Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/10pdf/09-893.pdf
Page Number: 37

10 

AT&T MOBILITY LLC v. CONCEPCION 

BREYER, J., dissenting 

rational  view,  nonclass  arbitration  over  such  sums  will 
also  sometimes  have  the  effect  of  depriving  claimants  of 
their claims (say, for example, where claiming the $30.22
were to involve filling out many forms that require techni­
cal legal knowledge or waiting at great length while a call
is placed on hold).  Discover Bank sets forth circumstances 
in  which  the  California  courts  believe  that  the  terms  of 
consumer  contracts  can  be  manipulated  to  insulate  an
agreement’s  author  from  liability  for  its  own  frauds  by
“deliberately  cheat[ing]  large  numbers  of  consumers  out 
of  individually  small  sums  of  money.”    36  Cal.  4th,  at 
162–163,  113  P. 3d,  at  1110.    Why  is  this  kind  of  deci­
sion—weighing  the  pros  and  cons  of  all  class  proceedings 
alike—not California’s to make? 

Finally, the majority can find no meaningful support for 
its  views  in  this  Court’s  precedent.  The  federal  Act  has 
been  in  force  for  nearly  a  century.    We  have  decided  doz­
ens  of  cases  about  its  requirements.    We  have  reached 
results  that  authorize  complex  arbitration  procedures. 
E.g., Mitsubishi Motors, 473 U. S., at 629 (antitrust claims
arising  in  international  transaction  are  arbitrable).    We 
have upheld nondiscriminatory state laws that slow down 
arbitration  proceedings.  E.g.,  Volt  Information  Sciences, 
489  U. S.,  at  477–479  (California  law  staying  arbitration
proceedings  until  completion  of  related  litigation  is  not 
pre-empted).  But  we  have  not,  to  my  knowledge,  applied 
the Act to strike down a state statute that treats arbitra­
tions on par with judicial and administrative proceedings. 
Cf. Preston, 552 U. S., at 355–356 (Act pre-empts state law 
that  vests  primary  jurisdiction  in  state  administrative 
board).

At  the  same  time,  we  have  repeatedly  referred  to  the
Act’s basic objective as assuring that courts treat arbitra­
tion agreements “like all other contracts.”  Buckeye Check 
Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U. S. 440, 447 (2006).  See 
also,  e.g.,  Vaden  v.  Discover  Bank,  556  U. S.  ___,  ___