Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/558bv.pdf
Page Number: 323.0

162 

SMITH  v.  SPISAK 

Opinion of Stevens, J. 

to charges of misconduct.  See Brief for Steven Lubet et al. 
as  Amici  Curiae  15–16  (observing  that  counsel’s  closing  ar­
gument  “would  have  been  improper  even  coming  from  the 
prosecutor”).  A few examples are in order. 

Presumably  to  take  the  “sting”  out  of  the  prosecution’s 
case,  Brief  for  Petitioner  37,  counsel  described  his  client’s 
acts in vivid detail to the jury: 

“[Y]ou  can  smell  almost  the  blood.  You  can  smell,  if 
you  will,  the  urine.  You  are  in  a  bathroom,  and  it  is 
death, and you can smell the death . . . and you can feel, 
the  loneliness  of  that  railroad  platform  .  .  .  and  we  can 
all know the terror that [the victim] felt when he turned 
and  looked  into  those  thick  glasses  and  looked  into  the 
muzzle  of  a  gun  that  kept  spitting  out  bullets  .  .  .  And 
we  can  see  a  relatively  young  man  cut  down  with  so 
many  years  to  live,  and  we  could  remember  his  widow, 
and  we  certainly  can  remember  looking  at  his  chil­
dren . . . There  are  too  many  family  albums.   There 
are  too  many  family  portraits  dated  1982  that  have  too 
many  empty spaces.  And  there  is too  much terror  left 
in  the  hearts  of  those  that  we  call  lucky.” 4  Spisak 
v.  Mitchell,  465  F.  3d,  at  704–705  (internal  quotation 
marks omitted). 

Presumably to “gain credibility” with the jury, Brief for Peti­
tioner 37, counsel argued that his client deserved no sympa­
thy for his actions: 

4 To  make  matters  worse,  these  graphic  and  emotionally  charged  de­
scriptions  of  Spisak’s  crimes  were  irrelevant  under  state  law  even  for 
purposes  of  the  State’s  case  for  aggravating  circumstances.  See  State  v. 
Wogenstahl,  75  Ohio  St.  3d  344,  356,  662  N.  E.  2d  311,  322  (1996)  (“[T]he 
nature and circumstances of the offense may only enter into the statutory 
weighing process on the side of mitigation”); see also State v.  Johnson, 24 
Ohio St. 3d 87, 93, 494 N. E. 2d 1061, 1066 (1986) (explaining that statutory 
aggravating circumstances should be narrowly construed); Ohio Rev. Code 
Ann.  § 2929.04(A)  (Lexis  2006)  (identifying  10  aggravating  circumstances 
but not including heinous circumstances of offense).