Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/12pdf/11-556_11o2.pdf
Page Number: 20.0

Cite as:  570 U. S. ____ (2013) 

17 

Opinion of the Court 

1997,  No.  97–282,  p.  24  (“Supervisors  typically  exercise 
broad  discretionary  powers  over  their  subordinates,  de­
termining  many  of  the  terms  and  conditions  of  their 
employment,  including  their  raises  and  prospects  for  pro-
motion  and  controlling  or  greatly  influencing  whether 
they are to be dismissed”). 

For these reasons, we have no difficulty rejecting petition- 
er’s  argument  that  the  question  before  us  in  the  present 
case  was  effectively  settled  in  her  favor  by  our  treatment 
of the alleged harassers in Ellerth and Faragher.11 

The  dissent  acknowledges  that  our  prior  cases  do  “not 
squarely  resolve  whether  an  employee  without  power  to 
take tangible employment actions may nonetheless qualify 
as  a  supervisor,”  but  accuses  us  of  ignoring  the  “all-too­
plain  reality”  that  employees  with  authority  to  control 
their subordinates’ daily work are aided by that authority 
in perpetuating a discriminatory work environment.  Post, 
at  8  (opinion  of  GINSBURG,  J.).    As  Ellerth  recognized, 
however, “most workplace tortfeasors are aided in accom­
plishing  their  tortious  objective  by  the  existence  of  the 
agency  relation,”  and  consequently  “something  more”  is 
required in order to warrant vicarious liability.  524 U. S., 
at  760.  The  ability  to  direct  another  employee’s  tasks  is 
—————— 

11 According to the dissent, the rule that we adopt is also inconsistent 
with our decision in Pennsylvania State Police v. Suders, 542 U. S. 129 
(2004).    See  post,  at  7–8.  The  question  in  that  case  was  “whether  a 
constructive  discharge  brought  about  by  supervisor  harassment  ranks
as  a  tangible  employment  action  and  therefore  precludes  assertion  of
the  affirmative  defense  articulated  in  Ellerth  and  Faragher.”  Suders, 
supra,  at  140.    As  the  dissent  implicitly  acknowledges,  the  supervi­
sor  status  of  the  harassing  employees  was  not  before  us  in  that  case. 
See  post,  at  8.  Indeed,  the  employer  conceded  early  in  the  litigation
that  the  relevant  employees  were  supervisors,  App.  in  Pennsylvania 
State  Police  v.  Suders,  O.  T.  2003,  No.  03–95,  p. 20  (Answer  ¶29), 
and  we  therefore  had  no  occasion  to  question  that  unchallenged 
characterization.