Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/22pdf/21-476_c185.pdf
Page Number: 49.0

Cite as:  600 U. S. ____ (2023) 

17 

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting 

most  people  either  because  they  already  have  them  or  do
not need them; these are protections against exclusion from 
an almost limitless number of transactions and endeavors 
that constitute ordinary civic life in a free society.”  Romer 
v. Evans, 517 U. S. 620, 631 (1996).  LGBT  people do not 
seek any special treatment.  All they seek is to exist in pub-
lic.  To inhabit public spaces on the same terms and condi-
tions as everyone else. 

C 
Yet for as long as public accommodations laws have been
around,  businesses  have  sought  exemptions  from  them. 
The civil rights and women’s liberation eras are prominent 
examples of this.  Backlashes to race and sex equality gave 
rise  to  legal  claims  of  rights  to  discriminate,  including
claims based on First Amendment freedoms of expression
and association.  This Court was unwavering in its rejection
of those claims, as invidious discrimination “has never been 
accorded affirmative constitutional protections.”  Norwood 
v. Harrison, 413 U. S.  455, 470 (1973).  In particular, the
refusal to deal with or to serve a class of people is not an 
expressive interest protected by the First Amendment. 

1 

Opponents of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 objected that 
the  law  would  force  business  owners  to  defy  their  beliefs.
Cf. ante, at 3.  They argued that the Act would deny them
“any freedom to speak or to act on the basis of their religious 
convictions or their deep-rooted preferences for associating 
or  not  associating  with  certain  classifications  of  people.”
110 Cong. Rec. 7778 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Tower).  Con-
gress rejected those arguments.  Title II of the Act, in par-
ticular, did not invade “rights of privacy [or] of free associ-
ation,”  Congress  concluded,  because  the  establishments
covered by the law were “those regularly held open to the