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The Bureau’s mission is to provide comprehensive data about the nation’s people and economy. The 2010 census enumerates the number and location of people on Census Day, which is April 1, 2010. However, census operations begin long before Census Day and continue afterward. For example, address canvassing for the 2010 census will begin in April 2009, while the Secretary of Commerce must report tabulated census data to the President by December 31, 2010, and to state governors and legislatures by March 31, 2011. The decennial census is a major undertaking for the Bureau that includes the following major activities: Establishing where to count. This includes identifying and correcting addresses for all known living quarters in the United States (address canvassing) and validating addresses identified as potential group quarters, such as college residence halls and group homes (group quarters validation). Collecting and integrating respondent information. This includes delivering questionnaires to housing units by mail and other methods, processing the returned questionnaires, and following up with nonrespondents through personal interviews (nonresponse follow-up). It also includes enumerating residents of group quarters (group quarters enumeration) and occupied transitional living quarters (enumeration of transitory locations), such as recreational vehicle parks, campgrounds, and hotels. It also includes a final check of housing unit status (field verification) where Bureau workers verify potential duplicate housing units identified during response processing. Providing census results. This includes tabulating and summarizing census data and disseminating the results to the public. Automation and IT are to play a critical role in the success of the 2010 census by supporting data collection, analysis, and dissemination. Several systems will play a key role in the 2010 census. For example, enumeration “universes,” which serve as the basis for enumeration operations and response data collection, are organized by the Universe Control and Management (UC&M) system, and response data are received and edited to help eliminate duplicate responses using the Response Processing System (RPS). Both UC&M and RPS are legacy systems that are collectively called the Headquarters Processing System. Geographic information and support to aid the Bureau in establishing where to count U.S. citizens are provided by the Master Address File/Topologically Integrated Geographic Encoding and Referencing (MAF/TIGER) system. The Decennial Response Integration System (DRIS) is to provide a system for collecting and integrating census responses from all sources, including forms and telephone interviews. The Field Data Collection Automation (FDCA) program includes the development of handheld computers for the address canvassing operation and the systems, equipment, and infrastructure that field staff will use to collect data. Paper-Based Operations (PBO) was established in August 2008 primarily to handle certain operations that were originally part of FDCA. PBO includes IT systems and infrastructure needed to support the use of paper forms for operations such as group quarters enumeration activities, nonresponse follow-up activities, enumeration at transitory locations activities, and field verification activities. These activities were originally to be conducted using IT systems and infrastructure developed by the FDCA program. Finally, the Data Access and Dissemination System II (DADS II) is to replace legacy systems for tabulating and publicly disseminating data. As stated in our testing guide and the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) standards, complete and thorough testing is essential for providing reasonable assurance that new or modified IT systems will perform as intended. To be effective, testing should be planned and conducted in a structured and disciplined fashion that includes processes to control each incremental level of testing, including testing of individual systems, the integration of those systems, and testing to address all interrelated systems and functionality in an operational environment. Further, this testing should be planned and scheduled in a structured and disciplined fashion. Comprehensive testing that is effectively planned and scheduled can provide the basis for identifying key tasks and requirements and better ensure that a system meets these specified requirements and functions as intended in an operational environment. In preparation for the 2010 census, the Bureau planned what it refers to as the Dress Rehearsal. The Dress Rehearsal includes systems and integration testing, as well as end-to-end testing of key operations in a census-like environment. During the Dress Rehearsal period, running from February 2006 through June 2009, the Bureau is developing and testing systems and operations, and it held a mock Census Day on May 1, 2008. The Dress Rehearsal activities, which are still under way, are a subset of the activities planned for the actual 2010 census and include testing of both IT and non-IT related functions, such as opening offices and hiring staff. The Dress Rehearsal identified significant technical problems during the address canvassing and group quarters validation operations. For example, during the Dress Rehearsal address canvassing operation, the Bureau encountered problems with the handheld computers, including slow and inconsistent data transmissions, the devices freezing up, and difficulties collecting mapping coordinates. As a result of the problems observed during the Dress Rehearsal, cost overruns and schedule slippage in the FDCA program, and other issues, the Bureau removed the planned testing of several key operations from the Dress Rehearsal and switched key operations, such as nonresponse follow-up, to paper-based processes instead of using the handheld computers as originally planned. Through the Dress Rehearsal and other testing activities, the Bureau has completed key system tests, but significant testing has yet to be done, and planning for this is not complete. Table 1 summarizes the status and plans for system testing. Effective integration testing ensures that external interfaces work correctly and that the integrated systems meet specified requirements. This testing should be planned and scheduled in a disciplined fashion according to defined priorities. For the 2010 census, each program office is responsible for and has made progress in defining system interfaces and conducting integration testing, which includes testing of these interfaces. However, significant activities remain to be completed. For example, for systems such as PBO, interfaces have not been fully defined, and other interfaces have been defined but have not been tested. In addition, the Bureau has not established a master list of interfaces between key systems, or plans and schedules for integration testing of these interfaces. A master list of system interfaces is an important tool for ensuring that all interfaces are tested appropriately and that the priorities for testing are set correctly. As of October 2008, the Bureau had begun efforts to update a master list it had developed in 2007, but it has not provided a date when this list will be completed. Without a completed master list, the Bureau cannot develop comprehensive plans and schedules for conducting systems integration testing that indicate how the testing of these interfaces will be prioritized. With the limited amount of time remaining before systems are needed for 2010 operations, the lack of comprehensive plans and schedules increases the risk that the Bureau may not be able to adequately test system interfaces, and that interfaced systems may not work together as intended. Although several critical operations underwent end-to-end testing in the Dress Rehearsal, others did not. As of December 2008, the Bureau had not established testing plans or schedules for end-to-end testing of the key operations that were removed from the Dress Rehearsal, nor has it determined when these plans will be completed. These operations include enumeration of transitory locations, group quarters enumeration, and field verification. The decreasing time available for completing end-to-end testing increases the risk that testing of key operations will not take place before the required deadline. Bureau officials have acknowledged this risk in briefings to the Office of Management and Budget. However, as of January 2009, the Bureau had not completed mitigation plans for this risk. According to the Bureau, the plans are still being reviewed by senior management. Without plans to mitigate the risks associated with limited end-to-end testing, the Bureau may not be able to respond effectively if systems do not perform as intended. As stated in our testing guide and IEEE standards, oversight of testing activities includes both planning and ongoing monitoring of testing activities. Ongoing monitoring entails collecting and assessing status and progress reports to determine, for example, whether specific test activities are on schedule. In addition, comprehensive guidance should describe each level of testing and the types of test products expected. In response to prior recommendations, the Bureau took initial steps to enhance its programwide oversight; however, these steps have not been sufficient. For example, in June 2008, the Bureau established an inventory of all testing activities specific to all key decennial operations. However, the inventory has not been updated since May 2008, and officials have no plans for further updates. In another effort to improve executive-level oversight, the Decennial Management Division began producing (as of July 2008) a weekly executive alert report and has established (as of October 2008) a dashboard and monthly reporting indicators. However, these products do not provide comprehensive status information on the progress of testing key systems and interfaces. Further, the assessment of testing progress has not been based on quantitative and specific metrics. The lack of quantitative and specific metrics to track progress limits the Bureau’s ability to accurately assess the status and progress of testing activities. In commenting on our draft report, the Bureau provided selected examples where they had begun to use more detailed metrics to track the progress of end-to-end testing activities. The Bureau also has weaknesses in its testing guidance. According to the Associate Director for the 2010 census, the Bureau did establish a policy strongly encouraging offices responsible for decennial systems to use best practices in software development and testing, as specified in level 2 of Carnegie Mellon’s Capability Maturity Model® Integration. However, beyond this general guidance, there is no mandatory or specific guidance on key testing activities such as criteria for each level or the type of test products expected. The lack of guidance has led to an ad hoc—and, at times—less than desirable approach to testing. In our report, we are making ten recommendations for improvements to the Bureau’s testing activities. Our recommendations include finalizing system requirements and completing development of test plans and schedules, establishing a master list of system interfaces, prioritizing and developing plans to test these interfaces, and establishing plans to test operations removed from the Dress Rehearsal. In addition, we are recommending that the Bureau improve its monitoring of testing progress and improve executive-level oversight of testing activities. In written comments on the report, the department had no significant disagreements with our recommendations. The department stated that its focus is on testing new software and systems, not legacy systems and operations used in previous censuses. However, the systems in place to conduct these operations have changed substantially and have not yet been fully tested in a census-like environment. Consistent with our recommendations, finalizing test plans and schedules and testing all systems as thoroughly as possible will help to ensure that decennial systems will work as intended. In summary, while the Bureau’s program offices have made progress in testing key decennial systems, much work remains to ensure that systems operate as intended for conducting an accurate and timely 2010 census. This work includes system, integration, and end-to-end testing activities. Given the rapidly approaching deadlines of the 2010 census, completing testing and establishing stronger executive-level oversight are critical to ensuring that systems perform as intended when they are needed. Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, this concludes our statement. We would be pleased to respond to any questions that you or other members of the subcommittee may have at this time. If you have any questions about matters discussed in this testimony, please contact David A. Powner at (202) 512-9286 or pownerd@gao.gov or Robert Goldenkoff at (202) 512-2757 or goldenkoffr@gao.gov. Other key contributors to this testimony include Sher`rie Bacon, Barbara Collier, Neil Doherty, Vijay D’Souza, Elizabeth Fan, Nancy Glover, Signora May, Lee McCracken, Ty Mitchell, Lisa Pearson, Crystal Robinson, Melissa Schermerhorn, Cynthia Scott, Karl Seifert, Jonathan Ticehurst, Timothy Wexler, and Katherine Wulff. This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States. The published product may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without further permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this material separately. | The Decennial Census is mandated by the U.S. Constitution and provides vital data that are used, among other things, to reapportion and redistrict congressional seats and allocate federal financial assistance. In March 2008, GAO designated the 2010 Decennial Census a high-risk area, citing a number of long-standing and emerging challenges, including weaknesses in the U.S. Census Bureau's (Bureau) management of its information technology (IT) systems and operations. In conducting the 2010 census, the Bureau is relying on both the acquisition of new IT systems and the enhancement of existing systems. Thoroughly testing these systems before their actual use is critical to the success of the census. GAO was asked to testify on its report, being released today, on the status and plans of testing of key 2010 decennial IT systems. Although the Bureau has made progress in testing key decennial systems, critical testing activities remain to be performed before systems will be ready to support the 2010 census. Bureau program offices have completed some testing of individual systems, but significant work still remains to be done, and many plans have not yet been developed (see table below). In its testing of system integration, the Bureau has not completed critical activities; it also lacks a master list of interfaces between systems and has not developed testing plans and schedules. Although the Bureau had originally planned what it refers to as a Dress Rehearsal, starting in 2006, to serve as a comprehensive end-to-end test of key operations and systems, significant problems were identified during testing. As a result, several key operations were removed from the Dress Rehearsal and did not undergo end-to-end testing. The Bureau has neither developed testing plans for these key operations, nor has it determined when such plans will be completed. Weaknesses in the Bureau's testing progress and plans can be attributed in part to a lack of sufficient executive-level oversight and guidance. Bureau management does provide oversight of system testing activities, but the oversight activities are not sufficient. For example, Bureau reports do not provide comprehensive status information on progress in testing key systems and interfaces, and assessments of the overall status of testing for key operations are not based on quantitative metrics. Further, although the Bureau has issued general testing guidance, it is neither mandatory nor specific enough to ensure consistency in conducting system testing. Without adequate oversight and more comprehensive guidance, the Bureau cannot ensure that it is thoroughly testing its systems and properly prioritizing testing activities before the 2010 Decennial Census, posing the risk that these systems may not perform as planned. |
Under DERP, DOD is required to conduct environmental restoration activities at sites located on former and active defense properties that were contaminated while under its jurisdiction. Program goals include the identification, investigation, research and development, and cleanup of contamination from hazardous substances, pollutants, and contaminants; the correction of other environmental damage (such as detection and disposal of unexploded ordnance) that creates an imminent and substantial endangerment to public health or welfare or the environment; and the demolition and removal of unsafe buildings and structures. Types of environmental contaminants found at military installations include solvents and corrosives; fuels; paint strippers and thinners; metals, such as lead, cadmium, and chromium; and unique military substances, such as nerve agents and unexploded ordnance. DOD has undergone five BRAC rounds, with the most recent occurring in 2005. Under the first four rounds, in 1988, 1991, 1993, and 1995, DOD closed 97 major bases, had 55 major base realignments, and addressed hundreds of minor closures and realignments. DOD reported that the first four BRAC rounds reduced the size of its domestic infrastructure by about 20 percent and generated about $6.6 billion in net annual recurring savings beginning in fiscal year 2001. As a result of the 2005 BRAC decisions, DOD was slated to close an additional 25 major bases, complete 32 major realignments, and complete 755 minor base closures and realignments. When the BRAC decisions were made final in November 2005, the BRAC Commission had projected that the implementation of these decisions would generate over $4 billion in annual recurring net savings beginning in 2011. In accordance with BRAC statutory authority, DOD must complete closure and realignment actions by September 15, 2011—6 years following the date the President transmitted his report on the BRAC recommendations to Congress. Environmental cleanup and property transfer actions associated with BRAC sites can exceed the 6-year time limit, having no deadline for completion. As we have reported in the past, addressing the cleanup of contaminated properties has been a key factor related to delays in transferring unneeded BRAC property to other parties for reuse. DOD officials have told us that they expect environmental cleanup to be less of an impediment for the 2005 BRAC sites since the department now has a more mature cleanup program in place to address environmental contamination on its bases. In assessing potential contamination and determining the degree of cleanup required (on both active and closed bases), DOD must comply with cleanup standards and processes under all applicable environmental laws, regulations, and executive orders. The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA) authorizes the President to conduct or cause to be conducted cleanup actions at sites where there is a release or threatened release of hazardous substances, pollutants or contaminants which may present a threat to public health and the environment. The Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA) amending CERCLA clarified that federal agencies with such sites shall be subject to and comply with CERCLA in the same manner as a private party, and DOD was subsequently delegated response authority for its properties. To respond to potentially contaminated sites on both active and closed bases, DOD generally uses the CERCLA process, which includes the following phases and activities, among others: preliminary assessment, site investigation, remedial investigation and feasibility study, remedial design and remedial action, and long-term monitoring. SARA also required the Secretary of Defense to carry out the Defense Environmental Restoration Program (DERP). Following SARA’s enactment, DOD established DERP, which consists of two key subprograms focused on environmental contamination: (1) the Installation Restoration Program (IRP), which addresses the cleanup of hazardous substances where they were released into the environment prior to October 17, 1986; and (2) the Military Munitions Response Program (MMRP), which addresses the cleanup of munitions, including unexploded ordnance and the contaminants and metals related to munitions, where they were released into the environment prior to September 30, 2002. While DOD is authorized to conduct cleanups of hazardous substances released after 1986 and munitions released after 2002, these activities are not eligible for DERP funds but are instead considered “compliance” cleanups and are typically funded by base operations and maintenance accounts. Once a property is identified for transfer by a BRAC round, DOD’s cleanups are funded by the applicable BRAC account. While SARA had originally required the government to warrant that all necessary cleanup actions had been taken before transferring property to nonfederal ownership, the act was amended in 1996 to allow expedited transfers of contaminated property. Now such property, under some circumstances, can be transferred to nonfederal users before all remedial action has been taken. However, certain conditions must exist before DOD can exercise this early transfer authority; for example, the property must be suitable for the intended reuse and the governor of the state must concur with the transfer. Finally, DOD remains responsible for completing all necessary response action, after which it must warrant that such work has been completed. DOD uses the same method to propose funding for cleanup at active and BRAC sites and FUDS; and cleanup funding is based on DERP goals and is generally proportional to the number of sites in each of these categories. Specifically, officials in the Military Departments, Defense Agencies, and FUDS program who are responsible for environmental restoration at the sites under their jurisdiction formulate cleanup budget proposals based on instructions in DOD’s financial management regulation and DERP environmental restoration performance goals. DOD’s DERP goals include reducing risk to human health and the environment, preparing BRAC properties to be environmentally suitable for transfer, having final remedies in place and completing response actions, and fulfilling other established milestones to demonstrate progress toward meeting program performance goals. DERP goals included target dates representing when the current