Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/09pdf/08-1371.pdf
Page Number: 37

Cite as:  561 U. S. ____ (2010) 

31 

Opinion of the Court 

  Finding  Hastings’  open-access  condition  on  RSO  status 
reasonable  and  viewpoint  neutral,  we  reject  CLS’  free­
speech and expressive-association claims.27 

IV 
In  its  reply  brief,  CLS  contends  that  “[t]he  peculiarity,
incoherence,  and  suspect  history  of  the  all-comers  policy
all point to pretext.”  Reply Brief 23.  Neither the District 
Court  nor  the  Ninth  Circuit  addressed  an  argument  that
Hastings selectively enforces its all-comers policy, and this 
Court is not the proper forum  to  air the issue in the first
instance.28    On  remand,  the  Ninth  Circuit  may  consider 

—————— 

the  Law  School’s  regulation  by  dropping  access  barriers,  they  may

express  any  viewpoint  they  wish—including  a  discriminatory  one.    Cf.  

Rumsfeld  v.  Forum  for  Academic  and  Institutional  Rights,  Inc.,  547

U. S.  47,  60  (2006)  (“As  a  general  matter,  the  Solomon  Amendment 
regulates  conduct,  not  speech.    It  affects  what  law  schools  must  do— 
afford  equal  access  to  military  recruiters—not  what  they  may  or  may 
not  say.”).  Today’s  decision  thus  continues  this  Court’s  tradition  of 
“protect[ing] the freedom to express ‘the thought that we hate.’ ”  Post, 
at  1  (ALITO, J.,  dissenting)  (quoting  United  States  v.  Schwimmer,  279 
U. S. 644, 655 (1929) (Holmes, J., dissenting)). 

27 CLS briefly argues that Hastings’ all-comers condition violates the 
Free  Exercise  Clause.    Brief  for  Petitioner  40–41.    Our  decision  in 
Smith,  494  U. S.  872,  forecloses  that  argument.    In  Smith,  the  Court 
held  that  the  Free  Exercise  Clause  does  not  inhibit  enforcement  of 
otherwise  valid  regulations  of  general  application  that  incidentally 
burden  religious  conduct.  Id.,  at  878–882.    In  seeking  an  exemption
from  Hastings’  across-the-board  all-comers  policy,  CLS,  we  repeat, 
seeks  preferential,  not  equal,  treatment;  it  therefore  cannot  moor  its 
request for accommodation to the Free Exercise Clause. 

28 Finding the Ninth Circuit’s analysis cursory, the dissent repeatedly 
urges us to resolve the pretext question.  See, e.g., post, at 2, 31–35, and 
17, n. 2.  In doing so, the dissent forgets that “we are a court of review, 
not of first view.”  Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U. S. 709, 718, n. 7 (2005). 
When  the  lower  courts  have  failed  to  address  an  argument  that  de­
served  their  attention,  our  usual  practice  is  to  remand  for  further
consideration,  not  to  seize  the  opportunity  to  decide  the  question
ourselves.  That is especially true when we agree to review an issue on
the  understanding  that  “[t]he  material  facts  . . .  are  undisputed,”  as