Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/19pdf/18-556_e1pf.pdf
Page Number: 20.0

Cite as:  589 U. S. ____ (2020) 

3 

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting 

ordinary person’s—or judge’s—judgment, that matters.1 

Finally, a stop must be individualized—that is, based on 
“a  suspicion  that  the  particular  [subject]  being  stopped  is 
engaged in wrongdoing.”  Cortez, 449 U. S., at 418; Prado 
Navarette  v.  California,  572  U. S.  393,  396–397  (2014). 
This does not mean that the officer must know the driver’s 
identity.  But a seizure must rest on more than the “likeli-
hood that [a] given person” or particular vehicle is engaged 
in wrongdoing.  Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U. S., at 886–887.  The 
inquiry  ordinarily  involves  some  observation  or  report 
about the target’s behavior—not merely the class to which 
he belongs.  See, e.g., Navarette, 572 U. S., at 398, 402 (up-
holding  vehicle  stop  based  on  an  anonymous  tip  about 
driver conduct, interpreted in light of the “accumulated ex-
perience of thousands of officers”); Sokolow, 490 U. S., at 10 
(evaluating the collective facts giving rise to suspicion that 
an individual was transporting narcotics instead of relying 
on law enforcement’s simplified drug courier “ ‘profile’ ”). 

B 

Faithful adherence to these precepts would yield a signif-
icantly different analysis and outcome than that offered by 
the majority. 

For  starters,  the  majority  flips  the  burden  of  proof.    It 
permits Kansas police officers to effectuate roadside stops 
whenever  they  lack  “information  negating  an  inference” 
that a vehicle’s unlicensed owner is its driver.  Ante, at 1. 

—————— 

1 Cortez explained why this is so.  Law enforcement officers, behaving
akin  to  “jurors  as  factfinders,”  have  “formulated  certain  commonsense 
conclusions about human behavior” as it relates to “the field of law en-
forcement.”  449 U. S., at 418.  A trained officer thus “draws inferences 
and makes deductions—inferences and deductions that might well elude
an untrained person.”  Ibid.; see also United States v. Arvizu, 534 U. S. 
266, 276 (2002) (crediting officer assessment of driver behavior that was
based on “his specialized training and familiarity with the customs of the 
area’s inhabitants”).