Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/21pdf/21-147_g31h.pdf
Page Number: 41

Cite as:  596 U. S. ____ (2022) 

17 

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting
Opinion of SOTOMAYOR, J. 

involving facts substantially identical to those in Bivens it-
self.  Supra, at 8–9.3 

B 

The  Court’s  application  of  its  new  standard  to  Boule’s 
Fourth Amendment claim underscores just how novel that 
standard is.  Even assuming the claim presents a new con-
text, the Court’s insistence that national-security concerns
bar  the  claim  directly  contravenes  Ziglar.  Moreover,  the 
Court’s  holding  that  a  nonbinding  administrative  investi-
gation process, internal to the agency and offering no mean-
ingful  protection  of  the  constitutional  interests  at  stake, 
constitutes an alternative remedy that forecloses Bivens re-
lief blinks reality. 

1 

The Court acknowledges the force of the Court of Appeals’ 
conclusion that Bivens and this case present “ ‘almost par-
allel  circumstances,’ ”  but  it  nonetheless  concludes  that  a 
most  unlikely  special  factor  counsels  hesitation:  the 
“national-security context.”  Ante, at 10.  By the Court’s tell-
ing,  Hernández  declined  to  recognize  a  Bivens  action  “be-
cause  ‘regulating  the  conduct  of  agents  at  the  border  un-
questionably  has  national  security  implications,’  and  the 
‘risk of undermining border security provides reason to hes-
itate  before  extending  Bivens  into  this  field.’ ”    Ante,  at  9 
—————— 

3 The  Court  supports  its  decision  not  to  recognize  an  action  under 
Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U. S. 388 (1971), by 
observing that we have declined to recognize a Bivens-style cause of ac-
tion for other constitutional violations.  Ante, at 1.  What the Court fails 
to acknowledge, however, is that each of those cases presented a mean-
ingfully new context and/or raised special factors counseling hesitation
that are not present in this case.  See supra, at 6, 9–10, 13–14, 15–16; 
infra, at 21–22.  The one exception is Hui v. Castaneda, 559 U. S. 799, 
808 (2010), in which the Court did not have to conduct this analysis be-
cause  it  held  the  FTCA’s  comprehensive  remedial  scheme,  which  pro-
vided  both  a  cause  of  action  and  an  exclusive  damages  remedy  for  the 
claim at issue, clearly precluded a Bivens claim.