Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/17pdf/16-1466_2b3j.pdf
Page Number: 76

Cite as:  585 U. S. ____ (2018) 

21 

KAGAN, J., dissenting 

claims it has become “an outlier among our First Amend-
ment cases.”  Ante, at 42.  That claim fails most spectacu-
larly  for  reasons  already  discussed:  Abood  coheres  with 
the  Pickering  approach  to  reviewing  regulation  of  public
employees’  speech.    See  supra,  at  11–13.    Needing  to 
stretch further, the majority suggests that Abood conflicts 
with “our political patronage decisions.”  Ante, at 44.  But 
in fact those decisions strike a balance much like Abood’s. 
On  the  one  hand,  the  Court  has  enabled  governments  to
compel  policymakers  to  support  a  political  party,  because 
that  requirement  (like  fees  for  collective  bargaining)  can
reasonably  be  thought  to  advance  the  interest  in  work-
place  effectiveness.  See  Elrod  v.  Burns,  427  U. S.  347, 
366–367  (1976);  Branti  v.  Finkel,  445  U. S.  507,  517 
(1980).  On the other hand, the Court has  barred govern-
ments  from  extending  that  rule  to  non-policymaking  em-
ployees  because  that  application  (like  fees  for  political
campaigns)  can’t  be  thought  to  promote  that  interest,  see 
Elrod, 427 U. S., at 366; the government is instead trying 
to “leverage the employment relationship” to achieve other 
goals, Garcetti, 547 U. S., at 419.  So all that the majority
has  left  is  Knox  and  Harris.  See  ante,  at  43.  Dicta  in 
those recent decisions indeed began the assault on Abood 
that  has  culminated  today.  But  neither  actually  ad-
dressed  the  extent  to  which  a  public  employer  may  regu-
late  its  own  employees’  speech.    Relying  on  them  is  boot-
strapping—and  mocking  stare  decisis.  Don’t  like  a 
decision?  Just  throw  some  gratuitous  criticisms  into  a 
couple  of  opinions  and  a  few  years  later  point  to  them  as
“special justifications.”

The  majority  is  likewise  wrong  to  invoke  “workability”
as a reason for overruling Abood.  Ante, at 38.  Does Abood 
require drawing a line?  Yes, between a union’s collective-
bargaining  activities  and  its  political  activities.    Is  that 
line  perfectly  and  pristinely  “precis[e],”  as  the  majority
demands?  Ante, at 38.  Well, not quite that—but as exer-