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30 MAINE COMMUNITY HEALTH OPTIONS v. UNITED STATES 

Opinion of the Court 

ship or tracking ever-changing accounting sheets.  Petition-
ers’ suit thus lies in the Tucker Act’s heartland.14 

V 
In  establishing  the  temporary  Risk  Corridors  program,
Congress  created  a  rare  money-mandating  obligation  re-
quiring the Federal Government to make payments under 
§1342’s  formula.  And  by  failing  to  appropriate  enough
sums for payments already owed, Congress did simply that 
and no more: The appropriation bills neither repealed nor 
discharged §1342’s unique obligation.  Lacking other statu-
tory paths to relief, and absent a Bowen barrier, petitioners
may seek to collect payment through a damages action in
the Court of Federal Claims.15 

These holdings reflect a principle as old as the Nation it-
self:  The  Government  should  honor  its  obligations.    Soon 
after ratification, Alexander Hamilton stressed this insight
as a cornerstone of fiscal policy.  “States,” he wrote, “who 
observe  their  engagements  . . .  are  respected  and  trusted: 
while the reverse is the fate of those . . . who pursue an op-
posite conduct.”  Report Relative to a Provision for the Sup-
port of Public Credit (Jan. 9, 1790), in 6 Papers of Alexander 

—————— 

14 The dissent concedes that there may “be some sharply defined cate-
gories  of  claims  that  may  be  properly  asserted”  through  the  Tucker
Act  “simply  as  a  matter  of  precedent.”    Post,  at  6,  and  nn. 3,  4  (citing
takings, breach-of-contract, failure-to-pay-compensation, and breach-of-
fiduciary-duty  claims  as  examples).    Petitioners’  claim—breach  of  an 
unambiguous  statutory  promise  to  pay  for  services  rendered  to  the 
Government—fits easily within those precedents.  The only differences
the dissent seems to assert here are that the dollar figure is higher and
that petitioners do not deserve a “bailout” for their “bet” that the Federal 
Government would comply with federal law.  Post, at 2, 3, 7; but cf., e.g., 
79 Fed. Reg. 30260 (assuring insurers with “concerns that risk corridors 
collections may not be sufficient to fully fund risk corridors payments” 
that the Government would still pay).  Our analysis in Tucker Act cases
has never revolved on such results-oriented reasoning. 

15 Having found that the Risk Corridors statute is a money-mandating
provision for which a Tucker Act suit lies, we need not resolve petitioners’
alternative arguments for recovery based on an implied-in-fact contract 
theory or under the Takings Clause.