Datasets:
func
stringlengths 0
484k
| target
int64 0
1
| cwe
sequencelengths 0
4
| project
stringclasses 799
values | commit_id
stringlengths 40
40
| hash
float64 1,215,700,430,453,689,100,000,000B
340,281,914,521,452,260,000,000,000,000B
| size
int64 1
24k
| message
stringlengths 0
13.3k
|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
static boolean ReadICCProfile(j_decompress_ptr jpeg_info)
{
char
magick[12];
ErrorManager
*error_manager;
ExceptionInfo
*exception;
Image
*image;
MagickBooleanType
status;
register ssize_t
i;
register unsigned char
*p;
size_t
length;
StringInfo
*icc_profile,
*profile;
/*
Read color profile.
*/
length=(size_t) ((size_t) GetCharacter(jpeg_info) << 8);
length+=(size_t) GetCharacter(jpeg_info);
length-=2;
if (length <= 14)
{
while (length-- > 0)
if (GetCharacter(jpeg_info) == EOF)
break;
return(TRUE);
}
for (i=0; i < 12; i++)
magick[i]=(char) GetCharacter(jpeg_info);
if (LocaleCompare(magick,ICC_PROFILE) != 0)
{
/*
Not a ICC profile, return.
*/
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) (length-12); i++)
if (GetCharacter(jpeg_info) == EOF)
break;
return(TRUE);
}
(void) GetCharacter(jpeg_info); /* id */
(void) GetCharacter(jpeg_info); /* markers */
length-=14;
error_manager=(ErrorManager *) jpeg_info->client_data;
exception=error_manager->exception;
image=error_manager->image;
profile=BlobToStringInfo((const void *) NULL,length);
if (profile == (StringInfo *) NULL)
{
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),
ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed","`%s'",image->filename);
return(FALSE);
}
error_manager->profile=profile;
p=GetStringInfoDatum(profile);
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) length; i++)
{
int
c;
c=GetCharacter(jpeg_info);
if (c == EOF)
break;
*p++=(unsigned char) c;
}
if (i != (ssize_t) length)
{
profile=DestroyStringInfo(profile);
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),
CorruptImageError,"InsufficientImageDataInFile","`%s'",
image->filename);
return(FALSE);
}
error_manager->profile=NULL;
icc_profile=(StringInfo *) GetImageProfile(image,"icc");
if (icc_profile != (StringInfo *) NULL)
{
ConcatenateStringInfo(icc_profile,profile);
profile=DestroyStringInfo(profile);
}
else
{
status=SetImageProfile(image,"icc",profile,exception);
profile=DestroyStringInfo(profile);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),
ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed","`%s'",image->filename);
return(FALSE);
}
}
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
"Profile: ICC, %.20g bytes",(double) length);
return(TRUE);
} | 1 | [
"CWE-416"
] | ImageMagick | 39f226a9c137f547e12afde972eeba7551124493 | 162,374,092,337,400,400,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 111 | https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1641 |
__export struct rad_dict_attr_t *rad_dict_find_attr_id(struct rad_dict_vendor_t *vendor, int id)
{
struct rad_dict_attr_t *attr;
struct list_head *items = vendor ? &vendor->items : &dict->items;
list_for_each_entry(attr, items, entry)
if (attr->id == id)
return attr;
return NULL;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-787"
] | accel-ppp | d4cb89721cc8e5b3dd3fbefaf173eb77ecb85615 | 123,560,801,128,212,490,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 11 | fix buffer overflow when receive radius packet
This patch fixes buffer overflow if radius packet contains invalid atribute length
and attrubute type from the following list: ipv4addr, ipv6addr, ipv6prefix or ifid
Reported-by: Chloe Ong
Reported-by: Eugene Lim <spaceraccoon@users.noreply.github.com>
Reported-by: Kar Wei Loh
Signed-off-by: Sergey V. Lobanov <sergey@lobanov.in> |
void set_user_nice(struct task_struct *p, long nice)
{
int old_prio, delta, on_rq;
unsigned long flags;
struct rq *rq;
if (TASK_NICE(p) == nice || nice < -20 || nice > 19)
return;
/*
* We have to be careful, if called from sys_setpriority(),
* the task might be in the middle of scheduling on another CPU.
*/
rq = task_rq_lock(p, &flags);
update_rq_clock(rq);
/*
* The RT priorities are set via sched_setscheduler(), but we still
* allow the 'normal' nice value to be set - but as expected
* it wont have any effect on scheduling until the task is
* SCHED_FIFO/SCHED_RR:
*/
if (task_has_rt_policy(p)) {
p->static_prio = NICE_TO_PRIO(nice);
goto out_unlock;
}
on_rq = p->se.on_rq;
if (on_rq)
dequeue_task(rq, p, 0);
p->static_prio = NICE_TO_PRIO(nice);
set_load_weight(p);
old_prio = p->prio;
p->prio = effective_prio(p);
delta = p->prio - old_prio;
if (on_rq) {
enqueue_task(rq, p, 0);
/*
* If the task increased its priority or is running and
* lowered its priority, then reschedule its CPU:
*/
if (delta < 0 || (delta > 0 && task_running(rq, p)))
resched_task(rq->curr);
}
out_unlock:
task_rq_unlock(rq, &flags);
} | 0 | [] | linux-2.6 | 8f1bc385cfbab474db6c27b5af1e439614f3025c | 80,653,397,182,524,560,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 46 | sched: fair: weight calculations
In order to level the hierarchy, we need to calculate load based on the
root view. That is, each task's load is in the same unit.
A
/ \
B 1
/ \
2 3
To compute 1's load we do:
weight(1)
--------------
rq_weight(A)
To compute 2's load we do:
weight(2) weight(B)
------------ * -----------
rq_weight(B) rw_weight(A)
This yields load fractions in comparable units.
The consequence is that it changes virtual time. We used to have:
time_{i}
vtime_{i} = ------------
weight_{i}
vtime = \Sum vtime_{i} = time / rq_weight.
But with the new way of load calculation we get that vtime equals time.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> |
GetNumWrongData(const byte * curPtr, const int maxnum)
{
int count = 0;
if (1 == maxnum) {
return (1);
}
while (maxnum > count+1 && *(curPtr + count) != *(curPtr + count + 1)) {
count++;
}
return (count);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-787"
] | ghostpdl | 9f39ed4a92578a020ae10459643e1fe72573d134 | 62,986,818,176,178,330,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 13 | Bug 701792: Avoid going beyond buffer in GetNumSameData() and GetNumWrongData().
GetNumSameData() compared buffer contents before checking that we are still
within bounds of buffer, which caused the bug.
Have made similar fix to GetNumWrongData() because it has similar error.
Fixes address sanitizer error in:
./sanbin/gs -sOutputFile=tmp -sDEVICE=lips4v ../bug-701792.pdf |
int btrfs_check_dir_item_collision(struct btrfs_root *root, u64 dir,
const char *name, int name_len)
{
int ret;
struct btrfs_key key;
struct btrfs_dir_item *di;
int data_size;
struct extent_buffer *leaf;
int slot;
struct btrfs_path *path;
path = btrfs_alloc_path();
if (!path)
return -ENOMEM;
key.objectid = dir;
btrfs_set_key_type(&key, BTRFS_DIR_ITEM_KEY);
key.offset = btrfs_name_hash(name, name_len);
ret = btrfs_search_slot(NULL, root, &key, path, 0, 0);
/* return back any errors */
if (ret < 0)
goto out;
/* nothing found, we're safe */
if (ret > 0) {
ret = 0;
goto out;
}
/* we found an item, look for our name in the item */
di = btrfs_match_dir_item_name(root, path, name, name_len);
if (di) {
/* our exact name was found */
ret = -EEXIST;
goto out;
}
/*
* see if there is room in the item to insert this
* name
*/
data_size = sizeof(*di) + name_len + sizeof(struct btrfs_item);
leaf = path->nodes[0];
slot = path->slots[0];
if (data_size + btrfs_item_size_nr(leaf, slot) +
sizeof(struct btrfs_item) > BTRFS_LEAF_DATA_SIZE(root)) {
ret = -EOVERFLOW;
} else {
/* plenty of insertion room */
ret = 0;
}
out:
btrfs_free_path(path);
return ret;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-310"
] | linux-2.6 | 9c52057c698fb96f8f07e7a4bcf4801a092bda89 | 248,982,828,227,266,640,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 58 | Btrfs: fix hash overflow handling
The handling for directory crc hash overflows was fairly obscure,
split_leaf returns EOVERFLOW when we try to extend the item and that is
supposed to bubble up to userland. For a while it did so, but along the
way we added better handling of errors and forced the FS readonly if we
hit IO errors during the directory insertion.
Along the way, we started testing only for EEXIST and the EOVERFLOW case
was dropped. The end result is that we may force the FS readonly if we
catch a directory hash bucket overflow.
This fixes a few problem spots. First I add tests for EOVERFLOW in the
places where we can safely just return the error up the chain.
btrfs_rename is harder though, because it tries to insert the new
directory item only after it has already unlinked anything the rename
was going to overwrite. Rather than adding very complex logic, I added
a helper to test for the hash overflow case early while it is still safe
to bail out.
Snapshot and subvolume creation had a similar problem, so they are using
the new helper now too.
Signed-off-by: Chris Mason <chris.mason@fusionio.com>
Reported-by: Pascal Junod <pascal@junod.info> |
static int rsi_mac80211_resume(struct ieee80211_hw *hw)
{
u16 rx_filter_word = 0;
struct rsi_hw *adapter = hw->priv;
struct rsi_common *common = adapter->priv;
common->wow_flags = 0;
rsi_dbg(INFO_ZONE, "%s: mac80211 resume\n", __func__);
if (common->hibernate_resume)
return 0;
mutex_lock(&common->mutex);
rsi_send_wowlan_request(common, 0, 0);
rx_filter_word = (ALLOW_DATA_ASSOC_PEER | ALLOW_CTRL_ASSOC_PEER |
ALLOW_MGMT_ASSOC_PEER);
rsi_send_rx_filter_frame(common, rx_filter_word);
mutex_unlock(&common->mutex);
return 0;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-416"
] | linux | abd39c6ded9db53aa44c2540092bdd5fb6590fa8 | 60,472,285,856,768,470,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 23 | rsi: add fix for crash during assertions
Observed crash in some scenarios when assertion has occurred,
this is because hw structure is freed and is tried to get
accessed in some functions where null check is already
present. So, avoided the crash by making the hw to NULL after
freeing.
Signed-off-by: Sanjay Konduri <sanjay.konduri@redpinesignals.com>
Signed-off-by: Sushant Kumar Mishra <sushant.mishra@redpinesignals.com>
Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo <kvalo@codeaurora.org> |
MagickExport MagickBooleanType SetImageProperty(Image *image,
const char *property,const char *value,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
MagickBooleanType
status;
MagickStatusType
flags;
assert(image != (Image *) NULL);
assert(image->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",image->filename);
if (image->properties == (void *) NULL)
image->properties=NewSplayTree(CompareSplayTreeString,
RelinquishMagickMemory,RelinquishMagickMemory); /* create splay-tree */
if (value == (const char *) NULL)
return(DeleteImageProperty(image,property)); /* delete if NULL */
status=MagickTrue;
if (strlen(property) <= 1)
{
/*
Do not 'set' single letter properties - read only shorthand.
*/
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),OptionError,
"SetReadOnlyProperty","`%s'",property);
return(MagickFalse);
}
/* FUTURE: binary chars or quotes in key should produce a error */
/* Set attributes with known names or special prefixes
return result is found, or break to set a free form properity
*/
switch (*property)
{
#if 0 /* Percent escape's sets values with this prefix: for later use
Throwing an exception causes this setting to fail */
case '8':
{
if (LocaleNCompare("8bim:",property,5) == 0)
{
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),OptionError,
"SetReadOnlyProperty","`%s'",property);
return(MagickFalse);
}
break;
}
#endif
case 'B':
case 'b':
{
if (LocaleCompare("background",property) == 0)
{
(void) QueryColorCompliance(value,AllCompliance,
&image->background_color,exception);
/* check for FUTURE: value exception?? */
/* also add user input to splay tree */
}
break; /* not an attribute, add as a property */
}
case 'C':
case 'c':
{
if (LocaleCompare("channels",property) == 0)
{
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),OptionError,
"SetReadOnlyProperty","`%s'",property);
return(MagickFalse);
}
if (LocaleCompare("colorspace",property) == 0)
{
ssize_t
colorspace;
colorspace=ParseCommandOption(MagickColorspaceOptions,MagickFalse,
value);
if (colorspace < 0)
return(MagickFalse); /* FUTURE: value exception?? */
return(SetImageColorspace(image,(ColorspaceType) colorspace,exception));
}
if (LocaleCompare("compose",property) == 0)
{
ssize_t
compose;
compose=ParseCommandOption(MagickComposeOptions,MagickFalse,value);
if (compose < 0)
return(MagickFalse); /* FUTURE: value exception?? */
image->compose=(CompositeOperator) compose;
return(MagickTrue);
}
if (LocaleCompare("compress",property) == 0)
{
ssize_t
compression;
compression=ParseCommandOption(MagickCompressOptions,MagickFalse,
value);
if (compression < 0)
return(MagickFalse); /* FUTURE: value exception?? */
image->compression=(CompressionType) compression;
return(MagickTrue);
}
break; /* not an attribute, add as a property */
}
case 'D':
case 'd':
{
if (LocaleCompare("delay",property) == 0)
{
GeometryInfo
geometry_info;
flags=ParseGeometry(value,&geometry_info);
if ((flags & GreaterValue) != 0)
{
if (image->delay > (size_t) floor(geometry_info.rho+0.5))
image->delay=(size_t) floor(geometry_info.rho+0.5);
}
else
if ((flags & LessValue) != 0)
{
if (image->delay < (size_t) floor(geometry_info.rho+0.5))
image->delay=(ssize_t)
floor(geometry_info.sigma+0.5);
}
else
image->delay=(size_t) floor(geometry_info.rho+0.5);
if ((flags & SigmaValue) != 0)
image->ticks_per_second=(ssize_t) floor(geometry_info.sigma+0.5);
return(MagickTrue);
}
if (LocaleCompare("delay_units",property) == 0)
{
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),OptionError,
"SetReadOnlyProperty","`%s'",property);
return(MagickFalse);
}
if (LocaleCompare("density",property) == 0)
{
GeometryInfo
geometry_info;
flags=ParseGeometry(value,&geometry_info);
image->resolution.x=geometry_info.rho;
image->resolution.y=geometry_info.sigma;
if ((flags & SigmaValue) == 0)
image->resolution.y=image->resolution.x;
return(MagickTrue);
}
if (LocaleCompare("depth",property) == 0)
{
image->depth=StringToUnsignedLong(value);
return(MagickTrue);
}
if (LocaleCompare("dispose",property) == 0)
{
ssize_t
dispose;
dispose=ParseCommandOption(MagickDisposeOptions,MagickFalse,value);
if (dispose < 0)
return(MagickFalse); /* FUTURE: value exception?? */
image->dispose=(DisposeType) dispose;
return(MagickTrue);
}
break; /* not an attribute, add as a property */
}
#if 0 /* Percent escape's sets values with this prefix: for later use
Throwing an exception causes this setting to fail */
case 'E':
case 'e':
{
if (LocaleNCompare("exif:",property,5) == 0)
{
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),OptionError,
"SetReadOnlyProperty","`%s'",property);
return(MagickFalse);
}
break; /* not an attribute, add as a property */
}
case 'F':
case 'f':
{
if (LocaleNCompare("fx:",property,3) == 0)
{
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),OptionError,
"SetReadOnlyProperty","`%s'",property);
return(MagickFalse);
}
break; /* not an attribute, add as a property */
}
#endif
case 'G':
case 'g':
{
if (LocaleCompare("gamma",property) == 0)
{
image->gamma=StringToDouble(value,(char **) NULL);
return(MagickTrue);
}
if (LocaleCompare("gravity",property) == 0)
{
ssize_t
gravity;
gravity=ParseCommandOption(MagickGravityOptions,MagickFalse,value);
if (gravity < 0)
return(MagickFalse); /* FUTURE: value exception?? */
image->gravity=(GravityType) gravity;
return(MagickTrue);
}
break; /* not an attribute, add as a property */
}
case 'H':
case 'h':
{
if (LocaleCompare("height",property) == 0)
{
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),OptionError,
"SetReadOnlyProperty","`%s'",property);
return(MagickFalse);
}
break; /* not an attribute, add as a property */
}
case 'I':
case 'i':
{
if (LocaleCompare("intensity",property) == 0)
{
ssize_t
intensity;
intensity=ParseCommandOption(MagickIntentOptions,MagickFalse,value);
if (intensity < 0)
return(MagickFalse);
image->intensity=(PixelIntensityMethod) intensity;
return(MagickTrue);
}
if (LocaleCompare("intent",property) == 0)
{
ssize_t
rendering_intent;
rendering_intent=ParseCommandOption(MagickIntentOptions,MagickFalse,
value);
if (rendering_intent < 0)
return(MagickFalse); /* FUTURE: value exception?? */
image->rendering_intent=(RenderingIntent) rendering_intent;
return(MagickTrue);
}
if (LocaleCompare("interpolate",property) == 0)
{
ssize_t
interpolate;
interpolate=ParseCommandOption(MagickInterpolateOptions,MagickFalse,
value);
if (interpolate < 0)
return(MagickFalse); /* FUTURE: value exception?? */
image->interpolate=(PixelInterpolateMethod) interpolate;
return(MagickTrue);
}
#if 0 /* Percent escape's sets values with this prefix: for later use
Throwing an exception causes this setting to fail */
if (LocaleNCompare("iptc:",property,5) == 0)
{
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),OptionError,
"SetReadOnlyProperty","`%s'",property);
return(MagickFalse);
}
#endif
break; /* not an attribute, add as a property */
}
case 'K':
case 'k':
if (LocaleCompare("kurtosis",property) == 0)
{
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),OptionError,
"SetReadOnlyProperty","`%s'",property);
return(MagickFalse);
}
break; /* not an attribute, add as a property */
case 'L':
case 'l':
{
if (LocaleCompare("loop",property) == 0)
{
image->iterations=StringToUnsignedLong(value);
return(MagickTrue);
}
break; /* not an attribute, add as a property */
}
case 'M':
case 'm':
if ((LocaleCompare("magick",property) == 0) ||
(LocaleCompare("max",property) == 0) ||
(LocaleCompare("mean",property) == 0) ||
(LocaleCompare("min",property) == 0) ||
(LocaleCompare("min",property) == 0))
{
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),OptionError,
"SetReadOnlyProperty","`%s'",property);
return(MagickFalse);
}
break; /* not an attribute, add as a property */
case 'O':
case 'o':
if (LocaleCompare("opaque",property) == 0)
{
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),OptionError,
"SetReadOnlyProperty","`%s'",property);
return(MagickFalse);
}
break; /* not an attribute, add as a property */
case 'P':
case 'p':
{
if (LocaleCompare("page",property) == 0)
{
char
*geometry;
geometry=GetPageGeometry(value);
flags=ParseAbsoluteGeometry(geometry,&image->page);
geometry=DestroyString(geometry);
return(MagickTrue);
}
#if 0 /* Percent escape's sets values with this prefix: for later use
Throwing an exception causes this setting to fail */
if (LocaleNCompare("pixel:",property,6) == 0)
{
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),OptionError,
"SetReadOnlyProperty","`%s'",property);
return(MagickFalse);
}
#endif
if (LocaleCompare("profile",property) == 0)
{
ImageInfo
*image_info;
StringInfo
*profile;
image_info=AcquireImageInfo();
(void) CopyMagickString(image_info->filename,value,MagickPathExtent);
(void) SetImageInfo(image_info,1,exception);
profile=FileToStringInfo(image_info->filename,~0UL,exception);
if (profile != (StringInfo *) NULL)
status=SetImageProfile(image,image_info->magick,profile,exception);
image_info=DestroyImageInfo(image_info);
return(MagickTrue);
}
break; /* not an attribute, add as a property */
}
case 'R':
case 'r':
{
if (LocaleCompare("rendering-intent",property) == 0)
{
ssize_t
rendering_intent;
rendering_intent=ParseCommandOption(MagickIntentOptions,MagickFalse,
value);
if (rendering_intent < 0)
return(MagickFalse); /* FUTURE: value exception?? */
image->rendering_intent=(RenderingIntent) rendering_intent;
return(MagickTrue);
}
break; /* not an attribute, add as a property */
}
case 'S':
case 's':
if ((LocaleCompare("size",property) == 0) ||
(LocaleCompare("skewness",property) == 0) ||
(LocaleCompare("scenes",property) == 0) ||
(LocaleCompare("standard-deviation",property) == 0))
{
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),OptionError,
"SetReadOnlyProperty","`%s'",property);
return(MagickFalse);
}
break; /* not an attribute, add as a property */
case 'T':
case 't':
{
if (LocaleCompare("tile-offset",property) == 0)
{
char
*geometry;
geometry=GetPageGeometry(value);
flags=ParseAbsoluteGeometry(geometry,&image->tile_offset);
geometry=DestroyString(geometry);
return(MagickTrue);
}
break; /* not an attribute, add as a property */
}
case 'U':
case 'u':
{
if (LocaleCompare("units",property) == 0)
{
ssize_t
units;
units=ParseCommandOption(MagickResolutionOptions,MagickFalse,value);
if (units < 0)
return(MagickFalse); /* FUTURE: value exception?? */
image->units=(ResolutionType) units;
return(MagickTrue);
}
break; /* not an attribute, add as a property */
}
case 'V':
case 'v':
{
if (LocaleCompare("version",property) == 0)
{
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),OptionError,
"SetReadOnlyProperty","`%s'",property);
return(MagickFalse);
}
break; /* not an attribute, add as a property */
}
case 'W':
case 'w':
{
if (LocaleCompare("width",property) == 0)
{
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),OptionError,
"SetReadOnlyProperty","`%s'",property);
return(MagickFalse);
}
break; /* not an attribute, add as a property */
}
#if 0 /* Percent escape's sets values with this prefix: for later use
Throwing an exception causes this setting to fail */
case 'X':
case 'x':
{
if (LocaleNCompare("xmp:",property,4) == 0)
{
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),OptionError,
"SetReadOnlyProperty","`%s'",property);
return(MagickFalse);
}
break; /* not an attribute, add as a property */
}
#endif
}
/* Default: not an attribute, add as a property */
status=AddValueToSplayTree((SplayTreeInfo *) image->properties,
ConstantString(property),ConstantString(value));
/* FUTURE: error if status is bad? */
return(status);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-476"
] | ImageMagick | b61d35eaccc0a7ddeff8a1c3abfcd0a43ccf210b | 229,196,161,740,944,960,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 459 | https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/298 |
proto_tree_add_item_ret_boolean(proto_tree *tree, int hfindex, tvbuff_t *tvb,
const gint start, gint length,
const guint encoding, gboolean *retval)
{
header_field_info *hfinfo = proto_registrar_get_nth(hfindex);
field_info *new_fi;
guint64 value, bitval;
DISSECTOR_ASSERT_HINT(hfinfo != NULL, "Not passed hfi!");
if (hfinfo->type != FT_BOOLEAN) {
REPORT_DISSECTOR_BUG("field %s is not of type FT_BOOLEAN",
hfinfo->abbrev);
}
/* length validation for native number encoding caught by get_uint64_value() */
/* length has to be -1 or > 0 regardless of encoding */
if (length < -1 || length == 0)
REPORT_DISSECTOR_BUG("Invalid length %d passed to proto_tree_add_item_ret_boolean",
length);
if (encoding & ENC_STRING) {
REPORT_DISSECTOR_BUG("wrong encoding");
}
/* I believe it's ok if this is called with a NULL tree */
value = get_uint64_value(tree, tvb, start, length, encoding);
if (retval) {
bitval = value;
if (hfinfo->bitmask) {
/* Mask out irrelevant portions */
bitval &= hfinfo->bitmask;
}
*retval = (bitval != 0);
}
CHECK_FOR_NULL_TREE(tree);
TRY_TO_FAKE_THIS_ITEM(tree, hfinfo->id, hfinfo);
new_fi = new_field_info(tree, hfinfo, tvb, start, length);
proto_tree_set_boolean(new_fi, value);
new_fi->flags |= (encoding & ENC_LITTLE_ENDIAN) ? FI_LITTLE_ENDIAN : FI_BIG_ENDIAN;
return proto_tree_add_node(tree, new_fi);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-401"
] | wireshark | a9fc769d7bb4b491efb61c699d57c9f35269d871 | 257,882,672,430,912,520,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 48 | epan: Fix a memory leak.
