Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/558bv.pdf
Page Number: 919

1072 

OCTOBER TERM, 2009 

Thomas, J., concurring 

558 U. S. 

Supreme  Court  of  India,  or  the  Privy  Council.”  Knight,  supra, 
at  990  (Thomas,  J.,  concurring  in  denial  of  certiorari). 

Eager  to  distinguish  this  case  from  Knight  and  all  the  other 
cases  in  which  the  Court  has  refused  to  grant  relief  on  Lackey 
grounds, Justice Stevens asserts that the petition here presents 
important  questions  regarding  the  proper  procedural  vehicle  for 
bringing  a  Lackey  claim  that  merit  this  Court’s  review.  First, 
the  procedural  posture  in  which  a  Lackey  claim  arises  does  not 
change  the  fact  that  the  claim  itself  has  no  constitutional  founda­
tion.  Accordingly, the claim’s procedural posture does not matter 
for  purposes  of  merits  relief;  a  Lackey  claim  would  fail  no  matter 
how  it  arrived.  In  addition,  Justice  Stevens  concedes  that  the 
unusual  contours  of  petitioner’s  Eighth  Amendment  claim  are  the 
reason  the  procedural  questions  in  this  case  are  difﬁcult.  Given 
that,  our  order  in  this  case  rightly  adheres  to  our  precedents 
denying  relief  on  Lackey  claims,  however  presented.  Second, 
even  if  the  procedural  claims  in  this  case  had  merit,  they  would 
not warrant review because Justice Stevens admits that a “suc­
cessful  Lackey  claim  would  have  the  effect  of  rendering  invalid  a 
particular  death  sentence,”  ante,  at  1069,  and  thus  would  “ ‘di­
rectly  call  into  question  the  “fact”  or  “validity”  of  the  sentence 
itself,’ ”  ibid.  (quoting  Nelson  v.  Campbell,  541  U. S.  637,  644 
(2004)).  Accordingly,  the  Sixth  Circuit  plainly  did  not  err  in 
treating  petitioner’s  §1983  motion  as  “the  functional  equivalent 
of ” a habeas petition.  Ante, at 1069.  And for the reasons above, 
the  panel’s  treatment  of  the  petition  as  a  second  or  successive 
petition would not, even if  reversed, entitle petitioner to the mer­
its  relief  he  seeks. 

At  bottom,  Justice  Stevens’  arguments  boil  down  to  policy 
disagreements  with  the  Constitution  and  the  Tennessee  Legisla­
ture.  Ibid.  (“[D]elaying  an  execution  does  not  further  public 
purposes  of  retribution  and  deterrence  but  only  diminishes  what­
ever  possible  beneﬁt  society  might  receive  from  petitioner’s 
death.  .  .  .  In  other  words,  the  penological  justiﬁcations  for  the 
death penalty diminish as the delay lengthens” (internal quotation 
marks omitted)).  Such views, no matter how “steadfast[ly]” held, 
ante,  at  1067,  are  not  grounds  for  enjoining  petitioner’s  execution 
or  for  granting  certiorari  on  the  procedural  questions  that  attend 
his  Lackey  claim.  As  long  as  our  system  affords  capital  defend­
ants  the  procedural  safeguards  this  Court  has  long  endorsed,  de­
fendants  who  avail  themselves  of  these  procedures  will  face  the