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Page Number: 25.0

20 

KENNEDY v. BREMERTON SCHOOL DIST. 

Opinion of the Court 

more lenient second-step Pickering–Garcetti test, or alter-
natively  intermediate  scrutiny.    See  Brief  for  Respondent
44–48.  Ultimately,  however,  it  does  not  matter  which 
standard we apply.  The District cannot sustain its burden 
under any of them.3 

A 

As we have seen, the District argues that its suspension 
of Mr. Kennedy was essential to avoid a violation of the Es-
tablishment Clause.  Id., at 35–42.  On its account, Mr. Ken-
nedy’s prayers might have been protected by the Free Ex-
ercise  and  Free  Speech  Clauses.    But  his  rights  were  in
“direct tension” with the competing demands of the Estab-
lishment Clause.  App. 43.  To resolve that clash, the Dis-
trict  reasoned,  Mr.  Kennedy’s  rights  had  to  “yield.”  Ibid. 
The  Ninth Circuit  pursued  this  same  line  of  thinking,  in-
sisting that the District’s interest in avoiding an Establish-
ment  Clause  violation  “ ‘trump[ed]’ ”  Mr.  Kennedy’s  rights
to religious exercise and free speech.  991 F. 3d, at 1017; see 
also id., at 1020–1021. 

But how could that be?  It is true that this Court and oth-
ers often refer to the “Establishment Clause,” the “Free Ex-
ercise  Clause,”  and  the  “Free  Speech  Clause”  as  separate 
units.  But the three Clauses appear in the same sentence
of the same Amendment:  “Congress shall make no law re-
specting  an  establishment  of  religion,  or  prohibiting  the
free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech.” 
Amdt. 1.  A natural reading of that sentence would seem to 
suggest  the  Clauses  have  “complementary”  purposes,  not 
warring  ones  where  one  Clause  is  always  sure  to  prevail 
—————— 

3 It  seems,  too,  that  it  is  only  here  where  our  disagreement  with  the 
dissent begins in earnest.  We do not understand our colleagues to con-
test that Mr. Kennedy has met his burdens under either the Free Exer-
cise or Free Speech Clause, but only to suggest the District has carried 
its own burden “to establish that its policy prohibiting Kennedy’s public
prayers was the least restrictive means of furthering a compelling state 
interest.”  Post, at 22 (opinion of SOTOMAYOR, J.).