Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/10pdf/09-152.pdf
Page Number: 3

Cite as:  562 U. S. ____ (2011) 

3 

Syllabus 

the extensive guidance for the two liability grounds specifically men-
tioned in the Act, strongly suggests that design defects were not men-
tioned because they are not a basis for liability.  The Act’s mandates 
lead to the same conclusion.  It provides for federal agency improve-
ment  of  vaccine  design  and  for  federally  prescribed  compensation,
which are other means for achieving the two beneficial effects of de-
sign-defect  torts—prompting  the  development  of  improved  designs, 
and  providing  compensation  for  inflicted  injuries.    The  Act’s  struc-
tural  quid  pro  quo  also  leads  to  the  same  conclusion.   The  vaccine 
manufacturers fund an informal, efficient compensation program for
vaccine injuries in exchange for avoiding costly tort litigation and the 
occasional disproportionate jury verdict.  Taxing their product to fund
the compensation program, while leaving their liability for design de-
fect  virtually  unaltered,  would  hardly  coax  them  back  into  the  mar-
ket.  Pp. 13–16. 

561 F. 3d 233, affirmed. 

SCALIA,  J.,  delivered  the  opinion  of  the  Court,  in  which  ROBERTS, 
C. J.,  and  KENNEDY, THOMAS, BREYER, and  ALITO, JJ.,  joined.    BREYER, 
J., filed a concurring opinion.  SOTOMAYOR, J., filed a dissenting opinion, 
in which GINSBURG, J., joined.  KAGAN, J., took no part in the considera-
tion or decision of the case.