Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/524bv.pdf
Page Number: 835.0

524US2

Unit: U100

[09-15-00 14:43:08] PAGES PGT: OPIN

790

FARAGHER v. BOCA RATON

Opinion of the Court

automatically to the employer”), cert. denied, 522 U. S. 997
(1997); cf. Katz, supra, at 255 (“Except in situations where a
proprietor, partner or corporate ofﬁcer participates person-
ally in the harassing behavior,” an employee must “demon-
strat[e] the propriety of holding the employer liable”).

Finally, there is nothing remarkable in the fact that claims
against employers for discriminatory employment actions
with tangible results, like hiring, ﬁring, promotion, compen-
sation, and work assignment, have resulted in employer lia-
bility once the discrimination was shown. See Meritor, 477
U. S., at 70–71 (noting that “courts have consistently held
employers liable for the discriminatory discharges of employ-
ees by supervisory personnel, whether or not the employer
knew, should have known, or approved of the supervisor’s
actions”); id., at 75 (Marshall, J., concurring in judgment)
(“[W]hen a supervisor discriminatorily ﬁres or refuses to
promote a black employee, that act is, without more, consid-
ered the act of the employer”); see also Anderson v. Method-
ist Evangelical Hospital, Inc., 464 F. 2d 723, 725 (CA6 1972)
(imposing liability on employer for racially motivated dis-
charge by low-level supervisor, although the “record clearly
shows that [its] record in race relations . . . is exemplary”).
A variety of reasons have been invoked for this apparently
unanimous rule. Some courts explain, in a variation of the
“proxy” theory discussed above, that when a supervisor
makes such decisions, he “merges” with the employer, and
his act becomes that of the employer. See, e. g., Kotcher v.
Rosa and Sullivan Appliance Ctr., Inc., 957 F. 2d 59, 62
(CA2 1992) (“The supervisor is deemed to act on behalf of
the employer when making decisions that affect the economic
status of the employee. From the perspective of the em-
ployee, the supervisor and the employer merge into a single
entity”); Steele v. Offshore Shipbuilding, Inc., 867 F. 2d 1311,
1316 (CA11 1989) (“When a supervisor requires sexual
favors as a quid pro quo for job beneﬁts, the supervisor,
by deﬁnition, acts as the company”); see also Lindemann &