Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/23pdf/22-451_7m58.pdf
Page Number: 82

Cite as:  603 U. S. ____ (2024) 

1 

KAGAN, J., dissenting 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

_________________ 

Nos. 22–451 and 22–1219 
_________________ 

22–451 

LOPER BRIGHT ENTERPRISES, ET AL., 
PETITIONERS 
v. 
GINA RAIMONDO, SECRETARY OF 
COMMERCE, ET AL. 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT 

22–1219 

RELENTLESS, INC., ET AL., PETITIONERS 
v. 
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, ET AL. 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT 

[June 28, 2024] 

JUSTICE  KAGAN,  with  whom  JUSTICE  SOTOMAYOR  and 

JUSTICE JACKSON join,* dissenting. 

For 40 years, Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources 
Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837 (1984), has served as a 
cornerstone of administrative law, allocating responsibility
for  statutory  construction  between  courts  and  agencies. 
Under  Chevron,  a  court  uses  all  its  normal  interpretive
tools to determine whether Congress has spoken to an is-
sue.  If the court finds Congress has done so, that is the end 
of the matter; the agency’s views make no difference.  But 
if the court finds, at the end of its interpretive work, that 

—————— 

*JUSTICE JACKSON did not participate in the consideration or decision 
of the case in No. 22–451 and joins this opinion only as it applies to the 
case in No. 22–1219.