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Page Number: 20

16 

MILLER v. ALABAMA 

Opinion of the Court 

friend  Shields  was  carrying  a  gun,  but  his  age  could  well 
have affected his calculation of the risk that posed, as well
as  his  willingness  to  walk  away  at  that  point.    All  these 
circumstances  go  to  Jackson’s  culpability  for  the  offense. 
See  Graham,  560  U. S.,  at  ___  (slip  op.,  at  18)  (“[W]hen
compared  to  an  adult  murderer,  a  juvenile  offender  who 
did not kill or intend to kill has a twice diminished moral 
culpability”).  And so too does Jackson’s family background 
and  immersion  in  violence:  Both  his  mother  and  his 
grandmother  had  previously  shot  other  individuals.    See 
Record  in  No.  10–9647,  pp.  80–82.    At  the  least,  a  sen-
tencer  should  look  at  such  facts  before  depriving  a  14-
year-old of any prospect of release from prison. 

That is true also in Miller’s case.  No one can doubt that 
he and Smith committed a vicious murder.  But they did it
when high on drugs and alcohol consumed with the adult 
victim.  And if ever a pathological background might have
contributed  to  a  14-year-old’s  commission  of  a  crime,  it  is
here.  Miller’s  stepfather  physically  abused  him;  his  alco-
holic  and  drug-addicted  mother  neglected  him;  he  had 
been in and out of foster care as a result; and he had tried 
to  kill  himself  four  times,  the  first  when  he  should  have 
been  in  kindergarten.    See  928  So. 2d,  at  1081  (Cobb,  J.,
concurring  in  result);  Miller  App.  26–28;  supra,  at  4. 
Nonetheless,  Miller’s  past  criminal  history  was  limited—
two instances of truancy and one of “second-degree crimi-
nal mischief.”  No. CR–03–0915, at 6 (unpublished memo-
randum).  That  Miller  deserved  severe  punishment  for 
killing  Cole  Cannon  is  beyond  question.    But  once  again, 
a  sentencer  needed  to  examine  all  these  circumstances 
before concluding that life without any possibility of parole 
was the appropriate penalty.

We therefore hold that the Eighth Amendment forbids a 
sentencing  scheme  that  mandates  life  in  prison  without 
possibility  of  parole  for  juvenile  offenders.    Cf.  Graham, 
560 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 24) (“A State is not required