Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/07pdf/07-290.pdf
Page Number: 122

Cite as:  554 U. S. ____ (2008) 

9 

BREYER, J., dissenting 

were decided well (80, 55, and 49 years, respectively) after 
the  framing;  they  neither  claim  nor  provide  any  special
insight  into  the  intent  of  the  Framers;  they  involve  laws
much  less  narrowly  tailored  that  the  one  before  us;  and
state  cases  in  any  event  are  not  determinative  of  federal
constitutional  questions,  see,  e.g.,  Garcia  v.  San  Antonio 
Metropolitan  Transit  Authority,  469  U. S.  528,  549  (1985) 
(citing Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 1 Wheat. 304 (1816)). 

Respondent  proposes  that  the  Court  adopt  a  “strict 
scrutiny”  test,  which  would  require  reviewing  with  care
each gun law to determine whether it is “narrowly tailored
to achieve a compelling governmental interest.”  Abrams v. 
Johnson, 521 U. S. 74, 82 (1997); see Brief for Respondent 
54–62.  But  the  majority  implicitly,  and  appropriately,
rejects  that  suggestion  by  broadly  approving  a  set  of 
laws—prohibitions  on  concealed  weapons,  forfeiture  by
criminals of the Second Amendment right, prohibitions on
firearms in certain locales, and governmental regulation of
commercial  firearm  sales—whose  constitutionality  under
a  strict  scrutiny  standard  would  be  far  from  clear.    See 
ante, at 54. 

Indeed,  adoption  of  a  true  strict-scrutiny  standard  for
evaluating  gun  regulations  would  be  impossible.  That  is 
because  almost  every  gun-control  regulation  will  seek  to 
advance (as the one here does) a “primary concern of every
government—a concern for the safety and indeed the lives 
of  its  citizens.”  United  States  v.  Salerno,  481  U. S.  739, 
755  (1987).    The  Court  has  deemed  that  interest,  as  well 
as  “the  Government’s  general  interest  in  preventing
crime,”  to  be  “compelling,”  see  id.,  at  750,  754,  and  the 
Court  has  in  a  wide  variety  of  constitutional  contexts 
found  such  public-safety  concerns  sufficiently  forceful  to 
justify  restrictions  on  individual  liberties,  see  e.g.,  Bran-
denburg  v.  Ohio,  395  U. S.  444,  447  (1969)  (per  curiam) 
(First Amendment free speech rights); Sherbert v. Verner, 
374  U. S.  398,  403  (1963)  (First  Amendment  religious