Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/12pdf/12-96_6k47.pdf
Page Number: 3.0

Cite as:  570 U. S. ____ (2013) 

3 

Syllabus 

cial discrimination in voting” that had “infected the electoral process 
in parts of our country for nearly a century,” Katzenbach, 383 U. S., 
at 308.  At the time, the coverage formula—the means of linking the 
exercise  of  the  unprecedented  authority  with  the  problem  that  war-
ranted it—made sense.  The Act was limited to areas where Congress 
found “evidence of actual voting discrimination,” and the covered ju-
risdictions  shared  two  characteristics:  “the  use  of  tests  and  devices 
for voter registration, and a voting rate in the 1964 presidential elec-
tion at least 12 points below the national average.”  Id., at 330.  The 
Court  explained  that  “[t]ests  and  devices  are  relevant  to  voting  dis-
crimination  because  of  their  long  history  as  a  tool  for  perpetrating
the  evil;  a  low  voting  rate  is  pertinent  for  the  obvious  reason  that 
widespread disenfranchisement must inevitably affect the number of 
actual voters.”  Ibid.  The Court therefore concluded that “the cover-
age  formula  [was]  rational  in  both  practice  and  theory.”    Ibid. 
Pp. 12–13. 

(3) Nearly  50  years  later,  things  have  changed  dramatically.
Largely because of the Voting Rights Act, “[v]oter turnout and regis-
tration rates” in covered jurisdictions “now approach parity.  Blatant-
ly discriminatory evasions of federal decrees are rare.  And minority 
candidates  hold  office  at  unprecedented  levels.”    Northwest  Austin, 
supra, at 202.  The tests and devices that blocked ballot access have 
been  forbidden  nationwide  for  over  40  years.    Yet  the  Act  has  not 
eased §5’s restrictions or narrowed the scope of §4’s coverage formula 
along  the  way.  Instead  those  extraordinary  and  unprecedented  fea-
tures  have  been  reauthorized  as  if  nothing  has  changed,  and  they
have grown even stronger.  Because §5 applies only to those jurisdic-
tions  singled  out  by  §4,  the  Court  turns  to  consider  that  provision.
Pp. 13–17. 

(b) Section 4’s formula is unconstitutional in light of current condi-

tions.  Pp. 17–25.

(1) In  1966,  the  coverage  formula  was  “rational  in  both  practice
and theory.”  Katzenbach, supra, at 330.  It looked to cause (discrimi-
natory tests) and effect (low voter registration and turnout), and tai-
lored the remedy (preclearance) to those jurisdictions exhibiting both. 
By  2009,  however,  the  “coverage  formula  raise[d]  serious  constitu-
tional  questions.”  Northwest Austin, supra, at 204.  Coverage today
is  based  on  decades-old  data  and  eradicated  practices.    The  formula 
captures States by reference to literacy tests and low voter registra-
tion and turnout in the 1960s and early 1970s.  But such tests have 
been  banned  for  over  40  years.    And  voter  registration  and  turnout 
numbers  in  covered  States  have  risen  dramatically.    In  1965,  the 
States could be divided into those with a recent history of voting tests 
and low voter registration and turnout and those without those char-