Patent Abstract:
A method for secure loading, integrity checking of the runtime image and control over the runtime execution of applications which ensures that a software application loads only code it was authorized to load, and that the software application is monitored for unauthorized modifications of the runtime image. The method proposed can be used as a basis for further enforcing of authorization rules during the execution of an application, e.g. for Digital Rights Management.

Full Description:
FIELD OF THE INVENTION 
     The present invention relates to the field of computer systems and methods, and more particularly without limitation to the field of computer security. 
     This application claims priority to copending Europe utility application entitled, “A Computer Security Method And Computer System” having serial no. EP 05300198.8, filed Mar. 18, 2005, which is entirely incorporated herein by reference. 
     BACKGROUND AND PRIOR ART 
     Over the last two decades, the functionality and convenience of computers has improved steadily. An ever growing number of interconnected computers and mobile devices are used to perform important tasks in many areas of society and in the daily lives of a growing number of people. This development, however beneficial, brings with it new vulnerabilities and concerns for security. A central problem is to allow a user to establish trust in the integrity of a computer system, or more particularly, in the integrity of a software application used for an important or sensitive purpose. 
     The integrity of a computer system depends not only on the integrity of the data in the non-volatile memory such as ROM or disks but also on the integrity of the runtime image in volatile memory such as RAM. The integrity of the runtime image can be corrupted due to intentional or non-intentional modifications of this image even if the static integrity of the executables before loading is guaranteed. Relevant vulnerabilities include loading of unauthorized code, buffer overflow, insufficient input validation, or, on Microsoft Windows platforms, security attacks based on a technique known as “DLL injection” where a remote process can write to the address space of a running application. Even with genuine code such as some system tools the runtime image of an application can be modified in an unauthorized manner. Since modifications can occur at any time, it is impossible to ensure a dynamic integrity of the runtime image of a software application with a single authentication before execution. 
     One prior art method for “secure software registration and integrity assessment in a computer system” is described in U.S. Pat. No. 5,944,821. A loader compares hash values of software applications before execution to previously prepared hash values in secure storage. Since no integrity checks during execution are performed, a dynamic integrity of the runtime image cannot be achieved. 
     The 2003 Microsoft Professional Developers Conference release of Microsoft Corporation&#39;s Next-Generation Secure Computing Base technologies for the Microsoft Windows family of operating systems is described in a white paper available at the Microsoft Developer Network library (http://msdn.microsoft.com/library/en-us/dnsecure/html/nca_considerations.asp). The computing environment is divided into two separate and distinct operating modes. Users can perform routine tasks in Standard mode using their existing applications, services, and devices. For their high-security tasks, those same users can run trusted, authenticated Nexus computing agents that execute in a separate and protected operating environment called Nexus mode. While Nexus mode protects Nexus computing agents from any harmful programs that may be running in Standard mode, within Nexus mode a Nexus security kernel uses standard virtual memory protections to isolate itself from Nexus computing agents and to isolate Nexus Computing agents from one another. 
     SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION 
     In accordance with the present invention there is provided a computer security method comprising loading a software application from a non-volatile memory in a volatile memory of a computer system by a secure loader, performing a first authentication of the software application, starting execution of the software application after its first authentication, and performing a second authentication of the software application during its execution. 
     Embodiments of the present invention are particularly advantageous as they enables to ensure not only the integrity of data stored in non-volatile memory but also the integrity of the runtime environment in volatile memory. 
     For example, the invention can help a user of a computer system ensure the integrity of software applications running on his or her platform. In another possible scenario the user can be prevented from executing an application in a way he or she is not explicitly authorized for, as is a common requirement in digital rights management. 
     In accordance with an embodiment of the invention the second authentication is performed repeatedly during the execution of the software application, for example at constant or variable time intervals. This has the advantage that unauthorized changes in the runtime environment occurring during the execution of the software application are detected after the passing of the current time interval. Such unauthorized changes may for example be caused by buffer overflow or insufficient input validation. A shorter time interval will lead to faster detection, and therefore higher security. Additionally or alternatively repeating the second authentication whenever new code sections are loaded into volatile memory or released from it by the software application has the advantage that unauthorized changes in the runtime environment at such events, for example caused by dynamically loaded unauthorized code, are detected before such code can be executed. 
