Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/18pdf/17-1011_mkhn.pdf
Page Number: 2

2 

JAM v. INTERNATIONAL FINANCE CORP. 

Syllabus 

continuously  equivalent.    The  IOIA  is  thus  like  other  statutes  that 
use  similar  or  identical  language  to  place  two  groups  on  equal  foot-
ing.  See,  e.g.,  Civil  Rights  Act  of  1866,  42  U. S. C.  §§1981(a),  1982; 
Federal  Tort  Claims  Act,  28  U. S. C.  §2674.    Whatever  the  ultimate 
purpose of international organization immunity may be, the immedi-
ate purpose of the IOIA immunity provision is expressed in language
that Congress typically uses to make one thing continuously equiva-
lent to another.  Pp. 6–9.

(b) That reading is confirmed by the “reference canon” of statutory
interpretation.    When  a  statute  refers  to  a  general  subject,  the  stat-
ute  adopts  the  law  on  that  subject  as  it  exists  whenever  a  question 
under the statute arises.  In contrast, when a statute refers to anoth-
er statute by specific title, the referenced statute is adopted as it ex-
isted  when  the  referring  statute  was  enacted,  without  any  subse-
quent amendments.  Federal courts have often relied on the reference 
canon  to  harmonize  a  statute  with  an  external  body  of  law  that  the 
statute refers to generally.  The IOIA’s reference to the immunity en-
joyed  by  foreign  governments  is  to  an  external  body  of  potentially
evolving law, not to a specific provision of another statute.  Nor is it a 
specific  reference  to  a  common  law  concept  with  a  fixed  meaning.
The phrase “immunity enjoyed by foreign governments” is not a term
of art with substantive content but rather a concept that can be given 
scope  and  content  only  by  reference  to  the  rules  governing  foreign 
sovereign immunity.  Pp. 9–11.

(c) The D. C. Circuit relied upon Atkinson’s conclusion that the ref-
erence canon’s probative force was  outweighed by an IOIA provision 
authorizing  the  President  to  alter  the  immunity  of  an  international 
organization.    But  the  fact  that  the  President  has  power  to  modify
otherwise applicable immunity rules is perfectly compatible with the
notion that those rules might themselves change over time in light of 
developments in the law governing foreign sovereign immunity.  The 
Atkinson court also did not consider the opinion of the State Depart-
ment, whose views in this area ordinarily receive “special attention,” 
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela v. Helmerich & Payne Int’l Drilling 
Co.,  581  U. S.  ___,  ___,  and  which  took  the  position  that  immunity 
rules of the IOIA and the FSIA were linked following the FSIA’s en-
actment.  Pp. 11–13.

(d) The  IFC  contends  that  interpreting  the  IOIA  immunity  provi-
sion  to  grant  only  restrictive  immunity  would  defeat  the  purpose  of
granting  immunity  in  the  first  place,  by  subjecting  international  or-
ganizations  to  suit  under  the  commercial  activity  exception  of  the 
FSIA for most or all of their core activities.  This would be particular-
ly  true  with  respect  to  international  development  banks,  which  use 
the tools of commerce to achieve their objectives.  Those concerns are