Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/23pdf/23-411_3dq3.pdf
Page Number: 19

14 

MURTHY v. MISSOURI 

Opinion of the Court 

different times.  Different groups of defendants communi-
cated with different platforms, about different topics, at dif-
ferent times.  And even where the plaintiff, platform, time,
content, and defendant line up, the links must be evaluated 
in light of the platform’s independent incentives to moder-
ate content.  As discussed, the platforms began to suppress 
the  plaintiffs’  COVID–19  content  before  the  defendants’ 
challenged communications started, which complicates the 
plaintiffs’  effort  to  demonstrate  that  each  platform  acted 
due to “government-coerced enforcement” of its policies, 83 
F. 4th,  at  370  (emphasis  deleted),  rather  than  in  its  own 
judgment as an “ ‘independent acto[r],’ ” Lujan, 504 U. S., at 
562.  With these factors in mind, we proceed to untangle the 
mass of the plaintiffs’ injuries and Government communi-
cations. 

2 

The plaintiffs rely on allegations of past Government cen-
sorship  as  evidence  that  future  censorship  is  likely.    But 
they  fail,  by  and  large,  to  link  their  past  social-media  re-
strictions to the defendants’ communications with the plat-
forms.  Thus, the events of the past do little to help any of 
the  plaintiffs  establish  standing  to  seek  an  injunction  to 
prevent future harms. 

Louisiana and Missouri.  The state plaintiffs devote min-
imal attention to restriction of their own social-media con-
tent,  much  less  to  a  causal  link  between  any  such  re-
striction  and  the  actions  of  any  Government  defendant. 
They  refer  only  to  Facebook’s  “flagg[ing]  . . .  and  de-
boost[ing]” of a Louisiana state representative’s post about 
children and the COVID–19 vaccine.  Brief for Respondents 
20; App. 635–636.  We need not decide whether an injury to