Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/524bv.pdf
Page Number: 564.0

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Cite as: 524 U. S. 498 (1998)

519

Opinion of O(cid:146)Connor, J.

lifetime health beneﬁts meant that Eastern “had every rea-
son to anticipate that it might be called upon to bear some
of the ﬁnancial burden that this expectation engendered.”
Id., at 161. Finally, in assessing the nature of the chal-
lenged governmental action, the court determined that the
Coal Act does not result in the physical invasion or perma-
nent appropriation of Eastern’s property, but merely “ad-
justs the beneﬁts and burdens of economic life to promote
Ibid. (internal quotation marks omit-
the common good.”
ted). The court also noted that the premiums are disbursed
to the privately operated Combined Fund, not to a govern-
ment entity. For those reasons, the court concluded, “there
is no basis whatever for [Eastern’s] claim that the [Coal Act]
transgresses the Takings Clause.”

Ibid.

Other Courts of Appeals have also upheld the Coal Act
against constitutional challenges.4
In view of the impor-
tance of the issues raised in this case, we granted certiorari.
522 U. S. 931 (1997).

III

We begin with a threshold jurisdictional question, raised
in the federal respondent’s answer to Eastern’s complaint:
Whether petitioner’s takings claim was properly ﬁled in Fed-
eral District Court rather than the United States Court of
Federal Claims. See App. (CA1) 40. Although the Com-
missioner no longer challenges the Court’s adjudication of
this action, see Brief for Federal Respondent 38–39, n. 30, it
is appropriate that we clarify the basis of our jurisdiction
over petitioner’s claims.

4 See, e. g., Holland v. Keenan Trucking Co., 102 F. 3d 736, 739–742 (CA4
1996); Lindsey Coal Mining Co. v. Chater, 90 F. 3d 688, 693–695 (CA3
1996); In re Blue Diamond Coal Co., 79 F. 3d 516, 521–526 (CA6 1996),
cert. denied, 519 U. S. 1055 (1997); Davon, Inc. v. Shalala, 75 F. 3d 1114,
1121–1130 (CA7), cert. denied, 519 U. S. 808 (1996); In re Chateaugay
Corp., 53 F. 3d 478, 486–496 (CA2), cert. denied sub nom. LTV Steel Co. v.
Shalala, 516 U. S. 913 (1995).