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Page Number: 2

2 

SUSAN B. ANTHONY LIST v. DRIEHAUS 

Syllabus 

thereunder.”  Babbitt v. Farm Workers, 442 U. S. 289, 298.  Pp. 7–11.
(b) Petitioners have alleged a credible threat of enforcement of the

Ohio law.  Pp. 11–17.

(1) Petitioners have alleged “an intention to engage in a course of 
conduct arguably affected with a constitutional interest” by pleading
specific  statements  they  intend  to  make  in  future  election  cycles. 
Pp. 11–12. 

(2) Petitioners’ intended future conduct is also “arguably . . . pro-
scribed  by  [the]  statute.”    The  Ohio  false  statement  statute  sweeps 
broadly, and a panel of the Ohio Elections Commission already found 
probable  cause  to  believe  that  SBA  violated  the  law  when  it  made
statements  similar  to  those  petitioners  plan  to  make  in  the  future. 
Golden  v.  Zwickler,  394  U. S.  103,  is  distinguishable;  the  threat  of 
prosecution under an electoral leafletting ban in that case was wholly
conjectural  because  the  plaintiff’s  “sole  concern”  related  to  a  former
Congressman who was unlikely to run for office again.  Here, by con-
trast,  petitioners’  speech  focuses  on  the  broader  issue  of  support  for
the  ACA,  not  on  the  voting  record  of  a  single  candidate.    Nor  does 
SBA’s  insistence  that  its  previous  statements  were  true  render  its
fears of enforcement misplaced.  After all, that insistence did not pre-
vent the Commission from finding probable cause for a violation the
first time.  Pp. 12–13. 

(3) Finally,  the  threat  of  future  enforcement  is  substantial. 
There  is  a  history  of  past  enforcement  against  petitioners.    Past  en-
forcement against the same conduct is good evidence that the threat
of  enforcement  is  not  “ ‘chimerical.’ ”    Steffel  v.  Thompson,  415  U. S. 
452, 459.  The credibility of that threat is bolstered by the fact that a
complaint  may  be  filed  with  the  State  Commission  by  “any  person,” 
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §3517.153(A), not just a prosecutor or agency.  

The  threatened  Commission  proceedings  are  of  particular  concern 
because of the burden they impose on electoral speech.  Moreover, the 
target of a complaint may be forced to divert significant time and re-
sources to hire legal counsel and respond to discovery requests in the 
crucial  days  before  an  election.    But  this  Court  need  not  decide 
whether the threat of Commission proceedings standing alone is suf-
ficient; here, those proceedings are backed by the additional threat of
criminal prosecution.  Pp. 14–17.

(c) The  Sixth  Circuit  separately  considered  two  other  “prudential 
factors”:  “fitness”  and  “hardship.”  This  Court  need  not  resolve  the 
continuing vitality of the prudential ripeness doctrine in this case be-
cause those factors are easily satisfied here.  See Lexmark Int’l, Inc. 
v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U. S. ___.  Pp. 17–18. 

525 Fed. Appx. 415, reversed and remanded. 

THOMAS, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.