Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/524bv.pdf
Page Number: 346.0

524US2

Unit: $U87

[09-15-00 14:31:25] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 524 U. S. 274 (1998)

301

Stevens, J., dissenting

can claim immunity from damages liability.11
Indeed, the
rule that the Court adopts would preclude a damages rem-
edy even if every teacher at the school knew about the har-
assment but did not have “authority to institute corrective
measures on the district’s behalf.” Ante, at 277.
It is not
my function to determine whether this newly fashioned rule
is wiser than the established common-law rule.
It is proper,
however, to suggest that the Court bears the burden of justi-
fying its rather dramatic departure from settled law, and to
explain why its opinion fails to shoulder that burden.

III

The Court advances several reasons why it would “frus-
trate the purposes” of Title IX to allow recovery against a
school district that does not have actual notice of a teacher’s
sexual harassment of a student. Ante, at 285 (internal quo-
tation marks omitted). As the Court acknowledges, how-
ever, the two principal purposes that motivated the enact-
ment of Title IX were: (1) “ ‘to avoid the use of federal
resources to support discriminatory practices’ ”; and (2) “ ‘to
provide individual citizens effective protection against those
practices.’ ” Ante, at 286 (quoting Cannon, 441 U. S., at
704).
It seems quite obvious that both of those purposes
would be served—not frustrated—by providing a damages
remedy in a case of this kind. To the extent that the Court’s
reasons for its policy choice have any merit, they suggest
that no damages should ever be awarded in a Title IX case—
in other words, that our unanimous holding in Franklin
should be repudiated.

11 The Court concludes that its holding “does not affect any right of re-
covery that an individual may have against a school district as a matter
of state law or against the teacher in his individual capacity under state
In this case, of course,
law or under 42 U. S. C. § 1983.” Ante, at 292.
the District Court denied petitioners’ § 1983 claim on summary judgment,
and it is undisputed that the Texas Tort Claims Act, Tex. Civ. Prac. &
Rem. Code Ann. § 101.051 (1997), immunizes school districts from tort lia-
bility in cases like this one.