Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/23pdf/23a349_0813.pdf
Page Number: 44

22 

OHIO v. EPA 

BARRETT, J., dissenting 

theory  largely  absent  from  applicants’  briefs.    One  can 
search  diligently  in  the  hundreds  of  pages  of  applicants’ 
opening  briefs  for  the  Court’s  theory—that  EPA  failed  to 
explain  in  its  final  rule  why  the  FIP’s  cost-effectiveness 
thresholds for imposing emissions limits do not shift with a 
different  mix  of  States—and  be  left  wondering  where  the 
Court found it.  That theory appears not to have crystallized 
until oral argument, during which counsel for the state ap-
plicants struggled to locate it in the States’ brief.  Tr. of Oral 
Arg. 11–12.  Consider just one illustrative example.  Given 
the importance to the Court’s theory of how the “knee in the 
curve” might change with different States, see ante, at 6, 7, 
and n. 4, 12, one might expect to find some mention of that 
idea in applicants’ briefs.  One would be wrong. 
  Given that applicants’ theory has evolved throughout the 
course of this litigation, we can hardly fault EPA for failing 
to  raise  every  potentially  meritorious  defense  in  its  re-
sponse brief.  That is particularly true given the compressed 
briefing schedule in this litigation’s emergency posture: The 
Court gave EPA less than two weeks to respond to multiple 
applications raising a host of general and industry-specific 
technical challenges, filed less than a week earlier.  Even 
still, EPA raised §7607(d)(7)(B)’s procedural bar.  Brief for 
Respondents 19.  And on the merits, EPA expressly argued 
that the FIP’s “viability and validity do not depend on the 
number of jurisdictions it covers”; the “Rule need not apply 
to  any  minimum  number  of  States  in  order to  operate  co-
herently.”   Id.,  at  24.   EPA  could  also  have demonstrated 
how the FIP’s state-agnostic methodology for selecting cost 
thresholds was apparent in the final rule.  But EPA cannot 
have  forfeited  that  more  specific  point  because  applicants 
did not raise it to begin with. 
  Because EPA did not forfeit these responses to the merits 
of applicants’ arbitrary-or-capricious challenge, there is no 
need to consider whether a departure from our typical ap-
proach to forfeited arguments is justified.  See ante, at 18.