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8 

OHIO v. AMERICAN EXPRESS CO. 

Opinion of the Court 

merchant  side  of  the  market,  the  District  Court  found 
that  Amex’s  antisteering  provisions  are  anticompetitive 
because  they  result  in  higher  merchant  fees.  See  id.,  at 
195–224. 

The  Court  of  Appeals  for  the  Second  Circuit  reversed. 
United States v. American Express Co., 838 F. 3d 179, 184 
(2016).  It  concluded  that  the  credit-card  market  is  one 
market,  not  two.    Id., at  196–200.    Evaluating  the  credit-
card market as a whole, the Second Circuit concluded that 
Amex’s  antisteering  provisions  were  not  anticompetitive 
and did not violate §1.  See id., at 200–206. 

We  granted  certiorari,  583  U. S.  ___  (2017),  and  now 

affirm. 

II 
Section 1 of the Sherman Act prohibits “[e]very contract,
combination  in  the  form  of  trust  or  otherwise,  or  conspir- 
acy,  in  restraint  of  trade  or  commerce  among  the  several
States.”  15  U. S. C.  §1.    This  Court  has  long  recognized
that,  “[i]n  view  of  the  common  law  and  the  law  in  this 
country”  when  the  Sherman  Act  was  passed,  the  phrase 
“restraint of trade” is best read to mean “undue restraint.” 
Standard Oil Co. of N. J. v. United States, 221 U. S. 1, 59– 
60  (1911).  This  Court’s  precedents  have  thus  understood 
§1 “to outlaw only unreasonable restraints.”  State Oil Co. 
v. Khan, 522 U. S. 3, 10 (1997) (emphasis added).

Restraints  can  be  unreasonable  in  one  of  two  ways.  A 
small group of restraints are unreasonable per se because 
they  “ ‘ “always  or  almost  always  tend  to  restrict  competi-
tion and decrease output.” ’ ”  Business Electronics Corp. v. 
Sharp Electronics Corp., 485 U. S. 717, 723 (1988).  Typi-
cally  only  “horizontal”  restraints—restraints  “imposed  by 
agreement between competitors”—qualify as unreasonable 
per se.  Id.,  at  730.  Restraints  that  are  not  unreasonable 
per se  are  judged  under  the  “rule  of  reason.”    Id.,  at  723. 
The rule of reason requires courts to conduct a fact-specific