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4 

EBAY INC. v. MERCEXCHANGE, L. L. C. 

Opinion of the Court 

and skill of individuals, and the incentive to further efforts 
for the same important objects” (internal quotation marks
omitted)).  Like the Patent Act, the Copyright Act provides
that courts “may” grant injunctive relief “on such terms as
it  may  deem  reasonable  to  prevent  or  restrain  infringe-
ment  of  a  copyright.”    17  U. S. C.  §502(a).    And  as  in  our 
decision today, this Court has consistently rejected invita-
tions to replace traditional equitable considerations with a 
rule that an injunction automatically follows a determina-
tion  that  a  copyright  has  been  infringed.    See,  e.g.,  New 
York  Times  Co.  v.  Tasini,  533  U. S.  483,  505  (2001)  (citing 
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U. S. 569, 578, n. 10 
(1994)); Dun v. Lumbermen’s Credit Assn., 209 U. S. 20, 23– 
24 (1908). 

Neither  the  District  Court  nor  the  Court  of  Appeals 
below  fairly  applied  these  traditional  equitable  principles
in  deciding  respondent’s  motion  for  a  permanent  injunc-
tion.  Although  the  District  Court  recited  the  traditional
four-factor  test,  275  F. Supp.  2d,  at  711,  it  appeared  to
adopt certain expansive principles suggesting that injunc-
tive relief could not issue in a broad swath of cases.  Most 
notably,  it  concluded  that  a  “plaintiff’s  willingness  to 
license its patents” and “its lack of commercial activity in
practicing  the  patents”  would  be  sufficient  to  establish 
that the patent holder would not suffer irreparable harm if 
an  injunction  did  not  issue.  Id.,  at  712.    But  traditional 
equitable  principles  do  not  permit  such  broad  classifica-
tions.  For example, some patent holders, such as univer-
sity  researchers  or  self-made  inventors,  might  reasonably 
prefer  to  license  their  patents,  rather  than  undertake 
efforts  to  secure  the  financing  necessary  to  bring  their 
works to market themselves.  Such patent holders may be
able  to  satisfy  the  traditional  four-factor  test,  and  we  see 
no basis for categorically denying them the opportunity to 
do so.  To the extent that the District Court adopted such 
a  categorical  rule,  then,  its  analysis  cannot  be  squared