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Page Number: 16.0

12 

BERGER v. NORTH CAROLINA STATE 
CONFERENCE OF THE NAACP 
Opinion of the Court 

follow given its concession that the legislative leaders may
intervene  permissively  under  Rule  24(b),  and  likely  as  a
matter of right under Rule 24(a)(2) if the attorney general 
ceases to represent the Board.  Brief for State Respondents 
2, 48, 55.  Nor, for that matter, does the Board identify an-
ything to support its suggestion that the State’s executive
branch  holds  a  constitutional  monopoly  on  representing
North Carolina’s practical interests in court.  Instead, the 
parties direct us to a provision stating that the General As-
sembly may determine the scope of the attorney general’s 
powers.  See  N. C.  Const.,  Art.  III,  § 7(2);  Bailey  v.  State, 
353 N. C. 142, 152–153, 540 S. E. 2d 313, 320 (2000).  And, 
as we have seen, while the General Assembly has afforded 
the attorney general considerable authority, it has also re-
served to itself some authority to defend state law on behalf 
of the State.  See N. C. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 120–32.6(b).  In 
fact,  it  seems  the  General  Assembly  has  sometimes  even 
entrusted the defense of state interests to private persons. 
See  § 1–608(b)  (permitting  private  citizens  to  bring  false-
claims actions “for the State”).

The  NAACP  offers  a  different  reply.    It  points  out  that
Rule  24(a)(2)  permits  intervention  only  by  “new”  parties. 
And,  it  submits,  the  legislative  leaders  are  already  effec-
tively “existing” parties to this suit challenging the enforce-
ment  of  state  law.  Brief  for  NAACP  Respondents  12–14.
But whatever other problems may attend this argument, it 
rests  on  a  premise  that  is  both  formally  and  functionally 
mistaken.  As a formal matter and consistent with princi-
ples of sovereign immunity, the NAACP has  not sued the 
State.    Only  state  officers  are  or  may  be  “parties”  here—
and, so far, the legislative leaders are not among them.  See 
Young, 209 U. S., at 159–160.  Functionally, of course, this
suit implicates North Carolina’s sovereign interests regard-
less of the named parties.  See Part I–A, supra.  Yet, con-
trary to the premise implicit in the NAACP’s argument, a
plaintiff who chooses to name this or that official defendant