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MONGE v. CALIFORNIA

Opinion of the Court

warrants the ultimate punishment; it is in many respects a
continuation of the trial on guilt or innocence of capital mur-
der.
“It is of vital importance” that the decisions made in
that context “be, and appear to be, based on reason rather
than caprice or emotion.” Gardner v. Florida, 430 U. S. 349,
358 (1977). Because the death penalty is unique “in both its
severity and its ﬁnality,” id., at 357, we have recognized an
acute need for reliability in capital sentencing proceedings.
See Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U. S. 586, 604 (1978) (opinion of
Burger, C. J.) (stating that the “qualitative difference be-
tween death and other penalties calls for a greater degree
of reliability when the death sentence is imposed”); see also
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668, 704 (1984) (Bren-
nan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“[W]e have
consistently required that capital proceedings be policed at
all stages by an especially vigilant concern for procedural
fairness and for the accuracy of factﬁnding”).

That need for reliability accords with one of the central
concerns animating the constitutional prohibition against
double jeopardy. As the Court explained in Green v. United
States, 355 U. S. 184 (1957), the Double Jeopardy Clause pre-
vents States from “mak[ing] repeated attempts to convict an
individual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to
embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling him to
live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well
as enhancing the possibility that even though innocent he
may be found guilty.”
Indeed, we cited the
Id., at 187–188.
heightened interest in accuracy in the Bullington decision
itself. We noted that in a capital sentencing proceeding, as
in a criminal trial, “ ‘the interests of the defendant [are] of
such magnitude that . . . they have been protected by stand-
ards of proof designed to exclude as nearly as possible the
likelihood of an erroneous judgment.’ ” 451 U. S., at 441
(quoting Addington v. Texas, 441 U. S. 418, 423–424 (1979)).
Moreover, we have suggested in earlier cases that Bull-
ington’s rationale is conﬁned to the “unique circumstances of