Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/524bv.pdf
Page Number: 789

524US2

Unit: $U99

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744

BURLINGTON INDUSTRIES, INC. v. ELLERTH

Syllabus

actuated, at least in part, by a purpose to serve the employer.
Id.,
§§ 228(1)(c), 230. Courts of Appeals have held, however, a supervisor
acting out of gender-based animus or a desire to fulﬁll sexual urges may
be actuated by personal motives unrelated and even antithetical to the
employer’s objectives. Thus, the general rule is that sexual harass-
ment by a supervisor is not conduct within the scope of employment.
Pp. 755–757.

(d) However, scope of employment is not the only basis for employer
liability under agency principles. An employer is subject to liability for
the torts of its employees acting outside the scope of their employment
when, inter alia, the employer itself was negligent or reckless, Restate-
ment § 219(2)(b), or the employee purported to act or to speak on behalf
of the employer and there was reliance upon apparent authority, or he
was aided in accomplishing the tort by the existence of the agency rela-
tion, id., § 219(2)(d). An employer is negligent, and therefore subject to
liability under § 219(2)(b), if it knew or should have known about sexual
harassment and failed to stop it. Negligence sets a minimum standard
for Title VII liability; but Ellerth seeks to invoke the more stringent
standard of vicarious liability. Section 219(2)(d) makes an employer vi-
cariously liable for sexual harassment by an employee who uses appar-
ent authority (the apparent authority standard), or who was “aided in
accomplishing the tort by the existence of the agency relation” (the
aided in the agency relation standard). Pp. 758–759.

(e) As a general rule, apparent authority is relevant where the agent
purports to exercise a power which he or she does not have, as distinct
from threatening to misuse actual power. Compare Restatement § 6
with § 8. Because supervisory harassment cases involve misuse of
actual power, not the false impression of its existence, apparent author-
ity analysis is inappropriate. When a party seeks to impose vicar-
ious liability based on an agent’s misuse of delegated authority, the Re-
statement’s aided in the agency relation rule provides the appropriate
analysis. Pp. 759–760.

(f) That rule requires the existence of something more than the em-
ployment relation itself because, in a sense, most workplace tortfeasors,
whether supervisors or co-workers, are aided in accomplishing their tor-
tious objective by the employment relation: Proximity and regular con-
tact afford a captive pool of potential victims. Such an additional aid
exists when a supervisor subjects a subordinate to a signiﬁcant, tangible
employment action, i. e., a signiﬁcant change in employment status, such
as discharge, demotion, or undesirable reassignment. Every Federal
Court of Appeals to have considered the question has correctly found
vicarious liability in that circumstance. This Court imports the signiﬁ-
cant, tangible employment action concept for resolution of the vicarious