Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/17pdf/17-459_1o13.pdf
Page Number: 25

Cite as:  585 U. S. ____ (2018) 

1 

KENNEDY, J., concurring 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

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No. 17–459 
_________________ 

WESCLEY FONSECA PEREIRA, PETITIONER v. 
JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS, III, ATTORNEY GENERAL 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT 

[June 21, 2018] 

JUSTICE KENNEDY, concurring. 
I agree with the Court’s opinion and join it in full.
This  separate  writing  is  to  note  my  concern  with  the
way in which the Court’s opinion in Chevron U. S. A. Inc. 
v.  Natural  Resources  Defense  Council,  Inc.,  467  U. S.  837 
(1984), has come to be understood and applied.  The appli-
cation of that precedent to the question presented here by
various  Courts  of  Appeals  illustrates  one  aspect  of  the
problem.

The  first  Courts  of  Appeals  to  encounter  the  question 
concluded or assumed that the notice necessary to trigger
the stop-time rule found in 8 U. S. C. §1229b(d)(1) was not 
“perfected”  until  the  immigrant  received  all  the  infor-
mation listed in §1229(a)(1).  Guamanrrigra v. Holder, 670 
F. 3d 404, 410 (CA2 2012) (per curiam); see also Dababneh 
v.  Gonzales,  471  F.  3d  806,  809  (CA7  2006);  Garcia-
Ramirez v.  Gonzales, 423 F. 3d 935, 937, n. 3 (CA9 2005) 
(per curiam).

That  emerging  consensus  abruptly  dissolved  not  long 
after  the  Board  of  Immigration  Appeals  (BIA)  reached  a
contrary interpretation of §1229b(d)(1) in Matter of Cama-
rillo, 25 I. & N. Dec. 644 (2011).  After that administrative 
ruling,  in  addition  to  the  decision  under  review  here,  at
least six Courts of Appeals, citing Chevron, concluded that 
§1229b(d)(1) was ambiguous and then held that the BIA’s