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Page Number: 55.0

12 

JESNER v. ARAB BANK, PLC 

Opinion of GORSUCH, J. 

the  response  is  much  the  same.  A  separate  clause  of  §9
gave  the  district  courts  “exclusive  original  cognizance  of
all civil causes of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction.”  1 
Stat.  77.  That  statute  has  long  been  given  a  broad  con-
struction  covering  “all  maritime  contracts,  torts  and  inju-
ries,”  DeLovio  v.  Boit,  7  F. Cas.  418,  442  (No.  3,776)  (CC 
Mass.  1815)  (Story,  J.),  along  with  “prize  jurisdiction,
which  probably  included  almost  all  ‘piracy’  cases  after 
1789,” Lee, supra, at 867.  So it is not clear why it’s neces-
sary  to  cram  the  problem  of  piracy  into  the  ATS.    If  any-
thing,  it  may  be  necessary  not  to  do  so.    Structural  fea-
tures  of  §9  make  it  at  least  questionable  that  both
provisions were meant to address the same subject matter:
Cases falling within §9’s ATS clause could also be brought
in state court or in the circuit courts, 1 Stat. 77, while §9’s 
admiralty  jurisdiction was generally exclusive, id., at 76– 
77.  See  Lee,  supra,  at  868.  And  the  two  provisions  also 
called for incompatible procedures: Section 9 required jury
trials  “in  all  causes  except  civil  causes  of  admiralty  and 
maritime jurisdiction.”  1 Stat. 77 (emphasis added). 

If  doubt  lingers  on  these  historical  questions,  it  is  a
doubt that should counsel restraint all the same.  Even if 
the  ATS  might  have  meant  to  allow  foreign  ambassadors 
to  sue  foreign  defendants,  or  foreign  plaintiffs  to  sue  for-
eign pirates, what would that prove about more mine-run
cases  like  ours,  where  none  of  those  special  concerns  are
implicated?  There  are  at  least  serious  historical  argu-
ments suggesting the ATS was not meant to apply to suits
like this one.  And to the extent Sosa affords courts discre-
tion  to  proceed,  these  arguments  should  inform  any  deci-
sion  whether  to  exercise  that  discretion. 
In  Kiobel  v. 
Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U. S. 108, 116–117 (2013), 
the  Court  invoked  Sosa  discretion  to  refuse  to  hear  cases 
involving foreign conduct.  I can see no reason why courts
should  respond  differently  when  it  comes  to  cases  involv-