Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/14pdf/14-7955_aplc.pdf
Page Number: 119

Cite as:  576 U. S. ____ (2015) 

23 

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting 

challenge  also  fails  because  they  identified  no  available 
alternative  means  by  which  the  State  may  kill  them  is 
legally indefensible. 

A 
This  Court  has  long  recognized  that  certain  methods  of
execution  are  categorically  off-limits.  The  Court  first 
confronted  an  Eighth  Amendment  challenge  to  a  method 
of  execution  in  Wilkerson  v.  Utah,  99  U. S.  130  (1879). 
Although  Wilkerson  approved  the  particular  method  at
issue—the firing squad—it made clear that “public dissec­
tion,”  “burning  alive,”  and  other  “punishments  of  torture
. . . in the same line of unnecessary cruelty, are forbidden 
by  [the  Eighth  A]mendment  to  the  Constitution.”  Id.,  at 
135–136.  Eleven  years  later,  in  rejecting  a  challenge  to
the first proposed use of the electric chair, the Court again
reiterated  that  “if  the  punishment  prescribed  for  an  of­
fense  against  the  laws  of  the  State  were  manifestly  cruel
and unusual, as burning at the stake, crucifixion, breaking
on the wheel, or the like, it would be the duty of the courts 
to  adjudge  such  penalties  to  be  within  the  constitutional 
prohibition.”  In re Kemmler, 136 U. S. 436, 446 (1890).

In  the  more  than  a  century  since,  the  Members  of  this
Court have often had cause to debate the full scope of the
Eighth  Amendment’s  prohibition  of  cruel  and  unusual
punishment.  See,  e.g.,  Furman  v.  Georgia,  408  U. S.  238 
(1972).  But  there  has  been  little  dispute  that  it  at  the 
very least precludes the imposition of “barbarous physical
punishments.”  Rhodes  v.  Chapman,  452  U. S.  337,  345 
(1981); see, e.g., Solem v. Helm, 463 U. S. 277, 284 (1983); 
id., at 312–313 (Burger, C. J., dissenting); Baze, 553 U. S., 
at 97–99 (THOMAS, J., concurring in judgment); Harmelin 
v. Michigan, 501 U. S. 957, 976 (1991) (opinion of SCALIA, 
J.).  Nor has there been any question that the Amendment 
prohibits such “inherently barbaric punishments under all 
circumstances.”  Graham  v.  Florida,  560  U. S.  48,  59