Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/558bv.pdf
Page Number: 396

Cite as: 558 U. S. 233 (2010) 

235 

Syllabus 

regulation, in contrast, are adjunct rulings.  A court decision reversing 
the denial of a motion to reopen does not direct the Executive to afford 
the alien substantive relief; ordinarily, it touches and concerns only the 
question  whether  the  alien’s  claims  have  been  accorded  a  reasonable 
hearing.  Had Congress wanted the jurisdictional bar to encompass de­
cisions  speciﬁed  as  discretionary  by  regulation  as  well  as  by  statute, 
moreover,  Congress  could  easily  have  said  so,  as  it  did  in  provisions 
enacted  simultaneously  with  § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii).  See,  e. g.,  IIRIRA, 
§ 213, 110 Stat. 3009–572.  Pp. 247–249. 

(5)  The  history  of  the  relevant  statutory  provisions  corroborates 
this determination.  Attorney General regulations have long addressed 
reopening  requests.  In  enacting  IIRIRA,  Congress  simultaneously 
codiﬁed the process for ﬁling motions to reopen and acted to bar judicial 
review  of  a  number  of  executive  decisions  regarding  removal.  But 
Congress did not codify the regulation delegating to the BIA discretion 
to  grant  or  deny  reopening  motions.  This  legislative  silence  indicates 
that  Congress  left  the  matter  where  it  was  pre-IIRIRA:  The  BIA  has 
broad discretion, conferred  by the Attorney General, “to  grant or deny 
a motion to reopen,” 8 CFR § 1003.2(a), but courts retain jurisdiction to 
review  the  BIA’s  decision.  It  is  unsurprising  that  Congress  would 
leave  in  place  judicial  oversight  of  this  “important  [procedural]  safe­
guard,”  Dada,  554  U. S.,  at  18,  where,  as  here,  the  alien’s  underlying 
asylum  claim  would  itself  be  reviewable.  The  REAL  ID  Act  of  2005, 
which further amended the INA by adding or reformulating provisions 
on  asylum,  protection  from  removal,  and  even  judicial  review,  did  not 
disturb the unbroken line of decisions upholding court review of admin­
istrative denials of motions to reopen.  Pp. 249–251. 

(c)  Any  lingering  doubt  about  § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii)’s  proper  interpreta­
tion  would  be  dispelled  by  a  familiar  statutory  construction  principle: 
the  presumption  favoring  judicial  review  of  administrative  action. 
When a statute is “reasonably susceptible to divergent interpretation,” 
this Court adopts the reading “that executive determinations generally 
are  subject  to  judicial  review.”  Gutierrez  de  Martinez  v.  Lamagno, 
515 U. S. 417, 434.  The Court has consistently applied this interpretive 
guide to legislation regarding immigration, and particularly to questions 
concerning  the  preservation  of  federal-court  jurisdiction.  See,  e. g., 
Reno  v.  Catholic  Social  Services,  Inc.,  509  U. S.  43,  63–64.  Because 
this presumption is “ ‘well-settled,’ ” ibid., the Court assumes that “Con­
gress legislates with knowledge of ” it, McNary v.  Haitian Refugee Cen­
ter, Inc., 498 U. S. 479, 496.  It therefore takes “ ‘ “clear and convincing 
evidence” ’ ”  to  dislodge  the  presumption.  Catholic  Social  Services, 
Inc., 509 U. S., at 64.  There is no such evidence here.  Finally, reading 
§ 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii)  to  apply  to  matters  where  discretion  is  conferred