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Page Number: 19.0

16 

RAMOS v. LOUISIANA 

Opinion of the Court 
Opinion of GORSUCH, J. 

IV 
A 
If Louisiana’s path to an affirmance is a difficult one, the
dissent’s is trickier still.  The dissent doesn’t dispute that
the  Sixth  Amendment  protects  the  right  to  a  unanimous
jury  verdict,  or  that  the  Fourteenth  Amendment  extends 
this right to state-court trials.  But, it insists, we must af-
firm Mr. Ramos’s conviction anyway.  Why?  Because the 
doctrine of stare decisis supposedly commands it.  There are 
two independent reasons why that answer falls short. 

In the first place and as we’ve seen, not even Louisiana 
tries  to  suggest  that  Apodaca  supplies  a  governing  prece-
dent.  Remember,  Justice  Powell  agreed  that  the  Sixth 
Amendment requires a unanimous verdict to convict, so he 
would have no objection to that aspect of our holding today.
Justice Powell reached a different result only by relying on 
a dual-track theory of incorporation that a majority of the
Court had already rejected (and continues to reject).  And 
to accept that reasoning as precedential, we would have to
embrace a new and dubious proposition:  that a single Jus-
tice writing only for himself has the authority to bind this
Court to propositions it has already rejected.

This  is  not  the  rule,  and  for  good  reason—it  would  do
more to destabilize than honor precedent.  To see how, con-
sider  a  hypothetical.    Suppose  we  face  a  question  of  first 
impression under the Fourth Amendment:  whether a State 
must  obtain  a  warrant  before  reading  a  citizen’s  email  in
the hands of an Internet provider and using that email as
evidence  in  a  criminal  trial.  Imagine  this  question  splits
the  Court,  with  four  Justices  finding  the  Fourth  Amend-
ment requires a warrant and four Justices finding no such 
—————— 

Relatedly,  the  dissent  suggests  that,  before  doing  anything  here,  we 
should survey all changes in jury practices since 1791.  See post, at 16, 
n. 26.  It sounds like an interesting study—but not one that could alter 
the  plain  meaning  of  the  Constitution  or  obliviate  its  undisputed  una-
nimity requirement.