inventory of active and BRAC sites and FUDS are expected to complete the preliminary assessment and site inspection phases, or achieve the remedy in place or response complete (RIP/RC) milestone. In addition, Congress has required the Secretary of Defense to establish specific performance goals for MMRP sites. Table 1 provides a summary of these goals for the IRP and MMRP. As the table indicates, BRAC sites have no established goals for preliminary assessments or site inspections. For sites included under the first four BRAC rounds, the goal is to reach the RIP/RC milestone at IRP sites by 2015 and at MMRP sites by 2009. For sites included under the 2005 BRAC round, the goal is to reach the RIP/RC milestone at IRP sites by 2014 and at MMRP sites by 2017. DOD’s military components plan cleanup actions that are required to meet these goals at the installation or site level. DOD requires the components to assess their inventory of BRAC and other sites by relative risk to help make informed decisions about which sites to clean up first. Using these relative risk categories, as well as other factors such as stakeholder interest and mission needs, the components set more specific cleanup targets each fiscal year to demonstrate progress and prepare a budget to achieve those goals and targets. The proposed budgets and obligations among site categories are also influenced by the need to fund long-term management activities. While DOD uses the number of sites achieving RIP/RC status as a primary performance metric, sites that have reached this goal may still require long-term management and, therefore, additional funding for a number of years. Table 2 shows the completion status for active and BRAC sites and FUDS, as of the end of fiscal year 2008. Table 3 shows the completion status of BRAC sites and those that require long term management under the IRP, MMRP, and the Building Demolition/Debris Removal Program by military component, for fiscal years 2004 through 2008. DOD data show that, in applying the broad restoration goals, performance goals, and targets, cleanup funding is generally proportional to the number of sites in the active, BRAC, and FUDS site categories. Table 4 shows the total DERP inventory of sites, obligations, and proportions at the end of fiscal year 2008. As the table indicates, the total number of BRAC sites requiring cleanup is about 17 percent of the total number of defense sites, while the $440.2 million obligated to address BRAC sites in fiscal year 2008 is equivalent to about 25 percent of the total funds obligated for cleaning up all defense waste sites. Since DERP was established, approximately $18.4 billion has been obligated for environmental cleanup at individual sites on active military bases, $7.7 billion for cleanup at sites located on installations designated for closure under BRAC, and about $3.7 billion to clean up FUDS sites. During fiscal years 2004 through 2008, about $4.8 billion was spent on cleaning up sites on active bases, $1.8 billion for BRAC sites, and $1.1 billion for FUDS sites. Table 5 provides DOD’s funding obligations for cleanup at BRAC sites by military component and program category for fiscal years 2004 through 2008. Table 6 shows DOD’s estimated cost to complete environmental cleanup for sites located at active installations, BRAC installations, and FUDS under the IRP, MMRP, and the Building Demolition and Debris Removal Program for fiscal years 2004 through 2008. Finally, table 7 shows the total inventory of BRAC sites and the number ranked as high risk in the IRP and MMRP, by military component, for fiscal years 2004 through 2008. Our past work has also identified a number of challenges to DOD’s efforts in undertaking environmental cleanup activities at defense sites, including BRAC sites. For example, we have reported the following: DOD’s preliminary cost estimates for environmental cleanup at specific sites may not reflect the full cost of cleanup. That is, costs are generally expected to increase as more information becomes known about the extent of the cleanup needed at a site to make it safe enough to be reused by others. We reported in 2007 that our experience with prior BRAC rounds had shown that cost estimates tend to increase significantly once more detailed studies and investigations are completed. Environmental cleanup issues are unique to each site. However, we have reported that three key factors can lead to delays in the cleanup and transfer of sites. These factors are (1) technological constraints that limit DOD’s ability to accurately identify, detect, and clean up unexploded ordnance from a particular site, (2) prolonged negotiations between environmental regulators and DOD about the extent to which DOD’s actions are in compliance with environmental regulations and laws, and (3) the discovery of previously undetected environmental contamination that can result in the need for further cleanup, cost increases, and delays in property transfer. In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, while the data indicate that DOD has made progress in cleaning up its contaminated sites, they also show that a significant amount of work remains to be done. Given the large number of sites that DOD must clean up, we recognize that it faces a significant challenge. Addressing this challenge, however, is critical because environmental cleanup has historically been a key impediment to the expeditious transfer of unneeded property to other federal and nonfederal parties who can put the property to new uses. Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be happy to respond to any questions that you or Members of the Subcommittee may have. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this statement. For further information about this testimony, please contact Anu Mittal at (202) 512- 3841 or mittala@gao.gov or John B. Stephenson at (202) 512-3841 or stephensonj@gao.gov. Contributors to this testimony include Elizabeth Beardsley, Antoinette Capaccio, Vincent Price, and John Smith. This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States. The published product may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without further permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this material separately. | Under the Defense Environmental Restoration Program (DERP), the Department of Defense (DOD) is responsible for cleaning up about 5,400 sites on military bases that have been closed under the Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) process, as well as 21,500 sites on active bases and over 4,700 formerly used defense sites (FUDS), properties that DOD owned or controlled and transferred to other parties prior to October 1986. The cleanup of contaminants, such as hazardous chemicals or unexploded ordnance, at BRAC bases has been an impediment to the timely transfer of these properties to parties who can put them to new uses. The goals of DERP include (1) reducing risk to human health and the environment (2) preparing BRAC properties to be environmentally suitable for transfer (3) having final remedies in place and completing response actions and (4) fulfilling other established milestones to demonstrate progress toward meeting program performance goals. This testimony is based on prior work and discusses information on (1) how DOD allocates cleanup funding at all sites with defense waste and (2) BRAC cleanup status. It also summarizes other key issues that GAO has identified in the past that can impact DOD's environmental cleanup efforts. DOD uses the same method to propose funding for cleanup at FUDS, active sites, and BRAC sites; cleanup funding is based on DERP goals and is generally proportional to the number of sites in each of these categories. Officials in the Military Departments, Defense Agencies, and FUDS program, who are responsible for executing the environmental restoration activities at their respective sites, formulate cleanup budget proposals using the instructions in DOD's financial management regulation and DERP environmental restoration performance goals. DERP's goals include target dates for reaching the remedy-in-place or response complete (RIP/RC) milestone. For example, for sites included under the first four BRAC rounds, the goal is to reach the RIP/RC milestone at sites with hazardous substances released before October 1986 by 2015 and for sites in the 2005 BRAC round by 2014. DOD's military components plan cleanup actions that are required to meet DERP goals at the installation or site level. DOD requires the components to assess their inventory of BRAC and other sites by relative risk to help make informed decisions about which sites to clean up first. Using these relative risk categories, as well as other factors, the components set more specific restoration targets each fiscal year to demonstrate progress and prepare a budget to achieve those goals and targets. DOD data show that, in applying the goals, and targets, cleanup funding has generally been proportional to the number of sites in the FUDS, active, and BRAC site categories. For example, the total number of BRAC sites requiring cleanup is about 17 percent of the total number of defense sites requiring cleanup, while the $440.2 million obligated to address BRAC sites in fiscal year 2008 is equivalent to about 25 percent of the total funds obligated for this purpose for all defense waste sites. GAO's past work has also shown that DOD's preliminary cost estimates for cleanup generally tend to rise significantly as more information becomes known about the level of contamination at a specific site. In addition, three factors can lead to delays in cleanup. They are (1) technological constraints that limit DOD's ability to detect and cleanup certain kinds of hazards, (2) prolonged negotiations with environmental regulators on the extent to which DOD's actions are in compliance with regulations and laws, and (3) the discovery of previously unknown hazards that can require additional cleanup, increase costs, and delay transfer of the property. |
The Constitution gives Congress the power of the purse, that is, the power to spend, collect revenue, and borrow. It does not, however, establish procedures by which Congress must consider budget-related legislation. Instead, it states that each chamber may "determine the Rules of its Proceedings." Over time, Congress has therefore developed various rules and practices to govern consideration of budgetary legislation. The basic framework that is used today for congressional consideration of budget policy was established in the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 (the Budget Act). This act provides for the annual adoption of a concurrent resolution on the budget as a mechanism for setting forth aggregate levels of spending, revenue, the surplus or deficit, and public debt. The Budget Act also established standing committees in both chambers of Congress with jurisdiction over, among other things, the concurrent resolution on the budget. This report describes the structure and responsibilities of the Committee on the Budget in the House of Representatives. The rules of the House require that the Budget Committee's membership be composed of five members from the Committee on Ways and Means, five members from the Committee on Appropriations, and one member from the Committee on Rules. In addition, House rules require that the committee include one member designated by the majority party leadership and one member designated by the minority party leadership. The Committee on Ways and Means exercises sole jurisdiction over revenue-raising matters, and the Appropriations Committee exercises sole jurisdiction over discretionary spending. Granting these committees guaranteed representation on the Budget Committee provides them with an avenue for continuing involvement with decisions affecting their committee's jurisdiction. The Congressional Budget Act originally provided for 23 members to serve on the Budget Committee. Over time, the number of Budget Committee members has varied, and is currently 39. Under House rules, members of the House Budget Committee may not serve more than four in any six successive Congresses. Originally, the Budget Act limited service on the Budget Committee to two in any five successive Congresses. The rotating and representational membership on the Budget Committee affords Members of the House an increased level of participation in the activities of the Budget Committee. The House Democratic Caucus outlines additional term limits for its members serving on the House Budget Committee. Its rules state that no Member, other than the Member designated by leadership, shall serve more than three Congresses in any period of five successive congresses. The House Republican Conference has no comparable rule. Both Democrats and Republicans designate the Budget Committee as a nonexclusive committee. In general, this means that besides the House rule restricting any Member from serving on more than two standing committees, few restrictions apply to Budget Committee members regarding their other committee assignments. Although the Budget Act does not prohibit the creation of subcommittees, the Budget Committee has never had them. The committee, however, sometimes establishes ad hoc task forces to study specific issues. For example, there have been task forces on such subjects as entitlements, tax policy, economic policy, and budget reform. The jurisdiction of the House Budget Committee is derived from the Budget Act as well as House Rule X. This jurisdiction is protected under the Budget Act, which states that no bill, resolution, amendment, motion, or conference report dealing with any matter within the jurisdiction of the Budget Committee shall be considered in the House unless it is a bill or resolution that has been reported by the Budget Committee or unless it is an amendment to a bill or resolution reported by the Budget Committee. House Rule X, clause 1(d) states that the Budget Committee will have jurisdiction over the concurrent resolution on the budget; other matters required to be referred to it pursuant to the Budget Act; establishment, extension, and enforcement of special controls over the federal budget; and the budget process generally. Over the years, the duties and responsibilities of the Budget Committee have been established in statute, as well as House Rules. This report discusses the Budget Committee's responsibilities under the following categories: the budget resolution, reconciliation, budget process reform, oversight of the Congressional Budget Office, revisions of allocations and adjustments, and scorekeeping. The Budget Committee is responsible for developing the annual budget resolution. The budget resolution is a mechanism for setting forth aggregate levels of spending, revenue, the deficit or surplus, and public debt. Its purpose is to create enforceable parameters within which Congress can consider legislation dealing with spending and revenue. The budget resolution also often includes other matters such as reconciliation directives or procedures necessary to carry out the Budget Act. The Budget Committee can use the budget resolution as a means for initiating changes in tax and spending policy, but the other House committees having jurisdiction over those issues would be responsible for any legislation that would implement those changes. So rather than drafting program- or agency-oriented legislation as most other committees do, the Budget Committee, similar to the House Rules Committee, devotes most of its time to developing the parameters within which the House may consider legislation. In developing the budget resolution, the Budget Committee examines a budget outlook report that includes baseline budget projections presented to Congress by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO). The Budget Committee also receives and examines the budget request submitted by the President, and then holds hearings at which they hear testimony from officials who justify and explain the President's budget recommendations. These include the Director of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), the Chair of the Federal Reserve Board, and secretaries of each department, as well as other presidential advisors. In addition, CBO issues a report that analyzes the President's budget and compares it to CBO's own economic and technical assumptions. The Budget Committee also gathers information from the other committees of the House. The Budget Committee holds hearings at which individual Members testify. In addition, Committees each submit their "views and estimates" to the Budget Committee, providing information on the preferences and legislative plans of that committee regarding budget matters within its jurisdiction. These "views and estimates" must include an estimate of the total amount of new budget authority and budget outlays for federal programs that are anticipated for all bills and resolutions within the committee's jurisdiction that will be effective during that fiscal year. House rules require that committees submit "views and estimates" to the Budget Committee within six weeks of the President's budget submission or at such time as the Budget Committee may request. During deliberation on the budget resolution, it has been the policy of the Budget Committee to use as a starting point the baseline data prepared by CBO. The Budget Committee then develops and marks up the budget resolution before reporting it to the full House. In marking up the budget resolution, the Budget Committee first considers budget aggregates, functional categories, and other appropriate matter, allowing the offering of amendments. During mark-up, the Budget Committee allows subsequent amendments to be offered to aggregates, functional categories, or other appropriate matters, even if they have already been amended in their entirety. Following adoption of the aggregates, functional categories, and other appropriate matter, the text of the budget resolution is considered for amendment. At the completion of this, a final vote on reporting the budget resolution occurs. Because the budget resolution is a concurrent resolution, once the House and Senate each adopt their own version of the budget resolution, they typically agree to go to conference to reconcile the differences between the two versions. Members of the Budget Committee represent the House in these inter-chamber negotiations. Upon agreement on a conference report, a joint explanatory statement is written to accompany the report. Within this joint explanatory statement are allocations required under Section 302(a) of the Budget Act that establish spending limits for each committee. The text of the budget resolution establishes congressional priorities by dividing spending among the 20 major functional categories of the federal budget. These 20 functional categories do not correspond to the committee jurisdictions under which the House or Senate operate. As a result, the spending levels in the 20 functional categories must subsequently be allocated to the committees having jurisdiction over spending. These totals are referred to as 302(a) allocations and hold committees accountable for staying within the spending limits established by the budget resolution. Members of the conference committee and their staff work to determine appropriate 302(a) allocations to be included in the joint explanatory statement accompanying the conference report on the budget resolution. Budget resolutions sometimes include reconciliation instructions that instruct committees to develop legislation that will change current revenue or direct spending laws to conform with policies established in the budget resolution. The Budget Committee can choose to include this in the budget resolution that they report to the full chamber. If the adopted budget resolution does include reconciliation instructions, committees respond by drafting legislative language to meet their specified targets. The Budget Committee is responsible for packaging "without any substantive revision" the legislative language recommended by committees into one or more reconciliation bills. If only a single committee is instructed to recommend reconciliation changes, then those changes are reported directly to the chamber without packaging by the Budget Committee. The Budget Committee is not permitted to revise substantively the reconciliation legislation as recommended by the instructed committees, even if a committee's recommendations do not reach the dollar levels in the reconciliation instructions included in the budget resolution. The Budget Committee, however, may sometimes collaborate with House leadership to develop alternatives that may be offered as floor amendments to the reconciliation bill. Since 1995, House Rules have provided that the Budget Committee shall have jurisdiction over the budget process generally. This includes studying on a continuing basis proposals to improve or reform the budget process, including both singular and comprehensive changes to the budget process. These rule changes can be proposed as a provision in the budget resolution, or as a separate measure. When considering budget reform, the Budget Committee may create a task force (the Budget Committee does not have subcommittees, but sometimes creates ad hoc task forces to address specific issues) to research potential reform issues. The task force may hold hearings where they listen to testimony from current and past Members of Congress, as well as representatives from the Administration, to help determine the need for reform. For example, during the 105 th Congress the Budget Committee created a Task Force on Budget Process, also known as the Nussle-Cardin Task Force, that examined budget reform issues. This task force held hearings and eventually released several recommendations, including making the budget resolution a joint resolution. Although budget process reform measures or budget resolutions may include provisions that have an impact on House rules, jurisdiction over the rules of the House is under the Rules Committee. The Budget Act specifically provides that a budget resolution reported from the Budget Committee that includes any matter or procedure that would change any rule of the House would trigger a referral to the House Rules Committee. In addition to creating the House and Senate Budget Committees, the Budget Act also established the Congressional Budget Office. House rules state that the Budget Committee shall be responsible for oversight of the CBO. Specifically, the rules state that the Committee shall review on a continuing basis the conduct by the CBO of its functions and duties. This oversight can include hearings at which CBO's practices are examined. For example, during the 107 th Congress the House Budget Committee held a