Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/23pdf/23-939_e2pg.pdf
Page Number: 39

Cite as:  603 U. S. ____ (2024) 

31 

Opinion of the Court 

claims.”  Id., at 46, 48.  That proposal threatens to eviscer-
ate  the  immunity  we  have  recognized.    It  would  permit  a
prosecutor to do indirectly what he cannot do directly—in-
vite the jury to examine acts for which a President is im-
mune from prosecution to nonetheless prove his liability on
any charge.  But “[t]he Constitution deals with substance, 
not  shadows.”  Cummings  v.  Missouri,  4  Wall.  277,  325 
(1867).  And the Government’s position is untenable in light
of the separation of powers principles we have outlined.

If official conduct for which the President is immune may
be scrutinized to help secure his conviction, even on charges
that purport to be based only on his unofficial conduct, the 
“intended effect” of immunity would be defeated.  Fitzger-
ald,  457  U. S.,  at  756.    The  President’s  immune  conduct 
would be subject to examination by a jury on the basis of 
generally applicable criminal laws.  Use of evidence about 
such conduct, even when an indictment alleges only unoffi-
cial conduct, would thereby heighten the prospect that the 
President’s  official  decisionmaking  will  be  distorted.    See 
Clinton, 520 U. S., at 694, n. 19. 

The Government asserts that these weighty concerns can
be managed by the District Court through the use of “evi-
dentiary rulings” and “jury instructions.”  Brief for United 
States 46.  But such tools are unlikely to protect adequately
the  President’s  constitutional  prerogatives.  Presidential 
acts frequently deal with “matters likely to ‘arouse the most 
intense  feelings.’ ”  Fitzgerald,  457  U. S.,  at  752  (quoting 
Pierson, 386 U. S., at 554).  Allowing prosecutors to ask or 
suggest that the jury probe official acts for which the Pres-
ident  is  immune  would  thus  raise  a  unique  risk  that  the 
jurors’ deliberations will be prejudiced by their views of the
President’s  policies  and  performance  while  in  office.    The 
prosaic tools on which the Government would have courts 
rely are an inadequate safeguard against the peculiar con-
stitutional concerns implicated in the prosecution of a for-
mer President.  Cf. Nixon, 418 U. S., at 706.  Although such