Patent Abstract:
A method and apparatus for securely communicating ephemeral information from a first node to a second node. In a first embodiment, the first node encodes and transmits an ephemeral message encrypted at least in part with an ephemeral key, from the first node to the second node. Only the second node has available to it the information that is needed to achieve decryption by an ephemeral key server of a decryption key that is needed to decrypt certain encrypted payload information contained within the message communicated from the first node to the second node. In a second embodiment the first node transmits to the second node an ephemeral message that is encrypted at least in part with an ephemeral key. The ephemeral message includes enough information to permit the second node to communicate at least a portion of the message to an ephemeral key server and for the ephemeral key server to verify that the second node is an authorized decryption agent for the message. After verifying that the second node is an authorized decryption agent for the message, the ephemeral key server returns to the second node an encrypted decryption key that is needed to decrypt the encrypted message. The ephemeral message may comprise an encrypted decryption key that may be used after decryption of the decryption key to decrypt other encrypted information communicated to the second node.

Full Description:
CROSS REFERENCE TO RELATED APPLICATIONS 
   N/A 
   STATEMENT REGARDING FEDERALLY SPONSORED RESEARCH OR DEVELOPMENT 
   N/A 
   BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION 
   The present invention relates generally to secure or private communications, and more specifically to a system and method for providing ephemeral decryptability of documents, files, and/or messages. 
   In recent years, individuals and businesses have increasingly employed computer and telecommunications networks, such as the World Wide Web (WWW), to exchange messages. These networks typically include a number of intermediate systems between the source of a message and its destination, at which the message may be temporarily written to a memory and/or data storage device. Such intermediate systems, as well as the communications lines within the network itself, are often considered to be susceptible to actions of a malicious third party, which may result in messages being intercepted as they are carried through the network. For this reason, various types of data encryption have been used to secure communications through such networks. Encryption algorithms are also sometimes used to support integrity checking and authentication of received messages. Integrity checking allows the message recipient to determine whether the message has been altered since it was generated, while authentication permits the recipient to verify the source of the message. 
   Specific encryption algorithms are usually thought of as being either “symmetric key” or “public key” systems. In symmetric key encryption, also sometimes referred to as “secret key” encryption, the two communicating parties use a shared, secret key to both encrypt and decrypt messages they exchange. The Data Encryption Standard (DES), published in 1977 by the National Bureau of Standards, and the International Data Encryption Algorithm (IDEA), developed by Xuejia Lai and James L. Massey, are examples of well known symmetric key encryption techniques. Public key encryption systems, in contrast to symmetric key systems, provide each party with two keys: a private key that is not revealed to anyone, and a public key made available to everyone. When the public key is used to encrypt a message, the resulting encoded message can only be decoded using the corresponding private key. Public key encryption systems also support the use of “digital signatures”, which are used to authenticate the sender of a message. A digital signature is an encrypted digest associated with a particular message, which can be analyzed by a holder of a public key to verify that the message was generated by someone knowing the corresponding private key. 
   While encryption protects the encrypted data from being understood by someone not in possession of the decryption key, the longer such encrypted information is stored, the greater potential there may be for such a key to fall into the wrong hands. For example, key escrows are often maintained which keep records of keys. Such records may be stored for convenience in order to recover encrypted data when a key has been lost, for law enforcement purposes, to permit the police to eavesdrop on conversations regarding criminal activities, or for business management to monitor the contents of employee communications. However, as a consequence of such long-term storage, the keys may be discovered over time. 
   In existing systems, there are various events that may result in an encrypted message remaining stored beyond its usefulness to a receiving party. First, there is no guarantee that a receiver of an encrypted message will promptly delete it after it has been read. Additionally, electronic mail and other types of messages may be automatically “backed-up” to secondary storage, either at the destination system, or even within intermediate systems through which they traverse. The time period such back-up copies are stored is sometimes indeterminate, and outside control of the message originator. Thus, it is apparent that even under ordinary circumstances, an encrypted message may remain in existence well beyond its usefulness, and that such longevity may result in the privacy of the message being compromised. 
   Existing systems for secure communications, such as the Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) protocol, provide for authenticated, private, real-time communications. In the SSL protocol, a server system generates a short-term public/private key pair that is certified as authentic using a long-term private key belonging to the server. The client uses the short-term public key to encrypt a symmetric key for use during the session. The server periodically changes its short-term private key, discarding any previous versions. This renders any records of previous sessions established using the former short-term public key undecryptable. Such a system is sometimes referred to as providing “perfect forward secrecy”. These existing systems, however, provide no mechanism for setting or determining a finite “lifetime”, in terms of decryptability, for stored encrypted data or messages independent of a real-time communications session. 
