Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/23pdf/23-108_8n5a.pdf
Page Number: 36.0

14 

SNYDER v. UNITED STATES 

JACKSON, J., dissenting 

paid the Buha brothers a visit at their dealership.  “I need 
money,” he said.  App. 72.  He asked for $15,000; the deal-
ership gave him $13,000.  When federal investigators heard 
about the payment and came calling, Snyder told them the
check was for information technology and health insurance 
consulting services that he had provided to the dealership. 
He gave different explanations for the money to Reeder and 
a different city employee.

Employees at Great Lakes Peterbilt testified that Snyder
never  performed  any  consulting  work  for  the  dealership. 
And  during  the  federal  investigation,  no  written  agree-
ments,  work  product,  evidence  of  meetings,  invoices,  or 
other documentation was ever produced relating to any con-
sulting  work  performed  by  Snyder.    All  of  this  confirmed 
testimony from the dealership’s controller, who had cut the 
check to Snyder: Snyder had instead been paid for an “ ‘in-
side track. ’ ”  App. to Pet. for Cert. 60a–61a. 

A  federal  grand  jury  charged  Snyder  with  violating  18
U. S. C.  §666(a)(1)(B).    App.  2–3.  The  indictment  alleged
that  Snyder  “did  corruptly  solicit,  demand,  accept,  and 
agree to accept a bank check in the amount of $13,000, in-
tending to be influenced and rewarded.”  Id., at 3.  A jury
found  him  guilty  of  violating  §666  in  connection  with  the 
garbage truck contracts.  It is not difficult to see why the 
jury  reached  that  conclusion,  having  been  instructed  that
the  Government  needed  to  prove  that  Snyder  “acted  cor-
ruptly, with the intent to be influenced or rewarded.”  Id., 
at 27.6 

—————— 

6 Even after its decision to construe §666 as a bribery-only statute, the
Court’s decision to reverse Snyder’s conviction, rather than vacate and 
remand, is perplexing.  The District Court specifically found that, “even 
if ” §666 were construed to penalize bribes alone, “there was ample evi-
dence  permitting  a  rational  jury  to  find,  from  the  circumstantial  evi-
dence, that there was an up-front agreement to reward Snyder for mak-
ing sure [Great Lakes Peterbilt] won the contract award(s).”  App. to Pet. 
for Cert. 63a.  Thus, the Seventh Circuit should have been permitted to