Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/23pdf/23-939_e2pg.pdf
Page Number: 63

Cite as:  603 U. S. ____ (2024) 

3 

BARRETT, J., concurring in part 

Gen.,  Re:  Applicability  of  Federal  Criminal  Laws  and  the
Constitution  to  Contemplated  Lethal  Operations  Against 
Shaykh  Anwar  al-Aulaqi  12–19  (July  16,  2010);  see  also
Brief  for  United  States  29–30;  post,  at  16,  and  n. 3 
(SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting).  I express no view about the
merits of that interpretation, but it shows that the thresh-
old question of statutory interpretation is a nontrivial step. 
If the statute covers the alleged official conduct, the pros-
ecution may proceed only if applying it in the circumstances
poses no “ ‘dange[r] of intrusion on the authority and func-
tions of the Executive Branch.’ ”  Ante, at 14 (quoting Nixon 
v. Fitzgerald, 457 U. S. 731, 754 (1982)).  On remand, the 
lower courts will have to apply that standard to various al-
legations involving the President’s official conduct.2  Some 
of  those  allegations  raise  unsettled  questions  about  the 
scope of Article II power, see ante, at 21–28, but others do 
not.  For example, the indictment alleges that the President
“asked  the  Arizona  House  Speaker  to  call  the  legislature 
into session to hold a hearing” about election fraud claims.
App. 193.  The President has no authority over state legis-
latures or their leadership, so it is hard to see how prose- 

—————— 

2 This analysis is unnecessary for allegations involving the President’s
private conduct because the Constitution offers no protection from pros-
ecution of acts taken in a private capacity.  Ante, at 15.  Sorting private 
from official conduct sometimes will be difficult—but not always.  Take 
the President’s alleged attempt to organize alternative slates of electors.
See, e.g., App. 208.  In my view, that conduct is private and therefore not 
entitled  to  protection.  See  post,  at  27–28  (SOTOMAYOR, J.,  dissenting). 
The  Constitution  vests  power  to  appoint  Presidential  electors  in  the 
States.  Art. II, §1, cl. 2; see also Chiafalo v. Washington, 591 U. S. 578, 
588–589 (2020).  And while Congress has a limited role in that process, 
see Art. II, §1, cls. 3–4, the President has none.  In short, a President has 
no legal authority—and thus no official capacity—to influence how the 
States  appoint  their  electors.    I  see  no  plausible  argument  for  barring 
prosecution of that alleged conduct.