Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/529bv.pdf
Page Number: 407

529US1

Unit: $U42

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332

ERIE v. PAP’S A. M.

Stevens, J., dissenting

the ordinance’s total ban on the ground that its censorship of
protected speech might be justiﬁed by an overriding state
interest, it should conclude that the ordinance is patently in-
valid. For these reasons, as well as the reasons set forth in
Justice White’s dissent in Barnes, I respectfully dissent.

Erie’s Ordinance No. 75–1994 updates an older ordinance of similar import.
Unfortunately, that old regulation is not in the record. Consequently,
whether the new ordinance merely “replaces” the old one is a matter of
debate. From statements of one councilmember, it can reasonably be in-
ferred that the old ordinance was merely a residential zoning restriction,
not a total ban. See App. 43.
If that is so, it leads to the further question
why Erie felt it necessary to shift to a total ban in 1994.

But even if the plurality’s factual contention is correct, it does not under-
mine the points I have made in the text.
In Barnes, the point of noting
the ancient pedigree of the Indiana statute was to demonstrate that its
passage antedated the appearance of adult entertainment venues, and
therefore could not have been motivated by the presence of those estab-
lishments. The inference supposedly rebutted in Barnes stemmed from
the timing of the enactment. Here, however, the inferences I draw de-
pend on the text of the ordinance, its preamble, its scope and enforcement,
and the comments of the councilmembers. These do not depend on the
timing of the ordinance’s enactment.