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529US3

Unit: $U54

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Cite as: 529 U. S. 598 (2000)

641

Souter, J., dissenting

In particular,

Chief Justice Marshall’s seminal opinion in Gibbons v.
Ogden, 9 Wheat., at 193–194, construed the commerce power
from the start with “a breadth never yet exceeded,” Wickard
v. Filburn, 317 U. S., at 120.
it is worth
noting, the Court in Wickard did not regard its holding as
exceeding the scope of Chief Justice Marshall’s view of
interstate commerce; Wickard applied an aggregate effects
test to ostensibly domestic, noncommercial farming con-
sistently with Chief Justice Marshall’s indication that the
commerce power may be understood by its exclusion of
subjects, among others, “which do not affect other States,”
Gibbons, 9 Wheat., at 195. This plenary view of the power
has either prevailed or been acknowledged by this Court at
every stage of our jurisprudence. See, e. g., id., at 197;
Nashville, C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Alabama, 128 U. S. 96, 99–100
(1888); Lottery Case, 188 U. S. 321, 353 (1903); Minnesota
Rate Cases, 230 U. S. 352, 398 (1913); United States v. Cali-
fornia, 297 U. S. 175, 185 (1936); United States v. Darby,
supra, at 115; Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States,
379 U. S., at 255; Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U. S., at 324. And it
was this understanding, free of categorical qualiﬁcations,
that prevailed in the period after 1937 through Lopez, as
summed up by Justice Harlan: “ ‘Of course, the mere fact that
Congress has said when particular activity shall be deemed
to affect commerce does not preclude further examination by
this Court. But where we ﬁnd that the legislators . . . have
a rational basis for ﬁnding a chosen regulatory scheme neces-
sary to the protection of commerce, our investigation is at an
end.’ ” Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U. S. 183, 190 (1968) (quoting
Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U. S., at 303–304).

Justice Harlan spoke with the beneﬁt of hindsight, for he
had seen the result of rejecting the plenary view, and today’s
attempt to distinguish between primary activities affecting
commerce in terms of the relatively commercial or non-
commercial character of the primary conduct proscribed
comes with the pedigree of near tragedy that I outlined in