Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/12pdf/11-345_l5gm.pdf
Page Number: 40.0

Cite as:  570 U. S. ____ (2013) 

3 

GINSBURG, J., dissenting 

I  have  several  times  explained  why  government  actors,
including  state  universities,  need  not  be  blind  to  the  lin-
gering  effects  of  “an  overtly  discriminatory  past,”  the
legacy  of  “centuries  of  law-sanctioned  inequality.”    Id.,  at 
298  (dissenting  opinion).    See  also  Adarand  Constructors, 
Inc.  v.  Peña,  515  U. S.  200,  272–274  (1995)  (dissenting 
opinion).  Among  constitutionally  permissible  options,  I
remain  convinced,  “those  that  candidly  disclose  their 
consideration of race [are] preferable to those that conceal 
it.”  Gratz, 539 U. S., at 305, n. 11 (dissenting opinion).

Accordingly,  I  would  not  return  this  case  for  a  second 
look.  As the thorough opinions below show, 631 F. 3d 213 
(CA5  2011);  645  F. Supp.  2d  587,  the  University’s  admis-
sions  policy  flexibly  considers  race  only  as  a  “factor  of  a 
factor  of  a  factor  of  a  factor”  in  the  calculus,  id.,  at  608; 
followed  a  yearlong  review  through  which  the  University 
reached  the  reasonable,  good-faith  judgment  that  suppos-
edly  race-neutral  initiatives  were  insufficient  to  achieve, 
in appropriate measure, the educational benefits of student-
body  diversity,  see  631  F. 3d,  at  225–226;  and  is  sub- 
ject  to  periodic  review  to  ensure  that  the  consideration  of 
race  remains  necessary  and  proper  to  achieve  the  Uni- 
versity’s  educational  objectives,  see  id.,  at  226.3   Justice 
Powell’s  opinion  in  Bakke  and  the  Court’s  decision  in 
Grutter  require  no  further  determinations.  See  Grutter, 

—————— 

3 As the Court said in Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U. S. 306, 339 (2003),
“[n]arrow  tailoring  . . .  require[s]  serious,  good  faith  consideration  of
workable  race-neutral  alternatives  that  will  achieve  the  diversity  the
university  seeks.”  But,  Grutter  also  explained,  it  does  not  “require  a 
university  to  choose  between  maintaining  a  reputation  for  excellence
[and]  fulfilling  a  commitment  to  provide  educational  opportunities
to  members  of  all  racial  groups.”    Ibid.    I  do  not  read  the  Court  to 
say  otherwise.   See  ante,  at  10  (acknowledging  that,  in  determining
whether  a  race-conscious  admissions  policy  satisfies  Grutter’s  narrow-
tailoring  requirement,  “a  court  can  take  account  of  a  university’s 
experience  and  expertise  in  adopting  or  rejecting  certain  admissions
processes”).