Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/04pdf/04-278.pdf
Page Number: 39.0

12 

CASTLE ROCK v. GONZALES 

STEVENS, J., dissenting 

ute’s  mandatory  directive  formed  the  basis  for  the  suit 
because it was “a specific duty imposed by statute for the 
benefit  of  individuals  previously  identified  by  judicial 
order.”  Id.,  at  707,  670  P. 2d,  at  140.11  In  Matthews  v. 
Pickett  County,  996  S. W.  2d  162  (Tenn.  1999)  (on  certifi-
cation  to  the  Sixth  Circuit),  the  court  confirmed  that  the 
statute  mandated  arrest  for  violations  of  domestic  re-
straining orders, and it held that the “public duty” defense 
to  a  negligence  action  was  unavailable  to  the  defendant 
police officers because the restraining order had created a 
“special duty” to protect the plaintiff.  Id., at 165.  See also 
Campbell  v.  Campbell,  294  N. J.  Super.  18,  24,  682  A. 2d 
272, 274 (1996) (domestic restraining order statute “allows 
no  discretion”  with  regard  to  arrest;  “[t]he  duty  imposed 
on the police officer is ministerial”); Donaldson v. Seattle, 
65  Wash.  App.  661,  670,  831  P. 2d  1098,  1103  (1992) 
(“Generally, where an officer has legal grounds to make an 
arrest he has considerable discretion to do so.  In regard to 
domestic violence, the rule is the reverse.  If the officer has 
the legal grounds to arrest pursuant to the statute, he has 
a  mandatory  duty  to  make  the  arrest”).    To  what  extent 
the  Colorado  Supreme  Court  would  agree  with  the  views
of these courts is, of course, an open question, but it does
seem  rather  brazen  for  the  majority  to  assume  that  the
Colorado  Supreme  Court  would  repudiate  this  consistent 
line of persuasive authority from other States. 

Indeed,  the  Court  fails  to  come  to  terms  with  the  wave 
of  domestic  violence  statutes  that  provides  the  crucial 
context  for  understanding  Colorado’s  law.  The  Court 
concedes that, “in the specific context of domestic violence, 

—————— 

11 The  Oregon  Supreme  Court  noted  that  the  “widespread  refusal  or 
failure  of  police  officers  to  remove  persons  involved  in  episodes  of 
domestic  violence  was  presented  to  the  legislature  as  the  main  reason 
for tightening the law so as to require enforcement of restraining orders 
by  mandatory  arrest  and  custody.”  Nearing,  295  Ore.,  at  709,  670 
P. 2d, at 142.