Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/18pdf/18-302_e29g.pdf
Page Number: 43.0

18 

IANCU v. BRUNETTI 

Opinion of SOTOMAYOR, J. 

public  associates  the  contents  of  trademarks  with  the 
Federal  Government,”  Tam,  582  U. S.,  at  ___  (slip  op.,  at 
17),  registration  nevertheless  entails  Government  in-
volvement  in  promoting  a  particular  mark.    Registration
requires  the  Government  to  publish  the  mark,  as  well  as 
to take steps to combat international infringement.  See 15 
U. S. C. §§1062, 1124; see also Brief for United States 35.
The  Government  has  a  reasonable  interest  in  refraining
from  lending  its  ancillary  support  to  marks  that  are  ob-
scene,  vulgar,  or  profane.  Cf.  Hustler  Magazine,  Inc.  v. 
Falwell,  485  U. S.  46,  56  (1988)  (“[S]peech  that  is  vulgar,
offensive, and shocking is not entitled to absolute constitu-
tional protection under all circumstances” (internal quota-
tion marks omitted)). 

III 
“The  cardinal  principle  of  statutory  construction  is  to 
save  and  not  to  destroy.”  Jones  &  Laughlin  Steel  Corp., 
301  U. S.,  at  30;  see  also  Hooper  v.  California,  155  U. S. 
648,  657  (1895)  (“The  elementary  rule  is  that  every  rea-
sonable construction must be resorted to, in order to save 
a statute from unconstitutionality”).  In directing the PTO
to deny the ancillary benefit of registration to trademarks
featuring “scandalous” content, Congress used a word that
is susceptible of different meanings.  The majority’s read-
ing  would  render  the  provision  unconstitutional;  mine
would  save  it.  Under  these  circumstances,  the  Court 
ought  to  adopt  the  narrower  construction,  rather  than 
permit  a  rush  to  register  trademarks  for  even  the  most 
viscerally  offensive  words  and  images  that  one  can
imagine.13 

—————— 

13 As noted above, I agree with the majority that §1052(a)’s bar on the 
registration of “immoral” marks is unconstitutional viewpoint discrimi-
nation.  See  supra,  at  2.    I  would  simply  sever  that  provision  and 
uphold  the  bar  on  “scandalous”  marks.  See  Reno  v.  American  Civil 
Liberties  Union,  521  U. S.  844,  882–883  (1997);  Brockett  v.  Spokane