Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/558bv.pdf
Page Number: 221.0

60 

BEARD  v.  KINDLER 

Opinion of the Court 

542  F.  3d,  at  80.  Turning  to  the  merits,  the  Court  of  Ap­
peals disagreed with the District Court on the improper ag­
gravating factor claim, but held that Kindler was entitled to 
relief based on his Mills and ineffective assistance of counsel 
claims.  542 F. 3d, at 80–87. 

The Commonwealth petitioned for certiorari, arguing that 
the Court of Appeals’ determination that state discretionary 
rules  are  automatically  inadequate  conﬂicted  with  the  hold­
ings  of  other  Courts  of  Appeals  and  warranted  this  Court’s 
review.  Pet.  for  Cert.  6–11.  Kindler  countered  that  the 
Commonwealth  had  mischaracterized  the  Third  Circuit’s 
holding.  Relying on the court’s citation of the Doctor opin­
ion,  Kindler  argued  that  the  Third  Circuit  did  not  hold 
that  discretionary  state  rules  are  automatically  inadequate; 
rather  the  court  determined  that  the  state  courts  applied 
“a new  and different rule from  that in existence at  the time 
of the  alleged default.”  Brief in  Opposition 3.  It  was that 
new  rule,  Kindler  maintained,  that  the  Third  Circuit  found 
inadequate.  Ibid. 

We  granted  the  Commonwealth’s  petition  for  certiorari. 
556  U. S.  1234  (2009).  That  petition  asks  us  to  decide 
whether  discretionary  procedural  rulings  are  automatically 
inadequate to bar federal court review on habeas. 

II 

The  question  whether  a  state  procedural  ruling  is  ade­
quate  is itself  a question  of  federal law.  Lee  v.  Kemna,  534 
U. S. 362, 375 (2002).  We have framed the adequacy inquiry 
by  asking  whether  the  state  rule  in  question  was  “ ‘ﬁrmly 
established  and  regularly  followed.’ ”  Id.,  at  376  (quoting 
James v.  Kentucky, 466 U. S. 341, 348 (1984)). 

We  hold  that  a  discretionary  state  procedural  rule  can 
serve  as  an  adequate  ground  to  bar  federal  habeas  review. 
Nothing  inherent  in  such  a  rule  renders  it  inadequate  for 
purposes  of  the  adequate  state  ground  doctrine.  To  the 
contrary,  a  discretionary  rule  can  be  “ﬁrmly  established”