Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/16pdf/15-1293_1o13.pdf
Page Number: 1

(Slip Opinion) 

OCTOBER  TERM,  2016 

1 

Syllabus 

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader. 
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337. 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

Syllabus 

MATAL, INTERIM DIRECTOR, UNITED STATES
 
PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE v. TAM
 

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR 
THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT 

No. 15–1293.  Argued January 18, 2017—Decided June 19, 2017 

Simon Tam, lead singer of the rock group “The Slants,” chose this mon-
iker in order to “reclaim” the term and drain its denigrating force as 
a derogatory term for Asian persons.  Tam sought federal registration 
of  the  mark  “THE  SLANTS.”    The  Patent  and  Trademark  Office 
(PTO) denied the application under a Lanham Act provision prohibit-
ing  the  registration  of  trademarks  that  may  “disparage  . . .  or  bring
. . .  into  contemp[t]  or  disrepute”  any  “persons,  living  or  dead.”    15 
U. S. C.  §1052(a).    Tam  contested  the  denial  of  registration  through 
the  administrative  appeals  process,  to  no  avail.    He  then  took  the 
case  to  federal  court,  where  the  en  banc  Federal  Circuit  ultimately
found  the  disparagement  clause  facially  unconstitutional  under  the 
First Amendment’s Free Speech Clause.  

Held: The judgment is affirmed. 

808 F. 3d 1321, affirmed. 

JUSTICE  ALITO  delivered  the  opinion  of  the  Court  with  respect  to 

Parts I, II, and III–A, concluding: 

1. The  disparagement  clause  applies  to  marks  that  disparage  the 
members of a racial or ethnic group.  Tam’s view, that the clause ap-
plies only to natural or juristic persons, is refuted by the plain terms
of the clause, which uses the word “persons.”  A mark that disparages
a “substantial” percentage of the members of a racial or ethnic group 
necessarily  disparages  many  “persons,”  namely,  members  of  that 
group.  Tam’s  narrow  reading  also  clashes  with  the  breadth  of  the
disparagement  clause,  which  by  its  terms  applies  not  just  to  “per-
sons,”  but  also  to  “institutions”  and  “beliefs.”    §1052(a).    Had  Con-
gress wanted to confine the reach of the clause, it could have used the