     In accordance with an embodiment of the invention a digital certificate accompanies the software application, preferably in the form of a separate file on disk, for example in XML format, digitally signed by an authority trusted by the platform owner. The certificate is loaded and the software application authenticated using the information from the certificate. 
     In accordance with an embodiment of the invention the digital certificate lists hash values of code sections allowed to be loaded by the application; an assumption is that all pieces of code the application loads should be declared in the application&#39;s certificate. Each hash value itself is digitally signed by an authority trusted by the platform owner. 
     In accordance with an embodiment of the invention the second authentication of the software application is performed by authenticating a snapshot of the current image of the software application in volatile memory. The current image of the software application is read from the volatile memory. For each code section, the current hash value is then calculated from the image. The authentication is successful if each of the calculated hash value matches one of the hash values listed in the certificate. Either at regular intervals, or at any time a new code section is loaded or unloaded dynamically the application process is suspended, a new snapshot taken and authenticated. 
     In accordance with an embodiment of the invention the authentication method is adapted to take into account any genuine modifications that under some operating systems are applied to the runtime image of a code section after or during loading it in the volatile memory. This is achieved by reverse transforming the code of a code section after reading it from the volatile memory and before calculating its current hash value. 
     In accordance with an embodiment of the invention the genuine modifications are fix-ups of code that is not independent of its position in the volatile memory. For example, dynamically linked libraries on Microsoft Windows platforms often contain code that is not position-independent and has to be modified if the library is loaded at an address other than its preferred address. 
     In accordance with an embodiment of the invention the certificate comprises authorization rules limiting the right of the user to execute the software application in a way he or she is not explicitly authorized for. For example, the execution of the software application can be bound to a specific machine or a specific user; it is possible to limit the number of allowed executions, allow only parts of the application to be used on a particular platform, or execution during a given timeframe. An authorization rule may also allow dynamic loading of code sections from a library or executable signed by a specified, trusted software provider. The signature can be attached to the library or executable file in a special section. 
     In accordance with an embodiment of the invention the computer system comprises a cryptographic unit that directly controls loading and execution of the software application, which has to be separated into a first and a second part. The cryptographic unit provides cryptographic capabilities, secure storage, and authentication capabilities. The following protocol by which the cryptographic unit starts the software application requires that the cryptographic unit and the first part of the software application share a secret key and are able to independently calculate a keyed-hash message authentication code with it. 
     First, the cryptographic unit creates a token specifying a timeout and comprising information necessary for establishing a secure communication channel. The cryptographic unit inserts the token into a software verification function it stores, and calculates the keyed hash from the resulting bytes using the secret key shared with the first part of the software application. The cryptographic unit then provides the software verification function and its keyed hash to the first part of the software application. The first part of the software application verifies the keyed hash to authenticate the received software verification function and passes control to it. The software verification function then provides back the token to the cryptographic unit, before the token&#39;s timeout expires. The software verification function then passes control to the second part of the software application and provides the token to it. The second part of the software application then uses the token to establish a secure communication channel with the cryptographic unit. 
     In accordance with an embodiment of the invention, the second part of the software application comprises an encrypted section. After having sent the token back to the cryptographic unit, the software verification function requests the decryption of the encrypted section from the cryptographic unit. 
     In accordance with an embodiment of the invention the described protocol for starting the software application by the cryptographic unit is preceded by further steps to establish trust between the first part of the software application and the cryptographic unit. The first part of the software application begins by providing a request for a session identifier to the cryptographic unit. Then, the cryptographic unit creates the session identifier, preferably a random number, and returns it. The first part of the software application then prepares a request for communication comprising the session identifier and the process identifier of its own process. It calculates a keyed hash of the request for communication using the secret key shared with the cryptographic unit and provides both the request and the keyed hash to the cryptographic unit. The cryptographic unit then verifies the keyed hash. 
     In accordance with an embodiment of the invention the computer system comprises a secure loader. The secure loader, which is responsible for performing the second authentication of the software application, is itself implemented as another software application, its loading and execution preferably controlled directly by the cryptographic unit as described. The secure loader is started by loading it from the non-volatile memory in the volatile memory, performing a first authentication of the secure loader, starting execution of the secure loader after its first authentication, and performing a second authentication of the secure loader during its execution. 
