Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/21pdf/21-401_2cp3.pdf
Page Number: 17.0

Cite as:  596 U. S. ____ (2022) 

13 

Opinion of the Court 

treaty’s existence is dispositive, because Russia and Lithu-
ania are free to structure investor-state dispute resolution 
as  they  see  fit.  What  matters  is  the  substance  of  their 
agreement: Did these two nations intend to confer govern-
mental authority on an ad hoc panel formed pursuant to the
treaty?   See  BG  Group  plc  v.  Republic  of  Argentina,  572 
U. S. 25, 37 (2014) (“As a general matter, a treaty is a con-
tract,  though  between  nations,”  and  “[i]ts  interpretation 
normally is, like a contract’s interpretation, a matter of de-
termining the parties’ intent”).

The provision regarding ad hoc arbitration appears in Ar-
ticle 10, which permits an investor to choose one of four fo-
rums to resolve disputes: 

“a)  [a]  competent  court  or  court  of  arbitration  of  the 
Contracting  Party  in  which  territory  the  investments 
are made; 
“b) the Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber 
of Commerce; 
“c) the Court of Arbitration of the International Cham-
ber of Commerce; 
“d)  an  ad  hoc  arbitration  in  accordance  with  Arbitra-
tion Rules of the United Nations Commission on Inter-
national  Trade  Law  (UNCITRAL).”    App.  to  Pet.  for 
Cert. in No. 21–518, at 64a–65a. 

The  options  on  this  menu  vary  in  form.    For  example,  a 
“competent court or court of arbitration of the Contracting
Party” (i.e., the state in which an investor does business) is 
clearly  governmental;  a  court  “of ”  a  sovereign  belongs  to
that sovereign.  The inclusion of courts on the list reflects 
Russia and Lithuania’s intent to give investors the choice
of bringing their disputes before a pre-existing governmen-
tal body.

An ad hoc arbitration panel, by contrast, is not a pre-ex-
isting body, but one formed for the purpose of adjudicating 
investor-state disputes.  And nothing in the treaty reflects