Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/558bv.pdf
Page Number: 626.0

Cite as: 558 U. S. 310 (2010) 

465 

Opinion of Stevens, J. 

1.  Antidistortion 

The fact that corporations are different from human beings 
might seem to need no elaboration, except that the majority 
opinion  almost  completely  elides  it.  Austin  set  forth  some 
of  the  basic  differences.  Unlike  natural  persons,  corpora­
tions have “limited liability” for their owners and managers, 
“perpetual  life,”  separation  of  ownership  and  control,  “and 
favorable  treatment  of  the  accumulation  and  distribution  of 
assets . . . that enhance their ability to attract capital and to 
deploy  their  resources  in  ways  that  maximize  the  return  on 
their  shareholders’  investments.”  494  U. S.,  at  658–659. 
Unlike voters in U. S. elections, corporations may be foreign 
controlled.70  Unlike  other  interest  groups,  business  corpo­
rations  have  been  “effectively  delegated  responsibility  for 
ensuring  society’s  economic  welfare”; 71  they  inescapably 
structure  the life  of  every  citizen.  “ ‘[T]he resources  in  the 
treasury  of a  business  corporation,’ ” furthermore,  “ ‘are  not 
an indication of popular support for the corporation’s political 
ideas.’ ”  Id.,  at  659  (quoting  MCFL,  479  U. S.,  at  258). 
“ ‘They  reﬂect  instead  the  economically  motivated  decisions 
of  investors  and  customers.  The  availability  of  these  re­
sources  may  make  a  corporation  a  formidable  political  pres­
ence,  even  though  the  power  of  the  corporation  may  be  no 
reﬂection of the power of its ideas.’ ”  494 U. S., at 659 (quot­
ing MCFL, 479 U. S., at 258).72 

70 In  state  elections,  even  domestic  corporations  may  be  “foreign” 
controlled  in  the  sense  that  they  are  incorporated  in  another  jurisdiction 
and primarily owned and operated by out-of-state residents. 

71 Regan,  Corporate  Speech  and  Civic  Virtue,  in  Debating  Democracy’s 
Discontent 289, 302 (A. Allen & M. Regan eds. 1998) (hereinafter Regan). 
72 Nothing in this analysis turns on whether the corporation is conceptu­
alized as a grantee of a state concession, see, e. g., Trustees of Dartmouth 
College v.  Woodward, 4 Wheat. 518, 636 (1819) (Marshall, C. J.), a nexus of 
explicit and implicit contracts, see, e. g., F. Easterbrook & D. Fischel, The 
Economic  Structure  of  Corporate  Law  12  (1991),  a  mediated  hierarchy  of 
stakeholders, see, e. g., Blair & Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corpo­