Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/23pdf/22-704_4246.pdf
Page Number: 3.0

Cite as:  602 U. S. ____ (2024) 

3 

Syllabus 

when Congress enacted the Lanham Act in 1946.  The Act’s compre-
hensive system for federal registration of trademarks continues to dis-
tinguish based on a mark’s content.  This history demonstrates that 
restrictions  on  trademarks  have  always  turned  on  a  mark’s  content 
and have existed harmoniously alongside the First Amendment from 
the  beginning.    That  relationship  suggests  that  heightened  scrutiny 
need not always apply in this unique context. 

The content-based nature of trademark protection is compelled by
the  historical  rationales  of  trademark  law—to  prohibit  confusion  by 
identifying the ownership and source of goods.  Indicating ownership 
and the manufacturing source touch on the content of the mark, i.e., 
from whom the product came.  And policing trademarks so as to pre-
vent confusion over the source of goods requires looking to the mark’s 
content.  Because of the uniquely content-based nature of trademark 
regulation and the longstanding coexistence of trademark regulation 
with the First Amendment, a solely content-based restriction of trade-
mark  registration  need  not  be  evaluated  under heightened  scrutiny. 
R. A. V. v. St. Paul, 505 U. S. 377, 387.  Pp. 6–12.

(c) The  history  and  tradition  of  restricting  trademarks  containing 
names  is  sufficient  to  conclude  that  the  names  clause  is  compatible 
with the First Amendment.  Pp. 12–19. 

(1) Restrictions  on  trademarking  names  have  historically  been 
grounded  in  the  notion  that  a  person  has  ownership  over  his  own 
name, and that he may not be excluded from using that name by an-
other’s trademark.  See Brown Chemical Co. v. Meyer, 139 U. S. 540, 
544.  The  common  law  prevented  a  person  from  trademarking  any 
name—even his own—by itself.  It did, however, allow a person to ob-
tain a trademark containing his own name, provided that he could not 
use the mark containing his name to the exclusion of a person with the 
same name.  The common-law approach thus protected only a person’s
right  to  use  his  own  name,  an  understanding  that  was  carried  over 
into federal statutory law and included in the names clause.  The Court 
finds no evidence that the common law afforded protection to a person 
seeking a trademark of another living person’s name.  This common-
law  understanding  is  reflected  in  federal  statutory  law,  and  its  re-
quirement  that  a  trademark  contain  more  than  merely  a  name  re-
mains largely intact.  See §1052(e)(4).  It is thus unsurprising that the 
Lanham Act included the names clause.   

The  restriction  on  trademarking  names  also  reflects  trademark 
law’s  historical  rationale  of  identifying  the  source  of  goods  and  thus 
ensuring that consumers know the source of a product and can evalu-
ate it based upon the manufacturer’s reputation and goodwill.  Moreo-
ver,  the  clause  respects  the  established  connection  between  a  trade-
mark  and  its  protection  of  the  markholder’s  reputation.    This  Court