Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/22pdf/21-86_l5gm.pdf
Page Number: 18

Cite as:  598 U. S. ____ (2023) 

13 

Opinion of the Court 

action to a court of appeals.  So Free Enterprise Fund’s anal-
ysis of the judicial review factor does not control. 

Yet  a  problem  remains,  stemming  from  the  interaction 
between the alleged injury and the timing of review.  To see 
the difficulty, think first about Thunder Basin and Elgin. 
If an appellate court had ruled in favor of the coal company 
or the federal employee on review of an agency decision, the 
court could have remedied the party’s injury.  It could have 
revoked the fine assessed on the company or reinstated the 
employee with backpay.  But not so here.  The harm Axon 
and Cochran allege is “being subjected” to “unconstitutional 
agency  authority”—a  “proceeding  by  an  unaccountable 
ALJ.”  Brief for Axon 36; see Brief for Cochran 37 (contend-
ing she suffers harm from “having to appear in proceedings” 
before  an  unconstitutionally  insulated  ALJ).    That  harm 
may  sound  a  bit  abstract;  but  this  Court  has  made  clear 
that it is “a here-and-now injury.”  Seila Law LLC v. Con-
sumer  Financial  Protection  Bureau,  591  U. S.  ___,  ___ 
(2020) (slip op., at 10) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
And—here is the rub—it is impossible to remedy once the 
proceeding is over, which is when appellate review kicks in. 
Suppose a court of appeals agrees with Axon, on review of 
an adverse FTC decision, that ALJ-led proceedings violate 
the separation of powers.  The court could of course vacate 
the FTC’s order.  But Axon’s separation-of-powers claim is 
not  about  that  order;  indeed,  Axon  would  have  the  same 
claim  had  it  won  before  the  agency.    The  claim,  again,  is 
about subjection to an illegitimate proceeding, led by an il-
legitimate  decisionmaker.    And  as  to  that  grievance,  the 
court of appeals can do nothing: A proceeding that has al-
ready  happened  cannot  be  undone.
  Judicial  review  of 
Axon’s  (and  Cochran’s)  structural  constitutional  claims 
would come too late to be meaningful. 

The limits of that conclusion are important to emphasize. 
The  Government,  in  disputing  our  position,  notes  that 
many  review  schemes—involving  not  only  agency  action