Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/529bv.pdf
Page Number: 440

529US2

Unit: $U46

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Cite as: 529 U. S. 362 (2000)

365

Syllabus

ently than this Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts.
Under the “unreasonable application” clause, a federal habeas court may
grant relief if the state court identiﬁes the correct governing legal prin-
ciple from this Court’s decisions but unreasonably applies that principle
to the facts of the prisoner’s case. Pp. 402–409.

(b) In deﬁning what qualiﬁes as an “unreasonable application of . . .
clearly established Federal law,” the Fourth Circuit erred in holding
that a state-court decision involves such an application only if the state
court has applied federal law in a manner that reasonable jurists would
all agree is unreasonable. That standard would tend to mislead federal
habeas courts by focusing on a subjective inquiry. Rather, the federal
court should ask whether the state court’s application of clearly estab-
lished federal law was objectively unreasonable. Cf. Wright v. West,
505 U. S. 277, 304. Although difﬁcult to deﬁne, “unreasonable” is a com-
mon legal term familiar to federal judges. For present purposes, the
most important point is that an unreasonable application of federal law
is different from an incorrect application of federal law. See, e. g., id.,
at 305. Because Congress speciﬁcally used the word “unreasonable,”
and not a term like “erroneous” or “incorrect,” a federal habeas court
may not grant relief simply because it concludes in its independent judg-
ment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established
federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must
also be unreasonable. Finally, the phrase “clearly established Federal
law, as determined by [this] Court” refers to the holdings, as opposed to
the dicta, of this Court’s decisions as of the time of the relevant state-
court decision.
In this respect, the quoted phrase bears only a slight
connection to this Court’s jurisprudence under Teague v. Lane, 489 U. S.
288. Whatever would qualify as an “old rule” under Teague will consti-
tute “clearly established Federal law, as determined by [this] Court,”
see, e. g., Stringer v. Black, 503 U. S. 222, 228, but with one caveat: Sec-
tion 2254(d)(1) restricts the source of clearly established law to this
Court’s jurisprudence. Pp. 409–413.

Stevens, J., announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the
opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, III, and IV, in which O’Con-
nor, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., joined, and an opin-
ion with respect to Parts II and V, in which Souter, Ginsburg, and
Breyer, JJ., joined. O’Connor, J., delivered the opinion of the Court
with respect to Part II (except as to the footnote), in which Rehnquist,
C. J., and Kennedy and Thomas, JJ., joined, and in which Scalia, J.,
joined, except as to the footnote, and an opinion concurring in part and