Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/21pdf/20-843_7j80.pdf
Page Number: 104.0

Cite as:  597 U. S. ____ (2022) 

21 

BREYER, J., dissenting 

evidentiary record to answer those questions.  Yet it strikes 
down New York’s licensing regime as a violation of the Sec-
ond Amendment. 

III 
A 

How does the Court justify striking down New York’s law 
without  first  considering  how  it  actually  works  on  the 
ground and what purposes it serves?  The Court does so by 
purporting to rely nearly exclusively on history.  It requires 
“the government [to] affirmatively prove that its firearms 
regulation  is  part  of  the  historical  tradition  that  delimits 
the outer bounds of ‘the right to keep and bear arms.’ ”  Ante, 
at 10.  Beyond this historical inquiry, the Court refuses to
employ what it calls “means-end scrutiny.”  Ibid.  That is, 
it refuses to consider whether New York has a compelling 
interest in regulating the concealed carriage of handguns or 
whether New York’s law is narrowly tailored to achieve that
interest.  Although I agree that history can often be a useful 
tool in determining the meaning and scope of constitutional 
provisions, I believe the Court’s near-exclusive reliance on
that single tool today goes much too far.

The Court concedes that no Court of Appeals has adopted
its rigid history-only approach.  See ante, at 8.  To the con-
trary, every Court of Appeals to have addressed the ques-
tion  has  agreed  on  a  two-step  framework  for  evaluating 
whether a firearm regulation is consistent with the Second
Amendment.  Ibid.; ante, at 10, n. 4 (majority opinion) (list-
ing  cases  from  the  First,  Second,  Third,  Fourth,  Fifth, 
Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, Tenth, Eleventh, and D. C. Circuits).
At the first step, the Courts of Appeals use text and history
to  determine  “whether  the  regulated  activity  falls  within 
the scope of the Second Amendment.”  Ezell v. Chicago, 846 
F. 3d 888, 892 (CA7 2017).  If it does, they go on to the sec-
ond  step  and  consider  “ ‘the  strength  of  the  government’s
justification  for  restricting  or  regulating’ ”  the  Second