Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/529bv.pdf
Page Number: 871

529US3

Unit: $U59

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796

VERMONT AGENCY OF NATURAL RESOURCES v.
UNITED STATES ex rel. STEVENS
Stevens, J., dissenting

gaged in a violation of § 3729. Finally, a “person” is deﬁned
to include “any State or political subdivision of a State.”
§ 3733(l)(4). Hence, the CID provisions clearly state that a
“person” who may be “engaged in any violation of a false
claims law,” including § 3729, includes a “State or a politi-
cal subdivision of a State.” 7 These CID provisions thus
unmistakably express Congress’ understanding that a State
may be a “person” who can violate § 3729.

Elsewhere in the False Claims Act the term “person”
includes States as well. For example, § 3730 of the Act—
both before and after the 1986 amendments—uses the word
“person” twice. First, subsection (a) of § 3730 directs the
Attorney General to investigate violations of § 3729, and
provides that if she “ﬁnds that a person has violated or
is violating” that section, she may bring a civil action
“under this section against the person.”
(Emphases added.)
Second, subsection (b) of § 3730 also uses the word “person,”
though for a different purpose; in that subsection the word
is used to describe the plaintiffs who may bring qui tam
actions on behalf of themselves and the United States.

Quite clearly, a State is a “person” against whom the
Attorney General may proceed under § 3730(a).8 And as
I noted earlier, see supra, at 794, before 1986 States were
considered “persons” who could bring a qui tam action
as a relator under § 3730(b)—and the Court offers nothing
to question that understanding. See ante, at 787, n. 18.
Moreover, when a qui tam relator brings an action on behalf
of the United States, he or she is, in effect, authorized to act
as an assignee of the Federal Government’s claim. See ante,
at 773. Given that understanding, combined with the fact

7 Because this concatenation of deﬁnitions expressly references and in-
corporates § 3729, it is no answer that the deﬁnitions listed in § 3733 apply,
by their terms, “[f]or the purposes of ” § 3733.

8 Justice Ginsburg, who joins in the Court’s judgment, is careful to
point out that the Court does not disagree with this reading of § 3730(a).
Ante, at 789.