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Page Number: 72.0

30 

HAALAND v. BRACKEEN 

GORSUCH, J., concurring 

“clearly within the scope of the power to regulate commerce
with  the  Indian  [T]ribes.”  United  States  v.  Bailey,  424 
F. Cas. 937, 939 (No. 14,495) (CC Tenn. 1834).  Of course, 
the  kinds  of  criminal  trespasses  Congress  regulated  as
early as 1790 were not themselves commercial.  But a tres-
pass against even one individual Indian could disrupt com-
merce with that individual.  See Green 660–661, and n. 76.  
By extension, such a trespass could disrupt dealings with 
other members of the Tribe and with other allied Tribes too. 
See Balkin 24–26.  Recognizing this, the framers entrusted
Congress with the power previously exercised by the Brit-
ish  Parliament  to  “restrain  the  disorderly  and  licentious 
from intrusions” by non-Indians against even individual In-
dians—all to preserve functioning channels of trade and in-
tercourse “with the Indians.”  Worcester, 6 Pet., at 552, 556. 

3 

If Congress’s powers under the Indian Commerce Clause 
are broader than those it enjoys under the Interstate Com-
merce Clause, “broader” does not mean “plenary.”  Even the 
federal government’s “power to control and manage” rela-
tions  with  the  Tribes  under  the  Indian  Commerce  Clause 
comes with “pertinent constitutional restrictions.”  United 
States v. Creek Nation, 295 U. S. 103, 110 (1935).  Congress
cannot, for example, expand the scope of its own power by
arbitrarily  labeling  non-Indians  as  Indians.  See  United 
States v. Sandoval, 231 U. S. 28, 46 (1913).  Nor can it reg-
ulate  in  peripherally  related  fields  merely  by  identifying 
some  incidental  connection  to  non-Indians’  dealings  with 
Indians.  Instead, Congress’s actions must still bear a valid 
“nexus”  to  Indian  commerce  to  withstand  constitutional 
challenge.  Lopez, 514 U. S., at 562 (quoting United States 
v. Bass, 404 U. S. 336, 347 (1971)).  As we have seen, too, 
“the scope of congressional authority” over the Tribes under
the Indian Commerce Clause is “best construed as a nega-
tive one.”  Pearl 325.  Its text “limits the legislative reach to