Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/10pdf/09-1233.pdf
Page Number: 70.0

12 

BROWN v. PLATA 

SCALIA, J., dissenting 

California  prisoners  four  times  this  Term  alone.  Cullen 
v.  Pinholster,  563  U. S.  ___  (2011);  Felkner  v.  Jackson, 
562 U. S. ___ (2011) (per curiam); Swarthout v. Cooke, 562 
U. S. ___ (2011) (per curiam); Harrington, supra.  And yet 
here,  the  Court  affirms  an  order  granting  the  functional 
equivalent  of  46,000  writs  of  habeas  corpus,  based  on  its 
paean to courts’ “substantial flexibility when making these 
judgments.”  Ante, at 41.  It seems that the Court’s respect 
for  state  sovereignty  has  vanished  in  the  case  where  it 
most matters. 

II 

The  Court’s  opinion  includes  a  bizarre  coda  noting 
that “[t]he State may wish to move for modification of the
three-judge  court’s  order  to  extend  the  deadline  for  the 
required reduction to five years.”  Ante, at 46–47.  The Dis-
trict  Court,  it  says,  “may  grant  such  a  request  provided 
that the State satisfies necessary and appropriate precon-
ditions  designed  to  ensure  the  measures  are  taken  to 
implement  the  plan  without  undue  delay”;  and  it  gives 
vague  suggestions  of  what  these  preconditions  “may  in-
clude,” such as “interim benchmarks.”  Ante, at 47.  It also 
invites the District Court to “consider whether it is appro-
priate to order the State to begin without delay to develop
a  system  to  identify  prisoners  who  are  unlikely  to  reof-
fend,” and informs the State that it “should devise systems
to  select  those  prisoners  least  likely  to  jeopardize  public
safety.”  Ibid.  (What a good idea!)

The  legal  effect  of  this  passage  is  unclear—I  suspect 
intentionally so.  If it is nothing but a polite reminder to 
the  State  and  to  the  District  Court  that  the  injunction  is 
subject to modification, then it is entirely unnecessary.  As 
both  the  State  and  the  District  Court  are  undoubtedly
aware,  a  party  is  always  entitled  to  move  to  modify  an
equitable decree, and the PLRA contains an express provi-
sion  authorizing  District  Courts  to  modify  or  terminate