Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/17pdf/16-1161_dc8f.pdf
Page Number: 34.0

8 

GILL v. WHITFORD 

KAGAN, J., concurring 

II 

Everything said so far relates only to suits alleging that 
a  partisan  gerrymander  dilutes  individual  votes.    That  is 
the way the Court sees this litigation.  See ante, at 14–17. 
And as I’ll discuss, that is the most reasonable view.  See 
infra,  at  10–11.    But  partisan  gerrymanders  inflict  other 
kinds  of  constitutional  harm  as  well.    Among  those  inju­
ries,  partisan  gerrymanders  may  infringe  the  First 
Amendment  rights  of  association  held  by  parties,  other
political organizations, and their members.  The plaintiffs
here have sometimes pointed to that kind of harm.  To the 
extent they meant to do so, and choose to do so on remand, 
their associational claim would occasion a different stand­
ing inquiry than the one in the Court’s opinion.

JUSTICE  KENNEDY  explained  the  First  Amendment 
associational injury deriving from a partisan gerrymander
in his concurring opinion in Vieth, 541 U. S. 267.  “Repre­
sentative  democracy,”  JUSTICE  KENNEDY  pointed  out,  is
today “unimaginable without the ability of citizens to band 
together”  to  advance  their  political  beliefs.    Id.,  at  314 
(opinion  concurring  in  judgment)  (quoting  California 
Democratic  Party  v.  Jones,  530  U. S.  567,  574  (2000)).
That means significant “First Amendment concerns arise” 
when  a  State  purposely  “subject[s]  a  group  of  voters  or 
their  party  to  disfavored  treatment.”    541  U. S.,  at  314. 
Such action “burden[s] a group of voters’ representational
rights.” 
Ibid.;  see  id.,  at  315  (similarly  describing  the
“burden[]  on  a  disfavored  party  and  its  voters”  and  the 
“burden  [on]  a  group’s  representational  rights”).  And  it 
does  so  because  of  their  “political  association,”  “participa­
tion  in  the  electoral  process,”  “voting  history,”  or  “expres­
sion of political views.”  Id., at 314–315. 

As  so  formulated,  the  associational  harm  of  a  partisan
gerrymander  is  distinct  from  vote  dilution.  Consider  an 
active member of the Democratic Party in  Wisconsin who
resides  in  a  district  that  a  partisan  gerrymander  has  left