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Page Number: 13

10 

MELLOULI v. LYNCH 

Opinion of the Court 

The  BIA,  however,  announced  and  applied  a  different 
approach to drug-paraphernalia offenses (as distinguished 
from  drug  possession  and  distribution  offenses)  in  Matter 
of  Martinez  Espinoza,  25  I.  &  N.  Dec.  118  (2009).  There, 
the BIA ranked paraphernalia statutes as relating to “the 
drug trade in general.”  Id., at 121.  The BIA rejected the 
argument  that  a  paraphernalia  conviction  should  not 
count at all because it targeted implements, not controlled 
substances.  Id.,  at  120.  It  then  reasoned  that  a  para-
phernalia  conviction  “relates  to”  any  and  all  controlled 
substances, whether or not federally listed, with which the 
paraphernalia  can  be  used.    Id.,  at  121.  Under  this  rea-
soning, there is no need to show that the type of controlled 
substance  involved  in  a  paraphernalia  conviction  is  one
defined in §802.

The  Immigration  Judge  in  this  case  relied  upon  Mar-
tinez Espinoza in ordering Mellouli’s removal, quoting that
decision  for  the  proposition  that  “ ‘the  requirement  of  a 
correspondence  between  the  Federal  and  State  controlled
substance  schedules,  embraced  by  Matter  of  Paulus  .  .  . 
has never been extended’ ” to paraphernalia offenses.  App.
to Pet. for Cert. 32 (quoting Martinez Espinoza, 25 I. & N. 
Dec., at 121).  The BIA affirmed, reasoning that Mellouli’s
conviction  for  possession  of  drug  paraphernalia  “involves 
drug  trade  in  general  and,  thus,  is  covered  under
[§1227(a)(2)(B)(i)].”  App.  to  Pet.  for  Cert.  18.    Denying
Mellouli’s  petition  for  review,  the  Eighth  Circuit  deferred
to the BIA’s decision in Martinez Espinoza, and held that 
a  Kansas  paraphernalia  conviction  “ ‘relates  to’  a  federal 

—————— 

vanishing  point  the  words  “as  defined  in  [§802].”    If  §1227(a)(2)(B)(i) 
stopped with the words “relating to a controlled substance,” the dissent
would  make  sense.    But  Congress  did  not  stop  there.    It  qualified 
“relating to a controlled substance” by adding the limitation “as defined 
in [§802].”  If those words do not confine §1227(a)(2)(B)(i)’s application 
to drugs defined in §802, one can only wonder why Congress put them
there.