Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/17pdf/16-1466_2b3j.pdf
Page Number: 58

Cite as:  585 U. S. ____ (2018) 

3 

KAGAN, J., dissenting 

which  required  teachers  who  had  not  joined  the  union  to 
pay it “a service charge equal to the regular dues required 
of [u]nion members.”  Abood, 431 U. S., at 212.  A group of 
non-union members sued over that clause, arguing that it 
violated the First Amendment. 

In considering their challenge, the Court canvassed the
purposes  of  the  “agency  shop”  clause.  It  was  rooted,  the 
Court  understood,  in  the  “principle  of  exclusive  union
representation”—a  “central  element”  in  “industrial  rela-
tions”  since  the  New  Deal.  Id.,  at  220.    Significant  bene-
fits,  the  Court  explained,  could  derive  from  the  “designa-
tion  of  a  single  [union]  representative”  for  all  similarly
situated  employees  in  a  workplace.    Ibid.  In  particular,
such  arrangements:  “avoid[ ]  the  confusion  that  would
result from attempting to enforce two or more agreements 
specifying  different terms and conditions of employment”;
“prevent[ ]  inter-union  rivalries  from  creating  dissension 
within  the  work  force”;  “free[ ]  the  employer  from  the 
possibility  of  facing  conflicting  demands  from  different
unions”; and “permit[ ] the employer and a single union to 
reach  agreements  and settlements  that  are  not  subject  to
attack  from  rival  labor  organizations.”    Id.,  at  220–221. 
As  proof,  the  Court  pointed  to  the  example  of  exclusive-
representation  arrangements  in  the  private-employment 
sphere:  There,  Congress  had  long  thought  that  such
schemes  would  promote  “peaceful  labor  relations”  and 
“labor stability.”  Id., at 219, 229.  A public employer like 
Detroit,  the  Court  believed,  could  reasonably  make  the 
same calculation. 

But  for  an  exclusive-bargaining  arrangement  to  work,
such  an  employer  often  thought,  the  union  needed  ade-
quate  funding.  Because  the  “designation  of  a  union  as
exclusive representative carries with it great responsibili-
ties,”  the  Court  reasoned,  it  inevitably  also  entails  sub-
stantial costs.  Id., at  221.  “The  tasks of negotiating and 
administering  a  collective-bargaining  agreement  and