Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/13pdf/12-417_9okb.pdf
Page Number: 12

Cite as:  571 U. S. ____ (2014) 

9 

Opinion of the Court 

ers “ma[d]e extensive use of dangerously caustic and toxic 
materials, and [we]re compelled by circumstances, includ-
ing  vital  considerations  of  health  and  hygiene,  to  change 
clothes” on the job site.  350 U. S., at 248, 254–255. 

Petitioners  contend  that  any  attempt  at  a  general  defi-
nition of “clothes” will cast a net so vast as to capture all
manner  of  marginal  things—from  bandoliers  to  barrettes
to  bandages.  Yet  even  acknowledging  that  it  may  be
impossible to eliminate all vagueness when interpreting a 
word  as  wide-ranging  as  “clothes,”  petitioners’  fanciful
hypotheticals  give  us  little  pause.    The  statutory  context 
makes  clear  that  the  “clothes”  referred  to  are  items  that 
are integral to job performance; the donning and doffing of
other items would create no claim to compensation under
the  Act,  and  hence  no  need  for  the  §203(o)  exception.
Moreover, even with respect to items that can be regarded
as  integral  to  job  performance,  our  definition  does  not
embrace  the  view,  adopted  by  some  Courts  of  Appeals,
that  “clothes”  means  essentially  anything  worn  on  the 
body—including accessories, tools, and so forth.  See, e.g., 
Salazar  v.  Butterball,  LLC,  644  F. 3d  1130,  1139–1140 
(CA10  2011)  (“clothes”  are  “items  or  garments  worn  by  a 
person”  and  include  “knife  holders”).    The  construction 
we  adopt  today  is  considerably  more  contained.    Many
accessories—necklaces and knapsacks, for instance—are not
“both designed and used to cover the body.”  Nor are tools
“commonly  regarded  as  articles  of  dress.”    Our  definition 
leaves  room  for  distinguishing  between  clothes  and  wear-
able  items  that  are  not  clothes,  such  as  some  equipment 
and devices.6 

Respondent and its amici, by contrast, give the term in 

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6 Petitioners  and  their  amici  insist  that  equipment  can  never  be 
clothes.  While  we  do  not  believe  that  every  wearable  piece  of  equip-
ment  qualifies—for  example,  a  wristwatch—our  construction  of 
“clothes”  does  not  exclude  all  objects  that  could  conceivably  be  charac-
terized as equipment.