Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/558bv.pdf
Page Number: 301.0

140 

SMITH  v.  SPISAK 

Syllabus 

2.  Similarly,  the  state-court  decision  rejecting  Spisak’s  ineffective-
assistance-of-counsel claim was not “contrary to, or . . . an unreasonable 
application” of, the law “clearly established” in Strickland.  § 2254(d)(1). 
To  prevail  on  this  claim,  Spisak  must  show,  inter  alia,  that  there  is 
a  “reasonable  probability  that,  but  for  counsel’s  unprofessional  errors, 
the  result  of  the  proceeding  would  have  been  different.”  Strickland, 
supra,  at  694.  Even  assuming  that  the  closing  argument  was  inade­
quate in the respects claimed by Spisak, this Court ﬁnds no “reasonable 
probability” that a better closing argument without these defects would 
have made a signiﬁcant difference.  Any different, more adequate clos­
ing argument would have taken place in the following context: Spisak’s 
defense  at  the  trial’s  guilt  phase  consisted  of  an  effort  by  counsel  to 
show that Spisak was not guilty by reason of insanity.  Counsel, appar­
ently  hoping  to  demonstrate  Spisak’s  mentally  defective  condition, 
called him to the stand, where he freely admitted committing three mur­
ders  and  two  other  shootings  and  repeatedly  expressed  an  intention 
to  commit  further  murders  if  given  the  opportunity.  In  light  of  this 
background and for the following reasons, the assumed closing argument 
deﬁciencies do not raise the requisite reasonable probability of a differ­
ent  result  but  for  the  deﬁcient  closing.  First,  since  the  sentencing 
phase took place immediately after the guilt phase, the jurors had fresh 
in their minds the government’s extensive and graphic evidence regard­
ing  the  killings,  Spisak’s  boastful  and  unrepentant  confessions,  and  his 
threats  to  commit  further  violent  acts.  Second,  although  counsel  did 
not  summarize  the  mitigating  evidence  in  great  detail,  he  did  refer  to 
it, and the defense experts’ more detailed testimony regarding Spisak’s 
mental  illness  was  also  fresh  in  the  jurors’  minds.  Third,  Spisak  does 
not  describe  what  other  mitigating  factors  counsel  might  have  men­
tioned; all those he proposes essentially consist of aspects of the “mental 
defect”  factor  that  the  defense  experts  described.  Finally,  in  light  of 
counsel’s  several  appeals  to  the  jurors’  sense  of  humanity,  it  is  unlikely 
that  a  more  explicit  or  elaborate  appeal  for  mercy  could  have  changed 
the  result,  either  alone  or  together  with  the  foregoing  circumstances. 
The Court need not reach Spisak’s claim that § 2254(d)(1) does not apply 
to his claim, because it would reach the same conclusion even on de novo 
review.  Pp. 149–156. 

512 F. 3d 852, reversed. 

Breyer, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C. J., 
and  Scalia,  Kennedy,  Thomas,  Ginsburg,  Alito,  and  Sotomayor,  JJ., 
joined, and in which Stevens, J., joined as to Part III.  Stevens, J., ﬁled 
an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, post, p. 156.