Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/05pdf/04-1084.pdf
Page Number: 3.0

Cite as:  546 U. S. ____ (2006) 

3 

Syllabus 

accepted  safety  for  use  . . .  under  medical  supervision,”  21  U. S. C. 
§812(b)(1), by itself precludes any consideration of individualized ex-
ceptions, and that the Act’s “closed” regulatory system, which prohib-
its all use of controlled substances except as the Act itself authorizes, 
see  Gonzales  v.  Raich,  545  U. S.  ___,  ___,  cannot  function  properly  if 
subjected to judicial exemptions.  Pp. 8–16.

(a) RFRA  and  its  strict  scrutiny  test  contemplate  an  inquiry 
more focused than the Government’s categorical approach.  RFRA re-
quires  the  Government  to  demonstrate  that  the  compelling  interest 
test is satisfied through application of the challenged law “to the per-
son”—the particular claimant whose sincere exercise of religion is be-
ing  substantially  burdened.    42  U. S. C.  §2000bb–1(b).  Section 
2000bb(b)(1)  expressly  adopted  the  compelling  interest  test  of  Sher-
bert v. Verner, 374 U. S. 398, and Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U. S. 205. 
There, the Court looked beyond broadly formulated interests justify-
ing the general applicability of government mandates, scrutinized the 
asserted  harms,  and  granted  specific  exemptions  to  particular  reli-
gious claimants.  Id., at 213, 221, 236; Sherbert, supra, at 410.  Out-
side  the  Free  Exercise  area  as  well,  the  Court  has  noted  that 
“[c]ontext matters” in applying the compelling interest test, Grutter v. 
Bollinger, 539 U. S. 306, 327, and has emphasized that strict scrutiny’s 
fundamental  purpose  is  to  take    “relevant  differences”  into  account, 
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515 U. S. 200, 228.  Pp. 9–10. 

(b) Under  RFRA’s  more  focused  inquiry, the  Government’s  mere 
invocation  of  the  general  characteristics  of  Schedule  I  substances 
cannot carry the day.  Although Schedule I substances such as DMT 
are  exceptionally  dangerous,  see,  e.g.,  Touby  v.  United  States,  500 
U. S.  160,  162,  there  is  no  indication  that  Congress,  in  classifying
DMT,  considered  the  harms  posed  by  the  particular  use  at  issue. 
That  question  was  litigated  below.    Before  the  District  Court  found 
that the Government had not carried its burden of showing a compel-
ling  interest  in  preventing  such  harm,  the  court  noted  that  it  could 
not  ignore  the  congressional  classification  and  findings.    But  Con-
gress’  determination  that  DMT  should  be  listed  under  Schedule  I 
simply  does  not  provide  a  categorical  answer  that  relieves  the  Gov-
ernment  of  the  obligation  to  shoulder  its  RFRA  burden.    The  Con-
trolled  Substances  Act’s  authorization  to  the  Attorney  General  to 
“waive the requirement for registration of certain manufacturers, dis-
tributors, or dispensers if he finds it consistent with the public health 
and  safety,”  21  U. S. C.  §822(d),  reinforces  that  Congress’  findings 
with  respect  to  Schedule  I  substances  should  not  carry  the  determi-
native  weight,  for  RFRA  purposes,  that  the  Government  would  as-
cribe  to  them.    Indeed,  despite  the  fact  that  everything  the  Govern-
ment says about the DMT in hoasca applies in equal measure to the