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Cite as: 524 U. S. 274 (1998)

285

Opinion of the Court

at 77–78 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment). We sug-
gested as much in Franklin, where we recognized “the gen-
eral rule that all appropriate relief is available in an action
brought to vindicate a federal right,” but indicated that the
rule must be reconciled with congressional purpose.
503
U. S., at 68. The “general rule,” that is, “yields where nec-
essary to carry out the intent of Congress or to avoid frus-
trating the purposes of the statute involved.” Guardians
Assn. v. Civil Serv. Comm’n of New York City, 463 U. S. 582,
595 (1983) (opinion of White, J.); cf., Cannon, 441 U. S, at 703
(“[A] private remedy should not be implied if it would frus-
trate the underlying purpose of the legislative scheme”).

Applying those principles here, we conclude that it would
“frustrate the purposes” of Title IX to permit a damages
recovery against a school district for a teacher’s sexual har-
assment of a student based on principles of respondeat supe-
rior or constructive notice, i. e., without actual notice to a
school district ofﬁcial. Because Congress did not expressly
create a private right of action under Title IX, the statutory
text does not shed light on Congress’ intent with respect to
the scope of available remedies. Franklin, 503 U. S., at 71;
id., at 76 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment).
Instead, “we
attempt to infer how the [1972] Congress would have ad-
dressed the issue had the . . . action been included as an
express provision in the” statute. Central Bank of Denver,
N. A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N. A., 511 U. S. 164,
178 (1994) (internal quotation marks omitted); see Musick,
Peeler, supra, at 294–295; North Haven Bd. of Ed. v. Bell,
456 U. S. 512, 529 (1982).

As a general matter, it does not appear that Congress con-
templated unlimited recovery in damages against a funding
recipient where the recipient is unaware of discrimination in
its programs. When Title IX was enacted in 1972, the prin-
cipal civil rights statutes containing an express right of ac-
tion did not provide for recovery of monetary damages at all,
instead allowing only injunctive and equitable relief. See 42