Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/23pdf/22-704_4246.pdf
Page Number: 28

Cite as:  602 U. S. ____ (2024) 

1 

BARRETT, J., concurring in part 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

_________________ 

No. 22–704 
_________________ 

KATHERINE K. VIDAL, UNDER SECRETARY OF 
COMMERCE FOR INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
AND DIRECTOR, UNITED STATES PATENT 
AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, PETITIONER 
v. STEVE ELSTER 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT 

[June 13, 2024] 

JUSTICE BARRETT, with whom JUSTICE KAGAN joins, with 
whom JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR joins as to Parts I, II, and III– 
B, and with whom JUSTICE JACKSON joins as to Parts I and 
II, concurring in part. 

While I agree with the Court that the names clause does 
not violate the First Amendment, I disagree with some of
its reasoning.  The Court claims that “history and tradition”
settle the constitutionality of the names clause, rendering
it unnecessary to adopt a standard for gauging whether a 
content-based  trademark  registration  restriction  abridges
the right to free speech.  That is wrong twice over.  First, 
the  Court’s  evidence,  consisting  of  loosely  related  cases
from the late-19th and early-20th centuries, does not estab-
lish a historical analogue for the names clause.  Second, the 
Court never explains why hunting for historical forebears
on a restriction-by-restriction basis is the right way to ana-
lyze the constitutional question.  I would adopt a standard, 
grounded  in  both  trademark  law  and  First  Amendment 
precedent,  that  reflects  the  relationship  between  content-
based trademark registration restrictions and free speech. 
In my view, such restrictions, whether new or old, are per-