Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/22pdf/21-806_2dp3.pdf
Page Number: 3.0

Cite as:  599 U. S. ____ (2023) 

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Syllabus 

“unambiguously confe[r]” individual rights, making those rights “pre-
sumptively enforceable” under §1983.  Id., at 283–284. 

Gonzaga sets forth the Court’s established method for ascertaining 
unambiguous conferral.  Courts must employ traditional tools of stat-
utory  construction  to  assess  whether  Congress  has  “unambiguously 
conferred” “individual rights upon a class of beneficiaries” to which the 
plaintiff belongs.  Id., at 283, 285–286.  Notably, it must be determined 
that  “Congress  intended  to  create  a  federal  right”  for  the  identified 
class, not merely that the plaintiffs fall “within the general zone of in-
terest that the statute is intended to protect.”  Id., at 283 (emphasis 
deleted).    The  test  for  unambiguous  conferral  is  satisfied  where  the 
provision in question is “ ‘phrased in terms of the persons benefited’ ” 
and  contains  “rights-creating,”  individual-centric  language  with  an 
“ ‘unmistakable focus on the benefited class.’ ”  Id., at 284, 287 (empha-
sis deleted).  If a statutory provision surmounts this significant hurdle, 
it “secures” individual rights that are deemed “presumptively enforce-
able” under §1983.  Id., at 284. 

The  unnecessary-restraint  and  predischarge-notice  provisions  in
FNHRA that Talevski’s complaint invokes meet this test.  The FNHRA 
lays  out  a  litany  of  statutory  “[r]equirements  relating  to  residents’ 
rights,” §1396r(c).  The unnecessary-restraint provision requires nurs-
ing facilities to “protect and promote” residents’ “right to be free from 
. . . any physical or chemical restraints . . . not required to treat the 
resident’s medical symptoms.”  §1396r(c)(1)(A)(ii).  The predischarge-
notice  provision  imposes  preconditions  that  a  nursing  facility  must
meet to “transfer or discharge [a] resident.” §§1396r(c)(2)(A)–(B).  Both 
provisions  reside  in  §1396r(c),  which  expressly  concerns  “[r]equire-
ments relating to residents’ rights.”  Ibid. (emphasis added).  This fram-
ing is indicative of an individual “rights-creating” focus.  Gonzaga, 536 
U. S., at 284.  That these two provisions also establish who must com-
ply  with  these  statutory  rights  (namely,  the  Medicaid-participant
nursing homes) does not dispel the statute’s focus on the nursing-home
residents,  i.e.,  the  benefited  class.    The  provisions  use  clear  “rights-
creating  language,”  speak  “ ‘in  terms  of  the  persons  benefited,’ ”  and 
have an “ ‘unmistakable focus on the benefited class.’ ”  Id., at 284, 287, 
290 (emphasis deleted).  Thus, they satisfy Gonzaga’s stringent stand-
ard, and the rights they recognize are presumptively enforceable under
§1983.  Pp. 11–17.

(2) Even if a statutory provision unambiguously secures rights, a
defendant “may defeat [the] presumption by demonstrating that Con-
gress did not intend” that §1983 be available to enforce those rights. 
Rancho Palos Verdes v. Abrams, 544 U. S. 113, 120.   Evidence of such 
intent may be found expressly in the statute creating the right, or im-