Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/21pdf/21-511_o75p.pdf
Page Number: 3.0

Cite as:  596 U. S. ____ (2022) 

3 

Syllabus 

federal habeas case, Shinn, 596 U. S., at ___, and frustrate the “State’s 
interest[ ] in finality,” Calderon, 523 U. S., at 556.  A federal court or-
der  requiring  a  State  to  transport  a  prisoner  to  a  public  setting  not 
only delays resolution of his habeas case, but may also present serious 
risks to public safety.  Commanding a State to take such risks so that
a prisoner can search for unusable evidence would not be a “necessary 
or  appropriate”  means  of  aiding  a  federal  court’s  limited  habeas  re-
view.  Pp. 4–9.

(b) The District Court and Court of Appeals in this case concluded 
that  directing  the  State  to  transport  Twyford  to  a  medical  facility 
would aid the adjudication of his habeas petition, but they never de-
termined how this could aid his cause.  For the reasons discussed, that 
was  error.  Applying  the  proper  standard  here  is  straightforward. 
Twyford  never  explained  how  the  results  of  the  neurological  testing 
could  be  admissible  in  his  habeas  proceedings,  and  it  is  hard  to  see
how they could be, since the District Court’s AEDPA review is limited
to “the record that was before the state court,” Pinholster, 563 U. S., at 
181, and Twyford made no attempt to explain how that bar would be 
inapplicable  in  his  case.   Twyford  suggested  that  the  results  of  his 
brain testing could “plausibly” bear on the question whether to excuse 
procedural  default,  but  he  did  not  identify  the  particular  defaulted
claims nor explain how the testing would allow him to resurrect those 
claims.  Pp. 9–11. 

11 F. 4th 518, reversed and remanded. 

ROBERTS, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which THOMAS, 
ALITO, KAVANAUGH, and BARRETT, JJ., joined.  BREYER, J., filed a dissent-
ing opinion, in which SOTOMAYOR and KAGAN, JJ., joined.  GORSUCH, J., 
filed a dissenting opinion.