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Page Number: 25.0

8 

GARZA v. IDAHO 

THOMAS, J., dissenting 

690. 

Counsel’s  choice  not  to  appeal  Garza’s  sentence—the
only issue Garza asked his counsel to challenge—was not 
only  not  deficient,  it  was  the  only  professionally  reasona-
ble  course  of  action  for  counsel  under  the  circumstances. 
That  is  because  filing  an  appeal  would  have  been  worse 
than  pointless  even  judging  by  Garza’s  own  express  de-
sires;  it  would  have  created  serious  risks  for  Garza  while 
having  no  chance  at  all  of  achieving  Garza’s  stated  goals
for  an  appeal.  Garza  had  pleaded  guilty  under  Rule  11, 
expressly  waived  his  right  to  appeal  his  sentence,  and 
stated that his desire in appealing was to have his consec-
utive sentences “r[u]n concurrent.”  Record 207.  But that 
kind of appeal challenges the defining feature of a Rule 11
plea: the agreed-upon sentence from which the trial court
has no discretion to deviate.  Here, that sentence includes 
the  consecutive  sentences  that  Garza  agreed  to,  then
sought  to  challenge.  Had  Garza’s  counsel  reflexively  filed 
an  appeal  and  triggered  resentencing,  Garza  might  have
faced  life  in  prison,  especially  in  light  of  the  trial  court’s
concern  that  the  agreed-upon  sentence  (from  which  it 
could  not  deviate  under  Rule  11)  might  have  been  too 
lenient.  And Garza’s admissions at the plea hearings and 
his  written  plea  form  could  have  been  (and  thus  likely 
would have been) used against him if he had proceeded to
trial  on  any  additional  charges  filed  by  the  State  after 
breaching the plea agreements.  See id., at 104 (“[S]hould
the  court  reinstate  a  plea  of  not  guilty  on  his  behalf,  the 
State  will  use  Defendant’s  testimony  during  his  entry  of 
plea of guilty and his written plea form, during the State’s
case at trial”); id., at 92 (same).

Under  these  circumstances,  it  is  eminently  reasonable 
for  an  attorney  to  “respec[t]  his  client’s  formal  waiver  of 
appeal”  and  uphold  his  duty  “to  avoid  taking  steps  that 
will cost the client the benefit of the plea bargain.”  Nunez 
v.  United  States,  546  F. 3d  450,  453,  455  (CA7  2008)