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Page Number: 193

32 

PORTER  v.  McCOLLUM 

Per Curiam 

struggled  with  Porter  and  forced  him  outside  where  Porter 
shot him. 

Porter represented himself, with standby counsel, for most 
of  the  pretrial  proceedings  and  during  the  beginning  of  his 
trial.  Near the  completion of the  State’s case in  chief, Por­
ter  pleaded  guilty.  He  thereafter  changed  his  mind  about 
representing himself, and his standby counsel was appointed 
as  his  counsel  for  the  penalty  phase.  During  the  penalty 
phase,  the  State  attempted  to  prove  four  aggravating  fac­
tors: Porter had been “previously convicted” of another vio­
lent felony (i. e., in Williams’ case, killing Burrows, and in his 
case, killing Williams); 2  the murder was committed during a 
burglary;  the  murder  was  committed  in  a  cold,  calculated, 
and  premeditated  manner;  and  the  murder  was  especially 
heinous,  atrocious,  or  cruel.  The  defense  put  on  only  one 
witness, Porter’s ex-wife, and read an excerpt from a deposi­
tion.  The  sum  total  of  the  mitigating  evidence  was  incon­
sistent  testimony  about  Porter’s  behavior  when  intoxicated 
and  testimony  that  Porter  had  a  good  relationship  with  his 
son.  Although  his  lawyer  told  the  jury  that  Porter  “has 
other  handicaps  that  weren’t  apparent  during  the  trial”  and 
Porter  was  not  “mentally  healthy,”  he  did  not  put  on  any 
evidence  related  to  Porter’s  mental  health.  3  Tr.  477–478 
(Jan. 22, 1988). 

The  jury  recommended  the  death  sentence  for  both  mur­
ders.  The  trial  court  found  that  the  State  had  proved  all 
four  aggravating  circumstances  for  the  murder  of  Williams 
but  that  only  the  ﬁrst  two  were  established  with  respect  to 
Burrows’  murder.  The  trial  court  found  no  mitigating  cir­
cumstances and imposed a death sentence for Williams’ mur­

2 It is an aggravating factor under Florida law that “[t]he defendant was 
previously convicted  of another capital felony  or of a felony  involving the 
use or threat of violence to the person.”  Fla. Stat. § 921.141(5)(b) (1987). 
In Porter’s case, the State established that factor by reference to Porter’s 
contemporaneous convictions stemming from the same episode: two counts 
of murder and one count of aggravated assault.  Tr. 5 (Mar. 4, 1988).