Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/19pdf/18-1323_c07d.pdf
Page Number: 60.0

Cite as:  591 U. S. ____ (2020) 

15 

ROBERTS, C. J., concurring
ROBERTS, C. J., concurring in judgment 

the number of patients the physician has treated in the hos-
pital in the recent past, the needs of the hospital, the mis-
sion of the hospital, or the business model of the hospital.” 
Ibid.5 

And the District Court found that, as in Texas, Louisiana 
“hospitals  often  grant  admitting  privileges  to  a  physician 
because the physician plans to provide services in the hos-
pital” and that “[i]n general, hospital admitting privileges 
are not provided to physicians who never intend to provide
services  in  a  hospital.”  Id.,  at  49.   But  “[b]ecause,  by  all
accounts, abortion complications are rare, an abortion pro-
vider  is  unlikely  to  have  a  consistent  need  to  admit  pa-
tients.”  Id., at 50 (citations omitted).6 

Importantly, the District Court found that “since the pas-
sage of [the Louisiana law], all five remaining doctors have 
attempted in good faith to comply” with the law by applying
for  admitting  privileges,  yet  have  had  very  little  success. 
Id., at 78 (emphasis added).  This finding was necessary to 
ensure  that  the  physicians’  inability  to  obtain  admitting
privileges  was  attributable  to  the  new  law  rather  than  a 
halfhearted attempt to obtain privileges.  Only then could
the  District  Court  accurately  identify  the  Louisiana  law’s
burden on abortion access. 

The  question  is  not  whether  we  would  reach  the  same 

—————— 

5 JUSTICE ALITO misunderstands my discussion of credentials as focus-
ing on the law’s lack of benefits.  See post, at 4 (dissenting opinion).  But 
my analysis, like Casey, is limited to the law’s effect on the availability 
of abortion. 

6 I agree with JUSTICE ALITO that the validity of admitting privileges
laws “depend[s] on numerous factors that may differ from State to State.” 
Post, at 9 (dissenting opinion).  And I agree with JUSTICE GORSUCH that 
“[w]hen it comes to the factual record, litigants normally start the case 
on  a  clean  slate.”  Post,  at  14  (dissenting  opinion).    Appreciating  that
others may in good faith disagree, however, I cannot view the record here
as  in  any  pertinent  respect  sufficiently  different  from  that  in  Whole 
Woman’s Health to warrant a different outcome.