Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/20pdf/20-543_3e04.pdf
Page Number: 46.0

Cite as:  594 U. S. ____ (2021) 

15 

GORSUCH, J., dissenting 

  Having  said  all  this,  my  disagreement  with  the  Court’s 
“implausibility” argument is a relatively modest one.  We 
agree  that  linguistic  and  historical  context  may  provide 
useful interpretive guidance, and no one today seeks to sug-
gest  that  judges  may  sanitize  statutes  in  service  of  their 
own sensibilities about the rational and harmonious.3  In-
stead, our disagreement is simply about applying the plain 
meaning, grammar, context, and canons of construction to 
the particular statutory terms before us.  As I see it, an or-
dinary reader would understand that the recognition clause 
applies  the  same  way  to  all  Indian  groups.    And  if  that’s 
true, there’s just no way to read the text to include ANCs 
as “Tribal governments” for purposes of the CARES Act. 

* 
  In my view, neither of the Court’s alternative theories for 
reversal  can  do  the  work  required  of  it.    The  recognition 
clause denotes the formal recognition between the federal 
government and a tribal government that triggers eligibil-
ity  for  the  full  panoply  of  special  benefits  given  to  Indian 
tribes.  Meanwhile, a fair reading of that clause indicates 
that it applies to ANCs.  Accordingly, with respect, I would 
affirm. 

—————— 

3

 The Court does not suggest, for example, that the reading of the stat-
ute  it  rejects  would  be  “absurd.”    Absurdity  doctrine  “does  not  license 
courts to improve statutes (or rules) substantively, so that their outcomes 
accord more closely” with “ ‘what we might think is the preferred result.’ ” 
Jaskolski v. Daniels, 427 F. 3d 456, 461 (CA7 2005) (Easterbrook, J. for 
the court) (ellipsis omitted).  At most, it may serve a linguistic function—
capturing circumstances in which a statute’s apparent meaning is so “un-
thinkable” that any reasonable reader would immediately (1) know that 
it contains a “technical or ministerial” mistake, and (2) understand the 
correct meaning of the text.  See Lexington Ins. Co. v. Precision Drilling 
Co.,  830  F.  3d  1219,  1221–1223  (CA10  2016);  A.  Scalia  &  B.  Garner, 
Reading Law 237–238 (2012).  Anything more would threaten the sepa-
ration of powers, undermine fair notice, and risk upsetting hard-earned 
legislative compromises.  Ibid; see also Virginia Uranium, Inc. v. Warren, 
587 U. S. ___, ___–___ (2019) (slip op., at 15–16).