Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/19pdf/18-1023_m64o.pdf
Page Number: 29

Cite as:  590 U. S. ____ (2020) 

25 

Opinion of the Court 

of Federal Claims.  White Mountain Apache, 537 U. S., at 
472–473.12 

But  there  are  two  exceptions.    The  Tucker  Act  yields 
when  the  obligation-creating  statute  provides  its  own  de-
tailed remedies, or when the Administrative Procedure Act, 
60 Stat. 237, provides an avenue for relief.  See Bormes, 568 

—————— 

12 Relying on Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U. S. 275 (2001), the dissent’s 
logic suggests that a federal statute could never provide a cause of action 
for damages absent magic words explicitly inviting suit.  See post, at 2, 
4–7.  We  have  repeatedly  rejected  that  notion—including  in  opinions 
written  by  Sandoval’s  author.  See,  e.g.,  United  States  v.  Bormes,  568 
U. S. 6, 15–16 (2012); United States v. Navajo Nation, 556 U. S. 287, 290 
(2009).  Not even Sandoval went as far as the dissent; that decision in-
stead explained that “[t]he judicial task is to interpret the statute Con-
gress has passed to determine whether it displays an intent to create not 
just a private right but also a private remedy.”  532 U. S., at 286.  That 
is precisely what the money-mandating inquiry does: It provides a frame-
work for determining when Congress has authorized a claim against the 
Government. 

This framework also makes good sense.  Cf. post, at 4.  As the author 
of Sandoval explained, if a statutory obligation to pay money is manda-
tory, then the congressionally conferred “right to receive money,” post, at 
8, n. 5, will typically display an intent to provide a damages remedy for 
the defaulted amount, Bowen v. Massachusetts, 487 U. S. 879, 923 (1988)
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (a “statute commanding the payment of a specified 
amount  of  money  by  the  United  States  impliedly  authorizes  (absent
other indication) a claim for damages in the defaulted amount”).  As this 
Court  recently  observed,  Congress  enacted  the  Tucker  Act  to  “suppl[y] 
the  missing  ingredient  for  an  action  against  the  United  States  for  the 
breach  of  monetary  obligations  not  otherwise  judicially  enforceable.” 
Bormes, 568 U. S., at 12. 

By the dissent’s contrary suggestion, not only is a mandatory statutory 
obligation to pay meaningless, so too is a constitutional one.  After all, 
the Constitution did not “expressly create . . . a right of action,” post, at 
3, when it mandated “just compensation” for Government takings of pri-
vate property for public use, Amdt. 5; see also First English Evangelical 
Lutheran  Church  of  Glendale  v.  County  of  Los  Angeles,  482  U. S.  304, 
315–316 (1987).  Although there is no express cause of action under the 
Takings Clause, aggrieved owners can sue through the Tucker Act under 
our case law.  E.g., Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U. S. 986, 1016– 
1017 (1984) (citing United States v. Causby, 328 U. S. 256, 267 (1946)).