Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/19pdf/18-1023_m64o.pdf
Page Number: 31.0

Cite as:  590 U. S. ____ (2020) 

27 

Opinion of the Court 

insurers—falls  comfortably  within  the  class  of  money-
mandating statutes that permit recovery of money damages 
in the Court of Federal Claims. 

Bolstering our finding is §1342’s focus on compensating
insurers for past conduct.  In assessing Tucker Act actions,
this Court has distinguished statutes that “attempt to com-
pensate  a  particular  class  of  persons  for  past  injuries  or
labors”  from  laws  that  “subsidize  future  state  expendi-
tures.”  Bowen,  487  U. S.,  at  906,  n.  42.    (The  first  group
permits Tucker Act suits; the second does not.)  The Risk 
Corridors statute sits securely in the first category: It uses 
a  backwards-looking  formula  to  compensate  insurers  for 
losses  incurred  in  providing  healthcare  coverage  for  the 
prior year.13 

2 
Nor is there a separate remedial scheme supplanting the
Court  of  Federal  Claims’  power  to  adjudicate  petitioners’ 
claims. 

True, the Tucker Act “is displaced” when “a law assert-
edly  imposing  monetary  liability  on  the  United  States
contains its own judicial remedies.”  Bormes, 568 U. S., at 

—————— 

13 Despite  agreeing  that  “[t]he  Court  is  correct”  on  the  case  law,  the 
dissent proposes supplemental briefing and re-argument.  Post, at 4, 8. 
We underscore, however, that all Members of this Court agree that to-
day’s cases do not break new doctrinal ground.

The Federal Circuit, moreover, concurs in our conclusion.  892 F. 3d, 
1311,  1320,  n. 2  (2018)  (holding  that  §1342  “is  money-mandating  for 
[Tucker  Act]  purposes”  (citing  Greenlee  County  v.  United  States,  487 
F. 3d 871, 877 (CA Fed. 2007))).  It also agrees with our analysis broadly,
having held that “shall pay” language “generally makes a statute money-
mandating” under the Tucker Act.  Id., at 877 (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  Conversely, the Court of Appeals has concluded that a statute 
is not money mandating where the Government enjoys “complete discre-
tion” in determining whether (and whom) to pay.  See, e.g., Doe v. United 
States,  463  F. 3d  1314,  1324  (2006)  (noting  that  the  statutory 
term, “may,” creates a rebuttable presumption that the “statute creates 
discretion”).