Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/18pdf/18-281_6j37.pdf
Page Number: 20

Cite as:  587 U. S. ____ (2019) 

5 

ALITO, J., dissenting 

districting plan in Beens were different from the effects of 
the  plan  now  before  us  because  the  former  concerned  the 
legislature’s internal operations.  See ante, at 10–11.  But 
even  if  the  imposition  of  the  court-ordered  plan  in  this 
case would not affect the internal operations of the House 
(and that is by no means clear), it is very strange to think 
that changes to such things as “committee structures” and 
“voting  rules,”  see  ante,  at  10,  are  more  important  than 
changes in legislative output. 
  In  short,  the  invalidation  of  the  House’s  redistricting 
plan and its replacement with a court-ordered map would 
cause  the  House  to  suffer  a  “concrete”  injury.    And  as 
Article III demands, see Spokeo, 578 U. S., at ___–___ (slip 
op.,  at  6–7),  that  injury  would  also  be  “particularized” 
(because  it  would  target  the  House);  “imminent”  (because 
it  would  certainly  occur  if  this  appeal  is  dismissed); 
“traceable”  to  the  imposition  of  the  new,  court-ordered 
plan;  and  “redress[able]”  by  the  relief  the  House  seeks 
here.  Ibid. 

II 
  Although  the  opinion  of  the  Court  begins  by  citing  the 
three  fundamental  Article  III  standing  requirements  just 
discussed,  see  ante,  at  3,  it  is  revealing  that  the  Court 
never  asserts  that  the  effect  of  the  court-ordered  plan  at 
issue  would  not  cause  the  House  “concrete”  harm.    In-
stead,  the  Court  claims  only  that  any  harm  would  not  be 
“ ‘judicially  cognizable,’ ”  ante,  at  7;  see  also  ante,  at  11.  
The  Court  lifts  this  term  from  Raines  v.  Byrd,  521  U. S. 
811,  819  (1997),  where  the  Court  held  that  individual 
Members  of  Congress  lacked  standing  to  challenge  the 
constitutionality of the Line Item Veto Act.  But the deci-
sion  in  Raines  rested  heavily  on  federal  separation-of-
powers concerns, which  are  notably  absent  here.    See  id., 
at  819–820,  826–829;  id.,  at  832–835  (Souter,  J.,  concur-
ring in judgment).  And although the Court does not say so