Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/19pdf/18-260_jifl.pdf
Page Number: 23.0

Cite as:  590 U. S. ____ (2020) 

1 

KAVANAUGH, J., concurring 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

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No. 18–260 
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COUNTY OF MAUI, HAWAII, PETITIONER v. HAWAII 
WILDLIFE FUND, ET AL. 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT 

[April 23, 2020] 

  JUSTICE KAVANAUGH, concurring. 
  I  join  the  Court’s  opinion  in  full.    I  write  separately  to 
emphasize three points. 
  First, the Court’s interpretation of the Clean Water Act 
regarding pollution “from” point sources adheres to the in-
terpretation set forth in Justice Scalia’s plurality opinion in 
Rapanos v. United States, 547 U. S. 715 (2006).  The Clean 
Water Act requires a permit for “any addition of any pollu-
tant to navigable waters from any point source.”  33 U. S. C. 
§1362(12)(A);  see  §§1311(a),  1342(a).    The  key  word  is 
“from.”  The question in this case is whether the County of 
Maui needs a permit for its Lahaina Wastewater Reclama-
tion Facility.  No one disputes that pollutants originated at 
Maui’s wastewater facility (a point source), and no one dis-
putes that the pollutants ended up in the Pacific Ocean (a 
navigable water).  Maui contends, however, that it does not 
need a permit.  Maui says that the pollutants did not come 
“from” the Lahaina facility because the pollutants traveled 
through groundwater before reaching the ocean. 
  Justice  Scalia’s  plurality  opinion  in  Rapanos  explained 
why Maui’s interpretation of the Clean Water Act is incor-
rect.  In that case, Justice Scalia stated that polluters could 
not “evade the permitting requirement of §1342(a) simply 
by  discharging  their  pollutants  into  noncovered  intermit-
tent watercourses that lie upstream of covered waters.”  547