Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/19pdf/17-1618_hfci.pdf
Page Number: 167

Cite as:  590 U. S. ____ (2020) 

23 

KAVANAUGH, J., dissenting 

statute’s individual terms, mechanically puts them back to-
gether, and generates an interpretation of the phrase “dis-
criminate because of sex” that is literal.  See ante, at 5–9, 
17, 24–26.  But to reiterate, that approach to statutory in-
terpretation is fundamentally flawed.  Bedrock principles of 
statutory  interpretation  dictate  that  we  look  to  ordinary 
meaning, not literal meaning, and that we likewise adhere 
to the ordinary meaning of phrases, not just the meaning of 
words in a phrase.  And the ordinary meaning of the phrase 
“discriminate  because  of  sex”  does  not  encompass  sexual 
orientation discrimination. 
  The majority opinion deflects that critique by saying that 
courts  should  base  their  interpretation  of  statutes  on  the 
text as written, not on the legislators’ subjective intentions.  
Ante, at 20, 23–30.  Of course that is true.  No one disagrees.  
It is “the provisions of our laws  rather than  the principal 
concerns of our legislators by which we are governed.”  On-
cale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 523 U. S. 75, 79 
(1998). 
  But in my respectful view, the majority opinion makes a 
fundamental mistake by confusing ordinary meaning with 
subjective intentions.  To briefly explain: In the early years 
after  Title  VII  was  enacted,  some  may  have  wondered 
whether  Title  VII’s  prohibition on  sex  discrimination  pro-
tected male employees.  After all, covering male employees 
may not have been the intent of some who voted for the stat-
ute.  Nonetheless, discrimination on the basis of sex against 
women and discrimination on the basis of sex against men 
are both understood as discrimination because of sex (back 
in 1964 and now) and are therefore encompassed within Ti-
tle VII.  Cf. id., at 78–79; see Newport News Shipbuilding 
& Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U. S. 669, 682–685 (1983).  So 
too, regardless of what the intentions of the drafters might 
have been, the ordinary meaning of the law demonstrates 
that harassing an employee because of her sex is discrimi-
nating against the employee because of her sex with respect