Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/07pdf/07-290.pdf
Page Number: 123

10 

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA v. HELLER 

BREYER, J., dissenting 

rights);  Brigham  City  v.  Stuart,  547  U. S.  398,  403–404 
(2006)  (Fourth  Amendment  protection  of  the  home);  New 
York  v.  Quarles,  467  U. S.  649,  655  (1984)  (Fifth  Amend-
ment  rights  under  Miranda  v.  Arizona,  384  U. S.  436 
(1966));  Salerno,  supra,  at  755  (Eighth  Amendment  bail 
rights).  Thus,  any  attempt  in  theory  to  apply  strict  scru-
tiny to gun regulations will in practice turn into an inter-
est-balancing  inquiry,  with  the  interests  protected  by  the 
Second  Amendment  on  one  side  and  the  governmental 
public-safety  concerns  on  the  other,  the  only  question 
being  whether  the  regulation  at  issue  impermissibly  bur-
dens the former in the course of advancing the latter.

I would simply adopt such an interest-balancing inquiry 
explicitly.  The  fact  that  important  interests  lie  on  both
sides of the constitutional equation suggests that review of
gun-control  regulation  is  not  a  context  in  which  a  court
should  effectively  presume  either  constitutionality  (as  in
rational-basis  review)  or  unconstitutionality  (as  in  strict
scrutiny).  Rather,  “where  a  law  significantly  implicates
competing  constitutionally  protected  interests  in  complex
ways,”  the  Court  generally  asks  whether  the  statute  bur-
dens  a  protected  interest  in  a  way  or  to  an  extent  that  is
out  of  proportion  to  the  statute’s  salutary  effects  upon
other  important  governmental  interests.    See  Nixon  v. 
Shrink  Missouri  Government  PAC,  528  U. S.  377,  402 
(2000) (BREYER, J., concurring).  Any answer would take 
account  both  of  the  statute’s  effects  upon  the  competing
interests  and  the  existence  of  any  clearly  superior  less
restrictive  alternative.    See  ibid.    Contrary  to  the  major-
ity’s unsupported suggestion that this sort of “proportion-
ality”  approach  is  unprecedented,  see  ante,  at  62,  the 
Court  has  applied  it  in  various  constitutional  contexts,
including election-law cases, speech cases, and due process 
cases.  See  528  U. S.,  at  403  (citing  examples  where  the
Court has taken such an approach); see also, e.g., Thomp-
son  v.  Western  States  Medical  Center,  535  U. S.  357,  388