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Page Number: 57

18 

OBERGEFELL v. HODGES 

ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting 

ness” by the laws challenged in these cases—no one.  Ante, 
at 28.  At the same time, the laws in no way interfere with 
the “right to be let alone.” 

The  majority  also  relies  on  Justice  Harlan’s  influential
dissenting opinion in Poe v. Ullman, 367 U. S. 497 (1961). 
As  the  majority  recounts,  that  opinion  states  that  “[d]ue 
process has not been reduced to any formula.”  Id., at 542. 
But  far  from  conferring  the  broad  interpretive  discretion
that the majority discerns, Justice Harlan’s opinion makes 
clear  that  courts  implying  fundamental  rights  are  not
“free  to  roam  where  unguided  speculation  might  take
them.”  Ibid.    They  must  instead  have  “regard  to  what 
history  teaches”  and  exercise  not  only  “judgment”  but
“restraint.”  Ibid.  Of particular relevance, Justice Harlan
explained  that  “laws  regarding  marriage  which  provide 
both  when  the  sexual  powers  may  be  used  and  the  legal 
and  societal  context  in  which  children  are  born  and 
brought  up  . . .  form  a  pattern  so  deeply  pressed  into  the 
substance  of  our  social  life  that  any  Constitutional  doc-
trine in this area must build upon that basis.”  Id., at 546. 
In  sum,  the  privacy  cases  provide  no  support  for  the
majority’s  position,  because  petitioners  do  not  seek  pri- 
vacy.  Quite  the  opposite,  they  seek  public  recognition  of 
their  relationships,  along  with  corresponding  government 
benefits.  Our  cases  have  consistently  refused  to  allow 
litigants  to  convert  the  shield  provided  by  constitutional 
liberties  into  a  sword  to  demand  positive  entitlements
from the State.  See DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dept. 
of  Social  Servs.,  489  U. S.  189,  196  (1989);  San  Antonio 
Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U. S. 1, 35–37 
(1973);  post,  at  9–13  (THOMAS,  J.,  dissenting).    Thus, 
although the right to privacy recognized by our precedents
certainly plays a role in protecting the intimate conduct of 
same-sex couples, it provides no affirmative right to rede-
fine  marriage  and  no  basis  for  striking  down  the  laws  at
issue here.