Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/529bv.pdf
Page Number: 550.0

529US2

Unit: $U50

[09-26-01 10:29:49] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 529 U. S. 473 (2000)

475

Syllabus

AEDPA’s present provisions, which incorporate earlier habeas corpus
principles. Except for substituting the word “constitutional” for the
word “federal,” the present § 2253 is a codiﬁcation of the CPC standard
announced in Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U. S. 880, 894. See Williams v.
Taylor, ante, at 434. Under Barefoot, a substantial showing of the de-
nial of a right includes showing that reasonable jurists could debate
whether (or, for that matter, agree that) the petition should have been
resolved in a different manner or that the issues presented were “ ‘ade-
quate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.’ ”
463 U. S., at 893,
and n. 4. Pp. 483–484.

(b) Determining whether a COA should issue where the petition
was dismissed on procedural grounds has two components, one directed
at the underlying constitutional claims and one directed at the district
court’s procedural holding. Section 2253 mandates that both showings
be made before the court of appeals may entertain the appeal. Each
component is part of a threshold inquiry, and a court may ﬁnd that it
can dispose of the application in a fair and prompt manner if it proceeds
ﬁrst to resolve the issue whose answer is more apparent from the record
and arguments. Resolution of procedural issues ﬁrst is allowed and
encouraged by the rule that this Court will not pass upon a constitu-
tional question if there is also present some other ground upon which
the case may be disposed of. Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U. S. 288, 347.
Here, Slack did not attempt to make a substantial showing of the denial
of a constitutional right, instead arguing only that the District Court’s
procedural rulings were wrong. This Court does not attempt to deter-
mine whether Slack could make the required showing of constitutional
error, for the issue was neither briefed nor presented below because of
the view that the CPC, rather than COA, standards applied.
It will be
necessary to consider the matter upon any remand for further proceed-
ings. The Court does, however, address the second component of the
§ 2253(c) inquiry, whether jurists of reason could conclude that the Dis-
trict Court’s dismissal on procedural grounds was debatable or incor-
rect. Pp. 484–485.

3. A habeas petition which is ﬁled after an initial petition was dis-
missed without adjudication on the merits for failure to exhaust state
remedies is not a “second or successive” petition as that term is under-
stood in the habeas corpus context. Pp. 485–490.

(a) The District Court erred in concluding to the contrary. Be-
cause the question whether Slack’s pre-AEDPA, 1995 petition was sec-
ond or successive implicates his right to relief in the trial court, pre-
AEDPA law governs. See Lindh v. Murphy, supra. Whether the
dismissal was appropriate is controlled by Rule 9(b) of the Rules Gov-
erning § 2254, which incorporates the Court’s prior decisions on the