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34 

HEALTH AND HOSPITAL CORPORATION OF MARION 
CTY. v. TALEVSKI 
THOMAS, J., dissenting 

natures  of  legislation  under  the  Reconstruction  Amend-
ments  and  “legislation  enacted  pursuant  to  the  spending 
power,” the latter of which “is much in the nature of a con-
tract: in return for federal funds, the States agree to comply
with federally imposed conditions.”  Id., at 17.  Consistent 
with the traditional position, the Court also explained that 
“[i]n  legislation  enacted  pursuant  to  the  spending  power, 
the typical remedy for state noncompliance with federally
imposed conditions is not a private cause of action for non-
compliance but rather action by the Federal Government to
terminate the funds to the State.”  Id., at 28.  Ultimately,
because the Pennhurst Court determined that the provision 
at issue was not intended to secure rights by imposing obli-
gations on States, see id., at 22–27, it did not need to con-
front  the  constitutional  problem  created  by  Thiboutot. 
Nonetheless,  Pennhurst  both  recognized  the  problem  and
pointed to the solution—a return to the traditional contrac-
tual understanding that itself flows naturally from the lim-
ited nature of Congress’ spending authority.

Without that understanding, however, it is unavoidable
that  spending  conditions  that  impose  substantive  obliga-
tions on the States with the force of federal law are uncon-
stitutional.15  As shown above, the federal spending power 
—————— 
rights.  . . .  Congress  may,  under  section  5  [of  the  Fourteenth  Amend-
ment], establish certain restrictions that might otherwise implicate the 
prerogatives of the states”).  The petitioners in Pennhurst squarely rec-
ognized that, if the legislation at issue was predicated on the spending 
power alone, “Congress exceeded the limits of that power.”  Brief for Pe-
titioners, O.T. 1980, No. 79–1404, etc., p. 36, n. 57. 

15 Many  litigants  have  recognized  the  constitutional  problems.    See, 
e.g., Brief for Petitioner in Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, O. T. 2001, No. 01–679, 
p. 42, n. 14 (“Nor is it clear that the conditions in Spending Clause legis-
lation qualify as ‘laws’ under §1983.  Such conditions only become oper-
ative when the contract is accepted by a recipient; it is the resulting con-
tract, not the federal legislation itself, that gives rise to obligations and
allegedly enforceable rights”); Brief for Petitioner in National Collegiate 
Athletic  Assn.  v.  Smith,  O.  T.  1998,  No.  98–84,  p. 3;  Brief  for  United 
States as Amicus Curiae in Suter v. Artist M., O. T. 1991, No. 90–1488,