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484  CITIZENS  UNITED  v.  FEDERAL  ELECTION  COMM’N 

Opinion of Thomas, J. 

ﬁcials  or  private  parties.”  Ante,  at  367  (internal  quotation 
marks  omitted).  But  the  Court’s  opinion  itself  proves  the 
irony  in  this  compromise.  In  correctly  explaining  why  it 
must address the facial constitutionality of § 203, see ante, at 
322–336,  the  Court  recognizes  that  “[t]he  First  Amendment 
does not permit laws that force speakers to . . .  seek declara­
tory  rulings  before  discussing  the  most  salient  political  is­
sues  of  our  day,”  ante,  at  324;  that  as-applied  challenges  to 
§ 203  “would  require  substantial  litigation  over  an  extended 
time”  and  result  in  an  “interpretive  process  [that]  itself 
would  create  an  inevitable,  pervasive,  and  serious  risk  of 
chilling protected speech pending the drawing of ﬁne distinc­
tions  that,  in  the  end,  would  themselves  be  questionable,” 
ante, at 326–327; that “a court would be remiss in performing 
its  duties  were  it  to  accept  an  unsound  principle  merely  to 
avoid the necessity of making a broader ruling,” ante, at 329; 
and  that  avoiding  a  facial  challenge  to  § 203  “would  prolong 
the substantial, nationwide chilling effect” that § 203 causes, 
ante,  at  333.  This  logic,  of  course,  applies  equally  to  as-
applied challenges to §§ 201 and 311. 

Irony aside, the Court’s promise that as-applied challenges 
will  adequately  protect  speech  is  a  hollow  assurance.  Now 
more  than  ever,  §§ 201  and  311  will  chill  protected  speech 
because—as  California  voters  can  attest—“the  advent  of 
the  Internet”  enables  “prompt  disclosure  of  expenditures,” 
which “provide[s]” political opponents “with the information 
needed” to intimidate and retaliate against their foes.  Ante, 
at 370.  Thus, “disclosure permits citizens . . . to  react to the 
speech of [their political opponents] in a proper”—or undeni­
ably  improper—“way”  long  before  a  plaintiff  could  prevail 
on an as-applied challenge.2  Ante, at 371. 

2 But  cf.  Hill  v.  Colorado,  530  U. S.  703,  707–710  (2000)  (approving  a 
statute  restricting  speech  “within  100  feet”  of  abortion  clinics  because  it 
protected women seeking an abortion from “ ‘sidewalk counseling,’ ” which 
“consists  of  efforts  ‘to  educate,  counsel,  persuade,  or  inform  passersby 
about  abortion  and  abortion  alternatives  by  means  of  verbal  or  written