Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/524bv.pdf
Page Number: 180

524US1

Unit: $U79

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Cite as: 524 U. S. 125 (1998)

135

Opinion of the Court

preciable distance and, typically, by a customary or usual car-
rier agency”); see also Webster’s Dictionary of Synonyms 141
(1942).
If Smith, for example, calls a parcel delivery service,
which sends a truck to Smith’s house to pick up Smith’s pack-
age and take it to Los Angeles, one might say that Smith
has shipped the package and the parcel delivery service has
transported the package. But only the truck driver has
“carried” the package in the sense of “carry” that we believe
Congress intended. Therefore, “transport” is a broader
category that includes “carry” but also encompasses other
activity.

The dissent refers to § 926A and to another statute where
Congress used the word “transport” rather than “carry” to
describe the movement of ﬁrearms. 18 U. S. C. § 925(a)
(2)(B); post, at 146–147. According to the dissent, had Con-
gress intended “carry” to have the meaning we give it, Con-
gress would not have needed to use a different word in these
provisions. But as we have discussed above, we believe the
word “transport” is broader than the word “carry.”

And,

if Congress intended “carry” to have the limited
deﬁnition the dissent contends, it would have been quite un-
necessary to add the proviso in § 926A requiring a person, to
be exempt from penalties, to store her ﬁrearm in a locked
container not immediately accessible. See § 926A (quoted in
full, post, at 146) (exempting from criminal penalties one who
transports a ﬁrearm from a place where “he may lawfully
possess and carry such ﬁrearm” but not exempting the
“transportation” of a ﬁrearm if it is “readily accessible or is
directly accessible from the passenger compartment of such
transporting vehicle”). The statute simply could have said
that such a person may not “carry” a ﬁrearm. But, of
course, Congress did not say this because that is not what
“carry” means.

As we interpret the statutory scheme, it makes sense.
Congress has imposed a variable penalty with no mandatory
minimum sentence upon a person who “transports” (or