Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/12pdf/12-133_19m1.pdf
Page Number: 18

Cite as:  570 U. S. ____ (2013) 

5 

KAGAN, J., dissenting 

omitted).  We rejected that contention, but not because we 
doubted that such fees could prevent the effective vindica-
tion  of  statutory  rights.    To  the  contrary,  we  invoked  our 
rule  from  Mitsubishi,  making  clear  that  it  applied  to  the 
case before us.  See 538 U. S., at 90.  Indeed, we added a 
burden  of  proof:  “[W]here,  as  here,”  we  held,  a  party  as-
serting  a  federal  right  “seeks  to  invalidate  an  arbitration
agreement on the ground that arbitration would be prohib-
itively  expensive,  that  party  bears  the  burden  of  showing 
the  likelihood  of  incurring  such  costs.”    Id.,  at  92.  Ran-
dolph,  we  found,  had  failed  to  meet  that  burden:  The 
evidence she offered was “too speculative.”  Id., at 91.  But 
even as we dismissed Randolph’s suit, we reminded courts
to  protect  against  arbitration  agreements  that  make  fed-
eral claims too costly to bring. 

Applied  as  our  precedents  direct, 

the  effective-
vindication rule furthers the purposes not just of laws like 
the  Sherman  Act,  but  of  the  FAA  itself.  That  statute 
reflects  a  federal  policy  favoring  actual  arbitration—that
is,  arbitration  as  a  streamlined  “method  of  resolving  dis-
putes,”  not  as  a  foolproof  way  of  killing  off  valid  claims. 
Rodriguez  de  Quijas  v.  Shearson/American  Express,  Inc., 
490  U. S.  477,  481  (1989).    Put  otherwise:  What  the  FAA 
prefers  to  litigation  is  arbitration,  not  de facto  immunity.
The  effective-vindication  rule  furthers  the  statute’s  goals 
by  ensuring  that  arbitration  remains  a  real,  not  faux, 
method  of  dispute  resolution.  With  the  rule,  companies
have  good  reason  to  adopt  arbitral  procedures  that  facili-
tate  efficient  and  accurate  handling  of  complaints.    With-
out  it,  companies  have  every  incentive  to  draft  their 
agreements  to  extract  backdoor  waivers  of  statutory
rights,  making  arbitration  unavailable  or  pointless.    So 
down  one  road:  More  arbitration,  better  enforcement  of 
federal  statutes.  And  down  the  other:  Less  arbitration, 
poorer  enforcement  of  federal  statutes.    Which  would  you 
prefer?  Or still more aptly: Which do you think Congress