Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/17pdf/16-1140_5368.pdf
Page Number: 47.0

Cite as:  585 U. S. ____ (2018) 

21 

BREYER, J., dissenting 

standard of review based on our precedents that deal with 
speech  restrictions,  not  disclosures.  Ante,  at  17  (citing, 
e.g.,  In re  R. M. J.,  455  U. S.,  at  203;  Virginia  Bd.  of 
Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 
U. S. 748, 772, n. 24 (1976); Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 
U. S.  350,  384  (1977);  and  Zauderer,  471  U. S.,  at  649 
(portion  of  opinion  considering  speech  restrictions,  not 
disclosures)).  This approach is incompatible with Zauderer. 
See Zauderer, supra, at 651 (upholding attorney disclosure 
requirements  where  “reasonably  related  to  the  State’s
interest”); Milavetz, 559 U. S., at 250–253 (same). 

There  is  no  basis  for  finding  the  State’s  interest  “hypo-
thetical.”  The  legislature  heard  that  information-related 
delays  in  qualified  healthcare  negatively  affect  women 
seeking  to  terminate  their  pregnancies  as  well  as  women
carrying  their  pregnancies  to  term,  with  delays  in  quali-
fied  prenatal  care  causing  life-long  health  problems  for
infants.  Reproductive FACT Act: Hearing on Assembly B. 
775  before  the  Senate  Health  Committee,  2015  Cal.  Leg.
Sess.  Even  without  such  testimony,  it  is  “self-evident” 
that  patients  might  think  they  are  receiving  qualified
medical care when they enter facilities that collect health
information,  perform  obstetric  ultrasounds  or  sonograms,
diagnose  pregnancy,  and  provide  counseling  about  preg-
nancy  options  or  other  prenatal  care.    Milavetz,  supra,  at 
251.  The  State’s  conclusion  to  that  effect  is  certainly 
reasonable. 

The  majority  also  suggests  that  the  Act  applies  too
broadly,  namely,  to  all  unlicensed  facilities  “no  matter 
what the facilities say on site or in their advertisements.” 
Ante, at 18.  But the Court has long held that a law is not 
unreasonable  merely  because  it  is  overinclusive.    For 
instance, in Semler the Court upheld as reasonable a state 
law that prohibited licensed dentists from advertising that 
their  skills  were  superior  to  those  of  other  dentists.    294 
U. S.,  at  609.  A  dentist  complained  that  he  was,  in  fact,