Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/23pdf/22-915_8o6b.pdf
Page Number: 86

Cite as:  602 U. S. ____ (2024) 

15 

THOMAS, J., dissenting 

defense  is  “the  central  component  of  the  [Second  Amend-
ment]  right,”  then  common  sense  dictates  that  it  matters 
whether you can defend yourself with a firearm anywhere, 
only at home, or nowhere.  Heller, 554 U. S., at 599 (empha-
sis deleted).  And, the Government’s suggestion ignores that 
we have repeatedly drawn careful distinctions between var-
ious  laws’  burdens.  See,  e.g.,  id.,  at  632  (explaining  that
laws  that  “did  not  clearly  prohibit  loaded  weapons  . . .  do 
not remotely burden the right of self-defense as much as an
absolute ban on handguns”); see also Bruen, 597 U. S., at 
48. 

Our  careful  parsing  of  regulatory  burdens  makes  sense 
given that  the Second  Amendment codifies a right  with  a 
“historically fixed meaning.”  Id., at 28.  Accordingly, his-
tory is our reference point and anchor.  If we stray too far
from  it  by  eliding  material  differences  between  historical
and modern laws, we “risk endorsing outliers that our an-
cestors would never have accepted.”  Id., at 30 (internal quo-
tation marks and alteration omitted).

Second, the Government offers no “comparable justifica-
tion” between laws punishing firearm storage practices and 
§922(g)(8).  It posits that both laws punish persons whose
“conduct suggested that he would not use [firearms] respon-
sibly.”  Brief for United States 24.  The Government, how-
ever, does not even attempt to ground that justification in 
historical evidence.  See infra, at 28–29. 

The  Government’s  proposed  justification  is  also  far  too 
general.  Nearly all firearm regulations can be cast as pre-
venting  “irresponsible”  or  “unfit”  persons  from  accessing 
firearms.  In addition, to argue that a law limiting access to
firearms is justified by the fact that the regulated groups
should  not  have  access  to  firearms  is  a  logical  merry-go-
round.  As  the  Court  has  made  clear,  such  overly  broad
judgments cannot suffice.  In Bruen, New York claimed it 
could  effectively  ban  public  carry  because  “the  island  of 
Manhattan [is] a ‘sensitive place.’ ”  597 U. S., at 31.  New