Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/524bv.pdf
Page Number: 784

524US2

Unit: $U98

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Cite as: 524 U. S. 721 (1998)

739

Scalia, J., dissenting

gress and the people on [their] passage.” Slaughter-House
Cases, 16 Wall. 36, 96 (1873).1

Although California’s system is not nearly that sinister, it
takes the ﬁrst steps down that road. The California Code
is full of “sentencing enhancements” that look exactly like
separate crimes, and that expose the defendant to additional
maximum punishment. Cal. Penal Code § 12022.5 (1982) is
typical: “[A]ny person who personally uses a ﬁrearm in the
commission or attempted commission of a felony shall . . . be
punished by an additional term of imprisonment in the state
prison for three, four, or ﬁve years.” Compare that provi-
sion with its federal counterpart, 18 U. S. C. § 924(c)(1), which
provides that “[w]hoever, during and in relation to any crime
of violence or drug trafﬁcking crime . . . uses or carries a
ﬁrearm, shall, in addition to the punishment provided for
such crime of violence or drug trafﬁcking crime, be sen-
tenced to imprisonment for ﬁve years.” Everyone agrees
that 18 U. S. C. § 924(c)(1) describes a separate crime enti-
tling those who are charged to the constitutional protections
Indeed, the undis-
that accompany criminal convictions.
puted fact that each of the elements of § 924(c)(1) must be

1 The Court suggests that “fundamental fairness” will sometimes call for
treating a particular fact as a sentencing factor rather than an element,
even if it increases the defendant’s maximum sentencing exposure, because
“[a] defendant might not, for example, wish to simultaneously profess his
innocence of a drug offense and dispute the amount of drugs allegedly
involved.” Ante, at 729. Even if I agreed that putting a defendant to
such a choice would be fundamentally unfair, I see no reason to assume
that defendants would be eager to pursue such a strategy at the cost of
forfeiting their traditional rights to jury trial and proof beyond a reason-
able doubt. But in any event, there is no need to contemplate such Faus-
tian bargains.
If simultaneous consideration of two elements would be
genuinely prejudicial to the defendant (as, for example, when one of the
elements involves the defendant’s prior criminal history), the trial can be
bifurcated without sacriﬁcing jury factﬁnding in the second phase. See
Almendarez-Torres, 523 U. S. 224, 261, 269 (1998) (Scalia, J., dissenting).