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Page Number: 4

4 

TRUMP v. VANCE 

Syllabus 

the one under investigation, but the President concedes that such in-
vestigations are permitted under Article II and the Supremacy Clause.  
And the receipt of a subpoena would not seem to categorically magnify 
the harm to the President’s reputation.  Additionally, in the grand jury 
context longstanding secrecy rules aim to prevent the very stigma the 
President anticipates.  Pp. 14–15. 

(iii) Finally, the President argues that subjecting Presidents to state 
criminal subpoenas will make them “easily identifiable target[s]” for 
harassment.  Fitzgerald, 457 U. S., at 753.  The Court rejected a nearly 
identical argument in Clinton, concluding that the risk posed by har-
assing civil litigation was not “serious” because federal courts have the 
tools to deter and dismiss vexatious lawsuits.  520 U. S., at 708.  Har-
assing  state  criminal  subpoenas  could,  under  certain  circumstances, 
threaten the independence or effectiveness of the Executive.  But here 
again the law already seeks to protect against such abuse.  First, grand 
juries are prohibited from engaging in “arbitrary fishing expeditions” 
or  initiating  investigations  “out  of  malice  or  an  intent  to  harass,” 
United States v. R. Enterprises, Inc., 498 U. S. 292, 299, and federal 
courts  may  intervene  in  state  proceedings  that  are  motivated  by  or 
conducted in bad faith.  Second, because the Supremacy Clause pro-
hibits state judges and prosecutors from interfering with a President’s 
official duties, any effort to manipulate a President’s policy decisions 
or to retaliate against a President for official acts through issuance of 
a subpoena would be an unconstitutional attempt to “influence” a su-
perior sovereign “exempt” from such obstacles, see McCulloch v. Mary- 
land, 4 Wheat. 316, 417.  And federal law allows a President to chal-
lenge any such allegedly unconstitutional influence in a federal forum.  
Pp. 15–17. 

(2) A state grand jury subpoena seeking a President’s private pa-

pers need not satisfy a heightened need standard, for three reasons.  
First, although a President cannot be treated as an “ordinary individ-
ual”  when  executive  communications  are  sought,  Burr  teaches  that, 
with regard to private papers, a President stands in “nearly the same 
situation with any other individual.”  25 F. Cas., at 191–192.  Second, 
there  has  been  no  showing  here  that  heightened  protection  against 
state subpoenas is necessary for the Executive to fulfill his Article II 
functions.  Finally, absent a need to protect the Executive, the public 
interest in fair and effective law enforcement cuts in favor of compre-
hensive access to evidence.   
   Rejecting  a  heightened  need  standard  does  not  leave  Presidents 
without recourse.  A President may avail himself of the same protec-
tions available to every other citizen, including the right to challenge 
the  subpoena  on  any  grounds  permitted  by  state  law,  which usually 
include bad faith and undue burden or breadth.  When the President