Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/20pdf/19-1434_ancf.pdf
Page Number: 32

Cite as:  594 U. S. ____ (2021) 

5 

Opinion of GORSUCH, J. 

question to determine what Congress has said should hap-
pen in that event.  Sometimes Congress includes “fallback”
provisions of just this sort, and sometimes those provisions
tell  us  to  disregard  this  or  that  provision  if  its  statutory
scheme is later found to offend the Constitution.  See, e.g., 
Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U. S. 714, 718–719 (1986); see also
Walsh, Partial Unconstitutionality, 85 N. Y. U. L. Rev. 738,
780–781 (2010).

The problem here is that Congress has said nothing of the 
sort.  And here it is the combination of separate statutory
provisions that conspire to create a constitutional violation. 
Through some provisions, Congress has authorized execu-
tive officers to cancel patents.  §§6(b)(4), 318(a).  Through
others, it has made their exercise of that power unreviewa-
ble within the Executive Branch.  See  §§6(c), 318(b).  It’s 
the combination of these provisions—the exercise of execu-
tive  power  and  unreviewability—that  violates  the  Consti-
tution’s separation of powers.

Nor  is  there  only  one  possible  way  out  of  the  problem. 
First, one could choose as the Court does and make PTAB 
decisions subject to review by the Director, who is answer-
able to the President through a chain of dependence.  See 
Duffy,  Are  Administrative  Patent  Judges  Unconstitu-
tional?  77 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 904, 911 (2009).  Separately,
one could specify that PTAB panel members should be ap-
pointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate and 
render their decisions directly reviewable by the President. 
See Lawson, 26 Geo. Mason L. Rev., at 57.  Separately still, 
one could reassign the power to cancel patents to the Judi-
ciary  where  it  resided  for  nearly  two  centuries.    See  Oil 
States, 584 U. S., at ___–___ (GORSUCH, J., dissenting) (slip
op., at 8–10).  Without some direction from Congress, this
problem cannot be resolved as a matter of statutory inter-
pretation.  All that remains is a policy choice. 

In circumstances like these, I believe traditional remedial 
principles should be our guide.  Early American courts did