hearing titled, "CBO Role and Performance: Enhancing Accuracy, Reliability, and Responsiveness in Budget and Economic Estimates." The Budget Committee also plays a role in the selection of the Director of CBO. The Budget Act states that the Speaker of the House and the President pro tempore of the Senate shall appoint the Director of the CBO after receiving recommendations from the House and Senate Budget Committees. Provisions in individual budget resolutions, as well as the Budget Act, grant the Budget Chair (not the entire Budget Committee) the authority to revise or adjust budget levels and other matters included in the annual budget resolution in certain circumstances. For instance, Congress frequently includes provisions referred to as "reserve funds" in the annual budget resolution, which provide the chairs of the House and Senate Budget Committees the authority to adjust committee spending allocations if certain conditions are met. Typically these conditions consist of a committee reporting legislation dealing with a particular policy or an amendment dealing with that policy being offered on the floor. Once this action has taken place, the Budget Committee Chair submits the adjustment to his respective chamber. Reserve funds frequently require that the net budgetary impact of the specified legislation be deficit neutral. Deficit-neutral reserve funds provide that a committee may report legislation with spending in excess of its allocations, but require the excess amounts be offset by equivalent reductions elsewhere. The Budget Committee Chair may then increase the committee spending allocations by the appropriate amounts to prevent a point of order under Section 302 of the Budget Act. The Budget Committee Chair is also authorized to make adjustments to the budget resolution levels under the "fungibility rule." The "fungibility rule" applies when a committee has been instructed through reconciliation directions to develop legislation that will change both revenue and direct spending laws to conform with policies established in the budget resolution. Under this rule, the Budget Committee Chair is then authorized to submit for printing in the Congressional Record appropriate changes in budget resolution levels, and committee spending allocations. The Budget Act also allows for further revisions to the budget resolution. For more information on revisions and adjustments related to the budget process, see CRS Report RL33122, Congressional Budget Resolutions: Revisions and Adjustments , by [author name scrubbed]. The Budget Committee is responsible for making summary budget scorekeeping reports available to the Members of the House on at least a monthly basis. Scorekeeping is the process of measuring the budgetary effects of pending and enacted legislation against the levels recommended in the budget resolution, in general to determine if proposed legislation would violate the levels set forth in the budget resolution. If a Member raises a point of order that legislation or an amendment being considered on the floor violates fiscal limits, the Parliamentarian relies on the estimates provided by the Budget Committee in the form of scorekeeping reports to advise the presiding officer regarding whether the legislative matter is out of order. Similarly, if a member raises a point of order that legislation or an amendment violates Rule XXI, clause 10, known as the PAYGO rule, the Parliamentarian relies on estimates provided by the Budget Committee. The Budget Committee played a similar role under certain expired budget enforcement statutes such as the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 (also known as the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act) and the Budget Enforcement Act of 1990. To assist the Budget Committee in scorekeeping, the Director of CBO is required to issue an up-to-date tabulation of congressional budget action to the Budget Committees on at least a monthly basis. Specifically, this report details and tabulates the progress of congressional action on bills and joint resolutions providing new budget authority or providing an increase or decrease in revenues or tax expenditures for each fiscal year covered by the budget resolution. It has been the policy of the Budget Committee that its scorekeeping reports be prepared by the Budget Committee staff, transmitted to the Speaker in the form of a Parliamentarian's Status Report, and printed in the Congressional Record . | The basic framework that is used today for congressional consideration of budget policy was established in the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974. This act provides for the annual adoption of a concurrent resolution on the budget as a mechanism for setting forth aggregate levels of spending, revenue, and public debt. The act also established standing committees in both chambers of Congress with jurisdiction over, among other things, the concurrent resolution on the budget. This report describes the structure and responsibilities of the Committee on the Budget in the House of Representatives. House and party rules specify the composition of the committee's membership and also stipulate that most members of the House Budget Committee may not serve more than four in any six successive Congresses. Unlike most other committees, the Budget Committee does not have subcommittees. Instead, the committee sometimes establishes ad hoc task forces to study specific issues. In addition to committee structure, this report covers the House Budget Committee's responsibilities divided into categories related to the annual budget resolution, reconciliation, budget process reform, oversight of the Congressional Budget Office, revisions and adjustments of allocations, and scorekeeping. This report will be updated as needed. |
According to the Federal Trade Commission, identity theft is the most common complaint from consumers in all 50 states, and accounts for over 35% of the total number of complaints the Identity Theft Data Clearinghouse received for calendar years 2004, 2005, and 2006. In calendar year 2006, of the 674,354 complaints received, 246,035 or 36% were identity theft complaints. The identity theft victim's information was misused for credit card fraud in 25% of the identity theft complaints; for phone or utilities fraud in 16% of the identity theft complaints; for bank fraud in 16% of the identity theft complaints; for employment-related fraud in 14% of the identity theft complaints; for government documents or benefits fraud in 5% of the identity theft complaints; for loan fraud in 5% of the identity theft complaints; and other types of identity theft fraud made up 24% of the complaints. As a result of identity theft, victims may incur damaged credit records, unauthorized charges on credit cards, and unauthorized withdrawals from bank accounts. Sometimes, victims must change their telephone numbers or even their social security numbers. Victims may also need to change addresses that were falsified by the impostor. With media reports of data security breaches increasing, concerns about new cases of identity theft are widespread. This report provides an overview of the federal laws that could assist victims of identity theft with purging inaccurate information from their credit records and removing unauthorized charges from credit accounts, as well as federal laws that impose criminal penalties on those who assume another person's identity through the use of fraudulent identification documents. This report will be updated as warranted. While not exclusively aimed at consumer identity theft, the Identity Theft Assumption Deterrence Act prohibits fraud in connection with identification documents under a variety of circumstances. Certain offenses under the statute relate directly to consumer identity theft, and impostors could be prosecuted under the statute. For example, the statute makes it a federal crime, under certain circumstances, to knowingly and without lawful authority produce an identification document, authentication feature , or false identification document; or to knowingly possess an identification document that is or appears to be an identification document of the United States which is stolen or produced without lawful authority knowing that such document was stolen or produced without such authority. It is also a federal crime to knowingly transfer or use, without lawful authority, a means of identification of another person with the intent to commit, or aid or abet, any unlawful activity that constitutes a violation of federal law, or that constitutes a felony under any applicable state or local law. The punishment for offenses involving fraud related to identification documents varies depending on the specific offense and the type of document involved. For example, a fine or imprisonment of up to 15 years may be imposed for using the identification of another person with the intent to commit any unlawful activity under state law, if, as a result of the offense, the person committing the offense obtains anything of value totaling $1,000 or more during any one-year period. Other offenses carry terms of imprisonment up to three years. However, if the offense is committed to facilitate a drug trafficking crime or in connection with a crime of violence, the term of imprisonment could be up to twenty years. Offenses committed to facilitate an action of international terrorism are punishable by terms of imprisonment up to twenty-five years. The Identity Theft Penalty Enhancement Act was signed on July 15, 2004, ( P.L. 108-275 ). The act amends Title 18 of the United States Code to define and establish penalties for aggravated identity theft and makes changes to the existing identity theft provisions of Title 18. Under the law, aggravated identity theft occurs when a person "knowingly transfers, possess, or uses, without lawful authority, a means of identification of another person" during and in relation to the commission of certain enumerated felonies. The penalty for aggravated identity theft is a term of imprisonment of two years in addition to the punishment provided for the original felony committed. Offenses committed in conjunction with certain terrorism offenses are subject to an additional term of imprisonment of five years. The act also directs the United States Sentencing Commission to "review and amend its guidelines and its policy statements to ensure that the guideline offense levels and enhancements appropriately punish identity theft offenses involving an abuse of position" adhering to certain requirements outlined in the legislation. In addition to increasing penalties for identity theft, the act authorized appropriations to the Justice Department "for the investigation and prosecution of identity theft and related credit card and other fraud cases constituting felony violations of law, $2,000,000 for FY2005 and $2,000,000 for each of the 4 succeeding fiscal years." While the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) does not directly address identity theft, it could offer victims assistance in having negative information resulting from unauthorized charges or accounts removed from their credit files. The purpose of the FCRA is "to require that consumer reporting agencies adopt reasonable procedures for meeting the needs of commerce for consumer credit, personnel, insurance, and other information in a manner which is fair and equitable to the consumer, with regard to the confidentiality, accuracy, relevancy, and proper utilization of such information." The FCRA outlines a consumer's rights in relation to his or her credit report, as well as permissible uses for credit reports and disclosure requirements. In addition, the FCRA imposes a duty on consumer reporting agencies to ensure that the information they report is accurate, and requires persons who furnish information to ensure that the information they furnish is accurate. The FCRA allows consumers to file suit for violations of the act, which could include the disclosure of inaccurate information about a consumer by a credit reporting agency. A consumer who is a victim of identity theft could file suit against a credit reporting agency for the agency's failure to verify the accuracy of information contained in the report and the agency's disclosure of inaccurate information as a result of the consumer's stolen identity. Under the FCRA, as recently amended, a consumer may file suit not later than the earlier of two years after the date of discovery by the plaintiff of the violation that is the basis for such liability, or five years after the date on which the violation occurred. The FACT Act, signed on December 4, 2003, includes, inter alia , a number of amendments to the Fair Credit Reporting Act aimed at preventing identity theft and assisting victims. Generally, these new provisions mirror laws passed by state legislatures and create a national standard for addressing consumer concerns with regard to identity theft and other types of fraud. Credit card issuers, who operate as users of consumer credit reports, are required, under a new provision of the FCRA, to follow certain procedures when the issuer receives a request for an additional or replacement card within a short period of time following notification of a change of address for the same account. In a further effort to prevent identity theft, other new provisions require the truncation of credit card account numbers on electronically printed receipts, and, upon request, the truncation of social security numbers on credit reports provided to a consumer. Consumers who have been victims of identity theft, or expect that they may become victims, are now able to have fraud alerts placed in their files. Pursuant to the new provisions, a consumer may request a fraud alert from one consumer reporting agency and that agency is required to notify the other nationwide consumer reporting agencies of the existence of the alert. In general, fraud alerts are to be maintained in the file for 90 days, but a consumer may request an extended alert which is maintained for up to seven years. The fraud alert becomes a part of the consumer's credit file and is thus passed along to all users of the report. The alert must also be included with any credit score generated using the consumer's file, and must be referred to other consumer reporting agencies. In addition to the fraud alert, victims of identity theft may also have information resulting from the crime blocked from their credit reports. After the receipt of appropriate proof of the identity of the consumer, a copy of an identity theft report, the identification of the alleged fraudulent information, and a statement by the consumer that the information is not information relating to any transaction conducted by the consumer, a consumer reporting agency must block all such information from being reported and must notify the furnisher of the information in question that it may be the result of identity theft. Requests for the blocking of information must also be referred to other consumer reporting agencies. Victims of identity theft are also allowed to request information about the alleged crime. A business entity is required, upon request and subject to verification of the victim's identity, to provide copies of application and business transaction records evidencing any transaction alleged to be a result of identity theft to the victim or to any law enforcement agency investigating the theft and authorized by the victim to take receipt of the records in question. The Fair Credit Billing Act (FCBA) is not an identity theft statute per se , but it does provide consumers with an opportunity to receive an explanation and proof of charges that may have been made by an impostor and to have unauthorized charges removed from their accounts. The purpose of the FCBA is "to protect the consumer against inaccurate and unfair credit billing and credit card practices." The law defines and establishes a procedure for resolving billing errors in consumer credit transactions. For purposes of the FCBA, a "billing error" includes unauthorized charges, charges for goods or services not accepted by the consumer or delivered to the consumer, and charges for which the consumer has asked for an explanation or written proof of purchase. Under the FCBA, consumers are able to file a claim with the creditor to have billing errors resolved. Until the alleged billing error is resolved, the consumer is not required to pay the disputed amount, and the creditor may not attempt to collect, any part of the disputed amount, including related finance charges or other charges. The act sets forth dispute resolution procedures and requires an investigation into the consumer's claims. If the creditor determines that the alleged billing error did occur, the creditor is obligated to correct the billing error and credit the consumer's account with the disputed amount and any applicable finance charges. Similar to the Fair Credit Billing Act, the Electronic Fund Transfer Act is not an identity theft statute per se , but it does provide consumers with a mechanism for challenging unauthorized transactions and having their accounts recredited in the event of an error. The purpose of the Electronic Fund Transfer Act (EFTA) is to "provide a basic framework establishing the rights, liabilities, and responsibilities of participants in electronic fund transfer systems." Among other things, the EFTA limits a consumer's liability for unauthorized electronic fund transfers. If the consumer notifies the financial institution within two business days after learning of the loss or theft of a debt card or other device used to make electronic transfers, the consumer's liability is limited to the lesser of $50 or the amount of the unauthorized transfers that occurred before notice was given to the financial institution. Additionally, financial institutions are required to provide a consumer with documentation of all electronic fund transfers initiated by the consumer from an electronic terminal. If a financial institution receives, within 60 days after providing such documentation, an oral or written notice from the consumer indicating the consumer's belief that the documentation provided contains an error, the financial institution must investigate the alleged error, determine whether an error has occurred, and report or mail the results of the investigation and determination to the consumer within 10 business days. The notice from the consumer to the financial institution must identify the name and account number of the consumer; indicate the consumer's belief that the documentation contains an error and the amount of the error; and set forth the reasons for the consumer's belief that an error has occurred. In the event that the financial institution determines that an error has occurred, the financial institution must correct the error within one day of the determination in accordance with the provisions relating to the consumer's liability for unauthorized charges. The financial institution may provisionally recredit the consumer's account for the amount alleged to be in error pending the conclusion of its investigation and its determination of whether an error has occurred, if it is unable to complete the investigation within 10 business days. The President's Identity Theft Task Force reported its final recommendations April 2007, and recommended a plan that is intended to harness government resources to crack down on the criminals who traffic in stolen identities, strengthen efforts to protect the personal information, help law enforcement officials investigate and prosecute identity thieves, help educate consumers and businesses about protecting themselves, and increase the safeguards on personal data entrusted to federal agencies and private entities. The Plan focuses on improvements in four key areas: keeping sensitive consumer data from identity thieves through better data security and education; making it more difficult for identity thieves who obtain consumer data; assisting the victims of identity theft in recovering from the crime; and deterring identity theft by more aggressive prosecution and punishment. Several recommendations made by the Task Force are aimed at closing the gaps in federal criminal statutes used to prosecute identity theft-related offenses to ensure increased federal prosecution. They are as follows: Amend the identity theft and aggravated identity theft statutes to ensure that identity thieves who misappropriate information belonging to corporations and organizations can be prosecuted Add new crimes to the list of predicate offenses for aggravated identity theft offenses Amend the statute that criminalizes the theft of electronic data by eliminating the current requirement that the information must have been stolen through interstate communications Penalize creators and distributors of malicious spyware and keyloggers Amend the cyber-extortion statute to cover additional, alternate types of cyber-extortion Ensure that an identity thief's sentence can be enhanced when the criminal conduct affects more than one victim In accordance with the REAL ID Act of 2005, on January 11, 2008, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) published the final rule for State-issued driver's licenses and identification cards that federal agencies would accept for official purposes on or after May 11, 2008, in accordance with the REAL ID Act of 2005. The Real ID Rule establishes standards to meet the minimum requirements of the REAL ID Act. These standards involve a number of aspects of the process used to issue identification documents, including information and security features that must be incorporated into each card; proof of identity and U.S. citizenship or legal status of an applicant; verification of the source documents provided by an applicant; and security standards for the offices that issue licenses and identification cards. All states submitting requests will receive extensions until December 31, 2009. In addition, states that meet certain benchmarks for the security of their credentials and licensing and identification processes will be able to obtain a second extension until May 10, 2011. The Rule extends the enrollment time period to allow states determined by DHS to be in compliance with the act to replace all licenses intended for official purpose with REAL ID-compliant cards by December 1, 2014, for people born after December 1, 1964, and by December 1, 2017, for those born on or before December 1, 1964. The rule is effective March 31, 2008. | According to the Federal Trade Commission, identity theft is the most common complaint from consumers in all fifty states, and complaints regarding identity theft have grown for seven consecutive years. Victims of identity theft may incur damaged credit records, unauthorized charges on credit cards, and unauthorized withdrawals from bank accounts. Sometimes, victims must change their telephone numbers or even their social security numbers. Victims may also need to change addresses that were falsified by the impostor. This report provides an overview of the federal laws that could assist victims of identity theft with purging inaccurate information from their credit records and removing unauthorized charges from credit accounts, as well as federal laws that impose criminal penalties on those who assume another person's identity through the use of fraudulent identification documents. This report will be updated as events warrant. |
