Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/23pdf/22-1008_1b82.pdf
Page Number: 26.0

Cite as:  603 U. S. ____ (2024) 

21 

Opinion of the Court 

contested  does  not  enter  a  promised  land  free  from  legal
challenge.”  Id., at 821.  Likewise, the dissent imagines an
alternative reality of total finality that simply does not ex-
ist.  See post, at 21–23. 

Moreover,  the  opportunity  to  challenge  agency  action
does not mean that new plaintiffs will always win or that 
courts  and  agencies  will  need  to  expend  significant  re-
sources to address each new suit.  Given that major regula-
tions  are  typically  challenged  immediately,  courts  enter-
taining later challenges often will be able to rely on binding 
Supreme Court or circuit precedent.  If neither this Court 
nor  the  relevant  court  of  appeals  has  weighed  in,  a  court 
may be able to look to other circuits for persuasive author-
ity.  And if no other authority upholding the agency action
is  persuasive,  the  court  may  have  more  work  to  do,  but
there is all the more reason for it to consider the merits of 
the newcomer’s challenge.8 

Turning to the other side of the policy ledger, the Board
slights  the  arguments  supporting  the  plaintiff-centric  ac-
crual  rule.  In  addition  to  being  compelled  by  §2401(a)’s
text,  this  rule  vindicates  the  APA’s  “basic  presumption”
that anyone injured by agency action should have access to 
judicial review.  Abbott Labs., 387 U. S., at 140.  It also re-
spects  our  “deep-rooted  historic  tradition  that  everyone 

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8 It also may be that some injuries can only be suffered by entities that 
existed at the time of the challenged action.  Corner Post suggests that
only  parties  that  existed  during  the  rulemaking  process  can  claim  to 
have been injured by a “procedural” shortcoming, like a deficient notice 
of proposed rulemaking.  Reply Brief 18–19.  We need not resolve that 
issue here because there is no dispute that Corner Post proffered an in-
jury that does not depend on its having existed when the Board promul-
gated Regulation II: the rule’s alleged conflict with the Durbin Amend-
ment.  The  dissent’s  observation  that  “the  claims  in  this  case  are 
procedural,” post, at 18, is confused.  Even if some of Corner Post’s claims 
might be procedural, its central claim—that the regulation violates the 
statute—is a prototypical substantive challenge.