Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/17pdf/16-499_1a7d.pdf
Page Number: 58

Cite as:  584 U. S. ____ (2018) 

1 

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

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No. 16–499 
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JOSEPH JESNER, ET AL., PETITIONERS v.
 
ARAB BANK, PLC
 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 

APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
 

[April 24, 2018] 

JUSTICE  SOTOMAYOR,  with  whom  JUSTICE  GINSBURG, 

JUSTICE BREYER, and JUSTICE KAGAN join, dissenting. 

The  Court  today  holds  that  the  Alien  Tort  Statute
(ATS),  28  U. S. C.  §1350,  categorically  forecloses  foreign
corporate  liability.  In  so  doing,  it  absolves  corporations
from responsibility under the ATS for conscience-shocking 
behavior.  I disagree both with the Court’s conclusion and
its  analytic  approach.  The  text,  history,  and  purpose  of 
the  ATS,  as  well  as  the  long  and  consistent  history  of 
corporate liability in tort, confirm that tort claims for law­
of-nations violations may be brought against  corporations 
under the ATS.  Nothing about the corporate form in itself
raises foreign-policy concerns that require the Court, as a 
matter of  common-law discretion, to immunize all foreign
corporations  from  liability  under  the  ATS,  regardless  of 
the specific law-of-nations violations alleged.  I respectfully 
dissent. 

I 
The  plurality  assumes  without  deciding  that  whether
corporations can be permissible defendants under the ATS 
turns  on  the  first  step  of  the  two-part  inquiry  set  out  in 
Sosa  v.  Alvarez-Machain,  542  U. S.  692  (2004).    But  by
asking whether there is “a specific, universal, and obliga­
tory  norm  of  liability  for  corporations”  in  international