Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/19pdf/18-5924_n6io.pdf
Page Number: 66

Cite as:  590 U. S. ____ (2020) 

5 

ALITO, J., dissenting 

should  set  an  example  of  rational  and  civil  discourse  in-
stead of contributing to the worst current trends. 

Now to what matters. 

II 

A 
I begin with the question whether Apodaca was a prece-
dent  at  all.  It  is  remarkable  that  it  is  even  necessary  to 
address  this  question,  but  in  Part  IV–A  of  the  principal
opinion, three Justices take the position that Apodaca was 
never a precedent.  The only truly fitting response to this
argument is: “Really?”

Consider  what  it  would  mean  if  Apodaca  was  never  a 
precedent.  It would mean that the entire legal profession
was fooled for the past 48 years.  Believing that Apodaca 
was a precedent, the courts of Louisiana and Oregon tried 
thousands of cases under rules allowing conviction by a vote
of 11 to 1 or 10 to 2, and appellate courts in those States 
upheld these convictions based on Apodaca.9  But according 

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adopted to serve?”  Ante, at 14, n. 44.  But three sentences later it an-
swers its own question when it observes that “a jurisdiction adopting a
nonunanimous jury rule for benign reasons today would still violate the 
Sixth Amendment.”  Ibid. 

JUSTICE  KAVANAUGH’s defense,  see  ante,  at  13–15  (opinion  concur-
ring  in  part), is  essentially  the  same.    After  reiterating the  history re-
counted by the majority, he eventually acknowledges that there are “neu-
tral  and  legitimate”  reasons  for  allowing  non-unanimous  verdicts  and 
that  Louisiana  may  have  retained  a  version  of  its  old  rule  for  such 
reasons.    He  also  agrees  with  the  majority  that  a  rule  allowing  non- 
unanimous  verdicts  would  be  unconstitutional  no  matter  what  the 
State’s reasons.  So what is the relevance of the original motivations for 
the  Louisiana  and  Oregon  rules?   He  offers  no  explanation.    He  does  
opine that allowing such verdicts works to the disadvantage of African-
American  defendants,  but  the  effect  of  various  jury  decision  rules  is  a 
complex  question  that  has  been  the  subject  of  much  social-science  re-
search, none of which the opinion even acknowledges. 

9 For  Oregon,  see,  e.g.,  State  v.  Bowen,  215  Ore.  App.  199,  168  P. 3d