Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/22pdf/22-138_43j7.pdf
Page Number: 44.0

2 

COUNTERMAN v. COLORADO 

BARRETT, J., dissenting 

I 
Since the founding, the First Amendment has allowed the
government to regulate certain “areas of speech” “because
of  their  constitutionally  proscribable  content.”    R. A. V.  v. 
St. Paul, 505 U. S. 377, 382–383 (1992) (emphasis deleted).
This includes true threats, which are “serious expression[s] 
of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence to a par-
ticular  individual  or  group  of  individuals.”    Virginia  v. 
Black, 538 U. S. 343, 359 (2003); see also R. A. V., 505 U. S., 
at 388 (“[T]hreats of violence are outside the First Amend-
ment”).  True  threats  carry  little  value  and  impose  great 
cost.  See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U. S. 568, 572 
(1942)  (“[A]ny  benefit  that  may  be  derived  from  [true
threats] is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order
and morality”).  “[B]y their very utterance,” true threats “in-
flict injury.”  Ibid.  They provoke “the fear of violence,” cre-
ate “disruption,” give rise to “the possibility that the threat-
ened violence will occur”—and the list goes on.  Black, 538 
U. S., at 360 (internal quotation marks omitted).1 

The nature of a true threat points to an objective test for
determining the scope of First Amendment protection: Nei-
ther its “social value” nor its potential for “injury” depends
on the speaker’s subjective intent.  Chaplinsky, 315 U. S., 
at 572.  They can relate, of course—a speaker who does not 
intend  to  threaten  is  less  likely  to  utter  a  statement  that
could be taken that way.  But the Constitution ultimately 
declines  to  protect  true  threats  for  objective  reasons,  not 

—————— 

1 Indeed, the Colorado Legislature considered these very harms when 
it enacted the statute at issue here.  The statutory findings explain that 
stalking, harassment, and threats have “an immediate and long-lasting
impact  on  quality  of  life  as  well  as  risks  to  security  and  safety  of  the 
victim and persons close to the victim.”  Colo. Rev. Stat. §§18–3–601(1)(f), 
18–3–602(1) (2022).  So the legislature passed the statute to “encourag[e]
and authoriz[e] effective intervention” before the covered conduct could 
“escalate into behavior that has even more serious consequences.”  §18–
3–601(2).