Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/19pdf/18-1116_h3cj.pdf
Page Number: 7

Cite as:  589 U. S. ____ (2020) 

5 

Opinion of the Court 

Circuit reversed.  As relevant here,2 the court construed “ac-
tual knowledge” to mean “what it says: knowledge that is
actual, not merely a possible inference from ambiguous cir-
cumstances.”  909 F. 3d 1069, 1076 (2018) (internal quota-
tion marks omitted).  Although Sulyma “had sufficient in-
formation  available  to  him  to  know  about  the  allegedly
imprudent investments” more than three years before filing 
suit, the court held that his testimony created a dispute as 
to when he actually gained that knowledge.  Id., at 1077. 

Several Circuits have likewise construed §1113(2) to re-
quire “knowledge that is actual,” id., at 1076, but one has 
construed it to require only proof of sufficient disclosure.3 
We  granted  certiorari,  587  U. S.  ___  (2019),  to  resolve 
whether the phrase “actual knowledge” does in fact mean
“what it says,” 909 F. 3d, at 1076, and hold that it does. 

II 
A 
“We must enforce plain and unambiguous statutory lan-
guage” in ERISA, as in any statute, “according to its terms.” 
Hardt v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 560 U. S. 242, 251 
(2010).  Although ERISA does not define the phrase “actual 
knowledge,” its meaning is plain.  Dictionaries are hardly
necessary to confirm the point, but they do.  When Congress 

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2 The  court  also  addressed  the  separate  question  of  what  exactly  a
plaintiff must actually know about a defendant’s conduct and the rele-
vant law in order for §1113(2) to apply.  That question is not before us 
and we do not address it. 

3 Compare Caputo v. Pfizer, Inc., 267 F. 3d 181, 194 (CA2 2001); Reich 
v.  Lancaster,  55  F.  3d  1034,  1056–1057  (CA5  1995);  Gluck  v.  Unisys 
Corp., 960 F. 2d 1168, 1176 (CA3 1992); Radiology Center, S. C., v. Stifel, 
Nicolaus & Co., 919 F. 2d 1216, 1222 (CA7 1990); Brock v. Nellis, 809 
F. 2d 753, 754–755 (CA11 1987), with Brown v. Owens Corning Invest-
ment Review Comm., 622 F. 3d 564, 571 (CA6 2010) (“Actual knowledge 
does not require proof that the individual Plaintiffs actually saw or read
the documents that disclosed the allegedly harmful investments” (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted)).