Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/558bv.pdf
Page Number: 542.0

Cite as: 558 U. S. 310 (2010) 

381 

Roberts, C. J., concurring 

The First Amendment theory underlying Austin’s holding is 
extraordinarily  broad.  Austin’s  logic  would  authorize  gov­
ernment  prohibition  of  political  speech  by  a  category  of 
speakers in the name of equality—a point that most scholars 
acknowledge  (and  many  celebrate),  but  that  the  dissent  de­
nies.  Compare, e. g., Garrett, New Voices in Politics: Justice 
Marshall’s  Jurisprudence  on  Law  and  Politics,  52  How.  L.  J. 
655,  669  (2009)  (Austin  “has  been  understood  by  most  com­
mentators to be an opinion driven by equality considerations, 
albeit  disguised  in  the  language  of  ‘political  corruption’ ”), 
with  post,  at  464  (Austin’s  rationale  “is  manifestly  not  just 
an ‘equalizing’ ideal in disguise”).2 

It  should  not  be  surprising,  then,  that  Members  of  the 
Court  have  relied  on  Austin’s  expansive  logic  to  justify 
greater incursions on the First Amendment, even outside the 
original  context  of  corporate  advocacy  on  behalf  of  candi­
dates  running  for  ofﬁce.  See,  e. g.,  Davis  v.  Federal  Elec­
tion Comm’n, 554 U. S. 724, 756 (2008) (Stevens, J., concur­
ring  in  part  and  dissenting  in  part)  (relying  on  Austin  and 
other  cases  to  justify  restrictions  on  campaign  spending  by 
individual  candidates,  explaining  that  “there  is  no  reason 
that their logic—speciﬁcally, their concerns about the corro­
sive  and  distorting  effects  of  wealth  on  our  political  proc­
ess—is  not  equally  applicable  in  the  context  of  individual 
wealth”);  McConnell,  supra,  at  203–209  (extending  Austin 
beyond its original context to cover not only the “functional 
equivalent”  of  express  advocacy  by  corporations,  but  also 

2 See  also, e. g.,  R. Hasen,  The Supreme  Court and  Election  Law: Judg­
ing Equality from Baker v. Carr to Bush v. Gore 114 (2003) (“Austin repre­
sents  the  ﬁrst  and  only  case  [before  McConnell]  in  which  a  majority  of 
the  Court  accepted,  in  deed  if  not  in  word,  the  equality  rationale  as  a 
permissible state interest”); Strauss, Corruption, Equality, and Campaign 
Finance Reform, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 1369, and n. 1 (1994) (noting that Aus­
tin’s  rationale  was  based  on  equalizing  political  speech);  Ashdown,  Con­
trolling  Campaign  Spending  and  the  “New  Corruption”:  Waiting  for  the 
Court,  44  Vand.  L.  Rev.  767,  781  (1991);  Eule,  Promoting  Speaker  Diver­
sity: Austin and Metro Broadcasting, 1990 S. Ct. Rev. 105, 108–111.