Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/558bv.pdf
Page Number: 596

Cite as: 558 U. S. 310 (2010) 

435 

Opinion of Stevens, J. 

cant in evaluating precedents.  Second, each case in this line 
expressed support for the principle that corporate and union 
political speech ﬁnanced with PAC funds, collected voluntar­
ily from the organization’s stockholders or members, receives 
greater  protection  than  speech  ﬁnanced  with  general  treas­
ury funds.60 

This principle was carried forward when Congress enacted 
comprehensive campaign ﬁnance reform in the Federal Elec­
tion  Campaign  Act  of  1971  (FECA),  86  Stat.  3,  which  re­
tained  the  restriction  on  using  general  treasury  funds  for 
contributions and  expenditures, 2  U. S. C. § 441b(a).  FECA 

60 See  Pipeﬁtters  v.  United  States,  407  U. S.  385,  409,  414–415  (1972) 
(reading the statutory bar on corporate and union campaign spending not 
to apply to “the voluntary donations of employees,” when maintained in a 
separate  account,  because  “[t]he  dominant  [legislative]  concern  in  requir­
ing that contributions be voluntary was, after all, to protect the dissenting 
stockholder  or  union  member”);  Automobile  Workers,  352  U. S.,  at  592 
(advising the District Court to consider on remand whether the broadcast 
in question was “paid for out of the general dues of the union membership 
or  [whether]  the  funds  [could]  be  fairly  said  to  have  been  obtained  on  a 
voluntary basis”); United States v. CIO, 335 U. S. 106, 123 (1948) (observing 
that “funds voluntarily contributed [by union members or corporate stock­
holders]  for  election  purposes”  might  not  be  covered  by  the  expenditure 
bar).  Both  the  Pipeﬁtters  and  the  Automobile  Workers  Courts  approv­
ingly  referenced  Congress’  goal  of  reducing  “the  effect  of  aggregated 
wealth on federal elections,” understood as wealth drawn from a corporate 
or union general treasury without the stockholders’ or members’ “free and 
knowing choice.”  Pipeﬁtters, 407 U. S., at 416; see Automobile Workers, 
352 U. S., at 582. 

The  two  dissenters  in  Pipeﬁtters  would  not  have  read  the  statutory 
provision in question, a successor to § 304 of the Taft-Hartley Act, to allow 
such robust use of corporate and union funds to ﬁnance otherwise prohib­
ited electioneering.  “This opening of the door to extensive corporate and 
union  inﬂuence  on  the  elective  and  legislative  processes,”  Justice  Powell 
wrote, “must be viewed with genuine concern.  This seems to me to be a 
regressive  step  as  contrasted  with  the  numerous  legislative  and  judicial 
actions  in  recent  years  designed  to  assure  that  elections  are  indeed  free 
and  representative.”  407  U. S.,  at  450  (opinion  of  Powell,  J.,  joined  by 
Burger, C. J.).