Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/23pdf/22-915_8o6b.pdf
Page Number: 12

8 

UNITED STATES v. RAHIMI 

Opinion of the Court 

with the principles underlying the Second Amendment, but
it need not be a “dead ringer” or a “historical twin.”  Ibid. 
(emphasis deleted).1 

B 
Bearing these principles in mind, we conclude that Sec-

tion 922(g)(8) survives Rahimi’s challenge. 

1 

Rahimi challenges Section 922(g)(8) on its face.  This is 
the  “most  difficult  challenge  to  mount  successfully,”  be-
cause it requires a defendant to “establish that no set of cir-
cumstances  exists  under  which  the  Act  would  be  valid.” 
United States v. Salerno, 481 U. S. 739, 745 (1987).  That 
means  that  to  prevail, the  Government  need only  demon-
strate that Section 922(g)(8) is constitutional in some of its 
applications.  And here the provision is constitutional as ap-
plied to the facts of Rahimi’s own case. 

Recall  that  Section  922(g)(8)  provides  two  independent
bases for liability.  Section 922(g)(8)(C)(i) bars an individual
from possessing a firearm if his restraining order includes 
a  finding  that  he  poses  “a  credible  threat  to  the  physical
safety”  of  a  protected  person. 
Separately,  Section 
922(g)(8)(C)(ii)  bars  an  individual  from  possessing  a  fire-
arm if his restraining order “prohibits the use, attempted
use,  or  threatened  use  of  physical  force.”    Our  analysis 
starts  and  stops  with  Section  922(g)(8)(C)(i)  because  the 
Government offers ample evidence that the Second Amend-
ment  permits  the  disarmament  of  individuals  who  pose  a
credible threat to the physical safety of others.  We need not 

—————— 

1 We  also  recognized  in  Bruen  the  “ongoing  scholarly  debate  on
whether courts should primarily rely on the prevailing understanding of 
an  individual  right  when  the  Fourteenth  Amendment  was  ratified  in 
1868 when defining its scope (as well as the scope of the right against the
Federal Government).”  597 U. S., at 37.  We explained that under the
circumstances, resolving the dispute was unnecessary to decide the case. 
Id., at 37–38.  The same is true here.