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CLINTON v. CITY OF NEW YORK

Breyer, J., dissenting

that “unequal and unreasonable” rates were imposed); see
also Field v. Clark, supra, at 691 (historically in the ﬂexible
tariff statutes Congress has “invest[ed] the President with
large discretion”).

The majority also tries to distinguish these examples on
the ground that the President there executed congressional
policy while here he rejects that policy. See ante, at 444.
The President here, however, in exercising his delegated
authority does not reject congressional policy. Rather, he
executes a law in which Congress has speciﬁed its desire
that the President have the very authority he has exercised.
See Part III, supra.

The majority further points out that these cases concern
imports, an area that, it says, implicates foreign policy and
therefore justiﬁes an unusual degree of discretion by the
President. See ante, at 445. Congress, however, has not
limited its delegations of taxation authority to the “foreign
policy” arena. The ﬁrst Congress gave the Secretary of the
Treasury the “power to mitigate or remit” statutory penal-
ties for nonpayment of liquor taxes “upon such terms and
conditions as shall appear to him reasonable.” Act of Mar.
3, 1791, ch. 15, § 43, 1 Stat. 209. A few years later, the Sec-
retary was authorized, in lieu of collecting the stamp duty
enacted by Congress, “to agree to an annual composition for
the amount of such stamp duty, with any of the said banks,
of one per centum on the amount of the annual dividend
made by such banks.” Act of July 6, 1797, ch. 11, § 2, 1 Stat.
528. More recently, Congress has given to the Executive
Branch the authority to “prescribe all needful rules and reg-
ulations for the enforcement of [the Internal Revenue Code],
including all rules and regulations as may be necessary by
reason of any alteration of law in relation to internal reve-
nue.”
26 U. S. C. § 7805(a). And the Court has held that
such rules and regulations, “which undoubtedly affect indi-
vidual taxpayer liability, are . . . without doubt the result of
entirely appropriate delegations of discretionary authority