Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/18pdf/18-302_e29g.pdf
Page Number: 32

Cite as:  588 U. S. ____ (2019) 

7 

Opinion of SOTOMAYOR, J. 

U. S. C.  §1464  (prohibiting  “obscene,  indecent,  or  profane 
language”  in  radio  communications);  FCC  v.  Pacifica 
Foundation,  438  U. S.  726,  746,  and  n. 22  (1978)  (opinion
of  Stevens,  J.)  (regulator’s  objection  to  a  monologue  con-
taining various “four-letter words” was not to its “point of
view, but to the way in which it [wa]s expressed”); 46 CFR 
§67.117(b)(3)  (2018)  (Coast  Guard  regulation  prohibiting 
vessel  names  that  “contain”  or  are  “phonetically  identical
to  obscene,  indecent,  or  profane  language,  or  to  racial  or 
ethnic epithets”); see also Jacobs, The Public Sensibilities 
Forum,  95  Nw.  U.  L.  Rev.  1357,  1416–1417,  and  n. 432 
(2001) (noting that “swear words” are “perhaps more than 
any  other  categor[y]  capable  of  specific  articulation”  and
citing  one  state  agency’s  list).  Of  course,  “scandalous” 
offers  its  own  limiting  principle:  if  a  word,  though  not
exactly  polite,  cannot  be  said  to  be  “scandalous”—e.g., 
“shocking”  or  “extremely  offensive,”  8  Century  Dictionary 
5374—it  is  clearly  not  the  kind  of  vulgarity  or  profanity 
that Congress intended to target.  Everyone can think of a 
small number of words (including the apparent homonym 
of Brunetti’s mark) that would, however, plainly qualify.5 

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appear to confirm, that “scandalous” in §1052(a) has often been applied
to  cover  this  kind  of  content,  see  Brief  for  United  States  27;  In  re 
Boulevard  Entertainment,  Inc.,  334  F. 3d  1336,  1340  (CA  Fed.  2003); 
Snow, Denying Trademark for Scandalous Speech, 51 U. C. D. L. Rev. 
2331, 2339 (2018) (Snow), the majority notes that the  PTO has hardly 
amassed a perfect track record of consistency, see ante, at 6–8.  Be that 
as  it  may,  the  Government  undeniably  receives  a  large  volume  of
trademark  applications  that  easily  would  fit  under  this  rubric  (exam-
ples  of  which  I  will  spare  the  reader).    See  In  re  Brunetti,  877  F. 3d 
1330,  1355  (CA  Fed.  2017)  (noting  an  appendix  containing  marks 
denied  registration  “whose  offensiveness  cannot  be  reasonably  ques-
tioned”).  As  a  result  of  today’s  ruling,  all  of  those  marks  will  now 
presumably have to be registered. 

5 There is at least one particularly egregious racial epithet that would 
fit this description as well.  While Matal v. Tam, 582 U. S. ___ (2017), 
removed a statutory basis to deny the registration of racial epithets in 
general,  the  Government  represented  at  oral  argument  that  it  is