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CLINTON v. CITY OF NEW YORK

Breyer, J., dissenting

States, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co., 463
U. S. 29, 40–42 (1983). The President has not so narrowed
his discretionary power through rule, nor is his implemen-
tation subject to judicial review under the terms of the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act. See, e. g., Franklin v. Massa-
chusetts, 505 U. S. 788, 801 (1992) (APA does not apply to
President absent express statement by Congress).

While I believe that these last mentioned considerations
are important, they are not determinative. The President,
unlike most agency decisionmakers,
is an elected ofﬁcial.
He is responsible to the voters, who, in principle, will judge
the manner in which he exercises his delegated authority.
Whether the President’s expenditure decisions, for example,
are arbitrary is a matter that in the past has been left pri-
marily to those voters to consider. And this Court has made
clear that judicial review is less appropriate when the Presi-
dent’s own discretion, rather than that of an agency, is at
stake. See Dalton v. Specter, 511 U. S. 462, 476 (1994) (Pres-
idential decision on military base closure recommendations
not reviewable; President could “approv[e] or disapprov[e]
the recommendations for whatever reason he sees ﬁt”);
Franklin, 505 U. S., at 801 (President’s decision whether or
not to transmit census report to Congress was unreviewable
by courts for abuse of discretion); cf. id., at 799–800 (it was
“important to the integrity of the process” that the decision
was made by the President, a “constitutional ofﬁcer” as op-
posed to the unelected Secretary of Commerce). These
matters reﬂect in part the Constitution’s own delegation of
“executive Power” to “a President,” Art. II, § 1; cf. Clinton
v. Jones, 520 U. S. 681, 710–711 (1997) (Breyer, J., concur-
ring in judgment) (discussing unitary Executive), and we
must take this into account when applying the Constitution’s
nondelegation doctrine to questions of Presidential authority.
Consequently I believe that the power the Act grants the
President to prevent spending items from taking effect does
not violate the “nondelegation” doctrine.