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Page Number: 25

4 

OIL STATES ENERGY SERVICES, LLC v. GREENE’S 
ENERGY GROUP, LLC 
GORSUCH, J., dissenting 

Murray’s  Lessee  v. Hoboken  Land  &  Improvement  Co.,  18 
How.  272,  284  (1856).    From  this  and  as  we’ve  recently 
explained,  it  follows  that,  “[w]hen  a  suit  is  made  of  the 
stuff of the traditional actions at common law tried by the 
courts  at  Westminster  in  1789  . . .  and  is  brought  within 
the  bounds  of  federal  jurisdiction,  the  responsibility  for 
deciding  that  suit  rests  with”  Article  III  judges  endowed 
with  the  protections  for  their  independence  the  framers 
thought  so  important.    Stern  v.  Marshall,  564  U. S.  462, 
484 (2011) (internal quotation marks omitted).  The Court 
does  not  quarrel  with  this  test.    See  ante,  at  12–14.    We 
part ways only on its application.1 
  As  I  read  the  historical  record  presented  to  us,  only 
courts could hear patent challenges in England at the time 
of the founding.  If facts were in dispute, the matter first 
had  to  proceed  in  the  law  courts.    See,  e.g.,  Newsham  v. 
Gray, 2 Atk. 286, 26 Eng. Rep. 575 (Ch. 1742).  If success-
ful  there,  a  challenger  then  had  to  obtain  a  writ  of  scire 
facias in the law side of the Court of Chancery.  See, e.g., 
Pfander,  Jurisdiction-Stripping  and  the  Supreme  Court’s 
Power  To  Supervise  Inferior  Tribunals,  78  Texas  L.  Rev. 
1433, 1446, n. 53 (2000); Lemley, Why Do Juries Decide If 
Patents Are Valid? 99 Va. L. Rev. 1673, 1686–1687 (2013) 
(Lemley,  Juries).    The  last  time  an  executive  body  (the 
King’s  Privy  Council)  invalidated  an  invention  patent  on 
an  ordinary  application  was  in  1746,  in  Darby  v.  Betton, 
PC2/99,  pp. 358–359;  and  the  last  time  the  Privy  Council 
—————— 

1 Some of our concurring colleagues see it differently.  See ante, at 1 
(BREYER, J., concurring).  They point to language in Commodity Futures 
Trading  Comm’n  v.  Schor,  478  U. S.  833  (1986),  promoting  the  notion 
that  the  political  branches  may  “depart  from  the  requirements  of 
Article III” when the benefits outweigh the costs.  Id., at 851.  Color me 
skeptical.    The  very  point  of  our  written  Constitution  was  to  prevent 
the  government  from  “depart[ing]”  from  its  protections  for  the  people 
and their liberty just because someone later happens to think the costs 
outweigh the benefits.  See United States v. Stevens, 559 U. S. 460, 470 
(2010).