Network-centric warfare (NCW), also known as network-centric operations (NCO), is a key element of defense transformation. NCW focuses on using computers, high-speed data links, and networking software to link military personnel, platforms, and formations into highly integrated local and wide-area networks. Within these networks, personnel are to share large amounts of information on a rapid and continuous basis. The Department of Defense (DOD) and the Navy view NCW as a key element of defense transformation that will dramatically improve combat capability and efficiency. The Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC) system links Navy ships and aircraft operating in a particular area into a single, integrated air-defense network in which radar data collected by each platform is transmitted on a real-time (i.e., instantaneous) basis to the other units in the network. Units in the network share a common, composite, real-time air-defense picture. CEC will permit a ship to shoot air-defense missiles at incoming anti-ship missiles that the ship itself cannot see, using radar targeting data gathered by other units in the network. It will also permit air-defense missiles fired by one ship to be guided by other ships or aircraft. The Navy wants to install the system on aircraft carriers, Aegis-equipped cruisers and destroyers, selected amphibious ships, and E-2C Hawkeye carrier-based airborne early warning aircraft over the next several years. The system has potential for being extended to include Army and Air Force systems. Tests of CEC aboard Navy ships in 1998 revealed significant interoperability (i.e., compatibility) problems between CEC's software and the software of the air-defense systems on some ships. In response, the Navy undertook a major effort to identify, understand, and fix the problems. The CEC system, with the new fixes, passed its technical evaluation (TECHEVAL) testing in February and March 2001 and final operational evaluation (OPEVAL) testing in April and May 2001. In 2002, the primary CEC contractor, Raytheon, faced potential competition from two firms—Lockheed and a small firm called Solipsys—for developing the next version of CEC, called CEC Block II. Solipsys had devised an alternative technical approach to CEC, called the Tactical Component Network (TCN). Solipsys entered into a teaming arrangement with Lockheed to offer TCN to the Navy as the technical approach for Block II. In late-December 2002, Raytheon announced that it had agreed to purchase Solipsys. In early-February 2003, Raytheon and Lockheed announced that they had formed a team to compete for the development of Block II. Some observers expressed concern that these developments would reduce the Navy's ability to use competition in its acquisition strategy for Block II. As an apparent means of preserving competition, the Navy in mid-2003 announced that it would incorporate open-architecture standards into Block II divide the Block II development effort into a series of smaller contracts for which various firms might be able to submit bids. In December 2003, however, the Navy canceled plans for developing Block II in favor of a new plan for developing a joint-service successor to Block I. The conference report ( H.Rept. 108-283 , page 290) on the FY2004 defense appropriations act ( H.R. 2658 / P.L. 108-87 ) directed the Navy to keep the Appropriations committees informed on potential changes to the CEC Block II acquisition strategy and stated that, if the Navy adopts a new acquisition strategy, "the additional funds provided in this act for CEC Block 2 may be merged with and be available for purposes similar to the purposes for which appropriated." The House and Senate Armed Services Committees, in their reports ( H.Rept. 109-89 , page 178, and S.Rept. 109-69 , pages 108-109, respectively) on the FY2006 defense authorization bill ( H.R. 1815 / S. 1042 ), expressed satisfaction with the Navy's efforts to improve interoperability between the CEC system and other combat direction systems and ended a requirement established in the conference report ( H.Rept. 105-736 ) on the FY1999 defense authorization act ( P.L. 105-261 ) for the Navy to report to Congress on these efforts on a quarterly basis. The Naval Integrated Fire Control-Counter Air (NIFC-CA) system is to combine the CEC system with the E-2D Advanced Hawkeye carrier-based airborne radar and control system (AWACS) aircraft and the SM-6 version of the ship-based Standard air defense missile (both now in development) to expand the Navy's networked air-defense capabilities out to the full range of the SM-6 missile. Among other things, NIFC-CA will enable Navy forces at sea to provide overland defense against enemy cruise missiles. Current Navy plans call for NIFC-CA to be partially deployed in FY2011 and fully deployed in 2014. IT-21, which stands for Information Technology for the 21 st Century, is the Navy's investment strategy for procuring the desktop computers, data links, and networking software needed to establish an intranet for transmitting tactical and administrative data within and between Navy ships. The IT-21 network uses commercial, off-the-shelf (COTS) desktop computers and networking software that provide a multimedia organizational intranet. The Navy believes IT-21 will improve U.S. naval warfighting capability and achieve substantial cost reductions by significantly reducing the time and number of people required to carry out various tactical and administrative functions. FY2008 funding requested for IT-21 "continues to provide Integrated Shipboard Network Systems (Increment 1) procurement and installation to achieve a Full Operational Capability (FOC) for all platforms by FY2011." FORCEnet is the Navy's overall approach for linking various networks that contribute to naval NCW into a single capstone information network for U.S. naval forces. The Navy has highlighted FORCEnet as being at the center of Sea Power 21, the Navy's vision statement for the future. The Navy states that "Undersea FORCEnet Satellite Communications (SATCOM) FY2008 funding provides the Internet Protocol (IP) connectivity between Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) platforms to conduct collaborative ASW. Connecting the platforms for collaborative ASW enables sharing of time critical queuing, classification, and targeting data, provides a means for precluding blue-on-blue engagement, and ensures rapid positioning of ASW platforms into the best attack posture to prosecute the threat submarine." Some observers have criticized FORCEnet for being insufficiently defined. The Naval Network Warfare Command issued a functional concept document for FORCEnet in February 2005, but Navy officials acknowledged at the time that the concept was not yet adequately defined and stated that an improved version of the document would be published in 2006. The conference report ( H.Rept. 107-732 ) on the FY2003 defense appropriations bill ( H.R. 5010 / P.L. 107-248 ) expressed concern about "the lack of specificity and documentation on the program," and directed the Navy to submit a detailed report on it by May 1, 2003 (page 279). The Senate Appropriations Committee, in its report ( S.Rept. 108-87 , page 156) on the FY2004 defense appropriations bill ( S. 1382 ), expressed support for the FORCEnet program but also said it "is concerned that no requirements have been approved or implemented and that there is duplication of effort, especially in the areas of experimentation and demonstrations. The Committee directs that the FORCEnet program establish these requirements, test them within the Navy Warfighting Experimentations and Demonstrations line (PE0603758N), and release the approved requirements changes as quickly as possible." A significant program related to NCW is the Navy-Marine Corps Intranet (NMCI), which is a corporate-style intranet linking more than 300 Navy and Marine Corps shore installations. NMCI is to include a total 344,000 computer work stations, or "seats." As of January 2006, the Navy had ordered 341,000 seats and fully implemented about 264,000. The Navy planned to achieve steady-state operation of all NMCI seats during FY2007. In October 2000, the Navy awarded an industry team led by Electronic Data Systems (EDS) Corporation an $6.9-billion, five-year contract for installing, supporting, and periodically upgrading the NMCI. In October 2002, Congress, through P.L. 107-254 , authorized a two-year extension to this contract, which is now worth $8.9 billion. Congress has closely followed the program for several years. The NMCI implementation effort has experienced a number of challenges and delays. A 2005 report from DOD's weapons-testing office identified problems found with the program in 2003. On September 30, 2004, the Navy and EDS restructured the terms of the NMCI contract to consolidate the number of performance measures and focus on measuring results rather than implementation steps. User reaction to the system reportedly has been mixed. A December 2006 Government Accountability office (GAO) report on NMCI stated: NMCI has not met its two strategic goals—to provide information superiority and to foster innovation via interoperability and shared services. Navy developed a performance plan in 2000 to measure and report progress towards these goals, but did not implement it because the program was more focused on deploying seats and measuring contractor performance against contractually specified incentives than determining whether the strategic mission outcomes used to justify the program were met. GAO's analysis of available performance data, however, showed that the Navy had met only 3 of 20 performance targets (15 percent) associated with the program's goals and nine related performance categories. By not implementing its performance plan, the Navy has invested, and risks continuing to invest heavily, in a program that is not subject to effective performance management and has yet to produce expected results. GAO's analysis also showed that the contractor's satisfaction of NMCI service level agreements (contractually specified performance expectations) has been mixed. Since September 2004, while a significant percentage of agreements have been met for all types of seats, others have not consistently been met, and still others have generally not been met. Navy measurement of agreement satisfaction shows that performance needed to receive contractual incentive payments for the most recent 5-month period was attained for about 55 to 59 percent of all eligible seats, which represents a significant drop from the previous 9-month period. GAO's analysis and the Navy's measurement of agreement satisfaction illustrate the need for effective performance management, to include examining agreement satisfaction from multiple perspectives to target needed corrective actions and program changes. GAO analysis further showed that NMCI's three customer groups (end users, commanders, and network operators) vary in their satisfaction with the program. More specifically, end user satisfaction surveys indicated that the percent of end users that met the Navy's definition of a satisfied user has remained consistently below the target of 85 percent (latest survey results categorize 74 percent as satisfied). Given that the Navy's definition of the term "satisfied" includes many marginally satisfied and arguably somewhat dissatisfied users, this percentage represents the best case depiction of end user satisfaction. Survey responses from the other two customer groups show that both were not satisfied. GAO interviews with customers at shipyards and air depots also revealed dissatisfaction with NMCI. Without satisfied customers, the Navy will be challenged in meeting program goals. To improve customer satisfaction, the Navy identified various initiatives that it described as completed, under way, or planned. However, the initiatives are not being guided by a documented plan(s), thus limiting their potential effectiveness. This means that after investing about 6 years and $3.7 billion, NMCI has yet to meet expectations, and whether it will is still unclear. Department of Defense officials conceded problems with the implementation of NMCI at a March 28, 2007, hearing before the Terrorism and Unconventional Threats and Capabilities subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee. Potential issues for Congress include the following: Is the Navy's implementation of NMCI adequate? To what degree is the system achieving its goals? Does the Navy have a clear and adequate acquisition strategy for developing a successor to CEC Block I? Is the FORCEnet concept adequately defined? Is the Navy taking sufficient actions for preventing, detecting, and responding to attacks on NCW computer networks? Is the Navy taking sufficient steps to provide adequate satellite bandwidth capacity to support NCW? Are Navy efforts to develop new tactics, doctrine, and organizations to take full advantage of NCW sufficient? Has the Navy taken the concept of NCW adequately into account in planning its future fleet architecture? What effect will implementation of NCW in U.S. and allied navies have on U.S.-allied naval interoperability? | Programs for implementing network-centric warfare (NCW) in the Navy include the Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC) and Naval Integrated Fire Control-Counter Air (NIFC-CA) systems, the IT-21 program, and FORCEnet. A related program is the Navy-Marine Corps Intranet (NMCI). Congress has expressed concern for some of these programs, particularly NMCI. This report will be updated as events warrant. |
The mission of INS, an agency of the Department of Justice, is to administer and enforce the immigration laws of the United States. To accomplish its mission, INS has three interrelated business areas— enforcement, immigration services, and corporate (i.e., mission-support) services. Enforcement includes border inspections of persons entering the United States, detecting and preventing smuggling and illegal entry, and identifying and removing illegal entrants. Immigration services include granting legal permanent residence status, nonimmigrant status (e.g. students and tourists), and naturalization. INS efforts to protect our nation’s borders are performed under both of these core mission areas. Corporate services include functions such as financial and human capital management. INS’ field structure consists of 3 regional offices, 4 regional service centers, 3 administrative centers, 36 district offices, 21 Border Patrol sectors, and more than 300 land, sea, and air ports of entry. To carry out its responsibilities, INS relies on IT. For example, the Integrated Surveillance Intelligence System (ISIS) is to provide “24 by 7” border coverage through ground-based sensors, fixed cameras, and computer-aided detection capabilities. Also the Student Exchange Visitor Information System (SEVIS) is to manage information about nonimmigrant foreign students and exchange visitors from schools and exchange programs. Each year INS invests, on average, about $300 million in IT systems, infrastructure, and services. Recent studies have identified significant weaknesses in INS’ management of IT projects. In August 1998, the Logistics Management Institute (LMI) reported that INS did not track and manage projects to a set of cost, schedule, technical, and benefit baselines. LMI noted that while INS had defined good procedures for developing systems, it did not consistently follow them. Similarly, in July 1999, the Justice Inspector General (IG) reported that INS was not adequately managing its IT systems. In particular, the IG reported that (1) estimated completion dates for some IT projects had been delayed without explanation, (2) project costs continued to spiral upward with no justification for how funds are spent, and (3) projects were nearing completion with no assurance that they would meet performance and functional requirements. In light of the reported problems on individual projects, we reviewed INS’ institutional approach to managing IT to determine the root cause of project problems and to provide the basis for recommending fundamental management reform. In doing so, we focused on two key and closely related IT management process controls: investment management and enterprise architecture management. In August 2000 and December 2000, we reported that INS lacked both of these management process controls because the former agency leadership had not viewed either as an institutional priority. We also provided INS, through our recommenda- tions, a roadmap for establishing and implementing both controls. INS agreed with our findings and recommendations, and it committed to implementing the recommendations. Although INS has made progress to date in doing so, much remains to be accomplished before it will have implemented these management controls and have the capability to effectively and efficiently manage IT. As defined by the Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996 and associated Office and Management and Budget instructions, and as practiced by leading public and private sector organizations, effective IT investment management requires implementing process controls for maximizing the value and assessing and managing the risks of investments. The goal is to have the means in place and functioning to help ensure that IT projects are being implemented at acceptable costs, within reasonable and expected time frames, and are contributing to tangible, observable improvements in mission performance. To help agencies understand their respective IT investment management capabilities, we developed the Information Technology Investment Management (ITIM) maturity framework. The ITIM framework is a tool that identifies critical processes and practices for successful IT investment and organizes them into a framework of increasingly mature stages. A fundamental premise of the framework is that each incremental stage lays a foundation on which subsequent stages build. The initial stage focuses on controlling investments already underway, while also starting to establish a way to select new investments. Later stages emphasize managing investments from a portfolio perspective in which individual investments are evaluated as a set of competing options based on their contribution to mission goals and objectives. The goal is to arrive at the optimal mix of projects in which to invest resources. Agencies can use the framework for assessing the strengths and weaknesses of their existing investment management processes and for developing a roadmap for improvement. The Chief Information Officers Council has endorsed the ITIM framework. In order for an agency to achieve a minimum level of IT management effectiveness, it needs to first gain control of its current investments. To do this, it must establish and implement processes and practices for ensuring that projects have defined cost, schedule, and performance expectations; that projects are continuously controlled to determine whether commitments are being met and to address deviations; and that decisionmakers have this basic investment information to use in selecting new projects for funding and deciding whether to continue existing projects. Once it has established these project-specific control and selection processes, the agency then should move to considering each new investment not as a separate and distinct project, but rather as part of an integrated portfolio of investments that collectively contribute to mission goals and objectives. To do this, the agency should establish and implement processes and practices for analyzing the relative pros and cons of competing investment options and selecting a set of investments that agency leadership believes best meets mission-based and explicitly defined investment criteria. Integral to an effective IT investment management process is having a well-defined enterprise architecture or blueprint for guiding the content and characteristics of investments in new and existing IT systems, infrastructure, and services. The goal is to help ensure that the new and modified IT assets will, among other things, be designed and implemented to promote interoperability and avoid duplication, thereby optimizing agencywide performance and accountability. In more specific terms, an enterprise architecture is a comprehensive and systematically derived description of organization’s operations, both in logical terms (including business functions and applications, business rules, work locations, information needs and users, and the interrelation- ships among these variables) and in technical terms (including IT hardware, software, data, communications, security, and performance characteristics and standards). If defined properly, enterprise architectures can clarify and help optimize the connections among an organization’s interrelated and interdependent business operations and the underlying IT supporting these operations. A complete enterprise architecture includes both the current architecture (as it is now) and the target architecture (the goal), as well as a plan for moving between the two. To assist agencies in developing, maintaining, and implementing enterprise architectures, we collaborated with the Chief Information Officers Council to develop a practical guide for enterprise architecture management. In December 2000 we reported that while INS had some investment control elements, it nevertheless lacked the full set of foundational investment management processes and practices needed to effectively control its ongoing IT projects and ensure that it was meeting cost, schedule, and performance commitments and contributing to measurable mission performance and accountability goals. For example, INS had not consistently (1) developed and maintained project management plans that specified cost and schedule baselines, (2) linked projects to INS mission needs, and (3) tracked and monitored projects to determine whether they were meeting project baselines and mission needs. Without this information, the investment review board (that, to its credit, INS had established to make investment selection decisions) could