Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/21pdf/21-12_m6hn.pdf
Page Number: 32

Cite as:  596 U. S. ____ (2022) 

5 

KAGAN, J., dissenting 

knows which candidate won (and so is in a position to re-
turn  the  favor  by  delivering  government  benefits).    Con-
sistent with our caselaw, that minor restriction on a candi-
date’s use of other people’s money does not severely burden
his (or anyone else’s) expression.

The  majority’s  argument  to  the  contrary  focuses  not  on 
the restriction Section 304 actually imposes, but on the in-
direct effects the provision might have.  The majority does
not dispute that Section 304 places no limits on the amount 
a candidate can spend for expression.  See ante, at 11.  Nor 
does (or could) the majority even claim that the provision 
caps what a candidate can lend his campaign.  Instead, the 
majority argues that the law “may deter” a candidate from 
making large loans because it curtails a potential source of 
repayment—i.e.,  post-election  donations.  Ante,  at  12.  In 
that way, the majority insists, the law—though concededly
regulating only the use of contributions—functions to “re-
strict[ ] a candidate’s speech.”  Ante, at 11; see ante, at 13. 
But every contribution regulation has some kind of indi-
rect effect on electoral speech, and we have still understood 
them  to  impose  only  minimal  burdens.    Consider  again  a 
standard  contribution  ceiling,  like  the  federal  $2,900  cap. 
That limit, as we have acknowledged, makes raising money
harder.  See Randall, 548 U. S., at 247; Buckley, 424 U. S., 
at  20–21.    And  so  it  predictably  gives  a  campaign  less
money to spend.  (In fact, a lot less: Just think of a world in 
which a candidate could raise an unlimited sum from every 
supporter.)    With  the  contribution  cap  in  effect,  the  cam-
paign  cannot  pay  for  (nearly)  as  many  advertisements,
mailings, signs, and so forth.  And likewise, to return to the 
fact  pattern  here,  the  campaign  has  less  money  available 
than  it  otherwise  would  to  repay  a  candidate’s  (or  any
other) loans.  By the majority’s logic, that downstream ef-
fect would mean the contribution cap imposes a significant 
First Amendment burden.  But as noted above, we have al-
ways held to the contrary, save for the rare case in which