Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/14pdf/13-534_19m2.pdf
Page Number: 12

Cite as:  574 U. S. ____ (2015) 

7 

Opinion of the Court 

between state sovereignty and the Nation’s commitment to
a  policy  of  robust  competition,  Parker  immunity  is  not 
unbounded.  “[G]iven  the  fundamental  national  values  of 
free enterprise and economic competition that are embod­
ied in the federal antitrust laws, ‘state action immunity is
disfavored,  much  as  are  repeals  by  implication.’ ”    Phoebe 
Putney, supra, at ___ (slip op., at 7) (quoting Ticor, supra,
at 636).

An  entity  may  not  invoke  Parker  immunity  unless  the
actions in question are an exercise of the State’s sovereign 
power.  See  Columbia  v.  Omni  Outdoor  Advertising,  Inc., 
499  U. S.  365,  374  (1991).    State  legislation  and  “deci­
sion[s] of a state supreme court, acting legislatively rather 
than judicially,” will satisfy this standard, and “ipso facto
are  exempt  from  the  operation  of  the  antitrust  laws”  be­
cause  they  are  an  undoubted  exercise  of  state  sovereign 
authority.  Hoover, supra, at 567–568. 

But  while  the  Sherman  Act  confers  immunity  on  the
States’  own  anticompetitive  policies  out  of  respect  for 
federalism,  it  does  not  always  confer  immunity  where,  as
here,  a  State  delegates  control  over  a  market  to  a  non-
sovereign actor.  See Parker, supra, at 351 (“[A] state does
not  give  immunity  to  those  who  violate  the  Sherman  Act
by authorizing them to violate it, or by declaring that their 
action is lawful”).  For purposes of Parker, a nonsovereign 
actor is one whose conduct does not automatically qualify 
as that of the sovereign State itself.  See Hoover, supra, at 
567–568.  State  agencies  are  not  simply  by  their  govern­
mental  character  sovereign  actors  for  purposes  of  state-
action immunity.  See Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 
U. S.  773,  791  (1975)  (“The  fact  that  the  State  Bar  is  a 
state agency for some limited purposes does not create an 
antitrust  shield  that  allows  it  to  foster  anticompetitive 
practices  for  the  benefit  of  its  members”).    Immunity  for 
state  agencies,  therefore,  requires  more  than  a  mere  fa­
cade  of  state  involvement,  for  it  is  necessary  in  light  of