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14  AMERICANS FOR PROSPERITY FOUNDATION v. BONTA 

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting 

The Court next looks to McCutcheon v. Federal Election 
Comm’n,  572  U. S.  185  (2014),  which  addressed  political 
contribution limits, not disclosure regimes.  It is no surprise
that the Court subjected the former to narrow tailoring, as 
Buckley had already held that contribution limits directly 
“impinge on protected associational freedoms.”  424 U. S., 
at  22;  see  also  McCutcheon,  572  U. S.,  at  204  (explaining 
that aggregate limits on contributions “diminish an individ-
ual’s right of political association” by “limit[ing] the number 
of  candidates  he  supports”  or  the  amount  of  money  he 
gives).  Buckley itself distinguished the First Amendment 
burdens of disclosure requirements and contribution limits. 
See 424 U. S., at 64 (noting that, unlike contribution limits, 
“disclosure requirements impose no ceiling on campaign-re-
lated activities” and concluding only that compelled disclo-
sure “can” infringe associational rights).  Apparently, those 
distinctions no longer matter.

Neither Shelton nor McCutcheon, then, supports the idea
that all disclosure requirements must be narrowly tailored. 
McCutcheon arose in the context of a direct limit on associ-
ational  freedoms,  while  the  law  in  Shelton  “broadly  sti-
fle[d]” associational rights.  Ignoring these distinctions, the
Court decides that it will indiscriminately require narrow 
—————— 
See ante, at 10–11.  Baird involved the Arizona State Bar’s requirement 
that lawyers seeking admission disclose their organizational affiliations
and  face  denial  if  they  gave  the  wrong  answers.    The “state  inquiries”
were not just “[b]road and sweeping”; they were designed to identify and 
“punis[h]” applicants who “[held] certain beliefs” or were “member[s] of 
a  particular  political  organization.”    401  U. S.,  at  6.    As  the  Court  ex-
plained,  “a  State  may  not  inquire  about  a  man’s  views  or  associations 
solely for the purpose of withholding a right or benefit because of what
he believes.”  Id., at 7.  The Court nowhere suggests that California will
“punish” donors for their beliefs.  That logic thus has no application here. 
The Court also draws on language from NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S. 
415 (1963).  Ante, at 10.  But that case did not involve a disclosure re-
quirement at all.  It involved a law that made it a crime for a person to 
advise another of the infringement of her legal rights and to refer her to
a group of attorneys, like the legal staff of the NAACP, for assistance.