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8 

FISHER v. UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN 

Opinion of the Court 

Bakke,  438  U. S.,  at  305  (opinion  of  Powell,  J.)  (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 

While these are the cases that most specifically address
the  central  issue  in  this  case,  additional  guidance  may
be found in the Court’s broader equal protection jurispru-
dence which applies in this context.  “Distinctions between 
citizens  solely  because  of  their  ancestry  are  by  their  very
nature odious to a free people,” Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U. S. 
495,  517  (2000)  (internal  quotation  marks  omitted),  and 
therefore “are contrary to our traditions and hence consti-
tutionally suspect,”  Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U. S. 497, 499 
(1954).  “ ‘[B]ecause  racial  characteristics  so  seldom  pro-
vide a relevant basis for disparate treatment,’ ” Richmond 
v.  J.  A.  Croson  Co.,  488  U. S.  469,  505  (1989)  (quoting 
Fullilove  v.  Klutznick,  448  U. S.  448,  533–534  (1980) 
(Stevens,  J.,  dissenting)),  “the  Equal  Protection  Clause 
demands that racial classifications . . . be subjected to the 
‘most rigid  scrutiny.’ ”   Loving v. Virginia, 388 U. S. 1, 11 
(1967).

To  implement  these  canons,  judicial  review  must  begin
from  the  position  that  “any  official  action  that  treats  a
person differently on account of his race or ethnic origin is
inherently suspect.”  Fullilove, supra, at 523 (Stewart,  J., 
dissenting);  McLaughlin  v.  Florida,  379  U. S.  184,  192 
(1964).  Strict scrutiny is a searching examination, and it 
is  the  government  that  bears  the  burden  to  prove  “ ‘that
the reasons for any [racial] classification [are] clearly iden-
tified  and  unquestionably  legitimate,’ ”  Croson,  supra,  at 
505 (quoting Fullilove, 448 supra, at 533–535 (Stevens, J., 
dissenting)). 

II 
Grutter made clear that racial “classifications are consti-
tutional only if they are narrowly tailored to further com-
pelling  governmental  interests.”    539  U. S.,  at  326.    And 
Grutter endorsed Justice Powell’s conclusion in Bakke that