Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/16pdf/15-1293_1o13.pdf
Page Number: 11.0

Cite as:  582 U. S. ____ (2017) 

7 

Opinion of the Court 

corrected (Feb. 11, 2016).  He chose this moniker in order 
to  “reclaim”  and  “take  ownership”  of  stereotypes  about
people of Asian ethnicity.  Ibid. (internal quotation marks
omitted).  The group “draws inspiration for its lyrics from
childhood  slurs  and  mocking  nursery  rhymes”  and  has
given  its  albums  names  such  as  “The  Yellow  Album”  and 
“Slanted Eyes, Slanted Hearts.”  Ibid. 

Tam  sought  federal  registration  of  “THE  SLANTS,”  on
the principal register, App. 17, but an examining attorney 
at  the  PTO  rejected  the  request,  applying  the  PTO’s  two-
part  framework  and  finding  that  “there  is  . . .  a  substan-
tial composite of persons who find the term in the applied-
for  mark  offensive.”    Id.,  at  30.  The  examining  attorney 
relied  in  part  on  the  fact  that  “numerous  dictionaries 
define  ‘slants’  or  ‘slant-eyes’  as  a  derogatory  or  offensive 
term.”  Id., at 29.  The examining attorney also relied on a 
finding  that  “the  band’s  name  has  been  found  offensive 
numerous times”—citing a performance that was canceled
because  of  the  band’s  moniker  and  the  fact  that  “several 
bloggers  and  commenters  to  articles  on  the  band  have
indicated that they find the term and the applied-for mark
offensive.”  Id., at 29–30. 

Tam  contested  the  denial  of  registration  before  the 
examining attorney and before the PTO’s Trademark Trial 
and Appeal Board (TTAB) but to no avail.  Eventually, he 
took  the  case  to  federal  court,  where  the  en  banc  Federal 
Circuit ultimately found the disparagement clause facially
unconstitutional  under  the  First  Amendment’s  Free 
Speech  Clause.  The  majority  found  that  the  clause  en- 
gages  in  viewpoint-based  discrimination,  that  the  clause 
regulates  the  expressive  component  of  trademarks  and
consequently cannot be treated as commercial speech, and 
that the clause is subject to and cannot satisfy strict scru-
tiny.  See  808  F. 3d,  at  1334–1339.    The  majority  also
rejected  the  Government’s  argument  that  registered
trademarks  constitute  government  speech,  as  well  as  the