Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/23pdf/22-859new_kjfm.pdf
Page Number: 89.0

Cite as:  603 U. S. ____ (2024) 

29 

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting 

and orders barring violators from holding certain positions
and  performing  certain  activities  in  the  industry.    See  15 
U. S. C. §§77h–1(f ), and (g), 78u–2, 78u–3(f ). 

For these reasons, “[a]n action brought by an Executive 
Branch agency to enforce federal securities laws is not the 
same  as  an  action  brought  by  one  individual  against  an-
other for monetary or injunctive relief of the sort that law 
courts (with juries) in England or the States have tradition-
ally heard.”  Brief for Professor John Golden et al. as Amici 
Curiae  3.  Congress  did  not  unlawfully  “siphon”  a  tradi-
tional legal action “away from an Article III court” when it
enacted  the  federal-securities  laws  and  provided  for  their 
enforcement within the SEC.  Ante, at 21. 

The majority asserts that “Granfinanciera effectively de-
cides this case.”  Ante, at 20.  That can only be true, though,
if one ignores what Granfinanciera actually says: Its public-
rights analysis of whether an action is closely intertwined 
with a federal regulatory program only applies “in cases not
involving the Federal Government.”  492 U. S., at 54.  The 
analysis from Atlas Roofing controls where, as here, “ ‘the 
Government is involved in its sovereign capacity under an 
otherwise  valid  statute.’ ”  492  U. S.,  at  51  (quoting  Atlas 
Roofing, 430 U. S., at 458). 

C 
Both cases relied on by the majority, Tull and Granfinan-
ciera, reaffirm that Atlas Roofing controls precisely in cir-
cumstances like the ones at issue in this case.  That is why 
the majority’s late-stage attempt to distinguish Atlas Roof-
ing fails.  The majority’s principal argument that the OSHA
scheme in Atlas Roofing “did not borrow its cause of action 
from the common law” and was instead a “self-consciously
novel”  scheme  that  “resembled  a  detailed  building  code,” 
ante, at 23–24, is flawed on multiple fronts. 

First, OSHA’s cause of action should be largely irrelevant
under the majority’s view that the remedy of civil penalties