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Page Number: 32

Cite as:  602 U. S. ____ (2024) 

1 

ALITO, J., concurring in judgment 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

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No. 22–899 
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JASON SMITH, PETITIONER v. ARIZONA 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS OF 
ARIZONA, DIVISION ONE 

[June 21, 2024] 

JUSTICE ALITO, with whom the CHIEF JUSTICE joins, con-

curring in the judgment. 

Today,  the  Court  inflicts  a  needless,  unwarranted,  and 
crippling wound on modern evidence law.  There was a time 
when expert witnesses were required to express their opin-
ions  as  responses  to  hypothetical  questions.    But  eventu-
ally, this highly artificial, awkward, confusing, and abuse-
laden  form  of  testimony  earned  virtually  unanimous  con-
demnation.  More  than  a  century  ago,  judges,  evidence 
scholars, and legal reform associations began to recommend
that courts abandon the required use of hypotheticals, and 
more than 50 years ago, the Federal Rules of Evidence did 
so.  Now, however, the Court proclaims that a prosecution
expert  will  frequently  violate  the  Confrontation  Clause 
when  he  testifies  in  strict  compliance  with  the  Federal 
Rules of Evidence and similar modern state rules.  Instead, 
the Court suggests that such experts revert to the form that
was buried a half-century ago.  Ante, at 18.  There is no good 
reason for this radical change. 

I 
To explain why I think the Court has gone far astray, I
begin with a brief look at the history of expert testimony—
and  particularly,  why  the  hypothetical-question  require-
ment was replaced by the (superior) mode of testimony al-
lowed by the Federal Rules of Evidence.