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Cite as: 524 U. S. 742 (1998)

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Opinion of the Court

In Meritor, we acknowledged this consensus. See 477 U. S.,
at 70–71 (“[T]he courts have consistently held employers
liable for the discriminatory discharges of employees by su-
pervisory personnel, whether or not the employer knew, or
should have known, or approved of the supervisor’s actions”).
Although few courts have elaborated how agency principles
support this rule, we think it reﬂects a correct application of
the aided in the agency relation standard.

In the context of this case, a tangible employment action
would have taken the form of a denial of a raise or a promo-
tion. The concept of a tangible employment action appears
in numerous cases in the Courts of Appeals discussing claims
involving race, age, and national origin discrimination, as
well as sex discrimination. Without endorsing the speciﬁc
results of those decisions, we think it prudent to import the
concept of a tangible employment action for resolution of the
vicarious liability issue we consider here. A tangible em-
ployment action constitutes a signiﬁcant change in employ-
ment status, such as hiring, ﬁring, failing to promote, re-
assignment with signiﬁcantly different responsibilities, or a
decision causing a signiﬁcant change in beneﬁts. Compare
Crady v. Liberty Nat. Bank & Trust Co. of Ind., 993 F. 2d
132, 136 (CA7 1993) (“A materially adverse change might be
indicated by a termination of employment, a demotion evi-
denced by a decrease in wage or salary, a less distinguished
title, a material loss of beneﬁts, signiﬁcantly diminished ma-
terial responsibilities, or other indices that might be unique
to a particular situation”), with Flaherty v. Gas Research
Institute, 31 F. 3d 451, 456 (CA7 1994) (a “bruised ego” is not
enough), Kocsis v. Multi-Care Management, Inc., 97 F. 3d
876, 887 (CA6 1996) (demotion without change in pay, bene-
ﬁts, duties, or prestige insufﬁcient), and Harlston v. McDon-
nell Douglas Corp., 37 F. 3d 379, 382 (CA8 1994) (reassign-
ment to more inconvenient job insufﬁcient).

When a supervisor makes a tangible employment decision,
there is assurance the injury could not have been inﬂicted