Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/19pdf/18-1323_c07d.pdf
Page Number: 79

18 

JUNE MEDICAL SERVICES L. L. C. v. RUSSO 

THOMAS, J., dissenting 

Court has doggedly adhered to [its core holding] again and 
again, often to disastrous ends.”  Gamble v. United States, 
587 U. S. ___, ___ (2019) (THOMAS, J., concurring) (slip op., 
at 16).  In doing so, the Court has repeatedly invoked stare 
decisis.  See, e.g., Casey, 505 U. S., at 854–869.  And today, 
a majority of the Court insists that this doctrine compels its 
result.  See  ante,  at  40  (plurality  opinion);  ante,  at  2,  11 
(opinion of ROBERTS, C. J.).

The  Court’s  current  “formulation  of  the  stare  decisis 
standard does not comport with our judicial duty under Ar-
ticle III,” which requires us to faithfully interpret the Con-
stitution.  Gamble,  587  U. S.,  at  ___  (THOMAS,  J.,  concur-
ring)  (slip  op.,  at  2).  Rather,  when  our  prior  decisions
clearly conflict with the text of the Constitution, we are re-
quired to “privilege [the] text over our own precedents.”  Id., 
at  ___  (slip  op.,  at  10).   Because  Roe  and  its  progeny  are
premised  on  a  “demonstrably  erroneous  interpretation  of 
the  Constitution,”  we  should  not  apply  them  here.  587 
U. S., at ___ (THOMAS, J., concurring) (slip op., at 10). 

Even under THE CHIEF JUSTICE’s approach to stare deci-
sis, continued adherence to these precedents cannot be jus-
tified.  Stare decisis is “not an inexorable command,” ante, 
at 3 (internal quotation marks omitted), and this Court has
recently overruled a number of poorly reasoned precedents 
that have proved themselves to be unworkable, see Knick v. 
Township of Scott, 588 U. S. ___, ___–___ (2019) (ROBERTS, 
C. J., for the Court) (slip op., at 20–23); Franchise Tax Bd. 
of Cal. v. Hyatt, 587 U. S. ___, ___–___ (2019) (slip op., at 
16–17); Janus v. State, County, and Municipal Employees, 
585 U. S. ___, ___–___ (2018) (slip op., at 33–47).  As I have 
already demonstrated, supra, at 14–17, Roe’s reasoning is
utterly  deficient—in  fact,  not  a  single  Justice  today  at-
tempts to defend it.  

Moreover, the fact that no five Justices can agree on the
proper interpretation of our precedents today evinces that