Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/524bv.pdf
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524US2

Unit: $U93

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CLINTON v. CITY OF NEW YORK

Opinion of the Court

U. S. C. § 691(a)(A) (1994 ed., Supp. II), those determinations
did not qualify his discretion to cancel or not to cancel. Fi-
nally, whenever the President suspended an exemption
under the Tariff Act, he was executing the policy that Con-
gress had embodied in the statute.
In contrast, whenever
the President cancels an item of new direct spending or a
limited tax beneﬁt he is rejecting the policy judgment made
by Congress and relying on his own policy judgment.35
Thus, the conclusion in Field v. Clark that the suspensions
mandated by the Tariff Act were not exercises of legislative
power does not undermine our opinion that cancellations
pursuant to the Line Item Veto Act are the functional equiv-
alent of partial repeals of Acts of Congress that fail to satisfy
Article I, § 7.

The Government’s reliance upon other tariff and import
statutes, discussed in Field, that contain provisions similar
to the one challenged in Field is unavailing for the same
reasons.36 Some of those statutes authorized the President
to “suspen[d] and discontinu[e]” statutory duties upon his de-
termination that discriminatory duties imposed by other na-
tions had been abolished. See 143 U. S., at 686–687 (discuss-
ing Act of Jan. 7, 1824, ch. 4, § 4, 4 Stat. 3, and Act of May
24, 1828, ch. 111, 4 Stat. 308).37 A slightly different statute,

35 For example, one reason that the President gave for canceling § 968 of
the Taxpayer Relief Act was his conclusion that “this provision failed to
target its beneﬁts to small-and-medium size cooperatives.” App. to Juris.
Statement 71a (Cancellation No. 97–2); see n. 8, supra. Because the Line
Item Veto Act requires the President to act within ﬁve days, every exer-
cise of the cancellation power will necessarily be based on the same facts
and circumstances that Congress considered, and therefore constitute a
rejection of the policy choice made by Congress.

36 The Court did not, of course, expressly consider in Field whether
those statutes comported with the requirements of the Presentment
Clause.

37 Cf. 143 U. S., at 688 (discussing Act of Mar. 6, 1866, ch. 12, § 2, 14 Stat.
4, which permitted the President to “declare the provisions of this act to
be inoperative” and lift import restrictions on foreign cattle and hides
upon a showing that such importation would not endanger U. S. cattle).