Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/21pdf/20-843_7j80.pdf
Page Number: 112

Cite as:  597 U. S. ____ (2022) 

29 

BREYER, J., dissenting 

the Right To Keep and Bear Arms: 1688–1788, in Guns in
Law 20–27 (A. Sarat, L. Douglas, & M. Umphrey eds. 2019);
P.  Finkelman,  The  Living  Constitution  and  the  Second
Amendment: Poor History, False Originalism, and a Very
Confused Court, 37 Cardozo L. Rev. 623 (2015); D. Walker,
Necessary  to  the  Security  of  Free  States:  The  Second
Amendment as the Auxiliary Right of Federalism, 56 Am. 
J. Legal Hist. 365 (2016); W. Merkel, Heller as Hubris, and 
How  McDonald  v.  City  of  Chicago  May  Well  Change  the
Constitutional  World  as  We  Know  It,  50  Santa  Clara  L. 
Rev. 1221 (2010).

I  repeat  that  I  do  not  cite  these  arguments  in  order  to 
relitigate  Heller.  I  wish  only  to  illustrate  the  difficulties 
that may befall lawyers and judges when they attempt to 
rely solely on history to interpret the Constitution.  In Hel-
ler,  we  attempted  to  determine  the  scope  of  the  Second
Amendment right to bear arms by conducting a historical 
analysis,  and  some  of  us  arrived  at  very  different  conclu-
sions based on the same historical sources.  Many experts
now tell us that the Court got it wrong in a number of ways. 
That  is  understandable  given  the  difficulty  of  the  inquiry 
that the Court attempted to undertake.  The Court’s past
experience with historical analysis should serve as a warn-
ing  against  relying  exclusively,  or  nearly  exclusively,  on
this mode of analysis in the future.

Failing to heed that warning, the Court today does just 
that.  Its near-exclusive reliance on history will pose a num-
ber of practical problems.  First, the difficulties attendant 
to  extensive  historical  analysis  will  be  especially  acute  in 
the lower courts.  The Court’s historical analysis in this case 
is  over  30  pages  long  and  reviews  numerous  original
sources from over 600 years of English and American his-
tory.  Ante,  at  30–62.  Lower  courts—especially  district
courts—typically have fewer research resources, less assis-
tance from amici historians, and higher caseloads than we 
do.  They are therefore ill equipped to conduct the type of