Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/22pdf/598us1r3_j4ek.pdf
Page Number: 14.0

Cite as:  598 U. S. 17 (2023) 

29 

Opinion of the Court 

below, that Lynch was both a “signifcant change in the law” 
and satisfed retroactivity because it “merely applied the rule 
of  Simmons”).  On  the  interpretation  adopted  below,  how-
ever, it is impossible for  Cruz, and similarly situated capital 
defendants,  to  obtain  relief.  To  show  retroactivity,  Cruz 
argued  before  the  Arizona  Supreme  Court  that  Lynch  ap-
plied  “settled” federal  law.  Under the  decision below,  how-
ever,  that  same  argument  implies  that  Lynch  was  not  a 
“signifcant  change  in  the  law.”  The  fact  that  the  Arizona 
Supreme  Court's  decision  in  this  case  generates  this  catch-
22,  whereas  earlier  Rule  32.1(g)  decisions  did  not,  further 
underscores  the  novelty  of  the  decision  and  its  departure 
from pre-existing Arizona Supreme Court law. 

Under these unusual circumstances, the Arizona Supreme 
Court's  application  of  Rule  32.1(g)  to  Lynch  was  so  novel 
and  unfounded  that  it  does  not  constitute  an  adequate  state 
procedural  ground.  It  is  therefore  not  necessary  to  reach 
the further issue whether the decision below is independent 
of federal law.2 

III 

The  State  and  the  dissent  offer  various  reformulations  of 
the  argument  that  Lynch  was  not  a  “signifcant  change  in 
the  law” for  Rule  32.1(g) purposes,  but  each  fails to  grapple 
with the basic point that Lynch reversed previously binding 
Arizona Supreme Court precedent. 

Both the State and the dissent argue that the Arizona Su-
preme Court was justifed in treating Lynch differently than 
other transformative decisions of this Court, such as Ring v. 
Arizona,  536  U. S.  584  (2002),  and  Padilla  v.  Kentucky,  559 
U. S. 356 (2010), because Lynch was a summary reversal and 
so did not “impos[e] a new or changed interpretation of state 

2 The Court also does not need to reach Cruz's additional arguments that 
the  decision  below  refects  an  attitude  of  hostility  toward  Simmons  v. 
South Carolina, 512 U. S. 154 (1994) (plurality opinion), and Lynch v. Ari-
zona,  578  U. S.  613  (2016)  (per  curiam),  and  impermissibly  discriminates 
against federal law by nullifying Cruz's rights under Simmons. 

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