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Page Number: 52.0

6 

MILLER v. ALABAMA 

THOMAS, J., dissenting 

treated  no  differently. 
“[M]andatory  death  sentences
abounded  in  our  first  Penal  Code”  and  were  “common  in 
the  several  States—both  at  the  time  of  the  founding  and 
throughout  the  19th  century.”    Harmelin,  501  U. S.,  at 
994–995;  see  also  Woodson,  supra,  at  289  (plurality  opin-
ion)  (“At  the  time  the  Eighth  Amendment  was  adopted 
in  1791,  the  States  uniformly  followed  the  common-law 
practice  of  making  death  the  exclusive  and  mandatory
sentence  for  certain  specified  offenses”).  Accordingly,  the 
idea  that  the  mandatory  imposition  of  an  otherwise-
constitutional  sentence  renders  that  sentence  cruel  and 
unusual  finds  “no  support  in  the  text  and  history  of  the
Eighth Amendment.”  Harmelin, supra, at 994. 

Moreover,  mandatory  death  penalty  schemes  were  “a
perfectly  reasonable  legislative  response  to  the  concerns
expressed  in  Furman”  regarding  unguided  sentencing 
discretion,  in  that  they  “eliminat[ed]  explicit  jury  discre-
tion  and  treat[ed]  all  defendants  equally.”  Graham  v. 
Collins,  506  U. S.  461,  487  (1993)  (THOMAS,  J.,  concur-
ring).  And, as Justice White explained more than 30 years 
ago,  “a  State  is  not  constitutionally  forbidden  to  provide 
that  the  commission  of  certain  crimes  conclusively  estab-
lishes that a criminal’s character is such that he deserves 
death.”  Roberts, supra, at 358 (dissenting opinion).  Thus, 
there  is  no  basis  for  concluding  that  a  mandatory  capi- 
tal  sentencing  scheme  is  unconstitutional.  Because  the 
Court’s  cases  requiring  individualized  sentencing  in  the
capital context are wrongly decided, they cannot serve as a
valid  foundation  for  the  novel  rule  regarding  mandatory
life-without-parole  sentences  for  juveniles  that  the  Court
announces today. 

B 
In any event, this Court has already declined to extend
its  individualized-sentencing  rule  beyond  the  death  pen-
alty context.  In Harmelin, the defendant was convicted of