Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/22pdf/598us1r3_j4ek.pdf
Page Number: 11.0

26 

CRUZ v. ARIZONA 

Opinion of the Court 

cedural  rule  that  is  “ `frmly  established  and  regularly  fol-
lowed'  .  .  .  will  be  adequate  to  foreclose  review  of  a  federal 
claim.”  Lee,  534  U. S.,  at  376.  Nevertheless,  in  “excep-
tional  cases,”  a  “generally  sound  rule”  may  be  applied  in  a 
way  that  “renders  the  state  ground  inadequate  to  stop  con-
sideration of a federal question.”  Ibid.  This is one of those 
exceptional cases. 

In  particular,  this  case  implicates  this  Court's  rule,  re-
served  for  the  rarest  of  situations,  that  “an  unforeseeable 
and  unsupported  state-court  decision  on  a  question  of  state 
procedure  does  not  constitute  an  adequate  ground  to  pre-
clude  this  Court's  review  of  a  federal  question.”  Bouie  v. 
City  of  Columbia,  378  U. S.  347,  354  (1964).  “Novelty  in 
procedural  requirements  cannot  be  permitted  to  thwart  re-
view in this Court applied for by those who, in justifed reli-
ance upon prior decisions, seek vindication in state courts of 
their federal constitutional rights.”  NAACP v. Alabama ex 
rel. Patterson, 357 U. S. 449, 457–458 (1958).  This Court has 
applied  this  principle  for  over  a  century.  See,  e. g.,  Enter-
prise  Irrigation  Dist.  v.  Farmers  Mut.  Canal  Co.,  243  U. S. 
157,  165  (1917)  (holding  that  a  state  ground  was  adequate 
where it was not “without fair support or so unfounded as to 
be essentially arbitrary or merely a device to prevent a review 
of  the  other  [federal]  ground  of  the  judgment”).  And  this 
Court  has  continued  to  reaffrm  this  important  rule.  See 
Walker v. Martin, 562 U. S. 307, 320 (2011) (“A state ground, 
no doubt, may be found inadequate when `discretion has been 
exercised  to  impose  novel  and  unforeseeable  requirements 
without fair or substantial support in prior state law' ” (quot-
ing 16B C. Wright, A. Miller, & E. Cooper, Federal Practice 
and Procedure § 4026, p. 386 (2d ed. 1996) (Wright & Miller))). 
At  issue  here  is  the  Arizona  Supreme  Court's  decision 
that  Cruz's  motion  for  postconviction  relief  failed  to  satisfy 
Arizona  Rule  of  Criminal  Procedure  32.1(g).  Rule  32.1(g) 
allows defendants to fle a successive or untimely postconvic-
tion  petition  if  there  has  been  “a  signifcant  change  in  the 

Page Proof Pending Publication