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Cite as: 524 U. S. 399 (1998)

403

Opinion of the Court

tions to the privilege.
124 F. 3d, at 235. The Court of Ap-
peals also held that the notes were not protected by the
work-product privilege.

The dissenting judge would have afﬁrmed the District
Court’s judgment that the attorney-client privilege pro-
Id., at 237. He concluded that the
tected the notes.
common-law rule was that the privilege survived death. He
found no persuasive reason to depart from this accepted rule,
particularly given the importance of the privilege to full and
frank client communication.

Id., at 237.

Petitioners sought review in this Court on both the
attorney-client privilege and the work-product privilege.1
We granted certiorari, 523 U. S. 1045 (1998), and we now
reverse.

The attorney-client privilege is one of the oldest recog-
nized privileges for conﬁdential communications. Upjohn
Co. v. United States, 449 U. S. 383, 389 (1981); Hunt v. Black-
burn, 128 U. S. 464, 470 (1888). The privilege is intended to
encourage “full and frank communication between attorneys
and their clients and thereby promote broader public inter-
ests in the observance of law and the administration of jus-
tice.” Upjohn, supra, at 389. The issue presented here is
the scope of that privilege; more particularly, the extent to
which the privilege survives the death of the client. Our
interpretation of the privilege’s scope is guided by “the prin-
ciples of the common law . . . as interpreted by the courts
. . . in the light of reason and experience.” Fed. Rule Evid.
501; Funk v. United States, 290 U. S. 371 (1933).

The Independent Counsel argues that the attorney-client
privilege should not prevent disclosure of conﬁdential com-
munications where the client has died and the information is
relevant to a criminal proceeding. There is some authority
for this position. One state appellate court, Cohen v.
Jenkintown Cab Co., 238 Pa. Super. 456, 357 A. 2d 689 (1976),

1 Because we sustain the claim of attorney-client privilege, we do not

reach the claim of work-product privilege.