Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/17pdf/16-476_dbfi.pdf
Page Number: 43

2 

MURPHY v. NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSN. 

BREYER, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part 
Opinion of BREYER, J. 

own without the first. 

Why  would  Congress  enact  both  these  provisions?    The 
obvious  answer  is  that  Congress  wanted  to  “keep  sports 
gambling  from  spreading.”  S.  Rep.  No.  102–248,  pp.  4–6 
(1991).  It  feared  that  widespread  sports  gambling  would 
“threate[n]  to  change  the  nature  of  sporting  events  from 
wholesome  entertainment  for  all  ages  to  devices  for  gam-
bling.”  Id.,  at  4.  And  it  may  have  preferred  that  state
authorities  enforce  state  law  forbidding  sports  gambling
than  require  federal  authorities  to  bring  civil  suits  to 
enforce  federal  law  forbidding  about  the  same  thing. 
Alternatively, Congress might have seen subsection (2) as 
a backup, called into play if subsection (1)’s requirements, 
directed to the States, turned out to be unconstitutional— 
which,  of  course,  is  just  what  has  happened.    Neither  of 
these objectives is unreasonable.

So read, the two subsections both forbid sports gambling
but  §3702(2)  applies  federal  policy  directly  to  individuals
while  the  challenged  part  of  §3702(1)  forces  the  States  to 
prohibit  sports  gambling  schemes  (thereby  shifting  the
burden  of  enforcing  federal  regulatory  policy  from  the
Federal  Government  to  state  governments).    Section 
3702(2), addressed to individuals, standing alone seeks to
achieve Congress’ objective of halting the spread of sports
gambling  schemes  by  “regulat[ing]  interstate  commerce 
directly.”  New  York  v.  United  States,  505  U. S.  144,  166 
(1992).  But the challenged part of subsection (1) seeks the 
same  end  indirectly  by  “regulat[ing]  state  governments’ 
regulation  of  interstate  commerce.”  Ibid.    And  it  does  so  
by  addressing  the  States  (not  individuals)  directly  and 
telling state legislatures what laws they must (or cannot) 
enact.  Under  our  precedent,  the  first  provision  (directly
and  unconditionally  telling  States  what  laws  they  must
enact)  is  unconstitutional,  but  the  second  (directly  telling 
individuals what they cannot do) is not.  See ibid. 

As so interpreted, the statutes would make New Jersey’s