Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/07pdf/07-290.pdf
Page Number: 94.0

Cite as:  554 U. S. ____ (2008) 

27 

STEVENS, J., dissenting 

pose,  and  a  desire  to  protect  the  States’  militias  as  the
means  by  which  to  guard  against  that  danger.    But  state 
militias  could  not  effectively  check  the  prospect  of  a  fed­
eral standing army so long as Congress retained the power 
to  disarm  them,  and  so  a  guarantee  against  such  disar­
mament  was  needed.27  As  we  explained  in  Miller:  “With 
obvious  purpose  to  assure  the  continuation  and  render
possible  the  effectiveness  of  such  forces  the  declaration 
and  guarantee  of  the  Second  Amendment  were  made.    It 
must  be  interpreted  and  applied  with  that  end  in  view.”
307  U. S.,  at  178.    The  evidence  plainly  refutes  the  claim
that the Amendment was motivated by the Framers’ fears
that  Congress  might  act  to  regulate  any  civilian  uses  of 
weapons.  And even if the historical record were genuinely 
ambiguous, the burden would remain on the parties advo­
cating a change in the law to introduce facts or arguments
“ ‘newly  ascertained,’ ”  Vasquez,  474  U. S.,  at  266;  the 
Court is unable to identify any such facts or arguments. 

III 
Although  it  gives  short  shrift  to  the  drafting  history  of
the  Second  Amendment,  the  Court  dwells  at  length  on 
four other sources: the 17th-century English Bill of Rights; 
Blackstone’s  Commentaries  on  the  Laws  of  England;
postenactment  commentary  on  the  Second  Amendment;
and  post-Civil  War  legislative  history.28    All  of  these 

—————— 

27 The  Court  suggests  that  this  historical  analysis  casts  the  Second
Amendment  as  an  “odd  outlier,”  ante,  at  30;  if  by  “outlier,”  the  Court 
means that the Second Amendment was enacted in a unique and novel
context,  and  responded  to  the  particular  challenges  presented  by  the 
Framers’  federalism  experiment,  I  have  no  quarrel  with  the  Court’s
characterization. 

28 The Court’s fixation on the last two types of sources is particularly 
puzzling,  since  both  have  the  same  characteristics  as  postenactment
legislative  history,  which  is  generally  viewed  as  the  least  reliable 
source of authority for ascertaining the intent of any provision’s draft­
ers.  As has been explained: