Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/23pdf/22-859new_kjfm.pdf
Page Number: 30

Cite as:  603 U. S. ____ (2024) 

25 

Opinion of the Court 

when “courts of law supplied a cause of action and an ade-
quate remedy to the litigant”). 

Atlas Roofing concluded that Congress could assign the
OSH  Act  adjudications  to  an  agency  because  the  claims
were “unknown to the common law.”  430 U. S., at 461.  The 
case  therefore  does  not  control  here,  where  the  statutory 
claim is “ ‘in the nature of ’ ” a common law suit.  Id., at 453 
(quoting Jones & Laughlin, 301 U. S., at 48).  As we have 
explained,  Jarkesy  and  Patriot28  were  prosecuted  for
“fraudulent conduct,” App. to Pet. for Cert. 72a, and the per-
tinent statutory provisions derive from, and are interpreted 
in light of, their common law counterparts, see 15 U. S. C.
§§77q(a)(2),  78j(b),  80b–6(4);  17  CFR  §§240.10b–5(b),
275.206(4)–8(a)(1); Basic Inc., 485 U. S., at 253 (opinion of 
White, J.).

The  reasoning  of  Atlas  Roofing  cannot  support  any 
broader  rule.   The  dissent  chants  “Atlas  Roofing”  like  a 
mantra,  but  no  matter  how  many  times  it  repeats  those 
words, it cannot give Atlas Roofing substance that it lacks.4 

—————— 

4 Reading the dissent, one might also think that Atlas Roofing is among
this Court’s most celebrated cases.  As the concurrence shows, Atlas Roof-
ing represents a departure from our legal traditions.  See post, at 12–20 
(opinion of GORSUCH, J.).

This view is also reflected in the scholarship.  Commentators writing
comprehensively  on  Article  III  and  agency  adjudication  have  often 
simply ignored the case.  See, e.g., R. Fallon, Of Legislative Courts, Ad-
ministrative Agencies, and Article III, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 915 (1988) (no
citation to Atlas Roofing); J. Harrison, Public Rights, Private Privileges,
and Article III, 54 Ga. L. Rev. 143 (2019) (same); W. Baude, Adjudication
Outside Article III, 133 Harv. L. Rev. 1511 (2020) (same). 

Others  who  have  considered  it  have  offered  nothing  but  a  variety  of 
criticisms.    See,  e.g.,  R.  Kirst,  Administrative  Penalties  and  the  Civil 
Jury: The Supreme Court’s Assault on the Seventh Amendment, 126 U. 
Pa.  L.  Rev.  1281,  1294  (1978)  (through  its  “careless  use  of  precedent,” 
Atlas Roofing did “not recognize or [mis]understood” “careful distinctions 
developed  by  . . .  earlier  judges”);  G. Young,  Federal  Courts  &  Federal 
Rights,  45  Brooklyn  L.  Rev.  1145,  1153  (1979)  (“The  Atlas  Court  . . . 
failed to offer an adequate justification for its interpretation of the sev-