Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/14pdf/13-534_19m2.pdf
Page Number: 3.0

Cite as:  574 U. S. ____ (2015) 

3 

Syllabus 

harm  by  requiring  the  State  to  review  and  approve  interstitial  poli-
cies made by the entity claiming immunity.  Pp. 6–10.

(2) There  are  instances  in  which  an  actor  can  be  excused  from 
Midcal’s  active  supervision  requirement.    Municipalities,  which  are
electorally accountable, have general regulatory powers, and have no
private price-fixing agenda, are subject exclusively to the clear articu-
lation requirement.  See Hallie v. Eau Claire, 471 U. S. 34, 35.  That 
Hallie  excused  municipalities  from  Midcal’s  supervision  rule  for
these reasons, however, all but confirms the rule’s applicability to ac-
tors  controlled  by  active  market  participants.    Further,  in  light  of 
Omni’s  holding  that  an  otherwise  immune  entity  will  not  lose  im-
munity  based  on  ad hoc  and  ex post  questioning  of  its  motives  for
making particular decisions, 499 U. S., at 374, it is all the more nec-
essary to ensure the conditions for granting immunity are met in the
first  place,  see  FTC  v.  Ticor  Title  Ins.  Co.,  504  U. S.  621,  633,  and 
Phoebe  Putney,  supra,  at  ___.  The  clear  lesson  of  precedent  is  that 
Midcal’s active supervision test is an essential prerequisite of Parker 
immunity for any nonsovereign entity—public or private—controlled 
by active market participants.  Pp. 10–12.

(3) The  Board’s  argument  that  entities  designated  by  the  States
as agencies are exempt from Midcal’s second requirement cannot be
reconciled with the Court’s repeated conclusion that the need for su-
pervision turns not on the formal designation given by States to regu-
lators but on the risk that active market participants will pursue pri-
vate  interests  in  restraining  trade.    State  agencies  controlled  by
active market participants pose the very risk of self-dealing Midcal’s 
supervision  requirement  was  created  to  address.    See  Goldfarb  v. 
Virginia  State  Bar,  421  U. S.  773,  791.    This  conclusion  does  not 
question the good faith of state officers but rather is an assessment of 
the structural risk of market participants’ confusing their own inter-
ests  with  the  State’s  policy  goals.    While  Hallie  stated  “it  is  likely
that active state supervision would also not be required” for agencies, 
471  U. S.,  at  46,  n. 10,  the  entity  there  was  more  like  prototypical 
state  agencies,  not  specialized  boards  dominated  by  active  market
participants.    The  latter  are  similar  to  private  trade  associations
vested  by  States  with  regulatory  authority,  which  must  satisfy 
Midcal’s  active  supervision  standard.    445  U. S.,  at  105–106.    The 
similarities  between  agencies  controlled  by  active  market  partici-
pants  and  such  associations  are  not  eliminated  simply  because  the 
former  are  given  a  formal  designation  by  the  State,  vested  with  a
measure of government power, and required to follow some procedur-
al rules.  See Hallie, supra, at 39.  When a State empowers a group of 
active  market  participants  to  decide  who  can  participate  in  its  mar-
ket, and on what terms, the need for supervision is manifest.  Thus,