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22 

RUCHO v. COMMON CAUSE 

Opinion of the Court 

IV 

Appellees  and  the  dissent  propose  a  number  of  “tests” 
for  evaluating  partisan  gerrymandering  claims,  but  none 
meets  the need  for  a limited  and precise  standard  that  is 
judicially discernible and manageable.  And none provides 
a solid grounding for judges to take the extraordinary step
of  reallocating  power  and  influence  between  political
parties. 

A 
The  Common  Cause  District  Court  concluded  that  all 
but  one  of  the  districts  in  North  Carolina’s  2016  Plan 
violated  the  Equal  Protection  Clause  by  intentionally
diluting  the  voting  strength  of  Democrats.    318  F. Supp. 
3d, at 923.  In reaching that result the court first required 
the  plaintiffs  to  prove  “that  a  legislative  mapdrawer’s
predominant  purpose  in  drawing  the  lines  of  a  particular
district  was  to  ‘subordinate  adherents  of  one  political 
party  and  entrench  a  rival  party  in  power.’ ”  Id.,  at  865 
(quoting Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Independent 
Redistricting  Comm’n,  576  U. S.  ___,  ___  (2015)  (slip  op., 
at  1)).    The  District  Court  next  required  a  showing  “that 
the dilution of the votes of supporters of a disfavored party
in a particular district—by virtue of cracking or packing—
is  likely  to  persist  in  subsequent  elections  such  that  an 
elected  representative  from  the  favored  party  in  the  dis-
trict  will  not  feel  a  need  to  be  responsive  to  constituents
who  support  the  disfavored  party.”  318  F. Supp.  3d,  at 
867.  Finally, after a prima facie showing of partisan vote 
dilution,  the  District  Court  shifted  the  burden  to  the  de-
fendants  to  prove  that  the  discriminatory  effects  are  “at-
tributable  to  a  legitimate  state  interest  or  other  neutral 
explanation.”  Id., at 868. 

The  District  Court’s  “predominant  intent”  prong  is
borrowed  from  the  racial  gerrymandering  context.    In 
racial  gerrymandering  cases,  we  rely  on  a  “predominant