Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/529bv.pdf
Page Number: 274.0

529US1

Unit: $U37

[09-26-01 08:37:34] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 529 U. S. 193 (2000)

199

Opinion of the Court

ute, usually implies some degree of discretion[, but] [t]his
common-sense principle of statutory construction . . . can be
defeated by indications of legislative intent to the contrary
or by obvious inferences from the structure and purpose of
the statute” (footnote and citations omitted)); Citizens &
Southern Nat. Bank v. Bougas, 434 U. S. 35, 38 (1977). Cer-
tainly the warning ﬂag is up in this instance. While Cortez
Byrd points to clearly mandatory language in other parts of
the Act as some indication that “may” was used in a permis-
sive sense, cf. 9 U. S. C. §§ 2, 12, Harbert calls attention to a
contrary clue in even more obviously permissive language
elsewhere in the Act. See § 4 (“A party aggrieved by the
alleged failure, neglect, or refusal of another to arbitrate
under a written agreement for arbitration may petition any
United States district court which, save for such agreement,
would have jurisdiction under title 28 . . .” 1). Each party
has a point, but neither point is conclusive. The answer is
not to be had from comparing phrases.

Statutory history provides a better lesson, though, which
is conﬁrmed by following out the practical consequences of
Harbert’s position. When the FAA was enacted in 1925, it
appeared against the backdrop of a considerably more re-
strictive general venue statute than the one current today.
At the time, the practical effect of 28 U. S. C. § 112(a) was
that a civil suit could usually be brought only in the district
in which the defendant resided. See 28 U. S. C. § 112(a)
(1926 ed.).2 The statute’s restrictive application was all the

1 The original version of § 4 referred to “the judicial code at law,” rather

than Title 28. See United States Arbitration Act, 43 Stat. 883.

2 “[E]xcept as provided in sections 113 to 118 of this title, no civil suit
shall be brought in any district court against any person by any original
process or proceeding in any other district than that whereof he is an
inhabitant; but where the jurisdiction is founded only on the fact that the
action is between citizens of different States, suit shall be brought only in
the district of the residence of either the plaintiff or the defendant.”
28
U. S. C. § 112(a) (1926 ed.). The provision allowing suits in a diversity
action in the district in which the plaintiff resided was of limited effect,