Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/22pdf/21-1271_3f14.pdf
Page Number: 53.0

Cite as:  600 U. S. ____ (2023) 

15 

THOMAS, J., dissenting 

And the idea that we could still decide petitioners’ moot fed-
eral defense because it could “alter the presently operative 
statutes of North Carolina”—even if it cannot affect the ul-
timate judgment in this action—is wholly foreign to Article 
III.  Ante, at 7 (internal quotation marks omitted). 

In that light, the post-Harper I remedial Act and its “trig-
ger provisio[n]” plainly can make no difference to our juris-
diction or lack thereof.  Ante, at 8.  When passed, that Act 
was essentially a change in the State’s conduct under judi-
cial  constraint  (the  result  of  Harper  I ),  but  with  the  de-
clared  intention  of  resuming  the  original  conduct  if  that 
constraint were removed.  That declaration kept the contro-
versy alive while the constraint still existed, as in Hunt v. 
Cromartie, 526 U. S. 541, 545, n. 1 (1999).  But, after Har-
per III, there is no more constraint in this case.  Harper I 
has been overruled, and plaintiffs-respondents’ claims have 
been  dismissed  in  a  final  judgment.    Nothing  about  this
case prevents the State from either enacting or implement-
ing any districting plan.  If “the presently operative statutes 
of North Carolina” need to be “alter[ed],” that is the General
Assembly’s  job,  not  ours.  Ante,  at  7  (internal  quotation 
marks  omitted).    Regardless,  petitioners  have  fully  pre-
vailed in this case, and plaintiffs-respondents have not ob-
tained any enforceable relief that could affect the conduct
of future elections. 

Indeed, to the extent the trigger provision adds anything
to the majority’s analysis, it only underscores the absence
of a justiciable case or controversy.6  A state legislature is 

—————— 

6 I  assume  here  that  the  majority  is  reading  the  provision  correctly, 
though it is far from clear that this is actually the case.  As relevant, the 
provision stated that the remedial redistricting plan “is effective contin-
gent  upon  its  approval  or  adoption  by  the  [trial  court],”  “unless  the 
United States Supreme Court or any other federal court reverses or stays 
[Harper I ] . . . (or [Harper I ] is otherwise enjoined, made inoperable, or 
ineffective), and in such case [the 2021 Act] is again effective.”  2022 N. C.