Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/22pdf/21-476_c185.pdf
Page Number: 41

Cite as:  600 U. S. ____ (2023) 

9 

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting 

rationale.5  That  is  because  nowhere  in  the  relevant  case 
law “is monopoly suggested as the distinguishing character-
istic.”  E. Adler, Business Jurisprudence, 28 Harv. L. Rev. 
135, 156 (1914) (“A distinction based on monopoly would re-
quire proof that the common carrier had some kind of a mo-
nopoly which the private carrier did not have, or that ‘com-
mon’ was synonymous with ‘monopoly.’  The plain meaning
of the cases is [instead that] the common was the public, the 
professional, the business carrier or other trader”).6 

2 

After the Civil War, some States codified the common-law 
duty of public accommodations to serve all comers.  See M. 
Konvitz  &  T.  Leskes,  A  Century  of  Civil  Rights  155–157 
(1961).  Early state public accommodations statutes prohib-
ited discrimination based on race or color.  Yet the principle 
was  at  times  stated  more  broadly:  to  provide  “a  remedy
against any unjust discrimination to the citizen in all public 
places.”  Ferguson v. Gies, 82 Mich. 358, 365, 46 N. W. 718, 
720 (1890).  In 1885, Colorado adopted “ ‘An Act to Protect
All  Citizens  in  Their  Civil  Rights,’  which  guaranteed  ‘full 
—————— 

5 For example, a case on which the majority relies found that it could 
“shortly dispos[e]” of the question whether a steamship company was a 
common carrier because the company was “the owner of a general ship, 
carrying goods for hire . . . and perform[ing]” that service “regular[ly].” 
Liverpool & Great Western Steam Co. v. Phenix Ins. Co., 129 U. S. 397, 
437 (1889).  No showing of market power was required.  Ibid. 

6 Nor  does  “host[ing]  or  transport[ing]  others  and  their  belongings,” 
ante, at 13, explain the right of access.  Smiths, for instance, did not al-
ways practice their trade by holding property for others.  And even when 
they did, any duty of care resulting from such bailment cannot explain 
the  duty  to  serve  all  comers,  which  logically  must  be  assumed  before-
hand.  See Lane v.  Cotton, 12 Mod. 472, 484, 88 Eng. Rep. 1458, 1464 
(K. B. 1701) (Holt, C. J.).  That duty instead came from somewhere else,
and the weight of authority indicates that it came from a business’s act 
of holding itself out to the public as ready to serve anyone who would hire 
it.  Singer 1304–1330; 3 W. Blackstone, Commentaries  on the Laws of 
England  164  (1768);  J.  Story,  Commentaries  on  the  Law  of  Bailments 
§§495, 591 (1837); 1 T. Parsons, Law of Contracts 639, 643, 649 (1853).