Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/19pdf/18-1323_c07d.pdf
Page Number: 126.0

Cite as:  591 U. S. ____ (2020) 

11 

GORSUCH, J., dissenting 

Even when it comes to assessing the law’s effects on the
subset of women deemed “relevant,” this case proves unu-
sual.  Normally, to obtain a prospective injunction like the 
one approved today, a plaintiff must show that irreparable 
injury is not just possible, but likely.  O’Shea v. Littleton, 
414 U. S. 488, 501–502 (1974); Winter v. Natural Resources 
Defense Council, Inc., 555 U. S. 7, 22 (2008).  Yet, nothing
like that standard can be found at work today.

The  plaintiffs  allege  that  statewide  enforcement  of  Act 
620 would irreparably injure Louisiana women by making
it difficult for them to obtain abortions.  To justify injunc-
tive  relief  on  that  theory,  however,  it  can’t  be  enough  to 
show  that  the  law  would  induce  any  particular  doctor  or 
clinic  to  stop  providing  abortions.   Instead,  the  plaintiffs
would  have  to  show  that  a  sufficient  number  of  clinics 
would  close  (without  enough  new  clinics  opening)  so  that 
supply  would  no  longer  meet  demand  for  abortion  in  the
State.  And when assessing claims like that, we usually pro-
ceed with caution, aware of the “the difficulties and uncer-
tainties involved in determining how [a] relevant market” 
would  behave  in  response  to  changed  circumstances.  Illi-
nois  Brick  Co.  v.  Illinois,  431  U. S.  720,  743  (1977).    At  a 
minimum, we expect one change in a marketplace—such as 
the introduction of a new regulation—will induce other re-
sponsive changes.  General Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 519 U. S. 
278, 307–309 (1997).  When “the claim is one that simply 
makes  no  economic  sense,”  too,  the  plaintiffs  “must  come 
forward  with  more  persuasive  evidence  to  support  their 
claim  than  would  otherwise  be  necessary.”  Matsushita 
Elec.  Industrial  Co.  v.  Zenith  Radio  Corp.,  475  U. S.  574, 
587 (1986).

Rather than follow these rules, today’s decision proceeds 
to accept one speculative proposition after another to arrive
at what can only be called a worst case scenario.  Take the 
question whether existing providers will be able to continue