Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/20pdf/19-251_p86b.pdf
Page Number: 52.0

Cite as:  594 U. S. ____ (2021) 

23 

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting 

Indeed,  this  Court  has  already  rejected  such  an  indis-
criminate approach in the specific context of disclosure re-
quirements.    Just  over  a  decade  ago,  in  Reed,  petitioners
demonstrated that their own supporters would face reprisal
if their opposition to expanding domestic partnership laws
became public.  That evidence did not support a facial chal-
lenge  to  Washington’s  public  disclosure  law,  however,  be-
cause the “typical referendum petitio[n] concern[ed] tax pol-
icy, revenue, budget, or other state law issues,” and “there
[was] no reason to assume that any burdens imposed by dis-
closure of typical referendum petitions would be remotely
like the burdens plaintiffs fear in this case.”  561 U. S., at 
200–201 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also id., at 
202–203  (ALITO,  J.,  concurring)  (“Many  referendum  peti-
tions concern relatively uncontroversial matters, and plain-
tiffs have provided no reason to think that disclosure of sig-
natory  information  in  those  contexts  would  significantly
chill the willingness of voters to sign.  Plaintiffs’ facial chal-
lenge therefore must fail” (citation omitted)). 

So too here.  Many charitable organizations “concern rel-
atively uncontroversial matters” and petitioners “have pro-
vided no reason to think that” confidential disclosure of do-
nor  information  “would  significantly  chill  the  willingness
of ” most donors to give.  Nor does the Court provide such a 
reason.  It merely highlights threats that public disclosure 
would  pose  to  these  two  petitioners’  supporters.    Those 
threats  provide  “scant  evidence”  of  anything  beyond  “the
specific  harm”  that  petitioners’  donors  might  experience
were their Schedule B information publicly disclosed.  Id., 
at  200–201.  Petitioners’  “facial  challenge  therefore  must 
fail.”  Id., at 203 (ALITO, J., concurring).

How, then, can their facial challenge succeed?  Only be-
cause  the  Court  has  decided,  in  a  radical  departure  from
precedent, that there no longer need be any evidence that a
disclosure requirement is likely to cause an objective bur-
den  on  First  Amendment  rights  before  it  can  be  struck