Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/22pdf/21-376_7l48.pdf
Page Number: 38

30 

HAALAND v. BRACKEEN 

Opinion of the Court 

who seek to adopt or foster an Indian child.  Northeastern 
Fla.  Chapter,  Associated  Gen.  Contractors  of  America  v. 
Jacksonville, 508 U. S. 656, 666 (1993).  Under ICWA’s hi-
erarchy  of  preferences,  non-Indian  parents  are  generally 
last in line for potential placements.  According to petition-
ers,  this  “erects  a  barrier  that  makes  it  more  difficult  for 
members of one group to obtain a benefit than it is for mem-
bers of another group.”  Ibid.; see also Turner v. Fouche, 396 
U. S. 346, 362 (1970) (the Equal Protection Clause secures
the right of individuals “to be considered” for government
positions  and  benefits  “without  the  burden  of  invidiously 
discriminatory  disqualifications”).  The  racial  discrimina-
tion they allege counts as an Article III injury.9 

But the individual petitioners have not shown that this
injury  is  “likely”  to  be  “redressed  by  judicial  relief.” 
TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 594 U. S. ___, ___ (2021) (slip 
op., at 7).  They seek an injunction preventing the federal 
parties  from  enforcing  ICWA  and  a  declaratory  judgment 
that  the  challenged  provisions  are  unconstitutional.    Yet 
enjoining the federal parties would not remedy the alleged 
injury,  because  state  courts  apply  the  placement  prefer-
ences, and state agencies carry out the court-ordered place-
ments.  §§1903(1), 1915(a), (b); see also Brief for Individual 
Petitioners 63 (“There is no federal official who administers 
ICWA or carries out its mandates”).  The state officials who 
implement ICWA are “not parties to the suit, and there is 
no reason they should be obliged to honor an incidental le-
gal determination the suit produced.”  Lujan v. Defenders 
of Wildlife, 504 U. S. 555, 569 (1992) (plurality opinion).  So 
an injunction would not give petitioners legally enforceable 

—————— 

9 Respondents  raise  other  objections  to  the  individual  petitioners’
standing, including that the alleged injury is speculative because it de-
pends on future proceedings to foster or adopt Indian children.  Brief for 
Tribal Defendants 46–50; Brief for Federal Parties 49–52.  Because we 
resolve  the  standing  of  all  individual  petitioners  on  the  ground  of  re-
dressability, we do not address respondents’ other arguments.