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Page Number: 18

14 

TURNER v. ROGERS 

Opinion of the Court 

with  significant  information.  Cf.  id.,  at  41a–43a  (Rogers
describes  where  Turner  lived  and  worked).    And  the  pro-
ceeding is ultimately for her benefit.

A  requirement  that  the  State  provide  counsel  to  the 
noncustodial  parent  in  these  cases  could  create  an  asym-
metry of representation that would “alter significantly the
nature of the proceeding.”  Gagnon, supra, at 787.  Doing 
so  could  mean  a  degree  of  formality  or  delay  that  would 
unduly slow payment to those immediately in need.  And, 
perhaps  more  important  for  present  purposes,  doing  so 
could make the proceedings less fair overall, increasing the 
risk of a decision that would erroneously deprive a family 
of the support it is entitled to receive.  The needs of such 
families  play  an  important  role  in  our  analysis.    Cf.  post, 
at 10–12 (opinion of THOMAS, J.).

Third, as the Solicitor General points out, there is avail-
able a set of “substitute procedural safeguards,” Mathews, 
424 U. S., at 335, which, if employed together, can signifi-
cantly  reduce  the  risk  of  an  erroneous  deprivation  of  lib-
erty.  They can do so, moreover, without incurring some of 
the drawbacks inherent in recognizing an automatic right 
to counsel.  Those safeguards include (1) notice to the de-
fendant  that  his  “ability  to  pay”  is  a  critical  issue  in  the 
contempt proceeding; (2) the use of a form (or the equiva-
lent) to elicit relevant financial information; (3) an oppor-
tunity  at  the  hearing  for  the  defendant  to  respond  to
statements and questions about his financial status, (e.g., 
those  triggered  by  his  responses  on  the  form);  and  (4)  an
express  finding  by  the  court  that  the  defendant  has  the
ability to pay.  See Tr. of Oral Arg. 26–27; Brief for United 
States  as  Amicus  Curiae  23–25.  In  presenting  these  al-
ternatives,  the  Government  draws  upon  considerable 
experience  in  helping  to  manage  statutorily  mandated 
federal-state  efforts  to  enforce  child  support  orders.    See 
supra,  at  10.  It  does  not  claim  that  they  are  the  only 
possible  alternatives,  and  this  Court’s  cases  suggest,  for