Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/18pdf/18a774_3ebh.pdf
Page Number: 4.0

4 

JUNE MEDICAL SERVICES, L.L.C. v. GEE 

KAVANAUGH, J., dissenting 

the case, then even the State acknowledges that the law as 
applied  might  be  deemed  to  impose  an  undue  burden  for 
purposes of Whole Woman’s Health.  In that circumstance, 
the plaintiffs could file an as-applied complaint or motion
for  preliminary  injunction  in  the  District  Court,  and  the 
District  Court  could  consider  under  Whole  Woman’s 
Health  whether  to  enter  a  preliminary  or  permanent
injunction.

On  the  other  hand,  if  the  doctors  can  obtain  necessary 
admitting  privileges  during  the  45-day  transition  period, 
then  the  doctors  could  continue  performing  abortions  at 
the  three  clinics  both  during  and  after  the  45-day  transi-
tion  period,  as  envisioned  and  predicted  by  the  Fifth  Cir-
cuit.  And  in  that  circumstance,  the  Louisiana  law  as 
applied  would  not  impose  an  undue  burden  under  Whole 
Woman’s Health. 

In order to resolve the factual uncertainties presented in 
the  stay  application  about  the  three  doctors’  ability  to 
obtain admitting privileges, I would deny the stay without 
prejudice  to  the  plaintiffs’  ability  to  bring  a  later  as-
applied  complaint  and  motion  for  preliminary  injunction 
at the conclusion of the 45-day regulatory transition peri-
od.  The Court adopts an approach—granting the stay and 
presumably  then  granting  certiorari  for  plenary  review
next  Term  of  the  plaintiffs’  pre-enforcement  facial  chal-
lenge—that will take far longer and be no more beneficial 
than  the  approach  suggested  here.    I  respectfully  dissent
from the Court’s stay order.