Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/524bv.pdf
Page Number: 528.0

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Cite as: 524 U. S. 417 (1998)

483

Breyer, J., dissenting

nedy. See ante, at 450 (concurring opinion).
Indeed, the
President acts only in response to, and on the terms set by,
the Congress.

Nor can one say that the Act’s basic substantive objective
is constitutionally improper, for the earliest Congresses
could, see Part II, supra, and often did, confer on the Presi-
dent this sort of discretionary authority over spending, see
ante, at 466–467 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part). Cf. J. W. Hampton, 276 U. S., at 412 (Taft, C. J.)
(“[C]ontemporaneous legislative exposition of the Constitu-
tion when the founders of our Government and the framers
of our Constitution were actively participating in public af-
fairs . . . ﬁxes the construction to be given to its provisions”).
And, if an individual Member of Congress, who, say, favors
aid to Country A but not to Country B, objects to the Act on
the ground that the President may “rewrite” an appropria-
tions law to do the opposite, one can respond: “But a majority
of Congress voted that he have that power; you may vote to
exempt the relevant appropriations provision from the Act;
and if you command a majority, your appropriation is safe.”
Where the burden of overcoming legislative inertia lies is
within the power of Congress to determine by rule. Where
is the encroachment?

Nor can one say the Act’s grant of power “aggrandizes”
the Presidential ofﬁce. The grant is limited to the context
of the budget.
It is limited to the power to spend, or not to
spend, particular appropriated items, and the power to per-
mit, or not to permit, speciﬁc limited exemptions from gener-
ally applicable tax law from taking effect. These powers,
as I will explain in detail, resemble those the President has
exercised in the past on other occasions. See Part IV–C,
infra. The delegation of those powers to the President may
strengthen the Presidency, but any such change in Executive
Branch authority seems minute when compared with the
changes worked by delegations of other kinds of authority
that the Court in the past has upheld. See, e. g., American