Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/529bv.pdf
Page Number: 926.0

529US3

Unit: $U61

[11-02-00 07:34:21] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 529 U. S. 848 (2000)

851

Opinion of the Court

commerce-affecting activity; arson of such a dwelling, there-
is not subject to federal prosecution under § 844(i).
fore,
Our construction of § 844(i) is reinforced by the Court’s opin-
ion in United States v. Lopez, 514 U. S. 549 (1995), and the
interpretive rule that constitutionally doubtful constructions
should be avoided where possible, see Edward J. DeBartolo
Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Building & Constr. Trades
Council, 485 U. S. 568, 575 (1988).

I

On February 23, 1998, petitioner Dewey Jones tossed a
Molotov cocktail through a window into a home in Fort
Wayne, Indiana, owned and occupied by his cousin. No one
was injured in the ensuing ﬁre, but the blaze severely dam-
aged the home. A federal grand jury returned a three-count
indictment charging Jones with arson, 18 U. S. C. § 844(i)
(1994 ed., Supp. IV); using a destructive device during and
in relation to a crime of violence (the arson), 18 U. S. C.
§ 924(c); and making an illegal destructive device, 26 U. S. C.
§ 5861(f).
Jones was tried under that indictment in the
Northern District of Indiana and convicted by a jury on all
three counts.1 The District Court sentenced him, pursuant
to the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, to a total prison term
of 35 years, to be followed by ﬁve years of supervised release.
The court also ordered Jones to pay $77,396.87 to the insurer
of the damaged home as restitution for its loss. Jones ap-
pealed, and the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
afﬁrmed the judgment of the District Court.
178 F. 3d 479
(1999).

Jones unsuccessfully urged, both before the District Court
and on appeal to the Seventh Circuit, that § 844(i), when ap-
plied to the arson of a private residence, exceeds the author-
ity vested in Congress under the Commerce Clause of the

1 The question on which we granted review refers solely to Jones’s
§ 844(i) conviction. See infra, at 852. We therefore do not address his
§ 924(c) and § 5861(f) convictions.