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Page Number: 2

2  MANHATTAN COMMUNITY ACCESS CORP. v. HALLECK 

Syllabus 

vant  here,  the  entity  exercises  “powers  traditionally  exclusively  re-
served  to  the  State.”    Jackson  v.  Metropolitan  Edison  Co.,  419  U. S. 
345, 352.  The Court has stressed that “very few” functions fall into 
that  category.    Flagg  Bros.,  Inc.  v.  Brooks,  436  U. S.  149,  158.    The 
relevant function in this case—operation of public access channels on 
a cable system—has not traditionally and exclusively been performed 
by government.  Since the 1970s, a variety of private and public ac-
tors  have  operated  public  access  channels.    Early  Manhattan  public 
access  channels  were  operated  by  private  cable operators  with  some 
help  from  private  nonprofit  organizations.    That  practice  continued 
until  the  early  1990s,  when  MNN  began  to  operate  the  channels.  
Operating  public  access  channels  on  a  cable  system  is  not  a  tradi-
tional, exclusive public function.  Pp. 6–8. 

(2) The producers contend that the relevant function here is more 
generally  the  operation  of  a  public  forum  for  speech,  which,  they 
claim,  is  a  traditional,  exclusive  public  function.    But  that  analysis 
mistakenly  ignores  the  threshold  state-action  question.    Providing 
some kind of forum for speech is not an activity that only governmen-
tal entities have traditionally performed.  Therefore, a private entity 
who provides a forum for speech is not transformed by that fact alone 
into  a  state  actor.    See  Hudgens  v.  NLRB,  424  U. S.  507,  520–521.  
Pp. 8–10. 

(3) The producers note that the City has designated MNN to op-
erate the public access channels on Time Warner’s cable system, and 
that the State heavily regulates MNN with respect to those channels.  
But  the  City’s  designation  is  analogous  to  a  government  license,  a 
government  contract,  or  a  government-granted  monopoly,  none  of 
which converts a private entity into a state actor—unless the private 
entity is performing a traditional, exclusive public function.  See, e.g., 
San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic Comm., 
483  U. S.  522,  543–544.    And  the  fact  that  MNN  is  subject  to  the 
State’s extensive regulation “does not by itself convert its action into 
that of the State.”  Jackson, 419 U. S., at 350.  Pp. 11–14. 

(b) The  producers  alternatively  contend  that  the  public  access 
channels are actually the City’s property and that MNN is essentially 
managing  government  property  on  the  City’s  behalf.    But  the  City 
does not own or lease the public access channels and does not possess 
any  formal  easement  or  other  property  interest  in  the  channels.    It 
does not matter that a provision in the franchise agreements between 
the City and Time Warner allowed the City to designate a private en-
tity to operate the public access channels on Time Warner’s cable sys-
tem.  Nothing in the agreements suggests that the City possesses any 
property interest in the cable system or in the public access channels 
on that system.  Pp. 14–15.