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Page Number: 59.0

8 

MCCUTCHEON v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N 

BREYER, J., dissenting 

boundaries. 

B 
Since  the  kinds  of  corruption  that  can  destroy  the  link
between  public  opinion  and  governmental  action  extend 
well  beyond  those  the  plurality  describes,  the  plurality’s 
notion  of  corruption  is  flatly  inconsistent  with  the  basic
constitutional  rationale  I  have  just  described.    Thus,  it 
should surprise no one that this Court’s case law (Citizens 
United  excepted)  insists  upon  a  considerably  broader
definition. 

In  Buckley,  for  instance,  the  Court  said  explicitly  that
aggregate  limits  were  constitutional  because  they  helped 
“prevent  evasion  .  .  .  [through]  huge  contributions  to  the 
candidate’s political party,”  424 U. S., at 26 (the contrary 
to  what  the  plurality  today  seems  to  believe,  see  ante,  at 
36–39).  Moreover,  Buckley  upheld  the  base  limits  in
significant  part  because  they  helped  thwart  “the  appear­
ance of corruption stemming from public awareness of the 
opportunities for abuse inherent in a regime of large indi-
vidual financial contributions.”  424 U. S., at 27 (emphasis 
added).  And  it  said  that  Congress  could  reasonably  con­
clude that criminal laws forbidding “the giving and taking
of  bribes”  did  not  adequately  “deal  with  the  reality  or 
appearance  of  corruption.”    Id.,  at  28.  Bribery  laws,  the
Court  recognized,  address  “only  the  most  blatant  and 
specific  attempts  of  those  with  money  to  influence  gov­
ernmental  action.” 
extends further. 

Ibid.    The  concern  with  corruption 

Other  cases  put  the  matter  yet  more  strongly.    In 
Beaumont,  for  example,  the  Court  found  constitutional  a
ban on direct contributions by corporations because of the 
need to prevent corruption, properly “understood not only 
as  quid  pro  quo  agreements,  but  also  as  undue  influence
on  an  officeholder’s  judgment.”    Federal  Election  Comm’n 
v.  Beaumont,  539  U. S.  146,  155–156  (2003).    In  Federal