Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/529bv.pdf
Page Number: 449

529US2

Unit: $U46

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374

WILLIAMS v. TAYLOR

Opinion of Stevens, J.

with the standard of review applicable on habeas appeals
provided by 28 U. S. C. § 2254(d) (1994 ed., Supp. III), the
judge concluded that those errors established that the Vir-
ginia Supreme Court’s decision “was contrary to, or involved
an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal
law” within the meaning of § 2254(d)(1).

The Federal Court of Appeals reversed.

163 F. 3d 860
(CA4 1998).
It construed § 2254(d)(1) as prohibiting the
grant of habeas corpus relief unless the state court “ ‘decided
the question by interpreting or applying the relevant prece-
dent in a manner that reasonable jurists would all agree is
unreasonable.’ ”
Id., at 865 (quoting Green v. French, 143 F.
3d 865, 870 (CA4 1998)). Applying that standard, it could
not say that the Virginia Supreme Court’s decision on the
prejudice issue was an unreasonable application of the tests
developed in either Strickland or Lockhart.6
It explained
that the evidence that Williams presented a future danger
to society was “simply overwhelming,” 163 F. 3d, at 868, it
endorsed the Virginia Supreme Court’s interpretation of
Lockhart, 163 F. 3d, at 869, and it characterized the state
court’s understanding of the facts in this case as “reason-
able,” id., at 870.

We granted certiorari, 526 U. S. 1050 (1999), and now

reverse.

II

In 1867, Congress enacted a statute providing that federal
courts “shall have power to grant writs of habeas corpus in

preme Court ignored or overlooked the evidence of Williams’ difﬁcult
childhood and abuse and his limited mental capacity.
It is also unreason-
able to characterize the additional evidence as coming from ‘mostly rela-
tives.’ As stated, supra, Bruce Elliott, a respected professional in the
community, and several correctional ofﬁcers offered to testify on Williams
behalf.”

Id., at 476.

6 Like the Virginia Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals assumed, with-
out deciding, that the performance of trial counsel fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness.

163 F. 3d, at 867.