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8 

UNITED STATES EX REL. SCHUTTE v. SUPERVALU INC. 

Opinion of the Court 

that their reported prices were their “usual and customary”
prices?

It is equally important to recognize what we did not grant
certiorari to review: We are not reviewing the meaning of 
the  phrase  “usual  and  customary”  or  whether  any  of  re-
spondents’  claims  were,  in  fact,  inaccurate  or  otherwise
false.  Nor are we reviewing whether respondents actually 
thought that the phrase “usual and customary” referred to 
their  discounted  prices.    Nor,  for  that  matter,  are  we  re-
viewing any factual disputes about what respondents did or 
did not believe or do.  These cases come to us from the grant
of summary judgment to respondents on one discrete legal
issue, and we granted certiorari to resolve only that issue. 

II 

Based  on  the  FCA’s  statutory  text  and  its  common-law 
roots, the answer to the question presented is straightfor-
ward:  The  FCA’s  scienter  element  refers  to  respondents’ 
knowledge  and  subjective  beliefs—not  to  what  an  objec-
tively reasonable person may have known or believed.  And, 
even though the phrase “usual and customary” may be am-
biguous on its face, such facial ambiguity alone is not suffi-
cient  to  preclude  a  finding  that  respondents  knew  their
claims were false. 

A 
We start, as always, with the text of the FCA.  See Uni-
versal Health Services, Inc. v. United States ex rel. Escobar, 
579 U. S. 176, 187 (2016).  Here, the FCA defines the term 
“knowingly”  as  encompassing  three  mental  states:  First,
that the person “has actual knowledge of the information,” 
§3729(b)(1)(A)(i).  Second, that the person “acts in deliber-
ate  ignorance  of  the  truth  or  falsity  of  the  information,”
§3729(b)(1)(A)(ii).  And, third, that the person “acts in reck-
less  disregard  of  the  truth  or  falsity  of  the  information,”