Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/19pdf/18-1150_new_d18e.pdf
Page Number: 18

Cite as:  590 U. S. ____ (2020) 

15 

Opinion of the Court 

induce private parties like Lexis to assist in preparing af-
fordable annotated codes for widespread distribution.  That 
appeal  to  copyright  policy,  however,  is  addressed  to  the 
wrong forum.  As Georgia acknowledges, “[I]t is generally 
for Congress, not the courts, to decide how best to pursue 
the Copyright Clause’s objectives.”  Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 
U. S. 186, 212 (2003).  And that principle requires adher-
ence  to  precedent  when,  as  here,  we  have  construed  the
statutory text and “tossed [the ball] into Congress’s court,
for acceptance or not  as that branch elects.”  Kimble, 576 
U. S., at 456. 

Turning to our government edicts precedents, Georgia in-
sists that they can and should be read to focus exclusively 
on whether a particular work has “the force of law.”  Brief 
for Petitioners 32 (capitalization deleted).  JUSTICE THOMAS 
appears to endorse the same view.  See post, at 4.  But that 
framing has multiple flaws. 

Most obviously, it cannot be squared with the reasoning 
or results of our cases—especially Banks.  Banks, following 
Wheaton  and  the  “judicial  consensus”  it  inspired,  denied
copyright protection to judicial opinions without excepting 
concurrences  and  dissents  that  carry  no  legal  force.    128 
U. S., at 253 (emphasis deleted).  As every judge learns the
hard way, “comments in [a] dissenting opinion” about legal 
principles and precedents “are just that: comments in a dis-
senting  opinion.”    Railroad  Retirement  Bd.  v.  Fritz,  449 
U. S. 166, 177, n. 10 (1980).  Yet such comments are covered 
by the government edicts doctrine because they come from 
an official with authority to make and interpret the law. 

Indeed, Banks went even further and withheld copyright 
protection from headnotes and syllabi produced by judges.
128 U. S., at 253.  Surely these supplementary materials do
not have the force of law, yet they are covered by the doc-
trine.  The simplest explanation is the one Banks provided: 
These non-binding works are not copyrightable because of 
who creates them—judges acting in their judicial capacity.