Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/22pdf/21-454_4g15.pdf
Page Number: 65

4 

SACKETT v. EPA 

KAGAN, J., concurring in judgment 

even if it conflicts with judges’ policy preferences.  The ma-
jority’s  first  pass  through  the  statute  is,  as  JUSTICE 
KAVANAUGH says, “unorthodox.”   Post, at 9.  “A minus B, 
which  includes  C”?  Ante,  at  19.    The  majority  could  use 
every  letter  of  the  alphabet,  and  graduate  to  quadratic 
equations, and still not solve its essential problem.  As the 
majority concedes, the statute “tells us that at least some 
wetlands  must  qualify  as  ‘waters  of  the  United  States.’ ” 
Ante, at 18–19.  More, the statute tells us what those “some 
wetlands” are: the “adjacent” ones.  And again, as JUSTICE 
KAVANAUGH  shows,  “adjacent”  does  not  mean  adjoining. 
See post, at 4–6; supra, at 1–2.  So the majority proceeds to
its back-up plan.  It relies as well on a judicially manufac-
tured  clear-statement  rule.    When  Congress  (so  says  the
majority) exercises power “over private property”—particu-
larly,  over  “land  and  water  use”—it  must  adopt  “exceed-
ingly  clear  language.”  Ante,  at  23  (internal  quotation 
marks omitted).  There is, in other words, a thumb on the 
scale for property owners—no matter that the Act (i.e., the 
one Congress enacted) is all about stopping property own-
ers from polluting.  See supra, at 2. 

Even assuming that thumb’s existence, the majority still 
would  be  wrong.  As  JUSTICE  KAVANAUGH  notes,  clear-
statement  rules  operate  (when  they  operate)  to  resolve
problems of ambiguity and vagueness.  See post, at 11; see 
also  Bond  v.  United  States,  572  U. S.  844,  859  (2014); 
United  States  v.  Bass,  404  U. S.  336,  347  (1971).    And  no 
such problems are evident here.  One last time: “Adjacent” 
means neighboring, whether or not touching; so, for exam-
ple,  a  wetland  is  adjacent  to  water  on  the  other  side  of  a 
sand dune.  That congressional judgment is as clear as clear 
can be—which is to say, as clear as language gets.  And so 
a  clear-statement  rule  must  leave  it  alone.  The  majority
concludes otherwise because it is using its thumb not to re-
solve  ambiguity  or  clarify  vagueness,  but  instead  to  “cor-
rect” breadth.  Those paying attention have seen this move