Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/19pdf/19-631_2d93.pdf
Page Number: 47.0

Cite as:  591 U. S. ____ (2020) 

5 

Opinion of GORSUCH, J. 

turns to remedy.  Because the challenged robocall ban un-
constitutionally infringes on their speech, I would hold that
the plaintiffs are entitled to an injunction preventing its en-
forcement against them.  This is the traditional remedy for
proven violations of legal rights likely to work irreparable 
injury  in  the  future.    Preventing  the  law’s  enforcement
against the plaintiffs would fully address their injury.  And 
going this far, but no further, would avoid “short circuit[ing]
the democratic process” by interfering with the work of Con-
gress any more than necessary.  Washington State Grange 
v. Washington State Republican Party, 552 U. S. 442, 451 
(2008).

JUSTICE  KAVANAUGH’s  opinion  pursues  a  different 
course.  Invoking  “severability  doctrine,”  it  declares  the 
government-debt exception void and severs it from the stat-
ute.  As revised by today’s decision, the law prohibits nearly
all robocalls to cell phones, just as it did back in 1991.  In 
support of this remedy, we are asked to consider cases in-
volving  equal  protection  violations,  where  courts  have 
sometimes solved the problem of unequal treatment by lev-
eling others “down” to the plaintiff ’s status rather than by 
leveling the plaintiff “up” to the status others enjoy. 

I am doubtful of our authority to rewrite the law in this 
way.  Many have questioned the propriety of modern sever-
ability  doctrine,*  and  today’s  case  illustrates  some  of  the 
reasons why.  To start, it’s hard to see how today’s use of
severability doctrine qualifies as a remedy at all:  The plain-
tiffs  have  not  challenged  the  government-debt  exception,
they have not sought to have it severed and stricken, and
far from placing “unequal treatment” at the “heart of their 

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*See, e.g., Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, 
ante, at 14–24 (THOMAS, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part);
Harrison,  Severability,  Remedies,  and  Constitutional  Adjudication,  83
Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 56 (2014); see also Movsesian, Severability in Stat-
utes and Contracts, 30 Ga. L. Rev. 41, 41–42 (1995) (collecting academic 
criticism of severability doctrine).