Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/524bv.pdf
Page Number: 70.0

524US1

Unit: $U72

[09-06-00 17:28:15] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 524 U. S. 11 (1998)

25

Opinion of the Court

rectly related to voting, the most basic of political rights, is
sufﬁciently concrete and speciﬁc such that the fact that it is
widely shared does not deprive Congress of constitutional
power to authorize its vindication in the federal courts.

Respondents have also satisﬁed the remaining two con-
stitutional standing requirements. The harm asserted is
“fairly traceable” to the FEC’s decision about which respond-
ents complain. Of course, as the FEC points out, Brief for
Petitioner 29–31, it is possible that even had the FEC agreed
with respondents’ view of the law, it would still have decided
in the exercise of its discretion not to require AIPAC to
produce the information. Cf. App. to Pet. for Cert. 98a (de-
ciding to exercise prosecutorial discretion, see Heckler v.
Chaney, 470 U. S. 821 (1985), and “take no further action” on
§ 441b allegation against AIPAC). But that fact does not
destroy Article III “causation,” for we cannot know that the
FEC would have exercised its prosecutorial discretion in this
way. Agencies often have discretion about whether or not
to take a particular action. Yet those adversely affected by
a discretionary agency decision generally have standing to
complain that the agency based its decision upon an improper
legal ground. See, e. g., Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner,
387 U. S. 136, 140 (1967) (discussing presumption of review-
ability of agency action); Citizens to Preserve Overton Park,
If a reviewing court
Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U. S. 402, 410 (1971).
agrees that the agency misinterpreted the law, it will set
aside the agency’s action and remand the case—even though
the agency (like a new jury after a mistrial) might later, in
the exercise of its lawful discretion, reach the same result
for a different reason. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U. S. 80
(1943). Thus respondents’ “injury in fact” is “fairly trace-
able” to the FEC’s decision not to issue its complaint, even
though the FEC might reach the same result exercising its
discretionary powers lawfully. For similar reasons, the
courts in this case can “redress” respondents’ “injury in
fact.”