Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/14pdf/13-7120_p86b.pdf
Page Number: 19

Cite as:  576 U. S. ____ (2015) 

1 

THOMAS, J., concurring in judgment 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

_________________ 

No. 13–7120 
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SAMUEL JAMES JOHNSON, PETITIONER v. UNITED 
STATES 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT 

[June 26, 2015] 

JUSTICE THOMAS, concurring in the judgment. 
I  agree  with  the  Court  that  Johnson’s  sentence  cannot
stand.  But  rather  than  use  the  Fifth  Amendment’s  Due 
Process  Clause  to  nullify  an  Act  of  Congress,  I  would 
resolve  this  case  on  more  ordinary  grounds.    Under  con-
ventional  principles  of  interpretation  and  our  precedents,
the  offense  of  unlawfully  possessing  a  short-barreled 
shotgun  does  not  constitute  a  “violent  felony”  under  the 
residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA). 
The majority wants more.  Not content to engage in the 
usual business of interpreting statutes, it holds this clause 
to  be  unconstitutionally  vague,  notwithstanding  the  fact 
that  on  four  previous  occasions  we  found  it  determinate 
enough  for  judicial  application.    As  JUSTICE  ALITO  ex-
plains,  that  decision  cannot  be  reconciled  with  our  prece-
dents concerning the vagueness doctrine.  See post, at 13– 
17  (dissenting  opinion).  But  even  if  it  were  a  closer  case 
under  those  decisions,  I  would  be  wary  of  holding  the
residual clause to be unconstitutionally vague.  Although I 
have  joined  the  Court  in  applying  our  modern  vagueness 
doctrine  in  the  past,  see  FCC  v.  Fox  Television  Stations, 
Inc.,  567  U. S.  ___,  ___–___  (2012)  (slip  op.,  at  16–17),  I 
have  become  increasingly  concerned  about  its  origins  and 
application.  Simply put, our vagueness doctrine shares an 
uncomfortably  similar  history  with  substantive  due  pro-