Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/11pdf/10-9646.pdf
Page Number: 26

22 

MILLER v. ALABAMA 

Opinion of the Court 

in Atkins, Roper, and Thompson, we similarly banned the
death  penalty  in  circumstances  in  which  “less  than  half ”
of  the  “States  that  permit[ted]  capital  punishment  (for
whom the issue exist[ed])” had previously chosen to do so. 
Atkins, 536 U. S., at 342 (SCALIA, J., dissenting) (emphasis 
deleted); see id., at 313–315 (majority opinion); Roper, 543 
U. S.,  at  564–565;  Thompson,  487  U. S.,  at  826–827  (plu-
rality  opinion).  So  we  are  breaking  no  new  ground  in 
these cases.11 

Graham  and  Thompson  provide  special  guidance,  be-
cause they considered the same kind of statutes we do and 

—————— 

parole  discretionary  for  juveniles.    See  Alabama  Brief  25  (listing  12
States); Cal. Penal Code Ann. §190.5(b) (West 2008); Ind. Code §35–50–
2–3(b) (2011); N. M. Stat. §§31–18–13(B), 31–18–14, 31–18–15.2 (2010). 
According to available data, only about 15% of all juvenile life-without-
parole sentences come from those 15 jurisdictions, while 85% come from 
the  29  mandatory  ones.    See  Tr.  of  Oral  Arg.  in  No.  10–9646,  p.  19;
Human  Rights  Watch,  State  Distribution  of  Youth  Offenders  Serv- 
ing  Juvenile  Life  Without  Parole  (JLWOP),  Oct.  2,  2009,  online  at
http://www.hrw.org/news/2009/10/02/state-distribution-juvenile-offenders-
serving-juvenile-life-without-parole  (as  visited  June  21,  2012,  and 
available in Clerk of Court’s case file).  That figure indicates that when
given  the  choice,  sentencers  impose  life  without  parole  on  children
relatively  rarely.    And  contrary  to  THE  CHIEF  JUSTICE’s  argument,  see 
post, at 5, n. 2, we have held that when judges and juries do not often
choose to impose a sentence, it at least should not be mandatory.  See 
Woodson  v.  North  Carolina,  428  U. S.  280,  295–296  (1976)  (plurality 
opinion)  (relying  on  the  infrequency  with  which  juries  imposed  the 
death penalty when given discretion to hold that its mandatory imposi-
tion violates the Eighth Amendment). 

11 In response, THE CHIEF JUSTICE complains: “To say that a sentence 
may  be  considered  unusual  because  so  many  legislatures  approve  it 
stands precedent on its head.”  Post, at 5.  To be clear: That description 
in  no  way  resembles  our  opinion.    We  hold  that  the  sentence  violates 
the  Eighth  Amendment  because,  as  we  have  exhaustively  shown,  it 
conflicts  with  the  fundamental  principles  of  Roper,  Graham,  and  our 
individualized  sentencing  cases.   We  then  show  why  the  number  of
States  imposing  this  punishment  does  not  preclude  our  holding,  and 
note  how  its  mandatory  nature  (in  however  many  States  adopt  it) 
makes use of actual sentencing numbers unilluminating.