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Page Number: 48.0

2 

CORNER POST, INC. v. BOARD OF GOVERNORS, FRS 

JACKSON, J., dissenting 

moment of agency action.  Never mind that a plaintiff ’s in-
jury is utterly irrelevant to a facial APA claim.  According
to the Court, we must ignore all of this because, for other
kinds of claims, accrual begins at the time of a plaintiff ’s 
injury.

Next, the results.  The Court’s baseless conclusion means 
that there is effectively no longer any limitations period for 
lawsuits  that  challenge  agency  regulations  on  their  face. 
Allowing every new commercial entity to bring fresh facial 
challenges to long-existing regulations is profoundly desta-
bilizing for both Government and businesses.  It also allows 
well-heeled  litigants  to  game  the  system  by  creating  new 
entities or finding new plaintiffs whenever they blow past 
the statutory deadline.

The majority refuses to accept the straightforward, com-
monsense,  and  singularly  plausible  reading  of  the  limita-
tions statute that Congress wrote.  In doing so, the Court 
wreaks havoc on Government agencies, businesses, and so-
ciety at large.  I respectfully dissent. 

I 
When a claim accrues depends on the nature of the claim.
See Crown Coat, 386 U. S., at 517.  So, understanding the 
context in which these claims arose is essential to determin-
ing when Congress meant for them to accrue.  The facts of 
this very case illustrate the absurdity of the majority’s one-
size-fits-all  approach.   The  procedural  history  is  also  a
prime example of the gamesmanship that statutory limita-
tions periods are enacted to prevent. 

A 
Start with the relevant agency regulation.  In 2010, Con-
gress required the Federal Reserve Board to issue rules for
debit-card transaction fees.  See 15 U. S. C. §1693o–2(a)(1).
The Board did as Congress instructed.  As relevant here, in