Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/22pdf/20-1199_hgdj.pdf
Page Number: 129

Cite as:  600 U. S. ____ (2023) 

23 

GORSUCH, J., concurring 

under any program or activity receiving Federal financial 
assistance.”  §2000d.  The Equal Protection Clause reads: 
“No State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdic-
tion the equal protection of the laws.”  Amdt. 14, §1.  That 
such differently worded provisions should mean the same 
thing is implausible on its face. 

Consider just some of the obvious differences.  The Equal
Protection Clause operates on States.  It does not purport 
to regulate the conduct of private parties.  By contrast, Title 
VI applies to recipients of federal funds—covering not just
many state actors, but many private actors too.  In this way,
Title VI reaches entities and organizations that the Equal 
Protection Clause does not. 

In other respects, however, the relative scope of the two
provisions  is  inverted.  The  Equal  Protection  Clause  ad-
dresses all manner of distinctions between persons and this
Court has held that it implies different degrees of judicial 
scrutiny for different kinds of classifications.  So, for exam-
ple, courts apply strict scrutiny for classifications based on 
race,  color,  and  national  origin;  intermediate  scrutiny  for 
classifications  based  on  sex;  and  rational-basis  review  for 
classifications  based  on  more  prosaic  grounds.    See,  e.g., 
Fisher, 579 U. S., at 376; Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 
U. S. 469, 493–495 (1989) (plurality opinion); United States 
v. Virginia, 518 U. S. 515, 555–556 (1996); Board of Trus-
tees  of  Univ.  of  Ala.  v.  Garrett,  531  U. S.  356,  366–367 
(2001).  By contrast, Title VI targets only certain classifica-
tions—those based on race, color, or national origin.  And 
that  law  does  not  direct  courts  to  subject  these  classifica-
tions to one degree of scrutiny or another.  Instead, as we 
have seen, its rule is as uncomplicated as it is momentous.
Under Title VI, it is always unlawful to discriminate among 
persons  even  in  part  because  of  race,  color,  or  national 
origin.

In truth, neither Justice Powell’s nor Justice Brennan’s 
opinion in Bakke focused on the text of Title VI.  Instead,