Datasets:

Yusuf5

/

OpenCaselistCites

like 0

4 - Feb Sex Work

RISKY CONSUMPTION Risks of Prostitution: When the Person Is the Product MELISSA FARLEY Melissa Farley (mfarley@prostitutionresearch.com) is the executive director of the nonprofit organization Prostitution Research and Education, San Francisco, CA. Volume 3 Number 1 2018 pg 97-108 https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/pdfplus/10.1086/695670 cw//az Prostitution sex work is a gendered ... experienced sexual assault and 75 Katie Cruz (2013) University of Bristol, Law, Faculty Member, ‘Unmanageable Work, (Un)liveable Lives: The UK Sex Industry, Labour Rights and the Welfare State’ Social and Legal Studies 22(4) 465-488 *Used OCR, pls excuse typos cw//az DA 14/2/20 https://www.academia.edu/8589850/Unmanageable_Work_Un_liveable_Lives_The_UK_Sex_Industry_Labour_Rights_and_the_Welfare_State pg 20-21 BI need not mean that ... truly voluntary conditions Rae Story 17 guest writer, 3-18-2017, Breaking the Vicious Circle: Basic Income and Sexual Exploitation, BIEN, http://basicincome.org/news/2017/03/breaking-the-vicious-circle-basic-income-and-sexual-exploitation/, cw//az Being trapped in prostitution ... woman by virtue of her humanity,

1 - Debt

Contention two is Debt The BRI, with the EU joining on and helping fund it, along with projects in their own countries, will put the EU in debt to China. Hurley ‘18 writes that 8 of the countries part of the BRI are currently at a very high debt risk because of the loans they had to take for BRI infrastructure construction. For countries to clear up money to help get out of the recession, they will have to cut benefits, and this occurs in the form of austerity. The EU going into severe debt itself is very problematic, as cuts must be made in order to pay off this debt. as Devine ‘17 writes that “EU maintains a staunch and unwavering commitment to austerity within its member states.” The International Monetary Fund 19 gives an example of this occurring by saying “a BRI project has sent Montenegro’s debt soaring and has forced the government to raise taxes, partially freeze public sector wages and lower benefits.” The impact of this is quality of life. Benjamin Meuller of New York Times explains in 2019 that as a result of austerity programs in England reduced the average income of the poorest 20 of households by 10, as a result of slashed social programs and about 600,000 children have fallen back into relative poverty. If we see full BRI implementation through the AFF world this number would be magnified. In countries across the Belt and road initiative.

0 - General Info

Contact Jason on messenger for more info, we will disclose all cases we've broke at toc qualifying tournaments. if you want an email chain ask us before round.

Disclosure Info

Jayant Namdhari Aadit Walia jaynamdhari1@gmail.com Trvialism#2416 aaditwal@gmail.com We will disclose cites and first and last 3 words at a minimum, we don't disclose analytics and want you to disclose all broken positions. Tell me if you want a specific mode of disclosure.

Aff Case

https://docs.google.com/document/d/1ophrFy4ctbL1YLY2CgXbyYfkd4htgIxuTIM2Veu32ZA/edit?usp=sharing Lemme know if this doesn't work Google Books: Baker https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/facsch_lawrev/276/ Control F: Competition Among Rivals Cohan https://books.google.com/books?id=cobUDAAAQBAJandpg=PT27andlpg=PT27anddq=how+many+people+have+google+and+amazon+lifted+out+of+povertyandsource=blandots=NvO9jRJMvuandsig=ACfU3U01IJsDaTkQPs7Bi0qury-m8mfLLQandhl=enandsa=Xandved=2ahUKEwjTprLc8bnpAhUnnOAKHU8ADoEQ6AEwAHoECAkQAQ#v=onepageandq=how20many20people20have20google20and20amazon20lifted20out20of20povertyandf=false Control F: Billions of people out of poverty Ping Li https://books.google.com/books?id=bkWCD35sjjICandpg=PA74andlpg=PA74anddq=disruptive+innovations+simplify+and+reduce+prices+for+marketsandsource=blandots=W26kmIhNS8andsig=ACfU3U0rTRg9CLiupQ6ILEfpJRpVZ7nknQandhl=enandsa=Xandved=2ahUKEwiqpJ7k9bnpAhWAj3IEHcuHAG4Q6AEwAHoECAwQAQ#v=onepageandq=disruptive20innovations20simplify20and20reduce20prices20for20marketsandf=false Control F: Sold at a lower price IMF https://books.google.com/books?id=GdJKHTWMMs0Candpg=PA9andlpg=PA9anddq=In+the+first+three+regressions,+a+1+percent+increase+in+U.S.+growth+is+correlatedandsource=blandots=lsryNNRLmhandsig=ACfU3U3kHu25ySdz8oJ4nweXMIYP8YCSkgandhl=enandsa=Xandved=2ahUKEwjt0smsg8PpAhVCZN8KHScyAFMQ6AEwAnoECAkQAQ#v=onepageandq=In20the20first20three20regressions2C20a20120percent20increase20in20U.S.20growth20is20correlatedandf=false Ctrl F: In the first three regressions, a 1 percent increase in U.S. growth is correlated

