Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/558bv.pdf
Page Number: 832

ORDERS 

985 

558 U. S. 

November 2, 2009 

No.  09–6536.  Naddi  v.  Hernandez,  Warden,  et  al.  C.  A. 
9th  Cir.  Motion  of  petitioner  for  leave  to  proceed  in  forma  pau­
peris  denied,  and  certiorari  dismissed.  See  this  Court’s  Rule 
39.8. 

No.  09–6684.  Howard  v.  United  States  District  Court 
for  the  Southern  District  of  Ohio  et  al.  C.  A.  D.  C.  Cir. 
Motion  of  petitioner  for  leave  to  proceed  in  forma  pauperis  de­
nied,  and  certiorari  dismissed.  See  this  Court’s  Rule  39.8. 

Certiﬁcate  Dismissed 

No. 09–166.  United States  v.  Seale.  C. A. 5th Cir.  Ques­
tion certiﬁed by the United States Court  of Appeals for the Fifth 
Circuit  dismissed.  Reported  below:  577  F.  3d  566. 

Statement  of  Justice  Stevens,  with  whom  Justice  Scalia 

joins,  respecting  the  dismissal  of  the  certiﬁed  question. 

This  certiﬁcate  presents  us  with  a  pure  question  of  law  that 
may  well  determine  the  outcome  of  a  number  of  cases  of  ugly 
racial  violence  remaining  from  the  1960’s.  The  question  is  what 
statute  of  limitations  applies  to  a  prosecution  under  18  U. S. C. 
§ 1201  commenced  in  2007  for  a  kidnaping  offense  that  occurred 
in  1964. 

James  Ford  Seale  was  found  guilty  of  violating  § 1201,  a  provi­
sion  that  does  not  include  its  own  limitations  period.  Title  18 
U. S. C.  § 3281  provides  that  “any  offense  punishable  by  death” 
may  be  prosecuted  “at  any  time  without  limitation,”  whereas 
§ 3282(a)  imposes  a  5-year  period  of  limitations  for  all  other  of­
fenses  “[e]xcept  as  otherwise  expressly  provided  by  law.”  In 
1964  a  violation  of  § 1201  was  a  capital  offense  when  the  victim 
was harmed, and since 1994 a violation of § 1201 has been a capital 
offense  when  the  kidnaping  results  in  the  loss  of  life.  But  for 
more  than  two  decades  in  between,  Seale’s  crime  was  not  punish­
able  by  death. 

Several  developments  accounted  for  this.  In  1968  this  Court 
held that the death penalty provision in the old § 1201 was uncon­
stitutional because it applied “only to those defendants who assert 
the  right  to  contest  their  guilt  before  a  jury,”  United  States  v. 
Jackson,  390  U. S.  570,  581,  and  in  1972  we  cast  signiﬁcant  doubt 
on  the  constitutionality  of  death  penalty  laws  nationwide,  Fur-
man v.  Georgia, 408 U. S. 238 (per curiam).  Following Furman, 
Congress  repealed  the  death  penalty  clause  of  § 1201,  see  Act  for