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PHILLIPS v. WASHINGTON LEGAL FOUNDATION

Opinion of the Court

v. Chicago, 166 U. S. 226, 239 (1897), provides that “private
property” shall not “be taken for public use, without just
compensation.” Because the Constitution protects rather
than creates property interests, the existence of a property
interest is determined by reference to “existing rules or un-
derstandings that stem from an independent source such as
state law.” Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408
U. S. 564, 577 (1972).

All agree that under Texas law the principal held in
IOLTA trust accounts is the “private property” of the client.
Texas IOLTA Rule 4 (discussing circumstances under which
“client funds” must be deposited in an IOLTA account);
Texas Bar Rule 1.14(a) (lawyers “shall hold funds . . . be-
longing in whole or in part to clients . . . separate from the
lawyer’s own property”); see also Brief for United States
as Amicus Curiae 10 (“There can be no doubt that the cli-
ent funds underlying the IOLTA program are the property
of respondents”). When deposited in an IOLTA account,
these funds remain in the control of a private attorney and
are freely available to the client upon demand. As to the
principal, then, the IOLTA rules at most “regulate the use
of [the] property.” Yee v. Escondido, 503 U. S. 519, 522
(1992). Respondents do not contend that the State’s regu-
lation of the manner in which attorneys hold and manage
client funds amounts to a taking of private property. The
question in this case is whether the interest on an IOLTA
account is “private property” of the client for whom the prin-
cipal is being held.4

4 We granted certiorari in this case to answer the question whether
“interest earned on client trust funds held by lawyers in IOLTA accounts
[is] a property interest of the client or lawyer, cognizable under the . . .
Jus-
Fifth Amendmen[t] to the U. S. Constitution . . . .” Pet. for Cert. i.
tice Souter contends that we should vacate the judgment of the Court
of Appeals because it was improper for that court to have answered this
question apart from the takings and just compensation questions. Peti-
tioners, however, did not argue in their petition for certiorari that it was
error for the Fifth Circuit to address the property question alone. Be-
cause, under this Court’s Rule 14(1)(a), our practice is to consider “[o]nly