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INTEL CORP. INVESTMENT POLICY COMM. v. SULYMA 

Opinion of the Court 

plaintiffs subject to §1113.  The Secretary of Labor, for ex-
ample, may also sue imprudent fiduciaries for the benefit of 
plan participants.  See §1132(a)(2).  And the United States 
represents that the Secretary will have a hard time doing
so  within  §1113(2)’s  timeframe  if  deemed  to  have  actual 
knowledge of the facts contained in the many reports that
the Department receives from ERISA plans each year.  See 
Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 27–28.  Moreover, 
the statute’s repose period will still protect defendants from 
suits filed more than six years after the alleged breach.  See 
§1113(1).

Petitioners  may  well  be  correct  that  heeding  the  plain
meaning  of  §1113(2)  substantially  diminishes  the  protec-
tion that it provides for ERISA fiduciaries, but by the same
token,  petitioners’  interpretation  would  greatly  reduce
§1113(1)’s  value  for  beneficiaries,  given  the  disclosure  re-
gime that petitioners themselves emphasize.  Choosing be-
tween  these  alternatives  is  a  task  for  Congress,  and  we
must  assume  that  the  language  of  §1113(2)  reflects  Con-
gress’s choice.  If policy considerations suggest that the cur-
rent scheme should be altered, Congress must be the one to 
do it.  See, e.g., Azar v. Allina Health Services, 587 U. S. ___, 
___ (2019).

Finally, petitioners argue that the plain meaning of “ac-
tual knowledge” renders an earlier version of §1113(2) inco-
herent.  As originally enacted, the §1113(2) limitations pe-
riod  began  either  when  the  plaintiff  gained  actual 
knowledge  of  the  alleged  breach  or  when  “a  report  from
which [the plaintiff] could reasonably be expected to have 
obtained knowledge . . . was filed with” the Secretary of La-
bor.  29 U. S. C. §1113(2) (1976 ed.).  That latter, construc-
tive-knowledge  clause  was  later  repealed.  See  Omnibus 
Budget  Reconciliation  Act  of  1987,  §9342(b),  101  Stat.
1330–371.  According to petitioners, if “actual knowledge”
means  what  it  says,  then  the  original  version  of  §1113(2)
charged plan participants with learning what was sent to