Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/23pdf/23-5572_l6hn.pdf
Page Number: 25.0

Cite as:  603 U. S. ____ (2024) 

5 

JACKSON, J., concurring 

Ante, at 8–9. 

This understanding of §1512(c)’s text and purpose is en-
tirely consistent with the statute’s enactment history.  Con-
gress enacted §1512(c) as part of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act,
which “was prompted  by the exposure of Enron’s massive 
accounting  fraud  and  revelations  that  the  company’s  out-
side auditor, Arthur Andersen LLP, had systematically de-
stroyed  potentially  incriminating  documents.”    Yates  v. 
United  States,  574  U. S.  528,  535–536  (2015)  (plurality 
opinion).  When introducing what later became §1512(c) on
the Senate floor, Senator Lott emphasized that its principal 
purpose was to target document destruction, which was, at
the time, prohibited “only if . . . a subpoena ha[d] been is-
sued for the evidence that ha[d] been destroyed or altered.” 
148 Cong. Rec. S6545 (July 10, 2002).  “[T]his section,” he
explained, “would allow the Government to charge obstruc-
tion against individuals who acted alone, even if the tam-
pering took place prior to the issuance of a grand jury sub-
poena.”  Ibid.  Similarly, the Senate Report accompanying
the proposed statute noted that “current federal obstruction
of justice statutes relating to document destruction [were] 
riddled  with  loopholes  and  burdensome  proof  require-
ments.”  S. Rep. No. 107–146, p. 6 (2002).  According to the 
Senate  Report,  §1512(c)  was  drafted  to  fill  these  gaps: 
“When  a  person  destroys  evidence  with  the  intent  of  ob-
structing any type of investigation and the matter is within
the  jurisdiction  of  a  federal  agency,  overly  technical  legal
distinctions should neither hinder nor prevent prosecution 
and punishment.”  Id., at 7. 

Conversely, there is no indication whatsoever that Con-
gress intended to create a sweeping, all-purpose obstruction 
statute.  As  the  majority  notes,  “[f]ederal  obstruction  law
consists of numerous provisions that target specific crimi-
nal acts and settings.”  Ante, at 10.  Outside of the Govern-
ment’s  proposed  interpretation  of  §1512(c),  Congress  has
never enacted “a one-size-fits-all solution to obstruction of