Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/19pdf/18-1023_m64o.pdf
Page Number: 42

Cite as:  590 U. S. ____ (2020) 

7 

ALITO, J., dissenting 

(ATS), a provision like the Tucker Act that grants federal 
jurisdiction  but  does  not  itself  create  any  right  of  action. 
Sosa  v.  Alvarez-Machain,  542  U. S.  692,  713  (2004).    Our 
cases have assumed that the ATS was enacted on the as-
sumption  that  it  would  provide  a  jurisdictional  basis  for 
plaintiffs to assert common-law claims, see id., at 724, but 
our recent cases have held that even there, we should exer-
cise “great caution” before recognizing any new claims not 
created by statute, id., at 728.  See also Jesner, 584 U. S., 
at ___–___ (slip op., at 18–19); Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petro-
leum  Co.,  569  U. S.  108,  116–117  (2013).    There  is  every
reason to believe that a similar caution should guide cases
under  the  Tucker  Act—especially  when  billions  of  dollars
of  federal  funds  are  at  stake.    The  money-mandating  test 
that  the  Court  applies  here  is  in  stark  tension  with  this
precedent.

Despite its importance, the legitimacy of inferring a right
of  action  under  §1342  has  not  received  much  attention  in
these cases.  The Federal Circuit addressed the question in
passing in a footnote, 892 F. 3d 1311, 1320, n. 2 (2018), and 
in this Court, the briefing and argument focused primarily 
on other issues.  No attempt was made to reconcile our ap-
proach to inferring rights of action in Tucker Act cases with 
our broader jurisprudence. 

I  am  unwilling  to  endorse  the  Court’s  holding  in  these 
cases without understanding how the “money-mandating”
test on which the Court relies fits into our general approach
to the recognition of implied rights of action.5  Because the 

—————— 

5 The Court claims that the logic of this opinion “suggests that a federal
statute could never provide a cause of action for damages absent magic
words  explicitly  inviting  suit.”  Ante,  at  25,  n. 12.  But  all  I  suggest  is
that the Court request briefing on the question of inferring causes of ac-
tion to recover damages under the Tucker Act.  The Court makes no effort 
to explain how the test it applies here can be reconciled with our general
approach to inferring private rights of action but is apparently content 
to allow that inconsistency to remain.