Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/22pdf/21-1496_d18f.pdf
Page Number: 24

18 

TWITTER, INC. v. TAAMNEH 

Opinion of the Court 

abetted the Reina nightclub attack, with a strict nexus be-
tween  their  assistance  and  that  attack.  Neither  side  is 
quite right.

To start, we find it unnecessary to parse whether the tex-
tual object of “aids and abets” is “the person” or the “act of 
international terrorism.”  That syntactic dispute makes lit-
tle  difference  here,  because  aiding  and  abetting  is  inher-
ently a rule of secondary liability for specific wrongful acts. 
See  Prosser  &  Keeton  323.  As  stated  above,  the  rule  im-
poses liability for a wrong on those who “hel[p] another to 
complete its commission.”  Rosemond, 572 U. S., at 70 (em-
phasis  added).  Or,  as  Halberstam  put  it,  the  defendant 
must aid and abet “a tortious act.”  705 F. 2d, at 484. 

Nor would a contrary rule make sense for torts.  That is 
because tort law imposes liability only when someone com-
mits an actual tort; merely agreeing to commit a tort or sug-
gesting  a  tortious  act  is  not,  without  more,  tortious.    See 
Prosser  &  Keeton  324;  Halberstam,  705  F. 2d,  at  479.11 
“Enterprises” or “conspiracies” alone are therefore not tor-
tious—the focus must remain on the tort itself.  The same 
is true here: The ATA opens the courthouse doors only if the
plaintiff is “injured . . . by reason of an act of international 
terrorism.”  §2333(a).  JASTA  further  restricts  secondary 
liability by requiring that the “act of international terror-
ism”  be  “committed,  planned,  or  authorized  by”  a  foreign
terrorist organization designated as such “as of the date on 
which  such  act  of  international  terrorism  was  committed, 
planned, or authorized.”  §2333(d).  Thus, it is not enough, 

—————— 

11 In  this respect,  tort  law  is different  from  criminal  law,  which does 
punish mere agreements to commit crimes.  See, e.g., 2 LaFave §12.2(b),
at 372 (“At common law a conspiracy was punishable even though no act
was done beyond the mere making of the agreement”); see also 1 J. Ohlin, 
Wharton’s Criminal Law §8.7, p. 242 (16th ed. 2021) (noting that statu-
tory requirements of an “overt act” generally do not require that the overt 
act be criminal); Iannelli v. United States, 420 U. S. 770, 785, n. 17 (1975) 
(similar).