Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/22pdf/21-806_2dp3.pdf
Page Number: 24.0

20 

HEALTH AND HOSPITAL CORPORATION OF MARION 
CTY. v. TALEVSKI 
Opinion of the Court 

(statutory “remedial devices” that are “sufficiently compre-
hensive . . . may suffice” to show implicit preclusion).  But 
when  a  particular  comprehensive  remedial  scheme  dis-
charges the defendant’s burden, it does so because the ap-
plication of ordinary interpretive tools reveals incompatibil-
ity,  i.e.,  it  demonstrates  that  “Congress  intended  [that]
statute’s  remedial  scheme  to  be  the  ‘exclusive  avenue 
through which a plaintiff may assert [his] claims.’ ”  Fitzger-
ald, 555 U. S., at 252. 

Nothing  in  the  FNHRA  indicates  the  incompatibility
evinced in our three prior cases finding implicit preclusion.  
Rancho  Palos  Verdes,  544  U. S.,  at  120–123,  127;  Smith, 
468 U. S., at 1008–1013; Sea Clammers, 453 U. S., at 6–7, 
19–21.  Rancho  Palos  Verdes,  Smith,  and  Sea  Clammers 
concerned  statutes  with  self-contained  enforcement 
schemes  that  included  statute-specific  rights  of  action. 
Rancho  Palos  Verdes,  544  U. S.,  at  120–123;  Smith,  468 
U. S., at 1008–1012; Sea Clammers, 453 U. S., at 6–7, 17, 
and n. 27, 19–21.  Each such statute required plaintiffs to 
“comply with particular procedures and/or to exhaust par-
ticular  administrative  remedies”  under  the  statute’s  en-
forcement scheme before suing under its dedicated right of
action.  Fitzgerald, 555 U. S., at 254.  And each statute-spe-
cific right of action offered fewer benefits than those avail-
able under §1983.  Ibid., and n. 1.  Thus, in all three cases, 
§1983’s operation would have thwarted Congress’s scheme
coming and going: It would have “circumvented” the stat-
utes’ presuit procedures, and would have also “given plain-
tiffs access to tangible benefits” as remedies that were “un-
available  under  the  statutes.” 
Id.,  at  254.  Those 
“ ‘comprehensive enforcement scheme[s]’ ” were “ ‘incompat-
ible with individual enforcement under §1983.’ ”  Id., at 252 
(quoting Rancho Palos Verdes, 544 U. S., at 120). 

HHC  has  identified  no  equivalent  sign  in  the  FNHRA; 
nor has JUSTICE ALITO, see post, at 1, 3–5 (dissenting opin-
ion).  In focusing on what the FNHRA contains, they ignore