Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/14pdf/13-7120_p86b.pdf
Page Number: 49.0

12 

JOHNSON v. UNITED STATES 

ALITO, J., dissenting 

Taylor  Court  feared  that  a  conduct-specific  approach
would  unduly  burden  the  courts,  experience  has  shown 
that  application  of  the  categorical  approach  has  not  al­
ways  been  easy.  Indeed,  the  Court’s  main  argument  for 
overturning  the  statute  is  that  this  approach  is  unman­
ageable in residual clause cases.

As  for  the  notion  that  the  categorical  approach  is  more
forgiving  to  defendants,  there  is  a  strong  argument  that 
the  opposite  is  true,  at  least  with  respect  to  the  residual
clause.  Consider two criminal laws:  Injury occurs in 10%
of cases involving the violation of statute A, but in 90% of 
cases  involving  the  violation  of  statute  B.  Under  the 
categorical approach, a truly dangerous crime under stat­
ute A might not qualify as a violent felony, while a crime
with  no  measurable  risk  of  harm  under  statute  B  would 
count  against  the  defendant.    Under  a  conduct-specific
inquiry,  on  the  other  hand,  a  defendant’s  actual  conduct 
would  determine  whether  ACCA’s  mandatory  penalty 
applies.

It is also significant that the allocation of the burden of
proof  protects  defendants.    The  prosecution  bears  the 
burden  of  proving  that  a  defendant  has  convictions  that 
qualify  for  sentencing  under  ACCA.    If  evidentiary  defi­
ciencies,  poor  recordkeeping,  or  anything  else  prevents 
the  prosecution  from  discharging  that  burden  under  the 
conduct-specific  approach,  a  defendant  would  not  receive 
an ACCA sentence. 

Nor would a conduct-specific inquiry raise constitutional 
problems of its own.  It is questionable whether the Sixth 
Amendment creates a right to a jury trial in this situation. 
See  Almendarez-Torres  v.  United  States,  523  U. S.  224 
(1998).  But  if  it  does,  the  issue  could  be  tried  to  a  jury,
and  the  prosecution  could  bear  the  burden  of  proving 
beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant’s prior crimes 
involved conduct that presented a serious potential risk of
injury to another.  I would adopt this alternative interpre­