Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/22pdf/20-1199_l6gn.pdf
Page Number: 133.0

2 

STUDENTS FOR FAIR ADMISSIONS, INC. v. PRESIDENT 
AND FELLOWS OF HARVARD COLLEGE 
KAVANAUGH, J., concurring 

306–308 (1880).  As a result, the Court has long held that
racial  classifications  by  the  government,  including  race-
based  affirmative  action  programs,  are  subject  to  strict 
judicial scrutiny.   

strict 

racial 

Under 

scrutiny, 

classifications  are 
constitutionally  prohibited  unless  they  are  narrowly
tailored  to  further  a  compelling  governmental  interest. 
Grutter, 539 U. S., at 326–327.  Narrow tailoring requires 
courts  to  examine,  among  other  things,  whether  a  racial
classification is “necessary”—in other words, whether race-
neutral  alternatives  could  adequately  achieve 
the 
governmental interest.  Id., at 327, 339–340; Richmond v. 
J. A. Croson Co., 488 U. S. 469, 507 (1989).

Importantly,  even  if  a  racial  classification  is  otherwise
narrowly  tailored  to  further  a  compelling  governmental
interest, a “deviation from the norm of equal treatment of 
all  racial  and  ethnic  groups”  must  be  “a  temporary
matter”—or  stated  otherwise,  must  be  “limited  in  time.” 
Id., at 510 (plurality opinion of O’Connor, J.); Grutter, 539 
U. S., at 342.   

In 1978, five Members of this Court held that race-based 
affirmative  action  in  higher  education  did  not  violate  the 
Equal Protection Clause or Title VI of the Civil Rights Act, 
so  long  as  universities  used  race  only  as  a  factor  in
admissions  decisions  and  did  not  employ  quotas.  See 
Regents  of  Univ.  of  Cal.  v.  Bakke,  438  U. S. 265,  325–326 
(1978)  (joint  opinion  of  Brennan,  White,  Marshall,  and 
Blackmun, JJ.); id., at 287, 315–320 (opinion of Powell, J.).
One  Member  of  the  Court’s  five-Justice  majority,  Justice 
Blackmun, added that race-based affirmative action should 
exist only as a temporary measure.  He expressed hope that
such programs would be “unnecessary” and a “relic of the 
past” by 1988—within 10 years “at the most,” in his words—
although  he  doubted  that  the  goal  could  be  achieved  by 
then.  Id., at 403 (opinion of Blackmun, J.). 

In 2003, 25 years after Bakke, five Members of this Court