Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/17pdf/16-476_dbfi.pdf
Page Number: 23.0

Cite as:  584 U. S. ____ (2018) 

19 

Opinion of the Court 

This  distinction  is  empty.    It  was  a  matter  of  happen­
stance  that  the  laws  challenged  in  New  York  and  Printz 
commanded “affirmative” action as opposed to imposing a
prohibition.    The  basic  principle—that  Congress  cannot 
issue  direct  orders  to  state  legislatures—applies  in  either 
event. 

Here  is  an  illustration.   PASPA  includes  an  exemption
for  States  that  permitted  sports  betting  at  the  time  of 
enactment,  §3704,  but  suppose  Congress  did  not  adopt
such  an  exemption.  Suppose  Congress  ordered  States
with legalized sports betting to take the affirmative step of
criminalizing  that  activity  and  ordered  the  remaining
States  to  retain  their  laws  prohibiting  sports  betting.
There  is  no  good  reason  why  the  former  would  intrude
more deeply on state sovereignty than the latter. 

B 

Respondents  and  the  United  States  claim  that  prior 
decisions  of  this  Court  show  that  PASPA’s  anti-
authorization provision is constitutional, but they misread 
those cases.  In none of them did we uphold the constitu­
tionality  of  a  federal  statute  that  commanded  state  legis­
latures to enact or refrain from enacting state law. 

In  South  Carolina  v.  Baker,  485  U. S.  505  (1988),  the 
federal  law  simply  altered  the  federal  tax  treatment  of
private  investments.  Specifically,  it  removed  the  federal
tax exemption for interest earned on state and local bonds 
unless  they  were  issued  in  registered  rather  than  bearer 
form.  This law did not order the States to enact or main­
tain any existing laws.  Rather, it simply had the indirect
effect  of  pressuring  States  to  increase  the  rate  paid  on 
their bearer bonds in order to make them competitive with
other bonds paying taxable interest. 

In any event, even if we assume that removal of the tax 
exemption  was  tantamount  to  an  outright  prohibition  of 
the issuance of bearer bonds, see id., at 511, the law would