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Page Number: 2.0

2 

PATEL v. GARLAND 

Syllabus 

determinations of which Patel sought review—whether he had testi-
fied credibly and whether he had subjectively intended to misrepresent
himself as a citizen—each qualified as an unreviewable judgment.  On 
rehearing,  the  en  banc  court  agreed  with  the  panel.    This  Court  
granted  certiorari  to  resolve  a  Circuit  conflict  as  to  the  scope  of 
§1252(a)(2)(B)(i). 

Held: Federal courts lack jurisdiction to review facts found as part of dis-
cretionary-relief  proceedings  under  §1255  and  the  other  provisions 
enumerated in §1252(a)(2)(B)(i).  Pp. 6–17.

(a) This case largely turns on the scope of the word “judgment” as 
used  in  §1252(a)(2)(B)(i).    In  support  of  the  judgment  below,  Court-
appointed amicus defines it as any authoritative decision—encompass-
ing any and all decisions relating to the granting or denying of discre-
tionary relief.  By contrast, the Government argues that it refers ex-
clusively to a decision requiring the use of discretion, which the factual 
findings in this case are not.  Patel agrees that “judgment” implies an 
exercise of discretion but interprets the qualifying phrase “regarding 
the  granting  of  relief”  as  focusing  the  jurisdictional  bar  on  only  the
Immigration Judge’s ultimate decision whether to grant relief.  Every-
thing else, he says, is reviewable.  Pp. 6–14. 

(1) Only  amicus’  definition 

fits  the  text  and  context  of 
§1252(a)(2)(B)(i).  “ [T]he word ‘any’ has an expansive meaning.”  Babb 
v. Wilkie, 589 U. S. ___, ___, n. 2 (some internal quotation marks omit-
ted).  As applied here, “any” means a judgment “ ‘of whatever kind’ ” 
under §1255 and the other enumerated provisions.  United States v. 
Gonzales, 520 U. S. 1, 5.  The word “regarding” has a similarly “broad-
ening effect.”  Lamar, Archer & Cofrin, LLP v. Appling, 584 U. S. ___, 
___.  Thus, §1252(a)(2)(B)(i) encompasses not just “the granting of re-
lief” but also any judgment relating to the granting of relief.  Amicus’ 
reading  is  reinforced  by  Congress’  later  addition  of  §1252(a)(2)(D), 
which  preserves  review  of  legal  and  constitutional  questions  but
makes no mention of preserving review of questions of fact.  Moreover, 
this Court has already relied on subparagraph (D) to all but settle that
judicial review of factfinding is unavailable.  See Guerrero-Lasprilla v. 
Barr, 589 U. S. ___; Nasrallah v. Barr, 590 U. S. ___ (2020).  Pp. 8–10. 
(2) The Government’s and Patel’s interpretations read like elabo-
rate efforts to avoid the text’s most natural meaning.  The Government 
cites dictionary definitions such as “the mental or intellectual process 
of forming an opinion or evaluation by discerning and comparing” as 
indicating that “judgment” refers exclusively to a discretionary deci-
sion, which it describes as one that is “subjective or evaluative.”  Brief 
for Respondent 12.  The factual findings in this case, it says, do not fit 
that description.  The Government is wrong about both text and con-
text.    A  “judgment”  does  not  necessarily  involve  discretion,  nor  does