Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/21pdf/20-843_7j80.pdf
Page Number: 3

Cite as:  597 U. S. ____ (2022) 

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Syllabus 

can, and must, apply to circumstances beyond those the Founders spe-
cifically anticipated, even though its meaning is fixed according to the 
understandings  of  those  who  ratified  it.    See,  e.g.,  United  States  v. 
Jones, 565 U. S. 400, 404–405.  Indeed, the Court recognized in Heller 
at least one way in which the Second Amendment’s historically fixed
meaning applies to new circumstances: Its reference to “arms” does not 
apply “only [to] those arms in existence in the 18th century.”  554 U. S., 
at 582. 

To  determine  whether  a  firearm  regulation  is  consistent  with  the 
Second Amendment, Heller and McDonald point toward at least two
relevant metrics: first, whether modern and historical regulations im-
pose a comparable burden on the right of armed self-defense, and sec-
ond, whether that regulatory burden is comparably justified.  Because 
“individual  self-defense  is  ‘the  central  component’  of  the  Second 
Amendment  right,”  these  two  metrics  are  “ ‘central’ ”  considerations 
when engaging in an analogical inquiry.  McDonald, 561 U. S., at 767 
(quoting Heller, 554 U. S., at 599).

To be clear, even if a modern-day regulation is not a dead ringer for 
historical precursors, it still may be analogous enough to pass consti-
tutional muster.  For example, courts can use analogies to “longstand-
ing” “laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such 
as  schools  and  government buildings”  to  determine  whether  modern
regulations  are  constitutionally  permissible.  Id.,  at  626.  That  said, 
respondents’ attempt to characterize New York’s proper-cause require-
ment as a “sensitive-place” law lacks merit because there is no histor-
ical basis for New York to effectively declare the island of Manhattan 
a “sensitive place” simply because it is crowded and protected gener-
ally by the New York City Police Department.  Pp. 17–22.

(b) Having  made  the  constitutional  standard  endorsed  in  Heller 
more explicit, the Court applies that standard to New York’s proper-
cause requirement.  Pp. 23–62.

(1) It  is  undisputed  that  petitioners  Koch  and  Nash—two  ordi-
nary, law-abiding, adult citizens—are part of “the people” whom the 
Second Amendment protects.  See Heller, 554 U. S., at 580.  And no 
party disputes that handguns are weapons “in common use” today for 
self-defense.  See id., at 627.  The Court has little difficulty concluding
also that the plain text of the Second Amendment protects Koch’s and
Nash’s  proposed  course  of  conduct—carrying  handguns  publicly  for 
self-defense.  Nothing  in  the  Second  Amendment’s  text  draws  a 
home/public  distinction  with  respect  to  the  right  to  keep  and  bear
arms, and the definition of “bear” naturally encompasses public carry.
Moreover, the Second Amendment guarantees an “individual right to 
possess and carry weapons in case of confrontation,” id., at 592, and 
confrontation can surely take place outside the home.  Pp. 23–24.