Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/23pdf/23-175_19m2.pdf
Page Number: 52

8 

CITY OF GRANTS PASS v. JOHNSON 

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting 

worker is working on my housing.”  Service Providers Brief 
16.  Once the worker was able to secure him stable housing, 
he “had no further encounters with the police, no citations,
and no arrests.”  Ibid. 

These  and  countless  other  stories  reflect  the  reality  of
criminalizing  sleeping  outside  when  people  have  no  other 
choice. 

II 
Grants Pass, a city of 38,000 people in southern Oregon,
adopted  three  ordinances  (Ordinances)  that  effectively 
make it unlawful to sleep anywhere in public, including in
your car, at any time, with as little as a blanket or a rolled-
up shirt as a pillow.  The Ordinances prohibit “[c]amping”
on  “any  sidewalk,  street,  alley,  lane,  public  right  of  way, 
park, bench, or any other publicly-owned property or under 
any bridge or viaduct.”  Grants Pass, Ore. Municipal Code 
§5.61.030  (2024).    A  “[c]ampsite”  is  defined  as  “any  place
where bedding, sleeping bag, or other material used for bed-
ding purposes, or any stove or fire is placed, established, or 
maintained  for  the  purposes  of  maintaining  a  temporary
place to live.”  §5.61.010(B).  Relevant here, the definition 
of “campsite” includes sleeping in “any vehicle.”  Ibid.  The 
Ordinances also prohibit camping in public parks, including 
the “[o]vernight parking” of any vehicle.  §6.46.090(B).1 

The City enforces these Ordinances with fines starting at
$295 and increasing to $537.60 if unpaid.  Once a person is 
cited  twice  for  violating  park  regulations  within  a  1-year
period,  city  officers  can  issue  an  exclusion  order  barring
that person from the park for 30  days.   See §6.46.350.  A 
—————— 

1 The  City’s  “sleeping”  ordinance  prohibits  sleeping  “on  public  side-
walks,  streets,  or  alleyways  at  any  time  as  a  matter  of  individual  and 
public safety.”  §5.61.020(A).  That ordinance is not before the Court to-
day  because, after  the  only class  representative  with  standing  to chal-
lenge  this  ordinance  died,  the  Ninth  Circuit  remanded  to  the  District
Court “to determine whether a substitute representative is available as 
to that challenge alone.”  72 F. 4th 868, 884 (2023).