Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/12pdf/11-697_d1o2.pdf
Page Number: 3

Cite as:  568 U. S. ____ (2013) 

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Syllabus 

nearly  180  nations  that  have  signed  a  copyright  treaty  with  the
United States.  Pp. 8–12.

(2) Both  historical  and  contemporary  statutory  context  indicate
that Congress did not have geography in mind when writing the pre-
sent  version  of  §109(a).    A  comparison  of  the  language  in  §109(a)’s
predecessor and the present provision supports this conclusion.  The 
former  version  referred  to  those  who  are  not  owners  of  a  copy,  but 
mere  possessors  who  “lawfully  obtained”  a  copy,  while  the  present 
version covers only owners of a “lawfully made” copy.  This new lan-
guage, including the five words at issue, makes clear that a lessee of
a copy will not receive “first sale” protection but one who owns a copy 
will  be  protected,  provided  that  the  copy  was  “lawfully  made.”    A 
nongeographical interpretation is also  supported by other provisions 
of  the  present  statute.  For  example,  the  “manufacturing  clause,” 
which limited importation of many copies printed outside the United
States,  was  phased  out  in  an  effort  to  equalize  treatment  of  copies 
made  in  America  and  copies  made  abroad.    But  that  “equal  treat-
ment” principle is difficult  to square with a geographical interpreta-
tion that would grant an American copyright holder permanent con-
trol over the American distribution chain in respect to copies printed 
abroad but not those printed in America.  Finally, the Court normally 
presumes  that  the  words  “lawfully  made  under  this  title”  carry  the 
same  meaning  when  they  appear  in  different  but  related  sections,
and  it  is  unlikely  that  Congress  would  have  intended  the  conse-
quences produced by a geographical interpretation.  Pp. 12–16.

(3) A  nongeographical  reading  is  also  supported  by  the  canon  of 
statutory  interpretation  that  “when  a  statute  covers  an  issue  previ-
ously  governed  by  the  common  law,”  it  is  presumed  that  “Congress 
intended  to  retain  the  substance  of  the  common  law.”  Samantar  v. 
Yousuf,  560  U. S.  ___,  ___.    The  common-law  “first  sale”  doctrine, 
which  has  an  impeccable  historic  pedigree,  makes  no  geographical 
distinctions.  Nor can such distinctions be found in Bobbs-Merrill Co. 
v. Straus, 210 U. S. 339, where this Court first applied the “first sale”
doctrine, or in §109(a)’s predecessor provision, which Congress enact-
ed a year later.  Pp. 17–19.

(4) Library  associations,  used-book  dealers,  technology  compa-
nies,  consumer-goods  retailers,  and  museums  point  to  various  ways
in  which  a  geographical  interpretation  would  fail  to  further  basic 
constitutional  copyright  objectives,  in  particular  “promot[ing]  the
Progress of Science and useful Arts,” Art. I, §8, cl. 8.  For example, a 
geographical interpretation  of the first-sale doctrine would likely re-
quire libraries to obtain permission before circulating the many books 
in  their  collections  that  were  printed  overseas.    Wiley  counters  that
such problems have not occurred in the 30 years since a federal court