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10 

DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION v. BROWN 

Opinion of the Court 

to see how such an injury could be particular (since all peo-
ple suffer it) or concrete (since an as-yet-uncreated benefits
plan  is  necessarily  “ ‘abstract’ ”  and  not  “ ‘real’ ”).1  Spokeo, 
Inc. v. Robins, 578 U. S. 330, 340 (2016); see also Allen v. 
Wright,  468  U. S.  737,  755–756  (1984)  (rejecting  a  theory 
that would “extend [standing] nationwide”).  Nor have we 
ever accepted that an  injury is redressable when the pro-
spect of redress turns on the Government’s wholly discre-
tionary decision to create a new regulatory or benefits pro-
gram.

Nonetheless,  we  think  the  deficiencies  of  respondents’
claim are clearest with respect to traceability.  They cannot
show that their purported injury of not receiving loan relief 
under the HEA is fairly traceable to the Department’s (al-
legedly  unlawful)  decision  to  grant  loan  relief  under  the
HEROES Act. 

1 
At the outset, we reiterate what respondents’ claim is not.
Respondents are not claiming that they are injured by not 
being included in the Plan (or, in Taylor’s case, by being re-
munerated by the Plan less generously than he thinks him-
self entitled to).  After all, they think the Plan is substan-
tively  unlawful,  a  merits  contention  that  “we  accept  as 
valid” for purposes of analyzing standing.  Federal Election 
Comm’n  v.  Ted  Cruz  for  Senate,  596  U. S.  ___,  ___  (2022) 
(slip  op.,  at  6).    It  would  be  quite  strange  to  think  that  a
party experiences an Article III injury by not being affected 
by an unlawful action (in Brown’s case) or not being more 
affected by such action (in Taylor’s). 

Instead, respondents seek relief under a separate statu-
tory source.  They name the HEA as that potential source, 
but presumably they would be pleased for the Department 

—————— 

1 In contrast, a claim of unlawful exclusion from an existing benefits 
program  can  be  fit  for  judicial  resolution.    See,  e.g.,  Trinity  Lutheran 
Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 582 U. S. 449, 462 (2017).