Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/19pdf/17-1498_8mjp.pdf
Page Number: 42

Cite as:  590 U. S. ____ (2020) 

7 

Opinion of GORSUCH, J. 

party’s  pollutants  involuntarily,  it  would  invite  weighty 
takings  arguments  under  the  Fifth  Amendment.  See 
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U. S. 
419, 421 (1982).  And if the statute really did grant the fed-
eral government the power to regulate virtually each shov-
elful of dirt homeowners may dig on their own properties, it 
would sorely test the reaches of Congress’s power under the
Commerce Clause.  See National Federation of Independent 
Business v. Sebelius, 567 U. S. 519, 551–553 (2012). 

Atlantic  Richfield’s  replies  do  nothing  to  address  these 
problems.  Instead of making some helpful textual or con-
textual  rejoinder  about  §122,  the  company  asks  us  look 
somewhere else entirely.  Now, Atlantic Richfield says, we 
should  direct  our  attention  to  §107,  a  provision  that  lists
four classes of “[c]overed persons” the federal government 
is authorized to sue under CERCLA.  One of these classes 
encompasses any person who owns a “facility” where haz-
ardous waste has “come to be located.”  §§9607, 9601(9).  Be-
cause  the  landowners’  properties  qualify  as  “facilit[ies]”
where  Atlantic  Richfield’s  waste  has  come  to  be  located, 
everyone admits the landowners themselves are “[c]overed 
persons.”  And, according to Atlantic Richfield, this neces-
sarily  means  they  are  also  “potentially  responsible 
part[ies]” subject to §122(e)(6)’s requirement that they seek 
federal permission before proceeding with any cleanup. 

But notice the linguistic contortion and logical leap.  Lin-
guistically, §107 identifies the “[c]overed persons” the gov-
ernment is authorized to sue.  Section 122 requires a “po-
tentially  responsible  party”  seeking  settlement  with  and
discharge of liability from the federal government to obtain 
its permission before engaging in a cleanup.  The terms use 
different  language,  appear  in  different  statutory  sections, 
and address different matters.  Nor are these two sections 
the only ones like them.  CERCLA differentiates between 
covered  persons  and  potentially  responsible  parties  in
many places:  Some sections apply to all persons covered by