Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/22pdf/21-1271_3f14.pdf
Page Number: 64

26 

MOORE v. HARPER 

THOMAS, J., dissenting 

some  of  the  most  politically  acrimonious  and  fast-moving 
cases that come before them.  In many cases, it is difficult
to imagine what this inquiry could mean in theory, let alone 
practice.    For  example,  suppose  that  we  were  reviewing 
Harper I under this framework.  Perhaps we could have de-
termined that reading justiciable prohibitions against par-
tisan gerrymandering into the North Carolina Constitution 
exceeded  the  bounds  of  ordinary  judicial  review  in  North 
Carolina; perhaps not.  If not, then, in order to ensure that 
Harper I had not “arrogate[d]” the power of regulating fed-
eral  elections,  ante,  at  29,  we  would  presumably  have
needed to ask next whether it exceeded the bounds of ordi-
nary judicial review in North Carolina to find that the spe-
cific congressional map here violated those prohibitions.  Af-
ter  all,  in  constitutional  judgments  of  this  kind,  it  can  be
difficult to separate the rule from the fact pattern to which 
the  rule  is  applied.    We  have  held,  however,  that  federal 
courts are not equipped to judge partisan-gerrymandering 
questions at all.  Rucho v. Common Cause, 588 U. S. ___, 
___ (2019) (slip op., at 30).  It would seem to follow, a forti-
ori,  that  they  are  not  equipped  to  judge  whether  a  state 
court’s  partisan-gerrymandering  determination  surpassed
“the bounds of ordinary judicial review.”

Even  in  cases  that  do  not  involve  a  justiciability  mis-
match, the majority’s advice invites questions of the most 
far-reaching scope.  What are “the bounds of ordinary judi-
cial  review”?  What  methods  of  constitutional  interpreta-
tion do they allow?  Do those methods vary from State to 
State?  And what about stare decisis—are federal courts to 
review state courts’ treatment of their own precedents for
some sort of abuse of discretion?  The majority’s framework
would seem to require answers to all of these questions and 
more. 

In the end, I fear that this framework will have the effect 
of investing potentially large swaths of state constitutional
law with the character of a federal question not amenable