Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/20pdf/20-5904_i4dk.pdf
Page Number: 9.0

Cite as:  593 U. S. ____ (2021) 

7 

Opinion of the Court 

But  because  the  Act  increased  the  trigger  quantity  under 
subparagraph  (A)  to  280  grams,  a  person  charged  with 
those  original  elements  after  2010  is  now  subject  to  the
more  lenient  prison  range  for  subparagraph  (B):  5-to-40 
years.  Similarly, the elements of an offense under subpar-
agraph (B) before 2010 were knowing or intentional posses-
sion  with  intent  to  distribute  at  least  5  grams  of  crack.
Originally punishable by 5-to-40 years, the offense defined 
by  those  elements4  is  now  punishable  by  0-to-20  years—
that is, the penalties under subparagraph (C).  The statu-
tory  penalties  thus  changed  for  all  subparagraph  (A)  and 
(B) offenders.  But no statutory penalty changed for subpar-
agraph (C) offenders.  That is hardly surprising because the
Fair Sentencing Act addressed “cocaine sentencing dispar-
ity,”  §2,  124  Stat.  2372,  and  subparagraph  (C)  had  never 
differentiated between crack and powder offenses. 

To  avoid  this  straightforward  result,  petitioner  and  the
United States offer a sleight of hand.  Petitioner says that 
the  phrase  “statutory  penalties”  in  fact  means  “penalty
statute.”  The  United  States  similarly  asserts  that  peti-
tioner  is  eligible  for  a  sentence  reduction  if  the  Fair  Sen-
tencing Act changed the “penalty scheme.”   

But  we  will  not  convert  nouns  to  adjectives  and  vice 
versa.  As stated above, “statutory penalties” references the 
entire phrase “a violation of a Federal criminal statute.”  It 
thus  directs  our  focus  to  the  statutory  penalties  for  peti-
tioner’s offense, not the statute or statutory scheme.

Even  if  the  “penalty  statute”  or  “penalty  scheme”  were
the proper focus, neither was modified for subparagraph (C)
offenders.  To “modify” means “to change moderately.”  MCI 
Telecommunications  Corp.  v.  American  Telephone  &  Tele-
graph Co., 512 U. S. 218, 225 (1994).  The Fair Sentencing 
—————— 

4 Of course, an indictment that charged a person with 5 grams of crack 
now  is  no  different  from  one  charging  the  person  with  an  unspecified 
amount of crack.  The usual practice is to ignore extraneous language in 
an indictment. E.g., Ford v. United States, 273 U. S. 593, 602 (1927).