Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/21pdf/21-499_gfbh.pdf
Page Number: 21

Cite as:  597 U. S. ____ (2022) 

1 

KAGAN, J., dissenting 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

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No. 21–499 
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CARLOS VEGA, PETITIONER v. TERENCE B. TEKOH 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT 

[June 23, 2022] 

JUSTICE  KAGAN,  with  whom  JUSTICE  BREYER  and 

JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR join, dissenting. 

The Court’s decision in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 
(1966), affords well-known protections to suspects who are 
interrogated by police while in custody.  Those protections
derive  from  the  Constitution:  Dickerson  v.  United  States 
tells us in no uncertain terms that Miranda is a “constitu-
tional rule.”  530 U. S. 428, 444 (2000).  And that rule grants
a corresponding right: If police fail to provide the Miranda 
warnings to a suspect before interrogating him, then he is 
generally entitled to have any resulting confession excluded
from his trial.  See 384 U. S., at 478–479.  From those facts, 
only one conclusion can follow—that Miranda’s protections 
are a “right[ ]” “secured by the Constitution” under the fed-
eral civil rights statute.  Rev. Stat. §1979, 42 U. S. C. §1983.
Yet the Court today says otherwise.  It holds that Miranda 
is  not  a  constitutional  right  enforceable  through  a  §1983
suit.  And so it prevents individuals from obtaining any re-
dress when police violate their rights under Miranda.  I re-
spectfully dissent. 

Miranda  responded  to  problems  stemming  from  the  in-
terrogation  of  suspects  “incommunicado”  and  “in  a  police-
dominated  atmosphere.”  Miranda,  384  U. S.,  at  445.    In 
such an environment, Miranda said, there are “pressures” 
which may “compel [a suspect] to speak where he would not 
otherwise do so freely.”  Id., at 467.  And so Miranda found