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16 

TRUMP v. VANCE 

Opinion of the Court 

pervising  local  grand  juries  may  not  exhibit  the  same  re-
spect that federal courts show to the President as a coordi-
nate branch of Government. 

We recognize, as does the district attorney, that harass-
ing subpoenas could, under certain circumstances, threaten 
the independence or effectiveness of the Executive.  See Tr. 
of Oral Arg. 73.  Even so, in Clinton we found that the risk 
of  harassment  was  not  “serious”  because  federal  courts 
have the tools to deter and, where necessary, dismiss vexa-
tious civil suits.  520 U. S., at 708.  And, while we cannot 
ignore the possibility that state prosecutors may have polit-
ical motivations, see post, at 15 (ALITO, J., dissenting), here
again the law already seeks to protect against the predicted 
abuse. 

First, grand juries are prohibited from engaging in “arbi-
trary fishing expeditions” and initiating investigations “out 
of malice or an intent to harass.”  United States v. R. Enter-
prises, Inc., 498 U. S. 292, 299 (1991).  See also, e.g., Virag 
v. Hynes, 54 N. Y. 2d 437, 442–443, 430 N. E. 2d 1249, 1252 
(1981) (recognizing that grand jury subpoenas can be “chal-
lenged by an affirmative showing of impropriety,” including 
“bad faith” (internal quotation marks omitted)).  These pro-
tections, as the district attorney himself puts it, “apply with
special  force  to  a  President,  in  light  of  the  office’s  unique
position as the head of the Executive Branch.”  Brief for Re-
spondent Vance 43.  And, in the event of such harassment, 
a  President  would  be  entitled  to  the  protection  of  federal 
courts.  The  policy  against  federal  interference  in  state 
criminal proceedings, while strong, allows “intervention in
those cases where the District Court properly finds that the 
state proceeding is motivated by a desire to harass or is con-
ducted  in  bad  faith.”  Huffman  v.  Pursue,  Ltd.,  420  U. S. 
592, 611 (1975).

Second, contrary to JUSTICE ALITO’s characterization, our 
holding  does  not  allow  States  to  “run  roughshod  over  the 
functioning  of  [the  Executive  B]ranch.”  Post,  at  22.  The