1-NovDec-K

=1AC – MAFFA= ====Arms sales are a relic of the perfect map of war, one long since handed over to the harshness of Suns and Winters. The military logic of US arms sales post-9/11 in service of ‘network-centric warfare’ is emblematic of our absolute indeterminacy, wherein the possibility of human relationality has been overtaken by the social order, which has been overtaken by a veritable house of mirrors. Knowledge is trapped in the abyss; grasp it tightly and like so many grains of sand, it slips away, eventually to disappear.==== ====We challenge all appearances of this relic of arms sales and military logistics, this ontology of war. We call its transparency illusion, and its virtuosity violent. The reality of warfare thrives on the reification of war as generative and reality. This principled reality accomplishes the techno-liquidation of the human, of meaning, of thought. All are subordinated to models and endless preparation wherein war disappears in favor of the simulacral violence of a clean kill that takes place on the unlimited battlefield.==== **Nordin and Oberg 15** ~~Dan Oberg, professor of military science, Swedish Defense College, Stockholm, and Astrid Nordin, professor of politics, philosophy, and religion at Lancaster University~~ Targeting the Ontology of War: From Clausewitz to Baudrillard, Millennium: Journal of International Studies 2015, Vol. 43(2) pg. 399 In Baudrillard’s notorious critique of the Gulf war he identifies traditional conceptions of war as AND subject is disappearing in repetitive excess, what happens to the enemy Other? ====The transparency of arms sales is a viral violence that fails to produce reality. Information is contrary to its own intent and appearance is swamped by media indeterminacy as the object is erased in disappearance. Confusion gives way to constant implosive violence as we attempt to impose meaning onto the mapped globe==== **Artrip and Debrix 14**. Ryan E. Artrip, Doctoral Student, ASPECT, Virginia Polytechnic Institute, and Francois Debrix, professor of political science at Virginia Polytechnical Institute, "The Digital Fog of War: Baudrillard and the Violence of Representation," Volume 11, Number 2 (May, 2014) The story that needs to be told is thus not about the undoubtedly deplorable " AND immune systems and our capacities to resist" (2003; our italics). ====The map of U.S. imperialism has overwritten the world and war-as-fighting has disappeared. Models of generative exchange between antagonists is outmoded by pre-planned scripts of war as made through an act of disappearance through video games or films.==== ====Endless analysis about war as fighting only obscures the primacy of the simulated model. The 1AC is a performance of a radically other ontology of war, an illusory ontology of disappearance, we force the truth of war to withdraw by pulling the chair out from under the gamer, officer and policy maker. We are the radical thought moving faster than reality, directing the implosive violence of military presence back on itself. We are not cartagrophers; rather we are all Spartacus.==== **Nordin and Oberg 15** ~~Dan Oberg, professor of military science, Swedish Defense College, Stockholm, and Astrid Nordin, professor of politics, philosophy, and religion at Lancaster University~~ Targeting the Ontology of War: From Clausewitz to Baudrillard, Millennium: Journal of International Studies 2015, Vol. 43(2) pg. 406 We have argued to this point that critical war studies, in Clausewitz’s footsteps, AND a new vantage point on (critical) war studies for future debates. ====Thus, the 1AC is radical thought about arms sales as an operation of theory-fiction that cultivates illusory and surreal readings of the resolution in an effusive play with language. ==== **Strehle 14**. ~~Samuel Strehle, fellow in the DFG research training group "The Real and Modern Culture" at the University of Konstanz, Germany, MAs in sociology and philosophy from Albert-Ludwigs-Universitat Freiburg, Germany, researcher in the department of anthropology at the University of Trier, Germany, currently pursuing a PhD in sociology at the University of Basel, Switzerland~~ "A Poetic Anthropology of War: Jean Baudrillard and the 1991 Gulf War," International Journal of Baudrillard Studies, Volume 11, Number 2 (May, 2014) ///ahsBC The production of war signs is linked to the issue of war not only in AND matter if this other really exists or if it has to be feigned. ====Our point is not to defend meaning as it’s unhappy. Any attempt to impose meaning paradoxically terminates in its own disappearance, which is great because any idea that can be defended deserves to disappear. The form of reality is simply too obvious to be real. We should engage in the felicitous and happy form of language to push debate through to its own disappearance. This is the only political act left. Bet on the form of radical illusion.==== **Plato **19**96**. Jean (not like the pants) Baudrillard, The Perfect Crime, pg. 96 Say: This is real, the world is real, the real exists ( AND , corrosive of meaning, generative of an erotic perception of reality's turmoil.

