Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/16pdf/16-122_1b7d.pdf
Page Number: 4

4 

LEONARD v. TEXAS 

Statement of THOMAS, J. 

These  forfeiture  operations  frequently  target  the  poor 
and  other  groups  least  able  to  defend  their  interests  in 
forfeiture proceedings.  Id., at 53–54; Sallah, O’Harrow, & 
Rich,  Stop  and  Seize,  Washington  Post,  Sept.  7,  2014, 
pp. A1, A10.  Perversely, these same groups are often the
most burdened by forfeiture.  They are more likely to use 
cash than alternative forms of payment, like credit cards,
which may be less susceptible to forfeiture.  And they are
more likely to suffer in their daily lives while they litigate
for the return of a critical item of property, such as a car
or a home. 

III 
The  Court  has  justified  its  unique  constitutional  treat-
ment  of  civil  forfeiture  largely  by  reference  to  a  discrete 
historical practice that existed at the time of the founding.
See,  e.g.,  Bennis  v.  Michigan,  516  U. S.  442,  446–448 
(1996).  “ ‘English Law provided for statutory forfeitures of
offending  objects  used  in  violation  of  the  customs  and
revenue  laws.’ ”  Austin,  supra,  at  612  (quoting  Calero-
Toledo  v.  Pearson  Yacht  Leasing  Co.,  416  U. S.  663,  682 
(1974)).  This  practice  “took  hold  in  the  United  States,”
where  the  “First  Congress  passed  laws  subjecting  ships
and cargos involved in customs offenses to forfeiture.”  509 
U. S.,  at  613.    Other  early  statutes  also  provided  for  the
forfeiture of pirate ships.  United States v. Parcel of Rum-
son, N. J., Land, 507 U. S. 111, 119 (1993) (plurality opin-
ion).  These  early  statutes  permitted  the  government  to
proceed  in rem  under  the  fiction  that  the  thing  itself, 
rather  than  the  owner,  was  guilty  of  the  crime.    See 
Calero-Toledo, supra, at 684–685; Act of Aug. 4, 1790, §67, 
1  Stat.  176–177.    And,  because  these  suits  were  in rem 
rather  than  in  personam,  they  typically  proceeded  civilly
rather  than  criminally.    See  United  States  v.  La  Venge-
ance, 3 Dall. 297, 301 (1796). 

In  the  absence  of  this  historical  practice,  the  Constitu-