Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/11pdf/10-1150.pdf
Page Number: 25

Cite as:  566 U. S. ____ (2012) 

21 

Opinion of the Court 

“obvious in light of prior art,” §103, and that it be “full[y], 
clear[ly],  concise[ly],  and  exact[ly]”  described,  §112—can
perform  this  screening  function.  In  particular,  it  argues
that these claims likely fail for lack of novelty under §102. 
This approach, however, would make the “law of nature”
exception  to  §101  patentability  a  dead  letter.  The  ap­
proach  is  therefore  not  consistent  with  prior  law.  The 
relevant  cases  rest  their  holdings  upon  section  101,  not 
later  sections.  Bilski,  561  U. S.  ___;  Diehr,  supra;  Flook, 
supra; Benson, 409 U. S. 63.  See also H. R. Rep. No. 1923, 
82d Cong., 2d Sess., 6 (1952) (“A person may have ‘invent­
ed’  a  machine  or  a  manufacture,  which  may  include  any­
thing  under  the  sun  that  is  made  by  man,  but  it  is  not 
necessarily patentable  under section 101 unless the condi­
tions of the title are fulfilled” (emphasis added)). 

We  recognize  that,  in  evaluating  the  significance  of 
additional  steps,  the  §101  patent-eligibility  inquiry  and,
say,  the  §102  novelty  inquiry  might  sometimes  overlap.
But  that  need  not  always  be  so.    And  to  shift  the  patent­
eligibility  inquiry  entirely  to  these  later  sections  risks
creating  significantly  greater  legal  uncertainty,  while 
assuming  that  those  sections  can  do  work  that  they  are 
not equipped to do.

What role would laws of nature, including newly discov­
ered  (and  “novel”)  laws  of  nature,  play  in  the  Govern­
ment’s suggested “novelty” inquiry?  Intuitively, one would
suppose  that  a  newly  discovered  law  of  nature  is  novel.
The  Government,  however,  suggests  in  effect  that  the 
novelty of a component law of nature may be disregarded 
when  evaluating  the  novelty  of  the  whole.  See  Brief  for 
United  States  as  Amicus  Curiae  27.  But  §§102  and  103 
say nothing about treating laws of nature as if they were
part  of  the  prior  art  when  applying  those  sections.    Cf. 
Diehr,  450  U. S.,  at  188  (patent  claims  “must  be  consid­
ered  as  a  whole”).  And  studiously  ignoring  all  laws  of 
nature when evaluating a patent application under §§102