Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/529bv.pdf
Page Number: 662

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Unit: $U53

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Cite as: 529 U. S. 576 (2000)

587

Opinion of the Court

effect to an agency’s regulation containing a reasonable in-
terpretation of an ambiguous statute.

Id., at 842–844.

Here, however, we confront an interpretation contained in
an opinion letter, not one arrived at after, for example, a
formal adjudication or notice-and-comment rulemaking.
In-
terpretations such as those in opinion letters—like interpre-
tations contained in policy statements, agency manuals, and
enforcement guidelines, all of which lack the force of law—
do not warrant Chevron-style deference. See, e. g., Reno v.
Koray, 515 U. S. 50, 61 (1995) (internal agency guideline,
which is not “subject to the rigors of the Administrative Pro-
cedur[e] Act, including public notice and comment,” entitled
only to “some deference” (internal quotation marks omit-
ted)); EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co., 499 U. S. 244,
256–258 (1991)
(interpretative guidelines do not receive
Chevron deference); Martin v. Occupational Safety and
Health Review Comm’n, 499 U. S. 144, 157 (1991) (interpre-
tative rules and enforcement guidelines are “not entitled to
the same deference as norms that derive from the exercise
of the Secretary’s delegated lawmaking powers”). See gen-
erally 1 K. Davis & R. Pierce, Administrative Law Treatise
§ 3.5 (3d ed. 1994).
Instead, interpretations contained in for-
mats such as opinion letters are “entitled to respect” under
our decision in Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U. S. 134, 140
(1944), but only to the extent that those interpretations have
the “power to persuade,” ibid. See Arabian American Oil
Co., supra, at 256–258. As explained above, we ﬁnd unper-
suasive the agency’s interpretation of the statute at issue in
this case.

Of course, the framework of deference set forth in Chevron
does apply to an agency interpretation contained in a regula-
tion. But in this case the Department of Labor’s regulation
does not address the issue of compelled compensatory time.
The regulation provides only that “[t]he agreement or under-
standing [between the employer and employee] may include
other provisions governing the preservation, use, or cashing