Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/529bv.pdf
Page Number: 778.0

529US3

Unit: $U56

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Cite as: 529 U. S. 694 (2000)

703

Opinion of the Court

stead, simply on whether § 3583(e)(3) permitted imposition of
supervised release following a recommitment.6

III
Section 3583(e), at the time of Johnson’s conviction, author-

ized a district court to

“(1) terminate a term of supervised release and dis-
charge the person released at any time after the expira-
tion of one year of supervised release, pursuant to the
provisions of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
relating to the modiﬁcation of probation, if it is satisﬁed
that such action is warranted by the conduct of the per-
son released and the interest of justice;

“(2) extend a term of supervised release if less than
the maximum authorized term was previously imposed,
and . . . modify, reduce, or enlarge the conditions of su-
pervised release, at any time prior to the expiration or
termination of the term of supervised release, pursuant
to the provisions of the Federal Rules of Criminal Proce-
dure relating to the modiﬁcation of probation and the
provisions applicable to the initial setting of the terms
and conditions of post-release supervision;

6 We took a similar approach in Cisneros v. Alpine Ridge Group, 508
U. S. 10 (1993). The respondents in that case were private developers
who had entered into contracts with the Department of Housing and
Urban Development. When the Department sought to recalibrate pay-
ments it owed under the contracts, the developers sued, and the Ninth
Circuit ruled that the Department’s proposed method of calculating pay-
ments was prohibited by the contracts. Congress subsequently passed
legislation explicitly authorizing that method of calculation. The develop-
ers resisted application of that legislation to their contracts on the grounds
that it retroactively deprived them of vested contractual rights, in viola-
tion of the Due Process Clause. We ruled (disagreeing with the Ninth
Circuit’s earlier holding) that the Department’s methodology was accept-
able under the contracts as signed. Finding the governmental action per-
mitted by the old law, we declined to consider the constitutional conse-
quences of a legislative attempt to change the applicable law.