Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/558bv.pdf
Page Number: 470

Cite as: 558 U. S. 290 (2010) 

309 

Stevens, J., dissenting 

primary  responsibility  for  Wood’s  penalty  phase,  believed 
that  further  investigation  had  value,  ante,  at  302.  Despite 
the fact that Trotter had a meager ﬁve months of experience 
as a lawyer when he was appointed to represent Wood, App. 
261, even he knew that further investigation into any mental 
or psychological deﬁcits was in order.5 

In  my  view,  any  decision to  abandon  an  investigation  into 
the  mitigating  evidence  signaled  by  Dr.  Kirkland’s  report 
was  so  obviously  unreasonable  that  the  decision  itself  is 
highly  persuasive  evidence  that  counsel  did  not  have  any 
strategy in mind when they did so.  I share the view of my 
dissenting  colleague  below  that  the  District  Court  correctly 
concluded  that  the  failure  to  investigate  was  the  product  of 
inattention and neglect by attorneys preoccupied with other 
concerns and not the product of a deliberate choice between 
two  permissible  alternatives.  For  the  state  court  to  con­
clude otherwise was thus “an unreasonable determination of 
the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court 
proceeding”  within  the  meaning  of  28  U. S. C.  § 2254(d)(2).6 

I therefore respectfully dissent. 

5 Shortly  before  the  penalty  phase  commenced,  Trotter  sent  letters  to 
his  two  more  experienced  co-counsel  imploring  that  “we  should  request 
an independent psychological evaluation—even if that means asking for a 
postponement  of  the  sentencing  hearing.”  App.  343  (letter  from  Trotter 
to  Dozier);  id.,  at  345  (letter  from  Trotter  to  Ralph).  Trotter  attempted 
to procure Wood’s school records and speak to his former special education 
teachers  in  order  to  obtain  “anything  that  would  be  able  to  be  used  as  a 
mitigating factor,” id., at 267 (testimony of Trotter), but he failed to follow 
up  on  a  subpoena  issued  for  the  records  and  never  spoke  at  length  with 
any  of  Wood’s  teachers,  id.,  at  267–268.  Notably,  at  least  two  of  these 
former teachers were willing to testify on Wood’s behalf at the state post-
conviction  hearing,  see  id.,  at  401–421  (testimony  of  Maddox  and  Penn). 
6 I  would  also  reach the  same  conclusion  were  I  to agree  with  respond­
ents  and  their  amici  that  a  habeas  petitioner  must  pierce  § 2254(e)(1)’s 
presumption of correctness with respect to state-court ﬁndings of fact be­
fore he can proceed to show he is entitled to relief under § 2254(d)(2).  See 
ante, at 300, n. 2.