Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/21pdf/20-1459_n7ip.pdf
Page Number: 24.0

Cite as:  596 U. S. ____ (2022) 

7 

THOMAS, J., dissenting 

case” conduct and judging whether that abstracted conduct
“presents a serious risk of physical injury”—“conspire[d] to 
make [the residual clause] unconstitutionally vague.”  576 
U. S., at 597–598 (majority opinion). 

That conclusion was not inevitable.  The Johnson Court 
did “not doubt the constitutionality of laws that call for the 
application  of  a  qualitative  standard  such  as  ‘substantial 
risk’  to  real-world  conduct.”  Id.,  at  603–604.    Thus,  the 
Court “all but concede[d] that the residual clause would be
constitutional if,” rather than incorporating James’ categor-
ical  approach,  it  looked  to  whether  the  “ ‘real-world  con-
duct’ ” of the underlying conviction presented a serious risk 
of physical injury to another.  576 U. S., at 632 (ALITO, J., 
dissenting).

Despite  recognizing  that  a  conduct-based  approach  was
constitutionally sound, the Court later extended Johnson to 
the residual clause in §924(c).  See United States v. Davis, 
588 U. S. ___, ___ (2019).  The Davis Court decided that the 
§924(c)  residual  clause’s  language  was  so  similar  to  the 
ACCA residual clause that it, too, must be void for vague-
ness.  Id., at ___–___, ___–___ (slip op., at 6–7, 24–25).  Four 
of us, however, advanced a more sensible approach: Rather 
than extend Johnson to nullify §924(c)’s residual clause, we 
should simply not use the categorical approach when inter-
preting residual clauses and adopt a framework focused on
the defendant’s actual conduct that Johnson conceded was 
constitutional.  See 588 U. S., at ___–___ (slip op., at 16–17) 
(KAVANAUGH, J., dissenting).
  As the Davis dissent explained, §924(c)’s residual clause 
is best interpreted to call for a conduct-based approach.  Id., 
at ___–___ (slip op., at 17–24).  To begin with, the plain text
of the residual clause strongly supports a conduct-based ap-
proach.  See  ibid.  Further,  none  of  the  perceived  Sixth
Amendment concerns that attend to ACCA’s sentencing en-
hancement  are  present  in  the  §924(c)  context,  because  a
“jury will find the facts or, if the case ends in a guilty plea,