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Page Number: 71

4 

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA v. HELLER 

STEVENS, J., dissenting 

unpersuasive  reading  of  the  Amendment’s  text;  signifi­
cantly  different  provisions  in  the  1689  English  Bill  of
Rights,  and  in  various  19th-century  State  Constitutions;
postenactment  commentary  that  was  available  to  the 
Court  when  it  decided  Miller;  and,  ultimately,  a  feeble
attempt  to  distinguish  Miller  that  places  more  emphasis
on the Court’s decisional process than on the reasoning in 
the opinion itself. 

Even  if  the  textual  and  historical  arguments  on  both 
sides  of  the  issue  were  evenly  balanced,  respect  for  the
well-settled views of all of our predecessors on this Court, 
and  for  the  rule  of  law  itself,  see  Mitchell  v.  W.  T.  Grant 
Co.,  416  U. S.  600,  636  (1974)  (Stewart,  J.,  dissenting), 
would  prevent  most  jurists  from  endorsing  such  a  dra­
matic upheaval in the law.4  As Justice Cardozo observed 
years  ago,  the  “labor  of  judges  would  be  increased  almost 
to  the  breaking  point  if  every  past  decision  could  be  re­
opened  in  every  case,  and  one  could  not  lay  one’s  own 

—————— 

4 See  Vasquez  v.  Hillery,  474  U. S.  254,  265,  266  (1986)  (“[Stare  de-
cisis] permits society to presume that bedrock principles are founded in 
the  law  rather  than  in  the  proclivities  of  individuals,  and  thereby 
contributes to the integrity of our constitutional system of government, 
both in appearance and in fact.  While stare decisis is not an inexorable 
command,  the  careful  observer  will  discern  that  any  detours  from  the
straight  path  of  stare  decisis  in  our  past  have  occurred  for  articulable 
reasons, and only when the Court has felt obliged ‘to bring its opinions
into  agreement  with  experience  and  with  facts  newly  ascertained.’ 
Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U. S. 393, 412 (1932) (Brandeis, 
J.,  dissenting)”);  Pollock  v.  Farmers’  Loan  &  Trust  Co.,  157  U. S.  429, 
652  (1895)  (White,  J.,  dissenting)  (“The  fundamental  conception  of  a 
judicial  body  is  that  of  one  hedged  about  by  precedents  which  are 
binding on the court without regard to the personality of its members. 
Break  down  this  belief  in  judicial  continuity  and  let  it  be  felt  that  on 
great  constitutional  questions  this  Court  is  to  depart  from  the  settled
conclusions of its predecessors, and to determine them all according to
the  mere  opinion  of  those  who  temporarily  fill  its  bench,  and  our 
Constitution will, in my judgment, be bereft of value and become a most
dangerous instrument to the rights and liberties of the people”).