Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/21pdf/21a375_d18f.pdf
Page Number: 5.0

Cite as:  595 U. S. ____ (2022) 

5 

KAVANAUGH, J., concurring 

  Some  of  this  Court’s  opinions,  including  Purcell  itself, 
could  be  read  to  imply  that  the  principle  is  absolute  and 
that a district court may never enjoin a State’s election laws 
in the period close to an election.  As I see it, however, the 
Purcell principle is probably best understood as a sensible 
refinement of ordinary stay principles for the election con-
text—a  principle  that  is  not  absolute  but  instead  simply 
heightens the showing necessary for a plaintiff to overcome 
the State’s extraordinarily strong interest in avoiding late, 
judicially  imposed  changes  to  its  election  laws  and  proce-
dures.  Although the Court has not yet had occasion to fully 
spell out all of its contours, I would think that the Purcell 
principle  thus  might  be  overcome even  with  respect  to  an 
injunction  issued  close  to  an  election  if  a  plaintiff  estab-
lishes  at  least  the following:  (i) the  underlying  merits  are 
entirely  clearcut  in  favor  of  the  plaintiff;  (ii)  the  plaintiff 
would  suffer  irreparable  harm  absent  the  injunction; 
(iii) the plaintiff has not unduly delayed bringing the com-
plaint to court; and (iv) the changes in question are at least 
feasible before the election without significant cost, confu-
sion, or hardship.  Cf. Lucas v. Townsend, 486 U. S. 1301 
(1988) (Kennedy, J., in chambers); McCarthy v. Briscoe, 429 
U. S. 1317 (1976) (Powell, J., in chambers). 
  Here, however, even such a relaxed version of the Purcell 
principle would not permit the District Court’s late-break-
ing injunction.  That is because the plaintiffs could not sat-
isfy at least two of those four prerequisites—namely, that 
the merits be clearcut in favor of the plaintiff, and that the 
changes  be  feasible  without  significant  cost,  confusion,  or 
hardship. 
  As to the merits, the underlying question here is whether 
a  second  majority-minority  congressional  district  (out  of 
seven total districts in Alabama) is required by the Voting 
Rights  Act  and  not  prohibited  by  the  Equal  Protection 

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are easy to implement.