Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/23pdf/23-939_e2pg.pdf
Page Number: 65.0

Cite as:  603 U. S. ____ (2024) 

5 

BARRETT, J., concurring in part 

The present circumstances fall squarely within our prec-
edent authorizing interlocutory review.  When a President 
moves  to  dismiss  an  indictment  on  Article  II  grounds,  he
“makes no challenge whatsoever to the merits of the charge 
against  him.”   Abney  v.  United  States,  431  U. S.  651,  659 
(1977) (allowing interlocutory appeal of rejection of double
jeopardy defense).  He instead contests whether the Consti-
tution allows Congress to criminalize the alleged conduct, a 
question that is “collateral to, and separable from” his guilt 
or  innocence.  Ibid.  Moreover,  the  President’s  Executive 
Branch authority “would be significantly undermined if ap-
pellate review” of the constitutional challenge “were post-
poned until after conviction and sentence.”  Id., at 660; see 
also Helstoski v. Meanor, 442 U. S. 500, 507 (1979) (allow-
ing interlocutory appeal of refusal to dismiss an indictment
on  Speech  or  Debate  Clause  grounds).    The  prospect  of  a 
trial court erroneously allowing the prosecution to proceed 
poses a unique danger to the “independence of the Execu-
tive Branch.”  Trump v. Vance, 591 U. S. 786, 800 (2020).
As  the  Court  explains,  the  possibility  that  the  President 
will be made to defend his official conduct before a jury after 
he  leaves  office  could  distort  his  decisions  while  in  office. 
Ante, at 13–14, 36.  These Article II concerns do not insulate 
the President from prosecution.  But they do justify inter-
locutory review of the trial court’s final decision on the Pres-
ident’s as-applied constitutional challenge.  See Helstoski, 
442 U. S., at 507–508; Abney, 431 U. S., at 659–661; see also 
Reply Brief for United States in No. 23–624, p. 5 (agreeing 
that the President “has a right to an interlocutory appeal
from the district court’s rejection of his immunity defense”). 
I understand most of the Court’s opinion to be consistent
with these views.  I do not join Part III–C, however, which 
holds that the Constitution limits the introduction of pro-
tected  conduct  as  evidence  in  a  criminal  prosecution  of  a 
President, beyond the limits afforded by executive privilege.
See  ante,  at  30–32.  I  disagree  with  that  holding;  on  this