Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/23pdf/23-5572_l6hn.pdf
Page Number: 40

12 

FISCHER v. UNITED STATES 

BARRETT, J., dissenting 

eliminates much of the overlap that the Court perceives be-
tween (c)(2) and the provisions that do not require an “offi-
cial proceeding.”

Moreover, §§1512(a)(1)(A) and (d)(1) prohibit preventing
the mere attendance of any person in an official proceeding. 
Preventing attendance will not always have the effect of ob-
structing,  influencing,  or  impeding  the  proceeding.  And 
§1512(d)(1) makes it a crime to intentionally harass some-
one and thereby dissuade her from testifying in an official 
proceeding.  In contrast to (c)(2), this provision—which car-
ries  a  significantly  lower  maximum  penalty—does  not  re-
quire a defendant to act “corruptly.”

This is not to deny that (c)(2)—if allowed its broad, ordi-
nary  meaning—overlaps  with  several  offenses  in  Chapter 
73.  See ante, at 10–11.  Even so, (c)(2) still leaves a healthy 
amount of work for other obstruction offenses.  And besides, 
“substantial”  overlap  “is  not  uncommon  in  criminal  stat-
utes.”  Loughrin v. United States, 573 U. S. 351, 358, n. 4 
(2014);  see  also  Hubbard  v.  United  States,  514  U. S.  695, 
714,  n. 14  (1995)  (opinion  of  Stevens,  J.).    “The  mere  fact 
that two federal criminal statutes criminalize similar con-
duct says little about the scope of either.”  Pasquantino v. 
United States, 544 U. S. 349, 358, n. 4 (2005).  That is espe-
cially true here, because Congress enacted (c)(2) after it had 
already enacted other subsections of §1512, as well as ob-
struction offenses like §§1503 and 1505.  The redundancy 
argument would have more force if (c)(2) “render[ed] super-
fluous an entire provision passed in proximity as part of the 
same Act.”  Yates v. United States, 574 U. S. 528, 543 (2015)
(plurality  opinion)  (emphasis  added).    As  it  stands,  the 
canon against surplusage does not provide any reason to ar-
tificially narrow (c)(2)’s scope. 

In  any  event,  the  Court’s  formulation  does  not  begin  to
cure the statutory overlap.  Killing a person with the intent
to prevent the production of a record in an official proceed-
ing  constitutes  conduct  that  impairs  the  availability  of  a