Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/22pdf/21-1086_1co6.pdf
Page Number: 102.0

6 

ALLEN v. MILLIGAN 

ALITO, J., dissenting 

on this issue, see Voinovich v. Quilter, 507 U. S. 146, 155–
156 (1993); White v. Regester, 412 U. S. 755, 766 (1973), but 
a plaintiff can satisfy the former burden simply by adducing 
evidence—in  any  acceptable  form—that  race  did  not  pre-
dominate. 
  A  plaintiff  need  not  offer  computer-related  evidence.  
Once upon a time, legislative maps were drawn without us-
ing  a  computer,  and  nothing  prevents  a  §2  plaintiff  from 
taking this old-school approach in creating an illustrative 
district.  See, e.g., M. Altman, K. McDonald, & M. McDon-
ald,  From  Crayons  to  Computers:  The  Evolution  of  Com-
puter Use in Redistricting, 23 Soc. Sci. Computer Rev. 334, 
335–336 (2005).  In that event, the plaintiff can simply call 
upon the mapmaker to testify about the process he or she 
used and the role, if any, that race played in that process.  
The  defendant  may  seek  to  refute  that  testimony  in  any 
way that the rules of civil procedure and evidence allow. 
  If,  as  will  often  be  the  case  today,  a  §2  plaintiff ’s  map-
maker  uses  a  computer  program,  the  expert  can  testify 
about  the  weight,  if  any,  that  the  program  gives  to  race.  
The plaintiff will presumably argue that any role assigned 
to race was not predominant, and the defendant can contest 
this by cross-examining the plaintiff ’s expert, seeking the 
actual program in discovery, and calling its own expert to 
testify  about  the  program’s  treatment  of  race.    After  this, 
the trial court will be in a position to determine whether the 
program gave race a “predominant” role. 
  This is an entirely workable scheme.  It does not obligate 
either  party  to  offer  computer  evidence,  and  it  minimizes 
the likelihood of a clash between what §2 requires and what 
the Constitution forbids.  We have long assumed that §2 is 
consistent  with  the  Constitution.    See,  e.g.,  Cooper,  581 
U. S., at 301 (assuming States have a compelling interest 
in  complying  with  §2);  Shaw  II,  517  U. S.,  at  915  (same); 
Vera, 517 U. S., at 977 (plurality opinion) (same).  But that 
cannot mean that every conceivable interpretation of §2 is