Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/21pdf/20-1088_dbfi.pdf
Page Number: 12

8 

CARSON v. MAKIN 

Opinion of the Court 

We  deemed  it  “unremarkable  in  light  of  our  prior  deci-
sions” to conclude that the Free Exercise Clause did not per-
mit Missouri to “expressly discriminate[ ] against otherwise
eligible recipients by disqualifying them from a public ben-
efit solely because of their religious character.”  Id., at ___– 
___ (slip op., at 9–10).  While it was true that Trinity Lu-
theran remained “free to continue operating as a church,” it 
could enjoy that freedom only “at the cost of automatic and 
absolute exclusion from the benefits of a public program for 
which  the  Center  [was]  otherwise  fully  qualified.”    Id.,  at 
___ (slip op., at 10) (citing McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U. S. 618, 
626  (1978)  (plurality  opinion)).  Such  discrimination,  we 
said, was “odious to our Constitution” and could not stand. 
582 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 15). 

Two Terms ago, in Espinoza, we reached the same con-
clusion as to a Montana program that provided tax credits
to donors who sponsored scholarships for private school tu-
ition.  The Montana Supreme Court held that the program, 
to the extent it included religious schools, violated a provi-
sion of the Montana Constitution that barred government
aid to any school controlled in whole or in part by a church, 
sect, or denomination.  As a result of that holding, the State 
terminated  the  scholarship  program,  preventing  the  peti-
tioners  from  accessing  scholarship  funds  they  otherwise 
would have used to fund their children’s educations at reli-
gious schools. 

We again held that the Free Exercise Clause forbade the 
State’s  action.    The  application  of  the  Montana  Constitu-
tion’s no-aid provision, we explained, required strict scru-
tiny because it “bar[red] religious schools from public bene-
fits solely because of the religious character of the schools.” 
Espinoza, 591 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 9).  “A State need not 
subsidize  private  education,”  we  concluded,  “[b]ut  once  a
State  decides  to  do  so,  it  cannot  disqualify  some  private
schools solely because they are religious.”  Id., at ___ (slip
op., at 20).