Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/16pdf/15-1358_6khn.pdf
Page Number: 43.0

Cite as:  582 U. S. ____ (2017) 

5 

Opinion of THOMAS, J. 

have been violated.” Anderson, supra, at 641–643 (internal 
quotation  marks  omitted).*    We  have  not  attempted  to 
locate  that  standard  in  the  common  law  as  it  existed  in 
1871, however, and some evidence supports the conclusion 
that  common-law  immunity  as  it  existed  in  1871  looked 
quite  different  from  our  current  doctrine.    See  generally 
Baude, Is Qualified Immunity Unlawful? 106 Cal. L. Rev. 
(forthcoming  2018)  (manuscript,  at  7–17),  online  at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2896508  (as  last  visited 
June 15, 2017). 

Because  our  analysis  is  no  longer  grounded  in  the 
common-law backdrop against which Congress enacted the 
1871  Act,  we  are  no  longer  engaged  in  “interpret[ing]  the
intent of Congress in enacting” the Act.  Malley, supra, at 
342;  see  Burns,  supra,  at  493.  Our  qualified  immunity
precedents  instead  represent  precisely  the  sort  of  “free-
wheeling  policy  choice[s]”  that  we  have  previously  dis-
claimed  the  power  to  make.  Rehberg  v.  Paulk,  566  U. S. 
356,  363  (2012)  (internal  quotation  marks  omitted);  see 
also  Tower,  supra,  at  922–923  (“We  do  not  have  a  license 
to establish immunities from” suits brought under the Act
“in the interests of what we judge to be sound public pol- 
icy”).  We  have  acknowledged,  in  fact,  that  the  “clearly
established” standard is designed to “protec[t] the balance
between  vindication  of  constitutional  rights  and  govern-
ment  officials’  effective  performance  of  their  duties.” 
Reichle  v.  Howards,  566  U. S.  658,  664  (2012)  (internal
quotation marks omitted); Harlow, supra, at 807 (explain-
ing  that  “the  recognition  of  a  qualified  immunity  defense 
. . .  reflected  an  attempt  to  balance  competing  values”). 

—————— 

* Although  we  first  formulated  the  “clearly  established”  standard  in 
Bivens cases like Harlow and Anderson, we have imported that stand-
ard directly into our 1871 Act cases.  See, e.g., Pearson v. Callahan, 555 
U. S. 223, 243–244 (2009) (applying the clearly established standard to
a §1983 claim).