Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/19pdf/19-46_8n59.pdf
Page Number: 19.0

Cite as:  591 U. S. ____ (2020) 

1 

BREYER, J., dissenting 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

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No. 19–46 
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UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, 
ET AL., PETITIONERS v. BOOKING.COM B. V. 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT 

[June 30, 2020] 

JUSTICE BREYER, dissenting. 
What is Booking.com?  To answer this question, one need
only consult the term itself.  Respondent provides an online 
booking  service.    The  company’s  name  informs  the  con-
sumer of the basic nature of its business and nothing more.
Therein lies the root of my disagreement with the majority. 
Trademark law does not protect generic terms, meaning
terms that do no more than name the product or service it-
self.  This  principle  preserves  the  linguistic  commons  by
preventing one producer from appropriating to its own ex-
clusive use a term needed by others to describe their goods
or  services.  Today,  the  Court  holds  that  the  addition  of
“.com” to an otherwise generic term, such as “booking,” can 
yield a protectable trademark.  Because I believe this result 
is inconsistent with trademark principles and sound trade-
mark policy, I respectfully dissent. 

I 
A 
Trademark  law  protects  those  “ ‘distinctive  marks— 
words, names, symbols, and the like’ ” that “ ‘distinguish a
particular artisan’s goods from those of others.’ ”  Matal v. 
Tam, 582 U. S. ___, ___ (2017) (slip op., at 2) (quoting B&B 
Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Industries, Inc., 575 U. S. 138, 142 
(2015)).  To determine whether a given term is sufficiently