Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/18pdf/17-1026_2c83.pdf
Page Number: 12

Cite as:  586 U. S. ____ (2019) 

9 

Opinion of the Court 

Ortega show why that presumption applies equally here.

With  regard  to  prejudice,  Flores-Ortega  held  that,  to 
succeed in an ineffective-assistance claim in this context, a 
defendant  need  make  only  one  showing:  “that,  but  for 
counsel’s  deficient  failure  to  consult  with  him  about  an 
appeal, he would have timely appealed.”  528 U. S., at 484. 
So  long  as  a  defendant  can  show  that  “counsel’s  constitu-
tionally deficient performance deprive[d him] of an appeal 
that  he  otherwise  would  have  taken,”  courts  are  to  “pre-
sum[e]  prejudice  with  no  further  showing  from  the  de-
fendant  of  the  merits  of  his  underlying  claims.”    Ibid. 
Because  there  is  no  dispute  here  that  Garza  wished  to 
appeal,  see  supra,  at  2,  a  direct  application  of  Flores-
Ortega’s  language  resolves  this  case.    See  528  U. S.,  at 
484. 

Flores-Ortega’s  reasoning  shows  why  an  appeal  waiver
does not complicate this straightforward application.  That 
case,  like  this  one,  involves  a  lawyer  who  forfeited  an 
appellate  proceeding  by  failing  to  file  a  notice  of  appeal. 
Id.,  at  473–475.  As  the  Court  explained,  given  that  past
precedents  call  for  a  presumption  of  prejudice  whenever 
“ ‘the  accused  is  denied  counsel  at  a  critical  stage,’ ”  it 
makes  even  greater  sense  to  presume  prejudice  when
counsel’s  deficiency  forfeits  an  “appellate  proceeding  alto-
gether.”  Id., at 483.  After all, there is no disciplined way 
to  “accord  any  ‘presumption  of  reliability’. . .  to  judicial 
proceedings  that  never  took  place.”    Ibid.  (quoting  Smith 
v. Robbins, 528 U. S. 259, 286 (2000)).

That  rationale  applies  just  as  well  here  because,  as 
discussed  supra,  at  4–6,  Garza  retained  a  right  to  appeal
at  least  some  issues  despite  the  waivers  he  signed.10    In  
other  words,  Garza  had  a  right  to  a  proceeding,  and  he 

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10 Or the State might not have invoked the waiver at all.  E.g., United 
States  v.  Archie,  771  F. 3d  217,  223,  n. 2  (CA4  2014); State v.  Rendon, 
2012 WL 9492805, *1, n. 1 (Idaho Ct. App., May 11, 2012).