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524us1$82K 02-22-99 22:42:40 PAGES OPINPGT

Cite as: 524 U. S. 184 (1998)

205

Scalia, J., dissenting

presumption that willful violation requires knowledge of the
law violated.

If one had to choose, therefore, I think a presumption of
statutory intent that is the opposite of the one the Court
applies would be more reasonable.
I would not, however,
It
decide this case on the basis of any presumption at all.
is common ground that the statutory context here requires
some awareness of the law for a § 924(a)(1)(D) conviction, but
the statute is simply ambiguous, or silent, as to the precise
contours of that mens rea requirement.
In the face of that
ambiguity, I would invoke the rule that “ ‘ambiguity concern-
ing the ambit of criminal statutes should be resolved in favor
of lenity,’ ” United States v. Bass, 404 U. S., at 347, quoting
Rewis v. United States, 401 U. S. 808, 812 (1971).

“The rule that penal laws are to be construed strictly,
is, perhaps, not much less old than construction itself.
It is founded on the tenderness of the law for the rights
of individuals; and on the plain principle that the power
of punishment is vested in the legislative, not in the
judicial department.” United States v. Wiltberger, 5
Wheat. 76, 95 (1820).

In our era of multiplying new federal crimes, there is more
reason than ever to give this ancient canon of construction
consistent application: by fostering uniformity in the inter-
pretation of criminal statutes, it will reduce the occasions
on which this Court will have to produce judicial havoc by
resolving in defendants’ favor a Circuit conﬂict regarding the
substantive elements of a federal crime, see, e. g., Bousley v.
United States, 523 U. S. 614 (1998).

I respectfully dissent.