Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/21pdf/20-979_h3ci.pdf
Page Number: 17.0

Cite as:  596 U. S. ____ (2022) 

13 

Opinion of the Court 

This reference to barring review of discretionary decisions, 
the Government says, implies that review of nondiscretion-
ary decisions is allowed. 

Kucana’s  discussion  is  inapposite.  That  opinion  ad-
dressed  whether  the  Attorney  General  could  unilaterally
proscribe review of decisions “declared discretionary by the 
Attorney General himself through regulation.”  Id., at 237. 
In drawing the comparison between clauses (i) and (ii), we 
thus focused on the fact that each form of relief identified 
in clause (i) was entrusted to the Attorney General’s discre-
tion  by  statute.  Id.,  at  246.  We  neither  said  nor  implied 
anything about review of eligibility decisions made in the 
course of exercising that statutory discretion. 

In short, the Government is wrong about both text and 
context.  A “judgment” does not necessarily involve discre-
tion, nor does context indicate that only discretionary judg-
ments are covered by §1252(a)(2)(B)(i). 

2 

the 

Patel 

Unlike 

Government, 

interprets 
§1252(a)(2)(B)(i)  to  prohibit  review  of  only  the  ultimate
grant  or  denial  of  relief,  leaving  all  eligibility  determina-
tions reviewable.  That, Patel says, is because the provision
specifies the kind of judgment to which the bar applies: “any
judgment regarding the granting  of relief.”  Eligibility de-
terminations—which  Patel  characterizes  as  “first-step  de-
cisions”—are not judgments regarding the granting of relief 
because eligibility is a necessary but insufficient condition 
for relief.  The only judgment that can actually grant relief 
is  what  Patel  describes  as  the  “second-step  decision” 
whether to grant the applicant the “ ‘ “grace” ’ ” of relief from 
removal.  Brief for Petitioners 20 (quoting St. Cyr, 533 U. S., 
at 308).  So, Patel argues, that is the sole judgment to which 
the bar applies.

Like the Government, Patel cannot square his interpre-
tation with the text of §1252(a)(2)(B)(i).  He claims that his