Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/14pdf/13-7451_m64o.pdf
Page Number: 32

Cite as:  574 U. S. ___ (2015) 

5 

KAGAN, J., dissenting 

ment or thing” in an effort to thwart an official investiga-
tion  or  proceeding.  ALI,  Model  Penal  Code  §241.7(1),
p.  175  (1962)  (emphasis  added).  The  Code’s  commentary
emphasizes that the offense described in that provision is 
“not limited to conduct that [alters] a written instrument.” 
Id.,  §241.7,  Comment  3,  at  179.    Rather,  the  language 
extends  to  “any  physical  object.”    Ibid.  Consistent  with 
that  statement—and,  of  course,  with  ordinary  meaning—
courts in the more than 15 States that have laws based on 
the  Model  Code’s  tampering  provision  apply  them  to  all 
tangible  objects,  including  drugs,  guns,  vehicles  and  . . .
yes, animals.  See, e.g., State v. Majors, 318 S. W. 3d 850, 
859–861 (Tenn. 2010) (cocaine); Puckett v. State, 328 Ark. 
355,  357–360,  944  S.  W.  2d  111,  113–114  (1997)  (gun); 
State  v.  Bruno,  236  Conn.  514,  519–520,  673  A.  2d  1117, 
1122–1123 (1996) (bicycle, skeleton, blood stains); State v. 
Crites, 2007 Mont. Dist. LEXIS 615, *5–*7 (Dec. 21, 2007) 
(deer antlers).  Not a one has limited the phrase’s scope to
objects that record or preserve information. 

The  words  “record,  document,  or  tangible  object”  in
§1519 also track language in 18 U. S. C. §1512, the federal
witness-tampering  law  covering  (as  even  the  plurality 
accepts, see ante, at 12) physical evidence in all its forms. 
Section 1512, both in its original version (preceding §1519) 
and  today,  repeatedly  uses  the  phrase  “record,  document,
or  other  object”—most  notably,  in  a  provision  prohibiting
the  use  of  force  or  threat  to  induce  another  person  to
withhold  any  of  those  materials  from  an  official  proceed-
ing.  §4(a)  of  the  Victim  and  Witness  Protection  Act  of
1982,  96  Stat.  1249,  as  amended,  18  U. S. C.  §1512(b)(2).
That language, which itself likely derived from the Model
Penal Code, encompasses no less the bloody knife than the 
incriminating letter, as all courts have for decades agreed.
See, e.g., United States v. Kellington, 217 F. 3d 1084, 1088 
(CA9 2000) (boat); United States v. Applewhaite, 195 F. 3d 
679, 688 (CA3 1999) (stone wall).  And typically “only the