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GLACIER NORTHWEST, INC. v. TEAMSTERS 

Syllabus 

gage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargain-
ing or other mutual aid or protection,” 29 U. S. C. §157—at least argu-
ably protected the drivers’ conduct, so the State lacked  the power to
hold the Union accountable for any of the strike’s consequences.  The 
Washington  Supreme  Court  agreed  with  the  Union,  reasoning  that 
“the NLRA preempts Glacier’s tort claims related to the loss of its con-
crete product because that loss was incidental to a strike arguably pro-
tected by federal law.”   

Held: The NLRA did not preempt Glacier’s tort claims alleging that the 
Union intentionally destroyed the company’s property during a labor 
dispute.  Pp. 6–12.

(a) The parties agree that the NLRA protects the right to strike but 
that this right is not absolute.  The National Labor Relations Board 
has long taken the position—which the parties accept—that the NLRA
does  not  shield  strikers  who  fail  to  take  “reasonable  precautions”  to 
protect  their  employer’s  property  from  foreseeable,  aggravated,  and
imminent danger due to the sudden cessation of work.  Bethany Medi-
cal Center, 328 N. L. R. B. 1094.  Given this undisputed limitation on 
the right to strike, the Court concludes that the Union has not met its
burden  as  the  party  asserting  preemption  to  demonstrate  that  the
NLRA arguably protects the drivers’ conduct.  Longshoremen v. Davis, 
476 U. S. 380, 395.  Accepting the complaint’s allegations as true, the 
Union did not take reasonable precautions to protect Glacier’s property
from imminent danger resulting from the drivers’ sudden cessation of
work.  The Union knew that concrete is highly perishable, that it can 
last  for  only  a  limited  time  in  a  delivery  truck’s  rotating  drum,  and 
that concrete left to harden in a truck’s drum causes significant dam-
age to the truck.  The Union nevertheless coordinated with truck driv-
ers  to  initiate  the  strike  when  Glacier  was  in  the  midst  of  batching 
large quantities of concrete and delivering it to customers.  The result-
ing risk of harm to Glacier’s equipment and destruction of its concrete
were both foreseeable and serious.  The Union thus failed to “take rea-
sonable precautions to protect” against this foreseeable and imminent
danger.  Bethany Medical Center, 328 N. L. R. B., at 1094.  Indeed, far 
from taking reasonable precautions, the Union executed the strike in
a manner designed to achieve those results.  Because such conduct is 
not arguably protected by the NLRA, the state court erred in dismiss-
ing Glacier’s tort claims as preempted. Pp. 6–8.

(b) The Union’s efforts to resist the conclusion that the NLRA does 
not arguably protect its conduct are unavailing.  First, the Union em-
phasizes  that  the  NLRA’s  protection  of  the  right  to  strike  should  be 
interpreted generously.  But the protected right to strike is not abso-
lute, thus the Court must analyze whether the strike exceeded the lim-
its of conduct protected by the statute.