Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/558bv.pdf
Page Number: 530.0

Cite as: 558 U. S. 310 (2010) 

369 

Opinion of the Court 

lar distinction into BCRA’s disclosure requirements.  We re­
ject this contention. 

The  Court  has  explained  that  disclosure  is  a  less  restric­
tive alternative to more comprehensive regulations of 
speech.  See, e. g., MCFL, 479 U. S., at 262.  In Buckley, the 
Court  upheld  a  disclosure  requirement  for  independent  ex­
penditures  even  though  it  invalidated  a  provision  that  im­
posed  a  ceiling  on  those  expenditures.  424  U. S.,  at  75–76. 
In  McConnell, three  Justices  who  would  have  found  § 441b 
to  be  unconstitutional  nonetheless  voted  to  uphold  BCRA’s 
disclosure  and  disclaimer  requirements.  540  U. S.,  at  321 
(opinion  of  Kennedy,  J.,  joined  by  Rehnquist,  C.  J.,  and 
Scalia, J.).  And the Court has upheld registration and dis­
closure requirements on lobbyists, even though Congress has 
no  power  to  ban  lobbying  itself.  United  States  v.  Harriss, 
347 U. S. 612, 625 (1954) (Congress “has merely provided for 
a  modicum  of  information  from  those  who  for  hire  attempt 
to  inﬂuence  legislation  or  who  collect  or  spend  funds  for 
that purpose”).  For these reasons, we reject Citizens Unit­
ed’s contention that the disclosure requirements must be lim­
ited  to  speech  that  is  the  functional  equivalent  of  express 
advocacy. 

Citizens  United  also  disputes  that  an  informational  inter­
est  justiﬁes  the  application  of  § 201  to  its  ads,  which  only 
attempt to persuade viewers to see the ﬁlm.  Even if it dis­
closed the funding sources for the ads, Citizens United says, 
the  information  would  not  help  viewers  make  informed 
choices  in  the  political  marketplace.  This  is  similar  to  the 
argument rejected above with respect to disclaimers.  Even 
if the ads only pertain to a commercial transaction, the public 
has an interest in knowing who is speaking about a candidate 
shortly before an election.  Because the informational inter­
est  alone  is  sufﬁcient  to  justify  application  of  § 201  to  these 
ads,  it  is  not  necessary  to  consider  the  Government’s  other 
asserted interests.