Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/17pdf/16-1161_dc8f.pdf
Page Number: 29.0

Cite as:  585 U. S. ____ (2018) 

3 

KAGAN, J., concurring
 

I 

As the Court explains, the plaintiffs’ theory in this case
focuses on vote dilution.  See ante, at 15 (“Here, the plain­
tiffs’  partisan  gerrymandering  claims  turn  on  allegations 
that  their  votes  have  been  diluted”);  see  also  ante,  at  14, 
16–17.  That is, the plaintiffs assert that Wisconsin’s State 
Assembly Map has caused their votes “to carry less weight 
than [they] would carry in another, hypothetical district.” 
Ante, at 16.  And the mechanism used to wreak that harm 
is  “packing”  and  “cracking.”    Ante,  at  14.  In  a  relatively
few  districts,  the  mapmakers  packed  supermajorities  of
Democratic  voters—well  beyond  the  number  needed  for  a
Democratic  candidate  to  prevail.    And  in  many  more  dis­
tricts,  dispersed  throughout  the  State,  the  mapmakers
cracked  Democratic  voters—spreading  them  sufficiently
thin  to  prevent  them  from  electing  their  preferred  candi­
dates.  The  result  of  both  practices  is  to  “waste”  Demo­
crats’ votes.  Ibid. 

The harm of vote dilution, as this Court has long stated,
is “individual and personal in nature.”  Reynolds v. Sims, 
377 U. S. 533, 561 (1964); see ante, at 15.  It arises when 
an  election  practice—most  commonly,  the  drawing  of
district  lines—devalues  one  citizen’s  vote  as  compared  to
others.  Of  course,  such  practices  invariably  affect  more 
than one citizen at a time.  For example, our original one-
person,  one-vote  cases  considered  how  malapportioned 
maps  “contract[ed]  the  value”  of  urban  citizens’  votes 
while  “expand[ing]”  the  value  of  rural  citizens’  votes. 
Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U. S. 1, 7 (1964).  But we under­
stood  the  injury  as  giving  diminished  weight  to  each  par­
ticular  vote,  even  if  millions  were  so  touched.    In  such 
cases,  a  voter  living  in  an  overpopulated  district  suffered
“disadvantage  to  [herself]  as  [an]  individual[ ]”:  Her  vote
counted  for  less  than  the  votes  of  other  citizens  in  her 
State.  Baker v. Carr, 369 U. S. 186, 206 (1962); see ante, 
at  15.  And  that  kind  of  disadvantage  is  what  a  plaintiff