Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/20pdf/20a87_4g15.pdf
Page Number: 25

Cite as:  592 U. S. ____ (2020) 

3 

BREYER, J., dissenting 

that decision. 

For one thing, there is no need now to issue any such in-
junction.  Those  parts of  Brooklyn  and  Queens  where  the 
Diocese’s  churches  and  the  two  applicant  synagogues  are
located are no longer within red or orange zones.  Brief in 
Opposition  in  No.  20A90,  at  17.  Thus,  none  of  the  appli-
cants are now subject to the fixed-capacity restrictions that
they challenge in their applications.  The specific applicant
houses of worship are now in yellow zones where they can 
hold services up to 50% of maximum capacity.  And the ap-
plicants  do  not  challenge  any  yellow  zone  restrictions,  as 
the conditions in the yellow zone provide them with more 
than the relief they asked for in their applications.

Instead, the applicants point out that the State might re-
impose  the  red  or  orange  zone  restrictions  in  the  future.
But, were that to occur, they could refile their applications 
here, by letter brief if necessary.  And this Court, if neces-
sary, could then decide the matter in a day or two, perhaps
even in a few hours.  Why should this Court act now without 
argument or full consideration in the ordinary course (and
prior to the Court of Appeals’ consideration of the matter)
when there is no legal or practical need for it to do so?  I 
have found no convincing answer to that question.

For another thing, the Court’s decision runs contrary to
ordinary governing law.  We have previously said that an 
injunction is an “extraordinary remedy.”  Nken v. Holder, 
556 U. S. 418, 428 (2009) (internal quotation marks omit-
ted).  That  is  especially  so  where,  as  here,  the  applicants 
seek  an  injunction  prior  to  full  argument  and  contrary  to 
the lower courts’ determination.  Here, we consider severe 
restrictions.  Those restrictions limit the number of persons 
who can attend a religious service to 10 and 25 congregants
(irrespective of mask-wearing and social distancing).  And 
those numbers are indeed low.  But whether, in present cir-
cumstances,  those  low  numbers  violate  the  Constitution’s 
Free Exercise Clause is far from clear, and, in my view, the