Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/10pdf/10-10.pdf
Page Number: 15

Cite as:  564 U. S. ____ (2011) 

11 

Opinion of the Court 

payment  of  child  support  is  likely  to  be  an  ineffective 
strategy,”  the  Government  also  tells  us  that  “coercive
enforcement  remedies,  such  as  contempt,  have  a  role  to
play.”  Brief  for  United  States  as  Amicus  Curiae  21–22, 
and  n. 8  (citing  Dept.  of  Health  and  Human  Services, 
National  Child  Support  Enforcement,  Strategic  Plan:  FY
2005–2009, pp. 2, 10).  South Carolina, which relies heav-
ily  on  contempt  proceedings,  agrees  that  they  are  an  im-
portant tool.

We  here  consider  an  indigent’s  right  to  paid  counsel  at
such a contempt proceeding.  It is a civil proceeding.  And 
we  consequently  determine  the  “specific  dictates  of  due
process”  by  examining  the  “distinct  factors”  that  this
Court  has  previously  found  useful  in  deciding  what  spe-
cific safeguards the Constitution’s Due Process Clause re-
quires  in  order  to  make  a  civil  proceeding  fundamentally 
fair.  Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U. S. 319, 335 (1976) (con-
sidering  fairness  of  an  administrative  proceeding).    As 
relevant  here  those  factors  include  (1)  the  nature  of  “the
private interest that will be affected,” (2) the comparative
“risk”  of  an  “erroneous  deprivation”  of  that  interest  with
and  without  “additional  or  substitute  procedural  safe-
guards,” and (3) the nature and magnitude of any counter-
vailing  interest  in  not  providing  “additional  or  substitute 
procedural  requirement[s].”  Ibid.   See  also  Lassiter,  452 
U. S., at 27–31 (applying the Mathews framework). 

The  “private  interest  that  will  be  affected”  argues
strongly  for  the  right  to  counsel  that  Turner  advocates.
That  interest  consists  of  an  indigent  defendant’s  loss  of 
personal  liberty  through  imprisonment.    The  interest  in 
securing that freedom, the freedom “from bodily restraint,”
lies “at the core of the liberty protected by the Due Process 
Clause.”  Foucha  v.  Louisiana,  504  U. S.  71,  80  (1992). 
And  we  have  made  clear  that  its  threatened  loss  through 
legal  proceedings  demands  “due  process  protection.” 
Addington v. Texas, 441 U. S. 418, 425 (1979).