Patent Abstract:
A method of enhancing security of a storage component communicating with a host processor over a bus comprises: interrupting software execution of an in progress security command in the storage component by issuance of a reset that is selected from the group consisting of a software reset and a hard reset; and preventing a security state transition upon return to software execution of the in progress security command.

Full Description:
[0001]     This application claims the benefit of U.S. Provisional Application No. 60/739,858, filed Nov. 23, 2005, and entitled “Security Improvements for ATA HD Drives”.  
       CROSS REFERENCE TO RELATED PENDING APPLICATION  
       [0002]     U.S. Patent Application No. (HP Docket No. 200601451 -1), entitled “Method of Securing Access to a Hard Disk Drive of a Computer System With an Enhanced Security Mode”, assigned to the same assignee as the instant application and filed currently therewith. 
     
    
     BACKGROUND  
       [0003]     Computer systems generally include a mass storage component, like a hard disk drive (HDD), for example, to store the operational and application software of one or more host processing units. IBM&#39;s AT bus has become a defacto standard for linking the host processing unit with the HDD and for providing the protocol for communication therebetween. AT is a trademark of the IBM Corporation. Specifications for such linking and communication over the AT bus are currently provided by the ANSI standard published as NCITS 397-2005 AT Attachment-7 and AT Attachment-7 With Packet Interface (ATA/ATAPI-7), Vol. 1, which is incorporated herein by reference in its entirety. These specifications may be located over the world wide web at the website “www.incits.org”. A security mode feature is included in the AT bus protocol standard, substantially in Section 4.7 thereof, which is intended to prevent unintended user access or unintended software, like a rogue or virus software, for example, which may have penetrated the host computer&#39;s defenses, from locking out the user from accessing software from the HDD.  
         [0004]     Section 4.7 of the ATA/ATAPI-7 specification sets forth a password system for restricting access to user software stored on the HDD. In this standard, various predetermined commands issued by the host processing unit or elements thereof permit setting a password and accessing the drive storage with the password. However, the standard has certain drawbacks, which will be described in greater detail below, which may permit the password to be scrambled or changed, under certain conditions, by unintended software, thus locking out the USER from accessing the mass storage component.  
       SUMMARY  
       [0005]     In accordance with one aspect of the present invention, method of enhancing security of a storage component communicating with a host processor over a bus comprises: interrupting software execution of an in progress security command in the storage component by issuance of a reset that is selected from the group consisting of a software reset and a hard reset; and preventing a security state transition upon return to software execution of the in progress security command. 
     
    
     BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS  
       [0006]      FIG. 1  is a block diagram schematic of an exemplary computer system comprising a storage component coupled to a host CPU over an AT bus;  
         [0007]      FIG. 2  is a security mode state diagram of security mode features suitable for use in the computer system of  FIG. 1  for security of the storage component;  
         [0008]      FIG. 3  is a flowchart of exemplary enhancement security software suitable for use in the storage component to ensure that any security command interrupted by a soft reset (SRST) will cause no Security state transition;  
         [0009]      FIG. 4  is a flowchart of exemplary enhancement security software suitable for use in the storage component to ensure that any power on reset (POR) of the system initiated while in an original security state or during the execution of a command that started in the original security state will result in only predetermined post POR Security state transitions;  
         [0010]      FIG. 5  is a flowchart of exemplary enhancement security software suitable for use in the storage component to ensure that a hard reset command issued over the AT bus during a security command execution shall cause no Security state transitions;  
         [0011]      FIGS. 6A and 6B  compositely depict a flowchart of exemplary enhancement security software suitable for use in the storage component to handle a condition in which a Security Unlock command is issued over the AT bus  16  along with a Master password;  
         [0012]      FIGS. 7A and 7B  compositely depict a flowchart of exemplary enhancement security software suitable for use in the storage component to handle a condition in which a Security Unlock command is issued over the AT bus  16  along with a User password; and  
         [0013]      FIGS. 8, 8A ,  8 B and  8 C compositely depict a flowchart of exemplary enhancement security software suitable for use in the storage component to handle enhanced security mode conditions in which one of a Set Password command, a Security Unlock command, a Security disable command and a Security erase command along with an associated password are received from the AT bus by the storage component. 
