Patent Abstract:
A network extension device comprising a CPU, memory, protected I/O connectable to local controls and peripherals, external communications port, a trusted device connected to the CPU such that it can provide attestation of the network extension device&#39;s trusted operation to a connected known external network, and a protected interface connected to at least one network extension module that includes a local network communications port. Optionally, a traffic encryption module may be provided, and the trusted device&#39;s attestation may include a check of its operation. Also, a method comprising connecting the network extension device to an external network, performing an operating mode check, causing the network extension device to operate in a mode and perform a security check that correspond to the result, causing the trusted device to attest trusted operation to the external network and thereafter causing the CPU to function fully and permitting access to the external network.

Full Description:
FIELD OF THE INVENTION 
     The present invention relates to computing networks in general and, in particular, to a secure network extension device and method. 
     BACKGROUND 
     Enterprise networks are commonly overseen at remote sites by an Information Technology (IT) administrator placed on-site to deploy and maintain the remote network&#39;s functionality, availability, and security. Means of remotely administering network functionality and availability are known, but they do not handle security adequately to maintain the posture required for high value information systems without local security administration. Assigning IT administrator resources to remote sites presents a significant cost, and security depends greatly on the particular administrator&#39;s expertise and prioritization of security. This issue can be pronounced for some organizations (e.g., DoD, Financial, Medical, Government) that may need significant networked resources at remote sites, but require high network security and data confidentiality; the issue is compounded where the remote sites may be prone to degradation, reduction, or loss of network communications. 
     SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION 
     The present invention permits robust centralized IT administration of remote network extensions from the central enterprise network, through means including the attestation of trusted operation, allowing personnel at a remote location to operate securely. A network extension device according to an embodiment of the present invention may comprise a CPU, a memory connected to the CPU, a protected I/O connected to the CPU and connectable to one or more local controls and to one or more local peripherals, an external communications port connected to the CPU and connectable to a known external network, a trusted device connected to the CPU such that the trusted device can provide attestation of trusted operation of the network extension device to a known external network to which the external communications port is connected, and a protected interface connected to the CPU and to at least one network extension module that includes a local network communications port. In a preferred embodiment, a traffic encryption module is also connected to the CPU and to the trusted device such that the trusted device can communicate attestation of trusted operation of the traffic encryption module to a connected known external network, such as with the trusted device checking the traffic encryption module&#39;s encryption algorithm. The network extension device&#39;s communications and security functions may be embodied within a single module (e.g., a trusted controller module) to further enhance security and remote verifiability, and the network extension device also may include tamper-proofing such as sensors. 
     A method of secure computing using a network extension device according to an embodiment of the present invention comprises providing a network extension device (having a CPU, a memory connected to the CPU, a protected I/O connected to the CPU and connectable to one or more local controls and one or more local peripherals, a trusted device connected to the CPU, and an external communications port connectable to a known external network, connecting the external communications port to the external network, after making the connection performing an operating mode check, after making the operating mode check causing the network extension device to operate in a mode corresponding to its results and performing a security check corresponding to its results, after making the connection causing the trusted device to attest the trusted operation of the network extension device to the external network, and after sending acceptable attestation causing the CPU to function fully and permitting the network extension device to access the external network. A high assurance level of trust for the remote site network (i.e., network extension) preferably is afforded throughout different modes of operation (e.g., different communication conditions such as full bandwidth, partial bandwidth, or no network connectivity), and different security checks may be performed depending on the mode of operation. In an embodiment adapted for modes that correspond to different levels of external network bandwidth, local (i.e., on the network extension device) backing up of data and/or execution of applications may be implemented during modes that are less than full bandwidth. 
    
    
     
       BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS 
         FIG. 1  is a block diagram of a network extension device according to an embodiment of the invention. 
         FIG. 2  is a flowchart of a process of communication failover according to an embodiment of the present invention. 
     
    
    
     DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF EMBODIMENTS 
     Referring to  FIG. 1 , a block diagram of a network extension device  100  according to an embodiment of the present invention is shown. In a preferred embodiment, the network extension device  100  is in a sealed enclosure that is physically secured by a tamper security boundary  119 , and primarily comprises a trusted controller module  120  (embodied, e.g., on a printed circuit board) and one or more (N) network extension modules  150  (embodied, e.g., in commercial off-the-shelf servers such as the HP ProLiant® DL320 Generation 6 with Trusted Platform Module). The trusted controller module  120  receives power from power control  121 , which can be connected to external power  110 . Power control  121  then also controls network extension power  151 , via power switch  131  to which network extension devices  100  are connected. Network extension module  150  includes a CPU  153 , memory  154 , a communication port  159 , an input/output  152 , and a trusted device  155 . The trusted controller module  120  includes a CPU  123 , memory  124 , a protected interface  132 , an input/output  142  connecting the module  120  to internal storage  143  (e.g., a hard drive) and other internal devices  144 , a security monitor  136  connected to on-master security sensors  137  and internal security sensors  138 , a trusted device  125  connected to a cryptographic key store  126 , a traffic encryption module  127 , a network security module  128 , and a communication port  129 . Communication port  129  can connect to an external network  99  such as through one or more (N) COM devices  102 , and communication port  159  can connect to a local client network  199 . In addition to controlling communication port  129 , network security module  128  also may have switch and route control over communication port  159 &#39;s local network connection. Encrypted communication with the local client network  199  (e.g., an office, temporary work site, etc.) may also be supported, preferably with any wires connecting to the communication port  159  being physically secured from tampering. Additionally, protected I/O  122  (which provides the trusted controller module  120  protection by only admitting authorized I/O, and checking the authorized I/O for viruses, malware, black/white list information, etc.) can connect to local peripheral devices  111 , a local control  112  (e.g., a keyboard, mouse, etc.), and an out-of-band remote control  113  to which might be connected one or more COM devices  114  (of which the system would preferably require pre-configured credentials or the like that would have to be authenticated, e.g., by the external network  99 , before a COM device  114  would be allowed to change settings etc.). 
     The trusted controller module  120  protects communications and ensures secure computing by utilizing the trusted device  125  to ensure that various functions are operating in a known configuration. In a preferred embodiment, the trusted controller module  120  provides network traffic encryption, network security, protected interfaces, security monitoring and control, communications failover, and general computing resources needed for the network extension, described further below. The number of network extension modules  150  may be scalable, to extend the general computing resources needed to support a larger client network extension. 
     The protected interface  132  buffers data passed into the trusted controller module  120  from the network extension module(s)  150 , and is preferably a high-speed, low-level interface that can be configured to provide functions such as confirmation of message types, malware detection, and other facilities to preclude receiving data that might affect the security (e.g., modify security settings or protocols) of the trusted controller module  120  through the network extension module  150  from a local user or attached local network. Message type checking and malware detection could be based on multiple well-known techniques and software available from commercial vendors such as Symantec and McAfee. 
     Traffic encryption module  127  encrypts data traversing the network between the remote site (where the network extension device  100  is) and the enterprise network (external network  99 ), using algorithms and key management schemes chosen based on the application and the sensitivity of its data. In a preferred embodiment, the National Security Agency&#39;s Suite B cryptographic algorithms can be used, which include Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) used with the Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) for traffic encryption and Elliptic-Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) key agreement. Optionally, the trusted controller module  120  can handle more than one level of encryption, such as in a secure sockets layer-encrypted browser session sent through a virtual private network. 
     The security monitor  136  controls the system&#39;s response to a perceived physical attack that may compromise the data and/or trust of the system, enhancing security as an additional layer of defense to network and application security mechanisms (which could otherwise be circumvented when physical access is granted to the hardware, e.g., by active probing, forced data remanence, and/or malicious hardware replacement). A tamper security boundary  119  can be provided with a sealed container housing the hardware and one or more internal sensors  138  and/or on-master sensors  137 , such as tamper switches provided to detect access to the sealed container, active tamper wrappers around sensitive components, temperature monitors, and voltage detectors. If a breach is detected, the security monitor  136  can cause various responses including erasure of all sensitive unencrypted data and some security parameters that will prevent the system from operating until the appropriate security controls and initialization parameters have been restored by a trusted source. 
     The network security module  128  can include a firewall (e.g., with “white lists” of authorized network resources), intrusion detection and prevention system (e.g., a commercial IPS security appliance from a commercial vendor such as Juniper Networks or CISCO), and malware/antivirus system (e.g., off-the-shelf software from a commercial vendor such as Symantec), so that the network infrastructure, policies enforced (remotely) by the network administrator, and the trust of the network remain intact as deployed, preserving confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the network. 
