Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/14pdf/13-7451_m64o.pdf
Page Number: 35.0

8 

YATES v. UNITED STATES 

KAGAN, J., dissenting 

section  of  Sarbanes-Oxley  serve  as  “but  a  short-hand 
reference to the general subject matter” of the provision at 
issue,  “not  meant  to  take  the  place  of  the  detailed  provi-
sions of the text.”  Lawson v. FMR LLC, 571 U. S. ___, ___ 
(2014)  (slip  op.,  at  16)  (quoting  Trainmen,  331  U. S.,  at 
528).  The “under-inclusiveness” of the headings, we stated,
was  “apparent.”    Lawson,  571  U. S.,  at  ___  (slip  op.,  at 
16).  So  too  for  §1519’s  title,  which  refers  to  “destruction, 
alteration,  or  falsification”  but  not  to  mutilation,  conceal-
ment, or covering up, and likewise mentions “records” but 
not other documents or objects.  Presumably, the plurality 
would  not  refuse  to  apply  §1519  when  a  person  only  con-
ceals evidence rather  than destroying, altering, or falsify-
ing it; instead, the plurality would say that a title is just a
title, which cannot “undo or limit” more specific statutory 
text.  Ibid.  (quoting  Trainmen,  331  U. S.,  at  529).    The 
same  holds  true  when  the  evidence  in  question  is  not  a 
“record” but something else whose destruction, alteration,
etc., is intended to obstruct justice.

The plurality next tries to divine meaning from §1519’s 
“position within Chapter 73 of Title 18.”  Ante, at 10.  But 
that move is yet odder than the last.  As far as I can tell, 
this Court has never once suggested that the section num-
ber assigned to a law bears upon its meaning.  Cf. Scalia, 
supra,  at  xi–xvi  (listing  more  than  50  interpretive  princi-
ples  and  canons  without  mentioning  the  plurality’s  new
number-in-the-Code  theory).    And  even  on  its  own  terms, 
the plurality’s argument is hard to fathom.  The plurality
claims that if §1519 applied to objects generally, Congress 
would  not  have  placed  it  “after  the  pre-existing  §1516, 
§1517,  and  §1518”  because  those  are  “specialized  provi-
sions.”  Ante,  at  11.  But  search  me  if  I  can  find  a  better 
place for a broad ban on evidence-tampering.  The plural- 
ity  seems  to  agree  that  the  law  properly  goes  in  Chapter 
73—the criminal code’s chapter on “obstruction of justice.”
But  the  provision  does  not  logically  fit  into  any  of  that