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Page Number: 13.0

10 

COVENTRY HEALTH CARE OF MO., INC. v. NEVILS 

Opinion of the Court 

contractual  terms.  The  Employee  Retirement  Income
Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U. S. C. §1001 et seq., for 
example,  preempts  “any  and  all  State  laws  insofar  as
they . . .  relate  to  any  employee  benefit  plan.”    §1144(a).
And  the  Federal  Arbitration  Act  (FAA),  9  U. S. C.  §1 
et seq.,  limits  the  grounds  for  denying  enforcement  of 
“written provision[s] in . . . contract[s]” providing for arbi-
tration,  thereby  preempting  state  laws  that  would  other-
wise  interfere  with  such  contracts.    §2.  This  Court  has 
several  times  held  that  those  statutes  preempt  state  law, 
see,  e.g.,  Gobeille  v.  Liberty  Mut.  Ins.  Co.,  577  U. S.  ___, 
___–___ (2016) (slip op., at 5–12) (ERISA); Marmet Health 
Care Center, Inc. v. Brown, 565 U. S. 530, 532–534 (2012) 
(per  curiam)  (FAA),  and  Nevils  does  not  contend  that 
those  measures  violate  the  Supremacy  Clause,  see  Brief 
for Respondent 22.

Nevils instead attempts to distinguish those other stat-
utes  by  highlighting  a  particular  textual  feature  of 
§8902(m)(1):  Section  8902(m)(1)  states  that  the  “terms  of 
any contract” between OPM and a carrier “shall supersede
and preempt” certain state or local laws.  (Emphasis added.) 
That  formulation,  Nevils  asserts,  violates  the  Supremacy 
Clause’s  mandate  that  only  the  “Laws  of  the  United 
States”  may  reign  supreme  over  state  law.    U. S.  Const., 
Art. VI, cl. 2 (emphasis added).  Nevils’ argument elevates 
semantics  over  substance.  While  Congress’  formulation
might  differ 
from  the  phrasing  of  other  statutes, 
§8902(m)(1)  manifests  the  same  intent  to  preempt  state 
law.4    Because  we  do  not  require  Congress  to  employ  a 

—————— 

4 Congress’  choice  of  language  is  not  unique  to  §8902(m)(1).    Several 
related  statutes  governing  federal-employee  and  military-member
benefits  employ  similar  formulations.    See  §8959  (“The  terms  of  any
contract  that  relate  to  the  nature,  provision,  or  extent  of  coverage  or 
benefits  (including  payments  with  respect  to  benefits)  shall  supersede 
and  preempt  any  State  or  local  law, or  any regulation  issued  thereun-
der,  which  relates  to  dental  benefits,  insurance,  plans,  or  contracts.”);