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26 

HEALTH AND HOSPITAL CORPORATION OF MARION 
CTY. v. TALEVSKI 
THOMAS, J., dissenting 

State could not be injured because the Act was not a direct
legal regulation.  Rather, it was a mere offer to bargain—it 
“imposed” no “burden . . . upon the States” and did not re-
quire them “to do or to yield anything” of its own force.  Id., 
at 482.  The State could not seek judicial redress because
the  contractual  nature  of  the  Act’s  provisions  meant  that
States could vindicate their own rights “by the simple expe-
dient  of  not  yielding.”    Ibid.;  see  also  Corwin,  36  Harv. 
L. Rev.,  at  579  (noting  that  the  Maternity  Act  adhered  to
the traditional requirements of state consent and the “gen-
eral  caveat  against  jurisdictional  rights  following  in  the
wake of appropriations”). “[T]he Justices in Mellon under-
stood that Congress’ power to spend money is not a legisla-
tive power.”  Engdahl, 52 S. D. L. Rev., at 498 (emphasis in 
original).

Cases involving New Deal spending programs teach the
same  lesson.    For  example,  United  States  v.  Butler,  297 
U. S. 1 (1936), concerned the constitutionality of the Agri-
cultural Adjustment Act, which offered subsidies to farmers 
not to sell crops.  The Government defended the Act on the 
ground that it did not regulate any private or state party.
Instead, “[a]ny commands or restrictions in the Act [were]
imposed only upon the use by [federal] administrative offi-
cials  of  the  money  granted.”  Brief  for  United  States  in 
United States v. Butler, O. T. 1935, No. 401, p. 264.  In line 
with the traditional distinction between mere spending and
regulatory  commands,  the  Government  urged  that  “Con-
gress ha[d] not gone beyond its power of authorizing an ex-
penditure” precisely because “[i]t ha[d] not sought to force 
or  command  citizens  to  receive  the  money  offered  and  to 
perform the conditions upon which the funds are to be dis-
bursed.”  Id., at 265.  The Government expressly relied on 
the  contractual  nature  of  the  Act’s  conditions,  as  distinct 
from any “exercise of sovereign regulation”: 

“It would be most unusual to suppose that a contract