Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/529bv.pdf
Page Number: 879.0

529US3

Unit: $U60

[09-26-01 12:39:04] PAGES PGT: OPIN

804

UNITED STATES v. PLAYBOY ENTERTAINMENT
GROUP, INC.
Syllabus

It also singles out particular
Section 505 is a content-based regulation.
It is of no moment that the statute does
programmers for regulation.
not impose a complete prohibition. Since § 505 is content based, it can
stand only if it satisﬁes strict scrutiny. E. g., Sable Communications
of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U. S. 115, 126.
It must be narrowly tailored
to promote a compelling Government interest, and if a less restrictive
alternative would serve the Government’s purpose, the legislature must
use that alternative. Cable television, like broadcast media, presents
unique problems, but even where speech is indecent and enters the
home, the objective of shielding children does not sufﬁce to support a
blanket ban if the protection can be obtained by a less restrictive alter-
native. There is, moreover, a key difference between cable television
and the broadcasting media: Cable systems have the capacity to block
unwanted channels on a household-by-household basis. Targeted block-
ing is less restrictive than banning, and the Government cannot ban
speech if targeted blocking is a feasible and effective means of further-
ing its compelling interests. Pp. 811–815.

(b) No one disputes that § 504 is narrowly tailored to the Govern-
ment’s goal of supporting parents who want sexually explicit channels
blocked. The question here is whether § 504 can be effective. Despite
empirical evidence that § 504 generated few requests for household-by-
household blocking during a period when it was the sole federal blocking
statute in effect, the District Court correctly concluded that § 504, if
publicized in an adequate manner, could serve as an effective, less re-
strictive means of reaching the Government’s goals. When the Govern-
ment restricts speech, the Government bears the burden of proving the
constitutionality of its actions. E. g., Greater New Orleans Broad-
casting Assn., Inc. v. United States, 527 U. S. 173, 183. Of three expla-
nations for the lack of individual blocking requests under § 504—(1) indi-
vidual blocking might not be an effective alternative, due to technologi-
cal or other limitations; (2) although an adequately advertised blocking
provision might have been effective, § 504 as written does not require
sufﬁcient notice to make it so; and (3) the actual signal bleed problem
might be far less of a concern than the Government at ﬁrst had sup-
posed—the Government had to show that the ﬁrst was the right answer.
According to the District Court, however, the ﬁrst and third possibilities
were “equally consistent” with the record before it, and the record was
not clear as to whether enough notice had been issued to give § 504 a
ﬁghting chance. Unless the District Court’s ﬁndings are clearly errone-
ous, the tie goes to free expression. With regard to signal bleed itself,
the District Court’s thorough discussion exposes a central weakness in
the Government’s proof: There is little hard evidence of how widespread