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303 CREATIVE LLC v. ELENIS 

Syllabus 

as the State demands or face sanctions for expressing her own beliefs,
sanctions that may include compulsory participation in “remedial . . . 
training,”  filing  periodic  compliance  reports,  and  paying  monetary 
fines.  That is an impermissible abridgement of the First Amendment’s 
right to speak freely.  Hurley, 515 U. S., at 574. 

Under  Colorado’s  logic,  the  government  may  compel  anyone  who
speaks for pay on a given topic to accept all commissions on that same 
topic—no matter the message—if the topic somehow implicates a cus-
tomer’s statutorily protected trait.  6 F. 4th, at 1199 (Tymkovich, C. J., 
dissenting).  Taken seriously, that principle would allow the govern-
ment to force all manner of artists, speechwriters, and others whose 
services involve speech to speak what they do not believe on pain of 
penalty.  The Court’s precedents recognize the First Amendment tol-
erates  none  of  that.    To  be  sure,  public  accommodations  laws  play  a 
vital  role  in  realizing  the  civil  rights  of  all  Americans,  and  govern-
ments in this country have a “compelling interest” in eliminating dis-
crimination  in  places  of  public  accommodation.    Roberts  v.  United 
States  Jaycees,  468  U. S.  609,  628.    This  Court  has  recognized  that 
public accommodations laws “vindicate the deprivation of personal dig-
nity that surely accompanies denials of equal access to public estab-
lishments.”  Heart  of  Atlanta  Motel,  Inc.  v.  United  States,  379  U. S. 
241, 250 (internal quotation marks omitted).  Over time, governments 
in this country have expanded public accommodations laws in notable 
ways.  Statutes like Colorado’s grow from nondiscrimination rules the 
common law sometimes imposed on common carriers and places of tra-
ditional public accommodation like hotels and restaurants.  Dale, 530 
U. S., at 656–657.  Often, these enterprises exercised something like
monopoly power or hosted or transported others or their belongings. 
See, e.g., Liverpool & Great Western Steam Co. v. Phenix Ins. Co., 129 
U. S. 397, 437.  Importantly, States have also expanded their laws to 
prohibit  more forms  of  discrimination.    Today,  for  example,  approxi-
mately  half  the  States  have  laws  like  Colorado’s  that  expressly  pro-
hibit discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.  The Court has 
recognized this is “unexceptional.”  Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Col-
orado  Civil  Rights  Comm’n,  584  U. S.  ___,  ___.    States  may  “protect
gay persons, just as [they] can protect other classes of individuals, in 
acquiring  whatever  products  and  services  they  choose  on  the  same 
terms  and  conditions  as  are  offered  to  other  members  of  the  public. 
And  there  are  no  doubt  innumerable  goods  and  services  that  no  one 
could argue implicate the First Amendment.”  Ibid.  At the same time, 
this Court has also long recognized that no public accommodations law
is immune from the demands of the Constitution.  In particular, this
Court has held, public accommodations statutes can sweep too broadly
when deployed to compel speech.  See, e.g., Hurley, 515 U. S., at 571,