Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/22pdf/598us1r3_j4ek.pdf
Page Number: 8

Cite as:  598 U. S. 17 (2023) 

23 

Opinion of the Court 

tive  Clemency  to  testify  that  the  board  no  longer  had  au-
thority  to  parole  any  capital  defendants.  In  response,  the 
State  sought  to  prevent  Cruz  from  offering  evidence  as  to 
“the  prospects  of  parole  for  an  inmate  sentenced  to  life  im-
prisonment.”  Id.,  at  45.  The  trial  court  precluded  the 
testimony. 

During  the  aggravation/mitigation  phase  of  an  Arizona 
capital trial, the jury must frst determine whether an aggra-
vating  circumstance  exists.  The  jury  here  found  a  single 
aggravating  factor  that  Cruz  knowingly  killed  a  police  off-
cer.  See  Ariz.  Rev.  Stat.  Ann.  § 13–703(F)(10)  (2003)  (re-
numbered  as  § 13–751(F)(8)).  The  jury  then  heard  from  16 
defense  witnesses  who  testifed  to  Cruz's  good  behavior  in 
prison,  his  abuse  and  neglect  as  a  child,  his  posttraumatic 
stress disorder, and his history of drug use, including around 
the time of the offense. 

After  counsel  made  closing  arguments,  the  judge  in-
structed  the  jury  that  Cruz  was  eligible  for  three  penalties: 
(1)  “Death  by  lethal  injection”;  (2)  “Life  imprisonment  with 
no possibility of parole or release from imprisonment on any 
basis”; and (3) “Life imprisonment with a possibility of parole 
or  release  from  imprisonment”  after  25  years.  App.  94. 
The reference to parole was plainly wrong.  See Lynch, 578 
U. S., at 615  (the only “release” available  under Arizona law 
is  executive  clemency,  not  parole).  The  judge  further  in-
structed  the  jury  that  its  only choice  was  whether  or  not  to 
sentence Cruz to death; if the jury did not vote for death, the 
judge would then choose between the two remaining possible 
sentences.  The jury sentenced Cruz to death. 

Three  jurors, unprompted  by Cruz,  issued a  press release 
the  next  day.  The  jurors  explained  that  this  had  been  a 
“gut-wrenching  decision”  and  that  “[t]here was  not  one  per-
son on the jury who did not cry.”  App. 144.  They reported 
that they would rather have voted for life without the possi-
bility of parole, but that they were not given that option.  A 
fourth  juror  later  stated  in  a  declaration:  “If  I  could  have 

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