Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/529bv.pdf
Page Number: 356

529US1

Unit: $U42

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Cite as: 529 U. S. 277 (2000)

281

Syllabus

judgment). Erie’s ordinance, too, by its terms prohibits not merely
nude dancing, but the act—irrespective of whether it is engaged in for
expressive purposes—of going nude in public. The facts that the pre-
amble explains the ordinance’s purpose, in part, as limiting a recent
increase in nude live entertainment, that city councilmembers in sup-
porting the ordinance commented to that effect, and that the ordinance
includes in the deﬁnition of nudity the exposure of devices simulating
that condition, neither make the law any less general in its reach nor
demonstrate that what the municipal authorities really ﬁnd objection-
able is expression rather than public nakedness. That the city made no
effort to enforce the ordinance against a production of Equus involving
nudity that was being staged in Erie at the time the ordinance became
effective does not render the ordinance discriminatory on its face. The
assertion of the city’s counsel in the trial court that the ordinance would
not cover theatrical productions to the extent their expressive activity
rose to a higher level of protected expression simply meant that the
ordinance would not be enforceable against such productions if the Con-
stitution forbade it. That limitation does not cause the ordinance to be
not generally applicable, in the relevant sense of being targeted against
expressive conduct. Moreover, even if it could be concluded that Erie
speciﬁcally singled out the activity of nude dancing, the ordinance still
would not violate the First Amendment unless it could be proved (as on
this record it could not) that it was the communicative character of nude
dancing that prompted the ban. See id., at 577. There is no need to
identify “secondary effects” associated with nude dancing that Erie
could properly seek to eliminate. The traditional power of government
to foster good morals, and the acceptability of the traditional judgment
that nude public dancing itself is immoral, have not been repealed by
the First Amendment. Pp. 307–310.

O’Connor, J., announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the
opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I and II, in which Rehnquist,
C. J., and Kennedy, Souter, and Breyer, JJ., joined, and an opinion with
respect to Parts III and IV, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and Kennedy
and Breyer, JJ., joined. Scalia, J., ﬁled an opinion concurring in the
judgment, in which Thomas, J., joined, post, p. 302. Souter, J., ﬁled an
opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, post, p. 310. Stevens,
J., ﬁled a dissenting opinion, in which Ginsburg, J., joined, post, p. 317.

Gregory A. Karle argued the cause for petitioners. With
him on the briefs were Gerald J. Villella and Valerie J.
Sprenkle.