Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/22pdf/22-506_nmip.pdf
Page Number: 77

30 

BIDEN v. NEBRASKA 

KAGAN, J., dissenting 

questions  doctrine  to  jettison  the  Secretary’s  loan  for-
giveness plan.  Small wonder the majority invokes the doc-
trine.  The majority’s “normal” statutory interpretation can-
not sustain its decision.  The statute, read as written, gives 
the  Secretary  broad  authority  to  relieve  a  national  emer-
gency’s  effect  on  borrowers’  ability  to  repay  their  student 
loans.  The  Secretary  did  no  more  than  use  that  lawfully 
delegated  authority.  So  the  majority  applies  a  rule  spe-
cially crafted to kill significant regulatory action, by requir-
ing  Congress  to  delegate  not  just  clearly  but  also  micro- 
specifically.  The question, the majority maintains, is “who 
has the authority” to decide whether such a significant ac-
tion should go forward.  Ante, at 19; see supra, at 23.  The 
right answer is the political branches: Congress in broadly 
authorizing loan relief, the Secretary and the President in
using  that  authority  to  implement  the  forgiveness  plan.
The majority instead says that it is theirs to decide.

So in a case not a case, the majority overrides the com-
bined judgment of the Legislative and Executive Branches, 
with the consequence of eliminating loan forgiveness for 43
million  Americans.    I  respectfully  dissent  from  that  deci-
sion.