Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/20pdf/19-1284_869d.pdf
Page Number: 3.0

Cite as:  592 U. S. ____ (2020) 

3 

Statement of THOMAS, J. 

publishers or  speakers  (like  newspapers)  and  distributors
(like  newsstands  and  libraries).    Publishers  or  speakers
were subjected to a higher standard because they exercised
editorial control.  They could be strictly liable for transmit-
ting illegal content.  But distributors were different.  They
acted as a mere conduit without exercising editorial control, 
and  they  often  transmitted  far  more  content  than  they 
could be expected to review.  Distributors were thus liable 
only when they knew (or constructively knew) that content
was illegal.  See, e.g., Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Ser-
vices Co., 1995 WL 323710, *3 (Sup. Ct. NY, May 24, 1995); 
Restatement (Second) of Torts §581 (1976); cf. Smith v. Cal-
ifornia, 361 U. S. 147, 153 (1959) (applying a similar prin-
ciple outside the defamation context). 

The year before Congress enacted §230, one court blurred 
this distinction.  An early Internet company was sued for 
failing to take down defamatory content posted by an uni-
dentified  commenter  on  a  message  board.  The  company
contended that it merely distributed the defamatory state-
ment.  But the company had also held itself out as a family-
friendly service provider that moderated and took down of-
fensive content.  The court determined that the company’s
decision to exercise editorial control over some content “ren-
der[ed]  it  a  publisher”  even  for  content  it  merely  distri-
buted.  Stratton Oakmont, 1995 WL 323710, *3–*4. 

Taken at face value, §230(c) alters the Stratton Oakmont 
rule in two respects.  First, §230(c)(1) indicates that an In-
ternet provider does not become the publisher of a piece of 
third-party content—and thus subjected to strict liability—
simply  by  hosting  or  distributing  that  content.    Second, 
§230(c)(2)(A)  provides  an  additional  degree  of  immunity 
when companies take down or restrict access to objectiona-
ble content, so long as the company acts in good faith.  In 
short, the statute suggests that if a company unknowingly
leaves  up  illegal  third-party  content,  it  is  protected  from 
publisher liability by §230(c)(1); and if it takes down certain