Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/17pdf/17-494_j4el.pdf
Page Number: 31.0

Cite as:  585 U. S. ____ (2018) 

1 

GORSUCH, J., concurring 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

_________________ 

No. 17–494 
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SOUTH DAKOTA, PETITIONER v. WAYFAIR, INC., 

ET AL. 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF

 SOUTH DAKOTA
 

[June 21, 2018 ] 

JUSTICE GORSUCH, concurring. 
Our  dormant  commerce  cases  usually  prevent  States
from  discriminating  between  in-state  and  out-of-state 
firms.  National  Bellas  Hess,  Inc.  v.  Department  of  Reve-
nue of Ill., 386 U. S. 753 (1967), and Quill  Corp. v. North 
Dakota,  504  U. S.  298  (1992),  do  just  the  opposite.    For 
years they have enforced a judicially created tax break for 
out-of-state  Internet  and  mail-order  firms  at  the  expense
of  in-state  brick-and-mortar  rivals.    See  ante,  at  12–13; 
Direct  Marketing  Assn.  v.  Brohl,  814  F.  3d,  1129,  1150 
(CA10  2016)  (Gorsuch,  J.  concurring).    As  Justice  White 
recognized  26  years  ago,  judges  have  no  authority  to  con-
struct  a  discriminatory  “tax  shelter”  like  this.    Quill, 
supra, at 329 (opinion concurring in part and dissenting in 
part).  The Court is right to correct the mistake and I am
pleased to join its opinion. 

My agreement with the Court’s discussion of the history 
of  our  dormant  commerce  clause  jurisprudence,  however, 
should  not  be  mistaken  for  agreement  with  all  aspects  of
the  doctrine.    The  Commerce  Clause  is  found  in  Article  I 
and  authorizes  Congress  to  regulate  interstate  commerce. 
Meanwhile  our  dormant  commerce  cases  suggest  Article
III  courts  may  invalidate  state  laws  that  offend  no  con-
gressional statute.  Whether and how much of this can be 
squared with the text of the Commerce Clause, justified by