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Page Number: 32.0

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FULTON v. PHILADELPHIA 

ALITO, J., concurring in judgment
ALITO, J., concurring in judgment 

cision will be of no help in other cases involving the exclu-
sion of faith-based foster care and adoption agencies unless 
by some chance the relevant laws contain the same glitch
as  the  Philadelphia  contractual  provision  on  which  the 
majority’s  decision  hangs.    The  decision  will  be  even  less 
significant in all the other important religious liberty cases
that are bubbling up.
  We should reconsider Smith without further delay.  The 
correct interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause is a ques-
tion of great importance, and Smith’s interpretation is hard 
to defend.  It can’t be squared with the ordinary meaning of
the text of the Free Exercise Clause or with the prevalent 
understanding of the scope of the free-exercise right at the
time of the First Amendment’s adoption.  It swept aside dec-
ades of established precedent, and it has not aged well.  Its 
interpretation has been undermined by subsequent schol-
arship on the original meaning of the Free Exercise Clause. 
Contrary  to  what  many  initially  expected,  Smith  has  not 
provided a clear-cut rule that is easy to apply, and experi-
ence has disproved the Smith majority’s fear that retention
of the Court’s prior free-exercise jurisprudence would lead 
to “anarchy.”  494 U. S., at 888. 

When Smith reinterpreted the Free Exercise Clause, four
Justices—Brennan,  Marshall,  Blackmun,  and  O’Connor— 
registered strong disagreement.  Id., at 891, 892 (O’Connor,
J., joined in part by Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ.,
concurring  in  judgment);  id.,  at  907–908  (Blackmun,  J., 
joined  by  Brennan  and  Marshall,  JJ.,  dissenting).    After 

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nation as provided in the D. C. Human Rights Act,” which prohibits dis-
crimination on the basis of sexual orientation); see also 110 Code Mass.
Regs.  1.09(1)  (2008)  (“No  applicant  for  or  recipient  of  Department  [of 
Children and Families] services shall, on the ground of . . . sexual orien-
tation . . . be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or
otherwise be subjected to discrimination in connection with any service, 
program, or activity administered or provided by the Department”).