Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/16pdf/15-1194_08l1.pdf
Page Number: 10.0

Cite as:  582 U. S. ____ (2017) 

7 

Opinion of the Court 

nized, “[t]he sexual abuse of a child is a most serious crime 
and  an  act  repugnant  to  the  moral  instincts  of  a  decent
people.”  Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U. S. 234, 
244  (2002).  And  it  is  clear  that  a  legislature  “may  pass
valid laws to protect children” and other victims of sexual
assault “from abuse.”  See id., at 245; accord, New York v. 
Ferber,  458  U. S.  747,  757  (1982).  The  government,  of
course,  need  not  simply  stand  by  and  allow  these  evils  to 
occur.  But  the assertion of a valid governmental interest 
“cannot,  in  every  context,  be  insulated  from  all  constitu-
tional protections.”  Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U. S. 557, 563 
(1969).

It is necessary to make two assumptions to resolve this 
case.  First, given the broad wording of the North Carolina 
statute at issue, it might well bar access not only to com-
monplace  social  media  websites  but  also  to  websites 
as  varied  as  Amazon.com,  Washingtonpost.com,  and 
Webmd.com.  See post, at 6–9; see also Brief for Electronic 
Frontier  Foundation  24–27;  Brief  for  Cato  Institute  et al. 
as  Amici  Curiae  10–12,  and  n. 6.    The  Court  need  not 
decide  the  precise  scope  of  the  statute.    It  is  enough  to
assume that the law applies (as the State concedes it does) 
to social networking sites “as commonly understood”—that
is,  websites  like  Facebook,  LinkedIn,  and  Twitter.    See 
Brief for Respondent 54; Tr. of Oral Arg. 27.

Second,  this  opinion  should  not  be  interpreted  as  bar-
ring a State from enacting more specific laws than the one 
at  issue.  Specific  criminal  acts  are  not  protected  speech
even  if  speech  is  the  means  for  their  commission.    See 
Brandenburg  v.  Ohio,  395  U. S.  444,  447–449  (1969)  ( per 
curiam).  Though the issue is not before the Court, it can 
be assumed that the First Amendment permits a State to 
enact  specific,  narrowly  tailored  laws  that  prohibit  a  sex
offender  from  engaging  in  conduct  that  often  presages  a
sexual crime, like contacting a minor or using a website to 
gather information about a minor.  Cf. Brief for Respond-