Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/529bv.pdf
Page Number: 915.0

529US3

Unit: $U60

[09-26-01 12:39:04] PAGES PGT: OPIN

840

UNITED STATES v. PLAYBOY ENTERTAINMENT
GROUP, INC.
Breyer, J., dissenting

million children in homes with faulty scrambling systems.
See id., at 12. And, of course, the record contains additional
anecdotal evidence and the concerns expressed by elected
ofﬁcials, probative of a larger problem. See 30 F. Supp. 2d,
at 709, and n. 10; see also 141 Cong. Rec. 15586 (1995).

I would add to this empirical evidence the majority’s own
statement that “most cable operators had ‘no practical choice
but to curtail’ ” adult programming by switching to night-
time only transmission of adult channels. Ante, at 809 (em-
phasis added) (quoting 30 F. Supp. 2d, at 711).
If signal
bleed is not a signiﬁcant empirical problem, then why, in
light of the cost of its cure, must so many cable operators
switch to nighttime hours? There is no realistic answer to
this question.
I do not think it realistic to imagine that sig-
nal bleed occurs just enough to make cable operators skittish,
without also signiﬁcantly exposing children to these images.
See ante, at 821.

If, as the majority suggests, the signal bleed problem is
not signiﬁcant, then there is also no signiﬁcant burden on
speech created by § 505. The majority cannot have this evi-
dence both ways. And if, given this logical difﬁculty and
the quantity of empirical evidence, the majority still believes
that the Government has not proved its case, then it imposes
a burden upon the Government beyond that suggested in any
other First Amendment case of which I am aware.

III

The majority’s second claim—that the Government failed
to demonstrate the absence of a “less restrictive alterna-
tive”—presents a closer question. The speciﬁc question is
whether § 504’s “opt-out” amounts to a “less restrictive,” but
similarly practical and effective, way to accomplish § 505’s
child-protecting objective. As Reno tells us, a “less restric-
tive alternativ[e]” must be “at least as effective in achieving
the legitimate purpose that the statute was enacted to
serve.”

521 U. S., at 874.