Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/18pdf/18-302_e29g.pdf
Page Number: 20.0

Cite as:  588 U. S. ____ (2019) 

3 

Opinion of BREYER, J. 

First  Amendment  protects.  See  Janus  v.  State,  County, 
and  Municipal  Employees,  585  U. S.  ___,  ___–___  (2018) 
(KAGAN, J., dissenting) (slip op., at 27–28); Sorrell v. IMS 
Health  Inc.,  564  U. S.  552,  589–592  (2011)  (BREYER,  J., 
dissenting);  see  generally  Reed,  576  U. S.,  at  ___–___ 
(opinion of BREYER, J.) (slip op., at 2–4). 

Rather than deducing the answers to First Amendment
questions strictly from categories, as the Court often does,
I would appeal more often and more directly to the values 
the  First  Amendment  seeks  to  protect.    As  I  have  previ-
ously written, I would ask whether the regulation at issue 
“works speech-related harm that is out of proportion to its
justifications.”  United  States  v.  Alvarez,  567  U. S.  709, 
730 (2012) (opinion concurring in judgment); see Reed, 576 
U. S., at ___ (opinion concurring in judgment) (slip op., at 
4) (discussing the matter further, particularly in respect to 
the category of content discrimination). 

B 

This  case  illustrates  the  limits  of  relying  on  rigid  First 
Amendment categories, for the statute at issue does not fit 
easily into any of these categories. 

The  Court  has  not  decided  whether  the  trademark 
statute is simply a method of regulating pure “commercial
speech.”  See  Matal  v.  Tam,  582  U. S.  ___,  ___  (2017)
(opinion  of  ALITO,  J.)  (slip  op.,  at  24)  (leaving  open  the
question whether trademarks are commercial speech); id., 
at  ___  (opinion  of  Kennedy,  J.)  (slip  op.,  at  5)  (same). 
There  may  be  reasons  for  doubt  on  that  score.    Trade-
marks, after all, have an expressive component in addition
to a commercial one, and the statute does not bar anyone 
from  speaking.    To  be  sure,  the  statute  does  regulate  the
commercial  function  of  trademarks.    But  it  does  so  in  a 
limited  way  designed  primarily  to  ensure  that  a  mark 
identifies the product’s source.  See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. 
v. Samara Brothers, Inc., 529 U. S. 205, 212 (2000).