Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/524bv.pdf
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Cite as: 524 U. S. 624 (1998)

661

Opinion of Rehnquist, C. J.

to a child if they become pregnant, and perform the manual
tasks necessary to rear a child to maturity. See App. 53–54.
While individuals infected with HIV may choose not to en-
gage in these activities, there is no support in language,
logic, or our case law for the proposition that such voluntary
choices constitute a “limit” on one’s own life activities.

The Court responds that the ADA “addresses substantial
limitations on major life activities, not utter inabilities.”
I agree, but fail to see how this assists the
Ante, at 641.
Court’s cause. Apart from being unable to demonstrate that
she is utterly unable to engage in the various activities that
comprise the reproductive process, respondent has not even
explained how she is less able to engage in those activities.
Respondent contends that her ability to reproduce is lim-
ited because “the fatal nature of HIV infection means that a
parent is unlikely to live long enough to raise and nurture
the child to adulthood.” Brief for Respondent Abbott 22.
But the ADA’s deﬁnition of a disability is met only if the
alleged impairment substantially “limits” (present tense)
a major life activity.
42 U. S. C. § 12102(2)(A). Asympto-
matic HIV does not presently limit respondent’s ability to
perform any of the tasks necessary to bear or raise a child.
Respondent’s argument, taken to its logical extreme, would
render every individual with a genetic marker for some de-
bilitating disease “disabled” here and now because of some
possible future effects.

In my view, therefore, respondent has failed to demon-
strate that any of her major life activities were substantially
limited by her HIV infection.

II

While the Court concludes to the contrary as to the “dis-
ability” issue, it then quite correctly recognizes that peti-
tioner could nonetheless have refused to treat respondent if
her condition posed a “direct threat.” The Court of Appeals