Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/524bv.pdf
Page Number: 671.0

524US2

Unit: $U96

[09-15-00 14:39:49] PAGES PGT: OPIN

626

BRAGDON v. ABBOTT

Syllabus

mission. Evidence suggesting that antiretroviral therapy can lower the
risk of perinatal transmission to about 8%, even if relevant, does not
avail petitioner because it cannot be said as a matter of law that an 8%
risk of transmitting a dread and fatal disease to one’s child does not
represent a substantial
limitation on reproduction. The decision to
reproduce carries economic and legal consequences as well. There are
insurance, and
added costs for antiretroviral therapy, supplemental
long-term health care for the child who must be examined and treated.
Some state laws, moreover, forbid HIV-infected persons to have sex
with others, regardless of consent.
In the context of reviewing sum-
mary judgment, the Court must take as true respondent’s unchallenged
testimony that her HIV infection controlled her decision not to have a
child. Pp. 639–642.

(e) The uniform body of administrative and judicial precedent inter-
preting similar language in the Rehabilitation Act conﬁrms the Court’s
holding. Every agency and court to consider the issue under the Reha-
bilitation Act has found statutory coverage for persons with asympto-
matic HIV. The uniformity of that precedent is signiﬁcant. When ad-
ministrative and judicial interpretations have settled the meaning of an
existing statutory provision, repetition of the same language in a new
statute indicates, as a general matter, Congress’ intent to incorporate
such interpretations as well. See, e. g., Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U. S. 575,
580–581. Pp. 642–645.

(f) The Court’s holding is further reinforced by the guidance issued
by the Justice Department and other agencies authorized to administer
the ADA, which supports the conclusion that persons with asympto-
matic HIV fall within the ADA’s deﬁnition of disability. The views of
agencies charged with implementing a statute are entitled to deference.
See Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,
467 U. S. 837, 844. Pp. 646–647.

2. In afﬁrming the summary judgment, the First Circuit did not cite
sufﬁcient material in the record to determine, as a matter of law, that
respondent’s HIV infection posed no direct threat to the health and
safety of others. The ADA’s direct threat provision, § 12182(b)(3),
stems from School Bd. of Nassau Cty. v. Arline, 480 U. S. 273, 287, in
which this Court reconciled competing interests in prohibiting discrimi-
nation and preventing the spread of disease by construing the Rehabili-
tation Act not to require the hiring of a person who posed “a signiﬁcant
risk of communicating an infectious disease to others,” id., at 287, and
n. 16. The existence of a signiﬁcant risk is determined from the stand-
point of the health care professional who refuses treatment or accommo-
dation, and the risk assessment is based on the medical or other objec-