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10 

FISHER v. UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN 

Opinion of the Court 

Parents  Involved  in  Community  Schools  v.  Seattle  School 
Dist. No. 1, 551 U. S. 701, 732 (2007).

Once  the  University  has  established  that  its  goal  of  di-
versity  is  consistent  with  strict  scrutiny,  however,  there 
must  still  be  a  further  judicial  determination  that  the
admissions process  meets  strict  scrutiny  in  its  implemen-
tation.  The University must prove that the means chosen
by the University to attain diversity are narrowly tailored
to  that  goal.    On  this  point,  the  University  receives  no 
deference.  Grutter made clear that it is for the courts, not 
for university administrators, to ensure that “[t]he means 
chosen to accomplish the [government’s] asserted purpose
must  be  specifically  and  narrowly  framed  to  accomplish 
that purpose.”  539 U. S., at 333 (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  True, a court can take account of a university’s
experience  and  expertise  in  adopting  or  rejecting  certain
admissions processes.  But, as the Court said in Grutter, it 
remains at all times the University’s obligation to demon-
strate,  and  the  Judiciary’s  obligation  to  determine,  that
admissions processes “ensure that each applicant is evalu-
ated  as  an  individual  and  not  in  a  way  that  makes  an
applicant’s  race  or  ethnicity  the  defining  feature  of  his  or 
her application.”  Id., at 337. 

Narrow  tailoring  also  requires  that  the  reviewing  court
verify  that  it  is  “necessary”  for  a  university  to  use  race 
to  achieve  the  educational  benefits  of  diversity.    Bakke, 
supra, at 305.  This involves a careful judicial inquiry into
whether  a  university  could  achieve  sufficient  diversity 
without  using  racial  classifications.    Although  “[n]arrow 
tailoring  does  not  require  exhaustion  of  every  conceivable 
race-neutral  alternative,”  strict  scrutiny  does  require  a 
court to examine with care, and not defer to, a university’s 
“serious, good faith consideration of workable race-neutral 
alternatives.”  See Grutter, 539 U. S., at 339–340 (empha-
sis  added).    Consideration  by  the  university  is  of  course 
necessary, but it is not sufficient to satisfy strict scrutiny: