Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/23pdf/22-915_8o6b.pdf
Page Number: 47

12 

UNITED STATES v. RAHIMI 

KAVANAUGH, J., concurring 

Importantly, the Framers themselves intended that post-
ratification  history  would  shed  light  on  the  meaning  of 
vague  constitutional  text.    They  understood  that  some 
constitutional  text  may  be  “more  or  less  obscure  and 
equivocal” such that questions “daily occur in the course of 
practice.”  The  Federalist  No.  37,  at  228–229.  Madison 
explained  that  the  meaning  of  vague  text  would  be 
“liquidated  and  ascertained  by  a  series  of  particular
discussions and adjudications.”  Id., at 229.  In other words, 
Madison  articulated  the  Framers’  expectation  and  intent
that  post-ratification  history  would  be  a  proper  and
important tool to help constitutional interpreters determine 
the meaning of vague constitutional text. 

From  early  on,  this  Court  followed  Madison’s  lead.    In 
1819, in one of its most important decisions ever, the Court 
addressed  the  scope  of  Article  I’s  Necessary  and  Proper
Clause.  McCulloch  v.  Maryland,  4  Wheat.  316  (1819).
Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Marshall invoked post-
ratification history to conclude that Congress’s authority to 
establish a national bank could “scarcely be considered as
an open question.”  Id., at 401.  The constitutionality of the 

—————— 
answer  to  those  various  methodological  questions.  See,  e.g.,  Noel 
Canning, 573 U. S., at 522–556; Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 
343 U. S. 579, 610–611 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 

And I will not attempt to answer all of those questions here.  Respected
scholars are continuing to undertake careful analysis.  See generally J.
Alicea, Practice-Based Constitutional Theories, 133 Yale L. J. 568 (2023); 
R. Barnett & L. Solum, Originalism After Dobbs, Bruen, and Kennedy: 
The  Role  of  History  and  Tradition,  118  Nw.  U.  L.  Rev.  433  (2023);  M. 
DeGirolami,  Traditionalism  Rising,  24  J.  Contemp.  Legal  Issues  9 
(2023); S. Girgis, Living Traditionalism, 98 N. Y. U. L. Rev. 1477 (2023); 
W.  Baude,  Constitutional  Liquidation,  71  Stan.  L.  Rev.  1  (2019);  C.
Bradley,  Doing  Gloss,  84  U.  Chi.  L. Rev.  59  (2017);  C.  Bradley  &  T. 
Morrison, Historical Gloss and the Separation of Powers, 126 Harv. L. 
Rev.  411  (2012);  A.  Amar,  America’s  Constitution  (2005);  C.  Nelson, 
Originalism and Interpretive Conventions, 70 U. Chi. L. Rev. 519 (2003); 
M. McConnell, Tradition and Constitutionalism Before the Constitution, 
1998 U. Ill. L. Rev. 173.