Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/524bv.pdf
Page Number: 786

524US2

Unit: $U98

[09-06-00 19:40:38] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 524 U. S. 721 (1998)

741

Scalia, J., dissenting

several additional facts that California and the Court have
chosen to label “sentence enhancement allegations.” How-
ever California chooses to divide and label its criminal code,
I believe that for federal constitutional purposes those extra
four years are attributable to conviction of a new crime.2
Monge was functionally acquitted of that crime when the
California Court of Appeal held that the evidence adduced
at trial was insufﬁcient to sustain the trial court’s “enhance-
ment” ﬁndings, see Burks v. United States, 437 U. S. 1, 18
(1978). Giving the State a second chance to prove him
guilty of that same crime would violate the very core of the
double jeopardy prohibition.

That disposition would contradict, of course, the Court’s
holding in Almendarez-Torres that “recidivism” ﬁndings do
not have to be treated as elements of the offense, even if they
increase the maximum punishment to which the defendant is
exposed. That holding was in my view a grave constitu-
tional error affecting the most fundamental of rights.
I
note, in any event, that Almendarez-Torres left open the
question whether “enhancements” that increase the maxi-
mum sentence and that do not involve the defendant’s prior
criminal history are valid. That qualiﬁcation is an implicit
limitation on the Court’s holding today.

I respectfully dissent.

2 The Court contends that this issue “was neither considered by the state
courts nor discussed in petitioner’s brief before this Court.” Ante, at 728.
But Monge has argued consistently that reconsideration of the enhance-
ment issue would violate the Double Jeopardy Clause. He did not explic-
itly contend that the enhancement was in reality an element of the offense
with which he was charged, but I believe that was fairly included within
the argument he did make.
“When an issue or claim is properly before
the court, the court is not limited to the particular legal theories advanced
by the parties, but rather retains the independent power to identify and
apply the proper construction of governing law.” Kamen v. Kemper
Financial Services, Inc., 500 U. S. 90, 99 (1991). See also United States
Nat. Bank of Ore. v. Independent Ins. Agents of America, Inc., 508 U. S.
439, 446 (1993).