Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/19pdf/17-1712_0971.pdf
Page Number: 13

Cite as:  590 U. S. ____ (2020) 

3 

THOMAS, J., concurring 

question of standing in this case due to their misinterpre-
tations of the statute.  I continue to object to this Court’s 
practice of using the common law of trusts as the “starting
point” for interpreting ERISA.  Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 
U. S. 489, 497 (1996).  “[I]n ‘every case involving construc-
tion of a statute,’ the ‘starting point . . . is the language it-
self.’ ”  Id., at 528 (THOMAS, J., dissenting) (quoting Ernst & 
Ernst  v.  Hochfelder,  425  U. S.  185,  197  (1976);  ellipsis  in 
original).  This  is  especially  true  for  ERISA  because  its 
“statutory  definition  of  a  fiduciary  departs  from  the  com-
mon law.”  Varity, supra, at 528.  The Court correctly ap-
plies Varity here, but in an appropriate case, we should re-
consider  our  reliance  on  loose  analogies  in  both  our 
standing and ERISA jurisprudence.