Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/21pdf/20-603_o758.pdf
Page Number: 21.0

Cite as:  597 U. S. ____ (2022) 

1 

KAGAN, J., concurring 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

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No. 20–603 
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LE ROY TORRES, PETITIONER v. TEXAS 
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS OF 
TEXAS, THIRTEENTH DISTRICT 

[June 29, 2022] 

JUSTICE KAGAN, concurring. 
In my view, our sovereign immunity decisions have not
followed a straight line.  Two years ago, I described Katz’s 
“plan  of  the  Convention”  analysis  as  “good  for  one  clause
only”—i.e., Article I’s Bankruptcy Clause.  Allen v. Cooper, 
589  U. S.  ___,  ___–___  (2020)  (slip  op.,  at  8–9)  (hyphens 
omitted); see Central Va. Community College v. Katz, 546 
U. S. 356, 373–379 (2006).  I thought then that our prece-
dents had shut the door on further Article I exceptions to
state sovereign immunity.  But PennEast proved me wrong. 
See  PennEast  Pipeline  Co.  v.  New  Jersey,  594  U. S.  ___ 
(2021).  The question there was whether the States had con-
sented in the plan of the Convention to the Federal Govern-
ment’s exercise of Article I’s eminent domain power, includ-
ing  through  private  parties’  suits.    Relying  on  our  prior
decisions, I concluded that the States had not so consented. 
See id., at ___–___ (BARRETT, J., dissenting) (slip op., at 1– 
4).  But the Court ruled otherwise.  Using a new test, it held
that  the  eminent  domain  power  was  “complete  in  itself,”
meaning that the States had “consented to the [federal] ex-
ercise of that power[ ] in its entirety.”  Id., at ___ (slip op., 
at 22).  The question today, given PennEast, is whether the 
same  is  true  of  the  war  powers.    Were  those  powers  also
“complete in themselves,” so that the States likewise con-
sented to congressionally authorized private litigation?