   Accordingly it would be desirable to have a system for specifying a finite period after which stored encrypted data, such as electronic mail messages, cannot be decrypted. After such a “decryption lifetime” period expires, the encrypted data should become effectively unrecoverable. The system should provide the ability to specify such a decryptability lifetime on a per message, data unit, or file basis, independent of any particular real-time communications session. Additionally, the system should not transmit information in a manner that would permit an eavesdropper or malicious party to decrypt the information by obtaining a long term decryption key subsequent to expiration of an ephemeral key pair used in the respective encryption process. 
   BRIEF SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION 
   A system and method for providing ephemeral decryptability is disclosed. The presently disclosed system and method enables a user to encrypt a message in a way that ensures that the message cannot be decrypted after a finite period. The encrypted message that will become undecryptable after the finite period of time is referred to herein as an ephemeral message. 
   One or more ephemeral encryption keys are provided by an ephemerizer service or node to a party wishing to encrypt a message to be passed to a destination party. The node that provides the ephemeral service is referred to as an ephemerizer The ephemeral key or keys are each associated with an expiration time. 
   A first node communicates with a second node using the ephemerizer node as an “ephemerizer service”. The ephemerizer publishes a selection of ephemeral public/private key pairs, or generates ephemeral symmetric keys upon request. Each ephemeral key is associated with an expiration time. A party wishing to encrypt a message acquires one of the ephemerizer&#39;s ephemeral encryption keys with an appropriate expiration time. Alternatively, where none of the associated expiration times offered by the ephemerizer are appropriate for the message to be transmitted, the party wishing to encrypt that message may request an ephemeral key expiration time or range of expiration times, in which case the ephemerizer generates an ephemeral key having an appropriate expiration time and provides it to the requester. 
   Associated with each ephemeral key is a key identifier (Key Id). The Key ID is used by a client of the ephemeral service to inform the ephemerizer which key to use to decryption. If no Key ID is employed or specified, the ephemerizer may successively try to decrypt an ephemeral message using the keys available until the proper key is found. If there are only a relatively small number of keys, this method is feasible, if not optimal. 
   In a first illustrative embodiment in which a first node desires to transmit a message to a second node using the ephemerizer service, the second node proves knowledge of its private key by unwrapping certain information that is then forwarded to the ephemerizer. The ephemerizer then cooperates in the decryption process. 
   More specifically, the first node generates a first secret key and encrypts an information message intended for the second node with the first secret key. The first node then encrypts the first secret key with a public key associated with the second node and further encrypts the resulting string with an ephemeral public key having a desired expiration time to form an ephemeral key string. The first node further encrypts the ephemeral key string and the ephemeral public key with the public key associated with the second node to form an encoded key string and transmits to the second node the encrypted information message, the encoded key string and a URL that identifies the ephemerizer to be used in the decryption process. 
   The second node utilizes its private key to decrypt the encoded key string and additionally generates a second secret key for use in communicating with the applicable ephemerizer. The second node transmits to the ephemerizer at the ephemerizer URL the second secret key encrypted with the ephemeral public key and additionally, the ephemeral key string encrypted with the second secret key. The ephemerizer decrypts the second secret key using the applicable ephemeral private key and decrypts the ephemeral key string using the second secret key to obtain the ephemeral key string. The ephemerizer then decrypts the ephemeral key string using the ephemeral private key to obtain the first secret key that is encrypted with the second node public key. The ephemerizer then encrypts the encrypted first secret key with the second secret key and transmits the same to the second node. 
   The second node unwraps the first secret key received from the ephemerizer by first decrypting the string with the second secret key and then decrypting the resultant string with the second node private key to obtain the first secret key. The first secret key is used to decrypt the information message. The information message and the first secret key are deleted by the second node to prevent access to the message by an attacker who might discover the second node private key subsequent to the expiration of the respective ephemeral key pair. 
   In a second illustrative embodiment, the second node obtains the cooperation of the ephemerizer in decrypting the data needed to decrypt the message by proving to the ephemerizer that it possesses the private key associated with a public key that is securely associated with the encrypted data. 
