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Page Number: 11

8 

LUCIA v. SEC 

Opinion of the Court 

cers, even when their decisions were not final.4 

Freytag  says  everything  necessary  to  decide  this  case.
To  begin,  the  Commission’s  ALJs,  like  the  Tax  Court’s 
STJs, hold a continuing office established by law.  See id., 
at  881.  Indeed,  everyone  here—Lucia,  the  Government, 
and the amicus—agrees on that point.  See Brief for Peti-
tioners  21;  Brief  for  United  States  17–18,  n.  3;  Brief  for 
Amicus  Curiae  22,  n.  7.  Far  from  serving  temporarily  or
episodically,  SEC  ALJs  “receive[ ]  a  career  appointment.”
5  CFR  §930.204(a)  (2018).    And  that  appointment  is  to  a
position created by statute, down to its “duties, salary, and
means  of  appointment.”  Freytag,  501  U. S.,  at  881;  see  5 
U. S. C. §§556–557, 5372, 3105. 

Still  more,  the  Commission’s  ALJs  exercise  the  same 
“significant  discretion”  when  carrying  out  the  same  “im-
portant functions” as STJs do.  Freytag, 501 U. S., at 882. 
Both  sets  of  officials  have  all  the  authority  needed  to 
ensure  fair  and  orderly  adversarial  hearings—indeed, 
nearly  all  the  tools  of  federal  trial  judges.    See  Butz,  438 
U. S., at 513; supra, at 2.  Consider in order the four spe-
cific (if overlapping) powers Freytag mentioned.  First, the 

—————— 

4 The Court also provided an alternative basis for viewing the STJs as 
officers.  “Even if the duties of [STJs in major cases] were not as signifi-
cant  as  we  . . .  have  found  them,”  we  stated,  “our  conclusion  would  be 
unchanged.”    Freytag,  501  U. S.,  at  882.    That  was  because  the  Gov-
ernment  had  conceded  that  in  minor  matters,  where  STJs  could  enter 
final  decisions,  they  had  enough  “independent  authority”  to  count  as
officers.  Ibid.  And we thought it made no sense to classify the STJs as
officers  for  some  cases  and  employees  for  others.    See  ibid.  JUSTICE 
SOTOMAYOR  relies  on  that  back-up  rationale  in  trying  to  reconcile 
Freytag  with  her  view  that  “a  prerequisite  to  officer  status  is  the 
authority” to issue at least some “final decisions.”  Post, at 5 (dissenting 
opinion).  But Freytag has two parts, and its primary analysis explicitly 
rejects JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR’s theory that final decisionmaking authority 
is  a  sine  qua  non  of  officer status.    See  501  U. S.,  at  881–882.    As  she 
acknowledges,  she  must  expunge  that  reasoning  to  make  her  reading
work.  See post, at 5 (“That part of the opinion[ ] was unnecessary to the 
result”).