Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/20pdf/20-507_h315.pdf
Page Number: 8.0

8 

MAYS v. HINES 

Per Curiam 

  Similarly untenable was the Sixth Circuit’s backstop the-
ory that a more aggressive attorney could have changed the 
result  by  casting  doubt  on  Jones’  credibility.    814  Fed. 
Appx., at 940.  As an initial matter, this conjecture ignores 
that Jones’ brief testimony about discovering the body did 
not indicate that Hines was the culprit.  Ample other evi-
dence was what did that.  Perhaps in light of this obvious 
disjuncture, the Sixth Circuit’s analysis of why an attack on 
Jones’  credibility  would  have  been  productive  ultimately 
circled back to the majority’s main assumption “that Jones 
was a viable alternative suspect.”  Id., at 941.  Regardless, 
to the extent Jones’ credibility actually mattered, the jury 
already had several good reasons to be skeptical—for exam-
ple, his peculiar tale of discovering the body; the insinua-
tions  of  Hines’  attorney;  and  the  discrepancies  between 
Jones’ exact description of finding the body and the account 
of the first responders.  None of these made a difference. 

III 
  The Sixth Circuit had no reason to revisit the decision of 
the Tennessee court, much less ignore the ample evidence 
supporting  that  court’s conclusion.    We  grant  the  petition 
for a writ of certiorari and respondent’s motion to proceed 
in  forma  pauperis,  and  we  reverse  the  judgment  of  the 
Court of Appeals. 

It is so ordered. 

  JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR dissents. 

—————— 
heard  this  tale—and  Hines’  attorney  stressed  its  oddities—yet  found 
that Hines was the murderer.  A federal court cannot now claim that the 
truth would have made a difference.