Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/21pdf/21-463_3ebh.pdf
Page Number: 3

Cite as:  595 U. S. ____ (2021) 

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Syllabus 

(1) Under the doctrine of sovereign immunity, named defendants 
Penny  Clarkston  (a  state-court  clerk)  and  Austin  Jackson  (a  state-
court judge) should be dismissed.   The petitioners have explained that 
they hope to certify a class and request an order enjoining all state-
court  clerks  from  docketing  S.  B.  8  cases,  and  all  state-court  judges 
from  hearing  them.    The  difficulty  with  this  theory  of  relief  is  that 
States are generally immune from suit under the terms of the Eleventh 
Amendment or the doctrine of sovereign immunity.  While the Court 
in Ex parte Young, 209 U. S. 123, did recognize a narrow exception al-
lowing  an  action  to  prevent  state  officials  from  enforcing  state  laws 
that are contrary to federal law, that exception is grounded in tradi-
tional equity practice.  Id., at 159–160.  And as Ex parte Young itself 
explained, this traditional exception does not normally permit federal 
courts  to  issue  injunctions  against  state-court  judges or clerks.    The 
traditional remedy against such actors has been some form of appeal, 
not  an  ex  ante  injunction  preventing  courts  from  hearing  cases.    As 
stated in Ex parte Young, “an injunction against a state court” or its 
“machinery” “would be a violation of the whole scheme of our Govern-
ment.”  Id., at 163.  The petitioners’ clerk-and-court theory thus fails 
under Ex parte Young.   
   It fails for the additional reason that no Article III “case or contro-
versy” between “adverse litigants” exists between the petitioners who 
challenge S. B. 8 and either the state-court clerks who may docket dis-
putes against the petitioners or the state-court judges who decide those 
disputes.  Muskrat v. United States, 219 U. S. 346, 361; see Pulliam v. 
Allen 466 U. S. 522, 538, n. 18.  Further, as to remedy, Article III does 
not confer on federal judges the power to supervise governmental op-
erations.  The petitioners offer no meaningful limiting principle that 
would apply if federal judges could enjoin state-court judges and clerks 
from entertaining disputes under S. B. 8.  And if the state-court judges 
and clerks qualify as “adverse litigants” for Article III purposes in the 
present  case,  when  would  they  not?    Many  more  questions  than  an-
swers would present themselves if the Court journeyed the way of the 
petitioners’ theory.  Pp. 4–9. 

(2) Texas Attorney General Paxton should be dismissed.  The pe-
titioners seek to enjoin him from enforcing S. B. 8, which the petition-
ers suggest would automatically bind any private party interested in 
pursuing an S. B. 8 suit.  The petitioners have not identified any en-
forcement authority the attorney general possesses in connection with 
S. B. 8 that a federal court might enjoin him from exercising.  The pe-
titioners point to a state statute that says the attorney general “may 
institute an action for a civil penalty of $1,000” for violations of “this 
subtitle or a rule or order adopted by the [Texas Medical B]oard,”  Tex. 
Occ. Code Ann. §165.101, but the qualification “this subtitle” limits the