Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/18pdf/17-1026_2c83.pdf
Page Number: 34

Cite as:  586 U. S. ____ (2019) 

17 

THOMAS, J., dissenting 

lieu  of  applying  Strickland’s  fact-specific  inquiry,  thereby
departing  even  further  from  the  original  meaning  of  the
Sixth Amendment. 

There  are  a  few  problems  with  these  precedents  that 
should cause us to pause before extending them.  First, the 
ineffective-assistance  standard  apparently  originated  not 
in  the  Sixth  Amendment,  but  in  our  Due  Process  Clause 
jurisprudence.  See McMann, supra, at 771, n. 14. Second, 
“[t]he  Constitution,  by  its  terms,  does  not  mandate  any
particular  remedy  for  violations  of  its  own  provisions.” 
United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U. S. 140, 157 (2006) 
(ALITO,  J.,  dissenting);  cf.  Collins  v.  Virginia,  584  U. S. 
___,  ___–___  (2018)  (THOMAS,  J.,  concurring)  (slip  op.,  at
2–5) (explaining that the exclusionary rule is not required
by  the  Fourth  Amendment).    Strickland  does  not  explain
how the Constitution requires a new trial for violations of 
any right to counsel. 

Third, our precedents seek to use the Sixth Amendment 
right  to  counsel  to  achieve  an  end  it  is  not  designed  to 
guarantee.  The  right  to  counsel  is  not  an  assurance  of 
an  error-free  trial  or  even  a  reliable  result.    It  ensures 
fairness  in  a  single  respect:  permitting  the  accused  to 
employ the services of an attorney.  The structural protec-
tions  provided  in  the  Sixth  Amendment  certainly  seek  to 
promote  reliable  criminal  proceedings,  but  there  is  no 
substantive  right  to  a  particular  level  of  reliability.    In 
assuming  otherwise,  our  ever-growing  right-to-counsel
precedents  directly  conflict  with  the  government’s  legiti-
I 
mate  interest  in  the  finality  of  criminal  judgments. 
would  proceed  with  far  more  caution  than  the  Court  has
traditionally demonstrated in this area. 

C 
The  Court  should  hesitate  before  further  extending  our 
precedents and imposing additional costs on the taxpayers