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Page Number: 19.0

14 

CORNER POST, INC. v. BOARD OF GOVERNORS, FRS 

Opinion of the Court 

1948—not to mention in the Little Tucker Act—the dissent 
cannot “displace” this “standard rule” with scattered cita-
tions to different, inapposite statutes.  Green, 578 U. S., at 
554. 

2 
The standard accrual rule that §2401(a)’s limitations pe-
riod  exemplifies  is  plaintiff  specific—even  if  repose  provi-
sions  like  the  Hobbs  Act  eschew  a  “challenger-by-
challenger” approach.  Brief for Respondent 9.  The Board’s 
rule  would  start  the  limitations  period  applicable  to  the
plaintiff not when she had a complete and present cause of 
action but when the agency action was final and, theoreti-
cally, some other plaintiff was injured and could have sued.
But §2401(a)’s text focuses on a specific plaintiff: “the com-
plaint is filed within six years after the right of action first 
accrues.”  (Emphasis added.) 

The  dissent  disputes  §2401(a)’s  plaintiff  specificity  by
pointing out that it does not say “the plaintiff ’s right of ac-
tion first accrues.”  Post, at 9.  True, but it does use the def-
inite article “the” to link “the complaint” with “the right of 
action.”  So the most natural interpretation is that its limi-
tations  period  begins  when  the  cause  of  action  associated 
with the complaint—the plaintiff ’s cause of action—is com-
plete.  And while the dissent cites dictionary definitions of 
“accrue” that mention “ ‘a right to sue,’ ” ibid., the statute’s 
use of the definite article “the” takes precedence.  The Board 
and the dissent read §2401(a) as if it says “the complaint is 
filed  within  six  years  after  a  right  of  action  [i.e.,  anyone’s
right of action] first accrues”—which, of course, it does not. 
In  fact,  we  have  explained  that  the  traditional  accrual
rule  looks  to  when  “the  plaintiff ”—this  particular  plain-
tiff—“has a complete and present cause of action.”  Green, 
578  U. S.,  at  554  (internal  quotation  marks  omitted;  em-
phasis added).  No precedent suggests that the traditional
rule  contemplates  the  Board’s  hypothetical  “when  could