Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/21pdf/20-493_jgko.pdf
Page Number: 21.0

Cite as:  596 U. S. ____ (2022) 

17 

Opinion of the Court 

Texas suggests that Congress’s reference to the tribal reso-
lution at least augurs in favor of a “broa[d]” reading of sub-
section (a).  Brief for Respondent 22; see also post, at 9–10. 
But saying that tells us nothing about how much broader 
the  law  should  be  read.    And,  as  we  have  seen,  the  only
“broader”  reading  of  subsection  (a)  Texas  offers  faces  its
challenges—  it  requires  us  to  believe  that  subsection  (a) 
swallows subsection (b) whole, makes a nullity of subsection
(c),  and  defies  Congress’s  apparent  adoption  of  Cabazon’s 
prohibitory/regulatory distinction.   

There is still another and maybe more fundamental prob-
lem  here.  On  our  interpretation  of  the  Restoration  Act, 
Congress did legislate “in accordance with” the Tribe’s res-
olution: It expressly granted the Tribe federal recognition 
and chose not to apply Texas gaming regulations as surro-
gate  federal  law  on  tribal  land.    Of  course,  Congress  also 
sought  to  act  in  accordance  with  at  least  some  of  Texas’s 
concerns by banning those games fully barred by Texas law.
In the end, it seems each got half a loaf.

By contrast, adopting Texas’s alternative interpretation
of the Restoration Act would make a mockery of Congress’s
statement  that  it  sought  to  act  “in  accordance  with”  the 
Tribe’s  resolution.  On  the  State’s  view,  all  of  its  gaming 
regulations  serve  as  surrogate  federal  law  applicable  on
tribal lands.  That’s a result few would dare to describe as 
“accord[ing] with” the tribal resolution.  In fact, it’s an out-
come more nearly the opposite of what the Tribe sought and 
closer to what it described as a “wholly unsatisfactory . . . 
infringement upon the Tribe[’s] power of self government” 
and “[i]nconsistent with the central purposes of restoration
of the federal trust relationship.”  App. to Pet. for Cert. 122.
To be sure and as Texas and the dissent both highlight,
the  statutory  terms  Congress  finally  settled  on  were  in 
some respects more generous to the Tribe than those its res-
olution authorized tribal negotiators in Washington to ac-
cept.  Rather than ban all gaming on tribal lands, Congress