Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/22pdf/21-1086_1co6.pdf
Page Number: 5

Cite as:  599 U. S. ____ (2023) 

5 

Syllabus 

would “revise and reformulate the Gingles threshold inquiry that has 
been the baseline of [the Court’s] §2 jurisprudence” for decades.  Bart-
lett v. Strickland, 556 U. S. 1, 16 (plurality opinion).  Pp. 15–18. 

(2) Alabama argues that absent a benchmark, the Gingles frame-
work  ends  up  requiring  the racial  proportionality  in  districting  that 
§2(b)  forbids.    The  Court’s  decisions  implementing  §2  demonstrate, 
however, that when properly applied, the Gingles framework itself im-
poses meaningful constraints on proportionality.  See Shaw v. Reno, 
509 U. S. 630, 633–634; Miller v. Johnson, 515 U. S. 900, 906; Bush v. 
Vera, 517 U. S. 952, 957 (plurality opinion).  In Shaw v. Reno, for ex-
ample,  the  Court  considered  the  permissibility of  a  second  majority-
minority district in North Carolina, which at the time had 12 seats in 
the U. S. House of Representatives and a 20% black voting age popu-
lation.  509 U. S., at 633–634.  Though North Carolina believed §2 re-
quired a second majority-minority district, the Court found North Car-
olina’s  approach  an  impermissible  racial  gerrymander  because  the 
State  had  “concentrated  a  dispersed  minority  population  in  a  single 
district by disregarding traditional districting principles such as com-
pactness, contiguity, and respect for political subdivisions.”  Id., at 647.  
  The  Court’s  decisions  in  Bush  and  Shaw  similarly  declined  to  re-
quire additional majority-minority districts under §2 where those dis-
tricts did not satisfy traditional districting principles.  
  The Court recognizes that reapportionment remains primarily the 
duty and responsibility of the States, not the federal courts.  Section 2 
thus never requires adoption of districts that violate traditional redis-
tricting principles and instead limits judicial intervention to “those in-
stances of intensive racial politics” where the “excessive role [of race] 
in the electoral process . . . den[ies] minority voters equal opportunity 
to participate.”  S. Rep. No. 97–417, pp. 33–34.  Pp. 18–22. 

(c) To apply its race-neutral benchmark in practice, Alabama would 
require  plaintiffs  to  make  at  least  three  showings.    First,  Alabama 
would require §2 plaintiffs to show that the illustrative maps adduced 
for  the  first  Gingles  precondition  are  not  based  on  race.    Alabama 
would next graft onto §2 a requirement that plaintiffs demonstrate, at 
the totality of circumstances stage, that the State’s enacted plan con-
tains fewer majority-minority districts than what an “average” race-
neutral plan would contain.  And finally, Alabama would have plain-
tiffs prove that any deviation between the State’s plan and a race-neu-
tral plan is explainable “only” by race.  The Court declines to adopt any 
of these novel requirements.  
  Here, Alabama contends that because HB1 sufficiently “resembles” 
the  “race-neutral”  maps  created  by  the  State’s  experts—all of  which 
lack two majority-black districts—HB1 does not violate §2.  Alabama’s 
reliance on the maps created by its experts Dr. Duchin and Dr. Imai is