Make sure _proto_tree_add_bits_ret_val allocates a bits array using the
packet scope, otherwise we leak memory. Fixes #17032. |
auth_update_component(struct sc_card *card, struct auth_update_component_info *args)
{
struct sc_apdu apdu;
unsigned char sbuf[SC_MAX_APDU_BUFFER_SIZE + 0x10];
unsigned char ins, p1, p2;
int rv, len;
LOG_FUNC_CALLED(card->ctx);
if (args->len > sizeof(sbuf) || args->len > 0x100)
LOG_FUNC_RETURN(card->ctx, SC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENTS);
sc_log(card->ctx, "nn %i; len %i", args->component, args->len);
ins = 0xD8;
p1 = args->component;
p2 = 0x04;
len = 0;
sbuf[len++] = args->type;
sbuf[len++] = args->len;
memcpy(sbuf + len, args->data, args->len);
len += args->len;
if (args->type == SC_CARDCTL_OBERTHUR_KEY_DES) {
int outl;
const unsigned char in[8] = {0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0};
unsigned char out[8];
EVP_CIPHER_CTX * ctx = NULL;
if (args->len!=8 && args->len!=24)
LOG_FUNC_RETURN(card->ctx, SC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENTS);
ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
if (ctx == NULL)
SC_FUNC_RETURN(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL,SC_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY);
p2 = 0;
if (args->len == 24)
EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_des_ede(), NULL, args->data, NULL);
else
EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_des_ecb(), NULL, args->data, NULL);
rv = EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, out, &outl, in, 8);
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
if (rv == 0) {
sc_log(card->ctx, "OpenSSL encryption error.");
LOG_FUNC_RETURN(card->ctx, SC_ERROR_INTERNAL);
}
sbuf[len++] = 0x03;
memcpy(sbuf + len, out, 3);
len += 3;
}
else {
sbuf[len++] = 0;
}
sc_format_apdu(card, &apdu, SC_APDU_CASE_3_SHORT, ins, p1, p2);
apdu.cla |= 0x80;
apdu.data = sbuf;
apdu.datalen = len;
apdu.lc = len;
if (args->len == 0x100) {
sbuf[0] = args->type;
sbuf[1] = 0x20;
memcpy(sbuf + 2, args->data, 0x20);
sbuf[0x22] = 0;
apdu.cla |= 0x10;
apdu.data = sbuf;
apdu.datalen = 0x23;
apdu.lc = 0x23;
rv = sc_transmit_apdu(card, &apdu);
apdu.cla &= ~0x10;
LOG_TEST_RET(card->ctx, rv, "APDU transmit failed");
sbuf[0] = args->type;
sbuf[1] = 0xE0;
memcpy(sbuf + 2, args->data + 0x20, 0xE0);
sbuf[0xE2] = 0;
apdu.data = sbuf;
apdu.datalen = 0xE3;
apdu.lc = 0xE3;
}
rv = sc_transmit_apdu(card, &apdu);
sc_mem_clear(sbuf, sizeof(sbuf));
LOG_TEST_RET(card->ctx, rv, "APDU transmit failed");
rv = sc_check_sw(card, apdu.sw1, apdu.sw2);
LOG_FUNC_RETURN(card->ctx, rv);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-125"
] | OpenSC | 8fe377e93b4b56060e5bbfb6f3142ceaeca744fa | 262,522,697,236,003,360,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 89 | fixed out of bounds reads
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting and suggesting security fixes. |
static s32 brcmf_set_auth_type(struct net_device *ndev,
struct cfg80211_connect_params *sme)
{
struct brcmf_cfg80211_profile *profile = ndev_to_prof(ndev);
struct brcmf_cfg80211_security *sec;
s32 val = 0;
s32 err = 0;
switch (sme->auth_type) {
case NL80211_AUTHTYPE_OPEN_SYSTEM:
val = 0;
brcmf_dbg(CONN, "open system\n");
break;
case NL80211_AUTHTYPE_SHARED_KEY:
val = 1;
brcmf_dbg(CONN, "shared key\n");
break;
default:
val = 2;
brcmf_dbg(CONN, "automatic, auth type (%d)\n", sme->auth_type);
break;
}
err = brcmf_fil_bsscfg_int_set(netdev_priv(ndev), "auth", val);
if (err) {
brcmf_err("set auth failed (%d)\n", err);
return err;
}
sec = &profile->sec;
sec->auth_type = sme->auth_type;
return err;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-119",
"CWE-787"
] | linux | 8f44c9a41386729fea410e688959ddaa9d51be7c | 275,196,499,693,108,930,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 32 | brcmfmac: fix possible buffer overflow in brcmf_cfg80211_mgmt_tx()
The lower level nl80211 code in cfg80211 ensures that "len" is between
25 and NL80211_ATTR_FRAME (2304). We subtract DOT11_MGMT_HDR_LEN (24) from
"len" so thats's max of 2280. However, the action_frame->data[] buffer is
only BRCMF_FIL_ACTION_FRAME_SIZE (1800) bytes long so this memcpy() can
overflow.
memcpy(action_frame->data, &buf[DOT11_MGMT_HDR_LEN],
le16_to_cpu(action_frame->len));
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 3.9.x
Fixes: 18e2f61db3b70 ("brcmfmac: P2P action frame tx.")
Reported-by: "freenerguo(郭大兴)" <freenerguo@tencent.com>
Signed-off-by: Arend van Spriel <arend.vanspriel@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> |
CImg<T>& blur_box(const float boxsize_x, const float boxsize_y, const float boxsize_z,
const unsigned int boundary_conditions=1,
const unsigned int nb_iter=1) {
if (is_empty()) return *this;
if (_width>1) boxfilter(boxsize_x,0,'x',boundary_conditions,nb_iter);
if (_height>1) boxfilter(boxsize_y,0,'y',boundary_conditions,nb_iter);
if (_depth>1) boxfilter(boxsize_z,0,'z',boundary_conditions,nb_iter);
return *this;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-770"
] | cimg | 619cb58dd90b4e03ac68286c70ed98acbefd1c90 | 340,143,946,313,479,640,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 9 | CImg<>::load_bmp() and CImg<>::load_pandore(): Check that dimensions encoded in file does not exceed file size. |
static int network_flush(cdtime_t timeout,
__attribute__((unused)) const char *identifier,
__attribute__((unused)) user_data_t *user_data) {
pthread_mutex_lock(&send_buffer_lock);
if (send_buffer_fill > 0) {
if (timeout > 0) {
cdtime_t now = cdtime();
if ((send_buffer_last_update + timeout) > now) {
pthread_mutex_unlock(&send_buffer_lock);
return (0);
}
}
flush_buffer();
}
pthread_mutex_unlock(&send_buffer_lock);
return (0);
} /* int network_flush */ | 0 | [
"CWE-835"
] | collectd | f6be4f9b49b949b379326c3d7002476e6ce4f211 | 256,471,210,509,380,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 19 | network plugin: Fix endless loop DOS in parse_packet()
When correct 'Signature part' is received by Collectd, configured without
AuthFile option, condition for endless loop occurs due to missing increase
of pointer to next unprocessed part.
This is a forward-port of #2233.
Fixes: CVE-2017-7401
Closes: #2174
Signed-off-by: Florian Forster <octo@collectd.org> |
static void test_bug9643()
{
MYSQL_STMT *stmt;
MYSQL_BIND my_bind[1];
int32 a;
int rc;
const char *stmt_text;
int num_rows= 0;
ulong type;
ulong prefetch_rows= 5;
myheader("test_bug9643");
mysql_query(mysql, "drop table if exists t1");
mysql_query(mysql, "create table t1 (id integer not null primary key)");
rc= mysql_query(mysql, "insert into t1 (id) values "
" (1), (2), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9)");
myquery(rc);
stmt= mysql_stmt_init(mysql);
/* Not implemented in 5.0 */
type= (ulong) CURSOR_TYPE_SCROLLABLE;
rc= mysql_stmt_attr_set(stmt, STMT_ATTR_CURSOR_TYPE, (void*) &type);
DIE_UNLESS(rc);
if (! opt_silent)
printf("Got error (as expected): %s\n", mysql_stmt_error(stmt));
type= (ulong) CURSOR_TYPE_READ_ONLY;
rc= mysql_stmt_attr_set(stmt, STMT_ATTR_CURSOR_TYPE, (void*) &type);
check_execute(stmt, rc);
rc= mysql_stmt_attr_set(stmt, STMT_ATTR_PREFETCH_ROWS,
(void*) &prefetch_rows);
check_execute(stmt, rc);
stmt_text= "select * from t1";
rc= mysql_stmt_prepare(stmt, stmt_text, strlen(stmt_text));
check_execute(stmt, rc);
bzero((char*) my_bind, sizeof(my_bind));
my_bind[0].buffer_type= MYSQL_TYPE_LONG;
my_bind[0].buffer= (void*) &a;
my_bind[0].buffer_length= sizeof(a);
mysql_stmt_bind_result(stmt, my_bind);
rc= mysql_stmt_execute(stmt);
check_execute(stmt, rc);
while ((rc= mysql_stmt_fetch(stmt)) == 0)
++num_rows;
DIE_UNLESS(num_rows == 9);
rc= mysql_stmt_close(stmt);
DIE_UNLESS(rc == 0);
rc= mysql_query(mysql, "drop table t1");
myquery(rc);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-416"
] | server | eef21014898d61e77890359d6546d4985d829ef6 | 257,412,792,354,208,870,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 56 | MDEV-11933 Wrong usage of linked list in mysql_prune_stmt_list
mysql_prune_stmt_list() was walking the list following
element->next pointers, but inside the loop it was invoking
list_add(element) that modified element->next. So, mysql_prune_stmt_list()
failed to visit and reset all elements, and some of them were left
with pointers to invalid MYSQL. |
zzip_mem_disk_load(ZZIP_MEM_DISK* dir, ZZIP_DISK* disk)
{
if (dir->list) zzip_mem_disk_unload(dir);
___ struct zzip_disk_entry* entry = zzip_disk_findfirst(disk);
for (; entry ; entry = zzip_disk_findnext(disk, entry)) {
ZZIP_MEM_DISK_ENTRY* item = zzip_mem_disk_entry_new(disk, entry);
if (dir->last) { dir->last->zz_next = item; }
else { dir->list = item; }; dir->last = item;
} ____;
dir->disk = disk;
return 0;
} | 1 | [
"CWE-119"
] | zziplib | 596d9dfce2624e849417d4301e8d67935608aa5e | 219,475,429,227,882,320,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 12 | memdisk
(.) |
int rsa_pkcs1_decrypt( rsa_context *ctx,
int mode, size_t *olen,
const unsigned char *input,
unsigned char *output,
size_t output_max_len)
{
switch( ctx->padding )
{
case RSA_PKCS_V15:
return rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_decrypt( ctx, mode, olen, input, output,
output_max_len );
#if defined(POLARSSL_PKCS1_V21)
case RSA_PKCS_V21:
return rsa_rsaes_oaep_decrypt( ctx, mode, NULL, 0, olen, input,
output, output_max_len );
#endif
default:
return( POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING );
}
} | 1 | [
"CWE-310"
] | polarssl | 43f9799ce61c6392a014d0a2ea136b4b3a9ee194 | 103,061,960,944,602,730,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 22 | RSA blinding on CRT operations to counter timing attacks |
void subtime(struct timeval *a, struct timeval *b)
{
timersub(a, b, b);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-20",
"CWE-703"
] | sgminer | 910c36089940e81fb85c65b8e63dcd2fac71470c | 228,197,706,535,211,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 4 | stratum: parse_notify(): Don't die on malformed bbversion/prev_hash/nbit/ntime.
Might have introduced a memory leak, don't have time to check. :(
Should the other hex2bin()'s be checked?
Thanks to Mick Ayzenberg <mick.dejavusecurity.com> for finding this. |
bool Item::cleanup_processor(void *arg)
{
if (fixed)
cleanup();
return FALSE;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-416"
] | server | c02ebf3510850ba78a106be9974c94c3b97d8585 | 250,276,211,036,235,450,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 6 | MDEV-24176 Preparations
1. moved fix_vcol_exprs() call to open_table()
mysql_alter_table() doesn't do lock_tables() so it cannot win from
fix_vcol_exprs() from there. Tests affected: main.default_session
2. Vanilla cleanups and comments. |
static struct sb_uart_state *uart_get(struct uart_driver *drv, int line)
{
struct sb_uart_state *state;
MP_MUTEX_LOCK(mp_mutex);
state = drv->state + line;
if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&state->mutex)) {
state = ERR_PTR(-ERESTARTSYS);
goto out;
}
state->count++;
if (!state->port) {
state->count--;
MP_STATE_UNLOCK(state);
state = ERR_PTR(-ENXIO);
goto out;
}
if (!state->info) {
state->info = kmalloc(sizeof(struct sb_uart_info), GFP_KERNEL);
if (state->info) {
memset(state->info, 0, sizeof(struct sb_uart_info));
init_waitqueue_head(&state->info->open_wait);
init_waitqueue_head(&state->info->delta_msr_wait);
state->port->info = state->info;
tasklet_init(&state->info->tlet, mp_tasklet_action,
(unsigned long)state);
} else {
state->count--;
MP_STATE_UNLOCK(state);
state = ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
}
}
out:
MP_MUTEX_UNLOCK(mp_mutex);
return state;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-200"
] | linux | a8b33654b1e3b0c74d4a1fed041c9aae50b3c427 | 313,685,609,041,585,120,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 40 | Staging: sb105x: info leak in mp_get_count()
The icount.reserved[] array isn't initialized so it leaks stack
information to userspace.
Reported-by: Nico Golde <nico@ngolde.de>
Reported-by: Fabian Yamaguchi <fabs@goesec.de>
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> |
grapheme_extract_charcount_iter(UBreakIterator *bi, int32_t csize, unsigned char *pstr, int32_t str_len)
{
int pos = 0, prev_pos = 0;
int ret_pos = 0, prev_ret_pos = 0;
while ( 1 ) {
pos = ubrk_next(bi);
if ( UBRK_DONE == pos ) {
break;
}
/* if we are beyond our limit, then the loop is done */
if ( pos > csize ) {
break;
}
/* update our pointer in the original UTF-8 buffer by as many characters
as ubrk_next iterated over */
prev_ret_pos = ret_pos;
U8_FWD_N(pstr, ret_pos, str_len, pos - prev_pos);
if ( prev_ret_pos == ret_pos ) {
/* something wrong - malformed utf8? */
break;
}
prev_pos = pos;
}
return ret_pos;
} | 0 | [] | php-src | 16d0b9c836b793f9338c5a6296fba1b272bbae06 | 29,138,782,675,523,820,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 33 | Fix bug #72061 - Out-of-bounds reads in zif_grapheme_stripos with negative offset |
static void regulator_bulk_enable_async(void *data, async_cookie_t cookie)
{
struct regulator_bulk_data *bulk = data;
bulk->ret = regulator_enable(bulk->consumer);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-416"
] | linux | 60a2362f769cf549dc466134efe71c8bf9fbaaba | 53,491,484,475,638,870,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 6 | regulator: core: Fix regualtor_ena_gpio_free not to access pin after freeing
After freeing pin from regulator_ena_gpio_free, loop can access
the pin. So this patch fixes not to access pin after freeing.
Signed-off-by: Seung-Woo Kim <sw0312.kim@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org> |
static void free_pgpaths(struct list_head *pgpaths, struct dm_target *ti)
{
struct pgpath *pgpath, *tmp;
struct multipath *m = ti->private;
list_for_each_entry_safe(pgpath, tmp, pgpaths, list) {
list_del(&pgpath->list);
if (m->hw_handler_name)
scsi_dh_detach(bdev_get_queue(pgpath->path.dev->bdev));
dm_put_device(ti, pgpath->path.dev);
free_pgpath(pgpath);
}
} | 0 | [
"CWE-284",
"CWE-264"
] | linux | ec8013beddd717d1740cfefb1a9b900deef85462 | 249,918,762,209,933,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 13 | dm: do not forward ioctls from logical volumes to the underlying device
A logical volume can map to just part of underlying physical volume.
In this case, it must be treated like a partition.
Based on a patch from Alasdair G Kergon.
Cc: Alasdair G Kergon <agk@redhat.com>
Cc: dm-devel@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> |
bgp_attr_origin (struct bgp_attr_parser_args *args)
{
struct peer *const peer = args->peer;
struct attr *const attr = args->attr;
const bgp_size_t length = args->length;
/* If any recognized attribute has Attribute Length that conflicts
with the expected length (based on the attribute type code), then
the Error Subcode is set to Attribute Length Error. The Data
field contains the erroneous attribute (type, length and
value). */
if (length != 1)
{
zlog (peer->log, LOG_ERR, "Origin attribute length is not one %d",
length);
return bgp_attr_malformed (args,
BGP_NOTIFY_UPDATE_ATTR_LENG_ERR,
args->total);
}
/* Fetch origin attribute. */
attr->origin = stream_getc (BGP_INPUT (peer));
/* If the ORIGIN attribute has an undefined value, then the Error
Subcode is set to Invalid Origin Attribute. The Data field
contains the unrecognized attribute (type, length and value). */
if ((attr->origin != BGP_ORIGIN_IGP)
&& (attr->origin != BGP_ORIGIN_EGP)
&& (attr->origin != BGP_ORIGIN_INCOMPLETE))
{
zlog (peer->log, LOG_ERR, "Origin attribute value is invalid %d",
attr->origin);
return bgp_attr_malformed (args,
BGP_NOTIFY_UPDATE_INVAL_ORIGIN,
args->total);
}
/* Set oring attribute flag. */
attr->flag |= ATTR_FLAG_BIT (BGP_ATTR_ORIGIN);
return 0;
} | 0 | [] | quagga | 8794e8d229dc9fe29ea31424883433d4880ef408 | 155,420,048,715,899,980,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 42 | bgpd: Fix regression in args consolidation, total should be inited from args
* bgp_attr.c: (bgp_attr_unknown) total should be initialised from the args. |
bool ParticipantImpl::removeSubscriber(
Subscriber* sub)
{
for (auto sit = m_subscribers.begin(); sit != m_subscribers.end(); ++sit)
{
if (sit->second->getGuid() == sub->getGuid())
{
delete(sit->second);
m_subscribers.erase(sit);
return true;
}
}
return false;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-284"
] | Fast-DDS | d2aeab37eb4fad4376b68ea4dfbbf285a2926384 | 172,398,974,772,747,200,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 14 | check remote permissions (#1387)
* Refs 5346. Blackbox test
Signed-off-by: Iker Luengo <ikerluengo@eprosima.com>
* Refs 5346. one-way string compare
Signed-off-by: Iker Luengo <ikerluengo@eprosima.com>
* Refs 5346. Do not add partition separator on last partition
Signed-off-by: Iker Luengo <ikerluengo@eprosima.com>
* Refs 5346. Uncrustify
Signed-off-by: Iker Luengo <ikerluengo@eprosima.com>
* Refs 5346. Uncrustify
Signed-off-by: Iker Luengo <ikerluengo@eprosima.com>
* Refs 3680. Access control unit testing
It only covers Partition and Topic permissions
Signed-off-by: Iker Luengo <ikerluengo@eprosima.com>
* Refs #3680. Fix partition check on Permissions plugin.
Signed-off-by: Iker Luengo <ikerluengo@eprosima.com>
* Refs 3680. Uncrustify
Signed-off-by: Iker Luengo <ikerluengo@eprosima.com>
* Refs 3680. Fix tests on mac
Signed-off-by: Iker Luengo <ikerluengo@eprosima.com>
* Refs 3680. Fix windows tests
Signed-off-by: Iker Luengo <ikerluengo@eprosima.com>
* Refs 3680. Avoid memory leak on test
Signed-off-by: Iker Luengo <ikerluengo@eprosima.com>
* Refs 3680. Proxy data mocks should not return temporary objects
Signed-off-by: Iker Luengo <ikerluengo@eprosima.com>
* refs 3680. uncrustify
Signed-off-by: Iker Luengo <ikerluengo@eprosima.com>
Co-authored-by: Miguel Company <MiguelCompany@eprosima.com> |
void virDomainInputDefFree(virDomainInputDefPtr def)
{
if (!def)
return;
virDomainDeviceInfoClear(&def->info);
VIR_FREE(def->source.evdev);
VIR_FREE(def->virtio);
VIR_FREE(def);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-212"
] | libvirt | a5b064bf4b17a9884d7d361733737fb614ad8979 | 237,339,978,112,959,250,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 10 | conf: Don't format http cookies unless VIR_DOMAIN_DEF_FORMAT_SECURE is used
Starting with 3b076391befc3fe72deb0c244ac6c2b4c100b410
(v6.1.0-122-g3b076391be) we support http cookies. Since they may contain
somewhat sensitive information we should not format them into the XML
unless VIR_DOMAIN_DEF_FORMAT_SECURE is asserted.
