Patent Abstract:
This invention provides a novel method, system, and apparatus allowing an authorized user access to controlled assets when a passcode method malfunctions, such as when a user forgets a password, a token malfunction, or a biometric mismatch. The invention allows temporary access to an access control system without knowing the password and without sending the user the password or a new random password. The user is able to set a new password without knowing the previous password. Furthermore, stored encrypted data is preserved and made accessible once again via the new passcode. This invention works for many authentication methods such as restoring access when a password, token, access card, or biometric sample is used.

Full Description:
CROSS-REFERENCE TO RELATED APPLICATIONS 
     The present application is a continuation application to non-provisional application Ser. No. 13/671,534 filed Nov. 7, 2012 which is currently pending and related to and claimed priority from prior provisional application Ser. No. 61/628,996 filed Nov. 10, 2011. 
    
    
     FIELD OF THE INVENTION 
     This invention relates generally to the field of protecting secured assets, and particularly a method and system for creating a passcode to allow a user access to controlled assets and a passcode recovery process for when the source of the passcode fails to function. 
     BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION 
     The protection of valuable assets is vital for government, private entities and individuals. Valuable assets are commonly protected by various access control systems to ensure that access to the assets are limited to only authorized persons. This includes protecting physical assets such as research labs with expensive equipment and file cabinets containing sensitive private information stored in the human resource department of a corporate office. Applications also include protecting electronic assets in the form of electronic data stored in computer and electronic systems. Access control systems use various authentication methods to control access to the physical and electronic assets. Typical authentication methods include passwords, tokens, access cards, biometrics, or other passcodes that ensure only authorized persons have access to the valuable assets. 
     Several problems arise when the authentication process malfunctions, such as when a user forgets a password, a token fails to work, or biometric match failure. Furthermore with respect to electronic data, stored and encrypted data will be lost, when a security system uses the passcode as an input for a data encryption algorithm or other secure transformation function. Users are encumbered with security features that require users to remember passwords, carry tokens, or utilize biometric features, so it is inevitable that such authentication methods regularly malfunction. 
     Existing authentication methods are vulnerable to misuse when a user attempts to recover a passcode after the authentication method fails to function, such as when the user forgets a password, has a malfunctioning token, or experiences a biometric match failure. For example, to reset a password the access control system must keep a record of the password in a database and send a copy to the user upon request. Alternatively, the access control system may establish a new random password and send a copy to the user. In both cases, the access control system knows the user&#39;s password. The password is thus vulnerable to disclosure to unauthorized users by means of attacks on the server, database, or the copy sent to the user. The password is also vulnerable to disclosure by unauthorized users from insider threats that lookup or reset the password from within the access control system. Furthermore, stored encrypted data will be permanently lost if the security system used the password as an input to the encryption algorithm and the original password was not stored in backup, or the user&#39;s stored encrypted data is susceptible to decryption by an unauthorized user with access to the stored password in backup. 
     This invention provides a novel method allowing an authorized user access to controlled assets when a passcode method malfunctions, such as when a user forgets a password, a token malfunction, or a biometric mismatch. For example, the invention allows temporary access to an access control system without knowing the password and without sending the user the password or a new random password. The user is able to set a new password without knowing the previous password. Furthermore, stored encrypted data is preserved and made accessible once again via the new password. This invention works for many authentication methods such as restoring access when a password, token, access card, or biometric method is used. 
     BRIEF SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION 
     In one embodiment of the invention a method for creating a passcode which may be derived from a password, token or biometric sample to allow a user access to controlled assets and a passcode code recovery process for when the source of the passcode (i.e. password, token, or biometric sample) fails to function comprises the first step of creating a passcode. Next, if needed, the passcode is converted into a numeric value. Next, either a predetermined value or a generated random code that is at least the same order of magnitude as the passcode or its numeric conversion is used as the first cryptographic recovery split. Next, the passcode and random code are used as inputs in a cryptographic derivation function to form a second cryptographic recovery split. More recovery splits may be generated if needed, but two is the minimum required. Next, the first cryptographic recovery split is stored in one repository and the second cryptographic recovery split is stored in a second repository that is isolated from the first repository. Next, when the source of the passcode fails to function, the first cryptographic recovery split is retrieved from the first repository and the second cryptographic recovery split is retrieved from the second repository. Next, the two cryptographic recovery split values are recombined in a reverse operation to reproduce the original passcode. Next, a new source of the passcode is supplied (i.e. a new password, new token, or new biometric sample) and cryptographically reconciled with the cryptographic derivation function to produce the same passcode. Alternatively, a new passcode can be generated and all existing electronic data may be encrypted using the new passcode instead of the original passcode. Next, a new random code is created that is at least the same size as the new passcode. Finally, the new passcode and new random code are used as inputs in a cryptographic derivation function to form a new second cryptographic recovery split with the new first cryptographic recovery split stored in a first repository and the new second cryptographic recovery split stored in a second repository. 
