Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/529bv.pdf
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Unit: $U46

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Cite as: 529 U. S. 362 (2000)

403

Opinion of the Court

lished Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court
of the United States.”

Accordingly, for Williams to obtain federal habeas relief, he
must ﬁrst demonstrate that his case satisﬁes the condition
set by § 2254(d)(1). That provision modiﬁes the role of
federal habeas courts in reviewing petitions ﬁled by state
prisoners.

Justice Stevens’ opinion in Part II essentially contends
that § 2254(d)(1) does not alter the previously settled rule
of independent review.
Indeed, the opinion concludes its
statutory inquiry with the somewhat empty ﬁnding that
§ 2254(d)(1) does no more than express a “ ‘mood’ that the
Federal Judiciary must respect.” Ante, at 386. For Jus-
tice Stevens, the congressionally enacted “mood” has two
important qualities. First, “federal courts [must] attend to
every state-court judgment with utmost care” by “carefully
weighing all the reasons for accepting a state court’s judg-
ment.” Ante, at 389. Second, if a federal court undertakes
that careful review and yet remains convinced that a prison-
er’s custody violates the Constitution, “that independent
Ibid.
judgment should prevail.”
One need look no further than our decision in Miller to
see that Justice Stevens’
interpretation of § 2254(d)(1)
gives the 1996 amendment no effect whatsoever. The com-
mand that federal courts should now use the “utmost care”
by “carefully weighing” the reasons supporting a state
court’s judgment echoes our pre-AEDPA statement in
Miller that federal habeas courts “should, of course, give
great weight to the considered conclusions of a coequal state
judiciary.”
474 U. S., at 112. Similarly, the requirement
that the independent judgment of a federal court must in the
end prevail essentially repeats the conclusion we reached in
the very next sentence in Miller with respect to the speciﬁc
issue presented there: “But, as we now reafﬁrm, the ultimate
question whether, under the totality of the circumstances,
the challenged confession was obtained in a manner compat-