Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/23pdf/23-50diff_d18f.pdf
Page Number: 19

Cite as:  602 U. S. ____ (2024) 

3 

GORSUCH, J., dissenting 

all, when a State provides exactly the tort claim the plain-
tiff seeks, it provides him with all the process he is due.  See 
id.,  at  284;  Cordova,  816  F. 3d,  at  662  (opinion  of  Gor-
such, J.).    And,  consistent  with  the  common  law,  many
States recognize claims for malicious prosecution.  Indeed, 
the relevant State here (Ohio) permits such a cause of ac-
tion.  Notably, too, unlike the tort this Court seeks to cobble 
together under the aegis of the Fourth Amendment, Ohio’s
tort does not require a plaintiff to prove that he was seized.
Compare Trussell v. General Motors Corp., 53 Ohio St. 3d 
142, 145–146, 559 N. E. 2d 732, 735–736 (1990), with ante, 
at  1  (majority  opinion).  Of  course,  should  a  State  fail  to 
provide a malicious-prosecution claim to secure his proce-
dural  due  process  rights,  or  a  fair  forum  for  entertaining
such a claim, a federal court may need to act to vindicate
§1983 and the promise of procedural due process.  Cordova, 
816  F. 3d,  at  665  (opinion  of  Gorsuch, J.).  But  in  many
cases  (this  one  included),  a  State  malicious-prosecution 
claim may be both easier for a plaintiff to prove than any-
thing the Court today provides and sufficient to ensure any
process he is due.  Albright, 510 U. S., at 285–286 (opinion 
of Kennedy, J.); Cordova, 816 F. 3d, at 662 (opinion of Gor-
such, J.).

For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.