Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/22pdf/21-1449_d9eh.pdf
Page Number: 16.0

Cite as:  598 U. S. ____ (2023) 

1 

THOMAS, J., concurring in judgment 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

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No. 21–1449 
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GLACIER NORTHWEST, INC., DBA CALPORTLAND, 
PETITIONER v. INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD 
OF TEAMSTERS LOCAL UNION NO. 174 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF 
WASHINGTON 

[June 1, 2023]

 JUSTICE  THOMAS,  with  whom  JUSTICE  GORSUCH  joins,

concurring in the judgment. 

I  agree  that  petitioner’s  state-court  claims  are  not  pre-
empted by the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).  The 
majority reaches this conclusion, however, by applying the 
Court’s precedent in San Diego Building Trades Council v. 
Garmon, 359 U. S. 236 (1959), which held that state courts
are  disabled  from  adjudicating  state-law  claims  that  con-
cern conduct “arguably” protected under the NLRA.  Id., at 
245–246.  Because this Court has previously held that the
type of conduct alleged here is not protected, I join JUSTICE 
ALITO’s opinion concurring in the judgment.  I write sepa-
rately to emphasize the oddity of Garmon’s broad pre-emp-
tion regime.

This Court typically applies a high bar before concluding 
that federal law “strip[s] state courts of jurisdiction to hear 
their own state claims.”  Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Christian, 
590 U. S. ___, ___–___ (2020) (slip op., at 11–12).  Likewise, 
the Court  generally requires a “clear” purpose to displace 
state law before finding that a federal statute does so.  Wy-
eth v. Levine, 555 U. S. 555, 565 (2009) (internal quotation
marks omitted). 

As the majority notes, however, Garmon “goes beyond the 
usual preemption rule.”  Ante, at 3.  In Garmon, the Court