     In accordance with an embodiment of the invention the computer system is a trusted platform in the sense of the Trusted Computing Group specification. The secure loader is loaded as part of a secure boot process, where the cryptographic unit provides a root of trust for the platform. The secure loader can be seen as a measurement agent on the trusted platform, which measures the dynamic integrity of the running applications. Preferably standard capabilities of the trusted platform are reused for establishing the shared secret between the cryptographic unit and the secure loader, and also for replacing some of the steps in the described protocol that establish trust between the first part of the software application and the cryptographic unit. 
    
    
     
       BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS 
       In the following preferred embodiments of the invention will be described in greater detail by way of example only making reference to the drawings in which: 
         FIG. 1  is a block diagram of a first embodiment of a computer system of the invention, 
         FIG. 2  is a flowchart illustrating a preferred mode of operation of the computer system of  FIG. 1  for user authentication, 
         FIG. 3  is an object relationship diagram illustrating a preferred protocol for starting a software application, 
         FIG. 4  is a juxtaposition of a preferred executable file format of a software application and its runtime image in volatile memory. 
     
    
    
     DETAILED DESCRIPTION 
       FIG. 1  shows a computer system  104  comprising a non-volatile memory  101 , a volatile memory  102 , a cryptographic unit  116  and a processor  146 . The non-volatile memory  101 , for example a hard disk, stores several files, including a software application  100  and a digital certificate  106  belonging to the software application  100 . The digital certificate  106  contains information about the code authorized to be loaded by the software application, in the form of hash values  108  of the code sections  110  of the software application. It can furthermore contain authorization rules  114  governing the execution of the application or allowing dynamic loading of additional code libraries  115  signed by a specific software provider whom the platform owner trusts. 
     In operation, the processor  146  can execute various program functions. In particular, it can execute a loader function  128  for loading executable code such as the code sections  110  of software application  100  from the non-volatile memory  101  into the volatile memory  102 . It furthermore can execute a first authenticator  130  that performs a first authentication of the software application  100 . This first authentication includes verifying the integrity of both the code sections  110  to load and of the certificate  108 . Using the hashing component  136  hash values of the code sections  110  are calculated and compared to the certified hash values  108  stored in the certificate  106 . The first authenticator  130  checks any authorization rules  114  found in the certificate as for example requirements to execute the software application on a specific platform, or in a specific time frame. 
     After a successful first authentication the processor  146  can execute program instructions  132  for starting execution of the software application  100 . During the execution of the software application  100 , a second authenticator  134  monitors and checks the integrity of the runtime image either at regular intervals or whenever it detects a change in the runtime image, for example when one of the code libraries  115  is dynamically loaded or unloaded. 
     The computer system  104  preferably comprises a cryptographic unit  116  having an identifier creator  144  for creating session identifiers, a token creator  138  for creating security tokens, a software verification function  118 , a hashing component  140  that is independent of the hashing component  136  of the processor  146 , and program instructions  142  of its own. Depending on the nature of the computer system  104  the cryptographic unit  116  can be implemented in different ways. On a trusted platform in the sense of the Trusted Computing Group specification the cryptographic unit can be considered as an extension to the Trusted Platform Module, a simple hardware module that serves as a root of trust for the platform. On non-trusted platforms, it can be implemented in the form of a cryptographic expansion card, or even purely as software. 
     The cryptographic unit  116  can directly control the loading and execution of the software application  100 , under the provision that the software application  100  be divided into a first  120  and a second  122  part, where the first part can be launched as a conventional software application, and the second part may comprise a code section that is encrypted in a way that requires the services of the cryptographic unit for decryption before it can be executed. By requiring these services, the software application  100  is forced to submit itself under the control of the cryptographic unit. To allow the software application  100  and the cryptographic unit  116  to authenticate to each other, they are instructed to share a secret key kept both in the cryptographic unit and by the software application. 
     In operation, when the processor  146  starts to execute software application  100 , a new process is created that loads the code sections  110  of the first part  120  of the software application. The first part of the software application initiates communication with the cryptographic unit by requesting a session identifier. The identifier creator  144  of the cryptographic unit generates a random number and returns it as session identifier to the first part of the software application. The session identifier will remain valid until the software application terminates and serves to protect against replay attacks, where a potential attacker records genuine messages and replays them at a later time. Using the hashing component  136  of the first part of the software application and the secret key shared by the first part of the software application and the cryptographic unit, the first part of the software application then calculates the keyed hash of the request for communication and provides both the request for communication and the keyed hash calculated from it to the cryptographic unit  116 . Using its own internal hashing component  140 , which employs the same hashing algorithm as the hashing component  136  of the first part of the software application, and the secret key shared with the first part of the software application, the cryptographic unit independently calculates the keyed hash of the request for communication received from the first part of the software application and verifies that the first part of the software application knows the secret key by establishing the identity of the result with the keyed hash supplied by the first part of the software application. 
