Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/22pdf/21-1086_1co6.pdf
Page Number: 112

16 

ALLEN v. MILLIGAN 

ALITO, J., dissenting 

precedents in another way.  We have been sensitive to the 
gravity  of  “ ‘trapp[ing]’ ”  States  “ ‘between  the  competing 
hazards of liability’ ” imposed by the Constitution and the 
VRA.    Id.,  at  196  (quoting  Vera,  517  U. S.,  at  977).    The 
VRA’s demand that States not unintentionally “dilute” the 
votes of particular groups must be reconciled with the Con-
stitution’s demand that States generally avoid intentional 
augmentation of the political power of any one racial group 
(and thus the diminution of the power of other groups).  The 
plurality’s  predominance  analysis  shreds  that  prudential 
concern.  If a private plaintiff can demonstrate §2 liability 
based on the production of a map that the State has every 
reason to believe it could not constitutionally draw, we have 
left “state legislatures too little breathing room” and virtu-
ally guaranteed that they will be on the losing end of a fed-
eral court’s judgment.  Bethune-Hill, 580 U. S., at 196. 

* 

  * 

  * 
  The Court’s treatment of Gingles is inconsistent with the 
text of §2, our precedents on racial predominance, and the 
fundamental principle that  States  are  almost always pro-
hibited from basing decisions on race.  Today’s decision un-
necessarily  sets  the  VRA  on  a  perilous  and  unfortunate 
path.  I respectfully dissent.