Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/21pdf/20-1459_n7ip.pdf
Page Number: 31

14 

UNITED STATES v. TAYLOR 

THOMAS, J., dissenting 

that the categorical approach applies most plausibly in the
elements-clause context, see id., at ___ (slip op., at 26), the 
Government has suggested that even that clause might bet-
ter accord with a conduct-based approach.  Tr. of Oral Arg. 
5–6; see also Burris, 912 F. 3d, at 409–410 (Thapar, J., con-
curring).

In light of the mischief that the categorical approach has
caused, we should welcome briefing on whether a conduct-
based approach tacks closer to statutory text and common 
sense—especially in the elements-clause context.  If it does, 
we should adopt it.4 

* 

* 

* 
Even  Alice,  having  slaked  her  curiosity,  eventually  re-
turned from the land beyond the looking glass.  It is high
time that this Court do the same.  In this case, I would begin 
the trek back by adopting the Davis dissent’s conduct-based 
approach, reviving §924(c)’s residual clause, and reversing 
the judgment below.  And in future cases, when it comes to 
interpreting §924(c)’s elements clause, I will carefully con-
sider  alternatives  to  this  Court’s  atextual  and  ever-more-
absurd categorical approach.  For these reasons, I respect-
fully dissent. 

—————— 

4 Meanwhile, JUSTICE ALITO’s  dissent  offers  an  intriguing  alternative 
interpretation of §924(c)(3)(A)’s elements clause.  See post, at 1–4.  While 
no party advocates for the interpretation in this case, we should welcome
further briefing on it as well.