Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/11pdf/10-9646.pdf
Page Number: 11

Cite as:  567 U. S. ____ (2012) 

7 

Opinion of the Court 

practices  based  on  mismatches  between  the  culpability  of 
a  class  of  offenders  and  the  severity  of  a  penalty.    See 
Graham, 560 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 9–10) (listing cases).  
So,  for  example,  we  have  held  that  imposing  the  death 
penalty  for  nonhomicide  crimes  against  individuals,  or 
imposing it on mentally retarded  defendants, violates the 
Eighth Amendment.  See Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U. S. 
407 (2008); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U. S. 304 (2002).  Sev-
eral  of  the  cases  in  this  group  have  specially  focused  on 
juvenile  offenders,  because  of  their  lesser  culpability.   
Thus, Roper held that the Eighth Amendment bars capital 
punishment  for  children,  and  Graham  concluded  that  the 
Amendment  also  prohibits  a  sentence  of  life  without  the 
possibility of parole for a child who committed a nonhomi-
cide  offense.    Graham  further  likened  life  without  parole 
for  juveniles  to  the  death  penalty  itself,  thereby  evoking 
a  second  line  of  our  precedents.    In  those  cases,  we  have 
prohibited  mandatory  imposition  of  capital  punishment, 
requiring that sentencing authorities consider the charac-
teristics of a defendant and the details of his offense before 
sentencing him to death.  See Woodson v. North Carolina, 
428  U. S.  280  (1976)  (plurality  opinion);  Lockett  v.  Ohio, 
438 U. S. 586 (1978) (plurality opinion).  Here, the conflu-
ence of these two lines of precedent leads to the conclusion 
that mandatory life-without-parole sentences for juveniles 
violate the Eighth Amendment.4 
—————— 

4

 The three dissenting opinions here each take issue with some or all 
of  those  precedents.    See post,  at  5–6  (opinion  of  ROBERTS,  C. J.); post, 
at 1–6 (opinion of THOMAS, J.); post, at 1–4 (opinion of ALITO, J.).   That 
is not surprising: their authors (and joiner) each dissented from some or 
all of those precedents.  See, e.g., Kennedy, 554 U. S., at 447 (ALITO, J., 
joined  by  ROBERTS,  C. J.,  and  SCALIA  and  THOMAS,  JJ.,  dissenting); 
Roper,  543  U. S.,  at  607  (SCALIA,  J.,  joined  by  THOMAS,  J.,  dissenting); 
Atkins,  536  U. S.,  at  337  (SCALIA,  J.,  joined  by  THOMAS,  J.,  dissent- 
ing);  Thompson,  487  U. S.,  at  859  ((SCALIA,  J.,  dissenting);  Graham  v. 
Collins, 506 U. S. 461, 487 (1993) (THOMAS, J., concurring) (contending 
that Woodson was wrongly decided).  In particular, each disagreed with