Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/558bv.pdf
Page Number: 439

278 

SOUTH  CAROLINA  v.  NORTH  CAROLINA 

Opinion of Roberts, C. J. 

U. S.  1,  8–9  (2001);  Pennsylvania  v.  New  Jersey,  426  U. S. 
660,  665  (1976)  (per  curiam)  (It  is  “settled  doctrine  that  a 
State  has  standing  to  sue  only  when  its  sovereign  or  quasi-
sovereign  interests  are  implicated  and  it  is  not  merely  liti­
gating  as  a  volunteer  the  personal  claims  of  its  citizens”). 
And  in  deciding  whether  a  State  meets  that  requirement, 
this  Court  considers  whether  the  State  is  “in  full  control  of 
[the] litigation.”  Kansas v.  Colorado, supra, at 8. 

The second guiding principle is a practical one: We are not 
well  suited  to  assume  the  role of  a  trial  judge.  See  Ohio  v. 
Wyandotte  Chemicals  Corp.,  401  U. S.  493,  498  (1971).  We 
have  attempted  to  address  that  reality  by  relying  on  the 
services  of  able  special  masters,  who  have  become  vitally 
important  in  allowing  us  to  manage  our  original  docket. 
But the responsibility for the exercise of this Court’s original 
jurisdiction remains ours alone under the Constitution. 

These two considerations—that our original jurisdiction is 
limited  to  high  claims  affecting  state  sovereignty,  and  that 
practical  realities  limit  our  ability  to  act  as  a  trial  court— 
converge in our standard for intervention in original actions. 
We articulated that standard in New Jersey v.  New York, 345 
U. S.  369,  373  (1953)  (per  curiam).  There,  we  denied  the 
city  of Philadelphia’s  motion for  leave  to intervene  in an  ac­
tion,  to  which  the  Commonwealth  of  Pennsylvania  was  al­
ready  a  party,  involving  the  apportionment  of  the  Delaware 
River.  Id.,  at  373–374.  We  set  out  the  following  test  for 
intervention  in  an  original  action:  “An  intervenor  whose 
state  is  already  a  party  should  have  the  burden  of  showing 
some  compelling  interest  in  his  own  right,  apart  from  his 
interest in a class with all other citizens and creatures of the 
state,  which  interest  is  not  properly  represented  by  the 
state.”  Id., at 373. 

This exacting standard is grounded on a “necessary recog­
nition  of  sovereign  dignity,”  ibid.,  under  which  “the  state, 
when a party to a suit involving a matter of sovereign inter­
est,  ‘must  be  deemed  to  represent  all  its  citizens,’ ”  id.,  at