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36 

CRUZ v. ARIZONA 

Barrett, J., dissenting 

strates “a purpose or pattern to evade constitutional guaran-
tees.”  Ibid.  That  is  why  we  have  been  careful  to  explain 
that,  in  the  inadequacy  context,  a  decision  is  “ `novel' ”  only 
when  it  was  wholly  “ `unforeseeable' ”  and  lacked  any  “ `fair 
or  substantial  support  in  prior  state  law.' ”  Walker,  562 
U. S., at 320 (quoting 16B C. Wright, A. Miller, & E. Cooper, 
Federal Practice and Procedure § 4026, p. 386 (2d ed. 1996)). 
The  Court's  real  objection  is  that  it  thinks  the  Arizona 
Supreme  Court  violated  its  own  Rule  32.1(g)  precedent  by 
holding  that  Lynch  is  not  a  signifcant  change  in  law.  For 
one,  the  Court  says,  the  Arizona  Supreme  Court  has  pre-
viously  explained  that  “ `[t]he  archetype' ”  of  a  signifcant 
change  occurs  “ `when  an  appellate  court  overrules  pre-
viously binding case law,' ” and Lynch overruled binding Ari-
zona case law.  Ante, at 27 (quoting Shrum, 220 Ariz., at 118, 
203 P. 3d, at 1178).  In isolation, that language does suggest 
that  Lynch  is  a  “signifcant  change”  for  purposes  of  Rule 
32.1(g).  Context, however, shows there is more to the story: 
Shrum illustrated its point with the example of Ring v. Ari-
zona,  536  U. S.  584  (2002),  which  was  a  signifcant  change 
because it overruled our contrary decision in Walton v. Ari-
zona,  497  U. S.  639  (1990).  220  Ariz.,  at  118–119,  203  P.  3d, 
at  1178–1179  (citing  State  v.  Towery,  204  Ariz.  386,  390,  64 
P.  3d  828,  832  (2003)).  Unlike  Lynch,  Ring  changed  the 
governing  legal  doctrine,  not  a  mistaken  application  of  that 
doctrine.  So Shrum's reasoning is not inconsistent with the 
result below. 

The  Court  also  asserts  that  Arizona  courts  typically  ana-
lyze how an intervening decision affects the law in Arizona, 
so  by  that  logic,  decisions  like  Lynch  that  change  the  law's 
on-the-ground  application  in  Arizona  constitute  grounds  for 
relief  under  Rule  32.1(g).  Ante,  at  28.  I  do  not  read  the 
Arizona  Supreme  Court's  “past  unambiguous  holdings”  to 
say  as  much.  Patterson,  357  U. S.,  at  456.  The  closest  ex-
ample  the  Court  offers  is  State  v.  Valencia,  241  Ariz.  206, 
386  P.  3d  392  (2016),  in  which  the  Arizona  Supreme  Court 

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