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[ "First, there is a “growing interconnection between national law, EU harmonization, and international human rights obligations.”65 Accordingly, we review here the status of persons displaced by natural disaster as a matter of 1) international law, 2) regional or “supranational” EU law, and 3) national law—highlighting some relevant linkages.66 Second, the EU is not a legal monolith. Not all EU immigration and asylum measures apply to all EU Member States at all times. For instance, some Member States, namely the United Kingdom, Ireland, and Denmark, enjoy certain “opt-out” or “opt-in” privileges, while, at the same time, some non-EU members (Norway, Iceland, Switzerland, and Liechtenstein) have signed on to discrete elements of the EU migration and asylum regime.67 Finally, because of the “direct effects doctrine,” much of the EU’s supranational law also amounts to national law at the Member State level. The EU implements immigration and asylum law primarily through “Directives”—legislative acts that require Member States to accomplish specified results without prescribing exactly how those results should be achieved. While Directives do not create a private cause of action, where provisions are clear and unconditional, these legislative instruments may also have “direct effect” (l’effet utile), “meaning that they are applicable in national courts and could be directly invoked as part of national law.”68 Disaster Displacement in International Law In the European context, international law affecting persons displaced by disaster falls into four main categories: 1) international human rights law, as articulated principally in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and related covenants and conventions, 2) uniquely European human rights instruments that are of an international character, 3) international 65. Id. 66. Because it goes beyond the scope of our present research, we do not consider here the potential role of bilateral treaties made between EU Members States and third countries, such as the so-called “readmission agreements,” nor do we consider the “mobility partnerships” made between the EU and other nations. Neither do we consider the EU’s international development policies and funding, another venue through which the Union addresses issues related to climate change, natural disasters, and disaster-induced displacement. Likewise, EU rules regarding which Member State bears responsibility for adjudicating a specific applicant’s asylum claim, reception conditions for those seeking international protection, so-called “safe country of origin” rules, asylum procedures, laws and policies regarding irregular migration, and the EU effort to “externalize” its irregular migration policy, along with EU border control, data, and visa policy, all of which play a role. See PEERS, supra note 57, at 295-96. Many of these rules and policies further deter not only migrants, but also would be asylum-seekers and others in need of international protection, with the ultimate effect that fewer persons in need of protection ever have the merits of their claim assessed. Therefore, while our research does not directly address these issues, the reader should not discount their effect on the choices available to persons vulnerable to disaster-induced displacement. 67. See PEERS, supra note 57, at 312-14 (analyzing complex opt-out/opt-in rules along with other factors that affect the territorial scope and temporal application of EU immigration and asylum law). 68. Id. at 8. The “direct effects doctrine” holds for treaties as well, meaning certain treaty provision have the force of law even without national implementing measures. See RALPH H. FOLSOM, EUROPEAN UNION LAW IN A NUTSHELL 95-104 (7th ed. 2011). 10", "refugee and asylum law, and, finally, 4) soft law, most specifically the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement. International Human Rights Law Currently, there are few, if any, international institutions and no international legal instruments that directly address the phenomenon of disaster-induced displacement.69 This is not to say, however, that those displaced by natural disaster or environmental degradation have no rights. On the contrary, as human beings, disaster migrants enjoy the full range of fundamental rights that the rest of us enjoy, including norms and provisions that may have specific application for their particular circumstances.70 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights sets out the broad foundation of international human rights law. The General Assembly proclaimed the Universal Declaration in 1948 “as a common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations...”71 While it was not initially conceived as a legally binding instrument, the Declaration has established the underlying normative framework for international human rights law, and many consider at least certain provisions of the Universal Declaration to be binding as a matter of customary international law, for instance, the prohibition against torture.72 Article 13(2) of the UDHR declares that, “Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country.” More to the point, article 14 declares that, “Everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution.” However, article 14 provides “only a right to seek asylum, and to enjoy it if it is granted; there is no right to be granted asylum; there is no obligation on any state to grant it.”73 Furthermore, the right recognized by the Declaration “is only a right to seek asylum from oppression, not a right to seek and enjoy refuge from grinding poverty, from civil war, from 69. Susan Martin, Climate Change, Migration, and Governance, 16 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 397, 403 (2010). 70. Id. 71. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III) pmbl. (Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter UDHR]. 72 See, e.g., Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 882 (2nd Cir. 1980). “For although there is no universal agreement as to the precise extent of the ‘human rights and fundamental freedoms’ guaranteed to all by the [U.N.] Charter, there is at present no dissent from the view that the guaranties include, at a bare minimum, the right to be free from torture. This prohibition has become part of customary international law, as evidenced and defined by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights...which states, in the plainest of terms, ‘no one shall be subjected to torture.’” 73. Louis Henkin, Introduction: Refugees and Their Human Rights, 18 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1079, 1079 (1994-1995) (emphasis added). 11", "natural disasters.”74 In fact, article 13(2) sets forth “only half a right—a right to leave, not a right to be received, to enjoy a haven or to resettle.”75 Nonetheless, articles 13 and 14 are relevant, on a normative level, to the emerging discourse regarding disaster-induced displacement, as are other provisions of the UDHR. For instance, as explained further below, the Universal Declaration’s prohibition against torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment76 is relevant to the issue of disaster displacement, especially given its incorporation into the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR).77 Likewise, the Universal Declaration recognizes “the right to life, liberty and security of person,”78 as well as a prohibition against “arbitrary interference” with privacy and family,79 both of which correspond to relevant ECHR provisions and case law. Finally, the UDHR recognizes a range of economic and social rights, including, inter alia, the right to a standard of living adequate for health and well-being, along with the right to food, clothing, housing, medical care, social services, and the right to security in the event of “circumstances beyond [one’s] control.”80 Jessica Cooper suggests that, “The comprehensive language of these provisions can be interpreted as setting broad environmental standards and creating an implicit human right to freedom from life-threatening and otherwise intolerable environmental conditions.”81 The principle of nondiscrimination espoused in the UDHR is relevant as well, ensuring that, everyone is entitled to the rights and freedoms set forth therein, “without distinction of any kind,” such as race, color, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth “or other status.”82 Such fundamental economic and social rights may, and, indeed, must play a role in shaping any future international legal regime designed to address admission of persons displaced by disaster. Nonetheless, the Universal Declaration is generally insufficient as a basis for the protection of international migrants, and even less sufficient as to forcibly displaced migrants, such as those uprooted by natural disaster.83 At any rate, beyond issues related to the status, 74. Id. 75. Id. 76. UDHR, supra note 71, art. 5. 77. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter European Convention on Human Rights or ECHR]. 78. UDHR, supra note 71, art. 3. 79. Id. art. 12. 80. Id. art. 25(1). 81. Cooper, supra note 46, at 6. 82. UDHR, supra note 71, art. 2. 83. Roger Zetter, Protecting People Displaced by Climate Change: Some Conceptual Challenges, in CLIMATE CHANGE AND DISPLACEMENT: MULTIDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES 131, 132 (Jane McAdam ed., 2010) [hereinafter CLIMATE CHANGE AND DISPLACEMENT]. 12", "admissibility, or, at least, non-removability of disaster victims, human rights also play an important role with respect to the content of the rights accorded to disaster migrants once they are subject to the jurisdiction of a destination state, whether they came to that state via regular or irregular channels.84 The rights set forth in the UDHR—again, generally considered nonbinding—have been broadly transposed into two international covenants—the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights85 and the International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights.86 While these two instruments are legally binding, the rights transposed are set in more conservative legal language that affords a scope considerably less sweeping than the declarative language of the UDHR would otherwise suggest. The ICCPR does not speak specifically of asylum. Rather, article 12(2) says simply that, “Everyone shall be free to leave any country, including his own.”87 Nonetheless, the United Nations Human Rights Committee88 has ruled that the ICCPR “contains an implicit protection against removal to face treatment which would amount to a breach of standards set out in the Covenant.”89 All EU Member States have ratified, or in some cases acceded to, the ICCPR and the ICESCR, as have Norway and Switzerland, whose provisions relevant to disaster-induced displacement are also discussed below.90 Natural disasters and climate change-related outcomes implicate additional human rights conventions and norms as well.91 For instance, the 1954 Convention Relating to Stateless 84. Louis Henkin, Introduction: Refugees and Their Human Rights, 18 Fordham Int’l L.J. 1079, 1079-80 (1994-1995) (emphasis added). 85. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR]. 86. International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter ICESCR]. 87. ICCPR, supra note 85, art. 12(2). 88. The U.N. Human Rights Committee has a degree of competence in supervising application of the ICCPR. See id. art. 41. 89. PEERS, supra note 57, at 317. 90. United Nations Treaty Collection, available at http://treaties.un.org/Pages/DB.aspx?path=DB/MTDSG/page1_en.xml (click “Status of Treaties” and then “CHAPTER IV” (Human Rights) for individual country ratification, accession, and succession records, as well as relevant reservations, understandings, and declarations) (status as at June 6, 2012, 05:05:27 EDT). 91. In addition to the ICCPR and ICESCR mentioned elsewhere, the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights [OHCHR] has identified specific human rights implications with respect to other legal and normative instruments, including, but not limited to the Convention on the Rights of the Child (Nov. 20, 1989) 1577 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter CRC]; Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities , Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (Dec. 18, 1979) 1249 U.N.T.S. 13; International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families, Charter of the United Nations, and Declaration on the Right to Development, United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. See OHCHR, Report of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the Relationship between Climate Change and Human Rights, ¶ 70, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/10/61 (Jan. 15, 2009). 13", "Persons92 may be applicable, especially with respect to so-called “sinking islands.”93 Notwithstanding, UNHCR has urged decision-makers and thought leaders to emphasize “the legal presumption of continuity of statehood” and avoid “the notion that such states will “disappear” or “sink,” thereby surrendering their international legal personality.94 Neither the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change nor the Kyoto Protocol specifically addresses the issue of protection for persons displaced by climate change,95 although it has been suggested that certain concepts developed in those documents, and in environmental law more broadly, may provide useful reference points in addressing disaster- induced displacement, such concepts including, inter alia, “intergenerational equity and justice” and the “precautionary principle.”96 Regardless of what the human rights implications may be, the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights has pointed out that, at least in the climate change context, the diminished or compromised enjoyment of human rights may be difficult to characterize as a legal violation for three reasons. First, because of “complex causal relationships,” a direct link between the carbon emissions of a specific country and consequent deleterious effects is difficult to “disentangle;” second, because extreme weather events are, in fact, multi-causal in nature, it is “impossible” to disaggregate that portion of the harm “attributable to global warming,” and third, because the harm associated with climate change is often prospective in nature, whereas legal culpability for human rights violations generally addresses harm retrospectively.97 International Human Rights Protection in Europe There are three principal sources of human rights protection with specific relevance to the European Union, 1) the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, also known as the “European Convention on Human Rights” or simply the ECHR,98 2) the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union,99 and 3) general 92. Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons, Sept. 28, 1954, 360 U.N.T.S. 117 (entered into force June 6, 1960). 93. See, e.g., Jane McAdam, ‘Disappearing States’, Statelessness and the Boundaries of International Law, in CLIMATE CHANGE AND DISPLACEMENT supra note 83, at 105-129. 94. U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, Summary of Deliberations on Climate Change and Displacement, 2, 7 (Apr. 2011) available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4d9f22b32.html (accessed May 2, 2012). 95. Zetter, supra note 83, at 132. 96. See OHCHR, supra note 91, at ¶¶ 89-91. 97. See id. at ¶ 70. 98. European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 77. 99. Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Dec. 12, 2000, 2000 O.J. (C 364) 1 (XX) (adopted Dec. 7, 2000) [hereinafter Charter]. 14", "principles of European Union law.100 This legal framework is set forth in article 6 of the Treaty on the European Union,101 which 1) incorporates the Charter of Fundamental Rights into EU law, giving it “the same legal value as the [founding] Treaties,”102 2) imposes an obligation on the European Union to accede to the European Convention on Human Rights,103 and 3) declares that, “Fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the [ECHR], and as they result from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States, shall constitute general principles of the [European] Union’s law.”104 The “general principles” provision of article 6 confirms long-standing European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) case law, which case law also suggests that protections afforded under “general principles of EU law” are, at least in some instances, broader than protections afforded under the ECHR alone.105 Arguably, the right to asylum is among the general principles of EU law, given recognition of this right in the national constitutions of several Member States.106 At any rate, European Union institutions must interpret EU asylum law “while respecting the [Refugee] Convention and the other relevant treaties,”107 including the European Convention on Human Rights. The European Convention on Human Rights was adopted in 1950 under the auspices of the Council of Europe, an entity whose membership includes 47 European nations,108 as compared to only 27 nations that are Member States of European Union. All EU Member States are also members of the Council of Europe and States Parties to the ECHR.109 Consequently, within the European Union, the ECHR operates on several levels. First, the ECHR is a treaty, binding between sovereign nations as a matter of international law; second, the ECHR is “an integral part” of Member States’ domestic law,110 third, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) has ruled that at least certain provisions of the ECHR (e.g., 100. PEERS, supra note 57, at 96. 101. TEU, supra note 55. 102. Id. art. 6 (1). 103. Id. art. 6 (2). 104. Id. art. 6 (3). 105. PEERS, supra note 57, at 97 (but see discussion regarding possibility that, because not all Member States have ratified them, the fourth and seventh protocols of the ECHR may not form part of general principles of EU law, such protocols including, inter alia, provisions on “freedom of movement,” “prohibition of expulsion of nationals,” “prohibition of collective expulsion of aliens,” and “procedural safeguards relating to the expulsion of aliens.”). 106. Id. at 98. 107. Joined Cases C-175 & 176 & 178 & 179/08 Abdulla and Others v. Ger. ¶ 53, 2010 E.C.R. I- 01493. 108. Council of Europe, available at http://www.coe.int/ web/coe-portal (accessed June 7, 2012). 109. FOLSOM, supra note 68, at 1. See also Council of Europe, http://www.coe.int/ web/coe-portal (accessed June 7, 2012). 110. Council of Europe, Rec(2006)6 of the Committee of Ministers to Member States on Internally Displaced Persons of 5 April 2006, ¶ 11 (adopted by the Committee of Ministers at the 961st meeting of the Ministers’ Deputies). 15", "article 3), together with relevant European Court of Human Rights case law, operate as a source of “the general principles of European Union law;”111 fourth, the ECHR provides a normative framework that further informs the development of customary international law, by which Member States are bound,112 and fifth, following EU accession as mandated by the Treaty of Lisbon and the TEU, the ECHR will one day become binding on the EU itself, as a legal person, and thereafter binding on Member States—not only as a matter of international law, but also as a matter of regional EU law. The ECHR is relevant to the plight of disaster-induced displacement because in its case law, the European Court of Human Rights has interpreted certain provisions of the Convention in a manner that may support future claims on behalf of persons affected by natural disaster. For instance, though the case did not involve displaced persons crossing an international border, in Budayeva and Others v. Russia,113 the ECtHR found a violation of ECHR article 2 (the right to life) where authorities “failed to implement land-planning and emergency relief policies while they were aware of an increasing risk of a large-scale mudslide.”114 The burden on the State in such cases must be reasonable, taking into account the State’s “priorities and resources.”115 The burden would be lower to the degree that the risk is “natural, as opposed to human-made,” and higher to the degree that the risk is susceptible to mitigation as well as to the extent that the risk generates recurring effects in a discrete area, that is, to the degree that the calamitous effects are predictable.116 The right to life is non-derogable and raises a non-refoulement obligation.117 Accordingly, article 2 ECHR may also serve as a prohibition against removal, though no case has relied exclusively upon the provision for this purpose. Rather, where the Court prohibits removal, it typically does so based on article 3, which prohibits torture or inhuman or degrading 111. PEERS, supra note 57, at 323. 