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16 

NORTH CAROLINA STATE BD. OF DENTAL
EXAMINERS v. FTC 
Opinion of the Court 

present a claim for money damages, does not offer occasion
to address the question whether agency officials, including 
board  members,  may,  under  some  circumstances,  enjoy
immunity from damages liability.  See Goldfarb, 421 U. S., 
at  792,  n.  22;  see  also  Brief  for  Respondent  56.    And,  of 
course, the States may provide for the defense and indem­
nification of agency members in the event of litigation. 

States,  furthermore,  can  ensure  Parker  immunity  is
available to agencies by adopting clear policies to displace 
competition;  and,  if  agencies  controlled  by  active  market 
participants interpret or enforce those policies, the States
may  provide  active  supervision.    Precedent  confirms  this 
principle.  The  Court  has  rejected  the  argument  that  it
would be unwise to apply the antitrust laws to professional
regulation  absent  compliance  with  the  prerequisites  for
invoking Parker immunity: 

“[Respondents]  contend  that  effective  peer  review  is
essential  to  the  provision  of  quality  medical  care  and 
that any threat of antitrust liability will prevent phy­
sicians from participating openly and actively in peer-
review  proceedings.    This  argument,  however,  essen­
tially challenges the wisdom of applying the antitrust 
laws  to  the  sphere  of  medical  care,  and  as  such  is 
properly directed to the legislative branch.  To the ex­
tent  that  Congress  has  declined  to  exempt  medical
peer review from the reach of the antitrust laws, peer
review  is  immune  from  antitrust  scrutiny  only  if  the 
State effectively has made this conduct its own.” Pat-
rick, 486 U. S. at 105–106 (footnote omitted). 

The  reasoning  of  Patrick  v.  Burget  applies  to  this  case
with  full  force,  particularly  in  light  of  the  risks  licensing 
boards dominated by market participants may pose to the
free  market.    See  generally  Edlin  &  Haw,  Cartels  by  An­
other Name: Should Licensed Occupations Face Antitrust 
Scrutiny? 162 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1093 (2014).