Reported-by: Han Han <hhan@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Krempa <pkrempa@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Erik Skultety <eskultet@redhat.com> |
static ssize_t tlbflush_read_file(struct file *file, char __user *user_buf,
size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
{
char buf[32];
unsigned int len;
len = sprintf(buf, "%ld\n", tlb_single_page_flush_ceiling);
return simple_read_from_buffer(user_buf, count, ppos, buf, len);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-362"
] | linux | 71b3c126e61177eb693423f2e18a1914205b165e | 23,801,901,871,415,734,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 9 | x86/mm: Add barriers and document switch_mm()-vs-flush synchronization
When switch_mm() activates a new PGD, it also sets a bit that
tells other CPUs that the PGD is in use so that TLB flush IPIs
will be sent. In order for that to work correctly, the bit
needs to be visible prior to loading the PGD and therefore
starting to fill the local TLB.
Document all the barriers that make this work correctly and add
a couple that were missing.
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> |
bool CSteamNetworkConnectionUDP::BBeginAccept(
CSteamNetworkListenSocketDirectUDP *pParent,
const netadr_t &adrFrom,
CSharedSocket *pSharedSock,
const SteamNetworkingIdentity &identityRemote,
uint32 unConnectionIDRemote,
const CMsgSteamDatagramCertificateSigned &msgCert,
const CMsgSteamDatagramSessionCryptInfoSigned &msgCryptSessionInfo,
SteamDatagramErrMsg &errMsg
)
{
AssertMsg( !m_pTransport, "Trying to accept when we already have transport?" );
// Setup transport
CConnectionTransportUDP *pTransport = new CConnectionTransportUDP( *this );
if ( !pTransport->BAccept( pSharedSock, adrFrom, errMsg ) )
{
pTransport->TransportDestroySelfNow();
return false;
}
m_pTransport = pTransport;
m_identityRemote = identityRemote;
// Caller should have ensured a valid identity
Assert( !m_identityRemote.IsInvalid() );
m_unConnectionIDRemote = unConnectionIDRemote;
if ( !pParent->BAddChildConnection( this, errMsg ) )
return false;
// Let base class do some common initialization
SteamNetworkingMicroseconds usecNow = SteamNetworkingSockets_GetLocalTimestamp();
if ( !CSteamNetworkConnectionBase::BInitConnection( usecNow, 0, nullptr, errMsg ) )
{
DestroyTransport();
return false;
}
// Process crypto handshake now
if ( !BRecvCryptoHandshake( msgCert, msgCryptSessionInfo, true ) )
{
DestroyTransport();
Assert( GetState() == k_ESteamNetworkingConnectionState_ProblemDetectedLocally );
V_sprintf_safe( errMsg, "Failed crypto init. %s", m_szEndDebug );
return false;
}
// Start the connection state machine
return BConnectionState_Connecting( usecNow, errMsg );
} | 0 | [
"CWE-703"
] | GameNetworkingSockets | d944a10808891d202bb1d5e1998de6e0423af678 | 224,142,327,983,614,340,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 51 | Tweak pointer math to avoid possible integer overflow |
static void fwnet_remove(struct fw_unit *unit)
{
struct fwnet_peer *peer = dev_get_drvdata(&unit->device);
struct fwnet_device *dev = peer->dev;
struct net_device *net;
int i;
mutex_lock(&fwnet_device_mutex);
net = dev->netdev;
fwnet_remove_peer(peer, dev);
if (list_empty(&dev->peer_list)) {
unregister_netdev(net);
fwnet_fifo_stop(dev);
for (i = 0; dev->queued_datagrams && i < 5; i++)
ssleep(1);
WARN_ON(dev->queued_datagrams);
list_del(&dev->dev_link);
free_netdev(net);
}
mutex_unlock(&fwnet_device_mutex);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-119",
"CWE-284",
"CWE-787"
] | linux | 667121ace9dbafb368618dbabcf07901c962ddac | 183,275,235,350,997,300,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 28 | firewire: net: guard against rx buffer overflows
The IP-over-1394 driver firewire-net lacked input validation when
handling incoming fragmented datagrams. A maliciously formed fragment
with a respectively large datagram_offset would cause a memcpy past the
datagram buffer.
So, drop any packets carrying a fragment with offset + length larger
than datagram_size.
In addition, ensure that
- GASP header, unfragmented encapsulation header, or fragment
encapsulation header actually exists before we access it,
- the encapsulated datagram or fragment is of nonzero size.
Reported-by: Eyal Itkin <eyal.itkin@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Eyal Itkin <eyal.itkin@gmail.com>
Fixes: CVE 2016-8633
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Stefan Richter <stefanr@s5r6.in-berlin.de> |
static inline void smb2_sg_set_buf(struct scatterlist *sg, const void *buf,
unsigned int buflen)
{
void *addr;
/*
* VMAP_STACK (at least) puts stack into the vmalloc address space
*/
if (is_vmalloc_addr(buf))
addr = vmalloc_to_page(buf);
else
addr = virt_to_page(buf);
sg_set_page(sg, addr, buflen, offset_in_page(buf));
} | 0 | [
"CWE-476"
] | linux | d6f5e358452479fa8a773b5c6ccc9e4ec5a20880 | 3,494,783,149,816,233,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 13 | cifs: fix NULL ptr dereference in smb2_ioctl_query_info()
When calling smb2_ioctl_query_info() with invalid
smb_query_info::flags, a NULL ptr dereference is triggered when trying
to kfree() uninitialised rqst[n].rq_iov array.
This also fixes leaked paths that are created in SMB2_open_init()
which required SMB2_open_free() to properly free them.
Here is a small C reproducer that triggers it
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdint.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <sys/ioctl.h>
#define die(s) perror(s), exit(1)
#define QUERY_INFO 0xc018cf07
int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
int fd;
if (argc < 2)
exit(1);
fd = open(argv[1], O_RDONLY);
if (fd == -1)
die("open");
if (ioctl(fd, QUERY_INFO, (uint32_t[]) { 0, 0, 0, 4, 0, 0}) == -1)
die("ioctl");
close(fd);
return 0;
}
mount.cifs //srv/share /mnt -o ...
gcc repro.c && ./a.out /mnt/f0
[ 1832.124468] CIFS: VFS: \\w22-dc.zelda.test\test Invalid passthru query flags: 0x4
[ 1832.125043] general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000000: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN NOPTI
[ 1832.125764] KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000000-0x0000000000000007]
[ 1832.126241] CPU: 3 PID: 1133 Comm: a.out Not tainted 5.17.0-rc8 #2
[ 1832.126630] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.15.0-0-g2dd4b9b-rebuilt.opensuse.org 04/01/2014
[ 1832.127322] RIP: 0010:smb2_ioctl_query_info+0x7a3/0xe30 [cifs]
[ 1832.127749] Code: 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 c1 ea 03 80 3c 02 00 0f 85 6c 05 00 00 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 4d 8b 74 24 28 4c 89 f2 48 c1 ea 03 <80> 3c 02 00 0f 85 cb 04 00 00 49 8b 3e e8 bb fc fa ff 48 89 da 48
[ 1832.128911] RSP: 0018:ffffc90000957b08 EFLAGS: 00010256
[ 1832.129243] RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: ffff888117e9b850 RCX: ffffffffa020580d
[ 1832.129691] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000004 RDI: ffffffffa043a2c0
[ 1832.130137] RBP: ffff888117e9b878 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000003
[ 1832.130585] R10: fffffbfff4087458 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffff888117e9b800
[ 1832.131037] R13: 00000000ffffffea R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff888117e9b8a8
[ 1832.131485] FS: 00007fcee9900740(0000) GS:ffff888151a00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 1832.131993] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 1832.132354] CR2: 00007fcee9a1ef5e CR3: 0000000114cd2000 CR4: 0000000000350ee0
[ 1832.132801] Call Trace:
[ 1832.132962] <TASK>
[ 1832.133104] ? smb2_query_reparse_tag+0x890/0x890 [cifs]
[ 1832.133489] ? cifs_mapchar+0x460/0x460 [cifs]
[ 1832.133822] ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0x3f/0x70
[ 1832.134125] ? cifs_strndup_to_utf16+0x15b/0x250 [cifs]
[ 1832.134502] ? lock_downgrade+0x6f0/0x6f0
[ 1832.134760] ? cifs_convert_path_to_utf16+0x198/0x220 [cifs]
[ 1832.135170] ? smb2_check_message+0x1080/0x1080 [cifs]
[ 1832.135545] cifs_ioctl+0x1577/0x3320 [cifs]
[ 1832.135864] ? lock_downgrade+0x6f0/0x6f0
[ 1832.136125] ? cifs_readdir+0x2e60/0x2e60 [cifs]
[ 1832.136468] ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0x3f/0x70
[ 1832.136769] ? __rseq_handle_notify_resume+0x80b/0xbe0
[ 1832.137096] ? __up_read+0x192/0x710
[ 1832.137327] ? __ia32_sys_rseq+0xf0/0xf0
[ 1832.137578] ? __x64_sys_openat+0x11f/0x1d0
[ 1832.137850] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x127/0x190
[ 1832.138103] do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90
[ 1832.138378] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
[ 1832.138702] RIP: 0033:0x7fcee9a253df
[ 1832.138937] Code: 00 48 89 44 24 18 31 c0 48 8d 44 24 60 c7 04 24 10 00 00 00 48 89 44 24 08 48 8d 44 24 20 48 89 44 24 10 b8 10 00 00 00 0f 05 <41> 89 c0 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 1f 48 8b 44 24 18 64 48 2b 04 25 28 00
[ 1832.140107] RSP: 002b:00007ffeba94a8a0 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010
[ 1832.140606] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007fcee9a253df
[ 1832.141058] RDX: 00007ffeba94a910 RSI: 00000000c018cf07 RDI: 0000000000000003
[ 1832.141503] RBP: 00007ffeba94a930 R08: 00007fcee9b24db0 R09: 00007fcee9b45c4e
[ 1832.141948] R10: 00007fcee9918d40 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007ffeba94aa48
[ 1832.142396] R13: 0000000000401176 R14: 0000000000403df8 R15: 00007fcee9b78000
[ 1832.142851] </TASK>
[ 1832.142994] Modules linked in: cifs cifs_arc4 cifs_md4 bpf_preload [last unloaded: cifs]
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paulo Alcantara (SUSE) <pc@cjr.nz>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com> |
TEST_F(ExpressionNaryTest, GroupingOptimizationOnAssociativeOnlyNotExecuteOnSingleConstantsBack) {
BSONArray spec = BSON_ARRAY("$path" << 55);
addOperandArrayToExpr(_associativeOnly, spec);
assertContents(_associativeOnly, spec);
intrusive_ptr<Expression> optimized = _associativeOnly->optimize();
ASSERT(_associativeOnly == optimized);
assertContents(_associativeOnly, BSON_ARRAY("$path" << 55));
} | 0 | [
"CWE-835"
] | mongo | 0a076417d1d7fba3632b73349a1fd29a83e68816 | 336,184,152,400,771,970,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 8 | SERVER-38070 fix infinite loop in agg expression |
int security_vm_enough_memory_mm(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages)
{
WARN_ON(mm == NULL);
return security_ops->vm_enough_memory(mm, pages);
} | 0 | [] | linux-2.6 | ee18d64c1f632043a02e6f5ba5e045bb26a5465f | 263,465,344,747,992,300,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 5 | KEYS: Add a keyctl to install a process's session keyring on its parent [try #6]
Add a keyctl to install a process's session keyring onto its parent. This
replaces the parent's session keyring. Because the COW credential code does
not permit one process to change another process's credentials directly, the
change is deferred until userspace next starts executing again. Normally this
will be after a wait*() syscall.
To support this, three new security hooks have been provided:
cred_alloc_blank() to allocate unset security creds, cred_transfer() to fill in
the blank security creds and key_session_to_parent() - which asks the LSM if
the process may replace its parent's session keyring.
The replacement may only happen if the process has the same ownership details
as its parent, and the process has LINK permission on the session keyring, and
the session keyring is owned by the process, and the LSM permits it.
Note that this requires alteration to each architecture's notify_resume path.
This has been done for all arches barring blackfin, m68k* and xtensa, all of
which need assembly alteration to support TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME. This allows the
replacement to be performed at the point the parent process resumes userspace
execution.
This allows the userspace AFS pioctl emulation to fully emulate newpag() and
the VIOCSETTOK and VIOCSETTOK2 pioctls, all of which require the ability to
alter the parent process's PAG membership. However, since kAFS doesn't use
PAGs per se, but rather dumps the keys into the session keyring, the session
keyring of the parent must be replaced if, for example, VIOCSETTOK is passed
the newpag flag.
This can be tested with the following program:
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <keyutils.h>
#define KEYCTL_SESSION_TO_PARENT 18
#define OSERROR(X, S) do { if ((long)(X) == -1) { perror(S); exit(1); } } while(0)
int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
key_serial_t keyring, key;
long ret;
keyring = keyctl_join_session_keyring(argv[1]);
OSERROR(keyring, "keyctl_join_session_keyring");
key = add_key("user", "a", "b", 1, keyring);
OSERROR(key, "add_key");
ret = keyctl(KEYCTL_SESSION_TO_PARENT);
OSERROR(ret, "KEYCTL_SESSION_TO_PARENT");
return 0;
}
Compiled and linked with -lkeyutils, you should see something like:
[dhowells@andromeda ~]$ keyctl show
Session Keyring
-3 --alswrv 4043 4043 keyring: _ses
355907932 --alswrv 4043 -1 \_ keyring: _uid.4043
[dhowells@andromeda ~]$ /tmp/newpag
[dhowells@andromeda ~]$ keyctl show
Session Keyring
-3 --alswrv 4043 4043 keyring: _ses
1055658746 --alswrv 4043 4043 \_ user: a
[dhowells@andromeda ~]$ /tmp/newpag hello
[dhowells@andromeda ~]$ keyctl show
Session Keyring
-3 --alswrv 4043 4043 keyring: hello
340417692 --alswrv 4043 4043 \_ user: a
Where the test program creates a new session keyring, sticks a user key named
'a' into it and then installs it on its parent.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> |
congestion_control_init(congestion_control_t *cc,
const circuit_params_t *params,
cc_path_t path)
{
cc->sendme_pending_timestamps = smartlist_new();
cc->sendme_arrival_timestamps = smartlist_new();
cc->in_slow_start = 1;
congestion_control_init_params(cc, params, path);
cc->next_cc_event = CWND_UPDATE_RATE(cc);
} | 0 | [] | tor | b0496d40197dd5b4fb7b694c1410082d4e34dda6 | 113,303,769,819,035,550,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 12 | Fix for RTT calculation hang during congestion control.
Only cache RTT on explicit stalls; Only use this cache for the
RTT decrease case. Otherwise use only local circuit RTT state for clock jump
checks. |
kssl_tgt_is_available(KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx)
{
krb5_error_code krb5rc = KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
krb5_context krb5context = NULL;
krb5_ccache krb5ccdef = NULL;
krb5_creds krb5creds, *krb5credsp = NULL;
int rc = 0;
memset((char *)&krb5creds, 0, sizeof(krb5creds));
if (!kssl_ctx)
return(0);
if (!kssl_ctx->service_host)
return(0);
if ((krb5rc = krb5_init_context(&krb5context)) != 0)
goto err;
if ((krb5rc = krb5_sname_to_principal(krb5context,
kssl_ctx->service_host,
(kssl_ctx->service_name)? kssl_ctx->service_name: KRB5SVC,
KRB5_NT_SRV_HST, &krb5creds.server)) != 0)
goto err;
if ((krb5rc = krb5_cc_default(krb5context, &krb5ccdef)) != 0)
goto err;
if ((krb5rc = krb5_cc_get_principal(krb5context, krb5ccdef,
&krb5creds.client)) != 0)
goto err;
if ((krb5rc = krb5_get_credentials(krb5context, 0, krb5ccdef,
&krb5creds, &krb5credsp)) != 0)
goto err;
rc = 1;
err:
#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
kssl_ctx_show(kssl_ctx);
#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
if (krb5creds.client) krb5_free_principal(krb5context, krb5creds.client);
if (krb5creds.server) krb5_free_principal(krb5context, krb5creds.server);
if (krb5context) krb5_free_context(krb5context);
return(rc);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-20"
] | openssl | cca1cd9a3447dd067503e4a85ebd1679ee78a48e | 26,146,682,338,263,900,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 48 | Submitted by: Tomas Hoger <thoger@redhat.com>
Fix for CVE-2010-0433 where some kerberos enabled versions of OpenSSL
could be crashed if the relevant tables were not present (e.g. chrooted). |
struct dentry *ovl_entry_real(struct ovl_entry *oe, bool *is_upper)
{
struct dentry *realdentry;
realdentry = ovl_upperdentry_dereference(oe);
if (realdentry) {
*is_upper = true;
} else {
realdentry = oe->lowerdentry;
*is_upper = false;
}
return realdentry;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-284",
"CWE-264"
] | linux | 69c433ed2ecd2d3264efd7afec4439524b319121 | 61,750,705,353,684,010,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 13 | fs: limit filesystem stacking depth
Add a simple read-only counter to super_block that indicates how deep this
is in the stack of filesystems. Previously ecryptfs was the only stackable
filesystem and it explicitly disallowed multiple layers of itself.
Overlayfs, however, can be stacked recursively and also may be stacked
on top of ecryptfs or vice versa.
To limit the kernel stack usage we must limit the depth of the
filesystem stack. Initially the limit is set to 2.
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz> |
static String* Pe_r_bin_pe_parse_string(struct PE_(r_bin_pe_obj_t)* bin, PE_DWord* curAddr) {
String* string = calloc (1, sizeof(*string));
PE_DWord begAddr = *curAddr;
int len_value = 0;
int i = 0;
if (!string) {
bprintf ("Warning: calloc (String)\n");
return NULL;
}
if (begAddr > bin->size || begAddr + sizeof(string->wLength) > bin->size) {
free_String (string);
return NULL;
}
if (r_buf_read_at (bin->b, *curAddr, (ut8*) &string->wLength, sizeof(string->wLength)) != sizeof(string->wLength)) {
bprintf ("Warning: read (String wLength)\n");
goto out_error;
}
*curAddr += sizeof(string->wLength);
if (*curAddr > bin->size || *curAddr + sizeof(string->wValueLength) > bin->size) {
goto out_error;
}
if (r_buf_read_at (bin->b, *curAddr, (ut8*) &string->wValueLength, sizeof(string->wValueLength)) != sizeof(string->wValueLength)) {
bprintf ("Warning: read (String wValueLength)\n");
goto out_error;
}
*curAddr += sizeof(string->wValueLength);
if (*curAddr > bin->size || *curAddr + sizeof(string->wType) > bin->size) {
goto out_error;
}
if (r_buf_read_at (bin->b, *curAddr, (ut8*) &string->wType, sizeof(string->wType)) != sizeof(string->wType)) {
bprintf ("Warning: read (String wType)\n");
goto out_error;
}
*curAddr += sizeof(string->wType);
if (string->wType != 0 && string->wType != 1) {
bprintf ("Warning: check (String wType)\n");
goto out_error;
}
for (i = 0; *curAddr < begAddr + string->wLength; ++i, *curAddr += sizeof (ut16)) {
ut16 utf16_char;
if (*curAddr > bin->size || *curAddr + sizeof (ut16) > bin->size) {
goto out_error;
}
if (r_buf_read_at (bin->b, *curAddr, (ut8*) &utf16_char, sizeof (ut16)) != sizeof (ut16)) {
bprintf ("Warning: check (String szKey)\n");
goto out_error;
}
string->szKey = (ut16*) realloc (string->szKey, (i + 1) * sizeof (ut16));
string->szKey[i] = utf16_char;
string->wKeyLen += sizeof (ut16);
if (!utf16_char) {
*curAddr += sizeof (ut16);
break;
}
}
align32 (*curAddr);
len_value = R_MIN (string->wValueLength * 2, string->wLength - (*curAddr - begAddr));
string->wValueLength = len_value;
if (len_value < 0) {
len_value = 0;
}
string->Value = (ut16*) calloc (len_value + 1, 1);
if (!string->Value) {
bprintf ("Warning: malloc (String Value)\n");
goto out_error;
}
if (*curAddr > bin->size || *curAddr + len_value > bin->size) {
goto out_error;
}
if (r_buf_read_at (bin->b, *curAddr, (ut8*) string->Value, len_value) != len_value) {
bprintf ("Warning: read (String Value)\n");
goto out_error;
}
*curAddr += len_value;
return string;
out_error:
free_String (string);
return NULL;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-125"
] | radare2 | 4e1cf0d3e6f6fe2552a269def0af1cd2403e266c | 234,554,764,011,263,940,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 81 | Fix crash in pe |
glob_func_error(VALUE val)
{
struct glob_error_args *arg = (struct glob_error_args *)val;
VALUE path = rb_enc_str_new_cstr(arg->path, arg->enc);
rb_syserr_fail_str(arg->error, path);
return Qnil;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-22"
] | ruby | bd5661a3cbb38a8c3a3ea10cd76c88bbef7871b8 | 164,057,602,225,359,800,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 7 | dir.c: check NUL bytes
* dir.c (GlobPathValue): should be used in rb_push_glob only.
other methods should use FilePathValue.
