Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/23pdf/22-704_4246.pdf
Page Number: 40

Cite as:  602 U. S. ____ (2024) 

13 

BARRETT, J., concurring in part 

law would already prevent those uses of another’s name as 
a trademark.  On the contrary, they seemed most concerned 
about the types of marks that the common law appeared to 
allow.  See supra, at 11. 

It is thus difficult to say that the names clause is consti-
tutional solely because of its historical pedigree.6  Perhaps
recognizing  that  reality,  the  Court  relies  not  only  on  the 
purported common-law tradition restricting the trademark-
ing of names, but also points to the names clause’s relation
to  trademark’s  historical  purposes.    Ante,  at  16–18.  The 
latter  argument  is  quite  similar  to  my  own—I  agree  that 
the names clause helps to ensure that the proposed mark 
functions as a source identifier and to guard against repu-
tational consequences, serving trademark’s historical goals. 

B 

But I cannot agree with the Court that the existence of a 
“common-law tradition” and a “historical analogue” is suffi-
cient  to  resolve  this  case.  Ante,  at  19–20.  Even  if  the 
Court’s evidence were rock solid, I still would not adopt this
approach.  To be sure, tradition has a legitimate role to play
in constitutional adjudication.  For instance, the longstand-
ing practice of the political branches can reinforce our un-
derstanding  of  the  Constitution’s  original  meaning.    Con-
sumer  Financial  Protection  Bureau  v.  Community 
Financial  Services  Assn.  of  America,  Ltd.,  601  U. S.  416, 
442 (2024) (KAGAN, J., concurring).  A course of deliberate 
practice  might  liquidate  ambiguous  constitutional  provi-
sions.  See  The  Federalist  No.  37,  p. 229  (C.  Rossiter  ed. 
—————— 

6 The  Court  characterizes  my  critique  as  a  demand  for  a  “historical 
twin.”  Ante, at 19, n. 4.  On the contrary, my point is that the Court has
not cleared the “historical analogue” bar it sets for itself.  The existence 
of  closely  analogous  historical  counterexamples  surely  complicates  the 
argument that “history and tradition” alone establish the clause’s consti-
tutionality.  By  presenting  its  evidence  as  conclusive,  “the  Court  over-
claims.”  Samia v. United States, 599 U. S. 635, 657 (2023) (BARRETT, J., 
concurring in part and concurring in judgment).