Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/17pdf/16-1140_5368.pdf
Page Number: 11

Cite as:  585 U. S. ____ (2018) 

7 

Opinion of the Court 

ments have “ ‘no power to restrict expression because of its 
message,  its  ideas,  its  subject  matter,  or  its  content.’ ” 
Ibid. (quoting Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U. S. 
92, 95 (1972)).

The  licensed  notice  is  a  content-based  regulation  of 
speech.  By  compelling  individuals  to  speak  a  particular 
message,  such  notices  “alte[r]  the  content  of  [their]
speech.”  Riley  v.  National  Federation  of  Blind  of  N.  C., 
Inc., 487 U. S. 781, 795 (1988); accord, Turner Broadcast-
ing System, Inc. v. FCC, 512 U. S. 622, 642 (1994); Miami 
Herald  Publishing  Co.  v.  Tornillo,  418  U. S.  241,  256 
(1974).  Here, for example, licensed clinics must provide a
government-drafted  script  about  the  availability  of  state-
sponsored services, as well as contact information for how
to  obtain  them.    One  of  those  services  is  abortion—the 
very practice that petitioners are devoted to opposing.  By
requiring  petitioners  to  inform  women  how  they  can  ob-
tain  state-subsidized  abortions—at  the  same  time  peti-
tioners try to dissuade women from choosing that option—
the licensed notice plainly “alters the content” of petition-
ers’ speech.  Riley, supra, at 795. 

B 

Although the licensed notice is content based, the Ninth 
Circuit  did  not  apply  strict  scrutiny  because  it  concluded
that the notice regulates “professional speech.”  839 F. 3d, 
at  839.  Some  Courts  of  Appeals  have  recognized  “profes-
sional  speech”  as  a  separate  category  of  speech  that  is
subject  to  different  rules.  See,  e.g.,  King  v.  Governors  of 
New  Jersey,  767  F. 3d  216,  232  (CA3  2014);  Pickup  v. 
Brown,  740  F. 3d  1208,  1227–1229  (CA9  2014);  Moore-
King  v.  County  of  Chesterfield,  708  F. 3d  560,  568–570 
(CA4  2014).  These  courts  define  “professionals”  as  indi-
viduals  who  provide  personalized  services  to  clients  and
who  are  subject  to  “a  generally  applicable  licensing  and
regulatory  regime.”  Id.,  at  569;  see  also,  King,  supra,  at