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16 

ARIZONA STATE LEGISLATURE v. ARIZONA 
INDEPENDENT REDISTRICTING COMM’N
 
Opinion of the Court 

elections  had  been  submitted  to  a  popular  vote,  resulting
in disapproval of the legislature’s measure.  State election 
officials  asked  the  State’s  Supreme  Court  to  declare  the 
referendum void.  That court rejected the request, holding
that  the  referendum  authorized  by  Ohio’s  Constitution, 
“was  a  part  of  the  legislative  power  of  the  State,”  and 
“nothing  in  [federal  statutory  law]  or  in  [the  Elections
Clause] operated to the contrary.”  241 U. S., at 567.  This 
Court  affirmed  the  Ohio  Supreme  Court’s  judgment.  In 
upholding  the  state  court’s  decision,  we  recognized  that
the referendum was “part of the legislative power” in Ohio, 
ibid.,  legitimately  exercised  by  the  people  to  disapprove
the legislation creating congressional districts.  For redis­
tricting  purposes,  Hildebrant  thus  established,  “the  Leg- 
islature”  did  not  mean  the  representative  body  alone.
Rather, the word encompassed a veto power lodged in the 
people.  See  id.,  at  569  (Elections  Clause  does  not  bar 
“treating  the  referendum  as  part  of  the  legislative  power
for  the  purpose  of  apportionment,  where  so  ordained  by 
the state constitutions and laws”). 

Hawke v. Smith involved the Eighteenth Amendment to
the  Federal  Constitution.  Ohio’s  Legislature  had  ratified
the  Amendment,  and  a  referendum  on  that  ratification 
was  at  issue.  Reversing  the  Ohio  Supreme  Court’s  deci­
sion  upholding  the  referendum,  we  held  that  “ratification 
by a State  of a constitutional amendment is not an act of 
legislation within the proper sense of the word.”  253 U. S., 
at  229. 
Instead,  Article  V  governing  ratification  had 
lodged  in  “the  legislatures  of  three-fourths  of  the  several
States” sole authority to assent to a proposed amendment. 
Id.,  at  226.    The  Court  contrasted  the  ratifying  function, 
exercisable  exclusively  by  a  State’s  legislature,  with  “the 
ordinary  business  of  legislation.”  Id.,  at  229.  Davis  v. 
Hildebrant,  the  Court  explained,  involved  the  enactment 
of  legislation,  i.e.,  a  redistricting  plan,  and  properly  held 
that  “the  referendum  [was]  part  of  the  legislative  author-