Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/14pdf/13-1034_3dq4.pdf
Page Number: 24

Cite as:  575 U. S. ____ (2015) 

7 

THOMAS, J., dissenting 

ment of a federally controlled  substance would be to read 
“relating  to”  as  modifying  “violation”  instead  of  “law.”
Under that reading, the statute would attach immigration 
consequences  to  a  “violation  . . .  relating  to  a  controlled 
substance  (as  defined  in  section  802  of  title  21),”  rather 
than a violation of a “law . . . relating to a controlled sub-
stance  (as  defined  in  section  802  of  title  21).”    Yet  the 
majority  expressly—and  correctly—rejects  as  grammati-
cally  incorrect  Mellouli’s  argument  that  the  “relating  to” 
clause modifies “violation.”  Ante, at 12. 

Having done so, the majority can reconcile its outcome
with  the  text  only  by  interpreting  the  words  “relating  to”
to  mean  “regulating  only.”  It  should  be  obvious  why  the
majority  does  not  make  this  argument  explicit.    Even 
assuming “regulating only” were a permissible interpreta-
tion of “relating to”—for it certainly is not the most natu-
ral  one—that  interpretation  would  be  foreclosed  by  Con-
gress’  pointed  word  choice  in  the  surrounding  provisions. 
And  given  the  logical  upshot  of  the  majority’s  interpreta-
tion, it is it even more understandable that it avoids offer-
ing  an  explicit  exegesis.    For  unless  the  Court  ultimately 
adopts the modified categorical approach for statutes, like 
the  one  at  issue  here,  that  define  offenses  with  reference 
to  “controlled  substances”  generally,  and  treats  them  as
divisible  by  each  separately  listed  substance,  ante,  at  6, 
n. 4,  its  interpretation  would  mean  that  no  conviction 
under a controlled-substances regime more expansive than
the  Federal  Government’s  would  trigger  removal.2   Thus, 

—————— 

2 If the Court ultimately adopts the modified categorical approach, it
runs into new textual problems.  Under that approach, an alien would 
be subject to removal for violating Kansas’ drug paraphernalia statute
whenever  a  qualifying  judicial  record  reveals  that  the  conviction 
involved  a  federally  controlled  substance.    If  that  result  is  permissible
under  the  removal  statute,  however,  then  Kansas’  paraphernalia  law
must  qualify  as  a  law  “relating  to”  a  federally  controlled  substance. 
Otherwise, the text of the statute would afford no basis for his removal.