Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/18pdf/18-302_e29g.pdf
Page Number: 18

Cite as:  588 U. S. ____ (2019) 

1 

Opinion of BREYER, J. 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

_________________ 

No. 18–302 
_________________ 

ANDREI IANCU, UNDER SECRETARY OF COMMERCE 
FOR INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND DIRECTOR, 
PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, 
PETITIONER v. ERIK BRUNETTI 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT 

[June 24, 2019] 

JUSTICE  BREYER,  concurring  in  part  and  dissenting  in 

part. 

Our precedents warn us against interpreting statutes in
ways  that  would  likely  render  them  unconstitutional. 
Virginia v. American Booksellers Assn., Inc., 484 U. S. 383, 
397  (1988)  (noting  that  a  law  “will  be  upheld”  if  it  is 
“ ‘readily  susceptible’  to  a  narrowing  construction  that
would make it constitutional”); United States v. 12 200-ft. 
Reels of Super 8MM. Film, 413 U. S. 123, 130, n. 7 (1973) 
(noting  our  “duty”  to  adopt  a  “ ‘fairly  possible’ ”  construc-
tion  by  which  constitutional  doubts  “ ‘may  be  avoided’ ” 
(quoting  United  States  v.  Thirty-seven  Photographs,  402 
U. S.  363,  369  (1971))).  Following  these  precedents,  I
agree  with  JUSTICE  SOTOMAYOR  that,  for  the  reasons  she 
gives,  we  should  interpret  the  word  “scandalous”  in  the 
present  statute  to  refer  only  to  certain  highly  “vulgar”  or 
“obscene”  modes  of  expression.    See  post,  at  6–7  (opinion
concurring in part and dissenting in part).

The  question,  then,  is  whether  the  First  Amendment 
permits  the  Government  to  rely  on  this  statute,  as  nar-
rowly construed, to deny the benefits of federal trademark 
registration  to  marks  like  the  one  at  issue  here,  which 
involves the use of the term “FUCT” in connection with a