Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/14pdf/14-7955_aplc.pdf
Page Number: 76.0

26 

GLOSSIP v. GROSS 

BREYER, J., dissenting 

Thus  an  offender  who  is  sentenced  to  death  is  two  or 
three times more likely to find his sentence overturned or 
commuted than to be executed; and he has a good chance 
of  dying  from  natural  causes  before  any  execution  (or
exoneration)  can  take  place.    In  a  word,  executions  are 
rare.  And an individual contemplating a crime but evalu­
ating  the  potential  punishment  would  know  that,  in  any 
event, he faces a potential sentence of life without parole.

These facts, when recurring, must have some offsetting 
effect on a potential perpetrator’s fear of a death penalty.
And, even if that effect is no more than slight, it makes it 
difficult  to  believe  (given  the  studies  of  deterrence  cited
earlier) that such a rare event significantly deters horren­
dous  crimes.  See  Furman,  408  U. S.,  at  311–312  (White, 
J.,  concurring)  (It  cannot  “be  said  with  confidence  that 
society’s  need  for  specific  deterrence  justifies  death  for  so
few when for so many in like circumstances life imprison­
ment or shorter prison terms are judged sufficient”). 

But  what  about  retribution?    Retribution  is  a  valid 
penological  goal.  I  recognize  that  surviving  relatives  of
victims of a horrendous crime, or perhaps the community 
itself,  may  find  vindication  in  an  execution.  And  a  com­
munity that favors  the death penalty has an understand- 
able interest in representing their voices.  But see A. Sarat, 
Mercy on Trial: What It Means To Stop an Execution 130
(2005)  (Illinois  Governor  George  Ryan  explained  his  deci­
sion to commute all death sentences on the ground that it
was  “cruel  and  unusual”  for  “family  members  to  go
through this . . . legal limbo for [20] years”).

The  relevant  question  here,  however,  is  whether  a
“community’s  sense  of  retribution”  can  often  find  vindica­
tion in “a death that comes,” if at all, “only several decades
after  the  crime  was  committed.”  Valle  v.  Florida,  564 
U. S. ___, ___ (2011) (BREYER, J., dissenting from denial of
stay) (slip op., at 3).  By then the community is a different 
group  of  people.  The  offenders  and  the  victims’  families