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Page Number: 28.0

Cite as:  603 U. S. ____ (2024) 

23 

Opinion of the Court 

on all this, Justice Marshall concluded, because the defend-
ant before the Court had not been convicted “for being” an 
“alcoholic,  but  for  [engaging  in  the  act  of]  being  in  public
while drunk on a particular occasion,” Robinson did not ap-
ply.  Powell, 392 U. S., at 532.6 

This case is no different from Powell.  Just as there, the 
plaintiffs here seek to expand Robinson’s “small” intrusion 
“into  the  substantive  criminal  law.”  Just  as  there,  the 
plaintiffs here seek to extend its rule beyond laws address-
ing  “mere  status”  to  laws  addressing  actions  that,  even  if 
undertaken  with  the  requisite  mens  rea,  might  “in  some 
sense” qualify as “ ‘involuntary.’ ”  And just as Powell could 
find  nothing  in  the  Eighth  Amendment  permitting  that
course, neither can we.  As we have seen, Robinson already
sits uneasily with the Amendment’s terms, original mean-
ing,  and  our  precedents.    Its  holding  is  restricted  to  laws
that  criminalize  “mere  status.”  Nothing  in  the  decision
called into question the “broad power” of States to regulate 
acts undertaken with some mens rea.  And, just as in Pow-
ell,  we  discern  nothing  in  the  Eighth  Amendment  that
might provide us with lawful authority to extend Robinson 
beyond its narrow holding. 

—————— 

6 Justice White, who cast the fifth vote upholding the conviction, con-
curred in the result.  Writing only for himself, Justice White expressed
some sympathy for Justice Fortas’s theory, but ultimately deemed that 
“novel construction” of the Eighth Amendment “unnecessary to pursue” 
because the defendant hadn’t proven that his alcoholism made him “un-
able to stay off the streets on the night in question.”  392 U. S., at 552, 
n. 4, 553–554 (White, J., concurring in result).  In Martin, the Ninth Cir-
cuit suggested Justice White’s solo concurrence somehow rendered the 
Powell  dissent  controlling  and  the  plurality  a  dissent.    See  Martin  v. 
Boise, 920 F. 3d 584, 616–617 (2019).  Before us, neither the plaintiffs 
nor  the  dissent  defend  that  theory,  and  for  good  reason:    In  the  years
since Powell, this Court has repeatedly relied on Justice Marshall’s opin-
ion, as we do today.  See, e.g., Kahler v. Kansas, 589 U. S. 271, 280 (2020); 
Clark v. Arizona, 548 U. S. 735, 768, n. 38 (2006); Jones v. United States, 
463 U. S. 354, 365, n. 13 (1983).