Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/19pdf/18-801_o758.pdf
Page Number: 6.0

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PETER v. NANTKWEST, INC. 

Opinion of the Court 

as the ‘ “American Rule” ’: Each litigant pays his own attor-
ney’s fees, win or lose, unless a statute or contract provides
otherwise.”  Hardt v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 560 
U. S.  242,  252–253  (2010)  (quoting  Ruckelshaus  v.  Sierra 
Club, 463 U. S. 680, 683 (1983)).  The American Rule has 
“roots in our common law reaching back to at least the 18th
century.”  Baker Botts, 576 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 3) (citing 
Arcambel v. Wiseman, 3 Dall. 306 (1796)); see also Summit 
Valley  Industries,  Inc.  v.  Carpenters,  456  U. S.  717,  721 
(1982) (observing that the American Rule “has been consist-
ently followed for almost 200 years”); Alyeska Pipeline, 421 
U. S., at 257 (referring to the presumption against shifting 
attorney’s fees as a “general” rule). 

The  Government  does  not  dispute  this  principle  or  its
pedigree, but argues instead that it does not apply at all.
Because the American Rule presumption is most often over-
come when a statute awards fees to a “prevailing party,” the
Government  maintains,  the  presumption  applies  only  to 
prevailing-party statutes.  And because §145 requires one 
party to pay all expenses regardless of outcome, the argu-
ment goes, it is not a statute subject to the presumption. 

That view is incorrect.  This Court has never suggested
that  any  statute  is  exempt  from  the  presumption  against 
fee shifting.  Nor has it limited its American Rule inquiries
to prevailing-party statutes.  Indeed, the Court has devel-
oped a “line of precedents” “addressing statutory deviations 
from  the  American  Rule  that  do  not  limit  attorney’s  fees
awards to the ‘prevailing party.’ ”  Hardt, 560 U. S., at 254; 
see also Baker Botts, 576 U. S., at ___–___ (slip op., at 5–7) 
(analyzing a bankruptcy provision that did not mention pre-
vailing  parties  under  the  American  Rule’s  presumption 
against fee shifting). 

Sebelius v. Cloer, 569 U. S. 369 (2013), confirms that the 
presumption  against  fee  shifting  applies  to  all  statutes—
even those like §145 that do not explicitly award attorney’s
fees to “prevailing parties.”  In Cloer, the Court interpreted