Contact for Flow and Go

Hey yall, Max~-~~-~-1st speaker~-~~-~- Maxschen.debate@gmail.com Arnav~-~~-~-2nd speaker~-~~-~- aggarwalarnav2007@gmail.com Disclosure is fun; email me and max if u want to disclose We are traditional; plz dont read progressive argumentation Happy debating :)

TOC NEG

C1 NGOS Specifically, there are two ways that the U.S. military presence amplifies NGO operations. First is through logistics. U.S. military presence is key to collecting and providing intel that allow humanitarian missions to happen. Lawry of the IHD in 2009 confirms that the military provides extensive intelligence information about population movement, security infrastructure conditions, and other information necessary for NGOs to conduct operations. He furthers that since NGOs do not have satellites, intelligence analysts, or other capacities to collect and digest complex and intricate information, the military is critical to the execution of humanitarian missions. Militaries, too, have various comparative advantages. Without the military in many instances, NGOs would have been unable to provide humanitarian services or less efficient in their programming. • Militaries have a monopoly on security and the use of force. When a population is affected by conflict, external, noncombatant militaries can provide security for humanitarian operations, displaced persons, and both NGO and UN staff and infrastructure. NGOs, with strict neutrality and noncombatant policies and lack of capacity, cannot. • Militaries can provide extensive intelligence information about population movements, security conditions, road, river and bridge conditions, and other information pertinent to conducting humanitarian operations. NGOs do not have satellites, intelligence analysts, or other capacities to collect and digest complex and intricate information. • Militaries have by far the largest airlift capacity globally. Aside from the private sector, the combined load capacity of which is much greater than even the U.S. military, the US military is the largest single organization that can lift humanitarian supplies and materials in almost every condition and in very short notice. NGOs do use aircraft, but normally sporadically and in the worst scenarios for minimal periods. • Militaries have distinct advantages in large-scale communications infrastructure and communications capacities. NGOs often depend on communication capacities from militaries or UN agencies (or both) because large satellite stations, bandwidth, and other regional or global communications are not available at reasonable costs for NGOs. • Militaries can respond to maritime and/or chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high yield explosives (CBRNE) emergencies. NGOs have almost no capacity.219 Lawry empirically finds that during the 2003 Iraq invasion of Kuwait, a humanitarian conflict that was developed around the U.S. military directly relayed critical/logistical information to more than 80 NGOs. There have been other successful military run information-coordination centers in Afghanistan, Kuwait, and Indonesia. A humanitarian operations center, also called a civil-military operations center, run by the U.S. military, was indispensable in Kuwait during the 2003 Iraq invasion.216 Although coordination met with resistance from NGOs in the early stages of the war, ultimately more than 80 NGOs, the UN, and the military met within this center and worked together. Having a neutral and media-free space for close interaction and discussion allowed civil and military actors to consult without having to fight the usual issues of ownership and control. At the HOC-Kuwait, humanitarian information was collected and shared. The vast preponderance of cooperation and collaboration, interestingly, occurred informally over coffee after daily briefings. Lessons learned from this productive experience have been invaluable in easing the often times contentious civilmilitary relationship. Themes that recurred over the years are notable, and include simply agreeing on common definitions of important terms and avoiding use of confusing acronyms and potentially offensive phrases.217 NGOs, for example, agreed to avoid using the term belligerent, and the military agreed not to call the NGOs force multipliers. Second is security. Without a dominant military presence, NGOs would be at a serious risk. Penner of the Small Wars Journal in 2013 confirms that NGOs are not security oriented like the military and as a result they are unable to protect themselves in violent environments, resulting in failed missions. NGO-military cooperation has largely been ad hoc. Institutional and cultural differences pervade. NGOs required logistical support for large operations and the military often provided logistical infrastructure for NGOs. NGOs provided the military with accurate information on troubled areas. NGOs are highly cognizant of how their actions affect donor support. NGOs are less security oriented than the military. The NGO-military relationship works best when both have something to offer the other. Fortunately, U.S. military cooperation with NGOs has secured operations and brought about the completion of missions and protection of all critical infrastructure. O’Donohue of the JCS in 2019 confirms that the U.S. military gives security to NGOs in all aspects of humanitarian projects, from securing aid supplies, main shipping routes, protecting relief