Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/21pdf/20-601_bq7c.pdf
Page Number: 26

Cite as:  595 U. S. ____ (2022) 

3 

KAGAN, J., concurring in judgment 

Oakland Scavenger Co., 487 U. S. 312, 315 (1988).  Or oth-
erwise said, granting intervention would enable the party 
to  circumvent  those  limits,  by  awarding  him  the  “equiva-
lent” of more “time for filing a notice of appeal.”  Ibid.; see 
Hutchinson  v.  Pfeil,  211  F. 3d  515,  519  (CA10  2000) 
(“[I]ntervention is not a means to escape the consequences 
of  noncompliance”  with  the  jurisdictional  timely-appeal 
rule).  That is the essence of EMW’s objection.  EMW con-
tends that the attorney general, though a non-party, could 
have  appealed  the  District  Court’s  judgment  because  it 
bound his office.  But the attorney general chose at the time 
not to appeal.  He should not now be allowed, EMW says, to 
sidestep the jurisdictional deadline he missed by means of 
intervening.  See Brief for Respondents 10, 15–16, 19–21. 
  But  the  anti-circumvention  rationale  for  denying  inter-
vention does not sensibly apply here because of the change 
in circumstances between the time to appeal and the time 
of the motion to intervene.  Recall that the attorney general, 
by agreeing early on to the dismissal of the claims against 
him, effectively handed off defense of the challenged law to 
the  health  secretary.    See  ante,  at  2.    After  the  District 
Court ruled, the secretary continued to perform that func-
tion, appealing the court’s decision to strike down the law.  
Assume  here,  as  EMW  argues,  that  the  attorney  general 
also could have appealed.*  Even if so, the attorney general 
had no reason to take that step: The secretary was handling 
the appeal, just as he had handled the trial court proceed-
ings.  It was only once the Sixth Circuit ruled and the sec-
retary  ceased  defending  the  law—choosing  not  to  seek  en 

—————— 

* That assumption is perfectly reasonable.  The agreement of dismissal 
made the District Court’s judgment binding on the attorney general’s of-
fice (subject to any later revision or reversal).  See App. 29–30.  And a 
non-party bound by a judgment often has the same appeal rights as a 
party.    See  Devlin  v.  Scardelletti,  536  U. S.  1,  7–8  (2002)  (discussing 
cases); C. Wright, A. Miller, & E. Cooper, 15A Federal Practice and Pro-
cedure §3902.1, pp. 186–189, n. 35 (2d ed. Supp. 2021) (same).