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Page Number: 25.0

20 

MURTHY v. MISSOURI 

Opinion of the Court 

rather than its own.7 

With one or two potentially viable links, Hines makes the
best showing of all the plaintiffs.  Still, Facebook was tar-
geting  her  pages  before  almost  all  of  its  communications 
with the White House and the CDC, which weakens the in-
ference that her subsequent restrictions are likely traceable 
to “government-coerced enforcement” of Facebook’s policies,
83 F. 4th, at 370 (emphasis deleted), rather than to Face-
book’s  independent  judgment.8    Even  assuming,  however, 

—————— 

7 The dissent does not dispute the Court’s assessment of these asserted 
links.    Instead,  the  dissent  draws  links  that  Hines  herself  has  not  set 
forth, often based on injuries that Hines never claimed.  Compare post, 
at 19–20, with Brief for Respondents 19–20; App. 628–632.  For instance, 
the  dissent  says  that  in  May  2021,  Facebook  began  demoting  content 
from accounts that repeatedly shared misinformation, purportedly due 
to White House pressure.  Post, at 10, 19.  Because Facebook frequently 
fact  checked  Hines’  posts,  the  dissent  simply  assumes  (without  citing
Hines’ declarations) that her content was subsequently hidden from her
friends’ feeds.  Post, at 19.  Likewise, pointing to an August 2021 policy 
change, the dissent concludes that the mid-July 2021 deplatforming of 
one  of  Hines’  groups  rendered  her  other  pages  “non-recommendable.” 
Ibid.  Hines, however, never claimed as much—and the plaintiffs bear 
the burden to establish standing by setting forth “specific facts.”  Lujan 
v.  Defenders  of  Wildlife,  504  U. S.  555,  561  (1992)  (internal  quotation 
marks omitted).  It is especially important to hold the plaintiffs to their
burden in a case like this one, where the record spans over 26,000 pages
and the lower courts did not make any specific causation findings.  As 
the  Seventh  Circuit  has  memorably  put  it,  “[j]udges  are  not  like  pigs, 
hunting  for  truffles  buried  [in  the  record].”    Gross  v.  Cicero,  619  F. 3d 
697, 702 (2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

8 By  acknowledging  the  real  possibility  that  Facebook  acted  inde-
pendently in suppressing Hines’ content, we are not applying a “new and 
heightened standard,” as the dissent claims.  Post, at 20.  The whole pur-
pose  of  the  traceability  requirement  is  to  ensure  that  “in  fact,  the  as-
serted  injury  was  the  consequence  of  the  defendants’  actions,”  rather 
than of “the independent action” of a third party.  Simon v. Eastern Ky. 
Welfare Rights Organization, 426 U. S. 26, 42, 45 (1976).  Nor is our anal-
ysis inconsistent with Department of Commerce v. New York, 588 U. S. 
752  (2019).    See  post,  at  19.  There,  the  plaintiffs,  including  several 
States,  challenged  the  Secretary  of  Commerce’s  decision  to  reinstate  a