Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/529bv.pdf
Page Number: 78

529US1

Unit: $U32

[10-04-01 09:20:53] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 529 U. S. 1 (2000)

3

Syllabus

case. They themselves foreclose distinctions based upon the “poten-
tial future” versus “actual present” nature of the claim, the “general
legal” versus the “fact-speciﬁc” nature of the challenge, the “collateral”
versus the “noncollateral” nature of the issues, or the “declaratory”
versus “injunctive” nature of the relief sought. Nor can the Court
accept a distinction that limits § 405(h)’s scope to claims for monetary
beneﬁts or that involve “amounts,” as neither the language nor the pur-
poses of § 405 support such a distinction. Neither McNary v. Haitian
Refugee Center, Inc., 498 U. S. 479, nor Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U. S.
319, supports the Council’s effort to distinguish Salﬁ and Ringer. The
Court’s approval of a § 1331 suit against the Immigration and Natu-
ralization Service in McNary rested on the different language of the
immigration statute. And Eldridge was a case in which the respondent
had complied with, not disregarded, the Social Security Act’s special
review procedures—speciﬁcally the nonwaivable and nonexcusable re-
quirement that an individual present a claim to the agency before rais-
ing it in court. The upshot is that the Council’s argument must rest
primarily upon Michigan Academy. Pp. 11–15.

(c) Michigan Academy did not, contrary to the Court of Appeals’
holding, modify the Court’s earlier holdings by limiting § 405(h)’s scope,
as incorporated by § 1395ii, to “amount determinations.” That case in-
volved the lawfulness of HHS regulations governing procedures used
to calculate Medicare Part B beneﬁts; and the Medicare statute, as
it then existed, did not provide for § 405(g) review of such decisions.
The Court ruled that this silence did not itself foreclose § 1331 review.
In response to the argument that § 405(h) barred § 1331 review, the
Court declined to pass in the abstract on the meaning of § 405(h) be-
cause that section was made applicable to the Medicare Act “to the
same extent as” it is applicable to the Social Security Act by virtue
of 42 U. S. C. § 1395ii. The Court interpreted that phrase to foreclose
application of § 405(h) where its application would preclude judicial
review rather than channel it through the agency. As limited by the
Court of Appeals, Michigan Academy would have overturned or dra-
matically limited earlier precedents such as Salﬁ and Ringer, and would
have created a hardly justiﬁable distinction between “amount determi-
nations” and many similar HHS determinations. This Court does
not normally overturn, or so dramatically limit, earlier authority sub
silentio, and it did not do so here. Pp. 15–20.

(d) The Council’s argument that it falls within the Michigan Acad-
emy exception because it can obtain no review at all unless it can obtain
§ 1331 review is unconvincing.
It argues that review is available only
after the Secretary terminates a home’s provider agreement. But in