Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/21pdf/21-147_g31h.pdf
Page Number: 46

22 

EGBERT v. BOULE 

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting
Opinion of SOTOMAYOR, J. 

at ___ (slip op., at 25) (petition for writ of habeas corpus or 
injunctive relief ); Bush, 462 U. S., at 385.7 

The Court previously has emphasized that a Bivens ac-
tion may be inappropriate where “Congress has provided an
alternative remedy which it explicitly declared to be a sub-
stitute  for  recovery  directly  under  the  Constitution  and 
viewed as equally effective.”  Carlson, 446 U. S., at 18–19 
(emphasis  deleted).  Thus,  our  cases  declining  to  extend 
Bivens have done so where Congress, sometimes in conjunc-
tion with the Executive Branch, provided “comprehensive” 
and meaningful remedies.  Bush, 462 U. S., at 388; see also 
Schweiker,  487  U. S.,  at  414,  423,  428  (emphasizing  that
the “design” of the “elaborate remedial scheme” in the So-
cial  Security  disability  program  “suggests  that  Congress
has provided what it considers adequate remedial mecha-
nisms  for  constitutional  violations  that  may  occur  in  the 
course  of  its  administration”);  Malesko,  534  U. S.,  at  72 
(noting  that  remedies  available  to  the  plaintiff  were  “at 
least as great, and in many respects greater, than anything 

—————— 

7 Aside  from  CBP’s  internal  grievance  procedure,  Agent  Egbert  con-
tends that the FTCA offers an alternative remedy for claims like Boule’s.
This Court does not endorse this argument, and for good reason.  This 
Court  repeatedly  has  observed  that  the  FTCA  does  not  cover  claims 
against Government employees for “violation[s] of the Constitution of the 
United  States.”    28  U. S. C.  §2679(b)(2)(A);  see  Wilkie  v.  Robbins,  551 
U. S.  537,  553  (2007); Carlson  v. Green,  446  U. S.  14,  20  (1980)  (“Con-
gress views FTCA and Bivens as parallel, complementary causes of ac-
tion”);  Correctional  Services  Corp.  v.  Malesko,  534  U. S.  61,  68  (2001) 
(noting that it was “crystal clear” that “Congress intended the FTCA and 
Bivens to serve as parallel and complementary sources of liability” (in-
ternal quotation marks omitted)).  Just two Terms ago, the Court reaf-
firmed  that  by  carving  out  claims  “ ‘brought  for  . . .  violation[s]  of  the 
Constitution’ ”  from  the  FTCA’s  “ ‘exclusive  remedy  for  most  claims 
against  Government  employees  arising  out  of  their  official  conduct,’ ” 
“Congress made clear that it was not attempting to abrogate Bivens” and 
instead “simply left Bivens where it found it,”  Hernández v. Mesa, 589 
U. S. ___, ___–___, and n. 9 (2020) (slip op., at 16–17, and n. 9) (quoting 
Hui, 559 U. S., at 806; §2679(b)(2)(A)). 

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