Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/13pdf/12-536_e1pf.pdf
Page Number: 74.0

Cite as:  572 U. S. ____ (2014) 

23 

BREYER, J., dissenting 

regulations,  however,  do  not  prevent  a  person  who  has 
contributed to a candidate from also contributing to multi-
candidate committees that support the candidate.  Indeed, 
the  rules  specifically  authorize  such  contributions.  See 
§110.1(h) (“A person may contribute to a candidate . . . and 
also  contribute  to  a  political  committee  which  has  sup- 
ported,  or  anticipates  supporting,  the  same  candidate  in
the same election,” as long as the political committee is “not 
the candidate’s principal campaign committee” or a “single
candidate  committee”  (emphasis  added)).    Example  Three
illustrates  the  latter  kind  of  contribution.    And  briefs 
before us make clear that the possibility for circumventing
the  base  limits  through  making  such  contributions  is  a
realistic,  not  an  illusory,  one.  See  Brief  for  Appellee  36
(demonstrating  that  many  PACs  today  explain  in  their 
public materials just what fairly small group of candidates
they intend to support); Brief for Americans for Campaign
Reform as Amicus Curiae 14–15 (similar).

Fifth,  the  plurality  points  to  another  FEC  regulation
(also  added  in  1976),  which  says  that  “an  individual  who
has contributed to a candidate” may not “also contribute to 
a  political  committee  that  has  supported  or  anticipates
supporting  the  same  candidate  if  the  individual  knows
that  ‘a  substantial  portion  [of  his  contribution]  will  be
contributed to, or expended on behalf of,’ that candidate.” 
Ante,  at  13  (quoting  11  CFR  §110.1(h)(2);  brackets  in
original);  accord,  41  Fed.  Reg.  35948.    This  regulation  is 
important,  for  in  principle,  the  FEC  might  use  it  to  pre­
vent the circumstances that Examples  Two and Three set 
forth  from  arising.    And  it  is  not  surprising  that  the  plu­
rality  relies  upon  the  existence  of  this  rule  when  it  de­
scribes  those  circumstances  as  “implausible,”  “illegal,”  or 
“divorced from reality.”  Ante, at 23, 24, 28. 

In  fact,  however,  this  regulation  is  not  the  strong  anti­
circumvention  weapon  that  the  plurality  imagines.    De­
spite  the  plurality’s  assurances,  it  does  not  “disarm”  the