Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/22pdf/22-10_ifjn.pdf
Page Number: 3

Cite as:  599 U. S. ____ (2023) 

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Syllabus 

identity  theft  specifically,  rather  than  all  fraud  involving  means  of 
identification.  Ibid. 

The Government urges the Court to ignore §1028A’s title, because 
the Government’s reading of the provision bears little resemblance to 
ordinary understandings of “identity theft.”  This broad reading would,
in practice, place garden-variety overbilling at the core of §1028A.  In-
stead, “identity theft” has a focused meaning: “[T]he fraudulent appro-
priation and use of another person’s identifying data or documents,” 
Webster’s Unabridged Dictionary xi, or “[t]he unlawful taking and use 
of another person’s identifying information for fraudulent purposes,” 
Black’s Law Dictionary 894.  This understanding of identity theft sup-
ports a reading of “in relation to” where use of the means of identifica-
tion is at the crux of the underlying crime.  And under these defini-
tions,  identity  theft  occurs  when  a  defendant  “uses”  the  means  of 
identification itself to defraud others.  Further, the inclusion of “aggra-
vated” in §1028A’s title suggests that Congress had in mind a particu-
larly  serious  form  of  identity  theft,  not  just  all  manner  of  everyday 
overbilling offenses.  Pp. 8–12.

(2) Section 1028A(a)(1)’s language points in the same direction as
its  title.    In  particular,  Congress  used  a  trio  of  verbs  that  reflect  an 
ordinary understanding of identity theft.  Section 1028A(a)(1) applies 
when  a  defendant  “knowingly  transfers,  possesses,  or  uses,  without 
lawful authority, a means of identification of another person,” “during 
and in relation to” any predicate offense.  (Emphasis added).  The two 
verbs neighboring “uses”—“transfers” and “possesses”—are most nat-
urally read in the context of §1028A(a)(1) to connote not only theft, but 
ordinary understandings of identity theft in particular, i.e., they point
to (1) theft of a (2) means of identification belonging to (3) another per-
son.  Because “transfer” and “possess” channel ordinary identity theft, 
the interpretative cannon noscitur a sociis (“ ‘a word is known by the 
company it keeps,’ ” McDonnell v. United States, 579 U. S. 550, 568– 
569) indicates that “uses” should be read in a similar manner.  In ad-
dition, the Court “assume[s] that Congress used [three] terms because
it intended each term to a have a particular, nonsuperfluous meaning.” 
Bailey, 516 U. S., at 146.  On a more targeted reading, §1028A(a)(1)’s
three verbs capture the complexity of identity theft, which intermin-
gles  aspects  of  theft  and  fraud,  misappropriation  and  deceitful  use.
While  “transfer”  and  “possess”  conjure  up  two  steps  of  theft,  “uses” 
supplies  the  deceitful  use  aspect.    In  contrast,  if  §1028A(a)(1)  is  not 
read  in  this  narrow  manner,  then  the  two  other  verbs  risk  leaving 
“uses” without “virtually any function.”  Ibid.  Pp. 12–15.

(d) The  list  of  §1028A(a)(1)’s  predicate  offenses  creates  additional 
problems for the Government’s broad reading.  Section 1028A(a)(1)’s 
enhancement  adds  a  severe  2-year  mandatory  prison  sentence  onto