Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/20pdf/19-1434_ancf.pdf
Page Number: 43.0

4 

UNITED STATES v. ARTHREX, INC. 

BREYER, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part
Opinion of BREYER, J. 

Justice  Frankfurter,  writing  for  a  unanimous  Court,  said
that Congress sought to create a commission that was “ ‘en-
tirely free from the control or coercive influence, direct or 
indirect,’ of either the Executive or the Congress.”  Id., at 
355–356  (quoting  Humphrey’s  Executor  v.  United  States, 
295  U. S.  602,  629  (1935)).    He  then  asked  why  Congress
might  want  to  deny  the  President  the  power  to  remove  a 
commissioner.  Because, he answered, the “intrinsic judicial 
character”  of  the  Commission’s  duties  required  that  it  be
able to adjudicate claims solely on the merits of each claim
free of external executive pressure.  357 U. S., at 355.  “Con-
gress did not wish to have hang over the Commission the 
Damocles’ sword of removal by the President for no reason
other  than  that  he  preferred  to  have  on  that  Commission
men of his own choosing.”  Id., at 356.  The Court has sub-
sequently used the functional approach reflected in Wiener 
to resolve all manner of separation-of-powers disputes, in-
cluding disputes under the Appointments Clause.  See, e.g., 
Buckley, 424 U. S., at 126 (distinguishing employees from
officers by asking if the individual exercises “significant au-
thority”);  Mistretta  v.  United  States,  488  U. S.  361,  409 
(1989)  (asking  whether  a  statute  “prevents  the  Judicial
Branch from performing its constitutionally assigned func-
tions”).

In this suit, a functional approach, which considers pur-
poses  and  consequences,  undermines  the  Court’s  result.
Most agencies (and courts for that matter) have the power
to reconsider an earlier decision, changing the initial result
if appropriate.  Congress believed that the PTO should have
that same power and accordingly created procedures for re-
considering  issued  patents.  Congress  also  believed  it  im-
portant to strengthen the reconsideration power with pro-
cedural safeguards that would often help those whom the
PTO’s initial decision had favored, such as the requirement
that review be available only when there is a “reasonable 
likelihood”  that  the  patent  will  be  invalid.    35  U. S. C.