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Page Number: 50.0

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DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY v. 
REGENTS OF UNIV. OF CAL. 

Opinion of THOMAS, J. 

entirely new programmatic exemption.

At the outset, Congress clearly knows how to provide for 
classwide deferred action when it wishes to do so.  On mul-
tiple  occasions,  Congress  has  used  express  language  to 
make certain classes of individuals eligible for deferred ac-
tion.  See 8 U. S. C. §§1154(a)(1)(D)(i)(II), (IV) (certain indi-
viduals covered under the Violence Against Women Act are 
“eligible for deferred action”); Victims of Trafficking and Vi-
olence Protection Act of 2000, 114 Stat. 1522 (“ ‘Any individ-
ual  described  in  subclause  (I)  is  eligible  for  deferred  ac-
tion’ ”);  Uniting  and  Strengthening  America  by  Providing 
Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Ter-
rorism (USA PATRIOT ACT) Act of 2001, §423(b), 115 Stat.
361 (“Such spouse, child, son, or daughter may be eligible 
for  deferred  action”);  National  Defense  Authorization  Act 
for  Fiscal  Year  2004,  §§1703(c)(1)(A),  (2),  117  Stat.  1694–
1695 (“Such spouse or child shall be eligible for deferred ac-
tion”).6  Congress has failed to provide similar explicit pro-
visions for DACA recipients, and the immigration laws con-
tain  no  indication  that  DHS  can,  at  will,  create  its  own 
categorical policies for deferred action. 

Other  provisions  pertaining  to  relief  from  removal  fur-
ther demonstrate that DHS lacked the delegated authority 

—————— 

6 In  the  DAPA  litigation,  DHS  noted  that  some  deferred-action  pro-
grams have been implemented by the Executive Branch without explicit
legislation.    But  “ ‘past  practice  does  not,  by  itself,  create  [executive] 
power.’ ”  Medellín v. Texas, 552 U. S. 491, 532 (2008) (quoting Dames & 
Moore v. Regan, 453 U. S. 654, 686 (1981)).  If any of these programs had
been challenged, it would seem that they would be legally infirm for the 
same reasons as DACA.  Moreover, if DHS had the authority to create 
new categories of aliens eligible for deferred action, then all of Congress’ 
deferred-action  legislation  was  but  a  superfluous  exercise.  Duncan  v. 
Walker, 533 U. S. 167, 174 (2001).  Finally, whereas some deferred-action
programs were followed by legislation, DACA has existed for eight years, 
and Congress is no closer to a legislative solution than it was in 2012. 
See, e.g., American Dream and Promise Act of 2019, H. R. 6, 116th Cong., 
1st Sess.