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MONGE v. CALIFORNIA

Opinion of the Court

The Double Jeopardy Clause “does not provide the defend-
ant with the right to know at any speciﬁc moment in time
what the exact limit of his punishment will turn out to be.”
DiFrancesco, 449 U. S., at 137. Consequently, it is a “well-
established part of our constitutional jurisprudence” that the
guarantee against double jeopardy neither prevents the
prosecution from seeking review of a sentence nor restricts
the length of a sentence imposed upon retrial after a defend-
ant’s successful appeal. See id., at 135; Pearce, supra, at
720; see also Stroud v. United States, 251 U. S. 15, 18 (1919)
(despite a harsher sentence on retrial, the defendant was not
“placed in second jeopardy within the meaning of the
Constitution”).

Our opinion in Bullington established a “narrow excep-
tion” to the general rule that double jeopardy principles have
no application in the sentencing context. See Schiro v. Far-
In Bullington, a capital de-
ley, 510 U. S. 222, 231 (1994).
fendant had received a sentence of life imprisonment from
the original sentencing jury. The defendant subsequently
obtained a new trial on the ground that the court had permit-
ted prospective women jurors to claim automatic exemption
from jury service in violation of the Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments.
451 U. S., at 436. When the State an-
nounced its intention to seek the death penalty again, the
defendant alleged a double jeopardy violation. We deter-
mined that the ﬁrst jury’s deliberations bore the “hallmarks
of the trial on guilt or innocence,” id., at 439, because the
jury was presented with a choice between two alternatives
together with standards to guide their decision, the prosecu-
tion undertook the burden of establishing facts beyond a rea-
sonable doubt, and the evidence was introduced in a separate
In
proceeding that formally resembled a trial, id., at 438.
light of the jury’s binary determination and the heightened
procedural protections, we found the proceeding distinct
from traditional sentencing, in which “it is impossible to con-
clude that a sentence less than the statutory maximum ‘con-