Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/23pdf/22-915_8o6b.pdf
Page Number: 2

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UNITED STATES v. RAHIMI 

Syllabus 

U. S. 742, 778.  That right, however, “is not unlimited,” District of Co-
lumbia v. Heller, 554 U. S. 570, 626.  The reach of the Second Amend-
ment is not limited only to  those arms that were in existence at the 
Founding.  Heller, 554 U. S., at 582.  Rather, it “extends, prima facie,
to all instruments that constitute bearable arms, even those that were 
not [yet] in existence.”  Ibid.  By that same logic, the Second Amend-
ment permits more than just regulations identical to those existing in
1791. 
Under  our  precedent,  the  appropriate  analysis  involves  considering 
whether  the  challenged  regulation  is  consistent  with  the  principles 
that underpin the Nation’s regulatory tradition.  Bruen, 597 U. S., at 
26–31.    When  firearm  regulation  is  challenged  under  the  Second
Amendment, the Government must show that the restriction “is con-
sistent  with  the  Nation’s  historical  tradition  of  firearm  regulation.” 
Bruen, 597 U. S., at 24.  A court must ascertain whether the new law 
is “relevantly similar” to laws that our tradition is understood to per-
mit, “apply[ing] faithfully the balance struck by the founding genera-
tion to modern circumstances.”  Id., at 29, and n. 7.  Why and how the 
regulation burdens the right are central to this inquiry.  As Bruen ex-
plained, a challenged regulation that does not precisely match its his-
torical  precursors  “still  may  be  analogous  enough  to  pass  constitu-
tional muster.”  Id., at 30.  Pp. 5–8.

(b) Section 922(g)(8) survives Rahimi’s challenge.  Pp. 8–17.

(1) Rahimi’s facial challenge to Section 922(g)(8) requires him to
“establish  that  no  set  of  circumstances  exists  under  which  the  Act 
would be valid.”  United States v. Salerno, 481 U. S. 739, 745.  Here, 
Section 922(g)(8) is constitutional as applied to the facts of Rahimi’s 
own case.  Rahimi has been found by a court to pose a credible threat
to the physical safety of others, see §922(g)(8)(C)(i), and the Govern-
ment offers ample evidence that the Second Amendment permits such 
individuals to be disarmed.  P. 8. 

(2) The Court reviewed the history of American gun laws exten-
sively in Heller and Bruen.  At common law people were barred from
misusing weapons to harm or menace others.  Such conduct was often 
addressed  through  ordinary  criminal  laws  and  civil  actions,  such  as 
prohibitions  on  fighting  or  private  suits  against  individuals  who 
threatened others.  By the 1700s and early 1800s, though, two distinct
legal regimes had developed that specifically addressed firearms vio-
lence: the surety laws and the “going armed” laws.  Surety laws were 
a form of “preventive justice,” 4 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the 
Laws of England 251 (10th ed. 1787), which authorized magistrates to
require individuals suspected of future misbehavior to post a bond.  If 
an individual failed to post a bond, he would be jailed.  If the individual 
did post a bond and then broke the peace, the bond would be forfeit.