Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/04pdf/04-278.pdf
Page Number: 44

Cite as:  545 U. S. ____ (2005) 

17 

STEVENS, J., dissenting 

discussed,  the  statute  (as  well  as  the  order  itself)  man-
dated police enforcement, §§18–6–803.5(3)(a)–(b).16 

Because the statute’s guarantee of police enforcement is 
triggered  by,  and  operates  only  in  reference  to,  a  judge’s 
granting  of  a  restraining  order  in  favor  of  an  identified 
“ ‘protected  person,’ ”  there  is  simply  no  room  to  suggest 
that such a person has received merely an “ ‘incidental’ ” or 
“ ‘indirect’ ” benefit, see ante, at 18.  As one state court put
it, domestic restraining order statutes “identify with preci-
sion when, to whom, and under what circumstances police 
protection  must  be  afforded.  The  legislative  purpose  in
requiring  the  police  to  enforce  individual  restraining
orders  clearly  is  to  protect  the  named  persons  for  whose
protection  the  order  is  issued,  not  to  protect  the  commu-
nity at large by general law enforcement activity.”  Near-
ing,  295  Ore.,  at  712,  670  P. 2d,  at  143.17   Not  only  does 

—————— 

16 I find it neither surprising nor telling, cf. ante, at 15, that the stat-
ute  requires  the  restraining  order  to  contain,  “in  capital  letters  and 
bold  print,”  a  “notice”  informing  protected  persons  that  they  can  de-
mand or request, respectively, civil and criminal contempt proceedings. 
§18–6–803.5(7).  While  the  legislature  may  have  thought  that  these 
legal  remedies  were  not  popularly  understood,  a  person’s  right  to 
“demand” or “request” police enforcement of a restraining order simply 
goes  without  saying  given  the  nature  of  the  order  and  its  language. 
Indeed,  for  a  holder  of  a  restraining  order  who  has  read  the  order’s 
emphatic language, it would likely come as quite a shock to learn that 
she has no right to demand enforcement in the event of a violation.  To 
suggest that a protected person has no such right would posit a lacuna 
between  a  protected  person’s  rights  and  an  officer’s  duties—a  result 
that  would  be  hard  to  reconcile  with  the  Colorado  Legislature’s  dual 
goals of putting an end to police indifference and empowering potential 
victims of domestic abuse. 

17 See also Matthews v. Pickett County, 996 S. W. 2d 162, 165 (Tenn. 
1999)  (“The  order  of  protection  in  this  case  was  not  issued  for  the 
public’s  protection  in  general.    The  order  of  protection  specifically 
identified  Ms.  Matthews  and  was  issued  solely  for  the  purpose  of 
protecting  her.    Cf.  Ezell  [v.  Cockrell,  902  S. W.  2d  394,  403  (Tenn. 
1995)] (statute prohibiting drunk driving does not specify an individual 
but  undertakes  to  protect  the  public  in  general  from  intoxicated  driv-