Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/19pdf/18-1323_c07d.pdf
Page Number: 45.0

40 

JUNE MEDICAL SERVICES L. L. C. v. RUSSO 

Opinion of BREYER, J. 

plaintiff ’s burden in a challenge to an abortion regulation
is  to  show  that  the  regulation’s  “purpose  or  effect”  is  to 
“plac[e] a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seek-
ing an abortion of a nonviable fetus.”  505 U. S., at 877 (plu-
rality opinion); see Whole Woman’s Health, 579 U. S., at ___ 
(slip  op.,  at  8);  Gonzales,  550  U. S.,  at  156;  Stenberg,  530 
U. S., at 921; Mazurek, 520 U. S., at 971. 

Finally,  the  State  makes  several  arguments  about  the 
standard  of  review  that  it  would  have  us  apply  in  cases
where  a  regulation  is  found  not  to  impose  a  substantial 
obstacle to a woman’s choice.  Brief for Respondent 60–66.
That, however, is not this case.  The record here establishes 
that  Act  620’s  admitting-privileges  requirement  places  a
substantial obstacle in the path of a large fraction of those
women  seeking  an  abortion  for  whom  it  is  a  relevant 
restriction. 

* 

* 
This  case  is  similar  to,  nearly  identical  with,  Whole 
Woman’s Health.  And the law must consequently reach a 
similar conclusion.  Act 620 is unconstitutional.  The Court 
of Appeals’ judgment is erroneous.  It is 

* 

Reversed.