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CLINTON v. CITY OF NEW YORK

Opinion of the Court

more v. Arkansas, 495 U. S. 149, 155 (1990).15 Our disposi-
tion of the ﬁrst challenge to the constitutionality of this Act
demonstrates our recognition of the importance of respect-
ing the constitutional limits on our jurisdiction, even when
Congress has manifested an interest in obtaining our views
as promptly as possible. But these cases differ from Raines,
not only because the President’s exercise of his cancellation
authority has removed any concern about the ripeness of the
dispute, but more importantly because the parties have al-
leged a “personal stake” in having an actual injury redressed
rather than an “institutional injury” that is “abstract and
widely dispersed.”

521 U. S., at 829.

In both the New York and the Snake River cases, the Gov-
ernment argues that the appellees are not actually injured
because the claims are too speculative and, in any event, the
claims are advanced by the wrong parties. We ﬁnd no merit
in the suggestion that New York’s injury is merely specula-
tive because HHS has not yet acted on the State’s waiver
requests. The State now has a multibillion dollar contin-
gent liability that had been eliminated by § 4722(c) of the
Balanced Budget Act of 1997. The District Court correctly
concluded that the State, and the appellees, “suffered an im-
mediate, concrete injury the moment that the President used
the Line Item Veto to cancel section 4722(c) and deprived
985 F. Supp., at 174. The
them of the beneﬁts of that law.”
self-evident signiﬁcance of the contingent liability is con-
ﬁrmed by the fact that New York lobbied Congress for this
relief, that Congress decided that it warranted statutory at-
tention, and that the President selected for cancellation only
this one provision in an Act that occupies 536 pages of the
Statutes at Large. His action was comparable to the judg-
ment of an appellate court setting aside a verdict for the
defendant and remanding for a new trial of a multibillion

15 To meet the standing requirements of Article III, “[a] plaintiff must
allege personal injury fairly traceable to the defendant’s allegedly unlaw-
ful conduct and likely to be redressed by the requested relief.” Allen v.
Wright, 468 U. S. 737, 751 (1984).