Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/21pdf/21-954_7l48.pdf
Page Number: 42

Cite as:  597 U. S. ____ (2022) 

9 

ALITO, J., dissenting 

shall  be  detained  for  a  [removal]  proceeding.”    (Emphasis
added.)  Six years ago, the Government argued strenuously 
that  this  requirement  is  mandatory,  and  its  brief  could 
hardly have been more categorical or emphatic in making 
this point.  See Brief for Petitioners in Jennings v. Rodri-
guez, O. T. 2017, No. 15–1204, p. 15 (“Aliens seeking admis-
sion who are not ‘clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be 
admitted’ are statutorily prohibited from physically enter-
ing the United States and must be detained during removal
proceedings . . . , unless the Secretary exercises his discre-
tion to release them on parole”); id., at 17 (“Unlike the word 
‘may,’ which implies discretion, the word ‘shall’ usually con-
notes a requirement.  And here, the repeated ‘shall be de-
tained’  clearly  means  what  it  says”  (internal  quotation 
marks and citations omitted)). 

The  Jennings  Court  correctly  accepted  that  argument, 
which was central to our holding.  See 583 U. S., at ___ (slip 
op.,  at  13)  (“Read  most  naturally,  §§1225(b)(1)  and  (b)(2) 
thus  mandate  detention  of  applicants  for  admission  until 
certain  proceedings  have  concluded”).    But  now,  in  an 
about-face, the Government argues that “shall be detained” 
actually means “may be detained.”  See Brief for Petitioners 
29 (“[T]he Court will not construe a provision stating that
law enforcement ‘shall’ take some action as a ‘true mandate’ 
absent  ‘some  stronger  indication  from  the  . . .  Legisla-
ture’ ”).

The  Government  was  correct  in  Jennings  and  is  wrong
here.  “[S]hall be detained” means “shall be detained.”  The 
Government points out that it lacks the facilities to detain
all  the  aliens  in  question,  and  no  one  questions  that  fact.
But use of the contiguous-return authority would at least 
reduce the number of aliens who are released in violation of 
the  INA’s  command.    The  District  Court  made  a  factual 
finding that rescinding MPP would cause additional viola-
tions of Congress’s unambiguous detention mandate.  554 
F. Supp. 3d, at 851–852.  It also found that “the termination