Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/11pdf/10-9646.pdf
Page Number: 25.0

Cite as:  567 U. S. ____ (2012) 

21 

Opinion of the Court 

enactments.  See,  e.g.,  Sumner  v.  Shuman,  483  U. S.  66 
(relying  on  Woodson’s  logic  to  prohibit  the  mandatory 
death  penalty  for  murderers  already  serving  life  without 
parole);  Lockett,  438  U. S.,  at  602–608  (plurality  opinion) 
(applying  Woodson  to  require  that  judges  and  juries
consider  all  mitigating  evidence);  Eddings,  455  U. S.,  at 
110–117 (similar).  We see no difference here. 

In any event, the “objective indicia” that the States offer
do  not  distinguish  these  cases  from  others  holding  that
a sentencing practice violates the Eighth Amendment.  In 
Graham,  we  prohibited  life-without-parole  terms  for 
juveniles  committing  nonhomicide  offenses  even  though
39  jurisdictions  permitted  that  sentence.  See  560  U. S., 
at  ___  (slip  op.,  at  11).    That  is  10  more  than  impose  life
without  parole  on  juveniles  on  a  mandatory  basis.10    And  

—————— 

10 In  assessing  indicia  of  societal  standards,  Graham  discussed  “ac-
tual sentencing practices” in addition to legislative enactments, noting
how infrequently sentencers imposed the statutorily available penalty.
560 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 11).  Here, we consider the constitutional- 
ity  of  mandatory  sentencing  schemes—which  by  definition  remove  a
judge’s  or  jury’s  discretion—so  no  comparable  gap  between  legislation
and  practice  can  exist.    Rather  than  showing  whether  sentencers 
consider life without parole for juvenile homicide offenders appropriate,
the  number  of  juveniles  serving  this  sentence,  see  post,  at  1,  3–4 
(ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting), merely reflects the number who have com-
mitted  homicide  in  mandatory-sentencing  jurisdictions.    For  the  same 
reason, THE CHIEF JUSTICE’s comparison of ratios in this case and Gra-
ham  carries  little  weight.    He  contrasts  the  number  of  mandatory 
life-without-parole  sentences  for  juvenile  murderers,  relative  to  the 
number  of  juveniles  arrested  for  murder,  with  “the  corresponding 
number” of sentences in Graham (i.e., the number of life-without-parole
sentences  for  juveniles  who  committed  serious  nonhomicide  crimes,  as
compared  to  arrests  for  those  crimes).    Post,  at  4.   But  because  the 
mandatory nature of the sentences here necessarily makes them more
common, THE CHIEF JUSTICE’s figures do not “correspon[d]” at all.  The 
higher ratio is mostly a function of removing the sentencer’s discretion.
Where  mandatory  sentencing  does not  itself  account  for  the  number
of  juveniles  serving  life-without-parole  terms,  the  evidence  we  have  of
practice  supports  our  holding.    Fifteen  jurisdictions  make  life  without