Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/14pdf/13-1041_0861.pdf
Page Number: 22

Cite as:  575 U. S. ____ (2015) 

3 

SCALIA, J., concurring in judgment 

the  meaning  or  applicability  of  the  terms  of  an  agency 
action,”  we  have—relying  on  a  case  decided  before  the 
APA, Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U. S. 410 
(1945)—held  that  agencies  may  authoritatively  resolve 
ambiguities  in  regulations.    Auer  v.  Robbins,  519  U. S. 
452, 461 (1997).

By  supplementing  the  APA  with  judge-made  doctrines
of  deference,  we  have  revolutionized  the  import  of  inter-
pretive  rules’  exemption  from  notice-and-comment  rule-
making.    Agencies  may  now  use  these  rules  not  just  to
advise  the  public,  but  also  to  bind  them.    After  all,  if  an 
interpretive  rule  gets  deference,  the  people  are  bound  to
obey  it  on  pain  of  sanction,  no  less  surely  than  they  are
bound to obey substantive rules, which are accorded simi-
lar deference.  Interpretive rules that command deference 
do have the force of law. 

The  Court’s  reasons  for  resisting  this  obvious  point 
would not withstand a gentle breeze.  Even when an agen-
cy’s  interpretation  gets  deference, the  Court  argues,  “it  is 
the court that ultimately decides whether [the text] means
what  the  agency  says.”  Ante,  at  10–11,  n. 4.    That  is  not 
quite so.  So long as the agency does not stray beyond the
ambiguity in the text being interpreted, deference compels
the  reviewing  court  to  “decide”  that  the  text  means  what
the  agency  says.    The  Court  continues  that  “deference  is 
not  an  inexorable  command  in  all  cases,”  because  (for 
example) it does not apply to plainly erroneous interpreta-
tions.  Ibid.  True, but beside the point.  Saying all inter-
pretive  rules  lack  force  of  law  because  plainly  erroneous 
interpretations  do  not  bind  courts  is  like  saying  all  sub-
stantive  rules  lack  force  of  law  because  arbitrary  and 
capricious rules do not bind courts.  Of course an interpre-
tive rule must meet certain conditions before it gets defer-
ence—the  interpretation  must,  for  instance,  be  reason-
able—but  once  it  does  so  it  is  every  bit  as  binding  as  a
substantive  rule.  So  the  point  stands:  By  deferring  to