Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/21pdf/20-659_3ea4.pdf
Page Number: 12.0

Cite as:  596 U. S. ____ (2022) 

9 

Opinion of the Court 

506. 

The treatises of that era agreed that a favorable termina-
tion occurred so long as the prosecution ended without con-
viction.  Cooley’s tort-law treatise stated, for example, that 
“the reasonable rule seems to be, that the technical prereq-
uisite is only that the particular prosecution be disposed of
in such a manner that this cannot be revived, and the pros-
ecutor,  if  he  proceeds  further,  will  be  put  to  a  new  one.” 
Cooley 186; see also Newell 343 (expressing approval of the
rule); Hilliard 453, and n. 5 (recognizing the rule).

The  parties  to  this  case  have  identified  only  one  court
that required something more, such as an acquittal or a dis-
missal accompanied by some affirmative indication of inno-
cence.  In 1863, the Rhode Island Supreme Court concluded, 
“with reluctance,” that “ ‘the termination must be such as to 
furnish  prima  facie  evidence  that  the  action  was  without 
foundation.’ ”  Rounds v. Humes, 7 R. I. 535, 537 (1863).  But 
Rhode  Island  stood  as  an  outlier  on  that  question.    The 
other American courts to consider the issue did not require
some affirmative indication of innocence in order for a ma-
licious prosecution tort claim to proceed.  The courts simply
required that the prosecution ended in the defendant’s fa-
vor.  As Chief Judge Pryor explained in his comprehensive 
opinion  for  the  Eleventh  Circuit  in  Laskar  v.  Hurd,  972 
F. 3d, at 1287: “The clear majority of American courts did 
not limit favorable terminations to those that suggested the 
accused’s innocence.” 

Against that body of precedent and historical practice, re-
spondent Clark contends that American courts as of 1871 
had  not  settled  on  any  particular  favorable  termination
rule.  But the cases and treatises that respondent latches
onto addressed a separate issue—not whether the prosecu-
tion had terminated in the defendant’s favor, but whether 
the prosecution had terminated at all.  In particular, courts
divided over whether a prosecutor’s dismissal without dis-
charge by a judge in fact terminated a prosecution.  Some