     Having in this way authenticated the first part  120  of the software application  100 , the cryptographic unit  116  by means of the token creator  138  next creates a token, being essentially a string of bytes that wraps a timeout specification and further information needed by the software application  100  to establish a secure communication channel with the cryptographic unit. The cryptographic unit then executes program instructions  142  to insert the token into a template of a software verification function  118  that is stored by the cryptographic unit. Using its own internal hashing component  140  and the secret key it shares with the first part of the software function, the cryptographic unit then calculates a keyed hash of the bytes of the software verification function including the token. The cryptographic unit then executes further program instructions  142  for sending both the bytes of the software verification function and the keyed hash calculated from it to the first part of the software application. 
     Having received the software verification function  118  and the keyed hash that the cryptographic  116  unit calculated from it, the first part  120  of the software application  100  verifies the keyed hash by calculating itself a keyed hash of the software verification function using its own hashing component  136  and the secret key it shares with the cryptographic unit If the results are equal, the first part of the software application has authenticated the cryptographic unit, by having established that the cryptographic unit knows the shared secret. The first part of the software application then inserts the software verification function including the token into its own memory space, and instructs it with the name of the second part of the software application that needs to be loaded and potentially decrypted before loading. Finally, it yields control of execution to the software verification function. 
     Having gained control, the software verification function  118 , which is located in the volatile memory  102  spaces of the first part of the software application, returns a copy of the token contained within it to the cryptographic unit  116 . As a security measure, the returning of the token has to complete within the timeout specified in the token. The software verification function then takes a snapshot of the code sections  110  of the first part  120  of the software application  100  and sends it for authentication to the cryptographic unit along with a digital signature that is part of the executable file of the first part  120  of the software application. The format of the executable file including the digital signature, which is an encrypted hash value, is explained in  FIG. 4 . 
     After the cryptographic unit  116  has the digital signature of the first part  120  of the software application  100 , the software verification function  118  sends to the cryptographic unit the bytes of the second part  122  of the software application along with a digital signature that is part of the executable file of the second part of the software application. The cryptographic unit verifies the digital signature of the second part of the software application. If the second part of the software application comprises encrypted code sections the cryptographic unit decrypts these code sections. The cryptographic unit returns the code of the second part of the software application to the software verification function, which loads it into the volatile memory  102  space of the software application. The software verification function then passes control to the second part of the software application. The second part of the software application uses the information contained in the token to establish a secure communication channel with the cryptographic unit. 
     If the computer system  104  is a trusted platform in the Trusted Computing Group specification, the cryptographic unit provides a root of trust that extends to the software application  100  because the software application  100  is authenticated and therefore trusted by the cryptographic unit. In a similar way, if the cryptographic unit is implemented as a cryptographic expansion card or in software only, a user of the computer system  104 , who has confidence in the cryptographic unit, can have confidence in the operation of the software application  100 , too. 
     In principle, any software application can, in the way described for the software application  100 , be authenticated by the cryptographic unit  116 , provided that it can be built in the same format as described for the software application  100 . In particular, it is possible to create a software application that, while itself being authenticated by the cryptographic unit in the way described for the software application  100 , is able to authenticate further software applications. The computer system  104  comprises such a software application, called a secure loader  126 . 
     The secure loader  126  is started as described above for software application  100 . Preferably the secure loader is loaded and executed under direct control of the cryptographic unit  116 , in the same way as described for the software application  100 . The secure loader  126  can then in turn securely load, dynamically authenticate, and authorize other software applications. 
     If the computer system  104  is a trusted platform in the sense of the Trusted Computing Group specification, the secure loader  126  is preferably loaded as part of a secure boot process. The cryptographic unit  116  provides a root of trust that extends to the secure loader, which is authenticated by the cryptographic unit, and via the secure loader to other software applications loaded and authenticated by the secure loader. On a trusted platform where the root of trust is implemented as a low-cost, low-performance hardware module the secure loader is of particular advantage. Because the secure loader is executed by the main processor  146  of the computer system the hardware requirements for the cryptographic unit  126  can be kept modest. 
