Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/524bv.pdf
Page Number: 378.0

524US2

Unit: $U89

[09-11-00 13:24:46] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 524 U. S. 321 (1998)

333

Opinion of the Court

The Government speciﬁcally contends that the forfeiture
of respondent’s currency is constitutional because it involves
an “instrumentality” of respondent’s crime.8 According to
the Government, the unreported cash is an instrumentality
because it “does not merely facilitate a violation of law,” but
is “ ‘the very sine qua non of the crime.’ ” Brief for United
States 20 (quoting United States v. United States Currency
in the Amount of One Hundred Forty-Five Thousand, One
Hundred Thirty-Nine Dollars, 18 F. 3d 73, 75 (CA2), cert.
denied sub nom. Etim v. United States, 513 U. S. 815 (1994)).
The Government reasons that “there would be no violation
at all without the exportation (or attempted exportation) of
the cash.” Brief for United States 20.

Acceptance of the Government’s argument would require
us to expand the traditional understanding of instrumental-
Instrumentalities
ity forfeitures. This we decline to do.
historically have been treated as a form of “guilty property”
that can be forfeited in civil in rem proceedings.
In this
case, however, the Government has sought to punish re-
spondent by proceeding against him criminally, in personam,
rather than proceeding in rem against the currency.
It is
therefore irrelevant whether respondent’s currency is an
instrumentality; the forfeiture is punitive, and the test for

8 Although the term “instrumentality” is of recent vintage, see Austin
v. United States, 509 U. S., at 627–628 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
concurring in judgment), it fairly characterizes property that historically
was subject to forfeiture because it was the actual means by which an
offense was committed. See infra this page; see, e. g., J. W. Goldsmith,
Jr.-Grant Co. v. United States, 254 U. S. 505, 508–510 (1921).
“Instrumen-
tality” forfeitures have historically been limited to the property actually
used to commit an offense and no more. See Austin v. United States,
supra, at 627–628 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judg-
ment). A forfeiture that reaches beyond this strict historical limitation
is ipso facto punitive and therefore subject to review under the Excessive
Fines Clause.