Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/20pdf/19-1257_g204.pdf
Page Number: 56.0

12 

BRNOVICH v. DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL COMMITTEE 

KAGAN, J., dissenting 

County, Section 2 is what voters have left. 

II 
  Section 2, as drafted, is well-equipped to meet the chal-
lenge.    Congress  meant  to  eliminate  all  “discriminatory 
election systems or practices which operate, designedly or 
otherwise,  to  minimize  or  cancel  out  the  voting  strength 
and political effectiveness of minority groups.”  S. Rep. No. 
97–417,  p. 28  (1982)  (S. Rep.).    And  that  broad  intent  is 
manifest  in  the  provision’s  broad  text.    As  always,  this 
Court’s task is to read that language as Congress wrote it—
to  give  the  section  all  the  scope  and  potency  Congress 
drafted  it  to  have.    So  I  start  by  showing  how  Section  2’s 
text requires courts to eradicate voting practices that make 
it harder for members of some races than of others to cast a 
vote, unless such a practice is necessary to support a strong 
state interest.  I then show how far from that text the ma-
jority strays.  Its analysis permits exactly the kind of vote 
suppression  that  Section  2,  by  its  terms,  rules  out  of 
bounds. 

A 
  Section  2,  as  relevant  here,  has  two  interlocking  parts.  
Subsection (a) states the law’s basic prohibition: 

“No  voting  qualification  or  prerequisite  to  voting  or 
standard, practice, or procedure shall be imposed or ap-
plied by any State or political subdivision in a manner 
which results in a denial or abridgement of the right of 
any citizen of the United States to vote on account of 
race or color.”  52 U. S. C. §10301(a). 

Subsection (b) then tells courts how to apply that bar—or 
otherwise  said,  when  to  find  that  an  infringement  of  the 
voting right has occurred: 

“A violation of subsection (a) is established if, based on