Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/524bv.pdf
Page Number: 74

524US1

Unit: $U72

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Cite as: 524 U. S. 11 (1998)

29

Scalia, J., dissenting

basic issue that Question Two presents without considering
the special communicative nature of the “expenditures” here
at issue, cf. United States v. CIO, 335 U. S. 106, 121 (1948)
(describing relation between membership communications
and constitutionally protected rights of association). And, a
considered determination of the scope of the statutory ex-
emption that Congress enacted to address membership com-
munications would helpfully inform our consideration of the
“major purpose” test.

The upshot, in our view, is that we should permit the FEC
to address, in the ﬁrst instance, the issue presented by Ques-
tion Two. We can thereby take advantage of the relevant
agency’s expertise, by allowing it to develop a more precise
rule that may dispose of this case, or at a minimum, will aid
the Court in reaching a more informed conclusion.
In our
view, the FEC should proceed to determine whether or not
AIPAC’s expenditures qualify as “membership communica-
tions,” and thereby fall outside the scope of “expenditures”
that could qualify it as a “political committee.”
If the FEC
decides that despite its new rules, the communications here
do not qualify for this exception, then the lower courts, in
reconsidering respondents’ arguments, can still evaluate the
signiﬁcance of the communicative context in which the case
arises.
If, on the other hand, the FEC decides that AIPAC’s
activities fall within the “membership communications” ex-
ception, the matter will become moot.

For these reasons, the judgment of the Court of Appeals
is vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

Justice Scalia, with whom Justice O(cid:146)Connor and

Justice Thomas join, dissenting.

The provision of law at issue in this case is an extraordi-
nary one, conferring upon a private person the ability to
bring an Executive agency into court to compel its enforce-