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Page Number: 223

62 

BEARD  v.  KINDLER 

Opinion of the Court 

of  circumstances,  the  [adequate  state  ground]  rule  operates 
in a most perverse way”). 

It  is  perhaps  unsurprising,  then,  that  the  federal  system 
often  grants  broad  discretion  to  the  trial  judge  when  his 
ringside  perspective  at  the  “ ‘main  event’ ”  offers  him  a 
comparative  advantage  in  decisionmaking.  Wainwright  v. 
Sykes,  433  U. S.  72,  90  (1977);  cf.  United  States  v.  Poynter, 
495  F.  3d  349,  351–352  (CA6  2007).  The  States  seem  to 
value  discretionary  rules  as  much  as  the  Federal  Govern­
ment does.  See Brief for State of California et al. as Amici 
Curiae  16–17  (citing  various  state  discretionary  procedural 
rules).  In  light  of  the  federalism  and  comity  concerns  that 
motivate  the  adequate  state  ground  doctrine  in  the  habeas 
context, see Coleman, 501 U. S., at 730, it would seem partic­
ularly  strange  to  disregard  state  procedural  rules  that  are 
substantially  similar  to  those  to  which  we  give  full  force  in 
our  own  courts.  Cf.  Francis  v.  Henderson,  425  U. S.  536, 
541–542 (1976).  Even stranger to do so with respect to rules 
in place in nearly every State, and all at one fell swoop. 

We take our holding in this case to be uncontroversial—so 
uncontroversial, in fact, that both parties agreed to the point 
before this Court.  See Tr. of Oral Arg. 29–31.  Rather than 
defending  the  question  on  which  we  granted  certiorari— 
whether  discretionary  rules  are  automatically  inadequate— 
Kindler  argues  that  the  Pennsylvania  courts  did  not  apply 
a  discretionary  rule  at  all,  but  instead  applied  a  new  rule 
mandating  dismissal.  Such  a  mandatory  dismissal,  Kindler 
contends,  constituted  a  break  from  past  discretionary  prac­
tice,  and  thus  does  not  provide  an  adequate  state  ground  to 
bar his federal claims.  We leave it to the Court of Appeals 
to address that argument, and any others Kindler may have 
preserved, on remand. 

For its part, the Commonwealth urges us not only to reject 
a  per  se  rule  about  discretionary  rulings,  but  also  to  under­
take  “[a]  new  effort  to  state  a  standard  for  inadequacy.” 
Brief  for  Petitioners  25.  Amici  supporting  the  Common­