     
    
     DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE INVENTION  
       [0014]      FIG. 1  is a block diagram schematic of an exemplary computer system suitable for embodying at least one aspect of the present invention. Referring to  FIG. 1 , the computer system includes at least one host central processing unit (CPU) and associated support logic which shall herein after be referred to collectively as CPU  10 . Interfaced to the CPU  10  in this exemplary embodiment are a random access memory (RAM)  12  and a non-volatile or read only memory (ROM)  14 . An AT bus  16 , which may be serial or parallel, may be used to interface computer components of the system to the host CPU  10 . The RAM  12  and ROM  14  may communicate with the host CPU  10  through the AT bus  16  or otherwise. The RAM  12  may be used by the computer system for storage of temporary data, and the non-volatile ROM  14  may be used to store initially executed operational software of the computer system, like a boot loader and basic input/output system (BIOS) software which is part of the operating system (OS) software of the computer system.  
         [0015]     Also, coupled to the host CPU  10  through the AT bus  16  is a mass storage component or device  18 , which may be a hard disk drive (HDD), for example. The HDD  18  may include: a controller  20  comprising for example a microprocessor and firmware for storing operational software thereof; and a hard disk storage media assembly  22  for storing user data. The controller  20  is coupled to the host CPU  10  over the AT bus  16  for controlling the data storage to and access from storage media  22  of the device  18 . Power may be supplied to the system from a power source  24  through an appropriate voltage regulator  26 . A power switch  28  may be used to switch power on and off to the system.  
         [0016]     In the exemplary embodiment, security mode software set forth by the ATA/ATAPI-7 standard specification referenced above may be stored in non-volatile memory of the HDD  18  as well as in the boot loader and BIOS software of the ROM  14 . A storage device which implements such a security mode feature includes the following minimum set of commands: SECURITY SET PASSWORD, SECURITY UNLOCK, SECURITY ERASE PREPARE, SECURITY ERASE UNIT, SECURITY FREEZE LOCK and SECURITY DISABLE PASSWORD. In operation, the security mode feature may be enabled by sending the command SECURITY SET PASSWORD and a USER password via the AT bus  16  to the controller  20  of storage device  18 . The operational software of the controller  20 , which may be stored in firmware thereof, responds to the set password command and stores the associated USER password in a designated non-volatile storage location of the device  18 . Once the security mode feature is enabled, user data may be accessed from the storage device  18  only upon sending the command SECURITY UNLOCK with either the USER password or an optional MASTER password via the AT bus  16  to the controller  20 .  
         [0017]     In response to the SECURITY SET PASSWORD, the controller  20  may set the security level to High or Maximum, which levels determine the device behavior when the optional Master password is used to unlock the device  18 . When the security level is set High, the USER password or the MASTER password may be used any place where a security password is required by the system. When the security level is set Maximum, the USER password may be used with any security command to perform the associated task, but there are restrictions on the use of the MASTER password. The SECURITY FREEZE LOCK command prevents changes to passwords, security states or security levels until a following power cycle, i.e. power off to power on. The purpose of this is to prevent unintended security changes on the system.  
         [0018]     A security mode state diagram of the security mode feature set forth in section 4.7 of the standard specification is shown in  FIG. 2 . In the present embodiment, the state diagram of  FIG. 2  includes seven security states which are as follows: SEC 0 , SEC 1 , SEC 2 , SEC 3 , SEC 4 , SEC 5  and SEC 6 , and is used to define the conditions of transitions between the states of the security mode feature. For example, the security state SEC 0  is gaused to be entered from states SEC 1  and SEC 2  by the controller  20  when the device  18  is powered down with the security mode feature set disabled as illustrated by arrowed lines  40  (from SEC 1 ) and  42  (from SEC 2 ). When the device  18  is powered up and security mode is disabled, the security state SEC 1  is caused to be entered from state SEC 0  by the controller  20  as illustrated by the arrowed line  44 . Also, when the controller receives a hardware RESET command over the AT bus  16 , the device will be caused to transition to state SEC 4  from state SEC 5  as illustrated by arrowed line  46  or caused to remain in state SEC 4  if already in state SEC 4  as illustrated by arrowed line  48 . Similarly, other transitions between states are defined in  FIG. 2  and illustrated by their respective arrowed lines.  
         [0019]     The following paragraphs describe exemplary drawbacks when implementing the Security Mode feature set as described in the ATA-7 specification as illustrated in  FIG. 2 .  