not act to effectively address deviations. The result was increased risk that the technology needed to support mission goals, such as securing America’s borders, would not be delivered on time and on budget and would not perform as intended. We also reported in December 2000 that INS was not effectively managing its IT investments, both new proposals and ongoing projects, as a portfolio, meaning that INS’ investment review board was not making portfolio selection and control decisions in terms of what mix of proposed and ongoing projects collectively best supported achievement of mission needs and priorities. In particular, INS had not defined, and thus was not using, investment selection criteria that were linked to mission needs and addressed cost, schedule, benefits, and risk. Without such criteria, the board lacked the basic information needed to assess the relative merits of and make trade-offs among its options for increasing IT capabilities, including acquiring new, enhancing existing, and operating and maintaining existing systems and infrastructure. By not employing portfolio investment management, we concluded that INS was at risk of not having the right mix of technology in place to support critical mission priorities, such as protecting America’s borders against the threat of terrorism. Accordingly, we made a series of recommendations to INS aimed at, among other things, treating the development and implementation of IT investment management process controls as an agency priority and managing them as such. Since our December 2000 report, INS has taken steps to implement our recommendations for establishing and following rigorous and disciplined investment management controls. In particular, it has developed a guide for IT investment management that, according to INS, defines many of the missing processes and practices. The key for INS will be to ensure that these processes and practices are effectively implemented. Given that the Justice IG, in reporting on IT project problems, found that INS was not following established project management procedures, successful implementation of INS’ newly developed investment guide cannot be taken for granted, and needs to be given the attention it deserves. In July 2000, we reported that INS did not have an enterprise architecture, including a description of both its “as is” and “to be” operational and technology environments and a roadmap for transitioning between the two environments. Moreover, we also reported that the efforts underway to develop the architecture were flawed and unlikely to produce useful architectural products. In particular, the development efforts were limited to a producing a bottom-up description of INS’ current IT environment (e.g., hardware and system software computing platforms, data structures and schemas, software applications) and mapping the software applications to mission areas. While this was a reasonable start to describing the current architectural environment, important steps still needed to be accomplished, such as linking the systems environment description to a decomposed view of agency mission areas, including each area’s component business functions, information needs, and information flows among functions. Moreover, doing this reliably required the participation of agency business owners; however, these owners were not involved. Also, INS had not begun developing either a target architecture or a capital investment plan for sequencing the projects that will it allow to migrate from its current architecture to its target architecture. These two components would be integral to INS’ previously mentioned need to implement effective investment management processes and practices because both controlling and selecting IT projects requires ensuring that these projects are provided for in the sequencing plan and are aligned with the target architecture. By doing so, investment decisionmakers can know (1) how proposed projects contribute to the strategic mission goals, needs, and priorities and (2) whether these projects will be engineered according to the technical models and standards, that are both embedded in the target architecture descriptions. Equally important, we reported that INS’ architecture development efforts were not being managed as a formal program, including having meaningful plans that provided a detailed breakdown of the work and associated schedules and resource needs. Further, these efforts did not include performance measures and progress reporting requirements to ensure that the effort was progressing satisfactorily. As a result, we concluded that it was unlikely that INS could produce a meaningful architecture that could be used to effectively and efficiently guide and constrain IT investment and project decisionmaking. Accordingly, we made a series of recommendations to INS aimed at making development of an enterprise architecture an agency priority and managing it as such. | Information technology (IT) management process controls are predictors of organizational success in developing, acquiring, implementing, operating, and maintaining IT systems and related infrastructure. GAO found that the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) has not implemented practices associated with effective IT investment and enterprise architecture management. Furthermore, these investments are not aligned with an agencywide blueprint that defines the agency's future operational and technological plans. INS does not know whether its ongoing investments are meeting their cost, schedule, and performance commitments. |
Based on state responses to our survey, we estimated that nearly 617,000, or about 89 percent of the approximately 693,000 regulated tanks, had been upgraded with the federally required equipment by the end of fiscal year 2000. EPA data showed that about 70 percent of the total number of tanks that its regions regulate on tribal lands had also been upgraded. With regard to the approximately 76,000 tanks that we estimated have not been upgraded, closed, or removed as required, 17 states and the 3 EPA regions we visited reported that they believed that most of these tanks were either empty or inactive. However, another five states reported that at least half of their non-upgraded tanks were still in use. EPA and states assume that the tanks are empty or inactive and therefore pose less risk. As a result, they may give them a lower priority for resources. However, states also reported that they generally did not discover tank leaks or contamination around tanks until the empty or inactive tanks were removed from the ground during replacement or closure. Consequently, unless EPA and the states address these non-compliant tanks in a more timely manner, they may be overlooking a potential source of soil and groundwater contamination. Even though most tanks have been upgraded, we estimated from our survey data that more than 200,000 of them, or about 29 percent, were not being properly operated and maintained, increasing the risk of leaks. The extent of operations and maintenance problems varied across the states, as figure 1 illustrates. The states reported a variety of operational and maintenance problems, such as operators turning off leak detection equipment. The states also reported that the majority of problems occurred at tanks owned by small, independent businesses; non-retail and commercial companies, such as cab companies; and local governments. The states attributed these problems to a lack of training for tank owners, installers, operators, removers, and inspectors. These smaller businesses and local government operations may find it more difficult to afford adequate training, especially given the high turnover rates among tank staff, or may give training a lower priority. Almost all of the states reported a need for additional resources to keep their own inspectors and program staff trained, and 41 states requested additional technical assistance from the federal government to provide such training. To date, EPA has provided states with a number of training sessions and helpful tools, such as operation and maintenance checklists and guidelines. One of EPA’s tank program initiatives is also intended to improve training and tank compliance with federal requirements, such as setting annual compliance targets with the states. The agency is in the process of implementing its compliance improvement initiative, which involves actions such as setting the targets and providing incentives to tank owners, but it is too early to gauge the impact of the agency’s efforts on compliance rates. According to EPA’s program managers, only physical inspections can confirm whether tanks have been upgraded and are being properly operated and maintained. However, only 19 states physically inspect all of their tanks at least once every 3 years—the minimum that EPA considers necessary for effective tank monitoring. Another 10 states inspect all tanks, but less frequently. The remaining 22 states do not inspect all tanks, but instead generally target inspections to potentially problematic tanks, such as those close to drinking water sources. In addition, not all of EPA’s own regions comply with the recommended rate. Two of the three regions that we visited inspected tanks located on tribal land every 3 years. Figure 2 illustrates the states’ reported inspection practices. According to our survey results, some states and EPA regions would need additional staff to conduct more frequent inspections. For example, under staffing levels at the time of our review, the inspectors in 11 states would each have to visit more than 300 facilities a year to cover all tanks at least once every 3 years, but EPA estimates that a qualified inspector can only visit at most 200 facilities a year. Moreover, because most states use their own employees to conduct inspections, state legislatures would need to provide them additional hiring authority and funding to acquire more inspectors. Officials in 40 states said that they would support a federal mandate requiring states to periodically inspect all tanks, in part because they expect that such a mandate would provide them needed leverage to obtain the requisite inspection staff and funding from their state legislatures. In addition to more frequent inspections, a number of states stated that they need additional enforcement tools to correct problem tanks. EPA’s program managers stated that good enforcement requires a variety of tools, including the ability to issue citations or fines. One of the most effective tools is the ability to prohibit suppliers from delivering fuel to stations with problem tanks. However, as figure 3 illustrates, 27 states reported that they did not have the authority to stop deliveries. In addition, EPA believes, and we agree, that the law governing the tank program does not give the Agency clear authority to regulate fuel suppliers and therefore prohibit their deliveries. Almost all of the states said they need additional enforcement resources and 27 need additional authority. Members of both an expert panel and an industry group, which EPA convened to help it assess the tank program, likewise saw the need for states to have more resources and more uniform and consistent enforcement across states, including the authority to prohibit fuel deliveries. They further noted that the fear of being shut down would provide owners and operators a greater incentive to comply with federal requirements. Under its tank initiatives, EPA is working with states to implement third party inspection programs, using either private contractors or other state agencies that may also be inspecting these business sites for other reasons. EPA’s regions have the opportunity, to some extent, to use the grants that they provide to the states for their tank programs as a means to encourage more inspections and better enforcement. However, the Agency does not want to limit state funding to the point where this further jeopardizes program implementation. The Congress may also wish to consider making more funds available to states to improve tank inspections and enforcement. For example, the Congress could increase the amount of funds it provides from the Leaking Underground Storage Tank trust fund, which the Congress established to specifically provide funds for cleaning up contamination from tanks. The Congress could then allow states to spend a portion of these funds on inspections and enforcement. It has considered taking this action in the past, and 40 states said that they would welcome such funding flexibility. In fiscal year 2000, EPA and the states confirmed a total of more than 14,500 leaks or releases from regulated tanks, although the Agency and many of the states could not verify whether the releases had occurred before or after the tanks had been upgraded. According to our survey, 14 states said that they had traced newly discovered leaks or releases that year to upgraded tanks, while another 17 states said they seldom or never detected such leaks. The remaining 20 states could not confirm whether or not their upgraded tanks leaked. EPA recognizes the need to collect better data to determine the extent and cause of leaks from upgraded tanks, the effectiveness of the current equipment, and if there is a need to strengthen existing equipment standards. The Agency has launched studies in several of its regions to obtain such data, but it may have trouble concluding whether leaks occurred after the upgrades. In a study of local tanks, researchers in Santa Clara County, California, concluded that upgraded tanks do not provide complete protection against leaks, and even properly operated and maintained tank monitoring systems cannot guarantee that leaks are detected. EPA, as one of its program initiatives, is working with the states to gather data on leaks from upgraded tanks in order to determine whether equipment requirements need to be strengthened, such as requiring double-walled tanks. The states and the industry and expert groups support EPA’s actions. In closing, the states and EPA cannot ensure that all regulated tanks have the required equipment to prevent health risks from fuel leaks, spills, and overfills or that tanks are safely operated and maintained. Many states are not inspecting all of their tanks to make sure that they do not leak, nor can they prohibit fuel from being delivered to problem tanks. EPA has the opportunity to help its regions and states correct these limitations through its tank initiatives, but it is difficult to determine whether the Agency’s proposed actions will be sufficient because it is just defining its implementation plans. The Congress also has the opportunity to help provide EPA and the states the additional inspection and enforcement authority and resources they need to improve tank compliance and safety. | Hazardous substances that leak from underground storage tanks can contaminate the soil and water and pose continuing health risks. Leaks of methyl tertiary butyl ether--a fuel additive--have forced several communities to close their wells. GAO surveyed all 50 states and the District of Columbia to determine whether tanks are compliant with the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) underground storage tank (UST) requirements. About 1.5 million tanks have been closed since the program was created, leaving about 693,000 tanks subject to UST requirements. Eighty-nine percent of these tanks had the required protective equipment installed, but nearly 30 percent of them were not properly operated and maintained. EPA estimates that the rest were inactive and empty. More than half of the states do not meet the minimum rate recommended by EPA for inspections. State officials said that they lacked the money, staff, and authority to conduct more inspections or more strongly enforce tank compliance. States reported that even tanks with the required leak prevention and detection equipment continue to leak, although the full extent of the problem is unknown. EPA is seeking better data on leaks from upgraded tanks and is considering whether it needs to set new tank requirements, such as double-walled tanks, to prevent future leaks. |
The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (Stafford Act, P.L. 93-288 ) authorizes the President to issue major disaster declarations in response to certain incidents that overwhelm the capabilities of tribal, state, and local governments. The Stafford Act defines a major disaster as any natural catastrophe (including any hurricane, tornado, storm, high water, wind-driven water, tidal wave, tsunami, earthquake, volcanic eruption, landslide, mudslide, snowstorm, or drought), or, regardless of cause, any fire, flood, or explosion, in any part of the United States, which in the determination of the President causes damage of sufficient severity and magnitude to warrant major disaster assistance under this chapter to supplement the efforts and available resources of states, local governments, and disaster relief organizations in alleviating the damage, loss, hardship, or suffering caused thereby. Major disaster declarations can authorize several types of federal assistance to support response and recovery efforts following an incident. The primary source of funding for federal assistance following a major disaster is the Disaster Relief Fund (DRF), which is managed by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). While this fund also provides assistance as a result of emergency declarations and Fire Management Assistance Grants, major disaster declarations historically account for the majority of obligations from the DRF. This report provides a national overview of actual and projected obligations funded through the DRF as a result of major disaster declarations between FY2000 and FY2015. In addition to providing a national overview, the electronic version of this report includes links to CRS products that summarize actual and projected obligations from the DRF as a result of major disaster declarations in each state and the District of Columbia. Each state profile includes information on the most costly incidents and impacted localities. In both the national and state-level products, information is provided on the types of assistance that have been provided for major disasters. Many other federal programs that provide assistance following a major disaster are not funded through the DRF. While the specific agencies and programs called upon will vary from one disaster to another, an overview of selected programs can be found in CRS Report R42845, Federal Emergency Management: A Brief Introduction , coordinated by [author name scrubbed]. A total of 936 major disaster declarations were made between FY2000 and FY2015. These declarations resulted in more than $133.6 billion in actual and projected obligations from the DRF. There was a high level of variation in the amount of actual and projected funding obligated for major disasters each year, with more than $48.6 billion in actual and projected obligations for disasters in FY2005 alone. Figure 1 displays the actual and projected obligations for all major disaster declarations each fiscal year. In Figure 1 , obligations associated with each declaration are reported in the fiscal year in which the major disaster was declared. However, disaster response and recovery expenses are often incurred over several years following an incident, including some of the incidents from FY2000 to FY2015. To account for the total amount of federal assistance ultimately obligated for major disasters, the obligations data used throughout this report reflect actual obligations as well as obligations projected under FEMA-approved spending plans. A major disaster declaration can authorize funding for different purposes, depending on the needs of the state. These purposes include the following: Public Assistance , which is used by tribal, state, or local governments, or certain private nonprofit organizations to provide emergency protective services, conduct debris removal operations, and repair or replace damaged public infrastructure; Individual Assistance , which provides direct aid to impacted households; Hazard Mitigation Assistance , which funds mitigation and resiliency projects and programs, typically across the entire state; FEMA administrative costs associated with each disaster declaration; and Mission Assignment , which tasks and reimburses other federal entities that provide direct disaster assistance. The decision concerning which types of assistance to provide is made either when the major disaster is declared or when the declaration is amended. For many major disasters, all of the assistance types outlined above are authorized. For others, some assistance types are not authorized. Figure 2 compares the actual and projected obligations for different types of assistance provided as a result of a major disaster declaration from FY2000 to FY2015. In addition to the major disaster assistance described above, there are other forms of assistance that are funded through the DRF. These include assistance associated with Emergency Declarations and with Fire Management Assistance Grants. The funding associated with these types of assistance typically results in lower obligation levels than assistance provided as a result of major disaster declarations, although there is significant variation across incidents. Emergency Declarations are often made at the time a threat is recognized in order to assist tribal, state, and local efforts prior to an incident. For the period FY2000 through FY2015, total obligations for emergency declarations were just over $2.37 billion. Fire Management Assistance Grants (FMAGs) provide aid for the control, management, and mitigation of fires. Total obligations for FMAGs from FY2000 through FY2015 were slightly more than $1.21 billion. Floods represent a majority of all major disaster declarations nationwide. One of the primary sources of assistance for flooding events is the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP), which is not funded through the DRF. For more information on the NFIP, please refer to CRS Report R44593, Introduction to FEMA's National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) , by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed]. Many existing CRS products address issues related to the DRF, the disaster declaration process, and types of DRF assistance. Below is a list of several of these resources: CRS Report R41981, Congressional Primer on Responding to Major Disasters and Emergencies , by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed] CRS Report R43519, Natural Disasters and Hazards: CRS Experts , by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed] CRS Report R43784, FEMA's Disaster Declaration Process: A Primer , by [author name scrubbed] CRS Report R43537, FEMA's Disaster Relief Fund: Overview and Selected Issues , by [author name scrubbed] CRS Report R44619, FEMA Disaster Housing: The Individuals and Households Program—Implementation and Potential Issues for Congress , by [author name scrubbed] CRS Report R43990, FEMA's Public Assistance Grant Program: Background and Considerations for Congress , by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed] In the electronic version of this report, Table 1 includes links to CRS products that summarize major disaster assistance from the DRF for each state and the District of Columbia. Actual and projected obligations from the DRF as a result of major disaster declarations for tribal lands, American Samoa, Guam, the Northern Mariana Islands, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, the Marshall Islands, and the Republic of Palau are available upon request. | The primary source of funding for federal assistance authorized by a major disaster declaration is the Disaster Relief Fund (DRF), which is managed by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). Major disaster declarations have occurred in every U.S. state since FY2000, with obligations for each incident ranging from a few hundred thousand dollars to more than $31 billion. This report summarizes DRF actual and projected obligations as a result of major disaster declarations at the national level for the period FY2000 through FY2015. CRS profiles for each state and the District of Columbia are linked to this report. Information on major disaster assistance from the DRF for tribal lands, U.S. territories, and freely associated states is available upon request. This report also includes lists of additional resources and key policy staff who can provide more information on the emergency management issues discussed. |
