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4  NEW YORK STATE RIFLE & PISTOL ASSN., INC. v. BRUEN 

Syllabus 

(2) The burden then falls on respondents to show that New York’s 
proper-cause  requirement  is  consistent  with  this  Nation’s  historical 
tradition of firearm regulation.  To do so, respondents appeal to a va-
riety of historical sources from the late 1200s to the early 1900s.  But 
when it comes to interpreting the Constitution, not all history is cre-
ated equal.  “Constitutional rights are enshrined with the scope they 
were understood to have when the people adopted them.”  Heller, 554 
U. S., at 634–635.  The Second Amendment was adopted in 1791; the
Fourteenth  in  1868.    Historical  evidence  that  long  predates  or  post-
dates either time may not illuminate the scope of the right.  With these 
principles in mind, the Court concludes that respondents have failed 
to meet their burden to identify an American tradition justifying New 
York’s proper-cause requirement.  Pp. 24–62.

(i) Respondents’  substantial  reliance  on  English  history  and 
custom before the founding makes some sense given Heller’s statement 
that the Second Amendment “codified a right ‘inherited from our Eng-
lish  ancestors.’ ”  554  U. S.,  at  599.    But  the  Court  finds  that  history
ambiguous  at  best  and  sees  little  reason  to  think  that  the  Framers 
would have thought it applicable in the New World.  The Court cannot 
conclude from this historical record that, by the time of the founding,
English law would have justified restricting the right to publicly bear
arms suited for self-defense only to those who demonstrate some spe-
cial need for self-protection.  Pp. 30–37.

(ii) Respondents next direct the Court to the history of the Col-
onies and early Republic, but they identify only three restrictions on 
public carry from that time.  While the Court doubts that just three 
colonial  regulations  could  suffice  to  show  a  tradition  of  public-carry
regulation, even looking at these laws on their own terms, the Court is
not convinced that they regulated public carry akin to the New York 
law  at  issue.  The  statutes  essentially  prohibited  bearing  arms  in  a 
way that spread “fear” or “terror” among the people, including by car-
rying  of  “dangerous  and  unusual  weapons.”    See  554  U. S.,  at  627. 
Whatever  the  likelihood  that  handguns  were  considered  “dangerous 
and unusual” during the colonial period, they are today “the quintes-
sential  self-defense  weapon.”  Id.,  at  629.    Thus,  these  colonial  laws 
provide no justification for laws restricting the public carry of weapons
that are unquestionably in common use today.  Pp. 37–42.

(iii) Only  after  the  ratification  of  the  Second  Amendment  in
1791 did public-carry restrictions proliferate.  Respondents rely heav-
ily  on  these  restrictions,  which  generally  fell  into  three  categories: 
common-law  offenses,  statutory  prohibitions,  and  “surety”  statutes.
None  of  these  restrictions  imposed  a  substantial  burden  on  public 
carry  analogous  to  that  imposed  by  New  York’s  restrictive  licensing 
regime.