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UNITED STATES v. ARTHREX, INC. 

Opinion of GORSUCH, J. 

Court’s  opinion.    Respectfully,  however,  I  am  unable  join
the Court’s severability discussion in Part III. 

* 

On the merits, I agree with the Court that Article II vests 
the “executive Power” in the President alone.  This admit-
tedly formal rule serves a vital function.  If the executive 
power is exercised poorly, the Constitution’s design at least 
ensures “[t]he people know whom to blame”—and hold ac-
countable.  Morrison  v.  Olson,  487  U. S.  654,  729  (1988) 
(Scalia, J., dissenting).  As Hamilton explained, the Presi-
dent’s “due dependence on the people and . . . due responsi-
bility” to them are key “ingredients which constitute safety 
in the republican sense.”  The Federalist No. 70, p. 424 (C. 
Rossiter ed. 1961).  Or as Madison put it, “no principle is 
more clearly laid down in the Constitution than that of re-
sponsibility.”  1 Annals of Cong. 462 (1789).  Without pres-
idential responsibility there can be no democratic account-
ability for executive action.

Of course, the framers recognized that no one alone can
discharge  all  the  executive  duties  of  the  federal  govern-
ment.  They “expected that the President would rely on sub-
ordinate  officers  for  assistance.”    Seila  Law  LLC  v.  Con-
sumer  Financial  Protection  Bureau,  591  U. S.  ___,  ___ 
(2020) (ROBERTS, C. J.) (slip op., at 2).  But the framers took 
pains  to  ensure  those  subordinates  would  always  remain
responsible  to  the  President  and  thus,  ultimately,  to  the 
people.  Because it is the President’s duty to take care that 
the  laws  be  faithfully  executed,  Art. II,  §3,  the  framers 
sought  to  ensure  he  possessed  “the  power  of  appointing, 
overseeing, and controlling those who execute the laws.”  1 
Annals of Cong. 463 (Madison) (emphasis added). 

To this end, the Constitution provided for a chain of au-
thority.  Several constitutional provisions reflect this struc-
ture.  See Calabresi & Prakash, The President’s Power To