Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/16pdf/15-577_khlp.pdf
Page Number: 51.0

Cite as:  582 U. S. ____ (2017) 

25 

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting 

solely on account of religious identity imposes a penalty on
the free exercise of religion that can be justified only by a
state  interest  of  the  highest  order,”  ante,  at  6  (majority 
opinion) (internal quotation marks omitted).  See ante, at 
1–2  (BREYER,  J.,  concurring  in  judgment).    Few  would 
disagree with a literal interpretation of this statement.  To 
fence  out  religious  persons  or entities  from  a truly  gener- 
ally available public benefit—one provided to all, no ques-
tions  asked,  such  as  police  or  fire  protections—would 
violate  the  Free  Exercise  Clause.  Accord,  Rosenberger, 
515  U. S.,  at  879,  n.  5  (Souter,  J.,  dissenting).    This  ex-
plains  why  Missouri  does  not  apply  its  constitutional 
provision in that manner.  See Tr. of Oral Arg. 35–36.  Nor 
has it done so here.  The Scrap Tire Program offers not a
generally available benefit but a selective benefit for a few 
recipients  each  year.  In  this  context,  the  comparison  to 
truly  generally  available  benefits  is  inapt.  Cf.  Everson, 
330 U. S., at 61, n. 56 (Rutledge, J., dissenting) (The Reli-
gion  Clauses  “forbi[d]  support,  not  protection  from  inter-
ference or destruction”). 

On  top  of  all  of  this,  the  Court’s  application  of  its  new 
rule here is mistaken.  In concluding that Missouri’s Arti-
cle  I,  §7,  cannot  withstand  strict  scrutiny,  the  Court  de-
scribes Missouri’s interest as a mere “policy preference for 
skating  as  far  as  possible  from  religious  establishment 
concerns.”  Ante,  at  14.  The  constitutional  provisions  of
thirty-nine States—all but invalidated today—the weighty 
interests  they  protect,  and  the  history  they  draw  on  de-
serve more than this judicial brush aside.14 

—————— 

14 In the end, the soundness of today’s decision may matter less than 
what  it  might  enable  tomorrow.    The  principle  it  establishes  can  be
manipulated  to  call  for  a  similar  fate  for  lines  drawn  on  the  basis  of
religious  use.  See  ante,  at  1–3  (GORSUCH,  J.,  concurring  in  part);  see 
also  ante,  at  1–2  (THOMAS,  J.,  concurring  in  part)  (going  further  and 
suggesting that lines drawn on the basis of religious status amount to 
per se  unconstitutional  discrimination  on  the  basis  of  religious  belief ).