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18 

COUNTERMAN v. COLORADO 

SOTOMAYOR, J., concurring
Opinion of SOTOMAYOR, J. 

gard  his  statements  as  threatening,  that  would  be  suffi-
cient.  It  would  be  quite  troubling  indeed  to  adopt  a  rule 
rendering  this  Court’s  admirable  defense  of  the  First 
Amendment wrongly decided.  Nor is Claiborne the only ex-
ample.  The foundational incitement case, Brandenburg v. 
Ohio,  395  U. S.  444  (1969)  (per  curiam),  extended  First
Amendment protections to armed  Klan members uttering 
racial slurs, a warning that “there might have to be some
revengeance  taken,”  and  plans  for  a  “ ‘four  hundred  thou-
sand strong’ ” march in two cities.  Id., at 446.  Then, as now, 
there would be at least some risk that a reasonable resident 
of those cities could feel threatened. 

These concrete examples illustrate a more general prin-
ciple.  Speech  inciting  imminent  and  dangerous  unlawful
activity will reasonably be threatening to those who would 
be  harmed  by  that  illegality.  In  all  such  cases,  whether 
seminal decisions by this Court or guilty pleas that barely
see  the  inside  of  a  courtroom,  the  Court’s  decision  effec-
tively downgrades to recklessness the mens rea required for
incitement of unlawful force; prosecutors could now simply 
charge such offenses as true threats.  This is particularly
worrisome because the standard for recklessness decreases 
the lower the “social utility” of the conduct.  1 W. LaFave, 
Substantive Criminal Law §5.4(f ) (3d ed. 2018).  That is a 
troubling standard for juries in a polarized nation to apply
in cases involving heated political speech.  This collateral 
damage can be avoided, however, if intent to threaten is un-
derstood as part of a true threat, just like intent to incite is 
part of incitement. 

2 

While obscenity is a step further afield of true threats and 
incitement, examination of this Court’s obscenity case law 
further supports an intent requirement for prosecutions of 
true threats. 

The Constitution “ ‘requires proof of scienter’ ” in part “ ‘to