Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/22pdf/20-1199_hgdj.pdf
Page Number: 180

Cite as:  600 U. S. ____ (2023) 

41 

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting 

colorblind Constitution,” but his historical analysis leads to
the  inevitable  conclusion  that  the  Constitution  is  not,  in 
fact,  colorblind.  Ante,  at  2.  Like  the  majority  opinion,
JUSTICE  THOMAS  agrees  that  race  can  be  used  to  remedy
past  discrimination  and  “to  equalize  treatment  against  a 
concrete baseline of government-imposed inequality.”  Ante, 
at 18–21.  He also argues that race can be used if it satisfies
strict  scrutiny  more  broadly,  and  he  considers  compelling 
interests  those  that  prevent  anarchy,  curb  violence,  and 
segregate prisoners.  Ante, at 26.  Thus, although JUSTICE 
THOMAS at times suggests that the Constitution only per-
mits  “directly  remedial”  measures  that  benefit  “identified 
victims  of  discrimination,”  ante,  at  20,  he  agrees  that  the
Constitution tolerates a much wider range of race-conscious 
measures. 

In the end, when the Court speaks of a “colorblind” Con-
stitution, it cannot really mean it, for it is faced with a body 
of  law  that  recognizes  that  race-conscious  measures  are 
permissible  under  the  Equal  Protection  Clause.    Instead, 
what the Court actually lands on is an understanding of the
Constitution that is “colorblind” sometimes, when the Court 
so chooses.  Behind those choices lie the Court’s own value 
judgments about what type of interests are sufficiently com-
pelling to justify race-conscious measures. 

Overruling  decades  of  precedent,  today’s  newly  consti-
tuted  Court  singles  out  the  limited  use  of  race  in  holistic
college admissions.  It strikes at the heart of Bakke, Grutter, 
and Fisher by holding that racial diversity is an “inescapa-
bly imponderable” objective that cannot justify race-conscious
affirmative action, ante, at 24, even though respondents’ ob-
jectives simply “mirror the ‘compelling interest’ this Court 

—————— 
at  395–402  (opinion  dissenting  in  part).  Justice  Marshall’s  reading  of
the Fourteenth Amendment does not support JUSTICE KAVANAUGH’S and 
the majority’s opinions.