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Page Number: 4.0

4 

CARSON v. MAKIN 

Syllabus 

discrimination is any less offensive to the Free Exercise Clause.  This 
case illustrates why.  “[E]ducating young people in their faith, incul-
cating its teachings, and training them to live their faith are responsi-
bilities  that  lie  at  the  very  core  of  the  mission  of  a  private  religious 
school.”  Our Lady of Guadalupe School v. Morrissey-Berru, 591 U. S. 
___, ___.  In short, the prohibition on status-based discrimination un-
der  the  Free  Exercise  Clause  is  not  a  permission  to  engage  in  use-
based discrimination. 

Locke v. Davey, 540 U. S. 712, does not assist Maine here.  The schol-
arship funds at issue in Locke were intended to be used “to prepare for 
the ministry.”  Trinity Lutheran, 582 U. S., at ___.  Locke’s reasoning
expressly turned on what it identified as the “historic and substantial
state interest” against using “taxpayer funds to support church lead-
ers.”  540 U. S., at 722, 725.  But “it is clear that there is no ‘historic 
and  substantial’  tradition  against  aiding  [private  religious]  schools” 
that is “comparable.”  Espinoza, 591 U. S., at ___.  Locke cannot be read 
to generally authorize the State to exclude religious persons from the
enjoyment of public benefits on the basis of their anticipated religious
use of the benefits.  Pp. 15–18. 

979 F. 3d 21, reversed and remanded. 

ROBERTS, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which THOMAS, 
ALITO, GORSUCH, KAVANAUGH, and BARRETT, JJ., joined.  BREYER, J., filed 
a  dissenting  opinion,  in  which  KAGAN  J.,  joined,  and  in  which  SO-
TOMAYOR, J., joined as to all but Part I–B.  SOTOMAYOR, J., filed a dissent-
ing opinion.