Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/19pdf/18-1086_5ie6.pdf
Page Number: 11

Cite as:  590 U. S. ____ (2020) 

9 

Opinion of the Court 

continued to use “Get Lucky.”  Tr. of Oral Arg. 46.  Instead, 
Marcel alleged in the 2011 Action that Lucky Brand com-
mitted  infringement  by  using  Lucky  Brand’s  own  marks 
containing the word “Lucky”—not the “Get Lucky” mark it-
self.    Plainly,  then,  the  2011  Action  challenged  different 
conduct, involving different marks. 

Not only that, but the complained-of conduct in the 2011
Action  occurred  after  the  conclusion  of  the  2005  Action. 
Claim  preclusion  generally  “does  not  bar  claims  that  are 
predicated on events that postdate the filing of the initial
complaint.”  Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 579 U. S. 
___,  ___  (2016)  (slip  op.,  at  12)  (internal  quotation  marks 
omitted); Lawlor v. National Screen Service Corp., 349 U. S. 
322, 327–328 (1955) (holding that two suits were not “based 
on the same cause of action,” because “[t]he conduct pres-
ently complained of was all subsequent to” the prior judg-
ment  and  it  “cannot  be  given  the  effect  of  extinguishing 
claims which did not even then exist and which could not 
possibly have been sued upon in the previous case”).  This 
is for good reason: Events that occur after the plaintiff files 
suit often give rise to new “[m]aterial operative facts” that
“in themselves, or taken in conjunction with the antecedent
facts,” create a new claim to relief.  Restatement (Second) 
§24, Comment f, at 203; 18 J. Moore, D. Coquillette, G. Jo-
seph, G. Vairo, & C. Varner, Federal Practice §131.22[1], p. 
131–55, n. 1 (3d ed. 2019) (citing cases where “[n]ew facts
create[d a] new claim”). 

This principle takes on particular force in the trademark
context, where the enforceability of a mark and likelihood 
of  confusion  between  marks  often  turns  on  extrinsic  facts 
that change over time.  As Lucky Brand points out, liability 
for trademark infringement turns on marketplace realities 
that can change dramatically from year to year.  Brief for 
Petitioners 42–45.  It is no surprise, then, that the Second 
Circuit  held  that  Marcel’s  2011  Action  claims  were  not 
barred  by  the  2005  Action.  By  the  same  token,  the  2005