Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/09pdf/08-964.pdf
Page Number: 3.0

Cite as:  561 U. S. ____ (2010) 

3 

Syllabus 

Finally, the Federal Circuit incorrectly concluded that this Court has
endorsed  the  machine-or-transformation  test  as  the  exclusive  test. 
Recent  authorities  show  that  the  test  was  never  intended  to  be  ex-
haustive or exclusive.  See, e.g., Parker v. Flook, 437 U. S. 584, 588, 
n. 9.  Pp. 5–8.

(c) Section  101  similarly  precludes  a  reading  of  the  term  “process” 
that  would  categorically  exclude  business  methods.    The  term 
“method”  within  §100(b)’s  “process”  definition,  at  least  as  a  textual
matter and  before other consulting other  Patent  Act limitations and
this Court’s precedents, may include at least some methods of doing
business.  The Court is unaware of any argument that the “ordinary,
contemporary,  common  meaning,”  Diehr,  supra,  at  182,  of  “method” 
excludes  business  methods.    Nor  is  it  clear  what  a  business  method 
exception would sweep in and whether it would exclude technologies
for conducting a business more efficiently.  The categorical exclusion
argument  is  further  undermined  by  the  fact  that  federal  law  explic-
itly contemplates the existence of at least some business method pat-
ents:  Under  §273(b)(1),  if  a  patent-holder  claims  infringement  based
on “a method in [a] patent,” the alleged infringer can assert a defense
of prior use.  By allowing this defense, the statute itself acknowledges 
that there may be business  method patents.  Section 273 thus clari-
fies the understanding that a business method is simply one kind of
“method” that is, at least in some circumstances, eligible for patent-
ing  under  §101.    A  contrary  conclusion  would  violate  the  canon 
against interpreting any statutory provision in a manner that would 
render  another  provision  superfluous.    See  Corley  v.  United  States, 
556 U. S. ___, ___.  Finally, while §273 appears to leave open the pos-
sibility  of  some  business  method  patents,  it  does  not  suggest  broad
patentability of such claimed inventions.  Pp. 10–11.    

(d) Even though petitioners’ application is not categorically outside
of  §101  under  the  two  atextual  approaches  the  Court  rejects  today,
that does not mean it is a “process” under §101.  Petitioners seek to 
patent  both  the  concept  of  hedging  risk  and  the  application  of  that 
concept  to  energy  markets.  Under  Benson,  Flook,  and  Diehr,  how-
ever,  these  are  not  patentable  processes  but  attempts  to  patent  ab-
stract ideas.  Claims 1 and 4 explain the basic concept of hedging and
reduce  that  concept  to  a  mathematical  formula.    This  is  an  unpat-
entable abstract idea, just like the algorithms at issue in Benson and 
Flook.  Petitioners’ remaining claims, broad examples of how hedging 
can  be  used  in  commodities  and  energy  markets,  attempt  to  patent 
the  use  of  the  abstract  hedging  idea,  then  instruct  the  use  of  well-
known random  analysis  techniques  to  help  establish  some  of  the  in-
puts into the equation.  They add even less to the underlying abstract 
principle than the invention held patent ineligible in Flook.  Pp. 12–