Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/22pdf/22-138_43j7.pdf
Page Number: 51.0

Cite as:  600 U. S. ____ (2023) 

9 

BARRETT, J., dissenting 

Our  decision  in  Black  illustrates  the  point.  There,  the 
Court considered a Virginia law that prohibited cross burn-
ing “ ‘with the intent of intimidating any person or group of
persons.’ ”  538 U. S., at 348.  Notably, the statute included 
a presumption: “ ‘Any such burning of a cross shall be prima
facie evidence of an intent to intimidate.’ ”  Ibid.  After three 
men were convicted under the statute, they challenged it as
facially  unconstitutional.  We  upheld  the  general  prohibi-
tion  on  cross  burning,  concluding  that  the  First  Amend-
ment  allows  the  government  to  ban  “a  particular  type  of 
threat.”  Id., at 362–363.  A plurality then went on to ad-
dress the statutory presumption.  While cross burning “may 
mean that a person is engaging in constitutionally proscrib-
able  intimidation,”  the  plurality  reasoned,  the  act  is  not 
monolithic.  Id., at 365.  Cross burning could be directed “at
an  individual”  or  “at  a  group  of  like-minded  believers”;  it
could be done “on a neighbor’s lawn” or “at a public rally”; 
it could be done with the property owner’s “permission” or 
without it.  Id., at 366.  The presumption “blur[red] the line”
between these different situations and “ignore[d] all of the 
contextual  factors  that  are  necessary  to  decide  whether  a
particular cross burning” was covered by the statute or not.4 

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surrounding events; (2) the medium or platform through which the state-
ment was communicated, including any distinctive conventions or archi-
tectural features; (3) the manner in which the statement was conveyed 
(e.g., anonymously or not, privately or publicly); (4) the relationship be-
tween the speaker and recipient(s); and (5) the subjective reaction of the
statement’s intended or foreseeable recipient(s).”  People in the Interest 
of R. D., 464 P. 3d 717, 721–722 (Colo. 2020). 

4 As  JUSTICE  SOTOMAYOR  emphasizes,  ante,  at  10,  n. 4,  the  plurality 
said that context informs “whether a particular cross burning is intended 
to intimidate,” 538 U. S., at 367 (emphasis added).  But this was a refer-
ence to the statutory requirements for a conviction, not the constitutional 
requirements—the Virginia statute covered only threats made “ ‘with the 
intent of intimidating any person or group of persons.’ ”  Id., at 348.  At 
no point did the Court hold that the First Amendment demands specific
intent; on the contrary, it recognized that a statement made “with the
intent of placing the victim in fear of bodily harm or death” is “a type of