Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/22pdf/21-1043_7648.pdf
Page Number: 26.0

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ABITRON AUSTRIA GMBH v. HETRONIC INT’L, INC. 

SOTOMAYOR, J., concurring in judgment 

then proceeds to determine at step two “whether the case
involves  a  domestic  application  of  the  statute.”    Ibid.    To  
determine whether a domestic application exists, the Court 
must ascertain the statute’s “focus,” i.e., “the objec[t] of the
statute’s solicitude.”  Morrison, 561 U. S., at 266–267. 

As I explain below, although I agree with the result the
Court reaches with respect to the first step, I disagree with 
its analysis at step two. 

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Sections 32(1)(a) and 43(a)(1)(A) of the Lanham Act im-
pose civil liability on a defendant who “use[s] in commerce” 
a trademark in a manner that is “likely to cause confusion,
or to cause mistake, or to deceive.”  15 U. S. C. §§1114(1)(a), 
1125(a)(1)(A).  The Act in turn defines “commerce” as “all 
commerce which may  lawfully be regulated by Congress.” 
§1127.

Under  this  Court’s  precedents,  this  language  is  insuffi-
cient to rebut the presumption against extraterritoriality at 
step one.  The Court has “repeatedly held that even statutes 
that  contain  broad  language  in  their  definitions  of  ‘com-
merce’ that expressly refer to ‘foreign commerce’ do not ap-
ply abroad” to all foreign conduct.  Morrison, 561 U. S., at 
262–263 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also RJR 
Nabisco, 579 U. S., at 344 (a statute’s reference to “foreign 
commerce” does not “mean literally all commerce occurring
abroad”).  The Court has also explained “that generic terms 
like ‘any’ or ‘every’ do not rebut the presumption.”  Kiobel v. 
Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U. S. 108, 118 (2013).  The 
term  “all”  is  not  meaningfully  different.    While  “the  word 
conveys  breadth,”  Peter  v.  NantKwest,  Inc.,  589  U. S.  ___, 
___ (2019) (slip op., at 7), it does not rebut the presumption 
either. 

The Court’s inquiry at step two centers on the “focus” of 

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