Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/20pdf/19-123_g3bi.pdf
Page Number: 9.0

Cite as:  593 U. S. ____ (2021) 

5 

Opinion of the Court 

that the City’s actions have burdened CSS’s religious exer-
cise by putting it to the choice of curtailing its mission or 
approving relationships inconsistent with its beliefs.  The 
City disagrees.  In its view, certification reflects only that
foster  parents  satisfy  the  statutory  criteria,  not  that  the 
agency endorses their relationships.  But CSS believes that 
certification is tantamount to endorsement.  And “religious
beliefs  need  not  be  acceptable,  logical,  consistent,  or  com-
prehensible  to  others  in  order  to  merit  First  Amendment 
protection.”  Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Employment Se-
curity Div., 450 U. S. 707, 714 (1981).  Our task is to decide 
whether the burden the City has placed on the religious ex-
ercise of CSS is constitutionally permissible. 

Smith held that laws incidentally burdening religion are 
ordinarily not subject to strict scrutiny under the Free Ex-
ercise Clause so long as they are neutral and generally ap-
plicable.  494 U. S., at 878–882.  CSS urges us to overrule 
Smith, and the concurrences in the judgment argue in favor 
of  doing  so,  see  post,  p. 1  (opinion  of  ALITO,  J.);  post,  p. 1 
(opinion of GORSUCH, J.).  But we need not revisit that de-
cision here.  This case falls outside Smith because the City
has burdened the religious exercise of CSS through policies
that do not meet the requirement of being neutral and gen-
erally applicable.  See Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. 
v. Hialeah, 508 U. S. 520, 531–532 (1993). 

Government fails to act neutrally when it proceeds in a
manner intolerant of religious beliefs or restricts practices
because  of  their  religious  nature. 
See  Masterpiece 
Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Comm’n, 584 U. S. 
___, ___–___ (2018) (slip op., at 16–17); Lukumi, 508 U. S., 
at 533.  CSS points to evidence in the record that it believes 
demonstrates that the City has transgressed this neutrality
standard,  but  we  find  it  more  straightforward  to  resolve
this case under the rubric of general applicability.

A law is not generally applicable if it “invite[s]” the gov-
ernment  to  consider  the  particular  reasons  for  a  person’s