Prior to 1940, U.S. presidents or their descendents typically retained ownership of papers documenting their terms of office. The fate of these papers was up to the former president or his descendents, and some were lost forever. In 1940, Franklin D. Roosevelt was the first president to arrange to have a library built using privately raised funds and to then transfer both the facility and his papers to the federal government. Through its Office of Presidential Libraries, NARA operates presidential libraries housing the papers of all subsequent presidents through George W. Bush, as well as President Roosevelt’s predecessor in the White House, Herbert Hoover. At the end of a president’s term, NARA staff begin working with the president’s official records and other materials. This work goes on during library construction and during the period between the dedication of the library facility and its transfer to the federal government. Table 1 provides facts about the 13 presidential libraries and museums operated by NARA. For most of the libraries, as the president’s term was coming to a close or after it ended, friends and supporters of the president created a private charitable foundation to collect donations to construct a library. Under current law, NARA collaborates with each presidential library foundation on the construction of the library facility, and when the facility construction is complete, the foundation deeds or gives the right to use the library facility or a portion of the facility to NARA. The Presidential Libraries Act of 1986 also requires that the National Archives Trust Fund receive an operating endowment for each library before NARA can accept the transfer of the library. These endowments fund some of the federal government’s costs for the operation and maintenance of the presidential libraries. Figure 1 captures key steps of the current process of establishing a presidential library. Some variations from this process may exist. Each library is operated by a director who is a NARA employee, and other library staff who are also NARA employees. The staffs typically include an administrative officer, facility manager, education and exhibits specialists, archivists, archives technicians, and clerks, among other staff. The director of a presidential library is appointed by the Archivist of the United States, the head of NARA, who consults with the former president in selecting a candidate. The Office of Presidential Libraries is headed by the Assistant Archivist for Presidential Libraries. The Office of Presidential Libraries is responsible for overseeing the management of records at the libraries, the development of policies and procedures for the management and operation of presidential libraries, and the development and coordination of plans, programs, and resource allocations at presidential libraries. The Office of Presidential Libraries is also involved in the creation of new presidential libraries. Funds appropriated by Congress support NARA’s staffing, administration, security, maintenance, and renovation projects at the library. In fiscal year 2009, NARA spent more than $68 million in appropriations to operate the presidential libraries. In addition, for fiscal year 2009 NARA received $41.5 million in special appropriations for repairs and restoration to the John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum ($22 million), the Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library and Museum ($17.5 million), and the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library & Museum ($2 million). Each private foundation is operated by a director, president, or CEO and other staff that may include a chief financial officer and director of communications, among other positions. Foundation support enables the libraries to expand their research and archival functions, as well as undertake additional projects such as public outreach efforts. The foundations’ level of involvement in the activities at their associated library, such as collaboration on public and educational programs, varies from library to library. Foundations may also sponsor their own programs and activities, such as hosting a lecture series or academic discussion or producing a newsletter. NARA officials told us that, in most cases, these kinds of programs and activities are offered in conjunction with and supported by library staff. For example, a foundation may pay for a lecture series that is held in NARA-controlled space. The foundations may also generally support their associated libraries with additional funding for new facilities and equipment and for updating permanent exhibits, adding program space, and giving the library the use of foundation staff time for library activities. Foundations provide these resources directly to their associated library. This process generally is handled at the library level based on the relationship between the library and the foundation. Each presidential library also has a trust fund that receives revenue from the sale of publications, museum shop sales, document reproductions, audio-visual reproductions, library admissions, public space rentals, educational conferences, and interest income. Trust- fund money helps the library cover the cost of museum shop inventory, personnel, operational and financial systems, equipment, and supplies. These funds may also support exhibit-related and public-programming expenses. In fiscal year 2009, the trust funds for presidential libraries had a total end-of-year balance of approximately $15 million. In addition to trust funds, presidential libraries also maintain funds from gifts donated to a library for general library support or for specific projects or programs. The federal laws specific to presidential libraries focus primarily on the design and construction of library facilities and, once constructed, the deeding of the library facilities, or the rights to use the facilities, to the federal government. Congress has enacted three primary statutes that provide the legal rules for the design, construction, and transfer of library facilities. NARA’s building-use regulations outline the permissible and prohibited uses of the presidential library facilities by other groups. According to the regulations, other groups may request the use of presidential library facilities when the activity is sponsored, cosponsored, or authorized by the library; conducted to further the library’s interests; and does not interfere with the normal operation of the library. The regulations prohibit the use of the facilities for profit-making, commercial advertisement or sales, partisan political activities, or sectarian activities. When NARA considers it to be in the public interest, NARA may allow for the occasional, nonofficial use of rooms and spaces in a presidential library and charge a reasonable fee for such use. Additionally, the regulations require outside organizations to apply for the use of library space by writing to the library director and submitting an Application for Use of Space in Presidential Libraries. Applying organizations must agree to review their event plans with library staff and that the plans will conform to library rules and procedures. The application also confirms that the organization will not charge admission fees, make indirect assessment fees for admission, or take collections for their events. Further, the application prohibits the organization from suggesting that the library endorses or sponsors the organization. Federal laws and regulations specify for all federal employees—including federal employees working at presidential libraries—what they may and may not do in their official capacity. For example, federal employees may not engage in commercial or political activity associated with their federal positions. According to NARA’s General Counsel, there are no special laws or regulations that apply only to how library employees interact with the foundation or, if applicable, university associated with their library, but the laws and regulations that apply throughout the federal government also apply to library employees. The Hatch Act provides the rules for the activities of library employees at events such as candidate debates or speeches by candidates that sometimes take place at the libraries. The Hatch Act, which is enforced by the U.S. Office of Special Counsel (OSC), prohibits certain political activities for federal employees. At an event such as these (or at any other time) a library employee may not use official authority to interfere with an election; solicit, accept, or receive political contributions from any person; run for nomination or as a candidate for election to a partisan political office; or solicit or discourage the political activity of any person connected to the business of the employee’s office. NARA employees must also follow the Standards of Ethical Conduct for Employees of the Executive Branch issued by the Office of Government Ethics. The standards emphasize that employees have a responsibility to the U.S. government and its citizens to place loyalty to the Constitution, laws, and ethical principles above private gain, and set forth 14 general principles. Among other things, the standards describe limitations on actions an employee may take while seeking other employment, and require that employees use the time they are serving in an official capacity in an honest effort to perform official duties. NARA’s Office of Presidential Libraries oversees the 13 presidential libraries. That office has developed systemwide policies, including the Presidential Libraries Manual, which discusses museum activities and records topics, and the NARA / Office of Presidential Libraries Architecture and Design Standards for Presidential Libraries. The Office of Presidential Libraries also works with the NARA General Counsel on the development of policies governing the library–foundation relationship. The NARA General Counsel has issued legal opinions on foundations’ use of library facilities, when and how library staff can support foundation activities, and if library staff can fundraise for the foundations. Additionally, NARA officials explained that the NARA General Counsel and the Office of Presidential Libraries negotiate with the foundations on the agreements establishing the relationship between a new library and its associated foundation. According to NARA officials, library directors at the individual libraries consult with the NARA General Counsel about activities that could have political undertones before allowing a program or event. For example, library directors have contacted NARA General Counsel to inquire about using libraries as polling places. NARA approved the use of libraries as polling places as long as certain requirements were met such as that no political solicitation occurs on library-controlled property. In another example, a local political party requested but was not allowed to hold a political forum at the library. NARA officials told us that NARA does not have internal directives specifically regarding the supervision of library and foundation staff. They said that when library staff are concerned about supervision or other issues while working on a collaborative project with the foundations, they are expected to seek advice from the NARA General Counsel’s ethics program staff. Table 3 provides a summary of NARA policies and NARA General Counsel opinions concerning library–foundation activities and other outside uses of the libraries. Each presidential library has a written agreement with its associated foundation and, if applicable, the associated university that governs aspects of the relationship between the entities. These agreements differ in format; content; and the extent to which they address use of facilities, library and foundation staff relationships, and political activities. These agreements must be consistent with the applicable statutes and NARA regulations. At some libraries, the library–foundation relationship is addressed by more than one agreement due to the updating or supplementing of original documents, or to the changing format of the agreements over time. Some of the oldest agreements are primarily a series of Letters of Offer and Acceptance between the foundation and the General Services Administration (GSA), with later agreements taking the form of a mutually signed agreement between the foundation and NARA. For example, the Ford museum and the Hoover, Truman, Eisenhower, and Kennedy library agreements (from 1957 to 1980) include one or more Letters of Offer and Acceptance between the foundation and the GSA. Later agreements from more-recently established libraries, as well as earlier libraries that updated their agreements, include mutually signed agreements between the foundation and NARA. Of these later agreements, some focus on a specific project or aspect of the library–foundation relationship, while some focus broadly on the library–foundation relationship. We reviewed the library–foundation agreements and found that, over time, the agreements have become increasingly more detailed, especially regarding staff, each entity’s use and control of the different parts of the facilities, and political activities. Earlier agreements are largely focused on the transfer of property from the foundation to the United States, while later agreements address additional aspects of the library–foundation relationship. For example, later agreements address which entity controls specific parts of the facilities, including details related to one entity’s use of the other’s space (such as the permitted purposes for using the other’s space, and reimbursing the other entity for costs associated with using its space). Later agreements are also more likely to clarify the different roles and responsibilities of library and foundation staff, and address activities or tasks that library staff are not allowed to perform. Some of the later agreements also address potential conflicts of interest between the library and the foundation. For example, two of the later agreements state that foundation staff are to act in the best interests of the foundation, and NARA staff are to act in the best interests of NARA and the United States. Regarding political activities, two of the later agreements state that library space is not allowed to be used for partisan political activities. Also, NARA regulations give library directors the authority to establish supplemental policies. According to NARA officials, these supplemental policies may provide further detail on the library–foundation relationship regarding facilities, staff, and political activities. Our review was limited to NARA- wide policies and library–foundation agreements and we did not review any local library supplemental policies. NARA officials explained that the written agreements between individual libraries and the foundations are important, but that they also do not fully prescribe the relationships between the entities. They said that the relationships are shaped over time and by factors such as the particular foundation’s interest in collaborating with the library or doing charitable work elsewhere. For example, the Harry S. Truman Library and Museum and its associated foundation, the Truman Library Institute, are colocated and often collaborate on educational programs. The foundation describes itself as working with the library to “fulfill the Truman Library’s commitment to research and education.” In contrast, the mission of the foundation associated with the Jimmy Carter Library and Museum, The Carter Center, does not directly focus on the library, but rather “to advance peace and health worldwide.” NARA officials said that interaction between individual libraries and their foundations vary, but they also stressed that no one foundation’s emphasis is more correct than another. These are examples of differences among foundations and how those differences shape the level of involvement by a foundation with a library. We provided a draft of this report to NARA. NARA had no substantive comments and provided technical comments by e-mail, which we incorporated as appropriate. NARA’s letter is reprinted in appendix I. We will send a copy of this report to the Archivist of the United States. This report will also be available at no charge on GAO’s Web site at http://www.gao.gov. If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-9110 or brostekm@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix II. In addition to the contact named above, David Lewis, Assistant Director; Sonya Phillips; Juliann Gorse; Brianna Benner; Sabrina Streagle; Lois Hanshaw; Susan Christiansen; Lindsay Read; and Jessica Thomsen made key contributions to this report. | The National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) operates presidential libraries for all of the former U.S. presidents since Herbert Hoover. These libraries received over 2.4 million visits in 2009, including researchers, public program attendees, and museum visitors. Each library is associated with a private foundation, which raised the funds to build the library and then turned the library facility over to the federal government. These foundations typically have ongoing relationships with the libraries they built, and some of these library-foundation relationships involve sharing of staff and facilities. Per congressional request, this report describes the principal laws, regulations, and NARA policies that govern library-foundation relationships and the appropriate use of library facilities and staff. GAO reviewed specific laws governing presidential libraries, and NARA regulations and policies. We also reviewed applicable laws and regulations governing activities held on government property and acceptable activities of federal employees. Further, we interviewed relevant NARA officials. NARA reviewed a draft of this report and had no substantive comments. NARA made technical suggestions which we incorporated as appropriate. GAO is not making any recommendations in this report. The federal laws specific to presidential libraries focus primarily on the design and construction of library facilities and, once constructed, the deeding of the library facilities, or the rights to use the facilities, to the federal government. NARA building-use regulations outline the permissible and prohibited uses of presidential library facilities by outside organizations. Prohibited uses include profit-making, commercial advertisement or sales, partisan political activities, or sectarian activities. Other laws and regulations govern what federal employees may and may not do in their official capacity. As federal employees, NARA library employees must follow these rules in their interactions with the foundation associated with the library. NARA's Office of Presidential Libraries has developed a policy manual and standards that address topics such as museum activities and records. This office also works with the NARA General Counsel to develop guidance governing the library-foundation relationship, such as those related to the foundations' use of library facilities and when and how library staff can support foundation activities. The libraries also have one or more written agreements with their associated foundation that govern different aspects of the relationship. These agreements differ in format; content; and the extent to which they address use of facilities, library and foundation staff relationships, and political activities. |
