Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/17pdf/16-1161_dc8f.pdf
Page Number: 13

Cite as:  585 U. S. ____ (2018) 

9 

Opinion of the Court 

plan was unconstitutional because its consciously political
design  was  “nothing  less  than  a  gigantic  political  gerry­
mander.”  Id., at 752.  This Court rejected that claim.  We 
reasoned that it would be “idle” to hold that “any political
consideration  taken  into  account  in  fashioning  a  reappor­
tionment  plan  is  sufficient  to  invalidate  it,”  because  dis­
tricting  “inevitably  has  and  is  intended  to  have  substan­
tial political consequences.”  Id., at 752–753. 

Thirteen years later came Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U. S. 
109 (1986).  Unlike the bipartisan gerrymander at issue in 
Gaffney,  the  allegation  in  Bandemer  was  that  Indiana 
Republicans  had  gerrymandered  Indiana’s 
legislative
districts  “to  favor  Republican  incumbents  and  candidates 
and to disadvantage Democratic voters” through what the 
plaintiffs  called  the  “stacking”  (packing)  and  “splitting” 
(cracking)  of  Democrats.    478  U. S.,  at  116–117  (plurality 
opinion).  A  majority  of  the  Court  agreed  that  the  case
before it was justiciable.  Id., at 125, 127.  The Court could 
not, however, settle on a standard for what constitutes an 
unconstitutional partisan gerrymander. 

Four Justices would have required the Bandemer plain­
tiffs  to  “prove  both  intentional  discrimination  against  an
identifiable  political  group  and  an  actual  discriminatory 
effect on that group.”  Id., at 127.  In that plurality’s view,
the  plaintiffs  had  failed  to  make  a  sufficient  showing  on
the  latter  point  because  their  evidence  of  unfavorable 
election  results  for  Democrats  was  limited  to  a  single
election cycle.  See id., at 135. 

Three Justices, concurring in the judgment, would have 
held  that  the  “Equal  Protection  Clause  does  not  supply
judicially  manageable  standards  for  resolving  purely 
political  gerrymandering  claims.”    Id.,  at  147  (opinion  of 
O’Connor, J.).  Justice  O’Connor  took issue, in particular,
with  the  plurality’s  focus  on  factual  questions  concerning 
“statewide  electoral  success.”    Id.,  at  158.  She  warned 
that  allowing  district  courts  to  “strike  down  apportion­