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2  DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN’S HEALTH ORGANIZATION 

THOMAS, J., concurring 

life, liberty, or property.  See, e.g., Johnson v. United States, 
576 U. S. 591, 623 (2015) (THOMAS, J., concurring in judg-
ment).  Other sources, by contrast, suggest that “due pro-
cess  of  law”  prohibited  legislatures  “from  authorizing  the 
deprivation  of  a  person’s  life,  liberty,  or  property  without 
providing him the customary procedures to which freemen
were entitled by the old law of England.”  United States v. 
Vaello Madero, 596 U. S. ___, ____ (2022) (THOMAS, J., con-
curring) (slip op., at 3) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Either  way,  the  Due  Process  Clause  at  most  guarantees 
process.  It does not, as the Court’s substantive due process 
cases suppose, “forbi[d] the government to infringe certain
‘fundamental’ liberty interests at all, no matter what pro-
cess is provided.”  Reno v. Flores, 507 U. S. 292, 302 (1993); 
see also, e.g., Collins v. Harker Heights, 503 U. S. 115, 125 
(1992).

As I have previously explained, “substantive due process” 
is an oxymoron that “lack[s] any basis in the Constitution.” 
Johnson, 576 U. S., at 607–608 (opinion of THOMAS, J.); see
also, e.g., Vaello Madero, 596 U. S., at ___ (THOMAS, J., con-
curring)  (slip  op.,  at  3)  (“[T]ext  and  history  provide  little 
support  for  modern  substantive  due  process  doctrine”).
“The notion that a constitutional provision that guarantees
only ‘process’ before a person is deprived of life, liberty, or
property could define the substance of those rights strains 
credulity for even the most casual user of words.”  McDon-
ald v. Chicago, 561 U. S. 742, 811 (2010) (THOMAS, J., con-
curring  in  part  and  concurring  in  judgment);  see  also 
United States v. Carlton, 512 U. S. 26, 40 (1994) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in judgment).  The resolution of this case is thus 
straightforward.  Because the Due Process Clause does not 
secure any substantive rights, it does not secure a right to 
abortion. 

The Court today declines to disturb substantive due pro-
cess jurisprudence generally or the doctrine’s application in
other, specific contexts.  Cases like Griswold v. Connecticut,