Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/20pdf/20-507_h315.pdf
Page Number: 6.0

6 

MAYS v. HINES 

Per Curiam 

least so undermined Jones’ credibility—that counsel’s omis-
sion  created  a  “ ‘substantial’ ”  risk  of  “a  different  result.”  
Cullen  v.  Pinholster,  563  U. S.  170,  189  (2011).    In  fact, 
Hines reasons that, “had [he] not been found with Mrs. Jen-
kins’  car,  Jones  would  have  been  the  primary  suspect.”  
Brief in Opposition 17 (emphasis added). 
  Our analysis is straightforward too.  Because a Tennes-
see  court  considered  and  rejected  Hines’  theory,  a  federal 
court  “shall  not”  grant a writ of  habeas  corpus  unless the 
earlier decision took an “unreasonable” view of the facts or 
law.  §2254(d).  This “standard is difficult to meet.”  Har-
rington v. Richter, 562 U. S. 86, 102 (2011).  The term “un-
reasonable” refers not to “ordinary error” or even to circum-
stances where the petitioner offers “a strong case for relief,” 
but rather to “ ‘extreme malfunctions in the state criminal 
justice syste[m].’ ”  Ibid.  In other words, a federal court may 
intrude on a State’s “ ‘sovereign power to punish offenders’ ” 
only when a decision “was so lacking in justification . . . be-
yond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.”  Id., at 
103. 
  If this rule means anything, it is that a federal court must 
carefully consider all the reasons and evidence supporting 
the state court’s decision.  After all, there is no way to hold 
that a decision was “lacking in justification” without iden-
tifying—let alone rebutting—all of the justifications.  Ibid.  
Any other approach would allow a federal court to “ ‘essen-
tially evaluat[e] the merits de novo’ ” by omitting inconven-
ient details from its analysis.  Shinn, 592 U. S., at ___–___ 
(slip op., at 8–9); see also Richter, 562 U. S., at 102–103. 
  The Sixth Circuit did precisely that.  Nowhere in its 10-
page discussion of Hines’ theory did the majority consider 
the substantial evidence linking him to the crime: His flight 
in a bloody shirt; his possession of the victim’s keys, wallet, 
and car; his recurring association with knives; or his ever-
changing stories about tussling with imaginary assailants.  
814 Fed. Appx., at 933–942.  The court instead focused on