Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/22pdf/21-1496_d18f.pdf
Page Number: 6.0

6 

TWITTER, INC. v. TAAMNEH 

Syllabus 

of mind with respect to their actions and the tortious conduct (even if 
not always the particular terrorist act).  Finally, the Ninth Circuit ap-
pears to have regarded Halberstam’s six substantiality factors as a se-
quence of disparate, unrelated considerations without a common con-
ceptual core.  In doing so, the Ninth Circuit focused primarily on the
value  of  defendants’  platforms  to  ISIS,  rather  than  whether  defend-
ants culpably associated themselves with ISIS’ actions.  Pp. 27–29. 

(3) There  is  also  one  set  of  allegations  specific  to  Google:  that 
Google  reviewed  and  approved  ISIS  videos  on  YouTube  as  part  of  a 
revenue-sharing system and thereby shared advertising revenue with
ISIS.  But  the  complaint  here  alleges  nothing  about  the  amount  of 
money  that  Google  supposedly  shared  with  ISIS,  the  number  of  ac-
counts approved for revenue sharing, or the content of the videos that 
were approved.  Nor does it give any other reason to view Google’s rev-
enue sharing as substantial assistance.  Without more, plaintiffs thus
have not plausibly alleged that Google knowingly provided substantial
assistance  to  the  Reina  attack,  let  alone  (as  their  theory  of  liability
would require) every single terrorist act committed by ISIS.  Pp. 29– 
30. 

(d) The concepts of aiding and abetting and substantial assistance 
do not lend themselves to crisp, bright-line distinctions.  Applying the 
guideposts  provided  by  the  common  law  and  Halberstam,  the  nexus 
between defendants and the Reina attack is far removed.  As alleged 
by  plaintiffs,  defendants  designed  virtual  platforms  and  knowingly
failed to do “enough” to remove ISIS-affiliated users and ISIS-related
content from their platforms.  Yet, plaintiffs have failed to allege that
defendants intentionally provided any substantial aid to the Reina at-
tack  or  otherwise  consciously  participated  in  it—much  less  that  de-
fendants  so  pervasively  and  systemically  assisted  ISIS  as  to  render 
them liable for every ISIS attack.  Plaintiffs accordingly have failed to 
state a claim under §2333(d)(2).  Pp. 30–31. 

2 F. 4th 871, reversed. 

THOMAS, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.  JACKSON, J., 

filed a concurring opinion.