Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/22pdf/21-1449_d9eh.pdf
Page Number: 22

Cite as:  598 U. S. ____ (2023) 

1 

JACKSON, J., dissenting 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

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No. 21–1449 
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GLACIER NORTHWEST, INC., DBA CALPORTLAND, 
PETITIONER v. INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD 
OF TEAMSTERS LOCAL UNION NO. 174 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF 
WASHINGTON 

[June 1, 2023]

 JUSTICE JACKSON, dissenting. 
The right to strike is fundamental to American labor law.
Congress enshrined that right in the National Labor Rela-
tions Act (NLRA) and simultaneously established the Na-
tional  Labor  Relations  Board  to  adjudicate  disputes  that
arise between workers and management.  That decision re-
flected  Congress’s  judgment  that  an  agency  with  special-
ized  expertise  should  develop  and  enforce  national  labor 
law  in  a  uniform  manner,  through  case-by-case  adjudica-
tion.  For its part, this Court has scrupulously guarded the
Board’s  authority  for  more  than  half  a  century.    See  San 
Diego  Building  Trades  Council  v.  Garmon,  359  U. S.  236 
(1959).  Under Garmon, and as relevant here, a court pre-
sented  with  a  tort  suit  based  on  strike  conduct  generally
must pause proceedings and permit the Board to determine 
in the first instance whether the union’s conduct is lawful 
if the conduct at issue is even “arguably” protected by the 
NLRA.  Id., at 245. 

Today, the Court falters.  As the majority acknowledges,
the Board’s General Counsel has filed a complaint with the 
Board after a thorough factual investigation, and that com-
plaint alleges that the NLRA protects the strike conduct at 
the center of this state-court tort suit.  The logical implica-
tion of a General Counsel complaint under Garmon is that