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FISCHER v. UNITED STATES 

Syllabus 

words,”  Yates v. United States, 574 U. S. 528, 536 (plurality opinion), 
and “ ‘give effect, if possible, to every clause and word of [the] statute.’ ”  
Williams  v.  Taylor,  529  U. S.  362,  404  (quoting  United  States  v. 
Menasche, 348 U. S. 528, 538-539).  The Court considers both “the spe-
cific context” in which (c)(2) appears “and the broader context of the 
statute as a whole.”  Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U. S. 337, 341. 

(1)  Section 1512(c)(1) describes particular types of criminal con-
duct in specific terms.  The purpose of (c)(2) is, as the parties agree, to 
cover some set of “matters not specifically contemplated” by (c)(1).  Re-
public of Iraq v. Beaty, 556 U. S. 848, 860.  Perhaps Congress sought 
to criminalize all obstructive acts in §1512(c), and having named a few 
examples in (c)(1), devised (c)(2) to prohibit the rest.  But (c)(2) could
have a narrower scope if Congress designed it to fill inadvertent gaps 
in the focused language of (c)(1). 

One way to discern the reach of an “otherwise” clause is to look for 
guidance from whatever examples come before it.  Two general princi-
ples are relevant.  First, the canon of noscitur a sociis teaches that a 
word  is  “given  more  precise  content  by  the  neighboring  words  with 
which it is associated.”  United States v. Williams, 553 U. S. 285, 294. 
And under the related canon of ejusdem generis, a general or collective 
term  at  the  end  of  a  list  of  specific  items  is  typically  controlled  and 
defined by reference to those specific items that precede it.  Southwest 
Airlines Co. v. Saxon, 596 U. S. 450, 458.  These approaches to statu-
tory  interpretation  track  the  common  sense  intuition  that  Congress 
would not ordinarily introduce a general term that renders meaning-
less the specific text that accompanies it.

Under  these  principles,  the  “otherwise”  provision  of  §1512(c)(2)  is
limited by the list of specific criminal violations that precede it in (c)(1). 
If, as the Government asserts, (c)(2) covers all forms of obstructive con-
duct  beyond  §1512(c)(1)’s  focus  on  evidence  impairment,  Congress 
would have had little reason to provide any specific examples at all. 
And the sweep of subsection (c)(2) would swallow (c)(1), leaving that 
narrower provision with no work to do.

Tethering subsection (c)(2) to the context of (c)(1) recognizes the dis-
tinct purpose of each provision.  Subsection (c)(1) refers to a defined 
set of offense conduct—four types of actions that, by their nature, im-
pair the integrity or availability of records, documents, or objects for
use in an official proceeding.  Reading the “otherwise” clause as having
been given more precise content by (c)(1), subsection (c)(2) makes it a 
crime to impair the availability or integrity of records, documents, or 
objects used in an official proceeding in ways other than those specified
in (c)(1).  For example, it is possible to violate (c)(2) by creating false
evidence—rather  than  altering  incriminating  evidence.    Subsection