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UNICOLORS, INC. v. H&M HENNES & MAURITZ, L. P. 

Syllabus 

an  inaccuracy  in  a  copyright  registration  under  §411(b)(1)(A)’s  safe 
harbor.  Pp. 4–9. 

it  was 

lacked  “knowledge  that 

(a) The  Copyright  Act  provides  that  a  certificate  of  registration  is 
valid, even though it contains inaccurate information, as long as the 
copyright  holder 
inaccurate.”  
§411(b)(1)(A).  Case law and the dictionary instruct that “knowledge” 
has historically “meant and still means the fact or condition of being 
aware of something.”  Intel Corp. Investment Policy Comm. v. Sulyma, 
589  U.  S.  ___,  ___  (internal  quotation  marks  omitted).    Nothing  in 
§411(b)(1)(A) suggests that the safe harbor applies differently simply 
because an applicant made a mistake of law as opposed to a mistake 
of fact.  If Unicolors was not aware of the legal requirement that ren-
dered information in its application inaccurate, it could not have in-
cluded the inaccurate information “with knowledge that it was inaccu-
rate.”  §411(b)(1)(A).  Pp. 4–5. 

(b) Nearby statutory provisions help confirm that here “knowledge” 
refers to knowledge of the law as well as the facts.  Registration appli-
cations  call  for  information  that  requires  both  legal  and  factual 
knowledge.  See, e.g., §409(4) (whether a work was made “for hire”); 
§409(8) (when and where the work was “published”); §409(9) (whether 
the  work  is  “a  compilation  or  derivative  work”).    Inaccurate  infor-
mation in a registration may arise from a mistake of law or a mistake 
of  fact.    Nothing  in  the  statutory  language  suggests  that  Congress 
wanted to forgive applicants—many of whom lack legal training—for 
factual but not (often esoteric) legal mistakes.  Moreover, had Congress 
intended a scienter requirement other than actual knowledge, it would 
have said so explicitly, as it did in other parts of the Copyright Act.  
Indeed, cases decided before Congress enacted §411(b) overwhelmingly 
concluded  that  inadvertent  mistakes  on  registration  certificates—
many  of  which  involved  mistakes  of  law—neither  invalidated  copy-
right  registrations  nor  disallowed  infringement  actions.    The  Court 
finds  no  indication  that  Congress  intended  to  alter  this  well-estab-
lished rule when it enacted §411(b).  Pp. 5–7. 

(c) Those who consider legislative history will find indications that 
Congress  enacted  §411(b)  to  make  it  easier,  not  more  difficult,  for 
nonlawyers to obtain valid copyright registrations.  It did so in part by 
“eliminating loopholes” that allowed infringers to exploit mistakes in 
the  application  process  to  prevent  enforcement  of  otherwise  validly 
registered copyrights.  H. R. Rep. No. 110–617, p. 20. Given this his-
tory, it would make no sense if §411(b) left copyright registrations ex-
posed to invalidation based on applicants’ good-faith misunderstand-
ings of the details of copyright law.  P. 7. 

(d) H&M’s remaining arguments are unavailing.  First, the Court’s 
interpretation of the statute will not allow copyright holders to avoid