Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/21pdf/20-915_pol1.pdf
Page Number: 17

Cite as:  595 U. S. ____ (2022) 

5 

THOMAS, J., dissenting 

question about fraud.  To provide an incomplete answer to 
the question presented disserves the public and our fellow 
judges.    The  Court  does  not  decide  the  question  that  has 
split the Courts of Appeals, but instead decides a question 
that no court has addressed.  And by granting review of one 
question but answering another, we encourage litigants “to 
seek  review  of  a  circuit  conflict  only  then  to  change  the 
question to one that seems more favorable.”  Czyzewski v. 
Jevic Holding Corp., 580 U. S. ___, ___ (2017) (THOMAS, J., 
dissenting)  (slip  op.,  at  2);  see  also  Yee,  503  U. S.,  at  536 
(parties would be “encouraged to fill their limited briefing 
space  and  argument  time  with  discussion  of  issues  other 
than the one on which certiorari was granted”).  The result 
is  muddled  briefing  on  questions  we  did  not  agree  to  re-
solve,  and  a  ruling  that  bypasses  the  ordinary  process  of 
appellate review. 

II 
  In  this  case,  the  Court’s  misstep  comes  at  considerable 
cost.  A requirement to know the law is ordinarily satisfied 
by constructive knowledge, cf. Jerman v. Carlisle, McNellie, 
Rini, Kramer & Ulrich, L. P. A., 559 U. S. 573, 584 (2010), 
because “actual knowledge of illegality” can be “difficult or 
impossible”  to  prove,  Ratzlaf  v.  United  States,  510  U. S. 
135,  162  (1994)  (Blackmun,  J.,  dissenting).    Yet  here,  the 
Court imposes an actual-knowledge-of-law standard that is 
virtually  unprecedented  except  in  criminal  tax  enforce-
ment.  See Cheek v. United States, 498 U. S. 192, 201–203 
(1991).  And while the Court claims the word “knowledge” 
in §411(b)(1)(A) compels this conclusion, see ante, at 5, that 
result is far from certain.  In Cheek, this Court required ac-
tual  knowledge  of  law  in  light  of  a  “willfulness”  require-
ment.  498 U. S., at 201–202.  A “knowledge” requirement, 
by  contrast,  often  encompasses  actual  and  constructive 
knowledge.    See  Intel  Corp.  Investment  Policy  Comm.  v. 
Sulyma,  589  U. S.  ___,  ___–___  (2020)  (slip  op.,  at  6–7).