Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/21pdf/20-1800_7lho.pdf
Page Number: 28.0

Cite as:  596 U. S. ____ (2022) 

9 

ALITO, J., concurring in judgment 

doctrine is based on the notion that governmental commu-
nication—and the exercise of control over those charged by 
law  with  implementing  a  government’s  communicative
agenda—do not normally “restrict the activities of . . . per-
sons acting as private individuals.”  Rust v. Sullivan, 500 
U. S. 173, 198–199 (1991); see also Summum, 555 U. S., at 
467 (“The Free Speech Clause restricts government regula-
tion of private speech”); Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors 
of Univ. of Va., 515 U. S. 819, 833–835 (1995).  So govern-
ment  speech  in  the  literal  sense  is  not  exempt  from  First 
Amendment attack if it uses a means that restricts private 
expression in a way that “abridges” the freedom of speech, 
as  is  the  case  with  compelled  speech.  Were  it  otherwise, 
virtually  every  government  action  that  regulates  private 
speech would, paradoxically, qualify as government speech
unregulated by the First Amendment.  Naked censorship of 
a speaker based on viewpoint, for example, might well con-
stitute  “expression”  in  the  thin  sense  that  it  conveys  the 
government’s  disapproval  of  the  speaker’s  message.    But 
plainly that kind of action cannot fall beyond the reach of
the First Amendment. 

It  follows  that  to  establish  that  expression  constitutes
government speech exempt from First Amendment attack, 
the government must satisfy two conditions.  First, it must 
show  that  the  challenged  activity  constitutes  government
speech in the literal sense—purposeful communication of a 
governmentally  determined  message  by  a  person  acting
within  the  scope  of  a  power  to  speak  for  the  government.
Second, the government must establish it did not rely on a 

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case in which the Federal Government attempts to restrict the speech of 
another  sovereign.    If  the  States  had  First  Amendment  rights  against
the Federal Government at the time of ratification, it is not obvious why
that right would be eliminated by the incorporation of the speech rights
of  private  citizens  against  the  States  through  the  Fourteenth  Amend-
ment.