Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/21pdf/20-601_bq7c.pdf
Page Number: 18

Cite as:  595 U. S. ____ (2022) 

1 

THOMAS, J., concurring 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

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No. 20–601 
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DANIEL CAMERON, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF 
KENTUCKY, PETITIONER v. EMW WOMEN’S 
SURGICAL CENTER, P. S. C., ET AL. 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT 

[March 3, 2022] 

  JUSTICE THOMAS, concurring. 
  I join the opinion of the Court.  I write to address another 
reason why respondents and their amici err in maintaining 
that the Court of Appeals lacked jurisdiction to consider At-
torney General Cameron’s motion to intervene. 
  As the Court explains, respondents now argue that Attor-
ney General Cameron is jurisdictionally barred from inter-
vening  in  the  appeal  because  his  predecessor,  then-Attor-
ney  General  Beshear,  stipulated  as  a  condition  of  his 
dismissal that the Kentucky attorney general’s office would 
be bound by the District Court’s final judgment.  According 
to respondents, that stipulation required the attorney gen-
eral  to  timely  notice  an  appeal  consistent  with  Federal 
Rules of Appellate Procedure 3 and 4 if he wished to chal-
lenge the District Court’s judgment on appeal.  To allow in-
tervention in the appeal, respondents posit, would circum-
vent  the  jurisdictional  requirements  of  Federal  Rules  of 
Appellate Procedure 3 and 4. 
  The  Court  rightly  rejects  respondents’  novel  argument 
because the attorney general’s stipulation preserved his of-
fice’s right  to  participate  in  the  appeal.   See  ante,  at  6–7.  
But  in  addition  to  the  infirmity  the  Court  identifies,  re-
spondents’  jurisdictional  argument  suffers  from  another,