Document ID: ./input/supremecourt_opinions/opinions/19pdf/18-9526_9okb.pdf
Page Number: 84

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MCGIRT v. OKLAHOMA 

THOMAS, J., dissenting 

The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals concluded that 
petitioner’s claim was procedurally barred under state law
because it was “not raised previously on direct appeal” and 
thus was “waived for further review.”  2018 OK CR 1057 ¶2,
___ P. 3d ___, ___ (citing Okla. Stat., Tit. 22, §1086 (2011)). 
The  court  found  no  grounds  for  excusing  this  default,  ex-
plaining that “[p]etitioner [had] not established any suffi-
cient reason why his current grounds for relief were not pre-
viously raised.”  ___ P. 3d, at ___.  This state procedural bar
was applied independent of any federal law, and it is ade-
quate to support the decision below.  We therefore lack ju-
risdiction to disturb the state court’s judgment.

There are two possible arguments in favor of jurisdiction, 
neither of which hold water.  First, one might claim that the
state procedural bar is not an “adequate” ground for deci-
sion in this case.  In Murphy, the Tenth Circuit suggested
that Oklahoma law permits jurisdictional challenges to be
raised for the first time on collateral review.  875 F. 3d, at 
907, n. 5 (citing Wallace v. State, 1997 OK CR 18, 935 P. 2d 
366).  But the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals did not 
even hint at such grounds for excusing petitioner’s default 
here.  More  importantly,  however,  we  may  not  go  beyond
“the four corners of the opinion” and delve into background 
principles  of  Oklahoma  law  to  determine  the  adequacy  of 
the  independent  state  ground.    Long,  463  U. S.,  at  1040. 
This Court put an end to that approach in Long, noting that
“[t]he process of examining state law is unsatisfactory be-
cause it requires us to interpret state laws with which we 
are generally unfamiliar, and which often, as in this case, 
have not been discussed at length by the parties.”  Id., at 
1039.  Moreover, such second-guessing disrespects “the in-
dependence of state courts,” id., at 1040, and the State it-
self, Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U. S. 722, 738–739 (1991).
Second, one might argue, as the Court does, that we have
jurisdiction because the decision below rests on federal, not 
state, grounds.  See ante, at 38,  n. 15.  It is true that the