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Page Number: 19.0

4 

WILKINS v. UNITED STATES 

THOMAS, J., dissenting 

trial or to be sued on an adverse possession theory.  Simi-
larly, and just as critically, it has not consented to be sued
(except by a State) once the 12-year statute of limitations 
has passed.

The majority acknowledges that these restrictions must
be strictly construed.  See ante, at 8.  Yet, it concludes that 
the time bar should not be considered jurisdictional.  In an-
other context, the majority’s conclusion is arguably plausi-
ble. But, in this context, it is simply incorrect.  As a condi-
tion  on  the  United  States’  limited  waiver  of  sovereign
immunity in the Quiet Title Act, the Act’s statute of limita-
tions  is  jurisdictional.    Moreover,  in  light  of  this  Court’s
longstanding  case  law,  the  jurisdictional  character  of  the 
time bar would have been well understood by the 1972 Con-
gress.  See  ante,  at  3  (suggesting  that  the  Court  should
“avoid  judicial  interpretations  that  undermine  Congress’ 
judgment” when interpreting arguably jurisdictional provi-
sions).

With  no  answer  to  the  Court’s  longstanding  view  that 
conditions  on  waivers  of  sovereign  immunity  are  jurisdic-
tional, the majority seeks refuge in Irwin v. Department of 
Veterans Affairs, 498 U. S. 89 (1990).  Ante, at 7–8.  Irwin 
considered  whether  equitable  tolling  should  apply  to  the 
time to file an employment-discrimination lawsuit against 
the Government under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964. There, the Court reasoned that “[t]ime requirements 
in lawsuits between private litigants are customarily sub-
ject  to  ‘equitable  tolling,’ ”  and  that  “[o]nce  Congress  has 
made . . . a waiver [of sovereign immunity], . . . making the
rule of equitable tolling applicable to suits against the Gov-
ernment,  in  the  same  way  that  it  is  applicable  to  private
suits, amounts to little, if any, broadening of the congres-
sional waiver.”  Irwin, 498 U. S., at 95.  It thus concluded 
that “[s]uch a principle is likely to be a realistic assessment 
of legislative intent as well as a practically useful principle 
of interpretation.”  Ibid.