Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/13pdf/12-536_e1pf.pdf
Page Number: 26

20 

MCCUTCHEON v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N 

Opinion of ROBERTS, C. J. 

It  is  fair  to  say,  as  Justice  Stevens  has,  “that  we  have
not  always  spoken  about  corruption  in  a  clear  or  con-
sistent voice.”  Id., at 447 (opinion concurring in part and 
dissenting  in  part).  The  definition  of  corruption  that  we 
apply today, however, has firm roots in Buckley itself.  The 
Court in that case upheld base contribution limits because
they targeted “the danger of actual quid pro quo arrange-
ments”  and  “the  impact  of  the  appearance  of  corruption
stemming  from  public  awareness”  of  such  a  system  of 
unchecked direct contributions.  424 U. S., at 27.  Buckley
simultaneously  rejected  limits  on  spending  that  was  less
likely to “be given as a quid pro quo for improper commit-
ments from the candidate.”  Id., at 47.  In any event, this 
case  is  not  the  first  in  which  the  debate  over  the  proper
breadth  of  the  Government’s  anticorruption  interest  has
been  engaged.  Compare  Citizens  United,  558  U. S.,  at 
356–361  (majority  opinion),  with  id.,  at  447–460  (opinion 
of Stevens, J.).

The  line  between  quid  pro  quo  corruption  and  general
influence  may  seem  vague  at  times,  but  the  distinction 
must  be  respected  in  order  to  safeguard  basic  First
Amendment  rights.  In  addition,  “[i]n  drawing  that  line, 
the  First  Amendment  requires  us  to  err  on  the  side  of 
protecting  political  speech  rather  than  suppressing  it.” 
Federal  Election  Comm’n  v.  Wisconsin  Right  to  Life,  551 
U. S. 449, 457 (2007) (opinion of ROBERTS, C. J.). 

The  dissent  laments  that  our  opinion  leaves  only  rem-
nants  of  FECA  and  BCRA  that  are  inadequate  to  combat 
corruption.  See post, at 2.  Such rhetoric ignores the fact
that  we  leave  the  base  limits  undisturbed.6  Those  base 

—————— 

6 The  fact  that this  opinion  does  not  address  the  base  limits  also  be-
lies  the  dissent’s  concern  that  we  have  silently  overruled  the  Court’s
holding in McConnell v. Federal Election Comm’n, 540 U. S. 93 (2003). 
See post, at 12–13.  At issue in McConnell was BCRA’s extension of the 
base limits to so-called “soft money”—previously unregulated contribu-
tions to national party committees.  See 540 U. S., at 142; see also post,