Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/10pdf/09-751.pdf
Page Number: 9.0

Cite as:  562 U. S. ____ (2011) 

5 

Opinion of the Court 

We granted certiorari.  559 U. S. ___ (2010). 

II 
To  succeed  on  a  claim  for  intentional  infliction  of  emo-
tional  distress  in  Maryland,  a  plaintiff  must  demonstrate
that  the  defendant  intentionally  or  recklessly  engaged  in
extreme  and  outrageous  conduct  that  caused  the  plaintiff 
to  suffer  severe  emotional  distress.  See  Harris  v.  Jones, 
281  Md.  560,  565–566,  380  A. 2d  611,  614  (1977).    The 
Free  Speech  Clause  of  the  First  Amendment—“Congress 
shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech”—
can  serve  as  a  defense  in  state  tort  suits,  including  suits
for  intentional  infliction  of  emotional  distress.  See,  e.g., 
Hustler  Magazine,  Inc.  v.  Falwell,  485  U. S.  46,  50–51 
(1988).3 

Whether  the  First  Amendment  prohibits  holding  West-
boro  liable  for  its  speech  in  this  case  turns  largely  on 
whether  that  speech  is  of  public  or  private  concern,  as 
determined by all the circumstances of the case.  “[S]peech
on  ‘matters  of  public  concern’  . . .  is  ‘at  the  heart  of  the 
First Amendment’s protection.’ ”  Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. 
Greenmoss  Builders,  Inc.,  472  U. S.  749,  758–759  (1985) 
(opinion  of  Powell,  J.)  (quoting  First  Nat.  Bank  of  Boston 
v.  Bellotti,  435  U. S.  765,  776  (1978)).    The  First  Amend-
ment  reflects  “a  profound  national  commitment  to  the 

—————— 

on any of his tort claims.  580 F. 3d, at 227 (opinion of Shedd, J.).  The 
Court of Appeals majority determined that the picketers had “voluntar-
ily waived” any such contention on appeal.  Id., at 216.  Like the court 
below, we proceed on the unexamined premise that respondents’ speech
was tortious. 

3 The  dissent  attempts  to  draw  parallels  between  this  case  and  hy-
pothetical cases involving defamation or fighting words.  Post, at 10–11 
(opinion  of  ALITO, J.).    But,  as  the  court  below  noted,  there  is  “no 
suggestion  that  the  speech  at  issue  falls  within  one  of  the  categorical
exclusions from First Amendment protection, such as those for obscen-
ity  or  ‘fighting  words.’ ”    580  F. 3d,  at  218,  n. 12;  see  United  States  v. 
Stevens, 559 U. S. ___ , ___ (2010) (slip op., at 5).