Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/16pdf/15-1293_1o13.pdf
Page Number: 36.0

6 

MATAL v. TAM 

Opinion of KENNEDY, J. 

of  trademarks,  the  metaphorical  marketplace  of  ideas
becomes a tangible, powerful reality.  Here that real mar-
ketplace exists as a matter of state law and our common-
law  tradition,  quite  without  regard  to  the  Federal  Gov-
ernment.  See ante, at 2.  These marks make up part of the 
expression  of  everyday  life,  as  with  the  names  of  enter-
tainment  groups,  broadcast  networks,  designer  clothing, 
newspapers, automobiles, candy bars, toys, and so on.  See 
Brief for Pro-Football, Inc., as Amicus Curiae 8 (collecting
examples).  Nonprofit organizations—ranging from medical-
research  charities  and  other  humanitarian  causes  to 
political  advocacy  groups—also  have  trademarks,  which
they  use  to  compete  in  a  real  economic  sense  for  funding 
and other resources as they seek to persuade others to join
their  cause.  See  id.,  at  8–9  (collecting  examples).  To 
permit  viewpoint  discrimination  in  this  context  is  to  per-
mit Government censorship. 

This  case  does  not  present  the  question  of  how  other
provisions  of  the  Lanham  Act  should  be  analyzed  under 
the First Amendment.  It is well settled, for instance, that 
to  the  extent  a  trademark  is  confusing  or  misleading  the
law  can  protect  consumers  and  trademark  owners.    See, 
e.g.,  FTC  v.  Winstead  Hosiery  Co.,  285  U. S.  483,  493 
(1922) (“The labels in question are literally false, and . . . 
palpably so.  All are, as the Commission found, calculated 
to  deceive  and  do  in  fact  deceive  a  substantial  portion  of
the  purchasing  public”).  This  case  also  does  not  involve 
laws  related  to  product  labeling  or  otherwise  designed  to 
protect  consumers.  See  Sorrell,  supra,  at  579  (“[T]he
government’s  legitimate  interest  in  protecting  consumers 
from  commercial  harms  explains  why  commercial  speech 
can  be  subject  to  greater  governmental  regulation  than
noncommercial  speech”  (internal  quotation  marks  omit-
ted)).  These  considerations,  however,  do  not  alter  the 
speech  principles  that  bar  the  viewpoint  discrimination 
embodied in the statutory provision at issue here.