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COUNTY OF MAUI v. HAWAII WILDLIFE FUND 

Syllabus 

direct  discharge  from  a  point  source  into  navigable  waters  or  when 
there is the functional equivalent of a direct discharge.  Pp. 4–18.

(a) Statutory context limits the reach of the phrase “from any point
source”  to  a  range  of  circumstances  narrower  than  that  which  the 
Ninth Circuit’s “fairly traceable” interpretation suggests.  At the same 
time,  it  is  significantly  broader  than  the  total  exclusion  of  all  dis-
charges through groundwater, as urged by Maui and by the Solicitor 
General as amicus curiae.  Pp. 4–5.

(b) The Ninth Circuit’s “fairly traceable” limitation could allow EPA
to assert permitting authority over the release of pollutants that reach
navigable waters many years after their release.  But Congress did not 
intend to provide EPA with such broad authority.  First, to interpret 
“from” so broadly might require a permit in unexpected circumstances,
such as, e.g., the 100-year migration of pollutants through 250 miles of
groundwater to a river.  Second, the statute’s structure indicates that, 
as to groundwater pollution and nonpoint source pollution, Congress
left substantial responsibility and autonomy to the States and did not
give  EPA  authority  that  could  seriously  interfere  with  this  state  re-
sponsibility.  Third, the Act’s legislative history strongly supports the
conclusion  that  the  permitting  provision  does  not  extend  so  far.    Fi-
nally, longstanding regulatory practice shows that EPA has success-
fully  applied  the  permitting  provision  to  pollution  discharges  from
point  sources  that  reached  navigable  waters  through  groundwater 
using a narrower interpretation than that of the Ninth Circuit.  Pp. 5– 
10. 

(c) Maui, the Government, and the two dissents argue for interpre-
tations that, in light of the statute’s language, structure, and purposes,
are also too extreme.  Pp. 10–15.

(1) Maui  and  the  Solicitor  General  argue  that  the  statute’s  per-
mitting  requirement  does  not  apply  if  a  pollutant,  having  emerged
from a “point source,” must travel through any amount of groundwater 
before reaching navigable waters.  That narrow interpretation would 
risk  serious  interference  with  EPA’s  ability  to  regulate  point  source 
discharges,  and  Congress  would  not  have  intended  to  create  such  a 
large and obvious loophole in one of the Clean Water Act’s key regula-
tory innovations.  P. 10. 

(2) Reading “from” in the phrase “from any point source” together 
with “conveyance” in the point source definition “any . . . conveyance,” 
Maui argues that the meaning of “from any point source” is not about 
where the pollution originated, but about how it got there.  Thus, Maui 
claims, a permit is required only if a point source ultimately delivers 
the pollutant to navigable waters.  By contrast, if a pollutant travels
through groundwater, then the groundwater is the conveyance and no 
permit  is  required.    But  Maui’s  definition  of  “from”  as  connoting  a