Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/18pdf/17-1717_4f14.pdf
Page Number: 60.0

Cite as:  588 U. S. ____ (2019) 

5 

GORSUCH, J., concurring in judgment 

Clause itself.  In Valley Forge Christian College v. Ameri-
cans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 
U. S.  464  (1982),  the  plaintiffs  objected  to  a  transfer  of 
property  from  the  federal  government  to  a  religious  col-
lege,  an  action  they  had  learned  about  through  a  news 
release.  This Court had little trouble concluding that the 
plaintiffs  lacked  standing  to  challenge  the  transfer,  ex-
plaining  that  “the  psychological  consequence  presumably 
produced  by  observation  of  conduct  with  which  one  dis- 
agrees” is not an injury-in-fact “sufficient to confer standing 
under  Art.  III.”    Id.,  at  485.    To  be  sure,  this  Court  has 
sometimes  resolved  Establishment  Clause  challenges  to 
religious  displays  on  the  merits  without  first  addressing 
standing.    But  as  this  Court  has  held,  its  own  failure  to 
consider standing cannot  be  mistaken  as  an  endorsement 
of  it:  “[D]rive-by  jurisdictional  rulings  of  this  sort”  carry 
“no  precedential  effect.”    Steel  Co.  v.  Citizens  for  Better 
Environment, 523 U. S. 83, 91 (1998). 
  Offended  observer  standing  is  deeply  inconsistent,  too, 
with  many  other  longstanding  principles  and  precedents.  
For example, this Court has consistently ruled that “ ‘gen-
eralized grievances’ about the conduct of Government” are 
insufficient  to  confer  standing  to  sue.    Schlesinger  v.  Re-
servists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U. S. 208, 217 (1974).  
But if offended observers could bring suit, this rule would 
be  rendered  meaningless:  Who,  after  all,  would  have 
trouble  recasting  a  generalized  grievance  about  govern-
mental action into an “I-take-offense” argument for stand-
ing?    Similarly,  this  Court  has  long  “adhered  to  the  rule 
that  a  party  ‘generally  must  assert  his  own  legal  rights 
and  interests,  and  cannot  rest  his  claim  to  relief  on  the 
legal  rights  or  interests  of  third  parties.’ ”    Kowalski  v. 
Tesmer,  543  U. S.  125,  129  (2004).    We  depart  from  this 
rule  only  where  the  party  seeking  to  invoke  the  judicial 
power  “has  a  ‘close’  relationship  with  the  person  who 
possesses  the  right”  and  “there  is  a  ‘hindrance’  to  the