Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/17pdf/17-965_h315.pdf
Page Number: 3.0

Cite as:  585 U. S. ____ (2018) 

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Syllabus 

iens  “would  be  detrimental  to  the  interests  of  the  United  States.” 
The  President  has  undoubtedly  fulfilled  that  requirement  here.    He 
first  ordered  DHS  and  other  agencies  to  conduct  a  comprehensive 
evaluation of every single country’s compliance with the information
and  risk  assessment  baseline.    He  then  issued  a  Proclamation  with 
extensive findings about the deficiencies and their impact.  Based on 
that review, he found that restricting entry of aliens who could not be
vetted with adequate information was in the national interest.   

Even  assuming  that  some  form  of  inquiry  into  the  persuasiveness
of the President’s findings is appropriate, but see Webster v. Doe, 486 
U. S.  592,  600,  plaintiffs’  attacks  on  the  sufficiency  of  the  findings
cannot  be  sustained.    The  12-page  Proclamation  is  more  detailed
than any prior order issued under §1182(f).  And such a searching in-
quiry is inconsistent with the broad statutory text and the deference
traditionally  accorded  the  President  in  this  sphere.    See,  e.g.,  Sale, 
509 U. S., at 187–188.   

The  Proclamation  comports  with  the  remaining  textual  limits  in
§1182(f).  While  the  word  “suspend”  often  connotes  a  temporary  de-
ferral,  the  President  is  not  required  to  prescribe  in  advance  a  fixed
end date for the entry restriction.  Like its predecessors, the Procla-
mation  makes  clear  that  its  “conditional  restrictions”  will  remain  in 
force only so long as necessary to “address” the identified “inadequa-
cies and risks” within the covered nations.  Finally, the Proclamation
properly  identifies  a  “class  of  aliens”  whose  entry  is  suspended,  and 
the word “class” comfortably encompasses a group of people linked by
nationality.  Pp. 10–15. 

(b) Plaintiffs  have  not  identified  any  conflict  between  the  Proc-
lamation  and  the  immigration  scheme  reflected  in  the  INA  that 
would implicitly bar the President from addressing deficiencies in the 
Nation’s vetting system.  The existing grounds of inadmissibility and
the narrow Visa Waiver Program do not address the failure of certain 
high-risk  countries  to  provide  a  minimum  baseline  of  reliable  infor-
mation.  Further,  neither  the  legislative  history  of  §1182(f)  nor  his-
torical  practice  justifies  departing  from  the  clear  text  of  the  statute.
Pp. 15–20. 

(c) Plaintiffs’ argument that the President’s entry suspension vio-
lates §1152(a)(1)(A) ignores the basic distinction between admissibil-
ity  determinations  and  visa  issuance  that  runs  throughout  the  INA.
Section  1182  defines  the  universe  of  aliens  who  are  admissible  into 
the  United  States  (and  therefore  eligible  to  receive  a  visa).    Once 
§1182  sets  the  boundaries  of  admissibility,  §1152(a)(1)(A)  prohibits
discrimination in the allocation of immigrant visas based on national-
ity and other traits.  Had Congress intended in §1152(a)(1)(A) to con-
strain the President’s power to determine who may enter the country,