Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/21pdf/20-1263diff_868c.pdf
Page Number: 17

12 

GALLARDO v. MARSTILLER 

Opinion of the Court 

for Petitioner 32.  Not so.  Section 1396k(a)(1)(A) only as-
signs “any rights . . . of the individual” (emphasis added), 
which is most naturally read as covering those rights “the
individual”  possesses  while  on  Medicaid.  We  must  also 
read §1396k(a)(1)(A)’s text in light of background legal prin-
ciples, and it is blackletter law that assignments typically
cover “only [those] rights possessed by the assignors at the 
time  of  the  assignments,”  United  States  v.  Central  Gulf 
Lines,  Inc.,  974  F. 2d  621,  629  (CA5  1992);  see  also  6A 
C. J. S., Assignments §88 (2022), or those rights “expected 
to  arise  out  of  an  existing  . . .  relationship,”  see  Restate-
ment  (Second)  of  Contracts  §321(1)  (1981);  see  also  9 
A. Corbin, Contracts §50.1 (2022).  Given that legal back-
drop, §1396k(a)(1)(A) cannot cover the sort of “lifetime as-
signment” Gallardo invokes.5 

* 
For these reasons, we affirm the judgment of the Court of

* 

* 

Appeals. 

It is so ordered. 

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5 Florida  also  suggested  at  argument  that  §1396k(a)(1)(A)  includes  a
germaneness requirement such that the assignment extends only to pay-
ments for medical care germane—i.e., related—to an injury or illness for 
which Medicaid covered treatment.  See Tr. of Oral Arg. 69.  However, 
we have no adversary briefing on this issue and no cause to resolve it.  It 
is undisputed that the settlement from which Florida seeks recovery is
germane  to  the  injury  for  which  Florida  paid  out  Medicaid  funds,  and 
Florida law requires as much.  See Fla. Stat. §409.910(6)(c).