Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/558bv.pdf
Page Number: 586.0

Cite as: 558 U. S. 310 (2010) 

425 

Opinion of Stevens, J. 

majority’s  view,  I  suppose  it  may  be  a  First  Amendment 
problem  that  corporations  are  not  permitted  to  vote,  given 
that voting is, among other things, a form of speech.52 

In  short,  the  Court  dramatically  overstates  its  critique  of 
identity-based  distinctions,  without  ever  explaining  why 
corporate  identity  demands  the  same  treatment  as  individ­
ual  identity.  Only  the  most  wooden  approach  to  the  First 
Amendment could  justify the unprecedented  line it  seeks to 
draw. 

Our First Amendment Tradition 

A third fulcrum of the Court’s opinion is the idea that Aus­
tin and McConnell are radical outliers, “aberration[s],” in our 
First  Amendment  tradition.  Ante,  at  355;  see  also  ante,  at 
361,  372  (professing  ﬁdelity  to  “our  law  and  our  tradition”). 
The  Court  has  it  exactly  backwards.  It  is  today’s  holding 
that  is  the  radical  departure  from  what  had  been  settled 
First  Amendment  law.  To  see  why,  it  is  useful  to  take  a 
long view. 

1.  Original Understandings 

Let us start from the beginning.  The Court invokes “an­
cient  First  Amendment  principles,”  ante,  at  319  (internal 
quotation marks omitted), and original understandings, ante, 
at 353–354, to defend today’s ruling, yet it makes only a per­
functory  attempt  to  ground  its  analysis  in  the  principles  or 

poration might be analogized to a foreign power in this respect, “inasmuch 
as  its  legal  loyalties  necessarily  exclude  patriotism.”  Teachout  393, 
n. 245. 

52 See  A.  Bickel,  The  Supreme  Court  and  the  Idea  of  Progress  59–60 
(1978);  A.  Meiklejohn,  Political  Freedom:  The  Constitutional  Powers  of 
the  People  39–40  (1965);  Tokaji,  First  Amendment  Equal  Protection:  On 
Discretion,  Inequality,  and  Participation,  101  Mich.  L.  Rev.  2409,  2508– 
2509  (2003).  Of  course,  voting  is  not  speech  in  a  pure  or  formal  sense, 
but  then  again  neither  is  a  campaign  expenditure;  both  are  nevertheless 
communicative acts aimed at inﬂuencing electoral outcomes.  Cf. Strauss, 
Corruption,  Equality,  and  Campaign  Finance  Reform,  94  Colum.  L.  Rev. 
1369, 1383–1384 (1994) (hereinafter Strauss).