Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/21pdf/20-1410_1an2.pdf
Page Number: 25

Cite as:  597 U. S. ____ (2022) 

5 

ALITO, J., concurring
ALITO, J., concurring in judgment 

to  elements,  and  the  “except  as  authorized”  introductory
phrase in §841(a)(1) is plainly not an element.

“The definition of the elements of a criminal offense is en-
trusted to the legislature, particularly in the case of federal 
crimes, which are solely creatures of statute.”  Liparota v. 
United States, 471 U. S. 419, 424 (1985).  See also Dixon v. 
United States, 548 U. S. 1, 7 (2006).  But authorization to 
dispense or distribute a controlled substance lacks the most
basic features of an element of an offense.  For one thing, it 
is black-letter law that an indictment must allege “the ele-
ments of the offense charged.”  Hamling v. United States, 
418 U. S. 87, 117 (1974).  So if lack of authorization were an 
element,  it  would  be  necessary  to  allege  that  in  every
§841(a)(1) indictment.  But §885 says that it is not “neces-
sary for the United States to negative any exemption or ex-
ception set forth in [the relevant subchapter] in any . . . in-
dictment.”  Beyond that, the prosecution bears the burden 
of  producing  evidence  with  respect  to  every  element  of  a 
crime.  Patterson, 432 U. S., at 215.  But §885(a)(1) also pro-
vides that “the burden of going forward with the evidence 
with  respect  to  any  such  exemption  or  exception  shall  be 
upon  the  person  claiming  its  benefit.”    It  could  hardly  be 

—————— 
States,  471  U. S.  419,  424  (1985);  see  also  United  States  v.  Davis,  588 
U. S. ___, ___ (2019) (slip op., at 5) (“Only the people’s elected represent-
atives in the legislature are authorized to ‘make an act a crime’ ” (quoting 
United States v. Hudson, 7 Cranch 32, 34 (1812))).  The mens rea canon 
is legitimate when it is used to determine what elements Congress in-
tended  to  include  in  the  definition  of  an  offense.    See,  e.g.,  Staples  v. 
United  States,  511  U. S.  600,  605  (1994)  (explaining  that  the  canon  is 
founded  on  an  inference  of  congressional  intent).  But  applying  that 
canon to override the intentions of Congress would be inconsistent with 
the Constitution’s separation of powers.  Federal courts have no consti-
tutional authority to re-write the statutes Congress has passed based on
judicial views about what constitutes “sound” or “just” criminal law.  Cf. 
X-Citement Video, 513 U. S., at 80–82 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (criticizing 
our mens rea canon precedents for “convert[ing a] rule of interpretation
into a rule of law” binding on Congress).