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Page Number: 17.0

14 

OKLAHOMA v. CASTRO-HUERTA 

Opinion of the Court 

viously explained that “the function” of the 1948 recodifica-
tion “was generally limited to that of consolidation and cod-
ification.”  Muniz v. Hoffman, 422 U. S. 454, 474 (1975) (in-
ternal quotation marks omitted).  This Court does not infer 
that Congress, “in revising and consolidating the laws, in-
tended to change their policy, unless such an intention be
clearly  expressed.”    Id.,  at  470  (internal  quotation  marks 
omitted).

For  many  reasons,  then,  we  cannot  conclude  that  Con-
gress,  by  recodifying  the  entire  Federal  Criminal  Code  in 
1948,  silently  ratified  a  few  sentences  of  dicta  from  Wil-
liams.  The reenactment canon does not apply in this case. 
Third,  Castro-Huerta  contends  that  the  Court  has  re-
peated the 1946 Williams dicta on several subsequent occa-
sions.  But the Court’s dicta, even if repeated, does not con-
stitute  precedent  and  does  not  alter  the  plain  text  of  the
General Crimes Act, which was the law passed by Congress
and signed by the President.  See National Collegiate Ath-
letic Assn. v. Alston, 594 U. S. ___, ___ (2021) (slip op., at 
21).3 

—————— 

3 In  addition  to  citing  Williams  and  later  cases,  Castro-Huerta  also 
cites the earlier 1913 decision in Donnelly v. United States, 228 U. S. 243. 
According  to Castro-Huerta,  Donnelly determined  that  States  may  not
exercise jurisdiction in Indian country over crimes by or against Indians. 
Castro-Huerta is wrong.  In Donnelly, the Court simply concluded that 
although  States  have  exclusive  jurisdiction  over  crimes  committed  by 
non-Indians against non-Indians in Indian country, States do not have 
similarly “undivided authority” over crimes committed by or against In-
dians  in  Indian  country.  Id.,  at  271–272  (emphasis  added).    In  other 
words,  the  Federal  Government  also  maintains  jurisdiction  under  the 
General Crimes Act over crimes by or against Indians in Indian country
because of the Federal Government’s interest in protecting and defend-
ing  tribes.  See  ibid.  (citing  United  States  v.  Kagama,  118  U.  S.  375 
(1886)).  Donnelly did not address the distinct question we confront here: 
whether  States  have  concurrent  jurisdiction  with  the  Federal  Govern-
ment  over  non-Indians  who  commit  crimes  against  Indians  in  Indian 
country.  If anything, Donnelly’s rejection of the argument that the State 
had  “undivided”  authority,  without  the  Court’s  saying  more,  suggests