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Page Number: 6.0

6 

MERRILL v. MILLIGAN 

KAVANAUGH, J., concurring 

Clause.  But the Court’s case law in this area is notoriously 
unclear  and  confusing.    As  THE  CHIEF  JUSTICE  rightly 
notes, there is “considerable disagreement and uncertainty 
regarding the nature and contours of a vote dilution claim.”  
Post, at 2 (dissenting opinion).  Indeed, an amicus brief filed 
by 14 States says (with some justification) that this Court 
and  the  lower  federal  courts  “have  been  less  than  clear” 
about the rules that govern majority-minority districts, and 
bluntly  adds that  “States  need  clarity.”   Brief for  State  of 
Louisiana et al. as Amici Curiae 3, 25. 
  At  this  preliminary  juncture,  the  underlying merits  ap-
pear to be close and, at a minimum, not clearcut in favor of 
the  plaintiffs.2    And  in  any  event,  the  plaintiffs  have  not 
established  that  the  changes  are  feasible  without  signifi-
cant cost, confusion, or hardship.  Therefore, the plaintiffs 
cannot overcome even a more relaxed version of the Purcell 
principle. 
  In short, the Purcell principle requires that we stay the 
District  Court’s  injunction  with  respect  to  the  2022  elec-
tions.  The Court has recognized that “practical considera-
tions sometimes require courts to allow elections to proceed 
despite  pending  legal  challenges.”    Riley  v.  Kennedy,  553 
U. S. 406, 426 (2008).  So it is here.  If the District Court’s 
judgment is eventually affirmed after appellate review, the 
injunction  can  take  effect  for  congressional  elections  that 
occur after 2022.3 
  The principal dissent disagrees and emphasizes the thor-

—————— 

2 Even under the ordinary stay standard outside the election context, 
the  State  has  at  least  a  fair  prospect  of  success  on  appeal—as  do  the 
plaintiffs, for that matter. 

3 Correcting an erroneous lower court injunction of a state election law 
does not itself constitute a Purcell problem.  Otherwise, appellate courts 
could never correct a late-breaking lower court injunction of a state elec-
tion law.  That would be absurd and is not the law.  See, e.g., Andino v. 
Middleton, 592 U. S. ___ (2020); Republican National Committee v. Dem-
ocratic National Committee, 589 U. S. ___ (2020) (per curiam).