Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/17pdf/16-402_h315.pdf
Page Number: 63

Cite as:  585 U. S. ____ (2018) 

13 

THOMAS, J., dissenting 

Carter, supra, at 92–94 (opinion of Scalia, J.).  Yet, under 
the  Katz  test,  individuals  can  have  a  reasonable  expecta­
tion  of  privacy  in  another  person’s  property.  See,  e.g., 
Carter,  525  U. S.,  at  89  (majority  opinion)  (“[A]  person
may have a legitimate expectation of privacy in the house
of  someone  else”).    Until  today,  our  precedents  have  not 
acknowledged  that  individuals  can  claim  a  reasonable
expectation  of  privacy  in  someone  else’s  business  records. 
See  ante,  at  2  (KENNEDY,  J.,  dissenting).  But  the  Court 
erases  that  line  in  this  case,  at  least  for  cell-site  location 
records.  In  doing  so,  it  confirms  that  the  Katz  test  does 
not  necessarily  require  an  individual  to  prove  that  the 
government searched his person, house, paper, or effect. 

Carpenter  attempts  to  argue  that  the  cell-site  records
are,  in  fact,  his  “papers,”  see  Brief  for  Petitioner  32–35;
Reply  Brief  14–15,  but  his  arguments  are  unpersuasive, 
see ante, at 12–13 (opinion of KENNEDY, J.); post, at 20–23 
(ALITO,  J.,  dissenting).    Carpenter  stipulated  below  that 
the cell-site records are the business records of Sprint and
MetroPCS.  See App. 51.  He cites no property law in his
briefs to this Court, and he does not explain how he has a
property right in the companies’ records under the law  of 
any  jurisdiction  at  any  point  in  American  history. 
If 
someone  stole  these  records  from  Sprint  or  MetroPCS, 
Carpenter does not argue that he could recover in a tradi­
tional  tort  action.  Nor  do  his  contracts  with  Sprint  and 
MetroPCS  make  the  records  his,  even  though  such  provi­
sions  could  exist  in  the  marketplace.    Cf.,  e.g.,  Google
Terms  of  Service,  https://policies.google.com/terms  (“Some
of our Services allow you to upload, submit, store, send or
receive  content.  You  retain  ownership  of  any  intellectual
property  rights  that  you  hold  in  that  content.    In  short, 
what belongs to you stays yours”).

Instead  of  property,  tort,  or  contract  law,  Carpenter
relies  on  the  federal  Telecommunications  Act  of  1996  to 
demonstrate that the cell site records are his papers.  The