Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/21pdf/21-418_i425.pdf
Page Number: 33.0

28 

KENNEDY v. BREMERTON SCHOOL DIST. 

Opinion of the Court 

B, supra.6 

The absence of evidence of coercion in this record leaves 
the District to its final redoubt.  Here, the District suggests 
that  any  visible  religious  conduct  by  a  teacher  or  coach 
should be deemed—without more and as a matter of law— 
impermissibly coercive on students.  In essence, the District 
asks us to adopt the view that the only acceptable govern-
ment  role  models  for  students  are  those  who  eschew  any 
visible  religious  expression.    See  also  post,  at  16–17 
(SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting).  If the argument sounds famil-
iar, it should.  Really, it is just another way of repackaging
the  District’s  earlier  submission  that  government  may
script everything a teacher or coach says in the workplace.
See Part III–B, supra.  The only added twist here is the Dis-
trict’s  suggestion  not  only  that  it  may  prohibit  teachers
from engaging in any demonstrative religious activity, but
that it must do so in order to conform to the Constitution. 

Such a rule would be a sure sign that our Establishment 
Clause jurisprudence had gone off the rails.  In the name of 
protecting religious liberty, the District would have us sup-
press it.  Rather than respect the First Amendment’s double 
protection for religious expression, it would have us prefer-
ence secular activity.  Not only could schools fire teachers 
for praying quietly over their lunch, for wearing a yarmulke
to  school,  or  for  offering  a  midday  prayer  during  a  break 
before practice.  Under the District’s rule, a school would be 
required to do so.  It is a rule that would defy this Court’s
traditional understanding that permitting private speech is 
—————— 

6 The dissent expresses concern that looking to “histor[y] an[d] tradi-
tion” to guide Establishment Clause inquiries will not afford “school ad-
ministrators” sufficient guidance.  Post, at 30.  But that concern supplies 
no excuse to adorn the Constitution with rules not supported by its terms
and the traditions undergirding them.  Nor, in any event, is there any 
question that the District understands that coercion can be a hallmark 
of an Establishment Clause violation.  See App. 105.  The District’s prob-
lem isn’t a failure to identify coercion as a crucial legal consideration; it
is a lack of evidence that coercion actually occurred.