Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/524bv.pdf
Page Number: 276

524US1

Unit: $U84

[09-06-00 20:39:07] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 524 U. S. 214 (1998)

231

Stevens, J., dissenting

actions based in state law.
that I join the Court’s opinion.

It is with this understanding

Justice Stevens, dissenting.
Everyone agrees that respondent’s tortious interference
claim would be barred by the ﬁled rate doctrine if it is
“wholly derivative of the contract claim for additional and
better services.” Ante, at 226 (majority opinion); ante, at
228 (Rehnquist, C. J., concurring). Moreover, it is true
that when the Magistrate Judge ruled that respondent’s case
would not support a punitive damages award as a matter of
state law, he characterized the tort claim as “stem[ming]
from the alleged failure of AT&T to comply with its contrac-
tual relationship.” Tr. 2207.
In my opinion, however, the
jury’s verdict on respondent’s tort claim is supported by evi-
dence that went well beyond, and differed in nature from,
the contract claim.

If petitioner, in an effort to appropriate respondent’s cus-
tomers, had included with each bill sent to a customer a
statement expressly characterizing respondent as an unethi-
cal, proﬁt-hungry middleman, I would think it clear that the
ﬁled rate doctrine would not constitute a defense to such
tortious conduct. The evidence in the record indicates that
a similar result was obtained by mailing bills to the custom-
ers that disclosed the markup that respondent obtained on
their calls.

Respondent’s tort claim was also premised in part on testi-
mony that AT&T used a telemarketer to contact respondent’s
customers and, without their authorization, convert them to
AT&T’s own long-distance service.
In re-
jecting AT&T’s motion for a directed verdict on the tort
claim, the Magistrate recognized that this practice of “slam-
ming” customers could “easily be a case of intentional inter-
ference” that would not necessarily also constitute breach of
contract.
Id., at 2166–2167. Slamming was clearly a part
of the case presented in the District Court. There was an

Id., at 557–558.