Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/20pdf/19-251_p86b.pdf
Page Number: 36.0

Cite as:  594 U. S. ____ (2021) 

7 

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting 

surely envisage signatories with reason to keep their sup-
port for such measures private.  But in Reed, such subjec-
tive reasons did not suffice to establish a cognizable burden
on associational rights.

Today, the Court abandons the requirement that plain-
tiffs demonstrate that they are chilled, much less that they
are  reasonably  chilled.    Instead,  it  presumes  (contrary  to
the evidence, precedent, and common sense) that all disclo-
sure  requirements  impose  associational  burdens.    For  ex-
ample, the Court explains that there is a risk of chill in this 
suit because the government requires disclosure of the iden-
tity of any donor “with reason to remain anonymous.”  Ante, 
at 17.  The Court does not qualify that statement, nor does
it require record evidence of such reasons.  If the Court did, 
it  would  not  be  able  to  strike  California’s  Schedule  B  re-
quirement down in all its applications, because the only ev-
idence  in  the  record  of  donors  with  any  reason  to  remain
anonymous is that of petitioners’.2 

At best, then, a subjective preference for privacy, which
previously did not confer standing, now subjects disclosure
requirements to close scrutiny.  Of course, all disclosure re-
quires some loss of anonymity, and courts can always imag-
ine  that  someone  might,  for  some  reason,  prefer  to  keep 
their donations undisclosed.  If such speculation is enough 
(and apparently it is), then all disclosure requirements ipso 
facto impose cognizable First Amendment burdens.

Indeed, the Court makes obvious its presumption that all 
disclosure  requirements  are  burdensome  by  beginning  its
analysis of “burden” with an evaluation of means-end fit in-
stead.  “[A] reasonable assessment of the burdens imposed 
by  disclosure,”  the  Court  explains,  “should  begin  with  an
understanding of the extent to which the burdens are un-
necessary, and that requires narrow tailoring.”  Ante, at 11; 
see  also  ante,  at  17–18  (excusing  plaintiffs  from  showing 

—————— 

2 See Part IV, infra.