Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/22pdf/20-1199_hgdj.pdf
Page Number: 7

Cite as:  600 U. S. ____ (2023) 

7 

Syllabus 

that  are  plainly  overbroad  (expressing,  for  example,  no  concern 
whether  South  Asian  or  East  Asian  students  are  adequately  repre-
sented as “Asian”); arbitrary or undefined (the use of the category “His-
panic”); or underinclusive (no category at all for Middle Eastern stu-
dents).    The  unclear  connection  between  the  goals  that  respondents 
seek  and  the  means  they  employ  preclude  courts  from  meaningfully 
scrutinizing respondents’ admissions programs. 

The  universities’  main  response  to  these  criticisms  is  “trust  us.”
They assert that universities are owed deference when using race to 
benefit some  applicants but not others.  While this Court has recog-
nized a “tradition of giving a degree of deference to a university’s aca-
demic decisions,” it has made clear that deference must exist “within 
constitutionally  prescribed  limits.”    Grutter,  539  U. S.,  at  328.    Re-
spondents have failed to present an exceedingly persuasive justifica-
tion  for  separating  students  on  the  basis  of  race  that  is  measurable 
and concrete enough to permit judicial review, as the Equal Protection
Clause requires.  Pp. 22–26.

(2) Respondents’ race-based admissions systems also fail to com-
ply with the Equal Protection Clause’s twin commands that race may
never be used as a “negative” and that it may not operate as a stereo-
type.  The First Circuit found that Harvard’s consideration of race has 
resulted in fewer admissions of Asian-American students.  Respond-
ents’ assertion that race is never a negative factor in their admissions 
programs  cannot  withstand  scrutiny.    College  admissions  are  zero-
sum, and a benefit provided to some applicants but not to others nec-
essarily advantages the former at the expense of the latter. 

Respondents admissions programs are infirm for a second reason as
well:  They  require  stereotyping—the  very  thing  Grutter  foreswore. 
When a university admits students “on the basis of race, it engages in 
the offensive and demeaning assumption that [students] of a particu-
lar  race,  because  of  their  race,  think  alike.”  Miller  v.  Johnson,  515 
U. S. 900, 911–912.  Such stereotyping is contrary to the “core purpose” 
of the Equal Protection Clause.  Palmore, 466 U. S., at 432.  Pp. 26– 
29. 

(3) Respondents’  admissions  programs  also  lack  a  “logical  end 
point”  as  Grutter  required.  539  U. S.,  at  342.    Respondents  suggest 
that the end of race-based admissions programs will occur once mean-
ingful representation and diversity are achieved on college campuses. 
Such  measures  of  success  amount  to  little  more  than  comparing  the 
racial breakdown of the incoming class and comparing it to some other 
metric, such as the racial makeup of the previous incoming class or the 
population in general, to see whether some proportional goal has been 
reached.    The  problem  with  this  approach  is  well  established: 
“[O]utright  racial  balancing”  is  “patently  unconstitutional.”    Fisher,