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GUAM v. UNITED STATES 

Syllabus 

cost-recovery claim under §107(a), leaving Guam no CERCLA remedy. 
As relevant here, Guam now contends that the 2004 consent decree did 
not  give  rise  to  a  viable  CERCLA  contribution  claim,  leaving  Guam 
free to pursue a cost-recovery action.  The case turns on whether CER-
CLA  authorizes  a  contribution  claim  only  when  a  party  resolves  a
CERCLA-specific liability or whether settlement of environmental lia-
bilities under other laws will do. 

Held: A settlement of environmental liabilities must resolve a CERCLA-
specific  liability  to  give  rise  to  a  contribution  action  under 
§113(f)(3)(B).  The Court interprets §113(f)(3)(B) in light of its text and
place  within  CERCLA’s  comprehensive  statutory  scheme.  Section 
113(f)’s  interlocking  provisions  governing  the  scope  of  a contribution
claim, taken together and in sequence, anticipate a predicate CERCLA
liability.  See New Prime Inc. v. Oliveira, 586 U. S. ___, ___.  Section 
113(f)’s anchor provision—entitled “contribution”—explains the scope
of contribution actions with reference to CERCLA’s other provisions, 
allowing contribution “during or following any civil action under §[1]06 
of this title or under §[1]07 of this title.”  §113(f)(1).  The provision at 
issue here—recognizing a statutory right to contribution in the specific
circumstance  where  a  person  “has  resolved  its  liability”  via  “settle-
ment,”  §113(f)(3)(B)—exists  within  “‘the  specific  context’”  of  §113(f),
which outlines the broader workings of CERCLA contribution.  Merit 
Management  Group,  LP  v.  FTI  Consulting,  Inc.,  583  U.  S.  ___,  ___. 
Section 113(f)(3)(B)’s opening clause further ties itself to the CERCLA 
regime by permitting contribution after a party “has resolved its lia-
bility . . . for some or all of a response action or for some or all of the 
costs  of  such  action.”    (Emphasis  added.)    The  anchor  provision  also
discusses allocation of “response costs,” and the phrase “response ac-
tion”  appears  dozens  of  times  throughout  the  Act.  That  remedial 
measures  under  different  environmental  statutes  might  functionally
overlap with a CERCLA response action does not justify reinterpreting
§113(f)(3)(B)’s phrase “resolved its liability . . . for some or all of a re-
sponse action” to instead mean “settled an environmental liability that
might  have  been  actionable  under  CERCLA.”
  Interpreting
§113(f)(3)(B) to authorize a contribution right for a host of environmen-
tal  liabilities  arising  under  other  laws  would  stretch  the  statute  be-
yond Congress’ actual language.  And because the word “resolve” con-
veys certainty and finality, it would be odd to interpret §113(f)(3)(B) as 
referring  to  a  party  that  has  “resolved  its  liability”  if  that  party  re-
mains  vulnerable  to  a  CERCLA  suit.  The  most  natural  reading  of
§113(f)(3)(B)  is  that  a  party  may  seek  contribution  under  CERCLA 
only after settling a CERCLA-specific liability, as opposed to resolving 
environmental liability under some other law.  The Government’s con-