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Page Number: 51

4 

ESPINOZA v. MONTANA DEPT. OF REVENUE 

GORSUCH, J., concurring 

a right “of  conscience,” an alternative the framers consid-
ered and rejected, our Constitution “extended the broader
freedom of action to all believers.”  McConnell, The Origins 
and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of Religion, 
103 Harv. L. Rev. 1409, 1490 (1989).  So whether the Mon-
tana  Constitution  is  better  described  as  discriminating
against religious status or use makes no difference:  It is a 
violation of the right to free exercise either way, unless the
State  can  show  its  law  serves  some  compelling  and  nar-
rowly  tailored  governmental  interest,  conditions  absent 
here for reasons the Court thoroughly explains.   

Our cases have long recognized the importance of protect-
ing religious actions, not just religious status.  In its very
first  decision  applying  the  Free  Exercise  Clause  to  the
States, the Court explained that the First Amendment pro-
tects the “freedom to act” as well as the “freedom to believe.” 
Cantwell  v.  Connecticut,  310  U. S.  296,  303  (1940).    The 
Court then reversed a criminal conviction against Newton 
Cantwell and his sons, Jehovah’s Witnesses who were pros-
ecuted not because of who they were but because of what 
they  did—proselytize  door-to-door  without  a  license.    See 
id., at 300–301, 307, 311.  In fact, this Court  has already 
recognized  that  parents’  decisions  about  the  education  of 
their children—the very conduct at issue here—can consti-
tute protected religious activity.  In Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 
U. S. 205 (1972), the Court held that Amish parents could 
not  be  compelled  to  send  their  children  to  a  public  high 
school  if  doing  so  would  conflict  with  the  dictates  of  their
faith.  See id., at 214–215, 220, 234–235. 

Even cases that seemingly focus on religious status do so
with  equal  respect  for  religious  actions.    In  McDaniel  v. 
Paty, 435 U. S. 618 (1978) (plurality opinion), for example, 
a State had barred the clergy from serving in the state leg-
islature or at the state constitutional convention.  See id., 
at 620–622.  Some have described the discrimination there 
as  focused  on  religious  “ ‘ status.’ ”  Trinity  Lutheran,  582