Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/14pdf/13-433_5h26.pdf
Page Number: 12

Cite as:  574 U. S. ____ (2014) 

1 

SOTOMAYOR, J., concurring 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

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No. 13–433 
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INTEGRITY STAFFING SOLUTIONS, INC., 

PETITIONER v. JESSE BUSK ET AL. 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 

APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
 

[December 9, 2014]

 JUSTICE  SOTOMAYOR, with whom JUSTICE  KAGAN joins,

concurring. 

I  concur  in  the  Court’s  opinion,  and  write  separately
only  to  explain  my  understanding  of  the  standards  the
Court applies. 

The  Court  reaches  two  critical  conclusions.    First,  the 
Court  confirms  that  compensable  “ ‘principal’ ”  activities 
“ ‘includ[e]  .  .  .  those  closely  related  activities  which  are 
indispensable  to  [a  principal  activity’s]  performance,’ ” 
ante, at 6 (quoting 29 CFR §790.8(c)(2013)), and holds that 
the  required  security  screenings  here  were  not  “integral 
and  indispensable”  to  another  principal  activity  the  em-
ployees were employed to perform, ante, at 7.  I agree.  As 
both  Department  of  Labor  regulations  and  our  precedent 
make  clear,  an  activity  is  “indispensable”  to  another, 
principal  activity  only  when  an  employee  could  not  dis-
pense with it without impairing his ability to perform the
principal activity safely and effectively.  Thus, although a 
battery  plant  worker  might,  for  example,  perform  his
principal  activities  without  donning  proper  protective
gear, he could not do so safely, see Steiner v. Mitchell, 350 
U.  S.  247,  250–253  (1956);  likewise,  a  butcher  might  be 
able to cut meat without having sharpened his knives, but 
he could not do so effectively, see Mitchell v. King Packing 
Co.,  350  U.  S.  260,  262–263  (1956);  accord,  29  CFR