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4  CAMERON v. EMW WOMEN’S SURGICAL CENTER, P. S. C. 

THOMAS, J., concurring 

have been obligated to do so, rather than pursue interven-
tion—“the  requisite  method  for  a  nonparty  to  become  a 
party to a lawsuit.”  Eisenstein, 556 U. S., at 933. 
  Respondents resist this conclusion and contend that the 
attorney general remained a “party” because then-Attorney 
General Beshear stipulated upon dismissal that “any final 
judgment in this action . . . will be binding on the Office of 
the Attorney General, subject to any modification, reversal 
or vacation of the judgment on appeal.”  App. 29–30.  Re-
spondents’  argument  has  a  veneer  of  plausibility  only  be-
cause of our decision in Devlin v. Scardelletti, 536 U. S. 1.  
There, a majority of this Court held that a nonnamed mem-
ber of a certified class action was a “party” who could appeal 
the approval of a settlement to which he objected.  Id., at 
10.  Rejecting the settled bright-line rule that only a named 
party  may  appeal  a  final  judgment,  the  Court  adopted  a 
vague, functionalist inquiry that determined “party” status 
“based on context.”  Ibid. 
  Applying  that  test,  Devlin  held  that  “nonnamed  class 
members are parties to the proceedings in the sense of be-
ing bound by the [judgment],” and it was “th[at] feature of 
class action litigation that require[d] that class members be 
allowed to appeal the approval of a settlement.”  Ibid.  “To 
hold  otherwise,”  the  Court  explained,  “would  deprive 
nonnamed  class  members  of  the  power  to  preserve  their 
own  interests  in  a  settlement  that  will  ultimately  bind 
them.”  Ibid. 
  I  joined  Justice  Scalia’s  dissent  in  Devlin,  which  reiter-
ated  that  “ ‘parties’  to  a  judgment  are  those  named  as 
such—whether as the original plaintiff or defendant in the 
complaint  giving  rise  to  the  judgment,  or  as  ‘one  who 
though not an original party becomes a party by interven-
tion, substitution, or third-party practice.’ ”  536 U. S., at 15 
(quoting Karcher v. May, 484 U. S. 72, 77 (1987); alterations 
omitted).  The Devlin Court’s holding was, and is, “contrary” 
to that “well-established law.”  536 U. S., at 150.  To reason,