Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/524bv.pdf
Page Number: 514

524US2

Unit: $U93

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Cite as: 524 U. S. 417 (1998)

469

Breyer, J., dissenting

of spending contained in the Balanced Budget Act of 1997,
there is not the slightest doubt that authorization would
have been constitutional. What the Line Item Veto Act
does instead—authorizing the President to “cancel” an item
of spending—is technically different. But the technical dif-
ference does not relate to the technicalities of the Present-
ment Clause, which have been fully complied with; and the
doctrine of unconstitutional delegation, which is at issue
here, is preeminently not a doctrine of technicalities. The
title of the Line Item Veto Act, which was perhaps designed
to simplify for public comprehension, or perhaps merely to
comply with the terms of a campaign pledge, has succeeded
in faking out the Supreme Court. The President’s action it
authorizes in fact is not a line-item veto and thus does not
offend Art. I, § 7; and insofar as the substance of that action
is concerned, it is no different from what Congress has per-
mitted the President to do since the formation of the Union.

IV

I would hold that the President’s cancellation of § 4722(c)
of the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 as an item of direct
spending does not violate the Constitution. Because I ﬁnd
no party before us who has standing to challenge the Presi-
dent’s cancellation of § 968 of the Taxpayer Relief Act of
1997, I do not reach the question whether that violates the
Constitution.

For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent.

Justice Breyer, with whom Justice O(cid:146)Connor and

Justice Scalia join as to Part III, dissenting.

I

I agree with the Court that the parties have standing, but
I do not agree with its ultimate conclusion.
In my view the
Line Item Veto Act (Act) does not violate any speciﬁc textual
constitutional command, nor does it violate any implicit