Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/558bv.pdf
Page Number: 444.0

Cite as: 558 U. S. 256 (2010) 

283 

Opinion of Roberts, C. J. 

The  other cases  relied  upon by  the  majority  are even  far­
ther  aﬁeld.  See  Maryland  v.  Louisiana,  451  U. S.  725 
(1981); Texas v.  Louisiana, 426 U. S. 465 (1976) (per curiam); 
Oklahoma v.  Texas, 258 U. S. 574 (1922).  None was an equi­
table  apportionment  action.  Two  involved  boundary  dis­
putes  in  which  the  Court  allowed  nonsovereign  intervenors 
to  claim  title  to  certain  parcels  of  property.  See  Texas  v. 
Louisiana, supra, at 466 (permitting intervention by the city 
of  Port  Arthur,  Texas);  Oklahoma  v.  Texas,  supra,  at  580– 
581 (same for private parties).  A claim to title in a particu­
lar piece of property is quite different from a general interest 
shared  by  all  citizens  in  the  State’s  waters.  And  it  would 
be  particularly  inapt  to  draw  general  conclusions  about  in­
tervention from Oklahoma v.  Texas, in which the Court took 
the  southern  half  of  the  Red  River  into  receivership.  See 
258 U. S., at 580.  In subsequently allowing persons to inter­
vene  to  assert  claims  to  the  subject  property,  the  Court  re­
lied  explicitly  on  the  fact  that  the  receiver  had  possession 
and  control  of  the  claimed  parcels,  and  “no  other  court  law­
fully [could] interfere with or disturb that possession or con­
trol.”  Id., at 581. 

The  majority’s  reliance  on  Maryland  v.  Louisiana  is 
equally  unavailing.  There,  several  States  challenged  the 
constitutionality of Louisiana’s application of a tax on natural 
gas that was brought into that State.  451 U. S., at 728.  In 
two  sentences  within  a  long  footnote,  the  Court  mentioned 
that it was permitting a group of pipeline companies to inter­
vene  and  challenge  the  tax.  Id.,  at  745,  n.  21.  The  Court 
made  clear  that  the  pipeline  companies  were  able  to  inter­
vene  in  light  of  the  particular  circumstances  in  that  case— 
namely,  Louisiana’s  tax  was  “directly  imposed  on  the  owner 
of imported gas,” and “the  pipelines most often own[ed] the 
gas.”  Ibid.  Again,  an  interest  in  a  tax  imposed  only  on 
discrete parties is obviously different from a general interest 
shared by all citizens of the State.