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Page Number: 51

12 

ARIZONA STATE LEGISLATURE v. ARIZONA 
INDEPENDENT REDISTRICTING COMM’N 
ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting 

ture”  referred  not  just  to  “the  two  houses  of  the  legisla-
ture”  but  to  “the  entire  legislative  power  of  the  state  . . . 
however  exercised.”  Brief  for  Petitioner,  O. T.  1931,  No. 
617, p. 22 (internal quotation marks omitted).  The Court 
did not respond by holding, as the majority today suggests, 
that  “ ‘the  Legislature’  comprises  the  referendum  and  the 
Governor’s  veto in the context of regulating congressional 
elections,”  or  that  “ ‘the  Legislature’  has  a  different  iden-
tity” in the Elections Clause than it does in Article V.  Ante, 
at 18–19.  Instead, the Court in Smiley said this: 

“Much  that  is  urged  in  argument  with  regard  to  the 
meaning  of  the  term  ‘Legislature’  is  beside  the  point. 
As this Court said in Hawke . . . the term was not one 
‘of  uncertain  meaning  when  incorporated  into  the
Constitution.  What  it  meant  when  adopted  it  still
means  for  purposes  of  interpretation.    A  Legislature
was  then  the  representative  body  which  made  the 
laws  of  the  people.’ ”    285  U. S.,  at  365  (quoting 
Hawke, 253 U. S., at 227).   

Remarkably,  the  majority  refuses  to  even  acknowledge
the  definition  of  “the Legislature”  adopted  in  both  Smiley
and Hawke, and instead embraces the interpretation that
this Court unanimously rejected more than 80 years ago.2 

C 
The history of the Elections Clause further supports the
conclusion that “the Legislature” is a representative body.
The first known draft of the Clause to appear at the Con-
stitutional  Convention  provided  that  “Each  state  shall 
prescribe  the  time  and  manner  of  holding  elections.”    1 

—————— 

2 The only hint of support the majority can glean from precedent is a 
passing  reference  in  Atlantic  Cleaners  &  Dyers,  Inc.  v.  United  States, 
286  U. S.  427,  434  (1932),  a  case  about  how  to  interpret  “trade  or
commerce” in the Sherman Act.  See ante, at 18.  And even that selected 
snippet describes the “legislature” as a “body.”  286 U. S., at 434.