Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/23pdf/22-277_d18f.pdf
Page Number: 59

Cite as:  603 U. S. ____ (2024) 

15 

THOMAS, J., concurring in judgment 

As best I can tell, the Court’s first departure from those 
principles was the development of the vagueness doctrine.
See Johnson v. United States, 576 U. S. 591, 616–620 (2015) 
(THOMAS, J., concurring in judgment) (describing history of
vagueness doctrine).  Before and at the time of the found-
ing, American and English courts dealt with vague laws by
“simply refus[ing] to apply them in individual cases.”  Id., 
at 615.  After the unfortunate rise of “substantive” due pro-
cess, however, American courts began striking down stat-
utes  wholesale  as  “unconstitutionally  indefinite.”    Id.,  at 
617.  This  Court  first  adopted  that  approach  in  1914, see 
International  Harvester  Co.  of  America  v.  Kentucky,  234 
U. S. 216, and has since repeatedly used the vagueness doc-
trine  “to  strike  down  democratically  enacted  laws”  in  the 
name of substantive due process, Sessions v. Dimaya, 584 
U. S. 148, 210 (2018) (THOMAS, J., dissenting); see Johnson, 
576  U. S.,  at  618–621  (opinion  of THOMAS,  J.).  As  I  have 
explained, I doubt that “our practice of striking down stat-

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irreconcilable with the Constitution, except as it is called upon to adjudge
the legal rights of litigants in actual controversies”); Chicago & Grand 
Trunk R. Co. v. Wellman, 143 U. S. 339, 345 (1892) (explaining that ju-
dicial review of a statute’s constitutionality “is legitimate only in the last
resort, and as a necessity in the determination of real, earnest, and vital 
controversy between individuals”); Muskrat v. United States, 219 U. S. 
346, 357 (1911) (“[T]here [i]s no general veto power in the court upon the 
legislation of Congress”); Yazoo & Mississippi Valley R. Co. v. Jackson 
Vinegar Co., 226 U. S. 217, 219 (1912) (rejecting argument that statute 
was “void in toto,” because the Court “must deal with the case in hand 
and  not  with  imaginary  ones”);  Dahnke-Walker  Milling  Co.  v.  Bondu-
rant, 257 U. S. 282, 289 (1921) (“[A] litigant can be heard to question a 
statute’s  validity  only  when  and  so  far  as  it  is  being  or  is  about  to  be
applied  to  his  disadvantage”);  Massachusetts  v.  Mellon,  262  U. S.  447, 
488 (1923) (Federal courts “have no power per se to review and annul acts 
of Congress on the ground that they are unconstitutional.  That question
may be considered only when the justification for some direct injury suf-
fered or threatened, presenting a justiciable issue, is made to rest upon 
such an act”).