Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/524bv.pdf
Page Number: 418

524US2

Unit: $U90

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Cite as: 524 U. S. 357 (1998)

373

Souter, J., dissenting

As to the police, the majority says that regular ofﬁcers
investigating crimes almost always act with the prospect of
a criminal prosecution before them. Their fear of eviden-
tiary suppression in the criminal trial will have as much de-
terrent effect as can be expected, therefore, while any risk
of suppression in parole administration is too unlikely to be
on their minds to inﬂuence their conduct.

The majority’s assumption will only sometimes be true,
however, and in many, or even most cases, it will quite likely
be false. To be sure, if a police ofﬁcer acts on the spur of
the moment to seize evidence or thwart crime, he may have
no idea of a perpetrator’s parole status. But the contrary
will almost certainly be the case when he has ﬁrst identiﬁed
the person he has his eye on: the local police know the local
felons, criminal history information is instantly available na-
tionally, and police and parole ofﬁcers routinely cooperate.
See, e. g., United States ex rel. Santos v. New York State Bd.
of Parole, 441 F. 2d 1216, 1217 (CA2 1971) (police ofﬁcer, who
had obtained “reasonable grounds” to believe that the pa-
rolee was dealing in stolen goods, informed the parole ofﬁcer;
the parole ofﬁcer and police ofﬁcer together searched parol-
ee’s apartment), cert. denied, 404 U. S. 1025 (1972); Grimsley
v. Dodson, 696 F. 2d 303, 304 (CA4 1982) (upon receipt of
information about probationer, probation ofﬁcer contacted a
sheriff, sheriff obtained search warrant, and together they
searched probationer’s house), cert. denied, 462 U. S. 1134
(1983); State ex rel. Wright v. Ohio Adult Parole Auth., 75
Ohio St. 3d 82, 83–84, 661 N. E. 2d 728, 730 (1996) (police
ofﬁcers suspected parolee had committed burglary and asked
his parole ofﬁcer to search his residence; parolee was then
reincarcerated for violating his parole conditions); People v.
Stewart, 242 Ill. App. 3d 599, 611–612, 610 N. E. 2d 197, 206
(1993) (police conducting illegal trafﬁc stop and subsequent
search and seizure knew or had reason to know that defend-
ant was on probation); People v. Montenegro, 173 Cal. App.
3d 983, 986, 219 Cal. Rptr. 331, 332 (4th Dist. 1985) (police
contacted parole agent so that they could conduct search of