Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/22pdf/21-1449_d9eh.pdf
Page Number: 21

2 

GLACIER NORTHWEST, INC. v. TEAMSTERS 

ALITO, J., concurring in judgment 

held  most  clearly  a  matter  for  the  States”);  Construction 
Workers  v.  Laburnum  Constr.  Corp.,  347  U. S.  656,  669 
(1954)  (The  NLRA  does  not  allow  employees  to  “destroy 
property without liability for the damage done”); Electrical 
Workers v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 315 U. S. 
740, 748 (1942) (The NLRA “was not designed to preclude a
State” from regulating threats of property damage); see also 
Linn  v.  Plant  Guard  Workers,  383  U. S.  53,  61–62  (1966) 
(“ ‘[T]here is no ground for concluding that existing criminal 
penalties or liabilities for tortious conduct have been elimi-
nated’ ”  by  the  NLRA);  Bill  Johnson’s  Restaurants,  Inc.  v. 
NLRB, 461 U. S. 731, 741–742 (1983) (“It has . . . repeatedly
been held that an employer has the right to seek local judi-
cial  protection  from  tortious  conduct  during  a  labor  dis-
pute”).

Nothing  more  is  needed  to  resolve  this  case.    Glacier’s 
complaint  alleges  that  the  Union  and  its  members  acted
“with the improper purpose to harm Glacier by causing [its]
batched concrete to be destroyed.”  App. 10; accord, id., at 
14,  19–20.  As  the  Court  recognizes,  they  succeeded  by 
“prompt[ing]  the  creation  of  the  perishable  product”  and 
then ceasing work when the concrete was in a vulnerable 
state.  Ante, at 10 (emphasis deleted); see App. 10–13.  Be-
cause  this  Court  has  long  rejected  the  Union’s  claim  that
this kind of conduct is protected, Garmon preemption does
not apply.  See Longshoremen v. Davis, 476 U. S. 380, 395 
(1986).1 

—————— 

1 The Court wisely declines to address the argument on which JUSTICE 
JACKSON relies regarding the effect of the complaint before the NLRB on 
this litigation.  See post, at 7–8.  That argument represents a striking 
extension of Garmon preemption, which, as the Court notes, is already 
an “unusual” doctrine.  See ante, at 3–4.  If the state courts on remand 
dismiss this case on that ground, the decision, in my judgment, would be
a good candidate for a quick return trip here.