Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/20pdf/20-297_4g25.pdf
Page Number: 23.0

Cite as:  594 U. S. ____ (2021) 

19 

Opinion of the Court 

2016);  see  Gubala  v.  Time  Warner  Cable,  Inc.,  846  F. 3d 
909, 912 (CA7 2017).

The standing inquiry in this case thus distinguishes be-
tween  (i)  credit  files  that  consumer  reporting  agencies 
maintain  internally  and  (ii)  the  consumer  credit  reports 
that  consumer  reporting  agencies  disseminate  to  third-
party creditors.  The mere presence of an inaccuracy in an
internal  credit  file,  if  it  is  not  disclosed  to  a  third  party,
causes no concrete harm.  In cases such as these where al-
legedly inaccurate or misleading information sits in a com-
pany database, the plaintiffs’ harm is roughly the same, le-
gally speaking, as if someone wrote a defamatory letter and 
then stored it in her desk drawer.  A letter that is not sent 
does not harm anyone, no matter how insulting the letter
is.  So too here.6 

Because the plaintiffs cannot demonstrate that the mis-
leading information in the internal credit files itself consti-

—————— 

6 For  the  first  time  in  this  Court,  the  plaintiffs  also  argue  that 
TransUnion “published” the class members’ information internally—for 
example,  to  employees  within  TransUnion  and  to  the  vendors  that 
printed  and  sent  the  mailings  that  the  class  members  received.    That 
new argument is forfeited.  In any event, it is unavailing.  Many Ameri-
can courts did not traditionally recognize intra-company disclosures as
actionable publications for purposes of the tort of defamation.  See, e.g., 
Chalkley v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 150 Va. 301, 326–328, 143 S. E. 
631, 638–639 (1928).  Nor have they necessarily recognized disclosures 
to printing vendors as actionable publications.  See, e.g., Mack v. Delta 
Air Lines, Inc., 639 Fed. Appx. 582, 586 (CA11 2016).  Moreover, even the 
plaintiffs’  cited  cases  require  evidence  that  the  defendant  actually
“brought  an  idea  to  the  perception  of  another,”  Restatement  of  Torts 
§559, Comment a, p. 140 (1938), and thus generally require evidence that
the document was actually read and not merely processed, cf. Ostrowe v. 
Lee, 256 N. Y. 36, 38–39, 175 N. E. 505, 505–506 (1931) (Cardozo, C. J.).
That evidence is lacking here.  In short, the plaintiffs’ internal publica-
tion theory circumvents a fundamental requirement of an ordinary def-
amation claim—publication—and does not bear a sufficiently “close rela-
tionship”  to  the  traditional  defamation  tort  to  qualify  for  Article  III 
standing.