Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/06pdf/05-1120.pdf
Page Number: 58

Cite as:  549 U. S. ____ (2007) 

5 

SCALIA, J., dissenting 

tor  may  defer  making  a  judgment—the  permissible  rea-
sons  for  deciding  not  to  grapple  with  the  issue  at  the
present  time.  Thus,  the  various  “policy”  rationales,  ante, 
at 31, that the Court criticizes are not “divorced from the 
statutory  text,”  ante,  at  30,  except  in  the  sense  that  the
statutory  text  is  silent,  as  texts  are  often  silent  about
permissible  reasons  for  the  exercise  of  agency  discretion. 
The  reasons  the  EPA  gave  are  surely  considerations  ex-
ecutive agencies regularly take into account (and ought to 
take  into  account)  when  deciding  whether  to  consider
entering a new field: the impact such entry would have on
other  Executive  Branch  programs  and  on  foreign  policy. 
There is no basis in law for the Court’s imposed limitation.
EPA’s  interpretation  of  the  discretion  conferred  by  the 
statutory  reference  to  “its  judgment”  is  not  only  reason-
able, it is the most natural reading of the text.  The Court 
nowhere  explains  why  this  interpretation  is  incorrect,  let
alone  why  it  is  not  entitled  to  deference  under  Chevron 
U. S. A.  Inc.  v.  Natural  Resources  Defense  Council,  Inc., 
467  U. S.  837  (1984).    As  the  Administrator  acted  within 
the  law  in  declining  to  make  a  “judgment”  for  the  policy
reasons  above  set  forth,  I  would  uphold  the  decision  to 
deny the rulemaking petition on that ground alone. 

B 

Even  on  the  Court’s  own  terms,  however,  the  same 
conclusion  follows.  As  mentioned  above,  the  Court  gives
EPA  the  option  of  determining  that  the  science  is  too 
uncertain  to  allow  it  to  form  a  “judgment”  as  to  whether
greenhouse  gases  endanger  public  welfare.    Attached  to 
this option (on what basis is unclear) is an essay require-
ment: “If,” the Court says, “the scientific uncertainty is so
profound  that  it  precludes  EPA  from  making  a  reasoned 
judgment  as  to  whether  greenhouse  gases  contribute  to
global warming, EPA must say so.”  Ante, at 31.  But EPA 
has  said  precisely  that—and  at  great  length,  based  on