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HERRERA v. WYOMING 

Syllabus 

(a) This  case  is  controlled  by  Mille  Lacs,  not  Race  Horse.  Race 
Horse  concerned  a  hunting  right  guaranteed  in  an  1868  treaty  with 
the  Shoshone  and  Bannock  Tribes  containing  language  identical  to 
that at issue here.  Relying on two lines of reasoning, the Race Horse 
Court  held  that  Wyoming’s  admission  to  the  United  States  in  1890 
extinguished the Shoshone-Bannock Treaty right.  First, the doctrine 
that new States are admitted to the Union on an “equal footing” with 
existing States led the Court to conclude that affording the Tribes  a 
protected  hunting  right  lasting  after  statehood  would  conflict  with 
the  power  vested  in  those  States—and  newly  shared  by  Wyoming—
“to  regulate  the  killing  of  game  within  their  borders.”    163  U.  S.,  at 
514.  Second, the Court found no evidence in the Shoshone-Bannock 
Treaty  itself  that  Congress  intended  the  treaty  right  to  continue  in 
“perpetuity.”    Id.,  at  514–515.    Mille  Lacs  undercut  both  pillars  of 
Race  Horse’s  reasoning.  Mille  Lacs  established  that  the  crucial  in-
quiry for treaty termination analysis is whether Congress has “clear-
ly  express[ed]”  an  intent  to  abrogate  an  Indian  treaty  right,  526 
U. S., at 202, or whether a termination point identified in the treaty 
itself has been satisfied, id., at 207.  Thus, while Race Horse “was not 
expressly overruled” in Mille Lacs, it “retain[s] no vitality,” Limbach 
v. Hooven & Allison Co., 466 U. S. 353, 361, and is repudiated to the 
extent  it  held  that  treaty  rights  can  be  impliedly  extinguished  at 
statehood.  Pp. 6–11.

(b) Repsis does not preclude Herrera from arguing that the 1868 
Treaty right survived Wyoming’s statehood.  Even when the elements 
of  issue  preclusion  are  met,  an  exception  may  be  warranted  if  there
has  been  an  intervening  “ ‘change  in  [the]  applicable  legal  context.’ ” 
Bobby  v.  Bies,  556  U. S.  825,  834.    Here,  Mille  Lacs’  repudiation  of 
Race Horse’s reasoning—on which Repsis relied—justifies such an ex-
ception.  Pp. 11–13. 

(c) Applying Mille Lacs, Wyoming’s admission into the Union did 
not  abrogate  the  Crow  Tribe’s  off-reservation  treaty  hunting  right.
First,  the  Wyoming  Statehood  Act  does  not  show  that  Congress
“clearly  expressed”  an  intent  to  end  the  1868  Treaty  hunting  right. 
See  526  U. S.,  at  202.    There  is  also  no  evidence  in  the  treaty  itself 
that  Congress  intended  the  hunting  right  to  expire  at  statehood,  or 
that the Crow Tribe would have understood it to do so.  Nor does the 
historical  record  support  such  a  reading  of  the  treaty.    The  State 
counters that statehood, as a practical matter, rendered all the lands 
in the State occupied.  Even assuming that Wyoming presents an ac-
curate historical picture, the State, by using statehood as a proxy for 
occupation,  subverts  this  Court’s  clear  instruction  that  treaty-
protected rights “are not impliedly terminated upon statehood.”  Id., 
at  207.    To  the  extent  that  the  State  seeks  to  rely  on  historical  evi-