Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/558bv.pdf
Page Number: 188.0

Cite as: 558 U. S. 15 (2009) 

27 

Per Curiam 

We  agree  with  the  state  court’s  characterization  of  the 
murder, and simply cannot comprehend the assertion by the 
Court  of  Appeals  that  this  case  did  not  involve  “needless 
suffering.”  The  jury  saw  autopsy  photographs  showing 
Steacy  McConnell’s  mangled  head,  her  skull  crushed  by  15 
to 20 blows from a steel dumbbell bar the jury found to have 
been wielded by Belmontes.  McConnell’s corpse showed nu­
merous  “defensive  bruises  and  contusions  on  [her]  hands, 
arms,  and  feet,”  id.,  at  839,  which  “plainly  evidenced  a  des­
perate  struggle  for  life  at  [Belmontes’]  hands,”  Belmontes, 
supra,  at  819,  755  P.  2d,  at  354.  Belmontes  left  McConnell 
to  die,  but ofﬁcers  found  her  still  ﬁghting for  her  life  before 
ultimately  succumbing  to  the  injuries  caused  by  the  blows 
from  Belmontes.  Record  3.  The  jury  also  heard  that  this 
savage murder was committed solely to prevent interference 
with  a  burglary  that  netted  Belmontes  $100  he  used  to  buy 
beer  and  drugs  for  the  night.  McConnell  suffered,  and  it 
was clearly needless. 

Some of the error below may be traced to confusion about 
the  appropriate  standard  and  burden  of  proof.  While  the 
Court of Appeals quoted the pertinent language from Strick­
land,  that  court  elsewhere  suggested  it  might  have  applied 
something different.  In explaining its prejudice determina­
tion,  the  Ninth  Circuit  concluded  that  “[t]he  aggravating 
evidence,  even  with  the  addition  of  evidence  that  Belmon­
tes  murdered  Howard,  is  not  strong  enough,  in  light  of  the 
mitigating  evidence  that  could  have  been  adduced,  to  rule 
out  a  sentence  of  life  in  prison.”  529  F.  3d,  at  875.  But 
Strickland  does  not  require  the  State  to  “rule  out”  a  sen­
tence of life in prison to prevail.  Rather, Strickland places 
the  burden  on  the  defendant,  not  the  State,  to  show  a  “rea­
sonable  probability”  that  the  result  would  have  been  differ­
ent.  466  U. S.,  at  694.  Under  a  proper  application  of  the 
Strickland  standard,  Belmontes  cannot  carry  this  burden. 
It  is  hard  to  imagine  expert  testimony  and  additional 
facts  about  Belmontes’  difﬁcult  childhood  outweighing  the