     The secure loader  126  can be implemented as a part of the operating system of the Computer system  104 , such as an extension of the standard operating system loader. 
       FIG. 2  shows a flowchart illustrating a computer security method, which comprises steps of secure loading, dynamic authentication, and authorization of a software application. In Step  200 , the software application is loaded from the non-volatile memory in the volatile memory. In Step  202 , the first authentication of the software application is performed. In Step  204 , the execution of the software application is started. In Step  206 , the second authentication of the software application is performed. 
     On a computer system comprising a secure loader, the method is performed twice. First it is performed with respect to the secure loader, preferably under control of a cryptographic unit of the computer system, and preferably as part of a secure boot process on a trusted platform in the sense of the Trusted Computing Group specification, where the cryptographic unit serves as a root of trust of the system. In Step  200 , the secure loader is loaded from the non-volatile memory in the volatile memory. In Step  202 , the first authentication of the secure loader is performed, In Step  204 , the execution of the secure loader is started. In Step  206 , the second authentication of the secure loader is performed. As a result, on a trusted platform, trust extends from the cryptographic unit as root of trust to the secure loader. 
     Second, the method is performed by the secure loader with respect to another, securely loaded software application. In Step  200 , the secure loader loads the securely loaded software application from the non-volatile memory in the volatile memory. In Step  202 , the secure loader performs the first authentication of the securely loaded software application. In Step  204 , the secure loader starts the execution of the securely loaded software application. In Step  206 , the secure loader performs the second authentication of the securely loaded software application. As a result, on a trusted platform, trust extends from the cryptographic unit as root of trust to the secure loader, and via the secure loader to the securely loaded software application. 
       FIG. 3  shows an object-relationship diagram illustrating a protocol by which the cryptographic unit starts the software application, which in order to be directly controlled by the cryptographic unit needs to be separated into a first and second part. After the start of the execution of the first part of the software application it requests ( 300 ) a session identifier from the cryptographic unit. The cryptographic unit creates ( 302 ) the session identifier and provides ( 304 ) it back to the first part of the software application. The first part of the software application then prepares ( 306 ) a request for communication intended for the cryptographic unit. To prove the authenticity of the request to the cryptographic unit, the first part of the software application calculates ( 308 ) and attaches a message-authentication code using a secret key that is known also to the cryptographic unit. The message authentication code preferably is a keyed hash based on a cryptographic hash function such as MD5 or SHA-1 and the secret key, calculated according to the method described by H. Krawczyk, M. Bellare, and R. Canetti in “HMAC: Keyed-Hashing for Message Authentication,” Internet Engineering Task Force, Request for Comments (RFC) 2104, February 1997. The first part of the software application provides ( 310 ) the request for communication and its keyed hash to the cryptographic unit, which verifies ( 312 ) the keyed hash, creates ( 314 ) a token comprising a timeout and information for establishing a secure communication channel with the cryptographic unit, inserts ( 316 ) the token into the software verification function it stores, and calculates ( 318 ) a keyed hash of the resulting bytes using the same secret key. The cryptographic unit then provides ( 320 ) the software verification function including the inserted token and its keyed hash to the first part of the software application, which verifies ( 322 ) the keyed hash and passes control to the software verification function, which now resides within the software application&#39;s memory space in the volatile memory. 
     The software verification function immediately provides back ( 326 ) the token to the cryptographic unit. This has to occur within the limit set by the timeout, which should be as short as possible for maximum security. The software verification function then requests ( 328 ) the cryptographic unit to decrypt any encrypted code sections of the second part of the software verification function. The cryptographic unit fulfils ( 330 ) the request and provides ( 331 ) the decrypted code to the software verification function, which passes ( 332 ) execution control and the token to the second part of the software application. The second part of the software application then uses this information to establish a secure communication channel with the cryptographic unit. 