     The trusted device  125  serves as the root of trust for the network extension device  100 , with the trusted device  155  providing an additional layer of security (e.g., verifying the boot up sequence, and then monitoring the application stack of the network extension module  150  to ensure the configuration has not been altered from what is expected); each can be based on the trusted platform module (TPM) of the trusted computing standard developed by the Trusted Computing Group. The trusted device  125  manages cryptographic functions such as cryptographic key management, certificate validation (either directly or by monitoring the software that performs validation), and non-traffic-related encryption. An embodiment of these functions could be extensions of the cryptographic functions found with a trusted device  125  such as hashing and key generation. The trusted device  125  also preferably provides remote attestation, preferably including of traffic encryption operation (including the algorithm), which can be implemented similarly to the remote attestation taught by U.S. Pat. No. 7,254,707 to Herbert et al., the teachings of which are incorporated by reference. For example, information can be captured in an audit log for the trusted device  125 , and then digitally signed and provided to the external network  99  via a protected communications path for attestation of the network extension device  100 . The trusted device  125  can be paired with hardware-based trusted processor extensions (such as Intel&#39;s trusted execution technology) to create and verify processor environments that run only approved software and can be correctly measured to verify system properties, providing superior assurance of trust over software-based techniques. A remote control function, for example via an out-of-band remote control  113 , could be enabled through a standard communications protocol (e.g., a later version of SNMP that provides facilities for confidentiality, message integrity, and authentication) that works with the trusted device  125  to verify that any remotely commanded configuration changes are executed correctly. 
     In a preferred embodiment of the invention, the network extension device  100  can have its security attested to an external network  99  (which network is ‘known,’ such as by the trusted device  125  being deployed to the remote site with cryptographic information corresponding to the external network  99 ) throughout multiple operational modes, such as throughout differing levels of communicativity as is outlined in the flowchart of  FIG. 2 . (Instead of differing communicativity levels, other types of operational modes could be used in other embodiments; for example, the operational modes could be differing network architectures, such as client/server, thin client, standalone workstation, cloud computing). In such a communication failover process  200 , trusted functionality of the network extension device  100  is retained even when communication is restricted (e.g., communication conditions degrade the bandwidth of a connection, or a reduced-bandwidth alternative communication mode is used) or lost. The process preferably automatically detects when failovers are necessary, and may be accompanied by one or more alternative modes of communication. Failover to POTS, satellite, etc., can be provided, such as with commercially available solutions by NETRIX including their Nx2200 series switches, and/or to a secondary interface using routing daemons such as disclosed in U.S. Patent Application Publication No. 2010/0097925 to Bell, such teachings of which are incorporated by reference. 
     With reference to  FIG. 2 , in such a failover process  200  the network extension device commences in full bandwidth mode  210  after startup  201 , immediately performing a security check  216 . (Preferably, data mirroring, which can utilize or be functionally similar to database software sold by several commercial vendors such as Microsoft and Oracle, also commences, preferably creating and maintaining a local copy of important data and applications that is complete enough to support subsequent operation in no bandwidth mode with at least a selected subset of applications. Various known failover computing and backup techniques can be employed as appropriate for a given embodiment, such as those taught in U.S. Pat. No. 7,707,457 to Marchand and U.S. Patent Application Publication No. 2010/0057789 to Kawaguchi, the disclosures of which in that regard are incorporated by reference.). Failure of the security check causes the network extension device  100  to enter recover mode  219  (whereupon an alert to the failure is provided, and depending on the perceived severity of the failure, an automated response to the failure may be initiated); otherwise, a bandwidth connectivity check  211  is performed to determine if full, partial, or no bandwidth communication is present (e.g., ‘full’ if the bandwidth is sufficient for the external network  99  to perform the computational processing required for the nodes connected to the network extension device  100  to operate as thin clients, ‘partial’ if the bandwidth tests at a level falling below support for thin client processing but sufficient to allow the network extension device  100  to process the applications while the data is exchanged with the external network  99 , and ‘no’ for a bandwidth that tests below a threshold to support even shared computational processing). The outcome at that step causes the network extension device  100  to enter the associated bandwidth mode (i.e., full bandwidth mode  210 , partial bandwidth mode  212 , no bandwidth mode  214 ) and then perform another security check  216 ,  217 , or  218 , and so on. In partial bandwidth mode  212 , the network extension device  100  performs a security check  217 , which if passed leads to a bandwidth connectivity check  211 . The outcome of the check again causes the network extension device  100  to enter the associated resultant bandwidth mode of the bandwidth connectivity check  212 . This same cycle is repeated when the network extension device  100  is in no bandwidth mode  214 , but with security check  218 . 
     In a preferred embodiment, the trusted device  125  changes what is monitored depending on the mode of communication. In full bandwidth mode  210 , the trusted device  125  performs security check  216  and monitors the functions that provide access to network applications and data that reside on the external network  99  for unauthorized changes (and also, e.g., for inappropriately addressed TCP/IP data packets when compared to the “white list” of approved recipients). In a ‘thin client embodiment,’ network extension module  150  preferably just passes data through without any significant processing during full bandwidth mode  210 . 
     After a communications failover to partial bandwidth mode  212 , local hosting of processing begins (preferably based on data mirrored during full bandwidth mode  210 ) such as running the web browser server locally (optionally, ‘locked down’) on the network extension module  150  (preferably using a secure system virtual machine), to leave the restricted communications bandwidth more available for data transport. The trusted device  125  preferably adapts its monitoring techniques and security check  217  to incorporate the adjusted operation of the network extension device  100 . In addition to monitoring the web browser server, the protocol of communications may be changed resulting in a different method by which monitoring must take place. 
     Finally, in the no bandwidth mode  214 , all applications and data are retained and executed locally until connectivity is re-established back to the external network  99 . (In this embodiment, that is the most complex local computing allowed by the architecture and system-enforced policy, and is specified to be within the monitoring capability of the trusted device  125 ). The techniques of monitoring and security check  218  by the trusted device  125  are preferably adapted to allow trust of the network extension device  100  to be retained and then attested back to the external network  99  when connectivity is restored. (Preferably, local mirror and external databases are re-synchronized if and when network connectivity is restored). 
     One skilled in the art will appreciate that other variations, modifications, and applications are also within the scope of the present invention. Thus, the foregoing detailed description is not intended to limit the invention in any way, which is limited only by the following claims and their legal equivalents.

Technology Classification (CPC): 7