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Page Number: 2.0

2 

BOSTOCK v. CLAYTON COUNTY 

Syllabus 

with their ordinary public meaning at the time of their enactment re-
solves these cases.  Pp. 4–12.

(1) The parties concede that the term “sex” in 1964 referred to the 
biological  distinctions  between  male  and  female.    And  “the  ordinary
meaning of ‘because of’ is ‘by reason of’ or ‘on account of,’ ” University 
of  Tex.  Southwestern  Medical  Center  v.  Nassar,  570  U. S.  338,  350. 
That term incorporates the but-for causation standard, id., at 346, 360, 
which, for Title VII, means that a defendant cannot avoid liability just
by citing some other factor that contributed to its challenged employ-
ment action.  The term “discriminate” meant “[t]o make a difference in 
treatment or favor (of one as compared with others).”  Webster’s New 
In  so-called  “disparate  treatment” 
International  Dictionary  745. 
cases, this  Court has held that the difference in treatment based on 
sex must be intentional.  See, e.g., Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 
487 U. S. 977, 986.  And the statute’s repeated use of the term “indi-
vidual”  means  that  the  focus  is  on  “[a]  particular  being  as  distin-
guished  from  a  class.”    Webster’s  New  International  Dictionary,  at 
1267.  Pp. 4–9.

(2) These terms generate the following rule: An employer violates
Title VII when it intentionally fires an individual employee based in 
part on sex.  It makes no difference if other factors besides the plain-
tiff’s  sex  contributed  to  the  decision  or  that  the  employer  treated 
women  as  a  group  the  same  when  compared  to  men  as  a  group.    A 
statutory violation occurs if an employer intentionally relies in part on 
an individual employee’s sex when deciding to discharge the employee. 
Because discrimination on the basis of homosexuality or transgender
status requires an employer to intentionally treat individual employ-
ees differently because of their sex, an employer who intentionally pe-
nalizes an employee for being homosexual or transgender also violates
Title  VII.  There  is  no  escaping  the  role  intent  plays:  Just  as  sex  is 
necessarily  a  but-for  cause  when  an  employer  discriminates  against 
homosexual or transgender employees, an employer who discriminates 
on these grounds inescapably intends to rely on sex in its decisionmak-
ing.  Pp. 9–12.

(b) Three leading precedents confirm what the statute’s plain terms 
suggest.  In Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U. S. 542, a com-
pany  was  held  to  have  violated  Title  VII  by  refusing  to  hire  women 
with young children, despite the fact that the discrimination also de-
pended on being a parent of young children and the fact that the com-
pany favored hiring women over men.  In Los Angeles Dept. of Water 
and Power v. Manhart, 435 U. S. 702, an employer’s policy of requiring 
women to make larger pension fund contributions than men because 
women tend to live longer was held to violate Title VII, notwithstand-
ing the policy’s evenhandedness between men and women as groups.