Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/22pdf/22-138_43j7.pdf
Page Number: 48.0

6 

COUNTERMAN v. COLORADO 

BARRETT, J., dissenting 

as there is an important difference between Counterman’s
knowledge of what his words meant and his knowledge of 
how they would be perceived.  Though the Court conflates
the two, our obscenity cases have repeatedly refused to re-
quire the latter as a matter of constitutional law.  Hamling, 
418 U. S., at 120–123; Rosen v. United States, 161 U. S. 29, 
41–42 (1896).  So obscenity doctrine does not help Counter-
man. 

The Court leans hardest on defamation law, but its argu-
ment depends on a single, cherry-picked strand of the doc-
trine.  Yes, New York Times Co. v. Sullivan requires public 
figures and public officials to show “actual malice” on a def-
amation  claim,  and  we  have  defined  “actual  malice”  as 
“knowledge that [the statement] was false” or “reckless dis-
regard of whether it was false or not.”  376 U. S. 254, 279– 
280 (1964).  But that is not the full story.  A private person
need  only  satisfy  an  objective  standard  to  recover  actual
damages for defamation.  Gertz v.  Robert Welch, Inc., 418 
U. S.  323,  347–350  (1974).    And  if  the  defamatory  speech
does not involve a matter of public concern, she may recover
punitive  damages  with  the  same  showing.    Dun  &  Brad-
street, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U. S. 749, 760– 
761 (1985) (plurality opinion).  We have justified that dis-
tinction on the ground that public-figure defamation claims
may deter “would-be critics of official conduct . . . from voic-
ing their criticism,” which would “dampe[n] the vigor and 
limit the variety of public debate.”  Sullivan, 376 U. S., at 
279.  Not  only  that,  but  “the  state  interest  in  protecting”
public figures is weaker, since they tend to  “enjoy signifi-
cantly greater access to the channels of effective communi-
cation and hence have a more realistic opportunity to coun-
teract  false  statements.”  Gertz,  418  U. S.,  at  344.  So, 
despite what the Court says, Sullivan does not stand for the 
broad proposition that the First Amendment “demand[s] a 
subjective mental-state requirement.”  Ante, at 6.  Instead, 
it simply raises the bar for borderline unprotected speech