Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/529bv.pdf
Page Number: 127.0

529US1

Unit: $U32

[10-04-01 09:20:54] PAGES PGT: OPIN

52

SHALALA v. ILLINOIS COUNCIL ON LONG
TERM CARE, INC.
Thomas, J., dissenting

seek to bring a preenforcement challenge to the Secretary’s
regulations under the Medicare Act.16

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Instead, I would hold that § 1395ii, as interpreted by Mich-
igan Academy, does not in this case incorporate § 405(h)’s
preclusion of
federal-question jurisdiction, especially in
light of the presumption in favor of preenforcement review.
I respectfully dissent.

16 The majority betrays its misunderstanding of the relationship be-
tween the presumption in favor of preenforcement review and ripe-
ness doctrine when it says that “any . . . presumption [in favor of pre-
enforcement review] must be far weaker than a presumption against
preclusion of all review in light of the traditional ripeness doctrine, which
often requires initial presentation of a claim to an agency.” Ante, at 19–
I do not dispute that respondent must demonstrate that its claims
20.
are ripe before the District Court may entertain respondent’s preenforce-
ment challenge. My point is only that respondent should be permitted
to make its ripeness argument and to have that argument assessed ac-
cording to traditional ripeness doctrine, rather than facing statutory pre-
clusion of review by (inevitably) failing the majority’s “super-hardship”
test. As I explained, supra, at 50, our cases establish a two-step analysis:
(1) in light of the presumption in favor of preenforcement review, construe
an ambiguous statute to allow preenforcement review; (2) apply ripeness
doctrine to determine whether the suit should be entertained.