Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/529bv.pdf
Page Number: 673

529US3

Unit: $U54

[10-04-01 09:35:39] PAGES PGT: OPIN

598

OCTOBER TERM, 1999

Syllabus

UNITED STATES v. MORRISON et al.

certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the fourth circuit

No. 99–5. Argued January 11, 2000—Decided May 15, 2000*

Petitioner Brzonkala ﬁled suit, alleging, inter alia, that she was raped
by respondents while the three were students at Virginia Polytechnic
Institute, and that this attack violated 42 U. S. C. § 13981, which pro-
vides a federal civil remedy for the victims of gender-motivated
violence. Respondents moved to dismiss on the grounds that the com-
plaint failed to state a claim and that § 13981’s civil remedy is unconsti-
tutional. Petitioner United States intervened to defend the section’s
In dismissing the complaint, the District Court held
constitutionality.
that it stated a claim against respondents, but that Congress lacked
authority to enact § 13981 under either the Commerce Clause or § 5 of
the Fourteenth Amendment, which Congress had explicitly identiﬁed
as the sources of federal authority for § 13981. The en banc Fourth
Circuit afﬁrmed.

Held: Section 13981 cannot be sustained under the Commerce Clause or

§ 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Pp. 607–627.

(a) The Commerce Clause does not provide Congress with author-
ity to enact § 13981’s federal civil remedy. A congressional enactment
will be invalidated only upon a plain showing that Congress has ex-
ceeded its constitutional bounds. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U. S.
549, 568, 577–578. Petitioners assert that § 13981 can be sustained
under Congress’ commerce power as a regulation of activity that sub-
stantially affects interstate commerce. The proper framework for ana-
lyzing such a claim is provided by the principles the Court set out
in Lopez. First, in Lopez, the noneconomic, criminal nature of pos-
sessing a ﬁrearm in a school zone was central to the Court’s conclusion
that Congress lacks authority to regulate such possession. Similarly,
gender-motivated crimes of violence are not, in any sense, economic
activity. Second, like the statute at issue in Lopez, § 13981 contains no
jurisdictional element establishing that the federal cause of action is in
pursuance of Congress’ regulation of interstate commerce. Although
Lopez makes clear that such a jurisdictional element would lend support
to the argument that § 13981 is sufﬁciently tied to interstate commerce

*Together with No. 99–29, Brzonkala v. Morrison et al., also on certio-

rari to the same court.