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12 

MASLENJAK v. UNITED STATES 

Opinion of the Court 

quirement,  when  in  fact  she  had  not.    The  Government 
need  only  expose  that  lie  to  establish  that  she  obtained
naturalization  illegally—for  had  she  told  the  truth  in-
stead, the official would have promptly denied her applica-
tion.  Or  consider  another,  perhaps  more  common  case 
stemming  from  the  “good  moral  character”  criterion.    See 
§1427(a)(3); supra, at 8.  That phrase is defined to exclude
any  person  who  has  been  convicted  of  an  aggravated  fel- 
ony.  See §1101(f )(8).  If a defendant falsely denied such a
conviction,  she  too  would  have  gotten  her  citizenship  by
means  of  a  lie—for  otherwise  the  outcome  would  have 
been  different.    In  short,  when  the  defendant  misrepre-
sents  facts  that  the  law  deems  incompatible  with  citizen-
ship, her lie must have played a role in her naturalization. 
But  that  is  not  the  only  time  a  jury  can  find  that  a 
defendant’s  lie  had  the  requisite  bearing  on  a  naturaliza-
tion  decision.  For  even  if  the  true  facts  lying  behind  a
false  statement  would  not  “in  and  of  themselves  justify
denial of citizenship,” they could have “led to the discovery
of  other  facts  which  would”  do  so.  Chaunt  v.  United 
States,  364  U. S.  350,  352–353  (1960).    We  previously
addressed  that  possibility  when  considering  the  civil
statute that authorizes the Government to revoke natural-
ization.  See  Kungys,  485  U. S.,  at  774–777  (opinion  of
Scalia,  J.)  (interpreting  8  U. S. C.  §1451(a)).5  As  we  ex-
plained in that context, a person whose lies throw investi-
gators  off  a  trail  leading  to  disqualifying  facts  gets  her
citizenship by means of those lies—no less than if she had 
denied the damning facts at the very end of the trail.  See 
ibid. 

When relying on such an investigation-based theory, the 

—————— 

5 Kungys concerned the part of that statute providing for the revoca-
tion  of  citizenship  “procured  by  concealment  of  a  material  fact  or  by
willful  misrepresentation.”    §1451(a).  As  noted  earlier,  the  same 
statute  includes  a  prong  covering  citizenship  that  is  “illegally  pro-
cured.”  See n. 2, supra.