Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/529bv.pdf
Page Number: 468

529US2

Unit: $U46

[10-07-01 17:18:24] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 529 U. S. 362 (2000)

393

Opinion of the Court

claim did not satisfy the “prejudice” component of the Strick-
land test.17

Cases such as Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U. S. 157 (1986), and
Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U. S. 364 (1993), do not justify a
departure from a straightforward application of Strickland
when the ineffectiveness of counsel does deprive the defend-
ant of a substantive or procedural right to which the law
entitles him.18
In the instant case, it is undisputed that
Williams had a right—indeed, a constitutionally protected
right—to provide the jury with the mitigating evidence that
his trial counsel either failed to discover or failed to offer.

Nevertheless, the Virginia Supreme Court read our deci-
sion in Lockhart to require a separate inquiry into fundamen-
tal fairness even when Williams is able to show that his law-
yer was ineffective and that his ineffectiveness probably
affected the outcome of the proceeding.

It wrote:

17 “But the ‘prejudice’ component of the Strickland test does not impli-
cate these concerns.
It focuses on the question whether counsel’s deﬁ-
cient performance renders the result of the trial unreliable or the proceed-
[466 U. S., at 687]; see Kimmelman, 477 U. S.,
ing fundamentally unfair.
at 393 (Powell, J., concurring). Unreliability or unfairness does not result
if the ineffectiveness of counsel does not deprive the defendant of any
substantive or procedural right to which the law entitles him. As we
have noted, it was the premise of our grant in this case that Perry was
correctly decided, i. e., that respondent was not entitled to an objection
based on ‘double counting.’ Respondent therefore suffered no prejudice
from his counsel’s deﬁcient performance.” Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U. S.
364, 372 (1993).

18 In her concurring opinion in Lockhart, Justice O’Connor stressed
this precise point.
“I write separately only to point out that today’s deci-
sion will, in the vast majority of cases, have no effect on the prejudice
inquiry under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668 (1984). The deter-
minative question—whether there is ‘a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have
been different,’ id., at 694—remains unchanged. This case, however, con-
cerns the unusual circumstance where the defendant attempts to demon-
strate prejudice based on considerations that, as a matter of law, ought
not inform the inquiry.”

Id., at 373.