       FIG. 4  shows a juxtaposition of a possible format of an executable file of the software application  100  suitable for being securely loaded with a corresponding runtime image  432  in volatile memory. The depicted format of the executable file is based on the standard executable format of Microsoft Windows executables but the principle considerations are equally valid on other platforms. At the beginning of the executable file  100  are located standard headers and sections  400  as can be found also in executable files of the standard executable format. During loading of the software application these standard headers and sections are copied into volatile memory, where their image  420  forms the head end of the software application&#39;s runtime image  432  in volatile memory. The standard headers and sections  400  are followed by non-encrypted code sections  110 , as can be found in the same way in executable files of the standard executable format. The non-encrypted code sections are copied to corresponding sections  422  of the software application&#39;s runtime image in volatile memory, possibly subject to post-processing depending on the location of the code in volatile memory. 
     A part of the code of the software application  100  is located in encrypted code sections  124  that can be sandwiched by sections of non-encrypted code. Such sections are not part of the standard executable format. During the loading of the software application  100  the encrypted code sections are decrypted before being added as further, decrypted, code sections  424  to the runtime image, subject to post-processing depending on the location of the decrypted code in volatile memory. Following the non-encrypted  110  and encrypted  124  code sections in the executable file  100  are further standard sections  406  as are found also in executable files of the standard executable format. These sections are copied during loading to form the tail end of the software application&#39;s runtime image, resulting in a runtime image  432  in volatile memory that is of the same format as a runtime image of a standard executable file. 
     The executable file further comprises a code encryption key  408  that was used for the encryption  402  of the code of the encrypted code section  124 . This key  408  is either supplied by the software creator or by the platform owner, possibly during installation of the software application  100 . The key  408  itself is subject to asymmetric encryption  410  using a public key of a public-private key pair, the private key of which is stored in the cryptographic unit  116 . If the computer system  104  is a trusted platform in the sense of the Trusted Computing Group specification the public key used could be part of an identity credential of the platform. The executable file further comprises pointers to the offset of the start  412  and the end  414  of the encrypted code section  124  serving to identify which part of the executable file has to be decrypted. Note that an executable file structured as depicted  100  could contain further encrypted code sections, each encrypted with different encryption keys stored in the file  100 . 
     The final section  416  of the depicted executable file  100  contains as digital signature a hash valve calculated from the rest of the executable file  100 . The hash value is subject to encryption  418  with the private key of the software creator or the platform owner. If the private key of the platform owner is used and the computer system  104  is a trusted platform in the sense of the Trusted Computing Group specification, the execution of the software application  100  could be bound to a specific platform identity. 
     LIST OF REFERENCE NUMERALS 
     
         
           100  Software application 
           101  Non-volatile memory 
           102  Volatile memory 
           104  Computer system 
           106  Certificate 
           108  Hash value 
           110  Code section 
           114  Authorization rule 
           115  Library 
           116  Cryptographic unit 
           118  Software verification function 
           120  First part of the software application 
           122  Second part of the software application 
           126  Secure loader 
           128  Loader 
           130  First authenticator 
           132  Program instructions 
           134  Second authenticator 
           136  Hashing component 
           138  Token creator 
           140  Hashing component 
           142  Program instructions 
           144  Identifier creator 
           146  Processor 
           200  Loading into volatile memory 
           202  First authentication 
           204  Start of execution 
           206  Second authentication 
           300  Request for session identifier 
           302  Creation of session identifier 
           304  Provision of session identifier 
           306  Preparation of request for communication 
           308  Calculation of keyed hash of request for communication 
           310  Provision of request for communication 
           312  Verification of keyed hash 
           314  Creation of token 
           316  Insertion of token into software verification function 
           318  Calculation of keyed hash of software verification function 
           320  Provision of software verification function 
           322  Verification of keyed hash 
           324  Passing of control to software verification function 
           326  Provision of token 
           328  Provision of request to decrypt 
           330  Decryption 
           331  Provision of decrypted second part of software application 
           332  Passing control to second part of software application 
           334  Establishing of secure channel 
           400  Standard headers and sections 
           402  Encryption by code encryption key 
           406  Other standard sections 
           408  Code encryption key 
           410  Encryption by public key of cryptographic unit 
           412  Offset of encrypted code start 
           414  Offset of encrypted code end 
           416  File hash 
           418  Encryption by private key of platform owner or software creator 
           420  Runtime image of standard headers and sections 
           422  Runtime image of non-encrypted code 
           424  Runtime image of encrypted code 
           430  Runtime image of other standard sections

Technology Classification (CPC): 6