Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/22pdf/598us1r3_j4ek.pdf
Page Number: 6

Cite as:  598 U. S. 17 (2023) 

21 

Opinion of the Court 

cant  change  in  the  law  for  purposes  of  Rule  32.1(g)  is  an 
adequate  and  independent  state-law  ground  for  the  judg-
ment.  It is not. 

I 

A 

Cruz  argued  at  trial  and  on  direct  appeal  that  the  trial 
court violated his due process rights under Simmons by not 
allowing him to inform the jury that the only sentencing al-
ternative to death in his case was life without parole. 

Prior to Cruz's trial, this Court had repeatedly reaffrmed 
Simmons'  holding.  In  case  after  case,  the  Court  explained 
that  when  “a  capital  defendant's  future  dangerousness  is  at 
issue, and the only sentencing alternative to death available 
to the jury is life imprisonment without possibility of parole, 
due process entitles the defendant `to inform the jury of [his] 
parole  ineligibility,  either  by  a  jury  instruction  or  in  argu-
ments by counsel.' ”  Shafer v. South Carolina, 532 U. S. 36, 
39  (2001)  (quoting  Ramdass  v.  Angelone,  530  U. S.  156,  165 
(2000)  (plurality  opinion));  see  also  Kelly  v.  South  Carolina, 
534 U. S. 246, 248, 251–252 (2002). 

The  same  year  this  Court  decided  Simmons,  Arizona 
amended  its  parole  statute  to  abolish  parole  for  all  felonies 
committed  after 1993.  Ariz.  Rev.  Stat. Ann.  § 41–1604.09(I) 
(1)  (1994).  Nevertheless,  Arizona's  capital  sentencing  stat-
ute  continued  to  list  two  alternatives  to  death:  (1)  “natural 
life,” which barred release “on any basis,” and (2) “life” with 
the  possibility  of  “release”  after  at  least  25  years.  § 13– 
751(A).  Because  of  the  elimination  of  parole,  however,  the 
only “release” available to capital defendants convicted after 
1993 was, and remains, executive clemency. 

Despite  the  elimination  of  parole  for  capital  defendants, 
the  Arizona  Supreme  Court  held,  in  a  series  of  cases 
commencing  with  Cruz's  direct  appeal,  that  Simmons  did 
not  apply  in  Arizona  because  the  State's  sentencing  scheme 
was  suffciently  distinct  from  the  one  at  issue  in  Sim-

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