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12 

YELLEN v. CONFEDERATED TRIBES OF CHEHALIS 
RESERVATION 
Opinion of the Court 

B 
Respondents urge this Court to discard the plain mean-
ing of the “Indian tribe” definition in favor of a term-of-art
construction.  In respondents’ view, the 69 words of the “In-
dian  tribe”  definition  are  a  long  way  of  saying  just  8:  An 
“Indian tribe” means a “federally recognized tribe.”  If that 
is right, respondents are correct that ANCs are not Indian
tribes, because everyone agrees they are not federally rec-
ognized tribes.  To prevail on this argument, however, re-
spondents  must  demonstrate  that  the  statutory  context
supports reading ISDA’s “Indian tribe” definition as a term
of art rather than according to its plain meaning.  See John-
son v. United States, 559 U. S. 133, 139 (2010).  Their efforts 
are not persuasive.

In  arguing  for  a  term-of-art  construction,  respondents
first rely on a series of Acts that terminated various tribes
starting in the late 1950s.  Those Acts closed tribal mem-
bership rolls, specified the division of tribal assets, and re-
voked tribal constitutions.  See, e.g., Act of Sept. 21, 1959, 
Pub. L. No. 86–322, 73 Stat. 592.  Following termination,
the tribe and its members were no longer “entitled to any of
the special services performed by the United States for In-
dians because of their status as Indians.”  §5, id., at 593.  As 
respondents note, this language resembles (although does
not mirror precisely) the final words of ISDA’s recognized-
as-eligible clause.  If being terminated means no longer be-
ing “entitled to any of the special services performed by the 
United  States  for  Indians  because of  their  status  as  Indi-
ans,” the argument goes, then being “recognized as eligible 
for  the  special  programs  and  services  provided  by  the
United States to Indians because of their status as Indians” 
means being a federally recognized tribe.

Respondents misjudge the relevance of these termination 
statutes.  Those statutes do not contain the words “recog-
nized as eligible”; they do not even contain the word “recog-
nized.”  Furthermore,  the  termination  statutes  use  their