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Page Number: 24

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COUNTY OF MAUI v. HAWAII WILDLIFE FUND 

KAVANAUGH, J., concurring 

U. S., at 742–743.  Justice Scalia reasoned that the Clean 
Water Act does not merely “forbid the ‘addition of any pol-
lutant directly to navigable waters from any point source,’ 
but  rather the ‘addition  of  any  pollutant  to  navigable  wa-
ters.’  Thus, from the time of the CWA’s enactment, lower 
courts have held that the discharge into intermittent chan-
nels  of  any  pollutant  that  naturally  washes  downstream 
likely  violates  §1311(a),  even  if  the  pollutants  discharged 
from a point source do not emit ‘directly into’ covered wa-
ters, but pass ‘through conveyances’ in between.”  Id., at 743 
(citations omitted). 
  In  other  words,  under  Justice  Scalia’s  interpretation  in 
Rapanos,  the  fact  that  the  pollutants  from  Maui’s 
wastewater  facility  reach  the  ocean  via  an  indirect  route 
does not itself exempt Maui’s facility from the Clean Water 
Act’s permitting requirement for point sources.  The Court 
today  adheres  to  Justice  Scalia’s  analysis  in  Rapanos  on 
that issue. 
  Second,  as  Justice  Scalia’s  opinion  in  Rapanos  pointed 
out and as the Court’s opinion today explains, the statute 
does not establish a bright-line test regarding when a pol-
lutant  may  be  considered  to  have  come  “from”  a  point 
source.  The source of the vagueness is Congress’ statutory 
text, not the Court’s opinion.  The Court’s opinion seeks to 
translate  the  vague  statutory  text  into  more  concrete  
guidance. 
  Third,  JUSTICE  THOMAS’  dissent  states  that  “the  Court 
does not commit” to “which factors are the most important” 
in determining whether pollutants that enter navigable wa-
ters come “from” a point source.  Post, at 5.  That critique is 
not accurate, as I read the Court’s opinion.  The Court iden-
tifies  relevant  factors  to  consider  and  emphasizes  that 
“[t]ime and distance are obviously important.”  Ante, at 15.  
And the Court expressly adds that “[t]ime and distance will 
be the most important factors in most cases, but not neces-
sarily every case.”  Ante, at 16.  Although the statutory text