Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/23pdf/22-915_8o6b.pdf
Page Number: 46.0

Cite as:  602 U. S. ____ (2024) 

11 

KAVANAUGH, J., concurring 

interpreting  and  applying 

governments  began 
the 
Constitution’s  text.  They  have  continued  to  do  so  ever 
since.  As  the  national  and  state  governments  over  time
have  enacted  laws  and  implemented  practices  to  promote 
the  general  welfare,  those  laws  and  practices  have  often 
reflected  and  reinforced  common  understandings  of  the
Constitution’s authorizations and limitations. 

Post-ratification  interpretations  and  applications  by 
government  actors—at  least  when  reasonably  consistent 
and  longstanding—can  be  probative  of  the  meaning  of 
vague constitutional text.  The collective understanding of
Americans who, over time, have interpreted and applied the 
broadly  worded  constitutional  text  can  provide  good
guidance  for  a  judge  who  is  trying  to  interpret  that  same
text decades or centuries later.  See, e.g., Republican Party 
of Minn. v.  White, 536  U. S. 765, 785 (2002) (a “universal 
long-established  tradition  of  prohibiting  certain 
and 
conduct creates a strong presumption that the prohibition
is constitutional” (quotation marks omitted)); United States 
v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U. S. 459, 472–473 (1915) (“officers, 
law-makers and citizens naturally adjust themselves to any 
long-continued  action”  of  the  government  “on  the 
presumption  that”  unconstitutional  “acts  would  not  have
been allowed to be so often repeated as to crystallize into a 
regular  practice”);  McPherson  v.  Blacker,  146  U. S.  1,  27 
(1892) 
vague,
“contemporaneous  and  subsequent  practical  construction 
are entitled to the greatest weight”).4 
—————— 

constitutional 

(when 

text 

is 

4 Post-ratification  history  is  sometimes  also  referred  to  as  tradition, 
liquidation, or historical gloss.  Those concepts are probably not identical 
in all respects.  In any event, in applying those concepts in constitutional
interpretation, some important questions can arise, such as: (i) the level 
of generality at which to define a historical practice; (ii) how widespread 
a  historical  practice  must  have  been; (iii) how  long  ago  it  must  have
started; and (iv) how long it must have endured.

Although this Court’s constitutional precedents routinely rely on post-
ratification  history,  those  precedents  do  not  supply  a  one-size-fits-all