Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/529bv.pdf
Page Number: 551.0

529US2

Unit: $U50

[09-26-01 10:29:49] PAGES PGT: OPIN

476

SLACK v. McDANIEL

Syllabus

subject, McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U. S. 467, 487, and states: “A second
or successive petition [alleging new and different grounds] may be dis-
missed if . . . the judge ﬁnds that the failure . . . to assert those grounds
in a prior petition constituted an abuse of the writ.” The “second or
successive petition” phrase is a term of art given substance in, e. g.,
Rose v. Lundy, 455 U. S., at 510, which held that a district court must
dismiss habeas petitions containing both exhausted and unexhausted
claims, but contemplated that the prisoner could return to federal court
after the requisite exhaustion, id., at 520–521. Thus, a petition ﬁled
after a mixed petition has been dismissed under Rose v. Lundy before
the district court adjudicated any claims is to be treated as any other
ﬁrst petition and is not a second or successive petition. Neither Rose
v. Lundy nor Stewart v. Martinez-Villareal, 523 U. S. 637 (1998), sup-
ports the State’s contention that the prisoner, upon his return to federal
court, should be restricted to the claims made in his initial petition.
It
is instead more appropriate to treat the initial mixed petition as though
it had not been ﬁled, subject to whatever conditions the court attaches
to the dismissal. Accordingly, Slack’s 1995 petition should not have
been dismissed on the grounds that it was second or successive. To the
extent that the Court’s ruling might allow prisoners repeatedly to re-
turn to state court and thereby inject undue delay into the collateral
review process, the problem can be countered under the States’ power
to impose proper procedural bars and the federal courts’ broad powers
to prevent duplicative or unnecessary litigation. Pp. 485–489.

(b) Thus, Slack has demonstrated that reasonable jurists could con-
clude that the District Court’s abuse of the writ holding was wrong.
Whether Slack is otherwise entitled to the issuance of a COA is a ques-
tion to be resolved ﬁrst upon remand. Pp. 489–490.

Reversed and remanded.

Kennedy, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, Part I of which was
unanimous, Part II of which was joined by Rehnquist, C. J., and O’Con-
nor, Scalia, Thomas, and Ginsburg, JJ., and Parts III and IV of which
were joined by Rehnquist, C. J., and Stevens, O’Connor, Souter,
Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ. Stevens, J., ﬁled an opinion concurring in
part and concurring in the judgment, in which Souter and Breyer, JJ.,
joined, post, p. 490. Scalia, J., ﬁled an opinion concurring in part and
dissenting in part, in which Thomas, J., joined, post, p. 490.

Michael Pescetta, by appointment of the Court, 526 U. S.
1049, argued and reargued the cause for petitioner. With
him on the briefs was Timothy P. O’Toole.