Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/19pdf/19-431_5i36.pdf
Page Number: 35.0

Cite as:  591 U. S. ____ (2020) 

5 

ALITO, J., concurring 

In 2017, the new administration took up the task of at-
tempting  to  find  a  solution.  After  receiving  more  than
56,000 comments, it issued the rule now before us, which 
made the church exemption available to non-governmental
employers who object to the provision of some or all contra-
ceptive  services  based  on  sincerely  held  religious  beliefs.4 
45  CFR  §147.132  (2019);  see  83  Fed.  Reg.  57540,  57590. 
(The  “religious  exemption.”)  The  Court  of  Appeals,  as
noted, held that RFRA did not require this new rule. 

II 
A 
RFRA broadly prohibits the Federal Government from vi-
olating religious liberty.  See 42 U. S. C. §2000bb–1(a).  It 
applies to every “branch, department, agency, [and] instru-
mentality” of the Federal Government, as well as any “per-
son acting under the color of ” federal law.  §2000bb–2(1).
And this prohibition applies to the “implementation” of fed-
eral  law.  §2000bb–3(a).    Thus,  unless  the  ACA  or  some 
other subsequently enacted statute made RFRA inapplica-
ble to the contraceptive mandate, the Departments respon-
sible for administering that mandate are obligated to do so 
in a manner that complies with RFRA.

No provision of the ACA abrogates RFRA, and our deci-
sion in Hobby Lobby, 573 U. S., at 736, established that ap-
plication  of  the  contraceptive  mandate  must  conform  to 
RFRA’s demands.  Thus, it was incumbent on the Depart-
ments to ensure that the rules implementing the mandate
were consistent with RFRA, as interpreted in our decision. 

B 
Under RFRA, the Federal Government may not “substan-
tially burden a person’s exercise of religion even if the bur-
den results from a rule of general applicability,” unless it 

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4 A  similar  exemption  was  provided  for  employers  with  moral  objec-

tions.  See 45 CFR §147.33.