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4 

ZIGLAR v. ABBASI 

Syllabus 

United States Dist. Court for D. C., 542 U. S. 367, 382.  The litigation
process might also implicate the discussion and deliberations that led
to the formation of the particular policy, requiring courts to interfere
with sensitive Executive Branch functions.  See Clinton v. Jones, 520 
U. S. 681, 701. 

Other special factors counsel against extending Bivens to cover the 
detention policy claims against any of the petitioners.  Because those 
claims challenge major elements of the Government’s response to the 
September  11  attacks,  they  necessarily  require  an  inquiry  into  na-
tional-security  issues.  National-security  policy,  however,  is  the  pre-
rogative  of  Congress  and  the  President,  and  courts  are  “reluctant  to
intrude  upon”  that  authority  absent  congressional  authorization. 
Department  of  Navy  v.  Egan,  484  U. S.  518,  530.    Thus,  Congress’
failure to provide a damages remedy might be more than mere over-
sight, and its silence might be more than “inadvertent.”  Schweiker v. 
Chilicky, 487 U. S. 412, 423.  That silence is also relevant and telling
here, where Congress has had nearly 16 years to extend “the kind of 
remedies  [sought  by]  respondents,”  id.,  at  426,  but  has  not  done  so. 
Respondents also may have had available “ ‘other alternative forms of
judicial relief,’ ” Minneci v. Pollard, 565 U. S. 118, 124, including in-
junctions and habeas petitions. 

The  proper  balance  in  situations  like  this,  between  deterring  con-
stitutional violations and freeing high officials to make the lawful de-
cisions necessary to protect the Nation in times of great peril, is one
for the Congress to undertake, not the Judiciary.  The Second Circuit 
thus erred in allowing respondents’ detention policy claims to proceed 
under Bivens.  Pp. 17–23.

3. The  Second  Circuit  also  erred  in  allowing  the  prisoner  abuse
claim  against  Warden  Hasty  to  go  forward  without  conducting  the 
required  special  factors  analysis.    Respondents’  prisoner  abuse  alle-
gations against Warden Hasty state a plausible ground to find a con-
stitutional violation should a Bivens remedy be implied.  But the first
question  is  whether  the  claim  arises  in  a  new  Bivens  context.  This 
claim  has  significant  parallels  to  Carlson,  which  extended  Bivens  to 
cover  a  failure  to  provide  medical  care  to  a  prisoner,  but  this  claim
nevertheless seeks to extend Carlson to a new context.  The constitu-
tional  right  is  different  here:  Carlson  was  predicated  on  the  Eighth 
Amendment while this claim was predicated on the Fifth.  The judi-
cial guidance available to this warden with respect to his supervisory
duties was less developed.  There might have been alternative reme-
dies available.  And Congress did not provide a standalone damages 
remedy  against  federal  jailers  when  it  enacted  the  Prison  Litigation
Reform  Act  some  15  years  after  Carlson.  Given  this  Court’s  ex-
pressed  caution  about  extending  the  Bivens  remedy,  this  context