Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/14pdf/14-556_3204.pdf
Page Number: 23.0

18 

OBERGEFELL v. HODGES 

Opinion of the Court 

the recognition that laws excluding same-sex couples from
the  marriage  right  impose  stigma  and  injury  of  the  kind
prohibited by our basic charter.

Objecting that this does not reflect an appropriate fram-
ing  of  the  issue,  the  respondents  refer  to  Washington  v. 
Glucksberg,  521  U. S.  702,  721  (1997),  which  called  for  a 
“ ‘careful description’ ” of fundamental rights.  They assert
the  petitioners  do  not  seek  to  exercise  the  right  to  marry
but rather a new and nonexistent “right to same-sex mar-
riage.”  Brief for Respondent in No. 14–556, p. 8.  Glucks-
berg  did  insist  that  liberty  under  the  Due  Process  Clause 
must  be  defined  in  a  most  circumscribed  manner,  with 
central reference to specific historical practices.  Yet while 
that approach may have been appropriate for the asserted
right  there  involved  (physician-assisted  suicide),  it  is
inconsistent  with  the  approach  this  Court  has  used  in
discussing  other  fundamental  rights,  including  marriage
and intimacy.  Loving did not ask about a “right to inter-
racial  marriage”;  Turner  did  not  ask  about  a  “right  of
inmates to marry”; and Zablocki did not ask about a “right
of  fathers  with  unpaid  child  support  duties  to  marry.”
Rather, each case inquired about the right to marry in its
comprehensive  sense,  asking  if  there  was  a  sufficient
justification  for  excluding  the  relevant  class  from  the 
right.  See also Glucksberg, 521 U. S., at 752–773 (Souter,
J.,  concurring  in  judgment);  id.,  at  789–792  (BREYER,  J., 
concurring in judgments). 

That  principle  applies  here.  If  rights  were  defined  by
who  exercised  them  in  the  past,  then  received  practices
could  serve  as  their  own  continued  justification  and  new 
groups  could  not  invoke  rights  once  denied.  This  Court 
has rejected that approach, both with respect to the right
to marry and the rights of gays and lesbians.  See Loving
388 U. S., at 12; Lawrence, 539 U. S., at 566–567. 

The right to marry is fundamental as a matter of history
and  tradition,  but  rights  come  not  from  ancient  sources