Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/558bv.pdf
Page Number: 833.0

986 

OCTOBER TERM, 2009 

Statement of Stevens, J. 

558 U. S. 

the  Protection  of  Foreign  Ofﬁcials  and  Ofﬁcial  Guests  of  the 
United  States,  Pub.  L.  92–539,  § 201,  86  Stat.  1072,  which  had  the 
effect of changing the applicable statute of limitations from § 3281 
to  § 3282. 

In  this  case,  the  District  Court  held  that  the  1972  repeal  did 
not  retroactively  change  the  character  of  a  violation  of  § 1201  as 
a capital offense within the meaning of § 3281—and therefore that 
the  prosecution  of  Seale  could  go  forward—but  a  panel  of  the 
Court  of  Appeals  reversed.  542  F.  3d  1033  (CA5  2008).  In  re­
sponse  to  the  Government’s  petition  for  rehearing  en  banc,  the 
full  court  vacated  the  panel  decision  and,  by  an  equally  divided 
9-to-9  vote, afﬁrmed  the  District Court’s  ruling  on the  limitations 
defense.  570  F.  3d  650  (2009)  (per  curiam);  see  also  id.,  at  651 
(DeMoss,  J.,  dissenting)  (noting  the  afﬁrmance’s  “nominal”  nature 
in  light  of  the  deadlock).  Following  the  procedure  authorized  by 
Congress  in  28  U. S. C.  § 1254(2)  and  by  this  Court’s  Rule  19,  a 
majority  of  the  members  of  the  en  banc  court  voted  to  certify 
this  question  of  law  to  us  for  decision. 

The  question  is  narrow,  debatable,  and  important.  I  recognize 
that  the  question  reaches  us  in  an  interlocutory  posture,  as  Seale 
appealed  his  conviction  on  numerous  grounds,  and  that  “[i]t  is 
primarily  the  task  of  a  Court  of  Appeals  to  reconcile  its  internal 
difﬁculties,” Wisniewski v.  United States, 353 U. S. 901, 902 (1957) 
(per  curiam).  Yet  I  see  no  beneﬁt  and  signiﬁcant  cost  to  post­
poning  the  question’s  resolution.  A  prompt  answer  from  this 
Court  will  expedite  the  termination  of  this  litigation  and  deter­
mine  whether  other  similar  cases  may  be  prosecuted.  In  these 
unusual  circumstances,  certiﬁcation  can  serve  the  interests  not 
only  of  legal  clarity  but  also  of  prosecutorial  economy  and  “the 
proper  administration  and  expedition  of  judicial  business.”  Ibid. 
The  certiﬁcation  process  has  all  but  disappeared  in  recent  dec­
ades.  The  Court  has  accepted  only  a  handful  of  certiﬁed  cases 
since  the  1940’s  and  none  since  1981;  it  is  a  newsworthy  event 
these  days  when  a  lower  court  even  tries  for  certiﬁcation.  Sec­
tion  1254(2)  and  this  Court’s  Rule  19  remain  part  of  our  law 
because the certiﬁcation process serves a valuable, if limited, func­
tion.  We  ought  to  avail  ourselves  of  it  in  an  appropriate  case. 
In my judgment, this case should be briefed and set for argument.