Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/19pdf/18-556_e1pf.pdf
Page Number: 11

Cite as:  589 U. S. ____ (2020) 

9 

Opinion of the Court 

V 
This  Court’s  precedents  have  repeatedly  affirmed  that
“ ‘the ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is “rea-
sonableness.” ’ ”  Heien,  574  U. S.,  at  60  (quoting  Riley  v. 
California, 573 U. S. 373, 381 (2014)).  Under the totality of
the circumstances of this case, Deputy Mehrer drew an en-
tirely  reasonable  inference  that  Glover  was  driving  while
his license was revoked. 

We emphasize the narrow scope of our holding.  Like all 
seizures,  “[t]he  officer’s  action  must  be  ‘justified  at  its  in-
ception.’ ”  Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court of Nev., Hum-
boldt Cty., 542 U. S. 177, 185 (2004) (quoting United States 
v. Sharpe, 470 U. S. 675, 682 (1985)).  “The standard takes 
into  account  the  totality  of  the  circumstances—the  whole
picture.”  Navarette,  572  U. S.,  at  397  (internal  quotation 
marks omitted).  As a result, the presence of additional facts
might dispel reasonable suspicion.  See Terry, supra, at 28. 
For example, if an officer knows that the registered owner
of  the  vehicle  is  in  his  mid-sixties  but  observes  that  the 
driver  is  in  her  mid-twenties,  then  the  totality  of  the  cir-
cumstances would not “raise a suspicion that the particular
individual being stopped is engaged in wrongdoing.”  Cor-
tez,  449  U. S.,  at  418;  Ornelas,  517  U. S.,  at  696  (“ ‘[e]ach 
case is to be decided on its own facts and circumstances’ ” 
(quoting Ker v. California, 374 U. S. 23, 33 (1963))).  Here, 
Deputy Mehrer possessed no exculpatory information—let 
alone sufficient information to rebut the reasonable infer-
ence that Glover was driving his own truck—and thus the 
stop was justified.2 

—————— 
of Mexican ancestry”). 

2 The dissent argues that this approach impermissibly places the bur-
den of proof on the individual to negate the inference of reasonable sus-
picion.  Post, at 3.  Not so.  As the above analysis makes clear, it is the 
information possessed by the officer at the time of the stop, not any in-
formation  offered  by  the  individual  after  the  fact,  that  can  negate  the 
inference.