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DANVILLE CHRISTIAN ACADEMY, INC. v. BESHEAR 

GORSUCH, J., dissenting 

ex rel.  Danville  Christian  Academy,  Inc.  v.  Beshear,  ___ 
F. 3d ___, 2020 WL 7017858 (Nov. 29, 2020).  It did so by 
considering  the  School  EO  in  isolation  and  ignoring  the 
many activities permitted under the Business EO.  Looking 
only to the School EO, the court explained, religious exer-
cises  were  subject  to  “neutral”  and  “generally  applicable” 
rules.  Id., at *3.  After all, the School EO treated religious 
and secular schools the same.  Accordingly, the circuit con-
cluded, the School EO triggered only rational-basis review 
and easily passed muster under the terms of Employment 
Div. Dept. of Human Resources of Ore. v. Smith, 494 U. S. 
872 (1990). 
  Whatever the ultimate merits of this case, the Sixth Cir-
cuit’s  decisional  path was  flawed  in  at  least two  respects.  
First, the court had an obligation to address the plaintiffs’ 
argument that the two EOs, considered together, resulted 
religion.  
in  unconstitutional  discrimination  against 
Whether discrimination is spread across two orders or em-
bodied in one makes no difference; the Constitution cannot 
be evaded merely by multiplying the decrees.  See Church 
of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U. S. 520, 539–
540  (1993).    Second,  under  this  Court’s  precedents,  even 
neutral and generally applicable laws are subject to strict 
scrutiny  where  (as  here)  a  plaintiff  presents  a  “hybrid” 
claim—meaning a claim involving the violation of the right 
to free exercise and another right, such as the right of par-
ents “to direct the education of their children.”  Smith, 494 
U. S., at 881. 
  Perhaps  the  Sixth  Circuit’s  errors  are  understandable.  
Smith’s rules about how to determine when laws are “neu-
tral” and “generally applicable” have long proved perplex-
ing.  See, e.g., Laycock & Collis, Generally Applicable Law 
and  the  Free  Exercise  of  Religion,  95  Neb.  L. Rev.  1,  5–6 
(2016).  It is far from clear, too, why the First Amendment’s 
right to free exercise should be treated less favorably than 
other rights, or ought to depend on the presence of another