Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/19pdf/18-1116_h3cj.pdf
Page Number: 13

Cite as:  589 U. S. ____ (2020) 

11 

Opinion of the Court 

the Secretary but not what was sent to them. 

The version at issue here, however, is the current one— 
from which Congress removed any mention of constructive 
knowledge.    “When  Congress  acts  to  amend a  statute,  we 
presume  it  intends  its  amendment  to  have  real  and  sub-
stantial effect.”  Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 
542  U. S.  241,  258–259  (2004)  (internal  quotation  marks
omitted).  Section 1113(2)’s history thus more readily sug-
gests  that  the  current  version  does  in  fact  require  actual 
knowledge. 

III 
Nothing in this opinion forecloses any of the “usual ways”
to  prove  actual  knowledge  at  any  stage  in  the  litigation. 
Farmer  v.  Brennan,  511  U. S.  825,  842  (1994).    Plaintiffs 
who recall reading particular disclosures will of course be 
bound by oath to say so in their depositions.  On top of that,
actual  knowledge  can  be  proved  through  “inference  from 
circumstantial evidence.”  Ibid.; see also Staples v. United 
States, 511 U. S. 600, 615–616, n. 11 (1994) (“[K]nowledge
can be inferred from circumstantial evidence”).  Evidence of 
disclosure would no doubt be relevant, as would electronic 
records showing that a plaintiff viewed the relevant disclo-
sures and evidence suggesting that the plaintiff took action 
in  response  to  the  information  contained  in  them.  And 
though,  “[a]t  the  summary  judgment  stage,  facts  must  be 
viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party,” 
that is true “only if there is a ‘genuine’ dispute as to those 
facts.”  Scott v. Harris, 550 U. S. 372, 380 (2007) (quoting 
Fed.  Rule  Civ.  Proc.  56(c)). 
If  a  plaintiff ’s  denial  of 
knowledge is “blatantly contradicted by the record,” “a court
should  not  adopt  that  version  of  the  facts  for  purposes  of 
ruling  on  a  motion  for  summary  judgment.”    550  U. S., 
at 380. 

Today’s  opinion  also  does  not  preclude  defendants  from
contending that evidence of “willful blindness” supports a