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Page Number: 27

6 

GLACIER NORTHWEST, INC. v. TEAMSTERS 

JACKSON, J., dissenting 

complex matters—given that its decisions are subject to re-
view in federal court—“it must assuredly be the first.”  Ma-
rine  Engineers  v.  Interlake  S.  S.  Co.,  370  U. S.  173,  185 
(1962) (emphasis added).

For that reason, this Court has long held that courts pre-
sented with claims arising out of a labor dispute must some-
times pause their proceedings to permit the Board to con-
sider the dispute in the first instance.  As relevant here, we 
have held that if §7—including its protection of the right to 
strike—“arguably” protects the conduct at issue in a state-
court suit, then the court must await the Board’s word as to 
whether  the  conduct  is,  in  fact,  protected.    Garmon,  359 
U. S., at 245. 

To determine whether conduct is “arguably protected,” a
state court examines the showing of the party invoking Gar-
mon  and  seeking  to  pause  the  litigation.    The  court  asks 
whether that party has (1) “advance[d] an interpretation of 
the [NLRA] that is not plainly contrary to its language and 
that has not been ‘authoritatively rejected’ by the courts or
the Board,” and (2) “put forth enough evidence to enable the 
court to find that the Board reasonably could uphold a claim 
based on such an interpretation.”  Longshoremen v. Davis, 
476 U. S. 380, 395 (1986).  If so, the state court must pause 
proceedings to allow the Board to consider the complex legal
and  factual  contours  of  the  question  whether  the  union’s
conduct is actually protected by the NLRA.

The  majority  refers  to  this  as  “Garmon  preemption,”  in
keeping with historical practice.  Ante, at 3.  But the term 
“preemption” is something of a misnomer.  Rather than en-
tirely and automatically precluding the state-court suit, the 
rule instead requires state courts to take a “jurisdictional
hiatus”  while  the  Board  considers  the  dispute  in  the  first 
instance.  Sears, Roebuck & Co., 436 U. S., at 203.  If the 
Board  determines  (subject  to  judicial  review)  that  §7  pro-
tects the union’s conduct, normal conflict preemption kicks 
in: A state court may not hold a union liable on state-law