https://hackerone.com/reports/302338
* dir.c (rb_push_glob): expand GlobPathValue
git-svn-id: svn+ssh://ci.ruby-lang.org/ruby/trunk@62989 b2dd03c8-39d4-4d8f-98ff-823fe69b080e |
int ipmi_set_my_LUN(struct ipmi_user *user,
unsigned int channel,
unsigned char LUN)
{
int index, rv = 0;
user = acquire_ipmi_user(user, &index);
if (!user)
return -ENODEV;
if (channel >= IPMI_MAX_CHANNELS) {
rv = -EINVAL;
} else {
channel = array_index_nospec(channel, IPMI_MAX_CHANNELS);
user->intf->addrinfo[channel].lun = LUN & 0x3;
}
release_ipmi_user(user, index);
return rv;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-416",
"CWE-284"
] | linux | 77f8269606bf95fcb232ee86f6da80886f1dfae8 | 166,266,362,563,834,550,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 20 | ipmi: fix use-after-free of user->release_barrier.rda
When we do the following test, we got oops in ipmi_msghandler driver
while((1))
do
service ipmievd restart & service ipmievd restart
done
---------------------------------------------------------------
[ 294.230186] Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address 0000803fea6ea008
[ 294.230188] Mem abort info:
[ 294.230190] ESR = 0x96000004
[ 294.230191] Exception class = DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits
[ 294.230193] SET = 0, FnV = 0
[ 294.230194] EA = 0, S1PTW = 0
[ 294.230195] Data abort info:
[ 294.230196] ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000004
[ 294.230197] CM = 0, WnR = 0
[ 294.230199] user pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp = 00000000a1c1b75a
[ 294.230201] [0000803fea6ea008] pgd=0000000000000000
[ 294.230204] Internal error: Oops: 96000004 [#1] SMP
[ 294.235211] Modules linked in: nls_utf8 isofs rpcrdma ib_iser ib_srpt target_core_mod ib_srp scsi_transport_srp ib_ipoib rdma_ucm ib_umad rdma_cm ib_cm iw_cm dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log dm_mod aes_ce_blk crypto_simd cryptd aes_ce_cipher ghash_ce sha2_ce ses sha256_arm64 sha1_ce hibmc_drm hisi_sas_v2_hw enclosure sg hisi_sas_main sbsa_gwdt ip_tables mlx5_ib ib_uverbs marvell ib_core mlx5_core ixgbe ipmi_si mdio hns_dsaf ipmi_devintf ipmi_msghandler hns_enet_drv hns_mdio
[ 294.277745] CPU: 3 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/3 Kdump: loaded Not tainted 5.0.0-rc2+ #113
[ 294.285511] Hardware name: Huawei TaiShan 2280 /BC11SPCD, BIOS 1.37 11/21/2017
[ 294.292835] pstate: 80000005 (Nzcv daif -PAN -UAO)
[ 294.297695] pc : __srcu_read_lock+0x38/0x58
[ 294.301940] lr : acquire_ipmi_user+0x2c/0x70 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.307853] sp : ffff00001001bc80
[ 294.311208] x29: ffff00001001bc80 x28: ffff0000117e5000
[ 294.316594] x27: 0000000000000000 x26: dead000000000100
[ 294.321980] x25: dead000000000200 x24: ffff803f6bd06800
[ 294.327366] x23: 0000000000000000 x22: 0000000000000000
[ 294.332752] x21: ffff00001001bd04 x20: ffff80df33d19018
[ 294.338137] x19: ffff80df33d19018 x18: 0000000000000000
[ 294.343523] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000
[ 294.348908] x15: 0000000000000000 x14: 0000000000000002
[ 294.354293] x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000000
[ 294.359679] x11: 0000000000000000 x10: 0000000000100000
[ 294.365065] x9 : 0000000000000000 x8 : 0000000000000004
[ 294.370451] x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : ffff80df34558678
[ 294.375836] x5 : 000000000000000c x4 : 0000000000000000
[ 294.381221] x3 : 0000000000000001 x2 : 0000803fea6ea000
[ 294.386607] x1 : 0000803fea6ea008 x0 : 0000000000000001
[ 294.391994] Process swapper/3 (pid: 0, stack limit = 0x0000000083087293)
[ 294.398791] Call trace:
[ 294.401266] __srcu_read_lock+0x38/0x58
[ 294.405154] acquire_ipmi_user+0x2c/0x70 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.410716] deliver_response+0x80/0xf8 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.416189] deliver_local_response+0x28/0x68 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.422193] handle_one_recv_msg+0x158/0xcf8 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.432050] handle_new_recv_msgs+0xc0/0x210 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.441984] smi_recv_tasklet+0x8c/0x158 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.451618] tasklet_action_common.isra.5+0x88/0x138
[ 294.460661] tasklet_action+0x2c/0x38
[ 294.468191] __do_softirq+0x120/0x2f8
[ 294.475561] irq_exit+0x134/0x140
[ 294.482445] __handle_domain_irq+0x6c/0xc0
[ 294.489954] gic_handle_irq+0xb8/0x178
[ 294.497037] el1_irq+0xb0/0x140
[ 294.503381] arch_cpu_idle+0x34/0x1a8
[ 294.510096] do_idle+0x1d4/0x290
[ 294.516322] cpu_startup_entry+0x28/0x30
[ 294.523230] secondary_start_kernel+0x184/0x1d0
[ 294.530657] Code: d538d082 d2800023 8b010c81 8b020021 (c85f7c25)
[ 294.539746] ---[ end trace 8a7a880dee570b29 ]---
[ 294.547341] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt
[ 294.556837] SMP: stopping secondary CPUs
[ 294.563996] Kernel Offset: disabled
[ 294.570515] CPU features: 0x002,21006008
[ 294.577638] Memory Limit: none
[ 294.587178] Starting crashdump kernel...
[ 294.594314] Bye!
Because the user->release_barrier.rda is freed in ipmi_destroy_user(), but
the refcount is not zero, when acquire_ipmi_user() uses user->release_barrier.rda
in __srcu_read_lock(), it causes oops.
Fix this by calling cleanup_srcu_struct() when the refcount is zero.
Fixes: e86ee2d44b44 ("ipmi: Rework locking and shutdown for hot remove")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.18
Signed-off-by: Yang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Corey Minyard <cminyard@mvista.com> |
irc_server_set_host (struct t_irc_server *server, const char *host)
{
struct t_irc_channel *ptr_channel;
/* if host is the same, just return */
if ((!server->host && !host)
|| (server->host && host && strcmp (server->host, host) == 0))
{
return;
}
/* update the nick host in server */
if (server->host)
free (server->host);
server->host = (host) ? strdup (host) : NULL;
/* set local variable "host" for server and all channels/pv */
weechat_buffer_set (server->buffer, "localvar_set_host", host);
for (ptr_channel = server->channels; ptr_channel;
ptr_channel = ptr_channel->next_channel)
{
weechat_buffer_set (ptr_channel->buffer,
"localvar_set_host", host);
}
weechat_bar_item_update ("irc_host");
weechat_bar_item_update ("irc_nick_host");
} | 0 | [
"CWE-120",
"CWE-787"
] | weechat | 40ccacb4330a64802b1f1e28ed9a6b6d3ca9197f | 282,281,645,955,468,200,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 28 | irc: fix crash when a new message 005 is received with longer nick prefixes
Thanks to Stuart Nevans Locke for reporting the issue. |
static int crypto_pcomp_init(struct crypto_tfm *tfm, u32 type, u32 mask)
{
return 0;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-310"
] | linux | 9a5467bf7b6e9e02ec9c3da4e23747c05faeaac6 | 147,664,987,213,752,340,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 4 | crypto: user - fix info leaks in report API
Three errors resulting in kernel memory disclosure:
1/ The structures used for the netlink based crypto algorithm report API
are located on the stack. As snprintf() does not fill the remainder of
the buffer with null bytes, those stack bytes will be disclosed to users
of the API. Switch to strncpy() to fix this.
2/ crypto_report_one() does not initialize all field of struct
crypto_user_alg. Fix this to fix the heap info leak.
3/ For the module name we should copy only as many bytes as
module_name() returns -- not as much as the destination buffer could
hold. But the current code does not and therefore copies random data
from behind the end of the module name, as the module name is always
shorter than CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME.
Also switch to use strncpy() to copy the algorithm's name and
driver_name. They are strings, after all.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Cc: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> |
**/
CImgList(): | 0 | [
"CWE-125"
] | CImg | 10af1e8c1ad2a58a0a3342a856bae63e8f257abb | 148,572,735,456,648,060,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 2 | Fix other issues in 'CImg<T>::load_bmp()'. |
unsigned int iucv_sock_poll(struct file *file, struct socket *sock,
poll_table *wait)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
unsigned int mask = 0;
sock_poll_wait(file, sk_sleep(sk), wait);
if (sk->sk_state == IUCV_LISTEN)
return iucv_accept_poll(sk);
if (sk->sk_err || !skb_queue_empty(&sk->sk_error_queue))
mask |= POLLERR |
(sock_flag(sk, SOCK_SELECT_ERR_QUEUE) ? POLLPRI : 0);
if (sk->sk_shutdown & RCV_SHUTDOWN)
mask |= POLLRDHUP;
if (sk->sk_shutdown == SHUTDOWN_MASK)
mask |= POLLHUP;
if (!skb_queue_empty(&sk->sk_receive_queue) ||
(sk->sk_shutdown & RCV_SHUTDOWN))
mask |= POLLIN | POLLRDNORM;
if (sk->sk_state == IUCV_CLOSED)
mask |= POLLHUP;
if (sk->sk_state == IUCV_DISCONN)
mask |= POLLIN;
if (sock_writeable(sk) && iucv_below_msglim(sk))
mask |= POLLOUT | POLLWRNORM | POLLWRBAND;
else
set_bit(SOCK_ASYNC_NOSPACE, &sk->sk_socket->flags);
return mask;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-20",
"CWE-269"
] | linux | f3d3342602f8bcbf37d7c46641cb9bca7618eb1c | 266,043,790,386,285,540,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 38 | net: rework recvmsg handler msg_name and msg_namelen logic
This patch now always passes msg->msg_namelen as 0. recvmsg handlers must
set msg_namelen to the proper size <= sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage)
to return msg_name to the user.
This prevents numerous uninitialized memory leaks we had in the
recvmsg handlers and makes it harder for new code to accidentally leak
uninitialized memory.
Optimize for the case recvfrom is called with NULL as address. We don't
need to copy the address at all, so set it to NULL before invoking the
recvmsg handler. We can do so, because all the recvmsg handlers must
cope with the case a plain read() is called on them. read() also sets
msg_name to NULL.
Also document these changes in include/linux/net.h as suggested by David
Miller.
Changes since RFC:
Set msg->msg_name = NULL if user specified a NULL in msg_name but had a
non-null msg_namelen in verify_iovec/verify_compat_iovec. This doesn't
affect sendto as it would bail out earlier while trying to copy-in the
address. It also more naturally reflects the logic by the callers of
verify_iovec.
With this change in place I could remove "
if (!uaddr || msg_sys->msg_namelen == 0)
msg->msg_name = NULL
".
This change does not alter the user visible error logic as we ignore
msg_namelen as long as msg_name is NULL.
Also remove two unnecessary curly brackets in ___sys_recvmsg and change
comments to netdev style.
Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> |
xfrm_state_lookup(struct net *net, u32 mark, const xfrm_address_t *daddr, __be32 spi,
u8 proto, unsigned short family)
{
struct xfrm_state *x;
rcu_read_lock();
x = __xfrm_state_lookup(net, mark, daddr, spi, proto, family);
rcu_read_unlock();
return x;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-416"
] | linux | dbb2483b2a46fbaf833cfb5deb5ed9cace9c7399 | 106,215,368,509,155,800,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 10 | xfrm: clean up xfrm protocol checks
In commit 6a53b7593233 ("xfrm: check id proto in validate_tmpl()")
I introduced a check for xfrm protocol, but according to Herbert
IPSEC_PROTO_ANY should only be used as a wildcard for lookup, so
it should be removed from validate_tmpl().
And, IPSEC_PROTO_ANY is expected to only match 3 IPSec-specific
protocols, this is why xfrm_state_flush() could still miss
IPPROTO_ROUTING, which leads that those entries are left in
net->xfrm.state_all before exit net. Fix this by replacing
IPSEC_PROTO_ANY with zero.
This patch also extracts the check from validate_tmpl() to
xfrm_id_proto_valid() and uses it in parse_ipsecrequest().
With this, no other protocols should be added into xfrm.
Fixes: 6a53b7593233 ("xfrm: check id proto in validate_tmpl()")
Reported-by: syzbot+0bf0519d6e0de15914fe@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Cc: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com> |
int security_syslog(int type)
{
return security_ops->syslog(type);
} | 0 | [] | linux-2.6 | ee18d64c1f632043a02e6f5ba5e045bb26a5465f | 207,415,667,638,984,660,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 4 | KEYS: Add a keyctl to install a process's session keyring on its parent [try #6]
Add a keyctl to install a process's session keyring onto its parent. This
replaces the parent's session keyring. Because the COW credential code does
not permit one process to change another process's credentials directly, the
change is deferred until userspace next starts executing again. Normally this
will be after a wait*() syscall.
To support this, three new security hooks have been provided:
cred_alloc_blank() to allocate unset security creds, cred_transfer() to fill in
the blank security creds and key_session_to_parent() - which asks the LSM if
the process may replace its parent's session keyring.
The replacement may only happen if the process has the same ownership details
as its parent, and the process has LINK permission on the session keyring, and
the session keyring is owned by the process, and the LSM permits it.
Note that this requires alteration to each architecture's notify_resume path.
This has been done for all arches barring blackfin, m68k* and xtensa, all of
which need assembly alteration to support TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME. This allows the
replacement to be performed at the point the parent process resumes userspace
execution.
This allows the userspace AFS pioctl emulation to fully emulate newpag() and
the VIOCSETTOK and VIOCSETTOK2 pioctls, all of which require the ability to
alter the parent process's PAG membership. However, since kAFS doesn't use
PAGs per se, but rather dumps the keys into the session keyring, the session
keyring of the parent must be replaced if, for example, VIOCSETTOK is passed
the newpag flag.
This can be tested with the following program:
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <keyutils.h>
#define KEYCTL_SESSION_TO_PARENT 18
#define OSERROR(X, S) do { if ((long)(X) == -1) { perror(S); exit(1); } } while(0)
int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
key_serial_t keyring, key;
long ret;
keyring = keyctl_join_session_keyring(argv[1]);
OSERROR(keyring, "keyctl_join_session_keyring");
key = add_key("user", "a", "b", 1, keyring);
OSERROR(key, "add_key");
ret = keyctl(KEYCTL_SESSION_TO_PARENT);
OSERROR(ret, "KEYCTL_SESSION_TO_PARENT");
return 0;
}
Compiled and linked with -lkeyutils, you should see something like:
[dhowells@andromeda ~]$ keyctl show
Session Keyring
-3 --alswrv 4043 4043 keyring: _ses
355907932 --alswrv 4043 -1 \_ keyring: _uid.4043
[dhowells@andromeda ~]$ /tmp/newpag
[dhowells@andromeda ~]$ keyctl show
Session Keyring
-3 --alswrv 4043 4043 keyring: _ses
1055658746 --alswrv 4043 4043 \_ user: a
[dhowells@andromeda ~]$ /tmp/newpag hello
[dhowells@andromeda ~]$ keyctl show
Session Keyring
-3 --alswrv 4043 4043 keyring: hello
340417692 --alswrv 4043 4043 \_ user: a
Where the test program creates a new session keyring, sticks a user key named
'a' into it and then installs it on its parent.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> |
bool ha_partition::initialize_partition(MEM_ROOT *mem_root)
{
handler **file_array, *file;
ulonglong check_table_flags;
DBUG_ENTER("ha_partition::initialize_partition");
if (m_create_handler)
{
m_tot_parts= m_part_info->get_tot_partitions();
DBUG_ASSERT(m_tot_parts > 0);
if (new_handlers_from_part_info(mem_root))
DBUG_RETURN(1);
}
else if (!table_share || !table_share->normalized_path.str)
{
/*
Called with dummy table share (delete, rename and alter table).
Don't need to set-up anything.
*/
DBUG_RETURN(0);
}
else if (get_from_handler_file(table_share->normalized_path.str,
mem_root, false))
{
my_error(ER_FAILED_READ_FROM_PAR_FILE, MYF(0));
DBUG_RETURN(1);
}
/*
We create all underlying table handlers here. We do it in this special
method to be able to report allocation errors.
Set up primary_key_is_clustered and
has_transactions since they are called often in all kinds of places,
other parameters are calculated on demand.
Verify that all partitions have the same table_flags.
*/
check_table_flags= m_file[0]->ha_table_flags();
m_pkey_is_clustered= TRUE;
file_array= m_file;
do
{
file= *file_array;
if (!file->primary_key_is_clustered())
m_pkey_is_clustered= FALSE;
if (check_table_flags != file->ha_table_flags())
{
my_error(ER_MIX_HANDLER_ERROR, MYF(0));
DBUG_RETURN(1);
}
} while (*(++file_array));
m_handler_status= handler_initialized;
DBUG_RETURN(0);
} | 0 | [] | server | f305a7ce4bccbd56520d874e1d81a4f29bc17a96 | 169,860,518,244,737,900,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 53 | bugfix: long partition names |
init_write_reg(
int name,
yankreg_T **old_y_previous,
yankreg_T **old_y_current,
int must_append,
int *yank_type UNUSED)
{
if (!valid_yank_reg(name, TRUE)) // check for valid reg name
{
emsg_invreg(name);
return FAIL;
}
// Don't want to change the current (unnamed) register
*old_y_previous = y_previous;
*old_y_current = y_current;
get_yank_register(name, TRUE);
if (!y_append && !must_append)
free_yank_all();
return OK;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-122",
"CWE-787"
] | vim | d25f003342aca9889067f2e839963dfeccf1fe05 | 299,550,476,032,393,100,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 22 | patch 9.0.0011: reading beyond the end of the line with put command
Problem: Reading beyond the end of the line with put command.
Solution: Adjust the end mark position. |
static json_t *json_object_deep_copy(const json_t *object)
{
json_t *result;
void *iter;
result = json_object();
if(!result)
return NULL;
/* Cannot use json_object_foreach because object has to be cast
non-const */
iter = json_object_iter((json_t *)object);
while(iter) {
const char *key;
const json_t *value;
key = json_object_iter_key(iter);
value = json_object_iter_value(iter);
json_object_set_new_nocheck(result, key, json_deep_copy(value));
iter = json_object_iter_next((json_t *)object, iter);
}
return result;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-310"
] | jansson | 8f80c2d83808150724d31793e6ade92749b1faa4 | 198,512,818,646,698,080,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 24 | CVE-2013-6401: Change hash function, randomize hashes
Thanks to Florian Weimer and Eric Sesterhenn for reporting, reviewing
and testing. |
static int mmap_ureg(struct vm_area_struct *vma, struct qib_devdata *dd,
u64 ureg)
{
unsigned long phys;
unsigned long sz;
int ret;
/*
* This is real hardware, so use io_remap. This is the mechanism
* for the user process to update the head registers for their ctxt
* in the chip.
*/
sz = dd->flags & QIB_HAS_HDRSUPP ? 2 * PAGE_SIZE : PAGE_SIZE;
if ((vma->vm_end - vma->vm_start) > sz) {
qib_devinfo(dd->pcidev,
"FAIL mmap userreg: reqlen %lx > PAGE\n",
vma->vm_end - vma->vm_start);
ret = -EFAULT;
} else {
phys = dd->physaddr + ureg;
vma->vm_page_prot = pgprot_noncached(vma->vm_page_prot);
vma->vm_flags |= VM_DONTCOPY | VM_DONTEXPAND;
ret = io_remap_pfn_range(vma, vma->vm_start,
phys >> PAGE_SHIFT,
vma->vm_end - vma->vm_start,
vma->vm_page_prot);
}
return ret;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-284",
"CWE-264"
] | linux | e6bd18f57aad1a2d1ef40e646d03ed0f2515c9e3 | 325,892,051,447,840,600,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 30 | IB/security: Restrict use of the write() interface
The drivers/infiniband stack uses write() as a replacement for
bi-directional ioctl(). This is not safe. There are ways to
trigger write calls that result in the return structure that
is normally written to user space being shunted off to user
specified kernel memory instead.
For the immediate repair, detect and deny suspicious accesses to
the write API.
For long term, update the user space libraries and the kernel API
to something that doesn't present the same security vulnerabilities
(likely a structured ioctl() interface).
The impacted uAPI interfaces are generally only available if
hardware from drivers/infiniband is installed in the system.
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgunthorpe@obsidianresearch.com>
[ Expanded check to all known write() entry points ]
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com> |
xmlHashAddEntry(xmlHashTablePtr table, const xmlChar *name, void *userdata) {
return(xmlHashAddEntry3(table, name, NULL, NULL, userdata));
} | 0 | [
"CWE-399"
] | libxml2 | 8973d58b7498fa5100a876815476b81fd1a2412a | 148,906,882,834,292,230,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 3 | Add hash randomization to hash and dict structures
Following http://www.ocert.org/advisories/ocert-2011-003.html
it seems that having hash randomization might be a good idea
when using XML with untrusted data
* configure.in: lookup for rand, srand and time
* dict.c: add randomization to dictionaries hash tables
* hash.c: add randomization to normal hash tables |
static struct bsg_command *bsg_alloc_command(struct bsg_device *bd)
{
struct bsg_command *bc = ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
spin_lock_irq(&bd->lock);
if (bd->queued_cmds >= bd->max_queue)
goto out;
bd->queued_cmds++;
spin_unlock_irq(&bd->lock);
bc = kmem_cache_zalloc(bsg_cmd_cachep, GFP_KERNEL);
if (unlikely(!bc)) {
spin_lock_irq(&bd->lock);
bd->queued_cmds--;
bc = ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
goto out;
}
bc->bd = bd;
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&bc->list);
dprintk("%s: returning free cmd %p\n", bd->name, bc);
return bc;
out:
spin_unlock_irq(&bd->lock);
return bc;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-399"
] | linux-2.6 | f2f1fa78a155524b849edf359e42a3001ea652c0 | 83,903,343,827,894,920,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 28 | Enforce a minimum SG_IO timeout
There's no point in having too short SG_IO timeouts, since if the
command does end up timing out, we'll end up through the reset sequence
that is several seconds long in order to abort the command that timed
out.
As a result, shorter timeouts than a few seconds simply do not make
sense, as the recovery would be longer than the timeout itself.
Add a BLK_MIN_SG_TIMEOUT to match the existign BLK_DEFAULT_SG_TIMEOUT.
