Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/19pdf/19-635_o7jq.pdf
Page Number: 51.0

Cite as:  591 U. S. ____ (2020) 

7 

ALITO, J., dissenting 

otherwise interfering with the lawful work of federal agen-
cies, instrumentalities, and officers.5  The Court premised 

—————— 
payment of which, if they are enforceable, would be required before exe-
cuting a function of government.  Such a requirement is prohibited  by 
the supremacy clause”); Clallam County v. United States, 263 U. S. 341, 
344 (1923) (holding that property owned by the United States is immune
from state taxation); see also Weston v. City Council of Charleston, 2 Pet. 
449, 469 (1829) (“The tax on government stock is thought by this Court 
to be a tax on the contract, a tax on the power to borrow money on the 
credit of the United States, and consequently to be repugnant to the con-
stitution”); Osborn v. Bank of United States, 9 Wheat. 738, 867 (1824) (“If
the trade of the Bank be essential to its character, as a machine for the 
fiscal operations of the government, that trade must be as exempt from 
State control as the actual conveyance of the public money.  Indeed, a tax 
bears upon the whole machine; as well upon the faculty of collecting and
transmitting the money of the nation, as on that of discounting the notes 
of  individuals.
  No  distinction  is  taken  between  them”);  Dawson  v. 
Steager, 586 U. S. ___, ___ (2019) (slip op., at 2) (surveying Court prece-
dent on intergovernmental tax immunity). 

5 Goodyear Atomic Corp. v. Miller, 486 U. S. 174, 180 (1988) (“It is well
settled that the activities of federal installations are shielded by the Su-
premacy  Clause  from  direct  state  regulation  unless  Congress  provides 
‘clear and unambiguous’ authorization for such regulation”); id., at 181 
(concluding that “a federally owned facility performing a federal function
is shielded from direct state regulation, even though the federal function
is carried out by a private contractor, unless Congress clearly authorizes 
such regulation”); Hancock v. Train, 426 U. S. 167, 178–179 (1976) (re-
jecting state agency’s bid to regulate a federal installation and surveying 
doctrines that establish that “ ‘the federal function must be left free’ of 
[state] regulation”); see also Leslie Miller, Inc. v. Arkansas, 352 U. S. 187, 
189–190 (1956) (per curiam) (concluding that federal contractors cannot
be forced to submit to state licensing procedures that would add to the 
qualifications required to receive the federal contract); Johnson v. Mar-
yland,  254  U. S.  51,  57  (1920)  (concluding  that  federal  postal  officials
may not be required to get a state driver’s license to perform their duties 
and  explaining  that  “the  immunity  of  the  instruments  of  the  United 
States from state control in the performance of their duties extends to 
. . . requirement[s] that they desist from performance until they satisfy
a state officer upon examination that they are competent for a necessary 
part  of  them”);  In  re  Neagle,  135  U. S.  1,  75  (1890)  (concluding  that  a 
federal official may not be “held in the state court to answer for an act 
which he [or she] was authorized to do by the law of the United States”);