Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/21pdf/19-1392_6j37.pdf/19-1392_6j37.pdf
Page Number: 5.0

Cite as:  597 U. S. ____ (2022) 

5 

Syllabus 

discussed below weigh strongly in favor of overruling Roe and Casey. 
Pp. 39–66. 

(1) The nature of the Court’s error.  Like the infamous decision in 
Plessy v. Ferguson, Roe was also egregiously wrong and on a collision 
course with the Constitution from the day it was decided.  Casey per-
petuated  its  errors,  calling  both  sides  of  the  national  controversy  to 
resolve their debate, but in doing so, Casey necessarily declared a win-
ning side.  Those on the losing side—those who sought to advance the 
State’s  interest  in  fetal  life—could  no  longer  seek  to  persuade  their
elected  representatives  to  adopt  policies  consistent  with  their  views. 
The Court short-circuited the democratic  process by closing it to  the 
large number of Americans who disagreed with Roe.  Pp. 43–45. 

(2) The  quality  of  the  reasoning.  Without  any  grounding  in  the 
constitutional  text,  history,  or  precedent,  Roe  imposed  on  the  entire 
country  a  detailed  set  of  rules  for  pregnancy  divided  into  trimesters 
much like those that one might expect to find in a statute or regulation. 
See 410 U. S., at 163–164.  Roe’s failure even to note the overwhelming 
consensus of state laws in effect in 1868 is striking, and what it said
about the common law was simply wrong.  Then, after surveying his-
tory, the opinion spent many paragraphs conducting the sort of fact-
finding that might be undertaken by a legislative committee, and did 
not explain why the sources on which it relied shed light on the mean-
ing of the Constitution.  As to precedent, citing a broad array of cases,
the Court found support for a constitutional “right of personal privacy.” 
Id., at 152.  But Roe conflated the right to shield information from dis-
closure and the right to make and implement important personal de-
cisions  without  governmental  interference.  See  Whalen  v.  Roe,  429 
U. S. 589, 599–600.  None of these decisions involved what is distinc-
tive  about  abortion:  its  effect  on  what  Roe  termed  “potential  life.” 
When the Court summarized the basis for the scheme it imposed on
the  country,  it  asserted  that  its  rules  were  “consistent  with,”  among
other things, “the relative weights of the respective interests involved”
and “the demands of the profound problems of the present day.”  Roe, 
410 U. S., at 165.  These are precisely the sort of considerations that 
legislative  bodies  often  take  into  account  when  they  draw  lines  that 
accommodate competing interests.  The scheme Roe produced looked 
like  legislation,  and  the  Court  provided  the  sort  of  explanation  that 
might be expected from a legislative body.  An even more glaring defi-
ciency  was  Roe’s  failure  to  justify  the  critical  distinction  it  drew  be-
tween pre- and post-viability abortions.  See id., at 163.  The arbitrary 
viability  line,  which  Casey  termed  Roe’s  central  rule,  has  not  found 
much support among philosophers and ethicists who have attempted 
to justify a right to abortion.  The most obvious problem with any such