Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/19pdf/18-916_f2ah.pdf
Page Number: 28.0

Cite as:  590 U. S. ____ (2020) 

9 

GORSUCH, J., dissenting 

tution authority as opposed to  some other inter partes re-
view  institution  authority.  In  fact,  you  can  strike  “under 
this  section”  from  §314(d)  and  Thryv’s  interpretation  re-
mains unchanged.  That’s a pretty good clue something has 
gone wrong.

Faced with this problem of surplusage, Thryv alludes to 
the possibility that Congress included redundant language 
to be “double sure.”  But double sure of what?  Thryv does
not identify any confusion that the phrase “under this sec-
tion” might help avoid.  Given the lack of any other provi-
sion, anywhere in the U. S. Code, authorizing anyone to in-
stitute  inter  partes  review,  even  the  most  obtuse  reader
would never have any use for the clarification supposedly 
provided by “under this section” on Thryv’s account. 

Maybe  so,  Thryv  replies,  but  we  shouldn’t  worry  about 
the  surplusage  here  because  the  AIA  contains  surplusage
elsewhere.  The  other  putative  examples  of  surplusage
Thryv identifies, however, have no bearing on the provision 
now before us.  And even a passing glance reveals no sur-
plusage in them either.  Consider §315(c).  It says that “the
Director, in his or her discretion, may join as a party to that
inter partes review any person who properly files a petition 
under section 311 that the Director, after receiving a pre-
liminary response under section 313 . . . , determines war-
rants the institution of an inter partes review under section 
314.” (Emphasis added.)  Thryv argues that all these cross-
references  are  unnecessary.  But  look  closely:    Each  of 
§315(c)’s cross-references does important work to establish 
the rules for joinder.  Strike the first and the requirements
of a joinder petition become undefined.  Strike the second 
and it’s a mystery what kind of response the patent owner 
is entitled to file.  Strike the third and the Director’s deter-
mination  whether  to  grant  joinder  becomes  standardless.
All  of  this  language  has  a  point  to  it—just  as  “under  this
section” does under a faithful interpretation of §314(d).

That leaves Thryv only one more tenuous textual lifeline