Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/23pdf/22-1008_1b82.pdf
Page Number: 47.0

Cite as:  603 U. S. ____ (2024) 

1 

JACKSON, J., dissenting 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

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No. 22–1008 
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CORNER POST, INC., PETITIONER v. BOARD 
OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL  
RESERVE SYSTEM 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT 

[July 1, 2024]

 JUSTICE JACKSON, with whom JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR and 

JUSTICE KAGAN join, dissenting. 

More than half a century ago, this Court highlighted the
long-recognized “hazards inherent in attempting to define
for  all  purposes  when  a  ‘cause  of  action’  first  ‘accrues.’ ” 
Crown Coat Front Co. v. United States, 386 U. S. 503, 517 
(1967).  Today, the majority throws that caution to the wind
and engages in the same kind of misguided reasoning about
statutory  limitations  periods  that  we  have  previously  ad-
monished. 

The  flawed  reasoning  and  far-reaching  results  of  the 
Court’s ruling in this case are staggering.  First, the reason-
ing.  The  text  and  context  of  the  relevant  statutory  provi-
sions plainly reveal that, for facial challenges to agency reg-
ulations,  the  6-year  limitations  period  in  28  U. S. C.
§2401(a)  starts  running  when  the  rule  is  published.  The 
Court says otherwise today, holding that the broad statu-
tory term “accrues” requires us to conclude that the limita-
tions period for Administrative Procedure Act (APA) claims
runs from the time of a plaintiff ’s injury.  Never mind that 
this Court’s precedents tell us that the meaning of “accrues”
is context specific.  Never mind that, in the administrative-
law  context,  limitations  statutes  uniformly  run  from  the