Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/21pdf/21-5726_5iel.pdf
Page Number: 16.0

Cite as:  596 U. S. ____ (2022) 

1 

GORSUCH, J., dissenting 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

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No. 21–5726 
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DEXTER EARL KEMP, PETITIONER v. 
UNITED STATES 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT 

[June 13, 2022] 

JUSTICE GORSUCH, dissenting. 
The Court took this case to determine whether a district 
court’s mistake of law is correctable under Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 60(b)(1) or 60(b)(6).

From the start, granting review was a questionable use
of judicial resources.  The answer matters only under rare 
circumstances:  A losing party fails to appeal or secure relief
under Rule 59(e), opting instead to file a Rule 60(b) motion.
That motion comes more than a year after judgment but—
piling contingency on contingency—within what the court
would otherwise deem a “reasonable time.”  Rule 60(c)(1).
By petitioner’s own (uncontested) count, his is the first pe-
tition  ever  to  present  today’s  question  for  this  Court’s  re-
view.  See Pet. for Cert. 24; Brief in Opposition 26.  Beyond
even that, an alternative route exists to resolve the ques-
tion posed here.  Congress has adopted the Rules Enabling
Act.  See 28 U. S. C. §§ 2071–2077.  Under its terms, a com-
mittee  composed  of  judges  and  practitioners  may  recom-
mend to this Court any warranted clarifications to the Fed-
eral  Rules  of  Civil  Procedure. 
Those 
recommendations  generally  take  effect  upon  our  approval
and absent congressional objection.  § 2074.

§ 2073. 

Undeterred, the Court takes up and resolves this case an-
yway.  It holds that Rule 60(b)(1), not Rule 60(b)(6), applies. 
In an unexpected twist, the Court adopts a further position