Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/19pdf/17-1618_hfci.pdf
Page Number: 146

2 

BOSTOCK v. CLAYTON COUNTY 

KAVANAUGH, J., dissenting 

should be expanded to prohibit employment discrimination
because  of  sexual  orientation.  Under  the  Constitution’s 
separation of powers, the responsibility to amend Title VII 
belongs to Congress and the President in the legislative pro-
cess, not to this Court. 

The  political  branches  are  well  aware  of  this  issue.  In 
2007, the U. S. House of Representatives voted 235 to 184 
to prohibit employment discrimination on the basis of sex-
ual orientation.  In 2013, the U. S. Senate voted 64 to 32 in 
favor of a similar ban.  In 2019, the House again voted 236 
to 173 to outlaw employment discrimination on the basis of 
sexual  orientation.  Although  both  the  House  and  Senate 
have voted at different times to prohibit sexual orientation
discrimination, the two Houses have not yet come together
with the President to enact a bill into law. 

The  policy  arguments  for  amending  Title  VII  are  very
weighty.  The Court has previously stated, and I fully agree, 
that gay and lesbian Americans “cannot be treated as social
outcasts or as inferior in dignity and worth.”  Masterpiece 
Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Comm’n, 584 U. S. 
___, ___ (2018) (slip op., at 9). 

But we are judges, not Members of Congress.  And in Al-
exander Hamilton’s words, federal judges exercise “neither
Force nor Will, but merely judgment.”  The Federalist No. 
78,  p.  523  (J.  Cooke  ed.  1961).  Under  the  Constitution’s 
separation of powers, our role as judges is to interpret and
follow the law as written, regardless of whether we like the
result.  Cf. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U. S. 397, 420–421 (1989) 
(Kennedy, J., concurring).  Our role is not to make or amend 
the law.  As written, Title VII does not prohibit employment 
discrimination because of sexual orientation.1 

—————— 

1 Although this opinion does not separately analyze discrimination on
the basis of gender identity, this opinion’s legal analysis of discrimina-
tion on the basis of sexual orientation would apply in much the same way
to discrimination on the basis of gender identity.