Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/20pdf/20-5904_i4dk.pdf
Page Number: 10

8 

TERRY v. UNITED STATES 

Opinion of the Court 

Act  changed  nothing  in  subparagraph  (C).  The  United 
States notes that prosecutors before 2010 could charge of-
fenders under subparagraph (B) if the offense involved be-
tween 5 and 28 grams of crack; now, prosecutors can charge
those offenders only under subparagraph (C).  But even be-
fore 2010, prosecutors could charge those offenders under 
subparagraph (C) because quantity has never been an ele-
ment under that subparagraph.  See, e.g., United States v. 
Birt, 966 F. 3d 257, 259 (CA3 2020) (noting that an offender 
charged under subparagraph (C) had possessed 186 grams
of crack).  It also defies common parlance to say that alter-
ing a different provision modified subparagraph (C).  If Con-
gress abolished the crime of possession with intent to dis-
tribute, prosecutors then would have to bring charges under
the  lesser  included  offense  of  simple  possession.    But  no-
body would say that abolishing the first offense changed the
second. 

In light of the clear text, we hold  that §2(a) of the Fair 
Sentencing  Act  modified  the  statutory  penalties  only  for 
subparagraph  (A)  and  (B)  crack  offenses—that  is,  the  of-
fenses that triggered mandatory-minimum penalties.  The 
judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed. 

It is so ordered.