Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/22pdf/21-1086_1co6.pdf
Page Number: 106.0

10 

ALLEN v. MILLIGAN 

ALITO, J., dissenting 

A 
  The major theme of this part of the Court’s opinion is that 
Alabama’s  argument,  in  effect,  is  that  “Gingles  must  be 
overruled.”  Ante, at 25.  But as I wrote at the beginning of 
this opinion, I would decide these cases under the Gingles 
framework.  We should recognize, however, that the Gingles 
framework is not the same thing as a statutory provision, 
and it is a mistake to regard it as such.  National Pork Pro-
ducers Council v. Ross, 598 U. S. ___, ___ (2023) (slip op., at 
9) (“[T]he language of an opinion is not always to be parsed 
as  though  we  were  dealing  with  language  of  a  statute” 
(quoting  Reiter  v.  Sonotone  Corp.,  442  U. S.  330,  341 
(1979))).  In applying that framework today, we should keep 
in mind subsequent developments in our case law. 
  One important development has been a sharpening of the 
methodology used in interpreting statutes.  Gingles was de-
cided  at  a  time  when  the  Court’s  statutory  interpretation 
decisions sometimes paid less attention to the actual text of 
the statute than to its legislative history, and Gingles falls 
into  that  category.    The  Court  quoted  §2  but  then  moved 
briskly to the Senate Report.  See 478 U. S., at 36–37, 43, 
and n. 7.  Today, our statutory interpretation decisions fo-
cus squarely on the statutory text.  National Assn. of Mfrs. 
v. Department of Defense, 583 U. S. 109, 127 (2018); Puerto 
Rico  v.  Franklin  Cal.  Tax-Free  Trust,  579  U. S.  115,  125 
(2016); cf. Brnovich, 594 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 14).  And 
as we held in Brnovich, “[t]he key requirement” set out in 
the  text  of  §2  is  that  a  State’s  electoral  process  must  be 
“ ‘equally open’ ” to members of all racial groups.  Id., at ___ 
(slip  op.,  at  15).    The  Gingles  framework  should  be  inter-
preted in a way that gives effect to this standard. 
  Another development that we should not ignore concerns 
our  case  law  on  racial  predominance.    Post-Gingles  deci-
sions like Miller, 515 U. S., at 920, Shaw II, 517 U. S., at 
906–907,  and  Vera,  517  U. S.,  at  979  (plurality  opinion), 
made  it  clear  that  it  is  unconstitutional  to  use  race  as  a