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UNITED STATES v. MORRISON

Opinion of the Court

In contrast with the lack of congressional ﬁndings that we
faced in Lopez, § 13981 is supported by numerous ﬁndings
regarding the serious impact that gender-motivated violence
has on victims and their families. See, e. g., H. R. Conf. Rep.
No. 103–711, p. 385 (1994); S. Rep. No. 103–138, p. 40 (1993);
S. Rep. No. 101–545, p. 33 (1990). But the existence of con-
gressional ﬁndings is not sufﬁcient, by itself, to sustain the
constitutionality of Commerce Clause legislation. As we
stated in Lopez, “ ‘[S]imply because Congress may conclude
that a particular activity substantially affects interstate
commerce does not necessarily make it so.’ ”
514 U. S., at
557, n. 2 (quoting Hodel, 452 U. S., at 311 (Rehnquist, J.,
concurring in judgment)). Rather, “ ‘[w]hether particular
operations affect interstate commerce sufﬁciently to come
under the constitutional power of Congress to regulate them
is ultimately a judicial rather than a legislative question,
and can be settled ﬁnally only by this Court.’ ” 514 U. S., at
557, n. 2 (quoting Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U. S., at 273
(Black, J., concurring)).

punish “interstate crimes of abuse including crimes committed against
spouses or intimate partners during interstate travel and crimes com-
mitted by spouses or intimate partners who cross State lines to continue
the abuse.” S. Rep. No. 103–138, p. 43 (1993). That criminal provision
has been codiﬁed at 18 U. S. C. § 2261(a)(1), which states:
“A person who travels across a State line or enters or leaves Indian coun-
try with the intent to injure, harass, or intimidate that person’s spouse or
intimate partner, and who, in the course of or as a result of such travel,
intentionally commits a crime of violence and thereby causes bodily injury
to such spouse or intimate partner, shall be punished as provided in sub-
section (b).”

The Courts of Appeals have uniformly upheld this criminal sanction as
an appropriate exercise of Congress’ Commerce Clause authority, reason-
ing that “[t]he provision properly falls within the ﬁrst of Lopez’s categories
as it regulates the use of channels of interstate commerce—i. e., the use
of the interstate transportation routes through which persons and goods
move.” United States v. Lankford, 196 F. 3d 563, 571–572 (CA5 1999)
(collecting cases) (internal quotation marks omitted).