Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/19pdf/18-877_dc8f.pdf
Page Number: 22.0

2 

ALLEN v. COOPER 

Opinion of THOMAS, J. 

ida Prepaid “is incorrect, much less demonstrably errone-
ous.”  Gamble, 587 U. S., at ___ (same) (slip op., at 17).  The 
Court  in  Florida  Prepaid  correctly  concluded  that  “Con-
gress may not abrogate state sovereign immunity pursuant 
to its Article I powers,” including its powers under the In-
tellectual Property Clause.  527 U. S., at 636 (citing Semi-
nole  Tribe  of  Fla.  v.  Florida,  517  U. S.  44,  72–73  (1996)). 
Petitioners’ claims to the contrary are unpersuasive.* 

Second, I do not join the Court’s discussion regarding fu-
ture copyright legislation.  In my view, we should opine on 
“only  the  case  before  us  in  light  of  the  record  before  us.” 
Manhattan Community Access Corp. v. Halleck, 587 U. S. 
___, ___ (2019) (slip op., at 15).  We should not purport to 
advise Congress on how it might exercise its legislative au-
thority, nor give our blessing to hypothetical statutes or leg-
islative records not at issue here. 

Finally,  I  believe  the  question  whether  copyrights  are 
property  within  the  original  meaning  of  the  Fourteenth 
Amendment’s  Due  Process  Clause  remains  open.  The 
Court  relies  on  Fox  Film  Corp.  v.  Doyal,  286  U. S.  123 
(1932),  to  conclude  that  “[c]opyrights  are  a  form  of  prop-
erty.”  Ante, at 11.  But Fox Film Corp. addressed “property” 
in the context of state tax laws, not the Due Process Clause. 
286 U. S., at 128.  And although we stated in Florida Pre-
paid that patents are “property” for due process purposes, 
we did not analyze the Fourteenth Amendment’s text, and 
neither  of  the  cases  we  cited  involved  due  process.  527 
U. S., at 642 (citing Brown v. Duchesne, 19 How. 183, 197 

—————— 

*Because I adhere to our precedents regarding Article I and state sov-
ereign immunity, I continue to believe that Central Va. Community Col-
lege  v.  Katz,  546  U. S.  356  (2006),  was  wrongly  decided.    See  id.,  at 
379–385 (THOMAS, J., dissenting).  The Court today rightfully limits that de- 
cision to the Bankruptcy Clause context, calling it a “good-for-one-clause-
only holding.”  Ante, at 9.  I would go a step further and recognize that 
the Court’s decision in Katz is not good for even that clause.