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Page Number: 13

10 

UZUEGBUNAM v. PRECZEWSKI 

Opinion of the Court 

he may demand payment for millions of dollars in compen-
satory damages.”  Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U. S. 103, 111, 113 
(1992).  Because nominal damages are in fact damages paid 
to the plaintiff, they “affec[t] the behavior of the defendant
towards the plaintiff ” and thus independently provide re-
dress.  Hewitt v. Helms, 482 U. S. 755, 761 (1987) (emphasis 
deleted);  accord,  Mission  Product  Holdings,  Inc.  v.  Temp-
nology,  LLC,  587  U. S.  ___,  ___  (2019)  (slip  op.,  at  6)  (“If
there is any chance of money changing hands, [the] suit re-
mains live”).  True, a single dollar often cannot provide full
redress, but the ability “to effectuate a partial remedy” sat-
isfies the redressability requirement. Church of Scientology 
of Cal. v. United States, 506 U. S. 9, 13 (1992).

The next difficulty faced by respondents and the dissent
is their inability to square their argument with established 
principles of standing.  Because redressability is an “ ‘irre-
ducible’ ” component of standing, Spokeo, 578 U. S., at 338, 
no federal court has jurisdiction to enter a judgment unless
it provides a remedy that can redress the plaintiff ’s injury.
Yet early courts routinely awarded nominal damages alone. 
Certainly, no one seems to think that those judgments were
without  legal  effect.    Those  nominal  damages  necessarily 
must have provided redress.  Respondents contend that a
request  for  compensatory  damages  at  the  pleading  stage 
was  what  provided  the  basis  for  nominal  damages  at  the
judgment stage.  But a plaintiff must maintain a personal
interest in the dispute at every stage of litigation, including 
when judgment is entered, Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 
504  U. S.  555,  561  (1992),  and  must  do  so  “separately  for 
each  form  of  relief  sought,”  Friends  of  the  Earth,  Inc.  v. 
Laidlaw Environmental Services (TOC), Inc., 528 U. S. 167, 
185  (2000).    As  soon  as  a  plea  for  compensatory  damages
fails at the factfinding stage of litigation, that plea can no
longer support jurisdiction for a favorable judgment.  The 
dissent’s contrary assertion is unaccompanied by any cita-
tion.