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10 

UNITED STATES v. RAHIMI 

Opinion of the Court 

and disfavored religious groups.  By the time of the found-
ing,  however,  state  constitutions  and  the  Second  Amend-
ment had largely eliminated governmental authority to dis-
arm  political  opponents  on  this  side  of  the  Atlantic.    See 
Heller, 554 U. S., at 594–595, 600–603.  But regulations tar-
geting  individuals  who  physically  threatened  others  per-
sisted.  Such conduct was often addressed through ordinary
criminal  laws  and  civil  actions,  such  as  prohibitions  on 
fighting or private suits against individuals who threatened 
others.  See 4 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of 
England 145–146, 149–150 (10th ed. 1787) (Blackstone); 3 
id.,  at  120.    By  the  1700s  and  early  1800s,  however,  two 
distinct  legal  regimes  had  developed  that  specifically  ad-
dressed firearms violence. 

The first were the surety laws.  A form of “preventive jus-
tice,” these laws derived from the ancient practice of frank-
pledges.  4 id., at 251–253.  Reputedly dating to the time of 
Canute, the frankpledge system involved compelling adult 
men  to  organize  themselves  into  ten-man  “tithing[s].”    A. 
Lefroy, Anglo-Saxon Period of English Law, Part II, 26 Yale
L. J.  388,  391  (1917).  The  members  of  each  tithing  then
“mutually  pledge[d]  for  each  other’s  good  behaviour.”    4 
Blackstone 252.  Should any of the ten break the law, the
remaining nine would be responsible for producing him in
court,  or  else  face  punishment  in his  stead.    D.  Levinson, 
Collective Sanctions, 56 Stan. L. Rev. 345, 358 (2003). 

Eventually,  the  communal  frankpledge  system  evolved 
into  the  individualized  surety  regime.    Under  the  surety
laws, a magistrate could “oblig[e] those persons, [of] whom
there is a probable ground to suspect of future misbehav-
iour,  to  stipulate  with  and  to  give  full  assurance  . . .  that 
such  offence  . . .  shall  not  happen[,]  by  finding  pledges  or 
securities.”  4 Blackstone 251.  In other words, the law au-
thorized magistrates to require individuals suspected of fu-
ture  misbehavior  to  post  a  bond.  Ibid.   If  an  individual 
failed to post a bond,  he would be jailed.  See,  e.g., Mass.