Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/18pdf/18-281_6j37.pdf
Page Number: 8.0

Cite as:  587 U. S. ____ (2019) 

5 

Opinion of the Court 

provided  in  this  chapter  and  except  for  [certain  judi-
cial  misconduct  proceedings].”    Va.  Code  Ann.  §2.2–
507(A) (2017).2 

  Virginia has thus chosen to speak as a sovereign entity 
with a single voice.  In this regard, the State has adopted 
an  approach  resembling  that  of  the  Federal  Government, 
which “centraliz[es]” the decision whether to seek certiorari 
by “reserving litigation in this Court to the Attorney Gen-
eral  and  the  Solicitor  General.”    United  States  v.  Provi-
dence Journal Co., 485 U. S. 693, 706 (1988) (dismissing a 
writ  of  certiorari  sought  by  a  special  prosecutor  without 
authorization  from  the  Solicitor  General);  see  28  U. S. C. 
§518(a);  28  CFR  §0.20(a)  (2018).    Virginia,  had  it  so  cho-
sen,  could  have  authorized  the  House  to  litigate  on  the 
State’s  behalf,  either  generally  or  in  a  defined  class  of 
cases.  Hollingsworth, 570 U. S., at 710.  Some States have 
done  just  that.    Indiana,  for  example,  empowers  “[t]he 
House of Representatives and Senate of the Indiana Gen-
eral  Assembly  . . .  to  employ  attorneys  other  than  the 
Attorney  General  to  defend  any  law  enacted  creating 
legislative  or  congressional  districts  for  the  State  of  Indi-
ana.”  Ind. Code §2–3–8–1 (2011).  But the choice belongs 
to Virginia, and the House’s argument that it has authority 
to  represent  the  State’s  interests  is  foreclosed  by  the 
State’s contrary decision. 
  The  House  observes  that  Virginia  state  courts  have 
permitted  it  to  intervene  to  defend  legislation.    But  the 
sole case the House cites on this point—Vesilind v. Virginia 
State  Bd.  of  Elections,  295  Va.  427,  813  S. E.  2d  739 

—————— 

2 The  exceptions  referenced  in  the  statute’s  text  are inapposite here.  
They  include  circumstances  where,  “in  the  opinion  of  the  Attorney 
General, it is impracticable or uneconomical for [the] legal service to be 
rendered  by  him  or  one  of  his  assistants,”  or  where  the  Virginia  Su-
preme Court or any of its justices are litigating matters “arising out of 
[that court’s] official duties.”  §2.2–507(C).