Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/529bv.pdf
Page Number: 826.0

529US3

Unit: $U57

[09-26-01 12:19:03] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 529 U. S. 728 (2000)

751

O’Connor, J., concurring

First, in Part II–A, the Court holds that the Secretary did
not exceed his authority under the Taylor Grazing Act by
promulgating the new “grazing preference” and “permitted
use” rules.
I agree with that holding but would place spe-
cial emphasis on the Court’s third reason for rejecting peti-
tioners’ facial challenge to the regulations. Petitioners have
not shown how the new regulations themselves—rather than
speciﬁc actions the Secretary might take pursuant to those
regulations—violate the Taylor Grazing Act’s requirement
that “grazing privileges recognized and acknowledged . . . be
adequately safeguarded.” 43 U. S. C. § 315b.
It is of partic-
ular importance, as the Court notes, ante, at 743, that the
Secretary has assured us that the new regulations do not in
actual practice “alter the active use/suspended use formula
in grazing permits” and that “ ‘present suspended use would
continue to be recognized and have a priority for additional
grazing use within the allotment.’ ” Brief for Respondents
22 (quoting Bureau of Land Management, Rangeland Reform
’94: Final Environmental Impact Statement 144 (1994)).
For these reasons, petitioners’ facial challenge to the regula-
tions must fail. Should a permit holder ﬁnd, however, that
the Secretary’s speciﬁc application of the new regulations
deviates from the above assurances and in the process de-
prives the permit holder of grazing privileges to such an ex-
tent that the Secretary’s conduct can be termed a failure to
adequately safeguard such privileges, the permit holder may
bring an as-applied challenge to the Secretary’s action at
that time. The Court’s holding today in no way forecloses
such a challenge. See ante, at 744 (“[T]he affected permit
holder remains free to challenge such an individual [denial
of] grazing privileges, and the courts remain free to deter-
mine its lawfulness in context”).

Second, it is important to note that the Court’s decision
today only rejects petitioners’ claim that the 1995 regula-
tions exceed the Secretary’s authority under the Taylor
Grazing Act. We are not presented in this case with a claim
under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U. S. C.