         [0020]     With security disabled, if a security freeze lock is not performed, any software may issue a Security Set Password with an unknown/random password, rendering the storage component  18  inaccessible. Therefore, it is recommended to have the system BIOS of ROM  14  issue via the host CPU  10  the SECURITY FREEZE LOCK command before turning execution over to the boot loader of ROM  14 . After the SECURITY FREEZE LOCK command has been issued, the storage component  18  is in the SEC 2 :Security disabled/Frozen state.  
         [0021]     In this state, a drawback of the Security Mode feature arises when a condition of a “hard” reset or an asynchronous loss of signal occurs over a serial AT attachment (SATA) bus. In SATA, the hard reset may be caused by the signal COMRESET, and in a parallel AT attachment (PATA) bus, the hard reset may be caused by the signal HRESET. This condition will normally cause a hardware reset to be generated, forcing the storage component  18  to transition from the SEC 2  state to the SEC 1 : Security disabled/not Frozen state. While in the SEC 1  state the storage component  18  may accept a Security Set Password command.  
         [0022]     A possible scenario of this drawback is as follows: the system BIOS issues via the host CPU  10  the SECURITY FREEZE LOCK command during power-on self test (POST) (SEC 2 : Security disabled/Frozen). While, in the OS environment, an unintended or rogue software may effect the following steps:  
         [0023]     1) Generate a hard reset via the SATA bus Scontrol register or via the PATA bus PCI registers (causes a SEC 2 : SEC 1  security state transition),  
         [0024]     2) Issue a Security Set Password with a random password (causes a SEC 1 : SEC 5  security state transition)  
         [0025]     3) Issue a Security Freeze Lock command (SEC 5 : SEC 6  security state transition)  
         [0026]     4) Generate a hard reset which causes immediate inaccessibility (e.g. blue screen in a Windows™ environment). If this command is not set, the computer system will be prevented from booting up after the next cold start. Under these conditions, the User is no longer able to access data on the storage component  18 .  
         [0027]     If security is enabled and a SECURITY FREEZE LOCK command has not been issued, any unintended software may issue a Security Set Password with an unknown/random or rogue password, rendering the storage component  18  inaccessible to the User in the future. Therefore, it is recommended that the system BIOS in ROM  14  to issue via the host CPU  10  the SECURITY FREEZE LOCK command before turning execution over to the boot loader in ROM  14 . After the SECURITY FREEZE LOCK command has been issued with security disabled, the storage component  18  is in the SEC 6 : Security disabled/Frozen state.  
         [0028]     Also, with security enabled and no FREEZE LOCK command, the condition of a hard reset or asynchronous loss of signal occurring on the SATA bus may cause a generation of a hardware reset in the storage component  18 . This reset causes the storage component  18  to transition from the SEC 5 : Unlocked/Not Frozen state to the SEC 4 : Security enabled/Locked state. While in state SEC 4 , the storage component  18  may no longer accept user data access commands via the host CPU  10  or otherwise. Thus, the USER no longer has access to the storage device  18 .  
         [0029]     A possible scenario of this drawback is as follows: the security feature is enabled by setting the User password and optionally the Master password. Under this condition, the system BIOS issues via the host CPU  10  the SECURITY UNLOCK command with the password during POST (causing a SEC 4 : SEC 5  security state transition). Thus, while in the operating system (OS) environment, an unintended or rogue software may generate a hard reset via the SATA bus Scontrol register (causing a SEC 6 : SEC 4  security state transition). In this state, the User is no longer able to access the storage component  18 , causing the OS software to “crash” (e.g. blue screen for Windows™ operating system).  
         [0030]     Another drawback of the Security Mode feature arises in the SEC 2  state when a hard reset or an asynchronous loss of signal occurs over the SATA bus, which will normally cause the generation of a hardware reset, which may force the storage component  18  to transition from the SEC 2  state to the SEC 1 : Security disabled/not Frozen state. While in the SEC 1  state the storage component  18  may accept a Security Set Password command.  
         [0031]     To alleviate the conditions of the foregoing described drawbacks, enhancement software may be incorporated into the firmware of controller  20  to ensure that any security command interrupted by a soft reset (SRST) will cause no Security state transition. An example of such software is illustrated by the steps or blocks of the flowchart of  FIG. 3 . Referring to  FIG. 3 , one way of detecting a soft reset is to monitor the device control register (DCR) in the controller  20  (see  FIG. 1 ) by the step  100 . If the SRST bit of the DCR is toggled as determined by step  102 , then the “in progress” command will be interrupted by step  104 . After the interrupt task is completed, the software will return the required reset status appropriate for that type of software reset. Thereafter, execution will be returned to the security state (SEC#) prior to the issue of the interrupted command by step  108 , thus, ensuring that no unintended security state transition will occur.  
