Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/19pdf/18-1195_g314.pdf
Page Number: 31

6 

ESPINOZA v. MONTANA DEPT. OF REVENUE 

THOMAS, J., concurring 

a prayer violated the Establishment Clause); see also Ken-
nedy  v.  Bremerton  School  Dist.,  869  F. 3d  813,  831  (CA9 
2017)  (M.  Smith,  J.,  concurring)  (coach’s  decision  to  lead
voluntary prayer after football games); Walz v. Egg Harbor 
Twp. Bd. of Ed., 342 F. 3d 271, 280 (CA3 2003) (student’s 
decision to distribute small gifts with religious messages to
classmates). 

II 

The Court’s current understanding of the Establishment 
Clause actually thwarts, rather than promotes, equal treat-
ment of religion.  Under a proper understanding of the Es-
tablishment Clause, robust and lively debate about the role
of religion in government is permitted, even encouraged, at
the state and local level.  The Court’s distorted view of the 
Establishment Clause, however, removes the entire subject
of religion from the realm of permissible governmental ac-
tivity, instead mandating strict separation. 

This interpretation of the Establishment Clause operates 
as  a  type  of  content-based  restriction  on  the  government.
The Court has interpreted the Free Speech Clause to pro-
hibit  content-based  restrictions  because  they  “value  some
forms  of  speech  over  others,”  City  of  Ladue  v.  Gilleo,  512 
U. S. 43, 60 (1994) (O’Connor, J., concurring), thus tending 
to “tilt public debate in a preferred direction,” Sorrell v. IMS 
Health  Inc.,  564  U. S.  552,  578–579  (2011).    The  content-
based  restriction  imposed  by  this  Court’s  Establishment
Clause jurisprudence operates no differently.  It communi-
cates a message that religion is dangerous and in need of 
policing, which in turn has the effect of tilting society in fa-
vor of devaluing religion.

Historical evidence suggests that many advocates for this
separationist view were originally motivated by hostility to-
ward certain disfavored religions.  See P. Hamburger, Sep-
aration  of  Church  and  State  391–454  (2002).    And  this 
Court’s adoption of a separationist interpretation has itself