Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/22pdf/21-806_2dp3.pdf
Page Number: 74.0

6 

HEALTH AND HOSPITAL CORPORATION OF MARION 
CTY. v. TALEVSKI 
ALITO, J., dissenting 

ble.”  We have recognized as much when holding that a ma-
terially  identical  saving  clause  did  not  authorize  implied 
remedies  under  a  separate  remedial  provision.   See  AMG 
Capital Management,  LLC v. FTC, 593 U. S. ___, ___–___ 
(2021)  (slip  op.,  at  12–13).  And  in  the  §1983  context,  we 
have similarly held that saving clauses do “not ‘refer to  a 
suit for redress of a violation of the statut[e] at issue.’ ”  Ran-
cho Palos Verdes, 544 U. S., at 126–127 (alterations omit-
ted); accord, Sea Clammers, 453 U. S., at 20–21, n. 31. 

These results are understandable.  There is a considerable 
difference  between  preserving  existing  remedies  for  con-
duct that happens to violate other laws and providing a one-
stop remedy for the precise provisions in a statute.  See Al-
exander,  532  U. S.,  at  289–290.  The  latter  interpretation
runs against a century of holdings that a statute “ ‘cannot 
be held to destroy itself’ ” through a saving clause.  Ameri-
can Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Central Office Telephone, 
Inc., 524 U. S. 214, 227–228 (1998) (quoting Texas & Pacific 
R. Co. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U. S. 426, 446 (1907)).
Conversely, concluding that FNHRA “may be enforced only
through the statute’s express remed[ies]” gives full effect to
§1396r(h)(8)  because  “the  claims  available  under  §1983
prior to the enactment of the [Act] continue to be available.” 
Rancho Palos Verdes, 544 U. S., at 126. 

In short, “[a]llowing a plaintiff to circumvent [FNHRA’s]
administrative  remedies  would  be  inconsistent  with  Con-
gress’ carefully tailored scheme.”  Smith v.  Robinson, 468 
U. S. 992, 1012 (1984).  I would thus hold that the Act pre-
cludes enforcement under §1983 and reverse the judgment
below.  I therefore respectfully dissent.