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GEIER v. AMERICAN HONDA MOTOR CO.

Opinion of the Court

Liability § 4(b), Comment e (1997) (distinguishing between
state-law compliance defense and a federal claim of pre-
emption).
It is difﬁcult to understand why Congress would
have insisted on a compliance-with-federal-regulation pre-
condition to the provision’s applicability had it wished the
Act to “save” all state-law tort actions, regardless of their
potential threat to the objectives of federal safety standards
promulgated under that Act. Nor does our interpretation
conﬂict with the purpose of the saving provision, say, by
rendering it ineffectual. As we have previously explained,
the saving provision still makes clear that the express
pre-emption provision does not of its own force pre-empt
common-law tort actions. And it thereby preserves those
actions that seek to establish greater safety than the mini-
mum safety achieved by a federal regulation intended to pro-
vide a ﬂoor. See supra, at 867–868.

Moreover, this Court has repeatedly “decline[d] to give
broad effect to saving clauses where doing so would upset
the careful regulatory scheme established by federal law.”
United States v. Locke, ante, at 106–107; see American Tele-
phone & Telegraph Co. v. Central Ofﬁce Telephone, Inc., 524
U. S. 214, 227–228 (1998) (AT&T); Texas & Paciﬁc R. Co. v.
Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U. S. 426, 446 (1907). We ﬁnd
this concern applicable in the present case. And we con-
clude that the saving clause foresees—it does not foreclose—
the possibility that a federal safety standard will pre-empt a
state common-law tort action with which it conﬂicts. We do
not understand the dissent to disagree, for it acknowledges
that ordinary pre-emption principles apply, at least some-
times. Post, at 899–900 (opinion of Stevens, J.).

Neither do we believe that the pre-emption provision, the
saving provision, or both together, create some kind of “spe-
cial burden” beyond that inherent in ordinary pre-emption
principles—which “special burden” would specially disfavor
pre-emption here. Cf. post, at 898–899. The two provi-
sions, read together, reﬂect a neutral policy, not a specially