Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/529bv.pdf
Page Number: 780.0

529US3

Unit: $U56

[09-28-01 09:22:18] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 529 U. S. 694 (2000)

705

Opinion of the Court

fendant incarcerated for a term as long as the original super-
In-
vised release term. But that is not what Congress did.
stead of using “terminate” with the sense of ﬁnality just
illustrated in subsection (1), Congress used the verb “re-
voke” and so at the least left the door open to a reading of
subsection (3) that would not preclude further supervised
release after the initial revocation.7
In fact, the phrasing of
subsection (3) did more than just leave the door open to the
nonpreclusive reading.

As it was written before the 1994 amendments, subsection
(3) did not provide (as it now does) that the court could re-
voke the release term and require service of a prison term
equal to the maximum authorized length of a term of super-
vised release.
It provided, rather, that the court could “re-
voke a term of supervised release, and require the person
to serve in prison all or part of the term of supervised
release . . . .” So far as the text is concerned, it is not a
“term of imprisonment” that is to be served, but all or part
of “the term of supervised release.” But if “the term of
supervised release” is being served, in whole or part, in
prison, then something about the term of supervised release
survives the preceding order of revocation. While this
sounds very metaphysical, the metaphysics make one thing
clear: unlike a “terminated” order of supervised release, one

7 The dissent offers an erudite explanation of the different senses of the
two words, intending to demonstrate that Congress displayed “an admira-
bly precise use of language,” by using “revoke” to mean “annul” and “ter-
minate” to indicate that “[t]he supervised release is treated as fulﬁlled,
and the sentence is complete.” Post, at 717 (opinion of Scalia, J.). That
is virtuoso lexicography, but it shows only that English is rich enough to
give even textualists room for creative readings. This one encounters
serious difﬁculties; the very same section of the statute (as in effect at the
time of Johnson’s offense) provides that if the person released is found in
possession of a controlled substance, “the court shall terminate the term
of supervised release and require the defendant to serve in prison not less
than one-third of the term of supervised release.”
18 U. S. C. § 3583(g)
(1988 ed.).