Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/21pdf/20-601_bq7c.pdf
Page Number: 37.0

8  CAMERON v. EMW WOMEN’S SURGICAL CENTER, P. S. C. 

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting 

that  “points  decisively  against  intervention”  and  hardly 
suggests that  denial  of intervention would  be an  abuse  of 
discretion.    831  Fed.  Appx.,  at  750.    Neither  of  those  two 
cases involved a situation in which the intervenor on behalf 
of the State was a party to the case earlier in the proceed-
ings, let alone one in which the intervenor had previously 
disclaimed  his  theory  of  intervention  to  obtain  dismissal 
from the suit.  See Day v. Apoliona, 505 F. 3d 963, 965–966 
(CA9 2007); Peruta v. County of San Diego, 824 F. 3d 919, 
941  (CA9  2016)  (en  banc).    Indeed,  the  Ninth  Circuit  has 
denied intervention on facts similar to these.  In Yniguez v. 
Arizona, 939 F. 2d 727 (1991), the court considered a state 
attorney general’s motion to intervene on appeal to defend 
the constitutionality of a state law where the attorney gen-
eral had previously “argued for and won a dismissal of the 
suit against him in the district court.”  Id., at 729.  There, 
as here, the attorney general sought to intervene after the 
only remaining state defendant in the case declined to pur-
sue  the  case  further.    Id.,  at  730.    The  court  nonetheless 
held that “having argued in the district court that he should 
not be a party, the Attorney General is estopped from now 
arguing  that  he  should  be.”    Id.,  at  738.    Other  Courts  of 
Appeals have similarly held that stipulations entered into 
by a public official in his official capacity are binding on the 
official’s successors.  Morales Feliciano v. Rullan, 303 F. 3d 
1, 8 (CA1 2002); Vann v. United States Dept. of Interior, 701 
F. 3d 927, 929 (CADC 2012); see generally 11A A. Miller, 
M.  Kane,  &  C.  Wright,  Federal  Practice  and  Procedure 
§2956 (3d ed. 2021). 
  Perhaps the Court means to excuse the attorney general 
from his prior stipulation because of the intervening elec-
tion.    That  election  undoubtedly  explains,  as  a  practical 
matter, the attorney general’s change in position.  But the 
Court’s reasoning would seem to apply equally if Attorney 
General  Cameron  had  held  office  since  the  outset  of  this 
lawsuit, made a calculated decision to stipulate to dismissal