Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/22pdf/22-58_i425.pdf
Page Number: 9.0

6 

UNITED STATES v. TEXAS 

Opinion of the Court 

to cut against them as well”). 

In  short,  this  Court’s  precedents  and  longstanding
historical practice establish that the States’ suit here is not 
the kind redressable by a federal court. 

B 
Several  good  reasons  explain  why,  as  Linda  R. S.  held, 
federal  courts  have  not  traditionally  entertained  lawsuits 
of this kind. 

To begin with, when the Executive Branch elects not to 
arrest or prosecute, it does not exercise coercive power over
an  individual’s  liberty  or  property,  and  thus  does  not 
infringe upon interests that courts often are called upon to 
protect.  See Lujan, 504 U. S., at 561–562.  And for standing 
purposes,  the  absence  of  coercive  power  over  the  plaintiff 
makes  a  difference:  When  “a  plaintiff ’s  asserted  injury 
arises from the government’s allegedly unlawful regulation 
(or  lack  of  regulation)  of  someone  else,  much  more  is 
needed”  to  establish  standing. 
Id.,  at  562  (emphasis 
deleted).2 

Moreover,  lawsuits  alleging  that  the  Executive  Branch
has made an insufficient number of arrests or brought an 
insufficient  number  of  prosecutions  run  up  against  the 
Executive’s  Article  II  authority  to  enforce  federal  law. 
Article II of the Constitution assigns the “executive Power”
to the President and provides that the President “shall take
Care  that  the  Laws  be  faithfully  executed.”  U. S.  Const., 
Art. II, §1, cl. 1; §3.  Under Article II, the Executive Branch 
possesses  authority  to  decide  “how  to  prioritize  and  how 
aggressively to pursue legal actions against defendants who 
violate the law.”  TransUnion LLC, 594 U. S., at ___ (slip 
op.,  at  13);  see  Lujan,  504  U. S.,  at  576–578;  Allen,  468 

—————— 

2 By contrast, when “the plaintiff is himself an object of the action (or 
forgone  action)  at  issue,”  “there  is  ordinarily  little  question  that  the
action or inaction has caused him injury, and that a judgment preventing
or requiring the action will redress it.”  Lujan, 504 U. S., at 561–562.