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Page Number: 33

12 

CHIAFALO v. WASHINGTON 

THOMAS, J., concurring in judgment 

Rhodes, 393 U. S. 23, 29 (1968).  That is, powers related to
electors reside with States to the extent that the Constitu-
tion does not remove or restrict that power.  Thus, to inval-
idate a state law, there must be “something in the Federal 
Constitution that deprives the [States of] the power to enact
such [a] measur[e].”  U. S. Term Limits, 514 U. S., at 850 
(THOMAS, J., dissenting). 

As the Court recognizes, nothing in the Constitution pre-
vents States from requiring Presidential electors to vote for 
the candidate chosen by the people.  Petitioners ask us to 
infer a constitutional right to elector independence by inter-
preting the terms “appoint,” “Electors,” “vote,” and “by Bal-
lot” to align with the Framers’ expectations of discretion in 
elector voting.  But the Framers’ expectations aid our inter-
pretive inquiry only to the extent that they provide evidence 
of  the  original  public  meaning  of  the  Constitution.    They
cannot be used to change that meaning.  As the Court ex-
plains, the plain meaning of the terms relied on by petition-
ers do not appear to “connote independent choice.”  Ante, at 
11.  Thus, “the original expectation[s]” of the Framers as to 
elector  discretion  provide  “no  reason  for  holding  that  the
power confided to the States by the Constitution has ceased
to exist.”  McPherson, 146 U. S., at 36; see also ante, at 12– 
13. 

* 

* 

* 

“The  people  of  the  States,  from  whom  all  governmental 
powers stem, have specified that all powers not prohibited 
to the States by the Federal Constitution are reserved ‘to
the States respectively, or to the people.’ ” U. S. Term Lim-
its, supra, at 852 (THOMAS, J., dissenting).  Because I would 
decide this case based on that fundamental principle, I con-
cur only in the judgment.