Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/17pdf/17-459_1o13.pdf
Page Number: 18.0

14 

PEREIRA v. SESSIONS 

Opinion of the Court 

“written notice” that, as relevant here, “specif[ies] . . . [t]he
time and place at which the [removal] proceedings will be
held.”  §1229(a)(1)(G)(i).  Thus,  when  the  term  “notice  to 
appear” is used elsewhere in the statutory section, includ-
ing as the trigger for the stop-time rule, it carries with it
the  substantive  time-and-place  criteria  required  by 
§1229(a).

Resisting  this  straightforward  understanding  of  the
text, the dissent posits that “§1229(a)(1)’s language can be 
understood  to  define  what  makes  a  notice  to appear  com-
plete.”  Post, at 10 (emphasis in original).  In the dissent’s 
view,  a  defective  notice  to  appear  is  still  a  “notice  to  ap-
pear”  even  if  it  is  incomplete—much  like  a  three-wheeled 
Chevy  is  still  a  car.  Post,  at  10–11.  The  statutory  text 
proves otherwise.  Section 1229(a)(1) does not say a “notice 
to  appear”  is  “complete”  when  it  specifies  the  time  and
place  of  the  removal  proceedings.  Rather,  it  defines  a 
“notice to appear” as a “written notice” that “specif[ies],” at
a  minimum,  the  time  and  place  of  the  removal  proceed-
ings.  §1229(a)(1)(G)(i).    Moreover,  the  omission  of  time-
and-place information is not, as the dissent asserts, some 
trivial,  ministerial  defect,  akin  to  an  unsigned  notice  of 
appeal.  Cf. Becker v. Montgomery, 532 U. S. 757, 763, 768 
(2001).  Failing  to  specify  integral  information  like  the
time  and  place  of  removal  proceedings  unquestionably
would “deprive [the notice to appear] of its essential char-
acter.”  Post, at 12, n. 5; see supra, at 12–13, n. 7.9 
—————— 

§356(a)(1)  (“In  this  section,  such  a  drug  is  referred  to  as  a  ‘break-
through therapy’ ”); 38 U. S. C. §7451(a)(2) (“hereinafter in this section
referred to as ‘covered positions’ ”); 42 U. S. C. §285g–4(b) (“hereafter in
this section referred to as ‘medical rehabilitation’ ”). 

9 The dissent maintains that Congress’ decision to make the stop-time
rule  retroactive  to  certain  pre-IIRIRA  “orders  to  show  cause”  “sheds 
considerable  light  on  the  question  presented”  because  orders  to  show 
cause  did  not  necessarily  include  time-and-place  information.    Post,  at