Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/524bv.pdf
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524US2

Unit: $U87

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282 GEBSER v. LAGO VISTA INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DIST.

Opinion of the Court

Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U. S. 57 (1986),
directs courts to look to common law agency principles when
assessing an employer’s liability under Title VII for sexual
harassment of an employee by a supervisor. See id., at 72.
Petitioners and the United States submit that, in light of
Franklin’s comparison of teacher-student harassment with
supervisor-employee harassment, agency principles should
likewise apply in Title IX actions.

Speciﬁcally, they advance two possible standards under
which Lago Vista would be liable for Waldrop’s conduct.
First, relying on a 1997 “Policy Guidance” issued by the De-
partment of Education, they would hold a school district
liable in damages under Title IX where a teacher is “ ‘aided
in carrying out the sexual harassment of students by his or
her position of authority with the institution,’ ” irrespective
of whether school district ofﬁcials had any knowledge of the
harassment and irrespective of their response upon becoming
aware. Brief for Petitioners 36 (quoting Dept. of Education,
Ofﬁce for Civil Rights, Sexual Harassment Policy Guidance:
Harrassment of Students by School Employees, Other Stu-
dents, or Third Parties, 62 Fed. Reg. 12034, 12039 (1997)
(1997 Policy Guidance)); Brief for United States as Amicus
Curiae 14. That rule is an expression of respondeat supe-
rior liability, i. e., vicarious or imputed liability, see Restate-
ment § 219(2)(d), under which recovery in damages against a
school district would generally follow whenever a teacher’s
authority over a student facilitates the harassment. Sec-
ond, petitioners and the United States submit that a school
district should at a minimum be liable for damages based on
a theory of constructive notice, i. e., where the district knew
or “should have known” about harassment but failed to un-
cover and eliminate it. Brief for Petitioners 28; Brief for
United States as Amicus Curiae 15–16; see Restatement
§ 219(2)(b). Both standards would allow a damages recovery
in a broader range of situations than the rule adopted by the