Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/17pdf/17-965_h315.pdf
Page Number: 18

Cite as:  585 U. S. ____ (2018) 

13 

Opinion of the Court 

Sudanese  government  and  armed  forces  “is  in  the  foreign 
policy  interests  of  the  United  States”);  Presidential  Proc-
lamation  No.  4865,  3  CFR  50–51  (1981)  (President 
Reagan)  (explaining  in  five  sentences  why  measures  to
curtail  “the  continuing  illegal  migration  by  sea  of  large 
numbers  of  undocumented  aliens  into  the  southeastern 
United States” are “necessary”).

Moreover, plaintiffs’ request for a searching inquiry into
the  persuasiveness  of  the  President’s  justifications  is 
inconsistent  with  the  broad  statutory  text  and  the  defer-
ence  traditionally  accorded  the  President  in  this  sphere. 
“Whether  the  President’s  chosen  method”  of  addressing 
perceived  risks  is  justified  from  a  policy  perspective  is
“irrelevant to the scope of his [§1182(f )] authority.”  Sale, 
509 U. S., at 187–188.  And when the President adopts “a
preventive  measure  . . .  in  the  context  of  international 
affairs  and  national  security,”  he  is  “not  required  to  con-
clusively link all of the pieces in the puzzle before [courts] 
grant  weight  to  [his]  empirical  conclusions.”  Holder  v. 
Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U. S. 1, 35 (2010). 

The  Proclamation  also  comports  with  the  remaining
textual  limits  in  §1182(f ).  We  agree  with  plaintiffs  that 
the word  “suspend” often connotes a “defer[ral] till later,” 
Webster’s  Third  New  International  Dictionary  2303 
(1966).  But  that  does  not  mean  that  the  President  is 
required  to  prescribe  in  advance  a  fixed  end  date  for  the
entry  restrictions.    Section  1182(f)  authorizes  the  Presi-
dent  to  suspend  entry  “for  such  period  as  he  shall  deem
necessary.”  It  follows  that  when  a  President  suspends
entry in response to a diplomatic dispute or policy concern,
he may link the duration of those restrictions, implicitly or
explicitly,  to  the  resolution  of  the  triggering  condition.
See,  e.g.,  Presidential  Proclamation  No.  5829,  3  CFR  88 
(1988) (President Reagan) (suspending the entry of certain
Panamanian  nationals  “until  such  time  as  . . .  democracy
has been restored in Panama”); Presidential Proclamation