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Page Number: 23.0

4 

JAM v. INTERNATIONAL FINANCE CORP. 

BREYER, J., dissenting 

. . .  as,”  provide  no  greater  help.  The  majority  finds  sup-
port for its dynamic interpretation in the Civil Rights Act
of 1866, which gives all citizens the “same right” to make 
and  enforce  contracts  and  to  buy  and  sell  property  “as  is 
enjoyed  by  white  citizens.”  42  U. S. C.  §§1981(a),  1982 
(emphasis added).  But it is purpose, not words, that read-
ily  resolves  any  temporal  linguistic  ambiguity  in  that 
statute.  The  Act’s  objective,  like  that  of  the  Fourteenth 
Amendment  itself,  was  a  Nation  that  treated  its  citizens 
Its  purpose—revealed  by  its  title,  historical 
equally. 
context, and other language in the statute—was “to guar-
antee  the  then  newly  freed  slaves  the  same  legal  rights 
that  other  citizens  enjoy.”    CBOCS  West,  Inc.  v.  Hum-
phries, 553 U. S. 442, 448 (2008).  Given this purpose, its
dynamic nature is obvious.

Similarly,  judges  interpreting  the  words  “same  . . .  as” 
have long resolved ambiguity not by looking at the words 
alone,  but  by  examining  the  statute’s  purpose  as  well. 
Compare, e.g., Kugler’s Appeal, 55 Pa. 123, 123–125 (1867) 
(adopting a dynamic interpretation of “same as” statute in 
light  of  “plain”  and  “manifest”  statutory  purpose);  and 
Gaston  v.  Lamkin,  115  Mo.  20,  34,  21  S. W.  1100,  1104 
(1893)  (adopting  a  dynamic  interpretation  of  “same  as” 
election  statute  given  the  legislature’s  intent  to  achieve 
“simplicity  and  uniformity  in  the  conduct  of  elections”),
with  O’Flynn  v.  East  Rochester,  292  N. Y.  156,  162,  54 
N. E.  2d  343,  346  (1944)  (adopting  a  static  interpretation
of  “same  as”  statute  given  that  the  legislature  “did  not 
contemplate”  that  subsequent  changes  to  a  referenced 
statute  would  apply  (interpreting  N. Y.  Gen.  Mun.  Law 
Ann. §360(5) (West 1934))).  There is no hard-and-fast rule 
that  the  statutory  words  “as  is”  or  the  statutory  words 
“same as” require applying the law as it stands today.

The  majority  wrongly  believes  that  it  can  solve  the 
temporal  problem  by  bringing  statutory  canons  into  play.
It relies on what it calls the “reference canon.”  That canon,