Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/14pdf/13-1034_3dq4.pdf
Page Number: 14.0

Cite as:  575 U. S. ____ (2015) 

11 

Opinion of the Court 

controlled  substance  because  it  is  a  crime  . . .  ‘associated 
with the drug trade in general.’ ”  719 F. 3d, at 1000. 

The  disparate  approach  to  state  drug  convictions,  de-
vised by the BIA and applied by the Eighth Circuit, finds 
no  home  in  the  text  of  §1227(a)(2)(B)(i).    The  approach,
moreover, “leads to consequences Congress could not have 
intended.”  Moncrieffe,  569  U. S.,  at  ___  (slip  op.,  at  15). 
Statutes  should  be  interpreted  “as  a  symmetrical  and
coherent  regulatory  scheme.”    FDA  v.  Brown  &  William-
son  Tobacco  Corp.,  529  U. S.  120,  133  (2000)  (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  The BIA, however, has adopted
conflicting  positions  on  the  meaning  of  §1227(a)(2)(B)(i), 
distinguishing  drug  possession  and  distribution  offenses 
from offenses involving the drug trade in general, with the 
anomalous  result  that  minor  paraphernalia  possession
offenses  are  treated  more  harshly  than  drug  possession
and  distribution  offenses.    Drug  possession  and  distribu-
tion  convictions  trigger  removal  only  if  they  necessarily 
involve  a  federally  controlled  substance,  see  Paulus,  11 
I. & N.  Dec.  274,  while  convictions  for  paraphernalia
possession, an offense less grave than drug possession and 
distribution,  trigger  removal  whether  or  not  they  neces-
sarily implicate a federally controlled substance, see Mar-
tinez  Espinoza,  25  I.  &  N.  Dec.  118.    The  incongruous
upshot  is  that  an  alien  is  not  removable  for  possessing  a 
substance  controlled  only  under  Kansas  law,  but  he  is 
removable  for  using  a  sock  to  contain  that  substance.
Because it makes scant sense, the BIA’s interpretation, we
hold, is owed no deference under the doctrine described in 
Chevron  U. S. A.  Inc.  v.  Natural  Resources  Defense  Coun-
cil, Inc., 467 U. S. 837, 843 (1984). 

III 
Offering  an  addition  to  the  BIA’s  rationale,  the  Eighth
Circuit  reasoned  that  a  state  paraphernalia  possession
conviction  categorically  relates  to  a  federally  controlled