Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/11pdf/10-9646.pdf
Page Number: 54.0

8 

MILLER v. ALABAMA 

THOMAS, J., dissenting 

Nothing about our Constitution, or about the qualitative
difference  between  any  term  of  imprisonment  and  death, 
has  changed  since  Harmelin  was  decided  21  years  ago. 
What has changed (or, better yet, “evolved”) is this Court’s
ever-expanding  line  of  categorical  proportionality  cases. 
The  Court  now  uses  Roper  and  Graham  to  jettison  Har-
melin’s  clear  distinction  between  capital  and  noncapital
cases  and  to  apply  the  former  to  noncapital  juvenile  of-
fenders.4    The  Court’s  decision  to  do  so  is  even  less  sup-
portable than the precedents used to reach it. 

III
  As  THE  CHIEF  JUSTICE  notes,  ante,  at  8–9  (dissenting 
opinion),  the  Court  lays  the  groundwork  for  future  incur-
sions on the States’ authority to sentence criminals.  In its 
categorical proportionality cases, the Court has considered 
“ ‘objective  indicia  of  society’s  standards,  as  expressed 
in  legislative  enactments  and  state  practice’  to  determine 
whether there is a national consensus against the sentenc-
ing practice at issue.”  Graham, 560 U. S., at ___ (slip op., 
at 10) (quoting Roper, 543 U. S., at 563).  In Graham, for 
example,  the  Court  looked  to  “[a]ctual  sentencing  prac-
tices”  to  conclude  that  there  was  a  national  consensus 
against life-without-parole sentences for juvenile nonhom-
icide  offenders.    560  U. S.,  at  ___  (slip  op.,  at  11–14); 
see also Roper, supra, at 564–565; Atkins v. Virginia, 536 
U. S. 304, 316 (2002).

Today,  the  Court  makes  clear  that,  even  though  its 

—————— 

4 In  support  of  its  decision  not  to  apply  Harmelin  to  juvenile  offend-
ers, the Court also observes that “ ‘[o]ur history is replete with laws and 
judicial recognition that children cannot be viewed simply as miniature 
adults.’ ”  Ante, at 19 (quoting J. D. B. v. North Carolina, 564 U. S. ___, 
___ (2011) (slip op., at 10–11) (some internal quotation marks omitted)).
That is no doubt true as a general matter, but it does not justify usurp-
ing authority that rightfully belongs to the people by imposing a consti-
tutional rule where none exists.