distribution centers, and delivery to facilities like medical clinics where the aid is used, the military protects and ensures humanitarian missions are completed. The joint force will work with interagency partners and the HN and often works with international organizations, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), PNs, and the private sector during FHA operations. The tenets of multinational unity of effort (i.e., respect, rapport, knowledge of partners, patience, and coordination) applied during an FHA mission cannot guarantee success; however, ignoring them may lead to mission failure. This publication has been prepared under the direction of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS). It sets forth joint doctrine to govern the activities and performance of the Armed Forces of the United States in joint operations, and it provides considerations for military interaction with governmental and nongovernmental agencies, multinational forces, and other interorganizational partners. It provides military guidance for the exercise of authority by combatant commanders and other joint force commanders (JFCs), and prescribes joint doctrine for operations and training. It provides military guidance for use by the Armed Forces in preparing and executing their plans and orders. It is not the intent of this publication to restrict the authority of the JFC from organizing the force and executing the mission in a manner the JFC deems most appropriate to ensure unity of effort in the accomplishment of objectives. Support Activities. Some activities that may be supported by US military forces under FHA include providing logistical support, such as the transportation of humanitarian supplies or personnel; making available, preparing, and transporting nonlethal excess property (EP) to foreign countries; transferring on-hand DOD stocks to respond to unforeseen emergencies; and conducting some DOD humanitarian demining assistance activities. In some circumstances, medical support and base operating services may be conducted if required by the operation. In addition to force protection and PR for the joint force, a JFC may also be tasked to provide protection for other personnel and assets. If not clearly stated in the mission, the extent of this security should be addressed in the ROE, to include protection of: (1) Forces of other nations working jointly with US forces in a multinational force. (2) USG, NGO, and international organization personnel and equipment. (3) HA recipients. (4) Affected country personnel and assets. (5) Humanitarian relief convoys, supplies, and main supply routes. (6) Relief distribution centers. (7) Stocks of HA supplies. (8) Ports and airfields. (9) Hospitals and medical clinics. It is for these two reasons that Lawry writes that without U.S. military presence NGOs would be unable to provide support to areas of dire need. NGOs are better at managing refugee camps and providing water and sanitation services because of their close relationships with UNHCR. NGO staff members are also often trained or specialized in various aspects of camp management.218 Militaries, too, have various comparative advantages. Without the military in many instances, NGOs would have been unable to provide humanitarian services or less efficient in their programming. • Militaries have a monopoly on security and the use of force. When a population is affected by conflict, external, noncombatant militaries can provide security for humanitarian operations, displaced persons, and both NGO and UN staff and infrastructure. NGOs, with strict neutrality and noncombatant policies and lack of capacity, cannot. The impact is preventing a humanitarian crisis. Absent logistical support and protection from the military, NGO operations would fail. The OCHA in 2017 terminalizes that humanitarian partners continue to respond to rising displacement and provide basic assistance to families in new areas. To date, emergency response actors of food, water, and medical kits have been distributed to cover the immediate needs of more than two million people. And absent our military presence, the millions who rely on NGOs and our military are left without basic standards of living. Iraq: UN and partners scale up humanitarian response to growing needs As fighting continues in west Mosul Iraq, humanitarian partners continue to respond to rising displacement and provide basic assistance to families in newly accessible areas, where conditions allow. Where access inside west Mosul city allows humanitarian partners to reach civilians, displaced families are provided with ready-to-eat food rations. Resident or returning families in the area are provided dry food rations i.e. to cook themselves. Almost 62,000 people in 14 west Mosul neighbourhoods have received ready-to-eat food rations to date; 64,000 people in eleven west Mosul neighbourhoods have received dry food rations. West Mosul has been cut off from its main supply route since November 2016, and remains largely inaccessible to humanitarian actors. In western Mosul city, many neighbourhoods face chronic water shortages, with many people drinking untreated water. Humanitarians are concerned over an increased number of displaced children arriving from western Mosul with diarrhoea. Shortages of clean drinking water have likely been exacerbated by ISIL’s recent attacks on the Badush water treatment plant, western Mosul’s largest functioning treatment