Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/22pdf/21-1086_1co6.pdf
Page Number: 54.0

Cite as:  599 U. S. ____ (2023) 

9 

THOMAS, J., dissenting 

with  “equal  opportunity”  serving  an  ancillary  function.6  
594  U. S.,  at  ___  (slip  op.,  at  15).    Relying  significantly 
on §2(b)’s disclaimer of a right to proportional representa-
tion,  we  also  held  that  §2  does  not  enact  a  “freewheeling 
disparate-impact regime.”  Id., at ___, and n. 14 (slip op., at 
22,  and  n.  14).    Brnovich  further  stressed  the  value  of 
“benchmarks  with  which  . . .  challenged  [electoral]  rule[s] 
can  be compared,”  id., at  ___  (slip  op.,  at  17), and  that  “a 
meaningful comparison is essential” in judging the signifi-
cance of any challenged scheme’s racially disparate impact.  
Id., at ___ (slip op., at 18).  To the extent §2 applies to dis-
tricting plans, then, it requires that they be “equally open 
to participation” by voters of all races, but it is not a pure 
disparate-impact  statute  and  does  not  guarantee  propor-
tional representation. 
  In its main argument here, Alabama simply carries these 
principles  to  their  logical  conclusion:  Any  vote-dilution 
benchmark must be race neutral.  See Brief for Appellants 
32–46.  Whatever “equal openness” means in the context of 
single-member  districting,  no  “meaningful  comparison”  is 
possible using a benchmark that builds in a presumption in 
favor  of  minority-controlled  districts.    Indeed,  any  bench-
mark other than a race-neutral one would render the vote-
dilution inquiry fundamentally circular, allowing courts to 
conclude that a districting plan “dilutes” a minority’s voting 
strength  “on  account  of  race”  merely  because  it  does  not 
measure  up  to  an  ideal  already  defined  in  racial  terms.  
Such  a  question-begging  standard  would  not  answer  our 
precedents’  demand  for  an  “objective,”  “reasonable  bench-
mark.”    Holder,  512  U. S.,  at  881  (plurality  opinion)  (em-
phasis  added).    Nor  could  any  nonneutral  benchmark  be 
reconciled  with  Brnovich’s  rejection  of  a  disparate-impact 

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6 While Brnovich involved a time-place-and-manner voting rule, not a 
vote-dilution challenge to a districting plan, its analysis logically must 
apply to vote-dilution cases if the text of §2 covers such claims at all.