Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/20pdf/20-437_bqmc.pdf
Page Number: 8.0

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UNITED STATES v. PALOMAR-SANTIAGO 

Opinion of the Court 

is not “available” when an immigration judge erroneously
informs a noncitizen that his prior conviction renders him 
removable.  Noncitizens, the argument goes, cannot be ex-
pected to know that the immigration judge might be wrong.
Because noncitizens will not recognize a substantive basis
for  appeal  to  the  BIA,  that  administrative  review  is  not 
practically “available” under §1326(d)(1).3 

Palomar-Santiago  looks  to  Ross  v.  Blake  for  support.
That  case  addressed  the  Prison  Litigation  Reform  Act,
which requires that prisoners exhaust “such administrative 
remedies as are available” before suing in federal court.  42 
U. S. C. §1997e(a).  Ross held that whether such remedies 
are “available” turns on “the real-world workings of prison 
grievance systems,” and it acknowledged that there are “cir-
cumstances  in  which  an  administrative  remedy,  although
officially on the books, is not capable of use to obtain relief.” 
578 U. S., at 643.  Nothing in Ross, however, suggests that
the  substantive  complexity  of  an  affirmative  defense  can 
alone render further review of an adverse decision “unavail-
able.”  Administrative review of removal orders exists pre-
cisely so noncitizens can challenge the substance of immi-
gration judges’ decisions.  The immigration judge’s error on
the merits does not excuse the noncitizen’s failure to comply
with  a  mandatory  exhaustion  requirement  if  further  ad-
ministrative review, and then judicial review if necessary, 
could fix that very error. 

Second,  Palomar-Santiago  contends  that  the  §1326(d) 
prerequisites apply only when a defendant argues that his 
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but  the  Court  declines  to  address  his  arguments,  which  were  neither 
raised  below  nor  fairly  encompassed  by  the  question  presented  to  this
Court.  See Brownback v. King, 592 U. S. ___, ___, n. 4 (2021) (slip op., at 
5, n. 4). 

3 On this theory, the unavailability of administrative review before the
BIA would also mean that noncitizens like Palomar-Santiago do not have
the “opportunity” for judicial review under §1326(d)(2), because they may
not seek review of a removal order in federal court without first appeal-
ing the order to the BIA.  See 8 U. S. C. §1252(d)(1).