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Page Number: 81

24 

JESNER v. ARAB BANK, PLC 

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting 

law. . . .  Sosa’s  cautionary  admonitions  provide  no  reason
to  depart  from  the  common  law  on  this  issue”).    At  oral 
argument  in  this  case,  the  United  States  told  the  Court
that  it  saw  no  “sound  reason  to  categorically  exclude
corporate liability.”  Tr. of Oral Arg. 29.  It explained that
another country would hold the United States accountable
for  not  providing  a  remedy  against  a  corporate  defendant 
in  a  “classic”  ATS  case,  such  as  one  involving  a  “foreign
officia[l]  injured  in  the  United  States,”  id.,  at  32–33,  and 
suggested  that  foreclosing  the  ability  to  recover  from  a 
corporation  actually  would  raise  “the  possibility  of  fric­
tion,”  id.,  at  33.    Notably,  the  Government’s  position  that 
categorically  barring  corporate  liability  under  the  ATS  is
wrong has been consistent across two administrations led 
by Presidents of different political parties.

Likewise,  when  Members  of  Congress  have  weighed  in 

on  the  question  whether  corporations  can  be  proper  de­
fendants  in  an  ATS  suit,  it  has  been  to  advise  the  Court 
against the rule it now adopts.  See Brief for Sen. Sheldon 
Whitehouse  et al.  as  Amici  Curiae  7–11;  Brief  for  Former 
Sen.  Arlen  Specter  et al.  as  Amici  Curiae  in  Kiobel  v. 
Royal  Dutch  Petroleum  Co.,  O. T.  2012,  No.  10–1491, 
pp. 17–18.    Congress  has  also  never  seen  it  necessary  to 
immunize  corporations  from  ATS  liability  even  though 
corporations have been named as defendants in ATS suits
for  years.  See  Monessen  Southwestern  R.  Co.  v.  Morgan, 
486  U. S.  330,  338  (1988)  (“Congress’  failure  to  disturb
a  consistent  judicial  interpretation  of  a  statute  may  pro­
vide some indication that ‘Congress at least acquiesces in,
and  apparently  affirms,  that  [interpretation]’ ”  (quoting 
Cannon  v.  University  of  Chicago,  441  U. S.  677,  703 
(1979))).

Given  the  deference  to  the  political  branches  that  Sosa 
encourages,  I  find  it  puzzling  that  the  Court  so  eagerly 
departs  from  the  express  assessment  of  the  Executive 
Branch and Members of Congress that corporations can be