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Page Number: 23

18 

BIDEN v. TEXAS 

Opinion of the Court 

authority to some extent.  Importantly, the authority is not 
unbounded: DHS may exercise its discretion to parole ap-
plicants “only on a case-by-case basis for urgent humanitar-
ian reasons or significant public benefit.”  Ibid.  And under 
the APA, DHS’s exercise of discretion within that statutory
framework  must be reasonable and reasonably explained.
See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Assn. of United States, Inc. v. State 
Farm Mut.  Automobile Ins. Co., 463 U. S. 29 (1983).  But 
the  availability  of  the  parole  option  additionally  makes 
clear  that  the  Court  of  Appeals  erred  in  holding  that  the 
INA  required  the  Government  to  continue  implementing 
MPP. 

In sum, the contiguous-territory return authority in sec-
tion 1225(b)(2)(C) is discretionary—and remains discretion-
ary notwithstanding any violation of section 1225(b)(2)(A).
To reiterate: we need not and do not resolve the parties’ ar-
guments regarding whether section 1225(b)(2)(A) must be 
read  in  light  of  traditional  principles  of  law  enforcement 
discretion,  and  whether  the  Government  is  lawfully  exer-
cising its parole authorities pursuant to sections 1182(d)(5)
and  1226(a).  We  merely  hold  that  section  1225(b)(2)(C)
means what it says: “may” means “may,” and the INA itself
does  not  require  the  Secretary  to  continue  exercising  his
discretionary authority under these circumstances. 

IV 
The Court of Appeals also erred in holding that “[t]he Oc-
tober  29  Memoranda  did  not  constitute  a  new  and  sepa-
rately reviewable ‘final agency action.’ ”  20 F. 4th, at 951. 
To recap, the Secretary first attempted to terminate MPP
through the June 1 Memorandum.  As the Court of Appeals 
correctly held, that constituted final agency action.  See id., 
at 947 (citing Bennett v. Spear, 520 U. S. 154 (1997)).  But 
the District Court found that the Secretary’s stated grounds 
in the June 1 Memorandum were inadequate, and therefore
“vacated”  the  June  1  Memorandum  and  “remanded  [the