Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/23pdf/23-175_19m2.pdf
Page Number: 63.0

Cite as:  603 U. S. ____ (2024) 

19 

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting 

contest any of this.  So much for the Ordinances applying to 
backpackers and students. 

V 

Robinson should squarely resolve this case.  Indeed, the 
majority seems to agree that an ordinance that fined and
jailed  “homeless”  people  would  be  unconstitutional.  See 
ante,  at  21  (disclaiming  that  the  Ordinances  “criminalize
mere status”).  The majority resists a straightforward ap-
plication of Robinson by speculating about policy consider-
ations and fixating on extensions of the Ninth Circuit’s nar-
row rule in Martin. 

The majority is wrong on all accounts.  First, no one con-
tests the power of local governments to address homeless-
ness.  Second,  the  majority  overstates  the  line-drawing 
problems that this case presents.  Third, a straightforward 
application  of  Robinson  does  not  conflict  with  Powell  v. 
Texas, 392 U. S. 514 (1968).  Finally, the majority draws the 
wrong  message  from  the  various  amici  requesting  this
Court’s guidance. 

A 
No one contests that local governments can regulate the
time, place, and manner of public sleeping pursuant to their 
power  to  “enact  regulations  in  the  interest  of  the  public 
safety, health, welfare or convenience.”  Schneider v. State 
(Town of Irvington), 308 U. S. 147, 160 (1939).  This power
includes  controlling  “the  use  of  public  streets  and  side-
walks, over which a municipality must rightfully exercise a
great deal of control in the interest of traffic regulation and 
public  safety.”  Shuttlesworth  v.  Birmingham,  394  U. S. 
147, 152 (1969).  When exercising that power, however, reg-
ulations still “may not abridge the individual liberties se-
cured by the Constitution.”  Schneider, 308 U. S., at 160. 

The Ninth Circuit in Martin provided that “an ordinance