Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/22pdf/21-376_7l48.pdf
Page Number: 109

Cite as:  599 U. S. ____ (2023) 

27 

THOMAS, J., dissenting

  Nevertheless,  Cherokee  Nation’s  suggestion  was  picked 
up decades later in United States v. Kagama, 118 U. S. 375 
(1886)—the  first  case  to  actually  apply  a  broader,  unenu-
merated power over Indian affairs.  In Kagama, the Court 
considered the Major Crimes Act of 1885, which, similar to
the 1817 Act held unconstitutional by Justice McLean while 
riding circuit, regulated crimes on Indian lands committed 
by Indians; the Major Crimes Act differed from the 1817 Act 
only in that it extended to crimes committed against other
  Similarly  to  Justice
Indians.  See  §9,  23  Stat.  385.
McLean’s Bailey opinion, the Court first  rejected the idea
that the Commerce Clause could support the Act—reason-
ing that “it would be a very strained construction of th[e]
clause, that a system of criminal laws for Indians . . . was 
authorized by the grant of power to regulate commerce with
the Indian tribes.”  Kagama, 118 U. S., at 378–379. 

But the Court determined that the Major Crimes Act was
constitutional  nevertheless.  As  the  Court  first  noted,  the 
Act was “confined to the acts of an Indian of some tribe, of 
a criminal character, committed within the limits of the res-
ervation.”  Id., at 383.  The Court then cited several cases 
arising  from  congressional  regulations  of  Indian  lands  lo-
cated  within  federal  territories,  noting  that  Congress  had 
previously punished offenses committed on such lands.  See 
id., at 380 (citing United States v. Rogers, 4 How. 567, 572 
(1846); Murphy v. Ramsey, 114 U. S. 15, 44 (1885); Ameri-
can Ins. Co. v. 356 Bales of Cotton, 1 Pet. 511, 542 (1828)).
Next,  the  Court  reasoned  that  the  Act  “does  not  interfere 
with the process of the State courts within the reservation, 
nor  with  the  operation  of  State  laws  upon  white  people
found there.”  118 U. S., at 383.  Instead, the Act’s “effect[s
are]  confined  to  the  acts  of  an  Indian  of  some  tribe,  of  a 
criminal character, committed within the limits of the res-
ervation.”  Ibid. 

That sort of language seems to view Indian lands as akin
to quasi-federal lands or perhaps “external” to the Nation’s