This report provides an overview of the development of the process for appointing the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), briefly discusses the history of nominations to this position from 1973 through 2017, and identifies related congressional hearing records and reports. Federal statute provides that the Director of the FBI is to be appointed by the President by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. When there is a vacancy or an anticipated vacancy, the President begins the appointment process by selecting and vetting his preferred candidate for the position. The vetting process for presidential appointments includes an FBI background check and financial disclosure. The President then submits the nomination to the Senate, where it is referred to the Committee on the Judiciary. The Committee on the Judiciary usually holds hearings on a nomination for the FBI Director. The committee may then vote to report the nomination back to the Senate favorably, unfavorably, or without recommendation. Once reported, the nomination is available for Senate consideration. If the Senate confirms the nomination, the individual is formally appointed to the position by the President. Prior to the implementation of the current nomination and confirmation process, J. Edgar Hoover was Director of the FBI for nearly 48 years. He held the position from May 10, 1924, until his death on May 2, 1972. The current process dates from 1968, when the FBI Director was first established as a presidentially appointed position requiring Senate confirmation in an amendment to the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968. The proposal for a presidentially appointed Director had been introduced and passed in the Senate twice previously, but had never made it through the House. Floor debate in the Senate focused on the inevitable end of Hoover's tenure (due to his advanced age), the vast expansion of the FBI's size and role under his direction, and the need for Congress to strengthen its oversight role in the wake of his departure. In 1976, the 10-year limit for any one incumbent was added as part of the Crime Control Act of 1976. This provision also prohibits the reappointment of an incumbent. As with the previous measure, the Senate had introduced and passed this provision twice previously, but it had failed to pass the House. From 1973 through 2017, eight nominations for FBI Director were confirmed, and two other nominations were withdrawn. Due to a 2011 statute allowing for the reappointment of a specific incumbent, two of the eight confirmed nominations were of the same person, Robert S. Mueller III. Each of these nominations is shown in Table 1 and discussed below. L. Patrick Gray III. On the day after the death of long-time Director J. Edgar Hoover, L. Patrick Gray was appointed acting Director. President Richard M. Nixon nominated Gray to be Director on February 21, 1973. Over the course of nine days, the Senate Committee on the Judiciary held hearings on the nomination. Although Gray's nomination was supported by some in the Senate, his nomination ran into trouble during the hearings as other Senators expressed concern about partisanship, lack of independence from the White House, and poor handling of the Watergate investigation. The President withdrew the nomination on April 17, and Gray resigned as acting Director on April 27, 1973. Clarence M. Kelley. Clarence M. Kelley was the first individual to become FBI Director through the nomination and confirmation process. A native of Missouri, Kelley was a 21-year veteran of the FBI, becoming chief of the Memphis field office. He was serving as Kansas City police chief when President Nixon nominated him on June 8, 1973. During the three days of confirmation hearings, Senators appeared satisfied that Kelley would maintain nonpartisan independence from the White House and be responsive to their concerns. The Senate Committee on the Judiciary approved the nomination unanimously the following day. He was sworn in by the President on July 9, 1973. Kelly remained FBI Director until his retirement on February 23, 1978. Frank M. Johnson Jr. With the anticipated retirement of Clarence Kelley, President Jimmy Carter nominated U.S. District Court Judge Frank M. Johnson Jr. of Alabama, on September 30, 1977. Johnson faced serious health problems around the time of his nomination, however, and the President withdrew the nomination on December 15, 1977. William H. Webster. In the aftermath of the withdrawn Johnson nomination, President Carter nominated U.S. Court of Appeals Judge William H. Webster to be Director on January 20, 1978. Prior to his service on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, Webster had been U.S. Attorney and then U.S. District Court Judge for the Eastern District of Missouri. After two days of hearings, the Senate Committee on the Judiciary unanimously approved the nomination and reported it to the Senate. The Senate confirmed the nomination on February 9, 1978, and Webster was sworn in on February 23, 1978. He served as Director of the FBI until he was appointed as Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in May 1987. William S. Sessions. On September 9, 1987, President Ronald W. Reagan nominated William S. Sessions, Chief Judge of the U.S. District Court of Western Texas, to replace Webster. Prior to his service on the bench, Sessions had worked as chief of the Government Operations Section of the Criminal Division of the Department of Justice and as U.S. Attorney for the Western District of Texas. Following a one-day hearing, the Senate Committee on the Judiciary unanimously recommended confirmation. The Senate confirmed the nomination, without opposition, on September 25, and Sessions was sworn in on November 2, 1987. Sessions was the first of two FBI Directors to be removed from office. President William J. Clinton removed Sessions from office on July 19, 1993, citing "serious questions ... about the conduct and the leadership of the Director," and a report on "certain conduct" issued by the Office of Professional Responsibility at the Department of Justice. Some Members of Congress questioned the dismissal, but they did not prevent the immediate confirmation of Sessions's successor. Louis J. Freeh. President Clinton nominated former FBI agent, federal prosecutor, and U.S. District Court Judge Louis J. Freeh of New York as FBI Director on July 20, 1993, the day following Sessions's removal. The Senate Committee on the Judiciary held one day of hearings and approved the nomination. The nomination was reported to the full Senate on August 3, and Freeh was confirmed on August 6, 1993. He was sworn in on September 1, 1993, and served until his voluntary resignation, which became effective June 25, 2001. Robert S. Mueller III. On July 18, 2001, President George W. Bush nominated Robert S. Mueller III to succeed Freeh. The Senate Committee on the Judiciary held two days of hearings, and the nomination was reported on August 2, 2001. The nomination was confirmed by the Senate on the same day by a vote of 98-0. Mueller had served as the U.S. Attorney for the Northern District of California in San Francisco, and as the Acting Deputy U.S. Attorney General from January through May 2001. The former marine had also been U.S. Attorney for Massachusetts and served as a homicide prosecutor for the District of Columbia. Under President George Bush, Mueller was in charge of the Department of Justice's criminal division during the investigation of the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 and the prosecution of Panamanian leader Manuel Noriega. From 1973 through 2016, Mueller was the only FBI Director to be appointed to more than one term. P.L. 112-24 , enacted on July 26, 2011, allowed the incumbent Director to be nominated for, and appointed to, an additional two-year term. After the bill was signed, Mueller was nominated for this second term by President Barack Obama, and he was confirmed the following day by a vote of 100-0. Mueller's two-year term expired on September 4, 2013. James B. Comey Jr. As Mueller's unique two-year term drew to a close, President Obama nominated James B. Comey Jr. to succeed him. Comey had previously served as U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York, from January 2002 to December 2003, and as Deputy Attorney General, from December 2003 to August 2005. The President submitted Comey's nomination on June 21, 2013. The Senate Committee on the Judiciary held a hearing on the nomination on July 9 and voted unanimously to report the nomination favorably to the full Senate on July 18. The Senate confirmed the nomination by a vote of 93-1 on July 29. Comey began his term of office on September 4, 2013. Comey was removed from office by President Donald J. Trump on May 9, 2017. Christopher A. Wray. Seven weeks after Comey was removed from office, President Trump nominated Christopher A. Wray to succeed him. From 1997 until 2005, Wray served in several leadership positions at the Department of Justice, including Principal Associate Deputy Attorney General and Assistant Attorney General for the Criminal Division. He later worked in private practice at a law firm. The President submitted Wray's nomination on June 26, 2017. The Senate Committee on the Judiciary held a hearing on the nomination on July 12 and voted unanimously to report the nomination favorably to the full Senate on July 20. The Senate confirmed the nomination by a vote of 92-5 on August 1. Wray began his term of office on August 2, 2017. U.S. Congress. Senate Committee on the Judiciary. Nomination of Louis Patrick Gray III, of Connecticut, to be Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation . Hearings. 93 rd Cong., 1 st sess., February 28, 1973; March 1, 6, 7, 8, 9, 12, 20, 21, and 22, 1973. Washington: GPO, 1973. —.—. Executive Session, Nomination of L. Patrick Gray, III to be Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation. Hearing. 93 rd Cong., 1 st sess., April 5, 1973. Unpublished. —.—. Nomination of Clarence M. Kelley to be Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation . Hearings. 93 rd Cong., 1 st sess., June 19, 20, and 25, 1973. Washington: GPO, 1973. —.—. Nomination of William H. Webster, of Missouri, to be Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation . Hearings. 95 th Cong., 2 nd sess., January 30 and 31, 1978; February 7, 1978. Washington: GPO, 1978. —.—. Nomination of William S. Sessions, of Texas, to be Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation . Hearings. 100 th Cong., 1 st sess., September 9, 1987. S.Hrg. 100-1080. Washington: GPO, 1990. —.—. Nomination of Louis J. Freeh, of New York, to be Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation . Hearings. 103 rd Cong., 1 st sess., July 29, 1993. S.Hrg. 103-1021. Washington: GPO, 1995. —.—. Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Robert S. Mueller, III to be Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation . Hearings. 107 th Cong., 1 st sess., July 30-31, 2001. S.Hrg. 107-514. Washington: GPO, 2002. —.—. Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of James B. Comey, Jr., to be Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation . Hearings. 113 th Cong., 1 st sess., July 9, 2013. S.Hrg. 113-850. Washington: GPO, 2017. —.—. Subcommittee on FBI Oversight. Ten-Year Term for FBI Director . Hearing. 93 rd Cong., 2 nd sess., March 18, 1974. Washington: GPO, 1974. U.S. Congress. Senate Committee on the Judiciary. Ten-Year Term for FBI Director . Report to accompany S. 2106 . 93 rd Cong., 2 nd sess. S.Rept. 93-1213. Washington: GPO, 1974. —.—. William H. Webster to be Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation . Report to accompany the nomination of William H. Webster to be Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. 95 th Cong., 2 nd sess., February 7, 1978. Exec. Rept. 95-14. Washington: GPO, 1978. —.—. William S. Sessions to be Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation . Report to accompany the nomination of William Sessions to be Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. 100 th Cong., 1 st sess., September 15, 1987. Exec. Rept. 100-6. Washington: GPO, 1987. —.—. A Bill to Extend the Term of the Incumbent Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation . Report to accompany S. 1103 . 112 th Cong., 1 st sess., June 21, 2011. S.Rept. 112-23 . Washington: GPO, 2011. | The Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) is appointed by the President by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. The statutory basis for the present nomination and confirmation process was developed in 1968 and 1976, and has been used since the death of J. Edgar Hoover in 1972. From 1973 through 2017, eight nominations for FBI Director were confirmed, and two other nominations were withdrawn by the President before confirmation. The position of FBI Director has a fixed 10-year term, and the officeholder cannot be reappointed, unless Congress acts to allow a second appointment of the incumbent. There are no statutory conditions on the President's authority to remove the FBI Director. From 1973 through 2017, two Directors were removed by the President. President William J. Clinton removed William S. Sessions from office on July 19, 1993, and President Donald J. Trump removed James B. Comey from office on May 9, 2017. Robert S. Mueller III was the first FBI Director to be appointed to a second term, and this was done under special statutory arrangements. He was first confirmed by the Senate on August 2, 2001, with a term of office that expired in September 2011. In May 2011, President Barack Obama announced his intention to seek legislation that would extend Mueller's term of office for two years. Legislation that would allow Mueller to be nominated to an additional, two-year term was considered and passed in the Senate and the House, and President Obama signed the bill into law (P.L. 112-24) on July 26, 2011. Mueller subsequently was nominated and confirmed to the two-year term, and he served until September 4, 2013. This report provides an overview of the development of the process for appointing the FBI Director, briefly discusses the history of nominations to this position from 1973-2017, and identifies related congressional hearing records and reports. |
Immunizations are widely considered one of the leading public health achievements of the 20th century. Mandatory immunization programs have eradicated polio and smallpox in the United States and reduced the number of deaths from several childhood diseases, such as measles, to near zero. A consistent supply of many different vaccines is needed to support this effort. CDC currently recommends routine immunizations against 11 childhood diseases: diphtheria, tetanus, pertussis (whooping cough), Haemophilus influenzae type b (most commonly meningitis), hepatitis B, measles, mumps, rubella (German measles), invasive pneumococcal disease, polio, and varicella (chicken pox). By combining antigens (the component of a vaccine that triggers an immune response), a single injection of a combination vaccine can protect against multiple diseases. The federal government, primarily through agencies of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), has a role both as a purchaser of vaccines and as a regulator of the industry. The federal government is the largest purchaser of vaccines in the country. CDC negotiates large purchase contracts with manufacturers and makes the vaccines available to public immunization programs under the Vaccines for Children (VFC) program. Under VFC, vaccines are provided for certain children, including those who are eligible for Medicaid or uninsured. Participating public and private health care providers obtain vaccines through VFC at no charge. A second program, established under section 317, of the Public Health Service Act, provides project grants for preventive health services, including immunizations. Currently, CDC supports 64 state, local, and territorial immunization programs (for simplicity, we refer to them as state immunization programs). In total, about 50 percent of all the childhood vaccines administered in the United States each year are obtained by public immunization programs through CDC contracts. The federal government is also responsible for ensuring the safety of the nation’s vaccine supply. FDA regulates the production of vaccines. It licenses all vaccines sold in the United States, requiring clinical trials to demonstrate that vaccines are safe and effective, and reviews the manufacturing process to ensure that vaccines are made consistently in compliance with current good manufacturing practices. Once vaccines are licensed, FDA also conducts periodic inspections of production facilities to ensure that manufacturers maintain compliance with FDA manufacturing requirements. States also have an important role in immunization efforts. Policies for immunization requirements, including minimum school and day care entry requirements are made almost exclusively at the state level, although cities occasionally impose additional requirements. Each state also established an immunization infrastructure to monitor infectious disease outbreaks, administer federal immunization grants, manage centralized supplies of vaccine, and otherwise promote immunization policies. Recent vaccine shortages have necessitated temporary modifications to the recommended immunization schedule and have caused states to scale back immunization requirements. In our survey of 64 state immunization programs, administered through the Association for State and Territorial Health Officials (ASTHO), all 52 responding programs indicated that they had experienced shortages of two or more vaccines and had taken some form of action to deal with the shortages. Vaccine shortages experienced at the state level have, in turn, prompted cutbacks in immunization requirements for admission to day care or school. Thirty-five states reported putting into effect new, less stringent immunization requirements that allow children who have received fewer than the recommended number of vaccinations to attend school. In general, these states have reduced the immunization requirements for day care and/or school entry or have temporarily suspended enforcement of those requirements until vaccine supplies are replenished. For example, the Minnesota Department of Health suspended the school and postsecondary immunization laws for Td vaccine for the second year in a row, with the suspension extending through the 2002-2003 school year. Other states, including South Carolina and Washington, reported allowing children to attend day care or school even if they were not in compliance with immunization requirements, under the condition that they be recalled for vaccinations when supplies became available. While it is too early to measure the effect of deferred vaccinations on immunization rates, a number of states reported that vaccine shortages and missed make-up vaccinations may take a toll on coverage and, therefore, increase the potential for infectious disease outbreaks. The full impact of vaccine shortages is difficult to measure for several reasons. For example, none of the national immunization coverage surveys measures vaccination coverage of children under the age of 18 months—the age cohort receiving the majority of vaccinations. While immunization experts generally agree that the residual effects of historically high immunization rates afford temporary protection for underimmunized children, missed immunizations could make susceptible children vulnerable to disease outbreaks. For example, a CDC analysis of a 1998 outbreak of measles in an Anchorage, Alaska, school showed that only 51 percent of the 2,186 children exposed had received the requisite two doses of measles vaccine. No single reason explains the rash of recent vaccine shortages; rather, multiple factors coincided that affected both the supply of and demand for vaccines. We identified four key factors, as follows. Production Problems - Manufacturing production problems contributed to the shortage of certain vaccines. In some cases, production slowdowns or interruptions occurred when planned maintenance activities took longer than expected; in other cases, production was affected as manufacturers addressed problems identified in FDA inspections. Changes over the last several years in FDA inspection practices may have resulted in the identification of more or different instances of manufacturers’ noncompliance with FDA manufacturing requirements. For example, prior to these changes, biologics inspections tended to focus primarily on scientific or technical issues and less on compliance with good manufacturing practices and documentation issues. FDA did take some steps to inform manufacturers about its inspection program changes; however, some manufacturers reported problems related to how well the changes were communicated. FDA issued a compliance program guidance manual detailing the new protocol for conducting inspections intended for FDA staff. However, the information in it could have provided manufacturers a better understanding of the scope of the inspections, but the manual was not made widely available—only upon request. Removal of Thimerosal - Calls for the removal of the preservative thimerosal from childhood vaccines illustrate the effect that policy changes can have on the supply of vaccine. As a precautionary measure, in July 1999, the American Academy of Pediatrics (AAP) and the U.S. Public Health Service (PHS) issued a joint statement advising that thimerosal in vaccines be eliminated or reduced as soon as possible. While thimerosal was present in several vaccines, removing it from some vaccines was more complex than for others. For example, one manufacturer of the diphtheria- tetanus-acellular pertussis vaccine (DTaP) had to switch its packaging from multidose to single-dose vials due to the removal of the preservative. This process reduced the manufacturer’s output of vaccine by 25 percent, according to the manufacturer. Manufacturer’s Decision to Discontinue Production - Another major factor in the shortage of DTaP, and also Td, was the decision of one manufacturer to discontinue production of all products containing tetanus toxoid. With little advance warning, the company announced in January 2001 that it had ceased production of these vaccines. According to the manufacturer, prior to its decision, it produced approximately one-quarter of all Td and 25 to 30 percent of all DTaP distributed in the United States, so the company’s departure from these markets was significant. In the previous year, another manufacturer that supplied a relatively small portion of DTaP also had stopped producing this vaccine. Together these decisions decreased the number of major manufacturers of DTaP from four to two and of Td from two to one. Unanticipated Demand - The addition of new vaccines to the recommended immunization schedule can also result in shortages if the demand for vaccine outstrips the predicted need and production levels. This was the case with a newly licensed vaccine, pneumococcal conjugate vaccine (PCV), which protects against invasive pneumococcal diseases in young children. PCV was licensed by FDA in February 2000 and formally added to the recommended schedule in January 2001. Company officials said an extensive education campaign prior to its availability resulted in record-breaking initial demand for the vaccine. CDC reported shortages of PCV existed through most of 2001, and the manufacturer was only able to provide about half the needed doses during the first 5 months of 2002. Ongoing manufacturing problems limit production, exacerbating the shortage. While the recent shortages have been largely resolved, the vaccine supply remains vulnerable to any number of disruptions that could occur in the future—including those that contributed to recent shortages and other potential problems, such as a catastrophic plant fire. One key reason is that the nature of vaccine manufacturing prevents the quick production of more vaccine when disruptions occur. Manufacturing a vaccine is a complex, highly controlled process, involving living biological organisms, that can take several months to over a year. Another underlying problem is the limited number of manufacturers—five of the eight recommended