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Cite as: 524 U. S. 742 (1998)

767

Thomas, J., dissenting

informs anyone in a position of authority about the super-
visor’s conduct. As a result, employer liability under Title
VII is judged by different standards depending upon
whether a sexually or racially hostile work environment is
alleged. The standard of employer liability should be the
same in both instances: An employer should be liable if, and
only if, the plaintiff proves that the employer was negligent
in permitting the supervisor’s conduct to occur.

I

Years before sexual harassment was recognized as “dis-
criminat[ion] . . . because of . . . sex,” 42 U. S. C. § 2000e–
2(a)(1), the Courts of Appeals considered whether, and when,
a racially hostile work environment could violate Title VII.1
In the landmark case Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F. 2d 234 (1971),
cert. denied, 406 U. S. 957 (1972), the Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit held that the practice of racially segregat-
ing patients in a doctor’s ofﬁce could amount to discrimina-
tion in “ ‘the terms, conditions, or privileges’ ” of employ-
ment, thereby violating Title VII.
454 F. 2d, at 238 (quoting
42 U. S. C. § 2000e–2(a)(1)). The principal opinion in the
case concluded that employment discrimination was not lim-
ited to the “isolated and distinguishable events” of “hiring,
ﬁring, and promoting.”
454 F. 2d, at 238 (opinion of Gold-
berg, J.). Rather, Title VII could also be violated by a work
environment “heavily polluted with discrimination,” because
of the deleterious effects of such an atmosphere on an em-
ployee’s well-being.

Ibid.

Accordingly, after Rogers, a plaintiff claiming employment
discrimination based upon race could assert a claim for a
racially hostile work environment, in addition to the classic

1 This sequence of events is not surprising, given that the primary goal
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was to eradicate race discrimination and
that the statute’s ban on sex discrimination was added as an eleventh-hour
amendment in an effort to kill the bill. See Barnes v. Costle, 561 F. 2d
983, 987 (CADC 1977).