Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/21pdf/20-637_10n2.pdf
Page Number: 21

Cite as:  595 U. S. ____ (2022) 

3 

ALITO, J., concurring 

of evidence that might otherwise be barred by the Confron-
tation Clause.  Under the traditional rule of completeness,
if a party introduces all or part of a declarant’s statement,
the opposing party is entitled to introduce the remainder of 
that  statement  or  another  related  statement  by  the  same
declarant, regardless of whether the statement is testimo-
nial or there was a prior opportunity to confront the declar-
ant.  See, e.g., 1 B. Bergman, N. Hollander, & T. Duncan, 
Wharton’s  Criminal  Evidence  §4:10  (15th  ed.  1997)  (ex-
plaining  rule  of  completeness  and  collecting  cases);  Fed.
Rule  Evid.  106  (partially  codifying  rule  of  completeness
with respect to writings and recorded statements). 

The rule of completeness fits comfortably within the con-
cept of implied waiver.  By introducing part or all of a state-
ment  made  by  an  unavailable  declarant,  a  defendant  has 
made a knowing and voluntary decision to permit that de-
clarant to appear as an unconfronted witness.  As a result, 
the  defendant  cannot  consistently  maintain  that  the  re-
mainder  of  the  declarant’s  statement  or  the  declarant’s 
other statements on the same subject should not be admit-
ted due to the impossibility of cross-examining that declar-
ant.  The defendant’s decision to present the statement of 
an unavailable declarant is inconsistent with the simulta-
neous  assertion  of  the  Sixth  Amendment  right  to  subject
that declarant to cross-examination. 

Analogous logic governs the Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination.  As our precedent makes clear, 
when an accused takes the stand, he implicitly “ ‘determines 
the  area  of  disclosure  and  therefore  of  inquiry’ ”  and  thus
“cannot reasonably claim that the Fifth Amendment gives
him . . . an immunity from cross-examination on the mat-
ters  he  has  himself  put  into  dispute.”  Brown  v.  United 
States, 356 U. S. 148, 155–156 (1958). 

The  Sixth  Amendment  right  to  confrontation  should  be 
analyzed no differently.  When a defendant introduces the 
statement of an unavailable declarant on a given subject,