Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/529bv.pdf
Page Number: 804.0

529US3

Unit: $U57

[09-26-01 12:19:03] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 529 U. S. 728 (2000)

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Syllabus

“permitted use,” which refers to forage “allocated by, or under the guid-
ance of an applicable land use plan.” The new deﬁnitions do not exceed
the Secretary’s authority under § 315b. First, § 315b’s words “so far as
consistent with the purposes” of the Act and “issuance of a permit”
creates no “right, title, interest, or estate” make clear that the ranchers’
interest in permit stability is not absolute and that the Secretary is
free reasonably to determine just how, and the extent to which, grazing
privileges are to be safeguarded. Moreover, since Congress itself has
directed development of land use plans, and their use in the allocation
process, it is difﬁcult to see how a deﬁnitional change that simply refers
to using such plans could violate the Taylor Act by itself, without more.
Given the broad discretionary powers that the Taylor Act grants the
Secretary, the Act must be read as here granting him at least ordinary
administrative leeway to assess “safeguard[ing]” in terms of the Act’s
other purposes and provisions. Second, the pre-1995 AUM system that
petitioners seek to “safeguard” did not offer them anything like absolute
security, for the Secretary had well-established pre-1995 authority to
cancel, modify, or decline to review permits, including the power to do
so pursuant to a land use plan. Third, the new deﬁnitional regulations
by themselves do not automatically bring about a self-executing change
that would signiﬁcantly diminish the security of grazing privileges.
The Interior Department represents that the new deﬁnitions merely
clarify terminology. The new regulations do seem to tie grazing privi-
leges to land use plans more explicitly than did the old. However, all
Bureau of Land Management lands have been covered by land use plans
for nearly 20 years, yet the ranchers have not provided a single example
in which interaction of plan and permit has jeopardized or might jeopar-
dize permit security. A particular land use plan might lead to a denial
of privileges that the pre-1995 regulations would have provided, but
the question here is whether the deﬁnition changes by themselves vio-
late the Act’s requirement that grazing privileges be “adequately safe-
guarded.” They do not. Pp. 739–744.

(b) The deletion of the phrase “engaged in the livestock business”
from § 4110.1(a) does not violate the statutory limitation to “stock own-
ers.” Section 315b, just two sentences after using “stock owners,”
gives preference to “landowners engaged in the livestock business.”
This indicates that Congress did not intend to make the phrases syn-
onyms. Neither the Act’s legislative history nor its basic purpose sug-
gests an absolute limit to those engaged in the livestock business was
intended by the term “stock owner.” The ranchers’ underlying concern
is that the amendment is part of a scheme to end grazing on public lands