Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/529bv.pdf
Page Number: 594.0

529US2

Unit: $U52

[09-26-01 10:36:40] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 529 U. S. 513 (2000)

519

Opinion of the Court

that amendment was critical. The “outcry or corrobora-
tion” requirement was not satisﬁed for those convictions; 4
they rested solely on the victim’s testimony. Accordingly,
the verdicts on those four counts stand or fall depending
on whether the child victim exception applies. Under the
old law, the exception would not apply, because the victim
was more than 14 years old at the time of the alleged of-
fenses. Under the new law, the exception would apply, be-
In
cause the victim was under 18 years old at that time.
short, the validity of four of petitioner’s convictions depends
on whether the old or new law applies to his case, which, in
turn, depends on whether the Ex Post Facto Clause pro-
hibits the application of the new version of Article 38.07 to
his case.

As mentioned, only 4 of petitioner’s 15 total convictions
are implicated by the amendment to Article 38.07; the other
11 counts—including the 2 convictions for which petitioner
received life sentences—are uncontested. Six counts are
uncontested because they were committed when the victim
was under 14 years old, so his convictions stand even under
the old law; the other ﬁve uncontested counts were com-
mitted after the new Texas law went into effect, so there
could be no ex post facto claim as to those convictions. See

Sess., ch. 900, § 12.01, 1993 Tex. Gen. Laws 3765, 3766, and Act of May 10,
1993, 73d Leg., Reg. Sess., ch. 200, § 1, 1993 Tex. Gen. Laws 387, 388.

4 The victim did not make an outcry until March 1995, more than six
months after the alleged offenses. Although the 1993 amendment to Arti-
cle 38.07 extended the outcry period from six months to one year, see n. 3,
supra, the victim’s outcry did not come within that time period either.
Accordingly, that change in the outcry provision is immaterial to this case.
The State argues that there is evidence corroborating the victim’s testi-
mony, so it does not help petitioner even if the old law applies. See Brief
for Respondent 4, n. 2. Before the state court, however, petitioner ar-
gued that “there was nothing to corroborate [the victim’s] version of
events,” 963 S. W. 2d 833, 836 (Tex. Ct. App. 1998), and that court accepted
the contention as correct for the purposes of its decision. We do the
same here.