Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/23pdf/23-726_6jgm.pdf
Page Number: 41.0

18 

MOYLE v. UNITED STATES 

ALITO, J., dissenting 

Three of the six Justices in the majority also agree that
there is a conflict—and judging from their fiery rhetoric, a 
big one.  See ante, at 1 (KAGAN, J., joined by SOTOMAYOR, 
J., and by JACKSON, J., as to Part II, concurring); ante, at 7 
(JACKSON,  J.,  concurring  in  part  and  dissenting  in  part).
And they are correct to this extent: there is a real conflict. 

A 

I begin with the Government’s argument that “there are 
numerous  conditions”  that  may  afflict  a  pregnant  woman
“where a doctor’s immediate concern is not death.”  Tr. of 
Oral Arg. 103.  In those cases, the Government explains, a
doctor might be worried about serious risks to the woman’s
“health.”  Ibid.  In the Government’s telling, EMTALA re-
quires hospitals to perform an abortion on demand in these 
circumstances. 

Idaho law says otherwise.  An Idaho doctor may not per-
form  an  abortion  unless  the  doctor  “determine[s],  in  his
good faith medical judgment . . . , that the abortion [is] nec-
essary to prevent the death of the pregnant woman.”  Idaho 
Code Ann. §18–622(2)(a)(i).  And even then, the doctor must 
“attemp[t] to perform the abortion in the manner that . . . 
provide[s] the best opportunity for the unborn child to sur-
vive,” unless doing so “would . . . pos[e] a greater risk of the
death of the pregnant woman.”  §622(2)(a)(ii). 

These  standards  do  not  require  a  doctor  to  be  “objec-
tive[ly]  certai[n]”  that  the  abortion  is  “ ‘necessary’  to  save
the woman’s life.” Planned Parenthood, 171 Idaho, at 445, 
522 P. 3d, at 1203 (emphasis deleted).  Nor does Idaho law 
require  that  the  risk  of  death  be  particularly  immediate. 
Ibid.  Indeed, the Idaho Supreme Court has explained that
the  law  “leaves  wide  room  for  the  physician’s  ‘good  faith 
medical  judgment’  on  whether  [an]  abortion  was  ‘neces-
sary.’ ”  Ibid.; accord, id., at 446, 522 P. 3d, at 1203 (noting 
that  the  Act  “imposes  a  subjective  standard  based  on  the 
individual physician’s good faith medical judgment”).  And