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Page Number: 66

58  DOBBS v. JACKSON WOMEN’S HEALTH ORGANIZATION 

Opinion of the Court 

the ground that it creates an “undue burden” because the 
burden  it  imposes,  though  slight,  outweighs  its  negligible
benefits?  Casey does not say, and this ambiguity would lead
to  confusion  down  the  line.  Compare  June  Medical,  591 
U. S., at ___–___ (plurality opinion) (slip op., at 1–2), with 
id., at ___–___ (ROBERTS, C. J., concurring) (slip op., at 5– 
6).

The third rule complicates the picture even more.  Under 
that  rule,  “[u]nnecessary  health  regulations  that  have  the
purpose  or  effect  of  presenting  a  substantial  obstacle  to  a 
woman seeking an abortion impose an undue burden on the 
right.”  Casey, 505 U. S., at 878 (emphasis added).  This rule 
contains no fewer than three vague terms.  It includes the 
two  already  discussed—“undue  burden”  and  “substantial
obstacle”—even though they are inconsistent.  And it adds 
a  third  ambiguous  term  when  it  refers  to  “unnecessary 
health regulations.”  The term “necessary” has a range of
meanings—from “essential” to merely “useful.”  See Black’s 
Law Dictionary 928 (5th ed. 1979); American Heritage Dic-
tionary of the English Language 877 (1971).  Casey did not 
explain the sense in which the term is used in this rule.

In  addition  to  these  problems,  one  more  applies  to  all 
three rules.  They all call on courts to examine a law’s effect 
on women, but a regulation may have a very different im-
pact on different women for a variety of reasons, including
their places of residence, financial resources, family situa-
tions, work and personal obligations, knowledge about fetal 
development and abortion, psychological and emotional dis-
position and condition, and the firmness of their desire to 
obtain abortions.  In order to determine whether a regula-
tion presents a substantial obstacle to women, a court needs
to know which set of women it should have in mind and how 
many of the women in this set must find that an obstacle is
“substantial.” 

Casey  provided  no  clear  answer  to  these  questions.    It 
said  that  a  regulation  is  unconstitutional  if  it  imposes  a