Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/18pdf/18-302_e29g.pdf
Page Number: 42.0

Cite as:  588 U. S. ____ (2019) 

17 

Opinion of SOTOMAYOR, J. 

ing  what  is  effectively  a  state  subsidy,  faces  only  indirect 
pressure . . . ”); Velazquez, 531 U. S., at 544 (“As this suit
involves  a  subsidy,  limited  forum  cases  . . .  may  not  be 
controlling  in  a  strict  sense,  yet  they  do  provide  some
instruction”). 

Whichever label one chooses here, the federal system of 
trademark registration fits: It is, in essence, an opportun-
ity to include one’s trademark on a list and thereby secure 
the  ancillary  benefits  that  come  with  registration.11   Just 
as  in  the  limited-forum  and  government-program  cases, 
some  speakers  benefit,  but  no  speakers  are  harmed. 
Brunetti, for example, can use, own, and enforce his mark
regardless of whether it has been registered.  Whether he 
may  register  his  mark  can  therefore  turn  on  reasonable, 
viewpoint-neutral content regulations.12 

C 

Prohibiting  the  registration  of  obscene,  profane,  or 
vulgar  marks  qualifies  as  reasonable,  viewpoint-neutral, 
content-based  regulation.  Apart  from  any  interest  in
regulating commerce itself, the Government has an inter-
est  in  not  promoting  certain  kinds  of  speech,  whether 
because  such  speech  could  be  perceived  as  suggesting 
governmental  favoritism  or  simply  because  the  Govern-
ment  does  not  wish  to  involve  itself  with  that  kind  of 
speech.  See, e.g., Ysursa, 555 U. S., at 359–360; Cornelius, 
473  U. S.,  at  809.  While  “there  is  no  evidence  that  the 

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11 Not  every  registration  system  would  necessarily  fit  the  same  bill,
whether because not every such system invites expressive content like 
trademarks or simply because other forms of registration may not be so
ancillary as to qualify solely as a “benefit.” 

12 Though I do not address the constitutionality of provisions not be-
fore  the  Court,  I  note  as  well  that  the  “scandalous”  bar  in  §1052(a)  is 
hardly  the  only  provision  in  §1052  that  could  be  characterized  as 
content  discriminatory.    See,  e.g.,  §1052(b)  (no  flags  or  insignias);
§1052(c)  (no  unapproved  markers  of  deceased  U. S.  Presidents  during 
the lives of their spouses).