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Page Number: 10.0

6 

SNYDER v. PHELPS 

Opinion of the Court 

principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibi-
ted, robust, and wide-open.”  New York Times Co. v. Sulli-
van,  376  U. S.  254,  270  (1964).    That  is  because  “speech
concerning public affairs is more than self-expression; it is
the  essence  of  self-government.”    Garrison  v.  Louisiana, 
379 U. S. 64, 74–75 (1964).  Accordingly, “speech on public 
issues  occupies  the  highest  rung  of  the  hierarchy  of  First 
Amendment  values,  and  is  entitled  to  special  protection.” 
Connick  v.  Myers,  461  U. S.  138,  145  (1983)  (internal
quotation marks omitted). 
  “ ‘[N]ot  all  speech  is  of  equal  First  Amendment  impor-
tance,’ ”  however,  and  where  matters  of  purely  private 
significance are at issue, First Amendment protections are
often less rigorous.  Hustler, supra, at 56 (quoting Dun & 
Bradstreet, supra, at 758); see Connick, supra, at 145–147. 
That  is  because  restricting  speech  on  purely  private  mat-
ters  does  not  implicate  the  same  constitutional  concerns 
as limiting speech on matters of public interest: “[T]here is
no  threat  to  the  free  and  robust  debate  of  public  issues;
there  is  no  potential  interference  with  a  meaningful  dia-
logue  of  ideas”;  and  the  “threat  of  liability”  does  not  pose
the  risk  of  “a  reaction  of  self-censorship”  on  matters  of
public  import.  Dun  &  Bradstreet,  supra,  at  760  (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 

We  noted  a  short  time  ago,  in  considering  whether 
public  employee  speech  addressed  a  matter  of  public  con-
cern,  that  “the  boundaries  of  the  public  concern  test  are
not  well  defined.”  San  Diego  v.  Roe,  543  U. S.  77,  83 
(2004) (per curiam).  Although that remains true today, we
have  articulated  some  guiding  principles,  principles  that 
accord  broad  protection  to  speech  to  ensure  that  courts
themselves do not become inadvertent censors. 

Speech deals with matters of public concern when it can 
“be  fairly  considered  as  relating  to  any  matter  of  politi- 
cal,  social,  or  other  concern  to  the  community,”  Connick, 
supra,  at  146,  or  when  it  “is  a  subject  of  legitimate  news