Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/22pdf/21-468_5if6.pdf
Page Number: 38.0

Cite as:  598 U. S. ____ (2023) 

3 

SOTOMAYOR, J., concurring
SOTOMAYOR, J., concurring in part 

opinion.  I acknowledge that the inquiry is difficult and del-
icate, and federal courts are well advised to approach the 
matter with caution.  See ante, at 28.  Yet, I agree with THE 
CHIEF JUSTICE that courts generally are able to weigh dis-
parate  burdens  and  benefits  against  each  other,  and  that 
they  are  called  on  to  do  so  in  other  areas  of  the  law  with
some frequency.  See post, at 3–4.  The means-ends tailoring
analysis that Pike incorporates is likewise familiar to courts
and does not raise the asserted incommensurability prob-
lems that trouble JUSTICE GORSUCH. 

In my view, and as JUSTICE GORSUCH concludes for a sep-
arate plurality of the Court, petitioners’ Pike claim fails for 
a much narrower reason.  Reading petitioners’ allegations 
in light of the Court’s decision in Exxon Corp. v. Governor 
of Maryland, 437 U. S. 117 (1978), the complaint fails to al-
lege  a  substantial  burden  on  interstate  commerce.    See 
ante, at 21–25.  Alleging a substantial burden on interstate 
commerce is a threshold requirement that plaintiffs must 
satisfy before courts need even engage in Pike’s balancing
and tailoring analyses.  Because petitioners have not done
so, they fail to state a Pike claim.