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Page Number: 4.0

4 

TRUMP v. HAWAII 

Syllabus 

it  could  have  chosen  language  directed  to  that  end.    Common  sense 
and historical practice confirm that §1152(a)(1)(A) does not limit the
President’s  delegated  authority  under  §1182(f).    Presidents  have  re-
peatedly  exercised  their  authority  to  suspend  entry  on  the  basis  of
nationality.    And  on  plaintiffs’  reading,  the  President  would  not  be
permitted to suspend entry from particular foreign states in response
to an epidemic, or even if the United States were on the brink of war. 
Pp. 20–24. 

3. Plaintiffs  have  not  demonstrated  a  likelihood  of  success  on  the 
merits  of  their  claim  that  the  Proclamation  violates  the  Establish-
ment Clause.  Pp. 24–38. 

(a) The  individual  plaintiffs  have  Article  III  standing  to  chal-
lenge  the  exclusion  of  their  relatives  under  the  Establishment 
Clause.  A person’s interest in being united with his relatives is suffi-
ciently concrete and particularized to form the basis of an Article III 
injury in fact.  Cf., e.g., Kerry v. Din, 576 U. S. ___, ___.  Pp. 24–26.

(b) Plaintiffs allege that the primary purpose of the Proclamation
was religious animus and that the President’s stated concerns about
vetting protocols and national security were but pretexts for discrim-
inating  against  Muslims.  At  the  heart  of  their  case  is  a  series  of 
statements  by  the  President  and  his  advisers  both  during  the  cam-
paign and since the President assumed office.  The issue, however, is 
not whether to denounce the President’s  statements,  but the signifi-
cance of those statements in reviewing a Presidential directive, neu-
tral  on  its  face,  addressing  a  matter  within  the  core  of  executive  re-
sponsibility.    In  doing  so,  the  Court  must  consider  not  only  the 
statements  of  a  particular  President,  but  also  the  authority  of  the 
Presidency itself.  Pp. 26–29.

(c) The admission and exclusion of foreign nationals is a “funda-
mental  sovereign  attribute  exercised  by  the  Government’s  political
departments  largely  immune  from  judicial  control.”  Fiallo  v.  Bell, 
430  U. S.  787,  792.    Although  foreign  nationals  seeking  admission
have no constitutional right to entry, this Court has engaged in a cir-
cumscribed  judicial  inquiry  when  the  denial  of  a  visa  allegedly  bur-
dens  the  constitutional  rights  of  a  U. S.  citizen.    That  review  is  lim-
ited  to  whether  the  Executive  gives  a  “facially  legitimate  and  bona
fide” reason for its action, Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U. S. 753, 769, 
but the Court need not define the precise contours of that narrow in-
quiry  in  this  case.  For  today’s  purposes,  the  Court  assumes  that  it
may look behind the face of the Proclamation to the extent of apply-
ing  rational  basis  review,  i.e.,  whether  the  entry  policy  is  plausibly 
related  to  the  Government’s  stated  objective  to  protect  the  country 
and improve vetting processes.  Plaintiffs’ extrinsic evidence may be 
considered, but the policy will be upheld so long as it can reasonably