Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/20pdf/20-297_4g25.pdf
Page Number: 43.0

12 

TRANSUNION LLC v. RAMIREZ 

THOMAS, J., dissenting 

___ (same); see also Muransky, 979 F. 3d, at 970–972 (Jor-
dan, J., dissenting); Huff v. TeleCheck Servs., Inc., 923 F. 3d 
458, 469 (CA6 2019) (“Article III standing may draw a line
between  private  and  public  rights”);  Bryant  v.  Compass 
Group  USA,  Inc.,  958  F. 3d,  617,  624  (CA7  2020)  (the 
Spokeo concurrence “drew a useful distinction between two 
types of injuries”).

The  majority  today,  however,  takes  the  road  less  trav-
eled: “[U]nder Article III, an injury in law is not an injury
in fact.”  Ante, at 11; but see Webb v. Portland Mfg. Co., 29 
F. Cas. 506, 508 (No. 17,322) (CC Me. 1838) (“The law tol-
erates no farther inquiry than whether there has been the 
violation of a right”).  No matter if the right is personal or
if the legislature deems the right worthy of legal protection, 
legislatures are constitutionally unable to offer the protec-
tion  of  the  federal  courts  for  anything  other  than  money,
bodily  integrity,  and  anything  else  that  this  Court  thinks
looks close enough to rights existing at common law.  See 
ante,  at  9.    The  1970s  injury-in-fact  theory  has  now  dis-
placed the traditional gateway into federal courts.

This approach is remarkable in both its novelty and ef-
fects.  Never before has this Court declared that legal injury 
is inherently insufficient to support standing.5  And never 
before has this Court declared that legislatures are consti-
tutionally precluded from creating legal rights enforceable
in  federal  court  if  those  rights  deviate  too  far  from  their 

—————— 

5 See,  e.g.,  Lujan  v.  Defenders  of  Wildlife,  504  U. S.  555,  578  (1992)
(“Nothing  in  this  contradicts  the  principle  that  the  injury  required  by 
Art. III may exist solely by virtue of ‘statutes creating legal rights, the 
invasion of which creates standing” (internal quotation marks, brackets, 
and ellipsis omitted)); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U. S. 490, 514 (1975) (“Con-
gress may create a statutory right or entitlement the alleged deprivation
of which can confer standing to sue even where the plaintiff would have 
suffered no judicially cognizable injury in the absence of statute”); Linda 
R. S. v. Richard D., 410 U. S. 614, 617, n. 3 (1973) (“Congress may enact
statutes  creating  legal  rights,  the  invasion  of  which  creates  standing, 
even though no injury would exist without the statute”).