Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/19pdf/18-916_f2ah.pdf
Page Number: 26

Cite as:  590 U. S. ____ (2020) 

7 

GORSUCH, J., dissenting 

318(a), 319.  So judicial review of the Director’s initial ap-
praisal of the merits isn’t really eliminated as much as it is 
channeled toward the Board’s final decision on those mer-
its.  That process finds a ready analogue elsewhere in our 
law.  Much  as  here,  an  indicted  criminal  defendant  un-
happy  with  a  grand  jury’s  finding  of  probable  cause  isn’t 
permitted  to  challenge  that  preliminary  assessment,  but 
may instead move the court for acquittal after the govern-
ment has presented all its evidence.  See Costello v. United 
States,  350  U. S.  359,  363  (1956);  Fed.  Rule  Crim.  Proc. 
29(a).

Matters  outside  §314  are  different.  Take  the  provision
before us, §315(b).  It promises that an inter partes review
“may not be instituted” more than a year after the initiation
of  litigation.    This  stands  as  an  affirmative  limit  on  the 
agency’s authority.  Much like a statute of limitations, this 
provision  supplies  an  argument  a  party  can  continue  to 
press throughout the life of the administrative proceeding
and  on  appeal.  Nothing  in  §315(b)  speaks  of  a  “deter-
mination  by  the  Director,”  let  alone  suggests  that  the
agency’s initial ruling on a petition’s timeliness is “final and 
nonappealable.” 

To pretend otherwise would invite a linguistic nonsense. 
We would have to read §314’s language speaking of “[t]he”
“determination” “under this section” to include not one de-
termination but two—and to include not only the determi-
nation actually made under “this section” but also a second 
assessment  made  about  the  effect  of  an  entirely  different
section. 

To  pretend  otherwise  would  invite  a  practical  nonsense
as  well.  Because  the  Director’s  initial  “reasonable  likeli-
hood” determination under §314(a) relates to the merits, it 
will be effectively reviewed both by the Board and courts as
the case progresses.  But when does the Director’s applica-
tion of §315(b)’s time bar get another look?  Under Thryv’s
interpretation,  a  provision  that  reads  like  an  affirmative