Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/558bv.pdf
Page Number: 230

Cite as: 558 U. S. 67 (2009) 

69 

Syllabus 

sary  prerequisite  to  NRAB  arbitration?  Answering  this  “single  ques­
tion”  in  the  negative,  the  Seventh  Circuit  effectively  resolved  the 
Union’s core complaint.  Because nothing in the Act elevates to jurisdic­
tional  status  the  obligation  to  conference  minor  disputes  or  to  prove 
conferencing, a negative answer to the “single question” leaves no doubt 
about the Union’s entitlement, in accord with § 153 First (q), to vacation 
of  the  Board’s  orders.  Given  this  statutory  ground  for  relief,  there  is 
no  due  process  issue  alive  in  this  case,  and  no  warrant  to  answer  a 
question that may be consequential in another case.  Nevertheless, the 
grant of certiorari here enables this Court to reduce confusion, clouding 
court as well as Board decisions, over matters properly typed “jurisdic­
tional.”  Pp. 79–81. 

2.  Congress  authorized  the  Board  to  prescribe  rules  for  presenting 
and  processing  claims,  § 153  First  (v),  but  Congress  alone  controls  the 
Board’s jurisdiction.  By refusing to adjudicate the instant cases on the 
false premise that it lacked “jurisdiction” to hear them, the NRAB panel 
failed “to conform, or conﬁne itself, to matters [Congress placed] within 
the scope of [NRAB] jurisdiction,” § 153 First (q).  Pp. 81–86. 

(a)  Not  all  mandatory  “prescriptions,  however  emphatic,  ‘are  .  .  . 
properly  typed  “jurisdictional.” ’ ”  Arbaugh  v.  Y &  H Corp.,  546  U. S. 
500, 510.  Subject-matter jurisdiction properly comprehended refers to 
a  tribunal’s  “ ‘power  to  hear  a  case,’ ”  and  “ ‘can  never  be  forfeited  or 
waived.’ ”  Id.,  at  514.  In  contrast,  a  “claim-processing  rule”  does  not 
reduce a tribunal’s adjudicatory domain and is ordinarily “forfeited if the 
party asserting the rule waits too long to raise the point.”  Kontrick v. 
Ryan, 540 U. S. 443, 456.  For example, this Court has held nonjurisdic­
tional  and  forfeitable  the  provision  in Title  VII  of  the  Civil  Rights  Act 
of  1964  requiring  complainants  to  ﬁle  a  timely  discrimination  charge 
with  the  Equal  Employment  Opportunity  Commission  (EEOC)  before 
proceeding  to court,  Zipes v.  Trans World  Airlines, Inc.,  455  U. S. 385, 
393.  In contrast,  the Court  has reafﬁrmed the  jurisdictional character 
of  28  U. S. C.  § 2107(a)’s  time  limitation  for  ﬁling  a  notice  of  appeal. 
Bowles  v.  Russell,  551  U. S.  205,  209–211.  Here,  the  requirement  that 
parties to minor disputes, as a last chance prearbitration, attempt settle­
ment  “in  conference”  is  imposed  on  carriers  and  grievants  alike,  but 
satisfaction  of  that  obligation  does  not  condition  the  Board’s  adjudica­
tory authority, which extends to “all disputes between carriers and their 
employees  ‘growing  out  of  grievances  or  out  of  the  interpretation  or 
application  of  agreements  concerning  rates  of  pay,  rules,  or  working 
conditions . . . ,’ ” Slocum v.  Delaware, L. & W. R. Co., 339 U. S. 239, 240 
(quoting  § 153  First  (i)).  When  a  CBA’s  grievance  procedure  has  not 
been followed, resort to the Board would ordinarily be objectionable as 
premature,  but  the  conference  requirement  is  independent  of  the  CBA