Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/524bv.pdf
Page Number: 780.0

524US2

Unit: $U98

[09-06-00 19:40:38] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 524 U. S. 721 (1998)

735

Stevens, J., dissenting

ing.” Burks v. United States, 437 U. S. 1, 11 (1978).1 Today,
In this case, the
the Court ignores this cardinal principle.
prosecution attempted to prove that petitioner had pre-
viously been convicted of a qualifying felony.
If the prose-
cution had proved this fact, petitioner would have automati-
cally been sentenced to an additional ﬁve years in prison.2
The prosecution, however, failed to prove its case.3 Conse-
quently, the Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits a “ ‘second
bite at the apple.’ ”

Id., at 17.

Until today, the Court has never held that a retrial or re-
sentencing is permissible when the evidence in the ﬁrst pro-
ceeding was insufﬁcient; instead, the Court has consistently
drawn a line between insufﬁciency of the evidence and legal
errors that infect the ﬁrst proceeding.4
In his unanimous

1 See also, e. g., Poland v. Arizona, 476 U. S. 147, 152 (1986) (reprosecu-
tion or resentencing prohibited whenever “a jury agrees or an appellate
court decides that the prosecution has not proved its case” (internal quota-
tion marks omitted)); cf. Schiro v. Farley, 510 U. S. 222, 231–232 (1994)
(“The state is entitled to ‘one fair opportunity’ to prosecute a defendant,
. . . and that opportunity extends not only to prosecution at the guilt phase,
but also to present evidence at an ensuing sentencing proceeding”).

2 The ﬁnding of this fact would have also increased petitioner’s sentenc-
ing range. See Cal. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 11361(a) (West 1991).
This case, then, is factually different from Caspari v. Bohlen, 510 U. S.
383, 386–387 (1994), as the factual ﬁnding in that case did not automatically
increase the respondent’s sentence or affect his sentencing range.

3 The California appellate court concluded that “[t]here was insufﬁcient
evidence that [petitioner] suffered a prior felony conviction” within the
meaning of the “three-strikes” law. App. 41 (emphasis omitted).
It is
immaterial, of course, that this determination was made by an appellate
court rather than by the trial judge or jury. Burks v. United States, 437
U. S. 1, 11 (1978). The State concedes that the evidence was insufﬁcient.
4 See, e. g., Poland, 476 U. S., at 154 (“[The Arizona Supreme Court] did
not hold that the prosecution had failed to prove its case . . . .
Indeed,
the court clearly indicated that there had been no such failure by remark-
ing that ‘the trial court mistook the law when it did not ﬁnd that the
defendants [satisﬁed the disputed aggravator]’ ”); United States v. Di-
Francesco, 449 U. S. 117, 141 (1980) (“The federal statute speciﬁes that the