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Page Number: 8.0

8 

BALDWIN v. UNITED STATES 

THOMAS, J., dissenting 

The “application of th[is] mandamus standard was a conse-
quence solely of the form of relief requested,” not a require-
ment that courts defer to the Executive’s reasonable inter-
pretation of a statute.  Bamzai, 126 Yale L. J., at 958.  The 
Court  even  acknowledged  in  mandamus  cases  that  “[i]f  a
suit should come before this Court, which involved the con-
struction of any of these laws, the Court certainly would not
be bound to adopt the construction given by the head of a 
department.”  Decatur v. Paulding, 14 Pet. 497, 515 (1840); 
see also United States ex rel. Dunlap v. Black, 128 U. S. 40, 
48–49 (1888).

The rule in Chevron thus differs from historical practice 
in at least four ways.  First, it requires deference regardless 
of whether the interpretation began around the time of the
statute’s  enactment  (and  thus  might  reflect  the  statute’s
original meaning).  Second, it requires deference regardless
of  whether  an  agency  has  changed  its  position.    Third,  it 
requires deference regardless of whether the agency’s inter-
pretation has the sanction of long practice.  And fourth, it 
applies  in  actions  in  which  courts  historically  have  inter-
preted statutes independently. 

II
  Even if Chevron deference were sound, I have become in-
creasingly  convinced  that  Brand  X  was  still  wrongly  de-
cided because it is even more inconsistent with the Consti-
tution and traditional tools of statutory interpretation than 
Chevron. 

A 
By  requiring  courts  to  overrule  their  own  precedent
simply because an agency later adopts a different interpre-
tation of a statute, Brand X likely conflicts with Article III 
of  the  Constitution.  The  Constitution  imposes  a  duty  on
judges to exercise the judicial power.  See supra, at 2.  That 
power is to be exercised “for the purpose of giving effect to