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Page Number: 41

14 

VIDAL v. ELSTER 

BARRETT, J., concurring in part 

1961).  The  views  of  preceding  generations  can  persuade, 
and, in the realm of stare decisis, even bind.  But tradition 
is not an end in itself—and I fear that the Court uses it that 
way here.

The Court does not (and could not) argue that the late-
19th  and  early-20th  century  names-restriction  tradition 
serves  as  evidence  of  the  original  meaning  of  the  Free 
Speech Clause.  Cf. Samia v. United States, 599 U. S. 635, 
655–656  (2023)  (BARRETT,  J.,  concurring  in  part  and  con-
curring in judgment).  Nor does it treat the history it recites
as  a  persuasive  data  point.  Instead,  it  presents  tradition
itself  as  the  constitutional  argument;  the  late-19th  and
early-20th  century  evidence  is  dispositive  of  the  First 
Amendment issue.  Yet what is the theoretical justification 
for using tradition that way?

Relying  exclusively  on  history  and  tradition  may  seem
like a way of avoiding judge-made tests.  But a rule render-
ing tradition dispositive is itself a judge-made test.  And I 
do not see a good reason to resolve this case using that ap-
proach rather than by adopting a generally applicable prin-
ciple.  (After all, there is a tradition of the latter approach 
too.  See, e.g., McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 421 
(1819) (adopting standard for application of the Necessary 
and  Proper  Clause).)  In  the  course  of  applying  broadly 
worded text like the Free Speech Clause, courts must inev-
itably articulate principles to resolve individual cases.  I do 
not  think  we  can  or  should  avoid  doing  so  here.    As  I  ex-
plained in Part I–B, the takeaway from history is that con-
tent-based trademark restrictions have long been central to
trademark’s  purpose  of  facilitating  source  identification, 
and they have not posed a serious risk of censorship.  This 
principle  offers  a  generally  applicable  way  to  think  about 
whether registration restrictions “ ‘play well with the First 
Amendment.’ ”  Ante, at 12.  We should bring clarity to the 
law by adopting it.

In my view, the Court’s laser-like focus on the history of