Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/19pdf/18-1116_h3cj.pdf
Page Number: 11

Cite as:  589 U. S. ____ (2020) 

9 

Opinion of the Court 

holds it in his hand.  Ibid.  In other words, he has the req-
uisite knowledge because he could acquire it with reason- 
able effort.  That turns §1113(2) into what it is plainly not: 
a constructive-knowledge requirement. 

Petitioners’ contextual argument fails for the same rea-
son.  As they point out, ERISA’s disclosure regime is meant
to “ensur[e] that ‘the individual participant knows exactly
where he stands with respect to the plan.’ ”  Firestone Tire 
& Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U. S. 101, 118 (1989) (quoting 
H. R. Rep. No. 93–533, p. 11 (1973)).  This is the reason for 
ERISA’s requirements that disclosures be written for a lay
audience.  See, e.g., 29 U. S. C. §1022(a).  Once plan admin-
istrators satisfy their obligations to impart knowledge, pe-
titioners say, §1113(2)’s knowledge requirement is satisfied 
too.  But  that  is  simply  not  what  §1113(2)  says.    Unlike 
other  ERISA 
form 
§1113(2)’s  context—§1113(2)  begins  only  when  a  plaintiff
actually is aware of the relevant facts, not when he should 
be.  And a given plaintiff will not necessarily be aware of all
facts disclosed to him; even a reasonably diligent plaintiff 
would not know those facts immediately upon receiving the
disclosure.  Although “the words of a statute must be read
in their context,” Davis v. Michigan Dept. of Treasury, 489 
U. S. 803, 809 (1989), petitioners’ argument again gives the
word “actual” little meaning at all. 

limitations  periods—which  also 

Petitioners also argue that §1113(2)’s plain meaning un-
dermines  its  purpose  of  protecting  plan  administrators 
from suits over bygone investment decisions.  If a plan par-
ticipant can simply deny knowledge, they say, administra-
tors will rarely get the benefit of §1113(2).  But even if this 
is true, as it may well be, we cannot say that heeding the
clear meaning of the word “actual” renders the statute so 
“ ‘[in]coherent’ ” that it must be disregarded.  Kingdomware 
Technologies, Inc. v. United States, 579 U. S. ___, ___ (2016) 
(slip op., at 8).

For one thing, plan participants are not the only potential