Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/529bv.pdf
Page Number: 645

529US2

Unit: $U52

[09-26-01 10:36:40] PAGES PGT: OPIN

570

CARMELL v. TEXAS

Ginsburg, J., dissenting

That is a plausible reading of Collins, and I might well be
prepared to accept it, were the issue presented here. But it
is not. For purposes of this case, it does not matter whether
Collins eliminated the fourth Calder category or left it un-
disturbed. For even if the fourth category remains viable,
our precedents make clear that it cannot be stretched to
ﬁt the statutory change at issue here. Those precedents—
decisions that fully acknowledged the fourth Calder cate-
gory—ﬁrmly establish that retroactively applied changes
in rules concerning the admissibility of evidence and the
competency of witnesses do not raise Ex Post Facto Clause
concerns.

In Thompson v. Missouri, 171 U. S. 380 (1898), this Court
upheld against ex post
facto attack the retroactive ap-
plication of a statute that permitted the introduction of
previously inadmissible evidence to demonstrate the authen-
ticity of disputed writings. The new statute, the Court rea-
soned, “did nothing more than remove an obstacle arising
out of a rule of evidence that withdrew from the consid-
eration of the jury testimony which, in the opinion of the
legislature, tended to elucidate the ultimate, essential fact
to be established, namely, the guilt of the accused.”
Id., at
387.

The case most similar to the one before us is Hopt v. Terri-
In that case, a statute
tory of Utah, 110 U. S. 574 (1884).
in effect at the time of the offense but repealed by the time
of trial provided that felons were incompetent to testify.
The defendant, whose conviction for capital murder had been
based in large part on the testimony of a felon, claimed that
the application of the new law to his trial was ex post facto.
The Court rejected the defendant’s claim, adopting reasoning
applicable to the instant case:

“Statutes which simply enlarge the class of persons who
may be competent to testify in criminal cases are not
ex post facto in their application to prosecutions for
crimes committed prior to their passage; for they do