Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/23pdf/22-899_97be.pdf
Page Number: 29

Cite as:  602 U. S. ____ (2024) 

1 

GORSUCH, J., concurring in part 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

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No. 22–899 
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JASON SMITH, PETITIONER v. ARIZONA 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS OF 
ARIZONA, DIVISION ONE 

[June 21, 2024] 

JUSTICE GORSUCH, concurring in part. 
I  am  pleased  to  join  the  Court’s  opinion  holding  that,
when an expert presents another’s statements as the “ba-
sis” for his own opinion, he is offering those statements for 
their truth.  See Parts I, II, and IV, ante. 

I cannot join, however, the Court’s discussion in Part III
about when an absent analyst’s statement might qualify as
“testimonial.”  See ante, at 19–21.  As the Court says, “that
issue is not now fit for our resolution.”  Ante, at 19.  It was 
not part of the question presented for our review, nor was
it the focus of the decision below.  Ante, at 19–20.  In fact, 
the State devoted so little attention to the “testimonial” is-
sue in the Arizona courts that any argument it might make
on  the  subject  on  remand  may  be  forfeited.  Ante,  at  20. 
Further, the Court’s thoughts on the subject are in no way
necessary to the resolution of today’s dispute.  What makes 
a  statement  testimonial,  the  Court  notes,  is  an  entirely
“separate” issue.  Ante, at 19. 

Nor am I entirely sure about the guidance found in Part
III.  The Sixth Amendment protects the accused’s “right . . . 
to be confronted with the witnesses against him.”  As the 
Court  sees  it,  whether  a  statement  being  offered  for  its
truth and tendency to inculpate a defendant triggers that
right depends “on the ‘primary purpose’ of the statement, 
and in particular on how it relates to a future criminal pro-
ceeding.”  Ante, at 19.  I cannot help but wonder whether