Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/04pdf/04-278.pdf
Page Number: 31

4 

CASTLE ROCK v. GONZALES 

STEVENS, J., dissenting 

518 U. S. 137, 145 (1996) (per curiam). 

Unfortunately,  the  Court  does  not  even  attempt  to
demonstrate  that  the  six-judge  en  banc  majority  was 
“clearly wrong” in its interpretation of Colorado’s domestic 
restraining  order  statute;  nor  could  such  a  showing  be 
made.  For  it  is  certainly  plausible  to  construe  “shall  use 
every  reasonable  means  to  enforce  a  restraining  order” 
and “shall  arrest,” Colo. Rev. Stat. §§18–6–803.5(3)(a)–(b) 
(Lexis  1999)  (emphases  added),  as  conveying  mandatory
directives  to  the  police,  particularly  when  the  same  stat-
ute,  at  other  times,  tellingly  employs  different  language
that  suggests  police  discretion,  see  §18–6–803.5(6)(a)  (“A 
peace  officer  is  authorized  to  use  every  reasonable  means 
to  protect  . . .”;  “Such  peace  officer  may  transport  . . .” 
(emphases added)).1  Moreover, unlike today’s decision, the 
Court of Appeals was attentive to the legislative history of 
the statute, focusing on a statement by the statute’s spon-
sor  in  the  Colorado  House,  ante,  at  10,  n. 6  (quoting
statement),  which  it  took  to  “emphasiz[e]  the  importance
of  the  police’s  mandatory  enforcement  of  domestic  re-
straining  orders.”    366  F. 3d  1093,  1107  (CA10  2004)  (en 
banc).  Far  from  overlooking  the  traditional  presumption 
of  police  discretion,  then,  the  Court  of  Appeals’  diligent 
analysis of the statute’s text, purpose, and history led it to 
conclude that the Colorado Legislature intended precisely 
to  abrogate  that  presumption  in  the  specific  context  of 
domestic restraining orders.  That conclusion is eminently 
reasonable and, I believe, worthy of our deference.2 

—————— 

1 The Court of Appeals also looked to other provisions of the statute to 
inform  its  analysis.    In  particular,  it  reasoned  that  a  provision  that 
gave  police  officers  qualified  immunity  in  connection  with  their  en-
forcement  of  restraining  orders,  see  Colo.  Rev.  Stat.  §18–6–803.5(5)
(Lexis  1999),  supported  the  inference  that  the  Colorado  Legislature 
intended  mandatory  enforcement.    See  366  F. 3d  1093,  1108  (CA10 
2004) (en banc). 

2 The Court declines to show deference for the odd reason that, in its