Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/21pdf/21-954_7l48.pdf
Page Number: 2

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BIDEN v. TEXAS 

Syllabus 

The District Court vacated the June 1 Memorandum and remanded to 
DHS.  It  also  imposed  a  nationwide  injunction  ordering  the  Govern-
ment to “enforce and implement MPP in good faith until such a time 
as it has been lawfully rescinded in compliance with the APA and until 
such a time as the federal government has sufficient detention capac-
ity to detain all aliens subject to mandatory detention under [section 
1225] without releasing any aliens because of a lack of detention re-
sources.”  Id., at 857 (emphasis in original). 

While the Government’s appeal was pending, the Secretary released
the October 29 Memoranda, which again announced the termination 
of MPP and explained anew his reasons for doing so.  The Government 
then moved to vacate the injunction on the ground that the October 29
Memoranda had superseded the June 1 Memorandum.  But the Court 
of Appeals denied the motion and instead affirmed the District Court’s 
judgment in full.  With respect to the INA question, the Court of Ap-
peals  agreed  with  the  District  Court’s  analysis  that  terminating  the
program would violate the INA, concluding that the return policy was 
mandatory  so  long  as  illegal  entrants  were  being  released  into  the
United States.  The Court of Appeals also held that “[t]he October 29 
Memoranda did not constitute a new and separately reviewable ‘final 
agency action.’ ”  20 F. 4th 928, 951. 

Held: The Government’s rescission of MPP did not violate section 1225 
of the INA, and the October 29 Memoranda constituted final agency
action.  Pp. 8–25.

(a) Beginning  with  jurisdiction,  the  injunction  that  the  District
Court entered in this case violated 8 U. S. C. §1252(f )(1).  See Garland 
v. Aleman Gonzalez, 596 U. S. ___, ___.  But section 1252(f )(1) does not
deprive this Court of jurisdiction to reach the merits of an appeal even 
where a lower court enters a form of relief barred by that provision. 
Section 1252(f )(1) withdraws a district court’s “jurisdiction or author-
ity” to grant a particular form of relief.  It does not deprive lower courts
of  all  subject  matter  jurisdiction  over  claims  brought  under  sections 
1221 through 1232 of the INA.  

The text of the provision makes that clear.  Section 1252(f )(1) de-
prives courts of the power to issue a specific category of remedies: those
that “enjoin or restrain the operation of ” the relevant sections of the 
statute.    And  Congress  included  that  language  in  a  provision  whose 
title—“Limit on injunctive relief ”—makes clear the narrowness of its 
scope.  Moreover, the provision contains a parenthetical that explicitly
preserves  this  Court’s  power  to  enter  injunctive  relief.    If  section 
1252(f )(1) deprived lower courts of subject matter jurisdiction to adju-
dicate any non-individual claims under sections 1221 through 1232, no
such  claims  could  ever  arrive  at  this  Court,  rendering  the  specific 
carveout for Supreme Court injunctive relief nugatory.