Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/20pdf/20-382_869d.pdf
Page Number: 8

Cite as:  593 U. S. ____ (2021) 

5 

Opinion of the Court 

Inc. v. Transport Workers, 451 U. S. 77, 86–87 (1981).  The 
most  obvious  place  to  look  for  that  threshold  liability  is 
CERCLA’s  reticulated  statutory  matrix  of  environmental
duties  and  liabilities.    Cf.  Burlington  N.  &  S.  F. R. Co.  v. 
United  States,  556  U. S.  599,  610  (2009)  (“[Section
107(a)(3)] liability may not extend beyond the limits of the 
statute  itself ”).    After  all,  “[s]tatutes  must  ‘be  read  as  a 
whole,’ ” Atlantic Research, 551 U. S., at 135—an especially 
salient approach in this case given that CERCLA’s very ti-
tle reinforces that it is a “Comprehensive” Act.

Remaining  within  the  bounds  of  CERCLA  is  also  con-
sistent with the familiar principle that a federal contribu-
tion action is virtually always a creature of a specific statu-
tory regime.  See Northwest Airlines, 451 U. S., at 90–91, 
95–97 (noting a “narrow exception” for admiralty cases).  In 
fact, there is no “general federal right to contribution” what-
soever.  Id., at 96; cf. Middlesex County Sewerage Authority 
v. National Sea Clammers Assn., 453 U. S. 1, 13–15 (1981) 
(refusing to “assum[e] that Congress intended to authorize 
by implication additional judicial remedies for private citi-
zens  suing  under  [two  environmental  statutes]”).    That 
modest  understanding  is  difficult  to  reconcile  with  the 
United States’ invitation to treat §113(f )(3)(B) as a free-rov-
ing contribution right for a host of environmental liabilities 
arising under other laws.

The interlocking language and structure of the relevant
text  confirm  this  understanding.    The  provision  at  issue 
here—§113(f )(3)(B)—recognizes a statutory right to contri-
bution in the specific circumstance where a person “has re-
solved  its  liability”  via  “settlement.”    But  as  explained
above, this entitlement to postsettlement contribution does
not  stand  alone.  On  the  contrary,  §113(f )(3)(B)  exists
within “ ‘the specific context’ ” of subsection (f ), which out-
lines the broader workings of CERCLA contribution.  Merit 
Management Group, LP v. FTI Consulting, Inc., 583 U. S. 
___, ___ (2018) (slip op., at 11).