Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/23pdf/22-451_7m58.pdf
Page Number: 33

Cite as:  603 U. S. ____ (2024) 

25 

Opinion of the Court 

amici in such cases are steeped in the subject matter, and
reviewing courts have the benefit of their perspectives.  In 
an agency case in particular, the court will go about its task
with  the  agency’s  “body  of  experience  and  informed  judg-
ment,” among other information, at its disposal.  Skidmore, 
323 U. S., at 140.  And although an agency’s interpretation
of a statute “cannot bind a court,” it may be especially in-
formative “to the extent it rests on factual premises within
[the agency’s] expertise.”  Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and 
Firearms v. FLRA, 464 U. S. 89, 98, n. 8 (1983).  Such ex-
pertise has always been one of the factors which may give 
an  Executive  Branch  interpretation  particular  “power  to
persuade, if lacking power to control.”  Skidmore, 323 U. S., 
at 140; see, e.g., County of Maui v. Hawaii Wildlife Fund, 
590 U. S. 165, 180 (2020); Moore, 95 U. S., at 763. 

For  those  reasons,  delegating  ultimate  interpretive  au-
thority to agencies is simply  not necessary to ensure that 
the resolution of statutory ambiguities is well informed by 
subject matter expertise.  The better presumption is there-
fore that Congress expects courts to do their ordinary job of
interpreting statutes, with due respect for the views of the
Executive Branch.  And to the extent that Congress and the 
Executive Branch may disagree with how the courts have
performed that job in a particular case, they are of course 
always free to act by revising the statute.

Nor does a desire for the uniform construction of federal 
law justify  Chevron.  Given inconsistencies in how judges 
apply Chevron, see infra, at 30–33, it is unclear how much 
the doctrine as a whole (as opposed to its highly deferential
second  step)  actually  promotes  such  uniformity.    In  any 
event, there is little value in imposing a uniform interpre-
tation of a statute if that interpretation is wrong.  We see 
no reason to presume that Congress prefers uniformity for 
uniformity’s sake over the correct interpretation of the laws
it enacts.