Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/20pdf/20-512_gfbh.pdf
Page Number: 27

Cite as:  594 U. S. ____ (2021) 

23 

Opinion of the Court 

Take two examples.  In National Soc. of Professional En-
gineers v. United States, 435 U. S. 679 (1978), a trade asso-
ciation  argued  that  price  competition  between  engineers 
competing for building projects had to be restrained to en-
sure  quality  work  and  protect  public  safety.  Id.,  at  679– 
680.  This Court rejected that appeal as “nothing less than
a frontal assault on the basic policy of the Sherman Act.” 
Id., at 695.  The “statutory policy” of the Act is one of com-
petition and it “precludes inquiry into the question whether 
competition is good or bad.”  Ibid.  In FTC v. Superior Court 
Trial Lawyers Assn., 493 U. S. 411 (1990), criminal defense 
lawyers agreed among themselves to refuse court appoint-
ments until the government increased their compensation. 
Id., at 414.  And once more the Court refused to consider 
whether  this  restraint  of  trade  served  some  social  good 
more important than competition:  “The social justifications 
proffered for respondents’ restraint of trade . . . do not make 
it any less unlawful.”  Id., at 424. 

To be sure, this Court once dallied with something that 
looks a bit like an antitrust exemption for professional base-
ball.  In Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore, Inc. v. National 
League of Professional Baseball Clubs, 259 U. S. 200 (1922),
the Court reasoned that “exhibitions” of “base ball” did not 
implicate the Sherman Act because they did not involve in-
terstate trade or commerce—even though teams regularly
crossed state lines (as they do today) to make  money and 
enhance  their  commercial  success.    Id.,  at  208–209.    But 
this Court has refused to extend Federal Baseball’s reason-
ing  to  other  sports  leagues—and  has  even  acknowledged
criticisms  of  the  decision  as  “ ‘unrealistic’ ”  and  “ ‘incon-
sistent’ ” and “aberration[al].”  Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U. S. 258, 
282 (1972) (quoting Radovich v. National Football League, 
352 U. S. 445, 452 (1957)); see also Brief for Advocates for 
Minor Leaguers as Amicus Curiae 5, n. 3 (gathering criti-
cisms).  Indeed,  as  we  have  seen,  this  Court  has  already 
recognized that the NCAA itself is subject to the Sherman