Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/23pdf/22-915_8o6b.pdf
Page Number: 18

14 

UNITED STATES v. RAHIMI 

Opinion of the Court 

the surety and going armed laws represent. 
Like  the  surety  and  going  armed 

laws,  Section 
922(g)(8)(C)(i) applies to individuals found to threaten the
physical  safety  of  another.  This  provision  is  “relevantly
similar” to those founding era regimes in both why and how 
it burdens the Second Amendment right.  Id., at 29.  Section 
922(g)(8)  restricts  gun  use  to  mitigate  demonstrated 
threats  of  physical  violence,  just  as  the  surety  and  going
armed  laws  do.  Unlike  the  regulation  struck  down  in 
Bruen, Section 922(g)(8) does not broadly restrict arms use 
by the public generally.

The burden Section 922(g)(8) imposes on the right to bear
arms also fits within our regulatory tradition.  While we do 
not suggest that the Second Amendment prohibits the en-
actment of laws banning the possession of guns by catego-
ries of persons thought by a legislature to present a special
danger of misuse, see Heller, 554 U. S., at 626, we note that 
Section 922(g)(8) applies only once a court has found that 
the defendant “represents a credible threat to the physical
safety”  of  another.  §922(g)(8)(C)(i).  That  matches  the 
surety and going armed laws, which involved judicial deter-
minations  of  whether  a  particular  defendant  likely  would 
threaten or had threatened another with a weapon. 

Moreover, like surety bonds of limited duration, Section
922(g)(8)’s restriction was temporary as applied to Rahimi.
Section 922(g)(8) only prohibits firearm possession so long
as  the  defendant  “is”  subject  to  a  restraining  order.
§922(g)(8).  In Rahimi’s case that is one to two years after 
his release from prison, according to Tex. Fam. Code Ann. 
§85.025(c) (West 2019).  App. 6–7.

Finally, the penalty—another relevant aspect of the bur-
den—also  fits  within  the  regulatory  tradition.    The  going
armed laws provided for imprisonment, 4 Blackstone 149,
and if imprisonment was permissible to respond to the use
of guns to threaten the physical safety of others, then the
lesser  restriction  of  temporary  disarmament  that  Section