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PACKINGHAM v. NORTH CAROLINA 

Syllabus 

networks in that medium.  Pp. 4–6.

(b) This  background  informs  the  analysis  of  the  statute  at  issue.
Even assuming that the statute is content neutral and thus subject to 
intermediate  scrutiny,  the  provision  is  not  “ ‘ “narrowly  tailored  to 
serve  a  significant  governmental  interest.” ’ ”  McCullen  v.  Coakley, 
573  U. S.  ___,  ___.    Like  other  inventions  heralded  as  advances  in 
human  progress,  the  Internet  and  social  media  will  be  exploited  by
the criminal mind.  It is also clear that “sexual abuse  of a child is a 
most  serious  crime  and  an  act  repugnant  to  the  moral  instincts  of  a
decent people,” Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U. S. 234, 244, 
and  that  a  legislature  “may  pass  valid  laws  to  protect  children”  and
other sexual assault victims, id., at 245.  However, the assertion of a 
valid  governmental  interest  “cannot,  in  every  context,  be  insulated
from  all  constitutional  protections.”    Stanley  v.  Georgia,  394  U. S. 
557, 563.   

Two assumptions are made in resolving this case.  First, while the 
Court need not decide the statute’s precise scope, it is enough to as-
sume  that  the  law  applies  to  commonplace  social  networking  sites
like  Facebook,  LinkedIn,  and  Twitter.  Second,  the  Court  assumes 
that the First Amendment permits a State to enact specific, narrow-
ly-tailored laws that prohibit a sex offender from engaging in conduct 
that often presages a sexual crime, like contacting a minor or using a
website to gather information about a minor.

Even with these assumptions, the statute here enacts a prohibition 
unprecedented  in  the  scope  of  First  Amendment  speech  it  burdens. 
Social  media  allows  users  to  gain  access  to  information  and  com-
municate with one another on any subject that might come to mind. 
With one broad stroke, North Carolina bars access to what for many
are the principal sources for knowing current events, checking ads for 
employment,  speaking  and  listening  in  the  modern  public  square,
and  otherwise  exploring  the  vast  realms  of  human  thought  and 
knowledge.    Foreclosing  access  to  social  media  altogether  thus  pre-
vents users from engaging in the legitimate exercise of First Amend-
ment rights.  Even convicted criminals—and in some instances espe-
cially  convicted  criminals—might  receive  legitimate  benefits  from
these means for access to the world of ideas, particularly if they seek 
to reform and to pursue lawful and rewarding lives.  Pp. 6–8.

(c) The State has not met its burden to show that this sweeping law
is  necessary  or  legitimate  to  serve  its  purpose  of  keeping  convicted 
sex  offenders  away  from  vulnerable  victims.    No  case  or  holding  of 
this Court has approved of a statute as broad in its reach.  The State 
relies on Burson v. Freeman, 504 U. S. 191, but that case considered 
a  more  limited  restriction—prohibiting  campaigning  within  100  feet
of a polling place—in order to protect the fundamental right to vote.