Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/10pdf/10-277.pdf
Page Number: 27

Cite as:  564 U. S. ____ (2011) 

23 

Opinion of the Court 

whether  class  issues  predominate or  whether  class  action 
is  a  superior  method  of  adjudicating  the  dispute.    Pre-
dominance  and  superiority  are  self-evident.    But  with 
respect  to  each  class  member’s  individualized  claim  for
money,  that  is  not  so—which  is  precisely  why  (b)(3)  re-
quires the judge to make findings about predominance and 
superiority before allowing the class.  Similarly, (b)(2) does
not  require  that  class  members  be  given  notice  and  opt- 
out  rights,  presumably  because  it  is  thought  (rightly  or
wrongly)  that  notice  has  no  purpose  when  the  class  is 
mandatory, and that depriving people of their right to sue 
in this manner complies with the Due Process Clause.  In 
the  context  of  a  class  action  predominantly  for  money 
damages  we  have  held  that  absence  of  notice  and  opt-out
violates due process.  See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 
472 U. S. 797, 812 (1985).  While we have never held that 
to  be  so  where  the  monetary  claims  do  not  predominate,
the serious possibility that it may be so provides an addi-
tional  reason  not  to  read  Rule  23(b)(2)  to  include  the 
monetary claims here. 

B 

Against  that  conclusion,  respondents  argue  that  their 
claims for backpay  were appropriately certified as part of
a  class  under  Rule  23(b)(2)  because  those  claims  do  not
“predominate”  over  their  requests  for  injunctive  and  de-
claratory relief.  They rely upon the Advisory Committee’s 
statement  that  Rule  23(b)(2)  “does  not  extend  to  cases  in
which  the  appropriate  final  relief  relates  exclusively  or 
predominantly  to  money  damages.”  39  F. R. D.,  at  102 
(emphasis  added).  The  negative  implication,  they  argue, 
is  that  it  does  extend  to  cases  in  which  the  appropriate
final relief relates only partially and nonpredominantly to 
money  damages.  Of  course  it  is  the  Rule  itself,  not  the 
Advisory Committee’s description of it, that governs.  And 
a  mere  negative  inference  does  not  in  our  view  suffice  to