Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/20pdf/20-297_4g25.pdf
Page Number: 48

Cite as:  594 U. S. ____ (2021) 

17 

THOMAS, J., dissenting 

Surely  with  a  harm  so  closely  paralleling  a  common-law 
harm, this is an instance where a plaintiff “need not allege
any additional harm beyond the one Congress has identi-
fied.”  Spokeo, 578 U. S., at 342 (emphasis deleted).

But  even  setting  aside  everything  already  mentioned—
the Constitution’s text, history, precedent, financial harm,
libel, the risk of publication, and actual disclosure to a third 
party—one need only tap into common sense to know that 
receiving a letter identifying you as a potential drug traf-
ficker or terrorist is harmful.  All the more so when the in-
formation comes in the context of a credit report, the entire 
purpose  of  which  is  to  demonstrate  that  a  person  can  be 
trusted. 

And if this sort of confusing and frustrating communica-
tion is insufficient to establish a real injury, one wonders
what could rise to that level.  If, instead of falsely identify-
ing  Ramirez  as  a  potential  drug  trafficker  or  terrorist, 
TransUnion had flagged him as a “potential” child molester,
would that alone still be insufficient to open the courthouse 
doors?  What about falsely labeling a person a racist?  In-
cluding a slur on the report?  Or what about openly reduc-
ing a person’s credit score by several points because of his 
race?  If none of these constitutes an injury in fact, how can
that possibly square with our past cases indicating that the 
inability to “observe an animal species, even for purely es-
thetic  purposes,  . . .  undeniably”  is?    Lujan,  504  U. S.,  at 
562; see also Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environ-
mental  Services  (TOC),  Inc.,  528  U. S.  167,  183  (2000) 
(“plaintiffs adequately allege injury in fact when they aver 
that they use the affected area and are persons for whom 
the  aesthetic  and  recreational  values  of  the  area  will  be 
lessened”  (internal  quotation  marks  omitted));  Summers, 
555 U. S., at 494 (“[I]f . . . harm in fact affects the recrea-
tional  or  even  the  mere  esthetic  interests  of  the  plaintiff, 
that will suffice”).  Had the class members claimed an aes-
thetic  interest  in  viewing  an  accurate  report,  would  this