Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/22pdf/22-535_i3kn.pdf
Page Number: 18

14 

DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION v. BROWN 

Opinion of the Court 

87 Fed. Reg. 61512–61514.  And to the extent that the De-
partment’s decision to adopt the Plan under the HEROES
Act might have some incidental effect on the likelihood that 
the Department will undertake a separate loan-forgiveness 
program  under  a  different  statute,  the  relationship  is  not 
sufficiently  close  to  persuade  us  that  the  latter  is  fairly 
traceable to the former.  See, e.g., Simon, 426 U. S., at 42– 
43 (accepting that certain tax rules might “ ‘encourag[e]’ ” or
“ ‘discourage’ ” particular behavior, but nonetheless holding 
that  connection  to  be  insufficient  to  establish  standing
where it was “just as plausible” that actors would “forgo fa-
vorable tax treatment”).  Moreover, no one argues that the
existing references to one-time relief are legally binding.  To 
whatever extent the Department has determined that the 
Plan crowds out other efforts to forgive student loans, that,
too,  is  a  discretionary  and  independent  decision  that  re-
spondents may ask it to reconsider with a §553(e) petition.
Finally,  Brown  and  Taylor  also  argue  that  they  have
demonstrated causation because the Secretary’s failure to 
observe  the  requisite  procedural  rules  cost  them  a 
“ ‘chance’ ” to “obtain debt forgiveness.”  Brief for Respond-
ents 28.  But referring in the abstract to a “chance” of ob-
taining  “debt  forgiveness”  does  not  solve  their  problem.
They do not want debt forgiveness under the HEROES Act, 
which they claim is unlawful.  They want debt forgiveness 
under the HEA.  Nothing the Secretary has done deprives 
them of a “chance” to seek that result. 

Because  respondents  cannot  meaningfully  connect  the
absence of loan relief under the HEA to the adoption of the 
Plan,  they  have  failed  to  show  that  their  injury  is  fairly
traceable to the Plan. 

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For  these  reasons,  respondents  lack  standing,  and  we 
therefore vacate the judgment of the District Court and re-
mand  the  case  with  instructions  to  dismiss.  By  vacating 

*