Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/558bv.pdf
Page Number: 476

Cite as: 558 U. S. 310 (2010) 

315 

Syllabus 

(4)  Because  § 441b  is  not  limited  to  corporations  or  associations 
created  in  foreign  countries  or funded  predominantly  by  foreign  share­
holders,  it  would  be  overbroad  even  if  the  Court  were  to  recognize  a 
compelling governmental interest in limiting  foreign inﬂuence over the 
Nation’s political process.  P. 362. 

(d)  The relevant factors in deciding whether to adhere to stare deci­
sis, beyond workability—the precedent’s antiquity, the reliance interests 
at stake, and whether the decision was well reasoned—counsel in favor 
of abandoning Austin, which itself contravened the precedents of Buck­
ley and Bellotti.  As already explained, Austin was not well reasoned. 
It  is  also  undermined  by  experience  since  its  announcement.  Political 
speech  is so  ingrained in  this country’s  culture that  speakers  ﬁnd ways 
around  campaign  ﬁnance  laws.  Rapid  changes  in  technology—and  the 
creative  dynamic  inherent  in  the  concept  of  free  expression—counsel 
against  upholding  a  law  that  restricts  political  speech  in  certain  media 
or  by  certain  speakers.  In  addition,  no  serious  reliance  issues  are  at 
stake.  Thus,  due  consideration  leads  to  the  conclusion  that  Austin 
should be overruled.  The Court returns to the principle established in 
Buckley  and  Bellotti  that  the  Government  may  not  suppress  political 
speech based on the speaker’s corporate identity.  No sufﬁcient govern­
mental  interest  justiﬁes  limits  on  the  political  speech  of  nonproﬁt  or 
for-proﬁt corporations.  Pp. 362–366. 

3.  BCRA  §§ 201  and  311  are  valid  as  applied  to  the  ads  for  Hillary 

and to the movie itself.  Pp. 366–372. 

(a)  Disclaimer  and disclosure  requirements may  burden the  ability 
to  speak,  but  they  “impose  no  ceiling  on  campaign-related  activities,” 
Buckley, supra, at 64, or “ ‘ “prevent anyone from speaking,” ’ ” McCon­
nell, 540 U. S., at 201.  The Buckley Court explained that disclosure can 
be justiﬁed by a governmental interest in providing “the electorate with 
information”  about  election-related  spending  sources.  424  U. S.,  at  66. 
The McConnell Court applied this interest in rejecting facial challenges 
to §§ 201 and 311.  540 U. S., at 196.  However, the Court acknowledged 
that  as-applied  challenges  would  be  available  if  a  group  could  show  a 
“ ‘reasonable probability’ ” that disclosing its contributors’ names would 
“ ‘subject them to threats, harassment, or reprisals from either Govern­
ment ofﬁcials or private parties.’ ”  Id., at 198.  Pp. 366–367. 

(b)  The disclaimer and disclosure requirements are valid as applied 
to Citizens United’s ads.  They fall within BCRA’s “electioneering com­
munication”  deﬁnition:  They  referred  to  then-Senator  Clinton  by  name 
shortly  before  a  primary  and  contained  pejorative  references  to  her 
candidacy.  Section  311  disclaimers  provide  information  to  the  elector­
ate,  McConnell,  supra,  at  196,  and  “insure  that  the  voters  are  fully 
informed”  about  who  is  speaking,  Buckley,  supra,  at  76.  At  the  very