Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/21pdf/20-843_7j80.pdf
Page Number: 17

Cite as:  597 U. S. ____ (2022) 

11 

Opinion of the Court 

the “ ‘normal and ordinary’ ” meaning of the Second Amend-
ment’s language.  554 U. S., at 576–577, 578.  That analysis
suggested  that  the  Amendment’s  operative  clause—“the
right of the people to keep and bear Arms shall not be in-
fringed”—“guarantee[s] the individual right to possess and 
carry  weapons  in  case  of  confrontation”  that  does  not  de-
pend on service in the militia.  Id., at 592. 

From  there,  we  assessed  whether  our  initial  conclusion 
was “confirmed by the historical background of the Second
Amendment.”  Ibid.  We looked to history because “it has 
always  been  widely  understood  that  the  Second  Amend-
ment . . . codified a pre-existing right.”  Ibid.  The Amend-
ment “was not intended to lay down a novel principle but 
rather  codified  a  right  inherited  from  our  English  ances-
tors.” 
Id.,  at  599  (alterations  and  internal  quotation 
marks  omitted).  After  surveying  English  history  dating
from  the  late  1600s,  along  with  American  colonial  views
leading up to the founding, we found “no doubt, on the basis 
of both text and history, that the Second Amendment con-
ferred an individual right to keep and bear arms.”  Id., at 
595. 

We  then  canvassed  the  historical  record  and  found  yet 
further confirmation.  That history included the “analogous 
arms-bearing  rights  in  state  constitutions  that  preceded
and immediately followed adoption of the Second Amend-
ment,”  id.,  at  600–601,  and  “how  the  Second  Amendment 
was  interpreted  from  immediately  after  its  ratification
through the end of the 19th century,” id., at 605.  When the 
principal dissent charged that the latter category of sources 
was illegitimate “postenactment legislative history,” id., at 
662, n. 28 (opinion of Stevens, J.), we clarified that “exami-
nation of a variety of legal and other sources to determine 
the public understanding of a legal text in the period after 
its enactment or ratification” was “a critical tool of consti-
tutional interpretation,” id., at 605 (majority opinion).

In assessing the postratification history, we looked to four