Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/07pdf/07-290.pdf
Page Number: 56

Cite as:  554 U. S. ____ (2008) 

53 

Opinion of the Court 

Amendment’s  operative  clause  furthers  the  purpose  an­
nounced  in  its  preface.    We  therefore  read  Miller  to  say
only  that  the  Second  Amendment  does  not  protect  those 
weapons  not  typically  possessed  by  law-abiding  citizens
for  lawful  purposes,  such  as  short-barreled  shotguns.
That  accords  with  the  historical  understanding  of  the
scope of the right, see Part III, infra.25 

We  conclude  that  nothing  in  our  precedents  forecloses 
our  adoption  of  the  original  understanding  of  the  Second
Amendment.  It  should  be  unsurprising  that  such  a  sig­
nificant matter has been for so long judicially unresolved.
For most of our history, the Bill of Rights was not thought 
applicable to the States, and the Federal Government did 
not  significantly  regulate  the  possession  of  firearms  by
law-abiding citizens.  Other provisions of the Bill of Rights
have  similarly  remained  unilluminated  for  lengthy  peri­
ods.  This  Court  first  held  a  law  to  violate  the  First 
Amendment’s  guarantee  of  freedom  of  speech  in  1931,
almost  150  years  after  the  Amendment  was  ratified,  see 
Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U. S. 697 (1931), and 
it  was  not  until  after  World  War  II  that  we  held  a  law 

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25 Miller  was  briefly  mentioned  in  our  decision  in  Lewis  v.  United 
States, 445 U. S. 55 (1980), an appeal from a conviction for being a felon
in possession of a firearm.  The challenge was based on the contention
that the prior felony conviction had been unconstitutional.  No Second 
Amendment claim was raised or briefed by any party.  In the course of 
rejecting the asserted challenge, the Court commented gratuitously, in 
a  footnote,  that  “[t]hese  legislative  restrictions  on  the  use  of  firearms
are  neither  based  upon  constitutionally  suspect  criteria,  nor  do  they
trench upon any constitutionally protected liberties.  See United States 
v.  Miller . . .  (the  Second  Amendment  guarantees  no  right  to  keep  and 
bear a firearm that does not have ‘some reasonable relationship to the
preservation  or  efficiency  of  a  well  regulated  militia’).”  Id.,  at  65–66, 
n. 8.  The footnote then cites several Court of Appeals cases to the same
effect.  It is inconceivable that we would rest our interpretation of the
basic  meaning  of  any  guarantee  of  the  Bill  of  Rights  upon  such  a
footnoted dictum in a case where the point was not at issue and was not
argued.