Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/23pdf/23-939_e2pg.pdf
Page Number: 111.0

14 

TRUMP v. UNITED STATES 

JACKSON, J., dissenting 

does  not  contain  a  Core  Powers  Clause.6   So  the  actual 
metes and bounds of the “core” Presidential powers are re-
ally anyone’s guess.

Nor does the majority explain how to consistently distin-
guish between official and unofficial acts.  Quite the oppo-
site, in fact.  While acknowledging that this is a critical line
that  courts  must  draw  in  order  for  its  new  accountability 
model to work properly, the majority simultaneously cau-
tions that making this distinction “can be difficult”—likely
a  gross  understatement  given  the  recognized  “breadth  of
the  President’s  ‘discretionary  responsibilities’  under  the 
Constitution  and  laws  of  the  United  States.”  Ante,  at  17. 
The  majority  likewise  provides  no  guidance  as  to  when, 
how,  or  why  the  President’s  “presumptive”  immunity  for 
noncore official acts might be rebutted, saying only that ap-
plying the criminal law to a President’s acts must pose “no
‘dangers of intrusion on the authority and functions of the
Executive Branch.’ ”  Ante, at 14 (quoting Nixon v. Fitzger-
ald, 457 U. S. 731, 754 (1982)).

At  most,  to  distinguish  official  from  unofficial  conduct,
the majority advises asking whether the former President’s 
conduct was “ ‘manifestly or palpably beyond [his] author-
ity.’ ”  Ante, at 17 (quoting Blassingame v. Trump, 87 F. 4th 
1, 13 (CADC 2023)).  But that test can be illusory, as is ev-
idenced by the facts alleged in this very case.  With respect
to  the  indictment’s  allegations  concerning  petitioner’s  at-
tempt  to  assemble  false  slates  of  electors  in  conjunction 

—————— 

6 Some of the powers the majority designates as “core” powers are, at 
best,  implied  from  indefinite  constitutional  language.    See,  e.g.,  Seila 
Law, 591 U. S., at 268–269 (KAGAN, J., concurring in judgment with re-
spect to severability and dissenting in part) (“Nowhere does the text say
anything about the President’s power to remove subordinate officials at 
will”); Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 576 U. S. 1, 11 (2015) (“[T]he Constitution does
not use the term ‘recognition,’ either in Article II or elsewhere”); id., at 
63  (ROBERTS, C. J.,  dissenting)  (calling  the  “asserted  textual  bases”  for 
an exclusive Presidential recognition power “tenuous”).