Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/21pdf/20-1410_1an2.pdf
Page Number: 29.0

Cite as:  597 U. S. ____ (2022) 

9 

ALITO, J., concurring
ALITO, J., concurring in judgment 

these  or  any  other  questions  naturally  raised  by  its  ipse 
dixit that the exception in §841(a) is “sufficiently like” an
element  to  require  that  it  be  treated  as  such  in  some  re-
spects but not others. 

C 
The Court also errs in holding that, if a §841(a)(1) defend-
ant “meets the burden of producing evidence that his or her 
conduct was ‘authorized,’ ” the Government has the burden 
to  “prove  beyond  a  reasonable  doubt  that  the  defendant 
knowingly or intentionally acted in an unauthorized man-
ner,” ante, at 5.  As noted, the common-law rule was that 
the defendant had the burden of production and persuasion 
on  any  affirmative  defense.  And  the  Court  has  held  that 
when Congress does not address the burden of proof in the 
text  of  a  statute,  “we  presume  that  Congress  intended  to 
preserve  the  common-law  rule.”    Smith  v.  United  States, 
568 U. S. 106, 112 (2013); see also Dixon, 548 U. S., at 13– 
14. 

The Court identifies one and only one reason for deviat-
ing  from  this  background  rule—the  fact  that  §885(a)(1) 
states that “the burden of going forward with the evidence 
with respect to any . . . exemption or exception shall be upon
the  person  claiming  its  benefit.”  Because  this  provision
does not say expressly that a defendant also has the burden
of persuasion, the Court infers that Congress meant to al-
locate that burden to the prosecution.  That inference is un-
warranted.  Section 885(a)(1) explicitly relieves the Govern-
ment  of  the  burden  of  “negativ[ing]”  exceptions  “in  any
trial.”  And it is hard to see how the Government does not 
have the burden to “negative” exceptions if it must affirma-
tively disprove a prima facie case of authorization any time
a defendant satisfies the initial burden of production. 

But even if one credits the majority’s assumption that the
CSA partly deviates from the common-law rule by shifting
the burden of persuasion to the Government, the majority’s