Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/524bv.pdf
Page Number: 260

524US1

Unit: $U84

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Cite as: 524 U. S. 214 (1998)

215

Syllabus

(a) Sections 203(a) and (c) are modeled after similar provisions of the
Interstate Commerce Act (ICA), and the “ﬁled rate doctrine” associated
with the ICA tariff provisions applies to the Communications Act as
well. MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. American Telephone & Tele-
graph Co., 512 U. S. 218, 229–231. Under that doctrine, the rate a car-
rier duly ﬁles is the only lawful charge. Louisville & Nashville R. Co.
v. Maxwell, 237 U. S. 94, 97. Even if a carrier intentionally misrepre-
sents its rate and a customer relies on the misrepresentation, the carrier
cannot be held to the promised rate if it conﬂicts with the published
tariff. Kansas City Southern R. Co. v. Carl, 227 U. S. 639, 653. That
this case involves services and billing rather than rates or ratesetting
does not make the ﬁled rate doctrine inapplicable. Since rates have
meaning only when one knows the services to which they are attached,
any claim for excessive rates can be couched as a claim for inadequate
services and vice versa. The Communications Act recognizes this in
the §§ 203(a) and (c) requirements, and the cases decided under the ICA
make it clear that discriminatory privileges are not limited to discounted
rates, see, e. g., United States v. Wabash R. Co., 321 U. S. 403, 412–413.
Pp. 221–224.

(b) This Court’s ﬁled-rate cases involving special services claims can-
not be distinguished on the ground that the services they involved
should have been included in the tariff. That is precisely the case here.
Even provisioning and billing are “covered” by the applicable tariff.
Nor does it make any difference that petitioner provided the same serv-
ices, without charge, to other customers; that only tends to show that
petitioner acted unlawfully with regard to the other customers as well.
Pp. 224–226.

(c) The analysis used in evaluating respondent’s contract claim applies
with equal force to its wholly derivative tortious-interference claim.
The Communications Act’s saving clause does not dictate a different
result.
It copies the ICA’s saving clause, which has long been held to
preserve only those rights that are not inconsistent with the statutory
ﬁled-rate requirements. Keogh v. Chicago & Northwestern R. Co., 260
U. S. 156, 163. Finally, respondent’s argument that petitioner’s willful
misconduct makes the relief awarded here consistent with the tariff is
rejected. Pp. 226–228.
108 F. 3d 981, reversed.

Scalia, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist,
C. J., and Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ.,
joined. Rehnquist, C. J., ﬁled a concurring opinion, post, p. 228. Ste-
vens, J., ﬁled a dissenting opinion, post, p. 231. O’Connor, J., took no
part in the consideration or decision of the case.