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Page Number: 69.0

14  JANUS v. STATE, COUNTY, AND MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES 

KAGAN, J., dissenting 

cede  that  “we  have  sometimes  looked  to Pickering  in  con-
sidering  general  rules  that  affect  broad  categories  of  em-
ployees.”  Ante, at 23.  In fact, the majority cannot come up 
with  any  case  in  which  we  have  not  done  so.  All  it  can 
muster  is  one  case  in  which  while  applying  the  Pickering 
test  to  a  broad  rule—barring  any  federal  employee  from
accepting  any  payment  for  any  speech  or  article  on  any 
topic—the  Court  noted  that  the  policy’s  breadth  would 
count  against  the  government  at  the  test’s  second  step. 
See  United  States  v.  Treasury  Employees,  513  U. S.  454 
(1995).  Which  is  completely  predictable.    The  inquiry  at 
that  stage,  after  all,  is  whether  the  government  has  an
employment-related  interest  in  going  however  far  it  has 
gone—and  in  Treasury  Employees,  the  government  had 
indeed  gone  far.  (The  Court  ultimately  struck  down  the 
rule because it applied to speech in which the government 
had  no  identifiable  managerial  interest.    See  id.,  at  470, 
477.)  Nothing  in  Treasury  Employees  suggests  that  the
Court  defers  only  to  ad hoc  actions,  and  not  to  general 
rules,  about  public  employee  speech.    That  would  be  a 
perverse  regime,  given  the  greater  regularity  of  rulemak-
ing and the lesser danger of its abuse.  So I would wager a
small fortune that the next time a general rule governing 
public  employee  speech  comes  before  us,  we  will  dust  off 
Pickering. 

Second,  the  majority’s  distinction  between  compelling 
and  restricting  speech  also  lacks  force.    The  majority
posits  that  compelling  speech  always  works  a  greater 
injury, and so always requires a greater justification.  See 
ante,  at  8.  But  the  only  case  the  majority  cites  for  that
reading of our precedent is possibly (thankfully) the most 
exceptional  in  our  First  Amendment  annals:  It  involved 
the  state  forcing  children  to  swear  an  oath  contrary  to
their  religious  beliefs.  See  ibid.  (quoting  West  Virginia 
Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 624 (1943)).  Regulations
challenged  as  compelling  expression  do  not  usually  look