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Page Number: 38.0

6 

HEALTH AND HOSPITAL CORPORATION OF MARION 
CTY. v. TALEVSKI 
THOMAS, J., dissenting 

In Thiboutot, the Court held that “the plain language of
[§1983]  undoubtedly  embraces  [a]  claim  that  [the  defend-
ant]  violated”  a  spending-power  statute,  reasoning  that 
“the phrase ‘and laws’ . . . means what it says” and is not 
“limited to some subset of laws.”  448 U. S., at 4.  The Court 
unquestioningly follows Thiboutot’s logic today. 

It is obvious, however, that conditional spending legisla-
tion does not function—and, in particular, does not “secure
rights”—like  laws  enacted  under  Congress’  enumerated
legislative powers, such as the Commerce Clause.  The lat-
ter, which I will refer to as “sovereign legislative” or “regu-
latory”  powers,  include  powers  to  directly  impose  obliga-
tions, duties, prohibitions, and the like on individuals and 
entities beyond the Federal Government, and hence to se-
cure  corresponding  rights  in  the  persons  and  entities  to 
which such obligations are owed.  Laws that Congress en-
acts pursuant to its regulatory powers are binding on the
regulated parties and pre-empt contrary state law of their
own force.  Whatever rights such laws secure, those rights
are secured “by the . . . laws” themselves.  §1983.

By contrast, legislation that conditions a State’s receipt 
of  federal  funds  on  compliance  with  certain  requirements
imposes  no  obligations  and  secures  no  rights  of  its  own 
force.  The stated conditions simply have no effect and do 
not arguably secure any rights (“by law” or otherwise) un-
less  and  until  they  are  freely  accepted  by  the  State.    Not 
only that, the Executive Branch can prevent the conditions 

—————— 
omitted)); Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U. S. 
1, 15, 16, n. 12, 18–19 (1981) (repeatedly using the formula “rights and
obligations” correlatively); see also W. Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Le-
gal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 Yale L. J. 16, 28– 
32  (1913).    This  rule,  it  should  be  noted,  addresses  what  it  means  for 
private rights to be secured by law, a distinct question from the level of
clarity with which Congress must speak before courts may infer that it 
intended to create such rights.  See Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U. S. 273, 
290 (2002).