Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/21pdf/20-493_jgko.pdf
Page Number: 17.0

Cite as:  596 U. S. ____ (2022) 

13 

Opinion of the Court 

meaning  of  the  statutory  terms  before  us,  important  con-
textual clues resolve them.  Recall that Congress passed the 
Act just six months after this Court handed down Cabazon. 
See Part I–B, supra.  In that decision, the Court interpreted
Public Law 280 to mean that only “prohibitory” state gam-
ing laws could be applied on the Indian lands in question,
not  state  “regulatory”  gaming  laws.    The  Court  then  pro-
ceeded to hold that California bingo laws—laws materially 
identical  to  the  Texas  bingo  laws  before  us  today—fell  on
the  regulatory  side  of  the  ledger.  Just  like  Texas  today,
California heavily regulated bingo, allowing it only in cer-
tain  circumstances  (usually  for  charity).    Just  like  Texas, 
California  criminalized  violations  of  its  rules.  Compare 
Cabazon,  480  U. S.,  at  205,  with  Tex.  Occ.  Code  Ann. 
§ 2001.551.  Still, because California permitted some forms 
of bingo, the Court concluded that meant California did not 
prohibit, but only regulated, the game.  Cabazon, 480 U. S., 
at 211. 

For us, that clinches the case.  This Court generally as-
sumes that, when Congress enacts statutes, it is aware of
this Court’s relevant precedents.  See Ryan v. Valencia Gon-
zales,  568  U. S.  57,  66  (2013).    And  at  the  time  Congress 
adopted the Restoration Act, Cabazon was not only a rele-
vant precedent concerning Indian gaming; it was the prece-
dent.  See Part I–B, supra.  In Cabazon, the Court drew a 
sharp  line  between  the  terms  prohibitory  and  regulatory
and held that state bingo laws very much like the ones now 
before us qualified as regulatory rather than prohibitory in 
nature.  We do not see how we might fairly read the terms
of the Restoration Act except in the same light.  After all, 
“[w]hen the words of the Court are used in a later statute 
governing the same subject matter, it is respectful of Con-
gress and of the Court’s own processes to give the words the
same meaning in the absence of specific direction to the con-
trary.”  Williams v. Taylor, 529 U. S. 420, 434 (2000).

Even beyond that vital contextual clue lie others.  In the