Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/17pdf/17-965_h315.pdf
Page Number: 64.0

8 

TRUMP v. HAWAII 

BREYER, J., dissenting 

that . . . would  likely  lead  to  the  child’s  developmental
harm or death.’ ”  Center for Constitutional Rights and the
Rule of Law Clinic, Yale Law School, Window Dressing the
Muslim  Ban:  Reports  of  Waivers  and  Mass  Denials  from
Yemeni-American Families Stuck in Limbo 18 (2018). 

Declarations,  anecdotal  evidence,  facts,  and  numbers 
taken from amicus briefs are not judicial factfindings.  The 
Government has not had an opportunity to respond, and a 
court has not had an opportunity to decide.  But, given the 
importance of the decision in this case, the need for assur-
ance that the Proclamation does not rest upon a “Muslim 
ban,”  and  the  assistance  in  deciding  the  issue  that  an-
swers  to  the  “exemption  and  waiver”  questions  may  pro-
vide, I would send this case back to the District Court for 
further proceedings.  And, I would leave the injunction in
effect  while  the  matter  is  litigated.    Regardless,  the
Court’s  decision  today  leaves  the  District  Court  free  to
explore these issues on remand. 

If  this  Court  must  decide  the  question  without  this
further litigation, I would, on balance, find the evidence of 
antireligious  bias,  including  statements  on  a  website 
taken down only after the President issued the two execu-
tive  orders  preceding  the  Proclamation,  along  with  the
other  statements  also  set  forth  in  JUSTICE  SOTOMAYOR’s 
opinion,  a  sufficient  basis  to  set  the  Proclamation  aside. 
And for these reasons, I respectfully dissent.