Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/21pdf/21-12_m6hn.pdf
Page Number: 26

Cite as:  596 U. S. ____ (2022) 

21 

Opinion of the Court 

simply  the  individual  contribution  limits,  which  are  now 
more than ten times higher than the gift limit: $2,900 per
election.  And Section 304 allows over 86 such “gifts” before
a campaign hits the Act’s $250,000 cap.  Either the Govern-
ment is openly tolerating a significant number of “gifts” far 
more generous than what it would normally think fit to al-
low,  or  post-election  contributions that  go  toward  retiring
campaign debt are in  no real sense “gifts”  to a candidate.
We find the latter answer more persuasive.

As a final argument, the Government claims that if the 
matter is otherwise in doubt, we should defer to Congress’s
“legislative judgment” that Section 304 furthers an anticor-
ruption  goal.    Brief  for  Appellant  39;  see  also  post,  at  8 
(KAGAN, J., dissenting) (also arguing that we have no “rea-
son  to  second-guess  Congress’s  experience-based  judg-
ment”).  Such  deference,  the  Government  contends,  is 
grounded “in part on the understanding that Congress ‘is
far better equipped than the judiciary to amass and evalu-
ate the vast amounts of data bearing upon legislative ques-
tions.’ ”  Brief for Appellant 40 (quoting Turner Broadcast-
ing  System,  Inc.  v.  FCC,  520  U. S.  180,  195  (1997)  (some 
internal quotation marks omitted)).  But as explained, the
evidence here is scant, and Congress’s judgment is hardly 
based  on  “vast  amounts  of  data.”  Id.,  at  195.    Moreover, 
deference  to  Congress  would  be  especially  inappropriate
where, as here, the legislative act may have been an effort
to “insulate[ ] legislators from effective electoral challenge.” 
Shrink  Missouri  Government  PAC,  528  U. S.,  at  404 
(BREYER,  J.,  concurring);  see  also  Randall  v.  Sorrell,  548 
U. S. 230, 248–249 (2006) (plurality opinion).

In the end, it remains our role to decide whether a partic-
ular legislative choice is constitutional.  See Sable Commu-
nications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U. S. 115, 129 (1989); see 
also Randall, 548 U. S., at 248–249 (stressing need for “the
exercise of independent judicial judgment” in case raising 
concern  that  “contribution  limits  that  are  too  low  [may]