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Cite as: 524 U. S. 184 (1998)

191

Opinion of the Court

III

The word “willfully” is sometimes said to be “a word of
many meanings” whose construction is often dependent on
the context in which it appears. See, e. g., Spies v. United
States, 317 U. S. 492, 497 (1943). Most obviously it differ-
entiates between deliberate and unwitting conduct, but in
the criminal law it also typically refers to a culpable state
of mind. As we explained in United States v. Murdock, 290
U. S. 389 (1933), a variety of phrases have been used to de-
scribe that concept.12 As a general matter, when used in
the criminal context, a “willful” act is one undertaken with
a “bad purpose.” 13
In other words, in order to establish a

12 “The word often denotes an act which is intentional, or knowing, or
voluntary, as distinguished from accidental. But when used in a crimi-
nal statute it generally means an act done with a bad purpose (Felton v.
United States, 96 U. S. 699; Potter v. United States, 155 U. S. 438; Spurr
v. United States, 174 U. S. 728); without justiﬁable excuse (Felton v.
United States, supra; Williams v. People, 26 Colo. 272; 57 Pac. 701; People
v. Jewell, 138 Mich 620; 101 N. W. 835; St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry. Co. v.
Batesville & W. Tel. Co., 80 Ark. 499; 97 S. W. 660; Clay v. State, 52 Tex. Cr.
555; 107 S. W. 1129); stubbornly, obstinately, perversely, Wales v. Miner, 89
Ind. 118, 127; Lynch v. Commonwealth, 131 Va. 762; 109 S. E. 427; Claus
v. Chicago Gt. W. Ry. Co., 136 Iowa 7; 111 N. W. 15; State v. Harwell, 129
N. C. 550; 40 S. E. 48. The word is also employed to characterize a thing
done without ground for believing it is lawful (Roby v. Newton, 121 Ga.
679; 49 S. E. 694), or conduct marked by careless disregard whether or not
one has the right so to act, United States v. Philadelphia & R. Ry. Co.,
223 Fed. 207, 210; State v. Savre, 129 Iowa 122; 105 N. W. 387; State v.
Morgan, 136 N. C. 628; 48 S. E. 670.”

290 U. S., at 394–395.

13 See, e. g., Heikkinen v. United States, 355 U. S. 273, 279 (1958) (“There
can be no willful failure by a deportee, in the sense of § 20(c), to apply
to, and identify, a country willing to receive him in the absence of evi-
dence . . . of a ‘bad purpose’ or ‘[non-]justiﬁable excuse,’ or the like. . . .
[I]t cannot be said that he acted ‘willfully’—i. e., with a ‘bad purpose’ or
without ‘justiﬁable excuse’ ”); United States v. Murdock, 290 U. S. 389, 394
(1933) (“[W]hen used in a criminal statute [willfully] generally means an
act done with a bad purpose”); Felton v. United States, 96 U. S. 699, 702
(1878) (“Doing or omitting to do a thing knowingly and wilfully,
im-
plies not only a knowledge of the thing, but a determination with a bad