Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/18pdf/17-1272_7l48.pdf
Page Number: 9.0

Cite as:  586 U. S. ____ (2019) 

7 

Opinion of the Court 

resolve  the  merits  of  the  dispute  even  if  the  court
thinks  that  a  party’s  claim  on  the  merits  is  frivolous. 
AT&T  Technologies,  475  U. S.,  at  649−650.  So,  too,  with 
arbitrability. 

Third,  Archer  and  White  says  that,  as  a  practical  and 
policy matter, it would be a waste of the parties’ time and 
money to send the arbitrability question to an arbitrator if 
the  argument  for  arbitration  is  wholly  groundless. 
In 
cases like this, as Archer and White sees it, the arbitrator 
will  inevitably  conclude  that  the  dispute  is  not  arbitrable
and then send the case back to the district court.  So why 
waste the time and money?  The short answer is that the 
Act  contains  no  “wholly  groundless”  exception,  and  we
may  not  engraft  our  own  exceptions  onto  the  statutory 
text.  See  Exxon  Mobil  Corp.  v.  Allapattah  Services,  Inc., 
545 U. S. 546, 556−557 (2005).

In  addition,  contrary  to  Archer  and  White’s  claim,  it  is 
doubtful  that  the  “wholly  groundless”  exception  would 
save time and money systemically even if it might do so in 
some individual cases.  Archer and White assumes that it 
is easy to tell when an argument  for arbitration of a par-
ticular dispute is wholly groundless.  We are dubious.  The 
exception would inevitably spark collateral litigation (with 
briefing,  argument,  and  opinion  writing)  over  whether  a 
seemingly  unmeritorious  argument  for  arbitration  is 
wholly  groundless,  as  opposed  to  groundless.    We  see  no 
reason to create such a time-consuming sideshow.

Archer  and  White  further  assumes  that  an  arbitrator 
would inevitably reject arbitration in those cases where a 
judge would conclude that the argument for arbitration is
wholly  groundless.    Not  always.  After  all,  an  arbitrator 
might hold a different view of the arbitrability issue than 
a court does, even if the court finds the answer obvious.  It 
is not unheard-of for one fair-minded adjudicator to think 
a decision is obvious in one direction but for another fair-
minded adjudicator to decide the matter the other way.