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ARIZONA v. INTER TRIBAL COUNCIL OF ARIZ. INC. 

Syllabus 

one  meaning,”  they  “are  given  content  . . .  by  their  surroundings.” 
Whitman  v.  American  Trucking  Assns.,  Inc.,  531  U. S.  457,  466. 
Reading “accept” merely to  denote willing receipt seems out of place
in the context of an official mandate to accept and use something for
a given purpose.  The implication of such a mandate is that its object
is to be accepted as sufficient for the requirement it is meant to satis-
fy.  Arizona’s  reading  is  also  difficult  to  reconcile  with  neighboring
NVRA provisions, such as §1973gg–6(a)(1)(B) and §1973gg–4(a)(2). 

Arizona’s  appeal  to  the  presumption  against  pre-emption  invoked 
in this Court’s Supremacy Clause cases is inapposite.  The power the 
Elections  Clause  confers  is  none  other  than  the  power  to  pre-empt.
Because Congress, when it acts under this Clause, is always on notice 
that its legislation will displace some element of a pre-existing legal
regime  erected  by  the  States,  the  reasonable  assumption  is  that  the
text  of  Elections  Clause  legislation  accurately  communicates  the 
scope of Congress’s pre-emptive intent.  

Nonetheless, while the NVRA forbids States to demand that an ap-
plicant  submit  additional  information  beyond  that  required  by  the 
Federal  Form,  it  does  not  preclude  States  from  “deny[ing]  registra-
tion  based  on  information  in  their  possession  establishing  the  appli-
cant’s ineligibility.”  Pp. 6–13. 

(c) Arizona is correct that the Elections Clause empowers Congress 
to  regulate  how  federal  elections  are  held,  but  not  who  may  vote  in 
them.  The latter is the province of the States.  See U. S. Const., Art. 
I, §2, cl. 1; Amdt. 17.  It would raise serious constitutional doubts if a 
federal statute precluded a State from obtaining the information nec-
essary  to  enforce  its  voter  qualifications.    The  NVRA  can  be  read  to 
avoid  such  a  conflict,  however.    Section  1973gg–7(b)(1)  permits  the
EAC to include on the Federal Form information “necessary to enable
the  appropriate  State  election  official  to  assess  the  eligibility  of  the
applicant.”  That  validly  conferred  discretionary  executive  authority
is properly exercised (as the Government has proposed) to require the
inclusion of Arizona’s concrete-evidence requirement if such evidence
is necessary to enable Arizona to enforce its citizenship qualification. 
The  NVRA  permits  a  State  to  request  the  EAC  to  include  state-
specific  instructions  on  the  Federal  Form,  see  42  U. S. C.  §1973gg–
7(a)(2), and a State may challenge the EAC’s rejection of that request
(or failure to act on it) in a suit under the Administrative Procedure 
Act.  That alternative means of enforcing its constitutional power to 
determine  voting  qualifications  remains  open  to  Arizona  here. 
Should the EAC reject or decline to act on a renewed request, Arizona 
would  have  the  opportunity  to  establish  in  a  reviewing  court  that  a
mere  oath  will  not  suffice  to  effectuate  its  citizenship  requirement 
and  that  the  EAC  is  therefore  under  a  nondiscretionary  duty  to  in-