Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/16pdf/15-1358_6khn.pdf
Page Number: 41.0

Cite as:  582 U. S. ____ (2017) 

3 

Opinion of THOMAS, J. 

defenses  rather  than  in  derogation  of  them.”    Malley  v. 
Briggs,  475  U. S.  335,  339  (1986)  (internal  quotation
marks  omitted).    We  have  done  so  because  “[c]ertain  im-
munities  were  so  well  established  in  1871  . . .  that  ‘we 
presume that Congress would have specifically so provided 
had  it  wished  to  abolish’  them.”    Buckley  v.  Fitzsimmons, 
509  U. S.  259,  268  (1993);  accord,  Briscoe  v.  LaHue,  460 
U. S.  325,  330  (1983).    Immunity  is  thus  available  under 
the  statute  if  it  was  “historically  accorded  the  relevant
official” in an analogous situation “at common law,” Imbler 
v. Pachtman, 424 U. S. 409, 421 (1976), unless the statute 
provides  some  reason  to  think  that  Congress  did  not  pre-
serve the defense, see Tower v. Glover, 467 U. S. 914, 920 
(1984).

In  some  contexts,  we  have  conducted  the  common-law 
inquiry  that  the  statute  requires.    See  Wyatt  v.  Cole,  504 
U. S.  158,  170  (1992)  (KENNEDY,  J.,  concurring).    For 
example,  we  have  concluded  that  legislators  and  judges
are absolutely immune from liability under §1983 for their 
official acts because that immunity was well established at 
common law in 1871.  See Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U. S. 
367, 372–376 (1951) (legislators); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U. S. 
547, 553–555 (1967) (judges).  We have similarly looked to 
the  common  law  in  holding  that  a  prosecutor  is  immune
from  suits  relating  to  the  “judicial  phase  of  the  criminal 
process,”  Imbler,  supra,  at  430;  Burns  v.  Reed,  500  U. S. 
478, 489–492 (1991); but see Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U. S. 
118,  131–134  (1997)  (Scalia,  J.,  joined  by  THOMAS,  J., 
concurring)  (arguing  that  the  Court  in  Imbler  misunder-
stood  1871  common-law  rules),  although  not  from  suits
relating to the prosecutor’s advice to police officers, Burns, 
supra, at 493. 

In  developing  immunity  doctrine  for  other  executive
officers, we also started off by applying common-law rules.
In  Pierson,  we  held  that  police  officers  are  not  absolutely 
immune  from  a  §1983  claim  arising  from  an  arrest  made