Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/22pdf/21-869_87ad.pdf
Page Number: 37

Cite as:  598 U. S. ____ (2023) 

31 

Opinion of the Court 

rejected the idea “that any secondary work that adds a new 
aesthetic or new expression to its source material is neces-
sarily  transformative.”  11  F. 4th,  at  38–39.    It  also  ap-
peared correctly to accept that meaning or message is rele-
vant to, but not dispositive of, purpose.  See id., at 41 (“[T]he 
secondary work itself must reasonably be perceived as em-
bodying a distinct artistic purpose, one that conveys a new 
meaning  or  message  separate  from  its  source  material”); 
id., at 42 (“[T]he judge must examine whether the second-
ary work’s use of its source material is in service of a fun-
damentally different and new artistic purpose and charac-
ter, [which] must, at a bare minimum, comprise something 
more than the imposition of another artist’s style on the pri-
mary work . . . ” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

Elsewhere,  however,  the  Court  of  Appeals  stated  that
“the district judge should not assume the role of art critic
and seek to ascertain the intent behind or meaning of the
works  at  issue.”    Id.,  at  41.  That  statement  is  correct  in 
part.    A  court  should  not  attempt  to  evaluate  the  artistic
significance  of  a  particular  work.   See  Bleistein  v.  Don-
aldson  Lithographing  Co.,  188  U. S.  239,  251  (1903) 
(Holmes, J.) (“It would be a dangerous undertaking for per-
sons trained only to the law to constitute themselves final 
judges of the worth of [a work], outside of the narrowest and 
most  obvious  limits”).19    Nor  does  the  subjective  intent  of 

—————— 

19 The dissent demonstrates the danger of this approach.  On its view, 
the  first  fair  use  factor  favors  AWF’s  use  of  Goldsmith’s  photograph 
simply because Warhol created worthy art.  Goldsmith’s original work, 
by contrast, is just an “old photo,” one of Warhol’s “templates.”  Post, at 
2, 17 (opinion of KAGAN, J.).  In other words, the dissent (much like the 
District Court) treats the first factor as determined by a single fact: “It’s 
a Warhol.”  This Court agrees with the Court of Appeals that such logic
would create a kind of privilege that has no basis in copyright law.  See 
11 F. 4th, at 43.  Again, the Court does not deny that Warhol was a major
figure in American art.  But it leaves the worth of his works to the critics. 
Compare,  e.g.,  D.  Antin,  Warhol:  The  Silver  Tenement,  in  Pop  Art:  A