Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/23pdf/23-939_e2pg.pdf
Page Number: 103

6 

TRUMP v. UNITED STATES 

JACKSON, J., dissenting 

nature of Presidential power requires that a former Presi-
dent have some immunity from criminal prosecution for of-
ficial  acts  during  his  tenure  in  office”).  Instead  of  no  im-
munity  (the 
individual  accountability  model)  or  an 
unqualified  grant  of  absolute  immunity  for  “all  official 
acts,” Brief for Petitioner 44 (emphasis added), the majority 
purports to adopt something of a hybrid.2  It holds that a 
former President may or may not be immune from criminal
prosecution for conduct undertaken while in office, to be de-
termined on a case-by-case basis.  According to the major-
ity, whether a former President is immune depends on how 
his criminal conduct is classified, as among three possible 
categories.

First, with respect to any criminal conduct relating to a 
President’s  “core  constitutional  powers”—those  subjects
“within  his  ‘conclusive  and  preclusive’  constitutional  au-
thority”—the  President  is  entitled  to  absolute  immunity
from criminal prosecution.  See ante, at 6, 8.  Second, ex-
panding outward from this “core,” regarding all other “acts
within  the  outer  perimeter  of  [the  President’s]  official  re-
sponsibility,”  the  President  is  entitled  to  “at  least  a  pre-
sumptive immunity from criminal prosecution.”  Ante, at 14. 

—————— 

2 Its feigned judicial humility notwithstanding, see ante, at 41, the ma-
jority’s holding goes further—much further—than necessary to resolve 
this case.  Petitioner’s argument in both the lower courts and this one 
was that a former President is categorically immune from federal crimi-
nal  prosecution  for  “all”  acts  within  the  outer  perimeter  of  his  official 
duties.    See  Opening  Brief  for  Defendant-Appellant  in  No.  23–3228 
(CADC,  Dec.  23,  2023),  p. 23;  91  F.  4th  1173,  1188–1189,  1195,  1208
(CADC 2024) (per curiam); Brief for Petitioner 41–47 (arguing for abso-
lute  immunity  for  “all  actions  within  the  ‘outer  perimeter’ ”  of  a  Presi-
dent’s responsibilities, and imploring the Court not to adopt a “ ‘function-
based’ approach”).  Thus, it would have been enough for the Court simply
to reject petitioner’s categorical claim and leave it at that.  But the ma-
jority sua sponte rephrased the question presented, and it now takes full 
advantage of this opportunity to devise from whole cloth an entirely new 
legal  framework  for  judicial  evaluation  of  potential  criminal  immunity
for former Presidents.