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Page Number: 17.0

Cite as:  567 U. S. ____ (2012) 

13 

Opinion of the Court 

judgment)  (slip  op.,  at  5)—makes  relevant  here  a  second 
line of our precedents, demanding individualized sentenc-
ing  when  imposing  the  death  penalty.  In  Woodson,  428 
U. S.  280,  we  held  that  a  statute  mandating  a  death  sen-
tence  for  first-degree  murder  violated  the  Eighth  Amend-
ment.  We thought the mandatory scheme flawed because 
it  gave  no  significance  to  “the  character  and  record  of 
the individual offender or the circumstances” of the offense, 
and  “exclud[ed]  from  consideration  . . .  the  possibility  of 
compassionate or mitigating factors.”  Id., at 304.  Subse-
quent  decisions  have  elaborated  on  the  requirement  that 
capital  defendants  have  an  opportunity  to  advance,  and 
the  judge  or  jury  a  chance  to  assess,  any  mitigating  fac-
tors,  so  that  the  death  penalty  is  reserved  only  for  the
most  culpable  defendants  committing  the  most  serious 
offenses.    See,  e.g.,  Sumner  v.  Shuman,  483 U. S.  66,  74– 
76  (1987);  Eddings  v.  Oklahoma,  455  U. S.  104,  110–112 
(1982); Lockett, 438 U. S., at 597–609 (plurality opinion).

Of  special  pertinence  here,  we  insisted  in  these  rulings 
that a sentencer have the ability to consider the “mitigat-
ing  qualities  of  youth.”  Johnson  v.  Texas,  509  U. S.  350, 
367  (1993).  Everything  we  said  in  Roper  and  Graham 
about that stage of life also appears in these decisions.  As
we  observed,  “youth  is  more  than  a  chronological  fact.” 
Eddings, 455 U. S., at 115.  It is a time of immaturity, ir- 
responsibility, “impetuousness[,] and recklessness.”  John-
son,  509  U. S.,  at  368.    It  is  a  moment  and  “condition 
of life when a person may be most susceptible to influence 
and to psychological damage.”  Eddings, 455 U. S., at 115. 
And its “signature qualities” are all “transient.”  Johnson, 
509 U. S., at 368.  Eddings is especially on point.  There, a 
16-year-old  shot  a  police  officer  point-blank  and  killed 
him.  We invalidated his death sentence because the judge 
did  not  consider  evidence  of  his  neglectful  and  violent 
family background (including his mother’s drug abuse and 
his father’s physical abuse) and his emotional disturbance.