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Page Number: 17

12 

ZIGLAR v. ABBASI 

Opinion of the Court 

ment  suit  against  a  private  prison  operator,  Malesko, 
supra,  at  63;  a  due  process  suit  against  officials  from  the 
Bureau of Land Management, Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U. S. 
537, 547–548, 562 (2007); and an Eighth Amendment suit 
against  prison  guards  at  a  private  prison,  Minneci  v. 
Pollard, 565 U. S. 118, 120 (2012).

When a party seeks to assert an implied cause of action
under the Constitution itself, just as when a party seeks to
assert  an  implied  cause  of  action  under  a  federal  statute, 
separation-of-powers principles are or should be central to 
the analysis.  The question is “who should decide” whether 
to provide for a damages remedy, Congress or the courts? 
Bush, 462 U. S., at 380. 

The answer most often will be Congress.  When an issue 
“ ‘involves  a  host  of  considerations  that  must  be  weighed 
and  appraised,’ ”  it  should  be  committed  to  “ ‘those  who 
write the laws’ ” rather than “ ‘those who interpret them.’ ”  
Ibid.  (quoting  United  States  v.  Gilman,  347  U. S.  507, 
512–513  (1954)).  In  most  instances,  the  Court’s  prece-
dents  now  instruct,  the  Legislature  is  in  the  better  posi-
tion  to  consider  if  “ ‘the  public  interest  would  be  served’ ” 
by imposing a “‘new substantive legal liability.’”  Schweiker, 
supra,  at  426–427  (quoting  Bush,  supra,  at  390).    As  a 
result,  the  Court  has  urged  “caution”  before  “extending 
Bivens remedies into any new context.”  Malesko, supra, at 
74.  The Court’s precedents now make clear that a Bivens 
remedy  will  not  be  available  if  there  are  “ ‘special  factors
counselling hesitation in the absence of affirmative action 
by  Congress.’ ”    Carlson,  446  U. S.,  at  18  (quoting  Bivens, 
403 U. S., at 396).

This  Court  has  not  defined  the  phrase  “special  factors 
counselling  hesitation.”   The  necessary  inference,  though,
is that the inquiry must concentrate on whether the Judi-
ciary is well suited, absent congressional action or instruc-
tion, to consider and weigh the costs and benefits of allow-
ing  a  damages  action  to  proceed.    Thus,  to  be  a  “special