Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/17pdf/16-1454_5h26.pdf
Page Number: 13.0

Cite as:  585 U. S. ____ (2018) 

9 

Opinion of the Court 

assessment of “market power and market structure . . . to 
assess  the  [restraint]’s  actual  effect”  on  competition. 
Copperweld  Corp.  v.  Independence  Tube  Corp.,  467  U. S. 
752,  768  (1984).    The  goal  is  to  “distinguis[h]  between 
restraints  with  anticompetitive  effect  that  are  harmful  to 
the consumer and restraints stimulating competition that
are  in  the  consumer’s  best  interest.”  Leegin  Creative 
Leather  Products,  Inc.  v.  PSKS,  Inc.,  551  U. S.  877,  886 
(2007).

In  this  case,  both  sides  correctly  acknowledge  that
Amex’s  antisteering  provisions  are  vertical  restraints— 
i.e.,  restraints  “imposed  by  agreement  between  firms  at
different  levels  of  distribution.”    Business  Electronics, 
supra,  at  730.    The  parties  also  correctly  acknowledge
that,  like  nearly  every  other  vertical  restraint,  the  anti-
steering  provisions  should  be  assessed  under  the  rule  of 
reason.  See Leegin, supra, at 882; State Oil, supra, at 19; 
Business Electronics, supra, at 726; Continental T. V., Inc. 
v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U. S. 36, 57 (1977).

To  determine  whether  a  restraint  violates  the  rule  of 
reason,  the  parties  agree  that  a  three-step,  burden-
shifting  framework  applies.  Under  this  framework,  the 
plaintiff  has  the  initial  burden  to  prove  that  the  chal-
lenged  restraint  has  a  substantial  anticompetitive  effect 
that  harms  consumers  in  the  relevant  market.    See  1  J. 
Kalinowski,  Antitrust  Laws  and  Trade  Regulation
§12.02[1]  (2d  ed.  2017)  (Kalinowski);  P.  Areeda  &  H.
Hovenkamp,  Fundamentals  of  Antitrust  Law  §15.02[B] 
(4th  ed.  2017)  (Areeda  &  Hovenkamp);  Capital  Imaging 
Assoc.,  P. C.  v.  Mohawk  Valley  Medical  Associates,  Inc., 
996 F. 2d 537, 543 (CA2 1993).  If the plaintiff carries its
burden, then the burden shifts to the defendant to show a 
procompetitive rationale for the restraint.  See 1 Kalinow-
ski  §12.02[1];  Areeda  &  Hovenkamp  §15.02[B];  Capital 
Imaging  Assoc.,  supra,  at  543.    If  the  defendant  makes 
this  showing,  then  the  burden  shifts  back  to  the  plaintiff