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Page Number: 80

18 

MOODY v. NETCHOICE, LLC 

ALITO, J., concurring in judgment 

as content “curation.”  But whatever you call it, not all com-
pilers do this, at least in a way that is inherently expressive.
Some  may  serve  as  “passive  receptacle[s]”  of  third-party
speech or as “dumb pipes”16 that merely emit what they are 
fed.  Such entities communicate no message of their own,
and accordingly, their conduct does not merit First Amend-
ment  protection.17  Miami  Herald  Publishing  Co.  v. 
Tornillo, 418 U. S. 241, 258 (1974).

Determining whether an entity should be viewed as a “cu-
rator” or a “dumb pipe” may not always be easy because dif-
ferent aspects of an entity’s operations may take different 
approaches with respect to hosting third-party speech.  The 
typical newspaper regulates the content and presentation
of articles authored by its employees or others, PG&E, 475 
U. S., at 8, but that same paper might also run nearly all 
the classified advertisements it receives, regardless of their
content  and  without  adding  any  expression  of  its  own.
Compare Tornillo, 418 U. S. 241, with Pittsburgh Press Co. 
v. Pittsburgh Comm’n on Human Relations, 413 U. S. 376 
(1973).  These  differences  may  be  significant  for  First
Amendment purposes.

The same may be true for a parade organizer.  For exam-
ple, the practice of a parade organizer may be to select the 

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16 American Broadcasting Cos. v. Aereo, Inc., 573 U. S. 431, 458 (2014) 

(Scalia, J., dissenting). 

17 The majority states that it is irrelevant whether “a compiler includes
most items and excludes just a few.”  Ante, at 18.  That may be true if the 
compiler  carefully  reviews,  edits,  and  selects  a  large  proportion  of  the 
items it receives.  But if an entity, like some “sort of community billboard,
regularly carr[ies] the messages of third parties” instead of selecting only
those that contribute to a common theme, then this information becomes 
highly relevant.  PG&E, 475 U. S. 1, 23 (1986) (Marshall, J., concurring 
in judgment).  Entities that have assumed the role of common carriers 
fall  into  this  category,  for  example.    And  the  States  defend  portions  of
their laws on the ground that at least some social-media platforms have
taken on that role.  The majority brushes aside that argument without 
adequate consideration.