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Page Number: 31

2 

BROWN v. DAVENPORT 

KAGAN, J., dissenting 

I 

Because  the  majority  begins  with  some  law-chambers 
history,  see  ante,  at  7–11,  I  do  too—though  fair  warning:
My discussion is no more relevant than the majority’s to the
issue before us.  Not surprisingly, neither of the parties to
this small and legally mundane case thought it a suitable 
occasion  for  a  from-Blackstone-onward  theory  of  habeas
practice.  Yet the majority, unprompted, embarks on that
project, perhaps hoping that the seeds it sows now will yield 
more  succulent  fruit  in  cases  to  come.  In  the  majority’s
story, post-conviction habeas relief was all but unavailable 
until the mid-20th century—when in an instant the Court 
in Brown v. Allen, 344 U. S. 443 (1953), upended the rules. 
That account repeats the views expressed in a recent con-
currence,  authored  by  the  same  Justice  as  today  delivers
the  majority  opinion.  See  Edwards  v.  Vannoy,  593  U. S. 
___, ___–___ (2021) (GORSUCH, J., concurring) (slip op., at 
2–8); id., at ___ (slip op., at 3) (Habeas historically “provided 
no recourse for a prisoner confined pursuant to a final judg-
ment of conviction”).  But the theory, in its fundamentals,
is wrong.  Federal courts long before Brown  extended ha-
beas  relief  to  prisoners  held  in  violation  of  the  Constitu-
tion—even after a final conviction. 

This  Court  started  reviewing  post-conviction  constitu-
tional claims under Congress’s first grant of habeas author-
ity, included in the Judiciary Act of 1789.  That provision,
applying only to federal prisoners, did not specifically pro-
vide for collateral review of constitutional claims.  See Act 
of Sept. 24, 1789, §14, 1 Stat. 81–82 (enabling federal courts 
to grant habeas writs to “inquir[e] into the cause of [a fed-
eral  prisoner’s]  commitment”).    But  even  without  explicit
permission, the Court in the mid-19th century invoked the 
habeas  law  to  adjudicate  those  claims—including  some
from petitioners already convicted and sentenced.  See 1 R. 
Hertz & J. Liebman, Federal Habeas Corpus Practice and 
Procedure §2.4[d][i], p. 51 (7th ed. 2020).  In Ex parte Wells,