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8 

LOPER BRIGHT ENTERPRISES v. RAIMONDO 

GORSUCH, J., concurring 

ion  “must  be  taken  in  connection  with  its  immediate  con-
text,” In re Ayers, 123 U. S. 443, 488 (1887), and stray “re-
marks” must not be elevated above the written law, see The 
Belfast, 7 Wall. 624, 641 (1869); see also, e.g., Trebilcock v. 
Wilson, 12 Wall. 687, 692–693 (1872); Mason v. Eldred, 6 
Wall.  231,  236–238  (1868).  During  Chief  Justice  Chase’s 
tenure, it seems a Justice writing the Court’s majority opin-
ion would generally work alone and present his work orally 
and in summary form to his colleagues at conference, which 
meant  that  other  Justices  often  did  not  even  review  the 
opinion prior to publication.  6 C. Fairman, History of the
Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States  69–70  (1971).  The 
Court could proceed in this way because it understood that 
a single judicial opinion may resolve a “case or controversy,”
and in so doing it may make “effective law” for the parties, 
but it does not legislate for the whole of the country and is 
not to be confused with laws that do. 

C 
From all this, I see at least three lessons about the doc-
trine of stare decisis relevant to the decision before us today.
Each concerns a form of judicial humility. 

First, a past decision may bind the parties to a dispute,
but  it  provides  this  Court  no  authority  in  future  cases  to
depart  from  what  the  Constitution  or  laws  of  the  United 
States  ordain. 
Instead,  the  Constitution  promises,  the 
American  people  are  sovereign  and  they  alone  may, 
through  democratically  responsive  processes,  amend  our 
foundational  charter  or  revise  federal  legislation.    Une-
lected judges enjoy no such power.  Part I–B, supra. 

Recognizing as much, this Court has often said that stare 
decisis is not an “ ‘inexorable command.’ ”  State Oil Co. v. 
Khan, 522 U. S. 3, 20 (1997).  And from time to time it has 
found  it  necessary  to  correct  its  past  mistakes.    When  it 
comes to correcting errors of constitutional interpretation, 
the Court has stressed the importance of doing so, for they