Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/22pdf/21-857_4357.pdf
Page Number: 44.0

12 

JONES v. HENDRIX 

JACKSON, J., dissenting 

by a mudslide.  The majority’s parsimonious perspective on 
the  meaning  of  “inadequate  or  ineffective”  is  flawed  in 
many respects.

First and foremost, it is entirely atextual.  The majority
cites exactly zero dictionary definitions of the terms “inad-
equate” or “ineffective.”  And while it does reference an ear-
lier  draft  of  the  legislation  that  became  §2255,  ante,  at  7 
(quoting Hayman, 342 U. S., at 215, n. 23), it fails to men-
tion  that  Congress  specifically  rejected  language  that  em-
braced the majority’s “impracticable only” proposition.  See 
Hayman, 342 U. S., at 215, n. 23; In re Dorsainvil, 119 F. 
3d 245, 250 (CA3 1997).

Furthermore,  while  the  majority  opinion  accurately  re-
cites the history and purpose of §2255, see ante, at 5–6, it 
ignores  the  import  of  that  history.  As  explained  above,
when Congress enacted §2255 in 1948, it intended to ensure 
equivalence between traditional habeas and the new §2255
mechanism for postconviction review.  Supra, at 5.  Accord-
ingly,  Congress  inserted  the  saving  clause  to  ensure  that
certain  pre-existing  postconviction  claims  (say,  a  claim  of 
statutory innocence) could still be heard even if the statu-
tory language Congress was adopting inadvertently barred 
them.  Supra, at 3–7.  And Congress preserved the language
of  §2255(e)—the  language  that  performs  the  equalizing 
function—in  1996,  even  as  it  made  other  significant
changes to §2255.  Supra, at 7–8. 

Ignoring  all  this,  the  majority  grounds  its  analysis  of 
§2255(e) in a scattershot of lower court cases that the ma-
jority  claims  “[t]raditionally”  viewed  the  saving  clause  as
solving only for practical filing problems.  Ante, at 6–7.  To 
be sure, a handful of lower courts applied the saving clause 
where the sentencing court was dissolved.  Ibid.  But lower 
courts have also “[t]raditionally,” ante, at 6, treated the sav-
ing  clause  as  permitting  individuals  with  previously  una-
vailable statutory innocence claims to file habeas petitions