Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/18pdf/17-1717_4f14.pdf
Page Number: 5.0

Cite as:  588 U. S. ____ (2019) 

5 

Syllabus 

prayer  and  that  many state legislatures had followed suit.  And the 
Court  in  Town  of Greece reasoned that the historical practice of hav-
ing, since the First Congress, chaplains in Congress showed “that the 
Framers  considered  legislative  prayer  a  benign  acknowledgment  of 
religion’s  role  in  society.”    572  U. S.,  at  576.    Where  monuments, 
symbols,  and practices with a longstanding history follow in the tra-
dition  of  the  First  Congress  in  respecting  and  tolerating  different 
views,  endeavoring to achieve inclusivity and nondiscrimination, and 
recognizing  the  important  role  religion  plays  in  the  lives  of  many 
Americans, they are likewise constitutional.  Pp. 24–28. 
  JUSTICE  THOMAS,  agreeing  that the Bladensburg Cross is constitu-
tional, concluded:  

(a) The  text  and  history  of  the  Clause—which  reads  “Congress 
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion”—suggest 
that  it  should  not  be  incorporated  against  the  States.    When  the 
Court  incorporated  the  Clause  in  Everson  v.  Board  of  Ed.  of Ewing, 
330  U. S.  1,  15,  it  apparently  did  not  consider that an incorporated 
Establishment  Clause  would  prohibit  exactly  what  the  text  of  the 
Clause seeks to protect: state establishments of religion.  The appro-
priate  question  is  whether  any  longstanding  right  of  citizenship  re-
strains the States in the establishment context.  Further confounding 
the  incorporation  question  is  the  fact  that the First Amendment by 
its terms applies only to “law[s]” enacted by “Congress.”  Pp. 1–3. 

(b) Even  if  the  Clause  applied  to  state  and  local  governments  in 
some  fashion, “[t]he mere presence of the monument along [respond-
ents’] path involves no [actual legal] coercion,” the sine qua non of an 
establishment  of  religion.    Van  Orden  v.  Perry,  545  U. S.  677,  694 
(opinion  of  THOMAS,  J.).    The  plaintiff  claiming  an  unconstitutional 
establishment of religion must demonstrate that he was actually co-
erced by government conduct that shares the characteristics of an es-
tablishment  as  understood  at  the  founding.    Respondents  have  not 
demonstrated that maintaining a religious display on public property 
shares any of the historical characteristics of an establishment of re-
ligion.    Town  of  Greece  v.  Galloway,  572  U. S. 565, 608 (same).  The 
Bladensburg  Cross  is  constitutional  even  though  the  cross  has reli-
gious significance.  Religious displays or speech need not be limited to 
those  considered  nonsectarian.    Insisting  otherwise  is  inconsistent 
with  this  Nation’s  history  and  traditions,  id., at  578–580 (majority 
opinion),  and  would  force  the  courts  “to  act  as  supervisors  and cen-
sors of religious speech,” id., at 581.  Pp. 3–5. 

(c) The plurality rightly rejects the relevance of the test set forth in 
Lemon  v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602, 612–613, to claims like this one, 
which  involve  religiously  expressive  monuments,  symbols,  displays, 
and  similar  practices,  but  JUSTICE  THOMAS  would  take  the  logical