Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/23pdf/22-915_8o6b.pdf
Page Number: 39

4 

UNITED STATES v. RAHIMI 

KAVANAUGH, J., concurring 

Columbia v. Heller, 554 U. S. 570, 626 (2008). 

II 

A  recurring  and  difficult  issue  for  judges,  therefore,  is 
how to interpret vague constitutional text.  That issue often 
arises (as here) in the context of determining exceptions to
textually  guaranteed  individual  rights.  To  what  extent 
does  the  Constitution  allow  the  government  to  regulate 
speech or guns, for example?1 

In many cases, judicial precedent informs or controls the
answer (more on that later).  But absent precedent, there 
are really only two potential answers to the question of how 
to  determine  exceptions  to  broadly  worded  constitutional 
rights: history or policy. 

Generally speaking, the historical approach examines the 
laws, practices, and understandings from before and after 
ratification  that  may  help  the  interpreter  discern  the 
meaning  of  the  constitutional  text  and  the  principles 
embodied  in  that  text.  The  policy  approach  rests  on  the
philosophical or policy dispositions of the individual judge. 

History, not policy, is the proper guide. 
For more than 200 years, this Court has relied on history 
when construing vague constitutional text in all manner of 
constitutional  disputes.  For  good  reason.    History  can 
supply  evidence  of  the  original  meaning  of  vague  text.
History is far less subjective than policy.  And reliance on 
history is more consistent with the properly neutral judicial 

—————— 

1 There  are  two  ways  to  frame  this  point—either  (i)  determining  the 
exceptions  to  a  constitutional  right  or  (ii)  determining  the  affirmative 
scope or contours of that constitutional right.  Either way, the analysis 
is the same—does the constitutional provision, as originally understood, 
permit  the  challenged  law?    This  opinion  uses  the  term  “exceptions,” 
which  underscores  that  the  constitutional  baseline  is  protection  of  the 
textually enumerated right.  See Federal Election Comm’n v. Wisconsin 
Right to Life, Inc., 551 U. S. 449, 482 (2007) (opinion of ROBERTS, C. J.) 
(stating  in  a  First  Amendment  case  that  “it  is  worth  recalling  the 
language we are applying”).