Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/558bv.pdf
Page Number: 622

Cite as: 558 U. S. 310 (2010) 

461 

Opinion of Stevens, J. 

of  our  political  system.  This  possibility,  the  Court  appar­
ently  believes,  licenses  it  to  run  roughshod  over  Congress’ 
handiwork. 

In my view, we should instead start by acknowledging that 
“Congress  surely  has  both  wisdom  and  experience  in  these 
matters that is far superior to ours.”  Colorado Republican 
Federal  Campaign  Comm.  v.  FEC,  518  U. S.  604,  650  (1996) 
(Stevens,  J.,  dissenting).  Many  of  our  campaign  ﬁnance 
precedents  explicitly  and  forcefully  afﬁrm  the  propriety  of 
such presumptive deference.  See, e. g., McConnell, 540 
U. S.,  at  158;  Beaumont,  539  U. S.,  at  155–156;  NRWC,  459 
U. S., at 209–210.  Moreover, “[j]udicial deference is particu­
larly warranted where, as here, we deal with a congressional 
judgment that has remained essentially unchanged through­
out a century of careful legislative adjustment.”  Beaumont, 
539  U. S.,  at  162,  n.  9  (internal  quotation  marks  omitted); 
cf. Shrink Missouri, 528 U. S., at 391 (“The quantum of em­
pirical  evidence  needed  to  satisfy  heightened  judicial  scru­
tiny  of  legislative  judgments  will  vary  up  or  down  with  the 
novelty  and  plausibility  of  the  justiﬁcation  raised”).  In 
America,  incumbent  legislators  pass  the  laws  that  govern 
campaign  ﬁnance,  just  like  all  other  laws.  To  apply  a  level 
of  scrutiny  that  effectively  bars  them  from  regulating 
electioneering  whenever  there  is  the  faintest  whiff  of 
self-interest,  is  to  deprive  them  of  the  ability  to  regulate 
electioneering. 

This  is  not  to  say  that  deference  would  be  appropriate  if 
there were a solid basis for believing that a legislative action 
was motivated by the desire to protect incumbents or that it 
will  degrade  the  competitiveness  of  the  electoral  process.68 

68 Justice Breyer has suggested that we strike the balance as follows: 
“We  should  defer  to  [the  legislature’s]  political  judgment  that  unlimited 
spending threatens the integrity of the electoral process.  But we should 
not  defer  in  respect  to  whether  its  solution  .  .  .  insulates  legislators  from 
effective  electoral  challenge.”  Shrink  Missouri,  528  U. S.,  at  403–404 
(concurring opinion).