Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/19pdf/19-465_i425.pdf
Page Number: 24.0

Cite as:  591 U. S. ____ (2020) 

3 

THOMAS, J., concurring in judgment 

1 
The Court’s conclusion that the text of Article II, §1, ex-
pressly grants States the power to impose substantive con-
ditions or qualifications on electors is highly questionable. 
Its  interpretation  appears  to  strain  the  plain  meaning  of
the text, ignore historical evidence, and give the term “Man-
ner”  different  meanings  in  parallel  provisions  of  Article  I
and Article II. 

First, the Court’s attempt to root its analysis in Article II,
§1, seems to stretch the plain meaning of the Constitution’s 
text.  Article II, §1, provides that States shall appoint elec-
tors “in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct.”
At the time of the founding, the term “manner” referred to
a “[f]orm” or “method.”  1 S. Johnson, A Dictionary of the
English Language (6th ed. 1785); see also 1 J. Ash, The New 
and Complete Dictionary of the English Language (2d ed.
1795).  These  definitions  suggest  that  Article  II  requires 
state legislatures merely to set the approach for selecting
Presidential electors, not to impose substantive limitations
on  whom  may  become  an  elector.  And  determining  the 
“Manner”  of  appointment  certainly  does  not  include  the 
power to impose requirements as to how the electors vote 
after they are appointed, which is what the Washington law
addresses.  See infra, at 8–9. 

Historical evidence from the founding also suggests that 
the  “Manner”  of  appointment  refers  to  the  method  for  se-
lecting  electors,  rather  than  the  substantive  limitations 
placed on the position.  At the Convention, the Framers de-
bated  whether  Presidential  electors  should  be  selected  by 
the state legislatures or by other electors chosen by the vot-
ers of each State.  Oliver Ellsworth and Luther Martin, for 
example, thought the President should be chosen by elec-
tors selected by state legislatures.  McPherson v. Blacker, 
146 U. S. 1, 28 (1892).  Alexander Hamilton, however, pre-
ferred a system in which the President would be chosen “by 
electors chosen by electors chosen by the people.”  Ibid.  The