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Page Number: 52

Cite as:  598 U. S. ____ (2023) 

1 

KAGAN, J., dissenting 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

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No. 21–869 
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ANDY WARHOL FOUNDATION FOR THE VISUAL 
ARTS, INC., PETITIONER v. LYNN 
GOLDSMITH, ET AL. 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT 

[May 18, 2023] 

JUSTICE  KAGAN,  with  whom  THE  CHIEF  JUSTICE  joins,

dissenting. 

Today,  the  Court  declares  that  Andy  Warhol’s  eye-pop-
ping  silkscreen  of  Prince—a  work  based  on  but  dramati-
cally  altering  an  existing  photograph—is  (in  copyright
lingo) not “transformative.”  Still more, the Court decides 
that even if Warhol’s portrait were transformative—even if 
its  expression  and  meaning  were  worlds  away  from  the
photo—that  fact  would  not  matter.   For  in  the  majority’s
view, copyright law’s first fair-use factor—addressing “the
purpose and character” of “the use made of a work”—is un-
interested  in  the  distinctiveness  and  newness  of  Warhol’s 
portrait.  17 U. S. C. §107.  What matters under that factor, 
the  majority  says,  is instead  a  marketing  decision: In  the 
majority’s  view,  Warhol’s  licensing  of  the  silkscreen  to  a 
magazine precludes fair use.1 

You’ve probably heard of Andy Warhol; you’ve probably 
seen  his  art.  You  know  that  he  reframed  and  reformu-
lated—in a word, transformed—images created first by oth-
ers.  Campbell’s soup cans and Brillo boxes.  Photos of ce-
lebrity  icons:  Marilyn,  Elvis,  Jackie,  Liz—and,  as  most 
—————— 

1 By the time of the licensing, Warhol had died and the Warhol Foun-
dation had stepped into his shoes.  But for ease of exposition, I will refer
to both the artist and his successor-in-interest as Warhol.