Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/19pdf/18-1195_g314.pdf
Page Number: 68

Cite as:  591 U. S. ____ (2020) 

7 

BREYER, J., dissenting 

believe “with a passionate conviction that they were enti-
tled to worship God in their own way and to teach their chil-
dren and to form their characters in the way that seemed
to them calculated to impress the stamp of the God-fearing
man.”  C. Radcliffe, The Law & Its Compass 71 (1960).  But 
the  bitter  lesson  of  religious  conflict  also  inspired  the  Es-
tablishment  Clause  and  the  state-law  bans  on  compelled 
support the Court cited in Locke.  Cf., e.g., J. Madison, Me-
morial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments,
reprinted in Everson v. Board of Ed. of Ewing, 330 U. S. 1, 
69 (1947) (appendix to dissent of Rutledge, J.) (recalling the
“[t]orrents  of  blood”  shed  in  efforts  to  establish  state  reli-
gion).

What, then, is the difference between Locke and the pre-
sent  case?  And  what  is  it  that  leads  the  majority  to  con-
clude that funding the study of religion is more like paying
to fix up a playground (Trinity Lutheran) than paying for a 
degree in theology (Locke)?  The majority’s principal argu-
ment appears to be that, as in Trinity Lutheran, Montana 
has excluded religious schools from its program “solely be-
cause of the religious character of the schools.”  Ante, at 9. 
The  majority  seeks  to  contrast  this  status-based  discrimi-
nation  with  the  program  at  issue  in  Locke,  which  it  says
denied scholarships to divinity students based on the reli-
gious use to which they put the funds—i.e., training for the 
ministry, as opposed to secular professions.  See ante, at 11 
(citing Trinity Lutheran, 582 U. S., at ___–___ (slip op., at 
9–10)).

It  is  true  that  Montana’s  no-aid  provision  broadly  bars
state aid to schools based on their religious affiliation.  But 
this case does not involve a claim of status-based discrimi-
nation.  The  schools  do  not  apply  or  compete  for  scholar-
ships, they are not parties to this litigation, and no one here 
purports to represent their interests.  We are instead faced 
with  a  suit  by  parents  who  assert  that  their  free  exercise 
rights are violated by the application of the no-aid provision