Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/10pdf/09-530.pdf
Page Number: 35.0

Cite as:  562 U. S. ____ (2011) 

7 

SCALIA, J., concurring in judgment 

gets  to  pontificate  upon  a  matter  that  is  none  of  its
business:  the  appropriate  balance  between  security  and 
privacy.    If  I  am  correct  that  there  exists  no  right  to  in-
formational  privacy,  all  that  discussion  is  an  exercise  in 
judicial  maximalism.    Better  simply  to  state  and  apply 
the  law  forthrightly  than  to  hold  our  view  of  the  law  in 
pectore,  so  that  we  can  inquire  into  matters  beyond  our 
charter, and probably beyond our ken. 

If, on the other hand, the Court believes that there is a 
constitutional right to informational privacy, then I fail to
see the minimalist virtues in delivering a lengthy opinion 
analyzing  that  right  while  coyly  noting  that  the  right  is
“assumed” rather than “decided.”  Thirty-three years have 
passed since the Court first suggested that the right may, 
or may not, exist.  It is past time for the Court to abandon 
this Alfred Hitchcock line of our jurisprudence.

2. It harms our image, if not our self-respect, because it 
makes no sense.  The Court decides that the Government 
did  not  violate  the  right  to  informational  privacy  without 
deciding whether there is a right to informational privacy,
and  without  even  describing  what  hypothetical  standard
should  be  used  to  assess  whether  the  hypothetical  right 
has been violated.  As I explained last Term in objecting to 
another of the Court’s never-say-never dispositions: 

“[The  Court]  cannot  decide  that  [respondents’]  claim
fails  without  first  deciding  what  a  valid  claim  would
consist  of. . . .  [A]greeing  to  or  crafting  a  hypothetical
standard for a hypothetical constitutional right is suf-
ficiently  unappealing  . . .  that  [the  Court]  might  as 
well acknowledge the right as well.  Or [it] could avoid
the  need  to  agree  with  or  craft  a  hypothetical  stan-
dard by denying the right.  But embracing a standard 
while  being  coy  about  the  right  is,  well,  odd;  and  de-
ciding this case while addressing neither the standard 
nor the right is quite impossible.”  Stop the Beach Re-