Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/21pdf/21-418_i425.pdf
Page Number: 4.0

4 

KENNEDY v. BREMERTON SCHOOL DIST. 

Syllabus 

must satisfy at least “strict scrutiny,” showing that its restrictions on 
the plaintiff’s protected rights serve a compelling interest and are nar-
rowly tailored to that end.  See Lukumi, 508 U. S., at 533.  A similar 
standard generally obtains under the Free Speech Clause.  See Reed 
v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U. S. 155, 171.  The District asks the Court to 
apply to Mr. Kennedy’s claims the more lenient second-step Pickering–
Garcetti test, or alternatively, intermediate scrutiny.  The Court con-
cludes, however, that the District cannot sustain its burden under any 
standard.  Pp. 19–30. 

i. The  District,  like  the  Ninth  Circuit  below,  insists  Mr.  Ken-
nedy’s  rights  to  religious  exercise  and  free  speech  must  yield  to  the 
District’s interest in avoiding an Establishment Clause violation under 
Lemon and its progeny.  The Lemon approach called for an examina-
tion of a law’s purposes, effects, and potential for entanglement with 
religion.  Lemon, 403 U. S., at 612–613.  In time, that approach also 
came  to  involve  estimations  about  whether  a  “reasonable  observer” 
would consider the government’s challenged action an “endorsement” 
of religion.  See, e.g., County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties 
Union, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U. S. 573, 593.  But—given the 
apparent  “shortcomings”  associated  with  Lemon’s  “ambitiou[s],”  ab-
stract,  and  ahistorical  approach  to  the  Establishment  Clause—this 
Court long ago abandoned  Lemon and its endorsement test offshoot.  
American Legion v. American Humanist Assn., 588 U. S. ___, ___ (plu-
rality opinion).   
   In  place  of  Lemon  and  the  endorsement  test,  this  Court  has  in-
structed that the Establishment Clause must be interpreted by “‘ref-
erence to historical practices and understandings.’ ”  Town of Greece v. 
Galloway, 572 U. S. 565, 576.  A natural reading of the First Amend-
ment suggests that the Clauses have “complementary” purposes, not 
warring ones where one Clause is always sure to prevail over the oth-
ers.  Everson v. Board of Ed. of Ewing, 330 U. S. 1, 13, 15.  An analysis 
focused on original meaning and history, this Court has stressed, has 
long  represented  the  rule  rather  than  some  “ ‘exception’ ”  within  the 
“Court’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence.”  Town of Greece, at 575.  
The District and the Ninth Circuit erred by failing to heed this guid-
ance.  Pp. 19–30. 

ii. The  District  next  attempts  to  justify  its  suppression  of  Mr. 
Kennedy’s religious activity by arguing that doing otherwise would co-
erce students to pray.  The Ninth Circuit did not adopt this theory in 
proceedings  below  and  evidence  of  coercion  in  this  record  is  absent.  
The District suggests that any visible religious conduct by a teacher or 
coach should be deemed—without more and as a matter of law—im-
permissibly coercive on students.  A rule that the only acceptable gov-