Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/07pdf/07-290.pdf
Page Number: 124.0

Cite as:  554 U. S. ____ (2008) 

11 

BREYER, J., dissenting 

(2002)  (BREYER,  J.,  dissenting)  (commercial  speech);  Bur-
dick v. Takushi, 504 U. S. 428, 433 (1992) (election regula-
tion); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U. S. 319, 339–349 (1976) 
(procedural  due  process);  Pickering  v.  Board  of  Ed.  of 
Township High School Dist. 205, Will Cty., 391 U. S. 563, 
568 (1968) (government employee speech). 

In  applying  this  kind  of  standard  the  Court  normally 
defers  to  a  legislature’s  empirical  judgment  in  matters
where a legislature is likely to have greater expertise and 
greater  institutional  factfinding  capacity.  See  Turner 
Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 520 U. S. 180, 195–196 
(1997);  see  also  Nixon,  supra,  at  403  (BREYER, J.,  concur-
ring).  Nonetheless, a court, not a legislature, must make
the  ultimate  constitutional  conclusion,  exercising  its  “in-
dependent  judicial  judgment”  in  light  of  the  whole  record 
to  determine  whether  a 
law  exceeds  constitutional 
boundaries.  Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U. S. 230, 249 (2006) 
(opinion  of  BREYER,  J.)  (citing  Bose  Corp.  v.  Consumers 
Union of United States, Inc., 466 U. S. 485, 499 (1984)). 

The  above-described  approach  seems  preferable  to  a 
more rigid approach here for a further reason.  Experience
as  much  as  logic  has  led  the  Court  to  decide  that  in  one 
area  of  constitutional  law  or  another  the  interests  are 
likely  to  prove  stronger  on  one  side  of  a  typical  constitu-
tional  case  than  on  the  other.    See,  e.g.,  United  States  v. 
Virginia,  518  U. S.  515,  531–534  (1996)  (applying  height-
ened  scrutiny  to  gender-based  classifications,  based  upon 
experience with prior cases);  Williamson v.  Lee  Optical  of 
Okla.,  Inc.,  348  U. S.  483,  488  (1955)  (applying  rational-
basis  scrutiny  to  economic  legislation,  based  upon  experi-
ence  with  prior  cases).    Here,  we  have  little  prior  experi-
ence.  Courts  that  do  have  experience  in  these  matters
have uniformly taken an approach that treats empirically-
based legislative judgment with a degree of deference.  See 
Winkler,  Scrutinizing  the  Second  Amendment,  105  Mich.
L. Rev.  683,  687,  716–718  (2007)  (describing  hundreds  of