Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/21pdf/21-954_7l48.pdf
Page Number: 45

12 

BIDEN v. TEXAS 

ALITO, J., dissenting 

That reading ignores “the statutory structure” of the INA, 
ante,  at  14,  and  wrongly  “confine[s]  itself  to  examining  a
particular statutory provision in isolation.”  FDA v. Brown 
& Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U. S. 120, 132 (2000).  We 
have an obligation to read the INA as a “coherent regula-
tory scheme.”  Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U. S. 561, 569 
(1995); see also FTC v. Mandel Brothers, Inc., 359 U. S. 385, 
389 (1959); Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis, 584 U. S. ___, ___ 
(2018) (slip op., at 10); A. Scalia & G. Garner, Reading Law 
180  (2012)  (describing  the  “harmonious-reading  canon”).
And  if  we  follow  that  canon,  the  majority’s  interpretation
collapses.

Read as a whole, the INA gives DHS discretion to choose 
from  among  only  three  options  for  handling  the  relevant 
category of inadmissible aliens.  The Government must ei-
ther: (1) detain them, (2) return them to a contiguous for-
eign nation, or (3) parole them into the United States on an 
individualized, case-by-case basis.  These options operate in
a hydraulic relationship: When it is not possible for the Gov-
ernment to comply with the statutory mandate to detain in-
admissible aliens pending further proceedings, it must re-
sort  to  one  or  both  of  the  other  two  options  in  order  to 
comply with the detention requirement to the greatest ex-
tent possible.

There is nothing strange about this interpretation of how 
the relevant provisions of the INA work together.  Consider 
this  example.  Suppose  a  state  law  provides  that  every 
school  district  “shall”  provide  a  free  public  education  to 
every  student  from  kindergarten  through  the  12th  grade
and that another statute says that a district “may” arrange
for its students to attend high school in an adjacent district.
A small district refuses to operate its own high school be-
cause it lacks the necessary funds, and this district also de-
clines  to  arrange  for  its  students  to  attend  a  school  in  an
adjacent district because the law says only that a district
“may” take that course of action.  Refusing to exercise this