Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/529bv.pdf
Page Number: 582.0

529US2

Unit: $U51

[09-26-01 10:31:04] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 529 U. S. 494 (2000)

507

Stevens, J., dissenting

§ 1962(d), sue co-conspirators who might not themselves have
violated one of the substantive provisions of § 1962.

III

We conclude, therefore, that a person may not bring suit
under § 1964(c) predicated on a violation of § 1962(d) for inju-
ries caused by an overt act that is not an act of racketeering
or otherwise unlawful under the statute.

The judgment of the Court of Appeals is afﬁrmed.

It is so ordered.

Justice Stevens, with whom Justice Souter joins,

dissenting.

For the purpose of decision, I assume—as I think the
Court does—that petitioner has alleged an injury proxi-
mately caused by an overt act in furtherance of a conspiracy
that violated 18 U. S. C. § 1962(d).
In my judgment, the
plain language of the Racketeer Inﬂuenced and Corrupt Or-
ganizations Act (RICO) makes it clear that petitioner there-
fore has a cause of action under § 1964(c), whether or not the
overt act is a racketeering activity listed in § 1961(1). The
common-law civil conspiracy cases relied upon by the Court
prove nothing to the contrary.

A “conspiracy” is an illegal agreement. There is, of
course, a difference between the question whether an agree-
ment is illegal and the question whether an admittedly illegal
agreement gives rise to a cause of action for damages. Sec-
tion 1962(d), which makes RICO conspiracies unlawful, ad-
dresses the former question; 1 § 1964(c), which imposes civil

1 Those who participate in an illegal agreement to violate the substan-
tive provisions of § 1962(a), (b), or (c) have engaged in a conspiracy in
violation of § 1962(d). See Salinas v. United States, 522 U. S. 52, 63–65
(1997). Although “[t]here is no requirement of some overt act” to violate
§ 1962(d), id., at 63, that, of course, does not mean that an agreement alone
gives rise to civil liability under § 1964(c).