Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/529bv.pdf
Page Number: 261

529US1

Unit: $U36

[09-26-01 08:36:39] PAGES PGT: OPIN

186

FDA v. BROWN & WILLIAMSON TOBACCO CORP.

Breyer, J., dissenting

“response” to “the problem of tobacco and health,” ante, at
157, is based on legislative silence. Notwithstanding the
views voiced by various legislators, Congress itself has ad-
dressed expressly the issue of the FDA’s tobacco-related au-
thority only once—and, as I have said, its statement was that
the statute was not to “be construed to affect the question of
whether the [FDA] has any authority to regulate any tobacco
product.” Note following 21 U. S. C. § 321 (1994 ed., Supp.
III). The proper inference to be drawn from all of the
post-1965 statutes, then, is one that interprets Congress’
general legislative silence consistently with this statement.

IV

I now turn to the ﬁnal historical fact that the majority
views as a factor in its interpretation of the subsequent leg-
islative history: the FDA’s former denials of its tobacco-
related authority.

Until the early 1990’s, the FDA expressly maintained that
the 1938 statute did not give it the power that it now seeks
to assert.
It then changed its mind. The majority agrees
with me that the FDA’s change of positions does not make a
signiﬁcant legal difference. See ante, at 156–157; see also
Chevron, 467 U. S., at 863 (“An initial agency interpretation
is not instantly carved in stone”); accord, Smiley v. Citibank
(South Dakota), N. A., 517 U. S. 735, 742 (1996) (“[C]hange
is not invalidating”). Nevertheless, it labels those denials
“important context” for drawing an inference about Con-
In my view, the FDA’s change
gress’ intent. Ante, at 157.
of policy, like the subsequent statutes themselves, does noth-
ing to advance the majority’s position.

When it denied jurisdiction to regulate cigarettes, the
In 1963, for
FDA consistently stated why that was so.
example, FDA administrators wrote that cigarettes did not
satisfy the relevant FDCA deﬁnitions—in particular, the
“intent” requirement—because cigarette makers did not sell
their product with accompanying “therapeutic claims.”