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Page Number: 48

26 

TORRES v. TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY 

THOMAS, J., dissenting 

subjects to which it applies.  See id., at 197. 

Gibbons’  understanding  of  a  congressional  power  being 
“complete  in  itself ”  was  repeated  by  this  Court  time  and
time  again  for  nearly  two  centuries.    Almost  always,  the
Court used the term to refer to Congress’ authority to regu-
late interstate and foreign commerce.11  And, over time, the 
Court confirmed that because Congress’ power over inter-
state commerce “is plenary and complete in itself . . . [i]t fol-
lows  that  no  form  of  state  activity  can  constitutionally 
thwart  the  regulatory  power  granted  by  the  commerce 
clause  to  Congress.”    United  States  v.  Wrightwood  Dairy 
Co., 315 U. S. 110, 119 (1942); see also Wickard v. Filburn, 
317  U. S.  111,  124  (1942).    This  language  echoes  Kohl’s 
holding that the federal eminent domain power “can neither 
be enlarged nor diminished by a State.”  91 U. S., at 374. 

Ignoring this long history about the very “completeness” 
standard  that  it  purports  to  apply,  the  Court  grasps  for 
some basis to explain how its decision is consistent with this
Court’s  understanding  of  Congress’  commerce  power  in 
Seminole Tribe.  It asserts that Congress’ power under the 
Army  and  Navy  Clauses  is  somehow  “complete  in  itself ” 
while  its  power  under  the  Commerce  Clause  is  less  than
“complete” because “federal regulation of commerce (at is-
sue  in  Seminole  Tribe)  involves  goods  that,  before  they 

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11 See, e.g., Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat. 419, 446 (1827) (Marshall, 
C. J., for the Court) (a power “complete in itself ” is “coextensive with the 
subject  on  which  it  acts”);  Kidd  v.  Pearson,  128  U. S.  1,  17  (1888); 
Addyston  Pipe  &  Steel  Co.  v.  United  States,  175  U. S.  211,  228  (1899); 
Lottery  Case,  188  U. S.  321,  347  (1903);  Second  Employers’  Liability 
Cases, 223 U. S. 1, 47 (1912); Hoke v. United States, 227 U. S. 308, 323 
(1913); United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U. S. 144, 147 (1938); 
United States v. Darby, 312 U. S. 100, 114 (1941); Heart of Atlanta Motel, 
Inc. v. United States, 379 U. S. 241, 254–255 (1964); Hodel v. Virginia 
Surface  Mining  &  Reclamation  Assn.,  Inc.,  452  U. S.  264,  276  (1981); 
United States v. Lopez, 514 U. S. 549, 553 (1995); see also South Carolina 
v.  Katzenbach,  383  U. S.  301,  327  (1966)  (characterizing  Congress’  au-
thority under §2 of the Fifteenth Amendment as “ ‘complete in itself ’ ”).