Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/14pdf/13-1041_0861.pdf
Page Number: 33.0

Cite as:  575 U. S. ____ (2015) 

9 

THOMAS, J., concurring in judgment 

n.  66  (2000);  Nelson,  Originalism  and  Interpretive  Con-
ventions,  70  U.  Chi.  L. Rev.  519,  525–526  (2003).    As 
James  Madison  explained,  “All  new  laws,  though  penned 
with the greatest technical skill and passed on the fullest 
and  most  mature  deliberation,  are  considered  as  more  or 
less  obscure  and  equivocal  . . . .”    The  Federalist  No.  37, 
at 229. 

The judicial power was understood to include the power 
to resolve these ambiguities over time.  See ibid.  Alexan-
der Hamilton lauded this power, arguing that “[t]he inter-
pretation of the laws is the proper and peculiar province of 
the  courts.”  Id.,  No.  78,  at  467.  It  is  undoubtedly  true
that the other branches of Government have the authority 
and  obligation  to  interpret  the  law,  but  only  the  judicial 
interpretation  would  be  considered  authoritative  in  a 
judicial proceeding.  Vile 360. 

Although  the  Federalists  and  Anti-Federalists  engaged
in  a  public  debate  about  this  interpretive  power,  that
debate centered on the dangers inherent in the power, not
on its allocation under the Constitution.  See, e.g., Letters 
from  The  Federal  Farmer  XV  (Jan.  18,  1788),  in  2  The 
Complete  Anti-Federalist  315–316  (H.  Storing  ed.  1981) 
(arguing  that  the  interpretive  power  made  the  Judiciary
the  most  dangerous  branch).    Writing  as  “Brutus,”  one
leading  anti-Federalist  argued  that  judges  “w[ould]  not 
confine  themselves  to  any  fixed  or  established  rules,  but 
w[ould] determine, according to what appears to them, the 
reason  and  spirit  of  the  constitution.”  Essays  of  Brutus 
(Jan.  31,  1788),  in  2  id.,  at  420.  The  Federalists  rejected
these arguments, assuring the public that judges would be 
guided  “by  strict  rules  and  precedents  which  serve  to
define  and  point  out  their  duty  in  every  particular  case
that comes before them.”  The Federalist No. 78, at 471 (A. 
Hamilton).  Those  rules  included  principles  of  interpreta-
tion  that  had  been  set  out  by  jurists  for  centuries.    See, 
e.g., 2 S. von Pufendorf, De Officio Hominis Et Civis Juxta