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Page Number: 50

24 

TRINITY LUTHERAN CHURCH OF COLUMBIA, INC. v.
COMER 
SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting
 

inappropriate.    A  State’s  decision  not  to  fund  houses  of 
worship  does  not  disfavor  religion;  rather,  it  represents  a
valid choice to remain secular in the face of serious estab-
lishment and free exercise concerns.  That does not make 
the State “atheistic or antireligious.”  County of Allegheny 
v.  American  Civil  Liberties  Union,  Greater  Pittsburgh 
Chapter, 492 U. S. 573, 610 (1989).  It means only that the 
State has “establishe[d] neither atheism nor religion as its 
official creed.”  Ibid.  The Court’s conclusion “that the only
alternative  to  governmental  support  of  religion  is  govern-
mental hostility to it represents a giant step backward in
our  Religion  Clause  jurisprudence.” 
Id.,  at  652,  n. 11 
(Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

At  bottom,  the  Court  creates  the  following  rule  today:
The  government  may  draw  lines  on  the  basis  of  religious 
status  to  grant  a  benefit  to  religious  persons  or  entities 
but  it  may  not  draw  lines  on  that  basis  when  doing  so 
would further the interests the Religion Clauses protect in 
other ways.  Nothing supports this lopsided outcome.  Not 
the  Religion  Clauses,  as  they  protect  establishment  and
free  exercise  interests  in  the  same  constitutional  breath, 
neither privileged over the other.  Not precedent, since we
have  repeatedly  explained  that  the  Clauses  protect  not 
religion  but  “the  individual’s  freedom  of  conscience,”  Jaf-
free,  472  U. S.,  at  50—that  which  allows  him  to  choose 
religion,  reject  it,  or  remain  undecided.    And  not  reason, 
because  as  this  case  shows,  the  same  interests  served  by
lifting  government-imposed  burdens  on  certain  religious
entities  may  sometimes  be  equally  served  by  denying 
government-provided benefits to certain religious entities.
Cf.  Walz,  397  U. S.,  at  674  (entanglement);  Amos,  483 
U. S., at 336 (influence on religious activities). 

JUSTICE  BREYER’s  concurrence  offers  a  narrower  rule 
that  would  limit  the  effects  of  today’s  decision,  but  that 
rule does not resolve this case.  JUSTICE BREYER, like the 
Court,  thinks  that  “denying  a  generally  available  benefit