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BABCOCK v. KIJAKAZI 

Syllabus 

Retirees receive Social Security benefits based on a progressive for-
mula  that  awards  a  percentage  of  average  past  earnings. 
§415(a)(1)(A).  The formula originally did not account for earnings from 
jobs exempt from Social Security taxes, many of which provide sepa-
rate pensions.  In response to this potential windfall, Congress modi-
fied the formula to reduce benefits when a retiree receives such a sep-
arate pension payment.  But Congress left benefits unchanged if the 
pension payment was “based wholly on service as a member of a uni-
formed service.”  §415(a)(7)(A)(III).  The National Guard of the United 
States is defined as a uniformed service, §410(m), so whether the uni-
formed-services exception applies depends on whether Babcock’s tech-
nician work was service “as” a member of the National Guard. 

It was not.  In context, “as” is most naturally read to mean “[i]n the 
role, capacity, or function of.”  American Heritage Dictionary 106.  And 
the statute defines the role, capacity, or function in which a technician
serves as that of a civilian: “For purposes of this section and any other 
provision of law,” a technician “is” a “civilian employee,” “assigned to
a civilian position” and “authorized and accounted for as” a “civilian.” 
10  U. S. C.  §§10216(a)(1),  (a)(1)(C),  (a)(2).  Technicians  hired  before 
1984 like Babcock are members of the “civil service” entitled to pen-
sions under Title 5 of the U. S. Code, which governs the pay and bene-
fits  of  civil  servants.    See  5  U. S. C.  §2101.    Looking  to  the  broader
statutory context, technicians possess characteristically civilian rights 
to seek redress for employment discrimination and to receive workers’ 
compensation, disability benefits, and compensatory time off for over-
time work.  These provisions demonstrate that Congress consistently
distinguished technician employment from National Guard service.

That distinction holds true even though Babcock also served at other
times in a different capacity as a member of the National Guard.  His 
civil-service pension payments are not based on that service, for which 
he received separate military pension payments that do not trigger the 
windfall elimination provision.  And a condition of employment, such 
as the requirement that a technician maintain Guard membership, is
not the same as the capacity in which one serves.  Babcock contends 
that the technician job’s qualifications, duties, and dress code render 
it  functionally  indistinguishable  from  National  Guard  service,  and 
that the Court should interpret “as” more loosely to capture payments 
for “service [in the likeness of or the same as] a member of a uniformed 
service.”    But  the  Court  finds  no  reason  to  adopt  a  meaning  of  “as”
other  than  the  most  natural  one,  particularly  when  Babcock’s  func-
tional  test  is  inconsistent  with  the  statutory  scheme.    Determining 
whether Babcock’s employment was service “as” a member of the Na-
tional Guard does not turn on factors like whether he wore his uniform 
to work but rather on how Congress classified the position.  Congress’