Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/558bv.pdf
Page Number: 376

Cite as: 558 U. S. 209 (2010) 

215 

Per Curiam 

ings conﬁdential.  Id., at 503–504.  The Court, nonetheless, 
found it was error to close the courtroom.  Id., at 513. 

Trial  courts  are  obligated  to  take  every  reasonable  meas­
ure  to  accommodate  public  attendance  at  criminal  trials. 
Nothing  in  the  record  shows  that  the  trial  court  could  not 
have  accommodated  the  public  at  Presley’s  trial.  Without 
knowing the precise circumstances, some possibilities include 
reserving one or more rows for the public; dividing the jury 
venire  panel  to  reduce  courtroom  congestion;  or  instructing 
prospective  jurors  not  to  engage  or  interact  with  audience 
members. 

Petitioner  also  argues  that,  apart  from  failing to consider 
alternatives  to  closure,  the  trial  court  erred  because  it  did 
not  even  identify  any  overriding  interest  likely  to  be  preju­
diced  absent  the  closure  of  voir  dire.  There  is  some  merit 
to  this  complaint.  The  generic  risk  of  jurors  overhearing 
prejudicial  remarks,  unsubstantiated  by  any  speciﬁc  threat 
or incident, is inherent whenever members of the public are 
present during the selection of jurors.  If broad concerns of 
this  sort  were  sufﬁcient  to  override  a  defendant’s  constitu­
tional right to a public trial, a court could exclude the public 
from  jury  selection  almost  as  a  matter  of  course.  As  noted 
in  the  dissent  below,  “the  majority’s  reasoning  permits  the 
closure of voir dire in every criminal case conducted in this 
courtroom  whenever  the  trial  judge  decides,  for  whatever 
reason, that he or she would prefer to ﬁll the courtroom with 
potential  jurors  rather  than  spectators.”  285  Ga.,  at  276, 
674 S. E. 2d, at 913 (opinion of Sears, C. J.). 

There  are  no  doubt  circumstances  where  a  judge  could 
conclude  that  threats  of  improper  communications  with  ju­
rors or safety concerns are concrete enough to warrant clos­
ing  voir  dire.  But  in  those  cases,  the  particular  interest, 
and  threat  to  that  interest,  must  “be  articulated  along  with 
ﬁndings  speciﬁc  enough  that  a  reviewing  court  can  deter­
mine  whether  the  closure  order  was  properly  entered.” 
Press-Enterprise I, supra, at 510; see also Press-Enterprise