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Page Number: 17

12 

CONCEPCION v. UNITED STATES 

Opinion of the Court 

were in effect at the time the covered offense was com-
mitted.”  132 Stat. 5222. 

The third section, §404(c), places two explicit limitations

on available relief: 

“No court shall entertain a motion made under this 
section to reduce a sentence if the sentence was previ-
ously imposed or previously reduced in accordance with
the amendments made by sections 2 and 3 of the Fair
Sentencing Act of 2010 . . . or if a previous motion made 
under this section to reduce the sentence was, after the 
date of enactment of this Act, denied after a complete 
review of the motion on the merits.  Nothing in this sec-
tion shall be construed to require a court to reduce any
sentence pursuant to this section.”  132 Stat. 5222. 

The text of the First Step Act does not so much as hint
that  district  courts  are  prohibited  from  considering  evi-
dence  of  rehabilitation,  disciplinary  infractions,  or  unre-
lated Guidelines changes.  The only two limitations on dis-
trict  courts’  discretion  appear  in  §404(c):  A  district  court 
may  not  consider  a  First  Step  Act  motion  if  the  movant’s 
sentence  was  already  reduced  under  the  Fair  Sentencing
Act or if the court considered and rejected a motion under
the  First  Step  Act.  Neither  of  those  limitations  applies
here.  By its terms, §404(c) does not prohibit district courts
from considering any arguments in favor of, or against, sen-
tence modification.  In fact, §404(c) only underscores that a
district court is not required to modify a sentence for any 
reason.  “Drawing meaning from silence is particularly in-
appropriate”  in  the  sentencing  context,  “for  Congress  has
shown that it knows how to direct sentencing practices in
express terms.”  Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U. S. 85,