Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/22pdf/21-1043_7648.pdf
Page Number: 21.0

Cite as:  600 U. S. ____ (2023) 

3 

JACKSON, J., concurring 

way  Congress  described,  §1114(1)(a)  and  §1125(a)(1)  may 
reach the “person,” §1127, who is “us[ing that m]ark as  a 
trademark,” Jack Daniel’s, 599 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 14). 
But if the mark is not serving that function in domestic com-
merce, then the conduct Congress cared about is not occur-
ring  domestically,  and  these  provisions’  purely  domestic 
sweep cannot touch that person.

Consider an example.  Imagine that a German company 
begins  making  and  selling  handbags  in  Germany  marked 
“Coache”  (the  owner’s  family  name).    Next,  imagine  that
American students buy the bags while on spring break over-
seas,  and  upon  their  return  home  employ  those  bags  to 
carry personal items.  Imagine finally that a representative 
of  Coach  (the  United  States  company)  sees  the  students 
with the bags and persuades Coach to sue the German com-
pany  for  Lanham  Act  infringement,  fearing  that  the 
“Coache” mark will cause consumer confusion.  Absent ad-
ditional facts, such a claim seeks an impermissibly extra-
territorial application of the Act.  The mark affixed to the 
students’ bags is not being  “use[d] in commerce” domesti-
cally as the Act understands that phrase: to serve a source-
identifying  function  “in  the  ordinary  course  of  trade,”
§1127.

Now change the facts in just one respect: The American
students  tire  of  the  bags  six  weeks  after  returning  home, 
and resell them in this country, confusing consumers and 
damaging Coach’s brand.  Now, the marked bags are in do-
mestic commerce; the marks that the German company af-
fixed  to  them  overseas  continue  “to  identify  and  distin-
guish”  the  goods  from  others  in  the  (now  domestic)
marketplace and to “indicate the source of the goods.”  Ibid. 
So  the  German  company  continues  to  “use  [the  mark]  in
commerce” within the meaning of the Act, thus triggering
potential liability under §1114(1)(a) and §1125(a)(1).  This 
result  makes  eminent  sense  given  the  source-identifying