Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/18pdf/18-281_6j37.pdf
Page Number: 22

Cite as:  587 U. S. ____ (2019) 

7 

ALITO, J., dissenting 

structure created by the Federal Constitution.  An interest 
asserted by a Member of Congress or by one or both Houses 
of  Congress  that  is  inconsistent  with  that  structure  may 
not be judicially cognizable.  But I do not see how we can 
say  anything  similar  about  the  standing  of  state  legisla-
tors  or  state  legislative  bodies.2    Cf.  Karcher  v.  May,  484 
U. S.  72,  81–82  (1987).    The  separation  of  powers  (or  the 
lack thereof ) under a state constitution is purely a matter 
of state law, and neither the Court nor the Virginia Solici-
tor  General  has  provided  any  support  for  the  proposition 
that  Virginia  law  bars  the  House  from  defending,  in  its 
own right, the constitutionality of a districting plan. 

  * 
  For these reasons, I would hold that the House of Dele-
gates has standing, and I therefore respectfully dissent. 

  * 

* 

—————— 

2 The Court’s observation that the Virginia Constitution gives legisla-
tive districting authority to the General Assembly as a whole—in other 
words, to the House of Delegates and the Senate in combination—does 
not answer the question.  To start, a similar argument against standing 
was  pressed  and  rejected  in  Sixty-seventh  Minnesota  State  Senate  v. 
Beens,  406  U. S.  187  (1972)  (per  curiam),  see  Motion  of  Appellees  to 
Dismiss Appeal in O. T. 1971, No. 71–1024, p. 9, and the Court does not 
explain why a different outcome is warranted here.  Nor am I persuaded 
by  the  Court’s  citation  of  Arizona  State  Legislature  v.  Arizona  Inde-
pendent Redistricting Comm’n, 576 U. S. ___ (2015).  There, the Court 
held that the Arizona Legislature had standing to bring a suit aimed at 
protecting  its  redistricting  authority.    But  from  the  fact  that  a  whole 
legislature  may  have  standing  to  defend  its  redistricting  authority,  it 
does not follow that the House necessarily lacks standing to challenge a 
redistricting  decision  based  on  concrete  injuries  to  its  institutional 
interests.  Cf. Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U. S. ___, ___, n. 7 (2016) (slip 
op., at 8, n. 7).