Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/17pdf/16-499_1a7d.pdf
Page Number: 47.0

4 

JESNER v. ARAB BANK, PLC 

Opinion of GORSUCH, J. 

judgment).1 

But  even  accepting  Sosa’s  framework  does  not  end  the 
matter.  As  the  Court  acknowledges,  there  is  a  strong
argument  that  “a  proper  application  of  Sosa  would  pre-
clude  courts  from  ever  recognizing  any  new  causes  of 
action  under  the  ATS.”  Ante,  at  19.    I  believe  that  argu-
ment is correct.  For the reasons just described, separation 
of  powers  considerations  ordinarily  require  us  to  defer  to 
Congress  in  the  creation  of  new  forms  of  liability.    This 
Court  hasn’t  yet  used  Sosa’s  assertion  of  discretionary
authority to recognize a new cause of action, and I cannot 
imagine a sound reason, hundreds of years after the stat-
ute’s  passage,  to  start  now.    For  a  court  inclined  to  claim 
the  discretion  to  enter  this  field,  it  is  a  discretion  best 
exercised by staying out of it. 

The  context  in  which  any  Sosa  discretion  would  be 
exercised confirms the wisdom of restraint.  Sosa acknowl-
edged  that  any  decision  to  create  a  new  cause  of  action 
would  “inevitably  [involve]  an  element  of  judgment  about
the practical consequences” that might follow.  Id., at 732– 
733.  But  because  the  point  of  such  a  claim  would  be  to 
vindicate  “a  norm  of  international  character,”  id.,  at  725, 
those  “practical  consequences”  would  likely  involve  ques-
tions of foreign affairs and national security—matters that
implicate neither judicial expertise nor authority.  It is for 
Congress  to  “define  and  punish  . . .  Offences  against  the 
—————— 

1 The  dissent  claims  that  Congress’s  decision  to  give  federal  courts
“jurisdiction  over  claims  based  on  ‘the  law  of  nations,’ ”  necessarily
implies  the  authority  to  develop  that  law.    Post,  at  16.    That  does  not 
follow.  Federal  courts  have  jurisdiction  over  all  kinds  of  cases—for 
example, those arising under the law of torts or contracts.  Yet follow-
ing our decision in Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64 (1938), federal
courts  are  generally  no  longer  permitted  to  promulgate  new  federal 
common  law  causes  of  action  in  those  areas.    Id.,  at  75.    I  can  see  no 
reason  to  treat  the  law  of  nations  differently.    See  Sosa  v.  Alvarez-
Machain,  542  U. S.  692,  744–746  (2004)  (Scalia,  J.,  concurring  in  part
and concurring in judgment).