Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/19pdf/18-1323_c07d.pdf
Page Number: 14

Cite as:  591 U. S. ____ (2020) 

9 

Opinion of BREYER, J. 

reduction in abortion services.”  Id., at 88; see id., at 
79, 82, 87–88. 

  In sum, “Act 620 does not advance Louisiana’s legit-
imate  interest  in  protecting  the  health  of  women 
seeking abortions.  Instead, Act 620 would increase 
the risk of harm to women’s health by dramatically 
reducing the availability of safe abortion in Louisi-
ana.”  Id., at 87; see also id., at 65–66. 

The District Court added that 

“there is no legally significant distinction between this
case  and  [Whole  Woman’s  Health]:  Act  620  was  mod-
eled after the Texas admitting privileges requirement, 
and it functions in the same manner, imposing signifi-
cant obstacles to abortion access with no countervailing 
benefits.”  Id., at 88. 

On the basis of these findings, the court held that Act 620
and its implementing regulations are unconstitutional.  It 
entered  an  injunction  permanently  forbidding  their  en-
forcement. 

E 
The State appealed.  A divided panel of the Court of Ap-
peals  reversed  the  District  Court’s  judgment.  The  panel
majority concluded that Act 620’s impact was “dramatically 
less”  than  that  of  the  Texas  law  invalidated  in  Whole 
Woman’s Health.  June Medical Services L. L. C. v. Gee, 905 
F. 3d  787,  791  (CA5  2018).    “Despite  its  diligent  effort  to
apply  [Whole  Woman’s  Health]  faithfully,”  the  majority
thought  that  the  District  Court  had  “clearly  erred  in  con-
cluding otherwise.”  Id., at 815. 

With respect to the Act’s asserted benefits, the majority
thought that, “[u]nlike Texas, Louisiana presents some ev-
idence of a minimal benefit.”  Id., at 805.  Rejecting the Dis-
trict Court’s contrary finding, it concluded that the admit-
real,  and 
ting-privileges 

“performs  a 

requirement