Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/10pdf/09-893.pdf
Page Number: 24

Cite as:  563 U. S. ____ (2011) 

3 

THOMAS, J., concurring 

See Duncan v. Walker, 533 U. S. 167, 174 (2001) (“It is our 
duty to give effect, if possible, to every clause and word of
a statute” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

Concededly,  the  difference  between  revocability,  on  the
one hand, and validity and enforceability, on the other, is
not  obvious.    The  statute  does  not  define  the  terms,  and 
their  ordinary  meanings  arguably  overlap.    Indeed,  this 
Court  and  others  have  referred  to  the  concepts  of  revoca-
bility,  validity,  and  enforceability  interchangeably.  But 
this  ambiguity  alone  cannot  justify  ignoring  Congress’ 
clear  decision  in  §2  to  repeat  only  one  of  the  three 
concepts.

To clarify the meaning of §2, it would be natural to look
to  other  portions  of  the  FAA.    Statutory  interpretation
focuses  on  “the  language  itself,  the  specific  context  in 
which  that  language  is  used,  and  the  broader  context  of
the  statute  as  a  whole.”  Robinson  v.  Shell  Oil  Co.,  519 
U. S.  337,  341  (1997).  “A  provision  that  may  seem  am-
biguous  in  isolation  is  often  clarified  by  the  remainder  of 
the statutory scheme . . . because only one of the permissi-
ble  meanings  produces  a  substantive  effect  that  is  com-
patible with the rest of the law.”  United Sav. Assn. of Tex. 
v.  Timbers  of  Inwood  Forest  Associates,  Ltd.,  484  U. S. 
365, 371 (1988).

Examining the broader statutory scheme, §4 can be read 
to clarify the scope of §2’s exception to the enforcement of 
arbitration agreements.  When a party seeks to enforce an 
arbitration  agreement  in  federal  court,  §4  requires  that
“upon being satisfied that the making of the agreement for 
arbitration  or  the  failure  to  comply  therewith  is  not  in
issue,”  the  court  must  order  arbitration  “in  accordance 
with the terms of the agreement.” 

Reading  §§2  and  4  harmoniously,  the  “grounds  . . .  for 
the  revocation”  preserved  in  §2  would  mean  grounds  re-
lated to the making of the agreement.  This would require 
enforcement  of  an  agreement  to  arbitrate  unless  a  party