Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/23pdf/23-108_8n5a.pdf
Page Number: 37.0

Cite as:  603 U. S. ____ (2024) 

15 

JACKSON, J., dissenting 

B 
One thing is clear from the Court’s opinion in this case—
the  majority  isn’t  much  worried  about  what  happens  to
Snyder under §666.  It pivots to the other 18,999,999 state,
local,  and  tribal  officials  at  work  throughout  the  country
and laments that there are “no clear federal rules” for them. 
Ante, at 12.  But §666 was not designed to apply to teachers
accepting fruit baskets, soccer coaches getting gift cards, or 
newspaper delivery guys who get a tip at Christmas.  See 
ibid.  (reciting  similar  examples).    We  know  this  because, 
beyond requiring acceptance of a reward, §666 weaves to-
gether multiple other elements (that the Government must 
prove beyond a reasonable doubt), which collectively do the
nuanced  work  of  sifting  illegal  gratuities  from  inoffensive 
ones. 

Those  limits  are  clear  on  the  face  of  the  statute;  when 
construed as a whole, the text of §666 provides more than
adequate notice to those this statute covers.  Now, for a list 
of  my  own:  First,  §666  applies  only  when  a  state,  local,
tribal,  or  private  entity  “receives,  in  any  one  year  period, 
benefits in excess of $10,000 under a Federal program in-
volving” some “form of Federal assistance.”  §666(b).  Sec-
ond, the statute requires that the criminalized payment be
“in connection with any business, transaction, or series of 
transactions”  of  the  covered  entity.    §§666(a)(1)(B),  (a)(2). 
Third, that “business, transaction, or series of transactions” 
must involve “[some]thing of value of $5,000 or more.”  Ibid. 
Fourth, §666 expressly “does not apply to bona fide salary,
wages,  fees,  or  other  compensation  paid  . . .  in  the  usual 
course of business.”  §666(c).  Nor does it apply to “expenses 
paid  or  reimbursed  . . .  in  the  usual  course  of  business.” 

—————— 
assess in the first instance whether any instructional error was prejudi-
cial.  Under our current precedent, Snyder is not entitled to automatic 
relief due to a mere instructional error.  See, e.g., Greer v. United States, 
593 U. S. 503, 507, 513 (2021).