Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/11pdf/10-1121c4d6.pdf
Page Number: 42.0

Cite as:  567 U. S. ____ (2012) 

9 

BREYER, J., dissenting 

assessment  at  the  center  of  this  case  was  even  imposed. 
Compare  App.  108  (reflecting  that  the  audit  of  the  2004
budget  was  completed  by  April  25,  2005)  with  id.,  at  25 
(reflecting  approval  of  the  special  assessment  on  July  30, 
2005).

More  specifically,  the  Court  suggests  that  the  Consti-
tution  prohibits  the  union’s  classification  of  money  spent
“ ‘lobbying  .  .  .  the  electorate’ ”  as  a  chargeable  expense.
See ante, at 20.  But California state law explicitly permits
the  union  to  classify  some  lobbying  expenses  as  charge-
able.  See  Cal.  Govt.  Code  Ann.  §3515.8  (West  2010)  (a 
nonmember’s  fair  share  includes  “the  costs  of  support 
of  lobbying  activities  designed  to  foster  policy  goals  and
collective  negotiations  and  contract  administration”);  see 
also Lillebo v. Davis, 222 Cal. App. 3d 1421, 1442, 272 Cal. 
Rptr.  638,  651  (1990)  (construing  §3515.8  narrowly,  but 
explaining  that  “[w]e  cannot  fathom  how  a  union’s  lobby-
ing  the  Legislature  for  improvement  of  the  conditions  of 
employment  of  the  members  of  its  bargaining  unit  .  .  . 
could not be considered to be part of its role as representa-
tive  .  .  .”).    No  one  has  attacked  the  constitutionality  of 
California’s  law;  no  brief  argues  the  question;  and  this
Court  does  not  normally  find  state  laws  unconstitutional 
without, at least, giving those who favor the law an oppor-
tunity to argue the matter. 

The Court further complains that the basic administra-
tive system requires an objecting nonmember to “come up
with  the  resources  to  mount”  a  “legal  challenge”  to  the
union’s allocation “in a timely fashion.”  Ante, at 19.  That 
concern too is misplaced.  The union has offered to pay for 
neutral  arbitration  of  such  disputes  before  the  American 
Arbitration Association.  App. 103–104.  And, again, inso-
far as the Court casts doubt on the constitutional validity
of the basic system, the Court does so without the benefit
of argument.

Finally, the Court argues that (Step 1) Hudson is “pred-