Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/04pdf/04-278.pdf
Page Number: 15.0

12 

CASTLE ROCK v. GONZALES 

Opinion of the Court 

The  deep-rooted  nature  of  law-enforcement  discretion, 
even  in  the  presence  of  seemingly  mandatory  legislative 
commands,  is  illustrated  by  Chicago  v.  Morales,  527  U. S. 
41  (1999),  which  involved  an  ordinance  that  said  a  police 
officer “ ‘shall order’ ”  persons  to  disperse in  certain  circum-
stances, id., at 47, n. 2.  This Court rejected out of hand the 
possibility  that  “the  mandatory  language  of  the  ordinance 
. . . afford[ed] the police no discretion.”  Id., at 62, n. 32.  It 
is,  the  Court  proclaimed,  simply  “common  sense  that  all 
police  officers  must  use  some  discretion  in  deciding  when 
and  where  to  enforce  city  ordinances.” 
Ibid.  (emphasis 
added). 

Against  that  backdrop,  a  true  mandate  of  police  action 
would require some stronger indication from the Colorado 
Legislature  than  “shall  use  every  reasonable  means  to 
enforce  a  restraining  order”  (or  even  “shall  arrest  . . .  or 
. . .  seek  a  warrant”),  §§18–6–803.5(3)(a),  (b).    That  lan-
guage  is  not  perceptibly  more  mandatory  than  the  Colo-
rado statute which has long told municipal chiefs of police 
that they “shall pursue and arrest any person fleeing from 
justice  in  any  part  of  the  state”  and  that  they  “shall  ap-
prehend  any  person  in  the  act  of  committing  any  offense 
. . .  and,  forthwith  and  without  any  warrant,  bring  such 
person  before  a  . . .  competent  authority  for  examination 
and trial.”  Colo. Rev. Stat. §31–4–112 (Lexis 2004).  It is 
hard  to  imagine  that  a  Colorado  peace  officer  would  not 
have some discretion to determine that—despite probable 
cause to believe a restraining order has been violated—the 
circumstances  of  the  violation  or  the  competing  duties  of 
that  officer  or  his  agency  counsel  decisively  against  en-
forcement  in  a  particular  instance.8   The  practical  neces-
—————— 

8 Respondent  in  fact  concedes  that  an  officer  may  “properly”  decide 
not  to  enforce  a  restraining  order  when  the  officer  deems  “a  technical 
violation”  too  “immaterial”  to  justify  arrest.    Respondent  explains  this 
as  a  determination  that  there  is  no  probable  cause.    Brief  for  Respon-
dent 28.  We think, however, that a determination of no probable cause