Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/524bv.pdf
Page Number: 360

524US2

Unit: $U88

[09-06-00 16:44:02] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 524 U. S. 308 (1998)

315

Opinion of the Court

Under the Government’s approach, a state weapons limi-
tation on an offender activates the uniform federal ban on
possessing any ﬁrearms at all. This is so even if the guns
the offender possessed were ones the State permitted him
to have. The State has singled out the offender as more
dangerous than law-abiding citizens, and federal law uses
this determination to impose its own broader stricture.

Although either reading creates incongruities, petitioner’s
approach yields results contrary to a likely, and rational, con-
gressional policy.
If permission to possess one ﬁrearm en-
tailed permission to possess all, then state permission to
have a pistol would allow possession of an assault weapon
as well. Under this view, if petitioner, in violation of state
law, had possessed a handgun, the unless clause would still
not apply because he could have possessed a riﬂe. Not only
would this strange result be inconsistent with any conceiv-
able federal policy, but it also would arise often enough to
impair the working of the federal statute. Massachusetts,
in this case, and some 15 other States choose to restore civil
rights while restricting ﬁrearm rights in part. The per-
missive reading would make these partial restrictions a
nullity under federal
indeed in the egregious cases
with the most dangerous weapons. Congress cannot have
intended this bizarre result.

law,

Under petitioner’s all-or-nothing argument, federal

law
would forbid only a subset of activities already criminal
under state law. This limitation would contradict the intent
In Congress’ view, existing state laws “pro-
of Congress.
vide less than positive assurance that the person in question
no longer poses an unacceptable risk of dangerousness.”
Dickerson, 460 U. S., at 120. Congress meant to keep guns
away from all offenders who, the Federal Government
feared, might cause harm, even if those persons were not
deemed dangerous by States. See id., at 119.
If federal
law is to provide the missing “positive assurance,” it must
reach primary conduct not covered by state law. The need