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Page Number: 62

18 

ZIGLAR v. ABBASI 

BREYER, J., dissenting 

work.  Some  of  them  are  better  cast  as  “special  factors” 
relevant to Step Three.  But, as I see it, none should nor-
mally foreclose a Bivens action and none is determinative 
here.  Consider them one by one: 

(1)  The  rank  of  the  officers.  I  can  understand  why  an
officer’s rank might bear on whether he violated the Con-
stitution,  because,  for  example,  a  plaintiff  might  need  to 
show  the  officer  was  willfully  blind  to  a  harm  caused  by 
lower  ranking  officers  or  that  the  officer  had  actual 
knowledge of the misconduct.  And I can understand that 
rank might relate to the existence of a legal defense, such
as  qualified,  or  even  absolute,  immunity.    But  if—and  I 
recognize that this is often a very big if—a plaintiff proves 
a  clear  constitutional  violation,  say,  of  the  Fourth 
Amendment,  and  he  shows  that  the  defendant  does  not 
possess  any  form  of  immunity  or  other  defense,  then  why
should he not have a damages remedy for harm suffered? 
What does rank have to do with that question, namely, the 
Bivens  question?    Why  should  the  law  treat  differently  a
high-level  official  and  the  local  constable  where  each  has 
similarly violated the Constitution and where neither can
successfully assert immunity or any other defense?

(2)  The  constitutional  right  at  issue.    I  agree  that  this
factor can make a difference, but only when the substance 
of  the  right  is  distinct.  See,  e.g.,  Wilkie,  551  U. S.  537 
(land rights).  But, for reasons I have already pointed out,
there is no relevant difference between the rights at issue 
here and the rights at issue in our previous Bivens cases, 
namely,  the  rights  to  be  free  of  unreasonable  searches, 
invidious  discrimination,  and  physical  abuse  in  federal
custody.  See supra, at 10–11. 

(3)  The  generality or specificity of the individual action.
I should think that it is not the “generality or specificity” 
of  an  official  action  but  rather  the  nature  of  the  official 
action that matters.  Bivens should apply to some generally 
applicable  actions,  such  as  actions  taken  deliberately  to