Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/22pdf/21-454_4g15.pdf
Page Number: 41.0

Cite as:  598 U. S. ____ (2023) 

7 

THOMAS, J., concurring 

that  federal  jurisdiction  over  “navigable  waters”  was  lim-
ited to preventing “interfering with commerce”).  Similarly,
in Wisconsin v. Illinois, 278 U. S. 367 (1929), this Court in-
terpreted the 1899 Act in light of the constitutional prohi-
bition on Congress “arbitrarily destroy[ing] or impair[ing]
the  rights  of  riparian  owners  by  legislation  which  has  no
real or substantial relation to the control of navigation or 
appropriateness to that end.”  Id., at 415.1  The touchstone, 
thus, remained actual navigation.

Third, §13 of the Act requires some form of surface water
connection between a tributary and traditionally navigable 
waters.  See 33 U. S. C. §407 (prohibiting depositing refuse 
“into any tributary of any navigable water from which the 
same shall float or be washed into such navigable water”). 
To be sure, the Refuse Act also prohibits leaving refuse “on
the bank of any navigable water, or on the bank of any trib-
utary of any navigable water, where the same shall be liable 
to be washed into such navigable water.”  Ibid.  But, this 
prohibition  reflects  nothing  more  than  Congress’  tradi-
tional authority to regulate acts done on land that directly
impair  the  navigability  of  traditionally  navigable  waters.
See Rio Grande Dam & Irrigation Co., 174 U. S., at 708 (ex-
plaining that the Act reaches “any obstruction to the navi-
gable  capacity,  and  anything,  wherever  done  or  however 

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1 Courts had long carefully enforced limits on Congress’ navigation au-
thority in prosecutions brought under the Act of July 7, 1838, ch. 191, 5
Stat. 304 (Steamboat Acts of 1838), which prohibited the transportation
of goods “upon the bays, lakes, rivers, or other navigable waters of the 
United States” by certain steamboats.  See, e.g., The Seneca, 27 F. Cas. 
1021  (No.  16,251)  (DC  Wis.  1861);  see  also  The  James  Morrison,  26 
F. Cas. 579, 582 (No. 15,465) (DC Mo. 1846) (holding that the 1838 Act 
did not reach a ship whose “employment ha[d] no other than a remote
connection with ‘commerce or navigation among the several states;’ no 
more  connection  than  has  the  farmer  who  cultivates  hemp,  tobacco  or 
cotton  for  a  market  in  other  states—the  miner  who  digs  and  smelts
lead—the manufacturer who manufactures for the same market, or the 
traveler who intends purchasing any of these articles”).