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Page Number: 11.0

8  TC HEARTLAND LLC v. KRAFT FOODS GROUP BRANDS LLC 

Opinion of the Court 

incorporation.  Congress  has  not  amended  §1400(b)  since 
Fourco,  and  neither  party  asks  us  to  reconsider  our  hold-
ing  in  that  case.    Accordingly,  the  only  question  we  must 
answer  is  whether  Congress  changed  the  meaning  of 
§1400(b) when it amended §1391.  When Congress intends
to  effect  a  change  of  that  kind,  it  ordinarily  provides  a
relatively  clear  indication  of  its  intent  in  the  text  of  the 
amended  provision.  See  United  States  v.  Madigan,  300 
U. S. 500, 506 (1937) (“[T]he modification by implication of 
the settled construction of an earlier and different section 
is not favored”); A.  Scalia & B.  Garner, Reading Law 331 
(2012)  (“A  clear,  authoritative  judicial  holding  on  the 
meaning  of  a  particular  provision  should  not  be  cast  in
doubt  and  subjected  to  challenge  whenever  a  related
though not utterly inconsistent provision is adopted in the 
same statute or even in an affiliated statute”). 

The current version of §1391 does not contain any indi-
cation  that  Congress  intended  to  alter  the  meaning  of 
§1400(b)  as  interpreted  in  Fourco.  Although  the  current 
version  of  §1391(c)  provides  a  default  rule  that  applies 
“[f]or  all  venue  purposes,”  the  version  at  issue  in  Fourco 
similarly  provided  a  default  rule  that  applied  “for  venue 
purposes.”  353  U. S.,  at  223  (internal  quotation  marks 
omitted). 
In  this  context,  we  do  not  see  any  material
difference between the two phrasings.  See Pure Oil Co. v. 
Suarez,  384  U. S.  202,  204–205  (1966)  (construing  “ ‘for 
venue purposes’ ” to cover “all venue statutes”).  Respond-
ent  argues  that  “ ‘all  venue  purposes’  means  ‘all  venue 
‘all  venue  purposes  except  for  patent
purposes’—not 
venue.’ ”  Brief for Respondent 21.  The plaintiffs in Fourco 
advanced the same argument.  See 353 U. S., at 228 (“The 
main  thrust  of  respondents’  argument  is  that  §1391(c)  is
clear  and  unambiguous  and  that  its  terms  include  all 
actions—including  patent  infringement  actions”).  This 

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regime).