Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/558bv.pdf
Page Number: 408

Cite as: 558 U. S. 233 (2010) 

247 

Opinion of the Court 

discretionary  by  legislation.13  The  clause  (i)  enumeration, 
we  ﬁnd,  is  instructive  in  determining  the  meaning  of  the 
clause (ii) catchall.  Read harmoniously, both clauses convey 
that Congress barred court review of discretionary decisions 
only when Congress itself set out the Attorney General’s dis­
cretionary authority in the statute.  See Hall Street Associ­
ates, L.  L. C.  v.  Mattel,  Inc.,  552  U. S.  576,  586  (2008) 
(“[W]hen  a  statute  sets  out  a  series  of  speciﬁc  items  ending 
with a general  term, that general term is  conﬁned to cover­
ing subjects comparable to the speciﬁcs it follows.”).14 

4 

We also ﬁnd signiﬁcant the character of the decisions Con­
gress  enumerated  in  § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i),  thereby  insulating 
them from judicial review.  As the Government explained at 
oral argument, the determinations there listed are “substan­
tive decisions . . . made by the Executive in the immigration 
context  as  a  matter  of  grace,  things  that  involve  whether 
aliens can stay in the country or not.”  Tr. of Oral Arg. 14.15 

13 Congress excepted from § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) “the granting of relief under 
[§] 1158(a).”  Section  1158  concerns  applications for  asylum.  Absent  the 
exception, asylum applicants might fall within § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii)’s jurisdic­
tional  bar  because  a  statutory  provision,  § 1158(b)(1)(A),  speciﬁes  that 
“the  Attorney  General  may  grant  asylum.” 
(Emphasis  added.)  See 
Zadvydas v.  Davis, 533 U. S. 678, 697 (2001) (“ ‘may’ suggests discretion”). 
14 Amicus  suggests  that  the  word  “any”  in  § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii)  should  be 
read  expansively  to  draw  in  decisions  made  discretionary  by  regulation. 
Brief for Court-Appointed Amicus Curiae in Support of Judgment Below 
21–23.  But  § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii)  does  not  say  “any  decision”;  it  says  “any 
other  decision.”  And  as  we  have  just  explained,  other  decisions  falling 
within § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii)’s compass are most sensibly understood to include 
only decisions made discretionary by Congress.  See Brief for Respondent 
19–20,  and  n.  11  (noting  that  “over  thirty  provisions  in  the  relevant  sub-
chapter  of the  INA .  .  . explicitly  grant  the Attorney  General .  .  . ‘discre­
tion’ to make a certain decision”). 

15 Counsel  offered  this  explanation  in  response  to  the  question:  “Why 
would  Congress  want  to  exclude  review  for  discretionary  judgments  by 
the Attorney General that are recited explicitly to be discretionary in the