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Page Number: 12

10 

CARNEY v. ADAMS 

Opinion of the Court 

termine likely openings, without other preparations or in-
vestigations, and without any other supporting evidence. 

Second, the context offers Adams no support.  It suggests
an abstract, generalized grievance, not an actual desire to 
become a judge.  Indeed, Adams’ failure to apply previously
when he was eligible, his reading of the law review article,
his change of party affiliation, and his swift subsequent fil-
ing of the complaint show a desire to vindicate his view of 
the law, as articulated in the article he read. 

Third, if we were to hold that Adams’ few words of gen-
eral  intent—without  more  and  against  all  contrary  evi-
dence—were sufficient here to show an “injury in fact,” we
would significantly weaken the longstanding legal doctrine 
preventing this Court from providing advisory opinions at 
the request of one who, without other concrete injury, be-
lieves that the government is not following the law.  Adams 
did  not  show  that  he  was  “able  and  ready”  to  apply  for  a 
vacancy in the reasonably imminent future.  Adams has not 
sufficiently  differentiated  himself  from  a  general  popula-
tion of individuals affected in the abstract by the legal pro-
vision he attacks.  We do not decide whether a statement of 
intent alone under other circumstances could be enough to
show  standing.  But  we  are  satisfied  that  Adams’  words 
alone are not enough here when placed in the context of this 
particular record. 

Precedent supports the conclusion that an injury in fact
requires an intent that is concrete.  In Lujan, for example, 
organizations  dedicated  to  wildlife  conservation  sought  to
enjoin  enforcement  of  a  federal  regulation  that  they  be-
lieved would unlawfully harm endangered species.  Lujan, 
504  U. S.,  at  563–564.    The  organizations’  members  had 
previously  visited  the  species’  habitats  abroad,  and  they 
said that they intended to return to those foreign habitats 
in the future.  Ibid.  This Court recognized that having to
view a species-impoverished habitat could constitute a cog-
nizable injury.  Id., at 562–563.  But it pointed out that the