Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/558bv.pdf
Page Number: 374.0

Cite as: 558 U. S. 209 (2010) 

213 

Per Curiam 

solved  under  the  First,  not  the  Sixth,  Amendment.  464 
U. S.,  at  516  (Stevens,  J.,  concurring)  (“The  constitutional 
protection  for  the  right  of  access  that  the  Court  upholds 
today is found in the First Amendment, rather than the pub­
lic  trial  provision  of  the  Sixth”  (footnote  omitted)).  In  the 
instant  case,  the  question  then  arises  whether  it  is  so  well 
settled that the Sixth Amendment right extends to jury voir 
dire  that  this  Court  may  proceed  by  summary  disposition. 
The  point  is  well  settled  under  Press-Enterprise  I  and 
Waller.  The  extent  to  which  the  First  and  Sixth  Amend­
ment public trial rights are coextensive is an open question, 
and it is not necessary here to speculate whether or in what 
circumstances  the  reach  or  protections  of  one  might  be 
greater  than  the  other.  Still,  there  is  no  legitimate  reason, 
at least in the context of juror selection proceedings, to give 
one who asserts a First Amendment privilege greater rights 
to  insist  on  public  proceedings  than  the  accused  has.  “Our 
cases  have  uniformly  recognized  the  public-trial  guarantee 
as  one  created  for  the  beneﬁt  of  the  defendant.”  Gannett 
Co. v.  DePasquale, 443 U. S. 368, 380 (1979).  There could be 
no explanation for barring the accused from raising a consti­
tutional  right  that  is  unmistakably  for  his  or  her  beneﬁt. 
That  rationale  sufﬁces  to  resolve  the  instant  matter.  The 
Supreme Court of Georgia was correct in assuming that the 
Sixth Amendment right to a public  trial extends to the voir 
dire of prospective jurors. 

While the accused does have a right to insist that the voir 
dire of the jurors be public, there are exceptions to this gen­
eral  rule.  “[T]he  right  to  an  open  trial  may  give  way  in 
certain cases to other rights or interests, such as the defend­
ant’s  right  to  a  fair  trial  or  the  government’s  interest  in  in­
hibiting  disclosure  of  sensitive  information.”  Waller,  467 
U. S., at 45.  “Such circumstances will be rare, however, and 
the  balance  of  interests  must  be  struck  with  special  care.” 
Ibid.  Waller provided  standards for courts  to apply before 
excluding the public from any stage of a criminal trial: