Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/23pdf/23-175_19m2.pdf
Page Number: 43

Cite as:  603 U. S. ____ (2024) 

3 

THOMAS, J., concurring 

Clause in the first place.  The challenged ordinances are en-
forced  through  the  imposition  of  civil  fines  and  civil  park
exclusion  orders,  as  well  as  through  criminal  trespass
charges.  But,  “[a]t  the  time  the  Eighth  Amendment  was
ratified, the word ‘punishment’ referred to the penalty im-
posed for the commission of a crime.”  Helling v. McKinney, 
509 U. S. 25, 38 (1993) (THOMAS, J., dissenting); see ante, 
at 15–16.  The respondents have yet to explain how the civil
fines  and  park  exclusion  orders  constitute  a  “penalty  im-
posed for the commission of a crime.”  Helling, 509 U. S., at 
38. 

For  its  part,  the  Court  of  Appeals  concluded  that  the 
Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause governs these civil 
penalties  because  they  can  “later  . . .  become  criminal  of-
fenses.”  72 F. 4th 868, 890 (CA9 2023).  But, that theory 
rests on layer upon layer of speculation.  It requires reason-
ing that because violating one of the ordinances “could re-
sult in civil citations and fines, [and] repeat violators could 
be excluded from specified City property, and . . . violating
an exclusion order could subject a violator to criminal tres-
pass  prosecution,”  civil  fines  and  park  exclusion  orders 
therefore must be governed by the Cruel and Unusual Pun-
ishments  Clause.  Id.,  at  926  (O’Scannlain,  J.,  statement 
respecting denial of rehearing en banc) (emphasis added).
And, if this case is any indication, the possibility that a civil 
fine turns into a criminal trespass charge is a remote one. 
The respondents assert that they have been involuntarily 
homeless in Grants Pass for years, yet they have never re-
ceived a park exclusion order, much less a criminal trespass
charge.  See ante, at 11. 

Because  the  respondents’  claims  fail  either  way,  the
Court does not address the merits of the Court of Appeals’ 
theory.  See ante, at 16–17, and n. 4.  Suffice it to say, we 
have  never  endorsed  such  a  broad  view  of  the  Cruel  and 
Unusual Punishments Clause.  Both this Court and lower 
courts should be wary of expanding the Clause beyond its