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Page Number: 21

4 

IANCU v. BRUNETTI 

Opinion of BREYER, J. 

The  trademark  statute  cannot  easily  be  described  as  a
regulation of “government speech,” either.  Tam, 582 U. S., 
at ___–___ (slip op., at 12–18).  The Government, however, 
may be loosely associated with the mark because it regis-
ters the mark and confers certain benefits upon the owner. 
What about the concept of a “public forum”?  Trademark 
registration has little in common with a traditional public
forum, as the register of trademarks is not a public park, a
street, or a similar forum for public debate.  See Perry Ed. 
Assn.  v.  Perry  Local  Educators’  Assn.,  460  U. S.  37,  45 
(1983).  But one can find some vague resemblance between 
trademark registration and what this Court refers to as a
“limited  public  forum”  created  by  the  government  for
private speech.  See post, at 15 (opinion of SOTOMAYOR, J.); 
Christian  Legal  Soc.  Chapter  of  Univ.  of  Cal.,  Hastings 
College  of  Law  v.  Martinez,  561  U. S.  661,  679,  n. 11 
(2010).  The  trademark  registration  system  also  bears
some resemblance to cases involving government subsidies
for  private  speech,  as  such  programs—like  trademark
registration—may grant a benefit to some forms of speech 
without prohibiting other forms of speech.  See post, at 15 
(opinion  of SOTOMAYOR, J.);  Legal  Services  Corporation  v. 
Velazquez, 531 U. S. 533, 543–544 (2001) (noting that the 
First Amendment rules applicable to limited public forums
may be “instruc[tive]” “when the government establishes a
subsidy for specified ends”). 

agree  with 

discrimination,” 

As  for  the  concepts  of  “viewpoint  discrimination”  and
“content 
JUSTICE 
I 
SOTOMAYOR  that  the  boundaries  between  them  may  be 
difficult to discern.  Post, at 10; see Rosenberger v. Rector 
and  Visitors  of  Univ.  of  Va.,  515  U. S.  819,  831  (1995) 
(“[T]he  distinction  is  not  a  precise  one”).  Even  so,  it  is 
hard  to  see  how  a  statute  prohibiting  the  registration  of 
only  highly  vulgar  or  obscene  words  discriminates  based
on “viewpoint.”  Of course, such words often evoke power-
ful  emotions.    Standing  by  themselves,  however,  these