Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/13pdf/12-158_6579.pdf
Page Number: 16

Cite as:  572 U. S. ____ (2014) 

13 

Opinion of the Court 

We  have  applied  this  background  principle  when  con-
struing  federal  statutes  that  touched  on  several  areas  of 
traditional state responsibility.  See Gregory, supra, at 460 
(qualifications for state officers); BFP, supra, at 544 (titles
to  real  estate);  Solid  Waste  Agency  of  Northern  Cook  Cty. 
v.  Army  Corps  of  Engineers,  531  U. S.  159,  174  (2001) 
(land  and  water  use).  Perhaps  the  clearest  example  of
traditional  state  authority  is  the  punishment  of  local
criminal  activity.  United  States  v.  Morrison,  529  U. S. 
598,  618  (2000).  Thus,  “we  will  not  be  quick  to  assume
that  Congress  has  meant  to  effect  a  significant  change  in 
the  sensitive  relation  between  federal  and  state  criminal 
jurisdiction.”  Bass, 404 U. S., at 349. 

from 

felon 

In  Bass,  we  interpreted  a  statute  that  prohibited  any 
convicted 
“ ‘receiv[ing],  possess[ing],  or 
transport[ing] in commerce or affecting commerce . . . any 
firearm.’ ”    Id.,  at  337.   The  Government  argued  that  the
statute  barred  felons  from  possessing  all  firearms  and 
that  it  was  not  necessary  to  demonstrate  a  connection  to
interstate  commerce.    We  rejected  that  reading,  which 
would  “render[ ]  traditionally  local  criminal  conduct  a 
matter  for  federal  enforcement  and  would  also  involve  a 
substantial  extension  of  federal  police  resources.”    Id.,  at 
350.  We  instead  read  the  statute  more  narrowly  to  re-
quire proof of a connection to interstate commerce in every
case,  thereby  “preserv[ing]  as  an  element  of  all  the  of-
fenses  a  requirement  suited  to  federal  criminal  jurisdic-
tion alone.”  Id., at 351.
  Similarly,  in  Jones  v.  United  States,  529  U. S.  848,  850 
(2000),  we  confronted  the  question  whether  the  federal 
arson statute, which prohibited burning “ ‘any . . . property 
used  in  interstate  or  foreign  commerce  or  in  any  activity
affecting  interstate  or  foreign  commerce,’ ”  reached  an
owner-occupied private residence.  Once again we rejected
the Government’s “expansive interpretation,” under which
“hardly  a  building  in  the  land  would  fall  outside  the  fed-