Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/22pdf/22-58_i425.pdf
Page Number: 14

Cite as:  599 U. S. ____ (2023) 

11 

Opinion of the Court 

Third,  the  standing  calculus  might  change  if  the 
its  statutory
Executive  Branch  wholly  abandoned 
responsibilities  to  make  arrests  or  bring  prosecutions.
Under  the  Administrative  Procedure  Act,  a  plaintiff
arguably could obtain review of agency non-enforcement if 
an agency “has consciously and expressly adopted a general
policy that is so extreme as to amount to an abdication of 
its  statutory  responsibilities.”  Heckler,  470  U. S.,  at  833, 
n. 4  (internal  quotation  marks  omitted);  see  id.,  at  839 
(Brennan, J., concurring); cf. 5 U. S. C. §706(1).  So too, an 
extreme case of non-enforcement arguably could exceed the
bounds  of  enforcement  discretion  and  support  Article  III
standing.  But the States have not advanced a Heckler-style
“abdication”  argument  in  this  case  or  argued  that  the 
Executive  has  entirely  ceased  enforcing  the  relevant 
statutes.  Therefore,  we  do  not  analyze  the  standing
ramifications of such a hypothetical scenario. 

Fourth,  a  challenge  to  an  Executive  Branch  policy  that
involves both the Executive Branch’s arrest or prosecution 
priorities  and  the  Executive  Branch’s  provision  of  legal
benefits  or  legal  status  could  lead  to  a  different  standing 
analysis.  That  is  because  the  challenged  policy  might
implicate  more  than  simply  the  Executive’s  traditional 
enforcement  discretion.  Cf.  Department  of  Homeland 
Security v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 591 U. S. ___, ___–___ 
(2020)  (slip  op.,  at  11–12)  (benefits  such  as  work 
authorization and Medicare eligibility accompanied by non-
enforcement meant that the policy was “more than simply 
a  non-enforcement  policy”);  Texas  v.  United  States,  809 
F. 3d  134,  154  (CA5  2015)  (Linda  R. S.  “concerned  only 
nonprosecution,”  which 
“both 
is 
nonprosecution and the conferral of benefits”), aff ’d by an 
equally divided Court, 579 U. S. 547 (2016).  Again, we need 

distinct 

from 

—————— 
on  the  Executive’s  enforcement  discretion,  could  also  raise  Article  II 
issues.  See Tr. of Oral Arg. 24–25.