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Page Number: 1.0

(Slip Opinion) 

OCTOBER  TERM,  2016 

1 

Syllabus 

NOTE:  Where  it  is  feasible,  a  syllabus  (headnote)  will  be  released,  as  is
being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued.
The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been
prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader. 
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337. 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

Syllabus 

TC HEARTLAND LLC v. KRAFT FOODS GROUP 

BRANDS LLC
 

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR 
THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT 

No. 16–341.  Argued March 27, 2017—Decided May 22, 2017 

The  patent  venue  statute,  28  U. S. C.  §1400(b),  provides  that  “[a]ny
civil  action  for  patent  infringement  may  be  brought  in  the  judicial 
district  where  the  defendant  resides,  or  where  the  defendant  has 
committed  acts  of  infringement  and  has  a  regular  and  established
place  of  business.”    In  Fourco  Glass  Co.  v.  Transmirra  Products 
Corp.,  353  U. S.  222,  226,  this  Court  concluded  that  for  purposes  of 
§1400(b) a domestic corporation “resides” only in its State of incorpo-
ration, rejecting the argument that §1400(b) incorporates the broader
definition  of  corporate  “residence”  contained  in  the  general  venue
statute,  28  U. S. C.  §1391(c).    Congress  has  not  amended  §1400(b) 
since  Fourco,  but  it  has  twice  amended  §1391,  which  now  provides
that, “[e]xcept as otherwise provided by law” and “[f]or all venue pur-
poses,”  a  corporation  “shall  be  deemed  to  reside,  if  a  defendant,  in
any judicial district in which such defendant is subject to the court’s 
personal  jurisdiction  with  respect  to  the  civil  action  in  question.” 
§§1391(a), (c). 

Respondent  filed  a  patent  infringement  suit  in  the  District  Court
for  the  District  of  Delaware  against  petitioner,  a  competitor  that  is 
organized under Indiana law and headquartered in Indiana but ships
the allegedly infringing products into Delaware.  Petitioner moved to 
transfer  venue  to  a  District  Court  in  Indiana,  claiming  that  venue
was  improper  in  Delaware.    Citing  Fourco,  petitioner  argued  that  it 
did  not  “resid[e]”  in  Delaware  and  had  no  “regular  and  established 
place of business” in Delaware under §1400(b).  The District Court re-
jected  these  arguments.    The  Federal  Circuit  denied  a  petition  for  a 
writ of mandamus, concluding that §1391(c) supplies the definition of 
“resides” in §1400(b).  The Federal Circuit reasoned that because pe-