Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/17pdf/17-459_1o13.pdf
Page Number: 26

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PEREIRA v. SESSIONS 

KENNEDY, J., concurring 

interpretation was reasonable.  See Moscoso-Castellanos v. 
Lynch, 803 F. 3d 1079, 1083 (CA9 2015); O’Garro v. United 
States  Atty.  Gen.,  605  Fed.  Appx.  951,  953  (CA11  2015) 
(per curiam); Guaman-Yuqui v. Lynch, 786 F. 3d 235, 239– 
240  (CA2  2015)  (per  curiam);  Gonzalez-Garcia  v.  Holder, 
770 F. 3d 431, 434–435 (CA6 2014); Yi Di Wang v. Holder, 
759 F. 3d 670, 674–675 (CA7 2014); Urbina v. Holder, 745 
F. 3d  736,  740  (CA4  2014).    But  see  Orozco-Velasquez  v. 
Attorney General United States, 817 F. 3d 78, 81–82 (CA3 
2016).  The  Court  correctly  concludes  today  that  those 
holdings  were  wrong  because  the  BIA’s  interpretation 
finds little support in the statute’s text. 
  In according Chevron deference to the BIA’s interpreta-
tion,  some  Courts  of  Appeals  engaged  in  cursory  analysis
of  the  questions  whether,  applying  the  ordinary  tools  of 
statutory  construction,  Congress’  intent  could  be  dis-
cerned,  467  U. S.,  at  843,  n. 9,  and  whether  the  BIA’s 
interpretation  was  reasonable,  id.,  at  845.  In  Urbina  v. 
Holder, for example, the court stated, without any further
elaboration, that “we agree with the BIA that the relevant
statutory  provision  is  ambiguous.”  745  F. 3d,  at  740.  It 
then  deemed  reasonable  the  BIA’s  interpretation  of  the 
statute, “for the reasons the BIA gave in that case.”  Ibid. 
This  analysis  suggests  an  abdication  of  the  Judiciary’s
proper role in interpreting federal statutes.

The  type  of  reflexive  deference  exhibited  in  some  of 
these cases is troubling.  And when deference is applied to 
other  questions  of  statutory  interpretation,  such  as  an
agency’s  interpretation  of  the  statutory  provisions  that
concern the scope of its own authority, it is more troubling 
still.  See  Arlington  v.  FCC,  569  U. S.  290,  327  (2013) 
(ROBERTS,  C. J.,  dissenting)  (“We  do  not  leave  it  to  the
agency  to  decide  when  it  is  in  charge”).    Given  the  con-
cerns raised by some Members of this Court, see, e.g., id., 
at  312–328;  Michigan  v.  EPA,  576  U. S.  ___,  ___  (2015) 
(THOMAS, J., concurring); Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834