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Page Number: 41

8 

COUNTY OF MAUI v. HAWAII WILDLIFE FUND 

ALITO, J., dissenting 

or chemically changed as it travels,” “the amount of pollu-
tant entering the navigable waters relative to the amount 
of the pollutant that leaves the point source,” “the manner 
by or area in which the pollutant enters the navigable wa-
ters,” and “the degree to which the pollution (at that point)
has maintained its specific identity.”  Ante, at 16. 

The  Court  admits  that  its  rule  “does  not,  on  its  own, 
clearly  explain  how  to  deal  with  middle  instances,”  ibid., 
but that admission does not go far enough.  How the rule 
applies to “middle instances” is anybody’s guess.  Except in
extreme  cases,  dischargers  will  be  able  to  argue  that  the 
Court’s multifactor test does not require a permit.  Oppo-
nents will be able to make the opposite argument.  Regula-
tors will be able to justify whatever result they prefer in a 
particular case.  And judges will be left at sea. 

III 
A 
Instead of concocting our own rule, I would interpret the
words of the statute, and in my view, the better of the two
possible interpretations is that a permit is required when a
pollutant is discharged directly from a point source to nav-
igable  waters.  This  interpretation  is  consistent  with  the 
statutory language and better fits the overall scheme of the 
Clean Water Act.  And properly understood, it does not have 
the  sort  of  extreme  consequences  that  the  Court  finds 
unacceptable. 

Take the Court’s example of a pipe that discharges pollu-
tants  a  short  distance  from  the  ocean.  Ante,  at  10.  This 
pipe qualifies as a point source.  33 U. S. C. §1362(14).  If 
its  discharge  goes  directly  into  another  point  source  and
that point source discharges directly into navigable waters,
there is a direct discharge into navigable waters, and a per-
mit is needed.  See Rapanos v. United States, 547 U. S. 715,