Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/16pdf/15-1358_6khn.pdf
Page Number: 64.0

20 

ZIGLAR v. ABBASI 

BREYER, J., dissenting 

deter individual federal officers from committing constitu-
tional  violations”).  Insofar  as  the  Court  means  this  con-
sideration  to  provide  a  reason  why  there  should  be  no 
Bivens action where a Government employee acts in time
of security need, I shall discuss the matter next, in Part C. 
(7)  Other  potential  special  factors.  Since  I  am  not  cer-
tain what these other “potential factors” are and, since the 
Court  does  not  specify  their  nature,  I  would  not,  and  the
Court  cannot,  consider  them  in  differentiating  this  suit 
from  our  previous  Bivens  cases  or  as  militating  against 
recognizing a Bivens action here. 

C 
In  my  view,  the  Court’s  strongest  argument  is  that 
Bivens should not apply to policy-related actions taken in
times of national-security need, for example, during war or
national-security  emergency.  As  the  Court  correctly
points  out,  the  Constitution  grants  primary  power  to
protect the Nation’s security to the Executive and Legisla-
tive Branches, not to the Judiciary.  But the Constitution 
also  delegates  to  the  Judiciary  the  duty  to  protect  an
individual’s  fundamental  constitutional  rights.    Hence 
when  protection  of  those  rights  and  a  determination  of 
security  needs  conflict,  the  Court  has  a  role  to  play.    The 
Court most recently made this clear in cases arising out of
the  detention  of  enemy  combatants  at  Guantanamo  Bay.
Justice O’Connor wrote that “a state of war is not a blank 
check.”  Hamdi  v.  Rumsfeld,  542  U. S.  507,  536  (2004) 
(plurality opinion).  In Boumediene, 553 U. S., at 732–733, 
the  Court  reinforced  that  point,  holding  that  noncitizens
detained  as  enemy  combatants  were  entitled  to  challenge
their  detention  through  a  writ  of  habeas  corpus,  notwith-
standing the national-security concerns at stake. 

We  have  not,  however,  answered  the  specific  question
the  Court  places  at  issue  here:  Should  Bivens  actions 
continue to exist in respect to policy-related actions taken