Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/04pdf/04-278.pdf
Page Number: 48

Cite as:  545 U. S. ____ (2005) 

21 

STEVENS, J., dissenting 

order  entered  for  her  special  protection,  rather  than  on  a
formal  contract,  does  not  provide  a  principled  basis  for
refusing  to  consider  it  “property”  worthy  of  constitutional 
protection.20 

V 
Because  respondent  had  a  property  interest  in  the  en-

—————— 

20 According  to  JUSTICE  SOUTER, respondent  has  asserted  a  property 
interest  in  merely  a  “state-mandated  process,”  ante,  at  3  (opinion 
concurring in part and concurring in judgment), rather than in a state-
mandated “substantive guarantee,” ibid.  This misunderstands respon-
dent’s  claim.  Putting  aside  the  inartful  passage  of  respondent’s  brief 
that JUSTICE SOUTER relies upon, ante, at 2, it is clear that respondent 
is  in  fact  asserting  a  substantive  interest  in  the  “enforcement  of  the 
restraining order.”  Brief for Respondent 10.  Enforcement of a restrain-
ing  order  is  a  tangible,  substantive  act.    If  an  estranged  husband 
violates  a  restraining  order  by  abducting  children,  and  the  police 
succeed in enforcing the order, the person holding the restraining order 
has undeniably just received a substantive benefit.  As in other proce-
dural  due  process  cases,  respondent  is  arguing  that  the  police  officers 
failed  to  follow  fair  procedures  in  ascertaining  whether  the  statutory 
criteria  that  trigger  their  obligation  to  provide  enforcement—i.e.,  an 
outstanding  order  plus  probable  cause  that  it  is  being  violated—were 
satisfied in her case.  Cf. Carey v. Piphus, 435 U. S. 247, 266–267 (1978)
(discussing  analytic  difference  between  the  denial  of  fair  process  and 
the  denial  of  the  substantive  benefit  itself).    It  is  JUSTICE  SOUTER,  not 
respondent,  who  makes  the  mistake  of  “collapsing  the  distinction 
between property protected and the process that protects it,” ante, at 4. 
JUSTICE SOUTER also errs in suggesting that respondent cannot have 
a property interest in enforcement because she would not be authorized 
to  instruct  the  police  to  refrain  from  enforcement  in  the  event  of  a 
violation.  Ante, at 1.  The right to insist on the provision of a service is 
separate from the right to refuse the service.  For example, compulsory 
attendance  laws  deny  minors  the  right  to  refuse  to  attend  school. 
Nevertheless, we have recognized that minors have a property interest 
in  public  education  and  that  school  officials  must  therefore  follow  fair 
procedures  when  they  seek  to  deprive  minors  of  this  valuable  benefit 
through  suspension.    See  Goss,  419  U. S.  565.    In  the  end,  JUSTICE 
SOUTER overlooks the core purpose of procedural due process—ensuring 
that  a  citizen’s  reasonable  reliance  is  not  frustrated  by  arbitrary 
government action.