Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/20pdf/19-840_6jfm.pdf
Page Number: 42

Cite as:  593 U. S. ____ (2021) 

17 

ALITO, J., dissenting 

that  there  was  lack  of  traceability  because  there  was  no
proof that the injury was caused by the removal restriction. 
“Our precedents say otherwise,” we explained, as a “plain-
tiff ’s injury must be fairly traceable to the challenged ac-
tion  of  the  defendant,”  and  it  is  “sufficient  that  the  chal-
lenger sustains injury from an executive act that allegedly 
exceeds the official’s authority.”  Id., at ___–___ (opinion of
the Court) (slip op., at 9–10) (internal quotation marks and 
alterations omitted).  Not a single Justice disputed that con-
clusion.
  In Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting 
Oversight  Bd.,  561  U. S.  477  (2010),  an  accounting  firm 
challenged  the  power  of  the  Public  Company  Accounting 
Oversight  Board  to  regulate  the  accounting  industry  and 
investigate its activities.  The firm argued that (A) it was
harmed  by  the  actions  taken  under  statutory  provisions 
that gave the Board regulatory and investigatory authority;
(B)  other  provisions  unlawfully  insulated  Board  members 
with dual-layer for-cause removal restrictions; and (C) the
removal  provisions  were  inseverable  from  provisions  au-
thorizing the pertinent regulatory activities.  The Court en-
tertained this argument on the merits, concluding that the 
removal restriction was unlawful, id., at 492–508, but re-
jecting the argument that the removal provision was inse-
verable from the provisions authorizing the actions that di-
rectly harmed the firm, id., at 508–510.  While the Court’s 
severability determination meant that the accounting firm 
was  “not  entitled  to  broad  injunctive  relief  against  the 
Board’s  continued  operations,”  id.,  at  513,  no  one  ques-
tioned  the  firm’s  standing  to  seek  that  relief  in  the  first
place.

In  Minnesota  v.  Mille  Lacs  Band  of  Chippewa  Indians, 
526  U. S.  172  (1999),  several  Bands  of  Chippewa  Indians
sought  a  declaratory  judgment  that  an  1837  Treaty  gave
their members a right to hunt on historic Chippewa lands.
An  1850  Executive  Order  had  purported  to  revoke  those