Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/17pdf/16-499_1a7d.pdf
Page Number: 68

Cite as:  584 U. S. ____ (2018) 

11 

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting 

terrorism.  Dec. 9, 1999, Art. 2, S. Treaty Doc. No. 106–49,
2178  U. N. T. S.  230.    It  then  requires  each  signatory 
state, “in accordance with its domestic legal principles,” to
“take  the  necessary  measures  to  enable  a  legal  entity 
located  in  its  territory  or  organized  under  its  laws  to  be
held liable when a person responsible for the management 
or control of that legal entity has, in that capacity,” violated
the  Convention.  Id.,  Art.  5(1).    The  Convention  provides
that “[s]uch liability may be criminal, civil, or administra­
tive,”  ibid.,  so  long  as  the  penalties,  which  can  include
monetary  sanctions,  are  “effective,  proportionate  and 
dissuasive.”  Id., Art. 5(3).  The United States is a party to 
the Convention, along with 131 other states.5 

The plurality dismisses the relevance of this Convention 

because it does not require states parties to hold corpora­
tions liable in common-law tort actions, but rather permits
them  to  “fulfill  their  obligations  . . .  by  adopting  detailed 
regulatory regimes governing financial institutions.”  Ante, 
at 16.  That critique misses the point.  The significance of
the  Convention  is  that  the  international  community
agreed  that  financing  terrorism  is  unacceptable  conduct
and  that  such  conduct  violates  the  Convention  when  un­
dertaken by corporations.  That the Convention leaves up 
to each state party how to impose liability on corporations, 
e.g.,  via  erecting  a  regulatory  regime,  providing  for  tort
actions, or imposing criminal sanctions, is unremarkable,6 
and  simply  reflects  that  international  law  sets  out  stand­
—————— 

5 See  International  Convention  for  the  Suppression  of  the  Financing 
of  Terrorism,  online  at  https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/MTDSG/
Volume%20II/Chapter%20XVIII/XVIII-11.en.pdf (all Internet materials 
as last visited Apr. 16, 2018). 

6 The  Genocide  Convention  also  does  not  specifically  require  that
states parties recognize tort claims for genocide, but federal courts have 
long  permitted  such  actions  under  the  ATS  as  a  matter  of  federal 
common law.  See, e.g., Kadic, 70 F. 3d, at 236.  The same is true of the 
Torture  Convention.  See,  e.g.,  Filartiga  v.  Pena-Irala,  630  F. 2d  876, 
885 (CA2 1980).