Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/16pdf/15-1358_6khn.pdf
Page Number: 3

Cite as:  582 U. S. ____ (2017) 

3 

Syllabus 

analysis.  The question is whether Congress or the courts should de-
cide to authorize a damages suit.  Bush v. Lucas, 462 U. S. 367, 380. 
Most  often  it  will  be  Congress,  for  Bivens  will  not  be  extended  to  a 
new context if there are “ ‘special factors counselling hesitation in the
absence of affirmative action by Congress.’ ”  Carlson, supra, at 18.  If 
there are sound reasons to think Congress might doubt the efficacy or
necessity of a damages remedy as part of the system for enforcing the 
law  and  correcting  a  wrong,  courts  must  refrain  from  creating  that
kind of remedy.  An alternative remedial structure may also limit the 
Judiciary’s power to infer a new Bivens cause of action.  Pp. 8–14.

2. Considering the relevant special factors here, a Bivens-type rem-
edy should not be extended to the claims challenging the confinement
conditions  imposed  on  respondents  pursuant  to  the  formal  policy
adopted  by  the  Executive  Officials  in  the  wake  of  the  September  11 
attacks.  These “detention policy claims” include the allegations that
petitioners  violated  respondents’  due  process  and  equal  protection
rights  by  holding  them  in  restrictive  conditions  of  confinement,  and 
the  allegations  that  the  Wardens  violated  the  Fourth  and  Fifth 
Amendments  by  subjecting  respondents  to  frequent  strip  searches.
The  detention  policy  claims  do  not  include  the  guard-abuse  claim
against Warden Hasty.  Pp. 14–23.  

(a) The  proper  test  for  determining  whether  a  claim  arises  in  a 
new  Bivens  context  is  as  follows.    If  the  case  is  different  in  a  mean-
ingful way from previous Bivens cases decided by this Court, then the 
context is new.  Meaningful differences may include, e.g., the rank of 
the  officers  involved;  the  constitutional  right  at  issue;  the  extent  of
judicial guidance for the official conduct; the risk of disruptive intru-
sion  by  the  Judiciary  into  the  functioning  of  other  branches;  or  the
presence of potential special factors not considered in previous Bivens 
cases.    Respondents’  detention  policy  claims  bear  little  resemblance
to the three Bivens claims the Court has approved in previous cases.
The Second Circuit thus should have held that this was a new Bivens 
context and then performed a special factors analysis before allowing
this damages suit to proceed.  Pp. 15–17.

(b) The  special  factors  here  indicate  that  Congress,  not  the

courts, should decide whether a damages action should be allowed.  

With  regard  to  the  Executive  Officials,  a  Bivens  action  is  not  “a 
proper  vehicle  for  altering  an  entity’s  policy,”  Correctional  Services 
Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U. S. 61, 74, and is not designed to hold officers
responsible  for  acts  of  their  subordinates,  see  Iqbal,  supra,  at  676. 
Even  an  action  confined  to  the  Executive  Officers’  own  discrete  con-
duct would call into question the formulation and implementation of
a high-level executive policy, and the burdens of that litigation could
prevent officials from properly discharging their duties, see Cheney v.