Suggested-by: Alan Cox <alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Acked-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Jens Axboe <jens.axboe@oracle.com>
Cc: Jeff Garzik <jeff@garzik.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> |
static inline struct sk_buff *validate_xmit_xfrm(struct sk_buff *skb, netdev_features_t features, bool *again)
{
return skb;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-416"
] | linux | dbb2483b2a46fbaf833cfb5deb5ed9cace9c7399 | 60,852,953,061,237,295,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 4 | xfrm: clean up xfrm protocol checks
In commit 6a53b7593233 ("xfrm: check id proto in validate_tmpl()")
I introduced a check for xfrm protocol, but according to Herbert
IPSEC_PROTO_ANY should only be used as a wildcard for lookup, so
it should be removed from validate_tmpl().
And, IPSEC_PROTO_ANY is expected to only match 3 IPSec-specific
protocols, this is why xfrm_state_flush() could still miss
IPPROTO_ROUTING, which leads that those entries are left in
net->xfrm.state_all before exit net. Fix this by replacing
IPSEC_PROTO_ANY with zero.
This patch also extracts the check from validate_tmpl() to
xfrm_id_proto_valid() and uses it in parse_ipsecrequest().
With this, no other protocols should be added into xfrm.
Fixes: 6a53b7593233 ("xfrm: check id proto in validate_tmpl()")
Reported-by: syzbot+0bf0519d6e0de15914fe@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Cc: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com> |
static int shmem_remount_fs(struct super_block *sb, int *flags, char *data)
{
struct shmem_sb_info *sbinfo = SHMEM_SB(sb);
struct shmem_sb_info config = *sbinfo;
unsigned long blocks;
unsigned long inodes;
int error = -EINVAL;
if (shmem_parse_options(data, &config, true))
return error;
spin_lock(&sbinfo->stat_lock);
blocks = sbinfo->max_blocks - sbinfo->free_blocks;
inodes = sbinfo->max_inodes - sbinfo->free_inodes;
if (config.max_blocks < blocks)
goto out;
if (config.max_inodes < inodes)
goto out;
/*
* Those tests also disallow limited->unlimited while any are in
* use, so i_blocks will always be zero when max_blocks is zero;
* but we must separately disallow unlimited->limited, because
* in that case we have no record of how much is already in use.
*/
if (config.max_blocks && !sbinfo->max_blocks)
goto out;
if (config.max_inodes && !sbinfo->max_inodes)
goto out;
error = 0;
sbinfo->max_blocks = config.max_blocks;
sbinfo->free_blocks = config.max_blocks - blocks;
sbinfo->max_inodes = config.max_inodes;
sbinfo->free_inodes = config.max_inodes - inodes;
mpol_put(sbinfo->mpol);
sbinfo->mpol = config.mpol; /* transfers initial ref */
out:
spin_unlock(&sbinfo->stat_lock);
return error;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-400"
] | linux-2.6 | 14fcc23fdc78e9d32372553ccf21758a9bd56fa1 | 85,681,055,874,180,990,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 41 | tmpfs: fix kernel BUG in shmem_delete_inode
SuSE's insserve initscript ordering program hits kernel BUG at mm/shmem.c:814
on 2.6.26. It's using posix_fadvise on directories, and the shmem_readpage
method added in 2.6.23 is letting POSIX_FADV_WILLNEED allocate useless pages
to a tmpfs directory, incrementing i_blocks count but never decrementing it.
Fix this by assigning shmem_aops (pointing to readpage and writepage and
set_page_dirty) only when it's needed, on a regular file or a long symlink.
Many thanks to Kel for outstanding bugreport and steps to reproduce it.
Reported-by: Kel Modderman <kel@otaku42.de>
Tested-by: Kel Modderman <kel@otaku42.de>
Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins <hugh@veritas.com>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org> [2.6.25.x, 2.6.26.x]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> |
static errno_t sssctl_restore(bool force_start, bool force_restart)
{
errno_t ret;
if (!sssctl_start_sssd(force_start)) {
return ERR_SSSD_NOT_RUNNING;
}
if (sssctl_backup_file_exists(SSS_BACKUP_USER_OVERRIDES)) {
ret = sssctl_run_command((const char *[]){"sss_override", "user-import",
SSS_BACKUP_USER_OVERRIDES, NULL});
if (ret != EOK) {
ERROR("Unable to import user overrides\n");
return ret;
}
}
if (sssctl_backup_file_exists(SSS_BACKUP_USER_OVERRIDES)) {
ret = sssctl_run_command((const char *[]){"sss_override", "group-import",
SSS_BACKUP_GROUP_OVERRIDES, NULL});
if (ret != EOK) {
ERROR("Unable to import group overrides\n");
return ret;
}
}
sssctl_restart_sssd(force_restart);
ret = EOK;
return ret;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-78"
] | sssd | 7ab83f97e1cbefb78ece17232185bdd2985f0bbe | 154,674,701,828,439,540,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 32 | TOOLS: replace system() with execvp() to avoid execution of user supplied command
:relnote: A flaw was found in SSSD, where the sssctl command was
vulnerable to shell command injection via the logs-fetch and
cache-expire subcommands. This flaw allows an attacker to trick
the root user into running a specially crafted sssctl command,
such as via sudo, to gain root access. The highest threat from this
vulnerability is to confidentiality, integrity, as well as system
availability.
This patch fixes a flaw by replacing system() with execvp().
:fixes: CVE-2021-3621
Reviewed-by: Pavel Březina <pbrezina@redhat.com> |
thread_specific_data(void *private_data)
{
xmlDocPtr myDoc;
const char *filename = (const char *) private_data;
int okay = 1;
if (!strcmp(filename, "test/threads/invalid.xml")) {
xmlDoValidityCheckingDefaultValue = 0;
xmlGenericErrorContext = stdout;
} else {
xmlDoValidityCheckingDefaultValue = 1;
xmlGenericErrorContext = stderr;
}
myDoc = xmlParseFile(filename);
if (myDoc) {
xmlFreeDoc(myDoc);
} else {
printf("parse failed\n");
okay = 0;
}
if (!strcmp(filename, "test/threads/invalid.xml")) {
if (xmlDoValidityCheckingDefaultValue != 0) {
printf("ValidityCheckingDefaultValue override failed\n");
okay = 0;
}
if (xmlGenericErrorContext != stdout) {
printf("xmlGenericErrorContext override failed\n");
okay = 0;
}
} else {
if (xmlDoValidityCheckingDefaultValue != 1) {
printf("ValidityCheckingDefaultValue override failed\n");
okay = 0;
}
if (xmlGenericErrorContext != stderr) {
printf("xmlGenericErrorContext override failed\n");
okay = 0;
}
}
if (okay == 0)
return ((void *) Failed);
return ((void *) Okay);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-125"
] | libxml2 | a820dbeac29d330bae4be05d9ecd939ad6b4aa33 | 44,216,203,358,287,320,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 43 | Bug 758605: Heap-based buffer overread in xmlDictAddString <https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=758605>
Reviewed by David Kilzer.
* HTMLparser.c:
(htmlParseName): Add bounds check.
(htmlParseNameComplex): Ditto.
* result/HTML/758605.html: Added.
* result/HTML/758605.html.err: Added.
* result/HTML/758605.html.sax: Added.
* runtest.c:
(pushParseTest): The input for the new test case was so small
(4 bytes) that htmlParseChunk() was never called after
htmlCreatePushParserCtxt(), thereby creating a false positive
test failure. Fixed by using a do-while loop so we always call
htmlParseChunk() at least once.
* test/HTML/758605.html: Added. |
void fsck_set_msg_types(struct fsck_options *options, const char *values)
{
char *buf = xstrdup(values), *to_free = buf;
int done = 0;
while (!done) {
int len = strcspn(buf, " ,|"), equal;
done = !buf[len];
if (!len) {
buf++;
continue;
}
buf[len] = '\0';
for (equal = 0;
equal < len && buf[equal] != '=' && buf[equal] != ':';
equal++)
buf[equal] = tolower(buf[equal]);
buf[equal] = '\0';
if (!strcmp(buf, "skiplist")) {
if (equal == len)
die("skiplist requires a path");
init_skiplist(options, buf + equal + 1);
buf += len + 1;
continue;
}
if (equal == len)
die("Missing '=': '%s'", buf);
fsck_set_msg_type(options, buf, buf + equal + 1);
buf += len + 1;
}
free(to_free);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-20",
"CWE-88",
"CWE-522"
] | git | a124133e1e6ab5c7a9fef6d0e6bcb084e3455b46 | 130,448,972,128,989,900,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 37 | fsck: detect submodule urls starting with dash
Urls with leading dashes can cause mischief on older
versions of Git. We should detect them so that they can be
rejected by receive.fsckObjects, preventing modern versions
of git from being a vector by which attacks can spread.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com> |
static void *m_start(struct seq_file *m, loff_t *pos)
{
struct proc_mounts *p = proc_mounts(m);
down_read(&namespace_sem);
return seq_list_start(&p->ns->list, *pos);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-284",
"CWE-264"
] | linux | 3151527ee007b73a0ebd296010f1c0454a919c7d | 308,368,640,005,441,440,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 7 | userns: Don't allow creation if the user is chrooted
Guarantee that the policy of which files may be access that is
established by setting the root directory will not be violated
by user namespaces by verifying that the root directory points
to the root of the mount namespace at the time of user namespace
creation.
Changing the root is a privileged operation, and as a matter of policy
it serves to limit unprivileged processes to files below the current
root directory.
For reasons of simplicity and comprehensibility the privilege to
change the root directory is gated solely on the CAP_SYS_CHROOT
capability in the user namespace. Therefore when creating a user
namespace we must ensure that the policy of which files may be access
can not be violated by changing the root directory.
Anyone who runs a processes in a chroot and would like to use user
namespace can setup the same view of filesystems with a mount
namespace instead. With this result that this is not a practical
limitation for using user namespaces.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Reported-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> |
static int ehci_process_itd(EHCIState *ehci,
EHCIitd *itd,
uint32_t addr)
{
USBDevice *dev;
USBEndpoint *ep;
uint32_t i, len, pid, dir, devaddr, endp;
uint32_t pg, off, ptr1, ptr2, max, mult;
ehci->periodic_sched_active = PERIODIC_ACTIVE;
dir =(itd->bufptr[1] & ITD_BUFPTR_DIRECTION);
devaddr = get_field(itd->bufptr[0], ITD_BUFPTR_DEVADDR);
endp = get_field(itd->bufptr[0], ITD_BUFPTR_EP);
max = get_field(itd->bufptr[1], ITD_BUFPTR_MAXPKT);
mult = get_field(itd->bufptr[2], ITD_BUFPTR_MULT);
for(i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
if (itd->transact[i] & ITD_XACT_ACTIVE) {
pg = get_field(itd->transact[i], ITD_XACT_PGSEL);
off = itd->transact[i] & ITD_XACT_OFFSET_MASK;
len = get_field(itd->transact[i], ITD_XACT_LENGTH);
if (len > max * mult) {
len = max * mult;
}
if (len > BUFF_SIZE || pg > 6) {
return -1;
}
ptr1 = (itd->bufptr[pg] & ITD_BUFPTR_MASK);
qemu_sglist_init(&ehci->isgl, ehci->device, 2, ehci->as);
if (off + len > 4096) {
/* transfer crosses page border */
if (pg == 6) {
qemu_sglist_destroy(&ehci->isgl);
return -1; /* avoid page pg + 1 */
}
ptr2 = (itd->bufptr[pg + 1] & ITD_BUFPTR_MASK);
uint32_t len2 = off + len - 4096;
uint32_t len1 = len - len2;
qemu_sglist_add(&ehci->isgl, ptr1 + off, len1);
qemu_sglist_add(&ehci->isgl, ptr2, len2);
} else {
qemu_sglist_add(&ehci->isgl, ptr1 + off, len);
}
dev = ehci_find_device(ehci, devaddr);
if (dev == NULL) {
ehci_trace_guest_bug(ehci, "no device found");
qemu_sglist_destroy(&ehci->isgl);
return -1;
}
pid = dir ? USB_TOKEN_IN : USB_TOKEN_OUT;
ep = usb_ep_get(dev, pid, endp);
if (ep && ep->type == USB_ENDPOINT_XFER_ISOC) {
usb_packet_setup(&ehci->ipacket, pid, ep, 0, addr, false,
(itd->transact[i] & ITD_XACT_IOC) != 0);
usb_packet_map(&ehci->ipacket, &ehci->isgl);
usb_handle_packet(dev, &ehci->ipacket);
usb_packet_unmap(&ehci->ipacket, &ehci->isgl);
} else {
DPRINTF("ISOCH: attempt to addess non-iso endpoint\n");
ehci->ipacket.status = USB_RET_NAK;
ehci->ipacket.actual_length = 0;
}
qemu_sglist_destroy(&ehci->isgl);
switch (ehci->ipacket.status) {
case USB_RET_SUCCESS:
break;
default:
fprintf(stderr, "Unexpected iso usb result: %d\n",
ehci->ipacket.status);
/* Fall through */
case USB_RET_IOERROR:
case USB_RET_NODEV:
/* 3.3.2: XACTERR is only allowed on IN transactions */
if (dir) {
itd->transact[i] |= ITD_XACT_XACTERR;
ehci_raise_irq(ehci, USBSTS_ERRINT);
}
break;
case USB_RET_BABBLE:
itd->transact[i] |= ITD_XACT_BABBLE;
ehci_raise_irq(ehci, USBSTS_ERRINT);
break;
case USB_RET_NAK:
/* no data for us, so do a zero-length transfer */
ehci->ipacket.actual_length = 0;
break;
}
if (!dir) {
set_field(&itd->transact[i], len - ehci->ipacket.actual_length,
ITD_XACT_LENGTH); /* OUT */
} else {
set_field(&itd->transact[i], ehci->ipacket.actual_length,
ITD_XACT_LENGTH); /* IN */
}
if (itd->transact[i] & ITD_XACT_IOC) {
ehci_raise_irq(ehci, USBSTS_INT);
}
itd->transact[i] &= ~ITD_XACT_ACTIVE;
}
}
return 0;
} | 1 | [
"CWE-617"
] | qemu | 2fdb42d840400d58f2e706ecca82c142b97bcbd6 | 177,780,597,048,296,830,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 107 | hw: ehci: check return value of 'usb_packet_map'
If 'usb_packet_map' fails, we should stop to process the usb
request.
Signed-off-by: Li Qiang <liq3ea@163.com>
Message-Id: <20200812161727.29412-1-liq3ea@163.com>
Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com> |
int free_embedded_options(char ** options_list, int options_count)
{
int i;
for (i= 0; i < options_count; i++)
{
if (options_list[i])
free(options_list[i]);
}
free(options_list);
return 1;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-416"
] | DBD-mysql | a56ae87a4c1c1fead7d09c3653905841ccccf1cc | 12,008,645,177,397,620,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 13 | fix use-after-free crash in RT #97625 |
static bool reg_type_mismatch_ok(enum bpf_reg_type type)
{
switch (base_type(type)) {
case PTR_TO_CTX:
case PTR_TO_SOCKET:
case PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON:
case PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK:
case PTR_TO_XDP_SOCK:
case PTR_TO_BTF_ID:
return false;
default:
return true;
}
} | 0 | [
"CWE-787"
] | linux | 64620e0a1e712a778095bd35cbb277dc2259281f | 202,620,438,503,806,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 14 | bpf: Fix out of bounds access for ringbuf helpers
Both bpf_ringbuf_submit() and bpf_ringbuf_discard() have ARG_PTR_TO_ALLOC_MEM
in their bpf_func_proto definition as their first argument. They both expect
the result from a prior bpf_ringbuf_reserve() call which has a return type of
RET_PTR_TO_ALLOC_MEM_OR_NULL.
Meaning, after a NULL check in the code, the verifier will promote the register
type in the non-NULL branch to a PTR_TO_MEM and in the NULL branch to a known
zero scalar. Generally, pointer arithmetic on PTR_TO_MEM is allowed, so the
latter could have an offset.
The ARG_PTR_TO_ALLOC_MEM expects a PTR_TO_MEM register type. However, the non-
zero result from bpf_ringbuf_reserve() must be fed into either bpf_ringbuf_submit()
or bpf_ringbuf_discard() but with the original offset given it will then read
out the struct bpf_ringbuf_hdr mapping.
The verifier missed to enforce a zero offset, so that out of bounds access
can be triggered which could be used to escalate privileges if unprivileged
BPF was enabled (disabled by default in kernel).
Fixes: 457f44363a88 ("bpf: Implement BPF ring buffer and verifier support for it")
Reported-by: <tr3e.wang@gmail.com> (SecCoder Security Lab)
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> |
GF_Filter *gf_fs_load_filter(GF_FilterSession *fsess, const char *name, GF_Err *err_code)
{
const char *args=NULL;
const char *sep, *file_ext;
u32 i, len, count = gf_list_count(fsess->registry);
Bool quiet = (err_code && (*err_code == GF_EOS)) ? GF_TRUE : GF_FALSE;
assert(fsess);
assert(name);
if (err_code) *err_code = GF_OK;
sep = gf_fs_path_escape_colon(fsess, name);
if (sep) {
args = sep+1;
len = (u32) (sep - name);
} else len = (u32) strlen(name);
if (!len) {
if (!quiet) {
GF_LOG(GF_LOG_ERROR, GF_LOG_FILTER, ("Missing filter name in %s\n", name));
}
return NULL;
}
if (!strncmp(name, "enc", len)) {
return gf_fs_load_encoder(fsess, args);
}
/*regular filter loading*/
for (i=0;i<count;i++) {
const GF_FilterRegister *f_reg = gf_list_get(fsess->registry, i);
if ((strlen(f_reg->name)==len) && !strncmp(f_reg->name, name, len)) {
GF_Filter *filter;
GF_FilterArgType argtype = GF_FILTER_ARG_EXPLICIT;
if ((f_reg->flags & GF_FS_REG_REQUIRES_RESOLVER) && !fsess->max_resolve_chain_len) {
GF_LOG(GF_LOG_ERROR, GF_LOG_FILTER, ("Filter %s requires graph resolver but it is disabled\n", name));
if (err_code) *err_code = GF_BAD_PARAM;
return NULL;
}
if (f_reg->flags & GF_FS_REG_ACT_AS_SOURCE) argtype = GF_FILTER_ARG_EXPLICIT_SOURCE;
filter = gf_filter_new(fsess, f_reg, args, NULL, argtype, err_code, NULL, GF_FALSE);
if (!filter) return NULL;
if (!filter->num_output_pids) {
const char *src_url = strstr(name, "src");
if (src_url && (src_url[3]==fsess->sep_name))
gf_filter_post_process_task(filter);
}
return filter;
}
}
/*check JS file*/
file_ext = gf_file_ext_start(name);
if (file_ext && (file_ext > sep) )
file_ext = NULL;
if (!file_ext || strstr(name, ".js") || strstr(name, ".jsf") || strstr(name, ".mjs") ) {
Bool file_exists = GF_FALSE;
char szName[10+GF_MAX_PATH];
char szPath[10+GF_MAX_PATH];
if (len>GF_MAX_PATH)
return NULL;
strncpy(szPath, name, len);
szPath[len]=0;
GF_LOG(GF_LOG_DEBUG, GF_LOG_FILTER, ("Trying JS filter %s\n", szPath));
if (gf_file_exists(szPath)) {
file_exists = GF_TRUE;
} else {
strcpy(szName, szPath);
file_exists = gf_fs_solve_js_script(szPath, szName, file_ext);
if (!file_exists && !file_ext) {
strcat(szName, ".js");
if (gf_file_exists(szName)) {
strncpy(szPath, name, len);
szPath[len]=0;
strcat(szPath, ".js");
file_exists = GF_TRUE;
}
}
}
if (file_exists) {
sprintf(szName, "jsf%cjs%c", fsess->sep_args, fsess->sep_name);
strcat(szName, szPath);
if (name[len])
strcat(szName, name+len);
return gf_fs_load_filter(fsess, szName, err_code);
}
}
if (!quiet) {
GF_LOG(GF_LOG_ERROR, GF_LOG_FILTER, ("Failed to load filter %s: no such filter registry\n", name));
}
if (err_code) *err_code = GF_FILTER_NOT_FOUND;
return NULL;
} | 1 | [
"CWE-476"
] | gpac | 44fdc3d972c31c56efe73e1a3b63438d46087652 | 220,232,041,198,906,980,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 97 | fixed #1906 |
TEST_F(HttpHealthCheckerImplTest, GoAwayProbeInProgress) {
setupHCHttp2();
EXPECT_CALL(runtime_.snapshot_, featureEnabled("health_check.verify_cluster", 100))
.WillRepeatedly(Return(false));
cluster_->prioritySet().getMockHostSet(0)->hosts_ = {
makeTestHost(cluster_->info_, "tcp://127.0.0.1:80", simTime())};
cluster_->info_->stats().upstream_cx_total_.inc();
expectSessionCreate();
expectStreamCreate(0);
EXPECT_CALL(*test_sessions_[0]->timeout_timer_, enableTimer(_, _));
health_checker_->start();
// GOAWAY with NO_ERROR code during check should be handled gracefully.
test_sessions_[0]->codec_client_->raiseGoAway(Http::GoAwayErrorCode::NoError);
EXPECT_EQ(Host::Health::Healthy, cluster_->prioritySet().getMockHostSet(0)->hosts_[0]->health());
expectUnchanged(0);
respond(0, "200", false, false, true, false, {}, false);
// GOAWAY should cause a new connection to be created.
expectClientCreate(0);
expectStreamCreate(0);
EXPECT_CALL(*test_sessions_[0]->timeout_timer_, enableTimer(_, _));
test_sessions_[0]->interval_timer_->invokeCallback();
// Test host state hasn't changed.
expectUnchanged(0);
respond(0, "200", false, false, true, false, {}, false);
EXPECT_EQ(Host::Health::Healthy, cluster_->prioritySet().getMockHostSet(0)->hosts_[0]->health());
} | 0 | [
"CWE-476"
] | envoy | 9b1c3962172a972bc0359398af6daa3790bb59db | 215,775,242,690,504,880,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 31 | healthcheck: fix grpc inline removal crashes (#749)
Signed-off-by: Matt Klein <mklein@lyft.com>
Signed-off-by: Pradeep Rao <pcrao@google.com> |
Error Box_auxC::write(StreamWriter& writer) const
{
size_t box_start = reserve_box_header_space(writer);
writer.write(m_aux_type);
for (uint8_t subtype : m_aux_subtypes) {
writer.write8(subtype);
}
prepend_header(writer, box_start);
return Error::Ok;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-703"
] | libheif | 2710c930918609caaf0a664e9c7bc3dce05d5b58 | 241,889,598,447,862,300,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 14 | force fraction to a limited resolution to finally solve those pesky numerical edge cases |
static void cmd_capabilities(char *keyword __attribute__((unused)))
{
const char *mechlist;
int mechcount = 0;
prot_printf(nntp_out, "101 Capability list follows:\r\n");
prot_printf(nntp_out, "VERSION 2\r\n");
if (nntp_authstate || (config_serverinfo == IMAP_ENUM_SERVERINFO_ON)) {
prot_printf(nntp_out,
"IMPLEMENTATION Cyrus NNTP%s %s\r\n",
config_mupdate_server ? " Murder" : "", cyrus_version());
}
/* add STARTTLS */
if (tls_enabled() && !nntp_starttls_done && !nntp_authstate)
prot_printf(nntp_out, "STARTTLS\r\n");
/* check for SASL mechs */
sasl_listmech(nntp_saslconn, NULL, "SASL ", " ", "\r\n",
&mechlist, NULL, &mechcount);
/* add the AUTHINFO variants */
if (!nntp_authstate) {
prot_printf(nntp_out, "AUTHINFO%s%s\r\n",
(nntp_starttls_done || (extprops_ssf > 1) ||
config_getswitch(IMAPOPT_ALLOWPLAINTEXT)) ?
