Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/558bv.pdf
Page Number: 437.0

276 

SOUTH  CAROLINA  v.  NORTH  CAROLINA 

Opinion of Roberts, C. J. 

Because  we  are  not  persuaded that  Charlotte’s  interest  is 
sufﬁciently  unique  and  not  properly  represented  by  North 
Carolina  to  require  the  city’s  intervention  as  a  party  in  this 
litigation, we sustain South Carolina’s exception.8 

III 

We  thus  overrule  South  Carolina’s  exceptions  to  the  Spe­
cial  Master’s  First  Interim  Report  with  respect  to  the 
CRWSP  and  Duke  Energy,  but  we  sustain  South  Carolina’s 
exception with respect to Charlotte. 

It is so ordered. 

Chief  Justice  Roberts,  with  whom  Justice  Thomas, 
Justice  Ginsburg,  and  Justice  Sotomayor  join,  concur­
ring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part. 

The Court  correctly rejects  the Special  Master’s formula­
tion  of  a  new  test  for  intervention  in  original  actions,  and 
correctly  denies  the  city  of  Charlotte  leave  to  intervene. 
The  majority  goes  on,  however,  to  misapply  our  established 
test  in  granting  intervention  to  Duke  Energy  Carolinas, 
LLC  (Duke  Energy),  and  the  Catawba  River  Water  Supply 
Project (CRWSP). 

8 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24 does not require a contrary result. 
This  Court’s  Rule  17.2  allows  the  Federal  Rules  of  Civil  Procedure  to 
be  taken  as  “guides”  to  procedure  in  original  actions.  See  Arizona  v. 
California,  460  U. S.  605,  614  (1983).  Even  if  we  were  to  look  to  the 
standard  for  intervention  of  right  in  civil  matters,  Charlotte  would  not 
be entitled  to intervene  in this  dispute because  an existing  party—North 
Carolina—adequately represents Charlotte’s interest.  See Fed. Rule Civ. 
Proc.  24(a)(2).  To  the  extent  that  the  standard  for  permissive  interven­
tion  may  be  an  appropriate  guide  when  a  movant  presents  a  sufﬁciently 
“important  but  ancillary  concern,”  see  Arizona,  supra,  at  614–616,  we 
ﬁnd  no  such  concern  here.  North  Carolina’s  adequate  representation  of 
Charlotte and the heightened standard for intervention in original actions, 
see  New  Jersey  v.  New  York,  345  U. S.,  at  373,  persuade  us  not  to  apply 
the standard for permissive intervention set forth in Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 24(b)(1)(B).