Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/524bv.pdf
Page Number: 628.0

524US2

Unit: $U95

[09-06-00 18:40:44] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 524 U. S. 569 (1998)

583

Opinion of the Court

In contrast, the “decency and respect” criteria do not
silence speakers by expressly “threaten[ing] censorship of
ideas.” See ibid. Thus, we do not perceive a realistic dan-
ger that § 954(d)(1) will compromise First Amendment val-
ues. As respondents’ own arguments demonstrate, the con-
siderations that the provision introduces, by their nature, do
not engender the kind of directed viewpoint discrimination
that would prompt this Court to invalidate a statute on its
face. Respondents assert, for example, that “[o]ne would be
hard-pressed to ﬁnd two people in the United States who
could agree on what the ‘diverse beliefs and values of the
American public’ are, much less on whether a particular
work of art ‘respects’ them”; and they claim that “ ‘[d]ecency’
is likely to mean something very different to a septegenarian
in Tuscaloosa and a teenager in Las Vegas.” Brief for Re-
spondents 41. The NEA likewise views the considerations
enumerated in § 954(d)(1) as susceptible to multiple interpre-
tations. See Department of the Interior and Related Agen-
cies Appropriations for 1992, Hearing before the Subcom-
mittee on Interior and Related Agencies of the House
Committee on Appropriations, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., 234
(1991) (testimony of John Frohnmayer) (“[N]o one individual
is wise enough to be able to consider general standards of
decency and the diverse values and beliefs of the American
people all by him or herself. These are group decisions”).
Accordingly, the provision does not introduce considerations
that, in practice, would effectively preclude or punish the
Indeed, one could hardly
expression of particular views.
anticipate how “decency” or “respect” would bear on grant
applications in categories such as funding for symphony
orchestras.

Respondents’ claim that the provision is facially unconsti-
tutional may be reduced to the argument that the criteria in
§ 954(d)(1) are sufﬁciently subjective that the agency could
utilize them to engage in viewpoint discrimination. Given
the varied interpretations of the criteria and the vague ex-