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4  NATIONAL RIFLE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA v. VULLO 

JACKSON, J., concurring 

NRA does not contend that its (concededly unlawful) insur-
ance products offered through those business relationships 
were themselves “speech,” akin to a billboard, a television 
ad, or a book.  Nor does the complaint allege that Vullo pres-
sured  the  printer  of  American  Rifleman  (a  longstanding 
NRA periodical) to stop printing the magazine, or coerced a
convention center into canceling the NRA’s annual meeting.
See  VDARE  Foundation  v.  Colorado  Springs,  11  F. 4th 
1151, 1157 (CA10 2021).  In other words, the effect of Vullo’s
alleged coercion of regulated entities on the NRA’s speech
is significantly more attenuated here than in Bantam Books 
or most decisions applying it.  It is, for instance, far from 
obvious  that  Vullo’s  conduct  toward  regulated  entities es-
tablished  “a  system  of  prior  administrative  restraints” 
against the NRA’s expression.  Bantam Books, 372 U. S., at 
70. 

Of course, as the majority correctly observes, none of that
means  that  Vullo  may  target  with  impunity  the  NRA’s
“ ‘nonexpressive’ ”  activity  if  she  is  doing  so  to  punish  the
NRA for its expression.  See ante, at 17.  But it does suggest
that our First Amendment retaliation cases might provide 
a  better  framework  for  analyzing  these  kinds  of  allega-
tions—i.e., coercion claims that are not directly related to
the publication or distribution of speech.  And, fortunately 
for the NRA, the complaint in this case alleges both censor-
ship  and  retaliation  theories  for  how  Vullo  violated  the 
First  Amendment—theories  that,  in  my  opinion,  deserve 
separate analyses.
  “ ‘[A]s a general matter,’ the First Amendment prohibits
government officials from subjecting individuals to ‘retalia-
tory actions’ after the fact for having engaged in protected
speech.”  Houston Community College System v. Wilson, 595 
U. S. 468, 474 (2022) (quoting Nieves v. Bartlett, 587 U. S. 
391, 398 (2019)).  “[A] plaintiff pursuing a First Amendment 
retaliation claim must show, among other things, that the
government  took  an  ‘adverse  action’  in  response  to  his