112. As a general matter, customary international law exists in that space where state practice and opinio juris converge. See Ernest A. Young, Sorting Out the Debate over Customary International Law, 372- 74, 42 VA. J. INT’L L. 365 (2001-2002). See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 102(2) (1987) (defining customary international law as that which “results from a general and consistent practice of states followed by them from a sense of legal obligation.”), and STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE, art. 38(l)(b) (defining international custom “as evidence of a general practice accepted as law”). 113. Budayeva v. Russia, No. 15339/02, (Eur. Ct. H. R., 2008) available at http://www.echr.coe.int/ECHR/EN/Header/Case-Law/Decisions+and+judgments/HUDOC+database/. 114. OHCHR, supra note 91 (referencing Budayeva). Authorities also failed to provide residents with adequate warning of the dangers. Note that the situation in Russia seems little improved following Budayeva. A July 2012 flood in Krymsk killed 171 after authorities again failed to warn the local population. Several local leaders were arrested on charges of criminal negligence. Ellen Barry, 3 Face Negligence Charges in Reaction to Russia Flood, N.Y. Times, July 23, 2012, at A6. 115. Budayeva, No. 15339/02, at ¶ 135. 116. See McAdam, supra note 23, at 21. 117. Id. at 19. The “right to life” is also found in other international human rights documents, including, inter alia, the UDHR (art. 3), ICCPR (art. 6), and the CRC (art. 6). 16", "treatment or punishment.118 For the Court, article 3 analysis generally obviates the need for further analysis under article 2.119 While in theory, any human right could give rise to a non- refoulement obligation,120 the prohibition against torture and other inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment represents the only other human right “clearly recognized in international law” as imposing a non-refoulement obligation.121 The scope of the article 3 non-refoulement obligation is particularly relevant with respect to subsidiary protection under the European Union’s so-called Qualification Directive, discussed further below. In addition, because the Refugee Convention does not afford a right to asylum, the non- refoulement obligation is also central to the operation of that instrument, which provides that, “No Contracting State shall expel or return (“refouler”) a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion.”122 While the Refugee Convention qualifies the refoulement prohibition with certain exceptions (e.g., national security),123 the prohibition inherent in ECHR article 3 is absolute and may not be subjected to any balancing test against public interests, regardless of how “undesirable or dangerous” the applicant’s activities.124 Arguably, protection against refoulement, both in the refugee context and the human rights context, constitutes a rule of customary international law.125 Indeed, Lauterpacht and Bethlehem have suggested that the relevant non-refoulement rules “may well...amount to jus cogens [i.e. a peremptory norm] of a kind that no State practice and no treaty can set aside.”126 118. ECHR, supra note 77, art. 3. “No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.” 119. McAdam, supra note 23, at 20. 120. Id. at 17. See also PEERS, supra note 57, at 319-320 (considering extent to which ECHR articles 2, 5, 6, 8 and 13 enjoy a so-called “Soering effect”). 121. McAdam, supra note 23, at 18. 122. Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, July, 28 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 137, art. 33(1) (entered into force Apr. 22, 1954). See also Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 606 U.N.T.S. 267, 19 U.S.T. 6223, art. 1 (entered into force Oct. 4, 1967) [hereinafter New York Protocol]. 123. Refugee Convention, supra note 122, art. 33(2). 124. Chahal v. United Kingdom, App. No. 70/1995/576/662, 23 Eur. H.R. Rep. 413, ¶ 80 (1996). The refoulement prohibition in the Convention against Torture is likewise absolute: “No State Party shall expel, return (“refouler”) or extradite a person to another State where there are substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture.” Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, art. 3(1), Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85, G.A. Res. 39/46, U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 51) at 197, U.N. Doc. A/RES/39/708, (1984) (entered into force June 26, 1987) (ratified by all EU Member States) [hereinafter CAT]. 125. See Elihu Lauterpacht & Daniel Bethlehem, The Scope and Content of the Principle of Non- Refoulement: Opinion, in REFUGEE PROTECTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: UNHCR GLOBAL CONSULTATION ON REFUGEE PROTECTION 89, ¶ 193-253 (Erika Feller et al., eds. 2003). See also Kay Hailbronner, Non- Refoulement and “Humanitarian” Refugees: Customary International Law or Wishful Legal Thinking?, 26 VA. J. INT’L L. 857 (1985-1986) (analyzing status of non-refoulement principle as customary international law several years before 1989 ECtHR landmark decision in Soering v. United Kingdom). 126. See Lauterpacht & Bethlehem, supra note 125, at 89, ¶ 195. 17", "If Lauterpacht and Bethlehem are correct, it follows that to the extent substantial grounds can be shown for believing removal of a person displaced by natural disaster would expose that person to a real risk of being subjected to torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, a State Party to the ECHR is prohibited from implementing such removal, not only as a result of the non-refoulement obligation inherent in article 3 ECHR, but also as a matter of customary international law, and possibly as a matter of jus cogens. The same analysis holds where removal would breach obligations under article 2 (right to life), although, again, the ECtHR rarely decides cases on article 2 grounds alone.127 The challenge then is to demonstrate that return to an area affected by natural disaster amounts to a real risk of being subjected to arbitrary deprivation of life and/or to torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. To some extent, an individual may meet this challenge first by identifying specific disaster-related deprivations of socio- economic rights, such as the right to food, water, adequate health care, and housing, and then essentially “re-characterizing” those violations of socio-economic rights as a form of inhuman treatment.128 Whether a State has violated an individual’s right to life under article 2 would depend, in part, upon the “severity and extent” of the socio-economic harms inflicted.129 The section further below, regarding the EU Qualification Directive, discusses the circumstances under which it may be said that a State has violated the right of a person displaced by disaster not to be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment under article 3. *** In addition to the European Convention on Human Rights, one must consider as well the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, which Member States first proclaimed on December 7, 2000,130 but which only became binding after the Treaty of Lisbon came into force on December 1, 2009, thereby elevating the Charter to “the same legal value” as Treaties establishing the legal contours of the European Union.131 The Charter guarantees a right to asylum, “with due respect for the rules of the Geneva Convention” and its 1967 Protocol.132 Article 4 of the Charter also provides that, “No one may be removed, expelled or extradited to a State where there is a serious risk that he or she would be subjected to the death penalty, torture or other inhuman or degrading treatment or 127. McAdam, supra note 23, at 20. 128. Id. at 17. 129. See id. at 20 (synthesizing relevant criteria drawn from U.N Human Rights Committee review of individual complaints alleging violation of ICCPR article 6). 130. Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, art. 18, 2000 O.J. (C 364) 1 (2000) [hereinafter Charter]. Note that the Charter was proclaimed a second time, on December 12, 2007 with technical (but no substantive) revisions. The Charter as proclaimed in 2000 “continues to exist as a separate legal document.” PEERS, supra note 57, at 99. 131. TEU, supra note 55, art. 6 (1). 132. Charter, supra note 130. 18", "punishment.”133 Thus, while in the ECHR the non-refoulement obligations with respect to articles 2 and 3 are implied, in the Charter those obligations are express. Prior to the entry into force of Lisbon, a line of cases from the European Court of Justice made clear that while it had no binding legal effect, the Charter served the important role of reaffirming general principles of EU law. Peers suggests that these cases, “established, in effect, a ‘Batman and Robin’ approach to the protection of human rights in the EU legal order, with the general principles [playing] the lead role in human rights protection and the Charter performing the role of sidekick—the ‘Boy Wonder’ of the EU human rights law.”134 Following Lisbon, the Court of Justice seems now to rely more heavily upon the Charter and less so upon the general principles of EU law.135 As it relates to the European Convention on Human Rights, article 52(3) of the Charter says that where rights set forth therein correspond to those guaranteed by the ECHR, “the meaning and scope of those rights shall be the same” as that laid down by the Convention.136 The provision goes on to say that Union law may also provide for “more extensive protection.”137 That is to say, the rights set forth in the Charter are at least as broad as, if not broader than, those corresponding rights found in the ECHR.138 Indeed, the Court of Justice has recently affirmed that, with autonomous legal effect, article 4 of the Charter prohibits EU Member States from transferring an asylum seeker to another Member State (responsible under “Dublin” for examining the individual’s claim) where the sending State “cannot be unaware that systemic deficiencies in the asylum procedure and in the reception conditions of asylum seekers in [the receiving State] amount to substantial 133. Id. art. 19(2). 134. PEERS, supra note 57, at 99. 135. Id. at 100. 136. Certain provisions of Protocols 4 and 7 to the ECHR are not represented in the Charter. See id. 137. Charter, supra note 130, art. 52(3). 138. Peers observed that at least through September 11, 2010, the European Court of Justice had yet to address the relationship of the Charter to the general principals of EU law, national constitutions, the ECHR, as well as to other EU/EC and international treaties. He noted, however, that following “the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, the early case law [demonstrated] a tendency to refer to the Charter in practice as the sole or main source of human rights rules in the EU legal order, with more limited references to the general principals of EU law than before.” PEERS, supra note 57, at 100. Following Peers’ observation, the Court has made measured progress in defining these relationships. See, e.g., Joined Cases C-92 & 93/09, Volker und Markus Schecke v. Land Hessen, ¶ 45-92 (2010) http://curia.europa.eu/ (comparing scope of Charter with scope of ECHR and weighing Charter obligations against general principals of EU law in context of a violation of privacy claim); Case C-434/11, Corpul Naţional al Poliţiştilor v. Ministerul Administraţiei şi Internelor and others, ¶ 15 (2011) http://curia.europa.eu (noting that Charter provisions are applicable to EU Member States only when they are implementing European Union law). 19", "grounds for believing that the asylum seeker would face a real risk of being subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment within the meaning of that provision.”139 Much of the analysis that follows with respect to disaster-induced displacement relies upon the ECHR and general principles of EU law. However, the reader should bear in mind that given at least some evidence that the Charter may be advancing to the forefront of human rights protection in the EU (and the possibility that the scope of the Charter may ultimately prove broader than that of the ECHR), the Charter could play a distinct role in any future expansion of rights-based protection for persons displaced by disaster. Convention relating to the Status of Refugees Under the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, as modified by the 1967 Protocol, a refugee is a person who, owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.140 In addition to the requirement that the asylum-seeker must have crossed an international border, the refugee definition contains two further relevant elements: first, a “well-founded fear of persecution,” and second, the five grounds upon which such persecution must be based. While there is a great deal of case law and academic literature concerning the matter, there is, “no universally accepted” definition of persecution.141 Regardless of its characterization, persecution normally involves an act or omission by a State charged with protecting the individual.142 Where non-state actors are involved, their actions may be considered persecution, “if [the acts] are knowingly tolerated by authorities, or if authorities refuse, or prove unable, to offer effective protection.”143 Linking a natural disaster to concrete State acts or omissions is, in itself, a significant challenge, yet the asylum- 139. Joined Cases C-411 & 493/10, N. S. v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, ¶ 2 (2011) http://curia.europa.eu. 140. Refugee Convention, supra note 122, art. 1.A(2). See also New York Protocol, supra note 122, art. 1. 141. U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, Handbook and Guidelines on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees ¶ 51 (reissued Dec. 2011) U.N. Doc. HCR/1P/4/ENG/REV.3, available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4f33c8d92.html (accessed Apr. 18 2012). 142. Id. ¶ 65. 143. Id. 20", "seeker must go further to demonstrate as well that such acts or omissions amount to persecution based upon at least one of the five grounds set forth in the Convention. For the disaster-displaced person, this is no easy case to make. For one thing, those who have a well-founded fear of persecution based upon one of the five grounds—so-called, “Convention Refugees”—suffer persecution at the hands of their own government, and therefore cannot look to their government for protection and assistance, while, in contrast, most disaster victims can, and indeed do, look to their own government for protection and assistance.144 In any case, one should not assume that persons displaced by disaster are without protection, for although a disaster-displaced person may cross an international border and thereby come within the jurisdiction of a foreign state, such person is, nonetheless, still entitled to the protection of his or her country of origin.145 This is not to say, however, that the Refugee Convention has no application to persons displaced by disaster. UNHCR has suggested that the Convention could apply, for instance, “in situations where the victims of natural disasters flee because their government has consciously withheld or obstructed assistance in order to punish or marginalize them on one of the five grounds...”146 Another example might be where the environment itself serves as an instrument of persecution, essentially where a state or non-state actor uses the environment as a weapon. Burning crops, poisoning wells, killing livestock—these are familiar tactics, employed by combatants and “actors of persecution” for thousands of years. Modern variations might include, for instance, the use of chemical agents “to defoliate forests and mangroves” in order “to clear perimeters of military installations,”147 the torching of oil wells in a deliberate effort to despoil the environment,148 or even “cloud seeding” to generate increased rainfall with the purpose of impeding enemy movement.149 These specific acts, behind which there may rest some ostensible military purpose, do not necessarily constitute persecution entitling victims to refugee status. However, refugee status 144. Aurelie Lopez, The Protection of Environmentally Displaced Persons in International Law 37 ENVTL. L. 365, 377 (2010). 145. U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, Forced Displacement in the Context of Climate Change: Challenges for States under International Law, 10 (May 20, 2009), http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4a2d189ed.html (accessed Apr. 17, 2012). 146. Id. at 9-10 (conceding “such cases are likely to be few”). 147. See Jeanne Mager Stellman et al., The Extent and Patterns of Usage of Agent Orange and Other Herbicides in Vietnam, 422 NATURE 681, 681 (2003). 148. Following the invasion of Kuwait and in the final days of the 1990 Gulf War, Saddam Hussein ordered his retreating troops to set ablaze more than 700 oil wells, which burned uncontrollably for eight months, casting a toxic black cloud across the region. In addition, Hussein deliberately released millions of barrels of oil into the Persian Gulf creating a 9 mile long slick. See Jesica E. Seacor, Environmental Terrorism: Lessons from the Oil Fires of Kuwait, 10 AM. U. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 481 (1994-1995). 149. Deborah Shapley, Weather Warfare: Pentagon Concedes 7-Year Vietnam Effort, 184 no. 4141 Science 1059 (June 7, 1974). 21", "may exist where such persecution involves similar manipulation of the environment for the purpose of inflicting harm on a specific group, again, based upon one of the five grounds set forth in the Convention. A compelling “environment as weapon” example is Saddam Hussein’s draining of the marshes in southern Iraq as part of a systemic campaign to decimate a 5,000 year old culture shared by a loose affiliation of tribes “collectively known as the Ma’dan or Marsh Arabs.”150 Where actors use the environment as a weapon of persecution (based upon one of the five grounds), persons displaced by the ensuing “natural” disaster may well enjoy Convention refugee status. Some argue as well that to the extent governments make policy decisions that affect the environment, and to the extent those decisions, whether intentional or neglectful, yield adverse outcomes, such “government-induced degradation is a form of persecution” as to those persons affected.151 Yet, even if we accept that “government-induced degradation is a form of persecution,” standing on its own, this argument is “too simplistic” from the perspective of refugee status recognition because it ignores “further qualitative elements” required under the Convention, for instance, that persecution must be based upon one of the five grounds.152 There must be some “discriminatory element” that lifts mere deprivation to the level of a rights violation that amounts to persecution.153 A more precise statement might hold that persecution exists where “a government systemically imposes the risks and burdens of decisions impacting environmental quality on members of a particular race, religion, nationality, social group or political opinion on account of one or more of these protected factors.”154 However, even where such an imposition demonstrates persecution on a protected ground, it is not clear that the resulting persecution meets the threshold required under international law.155 McAdam contends that persecution remains “very much a question of degree and proportion,” and that, “[w]hether something amounts to ‘persecution’ is assessed according to the nature of the right at risk, the nature and severity of its restriction or impairment, and the likelihood of the restriction or impairment eventuating in the individual case.”156 Environmental degradation will generally not meet this threshold. Consequently, the “government-induced degradation” argument is “unconvincing.”157 Often, disasters contribute to social tensions that “degenerate into violent conflict,” over natural resources such as water or land, and, in turn, armed conflict generates violations of 150. See Lopez, supra note 144, at 384-85; see also Human Rights Watch, The Iraqi Government Assault on the Marsh Arabs: a Human Rights Watch Briefing Paper (Jan. 2003). 