Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/22pdf/21-476_c185.pdf
Page Number: 52.0

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303 CREATIVE LLC v. ELENIS 

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting 

which until then had denied admission to women.  The or-
ganization alleged that applying the law to require it to in-
clude  women  would  violate  its  “members’  constitutional 
rights  of  free  speech  and  association.”    468  U. S.,  at  615. 
“The power of the state to change the membership of an or-
ganization  is  inevitably  the  power  to  change  the  way  in 
which  it  speaks,”  the  Jaycees  argued.    Brief  for  Appellee,
O. T. 1983, No. 83–724, p. 19 (emphasis added).  Thus, “the 
right of the Jaycees to decide its own membership” was “in-
separable,” in its view, “from its ability to freely express it-
self.”  Ibid. 

This Court took a different view.  The Court held that the 
“application of the Minnesota statute to compel the Jaycees 
to accept women” did not infringe the organization’s First 
Amendment “freedom of expressive association.”  Roberts, 
468 U. S., at 622.  That was so because the State’s public
accommodations  law  did  “not  aim  at  the  suppression  of 
speech”  and  did  “not  distinguish  between  prohibited  and 
permitted activity on the basis of viewpoint.”  Id., at 623– 
624.  If  the  State  had  applied  the  law  “for  the  purpose  of 
hampering the organization’s ability to express its views,” 
that  would  be  a  different  matter.    Id.,  at  624  (emphasis 
added).  “Instead,” the law’s purpose was “eliminating dis-
crimination and assuring [the State’s] citizens equal access
to publicly available goods and services.”  Ibid.  “That goal,”
the  Court  reasoned,  “was  unrelated  to  the  suppression  of
expression”  and  “plainly  serves  compelling  state  interests 
of the highest order.”  Ibid. 

Justice O’Connor concurred in part and concurred in the 
judgment.  See id., at 631.  She stressed that the U. S. Jay-
cees  was  a  predominantly  commercial  entity  open  to  the
public.  And  she  took  the  view  that  there  was  a  First 
Amendment “dichotomy” between rights of commercial and 
expressive association.  Id., at 634.  The State, for example, 
was “free to impose any rational regulation” on commercial 
transactions themselves.  “A shopkeeper,” Justice O’Connor