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24  ANDY WARHOL FOUNDATION FOR VISUAL ARTS, INC. 

v. GOLDSMITH 
Opinion of the Court 

U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 26).  AWF’s licensing of the Orange
Prince  image  thus  “ ‘supersede[d]  the  objects,’ ”  Campbell, 
510 U. S., at 579, i.e., shared the objectives, of Goldsmith’s
photograph, even if the two were not perfect substitutes.12 

The use also “is of a commercial nature.”  §107(1).  Just 
as  Goldsmith  licensed  her  photograph  to  Vanity  Fair  for
$400,  AWF  licensed  Orange  Prince  to  Condé  Nast  for 
$10,000.  The  undisputed  commercial  character  of  AWF’s
use, though not dispositive, “tends to weigh against a find-
ing of fair use.”  Harper & Row, 471 U. S., at 562.13 
—————— 

12 In this way, the first factor relates to the fourth, market effect.  See 
Campbell,  510  U. S.,  at  591;  cf.  also  Harper  &  Row,  471  U. S.,  at  568 
(“The excerpts were employed as featured episodes in a story about the
Nixon  pardon—precisely  the  use  petitioners  had  licensed  to  Time”).
While the first factor considers whether and to what extent an original 
work and secondary use have substitutable purposes, the fourth factor 
focuses on actual or potential market substitution.  Under both factors, 
the analysis here might be different if Orange Prince appeared in an art 
magazine alongside an article about Warhol.  Brief for United States as 
Amicus Curiae 33. 

While keenly grasping the relationship between The Two Lolitas, the
dissent  fumbles  the  relationship  between  the  first  and  fourth  fair  use 
factors.  Under today’s decision, as before, the first factor does not ask 
whether a secondary use causes a copyright owner economic harm.  Cf. 
post, at 21 (opinion of KAGAN, J.).  There is, however, a positive associa-
tion between the two factors: A secondary use that is more different in 
purpose  and  character  is  less  likely  to  usurp  demand  for  the  original
work or its derivatives, as the Court has explained, see Campbell, 519 
U. S., at 591.  This relationship should be fairly obvious.  But see post, at 
22 (KAGAN, J., dissenting) (suggesting that the first factor can favor only
the user and the fourth factor only the copyright owner).  Still, the rela-
tionship  is  not  absolute.    For  example,  copies  for  classroom  use  might 
fulfill demand for an original work.  The first factor may still favor the
copyist, even if the fourth factor is shown not to.  At the same time, other 
forms of straight copying may be fair if a strong showing on the fourth 
factor outweighs a weak showing on the first. 

13 The dissent misconstrues the role of commercialism in this analysis. 
The Court does not hold that “[a]ll that matters is that [AWF] and the 
publisher  entered  into  a  licensing  transaction”;  or  that  the  first-factor