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ONEOK, INC. v. LEARJET, INC. 

Syllabus 

matters pre-empted by the Natural Gas Act.  Pp. 10–16. 

(a) The  Act  “was  drawn  with  meticulous  regard  for  the  continued 
exercise of state power.”  Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co. v. Public 
Serv.  Comm’n  of  Ind.,  332  U. S.  507,  517–518.    Where,  as  here,  a 
practice  affects  nonjurisdictional  as  well  as  jurisdictional  sales,  pre-
emption can be found only where a detailed examination convincingly 
demonstrates  that  a  matter  falls  within  the  pre-empted  field  as  de-
fined  by  this  Court’s  precedents.    Those  precedents  emphasize  the
importance  of  considering  the  target  at  which  the  state-law  claims 
aim.  See,  e.g.,  Northern  Natural  Gas  Co.  v.  State  Corporation 
Comm’n  of  Kan.,  372  U. S.  84;  Northwest  Central  Pipeline  Corp.  v. 
State Corporation Comm’n of Kan., 489 U. S. 493.  Here, respondents’ 
claims are aimed at practices affecting retail prices, a matter “firmly
on the States’ side of [the] dividing line.”  Id., at 514. 

Schneidewind v. ANR Pipeline Co., 485 U. S. 293, is not to the con-
trary.   That  opinion  explains  that  the  Act  does  not  pre-empt  “tradi-
tional” state regulation, such as blue sky laws.  Id., at 308, n. 11.  An-
titrust  laws,  like  blue  sky  laws,  are  not  aimed  at  natural-gas
companies  in  particular,  but  rather  all  businesses  in  the  market-
place.  The broad applicability of state antitrust laws supports a find-
ing of no pre-emption here.

So, too, does the fact that States have long provided “common-law
and statutory remedies against monopolies and unfair business prac-
tices,” California v. ARC America Corp., 490 U. S. 93, 101.  As noted 
earlier,  the  Act  circumscribes  FERC’s  powers  and  preserves  tradi-
tional areas of state authority.  §717(b).  Pp. 10–14. 

(b) Neither  Mississippi  Power  &  Light  Co.  v.  Mississippi  ex  rel. 
Moore,  487  U. S.  354,  nor  FPC  v.  Louisiana  Power  &  Light  Co.,  406 
U. S.  621,  supports  petitioners’  position.  Mississippi  Power  is  best 
read as a conflict pre-emption case, not a field pre-emption case.  In 
any event, the state inquiry in Mississippi Power was pre-empted be-
cause  it  was  directed  at  jurisdictional  sales  in  a  way  that  respond-
ents’ state antitrust suits are not.  Louisiana Power is also a conflict 
pre-emption  case,  and  thus  does  not  significantly  help  petitioners’ 
field pre-emption argument.  Pp. 14–15.

(c) Because the parties have not argued conflict pre-emption, ques-
tions involving conflicts between state antitrust proceedings and the 
federal rate-setting process are left for the lower courts to resolve in
the first instance.  Pp. 15–16.

(d) While  petitioners  and  the  Government  argue  that  this  Court
should defer to FERC’s determination that field pre-emption bars re-
spondents’ claims, they fail to point to a specific FERC determination
that  state  antitrust  claims  fall  within  the  field  pre-empted  by  the
Natural  Gas  Act.    Thus,  this  Court  need  not  consider  what  legal  ef-