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Page Number: 79.0

18 

ESPINOZA v. MONTANA DEPT. OF REVENUE 

BREYER, J., dissenting 

The Court’s occasional efforts to declare rules in spite of
this experience have failed to produce either coherence or
consensus in our First Amendment jurisprudence.  See Van 
Orden,  545  U. S.,  at  697  (BREYER,  J.,  concurring  in  judg-
ment) (listing examples).  The persistence of such disagree-
ments  bears  out  what  I  have  said—namely,  that  rigid,
bright-line rules like the one the Court adopts today too of-
ten  work  against  the  underlying  purposes  of  the  Religion 
Clauses.  And a test that fails to advance the Clauses’ pur-
poses is, in my view, far worse than no test at all.

Consider some of the practical problems that may arise
from the Court’s holding.  The States have taken advantage 
of the “play in the joints” between the Religion Clauses to
craft programs of public aid to education that address their 
local needs.  Many provide assistance to families with stu-
dents in nonpublic schools, ranging from scholarships to tax 
credits  and  deductions  that  reimburse  tuition  expenses.
See Dept. of Ed., A Duncan et al., Education Options in the
States 3–6 (2009).  Although most state constitutions today 
have no-aid provisions like Montana’s, those provisions are 
only one part of a broader system of local regulation.  See 
App.  D  to  Brief  for  Respondents.    Some  States  have  con-
cluded that their no-aid provisions do not bar scholarships
to students at religious schools, while others without such
clauses have nevertheless chosen not to fund religious edu-
cation.  See Brief for State of Colorado et al. as Amici Curiae 
6–7; Brief for State of Maine as Amicus Curiae 10–15.  To-
day’s decision upends those arrangements without stopping 
to ask whether they might actually further the objectives of 
the Religion Clauses in some or even many cases.

And what are the limits of the Court’s holding?  The ma-
jority asserts that States “need not subsidize private educa-
tion.”  Ante, at 20.  But it does not explain why that is so.  If 
making  scholarships  available  to  only  secular  nonpublic 
schools  exerts  “coercive”  pressure  on  parents  whose  faith 
impels  them  to  enroll  their  children  in  religious  schools,