Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/22pdf/22-138_43j7.pdf
Page Number: 38

Cite as:  600 U. S. ____ (2023) 

21 

SOTOMAYOR, J., concurring
Opinion of SOTOMAYOR, J. 

for criminal libel for failing to apply the Sullivan standard, 
which covers “only those false statements made with a high
degree of awareness of their probable falsity.”  Garrison v. 
Louisiana, 379 U. S. 64, 75 (1964).  Yet the Court expressed 
strong skepticism of the very concept of criminal prosecu-
tions  for  libel  and  noted  the  salutary  trend  of  its  “virtual
disappearance.”  Id., at 69–70.  The Court approvingly cited
the Model Penal Code’s recommendation that criminal libel 
be  limited  to  speech  likely  to  cause  a  breach  of  the  peace 
and “calculated” to do so.  Id., at 70.  This is not a promising 
theoretical  springboard  for  determining  the  mens  rea  re-
quired to criminalize other speech. 

If  the  Court  were  correct  that  the  Sullivan  standard  is 
the  appropriate  analogy,  however,  then  this  standard
should  guide  how  to  analyze  recklessness  in  true-threats 
prosecutions.  The  generic  formulation  of  recklessness  re-
quires that an individual disregard a relatively unspecified 
level of risk that the harm in question will occur.  See Bor-
den,  593  U. S.,  at  ___  (plurality  opinion)  (slip  op.,  at  5). 
Within  that  potentially  broad  range,  Sullivan  provides  a
more  definite  and  demanding  level  of  risk,  reflecting  the
First Amendment concerns at stake.  The Court has “made 
clear that the defendant must have made the false publica-
tion with a high degree of awareness of probable falsity or 
must  have  entertained  serious  doubts  as  to  the  truth.” 
Harte-Hanks  Communications,  Inc.  v.  Connaughton,  491 
U. S. 657, 667 (1989) (internal quotation marks and ellipsis
omitted).  This makes sense.  Allowing liability for aware-
ness of a small chance that a story may be false would un-
dermine the very shield Sullivan erects. 

For  similar  reasons,  after  today’s  ruling,  future  courts 
grappling  with  how  to  articulate  the  appropriate  level  of 
recklessness in true-threats cases would be well served to 
consult the Sullivan standard.  The equivalent to Sullivan 
for true threats would require a high degree of awareness 
that  a  statement  was  probably  threatening  or  serious