Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/14pdf/13-7451_m64o.pdf
Page Number: 8

Cite as:  574 U. S. ____ (2015) 

5 

Opinion of GINSBURG, J. 

acknowledged  that  the  Criminal  Code  contains  “sections
that would have been appropriate for the [G]overnment to 
pursue”  if  it  wished  to  prosecute  him  for  tampering  with
evidence.  App. 91.  Section 2232(a), set out supra, at 1–2, 
fit that description.  But §1519, Yates insisted, did not. 

The  Government  countered  that  a  “tangible  object”
within §1519’s compass is “simply something other than a
document or record.”  App. 93.   The trial judge expressed
misgivings  about  reading  “tangible  object”  as  broadly  as
the Government urged:  “Isn’t there a Latin phrase [about] 
construction of a statute . . . .  The gist of it is . . . you take 
a  look  at  [a]  line  of  words,  and  you  interpret  the  words
consistently.  So  if  you’re  talking  about  documents,  and 
records, tangible objects are tangible objects in the nature
of a document or a record, as opposed to a fish.”  Ibid.  The 
first-instance judge nonetheless followed controlling Elev-
enth Circuit precedent.  While recognizing that §1519 was
passed as part of legislation targeting corporate fraud, the
Court of Appeals had instructed that “the broad language
of §1519 is not limited to corporate fraud cases, and ‘Con-
gress  is  free  to  pass  laws  with  language  covering  areas 
well  beyond  the  particular  crisis  du  jour  that  initially 
prompted  legislative  action.’ ”  No.  2:10–cr–66–FtM– 
29SPC (MD Fla., Aug. 8, 2011), App. 116 (quoting United 
States v.  Hunt, 526 F. 3d 739, 744 (CA11 2008)).  Accord-
ingly,  the  trial  court  read  “tangible  object”  as  a  term  “in-
dependent”  of  “record”  or  “document.”    App.  116.  For 
violating §1519 and §2232(a), the court sentenced Yates to 
imprisonment  for  30  days,  followed  by  supervised  release 
for  three  years.    App.  118–120.    For  life,  he  will  bear  the 
stigma of having a federal felony conviction.

On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit found the text of §1519
“plain.”  733  F. 3d  1059,  1064  (2013).    Because  “tangible
object”  was  “undefined”  in  the  statute,  the  Court  of  Ap-
peals gave the term its “ordinary or natural meaning,” i.e., 
its  dictionary  definition,  “[h]aving  or  possessing  physical