Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/558bv.pdf
Page Number: 644.0

Cite as: 558 U. S. 310 (2010) 

483 

Opinion of Thomas, J. 

legal  trouble,  public  exposure  and  watchdog  groups  digging 
through their lives.”  Ibid. 

These instances of retaliation sufﬁciently demonstrate why 
this  Court  should  invalidate  mandatory  disclosure  and  re­
porting  requirements.  But  amici  present  evidence  of  yet 
another  reason  to  do  so—the  threat  of  retaliation  from 
elected  ofﬁcials.  As  amici’s  submissions  make  clear,  this 
threat extends far beyond a single ballot proposition in Cali­
fornia.  For  example,  a  candidate  challenging  an  incumbent 
state  attorney  general  reported  that  some  members  of  the 
State’s business community feared donating to his campaign 
because  they  did  not  want  to  cross  the  incumbent;  in  his 
words,  “ ‘I  go  to  so  many  people  and  hear  the  same  thing: 
“I  sure  hope  you  beat  [the  incumbent],  but  I  can’t  afford  to 
have  my  name  on  your  records.  He  might  come  after  me 
next.” ’ ”  Strassel, Challenging Spitzerism at the Polls, Wall 
Street  Journal,  Aug.  1,  2008,  p.  A11.  The  incumbent  won 
reelection in 2008. 

My  point  is  not  to  express  any  view  on  the  merits  of  the 
political  controversies  I  describe.  Rather,  it  is  to  demon­
strate—using real-world, recent examples—the fallacy in the 
Court’s  conclusion  that  “[d]isclaimer  and  disclosure  require­
ments . . . impose  no  ceiling  on  campaign-related  activities, 
and  do  not  prevent  anyone  from  speaking.”  Ante,  at  366 
(internal  quotation  marks  and  citation  omitted).  Of  course 
they do.  Disclaimer and disclosure requirements enable pri­
vate citizens and elected ofﬁcials to implement political strat­
egies  speciﬁcally  calculated  to  curtail  campaign-related 
activity  and  prevent  the  lawful,  peaceful  exercise  of  First 
Amendment rights. 

The  Court  nevertheless  insists  that  as-applied  challenges 
to  disclosure  requirements  will  sufﬁce  to  vindicate  those 
speech rights, as long as potential plaintiffs can “show a rea­
sonable  probability  that  disclosure  .  .  .  will  subject  them  to 
threats, harassment, or reprisals from either Government of­