Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/529bv.pdf
Page Number: 875

529US3

Unit: $U59

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VERMONT AGENCY OF NATURAL RESOURCES v.
UNITED STATES ex rel. STEVENS
Stevens, J., dissenting

about the PFCRA rests entirely on the premise that its
deﬁnition of “person” does not include States. That prem-
ise,
in turn, relies upon the fact that § 3801(a)(6) in the
PFCRA deﬁnes a “person” to include “any individual, part-
nership, corporation, association, or private organization,”
inter-
but does not mention States. We have, however,
preted similar deﬁnitions of “person,” which included corpo-
rations, partnerships, and associations, to include States as
well, even though States were not expressly mentioned in
the statutory deﬁnition. See California v. United States,
320 U. S., at 585; Georgia v. Evans, 316 U. S., at 160.
(I draw no deﬁnitive conclusions as to whether States are
subject to suit under the PFCRA; I only mean to suggest
that the Court’s premise is not as obvious as it presumes
it to be.)
In any event, the ultimate relevant question is
whether the text and legislative history of the FCA make it
clear that § 3729’s use of the word “person” includes States.
Because they do, nothing in any other piece of legislation
narrows the meaning of that term.

Finally, the Court relies on the fact that the current
version of the FCA includes a treble damages remedy that
is “essentially punitive in nature.” Ante, at 784. Citing
Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U. S. 247, 262–263 (1981),
the Court invokes the “presumption against imposition of
punitive damages on governmental entities.” Ante, at 785.
But as Newport explains, “courts vie[w] punitive damages
[against governmental bodies] as contrary to sound public
policy, because such awards would burden the very tax-

“person” would be the meaning adopted by the 1863 Congress, not the
1986 Congress. And on that premise, why should it matter what a differ-
ent Congress, in a different century, did in a separate statute? Of course,
as described earlier, see n. 5, supra, I believe it is the 1986 Congress’
understanding of the word “person” that controls, because it is that word
as enacted by the 1986 Congress that we are interpreting in this case.
But on the Court’s premise, it is the 1863 Congress’ understanding that
controls and the PFCRA should be irrelevant.