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Page Number: 24

20 

OHIO v. AMERICAN EXPRESS CO. 

Opinion of the Court 

merchant acceptance.10 

In sum, the plaintiffs have not satisfied the first step of
the rule of reason.  They have not carried their burden of
proving  that  Amex’s  antisteering  provisions  have  anti-
competitive  effects.  Amex’s  business  model  has  spurred 
robust  interbrand  competition  and  has  increased  the
quality and quantity of credit-card transactions.  And it is 
“[t]he  promotion  of  interbrand  competition,”  after  all, 
that “is . . . ‘the primary purpose of the antitrust laws.’”  Id., 
at 890. 

* 

* 
Because  Amex’s  antisteering  provisions  do  not  unrea-
sonably  restrain  trade,  we  affirm  the  judgment  of  the
Court of Appeals. 

* 

It is so ordered. 

—————— 

10 The  plaintiffs  argue  that  United  States  v.  Topco  Associates,  Inc., 
405  U. S.  596,  610  (1972),  forbids  any  restraint  that  would  restrict
competition  in  part  of  the  market—here,  for  example,  merchant  steer-
ing.  See  Brief  for  Petitioners  and  Respondents  Nebraska,  Tennessee,
and  Texas  30,  42.  Topco  does  not  stand  for  such  a  broad  proposition. 
Topco concluded that a horizontal agreement between competitors was 
unreasonable per se, even though the agreement did not extend to every
competitor  in  the  market.    See  405  U. S.,  at  599,  608.    A  horizontal 
agreement  between  competitors  is  markedly  different  from  a  vertical
agreement  that  incidentally  affects  one  particular  method  of  competi-
tion.  See Leegin, 551 U. S., at 888; Maricopa County Medical Soc., 457 
U. S., at 348, n. 18.