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16 

KIRTSAENG v. JOHN WILEY & SONS, INC. 

Opinion of the Court 

(2)  Section  109(e)  specifically  provides  that  the  owner 
of a particular copy of a copyrighted video arcade game 
“lawfully  made  under  this  title”  may  “publicly  perform
or display that game in coin-operated equipment” with­
out the authorization of the copyright owner.  To inter­
pret  these  words  geographically  means  that  an  arcade 
owner could not (“without the authority of the copyright
owner”) perform or display arcade games (whether new 
or  used)  originally  made  in  Japan.    Cf.  Red  Baron-
Franklin  Park,  Inc.  v.  Taito  Corp.,  883  F. 2d  275  (CA4 
1989). 

(3) Section 110(1) says that a teacher, without the copy­
right  owner’s  authorization,  is  allowed  to  perform  or
display  a  copyrighted  work  (say,  an  audiovisual  work) 
“in the course of face-to-face teaching activities”—unless 
the  teacher  knowingly  used  “a  copy  that  was  not  law- 
fully  made  under  this  title.”    To  interpret  these  words
geographically  would  mean  that  the  teacher  could  not 
(without further authorization) use a copy of a film dur­
ing class if the copy was lawfully made in Canada, Mex­
ico, Europe, Africa, or Asia. 

(4) In its introductory sentence, §106 provides the Act’s
basic exclusive rights to an “owner of a copyright under
this  title.”  The  last  three  words  cannot  support  a  geo­
graphic interpretation. 

Wiley  basically  accepts  the  first  three  readings,  but  ar- 
gues that Congress intended the restrictive consequences. 
And it argues that context simply requires that the words
of  the  fourth  example  receive  a  different  interpretation.
Leaving the fourth example to the side, we shall explain in 
Part  II–D,  infra,  why  we  find  it  unlikely  that  Congress
would have intended these, and other related consequences.