Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/529bv.pdf
Page Number: 144

529US1

Unit: $U34

[09-26-01 08:14:00] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 529 U. S. 61 (2000)

69

Opinion of the Court

Second, Grifﬁn prohibited comments that suggest a de-
fendant’s silence is “evidence of guilt.” 380 U. S., at 615
(emphasis added); see also United States v. Robinson, 485
U. S. 25, 32 (1988) (“ ‘Grifﬁn prohibits the judge and pros-
ecutor from suggesting to the jury that it may treat the
defendant’s silence as substantive evidence of guilt’ ” (quot-
ing Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U. S. 308, 319 (1976))). The
prosecutor’s comments in this case, by contrast, concerned
respondent’s credibility as a witness, and were therefore in
accord with our longstanding rule that when a defendant
takes the stand, “his credibility may be impeached and his
testimony assailed like that of any other witness.” Brown
“[W]hen [a de-
v. United States, 356 U. S. 148, 154 (1958).
fendant] assumes the role of a witness, the rules that gener-
ally apply to other witnesses—rules that serve the truth-
seeking function of the trial—are generally applicable to him
as well.” Perry v. Leeke, 488 U. S. 272, 282 (1989). See also
Reagan v. United States, 157 U. S. 301, 305 (1895).

Respondent points to our opinion in Geders v. United
States, 425 U. S. 80, 87–91 (1976), which held that the defend-
ant must be treated differently from other witnesses insofar
as sequestration orders are concerned, since sequestration
for an extended period of time denies the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel. With respect to issues of credibility, how-
ever, no such special treatment has been accorded. Jenkins
v. Anderson, 447 U. S. 231 (1980),
illustrates the point.
There the prosecutor in a ﬁrst-degree murder trial, during
cross-examination and again in closing argument, attempted
to impeach the defendant’s claim of self-defense by suggest-
ing that he would not have waited two weeks to report the
killing if that was what had occurred.
In an argument strik-
ingly similar to the one presented here, the defendant in
Jenkins claimed that commenting on his prearrest silence
violated his Fifth Amendment privilege against
self-
incrimination because “a person facing arrest will not remain
silent if his failure to speak later can be used to impeach