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12 

VIDAL v. ELSTER 

Opinion of the Court 

the First Amendment” (internal quotation marks omitted)); 
post, at 6 (opinion of SOTOMAYOR, J.); post, at 6–7 (opinion 
of BARRETT, J.). 

C 
We  have  acknowledged  that  trademark  rights  and  re-
strictions can “play well with the First Amendment.”  Jack 
Daniel’s, 599 U. S., at 159 (internal quotation marks omit-
ted).  In this case, we do not delineate an exhaustive frame-
work  for  when  a  content-based  trademark  restriction 
passes muster under the First Amendment.  But, in evalu-
ating a solely content-based trademark restriction, we can
consider its history and tradition, as we have done before
when considering the scope of the First Amendment.  See 
City of Austin v. Reagan Nat. Advertising of Austin, LLC, 
596 U. S. 61, 75 (2022); id., at 101 (THOMAS, J., dissenting); 
R. A. V., 505 U. S., at 382–383; Roth v. United States, 354 
U. S. 476, 482–483 (1957).

The Lanham Act’s names clause has deep roots in our le-
gal tradition.  Our courts have long recognized that trade-
marks  containing  names  may  be  restricted.  And,  these 
name restrictions served established principles.  This his-
tory and tradition is sufficient to conclude that the names 
clause—a content-based, but viewpoint-neutral, trademark
restriction—is compatible with the First Amendment.  We 
need look no further in this case. 

1 
Restrictions on trademarking names have a long history.
See  generally  2  McCarthy  §13:5.  Such  restrictions  have 
historically been grounded in the notion that a person has
ownership over his own name, and that he may not be ex-
cluded from using that name by another’s trademark.  As 
the Court has explained, “[a] man’s name is his own prop-
erty, and he has the same right to its use and enjoyment as
he  has  to  that  of  any  other  species  of  property.”    Brown