Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/529bv.pdf
Page Number: 432

529US2

Unit: $U45

[09-26-01 10:03:41] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 529 U. S. 344 (2000)

357

Opinion of the Court

The dissent contends that, under our holding, state law is
pre-empted even though “[n]o authority, federal or state, has
found that the signs in place” are “adequate to protect
safety.” Post, at 360 (opinion of Ginsburg, J.). This pre-
supposes that States have not fulﬁlled their obligation to
comply with §§ 646.214(b)(3) and (4). Those subsections es-
tablish a standard for adequacy that States are required to
follow in determining what devices to install when federal
funds are used. The dissent also argues that Easterwood
did not hold that federal funding of the devices is “sufﬁcient”
to effect pre-emption, and that “any statement as to the auto-
matic preemptive effect of federal funding should have re-
mained open for reconsideration in a later case.” Post,
at 361. But Easterwood did not, in fact, leave this question
open.
Instead, at the behest of the FHWA, the Court
clearly stated that §§ 646.214(b)(3) and (4) pre-empt state
tort claims concerning the adequacy of all warning devices
installed with the participation of federal funds.

Respondent also argues that pre-emption does not lie in
this particular case because the Oakwood Church Road
crossing presented several of the factors listed in
§ 646.214(b)(3), and because the TDOT did not install pave-
ment markings as required by the MUTCD. See Brief for
Respondent 20–22, 36; Brief in Opposition 6–8. This mis-
conceives how pre-emption operates under these circum-
stances. When the FHWA approves a crossing improve-
ment project and the State installs the warning devices
using federal funds, §§ 646.214(b)(3) and (4) establish a fed-
eral standard for the adequacy of those devices that displaces
state tort law addressing the same subject. At that point,
the regulation dictates “the devices to be installed and the
means by which railroads are to participate in their selec-
tion.” Easterwood, supra, at 671.
It is this displacement
of state law concerning the devices’ adequacy, and not the
State’s or the FHWA’s adherence to the standard set out
in §§ 646.214(b)(3) and (4) or to the requirements of the