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Page Number: 36.0

6 

BARR v. AMERICAN ASSN. OF POLITICAL  
CONSULTANTS, INC. 
Opinion of BREYER, J. 

The  plurality  claims  that  its  approach,  which  categori-
cally  applies  strict  scrutiny  to  content-based  distinctions, 
will not “affect traditional or ordinary economic regulation 
of  commercial  activity.”  Ante,  at  9.  But  how  is  that  so? 
Much  of  human  life  involves  activity  that  takes  place
through speech.  And much regulatory activity turns upon 
speech  content.  See,  e.g.,  Reed,  576  U. S.,  at  177–178 
(BREYER,  J.,  concurring  in  judgment)  (giving  examples). 
Consider,  for  example,  the  regulation  of  securities  sales, 
drug  labeling,  food  labeling,  false  advertising,  workplace 
safety warnings, automobile airbag instructions, consumer 
electronic labels, tax forms, debt collection, and so on.  All 
of  those  regulations  necessarily  involve  content-based
speech distinctions.  What are the differences between reg-
ulatory programs themselves other than differences based 
on content?  After all, the regulatory spheres in which the
Securities and Exchange Commission or the Federal Trade
Commission  operate  are  defined  by  content.    Put  simply, 
treating  all  content-based  distinctions  on  speech  as  pre-
sumptively  unconstitutional  is  unworkable  and  would  ob-
struct the ordinary workings of democratic governance.   

That conclusion is true here notwithstanding the plural-
ity’s  effort  to  bring  political  speech  into  the  First  Amend-
ment analysis.  See ante, at 7, 25 (characterizing Congress
as having “favored debt-collection speech over plaintiffs’ po-
litical  speech”).  It  is  true  that  the  underlying  cell  phone 
robocall  restriction  generally  prohibits  political  speakers
from making robocalls.  But that has little to do with the 
government-debt exception or its practical effect.  Nor does 
it justify the application of strict scrutiny.

Consider  prescription  drug  labels, securities  forms,  and 
tax  statements.  A  government  agency  might  reasonably 
specify just what information the form or label must contain 
and further provide that the form or label may not contain 
other information (thereby excluding political statements).
No one would think that the exclusion of political speech,