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Page Number: 24

16 

HAALAND v. BRACKEEN 

Opinion of the Court 

that argument is a dead end. 

Petitioners also assert that ICWA takes the “commerce” 
out  of  the  Indian  Commerce  Clause.  Their  consistent  re-
frain  is  that  “children  are  not  commodities  that  can  be 
traded.”  Brief for Individual Petitioners 16; Brief for Peti-
tioner Texas 23 (“[C]hildren are not commodities”); id., at 
18 (“Children are not articles of commerce”).  Rhetorically,
it is a powerful point—of course children are not commercial 
products.  Legally, though, it is beside the point.  As we al-
ready  explained,  our  precedent  states  that  Congress’s
power under the Indian Commerce Clause encompasses not
only trade but also “Indian affairs.”  Cotton Petroleum, 490 
U. S., at 192.  Even the judges who otherwise agreed with 
petitioners  below  rejected  this  narrow  view  of  the  Indian 
Commerce Clause as inconsistent with both our cases and 
“[l]ongstanding patterns of federal legislation.”  994 F. 3d, 
at 374–375 (principal opinion of Duncan, J.).  Rather than 
dealing with this precedent, however, petitioners virtually 
ignore it.

Next, petitioners argue that ICWA cannot be authorized 
by  principles  inherent  in  the  Constitution’s  structure  be-
cause those principles “extend, at most, to matters of war 
and peace.”  Brief for Petitioner Texas 28.  But that is not 
what our cases say.  We have referred generally to the pow-
ers “necessarily inherent in any Federal Government,” and 
we have offered examples like “creating departments of In-
dian affairs, appointing Indian commissioners, and . . . ‘se-
curing  and  preserving  the  friendship  of  the  Indian  Na-
tions’ ”—none  of  which  are  military  actions.    Lara,  541 
U. S., at 201–202.  Once again, petitioners make no argu-
ment that takes our cases on their own terms. 

Finally,  petitioners  observe  that  ICWA  does  not  imple-
ment  a  federal  treaty.    Brief  for  Petitioner  Texas  24–27; 
Brief  for  Individual  Petitioners  56–58.    This  does  not  get 
them very far either, since Congress did not purport to en-
act  ICWA  pursuant  to  the  Treaty  Clause  power  and  the