Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/23pdf/22-976_e29g.pdf
Page Number: 41.0

Cite as:  602 U. S. ____ (2024) 

17 

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting 

systems.    The  majority  creates  a  definition  of  the  statute 
that bans only “traditional” machineguns, even though its 
definition renders Congress’s clear intent readily evadable. 
  Every Member of the majority has previously emphasized 
that the best way to respect congressional intent is to ad-
here to the ordinary understanding of the terms Congress 
uses.    See,  e.g.,  Jam  v.  International  Finance  Corp.,  586 
U. S. 199, 209 (2019) (ROBERTS, C. J., for the Court) (“ ‘[T]he 
legislative purpose is expressed by the ordinary meaning of 
the  words  used’ ”);  Gross  v.  FBL  Financial  Services,  Inc., 
557 U. S. 167, 175 (2009) (THOMAS, J., for the Court) (“ ‘Stat-
utory construction must begin with the language employed 
by Congress and the assumption that the ordinary meaning 
of  that  language  accurately  expresses  the  legislative  pur-
pose’ ”); Wall v. Kholi, 562 U. S. 545, 551 (2011) (ALITO, J., 
for the Court) (“ ‘We give the words of a statute their ordi-
nary,  contemporary,  common  meaning,  absent  an  indica-
tion  Congress  intended  them  to  bear  some  different  im-
port’ ”);  BP  p.l.c.  v.  Mayor  and  City  Council  of  Baltimore, 
593  U. S.  230,  237  (2021)  (GORSUCH,  J.,  for  the  Court) 
(“When called on to interpret a statute, this Court generally 
seeks  to  discern  and  apply  the  ordinary  meaning  of  its 
terms at the time of their adoption”); Sackett v. EPA, 598 
U. S.  651,  723,  727  (2023)  (KAVANAUGH, J.,  concurring  in 
judgment)  (reasoning  that  departing  from  “all  indications 
of ordinary meaning” will “create regulatory uncertainty for 
the Federal Government . . . and regulated parties”); Bar-
tenwerfer v. Buckley, 598 U. S. 69, 77, 83 (2023) (BARRETT, 
J., for the Court) (declining to “artificially narrow ordinary 
meaning” to “second-guess [Congress’s] judgment”).  Today, 
the majority forgets that principle and substitutes its own 
view of what constitutes a “machinegun” for Congress’s. 

  * 
  Congress’s  definition  of  “machinegun”  encompasses 
bump stocks just as naturally as M16s.  Just like a person 

  * 

*