Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/18pdf/18-422_9ol1.pdf
Page Number: 18

Cite as:  588 U. S. ____ (2019) 

13 

Opinion of the Court 

mandering  has  gone  too  far.”  Vieth,  541  U. S.,  at  296 
(plurality opinion).  See League of United Latin American 
Citizens v. Perry, 548 U. S. 399, 420 (2006) (LULAC) (opin-
ion of Kennedy, J.) (difficulty is “providing a standard for 
deciding how much partisan dominance is too much”).

We first considered a partisan gerrymandering claim in 
Gaffney v. Cummings in 1973.  There we rejected an equal 
protection  challenge  to  Connecticut’s  redistricting  plan,
which “aimed at a rough scheme of proportional represen-
tation of the two major political parties” by “wiggl[ing] and
joggl[ing]  boundary  lines”  to  create  the  appropriate  num-
ber  of  safe  seats  for  each  party.    412  U. S.,  at  738,  752, 
n. 18  (internal  quotation  marks  omitted).    In  upholding
the  State’s  plan,  we  reasoned  that  districting  “inevitably
has  and  is  intended  to  have  substantial  political  conse-
quences.”  Id., at 753. 

Thirteen  years  later,  in  Davis  v.  Bandemer,  we  ad-
dressed a claim that Indiana Republicans had cracked and 
packed  Democrats  in  violation  of  the  Equal  Protection 
Clause.  478 U. S. 109, 116–117 (1986) (plurality opinion).
A majority of the Court agreed that the case was justicia-
ble,  but  the  Court  splintered  over  the  proper  standard  to 
apply.  Four Justices would have required proof of “inten-
tional  discrimination  against  an  identifiable  political
group  and  an  actual  discriminatory  effect  on  that  group.” 
Id., at 127.  Two Justices would have focused on “whether 
the  boundaries  of  the  voting  districts  have  been  distorted 
deliberately  and  arbitrarily  to  achieve  illegitimate  ends.” 
Id., at 165 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part).  Three  Justices,  meanwhile,  would  have  held  that 
the  Equal  Protection  Clause  simply  “does  not  supply 
judicially  manageable  standards  for  resolving  purely 
political  gerrymandering  claims.”    Id.,  at  147  (O’Connor, 
J.,  concurring  in  judgment).  At  the  end  of  the  day,  there 
was  “no  ‘Court’  for  a  standard  that  properly  should  be
applied in determining whether a challenged redistricting