Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/16pdf/15-1293_1o13.pdf
Page Number: 25.0

Cite as:  582 U. S. ____ (2017) 

21 

Opinion of the Court 
Opinion of ALITO, J. 

tent;  that  is,  the  law  permitted  the  employer  to  assist
union  speech  on  matters  relating  to  collective  bargaining 
but  made  it  harder  for  the  union  to  collect  money  to  sup-
port its election activities.  Id., at 188.  Upholding this law,
we  characterized  it  as  imposing  a  “modest  limitation”  on
an “extraordinary benefit,” namely, taking money from the 
wages  of  non-union  members  and  turning  it  over  to  the
union  free  of  charge.    Id.,  at  184.    Refusing  to  confer  an 
even  greater  benefit,  we  held,  did  not  upset  the  market-
place of ideas and did not abridge the union’s free speech 
rights.  Id., at 189–190. 

Ysursa  v.  Pocatello  Ed.  Assn.,  555  U. S.  353  (2009),  is 
similar.  There,  we  considered  an  Idaho  law  that  allowed 
public  employees  to  elect  to  have  union  dues  deducted 
from  their  wages  but  did  not  allow  such  a  deduction  for
money  remitted  to  the  union’s  political  action  committee. 
Id.,  at  355.    We  reasoned  that  the  “the  government  . . .
[was]  not  required  to  assist  others  in  funding  the  expres-
sion  of  particular  ideas.”  Id.,  at  358;  see  also  id.,  at  355 
(“The First Amendment . . . does not confer an affirmative
right  to  use  government  payroll  mechanisms  for  the  pur-
pose of obtaining funds for expression”). 

Davenport  and  Ysursa  are  akin  to  our  subsidy  cases.
Although  the  laws  at  issue  in  Davenport  and  Ysursa  did 
not provide cash subsidies to the unions, they conferred a 
very  valuable  benefit—the  right  to  negotiate  a  collective-
bargaining  agreement  under  which  non-members  would 
be obligated to pay an agency fee that the public employer
would collect and turn over to the union free of charge.  As 
in  the  cash  subsidy  cases,  the  laws  conferred  this  benefit 
because  it  was  thought  that  this  arrangement  served
important government interests.  See Abood v. Detroit Bd. 
of Ed., 431 U. S. 209, 224–226 (1977).  But the challenged
laws  did  not  go  further  and  provide  convenient  collection 
mechanisms for money to be used in political activities.  In 
essence,  the  Washington  and  Idaho  lawmakers  chose  to