Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/18pdf/17-571_e29f.pdf
Page Number: 3

Cite as:  586 U. S. ____ (2019) 

3 

Syllabus 

ing registration,  not to  the  copyright claimant’s  request for registra-
tion. 

Fourth Estate’s contrary reading stems in part from its misappre-
hension of the significance of certain 1976 revisions to the Copyright 
Act.    But  in  enacting  §411(a),  Congress  both  reaffirmed  the  general 
rule  that  registration  must  precede  an  infringement  suit  and  added 
an exception in that provision’s second sentence to cover instances in 
which registration is refused.  That exception would have no work to 
do if Congress intended the 1976 revisions to clarify that a copyright 
claimant may sue immediately upon applying for registration.  Note-
worthy,  too,  in  years  following the  1976  revisions,  Congress  resisted 
efforts  to  eliminate  §411(a), which  contains  the  registration  require-
ment. 

Fourth Estate also argues that, because “registration is not a con-
dition of copyright protection,” §408(a), §411(a) should not bar a copy-
right  claimant  from  enforcing  that  protection  in  court  once  she  has 
applied for registration.  But the Copyright Act safeguards copyright 
owners  by  vesting  them  with  exclusive  rights  upon  creation  of  their 
works  and prohibiting infringement from  that point forward.  To re-
cover for such infringement, copyright owners must simply apply for 
registration and await the Register’s decision.  Further, Congress has 
authorized  preregistration  infringement  suits  with  respect  to  works 
vulnerable to predistribution infringement, and Fourth Estate’s fear 
that a copyright owner might lose the ability to enforce her rights en-
tirely  is  overstated.  True,  registration  processing  times  have  in-
creased  from  one  to  two  weeks  in  1956  to  many  months  today.    De-
lays,  in  large  part,  are  the  result  of  Copyright  Office  staffing  and 
budgetary  shortages  that  Congress  can  alleviate,  but  courts  cannot 
cure.    Unfortunate  as  the  current  administrative  lag  may  be,  that 
factor  does  not  allow  this  Court  to  revise  §411(a)’s  congressionally 
composed text.  Pp. 7–12. 

856 F. 3d 1338, affirmed. 

GINSBURG, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.