Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/558bv.pdf
Page Number: 252.0

Cite as: 558 U. S. 87 (2009) 

91 

Opinion of the Court 

they asked the court (1) to certify the case as a class action, 
(2) to  declare that they  had a due  process right to  a prompt 
postseizure  probable-cause  hearing,  (3)  to  declare  that  the 
hearing  must  take  place  within  10  days  of  any  seizure,  and 
(4)  to  enjoin  the  defendants’  current  practice  of  keeping 
the  property  in  custody  for  a  longer  time  without  a  judi­
cial  determination  of  probable  cause.  See  Complaint  ¶ 36, 
App. 36a. 

The  defendants  moved  to  dismiss  the  complaint  on  the 
ground that Seventh Circuit precedent made clear that “the 
Constitution does not require any procedure prior to the ac­
tual  forfeiture  proceeding.”  Jones  v.  Takaki,  38  F.  3d  321, 
324 (1994) (citing Von Neumann, supra, at 249).  On Febru­
ary  22,  2007,  the  District  Court  granted  the  motion  to  dis­
miss.  It also denied the plaintiffs’ motion for class certiﬁca­
tion.  The plaintiffs appealed. 

On May 2, 2008, the Seventh Circuit decided the appeal in 
the  plaintiffs’  favor.  Smith  v.  Chicago,  524  F.  3d  834.  It 
reconsidered  and  departed  from  its  earlier  precedent.  Id., 
at 836–839.  It held that “the procedures set out in” the Illi­
nois  statute  “show  insufﬁcient  concern  for  the  due  process 
right  of  the  plaintiffs.”  Id.,  at  838.  And  it  added  that, 
“given  the  length  of  time  which  can  result  between  the  sei­
zure of property and the opportunity for an owner to contest 
the  seizure  under”  Illinois  law,  “some  sort  of  mechanism  to 
test the validity of the retention of the property is required.” 
Ibid.  The  Court  of  Appeals  reversed  the  judgment  of  the 
District  Court  and  remanded  the  case  for  further  proceed­
ings.  Id.,  at  839.  Its  mandate  issued  about  seven  weeks 
thereafter. 

On February 23, 2009, we granted certiorari to review the 
Seventh  Circuit’s  “due  process”  determination.  The  Court 
of  Appeals  had  already  recalled  its  mandate.  The  parties 
ﬁled briefs in this Court.  We then recognized that the case 
might be moot, and we asked the parties to address the ques­
tion of mootness at the forthcoming oral argument.