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16 

LOPER BRIGHT ENTERPRISES v. RAIMONDO 

Opinion of the Court 

Administrative  Procedure  Act  108  (1947);  see  also  Kisor, 
588 U. S., at 582 (plurality opinion) (same).  That “present
law,” as we have described, adhered to the traditional con-
ception of the judicial function.  See supra, at 9–13. 

Various  respected  commentators  contemporaneously
maintained that the APA required reviewing courts to ex-
ercise independent judgment on questions of law.  Professor 
John  Dickinson,  for  example,  read  the  APA  to  “impose  a 
clear mandate that all [questions of law] shall be decided by
the reviewing Court itself, and in the exercise of its own in-
dependent  judgment.”    Administrative  Procedure  Act: 
Scope  and  Grounds  of  Broadened  Judicial  Review,  33
A. B. A. J.  434,  516  (1947).    Professor  Bernard  Schwartz 
noted that §706 “would seem . . . to be merely a legislative
restatement of the familiar review principle that questions
of law are for the reviewing court, at the same time leaving
to the courts the task of determining in each case what are
questions of  law.”    Mixed  Questions  of  Law and  Fact  and 
the Administrative Procedure Act, 19 Ford. L. Rev. 73, 84– 
85  (1950).  And  Professor  Louis  Jaffe,  who  had  served  in 
several  agencies  at  the  advent  of  the  New  Deal,  thought
that §706 leaves it up to the reviewing “court” to “decide as
a ‘question of law’ whether there is ‘discretion’ in the prem-
ises”—that is, whether the statute at issue delegates par-
ticular discretionary authority to an agency.  Judicial Con-
trol of Administrative Action 570 (1965).

The  APA,  in  short,  incorporates  the  traditional  under-
standing of the judicial function, under which courts must
exercise  independent  judgment  in  determining  the  mean-
ing  of  statutory  provisions.  In  exercising  such  judgment,
though, courts may—as they have from the start—seek aid 
from  the  interpretations  of  those  responsible  for  imple-
menting particular statutes.  Such interpretations “consti-
tute a body of experience and informed judgment to which 
courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance” con-
sistent  with  the  APA.  Skidmore,  323  U. S.,  at  140.    And