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HOHN v. UNITED STATES

Opinion of the Court

tiﬁcates of appealability and motions for second or successive
applications were enacted in the same statute. The clear
limit on this Court’s jurisdiction to review denials of motions
to ﬁle second or successive petitions by writ of certiorari
contrasts with the absence of an analogous limitation to cer-
tiorari review of denials of applications for certiﬁcates of ap-
pealability. True, the phrase concerning the grant or denial
of second or successive applications refers to an action “by
a court of appeals”; still, we think a Congress concerned
enough to bar our jurisdiction in one instance would have
been just as explicit in denying it in the other, were that its
intention. See, e. g., Bates v. United States, 522 U. S. 23,
29–30 (1997) (“ ‘[W]here Congress includes particular lan-
guage in one section of a statute but omits it in another sec-
tion of the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress
acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or
exclusion’ ”) (quoting Russello v. United States, 464 U. S. 16,
23 (1983) (other internal quotation marks omitted)). The
dissent claims the absence of similar language in § 2253(c)
can be explained by Congress’ reliance on the rule holding
certiﬁcate applications unreviewable under § 1254(1). Post,
at 261–262. As we later discuss, any such reliance is les-
sened by the Court’s consistent practice of treating denials
of certiﬁcate applications as falling within its statutory cer-
tiorari jurisdiction. See infra, at 252.

Today’s holding conforms our commonsense practice to the
statutory scheme, making it unnecessary to invoke our ex-
traordinary jurisdiction in routine cases, which present im-
portant and meritorious claims. The United States does not
dispute that Hohn’s claim has considerable merit and ac-
knowledges that the trial court committed an error of consti-
tutional magnitude. The only contested issue is whether the
constitutional violation was a substantial one. Brief in Op-
position 7–8. Were we to adopt the position advanced by
the dissent, the only way we could consider his meritorious
claim would be through the All Writs Act, 28 U. S. C.