Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/19pdf/17-1618_hfci.pdf
Page Number: 54.0

Cite as:  590 U. S. ____ (2020) 

17 

ALITO, J., dissenting 

Man attracted to men 
Woman attracted to men 
Woman attracted to women 
Man attracted to women 

The discharged employees have one thing in common.  It 
is  not  biological  sex,  attraction  to  men,  or  attraction  to 
women.  It is attraction to members of their own sex—in a 
word, sexual orientation.  And that, we can infer, is the em-
ployer’s real motive.

In sum, the Court’s textual arguments fail on their own 
terms.  The Court tries to prove that “it is impossible to dis-
criminate  against  a  person  for  being  homosexual  or
transgender without discriminating against that individual 
based on sex,” ante, at 9, but as has been shown, it is en-
tirely possible for an employer to do just that.  “[H]omosex-
uality  and  transgender  status  are  distinct  concepts  from
sex,” ante, at 19, and discrimination because of sexual ori-
entation or transgender status does not inherently or nec-
essarily  constitute  discrimination  because  of  sex.  The 
Court’s  arguments  are  squarely  contrary  to  the  statutory 
text. 

But even if the words of Title VII did not definitively re-
fute  the  Court’s  interpretation,  that  would  not  justify  the 
Court’s refusal to consider alternative interpretations.  The 
Court’s excuse for ignoring everything other than the bare 
statutory text is that the text is unambiguous and therefore 
no one can reasonably interpret the text in any way other 
than the Court does.  Unless the Court has met that high 
standard, it has no justification for its blinkered approach.
And to say that the Court’s interpretation is the only possi-
ble reading is indefensible. 

B 
Although  the  Court  relies  solely  on  the  arguments  dis-
cussed above, several other arguments figure prominently
in the decisions of the lower courts and in briefs submitted