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Page Number: 19.0

16 

VANCE v. BALL STATE UNIV. 

Opinion of the Court 

may  have  wielded  less  authority,  ibid.  (noting  that  Sil­
verman  was  “responsible  for  making  the  lifeguards’  daily 
assignments,  and  for  supervising  their  work  and  fitness
training”).    Nevertheless,  the  city  never  disputed  Far­
agher’s characterization of both men as her “supervisors.” 
See  App.,  O.  T.  1997,  No.  97–282,  p. 40  (First  Amended 
Complaint  ¶¶6–7);  id.,  at  79  (Answer  to  First  Amended
Complaint  ¶¶6–7)  (admitting  that  both  harassers  had 
“supervisory responsibilities” over the plaintiff).9 

In  light  of  the  parties’  undisputed  characterization  of 
the alleged harassers, this Court simply was not presented 
with  the  question  of  the  degree  of  authority  that  an  em­
ployee  must  have  in  order  to  be  classified  as  a  supervi­
sor.10  The parties did not focus on the issue in their briefs, 
although  the  victim  in  Faragher  appears  to  have  agreed 
that  supervisors  are  employees  empowered  to  take  tangi­
ble  employment  actions.    See  Brief  for  Petitioner,  O.  T. 

—————— 

9 Moreover,  it  is  by  no  means  certain  that  Silverman  lacked  the  au­
thority  to  take  tangible  employment  actions  against  Faragher.    In  her 
merits  brief,  Faragher  stated  that,  as  a  lieutenant,  Silverman  “made
supervisory and disciplinary decisions and had input on the evaluations 
as  well.”  Id.,  at  9–10.    If  that  discipline  had  economic  consequences
(such  as  suspension  without  pay),  then  Silverman  might  qualify  as  a 
supervisor under the definition we adopt today.

Silverman’s  ability  to  assign  Faragher  significantly  different  work 
responsibilities  also  may  have  constituted  a  tangible  employment 
action.  Silverman  told  Faragher,  “ ‘Date  me  or  clean  the  toilets  for  a 
year.’ ”    Faragher,  supra,  at  780.    That  threatened  reassignment  of
duties likely would have constituted significantly different responsibili­
ties  for  a  lifeguard,  whose  job  typically  is  to  guard  the  beach.    If  that 
reassignment  had  economic  consequences,  such  as  foreclosing  Far- 
agher’s  eligibility  for  promotion,  then  it  might  constitute  a  tangible
employment action. 

10 The  lower  court  did  not  even  address  this  issue.   See  Faragher  v. 

Boca  Raton,  111  F. 3d  1530,  1547  (CA11  1997)  (Anderson,  J.,  concur­
ring in part and dissenting in part) (noting that it was unnecessary to 
“decide the threshold level of authority which a supervisor must possess
in order to impose liability on the employer”).