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Page Number: 21.0

2 

SNYDER v. PHELPS 

BREYER, J., concurring 

of  speech.  But  it  points  out  that  the  speech,  like  an  as-
sault,  seriously  harmed  a  private  individual.    Indeed,  the 
state  tort  of  “intentional  infliction  of  emotional  distress” 
forbids only conduct that produces distress “so severe that
no  reasonable  man  could  be  expected  to  endure  it,”  and
which itself is “so outrageous in character, and so extreme
in  degree,  as  to  go  beyond  all  possible  bounds  of  decency,
and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in 
a civilized community.”  Post, at 2–3 (opinion of ALITO, J.) 
(quoting Harris v. Jones, 281 Md. 560, 567, 571, 380 A. 2d 
611,  614,  616  (1977);  internal  quotation  marks  omitted). 
The dissent requires us to ask whether our holding unrea-
sonably  limits  liability  for  intentional  infliction  of  emo-
tional  distress—to  the  point  where  A  (in  order  to  draw
attention to his views on a public matter) might launch a
verbal assault upon B, a private person, publicly revealing 
the most intimate details of B’s private life, while knowing 
that  the  revelation  will  cause  B  severe  emotional  harm. 
Does our decision leave the State powerless to protect the 
individual against invasions of, e.g., personal privacy, even
in the most horrendous of such circumstances? 

As I understand the Court’s opinion, it does not hold or 
imply that the State is always powerless to provide private
individuals  with  necessary  protection.    Rather,  the  Court 
has  reviewed  the  underlying  facts  in  detail, as  will  some-
times prove necessary where First Amendment values and 
state-protected  (say,  privacy-related)  interests  seriously
conflict.  Cf.  Florida  Star  v.  B. J. F.,  491  U. S.  524,  533 
(1989);  Bose  Corp.  v.  Consumers  Union  of  United  States, 
Inc.,  466  U. S.  485,  499  (1984).    That  review  makes  clear 
that  Westboro’s  means  of  communicating  its  views  con-
sisted  of  picketing  in  a  place  where  picketing  was  lawful 
and in compliance with all police directions.  The picketing 
could  not  be  seen  or  heard  from  the  funeral  ceremony 
itself.  And Snyder testified that he saw no more than the
tops of the picketers’ signs as he drove to the funeral.  To