Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/23pdf/22-451_7m58.pdf
Page Number: 97

16 

LOPER BRIGHT ENTERPRISES v. RAIMONDO 

KAGAN, J., dissenting 

reviewing court shall decide all relevant questions of law,
interpret  constitutional  and  statutory  provisions,  and  de-
termine  the  meaning  or  applicability  of  the  terms  of  an
agency action.”  5 U. S. C. §706.

That text, contra the majority, “does not resolve the Chev-
ron question.”  C. Sunstein, Chevron As Law, 107 Geo. L. J. 
1613, 1642 (2019) (Sunstein).  Or said a bit differently, Sec-
tion 706 is “generally indeterminate” on the matter of def-
erence.  A.  Vermeule,  Judging  Under  Uncertainty  207 
(2006) (Vermeule).  The majority highlights the phrase “de-
cide all relevant questions of law” (italicizing the “all”), and 
notes  that  the  provision  “prescribes  no  deferential  stand-
ard” for answering those questions.  Ante, at 14.  But just
as the provision does not prescribe a deferential standard 
of review, so too it does not prescribe a de novo standard of 
review (in which the court starts from scratch, without giv-
ing deference).  In point of fact, Section 706 does not specify 
any standard of review for construing statutes.  See Kisor, 
588 U. S., at 581 (plurality opinion).  And when a court uses 
a  deferential  standard—here,  by  deciding  whether  an 
agency reading is reasonable—it just as much “decide[s]” a 
“relevant question[ ] of law” as when it uses a de novo stand-
ard.  §706.  The  deferring  court  then  conforms  to  Section 
706 “by determining whether the agency has stayed within 
the bounds of its assigned discretion—that is, whether the
agency has construed [the statute it administers] reasona-
bly.”  J. Manning, Chevron and the Reasonable Legislator,
128 Harv. L. Rev. 457, 459 (2014); see Arlington v. FCC, 569 
U. S. 290, 317 (2013) (ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting) (“We do
not  ignore  [Section  706’s]  command  when  we  afford  an
agency’s statutory interpretation Chevron deference; we re-
spect it”).2 
—————— 

2 The majority tries to buttress its argument with a stray sentence or 
two from the APA’s legislative history, but the same response holds.  As 
the majority notes, see ante, at 15, the House and Senate Reports each
stated that Section 706 “provid[ed] that questions of law are for courts