Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/17pdf/16-1140_5368.pdf
Page Number: 36

10 

NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF FAMILY AND 
LIFE ADVOCATES v. BECERRA
 
BREYER, J., dissenting 

given  to  the  majority’s  view,  are  no  longer  good  law.    In 
Planned  Parenthood  of  Southeastern  Pa.  v.  Casey,  505 
U. S.  833  (1992),  the  Court  again  considered  a  state  law 
that  required  doctors  to  provide  information  to  a  woman 
deciding  whether  to  proceed  with  an  abortion.  That  law 
required the doctor to tell the woman about the nature of 
the abortion procedure, the health risks of abortion and of 
childbirth,  the  “ ‘probable  gestational  age  of  the  unborn 
child,’ ” and the availability of printed materials describing 
the fetus, medical assistance for childbirth, potential child 
support,  and  the  agencies  that  would  provide  adoption
services  (or  other  alternatives  to  abortion).  Id.,  at  881 
(joint  opinion  of  O’Connor,  KENNEDY,  and  Souter,  JJ.) 
(quoting 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. §3205 (1990)).

This time a joint opinion of the Court, in judging whether 
the  State  could  impose  these informational  requirements, 
asked whether doing so imposed an “undue burden” upon
women seeking an abortion.  Casey, 505 U. S., at 882–883. 
It held that it did not.  Ibid.  Hence the statute was consti-
tutional.  Id.,  at  874.  The  joint  opinion  stated  that  the
statutory  requirements  amounted  to  “reasonable  meas-
ure[s]  to  ensure  an  informed  choice,  one  which  might 
cause the woman to choose childbirth over abortion.”  Id., 
at  883.  And,  it  “overruled”  portions  of  the  two  cases, 
Akron  and  Thornburgh,  that  might  indicate  the  contrary. 
Id., at 882. 

In respect to overruling the earlier cases, it wrote: 

“To the extent Akron I and Thornburgh find a consti-
tutional violation when the government requires, as it 
does  here,  the  giving  of  truthful,  nonmisleading  in-
formation  about  the  nature  of  the  procedure,  the  at-
tendant  health  risks  and  those  of  childbirth,  and  the 
‘probable  gestational  age’  of  the  fetus,  those  cases  go 
too far, are inconsistent with Roe’s acknowledgment of
an  important  interest  in  potential  life,  and  are  over-