Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/12pdf/11-556_11o2.pdf
Page Number: 9.0

6 

VANCE v. BALL STATE UNIV. 

Opinion of the Court 

tor, supra, at 72; Ellerth, supra, at 755. 

Under  the  Restatement,  “masters”  are  generally  not 
liable  for  the  torts  of  their  “servants”  when  the  torts  are 
committed outside the scope of the servants’ employment. 
See  1  Restatement  (Second)  of  Agency  §219(2),  p.  481 
(1957)  (Restatement).    And  because  racial  and  sexual 
harassment are unlikely to fall within the scope of a serv­
ant’s  duties,  application  of  this  rule  would  generally  pre­
clude  employer  liability  for  employee  harassment.    See 
Faragher,  supra,  at  793–796;  Ellerth,  supra,  at  757.    But 
in  Ellerth  and  Faragher,  we  held  that  a  provision  of  the 
Restatement provided the basis for an exception.  Section 
219(2)(d)  of  that  Restatement  recognizes  an  exception  to 
the  general  rule  just  noted  for  situations  in  which  the 
servant was “aided in accomplishing the tort by the exist­
ence  of  the  agency  relation.”2    Restatement  481;  see  Far-
agher,  supra, at 802–803; Ellerth, supra, at 760–763. 

Adapting  this  concept  to  the  Title  VII  context,  Ellerth 

and Faragher identified two situations in which the aided­
in-the-accomplishment  rule  warrants  employer  liability 
even in the absence of negligence, and both of these situa­
tions involve harassment by a “supervisor” as opposed to a 
co-worker.  First, the Court held that an employer is vicar­
iously  liable  “when  a  supervisor  takes  a  tangible  employ­
ment  action,”  Ellerth,  supra,  at  762;  Faragher,  supra,  at 
790—i.e., “a significant change in employment status, such 
as  hiring,  firing,  failing  to  promote,  reassignment  with 

—————— 

2 The  Restatement  (Third)  of  Agency  disposed  of  this  exception  to
liability,  explaining  that  “[t]he  purposes  likely  intended  to  be  met  by
the ‘aided in accomplishing’ basis are satisfied by a more fully elaborat­
ed treatment of apparent authority and by the duty of reasonable care
that  a  principal  owes  to  third  parties  with  whom  it  interacts  through 
employees  and  other  agents.”    2  Restatement  (Third)  §7.08,  p.  228 
(2005).    The  parties  do  not  argue  that  this  change  undermines  our
holdings in Faragher and Ellerth.