Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/21pdf/20-659_3ea4.pdf
Page Number: 26.0

Cite as:  596 U. S. ____ (2022) 

11 

ALITO, J., dissenting 

no precedent in Fourth Amendment law.  It is markedly dif-
ferent from the common-law tort of malicious prosecution,
and its dimensions are uncertain. 

First, it is not clear why this tort requires both a seizure 
and a prosecution.  As noted, the two do not always go to-
gether, and if the aim is to permit the victims of malicious 
prosecution to sue under §1983, it is not clear why detention 
should be required.  While pretrial detention certainly in-
creases the harm inflicted by a malicious prosecution, such
a  prosecution  can  be  very  damaging  even  if  the  victim  is
never detained.  See, e.g., M. Bigelow, The Law of Torts 204 
(1875) (a plaintiff may show damage to “his person by im-
prisonment, his reputation by the scandal, or . . . his prop-
erty  by  the  expense”).    The  majority’s  only  answer  to  the 
question  why  the  claim  requires  a  seizure  is  that  it  is 
“housed  in  the  Fourth  Amendment,”  ante,  at  5,  n. 2,  but 
that  response  begs  the  antecedent  question  whether  the 
Fourth Amendment houses a malicious-prosecution suit at 
all. 

Second,  where  the  person  bringing  suit  under  §1983  is
arrested and then prosecuted, it is not clear whether both 
the arrest and the prosecution must have been done with-
out  probable  cause  and  without  a  legitimate  law  enforce-
ment purpose.  An arrest made without probable cause may 
be  followed  by  a  prosecution  based  on  new  evidence  that 
clearly establishes probable cause.  And by the same token, 
the evidence that establishes probable cause at the time of 
arrest may be thoroughly discredited at some point well be-
fore the termination of a prosecution. 

Third and most important, it is not clear what the Court 
means  when  it  says  that  the  “gravamen”  of  the  claim  is 
“wrongful  initiation  of  charges  without  probable  cause.” 
Ante, at 6.  Since the Court refers repeatedly to “malicious 
prosecution,”  one  might  think  that  this  requires  a  guilty
mental state, but in a footnote, the Court raises the possi-
bility that the constitutional tort it recognizes may require