Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/22pdf/21-806_2dp3.pdf
Page Number: 62.0

30 

HEALTH AND HOSPITAL CORPORATION OF MARION 
CTY. v. TALEVSKI 
THOMAS, J., dissenting 

nor could they “supervise or control the application of the
payments.”  Ibid.11 

The Court again demonstrated its adherence to the tra-
ditional view in Oklahoma v. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 330 U. S. 
127 (1947).  There, the U. S. Civil Service Commission de-
termined that an Oklahoma highway commissioner had vi-
olated the Hatch Act, pledging to withhold a portion of the 
State’s highway grants equal to two years’ of the commis-
sioner’s compensation if the State failed to remove him.  Ok-
lahoma challenged the Commission’s order and the Act on
which  it  was  based  as  an  illicit  attempt  to  regulate  the 
State’s  internal  affairs.  Id.,  at  133.    Citing  Mellon,  the 
Court held that the Act was valid because it did not directly
regulate the State, which had “adopted the ‘simple expedi-
ent’ of not yielding” by refusing to remove its highway com-
missioner.  330 U. S., at 143. 

Thus, to defend these spending programs in the first half
of the 20th century, the Government relied on the long-set-
tled understanding that the power to spend carries with it 
no sovereign legislative power to create rights and duties. 
To  the  contrary,  the  Government  represented  that  these 
programs had the binding force, at most, of contracts.  They
did not pre-empt, nor did they bind States with the force of 
law; they merely spent federal dollars upon conditions, the 
violation of which entitled the Government to cease further 
payments.  The Court took this position as a given, and the 
contractual nature of spending conditions is precisely what
saved them from constitutional challenge.

In sum, the historical record is clear and consistent on a 
critical  proposition:  The  spending  power  is  the  power  to
spend only.  Any duties imposed by regulatory legislation, 
and any correlative rights secured by law, must find their 
—————— 

11 Justice  Sutherland’s  dissent  recognized  that  the  majority  had  ap-
plied the traditional framework, disagreeing only with its interpretation
of how the Social Security Act actually functioned.  See Steward Machine 
Co., 301 U. S., at 611–612.