Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/19pdf/18-260_jifl.pdf
Page Number: 30.0

Cite as:  590 U. S. ____ (2020) 

5 

THOMAS, J., dissenting 

of commerce. 

Further,  the  Court’s  interpretation  creates  practical 
problems of its own.  As the Court acknowledges, its opinion 
gives  almost  no  guidance,  save  for  a  list  of  seven  factors.
But the Court does not commit to whether those factors are 
the  only  relevant  ones,  whether  those  factors  are  always 
relevant, or which factors are the most important.  See ante, 
at 15–16.  It ultimately does little to explain how function-
ally equivalent an indirect discharge must be to require a 
permit.2 

The  Court  suggests  that  the  EPA  could  clarify  matters
through “administrative guidance,”  ante, at 17, but so far 
the  EPA  has  provided  only  limited  advice  and  recently
shifted its position, see 84 Fed. Reg. 16810 (2019); ante, at 
11–12.  In any event, the sort of “ ‘general rules’ ” that the
Court hopes the EPA will promulgate are constitutionally 
suspect.  See Department of Transportation v. Association 
of  American  Railroads,  575  U. S.  43,  67–87  (2015) 
(THOMAS, J., concurring in judgment). 

Despite  giving  minimal  guidance  as  to  how  this  case
should be decided on remand, the majority speculates about 
whether a permit would be required in other factual circum-

—————— 

2 JUSTICE  KAVANAUGH  believes  that  the  Court’s  opinion  provides 
enough guidance when it states that “[t]ime and distance will be the most
important factors in most cases, but not necessarily every case,” ante, at 
16 (majority opinion) (emphasis added).  See ante, at 2 (concurring opin-
ion).  His hope for guidance appears misplaced.  For all we know, these 
factors may not be the most important in 49 percent of cases.  The ma-
jority’s nonexhaustive seven-factor test “may aid in identifying relevant 
facts  for  analysis,  but—like  most  multifactor  tests—it  leaves  courts 
adrift once those facts have been identified.”  Dietz v. Bouldin, 579 U. S. 
___, ___ (2016) (THOMAS, J., dissenting) (slip op., at 3); see also Scalia,
The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1175, 1186–1187 
(1989) (noting that “when balancing is the mode of analysis, not much
general guidance may be drawn from the opinion” and arguing that “to-
tality of the circumstances tests and balancing modes of analysis” should 
“be avoided where possible”).