Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/524bv.pdf
Page Number: 403.0

524US2

Unit: $U90

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358

PENNSYLVANIA BD. OF PROBATION
AND PAROLE v. SCOTT
Syllabus

probative evidence. Leon, 468 U. S., at 907. Recognizing these costs,
the Court has repeatedly declined to extend the rule to proceedings
other than criminal trials. E. g., id., at 909.
It again declines to do so
here. The social costs of allowing convicted criminals who violate their
parole to remain at large are particularly high, see Morrissey v. Brewer,
408 U. S. 471, 477, 483, and are compounded by the fact that parolees
(particularly those who have already committed parole violations) are
more likely to commit future crimes than are average citizens, see Grif-
ﬁn v. Wisconsin, 483 U. S. 868, 880. Application of the exclusionary
rule, moreover, would be incompatible with the traditionally ﬂexible,
nonadversarial, administrative procedures of parole revocation, see
Morrissey, supra, at 480, 489, in that it would require extensive liti-
gation to determine whether particular evidence must be excluded,
cf., e. g., Calandra, supra, at 349. The rule would provide only minimal
deterrence beneﬁts in this context, because its application in crimi-
nal trials already provides signiﬁcant deterrence of unconstitutional
searches. Cf. United States v. Janis, 428 U. S. 433, 448, 454. The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s special rule for situations in which the
searching ofﬁcer knows his subject is a parolee is rejected because this
Court has never suggested that the exclusionary rule must apply in
every circumstance in which it might provide marginal deterrence, e. g.,
Calandra, supra, at 350; because such a piecemeal approach would add
an additional layer of collateral litigation regarding the ofﬁcer’s knowl-
edge of the parolee’s status; and because, in any event, any additional
deterrence would be minimal, whether the person conducting the search
was a police ofﬁcer or a parole ofﬁcer. Pp. 362–369.

548 Pa. 418, 698 A. 2d 32, reversed and remanded.

Thomas, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist,
C. J., and O(cid:146)Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy, JJ., joined. Stevens, J.,
ﬁled a dissenting opinion, post, p. 369. Souter, J., ﬁled a dissenting opin-
ion, in which Ginsburg and Breyer, JJ., joined, post, p. 370.

D. Michael Fisher, Attorney General of Pennsylvania, ar-
gued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were
John G. Knorr III, Chief Deputy Attorney General, and
Gregory R. Neuhauser and Calvin R. Koons, Senior Deputy
Attorneys General.

Malcolm L. Stewart argued the cause for the United
States as amicus curiae urging reversal. With him on the
brief were Solicitor General Waxman, Acting Assistant At-