Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/23pdf/22-704_4246.pdf
Page Number: 11.0

Cite as:  602 U. S. ____ (2024) 

7 

Opinion of the Court 

“ha[ve]  been  long  recognized  by  the  common  law  and  the
chancery courts of England and of this country, and by the 
statutes of some of the States,” and that protection contin-
ues today.  Id., at 92.  As we all agree, this “[h]istory informs 
the  understanding  that  content-based  distinctions  are  an
intrinsic feature of trademarks.”  Post, at 6 (SOTOMAYOR, J., 
concurring in judgment); accord, post, at 2–6 (BARRETT, J., 
concurring in part).  And, for the duration of that history,
the inherently content-based nature of trademark law has 
never been a cause for constitutional concern. 

Our  country  has  recognized  trademark  rights  since  the 
founding.  See  B.  Pattishall,  The  Constitutional  Founda-
tions of American Trademark Law, 78 Trademark Rep. 456, 
457–459 (1988).  At the outset, there were few recorded de-
cisions, and the law developed slowly.  Much of early Amer-
ican trademark law “was lifted essentially from that of Eng-
land.”  Id.,  at  457.  The  protection  of  trademarks  under
English law was an inherently content-based endeavor.  For 
example,  an  early  English  law  made  it  “lawful  to  and  for 
every Trader, Dealer and Weaver of Linen Manufacture, to
weave his Name, or fix some known Mark in any Piece of 
Linen Manufacture by him made.”  13 Geo. I, c. 26, p. 458 
(1726).  And, a person could be liable for fraud if he sold a 
product under another person’s mark.  See, e.g., id., at 459; 
Singleton v. Bolton, 3 Dougl. 293, 99 Eng. Rep. 661 (K. B. 
1783); Southern v. How, Pop. 143, 144, 79 Eng. Rep. 1243, 
1244 (K. B. 1618) (mentioning that an “action did well lie” 
if  a  clothier  “used  the  same  mark”  as  another);  J.  Baker,
Sources  of  English  Legal  History:  Private  Law  to  1750, 
p. 675  (2d  ed.  2010)  (discussing  J.  G.  v.  Samford,  also 
known as Sandforth’s Case, which held in 1584 that an ac-
tion  could  lie  when  a  clothier  “used  another  [clothier’s]
mark”);  see  also  G.  Jacob,  A  New-Law  Dictionary  (1729)
(defining “Mark to Goods” as “what ascertains the Property
or Goodness thereof . . . And if one Man shall use the Mark 
of another, to the Intent to do him Damage, Action upon the