         [0032]     One possible scenario of the above described enhancement is when the storage component  18  is in the Security state SEC 4 : Security Enabled/Locked and the host CPU  10  issues via the AT bus  16  a Security Erase Prepare command and a Security Erase command along with the proper password. Under these conditions, the storage component  18  receives the commands and password from the AT bus  16  and enters a busy state in response to the Security Erase command. Software on the host CPU  10  will time out and send a Soft Reset to the storage component  18  over the AT bus  16 . As a result of the enhancement, the storage component  18  responds to the Soft Reset by performing a sequence of steps including sending back to the host CPU  10  via the AT bus  16  a not BSY signal and RDY (appropriate status) signal (step  106 ) and returning to SEC 4  (prior security state) at the end of the Soft Reset sequence (step  108 ). In this condition, the USER is not allowed access to the data on the device  18  without a password and not allowed access to the device  18  without a complete erasure.  
         [0033]     Software may be also incorporated into the firmware of controller  20  to ensure that any power on reset (POR), caused by a system power interruption, for example, initiated while in an original security state or during the execution of a command that started in the original security state will result in only the post POR Security state transitions of the following table:  
                                                   Original State   Post POR State                           SEC1   SEC1           SEC2   SEC1           SEC4   SEC4           SEC5   SEC4           SEC6   SEC4                      
 
         [0034]     An example of such software is illustrated by the steps or blocks of the flowchart of  FIG. 4 . Referring to  FIG. 4 , in steps  110  and  112 , it is determined if a power on reset is initiated during the execution of a command. If not, then the command will continue to be executed in step  114 . However, if a POR is initiated, then in block  116 , the original state of the command being executed or otherwise is determined. If execution of the command has been completed as determined by step  118 , then upon power return, the software will go to the final state of the command transition in step  120 . Otherwise, upon power up, the software will be diverted in step  122  to the security state designated by the table above which may be stored in the firmware of the controller  20  as a look-up table, for example.  
         [0035]     Software may be also incorporated into the firmware of controller  20  to ensure that a hard reset command issued over the AT bus  16  during a security command execution shall cause no Security state transitions. An example of this software is illustrated by the flowchart of  FIG. 5 . Referring to  FIG. 5 , steps  130  and  132  determine if a hard reset command is issued and received by the controller  20  during its execution of a security command. If no hard reset is issued, the command will continue to be executed by controller  20  in step  134 . Otherwise, any security command interrupted by the hard reset command will cause the controller  20  to interrupt the outstanding command in step  136  and to return the required status appropriate for that type of reset to the host CPU  10  via the AT bus  16  in step  138 . At the end of the hard reset sequence, the controller  20  will return to the security state prior to the issuance of the interrupted command, i.e. original security state, in step  140 .  
         [0036]     Additional software may be also incorporated into the firmware of controller  20  to handle the condition in which a Security Unlock command is issued over the AT bus  16  along with a Master Password. The intent is to make the Security Unlock command behave like the Security Erase command so that there are fewer unique security decisions which will decrease the likelihood of an implementation issue. An example of such software is illustrated by the flowchart of  FIGS. 6A and 6  B. Referring to  FIGS. 6A and 6B , in step  150 , the controller  20  receives a Security Unlock command and a Master Password over the AT bus  16  and, in step  151 , the controller  20  determines if an expire counter has been decremented to a predetermined number which is zero (0)in the present example. In the present embodiment, the expire counter is decremented each time the received and set passwords do not match which will become more evident from the following description. However, it is understood that the expire counter could just as well be counted up to a predetermined number without deviating from the broad principles of the present invention.  
         [0037]     If the predetermined number of the expire counter has not been reached, the controller  20  next determines in which security state it is operating. If operating in security state SEC 1  (Disabled state—see  FIG. 2 ) as determined by decisional step  152 , then the controller  20  will compare the received Master Password with the most recently set Master Password which is stored in a designated memory location of the storage device  18 . If the two passwords compare or match as determined by the decisional step  154 , the controller  20  will respond by sending to the host CPU  10  via the AT bus  16  a status/error code of 50/00 hex in step  156 . Otherwise, the controller  20  will respond by sending to the host CPU  10  via the AT bus  16  a status/error code of 51/04 hex in step  158 . The program will exit after executing either step  156  or  158 .  
