Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/10pdf/09-152.pdf
Page Number: 45

16 

BRUESEWITZ v. WYETH LLC 

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting 

“Conspicuously  absent  from  the  submissions  by  [re-
spondent]  and  the  United  States  is  any  plausible  al-
ternative  interpretation  of  ‘in  addition  to  or  different 
from’  that  would  give  that  phrase  meaning.    Instead, 
they  appear  to  favor  reading  those  words  out  of  the 
statute,  which  would  leave  the  following:  ‘Such  State
shall  not  impose  or  continue  in  effect  any  require-
ments  for  labeling  or  packaging.’    This  amputated 
version  of  [the  statute]  would  no  doubt  have  clearly 
and  succinctly  commanded  the  pre-emption  of  all 
state  requirements  concerning  labeling.    That  Con-
gress added the remainder of the provision is evidence 
of its intent to draw a distinction between state label-
ing  requirements  that  are  pre-empted  and  those  that 
are not.”  544 U. S., at 448–449. 

As with the statutory interpretation rejected by this Court
in  Bates,  the  majority’s  interpretation  of  §22(b)(1)  func-
tionally excises 13 words out of the statute, including the
key term “unavoidable.”  See Duncan v. Walker, 533 U. S. 
167,  174  (2001)  (“We  are  especially  unwilling”  to  treat  a 
statutory  term  as  surplusage  “when  the  term  occupies  so 
pivotal  a  place  in  the  statutory  scheme”).    Although  the
resulting  “amputated  version”  of  the  statutory  provision 
“would  no  doubt  have  clearly  and  succinctly  commanded
the pre-emption of all state” design defect claims, the fact
“[t]hat  Congress  added  the  remainder  of  the  provision”  is 
strong evidence of its intent not to pre-empt design defect
claims  categorically.  Bates,  544  U. S.,  at  449;  see  also 
American Home Prods. Corp. v. Ferrari, 284 Ga. 384, 393, 
668 S. E. 2d 236, 242 (2008) (“ ‘If Congress had intended to
deprive injured parties of a long available form of compen-
sation,  it  surely  would  have  expressed  that  intent  more 
clearly’ ” (quoting Bates, 544 U. S., at 449)), cert. pending, 
No. 08–1120. 

Strikingly, the majority concedes that its interpretation