   More specifically, in the second embodiment, the first node generates a first secret key and encrypts an information message intended for the second node with the first secret key. The first node then encrypts the first secret key with a public key associated with the second node to form an encrypted first secret key and further encrypts the encrypted first secret key and the second node public key with an ephemeral public key to form an ephemeral key string having a desired expiration time. The first node then transmits to the second node the encrypted information message, the ephemeral key string, the relevant ephemeral public key, the Key Id and information that identifies and is useful for location of the ephemerizer that is to be used in the decryption process. 
   The second node generates a second secret key for use in communicating with the ephemerizer. The second node then encrypts the second secret key with the ephemerizer public key to form an encrypted second secret key and encrypts the ephemeral key string with the second secret key to form an encoded key string. The second node next transmits to the ephemerizer a message that includes at least the encrypted second secret key and the encoded key string. The message that is transmitted by the second node is signed using the private key of the second node. 
   The ephemerizer decrypts the second secret key using the applicable ephemeral public key and then decrypts the encoded key string using the second secret key to obtain the ephemeral key string. The ephemerizer next decrypts the ephemeral key string using the applicable ephemeral private key to obtain the first secret key encrypted with the second node public key and to obtain the second node public key. The ephemerizer then verifies the signature of the second node using the second node public key obtained by decrypting the ephemeral key string. The verification of the second node signature using the second node public key assures that the second node is an authorized decryption agent for the encrypted message. Following verification of the second node signature, the ephemerizer encrypts the encrypted first secret key with the second secret key and transmits the result to the second node. 
   The second node unwraps the encrypted first secret key by first decrypting the string received from the ephemerizer with the second secret key and then decrypting the result with the second node private key. After obtaining the first secret key in the foregoing manner, the second node uses the first secret key to decrypt the encrypted message received from the first node. The information message and the first secret key are deleted by the second node to prevent access to the message by an eavesdropper who might otherwise discover the second node private key or the first secret key subsequent to the expiration of the respective ephemeral key pair. 
   Other aspects, features and advantages of the disclosed methods and systems will be apparent to those skilled in the art from the Detailed Description that follows. 

   
     BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE SEVERAL VIEWS OF THE DRAWING 
     The invention will be more fully understood by reference to the following detailed description of the invention in conjunction with the drawings, of which: 
       FIG. 1  shows an ephemeral key pair list; 
       FIG. 2  is a block diagram of a system operative in a manner consistent with the present invention; 
       FIG. 3  depicts a block diagram of an exemplary computer system operative to perform the functions of the respective nodes and the ephemerizer depicted in  FIG. 2 ; 
       FIGS. 4   a ,  4   b  and  4   c  are a flow diagram that depict an exemplary method of operation of the system depicted in  FIG. 2 ; and 
       FIGS. 5   a  and  5   b  are a flow diagram that depict another exemplary method of operation of the system depicted in  FIG. 2 . 
   

   DETAILED DESCRIPTION 
   Consistent with the present invention, a system and method for providing ephemeral decryptability is disclosed which enables a user to ensure that encrypted information messages will become undecryptable after a certain point in time. In the presently described system and method, anyone that obtains access to a long term private key of an intended message recipient is unable to decrypt the information message subsequent to the expiration of the applicable ephemeral key pair. 
   As shown in  FIG. 1 , an ephemeral key pair list  10  includes a number of ephemeral key pairs  12 . Each ephemeral key pair includes a public key  14 , a private key  16 . An expiration time  18  an a Key ID  20  are associated with each ephemeral key pair. The public key  14  of an ephemeral key pair and the associated expiration time  18  and Key Id  20  may be read by parties wishing to use an ephemeral key pair  12 . The private key  16  of each ephemeral key is accessible only to the ephemerizer  164  ( FIG. 2 ). As in conventional public key encryption techniques, data encrypted using one of the public keys  14  can only be decrypted using the private key  16  from the same ephemeral key pair. Each of the ephemeral key pairs  12  represents a promise by the publisher of the ephemeral key pair list  12  that the ephemeral key pair will be irretrievably destroyed at the associated expiration time. 
   Referring to  FIG. 2 , the system includes a first node identified as Node A  160 , a second node that is identified as Node B  162 , and an ephemerizer  164 . Node A  160 , Node B  162  and the ephemerizer  164  are communicably coupled via a network  166  to permit communication among the nodes and the ephemerizer. The network  166  may comprise a local area network, a wide area network, a global communications network such as the Internet, a wireless or any other network suitable for communicably coupling the nodes  160 ,  162  and the ephemerizer  164 . Moreover, the network  166  may include various types of networks, such as those identified above, as sub-networks within a larger network. 
