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Page Number: 14

10 

ARIZONA STATE LEGISLATURE v. ARIZONA 
INDEPENDENT REDISTRICTING COMM’N
 
Opinion of the Court 

zona Legislature have standing to bring this suit?  Trained 
on  “whether  the  plaintiff  is  [a]  proper  party  to  bring  [a 
particular  lawsuit,]”  standing  is  “[o]ne  element”  of  the 
Constitution’s  case-or-controversy  limitation  on  federal
judicial authority, expressed in Article III of the Constitu­
tion.  Raines v. Byrd, 521 U. S. 811, 818 (1997).  “To qual­
ify as a party with standing to litigate,” the Arizona Legis­
lature “must show, first and foremost,” injury in the form
of  “ ‘invasion  of  a  legally  protected  interest’  that  is  ‘con­
crete  and  particularized’  and  ‘actual  or  imminent.’ ”    Ari-
zonans  for  Official  English  v.  Arizona,  520  U. S.  43,  64 
(1997)  (quoting  Lujan  v.  Defenders  of  Wildlife,  504  U. S. 
555,  560  (1992)).    The  Legislature’s  injury  also  must  be
“fairly traceable to the challenged action” and “redressable
by a favorable ruling.”  Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 
U. S.  ___,  ___  (2013)  (slip  op.,  at  10)  (internal  quotation 
marks omitted). 

The  Arizona  Legislature  maintains  that  the  Elections
Clause vests in it “primary responsibility” for redistricting.  
Brief for Appellant 51, 53.  To exercise that responsibility,
the Legislature urges, it must have at least the opportun- 
ity to engage (or decline to engage) in redistricting before
the  State  may  involve  other  actors  in  the  redistricting 
process.  See  id.,  at  51–53.  Proposition  106,  which  gives 
the  AIRC  binding  authority  over  redistricting,  regardless
of  the  Legislature’s  action  or  inaction,  strips  the  Legisla­
ture  of  its  alleged  prerogative  to  initiate  redistricting.
That  asserted  deprivation  would  be  remedied  by  a  court 
order  enjoining  the  enforcement  of  Proposition  106.  Al-
though we conclude that the Arizona Legislature does not 
have the exclusive, constitutionally guarded role it asserts, 
see  infra,  at  24–35,  one  must  not  “confus[e]  weakness  on 
the merits with absence of Article III standing.”  Davis v. 
United States, 564 U. S. ___, ___, n. 10 (2011) (slip op., at 
19,  n. 10);  see  Warth  v.  Seldin,  422  U. S.  490,  500  (1975) 
(standing  “often  turns  on  the  nature  and  source  of  the