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Page Number: 29

8 

ENTERGY CORP. v. RIVERKEEPER, INC. 

Opinion of BREYER, J. 

“wholly  disproportionate.”  Perhaps  the  EPA  does  not
mean to make much of that difference.  But if it means the 
new  words  to  set  forth  a  new  and  different  test,  the  EPA 
must adequately explain why it has changed its standard. 
Motor  Vehicle  Mfrs.  Assn.  of  United  States,  Inc.  v.  State 
Farm  Mut.  Automobile  Ins.  Co.,  463  U. S.  29,  42–43 
(1983);  National  Cable  &  Telecommunications  Assn.  v. 
Brand  X  Internet,  545  U. S.  967,  981  (2005);  Thomas 
Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U. S. 504, 524, n. 3 (1994) 
(THOMAS, J., dissenting).   

I  am  not  convinced  the  EPA  has  successfully  explained 
the  basis  for  the  change.  It  has  referred  to  the  fact  that 
existing  facilities  have  less  flexibility  than  new  facilities 
with  respect  to  installing  new  technologies,  and  it  has
pointed  to  special,  energy-related  impacts  of  regulation. 
68 Fed. Reg. 13541 (2003) (proposed rule).  But it has not 
explained  why  the  traditional  “wholly  disproportionate”
standard  cannot  do  the  job  now,  when  the  EPA  has  used 
that  standard  (for  existing  facilities  and  otherwise)  with 
apparent  success  in  the  past.    See,  e.g.,  Central  Hudson, 
supra. 

Consequently,  like  the  majority,  I  would  remand  these
cases  to  the  Court  of  Appeals.  But  unlike  the  majority  I
would permit that court to remand the cases to the EPA so 
that  the  EPA  can  either  apply  its  traditional  “wholly 
disproportionate”  standard  or  provide  an  adequately 
reasoned explanation for the change.