Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/23pdf/23-175_19m2.pdf
Page Number: 67.0

Cite as:  603 U. S. ____ (2024) 

23 

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting 

concurring in judgment).  So, in his view, it was “unneces-
sary to pursue at this point the further definition of the cir-
cumstances  or  the  state  of  intoxication  which  might  bar 
conviction of a chronic alcoholic for being drunk in a public 
place.”  Id., at 553. 

This case similarly called for a straightforward applica-
tion of Robinson.  The majority finds it telling that this dis-
sent “barely mentions” Justice Marshall’s opinion in Powell. 
Ante,  at  32.5    The  majority  completely  misses  the  point. 
Even Justice Marshall’s plurality opinion in Powell agreed
that  Robinson  prohibited  enforcing  laws  criminalizing  “a 
mere status.”  392 U. S., at 532.  The Powell Court consid-
ered a statute that criminalized voluntary conduct (getting
drunk) that could be rendered involuntary by a status (al-
coholism); here, the Ordinances criminalize conduct (sleep-
ing outside) that defines a particular status (homelessness).
So unlike the debate in Powell, this case does not turn on 
whether the criminalized actions are “ ‘involuntary’ or ‘oc-
casioned by’ ” a particular status.  Id., at 533 (Marshall, J., 
dissenting).  For all the reasons discussed above, see supra,
at 13–19, these Ordinances criminalize status and are thus 
unconstitutional under any of the opinions in Powell. 

D 
The majority does not let the reader forget that “a large
number  of  States,  cities,  and  counties”  all  “urg[ed]  the 
Court to grant review.”  Ante, at 14; see also ante, at 9 (“An
exceptionally large number of cities and States have filed 
briefs in this Court”); ante, at 34 (noting the “multitude of 
—————— 

5 The majority claims that this dissent does not dispute that Robinson 
is “hard to square” with the Eighth Amendment’s “text and this Court’s
other precedents.”  Ante, at 32.  That is wrong.  See supra, at 12 (recog-
nizing Robinson’s well-established rule).  The majority also claims that 
this  dissent  “ignores  Robinson’s  own  insistence  that  a  different  result 
would have obtained in that case if the law there had proscribed an act 
rather than status alone.”  Ante, at 32.  That too is wrong.  See supra, at 
11–12 (discussing Robinson’s distinction between status and conduct).