Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/14pdf/13-534_19m2.pdf
Page Number: 35

12 

NORTH CAROLINA STATE BD. OF DENTAL
EXAMINERS v. FTC 
ALITO, J., dissenting 

stances?  Suppose  that  active  market  participants  consti-
tute  a  voting  bloc  that  is  generally  able  to  get  its  way? 
How  about  an  obstructionist  minority  or  an  agency  chair 
empowered to set the agenda or veto regulations? 

Who  is  an  “active  market  participant”?    If  Board  mem-
bers withdraw from practice during a short term of service 
but typically return to practice when their terms end, does 
that  mean  that  they  are  not  active  market  participants 
during their period of service? 

What is the scope of the market in which a member may 
not  participate  while  serving  on  the  board?    Must  the 
market  be  relevant  to  the  particular  regulation  being 
challenged or merely to the jurisdiction of the entire agency? 
Would  the  result  in  the  present  case  be  different  if  a 
majority  of  the  Board  members,  though  practicing  den-
tists,  did  not  provide  teeth  whitening  services?  What  if 
they were orthodontists, periodontists, and the like?  And 
how  much  participation  makes  a  person  “active”  in  the 
market? 

The answers to these questions are not obvious, but the 
States  must  predict  the  answers  in  order  to  make  in-
formed choices about how to constitute their agencies. 

I  suppose  that  all  this  will  be  worked  out  by  the  lower 
courts  and  the  Federal  Trade  Commission  (FTC),  but  the 
Court’s approach raises a more fundamental question, and 
that is why the Court’s inquiry should stop with an exam-
ination  of  the  structure  of  a  state  licensing  board.    When 
the  Court  asks  whether  market  participants  control  the 
North  Carolina  Board,  the  Court  in  essence  is  asking 
whether  this  regulatory  body  has  been  captured  by  the 
entities  that  it  is  supposed  to  regulate.  Regulatory  cap-
ture  can  occur  in  many  ways.6    So  why  ask  only  whether  

—————— 

6 See, e.g., R. Noll, Reforming Regulation 40–43, 46 (1971); J. Wilson, 
The  Politics  of  Regulation  357–394  (1980).    Indeed,  it  has  even  been