Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/21pdf/20-915_pol1.pdf
Page Number: 16.0

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UNICOLORS, INC. v. H&M HENNES & MAURITZ, L. P. 

THOMAS, J., dissenting 

“fairly included” only if it raises a “prior question.”  Lebron 
v. National Railroad Passenger Corporation, 513 U. S. 374, 
381 (1995).  That is, resolving the new argument must be 
“a predicate to an intelligent resolution of the question pre-
sented.”  Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U. S. 33, 38 (1996) (internal 
quotation  marks  omitted).    Here,  to  decide  whether 
§411(b)(1)(A) requires fraud, we do not first need to decide 
what kind of knowledge fraud requires.  To the contrary, it 
makes  more  sense  to  establish  the  correct  legal  standard 
before deciding what satisfies its elements.  Cf. Manuel v. 
Joliet, 580 U. S. ___, ___–___, n. 1 (2017) (slip op., at 2–3, 
n. 1)  (ALITO,  J.,  dissenting).    This  case  proves  the  point: 
Unicolors  effectively  concedes  that  §411(b)(1)(A)  has  no 
fraudulent-intent  requirement  and  then  asks  us  to  hold 
that the provision nevertheless requires actual rather than 
constructive knowledge, and knowledge of legal and factual 
misstatements rather than knowledge of factual misstate-
ments alone.  Evidently, Unicolors can discern whether the 
statute requires fraud without addressing those questions.  
Likewise, the Ninth Circuit has held that §411(b)(1)(A) does 
not require fraud based on its “plain language.”  Gold Value, 
925 F. 3d, at 1147.  In reaching that conclusion, the Court 
of Appeals did not address the actual-versus-constructive-
knowledge issue, and it reserved the law-versus-fact issue.  
See ibid.  In short, deciding whether §411(b)(1)(A) requires 
a  particular  element  of  fraud  is  not  “prior”  to  deciding 
whether fraud is the proper standard in the first place. 
  But even if Unicolors’ arguments were “prior” questions, 
the Court still misapplies Rule 14.1(a).  We are free to ad-
dress “subsidiary question[s]” in deciding “any question pre-
sented.”  This Court’s Rule 14.1(a) (emphasis added).  Put 
another way, the subsidiary questions must be “inextrica-
bly  linked”  to  the  question  under  review  and  necessarily 
contribute to that question’s resolution.  City of Sherrill v. 
Oneida  Indian  Nation  of  N. Y.,  544  U. S.  197,  214,  n. 8 
(2005).  Here, though, the Court never answers the ultimate