Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/09pdf/08-1371.pdf
Page Number: 17.0

Cite as:  561 U. S. ____ (2010) 

11 

Opinion of the Court 

Time  and  again,  the  dissent  races  away  from  the  facts  to 
which CLS stipulated.  See, e.g., post, at 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 11, 
24.8    But  factual  stipulations  are  “formal  concessions  . . .
that  have  the  effect  of  withdrawing  a  fact  from  issue  and
dispensing  wholly  with  the  need  for  proof  of  the  fact.
Thus, a judicial admission . . . is conclusive in the case.”  2 
K. Broun,  McCormick  on  Evidence  §254,  p.  181  (6th  ed.
2006) (footnote omitted).  See also, e.g., Oscanyan v. Arms 
Co., 103 U. S. 261, 263 (1881) (“The power of the court to
act  in  the  disposition  of  a  trial  upon  facts  conceded  by
counsel  is  as  plain  as  its  power  to  act  upon  the  evidence
produced.”).9 

In  light  of  the  joint  stipulation,  both  the  District  Court
and  the  Ninth  Circuit  trained  their  attention  on  the  con­
stitutionality  of  the  all-comers  requirement,  as  described 
in  the  parties’  accord.  See  319  Fed.  Appx.,  at  645–646; 
App.  to  Pet.  for  Cert.  32a;  id.,  at  36a.    We  reject  CLS’s 
unseemly attempt to escape from the stipulation and shift 
—————— 

8 In an effort to undermine the stipulation, the dissent emphasizes a 
sentence in Hastings’ answer to CLS’s first amended complaint which,
the dissent contends, casts doubt on Hastings’ fidelity to its all-comers 
policy.  See  post,  at  5–6,  11.    In  context,  Hastings’  answer—which 
responded to CLS’s allegation that the Law School singles out religious 
groups  for  discriminatory  treatment—is  sensibly  read  to  convey  that
Hastings’ policies and regulations apply to all groups equally.  See App.
79  (denying  that  the  Nondiscrimination  Policy  imposes  on  religious
organizations  restraints  that  are  not  applied  to  political,  social,  and 
cultural groups).  In any event, the parties’ joint stipulation supersedes 
the  answer,  to  the  extent  of  any  conflict  between  the  two  filings.    See 
Pepper  &  Tanner,  Inc.  v.  Shamrock  Broadcasting,  Inc.,  563  F. 2d  391, 
393  (CA9  1977)  (Parties’  “stipulation  of  facts  . . .  superseded  all  prior
pleadings and controlled the subsequent course of the action.”). 

9 The  dissent  indulges  in  make-believe  when  it  suggests  that  we  are
making factual findings about Hastings’ all-comers policy.  Post, at 1, 2. 
As CLS’s petition for certiorari stressed, “[t]he material facts of this case 
are undisputed.”  Pet. for Cert. 2 (emphasis added).  We take the facts 
as the joint stipulation describes them, see supra, at 8–11; our decision 
respects, while the dissent ignores, the conclusive effect of the parties’ 
accord.