Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/529bv.pdf
Page Number: 982

529US3

Unit: $U62

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Cite as: 529 U. S. 861 (2000)

907

Stevens, J., dissenting

preferring instead to put the burden on petitioners to show
that their tort claim would not frustrate the Secretary’s pur-
poses. Ante, at 882 (noting that petitioners’ arguments
“cannot, by themselves, change the legal result”).
In view
of the important principles upon which the presumption is
founded, however, rejecting it in this manner is profoundly
unwise.

Our presumption against pre-emption is rooted in the
It recognizes that when Congress
concept of federalism.
legislates “in a ﬁeld which the States have traditionally
occupied . . . [,] we start with the assumption that the historic
police powers of the States were not to be superseded by the
Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose
of Congress.” Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U. S.,
at 230; see Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U. S. 519, 525
(1977). The signal virtues of this presumption are its place-
ment of the power of pre-emption squarely in the hands of
Congress, which is far more suited than the Judiciary to
strike the appropriate state/federal balance (particularly in
areas of traditional state regulation), and its requirement
In
that Congress speak clearly when exercising that power.
this way, the structural safeguards inherent in the normal
operation of the legislative process operate to defend state
interests from undue infringement. Garcia v. San Antonio
Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U. S. 528, 552 (1985);
see United States v. Morrison, ante, at 660–663 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting); Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U. S. 62,
93–94 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Allied-Bruce Termi-
nix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U. S. 265, 292–293 (1995) (Thomas,
J., dissenting); Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U. S. 452, 460–464
(1991).
In addition, the presumption serves as a limiting
principle that prevents federal judges from running amok
with our potentially boundless (and perhaps inadequately
considered) doctrine of implied conﬂict pre-emption based on
frustration of purposes—i. e., that state law is pre-empted if
it “stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execu-