Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/19pdf/18-1023_m64o.pdf
Page Number: 21.0

Cite as:  590 U. S. ____ (2020) 

17 

Opinion of the Court 

ternal quotation marks omitted).  Presented with two stat-
utes, the Court will “regard each as effective”—unless Con-
gress’ intention to repeal is “ ‘ “clear and manifest,” ’ ” or the 
two  laws  are  “irreconcilable.”  Morton,  417  U. S.,  at  550– 
551 (quoting United States v. Borden Co., 308 U. S. 188, 198 
(1939));  see  also  FCC  v.  NextWave  Personal  Communica-
tions Inc., 537 U. S. 293, 304 (2003) (“[W]hen two statutes
are  capable  of  co-existence,  it  is  the  duty  of  the  courts, 
absent  a  clearly  expressed  congressional  intention  to  the
contrary,  to  regard  each  as  effective”  (internal  quotation 
marks omitted)). 

This  Court’s  aversion  to  implied  repeals  is  “especially”
strong “in the appropriations context.”  Robertson v. Seattle 
Audubon Soc., 503 U. S. 429, 440 (1992); see also New York 
Airways,  Inc.  v.  United  States,  177  Ct.  Cl.  800,  810,  369 
F. 2d  743,  748  (1966).    The  Government  must  point  to 
“something more than the mere omission to appropriate a
sufficient sum.”  United States v. Vulte, 233 U. S. 509, 515 
(1914);  accord,  GAO  Redbook  2–63  (“The  mere  failure
to appropriate sufficient funds is not enough”).  The ques-
tion, then, is whether the appropriations riders manifestly 
repealed  or  discharged  the  Government’s  uncapped
obligation. 

Langston confirms that the appropriations riders did nei-
ther.  Recall that in Langston, Congress had established a 
statutory obligation to pay a salary of $7,500, yet later ap-
propriated  a  lesser  amount.    118  U. S.,  at  393–394.    This 
Court held that Congress did not “abrogat[e] or suspen[d]” 
the salary-fixing statute by “subsequent enactments [that]
merely appropriated a less amount” than necessary to pay,
because  the  appropriations  bill  lacked  “words  that  ex-
pressly or by clear implication modified or repealed the pre-
vious law.”  Id., at 394.
  Vulte reaffirmed that a mere failure to appropriate does
not repeal or discharge an obligation to pay.  At issue there 
was  whether  certain  appropriations  Acts  had  repealed  a