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Page Number: 33

4 

BROWN v. DAVENPORT 

KAGAN, J., dissenting 

of ] habeas corpus,” even after his case “had gone to convic-
tion and sentence,” when the state court “ha[d] no constitu-
tional authority or power to condemn” him.  In re Nielsen, 
131  U. S.  176,  184  (1889).    A  leading  treatise  of  the  time 
summarized the state of the law: A federal court “may, on
habeas corpus, release one who is restrained of his liberty 
in violation of the constitution of the United States, though 
held under the criminal process of a state court, and either
before or after judgment.”  W. Church, Writ of Habeas Cor-
pus §84, p. 117 (2d ed. 1893).

In line with that view, this Court granted habeas relief,
on an assortment of constitutional grounds, to both federal 
and  state  prisoners  challenging  their  convictions  or  sen-
tences.  The Court granted post-conviction relief to protect
habeas  applicants’  rights  to  a  grand  jury  indictment,  to  a
jury trial, to assistance of counsel, and against self-incrim-
ination.  See, e.g., Ex parte Wilson, 114 U. S. 417, 425–426, 
429 (1885); Callan v. Wilson, 127 U. S. 540, 547–548, 556– 
557  (1888);  Counselman  v.  Hitchcock,  142  U. S.  547,  552, 
585–586 (1892); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U. S. 458, 467–469 
(1938).  The Court granted post-conviction relief for viola-
tions of the Equal Protection Clause, the Double Jeopardy 
Clause, and the Ex Post Facto Clause.  See, e.g., Yick Wo v. 
Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356, 373–374 (1886); Nielsen, 131 U. S., 
at  190–191;  In  re  Medley,  134  U. S.  160,  170–173  (1890). 
And as due process rights expanded in the first half of the 
20th century, the Court held post-conviction habeas relief 
proper for those claims too.  See, e.g., Moore v. Dempsey, 261 
U. S.  86,  90–92  (1923);  Waley  v.  Johnston,  316  U. S.  101, 
104–105 (1942) (per curiam); Wade v. Mayo, 334 U. S. 672, 
683–684 (1948).

The modern Court has repeatedly acknowledged that his-
tory.  “[O]ver the years,” the Court explained (referencing
most  of  the  cases  cited  above),  “the  writ  of  habeas  corpus
evolved as a remedy available to effect discharge from any 
confinement  contrary  to  the  Constitution  or  fundamental