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324  CITIZENS  UNITED  v.  FEDERAL  ELECTION  COMM’N 

Opinion of the Court 

of  50,000  registered  voters—but  not  “infants,  pre-teens,  or 
otherwise  electorally  ineligible  recipients”—would  be  a  re­
quired  determination,  subject  to  judicial  challenge  and  re­
view, in any case where the issue was in doubt.  Id., at 6. 

In  our  view  the  statute  cannot  be  saved  by  limiting  the 
reach of  2 U. S. C. § 441b  through this  suggested interpreta­
tion.  In addition to the costs and burdens of litigation, this 
result would require a calculation as to the number of people 
a particular communication is likely to reach, with an inaccu­
rate  estimate  potentially  subjecting  the  speaker  to  criminal 
sanctions.  The First Amendment does not permit laws that 
force  speakers  to  retain  a  campaign  ﬁnance  attorney,  con­
duct  demographic  marketing  research,  or  seek  declaratory 
rulings  before  discussing  the  most  salient  political  issues  of 
our  day.  Prolix  laws  chill  speech  for  the  same  reason  that 
vague laws chill speech: People “of common intelligence must 
necessarily  guess  at  [the  law’s]  meaning  and  differ  as  to  its 
application.”  Connally v.  General Constr. Co., 269 U. S. 385, 
391 (1926).  The Government may not render a ban on politi­
cal speech constitutional by carving out a limited exemption 
through an amorphous regulatory interpretation.  We must 
reject  the  approach  suggested  by  the  amici.  Section  441b 
covers Hillary. 

B 

Citizens United next argues that § 441b may not be applied 
to Hillary under the approach taken in WRTL.  McConnell 
decided  that  § 441b(b)(2)’s  deﬁnition  of  an  “electioneering 
communication”  was  facially  constitutional  insofar  as  it  re­
stricted  speech  that  was  “the  functional  equivalent  of  ex­
press  advocacy”  for  or  against  a  speciﬁc  candidate.  540 
U. S., at 206.  WRTL then found an unconstitutional applica­
tion  of  § 441b  where  the  speech  was  not  “express  advocacy 
or  its  functional  equivalent.”  551  U. S.,  at  481  (opinion  of 
Roberts,  C.  J.).  As  explained  by  The  Chief  Justice’s 
controlling  opinion  in  WRTL,  the  functional-equivalent  test 
is  objective:  “[A]  court  should  ﬁnd  that  [a  communication]  is