Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/07pdf/07-290.pdf
Page Number: 20

Cite as:  554 U. S. ____ (2008) 

17 

Opinion of the Court 

objected  to  going  to  war  but  had  no  scruples  about  per­
sonal gunfights.  Quakers opposed the use of arms not just
for  militia  service,  but  for  any  violent  purpose  whatso­
ever—so  much  so  that  Quaker  frontiersmen  were  forbid­
den to use arms to defend their families, even though “[i]n 
such circumstances the temptation to seize a hunting rifle 
or  knife  in  self-defense  . . .  must  sometimes  have  been 
almost  overwhelming.”  P. Brock,  Pacifism  in  the  United 
States 359 (1968); see M. Hirst, The Quakers in Peace and 
War 336–339 (1923); 3 T. Clarkson, Portraiture of Quaker­
ism 103–104 (3d ed. 1807).  The Pennsylvania Militia Act
of  1757 exempted  from  service  those  “scrupling  the  use  of 
arms”—a  phrase  that  no  one  contends  had  an  idiomatic 
meaning.  See 5 Stat. at Large of Pa. 613 (J. Mitchell & H.
Flanders  eds.  1898)  (emphasis  added).    Thus,  the  most 
natural  interpretation  of  Madison’s  deleted  text  is  that
those  opposed  to  carrying  weapons  for  potential  violent 
confrontation  would  not  be  “compelled  to  render  military 
service,” in which such carrying would be required.13
  Finally, JUSTICE STEVENS suggests that “keep and bear
Arms”  was  some  sort  of  term  of  art,  presumably  akin  to
“hue  and  cry”  or  “cease  and  desist.”    (This  suggestion
usefully  evades  the  problem  that  there  is  no  evidence
whatsoever to support a military reading of “keep arms.”)
JUSTICE  STEVENS  believes  that  the  unitary  meaning  of 

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13 The  same  applies  to  the  conscientious-objector  amendments  pro­
posed  by  Virginia  and  North  Carolina,  which  said:  “That  any  person
religiously  scrupulous  of  bearing  arms  ought  to  be  exempted  upon 
payment of an equivalent to employ another to bear arms in his stead.”
See Veit 19; 4 J. Eliot, The Debates in the Several State Constitutions 
on  the  Adoption  of  the  Federal  Constitution  243,  244  (2d  ed.  1836) 
(reprinted 1941).  Certainly their second use of the phrase (“bear arms
in  his  stead”)  refers,  by  reason  of  context,  to  compulsory  bearing  of 
arms  for  military  duty.    But  their  first  use  of  the  phrase  (“any  person 
religiously  scrupulous  of  bearing  arms”)  assuredly  did  not  refer  to
people whose God allowed them to bear arms for defense of themselves 
but not for defense of their country.