Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/22pdf/22-179_o75q.pdf
Page Number: 51

Cite as:  599 U. S. ____ (2023) 

19 

JACKSON, J., dissenting 

its  prosecutorial  discretion  several  times.”    Ibid.    But  we 
were not moved: Such a prosecution was permitted by the 
statute, we noted, and that was enough to make it a serious 
threat.  “[T]he First Amendment protects against the Gov-
ernment;  it  does  not  leave  us  at  the  mercy  of  noblesse 
oblige.”  Ibid. 
  Second, just as in Stevens, “[t]his prosecution is itself ev-
idence of the danger in putting faith in Government repre-
sentations of prosecutorial restraint.”  Ibid.  At trial in this 
very  case,  the  Government  objected  to  Hansen’s  proposed 
jury instructions, which would have required, among other 
things,  that  the  Government  prove  that  Hansen  intended 
the noncitizen in question to reside in the United States il-
legally.    The  Government’s  objection  was  telling.    It  was 
based  on  the  argument  that  the  proposed  instructions 
added elements not found in the text of the statute itself.  
And  the  District  Court  was  persuaded;  it  sided  with  the 
Government in that regard.9  But now that the statute’s va-
lidity hangs in the balance, the Government has reversed 
course entirely—it now implores us to read into the statute 
the  very  element  that  it  earlier  opposed  as  atextual.    See 
Brief for United States 23–28. 
  This debacle exemplifies the real and ever-present risk of 
continuing to have facially overbroad criminal statutes on 
the books.  In its role as prosecutor, the Government often 
stakes out a maximalist position, only later to concede lim-
its when  the  statute  upon which  it relies  might  be struck 
down entirely and the Government finds itself on its back 
foot.10  I am not suggesting bad faith on anyone’s part; these 

—————— 

9 As the Government conceded during oral argument before this Court, 
given that its elements argument prevailed below, the instructions that 
the District Court gave to the jury in this case were legally erroneous.  
See Tr. of Oral Arg. 11; see also id., at 39–40 (acknowledging that the 
Court “should send the case back to the Ninth Circuit and let the Ninth 
Circuit decide what’s appropriate in light of ” the flawed instructions). 

10 The Court has seen similar moves in multiple cases just this Term.