Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/558bv.pdf
Page Number: 380

Cite as: 558 U. S. 209 (2010) 

219 

Thomas, J., dissenting 

be read to imply the latter, and the Court may well be right 
that  a  trial  court  violates  the  Sixth  Amendment  if  it  closes 
the courtroom without sua sponte considering reasonable al­
ternatives to closure.  But I would not decide the issue sum­
marily,  and  certainly  would  not  declare,  as  the  Court  does, 
that Waller and Press-Enterprise I “settl[e] the point” with­
out “leav[ing] any room for doubt.”  Ante, at 214. 

Besides  departing  from  the  standards  that  should  govern 
summary dispositions, today’s decision belittles the efforts of 
our judicial colleagues who have struggled with these issues 
in attempting to interpret and apply the same opinions upon 
which the Court so conﬁdently relies today.  See, e. g., Ayala 
v.  Speckard,  131  F.  3d  62,  70–72  (CA2  1997)  (en  banc),  cert. 
denied,  524  U. S.  958  (1998);  131  F.  3d,  at  74–75  (Walker, 
J.,  concurring);  id.,  at  77–80  (Parker,  J.,  dissenting).  The 
Court’s decision will also surely surprise petitioner, who did 
not  seek  summary  reversal  based  on  the  allegedly  incorrect 
application of this Court’s well-established precedents by the 
Supreme  Court of  Georgia,  but instead  asked  us to  “resolve 
this split of authority” over whether “the opponent of closure 
must  suggest  alternatives  to  closure”  or  whether  “those 
seeking  to  exclude  the  public  must  show  that  there  is  no 
available less-intrusive alternative.”  Pet. for Cert. 18.