Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/17pdf/16-1466_2b3j.pdf
Page Number: 73

18  JANUS v. STATE, COUNTY, AND MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES 

KAGAN, J., dissenting 

understood such cases to end at Pickering’s first step: If an
employee’s  speech  is  about,  in,  and  directed  to  the  work-
place, she has no “possibility of a First Amendment claim.” 
Garcetti, 547 U. S., at 418; see supra, at 11.  So take your 
pick.  Either the majority is exposing government entities
across  the  country  to  increased  First  Amendment  litiga-
tion and liability—and thus preventing them from regulat-
ing  their  workforces  as  private  employers  could.    Or  else, 
when  actual  cases  of  this  kind  come  around,  we  will  dis-
cover  that  today’s  majority  has  crafted  a  “unions  only” 
carve-out to our employee-speech law. 

What’s more, the government should prevail even if the
speech  involved  in  collective  bargaining  satisfies  Picker-
ing’s  first  part.    Recall  that  the  next  question  is  whether
the  government  has  shown  “an  adequate  justification  for 
treating  the  employee  differently  from  any  other  member 
of  the  general  public.”  Garcetti,  547  U. S.,  at  418;  supra,
at  11.  That  inquiry  is  itself  famously  respectful  of  gov-
ernment  interests.  This  Court  has  reversed  the  govern-
ment  only  when  it  has  tried  to  “leverage  the  employment 
relationship”  to  achieve  an  outcome  unrelated  to  the
workplace’s “effective functioning.”  Garcetti, 547 U. S., at 
419;  Rankin  v.  McPherson,  483  U. S.  378,  388  (1987).
Nothing like that is true here.  As Abood described, many 
government  entities  have  found  agency  fees  the  best  way 
to  ensure  a  stable  and  productive  relationship  with  an 
exclusive  bargaining  agent.    See  431  U. S.,  at  220–221, 
224–226;  supra,  at  3–4.  And  here,  Illinois  and  many 
governmental amici have explained again how agency fees 
advance  their  workplace  goals.    See  Brief  for  State  Re-
spondents  12,  36;  Brief  for  Governor  Tom  Wolf  et al.  as 
Amici  Curiae  21–33.  In  no  other  employee-speech  case
has  this  Court  dismissed  such  work-related  interests,  as 
the majority does here.  See supra, at 6–9 (discussing the
majority’s  refusal  to  engage  with  the  logic  of  the  State’s 
position).  Time and again, the Court has instead respected