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10 

NATIONAL PORK PRODUCERS COUNCIL v. ROSS 

Opinion of the Court 

They  “plainly  discriminate[d]”  against  out-of-staters by 
“erecting  an  economic  barrier  protecting  a  major  local  in-
dustry against competition from without the State.”  Dean 
Milk Co. v. Madison, 340 U. S. 349, 354 (1951) (discussing 
Baldwin).  Really,  the  laws  operated  like  “a  tariff  or  cus-
toms duty.”  West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U. S. 
186, 194 (1994); see Baldwin, 294 U. S., at 523 (condemning 
the  challenged  laws  for  seeking  to  “protec[t]”  New  York 
dairy farmers “against competition from without”). 

Brown-Forman and Healy differed from Baldwin only in
that  they  involved  price-affirmation,  rather  than  price-
fixing, statutes.  In Brown-Forman, New York required liq-
uor  distillers  to  affirm  (on  a  monthly  basis)  that  their  in-
state  prices  were  no  higher  than  their  out-of-state  prices.
476 U. S., at 576.  Once more, the goal was plain:  New York 
sought  to  force  out-of-state  distillers  to  “surrender”  what-
ever cost advantages they enjoyed against their in-state ri-
vals.  Id., at 580.  Once more, the law amounted to “simple 
economic  protectionism.”  Ibid.  (internal  quotation  marks
omitted).

In  Healy,  a  Connecticut  law  required  out-of-state  beer
merchants  to  affirm  that  their  in-state  prices  were  no
higher than those they charged in neighboring States.  491 
U. S.,  at  328–330.  Here,  too,  protectionism  took  center 
stage.  As  the  Court  later  noted,  “[t]he  essential  vice  in
laws” like Connecticut’s is that they “hoard” commerce “for
the benefit of ” in-state merchants and discourage consum-
ers from crossing state lines to make their purchases from
nearby out-of-state vendors.  C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Clarks-
town,  511  U. S.  383,  391–392  (1994).    Nor  did  the  law  in 
Healy even try to cloak its discriminatory purpose:  “By its
plain terms, the Connecticut affirmation statute applie[d] 
solely to interstate” firms, and in that way “clearly discrim-
inate[d] against interstate commerce.”  491 U. S., at 340– 
341.  The  Court  also  worried  that,  if  the  Connecticut  law