Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/20pdf/20-222_2c83.pdf
Page Number: 20.0

Cite as:  594 U. S. ____ (2021) 

1 

GORSUCH, J., dissenting
Opinion of GORSUCH, J. 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

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No. 20–222 
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GOLDMAN SACHS GROUP, INC., ET AL., 
PETITIONERS v. ARKANSAS TEACHER 
RETIREMENT SYSTEM, ET AL. 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT 

[June 21, 2021] 

JUSTICE  GORSUCH,  with  whom  JUSTICE  THOMAS  and 
JUSTICE  ALITO  join,  concurring  in  part  and  dissenting  in 
part. 

I join all but Part II–B of the Court’s opinion.  There, the 
Court  holds  that  the  defendant,  rather  than  the  plaintiff, 
“bear[s] the burden of persuasion on price impact.”  Ante, at 
9.  Respectfully, I disagree.

We  start  from  common  ground.  Basic  Inc.  v.  Levinson, 
485  U. S.  224,  245–247  (1988),  sought  to  import  fraud  on 
the market theory from economics into securities litigation.
In doing so, Basic posited two things—first, in an efficient 
market a company’s stock price generally reflects any pub-
lic and material information about the company; second, in-
vestors generally rely on a company’s stock price as an in-
dicator of the firm’s true value.  Ibid.  Given these economic 
assumptions, the Court held that securities fraud plaintiffs 
can presumptively meet their burden of proving reliance on
an  alleged  misrepresentation  by  proving  four  things:  (1)
the  defendant’s  alleged  misrepresentation  was  publicly
known; (2) it was material; (3) the stock traded in an effi-
cient  market;  and  (4)  the  plaintiff  purchased  the  stock  at 
the  market  price  between  the  time  the  misrepresentation 
was made and the truth was revealed.  See Halliburton Co. 
v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 573 U. S. 258, 277–278 (2014)