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Page Number: 2.0

2 

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA v. HELLER 

Syllabus 

of the operative clause.  The “militia” comprised all males physically
capable of acting in concert for the common defense.  The Antifederal-
ists feared that the Federal Government would disarm the people in 
order  to  disable  this  citizens’  militia,  enabling  a  politicized  standing 
army or a select militia to rule.  The response was to deny Congress 
power  to  abridge  the  ancient  right  of  individuals  to  keep  and  bear
arms,  so  that  the  ideal  of  a  citizens’  militia  would  be  preserved. 
Pp. 22–28.  

(c) The  Court’s  interpretation  is  confirmed  by  analogous  arms-
bearing  rights  in  state  constitutions  that  preceded  and  immediately
followed the Second Amendment.  Pp. 28–30.

(d) The  Second  Amendment’s  drafting  history,  while  of  dubious 
interpretive worth, reveals three state Second Amendment proposals 
that  unequivocally  referred  to  an  individual  right  to  bear  arms. 
Pp. 30–32.  

(e) Interpretation  of  the  Second  Amendment  by  scholars,  courts 
and  legislators,  from  immediately  after  its  ratification  through  the 
late 19th century also supports the Court’s conclusion.  Pp. 32–47.  

(f) None of the Court’s precedents forecloses the Court’s interpre-
tation.  Neither  United  States  v.  Cruikshank,  92  U. S.  542,  553,  nor 
Presser  v.  Illinois,  116  U. S.  252,  264–265,  refutes  the  individual-
rights interpretation.  United States v. Miller, 307 U. S. 174, does not 
limit the right to keep and bear arms to militia purposes, but rather 
limits the type of weapon to which the right applies to those used by 
the militia, i.e., those in common use for lawful purposes.  Pp. 47–54.
2. Like most rights, the Second Amendment right is not unlimited.
It  is  not  a  right  to  keep  and  carry  any  weapon  whatsoever  in  any 
manner  whatsoever  and  for  whatever  purpose:  For  example,  con-
cealed weapons prohibitions have been upheld under the Amendment 
or  state  analogues.    The  Court’s  opinion  should  not  be  taken  to  cast
doubt  on  longstanding  prohibitions  on  the  possession  of  firearms  by
felons  and  the  mentally  ill,  or  laws  forbidding  the  carrying  of  fire-
arms in sensitive places such as schools and government buildings, or 
laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of 
arms.  Miller’s holding that the sorts of weapons protected are those 
“in common use at the time” finds support in the historical tradition
of  prohibiting  the  carrying  of  dangerous  and  unusual  weapons. 
Pp. 54–56. 

3. The handgun ban and the trigger-lock requirement (as applied to
self-defense) violate the Second Amendment.  The District’s total ban 
on  handgun  possession  in  the  home  amounts  to  a  prohibition  on  an
entire class of “arms” that Americans overwhelmingly choose for the 
lawful  purpose  of  self-defense.    Under  any  of  the  standards  of  scru-
tiny  the  Court  has  applied  to  enumerated  constitutional  rights,  this