Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/19pdf/18-5924_n6io.pdf
Page Number: 38

4 

RAMOS v. LOUISIANA 

KAVANAUGH, J., concurring in part 

(1938);  West  Coast  Hotel  Co.  v.  Parrish,  300  U. S.  379 
(1937). 
  The  lengthy  and  extraordinary  list  of  landmark  cases 
that  overruled  precedent  includes  the  single  most  im-
portant and greatest decision in this Court’s history, Brown 
v. Board of Education, which repudiated the separate but 
equal doctrine of Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U. S. 537 (1896). 
  As  those  many  examples  demonstrate,  the  doctrine 
of  stare  decisis  does  not  dictate,  and  no  one  seriously 
maintains, that the Court should never overrule erroneous 
precedent.  As the Court has often stated and repeats today, 
stare  decisis  is  not  an  “inexorable  command.”    E.g.,  ante,  
at 20. 
  On the other hand, as Justice Jackson explained, just “be-
cause one should avoid Scylla is no reason for crashing into 
Charybdis.” Jackson, Decisional Law and Stare Decisis, 30 
A. B. A. J. 334 (1944).  So no one advocates that the Court 
should always overrule erroneous precedent. 
  Rather, applying the doctrine of stare decisis, this Court 
ordinarily  adheres  to  precedent,  but  sometimes  overrules 
precedent.  The difficult question, then, is when to overrule 
an erroneous precedent. 
  To  begin  with,  the  Court’s  precedents  on  precedent 
distinguish statutory cases from constitutional cases. 
  In statutory cases, stare decisis is comparatively strict, as 
history shows and the Court has often stated.  That is be-
cause  Congress  and  the  President  can  alter  a  statutory 
precedent by enacting new legislation.  To be sure, enacting 
new legislation requires finding room in a crowded legisla-
tive  docket  and  securing  the  agreement of  the  House, the 
Senate (in effect, 60 Senators), and the President.  Both by 
design and as a matter of fact, enacting new legislation is 
difficult—and  far  more  difficult  than  the  Court’s  cases 
sometimes seem to assume.  Nonetheless, the Court has or-
dinarily left the updating or correction of erroneous statu-
tory precedents to the legislative process.  See, e.g., Kimble