Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/23pdf/22-915_8o6b.pdf
Page Number: 31

Cite as:  602 U. S. ____ (2024) 

3 

GORSUCH, J., concurring 

change, facts on the ground may evolve, and new laws may
invite  new  challenges,  but  the  Constitution  the  people 
adopted remains our enduring guide.  Bruen, 597 U. S., at 
27–28; see, e.g., United States v. Jones, 565 U. S. 400, 404– 
405 (2012); Caetano v. Massachusetts, 577 U. S. 411, 411– 
412 (2016) (per curiam).  If changes are to be made to the 
Constitution’s directions, they must be made by the Ameri-
can people.  Nor is there anything remotely unusual about 
any of this.  Routinely, litigants and courts alike must con-
sult history when seeking to discern the meaning and scope 
of  a  constitutional  provision. 
See  post,  at  6–16 
(KAVANAUGH,  J.,  concurring)  (offering  examples).  And 
when  doing  so,  litigants  and  courts  “must  exercise  care.” 
See post, at 3, n. (BARRETT, J., concurring).

Consider just one example.  We have recognized that the 
Sixth  Amendment  enshrines  another  pre-existing  right:
the  right  of  a  defendant  to  confront  his  accusers  at  trial. 
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U. S. 36, 54 (2004).  Just as 
here, we have recognized that, in placing this right in the 
Constitution, the people set its scope, “admitting only those
exceptions established at the time of the founding.”  Ibid. 
And,  just  as  here,  when  a  party  asks  us  to  sustain  some 
modern  exception  to  the  confrontation  right,  we  require 
them to point to a close historic analogue to justify it.  See 
Giles v. California, 554 U. S. 353, 358–361 (2008).  Just as 
here, too, we have expressly rejected arguments that courts
should proceed differently, such as by trying to glean from
historic  exceptions  overarching  “policies,”  “ ‘purposes,’ ”  or
“values” to guide them in future cases.  See id., at 374–375 
(opinion  of  Scalia,  J.).    We  have  rejected  those  paths  be-
cause  the  Constitution  enshrines  the  people’s  choice  to
achieve certain policies, purposes, and values “through very
specific means”:  the right of confrontation as originally un-
derstood  at  the  time  of  the  founding.    Id.,  at  375.    As  we 
have put it, a court may not “extrapolate” from the Consti-
tution’s text and history “the values behind [that right], and