Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/19pdf/19-635_o7jq.pdf
Page Number: 31

4 

TRUMP v. VANCE 

KAVANAUGH, J., concurring in judgment 

Court  agree,  moreover,  that  a  President  may  raise  objec-
tions to a state criminal subpoena not just in state court but 
also in federal court.1  And the majority opinion indicates 
that, in light of the “high respect that is owed to the office 
of the Chief Executive,” courts “should be particularly me-
ticulous” in assessing a subpoena for a President’s personal 
records.  Ante, at 20 (quoting Clinton, 520 U. S., at 707, and 
Nixon, 418 U. S., at 702). 

In the end, much may depend on how the majority opin-
ion’s various standards are applied in future years and dec-
ades.2  It will take future cases to determine precisely how
much difference exists between (i) the various standards ar-
ticulated by the majority opinion, (ii) the overarching Nixon 
“demonstrated, specific need” standard that I would adopt,
and (iii) JUSTICE THOMAS’s and JUSTICE ALITO’s other pro-
posed standards.  In any event, in my view, lower courts in 
cases of this sort involving a President will almost invaria-
bly have to begin by delving into why the State wants the
information; why and how much the State needs the infor-
mation, including whether the State could obtain the infor-
mation  elsewhere;  and  whether  compliance  with  the  sub-
poena would unduly burden or interfere with a President’s
official duties. 

* 

* 
I agree that the case should be remanded to the District
Court  for  further  proceedings,  where  the  President  may
raise constitutional and legal objections to the state grand 

* 

—————— 

1 As I see it, the standards identified by the majority opinion should be 
considered, in this context, Article II requirements, not just statutory or
state-law requirements.  Cf. Cheney v. United States Dist. Court for D. C., 
542  U. S.  367,  385–392  (2004);  Clinton  v.  Jones,  520  U. S.  681,  707 
(1997); Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U. S. 731, 749–757 (1982); United States 
v. Nixon, 418 U. S. 683, 714–716 (1974). 

2 The same point—namely, that much may depend on future applica-
tion—is also true of the four considerations articulated by the Court to-
day in Trump v. Mazars USA, LLP, post, at 19–20.