Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/17pdf/17-130_4f14.pdf
Page Number: 27.0

Cite as:  585 U. S. ____ (2018) 

7 

BREYER, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part 
Opinion of BREYER, J. 

to the Commission’s administrative law judges even if the 
judges  are  inferior  “officers  of  the  United  States”  for  pur-
poses of the Appointments Clause.  In my dissent in Free 
Enterprise  Fund,  I  pointed  out  that  under  the  majority’s
analysis, the removal protections applicable to administra-
tive  law  judges—including  specifically  the  Commission’s
administrative  law  judges—would  seem  to  be  unconstitu-
tional.  Id.,  at  542,  587.    But  the  Court  disagreed,  saying 
that  “none  of  the  positions  [my  dissent]  identifie[d]  are
similarly situated to the Board.”  Id., at 506. 

The Free Enterprise Fund Court gave three reasons why
administrative  law  judges  were  distinguishable  from  the 
Board members at issue in that case.  First, the Court said 
that “[w]hether administrative law judges are necessarily
‘Officers  of  the  United  States’  is  disputed.”    Id.,  at  507, 
n. 10.  Second, the Court said that “unlike members of the 
Board, many administrative law judges of course perform 
adjudicative  rather  than  enforcement  or  policymaking 
functions, see [5 U. S. C.] §§554(d), 3105, or possess purely 
recommendatory  powers.”    Ibid.   And,  third,  the  Court 
pointed out that the civil service “employees” and adminis-
trative law judges to whom I referred in my dissent do not
“enjoy  the  same  significant  and  unusual  protections  from
Presidential  oversight  as  members  of  the  Board.”    Id.,  at 
506.  The Court added that the kind of “for cause” protec-
tion  the  statutes  provided  for  Board  members  was  “un- 
usually high.”  Id., at 503. 

The  majority  here  removes  the  first  distinction,  for  it
holds that the Commission’s administrative law judges are 
inferior  “Officers  of  the  United  States.”  Ante,  at  1.  The 
other two distinctions remain.  See, e.g., Wiener v. United 
States,  357  U. S.  349,  355–356  (1958)  (holding  that  Con-
gress is free to protect bodies tasked with “ ‘adjudicat[ing] 
according  to  law’  . . .  ‘from  the  control  or  coercive  influ-
ence,  direct  or  indirect,’  . . .  of  either  the  Executive  or 
Congress”) (quoting Humphrey’s Executor v. United States,