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12 

UZUEGBUNAM v. PRECZEWSKI 

ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting 

Justices declined the entreaty, citing “the lines of separa-
tion drawn by the Constitution between the three depart-
ments  of  the  government.”  3  Correspondence  and  Public
Papers of John Jay 488 (H. Johnston ed. 1891).  For over 
two centuries, the Correspondence of the Justices has stood
as  a  reminder  that  federal  courts  cannot  give  answers 
simply because someone asks. 

The Judiciary is authorized “to say what the law is” only
because “[t]hose who apply [a] rule to particular cases, must 
of  necessity  expound  and  interpret  the  rule.”  Marbury  v. 
Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 177 (1803) (emphasis added).  To-
day’s  decision  abandons  that  principle.    When  a  plaintiff 
brings a nominal damages claim in the absence of past dam-
ages or future harm, it is not “necessary to give an opinion
upon a question of law.”  San Pablo, 149 U. S., at 314.  It is 
instead a “gratuitous” exercise of the judicial power, Simon 
v.  Eastern  Ky.  Welfare  Rights  Organization,  426  U. S.  26, 
38 (1976), and expanding that power encroaches on the po-
litical  branches  and  the  States.    Perhaps  defendants  will
wise up and moot such claims by paying a dollar, but it is
difficult  to  see  that  outcome  as  a  victory  for  Article  III. 
Rather  than  encourage  litigants  to  fight  over  farthings, 
I  would  affirm 
the  Court  of 
Appeals. 

judgment  of 

the