Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/20pdf/19-357_6k47.pdf
Page Number: 5

Cite as:  592 U. S. ____ (2021) 

3 

Opinion of the Court 

bankruptcy,” the City  had acted  “to exercise control over” 
respondents’ property in violation of §362(a)(3).  Id., at 924– 
925.  We granted certiorari to resolve a split in the Courts
of Appeals over whether an entity that retains possession
of the property of a bankruptcy estate violates §362(a)(3).1 
589 U. S. ___ (2019).  We now vacate the judgment below. 

II 
The language used in §362(a)(3) suggests that merely re-
taining  possession  of  estate  property  does  not  violate  the 
automatic stay.  Under that provision, the filing of a bank-
ruptcy petition operates as a “stay” of “any act” to “exercise
control” over the property of the estate.  Taken together, the 
most natural reading of these terms—“stay,” “act,” and “ex-
ercise control”—is that §362(a)(3) prohibits affirmative acts 
that would disturb the status quo of estate property as of 
the time when the bankruptcy petition was filed.

Taking the provision’s operative words in turn, the term
“stay”  is  commonly  used  to  describe  an  order  that  “sus-
pend[s]  judicial  alteration  of  the  status  quo.”  Nken  v. 
Holder, 556 U. S. 418, 429 (2009) (brackets in original; in-
ternal quotation marks omitted).  An “act” is “[s]omething 
done or performed . . . ; a deed.”  Black’s Law Dictionary 30 
(11th ed. 2019); see also Webster’s New International Dic-
tionary 25 (2d ed. 1934) (“that which is done,” “the exercise
of power,” “a deed”).  To “exercise” in the sense relevant here 
means  “to  bring  into  play”  or  “make  effective  in  action.”
Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 795 (1993). 
And to “exercise” something like control is “to put in prac-
tice  or  carry  out  in  action.”    Webster’s  New  International 

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1 Compare  In  re  Fulton,  926  F. 3d  916,  924  (CA7  2019), In  re  Weber, 
719 F. 3d 72, 81 (CA2 2013), In re Del Mission Ltd., 98 F. 3d 1147, 1151– 
1152 (CA9 1996), and In re Knaus, 889 F. 2d 773, 774–775 (CA8 1989), 
with  In  re  Denby-Peterson,  941  F.  3d  115,  132  (CA3  2019),  and  In  re 
Cowen, 849 F. 3d 943, 950 (CA10 2017).