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Page Number: 4

4 

GOLAN v. HOLDER 

Syllabus 

ized by §514.  Pp. 23–32. 

(a) The pathmarking Eldred decision is again instructive.  There, 
the Court held that the CTEA’s enlargement of a copyright’s duration 
did not offend the First Amendment’s freedom of expression guaran-
tee.  Recognizing that some restriction on expression is the inherent 
and  intended  effect  of  every  grant  of  copyright,  the  Court  observed 
that the Framers regarded copyright protection not simply as a limit
on the manner in which expressive works may be used, but also as an
“engine of free expression.”   537  U. S., at  219.  The  “traditional con-
tours”  of  copyright  protection,  i.e.,  the  “idea/expression  dichotomy” 
and the “fair use” defense, moreover, serve as “built-in First Amend-
ment  accommodations.”    Ibid.   Given  the speech-protective  purposes 
and safeguards embraced by copyright law, there was no call for the
heightened  review  sought  in  Eldred.  The  Court  reaches  the  same 
conclusion here.  Section 514 leaves undisturbed the idea/expression
distinction  and  the  fair  use  defense.    Moreover,  Congress  adopted
measures  to  ease  the  transition  from  a  national  scheme  to  an  inter-
national copyright regime.  Pp. 23–26.

(b) Petitioners claim that First Amendment interests of a higher
order are at stake because they—unlike their Eldred counterparts—
enjoyed “vested rights” in works that had already entered the public
domain.  Their  contentions  depend  on  an  argument  already  consid-
ered  and  rejected,  namely,  that  the  Constitution  renders  the  public 
domain  largely  untouchable  by  Congress.    Nothing  in  the  historical
record,  subsequent  congressional  practice,  or  this  Court’s  jurispru-
dence  warrants  exceptional  First  Amendment  solicitude  for  copy-
righted  works  that  were  once  in  the  public  domain.    Congress  has 
several  times  adjusted  copyright  law  to  protect  new  categories  of
works as well as works previously in the public domain.  Section 514, 
moreover,  does  not  impose  a  blanket  prohibition  on  public  access.
The question is whether would-be users of certain foreign works must
pay for their desired use of the author’s expression, or else limit their 
exploitation  to  “fair  use”  of  those  works.    By  fully  implementing
Berne,  Congress  ensured  that  these  works,  like  domestic  and  most
other  foreign  works,  would  be  governed  by  the  same  legal  regime. 
Section  514  simply  placed  foreign  works  in  the  position  they  would 
have occupied if the current copyright regime had been in effect when
those works were created and first published.  Pp. 26–30. 

609 F. 3d 1076, affirmed. 

GINSBURG, J.,  delivered  the  opinion  of  the  Court,  in  which  ROBERTS, 
C. J.,  and  SCALIA,  KENNEDY,  THOMAS,  and  SOTOMAYOR,  JJ.,  joined. 
BREYER, J.,  filed  a  dissenting  opinion,  in  which  ALITO, J.,  joined.    KA-
GAN, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.