Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/529bv.pdf
Page Number: 355

529US1

Unit: $U42

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280

ERIE v. PAP’S A. M.

Syllabus

rely on the evidentiary foundation set forth in Renton and Young v.
American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U. S. 50, to the effect that secondary
effects are caused by the presence of even one adult entertainment es-
tablishment in a given neighborhood. See Renton, supra, at 51–52.
In
fact, Erie expressly relied on Barnes and its discussion of secondary
effects, including its reference to Renton and American Mini Theatres.
The evidentiary standard described in Renton controls here, and Erie
meets that standard.
In any event, the ordinance’s preamble also relies
on the city council’s express ﬁndings that “certain lewd, immoral activi-
ties carried on in public places for proﬁt are highly detrimental to the
public health, safety and welfare . . . .” The council members, familiar
with commercial downtown Erie, are the individuals who would likely
have had ﬁrsthand knowledge of what took place at, and around, nude
dancing establishments there, and can make particularized, expert judg-
ments about the resulting harmful secondary effects. Cf., e. g., FCC v.
National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting, 436 U. S. 775. The fact
that this sort of leeway is appropriate in this case, which involves a
content-neutral restriction that regulates conduct, says nothing what-
soever about its appropriateness in a case involving actual regulation
of First Amendment expression. Also, although requiring dancers to
wear pasties and G-strings may not greatly reduce these secondary ef-
fects, O’Brien requires only that the regulation further the interest in
combating such effects. The ordinance also satisﬁes O’Brien’s third
factor, that the government interest is unrelated to the suppression of
free expression, as discussed supra. The fourth O’Brien factor—that
the restriction is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of the
government interest—is satisﬁed as well. The ordinance regulates con-
duct, and any incidental impact on the expressive element of nude danc-
ing is de minimis. The pasties and G-string requirement is a minimal
restriction in furtherance of the asserted government interests, and the
restriction leaves ample capacity to convey the dancer’s erotic message.
See, e. g., Barnes, 501 U. S., at 572. Pp. 296–302.

Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, agreed that the Pennsyl-
vania Supreme Court’s decision must be reversed, but disagreed with
the mode of analysis that should be applied. Erie self-consciously mod-
eled its ordinance on the public nudity statute upheld in Barnes v. Glen
Theatre, Inc., 501 U. S. 560, calculating (one would have supposed rea-
sonably) that the Pennsylvania courts would consider themselves bound
by this Court’s judgment on a question of federal constitutional law.
That statute was constitutional not because it survived some lower level
of First Amendment scrutiny, but because, as a general law regulating
conduct and not speciﬁcally directed at expression, it was not subject to
Id., at 572 (Scalia, J., concurring in
First Amendment scrutiny at all.