Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/529bv.pdf
Page Number: 494.0

529US2

Unit: $U46

[10-07-01 17:18:24] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 529 U. S. 362 (2000)

419

Opinion of Rehnquist, C. J.

In Strickland, we said that both the performance and prej-
udice components of the ineffectiveness inquiry are mixed
questions of law and fact. 466 U. S., at 698.
It is with this
kind of a question that the “unreasonable application of ”
clause takes on meaning. While the determination of “prej-
udice” in the legal sense may be a question of law, the subsid-
iary inquiries are heavily factbound.

Here, there was strong evidence that petitioner would con-
It
tinue to be a danger to society, both in and out of prison.
was not, therefore, unreasonable for the Virginia Supreme
Court to decide that a jury would not have been swayed by
evidence demonstrating that petitioner had a terrible child-
hood and a low IQ. See ante, at 395–396. The potential
mitigating evidence that may have countered the ﬁnding that
petitioner was a future danger was testimony that petitioner
was not dangerous while in detention. See ante, at 396.
But, again, it is not unreasonable to assume that the jury
would have viewed this mitigation as unconvincing upon
hearing that petitioner set ﬁre to his cell while awaiting trial
for the murder at hand and has repeated visions of harming
other inmates.

Accordingly, I would hold that habeas relief is barred by

28 U. S. C. § 2254(d) (1994 ed., Supp. III).