Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/529bv.pdf
Page Number: 569

529US2

Unit: $U51

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494

OCTOBER TERM, 1999

Syllabus

BECK v. PRUPIS et al.

certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the eleventh circuit

No. 98–1480. Argued November 3, 1999—Decided April 26, 2000

The Racketeer Inﬂuenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) creates
a civil cause of action for “[a]ny person injured in his business or prop-
erty by reason of a violation of section 1962.” 18 U. S. C. § 1964(c).
Subsection (d) of § 1962 forbids “any person to conspire to violate any of
the provisions of subsection (a), (b), or (c) of [§ 1962].” Petitioner is a
former president, CEO, director, and shareholder of Southeastern Insur-
ance Group (SIG). Respondents are former senior ofﬁcers and direc-
tors of SIG who allegedly conspired to, and did, engage in acts of rack-
eteering. Petitioner alleged that after he discovered respondents’
unlawful conduct and contacted regulators, respondents orchestrated a
scheme to remove him from the company. Petitioner sued respondents,
asserting, among other things, a § 1964(c) cause of action for respond-
ents’ alleged conspiracy to violate §§ 1962(a), (b), and (c). Petitioner
alleged that his injury was proximately caused by an overt act—namely,
the termination of his employment—done in furtherance of respondents’
conspiracy, and that § 1964(c) therefore provided a cause of action. The
District Court dismissed his RICO conspiracy claim, agreeing with re-
spondents that employees who are terminated for refusing to participate
in RICO activities, or who threaten to report RICO activities, do not
have standing to sue under RICO for damages from their loss of employ-
ment.
In afﬁrming, the Eleventh Circuit held that, because the overt
act causing petitioner’s injury was not an act of racketeering, it could
not support a § 1964(c) cause of action.

Held: Injury caused by an overt act that is not an act of racketeering or
otherwise wrongful under RICO does not give rise to a cause of action
under § 1964(c) for a violation of § 1962(d). To determine what it means
to be “injured . . . by reason of ” a “conspir[acy],” this Court must look
to the common law of civil conspiracy. At common law, it was widely
accepted that a plaintiff could bring suit for civil conspiracy only if he
had been injured by an act that was itself tortious. When Congress
adopted RICO, it incorporated this principle. As at common law, a civil
conspiracy plaintiff cannot bring suit under RICO based on injury
caused by any act in furtherance of a conspiracy that might have caused
the plaintiff injury. Rather, such plaintiff must allege injury from an
act that is analogous to an “ac[t] of a tortious character,” see 4 Restate-