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INTEL CORP. INVESTMENT POLICY COMM. v. SULYMA 

Opinion of the Court 

passed ERISA, the word “actual” meant what it means to-
day:  “existing  in  fact  or  reality.”  Webster’s  Seventh  New 
Collegiate Dictionary 10 (1967); accord, Merriam-Webster’s
Collegiate  Dictionary  13  (11th  ed.  2005)  (same);  see  also
American  Heritage  Dictionary  14  (1973)  (“In  existence;
real; factual”); id., at 18 (5th ed. 2011) (“Existing in reality 
and not potential, possible, simulated, or false”).  So did the 
word “knowledge,” which meant and still means “the fact or 
condition of being aware of something.”  Webster’s Seventh 
New  Collegiate  Dictionary  469  (1967);  accord,  Merriam-
Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 691 (2005) (same); see also
American  Heritage  Dictionary  725  (1973)  (“Familiarity, 
awareness, or understanding gained through experience or 
study”);  id.,  at  973  (2011)  (same).  Thus,  to  have  “actual 
knowledge”  of  a  piece  of  information,  one  must  in  fact  be 
aware of it. 

Legal  dictionaries  give  “actual  knowledge”  the  same 
meaning:  “[r]eal  knowledge  as  distinguished  from  pre-
sumed  knowledge  or  knowledge  imputed  to  one.”    Ballen-
tine’s Law Dictionary 24 (3d ed. 1969); accord, Black’s Law 
“actual 
(11th  ed.  2019) 
Dictionary  1043 
knowledge”  as  “[d]irect  and  clear  knowledge,  as  distin-
guished from constructive knowledge”).4  The qualifier “ac-
tual” creates that distinction.  In everyday speech, “actual 
knowledge”  might  seem  redundant;  one  who  claims 

(defining 

—————— 

4 Petitioners cite this dictionary’s somewhat puzzling second definition 
of  “actual  knowledge,”  which  it  dubs  “implied  actual  knowledge”: 
“[k]nowledge of information that would lead a reasonable person to in-
quire further.”  Black’s Law Dictionary 1043 (11th ed. 2019).  Not even 
this entry, however, appears to equate “implied actual knowledge” with 
“actual knowledge” as normally understood.  It instead proceeds to ref-
erence the common-law “discovery rule,” ibid., under which a limitations 
period  begins  when  “the  plaintiff  discovers  (or  reasonably  should  have 
discovered)  the  injury  giving  rise  to  the  claim,”  id.,  at  585  (emphasis 
added); see also Merck & Co. v. Reynolds, 559 U. S. 633, 646 (2010).  As 
we  noted  in  Merck,  that  rule  is  broader  than  “actual  knowledge.”  Id., 
at 647.