Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/20pdf/19-123_g3bi.pdf
Page Number: 83

Cite as:  593 U. S. ____ (2021) 

61 

ALITO, J., concurring in judgment
ALITO, J., concurring in judgment 

applicable laws unconstitutional as applied are unremark-
able.  “[T]he normal rule is that partial, rather than facial,
invalidation is the required course, such that a statute may 
. . . be declared invalid to the extent that it reaches too far, 
but otherwise left intact.”  Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of 
Northern New Eng., 546 U. S. 320, 329 (2006) (internal quo-
tation marks omitted; emphasis added).  Thus, in Brown v. 
Socialist Workers ’74 Campaign Comm. (Ohio), 459 U. S. 87 
(1982), we held that a law requiring disclosure of campaign
contributions and expenditures could not be “constitution-
ally applied” to a minor party whose members and contrib-
utors would face “threats, harassment or reprisals.” Id., at 
101–102.  Cf.  NAACP  v.  Alabama  ex rel.  Patterson,  357 
U. S. 449, 466 (1958) (exempting the NAACP from a disclo-
sure  order  entered  to  purportedly  investigate  compliance
with a generally applicable statute).  In Hustler Magazine, 
Inc.  v.  Falwell,  485  U. S.  46,  56  (1988),  and  Snyder  v. 
Phelps,  562  U. S.  443,  459  (2011),  the  Court  held  that  an
established and generally applicable tort claim (the inten-
tional  infliction  of  emotional  distress)  could  not  constitu-
tionally  be  applied  to  the  particular  expression  at  issue. 
Similarly,  breach-of-the-peace  laws,  although  generally
valid, have been held to violate the Free Speech Clause un-
der  certain  circumstances.    See  Cohen  v.  California,  403 
U. S. 15, 16, 26 (1971); Cantwell, 310 U. S., at 300, 311; see 
also Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U. S. 514, 517, 535 (2001) (re-
spondents not liable under law prohibiting disclosure of il-
legally  intercepted  communications  because  their  speech
was  protected  by  the  First  Amendment);  United  States  v. 
Treasury Employees, 513 U. S. 454, 477 (1995) (respondents 
not  subject  to  the  honoraria  ban  because  it  would  violate 
their First Amendment rights); United States v. Grace, 461 
U. S. 171, 175, 179, 183 (1983) (respondents engaging in ex-
pressive conduct on public sidewalks not subject to law gen-
erally regulating conduct on Supreme Court grounds). 

Finally,  Smith’s  treatment  of  the  free-exercise  right  is