Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/19pdf/17-1618_hfci.pdf
Page Number: 152.0

8 

BOSTOCK v. CLAYTON COUNTY 

KAVANAUGH, J., dissenting 

 The Court refused a reading of “mineral deposits” that
would  include  water,  even  if  “water  is  a  ‘mineral,’  in 
the  broadest  sense  of  that  word,”  because  it  would 
bring about a “major . . . alteration in established legal
relationships based on nothing more than an overly lit-
eral  reading  of  a  statute,  without  any  regard  for  its
context or history.”  Andrus v. Charlestone Stone Prod-
ucts Co., 436 U. S. 604, 610, 616 (1978). 

 The  Court  declined  to  interpret  “facilitating”  a  drug
distribution crime in a way that would cover purchas-
ing drugs, because the “literal sweep of ‘facilitate’ sits
uncomfortably  with  common  usage.”    Abuelhawa  v. 
United States, 556 U. S. 816, 820 (2009). 

 The  Court  rebuffed  a  literal  reading  of  “personnel
rules” that would encompass any rules that personnel
must  follow  (as  opposed  to  human  resources  rules 
about personnel), and stated that no one “using ordi-
nary language would describe” personnel rules “in this 
manner.”  Milner v. Department of Navy, 562 U. S. 562, 
578 (2011). 

 The  Court  explained  that,  when  construing  statutory
phrases such as “arising from,” it avoids “uncritical lit-
eralism leading to results that no sensible person could 
have intended.”  Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U. S. ___, 
___–___ (2018) (plurality opinion) (slip op., at 9–10) (in-
ternal quotation marks omitted). 

Those  cases  exemplify  a  deeply  rooted  principle:  When 
there is a divide between the literal meaning and the ordi-
nary meaning, courts must follow the ordinary meaning. 

Next is a critical point of emphasis in this case.  The dif-
ference between literal and ordinary meaning becomes es-
pecially important when—as in this case—judges consider 
phrases in statutes.  (Recall that the shorthand version of
the phrase at issue here is “discriminate because of sex.”)3 

—————— 

3 The full phrasing of the statute is provided above in footnote 2.  This