Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/20pdf/19-251_p86b.pdf
Page Number: 54.0

Cite as:  594 U. S. ____ (2021) 

25 

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting 

of [governmental] action.”  Laird, 408 U. S., at 15.  There is 
no question that petitioners have shown that their donors
reasonably fear reprisals if their identities are publicly ex-
posed.  The Court and I, however, disagree about the likeli-
hood of that happening and the role Schedule Bs play in the
investigation of charitable malfeasance.  If the Court had 
simply granted as-applied relief to petitioners based on its 
reading of the facts, I would be sympathetic, although my 
own views diverge.  But the Court’s decision is not nearly
so  narrow  or  modest.  Instead,  the  Court  jettisons  com-
pletely the longstanding requirement that plaintiffs demon-
strate an actual First Amendment burden before the Court 
will subject government action to close scrutiny.  It then in-
validates  a  regulation  in  its  entirety,  even  though  it  can 
point to no record evidence demonstrating that the regula-
tion  is  likely  to  chill  a  substantial  proportion  of  donors. 
These moves are wholly inconsistent with the Court’s prec-
edents  and  our  Court’s  long-held  view  that  disclosure  re-
quirements  only  indirectly  burden  First  Amendment 
rights.  With respect, I dissent.