Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/529bv.pdf
Page Number: 472.0

529US2

Unit: $U46

[10-07-01 17:18:24] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 529 U. S. 362 (2000)

397

Opinion of the Court

determined that the death penalty was “just” and “appro-
priate,” concluded that there existed “a reasonable probabil-
ity that the result of the sentencing phase would have been
different” if the jury had heard that evidence. App. 429.
We do not agree with the Virginia Supreme Court that Judge
Ingram’s conclusion should be discounted because he appar-
ently adopted “a per se approach to the prejudice element”
that placed undue “emphasis on mere outcome determina-
254 Va., at 26–27, 487 S. E. 2d, at 200. Judge Ingram
tion.”
did stress the importance of mitigation evidence in making
his “outcome determination,” but it is clear that his predic-
tive judgment rested on his assessment of the totality of the
omitted evidence rather than on the notion that a single item
of omitted evidence, no matter how trivial, would require a
new hearing.

The Virginia Supreme Court’s own analysis of prejudice
reaching the contrary conclusion was thus unreasonable in
at least two respects. First, as we have already explained,
the State Supreme Court mischaracterized at best the appro-
priate rule, made clear by this Court in Strickland, for de-
termining whether counsel’s assistance was effective within
the meaning of the Constitution. While it may also have
conducted an “outcome determinative” analysis of its own,
254 Va., at 27, 487 S. E. 2d, at 200, it is evident to us that the
court’s decision turned on its erroneous view that a “mere”
difference in outcome is not sufﬁcient to establish constitu-
tionally ineffective assistance of counsel. See supra, at 394.
Its analysis in this respect was thus not only “contrary to,”
but also, inasmuch as the Virginia Supreme Court relied on
the inapplicable exception recognized in Lockhart, an “un-
reasonable application of ” the clear law as established by
this Court.

Second, the State Supreme Court’s prejudice determina-
tion was unreasonable insofar as it failed to evaluate the
totality of the available mitigation evidence—both that
adduced at trial, and the evidence adduced in the habeas pro-