Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/20pdf/19-1257_g204.pdf
Page Number: 68

24 

BRNOVICH v. DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL COMMITTEE 

KAGAN, J., dissenting 

to  vote  (say,  on  Election Day;  early  in  person;  or  by  mail) 
may be more “open” than a State with only one (on Election 
Day).  And some other statute might care about that.  But 
Section  2  does  not.    What  it  cares  about  is  that  a  State’s 
“political processes” are “equally open” to voters of all races.  
And a State’s electoral process is not equally open if, for ex-
ample, the State “only” makes Election Day voting by mem-
bers of one race peculiarly difficult.  The House Report on 
Section 2 addresses that issue.  It explains that an election 
system  would  violate  Section  2  if  minority  citizens  had  a 
lesser opportunity than white citizens to use absentee bal-
lots.    See  H. R.  Rep.,  at  31,  n. 106.    Even  if  the  minority 
citizens  could  just  as  easily  vote  in  person,  the  scheme 
would  “result  in  unequal  access  to  the  political  process.”  
Id., at 31.  That is not some piece of contestable legislative 
history.  It is the only reading of Section 2 possible, given 
the statute’s focus on equality.  Maybe the majority does not 
mean to contest that proposition; its discussion of this sup-
posed factor is short and cryptic.  But if the majority does 
intend to excuse so much discrimination, it is wrong.  Mak-
ing one method of voting less available to minority citizens 
than  to  whites  necessarily  means  giving  the  former  “less 
opportunity than other members of the electorate to partic-
ipate in the political process.”  §10301(b). 
  The  majority’s  history-and-commonality  factor  also 
pushes the inquiry away from what the statute demands.  
The oddest part of the majority’s analysis is the idea that 
“what was standard practice when §2 was amended in 1982 
is a relevant consideration.”  Ante, at 16.  The 1982 state of 
the world is no part of the Section 2 test.  An election rule 
prevalent at that time may make voting harder for minority 
than for white citizens; Section 2 then covers such a rule, as 
it covers any other.  And contrary to the majority’s unsup-
ported speculation, Congress “intended” exactly that.  Ante, 
at 17; see H. R. Rep., at 14 (explaining that the Act aimed 
to eradicate the “numerous practices and procedures which