Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/10pdf/09-751.pdf
Page Number: 31

Cite as:  562 U. S. ____ (2011) 

9 

ALITO, J., dissenting 

He  has  smoke  coming  from  his  nostrils  and  fire  from 
his mouth!  How dumb was that?”  Id., at 3791. 

In  light  of  this  evidence,  it  is  abundantly  clear  that
respondents,  going  far  beyond  commentary  on  matters  of 
public  concern,  specifically  attacked  Matthew  Snyder
because (1) he was a Catholic and (2) he was a member of 
the United States military.  Both Matthew and petitioner 
were private figures,16 and this attack was not speech on a 
matter of public concern.  While commentary on the Cath-
olic  Church  or  the  United  States  military  constitutes 
speech  on  matters  of  public  concern,  speech  regarding 
Matthew Snyder’s purely private conduct does not. 

JUSTICE  BREYER  provides  an  apt  analogy  to  a  case  in 
which the First Amendment would permit recovery in tort
for a verbal attack: 

“[S]uppose that A were physically to assault B, know-
ing that the assault (being newsworthy) would provide
A  with  an  opportunity  to  transmit  to  the  public  his 
views  on  a  matter  of  public  concern.    The  constitu-
tionally  protected  nature  of  the  end  would  not  shield
A’s use of unlawful, unprotected means.  And in some 
circumstances  the  use  of  certain  words  as  means 
would  be  similarly  unprotected.”  Ante,  at  1  (concur-
ring opinion). 

This  captures  what  respondents  did  in  this  case.    In-
deed,  this  is  the  strategy  that  they  have  routinely  em-
ployed—and  that  they  will  now  continue  to  employ—
inflicting  severe  and  lasting  emotional  injury  on  an  ever
growing list of innocent victims. 

IV 
The  Court  concludes  that  respondents’  speech  was
protected  by  the  First  Amendment  for  essentially  three 

—————— 

16 See 533 F. Supp. 2d 567, 577 (Md. 2008).