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20 

FULTON v. PHILADELPHIA 

ALITO, J., concurring in judgment
ALITO, J., concurring in judgment 

2168 (2000).

RFRA and RLUIPA have restored part of the protection 
that Smith withdrew, but they are both limited in scope and 
can be weakened or repealed by Congress at any time.  They
are no substitute for a proper interpretation of the Free Ex-
ercise Clause. 

III 
A 

That project must begin with the constitutional text.  In 
Martin  v.  Hunter’s  Lessee,  1  Wheat.  304,  338–339  (1816),
Justice Story laid down the guiding principle: “If the text be
clear and distinct, no restriction upon its plain and obvious 
import ought to be admitted, unless the inference be irre-
sistible.”    And  even  though  we  now  have  a  thick  body  of 
precedent regarding the meaning of most provisions of the 
Constitution, our opinions continue to respect the primacy
of the Constitution’s text.  See, e.g., Chiafalo v. Washington, 
591  U. S.  ___,  ___–___  (2020)  (slip  op.,  at  9–13)  (starting
with  the  text  of  Art.  II,  §1,  before  considering  historical 
practice);  Knick  v.  Township  of  Scott,  588  U. S.  ___,  ___ 
(2019)  (slip  op.,  at  6)  (beginning  analysis  with  the  text  of 
the  Takings  Clause);  Gamble  v.  United  States,  587  U. S. 
___, ___–___ (2019) (slip op., at 3–4) (starting with the text 
of the Fifth Amendment before turning to history and prec-
edent); City of Boerne, 521 U. S., at 519 (“In assessing the
breadth of §5’s enforcement power, we begin with its text”). 
Smith,  however,  paid  shockingly  little  attention  to  the
text  of  the  Free  Exercise  Clause.    Instead  of  examining 
what  readers  would  have  understood  its  words  to  mean 
when  adopted,  the  opinion  merely  asked  whether  it  was 
“permissible” to read the text to have the meaning that the 
majority favored.  494 U. S., at 878.  This strange treatment
of the constitutional text cannot be justified—and is espe-
cially surprising since it clashes so sharply with the way in
which Smith’s author, Justice Scalia, generally treated the