Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/10pdf/10-277.pdf
Page Number: 3.0

Cite as:  564 U. S. ____ (2011) 

3 

Syllabus 

whether  monetary  claims  can  ever  be  certified  under  the  Rule  be-
cause,  at  a  minimum,  claims  for  individualized  relief,  like  backpay, 
are  excluded.    Rule  23(b)(2)  applies  only  when  a  single,  indivisible
remedy  would  provide  relief  to  each  class  member.    The  Rule’s  his-
tory  and  structure  indicate  that  individualized  monetary  claims  be-
long  instead  in  Rule  23(b)(3),  with  its  procedural  protections  of  pre-
dominance,  superiority,  mandatory  notice,  and  the  right  to  opt  out.
Pp. 20–23. 

(b) Respondents  nonetheless  argue  that  their  backpay  claims 
were appropriately certified under Rule 23(b)(2) because those claims
do  not  “predominate”  over  their  injunctive  and  declaratory  relief  re-
quests.  That interpretation has no basis in the Rule’s text and does 
obvious  violence  to  the  Rule’s  structural  features.    The  mere  “pre-
dominance” of a proper (b)(2) injunctive claim does nothing to justify
eliminating Rule 23(b)(3)’s procedural protections, and creates incen-
tives for class representatives to place at risk potentially valid mone-
tary relief claims.  Moreover, a district court would have to reevalu-
ate  the  roster  of  class  members  continuously  to  excise  those  who 
leave  their  employment  and  become  ineligible  for  classwide  injunc-
tive  or  declaratory  relief.    By  contrast,  in  a  properly  certified  (b)(3)
class action for backpay, it would be irrelevant whether the plaintiffs
are  still  employed  at  Wal-Mart.    It  follows  that  backpay  claims
should not be certified under Rule 23(b)(2).  Pp. 23–26.

(c) It is unnecessary to decide whether there are any forms of “in-
cidental” monetary relief that are consistent with the above interpre-
tation  of  Rule  23(b)(2)  and  the  Due  Process  Clause  because  respon-
dents’  backpay  claims  are  not 
incidental  to  their  requested 
injunction.  Wal-Mart  is  entitled  to  individualized  determinations  of 
each employee’s eligibility for backpay.  Once a plaintiff establishes a
pattern  or  practice  of  discrimination,  a  district  court  must  usually
conduct  “additional  proceedings  . . .  to  determine  the  scope  of  indi-
vidual  relief.”  Teamsters  v.  United  States,  431  U. S.  324,  361.    The 
company  can  then  raise  individual  affirmative  defenses  and  demon-
strate that its action was lawful.  Id., at 362.  The Ninth Circuit erred 
in trying to replace such proceedings with Trial by Formula.  Because 
Rule 23 cannot be interpreted to “abridge, enlarge or modify any sub-
stantive right,” 28 U. S. C. §2072(b), a class cannot be certified on the
premise that Wal-Mart will not be entitled to litigate its statutory de-
fenses to individual claims.  Pp. 26–27. 

603 F. 3d 571, reversed. 

SCALIA,  J.,  delivered  the  opinion  of  the  Court,  in  which  ROBERTS, 
C. J., and KENNEDY, THOMAS, and ALITO, JJ., joined, and in which GINS-
BURG, BREYER, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ., joined as to Parts I and III.