Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/16pdf/16-341_8n59.pdf
Page Number: 3.0

Cite as:  581 U. S. ____ (2017) 

3 

Syllabus 

to  reconsider  that  decision,  the  only  question  here  is  whether  Con-
gress  changed  §1400(b)’s  meaning  when  it  amended  §1391.    When 
Congress  intends  to  effect  a  change  of  that  kind,  it  ordinarily  pro-
vides a relatively clear indication of its intent in the amended provi-
sion’s  text.    No  such  indication  appears  in  the  current  version  of 
§1391.   

Respondent points out that the current §1391(c) provides a default
rule  that,  on  its  face,  applies  without  exception  “[f]or  all  venue  pur-
poses.”    But  the  version  at  issue  in  Fourco  similarly  provided  a  de-
fault rule that applied “ ‘for venue purposes,’ ” 353 U. S., at 223, and
those phrasings are not materially different in this context.  The ad-
dition  of  the  word  “all”  to  the  already  comprehensive  provision  does 
not  suggest  that  Congress  intended  the  Court  to  reconsider  its  deci-
sion in Fourco.  Any argument based on this language is even weaker 
now  than  it  was  when  the  Court  rejected  it  in  Fourco.  Fourco  held 
that §1400(b) retained a meaning distinct from the default definition
contained  in  §1391(c),  even though  the  latter,  by  its  terms,  included 
no exceptions.  The current version of §1391 includes a saving clause, 
which  expressly  states  that  the  provision  does  not  apply  when  “oth-
erwise  provided  by  law,”  thus  making  explicit  the  qualification  that
the  Fourco  Court  found  implicit  in  the  statute.    Finally,  there  is  no
indication  that  Congress  in  2011  ratified  the  Federal  Circuit’s  deci-
sion in VE Holding.  Pp. 7–10. 

821 F. 3d 1338, reversed and remanded. 

THOMAS,  J.,  delivered  the  opinion  of  the  Court,  in  which  all  other 
Members joined, except GORSUCH, J., who took no part in the considera-
tion or decision of the case.