Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/529bv.pdf
Page Number: 456

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Unit: $U46

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Cite as: 529 U. S. 362 (2000)

381

Opinion of Stevens, J.

the “inevitable difﬁculties” that come with “attempting ‘to
determine whether a particular decision has really an-
nounced a “new” rule at all or whether it has simply applied
a well-established constitutional principle to govern a case
which is closely analogous to those which have been pre-
viously considered in the prior case law.’ ” Mackey, 401
U. S., at 695 (quoting Desist v. United States, 394 U. S. 244,
263 (1969)). But Teague established some guidance for mak-
ing this determination, explaining that a federal habeas
court operates within the bounds of comity and ﬁnality if it
applies a rule “dictated by precedent existing at the time
the defendant’s conviction became ﬁnal.” 489 U. S., at 301
(emphasis deleted). A rule that “breaks new ground or im-
poses a new obligation on the States or the Federal Govern-
ment,” ibid., falls outside this universe of federal law.

To this, AEDPA has added,

immediately following the
“clearly established law” requirement, a clause limiting the
area of relevant law to that “determined by the Supreme
Court of the United States.”
28 U. S. C. § 2254(d)(1) (1994
ed., Supp. III).
If this Court has not broken sufﬁcient legal
ground to establish an asked-for constitutional principle, the
lower federal courts cannot themselves establish such a prin-
ciple with clarity sufﬁcient to satisfy the AEDPA bar.
In
this respect, we agree with the Seventh Circuit that this
clause “extends the principle of Teague by limiting the source
of doctrine on which a federal court may rely in addressing
the application for a writ.” Lindh v. Murphy, 96 F. 3d 856,
869 (1996). As that court explained:

“This is a retrenchment from former practice, which al-
lowed the United States courts of appeals to rely on
their own jurisprudence in addition to that of the Su-
preme Court. The novelty in this portion of § 2254(d)(1)
is not the ‘contrary to’ part but the reference to ‘Federal
law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United
States’ (emphasis added). This extends the principle of
Teague [v. Lane, 489 U. S. 288 (1989),] by limiting the