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18 

CRUZ v. ARIZONA 

Syllabus 

nal  Procedure  32.1(g)  because  Lynch  did  not  result  in  “a  signifcant 
change in  the law.”  That  court reasoned that  Lynch was not  a signif-
cant change in the law because it relied on Simmons, which was clearly 
established  law  at  the  time  of  Cruz's  trial.  It  so  held  even  though 
Lynch overruled binding Arizona precedent foreclosing Simmons relief 
for  Arizona  capital  defendants,  and  even  though  the  Arizona  Supreme 
Court  had  previously  explained  that  the  “archetype”  of  a  “signifcant 
change  in  the  law”  is  the  overruling  of  “previously  binding  case  law.” 
State  v.  Shrum,  220  Ariz.  115,  118,  203  P.  3d  1175,  1178.  While  the 
court  reasoned  that  a  signifcant  change  in  the  application  of  a  law  is 
not the same as a signifcant change in the law itself, Arizona can point 
to  no  other  Rule  32.1(g)  decision  supporting  that  distinction.  This  in-
terpretation of Rule 32.1(g) is entirely new and conficts with prior Ari-
zona  case  law.  The  novelty  arises  from  the  way  in  which  the  Arizona 
Supreme Court disregarded the effect of Lynch on Arizona law.  Ordi-
narily,  Arizona  courts  applying  Rule  32.1(g)  focus  on  how  a  decision 
changes the law that is operative in the State.  Here, however, the Ari-
zona  Supreme  Court  disregarded  the  many  state  precedents  overruled 
by Lynch, focusing instead on whether Lynch had wrought a signifcant 
change in federal law.  Because the Arizona Supreme Court's interpre-
tation  is  so  novel  and  unforeseeable,  it  cannot  constitute  an  adequate 
state procedural ground for the challenged decision. 

Arizona's interpretation generates a catch-22 for Cruz and other simi-
larly  situated  capital  defendants  that  only  serves  to  compound  its  nov-
elty.  To  obtain  relief  under  Rule  32.1(g),  a  defendant  must  establish 
not just a signifcant change in the law but also that the law in question 
applies retroactively under Teague v. Lane, 489 U. S. 288.  Prior to the 
Arizona  Supreme  Court's  decision  below,  it  was  possible  to  show  that 
Lynch  both  was  a  “signifcant  change  in  the  law”  and  satisfed  retro-
activity  because  it  merely  applied  Simmons.  On  the  interpretation 
adopted below, however, the argument that Lynch applied “settled” fed-
eral  law  for  retroactivity  purposes  also  implies  that  Lynch  does  not 
represent  a  “signifcant  change  in  the  law.”  Earlier  Rule  32.1(g)  deci-
sions did not generate this catch-22.  Given the Court's conclusion that 
the Arizona  Supreme Court's  application of  Rule 32.1(g)  to Lynch  is so 
novel and unfounded that it does not constitute an adequate state proce-
dural ground, it is unnecessary for the Court to determine whether the 
decision below is also independent of federal law.  Pp. 25–29. 

(b)  Counterarguments  presented  in  this  case  offer  various  reformul-
ations of  the argument that Lynch  was not a “signifcant  change in the 
law”  for  Rule  32.1(g)  purposes,  but  they  fail  to  grapple  with  the  basic 
point  that  Lynch  reversed  previously  binding  Arizona  Supreme  Court 
precedent.  The fact that Lynch was a summary reversal did not justify 

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