Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/529bv.pdf
Page Number: 524

529US2

Unit: $U48

[09-26-01 10:25:49] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 529 U. S. 446 (2000)

449

Opinion of the Court

eligible for parole after 20 rather than 30 years. The Ohio
Court of Appeals afﬁrmed, and respondent did not appeal
to the Ohio Supreme Court.

After unsuccessfully pursuing state postconviction relief
pro se, respondent, again represented by new counsel, ﬁled
an application in the Ohio Court of Appeals to reopen his
direct appeal, pursuant to Ohio Rule of Appellate Proce-
dure 26(B),1 on the ground that his original appellate coun-
sel was constitutionally ineffective in failing to raise on di-
rect appeal a challenge to the sufﬁciency of the evidence.
The appellate court dismissed the application because re-
spondent had failed to show, as the rule required, good cause
for ﬁling after the 90-day period allowed.2 The Ohio Su-
preme Court, in a one-sentence per curiam opinion, afﬁrmed.
State v. Carpenter, 74 Ohio St. 3d 408, 659 N. E. 2d 786 (1996).
On May 3, 1996, respondent ﬁled a petition for writ of ha-
beas corpus in the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Ohio, alleging, inter alia, that the evi-
dence supporting his plea and sentence was insufﬁcient, in
violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, and
that his appellate counsel was constitutionally ineffective
in failing to raise that claim on direct appeal. Concluding
that respondent’s sufﬁciency-of-the-evidence claim was pro-
cedurally defaulted, the District Court considered next
whether the ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim could

1 Rule 26(B) provides, in relevant part:
“(1) A defendant in a criminal case may apply for reopening of the ap-
peal from the judgment of conviction and sentence, based on a claim of
ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. An application for reopening
shall be ﬁled in the court of appeals where the appeal was decided within
ninety days from journalization of the appellate judgment unless the appli-
cant shows good cause for ﬁling at a later time.”

2 Respondent ﬁled his application to reopen on July 15, 1994. Although
Rule 26(B) did not become effective until July 1, 1993, more than two years
after respondent’s direct appeal was completed, the Court of Appeals con-
sidered respondent’s time for ﬁling to have begun on the Rule’s effective
date and to have expired 90 days thereafter.