Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/19pdf/18-1323_c07d.pdf
Page Number: 114

Cite as:  591 U. S. ____ (2020) 

33 

ALITO, J., dissenting 

other  situation  in  which  a  party  is  allowed  to  invoke  the 
right of a third party with blatantly adverse interests.  The 
rule that the majority applies here is an abortion-only rule.
THE CHIEF JUSTICE properly notes that subsequent legal
developments may support overruling a precedent, ante, at 
3–4, and that factor too is present here.  Both our general 
standing  jurisprudence  and  our  treatment  of  third-party 
standing have changed since Singleton.  We have stressed 
the importance of insisting that a plaintiff assert an injury 
that is particular to its own situation.  See, e.g., Spokeo, Inc. 
v. Robins, 578 U. S. ___, ___ (2016) (slip op., at 7); Clapper 
v. Amnesty  Int’l USA,  568 U. S. 398, 409 (2013); Lujan  v. 
Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U. S. 555, 560 (1992).  Moreover, 
in  Kowalski,  543  U. S.  125,  we  refined  our  rule  for  third-
party  standing,  and  in  Newdow,  542  U. S.  1,  we  made  it 
clear that a plaintiff cannot sue on behalf of a third party if
the parties’ interests may conflict.

The presence or absence of reliance is often a critical fac-
tor in applying the doctrine of stare decisis, see, e.g., Fran-
chise Tax Bd., 587 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 17); Janus, 585 
U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 44); South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 
585  U. S.  ___,  ___  (2018)  (slip  op.,  at  20);  Hilton  v.  South 
Carolina Public Railways Comm’n, 502 U. S. 197, 206–207 
(1991),  but  neither  the  plurality  nor  THE  CHIEF  JUSTICE 
claims  that  any  reliance  interests  are  at  stake  here.
Women wishing to obtain abortions have not taken any ac-
tion in reliance on the ability of abortion providers to sue on 
their behalf, and eliminating third-party standing for pro-
viders would not interfere with the ability of women to sue. 
Nor does it appear that abortion providers have done any-
thing  in  reliance  on  the  special  third-party  standing  rule
they have enjoyed.  If that rule were abrogated, they could
still ask to intervene or appear as an amicus curiae in a suit 
brought by a woman, but it is deeply offensive to our rules 
of standing to permit them to sue in the name of their pa-