Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/529bv.pdf
Page Number: 179.0

529US1

Unit: $U35

[09-26-01 09:32:43] PAGES PGT: OPIN

104

UNITED STATES v. LOCKE

Opinion of the Court

In these cases, petitioners relied on Ray to argue that
Washington’s more recent state regulations were pre-
empted as well. The Court of Appeals, however, concluded
that Ray retained little validity in light of subsequent action
by Congress. We disagree. The Ray Court’s interpreta-
Its basic ana-
tion of the PWSA is correct and controlling.
lytic structure explains why federal pre-emption analysis ap-
plies to the challenged regulations and allows scope and due
recognition for the traditional authority of the States and
localities to regulate some matters of local concern.

At the outset, it is necessary to explain that the essential
framework of Ray, and of the PWSA which it interpreted,
are of continuing force, neither having been superseded by
subsequent authority relevant to these cases.
In narrowing
the pre-emptive effect given the PWSA in Ray, the Court of
Appeals relied upon OPA’s saving clauses, ﬁnding in their
language a return of authority to the States. Title I of OPA
contains two saving clauses, stating:

“(a) Preservation of State authorities . . .

“Nothing in this Act or the Act of March 3, 1851

shall—

“(1) affect, or be construed or interpreted as pre-
empting, the authority of any State or political sub-
division thereof from imposing any additional liability
or requirements with respect to—

“(A) the discharge of oil or other pollution by oil

within such State . . . .

.

.

.

.

.

“(c) Additional requirements and liabilities; penalties
“Nothing in this Act, the Act of March 3, 1851 (46
U. S. C. 183 et seq.), or section 9509 of [the Internal Rev-
enue Code of 1986 (26 U. S. C. 9509)], shall in any way
affect, or be construed to affect, the authority of the
United States or any State or political subdivision
thereof—