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36  STUDENTS FOR FAIR ADMISSIONS, INC. v. PRESIDENT 

AND FELLOWS OF HARVARD COLLEGE 
THOMAS, J., concurring 

O. T. 1952, No. 1, p. 7 (citation omitted).6  Embracing that
view, the Court held that “in the field of public education 
the  doctrine  of  ‘separate  but  equal’  has  no  place”  and 
“[s]eparate  educational  facilities  are  inherently  unequal.” 
Brown, 347 U. S., at 493, 495.  Importantly, in reaching this 
conclusion, Brown did not rely on the particular qualities of
the Kansas schools.  The mere separation of students on the 
basis  of  race—the  “segregation  complained  of,”  id.,  at  495 
(emphasis added)—constituted a constitutional injury.  See 
ante, at 12 (“Separate cannot be equal”). 

Just a few years later, the Court’s application of Brown 
made  explicit  what  was  already  forcefully  implied:  “[O]ur 
decisions have foreclosed any possible contention that . . . a 
statute or regulation” fostering segregation in public facili-
ties “may stand consistently with the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.”  Turner v. Memphis, 369 U. S. 350, 353 (1962) (per 
curiam); cf. A. Blaustein & C. Ferguson, Desegregation and 
the Law: The Meaning and Effect of the School Segregation 
Cases  145  (rev.  2d  ed.  1962)  (arguing  that  the  Court  in 
Brown had “adopt[ed] a constitutional standard” declaring 
“that all classification by race is unconstitutional per se”).

Today, our precedents place this principle beyond ques-
tion. 
In  assessing  racial  segregation  during  a  race- 
motivated prison riot, for example, this Court applied strict
scrutiny without requiring an allegation of unequal treat-
ment among the segregated facilities.  Johnson v. Califor-
nia, 543 U. S. 499, 505–506 (2005).  The Court today reaf-
firms the rule, stating that, following Brown, “[t]he time for 
—————— 

6 Briefing in a case consolidated with Brown stated the colorblind posi-
tion forthrightly: Classifications “[b]ased [s]olely on [r]ace or [c]olor” “can
never be” constitutional.  Juris. Statement in Briggs v. Elliott, O. T. 1951, 
No. 273, pp. 20–21, 25, 29; see also Juris. Statement in Davis v. County 
School Bd. of Prince Edward Cty., O. T. 1952, No. 191, p. 8 (“Indeed, we 
take  the  unqualified  position  that  the  Fourteenth  Amendment  has  to-
tally stripped the state of power to make race and color the basis for gov-
ernmental action. . . .  For this reason alone, we submit, the state sepa-
rate school laws in this case must fall”).