Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/14pdf/13-7120_p86b.pdf
Page Number: 11.0

Cite as:  576 U. S. ____ (2015) 

9 

Opinion of the Court 

dispositive,  and  confined  Begay  to  “strict  liability,  negli­
gence,  and  recklessness  crimes.”  564  U. S.,  at  ___–___ 
(slip op., at 10–11).

The  present  case,  our  fifth  about  the  meaning  of  the
residual  clause,  opens  a  new  front  of  uncertainty.    When 
deciding  whether  unlawful  possession  of  a  short-barreled 
shotgun is a violent felony, do we confine our attention to 
the  risk  that  the  shotgun  will  go  off  by  accident  while  in 
someone’s possession?  Or do we also consider the possibil­
ity that the person possessing the shotgun will later use it
to  commit  a  crime?  The  inclusion  of  burglary  and  extor­
tion among the enumerated offenses suggests that a crime
may qualify under the residual clause even if the physical
injury is remote from the criminal act.  But how remote is 
too  remote?  Once  again,  the  residual  clause  yields  no 
answers. 

This  Court  is  not  the  only  one  that  has  had  trouble
making sense of the residual clause.  The clause has “cre­
ated  numerous  splits  among  the  lower  federal  courts,”
where it has proved “nearly impossible to apply consistently.” 
Chambers,  555  U. S.,  at  133  (ALITO,  J.,  concurring  in 
judgment).    The  most  telling  feature  of  the  lower  courts’ 
decisions is not division about whether the residual clause 
covers  this  or  that  crime  (even  clear  laws  produce  close
cases);  it  is,  rather,  pervasive  disagreement  about  the
nature  of  the  inquiry  one  is  supposed  to  conduct  and  the 
kinds of factors one is supposed to consider.  Some judges
have  concluded  that  deciding  whether  conspiracy  is  a 
violent  felony  requires  evaluating  only  the  dangers  posed
by the “simple act of agreeing [to commit a crime],” United 
States  v.  Whitson,  597  F. 3d  1218,  1222  (CA11  2010)  (per 
curiam);  others  have  also  considered  the  probability  that 
the agreement will be carried out, United States v. White, 
571  F. 3d  365,  370–371  (CA4  2009).    Some  judges  have
assumed  that  the  battery  of  a  police  officer  (defined  to
include the slightest touching) could “explode into violence