151. Cooper, supra note 46, at 486-87. 152. Lopez, supra note 144, at 379-80. 153. JANE MCADAM, CLIMATE CHANGE, FORCED MIGRATION, AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 44 (2012). 154. Christopher M. Kozoll, Poisoning the Well: Persecution, the Environment, and Refugee Status, 15 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 271, 273 (2004). 155. MCADAM, supra note 153, at 43. 156. Id. 157. Id. 22", "human rights that amount to persecution as defined by refugee law.158 To that extent, disasters may produce traditional Convention refugee flows, and, likewise, refugees may be “part of a mixed flow of persons leaving a country in the aftermath of disasters.”159 One could argue also that victims of natural disaster constitute a “particular social group.” Of the five Convention grounds, “membership of a particular social group” is the ground with “the least clarity.”160 Its meaning must be understood “in an evolutionary manner, open to the diverse and changing nature of groups in various societies and evolving international human rights norms.”161 Still, the category “cannot be interpreted as a ‘catch all’ that applies to all persons fearing persecution.” In an attempt to synthesize decades of discordant international jurisprudence, UNHCR has defined a particular social group as: a group of persons who share a common characteristic other than their risk of being persecuted, or who are perceived as a group by society. The characteristic will often be one which is innate, unchangeable, or which is otherwise fundamental to identity, conscience or the exercise of one’s human rights. As to natural disasters—at least those triggered by government-induced environmental degradation—one commentator has proposed characterizing a social group that includes, “persons politically powerless to protect their environment.”162 However, this proposal is vulnerable to criticism on a number of fronts. First, a social group “cannot be defined exclusively by the fact that it is targeted for persecution.”163 That is to say that a social group must be “defined by something more than the harm sought to be remedied.”164 Here, one could argue that members of the putative group are not persecuted because they are politically powerless; rather, they are politically powerless because they are persecuted. Political powerlessness is not the reason for the persecution; it is the harm to be remedied. Furthermore, it would be difficult to argue that political powerlessness is an innate or immutable characteristic (I trust that it is not), or that political powerlessness is “fundamental to identity, conscience or the exercise of one’s human rights.” Accordingly, a particular social group defined as “persons politically powerless to protect their environment,” is unlikely to meet with the recognition of refugee claim adjudicators. Finally, the travaux préparatoires supports a generally pessimistic assessment with respect to disaster-induced displacement, indicating that drafters did not intend to extend the Refugee Convention’s application to victims of natural catastrophe. Indeed, at a July 1951 meeting of 158. U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, supra note 145, at 10. 159. Id. 160. U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, Guidelines on International Protection No. 2: “Membership of a particular social group” within the context of Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention and/or its 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, U.N. Doc. HCR/GIP/02/02, ¶ 1 (2002). 161. Id. ¶ 3. 162. Cooper, supra note 46, at 524. 163. U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, supra note 160, at ¶ 2. 164. Cooper, supra note 46, at 522. 23", "the Conference of Plenipotentiaries, Mr. Nehemiah Robinson, the Israeli delegate, flatly stated that, The text of sub-paragraph (2) [of article 1A—the refugee definition] obviously did not refer to refugees from natural disasters, for it was difficult to imagine that fires, floods, earthquakes or volcanic eruptions, for instance, differentiated between their victims on the grounds of race, religion or political opinion.165 No one challenged Robinson’s assessment with respect to natural disasters. Thus, while one can make a case for recognizing some disaster victims as “Convention refugees,” UNHCR has conceded that, “the large majority of persons leaving their countries in the context of disasters are unlikely to qualify as refugees under extant international law.”166 Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement Though they constitute nonbinding “soft law,” the 1998 Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement,167 draw upon “binding principles found in refugee, human rights and international humanitarian law.”168 The Guiding Principles are relevant to disaster-induced displacement for two reasons: first, because the vast majority of people displaced by natural disaster never cross an international border, and second, because the Guiding Principles expressly extend application to persons displaced by natural disaster. For the purposes of the Principles, paragraph 2 defines “internally displaced persons” as: ...persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized State border.169 The requirement that internally displaced persons must “not have crossed an internationally recognized State border” should be read in a “broad sense” to include not only those compelled to leave their home or habitual residence for another part of the country, but also those who, as a matter of necessity, traverse part of another nation to reach an alternative safe area in the country of origin, those who voluntarily or involuntarily exit the country of 165. General Assembly, Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees and Stateless Persons, Summary Record of the 22nd Meeting Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, on Monday, July 16, 1951, at 10:00 a.m., 6, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.2/SR.22 (Nov. 26, 1951). 166. U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, supra note 145. 167. ESCOR, Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement: Report of the Rep. of the Secretary- General, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2 (Feb. 11, 1998). 168. Zetter, supra note 83, at 133. 169. ESCOR, supra note 169, at ¶ 2 (emphasis added). 24", "origin and subsequently re-enter, but who nonetheless cannot return to their homes or places of habitual residence (for a reason stated in paragraph 2), as well as those who voluntarily leave for another part of their country of origin, but who later cannot return to their homes or places of habitual residence “because of events occurring during their absence that make return impossible or unreasonable.”170 In any event, the designation “internally displaced person” under the Guiding Principles does not establish a new legal category conferring a particular legal status. Rather, the definition is descriptive, meant to characterize those for whom certain rights are guaranteed as a function of 1) the fact that they are human, and 2) the fact that they are displaced—a position of “peculiar vulnerability” from which special needs flow.171 The Guiding Principles include “victims of disasters” because “experience shows that they also can, as a consequence of their displacement, become victims of human rights violations such as discrimination (e.g., because they have to move to an area where they constitute an ethnic minority), sexual and gender based violence (e.g., in overcrowded camps), or disregard of their property rights.”172 In 2006, the Council of Europe’s Committee of Ministers recommended that, the Guiding Principles “apply to all internally displaced persons, including persons displaced from their homes or places of habitual residence due to natural or man-made disasters.”173 The Ministers noted that the Principles “have gained international recognition and authority,” stressed a “willingness to implement [the Guiding Principles] in the member states’ national legislation and policy,” as well as a desire to promote and further developed the Principles as a minimum standard, beyond which more favorable standards may emerge.174 Disaster Displacement in European Union Law This section reviews the Qualification Directive175 and Temporary Protection Directive,176 two key instruments agreed in the first phase of EU efforts to “harmonize” migration and 170. Walter Kälin, Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement: Annotations, 38 STUD. TRANSNAT’L LEGAL POL’Y 1, 3-4 (2008). 171. Id. at 4-5. 172. Id. at 4. 173. Council of Europe, Rec(2006)6 of the Committee of Ministers to Member States on Internally Displaced Persons of 5 April 2006, ¶ 1 (adopted by the Committee of Ministers at the 961st meeting of the Ministers’ Deputies) (emphasis added). 174. See id. pmbl. 175. Council Directive 2004/83/EC of Apr. 29, 2004 on Minimum Standards for the Qualification and Status of Third Country Nationals or Stateless Persons as Refugees or as Persons Who Otherwise Need International Protection and the Content of the Protection Granted, 2004 O.J. (L 304) 12 (EC) [hereinafter Qualification Directive]. 176. Council Directive 2001/55/EC of 20 July 2001 on Minimum Standards for Giving Temporary Protection in the Event of a Mass Influx of Displaced Persons and on Measures Promoting a Balance of Efforts between Member States in Receiving Such Persons and Bearing the Consequences Thereof, 2001 O.J. (L 212) 12 [hereinafter Temporary Protection Directive]. 25" ]

[ "Notes 1. World Bank Group, “Military Expenditure (% of GDP),” 2016, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/MS.MIL.XPND. GD.ZS?locations=IR. 2. Ibid. 3. Ibid. 4. Ali Alfoneh, The Revolutionary Guards’ Looting of Iran’s Economy, American Enterprise Institute, June 2010, https://www.aei. org/wp-content/uploads/2011/10/03-MEO-2010-g.pdf. 5. Jon Greenberg, “Obama: Iran Spends $30 Billion on Defense; U.S. About $600 Billion,” Politifact, April 9, 2015, http://www. politifact.com/truth-o-meter/statements/2015/apr/09/barack-obama/obama-iran-spends-30-billion-defense-us-about-600-/. 6. Eli Lake, “Iran Spends Billions to Prop Up Assad,” June 9, 2015, https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2015-06-09/iran- spends-billions-to-prop-up-assad. 7. IHS Markit, “Iran—Defence Industry,” Jane’s World Defence Industry, August 7, 2015. 8. IHS Markit, “Procurement,” Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment—The Gulf States, January 5, 2016. 9. Ibid., 4–5. 10. John Matthew McInnis and Ashton Gilmore, Iran at War, American Enterprise Institute, December 2016, https://www.aei.org/ wp-content/uploads/2016/12/RPT-FP-McInnis-Iran-at-War-final-December-2016.pdf. 11. Mohammad Reza Farzanegan, Military Spending and Economic Growth: The Case of Iran, no. 23 (April 21, 2012), https://www. uni-marburg.de/fb02/makro/forschung/magkspapers/23-2012_farzanegan.pdf. 12. Michael Singh, “Aligning with Rouhani Is Not the Answer,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, January 27, 2015, http:// www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/a-deal-with-the-devil. 13. Ibid. 14. It is notable from a US policy perspective that these efforts toward diversification are arguably due in large part to the second order effects of international sanctions on Iran’s oil exports. Regardless of the internal debate over resistance economy, sanctions have pushed Iran toward less reliance on its energy sector. See IHS Markit, “Iran Defence Budget,” Jane’s Defence Budgets, January 18, 2016, 2. 15. Richard Nephew and Djaved Salehi-Isfahani, “Implications of Sustained Low Oil Prices on Iran,” Columbia University, July 2015, http://energypolicy.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/energy/Implications%20of%20Sustained%20Low%20Oil%20Prices%20on%20 Iran_July%202015.pdf. 16. Tsvetana Paraskova, “Here Are Some Wild Oil Predictions for 2017,” Business Insider, December 26, 2016, http://www.busines-s sinsider.com/where-will-the-price-of-oil-be-in-2017-2016-12. 17. IHS Markit, “Defence Production and R&D,” Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment—The Gulf States, January 5, 2016, 1. 18. Emanuele Ottolenghi et al., “How the Nuclear Deal Enriches Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps,” Foundation for Defense of Democracies, 2016, 19, http://www.defenddemocracy.org/content/uploads/documents/IRGC_Report.pdf. 19. Stratfor, “In Iran, Economic Reforms Hit a Hard Line,” April 13, 2016, https://www.stratfor.com/analysis/iran-economic- reforms-hit-hard-line. 20. Ibid. 21. Saeed Ghasseminejad, “How Iran’s Mafia-Like Revolutionary Guard Rules the Country’s Black Market,” Business Insider, December 10, 2015, http://www.businessinsider.com/how-irans-mafia-like-revolutionary-guard-rules-the-countrys-black-market-2015-12. 22. Radio Farda, “Iran’s Defense Budget Increased by 3,500 Million USD,” March 19, 2016, http://www.radiofarda.com/a/b22_iran_ parliament_increase_defence_budget/27673122.html. 26", "BUILDING THE IRANIAN MILITARY J. MATTHEW MCINN IS 23. Alfoneh, The Revolutionary Guards’ Looting of Iran’s Economy. 24. Ottolenghi, How the Nuclear Deal Enriches Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps, 8–10. 25. Ibid. 26. Ali Alfoneh, “How Intertwined Are the Revolutionary Guards in Iran’s Economy?,” AEI’s Critical Threats Project, October 22, 2007, https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/how-intertwined-are-the-revolutionary-guards-in-irans-economy. 27. Ottolenghi, How the Nuclear Deal Enriches Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps, 8–10. 28. Ibid. 29. Steve Stecklow, Yeganeh Torbati, and Babak Dehghanpisheh, “Khamenei Controls Massive Financial Empire Built on Property Seizures,” November 11, 2013, http://www.reuters.com/investigates/iran/#article/part1. 30. Ottolenghi, How the Nuclear Deal Enriches Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps, 22. 31. Stockholm Internation Peace Research Institute, “SIPRI Milex Data 1988-2015,” 2016, https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/ Milex-constant-USD.pdf. 32. Author’s analysis. 33. IHS Markit, “Iran Defence Budget,” 1. 34. In April 2015, US President Barack Obama stated in a speech that Iran spends approximately $30 billion USD on its military. Nei- ther the president nor any other US government entity provided any more details to illuminate this claim. No independent estimates of Iran’s current military spending exceeds $20 billion per year. If one includes Iranian outlays, however, to provide direct economic support to President Bashar al Assad and other key allies while sustaining the IRGC-led operations in Syria and Iraq, the $30 billion USD could be possible. On June 9, 2015, in an interview on Israeli television, President Obama stated that Iran spends $15 billion USD a year on defense, in line with estimates in this report. See Lake, “Iran Spends Billions to Prop Up Assad.” 35. Ibid. 36. IHS, “Defence Production and R&D,” 1. 37. Author’s analysis; and IHS Markit, “Iran Defence Budget,” 7. 38. Ibid., 8 39. Author’s analysis. 40. See Figure 3. 41. World Bank, “Military Expenditure (% of GDP).” 42. Alfoneh, The Revolutionary Guards’ Looting of Iran’s Economy. 43. Greenberg, “Obama: Iran Spends $30 Billion on Defense; U.S. About $600 Billion.” 44. World Bank, “Military Expenditure (% of GDP) USA,” http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/MS.MIL.XPND.GD.ZS?locations=US. 45. World Bank, “Military Expenditure (% of GDP) Saudi Arabia,” http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/MS.MIL.XPND.GD.ZS? locations=SA. 46. Lake, “Iran Spends Billions to Prop Up Assad.” 47. IHS, “Iran Defence Budget,” 7. 48. Patrick Clawson, “Iran’s ‘Frozen’ Assets: Exaggeration on Both Sides of the Debate,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, September 1, 2015, http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/irans-frozen-assets-exaggeration-on-both-sides-of-the- debate. 49. Young Journalists Club, “Parvand-e budjeh 95 dar baharastan basteh shod” [The Case of the 95 Budget Is Closed in Parliament], April 19, 2016, http://bit.ly/2jLqZ1A. 50. President Rouhani originally claimed during 2016 parliamentary debates that the $1.7 billion USD transferred from the US was already designated for nondefense purposes, but the final budget law approved required the Iranian central bank to allocate the mon- eys for the military. Rouhani’s initial use or misallocation may explain the confusion surrounding the moneys, including in the official exchanges and assessments in the US on the issue between Gen. Joseph Dunford, the chairman, the joint chiefs of staff, and members of the Senate in December 2016. Given the liquidity in the Iranian budgetary system and importance of legal guidance from parliament and the Guardian Council, the $1.7 billion or some close equivalent was most likely given or will be given to the military. 27", "BUILDING THE IRANIAN MILITARY J. MATTHEW MCINN IS 51. Elise Labott, Nicole Gaouette, and Kevin Liptak, “US Sent Plane with $400 Million in Cash to Iran,” CNN, August 4, 2016, http:// www.cnn.com/2016/08/03/politics/us-sends-plane-iran-400-million-cash/. 52. Mashregh News, “10% Financing Approved for 95 Projects in Order to Increase Defense,” April 30, 2016, http://bit.ly/2k7rztD. 53. Fars News Agency, “Samaneh padafandhavaye-e mushaki bord-e motavast-e mersad amadeh-ye bahrahbardari shod” [The Mer- sad Medium-Range Missile Is Ready for Operation], April 11, 2010, http://www.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=8901220244. 54. See Figure 4. 55. World Bank, “Military Expenditure (% of GDP).” 56. Rouhani’s economic team believes that without absorbing $30–$50 billion of foreign investment per year Iran will not be able to reach its target of 8 percent economic growth. 57. The current group of 20–24 year olds is at about 3.5 million with the next group being 20 percent smaller and the following group slightly smaller than that. 58. Tehran Times, “Annual FDI in Iran Expected to Hit $8 Billion,” June 18, 2016, http://www.tehrantimes.com/news/403520/Annual- FDI-in-Iran-expected-to-hit-8-billion. These numbers could come in even lower. 59 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, World Investment Report 2016: Iran, Islamic Republic of, June 21, 2016, http://unctad.org/sections/dite_dir/docs/wir2016/wir16_fs_ir_en.pdf. 60 IHS, “Procurement,” 4–5. 61 Ibid. 62. Ibid., 6. 63. Khamenei.ir, “Increasing Defensive and Offensive Capabilities Is Iran’s Inalienable Right,” September 1, 2016, http://english. khamenei.ir/news/4116/Increasing-Defensive-and-Offensive-Capabilities-is-Iran-s-Inalienable. 