Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/22pdf/21-476_c185.pdf
Page Number: 64.0

32 

303 CREATIVE LLC v. ELENIS 

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting 

936 F. 3d 740, 769 (CA8 2019) (Kelly, J., concurring in part 
and  dissenting  in  part).  To  allow  a  business  open  to  the
public  to  define  the  expressive  quality  of  its  goods  or  ser-
vices to exclude a protected group would nullify public ac-
commodations laws.  It would mean that a large retail store 
could sell “passport photos for white people.”

The  majority  protests  that  Smith  will  gladly  sell  her 
goods and services to anyone, including same-sex couples. 
Ante, at 2, 17.  She just will not sell websites for same-sex 
weddings.  Apparently, a gay or lesbian couple might buy a
wedding website for their straight friends.  This logic would 
be amusing if it were not so embarrassing.12  I suppose the
Heart of Atlanta Motel could have argued that Black people 
may still rent rooms for their white friends.  Smith answers 
that she will sell other websites for gay or lesbian clients. 
But then she, like Ollie McClung, who would serve Black 
people take-out but not table service, discriminates against
LGBT  people  by  offering  them  a  limited  menu.13    This  is  
plain to see, for all who do not look the other way. 

The majority, however, analogizes this case to Hurley and 
Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U. S. 640 (2000).  The 
law schools in FAIR likewise relied on Hurley and Dale to 
argue  that  the  Solomon  Amendment  violated  their  free-
speech  rights.  FAIR  confirmed,  however,  that  a  neutral 
regulation  of  conduct  imposes  an  incidental  burden  on
speech when the regulation grants a right of equal access 

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12 The majority tacitly acknowledges the absurdity.  At the start of its 
opinion,  it  explains  that  Smith  “decided  to  expand  her  offerings  to  in-
clude services for couples seeking websites for their weddings.”  Ante, at 1 
(emphasis added). 

13 What is “ ‘embarrassing’ ” about this reasoning is not, as the Court 
claims, the “distinction between status and message.”  Ante, at 18, n. 3. 
It is petitioners’ contrivance, embraced by the Court, that a prohibition
on status-based discrimination can be avoided by asserting that a group 
can always buy services on behalf of others, or else that the group can 
access  a  “separate  but  equal”  subset  of  the  services  made  available  to 
everyone else.