" USER" : "", mechcount ? " SASL" : "");
}
/* add the SASL mechs */
if (mechcount) prot_printf(nntp_out, "%s", mechlist);
/* add the reader capabilities/extensions */
if ((nntp_capa & MODE_READ) && (nntp_authstate || allowanonymous)) {
prot_printf(nntp_out, "READER\r\n");
prot_printf(nntp_out, "POST\r\n");
if (config_getswitch(IMAPOPT_ALLOWNEWNEWS))
prot_printf(nntp_out, "NEWNEWS\r\n");
prot_printf(nntp_out, "HDR\r\n");
prot_printf(nntp_out, "OVER\r\n");
prot_printf(nntp_out, "XPAT\r\n");
}
/* add the feeder capabilities/extensions */
if (nntp_capa & MODE_FEED) {
prot_printf(nntp_out, "IHAVE\r\n");
prot_printf(nntp_out, "STREAMING\r\n");
}
/* add the LIST variants */
prot_printf(nntp_out, "LIST ACTIVE%s\r\n",
((nntp_capa & MODE_READ) && (nntp_authstate || allowanonymous)) ?
" HEADERS NEWSGROUPS OVERVIEW.FMT" : "");
prot_printf(nntp_out, ".\r\n");
did_capabilities = 1;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-287"
] | cyrus-imapd | 77903669e04c9788460561dd0560b9c916519594 | 96,705,534,033,984,220,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 58 | Secunia SA46093 - make sure nntp authentication completes
Discovered by Stefan Cornelius, Secunia Research
The vulnerability is caused due to the access restriction for certain
commands only checking whether or not variable "nntp_userid" is non-NULL,
without performing additional checks to verify that a complete, successful
authentication actually took place. The variable "nntp_userid" can be set to
point to a string holding the username (changing it to a non-NULL, thus
allowing attackers to bypass the checks) by sending an "AUTHINFO USER"
command. The variable is not reset to NULL until e.g. a wrong "AUTHINFO
PASS" command is received. This can be exploited to bypass the
authentication mechanism and allows access to e.g. the "NEWNEWS" or the
"LIST NEWSGROUPS" commands by sending an "AUTHINFO USER" command without a
following "AUTHINFO PASS" command. |
void Compute(OpKernelContext* context) override {
// Read ragged_splits inputs.
OpInputList ragged_nested_splits_in;
OP_REQUIRES_OK(context, context->input_list("rt_nested_splits",
&ragged_nested_splits_in));
const int ragged_nested_splits_len = ragged_nested_splits_in.size();
RaggedTensorVariant batched_ragged_input;
// Read ragged_values input.
batched_ragged_input.set_values(context->input(ragged_nested_splits_len));
batched_ragged_input.mutable_nested_splits()->reserve(
ragged_nested_splits_len);
for (int i = 0; i < ragged_nested_splits_len; i++) {
batched_ragged_input.append_splits(ragged_nested_splits_in[i]);
}
if (!batched_input_) {
// Encode as a Scalar Variant Tensor.
Tensor* encoded_scalar;
OP_REQUIRES_OK(context, context->allocate_output(0, TensorShape({}),
&encoded_scalar));
encoded_scalar->scalar<Variant>()() = std::move(batched_ragged_input);
return;
}
// Unbatch the Ragged Tensor and encode the components.
std::vector<RaggedTensorVariant> unbatched_ragged_input;
auto batched_splits_top_vec =
batched_ragged_input.splits(0).vec<SPLIT_TYPE>();
int num_components = batched_splits_top_vec.size() - 1;
OP_REQUIRES(context, num_components >= 0,
errors::Internal("Invalid split argument."));
OP_REQUIRES_OK(context, UnbatchRaggedZerothDim<VALUE_TYPE, SPLIT_TYPE>(
batched_ragged_input, &unbatched_ragged_input));
// Bundle the encoded scalar Variant Tensors into a rank-1 Variant Tensor.
Tensor* encoded_vector;
int output_size = unbatched_ragged_input.size();
OP_REQUIRES_OK(context,
context->allocate_output(0, TensorShape({output_size}),
&encoded_vector));
auto encoded_vector_t = encoded_vector->vec<Variant>();
for (int i = 0; i < output_size; i++) {
encoded_vector_t(i) = unbatched_ragged_input[i];
}
} | 1 | [
"CWE-125",
"CWE-824"
] | tensorflow | be7a4de6adfbd303ce08be4332554dff70362612 | 209,500,931,068,648,330,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 45 | Ensure non-empty rt_nested_splits in tf.raw_ops.RaggedTensorToVariant
PiperOrigin-RevId: 387664237
Change-Id: Ia1700c34b5610873d63561abc86e23b46ead93b3 |
llsec_update_devkey_info(struct mac802154_llsec_device *dev,
const struct ieee802154_llsec_key_id *in_key,
u32 frame_counter)
{
struct mac802154_llsec_device_key *devkey = NULL;
if (dev->dev.key_mode == IEEE802154_LLSEC_DEVKEY_RESTRICT) {
devkey = llsec_devkey_find(dev, in_key);
if (!devkey)
return -ENOENT;
}
if (dev->dev.key_mode == IEEE802154_LLSEC_DEVKEY_RECORD) {
int rc = llsec_update_devkey_record(dev, in_key);
if (rc < 0)
return rc;
}
spin_lock_bh(&dev->lock);
if ((!devkey && frame_counter < dev->dev.frame_counter) ||
(devkey && frame_counter < devkey->devkey.frame_counter)) {
spin_unlock_bh(&dev->lock);
return -EINVAL;
}
if (devkey)
devkey->devkey.frame_counter = frame_counter + 1;
else
dev->dev.frame_counter = frame_counter + 1;
spin_unlock_bh(&dev->lock);
return 0;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-416"
] | linux | 1165affd484889d4986cf3b724318935a0b120d8 | 25,222,919,656,107,720,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 36 | net: mac802154: Fix general protection fault
syzbot found general protection fault in crypto_destroy_tfm()[1].
It was caused by wrong clean up loop in llsec_key_alloc().
If one of the tfm array members is in IS_ERR() range it will
cause general protection fault in clean up function [1].
Call Trace:
crypto_free_aead include/crypto/aead.h:191 [inline] [1]
llsec_key_alloc net/mac802154/llsec.c:156 [inline]
mac802154_llsec_key_add+0x9e0/0xcc0 net/mac802154/llsec.c:249
ieee802154_add_llsec_key+0x56/0x80 net/mac802154/cfg.c:338
rdev_add_llsec_key net/ieee802154/rdev-ops.h:260 [inline]
nl802154_add_llsec_key+0x3d3/0x560 net/ieee802154/nl802154.c:1584
genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0x228/0x320 net/netlink/genetlink.c:739
genl_family_rcv_msg net/netlink/genetlink.c:783 [inline]
genl_rcv_msg+0x328/0x580 net/netlink/genetlink.c:800
netlink_rcv_skb+0x153/0x420 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2502
genl_rcv+0x24/0x40 net/netlink/genetlink.c:811
netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1312 [inline]
netlink_unicast+0x533/0x7d0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1338
netlink_sendmsg+0x856/0xd90 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1927
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:654 [inline]
sock_sendmsg+0xcf/0x120 net/socket.c:674
____sys_sendmsg+0x6e8/0x810 net/socket.c:2350
___sys_sendmsg+0xf3/0x170 net/socket.c:2404
__sys_sendmsg+0xe5/0x1b0 net/socket.c:2433
do_syscall_64+0x2d/0x70 arch/x86/entry/common.c:46
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
Signed-off-by: Pavel Skripkin <paskripkin@gmail.com>
Reported-by: syzbot+9ec037722d2603a9f52e@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Acked-by: Alexander Aring <aahringo@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210304152125.1052825-1-paskripkin@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Stefan Schmidt <stefan@datenfreihafen.org> |
void
clear_fifo (i)
int i;
{
if (dev_fd_list[i])
{
dev_fd_list[i] = 0;
nfds--;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-20"
] | bash | 4f747edc625815f449048579f6e65869914dd715 | 256,528,028,332,019,100,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 9 | Bash-4.4 patch 7 |
static inline void DetectRunPrefilterPkt(
ThreadVars *tv,
DetectEngineCtx *de_ctx,
DetectEngineThreadCtx *det_ctx,
Packet *p,
DetectRunScratchpad *scratch
)
{
DetectPrefilterSetNonPrefilterList(p, det_ctx, scratch);
/* create our prefilter mask */
PacketCreateMask(p, &scratch->pkt_mask, scratch->alproto, scratch->app_decoder_events);
/* build and prefilter non_pf list against the mask of the packet */
PACKET_PROFILING_DETECT_START(p, PROF_DETECT_NONMPMLIST);
det_ctx->non_pf_id_cnt = 0;
if (likely(det_ctx->non_pf_store_cnt > 0)) {
DetectPrefilterBuildNonPrefilterList(det_ctx, scratch->pkt_mask, scratch->alproto);
}
PACKET_PROFILING_DETECT_END(p, PROF_DETECT_NONMPMLIST);
/* run the prefilter engines */
Prefilter(det_ctx, scratch->sgh, p, scratch->flow_flags);
/* create match list if we have non-pf and/or pf */
if (det_ctx->non_pf_store_cnt || det_ctx->pmq.rule_id_array_cnt) {
PACKET_PROFILING_DETECT_START(p, PROF_DETECT_PF_SORT2);
DetectPrefilterMergeSort(de_ctx, det_ctx);
PACKET_PROFILING_DETECT_END(p, PROF_DETECT_PF_SORT2);
}
#ifdef PROFILING
if (tv) {
StatsAddUI64(tv, det_ctx->counter_mpm_list,
(uint64_t)det_ctx->pmq.rule_id_array_cnt);
StatsAddUI64(tv, det_ctx->counter_nonmpm_list,
(uint64_t)det_ctx->non_pf_store_cnt);
/* non mpm sigs after mask prefilter */
StatsAddUI64(tv, det_ctx->counter_fnonmpm_list,
(uint64_t)det_ctx->non_pf_id_cnt);
}
#endif
} | 0 | [
"CWE-347"
] | suricata | d8634daf74c882356659addb65fb142b738a186b | 235,252,170,973,257,200,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 42 | stream: fix false negative on bad RST
If a bad RST was received the stream inspection would not happen
for that packet, but it would still move the 'raw progress' tracker
forward. Following good packets would then fail to detect anything
before the 'raw progress' position.
Bug #2770
Reported-by: Alexey Vishnyakov |
static int check_version_match(void)
{
DYNAMIC_STRING ds_version;
char version_str[NAME_CHAR_LEN + 1];
if (init_dynamic_string(&ds_version, NULL, NAME_CHAR_LEN, NAME_CHAR_LEN))
die("Out of memory");
if (run_query("show variables like 'version'", &ds_version, FALSE))
{
fprintf(stderr, "Error: Failed while fetching Server version! Could be"
" due to unauthorized access.\n");
dynstr_free(&ds_version);
return 1; /* Query failed */
}
if (extract_variable_from_show(&ds_version, version_str))
{
fprintf(stderr, "Error: Failed while extracting Server version!\n");
dynstr_free(&ds_version);
return 1; /* Query failed */
}
dynstr_free(&ds_version);
if (calc_server_version((char *) version_str) != MYSQL_VERSION_ID)
{
fprintf(stderr, "Error: Server version (%s) does not match with the "
"version of\nthe server (%s) with which this program was built/"
"distributed. You can\nuse --skip-version-check to skip this "
"check.\n", version_str, MYSQL_SERVER_VERSION);
return 1;
}
else
return 0;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-319"
] | mysql-server | 0002e1380d5f8c113b6bce91f2cf3f75136fd7c7 | 140,395,222,213,798,370,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 35 | BUG#25575605: SETTING --SSL-MODE=REQUIRED SENDS CREDENTIALS BEFORE VERIFYING SSL CONNECTION
MYSQL_OPT_SSL_MODE option introduced.
It is set in case of --ssl-mode=REQUIRED and permits only SSL connection.
(cherry picked from commit f91b941842d240b8a62645e507f5554e8be76aec) |
u32 parse_track_dump(char *arg, u32 dump_type)
{
if (!create_new_track_action(arg, TRACK_ACTION_RAW_EXTRACT, dump_type))
return 2;
track_dump_type = dump_type;
return 0; | 0 | [
"CWE-787"
] | gpac | 4e56ad72ac1afb4e049a10f2d99e7512d7141f9d | 219,920,299,519,188,300,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 7 | fixed #2216 |
void hci_conn_enter_active_mode(struct hci_conn *conn, __u8 force_active)
{
struct hci_dev *hdev = conn->hdev;
BT_DBG("hcon %p mode %d", conn, conn->mode);
if (conn->mode != HCI_CM_SNIFF)
goto timer;
if (!test_bit(HCI_CONN_POWER_SAVE, &conn->flags) && !force_active)
goto timer;
if (!test_and_set_bit(HCI_CONN_MODE_CHANGE_PEND, &conn->flags)) {
struct hci_cp_exit_sniff_mode cp;
cp.handle = cpu_to_le16(conn->handle);
hci_send_cmd(hdev, HCI_OP_EXIT_SNIFF_MODE, sizeof(cp), &cp);
}
timer:
if (hdev->idle_timeout > 0)
queue_delayed_work(hdev->workqueue, &conn->idle_work,
msecs_to_jiffies(hdev->idle_timeout));
} | 0 | [
"CWE-327"
] | linux | d5bb334a8e171b262e48f378bd2096c0ea458265 | 125,774,088,669,376,160,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 23 | Bluetooth: Align minimum encryption key size for LE and BR/EDR connections
The minimum encryption key size for LE connections is 56 bits and to
align LE with BR/EDR, enforce 56 bits of minimum encryption key size for
BR/EDR connections as well.
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Signed-off-by: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org |
e_mail_parser_parse (EMailParser *parser,
CamelFolder *folder,
const gchar *message_uid,
CamelMimeMessage *message,
GAsyncReadyCallback callback,
GCancellable *cancellable,
gpointer user_data)
{
GSimpleAsyncResult *simple;
EMailPartList *part_list;
g_return_if_fail (E_IS_MAIL_PARSER (parser));
g_return_if_fail (CAMEL_IS_MIME_MESSAGE (message));
part_list = e_mail_part_list_new (message, message_uid, folder);
simple = g_simple_async_result_new (
G_OBJECT (parser), callback,
user_data, e_mail_parser_parse);
g_simple_async_result_set_check_cancellable (simple, cancellable);
g_simple_async_result_set_op_res_gpointer (
simple, part_list, (GDestroyNotify) g_object_unref);
g_simple_async_result_run_in_thread (
simple, mail_parser_parse_thread,
G_PRIORITY_DEFAULT, cancellable);
g_object_unref (simple);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-347"
] | evolution | 9c55a311325f5905d8b8403b96607e46cf343f21 | 212,244,551,670,967,380,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 31 | I#120 - Show security bar above message headers
Closes https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/evolution/issues/120 |
static bool check_underflow(const struct ip6t_entry *e)
{
const struct xt_entry_target *t;
unsigned int verdict;
if (!unconditional(&e->ipv6))
return false;
t = ip6t_get_target_c(e);
if (strcmp(t->u.user.name, XT_STANDARD_TARGET) != 0)
return false;
verdict = ((struct xt_standard_target *)t)->verdict;
verdict = -verdict - 1;
return verdict == NF_DROP || verdict == NF_ACCEPT;
} | 1 | [
"CWE-119",
"CWE-787"
] | linux | 54d83fc74aa9ec72794373cb47432c5f7fb1a309 | 69,891,328,452,143,980,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 14 | netfilter: x_tables: fix unconditional helper
Ben Hawkes says:
In the mark_source_chains function (net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c) it
is possible for a user-supplied ipt_entry structure to have a large
next_offset field. This field is not bounds checked prior to writing a
counter value at the supplied offset.
Problem is that mark_source_chains should not have been called --
the rule doesn't have a next entry, so its supposed to return
an absolute verdict of either ACCEPT or DROP.
However, the function conditional() doesn't work as the name implies.
It only checks that the rule is using wildcard address matching.
However, an unconditional rule must also not be using any matches
(no -m args).
The underflow validator only checked the addresses, therefore
passing the 'unconditional absolute verdict' test, while
mark_source_chains also tested for presence of matches, and thus
proceeeded to the next (not-existent) rule.
Unify this so that all the callers have same idea of 'unconditional rule'.
Reported-by: Ben Hawkes <hawkes@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org> |
static inline TCGMemOp mo_64_32(TCGMemOp ot)
{
#ifdef TARGET_X86_64
return ot == MO_64 ? MO_64 : MO_32;
#else
return MO_32;
#endif
} | 0 | [
"CWE-94"
] | qemu | 30663fd26c0307e414622c7a8607fbc04f92ec14 | 250,893,554,458,281,860,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 8 | tcg/i386: Check the size of instruction being translated
This fixes the bug: 'user-to-root privesc inside VM via bad translation
caching' reported by Jann Horn here:
https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=1122
Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net>
CC: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
CC: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Pranith Kumar <bobby.prani@gmail.com>
Message-Id: <20170323175851.14342-1-bobby.prani@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> |
lyxml_free_attrs(struct ly_ctx *ctx, struct lyxml_elem *elem)
{
struct lyxml_attr *a, *next;
if (!elem || !elem->attr) {
return;
}
a = elem->attr;
do {
next = a->next;
lydict_remove(ctx, a->name);
lydict_remove(ctx, a->value);
if (a->type == LYXML_ATTR_STD_UNRES) {
free((char *)a->ns);
}
free(a);
a = next;
} while (a);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-674"
] | libyang | 298b30ea4ebee137226acf9bb38678bd82704582 | 35,593,257,233,789,404,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 21 | common FEATURE add a hard limit for recursion
Fixes #1453 |
SegmentCommand* Binary::segment_from_offset(uint64_t offset) {
return const_cast<SegmentCommand*>(static_cast<const Binary*>(this)->segment_from_offset(offset));
} | 1 | [
"CWE-703"
] | LIEF | 7acf0bc4224081d4f425fcc8b2e361b95291d878 | 42,342,701,268,356,780,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 3 | Resolve #764 |
static int pfkey_error(const struct sadb_msg *orig, int err, struct sock *sk)
{
struct sk_buff *skb = alloc_skb(sizeof(struct sadb_msg) + 16, GFP_KERNEL);
struct sadb_msg *hdr;
if (!skb)
return -ENOBUFS;
/* Woe be to the platform trying to support PFKEY yet
* having normal errnos outside the 1-255 range, inclusive.
*/
err = -err;
if (err == ERESTARTSYS ||
err == ERESTARTNOHAND ||
err == ERESTARTNOINTR)
err = EINTR;
if (err >= 512)
err = EINVAL;
BUG_ON(err <= 0 || err >= 256);
hdr = (struct sadb_msg *) skb_put(skb, sizeof(struct sadb_msg));
pfkey_hdr_dup(hdr, orig);
hdr->sadb_msg_errno = (uint8_t) err;
hdr->sadb_msg_len = (sizeof(struct sadb_msg) /
sizeof(uint64_t));
pfkey_broadcast(skb, GFP_KERNEL, BROADCAST_ONE, sk, sock_net(sk));
return 0;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-20",
"CWE-269"
] | linux | f3d3342602f8bcbf37d7c46641cb9bca7618eb1c | 68,105,614,729,744,530,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 30 | net: rework recvmsg handler msg_name and msg_namelen logic
This patch now always passes msg->msg_namelen as 0. recvmsg handlers must
set msg_namelen to the proper size <= sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage)
to return msg_name to the user.
This prevents numerous uninitialized memory leaks we had in the
recvmsg handlers and makes it harder for new code to accidentally leak
uninitialized memory.
Optimize for the case recvfrom is called with NULL as address. We don't
need to copy the address at all, so set it to NULL before invoking the
recvmsg handler. We can do so, because all the recvmsg handlers must
cope with the case a plain read() is called on them. read() also sets
msg_name to NULL.
Also document these changes in include/linux/net.h as suggested by David
Miller.
Changes since RFC:
Set msg->msg_name = NULL if user specified a NULL in msg_name but had a
non-null msg_namelen in verify_iovec/verify_compat_iovec. This doesn't
affect sendto as it would bail out earlier while trying to copy-in the
address. It also more naturally reflects the logic by the callers of
verify_iovec.
With this change in place I could remove "
if (!uaddr || msg_sys->msg_namelen == 0)
msg->msg_name = NULL
".
This change does not alter the user visible error logic as we ignore
msg_namelen as long as msg_name is NULL.
Also remove two unnecessary curly brackets in ___sys_recvmsg and change
comments to netdev style.
Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> |
void saveVCalendar (TNEFStruct *tnef, const gchar *tmpdir) {
gchar *ifilename;
variableLength *filename;
gchar *charptr, *charptr2;
FILE *fptr;
gint index;
DWORD *dword_ptr;
DWORD dword_val;
dtr thedate;
ifilename = g_build_filename (tmpdir, "calendar.vcf", NULL);
printf("%s\n", ifilename);
if ((fptr = fopen(ifilename, "wb"))==NULL) {
printf("Error writing file to disk!");
} else {
fprintf(fptr, "BEGIN:VCALENDAR\n");
if (tnef->messageClass[0] != 0) {
charptr2=tnef->messageClass;
charptr=charptr2;
while (*charptr != 0) {
if (*charptr == '.') {
charptr2 = charptr;
}
charptr++;
}
if (strcmp(charptr2, ".MtgCncl") == 0) {
fprintf(fptr, "METHOD:CANCEL\n");
} else {
fprintf(fptr, "METHOD:REQUEST\n");
}
} else {
fprintf(fptr, "METHOD:REQUEST\n");
}
fprintf(fptr, "VERSION:2.0\n");
fprintf(fptr, "BEGIN:VEVENT\n");
/* UID
After alot of comparisons, I'm reasonably sure this is totally
wrong. But it's not really necessary. */
/* I think it only exists to connect future modification entries to
this entry. so as long as it's incorrectly interpreted the same way
every time, it should be ok :) */
filename = NULL;
if ((filename=MAPIFindUserProp (&(tnef->MapiProperties),
PROP_TAG (PT_BINARY, 0x3))) == MAPI_UNDEFINED) {
if ((filename=MAPIFindUserProp (&(tnef->MapiProperties),
PROP_TAG (PT_BINARY, 0x23))) == MAPI_UNDEFINED) {
filename = NULL;
}
}
if (filename!=NULL) {
fprintf(fptr, "UID:");
for (index=0;index<filename->size;index++) {
fprintf(fptr,"%02X", (guchar)filename->data[index]);
}
fprintf(fptr,"\n");
}
/* Sequence */
filename = NULL;
if ((filename=MAPIFindUserProp (&(tnef->MapiProperties),
PROP_TAG (PT_LONG, 0x8201))) != MAPI_UNDEFINED) {
dword_ptr = (DWORD*)filename->data;
fprintf(fptr, "SEQUENCE:%i\n", (gint) *dword_ptr);
}
if ((filename=MAPIFindProperty (&(tnef->MapiProperties),
PROP_TAG (PT_BINARY, PR_SENDER_SEARCH_KEY)))
!= MAPI_UNDEFINED) {
charptr = filename->data;
charptr2 = strstr(charptr, ":");
if (charptr2 == NULL)
charptr2 = charptr;
else
charptr2++;
fprintf(fptr, "ORGANIZER;CN=\"%s\":MAILTO:%s\n",
charptr2, charptr2);
}
/* Required Attendees */
if ((filename = MAPIFindUserProp (&(tnef->MapiProperties),
PROP_TAG (PT_STRING8, 0x823b))) != MAPI_UNDEFINED) {
/* We have a list of required participants, so
write them out. */
if (filename->size > 1) {
charptr = filename->data-1;
while (charptr != NULL) {
charptr++;
charptr2 = strstr(charptr, ";");
if (charptr2 != NULL) {
*charptr2 = 0;
}
while (*charptr == ' ')
charptr++;
fprintf(fptr, "ATTENDEE;PARTSTAT=NEEDS-ACTION;");
fprintf(fptr, "ROLE=REQ-PARTICIPANT;RSVP=TRUE;");
fprintf(fptr, "CN=\"%s\":MAILTO:%s\n",
charptr, charptr);
charptr = charptr2;
}
}
/* Optional attendees */
if ((filename = MAPIFindUserProp (&(tnef->MapiProperties),
PROP_TAG (PT_STRING8, 0x823c))) != MAPI_UNDEFINED) {
/* The list of optional participants */
if (filename->size > 1) {
charptr = filename->data-1;
while (charptr != NULL) {
charptr++;
charptr2 = strstr(charptr, ";");
if (charptr2 != NULL) {
*charptr2 = 0;
}
while (*charptr == ' ')
charptr++;
fprintf(fptr, "ATTENDEE;PARTSTAT=NEEDS-ACTION;");
fprintf(fptr, "ROLE=OPT-PARTICIPANT;RSVP=TRUE;");
fprintf(fptr, "CN=\"%s\":MAILTO:%s\n",
charptr, charptr);
charptr = charptr2;
}
}
}
} else if ((filename = MAPIFindUserProp (&(tnef->MapiProperties),
PROP_TAG (PT_STRING8, 0x8238))) != MAPI_UNDEFINED) {
if (filename->size > 1) {
charptr = filename->data-1;
while (charptr != NULL) {
charptr++;
charptr2 = strstr(charptr, ";");
if (charptr2 != NULL) {
*charptr2 = 0;
}
while (*charptr == ' ')
charptr++;
fprintf(fptr, "ATTENDEE;PARTSTAT=NEEDS-ACTION;");
fprintf(fptr, "ROLE=REQ-PARTICIPANT;RSVP=TRUE;");
fprintf(fptr, "CN=\"%s\":MAILTO:%s\n",
charptr, charptr);
charptr = charptr2;
}
}
}
/* Summary */
filename = NULL;
if ((filename=MAPIFindProperty (&(tnef->MapiProperties),
PROP_TAG (PT_STRING8, PR_CONVERSATION_TOPIC)))
!= MAPI_UNDEFINED) {
fprintf(fptr, "SUMMARY:");
cstylefprint (fptr, filename);
fprintf(fptr, "\n");
}
/* Description */
if ((filename=MAPIFindProperty (&(tnef->MapiProperties),
PROP_TAG (PT_BINARY, PR_RTF_COMPRESSED)))
!= MAPI_UNDEFINED) {
variableLength buf;
if ((buf.data = (gchar *) DecompressRTF (filename, &buf.size)) != NULL) {
fprintf(fptr, "DESCRIPTION:");
printRtf (fptr, &buf);
free (buf.data);
}
}
/* Location */
filename = NULL;
if ((filename=MAPIFindUserProp (&(tnef->MapiProperties),
PROP_TAG (PT_STRING8, 0x0002))) == MAPI_UNDEFINED) {
if ((filename=MAPIFindUserProp (&(tnef->MapiProperties),
PROP_TAG (PT_STRING8, 0x8208))) == MAPI_UNDEFINED) {
filename = NULL;
}
}
if (filename != NULL) {
fprintf(fptr,"LOCATION: %s\n", filename->data);
}
/* Date Start */
filename = NULL;
if ((filename=MAPIFindUserProp (&(tnef->MapiProperties),
PROP_TAG (PT_SYSTIME, 0x820d))) == MAPI_UNDEFINED) {
if ((filename=MAPIFindUserProp (&(tnef->MapiProperties),
PROP_TAG (PT_SYSTIME, 0x8516))) == MAPI_UNDEFINED) {
filename=NULL;
}
}
if (filename != NULL) {
fprintf(fptr, "DTSTART:");
MAPISysTimetoDTR ((guchar *) filename->data, &thedate);
fprintf(fptr,"%04i%02i%02iT%02i%02i%02iZ\n",
thedate.wYear, thedate.wMonth, thedate.wDay,
thedate.wHour, thedate.wMinute, thedate.wSecond);
}
/* Date End */
filename = NULL;
if ((filename=MAPIFindUserProp (&(tnef->MapiProperties),
PROP_TAG (PT_SYSTIME, 0x820e))) == MAPI_UNDEFINED) {
if ((filename=MAPIFindUserProp (&(tnef->MapiProperties),
PROP_TAG (PT_SYSTIME, 0x8517))) == MAPI_UNDEFINED) {
filename=NULL;
}
}
if (filename != NULL) {
fprintf(fptr, "DTEND:");
MAPISysTimetoDTR ((guchar *) filename->data, &thedate);
fprintf(fptr,"%04i%02i%02iT%02i%02i%02iZ\n",
thedate.wYear, thedate.wMonth, thedate.wDay,
thedate.wHour, thedate.wMinute, thedate.wSecond);
}
/* Date Stamp */
filename = NULL;
if ((filename=MAPIFindUserProp (&(tnef->MapiProperties),
PROP_TAG (PT_SYSTIME, 0x8202))) != MAPI_UNDEFINED) {
fprintf(fptr, "CREATED:");
MAPISysTimetoDTR ((guchar *) filename->data, &thedate);
fprintf(fptr,"%04i%02i%02iT%02i%02i%02iZ\n",
thedate.wYear, thedate.wMonth, thedate.wDay,
thedate.wHour, thedate.wMinute, thedate.wSecond);
}
/* Class */
filename = NULL;
if ((filename=MAPIFindUserProp (&(tnef->MapiProperties),
PROP_TAG (PT_BOOLEAN, 0x8506))) != MAPI_UNDEFINED) {
dword_ptr = (DWORD*)filename->data;
dword_val = SwapDWord ((BYTE*)dword_ptr);
fprintf(fptr, "CLASS:" );
if (*dword_ptr == 1) {
fprintf(fptr,"PRIVATE\n");
} else {
fprintf(fptr,"PUBLIC\n");
}
}
/* Recurrence */
filename = NULL;
if ((filename=MAPIFindUserProp (&(tnef->MapiProperties),
PROP_TAG (PT_BINARY, 0x8216))) != MAPI_UNDEFINED) {
printRrule (fptr, filename->data, filename->size, tnef);
}
/* Wrap it up */
fprintf(fptr, "END:VEVENT\n");
fprintf(fptr, "END:VCALENDAR\n");
fclose (fptr);
}
g_free (ifilename);
} | 0 | [] | evolution | a9fb511ced4cfaffb7109e58a9db66e6279e309c | 203,510,093,158,569,770,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 249 | bug #641069 - tnef plugin vulnerabilities
Resolves directory traversal and buffer overflow vulnerabilities. |
static int mark_source_chains(const struct xt_table_info *newinfo,
unsigned int valid_hooks, void *entry0,
unsigned int *offsets)
{
unsigned int hook;
/* No recursion; use packet counter to save back ptrs (reset
* to 0 as we leave), and comefrom to save source hook bitmask.
*/
for (hook = 0; hook < NF_ARP_NUMHOOKS; hook++) {
unsigned int pos = newinfo->hook_entry[hook];
struct arpt_entry *e = entry0 + pos;
if (!(valid_hooks & (1 << hook)))
continue;
/* Set initial back pointer. */
e->counters.pcnt = pos;
for (;;) {
const struct xt_standard_target *t
= (void *)arpt_get_target_c(e);
int visited = e->comefrom & (1 << hook);
if (e->comefrom & (1 << NF_ARP_NUMHOOKS))
return 0;
e->comefrom
|= ((1 << hook) | (1 << NF_ARP_NUMHOOKS));
/* Unconditional return/END. */
if ((unconditional(e) &&
(strcmp(t->target.u.user.name,
XT_STANDARD_TARGET) == 0) &&
t->verdict < 0) || visited) {
unsigned int oldpos, size;
/* Return: backtrack through the last
* big jump.
*/
do {
e->comefrom ^= (1<<NF_ARP_NUMHOOKS);
oldpos = pos;
pos = e->counters.pcnt;
e->counters.pcnt = 0;
/* We're at the start. */
if (pos == oldpos)
goto next;
e = entry0 + pos;
} while (oldpos == pos + e->next_offset);
/* Move along one */
size = e->next_offset;
e = entry0 + pos + size;
if (pos + size >= newinfo->size)
return 0;
e->counters.pcnt = pos;
pos += size;
} else {
int newpos = t->verdict;
if (strcmp(t->target.u.user.name,
XT_STANDARD_TARGET) == 0 &&
newpos >= 0) {
/* This a jump; chase it. */
if (!xt_find_jump_offset(offsets, newpos,
newinfo->number))
return 0;
} else {
/* ... this is a fallthru */
newpos = pos + e->next_offset;
if (newpos >= newinfo->size)
return 0;
}
e = entry0 + newpos;
e->counters.pcnt = pos;
pos = newpos;
}
}
next: ;
}
return 1;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-787"
] | linux | b29c457a6511435960115c0f548c4360d5f4801d | 30,609,778,745,476,826,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 85 | netfilter: x_tables: fix compat match/target pad out-of-bound write
xt_compat_match/target_from_user doesn't check that zeroing the area
to start of next rule won't write past end of allocated ruleset blob.
Remove this code and zero the entire blob beforehand.
Reported-by: syzbot+cfc0247ac173f597aaaa@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reported-by: Andy Nguyen <theflow@google.com>
Fixes: 9fa492cdc160c ("[NETFILTER]: x_tables: simplify compat API")
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org> |
static int ntop_set_second_traffic(lua_State* vm) {
NetworkInterface *ntop_interface = getCurrentInterface(vm);
ntop->getTrace()->traceEvent(TRACE_DEBUG, "%s() called", __FUNCTION__);
if(!ntop_interface) return(CONST_LUA_ERROR);
ntop_interface->updateSecondTraffic(time(NULL));
return(CONST_LUA_OK);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-476"
] | ntopng | 01f47e04fd7c8d54399c9e465f823f0017069f8f | 255,683,374,254,688,600,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 10 | Security fix: prevents empty host from being used |
static int ext4_get_blocks_handle(handle_t *handle, struct inode *inode,
ext4_lblk_t iblock, unsigned int maxblocks,
struct buffer_head *bh_result,
int create, int extend_disksize)
{
int err = -EIO;
ext4_lblk_t offsets[4];
Indirect chain[4];
Indirect *partial;
ext4_fsblk_t goal;
int indirect_blks;
int blocks_to_boundary = 0;
int depth;
struct ext4_inode_info *ei = EXT4_I(inode);
int count = 0;
ext4_fsblk_t first_block = 0;
loff_t disksize;
J_ASSERT(!(EXT4_I(inode)->i_flags & EXT4_EXTENTS_FL));
J_ASSERT(handle != NULL || create == 0);
depth = ext4_block_to_path(inode, iblock, offsets,
&blocks_to_boundary);
if (depth == 0)
goto out;
partial = ext4_get_branch(inode, depth, offsets, chain, &err);
/* Simplest case - block found, no allocation needed */
if (!partial) {
first_block = le32_to_cpu(chain[depth - 1].key);
clear_buffer_new(bh_result);
count++;
/*map more blocks*/
while (count < maxblocks && count <= blocks_to_boundary) {
ext4_fsblk_t blk;
blk = le32_to_cpu(*(chain[depth-1].p + count));
if (blk == first_block + count)
count++;
else
break;
}
goto got_it;
}
/* Next simple case - plain lookup or failed read of indirect block */
if (!create || err == -EIO)
goto cleanup;
/*
* Okay, we need to do block allocation.
*/
goal = ext4_find_goal(inode, iblock, partial);
/* the number of blocks need to allocate for [d,t]indirect blocks */
indirect_blks = (chain + depth) - partial - 1;
/*
* Next look up the indirect map to count the totoal number of
* direct blocks to allocate for this branch.
*/
count = ext4_blks_to_allocate(partial, indirect_blks,
maxblocks, blocks_to_boundary);
/*
* Block out ext4_truncate while we alter the tree
*/
err = ext4_alloc_branch(handle, inode, iblock, indirect_blks,
&count, goal,
offsets + (partial - chain), partial);
/*
* The ext4_splice_branch call will free and forget any buffers
* on the new chain if there is a failure, but that risks using
* up transaction credits, especially for bitmaps where the
* credits cannot be returned. Can we handle this somehow? We
* may need to return -EAGAIN upwards in the worst case. --sct
*/
if (!err)
err = ext4_splice_branch(handle, inode, iblock,
partial, indirect_blks, count);
/*
* i_disksize growing is protected by i_data_sem. Don't forget to
* protect it if you're about to implement concurrent
* ext4_get_block() -bzzz
*/
if (!err && extend_disksize) {
disksize = ((loff_t) iblock + count) << inode->i_blkbits;
if (disksize > i_size_read(inode))
disksize = i_size_read(inode);
if (disksize > ei->i_disksize)
ei->i_disksize = disksize;
}
if (err)
goto cleanup;
set_buffer_new(bh_result);
got_it:
map_bh(bh_result, inode->i_sb, le32_to_cpu(chain[depth-1].key));
if (count > blocks_to_boundary)
set_buffer_boundary(bh_result);
err = count;
/* Clean up and exit */
partial = chain + depth - 1; /* the whole chain */
cleanup:
while (partial > chain) {
BUFFER_TRACE(partial->bh, "call brelse");
brelse(partial->bh);
partial--;
}
BUFFER_TRACE(bh_result, "returned");
out:
return err;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-399"
] | linux-2.6 | 06a279d636734da32bb62dd2f7b0ade666f65d7c | 219,997,241,910,423,230,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 116 | ext4: only use i_size_high for regular files
Directories are not allowed to be bigger than 2GB, so don't use
i_size_high for anything other than regular files. E2fsck should
complain about these inodes, but the simplest thing to do for the
kernel is to only use i_size_high for regular files.
This prevents an intentially corrupted filesystem from causing the
kernel to burn a huge amount of CPU and issuing error messages such
as:
EXT4-fs warning (device loop0): ext4_block_to_path: block 135090028 > max
Thanks to David Maciejak from Fortinet's FortiGuard Global Security
Research Team for reporting this issue.
http://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=12375
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: stable@kernel.org |
ZEND_API HashTable* ZEND_FASTCALL zend_array_dup(HashTable *source)
{
uint32_t idx;
HashTable *target;
IS_CONSISTENT(source);
ALLOC_HASHTABLE(target);
GC_REFCOUNT(target) = 1;
GC_TYPE_INFO(target) = IS_ARRAY;
target->nTableSize = source->nTableSize;
target->pDestructor = source->pDestructor;
if (source->nNumUsed == 0) {
target->u.flags = (source->u.flags & ~(HASH_FLAG_INITIALIZED|HASH_FLAG_PACKED|HASH_FLAG_PERSISTENT|ZEND_HASH_APPLY_COUNT_MASK)) | HASH_FLAG_APPLY_PROTECTION | HASH_FLAG_STATIC_KEYS;
target->nTableMask = HT_MIN_MASK;
target->nNumUsed = 0;
target->nNumOfElements = 0;
target->nNextFreeElement = 0;
target->nInternalPointer = HT_INVALID_IDX;
HT_SET_DATA_ADDR(target, &uninitialized_bucket);
} else if (GC_FLAGS(source) & IS_ARRAY_IMMUTABLE) {
target->u.flags = (source->u.flags & ~HASH_FLAG_PERSISTENT) | HASH_FLAG_APPLY_PROTECTION;
target->nTableMask = source->nTableMask;
target->nNumUsed = source->nNumUsed;
target->nNumOfElements = source->nNumOfElements;
target->nNextFreeElement = source->nNextFreeElement;
HT_SET_DATA_ADDR(target, emalloc(HT_SIZE(target)));
target->nInternalPointer = source->nInternalPointer;
memcpy(HT_GET_DATA_ADDR(target), HT_GET_DATA_ADDR(source), HT_USED_SIZE(source));
if (target->nNumOfElements > 0 &&
target->nInternalPointer == HT_INVALID_IDX) {
idx = 0;
while (Z_TYPE(target->arData[idx].val) == IS_UNDEF) {
idx++;
}
target->nInternalPointer = idx;
}
} else if (source->u.flags & HASH_FLAG_PACKED) {
target->u.flags = (source->u.flags & ~(HASH_FLAG_PERSISTENT|ZEND_HASH_APPLY_COUNT_MASK)) | HASH_FLAG_APPLY_PROTECTION;
target->nTableMask = source->nTableMask;
target->nNumUsed = source->nNumUsed;
target->nNumOfElements = source->nNumOfElements;
target->nNextFreeElement = source->nNextFreeElement;
HT_SET_DATA_ADDR(target, emalloc(HT_SIZE(target)));
target->nInternalPointer = source->nInternalPointer;
HT_HASH_RESET_PACKED(target);
if (target->nNumUsed == target->nNumOfElements) {
zend_array_dup_packed_elements(source, target, 0);
} else {
zend_array_dup_packed_elements(source, target, 1);
}
if (target->nNumOfElements > 0 &&
target->nInternalPointer == HT_INVALID_IDX) {
idx = 0;
while (Z_TYPE(target->arData[idx].val) == IS_UNDEF) {
idx++;
}
target->nInternalPointer = idx;
}
} else {
target->u.flags = (source->u.flags & ~(HASH_FLAG_PERSISTENT|ZEND_HASH_APPLY_COUNT_MASK)) | HASH_FLAG_APPLY_PROTECTION;
target->nTableMask = source->nTableMask;
target->nNextFreeElement = source->nNextFreeElement;
target->nInternalPointer = source->nInternalPointer;
HT_SET_DATA_ADDR(target, emalloc(HT_SIZE(target)));
HT_HASH_RESET(target);
if (target->u.flags & HASH_FLAG_STATIC_KEYS) {
if (source->nNumUsed == source->nNumOfElements) {
idx = zend_array_dup_elements(source, target, 1, 0);
} else {
idx = zend_array_dup_elements(source, target, 1, 1);
}
} else {
if (source->nNumUsed == source->nNumOfElements) {
idx = zend_array_dup_elements(source, target, 0, 0);
} else {
idx = zend_array_dup_elements(source, target, 0, 1);
}
}
target->nNumUsed = idx;
target->nNumOfElements = idx;
if (idx > 0 && target->nInternalPointer == HT_INVALID_IDX) {
target->nInternalPointer = 0;
}
}
return target;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-190"
] | php-src | 4cc0286f2f3780abc6084bcdae5dce595daa3c12 | 52,483,778,443,108,580,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 92 | Fix #73832 - leave the table in a safe state if the size is too big. |
seticc_lab(i_ctx_t * i_ctx_p, float *white, float *black, float *range_buff)
{
int code;
gs_color_space * pcs;
int i;
/* build the color space object */
code = gs_cspace_build_ICC(&pcs, NULL, gs_gstate_memory(igs));
if (code < 0)
return gs_rethrow(code, "building color space object");
/* record the current space as the alternative color space */
/* Get the lab profile. It may already be set in the icc manager.
