Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/22pdf/21-1164_7li8.pdf
Page Number: 3

Cite as:  ____ U. S. ____ (20__) 

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Syllabus 

ing ‘for lack of jurisdiction’ when some threshold fact has not been es-
tablished” is understood as a “drive-by jurisdictional rulin[g]” and re-
ceives “no precedential effect.”  Arbaugh, 546 U. S., at 511. 

Block is a textbook “drive-by jurisdictional rulin[g].”  Arbaugh, 546 
U. S., at 511.  The Government points to a statement in that opinion’s 
conclusion that if the Quiet Title Act’s time limit applied, “the courts 
below had no jurisdiction to inquire into the merits,” Block, 461 U. S., 
at 292.  Yet there is no discussion in Block about whether the provision 
is “ ‘technically jurisdictional’ ”—just a mere statement that a “thresh-
old fact” must “b[e] established” for there to be “jurisdiction.”  Arbaugh, 
546 U. S., at 512.  While Block did describe the Act’s time limit as “a 
condition  on  the  waiver  of  sovereign  immunity,”  461  U. S.,  at  287, 
Block never addressed whether the Act’s time limit was truly a limit
on  subject-matter  jurisdiction,  nor  did  anything  in  the  case  turn  on 
this question.  Contrary to the Government’s contentions, even in that
era, time limits in suits against the Government were not necessarily
subject-matter jurisdictional under this Court’s caselaw. 

Like Block, Mottaz contains no discussion of whether the Quiet Title 
Act’s  12-year  time  bar  was  technically  jurisdictional.    Instead,  the 
Court decided which of two possible time bars applied and, having de-
termined it was the Quiet Title Act’s 12-year limit, concluded that the
plaintiff had notice over 12 years before she sued.  Neither step in the 
Court’s analysis “turn[ed] on” whether any time limits were “ ‘techni-
cally jurisdictional.’ ”  Arbaugh, 546 U. S., at 512.  Once again, general 
statements in the opinion about waivers of immunity cannot change
this basic fact.  
  Finally, in Beggerly, the Court carefully analyzed whether the text 
and context of §2409a(g) were consistent with equitable tolling.  This 
would have been a mere waste of words if the Court had already held 
in Block and Mottaz that §2409a(g) was jurisdictional.   

These three cases point in one direction: This Court has never defin-
itively interpreted §2409a(g) as jurisdictional.  The Government’s ar-
gument about legislative acquiescence is unavailing given the absence 
of any definitive judicial interpretation to which Congress could acqui-
esce.  Pp. 5–12. 

13 F. 4th 791, reversed and remanded. 

SOTOMAYOR,  J.,  delivered  the  opinion  of  the  Court,  in  which  KAGAN, 
GORSUCH, KAVANAUGH, BARRETT, and JACKSON, JJ., joined.  THOMAS, J., 
filed a dissenting opinion, in which ROBERTS, C. J., and ALITO, J., joined.