Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/14pdf/13-271_j4ek.pdf
Page Number: 14.0

Cite as:  575 U. S. ____ (2015) 

11 

Opinion of the Court 

the  pre-empted  field  as  defined  by  our  precedents.    See 
Panhandle Eastern, supra, at 516–518; Interstate Natural 
Gas Co. v. FPC, 331 U. S. 682, 689–693 (1947).

Those precedents emphasize the importance of consider­
ing the target at which the state law aims in determining 
whether that law is pre-empted.  For example, in Northern 
Natural Gas Co. v. State Corporation Comm’n of Kan., 372 
U. S.  84  (1963),  the  Court  said  that  it  had  “consistently 
recognized”  that  the  “significant  distinction”  for  purposes 
of pre-emption in the natural-gas context is the distinction 
between “measures aimed directly at interstate purchasers
and wholesales for resale, and those aimed at” subjects left 
to  the  States  to  regulate.    Id.,  at  94  (emphasis  added). 
And, in Northwest Central, the Court found that the Natu­
ral Gas Act did not pre-empt a state regulation concerning
the  timing  of  gas  production  from  a  gas  field  within  the
State, even though the regulation might have affected the
costs  of  and  the  prices  of  interstate  wholesale  sales,  i.e., 
jurisdictional  sales.    489  U. S.,  at  514.    In  reaching  this
conclusion,  the  Court  explained  that  the  state  regulation
aimed  primarily  at  “protect[ing]  producers’  . . .  rights—a
matter  firmly  on  the  States’  side  of  that  dividing  line.” 
Ibid.  The Court contrasted this state regulation with the 
state  orders  at  issue  in  Northern  Natural,  which  “ ‘inva- 
lidly invade[d] the federal agency’s exclusive domain’ pre- 
cisely because” they were “‘unmistakably and unambiguously 
directed  at  purchasers.’ ”    Id.,  at  513  (quoting  Northern 
Natural,  supra,  at  92;  emphasis  added).    Here,  too,  the 
lawsuits  are  directed  at  practices  affecting  retail  rates– 
which are “firmly on the States’ side of that dividing line.”

Petitioners  argue  that  Schneidewind  constitutes  con- 
trary authority.  In that case, the Court found pre-empted a
state law that required public utilities, such as interstate 
pipelines  crossing  the  State,  to  obtain  state  approval
before issuing long-term securities.  485 U. S., at 306–309. 
But  the  Court  there  thought  that  the  State’s  securities