Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/22pdf/22-138_43j7.pdf
Page Number: 57

Cite as:  600 U. S. ____ (2023) 

15 

BARRETT, J., dissenting 

D. J. M. v. Hannibal Public School Dist. No. 60, 647 F. 3d 
754, 758 (CA8 2011);  Lovell v. Poway Unified School Dis-
trict,  90  F. 3d  367,  369,  372–373  (CA9  1996)  (similar); 
Haughwout v. Tordenti, 332 Conn. 559, 561–562, 211 A. 3d 
1, 3–4 (2019) (similar).  True threats can also be expressed 
by a parent, a teacher, or an employee in another context 
altogether.  See, e.g., Taveras, 342 Conn., at 567–569, 578, 
271 A. 3d, at 126–128, 133 (parent); Smith v. New York City 
Dept. of Ed., 109 App. Div. 3d 701, 702–703, 972 N. Y. S. 2d 
221, 222 (2013) (teacher); Diggs v. St. Louis, 613 S. W. 3d 
858, 862, 864 (Mo. App. 2020) (correctional officer). 

Barring some reason why the speech receives lesser con-
stitutional  protection,  e.g.,  Mahanoy  Area  School  Dist.  v. 
B. L.,  594  U. S.  ___,  ___–___  (2021)  (slip  op.,  at  4–5),  the
Court’s new rule applies to all of these situations.  That can 
make all the difference in some cases.  A delusional speaker
may  lack  awareness  of  the  threatening  nature  of  her 
speech; a devious speaker may strategically disclaim such
awareness; and a lucky speaker may leave behind no evi-
dence of mental state for the government to use against her.
The Court’s decision thus sweeps much further than it lets 
on. 

* 

* 

* 
The bottom line is this: Counterman communicated true 
threats, which, “everyone agrees, lie outside the bounds of
the First  Amendment’s protection.”  Ante, at  4.  He  knew 
what the words meant.  Those threats caused the victim to 
fear  for  her  life,  and  they  “upended  her  daily  existence.” 
Ante, at 2.  Nonetheless, the Court concludes that Counter-
man can prevail on a First Amendment defense.  Nothing
in the Constitution compels that result.  I respectfully dis-
sent.