Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/524bv.pdf
Page Number: 176.0

524US1

Unit: $U79

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Cite as: 524 U. S. 125 (1998)

131

Opinion of the Court

Nor is there any linguistic reason to think that Congress
intended to limit the word “carries” in the statute to any of
these special deﬁnitions. To the contrary, all these special
deﬁnitions embody a form of an important, but secondary,
meaning of “carry,” a meaning that suggests support rather
than movement or transportation, as when, for example, a
column “carries” the weight of an arch.
2 Oxford English
Dictionary, at 919, 921.
In this sense a gangster might
“carry” a gun (in colloquial language, he might “pack a gun”)
even though he does not move from his chair.
It is difﬁcult
to believe, however, that Congress intended to limit the stat-
utory word to this deﬁnition—imposing special punishment
upon the comatose gangster while ignoring drug lords who
drive to a sale carrying an arsenal of weapons in their van.
We recognize, as the dissent emphasizes, that the word
“carry” has other meanings as well. But those other mean-
ings (e. g., “carry all he knew,” “carries no colours”), see post,
at 143–144, are not relevant here. And the fact that speak-
ers often do not add to the phrase “carry a gun” the words
“in a car” is of no greater relevance here than the fact that
millions of Americans did not see Muscarello carry a gun in
his truck. The relevant linguistic facts are that the word
“carry” in its ordinary sense includes carrying in a car and
that the word, used in its ordinary sense, keeps the same
meaning whether one carries a gun, a suitcase, or a banana.
Given the ordinary meaning of the word “carry,” it is not
surprising to ﬁnd that the Federal Courts of Appeals have
unanimously concluded that “carry” is not limited to the car-
rying of weapons directly on the person but can include their
carriage in a car. United States v. Toms, 136 F. 3d 176, 181
(CADC 1998); United States v. Foster, 133 F. 3d 704, 708
(CA9 1998); United States v. Eyer, 113 F. 3d 470, 476 (CA3
1997); 106 F. 3d, at 1066 (case below); 106 F. 3d, at 639 (case
below); United States v. Malcuit, 104 F. 3d 880, 885, rehear-
ing en banc granted, 116 F. 3d 163 (CA6 1997); United
States v. Mitchell, 104 F. 3d 649, 653–654 (CA4 1997); United