Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/19pdf/18-9526_9okb.pdf
Page Number: 36

Cite as:  591 U. S. ____ (2020) 

33 

Opinion of the Court 

state law borrowed from Arkansas “to all persons . . . irre-
spective  of  race.”    Ibid.  A  year  later,  Congress  abolished 
tribal courts and transferred all pending criminal cases to
U. S. courts of the Indian Territory.  Curtis Act of 1898, §28, 
30 Stat. 504–505.  And, Oklahoma says, sending Indians to 
federal court and all others to state court would be incon-
sistent with this established and enlightened policy of ap-
plying the same law in the same courts to everyone. 

Here again, however, arguments along these and similar 
lines  have  been  “frequently  raised”  but  rarely  “accepted.” 
United States v. Sands, 968 F. 2d 1058, 1061 (CA10 1992) 
(Kelly,  J.).  “The  policy  of  leaving  Indians  free  from  state
jurisdiction and control is deeply rooted in this Nation’s his-
tory.”  Rice v. Olson, 324 U. S. 786, 789 (1945).  Chief Jus-
tice  Marshall,  for  example,  held  that  Indian  Tribes  were
“distinct  political communities, having territorial bounda-
ries, within which their authority is exclusive . . . which is 
not  only  acknowledged,  but  guarantied  by  the  United
States,” a power dependent on and subject to no state au-
thority.  Worcester  v.  Georgia,  6  Pet.  515,  557  (1832);  see 
also  McClanahan  v.  Arizona  Tax  Comm’n,  411  U. S.  164, 
168–169 (1973).  And in many treaties, like those now be-
fore us, the federal government promised Indian Tribes the
right to continue to govern themselves.  For all these rea-
sons, this Court has long “require[d] a clear expression of
the intention of Congress” before the state or federal gov-
ernment  may  try  Indians  for  conduct  on  their  lands.    Ex 
parte Crow Dog, 109 U. S. 556, 572 (1883). 

Oklahoma cannot come close to satisfying this standard.
In  fact,  the  only  law  that  speaks  expressly  here  speaks 
against the State.  When Oklahoma won statehood in 1907, 
the MCA applied immediately according to its plain terms. 
That statute, as phrased at the time, provided exclusive fed-
eral jurisdiction over qualifying crimes by Indians in “any 
Indian  reservation”  located  within  “the  boundaries  of  any