Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/558bv.pdf
Page Number: 458.0

Cite as: 558 U. S. 290 (2010) 

297 

Opinion of the Court 

In  a  divided  opinion,  the  Eleventh  Circuit  reversed  the 
grant of habeas relief.  542 F. 3d 1281 (2008).  The majority 
began by explaining the standard of review: “Section 2254(d) 
permits  federal  habeas  relief  only  where  the  state  courts’ 
decisions  were  (1)  ‘contrary  to,  or  involved  an  unreasonable 
application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined 
by the Supreme Court of the United States,’ or (2) ‘based on 
an  unreasonable  determination  of  the  facts  in  light  of  the 
evidence  presented in  the State  court proceeding.’ ”  Id.,  at 
1285 (quoting §§ 2254(d)(1)–(2)).  A “ ‘determination of a fac­
tual  issue  made  by  a  State  court  shall  be  presumed  to  be 
correct,’ ”  the  majority  explained,  and  the  petitioner  “ ‘shall 
have  the  burden  of  rebutting  the  presumption  of  correct­
ness  by  clear  and  convincing  evidence.’ ”  Ibid.  (quoting 
§ 2254(e)(1)).  “Thus,”  the  majority  stated,  the  federal  ha­
beas court’s “ ‘review of ﬁndings of fact by the state court is 
even more deferential than under a clearly erroneous stand­
ard of review.’ ”  Ibid. 

The majority then held that the Alabama court’s rejection 
of Wood’s ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim was neither 
an  unreasonable  application  of  clearly  established  law  nor 
based  on  an  unreasonable  determination  of  the  facts.  With 
respect  to  the  facts,  the  court  concluded  that  the  evidence 
presented in the Rule 32 hearings supported the state court’s 
ﬁndings that counsel made a strategic decision not to present 
mental  health  evidence  during  the  penalty  phase.  “At  a 
minimum,”  the  court  noted,  “Wood  has  not  presented  evi­
dence, much less clear and convincing evidence, that counsel 
did not make such decisions.”  Id., at 1304, n. 23.  The court 
also agreed with the state court’s legal conclusion that coun­
sel’s  strategic  decision  was  reasonable.  According  to  the 
court,  the  silent  record  created  a  presumption  that  coun­
sel  exercised  sound  professional  judgment,  supported  by 
ample  reasons,  not  to  present  the  information  they  had  ob­
tained.  These  reasons  included  unfavorable  information  in