Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/12pdf/11-556_11o2.pdf
Page Number: 26.0

Cite as:  570 U. S. ____ (2013) 

23 

Opinion of the Court 

The  alternative  approach  advocated  by  petitioner  and 

the  United  States  would  make  matters  far  more  compli­
cated  and  difficult.    The  complexity  of  the  standard  they
favor would impede the resolution of the issue before trial.
With  the  issue  still  open  when  trial  commences,  the  par­
ties  would  be  compelled  to  present  evidence  and  argu­
ment on supervisor status, the affirmative defense, and the
question of negligence, and the jury would have to grapple 
with all those issues as well.  In addition, it would often be 
necessary  for  the  jury  to  be  instructed  about  two  very
different  paths  of  analysis,  i.e.,  what  to  do  if  the  alleged
harasser  was  found  to  be  a  supervisor  and  what  to  do  if 
the alleged harasser was found to be merely a co-worker. 

Courts and commentators alike have opined on the need 
for  reasonably  clear  jury  instructions  in  employment 
discrimination cases.13  And the danger of juror confusion 

—————— 

13 See, e.g., Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc., 557 U. S. 167,  179 
(2009);  Armstrong  v.  Burdette  Tomlin  Memorial  Hospital,  438  F. 3d 
240, 249 (CA3 2006) (noting in the context of McDonnell Douglas Corp. 
v. Green, 411 U. S. 792 (1973), that that “the ‘prima facie case and the 
shifting burdens confuse lawyers and judges, much less juries, who do 
not  have  the  benefit  of  extensive  study  of  the  law  on  the  subject’ ” 
(quoting  Mogull  v.  Commercial  Real  Estate,  162  N. J.  449,  471,  744 
A. 2d 1186, 1199 (2000))); Whittington v. Nordam Group Inc., 429 F. 3d 
986,  998  (CA10  2005)  (noting  that  unnecessarily  complicated  instruc­
tions  complicate  a  jury’s  job  in  employment  discrimination  cases,  and 
“unnecessary complexity increases the opportunity for error”); Sanders 
v.  New  York  City  Human  Resources  Admin.,  361  F. 3d  749,  758  (CA2 
2004) (“Making the burden-shifting scheme of McDonnell Douglas part 
of a jury charge undoubtedly constitutes  error because of the manifest 
risk of confusion it creates”); Mogull, supra, at 473, 744 A. 2d, at 1200 
(“Given  the  confusion  that  often  results  when  the  first  and  second 
stages  of  the  McDonnell  Douglas  test  goes  to  the  jury,  we  recommend 
that  the  court  should  decide  both  those  issues”);  Tymkovich,  The 
Problem  with  Pretext,  85  Denver  Univ.  L. Rev.  503,  527–529  (2008) 
(discussing  the  potential  for  jury  confusion  that  arises  when  in­
structions  are  unduly  complex  and  proposing  a  simpler  framework); 
Grebeldinger, Instructing the Jury in a Case of Circumstantial Individ­