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4 

ARIZONA STATE LEGISLATURE v. ARIZONA 
INDEPENDENT REDISTRICTING COMM’N
 
Syllabus
 

process in which the people’s legislative power is coextensive with the 
state legislature’s authority, but the invention of the initiative was in
full  harmony with  the  Constitution’s  conception  of  the people  as  the
font  of  governmental  power.    It  would  thus  be  perverse  to  interpret 
“Legislature”  in  the  Elections  Clause  to  exclude  lawmaking  by  the 
people, particularly when such lawmaking is intended to advance the 
prospect that Members of Congress will in fact be “chosen . . . by the 
People of the several States,”  Art. I, §2.  Pp. 30–33.

(4) Banning lawmaking by initiative to direct a State’s method
of  apportioning  congressional  districts  would  not  just  stymie  at-
tempts to curb gerrymandering.  It would also cast doubt on numer-
ous other time, place, and manner regulations governing federal elec-
tions  that  States  have  adopted  by  the  initiative  method.    As  well,  it 
could  endanger  election  provisions  in  state  constitutions  adopted  by
conventions and ratified by voters at the ballot box, without involve-
ment or approval by “the Legislature.”  Pp. 33–35. 

997 F. Supp. 2d 1047, affirmed. 

GINSBURG, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which KENNEDY, 
BREYER,  SOTOMAYOR,  and  KAGAN,  JJ.,  joined.  ROBERTS,  C. J.,  filed  a 
dissenting  opinion,  in  which  SCALIA,  THOMAS,  and  ALITO,  JJ.,  joined. 
SCALIA,  J.,  filed  a  dissenting  opinion,  in  which  THOMAS,  J.,  joined.
THOMAS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which SCALIA, J., joined.