Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/558bv.pdf
Page Number: 388.0

Cite as: 558 U. S. 220 (2010) 

227 

Scalia, J., dissenting 

U. S.,  at  466–467,  as  respondent  recognizes;  indeed,  the 
Eleventh  Circuit  has  already  recognized  the  abrogation  of 
the  opinion  below  on  this  point,  see  Owen  v.  Secretary  for 
Dept.  of  Corrections,  568  F.  3d  894,  915,  n.  23  (2009).  But, 
as  Justice  Alito’s  dissent  demonstrates,  post,  p.  228,  the 
Eleventh  Circuit  (like  the  District  Court)  also  decided  that 
petitioner  was  not  entitled  to  habeas  relief  on  the  merits. 
554 F. 3d, at 936–938.  Thus the Court GVRs in light of Cone 
even  though  the  issue  on  which  Cone  throws  light  does  not 
affect the outcome. 

The Court has previously asserted a power to GVR when­
ever  there  is  “a  reasonable  probability  that  the  decision 
below rests upon a premise that the lower court would reject 
if given the opportunity for further consideration, and where 
it  appears  that  such  a  redetermination  may  determine  the 
ultimate outcome of the litigation.”  Lawrence v. Chater, 516 
U. S.  163,  167  (1996)  (per  curiam).  I  have  protested  even 
that ﬂabby standard, see id., at 190–191 (Scalia, J., dissent­
ing), but today the Court outdoes itself.  It GVRs where the 
decision below does not “rest upon” the objectionable faulty 
premise, but is independently supported by other grounds— 
so  that  redetermination  of  the  faulty  ground  will  assuredly 
not “determine the ultimate outcome of the litigation.”  The 
power to “revise and correct for error,” which the Court has 
already  turned  into  “a  power  to  void  for  suspicion,”  id.,  at 
190 (same) (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted), 
has now become the power to send back for a redo.  We have 
no  authority  to  decree  that.  If  the  Court  thinks  that  the 
Eleventh  Circuit’s  merits  holding  is  wrong,  then  it  should 
summarily  reverse  or  set  the  case  for  argument;  otherwise, 
the judgment below must stand.  The same is true if (as the 
Court  evidently  believes)  the  Court  of  Appeals  should  have 
required  an  evidentiary  hearing  before  resolving  the  mer­
its  question.  If  they  erred  in  that  regard  their  judgment 
should  be  reversed  rather  than  remanded  “in  light  of  Cone 
v.  Bell”—a disposition providing no hint that what we really