Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/17pdf/17-965_h315.pdf
Page Number: 91.0

Cite as:  585 U. S. ____ (2018) 

27 

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting 

order  was  rooted  in  dangerous  stereotypes  about,  inter 
alia,  a  particular  group’s  supposed  inability  to  assimilate
and desire to harm the United States.  See Korematsu, 323 
U. S.,  at  236–240  (Murphy,  J.,  dissenting).    As  here,  the 
Government  was  unwilling  to  reveal  its  own  intelligence
agencies’ views of the alleged security concerns to the very
citizens  it  purported  to  protect.  Compare  Korematsu  v. 
United  States,  584  F. Supp.  1406,  1418–1419  (ND  Cal.
1984)  (discussing  information  the  Government  knowingly 
omitted from report presented to the courts justifying the 
executive  order);  Brief  for  Japanese  American  Citizens
League as Amicus Curiae 17–19, with IRAP II, 883 F. 3d, 
at  268;  Brief  for  Karen  Korematsu  et al.  as  Amici  Curiae 
35–36, and n. 5 (noting that the Government “has gone to 
great lengths to shield [the Secretary of Homeland Securi­
ty’s]  report  from  view”).    And  as  here,  there  was  strong
evidence  that  impermissible  hostility  and  animus  moti- 
vated the Government’s policy.

Although  a  majority  of  the  Court  in  Korematsu  was 
willing  to  uphold  the  Government’s  actions  based  on  a 
barren invocation of national security, dissenting Justices
warned of that decision’s harm to our constitutional fabric. 
Justice  Murphy  recognized  that  there  is  a  need  for  great 
deference  to  the  Executive  Branch  in  the  context  of  na­
tional  security,  but  cautioned  that  “it  is  essential  that 
there  be  definite  limits  to  [the  government’s]  discretion,” 
as  “[i]ndividuals  must  not  be  left  impoverished  of  their 
constitutional  rights  on  a  plea  of  military  necessity  that 
has  neither  substance  nor  support.”    323  U. S.,  at  234 
(Murphy,  J.,  dissenting).    Justice  Jackson  lamented  that 
the  Court’s  decision  upholding  the  Government’s  policy
would  prove  to  be  “a  far  more  subtle  blow  to  liberty  than
the  promulgation  of  the  order  itself,”  for  although  the
executive  order  was  not  likely  to  be  long  lasting,  the 
Court’s  willingness  to  tolerate  it  would  endure.    Id.,  at 
245–246.