Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/18pdf/17-1702_h315.pdf
Page Number: 15.0

12  MANHATTAN COMMUNITY ACCESS CORP. v. HALLECK 

Opinion of the Court 

of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 518, 638–639 
(1819) (corporate charters).  The same principle applies if 
the  government funds or  subsidizes  a  private entity.   See 
Blum, 457 U. S., at 1011; Rendell-Baker, 457 U. S., at 840. 
  Numerous  private  entities  in  America  obtain  govern-
ment  licenses,  government  contracts,  or  government-
granted monopolies.  If those facts sufficed to transform a 
private  entity  into  a  state  actor,  a  large  swath  of  private 
entities  in  America  would  suddenly  be  turned  into  state 
actors  and  be  subject  to  a  variety  of  constitutional  con-
straints  on  their  activities.    As  this  Court’s  many  state-
action cases amply demonstrate, that is not the law.  Here, 
therefore,  the  City’s  designation  of  MNN  to  operate  the 
public  access  channels  on  Time  Warner’s  cable  system 
does not make MNN a state actor. 
  So, too, New York State’s extensive regulation of MNN’s 
operation  of  the  public  access  channels  does  not  make 
MNN  a  state  actor.    Under  the  State’s  regulations,  air 
time on the public access channels must be free, and pro-
gramming  must  be  aired  on  a  first-come,  first-served 
basis.    Those  regulations  restrict  MNN’s  editorial  discre-
tion  and  in  effect  require  MNN  to  operate  almost  like  a 
common  carrier.    But  under  this  Court’s  cases,  those  re-
strictions do not render MNN a state actor. 
  In Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., the leading case 
on point, the Court stated that the “fact that a business is 
subject  to  state  regulation  does  not  by  itself  convert  its 
action  into  that  of  the  State.”    419  U. S.,  at  350.    In  that 
case,  the  Court  held  that  “a  heavily  regulated,  privately 
owned  utility,  enjoying  at  least  a  partial  monopoly  in  the 
providing of electrical service within its territory,” was not 
a  state  actor.    Id.,  at  358.    The  Court  explained  that  the 
“mere existence” of a “regulatory scheme”—even if “exten-
sive and detailed”—did not render the utility a state actor.  
Id., at 350, and n. 7.  Nor did it matter whether the State 
had authorized the utility to provide electric service to the