Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/23pdf/23-939_e2pg.pdf
Page Number: 72.0

Cite as:  603 U. S. ____ (2024) 

5 

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting 

dispositive.”  United  States  v.  Nixon,  418  U. S.  683,  706, 
n. 16 (1974).  Insofar as the majority rails against the no-
tion that a “ ‘specific textual basis’ ” is required, ante, at 37 
(quoting  Nixon  v.  Fitzgerald,  457  U. S.  731,  750,  n.  31 
(1982)), it is attacking an argument that has not been made 
here.  The omission in the text of the Constitution is worth 
noting, however, for at least three reasons. 

First,  the  Framers  clearly  knew  how  to  provide  for  im-
munity  from  prosecution.  They  did  provide  a  narrow  im-
munity for legislators in the Speech or Debate Clause.  See 
Art. I, §6, cl. 1 (“Senators and Representatives . . . shall in 
all Cases, except Treason, Felony and Breach of the Peace,
be  privileged  from  Arrest  during  their  Attendance  at  the
Session of their respective Houses, and in going to and re-
turning from the same; and for any Speech or Debate in ei-
ther  House,  they  shall  not  be  questioned  in  any  other
Place”).  They did not extend the same or similar immunity
to Presidents. 

Second, “some state constitutions at the time of the Fram-
ing  specifically  provided  ‘express  criminal  immunities’  to 
sitting governors.”  Brief for Scholars of Constitutional Law 
as  Amici  Curiae  4  (quoting  S.  Prakash,  Prosecuting  and 
Punishing Our Presidents, 100 Tex. L. Rev. 55, 69 (2021)).
The Framers chose not to include similar language in the 
Constitution  to  immunize  the  President.  If  the  Framers 
“had  wanted  to  create  some  constitutional  privilege  to
shield  the  President  . . .  from  criminal  indictment,”  they 
could have done so.  Memorandum from R. Rotunda to K. 
Starr re: Indictability of the President 18 (May 13, 1998). 
They did not.

Third, insofar as the Constitution does speak to this ques-
tion, it actually contemplates some form of criminal liability 
for  former  Presidents.  The  majority  correctly  rejects
Trump’s argument that a former President cannot be pros-
ecuted unless he has been impeached by the House and con-
victed by the Senate for the same conduct.  See ante, at 32–