Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/21pdf/20-843_7j80.pdf
Page Number: 82

Cite as:  597 U. S. ____ (2022) 

1 

BARRETT, J., concurring 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

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No. 20–843 
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NEW YORK STATE RIFLE & PISTOL ASSOCIATION, 
INC., ET AL., PETITIONERS v. KEVIN P. BRUEN, IN 
HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS SUPERINTENDENT 
OF NEW YORK STATE POLICE, ET AL. 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT 

[June 23, 2022] 

JUSTICE BARRETT, concurring. 
I  join  the  Court’s  opinion  in  full.  I  write  separately  to
highlight two methodological points that the Court does not 
resolve.  First,  the  Court  does  not  conclusively  determine
the  manner  and  circumstances  in  which  postratification
practice may bear on the original meaning of the Constitu-
tion.  See ante, at 24–29.  Scholars have proposed competing 
and potentially conflicting frameworks for this analysis, in-
cluding liquidation, tradition, and precedent.  See, e.g., Nel-
son, Originalism and Interpretive Conventions, 70 U. Chi.
L. Rev. 519 (2003); McConnell, Time, Institutions, and In-
terpretation,  95  B. U.  L.  Rev.  1745  (2015).    The  limits  on 
the  permissible  use  of  history  may  vary  between  these 
frameworks  (and  between  different  articulations  of  each 
one).  To name just a few unsettled questions: How long af-
ter ratification may subsequent practice illuminate original
public meaning?  Cf. McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 
401 (1819) (citing practice “introduced at a very early period
of  our  history”).    What  form  must  practice  take  to  carry 
weight  in  constitutional  analysis?    See  Myers  v.  United 
States, 272 U. S. 52, 175 (1926) (citing a “legislative exposi-
tion of the Constitution . . . acquiesced in for a long term of 
years”).  And may practice settle the meaning of individual