Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/529bv.pdf
Page Number: 848.0

529US3

Unit: $U59

[09-26-01 12:32:42] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 529 U. S. 765 (2000)

773

Opinion of the Court

tected right. See Lujan, supra, at 560–561. A qui tam re-
lator has suffered no such invasion—indeed, the “right” he
seeks to vindicate does not even fully materialize until the
litigation is completed and the relator prevails.3 This is not
to suggest that Congress cannot deﬁne new legal rights,
which in turn will confer standing to vindicate an injury
caused to the claimant. See Warth, supra, at 500. As we
have held in another context, however, an interest that is
merely a “byproduct” of the suit itself cannot give rise to a
cognizable injury in fact for Article III standing purposes.
See Steel Co., supra, at 107 (“[A] plaintiff cannot achieve
standing to litigate a substantive issue by bringing suit for
the cost of bringing suit”); see also Diamond v. Charles, 476
U. S. 54, 69–71 (1986) (holding that assessment of attorney’s
fees against a party does not confer standing to pursue the
action on appeal).

We believe, however, that adequate basis for the relator’s
suit for his bounty is to be found in the doctrine that the
assignee of a claim has standing to assert the injury in fact
suffered by the assignor. The FCA can reasonably be re-
garded as effecting a partial assignment of the Govern-
ment’s damages claim.4 Although we have never expressly
recognized “representational standing” on the part of as-
signees, we have routinely entertained their suits, see, e. g.,

3 Blackstone noted, with regard to English qui tam actions, that “no
particular person, A or B, has any right, claim or demand, in or upon
[the bounty], till after action brought,” and that the bounty constituted an
“inchoate imperfect degree of property . . . [which] is not consummated
till judgment.”

2 W. Blackstone, Commentaries *437.

4 In addressing the Eleventh Amendment issue that we leave open
today, the dissent suggests that we are asserting that a qui tam relator
“is, in effect, suing as an assignee of the United States.” Post, at 802
(opinion of Stevens, J.); see also post, at 796 (same). More precisely, we
are asserting that a qui tam relator is, in effect, suing as a partial assignee
of the United States.