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Page Number: 35

30 

RUCHO v. COMMON CAUSE 

Opinion of the Court 

account when districting.”  541 U. S., at 305. 

The  District  Court  nevertheless  asserted  that  partisan 
gerrymanders  violate  “the  core  principle  of  [our]  republi-
can government” preserved in Art. I, §2, “namely, that the 
voters  should  choose  their  representatives,  not  the  other
way  around.”    318  F. Supp.  3d,  at  940  (quoting  Arizona 
State  Legislature,  576  U. S.,  at  ___  (slip  op., at  35);  inter-
nal quotation marks omitted; alteration in original).  That 
seems  like  an  objection  more  properly  grounded  in  the
Guarantee Clause of Article IV, §4, which “guarantee[s] to 
every  State  in  [the]  Union  a  Republican  Form  of  Govern-
ment.”  This Court has several times concluded, however, 
that the Guarantee Clause does not provide the basis for a 
justiciable  claim.  See,  e.g.,  Pacific  States  Telephone  & 
Telegraph Co. v. Oregon, 223 U. S. 118 (1912). 

V 
Excessive  partisanship  in  districting  leads  to  results 
that  reasonably  seem unjust.    But  the  fact  that  such  ger-
rymandering is “incompatible with democratic principles,” 
Arizona State Legislature, 576 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 1), 
does not mean that the solution lies with the federal judi-
ciary.    We  conclude  that  partisan  gerrymandering  claims
present political questions beyond the reach of the federal 
courts.  Federal judges have no license to reallocate politi-
cal power between the two major political parties, with no
plausible  grant  of  authority  in  the  Constitution,  and  no 
legal  standards  to  limit  and  direct  their  decisions. 
“[J]udicial action must be governed by standard, by rule,” 
and  must  be  “principled,  rational,  and  based  upon  rea-
soned  distinctions”  found  in  the  Constitution  or  laws. 
Vieth,  541  U. S.,  at  278,  279  (plurality  opinion).    Judicial 
review  of  partisan  gerrymandering  does  not  meet  those
basic requirements.

Today  the  dissent  essentially  embraces  the  argument
that  the  Court  unanimously  rejected  in  Gill:  “this  Court