Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/19pdf/19-431_5i36.pdf
Page Number: 51.0

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LITTLE SISTERS OF THE POOR SAINTS PETER 
AND PAUL HOME v. PENNSYLVANIA 
KAGAN, J., concurring in judgment 

HRSA’s guidelines can differentiate among preventive ser-
vices, mandating coverage of some but not others.  The opin-
ions disagree about whether those guidelines can also dif-
ferentiate  among  health  plans,  exempting  some  but  not 
others  from  the  contraceptive-coverage  requirement.    On 
that question, all the two opinions have in common is equal 
certainty  they  are  right.    Compare  ante,  at  16  (majority
opinion) (Congress “enacted expansive language offer[ing] 
no indication whatever that the statute limits what HRSA 
can  designate  as  preventive  care  and  screenings  or  who
must  provide  that  coverage”  (internal  quotation  marks 
omitted)), with post, at 9 (GINSBURG, J., dissenting) (“Noth-
ing  in  [the  statute]  accord[s]  HRSA  authority”  to  decide 
“who  must  provide  coverage”  (internal  quotation  marks 
omitted; emphasis in original)). 

Try  as  I  might,  I  do  not  find  that  kind  of  clarity  in  the 
statute.  Sometimes when I squint, I read the law as giving 
HRSA discretion over all coverage issues: The agency gets 
to decide who needs to provide what services to women.  At 
other  times,  I  see  the  statute  as  putting  the  agency  in
charge of only the “what” question, and not the “who.”  If I 
had to, I would of course decide which is the marginally bet-
ter reading.  But Chevron deference was built for cases like 
these.  See Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources De-
fense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837, 842–843 (1984); see also 
Arlington v. FCC, 569  U. S. 290, 301 (2013) (holding that 
Chevron applies to questions about the scope of an agency’s
statutory authority).  Chevron instructs that a court facing
statutory ambiguity should accede to a reasonable interpre-
tation by the implementing agency.  The court should do so 
because the agency is the more politically accountable ac-
tor.  See 467 U. S., at 865–866.  And it should do so because 
the agency’s expertise often enables a sounder assessment 
of which reading best fits the statutory scheme.  See id., at 
865.