Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/558bv.pdf
Page Number: 498.0

Cite as: 558 U. S. 310 (2010) 

337 

Opinion of the Court 

Bible  &  Tract  Soc.  of  N. Y.,  Inc.  v.  Village  of  Stratton,  536 
U. S. 150, 153 (2002); imposing a burden by impounding pro­
ceeds  on  receipts  or  royalties,  Simon  &  Schuster,  Inc.  v. 
Members  of  N.  Y.  State  Crime  Victims  Bd.,  502  U. S.  105, 
108,  123  (1991);  seeking  to  exact  a  cost  after  the  speech  oc­
curs, New York Times Co. v.  Sullivan, 376 U. S., at 267; and 
subjecting the speaker to criminal penalties, Brandenburg v. 
Ohio, 395 U. S. 444, 445 (1969) (per curiam). 

The  law  before  us  is  an  outright  ban,  backed  by  criminal 
sanctions.  Section  441b  makes  it  a  felony  for  all  corpora­
tions—including  nonproﬁt  advocacy  corporations—either  to 
expressly advocate the election or defeat of candidates or to 
broadcast electioneering communications within 30 days of a 
primary  election  and  60  days  of  a  general  election.  Thus, 
the  following  acts  would  all  be  felonies  under  § 441b:  The 
Sierra  Club  runs  an  ad,  within  the  crucial  phase  of  60  days 
before the general election, that exhorts the public to disap­
prove  of  a  Congressman  who  favors  logging  in  national  for­
ests;  the  National  Riﬂe  Association  publishes  a  book  urging 
the  public  to  vote  for  the  challenger  because  the  incumbent 
U.  S.  Senator  supports  a  handgun  ban;  and  the  American 
Civil Liberties Union creates a Web site telling the public to 
vote  for  a  Presidential  candidate  in  light  of  that  candidate’s 
defense of free speech.  These prohibitions are classic exam­
ples of censorship. 

Section 441b is a ban on corporate speech notwithstanding 
the fact that a PAC created by a corporation can still speak. 
See  McConnell,  540  U. S.,  at  330–333  (opinion  of  Kennedy, 
J.).  A  PAC  is  a  separate  association  from  the  corporation. 
So  the  PAC  exemption  from  § 441b’s  expenditure  ban, 
§ 441b(b)(2), does not allow corporations to speak.  Even if a 
PAC  could  somehow  allow  a  corporation  to  speak—and  it 
does  not—the  option  to  form  PACs  does  not  alleviate  the 
First  Amendment  problems  with  § 441b.  PACs  are  bur­
densome  alternatives;  they  are  expensive  to  administer  and 
subject  to  extensive  regulations.  For  example,  every  PAC