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Page Number: 4.0

4 

MATAL v. TAM 

Syllabus 

rowly  drawn.”  Id.,  at  564–565  (internal  quotation  marks  omitted).
One purported interest is in preventing speech expressing ideas that
offend,  but  that  idea  strikes  at  the  heart  of  the  First  Amendment. 
The  second  interest  asserted  is  protecting  the  orderly  flow  of  com-
merce  from  disruption  caused  by  trademarks  that  support  invidious
discrimination;  but  the  clause,  which  reaches  any  trademark  that
disparages  any  person,  group,  or  institution,  is  not  narrowly  drawn. 
Pp.  23–26.

 JUSTICE  KENNEDY,  joined  by  JUSTICE  GINSBURG,  JUSTICE  SO-
TOMAYOR, and  JUSTICE  KAGAN, agreed  that  15  U. S. C.  §1052(a)  con-
stitutes viewpoint discrimination, concluding: 

(a) With  few  narrow  exceptions,  a  fundamental  principle  of  the 
First Amendment is that the government may not punish or suppress
speech  based  on  disapproval  of  the  ideas  or  perspectives  the  speech 
conveys.  See Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 
U. S.  819,  828–829.    The  test  for  viewpoint  discrimination  is  wheth-
er—within  the  relevant  subject  category—the  government  has  sin-
gled  out  a  subset  of  messages  for  disfavor  based  on  the  views  ex-
pressed.  Here,  the  disparagement  clause  identifies  the  relevant 
subject  as  “persons,  living  or  dead,  institutions,  beliefs,  or  national
symbols,” §1052(a); and within that category, an applicant may regis-
ter a positive or benign mark but not a derogatory one.  The law thus 
reflects the Government’s disapproval of a subset of messages it finds 
offensive, the essence of viewpoint discrimination.  The Government’s 
arguments in defense of the statute are unpersuasive.  Pp. 2–5.

(b) Regardless  of  whether  trademarks  are  commercial  speech,  the 
viewpoint  based  discrimination  here  necessarily  invokes  heightened 
scrutiny.  See Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U. S. 552, 566.  To the 
extent  trademarks  qualify  as  commercial  speech,  they  are  an  exam-
ple of why that category does not serve as a blanket exemption from 
the  First  Amendment’s  requirement  of  viewpoint  neutrality.    In  the 
realm of trademarks, the metaphorical marketplace of ideas becomes 
a  tangible,  powerful  reality.    To  permit  viewpoint  discrimination  in 
this context is to permit Government censorship.  Pp. 5–7. 

ALITO,  J.,  announced  the  judgment  of  the  Court  and  delivered  the
opinion  of  the  Court  with  respect  to  Parts  I,  II,  and  III–A,  in  which 
ROBERTS,  C. J.,  and  KENNEDY,  GINSBURG,  BREYER,  SOTOMAYOR,  and 
KAGAN, JJ., joined, and in which THOMAS, J., joined except for Part II,
and  an  opinion  with  respect  to  Parts  III–B,  III–C,  and  IV,  in  which 
ROBERTS, C. J., and THOMAS and BREYER, JJ., joined.  KENNEDY, J., filed 
an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, in which
GINSBURG,  SOTOMAYOR,  and  KAGAN,  JJ.,  joined.    THOMAS,  J.,  filed  an 
opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.  GORSUCH, 
J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.