  It 
reasoned  that  Lynch  could  not  be  a  signifcant  change  be-
cause Lynch relied on Simmons, and Simmons “was clearly 
established at the time of Cruz's trial . . . despite the misap-
plication  of  that  law  by  the  Arizona  courts.”  251  Ariz.,  at 
206,  487  P.  3d,  at  994.  The  court  added  that  it  was  not 
enough that Lynch changed how Arizona courts applied fed-
eral law because “Rule 32.1(g) requires a signifcant change in 
the law . . . not a signifcant change in the application of the 
law.”  251 Ariz., at 207, 487 P. 3d, at 995 (emphasis in original). 
This  interpretation  of  Rule  32.1(g)  is  entirely  new  and  in 
confict with prior Arizona case law.  The State points to no 
other  instance  in  which  the  overturning  of  binding  Arizona 
precedent  failed  to  satisfy  Rule  32.1(g)'s  “signifcant  change 
in  the  law”  requirement.  Nor  has  the  State  identifed 
any  other  Rule  32.1(g)  decision  distinguishing  between  a 

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