Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/21pdf/20-826_p702.pdf
Page Number: 40.0

Cite as:  596 U. S. ____ (2022) 

11 

KAGAN, J., dissenting 

over—that  Brecht  makes  AEDPA  functionally  immaterial 
on  matters  relating  to  harmlessness.    “In  Fry,”  the  Ayala
Court began, “we held that the Brecht standard ‘subsumes’ 
the requirements that [AEDPA] imposes when a federal ha-
beas petitioner contests a state court’s determination that
a constitutional error was harmless under Chapman.”  576 
U. S.,  at  268.    Because  that  is  so,  Ayala  continued  (again
quoting  Fry),  “a  federal  habeas  court  need  not  ‘formal[ly]’ 
apply  both  Brecht  and  ‘AEDPA/Chapman.’ ”    576  U. S.,  at 
268  (alteration  in  original).  And  if  that  were  not  clear 
enough, the Court reprised: “In sum, a prisoner who seeks 
federal habeas corpus relief must satisfy Brecht, and if the 
state court adjudicated his claim on the merits, the Brecht 
test subsumes the limitations imposed by AEDPA.”  Id., at 
270.  But  still,  the  Court  was  not  done.    In  turning  to
whether  the  error  at  issue  had  caused  Ayala  harm,  the 
Court noted that he “necessarily” would not satisfy Brecht 
if he had failed to satisfy AEDPA/Chapman—which is the 
flipside  of  saying  he  necessarily  would  satisfy  AEDPA/ 
Chapman if he had satisfied Brecht.  576 U. S., at 270.  Both 
are  a  function,  once  again,  of  Brecht  “obviously  sub-
sum[ing]” AEDPA/Chapman.5 

Today’s majority contorts Ayala, too, beyond recognition.
The majority insists that only a “carefully curated snippet”
of that decision—one sentence, in fact—cuts against today’s
holding.  Ante,  at  20.  But  see  all  the  quotations  above. 
Ayala  repeats  the  key  point  favoring  Davenport—that  a 
court applying Brecht need not separately apply AEDPA—
multiple times over a span of more than three pages (with
the rest of that section providing supportive analysis).  See 
576 U. S., at 267–270.  Similarly, the majority asserts that 

—————— 

5 Only  the  Ayala  Court’s  application  of  Brecht  provoked  a  dissenting 
opinion.  The dissent explained that its disagreement did “not stem from 
[the  Court’s] discussion  of  the  applicable  standard  of  review”—i.e.,  the 
Brecht standard alone—“which simply restates the holding of Fry.”  576 
U. S., at 291 (SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting).