Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/558bv.pdf
Page Number: 465.0

304 

WOOD  v.  ALLEN 

Opinion of the Court 

because  counsel  failed  to  make  a  reasonable  investigation  of 
Wood’s  mental  deﬁciencies  before  deciding  not  to  pursue  or 
present  such  evidence.  Without  a  reasonable  investigation, 
Wood  contends,  these  decisions  were  an  unreasonable  ex­
ercise  of  professional  judgment  and  constituted  deﬁcient 
performance  under  Strickland.  We  agree  with  the  State, 
however,  that  this  argument  is  not  “fairly  included”  in 
the  questions  presented  under  this  Court’s  Rule  14.1(a). 
Whether  the  state  court  reasonably  determined  that  there 
was a strategic decision under § 2254(d)(2) is a different ques­
tion from whether the strategic decision itself was a reason­
able  exercise  of  professional  judgment  under  Strickland  or 
whether the application of Strickland was reasonable under 
§ 2254(d)(1).  Cf.  Rice, 546 U. S., at 342 (“The question 
whether  a  state  court  errs  in  determining  the  facts  is  a  dif­
ferent  question  from  whether  it  errs  in  applying  the  law”). 
These  latter  two  questions  may  be  “related  to  the  one  peti­
tione[r]  presented,  and  perhaps  complementary  to  the  one 
petitione[r]  presented,”  but  they  are  “not  fairly  included 
therein.”  Yee  v.  Escondido, 503 U. S. 519, 537 (1992) (inter­
nal quotation marks omitted). 

It is true that Wood’s petition discussed the Eleventh Cir­
cuit’s misapplication of § 2254(d)(1) and Strickland.  Pet. for 
Cert.  22–27.  But  “the  fact  that  [petitioner]  discussed  this 
issue in the text of [his] petition for certiorari does not bring 
it  before  us.  Rule  14.1(a)  requires  that  a  subsidiary  ques­
tion  be  fairly  included  in  the  question  presented  for  our  re­
view.”  Izumi  Seimitsu  Kogyo  Kabushiki  Kaisha  v.  U.  S. 
Philips Corp., 510 U. S. 27, 31, n. 5 (1993) (per curiam).  We 
therefore  do  not  address  Wood’s  argument  that  the  state 
court  unreasonably  applied  Strickland  in  rejecting  his 
ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim on the merits. 

*

*

* 

Because the resolution of this case does not turn on them, 
we  leave  for  another  day  the  questions  of  how  and  when