Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/14pdf/14-7955_aplc.pdf
Page Number: 81

Cite as:  576 U. S. ____ (2015) 

31 

BREYER, J., dissenting 

present  to  the  sentencing  judge  or  jury  all  mitigating
circumstances,  Lockett  v.  Ohio,  438  U. S.  586;  that  the 
State provide guidance adequate to reserve the application 
of  the  death  penalty  to  particularly  serious  murders, 
Gregg,  428  U. S.  153;  that  the  State  provide  adequate
counsel  and,  where  warranted,  adequate  expert  assis­
tance, Powell v. Alabama, 287 U. S. 45 (1932); Wiggins v. 
Smith,  539  U. S.  510  (2003);  Ake  v.  Oklahoma,  470  U. S. 
68 (1985); or that a jury must find the aggravating factors 
necessary  to  impose  the  death  penalty,  Ring,  536  U. S. 
584;  see  also  id.,  at  614  (BREYER,  J.,  concurring  in  judg­
ment)?  Should  we  no  longer  ensure  that  the  State  does 
not execute those who are seriously intellectually disabled, 
Atkins,  536  U. S.  304?    Should  we  eliminate  the  require­
ment that the manner of execution be constitutional, Baze, 
553 U. S. 35, or the requirement that the inmate be men­
tally  competent  at  the  time  of  his  execution,  Ford  v. 
Wainwright, 477 U. S. 399 (1986)?  Or should we get rid of 
the  criminal  protections  that  all  criminal  defendants
receive—for  instance,  that  defendants  claiming  violation
of constitutional guarantees (say “due process of law”) may 
seek  a  writ  of  habeas  corpus  in  federal  courts?    See,  e.g., 
O’Neal  v.  McAninch,  513 U. S. 432 (1995).   My answer to
these  questions  is  “surely  not.”  But  see  ante,  at  5–7 
(SCALIA, J., concurring).

One  might,  of  course,  argue  that  courts,  particularly
federal courts providing additional layers of review, apply 
these and other requirements too strictly, and that causes
delay.  But, it is difficult for judges, as it would be difficult
for  anyone,  not  to  apply  legal  requirements  punctiliously 
when  the  consequence  of  failing  to  do  so  may  well  be 
death,  particularly  the  death  of  an  innocent  person.    See, 
e.g.,  Zant  v.  Stephens,  462  U. S.  862,  885  (1983)
(“[A]lthough  not  every  imperfection  in  the  deliberative
process  is  sufficient,  even  in  a  capital  case,  to  set  aside  a
state-court  judgment,  the  severity  of  the  sentence  man­