Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/11pdf/10-9646.pdf
Page Number: 19.0

Cite as:  567 U. S. ____ (2012) 

15 

Opinion of the Court 

ing  cases  alike  teach  that  in  imposing  a  State’s  harshest 
penalties,  a  sentencer  misses  too  much  if  he  treats  every 
child as an adult.  To recap: Mandatory life without parole
for  a  juvenile  precludes  consideration  of  his  chronological 
age  and  its  hallmark  features—among  them,  immaturity,
impetuosity,  and  failure  to  appreciate  risks  and  conse-
quences.  It  prevents  taking  into  account  the  family  and 
home  environment  that  surrounds  him—and  from  which 
he  cannot  usually  extricate  himself—no  matter  how  bru-
tal  or  dysfunctional.  It  neglects  the  circumstances  of  the 
homicide offense, including the extent of his participation
in  the  conduct  and  the  way  familial  and  peer  pressures 
may  have  affected  him.    Indeed,  it  ignores  that  he  might 
have been charged and convicted of a lesser offense if not
for  incompetencies  associated  with  youth—for  example, 
his  inability  to  deal  with  police  officers  or  prosecutors
(including on a plea agreement) or his incapacity to assist 
his  own  attorneys.  See,  e.g.,  Graham,  560  U. S.,  at  ___ 
(slip op., at 27) (“[T]he features that distinguish juveniles 
from adults also put them at a significant disadvantage in 
criminal  proceedings”);  J.  D.  B.  v.  North  Carolina,  564 
U. S. ___, ___ (2011) (slip op., at 5–6) (discussing children’s
responses  to  interrogation).  And  finally,  this  mandatory 
punishment  disregards  the  possibility  of  rehabilitation 
even when the circumstances most suggest it.

Both cases before us illustrate the problem.  Take Jack-
son’s first.  As noted earlier, Jackson did not fire the bullet 
that  killed  Laurie  Troup;  nor  did  the  State  argue  that 
he  intended  her  death.  Jackson’s  conviction  was  instead 
based on an aiding-and-abetting theory; and the appellate
court affirmed the verdict only because the jury could have
believed  that  when  Jackson  entered  the  store,  he  warned 
Troup that “[w]e ain’t playin’,” rather than told his friends
that  “I  thought  you  all  was  playin’.”  See  359  Ark.,  at 
90–92, 194 S. W. 3d, at 759–760; supra, at 2.  To be sure, 
Jackson  learned  on  the  way  to  the  video  store  that  his