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Page Number: 24

4 

TURNER v. ROGERS 

THOMAS, J., dissenting 

“civil  contempt  is  not  a  ‘criminal  prosecution’  within  the
meaning  of  the  Sixth  Amendment”).    He  argues  instead 
that  “the  right  to  the  assistance  of  counsel  for  persons 
facing  incarceration  arises  not  only  from  the  Sixth
Amendment, but also from the requirement of fundamen-
tal  fairness  under  the  Due  Process  Clause  of  the  Four-
teenth Amendment.”  Brief for Petitioner 28.  In his view, 
this Court has relied on due process to “rejec[t] formalistic
distinctions  between  criminal  and  civil  proceedings,  in-
stead  concluding  that  incarceration  or  other  confinement
triggers the right to counsel.”  Id., at 33. 

But  if  the  Due  Process  Clause  created  a  right  to  ap-
pointed  counsel  in  all  proceedings  with  the  potential  for
detention,  then  the  Sixth  Amendment  right  to  appointed 
counsel  would  be  unnecessary.  Under  Turner’s  theory,
every instance in which the Sixth Amendment guarantees 
a  right  to  appointed  counsel  is  covered  also  by  the  Due 
Process  Clause.  The  Sixth  Amendment,  however,  is  the 
only constitutional provision that even mentions the assis-
tance  of  counsel;  the  Due  Process  Clause  says  nothing 
about counsel.  Ordinarily, we do not read a general provi-
sion  to  render  a  specific  one  superfluous.    Cf.  Morales  v. 
Trans  World  Airlines,  Inc.,  504  U. S.  374,  384  (1992) 
(“[I]t  is  a  commonplace  of  statutory  construction  that  the 
specific governs the general”).  The fact that one constitu-
tional  provision  expressly  provides  a  right  to  appointed 
counsel  in  specific  circumstances  indicates  that  the  Con-
stitution  does  not  also  sub  silentio  provide  that  right  far
more  broadly  in  another,  more  general,  provision.  Cf. 
Albright  v.  Oliver,  510  U. S.  266,  273  (1994)  (plurality 
opinion)  (“Where  a  particular  Amendment  provides  an 
explicit textual source of constitutional protection against 
a  particular  sort  of  government  behavior,  that  Amend-
ment, not the more generalized notion of ‘substantive due
process,’  must  be  the  guide  for  analyzing  these  claims” 
(internal quotation marks omitted)); id., at 281 (KENNEDY,