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4 

AMERICAN LEGION  v. AMERICAN HUMANIST ASSN. 

Syllabus 

es of their predecessors as it stands among memorials to veterans of 
later  wars.   It has thus become part of the community.  It would not 
serve that role had its design deliberately disrespected area soldiers, 
but  there  is  no  evidence that the names of any area Jewish soldiers 
were  either  intentionally  left  off  the  memorial’s  list  or  included 
against  the  wishes  of  their  families.    The  AHA  tries  to connect the 
Cross and the American Legion with anti-Semitism and the Ku Klux 
Klan,  but  the  monument,  which  was  dedicated  during  a  period  of 
heightened racial and religious animosity, includes the names of both 
Black  and White soldiers; and both Catholic and Baptist clergy par-
ticipated  in  the  dedication.    It  is also natural and appropriate for a 
monument commemorating the death of particular individuals to in-
voke  the  symbols  that  signify  what  death  meant  for  those  who  are 
memorialized.    Excluding  those  symbols  could  make  the  memorial 
seem incomplete.  This explains why Holocaust memorials invariably 
feature  a  Star  of  David  or  other  symbols  of  Judaism  and  why  the 
memorial at issue features the same symbol that marks the graves of 
so many soldiers near the battlefields where they fell.  Pp. 28–30. 

(d) The  fact  that  the  cross  is  undoubtedly  a  Christian  symbol 
should  not  blind  one  to  everything  else  that  the Bladensburg Cross 
has  come  to  represent:  a  symbolic  resting  place  for  ancestors  who 
never  returned  home, a place for the community to gather and honor 
all  veterans  and  their  sacrifices  for  this  Nation,  and  a  historical 
landmark.    For  many, destroying or defacing the Cross would not be 
neutral and would not further the ideals of respect and tolerance em-
bodied in the First Amendment.  P. 31. 
  JUSTICE  ALITO,  joined  by  THE  CHIEF JUSTICE, JUSTICE BREYER, and 
JUSTICE KAVANAUGH,  concluded  in Parts II–A and II–D: 

(a) Lemon  ambitiously  attempted  to  fashion  a  test  for  all  Estab-
lishment Clause cases.  The test called on courts to examine the pur-
poses  and  effects  of  a  challenged  government  action,  as well as any 
entanglement with religion that it might entail.  The expectation of a 
ready framework has not been met, and the Court has many times ei-
ther  expressly  declined  to  apply  the  test  or  simply  ignored  it.   See, 
e.g.,  Zobrest  v.  Catalina  Foothills  Sch.  Dist.,  509  U. S.  1;  Town  of 
Greece  v. Galloway,  572 U. S. 565.  Pp. 12–16. 

(b) The Lemon Court ambitiously attempted to find a grand unified 
theory of the Establishment Clause, but the Court has since taken a 
more  modest  approach  that  focuses  on  the  particular issue at hand 
and  looks  to  history  for  guidance.  The cases involving prayer before 
legislative sessions are illustrative.  In Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U. S. 
783, the Court upheld a State Legislature’s practice of beginning each 
session with a prayer by an official chaplain, finding it highly persua-
sive that Congress for over 200 years had opened its sessions with a