Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/19pdf/19-46_8n59.pdf
Page Number: 25.0

Cite as:  591 U. S. ____ (2020) 

7 

BREYER, J., dissenting 

the  website  at  issue.  In re  North  Carolina  Lottery,  866 
F. 3d, at 1367; see also Brief for International Trademark 
Association as Amicus Curiae 10–11; TMEP § 1209.03(m). 
These scenarios are not presented here, as “Booking.com” 
conveys only a website associated with booking. 

C 
The  majority  believes  that  Goodyear  is  inapposite  be-
cause of the nature of the domain name system.  Because 
only one entity can hold the contractual rights to a particu-
lar domain name at a time, it contends, consumers may in-
fer that a “generic.com” domain name refers to some specific
entity.  Ante, at 9. 

That fact does not distinguish Goodyear.  A generic term
may  suggest  that  it  is  associated  with  a  specific  entity. 
That  does  not  render  it  nongeneric.    For  example,  “Wine,
Inc.” implies the existence of a specific legal entity incorpo-
rated under the laws of some State.  Likewise, consumers 
may perceive “The Wine Company” to refer to some specific
company rather than a genus of companies.  But the addi-
tion  of  the  definite  article  “the”  obviously  does  not  trans-
form the generic nature of that term.  See In re The Com-
puter Store, Inc., 211 USPQ 72, 74–75 (TTAB 1981).  True, 
these terms do not carry the exclusivity of a domain name. 
But that functional exclusivity does not negate the principle 
animating Goodyear: Terms that merely convey the nature
of the producer’s business should remain free for all to use.  
See 128 U. S., at 603. 

This case illustrates the difficulties inherent in the ma-
jority’s fact-specific approach.  The lower courts determined 
(as the majority highlights), that consumers do not use the 
term “Booking.com” to refer to the class of hotel reservation
websites in ordinary speech.  915 F. 3d 171, 181–183 (CA4 
2019); ante, at 7.  True, few would call Travelocity a “Book-
ing.com.”  Ibid.  But literal use is not dispositive.  See 915 
F. 3d, at 182; H. Marvin Ginn Corp. v. International Assn.