Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/23pdf/23-726_6jgm.pdf
Page Number: 6.0

Cite as:  603 U. S. ____ (2024) 

5 

KAGAN, J., concurring 

occur.  §1395dd(e)(3)(A).  The statute does not list particu-
lar treatments—for example, defibrillation, blood transfu-
sion, or mechanical ventilation.  What it instead requires is
the treatment that is medically appropriate to stabilize the 
patient.  And when a pregnancy goes terribly wrong, that 
treatment  may  be  an  abortion.  Termination  of  the  preg-
nancy (which is often of a non-viable fetus) may be the only 
way to prevent a woman’s death or serious injury, including 
kidney failure or loss of fertility.  See 623 F. Supp. 3d,  at 
1101,  1103–1105.    I  do  not  understand  JUSTICE  ALITO  to 
dispute that medical fact.  And from that fact, a statutory
obligation arises.  It does not matter that EMTALA “does 
not mention abortion.”  Post, at 12; see post, at 5.  Neither, 
as just noted, does EMTALA mention any other treatment.
The statute simply requires the hospital to offer the treat-
ment  necessary  to  prevent  the  emergency  condition  from 
spiraling  downward.  And  on  rare  occasions  that  means 
providing an abortion.

The statute’s references to protecting an “unborn child”
do  not  lead  to  a  different  result.    Contrary  to  JUSTICE 
ALITO’s  view,  none  alters  EMTALA’s  command  when  a 
pregnancy threatens the woman’s life or health.  Three of 
the four provisions JUSTICE ALITO cites concern the treat-
ment  of  women  in  labor  (including  all  those  with  healthy 
pregnancies).  Those  provisions ensure  that  a  hospital,  in
considering  the  transfer  of  a  woman  to  another  facility,
takes account of risks to not only the woman but also her 
“unborn  child.”    §1395dd(c)(1)(A)(ii),  (2)(A),  (e)(1)(B)(ii).
The provisions have no application to women who are not 
in labor, but instead are experiencing a different pregnancy-
related condition.  The fourth provision (included within the 
definition of “emergency medical condition”) specifies that
a hospital must treat a condition that “plac[es] the health
of the individual (or, with respect to a pregnant woman, the 
health of the woman or her unborn child) in serious jeop-
ardy.”  §1395dd(e)(1)(A)(i).  The parenthetical there, added