Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/14pdf/13-7120_p86b.pdf
Page Number: 48.0

Cite as:  576 U. S. ____ (2015) 

11 

ALITO, J., dissenting 

. . .  has  three  previous  convictions’  for—not  a  person  who 
has  committed—three  previous  violent  felonies  or  drug 
offenses.”  495  U. S.,  at  600.  Second,  the  Court  relied  on 
legislative  history,  noting  that  ACCA  had  previously
contained  a  generic  definition  of  burglary  and  that  “the
deletion  of  [this]  definition  . . .  may  have  been  an  inad­
vertent  casualty  of  a  complex  drafting  process.”    Id.,  at 
589–590,  601.    Third,  the  Court  felt  that  “the  practical
difficulties and  potential  unfairness  of  a  factual  approach
[were] daunting.”  Id., at 601. 

None of these three grounds dictates that the categorical
approach  must  be  used  in  residual  clause  cases.    The 
second  ground,  which  concerned  the  deletion  of  a  generic 
definition of  burglary,  obviously  has  no  application  to  the 
residual clause.  And the first ground has much less force
in  residual  clause  cases.  In  Taylor,  the  Court  reasoned 
that  a  defendant  has  a  “conviction”  for  burglary  only  if 
burglary  is  the  offense  set  out  in  the  judgment  of  convic­
tion.  For instance, if a defendant commits a burglary but 
pleads  guilty,  under  a  plea  bargain,  to  possession  of  bur­
glar’s  tools,  the  Taylor  Court  thought  that  it  would  be
unnatural  to  say  that  the  defendant  had  a  conviction  for 
burglary.  Now consider a case in which a gang member is 
convicted  of  illegal  possession  of  a  sawed-off  shotgun  and 
the  evidence  shows  that  he  concealed  the  weapon  under
his coat, while searching for a rival gang member who had 
just  killed  his  brother.  In  that  situation,  it  is  not  at  all 
unnatural to say that the defendant had a conviction for a
crime  that  “involve[d]  conduct  that  present[ed]  a  seri-
ous  potential  risk  of  physical 
injury  to  another.” 
§924(e)(2)(B)(ii)  (emphasis  added).    At  the  very  least,  it 
would  be  a  reasonable  way  to  describe  the  defendant’s
conviction. 

The  Taylor  Court’s  remaining  reasons  for  adopting  the
categorical  approach cannot justify an interpretation that 
renders  the  residual  clause  unconstitutional.    While  the