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Cite as:  589 U. S. ____ (2020) 

1 

THOMAS, J., dissenting 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

HOWARD L. BALDWIN, ET UX. v. UNITED STATES 

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED 
STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT 

No. 19–402.  Decided February 24, 2020 

The petition for a writ of certiorari is denied. 
JUSTICE THOMAS, dissenting from the denial of certiorari. 
Under Chevron deference, courts generally must adopt an
agency’s interpretation of an ambiguous statute if that in-
terpretation is “reasonable.”  Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natu-
ral  Resources  Defense  Council,  Inc.,  467  U. S.  837,  844 
(1984).  Usually,  the  agency  interprets  the  statute  before
any court has considered the question.  But sometimes, the 
agency advances an interpretation after a court has already 
weighed in.  In the latter instance, we have held that it “fol-
lows from Chevron” that a court must abandon its previous 
interpretation in favor of the agency’s interpretation unless 
the prior court decision holds that the statute is unambigu-
ous.  National Cable & Telecommunications Assn. v. Brand 
X Internet Services, 545 U. S. 967, 982 (2005). 

This petition asks us to reconsider Brand X.  In 1992, the 
Ninth Circuit interpreted a deadline for requesting a refund
from the Internal Revenue Service (IRS).  See Anderson v. 
United States, 966 F. 2d 487, 489 (interpreting 26 U. S. C. 
§7502).  Nineteen years later—and two months after peti-
tioners claim to have mailed their paperwork to the IRS—
the  Treasury  Department  adopted  a  different  interpreta-
tion  through  an  informal  rulemaking.  See  26  CFR 
§ 301.7502–1(e)(2)(i) (2012).  When petitioners sued the IRS 
to recover their refund, the Ninth Circuit followed Brand X, 
deferred  to  the  agency’s  new  interpretation,  and  rejected 
petitioners’ claim.  921 F. 3d 836, 843 (2019).