Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/22pdf/22-58_i425.pdf
Page Number: 16

Cite as:  599 U. S. ____ (2023) 

13 

Opinion of the Court 

See, e.g., American Hospital Assn. v. Becerra, 596 U. S. ___, 
___–___  (2022)  (slip  op.,  at  9–14);  Weyerhaeuser  Co.  v. 
United States Fish and Wildlife Serv., 586 U. S. ___, ___– 
___ (2018) (slip op., at 8–15); Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 566 U. S. 
189, 196–201 (2012); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U. S. 557, 
592–595, 613–615, 635 (2006); id., at 636–646 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 
U. S. 579, 637–638, 640 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).

This  case  is  categorically  different,  however,  because  it 
implicates only one discrete aspect of the executive power—
namely, the Executive Branch’s traditional discretion over
whether  to  take  enforcement  actions  against  violators  of 
federal law.  And this case raises only the narrow Article III 
standing question of whether the Federal Judiciary may in 
effect  order  the  Executive  Branch  to  take  enforcement 
actions  against  violators  of  federal  law—here,  by  making 
more arrests.  Under this Court’s Article III precedents and 
the historical practice, the answer is no.6 

It  bears  emphasis  that  the  question  of  whether  the
federal courts have jurisdiction under Article III is distinct 
from  the  question  of  whether  the  Executive  Branch  is 
complying  with  the  relevant  statutes—here,  §1226(c)  and 
§1231(a)(2).  In other words, the question of reviewability is
different from the question of legality.  We take no position 
on whether the Executive Branch here is complying with its 
legal obligations under §1226(c) and §1231(a)(2).  We hold 

—————— 

6 As  part  of  their  argument  for  standing,  the  States  also  point  to 
Massachusetts  v.  EPA,  549  U. S.  497  (2007).    Putting  aside  any 
disagreements  that  some  may  have  with  Massachusetts  v.  EPA,  that 
decision does not control this case.  The issue there involved a challenge 
to  the  denial  of  a  statutorily  authorized petition  for  rulemaking,  not  a
challenge to an exercise of the Executive’s enforcement discretion.  Id., 
at 520, 526; see also id., at 527 (noting that there are “key differences 
between a denial of a petition for rulemaking and an agency’s decision 
not  to  initiate  an  enforcement  action”  and  that  “an  agency’s  refusal  to 
initiate  enforcement  proceedings  is  not  ordinarily  subject  to  judicial 
review”).