Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/529bv.pdf
Page Number: 186

529US1

Unit: $U35

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Cite as: 529 U. S. 89 (2000)

111

Opinion of the Court

pretation of the Title II PWSA provision now found at 46
U. S. C. § 3703(a), only the Federal Government may regulate
the “design, construction, alteration, repair, maintenance, op-
eration, equipping, personnel qualiﬁcation, and manning” of
tanker vessels.

In Ray, this principle was applied to hold that Washing-
ton’s tanker design and construction rules were pre-empted.
Those requirements failed because they were within a ﬁeld
reserved for federal regulation under 46 U. S. C. § 391a (1982
ed.), the predecessor to § 3703(a). We reafﬁrm Ray’s holding
on this point. Contrary to the suggestion of the Court of
Appeals, the ﬁeld of pre-emption established by § 3703(a)
cannot be limited to tanker “design” and “construction,”
terms which cannot be read in isolation from the other sub-
jects found in that section. Title II of the PWSA covers
“design, construction, alteration, repair, maintenance, opera-
tion, equipping, personnel qualiﬁcation, and manning” of
tanker vessels.
Ibid. Congress has left no room for state
regulation of these matters. See Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan
Assn. v. De la Cuesta, 458 U. S. 141 (1982) (explaining ﬁeld
pre-emption). As the Ray Court stated: “[T]he Supremacy
Clause dictates that the federal judgment that a vessel is
safe to navigate United States waters prevail over the con-
trary state judgment. Enforcement of the state require-
ments would at least frustrate what seems to us to be the
evident congressional intention to establish a uniform federal
regime controlling the design of oil tankers.”
435 U. S., at
165.

The existence of some overlapping coverage between the
two titles of the PWSA may make it difﬁcult to determine
whether a pre-emption question is controlled by conﬂict pre-
emption principles, applicable generally to Title I, or by ﬁeld
pre-emption rules, applicable generally to Title II. The Ray
Court acknowledged the difﬁculty, but declined to resolve
every question by the greater pre-emptive force of Title II.
We follow the same approach, and conﬂict pre-emption under