Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/21pdf/21-234_2b8e.pdf
Page Number: 12

Cite as:  596 U. S. ____ (2022) 

9 

Opinion of the Court 

close to moving the mountain of contrary regulatory author-
ity.  See supra, at 5–7.  When we say that a statute adopts
a term of art, we mean that it captures “the state of [a] body 
of  law,”  not  every  errant  decision  of  arguable  relevance. 
Federal Republic of Germany v. Philipp, 592 U. S. ___, ___ 
(2021) (slip op., at 9).  Even if George could pluck from the 
crowd  a  few  stray  decisions  pointing  his  way,  that  would 
not show a “ ‘settled’ meaning” that we can infer “Congress 
had . . . in mind when it enacted” this statute.  Return Mail, 
Inc. v. Postal Service, 587 U. S. ___, ___ (2019) (slip op., at 
15).  Instead, the mainstream of agency practice settles that
a clear-and-unmistakable-error claim cannot rest on a sub-
sequent change in interpretation.

George alternatively argues that the VA erred in apply-
ing this principle to his situation.  In his view, it is wrong 
to  describe  a  later  decision  invalidating  a  regulation  as  a 
“change  in interpretation  of  law.”  But  we  think  that  is  a 
perfectly natural way to characterize a decision announcing 
a new reading of a statute—much as the VA and Federal
Circuit did in the decisions on which George now relies.  VA 
Op. 3–2003, ¶¶3, 8, pp. 2, 5 (adopting a new “interpretation” 
to replace the prior “interpretation reflected in VA’s regula-
tions”); Wagner, 370 F. 3d, at 1092 (discussing that “change 
in agency interpretation”).  We have occasionally used sim-
ilar language ourselves.  E.g., Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U. S. 
524, 536–537 (2005) (referring to “[t]he change in the law 
worked by” our precedent “interpret[ing] the AEDPA stat-
ute of limitations”).  As the Federal Circuit has explained,
a lack of “accuracy” in a prior statutory interpretation “does
not  negate  the  fact  that”  it  is  an  “initial  interpretation.” 
Jordan v. Nicholson, 401 F. 3d 1296, 1298 (2005).  In short, 
a misinterpretation is still an interpretation, and a correc-
tion of that interpretation is a change.  So the VA’s applica-
tion  of  the  change-in-interpretation  label  to  claims  like 
George’s hardly reflects an “atypical” use of language, de-
spite his arguments to the contrary.  Brief for Petitioner 18.