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Page Number: 34

12 

SNYDER v. UNITED STATES 

JACKSON, J., dissenting 

without  those  lines,  “19  million  state  and  local  officials” 
could be imprisoned “for accepting even commonplace gra-
tuities.”  Ante, at 1. 

The majority’s fretting falls flat, especially in the context 
of this case.  There is no question that state, local, and tribal
officials deserve “clear lines,” but we were not asked to pro-
vide all of them at this moment.4  And, perhaps even more
important,  nothing  about  the  facts  of  this  case  even  re-
motely implicates a reasonable concern about the criminal-
ization of innocuous conduct on the part of an unwary offi-
cial.  Furthermore,  most  of  the  clear  lines  the  majority
seeks already exist—they come from the text of the statute. 
Limits within the text of §666 provide “fair notice” that com-
monplace  gratuities  are  typically  not  within  the  statute’s
reach, contra, ante, at 11, and they suffice to prevent pros-
ecution of the gift cards, burrito bowls, and steak dinners
that derail today’s decision.5 

A 
If  one  simply  accepts  what  the  statute  says  it  covers—
local officials who corruptly solicit, accept, or agree to accept
rewards  in  connection  with  official  business  worth  over  a 
certain  amount—Snyder’s  case  is  an  easy  one.    Perhaps
that is why the majority spends so little time describing it. 
Snyder took office as mayor of the city of Portage, Indi-
ana, in January 2012.  As mayor, Snyder and his appointees 

—————— 

4 Given  the  question  presented,  the  majority’s  demand  for  a  compre-
hensive interpretation of §666, for all purposes, is both striking and in-
consistent  with  our  usual  incremental  approach.    See  St.  Amant  v. 
Thompson, 390 U. S. 727, 730–731 (1968) (observing that the “outer lim-
its” of “many legal standards”—whether they be “provided by the Consti-
tution, statutes, or case law”—are “marked out through case-by-case ad-
judication”). 

5 Notably, I am not the only Justice who has viewed §666 in this way. 
See Sorich v. United States, 555 U. S. 1204, 1207 (2009) (Scalia, J., dis-
senting from denial of certiorari) (describing §666(a) as providing a “clear
rul[e]” prohibiting “bribes and gratuities to public officials”).