Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/07pdf/07-290.pdf
Page Number: 6.0

Cite as:  554 U. S. ____ (2008) 

3 

Opinion of the Court 

infringed.”  In interpreting this text, we are guided by the
principle that “[t]he Constitution was written to be under­
stood  by  the  voters;  its  words  and  phrases  were  used  in
their normal and ordinary as distinguished from technical
meaning.”  United  States  v.  Sprague,  282  U. S.  716,  731 
(1931); see also Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 188 (1824). 
Normal  meaning  may  of  course  include  an  idiomatic 
meaning, but it excludes secret or technical meanings that 
would  not  have  been  known  to  ordinary  citizens  in  the 
founding generation.

The  two  sides  in  this  case  have  set  out  very  different
interpretations  of  the  Amendment.    Petitioners  and  to­
day’s  dissenting  Justices  believe  that  it  protects  only  the 
right  to  possess  and  carry  a  firearm  in  connection  with
militia service.  See Brief for Petitioners 11–12; post, at 1 
(STEVENS, J.,  dissenting).    Respondent  argues  that  it
protects  an  individual  right  to  possess  a  firearm  uncon­
nected  with  service  in  a  militia,  and  to  use  that  arm  for 
traditionally  lawful  purposes,  such  as  self-defense  within
the home.  See Brief for Respondent 2–4.

The  Second  Amendment  is  naturally  divided  into  two
parts:  its  prefatory  clause  and  its  operative  clause.    The 
former does not limit the latter grammatically, but rather 
announces  a  purpose.  The  Amendment  could  be  re­
phrased, “Because a well regulated Militia is necessary to 
the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep
and  bear  Arms  shall  not  be  infringed.”    See  J.  Tiffany,  A 
Treatise  on  Government  and  Constitutional  Law  §585, 
p. 394 (1867); Brief for Professors of Linguistics and Eng­
lish  as  Amici  Curiae  3  (hereinafter  Linguists’  Brief).
Although  this  structure  of  the  Second  Amendment  is 
unique  in  our  Constitution,  other  legal  documents  of  the 
founding  era,  particularly  individual-rights  provisions  of 
state  constitutions,  commonly  included  a  prefatory  state­
ment of purpose.  See generally Volokh, The Commonplace
Second  Amendment,  73  N. Y.  U.  L. Rev.  793,  814–821