Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/20pdf/19-251_p86b.pdf
Page Number: 17

Cite as:  594 U. S. ____ (2021) 

13 

Opinion of the Court 

Attorney  General  receives  complaints  each  month  that
identify a range of misconduct, from “misuse, misappropri-
ation, and diversion of charitable assets,” to “false and mis-
leading charitable solicitations,” to other “improper activi-
ties  by  charities  soliciting  charitable  donations.”    App.  in
No.  19–255,  p. 270  (alteration  omitted).    Such  offenses 
cause  serious  social  harms.  And  the  Attorney  General  is
the primary law enforcement officer charged with combat-
ing them under California law.  See Cal. Govt. Code Ann. 
§12598.

There is a dramatic mismatch, however, between the in-
terest that the Attorney General seeks to promote and the 
disclosure  regime  that  he  has  implemented  in  service  of
that end.  Recall that 60,000 charities renew their registra-
tions each year, and nearly all are required to file a Sched-
ule  B.  Each  Schedule  B,  in  turn,  contains  information 
about a charity’s top donors—a small handful of individuals 
in some cases, but hundreds in others.  See App. in No. 19– 
251, p. 319.  This information includes donors’ names and 
the  total  contributions  they  have  made  to  the  charity,  as
well as their addresses. 

Given the amount and sensitivity of this information har-
vested by the State, one would expect Schedule B collection 
to form an integral part of California’s fraud detection ef-
forts.  It does not.  To the contrary, the record amply sup-
ports the District Court’s finding that there was not “a sin-
gle, concrete instance in which pre-investigation collection
of a Schedule B did anything to advance the Attorney Gen-
eral’s investigative, regulatory or enforcement efforts.”  182 
F. Supp. 3d, at 1055. 

The  dissent  devotes  much  of  its  analysis  to  relitigating
factual disputes that the District Court resolved against the 
Attorney General, see post, at 16–20, notwithstanding the 
applicable clear error standard of review, see Fed. Rule Civ. 
Proc. 52(a).  For example, the dissent echoes the State’s ar-
gument that, in some cases, it relies on up-front Schedule B