   Nodes A  160 , Node B  162  and the ephemerizer  164  each typically comprise a computer system  170 , as generally depicted in  FIG. 3 . The computer system  170  may be in the form of a personal computer or workstation, a personal digital assistant (PDA), an intelligent networked appliance, a controller or any other device capable of performing the functions attributable to the respective devices as described herein. 
   As depicted in  FIG. 3 , the computer system  170  typically includes a processor  170   a  that is operative to execute programmed instructions out of an instruction memory  170   b . The instructions executed in performing the functions herein described may comprise instructions stored within program code considered part of an operating system  170   e , instructions stored within program code considered part of an application  170   f , or instructions stored within program code allocated between the operating system  170   e  and the application  170   f . The memory  170   b  may comprise Random Access Memory (RAM), or a combination of RAM and Read Only Memory (ROM). The Nodes  160 ,  162  and the ephemerizer  164  each typically include a network interface  170   d  for coupling the respective device to the network  166 . The devices within the system may optionally include a secondary storage device  170   c  such as a disk drive, a tape drive or any other suitable secondary storage device. 
   The operation of the system is illustrated by reference to  FIGS. 2 and 4   a – 4   c . It is assumed for purposes of illustration that Node A  160  desires to send an ephemeral message to Node B  162 , that is, a message that will become undecipherable after some time. In this circumstance, Node A  160  ( FIG. 2 ) generates a first secret encryption key (SK 1 ) as depicted in step  200  ( FIG. 4   a ). The first secret encryption key has an associated decryption key. The first secret encryption key generated by Node A  160  is a temporary key and may be either a symmetric key or an asymmetric key. It is assumed for simplicity of illustration that the first secret encryption key comprises a symmetric key. As indicated in step  202 , Node A  160  next encrypts the message with the key SK 1 . Next, Node A encrypts the first secret key SK 1  with the public key (B-Public Key) of Node B  162  and encrypts the encrypted secret key SK 1  with the ephemeral public key (EPH-Public Key) to form X as illustrated in Step  204 . After encryption of the first secret key SK 1  with Node B&#39;s public key and the Ephemeral public key, as indicated in step  206 , Node A  160  transmits to Node B  162  the information message encrypted with the first secret key (SK 1 ), X and the ephemeral public key collectively encrypted with Node B&#39;s public key, the ephemeral public key and the address (URL) of the ephemerizer  164 . Node B then decrypts {X,Eph-Public Key}B-Public Key with Node B&#39;s private key to obtain X and the ephemeral public key as illustrated in step  208 . Node B  162  then generates or obtains a second secret key SK 2  for use in communicating with the ephemerizer  164  as depicted in step  210 . The second secret key SK 2  comprises a temporary key. 
   Node B  162  next transmits to the ephemerizer  164  the second secret key SK 2  encrypted with the ephemeral public key, X encrypted with the second secret key SK 2  and Node B&#39;s public key as illustrated in step  212 . 
   Following receipt of the above-identified transmission from Node B  162 , the ephemerizer  164  decrypts the second secret key (SK 2 ) using the ephemeral private key assuming that the ephemeral key has not expired as depicted in step  214 . The ephemerizer  164  next decrypts {X}SK 2  using the second secret key SK 2  to obtain X as depicted in step  216 . The ephemerizer  164  then decrypts X using the ephemeral private key (assuming that the respective ephemeral key has not expired) to obtain {SK 1 }B-Public Key as shown in step  218 . 
   As illustrated in step  220 , the ephemerizer  164  then encrypts {SK 1 }B-Public Key with the second secret key (SK 2 ) and sends the result to Node B  162  as depicted in step  220 . As shown in step  222 , Node B  162  then decrypts {{SK 1 }B-Public Key}SK 2  using the second secret key (SK 2 ) to obtain {SK 1 }B-Public Key. Thereafter, as illustrated in step  224 , Node B  162  decrypts {SK 1 }B-Public Key using Node B&#39;s private key to obtain the first secret key. Node B  162  then uses the first secret key to decrypt the message that was encrypted using the first secret key to obtain the unencrypted message as illustrated in step  226 . Finally, Node B  162  deletes the message, SK 1  and SK 2  to prevent another party from obtaining access to the first secret key that is needed to decrypt the message, as illustrated in step  228 . Node A  160  and the ephemerizer  164  also destroy SK 1  and SK 2  respectively, following completion of their respective tasks employing such temporary keys. 
