Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/21pdf/20-826_p702.pdf
Page Number: 30

Cite as:  596 U. S. ____ (2022) 

1 

KAGAN, J., dissenting 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

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No. 20–826 
_________________ 

MIKE BROWN, ACTING WARDEN, PETITIONER 
v. ERVINE DAVENPORT 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT 

[April 21, 2022] 

JUSTICE  KAGAN,  with  whom  JUSTICE  BREYER  and 

JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR join, dissenting. 

Twice  in  recent  years,  this  Court  has  addressed  how  a
federal habeas court is to evaluate whether a state trial er-
ror was harmless.  See Fry v. Pliler, 551 U. S. 112, 119–120 
(2007); Davis v. Ayala, 576 U. S. 257, 267–270 (2015).  And 
twice, we have made clear that the habeas court need apply 
only the standard prescribed in Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 
U. S. 619 (1993); it need not also run through the test set 
out in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of
1996  (AEDPA).  That  is  because,  we  have  both  times  ex-
plained,  the  Brecht  standard  “obviously  subsumes”  the 
“more liberal” AEDPA one: If a defendant meets the former, 
he will “necessarily” meet the latter too.  Fry, 551 U. S., at 
120; Ayala, 576 U. S., at 270. 

Today, the Court discards those crystal-clear statements, 
subscribed to on each occasion by every Justice.  The major-
ity  reverses  the  Court  of  Appeals  for  following  our  prior 
guidance, allowing the use of the Brecht test alone.  And in 
declaring Brecht insufficient, the majority consigns future 
habeas courts to a regimen of make-work.  Now those courts 
will  have  to  jump  through  AEDPA’s  hoops  as  well,  even 
though that extra analysis will never lead to a different re-
sult.  I respectfully dissent from that pointless demand.