Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/23pdf/23-50diff_d18f.pdf
Page Number: 18

2 

CHIAVERINI v. CITY OF NAPOLEON 

GORSUCH, J., dissenting 

of the Fourth Amendment is objective reasonableness.  But 
a  common-law  malicious-prosecution  claim  focuses  on  the
defendant’s  subjective  intent.  Ante,  at  2  (opinion  of
THOMAS, J.).   The  Fourth  Amendment  addresses  the  per-
missibility of a seizure.  But a common-law malicious-pros-
ecution claim can (and usually does) proceed without one. 
Ante, at 2–3.  A seizure in violation of the Fourth Amend-
ment can (and often does) take place without the initiation
of any judicial process.  But the whole point of a malicious-
prosecution claim is to contest the appropriateness of past 
judicial proceedings.  Ante, at 2.  For all these reasons, it’s 
“pretty  hard  to  see  how  you  might  squeeze  anything  that
looks quite like the common law tort of malicious prosecu-
tion into the Fourth Amendment.”  Cordova, 816 F. 3d, at 
663 (opinion of Gorsuch, J.).

That is not to say no constitutional hook exists for a §1983 
claim  addressing  the  malicious  use  of  process.    Rather,  it 
seems to me only that such a claim would be more properly
housed in the Fourteenth Amendment.  See Albright, 510 
U. S., at 283 (opinion of Kennedy, J.).  After all, unlike the 
Fourth  Amendment,  that  provision  does  focus  on  judicial
proceedings,  guaranteeing  those  who  come  before  our 
courts “due process” of law.  See ibid.; Thompson, 596 U. S., 
at  43,  n. 2;  Cordova,  816  F. 3d,  at  662  (opinion  of  Gor-
such, J.).  Inhering in due process is a promise that courts 
will  respect,  at  the  least,  those  “customary  procedures  to
which  freemen  were  entitled  by  the  old  law  of  England.” 
Sessions  v.  Dimaya,  584  U. S.  148,  176  (2018)  (GORSUCH, 
J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  And the common law has long
recognized a tort of malicious prosecution to protect against 
the  abuse  of  judicial  proceedings.  Albright,  510  U. S.,  at 
283 (opinion of Kennedy, J.).

Admittedly, a procedural due process claim for malicious 
prosecution may come with its own set of limitations.  After