Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/20pdf/19-1284_869d.pdf
Page Number: 5.0

Cite as:  592 U. S. ____ (2020) 

5 

Statement of THOMAS, J. 

To be sure, recognizing some overlap between publishers 
and distributors is not unheard of.  Sources sometimes use 
language that arguably blurs the distinction between pub-
lishers and distributors.  One source respectively refers to 
them  as  “primary  publishers”  and  “secondary  publishers
or  disseminators,”  explaining  that  distributors  can  be 
“charged  with  publication.”  W.  Keeton,  D.  Dobbs,  R. 
Keeton,  &  D.  Owen,  Prosser  and  Keeton  on  Law  of  Torts 
799, 803 (5th ed. 1984).

Yet there are good reasons to question this interpretation.
First, Congress expressly imposed distributor liability in 
the very same Act that included §230.  Section 502 of the 
Communications  Decency  Act  makes  it  a  crime  to  “know-
ingly  . . .  display”  obscene  material  to  children,  even  if  a 
third party created that content.  110 Stat. 133–134 (codi-
fied at 47 U. S. C. §223(d)).  This section is enforceable by 
civil remedy.  47 U. S. C. §207.  It is odd to hold, as courts 
have, that Congress implicitly eliminated distributor liabil-
ity in the very Act in which Congress explicitly imposed it.
Second, Congress enacted §230 just one year after Strat-
ton Oakmont used the terms “publisher” and “distributor,”
instead of “primary publisher” and “secondary publisher.”
If, as courts suggest, Stratton Oakmont was the legal back-
drop on which Congress legislated, e.g., FTC v. Accusearch 
Inc.,  570  F. 3d  1187,  1195  (CA10  2009),  one might  expect 
Congress to use the same terms Stratton Oakmont used. 

Third, had Congress wanted to eliminate both publisher 
and distributor liability, it could have simply created a cat-
egorical immunity in §230(c)(1): No provider “shall be held 
liable” for information provided by a third party.  After all, 
it used that exact categorical language in the very next sub-
section,  which  governs  removal  of  content.  §230(c)(2).
Where Congress uses a particular phrase in one subsection
and  a  different  phrase  in  another,  we  ordinarily  presume
that the difference is meaningful.  Russello v. United States, 
464 U. S. 16, 23 (1983); cf. Doe v. America Online, Inc., 783