Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/22pdf/21-86_l5gm.pdf
Page Number: 41.0

8 

AXON ENTERPRISE, INC. v. FTC 

GORSUCH, J., concurring in judgment 

cease and desist from anything.  That §5(c) does not fore-
close Axon’s case finds reinforcement next door too.  Section 
5(d) holds that, “[u]pon the filing of the record . . . the juris-
diction of the court of appeals of the United States to affirm, 
enforce, modify, or set aside orders of the Commission shall 
be exclusive.”  §45(d).  So until an administrative record is 
lodged in the court of appeals—something that hasn’t hap-
pened here either—the appellate court’s jurisdiction is not 
exclusive and a plaintiff like Axon remains free to proceed 
in district court. 

In both cases, the relevant statutes guide the way.  Sec-
tion  1331  grants  district  courts  the  power  to  hear  Ms. 
Cochran’s  and  Axon’s  claims  and  no  other  law  takes  that 
power away.  Resolving jurisdictional disputes by looking to 
the  terms of the  statutes  Congress  has  adopted  may hold 
none of the suspense that comes with a ride on the Thunder 
Basin roller coaster.  But that is as it should be.  “Where 
the statutory  language is clear, our sole function . . .  is to 
enforce it according to its terms.”  Rake v. Wade, 508 U. S. 
464, 471 (1993) (internal quotation marks omitted).3 

—————— 

3 The parties spar over whether the government forfeited different ar-
guments against district court jurisdiction premised on two provisions of 
the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).  E.g., Reply Brief for Respond-
ent in No. 21–1239, p. 21.  Forfeited or not, these arguments hardly help 
the government.  One of the APA provisions the government cites con-
cerns review of “preliminary, procedural, or intermediate agency action.” 
5  U. S. C. §704.  The government assumes we have “agency action” by 
dint of the “initiation” or “commencement” of agency proceedings against 
Ms. Cochran and Axon.  Tr. of Oral Arg. in No. 21–86, p. 51; Tr. of Oral 
Arg. in No. 21–1239, p. 67.  But “agency action” is a defined term, one 
that embraces “the whole or a part of an agency rule, order, license, sanc-
tion,  relief,  or  the  equivalent  or  denial  thereof,  or  failure  to  act.” 
5 U. S. C. §551(13).  Ms. Cochran and Axon are not subject to, and do not 
seek review of, any of those things.  The other APA provision says “[t]he 
form of proceeding for judicial review is the special statutory review pro-
ceeding  relevant  to  the  subject  matter in a  court  specified  by statute.” 
§703.  But as we have seen, Ms. Cochran and Axon do not seek judicial 
review of an SEC final order or an FTC cease-and-desist order—and both