Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/19pdf/17-1712_0971.pdf
Page Number: 24.0

Cite as:  590 U. S. ____ (2020) 

11 

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting 

duty.   Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust En-
richment  §1,  and  Comment  a,  p. 3  (2010).  Similarly,  dis-
gorgement allows a beneficiary to “stri[p]” the trustee of “a
wrongful gain.”  Id., §3, Comment a, at 22.  Our Court drew 
on these principles almost 200 years ago when it stated that
a  trustee’s  breach  of  loyalty  supports  a  cause  of  action
“without any further inquiry” into gain or loss to a trust or 
its beneficiaries.  Michoud v. Girod, 4 How. 503, 553 (1846); 
see  also,  e.g.,  id.,  at  556–557  (noting  this  rule’s  roots  in 
“English  courts  of  chancery  from  an  early  day”);  see  also 
Magruder v. Drury, 235 U. S. 106, 120 (1914) (under “the 
principles governing the duty of a trustee,” it “makes no dif-
ference that the [trust] estate was not a loser in the trans-
action”); Bogert & Bogert §543 (similar).  Put another way,
“traditional remedies” like “unjust enrichment . . . are not 
contingent on a plaintiff ’s allegation of damages beyond the 
violation of his private legal right.”  Spokeo,  578 U. S., at 
___–___ (THOMAS, J., concurring) (slip op., at 2–3). 

Nor does it matter whether the beneficiaries receive the 
remedy themselves.  A beneficiary may require a trustee to
“restore”  assets  directly  “to  the  trust  fund.”   Bogert  &
Bogert §861; see also Restatement (Second) of Trusts §205.  
In fact, because fiduciary duties are so paramount, the rem-
edy need not involve money at all.  A beneficiary may sue 
to  “enjoin  the  trustee  from  committing  a  breach  of  trust”
and to “remove the trustee.”  Id., §199. 

Congress built on this tradition by making plan fiduciar-
ies expressly liable to restore to the plan wrongful profits 
and any losses their breach caused, and by providing for in-
junctive  relief  to  stop  the  misconduct  and  remove  the 
wrongdoers.  See 29 U. S. C. §§1109, 1132(a)(2), (3).  In do-
ing  so,  Congress  rejected  the  Court’s  statement  that  a 
“trust-law analogy . . . does not” apply to “plaintiffs who al-
lege mismanagement of a defined-benefit plan.”  Cf. ante, at 
4.  To  the  contrary,  ERISA  imposes  “trust-like  fiduciary 
standards,” Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U. S. 489, 497 (1996),