Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/21pdf/21-12_m6hn.pdf
Page Number: 3.0

Cite as:  596 U. S. ____ (2022) 

3 

Syllabus 

campaign—to  repay  Cruz’s  loans.  Ordinarily,  it  would  not  matter 
whether  a  plaintiff  was  challenging  the  statute’s  enforcement  or  in-
stead the enforcement of a regulation.  Here, however, the parties as-
sume that the distinction makes a difference because the subject-mat-
ter jurisdiction of the three-judge District Court is limited to actions 
challenging the enforcement of the statute.  See BRCA §304(a).  Even 
under the Government’s account, the present inability of the Commit-
tee to repay and Cruz to recover the final $10,000 is traceable to the 
operation of Section 304 itself.  An agency’s regulation cannot “operate
independently of” the statute that authorized it.  California v. Texas, 
593 U. S. ___, ___.  Here, the FEC’s 20-day rule was expressly promul-
gated to implement Section 304.  Thus, if Section 304 is invalid and 
unenforceable, the agency’s 20-day rule is as well, and the remedy ap-
pellees sought in the District Court would redress appellees’ harm by
preventing enforcement of the agency’s 20-day rule.  See Lujan, 504 
U. S., at 561.  In challenging the FEC’s threatened enforcement of the 
loan-repayment limitation, through its implementing regulation, ap-
pellees may raise constitutional claims against Section 304, the statu-
tory provision that, through the agency’s regulation, is being enforced. 
Cf.  Collins  v.  Yellen,  594  U. S.  ___,  ___–___.    And  because  they  are
challenging “the constitutionality of [a] provision of [BCRA],” §403(a),
jurisdiction was proper in the three-judge District Court.  Pp. 6–10.

2. Section 304 of BCRA burdens core political speech without proper

justification.  Pp. 10–22. 

(a) The  loan-repayment  limitation  abridges  First  Amendment 
rights by burdening candidates who wish to make expenditures on be-
half  of  their  own  candidacy through  personal  loans.   Restricting  the
sources of funds that campaigns may use to repay candidate loans in-
creases  the  risk  that  such  loans  will  not  be  repaid  in  full,  which,  in
turn, deters candidates from loaning money to their campaigns.  This 
burden is no small matter.  Debt is a ubiquitous tool for financing elec-
toral  campaigns,  especially  for  new  candidates  and  challengers.   By
inhibiting a candidate from using this critical source of campaign fund-
ing,  Section  304  raises  a  barrier  to  entry—thus  abridging  political
speech.  Pp. 10–13. 

(b) The  Government  has  not  demonstrated  that  the  loan-repay-
ment  limitation  furthers  a  permissible  goal.    Any  law  that  burdens
First Amendment freedoms, even slightly, must be justified by a per-
missible interest.  Pp. 13–22. 

(i) The only permissible ground for restricting political speech 
recognized by this Court is the prevention of “quid pro quo” corruption 
or its appearance.  See McCutcheon v. Federal Election Comm’n, 572 
U. S. 185, 207.  Here, the Government argues that the contributions 
at issue raise a heightened risk of corruption because they are used to