Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/16pdf/15-1358_6khn.pdf
Page Number: 68

24 

ZIGLAR v. ABBASI 

BREYER, J., dissenting 

pointed  out,  can  “li[e]  about  like  a  loaded  weapon”  await-
ing  discharge  in  another  case.  Korematsu,  supra,  at  246 
(dissenting opinion).

A  damages  action,  however,  is  typically  brought  after
the emergency is over, after emotions have cooled, and at a
time when more factual information is available.  In such 
circumstances,  courts  have  more  time  to  exercise  such 
judicial  virtues  as  calm  reflection  and  dispassionate  ap- 
plication  of  the  law  to  the  facts.    We  have  applied  the 
Constitution  to  actions  taken  during  periods  of  war  and
national-security  emergency.  See  Boumediene,  553  U. S., 
at 732–733; Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U. S. 507; cf. Youngs-
town Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U. S. 579 (1952).  I 
should  think  that  the  wisdom  of  permitting  courts  to
consider Bivens actions, later granting monetary  compen-
sation  to  those  wronged  at  the  time,  would  follow 
a fortiori. 

As is well known, Lord Atkins, a British judge, wrote in
the  midst  of  World  War  II  that  “amid  the  clash  of  arms, 
the  laws  are  not  silent.    They  may  be  changed,  but  they 
speak the same language in war as in peace.”  Liversidge 
v. Anderson, [1942] A. C. 206 (H. L. 1941) 244.  The Court, 
in my view, should say the same of this Bivens action. 

With respect, I dissent.