Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/529bv.pdf
Page Number: 770.0

529US3

Unit: $U56

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Cite as: 529 U. S. 694 (2000)

695

Syllabus

rule does not reveal when or how that legislative decision was intended
to take effect; and the omission of an express effective date simply indi-
cates that, absent clear congressional direction, it takes effect on its
enactment date, Gozlon-Peretz v. United States, 498 U. S. 395, 404. Nor
did Congress expressly identify the relevant conduct in a way that
would point to retroactive intent. Thus, this case turns not on an ex
post facto question, but on whether § 3583(e)(3) permitted imposition of
supervised release following a recommitment. Pp. 699–703.

2. Section 3583(e)(3), at the time of Johnson’s conviction, gave the Dis-
trict Court the authority to reimpose supervised release. Subsection
(e)(3) does not speak directly to this question. And if the Court were
to concentrate exclusively on the verb “revoke,” it would not detect any
suggestion that reincarceration might be followed by another supervised
release term, for the conventional understanding of “revoke” is to annul
by recalling or taking back. However, there are textual reasons to
think that the option of further supervised release was intended. Sub-
section (e)(1) unequivocally “terminate[s]” a supervised release term
without the possibility of its reimposition or continuation at a later time.
Had Congress likewise meant subsection (3) to conclude any possibility
of supervised release later, it would have been natural for Congress to
write in like terms. That it chose “revoke” rather than “terminate”
left the door open to a reading of subsection (3) that would not preclude
further supervised release. The pre-1994 version of subsection (3) pro-
vided that a court could revoke a term of supervised release and require
the person to serve in prison all or part of the “term of supervised
release.” This indicates that a revoked supervised release term contin-
ues to have some effect.
If it could be served in prison, then the bal-
ance of it should remain effective when the reincarceration is over.
This interpretation means that Congress used “revoke” in an unconven-
tional way. However, the unconventional sense is not unheard of, for
“revoke” can also mean to call or summon back without the implication
of annulment. There is nothing surprising about the consequences of
this reading.
It also serves the congressional policy of providing for
supervised release after incarceration in order to improve the odds of a
successful transition from prison to liberty, and no prisoner would seem
to need it more than one who has tried liberty and failed. This reading
is also supported by pre-Sentencing-Guidelines parole practice. Con-
gress repeatedly used “revoke” in providing for the consequences of
parole violations, and there seems never to have been a question that a
new parole term could follow a prison sentence imposed after revocation
of an initial parole term. Since parole revocation followed by reincar-
ceration was not a mere termination of a limited liberty that a defendant
could experience only once per conviction, it is fair to suppose that,