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Page Number: 125.0

42  NEW YORK STATE RIFLE & PISTOL ASSN., INC. v. BRUEN 

BREYER, J., dissenting 

that preventing public terror was one reason that the Stat-
ute of Northampton prohibited public carriage, but not an 
element of the crime.  See supra, at 37–39.  And, consistent 
with that understanding, American regulations modeled on 
the  Statute  of  Northampton  appear  to  have  been  under-
stood to set forth a broad prohibition on public carriage of
firearms  without  any  intent-to-terrify  requirement.    See 
Charles, 60 Clev. St. L. Rev., at 35, 37–41; J. Haywood, A 
Manual  of  the  Laws  of  North-Carolina,  pt.  2,  p.  40  (3d 
ed.1814); J. Ewing, The Office and Duty of a Justice of the 
Peace 546 (1805).

The Court cites three cases considering common-law of-
fenses, ante, at 42–44, but those cases do not support the
view that only public carriage in a manner likely to terrify 
violated American successors to the Statute of Northamp-
ton.  If anything, they suggest that public carriage of fire-
arms was not common practice.  At least one of the cases 
the Court cites, State v. Huntly, wrote that the Statute of 
Northampton  codified  a  pre-existing  common-law  offense,
which provided that “riding or going armed with dangerous 
or unusual weapons, is a crime against the public peace, by
terrifying the good people of the land.”  25 N. C., at 420–421 
(quoting  4  Blackstone,  Commentaries,  at  149;  emphasis 
added).  Huntly added that “[a] gun is an ‘unusual weapon’ ” 
and that “[n]o man amongst us carries it about with him, as
one of his every-day accoutrements—as a part of his dress—
and  never,  we  trust,  will  the  day  come  when  any  deadly 
weapon will be worn or wielded in our peace-loving and law-
abiding State, as an appendage of manly equipment.”  25 
N. C., at 422.  True, Huntly recognized that citizens were 
nonetheless  “at  perfect  liberty”  to  carry  for  “lawful  pur-
pose[s]”—but  it  specified  that  those  purposes  were  “busi-
ness or amusement.”  Id., at 422–423.  New York’s law sim-
ilarly recognizes that hunting, target shooting, and certain
professional  activities  are  proper  causes  justifying  lawful
carriage of a firearm.  See supra, at 12–13.  The other two