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Page Number: 12

8 

MATAL v. TAM 

Opinion of the Court 

Government’s  contention  that  federal  registration  is  a 
form of government subsidy.  See id., at 1339–1355.  And 
the majority opined that even if the disparagement clause 
were  analyzed  under  this  Court’s  commercial  speech
cases,  the  clause  would  fail  the  “intermediate  scrutiny”
that those cases prescribe.  See id., at 1355–1357. 

Several  judges  wrote  separately,  advancing  an  assort-
ment of theories.  Concurring, Judge O’Malley agreed with
the  majority’s  reasoning  but  added  that  the  disparage-
ment clause is unconstitutionally vague.  See id., at 1358– 
1363.  Judge Dyk concurred in part and dissented in part. 
He  argued  that  trademark  registration  is  a  government 
subsidy  and  that  the  disparagement  clause  is  facially 
constitutional, but he found the clause unconstitutional as 
applied  to  THE  SLANTS  because  that  mark  constitutes
“core  expression”  and  was  not  adopted  for  the  purpose  of 
disparaging  Asian-Americans.  See  id.,  at  1363–1374.  In 
dissent,  Judge  Lourie  agreed  with  Judge  Dyk  that  the
clause is facially constitutional but concluded for a variety
of  reasons  that  it  is  also  constitutional  as  applied  in  this 
case.  See id., at 1374–1376.  Judge Reyna also dissented, 
maintaining  that  trademarks  are  commercial  speech  and 
that  the  disparagement  clause  survives  intermediate 
scrutiny  because  it  “directly  advances  the  government’s 
substantial interest in the orderly flow of commerce.”  See 
id., at 1376–1382. 

The Government filed a petition for certiorari, which we
granted  in  order  to  decide  whether  the  disparagement 
clause “is facially invalid under the Free Speech Clause of
the First Amendment.”  Pet. for Cert. i; see sub. nom. Lee 
v. Tam, 579 U. S. ___ (2016). 

II 
Before  reaching  the  question  whether  the  disparage-
ment  clause  violates  the  First  Amendment,  we  consider 
Tam’s argument that the clause does not reach marks that