Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/22pdf/22-58_i425.pdf
Page Number: 58.0

16 

UNITED STATES v. TEXAS 

ALITO, J., dissenting 

police its borders and regulate the entry of aliens.  The Con-
stitution  and  federal  immigration  laws  have  taken  away
most of that power, but the statutory provisions at issue in 
this case afford the State at least some protection—in par-
ticular by preventing the State and its residents from bear-
ing  the  costs,  financial  and  non-financial,  inflicted  by  the 
release  of  certain  dangerous  criminal  aliens.    Our  law  on 
standing should not deprive the State of even that modest
protection.  We should not treat Texas less favorably than
Massachusetts.  And even if we do not view Texas’s stand-
ing  argument  with  any  “special  solicitude,”  we  should  at 
least refrain from treating it with special hostility by failing 
to apply our standard test for Article III standing.

Despite the clear parallel with this case and the States’ 
heavy reliance on Massachusetts throughout their briefing,
the majority can only spare a passing footnote for that im-
portant precedent.  Ante, at 13, n. 6; see Brief for Respond-
ents 11, 12, 14, 16–18, 23; see also Brief for Arizona and 17 
Other States as Amici Curiae 7–12.  It first declines to say 
Massachusetts  was  correctly  decided  and  references  the
“disagreements  that  some  may  have”  with  that  decision. 
Ante, at 13, n. 6.  But it then concludes that Massachusetts 
“does not control” since the decision itself refers to “ ‘key dif-
ferences between a denial of a petition for rulemaking and
an agency’s decision not to initiate an enforcement action,’ ” 
with the latter “ ‘not ordinarily subject to judicial review.’ ”  
Ante,  at  13,  n. 6  (quoting  549  U.  S.,  at  527)  (emphasis
added).

The  problem  with  this  argument  is  that  the  portion  of 
Massachusetts to which the footnote refers deals not with 
its key Article III holding, but with the scope of review that 
is “ordinarily” available under the statutory scheme.  Im-
portantly,  Massachusetts  frames  its  statement  about  de-
clining  enforcement  as  restating  the  rule  of  Heckler  v. 
Chaney, 470 U. S. 821 (1985).  See 549 U. S., at 527.  And