Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/18pdf/18-302_e29g.pdf
Page Number: 30

Cite as:  588 U. S. ____ (2019) 

5 

Opinion of SOTOMAYOR, J. 

“scandalous”  to  do?    A  logical  answer  is  that  Congress
meant for “scandalous” to target a third and distinct type
of offensiveness: offensiveness in the mode of communica-
tion  rather  than  the  idea.  The  other  two  words  cover 
marks that are offensive because of the ideas they express; 
the  “scandalous”  clause  covers  marks  that  are  offensive 
because of the mode of expression, apart from any particu-
lar message or idea.

To be sure, there are situations in which it makes sense 
to treat adjoining words as expressing the same or highly 
similar  concepts  (even  at  the  risk  of  some  redundancy).
Cf. Swearingen v. United States, 161 U. S. 446, 450 (1896) 
(construing  “ ‘obscene,  lewd  or  lascivious’ ”  to  have  a  uni-
fied  meaning).  That  is  essentially  the  approach  that  the 
majority  takes.    See  ante,  at  6.2  But  that  is  not  the  ap-
proach that Congress appears to have intended here.  For 
example, “scandalous” does not serve as a broader catchall
at  the  end  of  a  list  of  similar  words  that  all  point  in  one 
direction.  E.g.,  Washington  State  Dept.  of  Social  and 
Health Servs. v. Guardianship Estate of Keffeler, 537 U. S. 
371,  384  (2003).  Nor  is  “scandalous”  simply  grouped 
among a number of closely related terms that help define
its meaning.  E.g., Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U. S. 561, 
575 (1995).

The  text  of  §1052,  instead,  is  a  grab  bag:  It  bars  the
registration  of  marks  featuring  “immoral,  deceptive,  or
scandalous  matter,”  as  well  as,  inter  alia,  disparaging 
marks,  flags,  insignias,  mislabeled  wines,  and  deceased 
Presidents.  See §§1052(a)–(e).  This is not, in other words, 
a situation in which Congress was simply being “verbos[e] 

—————— 

2 That  interpretive  move  appears  to  accord  with  the  Federal  Circuit 
and  the  PTO’s  past  practice.  Ante,  at  2–3.  Nevertheless,  it  is  by  no 
means  the  only  reasonable  way  to  read  this  text,  and  indeed  some 
courts  have  suggested  that  “scandalous”  can  and  should  be  applied 
independently  of  “immoral,”  see,  e.g.,  In  re  McGinley,  660  F. 2d  481, 
485, n. 6 (CCPA 1981).