Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/529bv.pdf
Page Number: 903.0

529US3

Unit: $U60

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UNITED STATES v. PLAYBOY ENTERTAINMENT
GROUP, INC.
Stevens, J., concurring

when a signiﬁcant number of children are likely to
view it.
“(c) ‘Scramble’ deﬁned

“As used in this section, the term ‘scramble’ means to
rearrange the content of the signal of the programming
so that the programming cannot be viewed or heard in
an understandable manner.”

Section 504 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L.
104–104, 110 Stat. 136, 47 U. S. C. § 560 (1994 ed., Supp. III),
provides in relevant part:

“(a) Subscriber request

“Upon request by a cable service subscriber, a cable
operator shall, without charge, fully scramble or other-
wise fully block the audio and video programming of
each channel carrying such programming so that one not
a subscriber does not receive it.
“(b) ‘Scramble’ deﬁned

“As used in this section, the term ‘scramble’ means to
rearrange the content of the signal of the programming
so that the programming cannot be viewed or heard in
an understandable manner.”

Justice Stevens, concurring.
Because Justice Scalia has advanced an argument that
the parties have not addressed, a brief response is in order.
Relying on Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U. S. 463 (1966),
Justice Scalia would treat programs whose content is, he
assumes, protected by the First Amendment as though they
were obscene because of the way they are advertised. The
four separate dissenting opinions in Ginzburg, authored by
Justices Black, Harlan, Douglas, and Stewart, amply demon-
strated the untenable character of the Ginzburg decision
when it was rendered. The Ginzburg theory of obscenity is
a legal ﬁction premised upon a logical bait and switch; adver-