     In another embodiment of the invention a system for creating a passcode which may be derived from a password, token or biometric sample to allow a user access to controlled assets and a passcode code recovery process for when the source of the passcode (i.e. password, token, or biometric sample) fails to function comprises a first device for creating a passcode. The passcode creation device is coupled to a random code generation device that uses a predetermined value or creates a random code of at least the same order of magnitude as the passcode to be used as a first cryptographic recovery split. Next a cryptographic derivation function device executes a cryptographic split operation using the passcode and random code as inputs to form a second cryptographic recovery split. The cryptographic derivation function device is coupled to at least two repositories. The random code is stored in the first repository as one cryptographic recovery split. The output of the cryptographic derivation function is stored in a second repository as the second cryptographic split. The source of the passcode (i.e. password, token, or biometric sample) is not stored in the first or second repositories; instead it is either stored in the user&#39;s memory, on an access card or another type of storage device separate from the first or second repositories. Next, when the source of the passcode (i.e. password, token, or biometric sample) fails to function the user initiates the passcode code recovery device which retrieves the random code from the first repository and the output of the cryptographic derivation function from the second repository then the two cryptographic recovery split values are recombined in a reverse operation to reproduce the original passcode. Next, a new source of the passcode is supplied (i.e. a new password, new token, or new biometric sample) and cryptographically reconciled with the cryptographic derivation function to produce the same passcode. Alternatively, a new passcode can be generated and all existing electronic data may be encrypted using the new passcode instead of the original passcode. Finally, the devices of this system are used again to repeat the steps required creating a new random code and new cryptographic recovery splits. 
    
    
     
       BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS 
       Features and advantages of the claimed subject matter will be apparent from the following detailed description of embodiments consistent therewith, which description should be considered with reference to the accompanying drawings, wherein: 
         FIG. 1  is a diagram of an exemplary embodiment for creating a passcode and the cryptographic recovery splits needed for the passcode recovery process in accordance with the teachings of the present invention; 
         FIG. 2  is a diagram of an exemplary embodiment for a passcode recovery process needed when the source of the passcode fails to function in accordance with the teachings of the present invention; 
         FIG. 3  is a diagram of an exemplary embodiment for a system to create a passcode and the cryptographic recovery splits needed for the passcode recovery process in accordance with the teachings of the present invention; 
         FIG. 4  is a diagram of an exemplary embodiment for a system that uses the source of the passcode to gain access to the controlled assets being protected by the access control system in accordance with the teachings of the present invention; 
         FIG. 5  is a diagram of an exemplary embodiment for a system including a passcode recovery device needed when the source of the passcode fails to function in accordance with the teachings of the present invention; 
         FIG. 6  is a diagram of an exemplary embodiment for an apparatus incorporating components that function in accordance with the teachings of the present invention. 
     
    
    
     DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE INVENTION 
     The following describes the details of the invention. Although the following description will proceed with reference being made to illustrative embodiments, many alternatives, modifications, and variations thereof will be apparent to those skilled in the art. Accordingly, it is intended that the claimed subject matter be viewed broadly. Examples are provided as reference and should not be construed as limiting. The term “such as” when used should be interpreted as “such as, but not limited to.” 
