Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/558bv.pdf
Page Number: 584.0

Cite as: 558 U. S. 310 (2010) 

423 

Opinion of Stevens, J. 

them  directly,  we  have  never  cast  doubt  on  laws  that  place 
special restrictions on campaign spending by foreign nation­
als.  See, e. g., 2 U. S. C. § 441e(a)(1).  And we have consist­
ently  approved  laws  that  bar  Government  employees,  but 
not  others,  from  contributing  to  or  participating  in  political 
activities.  See n. 45, supra.  These statutes burden the po­
litical expression of one class of speakers, namely, civil serv­
ants.  Yet we have sustained them on the basis of longstand­
ing  practice  and  Congress’  reasoned  judgment  that  certain 
regulations  which  leave  “untouched  full  participation  . . . in  
political  decisions  at  the  ballot  box,”  Civil  Service  Comm’n 
v.  Letter Carriers, 413  U. S.  548,  556  (1973)  (internal  quota­
tion marks omitted), help ensure that public ofﬁcials are “suf­
ﬁciently free from improper inﬂuences,” id., at 564, and that 
“conﬁdence  in  the  system  of  representative  Government  is 
not . . . eroded to a disastrous extent,” id., at 565. 

The  same  logic  applies  to  this  case  with  additional  force 
because it is the identity of corporations, rather than individ­
uals,  that  the  Legislature  has  taken  into  account.  As  we 
have  unanimously  observed,  legislatures  are  entitled  to  de­
cide  “that  the  special  characteristics  of  the  corporate  struc­
ture  require  particularly  careful  regulation”  in  an  electoral 
context.  NRWC,  459  U. S.,  at  209–210.50  Not  only  has  the 
distinctive  potential  of  corporations  to  corrupt  the  electoral 
process  long  been  recognized,  but  within  the  area  of  cam­
paign  ﬁnance,  corporate  spending  is  also  “furthest  from  the 
core of political expression, since corporations’ First Amend­
ment  speech  and  association  interests  are  derived  largely 

over time, id., at 223.  “In short,” I concluded, “Tennessee ha[d] failed to 
point to any legitimate interest that would justify its selective regulation 
of campaign-related expression.”  Id., at 225.  These criticisms are inap­
plicable to the case before us. 

50 They  are  likewise  entitled  to  regulate  media  corporations  differently 
from  other  corporations  “to  ensure  that  the  law  ‘does  not  hinder  or  pre­
vent  the  institutional  press  from  reporting  on,  and  publishing  editorials 
about, newsworthy events.’ ”  McConnell, 540 U. S., at 208 (quoting Aus­
tin v.  Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U. S. 652, 668 (1990)).