Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/21pdf/20-1573_8p6h.pdf
Page Number: 3.0

Cite as:  596 U. S. ____ (2022) 

3 

Syllabus 

represents a multitude of absent individuals; a PAGA plaintiff, by con-
trast, represents a single principal, the LWDA, that has a multitude
of claims.  As a result, PAGA suits exhibit virtually none of the proce-
dural characteristics of class actions. 

This Court’s FAA precedents treat bilateral arbitration as the pro-
totype of the individualized and informal form of arbitration protected 
from  undue  state  interference  by  the  FAA.    See,  e.g.,  Epic  Systems 
Corp. v. Lewis, 584 U. S. ___, ___.  Viking posits that a proceeding is 
“bilateral” only if it involves two and only two parties and “is conducted 
by  and  on  behalf  of  the  individual  named  parties  only.”    Wal-Mart 
Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U. S. 338, 348.  Thus, Iskanian’s prohibition
on PAGA waivers is inconsistent with the FAA because PAGA creates 
an intrinsically representational form of action and Iskanian requires 
parties  either  to  arbitrate  in  that  format  or  forgo  arbitration  alto-
gether.

This Court disagrees.  Nothing in the FAA establishes a categorical 
rule mandating enforcement of waivers of standing to assert claims on 
behalf of absent principals.  Non-class representative actions in which 
a single agent litigates on behalf of a single principal necessarily devi-
ate from the strict ideal of bilateral dispute resolution posited by Vi-
king, but this Court has never held that the FAA imposes a duty on
States to render all forms of representative standing waivable by con-
tract or that such suits deviate from the norm of bilateral arbitration. 
Unlike procedures distinctive to multiparty litigation, single-principal,
single-agent  representative  actions  are  “bilateral”  in  two  registers: 
They involve the rights of only the absent real party in interest and
the  defendant,  and  litigation  need  only  be  conducted  by  the  agent-
plaintiff  and  the  defendant.    Nothing  in  this  Court’s  precedent  sug-
gests that in enacting the FAA, Congress intended to require States to
reshape their agency law governing who can assert claims on behalf of 
whom to ensure that parties will never have to arbitrate disputes in a 
proceeding  that  deviates  from  bilateral  arbitration  in  the  strictest 
sense.  Pp. 7–17.

(b) PAGA’s built-in mechanism of claim joinder is in conflict with the 
FAA.  Iskanian’s prohibition on contractual division of PAGA actions 
into constituent claims unduly circumscribes the freedom of parties to 
determine “the issues subject to arbitration” and “the rules by which 
they will arbitrate,” Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela, 587 U. S. ____, ____, 
and does so in a way that violates the fundamental principle that “ar-
bitration is a matter of consent,” Stolt-Nielsen, 559 U. S., at 684.  For 
that reason, state law cannot condition the enforceability of an agree-
ment to arbitrate on the availability of a procedural mechanism that
would permit a party to expand the scope of the anticipated arbitration 
by introducing claims that the parties did not jointly agree to arbitrate.