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8 

OKLAHOMA v. CASTRO-HUERTA 

Opinion of the Court 

diction of the United States, except the District of Colum-
bia, shall extend to the Indian country.”  18 U. S. C. §1152. 
By its terms, the Act does not preempt the State’s author-
ity to prosecute non-Indians who commit crimes against In-
dians  in  Indian  country.    The  text  of  the  Act  simply  “ex-
tend[s]”  federal  law  to  Indian  country,  leaving  untouched
the  background  principle  of  state  jurisdiction  over  crimes 
committed  within  the  State,  including  in  Indian  country. 
Ibid. 

The  Act  also  specifies  the  body  of  federal  criminal  law 
that extends to Indian country—namely, “the general laws
of the United States as to the punishment of offenses com-
mitted in any place within the sole and exclusive jurisdic-
tion  of  the  United  States.”    Ibid.   Those  cross-referenced 
“general laws” are the federal laws that apply in federal en-
claves such as military bases and national parks.  Ibid. 

Importantly, however, the General Crimes Act does not
say that Indian country is equivalent to a federal enclave 
for jurisdictional purposes.  Nor does the Act say that fed-
eral jurisdiction is exclusive in Indian country, or that state 
jurisdiction is preempted in Indian country.

Under the General Crimes Act, therefore, both the Fed-
eral Government and the State have concurrent jurisdiction
to  prosecute  crimes  committed  in  Indian  country.2    The  
General  Crimes  Act  does  not  preempt  state  authority  to
prosecute Castro-Huerta’s crime. 

To overcome the text, Castro-Huerta offers several coun-

terarguments.  None is persuasive. 

—————— 

2 To the extent that a State lacks prosecutorial authority over crimes 
committed by Indians in Indian country (a question not before us), that
would not be a result of the General Crimes Act.  Instead, it would be the 
result of a separate principle of federal law that, as discussed below, pre-
cludes  state  interference  with  tribal  self-government.  See  Part  III–B, 
infra; White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U. S. 136, 142–143, 
145 (1980); McClanahan v. Arizona Tax Comm’n, 411 U. S. 164, 171−172 
(1973).