Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/19pdf/18-1195_g314.pdf
Page Number: 26.0

Cite as:  591 U. S. ____ (2020) 

1 

THOMAS, J., concurring 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

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No. 18–1195 
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KENDRA ESPINOZA, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. 
MONTANA DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, ET AL. 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF 
MONTANA 

[June 30, 2020] 

JUSTICE  THOMAS,  with  whom  JUSTICE  GORSUCH  joins,

concurring. 

The Court correctly concludes that Montana’s no-aid pro-
vision expressly discriminates against religion in violation
of the Free Exercise Clause.  And it properly provides relief 
to Montana religious schools and the petitioners who wish
to  use  Montana’s  scholarship  program  to  send  their  chil-
dren to such schools.  I write separately to explain how this 
Court’s interpretation of the Establishment Clause contin-
ues to hamper free exercise rights.  Until we correct course 
on  that  interpretation,  individuals  will  continue  to  face
needless obstacles in their attempts to vindicate their reli-
gious freedom. 

I 
A 
This case involves the Free Exercise Clause, not the Es-
tablishment Clause.   But as in all cases involving a state
actor,  the  modern  understanding  of  the  Establishment 
Clause is a “brooding omnipresence,” Southern Pacific Co. 
v. Jensen, 244 U. S. 205, 222 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting),
ever ready to be used to justify the government’s infringe-
ment on religious freedom.  Under the modern, but errone-
ous,  view  of  the  Establishment  Clause,  the  government 
must treat all religions equally and treat religion equally to