Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/558bv.pdf
Page Number: 623

462  CITIZENS  UNITED  v.  FEDERAL  ELECTION  COMM’N 

Opinion of Stevens, J. 

See  League  of  United  Latin  American  Citizens  v.  Perry, 
548 U. S. 399, 447 (2006) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting  in  part);  Vieth  v.  Jubelirer,  541  U. S.  267,  317 
(2004)  (Stevens,  J.,  dissenting).  Along  with  our  duty  to 
balance  competing  constitutional  concerns,  we  have  a  vital 
role  to  play  in  ensuring  that  elections  remain  at  least  mini­
mally  open,  fair,  and  competitive.  But  it  is  the  height  of 
recklessness to dismiss Congress’ years of bipartisan deliber­
ation  and  its  reasoned  judgment  on  this  basis,  without  ﬁrst 
conﬁrming  that  the  statute  in  question  was  intended  to  be, 
or  will  function  as,  a  restraint  on  electoral  competition. 
“Absent  record  evidence  of  invidious  discrimination  against 
challengers as a class, a court should generally be hesitant to 
invalidate  legislation  which  on  its  face  imposes  evenhanded 
restrictions.”  Buckley, 424 U. S., at 31. 

We  have  no  record  evidence  from  which  to  conclude  that 
BCRA § 203, or any of the dozens of state laws that the Court 
today  calls  into  question,  reﬂects  or  fosters  such  invidious 
discrimination.  Our  colleagues  have  opined  that  “ ‘any  re­
striction  upon  a  type  of  campaign  speech  that  is  equally 
available  to  challengers  and  incumbents  tends  to  favor  in­
cumbents. ’ ”  McConnell,  540  U. S.,  at  249  (opinion  of 
Scalia,  J.).  This  kind  of  airy  speculation  could  easily  be 
turned  on  its  head.  The  electioneering  prohibited  by  § 203 
might  well  tend  to  favor  incumbents,  because  incumbents 
have pre-existing relationships with corporations and unions, 
and groups that wish to procure legislative beneﬁts may tend 
to  support the  candidate  who, as  a  sitting  ofﬁceholder, is  al­
ready  in  a  position  to  dispense  beneﬁts  and  is  statistically 
likely  to  retain  ofﬁce.  If  a  corporation’s  goal  is  to  induce 
ofﬁceholders to do its bidding, the corporation would do well 
to cultivate stable, long-term relationships of dependency. 

So we do not have a solid theoretical basis for condemning 
§ 203  as  a  front  for  incumbent  self-protection,  and  it  seems 
equally  if  not  more  plausible  that  restrictions  on  corporate 
electioneering will be self-denying.  Nor do we have a good