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Page Number: 41.0

16 

IANCU v. BRUNETTI 

Opinion of SOTOMAYOR, J. 

Arts v. Finley, 524 U. S. 569, 573, 585–587 (1998) (compet-
itive  government  grant-making  program  to  support  the
arts).10    In  each  of  these  situations,  a  governmental  body 
established  an  initiative  that  supported  some  forms  of 
expression  without  restricting  others.  Some  speakers 
were better off, but no speakers were worse off. 

Regardless of the finer distinctions between these labels,
reasonable,  viewpoint-neutral  content  discrimination  is 
generally permissible under either framework.  See Chris-
tian  Legal  Soc.,  561  U. S.,  at  679  (“Any  access  barrier 
must  be  reasonable  and  viewpoint  neutral”);  Velazquez, 
531  U. S.,  at  543–544,  548–549  (analogizing  to  limited-
forum cases and explaining that “[w]here private speech is
involved,  even  Congress’  antecedent  funding  decision
cannot be aimed at the suppression of ideas thought inim-
ical to the Government’s own interest”); see also Ysursa v. 
Pocatello  Ed.  Assn.,  555  U. S.  353,  355  (2009)  (finding 
government  conduct  that  did  not  restrict  speech  but  sim-
ply “decline[d] to promote” it valid where it was “reasonable 
in light of the State’s interest”).  Perhaps for that reason, 
the  Court  has  often  discussed  the  two  frameworks  as  at 
least  closely  related.  See,  e.g.,  Christian  Legal  Society, 
561 U. S.,  at 682 (“[T]his case fits comfortably within the
limited-public  forum  category,  for  [the  plaintiff],  in  seek-

—————— 

10 In  Tam,  four  Justices  concluded  that  cash-subsidy  programs  like 
the  one  in  Finley  were  “not  instructive  in  analyzing”  trademark  regis-
tration.  582 U. S., at ___ (opinion of ALITO, J.) (slip op., at 20).  Trade-
mark registration differs, of course, because any “subsidy” comes in the 
form of a noncash benefit, but that difference does not foreclose under-
standing the registration system as a beneficial, noncash governmental 
program.  No  Justice,  meanwhile,  rejected  the  limited-public-forum 
analogy,  see  id.,  at  ___–___,  and  n. 16  (slip  op.,  at  22–23,  and  n.  16) 
(calling  such  cases  “[p]otentially  more  analogous”  and  reserving  the 
question), and scholars have noted arguments for adopting it. See Snow 
2364–2366;  Katyal,  Trademark  Intersectionality,  57  UCLA  L.  Rev. 
1601, 1676–1681 (2010); Lefstin, Note, Does the First Amendment Bar 
Cancellation of REDSKINS? 52 Stan. L. Rev. 665, 706–707 (2000).