Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/13pdf/13-193_omq2.pdf
Page Number: 15.0

Cite as:  573 U. S. ____ (2014) 

13 

Opinion of the Court 

future prosecution was “wholly conjectural.”  Ibid. 

Here,  by  contrast,  petitioners’  speech  focuses  on  the 
broader  issue  of  support  for  the  ACA,  not  on  the  voting 
record of a single candidate.  See Reply Brief 4–5 (identify-
ing  other  elected  officials  who  plan  to  seek  reelection  as
potential objects of SBA’s criticisms).  Because petitioners’
alleged  future  speech  is  not  directed  exclusively  at 
Driehaus,  it  does  not  matter  whether  he  “may  run  for
office again.”  Brief for Respondents 33 (internal quotation
marks omitted).  As long as petitioners continue to engage
in  comparable  electoral  speech  regarding  support  for  the 
ACA,  that  speech  will  remain  arguably  proscribed  by 
Ohio’s false statement statute. 

Respondents,  echoing  the  Sixth  Circuit,  contend  that
SBA’s  fears  of  enforcement  are  misplaced  because  SBA 
has  not  said  it  “ ‘plans  to  lie  or  recklessly  disregard  the
veracity of its speech.’ ”  Id., at 15 (quoting 525 Fed. Appx., 
at  422).  The  Sixth  Circuit  reasoned  that  because  SBA 
“can  only  be  liable  for making  a  statement  ‘knowing’  it  is 
false,”  SBA’s  insistence  that  its  speech  is  factually  true 
“makes  the  possibility  of  prosecution  for  uttering  such 
statements exceedingly slim.”  Id., at 422. 

The  Sixth  Circuit  misses  the  point.    SBA’s  insistence 
that the allegations in its press release were true did not 
prevent  the  Commission  panel  from  finding  probable
cause  to  believe  that  SBA  had  violated  the  law  the  first 
time  around.  And,  there  is  every  reason  to  think  that 
similar speech in the future will result in similar proceed-
ings, notwithstanding SBA’s belief in the truth of its alle-
gations.  Nothing  in  this  Court’s  decisions  requires  a
plaintiff who wishes to challenge the constitutionality of a 
law  to  confess  that  he  will  in  fact  violate  that  law.  See, 
e.g.,  Babbitt,  442  U. S.,  at  301  (case  was  justiciable  even 
though  plaintiffs  disavowed  any  intent  to  “propagate 
untruths”).