Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/14pdf/13-1314_3ea4.pdf
Page Number: 72.0

Cite as:  576 U. S. ____ (2015) 

1 

SCALIA, J., dissenting 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

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No. 13–1314 
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ARIZONA STATE LEGISLATURE, APPELLANT v.
 
ARIZONA INDEPENDENT REDISTRICTING 

COMMISSION ET AL. 

ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR 
THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

[June 29, 2015] 

JUSTICE  SCALIA,  with  whom  JUSTICE  THOMAS  joins,

dissenting. 

I  do  not  believe  that  the  question  the  Court  answers  is 
properly  before  us.  Disputes  between  governmental
branches or departments regarding the allocation of politi-
cal power do not in my view constitute “cases” or “contro-
versies” committed to our resolution by Art. III, §2, of the 
Constitution. 

What  those  who  framed  and  ratified  the  Constitution 
had in mind when they entrusted the “judicial Power” to a 
separate  and  coequal  branch  of  the  Federal  Government 
was  the  judicial  power  they  were  familiar  with—that 
traditionally  exercised  by  English  and  American  courts. 
The  “cases”  and  “controversies”  that  those  courts  enter-
tained  did  not  include  suits  between  units  of  government
regarding  their  legitimate  powers.    The  job  of  the  courts
was,  in  Chief  Justice  Marshall’s  words,  “solely,  to  decide 
on  the  rights  of  individuals,”  Marbury  v.  Madison,  1 
Cranch  137,  170  (1803).    Tocqueville  considered  this  one 
reason the new democracy could safely confer upon courts 
the immense power to hold legislation unconstitutional: 

“[B]y leaving it to private interest to censure the law, 
and by intimately uniting the trial of the law with the 
trial  of  an  individual,  legislation  is  protected  from