Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/17pdf/16-111diff2_e1pf.pdf
Page Number: 59.0

Cite as:  584 U. S. ____ (2018) 

7 

GINSBURG, J., dissenting 

in  the  cakes  Jack  requested  were  offensive  while  any 
message  in  a  cake  for  Craig  and  Mullins  was  not.    The 
Colorado court distinguished the cases on the ground that
Craig and Mullins were denied service based on an aspect 
of  their  identity  that  the  State  chose  to  grant  vigorous
protection from discrimination.  See App. to Pet. for Cert.
20a,  n. 8  (“The  Division  found  that  the  bakeries  did  not 
refuse  [Jack’s]  request  because  of  his  creed,  but  rather 
because  of  the  offensive  nature  of  the  requested  mes-
sage. . . . [T]here was no evidence that the bakeries based 
their  decisions  on  [Jack’s]  religion  . . .  [whereas  Phillips] 
discriminat[ed]  on  the  basis  of  sexual  orientation.”).    I  do 
not  read  the  Court  to  suggest  that  the  Colorado  Legisla-
ture’s  decision  to  include  certain  protected  characteristics
in  CADA  is  an  impermissible  government  prescription  of
what is and is not offensive.  Cf. ante, at 9–10.  To repeat,
the  Court  affirms  that  “Colorado  law  can  protect  gay
persons, just as it can protect other classes of individuals, 
in  acquiring  whatever  products  and  services  they  choose
on  the  same  terms  and  conditions  as  are  offered  to  other 
members of the public.”  Ante, at 10. 

II 

Statements  made  at  the  Commission’s  public  hearings 
on Phillips’ case provide no firmer support for the Court’s
holding today.  Whatever one may think of the statements 
in historical context, I see no reason why the comments of
one  or  two  Commissioners  should  be  taken  to  overcome 
Phillips’  refusal  to  sell a  wedding  cake  to  Craig  and  Mul-
lins.  The proceedings involved several layers of independ-
ent decisionmaking, of which the Commission was but one.  
See App. to Pet. for Cert. 5a–6a.  First, the Division had to 
find probable cause that Phillips violated CADA.  Second, 
the  ALJ  entertained  the  parties’  cross-motions  for  sum-
mary  judgment.  Third,  the  Commission  heard  Phillips’ 
appeal.  Fourth,  after  the  Commission’s  ruling,  the  Colo-