       FIG. 1  is a diagram of an exemplary embodiment for a method  100  to create a passcode  105  allowing a user  110  access to controlled assets  120  within an access control system  130 . The user  110  described throughout this specification may include a person, or an automated system controlled by computer software or other artificial intelligence. The controlled assets  120  may be physical assets such as a building, locked room, safe, or file cabinet; or an electronic asset such as data stored on a computer or electronic system. Furthermore, the passcode  105  and access control system  130  may comprise any type of system intended to control access to controlled assets  120  such as a direct passcode system, a token system which essentially stores the source of the passcode on a token device such as an RF chip within a fob or an access card, or a biometric system which essentially associates a passcode to the unique biometric features of a person, or thing, or any type of access control system that essentially uses a passcode. Examples of this invention are provided as reference throughout the specification using various passcode and access control systems, but any passcode and access control system may be substituted in the examples to exemplify this invention. 
     First the source for the passcode  101  is used as an input to create the passcode  140 . For example, a user  110  uses a numerical input console  115  to create a source for the passcode  101  that is used as the input to create a passcode  105  which allows the user  110  to access the controlled assets  120  within the access control system  130 . In some circumstances, the access control system  130  may allow use of a non-numeric passcode  151  such as a code using letters or special characters. In such a circumstance, the non-numeric passcode  151  is converted  150  to the passcode  105  with a numerical value. Next either a predetermined value or numerical random code  161  is created that is the same order of magnitude or greater as the value of the passcode&#39;s  105  numeric value. For example, if the passcode  105  comprises a number with six digits, the random code  161  will also comprise at least six digits. 
     Next the random code  161  and the passcode  105  are used as inputs for a cryptographic derivation function  170  to form a second cryptographic recovery split  171 . More recovery splits may be generated if needed, but two is the minimum required. The cryptographic derivation function  170  may be accomplished by using a reversible algorithm such as the Exclusive-OR (“XOR”) binary Boolean algebraic operation. The passcode  105  and random code  161  are used as inputs in the cryptographic derivation function  170  to form a second cryptographic recovery split  171  with the first encrypted split  161  stored in one repository  180  and the second encrypted split  171  stored in a second repository  190 . For example, the random code  161  is stored on a first storage device as one cryptographic split and the output of the cryptographic split  171  is stored on a second storage device as the second cryptographic split component  171 . The order in which the encrypted splits  161  and  171  are stored is not significant. The output from the XOR operation  171  could be stored in the first repository and the random code  161  could be stored in the second repository. 
     The passcode  105  is not stored on the first or second repositories; instead it is stored in a repository separate from the first or second repositories  180  and  190  that contain the recovery splits  161  and  171 . Alternatively, one of the cryptographic recovery splits  161  or  171  may be stored on the asset control system  130  or the same device that contains the user&#39;s encrypted data. The source of the passcode such as the password, token, or biometric sample is not stored in the first or second repositories; instead it is either stored in the user&#39;s memory, on an access card or another type of storage device separate from the first or second repositories  195 . 
     The XOR operation is ideal for encryption since it is virtually impossible to reverse without knowing the initial value of one of the two binary arguments and the output from the XOR operation; however any other type of reversible cryptographic split operation may be used. In other words, using the XOR operation the passcode  105  cannot be recovered without the random code  161  and the output of the XOR operation  171 . The random code  161  and the output of the XOR operation  171  are each useless by themselves because they individually cannot be used to recover the passcode  105 . However, the passcode  105  can be recovered when the random code  161  and the output of the XOR operation  171  are subjected to the inverse XOR operation. 
       FIG. 2  is a diagram of an exemplary embodiment for a method  200  to recover the passcode  222  when the source of the passcode  201  fails to function. First, the first cryptographic recovery split  207  is retrieved from the first repository  205  and the second cryptographic recovery split  212  is retrieved from the second repository  210 . In other words, the random passcode  207  is retrieved from the first repository  205  and the output from the XOR operation  212  is retrieved from the second repository  210 . The user  201  can have access to the first repository  205  and can readily obtain the first cryptographic recovery split  207 . The first repository  205  is available from the access control system  202 , is in the user&#39;s possession, or is otherwise directly available to the user through a third party. 
     The output from the XOR operation  212  (or  540  referring to  FIG. 5 ), however, is not directly available to the user  201  (or  515  referring to  FIG. 5 ). Instead, the user  515  must request the output from the XOR operation  540  from a separately controlled second repository  550 , referring to  FIG. 5 . For example, the second repository  550  may be a central database under the control of a custodian  560 . To gain access to the output from the XOR operation  540  the user  565  must first authenticate his/her identity, such as by answering questions that only the user  565  would be able to answer or other alternative means of identification commensurate with the security policy of the asset control system  590 . This may be accomplished by human interaction, or with an automated system coupled to the central database. Once the user  565  correctly authenticates his/her identity to the custodian  560 , the output from XOR operation  540  is released to the user  565 , or the access control system  590 . 
