Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/14pdf/13-1041_0861.pdf
Page Number: 39.0

Cite as:  575 U. S. ____ (2015) 

15 

THOMAS, J., concurring in judgment 

Marshall) (“If [the Government of the United States] make
a law not warranted by any of the powers enumerated, it 
would  be  considered  by  the  judges  as  an  infringement  of 
the Constitution which they are to guard. . . . They would
declare it void”); see also Vile 174.  The Framers “contem-
plated  [the  Constitution],  as  a  rule  for  the  government  of 
courts, as well as of the legislature.”  Marbury v. Madison, 
1 Cranch 137, 179–180 (1803).  Thus, if a case involved a 
conflict between a law and the Constitution, judges would
have  a  duty  “to  adhere  to  the  latter  and  disregard  the 
former.”  The Federalist No. 78, at 468 (A. Hamilton); see 
also  Marbury,  1  Cranch,  at  178.  Similarly,  if  a  case  in-
volved  an  executive  effort  to  extend  a  law  beyond  its 
meaning,  judges  would  have  a  duty  to  adhere  to  the  law 
that  had  been  properly  promulgated  under  the  Constitu-
tion.  Cf.  id.,  at  157–158  (considering  the  scope  of  the
President’s constitutional power of appointment).  As this 
Court  said  long  ago,  “[T]he  particular  phraseology  of  the 
constitution of the United States confirms and strengthens
the  principle,  supposed  to  be  essential  to  all  written  con-
stitutions, that a law repugnant to the constitution is void;
and  that  courts,  as  well  as  other  departments,  are  bound
by that instrument.”  Id., at 180. 

Article  III  judges  cannot  opt  out  of  exercising  their
check.  As we have long recognized, “[t]he Judiciary has a
responsibility to decide cases properly before it, even those
it  ‘would  gladly  avoid.’ ”  Zivotofsky  v.  Clinton,  566  U. S. 
___, ___ (2012) (slip op., at 5) (quoting Cohens v. Virginia, 
6 Wheat. 264, 404 (1821)).  This responsibility applies not
only  to  constitutional  challenges  to  particular  statutes, 
see, e.g., Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U. S. ___, ___ (2013) 
(slip op., at 2), including those based on the separation of 
powers,  Free  Enterprise  Fund,  561  U. S.,  at  501–502,  but 
also  to  more  routine  questions  about  the  best  interpreta-
tion  of  statutes,  see,  e.g.,  Whitfield  v.  United  States,  574 
U. S. ___, ___–___ (2015) (slip op., at 2–3), or the compati-