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Page Number: 4

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JESNER v. ARAB BANK, PLC 

Syllabus 

(a) Before  recognizing  an  ATS  common-law  action,  federal  courts
must  apply  the  two-part  test  announced  in  Sosa.  The  threshold 
question is whether a plaintiff can demonstrate that the alleged vio-
lation is “ ‘of a norm that is specific, universal, and obligatory.’ ”  542 
U. S., at 732.  Assuming that such a norm can control, it must be de-
termined  whether  allowing  the  case  to  proceed  under  the  ATS  is  a 
proper exercise of judicial discretion or whether caution requires the 
political branches to grant specific authority before corporate liability
can be imposed.  Id., at 732–733, and nn. 20–21.  With regard to the 
first Sosa question, the Court need not resolve whether corporate lia-
bility is a question governed by international law or whether that law
imposes  liability  on  corporations,  because,  as  shown  by  the  parties’ 
opposing arguments, there is at least sufficient doubt on the point to 
turn  to  Sosa’s  second  question:  whether  the  Judiciary  must  defer  to
Congress  to  determine  in  the  first  instance  whether  that  universal
norm has been recognized and, if so, whether it should be enforced in 
ATS suits. Pp. 11–18. 

(b) Especially  here,  in  the  realm  of  international  law,  it  is  im-
portant to look to analogous statutes for guidance on the appropriate
boundaries  of  judge-made  causes  of  action.    The  logical  statutory
analogy  for  an  ATS  common-law  action  is  the  TVPA—the  only  ATS 
cause of action created by Congress rather than the courts.  Drafted 
as “an unambiguous and modern basis for [an ATS] cause of action,” 
H. R. Rep. No. 102–367, p. 3, the TVPA reflects Congress’ considered 
judgment  of  the  proper  structure  for  such  an  action.    Absent  a  com-
pelling justification, courts should not deviate from that model.  Rel-
evant  here,  the  TVPA  limits  liability  to  “individuals,”  a  term  which 
unambiguously limits liability to natural persons, Mohamad v. Pales-
tinian  Authority,  566  U. S.  449,  453–456.    Congress’  decision  to  ex-
clude liability  for corporations in TVPA actions is all but dispositive
in this case.  Pp. 19–23. 

(c) Other  considerations  relevant  to  the  exercise  of  judicial  discre-
tion also counsel against allowing liability under the ATS for foreign 
corporations,  absent  congressional  instructions.    Corporate  liability
under  the  ATS  has  not  been  shown  to  be  essential  to  serving  that
statute’s goals, the ATS will seldom be the only way for plaintiffs to
hold the perpetrators liable, and plaintiffs still can sue the individual
corporate  employees  responsible  for  a  violation  of  international  law
under the ATS.  That the corporate form can be an instrument for in-
flicting  grave  harm  and  suffering  poses  serious  and  complex  ques-
tions  for  the  international  community  and  for  Congress.    And  this 
complexity makes it all the more important that Congress determine
whether  victims  of  human-rights  abuses  may  sue  foreign  corpora-
tions in federal court.  Pp. 23–25.