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Page Number: 21.0

4 

UNITED STATES v. TAYLOR 

THOMAS, J., dissenting 

violent crime nonetheless does not commit a “crime of vio-
lence” if a hypothetical criminal could commit the same of-
fense  without  satisfying  §924(c)’s  physical-force  require-
ment.  See  ibid.    Because  someone  else—“Adam”—could 
have  committed  attempted  Hobbs  Act  robbery  without
physical force, the Court holds, Taylor’s armed robbery that
resulted  in  the  victim’s  death  is  not  a  “crime  of  violence” 
under §924(c). 

II 

We have reached this point of absurdity only because this 
Court applies a narrow categorical approach to §924(c)’s el-
ements  clause  and  has  nullified  the  residual  clause  that 
would  have  captured  crimes  like  Taylor’s.    It  is  hard  to 
fathom why this makes sense or why any rational Congress 
would countenance such an outcome so divorced from real-
ity. 

A 
Our odyssey began in 1990, as the Court wrestled with a
different  clause  found in  a  different  part  of  §924:  ACCA’s
sentencing enhancement in §924(e).  Unlike §924(c), which
defines  a  substantive  crime,  ACCA  imposes  a  sentencing
enhancement  that  applies  to  any defendant  with  three  or 
more  prior  “violent  felon[ies]”  whom  the  Federal  Govern-
ment  convicts  of  illegally  possessing  a  firearm.    §§922(g),
924(e)(2).  Like §924(c), ACCA defines “violent felony” with
an elements clause and a residual clause.  The Act also in-
cludes  an  “enumerated-offenses”  clause  defining  “violent 
felony” to include any crime that “is burglary, arson, or ex-
tortion, [or] involves use of explosives.”  §924(e)(2).

In Taylor v. United States, 495 U. S. 575 (1990), the Court 
first  adopted  a  categorical  approach  when  interpreting
“burglary” under ACCA’s enumerated-offenses clause.  Id., 
at 598.  The Court construed “burglary” in the abstract, as
a “generic burglary” with elements derived from a treatise