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Page Number: 15.0

12 

VANCE v. BALL STATE UNIV. 

Opinion of the Court 

“the  individual  in  the  position  of  ultimate  authority  at  a
Bureau school”).  But sometimes the term is used to refer 
to  lower  ranking  individuals. 
See,  e.g.,  29  U. S. C. 
§152(11)  (defining  a  supervisor  to  include  “any  individual 
having  authority  . . .  to  hire,  transfer,  suspend,  lay  off,
recall,  promote,  discharge,  assign,  reward,  or  discipline
other employees, or responsibly to direct them, or to adjust
their  grievances,  or  effectively  to  recommend  such  action, 
if  in  connection  with  the  foregoing  the  exercise  of  such
authority  is  not  of  a  merely  routine  or  clerical  nature, 
but  requires  the  use  of  independent  judgment”);  42
U. S. C. §1396n(j)(4)(A) (providing that an eligible Medicaid
beneficiary  who  receives  care  through  an  approved  self­
directed services plan may “hire, fire, supervise, and man­
age the individuals providing such services”). 

Although  the  meaning  of  the  concept  of  a  supervisor
varies  from  one  legal  context  to  another,  the  law  often 
contemplates  that  the  ability  to  supervise  includes  the 
ability  to  take  tangible  employment  actions.7   See,  e.g.,  5 

—————— 

7 One outlier that petitioner points to is the National Labor Relations 
Act  (NLRA),  29  U.  S.  C.  §152(11).    Petitioner  argues  that  the  NLRA’s
definition supports her position in this case to the extent that it encom­
passes  employees  who  have  the  ability  to  direct  or  assign  work  to
subordinates.  Brief for Petitioner 27–28. 

The  NLRA  certainly  appears  to  define  “supervisor”  in  broad  terms.
The  National  Labor  Relations  Board  (NLRB)  and  the  lower  courts, 
however, have consistently explained that supervisory authority is not 
trivial or insignificant: If the term “supervisor” is construed too broadly, 
then employees who are deemed to be supervisors will be denied rights
that  the  NLRA  was  intended  to  protect.    E.g.,  In  re  Connecticut  Hu-
mane  Society,  358  NLRB  No.  31,  *33  (Apr.  12,  2012);  Frenchtown 
Acquisition  Co.,  Inc.  v.  NLRB,  683  F.  3d  298,  305  (CA6  2012); Beverly 
Enterprises-Massachusetts,  Inc.  v.  NLRB,  165  F.  3d  960,  963  (CADC 
1999).    Indeed,  in  defining  a  supervisor  for  purposes  of  the  NLRA, 
Congress sought to distinguish “between straw bosses, leadmen, set-up
men, and other minor supervisory employees, on the one hand, and the 
supervisor  vested  with  such  genuine  management  prerogatives  as  the