Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/558bv.pdf
Page Number: 579

418  CITIZENS  UNITED  v.  FEDERAL  ELECTION  COMM’N 

Opinion of Stevens, J. 

§ 114.4(c);  § 114.2(f)(2),  and  to  publicly  endorse  candidates 
through a press release and press conference, § 114.4(c)(6). 

At the time Citizens United brought this lawsuit, the only 
types  of  speech  that  could  be  regulated  under  § 203  were: 
(1) broadcast, cable, or satellite communications; 33 (2) capable 
of  reaching  at  least  50,000  persons  in  the  relevant  elector­
ate; 34  (3)  made  within  30  days  of  a  primary  or  60  days  of  a 
general  federal  election; 35  (4)  by  a  labor  union  or  a  non-
MCFL,  nonmedia  corporation; 36  (5)  paid  for  with  general 
treasury  funds; 37  and  (6)  “susceptible  of  no  reasonable  in­
terpretation  other  than  as  an  appeal  to  vote  for  or  against 
a  speciﬁc  candidate.” 38  The  category  of  communications 
meeting all of these criteria is not trivial, but the notion that 
corporate  political  speech  has  been  “suppress[ed]  .  .  .  alto­
gether,” ante, at 319, that corporations have been “exclu[ded] 
. . . from the general public dialogue,” ante, at 341, or that a 
work of ﬁction such as Mr. Smith Goes to Washington might 
be covered, ante, at 371–372, is nonsense.39  Even the plain­
tiffs in McConnell, who had every incentive to depict BCRA 
as negatively as possible, declined to argue that § 203’s prohi­
bition  on  certain  uses  of  general  treasury  funds  amounts  to 
a complete ban.  See 540 U. S., at 204. 

33 2 U. S. C. § 434(f)(3)(A)(i). 
34 § 434(f)(3)(C). 
35 § 434(f)(3)(A)(i)(II). 
36 § 441b(b); McConnell, 540 U. S., at 211. 
37 § 441b(b)(2)(C). 
38 WRTL, 551 U. S. 449, 470 (2007) (opinion of Roberts, C. J.). 
39 It is likewise nonsense to suggest that the FEC’s “ ‘business is to cen­
sor.’ ”  Ante,  at  335  (quoting  Freedman  v.  Maryland,  380  U. S.  51,  57 
(1965)).  The  FEC’s  business  is  to  administer  and  enforce  the  campaign 
ﬁnance  laws.  The  regulatory  body  at  issue  in  Freedman  was  a  state 
board  of  censors  that  had  virtually  unfettered  discretion  to  bar  distribu­
tion of motion picture ﬁlms it deemed not to be “ ‘moral and proper.’ ”  See 
id., at 52–53, and n. 2.  No movie could be shown in the State of Maryland 
that  was  not ﬁrst  approved  and  licensed by  the  board  of censors.  Id.,  at 
52,  n.  1.  It  is  an  understatement  to  say  that  Freedman  is  not  on  point, 
and the majority’s characterization of the FEC is deeply disconcerting.