64. Global Security, “Chemical Weapons,” http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/iran/cw.htm. 65. IHS Markit, “Armed Forces,” Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment—The Gulf States, January 27, 2016, 8–10. 66. Ibid. 67. Nuclear Threat Initiative, “Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL),” December 1, 2016, http://www.nti.org/ learn/facilities/274/. 68. Michele Gaietta, The Trajectory of Iran’s Nuclear Program (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 55–56. 69. Ottolenghi, How the Nuclear Deal Enriches Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps, 7. 70. Iran Watch, “Defense Industries Organization (DIO),” March 17, 2010, http://www.iranwatch.org/iranian-entities/defense- industries-organization-dio. 71. Ibid. 72. Ibid. 73. Anthony H. Cordesman, “The Conventional Military,” Iran Primer, August 2015, http://iranprimer.usip.org/resource/ conventional-military. 74. IHS, “Procurement,” 6. 75. Pakistan Defence, “Zulfiqar MBT, Iran,” August 8, 2007, http://defence.pk/threads/zulfiqar-mbt-iran.6691/. 76. Global Security, “T-72Z / Safir-74,” http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/iran/safir-74.htm. 77. IHS, “Procurement,” 7. 78. Farzin Nadimi, “Iran and Russia’s Growing Defense Ties,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, February 18, 2016, http:// www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/iran-and-russias-growing-defense-ties. 79. McInnis and Gilmore, Iran at War, 26–28. 80. IHS, “Procurement,” 24. 81. US Office of Naval Intelligence, Iran’s Naval Forces: From Guerilla Warfare to a Modern Naval Strategy, FAS, 2009, 6–12. 82. Ibid., 18 83. IHS, “Iran,” Jane’s World Navies, March 2, 2016, 15. 84. James Brandon Gentry, “China’s Role in Iran’s Anti-Access / Area Denial Weapons Capability Development,” Middle East 28", "BUILDING THE IRANIAN MILITARY J. MATTHEW MCINN IS Institute, April 16, 2013, http://www.mei.edu/content/china%E2%80%99s-role-iran%E2%80%99s-anti-access-area-denial-weapons- capability-development. 85. IHS, “Iran,” 17. 86. Gentry, “China’s Role in Iran’s Anti-Access / Area Denial Weapons Capability Development.” 87. IHS, “Iran,” 17. 88. IHS, “Iran—Air Force,” 4. 89. Ibid., 23. 90. Ibid., 17. 91. Ibid., 8. 92. McInnis and Gilmore, Iran at War, 6. 93. David Donald, “Iran Shows New Attack Helicopter and Missiles,” Aviation International News, January 18, 2013, http://www. ainonline.com/aviation-news/defense/2013-01-18/iran-shows-new-attack-helicopter-and-missiles. 94. Amir Toumaj, “Iran Army Hints at Deployment of Special Forces to Syria and Iraq,” FDD’s Long War Journal, March 25, 2016, http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2016/03/iran-deploys-army-special-forces-to-syria-and-iraq.php. 95. Alla Kassianova, “Russian Weapons Sales to Iran: Why They Are Unlikely to Stop,” Program on New Approaches to Research and Security in Eurasia, December 2006, http://www.ponarseurasia.org/sites/default/files/policy-memos-pdf/pm_0427.pdf. 96. Jeremy Bender, “Here’s Why Russia Selling S-300 Advanced Missile Systems to Iran Is Such a Big Deal,” Business Insider, June 4, 2015, http://www.businessinsider.com/why-russian-s-300-sale-to-iran-is-a-big-deal-2015-6. 97. Jeremy Binney, “Iran Unveils Bavar-373 Long-Range Air-Defence System,” IHS Jane’s 360, August 24, 2016, http://www.janes. com/article/63215/iran-unveils-bavar-373-long-range-air-defence-system. 98. IHS, “Iran—Air Force,” 8. 99. Fars News Agency, “Medium Range Mersad Missile System Ready for Operation,” April 11, 2010, http://www.farsnews.com/ newstext.php?nn=8901220244. 100. Scott Peterson, “Iran Missile System Tested, Rhetoric Sharpened on Eve of NATO Summit,” Christian Science Monitor, November 18, 2010, http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2010/1118/Iran-missile-system-tested-rhetoric-sharpened-on-eve- of-NATO-summit/%28page%29/2. 101. Army Recognition, “Iran Starts Mass Production of New Home-Made Air Defense Missile System Ya Zahra,” January 27, 2013, http://www.armyrecognition.com/january_2013_army_military_defense_industry_news/iran_starts_mass_production_of_new_home- made_air_defense_missile_system_ya_zahra_2701134.html. 102. Office of the Secretary of Defense, Proliferation: Threat and Response, Department of Defense, January 2001, 38, http://www.dod. gov/pubs/ptr20010110.pdf. 103. Paul K. Kerr, Stephen A. Hildreth, and Mary Beth D. Nikitin, “Iran-North Korea-Syria Ballistic Missile and Nuclear Cooperation,” Congressional Research Service, February 26, 2016, 3–4. 104. Iran Watch, “Iran Test Fires Nuclear-Capable Ballistic Missile in Apparent Violation of U.N. Resolutions,” October 15, 2015, http://www.iranwatch.org/our-publications/nuclear-iran-weekly/iran-test-fires-nuclear-capable-ballistic-missile-apparent- violation-un-resolutions. 105. Breanna Gautam, “Fact Sheet: Iran’s Nuclear and Ballistic Missile Programs,” Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, May 1, 2015, http://armscontrolcenter.org/fact-sheet-irans-nuclear-and-ballistic-missile-programs/. 106. Anthony H. Cordesman, Iran’s Rocket and Missile Forces and Strategic Options, Center for Strategic and International Studies, December 2014, 66–68, https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/legacy_files/files/publication/141218_Cordesman_IranRocket8- MissileForces_Web.pdf. 107. IHS, “Iran—Air Force,” 20. 108. Ibid. 109. Ibid., 22. 110. Ibid., 4. 29", "BUILDING THE IRANIAN MILITARY J. MATTHEW MCINN IS 111. Ibid. 112. Ibid., 20. 113. Umid Niayesh, “Russia to Import Drone Technology from Iran,” Trend News Agency, August 26, 2015, http://en.trend.az/iran/ politics/2427336.html. 114. Iran Electronics Industries, “Radar and Electronic Warfare,” http://www.ieimil.ir/category/radars. 115. Khamenei.ir, “Increasing Defensive and Offensive Capabilities Is Iran’s Inalienable Right.” 116. Office of the supreme leader, “Supreme Leader Meets with Department of Defense Officials and Experts,” September 10, 2016, http://bit.ly/2kN5HAQ. 117. Ibid. 118. Ibid. 119. See Figure 3. 120. Erik A. Olson, “Iran’s Path Dependent Military Doctrine,” Strategic Studies Quarterly (Summer 2016), http://www.au.af.mil/au/ ssq/digital/pdf/Summer16/Olson.pdf. 121. Hossein Aryan, “The Artesh: Iran’s Marginalized and Under-Armed Conventional Military,” Middle East Institute, November 15, 2011, http://www.mei.edu/content/artesh-iran%E2%80%99s-marginalized-and-under-armed-conventional-military. 122. Ibid. 123. Ibid. 124. McInnis and Gilmore, Iran at War, 39. 125. Deception, exaggerated claims, information operations, and fake systems could be considered a fourth pathway. 126. See Figure 4. 127. Sputnik International, “Su-30s, Mi-8s: Iran Considers Inking $8 Billion Arms Deal with Russia,” February 16, 2016, https:// sputniknews.com/military/201602161034839542-iran-russia-military-cooperation/. 128. This effort may also come from an official budget allocation but is more likely to be funded through major off-budget initiatives through the IRGC’s various firms and holdings. 129. Paul Bucala and Marie Donovan, “A New Era for Iran’s Military Leadership,” AEI’s Critical Threats Project, December 1, 2016, http://www.irantracker.org/analysis/bucala-donovan-new-era-irans-military-leadership-december-1-2016. 130. Olson, “Iran’s Path Dependent Military Doctrine.” 131. Ibid., 69. 132. Thomas G. Nielson, “What Can Iran Gain by Having a Nuclear Weapons Program That Threatens to Destabilize Security in the Middle East?,” Institute for Strategy and Danish Institute for International Studies, June 2015, http://www.fak.dk/publikationer/ Documents/What%20can%20Iran%20gain.pdf. 30" ]

[ "CHAPTER THREE Addressing a New Paradigm: Infectious Disease and National Security Our first research question asks how the emerging link between global infectious disease and U.S. national security has been perceived and acted upon across government sectors. This chapter begins with a section describing the evolution of this new paradigm, the effects of infectious disease on security, the implications of a biosecurity policy orientation to natural disease outbreaks, and the implications for global disease reporting. This chapter then summa- rizes a number of recent U.S. security initiatives addressing infectious diseases. The final sec- tion presents the views of stakeholders we interviewed regarding their perceptions of the link between infectious disease and national security. Infectious Disease and Security Evolving Security Concepts Traditional views of the association between infectious disease and security have often focused on the effect of health on military success (for example, see Szreter, 2003). In fact, many health discoveries that were made in the course of efforts to protect armies ultimately benefited other populations as well. For example, discoveries made near the turn of the 20th century, includ- ing the tracing of the natural history of diseases such as yellow fever and malaria, were studied initially in an effort to protect military forces (Berlinguer, 2003), and World War II provided the impetus to mass-produce penicillin. Similarly, the U.S. State Department has speculated that disease will emerge as a “con- flict starter,” and possibly even a “war outcome determinant” (see, for example, Center for Strategic International Studies, 2000, and U.S. Department of State, 1995). The relationship between disease and warfare is as old as war itself. Indeed, disease among armies has long been a contributing factor to military outcomes, and warfare has contributed to the spread of dis- ease.1 Following World War II, and based upon the institutions established at the end of that war, worldwide perceptions of national security were largely restricted to the military defense of territorial borders and interests; these perceptions were not much different from concepts of security prior to that war (Rothschild, 1995). The association of disease with warfare parallels traditional views of national security, i.e., armed protection of a nation’s borders and inter- 1 A complete discussion of this subject is beyond the scope of this study; more information can be found in Gabriel and Metz (1992) and Smallman-Raynor and Cliff (2004). 15", "16 Infectious Disease and National Security: Strategic Information Needs ests. Similarly, traditional views of the relationship between disease and security have focused on the threat of disease spreading across borders. However, increasing worldwide attention has recently been paid to a broader issue: the effect of infectious disease on other concepts of security. These newer concepts include the recognition of the inherent benefit of health: “[H]ealth itself is a power, a fundamental capacity for the development or maintenance of all other capacities” (Berlinguer, 2003, p. 57). This view has been extended from the individual to the state: when nations recognize that investment in health can improve the health of a nation’s population, advance its economy, and “promote humane values and moral leadership in a world of opportunities and profound health needs” (Howson, Fineberg, and Bloom, 1998, p. 590). This view illustrates the newly evolving concept of “human security.” In 1994, the UN Development Programme wrote of a transition “from nuclear security to human secu- rity,” meaning safety from “hunger, disease and repression” (United Nations Development Programme, 1994, p. 23). Shortly thereafter, the UN Secretary-General gave formal voice to a development that had been more than a decade in the making, calling for a “conceptual break- through,” going “beyond armed territorial security” and protecting the “security of people in their homes, jobs, and communities” (Rothschild, 1995, quoting then–UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali). The UN established an independent international commission on human security in 2001, mandated to clarify the concept of human security for global policy and action (Chen and Narasimhan, 2003). Chen and Narasimhan (2003) assert that “a new people-centered paradigm, with its policy and operational implications, can complement and strengthen state security to protect people in an unstable and interconnected world,” and “control of global infections is not possible without surveillance, control and response linked to international trade, migration, and movements” (p. 11). The UN commission produced a working definition of human security: “The objective of human security is to safeguard the vital core of human lives from critical pervasive threats while promoting long-term human flourishing” (Chen and Narasimhan, 2003, p. 4). In its final report, the commission asserted that “[g]lobal health is both essential and instrumental to achieving human security,” and “illness, disability and avoidable death are ‘critical pervasive threats’ to human security” (Commission on Human Security, 2003, p. 96). Effects of Infectious Disease on Security The discussion of human security versus older, traditional ideas of security is useful in under- standing the moral values with which the global community appears to approach the impor- tance of health today. However, it remains somewhat intangible, leaving firm associations between health (including infectious disease) and security incompletely defined. As Chen and Narasimhan (2003) point out, “health and human security are fundamentally valued in all societies, but their connections and interdependencies are not well understood.” Nonetheless, some authors assert a solid association between health and security, at least for the United States: “National security and public health experts agree that infectious diseases pose a sub- stantial direct and indirect threat to U.S. interests” (U.S. Government Accounting Office, 2000a, p. 2). Such assertions are based on a growing body of evidence that associates infec-", "Addressing a New Paradigm: Infectious Disease and National Security 17 tious disease with effects that may ultimately threaten both human and national concepts of security. As Brower and Chalk (2003) conclude, there is a definite link between infectious disease and security: Disease can affect individuals and also weaken public confidence in a government’s ability to respond; they have an adverse economic impact, undermine a state’s social order, catalyze regional instability, and pose a strategic threat through bioterrorism or biowarfare. Compelling arguments have been made linking infectious disease to conditions that logi- cally can affect security. These conditions include those mentioned by Brower and Chalk (2003), and others that have been argued by numerous other authors. The following is a summary of research that has associated specific effects of infectious disease with threats to security. Direct Mortality and Morbidity. The most obvious effect of disease that may result in the instability of a nation or region is the toll of some diseases that have high mortality rates. Such diseases, especially if highly prevalent, can pose a direct risk to a nation’s security by threatening to sicken and kill a significant portion of a country’s population (Heymann, 2003; Price-Smith, 2002), and a disease that targets sectors of a population that are relied upon for production and military protection can be particularly ominous (see also Chyba, 1998; Enemark, 2004; Frist, 2005; and White House, 2004). HIV/AIDS is a disease often cited in this regard. Economic Loss. As detailed in examples later in this chapter, an outbreak of disease—or even the perceived threat of an outbreak—can have significant repercussions on trade and travel for the affected nation. The economic effects of infectious diseases—whether endemic, e.g., malaria, or epidemic, e.g., cholera—can be devastating. As just one example, it has been estimated that Africa’s gross domestic product would be nearly one-third higher if malaria alone had been eliminated several decades ago (U.S. General Accounting Office, 2001). Many of these effects are indirect (e.g., loss of productivity and commerce), but there are also direct economic costs (e.g., culling of animal herds and medical costs of treating humans) that may affect security and relationships between nations in need and those able to provide assistance to control outbreaks. (For examples of both direct and indirect costs, see Brower and Chalk, 2003; Cash and Narasimhan, 2000; Enemark, 2004; Frist, 2005; Heymann, 2003; United Nations Security Council, 2000; U.S. General Accounting Office, 2001; U.S. National Intelligence Council, 2000; White House, 2004; and Wilson, 2003a.) In addition, the UN estimated in 2002 that $20 billion would be needed by 2007 to provide adequate prevention and care for populations affected by HIV/AIDS in low- and middle-income countries (UNAIDS, 2002; see also World Health Organization, 2002). Social and Governmental Disruption. It has been documented that infectious diseases cause significant social disruption through fear and anxiety about a disease (based on accurate or inaccurate information), the loss of people in key social positions due to illness or death, discrimination against groups affected by a disease, and the loss of the majority of (or entire) specific demographic groups. (For examples of social disruption, see Chyba, 1998; Elbe, 2002; Enemark, 2004; Heymann, 2003; Ostergard, 2002; Shisana, Zungu-Dirwayi, and Shisana, 2003; Store, Welch, and Chen, 2003; UNAIDS, 2004; U.S. National Intelligence Council, 2000; White House, 2004; and Wilson, 2003a.) Consider HIV/AIDS: In 2003, there were 3 million new infections in sub-Saharan Africa (UNAIDS, 2002, 2004). Since it was first", "18 Infectious Disease and National Security: Strategic Information Needs diagnosed in 1981, HIV/AIDS has accounted for approximately 20 million deaths worldwide. Between 34.6 and 42.3 million people were living with HIV/AIDS in 2003, and the dis- ease had orphaned approximately 12 million children in sub-Saharan Africa alone (UNAIDS, 2004). Half of new infections occur among 15- to 24-year-olds (UNAIDS, 2004), a tradition- ally productive segment of society. The reduction of this demographic group can lead to eco- nomic loss due to reduced productivity, but it also represents the loss of a core group of parents, social leaders, and key members of society, such as teachers and soldiers. Ministries of defense in some sub-Saharan African countries report HIV prevalence averages of 20–40 percent in their armed services, potentially affecting their military capabilities (UNAIDS, 2002). Not surprisingly, HIV/AIDS in sub-Saharan Africa has been associated with the destabi- lization of infrastructures needed for governance (Heymann, 2003), as well as with the disrup- tion of cohesion and stability of families, communities, and nation-states (Heymann, 2003; Shisana, Zungu-Dirwayi, and Shisana, 2003; Store, Welch, and Chen, 2003). As a society is degraded by infectious disease, its populace may lose confidence in a government that seems unable to control the disease. Such a loss in confidence, it has been asserted, results in a deg- radation of a government’s legitimacy and may lead to increased migration or increased vul- nerability to economic or military competition from other nations. (For examples of govern- ment disruption and instability, see Brower and Chalk, 2003; Enemark, 2004; Heymann, 2003; Huang, 2003; Ostergard, 2002; United Nations Security Council, 2000; U.S. National Intelligence Council, 2000; and Wilson, 2003a.) Implications of a Biodefense Orientation for Natural Disease Outbreaks Heymann (2003) points out that the response of industrialized countries has not been com- mensurate with the views of various organizations, such as the UN and the U.S. National Intelligence Council, that infectious diseases pose a threat to international security. During the 1990s, it remained unclear whether or not infectious diseases were seriously considered in the national security strategies of developed countries. That changed after the attacks on the United States in September and October 2001, and the newly perceived risk of bioterrorism, “immediately raised the infectious disease threat to the level of a high priority