Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/23pdf/23-719_19m2.pdf
Page Number: 9

Cite as:  601 U. S. ____ (2024) 

9 

Per Curiam 

forced to exercise its disability removal power before voting
begins if it wished for its decision to have any effect on the
current  election  cycle.  Perhaps  a  State  may  burden  con-
gressional authority in such a way when it exercises its “ex-
clusive” sovereign power over its own state offices.  Taylor, 
178 U. S., at 571.  But it is implausible to suppose that the 
Constitution affirmatively delegated to the States the au-
thority  to  impose  such  a  burden  on  congressional  power 
with respect to candidates for federal office.  Cf. McCulloch 
v.  Maryland,  4  Wheat.  316,  436  (1819)  (“States  have  no 
power . . . to retard, impede, burden, or in any manner con-
trol,  the  operations  of  the  constitutional  laws  enacted  by
Congress”).

Nor have the respondents identified any tradition of state
enforcement  of  Section  3  against  federal  officeholders  or 
candidates  in  the  years  following  ratification  of  the  Four-
teenth Amendment.3  Such a lack of historical precedent is 
generally a “ ‘telling indication’ ” of a “ ‘severe constitutional
problem’ ” with the asserted power.  United States v. Texas, 
599 U. S. 670, 677 (2023) (quoting Free Enterprise Fund v. 
Public Company Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U. S. 477, 
505  (2010)).    And  it  is  an  especially  telling  sign  here,  be-
cause as noted, States did disqualify persons from holding
state offices following ratification of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.  That pattern of disqualification with respect to state,
but  not  federal  offices  provides  “persuasive  evidence  of  a 
general understanding” that the States lacked enforcement
power  with  respect  to  the  latter.    U. S.  Term  Limits,  514 
—————— 

3 We  are  aware  of  just  one  example  of  state  enforcement  against  a 
would-be  federal  officer.    In  1868,  the  Governor  of  Georgia  refused  to 
commission John Christy, who had won the most votes in a congressional 
election, because—in the Governor’s view—Section 3 made Christy inel-
igible to serve.  But the Governor’s determination was not final; a com-
mittee of the House reviewed Christy’s qualifications itself and recom-
mended that he not be seated.  The full House never acted on the matter, 
and Christy was never seated.  See 1 A. Hinds, Precedents of the House 
of Representatives §459, pp. 470–472 (1907).