Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/17pdf/16-402_h315.pdf
Page Number: 99

Cite as:  585 U. S. ____ (2018) 

1 

GORSUCH, J., dissenting 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

_________________ 

No. 16–402 
_________________ 

TIMOTHY IVORY CARPENTER, PETITIONER v.
 
UNITED STATES
 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 

APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
 

[June 22, 2018] 

JUSTICE GORSUCH, dissenting. 
In the late 1960s this Court suggested for the first time
that  a  search  triggering  the  Fourth  Amendment  occurs 
when the government violates an “expectation of privacy”
that  “society  is  prepared  to  recognize  as  ‘reasonable.’ ”  
Katz  v.  United  States,  389  U. S.  347,  361  (1967)  (Harlan, 
J.,  concurring).    Then,  in  a  pair  of  decisions  in  the  1970s 
applying  the  Katz  test,  the  Court  held  that  a  “reasonable 
expectation  of  privacy”  doesn’t  attach  to  information 
shared  with  “third  parties.”  See  Smith  v.  Maryland,  442 
U. S.  735,  743–744  (1979);  United  States  v.  Miller,  425 
U. S.  435,  443  (1976).    By  these  steps,  the  Court  came  to
conclude, the Constitution does nothing to limit investiga-
tors from searching records you’ve entrusted to your bank,
accountant, and maybe even your doctor.

What’s  left  of  the  Fourth  Amendment?    Today  we  use
the Internet to do most everything.  Smartphones make it
easy  to  keep  a  calendar,  correspond  with  friends,  make 
calls, conduct banking, and even watch the game.  Count-
less  Internet  companies  maintain  records  about  us  and,
increasingly,  for  us.  Even  our  most  private  documents—
those that, in other eras, we would have locked safely in a 
desk  drawer  or  destroyed—now  reside  on  third  party 
servers.  Smith and Miller teach that the police can review 
all  of  this  material,  on  the  theory  that  no  one  reasonably