plant. Ensuring water treatment and sewage treatment facilities in Mosul are operational remains a top priority for humanitarian partners. Approximately 500,000 people live in ISIL-controlled areas of west Mosul. Iraqi authorities also estimate that some 150,000 civilians reside in 28 currently accessible neighbourhoods of western Mosul. Since the start of military operations to retake Mosul six months ago, nearly half a million people have been displaced from their homes. “The sheer volume of civilians still fleeing Mosul city is staggering,” said Humanitarian Coordinator for Iraq Lise Grande. “Our worst case scenario when the fighting started was that up to one million civilians may flee Mosul. Already, more than 493,000 people have left, leaving almost everything behind,” said Ms. Grande. To date, emergency response packages (of ready-to-eat food, water, hygiene and dignity kits) have been distributed to cover the immediate needs of more than two million people since the fighting began in late October. Front-line organizations have been providing food, water, shelter, emergency kits, medical support and psycho-social services – to both families who have fled and families who have stayed. C2 ISIS Rogers 18. Rogers, Michael. “Statement of Admiral Michael S. Rogers.” Congress, 27 February 2018. https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Rogers_02-27-18.pdf We face a growing variety of threats from adversaries acting with precision and boldness, and often with stealth. U.S. Cyber Command engages with adversaries in cyberspace every day. Accordingly, we have developed substantial knowledge of how malicious cyber actors work against the United States, our allies and partners, and many other targets as well. That knowledge in turn provides insights into the motivations, capabilities, and intentions of those who sponsor such activities, whether they be states, criminal enterprises, or violent extremists. Cyberspace is a global and dynamic operating environment, with unique challenges. A significant story in cyberspace over the past year relates to the progress made against the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), and USCYBERCOM contributions to the eviction of ISIS fighters from their geographic strongholds. Today, ISIS’s so-called “Caliphate” is crumbling. It has lost 98 percent of the territory it once controlled in Iraq and Syria, and approximately 3.2 million Syrians and 4.5 million Iraqis now have a pathway to begin to rebuild their cities and their lives. Denying sanctuary to ISIS in Iraq and Syria is a victory for civilization, and an important step in stabilizing the nations of that region and building peace in the Middle East. Cyberspace operations played an important role in this campaign, with USCYBERCOM supporting the successful offensive by U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM), U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), and our Coalition partners. 3 We learned a great deal in performing those missions, and continue to execute some today. Mounting cyber operations against ISIS helped us re-learn and reinforce important lessons learned over the last decade of cyber operations against violent extremists. I should emphasize that this campaign was a Coalition fight, with key international partners conducting and supporting both kinetic and cyberspace operations against ISIS. Wilson Center, 12-11-2019, "Report: Terrorism on Decline in Middle East and North Africa," https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/report-terrorism-decline-middle-east-and-north-africa The number of terrorist attacks in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) declined significantly in 2018, according to the Global Terrorism Index, an annual study by the Institute for Economics and Peace. The security situation improved in 17 countries and only worsened in Iran and Morocco. The better conditions were largely driven by the deterioration of ISIS, which lost much of its territory in Iraq and Syria. “Deaths attributed to the group declined 69 per cent, with attacks declining 63 per cent in 2018,” according to the report. “The largest decline in fatalities last year was in Iraq, which had 75 per cent fewer deaths from terrorism in 2018. Syria followed, with nearly a 40 percent reduction.” Problematically, ICG 19 reports International Crisis Group, 3-12-2019, “Averting an ISIS Resurgence in Iraq and Syria.” https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/eastern-mediterranean/syria/207-averting-isis-resurgence-iraq-and-syria In Iraq and Syria, ISIS is down but not out. The group remains active but reduced and geographically circumscribed. Keeping it down requires sustained effort. Any of several events – Turkish intervention in north-eastern Syria, but also instability in Iraq or spill-over of U.S.