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BRYAN v. UNITED STATES

Opinion of the Court

cases support the notion that disregard of a known legal obli-
gation is sufﬁcient to establish a willful violation, they in no
way stand for the proposition that it is required.31

Finally, petitioner argues that § 922(b)(3), which is gov-
erned by § 924(a)(1)(D)’s willfulness standard, indicates that
Congress intended “willfully” to include knowledge of the
law. Section 922(b)(3) prohibits licensees from selling ﬁre-
arms to any person who the licensee knows or has reasonable
cause to believe does not reside in the licensee’s State, except
where, inter alia, the transaction fully complies with the
laws of both the seller’s and buyer’s State. The subsection
further states that the licensee “shall be presumed, . . . in
the absence of evidence to the contrary, to have had actual
knowledge of the State laws and published ordinances of
both States.” 32 Although petitioner argues that the pre-
sumption in § 922(b)(3) indicates that Congress intended will-
fulness to require knowledge of the law for all offenses cov-
ered by § 924(a)(1)(D), petitioner is mistaken. As noted
above, while disregard of a known legal obligation is cer-

the owner of the pawnshop, as well as his employees, had knowledge of
the law).

31 In Mayesh, for example, the court stated:
“The uncontroverted evidence shows clearly that plaintiff was aware of
the above holding period requirements. Mr. Mayesh had been previously
advised on the requirements under Illinois law, and he clearly acknowl-
edged that he was aware of them. . . . Since the material facts are undis-
puted, as a matter of law the plaintiff clearly and knowingly violated the
Illinois holding provisions . . . , and hence, 18 U. S. C. § 922(b)(2). This
court can only consider such action to have been ‘wilful’ as a matter of
law. There is no basis for trial of any disputed facts in this connection.
This is sufﬁcient to justify refusal of license renewal.”
58 F. R. D., at 540.
See also, e. g., Perri, 637 F. 2d, at 1336 (stating that when a dealer under-
stands the requirements of the law, but knowingly fails to follow them or
is indifferent to them, willfulness “is established,” i. e., is satisﬁed); Stein’s,
649 F. 2d, at 468 (“Evidence of repeated violations with knowledge of the
law’s requirements has been held sufﬁcient to establish willfulness” (em-
phasis added)); McLemore, 317 F. Supp., at 1078–1079.

32 18 U. S. C. § 922(b)(3).