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AXON ENTERPRISE, INC. v. FTC 

Syllabus 

First,  preclusion  of  district  court  jurisdiction  “could  foreclose  all 
meaningful judicial review.”  Id., at 212–13.  Adequate judicial review 
does not usually demand a district court’s involvement.  And the stat-
utes  at issue  in  this  case  provide  for  judicial  review  of  adverse  SEC 
and FTC actions in a court of appeals.  But Cochran and Axon assert 
a  “here-and-now  injury”  from  being  subjected  to  an  illegitimate  pro-
ceeding, led by an illegitimate decisionmaker.  Seila Law LLC v. Con-
sumer Financial Protection Bureau, 591 U. S. ___, ___.  That injury is 
impossible to remedy once the proceeding is over, which is when ap-
pellate review kicks in.  Judicial review of the structural constitutional 
claims  would  thus  come  too late  to be meaningful.    To be  sure,  “the 
expense and disruption” of “protracted adjudicatory proceedings” on a 
claim do not alone justify immediate review.  FTC v. Standard Oil Co. 
of Cal., 449 U. S. 232, 244.  But the nature of the injury here is differ-
ent: As with a right “not to stand trial” that is “effectively lost” if review 
is deferred until after trial, see Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U. S. 511, 526, 
Axon and Cochran will lose their rights not to undergo the complained-
of agency proceedings if they cannot assert those rights until the pro-
ceedings are over. 

The collateralism factor also favors  Axon  and Cochran.  The  chal-
lenges to the Commissions’ authority have nothing to do with either 
the  enforcement-related  matters  the  Commissions  regularly  adjudi-
cate or those they would adjudicate in assessing the charges against 
Axon and Cochran.  Elgin, 567 U. S., at 22.  The parties’ claims are 
thus “ ‘collateral’ to any Commission orders or rules from which review 
might be sought.”  Free Enterprise Fund, 561 U. S., at 490. 

Finally,  Cochran’s  and  Axon’s  claims  are  “outside  the  [Commis-
sions’] expertise.”  Thunder Basin, 510 U. S., at 212.  The Court in Free 
Enterprise Fund determined that claims that tenure protections vio-
late Article II raise “standard questions of administrative” and consti-
tutional  law,  detached  from  “considerations  of  agency  policy.”    561 
U. S., at 491.  That statement covers Axon’s and Cochran’s claims that 
ALJs  are  too  far  insulated  from  the  President’s  removal  authority. 
And Axon’s constitutional challenge to the combination of prosecuto-
rial and adjudicative functions in the FTC is similarly distant from the 
FTC’s  “competence  and  expertise.”  Ibid.    The  Commission  knows  a 
good deal about competition policy, but nothing special about the sep-
aration of powers.  For that reason, “agency adjudications are gener-
ally  ill  suited  to  address  structural  constitutional  challenges”—like 
those maintained here.  Carr v. Saul, 593 U. S. ___, ___.  The Court 
concludes that the claims here are not the type the statutory review 
schemes at issue reach.  Pp. 10–18. 

No. 21–86, 986 F. 3d 1173, reversed and remanded; No. 21–1239, 20 F. 

4th 194, affirmed and remanded.