Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/524bv.pdf
Page Number: 192

524US1

Unit: $U79

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Cite as: 524 U. S. 125 (1998)

147

Ginsburg, J., dissenting

§§ 925(a)(2)(B) and 926A use “transport,” not “carry,” to
“impl[y] personal agency and some degree of possession.”
Ibid.10

Reading “carries” in § 924(c)(1) to mean “on or about [one’s]
person” is fully compatible with these and other “Firearms”
statutes.11 For example, under § 925(a)(2)(B), one could
carry his gun to a car, transport it to the shooting competi-
tion, and use it to shoot targets. Under the conditions of
§ 926A, one could transport her gun in a car, but under no
circumstances could the gun be readily accessible while she
travels in the car.
“[C]ourts normally try to read language
in different, but related, statutes, so as best to reconcile

10 The Court asserts that “ ‘transport’ is a broader category that includes
‘carry’ but also encompasses other activity.” Ante, at 135.
“Carry,” how-
ever, is not merely a subset of “transport.” A person seated at a desk
with a gun in hand or pocket is carrying the gun, but is not transporting
it. Yes, the words “carry” and “transport” often can be employed inter-
changeably, as can the words “carry” and “use.” But in Bailey, this Court
settled on constructions that gave “carry” and “use” independent mean-
ings. See 516 U. S., at 145–146. Without doubt, Congress is alert to the
discrete meanings of “transport” and “carry” in the context of vehicles,
as the Legislature’s placement of each word in § 926A illustrates. The
narrower reading of “carry” preserves discrete meanings for the two
words, while in the context of vehicles the Court’s interpretation of
“carry” is altogether synonymous with “transport.” Tellingly, when re-
ferring to ﬁrearms traveling in vehicles, the “Firearms” statutes routinely
use a form of “transport”; they never use a form of “carry.”

11 See infra, at 149, nn. 13, 14. The Government points to numerous
federal statutes that authorize law enforcement ofﬁcers to “carry ﬁre-
arms” and notes that, in those authorizing provisions, “carry” of course
means “both on the person and in a vehicle.” Brief for United States
31–32, and n. 18. Quite right. But as viewers of “Sesame Street” will
quickly recognize, “one of these things [a statute authorizing conduct] is
not like the other [a statute criminalizing conduct].” The authorizing
statutes in question are properly accorded a construction compatible with
the clear purpose of the legislation to aid federal law enforcers in the
performance of their ofﬁcial duties.
It is fundamental, however, that a
penal statute is not to be construed generously in the Government’s favor.
See, e. g., United States v. Bass, 404 U. S. 336, 348 (1971).