Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/524bv.pdf
Page Number: 422

524US2

Unit: $U90

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Cite as: 524 U. S. 357 (1998)

377

Souter, J., dissenting

Just as the Court has underestimated the competitive in-
ﬂuences tending to induce police and parole ofﬁcers to stint
on Fourth Amendment obligations, so I think it has mis-
understood the signiﬁcance of admitting illegally seized evi-
dence at the revocation hearing. On the one hand, the ma-
jority magniﬁes the cost of an exclusionary rule for parole
cases by overemphasizing the differences between a revoca-
tion hearing and a trial, and on the other hand it has mini-
mized the beneﬁts by failing to recognize the signiﬁcant like-
lihood that the revocation hearing will be the principal, not
the secondary, forum, in which evidence of a parolee’s crimi-
nal conduct will be offered.

The Court is, of course, correct that the revocation hear-
ing has not only an adversarial side in factﬁnding, but a pre-
dictive and discretionary aspect in addressing the proper
disposition when a violation has been found. See ante, at
366 (citing Gagnon v. Scarpelli, supra, at 787 (quoting Mor-
rissey v. Brewer, supra, at 480)). And I agree that open-
mindedness at the discretionary, dispositional stage is pro-
moted by the relative informality of the proceeding even at
its factﬁnding stage. Gagnon v. Scarpelli, supra, at 786.
That informality is fostered by limiting issues so that law-
yers are not always necessary, 411 U. S., at 787–788, and
by appointing lay members to parole boards, Morrissey v.
Brewer, supra, at 489. There is no question, either, that
application of an exclusionary rule, if there is no waiver of
Fourth Amendment rights, will tend to underscore the ad-
versary character of the factﬁnding process. This cannot,
however, be a dispositive objection to an exclusionary rule.
Any revocation hearing is adversary to a degree: counsel
must now be provided whenever the complexity of fact issues
so warrant, Gagnon v. Scarpelli, supra, at 787, and lay board
members are just as capable of passing upon Fourth Amend-

lar arrestee will end up challenging the lawfulness of his arrest in a formal
deportation proceeding.”
Id., at 1044. As the instant case may suggest,
there is no reason to expect parolees to be so reticent.