Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/14pdf/13-7451_m64o.pdf
Page Number: 19

16 

YATES v. UNITED STATES 

Opinion of GINSBURG, J. 

statutory  enumeration,  the  general  words  are  [usually] 
construed  to  embrace  only  objects  similar  in  nature  to
those objects enumerated by the preceding specific words.” 
Washington  State  Dept.  of  Social  and  Health  Servs.  v. 
Guardianship Estate of Keffeler, 537 U. S. 371, 384 (2003) 
(internal  quotation  marks  omitted).    In  Begay  v.  United 
States,  553  U. S.  137,  142–143  (2008),  for  example,  we
relied  on  this  principle  to  determine  what  crimes  were 
covered by the statutory phrase “any crime . . . that . . . is 
burglary, arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives, or 
otherwise  involves  conduct  that  presents  a  serious  poten-
tial  risk  of  physical  injury  to  another,”  18  U. S. C.
§924(e)(2)(B)(ii).    The  enumeration  of  specific  crimes,  we
explained,  indicates  that  the  “otherwise  involves”  provi-
sion  covers  “only  similar  crimes,  rather  than  every  crime 
that ‘presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to
another.’ ”  553 U. S., at 142.  Had Congress intended the 
latter “all encompassing” meaning, we observed, “it is hard 
to  see  why  it  would  have  needed  to  include  the  examples
at all.”  Ibid.  See also CSX Transp., Inc. v. Alabama Dept. 
of Revenue, 562 U. S. 277, ___ (2011) (slip op., at 16) (“We
typically  use  ejusdem  generis  to  ensure  that  a  general
word  will  not  render  specific  words  meaningless.”).  Just 
so here.  Had Congress intended “tangible object” in §1519 
to  be  interpreted  so  generically  as  to  capture  physical
objects  as  dissimilar  as  documents  and  fish,  Congress
would  have  had  no  reason  to  refer  specifically  to  “record”
or  “document.”    The  Government’s  unbounded  reading  of
“tangible  object”  would  render  those  words  misleading
surplusage.

Having used traditional tools of statutory interpretation
to  examine  markers  of  congressional  intent  within  the
Sarbanes-Oxley  Act  and  §1519  itself,  we  are  persuaded 
that an aggressive interpretation of “tangible object” must
be  rejected.  It  is  highly  improbable  that  Congress  would
have buried a general spoliation statute covering objects of