Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/19pdf/18-1195_g314.pdf
Page Number: 8.0

Cite as:  591 U. S. ____ (2020) 

5 

Opinion of the Court 

In December 2018, the Montana Supreme Court reversed 
the trial court.  393 Mont. 446, 435 P. 3d 603.  The Court 
first  addressed  the  scholarship  program  unmodified  by
Rule 1, holding that the program aided religious schools in
violation of the no-aid provision of the Montana Constitu-
tion.  In the Court’s view, the no-aid provision “broadly and 
strictly prohibits aid to sectarian schools.”  Id., at 459, 435 
P. 3d, at 609.  The scholarship program provided such aid
by using tax credits to “subsidize tuition payments” at pri-
vate schools that are “religiously affiliated” or “controlled in 
whole or in part by churches.”  Id., at 464–467, 435 P. 3d, 
at 612–613.  In that way, the scholarship program flouted
the State Constitution’s “guarantee to all Montanans that
their  government  will  not  use  state  funds  to  aid  religious
schools.”  Id., at 467, 435 P. 3d, at 614. 

The Montana Supreme Court went on to hold that the vi-
olation of the no-aid provision required invalidating the en-
tire  scholarship  program.    The  Court  explained  that  the
program provided “no mechanism” for preventing aid from 
flowing to religious schools, and therefore the scholarship
program could not “under any circumstance” be construed 
as consistent with the no-aid provision.  Id., at 466–468, 435 
P. 3d, at 613–614.  As a result, the tax credit is no longer
available to support scholarships at either religious or sec-
ular private schools.

The  Montana  Supreme  Court  acknowledged  that  “an
overly-broad” application of the no-aid provision “could im-
plicate  free  exercise  concerns”  and  that  “there  may  be  a 
case” where “prohibiting the aid would violate the Free Ex-
ercise Clause.”  Id., at 468, 435 P. 3d, at 614.  But, the Court 
concluded, “this is not one of those cases.”  Ibid. 

Finally,  the  Court  agreed  with  petitioners  that  the  De-
partment  had  exceeded  its  authority  in  promulgating 
Rule 1.  The Court explained that the statute creating the
scholarship program had broadly defined qualifying schools 
to include all private schools, including religious ones, and