Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/529bv.pdf
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529US1

Unit: $U42

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Cite as: 529 U. S. 277 (2000)

329

Stevens, J., dissenting

This narrow aim is conﬁrmed by the expressed views of
the Erie City Councilmembers who voted for the ordinance.
The four city councilmembers who approved the measure (of
the six total councilmembers) each stated his or her view
that the ordinance was aimed speciﬁcally at nude adult en-
tertainment, and not at more mainstream forms of entertain-
ment that include total nudity, nor even at nudity in general.
One lawmaker observed: “We’re not talking about nudity.
We’re not talking about the theater or art . . . . We’re talk-
ing about what is indecent and immoral. . . . We’re not pro-
hibiting nudity, we’re prohibiting nudity when it’s used in a
lewd and immoral fashion.” App. 39. Though not quite as
succinct, the other councilmembers expressed similar convic-
tions. For example, one member illustrated his understand-
ing of the aim of the law by contrasting it with his recollec-
tion about high school students swimming in the nude in the
school’s pool. The ordinance was not intended to cover
those incidents of nudity: “But what I’m getting at is [the
swimming] wasn’t indecent, it wasn’t an immoral thing, and

without regard to whether that conduct is expressive.” Barnes v. Glen
Theatre, Inc., 501 U. S., at 576, n. 3 (opinion concurring in judgment).
If
the ordinance regulates conduct (public nudity), it does not do so without
regard to whether the nudity is expressive if it exempts the public nudity
in Hair precisely “because of its expressive content.” Ante, at 309, n. 6
(opinion concurring in judgment). Moreover, if Erie exempts Hair be-
cause it wants to avoid a conﬂict with the First Amendment (rather than
simply to exempt instances of nudity it ﬁnds inoffensive), that rationale
still does not explain why Hair is exempted but Kandyland is not, since
Barnes held that both are constitutionally protected.

Justice Scalia also states that even if the ordinance singled out nude
dancing, he would not strike down the law unless the dancing was singled
out because of its message. Ante, at 310. He opines that here, the basis
for singling out Kandyland is morality.
Ibid. But since the “morality”
of the public nudity in Hair is left untouched by the ordinance, while the
“immorality” of the public nudity in Kandyland is singled out, the dis-
tinction cannot be that “nude public dancing itself is immoral.”
Ibid.
(emphasis in original). Rather, the only arguable difference between the
two is that one’s message is more immoral than the other’s.