Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/529bv.pdf
Page Number: 862.0

529US3

Unit: $U59

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Cite as: 529 U. S. 765 (2000)

787

Opinion of the Court

In sum, we believe that various features of the FCA, both
as originally enacted and as amended, far from providing
the requisite afﬁrmative indications that the term “per-
son” included States for purposes of qui tam liability, in-
dicate quite the contrary. Our conclusion is buttressed by
two other considerations that we think it unnecessary to
discuss at any length: ﬁrst, “the ordinary rule of statutory
construction” that “if Congress intends to alter the usual
constitutional balance between States and the Federal Gov-
ernment, it must make its intention to do so unmistakably
clear in the language of the statute,” Will, 491 U. S., at 65
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also
Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U. S. 452, 460–461 (1991); United
States v. Bass, 404 U. S. 336, 349 (1971), and second, the
doctrine that statutes should be construed so as to avoid
difﬁcult constitutional questions. We of course express no
view on the question whether an action in federal court
by a qui tam relator against a State would run afoul of the
Eleventh Amendment, but we note that there is “a serious
doubt” on that score. Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U. S. 288, 348
(1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted).18

*

*

*

We hold that a private individual has standing to bring
suit in federal court on behalf of the United States under
the False Claims Act, 31 U. S. C. §§ 3729–3733, but that the

In addition to being inapposite be-
at 585, and Evans, 316 U. S., at 160.
cause they did not authorize suits against States by private parties, see
n. 9, supra, the deﬁnitions of “person” in the statutes at issue in those
cases were not as detailed as that of the PFCRA, and set forth what the
term “person” included, rather than, as the PFCRA does, what the term
“person” “means,” see 31 U. S. C. § 3801(a)(6) (emphasis added).

18 Although the dissent concludes that States can be “persons” for pur-
poses of commencing an FCA qui tam action under § 3730(b), see post,
at 794–795, we need not resolve that question here, and therefore leave
it open.