Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/21pdf/21-429_8o6a.pdf
Page Number: 43

Cite as:  597 U. S. ____ (2022) 

15 

GORSUCH, J., dissenting 

Congress’s work must be resolved in favor of tribal sover-
eignty and against state power.  See ibid.; see also Cotton 
Petroleum, 490 U. S., at 177.  And, if anything, these rules 
bear special force in the criminal context, which lies at the 
heart of tribal sovereignty and in which Congress “has pro-
vided  a  nearly  comprehensive  set  of  statutes  allocating
criminal  jurisdiction”  among  federal,  tribal,  and  state  au-
thorities.  Cohen 527.3 

B 
From 1834 to 1968, Congress adopted a series of laws gov-
erning criminal jurisdiction on tribal lands.  Those laws are 
many, detailed, and clear.  Each operates against the back-
drop understanding that Tribes are sovereign and that in
our constitutional order only Congress may displace their 
authority.  Nor does anything in Congress’s work begin to
confer on Oklahoma the authority it seeks. 

Start  with  the  GCA,  first  adopted  by  Congress  in  1834 

1 

—————— 

3 In the civil context, Congress has not always provided comprehensive 
rules allocating jurisdiction.  See Cohen 527.  In light of that fact, this 
Court has, in “exception[al]” cases, id., at 524, allowed certain state laws 
to apply on tribal lands without express congressional approval, see, e.g., 
Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Reservation, 447 U. S. 134, 
154–159 (1980).  But even in the civil context this Court has proceeded
against  the  backdrop  of  tribal  sovereignty,  followed  the  presumption
against state authority, sought to abide its own repeated admonitions to
tread cautiously, and generally refused to consider competing state in-
terests.   See,  e.g.,  White  Mountain  Apache  Tribe  v.  Bracker,  448  U. S. 
136, 143–144 (1980); Cohen 520–525.  So, for example, in Confederated 
Tribes, this Court allowed the application of a state civil law only on a 
showing that the State sought to regulate market activities with primar-
ily off-reservation effects and “in which the Tribes ha[d no] significant 
interest.”  447 U. S., at 152.  Meanwhile, in Bracker this Court refused 
to permit a State to apply its civil tax laws on tribal lands even though 
Congress had not expressly prohibited the State from doing so.  448 U. S., 
at 143.