Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/529bv.pdf
Page Number: 196

529US1

Unit: $U36

[09-26-01 08:36:38] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 529 U. S. 120 (2000)

121

Syllabus

(a) Because this case involves an agency’s construction of a statute it
administers, the Court’s analysis is governed by Chevron U. S. A. Inc.
v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837, under which
a reviewing court must ﬁrst ask whether Congress has directly spoken
to the precise question at issue, id., at 842.
If so, the court must give
effect to Congress’ unambiguously expressed intent. E. g., id., at 843.
If not, the court must defer to the agency’s construction of the statute
so long as it is permissible. See, e. g., INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U. S.
415, 424.
In determining whether Congress has speciﬁcally addressed
the question at issue, the court should not conﬁne itself to examining a
particular statutory provision in isolation. Rather, it must place the
provision in context, interpreting the statute to create a symmetrical
and coherent regulatory scheme. Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U. S.
561, 569.
In addition, the meaning of one statute may be affected by
other Acts, particularly where Congress has spoken subsequently and
more speciﬁcally to the topic at hand. See, e. g., United States v. Estate
of Romani, 523 U. S. 517, 530–531. Finally, the court must be guided
to a degree by common sense as to the manner in which Congress
is likely to delegate a policy decision of such economic and political
magnitude to an administrative agency. Cf. MCI Telecommunica-
tions Corp. v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co., 512 U. S. 218, 231.
Pp. 131–133.

(b) Considering the FDCA as a whole, it is clear that Congress in-
tended to exclude tobacco products from the FDA’s jurisdiction. A fun-
damental precept of the FDCA is that any product regulated by the
FDA that remains on the market must be safe and effective for its in-
tended use. See, e. g., § 393(b)(2). That is, the potential for inﬂicting
death or physical injury must be offset by the possibility of therapeutic
beneﬁt. United States v. Rutherford, 442 U. S. 544, 556.
In its rule-
making proceeding, the FDA quite exhaustively documented that to-
bacco products are unsafe, dangerous, and cause great pain and suffer-
ing from illness. These ﬁndings logically imply that, if tobacco products
were “devices” under the FDCA, the FDA would be required to remove
them from the market under the FDCA’s misbranding, see, e. g., § 331(a),
and device classiﬁcation, see, e. g., § 360e(d)(2)(A), provisions.
In fact,
based on such provisions, the FDA itself has previously asserted that if
tobacco products were within its jurisdiction, they would have to be
removed from the market because it would be impossible to prove they
were safe for their intended use. Congress, however, has foreclosed a
ban of such products, choosing instead to create a distinct regulatory
scheme focusing on the labeling and advertising of cigarettes and smoke-
less tobacco.
Its express policy is to protect commerce and the national
economy while informing consumers about any adverse health effects.