Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/20pdf/19-840_6jfm.pdf
Page Number: 56

Cite as:  593 U. S. ____ (2021) 

31 

ALITO, J., dissenting 

Commerce  Clause  and  (arguably)  Taxing  Clause  powers.
Those powers cannot justify the individual mandate.  The 
statutory text says the individual mandate is “essential” to 
the overall scheme, 42 U. S. C. §18091(2)(I), and it repeat-
edly  states  that  the  various  provisions  work  “together,” 
NFIB, 567 U. S., at 694–696 (joint dissent).  It does not mat-
ter  that  this  language  appears  in  a  section  entitled  “find-
ings” as opposed to a section entitled “severability.”  Con-
gress can link distinct provisions in any number of ways, on 
this view, so long as it does so in the text.  The broader stat-
utory  history  and  structure,  moreover,  reinforce  that  con-
clusion.  The NFIB dissent explained how the ACA’s provi-
sions work in tandem to alter the insurance market.  567 
U. S., at 691–706.  Here, the individual mandate requires
individuals  to  obtain  “minimum  essential  coverage.”  26 
U. S. C.  §5000A(f ).    The  reporting  requirements,  in  turn, 
implement  the  mandate—indeed,  they  explicitly  cross-
reference §5000A—by requiring employers to provide infor-
mation about such coverage.  §§6055(e), 6056(b)(2)(B).  And 
the adult-children coverage requirement works as part of a
cohesive set of insurance reforms central to the ACA’s over-
all structure, which turns on healthy persons’ entry into the 
market  via  the  individual  mandate.  See  42  U. S. C. 
§300gg–14(a).  The individual mandate is thus inseverable 
from the provisions burdening the States under either ap-
proach to severability.

Having determined that the individual mandate is (1) un-
lawful  and  (2)  inseverable  from  the  provisions  burdening 
the state plaintiffs, the final question is what to do about it.
The  answer  largely  flows  from  everything  I  have  already
said  above.  Relief  in  a  case  runs  against  parties,  not 
against statutes.  Supra, at 9–10.  And provisions that are
inseverable from unconstitutional features of a statute can-
not be enforced.  Supra, at 15–20.  No matter how one ap-
proaches  the  question, then,  the  answer  is  clear:  Because 
the  mandate  is  unlawful  and  because  the  injury-causing