Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/20pdf/19-123_g3bi.pdf
Page Number: 49

Cite as:  593 U. S. ____ (2021) 

27 

ALITO, J., concurring in judgment
ALITO, J., concurring in judgment 

The argument goes as follows: Even if a law prohibits con-
duct that constitutes an essential religious practice, it can-
not be said to “prohibit” the free exercise of religion unless 
that was the lawmakers’ specific object. 

This is a hair-splitting interpretation.  It certainly does
not  represent  the  “normal  and  ordinary”  meaning  of  the 
Free Exercise Clause’s terms.  See Heller, 554 U. S., at 576. 
Consider how it would play out if applied to some of the hy-
pothetical laws discussed at the beginning of this opinion.
A  law  categorically  banning  all  wine  would  not  “prohibit” 
the celebration of a Catholic Mass?  A law categorically for-
bidding the slaughter of a conscious animal would not “pro-
hibit” kosher and halal slaughterhouses?  A rule categori-
cally banning any head covering in a courtroom would not 
“prohibit” appearances by orthodox Jewish men, Sikh men,
and Muslim women who wear hijabs?  It is no wonder that 
Smith’s  many  defenders  have  almost  uniformly  foregone
this argument. 

D 
Not  only  is  it  difficult  to  square  Smith’s  interpretation
with the terms of the Free Exercise Clause, the absence of 
any  language  referring  to  equal  treatment  is  striking.    If 
equal treatment was the objective, why didn’t Congress say 
that?  And since it would have been simple to cast the Free
Exercise Clause in equal-treatment terms, why would the
state  legislators  who  voted  for  ratification  have  read  the
Clause that way?

It is not as if there were no models that could have been 
used.  Other constitutional provisions contain non-discrim-
ination  language.    For  example,  Art.  I,  §9,  cl. 6,  provides
that  “[n]o  Preference  shall  be  given  by  any  Regulation  of
Commerce or Revenue to the Ports of one State over those 
of another.”  Under Art. IV, §2, cl. 1, “[t]he Citizens of each
State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of 
Citizens in the several States.”  Article V provides that “no