Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/529bv.pdf
Page Number: 279.0

529US1

Unit: $U37

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CORTEZ BYRD CHIPS, INC. v. BILL HARBERT
CONSTR. CO.
Opinion of the Court

permitting, not limiting, venue choice today. As against this
reasoning, speciﬁc to the history and function of a statute
addressing venue where arbitration is concerned, Harbert’s
citations of cases construing other special venue provisions
are beside the point. We found, for example, that Congress
had a restrictive intent as to venue in patent cases, see
Fourco Glass Co. v. Transmirra Products Corp., 353 U. S.
222, 227–228 (1957); Stonite Products Co. v. Melvin Lloyd
Co., 315 U. S. 561, 565–566 (1942), a restrictive intent for the
sake of protecting national banks when dealing with venue
for litigation against them, see Citizens & Southern Nat.
Bank v. Bougas, 434 U. S., at 44, and a restrictive intent as
to the geographic reach of Title VII, as evidenced by the lack
of extraterritorial venue and other enforcement mechanisms
in the statute, see EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co., 499
U. S. 244, 256 (1991). But the authority of these cases is not
that special venue statutes are deemed to be restrictive; they
simply show that analysis of special venue provisions must
be speciﬁc to the statute. With that we agree in holding the
permissive view of FAA venue provisions entitled to prevail.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and
the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion.

It is so ordered.