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Page Number: 79

12 

TRUMP v. UNITED STATES 

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting 

wise known as private) acts.  Even Trump did not claim im-
munity  for  such  acts  and,  as  the  majority  acknowledges,
such an immunity would be impossible to square with Clin-
ton  v.  Jones,  520  U. S.  681  (1997).    See  ante,  at  15.  This 
unremarkable  proposition  is  no  real  limit on today’s  deci-
sion.   It  does  not  hide  the  majority’s  embrace  of  the  most 
far-reaching view of Presidential immunity on offer.

In fact, the majority’s dividing line between “official” and
“unofficial” conduct narrows the conduct considered “unof-
ficial” almost to a nullity.  It says that whenever the Presi-
dent acts in a way that is “ ‘not manifestly or palpably be-
yond [his] authority,’ ” he is taking official action.  Ante, at 
17 (quoting Blassingame v. Trump, 87 F. 4th 1, 13 (CADC 
2023)).  It then goes a step further: “In dividing official from 
unofficial  conduct,  courts  may  not  inquire  into  the  Presi-
dent’s motives.”  Ante, at 18.  It is one thing to say that mo-
tive  is  irrelevant  to  questions  regarding  the  scope  of  civil 
liability,  but  it  is  quite  another  to  make  it  irrelevant  to 
questions regarding criminal liability.  Under that rule, any 
use of official power for any purpose, even the most corrupt 
purpose indicated by objective evidence of the most corrupt
motives  and  intent,  remains  official  and  immune.    Under 
the majority’s test, if it can be called a test, the category of 
Presidential action that can be deemed “unofficial” is des-
tined to be vanishingly small.

Ultimately, the majority pays lip service to the idea that
“[t]he  President,  charged  with  enforcing  federal  criminal 
laws,  is  not  above  them,”  ante,  at  13–14,  but  it  then  pro-
ceeds  to  place  former  Presidents  beyond  the  reach  of  the
federal criminal laws for any abuse of official power. 

B 
So how does the majority get to its rule?  With text, his-
tory, and established understanding all weighing against it,
the majority claims just one arrow in its quiver: the balanc-
ing test in Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U. S. 731 (1983).  Yet