Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/21pdf/20-601_bq7c.pdf
Page Number: 30

Cite as:  595 U. S. ____ (2022) 

1 

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

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No. 20–601 
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DANIEL CAMERON, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF 
KENTUCKY, PETITIONER v. EMW WOMEN’S 
SURGICAL CENTER, P. S. C., ET AL. 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT 

[March 3, 2022] 

  JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR, dissenting. 
  In every case, there must be a “point of time when litiga-
tion shall be at an end.”  Browder v. Director, Dept. of Cor-
rections of Ill., 434 U. S. 257, 264 (1978) (internal quotation 
marks omitted).  To effectuate that endpoint, our legal sys-
tem requires parties to abide by representations made in a 
lawsuit regardless of later regrets.  In this case, the attor-
ney general of Kentucky stipulated to his own dismissal as 
a  party  in  the  District  Court  and  agreed  to  have  another 
official  represent  Kentucky’s  interests.    Only  years  later, 
and after the Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court’s 
judgment,  did  the  attorney  general  ask  the  Court  of  Ap-
peals to allow him to return based on a position he had dis-
avowed  when  securing  his  dismissal  earlier  in  the  litiga-
tion.  The Court of Appeals refused his request to intervene. 
  Generally, the decision whether to permit intervention in 
a case is left to the “sound discretion” of the court in which 
intervention is sought, as that court is the best positioned 
to assess potential inefficiencies and unfairness that might 
result.  NAACP v. New York, 413 U. S. 345, 366 (1973).  The 
Court  acknowledges  that  highly  deferential  standard,  but 
nonetheless  bends over  backward to  accommodate  the  at-
torney general’s reentry into the case.  I fear today’s deci-
sion  will  open  the  floodgates  for  government  officials  to