security impera- tive worthy of attention in defense and intelligence circles” (Heymann, 2003, p. 105). While there is growing recognition in recent U.S. policy that improved preparation for bioattacks (i.e., bioterrorism) on the U.S. homeland can also result in improved surveillance for and response to naturally occurring disease outbreaks and vice versa, it is obvious that many of the initiatives since 2001 (described later in this chapter) have been focused on the former. There has been some debate about whether preparation for both events is complementary or whether a focus on bioattacks distracts from surveillance of naturally occurring disease, or vice versa. Brower and Chalk (2003) suggested that the United States expends considerable policy attention and resources to defend against “relatively unlikely” scenarios, such as a large-scale bioterrorist attack, concluding that “[r]esponses to more commonly occurring and currently more taxing natural outbreaks remain relatively overlooked and underfunded” (p. xix). In recent years, the public health and homeland security communities seem to have come to a realization that the public health infrastructure for infectious diseases in fact also under- pins the public health aspects of bioterrorism detection and early response. It seems to many", "Addressing a New Paradigm: Infectious Disease and National Security 19 that the only rational way to defend the world against a bioterrorist attack is to have a central principle of global public health security and to strengthen the capacity to detect and con- tain naturally occurring outbreaks (Heymann, 2003). Some authors have argued compellingly that public health surveillance for emerging diseases and preparedness for and detection of biological terrorism are strongly related (see, for example, Chyba, 1998). Presentations by the United States and other countries at the July 19–24, 2004, Meeting of Experts, held during the Biological and Toxins Weapon Convention, addressed surveillance and mitigation within this very framework, i.e., bioterrorism detection and early response relying in large part on the underlying public health infrastructure.2 The themes of the 2002 U.S. National Security Strategy include defeating terrorism and tyranny, as well as fostering the spread of freedom worldwide. U.S. experts recognized that infectious diseases pose a substantial obstacle to U.S. efforts to encourage economic growth and betterment in the lives of the poor in the developing world (U.S. General Accounting Office, 2000a). For example, the National Security Strategy recognizes that the United States’ strategic priority of combating global terror is threatened by disease (as well as war and des- perate poverty) in Africa. While a significant focus of the strategy is defense against terror- ist attacks in the United States, it also acknowledges that investments to defend against such attacks also present related opportunities: “Our medical system will be strengthened to manage not just bioterror, but all infectious diseases and mass-casualty dangers” (White House, 2002, pp. 6–7). Infectious Disease, Security, and Disease Reporting Given the potential consequences of infectious disease on a country’s international trade and economy (and, by extension, security), it is not surprising that some countries choose not to report disease outbreaks, or at least to delay their reporting. Such decisions can have global effects. With the major exception of HIV/AIDS, newly identified infectious diseases have not had a large effect on global infectious disease mortality, but new diseases are of concern due to their large numbers of casualties and high profile (Wilson, 2003a). While this observation is not necessarily predictive of the mortality caused by future emerging and reemerging diseases, the visibility of some diseases has caused anxiety that is sometimes out of proportion with the actual risk. Examples include plague in India (Wilson, 1995a) and Ebola in sub-Saharan Africa, which has emerged periodically since 1976, even though no scientific evidence suggests a serious risk of global spread of Ebola (other than through bioterrorism) (Wilson, 2003a). It should be noted that the level of anxiety caused by some diseases is, in fact, commensurate with the scale of their actual medical and societal effects. HIV/AIDS is one such example. In other cases, an increased level of anxiety can make permissible intensive and large-scale public health measures that may not have been possible previously, as was seen in the global response to SARS and the public acceptance of containment measures. 2 Melinda Moore, an author of this report, was a U.S. delegate to this meeting. The meeting report is available at http:// www.opbw.org/new_process/mx2004/bwc_msp.2004_mx_3_E.pdf, and a related press release is available at http:// www2.unog.ch/news2/documents/newsen/dc04029e.htm (both as of October 31, 2005).", "20 Infectious Disease and National Security: Strategic Information Needs Nonetheless, anxiety associated with such diseases, as well as subsequent legitimate public health intervention measures, has sometimes resulted in significant economic effects, including lost trade and tourism and the required culling of animal herds. Such economic effects or other unfavorable treatment by the world community have been a disincentive for countries to report outbreaks (see Cash and Narasimhan, 2000, and Fidler, 1997), yet they can have an important net benefit on public health and the global economy.3 As such, a disinclination of countries to report and respond appropriately to disease outbreaks poses a dangerous prospect in the face of a potential worldwide disease outbreak, such as pandemic influenza. International knowledge about infectious disease outbreaks, whether reported by the affected country or otherwise discovered, can have significant negative economic consequences through decreased trade and travel. Cash and Narasimhan (2000), in a study on the impedi- ments of global infectious disease surveillance, found that “current guidelines and regulations on emerging and re-emerging infectious diseases do not sufficiently take into account the fact that when developing countries report outbreaks they often derive few benefits and suffer dis- proportionately heavy social and economic consequences” (p. 1358). Their article presented two cases to support this conclusion: plague in India and cholera in South America. The illus- trative case of plague in India is summarized below. Plague in India. In September 1994, a hospital in Surat, India, admitted seven patients with pneumonia-like symptoms. Rather than waiting a week for laboratory confirmation of plague-like bacilli from patient samples, Indian officials declared an outbreak of plague. This decision may have also reflected a conservative public health approach, prompted by the fact that India’s public health laboratory infrastructure had eroded in the previous decade. Unfortunately, like many other places in the world, India lacked a robust diagnostic capability to confirm or rule out plague infections rapidly and confidently.4 Within three days, as many as 500,000 people fled Surat and the surrounding area, reacting to media reports of a plague outbreak. A low-threshold case definition of plague was adopted, and any persons showing respiratory symptoms were quarantined. Schools were closed, cargo was fumigated against rodents, flea controls were implemented, and antibiotics were administered to individuals who were presumed to be exposed. A WHO investigative team concluded that these measures were excessive. After implementing control measures, India declared the epidemic controlled in early October 1994, and the WHO concurred at the end of October of that year. In the end, either no (Cash and Narasimhan, 2000) or few cases of plague were confirmed on the basis of WHO bacterial standards.5 Even without a scientific confirmation of a plague outbreak, press reports were estimat- ing the magnitude of the outbreak, and some nations responded by stopping air travel to and from India. Although the WHO requested that no travel or trade restrictions be imposed, Bangladesh, Oman, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates stopped importing all Indian food; 3 Economic benefits of local intervention measures may be realized outside the affected country by preventing the inter- national spread of disease, thus avoiding increased costs of additional, widespread animal culling and reduced trade and travel among other countries, for example. 4 Ruth Berkelman, Emory University, personal communication, March 14, 2006. 5 Ruth Berkelman, Emory University, personal communication, March 14, 2006.", "Addressing a New Paradigm: Infectious Disease and National Security 21 Bangladesh halted all goods and people from crossing its border with India. Canada, France, Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom, and the United States issued travel warnings. Italy placed an embargo on all Indian goods, and Sweden canceled all textile shipments (Cash and Narasimhan, 2000, citing media reports). The world reaction to the suspected—but unconfirmed—plague outbreak had a signifi- cant impact on India’s economy. In 1994, India’s trade deficit doubled in comparison to the year before (Fidler et al., 1997). Overall, losses associated with the reported outbreak have been estimated at $2 billion (Levy and Gage, 1999), though long-term loss projections may be higher (Cash and Narasimhan, 2000). Cash and Narasimhan (2000) comment that other countries, observing the price that India paid, will probably be more reluctant to report similar outbreaks in the future. These authors observe that “[p]aradoxically, when a country reports an outbreak, the international community may benefit relatively little, whereas the reporting country itself may suffer great losses” (Cash and Narasimhan, 2000, p. 1364). They conclude that, if the interests of reporting countries are not protected, they are “likely to continue trying to conceal epidemics, and the goals of global surveillance are unlikely to be fully achieved” (p. 1365). In addition to economic consequences, countries may also be unwilling to report out- breaks or may overstate their preparedness for reasons of international prestige. For example, nearly every country initially denied or minimized the prevalence of HIV/AIDS within its borders (U.S. National Intelligence Council, 2000), partly because of the social and sexual stigma surrounding the disease. There is some evidence that a desire to protect its international image was a factor in China’s reluctance to report an outbreak of SARS in 2003, although the economic consequences of that outbreak were also significant, as discussed below. SARS in China and Beyond. The world experience of the 2003 SARS outbreak that began in China underscored the consequences of a nation failing to report an outbreak in a timely and accurate manner. The earliest human case of SARS is thought to have occurred in the Guangdong province, China, in November 2002. It apparently spread to humans through the slaughter of infected animals in unsanitary and crowded markets (Osterholm, 2005). The out- break came to the attention of Chinese health officials as early as a month later (Huang, 2003). Because Chinese law regarding the handling of public health–related information mandated that information about such outbreaks be classified as a state secret before being announced by the Ministry of Health, any physician or journalist who reported on the disease would risk accusation of leaking state secrets. Therefore, although the Chinese Ministry of Health was informed of the outbreak in January 2003, a news blackout persisted until February of that year (Huang, 2003), and the provincial government did not show evidence of taking the public health threat seriously and responding in a timely and appropriate manner. A contagious dis- ease coupled with government inaction took a significant toll on the frontline responders— health care providers (Huang, 2003). By the end of February 2003, nearly half the 900 cases in the Guangdong province city of Guangzhou were among health care workers (Pomfret, 2003). With a blackout on reporting about the disease within China, let alone the rest of the world, carriers of the disease traveled to other cities, provinces, and countries, perhaps oblivi- ous to the risk that they could spread the disease. The SARS outbreak was eventually noticed by the WHO. Finally, WHO experts were invited to China, where they were given access to", "22 Infectious Disease and National Security: Strategic Information Needs Guangdong only after waiting eight days in Beijing. They were not allowed to inspect military hospitals in Beijing for another week, and by that time the disease had already spread interna- tionally (Huang, 2003). In addition to the delay in reporting to the WHO, the information provided by Chinese officials was suspect, perhaps because they tried to avoid damage to China’s international image, as well as economic consequences that may have resulted from international reactions. When the WHO issued the first travel advisory in its 55-year history, recommending that people not visit Hong Kong or Guangdong, the Chinese health minister promised that China was safe and that the outbreak was under control. Earlier, the minister announced that only 12 cases of SARS had been identified in Beijing when in fact in the city’s No. 309 People’s Liberation Army Hospital alone there were 60 SARS patients (Huang, 2003). By the end of 2003, SARS had killed 774 people and infected over 8,000 people in 29 countries (World Health Organization, 2003). The initial lack of cooperation from officials in China may have contributed to this spread, but the extent to which it did so is unclear and may never be known (U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2004). It is also unclear the extent to which this initial lack of cooperation affected the overall economic consequence of the out- break, estimated at $11 billion to $18 billion (U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2004). What is clearer is that SARS highlighted the importance of prompt and accurate reporting of disease outbreaks. As summarized above and illustrated by the examples of plague in India and SARS in China and beyond, numerous authors have suggested that infectious disease can have signifi- cant effects on security, for individuals, nations, and the world. Because some of these effects are manifest in international relationships (e.g., travel and commerce), nations are caught in a difficult position when they experience an infectious disease outbreak. Reporting an outbreak can initiate a response internally and from outside the nation, which may result in timely and effective disease-control actions that mitigate social disruption, government destabilization, and loss of productivity within the affected country. On the other hand, a nation reporting a disease outbreak may experience disruption of trade and travel and suffer economic losses related to intervention measures (e.g., culling of bird flocks in the case of avian influenza). The resulting economic effects may be disproportionately large in the affected nation, in compari- son with the effects on its multiple trading partners. Faced with this possibility, an affected country may be reluctant to report an outbreak, given the current lack of protection against (what may be unnecessary) international reactions. Policymakers hope that improved global disease surveillance and the recently revised International Health Regulations, both described in Chapter Two, may help mitigate this problem. Infectious Disease and Recent U.S. National Security Initiatives While global infectious disease began to receive increased policy attention in the United States beginning in the 1990s, the attacks of September 11, 2001, and the anthrax attacks of the fol- lowing month, focused new attention on preparedness for detecting and responding to bio- terrorism attacks. The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), which was formed in", "Addressing a New Paradigm: Infectious Disease and National Security 23 response to the 2001 attacks, is the integrator of numerous new initiatives. The remainder of this chapter summarizes efforts to operationalize the new paradigm linking infectious diseases to national security, specifically the policy decisions following the attacks of 2001 and the resulting organizations and initiatives. These organizations and initiatives either build upon or supplement already-established systems for infectious disease surveillance. On June 12, 2002, Congress passed the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act (Public Law 107-188), requiring specific actions related to bioterrorism preparedness and response (U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2005). The law required the establishment of an integrated communications and surveillance network among federal, state, and local public health officials, as well as public and private health- related laboratories and hospitals. The act pertained to bioterrorism on the U.S. homeland, but the intended improvements are also useful for detecting and responding to natural infectious disease outbreaks. Concerned primarily about the potential risk to the United States from the deliberate use of biological agents, the President instructed federal departments and agencies to review their efforts and find ways to improve security against bioattacks in the United States. The result of this review was a joint strategy, embodied in Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD) 10 and National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 33, Biodefense for the 21st Century, collectively (White House, 2004). HPSD-10/NSPD-33 gives DHS the authority to coordinate a sustained effort against biological weapons threats, and it is based on four essen- tial pillars (White House, 2004; Vitko, 2005): 1. Threat awareness, including biological weapons–related intelligence, risk assessments, and anticipation of future threats 2. Prevention and protection, including proactive prevention and infrastructure protection 3. Surveillance and detection, including attack warning and attribution 4. Response and recovery. HSPD-10/NSPD-33 addresses the threat of deliberate use of a biological agent. While recognizing that “disease outbreaks, whether natural or deliberate, respect no geographic or political borders” (White House 2004), in only one instance does the document note that preparation for an intentional outbreak can also benefit the broader risk of natural infectious disease: “Private, local, and state capabilities are being augmented by and coordinated with Federal assets, to provide layered defenses against biological weapons attacks. These improve- ments will complement and enhance our defense against emerging or reemerging natural infec- tious diseases” (White House, 2004). HSPD-10/NSPD-33 spurred the development of a number of specific, related initia- tives. For example, the Office of Science and Technology Policy considers the Biosurveillance Initiative to be composed of three key initiatives: BioWatch, BioSense, and the National Biosurveillance Integration System (NBIS) (Office of Science and Technology Policy, 2005). Also stemming from HSPD-10/NSPD-33 are two initiatives related to research on and pro-", "24 Infectious Disease and National Security: Strategic Information Needs curement of medical countermeasures directed mostly against terrorism threats: BioShield and the National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures Center (NBACC). The following sec- tions summarize initiatives created by the U.S. government since 2001. BioWatch BioWatch is an early warning environmental monitoring system that collects air samples from multiple locations in approximately 30 U.S. cities deemed to be at high risk of an intentional attack with biological agents (Office of