Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/23pdf/22-859new_kjfm.pdf
Page Number: 90.0

30 

SEC v. JARKESY 

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting 

is  effectively  dispositive  under  Tull.  Atlas  Roofing,  and 
many  other  cases  involving  non-Article  III  adjudications,
also involved civil penalties designed to punish and deter, 
and yet the majority does not expressly disavow them.  Log-
ically, then, either Atlas Roofing and countless other cases 
were wrongly decided, or the majority’s view on civil penal-
ties is wrong.

Second,  because  the  majority  elides  the  critical  distinc-
tion between Atlas Roofing and Granfinanciera, it fails to 
grapple with the fact that this case, like Atlas Roofing and 
unlike Granfinanciera, involves the Government acting in 
its sovereign capacity to enforce a statutory violation.  That 
makes the right at issue a “public right” that Congress can
take outside the purview of Article III, even when the new 
cause of action is analogous to a common-law claim. 

Third,  the  relationship  between  the  federal-securities
laws  (including  their  antifraud  provisions)  and  common-
law fraud is materially indistinguishable from the relation-
ship between OSHA and the common-law torts of wrongful
death and negligence.  Unlike their common-law compara-
tors, neither statute requires actionable harm to an individ-
ual.  See supra, at 15.  In arguing that OSHA’s scheme was 
“self-consciously”  novel  in  ways  unknown  to  the  common
law, the majority points to the granularity of OSHA stand-
ards.  Ante, at 23–24.  Yet lawyers and regulated parties in 
the securities industry would be surprised to hear that this
could be a distinguishing feature.  Anyone familiar with the
industry knows securities laws are replete with specific and
exceedingly detailed requirements implementing the stat-
ute’s disclosure and antifraud provisions.  See, e.g., 17 CFR 
§275.206(4)–1(b)  (2023)  (prohibiting  testimonials  and  en-
dorsements that do not satisfy requirements without meet-
ing  complex  disclosure  requirements);  §275.206(4)–2(a) 
(prohibiting investment advisers from having custody of cli-
ent  funds  or  securities  unless  specific  requirements  are