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Page Number: 4

4 

BROWN v. PLATA 

Syllabus 

overcrowding was the “primary,” but not the only, cause of the viola-
tions,  and  that  reducing  crowding  would  not  entirely  cure  the  viola-
tions.  This  understanding of  the  primary  cause  requirement  is  con-
sistent  with  the  PLRA.    Had  Congress  intended  to  require  that
crowding be the only cause, the PLRA would have said so.  Pp. 26–29.
(d) The evidence supports the three-judge court’s finding that “no
other  relief  [would]  remedy  the  violation,”  §3626(a)(3)(E)(ii).    The 
State’s  claim  that  out-of-state  transfers  provide  a  less  restrictive  al-
ternative to  a  population limit  must fail  because requiring transfers 
is a population limit under the PLRA.  Even if they could be regarded 
as  a  less  restrictive  alternative,  the  three-judge  court  found  no  evi-
dence  of  plans  for  transfers  in  numbers  sufficient  to  relieve  over-
crowding.  The court also found no realistic possibility that California
could build itself out of this crisis, particularly given the State’s ongo-
ing fiscal problems.  Further, it rejected additional hiring as a realis-
tic alternative, since the prison system was chronically understaffed 
and would have insufficient space were adequate personnel retained.
The court also did not err when it concluded that, absent a population
reduction,  the  Receiver’s  and  Special  Master’s  continued  efforts 
would  not  achieve  a  remedy.    Their  reports  are  persuasive  evidence 
that,  with  no  reduction,  any  remedy  might  prove  unattainable  and 
would at the very least require vast expenditures by the State.  The 
State  asserts  that  these  measures  would  succeed  if  combined,  but  a 
long  history  of  failed  remedial  orders,  together  with  substantial  evi-
dence  of  overcrowding’s  deleterious  effects  on  the  provision  of  care, 
compels a different conclusion here.  Pp. 29–33. 

(e) The  prospective  relief  ordered  here  was  narrowly  drawn,  ex-
tended no further than necessary to correct the violation, and was the 
least intrusive means necessary to correct the violation.  Pp. 33–41. 

(1) The  population  limit  does  not  fail  narrow  tailoring  simply
because  prisoners  beyond  the  plaintiff  class  will  have  to  be  released
through parole or sentencing reform in order to meet the required re-
duction.  While narrow tailoring requires a “ ‘ “fit” between the [rem-
edy’s] ends and the means chosen to accomplish those ends,’ ” Board 
of Trustees of State Univ. of N. Y. v. Fox, 492 U. S. 469, 480, a narrow 
and otherwise proper remedy for a constitutional violation is not in-
valid  simply  because  it  will  have  collateral  effects.    Nor  does  the 
PLRA require that result.  The order gives the State flexibility to de-
termine who should be released, and the State could move the three-
judge court to modify its  terms.  The order also is not overbroad be-
cause  it  encompasses  the  entire  prison  system,  rather  than  sepa-
rately  assessing  each  institution’s  need  for  a  population  limit.    The 
Coleman court found a systemwide violation, and the State stipulated
to  systemwide  relief  in  Plata.  Assuming  no  constitutional  violation