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Page Number: 58.0

20 

MOORE v. HARPER 

THOMAS, J., dissenting 

to make the laws.”  State ex rel. Schrader v. Polley, 26 S. D. 
5, 10–11, 127 N. W. 848, 850–851 (1910). 

If  these  premises  hold,  then  petitioners’  conclusion  fol-
lows: In prescribing the times, places, and manner of con-
gressional elections, “the lawmaking body or power of the
state, as established by the state Constitution,” id., at 10, 
127 N. W., at 850, performs “a federal function derived from
the Federal Constitution,” which thus “transcends any lim-
itations sought to be imposed by the people of a State,” Le-
ser, 258 U. S., at 137.  As shown, each premise is easily sup-
ported  and  consistent  with  this  Court’s  precedents.
Petitioners’ conclusion also mirrors the Court’s interpreta-
tion of parallel language in the Electors Clause9 in McPher-
son  v.  Blacker,  146  U. S.  1  (1892):  “[T]he  words,  ‘in  such 
manner  as  the  legislature  thereof  may  direct,’ ”  “operat[e]
as a limitation upon the State in respect of any attempt to 
circumscribe the legislative power.”  Id., at 25.10 

The  majority  rejects  petitioners’  conclusion,  but  seem-
ingly without rejecting any of the premises from which that 
conclusion  follows.    Its  apparent  rationale—that  Hilde-
brant, Smiley, and Arizona State Legislature have already 
foreclosed  petitioners’  argument—is  untenable,  as  it  re-
quires disregarding a principled distinction between the is-
sues  in  those  cases  and  the  question  presented  here.    In 
those cases, the relevant state-constitutional provisions ad-
dressed  the  allocation  of  lawmaking  power  within  each 

—————— 

9 The Electors Clause provides that “[e]ach State shall appoint, in such
Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct, a Number of Electors” for 
the election of the President and Vice President.  Art. II, §1, cl. 2. 

10 Contrary to the majority’s suggestion of ambiguity, see ante, at 20, 
this statement can only have meant that the state legislature’s power to
direct the manner of appointing electors may not be limited by the state
constitution.  No other “limitation upon the State” is possible, for, as the 
McPherson Court said just a few sentences earlier, “the constitution of 
the State” is the only “authority” that ordinarily “limit[s]” “[t]he legisla-
tive power.”  146 U. S., at 25.