Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/12pdf/12-133_19m1.pdf
Page Number: 21.0

8 

AMERICAN EXPRESS CO. v. ITALIAN COLORS 

RESTAURANT 
KAGAN, J., dissenting 

the economic analysis.  In short, the agreement as applied
in  this  case  cuts  off  not  just  class  arbitration,  but  any 
avenue for sharing, shifting, or shrinking necessary costs. 
Amex  has  put  Italian  Colors  to  this  choice:  Spend  way,
way,  way  more  money  than  your  claim  is  worth,  or  relin-
quish your Sherman Act rights. 

So  contra  the  majority,  the  court  below  got  this  case 
right.  Italian  Colors  proved  what  the  plaintiff  in  Ran-
dolph  could  not—that  a  standard-form  agreement,  taken
as  a  whole,  renders  arbitration  of  a  claim  “prohibitively 
expensive.”  531  U. S.,  at  92.    The  restaurant  thus  estab-
lished  that  the  contract  “operate[s]  . . .  as  a  prospective 
waiver,”  and  prevents  the  “effective[ ]  . . .  vindicat[ion]”  of 
Sherman  Act  rights.  Mitsubishi,  473  U. S.,  at  637,  and 
n. 19.  I would follow our precedents and decline to compel 
arbitration. 

II 
The majority is quite sure that the effective-vindication
rule  does  not  apply  here,  but  has  precious  little  to  say
about  why.    It  starts  by  disparaging  the  rule  as  having 
“originated as dictum.”  Ante, at 6.  But it does not rest on 
that swipe, and for good reason.  As I have explained, see 
supra, at 3–4, the rule began as a core part of Mitsubishi: 
We held there that federal statutory claims are subject to 
arbitration  “so  long  as”  the  claimant  “effectively  may
vindicate its [rights] in the arbitral forum.”  473 U. S., at 
637 (emphasis added).  The rule thus served as an essen-
tial condition of the decision’s holding.3  And in Randolph, 

—————— 

3 The  majority  is  dead  wrong  when  it  says  that  Mitsubishi  reserved 
judgment  on  “whether  the  arbitration  agreement’s  potential  depriva-
tion  of  a  claimant’s  right  to  pursue  federal  remedies  may  render  that
agreement unenforceable.”  Ante, at 6, n. 2.  What the Mitsubishi Court 
had “no occasion to speculate on” was whether a particular agreement 
in fact eliminated the claimant’s federal rights.  473 U. S., at 673, n. 19. 
But we stated expressly that if the agreement did so (as Amex’s does),