Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/19pdf/19-431_5i36.pdf
Page Number: 56.0

Cite as:  591 U. S. ____ (2020) 

7 

KAGAN, J., concurring in judgment 

RFRA cast a long shadow over the Departments’ rulemak-
ing, see ante, at 19–22, and that statute does not apply to 
those with only moral scruples.  So a careful agency would
have weighed anew, in this different context, the benefits of 
exempting  more employers from  the mandate against the
harms of depriving more women of contraceptive coverage. 
In the absence of such a reassessment, it seems a close call 
whether the moral exemption can survive. 

None of this is to say that the Departments could not is-
sue a valid rule expanding exemptions from the contracep-
tive mandate.  As noted earlier, I would defer to the Depart-
ments’  view  of  the  scope  of  Congress’s  delegation.    See 
supra, at 3.  That means the Departments (assuming they 
act hand-in-hand with HRSA) have wide latitude over ex-
emptions, so long as they satisfy the requirements of rea-
soned decisionmaking.  But that “so long as” is hardly noth-
ing.  Even in an area of broad statutory authority—maybe
especially there—agencies must rationally account for their
judgments.