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Page Number: 40.0

2 

CHRISTIAN LEGAL SOC. CHAPTER OF UNIV. OF CAL., 

HASTINGS COLLEGE OF LAW v. MARTINEZ 

STEVENS, J., concurring

formal  recognition—while  continuing  to  exclude  gay  and 
non-Christian students (as well as, it seems, students who 
advocate for gay rights). 

In  the  dissent’s  view,  by  refusing  to  grant  CLS  an  ex-
emption  from  the  Nondiscrimination  Policy,  Hastings 
violated  CLS’s  rights,  for  by  proscribing  unlawful  dis-
crimination  on  the  basis  of  religion,  the  policy  discrimi-
nates  unlawfully  on  the  basis  of  religion.  There  are  nu-
merous  reasons  why  this  counterintuitive  theory  is 
unsound.  Although  the  First  Amendment  may  protect 
CLS’s  discriminatory  practices  off  campus,  it  does  not 
require a public university to validate or support them.

As written, the Nondiscrimination Policy is content and 
viewpoint neutral.  It does not reflect a judgment by school 
officials  about  the  substance  of  any  student  group’s
speech.  Nor  does  it  exclude  any  would-be  groups  on  the 
basis  of  their  convictions.  Indeed,  it  does  not  regulate 
expression  or  belief  at  all.  The  policy  is  “directed  at  the
organization’s activities rather than its philosophy,” Healy 
v. James, 408 U. S. 169, 188 (1972).  Those who hold reli-
gious  beliefs  are  not  “singled  out,”  post,  at  19  (ALITO,  J., 
dissenting);  those  who  engage  in  discriminatory  conduct 
based  on  someone  else’s  religious  status  and  belief  are
singled  out.1    Regardless  of  whether  they  are  the  product 

—————— 

1 The dissent appears to accept that Hastings may prohibit discrimi-
nation on the basis of religious status, though it rejects the notion that 
Hastings may do the same for religious belief.  See, e.g., post, at 22, n. 5, 
28.  If CLS sought to exclude a Muslim student in virtue of the fact that 
he  “is”  Muslim,  the  dissent  suggests,  there  would  be  no  problem  in
Hastings  forbidding  that.    But  if  CLS  sought  to  exclude  the  same 
student  in  virtue  of  the  fact  that  he  subscribes  to  the  Muslim  faith, 
Hastings must stand idly by.  This proposition is not only unworkable
in  practice  but  also  flawed  in  conception.    A  person’s  religion  often
simultaneously  constitutes  or  informs  a  status,  an  identity,  a  set  of 
beliefs  and  practices,  and  much  else  besides.    (So  does  sexual  orienta-
tion  for  that  matter,  see  ante,  at  22–23,  notwithstanding  the  dissent’s 
view that a rule excluding those who engage in “unrepentant homosex-