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Page Number: 14

10 

TRINITY LUTHERAN CHURCH OF COLUMBIA, INC. v.
COMER 
Opinion of the Court 

public  benefit  solely  because  of  their  religious  character.
If the cases just described make one thing clear, it is that
such  a  policy  imposes  a  penalty  on  the  free  exercise  of
religion that triggers the most exacting scrutiny.  Lukumi, 
508 U. S., at 546.  This conclusion is unremarkable in light 
of our prior decisions.

Like  the  disqualification  statute  in  McDaniel,  the  De-
partment’s policy puts Trinity Lutheran to a choice: It may
participate  in  an  otherwise  available  benefit  program  or 
remain  a  religious  institution.    Of  course,  Trinity  Lu-
theran  is  free  to  continue  operating  as  a  church,  just  as
McDaniel was free to continue being a minister.  But that 
freedom  comes  at  the  cost  of  automatic  and  absolute  ex-
clusion from the benefits of a public program for which the 
Center  is  otherwise  fully  qualified.    And  when  the  State 
conditions  a  benefit  in  this  way,  McDaniel  says  plainly
that  the  State  has  punished  the  free  exercise  of  religion: 
“To condition the availability of benefits . . . upon [a recip-
ient’s]  willingness  to  . . .  surrender[]  his  religiously  im-
pelled [status] effectively penalizes the free exercise of his 
constitutional liberties.”  435 U. S., at 626 (plurality opin-
ion) (alterations omitted).

The  Department  contends  that  merely  declining  to
extend  funds  to  Trinity  Lutheran  does  not  prohibit  the 
Church  from  engaging  in  any  religious  conduct  or  other-
wise exercising its religious rights.  In this sense, says the
Department,  its  policy  is  unlike  the  ordinances  struck
down  in  Lukumi,  which  outlawed  rituals  central  to  San-
teria.  Here  the  Department  has  simply  declined  to  allo-
cate  to  Trinity  Lutheran  a  subsidy  the  State  had  no  obli-
gation to provide in the first place.  That decision does not 
meaningfully  burden  the  Church’s  free  exercise  rights.
And absent any such burden, the argument continues, the 
Department  is  free  to  heed  the  State’s  antiestablishment 
objection to providing funds directly to a church.  Brief for 
Respondent 7–12, 14–16.