Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/22pdf/21-869_87ad.pdf
Page Number: 46.0

Cite as:  598 U. S. ____ (2023) 

1 

GORSUCH, J., concurring 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

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No. 21–869 
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ANDY WARHOL FOUNDATION FOR THE VISUAL 
ARTS, INC., PETITIONER v. LYNN 
GOLDSMITH, ET AL. 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT 

[May 18, 2023] 

JUSTICE  GORSUCH,  with  whom  JUSTICE  JACKSON  joins,

concurring. 

The question before us is a narrow one of statutory inter-
pretation.  It  concerns  the  meaning  of  one  of  four  factors 
Congress has instructed courts to consult when a party in-
vokes the affirmative defense of “fair use” to a claim of cop-
yright  infringement.  The  statutory  factor  in  question  re-
quires courts to consider “the purpose and character of the 
use.”  17 U. S. C. §107(1).  The parties disagree which “pur-
pose” and “character” counts. 

On the Foundation’s telling, the statute requires courts
to focus on the purpose the creator had in mind when pro-
ducing his work and the character of his resulting work.  So 
what matters in this case is that Andy Warhol intended to
apply a “ ‘new aesthetic’ ” to Lynn Goldsmith’s photograph
and the character of his work “ ‘transformed’ ” Prince from 
the  “ ‘vulnerable,  uncomfortable  person’ ”  depicted  in  Ms. 
Goldsmith’s  photograph  into  “ ‘an  iconic,  larger-than-life
figure.’ ”    Ante,  at  9–10;  post,  at  7–10,  18  (KAGAN, J.,  dis-
senting).  Because the purpose and character of Mr. War-
hol’s work is so different from Ms. Goldsmith’s, the Foun-
dation  insists,  the  first  statutory  factor  points  in  favor  of 
finding a fair-use affirmative defense.

By contrast, on Ms. Goldsmith’s reading of the law and