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Page Number: 29.0

2 

KNOX v. SERVICE EMPLOYEES 

SOTOMAYOR, J., concurring in judgment 

507,  519  (1991);  see  also  Locke  v.  Karass,  555  U. S.  207, 
211  (2009)  (“[N]onchargeable  union  activities  [include] 
political,  public  relations,  or  lobbying  activities”).    While 
the  union  is  free  to  pursue  its  ideological  goals  in  the 
political arena, it may not subsidize its efforts with object-
ing nonmembers’ funds, lest the objector be used as “ ‘an in-
strument  for  fostering  public  adherence  to  an  ideological 
point  of  view  he  finds  unacceptable.’ ”  Lehnert,  500  U. S., 
at 522 (plurality opinion) (quoting Wooley v. Maynard, 430 
U. S. 705, 715 (1977)).

Accordingly,  when  a  union  levies  a  special  assessment 
or dues increase to fund political activities, the union may
not  collect  funds  from  nonmembers  who  earlier  had  ob-
jected to the payment of nonchargeable expenses, and may 
not  collect  funds  from  other  nonmembers  without  provid-
ing a new Hudson notice and opportunity to opt out.  See 
Teachers v. Hudson, 475 U. S. 292 (1986).  Because SEIU 
failed  to  follow  these  procedures,  it  did  not  satisfy  its
constitutional  obligations.  That  holding  should  end  this
case; it is all petitioners asked this Court to decide.1 

II 
The  majority  agrees  that  SEIU’s  actions  were  at  odds
with  the  First  Amendment.  Yet  it  proceeds,  quite  un-
necessarily,  to  reach  significant  constitutional  issues  not
contained  in  the  questions  presented,  briefed,  or  argued. 
Petitioners did not question the validity of our precedents, 
which consistently have recognized that an opt-out system 

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1 See  Pet.  for  Cert.  (i)  (questions  presented);  Brief  for  Petitioners  (i)
(same);  id.,  at  39  (“The  Court  should  hold  that  . . .  when  a  union  im-
poses  a  forced-fee  increase  primarily  or  solely  for  political  purposes  be-
tween  notices,  it  may  not  collect  the  increase  from  nonmembers  who 
have  already  objected,  and  it  must  not  collect  the  increase  from  other 
nonmembers  until  it  has  ascertained  their  wishes  by  providing  them 
with  a  new  notice  about  the  increase’s  purpose  and  an  opportunity  to 
opt out”); see also App. 18–19 (complaint).