Science and Technology Policy, 2005). BioWatch labo- ratories, all of which are part of the CDC’s Laboratory Response Network (LRN), test the samples for selected agents and use a reporting system to send data to the CDC in order to support response to a potential outbreak (U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2005). BioWatch is a cooperative effort of DHS, the CDC’s LRN, and the Environmental Protection Agency (Office of Science and Technology Policy, 2005). BioSense Project BioSense was initiated by the CDC in fiscal year 2003 to improve the United States’ ability to monitor human health events.6 This nationwide system monitors the health status of American populations by analyzing diagnoses from ambulatory care sites, laboratory testing orders, and over-the-counter drug sales, in addition to other data sources. Monitored human disease trends can be integrated with environmental sampling data from Project BioWatch to present coordinated information to support response efforts (Office of Science and Technology Policy, 2005). However, the GAO has reported that BioSense is not widely used by state and local public health officials, primarily because of limitations in the data it collects (U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2005). National Biosurveillance Integration System A nascent government-wide system managed and coordinated by DHS, NBIS is intended to combine multiple data streams from sector-specific agencies—those with health, environ- mental, agricultural, and intelligence data—to provide all stakeholders with broad situational awareness that is expected to allow for earlier detection of events and to facilitate coordinated response (U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2005). The main goal of NBIS is to collect, assemble, and analyze a wide range of relevant information and make such information avail- able to government stakeholders in a timely and reliable fashion. Once fully operational, NBIS will collect data from DHS sources and other U.S. government agencies within a common platform and combine those data with environmental and intelligence data. Analysts from DHS will work together with analysts on DHS and NBIS detail from other federal agen- cies to process this information and present “situational awareness” to the DHS Homeland 6 Since the completion of data collection for this study, BioSense was revised and is now referred to as BioSense Real-Time (BioSense RT). This system is intended to receive a broad set of data directly from health care organizations in real time, with a special emphasis on information from emergency rooms, where people are most likely to go during an outbreak. It is also intended to provide simultaneous access to these data by all jurisdictional levels of public health (hospital, city, county, state, national). The emphasis of Biosense RT is less on the early detection of an event and more on how the health care system is able to respond by allocating available resources (see Caldwell, 2006).", "Addressing a New Paradigm: Infectious Disease and National Security 25 Security Operations Center (Morr, 2005) and an Interagency Incident Management Group, as described in the National Response Plan (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2004). NBIS is intended to help meet the HSPD-10/NSPD-33 call for “creating a national bio- awareness system that will permit the recognition of a biological attack at the earliest possible moment” (White House, 2004). Like other new DHS initiatives, NBIS was originally intended to focus only on intentional disease outbreaks (i.e., bioattacks) (Vitko, 2005). In fact, all of the DHS initiatives are intended to fit within the department’s “niche” by focusing exclusively on a homeland-directed attack (Morr, 2005), but officials at NBIS acknowledged that, because it is often difficult to determine initially whether or not an outbreak is deliberately caused, NBIS will also be useful in providing early warning of naturally occurring outbreaks. Further, unlike most other DHS initiatives, NBIS is more international in scope, though its intent is ultimately domestic protection. (NBACC also considers international information, including intelligence, to identify material threats.) A key component of NBIS is software that actively probes the Internet for reports or rumors of disease events; the software systematically searches over 1 million sites each day. There is some evidence that this software has identified recent outbreaks significantly earlier than other systems have. The DHS Science and Technology Directorate developed the NBIS system requirements and then transferred the initiative to the Directorate for Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection in December 2004 for implementation. The genesis of NBIS appears to be a com- prehensive 2003 study of the ability of the United States to rapidly detect bioattacks. A series of interagency meetings culminated in a report in December 2004 that marked the end of the requirements-determination process and the start of the implementation process. (The December 2004 report was not made available to RAND.) As of this writing, NBIS is under development, and its staff of analysts and information systems are being established in phases. NBIS officials intend for NBIS to serve as the “eyes and ears” of the nation for indicators and warnings that prompt early detection of a disease outbreak, whether natural or deliberate in origin; it is not designed to replace existing agencies’ responsibilities for response, risk assess- ment, or forensic attribution. BioShield Signed into law by President Bush in July 2004, Project BioShield is an initiative to speed the development and procurement of new medical countermeasures against chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear terrorist threats. The President committed $5.6 billion over ten years to accelerate development and stockpile vaccines, drugs, and diagnostic aids to fight anthrax, smallpox, and other potential threat agents (Office of Science and Technology Policy, 2005). The procurement of these products is supported by work at the NBACC. National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures Center In accordance with HSPD-10/NSPD-33, DHS requested and received appropriated funding, beginning in fiscal year 2003, for the construction of NBACC, a biodefense facility dedicated to homeland security activities. As of this writing, NBACC research programs are operating while the facility itself is being constructed within the National Interagency Biodefense Campus", "26 Infectious Disease and National Security: Strategic Information Needs at Fort Detrick, Maryland. Other agencies on this campus will include the Department of Health and Human Services’ National Institutes of Health (specifically, its National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases) and Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, the Department of Agriculture’s Agricultural Research Service and Foreign Disease–Weed Science Research Institute, and the Department of Defense’s (DoD’s) U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2005). Coordination of NBACC is performed by various interagency committees at different levels of seniority. NBACC principally comprises two component parts: the National Bioforensic Analysis Center and the Biological Threat Characterization Center (McQueary, 2005). A third com- ponent, the Biodefense Knowledge Center (BKC), was dedicated in September 2004 and is located at the Department of Energy’s Los Alamos National Laboratory (Shea, 2005). Programs undertaken by NBACC are currently conducted through partnerships and agreements with federal and private institutions (Martinez-Lopez, 2004); for example, the BKC draws upon the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory and three DHS Centers of Excellence, at the University of Minnesota, the University of Southern California, and Texas A&M University (U.S. Department of Energy, 2004). The mission of the NBACC is to understand current and future biological threats, assess vulnerabilities and determine potential consequences, and provide a national capability for conducting forensic analysis of evidence from biocrimes and terrorism (Albright, 2005). This mission will support the procurement of countermeasures under Project BioShield by assessing potential bioterrorism agents as “material threats.” Project BioShield requires that the Secretary of Homeland Security determine whether such a “mate- rial threat” exists before countermeasures can be taken (Gottron, 2003). NBACC provides a formal threat assessment every two years; the first is due in 2006 (Vitko, 2005). The scope of this first assessment has been agreed upon by the interagency Biodefense Policy Coordinating Committee, which is cochaired by the Homeland Security Council and the National Security Council. It will address 29 biological agents, evaluate the vulnerability of the United States to threats posed by these agents, and consider the potential consequences of any such attacks (Vitko, 2005). Department of Defense Initiatives DoD’s Walter Reed Army Institute of Research oversees the identification of possible biologi- cal threats to populations worldwide through the joint Global Emerging Infections System (GEIS), which draws upon overseas military medical research facilities to help monitor dis- ease, and the Electronic Surveillance System for the Early Notification of Community-Based Epidemics (ESSENCE), which uses data-mining techniques to identify unusually high rates of specified clinical syndromes. Additionally, DoD is deploying an improved Joint Biological Agent Identification and Diagnosis System to rapidly identify biological threat agents (Office of Science and Technology Policy, 2005).", "Addressing a New Paradigm: Infectious Disease and National Security 27 Summary A new paradigm has evolved that links infectious disease to security, recognizing the broad effects of disease on societies. One implication of this paradigm is that nations may take actions against one another to prevent infectious disease from reaching their borders. In some cases, these actions may be of some global benefit (i.e., in preventing disease spread), but their effects may result in disproportionate costs to a nation experiencing an outbreak. This situation can present disincentives to disease reporting by nations, even if the nation possesses the capability to do so. In recognition of this emerging paradigm, the United States has recently undertaken a number of initiatives to address infectious disease, including a DHS initiative, NBIS, intended to detect outbreaks worldwide and to provide information to all relevant federal stakeholders. Many stakeholders we interviewed acknowledged a link between infectious disease and national security. Their views are detailed in the next chapter.", "" ]

[ "Strategic Communication: An Integral Component of Counterinsurgency Operations Fred T. Krawchuk ∗ Introduction The tactical successes achieved by the United States and its allies in the war on terror- ism will mean little if the war for the hearts and minds of citizens in the Muslim world is lost. In a global counter-insurgency campaign, the military and other U.S. govern- ment agencies not only have to battle elusive foes, but also have to work closely with their counterparts in host nations, conduct sophisticated strategic communication ef- forts,1 support infrastructure development, and engage constructively with the local populace, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and the media. Counter-insur- gency is a separate and distinct form of warfare; it is a competition between ideologies and distinct socio-political movements. Successful counter-insurgency operations focus on diffusing violent socio-political movements, which is best done by drawing on a full spectrum of communications methods and thoughtful actions that encompasses programs across many agencies and non-governmental entities. Efforts to win hearts and minds will be much more effective if these efforts are coordinated, or at least if they do not work at cross-purposes. Stra- tegic communication is a critical component of such a strategy, and will be the focus of this paper. The United States government faces a formidable challenge when it comes to stra- tegic communication. Not everyone recognizes or fully appreciates the subtleties and complexities of strategy in today’s environment. The United States defense establish- ment is comfortable with fighting a conventional war, and is uncomfortable with the ∗ Lieutenant Colonel Fred T. Krawchuk is a U.S. Army Special Forces officer currently as- signed to the U.S. Pacific Command. He has led soldiers in a variety of infantry, information operations and special operations assignments in the United States, Europe, Asia, and Latin America. LTC Krawchuk served as an Olmsted Scholar in Spain and as an Army Senior Fellow with the U.S. Department of State. The personal views expressed in this paper are his alone, and do not represent the official policy or viewpoint of the Department of Defense or any other U.S. government agency. He may be reached at fred.krawchuk@gmail.com. 1 Strategic communication is the effective, thoughtful, and focused blending of public diplo- macy, information operations, non-military U.S. international broadcasting services, and public affairs, all working in coordination and oriented towards specific audiences in support of super-ordinate goals and transmitted via timely and appropriate means. Effective strategic communication helps create the conditions, build the relationships, and mobilize the re- sources that allow authentic, constructive, and engaging narratives to emerge between stake- holders. Successful strategic communication requires a deep appreciation of attitudes, per- ceptions, and culture; a capacity to pay attention to the environment; the capability to listen closely to and engage in healthy dialogues with a variety of diverse stakeholders; access to decision-makers; and the ability to measure effects, trends, and patterns. 35", "THE QUARTERLY JOURNAL ambiguity of unconventional warfare. The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) noted that, of 127 pacification operations in Iraq from May 2003 to May 2005, “most opera- tions were reactive to insurgency activity—seeking to hunt down insurgents. Only six percent of operations were directed specifically to create a secure environment for the population.”2 A cultural change within the various parts of the U.S. government will be required for it to be more effective at counter-insurgency operations. This is especially true for those engaged in the strategic communication aspects of counter-insurgency campaigns. A Defense Science Board recently stated that United States’ strategic communication capability is “in crisis.”3 Then-Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld echoed this concern: “The standard U.S. government public affairs operation ... tends to be reactive, rather than proactive—and it still operates for the most part on an eight-hour, five-days-a-week basis, while world events, and our ene- mies, are operating 24/7, across every time zone. That is an unacceptably dangerous deficiency.”4 Given the urgency and importance of this challenge, every government agency needs to adapt to the fast-paced and complex environment of counter-insur- gency and improve their respective organization’s strategic communication capabili- ties. The Core Challenge of Counter-Insurgency: Values and Beliefs Effectively dealing with counter-insurgency efforts from an ideological perspective re- quires new thinking and action. Winning hearts and minds is far more important than killing or capturing terrorists and insurgents. The United States has to recognize the importance of radical social movements and their ideology, and operate from this baseline. A comprehensive approach to strategic communication recognizes that the ideology a terrorist or insurgent group espouses is a critical component of these groups. Ideol- ogy serves as a recruiting tool and galvanizes foot soldiers, financiers, logisticians, and indirect supporters. It is the lifeblood of an organization. Deep-seated values, beliefs, and norms inform perspectives, influence actions, and forge networks with like-minded individuals. Ideology provides assumptions about how the world works, shapes priori- ties, and offers the rationale for decisions terrorists and insurgents make.5 2 U.S. Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, 2006). Available at: http://www.defenselink.mil/qdr/report/Report 20060203.pdf. 3 Defense Science Board, Report of the Defense Science Board 2004 Summer Study on Transi- tion to and from Hostilities (Washington, D.C.: December 2004), 71. 4 Donald Rumsfeld, “New Realities in the Media Age: A Conversation with Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense,” written transcript of speech given at the Council on Foreign Rela- tions, New York, NY (19 February 2006). Available at: http://www.cfr.org/publication/9900/ new_realities_in_the_media_age.html. 5 Don Beck, presentation at the Spiral Dynamics Conference, Washington, D.C. (6–11 January 2006). For more information, please refer to www.spiraldynamics.net. 36", "WINTER 2006 Before launching a strategic communication initiative, U.S. forces have to better understand ideology and the cultural terrain that the initiative will have to navigate. External approaches designed to improve local conditions in a counter-insurgency en- vironment will fail if they do not include parallel and simultaneous engagement with how people perceive the world they inhabit. This means strategic communication pro- fessionals have to learn more deeply about the socio-economic, historical, and cultural landscape in which social and political movements live. We enjoy the benefits of many sophisticated means for disseminating our messages: Internet, DVDs, radio, TV, etc. But if we do not appreciate the complexity and richness of the values and concerns of the people with whom we are communicating, we will miss the mark. Importance of Culture and Local Context Counter-insurgency and strategic communication planning demand deep cultural and social knowledge of threats and local populations. The United States government lacks the right people, programs, systems, and organizations that can provide anthropologi- cal knowledge on a wide variety of cultures. Counter-insurgency efforts do not address themselves to the fixed targets of the Cold War, but too much of the U.S. military is still stuck in Cold War approaches. As a result, human factors, cultural anthropology, and other analyses of socio-cultural data are underfunded and undermanned, and have not been supported as means for developing a central resource for social, economic, and cultural analysis.6 The importance of gaining an understanding of the local conditions of an insur- gency cannot be overestimated. Counter-insurgency planners must understand the needs of discontented groups. In addition to using military and federal agencies, strate- gic communication planners should employ media consultants, finance and business experts, psychologists, organizational network analysts, and scholars from a wide range of disciplines (including anthropology and religious studies) to develop a more com- prehensive picture of the environment. The more insight strategic communication planners have into the causes of the insurgency, the better their capacity to effectively address those conditions. Insurgents require regional support. By understanding where and why they get their support, planners can help develop long-term strategic commu- nication strategies that will address the insurgents’ constituencies. In order to develop sophisticated socio-cultural understanding of local and regional conditions that feed terrorist ideologies, we need to be able to establish baselines of values, attitudes, and perceptions around the world. This baseline is not static: ideolo- gies travel, cultures shift, and socio-economic developments occur. In order to track these underlying currents, we have to develop the capacity to monitor these changes. Public-sector and private-sector actors in the U.S. should work together to develop technology to map and track human conditions. If insurance companies and economists are able to follow trends and patterns in human behavior, why not broaden these ap- 6 Montgomery McFate, “The Military Utility of Understanding Adversary Culture,” Joint Forces Quarterly 38 (July 2005): 46. 