Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/524bv.pdf
Page Number: 788.0

524US2

Unit: $U99

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Cite as: 524 U. S. 742 (1998)

743

Syllabus

“discriminat[ion] against any individual with respect to his . . . terms
§ 2000e–2(a)(1).
[or] conditions . . . of employment, because of . . . sex.”
In Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U. S. 57, 65, this Court
distinguished between the two concepts, saying both are cognizable
under Title VII, though a hostile environment claim requires harass-
ment that is severe or pervasive. Meritor did not discuss the distinc-
tion for its bearing upon an employer’s liability for discrimination, but
held, with no further speciﬁcs, that agency principles controlled on this
point.
Id., at 72. Nevertheless, in Meritor’s wake, Courts of Appeals
held that, if the plaintiff established a quid pro quo claim, the employer
was subject to vicarious liability. This rule encouraged Title VII plain-
tiffs to state their claims in quid pro quo terms, which in turn put ex-
pansive pressure on the deﬁnition. For example, the question pre-
sented here is phrased as whether Ellerth can state a quid pro quo
claim, but the issue of real concern to the parties is whether Burlington
has vicarious liability, rather than liability limited to its own negligence.
This Court nonetheless believes the two terms are of limited utility.
To the extent they illustrate the distinction between cases involving a
carried-out threat and offensive conduct in general, they are relevant
when there is a threshold question whether a plaintiff can prove discrim-
ination. Hence, Ellerth’s claim involves only unfulﬁlled threats, so
it is a hostile work environment claim requiring a showing of severe
or pervasive conduct. This Court accepts the District Court’s ﬁnding
that Ellerth made such a showing. When discrimination is thus
proved, the factors discussed below, not the categories quid pro quo
and hostile work environment, control on the issue of vicarious liability.
Pp. 751–754.

(b) In deciding whether an employer has vicarious liability in a case
such as this, the Court turns to agency law principles, for Title VII
§ 2000e(b). Given
deﬁnes the term “employer” to include “agents.”
this express direction, the Court concludes a uniform and predictable
standard must be established as a matter of federal law. The Court
relies on the general common law of agency, rather than on the law of
any particular State. Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid,
490 U. S. 730, 740. The Restatement (Second) of Agency (hereinafter
Restatement) is a useful beginning point, although common-law princi-
ples may not be wholly transferable to Title VII. See Meritor, supra,
at 72. Pp. 754–755.

(c) A master is subject to liability for the torts of his servants com-
mitted while acting in the scope of their employment. Restatement
§ 219(1). Although such torts generally may be either negligent or in-
tentional, sexual harassment under Title VII presupposes intentional
conduct. An intentional tort is within the scope of employment when