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Page Number: 21

18 

MCGIRT v. OKLAHOMA 

Opinion of the Court 

rizes how we should approach the question of disestablish-
ment into three “steps.”  It reads Solem as requiring us to
examine the laws passed by Congress at the first step, con-
temporary events at the second, and even later events and 
demographics at the third.  On the State’s account, we have 
so far finished only the first step; two more await. 

This is mistaken.  When interpreting Congress’s work in
this arena, no less than any other, our charge is usually to 
ascertain and follow the original meaning of the law before 
us.  New  Prime  Inc.  v.  Oliveira,  586  U. S.  ___,  ___  (2019) 
(slip op., at 6).  That is the only “step” proper for a court of 
law.  To be sure, if during the course of our work an ambig-
uous statutory term or phrase emerges, we will sometimes 
consult contemporaneous usages, customs, and practices to
the extent they shed light on the meaning of the language
in question at the time of enactment.  Ibid.  But Oklahoma 
does not point to any ambiguous language in any of the rel-
evant statutes that could plausibly be read as an Act of dis-
establishment.  Nor may a court favor contemporaneous or 
later practices instead of the laws Congress passed.  As So-
lem explained, “[o]nce a block of land is set aside for an In-
dian reservation and no matter what happens to the title of 
individual plots within the area, the entire block retains its 
reservation status until Congress explicitly indicates other-
wise.”  465 U. S., at 470 (citing United States v. Celestine, 
215 U. S. 278, 285 (1909)).

Still, Oklahoma reminds us that other language in Solem 
isn’t  so  constrained.  In  particular,  the  State  highlights  a 
passage  suggesting  that  “[w]here  non-Indian  settlers 
flooded  into  the  opened  portion  of  a  reservation  and  the 
area  has  long  since  lost  its  Indian  character,  we  have 
acknowledged  that  de  facto,  if  not  de  jure,  diminishment 
may have occurred.”  465 U. S., at 471.  While acknowledg-
ing that resort to subsequent demographics was “an unor-
thodox  and  potentially  unreliable  method  of  statutory  in-
terpretation,”  the  Court  seemed  nonetheless  taken  by  its