Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/22pdf/21-1086_1co6.pdf
Page Number: 103.0

Cite as:  599 U. S. ____ (2023) 

7 

ALITO, J., dissenting 

constitutional, and I do not understand the majority’s anal-
ysis of Alabama’s constitutional claim to suggest otherwise.  
Ante,  at  33–34;  ante,  at  4  (KAVANAUGH,  J.,  concurring  in 
part). 
  Our  cases  make  it  perfectly  clear  that  using  race  as  a 
“predominant factor” in drawing legislative districts is un-
constitutional  unless  the  stringent  requirements  of  strict 
scrutiny can be satisfied,2 and therefore if §2 can be found 
to require the adoption of an additional majority-minority 
district that was created under a process that assigned race 
a  “predominant”  role,  §2  and  the  Constitution  would  be 
headed for a collision. 

II 
  When the  meaning  of  a  “reasonably configured” district 
is properly understood, it is apparent that the decisions be-
low must be vacated and that the cases must be remanded 
for  the  application  of  the  proper  test.    In  its  analysis  of 
whether the plaintiffs satisfied the first Gingles precondi-
tion, the District Court gave much attention to some tradi-
tional  districting  criteria—specifically,  compactness  and 
avoiding the splitting of political subdivisions and commu-
nities  of  interest—but  it  failed  to  consider  whether  the 
plaintiffs  had  shown  that  their  illustrative  districts  were 
created without giving race a “predominant role.”  Singleton 
v. Merrill, 582 F. Supp. 3d 924, 1008–1016 (ND Ala. 2022).  
For  this reason, the District  Court’s  §2  analysis was  defi-
cient. 
  It is true that the District Court addressed the question 
of  race-predominance  when  it  discussed  and  rejected  the 
State’s  argument  that  the  plaintiffs’  maps  violated  the 
Equal Protection Clause, but the court’s understanding of 
predominance was deeply flawed.  The court began this part 

—————— 

2 Although our cases have posited that racial predominance may be ac-
ceptable if strict scrutiny is satisfied, the Court does not contend that it 
is satisfied here.