Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/19pdf/19-715_febh.pdf
Page Number: 3.0

Cite as:  591 U. S. ____ (2020) 

3 

Syllabus 

is valid only if it is “related to, and in furtherance of, a legitimate task
of the Congress.”  Id., at 187.  The subpoena must serve a “valid legis-
lative purpose.”  Quinn v. United States, 349 U. S. 155, 161.  Further-
more, Congress may not issue a subpoena for the purpose of “law en-
forcement,” because that power is assigned to the Executive and the 
Judiciary.  Ibid.  Finally, recipients of congressional subpoenas retain 
their  constitutional  rights  and  various  privileges  throughout  the 
course of an investigation.  Pp. 11–12. 

(c) The President contends, as does the Solicitor General on behalf 
of the United States, that congressional subpoenas for the President’s 
information  should  be  evaluated  under  the  standards  set  forth  in 
United States v. Nixon, 418 U. S. 683, and Senate Select Committee on 
Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon, 498 F. 2d 725, which would 
require the House to show that the requested information satisfies a 
“demonstrated, specific need,” 418 U. S., at 713, and is “demonstrably
critical” to a legislative purpose, 498 F. 2d, at 731.  Nixon and Senate 
Select  Committee,  however,  involved  subpoenas  for  communications 
between the President and his close advisers, over which the President 
asserted executive privilege.  Because executive privilege safeguards 
the public interest in candid, confidential deliberations within the Ex-
ecutive  Branch,  information  subject  to  the  privilege  deserves  “the 
greatest protection consistent with the fair administration of justice.” 
418 U. S., at 715.  That protection should not be transplanted root and 
branch to cases involving nonprivileged, private information, which by 
definition does not implicate sensitive Executive Branch deliberations.
The standards proposed by the President and the Solicitor General— 
if applied outside the context of privileged information—would risk se-
riously impeding Congress in carrying out its responsibilities, giving 
short shrift to its important interests in conducting inquiries to obtain
information needed to legislate effectively.  Pp. 12–14.

(d) The approach proposed by the House, which relies on precedents 
that did not involve the President’s papers, fails to take adequate ac-
count of the significant separation of powers issues raised by congres-
sional  subpoenas  for  the  President’s  information.    The  House’s  ap-
proach would leave essentially no limits on the congressional power to
subpoena  the  President’s  personal  records.
  A  limitless  subpoena 
power  could  transform  the  established  practice  of  the  political
branches and allow Congress to aggrandize itself at the President’s ex-
pense.  These separation of powers concerns are unmistakably impli-
cated by the subpoenas here, which represent not a run-of-the-mill leg-
islative effort but rather a clash between rival branches of government 
over  records  of  intense  political  interest  for  all  involved.    The  inter-
branch conflict does not vanish simply because the subpoenas seek per-
sonal papers or because the President sued in his personal capacity.