Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/20pdf/19-251_p86b.pdf
Page Number: 41.0

12  AMERICANS FOR PROSPERITY FOUNDATION v. BONTA 

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting 

In  crucial  contrast  to  Shelton,  however,  the  Reed  Court 
found “scant evidence” that disclosure exposed signatories
of typical referendums to “threats, harassment, or reprisals
from  either  Government  officials  or  private  parties.”    561 
U. S.,  at  200–201  (internal  quotation  marks  omitted). 
Given  the  “modest  burdens”  imposed  by  the  requirement, 
id.,  at  201,  the  Court  required  a  correspondingly  modest 
level of tailoring.  Under that standard, the disclosure re-
quirement passed muster, and the Court refused to facially
strike it down. 

The public disclosure regimes in both Shelton and Reed 
served important government goals.  Yet the Court’s assess-
ment  of  each  differed  considerably  because  the  First 
Amendment  burdens  differed.  This  flexible  approach  is
necessary because not all reporting and disclosure regimes 
burden associational rights in the same way. 

2 
The Court now departs from this nuanced approach in fa-
vor of a “one size fits all” test.  Regardless of whether there
is any risk of public disclosure, and no matter if the burdens 
on  associational  rights  are  slight,  heavy,  or  nonexistent, 
disclosure regimes must always be narrowly tailored. 

The Court searches in vain to find a foothold for this new 
approach in precedent.  The Court first seizes on Shelton’s 
statement  that  a  governmental  interest  “ ‘cannot  be  pur-
sued by means that broadly stifle fundamental personal lib-
erties when the end can be more narrowly achieved.’ ”  Ante, 
at 9 (quoting 364 U. S., at 488).  The Court could not have 

—————— 
of ways in which Washington’s interest could be met without public dis-
closure.  Reed,  561  U. S.,  at  234–238  (opinion  of  THOMAS,  J.).  It  was 
enough  that  public  disclosure  could  “help”  advance  electoral  integrity. 
Id., at 198 (majority opinion).  The Court is clearly wrong to suggest it 
applied narrow tailoring in Reed.  See ante, at 11.