Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/19pdf/18-1334_8m58.pdf
Page Number: 36.0

10 

FINANCIAL OVERSIGHT AND MANAGEMENT BD. FOR 
PUERTO RICO v. AURELIUS INVESTMENT, LLC 
THOMAS, J., concurring in judgment 

the  Court  sets  up  a  dichotomy  between  officers  with  “pri-
marily  local  versus  primarily  federal”  duties.    Ante,  at  18 
(emphasis  deleted).    I  cannot  agree  with  this  amorphous 
test. 

As an initial matter, the Court need not decide whether 
an  officer  exercising  both  national  and  Article  IV  powers 
qualifies as an “Officer of the United States.”  The Board’s 
members  have  responsibility  for  ongoing  statutory  duties
that are entirely within the scope of Article IV.  See ante, at 
14–20. 

Resolving  this  unnecessary  issue  is  especially  problem-
atic because the original meaning of the phrase “Officers of
the United States” arguably includes all officers exercising
the powers of the National Government, even if those offic-
ers also exercise power vested under Article IV.  The Gov-
ernor  of  the  Northwest  Territory,  for  example,  seems  to 
have performed “primarily local” duties, yet the First Con-
gress believed the Governor was an “Officer of the United
States”  subject  to  the  restrictions  of  the  Appointments
Clause.  Supra, at 7–8; see also ante, at 8. 

The Court fails to engage with this point.  Indeed, it fails 
to provide any foundation at all for its “primarily local” rule. 
The only analysis to be found is a conclusory statement that 
Palmore v. United States, 411 U. S. 389 (1973), “provides a 
rough analogy.”  Ante, at 19.  But drawing a rule from a case 
that is “no[t] . . . directly on point,” ibid., without even ana-
lyzing the underlying reasoning of that case, is not sound 
constitutional interpretation.  And favoring a tangentially 
related  decision  from  1973  over  the  practices  of  the  First
Congress  is  certainly  not  “more  faithful  to  the  [Appoint-
ment] Clause’s original meaning,” ante, at 21. 

Finally,  the  Court  fails  to  provide  any  explanation  for
what  makes  an  officer’s  duties  “primarily  local.”    Ante,  at 
14–20.  Is it the relative importance of the duties?  Or is it 
the  number  of  duties  exercised  pursuant  to  each  power? 
And what ratio is required for duties to be primarily local?