Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/22pdf/21-1086_1co6.pdf
Page Number: 38

Cite as:  599 U. S. ____ (2023) 

31 

Opinion of the Court 

In doing so, we have unanimously held that §2 and Gingles 
“[c]ertainly . . . apply” to claims challenging single-member 
districts.  Growe, 507 U. S., at 40.  And we have even inval-
idated  portions  of  a  State’s  single-district  map  under  §2.  
See LULAC, 548 U. S., at 427–429.9  Alabama’s approach 
would require “abandoning” this precedent, “overruling the 
interpretation  of  §2”  as  set  out  in  nearly  a  dozen  of  our 
cases.  Holder, 512 U. S., at 944 (opinion of THOMAS, J.). 
  We  decline  to  take  that  step.    Congress  is  undoubtedly 
aware  of  our  construing  §2  to  apply  to  districting  chal-
lenges.  It can change that if it likes.  But until and unless 
it  does,  statutory  stare  decisis  counsels  our  staying  the 
course.  See, e.g., Kimble v. Marvel Entertainment, LLC, 576 
U. S. 446, 456 (2015).10 
  The statutory text in any event supports the conclusion 
that §2 applies to single-member districts.  Alabama’s own 
proffered definition of a “procedure is the manner or method 

—————— 

9 The dissent suggests that Growe does not support the proposition that 
§2  applies  to  single-member  redistricting.    Post,  at  4–5  (opinion  of 
THOMAS, J.).  The Court has understood Growe much differently.  See, 
e.g., Abrams v. Johnson, 521 U. S. 74, 90 (1997) (“Our decision in [Gin-
gles] set out the basic framework for establishing a vote dilution claim 
against  at-large,  multimembers  districts;  we  have  since  extended  the 
framework to single-member districts.” (citing Growe, 507 U. S., at 40–
41)); Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U. S. 997, 1006 (1994) (“In Growe, we 
held  that  a  claim  of  vote  dilution  in  a  single-member  district  requires 
proof  meeting  the  same  three  threshold  conditions  for  a  dilution  chal-
lenge to a multimember district . . . .”); Bartlett v. Strickland, 556 U. S. 
1,  12  (plurality  opinion)  (“The  Court  later  held  that  the  three  Gingles 
requirements apply equally in §2 cases involving single-member districts 
. . . .” (citing Growe, 507 U. S., at 40–41)). 

10 JUSTICE ALITO argues that “[t]he Gingles framework should be [re]in-
terpreted” in light of changing methods in statutory interpretation.  Post, 
at 10 (dissenting opinion).  But as we have explained, Gingles effectuates 
the  delicate legislative  bargain  that  §2  embodies.    And  statutory  stare 
decisis counsels strongly in favor of not “undo[ing] . . . the compromise 
that was reached between the House and Senate when §2 was amended 
in 1982.”  Brnovich, 594 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 22).