Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/21pdf/19-1392_6j37.pdf/19-1392_6j37.pdf
Page Number: 85.0

Cite as:  597 U. S. ____ (2022) 

77 

Opinion of the Court 

and the country—to face up to the real issue without fur-
ther delay. 

VI 

We must now decide what standard will govern if state 
abortion regulations undergo constitutional challenge and 
whether the law before us satisfies the appropriate stand-
ard. 

A 
Under our precedents, rational-basis review is the appro-
priate standard for such challenges.  As we have explained, 
procuring an abortion is not a fundamental constitutional 
right because such a right has no basis in the Constitution’s
text or in our Nation’s history.  See supra, at 8–39. 

It follows that the States may regulate abortion for legit-
imate  reasons,  and  when  such  regulations  are  challenged 
under the Constitution, courts cannot “substitute their so-
cial and economic beliefs for the judgment of legislative bod-
ies.”  Ferguson, 372 U. S., at 729–730; see also Dandridge 
v. Williams, 397 U. S. 471, 484–486 (1970); United States v. 
Carolene Products Co., 304 U. S. 144, 152 (1938).  That re-
spect  for  a  legislature’s  judgment  applies  even  when  the
laws  at  issue  concern  matters  of  great  social  significance 
and moral substance.  See, e.g., Board of Trustees of Univ. 
of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U. S. 356, 365–368 (2001) (“treatment 
of  the  disabled”);  Glucksberg,  521  U. S.,  at  728  (“assisted 
suicide”);  San  Antonio  Independent  School  Dist.  v.  Rodri-
guez, 411 U. S. 1, 32–35, 55 (1973) (“financing public edu-
cation”).

A law regulating abortion, like other health and welfare
laws, is entitled to a “strong presumption of validity.”  Hel-
ler v. Doe, 509 U. S. 312, 319 (1993).  It must be sustained 
if  there  is  a  rational  basis  on  which  the  legislature  could 
have thought that it would serve legitimate state interests. 
Id., at 320; FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U. S.