Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/21pdf/20-1459_n7ip.pdf
Page Number: 16.0

Cite as:  596 U. S. ____ (2022) 

13 

Opinion of the Court 

Alvarez suggests otherwise.3 

* 
The government quickly abandons the legal theory it ad-
vanced in the courts of appeals—and neither of the two new 
options  it  auditions  before  us  begins  to  fill  the  void.  In 
§ 924(c)(3)(A), Congress did not condition long prison terms 
on  an  abstract  judicial  inquiry  into  whether  and  to  what
degree this or that crime poses a risk to community peace 
and safety.  Nor did it mandate an empirical inquiry into
how crimes are usually committed, let alone impose a bur-
den  on  the  defendant  to  present  proof  about  the  govern-
ment’s own prosecutorial habits.

Congress tasked the courts with a much more straight-
forward job:  Look at the elements of the underlying crime
and ask whether they require the government to prove the 
use, attempted use, or threatened use of force.  Following 

—————— 

3 JUSTICE ALITO offers still another argument on the government’s be-
half.  According to our colleague, the crime of completed Hobbs Act rob-
bery requires the government to prove beyond a reasonable doubt, and a
unanimous jury must agree on, the particular “means” by which the de-
fendant committed his offense—by “actual” force, “threatened force,” “vi-
olence,” or “fear of injury.”  § 1951(b)(1); post, at 3–6 (dissenting opinion). 
And because attempts to commit robbery by some of these means could 
qualify as crimes of violence under § 924(c)(3)(A), JUSTICE ALITO would 
classify  the  entire  offense  of  attempted  Hobbs  Act  robbery  a  “crime  of 
violence.”  Post, at 6.  But the parties have not whispered a word about 
any  of  this.  Perhaps  for  good  reason  too.  For  one  thing,  it  is  unclear
whether the Act’s “means” clause sets forth elements or merely lists al-
ternative ways a defendant may take or obtain property against the vic-
tim’s  will.  If  the  latter  is  true,  as  some  courts  have  held,  a  jury  need
unanimously  conclude  only  that  the  defendant  used  one  of  the  listed 
means;  it  need  not  agree  on  which  one.  See,  e.g.,  United  States  v.  St. 
Hubert, 909 F. 3d 335, 348–349 (CA11 2018); United States v. Hancock, 
168 F. Supp. 3d 817, 821 (D MD 2016).  For another, even assuming the 
Act  is  divisible  in  the  sense  he  suggests,  JUSTICE  ALITO  acknowledges
that  his  some-is-good-enough  approach  defies  this  Court’s  precedents. 
Post, at 6; Descamps v. United States, 570 U. S. 254, 260–264 (2013).