Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/18pdf/18-481_5426.pdf
Page Number: 17.0

2  FOOD MARKETING INSTITUTE v. ARGUS LEADER MEDIA 

Opinion of BREYER, J. 

consider  Exemption  4  has  interpreted  it  [using]  National 
Park[s] ”);  Critical Mass Energy Project v.  NRC, 975 F. 2d 
871,  876  (CADC  1992)  (en  banc)  (collecting  cases).    One 
way to satisfy that requirement is by showing that disclo-
sure is “likely” to “cause substantial harm to the competi-
tive position of the person from whom the information was 
obtained.”  National  Parks,  498  F. 2d,  at  770,  and  n. 17. 
The  Eighth  Circuit,  in  this  case,  applied  the  same  stand-
ard.  Argus  Leader  Media  v.  United  States  Dept.  of  Agri-
culture, 889 F. 3d 914, 915 (2018).  And, like the majority, 
I  believe  that  National  Parks’  harm  requirement  goes
too far. 

For one thing, National Parks held that the only form of 
private  harm  that  can  warrant  nondisclosure  is  “competi-
tive”  harm.    498  F. 2d,  at  770–771  (emphasis  added). 
Later courts took this  to mean that harm from “future or 
potential  competition”  does  not  suffice,  Niagara  Mohawk 
Power  Corp.  v.  Department  of  Energy,  169  F. 3d  16,  19 
(CADC  1999),  and  even  that  harm  must  “flo[w]  from  the 
affirmative use of proprietary information by competitors,” 
Public  Citizen  Health  Research  Group  v.  FDA,  704  F. 2d 
1280,  1291,  n. 30  (CADC  1983)  (some  emphasis  added).
But  disclosure  of  confidential  information  can  cause  a 
business  serious  harm  in  ways  not  so  directly  linked  to
competition.  Disclosure,  for  example,  might  discourage
customers  from  using  a  firm’s  products,  but  without  sub-
stantial effect on its rivals.  It could mean increased poten-
tial  competition,  which  may,  or  may  not,  materialize.    It 
could,  by  revealing  buying  habits,  undermine  a  regulated 
firm  that  has  no  competitors.  The  list  goes  on.  I  can 
discern  no  basis  in  the  statute  for  categorically  excluding 
these other types of harm from the scope of Exemption 4.

Similarly,  the  need  to  prove  “substantial”  competitive
harm  can  sometimes  produce  complex  debates  about  the 
nature  of  competition  and  the  degree  of  injury.    National 
Parks,  498  F. 2d,  at  770.  And  those  debates  can  mean