Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/14pdf/14-7955_aplc.pdf
Page Number: 64

14 

GLOSSIP v. GROSS 

BREYER, J., dissenting 

can  make  a  difference.  See  Woodward  v.  Alabama,  571 
U. S.  ___,  ___  (2013)  (SOTOMAYOR,  J.,  dissenting  from
denial  of  certiorari)  (slip  op.,  at  7)  (noting  that  empirical
evidence suggests that, when Alabama judges reverse jury
recommendations, these “judges, who are elected in parti­
san  proceedings,  appear  to  have  succumbed  to  electoral
pressures”); Harris v. Alabama, 513 U. S. 504, 519 (1995) 
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (similar); Gelman, 1 J. Empirical 
L.  Studies,  at  247  (elected  state  judges  are  less  likely  to 
reverse  flawed  verdicts  in  capital  cases  in  small  towns 
than in larger communities).

Thus,  whether  one  looks  at  research  indicating  that
irrelevant or improper factors—such as race, gender, local 
geography, and resources—do significantly determine who
receives  the  death  penalty,  or  whether  one  looks  at  re­
search indicating that proper factors—such as “egregious­
ness”—do  not  determine  who  receives  the  death  penalty,
the  legal  conclusion  must  be  the  same:  The  research 
strongly  suggests  that  the  death  penalty  is  imposed 
arbitrarily.

JUSTICE THOMAS catalogues the tragic details of various
capital  cases,  ante,  at  6–10  (concurring  opinion),  but  this 
misses  my  point.    Every  murder  is  tragic,  but  unless  we
return  to  the  mandatory  death  penalty  struck  down  in 
Woodson,  428  U. S.,  at  304–305,  the  constitutionality  of 
capital  punishment  rests  on  its  limited  application  to  the
worst  of  the  worst,  supra,  at  9–10.    And  this  extensive 
body of evidence suggests that it is not so limited. 

Four  decades  ago,  the  Court  believed  it  possible  to  in­
terpret the Eighth Amendment in ways that would signifi­
cantly  limit  the  arbitrary  application  of  the  death  sen­
tence.  See  Gregg,  428  U. S.,  at  195  (joint  opinion  of 
Stewart,  Powell,  and  Stevens,  JJ.)  (“[T]he  concerns  ex­
pressed  in  Furman  that  the  penalty  of  death  not  be  im­
posed  in  an  arbitrary  or  capricious  manner  can  be  met”).
But that no longer seems likely.