Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/20pdf/20-255_g3bi.pdf
Page Number: 23

Cite as:  594 U. S. ____ (2021) 

9 

ALITO, J., concurring 

those hours.  See Morse, 551 U. S., at 424 (ALITO, J., con-
curring).  But even when students are on school premises
during regular school hours, they are not stripped of their
free-speech  rights.  Tinker  teaches  that  expression  that
does not interfere with a class (such as by straying from the 
topic, interrupting the teacher or other students, etc.) can-
not be suppressed unless it “involves substantial disorder
or invasion of the rights of others.”  393 U. S., at 513. 

IV 
A 

A  public  school’s  regulation  of  off-premises  student 
speech is a different matter.  While the decision to enroll a 
student  in  a  public  school  may  be  regarded  as  conferring 
the authority to regulate some off-premises speech (a sub-
ject  I  address  below),  enrollment  cannot  be  treated  as  a 
complete  transfer  of  parental  authority  over  a  student’s
speech.  In our society, parents, not the State, have the pri-
mary  authority  and  duty  to  raise,  educate,  and  form  the 
character  of  their  children.    See  Wisconsin  v.  Yoder,  406 
U. S. 205, 232 (1972) (“The history and culture of Western
civilization reflect a strong tradition of parental concern for 
the nurture and upbringing of their children.  This primary
role of the parents in the upbringing of their children is now 
established beyond debate as an enduring American tradi-
tion”);  Pierce  v.  Society  of  Sisters,  268  U. S.  510,  534–535 
(1925) (discussing “the liberty of parents and guardians to
direct the upbringing and education of children under their 
control”).  Parents do not implicitly relinquish all that au-
thority when they send their children to a public school.  As 
the Court notes, it would be far-fetched to suggest that en-
rollment implicitly confers the right to regulate what a child