Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/12pdf/11-556_11o2.pdf
Page Number: 54.0

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VANCE v. BALL STATE UNIV. 

GINSBURG, J., dissenting 

supervisor,  and  reviewed  Ball  State’s  liability  for  her
conduct under a negligence standard.  646 F. 3d 461, 470– 
471 (2011); App. to Pet. for Cert. 53a–55a, 59a–60a.  Because 
I  would  hold  that  the  Seventh  Circuit  erred  in  restrict- 
ing  supervisor  status  to  employees  formally  empowered 
to  take  tangible  employment  actions,  I  would  remand
for  application  of  the  proper  standard  to  Vance’s  claim.
On  this  record,  however,  there  is  cause  to  anticipate  that
Davis would not qualify as Vance’s supervisor.8 

Supervisor  status  is  based  on  “job  function  rather  than 
job  title,”  and  depends  on  “specific  facts”  about  the  work-
ing relationship.  EEOC Guidance 405:7654.  See supra, at 
13.  Vance  has  adduced  scant  evidence  that  Davis  con-
trolled  the  conditions  of  her  daily  work.    Vance  stated  in 
an  affidavit  that  the  general  manager  of  the  Catering
Division,  Bill  Kimes,  was  charged  with  “overall  supervi-
sion  in  the  kitchen,”  including  “reassign[ing]  people  to 
perform  different  tasks,”  and  “control[ling]  the  schedule.”
App.  431.  The  chef,  Shannon  Fultz,  assigned  tasks  by 
preparing “prep lists” of daily duties.  Id., at 277–279, 427. 
There  is  no  allegation  that  Davis  had  a  hand  in  creating
these  prep  lists,  nor  is  there  any  indication  that,  in  fact,
Davis  otherwise  controlled  the  particulars  of  Vance’s 
workday.  Vance  herself  testified  that  she  did  not  know 
whether Davis was her supervisor.  Id., at 198. 

True,  Davis’  job  description  listed  among  her  responsi-
bilities  “[l]ead[ing]  and  direct[ing]  kitchen  part-time,
substitute,  and  student  employee  helpers  via  demonstra-

—————— 

8 In addition to concluding that Davis was not Vance’s supervisor, the 
District  Court  held  that  the  conduct  Vance  alleged  was  “neither  suffi-
ciently severe nor pervasive to be considered objectively hostile for the 
purposes of Title VII.”  App. to Pet. for Cert. 66a.  The Seventh Circuit 
declined  to  address  this  issue.    See  646  F. 3d  461,  471  (2011).    If  the 
case  were  remanded,  the  Court  of  Appeals  could  resolve  the  hostile 
environment issue first, and then, if necessary, Davis’ status as super-
visor or co-worker.