Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/22pdf/22-58_i425.pdf
Page Number: 41

Cite as:  599 U. S. ____ (2023) 

5 

 BARRETT, J., concurring
BARRETT, J., concurring in judgment 

and transforms it into one about standing.  See ante, at 4 
(opinion of GORSUCH, J.)

The Court leans, too, on principles set forth in Heckler v. 
Chaney, 470 U. S. 821 (1985).  Ante, at 8, 11.  But, again, 
Heckler  was  not  about  standing.    It  addressed  a  different 
question: “the extent to which a decision of an administra-
tive agency to exercise its ‘discretion’ not to undertake cer-
tain enforcement actions is subject to judicial review under
the Administrative Procedure Act.”  470 U. S., at 823; see 
also 5 U. S. C. §701(a)(2) (the APA’s judicial-review provi-
sions do not apply “to the extent” that “agency action is com-
mitted to agency discretion by law”).  Heckler held that “an 
agency’s decision not to take enforcement action should be 
presumed  immune  from  judicial  review  under”  the  APA.
470  U. S.,  at  832.    But  such  a  decision  “is  only  presump-
tively  unreviewable;  the  presumption  may  be  rebutted
where the substantive statute has provided guidelines for 
the agency to follow in exercising its enforcement powers.” 
Id., at 832–833.  Whatever Heckler’s relevance to cases like 
this one, it does not establish a principle of Article III stand-
ing.  And elevating it to the status of a constitutional rule 
would transform it from a case about statutory provisions 
(that  Congress  is  free  to  amend)  to  one  about  a  constitu-
tional principle (that lies beyond Congress’s domain).  Alt-
hough the Court notes that Heckler involved the APA, its 
conflation  of  Heckler  with  standing  doctrine  is  likely  to 
cause  confusion.  See  ante,  at  8  (analogizing  “Article  III 
cases” to “Administrative Procedure Act cases”). 

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* 

* 
The Court weaves together multiple doctrinal strands to
create a rule that is not only novel, but also in tension with 
other decisions.  See ante, at 2–4 (opinion of GORSUCH, J.).
In  my  view,  this  case  should  be  resolved  on  the  familiar 
ground that it must be “ ‘likely,’ as opposed to merely ‘spec-
ulative,’ ” that any injury “will be ‘redressed by a favorable