Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/21pdf/20-843_7j80.pdf
Page Number: 99

16  NEW YORK STATE RIFLE & PISTOL ASSN., INC. v. BRUEN 

BREYER, J., dissenting 

as Amicus Curiae 20.  In comparison, other (perhaps more
rural) counties “have tailored the requirement to their own
circumstances, often issuing concealed-carry licenses more
freely  than  the  City.”  Ibid.;  see  also  In  re  O’Connor,  154 
Misc.  2d,  at  698,  585  N. Y. S.  2d,  at  1004  (“The  circum-
stances which exist in New York City are significantly dif-
ferent than those which exist in Oswego or Putnam Coun-
ties. . . . The licensing officers in each county are in the best
position to determine whether any interest of the popula-
tion of their county is furthered by the use of restrictions on 
pistol  licenses”);  Brief  for  Citizens  Crime  Commission  of 
New  York  City  as  Amicus  Curiae  18–19.  Given  the  geo-
graphic variation across the State, it is too sweeping for the
Court  to  suggest,  without  an  evidentiary  record,  that  the 
proper  cause  standard  is  “demanding”  in  Rensselaer 
County merely because it may be so in New York City. 

Finally, the Court compares New York’s licensing regime
to  that  of  other  States.    Ante,  at  4–6.  It  says  that  New 
York’s  law  is  a  “may  issue”  licensing  regime,  which  the 
Court  describes  as  a  law  that  provides  licensing  officers 
greater discretion to grant or deny licenses than a “shall is-
sue”  licensing  regime.  Ante,  at  4–5.  Because  the  Court 
counts 43 “shall issue” jurisdictions and only 7 “may issue” 
jurisdictions, it suggests that New York’s law is an outlier. 
Ibid.;  see  also  ante,  at  1–2  (KAVANAUGH,  J.,  concurring).
Implicitly, the Court appears to ask, if so many other States 
have  adopted  the  more  generous  “shall  issue”  approach, 
why can New York not be required to do the same? 

But  the  Court’s  tabulation,  and  its  implicit  question, 
overlook  important  context.  In  drawing  a  line  between
“may issue” and “shall issue” licensing regimes, the Court 
ignores the degree of variation within and across these cat-
egories.  Not all “may issue” regimes are necessarily alike,
nor are all “shall issue” regimes.  Conversely, not all “may
issue”  regimes  are  as  different  from  the  “shall  issue”  re-