Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/558bv.pdf
Page Number: 598

Cite as: 558 U. S. 310 (2010) 

437 

Opinion of Stevens, J. 

The corporate/individual distinction was not questioned by 
the Court’s disposition, in 1986, of a challenge to the expendi­
ture  restriction  as  applied  to  a  distinctive  type  of  nonproﬁt 
corporation.  In MCFL, 479 U. S. 238, we stated again “that 
‘the special characteristics of the corporate structure require 
particularly careful regulation,’ ” id., at 256 (quoting NRWC, 
459  U. S.,  at  209–210),  and  again  we  acknowledged  that  the 
Government  has  a  legitimate  interest  in  “regulat[ing]  the 
substantial  aggregations  of  wealth  amassed  by  the  special 
advantages which go with the corporate form,” 479 U. S., at 
257 (internal quotation marks omitted).  Those aggregations 
can distort the “free trade in ideas” crucial to candidate elec­
tions,  ibid.  (internal  quotation  marks  omitted),  at  the  ex­
pense  of  members  or  shareholders  who  may  disagree  with 
the object of the expenditures,  id., at 260.  What the Court 
held by a 5-to-4 vote was that a limited class of corporations 
must be allowed to use their general treasury funds for inde­
pendent  expenditures,  because  Congress’  interests  in  pro­
tecting shareholders and “restrict[ing] ‘the inﬂuence of polit­
ical war chests funneled through the corporate form,’ ” id., at 
257 (quoting FEC v.  National Conservative Political Action 
Comm., 470 U. S. 480, 501 (1985) (NCPAC)), did not apply to 
corporations  that  were  structurally  insulated  from  those 
concerns.61 

It  is  worth  remembering  for  present  purposes  that  the 
four  MCFL  dissenters,  led  by  Chief  Justice  Rehnquist, 
thought  the  Court  was  carrying  the  First  Amendment  too 

61 Speciﬁcally,  these  corporations  had  to  meet  three  conditions.  First, 
they  had  to  be  formed  “for  the  express  purpose  of  promoting  political 
ideas,” so that their resources reﬂected political support rather than com­
mercial  success.  MCFL,  479  U. S.,  at  264.  Next,  they  had  to  have  no 
shareholders,  so  that  “persons  connected  with  the  organization  will  have 
no  economic  disincentive  for  disassociating  with  it  if  they  disagree  with 
its political  activity.”  Ibid.  Finally, they could  not be “established  by a 
business corporation or a labor union,” nor “accept contributions from such 
entities,” lest they “serv[e] as conduits for the type of direct spending that 
creates a threat to the political marketplace.”  Ibid.