Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/21pdf/20-493_jgko.pdf
Page Number: 35

Cite as:  596 U. S. ____ (2022) 

11 

ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting 

the statute for one main reason: It adopts the Tribe’s argu-
ment that  the use of the word “prohibited” in §107(a) im-
plicitly incorporates the jurisdictional framework of Public 
Law 280 and Cabazon Band. 

1 
There are a number of reasons to be skeptical of this ap-
proach.  First, Congress knew how to incorporate the Public 
Law 280 framework where it wished to do so.  We know that 
because  that  is  precisely  what  Congress  did  in  §105(f )  of 
the  Restoration  Act.  There  is  little  reason  to  think  that 
Congress would have done so elsewhere in the very same 
Act with nothing more than a wink and a nudge. 

Second,  there  is  no  evidence  that  Congress  intended  to
use the word “prohibited” in §107(a) as a term of art.  The 
word  “prohibit”  appears  thousands  of  times  in  the  U. S. 
Code.  See Brief for Respondent 24, n. 6.  The fact that our 
decision in Cabazon Band used this generic term to describe
the  bounds of  Public  Law  280  is  hardly  enough  to  turn  it 
into a term of art with a more particularized meaning. 

Third, the text of §107(a) of the Restoration Act bears lit-
tle  resemblance  to  the  statutory  language  of  Public  Law 
280.  Compare 18 U. S. C. §1162 and 28 U. S. C. §1360 (set-
ting  forth  provisions  of  Public  Law  280)  with  §107  of  the
Restoration Act.  Thus, this is not a situation where a more 
recent enactment carries with it the “old soil” of a predeces-
sor statute or rule.  See F. Frankfurter, Some Reflections 
on  the  Reading  of  Statutes,  47  Colum.  L. Rev.  527,  537
(1947). 

Finally, the language used in §107 does not signal an in-
tent  to  adopt  Cabazon  Band’s  unique  dichotomy  between 
laws  that  are  “ ‘criminal/prohibitory’ ”  and  those  that  are
“ ‘civil/regulatory.’ ”  480 U. S., at 209.  The Tribe points to 
§107(a)’s  use  of  the  word  “prohibited”  and  §107(b)’s  refer-
ence to the State lacking “regulatory jurisdiction” on tribal 
lands  to  suggest  that  only  Texas’s  gaming  laws  that  are