Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/13pdf/12-536_e1pf.pdf
Page Number: 23.0

Cite as:  572 U. S. ____ (2014) 

17 

Opinion of ROBERTS, C. J. 

said to promote “a government where laws reflect the very 
thoughts,  views,  ideas,  and  sentiments,  the  expression  of 
which the First Amendment protects.”  Post, at 7. 

But  there  are  compelling  reasons  not  to  define  the
boundaries of the First Amendment by reference to such a
generalized  conception  of  the  public  good.  First,  the  dis-
sent’s “collective speech” reflected in laws is of course the 
will  of  the  majority,  and  plainly  can  include  laws  that 
restrict free speech.  The whole point of the First Amend-
ment  is  to  afford  individuals  protection  against  such  in-
fringements.  The  First  Amendment  does  not  protect 
the  government,  even  when  the  government  purports  to
act  through  legislation  reflecting  “collective  speech.”    Cf. 
United  States  v.  Alvarez,  567  U. S.  ___  (2012);  Wooley  v. 
Maynard, 430 U. S. 705 (1977); West Virginia Bd. of Ed. v. 
Barnette, 319 U. S. 624 (1943). 

Second,  the  degree  to  which  speech  is  protected  cannot 
turn on a legislative or judicial determination that partic-
ular speech is useful to the democratic process.  The First 
Amendment  does  not  contemplate  such  “ad hoc  balancing 
of  relative  social  costs  and  benefits.”    United  States  v. 
Stevens,  559  U. S.  460,  470  (2010);  see  also  United  States 
v.  Playboy  Entertainment  Group,  Inc.,  529  U. S.  803,  818 
(2000)  (“What  the  Constitution  says  is  that”  value  judg-
ments  “are  for  the  individual  to  make,  not  for  the  Gov-
ernment to decree, even with the mandate or approval of a 
majority”).

Third,  our  established  First  Amendment  analysis  al-
ready  takes  account  of  any  “collective”  interest  that  may
justify  restrictions  on  individual  speech.    Under  that 
accepted  analysis,  such  restrictions  are  measured  against 
the  asserted  public  interest  (usually  framed  as  an  im-
portant  or  compelling  governmental  interest).    As  ex-
plained  below,  we  do  not  doubt  the  compelling  nature  of 
the  “collective”  interest  in  preventing  corruption  in  the 
electoral process.  But we permit Congress to pursue that