Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/13pdf/12-158_6579.pdf
Page Number: 2.0

2 

BOND v. UNITED STATES 

Syllabus 

held that Bond lacked standing to raise her Tenth Amendment chal-
lenge, but this Court reversed.  On remand, the Third Circuit rejected 
her  Tenth  Amendment  argument  and  her  additional  argument  that
section 229 does not reach her conduct. 

Held: Section 229 does not reach Bond’s simple assault.  Pp. 8–21.

(a) The  parties  debate  whether  section  229  is  a  necessary  and 
proper means of executing the Federal Government’s power to make
treaties,  but  “normally  [this]  Court  will  not  decide  a  constitutional
question  if  there  is  some  other  ground  upon  which  to  dispose  of  the 
case.”  Escambia County v. McMillan, 466 U. S. 48, 51 (per curiam).
Thus,  this  Court  starts  with  Bond’s  argument  that  section  229  does 
not cover her conduct.  Pp. 8–9.

(b) This  Court  has  no  need  to  interpret  the  scope  of  the  interna-
tional Chemical Weapons Convention in this case.  The treaty speci-
fies  that  a  signatory  nation  should  implement  its  obligations  “in  ac-
cordance with its constitutional processes.”  Art. VII(1), 1974 U. N. T. 
S.  331.  Bond was  prosecuted  under  a  federal  statute,  which,  unlike 
the treaty, must be read consistent with the principles of federalism
inherent in our constitutional structure.  Pp. 10–21. 

(1) A fair reading of section 229 must recognize the duty of “fed-
eral courts to be certain of Congress’s intent before finding that fed-
eral  law  overrides”  the  “usual  constitutional  balance  of  federal  and 
state powers,” Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U. S. 452, 460.  This principle
applies to federal laws that punish local criminal activity, which has
traditionally been the responsibility of the States.  This Court’s prec-
edents have referred to basic principles of federalism in the Constitu-
tion to resolve ambiguity in federal statutes.  See, e.g., United States 
v.  Bass,  404  U. S.  336; Jones  v.  United  States,  529  U. S.  848.    Here, 
the ambiguity in the statute derives from the improbably broad reach
of the key statutory definition, given the term—“chemical weapon”—
that  is  being  defined,  the  deeply  serious  consequences  of  adopting 
such a boundless reading, and the lack of any apparent need to do so
in  light  of  the  context  from  which  the  statute  arose—a  treaty  about 
chemical warfare and terrorism, not about local assaults.  Thus, the 
Court  can  reasonably  insist  on  a  clear  indication  that  Congress  in-
tended  to  reach  purely  local  crimes  before  interpreting  section  229’s 
expansive language in a way that intrudes on the States’ police pow-
er.  Pp. 10–14.

(2) No such clear indication is found in section 229.  An ordinary
speaker  would  not  describe  Bond’s  feud-driven  act  of  spreading  irri-
tating  chemicals  as  involving  a  “chemical  weapon.”    And  the  chemi-
cals at issue here bear little resemblance to those whose prohibition
was the object of an international Convention.  Where the breadth of 
a  statutory  definition  creates  ambiguity,  it  is  appropriate  to  look  to