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2 

GEORGE v. MCDONOUGH 

Syllabus 

clear and unmistakable error.  Pp. 5–12.

(a) This case turns on the meaning of the 1997 statute subjecting a 
final  veterans’  benefits  decision  to  collateral  review  on  grounds  of 
“clear and unmistakable error.”  111 Stat. 2271 (38 U. S. C. §§5109A, 
7111).  No statute defines the term “clear and unmistakable error,” but 
the modifiers “clear” and “unmistakable” as well as the statutory struc-
ture suggest a narrow category.  A robust regulatory backdrop fills in 
the details.  Where Congress employs a term of art “ ‘ “obviously trans-
planted from another legal source,” ’ it ‘ “brings the old soil with it.” ’ ” 
Taggart v. Lorenzen, 587 U. S. ___, ___.  That principle applies here.
The  Court  agrees  with  the  Federal  Circuit  that  Congress  “codif[ied] 
and  adopt[ed]  the  [clear-and-unmistakable-error]  doctrine  as  it  had 
developed under” decades of prior agency practice.  Cook v. Principi, 
318 F. 3d 1334, 1344 (en banc).  That history reveals that this category
of  error  does  not  encompass  a  subsequent  “change  in  law  . . .  or  a 
change in interpretation of law.”  38 CFR §3.105 (Cum. Supp. 1963).
And the invalidation of a prior regulation constitutes a “change in in-
terpretation of law” under historical agency practice.  Defined by this 
regulatory history, the statutory term “clear and unmistakable error” 
does not encompass a claim like George’s.  Pp. 5–8.

(b) In response, George argues that the VA has distorted the history 
of agency practice that the 1997 statute codified.  But across a century 
of  review  for  clear  and  unmistakable  error,  George  can  muster  only
one uncertain outlier case sustaining a claim that arguably resembles
his, which does not move the mountain of contrary regulatory author-
ity.  He alternatively argues that the VA is wrong to call a later deci-
sion invalidating a regulation a “change in interpretation of law.”  But 
that is a perfectly natural use of language.  George tries to bolster his 
position  by  invoking  cases  explaining  that  a  judicial  decision  states 
what the statute “always meant,” Rivers v. Roadway Express, Inc., 511 
U. S. 298, 313, n. 12, and an unauthorized regulation is a “ ‘nullity,’ ” 
Dixon v. United States, 381 U. S. 68, 74.  But those general principles 
do not disturb the conclusion that the Board’s application of a then-
binding  regulation  is  not  the  kind of  “clear  and  unmistakable  error” 
for which collateral relief is available under §§5109A and 7111.  And 
that longstanding VA approach is consistent with the general rule that
the new interpretation of a statute can only retroactively affect deci-
sions still open on direct review. 

George also leans on what he describes as the plain meaning of the 
words “clear and unmistakable error.”  But as he concedes elsewhere, 
the real question is not what might be called clear and unmistakable 
error  in  the  abstract,  but  what  the  prevailing  understanding  of  this
term of art was when Congress codified it.  The fact that Congress did 
not expressly enact the specific regulatory principle barring collateral