Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/20pdf/19-251_p86b.pdf
Page Number: 25

2 

AMERICANS FOR PROSPERITY FOUNDATION v. BONTA 

Opinion of THOMAS, J. 
Opinion of THOMAS, J. 

repeated  recognition  “that  privacy  of  association  is  pro-
tected  under  the  First  Amendment.”    561  U. S.,  at  240 
(THOMAS, J., dissenting).    The  text  and  history  of  the  As-
sembly Clause suggest that the right to assemble includes 
the right to associate anonymously.  See 4 Annals of Cong.
900–902,  941–942  (1795)  (defending  the  Democratic-Re-
publican societies, many of which met in secret, as exercis-
ing  individuals’  “leave  to  assemble”);  see  also  Brief  for 
Becket Fund for Religious Liberty as Amicus Curiae 13–20; 
Reply Brief in No. 19–251, pp. 3–5; NAACP v. Alabama ex 
rel. Patterson, 357 U. S. 449 (1958) (discussing the history 
of  anonymous  publications).  And  the  right  to  associate 
anonymously  often  operates  as  a  vehicle  to  protect  other 
First Amendment rights, such as the freedom of the press. 
McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U. S. 334, 361–367 
(1995) (THOMAS, J., concurring) (“Founding-era Americans”
understood the freedom of the press to include the right of 
printers and publishers not to be compelled to disclose the
authors of anonymous works).  Laws directly burdening the 
right to associate anonymously, including compelled disclo-
sure laws, should be subject to the same scrutiny as laws
directly burdening other First Amendment rights.  Doe, 561 
U. S., at 232, 240. 

Second,  the  Court  holds  the  law  “overbroad”  and,  thus, 
invalid in all circumstances.  Ante, at 16.  But I continue to 
have  “doubts  about  [the]  origins  and  application”  of  our
“overbreadth doctrine.”  United States v. Sineneng-Smith, 
590 U. S. ___, ___ (2020) (THOMAS, J., concurring) (slip op., 
at  1).  That  doctrine  purports  to  grant  federal  courts  the 
power to invalidate a law “if a substantial number of its ap-
plications  are  unconstitutional,  judged  in  relation  to  the
statute’s plainly legitimate sweep.”   Ibid. (internal quota-
tion marks omitted).  However, the Court has no power to 
enjoin the lawful application of a statute just because that 
statute  might  be  unlawful  as-applied  in  other  circum-
stances.  Id., at ___ (slip op., at 9); Borden v. United States,