Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/20pdf/19-1434_ancf.pdf
Page Number: 71.0

24 

UNITED STATES v. ARTHREX, INC. 

THOMAS, J., dissenting 

520 U. S., at 663.  Take, for example, the Act establishing
the Department of War: It referred “to the Secretary of that
department as a ‘principal officer,’ ” and provided that “the 
Chief Clerk, would be ‘employed’ within the Department as
the  Secretary  ‘shall  deem  proper,’  as  an  ‘inferior  officer.’ ”  
Edmond, 520 U. S., at 664 (quoting ch. 7, 1 Stat. 49–50). 

But not every officer was neatly categorized as a principal 
officer or an inferior one.  For example, the Act of Congress
Establishing the Treasury Department created “the follow-
ing  officers,  namely:  a  Secretary  of  the  Treasury,  to  be
deemed head of the department; a Comptroller . . . , and an 
Assistant to the Secretary of the Treasury, which assistant
shall be appointed by the said Secretary.”  Act of Sept. 2,
1789, ch. 12, §1, 1 Stat. 65.  The statute does not label the 
Comptroller  as  a  principal  officer  or  a  department  head.
Nor is he expressly designated as an inferior officer.  More-
over,  his  duties  extended  beyond  doing  merely  what  the
Secretary  deemed  proper.  The  Comptroller’s  statutory
power  and  authority  included  “countersign[ing]  all  war-
rants drawn by the Secretary of Treasury,” “provid[ing] for
the regular and punctual payment of all monies which may 
be  collected,”  and  “direct[ing]  prosecutions  for  all  delin-
quencies of officers of the revenue, and for debts that are,
or shall be due to the United States.”  §3, id., at 66.  This 
quasi-judicial figure’s “principal duty seems to be deciding
upon the lawfulness and justice of the claims and accounts 
subsisting  between  the  United  States  and  particular  citi-
zens.”  1 Annals of Cong. 611–612 (Madison); see also ante, 
at 14–15.  Yet at least one early legislator (with no recorded
objections)  thought  “the  Comptroller  was  an  inferior  of-
ficer.”  1 Annals of Cong. 613 (Stone). 

Given the lack of historical support, it is curious that the
Court has decided to expand Edmond’s “functional” prong
to elevate administrative patent judges to principal-officer
status (only to demote them back to inferior-officer status).
Perhaps the Court fears that a more formal interpretation