Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/558bv.pdf
Page Number: 412

Cite as: 558 U. S. 233 (2010) 

251 

Opinion of the Court 

U. S. C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) did not preclude them from review­
ing  denials  of  motions  to  reopen,  see  Infanzon  v.  Ashcroft, 
386  F.  3d  1359,  1361–1362  (CA10  2004);  Medina-Morales  v. 
Ashcroft,  371  F.  3d  520,  528–529  (CA9  2004),  and  no  court 
had reached a contrary result.  Although adding or reformu­
lating  provisions  on  asylum,  § 101(a),  (b),  119  Stat.  302–303, 
protection  from  removal,  § 101(c),  (d),  id.,  at  303–305,  even 
judicial  review,  § 106,  id.,  at  310–311,  the  REAL  ID  Act  did 
not  disturb  the  unbroken  line  of  decisions  upholding  court 
review  of  administrative  denials  of  motions  to  reopen.  See 
supra, at 242; supra, at 238–239, n. 1.18 

IV 

Any  lingering  doubt  about  the  proper  interpretation  of  8 
U. S. C.  § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii)  would  be  dispelled  by  a  familiar 
principle of statutory construction: the presumption favoring 
judicial  review  of  administrative  action.  When  a  statute 
is  “reasonably  susceptible  to  divergent  interpretation,  we 
adopt  the  reading  that  accords  with  traditional  understand­
ings and basic principles: that executive determinations gen­
erally  are  subject  to  judicial  review.”  Gutierrez  de  Mar­
tinez  v.  Lamagno,  515  U. S.  417,  434  (1995).  We  have 
consistently applied that interpretive guide to legislation re­
garding  immigration,  and  particularly  to  questions  concern­
ing the preservation of federal-court jurisdiction.  See, e. g., 
INS  v.  St.  Cyr,  533  U. S.  289,  298  (2001);  Catholic  Social 
Services, Inc., 509 U. S., at 63–64; McNary, 498 U. S., at 496. 
Because  the  “presumption  favoring  interpretations  of  stat­
utes  [to]  allow  judicial  review  of  administrative  action”  is 

18 We  express  no  opinion  on  whether  federal  courts  may  review  the 
Board’s  decision  not  to  reopen  removal  proceedings  sua  sponte.  Courts 
of  Appeals  have  held  that  such  decisions  are  unreviewable  because 
sua  sponte  reopening  is  committed  to  agency  discretion  by  law,  see  5 
U. S. C. § 701(a)(2).  See, e. g., Tamenut v.  Mukasey, 521 F. 3d 1000, 1003– 
1004  (CA8  2008)  (en  banc)  (per  curiam)  (agreeing  with  ten  other  Courts 
of Appeals).