Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/18pdf/18-302_e29g.pdf
Page Number: 44.0

Cite as:  588 U. S. ____ (2019) 

19 

Opinion of SOTOMAYOR, J. 

That  said,  I  emphasize  that  Brunetti’s  challenge  is  a 
facial  one.  That  means  that  he  must  show  that  “ ‘a  sub-
stantial  number  of  [the  scandalous-marks  provision’s] 
applications are unconstitutional, judged in relation to the
[provision’s]  plainly  legitimate  sweep.’ ”    United  States  v. 
Stevens,  559  U. S.  460,  473  (2010).    With  “scandalous” 
narrowed  to  reach  only  obscene,  profane,  and  vulgar  con-
tent, the provision would not be overly broad.  Cf. Frisby, 
487 U. S., at 488 (rejecting a facial challenge after adopt-
ing a limiting construction); Boos, 485 U. S., at 331 (same). 
Even  so,  hard  cases  would  remain,  and  I  would  expect
courts to take seriously as-applied challenges demonstrat-
ing  a  danger  that  the  provision  had  been  used  to  restrict 
speech based on the views expressed rather than the mode
of expression.14  Cf. Finley, 524 U. S., at 587 (reserving the
possibility of as-applied challenges).

Freedom  of  speech  is  a  cornerstone  of  our  society,  and
the  First  Amendment  protects  Brunetti’s  right  to  use 
words  like  the  one  at  issue  here.    The  Government  need 
not, however, be forced to confer on Brunetti’s trademark 
(and  some  more  extreme)  the  ancillary  benefit  of  trade-
mark  registration,  when  “scandalous”  in  §1052(a)  can 
reasonably  be  read  to  bar  the  registration  of  only  those
marks  that  are  obscene,  vulgar,  or  profane.    Though  I 
concur as to the unconstitutionality of the term “immoral” 
in §1052(a), I respectfully dissent as to the term “scandal-
ous”  in  the  same  statute  and  would  instead  uphold  it
under the narrow construction discussed here. 

—————— 

Arcades, Inc., 472 U. S. 491, 504–507 (1985); see also Tam, 582 U. S., at 
___ (slip op., at 26) (striking down only the disparagement clause). 

14 The  majority  adverts  to  details  in  the  record  that  could  call  into 
question whether the PTO engaged in viewpoint discrimination in this 
very case.  See ante, at 3.  Because a facial challenge is the only chal-
lenge  before  the  Court,  I  do  not  address  whether  an  as-applied  chal-
lenge could have merit here.