Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/20pdf/19-251_p86b.pdf
Page Number: 35.0

6 

AMERICANS FOR PROSPERITY FOUNDATION v. BONTA 

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting 

activity, or has “generalized yet speculative apprehensive-
ness that the [government] may at some future date misuse 
the information in some way that would cause direct harm” 
to her.  Id., at 13.  She must still allege a risk of objective 
harm.  See id., at 14; see also Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 
568 U. S. 398, 417–418 (2013). 

Consistent  with  this  approach,  the  Court  has  carefully 
scrutinized record evidence to determine whether a disclo-
sure  requirement  actually  risks  exposing  supporters  to 
backlash.  See Patterson, 357 U. S., at 462 (compelled dis-
closure of NAACP members “entail[ed] the likelihood of a 
substantial restraint” on association in light of “an uncon-
troverted showing” that past disclosures exposed members
“to economic reprisal, loss of employment, threat of physical 
coercion,  and  other  manifestations  of  public  hostility”); 
Bates,  361  U. S.,  at  523–524  (compelled  disclosure  of 
NAACP membership “would work a significant interference 
with the freedom of association” based on “uncontroverted 
evidence”  that  past  identification  “had  been  followed  by 
harassment and threats of bodily harm”); Shelton v. Tucker, 
364 U. S. 479, 486 (1960) (disclosure of teachers’ organiza-
tional affiliations impaired association because record evi-
dence substantiated a “fear of public disclosure” and a “con-
stant  and  heavy”  pressure  on  teachers  “to  avoid  any  ties
which  might  displease  those  who  control  [their]  profes-
sional destin[ies]”); Buckley, 424 U. S., at 69–70 (“any seri-
ous  infringement”  on  associational  rights  caused  by  the 
compelled  disclosure  of  contributors  was  “highly  specula-
tive” on the record before the Court).
  Hence,  in  Doe  v.  Reed,  561  U. S.  186  (2010),  the  Court 
rejected a facial challenge to the public disclosure of refer-
enda  signatories  on  the  ground  that  the  “typical  referen-
dum” concerned revenue, budget, and tax policies unlikely 
to incite threats or harassment.  Id., at 200–201.  Any judge
who has witnessed local fights over raising taxes, funding 
schools,  building  sewer  systems,  or  rerouting  roads  can