Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/19pdf/18-260_jifl.pdf
Page Number: 3.0

Cite as:  590 U. S. ____ (2020) 

3 

Syllabus 

means does not fit in context.  Coupling “from” with “to” is strong evi-
dence  that  Congress  was  referring  to  a  destination  (“navigable  wa-
ters”) and an origin (“any point source”).  That Maui’s reading would 
create a serious loophole in the permitting regime also indicates that 
it is unreasonable.  Pp. 10–11. 

(3) The Solicitor General argues that the proper interpretation of
the statute is the one reflected in EPA’s recent Interpretive Statement,
namely, that “all releases of pollutants to groundwater” are excluded 
from the scope of the permitting program, “even where pollutants are 
conveyed  to  jurisdictional  surface  waters  via  groundwater.”    84  Fed. 
Reg. 16810, 16811.  That reading, which would open a loophole allow-
ing easy evasion of the statutory provision’s basic purposes, is neither 
persuasive nor reasonable.  EPA is correct that Congress did not re-
quire a permit for all discharges to groundwater, and it did authorize
study and funding related to groundwater pollution.  But the most that 
the study and funding provisions show is that Congress thought that 
the problem of pollution in groundwater would primarily be addressed 
by the States or perhaps by other federal statutes.  EPA’s new inter-
pretation  is  also  difficult  to  reconcile  with  the  statute’s  reference  to 
“any  addition”  of  a  pollutant  to  navigable  waters;  with  the  statute’s 
inclusion of “wells” in the “point source” definition, since wells would 
ordinarily discharge pollutants through groundwater; and with statu-
tory provisions that allow EPA to delegate its permitting authority to 
a State only if the State, inter alia, provides “ ‘adequate authority’ ” to 
“ ‘control the disposal of pollutants into wells,’ ” §402(b).  Pp. 11–13. 

(4) Perhaps, as the dissents suggest, the statute’s language could 
be narrowed by reading the statute to refer only to the pollutant’s im-
mediate  origin,  but  there  is  no  linguistic  basis  for  this  limitation. 
Pp. 13–15. 

(d) The statute’s words reflect Congress’ basic aim to provide federal 
regulation of identifiable sources of pollutants entering navigable wa-
ters without undermining the States’ longstanding regulatory author-
ity over land and groundwater.  The reading of the statute that best 
captures  Congress’  meaning,  reflected  in  the  statute’s  words,  struc-
ture, and purposes, is that a permit is required when there is a dis-
charge  from  a  point  source  directly  into  navigable  waters  or  when 
there is the functional equivalent of a direct discharge.  Many factors 
may be relevant to determining whether a particular discharge is the 
functional equivalent of one directly into navigable waters.  Time and 
distance  will  be  the  most  important  factors  in  most  cases,  but  other
relevant factors may include, e.g., the nature of the material through 
which  the  pollutant  travels  and  the  extent  to  which  the  pollutant  is
diluted or chemically changed as it travels.  Courts will provide addi-
tional guidance through decisions in individual cases.  The underlying