Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/20pdf/20-927_i42k.pdf
Page Number: 12

8 

UNITED STATES v. HIGGS 

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting 

391, 132 Stat. 5194.  The District Court denied Johnson’s 
motion, concluding that his death sentence was for a crime 
that was not a “covered offense.”  See United States v. John-
son, No. 3:92–cr–68 (ED Va., Nov. 19, 2020).  The Fourth 
Circuit denied a stay pending appeal.  See Order in United 
States v. Johnson, Nos. 20–15, 21–1, 21–2 (Jan. 12, 2021).
Judge  Motz  dissented  from  the  denial  of  stay  based  on 
Johnson’s First Step Act claim, explaining that the applica-
tion  of  the  definition  of  “covered  offense”  “present[s]  diffi-
cult and important issues necessitating adequate consider-
ation by this court.”  Id., at 9. 

Judge Motz was right. 

In  fact,  the  courts  of  appeals
have  divided  on  the  proper  way  to  interpret  the  statute’s
“covered offense” definition.2 When Johnson sought a stay,
this Court had already granted certiorari to resolve a split 
implicating this question.  See Pet. for Cert. in No. 20-5904. 
Rather than granting Johnson a stay and holding his case 
for  reconsideration  in  light  of  this,  the  Court  allowed  the 
Government  to  execute  Johnson  without  any  appellate
court ruling on the merits of his claims. 

Consider next Brandon Bernard.  Bernard, who was only 
eighteen when he committed the crimes for which he was
executed, raised credible allegations that the Government 
secured his death sentence by withholding exculpatory evi-
dence and eliciting knowingly false testimony in violation 
of  Brady  v.  Maryland,  373  U. S.  83  (1963),  and  Napue  v. 
Illinois, 360 U. S. 264 (1959).  But Bernard never received 
consideration  of  those  claims  on  the  merits.  Instead,  the 
Court  of  Appeals  for  the  Fifth  Circuit  held  that,  even 
though  Bernard  could  not  have  known  about  the  sup-
pressed  evidence  when  he  filed  his  first  habeas  petition, 

—————— 

2 Compare United States v. Smith, 954 F. 3d 446, 449–450 (CA1 2020)
(the Fair Sentencing Act must modify any penalty in the statute of con-
viction, such as 21 U. S. C. §841), with United States v. Jones, 962 F. 3d 
1290, 1298 (CA11 2020) (the Act must modify the penalty for the defend-
ant’s actual violation).