Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/19pdf/18-587_5ifl.pdf
Page Number: 28

Cite as:  591 U. S. ____ (2020) 

23 

Opinion of the Court 

two.  Ibid.  According to the Government, “It was not arbi-
trary and capricious for DHS to view deferred action and its
collateral benefits as importantly linked.”  Ibid.  Perhaps.
But that response misses the point.  The fact that there may
be a valid reason not to separate deferred action from ben-
efits does not establish that DHS considered that option or
that such consideration was unnecessary. 

The lead dissent acknowledges that forbearance and ben-
efits are legally distinct and can be decoupled.  Post, at 21– 
22, n. 14 (opinion of THOMAS, J).  It contends, however, that 
we should not “dissect” agency action “piece by piece.”  Post, 
at 21.  The dissent instead rests on the Attorney General’s
legal  determination—which  considered  only  benefits—“to 
supply the ‘reasoned analysis’ ” to support rescission of both 
benefits and forbearance.  Post, at 22 (quoting State Farm, 
463  U. S.,  at  42).    But  State  Farm  teaches  that  when  an 
agency  rescinds  a  prior  policy  its  reasoned  analysis  must 
consider the “alternative[s]” that are “within the ambit of 
the existing [policy].”  Id., at 51.  Here forbearance was not 
simply “within the ambit of the existing [policy],” it was the
centerpiece  of  the  policy:  DACA,  after  all,  stands  for  “De-
ferred Action for Childhood Arrivals.”  App. to Pet. for Cert. 
111a  (emphasis  added).  But  the  rescission  memorandum 
contains no discussion of forbearance or the option of retain-
ing forbearance without benefits.  Duke “entirely failed to 
consider  [that]  important  aspect  of  the  problem.”  State 
Farm, 463 U. S., at 43. 

That omission alone renders Acting Secretary Duke’s de-
cision arbitrary and capricious.  But it is not the only defect. 
Duke also failed to address whether there was “legitimate 
reliance” on the DACA Memorandum.  Smiley v. Citibank 
(South Dakota), N. A., 517 U. S. 735, 742 (1996).  When an 
agency changes course, as DHS did here, it must “be cogni-
zant that longstanding policies may have ‘engendered seri-
ous  reliance  interests  that  must  be  taken  into  account.’ ” 
Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 579 U. S. ___, ___ (2016)