     Next referring to  FIG. 2 , the two cryptographic recovery splits  207  and  212  are recombined by performing a reverse cryptographic derivation function  220  to recover the passcode  222 . The XOR operation  220  may be done by a component of the access control system  202 , such as a passcode recovery device  570 , referring to  FIG. 5 , or a computer  580  coupled  585  to the access control system  590 . The reverse XOR operation  220  uses the random code  207  and the output of the XOR operation  212  as inputs to recover the passcode  222 . 
     With the recovered passcode  222 , the user  201  is able to gain temporary access to the access control system  202 . Next, a new source of the passcode  206  is supplied such as a new password, new token, or new biometric sample and cryptographically reconciled with the cryptographic derivation function  220  to produce a new passcode  209 . The new passcode  209  may be identical to the original passcode  222 . Now any encrypted electronic data requiring the recovered passcode  222  may be decrypted  240  to prevent the loss of stored encrypted data. Alternatively the new passcode  209  can be generated with a unique value. 
     The method described in  FIG. 1  can now be repeated  250 . Referring to  FIG. 1 , for example if needed, the new passcode  105  may be converted into a numeric value  151 . Next, a new random code  161  is created that is at least the same order of magnitude as the original passcode or new passcode  105 . Finally the new passcode  105  and new random code  161  are used as inputs in the cryptographic derivation function  170  to form a second cryptographic recovery split  171  with the first cryptographic recovery split  161  stored in one repository  180  and the second cryptographic recovery split  171  stored in a second repository  190 . 
       FIG. 3  is an embodiment of the invention for a system  300  used to create a passcode  325  which may be derived from a source of the passcode  303  such as a password, token, or biometric sample to allow a user  301  access to controlled assets  380  in an access control system  370 . The system  300  comprises a passcode creation device  305 . In one embodiment, the passcode creation device  305  comprises a numerical input console  310  such as a keyboard, or other type of numeric console for inputting the source of the passcode  303 . The source of the passcode  303  may include a password, token, or biometric sample. In some circumstances, the passcode creation device  305  may comprise an input console  310  that creates a non-numeric passcode  315  such as a code using letters or special characters. In such a circumstance, the non-numeric passcode  315  must be converted to a numerical passcode  325  using a numeric code conversion device  320 . Next, the passcode creation device  305  is coupled to a random code generation device  330  that uses a predetermined value or creates a random code  335  of at least the same order of magnitude as the passcode  325  to be used as a first cryptographic recovery split. For example, if the passcode  325  comprises a number with six digits, the random code generation device  330  will create a random code  335  also comprising at least six digits. It is important for the random code  335  to have the same order of magnitude or greater than the passcode  325  so the two binary components can be used as inputs to a cryptographic derivation function device  340 . 
     Next the system comprises a cryptographic derivation function device  340  that executes a cryptographic split operation using the passcode  325  and random code  335  as inputs to form a second cryptographic recovery split  350 . The cryptographic derivation function device  340  accomplishes the cryptographic split by using a reversible algorithm such as the Exclusive-OR (“XOR”) binary Boolean algebraic operation. The random code  335  and the passcode  325  are used as inputs for a cryptographic derivation function to form a second cryptographic recovery split  350 . More cryptographic recovery splits may be generated if needed, but two is the minimum required. The first cryptographic recovery split, i.e. the random code  335 , is stored in one repository  355  and the second cryptographic recovery split, i.e. the output to the XOR operation  350 , is stored in a second repository  360 . The order in which the cryptographic recovery splits are stored is not significant. In other words, the output from the XOR operation  350  could be stored in the first repository  355  and the random code  335  could be stored in the second repository  360 . The repositories  355  and  360  may include any type of permanent or semi-permanent storage device capable of retaining the cryptographic recovery split such as random access memory (RAM) and read only memory (ROM) in a computer, server, network, and electronic database; printed on paper; or output onto a punch card. 
