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AUSTIN v. U. S. NAVY SEALS 1–26 

KAVANAUGH, J., concurring 

U. S. 518, 530 (1988).  As the Court has long emphasized,
moreover, the “complex, subtle, and professional decisions 
as to the composition, training, equipping, and control of a
military  force  are  essentially  professional  military  judg-
ments.”  Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U. S. 1, 10 (1973).  There-
fore, it is “difficult to conceive of an area of governmental 
activity in which the courts have less competence.”  Ibid. 

In  this  case,  the  District  Court,  while  no  doubt  well-in-
tentioned, in effect inserted itself into the Navy’s chain of
command,  overriding  military  commanders’  professional
military judgments.  The Court relied on the Religious Free-
dom  Restoration  Act.  See  42  U. S. C.  §2000bb−1(b).  But 
even  accepting  that  RFRA  applies  in  this  particular  mili-
tary context, RFRA does not justify judicial intrusion into 
military affairs in this case.  That is because the Navy has
an extraordinarily compelling interest in maintaining stra-
tegic and operational control over the assignment and de-
ployment of all Special Warfare personnel—including con-
trol  over  decisions  about  military  readiness.  And  no  less 
restrictive means would satisfy that interest in this context.
The Court “should indulge the widest latitude” to sustain
the  President’s  “function  to  command  the  instruments  of 
national  force,  at  least  when  turned  against  the  outside
world for the security of our society.”  Youngstown Sheet & 
Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U. S. 579, 645 (1952) (Jackson, J., 
concurring).  That fundamental principle applies here.  As 
Admiral William Lescher, Vice Chief of Naval Operations, 
explained: “Sending ships into combat without maximizing
the crew’s odds of success, such as would be the case with 
ship  deficiencies  in  ordnance,  radar,  working  weapons  or
the means to reliably accomplish the mission, is dereliction
of duty.  The same applies to ordering unvaccinated person-
nel into an environment in which they endanger their lives, 
the lives of others and compromise accomplishment of es-
sential missions.”  App. to Application for Partial Stay 110a.