Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/21pdf/20-843_7j80.pdf
Page Number: 83.0

2  NEW YORK STATE RIFLE & PISTOL ASSN., INC. v. BRUEN 

BARRETT, J., concurring 

rights as well as structural provisions?  See Baude, Consti-
tutional Liquidation, 71 Stan. L. Rev. 1, 49–51 (2019) (can-
vassing  arguments).  The  historical  inquiry  presented  in
this  case  does  not  require  us  to  answer  such  questions, 
which might make a difference in another case.  See ante, 
at 17–19. 

Second and relatedly, the Court avoids another “ongoing 
scholarly debate on whether courts should primarily rely on
the  prevailing  understanding  of  an  individual  right  when
the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified in 1868” or when 
the Bill of Rights was ratified in 1791.  Ante, at 29.  Here, 
the  lack  of  support  for  New  York’s  law  in  either  period
makes it unnecessary to choose between them.  But if 1791 
is the benchmark, then New York’s appeals to Reconstruc-
tion-era history would fail for the independent reason that
this evidence is simply too late (in addition to too little).  Cf. 
Espinoza v. Montana Dept. of Revenue, 591 U. S. ___, ___– 
___ (2020) (slip op., at 15–16) (a practice that “arose in the
second half of the 19th century . . . cannot by itself establish
an early American tradition” informing our understanding
of the First Amendment).  So today’s decision should not be 
understood  to  endorse  freewheeling  reliance  on  historical 
practice from the mid-to-late 19th century to establish the 
original meaning of the Bill of Rights.  On the contrary, the
Court  is  careful  to  caution  “against  giving  postenactment
history more weight than it can rightly bear.”  Ante, at 26.