Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/19pdf/17-1498_8mjp.pdf
Page Number: 38

Cite as:  590 U. S. ____ (2020) 

3 

Opinion of GORSUCH, J. 

tion of natural resources is a traditional and central respon-
sibility of state governments.  And States have long allowed 
landowners to seek redress for the pollution of their lands
through ancient common law causes of action like nuisance
and trespass.  The landowners employed exactly these the-
ories when they brought suit in state court seeking restora-
tion damages from Atlantic Richfield—money that could be
used  only  to  remove  arsenic,  lead,  and  other  toxins  from 
their  properties.  The  Montana  Supreme  Court  has  held 
that the landowners’ case states a viable claim for relief and 
warrants trial. 

Now, however, Atlantic Richfield wants us to call a halt 
to  the  proceedings.  The  company  insists  that  CERCLA
preempts and prohibits common law tort suits like this one. 
On Atlantic Richfield’s telling, CERCLA even prevents pri-
vate  landowners  from  voluntarily  remediating  their  own
properties at their own expense.  No one may do anything 
in 300 square miles of Montana, the company insists, with-
out first securing the federal government’s permission. 

But what in the law commands that result?  Everything
in CERCLA suggests that it seeks to supplement, not sup-
plant, traditional state law remedies and promote, not pro-
hibit, efforts to restore contaminated land.  Congress hardly
could have been clearer.  It stated that, “[n]othing in this 
[Act] shall be construed or interpreted as preempting any 
State  from  imposing  any  additional  liability  or  require-
ments with respect to the release of hazardous substances
within  such  State.”  42  U. S. C.  §9614(a).    It  added  that 
“[n]othing in this [Act] shall affect or modify in any way the
obligations or liabilities of any person under other Federal
or  State  law,  including  common  law,  with  respect  to  re-
leases of hazardous substances or other pollutants or con-
taminants.”  §9652(d).  And it said again that “[t]his [Act]
does not affect or otherwise impair the rights of any person 
under Federal, State, or common law, except with respect
to the timing of review as provided” elsewhere in provisions