Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/11pdf/10-1121c4d6.pdf
Page Number: 48

Cite as:  567 U. S. ____ (2012) 

15 

BREYER, J., dissenting 

protection  it  provides  primarily  helps  only  those  who  are
politically near neutral.  See generally Sunstein & Thaler,
Libertarian  Paternalism  is  not  an  Oxymoron,  70  U.  Chi.
L. Rev.  1159,  1161  (2003)  (explaining  that  default  rules 
play an important role when individuals do not have “well-
defined  preferences”).  Consequently,  the  Court,  which
held recently that the Constitution permits a State to im-
pose  an  opt-in  requirement,  see  Davenport,  551  U. S.,  at 
185, has never said that it mandates such a requirement.
There  is  no  good  reason  for  the  Court  suddenly  to  enter 
the debate, much less now to decide that the Constitution 
resolves it. 

Of  course,  principles  of  stare  decisis  are  not  absolute. 
But the Court cannot be right when it departs from those 
principles without benefit of argument in a matter of such
importance.

For these reasons, with respect, I dissent.