Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/11pdf/10-9646.pdf
Page Number: 42.0

6 

MILLER v. ALABAMA 

ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting 

other, especially on an issue of such importance as the one 
before  us.  But  in  Graham  and  Thompson  it  was  at  least 
plausible  as  a  practical  matter.    In  Graham,  the  extreme 
rarity  with  which  the  sentence  in  question  was  imposed 
could  suggest  that  legislatures  did  not  really  intend  the 
inevitable  result  of  the  laws  they  passed.    See  560  U. S., 
at  ___  (slip  op.,  at  15–16).  In  Thompson,  the  sentencing
practice was even rarer—only 20 defendants had received
it in the last century.  487 U. S., at 832 (plurality opinion).
Perhaps under those facts it could be argued that the leg- 
islature  was  not  fully  aware  that  a  teenager  could  re-
ceive  the  particular  sentence  in  question.    But  here  the 
widespread and recent imposition of the sentence makes it 
implausible  to  characterize  this  sentencing  practice  as  a
collateral consequence of legislative ignorance.3 

Nor do we display our usual respect for elected officials 
by  asserting  that  legislators  have  accidentally  required
2,000 teenagers to spend the rest of their lives in jail.  This 
is particularly true given that our well-publicized decision 
in  Graham  alerted  legislatures  to  the  possibility  that
teenagers  were  subject  to  life  with  parole  only  because  of
legislative  inadvertence.  I  am  aware  of  no  effort  in  the 
wake of  Graham to  correct any supposed legislative over-
sight.  Indeed,  in  amending  its  laws  in  response  to  Gra-
ham  one  legislature  made  especially  clear  that  it  does 
intend  juveniles  who  commit  first-degree  murder  to  re-
ceive mandatory life without parole.  See Iowa Code Ann. 
§902.1 (West Cum. Supp. 2012). 

In  the  end,  the  Court  does  not  actually  conclude  that
mandatory  life  sentences  for  juvenile  murderers  are  un- 
usual.  It  instead  claims  that  precedent  “leads  to”  today’s 

—————— 

3 The Court claims that I “take issue with some or all of these prece-
dents” and “seek to relitigate” them.  Ante, at 7–8, n. 4.  Not so: apply-
ing  this  Court’s  cases  exactly  as  they  stand,  I  do  not  believe  they
support the Court’s decision in this case.