Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/14pdf/13-534_19m2.pdf
Page Number: 27

4 

NORTH CAROLINA STATE BD. OF DENTAL
EXAMINERS v. FTC 

ALITO, J., dissenting
 

Building  Co.  v.  Trustees  of  Rex  Hospital,  425  U. S.  738, 
743, n. 2 (1976) (“[D]ecisions by this Court have permitted 
the  reach  of  the  Sherman  Act  to  expand  along  with  ex-
panding  notions  of  congressional  power”).  And  the  ex-
panded  reach  of  the  Sherman  Act  raised  an  important 
question.  The  Sherman  Act  does  not  expressly  exempt 
States from its scope.  Does that mean that the Act applies 
to  the  States  and  that  it  potentially  outlaws  many  tradi-
tional  state  regulatory  measures?    The  Court  confronted 
that question in Parker.
  In  Parker,  a  raisin  producer  challenged  the  California 
Agricultural  Prorate  Act,  an  agricultural  price  support 
program.  The California Act authorized the creation of an 
Agricultural  Prorate  Advisory  Commission  (Commission) 
to establish marketing plans for certain agricultural com-
modities within the State.  317 U. S., at 346–347.  Raisins 
were  among  the  regulated  commodities,  and  so  the  Com-
mission  established  a  marketing  program  that  governed
many  aspects  of  raisin  sales,  including  the  quality  and 
quantity of raisins sold, the timing of sales, and the price 
at  which  raisins  were  sold.  Id.,  at  347–348.  The  Parker 
Court assumed that this program would have violated “the 
Sherman Act if it were organized and made effective solely
by  virtue  of  a  contract,  combination  or  conspiracy  of  pri-
vate  persons,”  and  the Court  also assumed  that  Congress
could have prohibited a State from creating a program like 
California’s if it had chosen to do so.  Id., at 350.  Never-
theless,  the  Court  concluded  that  the  California  program
did  not  violate  the  Sherman  Act  because  the  Act  did  not 
circumscribe state regulatory power.  Id., at 351. 

The  Court’s  holding  in  Parker  was  not  based  on  either 
the language of the Sherman Act or anything in the legis-
lative  history  affirmatively  showing  that  the  Act  was  not 
meant to apply to the States.  Instead, the Court reasoned 
that “[i]n a dual system of government in which, under the 
Constitution,  the  states  are  sovereign,  save  only  as  Con-