     The source of the passcode  303  is not stored in the first or second repositories  355  and  360 ; instead it is either stored in the user&#39;s memory, on an access card or another type of storage device  303  separate from the first or second repositories  355  and  360 . The passcode  325  is also not stored on the first or second repositories  355  and  360 ; instead it is stored in a passcode repository  365  separate from the first or second repositories  355  and  360 . 
       FIG. 4  is a diagram of the invention  400  illustrating a typical use in which the user  405  retrieves the source of the passcode  415  from the source of the passcode repository  418  which in turn enables the passcode  420  to be retrieved from the passcode repository  410  and passed to the access control system  430  to gain access to the controlled assets  420  within the access control system  430 . To access the source of the passcode, the user may use some source  408  such as a password entered with a console, via a token, or from a biometric sample. The access control system  430  authenticates the passcode  420  and then allows the user  405  access to the controlled assets  420 . 
       FIG. 5  is a diagram of an exemplary embodiment of the invention for a system  500  used to recover a passcode  570  when the source of the passcode  303  (referring to  FIG. 3 ) such as a password, token, or biometric sample fails to function comprising a first passcode recovery device  510 . The passcode recovery device  510  retrieves the random code  520  from the first repository  530  and the output from the XOR operation  540  from the second repository  550 . The first repository  530  is situated such that the user  565  has ready access to the first repository  530  to obtain the random code  520 . For example, the first repository  530  may be coupled  535  to the access control system  590 , the user&#39;s computer, local system, server, or network  568  in the user&#39;s possession, or otherwise directly available to the user  565 . 
     The output from the XOR operation  540 , however, is not directly available to the user  565 . The user  565  must request the output from the XOR operation  540  from a separately controlled second repository  550 . For example, the second repository  550  may be a central database, server, computer, or network under the control of a custodian  560 . To gain access to the output from the XOR operation  540 , the user  565  must first authenticate his/her identity by answering questions that only the user  565  would be able to answer. This may be accomplished by human interaction, or with an automated system coupled to the separately controlled second repository  550 . Once the user  565  correctly authenticates his/her identity to the custodian  560 , the output from XOR operation  540  is released to the passcode recovery device  510 . 
     The passcode recovery device  510  then executes an inverse cryptographic split operation using the random code  520  and the output of the XOR operation  540  as inputs to reproduce the original passcode  570 . The passcode recovery device  510  may be a component of the access control system  590 , such as a computer  580  coupled  585  to the access control system  590 . 
     The user  565  is thus able to gain temporary access to the access control system  590  once the passcode  570  has been recovered. The process and devices used to create the passcode and recovery features can again be repeated. Referring to  FIG. 1 , the user  301  then supplies a new source for the passcode  303  such as a new password, new token, or new biometric sample that is cryptographically reconciled with the cryptographic derivation device  340 . Any electrical data encrypted with the passcode may be decrypted preventing loss of stored encrypted data. Finally, the devices comprising this system described in  FIG. 1  through  FIG. 5  may be used again to create new cryptographic recovery splits. 
     Throughout this description reference was made to several discreet devices, such as the passcode creation device  601 , random code generation device  602 , numeric passcode conversion device  603 , passcode repository  604 , first and second cryptographic recovery split repositories  605  and  606 , access control system  607 , and a passcode recovery device  607 . An apparatus such as a computer, electronic, or security apparatus may be devised where such discreet devices are combined into fewer devices, or designed with components and programed to execute the steps and incorporate the features described in this invention.  FIG. 6  illustrates an example, where the hardware  610  and software  620  of a computer, electronic system, or security system  600  could be designed to perform many, and possibly all of the functions and features described by this invention. 
     Several devices described throughout this invention may be coupled in a manner that allows the exchange and interaction of data, such that the operations and processes described may be carried out. For example, the devices may be coupled with electrical circuitry, or through wireless networks that allow the devices to transfer data, receive power, execute the operations described, and provide structural integrity. 
     The terms and expressions which have been employed herein are used as terms of description and not of limitation, and there is no intention, in the use of such terms and expressions, of excluding any equivalents of the features shown and described (or portions thereof), and it is recognized that various modifications are possible within the scope of the claims. Other modifications, variations, and alternatives are also possible. Accordingly, the claims are intended to cover all such equivalents.

Technology Classification (CPC): 7