Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/19pdf/19-635_o7jq.pdf
Page Number: 14

Cite as:  591 U. S. ____ (2020) 

9 

Opinion of the Court 

complex filed an indictment charging seven defendants as-
sociated with President Nixon and naming Nixon as an un-
indicted co-conspirator.  As the case moved toward trial, the 
Special Prosecutor secured a subpoena duces tecum direct-
ing Nixon to produce, among other things, tape recordings
of  Oval  Office  meetings.  Nixon  moved  to  quash  the  sub-
poena, claiming that the Constitution provides an absolute 
privilege  of  confidentiality  to  all  presidential  communica-
tions.  This Court rejected that argument in United States 
v. Nixon, 418 U. S. 683 (1974), a decision we later described 
as “unequivocally and emphatically endors[ing] Marshall’s”
holding that Presidents are subject to subpoena.  Clinton v. 
Jones, 520 U. S. 681, 704 (1997).

The Nixon Court readily acknowledged the importance of 
preserving the confidentiality of communications “between 
high Government officials and those who advise and assist
them.”  418 U. S., at 705.  “Human experience,” the Court 
explained,  “teaches  that  those  who  expect  public  dissemi-
nation of their remarks may well temper candor with a con-
cern for appearances and for their own interests to the det-
Ibid. 
riment 
Confidentiality thus promoted the “public interest in can-
did, objective, and even blunt or harsh opinions in Presiden-
tial decisionmaking.”  Id., at 708. 

the  decisionmaking  process.” 

of 

But, like Marshall two centuries prior, the Court recog-
nized  the  countervailing  interests  at  stake.  Invoking  the
common  law  maxim  that  “the  public  has  a  right  to  every 
man’s evidence,” the Court observed that the public interest
in fair and accurate judicial proceedings is at its height in
the criminal setting, where our common commitment to jus-
tice  demands  that  “guilt  shall  not  escape”  nor  “innocence
suffer.”  Id., at 709 (internal quotation marks and alteration 
omitted).  Because  these  dual  aims  would  be  “defeated  if 
judgments”  were  “founded  on  a  partial  or  speculative
presentation of the facts,” the Nixon Court recognized that
it  was  “imperative”  that  “compulsory  process  be  available