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4 

GARZA v. IDAHO 

THOMAS, J., dissenting 

collateral  counsel,  admitted  that  the  appeal  waiver  “was 
by the book,” that he “received exactly what he bargained 
for in exchange for his plea,” and that there was “no ambi-
guity”  as  to  the  appropriate  sentence.  Id.,  at  161–162, 
276–277.  Garza also conceded that, if forced to identify an
issue he would raise on appeal, “[t]he only issue that could 
be identified is sentencing review.”  Id., at 176, 371. 

The trial court granted summary judgment to Idaho.  It 
explained  that  Garza  needed  to  identify  “non-frivolous 
grounds for contending on appeal either that (i) the appeal
waiver  is  invalid  or  unenforceable,  or  (ii)  the  issues  he 
wants to pursue on appeal are outside the waiver’s scope.” 
App. to Pet. for Cert. 38a.  The Idaho Court of Appeals and 
the  Idaho  Supreme  Court  affirmed.    Notably,  the  Idaho 
Supreme  Court  declined  to  presume  negligent  perfor-
mance because state law imposes a duty on counsel not to 
file  frivolous  litigation  and  to  avoid  taking  actions  that 
will jeopardize the benefit his client gained from the plea 
bargain.  The  Idaho  Supreme  Court  also  found  Flores-
Ortega  inapplicable,  reasoning  that  once  a  defendant
waives his appellate rights, he no longer has a right to an
appellate proceeding at all. 

II 

As  with  most  ineffective-assistance  claims,  a  defendant 
seeking  to show  that  counsel was constitutionally  ineffec-
tive  for  failing  to  file  an  appeal  must  show  deficient  per-
formance  and  prejudice.    Strickland  v.  Washington,  466 
U. S.  668,  687  (1984).   Relying  on  Flores-Ortega,  the  ma-
jority  finds  that  Garza  has  satisfied  both  prongs.  In  so 
holding,  it  adopts  a  rule  whereby  a  criminal  defendant’s
invocation  of  the  words  “I  want  to  appeal”  can  undo  all 
sworn  attestations  to  the  contrary  and  resurrect  waived 
statutory rights.

This  rule  is  neither  compelled  by  precedent  nor  con-
sistent with the use of appeal waivers in plea bargaining.