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2 

BULLARD v. BLUE HILLS BANK 

Syllabus 

separate proceeding each time it reviews a proposed plan, and there-
fore  a  court’s  order  either  confirming  or  denying  a  plan  terminates
the proceeding and is final and immediately appealable.  But the rel-
evant  proceeding  is  the  entire  process  of  attempting  to  arrive  at  an
approved  plan  that  would  allow  the  bankruptcy  case  to  move  for-
ward.  Only  plan  confirmation,  or  case  dismissal,  alters  the  status
quo  and  fixes  the  parties’  rights  and  obligations;  denial  of  confirma-
tion  with  leave  to  amend  changes  little  and  can  hardly be  described
as  final.    Additional  considerations—that  the  statute  defining  core 
bankruptcy  proceedings  lists  “confirmations  of  plans,”  §157(b)(2)(L),
but omits any reference to denials; that immediate appeals from de-
nials  would  result  in  delays  and  inefficiencies  that  requirements  of
finality are designed to constrain; and that a debtor’s inability to im-
mediately appeal a denial encourages the debtor to work with credi-
tors  and  the  trustee  to  develop  a  confirmable  plan—bolster  the  con-
clusion that the relevant proceeding is the entire process culminating 
in confirmation or dismissal.  Pp. 4–8.

(b) The  Solicitor  General  suggests  that  because  bankruptcy  dis-
putes  are  generally  classified  as  either  “adversary  proceedings”  or 
“contested matters,” and because an order denying confirmation and
an order granting confirmation both resolve a contested matter, both
should be considered final.  This argument simply assumes that con-
firmation  is  appealable  because  it  resolves  a  contested  matter,  and
that therefore anything else that resolves the contested matter must
also be appealable.  But one could just as easily contend that confir-
mation is appealable because it resolves the entire plan consideration
process,  while  denial  is  not  because  it  does  not.    Any  asymmetry  in 
denying the debtor an immediate appeal from a denial while allowing
a  creditor  an  immediate  appeal  from  a  confirmation  simply  reflects
the  fact  that  confirmation  allows  the  bankruptcy  to  go  forward  and
alters  the  legal  relationships  among  the  parties,  while  denial  lacks
such  significant  consequences.    Nor  is  it  clear  that  the  asymmetry 
will  always  advantage  creditors.    Finally,  Bullard  contends  that  un-
less  denial  orders  are  final,  a  debtor  will  be  required  to  choose  be-
tween two untenable options: either accept dismissal of the case and 
then  appeal,  or  propose  an  amended  but  unwanted  plan  and  appeal
its confirmation.  These options will often be unsatisfying, but our lit-
igation  system  has  long  accepted  that  certain  burdensome  rulings
will be “only imperfectly reparable” by the appellate process.  Digital 
Equipment  Corp.  v.  Desktop  Direct,  Inc.,  511  U. S.  863,  872.    That 
prospect is made tolerable by the Court’s confidence that bankruptcy
courts rule correctly most of the time and by the existence of several
mechanisms  for  interlocutory  review,  e.g.,  §§158(a)(3),  (d)(2),  which 
“serve as useful safety valves for promptly correcting serious errors”