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CLINTON v. CITY OF NEW YORK

Kennedy, J., concurring

enacted over his veto, could restore to Congress the power
it now seeks to relinquish. That a congressional cession of
power is voluntary does not make it innocuous. The Consti-
tution is a compact enduring for more than our time, and one
Congress cannot yield up its own powers, much less those of
other Congresses to follow. See Freytag v. Commissioner,
501 U. S. 868, 880 (1991); cf. Chadha, supra, at 942, n. 13.
Abdication of responsibility is not part of the constitutional
design.

Separation of powers helps to ensure the ability of each
branch to be vigorous in asserting its proper authority.
In
this respect the device operates on a horizontal axis to se-
cure a proper balance of legislative, executive, and judicial
authority. Separation of powers operates on a vertical axis
as well, between each branch and the citizens in whose inter-
est powers must be exercised. The citizen has a vital inter-
est in the regularity of the exercise of governmental power.
If this point was not clear before Chadha, it should have
been so afterwards. Though Chadha involved the deporta-
tion of a person, while the case before us involves the ex-
penditure of money or the grant of a tax exemption, this
circumstance does not mean that the vertical operation of
the separation of powers is irrelevant here. By increasing
the power of the President beyond what the Framers envi-
sioned, the statute compromises the political liberty of our
citizens, liberty which the separation of powers seeks to
secure.

The Constitution is not bereft of controls over improvident
spending. Federalism is one safeguard, for political ac-
countability is easier to enforce within the States than na-
tionwide. The other principal mechanism, of course, is con-
trol of the political branches by an informed and responsible
electorate. Whether or not federalism and control by the
electorate are adequate for the problem at hand, they are
two of the structures the Framers designed for the problem
the statute strives to confront. The Framers of the Consti-