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Cite as: 524 U. S. 184 (1998)

193

Opinion of the Court

States v. Bailey, 444 U. S. 394 (1980), we held that the prose-
cution fulﬁlls its burden of proving a knowing violation of
the escape statute “if it demonstrates that an escapee knew
his actions would result in his leaving physical conﬁnement
without permission.”
Id., at 408. And in Staples v. United
States, 511 U. S. 600 (1994), we held that a charge that the
defendant’s possession of an unregistered machinegun was
unlawful required proof “that he knew the weapon he pos-
sessed had the characteristics that brought it within the stat-
utory deﬁnition of a machinegun.”
It was not,
however, necessary to prove that the defendant knew that
his possession was unlawful. See Rogers v. United States,
522 U. S. 252, 254–255 (1998) (plurality opinion). Thus, un-
less the text of the statute dictates a different result,15 the
term “knowingly” merely requires proof of knowledge of the
facts that constitute the offense.

Id., at 602.

With respect to the three categories of conduct that are
made punishable by § 924 if performed “knowingly,” the
background presumption that every citizen knows the law
makes it unnecessary to adduce speciﬁc evidence to prove
that “an evil-meaning mind” directed the “evil-doing hand.” 16
More is required, however, with respect to the conduct in
the fourth category that is only criminal when done “will-
fully.” The jury must ﬁnd that the defendant acted with an
evil-meaning mind, that is to say, that he acted with knowl-
edge that his conduct was unlawful.

Petitioner next argues that we must read § 924(a)(1)(D)
to require knowledge of the law because of our inter-

of such a regulation its ignorance would constitute a defense.” Boyce
Motor Lines, Inc. v. United States, 342 U. S. 337, 345 (1952).

15 Liparota v. United States, 471 U. S. 419 (1985), was such a case. We
there concluded that both the term “knowing” in 7 U. S. C. § 2024(c) and
the term “knowingly” in § 2024(b)(1) literally referred to knowledge of the
law as well as knowledge of the relevant facts. See id., at 428–430.

16 Justice Jackson’s translation of the terms mens rea and actus reus is
found in his opinion for the Court in Morissette v. United States, 342 U. S.
246, 251 (1952).