Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/09pdf/08-964.pdf
Page Number: 25.0

Cite as:  561 U. S. ____ (2010) 

5 

STEVENS, J., concurring in judgment 

eligible  subject  matter”;  and  (5)  whether  the  court’s  deci-
sions in State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Finan-
cial  Group,  Inc.,  149  F. 3d  1368  (1998)  (State  Street),  and 
AT&T  Corp.  v.  Excel  Communications,  Inc.,  172  F. 3d 
1352  (1999),  should  be  overruled  in  any  respect.    App.  to
Pet. for Cert. 144a–145a. 

The  en  banc  Court  of  Appeals  affirmed  the  Board’s
decision.  Eleven of the twelve judges agreed that petition-
ers’  claims  do  not  describe  a  patentable  “process,”  §101. 
Chief Judge Michel’s opinion, joined by eight other judges,
rejected several possible tests for what is a patent-eligible 
process, including whether the patent produces a “ ‘useful,
concrete and tangible result,’ ” whether the process relates 
to  “technological  arts,”  and  “categorical  exclusions”  for
certain  processes  such  as  business  methods.    In re  Bilski, 
545  F. 3d  943,  959–960  (2008).  Relying  on  several  of  our 
cases  in  which  we  explained  how  to  differentiate  a  claim
on a “fundamental principle” from a claim on a “process,”
the court concluded that a “claimed process is surely pat-
ent-eligible  under  §101  if:  (1)  it  is  tied  to  a  particular 
machine  or  apparatus,  or  (2)  it  transforms  a  particular 
article  into  a  different  state  or  thing.”    Id.,  at  954–955. 
The  court  further  concluded  that  this  “machine-or-
transformation  test”  is  “the  sole  test  governing  §101 
analyses,” id., at 955 (emphasis added), and therefore the 
“test  for  determining  patent  eligibility  of  a  process  under 
§101,” id., at 956.  Applying that test, the court held that 
petitioners’  claim  is  not  a  patent-eligible  process.    Id.,  at 
963–966. 

In  a  separate  opinion  reaching  the  same  conclusion, 
Judge  Dyk  carefully  reviewed  the  history  of  American
patent law and English precedents upon which our law is
based,  and  found  that  “the  unpatentability  of  processes
not  involving  manufactures,  machines,  or  compositions  of 
matter has been firmly embedded . . . since the time of the
Patent  Act  of  1793.”  Id.,  at  966.    Judge  Dyk  observed,