Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/21pdf/19-1392_6j37.pdf/19-1392_6j37.pdf
Page Number: 180.0

Cite as:  597 U. S. ____ (2022) 

33 

BREYER, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ., dissenting 

So  how  does  that  approach  prevent  the  “scale  of  justice” 
from “waver[ing] with every new judge’s opinion”?  1 Black-
stone 69.  It does not.  It makes radical change too easy and 
too fast, based on nothing more than the new views of new 
judges.  The majority has overruled Roe and Casey for one 
and only one reason: because it has always despised them,
and  now  it  has  the  votes  to  discard  them.    The  majority
thereby substitutes a rule by judges for the rule of law. 

A 
Contrary to the majority’s view, there is nothing unwork-
able about Casey’s “undue burden” standard.  Its primary
focus on whether a State has placed a “substantial obstacle” 
on a woman seeking an abortion is “the sort of inquiry fa-
miliar to judges across a variety of contexts.”  June Medical 
Services L. L. C. v. Russo, 591 U. S. ___, ___ (2020) (slip op., 
at 6) (ROBERTS, C. J., concurring in judgment).  And it has 
given  rise  to  no  more  conflict  in  application  than  many 
standards this Court and others unhesitatingly apply every
day.

General standards, like the undue burden standard, are 
ubiquitous in the law, and particularly in constitutional ad-
judication.  When  called  on  to  give  effect  to  the  Constitu-
tion’s  broad  principles,  this  Court  often  crafts  flexible 
standards that can be applied case-by-case to a myriad of
unforeseeable circumstances.  See Dickerson, 530 U. S., at 
441 (“No court laying down a general rule can possibly fore-
see the various circumstances” in which it must apply).  So,
for example, the Court asks about undue or substantial bur-
dens on speech, on voting, and on interstate commerce.  See, 
e.g., Arizona Free Enterprise Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. 
Bennett, 564 U. S. 721, 748 (2011); Burdick v. Takushi, 504 
U. S. 428, 433–434 (1992); Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 
U. S. 137, 142 (1970).  The Casey undue burden standard is 
the same.  It also resembles general standards that courts