Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/boundvolumes/524bv.pdf
Page Number: 584

524US2

Unit: $U94

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Cite as: 524 U. S. 498 (1998)

539

Opinion of Kennedy, J.

principally justiﬁed because a contrary interpretation would
render the Takings Clause unnecessary. See id., at 394
(opinion of Chase, J.).
In an appropriate case, therefore,
I would be willing to reconsider Calder and its progeny to
determine whether a retroactive civil law that passes mus-
ter under our current Takings Clause jurisprudence is none-
theless unconstitutional under the Ex Post Facto Clause.
Today’s case, however, does present an unconstitutional
taking, and I join Justice O(cid:146)Connor’s well-reasoned opin-
ion in full.

Justice Kennedy, concurring in the judgment and dis-

senting in part.

The plurality’s careful assessment of the history and pur-
pose of the statute in question demonstrates the necessity to
hold it arbitrary and beyond the legitimate authority of the
In my view, which is in full accord
Government to enact.
with many of the plurality’s conclusions, the relevant por-
tions of the Coal Industry Retiree Health Beneﬁt Act of 1992
(Coal Act), 26 U. S. C. § 9701 et seq. (1994 ed. and Supp. II),
must be invalidated as contrary to essential due process
principles, without regard to the Takings Clause of the Fifth
Amendment.
I concur in the judgment holding the Coal Act
unconstitutional but disagree with the plurality’s Takings
Clause analysis, which, it is submitted, is incorrect and quite
unnecessary for decision of the case.
I must record my re-
spectful dissent on this issue.

I

The ﬁnal Clause of the Fifth Amendment states:

“[N]or shall private property be taken for public use,
without just compensation.” U. S. Const., Amdt. 5.

The provision is known as the Takings Clause. The concept
of a taking under the Clause has become a term of art, and
my discussion begins here.