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Page Number: 23

18 

BIDEN v. NEBRASKA 

Opinion of the Court 

tions.  The dissent accordingly reads the statute as author-
izing any degree of change or any new addition, “from mod-
est  to  substantial”—and  nothing  in  the  dissent’s  analysis 
suggests stopping at “substantial.”  Post, at 20.  Because the 
Secretary  “does  not  have  to  leave  gaping  holes”  when  he 
waives  provisions,  the  argument  runs,  it  follows  that  any
replacement  terms  the  Secretary  uses  to  fill  those  holes 
must be lawful.  Ibid.  But the Secretary’s ability to add new 
terms “in lieu of ” the old is limited to his authority to “mod-
ify” existing law.  As with any other modification issued un-
der the Act, no new term or condition reported pursuant to 
§1098bb(b)(2)  may  distort  the  fundamental  nature  of  the 
provision it alters.5 

The  Secretary’s  comprehensive  debt  cancellation  plan 
cannot fairly be called a waiver—it not only nullifies exist-
ing provisions, but augments and  expands them dramati-
cally.  It cannot be mere modification, because it constitutes 
“effectively the introduction of a whole new regime.”  MCI, 
512 U. S., at 234.  And it cannot be some combination of the 
two,  because  when  the  Secretary  seeks  to add  to  existing
law, the fact that he has “waived” certain provisions does 
not give him a free pass to avoid the limits inherent in the
power to “modify.”  However broad the meaning of “waive 
or modify,” that language cannot authorize the kind of ex-
haustive rewriting of the statute that has taken place here.6 

—————— 

5 The dissent asserts that our decision today will control any challenge
to the Secretary’s temporary suspensions of loan repayments and inter-
est accrual.  Post, at 21–22.  We decide only the case before us.  A chal-
lenge  to  the  suspensions  may  involve  different  considerations  with  re-
spect to both standing and the merits. 

6 The States further contend that the Secretary’s program violates the 
requirement in the HEROES Act that any waivers or modifications be 
“necessary  to  ensure  that  . . .  affected  individuals  are  not  placed  in  a 
worse position financially in relation to” federal financial assistance.  20 
U. S. C.  §1098bb(a)(2)(A);  see  Brief  for  Respondents  39–44.    While  our 
decision does not rest upon that reasoning, we note that the Secretary