Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/21pdf/20-603_o758.pdf
Page Number: 3.0

Cite as:  597 U. S. ____ (2022) 

3 

Syllabus 

complete delegation of authority to the Federal Government to provide 
for the common defense.  Article I spells out Congress’ many related 
powers across multiple provisions, §8, cls. 1, 11–16; Article II makes 
the  President  the  “Commander  in  Chief,”    §2,  cl. 1;  and  Article  IV 
charges  the  Federal  Government  with  “protect[ing]”  States  “against
Invasion,” §4.  The Constitution also divests the States of like author-
ity, see Art. I, §10, cls. 1, 3, assigning them only a limited role in “the
Appointment of the Officers” to and the “training [of] the Militia,” “ac-
cording to the discipline prescribed by Congress,” §8, cl. 16.  History 
teaches the same lesson.  “[T]he want of power in Congress to raise an
army” under the Articles of Confederation had left the National Gov-
ernment “dependen[t] upon the States” to supply military forces via a 
system of quotas and requisition that had nearly cost the fledging Na-
tion victory in the Revolutionary War.  Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 
U. S. 366, 381.  The Constitution, by design, worked “an entire change
in the first principles of the system,” giving Congress direct power over
the “formation, direction or support of the NATIONAL FORCES.”  The 
Federalist No. 23, p. 148 (A. Hamilton).  By ratifying that document,
the States well knew that their sovereignty would give way to national 
policy to build and maintain the Armed Forces.  Consistent with this 
structural understanding, Congress has long legislated regarding mil-
itary forces at the expense of state sovereignty.  See, e.g., 1 Stat. 182. 
This Court’s precedents likewise show that ordinary background prin-
ciples of state sovereignty are displaced in this uniquely federal area.
See, e.g., Tarble’s Case, 13 Wall. 397, 398 (the “National government[’s] 
.  .  .  power  ‘to  raise  and  support  armies’ ”  cannot  be  “question[ed  by] 
any State authority”); United States v. Oregon, 366 U. S. 643, 648–649 
(authority “normally left to the States” is displaced by Congress’ “con-
stitutional powers to raise armies and navies”).

Under PennEast’s test, Congress’ power to build and maintain a na-
tional  military  is  “complete  in  itself”:  Upon  entering  the  Union,  the 
States agreed that their sovereignty would “yield . . . so far as is nec-
essary” to federal policy for the Armed Forces.  594 U. S., at ___.  Be-
cause the States committed not to “thwart” this federal power, “[t]he
consent of a State,” including to suit, “can never be a condition prece-
dent” to Congress’ chosen exercise.  Id., at ___.  Pp. 6–12.

(c) No  contention  to  the  contrary  persuades  the  Court  otherwise. 
The categorical claim that Congress may not exercise its Article I pow-
ers  to  abrogate  state  sovereign  immunity  ignores  the  fact  that  “con-
gressional  abrogation  is  not  the  only  means  of  subjecting  States  to 
suit. . . . States can also be sued if they have consented to suit in the 
plan of the Convention.”  PennEast, 594 U. S., at ___.  Nor is USERRA’s 
text  insufficiently  clear  to  displace  potential  immunity  under  Texas 
law.  USERRA expressly “supersedes any State law . . . that reduces,