Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/21pdf/21-418_i425.pdf
Page Number: 38

Cite as:  597 U. S. ____ (2022) 

1 

THOMAS, J., concurring 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

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No. 21–418 
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JOSEPH A. KENNEDY, PETITIONER v. 
BREMERTON SCHOOL DISTRICT 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT 

[June 27, 2022] 

JUSTICE THOMAS, concurring. 
I join the Court’s opinion because it correctly holds that 
Bremerton School District violated Joseph Kennedy’s First 
Amendment  rights.    I  write  separately  to  emphasize  that
the  Court’s  opinion  does  not  resolve  two  issues  related  to
Kennedy’s free-exercise claim.

First,  the  Court  refrains  from  deciding  whether  or  how 
public  employees’  rights  under  the  Free  Exercise  Clause
may or may not be different from those enjoyed by the gen-
eral public.  See ante, at 19, n. 2.  In “striking the appropri-
ate  balance”  between  public  employees’  constitutional
rights  and  “the  realities  of  the  employment  context,”  we
have  often  “consider[ed]  whether  the  asserted  employee
right implicates the basic concerns of the relevant constitu-
tional  provision,  or  whether  the  claimed  right  can  more
readily give way to the requirements of the government as
employer.”  Engquist  v.  Oregon  Dept.  of  Agriculture,  553 
U. S. 591, 600 (2008).  In the free-speech context, for exam-
ple,  that  inquiry  has  prompted  us  to  distinguish  between 
different  kinds  of  speech;  we  have  held  that  “the  First 
Amendment protects public employee speech only when it 
falls  within  the  core  of  First  Amendment  protection—
speech on matters of public concern.”  Ibid.  It remains an 
open question, however, if a similar analysis can or should 
apply  to  free-exercise  claims  in  light  of  the  “history”  and