Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/558bv.pdf
Page Number: 298

Cite as: 558 U. S. 120 (2010) 

137 

Thomas, J., concurring 

Justice  Thomas,  with whom Justice  Scalia  joins, 

concurring. 

I  join  the  per  curiam  because  it  correctly  holds  that  the 
Ninth  Circuit  erred  in  departing  from  Jackson’s  mandate 
that  a  federal  habeas  court  conﬁne  its  sufﬁciency-of-the­
evidence analysis to “the evidence adduced at trial” and, spe­
ciﬁcally, to “ ‘all of the evidence admitted by the trial court.’ ” 
Ante,  at  130,  131  (quoting  Lockhart  v.  Nelson,  488  U. S.  33, 
41  (1988));  see  Jackson  v.  Virginia,  443  U. S.  307  (1979). 
I  write  separately because  I  disagree  with the  Court’s  deci­
sion to complicate its analysis with an extensive discussion of 
the Mueller Report.  See ante, at 127–132.  Defense counsel 
commissioned  that  report  11  years  after  respondent’s  trial. 
See  ante,  at  121.  Accordingly,  the  report’s  attacks  on  the 
State’s  DNA  testimony  were  not  part  of  the  trial  evidence 
and  have  no  place  in  the  Jackson  inquiry.  See  Jackson, 
supra,  at  318;  Lockhart,  supra,  at  40–42.  That  is  all  we 
need or should say about the report in deciding this case. 

The  Court’s  opinion  demonstrates  as  much.  The  Court’s 
lengthy  discussion  of  the  Mueller  Report,  see  ante,  at  127– 
130,  is  merely  a  predicate  to  asserting  that  “even  if ”  the 
Court  of  Appeals  could  have  considered  the  report  in  its 
Jackson  analysis,  the  report  “provided  no  warrant  for  en­
tirely  excluding  the  DNA  evidence  or  Romero’s  testimony 
from  that  court’s  consideration”  because  the  report  “did  not 
contest that the DNA evidence matched Troy” or otherwise 
show  that  the  State’s  DNA  estimates  were  “unreliable,” 
ante,  at  132.  Based  on  these  observations,  the  Court  con­
cludes that the Mueller Report did not undermine the State’s 
DNA tests as “powerful inculpatory evidence.”  Ibid.  That 
is  true,  but  even  if  the  report  had  completely  undermined 
the  DNA  evidence—which  the  Ninth  Circuit  may  have  mis­
takenly believed it did, see Brown v.  Farwell, 525 F. 3d 787, 
795–796 (2008)—the panel still would have erred in consider­
ing  the  report  to  resolve  respondent’s  Jackson  claim.  The 
reason,  as  the  Court  reafﬁrms,  is  that  Jackson  claims  must