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Page Number: 22.0

16 

JESNER v. ARAB BANK, PLC 

Opinion of the Court 
Opinion of KENNEDY, J. 

International  Convention  for  the  Suppression  of  the  Fi-
nancing  of  Terrorism,  Dec.  9,  1999,  S.  Treaty  Doc.  No. 
106–49,  2178  U. N. T. S.  232.    But  by  its  terms  the  Con-
vention  imposes  its  obligations  only  on  nation-states  “to
enable”  corporations  to  be  held  liable  in  certain  circum-
stances under domestic law.  The United States and other 
nations,  including  Jordan,  may  fulfill  their  obligations
under  the  Convention  by  adopting  detailed  regulatory
regimes  governing  financial  institutions.  See,  e.g.,  18 
U. S. C.  §2333(a)  (private  right  of  action  under  the  Anti-
Terrorism  Act);  31  U. S. C.  §5311  et seq.  (Bank  Secrecy
Act); 31 CFR pt. 595 (2017) (Terrorism Sanctions Regula-
tions); Brief for Central Bank of Jordan as Amicus Curiae 
5  (describing  Jordan’s  “comprehensive  approach  to  pre-
venting  money  laundering  and  terrorist  financing”).  The 
Convention  neither  requires  nor  authorizes  courts,  with-
out congressional authorization, to displace those detailed
regulatory regimes by allowing common-law actions under 
the  ATS.  And  nothing  in  the  Convention’s  text  requires
signatories to hold corporations liable in common-law tort 
actions raising claims under international law.

In addition, petitioners and their amici cite a few cases 
from  other  nations  and  the  Special  Tribunal  for  Lebanon
that, according to petitioners, are examples of corporations
being held liable for violations of international law.  E.g., 
Brief for Petitioners 50–51.  Yet even assuming that these 
cases  are  relevant  examples,  at  most  they  demonstrate
that  corporate  liability  might  be  permissible  under  inter-
national law in some circumstances.  That falls far short of 
establishing  a  specific,  universal,  and  obligatory  norm  of 
corporate liability.

It must be remembered that international law is distinct 
from  domestic  law  in  its  domain  as  well  as  its  objectives. 
International  human-rights  norms  prohibit  acts  repug-
nant to all civilized peoples—crimes like genocide, torture, 
and slavery, that make their perpetrators “enem[ies] of all