Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/17pdf/16-1466_2b3j.pdf
Page Number: 75.0

20  JANUS v. STATE, COUNTY, AND MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES 

KAGAN, J., dissenting 

should  stand  by  yesterday’s  decisions”—is  “a  foundation 
stone  of  the  rule  of  law.”    Kimble,  576  U. S.,  at  ___  (slip 
op.,  at  7)  (quoting  Michigan  v.  Bay  Mills  Indian  Commu-
nity,  572  U. S.  ___,  ___  (2014)  (slip  op.,  at  15)).    It  “pro-
motes  the  evenhanded,  predictable,  and  consistent  devel-
opment”  of  legal  doctrine.    Payne  v.  Tennessee,  501  U. S. 
808,  827  (1991).    It  fosters  respect  for  and  reliance  on 
judicial  decisions.  See  ibid.  And  it  “contributes  to  the 
actual  and  perceived  integrity  of  the  judicial  process,” 
ibid.,  by  ensuring  that  decisions  are  “founded  in  the  law 
rather  than  in  the  proclivities  of  individuals,”  Vasquez  v. 
Hillery, 474 U. S. 254, 265 (1986).

And Abood is not just any precedent: It is embedded in 
the law (not to mention, as I’ll later address, in the world) 
in a way not many decisions are.  Over four decades, this 
Court  has  cited  Abood  favorably  many  times,  and  has
affirmed  and  applied  its  central  distinction  between  the
costs  of  collective  bargaining  (which  the  government  can 
charge  to  all  employees)  and  those  of  political  activities 
(which it cannot).  See, e.g., Locke v. Karass, 555 U. S. 207, 
213–214  (2009);  Lehnert,  500  U. S.,  at  519;  Teachers  v. 
Hudson,  475  U. S.  292,  301–302  (1986);  Ellis  v.  Railway 
Clerks,  466  U. S.  435,  455–457  (1984).    Reviewing  those 
decisions  not  a  decade  ago,  this  Court—unanimously—
called the Abood rule “a general First Amendment princi-
ple.”  Locke, 555 U. S., at 213.  And indeed, the Court has 
relied  on  that  rule  when  deciding  cases  involving  com-
pelled  speech  subsidies  outside  the  labor  sphere—cases
today’s decision does not question.  See, e.g., Keller v. State 
Bar of Cal., 496 U. S. 1, 9–17 (1990) (state bar fees); Board 
of Regents of Univ. of Wis. System v. Southworth, 529 U. S. 
217,  230–232  (2000)  (public  university  student  fees); 
Glickman  v.  Wileman  Brothers  &  Elliott,  Inc.,  521  U. S. 
457,  471–473  (1997)  (commercial  advertising  assess-
ments); see also n. 3, supra. 

Ignoring our repeated validation of Abood, the majority