Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/22pdf/22-10_ifjn.pdf
Page Number: 28

Cite as:  599 U. S. ____ (2023) 

3 

 GORSUCH, J., concurring
GORSUCH, J., concurring in judgment 

real  challenge  begins.  Drawing  on  contextual  clues  and 
rules of statutory interpretation, the Court concludes that
a violation of §1028A(a)(1) occurs whenever the “use of the
means of identification is at the crux of the underlying crim-
inality.”  Ante, at 10 (emphasis added).  “In other words, the 
means of identification specifically” must be in some way “a 
key mover in the criminality.”  Ibid. (emphasis added).  Put 
still  another  way,  the  “means  of  identification”  must  play 
the (or maybe a) “central role” in the commission of the of-
fense.  Ibid. (emphasis added). 

Setting  aside  some  definite-article  inconsistency,  those
formulations all sound sensible enough.  On closer review, 
however, they present intractable interpretive challenges of
their own.  When, exactly, is a “means of identification” “at 
the crux,” “a key mover,” or a “central role” player in an of-
fense?  No doubt, the answer “turns on causation, or at least 
causation  often  helps  to  answer  the  question.”    United 
States v. Michael, 882 F. 3d 624, 628 (CA6 2018).  The Court 
agrees but stresses that “a causal relationship” of any kind 
will not suffice.  Ante, at 20.  At the same time, however, it 
studiously  avoids  indicating  whether  the  appropriate 
standard  is  proximate  cause  or  something  else  entirely
novel.  Ibid.  All of which gives rise to further questions.  In 
virtually every fraud, a “means of identification” plays some 
critical role in the fraud’s success—good luck committing a
mail or wire fraud, for instance, without relying heavily on
the name of the victim and likely the names of other third 
parties.  Just how much “causation” must a prosecutor es-
tablish to sustain a §1028A(a)(1) conviction?  For that mat-
ter,  how  does  one  even  determine  the  extent  to  which  a 
“means of identification” “caused” an offense, as compared 
to the many other necessary inputs? 

The Court supplies no firm answer.  Instead, it leans on 
various illustrations that only highlight the difficulties in-
herent in this exercise.  Take, for instance, the Court’s as-
surance that a “waiter who serves flank steak but charges