Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/22pdf/22-10_ifjn.pdf
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16 

DUBIN v. UNITED STATES 

Opinion of the Court 

Far  from  distinguishing,  the  Government’s  reading  col-
lapses the enhancement into the enhanced.  Here, the Gov-
ernment claims that because petitioner’s overbilling was fa-
cilitated by the patient’s Medicaid reimbursement number, 
§1028A(a)(1) automatically applies.  Patient names or other 
identifiers will, of course, be involved in the great majority 
of  healthcare  billing,  whether  Medicare  for  massages, 
Hong,  938  F. 3d,  at  1051,  or  for  ambulance  stretcher  ser-
vices, Medlock, 792 F. 3d, at 706.  Patient names will be on 
prescriptions, Berroa, 856 F. 3d, at 148, 155–156, and pa-
tients committing fraud on their own behalf will often have
to include the names of others on their forms, such as doc-
tors or employers.  Under the Government’s own reading,
such  cases  are  “automatically  identity  theft,”  Tr.  of  Oral 
Arg. 82, independent of whether the name itself had any-
thing to do with the fraudulent aspect of the offense. 

Nor are these implications confined to healthcare.  Sec-
tion  1028A(a)(1)’s  predicates  include  a  vast  array  of  of-
fenses, including wire fraud and mail fraud.  §1028A(c)(5).
The Government’s boundless reading of “uses” and “in rela-
tion to” would cover facilitating mail fraud by using another
person’s  name  to  address  a letter  to  them.8  Even  beyond 

—————— 

8 To avoid this, the Government has advanced a medley of shifting and 
inconsistent readings of “without lawful authority,” another element of 
§1028A(a)(1).  Sometimes the Government has claimed that a defendant 
would not violate §1028A(a)(1) if they had permission to use a means of
identification to commit a crime.  See Brief for United States 32 (“every-
one is presumed to have permission to use other people’s names” in cer-
tain ways to facilitate crimes, such as addressing a letter); id., at 31–32 
(a defendant can have “lawful authority” to use a co-conspirator’s name 
to commit bank fraud).  Other times the Government has argued that no
one ever has permission to commit a crime.  App. 32 (a person “can’t give
someone [else] permission” to use their name to facilitate a crime); Tr. of 
Oral  Arg.  91–92  (doctor  would  violate  §1028A(a)(1)  even  if  patient 
granted permission to use his name in the fraud).  The Court need not, 
and does not, reach the proper interpretation of “without lawful author-
ity.”    Suffice  it  to  say,  these  attempts  to  rein  in  §1028A(a)(1)  through