-Iranian tensions – could enable its comeback. In Iraq, ISIS is waging an active, deadly insurgency. Yet it is an insurgency that is diminished, not just from ISIS’s capabilities at its height in early 2015, but also from the long campaign that preceded the group’s 2014 surge. ISIS’s current war is also one limited mostly to the country’s rural periphery. In much of Iraq today, security is better than it has been for years – despite the violence amid recent protests, which has marred the relative calm. Hennigan 19~-~-Hennigan, W.J. (W.J. Hennigan covers the Pentagon and national security issues in Washington, D.C. He has reported from more than two dozen countries across five continents, covering war, counter-terrorism, and the lives of U.S. service members.) “ISIS Fighters Are Gaining Strength After Trump’s Syria Pullout, US Spies Say.” Time, 19 November 2019. https://time.com/5732842/isis-gaining-strength-trump-syria-pullout/ The assessment, publicly disclosed Tuesday in a Department of Defense Office of Inspector General report, focused on the abrupt decision to remove all 1,000 U.S. troops from northern Syria. The move created a power vacuum and set off a series of violent developments on the ground that risks upending more than five years of progress in the war against the terrorist group. “ISIS exploited the Turkish incursion and subsequent draw-down of U.S. troops to reconstitute capabilities and resources within Syria and strengthen its ability to plan attacks abroad,” the 116-page report says. “The DIA also reported that without counter-terrorism pressure, ISIS will probably be able to more freely build clandestine networks and will attempt to free ISIS members detained in… prisons and family members living in internally displaced persons camps.” The White House referred questions about the inspector general report to the Pentagon, which responded by email. “ISIS fighters are still operating in the region, and unless pressure is maintained, a reemergence of the group and its capabilities remains a very real possibility,” Commander Sean Robertson, a Pentagon spokesman, said in a statement. “We are committed to keeping that from happening.” CBS 19~-~- “Defense Dept inspector general says ISIS likely to ‘resurge’ without ‘sustained pressure’.” CBS News, 4 February 2019. https://www.cbsnews.com/news/defense-isis-likely-to-resurge-without-sustained-pressure/ The U.S. military believes that "absent sustained pressure" on the Islamic State, ISIS could re-emerge in Syria within six to 12 months, according to a new Department of Defense Inspector General report on Operation Inherent Resolve. According to the Pentagon, while U.S.-backed Syrian forces have continued the fight to retake the remaining ISIS strongholds in Syria, ISIS remains a "potent force of battle-hardened and well-disciplined fighters that could likely resurge in Syria absent continued counterterrorism pressure," the report reads. Brahmi 20~-~- Brahimi, Alia. (Alia Brahimi is a former research fellow at Oxford University and the London School of Economics) “Qassem Suleimani Wanted US Troops Out of Iraq. If They Go, ISIS Will Be Back.” Foreign Policy, 17 January 2020. https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/01/17/qassem-suleimani-expel-us-troops-iraq-isis-will-be-back/ Now, as tensions escalate between the United States and Iran in the wake of the U.S. killing of Iranian military commander Qassem Suleimani this month, it is worth remembering that the Islamic State is regrouping in Iraq. Indeed, the militant group’s 14,000-18,000 fighters are returning to their guerrilla roots, assassinating tribal elders, taxing local populations, kidnapping soldiers, burning crops, laying roadside ambushes, and engaging in nighttime hit-and-runs. Training and support from U.S. forces in Iraq is essential to preventing its full-blown revival, but the standoff with Iran may yield the opposite result: removing the U.S. presence from Iraq altogether. ~-~-~-~- The United States has also provided training and mentoring to Iraqi forces, as well as critical help with battlespace management. The Iraqis are said to be highly capable with regard to signals intelligence and have developed counterterrorism expertise, but they still lack the ability to knit together the moving parts of the intelligence and targeting cycle. However controversial U.S. troop deployments in the Middle East are, for the time being, the 5,000-strong U.S. presence in Iraq is necessary (through of course not sufficient) to retain cohesion on the ground and maintain strategic momentum. “The sad truth is that, if left to their own devices, the Iraqi security forces might rot while they stand, like they did in 2014,” the former commander said. “Maybe not next week, but eventually it would happen.” Other countries will not fill-in. Magid (2020), Pesha. “Islamic State Aims for Comeback Amid Virus-Expedited U.S. Withdrawal.” Foreign Policy. APRIL 6, 2020, 5:04 PM. https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/04/06/iraq-islamic-state-comeback-coronavirus-us-withdrawal/ In Iraq, this prediction is already beginning to play out as several coalition members, including France and Britain, have withdrawn their troops from Iraq and halted their training programs to protect their soldiers from the spread of COVID-19. ... “Iraqi forces are fighting an ISIS insurgency that has abandoned the semi-conventional warfare that the organization had at its height and that is now a much harder target, operating as small guerrilla units in rugged terrain in the country’s rural periphery or attempting to work clandestinely to infiltrate populated areas,” said Sam Heller, a senior analyst at the International Crisis Group. “It’s an enemy that ISIS requires a relatively advanced set of technical enablers that the coalition is able to provide.” Chief among these enablers are air support and intelligence gathering to fight it, both of which are primarily provided by the United States. Rasool pointed to the same capabilities while talking about the need for a