Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/20pdf/19-1039_8n5a.pdf
Page Number: 23

18 

PENNEAST PIPELINE CO. v. NEW JERSEY 

Opinion of the Court 

765  (2002)  (internal  quotation  marks  omitted),  it  would 
hardly  be  served  by  favoring  private  or  Government-
supported invasions of state-owned lands over judicial pro-
ceedings.

Perhaps  sensing  the  incongruity  of  such  a  result,  New 
Jersey has taken the extreme stance that there is no consti-
tutional mechanism for Federal Government delegatees to 
exercise the eminent domain power against the States.  See 
Tr. of Oral Arg. 86.  This position is untenable.  “[J]ust as 
permission to harvest the wheat on one’s land implies per-
mission to enter on the land for that purpose,” A. Scalia &
B. Garner, Reading Law 192 (2012), so too does authoriza-
tion  to  take  property  interests  imply  a  means  through 
which those interests can be peaceably transferred.  An em-
inent  domain  power  that  is  incapable  of  being  exercised 
amounts to no eminent domain power at all.  And that is 
contrary to the plan of the Convention for the reasons dis-
cussed in Kohl, Stockton, Cherokee Nation, and Luxton. 

The dissent, for its part, declines to say whether Congress
could  authorize  a  certificate  holder  to  take  possession  of 
state property through upfront entry.  See post, at 7–8, and 
n. 3.  The dissent gestures at other judicial and administra-
tive procedures that delegatees might be able to use to take 
state  property.  See  post,  at  8,  n. 3.    But  such  procedures
would  almost  certainly  meet  the  same  fate  as  traditional 
condemnation  actions  under  the  dissent’s  analysis.  See 
Federal Maritime Comm’n v. South Carolina Ports Author-
ity, 535 U. S. 743, 760–761 (2002).

Furthermore, the respondents and the dissent prove too
much by emphasizing the historical absence of private con-
demnation suits against state-owned lands.  As a prelimi-
nary matter, they appear to cast doubt on the provenance 
of the Federal Government’s ability to exercise its eminent
domain power within the States.  See post, at 6; Brief for 
Respondent NCJF 40–42; Brief for Respondent New Jersey
et al. 16–18.  But we resolved in Kohl and its progeny that