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12 

ENTERGY CORP. v. RIVERKEEPER, INC. 

Opinion of the Court 

other  tests,  displays  an  intent  to  forbid  its  use.  This 
surely proves too much.  For while it is true that two of the 
other  tests  authorize  cost-benefit  analysis,  it  is  also  true
that  all  four  of  the  other  tests  expressly  authorize  some 
consideration  of  costs.  Thus,  if  respondents’  and  the  dis-
sent’s conclusion regarding the import of §1326(b)’s silence
is correct, it is a fortiori true that the BTA test permits no 
consideration  of  cost  whatsoever,  not  even  the  “cost-
effectiveness”  and  “feasibility”  analysis  that  the  Second 
Circuit  approved,  see  supra,  at  6,  that  the  dissent  would 
approve,  post,  at  1–2,  and  that  respondents  acknowledge. 
The  inference  that  respondents  and  the  dissent  would 
draw  from  the  silence  is,  in  any  event,  implausible,  as 
§1326(b)  is  silent  not  only  with  respect  to  cost-benefit 
analysis  but  with  respect  to  all  potentially  relevant  fac-
tors.  If  silence  here  implies  prohibition,  then  the  EPA
could not consider any factors in implementing §1326(b)—
an  obvious  logical  impossibility.    It  is  eminently  reason-
able to conclude that §1326(b)’s silence is meant to convey 
nothing more than a refusal to tie the agency’s hands as to 
whether  cost-benefit  analysis  should  be  used,  and  if  so  to 
what degree.

Contrary  to  the  dissent’s  suggestion,  see  post,  at  3–4, 
our  decisions  in  Whitman  v.  American  Trucking  Assns., 
Inc.,  531  U. S.  457  (2001),  and  American  Textile  Mfrs. 
Institute,  Inc.  v.  Donovan,  452  U. S.  490  (1981),  do  not
undermine  this  conclusion. 
In  American  Trucking,  we 
held  that  the  text  of  §109  of  the  Clean  Air  Act,  “inter-
preted  in  its  statutory  and  historical  context  . . .  unambi-
guously  bars  cost  considerations”  in  setting  air  quality 
standards  under  that  provision.    531  U. S.,  at  471.    The 
relevant  “statutory  context”  included  other  provisions  in 
the Clean Air Act that expressly authorized consideration 
of costs, whereas §109 did not.  Id., at 467–468.  American 
Trucking  thus  stands for  the  rather  unremarkable  propo-
sition  that  sometimes  statutory  silence,  when  viewed  in