Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/17pdf/16-1454_5h26.pdf
Page Number: 31

Cite as:  585 U. S. ____ (2018) 

7 

BREYER, J., dissenting 

encouraging  customers  to  use  other,  less-expensive  cards. 
Ibid. 

The  District  Court  also  found  that  even  though  Ameri­
can Express raised its merchant prices 20 times in this 5­
year period, it did not lose the business of any large mer­
chant.  Id.,  at  197.  Nor  did  American  Express  increase
benefits  (or  cut  credit-card  prices)  to  American  Express 
cardholders in tandem with the merchant price increases. 
Id.,  at  196.   Even  had  there  been  no  direct  evidence  of 
injury  to  competition,  American  Express’  ability  to  raise
merchant  prices  without  losing  any  meaningful  market 
share, in the District Court’s view, showed that American 
Express possessed power in the relevant market.  See id., 
at 195. 

The District Court also found that, in the absence of the 
provisions,  prices  to  merchants  would  likely  have  been
lower.  Ibid.  It wrote that in the late 1990’s, Discover, one 
of  American  Express’  competitors,  had  tried  to  develop  a
business  model  that  involved  charging  lower  prices  to 
merchants than the other companies charged.  Id., at 213. 
Discover  then  invited  each  “merchant  to  save  money  by
shifting  volume  to  Discover,”  while  simultaneously  offer­
ing  merchants  additional  discounts  “if  they  would  steer
customers to Discover.”  Ibid.  The court determined that 
these efforts failed because of American Express’ (and the
other  card  companies’)  “nondiscrimination  provisions.”
These  provisions,  the  court  found,  “denied  merchants  the 
ability  to  express  a  preference  for  Discover  or  to  employ 
any other tool by which they might steer share to Discov­
er’s lower-priced network.”  Id., at 214.  Because the provi­
sions  eliminated  any  advantage  that  lower  prices  might 
produce, Discover “abandoned its low-price business model”
and  raised  its  merchant  fees  to  match  those  of  its 
competitors.  Ibid.   This  series  of  events,  the  court  con­
cluded was “emblematic of the harm done to the competi­
tive process” by the “nondiscrimination provisions.”  Ibid.