Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/19pdf/19-631_2d93.pdf
Page Number: 39.0

Cite as:  591 U. S. ____ (2020) 

9 

Opinion of BREYER, J. 

general statements about content discrimination triggering
strict scrutiny, including in Reed, make sense as applied in 
this context.  As I have explained, they do not.

That said, I am not arguing for the abolition of the con-
cept of “content discrimination.”  There are times when us-
ing content discrimination to trigger scrutiny is eminently
reasonable.    Specifically,  when  content-based  distinctions 
are used as a method for suppressing particular viewpoints 
or threatening the neutrality of a traditional public forum,
content  discrimination  triggering  strict  scrutiny  is  gener-
ally appropriate.  See Reed, 576 U. S., at 176 (BREYER, J., 
concurring  in  judgment);  id.,  at  182–183  (KAGAN,  J.,  con-
curring in judgment).

Neither  of  those  situations  is  present  here.  Outside  of 
these  circumstances,  content  discrimination  can  at  times 
help determine the strength of a government justification
or  identify  a  potential  interference  with  the  free  market-
place of ideas.  See id., at 176–177 (BREYER, J., concurring 
in  judgment).  But,  as  I  have  explained,  this  case  is  not 
about protecting the marketplace of ideas.  It is not about 
the formation of public opinion or the transmission of the 
people’s will to elected representatives.  It is fundamentally
about a method of regulating debt collection. 

III 
I  would  examine  the  validity  of  the  regulation  at  issue
here using a First Amendment standard that (unlike strict
scrutiny) does not strongly presume that a regulation that
affects speech is unconstitutional.  However, given that the
government-debt exception does directly impact a means of 
communication, the appropriate standard requires a closer 
look at the restriction than does a traditional “rational ba-
sis” test.  A proper inquiry should examine the seriousness
of the speech-related harm, the importance of countervail-
ing  objectives,  the  likelihood  that  the  restriction  will
achieve those objectives, and whether there are other, less