Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/529bv.pdf
Page Number: 868

529US3

Unit: $U59

[09-26-01 12:32:42] PAGES PGT: OPIN

Cite as: 529 U. S. 765 (2000)

793

Stevens, J., dissenting

breadth of the “claims” to which the FCA applies 3 only
conﬁrms the notion that the law was intended to cover the
full range of fraudulent acts, including those perpetrated
by States.4

The legislative history of the 1986 amendments discloses
that both federal and state ofﬁcials understood that States
were “persons” within the meaning of the statute. Thus, in
a section of the 1986 Senate Report describing the history
of the Act, the committee unequivocally stated that the Act
reaches all parties who may submit false claims and that
“[t]he term ‘person’ is used in its broad sense to include
partnerships, associations, and corporations . . . as well as
States and political subdivisions thereof.” S. Rep. No. 99–
345, pp. 8–9.5

3 Title 31 U. S. C. § 3729(c) reads: “For purposes of this section, ‘claim’
includes any request or demand, whether under a contract or otherwise,
for money or property which is made to a contractor, grantee, or other
recipient if the United States Government provides any portion of the
money or property which is requested or demanded, or if the Government
will reimburse such contractor, grantee, or other recipient for any portion
of the money or property which is requested or demanded.”

4 When Congress amended the FCA in 1986, it noted that “[e]vidence
of fraud in Government programs and procurement is on a steady rise.”
H. R. Rep. No. 99–660, at 18. And at that time, federal grants to state
and local governments had totaled over $108 billion. See U. S. Dept. of
Commerce National Data Book and Guide to Sources, Statistical Abstract
of the United States 301 (108th ed. 1988) (compiling data from 1986).
It
is therefore difﬁcult to believe, as the Court contends, that Congress
intended “to cover all types of fraud, [but not] all types of fraudsters,”
ante, at 781, n. 10, a conclusion that would exclude from coverage such a
large share of potential fraud.

5 Petitioner argues that the Senate Report’s statement was simply in-
accurate, because the three cases to which the Report cited for support
did not interpret the meaning of the word “person” in the FCA. Brief
for Petitioner 25–26. The cases stand for the proposition that the statu-
tory term “person” may include States and local governments—exactly
the proposition I have discussed above. See supra, at 790. Petitioner’s
observation that none of the cases cited is directly on point only indicates