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UNITED STATES v. BALSYS

Opinion of the Court

apparently providing a witness with the right against com-
pelled self-incrimination when reasonably fearing prosecu-
tion by the government whose power the Clause limits, but
not otherwise. Since there is no helpful legislative history,5
and because there was no different common law practice at
the time of the framing, see Part III–C, infra; cf. Coun-
selman v. Hitchcock, 142 U. S. 547, 563–564 (1892) (listing
a sample of cases, including preframing cases, in which the
privilege was asserted, none of which involve fear of foreign
prosecution), there is no reason to disregard the contextual
reading. This Court’s precedent has indeed adopted that
so-called same-sovereign interpretation.

A

The currently received understanding of the Bill of
Rights as instituted “to curtail and restrict the general pow-
ers granted to the Executive, Legislative, and Judicial
Branches” of the National Government deﬁned in the origi-
nal constitutional articles, New York Times Co. v. United

5 See Gecas, 120 F. 3d, at 1435 (noting that the Clause has “virtually
no legislative history”); 5 The Founders’ Constitution 262 (P. Kurland &
R. Lerner eds. 1987) (indicating that the Clause as originally drafted and
introduced in the First Congress lacked the phrase “any criminal case,”
which was added at the behest of Representative Lawrence on the ground
that the Clause would otherwise be “in some degree contrary to laws
passed”).

In recent years, scholarly attention has reﬁned our knowledge of the
previous manifestations of the privilege against self-incrimination, the
present culmination of such scholarship being R. Helmholz et al., The Priv-
ilege Against Self-Incrimination (1997). What we know of the circum-
stances surrounding the adoption of the Fifth Amendment, however, gives
no indication that the Framers had any sense of a privilege more compre-
hensive than common law practice then revealed. See Moglen, Taking
the Fifth: Reconsidering the Origins of the Constitutional Privilege
Against Self-Incrimination, 92 Mich. L. Rev. 1086, 1123 (1994) (“[T]he leg-
islative history of the Fifth Amendment adds little to our understanding
of the history of the privilege”). As to the common law practice, see Part
III–C, infra.