Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/16pdf/16-309_h31i.pdf
Page Number: 14.0

10 

MASLENJAK v. UNITED STATES 

Opinion of the Court 

some role in her naturalization. 

B 
That conclusion leaves us with a more operational ques-
tion:  How  should  §1425(a)’s  requirement  of  causal  influ-
ence  apply  in  practice,  when  charges  are  brought  under
that law?4  Because the proper analysis may vary with the 
nature of the predicate crime, we confine our discussion of 
that issue to the kind of underlying illegality alleged here: 
a  false  statement  made  to  government  officials.    Such 
conduct  can  affect  a  naturalization  decision  in  a  single, 
significant  way—by  distorting  the  Government’s  under-
standing of the facts when it investigates, and then adju-
dicates, an application.  So the issue a jury must decide in
a case like this one is whether a false statement sufficiently
altered  those  processes  as  to  have  influenced  an  award 
of citizenship.

The  answer  to  that  question,  like  the  naturalization 
decision  itself,  turns  on  objective  legal  criteria.  Congress 
—————— 

4 JUSTICE  GORSUCH  would  stop  before  answering  that  question,  see 
post, at 2 (opinion concurring in part and concurring in judgment), but 
we think that such a halfway-decision would fail to fulfill our responsi-
bility to both parties and courts.  The Government needs to know what 
prosecutions to bring; defendants need to know what defenses to offer;
and  district  courts  need  to  know  how  to  instruct  juries.    Telling  them
only  “§1425(a)  has  something  to  do  with  causation”  would  not  much 
help them make those decisions.  And we are well-positioned to provide 
further  guidance.    The  parties  have  had  every  opportunity  to  address 
the  nature  of  the  statute’s  causal  standard,  and  both  gave  us  consid-
ered views about how the law should work in practice.  See, e.g., Brief 
for Petitioner 23–24, 30; Brief for United States 17–18, 48; Tr. of Oral 
Arg.  14–16,  23–25,  39–46.    Moreover,  many  lower courts  have  already
addressed those same issues—including one that has called this Court’s 
failure to provide clear guidance “maddening[ ].”  Latchin, 554 F. 3d, at 
713;  see,  e.g.,  id.,  at  713–714;  Munyenyezi,  781  F. 3d,  at  536–538; 
Alferahin,  433  F. 3d,  at  1155;  Aladekoba,  61  Fed.  Appx.,  at  27–28; 
United States v. Acheampong, 2015 WL 926113, *2–*3 (D Kan., Mar. 3, 
2015); United States v. Odeh, 2014 WL 5473042, *7–*8 (ED Mich., Oct. 
27, 2014).