Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/22pdf/22-58_i425.pdf
Page Number: 63.0

Cite as:  599 U. S. ____ (2023) 

21 

ALITO, J., dissenting 

suits  against  the  Executive  Branch  by  a  defined  set  of 
plaintiffs who have suffered concrete harms from execu-
tive under-enforcement and (ii) specifically authorize[s] the 
Judiciary to enter appropriate orders requiring additional
arrests or prosecutions by the Executive Branch.”  Ante, at 
10  (emphasis  added).  It  is  puzzling  why  the  presence  or 
absence  of  such  a  statute  should  control  the  question  of
standing under the Constitution.  We have said that the en-
actment of a statute may help us to determine in marginal
cases whether an injury is sufficiently concrete and partic-
ularized to satisfy the first prong of our three-part standing 
test.  Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U. S. 330, 341 (2016).  But 
once it is posited that a plaintiff has personally suffered a
“de facto” injury, i.e., an injury in fact, it is hard to see why 
the presence or absence of a statute authorizing suit has a 
bearing  on  the  question  whether  the  court  has  Article  III 
jurisdiction as opposed to the question whether the plaintiff 
has a cause of action.  In the end, however, none of this may 
matter  because  the  majority  suggests  that  such  a  statute
might be unconstitutional.  Ante, at 10, and n. 4. 

Third,  the  majority  tells  us  that  the  standing  outcome 
“might  change”  if  the  Federal  Government  “wholly  aban-
doned its statutory responsibilities,” but that statement is
both  equivocal  and  vague.  Ante,  at  11  (emphasis  added).
Under  what  circumstances  might  the  Court  say  that  the 
Federal  Government  has  “wholly  abandoned”  its  enforce-
ment duties?  Suppose the Federal Government announced 
that it would obey 80% of the immigration laws or 70% of 
the environmental laws.  Would the Court say that it had
“wholly  abandoned”  enforcement  of  these  bodies  of  law? 
What would happen if the Final Memorandum in this case 
had directed DHS agents not to arrest anyone convicted of 
any covered crime other than murder?  DHS would still be 
enforcing the arrest mandate as to one of the many covered 
crimes.  Would this only-murder policy qualify as complete 
abandonment?  And why should the ability of a particular