Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/558bv.pdf
Page Number: 915.0

1068 

OCTOBER TERM, 2009 

Statement of Stevens, J. 

558 U. S. 

eyewitness  testimony  against  him.  Id.,  at  473.  This  evidence 
calls  into  question  the  persuasive  force  of  the  eyewitness’  testi­
mony,  and,  consequently,  whether  Johnson’s  conviction  was  in­
fected  with  constitutional  error.  See  Brady  v.  Maryland,  373 
U. S.  83  (1963);  Johnson,  525  F.  3d,  at  490  (Cole,  J.,  dissenting). 
The  merits  of  Johnson’s  Brady  claim  are  not  before  us;  we  denied 
certiorari on this issue several months ago.  556 U. S. 1154 (2009). 
But  the  constitutional  concerns  raised  by  Judge  Cole’s  dissent 
only  underscore  my  strongly  held  view  that  state-caused  delay  in 
state-sponsored  killings  can  be  unacceptably  cruel.  See  Thomp­
son,  556  U. S.,  at  1116.2  We  cannot  know  as  a  deﬁnitive  matter 
whether, if the State had not withheld exculpatory evidence, John­
son  would  have  been  convicted  of  these  crimes.  We  do  know 
that  Johnson  would  not  have  waited  for  11  years  on  death  row 
before  the  State  met  its  disclosure  obligations.  In  short,  this  is 
as  compelling  a  case  as  I  have  encountered  for  addressing  the 
constitutional  concerns  that  I  raised  in  Lackey. 

This case deserves our full attention for another reason.  John­
son  has  brought  his  Eighth  Amendment  claim  under  42  U. S. C. 
§ 1983.  More  typically,  such  claims  have  been  brought  in  habeas 
corpus.  See,  e. g.,  Thompson  v.  Secretary  for  Dept.  of  Correc­
tions,  517  F.  3d  1279,  1280  (CA11  2008)  (per  curiam);  Allen  v. 
Ornoski, 435 F. 3d 946, 956–960 (CA9 2006); cf. Knight v.  Florida, 
528  U. S.  990,  998  (1999)  (Breyer,  J.,  dissenting  from  denial  of 
certiorari)  (discussing  Lackey  claim  raised  after  state  resentenc­
ing  on  successful  habeas  corpus  petition).  This  case’s  posture 
raises  two  important  questions:  whether  a  Lackey  claim  is  cogni­
zable  under  § 1983;  and,  if  it  is  not,  whether  a  second  federal 
habeas  petition  raising  a  Lackey  claim  is  a  successive  petition 
under  28  U. S. C.  § 2244(b)(2).  The  Sixth  Circuit  agreed  with  the 
District  Court’s  conclusion  that  a  stand-alone  Lackey  challenge 
under  § 1983  is  the  “functional  equivalent”  of  a  habeas  corpus 
challenge,  App.  to  Pet.  for  Cert.  9  (District  Court  opinion),  and 
thus  must  proceed  under  28  U. S. C.  § 2244(b)(2)’s  successive  peti­
tion bar, see Allen, 435 F. 3d, at 956–960.  The resolution of these 

2 The  possibility  that  there  was  constitutional  error  in  Johnson’s  case  is  far 
from  unique.  See  Root,  Cruel  and  Unusual  Punishment:  A  Reconsideration 
of  the  Lackey  Claim,  27  N. Y.  U.  Rev.  L.  &  Soc.  Change  281,  312–313  (2002) 
(discussing  error  rates  in  capital  trials)  (citing  J.  Liebman,  J.  Fagan,  &  V. 
West,  A  Broken  System:  Error  Rates  in  Capital  Cases,  1973–1995,  p.  5 
(2000)).