Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/21pdf/20-480_b97c.pdf
Page Number: 11.0

Cite as:  595 U. S. ____ (2022) 

1 

GORSUCH, J., dissenting 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

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No. 20–480 
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DAVID BRYON BABCOCK, PETITIONER v.
 KILOLO KIJAKAZI, ACTING COMMISSIONER 
OF SOCIAL SECURITY 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT 

[January 13, 2022]

 JUSTICE GORSUCH, dissenting. 
As the only dissenter on this narrow question of statutory
interpretation, I confess trepidation.  Still, I cannot help but
find compelling the arguments advanced by the petitioner
before us and by the Eighth Circuit in Petersen v. Astrue, 
633 F. 3d 633, 637–638 (2011). 

Dual-status military technicians hold “a unique position
in federal employment.”  Ante, at 2.  Not only do they some-
times serve on active duty, as the petitioner did.  Babcock 
v. Commissioner of Social Security, 959 F. 3d 210, 212 (CA6 
2020).  By statute, they spend the rest of their time working 
for the Guard—on matters ranging from training others to 
administration  to  equipment  maintenance.  10  U. S. C. 
§ 10216(a)(1)(C);  32  U. S. C.  § 709(a).    At  all  times,  they 
must  “maintain  membership”  in  the  National  Guard  and 
wear  a  Guard  uniform  while  on  the  job.
  10  U. S. C. 
§ 10216(a)(1)(B); 32 U. S. C. § 709(b).  The authority to dis-
charge  or  discipline  these  individuals,  too,  rests  with  the 
Adjutant General.  §§ 709(d), (f ).  Given these features of 
their  employment,  I  would  hold  that  dual-status  techni-
cians “serv[e] as” members of the National Guard in all the
work they perform for this country day in and day out.  42 
U. S. C. § 415(a)(7)(A)(III).

I appreciate the analogy to police officers moonlighting as