Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/09pdf/08-1529.pdf
Page Number: 11

8 

HUI v. CASTANEDA 

Opinion of the Court 

federal  remedy  was  also  available  under  the  FTCA.    446 
U. S., at 16–17.  Many of our subsequent Bivens decisions 
likewise addressed only the existence of an implied cause 
of action for an alleged constitutional violation.  See,  e.g., 
Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U. S. 537, 549 (2007) (declining “to 
devise a new Bivens damages action for retaliating against
the  exercise  of  ownership  rights”);  Bush  v.  Lucas,  462 
U. S.  367,  368  (1983)  (declining  to  “authorize  a  new  non-
statutory  damages  remedy  for  federal  employees  whose
First Amendment rights are violated by their superiors”). 
This  case  presents  the  separate  question  whether  peti-
tioners  are  immune  from  suit  for  the  alleged  violations.
To  determine  a  defendant’s  amenability  to  suit,  we  con-
sider  whether  he  or  she  may  claim  the  benefits  of  official 
immunity for the alleged misconduct.  Because petitioners 
invoke  only  the  immunity  provided  by  §233(a),  the  ques-
tion in this case is answered solely by reference to whether 
that provision gives petitioners the immunity they claim.6 
As  noted,  the  text  of  §233(a)  plainly  indicates  that  it
precludes a Bivens action against petitioners for the harm
alleged in this case.  Respondents offer three arguments in 
support of their claim that it does not.  None persuades us 
that §233(a) means something other than what it says.

Respondents first contend that §233(a) incorporates the
entirety  of  the  FTCA,  as  amended  by  the  Westfall  Act, 
through its reference to §1346(b).7  Section 1346(b) in turn
refers to “the provisions of chapter 171,” which constitute 
—————— 

6 We  express  no  opinion  as  to  whether  a  Bivens remedy  is  otherwise 
available  in  these  circumstances,  as  the  question  is  not  presented  in
this case. 

7 Section  1346(b)  provides  in  pertinent  part  that,  “[s]ubject  to  the 
provisions of chapter 171 of [Title 28], the district courts . . . shall have
exclusive  jurisdiction  of  civil  actions  on  claims  against  the  United
States, for money damages . . . for injury or loss of property, or personal
injury  or  death  caused  by  the  negligent  or  wrongful  act  or  omission  of
any  employee  of  the  Government  while  acting  within  the  scope  of  his 
office or employment.”