Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/524bv.pdf
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Cite as: 524 U. S. 498 (1998)

565

Breyer, J., dissenting

cinovic 37–38.
In later years, but before 1965, Congress pro-
vided the W&R Fund with special tax beneﬁts, helped the
Fund to build hospitals, and established health and safety
standards. Brief for Respondents UMWA Combined Bene-
ﬁt Fund et al. 11–12 (citing relevant statutes and record ma-
terials). This kind of Government intervention explains
why the president of the Southern Coal Producers’ Associa-
tion said, in the 1950’s, that if beneﬁts were reduced, it was

“entirely conceivable that Congress [would] step in and
take over the mines, assuming responsibility for the wel-
fare collections and payment.” App. (CA1) 2000.

I repeat that the Federal Government’s words and deeds,
along with those of the pre-1965 industry, did not necessarily
create contractually binding promises (which, had they ex-
isted, might have eliminated the need for this legislation).
But in labor relations, as in human relations, one can create
promises and understandings which, even in the absence of
a legally enforceable contract, others reasonably expect will
be honored.
Indeed, in labor relations such industrywide
understandings may spell the difference between labor war
and labor peace, for the parties may look to a strike, not to a
court, for enforcement.
It is that kind of important, mutual
understanding that is at issue here. For the record shows
that pre-1965 statements and other conduct led management
to understand, and labor legitimately to expect, that health
care beneﬁts for retirees and their dependents would con-
tinue to be provided.

Finally, Eastern continued to obtain proﬁts from the coal
mining industry long after 1965, for it operated a wholly
owned coal-mining subsidiary, Eastern Associated Coal
Corp. (hereinafter EACC), until the late 1980’s. Between
1966 and 1987, Eastern effectively ran EACC, sharing ofﬁ-
cers, supervising management, and receiving 100% of
EACC’s approximately $100 million in dividends. Brief for
Petitioner 6, n. 13; App. (CA1) 2172 (afﬁdavit of T. Gallagher,