Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/19pdf/18-1323_c07d.pdf
Page Number: 23

18 

JUNE MEDICAL SERVICES L. L. C. v. RUSSO 

Opinion of BREYER, J. 

is ‘plausible’ in light of the full record—even if another is
equally  or  more  so—must  govern.”  Cooper  v.  Harris,  581 
U. S. ___, ___ (2017) (slip op., at 4). 

Our dissenting colleagues suggest that a different, less-
deferential standard should apply here because the District 
Court enjoined the admitting-privileges requirement before 
it was enforced.  See post, at 11–12 (opinion of ALITO, J.); 
post, at 11–13 (opinion of GORSUCH, J.).  We are aware of 
no  authority  suggesting  that  appellate  scrutiny  of  factual
determinations varies with the timing of a plaintiff ’s law-
suit or a trial court’s decision.  And, in any event, the record
belies the dissents’ claims that the District Court’s findings
in this case were “conjectural” or premature.  As we have 
explained, the District Court’s order on the plaintiffs’ mo-
tion for a temporary restraining order suspended only Act
620’s penalties.  The plaintiffs were required to continue in 
their efforts to obtain admitting privileges.  See supra, at 5. 
The  District  Court  supervised  those  efforts  through  the 
trial and beyond.  See 250 F. Supp. 3d, at 77.  It based its 
findings on this real-world evidence, not speculative guess-
work.  Nor can we agree with the suggestion that the timing
of  the  District  Court’s  decision  somehow  prejudiced  the 
State.  From  the  start,  the  State  urged  that  the  District 
Court  decide  the  merits  of  the  plaintiffs’  claims  without
awaiting a decision on their applications for admitting priv-
ileges.  See App. 43–44.  And, when this case returned to 
the District Court in August 2016, following our decision in 
Whole Woman’s Health, the State stipulated that the case
was ripe for decision on the record as it stood in June 2015. 
See supra, at 5–6.  In short, we see no legal or practical ba-
sis to depart from the familiar standard that applies to all 
“[f]indings of fact.”  Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 52(a).

Under that familiar standard, we find that the testimony 
and other evidence contained in the extensive record devel-
oped over the 6-day trial support the District Court’s ulti-