Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/17pdf/16-1466_2b3j.pdf
Page Number: 3.0

Cite as:  585 U. S. ____ (2018) 

3 

Syllabus 

to  represent  nonmembers  in  the  absence  of  agency  fees.    And  their 
duty of fair representation is a necessary concomitant of the authori-
ty that a union seeks when it chooses to be the exclusive representa-
tive.  In any event, States can avoid free riders through less restric-
tive means than the imposition of agency fees.  Pp. 11–18. 

(b) Respondents’ alternative justifications for Abood are similarly 

unavailing.  Pp. 18–26. 

(1) The Union claims that Abood is supported by the First Amend-
ment’s original meaning.  But neither founding-era evidence nor dic-
tum in Connick v. Myers, 461 U. S. 138, 143, supports the view that 
the  First  Amendment  was  originally  understood  to  allow  States  to
force public employees to subsidize a private third party.  If anything, 
the opposite is true.  Pp. 18–22.

(2)  Nor  does  Pickering  v.  Board  of  Ed.  of  Township  High  School 
Dist. 205, Will Cty., 391 U. S. 563, provide a basis for Abood.  Abood 
was not based on Pickering, and for good reasons.  First, Pickering’s 
framework  was  developed  for  use  in cases  involving  “one  employee’s 
speech  and  its  impact  on  that  employee’s  public  responsibilities,” 
United States v. Treasury Employees, 513 U. S. 454, 467, while Abood 
and  other  agency-fee  cases  involve  a  blanket  requirement  that  all
employees  subsidize  private  speech  with  which  they  may  not  agree.
Second, Pickering’s framework was designed to determine whether a 
public  employee’s  speech  interferes  with  the  effective  operation  of  a 
government  office,  not  what  happens  when  the  government  compels 
speech or speech subsidies in support of third parties.  Third, the cat-
egorization  schemes  of  Pickering  and  Abood  do  not  line  up.    For  ex-
ample, under Abood, nonmembers cannot be charged for speech that
concerns  political  or  ideological  issues;  but  under  Pickering,  an  em-
ployee’s  free  speech  interests  on  such  issues  could  be  overcome  if 
outweighed by the employer’s interests.  Pp. 22–26. 

(c) Even  under  some  form  of  Pickering,  Illinois’  agency-fee  ar-

rangement would not survive.  Pp. 26–33.

(1) Respondents compare union speech in collective bargaining and
grievance proceedings to speech “pursuant to [an employee’s] official
duties,” Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U. S. 410, 421, which the State may 
require  of  its  employees.    But  in  those  situations,  the  employee’s 
words are really the words of the employer, whereas here the union is 
speaking on behalf of the employees.  Garcetti therefore does not ap-
ply.  Pp. 26–27. 

(2) Nor does the union speech at issue cover only matters of private 
concern,  which  the  State  may  also  generally  regulate  under  Picker-
ing.  To  the  contrary,  union  speech  covers  critically  important  and
public matters such as the State’s budget crisis, taxes, and collective 
bargaining issues related to education, child welfare, healthcare, and