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Page Number: 28.0

2 

GILL v. WHITFORD 

KAGAN, J., concurring 

theory.  Partisan  gerrymandering  no  doubt  burdens  indi­
vidual votes, but it also causes other harms.  And at some 
points  in  this  litigation,  the  plaintiffs  complained  of  a 
different  injury—an  infringement  of  their  First  Amend­
ment  right  of  association.    The  Court  rightly  does  not 
address  that  alternative  argument:  The  plaintiffs  did  not 
advance  it  with  sufficient  clarity  or  concreteness  to  make
it  a  real  part  of  the  case.  But  because  on  remand  they
may  well  develop  the  associational  theory,  I  address  the
standing  requirement  that  would  then  apply.    As  I’ll  ex­
plain, a plaintiff presenting such a theory would not need
to  show  that  her  particular  voting  district  was  packed  or
cracked  for  standing  purposes  because  that  fact  would 
Indeed, 
bear  no  connection  to  her  substantive  claim. 
everything about the litigation of that claim—from stand­
ing on down to remedy—would be statewide in nature.

Partisan gerrymandering, as this Court has recognized,
is  “incompatible  with  democratic  principles.”    Arizona 
State  Legislature  v.  Arizona  Independent  Redistricting 
Comm’n, 576 U. S. ___, ___ (2015) (slip op., at 1) (quoting 
Vieth  v.  Jubelirer,  541  U. S.  267,  292  (2004)  (plurality 
opinion); alterations omitted).  More effectively every day,
that practice enables politicians to entrench themselves in
power  against  the  people’s  will.    And  only  the  courts  can
do anything to remedy the problem, because gerrymanders
benefit  those  who  control  the  political  branches.  None  of 
those  facts  gives  judges  any  excuse  to  disregard  Article
III’s demands.  The Court is right to say they were not met 
here.  But  partisan  gerrymandering  injures  enough  indi­
viduals  and  organizations  in  enough  concrete  ways
to  ensure  that  standing  requirements,  properly  applied,
will  not  often  or  long  prevent  courts  from  reaching  the
merits  of  cases  like  this  one.    Or  from  insisting,  when
they do, that partisan officials stop degrading the nation’s 
democracy.