Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/558bv.pdf
Page Number: 247.0

86 

UNION PACIFIC R. CO. v. LOCOMOTIVE ENGINEERS 

Opinion of the Court 

and  in  Clerk  of  Court’s  case  ﬁle).  It  bears  repetition  here 
that neither the Union nor the Carrier, in its submissions to 
the Board, identiﬁed conferencing as a “question in dispute.” 
See supra, at 76. 

It  makes  sense  to  exclude  at  the  arbitration  stage  newly 
presented  “data  .  .  .  in  support  of  [the]  employee[’s]  [griev­
ance],”  29  CFR  § 301.5(d)—evidence  the  carrier  had  no  op­
portunity to consider prearbitration.  A contrary rule would 
sandbag the carrier.  But conferencing is not a fact bearing 
on  the  merits  of  a  grievance.  Indeed,  there  may  be  no  dis­
agreement at all about the occurrence of conferencing, as the 
Union believed to be the case here.  Moreover, the RLA re­
spects  the  right  of  the  parties  to  order  for  themselves  the 
conference procedures they will follow.  See 45 U. S. C. § 152 
Sixth (“[N]othing in this chapter shall be construed to super­
sede the provisions of any agreement (as to conferences) . . . 
in  effect  between  the  parties.”).  In  sum,  neither  the  RLA 
nor Circular One could plausibly be read to require, as a pre­
requisite  to  the  NRAB’s exercise  of  jurisdiction,  submission 
of proof of conferencing. 

*

*

* 

By  refusing  to  adjudicate  cases  on  the  false  premise  that 
it  lacked  power  to  hear  them,  the  NRAB  panel  failed  “to 
conform, or conﬁne itself,” to the jurisdiction Congress gave 
it.  We  therefore  afﬁrm  the  judgment  of  the  Court  of  Ap­
peals for the Seventh Circuit. 

It is so ordered.