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2 

TRUMP v. VANCE 

KAVANAUGH, J., concurring in judgment 

course, to a President.  At the same time, in light of Article 
II of the Constitution, this Court has repeatedly declared—
and the Court indicates again today—that a court may not
proceed against a President as it would against an ordinary 
litigant.  See Cheney v. United States Dist. Court for D. C., 
542 U. S. 367, 381–382 (2004) (“In no case would a court be
required to proceed against the president as against an or-
dinary  individual”  (internal  quotation  marks  and  altera-
tions omitted)); Clinton v. Jones, 520 U. S. 681, 704, n. 39 
(1997) (a court may not “proceed against the president as 
against an ordinary individual” (internal quotation marks
omitted)); United States v. Nixon, 418 U. S. 683, 715 (1974) 
(“In no case of this kind would a court be required to proceed 
against  the  president  as  against  an  ordinary  individual” 
(internal quotation marks and alterations omitted)); United 
States  v.  Burr,  25  F. Cas.  187,  192  (No.  14,694)  (CC  Va.
1807)  (Marshall,  C. J.)  (“In  no  case  of  this  kind  would  a 
court  be  required  to  proceed  against  the  president  as
against an ordinary individual”).

The question here, then, is how to balance the State’s in-
terests and the Article II interests.  The longstanding prec-
edent that has applied to federal criminal subpoenas for of-
ficial,  privileged  Executive  Branch  information  is  United 
States v. Nixon, 418 U. S. 683 (1974).  That landmark case 
requires that a prosecutor establish a “demonstrated, spe-
cific need” for the President’s information.  Id., at 713; see 
also  In  re  Sealed  Case,  121  F. 3d  729,  753–757  (CADC 
1997);  cf.  Senate  Select  Committee  on  Presidential  Cam-
paign  Activities  v.  Nixon,  498  F. 2d  725,  730–731  (CADC 
1974) (en banc) (similar standard for congressional subpoe-
nas to the Executive Branch).

The  Nixon  “demonstrated,  specific  need”  standard  is  a 
tried-and-true test that accommodates both the interests of 
the criminal process and the Article II interests of the Pres-
idency.  The Nixon standard ensures that a prosecutor’s in-
terest in subpoenaed information is sufficiently important