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4 

UNITED STATES v. HANSEN 

THOMAS, J., concurring 

to empower judges to pass upon not only the constitutional-
ity of laws, but also their policy.  One of the council’s main 
supporters,  James  Wilson,  stated  that  the  council  would 
share the New York Council’s power of reviewing laws, not 
only on constitutional grounds, but also to determine if they 
were  “unjust,”  “unwise,”  “dangerous,”  or  “destructive.”    2 
Farrand 73.  Such a power was needed, according to Wilson, 
because the ordinary judicial power of refusing to apply un-
constitutional laws in cases or controversies did not include 
the  authority  to  decline  to  give  effect  to  a  law  on  policy 
grounds.    Ibid.   The  other  leading  proponent of  a council, 
James  Madison,  similarly  argued  that  the  council  would 
veto  “laws  unwise  in  their  principle,  or  incorrect  in  their 
form.”  1 id., at 139.  For Madison, the council was necessary 
to remedy the defect caused by the limits of judicial power: 
Judges could not prevent the “pursuit of . . . unwise & un-
just  measures.”   2  id., at  74.   In  that  vein, George Mason 
similarly argued that a council was needed to prevent “un-
just oppressive or pernicious” laws from taking effect.  Id., 
at 78. 
  Significantly, proponents of a council rejected the prem-
ise that judicial power included a power to refuse to apply 
a  law  for  policy  reasons.    In  fact,  “[n]either  side  thought 
judges  would  or  should  be  authorized  to  make  policy—
whether  couched  in  the  language  of  justice  or  rights—
through  their  exercise  of  the  judicial  power.  . . .  [T]he  de-
bate over a council of revision was made necessary . . . be-
cause . . . not a single delegate on either side of the debate 
proposed or supported having judges perform a  policymak-
ing role from the bench.”  J. Anderson, Learning From the 
Great Council of Revision Debate, 68 Rev. Politics 79, 99–
100 (2006).  From that shared premise, the council’s propo-
nents argued that such an institution was needed precisely 
because it would be incompatible with judicial duty to take 
policy concerns into account in adjudicating cases.  See J. 
Mitchell, The Writ-of-Erasure Fallacy, 104 Va. L. Rev. 933,