Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/23pdf/23-175_19m2.pdf
Page Number: 41

Cite as:  603 U. S. ____ (2024) 

1 

THOMAS, J., concurring 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

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No. 23–175 
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CITY OF GRANTS PASS, OREGON, PETITIONER v. 
GLORIA JOHNSON, ET AL., ON BEHALF 
OF THEMSELVES AND ALL OTHERS 
SIMILARLY SITUATED 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT 

[June 28, 2024]

 JUSTICE THOMAS, concurring. 
I join the Court’s opinion in full because it correctly re-
jects the respondents’ claims under the Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Clause.  As the Court observes, that Clause 
“focuses  on  the  question  what  method  or  kind  of  punish-
ment  a  government  may  impose  after  a  criminal  convic-
tion.”  Ante, at 16 (internal quotation marks omitted).  The 
respondents,  by  contrast,  ask  whether  Grants  Pass  “may 
criminalize particular behavior in the first place.”  Ibid.  I 
write separately to make two additional observations about 
the respondents’ claims.

First, the precedent that the respondents primarily rely 
upon,  Robinson  v.  California,  370  U. S.  660  (1962),  was 
wrongly  decided.    In  Robinson,  the  Court  held  that  the 
Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause prohibits the en-
forcement  of  laws  criminalizing  a  person’s  status.    Id.,  at 
666.  That holding conflicts with the plain text and history
of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause.  See ante, 
at 15–16.  That fact is unsurprising given that the Robinson 
Court made no attempt to analyze the Eighth Amendment’s 
text  or  discern  its  original  meaning.    Instead,  Robinson’s 
holding rested almost entirely on the Court’s understand-
ing of public opinion: The Robinson Court observed that “in