Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/524bv.pdf
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Unit: $U90

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Cite as: 524 U. S. 357 (1998)

367

Opinion of the Court

such litigation, such a change would transform those pro-
ceedings from a “predictive and discretionary” effort to pro-
mote the best interests of both parolees and society into
trial-like proceedings “less attuned” to the interests of the
parolee. Gagnon v. Scarpelli, supra, at 787–788 (quoting
Morrissey v. Brewer, supra, at 480). We are simply unwill-
ing so to intrude into the States’ correctional schemes. See
Morrissey v. Brewer, supra, at 483 (recognizing that States
have an “overwhelming interest” in maintaining informal,
administrative parole revocation procedures). Such a trans-
formation ultimately might disadvantage parolees because
in an adversarial proceeding, “the hearing body may be less
tolerant of marginal deviant behavior and feel more pressure
to reincarcerate than to continue nonpunitive rehabilitation.”
Gagnon v. Scarpelli, supra, at 788. And the ﬁnancial costs
of such a system could reduce the State’s incentive to extend
parole in the ﬁrst place, as one of the purposes of parole is
to reduce the costs of criminal punishment while maintaining
a degree of supervision over the parolee.

The deterrence beneﬁts of the exclusionary rule would not
outweigh these costs. As the Supreme Court of Pennsylva-
nia recognized, application of the exclusionary rule to parole
revocation proceedings would have little deterrent effect
upon an ofﬁcer who is unaware that the subject of his search
In that situa-
548 Pa., at 431, 698 A. 2d, at 38.
is a parolee.
tion, the ofﬁcer will likely be searching for evidence of crim-
inal conduct with an eye toward the introduction of the
evidence at a criminal trial. The likelihood that illegally ob-
tained evidence will be excluded from trial provides deter-
rence against Fourth Amendment violations, and the remote
possibility that the subject is a parolee and that the evidence
may be admitted at a parole revocation proceeding surely
has little, if any, effect on the ofﬁcer’s incentives. Cf. United
States v. Janis, 428 U. S., at 448.

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court thus fashioned a special
rule for those situations in which the ofﬁcer performing the