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Page Number: 41.0

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MURPHY v. NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSN. 

THOMAS, J., concurring 

being  declared  nonseverable  and  thus  inoperative;  our 
precedents  do  not  ask  whether  the  plaintiff  has  standing 
to challenge those other provisions.  See National Federa-
tion  of  Independent  Business  v.  Sebelius,  567  U. S.  519, 
696–697  (2012)  (joint  dissent)  (citing,  as  an  example, 
Williams  v.  Standard  Oil  Co.  of  La.,  278  U. S.  235,  242– 
244 (1929)).  True, the plaintiff had standing to challenge 
the  unconstitutional  part  of  the  statute.  But  the  severa-
bility  doctrine  comes  into  play  only  after  the  court  has 
resolved  that  issue—typically  the  only  live  controversy 
between  the  parties.  In  every  other  context,  a  plaintiff
must  demonstrate  standing  for  each  part  of  the  statute 
that he wants to challenge.  See Lea 789, 751, and nn. 79– 
80 (citing, as examples, Davis v. Federal Election Comm’n, 
554  U. S.  724,  733–734  (2008);  DaimlerChrysler  Corp.  v. 
Cuno, 547 U. S. 332, 346, 350–353 (2006)).  The severabil-
ity  doctrine  is  thus  an  unexplained  exception  to  the  nor-
mal rules of standing, as well as the separation-of-powers 
principles  that  those  rules  protect.  See  Steel  Co.  v.  Citi-
zens for Better Environment, 523 U. S. 83, 101 (1998). 

In  sum,  our  modern  severability  precedents  are  in  ten-
sion with longstanding limits on the judicial power.  And, 
though  no  party  in  this  case  has  asked  us  to  reconsider 
these precedents, at some point, it behooves us to do so.