Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/14pdf/13-1041_0861.pdf
Page Number: 37.0

Cite as:  575 U. S. ____ (2015) 

13 

THOMAS, J., concurring in judgment 

vate parties alike can use these regulations in proceedings 
  See,  e.g.,  Christopher  v. 
against  regulated  parties. 
SmithKline  Beecham  Corp.,  567  U. S.  ___,  ___–___  (2012) 
(slip  op.,  at  6–7)  (private  party  relying  on  Department  of 
Labor  regulations);  FCC  v.  Fox  Television  Stations,  Inc., 
567  U. S.  ___,  ___  (2012)  (slip  op.,  at  6)  (agency  issuing 
notices of liability under regulations).  Just as it is critical 
for  judges  to  exercise  independent  judgment  in  applying 
statutes,  it  is  critical  for  judges  to  exercise  independent
judgment in determining that a regulation properly covers
the conduct of regulated parties.  Defining the legal mean-
ing of the regulation is one aspect of that determination. 

Seminole  Rock  deference,  however,  precludes  judges
from  independently  determining  that  meaning.  Rather 
than judges’ applying recognized tools of interpretation to 
determine  the  best  meaning  of  a  regulation,  this  doctrine
demands  that  courts  accord  “controlling  weight”  to  the 
agency  interpretation  of  a  regulation,  subject  only  to  the 
narrow  exception  for  interpretations  that  are  plainly 
erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.  That defer-
ence amounts to a transfer of the judge’s exercise of inter-
pretive  judgment  to  the  agency.  See  1  S.  Johnson,  Dic-
tionary  of  the  English  Language  499  (4th  ed.  1773) 
(defining  “[d]efer”  as  “to  leave  to  another’s  judgment”). 
But the agency, as part of the Executive Branch, lacks the
structural  protections  for  independent  judgment  adopted
by  the  Framers,  including  the  life  tenure  and  salary  pro-
tections  of  Article  III.    Because  the  agency  is  thus  not 
properly  constituted  to  exercise  the  judicial  power  under
the  Constitution,  the  transfer  of  interpretive  judgment
raises serious separation-of-powers concerns. 

—————— 

directly implicated here, I leave them for another case.  See Department 

of Transportation v. Association of American Railroads, ante, at 19–22
 
(THOMAS, J., concurring in judgment).