Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/529bv.pdf
Page Number: 599.0

529US2

Unit: $U52

[09-26-01 10:36:40] PAGES PGT: OPIN

524

CARMELL v. TEXAS

Opinion of the Court

footnotes in Justice Chase’s opinion, he listed examples of
various Acts of Parliament illustrating each of the four cate-
gories. See 3 Dall., at 389, nn. *, †, ‡, (cid:1).13 Each of these
examples is exactly the same as the ones Wooddeson himself
used in his treatise. See 2 Wooddeson 629 (case of the Earl
of Strafford); id., at 634 (case of Sir John Fenwick); id., at
638 (banishments of Lord Clarendon and of Bishop Atter-
bury); id., at 639 (Coventry Act).

Calder’s four categories, which embraced Wooddeson’s
in turn, soon embraced by contempo-
Joseph Story, for example, in writing on the

formulation, were,
rary scholars.
Ex Post Facto Clause, stated:

“The general interpretation has been, and is, . . . that
the prohibition reaches every law, whereby an act is
declared a crime, and made punishable as such, when
it was not a crime, when done; or whereby the act, if
a crime, is aggravated in enormity, or punishment; or
whereby different, or less evidence, is required to con-
vict an offender, than was required, when the act was
committed.”
3 Commentaries on the Constitution of
the United States § 1339, p. 212 (1833).

James Kent concurred in this understanding of the Clause:

“[T]he words ex post facto laws were technical expres-
sions, and meant every law that made an act done be-
fore the passing of the law, and which was innocent
when done, criminal; or which aggravated a crime, and

legal proof ” created when only one witness was available but “a statute
then lately made requiring two witnesses” had been in effect); id., at
638 (describing “acts of parliament, which principally affect the punish-
ment, making therein some innovation, or creating some forfeiture or dis-
ability, not incurred in the ordinary course of law”); id., at 639 (referring
to instances where “the legislature . . . imposed a sentence more severe
than could have been awarded by the inferior courts”). Cf. n. 9, supra.
13 The instances cited were the case of the Earl of Strafford, the case
of Sir John Fenwick, the banishments of Lord Clarendon and of Bishop
Atterbury, and the Coventry Act.