         [0038]     If the controller  20  is operating in security state SEC 2  or SEC 6  (Frozen States—see  FIG. 2 ) during reception of the Security Unlock command and Master Password as determined by step  160 , it will respond by sending to the host CPU  10  via the AT bus  16  a status/error code of 51/04 hex in step  162 . Controller  20  will also respond by sending to the host CPU  10  via the AT bus  16  the status/error code of 51/04 hex in step  162  if the expire counter has reached its predetermined number. The program will exit after executing step  162 .  
         [0039]     If the controller  20  is operating in security state SEC 4  (Locked state—see  FIG. 2 ) during reception of the Security Unlock command and Master Password as determined by step  164  and the current User Password level is set to Maximum as determined by decisional step  166 , it will respond by decrementing an expire counter thereof in step  168  and sending to the host CPU  10  via the AT bus  16  the status/error code of 51/04 hex in step  169 . If the current User Password level is not set to Maximum as determined by decisional step  166 , the controller  20  will compare the received and set passwords in step  170 . If there is a match in passwords, the controller  20  will respond by changing the security state SEC 4  to SEC 5  in step  171  and sending to the host CPU  10  via the AT bus  16  a status/error code of 50/00 hex in step  172 . On the other hand, if there is no match in passwords, program execution will be diverted to step  168 . Controller  20  will exit execution of the program after executing either step  169  or step  172 .  
         [0040]     If the controller  20  is operating in security state SEC 5  (Unlocked state—see  FIG. 2 ) during reception of the Security Unlock command and Master Password as determined by step  173  and the current User Password level is set to Maximum, it will respond by sending to the host CPU  10  via the AT bus  16  a status/error code of 51/04 hex in step  174 , i.e. all security unlock attempts with a master password shall result in a 51/04 hex status/error response. If the controller  20  is operating in security state SEC 5  (Unlocked state—see  FIG. 2 ) during reception of the Security Unlock command and Master Password as determined by step  173  and the current User Password level is set to High, it will divert software execution to step  154  in which the received and set Master Passwords are compared. If the two passwords match as determined by step  154 , then the controller  20  will respond in step  156  by sending a status/error digital code of 50/00 hex over the AT bus  16  to the host CPU  10 . Otherwise, the controller  20  will respond in step  158  by sending a status/error digital code of 51/04 hex over the AT bus  16  to the host CPU  10 . If the controller  20  is not in any security state as determined by the steps  152 ,  160 ,  164  and  173 , then it will respond to the reception of the Security Unlock command and Master Password, by exiting execution of the software.  
         [0041]     Further software may be also incorporated into the firmware of controller  20  to handle the condition in which a Security Unlock command is issued over the AT bus  16  along with a User Password. The intent is to limit the actual password comparisons to only times when an expire counter is used or the proper password has already been given to limit the ability for rogue software to do unbounded password testing. An example of such software is illustrated by the flowchart of  FIGS. 7A and 7B . Referring to  FIGS. 7A and 7B , in step  180 , the controller  20  receives the Security Unlock command and a User Password via the AT bus  16 . Thereafter, in step  181 , the controller  20  determines if the expire counter has reached its predetermined number, e.g. zero. If not, the controller  20  determines if it is in the security state SEC 1  in step  182 . If in SEC 1 , the controller  20  will not perform a password comparison in step  183  and instead, will respond to the Security Unlock command by sending in step  184  a status/error code of 51/04 hex over the AT bus  16  to the host CPU  10 . Also, if the expire counter has reached its predetermined number as determined by step  181 , the controller  20  will respond by sending in step  184  the status/error code of 51/04 hex over the AT bus  16  to the host CPU  10 .  
         [0042]     If the controller  20  is in the security state SEC 5  as determined by step  185 , it will perform a comparison of the received and set User passwords in step  186  and, if the two passwords match, it will send in step  187  a status/error code of 50/00 hex over the AT bus  16  to the host CPU  10 . Otherwise, if the two passwords do not match, the controller  20  will decrement the expire counter in step  188  a and will send in step  188  b a status/error code of 51/04 hex over the AT bus  16  to the host CPU  10 .  
