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524us1$75Z 02-18-99 19:35:21 PAGES OPINPGT

Cite as: 524 U. S. 74 (1998)

75

Syllabus

off his COBRA coverage under § 1162(2)(D)(i)’s plain meaning. Moore’s
contrary reading—that, for a beneﬁciary covered under a pre-existing
plan, the ﬁrst moment of coverage on the day following the election is
the moment of ﬁrst being covered after the date of election—ignores
the condition that the beneﬁciary must “ﬁrst becom[e]” covered after
election, robbing the modiﬁer “ﬁrst” of any consequence, thereby equat-
ing “ﬁrst becomes . . . covered” with “remains covered.” Pp. 82–83.

(b) Moore argues that the plain reading should be rejected because it
would permit a beneﬁciary to claim continuation coverage even if he has
obtained entirely new group coverage between the qualifying event and
the election. The statute, however, is not cast expressly in terms of
preserving the status quo of the beneﬁciary’s health care coverage as of
the date of the qualifying event.
In addition, there is no reason to
assume that a beneﬁciary with pre-existing coverage receives a windfall
as a result of his ability to elect COBRA coverage. Since a beneﬁciary
must pay for whatever COBRA coverage he obtains, there is no reason
to think he will make an election for coverage he does not need. Even
Moore would permit a beneﬁciary with coverage under a group health
plan to elect COBRA coverage whenever there is a “signiﬁcant gap”
between the coverage offered by the employer’s group health plan and
that offered by the beneﬁciary’s other group health plan. This “signiﬁ-
cant gap” approach to § 1162(2)(D)(i) is plagued with difﬁculties, how-
ever, beginning with the sheer absence of any statutory support for it.
Furthermore, this approach requires courts to make policy judgments
about the adequacy of the coverage provided by the beneﬁciary’s other
group health plan. This sort of inquiry is so far unsuitable for the
courts that this Court would expect a clear mandate before inferring
that Congress meant to foist it on the judiciary. Pp. 83–87.

114 F. 3d 1458, vacated and remanded.

Souter, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

S. Sheldon Weinhaus argued the cause for petitioner.

With him on the briefs was Marc A. Greidinger.

James A. Feldman argued the cause for the United States
as amicus curiae urging reversal. With him on the brief
were Solicitor General Waxman, Assistant Attorney Gen-
eral Argrett, Deputy Solicitor General Kneedler, Gary R.
Allen, and Teresa E. McLaughlin.