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Page Number: 13.0

8 

WHOLE WOMAN’S HEALTH v. JACKSON 

Opinion of the Court 

he  disregards  Ex parte  Young’s  express  teaching  against 
enjoining the “machinery” of courts.  209 U. S., at 163. 
  JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR seems to admit at least part of the 
problem.  She concedes that older “wooden” authorities like 
Ex parte Young appear to prohibit suits against state-court 
clerks.    Post,  at  7.    Still,  she  insists,  we  should  disregard 
those  cases  in favor  of more  “modern”  case law.   Ibid.   In 
places, THE CHIEF JUSTICE’s opinion seems to pursue much 
the same line of argument.  See post, at 4.  But even over-
looking  all  the  other  problems  attending  our  colleagues’ 
“clerks-only” theory, the authorities they cite do not begin 
to do the work attributed to them. 
  Most prominently, our colleagues point to Pulliam.  But 
that case had nothing to do with state-court clerks, injunc-
tions against them, or the doctrine of sovereign immunity.  
Instead, the Court faced only the question whether the suit 
before it could proceed against a judge consistent with the 
distinct  doctrine  of  judicial  immunity.    466  U. S.,  at  541–
543.  As well, the plaintiff sought an injunction only to pre-
vent  the  judge  from  enforcing  a  rule  of  her  own  creation.  
Id.,  at  526.   No one  asked  the  Court  to  prevent  the  judge 
from  processing  the  case  consistent  with  state  statutory 
law, let alone undo Ex parte Young’s teaching that federal 
courts lack such power under traditional equitable princi-
ples.  Tellingly, our colleagues do not read Pulliam to au-
thorize claims against state-court judges in this case.  And 
given that, it is a mystery how they might invoke the case 
as authority for claims against (only) state-court clerks, of-
ficials Pulliam never discussed. 
  If  anything,  the  remainder  of  our  colleagues’  cases  are 
even further afield.  Mitchum v. Foster did not involve state-
court clerks, but a judge, prosecutor, and sheriff.  See 315 
F. Supp. 1387, 1388 (ND Fla. 1970) (per curiam).  When it 
came  to  these  individuals,  the  Court  held  only  that  the 
Anti-Injunction Act did not bar suit against them.  407 U. S. 
225, 242–243 (1972).  Once more, the Court did not purport