Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/529bv.pdf
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529US2

Unit: $U46

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382

WILLIAMS v. TAYLOR

Opinion of Stevens, J.

source of doctrine on which a federal court may rely
It does not,
in addressing the application for a writ.
however, purport to limit the federal courts’ independ-
ent interpretive authority with respect to federal ques-
tions.”

Ibid.

A rule that fails to satisfy the foregoing criteria is barred by
Teague from application on collateral review, and, similarly,
is not available as a basis for relief in a habeas case to which
AEDPA applies.

In the context of this case, we also note that, as our prece-
dent interpreting Teague has demonstrated, rules of law may
be sufﬁciently clear for habeas purposes even when they are
expressed in terms of a generalized standard rather than as
a bright-line rule. As Justice Kennedy has explained:

“If the rule in question is one which of necessity re-
quires a case-by-case examination of the evidence, then
we can tolerate a number of speciﬁc applications without
saying that those applications themselves create a new
rule. . . . Where the beginning point is a rule of this
general application, a rule designed for the speciﬁc pur-
pose of evaluating a myriad of factual contexts, it will
be the infrequent case that yields a result so novel that
it forges a new rule, one not dictated by precedent.”
Wright v. West, 505 U. S. 277, 308–309 (1992) (opinion
concurring in judgment).

Moreover, the determination whether or not a rule is clearly
established at the time a state court renders its ﬁnal judg-
ment of conviction is a question as to which the “federal
courts must make an independent evaluation.”
Id., at 305
(O’Connor, J., concurring in judgment); accord, id., at 307
(Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment).

It has been urged, in contrast, that we should read Teague
and its progeny to encompass a broader principle of defer-
ence requiring federal courts to “validat[e]
‘reasonable,
good-faith interpretations’ of the law” by state courts.