Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/18pdf/17-571_e29f.pdf
Page Number: 2.0

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FOURTH ESTATE PUB. BENEFIT CORP. v. 
WALL-STREET.COM, LLC 
Syllabus 

(b) In  limited  circumstances,  copyright  owners  may  file  an  in-
fringement suit before undertaking registration.  For example, a copy-
right owner who is preparing to distribute a work of a type vulnera-
ble  to  predistribution  infringement—e.g.,  a  movie  or  musical 
composition—may  apply  to  the  Copyright  Office  for  preregistration. 
§408(f)(2).  A copyright owner may also sue for infringement of a live 
broadcast before “registration . . . has been made.”  §411(c).  Outside 
of  statutory  exceptions  not  applicable  here,  however,  §411(a)  bars  a 
copyright  owner  from  suing  for  infringement  until  “registration  . . . 
has been made.”  Fourth Estate advances the “application approach” 
to  this  provision,  arguing  that  registration  occurs  when  a  copyright 
owner submits a proper application for registration.  Wall-Street ad-
vocates  the  “registration  approach,”  urging  that  registration  occurs 
only  when  the  Copyright  Office  grants  registration  of  a  copyright. 
The  registration  approach  reflects  the  only  satisfactory  reading  of 
§411(a)’s text.  Pp. 3–12. 

(1) Read together, §411(a)’s first two sentences focus on action by 
the Copyright Office—namely, its registration or refusal to register a 
copyright claim.  If application alone sufficed to “ma[ke]” registration, 
§411(a)’s second sentence—which permits a copyright claimant to file 
suit when the Register has refused her application—would be super-
fluous.  Similarly,  §411(a)’s  third  sentence—which  allows  the  Regis-
ter to “become a party to the action with respect to the issue of regis-
trability  of 
if  an 
infringement suit could be filed and resolved before the Register act-
ed on an application.  The registration approach reading of §411(a) is 
supported  by  other  provisions  of  the  Copyright  Act.    In  particular, 
§410  confirms  that  application  is  discrete  from,  and  precedes,  regis-
tration, while §408(f)’s preregistration option would have little utility 
if a completed application sufficed to make registration.  Pp. 4–7. 

the  copyright  claim”—would  be  negated 

(2) Fourth Estate primarily contends that the Copyright Act uses 
the phrases “make registration” and “registration has been made” to 
describe  submissions  by  the  copyright  owner.  Fourth  Estate  there-
fore insists that §411(a)’s requirement that “registration . . . has been 
made  in  accordance  with  this  title”  most  likely  refers  to  a  copyright 
owner’s  compliance  with  statutory  requirements  for  registration  ap-
plications.  Fourth  Estate  points  to  other  Copyright  Act  provisions 
that appear to use the phrase “make registration” or one of its vari-
ants  to  describe  what  a  copyright  claimant  does.  Fourth  Estate 
acknowledges, however, that determining how the Copyright Act uses 
the  word  “registration”  in  a  particular  provision  requires  examining 
the  “specific  context”  in  which  the  term  is  used.    The  “specific  con-
text” of §411(a) permits only one sensible reading: The phrase “regis-
tration . . . has been made” refers to the Copyright Office’s act grant-