Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/12pdf/12-71_7l48.pdf
Page Number: 46

Cite as:  570 U. S. ____ (2013) 

5 

ALITO, J., dissenting 

power under the Elections Clause “it necessarily displaces
some element of a pre-existing legal regime erected by the
States.”  Ante,  at  11.    But  the  same  is  true  whenever 
Congress legislates in an area of concurrent state and fed- 
eral  power.  A  federal  law  regulating  the  operation  of
grain  warehouses,  for  example,  necessarily  alters  the 
“pre-existing legal regime erected by the States,” see Rice, 
supra,  at  229–230—even  if  only  by  regulating  an  activity 
the  States  had  chosen  not  to  constrain.2    In  light  of  Ari-
zona’s  constitutionally  codified  interest  in  the  integrity  of
its federal elections, “it is incumbent upon the federal courts
to  be  certain”  that  Congress  intended  to  pre-empt  Ari- 
zona’s law.  Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 473 U. S. 
234, 243 (1985). 

B 

The  canon  of  constitutional  avoidance  also  counsels 
against  the  Court’s  reading  of  the  Act.  As  the  Court 
acknowledges, the Constitution reserves for the States the
power  to  decide  who  is  qualified  to  vote  in  federal  elec-
tions.  Ante,  at  13–15;  see  Oregon  v.  Mitchell,  400  U. S. 
112,  210–211  (1970)  (Harlan,  J.,  concurring  in  part  and 
dissenting  in  part).  The  Court  also  recognizes  that,  al- 
though  Congress  generally  has  the  authority  to  regulate 
the “Times, Places and Manner of holding” such elections, 

—————— 

2 The Court observes that the Commerce Clause, unlike the Elections 
Clause,  empowers  Congress  to  legislate  in  areas  that  do  not  implicate 
concurrent state power.  Ante, at 12, n. 6.  Apparently the Court means
that  the  presumption  against  pre-emption  only  applies  in  those  unus- 
ual cases in which it is unclear whether a federal statute even touches on 
subject  matter  that  the  States  may  regulate  under  their  broad  police 
powers.    I  doubt  that  the  Court  is  prepared  to  abide  by  this  cramped
understanding  of  the  presumption  against  pre-emption.    See,  e.g., 
Hillman v. Maretta, 569 U. S. ___, ___ (2013) (slip op., at 6) (“There is
therefore  ‘a  presumption  against  pre-emption’  of  state  laws  governing 
domestic  relations”  (quoting  Egelhoff  v.  Egelhoff,  532  U. S.  141,  151 
(2001)).