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20 

PENNEAST PIPELINE CO. v. NEW JERSEY 

Opinion of the Court 

suits by the Federal Government.  If it could, then the ex-
tension  of  the  judicial  power  to  controversies  “between  a
State  and  Citizens  of  another  State,”  Art. III,  §2,  cl. 1, 
would suggest that Chisholm v. Georgia correctly held that
nonconsenting States could be subject to private suit.  And 
the existence of federal jurisdiction over controversies “be-
tween  a  State  . . .  and  foreign  States,”  Art. III,  §2,  cl. 1,
would suggest that States consented in the plan of the Con-
vention to suit by other nations, notwithstanding our hold-
ing to the contrary in Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi. 
A grant of judicial power does not imply an abrogation of 
sovereign  immunity.  Texas  rested  on  “the  consent  of  the 
State” in the constitutional plan, as does our decision today. 
143 U. S., at 646. 

As a final point, the other dissent offers a different the-
ory—that  even  if  the  States  consented  in  the  plan  of  the 
Convention to the proceedings below, the Eleventh Amend-
ment  nonetheless  divests  federal  courts  of  subject-matter
jurisdiction  over  a  suit  filed  against  a  State  by  a  diverse
plaintiff.  See  post,  at  3–4  (opinion  of  GORSUCH,  J.).  But 
under  our  precedents  that  no  party  asks  us  to  reconsider 
here, we have understood the Eleventh Amendment to con-
fer “a personal privilege which [a State] may waive at pleas-
ure.” Clark v. Barnard, 108 U. S. 436, 447 (1883); see, e.g., 
Lapides  v.  Board  of  Regents  of  Univ.  System  of  Ga.,  535 
U. S. 613, 618–619 (2002); Gunter v. Atlantic Coast Line R. 
Co.,  200  U. S.  273,  284  (1906).    When  “a  State  waives  its 
immunity  and  consents  to  suit  in  federal  court,  the  Elev-
enth Amendment does not bar the action.”  Atascadero State 
Hospital v. Scanlon, 473 U. S. 234, 238 (1985).  Such con-
sent may, as here, be “ ‘inherent in the constitutional plan.’ ”  
McKesson Corp. v. Division of Alcoholic Beverages and To-
bacco,  Fla.  Dept.  of  Business  Regulation,  496  U. S.  18,  30 
(1990) (quoting Principality of Monaco, 292 U. S., at 329); 
see, e.g., Katz, 546 U. S., at 377–378.