37", "THE QUARTERLY JOURNAL proaches so that we can more holistically observe and monitor other vital shifts on a global basis? Individuals, societies, tribes, nations—all are living organisms. Like a doctor who examines a patient regularly in order to provide preventive medicine, we need better mechanisms to monitor cultural and political “vital signs” in order to pre- vent conflict and anticipate strategic communication needs. The use of geographic in- formation systems (GIS) to display social, economic, health, and cultural data would help identify hot spots and anticipate opportunities, breakdowns, and conflicts. This deeper understanding of socio-economic conditions and culture will show strategic communication actors how values and beliefs shape political, economic, and social performance.7 In order to monitor and assess how ideology spreads, or to measure the impact of strategic communication efforts, more sophisticated systems and procedures to collect and analyze information will be required. Open-source collection and assessment mechanisms need to evolve. Systematic surveys, public opinion polls, focus group in- terviews, and cultural attitudinal databases are just a few examples of tools that need to be bolstered in order to establish baselines of perceptions, monitor political and social movements, and measure the impact of strategic communication plans. This kind of analysis and feedback would also assist strategic communicators to better understand their audience, develop appropriate themes, and establish the best means of delivering their messages. The signals of violent ideological threats are al- ways abundant and are widely recognized. Yet somehow they fail to penetrate the gov- ernment’s immune system’s seemingly automatic response to reject the familiar. If strategic communication actors are to effectively deal with insurgent groups, they must be able to go beyond established ways of seeing things and be open to new possibilities without judgment. We need to sit back, listen deeply, and study the situation from many angles and ask ourselves what, fundamentally, is going on. Strategic communi- cation players need better analytical tools to enable them to see what is happening globally and locally, and to inform their approaches to defusing hostility, improving the United States’ image abroad, and bridging gaps in dialogue. Strategy A successful strategic communication strategy encompasses a deep understanding of why people join terrorist or insurgency groups. People join, fund, tolerate, support, and/or encourage others to join movements due to many factors, ranging from the bot- tom of the hierarchy of human needs and values (safety and security) to the top (self- actualization). Some people support insurgent groups because they are afraid to do anything else, or because insurgents help them meet their basic needs, such as food or housing. When people see other sources of power and decide that these alternatives are sufficiently robust to last, people switch allegiances, because they see the direction in which the power is shifting and they do not want to be left out. Other core motivations for making such decisions include gaining and maintaining connections with clans, 7 Beck. 38", "WINTER 2006 tribes, family, friends, and local communities. Some people are motivated by achieve- ment, growth, and money, while different groups consider consensus and participation as key motivations. Some people are motivated by ideas and seek political or societal change, so they seek avenues through which to exert influence. If these people feel that they are neglected or oppressed, then they may think that political leaders do not care about them. Even if certain people do not admire insurgent leaders, their tactics, or their ideology, they may look to them for support. If people think that insurgents or ter- rorists are finally succeeding in getting attention for a previously neglected cause, then they may support these groups because they see them as effective. If people see insur- gency movements as a way to meet their core beliefs and needs, then they may join or support them. If we want to counteract a social movement, such as an insurgency, we need to of- fer alternative ideologies, improved economic opportunity or security, different chan- nels for political influence to travel, or ways to strengthen family and clan ties outside of insurgent movements. With a better understanding of the values and concerns of af- fected parties, we will be better able to provide more appropriate alternatives to politi- cal violence. The strategic approach to communications, then, needs to be like that of a headquarters of a socio-political movement. We should be rallying support and matching our words with our deeds. Since this is a long-term endeavor—instead of a short campaign, ending in a vote—the “negative campaigning” approach is less likely to be successful. Most of our energy should be devoted to building new alternatives or increasing existing alternatives. Acting like we already know the answers will not help. This ap- proach involves offering assumptions like “They would like us if they really knew us,” “The other side is inherently wrong or immoral,” and “We are doing the right things al- ready—we just need to get the word out better.” All of these things may, at times, be true, but they are still dangerous assumptions, and are very risky phrases to let slip into our communications. Therefore, we need to build rapport with others by listening, paying attention, and being responsive and proactive in a way that is appropriate to the socio-cultural needs of various groups.8 With this more holistic approach to understanding cultural landscapes and seeing insurgencies as socio-political movements, strategic communication planners can take a multifaceted approach and produce an effects-based strategy that aims to: • Address underlying causes of the insurgency • Dissuade the local populace from supporting the insurgency • Create new attractors that will draw support away from the insurgency • Discourage insurgents 8 Curtis Johnson, phone conversations and e-mail exchanges, January 2006. Curtis is a key leader in the Advanced Concepts Group, a think-tank at Sandia National Laboratories in New Mexico, and has been investigating various terrorism challenges, socio-political identity issues, and strategic communication. 39", "THE QUARTERLY JOURNAL • Tarnish the insurgents’ image • Disrupt recruitment • Counter propaganda • Build rapport with the local populace • Help defeat threatening ideologies • Reduce tensions and negative attitudes towards the United States and its allies • Communicate themes of freedom, tolerance, justice, dignity, and opportunity, and match them with actions • Develop and sustain the host nation’s strategic communication and independent media capacities, so that a country or region with an insurgent threat can conduct these tasks successfully (ultimately, we want to communicate shared interests and concerns, not appear unilateral, and not force messages that make our allies and partners look like puppets of the U.S.) • Develop a responsive network of key communicators and subject matter experts (U.S. and foreign) to help develop, communicate, clarify, and amplify appropri- ate messages rapidly and effectively • Actively engage with journalists, writers, students, grassroots leaders, NGOs, religious leaders, academics, opinion leaders, and think-tanks (U.S. and foreign). The United States military and other agencies must blend short-term kill-or-capture operations with host-nation capacity building and other long-term efforts to address violent social movements and their root causes. The 9/11 Commission Report emphati- cally states that the United States must “help defeat an ideology, not just a group of people.”9 Growing anti-American and anti-Western sentiment in the Middle East and elsewhere spelled out in numerous recent polls cannot be ignored. As the government defeats insurgents on the battlefield, it must also simultaneously help prevent the spread of insurgent movements and help promote the U.S. image abroad. This would include promoting the rule of law, professional and open media, educational programs, cultural exchanges, and economic development projects. To win the war of ideas, the United States must also confidently tell the truth, honor its words with actions, counter insurgent propaganda efforts, and communicate its mes- sages quickly and effectively. Robert Kaplan, the author of Imperial Grunts, further states: Because the battles in a counterinsurgency are small scale and often clandestine, the story line is rarely obvious. It becomes a matter of perceptions, and victory is awarded to those who weave the most compelling narrative. Truly, in the world of postmodern, 21st-century conflict, civilian and military public-affairs officers must become war fighters by another name. They must control and anticipate a whole new 9 The 9/11 Commission Report (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2004), 376. 40", "WINTER 2006 storm system represented by a global media, which too often exposes embarrassing facts out of historical or philosophical context.10 The United States and her allies are in direct competition with insurgents on the battlefield and in the media. Any strategic communication strategy must consider this fact and ensure that a comprehensive strategic communication plan is integrated with the overall counter-insurgency strategy. Learning to blend information operations, public affairs, psychological operations, and public diplomacy will help coordinate themes and messages. Currently, the United States government is spending too much time trying to separate the various players involved in strategic communications, in- stead of synchronizing them in order to beat the insurgents to the punch. Improving interagency systems and procedures would help the United States implement necessary changes in the way it develops and communicates thoughtful and persuasive messages to the right audiences at the right time with the appropriate means. With a more informed perspective, strategic communicators would then be better prepared to develop a more holistic strategic communication strategy. Planners of strategic communication efforts must dedicate time and resources to developing coun- try-specific objectives, themes, messages, and effects. Part of the strategic communi- cation strategy must also include developing overall themes to promote free and plu- ralistic media, high standards of journalism, rule of law, and transparency. Other ef- forts would include messages to reduce the motivation and legitimacy of those in- volved in terrorism and insurgencies as well as messages designed to build bridges for dialogue and highlight constructive activities of the United States and other countries. The importance of identifying audiences, opinion leaders, and key communicators must also be taken into account. The U.S. Congress, the American public, opinion leaders, and foreign populations all must be considered as critical audiences. Given the anti-U.S. feelings that currently pervade the international environment, pushing a “Made in the USA” message will probably not always be the most appropriate or ef- fective way of getting our point across. Who gets the credit for a communication should not matter; what does matter is whether the message is well received and helps to diminish violence. Finding mutual concerns and interests across a variety of organi- zations, groups, and societies is a critical step in helping to extinguish the fiery rhetoric of violent ideologies that promote killing innocent people for political gain. Unfortunately, a cultural divide exists between the various arms of the government and the private sector involved in strategic communication. Every agency has unique interests and values, and these can be difficult to reconcile. For instance, many NGOs are not going to want to be associated with military operations, even if they were in- formed of them and had plans to follow in the wake of military humanitarian assistance programs. However, there has to be a way to bring together all of the groups involved so that they are publicly cooperating and supporting each other, but still retain their 10 Robert D. Kaplan, “The Real Story of Fallujah: Why Isn’t the Administration Getting It Out?” Wall Street Journal (31 May 2004). Available at www.opinionjournal.com/editorial/ feature.html?id=110005147. 41", "THE QUARTERLY JOURNAL own identity and pursue their individual agency goals. Leaders need to step up and speak with one voice and focus on points where information operations, public affairs, public diplomacy, and private-sector public relations converge. Given that Al Qaeda has a sophisticated and active information capability, we must overcome bureaucratic turf battles, small-mindedness, and the absence of a visible commitment that pervades strategic communication. Within the U.S. government, improving interagency cooperation in strategic com- munication will require promoting and institutionalizing interagency exchanges, train- ing, exercises, organizational design, doctrine, and asking Congress for legislation similar to the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 to further help align and integrate the various parts of the government. Hiring media-savvy reporters and journalists to serve as consultants to military commanders and diplomats would also build a much-needed bridge between the government and the media.11 The various professionals in the public and private sectors involved in promoting the United States’ image, policies, and programs abroad must also identify super-ordi- nate goals that transcend other priorities and agendas. All actors must recognize and take responsibility for addressing their respective organizations’ cultural differences, suspicion, territorial protection, ignorance, and stereotypes that create barriers to inter- agency and multinational cooperation. With that understanding, strategic communica- tion actors will be more open to options that serve healthy super-ordinate goals in counter-insurgency. The fear of nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons triggered by terrorists, or the gap between the “haves and have-nots” that sows seeds of violence are examples of concerns that strategic communication actors cannot effectively take on unilaterally. Correcting the perceptions that the United States is engaged in a global war on Islam and acts in a unilateral fashion without regard to other countries’ interests will require numerous organizations within the U.S. government to better coordinate, integrate, and synchronize their themes and messages. This will require building net- works with NGOs, multinational companies, and other non-U.S. voices. Fragmented, isolated, ad hoc, piecemeal, and single-agency solutions will fail to make a significant difference in winning hearts and minds. Strategic communication professionals must work together (formally and informally) to integrate, align, and synergize their efforts. Recruiting and Selection This transformation in strategic communication will require incentives. Governmental bureaucracies will not change unless the people working within those bureaucracies— particularly those involved in strategic communication—are rewarded for working dif- ferently. In the military, for example, if we want to see public affairs, foreign area spe- cialists, civil affairs and information operations officers—all core players in counter- insurgency and strategic communication efforts—become truly integral to the military 11 Robert D. Kaplan, Atlantic Monthly journalist and author of Imperial Grunts; personal conversation on topic of media relations during his visit to Pacific Command, Honolulu, HI, 23 February 2006. 42", "WINTER 2006 profession, then we will need to provide them with much more attractive career tracks, including increased general and flag officer opportunities in these areas. The same ap- plies to the Department of State (DoS). Offer better career opportunities and promo- tions to public diplomacy professionals, and the DoS will enjoy more successful public diplomacy initiatives and a stronger cadre of foreign service officers dedicated to stra- tegic communication excellence. Providing rewarding career paths and opportunities for education and advancement will help attract quality people to the demanding chal- lenges that strategic communication presents in today’s information age. Enticing incentives are imperative because the interagency challenges and uncon- ventional threats require the right kind of people to support strategic communication in counter-insurgency campaigns. Strategic communication actors need to be intelligent, compassionate, and innovative in order to adapt to the multi-faceted and fast-moving information environment. Strategic communication planners and operators also have to be creative risk-takers who appreciate a multidisciplinary and comprehensive approach to complex problems. They cannot be protectors of the status quo or risk-averse ca- reerists. Recruiting and selecting the right people for strategic communication requires selecting people who can perform these jobs naturally. Too much time is wasted trying to reshape people to do strategic communication jobs for which they were unsuited from the start. Combined with situations where people with strategic communication skills and talents are stuck in non-strategic communication jobs, government organiza- tions will enjoy better success in strategic communication when they align people, form, and function in a more meaningful way. Placing talented people in a collabora- tive work environment led by competent innovators would help instill the more adap- tive organizational culture that is needed to engage ambiguous threats via strategic communication. Training and Development Hiring and promoting the right people for strategic communication tasks is not enough. The U.S. government must ensure that strategic communication players have the right skills to help them perform. Because few strategic communication professionals ever experience deep cultural immersion outside of the government, they often do not de- velop sufficient cultural and social expertise. Strategic communication entities must support internships with cutting-edge media outlets. They have to build better bridges with academics, think-tanks, and other organizations so that strategic communication staff will be able to exchange ideas with journalists; advertising and marketing experts; TV, movie, and other media-savvy professionals; and social scientists, psychologists, cultural anthropologists, and other academics.12 The Olmsted Scholarship program is a flagship example of what the government can do in conjunction with foundations and academic institutions to promote cultural sensitivity and strategic communication training. The Olmsted program offers military officers a chance to study in foreign universities, immerse themselves in the local cul- 12 McFate, “Military Utility of Understanding Adversary Culture,” 46. 