Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/19pdf/18-260_jifl.pdf
Page Number: 22.0

18 

COUNTY OF MAUI v. HAWAII WILDLIFE FUND 

Opinion of the Court 

where  appropriate.  See,  e.g.,  40  CFR  §122.44(k)  (2019). 
Judges,  too,  can  mitigate  any  hardship  or  injustice  when
they apply the statute’s penalty provision.  That provision 
vests  courts  with  broad  discretion  to  set  a  penalty  that
takes account of many factors, including “any good-faith ef-
forts to comply” with the Act, the “seriousness of the viola-
tion,” the “economic impact of the penalty on the violator,”
and  “such  other  matters  as  justice  may  require.”    See  33 
U. S. C. §1319(d).  We expect that district judges will exer-
cise their discretion mindful, as we are, of the complexities
inherent  to  the  context  of  indirect  discharges  through
groundwater, so as to calibrate the Act’s penalties when, for
example, a party could reasonably have thought that a per-
mit was not required.

In sum, we recognize that a more absolute position, such
as the means-of-delivery test or that of the Government or 
that of the Ninth Circuit, may be easier to administer.  But, 
as we have said, those positions have consequences that are 
inconsistent  with  major  congressional  objectives,  as  re-
vealed by the statute’s language, structure, and purposes. 
We consequently understand the permitting requirement,
§301, as applicable to a discharge (from a point source) of 
pollutants  that  reach  navigable  waters  after  traveling 
through  groundwater  if  that  discharge  is  the  functional
equivalent of a direct discharge from the point source into
navigable waters. 

VI 
Because the Ninth Circuit applied a different standard,
we vacate its judgment and remand the case for further pro-
ceedings consistent with this opinion. 

It is so ordered.