Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/19pdf/18-5924_n6io.pdf
Page Number: 39.0

Cite as:  590 U. S. ____ (2020) 

5 

KAVANAUGH, J., concurring in part 

v.  Marvel  Entertainment,  LLC,  576  U. S.  446,  456–457 
(2015);  Patterson  v.  McLean  Credit  Union,  491  U. S.  164, 
172–173  (1989);  Flood  v.  Kuhn,  407  U. S.  258,  283–284 
(1972).  The  principle  that  “it  is  more  important  that  the 
applicable rule of law be settled than that it be settled right” 
is “commonly true even where the error is a matter of seri-
ous concern, provided correction can be had by legislation.” 
Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U. S. 393, 406 (1932) 
(Brandeis, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).2 

In constitutional cases, by contrast, the Court has repeat-
edly said—and says again today—that the doctrine of stare 
decisis  is  not  as  “inflexible.”  Burnet,  285  U. S.,  at  406 
(Brandeis, J., dissenting); see also ante, at 20; Payne, 501 
U. S.,  at  828;  Scott,  437  U. S.,  at  101.  The  reason  is 
straightforward:  As  Justice  O’Connor  once  wrote  for  the 
Court, stare decisis is not as strict “when we interpret the 
Constitution because our interpretation can be altered only
by constitutional amendment or by overruling our prior de-
cisions.”  Agostini, 521 U. S., at 235.  The Court therefore 
“must  balance  the  importance  of  having  constitutional 
questions  decided  against  the  importance  of  having  them 
decided right.”  Citizens United, 558 U. S., at 378 (ROBERTS, 
C. J., concurring).  It follows “that in the unusual circum-
stance when fidelity to any particular precedent does more
to damage this constitutional ideal than to advance it, we
must be more willing to depart from that precedent.”  Ibid. 
In  his  canonical  opinion  in  Burnet,  Justice  Brandeis  de-
scribed the Court’s practice with respect to stare decisis in 
constitutional  cases  in  a  way  that  was  accurate  then  and 

—————— 

2 The Court’s precedents applying common-law statutes and pronounc-
ing the Court’s own interpretive methods and principles typically do not
fall within that category of stringent statutory stare decisis.  See Leegin 
Creative  Leather  Products,  Inc.  v.  PSKS,  Inc.,  551  U. S.  877,  899–907 
(2007); Kisor v. Wilkie, 588 U. S. ___, ___–___ (2019) (GORSUCH, J., con-
curring in judgment) (slip op., at 34–36).