Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/23pdf/22-704_4246.pdf
Page Number: 26.0

22 

VIDAL v. ELSTER 

Opinion of the Court 

IV 
Our decision today is narrow.  We do not set forth a com-
prehensive  framework  for  judging  whether  all  content-
based  but  viewpoint-neutral  trademark  restrictions  are 
constitutional.  Nor do we suggest that an equivalent his-
tory and tradition is required to uphold every content-based
trademark restriction.  We hold only that history and tra-
dition establish that the particular restriction before us, the
names clause in §1052(c), does not violate the First Amend-
ment.  Although  an  occasion  may  arise  when  history  and 
tradition  cannot  alone  answer  whether  a  trademark  re-
striction violates the First Amendment, that occasion is not 
today.  In a future case, we can address the “distinct ques-
tion”  whether  “a  viewpoint-neutral,  content-based  trade-
mark restriction” is constitutional without “such a histori-
cal pedigree.”  Post, at 1 (opinion of KAVANAUGH, J.).  The 
judgment of the Court of Appeals is 

Reversed.