Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/20pdf/19-783_k53l.pdf
Page Number: 19.0

Cite as:  593 U. S. ____ (2021) 

15 

Opinion of the Court 

accessing  computer  information,  but  not  the  computer  it-
self, for an improper purpose.10 

The Government’s position has another structural prob-
lem.  Recall that violating §1030(a)(2), the provision under
which Van Buren was charged, also gives rise to civil liabil-
ity.  See §1030(g).  Provisions defining “damage” and “loss” 
specify  what  a  plaintiff  in  a  civil  suit  can  recover. 
“ ‘[D]amage,’ ” the statute provides, means “any impairment 
to the integrity or availability of data, a program, a system,
or information.”  §1030(e)(8).  The term “loss” likewise re-
lates to costs caused by harm to computer data, programs, 
systems, or information services.  §1030(e)(11).  The statu-
tory definitions of “damage” and “loss” thus focus on tech-
nological  harms—such  as  the  corruption  of  files—of  the 
type  unauthorized  users  cause  to  computer  systems  and 
data.  Limiting  “damage”  and  “loss”  in  this  way  makes 
sense in a scheme “aimed at preventing the typical conse-
quences of hacking.”  Royal Truck, 974 F. 3d, at 760.  The 
term’s  definitions  are  ill  fitted,  however,  to  remediating 
“misuse” of sensitive information that employees may per-
missibly access using their computers.  Ibid.  Van Buren’s 
situation is illustrative: His run of the license plate did not 

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10 Unlike the Government, the dissent would read both clauses of sub-
section (a)(2) to require a circumstance-specific analysis.  Doing so, the 
dissent  contends,  would  reflect  that  “[p]roperty  law  generally  protects 
against both unlawful entry and unlawful use.”  Post, at 7.  This inter-
pretation  suffers  from  structural  problems  of  its  own.    Consider  the 
standard  rule  prohibiting  the  use  of  one’s  work  computer  for  personal 
purposes.  Under the dissent’s approach, an employee’s computer access 
would be without authorization if he logged on to the computer with the 
purpose of obtaining a file for personal reasons.  In that event, obtaining 
the file would not violate the “exceeds authorized access” clause, which 
applies  only  when  one  accesses  a  computer  “with  authorization.” 
§1030(e)(6)  (emphasis  added).    The  dissent’s  reading  would  therefore 
leave the “exceeds authorized access” clause with no work to do much of 
the  time—an  outcome  that  Van  Buren’s  interpretation  (and,  for  that
matter, the Government’s) avoids.