Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/22pdf/22-49_d18e.pdf
Page Number: 10

8 

LORA v. UNITED STATES 

Opinion of the Court 

We express no position on the Government’s view of dou-
ble jeopardy, because even assuming it, arguendo, the Gov-
ernment’s view does not refute our holding on the question 
presented.  The Government says someone cannot receive
both subsection (c) and subsection (j) sentences for the same
conduct.  But that aligns with our conclusion here: If a de-
fendant receives a sentence under subsection (j), he does not 
receive a sentence “imposed . . . under [subsection (c)]” that
would 
consecutive-sentence  mandate. 
§924(c)(1)(D)(ii).  Accordingly,  the  Government’s  view  of
double  jeopardy  can  easily  be  squared  with  our  view  that 
subsection (j) neither incorporates subsection (c)’s penalties 
nor triggers the consecutive-sentence mandate. 

trigger 

the 

B 
The  Government  protests  that  it  is  “implausible”  that
Congress imposed the harsh consecutive-sentence mandate
under  subsection  (c)  but  not  subsection  (j),  which  covers
more serious offense conduct.  Brief for United States 9, 28– 
35.  Yet that result is consistent with other design features
of the statute. 

Congress  plainly  chose  a  different  approach  to  punish-
ment in subsection (j) than in subsection (c).  Subsection (c),
first enacted in 1968, is full of mandatory penalties.  It con-
tains  mandatory  minimum  years  of  imprisonment  and 
mandatory consecutive sentences.  In fact, when subsection 
(j)  was  enacted  in  1994,  subsection  (c)  specified  not  just 
mandatory  minimums,  but  exact  mandatory  terms  of  im-
prisonment.  18 U. S. C. §924(c)(1) (1994 ed.) (e.g., exactly
five  years  of  imprisonment  for  the  base  subsection  (c)  of-
fense).

Subsection (j), by contrast, generally eschews mandatory
penalties in favor of sentencing flexibility.  Unlike subsec-
tion  (c),  subsection  (j)  contains  no  mandatory  minimums. 
Even  for  murder,  subsection  (j)  expressly  permits  a  sen-
tence of “any term of years.”  §924(j)(1) (emphasis added).