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Page Number: 11.0

8 

FOURTH ESTATE PUB. BENEFIT CORP. v.
WALL-STREET.COM, LLC 
Opinion of the Court 

how the statute uses the word “registration” in a particu-
lar prescription, one must “look to the specific context” in 
which  the  term  is  used.    Brief  for  Petitioner  29.    As  ex-
plained  supra,  at  4–7,  the  “specific  context”  of  §411(a)
permits  only  one  sensible  reading:  The  phrase  “registra-
tion . . . has been made” refers to the Copyright Office’s act
granting  registration,  not  to  the  copyright  claimant’s 
request for registration.

Fourth  Estate’s  contrary  reading  of  §411(a)  stems  in 
part  from  its  misapprehension  of  the  significance  of  cer-
tain 1976 revisions to the Copyright Act.  Before that year,
§411(a)’s  precursor  provided  that  “[n]o  action  or  proceed-
ing  shall  be  maintained  for  infringement  of  copyright  in 
any  work  until  the  provisions  of  this  title  with  respect  to
the  deposit  of  copies  and  registration  of  such  work  shall
have  been  complied  with.”  17  U. S. C.  §13  (1970  ed.). 
Fourth  Estate  urges  that  this  provision  posed  the  very 
question  we  resolve  today—namely,  whether  a  claimant’s
application alone effects registration.  The Second Circuit 
addressed  that  question,  Fourth  Estate  observes,  in 
Vacheron & Constantin-Le Coultre Watches, Inc. v. Benrus 
Watch  Co.,  260  F. 2d  637  (1958).  Brief  for  Petitioner  32– 
34.  In  that  case,  in  an  opinion  by  Judge  Learned  Hand, 
the  court  held  that  a  copyright  owner  who  completed  an
application  could  not  sue  for  infringement  immediately
upon the Copyright Office’s refusal to register.  Vacheron, 
260  F. 3d,  at  640–641.  Instead,  the  owner  first  had  to 
obtain  a  registration  certificate  by  bringing  a  mandamus 
action against the Register.  The Second Circuit dissenter 
would have treated the owner’s application as sufficient to
permit commencement of an action for infringement.  Id., 
at 645. 

Fourth Estate sees Congress’ 1976 revision of the regis-
tration  requirement  as  an  endorsement  of  the  Vacheron 
dissenter’s  position.  Brief  for  Petitioner  34–36.    We  dis-
agree.  The  changes  made  in  1976  instead  indicate  Con-