Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/19pdf/19-631_2d93.pdf
Page Number: 45

Cite as:  591 U. S. ____ (2020) 

3 

Opinion of GORSUCH, J. 

giving voice to those a majority would silence.  See McCul-
len v. Coakley, 573 U. S. 464, 477–478 (2014); but see ante, 
at 5–6 (BREYER, J., concurring in judgment with respect to
severability  and  dissenting  in  part)  (seeking  to  overturn
precedent and allow the government sometimes to impose
content-based restrictions to “respon[d] to the public will”).
In my view, the TCPA’s rule against cellphone robocalls
is a content-based restriction that fails strict scrutiny.  The 
statute is content-based because it allows speech on a sub-
ject the government favors (collecting its debts) while ban-
ning speech on other disfavored subjects (including political
matters).  Cf. ante, at 9–11 (opinion of BREYER, J.) (mistak-
enly  characterizing  the  content  discrimination  as  “not
about” political activities).  The statute fails strict scrutiny
because  the  government  offers  no  compelling  justification
for its prohibition against the plaintiffs’ political speech.  In 
fact, the government does not dispute that, if strict scrutiny
applies, its law must fall.

It’s easy enough to see why the government makes no ef-
fort  to  satisfy  strict  scrutiny.    Now  that  most  cell  phone
plans  do  not  charge  by  the  call,  the  only  justification  the
government cites for its robocall ban is its interest in pro-
tecting consumer privacy.  No one questions that protecting
consumer  privacy  qualifies  as  a  legitimate  and  “genuine”
interest for the government to pursue.  Ante, at 2–3, 10.  But 
before  the  government  may  censor  the  plaintiffs’  speech 
based on its content, it must point to a compelling interest. 
And  if  the  government  thinks  consumer  privacy  interests 
are insufficient to overcome its interest in collecting debts,
it’s hard to see how the government might invoke consumer 
privacy interests to justify banning private political speech. 
Especially when consumers seem to find debt collection ef-
forts  particularly  intrusive:    Year  after  year,  the  Federal 
Trade Commission receives more complaints about the debt
collection industry than any other.  The nature and breadth 
of the law’s exception calls into question the necessity of its