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14 

PATEL v. GARLAND 

Opinion of the Court 

is  the  only  interpretation  that  makes  sense  of  “regarding
the granting of relief ”; as he sees it, “any judgment regard-
ing  the  granting  of  relief ”  must  narrow  the  meaning  of
“judgment” to include only the decision “whether to grant
relief.”  Brief for Petitioners 22–25, 37–39.  To be sure, the 
reference to “the granting of relief ” appears to constrain the 
provision from sweeping in judgments that have nothing to 
do with that subject.  But as even the Government acknowl-
edges,  §1252(a)(2)(B)(i)  does  not  stop  at  just  the  grant  or
denial of relief; it extends to any judgment “regarding” that
ultimate decision.  See Brief for Respondent 18–20.  Patel’s 
interpretation to the contrary reads “regarding” out of the 
statute entirely.

Context further undermines Patel’s position.  He cannot 
explain why the bar in subparagraph (B) should be read dif-
ferently from subparagraph (C)’s prohibition on reviewing
final orders of removal for certain criminal offenses.  Patel 
acknowledges that this bar on review of a “final order” also
precludes review of its factual support, including the very
kind of factfinding at issue in this case.  Reply Brief for Pe-
titioners  7;  Guerrero-Lasprilla,  589  U. S.,  at  ___–___  (slip 
op., at 12–13).  But if Congress had wanted to achieve that
effect  in  subparagraph  (B),  he  argues,  it  could  have  used 
“final order” there too, rather than “judgment.”  Reply Brief 
for Petitioners 7.  Yet Patel ignores a simple explanation for 
the shift in terminology.  Subparagraph (B) bars review of
only one facet of the removal process (consideration of dis-
cretionary  relief)  whereas  subparagraph  (C)  prohibits  re-
view of the entire proceeding (removal based on a criminal 
offense).  Each statutory label describes its target, but oth-
erwise, the provisions preclude judicial review in the same
way and bear the same relationship to subparagraph (D). 
Given those similarities, we see no reason to think that sub-
paragraph (B) would allow a court to review the factual un-
derpinnings of a decision when subparagraph (C) prohibits
just that.