Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/17pdf/16-1454_5h26.pdf
Page Number: 33.0

Cite as:  585 U. S. ____ (2018) 

9 

BREYER, J., dissenting 

that  intended  to  charge  the  merchants  lower  prices.
See  id.,  at  214.    By  doing  so,  American  Express  has  “dis­
rupt[ed] the normal price-setting mechanism” in the mar­
ket.  Id., at 209.  As a result of the provisions, the District 
Court  found,  American  Express  was  able  to  raise  mer­
chant  prices  repeatedly  without  any  significant  loss  of
business,  because  merchants  were  unable  to  respond  to 
such price increases by encouraging shoppers to pay with
other  cards.  Id.,  at  215.    The  provisions  also  meant  that
competitors like Discover had little incentive to lower their
merchant  prices,  because  doing  so  did  not  lead  to  any 
additional  market  share.    Id.,  at  214.  The  provisions
thereby “suppress[ed] [American Express’] . . . competitors’ 
incentives  to  offer  lower  prices  . . .  resulting  in  higher 
profit-maximizing  prices  across  the  network  services 
market.”  Id., at 209.  Consumers throughout the economy 
paid higher retail prices as a result, and they were denied 
the opportunity to accept incentives that merchants might 
otherwise have offered to use less-expensive cards.  Id., at 
216,  220.  I  should  think  that,  considering  step  1  alone,
there is little more that need be said. 

The  majority,  like  the  Court  of  Appeals,  says  that  the
District  Court  should  have  looked  not  only  at  the  market
for the card companies’ merchant-related services but also
at  the  market  for  the  card  companies’  shopper-related
services, and that it should have combined them, treating 
them  as  a  single  market.    Ante,  at  14–15;  838  F. 3d,  at 
197.  But  I  am  not  aware  of  any  support  for  that  view  in
antitrust law.  	Indeed, this Court has held to the contrary. 
In Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 
U. S.  594,  610  (1953),  the  Court  held  that  an  antitrust
court  should  begin  its  definition  of  a  relevant  market  by
focusing  narrowly  on  the  good  or  service  directly  affected 
by  a  challenged  restraint.  The  Government  in  that  case 
claimed that a newspaper’s advertising policy violated the 
Sherman  Act’s  “rule  of  reason.”  See  ibid.    In  support  of