Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/558bv.pdf
Page Number: 415

254 

KUCANA  v.  HOLDER 

Alito, J., concurring in judgment 

§§ 1101–1107.  See  8  U. S. C.  § 1103(a)  (1994  ed.)  (giving  the 
Attorney  General  the  authority  to  “establish  such  regula­
tions . . . as he  deems necessary for carrying out his authority 
under [Chapter 12 of Title 8 of the U. S. Code]”). 

The amicus curiae whom we appointed to defend the deci­
sion  of  the  Court  of  Appeals  has  attempted  to  link  8  CFR 
§ 1003.2 to Subchapter II.  She notes that the Attorney Gen­
eral, in promulgating that regulation, cited not only 8 U. S. C. 
§ 1103(a),  but  also  a  provision  of  Subchapter  II,  8  U. S. C. 
§ 1252b  (1994  ed.).  See  61  Fed.  Reg.  18900,  18904  (1996).1 
This  latter  statutory  provision 2  conferred  the  authority  to 
reopen a narrow set of deportation orders, i. e., those issued 
after  the  alien  failed  to  appear  at  the  deportation  hearing. 
Although this statutory provision does not apply to petition­
er’s  motion  to  reopen,  amicus  argues  that  “the  section’s 

1 Two other provisions in Subchapter II refer to motions to reopen, but 
both were enacted after the implementation of 8 CFR § 1003.2 (2009), and 
therefore  that  regulation  cannot  be  said  to  implement  these  provisions. 
See  ante,  at  243,  n.  9.  Title  8  U. S. C.  § 1229a(c)(7),  which  addresses  the 
procedural  requirements  for  ﬁling  such  a  motion,  and  § 1252(b)(6),  which 
requires consolidation of a motion to reopen with the underlying removal 
order, were enacted as part of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immi­
grant  Responsibility  Act  of  1996  (IIRIRA)  in  September  1996  and  made 
effective in April 1997.  See 110 Stat. 3009–593, 3009–609.  Prior to that 
time,  the  consolidation  provision  was  found  in  Subchapter  I.  See  8 
U. S. C. § 1105a(a)(6) (1994 ed.). 

2 This  provision  conferred  the  authority  to  rescind  a  deportation  order 
“upon a motion to reopen ﬁled within 180 days after the date of the order 
of  deportation  if  the  alien  demonstrates  that  the  failure  to  appear  was 
because  of  exceptional  circumstances . . . or .  . .  upon  a  motion  to  reopen 
ﬁled  at  any  time  if  the  alien  demonstrates  that  the  alien  did  not  receive 
notice . . . or the alien  demonstrates that the alien was in Federal or State 
custody  and  did  not  appear  through  no  fault  of  the  alien.”  § 1252b(c)(3) 
(1994 ed.). 

A  similar  provision,  enacted  as  part  of  IIRIRA,  is  now  contained  in 
§ 1229a(b)(5)(C) (2006 ed.).  As the Government notes, this provision does 
not apply in this case because petitioner challenges the denial of his second 
motion  to  reopen,  which  the  parties  agree  is  governed  by  § 1229a(c)(7). 
Brief for Respondent 21, n. 13; id., at 6, n. 4.