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2 

CORNER POST, INC. v. BOARD OF GOVERNORS, FRS 

Syllabus 

or employees.  See Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U. S. 136, 140– 
141.  The Court has explained that §702 “requir[es] a litigant to show, 
at the outset of the case, that he is injured in fact by agency action.” 
Director, Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs v. Newport News 
Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., 514 U. S. 122, 127.  A litigant therefore 
cannot  bring  an  APA  claim  unless  and  until  she  suffers  an  injury. 
While §702 equips injured parties with a cause of action, §704 provides
that  judicial  review  is  available  in  most  cases  only  for  “final  agency 
action.”  Bennett v. Spear, 520 U. S. 154, 177–178.  Reading §702 and
§704  together,  a  plaintiff  may  bring  an  APA  claim  only  after  she  is 
injured by final agency action. 

To determine whether Corner Post’s APA claim is timely, the Court
must interpret §2401(a), which provides that civil actions against the
United States “shall be barred unless the complaint is filed within six 
years after the right of action first accrues.”  The Board says an APA 
claim “accrues” under §2401(a) when agency action is “final” for pur-
poses of §704; the claim can accrue for purposes of the statute of limi-
tations even before the plaintiff suffers an injury.  The Court disagrees.
A right of action “accrues” when the plaintiff has a “complete and pre-
sent cause of action,” which is when she has the right to “file suit and
obtain relief.”  Green v. Brennan, 578 U. S. 547, 554.  Because an APA 
plaintiff may not file suit and obtain relief until she suffers an injury 
from final agency action, the statute of limitations does not begin to 
run until she is injured.  Pp. 4–6.

(b) Congress enacted §2401(a) in 1948, two years after it enacted the 
APA.  Section 2401(a)’s predecessor was the statute-of-limitations pro-
vision for the Little Tucker Act, which provided for district court juris-
diction over certain claims against the United States.  When Congress 
revised and recodified the Judicial Code in 1948, it converted the Little 
Tucker  Act’s  statute  of  limitations  into  §2401(a)’s  general  statute  of 
limitations for all suits against the Government.  But Congress contin-
ued to start the statute of limitations period when the right “accrues.” 
Compare 36 Stat. 1093 (“after the right accrued for which the claim is
made”) with §2401(a) (“after the right of action first accrues”). 

“Accrue” had a well-settled meaning in 1948, as it does now: A “right 
accrues when it comes into existence,” United States v. Lindsay, 346 
U. S.  568,  569—i.e.,  “when  the  plaintiff  has  a  complete  and  present 
cause of action,” Gabelli v. SEC, 568 U. S. 442, 448.  This definition 
has appeared “in dictionaries from the 19th century up until today,” 
which explain that a cause of action accrues when a suit may be main-
tained  thereon.    568  U. S.,  at  448.  Thus,  a  cause  of  action  does  not 
become complete and present—it does not accrue—“until the plaintiff 
can file suit and obtain relief.”  Bay Area Laundry and Dry Cleaning