         [0043]     If the controller  20  is in the security state SEC 4  as determined by step  189 , it will perform a comparison of the received and set User passwords in step  190  and, if the two passwords match, it will change the security state from SEC 4  to SEC 5  in step  191  and send in step  192  a status/error code of 50/00 hex over the AT bus  16  to the host CPU  10 . Otherwise, if the two passwords do not match, the controller  20  will send in step  193  a status/error code of 51/04 hex over the AT bus  16  to the host CPU  10  and decrement the expire counter in step  194 . If the controller is in either security state SEC 2  or SEC 6  as determined by step  196 , it will respond by sending in step  198  a status/error code of 51/04 hex over the AT bus  16  to the host CPU  10 . If the controller  20  is not in any security state as determined by the steps  182 ,  185 ,  189 , and  196 , then it will respond to the reception of the Security Unlock command and User Password, by exiting execution of the software.  
         [0044]     Still further software may be also incorporated into the firmware of controller  20  to handle certain conditions under support for enhanced security. An example of such software is illustrated by the flowchart of  FIGS. 8, 8A ,  8 B and  8 C. Referring to  FIGS. 8, 8A ,  8 B and  8 C, if the controller  20  includes software to support an enhanced security mode, then if it receives a command, it first checks the expire counter in step  200  to determine if it has reached the predetermined number. For example, if the expire counter has been decremented to zero, the controller  20  will abort all security commands for all security states in step  201 . If the expire counter has not been decremented to zero, the controller  20  determines the received command and diverts program execution to the appropriate set of instructions or steps.  
         [0045]     For example, if a Set Password command and its associated password are determined to have been received in step  202 , then program execution is diverted to the steps illustrated in the flowchart of  FIG. 8A ; if a Security Unlock command and its associated password are determined to have been received in step  204 , then program execution is diverted to the steps illustrated in the flowchart of  FIG. 8B ; and if a Security Disable or Security Erase command and its associated password are determined to have been received in step  206 , then program execution is diverted to the steps illustrated in the flowchart of  FIG. 8C . While the flowchart of  FIG. 8C  will be used for program execution of both Security Disable and Security Erase commands, there is a difference in the program execution between the two which will be explained in greater detail below.  
         [0046]     For the reception of the Set Password command, the flowchart of  FIG. 8A  starts with determining in step  208  if an enhanced security flag has been set which is indicative of the enhanced security mode being enabled. If not set, it is determined if an enhanced security bit is set in step  210 . If not set, the program will perform appropriate security state transitions and rules according to the standard security mode, i.e. not enhanced mode, in step  212 . Otherwise, if the enhanced bit is determined to be set in step  210 , the enhanced security flag will be set and saved in step  214 , thus enabling the enhanced security mode. Once the enhanced security flag is set, it will remain set over all power cycles and resets until disabled or cleared by the program as will become more evident by the following description. When the controller  20  is in the enhanced security mode, it shall require all data payload security commands to have the enhanced security bit set and shall enforce all enhanced security rules.  
         [0047]     If it is determined that the enhanced security flag is set in step  208 , it is determined if an enhanced security bit is set in step  216 . If not set, the program will abort the received command and respond by sending a status/error code of 51/01 hex to the host CPU  10  via the AT bus  16  in step  218 . If the enhanced bit is set as determined by step  216  or after execution of step  214 , it is determined if the controller  20  is in security state SEC 1  as determined by step  220 . If it is determined in step  220  that the controller  20  is in any other state than SEC 1 , then the software will be diverted to step  218  wherein the command will be aborted and controller  20  will send a status/error code of 51/04 hex over the AT bus  16  to the host CPU  10 . The intent of this enhancement is to always require the host CPU  10  to disable the security mode with a password before a new password may be installed.  
         [0048]     If the controller is in state SEC 1 , then the controller  20  will save the received password in step  222 . Thereafter, if a User password is supplied as determined by step  224 , the security state of controller  20  is changed from SEC 1  to SEC 5  in step  226 . Whether or not a User password is supplied, the controller  20  will send the status code of 50/00 hex to the host CPU  10  via the AT bus  16  in step  228 .  
