Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/16pdf/15-1358_6khn.pdf
Page Number: 42

4 

ZIGLAR v. ABBASI 

Opinion of THOMAS, J. 

pursuant  to  an  unconstitutional  statute  because  the  com-
mon  law  never  granted  arresting  officers  that  sort  of
immunity.  386  U. S.,  at  555.    Rather,  we  concluded  that 
police  officers  could  assert  “the  defense  of  good  faith  and 
probable  cause”  against  the  claim  for  an  unconstitutional 
arrest  because  that  defense  was  available  against  the
analogous  torts  of  “false  arrest  and  imprisonment”  at
common law.  Id., at 557. 

In  further  elaborating  the  doctrine  of  qualified  immun-
ity for executive officials, however, we have diverged from 
the historical inquiry mandated by the statute.  See Wyatt, 
supra, at 170 (KENNEDY, J., concurring); accord, Crawford-
El  v.  Britton,  523  U. S.  574,  611  (1998)  (Scalia,  J., 
joined by THOMAS, J., dissenting).  In the decisions follow-
ing  Pierson,  we  have  “completely  reformulated  qualified 
immunity  along  principles  not  at  all  embodied  in  the 
common  law.”  Anderson  v.  Creighton,  483  U. S.  635,  645 
(1987)  (discussing  Harlow  v.  Fitzgerald,  457  U. S.  800 
(1982)).  Instead  of  asking  whether  the  common  law  in 
1871 would have accorded immunity to an officer for a tort 
analogous to the plaintiff ’s claim under §1983, we instead 
grant  immunity  to  any  officer  whose  conduct  “does  not 
violate  clearly  established  statutory  or  constitutional 
rights  of  which  a  reasonable  person  would  have  known.” 
Mullenix  v.  Luna,  577  U. S.  ___,  ___–___  (2015)  ( per  cu- 
riam) (slip op., at 4–5) (internal quotation marks omitted); 
Taylor v. Barkes, 575 U. S. ___, ___ (2015) (slip op., at 4) (a 
Government  official  is  liable  under  the  1871  Act  only  if 
“ ‘existing  precedent  . . .  placed  the  statutory  or  constitu-
tional  question  beyond  debate’ ”  (quoting  Ashcroft  v.  al-
Kidd,  563  U. S.  731,  741  (2011))).    We  apply  this  “clearly 
established”  standard  “across  the  board”  and  without 
regard to “the precise nature of the various officials’ duties 
or the precise character of the particular rights alleged to