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SANDIFER v. UNITED STATES STEEL CORP. 

Syllabus 

v.  United  States,  444  U. S.  37,  42.    In  dictionaries  from  the  era  of 
§203(o)’s  enactment,  “clothes”  denotes  items  that  are  both  designed 
and used to cover the body and are commonly regarded as articles of 
dress.    Nothing  in  §203(o)’s  text  or  context  suggests  anything  other
than this ordinary meaning.  There is no basis for petitioners’ propo-
sition  that  the  unmodified  term  “clothes”  somehow  omits  protective
clothing.    Section  203(o)’s  exception  applies  only  when  the  changing 
of clothes is “an integral and indispensable part of the principal activ-
ities  for  which  covered  workmen  are  employed,”  Steiner  v.  Mitchell, 
350  U. S.  247,  256,  and  thus  otherwise  compensable  under  the  Act.
See 29 U. S. C. §254(a).  And protective gear is the only clothing that
is  integral  and  indispensable  to  the  work of  many  occupations,  such 
as butchers and longshoremen.  Petitioners’ position is also incompat-
ible  with  the  historical  context  of  §203(o)’s  passage,  contradicting 
contemporaneous Labor Department regulations and dictum in Stei-
ner, see 350 U. S., at 248, 254–255.  The interpretation adopted here
leaves  room  for  distinguishing  between  clothes  and  wearable  items
that are not clothes, such as some equipment and devices.  The view 
of respondent and its amici that “clothes” encompasses the entire out-
fit that one puts on to be ready for work is also devoid of any textual
foundation.  Pp. 6–10.

(c) While  the  normal  meaning  of  “changing  clothes”  connotes  sub-
stitution, “changing” also carried the meaning to “alter” at the time of
§203(o)’s enactment.  The broader statutory context makes plain that 
“time  spent  in  changing  clothes”  includes  time  spent  in  altering 
dress.  Whether  one  exchanges  street  clothes  for  work  clothes  or
simply chooses to layer one over the other may be a matter of purely 
personal  choice,  and  §203(o)  should  not  be  read  to  allow  workers  to 
opt  into  or  out  of  its  coverage  at  random  or  at  will  when  another 
reading is textually permissible.  Pp. 10–11. 

(d) Applying  these  principles  here,  it  is  evident  that  the  donning 
and doffing in this case qualifies as “changing clothes” under §203(o).
Of the 12 items at issue, only 3—safety glasses, earplugs, and a res-
pirator—do  not  fit  within  the  elaborated  interpretation  of  “clothes.”
Apparently concerned that federal judges would have to separate the
minutes  spent  clothes-changing  and  washing  from  the  minutes  de-
voted  to  other  activities  during  the  relevant  period,  some  Courts  of
Appeals have invoked the doctrine de minimis non curat lex (the law
does not take account of trifles).  But that doctrine does not fit com-
fortably within this statute, which is all about trifles.  A more appro-
priate way to proceed is for courts to ask whether the period at issue 
can, on the whole, be fairly characterized as “time spent in changing
clothes or washing.”  If an employee devotes the vast majority of that
time to putting on and off equipment or other non-clothes items, the