   Via the above-described technique, once the first secret key is inaccessible there is no longer an ability to decrypt the encrypted information message. Moreover, once the ephemeral key expires, Node B  162  loses the ability to have to have SK 1  decrypted by the ephemerizer  164  and decryption of the encrypted information message is thwarted. 
   In the illustrated method the first secret key (SK 1 ) is encrypted with Node B&#39;s Public Key by Node A  160  as depicted in step  204 . Traditionally, when encrypting a message that is larger than a single RSA block with a public key, it is more efficient to encrypt the message with a secret key and to then encrypt the secret key with the respective public key. Thus, if the encryption of SK 1  with Node B&#39;s Public Key is not smaller than the ephemeral public key, it will take more than a single public key encryption operation to encrypt SK 1 . In this event, it is more efficient, rather than directly encrypting SK 1  with Node B&#39;s public key, to encrypt SK 1  with a randomly chosen secret key (SK 3 ) and to encrypt the secret key SK 3  with Node B&#39;s Public Key. In this event X={{SK 1 }SK 3 }Eph-Public Key, {SK 3 }B-Public Key. Given this optimization, Node A  160  would transmit to Node B  162  the following message:
         {Message}SK 1 , {X, Eph-Public Key}SK 3 , {SK 3 }B-Public Key, Eph-URL
 
As a further optimization, Node A  160  may encrypt a digest of the ephemeral public key (MD(Eph-Public Key)) rather than the ephemeral public key itself and transmit the ephemeral public key as plain text. This process reduces the amount of information that needs to be encrypted with Node B&#39;s public key and reduces computational resources and time needed to perform the specified encryption. In such event the message transmitted by Node A  160  to Node B  162  in step  206  would be as follows:
   {Message}SK 1 , {X, MD(Eph-Public Key)}SK 3 , {SK 3 }B-Public Key, Eph-Public Key, Eph-URL       

   An alternative embodiment for communication of an ephemeral message from Node B  162  to Node A  160  via a network  166  is illustrated in the flow chart of  FIGS. 5   a  and  5   b . In this embodiment, Node A securely conveys to the ephemerizer  164  a verification key associated with the intended recipient of the message (e.g. Node B). The verification key is used by the ephemerizer  164  to verify that the intended recipient is a proper recipient of the message. More specifically, referring to  FIG. 5   a , as depicted in step  300 , Node A generates a first secret key SK 1 . The first secret key SK 1  is preferably a temporary key. As depicted in step  302 , Node A  160  encrypts a message intended for communication to Node B using the first secret key SK 1 . Subsequently, Node A calculates a value X′ that includes the first secret key (SK 1 ) encrypted with the Node B public key and also includes the Node B public key all encrypted with the ephemeral public key for the ephemerizer  164 , as illustrated in step  304 . The Node B Public Key is included to facilitate subsequent verification, by the ephemerizer  164 , of a message received from Node B and signed with the Node B private key in the circumstance in which the ephemerizer  164  is not in possession of that key. 
   As shown in step  306 , Node A then sends to Node B the message encrypted with the first secret key, X′, the ephemeral public key, the URL of the ephemerizer, and the applicable Key ID. The URL of the ephemerizer is included so that Node B  162  can identify the ephemerizer  164  to be used during the decryption (unwrapping) process. Node B then generates or obtains a second secret key SK 2  for use in communicating with the ephemerizer  164  as illustrated in step  308 . The second private key SK 2  is also a temporary secret key and in the illustrative embodiment is a symmetric key. Node B then sends to the ephemerizer  164  the second secret key SK 2  encrypted with the ephemeral public key and the string X′ encrypted with the second secret key SK 2 . The message transmitted to the ephemerizer  164  by Node B  162  is signed by Node B  162  using Node B&#39;s private key, all as depicted in step  310 . The ephemerizer  164  decrypts the encrypted secret key using the ephemeral private key to obtain the second secret key SK 2  as depicted in step  312 . The ephemerizer  164  then decrypts the encrypted string X′ using the second secret key SK 2  to obtain the first secret key encrypted with the Node B public key along with the Node B public key as illustrated in step  314 . The ephemerizer  164  verifies that the message is in fact from Node B  162  using Node B&#39;s public key as shown in step  316 ; i.e. that the request to unwrap the message is from an authorized decryption agent for the respective message. 
