Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/529bv.pdf
Page Number: 146

529US1

Unit: $U34

[09-26-01 08:14:00] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 529 U. S. 61 (2000)

71

Opinion of the Court

approved of such “generic” comment before.
In Reagan, for
example, the trial court instructed the jury that “[t]he deep
personal interest which [the defendant] may have in the re-
sult of the suit should be considered . . . in weighing his
evidence and in determining how far or to what extent, if at
all, it is worthy of credit.” 157 U. S., at 304. The instruc-
tion did not rely on any speciﬁc evidence of actual fabrication
for its application; nor did it, directly at least, delineate the
guilty and the innocent. Like the comments in this case, it
simply set forth a consideration the jury was to have in mind
when assessing the defendant’s credibility, which, in turn,
assisted it in determining the guilt of the defendant. We
deemed that instruction perfectly proper. Thus, that the
comments before us here did not, of their own force, demon-
strate the guilt of the defendant, or even distinguish among
defendants, does not render them inﬁrm.2

Finally, the Second Circuit held, and the dissent contends,
that the comments were impermissible here because they
were made, not during cross-examination, but at summation,

2 The dissent’s stern disapproval of generic comment (it “tarnishes the
innocent no less than the guilty,” post, at 77–78; it suffers from an “in-
capacity to serve the individualized truth-ﬁnding function of trials,” post,
at 80; so that “when a defendant’s exercise of a constitutional fair trial
right is ‘insolubly ambiguous’ as between innocence and guilt, the prose-
cutor may not urge the jury to construe the bare invocation of the right
against the defendant,” post, at 78) hardly comports with its praising the
Court of Appeals for its “carefully restrained and moderate position”
in forbidding this monstrous practice only on summation and allowing
it during the rest of the trial, ibid. The dissent would also allow a prose-
cutor to remark at any time—even at summation—on the convenient “ﬁt”
between speciﬁc elements of a defendant’s testimony and the testimony
Ibid.
of others.
It is only a “general accusation of tailoring” that is
forbidden.
Ibid. But if the dissent believes that comments which “invite
the jury to convict on the basis of conduct as consistent with innocence as
with guilt” should be out of bounds, post, at 79—or at least should be out
of bounds in summation—comments focusing on such “ﬁt” must similarly
be forbidden. As the dissent acknowledges, “ﬁt” is as likely to result from
the defendant’s “sheer innocence” as from anything else. Post, at 85.