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Page Number: 63.0

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OBERGEFELL v. HODGES 

ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting 

Protection  Clause  supplies  independent  weight  for  its 
position, nor does it attempt to justify its gratuitous viola-
tion of the canon against unnecessarily resolving constitu-
tional  questions.    See  Northwest  Austin  Municipal  Util. 
Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U. S. 193, 197 (2009).  In any 
event,  the  marriage  laws  at  issue  here  do  not  violate  the
Equal  Protection  Clause,  because  distinguishing  between 
opposite-sex  and  same-sex  couples  is  rationally  related  to 
the  States’  “legitimate  state  interest”  in  “preserving  the 
traditional  institution  of  marriage.”    Lawrence,  539  U. S., 
at 585 (O’Connor, J., concurring in judgment).

It  is  important  to  note  with  precision  which  laws  peti-
tioners  have  challenged.  Although  they  discuss  some  of
the ancillary legal benefits that accompany marriage, such
as  hospital  visitation  rights  and  recognition  of  spousal 
status  on  official  documents,  petitioners’  lawsuits  target
the  laws  defining  marriage  generally  rather  than  those 
allocating  benefits  specifically.  The  equal  protection
analysis  might  be  different,  in  my  view,  if  we  were  con-
fronted  with  a  more  focused  challenge  to  the  denial  of 
certain  tangible  benefits.    Of  course,  those  more  selective 
claims  will  not  arise  now  that  the  Court  has  taken  the 
drastic  step  of  requiring  every  State  to  license  and  recog-
nize marriages between same-sex couples. 

IV 
The  legitimacy  of  this  Court  ultimately  rests  “upon  the
respect  accorded  to  its  judgments.”    Republican  Party  of 
Minn.  v.  White,  536  U. S.  765,  793  (2002)  (KENNEDY,  J., 
concurring).  That respect flows from the perception—and
reality—that  we  exercise  humility  and  restraint  in  decid-
ing cases according to the Constitution and law.  The role 
of the Court envisioned by the majority today, however, is 
anything  but  humble  or  restrained.    Over  and  over,  the 
majority exalts the role of the judiciary in delivering social 
change.  In  the  majority’s  telling,  it  is  the  courts,  not  the