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Page Number: 475.0

314  CITIZENS  UNITED  v.  FEDERAL  ELECTION  COMM’N 

Syllabus 

Federal  Election  Comm’n,  554  U. S.  724,  742.  Distinguishing  wealthy 
individuals  from  corporations  based  on  the  latter’s  special  advantages 
of, e. g., limited liability, does not sufﬁce to allow laws prohibiting speech. 
It is irrelevant for First Amendment purposes that corporate funds may 
“have little or no correlation to the public’s support for the corporation’s 
political  ideas.”  Austin,  supra,  at  660.  All  speakers,  including  indi­
viduals  and  the  media,  use  money  amassed  from  the  economic  market­
place to fund their speech, and the First Amendment protects the result­
ing speech.  Under the antidistortion rationale, Congress could also ban 
political  speech  of  media  corporations.  Although  currently  exempt 
from  § 441b,  they  accumulate  wealth  with  the  help  of  their  corporate 
form,  may  have  aggregations  of  wealth,  and  may  express  views  “hav­
[ing]  little  or  no  correlation  to  the  public’s  support”  for  those  views. 
Differential treatment of media corporations and other corporations can­
not  be  squared  with  the  First Amendment,  and  there  is  no  support  for 
the  view  that  the  Amendment’s  original  meaning  would  permit  sup­
pressing  media  corporations’  political  speech.  Austin  interferes  with 
the  “open  marketplace”  of  ideas  protected  by  the  First  Amendment. 
New  York  State  Bd.  of  Elections  v.  Lopez  Torres,  552  U. S.  196,  208. 
Its  censorship  is  vast  in  its  reach,  suppressing  the  speech  of  both  for-
proﬁt  and  nonproﬁt,  both  small  and  large,  corporations.  Pp.  349–356. 
(2)  This reasoning also shows the invalidity of the Government’s 
other  arguments.  It  reasons  that  corporate  political  speech  can  be 
banned  to  prevent  corruption  or  its  appearance.  The  Buckley  Court 
found this rationale “sufﬁciently important” to allow contribution limits 
but refused to extend that reasoning to expenditure limits, 424 U. S., at 
25, and the Court does not do so here.  While a single Bellotti footnote 
purported to leave the question open, 435 U. S., at 788, n. 26, this Court 
now concludes  that independent expenditures, including  those made by 
corporations, do not give rise to corruption or the appearance of corrup­
tion.  That  speakers  may  have  inﬂuence  over  or  access  to  elected  ofﬁ­
cials  does  not  mean  that  those  ofﬁcials  are  corrupt.  And  the  appear­
ance  of  inﬂuence  or  access  will  not  cause  the  electorate  to  lose  faith 
in  this  democracy.  Caperton  v.  A.  T.  Massey  Coal  Co.,  556  U. S.  868, 
distinguished.  Pp. 356–361. 

(3)  The  Government’s  asserted  interest  in  protecting  sharehold­
ers  from  being  compelled  to  fund  corporate  speech,  like  the  antidistor­
tion rationale, would allow the Government to ban political speech even 
of media corporations.  The statute is underinclusive; it only protects a 
dissenting  shareholder’s  interests  in  certain  media  for  30  or  60  days 
before an election when such interests would be implicated in any media 
at any time.  It is also overinclusive because it covers all corporations, 
including those with one shareholder.  Pp. 361–362.