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Page Number: 39.0

14 

IANCU v. BRUNETTI 

Opinion of SOTOMAYOR, J. 

Cohen therefore does not resolve this case in Brunetti’s 
favor.  Yes,  Brunetti  has  been,  as  Cohen  was,  subject  to 
content  discrimination,  but  that  content  discrimination  is 
properly  understood  as  viewpoint  neutral.    And  whereas 
even  viewpoint-neutral  content  discrimination  is  (in  all 
but the most compelling cases, such as threats) impermis-
sible  in  the  context  of  a  criminal  prosecution  like  the  one
that  Cohen  faced,  Brunetti  is  subject  to  such  regulation
only  in  the  context  of  the  federal  trademark-registration 
system.  I discuss next why that distinction matters. 

B 
While  the  Court  has  often  subjected  even  viewpoint-
neutral  content  discrimination  to  strict  constitutional 
scrutiny,  see,  e.g.,  Reed,  576  U. S.,  at  ___  (slip  op.,  at  6), 
there  are  contexts  in  which  it  does  not,  see,  e.g.,  Rosen-
berger, 515 U. S., at 829–830.  When that is the case, the 
difference between viewpoint-based and viewpoint-neutral
content  discrimination  can  be  decisive.    The  federal 
trademark-registration system is such a context.

Rights  to  a  trademark  itself  arise  through  use,  not
registration.  Regardless of whether a trademark is regis-
tered, it can be used, owned, and enforced against would-
be  infringers.  See  B&B  Hardware,  Inc.  v.  Hargis  Indus-
tries, Inc., 575 U. S. ___, ___, ___ (2015) (slip op., at 3, 5). 
Trademark registration, meanwhile, confers several ancil-

—————— 

scrutiny or invalidation of  a regulation by simply claiming disinter-
est  in  a  speaker’s  message,  see  United  States  v.  Eichman,  496  U. S. 
310,  315–317  (1990),  or  by  concealing  an  attempt  to  favor  some  views 
over others in superficially neutral garb, see Renton v. Playtime Thea-
tres, Inc., 475 U. S. 41, 46–49 (1986); cf. Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, 
Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U. S. 520, 533–534 (1993).  But there is no evidence 
in the record from which to conclude that Congress enacted the scandalous-
marks  provision  in  order  to  advantage  certain  views  over  others. 
And where a denial of trademark registration by the PTO raises such a 
concern,  it  would  be  proper  for  an  applicant  to  bring  an  as-applied 
challenge.  See infra, at 18–19.