Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/22pdf/20-1199_hgdj.pdf
Page Number: 165.0

26  STUDENTS FOR FAIR ADMISSIONS, INC. v. PRESIDENT 

AND FELLOWS OF HARVARD COLLEGE 
SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting 

a blind eye to these truths and overruling decades of prece-
dent, “content for now to disguise” its ruling as an applica-
tion of “established law and move on.”  Kennedy, 597 U. S., 
at  ___  (SOTOMAYOR,  J.,  dissenting)  (slip  op.,  at  29).    As 
JUSTICE THOMAS puts it, “Grutter is, for all intents and pur-
poses, overruled.”  Ante, at 58. 

It  is  a  disturbing  feature  of  today’s  decision  that  the
Court  does  not  even  attempt  to  make  the  extraordinary 
showing required by stare decisis.  The Court simply moves 
the goalposts, upsetting settled expectations and throwing
admissions programs nationwide into turmoil.  In the end, 
however, it is clear why the Court is forced to change the
rules  of  the  game  to  reach  its  desired  outcome:  Under  a 
faithful application of the Court’s settled legal framework,
Harvard  and  UNC’s  admissions  programs  are  constitu-
tional  and comply  with  Title  VI  of  the  Civil Rights  Act  of 
1964, 42 U. S. C. §2000d et seq.21 

—————— 

21 The same standard that applies under the Equal Protection Clause 
guides the Court’s review under Title VI, as the majority correctly recog-
nizes.  See ante, at 6, n. 2; see also Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 
U. S. 265, 325 (1978) (Brennan, J., concurring).  JUSTICE GORSUCH argues
that “Title VI bears independent force” and holds universities to an even 
higher standard than the Equal Protection Clause.  Ante, at 25.  Because 
no party advances JUSTICE GORSUCH’s argument, see ante, at 6, n. 2, the 
Court  properly  declines  to  address  it  under  basic  principles  of  party 
presentation.  See United  States v.  Sineneng-Smith,  590  U. S.  ___,  ___ 
(2020) (slip op., at 3).  Indeed, JUSTICE GORSUCH’s approach calls for even 
more  judicial  restraint.    If  petitioner  could  prevail  under  JUSTICE 
GORSUCH’s statutory analysis, there would be no reason for this Court to
reach  the  constitutional  question.  See  Escambia  County  v.  McMillan, 
466 U. S. 48, 51 (1984) (per curiam).  In a statutory case, moreover, stare 
decisis carries “enhanced force,” as it would be up to Congress to “correct 
any mistake it sees” with “our interpretive decisions.”  Kimble v. Marvel 
JUSTICE 
Entertainment,  LLC,  576  U. S.  446,  456 
GORSUCH wonders why the dissent, like the majority, does not “engage” 
with his statutory arguments.  Ante, at 16.  The answer is simple: This
Court plays “the role of neutral arbiter of matters the parties present.” 
Greenlaw v. United States, 554 U. S. 237, 243 (2008).  Petitioner made a 

(2015).