Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/04pdf/04-278.pdf
Page Number: 19

16 

CASTLE ROCK v. GONZALES 

Opinion of the Court 

domestic-violence  context  of  the  underlying  statute,  that 
would  not  necessarily  mean  that  state  law  gave  respon-
dent an entitlement to enforcement of the mandate.  Mak-
ing  the  actions  of  government  employees  obligatory  can 
serve various legitimate ends other than the conferral of a 
benefit  on  a  specific  class  of  people.  See,  e.g.,  Sandin  v. 
Conner,  515  U. S.  472,  482  (1995)  (finding  no  constitution-
ally protected liberty interest in prison regulations phrased 
in mandatory  terms,  in  part  because  “[s]uch  guidelines  are 
not set forth solely to benefit the prisoner”).  The serving of 
public rather than private ends is the normal course of the 
criminal  law  because  criminal  acts,  “besides  the  injury
[they  do]  to  individuals,  . . .  strike  at  the  very  being  of 
society;  which  cannot  possibly  subsist,  where  actions  of 
this  sort  are  suffered  to  escape  with  impunity.”  4  W. 
Blackstone,  Commentaries  on  the  Laws  of  England  5 
(1769);  see  also  Huntington  v.  Attrill,  146  U. S.  657,  668 
(1892).    This  principle  underlies,  for  example,  a  Colorado 
district  attorney’s  discretion  to  prosecute  a  domestic  as-
sault, even though the victim withdraws her charge.  See 
People  v.  Cunefare,  102  P. 3d  302,  311–312  (Colo.  2004) 
(Bender,  J.,  concurring  in  part,  dissenting  in  part,  and 
dissenting in part to the judgment). 

Respondent’s  alleged  interest  stems  only  from  a  State’s 
statutory  scheme—from  a  restraining  order  that  was 
authorized  by  and  tracked  precisely  the  statute  on  which 
the Court of Appeals relied.  She does not assert that she 
has  any  common-law  or  contractual  entitlement  to  en-
forcement.  If  she  was  given  a  statutory  entitlement,  we 
would expect to see some indication of that in the statute 
itself.  Although  Colorado’s  statute  spoke  of  “protected 
person[s]” such as respondent, it did so in connection with 
matters other than a right to enforcement.  It said that a 
“protected  person  shall  be  provided  with  a  copy  of  [a  re-
straining] order” when it is issued, §18–6–803.5(3)(a); that 
a  law  enforcement  agency  “shall  make  all  reasonable