Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/17pdf/17-459_1o13.pdf
Page Number: 3

Cite as:  585 U. S. ____ (2018) 

3 

Syllabus 

matter, because only paragraph (1) bears on the meaning of a “notice
to appear.”  If anything, paragraph (2), which allows for a “change or 
postponement”  of  the  proceedings  to  a  “new  time  and  place,” 
§1229(a)(2)(A)(i), bolsters the Court’s interpretation of the statute be-
cause  the  provision  presumes  that  the  Government  has  already
served a “notice to appear” that specified a time and place as required
by  §1229(a)(1)(G)(i).    Another  neighboring  provision,  §1229(b)(1),
lends  further  support  for  the  view  that  a  “notice  to  appear”  must
specify the time and place of removal proceedings to trigger the stop-
time  rule.    Section  1229(b)(1)  gives  a  noncitizen  “the  opportunity  to 
secure counsel before the first [removal] hearing date” by mandating
that  such  “hearing  date  shall  not  be  scheduled  earlier  than  10  days
after the service of the notice to appear.”  For that provision to have
any meaning, the “notice to appear” must specify the time and place
that the noncitizen, and his counsel, must appear at the removal pro-
ceedings.  Finally, common sense reinforces the conclusion that a no-
tice  that  does  not  specify  when  and  where  to  appear  for  a  removal
proceeding is not a “notice to appear” that triggers the stop-time rule.
After  all,  an  essential  function  of  a  “notice  to  appear”  is  to  provide
noncitizens  “notice”  of  the  information  (i.e.,  the  “time”  and  “place”) 
that  would  enable  them  “to  appear”  at  the  removal  hearing  in  the 
first  place.    Without  conveying  such  information,  the  Government
cannot reasonably expect noncitizens to appear for their removal pro-
ceedings.  Pp. 7–13. 

(b) The Government and the dissent advance a litany of counterar-
guments,  all  of  which  are  unpersuasive.    To  begin,  the  Government 
mistakenly  argues  that  §1229(a)  is  not  definitional.    That  is  wrong.
Section  1229(a)  speaks  in  definitional  terms,  requiring  that  a  notice
to  appear  specify,  among  other  things,  the  “time  and  place  at  which 
the  proceedings  will  be  held.”    As  such,  the  dissent  is  misguided  in
arguing that a defective notice to appear, which fails to specify time-
and-place  information,  is  still  a  notice  to  appear  for  purposes  of  the 
stop-time rule.  Equally unavailing is the Government’s (and the dis-
sent’s)  attempt  to  generate  ambiguity  in  the  statute  based  on  the
word  “under.”    In  light  of  the  plain  language  and  statutory  context, 
the word “under,” as used in the stop-time rule, clearly means “in ac-
cordance  with”  or  “according  to”  because  it  connects  the  stop-time 
trigger in §1229b(d)(1) to a “notice to appear” that specifies the enu-
merated  time-and-place  information.    The  Government  fares  no  bet-
ter in arguing that surrounding statutory provisions reinforce its pre-
ferred  reading  of  the  stop-time  rule,  as  none  of  those  provisions 
supports its atextual interpretation.  Unable to root its reading in the 
statutory text, the Government and dissent raise a number of practi-
cal  concerns,  but  those  concerns  are  meritless  and  do  not  justify  de-