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Page Number: 80

16 

TRUMP v. HAWAII 

SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting 

Proclamation 
heightened standard.  See supra, at 10–13. 

is  plainly  unconstitutional  under  that 

But even under rational-basis review, the Proclamation 

must  fall.  That  is  so  because  the  Proclamation  is  “ ‘di­
vorced  from  any  factual  context  from  which  we  could
discern  a  relationship  to  legitimate  state  interests,’  and
‘its  sheer  breadth  [is]  so  discontinuous  with  the  reasons
offered for it’ ” that the policy is “ ‘inexplicable by anything 
but  animus.’ ”    Ante,  at  33  (quoting  Romer  v.  Evans,  517 
U. S.  620,  632,  635  (1996));  see  also  Cleburne  v.  Cleburne 
Living Center, Inc., 473 U. S. 432, 448 (1985) (recognizing
that  classifications  predicated  on  discriminatory  animus 
can  never  be  legitimate  because  the  Government  has  no 
legitimate interest in exploiting “mere negative attitudes, 
or  fear”  toward  a  disfavored  group).    The  President’s 
statements,  which  the  majority  utterly  fails  to  address  in
its legal analysis, strongly support the conclusion that the
Proclamation was issued to express hostility toward Mus­
lims and exclude them from the country.  Given the over­
whelming  record  evidence  of  anti-Muslim  animus,  it  sim­
ply cannot be said that the Proclamation has a legitimate
basis.  IRAP  II,  883  F.  3d,  at  352  (Harris,  J.,  concurring) 
(explaining that the Proclamation contravenes the bedrock 
principle “that the government may not act on the basis of 

—————— 

when individual liberties are at stake.”  Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U. S. 
507, 536 (2004) (plurality opinion).  This Court’s Establishment Clause 
precedents require that, if a reasonable observer would understand an 
executive  action  to  be  driven  by  discriminatory  animus,  the  action  be
invalidated.  See  McCreary,  545  U. S.,  at  860.    That  reasonable-
observer  inquiry  includes  consideration  of  the  Government’s  asserted
justifications for its actions.  The Government’s invocation of a national-
security  justification,  however,  does  not  mean  that  the  Court  should 
close its eyes to other relevant information.  Deference is different from 
unquestioning acceptance.  Thus, what is “far more problematic” in this 
case is the majority’s apparent willingness to throw the Establishment
Clause out the window and forgo any meaningful constitutional review 
at the mere mention of a national-security concern.  Ante, at 32, n. 5.