Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/22pdf/21-1496_d18f.pdf
Page Number: 31.0

Cite as:  598 U. S. ____ (2023) 

25 

Opinion of the Court 

Because plaintiffs’ complaint rests so heavily on defend-
ants’ failure to act, their claims might have more purchase 
if  they  could  identify  some  independent  duty  in  tort  that
would  have  required  defendants  to  remove  ISIS’  content. 
See Woodward, 522 F. 2d, at 97, 100.  But plaintiffs identify 
that  would  require  defendants  or  other 
no  duty 
communication-providing  services  to  terminate  customers
after discovering that the customers were using the service
for illicit ends.  See Doe, 347 F. 3d, at 659; People v. Brophy, 
49 Cal. App. 2d 15, 33–34 (1942).14  To be sure, there may
be situations where some such duty exists, and we need not 
resolve  the  issue  today.  Even  if  there  were  such  a  duty
here,  it  would  not  transform  defendants’  distant  inaction 
into knowing and substantial assistance that could estab-
lish aiding and abetting the Reina attack.

If there were any doubt, the expansive scope of plaintiffs’ 
claims would put it to rest.  Given the lack of any concrete
nexus between defendants’ services and the Reina attack, 
plaintiffs’ claims would necessarily hold defendants liable 
as having aided and abetted each and every ISIS terrorist
act committed anywhere in the world.  Under plaintiffs’ the-
ory, any U. S. national victimized by an ISIS attack could 
bring the same claim based on the same services allegedly 
provided to ISIS.  Plaintiffs thus must allege that defend-
ants so systemically and pervasively assisted ISIS that de-
fendants could be said to aid and abet every single ISIS at-
tack.  Viewed  in  that  light,  the  allegations  here  certainly 

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14 Plaintiffs have not presented any case holding such a company liable
for merely failing to block such criminals despite knowing that they used 
the company’s services.  Rather, when legislatures have wanted to im-
pose a duty to remove content on these types of entities, they have ap-
parently done so by statute.  See, e.g., Telecommunications Act of 1996, 
§502, 110 Stat. 133–134 (codified, as amended, at 47 U. S. C. §223); but 
see  Reno  v.  American  Civil  Liberties  Union,  521  U. S.  844,  857,  874 
(1997)  (holding  parts  of  §223  unconstitutional  under  the  First  Amend-
ment).