Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/10pdf/09-530.pdf
Page Number: 37.0

Cite as:  562 U. S. ____ (2011) 

9 

SCALIA, J., concurring in judgment 

giving a clue as to the rule of law it is applying. 

3.  It  provides  no  guidance  whatsoever  for  lower  courts. 
Consider  the  sheer  multiplicity  of  unweighted,  relevant 
factors alluded to in today’s opinion: 

•	

It  is  relevant  that  the  Government  is  acting  “in  its
capacity ‘as proprietor’ and manager of its ‘internal op-
eration.’ ”    Ante,  at  12.    Of  course,  given  that  we  are
told  neither  what  the  appropriate  standard  should  be 
when the Government is acting as regulator nor what 
the appropriate standard should be when it is acting as
proprietor,  it  is  not  clear  what  effect  this  fact  has  on 
the analysis; but at least we know that it is something. 
•	 History  and  tradition  have  some  role  to  play,  ante,  at 
13–14,  but  how  much  is  uncertain.    The  Court  points
out that the Federal Government has been conducting
investigations  of  candidates  for  employment  since  the
earliest  days;  but  on  the  other  hand  it  acknowledges 
that  extension  of  those  investigations  to  employees  of
contractors is of very recent vintage. 

•	 The  contract  employees  are  doing  important  work. 
They are not mere janitors and maintenance men; they 
are  working  on  a  $568  million  observatory.    Ante,  at 
15.  Can it possibly be that the outcome of today’s case
would be different for background checks of lower-level
employees?   In  the  spirit  of  minimalism  we  are  never
told. 

•	 Questions  about  drug  treatment  are  (hypothetically)
constitutional  because  they  are  “reasonable,”  “useful,” 
and  “humane.”    Ante,  at  16–17  (internal  quotation 
marks  omitted).    And  questions  to  third  parties  are 
constitutional because they are “appropriate” and “per-
vasiv[e].”  Ante, at 18–19.  Any or all of these adjectives 
may be the hypothetical standard by which violation of 
the  hypothetical  constitutional  right  to  “informational 
privacy” is evaluated.