Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/19pdf/17-1618_hfci.pdf
Page Number: 42.0

Cite as:  590 U. S. ____ (2020) 

5 

ALITO, J., dissenting 

this opinion includes the full definitions of “sex” in the un-
abridged dictionaries in use in the 1960s.) 

In all those dictionaries, the primary definition of “sex”
was  essentially  the  same  as  that  in  the  then-most  recent
edition  of  Webster’s  New  International  Dictionary  2296 
(def. 1) (2d ed. 1953): “[o]ne of the two divisions of organisms
formed  on  the  distinction  of  male  and  female.”    See  also 
American Heritage Dictionary 1187 (def. 1(a)) (1969) (“The 
property  or  quality  by  which  organisms  are  classified  ac-
cording  to  their  reproductive  functions”);  Random  House 
Dictionary  of  the  English  Language  1307  (def.  1)  (1966) 
(Random House Dictionary) (“the fact or character of being
either  male  or  female”);  9  Oxford  English  Dictionary  577
(def. 1) (1933) (“Either of the two divisions of organic beings
distinguished as male and female respectively”). 

The Court does not dispute that this is what “sex” means
in Title VII, although it coyly suggests that there is at least 
some support for a different and potentially relevant defi-
nition.  Ante, at 5.  (I address alternative definitions below. 
See Part I–B–3, infra.)  But the Court declines to stand on 
that ground and instead “proceed[s] on the assumption that 
‘sex’ . . . refer[s] only to biological distinctions between male
and female.”  Ante, at 5. 

If that is so, it should be perfectly clear that Title VII does 
not  reach  discrimination  because  of  sexual  orientation  or 
gender  identity.  If  “sex”  in  Title  VII  means  biologically
male or female, then discrimination because of sex means 
discrimination  because  the  person  in  question  is  biologi-
cally male or biologically female, not because that person is 
sexually attracted to members of the same sex or identifies 
as a member of a particular gender.

How then does the Court claim to avoid that conclusion? 

—————— 
to an individual’s sex assigned at birth or sex characteristics.”  Ibid.  Un-
der these definitions, there is no apparent difference between discrimi-
nation because of transgender status and discrimination because of gen-
der identity.