Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/20pdf/19-1039_8n5a.pdf
Page Number: 26.0

Cite as:  594 U. S. ____ (2021) 

21 

Opinion of the Court 

C 
We  conclude  by  addressing  the  respondents’  argument
(which the dissent does not join) that even if States agreed 
in the plan of the Convention to condemnation suits by Fed-
eral  Government  delegatees,  the  NGA  does  not  authorize 
such  suits  with  the  requisite  clarity.  The  Third  Circuit 
adopted  this  position  below,  concluding  that  §717f(h)  did 
not use the “unmistakably clear” language necessary to del-
egate the Federal Government’s ability to sue nonconsent-
ing States.  938 F. 3d, at 111 (quoting Blatchford, 501 U. S., 
at 786); 938 F. 3d, at 111 (“If Congress had intended to del-
egate  the  federal  government’s  exemption  from  sovereign
immunity,  it  would  certainly  have  spoken  much  more
clearly.”).  The respondents renew their contention before 
this Court.  See Brief for Respondent NCJF 24–31; Brief for
Respondent  New  Jersey  et al.  31–39.    They  note  that  we
have required “unequivocal textual evidence” when deter-
mining whether a State has expressly consented to suit, or
when  evaluating  whether  Congress  has  validly  abrogated 
state  sovereign  immunity  under  the  Fourteenth  Amend-
ment.  Id., at 32 (citing Sossamon, 563 U. S., at 291; Hibbs, 
538 U. S., at 726).  And they argue that this requirement 
should apply with equal force in the context of private con-
demnation actions against nonconsenting States.

The respondents are certainly correct that a clear state-
ment is required to subject States to suit in the waiver and
abrogation contexts.  But they have again misconstrued the 
issue in this case as whether the United States can delegate 
its ability to sue States.  The issue is instead whether the 
United  States  can  delegate  its  eminent  domain  power  to
private  parties.  Regardless  whether  the  Federal  Govern-
ment must speak with unmistakable clarity when delegat-
ing  its  freestanding  exemption  from  state  sovereign  im-
munity  (assuming  such  a  delegation  is  even  permissible, 
see  Blatchford,  501  U. S.,  at  785),  there  is  no  similar  re-