Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/21pdf/21-463_3ebh.pdf
Page Number: 41

6 

WHOLE WOMAN’S HEALTH v. JACKSON 

SOTOMAYOR, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part 
Opinion of SOTOMAYOR, J. 

Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. Reich, 510 U. S. 200, 218 (1994).  
“It would be an injury to [a] complainant to harass it with 
a multiplicity of suits or litigation generally in an endeavor 
to enforce penalties under an unconstitutional enactment, 
and  to  prevent  it  ought  to  be  within  the  jurisdiction  of  a 
court of equity.”  Young, 209 U. S., at 160.  In fact, the cir-
cumstances at hand present an even stronger need for pre-
enforcement relief than in Young, given how S. B. 8 not only 
threatens a multiplicity of suits, but also turns state-court 
procedures  against  providers  to  ensure  they  cannot  effec-
tively defend their rights in a suit. 
  Under normal circumstances, providers might be able to 
assert their rights defensively in state court.  See ante, at 
15.  These are not normal circumstances.  S. B. 8 is struc-
tured to thwart review and result in “a denial of any hear-
ing.”    Young,  209  U. S.,  at  146.    To  that  end,  the  law  not 
only disclaims direct enforcement by state officials to frus-
trate  pre-enforcement  review,  but  also  skews  state-court 
procedures and defenses to frustrate post-enforcement re-
view.  The events of the last three months have shown that 
the  law  has  succeeded  in  its  endeavor.    That  is  precisely 
what  the  Court  in  Young  sought  to  avoid.    It  is  therefore 
inaccurate  to  characterize  the  foregoing  analysis  as  advo-
cating  “an  unqualified  right  to  pre-enforcement  review  of 
constitutional claims in federal court.”  Ante, at 15.  If that 
were  so,  the  same  charge  could  be  leveled  against  the 
Court’s decision in Young. 
  In  addition,  state-court  clerks  are  proper  defendants  in 
this action.  This Court has long recognized that “the action 
of state courts and judicial officers in their official capacities 
is to be regarded as action of the State.”  Shelley v. Kraemer, 
334 U. S. 1, 14 (1948).  In Shelley, private litigants sought 
to enforce restrictive racial covenants designed to preclude 
Black Americans from home ownership and to preserve res-
idential segregation.  The Court explained that these osten-
sibly private covenants involved state action because “but