Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/23pdf/23-5572_l6hn.pdf
Page Number: 28.0

8 

FISCHER v. UNITED STATES 

JACKSON, J., concurring 

a statute addresses significant criminal conduct when none 
of  the  available  indicia  of  congressional  intent,  including 
the  prohibition’s  placement,  suggest  that  Congress  in-
tended  that  result.    Here,  it  beggars  belief  that  Congress
would  have  inserted  a  breathtakingly  broad,  first-of-its-
kind  criminal  obstruction  statute  (accompanied  by  a  sub-
stantial 20-year maximum penalty) in the midst of a signif-
icantly  more  granular  series  of  obstruction  prohibitions
without clarifying its intent to do so—not in the text of the 
provision  itself,  nor  in  the  surrounding  statutory  context,
nor in any statement issued during the enactment process. 

* 

* 

* 
In my view, the Court properly interprets §1512(c)(2) in
the opinion it issues today.  It also rightly vacates the judg-
ment below and remands this case for further proceedings.
Joseph  Fischer  was  charged  with  violating  §1512(c)(2)  by
corruptly obstructing “a proceeding before Congress, specif-
ically, Congress’s certification of the Electoral College vote.” 
App. 183.  That official proceeding plainly used certain rec-
ords, documents, or objects—including, among others, those
relating to the electoral votes themselves.  See Tr. of Oral 
Arg. 65–67.  And it might well be that Fischer’s conduct, as
alleged  here,  involved  the  impairment  (or  the  attempted 
impairment) of the availability or integrity of things used
during the January 6 proceeding “in ways other than those
specified in (c)(1).”  Ante, at 8.  If so, then Fischer’s prosecu-
tion under §1512(c)(2) can, and should, proceed.  That issue 
remains available for the lower courts to determine on re-
mand.