Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/17pdf/16-1140_5368.pdf
Page Number: 30

4 

NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF FAMILY AND 
LIFE ADVOCATES v. BECERRA
 
BREYER, J., dissenting 

§123222.2 (requiring hospitals to ask incoming patients if 
they would like the facility to give their family information
about patients’ rights and responsibilities); N. C. Gen.  Stat.
Ann.  §131E–79.2  (2017)  (requiring  hospitals  to  tell  par-
ents of newborns about pertussis disease and the available
vaccine).  These  also  include  numerous  disclosure  re-
quirements found in other areas.  See, e.g., N. Y. C. Rules 
& Regs., tit. 1, §27–01 (2018) (requiring signs by elevators
showing  stair  locations);  San  Francisco  Dept.  of  Health, 
Director’s  Rules  &  Regs.,  Garbage  and  Refuse  (July  8,
2010) (requiring property owners  to inform tenants about 
garbage disposal procedures).

The  majority,  at  the  end  of  Part  II  of  its  opinion,  per-
haps recognizing this problem, adds a general disclaimer. 
It says that it does not “question the legality of health and
safety  warnings  long  considered  permissible,  or  purely
factual  and  uncontroversial  disclosures  about  commercial 
products.”  Ante,  at  16–17.    But  this  generally  phrased
disclaimer would seem more likely to invite litigation than 
to provide needed limitation and clarification.  The major-
ity, for example, does not explain why the Act here, which 
is  justified  in  part  by  health  and  safety  considerations,
does not fall within its “health” category.  Ante, at 14; see 
also Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 
U. S.  833,  882–884  (1992)  (joint  opinion  of  O’Connor, 
KENNEDY,  and  Souter,  JJ.)  (reasoning  that  disclosures
related  to  fetal  development  and  childbirth  are  related  to
the health of a woman seeking an abortion).  Nor does the
majority opinion offer any  reasoned  basis  that  might  help 
apply its disclaimer for distinguishing lawful from unlaw-
ful disclosures.  In the absence of a reasoned explanation of 
the  disclaimer’s  meaning  and  rationale,  the  disclaimer  is
unlikely  to  withdraw  the  invitation  to  litigation  that  the 
majority’s general broad “content-based” test issues.  That 
test  invites  courts  around  the  Nation  to  apply  an  unpre-
dictable First Amendment to ordinary social and economic