Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/558bv.pdf
Page Number: 385.0

224 

WELLONS  v.  HALL 

Per Curiam 

Moreover,  even  assuming  that  the  Eleventh  Circuit  in­
tended to address Wellons’ motions for discovery and an evi­
dentiary hearing, we cannot be sure that its reasoning really 
was independent of the Cone error.  The fact that his claims 
rested  on  “speculation”  and  “surmise”  was  due  to  the  ab­
sence of a record, which was in part based on the Cone error. 
And as the  Eleventh Circuit’s reasoning turned  on “the evi­
dence  presented  before  the  Georgia  Supreme  Court,”  554 
F.  3d,  at  937,  there  is  serious  doubt  about  whether  it  neces­
sarily relied on the very holes in the record that Wellons was 
trying to ﬁll. 

229.  But  that  does  not  address  the  question:  The  merits  of  what?  The 
question  whether  to  grant  habeas  relief  or  whether  to  permit  discovery 
and an evidentiary hearing? 

Contrary  to  our  dissenting  colleagues,  post,  at  231–232  (opinion  of 
Alito,  J.),  we  do  not  ﬁnd  it  dispositive  that  the  section  of  the  Eleventh 
Circuit’s  opinion  about  judge,  juror,  and  bailiff  misconduct  began  with  a 
full  page  statement  of  the  standard  of  review,  which  in  turn  included  a 
sentence  about  the  circumstances  under  which  an  evidentiary  hearing  is 
warranted.  See 554 F. 3d, at 934–935.  Immediately following the stand­
ard of review that Justice Alito quotes, the panel explained that “ ‘if the 
record .  . . precludes habeas  relief, a district  court is not required  to hold 
an  evidentiary  hearing,’ ”  and  that  “the  record  reveals  that  [Wellons’] 
claims . . . are  procedurally barred.”  Id., at 935. 

Moreover,  the  allegedly  “unequivocal”  holding  that  Justice  Alito 
quotes  was  preceded  by  a  discussion  of  the  deference  owed  under  the 
Antiterrorism  and  Effective  Death  Penalty  Act  of  1996  (AEDPA)  to  the 
“Georgia Supreme Court’s judgment as to the substance and effect of the 
ex  parte  communication.”  Id.,  at  937.  This  is  the  classic  formulation  of 
a  decision  whether  to  grant  habeas  relief.  Indeed,  it  would  be  bizarre  if 
a  federal  court  had  to  defer  to  state-court  factual  ﬁndings,  made  without 
any evidentiary  record, in  order to  decide whether  it could  create an  evi­
dentiary record to decide whether the factual ﬁndings were erroneous.  If 
that  were  the  case,  then  almost  no  habeas  petitioner  could  ever  get  an 
evidentiary hearing:  So long as  the state court  found a fact  that the peti­
tioner  was  trying  to  disprove  through  the  presentation  of  evidence,  then 
there could be no hearing.  AEDPA does not require such a crabbed and 
illogical  approach to  habeas  procedures,  and there  is  no  reason to  believe 
that the Eleventh Circuit thought otherwise.