Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/23pdf/22-915_8o6b.pdf
Page Number: 62

Cite as:  602 U. S. ____ (2024) 

3 

BARRETT, J., concurring 

of the text.  Samia v. United States, 599 U. S. 635, 656–657 
(2023) (BARRETT, J., concurring in part and  concurring in 
judgment).
  “Original history”—i.e., the generally dispositive kind—
plays two roles in the Second Amendment context.  It eluci-
dates how contemporaries understood the text—for exam-
ple, the meaning of the phrase “bear Arms.”  See Heller, 554 
U. S., at 582–592.  It also plays the more complicated role
of determining the scope of the pre-existing right that the
people  enshrined  in  our  fundamental  law.*    In  Rahimi’s 
case,  the  Court  uses  history  in  this  latter  way.  Call  this 
“original contours” history: It looks at historical gun regu-
lations to identify the contours of the right.

Courts have struggled with this use of history in the wake 
of  Bruen.  One  difficulty  is  a  level  of  generality  problem: 
Must the government produce a founding-era relative of the 
challenged regulation—if not a twin, a cousin?  Or do found-
ing-era gun regulations yield concrete principles that mark
the borders of the right?

Many  courts,  including  the  Fifth  Circuit,  have  under-
stood Bruen to require the former, narrower approach.  But 
Bruen emphasized that “analogical reasoning” is not a “reg-
ulatory straightjacket.”  597 U. S., at 30.  To be consistent 
with historical limits, a challenged regulation need not be 

—————— 

*To  my  mind,  this  use  of  history  walks  a  fine  line  between  original 
meaning (which controls) and expectations about how the text would ap-
ply (which do not).  See Whittington 383 (“Specific expectations about the
consequences  of  a  legal  rule  are  distinct  from  the  meaning  of  the  rule
itself ”).  Contemporary  government  actors  might  have  been  “wrong
about the consequences of their own constitutional rule,” or they “might 
not have fully and faithfully implemented the adopted constitutional rule
themselves.”  Id., at 384.  Thus, while early applications of a constitu-
tional rule can help illuminate its original scope, an interpreter must ex-
ercise care in considering them.  Id., at 385–386.  In the Second Amend-
ment context, particular gun regulations—even if from the ratification 
era—do not themselves have the status of constitutional law.