         [0049]     If a Security Unlock command and associated password are received by the controller  20  in step  204 , then program execution is diverted to the flowchart of  FIG. 8B  which starts with determining in step  230  if the enhanced security flag has been set. If not set, it is determined if the enhanced security bit is set in step  232 . If not set, the program will perform appropriate security state transitions and rules according to the standard security mode, i.e. not enhanced mode, in step  234 . Otherwise, if the enhanced bit is determined to be set in step  232 , the command will be aborted and a status/error code of 51/04 hex will be sent to the host CPU  10  via the AT bus in step  236 . If it is determined that the enhanced security flag is set in step  230 , it is determined if the enhanced security bit is set in step  238 . If not set, the program will also abort the received command and respond by sending a status/error code of 51/01 hex to the host CPU  10  via the AT bus  16  in step  236 .  
         [0050]     If the enhanced bit is determined to be set by step  238 , it is next determined in step  239  if the controller  20  is in the state SEC 4 . If the controller  20  is in any other state than SEC 4  as determined by step  239 , then software execution may be diverted to step  236  wherein the command will be aborted and controller  20  will send a status/error code of 51/04 hex over the AT bus  16  to the host CPU  10 . Otherwise, if the controller  20  is determined to be in SEC 4  by step  239 , the program will check to determine if the user level is set to maximum and the Master password was received in step  241 . If so, the expire counter will be decremented in step  240  and thereafter, step  236  is executed. Otherwise, the received and set passwords are compared in step  242  and if there is determined to be a password match, then the security state is changed from SEC 4  to SEC 5  in step  244  and a status/error code of 50/00 hex will be sent to the host CPU  10  via the AT bus  16  in step  246 . If the passwords do not match in step  242 , the controller  20  will decrement the expire counter in step  240  and abort the command and send a status/error code of 51/04 hex to the host CPU  10  via the AT bus  16  in step  236  and exit program execution.  
         [0051]     If a Security Disable or Security Erase command is received along with its associated password by the controller  20  in step  206 , then program execution is diverted to the flowchart of  FIG. 8C  which starts with determining in step  250  if the enhanced security flag has been set. If not set, it is determined if the enhanced security bit is set in step  252 . If not set, the program will perform appropriate security state transitions and rules according to the standard security mode, i.e. not enhanced mode, in step  254 . Otherwise, if the enhanced bit is determined to be set in step  252 , the command will be aborted and a status/error code of 51/04 hex will be sent to the host CPU  10  via the AT bus in step  256 . If it is determined that the enhanced security flag is set in step  250 , it is determined if the enhanced security bit is set in step  258 . If not set, the program will also abort the received command and respond by sending a status/error code of 51/01 hex to the host CPU  10  via the AT bus  16  in step  256 .  
         [0052]     If the enhanced bit is determined to be set by step  258 , it is next determined in step  260  if the controller  20  is in the state SEC 5  for the Security Disable command or in either state SEC 4  or SEC 5  for the Security Erase command. If the controller  20  is in any other state than SEC 5  for the Security Disable command or than state SEC 4  or SEC 5  for the Security Erase command as determined by step  260 , then software execution may be diverted to step  256  wherein the command will be aborted and controller  20  will send a status/error code of 51/04 hex over the AT bus  16  to the host CPU  10 .  
         [0053]     Otherwise, if the controller  20  is determined to be in state SEC 5  for the Security Disable command or in either state SEC 4  or SEC 5  for the Security Erase command by step  260 , the received and set passwords are compared in step  262 . There are different password matching rules for the Security Disable and Security Erase commands in the present embodiment. For the Security Disable command, if the user level is set to “high”, either User or Master passwords may be used, but if the user level is set to “maximum”, then only the User passwords may be used. For the Security Erase command, either the User or the Master passwords may be used independent of which user level, “high” or “maximum”, is set.  
         [0054]     If there is determined to be a password match in step  262 , then the security state is changed from SEC 5  or SEC 4  to SEC 1  in step  264 . Thereafter, the security enhanced flag will be cleared in step  266  and the controller  20  will send a status code of 50/00 hex to the host CPU  10  via the AT bus  16  in step  268  and exit program execution. If no password match is determined by step  262 , the program will abort the received command and respond by sending a status/error code of 51/01 hex to the host CPU  10  via the AT bus  16  in step  270 . Thereafter, the expire counter will be decremented in step  272  and the program will be exited.  
         [0055]     While aspects of the present invention have been presented herein above in connection with a variety of embodiments, it is understood that all such embodiments are merely described by way of example. Accordingly, the present invention and all of its aspects should not be limited in any way by the various embodiments presented above, but rather construed in breadth and broad scope in accordance with the recitation of the claims appended hereto.

Technology Classification (CPC): 6