Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/10pdf/09-530.pdf
Page Number: 15.0

Cite as:  562 U. S. ____ (2011) 

11 

Opinion of the Court 

III 

As  was  our  approach  in  Whalen,  we  will  assume  for 
present  purposes  that  the  Government’s  challenged  in-
quiries  implicate  a  privacy  interest  of  constitutional  sig-
nificance.  429  U. S.,  at  599,  605.10   We  hold,  however, 

—————— 

10 The  opinions  concurring  in  the  judgment  disagree  with  this  ap-
proach  and  would  instead  provide  a  definitive  answer  to  the  question
whether  there  is  a  constitutional  right  to  informational  privacy.  Post, 
at 6–7 (opinion of SCALIA, J.); post, at 1 (opinion of THOMAS, J.).  One of 
these  opinions  expresses  concern  that  our failure  to  do  so  will  “har[m] 
our image, if not our self-respect,” post, at 7 (SCALIA, J.), and will cause 
practical problems, post, at 8–9.  There are sound reasons for eschewing 
the concurring opinions’ recommended course. 

“The premise of our adversarial system is that appellate courts do not
sit as self-directed boards of legal inquiry and research, but essentially
as  arbiters  of  legal  questions  presented  and  argued  by  the  parties 
before  them.”  Carducci  v.  Regan,  714  F. 2d  171,  177  (CADC  1983) 
(opinion for the court by Scalia, J.).  In this case, petitioners did not ask
us to hold that there is no constitutional right to informational privacy, 
and  respondents  and  their  amici  thus  understandably  refrained  from 
addressing  that  issue  in  detail.  It  is  undesirable  for  us  to  decide  a 
matter of this importance in a case in which we do not have the benefit 
of briefing by the parties and in which potential amici had little notice 
that  the  matter  might  be  decided.      See  Pet.  for  Cert.  15  (“no  need  in 
this  case”  for  broad  decision  on  “the  scope  of  a  constitutionally-based
right to privacy for certain information”).  Particularly in cases like this
one,  where  we  have  only  the  “scarce  and  open-ended”  guideposts  of
substantive  due  process  to  show  us  the  way,  see  Collins  v.  Harker 
Heights, 503 U. S. 115, 125 (1992), the Court has repeatedly recognized 
the  benefits  of  proceeding  with  caution.    E.g.,  Herrera  v.  Collins,  506 
U. S.  390,  417  (1993)  (joined  by  SCALIA,  J.)  (assuming  “for  the  sake  of
argument . . . that in a capital case a truly persuasive demonstration of
‘actual  innocence’ ”  made  after  conviction  would  render  execution 
unconstitutional);  Cruzan  v.  Director,  Mo.  Dept.  of  Health,  497  U. S. 
261,  279  (1990)  (joined  by  SCALIA,  J.)  (“[W]e  assume  that  the  United
States Constitution would grant a competent person a constitutionally
protected right to refuse lifesaving hydration and nutrition”); Regents of 
Univ.  of  Mich.  v.  Ewing,  474  U. S.  214,  222–223  (1985)  (“assum[ing],
without deciding, that federal courts can review an academic decision of
a  public  educational  institution  under  a  substantive  due  process  stan-
dard”); Board of Curators of Univ. of Mo. v. Horowitz, 435 U. S. 78, 91–