Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/13pdf/12-536_e1pf.pdf
Page Number: 32

26 

MCCUTCHEON v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N 

Opinion of ROBERTS, C. J. 

the  donor’s  point  of  view,  it  strikes  us  as  far  more  likely 
that he will want to see his full $500,000 spent on behalf 
of  his  favored  candidate—even  if  it  must  be  spent  inde-
pendently—rather than see it diluted to a small fraction so
that it can be contributed directly by someone else.9 

Another  circumvention  example  is  the  one  that  appar-
ently motivated the District Court.  As the District Court 
crafted  the  example,  a  donor  gives  a  $500,000  check  to 
a  joint  fundraising  committee  composed  of  a  candidate,  a 
national  party  committee,  and  “most  of  the  party’s  state
party  committees”  (actually,  47  of  the  50).    893  F. Supp. 
2d,  at  140.  The  committees  divide  up  the  money  so  that
each  one  receives  the  maximum  contribution  permissible 
under the base limits, but then each transfers its allocated 
portion  to  the  same  single  committee.  That  committee 
uses the money for coordinated expenditures on behalf of a
particular  candidate.  If  that  scenario  “seem[s]  unlikely,” 
the District Court thought so, too.  Ibid.  But because the 
District Court could “imagine” that chain of events, it held 
that the example substantiated the Government’s circum-
vention concerns.  Ibid. 

One problem, however, is that the District Court’s spec-
ulation  relies  on  illegal  earmarking.    Lest  there  be  any 
confusion, a joint fundraising committee is simply a mech-
anism for individual committees to raise funds collectively,
not to circumvent base limits or earmarking rules.  See 11 
—————— 

9 The Justice Department agrees.  As Acting Assistant Attorney Gen-
eral  Mythili  Raman  recently  testified  before  Congress:  “We  anticipate
seeing  fewer  cases  of  conduit  contributions  directly  to  campaign  com-
mittees  or  parties,  because  individuals  or  corporations  who  wish  to
influence  elections  or  officials  will  no  longer  need  to  attempt  to  do  so
through conduit contribution schemes that can be criminally prosecut-
ed.  Instead, they are likely to simply make unlimited contributions to
Super  PACs  or  501(c)s.”    Hearing  on  Current  Issues  in  Campaign
Finance  Law  Enforcement  before  the  Subcommittee  on  Crime  and 
Terrorism of the Senate  Committee on the Judiciary, 113th Cong., 1st 
Sess., 3 (2013).