partnership with the coalition. “The cooperation with the international coalition, especially when it comes to reconnaissance, air support, and intelligence information—that is very important,” he said. “If you don’t have modern planes, then you cannot have a strong army.” The coalition uses its technical capabilities to help coordinate and advise missions with the Iraqi Army and local tribal militias that were mobilized in 2014 to fight the Islamic State. The impact is on preventing genocide. ISIS has repeatedly targeted ethno-religious groups in Iraq and Syria, including the Turkmen, Shabak, Yadizis, and Christians. UN 16~-~-UN Commision of Inquiry on Syria: ISIS is commiting genocide against the Yazidis.” UN, 2016. https://www.ohchr.org/FR/HRBodies/HRC/Pages/NewsDetail.aspx?NewsID=20113andLangID=F ISIS sought – and continues to seek – to destroy the Yazidis in multiple ways, as envisaged by the 1948 Genocide Convention. “ISIS has sought to erase the Yazidis through killings; sexual slavery, enslavement, and torture and inhuman and degrading treatment and forcible transfer causing serious bodily and mental harm; the infliction of conditions of life that bring about a slow death; the imposition of measures to prevent Yazidi children from being born, including forced conversion of adults, the separation of Yazidi men and women, and mental trauma; and the transfer of Yazidi children from their own families and placing them with ISIS fighters, thereby cutting them off from beliefs and practices of their own religious community”, the report says. In just two years, ISIS harmed millions. NBC 16~-~- Jamieson, Alastair. “ISIS Death Toll: 18,800 Killed in Iraq in 2 Years, UN says.” NBC News, 19 January 2016. https://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/isis-terror/isis-death-toll-18-800-killed-iraq-2-years-u-n499426 At least18,802 civilians have been killed in Iraq in ISIS-linked violence in under two years, a United Nations report said Tuesday — with millions of others forced from their homes and thousands more held as slaves. “The violence suffered by civilians in Iraq remains staggering,” said the report by the Office of the United Nations High Comissioner for Human Rights PDF link here. ISIS continues to commit “systematic and widespread violence and abuses of international human rights law and humanitarian law,” it said, adding that some of those act amount “crimes against humanity, and possibly genocide.” U.N. monitors recorded at least 55,047 civilian casualties as a result of the conflict between Jan. 1, 2014 and Oct. 31, 2015, with 18,802 people killed and and 36,245 wounded, it said. Over the same period, 3.2 million people became “internally displaced by ISIS” including over one million school-age girls and boys. “The persistent violence and scale of the displacement” limit their access to housing, clean water and education, the report said. It also documented human rights abuses, saying some 3,500 people are believed to be held as captives, mostly women and children from the Yazidi religious minority who have been forced into sexual slavery. C3 POWER VAC (Burke) Arleigh A., 1-2-2020, "America’s Failed Strategy in the Middle East: Losing Iraq and the Gulf," No Publication, https://www.csis.org/analysis/americas-failed-strategy-middle-east-losing-iraq-and-gulf In round two, the United States and its allies ended up fighting these Islamic extremists from 2004 to 2010. Although the United States defeated these extremists in western Iraq with the aid of a massive surge of U.S. ground troops and the aid of Iraqi Sunni popular forces, the United States failed to create a stable Iraqi government and economy. The United States effectively abandoned its nation building efforts after 2009 and withdrew its combat forces from Iraq at the end of 2011 – which createding a power vacuum that opened up Iraq to ISIS – all the while, it was never able to decide on any active strategy for stabilizing Iraq or dealing with the Syrian civil war. It focused on defeating ISIS – relying heavily on Syrian Kurds in the process – and scored another “victory” in 2016-2018 by disbanding the ISIS “caliphate.” Claire Parker and Rick Noack. Jan 30, 2020. “Iran has invested in allies and proxies across the Middle East. Here’s where they stand after Soleimani’s death.” https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2020/01/03/iran-has-invested-allies-proxies-across-middle-east-heres-where-they-stand-after-soleimanis-death/ Many — though not all — of the groups Iran sponsors are Shiite. While ideology plays a role in Iran’s foreign policy, experts say the regime’s primary goal is to project power throughout the Middle East to counter U.S., Israeli and Saudi influence. The success of Iran’s strategy rests in large part on its ability to capitalize on power vacuums in the Middle East, Vatanka said. Most recently, Iran has broadened its reach by backing militias in war-torn Yemen and Syria amid the chaos ushered in by the Arab Spring uprisings in 2011. How does Iran do this? Primarily through the Revolutionary Guard Corps’ Quds Force, which Soleimani controlled until his death. (The Trump administration designated the Revolutionary Guard a foreign terrorist organization in April). The Quds Force organizinges and trainings fighters with allied militias and provides them with weapons, according to a report by the Soufan Center. Iran also uses soft power to cement economic alliances with countries like Iraq, where Iran has supported local militias in the fight against U.S. forces in the aftermath of the 2003 invasion of Iraq and later in the fight against the Islamic State. Ahronheim (2020), Anna. “If US leaves the region, Israel will eventually go to war with Iran.” Jerusalem Post. JANUARY 8, 2020 18:33. https://www.jpost.com/israel-news/if-us-leaves-from-the-region-israel-will-eventually-go-to-war-with-iran-613446 Should the United States withdraw its forces and Iran continue on its path through Iraq and Syria, Israel will eventually find itself in a war along its entire northern border, Brig.