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Page Number: 3.0

Cite as:  584 U. S. ____ (2018) 

3 

Syllabus 

and  the  United  States  not  only  ignores  the  situation  that  Congress
faced when it enacted PASPA but also leads to results that Congress
is most unlikely to have wanted.  Pp. 11–13. 

(c) Respondents  and  the  United  States  cannot  invoke  the  canon 
of  interpretation  that  a  statute  should  not  be  held  to  be  unconstitu-
tional if there is any reasonable interpretation that can save it.  Even 
if the law could be interpreted as respondents and the United States
suggest,  it  would  still  violate  the  anticommandeering  principle. 
Pp. 13–14. 

2. PASPA’s  provision  prohibiting  state  authorization  of  sports 

gambling schemes violates the anticommandeering rule.  Pp. 14–24.

(a) As  the  Tenth  Amendment  confirms,  all  legislative  power  not
conferred on Congress by the Constitution is reserved for the States.
Absent from the list of conferred powers is the power to issue direct 
orders  to  the  governments  of  the  States.    The  anticommandeering 
doctrine  that  emerged  in  New  York  v.  United  States,  505  U. S.  144, 
and  Printz  v.  United  States,  521  U. S.  898,  simply  represents  the 
recognition of this limitation.  Thus, “Congress may not simply ‘com-
mandeer  the  legislative  process  of  the  States  by  directly  compelling 
them to enact and enforce a federal regulatory program.’ ”  New York, 
supra, at 161.  Adherence to the anticommandeering principle is im-
portant  for  several  reasons,  including,  as  significant  here,  that  the 
rule serves as “one of the Constitution’s structural safeguards of lib-
erty,” Printz, supra, at 921, that the rule promotes political accounta-
bility, and that the rule prevents Congress from shifting the costs of
regulation to the States.  Pp. 14–18. 

(b) PASPA’s  anti-authorization  provision  unequivocally  dictates
what  a  state  legislature  may  and  may  not  do.    The  distinction  be-
tween compelling a State to enact legislation and prohibiting a State
from  enacting  new  laws  is  an  empty  one.    The  basic  principle—that 
Congress  cannot  issue  direct  orders  to  state  legislatures—applies  in
either event.  Pp. 18–19. 

(c) Contrary  to  the  claim  of  respondents  and  the  United  States,
this Court’s precedents do not show that PASPA’s anti-authorization
provision  is  constitutional.    South  Carolina  v.  Baker,  485  U. S.  505; 
Reno  v.  Condon,  528  U. S.  141;  Hodel  v.  Virginia  Surface  Mining  & 
Reclamation  Assn.,  Inc.,  452  U. S.  264;  FERC  v.  Mississippi,  456 
U. S. 742, distinguished.  Pp. 19–21.

(d) Nor  does  the  anti-authorization  provision  constitute  a  valid
preemption provision.  To preempt state law, it must satisfy two re-
quirements.  It  must  represent  the  exercise  of  a  power  conferred  on 
Congress  by  the  Constitution.    And,  since  the  Constitution  “confers 
upon  Congress  the  power  to  regulate  individuals,  not  States,”  New 
York, supra, at 177, it must be best read as one that regulates private