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Page Number: 17

14 

BARR v. AMERICAN ASSN. OF POLITICAL  
CONSULTANTS, INC. 
Opinion of KAVANAUGH, J. 

sumption of severability.  The Court presumes that an un-
constitutional provision in a law is severable from the re-
mainder of the law or statute.  For example, in Free Enter-
prise  Fund  v.  Public  Company  Accounting  Oversight  Bd., 
the Court set forth the “normal rule”: “Generally speaking,
when confronting a constitutional flaw in a statute, we try 
to limit the solution to the problem, severing any problem-
atic portions while leaving the remainder intact.”  561 U. S. 
477, 508 (2010) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also 
Seila Law, ante, at 32 (same).  In Regan v. Time, Inc., the 
plurality opinion likewise described a “presumption” in “fa-
vor  of  severability”  and  stated  that  the  Court  should  “re-
frain  from  invalidating  more of  the  statute  than  is  neces-
sary.”  468 U. S. 641, 652–653 (1984). 

The Court’s power and preference to partially invalidate
a statute in that fashion has been firmly established since 
Marbury v. Madison.  There, the Court invalidated part of 
§13  of  the  Judiciary  Act  of  1789.    1  Cranch  137,  179–180 
(1803).  The  Judiciary  Act  did  not  contain  a  severability 
clause.  But the Court did not proceed to invalidate the en-
tire  Judiciary  Act.    As  Chief  Justice  Marshall  later  ex-
plained, if any part of an Act is “unconstitutional, the pro-
visions of that part may be disregarded while full effect will 
be given to such as are not repugnant to the constitution of 
the United States.”  Bank of Hamilton v. Lessee of Dudley, 
2 Pet. 492, 526 (1829); see also Dorchy v. Kansas, 264 U. S. 
286,  289–290  (1924)  (“A  statute  bad  in  part  is  not  neces-
sarily void in its entirety.  Provisions within the legislative 
power  may  stand  if  separable  from  the  bad”);  Loeb  v.  Co-
lumbia Township Trustees, 179 U. S. 472, 490 (1900) (“one 
section of a statute may be repugnant to the Constitution
without rendering the whole act void”). 

From  Marbury  v.  Madison  to  the  present,  apart  from
some  isolated  detours  mostly  in  the  late  1800s  and  early 
1900s, the Court’s remedial preference after finding a pro-
vision of a federal law unconstitutional has been to salvage