Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/22pdf/21-1164_7li8.pdf
Page Number: 14

Cite as:  598 U. S. ____ (2023) 

11 

Opinion of the Court 

analysis  of  whether  the  text  and  context  were  consistent 
with equitable tolling would have been wasted words if the
Court  had  already  held  that  §2409a(g)  was  jurisdictional. 
Precisely because the Court’s inquiry was so focused on the
particular nature of equitable tolling, Beggerly also did not 
address whether other exceptions such as “fraudulent con-
cealment or equitable estoppel might apply,” as Justice Ste-
vens  noted  in  his  concurrence.    Id.,  at  49.    If  anything, 
Beggerly’s discussion of nonjurisdictional reasons why toll-
ing specifically was unavailable indicates the Court under-
stood §2409a(g) not to be jurisdictional.  Thus, Beggerly un-
dermines  any  notion  that  Block  and  Mottaz  had  put  the 
jurisdictional question to rest. 

All  three  cases  therefore  point  in  one  direction:  This 
Court has never definitively interpreted §2409a(g) as juris-
dictional.7    For  similar  reasons,  the  Government’s  argu-
ment  about  legislative  acquiescence  is  unavailing.    Con-
gress amended the Act in 1986 to provide special rules for 
States  in  the  wake  of  Block.  See  100  Stat.  3351–3352. 
Then, as now, “none of our decisions establishe[d]” that the 
time limit was jurisdictional, so there was no definitive ju-
dicial interpretation to which Congress could acquiesce.  Al-
exander v. Sandoval, 532 U. S. 275, 291 (2001).  The mere 
existence  of  a  decision  employing  the  term  jurisdiction
without elaboration does not show Congress adopted that
view.  Nor  can  the  Government’s  handful  of  lower  court 
opinions stand in for a ruling of this Court, especially where
some of these decisions contain only fleeting references to 
jurisdiction.8  See Boechler, 596 U. S., at ___–___ (slip op., 
at 7–8). 

—————— 

7 The dissent invokes a fourth case, United States v. Dalm, 494 U. S. 
596 (1990), which offers no more support.  Dalm involved a separate pro-
vision  of  a  separate  statute,  see  id.,  at  601–602,  and  cannot  render 
§2490a(g) jurisdictional when Quiet Title  Act cases  like Block, Mottaz, 
and Beggerly failed to do so. 

8 See Fulcher v. United States, 696 F. 2d 1073, 1078 (CA4 1982).