Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/558bv.pdf
Page Number: 384

Cite as: 558 U. S. 220 (2010) 

223 

Per Curiam 

Although  Wellons  appealed  the  denial  of  “his  motions  for 
discovery and an evidentiary hearing,” 554 F. 3d, at 935, the 
Eleventh  Circuit  did  not  purport  to  address  the  merits  of 
that  issue  at  all.2  The  court  stated  only  that  “[e]ven  if  we 
assume  that  Wellons’s  misconduct  claims  are  not  procedur­
ally  barred,  they  do  not  entitle  Wellons  to  habeas  relief.” 
Id.,  at  936  (emphasis  added).  This  opaque  statement  ap­
pears to address only whether petitioner was entitled to ulti­
mate  relief  in  the  form  of  a  new  trial,  not  whether  petition­
er’s  allegations,  combined  with  the  facts  he  had  learned, 
entitled  him  to  the  discovery  and  evidentiary  hearing  that 
he sought. 

The  Eleventh  Circuit’s  reasoning  does  not  suggest  other­
wise.  The  court  observed  that  Wellons’  claims  of  miscon­
duct  were  “grounded  in  his  speculation  as  to  the  meaning 
underlying  the  jurors’  chocolate  ‘gifts’ ”  and  “the  surmise 
attached to their passive receipt of these gifts.”  Ibid.  This 
statement likewise indicates only that on the existing record, 
habeas  relief  was  inappropriate,  not  that  an  evidentiary 
hearing should be denied.  After all, had there been discov­
ery  or  an  evidentiary  hearing,  Wellons  may  have  been  able 
to  present  more  than  “speculation”  and  “surmise.”  The 
Eleventh Circuit also pointed to the state court’s decision on 
direct appeal, see id., at 937, and reviewed that decision “[i]n 
light of  the evidence presented before  the Georgia Supreme 
Court,”  ibid.  This,  too,  is  typical  of  a  court  reviewing  the 
denial of habeas relief, not the denial of discovery or an evi­
dentiary hearing.3 

2 As  Justice  Alito  explains  at  some  length,  see  post,  at  229–232,  the 
District Court did discuss the merits of that issue, but the District Court’s 
analysis  has  little  relevance  on  whether  the  Court  of  Appeals  made  an 
alternative holding or rather afﬁrmed the District Court’s decision on the 
ground that petitioner’s claim was procedurally barred. 

3 Justice  Alito  asserts that  the  Eleventh  Circuit  “stated in  unequivo­
cal  terms  that  its  holding  on  the  merits  of  petitioner’s  claim  was  inde­
pendent  of  its  holding  on  the  question  of  procedural  default.”  Post,  at