Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/558bv.pdf
Page Number: 463.0

302 

WOOD  v.  ALLEN 

Opinion of the Court 

read  to  support  the  Rule  32  court’s  factual  determination 
that counsel’s failure to pursue or present evidence of Wood’s 
mental  deﬁciencies  was  not  mere  oversight  or  neglect  but 
was  instead  the  result  of  a  deliberate  decision  to  focus  on 
other defenses. 

Arguing  that  the  state  court’s  factual  determination  to 
this  effect  was  unreasonable,  Wood  calls  our  attention  to 
Dozier’s testimony during the Rule  32 proceedings that evi­
dence  of  Wood’s  mental  health  problems  would  have  been 
presented  during  the  penalty  phase  if  counsel  had  been 
aware of it, id., at 169; that Dozier did not recall whether he 
had  decided  not  to  present  evidence  based  on  the  Kirkland 
report, id., at 168, 171; and that Dozier and Ralph had desig­
nated  the  inexperienced  Trotter  to  be  in  charge  of  the  pen­
alty  phase  proceedings,  id.,  at  270–271.  Trotter,  in  turn, 
testiﬁed that he did not recall considering Wood’s mental de­
ﬁciencies.  Id.,  at  288.  Wood  also  observes  that  the  Kirk­
land report was prepared for the guilt phase, not the penalty 
phase, and a strategic decision not to use the Kirkland report 
in the former does not necessarily carry over into the latter. 
Id.,  at  324.  Wood  notes  that  his  counsel  sought  to  obtain 
additional evidence about his mental health to use in mitiga­
tion  after  reviewing  the  Kirkland  report,  but  they  failed  to 
pursue  it,  in  part  out  of  a  belief  that  the  sentencing  judge 
would not grant a continuance to permit them to investigate. 
Id.,  at  285,  343–346.  Finally,  Wood  emphasizes  that  his 
counsel  must  have  thought  that  evidence  of  his  mental  deﬁ­
ciencies  was  important  because  they  presented  it  to  the 
judge at the ﬁnal sentencing hearing.  Id., at 88. 

Most of the evidence Wood highlights, however, speaks not 
to  whether  counsel  made  a  strategic  decision,  but  rather  to 
whether  counsel’s  judgment  was  reasonable—a  question 
we  do  not  reach.  See  Part  II–B,  infra.  As  for  any  evi­
dence  that  may  plausibly  be  read  as  inconsistent  with  the 
ﬁnding  that  counsel  made  a  strategic  decision,  we  conclude