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Page Number: 122

26 

GLOSSIP v. GROSS 

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting 

erably  risky  given  the  alternative  procedures  the  State
could have employed.

Addressing  this  claim,  the  Baze  plurality  clarified  that
“a  condemned  prisoner  cannot  successfully  challenge  a 
State’s  method  of  execution  merely  by  showing  a  slightly 
or marginally safer alternative,” 553 U. S., at 51; instead,
to succeed in a challenge of this type, the comparative risk 
must be “substantial,” id., at 61.  Nowhere did the plurality 
suggest  that  all  challenges  to  a  State’s  method  of  execu­
tion  would  require  this  sort  of  comparative-risk  analysis. 
Recognizing  the  relevance  of  available  alternatives  is  not 
at all the same as concluding that their absence precludes
a  claimant  from  showing  that  a  chosen  method  carries
objectively  intolerable  risks.    If,  for  example,  prison  offi­
cials chose a method of execution that has a 99% chance of 
causing  lingering  and  excruciating  pain,  certainly  that
risk  would  be  objectively  intolerable  whether  or  not  the 
officials  ignored  other  methods  in  making  this  choice.
Irrespective  of  the  existence  of  alternatives,  there  are 
some  risks  “so  grave  that  it  violates  contemporary  stand­
ards  of  decency  to  expose  anyone  unwillingly  to”  them. 
Helling v. McKinney, 509 U. S. 25, 36 (1993) (emphasis in 
original).
  That  the  Baze  plurality’s  statement  regarding  a  con­
demned  inmate’s  ability  to  point  to  an  available  alterna­
tive means of execution pertained only to challenges prem­
ised  on  the  existence  of  such  alternatives  is  further 
evidenced  by  the  opinion’s  failure  to  distinguish  or  even 
mention  the  Court’s  unanimous  decision  in  Hill  v. 
McDonough, 547 U. S. 573.  Hill held that a §1983 plain­
tiff  challenging  a  State’s  method  of  execution  need  not 
“identif[y] an alternative, authorized method of execution.” 
Id., at 582.  True, as the Court notes, ante, at 14–15, Hill 
did so in the context of addressing §1983’s pleading stand­
ard, rejecting the proposed alternative-means requirement 
because  the  Court  saw  no  basis  for  the  “[i]mposition  of