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6 

FISHER v. UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN 

Opinion of the Court 

certain  basic  premises.  First,  “decisions  based  on  race 
or  ethnic  origin  by  faculties  and  administrations  of  state 
universities are reviewable under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.” 
Id.,  at  287  (separate  opinion).  The  principle
of  equal  protection  admits  no  “artificial  line  of  a  ‘two- 
class  theory’ ”  that  “permits  the  recognition  of  special
wards entitled to a degree of protection greater than that 
accorded  others.”    Id.,  at  295.  It  is  therefore  irrelevant 
that  a  system  of  racial  preferences  in  admissions  may 
seem  benign.  Any  racial  classification  must  meet  strict
scrutiny,  for  when  government  decisions  “touch  upon  an
individual’s  race  or  ethnic  background,  he  is  entitled  to  a
judicial determination that the burden he is asked to bear 
on  that  basis  is  precisely  tailored  to  serve  a  compelling 
governmental interest.”  Id., at 299. 

Next,  Justice  Powell  identified  one  compelling  interest
that could justify the consideration of race: the interest in
the  educational  benefits  that  flow  from  a  diverse  student 
body.  Redressing past discrimination could not serve as a
compelling interest, because a university’s “broad mission 
[of]  education”  is  incompatible  with  making  the  “judicial, 
legislative,  or  administrative  findings  of  constitutional  or 
statutory  violations”  necessary  to  justify  remedial  racial
classification.  Id., at 307–309. 

The  attainment  of  a  diverse  student  body,  by  contrast, 
serves values beyond race alone, including enhanced class-
room  dialogue  and  the  lessening  of  racial  isolation  and 
stereotypes.  The  academic  mission  of  a  university  is
“a  special  concern  of  the  First  Amendment.”  Id.,  at  312. 
Part  of  “ ‘the  business  of  a  university  [is]  to  provide  that
atmosphere which is most conducive to speculation, exper-
iment,  and  creation,’ ”  and  this  in  turn  leads  to  the  ques-
tion of “ ‘who may be admitted to  study.’ ”   Sweezy v.  New 
Hampshire,  354  U. S.  234,  263  (1957)  (Frankfurter,  J.,
concurring in judgment). 

Justice  Powell’s  central  point,  however,  was  that  this