Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/21pdf/20-1263diff_868c.pdf
Page Number: 4.0

Cite as:  596 U. S. ____ (2022) 

3 

Syllabus 

laws granting themselves automatic rights to certain third-party pay-
ments, contains precisely the limitation that Gallardo would read into
the assignment provision.  Thus, if §1396k(a)(1)(A)’s broad language
alone were not dispositive, its contrast with the limiting language in 
§1396a(a)(25)(H) would be.  Pp. 5–7.

(b) Gallardo’s arguments that §1396k(a)(1)(A) has a different mean-
ing  are  unconvincing.  Gallardo  construes  the  prefatory  clause  to 
§1396k(a)(1)(A)— which provides that the “purpose” of the assignment
provision is to “assis[t] in the collection of medical support payments
and other payments for medical care owed to recipients of medical as-
sistance under the State plan”—to limit the assignment provision to
payments that are already “owed” for “past medical care provided un-
der the [state] plan.”  Brief for Petitioner 30.  But the prefatory clause 
defines to whom the third-party payments are “owed”—“recipients of
medical assistance under the State plan.”  It does not specify the pur-
pose  for  which  those  payments  must  be  made,  referring  to  “medical
support”  and  “medical  care”  payments,  consistent  with  the  adjacent 
language in §1396k(a)(1)(A).

Gallardo also proposes that the Court read the assignment provision 
to incorporate the more limited language in §1396a(a)(25)(H).  But the 
Court must give effect to, not nullify, Congress’ choice to include lim-
iting language in some provisions but not others, see Russello v. United 
States, 464 U. S. 16, 23.  Ahlborn, which Gallardo contends eliminated 
any daylight between §1396a(a)(25)(H) and §1396k(a)(1)(A), was clear 
that these two provisions “ech[o]” or “reinforc[e]” each other insofar as 
they both involve “recovery of payments for medical care,” 547 U. S., 
at 282, and not “payment for, for example, lost wages,” id., at 280.  Ahl-
born did not suggest that these provisions must be interpreted in lock-
step.  Gallardo’s idea that one of these two complementary provisions
must “prevail” over the other is therefore mistaken.  The complemen-
tary  provisions  concern  different  requirements;  they  do  not  conflict
just because one is broader than the other. 

Gallardo  and  the  United  States  also  argue  that  §1396k(a)(1)(A) 
should  be  interpreted  consistently  with  §§1396a(a)(25)(A)  and  (B), 
which require a State to seek reimbursement “to the extent of ” a third 
party’s liability “for care and services available under the plan.”  But 
the relevant language—“pay[ment] for care and services available un-
der the plan”—could just as readily refer to payment for medical care 
“available” in the future.  Regardless, Congress did not use this lan-
guage to define the scope of an assignment under §1396k(a)(1)(A), im-
plying  again  that  the  provisions  should  not  be  interpreted  the  same 
way.  This implication is strengthened by the fact that §1396k(a)(1)(A)
was enacted after §§1396a(a)(25)(A) and (B), and Congress did not use
the existing language in §§1396a(a)(25)(A) and (B) to define the scope