If not then lets populate it. */
if (igs->icc_manager->lab_profile == NULL ) {
/* This can't happen as the profile
should be initialized during the
setting of the user params */
return gs_rethrow(code, "cannot find lab icc profile");
}
/* Assign the LAB to LAB profile to this color space */
code = gsicc_set_gscs_profile(pcs, igs->icc_manager->lab_profile, gs_gstate_memory(igs));
if (code < 0)
return gs_rethrow(code, "installing the lab profile");
pcs->cmm_icc_profile_data->Range.ranges[0].rmin = 0.0;
pcs->cmm_icc_profile_data->Range.ranges[0].rmax = 100.0;
for (i = 1; i < 3; i++) {
pcs->cmm_icc_profile_data->Range.ranges[i].rmin =
range_buff[2 * (i-1)];
pcs->cmm_icc_profile_data->Range.ranges[i].rmax =
range_buff[2 * (i-1) + 1];
}
/* Set the color space. We are done. */
code = gs_setcolorspace(igs, pcs);
return code;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-704"
] | ghostpdl | 67d760ab775dae4efe803b5944b0439aa3c0b04a | 23,393,012,537,594,376,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 35 | Bug #700169 - unchecked type
Bug #700169 "Type confusion in setcolorspace"
In seticc() we extract "Name" from a dictionary, if it succeeds we then
use it as a string, without checking the type to see if it is in fact
a string.
Add a check on the type, and add a couple to check that 'N' is an integer
in a few places too. |
create_backup (char const *to, const struct stat *to_st, bool leave_original)
{
/* When the input to patch modifies the same file more than once, patch only
backs up the initial version of each file.
To figure out which files have already been backed up, patch remembers the
files that replace the original files. Files not known already are backed
up; files already known have already been backed up before, and are
skipped.
When a patch tries to delete a file, in order to not break the above
logic, we merely remember which file to delete. After the entire patch
file has been read, we delete all files marked for deletion which have not
been recreated in the meantime. */
if (to_st && ! (S_ISREG (to_st->st_mode) || S_ISLNK (to_st->st_mode)))
fatal ("File %s is not a %s -- refusing to create backup",
to, S_ISLNK (to_st->st_mode) ? "symbolic link" : "regular file");
if (to_st && lookup_file_id (to_st) == CREATED)
{
if (debug & 4)
say ("File %s already seen\n", quotearg (to));
}
else
{
int try_makedirs_errno = 0;
char *bakname;
if (origprae || origbase || origsuff)
{
char const *p = origprae ? origprae : "";
char const *b = origbase ? origbase : "";
char const *s = origsuff ? origsuff : "";
char const *t = to;
size_t plen = strlen (p);
size_t blen = strlen (b);
size_t slen = strlen (s);
size_t tlen = strlen (t);
char const *o;
size_t olen;
for (o = t + tlen, olen = 0;
o > t && ! ISSLASH (*(o - 1));
o--)
/* do nothing */ ;
olen = t + tlen - o;
tlen -= olen;
bakname = xmalloc (plen + tlen + blen + olen + slen + 1);
memcpy (bakname, p, plen);
memcpy (bakname + plen, t, tlen);
memcpy (bakname + plen + tlen, b, blen);
memcpy (bakname + plen + tlen + blen, o, olen);
memcpy (bakname + plen + tlen + blen + olen, s, slen + 1);
if ((origprae
&& (contains_slash (origprae + FILE_SYSTEM_PREFIX_LEN (origprae))
|| contains_slash (to)))
|| (origbase && contains_slash (origbase)))
try_makedirs_errno = ENOENT;
}
else
{
bakname = find_backup_file_name (to, backup_type);
if (!bakname)
xalloc_die ();
}
if (! to_st)
{
int fd;
if (debug & 4)
say ("Creating empty file %s\n", quotearg (bakname));
try_makedirs_errno = ENOENT;
safe_unlink (bakname);
while ((fd = safe_open (bakname, O_CREAT | O_WRONLY | O_TRUNC, 0666)) < 0)
{
if (errno != try_makedirs_errno)
pfatal ("Can't create file %s", quotearg (bakname));
makedirs (bakname);
try_makedirs_errno = 0;
}
if (close (fd) != 0)
pfatal ("Can't close file %s", quotearg (bakname));
}
else if (leave_original)
create_backup_copy (to, bakname, to_st, try_makedirs_errno == 0);
else
{
if (debug & 4)
say ("Renaming file %s to %s\n",
quotearg_n (0, to), quotearg_n (1, bakname));
while (safe_rename (to, bakname) != 0)
{
if (errno == try_makedirs_errno)
{
makedirs (bakname);
try_makedirs_errno = 0;
}
else if (errno == EXDEV)
{
create_backup_copy (to, bakname, to_st,
try_makedirs_errno == 0);
safe_unlink (to);
break;
}
else
pfatal ("Can't rename file %s to %s",
quotearg_n (0, to), quotearg_n (1, bakname));
}
}
free (bakname);
}
} | 1 | [
"CWE-59"
] | patch | dce4683cbbe107a95f1f0d45fabc304acfb5d71a | 80,857,221,028,679,830,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 116 | Don't follow symlinks unless --follow-symlinks is given
* src/inp.c (plan_a, plan_b), src/util.c (copy_to_fd, copy_file,
append_to_file): Unless the --follow-symlinks option is given, open files with
the O_NOFOLLOW flag to avoid following symlinks. So far, we were only doing
that consistently for input files.
* src/util.c (create_backup): When creating empty backup files, (re)create them
with O_CREAT | O_EXCL to avoid following symlinks in that case as well. |
static void print_request(struct drm_printer *m,
struct i915_request *rq,
const char *prefix)
{
const char *name = rq->fence.ops->get_timeline_name(&rq->fence);
char buf[80] = "";
int x = 0;
x = print_sched_attr(&rq->sched.attr, buf, x, sizeof(buf));
drm_printf(m, "%s %llx:%llx%s%s %s @ %dms: %s\n",
prefix,
rq->fence.context, rq->fence.seqno,
i915_request_completed(rq) ? "!" :
i915_request_started(rq) ? "*" :
"",
test_bit(DMA_FENCE_FLAG_SIGNALED_BIT,
&rq->fence.flags) ? "+" :
test_bit(DMA_FENCE_FLAG_ENABLE_SIGNAL_BIT,
&rq->fence.flags) ? "-" :
"",
buf,
jiffies_to_msecs(jiffies - rq->emitted_jiffies),
name);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-20",
"CWE-190"
] | linux | c784e5249e773689e38d2bc1749f08b986621a26 | 75,069,936,784,148,985,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 25 | drm/i915/guc: Update to use firmware v49.0.1
The latest GuC firmware includes a number of interface changes that
require driver updates to match.
* Starting from Gen11, the ID to be provided to GuC needs to contain
the engine class in bits [0..2] and the instance in bits [3..6].
NOTE: this patch breaks pointer dereferences in some existing GuC
functions that use the guc_id to dereference arrays but these functions
are not used for now as we have GuC submission disabled and we will
update these functions in follow up patch which requires new IDs.
* The new GuC requires the additional data structure (ADS) and associated
'private_data' pointer to be setup. This is basically a scratch area
of memory that the GuC owns. The size is read from the CSS header.
* There is now a physical to logical engine mapping table in the ADS
which needs to be configured in order for the firmware to load. For
now, the table is initialised with a 1 to 1 mapping.
* GUC_CTL_CTXINFO has been removed from the initialization params.
* reg_state_buffer is maintained internally by the GuC as part of
the private data.
* The ADS layout has changed significantly. This patch updates the
shared structure and also adds better documentation of the layout.
* While i915 does not use GuC doorbells, the firmware now requires
that some initialisation is done.
* The number of engine classes and instances supported in the ADS has
been increased.
Signed-off-by: John Harrison <John.C.Harrison@Intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Matthew Brost <matthew.brost@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniele Ceraolo Spurio <daniele.ceraolospurio@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Oscar Mateo <oscar.mateo@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Michel Thierry <michel.thierry@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Rodrigo Vivi <rodrigo.vivi@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Michal Wajdeczko <michal.wajdeczko@intel.com>
Cc: Michal Winiarski <michal.winiarski@intel.com>
Cc: Tomasz Lis <tomasz.lis@intel.com>
Cc: Joonas Lahtinen <joonas.lahtinen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniele Ceraolo Spurio <daniele.ceraolospurio@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Joonas Lahtinen <joonas.lahtinen@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20201028145826.2949180-2-John.C.Harrison@Intel.com |
MagickExport Image *SmushImages(const Image *images,
const MagickBooleanType stack,const ssize_t offset,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
#define SmushImageTag "Smush/Image"
CacheView
*smush_view;
const Image
*image;
Image
*smush_image;
MagickBooleanType
matte,
proceed,
status;
MagickOffsetType
n;
RectangleInfo
geometry;
register const Image
*next;
size_t
height,
number_images,
width;
ssize_t
x_offset,
y_offset;
/*
Compute maximum area of smushed area.
*/
assert(images != (Image *) NULL);
assert(images->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
if (images->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",images->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
image=images;
matte=image->matte;
number_images=1;
width=image->columns;
height=image->rows;
next=GetNextImageInList(image);
for ( ; next != (Image *) NULL; next=GetNextImageInList(next))
{
if (next->matte != MagickFalse)
matte=MagickTrue;
number_images++;
if (stack != MagickFalse)
{
if (next->columns > width)
width=next->columns;
height+=next->rows;
if (next->previous != (Image *) NULL)
height+=offset;
continue;
}
width+=next->columns;
if (next->previous != (Image *) NULL)
width+=offset;
if (next->rows > height)
height=next->rows;
}
/*
Smush images.
*/
smush_image=CloneImage(image,width,height,MagickTrue,exception);
if (smush_image == (Image *) NULL)
return((Image *) NULL);
if (SetImageStorageClass(smush_image,DirectClass) == MagickFalse)
{
InheritException(exception,&smush_image->exception);
smush_image=DestroyImage(smush_image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
smush_image->matte=matte;
(void) SetImageBackgroundColor(smush_image);
status=MagickTrue;
x_offset=0;
y_offset=0;
smush_view=AcquireVirtualCacheView(smush_image,exception);
for (n=0; n < (MagickOffsetType) number_images; n++)
{
SetGeometry(smush_image,&geometry);
GravityAdjustGeometry(image->columns,image->rows,image->gravity,&geometry);
if (stack != MagickFalse)
{
x_offset-=geometry.x;
y_offset-=SmushYGap(smush_image,image,offset,exception);
}
else
{
x_offset-=SmushXGap(smush_image,image,offset,exception);
y_offset-=geometry.y;
}
status=CompositeImage(smush_image,OverCompositeOp,image,x_offset,y_offset);
proceed=SetImageProgress(image,SmushImageTag,n,number_images);
if (proceed == MagickFalse)
break;
if (stack == MagickFalse)
{
x_offset+=(ssize_t) image->columns;
y_offset=0;
}
else
{
x_offset=0;
y_offset+=(ssize_t) image->rows;
}
image=GetNextImageInList(image);
}
if (stack == MagickFalse)
smush_image->columns=(size_t) x_offset;
else
smush_image->rows=(size_t) y_offset;
smush_view=DestroyCacheView(smush_view);
if (status == MagickFalse)
smush_image=DestroyImage(smush_image);
return(smush_image);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-665"
] | ImageMagick6 | 27b1c74979ac473a430e266ff6c4b645664bc805 | 324,447,022,029,194,630,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 129 | https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1522 |
static inline void tcp_advance_highest_sack(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
tcp_sk(sk)->highest_sack = tcp_skb_is_last(sk, skb) ? NULL :
tcp_write_queue_next(sk, skb);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-416",
"CWE-269"
] | linux | bb1fceca22492109be12640d49f5ea5a544c6bb4 | 246,129,762,974,249,900,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 5 | tcp: fix use after free in tcp_xmit_retransmit_queue()
When tcp_sendmsg() allocates a fresh and empty skb, it puts it at the
tail of the write queue using tcp_add_write_queue_tail()
Then it attempts to copy user data into this fresh skb.
If the copy fails, we undo the work and remove the fresh skb.
Unfortunately, this undo lacks the change done to tp->highest_sack and
we can leave a dangling pointer (to a freed skb)
Later, tcp_xmit_retransmit_queue() can dereference this pointer and
access freed memory. For regular kernels where memory is not unmapped,
this might cause SACK bugs because tcp_highest_sack_seq() is buggy,
returning garbage instead of tp->snd_nxt, but with various debug
features like CONFIG_DEBUG_PAGEALLOC, this can crash the kernel.
This bug was found by Marco Grassi thanks to syzkaller.
Fixes: 6859d49475d4 ("[TCP]: Abstract tp->highest_sack accessing & point to next skb")
Reported-by: Marco Grassi <marco.gra@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Ilpo Järvinen <ilpo.jarvinen@helsinki.fi>
Cc: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Cc: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Acked-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> |
static int __check_ptr_off_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
const struct bpf_reg_state *reg, int regno,
bool fixed_off_ok)
{
/* Access to this pointer-typed register or passing it to a helper
* is only allowed in its original, unmodified form.
*/
if (!fixed_off_ok && reg->off) {
verbose(env, "dereference of modified %s ptr R%d off=%d disallowed\n",
reg_type_str(env, reg->type), regno, reg->off);
return -EACCES;
}
if (!tnum_is_const(reg->var_off) || reg->var_off.value) {
char tn_buf[48];
tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off);
verbose(env, "variable %s access var_off=%s disallowed\n",
reg_type_str(env, reg->type), tn_buf);
return -EACCES;
}
return 0;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-787"
] | linux | 64620e0a1e712a778095bd35cbb277dc2259281f | 186,718,264,085,003,470,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 25 | bpf: Fix out of bounds access for ringbuf helpers
Both bpf_ringbuf_submit() and bpf_ringbuf_discard() have ARG_PTR_TO_ALLOC_MEM
in their bpf_func_proto definition as their first argument. They both expect
the result from a prior bpf_ringbuf_reserve() call which has a return type of
RET_PTR_TO_ALLOC_MEM_OR_NULL.
Meaning, after a NULL check in the code, the verifier will promote the register
type in the non-NULL branch to a PTR_TO_MEM and in the NULL branch to a known
zero scalar. Generally, pointer arithmetic on PTR_TO_MEM is allowed, so the
latter could have an offset.
The ARG_PTR_TO_ALLOC_MEM expects a PTR_TO_MEM register type. However, the non-
zero result from bpf_ringbuf_reserve() must be fed into either bpf_ringbuf_submit()
or bpf_ringbuf_discard() but with the original offset given it will then read
out the struct bpf_ringbuf_hdr mapping.
The verifier missed to enforce a zero offset, so that out of bounds access
can be triggered which could be used to escalate privileges if unprivileged
BPF was enabled (disabled by default in kernel).
Fixes: 457f44363a88 ("bpf: Implement BPF ring buffer and verifier support for it")
Reported-by: <tr3e.wang@gmail.com> (SecCoder Security Lab)
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> |
static int generate_session_id(const SSL *ssl, unsigned char *id,
unsigned int *id_len)
{
unsigned int count = 0;
do {
if (RAND_bytes(id, *id_len) <= 0)
return 0;
/*
* Prefix the session_id with the required prefix. NB: If our prefix
* is too long, clip it - but there will be worse effects anyway, eg.
* the server could only possibly create 1 session ID (ie. the
* prefix!) so all future session negotiations will fail due to
* conflicts.
*/
memcpy(id, session_id_prefix,
(strlen(session_id_prefix) < *id_len) ?
strlen(session_id_prefix) : *id_len);
}
while (SSL_has_matching_session_id(ssl, id, *id_len) &&
(++count < MAX_SESSION_ID_ATTEMPTS));
if (count >= MAX_SESSION_ID_ATTEMPTS)
return 0;
return 1;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-399"
] | openssl | 380f18ed5f140e0ae1b68f3ab8f4f7c395658d9e | 208,572,317,147,339,400,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 24 | CVE-2016-0798: avoid memory leak in SRP
The SRP user database lookup method SRP_VBASE_get_by_user had confusing
memory management semantics; the returned pointer was sometimes newly
allocated, and sometimes owned by the callee. The calling code has no
way of distinguishing these two cases.
Specifically, SRP servers that configure a secret seed to hide valid
login information are vulnerable to a memory leak: an attacker
connecting with an invalid username can cause a memory leak of around
300 bytes per connection.
Servers that do not configure SRP, or configure SRP but do not configure
a seed are not vulnerable.
In Apache, the seed directive is known as SSLSRPUnknownUserSeed.
To mitigate the memory leak, the seed handling in SRP_VBASE_get_by_user
is now disabled even if the user has configured a seed.
Applications are advised to migrate to SRP_VBASE_get1_by_user. However,
note that OpenSSL makes no strong guarantees about the
indistinguishability of valid and invalid logins. In particular,
computations are currently not carried out in constant time.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> |
static void __hrtimer_init(struct hrtimer *timer, clockid_t clock_id,
enum hrtimer_mode mode)
{
struct hrtimer_cpu_base *cpu_base;
int base;
memset(timer, 0, sizeof(struct hrtimer));
cpu_base = raw_cpu_ptr(&hrtimer_bases);
if (clock_id == CLOCK_REALTIME && mode != HRTIMER_MODE_ABS)
clock_id = CLOCK_MONOTONIC;
base = hrtimer_clockid_to_base(clock_id);
timer->base = &cpu_base->clock_base[base];
timerqueue_init(&timer->node);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-200"
] | tip | dfb4357da6ddbdf57d583ba64361c9d792b0e0b1 | 153,070,057,394,107,110,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 17 | time: Remove CONFIG_TIMER_STATS
Currently CONFIG_TIMER_STATS exposes process information across namespaces:
kernel/time/timer_list.c print_timer():
SEQ_printf(m, ", %s/%d", tmp, timer->start_pid);
/proc/timer_list:
#11: <0000000000000000>, hrtimer_wakeup, S:01, do_nanosleep, cron/2570
Given that the tracer can give the same information, this patch entirely
removes CONFIG_TIMER_STATS.
Suggested-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org>
Cc: Nicolas Pitre <nicolas.pitre@linaro.org>
Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Lai Jiangshan <jiangshanlai@gmail.com>
Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>
Cc: Xing Gao <xgao01@email.wm.edu>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Jessica Frazelle <me@jessfraz.com>
Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
Cc: Nicolas Iooss <nicolas.iooss_linux@m4x.org>
Cc: "Paul E. McKenney" <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
Cc: Richard Cochran <richardcochran@gmail.com>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Michal Marek <mmarek@suse.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Olof Johansson <olof@lixom.net>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: linux-api@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170208192659.GA32582@beast
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> |
static void i40e_remove_queue_channels(struct i40e_vsi *vsi)
{
enum i40e_admin_queue_err last_aq_status;
struct i40e_cloud_filter *cfilter;
struct i40e_channel *ch, *ch_tmp;
struct i40e_pf *pf = vsi->back;
struct hlist_node *node;
int ret, i;
/* Reset rss size that was stored when reconfiguring rss for
* channel VSIs with non-power-of-2 queue count.
*/
vsi->current_rss_size = 0;
/* perform cleanup for channels if they exist */
if (list_empty(&vsi->ch_list))
return;
list_for_each_entry_safe(ch, ch_tmp, &vsi->ch_list, list) {
struct i40e_vsi *p_vsi;
list_del(&ch->list);
p_vsi = ch->parent_vsi;
if (!p_vsi || !ch->initialized) {
kfree(ch);
continue;
}
/* Reset queue contexts */
for (i = 0; i < ch->num_queue_pairs; i++) {
struct i40e_ring *tx_ring, *rx_ring;
u16 pf_q;
pf_q = ch->base_queue + i;
tx_ring = vsi->tx_rings[pf_q];
tx_ring->ch = NULL;
rx_ring = vsi->rx_rings[pf_q];
rx_ring->ch = NULL;
}
/* Reset BW configured for this VSI via mqprio */
ret = i40e_set_bw_limit(vsi, ch->seid, 0);
if (ret)
dev_info(&vsi->back->pdev->dev,
"Failed to reset tx rate for ch->seid %u\n",
ch->seid);
/* delete cloud filters associated with this channel */
hlist_for_each_entry_safe(cfilter, node,
&pf->cloud_filter_list, cloud_node) {
if (cfilter->seid != ch->seid)
continue;
hash_del(&cfilter->cloud_node);
if (cfilter->dst_port)
ret = i40e_add_del_cloud_filter_big_buf(vsi,
cfilter,
false);
else
ret = i40e_add_del_cloud_filter(vsi, cfilter,
false);
last_aq_status = pf->hw.aq.asq_last_status;
if (ret)
dev_info(&pf->pdev->dev,
"Failed to delete cloud filter, err %s aq_err %s\n",
i40e_stat_str(&pf->hw, ret),
i40e_aq_str(&pf->hw, last_aq_status));
kfree(cfilter);
}
/* delete VSI from FW */
ret = i40e_aq_delete_element(&vsi->back->hw, ch->seid,
NULL);
if (ret)
dev_err(&vsi->back->pdev->dev,
"unable to remove channel (%d) for parent VSI(%d)\n",
ch->seid, p_vsi->seid);
kfree(ch);
}
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&vsi->ch_list);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-400",
"CWE-401"
] | linux | 27d461333459d282ffa4a2bdb6b215a59d493a8f | 274,725,512,782,208,700,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 81 | i40e: prevent memory leak in i40e_setup_macvlans
In i40e_setup_macvlans if i40e_setup_channel fails the allocated memory
for ch should be released.
Signed-off-by: Navid Emamdoost <navid.emamdoost@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Andrew Bowers <andrewx.bowers@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Kirsher <jeffrey.t.kirsher@intel.com> |
FilterEncodingNode *FLTCreateBinaryCompFilterEncodingNode(void)
{
FilterEncodingNode *psFilterNode = NULL;
psFilterNode = FLTCreateFilterEncodingNode();
/* used to store case sensitivity flag. Default is 0 meaning the
comparing is case sensititive */
psFilterNode->pOther = (int *)malloc(sizeof(int));
(*(int *)(psFilterNode->pOther)) = 0;
return psFilterNode;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-200",
"CWE-119"
] | mapserver | e52a436c0e1c5e9f7ef13428dba83194a800f4df | 215,023,328,165,304,860,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 12 | security fix (patch by EvenR) |
static int getScreenColumns(void) {
int cols;
#ifdef _WIN32
CONSOLE_SCREEN_BUFFER_INFO inf;
GetConsoleScreenBufferInfo(GetStdHandle(STD_OUTPUT_HANDLE), &inf);
cols = inf.dwSize.X;
#else
struct winsize ws;
cols = (ioctl(1, TIOCGWINSZ, &ws) == -1) ? 80 : ws.ws_col;
#endif
// cols is 0 in certain circumstances like inside debugger, which creates further issues
return (cols > 0) ? cols : 80;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-200"
] | mongo | 035cf2afc04988b22cb67f4ebfd77e9b344cb6e0 | 322,516,803,212,934,600,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 13 | SERVER-25335 avoid group and other permissions when creating .dbshell history file |
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