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Page Number: 545.0

524US2

Unit: $U94

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EASTERN ENTERPRISES v. APFEL

Syllabus

2. The Coal Act’s allocation of liability to Eastern violates the Takings

Clause. Pp. 522–537.

(a) Economic regulation such as the Coal Act may effect a taking.
United States v. Security Industrial Bank, 459 U. S. 70, 78. The party
challenging the government action bears a substantial burden, for not
every destruction or injury to property by such action is a constitutional
taking. A regulation’s constitutionality is evaluated by examining the
governmental action’s “justice and fairness.” See Andrus v. Allard,
444 U. S. 51, 65. Although that inquiry does not lend itself to any set
formula, three factors traditionally have informed this Court’s regu-
latory takings analysis: “[T]he economic impact of the regulation, its
interference with reasonable investment backed expectations, and the
character of the governmental action.” Kaiser Aetna v. United States,
444 U. S. 164, 175. Pp. 522–524.

(b) The analysis in this case is informed by previous decisions con-
sidering the constitutionality of somewhat similar legislative schemes:
Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U. S. 1 (Black Lung Beneﬁts
Act of 1972); Connolly v. Pension Beneﬁt Guaranty Corporation, 475
U. S. 211 (Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act of 1980); and
Concrete Pipe & Products of Cal., Inc. v. Construction Laborers Pen-
sion Trust for Southern Cal., 508 U. S. 602 (same). Those opinions
make clear that Congress has considerable leeway to fashion economic
legislation, including the power to affect contractual commitments be-
tween private parties; and that it may impose retroactive liability to
some degree, particularly where it is “ ‘conﬁned to short and limited
periods required by the practicalities of producing national legislation,’ ”
Pension Beneﬁt Guaranty Corporation v. R. A. Gray & Co., 467 U. S.
717, 731. The decisions, however, have left open the possibility that
legislation might be unconstitutional if it imposes severe retroactive lia-
bility on a limited class of parties that could not have anticipated the
liability, and if the extent of that liability is substantially disproportion-
ate to the parties’ experience. Pp. 524–529.

(c) The Coal Act’s allocation scheme, as applied to Eastern, pre-
sents such a case, when the three traditional factors are considered. As
to the economic impact, Eastern’s Coal Act liability is substantial, and
the company is clearly deprived of the $50 to $100 million it must pay
to the Combined Fund. An employer’s statutory liability for multiem-
ployer plan beneﬁts should reﬂect some proportionality to its experience
with the plan. Concrete Pipe, supra, at 645. Eastern contributed to
the 1947 and 1950 W&R Funds, but ceased its coal mining operations in
1965 and neither participated in negotiations nor agreed to make contri-
butions in connection with the Beneﬁt Plans established under the 1974,
It is the latter agreements, however,
1978, or subsequent NBCWA’s.
that ﬁrst suggest an industry commitment to funding lifetime health