Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/524bv.pdf
Page Number: 763

524US2

Unit: $U97

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718

UNITED STATES v. BALSYS

Breyer, J., dissenting

prosecution by a different sovereign seems not quite as un-
fair as prosecution by the same sovereign—could warrant
denying the privilege’s application.

The second consideration is practical. The majority, as
well as the Government, fear that application of the privilege
might unreasonably interfere with the work of law enforce-
ment. See ante, at 697–698; Brief for United States 30–36.
But in my view, that fear is overstated. After all, “foreign
application” of the privilege would matter only in a case
where an individual could not be prosecuted domestically but
the threat of foreign prosecution is substantial. Cf. Zica-
relli, 406 U. S., at 478–481 (declining to reach privilege claim
because witness did not face “real danger” of foreign prose-
cution). The Second Circuit points out that there have only
been a handful of such cases.
119 F. 3d, at 135 (ﬁnding only
six cases in the 25 years since Zicarelli). That is because
relatively few witnesses face deportation or extradition, and
a witness who will not “ ‘be forced to enter a country dis-
posed to prosecute him,’ ” 119 F. 3d, at 135 (quoting United
States v. Gecas, 50 F. 3d 1549, 1560 (CA11 1995), cannot make
the showing of “real and substantial” fear that Zicarelli
would require.

Moreover, even where a substantial likelihood of foreign
prosecution can be shown, the Government would only be
deprived of testimony that relates to the foreign crime; the
witness would not be entitled to claim a general silence.
See Hoffman v. United States, 341 U. S. 479, 486 (1951) (wit-
ness may only refuse to answer questions that might “in
themselves support a conviction” or “furnish a link in the
chain of evidence” for such crime). And nothing would pre-
vent the Government, in a civil proceeding, from arguing
that an adverse inference should be drawn from the wit-
nesses’ silence on particular questions, see Baxter v. Palmi-
giano, 425 U. S. 308, 318 (1976), or from supporting that in-
ference with evidence from other, nonprivileged sources.
Thus, without any adjustment in practice, it would seem that