Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/23pdf/23-939_e2pg.pdf
Page Number: 104

Cite as:  603 U. S. ____ (2024) 

7 

JACKSON, J., dissenting 

Third, if the criminal conduct at issue comprises “unofficial
acts, there is no immunity.”  Ante, at 15.3 

Applying the majority’s new Presidential accountability 
model  thus  seems  to  involve  bearing  down  on  the  indict-
ment’s  allegations  and  making  a  series  of  determinations
about the nature of the conduct at issue.  From the struc-
ture of the paradigm, it appears that the first decision point
is whether the alleged criminal conduct involves one of the 
President’s “core” powers.  If so (and apparently regardless
of  the  degree  to  which  the  conduct  implicates  that  core 
power), the President is absolutely immune from criminal 
liability for engaging in that criminal conduct.  If not, then 
one must proceed to consider whether the conduct qualifies 
as an “official” act or “unofficial” act of that President.  If 
the crime is an official act, the President is presumptively
immune  from  criminal  prosecution  and  punishment.    But 
even  then, immunity  still  hinges on  whether  there  is  any 
legal or factual basis for concluding that the presumption of 
immunity has been rebutted.  Alternatively, if the charged 
conduct  is  an  unofficial  act  (a  determination  that,  inci-

—————— 

3 It is important to note that the majority reframes the immunity ques-
tion presented here as a separation of powers concern that is compelled 
by Article II—as if what is being asked is whether Congress can crimi-
nalize executive prerogatives.  See, e.g., ante, at 6–7; see also ante, at 1– 
2  (BARRETT,  J.,  concurring  in  part).    But  that  is  not  anywhere close  to 
what  is  happening  in  this  case.    No  one  maintains  that  Congress  has 
passed  a  law  that  specifically  criminalizes  the  President’s  use  of  any 
power that the Constitution vests exclusively in the Executive, much less
that the Judiciary is being conscripted to adjudicate the propriety of such 
a statute.  To the contrary, the indictment here invokes criminal statutes
of general applicability that everyone is supposed to follow, both on and
off the job.  So, the real question is: Can the President, too, be held ac-
countable for committing crimes while he is undertaking his official du-
ties?  The nature of his authority under Article II (whether conclusive 
and preclusive, or shared with Congress, or otherwise) is entirely beside
the point.