Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/529bv.pdf
Page Number: 798.0

529US3

Unit: $U56

[09-28-01 09:22:19] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 529 U. S. 694 (2000)

723

Scalia, J., dissenting

revocation supervisory release given the actual text of sub-
section (e)(3), and nothing more is pertinent here. Hypo-
thetical discussion of what role § 3583(a) might play had
Congress legislated differently is beside the point.

The Court next turns to questions of policy—framed as an
inquiry into “congressional purpose.” Ante, at 708. Citing
legislative history (although not legislative history discuss-
ing the particular subsection at issue), ante, at 709–710, the
Court explains what it views as the policies Congress seeks
to serve with supervised release generally, and then explains
how these general policies would be undermined by reading
§ 3583(e)(3) as written.
“Our obligation,” the Court says, “is
to give effect to congressional purpose so long as the con-
gressional language does not itself bar that result.” Ante,
at 710, n. 10.
I think not. Our obligation is to go as far
in achieving the general congressional purpose as the text
of the statute fairly prescribes—and no further. We stop
where the statutory language does, and do not require ex-
plicit prohibition of our carrying the ball a few yards beyond.
In any event, as read by any English speaker except one who
talks of revoking a dog, the statute does “bar” the result the
Court reaches here. The proper canon to govern the pres-
ent case is quite simple: “[W]here, as here, the statute’s lan-
guage is plain, ‘the sole function of the courts is to enforce
it according to its terms,’ ” United States v. Ron Pair Enter-
prises, Inc., 489 U. S. 235, 241 (1989) (quoting Caminetti v.
United States, 242 U. S. 470, 485 (1917)).

Perhaps there is a scrivener’s error exception to that
canon, see, e. g., Holloway v. United States, 526 U. S. 1, 19,
n. 2 (1999) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Green v. Bock Laundry
Machine Co., 490 U. S. 504, 527–528 (1989) (Scalia, J., con-
curring in judgment), but the words of today’s author in an-
other case well describe why that is inapplicable here: “This
case is a far cry from the rare one where the effect of imple-
menting the ordinary meaning of the statutory text would
be patent absurdity or demonstrably at odds with the inten-