Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/17pdf/16-499_1a7d.pdf
Page Number: 62.0

Cite as:  584 U. S. ____ (2018) 

5 

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting 

international  community  specifically  and  universally
practices or endorses. 

B 
1 

The plurality nonetheless allies itself with the view that 
international law supplies the rule of decision in this case 
based on its reading of footnote 20 in Sosa.  That footnote 
sets  out  “[a]  related  consideration”  to  “the  determination
whether a norm is sufficiently definite to support a cause 
of action.”  542 U. S., at 732, and n. 20.  In full, it states: 

“A related consideration is whether international law 
extends the scope of liability for a violation of a given
norm to the perpetrator being sued, if the defendant is
a  private  actor  such  as  a  corporation  or  individual.
Compare Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F. 2d 
774,  791–795  (CADC  1984)  (Edwards,  J.,  concurring) 
(insufficient consensus in 1984 that torture by private 
actors  violates  international  law),  with  Kadic  v. 
Karadžić,  70  F. 3d  232,  239–241  (CA2  1995)  (suffi­
cient  consensus  in  1995  that  genocide  by  private  ac­
tors  violates  international  law).”  542  U. S.,  at  732, 
n. 20. 

In the Second Circuit’s decision in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch 
Petroleum, 621 F. 3d 111 (2010), the majority opinion read
footnote 20 to “requir[e] that [courts] look to international 
law  to  determine  [their]  jurisdiction  over  ATS  claims 
against  a  particular  class  of  defendant,  such  as  corpora­
tions.”  Id.,  at  127  (emphasis  in  original).  The  plurality
today  accords  “considerable  force  and  weight  to  [that]
position,”  ante,  at  13,  and  so  proceeds  to  assess  whether 
there  exists  a  specific,  universal,  and  obligatory  norm  of
liability for corporations in international law, ante, at 13– 
17.  But  the  Court  of  Appeals  mistook  the  meaning  of 
footnote 20, which simply draws attention to the fact that,