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2 

PAVAN v. SMITH 

Per Curiam 

times,  however,  the  Arkansas  Department  of  Health 
issued certificates bearing only the birth mother’s name.

The  department’s  decision  rested  on  a  provision  of  Ar-
kansas  law,  Ark.  Code  §20–18–401  (2014),  that  specifies
which individuals will appear as parents on a child’s state-
issued  birth  certificate.    “For  the  purposes  of  birth  regis-
tration,” that statute says, “the mother is deemed to be the 
woman who gives birth to the child.”  §20–18–401(e).  And 
“[i]f the mother was married at the time of either concep-
tion or birth,” the statute instructs that “the name of [her]
husband shall be entered on the certificate as the father of 
the  child.”  §20–18–401(f)(1).  There  are  some  limited 
exceptions  to  the  latter  rule—for  example,  another  man
may  appear  on  the  birth  certificate  if  the  “mother”  and 
“husband” and “putative father” all file affidavits vouching 
for the putative father’s paternity.  Ibid.  But as all parties 
agree,  the  requirement  that  a  married  woman’s  husband 
appear  on  her  child’s  birth  certificate  applies  in  cases 
where  the  couple  conceived  by  means  of  artificial  insemi-
nation  with  the  help  of  an  anonymous  sperm  donor.    See 
Pet.  for  Cert.  4;  Brief  in  Opposition  3–4;  see  also  Ark. 
Code  §9–10–201(a)  (2015)  (“Any  child  born  to  a  married 
woman  by  means  of  artificial  insemination  shall  be 
deemed the legitimate natural child of the woman and the
woman’s  husband  if  the  husband  consents  in  writing  to
the artificial insemination”).

The Jacobses and Pavans brought this suit in Arkansas
state  court  against  the  director  of  the  Arkansas  Depart-
ment  of  Health—seeking,  among  other  things,  a  declara-
tion  that  the  State’s  birth-certificate  law  violates  the 
Constitution.  The  trial  court  agreed,  holding  that  the 
relevant  portions  of  §20–18–401  are  inconsistent  with 
Obergefell  because  they  “categorically  prohibi[t]  every 
same-sex  married  couple  . . .  from  enjoying  the  same 
spousal benefits which are available to every opposite-sex 
married couple.”  App. to Pet. for Cert. 59a.  But a divided