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10 

THOMPSON v. CLARK 

ALITO, J., dissenting 

probable cause and then held for seven weeks without prob-
able cause after a judge ordered him detained.  Id., at 359– 
360.  The Court reasoned that the Fourth Amendment pro-
hibits “government officials from detaining a person in the
absence of probable cause.”  Id., at 367.  A violation of that 
prohibition,  the  Court  continued,  may  occur  both  “before
the formal onset of a criminal proceeding” and “when legal 
process  itself  goes  wrong—when,  for  example,  a  judge’s 
probable-cause determination is predicated solely on a po-
lice officer’s false statements.”  Ibid.  Accordingly, the Court
concluded that the plaintiff in that case could state a Fourth
Amendment claim because the “judge’s order holding [him] 
for trial” was not supported by probable cause.  Id., at 368. 
Although  the  majority  asserts  that  Manuel  authorized 
Fourth Amendment malicious-prosecution claims, see ante, 
at 4, Manuel did no such thing.  That decision expressly de-
clined to determine “whether (and, if so, how) [petitioner’s
Fourth  Amendment  claim]  should  resemble  the  malicious
prosecution tort.”  Id., at 372, n. 10.  Indeed, the majority’s
analysis here is incompatible with the analysis in Manuel, 
where the gravamen of the wrong was that petitioner was 
“detain[ed]  . . .  in  the  absence  of  probable  cause.”    Id.,  at 
367.  Manuel thus provides no support for the Court’s sug-
gestion  that  the  Fourth  Amendment  prohibits  the  “initia-
tion of charges without probable cause.”  Ante, at 6. 

III 
Instead of clarifying the law regarding §1983 malicious-
prosecution  claims,  today’s  decision,  I  fear,  will  sow  more 
confusion.  The Court endorses a Fourth Amendment claim 
for malicious prosecution that appears to have the following
elements: (1) the defendant “initiat[ed]” charges against the 
plaintiff in a way that was “wrongful” and “without proba-
ble cause,” (2) the “malicious prosecution resulted in a sei-
zure of the plaintiff,” and (3) the prosecution must not have
ended in conviction.  Ante, at 5–6, and n. 2.  This tort has