Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/529bv.pdf
Page Number: 968.0

529US3

Unit: $U62

[09-26-01 12:54:02] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 529 U. S. 861 (2000)

893

Stevens, J., dissenting

sume that such compliance would be admissible evidence
tending to negate charges of negligent and defective design.7
In addition, if Honda were ultimately found liable, such com-
pliance would presumably weigh against an award of puni-
tive damages. Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 485 F. Supp.
566, 583–584 (WD Okla. 1979) (concluding that substantial
compliance with regulatory scheme did not bar award of pu-
nitive damages, but noting that “[g]ood faith belief in, and
efforts to comply with, all government regulations would be
evidence of conduct inconsistent with the mental state requi-
site for punitive damages” under state law).8

The parties have not called our attention to any appellate
court opinions discussing the merits of similar no-airbag
claims despite the fact that airbag technology was available
for many years before the promulgation of the 1984 stand-
ard—a standard that is not applicable to any automobiles
manufactured before September 1, 1986. Given that an ar-
guable basis for a pre-emption defense did not exist until
that standard was promulgated, it is reasonable to infer that
the manufacturers’ assessment of their potential liability for
compensatory and punitive damages on such claims—even

cussing problem of basing state tort liability upon compliance with manda-
tory federal regulatory requirement as question of pre-emption rather
than of liability on the merits); Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v.
Paul, 373 U. S. 132, 142–143 (1963) (“A holding of federal exclusion of state
law is inescapable and requires no inquiry into congressional design where
compliance with both federal [regulations and state tort law] is a physi-
cal impossibility . . .”).

7 Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability § 4(b), and Comment e
(1997); Contini v. Hyundai Motor Co., 840 F. Supp. 22, 23–24 (SDNY 1993).
See also Restatement (Second) of Torts § 288C, and Comment a (1964)
(negligence); McNeil Pharmaceutical v. Hawkins, 686 A. 2d 567, 577–579
(D. C. 1996) (strict liability).

8 The subsequent history of Silkwood does not cast doubt on this prem-
ise. See Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 667 F. 2d 908, 921–923 (CA10
1981) (reversing on ground that federal law pre-empts award of punitive
damages), rev’d and remanded, 464 U. S. 238 (1984), on remand, 769 F. 2d
1451, 1457–1458 (CA10 1985).