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Page Number: 16

12 

PATEL v. GARLAND 

Opinion of the Court 

kind of judgment to which §1252(a)(2)(B)(i) refers is discre-
tionary.  But the text of the provision stops that argument
in its tracks because the bar on review applies to “any judg-
ment.”  Had Congress intended instead to limit the jurisdic-
tional bar to “discretionary judgments,” it could easily have 
used that language—as it did elsewhere in the immigration
code.  See,  e.g.,  §1226(e)  (“The  Attorney  General’s  discre-
tionary judgment regarding the application of this section 
shall  not  be  subject  to  review”  (emphasis  added));
§1252(b)(4)(D)  (“[T]he  Attorney  General’s  discretionary 
judgment whether to grant relief under section 1158(a) of 
this title shall be conclusive unless manifestly contrary to
the law and an abuse of discretion” (emphasis added)).  We 
express  no  view  about  what  “discretionary  judgment” 
means in those provisions—the point is simply that the ab-
sence of any reference to discretion in §1252(a)(2)(B)(i) un-
dercuts the Government’s efforts to read it in. 

The Government claims that Kucana v. Holder, 558 U. S. 
233  (2010),  which 
interpreted  neighboring  provision
§1252(a)(2)(B)(ii),  supports  its  argument.  That  provision
bars review of 

“any other decision or action of the Attorney General or 
the  Secretary  of  Homeland  Security  the  authority  for 
which  is  specified  under  this  subchapter  to  be  in  the 
discretion of the Attorney General or the Secretary of
Homeland  Security,  other  than  the  granting  of  relief
under section 1158(a) of this title.” 

We explained in Kucana that “[t]he proximity of clauses (i) 
and (ii), and the words linking them—‘any other decision’—
sugges[t] that Congress had in mind decisions of the same 
genre, i.e., those made discretionary by legislation.”  Id., at 
246–247.  “Read harmoniously,” we said, “both clauses con-
vey that Congress barred court review of discretionary de-
cisions only when Congress itself set out the Attorney Gen-
eral’s  discretionary  authority  in  the  statute.”  Id.,  at  247.