Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/18pdf/17-532_q86b.pdf
Page Number: 13.0

10 

HERRERA v. WYOMING 

Opinion of the Court 

Chippewa Treaty itself defined the specific “circumstances 
under  which  the  rights  would  terminate,”  and  there  was 
no  suggestion  that  statehood  would  satisfy  those  circum-
stances.  Ibid. 

Maintaining  its  focus  on  the  treaty’s  language,  Mille 
Lacs distinguished the Chippewa Treaty before it from the 
Shoshone-Bannock Treaty at issue in Race Horse.  Specifi-
cally, the Court noted that the Shoshone-Bannock Treaty,
unlike  the  Chippewa  Treaty,  “tie[d]  the  duration  of  the
rights  to  the  occurrence  of  some  clearly  contemplated
event[s]”—i.e.,  to  whenever  the  hunting  grounds  would
cease  to  “remai[n]  unoccupied  and  owned  by  the  United 
States.”  526  U. S.,  at  207.  In  drawing  that  distinction, 
however, the Court took care to emphasize that the treaty
termination  analysis  turns  on  the  events  enumerated  in
the “Treaty itself.”  Ibid.  Insofar as the Race Horse Court 
determined  that  the  Shoshone-Bannock  Treaty  was  “im-
pliedly  repealed,”  Mille  Lacs  disavowed  that  earlier  hold-
ing.  526 U. S., at 207.  “Treaty rights,” the Court clarified,
“are not impliedly terminated upon statehood.”  Ibid.  The 
Court  further  explained  that  “[t]he  Race  Horse  Court’s 
decision  to  the  contrary”—that  Wyoming’s  statehood  did 
imply  repeal  of  Indian  treaty  rights—“was  informed  by”
that  Court’s  erroneous  conclusion  “that  the  Indian  treaty 
rights were inconsistent with state sovereignty over natu-
ral resources.”  Id., at 207–208. 

In  sum,  Mille  Lacs  upended  both  lines  of  reasoning  in 
Race Horse.  The case established that the crucial inquiry 
for  treaty  termination  analysis  is  whether  Congress  has
expressly  abrogated  an  Indian  treaty  right  or  whether  a 
termination  point  identified  in  the  treaty  itself  has  been 
satisfied.  Statehood is irrelevant to this analysis unless a
statehood  Act  otherwise  demonstrates  Congress’  clear 
intent  to  abrogate  a  treaty,  or  statehood  appears  as  a 
termination  point  in  the  treaty.    See  526  U. S.,  at  207. 
“[T]here  is  nothing  inherent  in  the  nature  of  reserved