Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/21pdf/20-979_h3ci.pdf
Page Number: 21.0

Cite as:  596 U. S. ____ (2022) 

17 

(1956). 

Opinion of the Court 

D 

As a last resort, Patel and the Government insist that the 
statute  is  ambiguous  enough  to  trigger  the  presumption
that  Congress  did  not  intend  to  foreclose  judicial  review. 
We disagree.

Because “ ‘executive determinations generally are subject 
to  judicial  review,’ ”  Guerrero-Lasprilla,  589  U. S.,  at  ___ 
(slip op., at 6), we presume that review is available when a 
statute is silent.  See Reno v. Catholic Social Services, Inc., 
509 U. S. 43, 56 (1993).  But that presumption “may be over-
come  by  specific  language”  in  a  provision  or  evidence 
“drawn  from  the  statutory  scheme  as  a  whole.”    Block  v. 
Community Nutrition Institute, 467 U. S. 340, 349 (1984).
And as we have explained in detail, the text and context of
§1252(a)(2)(B)(i)—which  is,  after  all,  a  jurisdiction-strip-
ping statute—clearly indicate that judicial review of fact de-
terminations  is  precluded  in  the  discretionary-relief  con-
text.  The  plain  meaning  of  that  provision,  not  any 
interpretative  presumption,  drives  our  conclusion  today. 
Because the statute is clear, we have no reason to resort to 
the presumption of reviewability. 

* 

* 
Federal courts lack jurisdiction to review facts found as
part  of  discretionary-relief  proceedings  under  §1255  and
the  other  provisions  enumerated  in  §1252(a)(2)(B)(i).    We 
therefore affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals. 

* 

It is so ordered.