Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/13pdf/12-536_e1pf.pdf
Page Number: 27

Cite as:  572 U. S. ____ (2014) 

21 

Opinion of ROBERTS, C. J. 

limits  remain  the  primary  means  of  regulating  campaign 
contributions—the obvious explanation for why the aggre-
gate  limits  received  a  scant  few  sentences  of  attention  in 
Buckley.7 

B 
“When  the  Government  restricts  speech,  the  Govern-
ment  bears  the  burden  of  proving  the  constitutionality 
of  its  actions.”  United  States  v.  Playboy  Entertainment 
Group,  Inc.,  529  U. S.,  at  816.    Here,  the  Government 
seeks  to  carry  that  burden  by  arguing  that  the  aggregate 
limits further the permissible objective of preventing quid 
pro quo corruption. 

The  difficulty  is  that  once  the  aggregate  limits  kick  in, 
they ban all contributions of any amount.  But Congress’s
selection  of  a  $5,200  base  limit  indicates  its  belief  that 
contributions  of  that  amount  or  less  do  not  create  a  cog-
nizable  risk  of  corruption.    If  there  is  no  corruption  con-
cern  in  giving  nine  candidates  up  to  $5,200  each,  it  is
difficult  to  understand  how  a  tenth  candidate  can  be  re-
garded  as  corruptible  if  given  $1,801,  and  all  others  cor-

—————— 

at  31–38  (appendix  A  to  opinion  of  BREYER,  J.)  (excerpts  from 
McConnell  record  discussing  unregulated  “soft  money”).    Our  holding
about  the  constitutionality  of  the  aggregate  limits  clearly  does  not 
overrule McConnell’s holding about “soft money.” 

7 It would be especially odd to regard aggregate limits as essential to
enforce  base  limits  when  state  campaign  finance  schemes  typically 
include base limits but not aggregate limits.  Just eight of the 38 States
that  have  imposed  base  limits  on  contributions  from  individuals  to 
candidates  have  also  imposed  aggregate  limits  (excluding  restrictions 
on a specific subset of donors).  See Conn. Gen. Stat. §9–611(c) (2013); 
Me.  Rev.  Stat.  Ann.,  Tit.  21–A,  §1015(3)  (Supp.  2013);  Md.  Elec.  Law
Code  Ann.  §13–226(b)  (Lexis  Supp.  2013);  Mass.  Gen.  Laws,  ch.  55, 
§7A(a)(5)  (West  2012);  N. Y.  Elec.  Law  Ann.  §14–114(8)  (West  Supp. 
2013);  R. I.  Gen.  Laws  §17–25–10.1(a)(1)  (Lexis  2013);  Wis.  Stat. 
§11.26(4)  (2007–2008);  Wyo.  Stat.  Ann.  §22–25–102(c)(ii)  (2013).    The 
Government presents no evidence concerning the circumvention of base
limits from the 30 States with base limits but no aggregate limits.