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Page Number: 49.0

10 

OBERGEFELL v. HODGES 

ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting 

almost entirely on the Due Process Clause.

The  majority  purports  to  identify  four  “principles  and
traditions”  in  this  Court’s  due  process  precedents  that 
support  a  fundamental  right  for  same-sex  couples  to 
marry.  Ante, at 12.  In reality, however, the majority’s ap-
proach has no basis in principle or tradition, except for the 
unprincipled  tradition  of  judicial  policymaking  that  char-
acterized  discredited  decisions  such  as  Lochner  v.  New 
York,  198  U. S.  45.    Stripped  of  its  shiny  rhetorical  gloss, 
the  majority’s  argument  is  that  the  Due  Process  Clause 
gives  same-sex  couples  a  fundamental  right  to  marry
because it will be good for them and for society.  If I were a 
legislator, I would certainly consider that view as a matter 
of social policy.  But as a judge, I find the majority’s posi-
tion indefensible as a matter of constitutional law. 

A 
Petitioners’  “fundamental  right”  claim  falls  into  the
most  sensitive  category  of  constitutional  adjudication. 
Petitioners do not contend that their States’ marriage laws
violate  an  enumerated  constitutional  right,  such  as  the 
freedom  of  speech  protected  by  the  First  Amendment. 
There  is,  after  all,  no  “Companionship  and  Understand-
ing” or “Nobility and Dignity” Clause in the Constitution. 
See  ante,  at  3,  14.   They  argue  instead  that  the  laws  vio-
late  a  right  implied  by  the  Fourteenth  Amendment’s
requirement  that  “liberty”  may  not  be  deprived  without 
“due process of law.”

This  Court  has  interpreted  the  Due  Process  Clause  to
include  a  “substantive”  component  that  protects  certain
liberty interests against state deprivation “no matter what
process  is  provided.”  Reno  v.  Flores,  507  U. S.  292,  302 
(1993).  The theory is that some liberties are “so rooted in 
the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked
as  fundamental,”  and  therefore  cannot  be  deprived  with-
out compelling justification.  Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291