Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/19pdf/18-1323_c07d.pdf
Page Number: 132.0

Cite as:  591 U. S. ____ (2020) 

17 

GORSUCH, J., dissenting 

or  “of  the  merits  of  the  legislation”  at  issue.  Davidson  v. 
New Orleans, 96 U. S. 97, 104 (1878). 

By  contrast,  and  as  today’s  concurrence  recognizes,  the
legal standard the plurality applies when it comes to admit-
ting  privileges  for  abortion  clinics  turns  out  to  be  exactly
the  sort  of all-things-considered  balancing  of benefits  and 
burdens this Court has long rejected.  Really, it’s little more
than the judicial version of a hunter’s stew:  Throw in any-
thing  that  looks  interesting,  stir,  and  season  to  taste.    In 
another context, this Court has described the sort of deci-
sionmaking on display today as “inherently, and therefore 
permanently, unpredictable.”  Crawford v. Washington, 541 
U. S.  36,  68,  n. 10  (2004).    Under  its  terms,  “[w]hether  a 
[burden] is deemed [undue] depends heavily on which fac-
tors the judge considers and how much weight he accords
each of them.”  Id., at 63. 

What  was  true  there  turns  out  to  be  no  less  true  here. 
The plurality sides with the district court in concluding that
the time and cost some women might have to endure to ob-
tain an abortion outweighs the benefits of Act 620.  Perhaps
the plurality sees that answer as obvious, given its appar-
ent conclusion that the Act would offer the public no bene-
fits of any kind.  But for its test to provide any helpful guid-
ance,  it  must  be  capable  of  resolving  cases  the  plurality 
can’t so easily dismiss.  Suppose, for example, a factfinder 
credited the State’s evidence of medical benefit, finding that
a small number of women would obtain safer medical care 
if the law went into effect.  But suppose the same factfinder 
also credited a plaintiff ’s evidence of burden, finding that a 
large number of women would have to endure longer wait
times and farther drives, and that a very small number of 
women would be unable to obtain an abortion at all.  How 
is  a  judge  supposed  to balance,  say,  a  few  women’s  emer-
gency hysterectomies against many women spending extra 
hours  travelling  to  a  clinic?    The  plurality’s  test  offers  no