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Page Number: 26.0

6 

VEGA v. TEKOH 

KAGAN, J., dissenting 

text.  Ibid., n. 7.  The dormant Commerce Clause, the Court 
said, still provides a “right”—in the “ordinary” sense of be-
ing “ ‘[a] legally enforceable claim of one person against an-
other.’ ”  Ibid. (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 1324 (6th ed. 
1990)).  That describes Miranda to a tee.  And if a right im-
plied  from  Congress’s  constitutional  authority  over  inter-
state commerce is enforceable under §1983, how could it be 
that  Miranda—which  the  Court  has  found  necessary  to
safeguard  the  personal  protections  of  the  Fifth  Amend-
ment—is not also enforceable?  The majority again has no 
answer. 

* 

* 

* 
Today, the Court strips individuals of the ability to seek
a remedy for violations of the right recognized in Miranda. 
The majority observes that defendants may still seek “the
suppression at trial of statements obtained” in violation of 
Miranda’s  procedures.  Ante,  at  14–15.  But  sometimes, 
such a statement will not be suppressed.  And sometimes, 
as a result, a defendant will be wrongly convicted and spend 
years in prison.  He may succeed, on appeal or in habeas, in 
getting  the  conviction  reversed.    But  then,  what  remedy
does he have for all the harm he has suffered?  The point of
§1983  is  to  provide  such  redress—because  a  remedy  “is  a 
vital  component  of  any  scheme  for  vindicating  cherished 
constitutional guarantees.”  Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U. S. 635, 
639  (1980).    The  majority  here,  as  elsewhere,  injures  the 
right by denying the remedy.  See, e.g., Egbert v. Boule, 596 
U. S. ___ (2022).  I respectfully dissent.