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Page Number: 13

28 

CRUZ v. ARIZONA 

Opinion of the Court 

“change  in  the  law”  and  a  “change  in  the  application  of 
(emphasis in original).  The application of 
the law.”  Ibid. 
Rule 32.1(g) below  is thus the opposite  of frmly established 
and regularly followed. 

What  makes  the  interpretation  so  novel  is  the  way  in 
which it disregards the effect of Lynch on the law in Arizona. 
Ordinarily,  Arizona  courts  applying  Rule  32.1(g)  focus  on 
how a decision changes the law that is operative in Arizona, 
regardless  of  whether  the  intervening  decision  is  a  state  or 
federal  one.  See,  e. g.,  Shrum,  220  Ariz.,  at  119,  203  P.  3d, 
at  1179  (holding  that  a  state  decision  did  not  satisfy  Rule 
32.1(g) because it did not “overrule any prior opinion”); State 
v.  Valencia,  241  Ariz.  206,  208–209,  386  P.  3d  392,  394–395 
(2016) (fnding a “signifcant change in the law” where a prec-
edent  of  this  Court  changed  the  law  applied  in  Arizona); 
State v. Poblete, 227 Ariz. 537, 540, 260 P. 3d 1102, 1105 (App. 
2011) (same); see also State v. Bigger, 251 Ariz. 402, 412, 492 
P.  3d  1020,  1030  (2021)  (determining  that  a  decision  of  this 
Court  was  not  a  “signifcant  change  in  the  law”  in  part  be-
cause  it  did  not  “effec[t]  a  change  in  Arizona  law”).  Here, 
however,  the  Arizona  Supreme  Court  considered  only 
whether  there  had  been  a  signifcant  change  in  federal  law, 
disregarding  the fact  that Lynch  overruled binding  Arizona 
Supreme Court precedents, to dramatic effect for capital de-
fendants in Arizona. 

The  consequences  of  the  interpretation  below  compound 
its  novelty.  Arizona  requires  a  petitioner  seeking  Rule 
32.1(g) relief to establish not just a “signifcant change in the 
law,”  but  also  that  the  law  in  question  applies  retroactively 
under  this  Court's  analysis  in  Teague  v.  Lane,  489  U. S.  288 
(1989).  See, e. g., State v. Towery, 204 Ariz. 386, 389, 64 P. 3d 
828,  831  (2003)  (applying  Teague).  Under  Arizona's  long-
standing Rule 32.1(g) precedents, it is possible to satisfy both 
criteria.  See,  e. g.,  Order  in  State  v.  Rose,  No.  CR2007– 
149013–002, pp. 19–23 (Super. Ct. Maricopa Cty., Ariz., Aug. 
14,  2020)  (determining  in  another  case,  prior  to  the  decision 

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