Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/558bv.pdf
Page Number: 262

Cite as: 558 U. S. 100 (2009) 

101 

Syllabus 

particular  value  of  a  high  order.”  Will  v.  Hallock,  546  U. S.  345,  352– 
353.  In  making  this  determination,  the  Court  does  not  engage  in  an 
“individualized  jurisdictional  inquiry,”  Coopers  &  Lybrand  v.  Livesay, 
437  U. S. 463,  473, but  focuses  on “the  entire  category to  which a  claim 
belongs,”  Digital  Equipment  Corp.  v.  Desktop  Direct,  Inc.,  511  U. S. 
863,  868.  If  the  class  of  claims,  taken  as  a  whole,  can  be  adequately 
vindicated by other means, “the chance that the litigation at hand might 
be speeded, or a ‘particular injustic[e]’ averted,” does not provide a basis 
for § 1291 jurisdiction.  Ibid.  Pp. 106–107. 

(b)  Effective  appellate  review  of  disclosure  orders  adverse  to  the 
attorney-client privilege can be had by means other than collateral order 
appeal,  including  postjudgment  review.  Appellate  courts  can  remedy 
the  improper  disclosure  of  privileged  material  in  the  same  way  they 
remedy  a  host  of  other  erroneous  evidentiary  rulings:  by  vacating  an 
adverse judgment and remanding for a new trial in which the protected 
material and its fruits are excluded from evidence.  Moreover, litigants 
confronted  with  a  particularly  injurious  or  novel  privilege  ruling  have 
several  potential  avenues  of  immediate  review  apart  from  collateral 
order  appeal.  First,  a  party  may  ask  the  district  court  to  certify, 
and  the  court  of  appeals  to  accept,  an  interlocutory  appeal  involv­
ing  “a  controlling  question  of  law,”  the  prompt  resolution  of  which 
“may  materially  advance  the  ultimate  termination  of  the  litigation.” 
§ 1292(b).  Second,  in  extraordinary  circumstances  where  a  disclosure 
order  works  a  manifest  injustice,  a  party  may  petition  the  court  of  ap­
peals for a writ of mandamus.  Cheney v.  United States Dist. Court for 
D. C., 542 U. S. 367, 380.  Another option is for a party to defy a disclo­
sure  order  and  incur  court-imposed  sanctions  that,  e. g.,  “direc[t]  that 
the  matters  embraced  in  the  order  or  other  designated  facts  be  taken 
as established,” “prohibi[t] the disobedient party from supporting or op­
posing designated claims or defenses,” or “strik[e] pleadings in whole or 
in  part.”  Fed.  Rule  Civ.  Proc.  37(b)(2).  Alternatively,  when  the  cir­
cumstances warrant, a district court may issue a contempt order against 
a  noncomplying  party,  who  can  then  appeal  directly  from  that  ruling, 
at  least  when  the  contempt  citation  can  be  characterized  as  a  criminal 
punishment.  See, e. g., Church of Scientology of Cal. v.  United States, 
506  U. S.  9,  18,  n.  11.  These  established  appellate  review  mechanisms 
not  only  provide  assurances  to  clients  and  counsel  about  the  security 
of  their  conﬁdential  communications;  they  also  go  a  long  way  toward 
addressing  Mohawk’s  concern  that,  absent  collateral  order  appeals  of 
adverse attorney-client privilege rulings, some litigants may experience 
severe hardship.  The limited beneﬁts of applying “the blunt, categori­
cal  instrument  of  § 1291  collateral  order  appeal”  to  privilege-related 
disclosure  orders  simply  cannot  justify  the  likely  institutional  costs, 
Digital Equipment, 511 U. S., at 883, including unduly delaying the res­