Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/14pdf/13-6827_5h26.pdf
Page Number: 23.0

Cite as:  574 U. S. ____ (2015) 

3 

SOTOMAYOR, J., concurring 

tive  means  requirement.    Nor  does  it  intimate  that  offi-
cials  must  prove  that  they  considered  less  restrictive
alternatives  at  a  particular  point  in  time.    Instead,  the 
Court  correctly  notes  that  the  Department  inadequately 
responded  to  the  less  restrictive  policies  that  petitioner 
brought to the Department’s attention during the course of
the litigation, including the more permissive policies used 
by  the  prisons  in  New  York  and  California.    See,  e.g., 
United States v. Wilgus, 638 F. 3d 1274, 1289 (CA10 2011) 
(observing in the analogous context of the Religious Free-
dom Restoration Act of 1993 that the government need not 
“do  the  impossible—refute  each  and  every  conceivable
alternative  regulation  scheme”  but  need  only  “refute  the
alternative schemes offered by the challenger”). 

Because  I  understand  the  Court’s  opinion  to  be  con-

sistent with the foregoing, I join it.