Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/529bv.pdf
Page Number: 518.0

529US2

Unit: $U47

[10-04-01 09:34:47] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 529 U. S. 420 (2000)

443

Opinion of the Court

vagueness was not the fault of petitioner. Counsel had no
reason to believe Stinnett had been married to Meinhard or
been represented by Woodson. The underdevelopment of
these matters was attributable to Stinnett and Woodson, if
anyone. We do not suggest the State has an obligation to
pay for investigation of as yet undeveloped claims; but if the
prisoner has made a reasonable effort to discover the claims
to commence or continue state proceedings, § 2254(e)(2) will
not bar him from developing them in federal court.

The Court of Appeals held state habeas counsel was not
diligent because petitioner’s investigator on federal habeas
discovered the relationships upon interviewing two jurors
who referred in passing to Stinnett as “Bonnie Meinhard.”
See Brief for Petitioner 35. The investigator later con-
ﬁrmed Stinnett’s prior marriage to Meinhard by checking
Cumberland County’s public records. See 189 F. 3d, at 426
(“The documents supporting [petitioner’s] Sixth Amendment
claims have been a matter of public record since Stinnett’s
divorce became ﬁnal in 1979.
Indeed, because [petitioner’s]
federal habeas counsel located those documents, there is lit-
tle reason to think that his state habeas counsel could not
have done so as well”). We should be surprised, to say the
least, if a district court familiar with the standards of trial
practice were to hold that in all cases diligent counsel must
check public records containing personal information per-
taining to each and every juror. Because of Stinnett and
Woodson’s silence, there was no basis for an investigation
into Stinnett’s marriage history. Section 2254(e)(2) does not
apply to petitioner’s related claims of juror bias and prosecu-
torial misconduct.

We further note the Commonwealth has not argued that
petitioner could have sought relief in state court once he dis-
covered the factual bases of these claims some time between
appointment of federal habeas counsel on July 2, 1996, and
the ﬁling of his federal habeas petition on November 20,
1996. As an indigent, petitioner had 120 days following ap-