Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/558bv.pdf
Page Number: 446.0

Cite as: 558 U. S. 256 (2010) 

285 

Opinion of Roberts, C. J. 

in “the amount of water that Duke Energy needs to sustain 
its  operations  and  provide  electricity  to  the  region.”  Ante, 
at  272.  These  are  simply  interests  in  a  particular  use  of 
water or its ﬂow.  Even if Duke Energy uses water for par­
ticularly important purposes, its interests are no different in 
kind  from  the  interests  of  any  other  entity  that  relies  on 
water for its commercial operations. 

Finally,  the  majority  asserts  that  Duke  Energy  “has  a 
unique and compelling interest in protecting the terms of its 
existing  [Federal  Energy  Regulatory  Commission  (FERC)] 
license  and  the  [Comprehensive  Relicensing  Agreement 
(CRA)]  that  forms  the  basis  of  Duke  Energy’s  pending  re­
newal  application.”  Ante,  at  272–273.  And  the  majority 
contends  that  neither  State  represents  these  interests  be­
cause  “[n]either  State  has  signed  the  CRA  or  expressed  an 
intention  to  defend  its  terms,”  and  because  North  Carolina 
has  even  expressed  its  intent  to  challenge  the  terms  of  the 
CRA in this action.  Ante, at 273. 

Again,  all  this  amounts  to  is  an  articulation  of  the  reason 
Duke  Energy  asserts  a  particular  interest  in  the  waters  of 
the  Catawba.  Other  citizens  of  North  Carolina  doubtless 
have  reasons  of  their  own,  ones  they  ﬁnd  as  important  as 
Duke  Energy  believes  its  to  be.  Weighing  those  interests 
is an “intramural” matter for the State.  New Jersey v.  New 
York,  supra,  at  373.  In  addition,  the  Federal  Government 
is  doubtless  familiar  with  the  pending  FERC  proceedings, 
and it sees no corresponding need for us to grant Duke Ener­
gy’s  motion  to  intervene.  See  Brief  for  United  States  as 
Amicus Curiae 20, n. 3. 

As  for  CRWSP,  the  Special  Master  concluded  that  it 
should be allowed to intervene, but only because its position 
was “similar analytically to Charlotte’s.”  First Interim Re­
port of Special Master, O. T. 2008, No. 138, Orig., p. 25.  The 
Court  rejects  Charlotte’s  motion,  but  nonetheless  allows 
CRWSP  to  intervene  on  a  ground  not  relied  upon  by  the 
Special  Master.  According  to  the  majority,  CRWSP  should