Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/21pdf/20-603_o758.pdf
Page Number: 17.0

Cite as:  597 U. S. ____ (2022) 

13 

Opinion of the Court 

Government” is not alone sufficient to do away with sover-
eign immunity.  Seminole Tribe, 517 U. S., at 72; see post, 
at 11–12.  We agree.  In Seminole Tribe, we held that Con-
gress could not rely on its Article I commerce powers to ab-
rogate state sovereign immunity simply because that power 
was exclusive.  517 U. S., at 72.  But later, in PennEast, we 
found  that  the  federal  eminent  domain  power  was  “ ‘com-
plete in itself,’ ” and held that was enough to find a waiver 
of sovereign immunity in the constitutional structure.  594 
U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 22).  It thus matters to the analysis
that  federal  regulation  of  commerce  (at  issue  in  Seminole 
Tribe)  involves  goods  that,  before  they  travel  between 
States or outside a tribe, are subject to regulation by a sov-
ereign  other  than  the  Federal  Government  (a  State  or 
tribe).  That feature of commerce arguably makes the fed-
eral  regulatory  power  less  than  “complete.”    The  dissent 
takes issue with this “complete in itself ” inquiry.  See post, 
at 21–29.  But its quarrel lies with PennEast, which used 
the formulation we rely upon today.

In any event, the text, history, and precedent we have de-
scribed  indicate  that  an  assertion  of  state  sovereignty  to
frustrate  federal  prerogatives  to  raise  and  maintain  mili-
tary forces would be strongly “contradictory and repugnant” 
to the constitutional order.  The Federalist No. 32, at 200 
(A.  Hamilton)  (emphasis  in  original).  Neither  Seminole 
Tribe  nor  the  cases  that  followed  it,  such  as  Florida  Pre-
paid, 527 U. S. 627, considered federal powers that give rise
to these same structural inferences.  None of those powers 
(e.g., Indian commerce, interstate commerce, or intellectual 
property) is expressly denied to the States, or operates for 
the benefit of the entire Nation, or proves comparably es-
sential to the survival of the Union—itself a foundational 
purpose for drafting the Constitution.  See Brief for United 
States  as  Amicus  Curiae  30–31.  These  factors,  taken  to-
gether, lead us to conclude that the results in PennEast and 
Katz, not dicta in Seminole Tribe, control this case.