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Page Number: 19.0

16 

LIU v. SEC 

Opinion of the Court 

concluding  that  the  “primary  function  of  the remedy  is  to
deny the wrongdoer the fruits of ill-gotten gains”).  Under 
the Government’s theory, the very fact that it conducted an
enforcement action satisfies the requirement that it is “ap-
propriate or necessary for the benefit of investors.”

But  the  SEC’s  equitable,  profits-based  remedy  must  do
more  than  simply  benefit  the  public  at  large  by  virtue  of 
depriving a wrongdoer of ill-gotten gains.  To hold otherwise 
would render meaningless the latter part of §78u(d)(5).  In-
deed, this Court concluded similarly in Mertens when ana-
lyzing statutory language accompanying the term “equita-
ble  remedy.”  508  U. S.,  at  253  (interpreting  the  term 
“appropriate equitable relief ”).  There, the Court found that
the additional statutory language must be given effect since
the section “does not, after all, authorize . . . ‘equitable re-
lief ’ at large.”  Ibid.  As in Mertens, the phrase “appropriate
or necessary for the benefit of investors” must mean some-
thing  more  than  depriving  a  wrongdoer  of  his  net  profits
alone, else the Court would violate the “cardinal principle 
of interpretation that courts must give effect, if possible, to 
every clause and word of a statute.”  Parker Drilling Man-
agement Services, Ltd. v. Newton, 587 U. S. ___, ___ (2019) 
(slip op., at 9) (internal quotation marks omitted).

The  Government  additionally  suggests  that  the  SEC’s
practice of depositing disgorgement funds with the Treas-
ury may be justified where it is infeasible to distribute the 
collected funds to investors.5  Brief for Respondent 37.  It is 
an open question whether, and to what extent, that practice 
nevertheless satisfies the SEC’s obligation to award relief 

—————— 

5 We express no view as to whether the SEC has offered adequate proof 
of failed attempts to return funds to investors here.  To the extent that 
feasibility is relevant at all to equitable principles, we observe that lower
courts are well equipped to evaluate the feasibility of returning funds to 
victims of fraud.  See, e.g., SEC v. Lund, 570 F. Supp. 1397, 1404–1405
(CD Cal. 1983) (appointing a magistrate judge to determine whether it
was feasible to locate victims of financial wrongdoing).