Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/22pdf/21-376_7l48.pdf
Page Number: 35.0

Cite as:  599 U. S. ____ (2023) 

27 

Opinion of the Court 

1802, §2, 2 Stat. 155.8 

Federal  law  imposed  other  duties  on  state  courts  unre-
lated to immigration and naturalization.  The Judiciary Act 
of 1789, which authorized “any justice of the peace, or other 
magistrate  of  any  of  the  United  States”  to  arrest  and  im-
prison federal offenders, required the judge to set bail at the 
defendant’s  request.  §33,  1  Stat.  91.  Congress  also  re-
quired state courts to administer oaths to prisoners, to issue
certificates authorizing the apprehension of fugitives, and
to collect proof of the claims of Canadian refugees who had 
aided the United States in the Revolutionary War.  Act of 
May 5, 1792, ch. 29, §2, 1 Stat. 266 (“any person imprisoned 
. . . may have the oath or affirmation herein after expressed 
administered to him by any judge of the United States, or
of the general or supreme court of law of the state in which 
the debtor is imprisoned”); Act of Feb. 12, 1793, ch. 7, §1, 1 
Stat. 302 (“governor or chief magistrate of the state or ter-
ritory” shall “certif[y] as authentic” an indictment or affida-
vit charging a “fugitive from justice”); Act of Apr. 7, 1798, 
—————— 

8 Printz noted uncertainty about whether the naturalization laws ap-
plied only to States that voluntarily “authorized their courts to conduct 
naturalization proceedings.”  521 U. S., at 905–906.  But on their face, 
these statutes did not require state consent.  See Act of Mar. 26, 1790, 
ch. 3, §1, 1 Stat. 103 (providing that an alien could apply for citizenship
“to any common law court of record, in any one of the states wherein he 
shall have resided for the term of one year at least”); Act of Apr. 14, 1802, 
ch. 28, 2 Stat. 153 (referring to “the supreme, superior, district or circuit
court of some one of the states, or of the territorial districts of the United 
States, or a circuit or district court of the United States”).  And as Printz 
recognized, this Court has never held that consent is required.  521 U. S., 
at  905–906;  see  Holmgren  v.  United  States,  217  U. S.  509,  517  (1910) 
(holding that Congress could empower state courts to conduct naturali-
zation proceedings, but because California had already authorized juris-
diction, reserving the question whether its consent was necessary); but 
see United States v. Jones, 109 U. S. 513, 520 (1883) (stating in dicta that
the  naturalization  laws  “could  not  be  enforced”  in  state  court  “against 
the consent of the States”).  In any event, while the naturalization laws 
are  certainly  not  conclusive  evidence,  they  are  nonetheless  relevant  to 
discerning historical practice.