Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/529bv.pdf
Page Number: 269.0

529US1

Unit: $U37

[09-26-01 08:37:33] PAGES PGT: OPIN

194

CORTEZ BYRD CHIPS, INC. v. BILL HARBERT
CONSTR. CO.
Syllabus

guage supporting both views. However, the history and function of the
provisions conﬁrm that they were meant to expand, not limit, venue
choice. The FAA was enacted in 1925 against the backdrop of a consid-
erably more restrictive general venue statute than today’s. The 1925
general venue statute effectively limited civil suits to the district where
the defendant resided, and courts did not favor forum selection clauses.
The FAA’s venue provisions had an obviously liberalizing effect, undi-
minished by any suggestion that Congress meant simultaneously to
foreclose a suit where the defendant resided. That is normally a de-
fendant’s most convenient forum, and it would take a very powerful
reason ever to suggest that Congress meant to eliminate such a venue
for postarbitration disputes. This view is conﬁrmed by the obviously
liberalizing § 9, which permits forum selection agreements. Were §§ 10
and 11 construed restrictively, a proceeding to conﬁrm an award begun
in a selected forum would be held in abeyance while an objecting party
returned to the district of arbitration to modify or vacate the award.
Were that action unsuccessful, the parties would then return to the pre-
viously selected forum for the conﬁrming order originally sought.
Nothing could be more clearly at odds with the FAA’s policy of rapid
and unobstructed enforcement of arbitration agreements or with the
desired ﬂexibility of parties in choosing an arbitration site. A restric-
tive interpretation would also place § 3—which permits a court to stay
a proceeding referable to arbitration pending such arbitration—and
§§ 9–11 in needless tension, for a court with the power to stay an action
under § 3 also has the power to conﬁrm any ensuing arbitration award,
Marine Transit Corp. v. Dreyfus, 284 U. S. 263, 275–276. Harbert’s
interpretation would also create anomalous results in the aftermath of
arbitrations held abroad. Against this reasoning, speciﬁc to the FAA’s
history and function, Harbert’s citations to cases construing other spe-
cial venue provisions as restrictive, see, e. g., Fourco Glass Co. v. Trans-
mirra Products Corp., 353 U. S. 222, 227–228, are beside the point.
Their authority is not that special venue statutes are restrictive, but
that analysis of special venue provisions must be speciﬁc to the statute
in question. Pp. 198–204.

169 F. 3d 693, reversed and remanded.

Souter, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

Daniel H. Bromberg argued the cause for petitioner.
With him on the briefs were John L. Maxey II and John
F. Hawkins.