Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/21pdf/20-1410_1an2.pdf
Page Number: 9.0

Cite as:  597 U. S. ____ (2022) 

5 

Opinion of the Court 

This means that once a defendant meets the burden of pro-
ducing evidence that his or her conduct was “authorized,” 
the  Government  must  prove  beyond  a  reasonable  doubt 
that the defendant knowingly or intentionally acted in an
unauthorized manner.  Our conclusion rests upon several 
considerations. 

A 
First, as a general matter, our criminal law seeks to pun-
ish  the  “ ‘vicious  will.’ ”    Morissette  v.  United  States,  342 
U. S. 246, 251 (1952); see also id., at 250, n. 4 (quoting F.
Sayre,  Cases  on  Criminal  Law,  p.  xxxvi  (R.  Pound  ed.
1927)).  With  few  exceptions,  “ ‘wrongdoing  must  be  con-
scious to be criminal.’ ”  Elonis v. United States, 575 U. S. 
723, 734 (2015) (quoting Morissette, 342 U. S., at 252).  In-
deed,  we  have  said  that  consciousness  of  wrongdoing  is  a
principle “as universal and persistent in mature systems of
[criminal] law as belief in freedom of the human will and a 
consequent  ability  and  duty  of  the  normal  individual  to 
choose between good and evil.”  Id., at 250. 

Consequently,  when  we  interpret  criminal  statutes,  we
normally “start from a longstanding presumption, traceable
to the common law, that Congress intends to require a de-
fendant  to  possess  a  culpable  mental  state.”    Rehaif  v. 
United States, 588 U. S. ___, ___ (2019) (slip op., at 3).  We 
have  referred  to  this  culpable  mental  state  as  “scienter,”
which means the degree of knowledge necessary to make a 
person criminally responsible for his or her acts.  See ibid.; 
Black’s  Law  Dictionary  1613  (11th  ed.  2019);  Morissette, 
342 U. S., at 250–252. 

Applying the presumption of scienter, we have read into
criminal  statutes  that  are  “silent  on  the  required  mental
state”—meaning  statutes  that  contain  no  mens  rea  provi-
sion whatsoever—“ ‘that mens rea which is necessary to sep-
arate  wrongful  conduct  from  “otherwise  innocent  con-
duct.” ’ ”  Elonis, 575 U. S., at 736 (quoting Carter v. United