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YATES v. UNITED STATES 

Syllabus

 JUSTICE  GINSBURG,  joined  by  THE  CHIEF  JUSTICE,  JUSTICE  BREYER, 
and  JUSTICE  SOTOMAYOR,  concluded  that  a  “tangible  object”  within 
§1519’s compass is one used to record or preserve information.  Pp. 6–
20. 

(a) Although dictionary definitions of the words “tangible” and “ob-
ject”  bear  consideration  in  determining  the  meaning  of  “tangible  ob-
ject” in §1519, they are not dispositive.  Whether a statutory term is 
unambiguous  “is  determined  [not  only]  by  reference  to  the  language
itself,  [but  also  by]  the  specific  context  in  which  that  language  is 
used, and the broader context of the statute as a whole.”  Robinson v. 
Shell  Oil  Co.,  519  U. S.  337,  341.    Identical  language  may  convey
varying  content  when  used  in  different  statutes,  sometimes  even  in 
different provisions of the same statute.  See, e.g., FAA v. Cooper, 566 
U. S. ___, ___.  Pp. 7–10.

(b)  Familiar  interpretive  guides  aid  the  construction  of  “tangible
object.”  Though not commanding, §1519’s heading—“Destruction, al-
teration,  or  falsification  of  records  in  Federal  investigations  and
bankruptcy”—conveys no suggestion that the section prohibits spolia-
tion of any and all physical evidence, however remote from records.

Section 1519’s position within Title 18, Chapter 73, further signals
that §1519 was not intended to serve as a cross-the-board ban on the 
destruction of physical evidence.  Congress placed §1519 at the end of
Chapter  73  following  immediately  after  pre-existing  specialized  pro-
visions expressly aimed at corporate fraud and financial audits.   

The  contemporaneous  passage  of  §1512(c)(1),  which  prohibits  a 
person  from  “alter[ing],  destroy[ing],  mutilat[ing],  or  conceal[ing]  a
record, document, or other object . . . with the intent to impair the ob-
ject’s integrity or availability for use in an official proceeding,” is also
instructive.    The  Government  argues  that  §1512(c)(1)’s  reference  to
“other object” includes any and every physical object.  But if §1519’s
reference to “tangible object” already included all physical objects, as
the Government also contends, then Congress had no reason to enact 
§1512(c)(1).  Section 1519 should not be read to render superfluous an
entire  provision  passed  in  proximity  as  part  of  the  same  Act.    See 
Marx v. General Revenue Corp., 568 U. S. ___, ___. 

The  words  immediately  surrounding  “tangible  object”  in  §1519—
“falsifies,  or  makes  a  false  entry  in  any  record  [or]  document”—also
cabin  the  contextual  meaning  of  that  term.    Applying  the  canons 
noscitur a sociis and ejusdem generis, “tangible object,” as the last in
a list of terms that begins “any record [or] document,” is appropriate-
ly read to refer, not to any tangible object, but specifically to the sub-
set  of  tangible  objects  used  to  record  or  preserve  information.    This 
moderate  interpretation  accords  with  the  list  of  actions  §1519  pro-
scribes;  the  verbs  “falsif[y]”  and  “mak[e]  a  false  entry  in”  typically