Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/21pdf/21-463_3ebh.pdf
Page Number: 45.0

10 

WHOLE WOMAN’S HEALTH v. JACKSON 

SOTOMAYOR, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part 
Opinion of SOTOMAYOR, J. 

III 
  My disagreement with the Court runs far deeper than a 
quibble  over  how  many  defendants  these  petitioners  may 
sue.  The dispute is over whether States may nullify federal 
constitutional rights by employing schemes like the one at 
hand.   The  Court  indicates  that  they  can, so  long  as  they 
write  their  laws  to  more  thoroughly  disclaim  all  enforce-
ment  by  state  officials,  including  licensing  officials.    This 
choice to shrink from Texas’ challenge to federal supremacy 
will have far-reaching repercussions.  I doubt the Court, let 
alone the country, is prepared for them. 
  The  State’s  concessions  at  oral  argument  laid  bare  the 
sweeping consequences of its position.  In response to ques-
tioning,  counsel  for  the  State  conceded  that  pre-enforce-
ment review would be unavailable even if a statute imposed 
a bounty of $1,000,000 or higher.  Tr. of Oral Arg. 50–53.  
Counsel further admitted that no individual constitutional 
right was safe from attack under a similar scheme.  Tr. of 
Oral Arg. in United States v. Texas, No. 21–588, pp. 59–61, 
64–65.  Counsel even asserted that a State could further rig 
procedures by abrogating a state supreme court’s power to 
bind  its  own  lower  courts.    Id.,  at  78–79.    Counsel  main-
tained that even if a State neutered appellate courts’ power 
in such an extreme manner, aggrieved parties’ only path to 
a  federal  forum  would  be  to  violate  the  unconstitutional 
law, accede to infringement of their substantive and proce-
dural rights all the way through the state supreme court, 
and then, at last, ask this Court to grant discretionary cer-
tiorari review.  Ibid.  All of these burdens would layer atop 

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flout its terms, even if it nominally binds other state officials, and it errs 
by implying as much now.  The Court responds by downplaying how ex-
ceptional Texas’ scheme is, but it identifies no true analogs in precedent.  
See ante, at 11 (identifying only “somewhat” analogous statutes).  S. B. 8 
is no tort or private attorneys general statute: It deputizes anyone to sue 
without establishing any pre-existing personal stake (i.e., standing) and 
then skews procedural rules to favor these plaintiffs.