Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/22pdf/22-138_43j7.pdf
Page Number: 43

Cite as:  600 U. S. ____ (2023) 

1 

BARRETT, J., dissenting 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

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No. 22–138 
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BILLY RAYMOND COUNTERMAN, PETITIONER v. 
COLORADO 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS OF 
COLORADO 

[June 27, 2023] 

JUSTICE  BARRETT,  with  whom  JUSTICE  THOMAS  joins,

dissenting. 

Billy  Counterman  was  convicted  under  a  Colorado  law 
that prohibits true threats.  As everyone agrees, the statute 
requires  that  the  speaker  understand  the  meaning  of  his 
words.  Ante, at 4, n. 1.  The question is what more the First 
Amendment requires.  Colorado maintains that an objective
standard  is  enough—that  is,  the  government  must  show 
that a reasonable person would regard the statement as a 
threat of violence.  Counterman, however, argues that the
First  Amendment  requires  a  subjective  test—that  is,  the 
speaker himself must intend or know the threatening na-
ture of the statement. 

It should be easy to choose between these positions.  True 
threats  do  not  enjoy  First  Amendment  protection,  and
nearly every other category of unprotected speech may be 
restricted  using  an  objective  standard.    Nonetheless,  the 
Court  adopts  a  subjective  standard,  though  not  quite  the 
one advanced by Counterman.  The Court holds that speak-
ers  must  recklessly  disregard  the  threatening  nature  of 
their speech to lose constitutional protection.  Because this 
unjustifiably grants true threats preferential treatment, I 
respectfully dissent.