Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/558bv.pdf
Page Number: 543.0

382  CITIZENS  UNITED  v.  FEDERAL  ELECTION  COMM’N 

Roberts, C. J., concurring 

electioneering  speech  conducted  by  labor  unions).  The  dis­
sent  in  this  case  succumbs  to  the  same  temptation,  sug­
gesting  that  Austin  justiﬁes  prohibiting  corporate  speech 
because such speech might unduly inﬂuence “the market for 
legislation.”  Post, at 471.  The dissent reads Austin to per­
mit  restrictions  on  corporate  speech  based  on  nothing  more 
than  the  fact  that  the  corporate  form  may  help  individuals 
coordinate  and  present  their  views  more  effectively.  Post, 
at  471–472.  A  speaker’s  ability  to  persuade,  however,  pro­
vides  no  basis  for  government  regulation  of  free  and  open 
public debate on what the laws should be. 

If taken seriously, Austin’s logic would apply most directly 
to  newspapers  and  other  media  corporations.  They  have  a 
more  profound  impact  on  public  discourse  than  most  other 
speakers.  These  corporate  entities  are,  for  the  time  being, 
not  subject  to  § 441b’s  otherwise  generally  applicable  prohi­
bitions  on  corporate  political  speech.  But  this  is  simply  a 
matter of legislative grace.  The fact that the law currently 
grants  a  favored  position  to  media  corporations  is  no  rea­
son  to  overlook  the  danger  inherent  in  accepting  a  theory 
that  would  allow  government  restrictions  on  their  politi­
cal  speech.  See  generally  McConnell,  supra,  at  283–286 
(Thomas,  J.,  concurring  in  part,  concurring  in  judgment  in 
part, and dissenting in part). 

These readings of Austin do no more than carry that deci­
sion’s  reasoning  to  its  logical  endpoint.  In  doing  so,  they 
highlight  the  threat  Austin  poses  to  First  Amendment 
rights  generally,  even  outside  its  speciﬁc  factual  context  of 
corporate  express  advocacy.  Because  Austin  is  so  difﬁcult 
to conﬁne to its facts—and because its logic threatens to un­
dermine our First Amendment jurisprudence and the nature 
of public discourse more broadly—the costs of giving it stare 
decisis effect are unusually high. 

Finally  and  most  importantly,  the  Government’s  own  ef­
fort  to defend  Austin—or,  more accurately,  to defend  some­
thing that is not quite Austin—underscores its weakness as