Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/14pdf/13-7120_p86b.pdf
Page Number: 44

Cite as:  576 U. S. ____ (2015) 

7 

ALITO, J., dissenting 

(1921).  A  statute  is  thus  void  for  vagueness  only  if  it 
wholly  “fails  to  provide  a  person  of  ordinary  intelligence
fair notice of what is prohibited, or is so standardless that 
it  authorizes  or  encourages  seriously  discriminatory  en­
forcement.”  United States v. Williams, 553 U. S. 285, 304 
(2008).

The  bar  is  even  higher  for  sentencing  provisions.    The 
fair  notice  concerns  that  inform  our  vagueness  doctrine
are  aimed  at  ensuring  that  a  “ ‘person  of  ordinary  intelli­
gence  [has]  a  reasonable  opportunity  to  know  what  is
prohibited,  so  that  he  may  act  accordingly.’ ”  Hoffman 
Estates  v.  Flipside,  Hoffman  Estates,  Inc.,  455  U. S.  489, 
498 (1982) (quoting Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U. S. 
104,  108  (1972)).  The  fear  is  that  vague  laws  will  “ ‘trap 
the  innocent.’ ”    455  U. S.,  at  498.    These  concerns  have 
less  force  when  it  comes  to  sentencing  provisions,  which 
come  into  play  only  after  the  defendant  has  been  found 
guilty  of  the  crime  in  question.    Due  process  does  not 
require,  as  Johnson  oddly  suggests,  that  a  “prospective 
criminal”  be  able  to  calculate  the  precise  penalty  that  a
conviction  would  bring.  Supp.  Brief  for  Petitioner  5;  see 
Chapman v. United States, 500 U. S. 453, 467–468 (1991) 
(concluding that a vagueness challenge was “particularly”
weak “since whatever debate there is would center around 
the  appropriate  sentence  and  not  the  criminality  of  the
conduct”). 

B 
ACCA’s  residual  clause  unquestionably  provides  an
ascertainable  standard. 
It  defines  “violent  felony”  to
include any offense that “involves conduct that presents a 
serious  potential  risk  of  physical  injury  to  another.”    18 
U. S. C.  §924(e)(2)(B)(ii).    That  language  is  by  no  means
incomprehensible.  Nor is it unusual.  There are scores of 
federal and state laws that employ similar standards.  The 
Solicitor  General’s  brief  contains  a  99-page  appendix