Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/22pdf/21-1086_1co6.pdf
Page Number: 25

18 

ALLEN v. MILLIGAN 

Opinion of the Court 

specific illustrative maps that a plaintiff adduces.  Devia-
tion from that map shows it is possible that the State’s map 
has a disparate effect on account of race.  The remainder of 
the Gingles test helps determine whether that possibility is 
reality  by  looking  to  polarized  voting  preferences  and  the 
frequency  of  racially  discriminatory  actions  taken  by  the 
State, past and present. 
  A  State’s  liability  under  §2,  moreover,  must  be  deter-
mined “based on the totality of circumstances.”  52 U. S. C. 
§10301(b).  Yet Alabama suggests there is only one “circum-
stance[ ]” that matters—how the State’s map stacks up rel-
ative to the benchmark.  That single-minded view of §2 can-
not be squared with the VRA’s demand that courts employ 
a more refined approach.  And we decline to adopt an inter-
pretation of §2 that would “revise and reformulate the Gin-
gles threshold inquiry that has been the baseline of our §2 
jurisprudence” for nearly forty years.  Bartlett, 556 U. S., at 
16  (plurality  opinion);  see  also  Wisconsin  Legislature,  595 
U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 7) (faulting lower court for “improp-
erly  reduc[ing]  Gingles’  totality-of-circumstances  analysis 
to a single factor”); De Grandy, 512 U. S., at 1018 (“An in-
flexible rule would run counter to the textual command of 
§2, that the presence or absence of a violation be assessed 
‘based on the totality of circumstances.’ ”).3 

2 
  Alabama also argues that the race-neutral benchmark is 
required  because  our  existing  §2  jurisprudence  inevitably 
demands  racial  proportionality  in  districting,  contrary  to 
the last sentence of §2(b).  But properly applied, the Gingles 
framework  itself  imposes  meaningful  constraints  on  pro-

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3 The  principal  dissent  complains  that  “what  the  District  Court  did 
here is essentially no different from what many courts have done for dec-
ades  under  this  Court’s  superintendence.”    Post,  at  47  (opinion  of 
THOMAS, J.).  That is not such a bad definition of stare decisis.