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4 

ESPINOZA v. MONTANA DEPT. OF REVENUE 

THOMAS, J., concurring 

understanding of the former Clause has led to a correspond-
ingly cramped interpretation of the latter. 

Under this Court’s current approach, state and local gov-
ernments may rely on the Establishment Clause to justify 
policies  that  others  wish  to  challenge  as  violations  of  the
Free Exercise Clause.  Once the government demonstrates 
that its policy is required for compliance with the Constitu-
tion, any claim that the policy infringes on free exercise can-
not survive.  A few examples suffice to illustrate this prac-
tice. 

Of most relevance to this case is Locke v. Davey, 540 U. S. 
712 (2004), which Montana principally relies on to justify 
its discriminatory law.  In Locke, the Court held that pro-
hibiting  a  student  from  using  a  generally  available  state
scholarship  to  pursue  a  degree  in  devotional  theology  did 
not violate the student’s free exercise rights.  This was so, 
the Court said, in part because it furthered the State’s “an-
tiestablishment interests” in avoiding the education of reli-
gious ministers.  Id., at 722.  But no antiestablishment in-
terests, properly understood, were at issue in Locke.  The 
State neither coerced students to study devotional theology 
nor  conscripted  taxpayers  into  supporting  any  form  of  or-
thodoxy.  Thus, as I have explained, Locke incorrectly inter-
preted  the  Establishment  Clause  and  should  not  impact
free  exercise  challenges.    Trinity  Lutheran  Church  of  Co-
lumbia, Inc. v. Comer, 582 U. S. ___, ___ (2017) (THOMAS, 
J., concurring).  Yet, as Montana’s proffered justification for 
its law shows, governments continue to rely on Locke’s im-
proper  understanding  of  “antiestablishment  interests”  to
defend against free exercise challenges.  See Brief for State 
of  Colorado  et al.  as  Amici  Curiae  3,  10–12  (arguing  that 
Locke  justifies  the  38  state  constitutional  provisions  that 
are similar to Montana’s); see also Trinity Lutheran Church 
of Columbia, Inc. v. Pauley, 788 F. 3d 779, 785 (CA8 2015), 
rev’d  and  remanded,  582  U. S.  ___;  Eulitt  v.  Maine,  386