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26 

ARIZONA STATE LEGISLATURE v. ARIZONA 
INDEPENDENT REDISTRICTING COMM’N
 
Opinion of the Court 

The  Clause  was  also  intended  to  act  as  a  safeguard 
against  manipulation  of  electoral  rules  by  politicians  and 
factions in the States to entrench themselves or place their 
interests  over  those  of the  electorate.    As  Madison  urged, 
without the Elections Clause, “[w]henever the State Legis­
latures  had  a  favorite  measure  to  carry,  they  would  take
care  so  to  mould  their  regulations  as  to  favor  the  candi­
dates  they  wished  to  succeed.”  2  Records  of  the  Federal 
Convention 241 (M. Farrand rev. 1966).  Madison spoke in
response  to  a  motion  by  South  Carolina’s  delegates  to
strike  out  the  federal  power.   Those  delegates  so  moved
because South Carolina’s coastal elite had malapportioned 
their legislature, and wanted to retain the ability to do so. 
See  J.  Rakove,  Original  Meanings:  Politics  and  Ideas  in
the  Making  of  the  Constitution  223–224  (1996).    The 
problem Madison identified has hardly lessened over time. 
Conflict  of  interest  is  inherent  when  “legislators  dra[w]
district  lines  that  they  ultimately  have  to  run  in.”    Cain, 
121 Yale L. J., at 1817. 

Arguments in support of congressional control under the
Elections Clause were reiterated in the public debate over
ratification.  Theophilus Parsons, a delegate at the Massa­
chusetts  ratifying  convention,  warned  that  “when  faction 
and party spirit run high,” a legislature might take actions
like  “mak[ing]  an  unequal  and  partial  division  of  the
states  into  districts  for  the  election  of  representatives.” 
Debate in Massachusetts Ratifying Convention (16–17, 21
Jan.  1788),  in  2  The  Founders’  Constitution  256  (P.  Kur­
land & R. Lerner eds. 1987).  Timothy Pickering of Massa­
chusetts  similarly  urged  that  the  Clause  was  necessary
because  “the  State  governments  may  abuse  their  power,
and  regulate  . . .  elections  in  such  manner  as  would  be 
highly  inconvenient  to  the  people.”    Letter  to  Charles 
Tillinghast (24 Dec. 1787), in id., at 253.  He described the 
Clause  as  a  way  to  “ensure  to  the  people  their  rights  of 
election.”  Ibid.