Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/20pdf/19-123_g3bi.pdf
Page Number: 3

Cite as:  593 U. S. ____ (2021) 

3 

Syllabus 

deference.  Similarly  unavailing  is  the  City’s  recent  contention  that
section 3.21 does not even apply to CSS’s refusal to certify same-sex
couples.  That contention ignores the broad sweep of section 3.21’s text,
as well as the fact that the City adopted the current version of section 
3.21 shortly after declaring that it would make CSS’s obligation to cer-
tify same-sex couples “explicit” in future contracts.  Finally, because 
state  law  makes  clear  that  the  City’s  authority  to  grant  exceptions
from section 3.21 also governs section 15.1’s general prohibition on sex-
ual orientation discrimination, the contract as a whole contains no gen-
erally applicable non-discrimination requirement.  Pp. 7–10. 

(2) Philadelphia’s Fair Practices Ordinance, which as relevant for-
bids  interfering  with  the  public  accommodations  opportunities  of  an
individual based on sexual orientation, does not apply to CSS’s actions
here.  The Ordinance defines a public accommodation in relevant part 
to include a provider “whose goods, services, facilities, privileges, ad-
vantages or accommodations are extended, offered, sold, or otherwise 
made available to the public.”  Phila. Code §9–1102(1)(w).  Certifica-
tion  is  not  “made  available  to  the  public”  in  the  usual  sense  of  the
words.  Certification as a foster parent is not readily accessible to the 
public;  the  process  involves  a  customized  and  selective  assessment 
that bears little resemblance to staying in a hotel, eating at a restau-
rant, or riding a bus.  The District Court’s contrary conclusion did not 
take into account the uniquely selective nature of foster care certifica-
tion.  Pp. 10–13.

(b) The contractual non-discrimination requirement burdens CSS’s 
religious exercise and is not generally applicable, so it is subject to “the
most rigorous of scrutiny.”  Lukumi, 508 U. S., at 546.  A government
policy can survive strict scrutiny only if it advances compelling inter-
ests  and  is  narrowly  tailored  to  achieve  those  interests.    Ibid.  The 
question is not whether the City has a compelling interest in enforcing
its non-discrimination policies generally, but whether it has such an 
interest  in  denying  an  exception  to  CSS.    Under  the  circumstances 
here, the City does not have a compelling interest in refusing to con-
tract with CSS.  CSS seeks only an accommodation that will allow it
to continue serving the children of Philadelphia in a manner consistent
with  its  religious  beliefs;  it  does  not  seek  to  impose  those  beliefs  on
anyone else.  The refusal of Philadelphia to contract with CSS for the 
provision  of  foster  care  services  unless  the  agency  agrees  to  certify 
same-sex couples as foster parents cannot survive strict scrutiny and 
violates the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.  The Court 
does  not  consider  whether  the  City’s  actions  also  violate  the  Free 
Speech Clause.  Pp. 13–15. 

922 F. 3d. 140, reversed and remanded.