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Page Number: 23

10 

COINBASE, INC. v. BIELSKI 

JACKSON, J., dissenting 

court and a court of appeals would be simultaneously ana-
lyzing the same judgment.”  459 U. S., at 59. 

The  Court  today  expands  Griggs  beyond  what  the  Con-
gress  that  enacted  §16  could  have  foreseen,  let  alone  si-
lently  incorporated.  Indeed,  the  majority  can  identify  no 
other time this Court wielded Griggs to mandate a stay of 
all  merits  proceedings  just  because  a  distinct  procedural
question was on appeal.

In fact, the majority’s supercharged version of Griggs con-
tradicts its own account of Congress’s intent.  Consider the 
statutes that the majority points to as models of how Con-
gress would reject a mandatory-general-stay rule.  Ante, at 
6–7, and n. 6; see supra, at 4–5.  Under those statutes, the 
majority  says,  Congress  intends  that  an  interlocutory  ap-
peal does “not . . . automatically stay district court proceed-
ings.”  Ante, at 7.  Yet, the majority also seemingly accepts
that  under  those  statutes,  “the  Griggs  principle  applies.” 
Ante, at 5.  And per “the Griggs principle” as the majority
sees it, in some cases an interlocutory appeal does automat-
ically  stay  district  court  proceedings.    Ante,  at  3–4.  So  a 
mandatory general stay is thus both prohibited (by the stat-
utory text) and required (by the majority’s view of Griggs).3 
As this contradiction underscores, the majority’s holding is
untethered from any statute and any existing conception of 

—————— 

3 This contradiction arises, for example, under 28 U. S. C. §1292(b), one 
of the statutes that the majority cites as prohibiting mandatory general 
stays.  See ante, at 7, n. 6 (citing Act of Sept. 2, 1958, Pub. L. 85–919, 72
Stat. 1770 (codified at §1292(b))).  Section 1292(b) authorizes permissive
interlocutory appeals from a wide range of orders involving “controlling 
question[s] of law”—including rulings on arbitrability.  Arbitrability ap-
peals  under  §1292(b)  were  commonplace  when  Congress  enacted  9 
U. S. C. §16 in 1988.  See, e.g., Danford v. Schwabacher, 488 F. 2d 454, 
457 (CA9 1973) (“Since 1958 interlocutory arbitration orders have been 
reviewable in accordance with the procedures prescribed by 28 U. S. C. 
§1292(b)”).  And in a §1292(b) arbitrability appeal, the majority’s reading 
of §1292(b) would prohibit a mandatory general stay, while the majority’s 
view of Griggs would require one.