Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/524bv.pdf
Page Number: 854.0

524US2

Unit: U100

[09-15-00 14:43:09] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 524 U. S. 775 (1998)

809

Opinion of the Court

ﬂung locations could be effective without communicating
some formal policy against harassment, with a sensible com-
plaint procedure.

We have drawn this conclusion without overlooking two
possible grounds upon which the City might argue for the
opportunity to litigate further. There is, ﬁrst, the Court of
Appeals’s indulgent gloss on the relevant evidence: “There
is some evidence that the City did not effectively disseminate
among Marine Safety employees its sexual harassment pol-
icy.”
111 F. 3d, at 1539, n. 11. But, in contrast to the Court
of Appeals’s characterization, the District Court made an
explicit ﬁnding of a “complete failure on the part of the City
to disseminate said policy among Marine Safety Section
employees.”
864 F. Supp., at 1560. The evidence supports
the District Court’s ﬁnding and there is no contrary claim
before us.

The second possible ground for pursuing a defense was
asserted by the City in its argument addressing the possibil-
ity of negligence liability in this case.
It said that it should
not be held liable for failing to promulgate an antiharassment
policy, because there was no apparent duty to do so in the
1985–1990 period. The City purports to rest this argument
on the position of the EEOC during the period mentioned,
but it turns out that the record on this point is quite against
the City’s position. Although the EEOC issued regulations
dealing with promulgating a statement of policy and provid-
ing a complaint mechanism in 1990, see supra, at 806, ever
since 1980 its regulations have called for steps to prevent
violations, such as informing employees of their rights and
the means to assert them, ibid. The City, after all, adopted
an antiharassment policy in 1986.

The City points to nothing that might justify a conclusion
by the District Court on remand that the City had exercised
reasonable care. Nor is there any reason to remand for con-
sideration of Faragher’s efforts to mitigate her own damages,
since the award to her was solely nominal.