Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/21pdf/21-5726_5iel.pdf
Page Number: 14.0

Cite as:  596 U. S. ____ (2022) 

1 

SOTOMAYOR, J., concurring 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

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No. 21–5726 
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DEXTER EARL KEMP, PETITIONER v. 
UNITED STATES 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT 

[June 13, 2022] 

JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR, concurring. 
I join the Court’s opinion holding that the term “mistake”
in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(1) encompasses a 
judge’s  mistake  of  law.    I  write  separately  to  make  two 
points.

First, I join the Court’s opinion with the understanding
that  nothing  in  it  casts  doubt  on  the  availability  of  Rule
60(b)(6)  to  reopen  a  judgment  in  extraordinary  circum-
stances,  including  a  change  in  controlling  law.    See,  e.g., 
Buck  v.  Davis,  580  U. S.  100,  126,  128  (2017)  (concluding 
that  the  petitioner  was  “entitle[d]  to  relief  under  Rule
60(b)(6)” because of a change in law and intervening devel-
opments  of  fact);  Gonzalez  v.  Crosby,  545  U. S.  524,  531 
(2005)  (“[A]  motion  might  contend  that  a  subsequent
change in substantive law is a ‘reason justifying relief,’ Fed.
Rule  Civ.  Proc.  60(b)(6),  from  the  previous  denial  of  a 
claim”); Polites v. United States, 364 U. S. 426, 433 (1960) 
(leaving open that a “clear and authoritative change” in the 
law  governing  judgment  in  a  case  may  present  extraordi-
nary circumstances).  Today’s decision does not purport to
disturb these settled precedents.

Second, I do not understand the Court’s opinion to break 
any new ground as to Rule 60(c)(1), which requires that all 
Rule 60(b) motions be “made within a reasonable time.”  See 
11 C. Wright, A. Miller, & M. Kane, Federal Practice and