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Page Number: 55

10 

ALLEN v. MILLIGAN 

THOMAS, J., dissenting 

regime or the text’s disclaimer of a right to proportional rep-
resentation.  594 U. S., at ___, and n. 14 (slip op., at 22, and 
n. 14). 
  There is yet another compelling reason to insist on a race-
neutral  benchmark.    “The  Constitution  abhors  classifica-
tions  based  on  race.”    Grutter  v.  Bollinger,  539  U. S.  306, 
353 (2003) (THOMAS, J., concurring in part and dissenting 
in part).  Redistricting is no exception.  “Just as the State 
may not, absent extraordinary justification, segregate citi-
zens  on  the  basis  of  race  in  its  public  parks,  buses,  golf 
courses, beaches, and schools,” the State also “may not sep-
arate its citizens into different voting districts on the basis 
of race.”  Miller v. Johnson, 515 U. S. 900, 911 (1995) (cita-
tions omitted).  “[D]istricting maps that sort voters on the 
basis of race ‘ “are by their very nature odious.” ’ ”  Wisconsin 
Legislature v. Wisconsin Elections Comm’n, 595 U. S. ___, 
___  (2022)  (per curiam)  (slip  op.,  at  2)  (quoting  Shaw  v. 
Reno, 509 U. S. 630, 643 (1993) (Shaw I)).  Accordingly, our 
precedents  apply  strict  scrutiny  whenever  race  was  “the 
predominant factor motivating [the placement of] a signifi-
cant  number  of  voters  within  or  without  a  particular  dis-
trict,” Miller, 515 U. S., at 916, or, put another way, when-
ever  “[r]ace  was  the  criterion  that  . . .  could  not  be 
compromised” in a district’s formation.  Shaw v. Hunt, 517 
U. S. 899, 907 (1996) (Shaw II). 
  Because “[r]acial gerrymandering, even for remedial pur-
poses, may balkanize us into competing racial factions” and 
undermine “the goal of a political system in which race no 
longer matters,” Shaw I, 509 U. S., at 657, our cases have 
long recognized the need to interpret §2 to avoid “unneces-
sarily  infus[ing]  race  into  virtually  every  redistricting”  
plan.   LULAC,  548 U. S.,  at  446  (opinion  of  Kennedy,  J.); 
accord, Bartlett v. Strickland, 556 U. S. 1, 21 (2009) (plural-
ity opinion).  Plainly, however, that “infusion” is the inevi-
table result of any race-based benchmark.  Any interpreta-
tion  of  §2  that  permits  courts  to  condemn  enacted