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Page Number: 48

22 

NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF FAMILY AND 
LIFE ADVOCATES v. BECERRA
 
BREYER, J., dissenting 

better than other dentists.  Id., at 610.  Yet the Court held 
that “[i]n framing its policy, the legislature was not bound 
to provide for determinations of the relative proficiency of 
particular  practitioners.”  Id.,  at  612.  To  the  contrary, 
“[t]he  legislature  was  entitled  to  consider  the  general 
effects  of  the  practices  which  it  described,  and  if  these
effects  were  injurious  in  facilitating  unwarranted  and 
misleading  claims,  to  counteract  them  by  a  general  rule, 
even  though  in  particular  instances  there  might  be  no
actual deception or misstatement.”  Id., at 613. 

Relatedly, the majority suggests that the Act is suspect
because  it  covers  some  speakers  but  not  others.  Ante,  at 
18–19.  I  agree  that  a  law’s  exemptions  can  reveal  view-
point discrimination (although the majority does not reach 
this point).  “ ‘[A]n exemption from an otherwise permissi-
ble  regulation  of  speech  may  represent  a  governmental 
“attempt to give one side of a debatable public question an
advantage in expressing its views to the people.” ’ ”  McCul-
len, 573 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 15) (quoting City of Ladue 
v.  Gilleo,  512  U. S.  43,  51  (1994)).    Such  speaker-based
laws  warrant  heightened  scrutiny  “when  they  reflect  the
Government’s  preference  for  the  substance  of  what  the 
favored  speakers  have  to  say  (or  aversion  to  what  the
disfavored  speakers  have  to  say).”    Turner  Broadcasting 
System, Inc., 512 U. S., at 658.  Accordingly, where a law’s
exemptions “facilitate speech on only one side of the abor-
tion  debate,”  there  is  a  “clear  form  of  viewpoint  discrimi-
nation.”  McCullen, supra, at ___ (slip op., at 18).

There  is  no  cause  for  such  concern  here.    The  Act  does 
not,  on  its  face,  distinguish  between  facilities  that  favor 
pro-life and those that favor pro-choice points of view.  Nor 
is there any convincing evidence before us or in the courts
below  that  discrimination  was  the  purpose  or  the  effect
of  the  statute.  Notably,  California  does  not  single  out 
pregnancy-related facilities for this type of disclosure require- 
ment.  See, e.g., Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code Ann. §2053.6 (West