Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/12pdf/11-556_11o2.pdf
Page Number: 55.0

Cite as:  570 U. S. ____ (2013) 

21 

GINSBURG, J., dissenting 

tion, coaching, and overseeing their work.”  Id., at 13.  And 
another  employee  testified  to  believing  that  Davis  was  “a
supervisor.” 
Id.,  at  386.  But  because  the  supervisor-
status  inquiry  should  focus  on  substance,  not  labels  or
paper  descriptions,  it  is  doubtful  that  this  slim  evidence 
would  enable  Vance  to  survive  a  motion  for  summary 
judgment.  Nevertheless,  I  would  leave  it  to  the  Seventh 
Circuit  to  decide,  under  the  proper  standard  for  super-
visory  status,  what  impact,  if  any,  Davis’  job  description 
and  the  co-worker’s  statement  should  have  on  the  deter-
mination of Davis’ status.9 

V 
Regrettably,  the  Court  has  seized  upon  Vance’s  thin
case  to  narrow  the  definition  of  supervisor,  and  thereby
manifestly  limit  Title  VII’s  protections  against  workplace 
harassment.  Not even Ball State, the defendant-employer 
in  this  case,  has  advanced  the  restrictive  definition  the 
Court adopts.  See supra, at 5.  Yet the Court, insistent on 
constructing  artificial  categories  where  context  should  be 
key,  proceeds  on  an  immoderate  and  unrestrained  course 
to corral Title VII. 

Congress  has,  in  the  recent  past,  intervened  to  correct
this  Court’s  wayward  interpretations  of  Title  VII.    See 
Lilly  Ledbetter  Fair  Pay  Act  of  2009,  123  Stat.  5,  super-
seding Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U. S. 
618  (2007).  See  also  Civil  Rights  Act  of  1991,  105  Stat.
1071, superseding in part, Lorance v. AT&T Technologies, 
Inc.,  490  U. S.  900  (1989);  Martin  v.  Wilks,  490  U. S.  755 
(1989);  Wards  Cove  Packing  Co.  v.  Atonio,  490  U. S.  642 

—————— 

9 The Court agrees that Davis “would probably not qualify” as Vance’s 
supervisor  under  the  EEOC’s  definition.  Ante,  at  28–29.    Then  why,
one  might  ask,  does  the  Court  nevertheless  reach  out  to  announce  its 
restrictive standard in this case, one in which all parties, including the
defendant-employer,  accept  the  fitness  for  Title  VII  of  the  EEOC’s 
Guidance?  See supra, at 5.