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TRUMP v. UNITED STATES 

Syllabus 

President’s  exercise  of  his core  constitutional  powers,  this  immunity 
must be absolute.  As for his remaining official actions, he is entitled
to at least presumptive immunity.  Pp. 5–15.

(1) Article  II  of  the  Constitution  vests  “executive  Power”  in  “a 
President of the United States of America.”  §1, cl. 1.  The President 
has duties of “unrivaled gravity and breadth.”  Trump v. Vance, 591 
U. S. 786, 800.  His authority to act necessarily “stem[s] either from an
act of Congress or from the Constitution itself.”  Youngstown Sheet & 
Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U. S. 579, 585.  In the latter case, the Presi-
dent’s authority is sometimes “conclusive and preclusive.”  Id., at 638 
(Jackson, J., concurring).  When the President exercises such author-
ity,  Congress  cannot  act  on,  and  courts  cannot  examine,  the  Presi-
dent’s actions.  It follows that an Act of Congress—either a specific one 
targeted at the President or a generally applicable one—may not crim-
inalize  the  President’s  actions  within  his  exclusive  constitutional 
power.  Neither may the courts adjudicate a criminal prosecution that 
examines  such  Presidential  actions.   The  Court  thus  concludes  that 
the President is absolutely immune from criminal prosecution for con-
duct within his exclusive sphere of constitutional authority.  Pp. 6–9.

(2) Not all of the President’s official acts fall within his “conclusive 
and preclusive” authority.  The reasons that justify the President’s ab-
solute immunity from criminal prosecution for acts within the scope of
his exclusive constitutional authority do not extend to conduct in areas
where his authority is shared with Congress.  To determine the Presi-
dent’s immunity in this context, the Court looks primarily to the Fram-
ers’ design of the Presidency within the separation of powers, prece-
dent on Presidential immunity in the civil context, and criminal cases
where a President resisted prosecutorial demands for documents.  P. 
9. 

(i) The Framers designed the Presidency to provide for a “vigor-
ous” and “energetic” Executive.  The Federalist No. 70, pp. 471–472 (J. 
Cooke ed. 1961) (A. Hamilton).  They vested the President with “su-
pervisory and policy responsibilities of utmost discretion and sensitiv-
ity.”  Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U. S. 731, 750.  Appreciating the “unique 
risks”  that  arise  when  the  President’s  energies  are  diverted  by  pro-
ceedings that might render him “unduly cautious in the discharge of 
his official duties,” the Court has recognized Presidential immunities 
and privileges “rooted in the constitutional tradition of the separation
of powers and supported by our history.”  Id., at 749, 751, 752, n. 32. 
In Fitzgerald, for instance, the Court concluded that a former Presi-
dent is entitled to absolute immunity from “damages liability for acts
within the ‘outer perimeter’ of his official responsibility.”  Id., at 756. 
The Court’s “dominant concern” was to avoid “diversion of the Presi-
dent’s attention during the decisionmaking process caused by needless