Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/558bv.pdf
Page Number: 510.0

Cite as: 558 U. S. 310 (2010) 

349 

Opinion of the Court 

a  shareholder-protection  interest,  see  id.,  at  674–675  (Bren­
nan, J., concurring).  We consider the three points in turn. 

1 

As  for  Austin’s  antidistortion  rationale,  the  Government 
does little to defend it.  See Tr. of Oral Arg. 45–48 (Sept. 9, 
2009).  And  with  good  reason,  for  the  rationale  cannot 
support § 441b. 

If  the  First  Amendment  has  any  force,  it  prohibits  Con­
gress  from  ﬁning  or  jailing  citizens,  or  associations  of  citi­
zens, for simply engaging in political speech.  If the antidis­
tortion  rationale  were  to  be  accepted,  however,  it  would 
permit  Government  to  ban  political  speech  simply  because 
the speaker is an association that has taken on the corporate 
form.  The  Government  contends  that  Austin  permits  it  to 
ban corporate expenditures for almost all forms of communi­
cation stemming from a corporation.  See Part II–E, supra; 
Tr. of Oral Arg. 66 (Sept. 9, 2009); see also id., at 26–31 (Mar. 
24,  2009).  If  Austin  were  correct,  the  Government  could 
prohibit  a  corporation  from  expressing  political  views  in 
media  beyond  those  presented  here,  such  as  by  printing 
books.  The Government responds “that the FEC has never 
applied this statute to a book,” and if it did, “there would be 
quite  [a]  good  as-applied  challenge.”  Tr.  of  Oral  Arg.  65 
(Sept. 9, 2009).  This troubling assertion of brooding govern­
mental  power  cannot  be  reconciled  with  the  conﬁdence  and 
stability  in  civic  discourse  that  the  First  Amendment  must 
secure. 

Political  speech  is  “indispensable  to  decisionmaking  in  a 
democracy, and this is no less true because the speech comes 
from a corporation rather than an individual.”  Bellotti, 435 
U. S., at 777 (footnote omitted); see ibid. (the worth of speech 
“does  not  depend  upon  the  identity  of  its  source,  whether 
corporation,  association,  union,  or  individual”);  Buckley,  424 
U. S., at 48–49 (“[T]he concept that government may restrict 
the  speech  of  some  elements  of  our  society  in  order  to  en­