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4 

BIDEN v. KNIGHT FIRST AMENDMENT INSTITUTE  
AT COLUMBIA UNIV. 
THOMAS, J., concurring 

new regulation.  See Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Con-
rad, 420 U. S. 546, 547, 555 (1975).  But government offi-
cials who informally gather with constituents in a hotel bar 
can ask the hotel to remove a pesky patron who elbows into 
the  gathering  to  loudly  voice  his  views.  The  difference  is 
that the government controls the space in the first scenario, 
the hotel, in the latter.  Where, as here, private parties con-
trol the avenues for speech, our law has typically addressed
concerns about stifled speech through other legal doctrines, 
which may have a secondary effect on the application of the 
First Amendment. 

A 
If part of the problem is private, concentrated control over 
online content and platforms available to the public, then
part of the solution may be found in doctrines that limit the 
right of a private company to exclude.  Historically, at least
two legal doctrines limited a company’s right to exclude. 

First, our legal system and its British predecessor have
long subjected certain businesses, known as common carri-
ers, to special regulations, including a general requirement 
to serve all comers.  Candeub, Bargaining for Free Speech: 
Common  Carriage,  Network  Neutrality,  and  Section  230, 
22 Yale J. L. & Tech. 391, 398–403 (2020) (Candeub); see 
also  Burdick,  The  Origin  of  the  Peculiar  Duties  of  Public 
Service  Companies,  Pt.  1,  11  Colum.  L. Rev.  514  (1911).
Justifications  for  these  regulations  have  varied.    Some 
scholars have argued that common-carrier regulations are
justified only when a carrier possesses substantial market 
power.  Candeub 404.  Others have said that no substantial 
market power is needed so long as the company holds itself
out as open to the public.  Ibid.; see also Ingate v. Christie, 
3 Car. & K. 61, 63, 175 Eng. Rep. 463, 464 (N. P. 1850) (“[A] 
person [who] holds himself out to carry goods for everyone
as a business . . . is a common carrier”).  And this Court long
ago suggested that regulations like those placed on common