Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/17pdf/16-499_1a7d.pdf
Page Number: 40

4 

JESNER v. ARAB BANK, PLC 

Opinion of ALITO, J. 

“to find the rule that will best effectuate the federal policy.” 
Textile  Workers  v.  Lincoln  Mills  of  Ala.,  353  U. S.  448, 
457 (1957).

The  ATS  was  meant  to  help  the  United  States  avoid 
diplomatic friction.  The First Congress enacted the law to
provide a forum for adjudicating that “narrow set of viola-
tions  of  the  law  of  nations”  that,  if  left  unaddressed, 
“threaten[ed] serious consequences” for the United States. 
Sosa,  542  U. S.,  at  715;  see  also  Brief  for  Professors  of 
International Law et al. as Amici Curiae 7–12.  Specifically, 
the  First  Congress  was  concerned  about  offenses  like 
piracy, violation of safe conducts, and infringement of the
rights  of  ambassadors,  each  of  which  “if  not  adequately 
redressed  could  rise  to  an  issue  of  war.”    Sosa,  supra,  at 
715.  That threat was existentially terrifying for the young
Nation.  See  Kiobel  v.  Royal  Dutch  Petroleum  Co.,  569 
U. S.  108,  123–124  (2013).    To  minimize  the  danger,  the 
First  Congress  enacted  the  ATS,  “ensur[ing]  that  the
United States could provide a forum for adjudicating such
incidents”  and  thus  helping  the  Nation  avoid  further 
diplomatic imbroglios.  Id., at 124; see ante, at 25 (majority 
opinion).

Putting that objective together with the rules governing
federal  common  law  generally,  the  following  principle
emerges:  Federal  courts  should  decline  to  create  federal
common  law  causes  of  action  under  Sosa’s  second  step 
whenever  doing  so  would  not  materially  advance  the 
ATS’s  objective  of  avoiding  diplomatic  strife.    And  apply-
ing  that  principle  here,  it  is  clear  that  federal  courts
should  not  create  causes  of  action  under  the  ATS  against 
foreign  corporate  defendants.  All  parties  agree  that  cus-
tomary international law does not require corporate liabil-
ity as a general matter.  See Brief for Petitioners 30; Brief 
for Respondent 22; see also ante, at 17 (plurality opinion); 
post, at 3–4 (SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting).  But if customary
international law does not require corporate liability, then