Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/23pdf/22-1218_5357.pdf
Page Number: 2

2 

SMITH v. SPIZZIRRI 

Syllabus 

word “stay” as a “temporary suspension” of legal proceedings.  And re-
spondents’  attempt  to  read  “stay”  to  include  “dismiss”  cannot  be 
squared  with  the  surrounding  statutory  text,  which  anticipates  that
the  parties  can  return  to  federal  court  if  arbitration  breaks  down  or 
fails  to  resolve  the  dispute.    Notwithstanding  §3’s  text,  respondents 
suggest  that  district  courts  retain  the  inherent  authority  to  dismiss 
proceedings subject to arbitration.  But even assuming such inherent 
authority, “the inherent powers of the courts may be controlled or over-
ridden by statute or rule,” Degen v. United States, 517 U. S. 820, 823, 
and §3 does exactly that. 

The  FAA’s  structure  and  purpose  confirm  that  a  stay  is  required. 
Section 16(a)(1)(C) of the FAA authorizes an immediate interlocutory 
appeal of the denial of an arbitration request.  By contrast, Congress 
made clear in §16(b) that, outside of a narrow exception not applicable
here, an order compelling arbitration is not immediately appealable.
If a district court could dismiss a suit subject to arbitration even when 
a party requests a stay, that dismissal would trigger the right to an 
immediate appeal where Congress sought to forbid such an appeal.  Fi-
nally, staying rather than dismissing a suit comports with the super-
visory role that the FAA envisions for the courts.  Keeping the suit on
the court’s docket makes good sense in light of the FAA’s mechanisms
for  courts  with  proper  jurisdiction  to  assist  parties  in  arbitration. 
Pp. 3–6. 

62 F. 4th 1201, reversed and remanded. 

SOTOMAYOR, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.