Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/14pdf/14-7955_aplc.pdf
Page Number: 73

Cite as:  576 U. S. ____ (2015) 

23 

BREYER, J., dissenting 

2d 880, 894 (1972) (collecting sources) (“[C]ruelty of capital
punishment  lies  not  only  in  the  execution  itself  and  the 
pain incident thereto, but also in the dehumanizing effects
of  the  lengthy  imprisonment  prior  to  execution  during 
which the judicial and administrative procedures essential 
to  due  process  of  law  are  carried  out”  (footnote  omitted)); 
District  Attorney  for  Suffolk  Dist.  v.  Watson,  381  Mass. 
648,  673,  411  N.  E.  2d  1274,  1287  (1980)  (Braucher,  J., 
concurring)  (death  penalty  unconstitutional  under  State 
Constitution  in  part  because  “[it]  will  be  carried  out  only
after agonizing months and years of uncertainty”); see also 
Riley  v.  Attorney  General  of  Jamaica,  [1983]  1  A. C.  719,
734–735  (P.  C.  1982)  (Lord  Scarman,  joined  by  Lord 
Brightman, dissenting) (“execution after inordinate delay” 
would  infringe  prohibition  against  “cruel  and  unusual
punishments”  in  §10  of  the  “Bill  of  Rights  of  1689,”  the 
precursor  to  our  Eighth  Amendment);  Pratt  v.  Attorney 
Gen. of Jamaica, [1994] 2 A. C. 1, 4 (P. C. 1993); id., at 32– 
33  (collecting  cases  finding  inordinate  delays  unconstitu­
tional  or  the  equivalent);  State  v.  Makwanyane  1995  (3)
SA391  (CC)  (S. Afr.);  Catholic  Commission  for  Justice  & 
Peace  in  Zimbabwe  v.  Attorney-General,  [1993]  1  Zim. 
L. R.  242,  282  (inordinate  delays  unconstitutional);  Soer­
ing  v.  United  Kingdom,  11  Eur.  Ct.  H.  R.  (ser.  A),  p.  439
(1989)  (extradition  of  murder  suspect  to  United  States 
would violate the European Convention on Human Rights 
in light of risk of delay before execution); United States v. 
Burns, [2001] 1 S. C. R. 283, 353, ¶123 (similar). 

2 
The  second  constitutional  difficulty  resulting  from 
lengthy  delays  is  that  those  delays  undermine  the  death
penalty’s  penological  rationale,  perhaps  irreparably  so. 
The  rationale  for  capital  punishment,  as  for  any  punish­
ment, classically rests upon society’s need to secure deter­
rence, incapacitation, retribution, or rehabilitation.  Capi­