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"Wicked Rose" and the NCPH Hacking Group |
by Ken Dunham & Jim Melnick |
Zero-day attacks, where an attack occurs before public knowledge of a vulnerability is known, is |
a growing cause of concern for security professionals in the 21st century. An unprecedented |
number of zero-day attacks took place in 2006, largely involving Microsoft Office Files. Ken |
Dunham, Director of the Rapid Response Team, and Jim Melnick, Director of Threat Operations, |
led the VeriSign iDefense intelligence team to track down Chinese hackers for hire out of China, |
responsible for many of the attacks in 2006. Wicked Rose is the ring-leader of the NCPH |
hacking group and this is the story of their maturation into significant global threat by 2006. |
Introduction to N.C.P.H. |
N.C.P.H. (Network Crack Program Hacker) has about ten members or associates. Four core |
members exist as of 2006: |
(Wicked) Rose |
KuNgBiM |
Rodag |
Charles |
There are also some six other associates within NCPH and two other positions (possibly unfilled |
positions) whose purpose is unclear. However, |
Rose |
or |
Wicked Rose |
seems to be the |
primary leader. Membership rules, recruiting goals and standards are unknown. However, some |
members appear to be current or former students of Sichuan University of Science and |
Engineering.1 |
The group is responsible for development and deployment of exploit codes related vulnerabilities |
in Microsoft Word Malformed OLE Structure Code Execution and Microsoft Excel Malformed |
BIFF Structure Code Execution. |
Public Knowledge of a Zero-Day Word Exploit |
The story of NCPH zero-day attacks begins publicly on May 18, 2006. On this day the Internet |
Storm Center reports a new possible zero-day attack. iDefense worked closely with SANS and |
other organizations to analyze the threat landscape as it related to exploitation of this |
vulnerability. Within the next 36 hours, iDefense gained access to multiple codes and extracted a |
new rootkit called GinWui. Independent research proved the following: |
Exploitation targeted a new vulnerability that allowed attackers to successfully exploit |
computers running fully patched versions of Microsoft Word 2002 and others. |
Exploitation dated to May 12, 2006 and involved at least six unique hostile exploit files. |
iDefense confirmed that attacks targeted two organizations, one in the United States and |
one in Japan. |
Chinese-authored rootkits GinWui.A and GinWui.B exist in several attacks. iDefense |
identified the rootkits' source and authors as Chinese actor "Wicked Rose" and others |
profiled later in this report. |
www.suse.edu.cn & http://www.study-in-china.org/school/Sichuan/suse/ |
Successful installation of the rootkit requires Administrator or Debugger rights. Initial |
exploitation, however, does not require Administrator rights. |
iDefense identified unique malicious code attacks pointing to nease.net and authored |
several Snort signatures for this traffic. iDefense continues to monitor other domains |
related to the attack. |
The original attack upon a large DoD entity within the USA began on May 12, 2006. Targets of |
the attacker were apparently "Googled" by the attacker. Three variations of a Microsoft Word |
zero-day attack are involved in the attack. A few dozen attack files are first distributed to less |
than a dozen targets to identify which version works within the organization. |
Once attackers identify the vulnerable version of Microsoft Word used within the organization |
close to 200 messages sent out to multiple targets within the organization within 24 hours. This |
second wave of attack is distributed as "Planning document 5-16-2006.doc". This code is |
improved beyond the first variant sent out earlier to identify the vulnerable version of Word |
within the targeted network. |
A third attack commences on May 17, 2006. During this period, the Internet Storm Center and |
others get involved and the case becomes public. In the end, iDefense identified six unique |
samples, of which three are more prevalent than other variants. |
The GinWui Backdoor Rootkit Payload |
Zero day attacks commenced in May 2006 attempted to install a GinWui backdoor Trojan horse |
and Windows rootkit. A DLL file called winguis.dll and several SYS files install themselves |
when a computer is successfully attacked through an exploit. Two versions of the GinWui |
rootkit are installed during several attacks in May and June 2006. |
NCHP 5.0 Screenshot (GinWui Rootkit) |
Wicked Rose is the author of the GinWui malicious code. His code and support posts related to |
GinWui distributions exist on the Chinese NCPH and Evil Octal forums. Wicked Rose |
associates with WHG and others on this form. WHT hosted version "3.0beta.3" of the "NCPH |
remote control" rootkit code on May 2, 2006. This distribution of GinWui was largely unknown |
and undetected by anti-virus companies at the time of release. |
Versions of GinWui used in targeted attacks of May and June 2006 are private versions, not |
released to the public. This proves that Wicked Rose either constructed the zero day attacks or |
sold private code to users that performed the attack. |
Wicked Rose later documents additional updates to his rootkit code, version .50, at |
http://rodag.blogbus.com/index.html. By this time Wicked Rose was performing full-time |
development of this malicious code as a hacker for hire. |
June 21, 2007 |
Continued US Targeted Attacks |
Just over a month later, following initial GinWui based targeted attacks, another Microsoft Word |
exploit occurs on June 21, 2006. A spoofed e-mail is sent to a target containing a hostile |
Microsoft Word document. Analysis of the attack reveals that it's likely a test file used to |
identify what version of Word may be running within the targeted organization, rather than a |
refined targeted attack upon a known version of Microsoft Word. Chinese text within the Word |
document reveal Chinese characters discussing a systematic evaluation of offsets for Microsoft |
Word exploitation: |
RipGof attacks reveal a Chinese string related to systematic testing of offsets for exploitation. |
Backtracking Targeted Attacks: RipGof |
In June 2006 another targeted attack emerges, but it's not GinWui this time but a new code, |
RipGof.B. The attack attempts to exploit MS06-027 to install RipGof.B, a Trojan horse. This is |
the same exploit code used in the former Zero-Day attacks linked to Wicked Rose and the NCPH |
hacking group. The exploit code is still private at this time, proving that the author of both |
GinWui and RipGof attacks are the same individual or group or affiliated through underground |
criminal operations. |
RipGof.B is an improvement of the former exploit used in GinWui attacks. RipGof.B attacks |
included improvements to shellcode that attempts to fork to different locations based upon the |
address value of the stack to exploit multiple versions of Microsoft Word. Once installed, |
RipGof.B attempts to connect to enjoy.irdet.com and enjoy.bmwsee.com over TCP port 80. It |
runs as a rootkit and backdoor Trojan horse and phones home to a Chinese server with stolen |
data. |