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AMERICANS FOR PROSPERITY FOUNDATION v. BONTA 

Syllabus 

preventing  charitable  fraud  and  self-dealing.  But  the  enormous 
amount  of  sensitive  information  collected  through  Schedule  Bs  does 
not form an integral part of California’s fraud detection efforts.  Cali-
fornia does not rely on Schedule Bs to initiate investigations, and evi-
dence  at  trial  did  not  support  the  State’s  concern  that  alternative 
means  of  obtaining  Schedule  B  information—such  as  a  subpoena  or 
audit letter—are inefficient and ineffective compared to up-front col-
lection.  In reality, California’s interest is less in investigating fraud 
and  more  in  ease  of  administration.    But “the  prime  objective  of  the 
First  Amendment  is  not  efficiency.”  McCullen  v.  Coakley,  573  U.  S. 
464, 495.  Mere administrative convenience does not remotely “reflect
the seriousness of the actual burden” that the demand for Schedule Bs 
imposes on donors’ association rights.  Reed, 561 U. S., at 196 (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  Pp. 12–15. 

(2) In the First Amendment context, the Court has recognized a 
“type  of  facial  challenge,  whereby a  law  may  be  invalidated  as  over-
broad if a substantial number of its applications are unconstitutional,
judged in relation to the statute’s plainly legitimate sweep.”  United 
States v. Stevens, 559 U. S. 460, 473 (internal quotation marks omit-
ted).  The Attorney General’s disclosure requirement is plainly over-
broad under that standard.  The regulation lacks any tailoring to the 
State’s investigative goals, and the State’s interest in administrative 
convenience is weak.  As a result, every demand that might deter as-
sociation  “creates  an  unnecessary  risk  of  chilling”  in  violation  of  the
First Amendment.  Secretary of State of Md. v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 
467 U. S. 947, 968.  It does not make a difference in these cases if there 
is no disclosure to the public, see Shelton, 364 U. S., at 486, if some 
donors do not mind having their identities revealed, or if the relevant 
donor information is already disclosed to the IRS as a condition of fed-
eral tax-exempt status.  California’s disclosure requirement imposes a 
widespread  burden  on  donors’  associational  rights,  and  this  burden 
cannot be justified on the ground that the regime is narrowly tailored 
to investigating charitable wrongdoing, or that the State’s interest in
administrative convenience is sufficiently important.  Pp. 15–19. 

ROBERTS, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, except as to Part II– 
B–1.  KAVANAUGH  and  BARRETT,  JJ.,  joined  that  opinion  in  full,  ALITO 
and  GORSUCH,  JJ.,  joined  except  as  to  Part  II–B–1,  and  THOMAS,  J., 
joined except as to Parts II–B–1 and III–B.  THOMAS, J., filed an opinion 
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.  ALITO, J., filed an 
opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, in which GOR-
SUCH,  J.,  joined.    SOTOMAYOR,  J.,  filed  a  dissenting  opinion,  in  which 
BREYER and KAGAN, JJ., joined.