   The ephemerizer  164 , following verification of the signature, transmits to Node B  162  the first secret key encrypted with the Node B public key and further encrypted with the second secret key SK 2  as illustrated in step  318 . Node B  162  then decrypts the encrypted string received from the ephemerizer  164  using the temporary second secret key SK 2  to obtain the first secret key SK 1  encrypted with the Node B public key, as shown in step  320 . As illustrated in step  322 , Node B  162  then decrypts the encrypted first secret key using the Node B private key to obtain the first secret key SK 1 . Node B  162  is then able to decrypt the encrypted message received from Node A  160  using the first secret key to obtain the message in unencrypted form as depicted in step  324 . 
   Subsequently, as depicted in step  326 , Node B  162  deletes the decrypted message and the first and second secret keys to prevent the message from being retrieved after expiration of the relevant ephemeral key. Additionally, the Node A  160  and the ephemerizer  164  destroy secret keys SK 1  and SK 2 , respectively, when they have no further need for use of the respective keys. In the case of Node A, it may destroy SK 1  following transmission of the ephemeral message to Node B. In the case of the ephemerizer  164 , it may destroy SK 2  following transmittal of the partially decrypted encryption key to Node B  162  (i.e. following step  318 ). 
   Thus, in accordance with the alternative illustrated technique, the ephemerizer  164  will not cooperate in the decryption process unless the entity requesting decryption (in the illustrative embodiment Node B  162 ) proves it has the corresponding private key. More specifically, in the illustrative embodiment, the ephemerizer  164  returns the value it has decrypted using its ephemeral private key. The value being returned is encrypted with the second secret key SK 2  chosen by Node B  162  for communication with the ephemerizer  164 . In the foregoing manner, no eavesdropper or impersonator sees the first secret key encrypted with a long-term key alone absent additional encryption with the second temporary secret key SK 2 . Upon deletion of the temporary keys SK 1  and SK 2  and following the expiration of the ephemeral period, the message become undecipherable and highly secure ephemeral communication is assured. 
   It should be understood that the optimization techniques described with respect to  FIGS. 4   a – 4 C may also be employed in connection with the alternative embodiment depicted in  FIGS. 5   a – 5   b.    
   If a large string of information is to be encrypted, it is more efficient to encrypt the string with a secret key and to then encrypt the secret key with the appropriate public key of a public/private key pair than to encrypt the string directly with the public key. It is recognized that, although in the disclosed embodiments, the data is encrypted with a secret key that is, in turn, encrypted with the public key of the ephemerizer, the data could have been encrypted with the ephemeral public key directly. This approach is feasible if the length of the data string to be encrypted is relatively short or if processing latency does not pose a problem. Thus, it is recognized that the string may comprise information desired to be communicated to an intended recipient or alternatively a secret key used to encrypt such information. 
   Those skilled in the art should readily appreciate that the programs defining the functions of the present invention can be delivered to a computer in many forms; including, but not limited to: (a) information permanently stored on non-writable storage media (e.g. read only memory devices within a computer such as ROM or CD-ROM disks readable by a computer I/O attachment); (b) information alterably stored on writable storage media (e.g. floppy disks and hard drives); or (c) information conveyed to a computer through communication media for example using baseband signaling or broadband signaling techniques, including carrier wave signaling techniques, such as over computer or telephone networks via a modem. In addition, while the invention may be embodied in computer software, the functions necessary to implement the invention may alternatively be embodied in part or in whole using hardware components such as Application Specific Integrated Circuits or other hardware, or some combination of hardware components and software. 
   A destruction capability may be provided in a hardware device which stores at least the ephemeral decryption keys and which only allows them to be read after receiving proof of a current time prior to the expiration time, or which erases the memory in which the ephemeral decryption keys are stored at their associated expiration times or renders such decryption keys inaccessible such that they cannot be recovered, for example by powering down a volatile memory in which the ephemeral keys are stored or otherwise rendering the applicable ephemeral decryption key inaccessible. 
   While the invention is described through the above exemplary embodiments, it will be understood by those of ordinary skill in the art that modification to and variation of the illustrated embodiments may be made without departing from the inventive concepts herein disclosed. Specifically, while the illustrative embodiments are disclosed with reference to messages passed between users of a computer network, the invention may be employed in any context in which messages are passed between communicating entities. 
   Moreover, while the embodiments are described in connection with various illustrative data structures, one skilled in the art will recognize that the system may be embodied using a variety of specific data structures. Accordingly, the invention should not be viewed as limited except by the scope and spirit of the appended claims.

Technology Classification (CPC): 7