Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/21pdf/20-915_pol1.pdf
Page Number: 14

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UNICOLORS, INC. v. H&M HENNES & MAURITZ, L. P. 

THOMAS, J., dissenting 

I 
  We  should  dismiss  this  case for the  reasons we  gave  in 
City and County of San Francisco v. Sheehan, 575 U. S. 600 
(2015),  and  Yee  v.  Escondido,  503  U. S.  519  (1992).    In 
Sheehan, we granted review to resolve a Circuit split and 
decide  whether  the  Americans  with  Disabilities  Act  re-
quires  law  enforcement  officers  to  provide  reasonable  ac-
commodations to armed, violent, and mentally ill criminals 
while arresting them.  575 U. S., at 608.  But after the peti-
tioners’  opening  brief  “effectively  concede[d]”  that  it  may 
and pressed a narrower, “qualified” version of the original 
argument, id., at 609, we dismissed the case for lack of “ad-
versary presentation” of the question presented, id., at 610.  
In  Yee,  the  petitioner  raised  an  argument  that  was  not 
clearly pressed or passed upon below, that was not the sub-
ject of a known circuit split, and that, in fact, no court in the 
country  had  squarely  addressed  before.   See  503  U. S.,  at 
534, 537–538.  We declined to “be the first court in the Na-
tion” to decide the petitioner’s novel legal question.  Id., at 
538. 
  These considerations counsel dismissal here.  First, Uni-
colors  has  abandoned  the  actual  question  presented  and 
now presses novel arguments in favor of reversal.  We took 
this case to resolve an apparent split between the Eleventh 
Circuit, which has held that §411(b)(1)(A) requires “decep-
tive intent,” Roberts v. Gordy, 877 F. 3d 1024, 1030 (2017), 
and the Ninth Circuit, which held below that “there is no 
such intent-to-defraud requirement,” 959 F. 3d 1194, 1198 
(2020)  (citing  Gold  Value  Int’l  Textile,  Inc.  v.  Sanctuary 
Clothing, LLC, 925 F. 3d 1140, 1147 (CA9 2019)).  Agreeing 
with the Eleventh Circuit, Unicolors argued in its petition 
for  certiorari  that  “knowledge”  requires  “inten[t]  to  de-
fraud.”    Pet.  for  Cert.  7.    But  now,  siding  with  the  Ninth 
Circuit, Unicolors contends that a mere “knowing failure” 
satisfies §411(b)(1)(A).  Brief for Petitioner 33, 37 (internal 
quotation  marks  omitted).    The  United  States,  as  amicus