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SHALALA v. ILLINOIS COUNCIL ON LONG
TERM CARE, INC.
Opinion of the Court

“noncollateral” nature of the issues, or the “declaratory” ver-
sus “injunctive” nature of the relief sought. Nor can we ac-
cept a distinction that limits the scope of § 405(h) to claims
for monetary beneﬁts. Claims for money, claims for other
beneﬁts, claims of program eligibility, and claims that contest
a sanction or remedy may all similarly rest upon individual
fact-related circumstances, may all similarly dispute agency
policy determinations, or may all similarly involve the appli-
interpretation, or constitutionality of interrelated
cation,
regulations or statutory provisions. There is no reason to
distinguish among them in terms of the language or in terms
of the purposes of § 405(h). Section 1395ii’s blanket incorpo-
ration of that provision into the Medicare Act as a whole
certainly contains no such distinction. Nor for similar rea-
sons can we here limit those provisions to claims that in-
volve “amounts.”

The Council cites two other cases in support of its efforts
to distinguish Salﬁ and Ringer: McNary v. Haitian Refu-
gee Center, Inc., 498 U. S. 479 (1991), and Mathews v. El-
dridge, 424 U. S. 319 (1976).
In Haitian Refugee Center,
the Court held permissible a § 1331 challenge to “a group
of decisions or a practice or procedure employed in making
decisions” despite an immigration statute that barred § 1331
challenges to any Immigration and Naturalization Service
“ ‘determination respecting an application for adjustment of
status’ ” under the Special Agricultural Workers’ program.
498 U. S., at 491–498. Haitian Refugee Center’s outcome,
however, turned on the different language of that different
statute.
Indeed, the Court suggested that statutory lan-
guage similar to the language at issue here—any claim “aris-
ing under” the Medicare or Social Security Acts, § 405(h)—
would have led it to a different legal conclusion. See id., at
494 (using as an example a statute precluding review of “ ‘all
causes . . . arising under any of ’ ” the immigration statutes).
In Eldridge, the Court held permissible a District Court
lawsuit challenging the constitutionality of agency proce-