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Page Number: 30

8 

SNYDER v. UNITED STATES 

JACKSON, J., dissenting 

598 U. S. 115, 138–139 (2023).  But resort to these tools is 
questionable  under  certain  circumstances.    See  Milner  v. 
Department of Navy, 562 U. S. 562, 574 (2011) (“When pre-
sented, on the one hand, with clear statutory language and,
on  the  other,  with  dueling  committee  reports,  we  must
choose the language”).  In any event, here, the statutory and 
legislative history only make matters worse for the major-
ity’s analysis.

Section 666 traces its lineage to 18 U. S. C. §201, though
the  kinship  is  more  attenuated  than  the  majority  lets  on. 
Section  201  indeed  “contains  comprehensive  prohibitions
on bribes and gratuities to federal officials.”  Ante, at 4 (dis-
cussing §§201(b)–(c)).  But initially, it was not entirely clear 
which officials that federal statute covered.  By its terms,
§201  applies  broadly  to  “public  officials,”  see  §201(a),  and 
confusion  arose  among  some  lower  courts  as  to  “whether 
state and local employees could be considered ‘public offi-
cials’ ” under the statute.  Salinas, 522 U. S., at 58.  Without 
awaiting our resolution of the issue, Congress enacted §666 
in 1984.  Ibid.; see also 98 Stat. 2143. 

In §666, Congress expressly sought to reach state and lo-
cal  officials  “to  protect  the  integrity  of  the  vast  sums  of
money  distributed  through  Federal  programs.”    S. Rep. 
No. 98–225,  p. 370  (1983).    As  originally  enacted,  §666
barred those officials from soliciting, accepting, or agreeing 
to accept “anything of value . . . for or because of the recipi-
ent’s conduct,” §666(b) (1982 ed., Supp. II), using language
similar to that in §201(c), the federal-official gratuities pro-
vision.  Crucially, no one disputes that when it was initially 
enacted, §666 prohibited both bribes and gratuities.  Ante, 
at 4.  Similarly significant (though unmentioned by the ma-
jority), Congress imposed the same 10-year maximum term
of  imprisonment  for  a  violation  then  as  it  does  now.  See 
§666(b) (1982 ed., Supp. II); cf. ante, at 14 (describing it as
“unfathomable  that  Congress  would  authorize  a  10-year