Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/13pdf/12-536_e1pf.pdf
Page Number: 19.0

Cite as:  572 U. S. ____ (2014) 

13 

Opinion of ROBERTS, C. J. 

particular  candidate  may  not  also  contribute  to  a  single-
candidate committee for that candidate.  §110.1(h)(1).  Nor 
may an individual who has contributed to a candidate also 
contribute  to  a  political  committee  that  has  supported  or
anticipates  supporting  the  same  candidate,  if  the  individ-
ual knows that “a substantial portion [of his contribution] 
will  be  contributed  to,  or  expended  on  behalf  of,”  that 
candidate.  §110.1(h)(2).

In  addition  to  accounting  for  statutory  and  regulatory
changes  in  the  campaign  finance  arena,  appellants’  chal-
lenge raises distinct legal arguments that Buckley did not 
consider.  For example, presumably because of its cursory 
treatment of the $25,000 aggregate limit, Buckley did not 
separately address an overbreadth challenge with respect 
to  that  provision.  The  Court  rejected  such  a  challenge  to 
the base limits because of the difficulty of isolating suspect
contributions.  The  propriety  of  large  contributions  to  in- 
dividual  candidates  turned  on  the  subjective  intent  of 
donors, and the Court concluded that there was no way to
tell  which  donors  sought  improper  influence  over  legisla-
tors’ actions.  See 424 U. S., at 30.  The aggregate limit, on
the  other  hand,  was  upheld  as  an  anticircumvention
measure,  without  considering  whether  it  was  possible  to
discern  which  donations  might  be  used  to  circumvent  the 
base  limits.   See  id.,  at  38.  The  Court  never  addressed 
overbreadth  in  the  specific  context  of  aggregate  limits, 
where such an argument has far more force.

Given the foregoing, this case cannot be resolved merely
by  pointing  to  three  sentences  in  Buckley  that  were  writ-
ten without the benefit of full briefing or argument on the 
issue.  See Toucey v. New York Life Ins. Co., 314 U. S. 118, 
139–140  (1941)  (departing  from  “[l]oose  language  and  a 
sporadic,  ill-considered  decision”  when  asked  to  resolve 
a  question  “with  our  eyes  wide  open  and  in  the  light  of
full consideration”); Hohn v. United States, 524 U. S. 236, 
251  (1998)  (departing  from  a  prior  decision  where  it