Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/20pdf/20-334_5h26.pdf
Page Number: 8.0

Cite as:  593 U. S. ____ (2021) 

5 

Opinion of the Court 

Id., at 164–165.2  And the Court of Appeals held that the
District Court was compelled to award the disputed costs to
the OTCs.  Id., at 166–167. 

San Antonio sought this Court’s review.  We granted cer-

tiorari, 592 U. S. ___ (2021), and now affirm. 

II 
We hold that Rule 39 does not permit a district court to
alter a court of appeals’ allocation of the costs listed in sub-
division (e) of that Rule. 

A 
Rule  39  creates  a  cohesive  scheme  for  taxing  appellate 
costs.  As noted, it sets out default rules that are geared to
five potential outcomes of an appeal: dismissal, affirmance,
reversal, affirmance in part and reversal in part, and vaca-
tur.  Each of these default rules tracks the “venerable pre-
sumption  that  prevailing  parties  are  entitled  to  costs.” 
Marx, 568 U. S., at 377. 

These default rules give way, however, when “the court 
orders otherwise.”  Rule 39(a).  The parties agree that this 
reference to “the court” means the court of appeals, not the
district court, see Brief for Petitioner 17–18; Brief for Re-
spondents 20–21, and we agree with that interpretation.  In 
the Rules of Appellate Procedure, which “govern procedure 
in the United States courts of appeals,” Rule 1(a)(1), refer-
ences to a “court” are naturally read to refer to a court of
appeals  unless  the  text  or  context  clearly  indicates  other-
wise. 

The parties do not agree, however, on what the court of
appeals has the power to “orde[r].”  San Antonio thinks that 
the appellate court may say “who can receive costs (party
A,  party  B,  or  neither)”  but  lacks  “authority  to  divide  up
costs.”  Reply Brief 5.  So, the city argues, the district court 

—————— 

2 San Antonio does not challenge these features of the court’s decision, 

see, e.g., Brief for Petitioner 8, n. 2, and we do not address them.