Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/558bv.pdf
Page Number: 259.0

98 

ALVAREZ  v.  SMITH 

Opinion of Stevens, J. 

nant  to  justice”  .  .  .  in  view  of  the  nature  and  character  of 
the conditions which have caused the case to become moot.’ ” 
Id., at 24 (quoting United States v.  Hamburg-Amerikanische 
Packetfahrt-Actien  Gesellschaft,  239  U. S.  466,  477–478 
(1916), in turn quoting South Spring Hill Gold Mining Co. v. 
Amador Medean Gold Mining Co., 145 U. S. 300, 302 (1892); 
alteration  in  original).  The  “public  interest”  must  be  con­
sidered as part of this equitable inquiry, Bancorp, 513 U. S., 
at 26, 27, and that interest is generally better served by leav­
ing  appellate  judgments  intact.  “ ‘Judicial  precedents  are 
presumptively  correct  and  valuable  to  the  legal  community 
as  a  whole.  They  are  not  merely  the  property  of  private 
litigants  .  .  .  .’ ”  Id.,  at  26  (quoting  Izumi  Seimitsu  Kogyo 
Kabushiki  Kaisha  v.  U.  S.  Philips  Corp.,  510  U. S.  27,  40 
(1993)  (Stevens,  J.,  dissenting)).  Hence,  we  will  typically 
vacate  a judgment  when  the party  seeking  review has  been 
“frustrated by the vagaries of circumstance” or “when moot­
ness results from unilateral action of the party who prevailed 
below.”  Bancorp,  513  U. S.,  at  25.  But  we  will  typically 
decline  to  vacate  when  “the  party  seeking  relief  from  the 
judgment  below  caused  the  mootness  by  voluntary  action,” 
id.,  at  24,  including  action  taken  in  good  faith  and  in  con­
junction  with  the  opposing  party.  Even  when  “respondent 
agreed  to  [a]  settlement  that  caused  the  mootness,”  it  re­
mains  “petitioner’s  burden,  as  the  party  seeking  relief  from 
the status quo of the appellate judgment, to demonstrate not 
merely  equivalent  responsibility  for  the  mootness,  but  equi­
table  entitlement  to  the  extraordinary  remedy  of  vacatur.” 
Id., at 26.  “[M]ootness by reason of settlement does not jus­
tify vacatur of a judgment under review.”  Id., at 29. 

In my view, the Court has misapplied these principles.  To 
be  sure,  the  “settlement”  between  the  parties  in  this  case 
might  be  distinguished  from  the  more  conventional  settle­
ment  reached  by  the  parties  in  Bancorp.  And  we  have  no 
evidence  to  suggest  that  the  State  returned  respondents’ 
property prior to the conclusion of our review with the pur­