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Page Number: 40.0

32 

HAALAND v. BRACKEEN 

Opinion of the Court 

But “[r]edressability requires that the court be able to af-
ford relief through the exercise of its power, not through the 
persuasive  or  even  awe-inspiring  effect  of  the  opinion  ex-
plaining the exercise of its power.”  Franklin v. Massachu-
setts,  505  U. S.  788,  825  (1992)  (Scalia,  J.,  concurring  in 
part  and  concurring  in  judgment)  (emphasis  in  original); 
see also United States v. Juvenile Male, 564 U. S. 932, 937 
(2011) (per curiam) (a judgment’s “possible, indirect benefit 
in  a  future  lawsuit”  does  not  preserve  standing).  Other-
wise, redressability would be satisfied whenever a decision 
might persuade actors who are not before the court—con-
trary to Article III’s strict prohibition on “issuing advisory 
opinions.”  Carney v. Adams, 592 U. S. ___, ___ (2020) (slip 
op., at 4).  It is a federal court’s judgment, not its opinion,
that  remedies  an  injury;  thus  it  is  the  judgment,  not  the
opinion, that demonstrates redressability.  The individual 
petitioners can hope for nothing more than an opinion, so 
they cannot satisfy Article III.10 

B 
Texas  also  lacks  standing  to  challenge  the  placement
preferences.  It  has  no  equal  protection  rights  of  its  own, 
South  Carolina  v.  Katzenbach,  383  U. S.  301,  323  (1966), 
and it cannot assert equal protection claims on behalf of its 
citizens because “[a] State does not have standing as parens 
patriae to bring an action against the Federal Government,” 
Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 
U. S. 592, 610, n. 16 (1982).11  That should make the issue 

—————— 

10 Of course, the individual petitioners can challenge ICWA’s constitu-
tionality  in  state  court,  as  the  Brackeens  have  done  in  their  adoption
proceedings for Y. R. J.  994 F. 3d 249, 294 (2021) (principal opinion of 
Dennis, J.). 

11 Texas claims that it can assert third-party standing on behalf of non-
Indian families.  This argument is a thinly veiled attempt to circumvent 
the limits on parens patriae standing.  The case on which Texas relies, 
Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U. S. 42 (1992), allowed a State to represent