Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/14pdf/14-556_3204.pdf
Page Number: 53.0

14 

OBERGEFELL v. HODGES 

ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting 

tively,  deeply  rooted  in  this  Nation’s  history  and  tradi-
tion,” and “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, such 
that  neither  liberty  nor  justice  would  exist  if  they  were 
sacrificed.”  Glucksberg,  521  U. S.,  at  720–721  (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 

Although  the  Court  articulated  the  importance  of  his- 
tory and tradition to the fundamental rights inquiry most 
 precisely in Glucksberg, many other cases both before and 
after  have  adopted  the  same  approach.  See,  e.g.,  District 
Attorney’s  Office  for  Third  Judicial  Dist.  v.  Osborne,  557 
U. S. 52, 72 (2009); Flores, 507 U. S., at 303; United States 
v. Salerno, 481 U. S. 739, 751 (1987); Moore v. East Cleve-
land, 431 U. S. 494, 503 (1977) (plurality opinion); see also 
id.,  at  544  (White,  J.,  dissenting)  (“The  Judiciary,  includ-
ing  this  Court,  is  the  most  vulnerable  and  comes  nearest
to  illegitimacy  when  it  deals  with  judge-made  constitu-
tional  law  having  little  or  no  cognizable  roots  in  the  lan-
guage  or  even  the  design  of  the  Constitution.”);  Troxel  v. 
Granville,  530  U. S.  57,  96–101  (2000)  (KENNEDY,  J., 
dissenting) (consulting “ ‘[o]ur Nation’s history, legal tradi-
tions,  and  practices’ ”  and  concluding  that  “[w]e  owe  it  to
the  Nation’s  domestic  relations  legal  structure  . . .  to 
proceed  with  caution”  (quoting  Glucksberg,  521  U. S.,  at 
721)).

Proper  reliance  on  history  and  tradition  of  course  re-
quires looking beyond the individual law being challenged, 
so that every restriction on liberty does not supply its own
constitutional justification.  The Court is right about that. 
Ante, at 18.  But given the few “guideposts for responsible 
decisionmaking  in  this  unchartered  area,”  Collins,  503 
U. S.,  at  125,  “an  approach  grounded  in  history  imposes
limits on the judiciary that are more meaningful than any 
based on [an] abstract formula,” Moore, 431 U. S., at 504, 
n. 12 (plurality opinion).  Expanding a right suddenly and 
dramatically  is  likely  to  require  tearing  it  up  from  its 
roots.  Even a sincere profession of “discipline” in identify-