Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/16pdf/16-254_5iel.pdf
Page Number: 2.0

2 

WATER SPLASH, INC. v. MENON 

Syllabus 

there is no apparent reason why it would exclude the transmission of 
documents  for  the  purpose  of  service.    The  structure  of  the  Conven-
tion  strongly  counsels  against  such  an  exclusion.    The  Convention’s 
preamble and Article 1 limit the scope of the Convention to service of
documents  abroad,  and  its  full  title  includes  the  phrase  “Service
Abroad.”  This Court has also held that the scope of the Convention is 
limited to service of documents.  Id., at  701.  It would  thus be  quite 
strange  if  Article  10(a)—apparently  alone  among  the  Convention’s
provisions—concerned  something  other  than  service  of  documents.
Indeed, such a reading would render Article 10(a) superfluous.  Arti-
cle  10’s  function  is  to  ensure  that,  generally,  the  Convention  “shall
not  interfere” with  the  activities  described  in  10(a),  10(b),  and  10(c). 
But  since  Article  1  already  “eliminates  [the]  possibility”  that  the 
Convention  would  apply  to  any  communications  that  “do  not  culmi-
nate in service,” id., at 701, in order for Article 10(a) to do any work, 
it  must  pertain  to  sending  documents  for  the  purposes  of  service. 
Menon’s attempt to avoid this superfluity problem by suggesting that
Article 10(a) applies not to service of process but only to the service of 
“post-answer  judicial  documents”  lacks  any  plausible  textual  footing
in Article 10.  If the drafters wished to limit Article 10(a) to a particu-
lar subset of documents, they could have said so—as they did, e.g., in 
Article 15, which refers to “a writ of summons or an equivalent doc-
ument.”  Instead,  Article  10(a)  uses  the  term  “judicial  documents”—
the same term featured in 10(b) and 10(c).  And the ordinary mean-
ing  of  the  word  “send”  is  broad  enough  to  cover  the  transmission  of 
any  judicial  documents.    Accordingly,  the  text  and  structure  of  the
Convention  indicate  that  Article  10(a)  encompasses  service  by  mail.
Pp. 4–6.

(b) The  main  counterargument—that  Article  10(a)’s  phrase  “send
judicial documents” should mean something different than the phrase
“effect  service  of  judicial  documents”  in  Article  10(b)  and  Article 
10(c)—is  unpersuasive.    First,  it  must  contend  with  the  compelling 
structural  considerations  strongly  suggesting  that  Article  10(a)  per-
tains to service of documents.  Second, reading the word “send” as a
broad concept that includes, but is not limited to, service is probably 
more  plausible  than  interpreting  the  word  to  exclude  service,  and  it 
does not create the same superfluity problem.  Third, the French ver-
sion  of  the  Convention,  which  is  “equally  authentic”  to  the  English
version, Schlunk, supra, at 699, uses the word “adresser,” which has 
consistently  been  understood  to  mean  service  or  notice.    At  best, 
Menon’s  argument  creates  an  ambiguity  as  to  Article  10(a)’s  mean-
ing.  The Court thus turns to additional tools of treaty interpretation,
which comfortably resolve any lingering ambiguity in Water Splash’s
favor.  Pp. 7–8.