Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/21pdf/20-601_bq7c.pdf
Page Number: 3.0

Cite as:  595 U. S. ____ (2022) 

3 

Syllabus 

the  attorney  general  agreed  to  be  bound  was  the  judgment  that 
emerged after all appellate review concluded.  Pp. 6–7. 

(b) Turning to the question whether the Court of Appeals properly 
denied the attorney general’s motion to intervene, the Court notes that 
no  statute  or  rule  provides  a  general  standard  to  apply  in  deciding 
whether  intervention  on  appeal  should  be  allowed.     Guided  by  the 
“policies  underlying  intervention”  in  the  district  courts,  Automobile 
Workers v. Scofield, 382 U. S. 205, 217, n. 10, including the legal “in-
terest” that a party seeks to “protect” through intervention on appeal, 
Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 24(a)(2), the Court concludes that the Sixth Cir-
cuit  erred  in  denying  the  attorney  general’s  motion  to  intervene.  
Pp. 7–13. 

(1) Resolution of a motion for permissive intervention is commit-
ted to the discretion of the court before which intervention is sought, 
see Automobile Workers, 382 U. S., at 217, n. 10; Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 
24(b)(1)(a).  But a court fails to exercise its discretion soundly when it 
“base[s] its ruling on an erroneous view of the law,” Cooter & Gell v. 
Hartmarx Corp., 496 U. S. 384, 405, and that is what happened here.  
The Sixth Circuit panel failed to account for the strength of the Ken-
tucky attorney general’s interest in taking up the defense of HB 454 
when the secretary elected to acquiesce.  A State “clearly has a legiti-
mate  interest  in  the  continued  enforceability  of  its  own  statutes,” 
Maine v. Taylor, 477 U. S. 131, 137, and a State’s opportunity to defend 
its laws in federal court should not be lightly cut off.  The importance 
of ensuring that States have a fair opportunity to defend their laws in 
federal  court  has  been  recognized  by  Congress.    See  28  U.  S.  C. 
§2403(b); Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 24(a)(1).  These provisions—even if not 
directly  applicable  in  this  case  because  the  secretary  remained  a 
party—reflect the weighty interest that a State has in protecting its 
own laws.  Respect for state sovereignty must also take into account 
the authority of a State to structure its executive branch in a way that 
empowers multiple officials to defend its sovereign interests in federal 
court.  See Virginia House of Delegates v. Bethune-Hill, 587 U. S. ___, 
___.  The unusual course that this litigation took should not obscure 
the important constitutional consideration at stake.  Pp. 7–9. 

(2) The panel also erred in its evaluation of the other factors that 
bear on all applications for appellate intervention.  The panel’s assess-
ment  of  the  timeliness  of  the  attorney  general’s  motion to  intervene 
was mistaken.  While an important consideration, timeliness depends 
on the circumstances, and the progression of the litigation is “not solely 
dispositive.”  NAACP v. New York, 413 U. S. 345, 366.  Here, the most 
important circumstance relating to timeliness is that the attorney gen-
eral sought to intervene “as soon as it became clear” that the Common-
wealth’s interests “would no longer be protected” by the parties in the