Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/524bv.pdf
Page Number: 516

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Cite as: 524 U. S. 417 (1998)

471

Breyer, J., dissenting

At that time, a Congress, wishing to give a President the
power to select among appropriations, could simply have em-
bodied each appropriation in a separate bill, each bill subject
to a separate Presidential veto.

Today, however, our population is about 250 million, see
U. S. Dept. of Commerce, Census Bureau, 1990 Census, the
Federal Government employs more than 4 million people, see
Ofﬁce of Management and Budget, Budget of the United
States Government, Fiscal Year 1998: Analytical Perspec-
tives 207 (1997) (hereinafter Analytical Perspectives), the
annual federal budget is $1.5 trillion, see Ofﬁce of Manage-
ment and Budget, Budget of the United States Government,
Fiscal Year 1998: Budget 303 (1997) (hereinafter Budget),
and a typical budget appropriations bill may have a dozen
titles, hundreds of sections, and spread across more than 500
pages of the Statutes at Large. See, e. g., Balanced Budget
Act of 1997, Pub. L. 105–33, 111 Stat. 251. Congress cannot
divide such a bill into thousands, or tens of thousands, of
separate appropriations bills, each one of which the Presi-
dent would have to sign, or to veto, separately. Thus, the
question is whether the Constitution permits Congress to
choose a particular novel means to achieve this same, consti-
tutionally legitimate, end.

Second, the case in part requires us to focus upon the Con-
stitution’s generally phrased structural provisions, provi-
sions that delegate all “legislative” power to Congress and
vest all “executive” power in the President. See Part IV,
infra. The Court, when applying these provisions, has in-
terpreted them generously in terms of the institutional ar-
rangements that they permit. See, e. g., Mistretta v. United
States, 488 U. S. 361, 412 (1989) (upholding delegation of au-
thority to Sentencing Commission to promulgate Sentencing
Guidelines); Crowell v. Benson, 285 U. S. 22, 53–54 (1932)
(permitting non-Article III commission to adjudicate factual