Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/22pdf/21-1271_3f14.pdf
Page Number: 37.0

2 

MOORE v. HARPER 

KAVANAUGH, J., concurring 

v.  Gore,  531  U. S.  98,  115  (2000)  (Rehnquist,  C. J.,
concurring).

The  question,  then,  is  what  standard  a  federal  court
should  employ  to  review  a  state  court’s  interpretation  of
state  law  in  a  case  implicating  the  Elections  Clause—
whether  Chief  Justice Rehnquist’s  standard  from  Bush  v. 
Gore;  Justice  Souter’s  standard  from  Bush  v.  Gore;  the 
Solicitor  General’s  proposal  in  this  case;  or  some  other 
standard. 

Ibid.

Chief  Justice  Rehnquist’s  standard  is  straightforward:
whether the state court “impermissibly distorted” state law 
“beyond  what  a  fair  reading  required.” 
  As  I 
understand  it,  Justice  Souter’s  standard,  at  least  the 
critical  language,  is  similar:  whether  the  state  court 
exceeded “the limits of reasonable” interpretation of state 
law.  Id.,  at  133  (dissenting  opinion).    And  the  Solicitor 
General  here  has  proposed  another  similar  approach:
whether  the  state  court  reached  a  “truly  aberrant” 
interpretation  of  state  law.    Brief  for  United  States  as 
Amicus Curiae 27. 

As  I  see  it,  all  three  standards  convey  essentially  the
same  point:  Federal  court  review  of  a  state  court’s 
interpretation of state law in a federal election case should 
be  deferential,  but  deference  is  not  abdication.1   I  would  
adopt Chief Justice Rehnquist’s straightforward standard.
As able counsel for North Carolina stated at oral argument,
the Rehnquist standard “best sums it up.”  Tr. of Oral Arg.
131.  Chief Justice Rehnquist’s standard should apply not 
—————— 

1 I  doubt  that  there  would  be  a  material  difference  in  application 
among  the  standards  formulated  by  Chief  Justice  Rehnquist,  Justice 
Souter,  and  the  Solicitor  General,  given  the  similarities  in  the  three 
standards, at least as described above.  To be sure, different judges may 
reach  different  conclusions  in  an  individual  case  about  whether  a 
particular state court interpretation is impermissible under the chosen 
standard.    But  I  doubt  that  the  precise  formulation  of  the  standard—
assuming it is Chief Justice Rehnquist’s, Justice Souter’s, or the Solicitor
General’s—would be the decisive factor in any such disagreement.