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UNITED STATES v. ARTHREX, INC. 

Opinion of the Court 
Opinion of ROBERTS, C. J. 

a  statute,  we  give  “full  effect”  to  the  Constitution  and  to 
whatever portions of the statute are “not repugnant” to the 
Constitution, effectively severing the unconstitutional por-
tion of the statute.  Bank of Hamilton v. Lessee of Dudley, 2 
Pet.  492,  526  (1829)  (Marshall,  C. J.).    This  principle  ex-
plains our “normal rule that partial, rather than facial, in-
validation is the required course.”  Brockett v. Spokane Ar-
cades, Inc., 472 U. S. 491, 504 (1985). 

Arthrex asks us to hold the entire regime of inter partes
review unconstitutional.  In its view, any more tailored dec-
laration  of  unconstitutionality  would  necessitate  a  policy
decision best left to Congress in the first instance.  Because 
the good cannot be separated from the bad, Arthrex contin-
ues, the appropriate remedy is to order outright dismissal 
of the proceeding below.  The partial dissent, similarly for-
swearing the need to do anything beyond “identifying the
constitutional violation,” would grant full relief to Arthrex. 
Post, at 5–6 (GORSUCH, J., concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part).

In our view, however, the structure of the PTO and the 
governing constitutional principles chart a clear course: De-
cisions by APJs must be subject to review by the Director.
Congress vested the Director with the “powers and duties”
of the PTO, 35 U. S. C. §3(a)(1), tasked him with supervis-
ing APJs, §3(a)(2)(A), and placed the PTAB “in” the PTO,
§6(a).  A  single  officer  has  superintended  the  activities  of 
the  PTO  since  the  Commissioner  of  Patents  assumed  the 
role of “chief officer” of the Patent Office in 1836.  §1, 5 Stat. 
117–118.  The  Commissioner  long  oversaw  examiners-in-
chief, see 12 Stat. 246–247, just as the Director today has 
the responsibility to oversee APJs.  While shielding the ul-
timate  decisions  of  the  200-plus  APJs  from  review,  Con-
gress also provided the Director means of control over the 
institution and conduct of inter partes review.  35 U. S. C. 
§§314(a),  316(a).    In  every  respect  save  the  insulation  of
their  decisions  from  review  within  the  Executive  Branch,