Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/529bv.pdf
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529US3

Unit: $U60

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834

UNITED STATES v. PLAYBOY ENTERTAINMENT
GROUP, INC.
Scalia, J., dissenting

“virtually 100% sexually explicit adult programming.” 30
F. Supp. 2d 702, 707 (Del. 1998). For example, on its Spice
network, Playboy describes its own programming as depict-
ing such activities as “female masturbation/external,” “girl/
girl sex,” and “oral sex/cunnilingus.”
1 Record, Exh. 73,
p. TWC00132. As one would expect, given this content,
Playboy advertises accordingly, with calls to “Enjoy the sexi-
est, hottest adult movies in the privacy of your own home.”
6 id., Exh. 136, at 2P009732. An example of the promotion
for a particular movie is as follows: “Little miss country girls
are aching for a quick roll in the hay! Watch southern hos-
pitality pull out all the stops as these ravin’ nymphos tear
down the barn and light up the big country sky.” 7 id., Exh.
226, at 2P009187. One may doubt whether—or marvel
that—this sort of embarrassingly juvenile promotion really
attracts what Playboy assures us is an “adult” audience.
But it is certainly marketing sex.3

Thus, while I agree with Justice Breyer’s child-
protection analysis, it leaves me with the same feeling of

3 Both the Court, see ante, at 811, and Justice Thomas, see ante, at
830 (concurring opinion), ﬁnd great importance in the fact that “this case
has been litigated on the assumption that the programming at issue is not
obscene, but merely indecent,” see ibid. (emphasis deleted). But as I
noted in FW/PBS, Inc. v. Dallas, 493 U. S. 215, 262–263 (1990) (opinion
concurring in part and dissenting in part), we have not allowed the parties’
litigating positions to place limits upon our development of obscenity law.
See, e. g., Miller v. California, 413 U. S. 15, 24–25 (1973) (abandoning “ut-
terly without redeeming social value” test sua sponte); Ginzburg v. United
States, 383 U. S. 463 (1966) (adopting pandering theory unargued by the
Government); Mishkin v. New York, 383 U. S. 502 (1966) (upholding convic-
tions on theory that obscenity could be deﬁned by looking to the intent of
the disseminator, despite respondent’s express disavowal of that theory).
As for Justice Thomas’s concern that there has been no factual ﬁnding
of obscenity in this case, see ante, at 830 (concurring opinion): This is not
an as-applied challenge, in which the issue is whether a particular course
of conduct constitutes obscenity; it is a facial challenge, in which the issue
is whether the terms of this statute address obscenity. That is not for
the factﬁnder below, but for this Court.