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Page Number: 89

8 

LOPER BRIGHT ENTERPRISES v. RAIMONDO 

KAGAN, J., dissenting 

845; Smiley, 517 U. S., at 740–741.  An enacting Congress,
as noted above, knows those uncertainties will arise, even 
if it does not know what they will turn out to be.  See supra, 
at  4–5.  And  every  once  in  a  while,  Congress  provides  an 
explicit instruction for dealing with that contingency—as-
signing  primary  responsibility  to  the  courts,  or  else  to  an 
agency.  But much more often, Congress does not say.  Thus 
arises the need for a presumption—really, a default rule—
for what should happen in that event.  Does a statutory si-
lence or ambiguity then go to a court for resolution?  Or to 
an  agency?    This  Court  has  long  thought  Congress  would 
choose an agency, with courts serving only as a backstop to
make sure the agency makes a reasonable choice among the 
possible readings.  Or said otherwise, Congress would select
the agency it has put in control of a regulatory scheme to 
exercise the “degree of discretion” that the statute’s lack of
clarity or completeness allows.  Smiley, 517 U. S., at 741. 
Of  course,  Congress  can  always  refute  that  presumptive
choice—can say that, really, it would prefer courts to wield
that discretionary power.  But until then, the presumption 
cuts in the agency’s favor.1  The next question is why. 

—————— 

1 Note that presumptions of this kind are common in the law.  In other 
contexts, too, the Court responds to a congressional lack of direction by
adopting a presumption about what Congress wants, rather than trying
to figure that out in every case.  And then Congress can legislate, with 
“predictable effects,” against that “stable background” rule.  Morrison v. 
National Australia Bank Ltd., 561 U. S. 247, 261 (2010).  Take the pre-
sumption  against  extraterritoriality:  The  Court  assumes  Congress 
means for its statutes to apply only within the United States, absent a 
“clear  indication”  to  the  contrary.    Id.,  at  255.    Or  the  presumption
against retroactivity: The Court assumes Congress wants its laws to ap-
ply only prospectively, unless it “unambiguously instruct[s]” something
different.  Vartelas v. Holder, 566 U. S. 257, 266 (2012).  Or the presump-
tion against repeal of statutes by implication: The Court assumes Con-
gress does not intend a later statute to displace an earlier one unless it 
makes that intention “clear and manifest.”  Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis, 
584 U. S. 497, 510 (2018).  Or the (so far unnamed) presumption against 
treating  a  procedural  requirement  as  “jurisdictional”  unless  “Congress