Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/22pdf/21-1086_1co6.pdf
Page Number: 99.0

Cite as:  599 U. S. ____ (2023) 

3 

ALITO, J., dissenting 

the claim is that §2 requires the creation of an additional 
majority-minority  district,  the  first  precondition  means 
that  the  plaintiff  must  produce  an  additional  illustrative 
majority-minority  district  that  is  “reasonably  configured.”  
Cooper, 581 U. S., at 301; Wisconsin Legislature, 595 U. S., 
at ___ (slip op., at 3); see also Gingles, 478 U. S., at 50. 
  The Court’s basic error is that it misunderstands what it 
means  for  a  district  to  be  “reasonably  configured.”    Our 
cases  make  it  clear  that  “reasonably  configured”  is  not  a 
synonym for  “compact.”    We  have  explained that  the  first 
precondition  also  takes  into  account  other  traditional  dis-
tricting criteria like attempting to avoid the splitting of po-
litical subdivisions and “communities of interest.”  League 
of United Latin American Citizens v. Perry, 548 U. S. 399, 
433–434 (2006) (LULAC). 
  To its credit, the Court recognizes that compactness is not 
enough and that a district is not reasonably configured if it 
flouts  other  “traditional  districting  criteria.”    Ante,  at  10.  
At various points in its opinion it names quite a few: mini-
mizing the splitting of counties and other political subdivi-
sions,  keeping  “communities  of  interest”  together  where 
possible, and avoiding the creation of new districts that re-
quire two incumbents to run against each other.  Ante, at 
12, 26–27.  In addition, the Court acknowledges that a dis-
trict  is  not  “reasonably  configured”  if  it  does  not  comport 
with the Equal Protection Clause’s one-person, one-vote re-
quirement.  Ante, at 27.  But the Court fails to explain why 
compliance  with  “traditional  districting  criteria”  matters 
under §2 or why the only relevant equal protection principle 
is the one-person, one-vote requirement.  If the Court had 
attempted to answer these questions, the defect in its un-
derstanding of the first Gingles precondition would be un-
mistakable. 
  To explain this, I begin with what is probably the most 
frequently  mentioned  traditional  districting  criterion  and 
ask  why  it  should  matter  under  §2  whether  a  proposed