Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/19pdf/18-1195_g314.pdf
Page Number: 28

Cite as:  591 U. S. ____ (2020) 

3 

THOMAS, J., concurring 

505 U. S. 577, 640 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting); emphasis 
deleted);  American  Legion  v.  American  Humanist  Assn., 
588 U. S. ___, ___ (2019) (THOMAS, J., concurring in judg-
ment)  (slip  op.,  at  3);  see  also  McConnell,  Establishment 
and  Disestablishment  at  the  Founding,  Part  I:  Establish-
ment of Religion, 44 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 2105, 2131–2181
(2003); McConnell, Coercion: The Lost Element of Estab-
lishment, 27 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 933, 936–939 (1986).1 

Thus, the modern view, which presumes that States must 
remain both completely separate from and virtually silent 
on  matters  of  religion  to  comply  with  the  Establishment 
Clause,  is  fundamentally  incorrect.    Properly  understood,
the Establishment Clause does not prohibit States from fa-
voring  religion.  They  can  legislate  as  they  wish,  subject 
only to the limitations in the State and Federal Constitu-
tions.  See Muñoz, The Original Meaning of the Establish-
ment  Clause  and  the  Impossibility  of  Its  Incorporation,  8 
U. Pa. J. Const. L. 585, 632 (2006). 

B 
I  have  previously  made  these  points  in  Establishment
Clause cases to show that the Clause likely has no applica-
tion to the States or, if it is capable of incorporation, that
the Court employs a far broader test than the Clause’s orig-
inal meaning.  See, e.g., American Legion, 588 U. S., at ___ 
(opinion  concurring  in  judgment)  (slip  op.,  at  1);  Town  of 
Greece,  572  U. S.,  at  604  (opinion  concurring  in  part  and 
concurring  in  judgment).    But  the  Court’s  wayward  ap-
proach  to  the  Establishment  Clause  also  impacts  its  free 
exercise  jurisprudence.  Specifically,  its  overly  expansive 

—————— 

1 A party wishing to expand the scope of the Establishment Clause be-
yond  its  meaning  at  the  founding carries the  burden  of demonstrating 
that this broader reading is historically sound.  Town of Greece v. Gallo-
way, 572 U. S. 565, 607–608 (2014) (THOMAS, J., concurring in part and 
concurring in judgment).