Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/524bv.pdf
Page Number: 268

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Unit: $U84

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Cite as: 524 U. S. 214 (1998)

223

Opinion of the Court

While the ﬁled rate doctrine may seem harsh in some
circumstances, see, e. g., Maislin Industries, U. S., Inc. v.
Primary Steel, Inc., 497 U. S. 116, 130–131 (1990), its strict
application is necessary to “prevent carriers from inten-
tionally ‘misquoting’ rates to shippers as a means of offer-
ing them rebates or discounts,” the very evil the ﬁling re-
quirement seeks to prevent.
Id., at 127. Regardless of the
carrier’s motive—whether it seeks to beneﬁt or harm a par-
ticular customer—the policy of nondiscriminatory rates is vi-
olated when similarly situated customers pay different rates
for the same services.
It is that antidiscriminatory policy
which lies at “the heart of the common-carrier section of the
Communications Act.” MCI Telecommunications Corp. v.
American Telephone & Telegraph Co., supra, at 229.

The Ninth Circuit thought the ﬁled rate doctrine inap-
plicable “[b]ecause this case does not involve rates or rate-
setting, but rather involves the provisioning of services and
billing.”
108 F. 3d, at 990. Rates, however, do not exist
in isolation. They have meaning only when one knows the
services to which they are attached. Any claim for exces-
sive rates can be couched as a claim for inadequate services
and vice versa.
“If ‘discrimination in charges’ does not in-
clude non-price features, then the carrier could defeat the
broad purpose of the statute by the simple expedient of pro-
viding an additional beneﬁt at no additional charge. . . . An
unreasonable ‘discrimination in charges,’ that is, can come in
the form of a lower price for an equivalent service or in the
form of an enhanced service for an equivalent price.” Com-
petitive Telecommunications Assn. v. FCC, 998 F. 2d 1058,
1062 (CADC 1993). The Communications Act recognizes
this when it requires the ﬁled tariff to show not only
“charges,” but also “the classiﬁcations, practices, and regu-
lations affecting such charges,” 47 U. S. C. § 203(a); and
when it makes it unlawful to “extend to any person any privi-
leges or facilities in such communication, or employ or en-