Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/19pdf/18-1150_new_d18e.pdf
Page Number: 16

Cite as:  590 U. S. ____ (2020) 

13 

Opinion of the Court 

are particularly reluctant to disrupt precedents interpret-
ing  language  that  Congress  has  since  reenacted.    As  we 
explained  last  Term  in  Helsinn  Healthcare  S. A.  v.  Teva 
Pharmaceuticals  USA,  Inc.,  586  U. S.  ___  (2019),  when 
Congress  “adopt[s]  the  language  used  in  [an]  earlier  act,” 
we  presume  that  Congress  “adopted  also  the construction
given by this Court to such language, and made it a part of 
the enactment.”  Id., at ___ (slip op., at 7) (quoting Shapiro 
v. United States, 335 U. S. 1, 16 (1948)).  A century of cases
have rooted the government edicts doctrine in the word “au-
thor,” and Congress has repeatedly reused that term with-
out  abrogating  the  doctrine.    The  term  now  carries  this 
settled  meaning,  and  “critics  of  our  ruling  can  take  their
objections  across  the  street,  [where]  Congress  can  correct
any  mistake  it  sees.”  Kimble  v.  Marvel  Entertainment, 
LLC, 576 U. S. 446, 456 (2015).3 

Moving on from the text, Georgia invokes what it views
as the official position of the Copyright Office, as reflected
in  the  Compendium  of  U. S.  Copyright  Office  Practices 
(Compendium).  But,  as  Georgia  concedes,  the  Compen-
dium is a non-binding administrative manual that at most 

—————— 

3 JUSTICE THOMAS disputes the applicability of the Helsinn Healthcare 
presumption because States have asserted copyright in statutory anno-
tations  over  the  years  notwithstanding  our  government  edicts  prece-
dents.  Post, at 11–12.  In JUSTICE THOMAS’s view, those assertions prove
that our precedents could not have provided clear enough guidance for 
Congress to incorporate.  But that inference from state behavior proves 
too much.  The same study cited by JUSTICE THOMAS to support a practice
of claiming copyright in non-binding annotations also reports that “many 
states claim copyright interest in their primary law materials,” including 
statutes and regulations.  Dmitrieva, State Ownership of Copyrights in 
Primary Law Materials, 23 Hastings Com. & Entertainment L. J. 81, 109
(2000) (emphasis added).  JUSTICE THOMAS concedes that such assertions 
are plainly foreclosed by our government edicts precedents.  Post, at 4. 
That interested  parties  have  pursued ambitious  readings  of  our  prece-
dents does not mean those precedents are incapable of providing mean-
ingful guidance to us or to Congress.