childhood vaccines have only one major manufacturer each. Consequently, if there are interruptions in supply or if a manufacturer ceases production, there may be few or no alternative sources of vaccine. One situation that may help add to the supply of existing vaccines is the development of new vaccines. A recent example is a new formulation of DTaP that recently received FDA approval and has helped ease the shortage of DTaP. We identified 11 vaccines in development that could help meet the current recommended immunization schedule. These vaccines, some of which are already licensed for use in other countries, are in various stages of development, but all must undergo a rather lengthy process of clinical testing and FDA review. While FDA has mechanisms available to shorten the review process, they are not used for most vaccines under development. FDA policies generally restrict the use of its expedited review processes to vaccines that offer protection against diseases for which there are no existing vaccines. Because childhood vaccines under development often involve new forms or combinations of existing vaccines, they typically do not qualify for expedited FDA review. Federal efforts to strengthen the nation’s vaccine supply have taken on greater urgency with the recent incidents of shortages. As part of its mandate to study and recommend ways to encourage the availability of safe and effective vaccines, the National Vaccine Advisory Committee formed a work group to explore the issues surrounding vaccine shortages and identify strategies for further consideration by HHS. In its preliminary report, the work group identified several strategies that hold promise, such as streamlining the regulatory process, providing financial incentives for vaccine development, and strengthening manufacturers’ liability protection, but it concluded that these strategies needed further study. The work group did express support for expanding CDC vaccine stockpiles In response to the work group’s finding that streamlining the regulatory process needed further study, FDA recently announced that it is examining regulations governing manufacturing processes for both drugs and vaccine products to determine if reform is needed. However, FDA officials told us it is too early to define the scope and time frame for this reexamination. Regarding financial incentives for vaccine development, the Institute of Medicine is currently conducting a study of vaccine pricing and financing strategies that may address this issue. In regard to liability protections, the work group did make recommendations to strengthen the Vaccine Injury Compensation Program (VICP). VICP is a federal program authorized in 1986 to reduce vaccine manufacturers’ liability by compensating individuals for childhood-vaccine-related injuries from a VICP trust fund. The program was established, in part, to help stem the exodus of manufacturers from the vaccine business due to liability concerns. Manufacturers, however, reported a recent resurgence of childhood-vaccine-related lawsuits— including class action lawsuits related to past use of thimerosal—that allege that the lawsuits are not subject to VICP. While the work group acknowledged that recent vaccine shortages do not appear to be related to VICP liability issues, it indicated that strengthening VICP would encourage manufacturers to enter, or remain in, the vaccine production business. Legislation has been introduced for the purpose of clarifying and modifying VICP. Also consistent with the work group’s recommendations, CDC is considering whether additional vaccine stockpiles will help stabilize the nation’s vaccine supply. In 1993, with the establishment of the VFC program, CDC was required to purchase sufficient quantities of pediatric vaccines not only to meet normal usage, but also to provide an additional 6-month supply to meet unanticipated needs. Further, to ensure funding, CDC was authorized to make such purchases in advance of appropriations. Despite this requirement, to date, CDC has established partial stockpiles for only two—measles-mumps-rubella (MMR) and inactivated polio vaccine (IPV)—of the eight recommended childhood vaccines. Even if CDC decides to stockpile additional vaccines, the limited supply and manufacturing capacity will restrict CDC’s ability to build certain stockpiles in the near term. CDC estimates it could take 4 to 5 years to build stockpiles for all the currently recommended childhood vaccines—at a cost of $705 million. Past experience also demonstrates the difficulty of rapidly building stockpiles. Neither the current IPV nor MMR stockpiles have ever achieved target levels because of limited manufacturing capacity. In addition to these challenges, CDC will also need to address issues regarding its authority, strategy, and information needed to use stockpiled vaccines. Authority - It is uncertain whether stockpiled vaccines purchased with VFC funds can be used for non-VFC-eligible children. While the 1993 legislation required the Secretary of HHS to negotiate for a 6-month stockpile of vaccines to meet unanticipated needs, the legislation did not state that the supply of stockpiled vaccines may be made available for children not otherwise eligible through the VFC program. CDC officials said that the VFC legislation is unclear as to whether stockpiled vaccines can be used for all children. Strategy - Expanding the number of CDC vaccine stockpiles will require a substantial planning effort—an effort that is not yet complete. For example, CDC has not made key decisions about vaccine stockpiles to ensure their ready release, including the quantity of each vaccine to stockpile, the form of storage, and storage locations. Also, to ensure that use of a stockpile does not disrupt supply to other purchasers, procedures would need to be developed to ensure that stockpiles represent additional quantities to a manufacturer’s normal inventory levels. | Vaccine shortages began to appear in November 2000, when supplies of the tetanus and diptheria booster fell short. By October 2001, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) reported shortages of five vaccines that protect against eight childhood diseases. In addition to diptheria and tetanus vaccines, vaccines to protect against pertussis, invasive pneumococcal disease, measles, mumps, rubella, and varicella were in short supply. In July 2002, updated CDC data indicated supplies were returning to normal for most vaccines. However, the shortage of vaccine to protect against invasive pneumococcal disease was expected to continue through at least late 2002. Shortages have prompted federal authorities to recommend deferring some vaccinations and have caused most states to reduce or suspend immunization requirements for school and day care programs so that children who have not received all mandatory immunizations can enroll. States are concerned that failure to be vaccinated at a later date may reduce the share of the population protected and increase the potential for disease to spread; however, data are not currently available to measure these effects. Many factors, including production problems and unanticipated demand for new vaccines, contributed to recent shortages. Although problems leading to the shortages have largely been resolved, the potential exists for shortages to recur. Federal agencies and advisory committees are exploring ways to help stabilize the nation's vaccine supply, but few long-term solutions have emerged. Although CDC is considering expanding vaccine stockpiles to provide a cushion in the event of a supply disruption, limited supply and manufacturing capacity will restrict CDC's ability to build them. |
The TANF block grant was created by the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA) and was designed to give states the flexibility to provide both traditional welfare cash assistance benefits as well as a variety of other benefits and services to meet the needs of low-income families and children. States have responsibility for designing, implementing, and administering their welfare programs to comply with federal guidelines, as defined by federal law and HHS that oversees state TANF programs at the federal level. Importantly, with the fixed federal funding stream, states assume greater fiscal risks in the event of a recession or increased program costs. However, in acknowledgment of these risks, PRWORA also created a TANF Contingency Fund that states could access in times of economic distress. Similarly, during the recent economic recession, Congress created a $5 billion Emergency Contingency Fund for state TANF programs through the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, available in fiscal years 2009 and 2010. The story of TANF’s early years is well known. During a strong economy, increased federal support for work supports like child care, and the new TANF program’s emphasis on work, welfare rolls were cut by more than half. Many former welfare recipients increased their income through employment, and employment rates among single parents increased. At the same time that some families worked more and had higher incomes, others had income that left them still eligible for TANF cash assistance. However, many of these eligible families were not participating in the program. According to our estimates in a previous report, the vast majority—87 percent—of the caseload decline can be explained by the decline in eligible families participating in the program, in part because of changes to state welfare programs. These changes include mandatory work requirements, changes to application procedures, lower benefits, and policies such as lifetime limits on assistance, diversion policies, and sanctions for non-compliance, according to a review of the research. Among eligible families who did not participate, 11 percent did not work, did not receive means-tested disability benefits, and had very low incomes. While we have not updated this analysis, some research shows that this potentially vulnerable group may be growing. Despite the decrease in the cash assistance caseload overall, the number of cases in which aid was provided only for the children in the household increased slightly, amounting to about half the cash assistance caseload. For these households, the adult is not included in the benefit calculation, generally either because: (1) the parent is receiving cash support through the Supplemental Security Income program; (2) the parent is an immigrant who is ineligible; (3) the child is living with a nonparent caregiver; or (4) the parent has been sanctioned and removed from cash assistance for failing to comply with program requirements. Nationally, about one-third of these “child only” households are children living with non-parent caregivers. We also know that during and after this recent significant recession, while caseloads increased in most states, the overall national increase totaled about 13 percent from fiscal years 2008 to 2011. This has been the first test of TANF—with its capped block grant structure—during severe economic times. This relatively modest increase—and decreases in some states—has raised questions about the responsiveness of TANF to changing economic conditions. We recently completed work on what was happening to people who had exhausted their unemployment insurance While almost 40 percent of benefits after losing a job in the recession.near-poor households with children that had exhausted UI received aid through the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (formerly known as food stamps), we estimated that less than 10 percent received TANF cash assistance. A key TANF goal is helping parents prepare for and find jobs. The primary means to measure state efforts in this area has been TANF’s work participation requirements. Generally, states are held accountable for ensuring that at least 50 percent of all families receiving TANF cash assistance and considered work-eligible participate in one or more of the federally defined allowable activities for the required number of hours each week. However, over the years, states have not typically engaged that many recipients in work activities on an annual basis—instead, states have engaged about one third of families in allowable work activities nationwide. Most states have relied on a combination of factors, including various policy and funding options in federal law and regulations, to meet the work participation requirements without reaching the specified 50 percent. Factors that influenced states’ work participation rates included not only the number of families receiving TANF cash assistance who participated in work activities, but also: decreases in the number of families receiving TANF cash assistance (not due to program eligibility changes) that provide a state credit toward meeting its rates , state spending on TANF-related services beyond what is required that also provides a state credit toward meeting its rates, state policies that allow working families to continue receiving TANF cash assistance, helping a state to increase its rate, and state policies that provide nonworking families cash assistance outside of the TANF program. For example, some states serve families with work barriers outside of state TANF because of concerns that they will not be able to meet work requirements. Many states have cited challenges in meeting TANF work participation rates, such as requirements to verify participants’ actual activity hours and certain limitations on the types and timing of activities that count toward meeting the requirements. Because of the various factors that affect the calculation of states’ work participation rates, the rate’s usefulness as an indicator of a state’s effort to help participants achieve self-sufficiency is limited. Further, the TANF work participation rates, as enacted, in combination with the flexibility provided, may not serve as an incentive for states to engage more families or to work with families with complex needs. While the focus is often on TANF’s role in cash assistance, it plays a significant role in states’ budgets for other programs and services for low- income families, as allowed under TANF. The substantial decline in traditional cash assistance caseloads combined with state spending flexibilities under the TANF block grant allowed states to broaden their use of TANF funds. As a result, TANF and state TANF-related dollars played an increasing role in state budgets outside of traditional cash assistance payments. In our 2006 report that reviewed state budgets in nine states, we found that in the decade after Congress created TANF, the states used their federal and state TANF-related funds to support a wide range of state priorities, such as child welfare services, mental health services, substance abuse services, prekindergarten, and refundable state earned income credits for the working poor, among others. While some of this spending, such as that for child care assistance, relates directly to helping cash assistance recipients leave and stay off the welfare rolls, other spending is directed to a broader population that did not necessarily ever receive welfare payments. This is in keeping with the broad purposes of TANF specified in the law: providing assistance to needy families so that children could be cared for in their own homes or in the homes of relatives; ending needy families’ dependence on government benefits by promoting job preparation, work, and marriage; preventing and reducing the incidence of out-of-wedlock pregnancies; encouraging the formation and maintenance of two-parent families. This trend away from cash assistance has continued. In fact, in fiscal year 2011, federal TANF and state expenditures for purposes other than cash assistance totaled 71 percent of all expenditures. This stands in sharp contrast with 27 percent spent for purposes other than cash assistance in fiscal year 1997, when states first implemented TANF. Beyond the cash assistance rolls, the total number of families assisted is not known, as we have noted in our previous work. TANF funds can play an important role in some states’ child welfare budgets. In our previous work, Texas state officials told us that 30 percent of the child welfare agency’s budget was funded with TANF dollars in state fiscal year 2010. Many states have used TANF to fund child welfare services because, although TANF funding is a capped block grant, it is a relatively flexible funding source. However, some states may not be able to continue relying on TANF to fund child welfare services because they need to use TANF funds to address other program goals, such as promoting work. For example, Tennessee officials told us that they previously used some of their TANF grant to fund enhanced payments for children’s relative caregivers and their Relative Caregiver Program, but that the state recently discontinued this practice due to budget constraints. While states have devoted significant amounts of the block grant as well as state funds to these and other activities, little is known about the use of these funds. Existing TANF oversight mechanisms focus more on the cash assistance and welfare-to-work components of the block grant. For example, when states use TANF funds for some purposes, they are not required to report on funding levels for specific services and how those services fit into a strategy or approach for meeting TANF goals. In effect, there is little information on the numbers of people served by TANF- funded programs other than cash assistance, and there is no real measure of workload or of how services supported by TANF and state TANF-related funds meet the goals of welfare reform. This information gap hinders decision makers in considering the success of TANF and what trade offs might be involved in any changes to TANF when it is authorized. The federal-state TANF partnership makes significant resources available to address poverty in the lives of families with children. With these resources, TANF has provided a basic safety net to many families, triggered a focus on work in the nation’s welfare offices while helping many parents step into jobs, and provided states flexibility to help families in ways they believe will help prevent dependence on public assistance and improve the lives of children. At the same time, it does raise questions about the strength and breadth of the TANF safety net. Are some eligible families falling through? The emphasis on work participation rates as a measure of program performance has helped change the culture of state welfare programs to focus on moving families into employment, but weaknesses in the measure undercut its effectiveness. Are the work participation rates providing the right incentive to states to engage parents, including those difficult to serve, and help them achieve self-sufficiency? The flexibility of the TANF block grant has allowed states to shift their spending away from cash assistance and toward other programs and services for low-income families, potentially expanding the ability of states to combat poverty in new ways. However, we do not have enough information about the use of these funds to determine whether this flexibility is resulting in the most efficient and effective strategies at this time of scarce government resources and great need among the nation’s low-income families. Chairman Baucus, Ranking Member Hatch, and Members of the Committee, this concludes my statement. I would be pleased to respond to any questions you may have. For questions about this statement, please contact me at (202) 512-7215 or brownke@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this statement. Individuals who made key contributions to this testimony include Alexander G. Galuten, Gale C. Harris, Sara S. Kelly, Kathryn A. Larin, and Theresa Lo. This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States. The published product may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without further permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this material separately. | This hearing is on combating poverty and understanding new challenges for families. The testimony focuses on the role of the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) block grant in helping low-income families with children. As you know, the federal government significantly changed federal welfare policy in 1996 when it created TANF, a $16.5 billion annual block grant provided to states to operate their own welfare programs within federal guidelines. States are also required to maintain a specified level of their own spending to receive TANF funds. Over the past 15 years, the federal government and states have spent a total of $406 billion for TANF, about 60 percent of which were federal funds. This federal-state partnership has undergone multiple program and fiscal changes, including a dramatic drop in the number of families receiving monthly cash assistance benefits, as well as two economic recessions. According to the Bureau of the Census, poverty among children fell from about 21 percent in 1995 to about 16 percent in 2000, rising again to 22 percent in 2010. Examining TANFs past performance can help shed light on the challenges facing low-income families and the role of the federal government in combating poverty. This testimonybased primarily on reports issued by GAO from 2010 to 2012 on TANF and related issueswill focus on TANFs performance in three areas: (1) as a cash safety net for families in need, (2) as a welfare-to-work program that promotes employment, and (3) as a funding source for various services that address families needs. The federal-state TANF partnership makes significant resources available to address poverty in the lives of families with children. With these resources, TANF has provided a basic safety net to many families and helped many parents step into jobs. At the same time, there are questions about the strength and breadth of the TANF safety net. Many eligible familiessome of whom have very low incomesare not receiving TANF cash assistance. Regarding TANF as a welfare-to-work program, the emphasis on work participation rates as a measure of state program performance has helped change the culture of state welfare programs to focus on moving families into employment. However, features of the work participation rates as currently implemented undercut their effectiveness as a way to encourage states to engage parents, including those difficult to serve, and help them achieve self-sufficiency. Finally, states have used TANF funds to support a variety of programs other than cash assistance as allowed by law. Yet, we do not know enough about this spending or whether this flexibility is resulting in the most efficient and effective use of funds at this time. |
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