Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/21pdf/21-147_g31h.pdf
Page Number: 48

24 

EGBERT v. BOULE 

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting
Opinion of SOTOMAYOR, J. 

precedents.  That choice is in tension with the Court’s in-
sistence that “prescribing a cause of action is a job for Con-
gress, not the courts.”  Ante, at 1; see ante, at 11 (cautioning
against  “frustrat[ing]  Congress’s  policymaking  role”  when 
considering  whether  special  factors  counsel  hesitation).
Faithful  adherence  to  this  logic  counsels  maintaining 
Bivens in its current scope, but does not support changing 
the status quo to constrict Bivens, as the Court does today.
Congress, after all, has recognized and relied on the Bivens 
cause  of  action  in  creating  and  amending  other  remedies, 
including the FTCA.  By nevertheless repeatedly amending 
the legal standard that applies to Bivens claims and whit-
tling  down  the  number  of  claims  that  remain  viable,  the 
Court itself is making a policy choice for Congress.  What-
ever the merits of that choice, the Court’s decision today is
no exercise in judicial modesty. 

* 

* 

* 
This Court’s precedents recognize that suits for damages
play a critical role in deterring unconstitutional conduct by 
federal law enforcement officers and in ensuring that those 
whose  constitutional  rights  have  been  violated  receive 
meaningful redress.  The Court’s decision today ignores our 
repeated  recognition  of  the  importance  of  Bivens  actions, 
particularly in the Fourth Amendment search-and-seizure 
context,  and  closes  the  door  to  Bivens  suits  by  many  who
will suffer serious constitutional violations at the hands of 
federal agents.  I respectfully dissent from the Court’s treat-
ment of Boule’s Fourth Amendment claim.