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22  NEW YORK STATE RIFLE & PISTOL ASSN., INC. v. BRUEN 

Opinion of the Court 

“sensitive places” in this case, we do think respondents err
in  their  attempt  to  characterize  New  York’s  proper-cause
requirement as a “sensitive-place” law.  In their view, “sen-
sitive places” where the government may lawfully disarm 
law-abiding citizens include all “places where people typi-
cally  congregate  and  where  law-enforcement  and  other 
public-safety  professionals  are  presumptively  available.” 
Brief for Respondents 34.  It is true that people sometimes
congregate in “sensitive places,” and it is likewise true that
law  enforcement  professionals  are  usually  presumptively 
available in those locations.  But expanding the category of
“sensitive places” simply to all places of public congregation
that are not isolated from law enforcement defines the cat-
egory of “sensitive places” far too broadly.  Respondents’ ar-
gument  would  in  effect  exempt  cities  from  the  Second 
Amendment and would eviscerate the general right to pub-
licly  carry  arms  for  self-defense  that  we  discuss  in  detail 
below.  See Part III–B, infra.  Put simply, there is no his-
torical basis for New York to effectively declare the island
of  Manhattan  a  “sensitive  place”  simply  because  it  is
crowded and protected generally by the New York City Po-
lice Department.

Like Heller, we “do not undertake an exhaustive histori-
cal analysis . . . of the full scope of the Second Amendment.” 
554 U. S., at 626.  And we acknowledge that “applying con-
stitutional principles to novel modern conditions can be dif-
ficult and leave close questions at the margins.”  Heller v. 
District  of  Columbia,  670  F. 3d  1244,  1275  (CADC  2011) 
(Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).  “But that is hardly unique to 
the Second Amendment.  It is an essential component of ju-
dicial  decisionmaking  under  our  enduring  Constitution.” 
Ibid.  We see no reason why judges frequently tasked with
answering  these  kinds  of  historical,  analogical  questions
cannot do the same for Second Amendment claims.