Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/19pdf/18-1116_h3cj.pdf
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INTEL CORP. INVESTMENT POLICY COMM. v. SULYMA 

Syllabus 

“actual knowledge,” its meaning is plain.  Dictionaries confirm that, to 
have “actual knowledge” of a piece of information, one must in fact be
aware of it.  Legal dictionaries give “actual knowledge” the same mean-
ing.  The  law  will  sometimes  impute  knowledge—often  called  “con-
structive” knowledge—to a person who fails to learn something that a
reasonably diligent person would have learned.  The addition of “ac-
tual” in §1113(2) signals that the plaintiff’s knowledge must be more
than hypothetical.  Congress has repeatedly drawn the same “linguis-
tic distinction,” Merck & Co. v. Reynolds, 559 U. S. 633, 647, elsewhere 
in ERISA.  When Congress has included both actual and constructive 
knowledge in ERISA limitations provisions, Congress has done so ex-
plicitly.  But Congress has never added to §1113(2) the language it has
used in those other provisions to encompass both forms of knowledge.
Pp. 5–8.

(b) Petitioners’  arguments  for  a  broader  reading  of  §1113(2)  based 
on  text,  context,  purpose,  and  statutory  history  all  founder  on  Con-
gress’s choice of the word “actual.”  Petitioners may well be correct that 
heeding  the  plain  meaning  of  §1113(2)  substantially  diminishes  the
protection that it provides for ERISA fiduciaries.  But if policy consid-
erations suggest that the current scheme should be altered, Congress
must be the one to do it.  Pp. 8–11.
(c) This opinion does not foreclose any of the “usual ways” to prove ac-
tual knowledge at any stage in the litigation.  Farmer v. Brennan, 511 
U. S. 825, 842.  Plaintiffs who recall reading particular disclosures will
be bound by oath to say so in their depositions.  Actual knowledge can
also be proved through “inference from circumstantial evidence.”  Ibid. 
And this opinion does not preclude defendants from contending that
evidence  of  “willful  blindness”  supports  a  finding  of  “actual 
knowledge.”  Cf. Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S. A., 563 U. S. 
754, 769.  Pp. 11–12. 

909 F. 3d 1069, affirmed. 

ALITO, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.