Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/21pdf/20-1800_7lho.pdf
Page Number: 3

Cite as:  596 U. S. ____ (2022) 

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Syllabus 

izes the city and, when flying at halfstaff, conveys a community mes-
sage  of  sympathy  or  somber  remembrance.    The  question  remains
whether,  on  the  20  or  so  times  a  year  when  Boston  allowed  private 
groups  to  raise  their  own  flags,  those  flags,  too,  expressed  the  city’s 
message.  The circumstantial evidence of the public’s perception does 
not resolve the issue.  The most salient feature of this case is that Bos-
ton neither actively controlled these flag raisings nor shaped the mes-
sages the flags sent.  To be sure, Boston maintained control over an 
event’s date and time to avoid conflicts, and it maintained control over 
the plaza’s physical premises, presumably to avoid chaos.  But the key 
issue  is  whether  Boston  shaped  or  controlled  the  flags’  content  and 
meaning; such evidence would tend to show that Boston intended to
convey the flags’ messages as its own.  And on that issue, Boston’s rec-
ord  is  thin.    Boston  says  that  all  (or  at  least  most)  of  the  50  unique 
flags  it  approved  reflect  particular  city-endorsed  values  or  causes. 
That may well be true of flying other nations’ flags, or the Pride Flag
raised annually to commemorate Boston Pride Week, but the connec-
tion to other flag-raising ceremonies, such as one held by a community
bank, is more difficult to discern.  Further, Boston told the public that
it sought “to accommodate all applicants” who wished to hold events
at Boston’s “public forums,” including on City Hall Plaza.  App. to Pet.
for Cert. 137a.  The city’s application form asked only for contact infor-
mation and a brief description of the event, with proposed dates and 
times.  The city employee who handled applications testified that he
did not request to see flags before the events.  Indeed, the city’s prac-
tice was to approve flag raisings without exception—that is, until pe-
titioners’ request.  At the time, Boston had no written policies or clear 
internal  guidance  about  what  flags  groups  could  fly  and  what  those 
flags would communicate.  Boston’s control is therefore not comparable
to the degree of government involvement in the selection of park mon-
uments in Summum, see 555 U. S., at 472–473, or license plate designs 
in Walker, see 576 U. S., at 213.  Boston’s come-one-come-all practice—
except, that is, for petitioners’ flag—is much closer to the Patent and
Trademark Office’s policy of registering all manner of trademarks in 
Matal, see 582 U. S., at ___, ___.  All told, Boston’s lack of meaningful 
involvement in the selection of flags or the crafting of their messages
leads the Court to classify the third-party flag raisings as private, not
government, speech.  Pp. 6–12.

2.  Because  the  flag-raising  program  did  not  express  government 
speech,  Boston’s  refusal  to  let  petitioners  fly  their  flag  violated  the
Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment.  When the government 
does not speak for itself, it may not exclude private speech based on 
“religious  viewpoint”;  doing  so  “constitutes  impermissible  viewpoint 
discrimination.”  Good News Club v. Milford Central School, 533 U. S.