Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/529bv.pdf
Page Number: 151.0

529US1

Unit: $U34

[09-26-01 08:14:00] PAGES PGT: OPIN

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PORTUONDO v. AGARD

Ginsburg, J., dissenting

is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.

It is so ordered.

Justice Stevens, with whom Justice Breyer joins,

concurring in the judgment.

While I am not persuaded that the prosecutor’s summation
crossed the high threshold that separates trial error—even
serious trial error—from the kind of fundamental unfairness
for which the Constitution requires that a state criminal con-
viction be set aside, cf. Rose v. Lundy, 455 U. S. 509, 543–544
(1982), I must register my disagreement with the Court’s
implicit endorsement of her summation.

The defendant’s Sixth Amendment right “to be confronted
with the witnesses against him” serves the truth-seeking
function of the adversary process. Moreover, it also reﬂects
respect for the defendant’s individual dignity and reinforces
the presumption of innocence that survives until a guilty ver-
dict is returned. The prosecutor’s argument in this case de-
meaned that process, violated that respect, and ignored that
presumption. Clearly such comment should be discouraged
rather than validated.

The Court’s ﬁnal conclusion, which I join, that the argu-
ment survives constitutional scrutiny does not, of course, de-
prive States or trial judges of the power either to prevent
such argument entirely or to provide juries with instructions
that explain the necessity, and the justiﬁcations, for the de-
fendant’s attendance at trial.

Accordingly, although I agree with much of what Justice

Ginsburg has written, I concur in the Court’s judgment.

Justice Ginsburg, with whom Justice Souter joins,

dissenting.

The Court today transforms a defendant’s presence at trial
from a Sixth Amendment right into an automatic burden on
In
his credibility.

I dissent from the Court’s disposition.