Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/19pdf/17-1618_hfci.pdf
Page Number: 153

Cite as:  590 U. S. ____ (2020) 

9 

KAVANAUGH, J., dissenting 

Courts must heed the ordinary meaning of the phrase as a 
whole,  not  just  the  meaning  of  the  words  in  the  phrase.
That is because a phrase may have a more precise or con-
fined  meaning  than  the  literal  meaning  of  the  individual
words  in  the  phrase.    Examples  abound.  An  “American 
flag” could literally encompass a flag made in America, but 
in  common  parlance  it  denotes  the  Stars  and  Stripes.  A 
“three-pointer” could literally include a field goal in football, 
but in common parlance, it is a shot from behind the arc in 
basketball.  A “cold war” could literally mean any winter-
time  war,  but  in  common  parlance  it  signifies  a  conflict
short of open warfare.  A “washing machine” could literally
refer to any machine used for washing any item, but in eve-
ryday speech it means a machine for washing clothes. 

This Court has often emphasized the importance of stick-
ing  to  the  ordinary  meaning  of  a  phrase,  rather  than  the 
meaning of words in the phrase.  In FCC v. AT&T Inc., 562 
U. S. 397 (2011), for example, the Court explained: 

“AT&T’s argument treats the term ‘personal privacy’ 
as simply the sum of its two words: the privacy of a per-
son. . . .  But two words together may assume a more 
particular meaning than those words in isolation.  We 
understand a golden cup to be a cup made of or resem-
bling gold.  A golden boy, on the other hand, is one who
is charming, lucky, and talented.  A golden opportunity 
is one not to be missed.  ‘Personal’ in the phrase ‘per-
sonal privacy’ conveys more than just ‘of a person.’  It 
suggests  a  type  of  privacy  evocative  of  human  con-
cerns—not  the  sort  usually  associated  with  an  entity
like, say, AT&T.”  Id., at 406. 

—————— 
opinion uses “discriminate because of sex” as shorthand for “discriminate 
. . . because of . . . sex.”  Also, the plaintiffs do not dispute that the ordi-
nary meaning of the statutory phrase “discriminate” because of sex is the 
same as the statutory phrase “to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any 
individual” because of sex.