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BURLINGTON INDUSTRIES, INC. v. ELLERTH

Opinion of the Court

“A master is subject to liability for the torts of his
servants committed while acting in the scope of their
employment.”

An employer may be liable for both negligent and inten-
tional torts committed by an employee within the scope of
his or her employment. Sexual harassment under Title VII
presupposes intentional conduct. While early decisions ab-
solved employers of liability for the intentional torts of their
employees, the law now imposes liability where the employ-
ee’s “purpose, however misguided, is wholly or in part to
further the master’s business.” W. Keeton, D. Dobbs, R.
Keeton, & D. Owen, Prosser and Keeton on Law of Torts
§ 70, p. 505 (5th ed. 1984) (hereinafter Prosser and Keeton
on Torts).
In applying scope of employment principles to
intentional torts, however, it is accepted that “it is less likely
that a willful tort will properly be held to be in the course
of employment and that the liability of the master for such
torts will naturally be more limited.” F. Mechem, Outlines
of the Law of Agency § 394, p. 266 (P. Mechem 4th ed. 1952).
The Restatement deﬁnes conduct, including an intentional
tort, to be within the scope of employment when “actuated,
at least in part, by a purpose to serve the [employer],” even
if it is forbidden by the employer. Restatement §§ 228(1)(c),
230. For example, when a salesperson lies to a customer
to make a sale, the tortious conduct is within the scope of
employment because it beneﬁts the employer by increasing
sales, even though it may violate the employer’s policies.
See Prosser and Keeton on Torts § 70, at 505–506.

As Courts of Appeals have recognized, a supervisor acting
out of gender-based animus or a desire to fulﬁll sexual urges
may not be actuated by a purpose to serve the employer.
See, e. g., Harrison v. Eddy Potash, Inc., 112 F. 3d 1437, 1444
(CA10 1997), vacated on other grounds, post, p. 947; Torres
v. Pisano, 116 F. 3d 625, 634, n. 10 (CA2 1997). But see
Kauffman v. Allied Signal, Inc., 970 F. 2d, at 184–185 (hold-
ing harassing supervisor acted within scope of employment,