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62 

FULTON v. PHILADELPHIA 

ALITO, J., concurring in judgment
ALITO, J., concurring in judgment 

fundamentally at odds with how we usually think about lib-
erties guaranteed by the Bill of Rights.  As Justice Jackson 
famously put it, “[t]he very purpose of a Bill of Rights was 
to withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of politi-
cal controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majori-
ties and officials.”  Barnette, 319 U. S., at 638.  Smith, by
contrast, held that protection of religious liberty was better
left to the political process than to courts.  494 U. S., at 890. 
In Smith’s view, the Nation simply could not “afford the lux-
ury” of protecting the free exercise of religion from gener-
ally applicable laws.  Id., at 888.  Under this interpretation,
the free exercise of religion does not receive the judicial pro-
tection afforded to other, favored rights. 

C 
Workability.  One of Smith’s supposed virtues was ease of 
application, but things have not turned out that way.  In-
stead, at least four serious problems have arisen and con-
tinue to plague courts when called upon to apply Smith. 

1 
“Hybrid-rights”  cases.  The  “hybrid  rights”  exception,
which  was  essential  to  distinguish  Yoder,  has  baffled  the 
lower courts.  They are divided into at least three camps. 
See  Combs  v.  Homer-Center  School  Dist.,  540  F. 3d  231, 
244–247 (CA3 2008) (describing Circuit split).  Some courts 
have taken the extraordinary step of openly refusing to fol-
low this part of Smith’s interpretation.  The Sixth Circuit 
was remarkably blunt: “[H]old[ing] that the legal standard 
under the Free Exercise Clause depends on whether a free-
exercise  claim  is  coupled  with  other  constitutional  rights 
. . . is completely illogical.”  Kissinger v. Board of Trustees 
of Ohio State Univ., 5  F. 3d 177, 180 (1993).  The Second 
and  Third  Circuits  have  taken  a  similar  approach.    See 
Leebaert v. Harrington, 332 F. 3d 134, 144 (CA2 2003) (“We 
. . . can think of no good reason for the standard of review