43", "THE QUARTERLY JOURNAL ture, and bring fresh and innovative perspectives back to their respective services. The United States should promote similar programs throughout the government. More im- portantly, the government must ensure that its agencies benefit from these experiences by placing graduates of these programs in critical positions where they can bring these unique perspectives to strategic political-military and strategic communication posi- tions of authority. Government bureaucracies frequently practice an ineffective and cold “fill spaces with faces” mentality that does not consider a governmental em- ployee’s talents, passions, or interests. Too often we attempt to force or shape a person to fill the job. Given the complexity and nuances of strategic communication efforts, government organizations should instead build positions around talented people to cre- ate opportunities to match what they do best. This change will also require other new approaches to training and education. Training and development of all government professionals will require placing content addressing terrorism, irregular warfare, foreign languages, social sciences, psychology, complexity science, culture, media, and strategic communication in core curriculums of military, diplomatic, law enforcement, and intelligence training schools. These subjects are too often only electives, are underfunded and undermanned, and/or lack institu- tional support. In order to learn and grow, strategic communication leaders at all levels ought to also study diverse cultural and disciplinary perspectives. Like everyone else, govern- ment officials are molded by their experiences and see the world through various fil- ters. Complexity science and systems thinking help strategic communication actors broaden their apertures and learn to see patterns in ambiguity. Diverse social, cultural, academic, religious, and psychological perspectives can also open a strategic commu- nication actor’s mind to new possibilities in detecting subtle shifts over time. Leaders must study a variety of cultural, psychological, and social perspectives and incorporate relevant slices of each in order to recognize changing patterns in an insurgent cam- paign.13 Successful strategic communication also requires an awareness of how others per- ceive us, what signals we send (intended and unintended), how we view the world, and how the world views us. This requires a high degree of cultural self-awareness and re- flection. How does a strategic communication professional develop better self-aware- ness? Meditation, journaling, and other concentration exercises can help. Many scien- tific studies and well-documented experiments unquestionably demonstrate that medi- tation helps heighten perception and improves concentration and attention.14 Negotiation training is another active way in which strategic communication lead- ers can build competencies in awareness and listening. Many courses in mediation, conflict resolution, dialogue, and negotiation are available and should be part of a strategic communication leader’s professional development program. Leaders need to put this training into action by actively using a negotiation framework in their daily 13 Irene Sanders, “Strategic Thinking in a Complex World,” month-long course at the Smith- sonian Institution, Washington, D.C. (May 2004). 14 See the Web site of the Mind and Life Institute, at www.mindandlife.org. 44", "WINTER 2006 lives. By practicing looking for mutual interests and creative alternatives, leaders will hone their empathetic listening and authentic articulation skills. Practicing negotiation skills by consistently using an organized framework for simple as well as complex agreements will help strategic communication leaders become more proficient in per- suasion, coordination, and dealing with obstacles. Attitude Sophisticated training can help broaden strategic communication professionals’ atti- tudes and approaches to counter-insurgency. This will help them (and us) understand that we are part of the system, and thus we are part of the challenges confronted in any strategic communication effort— they cannot be separated. If we believe that strategic communication and counter-insurgency efforts are problems we have to solve “out there,” and we do not see or want to see any possible relationship between us (who are trying to solve the problem) and what the problem actually is, we will not be able to view counter-insurgency efforts accurately, in all their complexity. The environment surrounding such campaigns is highly dynamic and interdependent. Being fast and adaptable is difficult when our egocentricity and ethnocentricity get in the way of our perceptions. When we think, “Of course they will like this message, anyone (like me) would,” we unwittingly contribute to maintaining the undesired situation. We must be careful that we do not just address the symptoms of the problems and challenges we face. Not facing the real, fundamental problem will cause it to get worse. We cannot afford to seek symptomatic solutions to the challenges of strategic commu- nication. Quick fixes lead to unintended side effects and new problems for others, leading to more quick fixes and more side effects. We must dig deeper than the symp- toms of insurgencies to address the causes and underlying conditions and address those issues directly and openly.15 Addressing these underlying conditions via strategic communication is not just about sending a message via an opinion maker, TV, blog, e-mail, radio, or Web site. Attitudes and perceptions cannot only concern strategic communication planners. The behavior of all the players in the United States government, whether in a diplomatic negotiation in Indonesia or a military operation in Iraq, also sends strong messages to their audiences. Everyone involved in counter-insurgency has to ask herself what she is doing, in her actions and messages, to potentially produce negative trends or patterns of violence. How is she contributing to those conditions? Treating people appropri- ately, with dignity, and showing genuine respect for local cultural norms goes a long way in winning trust and confidence. Meeting and communicating with people at a place where they are socially and culturally comfortable is essential. Each person in his respective organization needs to understand that he is responsible for the themes and messages he is sending through his words and actions and the impact they are having. 15 Otto Scharmer, presentation at the conference Presencing: Collective Leadership for Pro- found Innovation and Change, Boston, MA (12–16 December 2005). For more information, please refer to www.solonline.org. 45", "THE QUARTERLY JOURNAL In today’s environment of instant global communications, everybody in an organiza- tion is a spokesperson and a communicator of an organization’s values and beliefs. To be an effective communicator requires a blend of cultural knowledge, technical skills in strategic communication, and a sincere motivation to bridge communication gaps. This requires discernment and consideration of other viewpoints, regardless of whether one agrees with them. Strategic communication planners must anticipate the tendencies of radical ideologies and learn how to minimize polarizing dynamics. This will include driving wedges between violent radicals and moderates in order to help re- solve deep-seated conflicts and meet underlying needs. Strategic communication actors will have to work with their audiences and decision makers to avoid “us vs. them” rhetoric. They should also enhance the capacities of pragmatists, moderate voices, and conciliators in the region where they are working. Listening sympathetically and re- spectfully and echoing back concerns are essential to success. Strategic communication is not about changing other people; rather, it is about designing the conditions and mo- bilizing the resources that allow authentic, constructive, and engaging narratives to emerge. Sophisticated and successful strategic communication meshes intellectual capital, communications technology, and the heartfelt desire to address the underlying conditions of violence.16 As part of this attitudinal shift, U.S. government officials will also have to wrestle with their tendency to rely on technology as a “silver bullet,” and their insistence on quick, kinetic results in counter-insurgency campaigns. Winning trust and confidence is a long-term process that has to be persuasively explained to foreign and domestic audi- ences alike. The process of change and adaptation within societies, nations, and or- ganizations demands deep listening, discernment, and staying power. Improving eco- nomic conditions and helping societies transform and evolve requires commitment and a willingness to accept a long time horizon. We must keep the seductiveness of tech- nology in perspective, and work towards institutionalizing the notion that the human component is the key to winning hearts and minds in counter-insurgency efforts. Organizational Design Donald Rumsfeld, speaking at the Council on Foreign Relations, stated that the “U.S. government still functions as a ‘five-and-dime’ store in an eBay world.”17 Fortunately, some marketing practices of successful global companies and social movements offer ways to help move strategic communication into the twenty-first century. Many suc- cessful companies employ a sophisticated branding strategy as a central part of their business, not relegated to the margins, as strategic communication is too often within the U.S. government. Leaders of various business lines (analogous to different gov- ernmental agencies) need their own strategies to execute their functions. The strategy for building cars is very different from the strategy for selling cars, but they need to have important points of coincidence. If we are selling “driving excitement,” the cars 16 Beck. 17 Rumsfeld, “New Realities in the Media Age.” 46", "WINTER 2006 had better be exciting to drive; if we are selling safety, then that had better be a differ- ent car. At the local level, freedom is needed to respond to local needs and local com- petition. This might include ordering the right mix of cars, pricing and advertising flexibility, service and operations flexibility, but all within the overarching marketing and branding strategy. Local businesses cannot compete if every decision has to go up to headquarters, but they have to be counted upon not to run local ads that ruin the cor- porate brand. Unlike the government, businesses accomplish this without a long list of orders, edicts, procedures, and signatures. The private sector does this with a clear coordinat- ing framework, a coherent and overarching strategy, two-way dialogue with customers, empowered local business leaders, and open and uninhibited dialogue between head- quarters and field agents. The U.S. government has much to learn and apply from suc- cessful multi-national companies and Madison Avenue advertisers.18 Successful branding strategies depend on a seamless fit between form and function within an organization in order to win trust and confidence. The Washington Post newspaper, for example, employs open office spaces and a flat organization, where re- porters and editors can quickly communicate with one another and get critical stories out in a timely and appropriate manner. One does not find reporters holed up in iso- lated cubicles. Editors are not separated by bureaucratic layers, nor do they work on different floors. They share the same well-organized space and enjoy a collaborative work environment, which promotes efficiency and speed. Strategic communication entities and the organizations they support ought to look at their physical spaces and organization design. Do they contribute to collaboration, aid in the sharing of information, and promote agility in quickly getting appealing sto- ries out to the right audiences in a timely manner? A carefully designed work environ- ment is essential to a successful strategic communication organization. Pressures cre- ated by strategic communication issues tend to keep leaders in a continual “fire-fight- ing” mode, with little or no time for reflection or real thinking. The design of a physi- cal workspace for a cutting-edge strategic communication entity would include space for brainstorming and scenario planning, and other spaces for project design that re- flect the sensibility of the audiences the strategic communication actors want to reach. A space that includes TV, radio, video, and the latest newspapers and magazines would help stimulate people’s thinking, show them what their competitors are doing, and of- fer fresh ways of seeing how other organizations present themselves to their audi- ences.19 The government needs to make strategic communication a central, not marginal, part of its operational design. First, a Deputy National Security Advisor for strategic communication with tasking authority over departments and agencies would help quarterback strategic communication efforts. Second, reviewing strategic communica- tion strategy in a systematic fashion (as the Department of Defense does with the 18 Personal communication with Curtis Johnson. 19 Tom Kelly, The Ten Faces of Innovation (New York: Doubleday, 2005). 47", "THE QUARTERLY JOURNAL Quarterly Defense Review) would be beneficial. This would help make strategic com- munication a central thread that runs through all military, economic, diplomatic, politi- cal, intelligence, financial, judicial, and law enforcement plans and policies. Third, strategic communication centers of excellence need to be established to synthesize and provide open source analysis, strategic communication products, databases, lessons learned, feedback/monitoring mechanisms, think-tank reports, academic studies, and subject matter expert exchanges.20 Finally, governmental operations centers need to in- corporate strategic communication as an integral part of their day-to-day business. To reflect the importance of strategic communication, 24/7 operations centers need to display cultural and socioeconomic overlays, and employ knowledge managers adept at open source analysis. Inside these updated operations centers, planners will constantly pay attention to the media, population studies, polling, other players (threats, governments, NGOs); analyze open source information; send messages; listen for the response; send updated messages; and prepare for contingencies. Given the around-the-clock nature of global connectivity and the rapid decision- making loops and information flows within the U.S. government, operations centers need to be fast and adaptive, making sure that that each local loop is locally con- trolled—not turned over to a committee (a sentence of “interagency death”) or sent up the chain. Strategic communication players will also have to speed up the process of prototyping themes and messages, and must actively experiment with how they are transmitted and received. Based on a tight feedback loop, strategic communication planners will adapt accordingly, and not rely on unevaluated, canned responses. Op- erations centers will have to “reorient staffing, schedules, and culture to engage the full range of media that are having such an impact today” in order to incorporate strategic communication as part of its daily functions.21 A successful organizational design for strategic communication would support fast and uninhibited flows of information and would empower teams with the authorities, approvals, and means to quickly communicate themes and messages. Secretary Rums- feld said, “Let there be no doubt—the longer it takes to put a strategic communications framework into place, the more we can be certain that the vacuum will be filled by the enemy and by news informers that most assuredly will not paint an accurate picture of what is actually taking place.”22 The United States government must support a holistic infrastructure to develop, produce, distribute, and disseminate strategic communication by, through, and with its interagency partners, host-nation counterparts, and private- sector venues. Too often, compartmentalization and bureaucratic layers favor the en- emy and endanger the success of strategic communication. Having the means to quickly coordinate and share knowledge, databases, strategic communication products, 20 Bruce Gregory, “Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication: Cultures, Firewalls, and Imported Norms,” paper presented at the American Political Science Association annual conference, Washington, D.C. (31 August 2005), 34–8. 21 Rumsfeld, “New Realities in the Media Age.” 22 Ibid. 48", "WINTER 2006 subject matter experts, and feedback across geographical and organizational bounda- ries is essential to impeding insurgencies. Conclusion 23 Insurgents remain a dangerous socio-political threat to the United States and its allies. The worldwide trend of anti-Western rhetoric and the sophistication of Al Qaeda’s in- formation war demonstrate that terrorist and insurgent groups are constantly adapting and reorganizing. Given Al Qaeda’s global reach, the United States must develop a more integrated strategic communication strategy for counter-insurgency with its allies to diminish violent rhetoric, improve its image abroad, and detect, deter, and defeat this social movement at its many levels. To counter this menace, the nation must con- tinue to develop flexible and efficient capabilities through innovative interagency stra- tegic communication organizations. Although it is extremely important, having the right strategy plus integrated and nimble strategic communication organizations is not sufficient if governmental leaders are unprepared to engage in actions in ambiguous environments and reorient their or- ganizational culture to deal with insurgencies. A successful strategic communication campaign is not just about better cultural awareness or new organizations. It is also about transforming the attitudes and mind-sets of leaders so they have the capacity to take decisive yet thoughtful action against insurgents in ambiguous situations. Ideally, the U.S. government would have strategic communication professionals in place who are sensitive observers and thoughtful communicators capable of working seamlessly within military, civilian, media, and international communities. To develop this capacity, strategic communication professionals must dedicate themselves to innovative training. In addition to traditional strategic communication technical skills, training in areas including negotiations, psychology, media relations, cultural anthropology, foreign languages, and complexity theory will become increas- ingly important. Like the martial arts master who deftly handles multiple attacks, the strategic communication expert, with multidisciplinary training and interagency ex- perience, would learn to adapt to any given situation in a fast-moving and fluid envi- ronment. To become agile and competent at strategic communication, the United States gov- ernment cannot approach the task piecemeal. Improving the ability to do “hearts and minds” campaigns requires that all elements of national power have to improve their capacities for dealing with irregular warfare. Integrated and holistic strategic commu- nication approaches to counter-insurgency will require the meshing of elements of na- tional power in new and constructive ways. This new attitude is imperative. An integrated and comprehensive approach to strategic communication requires a continued reorientation in the way the government plans, organizes, trains, and thinks about counter-insurgency. To be successful, the 23 Fred Krawchuk, Combating Terrorism: A Joint/Interagency Approach (Washington, D.C.: AUSA, January 2005). 49", "THE QUARTERLY JOURNAL United States will need to devote more attention and resources to strategic communi- cation in terms of strategy, training, and force development. Strategic communication leaders would then, through innovative training and adaptive organizations, be better able to communicate compelling messages with discernment and counter violent social movements with agility. 50" ]

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