Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/529bv.pdf
Page Number: 641

529US2

Unit: $U52

[09-26-01 10:36:40] PAGES PGT: OPIN

566

CARMELL v. TEXAS

Ginsburg, J., dissenting

of such an evidentiary rule does not violate the Ex Post
Facto Clause.

II

The Ex Post Facto Clause, this Court has said repeatedly,
furthers two important purposes. First, it serves “to as-
sure that legislative Acts give fair warning of their effect and
permit individuals to rely on their meaning until explicitly
changed.” Weaver v. Graham, 450 U. S. 24, 28–29 (1981).11
it “restricts governmental power by restraining
Second,
arbitrary and potentially vindictive legislation.”
Id., at 29;
see also Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U. S. 244,
267 (1994); Miller v. Florida, 482 U. S. 423, 429–430 (1987).
The latter purpose has much to do with the separation of
powers;
like its textual and conceptual neighbor the Bill
of Attainder Clause, the Ex Post Facto Clause aims to en-
sure that legislatures do not meddle with the judiciary’s
task of adjudicating guilt and innocence in individual cases.
Weaver, 450 U. S., at 29, n. 10.

The Court does not even attempt to justify its extension
of the Clause in terms of these two fundamental purposes.
That is understandable, for today’s decision serves neither
purpose. The ﬁrst purpose (fair warning and reliance), vital
as it is, cannot tenably be relied upon by Carmell. He had
ample notice that the conduct in which he engaged was
illegal. He certainly cannot claim to have relied in any way
on the preamendment version of Article 38.07: He tendered

11 Today’s opinion apart, see ante, at 531, n. 21, this Court has consist-
ently stressed “ ‘lack of fair notice’ ” as one of the “central concerns of the
Ex Post Facto Clause.” Lynce v. Mathis, 519 U. S. 433, 441 (1997) (quot-
ing Weaver v. Graham, 450 U. S. 24, 30 (1981)). See also Landgraf v.
USI Film Products, 511 U. S. 244, 266–267 (1994); Miller v. Florida, 482
U. S. 423, 430 (1987); Weaver, 450 U. S., at 28–29; Marks v. United States,
430 U. S. 188, 191–192 (1977). The implausibility of ex ante reliance on
rules of admissibility like the one at issue here helps explain why the
Ex Post Facto Clause has never been held to apply to changes in such
rules.