Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/17pdf/17-965_h315.pdf
Page Number: 81

Cite as:  585 U. S. ____ (2018) 

17 

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting 

animus toward a disfavored religious minority” (emphasis
in original)). 

The majority insists that the Proclamation furthers two
interrelated  national-security  interests:  “preventing  entry
of nationals who cannot be adequately vetted and inducing
other nations to improve their practices.”  Ante, at 34.  But 
the Court offers insufficient support for its view “that the
entry  suspension  has  a  legitimate  grounding  in  [those] 
national security concerns, quite apart from any religious
hostility.”  Ibid.;  see  also  ante,  at  33–38,  and  n. 7.    In­
deed, even a cursory review of the Government’s asserted
national-security rationale reveals that the Proclamation is
nothing  more  than  a  “ ‘religious  gerrymander.’ ”    Lukumi, 
508 U. S., at 535. 

The  majority  first  emphasizes  that  the  Proclamation 
“says  nothing  about  religion.”  Ante,  at  34.  Even  so,  the 
Proclamation,  just  like  its  predecessors,  overwhelmingly 
targets  Muslim-majority  nations.    Given  the  record  here, 
including  all  the  President’s  statements  linking  the  Proc­
lamation to his apparent hostility toward Muslims, it is of 
no  moment  that  the  Proclamation  also  includes  minor 
restrictions  on  two  non-Muslim  majority  countries,  North
Korea  and  Venezuela,  or  that  the  Government  has  re­
moved  a  few  Muslim-majority  countries  from  the  list  of 
covered  countries  since  EO–1  was  issued.    Consideration 
of the entire record supports the conclusion that the inclu­
sion  of  North  Korea  and  Venezuela,  and  the  removal  of 
other countries, simply reflect subtle efforts to start “talk­
ing territory instead of Muslim,” App. 123, precisely so the
Executive  Branch  could  evade  criticism  or  legal  conse­
quences for the Proclamation’s otherwise clear targeting of 
Muslims.  The  Proclamation’s  effect  on  North  Korea  and 
Venezuela,  for  example,  is  insubstantial,  if  not  entirely 
symbolic.  A  prior  sanctions  order  already  restricts  entry
of North Korean nationals, see Exec. Order No. 13810, 82 
Fed. Reg. 44705 (2017), and the Proclamation targets only