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Page Number: 2.0

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UNITED STATES v. ARTHREX, INC. 

Syllabus 

making them removable at will by the Secretary. 

Held: The judgment is vacated, and the case is remanded. 

941 F. 3d 1320, vacated and remanded. 

THE CHIEF JUSTICE delivered the opinion of the Court with respect 
to Parts I and II, concluding that the unreviewable authority wielded 
by APJs during inter partes review is incompatible with their appoint-
ment by the Secretary of Commerce to an inferior office.  Pp. 6–19.

(a) The Appointments Clause provides that only the President, with 
the  advice  and  consent  of  the  Senate,  can  appoint  principal  officers. 
With respect to inferior officers, the Clause permits Congress to vest
appointment power “in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in 
the Heads of Departments.”  Pp. 6–8.

(b) In Edmond v. United States, 520 U. S. 651, this Court explained
that an inferior officer must be “directed and supervised at some level
by others who were appointed by Presidential nomination with the ad-
vice and consent of the Senate.”  Id., at 663.  Applying that test to Coast
Guard Court of Criminal Appeals judges appointed by the Secretary of
Transportation,  the  Court held  that  the  judges  were  inferior  officers 
because they were effectively supervised by a combination of Presiden-
tially  nominated  and  Senate  confirmed  officers  in  the  Executive 
Branch.  Id., at 664–665.  What the Court in Edmond found “signifi-
cant” was that those judges had “no power to render a final decision on 
behalf of the United States unless permitted to do so by other Execu-
tive officers.”  Id., at 665. 

Such review by a superior executive officer is absent here.  While the 
Director has tools of administrative oversight, neither he nor any other
superior executive officer can directly review decisions by APJs.  Only
the PTAB itself “may grant rehearings.”  §6(c).  This restriction on re-
view relieves the Director of responsibility for the final decisions ren-
dered by APJs under his charge.  Their decision—the final word within 
the  Executive  Branch—compels  the  Director  to  “issue  and  publish  a
certificate” canceling or confirming patent claims he had previously al-
lowed.  §318(b). 

The  Government  and  Smith  &  Nephew  contend  that  the  Director
has various ways to indirectly influence the course of inter partes re-
view.  The Director, for example, could designate APJs predisposed to
decide a case in his preferred manner.  But such machinations blur the 
lines  of  accountability  demanded  by  the  Appointments  Clause  and 
leave the parties with neither an impartial decision by a panel of ex-
perts nor a transparent decision for which a politically accountable of-
ficer must take responsibility.

Even if the Director can refuse to designate APJs on future PTAB 
panels, he has no means of countermanding the final decision already
on  the  books.    Nor  can  the  Secretary  meaningfully  control  APJs