-Gen. (res.) Ilan Lavi has warned. “The United States is the main brakes in the region and its withdrawal would lead to an escalation, since the Iranians will continue to apply gas” to their aspirations of regional hegemony, Lavi said during a conference held by the Alma Research and Education Center in Northern Israel. On Monday evening, a letter sent from the head of the US military’s task force in Iraq to Abdul Amir, deputy director of Combined Joint Operations, sparked concern the US was removing its forces from Iraq after its parliament voted to oust American troops from the country following the assassination of top Iranian General Qasem Soleimani. While Washington later clarified that it was a “mistake” and no troops were being withdrawn, Lavi, who served as deputy head of the Northern Command, said that no one is able to predict what the American president might later decide to do. And if Trump does decide to withdraw, “I’m not optimistic,” he said. “Eventually, and I don’t mean tomorrow or next year, we will have to go to war. The Iranians will continue.” Saudi Arabia has reacted to Iranian expansion through wars. Marcus 19 https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-42008809 Fast-forward to 2011 and uprisings across the Arab world caused political instability throughout the region. Iran and Saudi Arabia exploited these upheavals to expand their influence, notably in Syria, Bahrain and Yemen, further heightening mutual suspicions. Iran's critics say it is intent on establishing itself or its proxies across the region, and achieving control of a land corridor stretching from Iran to the Mediterranean.How have things got worse? The strategic rivalry is heating up because Iran is in many ways winning the regional struggle. In Syria, Iranian (and Russian) support for President Bashar al-Assad has enabled his forces to largely rout rebel group groups backed by Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia is trying desperately to contain rising Iranian influence while the militaristic adventurism of the kingdom's young and impulsive Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman - the country's de facto ruler - is exacerbating regional tensions. He Saudi Arabia is waging a war against the rebel Houthis movement in neighbouring Yemen, in part to stem perceived Iranian influence there, but after four years this is proving a costly gamble. Iran has denied accusations that it is smuggling weaponry to the Houthis, though successive reports from a panel of UN experts have demonstrated significant assistance for the Houthis from Tehran in terms of both technology and weaponry. Sternman 18 https://www.newamerica.org/international-security/reports/twenty-first-century-proxy-warfare/ It’s a pricey wager and it is still unclear whether it’s a winning bet. Civil wars raging today in the so-called “arc of instability” remain the greatest threats to international security. Proxy Conflict in the Middle Eastthere has displacesd tens of millions of people, killed hundreds of thousands, and devastated large swaths of the region’s economy and infrastructure. Renewed U.S. rivalry with Russia and China and competition among Iran, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Israel for regional primacy are forcing Washington to reconfigure its grand strategy. Current conceptions of proxy warfare do not account for the paradigm shift now underway. A clear-eyed cost-benefits analysis of proxy warfare is needed to make U.S. strategy more effective. Not only that, Seth Cropsey, Gary Roughead, 10-31-2019, "A U.S. Withdrawal Will Cause a Power Struggle in the Middle East," Foreign Policy, https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/12/17/us-withdrawal-power-struggle-middle-east-china-russia-iran/ The unique mix of political forces in the Middle East suggests three possibilities in the event of U.S. naval withdrawal from the Middle East region, and none favor U.S. interests. First, Russia may broker a political arrangement among Turkey, Israel, and Iran, or, alternatively, support a coalition pitting some of those states against another in an e?ort to manufacture a manageable regional balance of power and allowing it to shift its attention back to Europe. The ?nal shape of this strategy would depend on several variables: Turkey’s approach to Syria, Israel’s posture against Iran (and its proxies), the outcome of Saudi Arabia’s war in Yemen, the Kurdish question, and the possibility of the Islamic State’s resurgence. Regardless of these factors, Russia will still bid for control of the Mediterranean Sea, which the United States will be hard-pressed to counter, particularly if China can manipulate its European economic partners into limiting or expelling the U.S. Navy from its Mediterranean bases. If that happens, Washington will have to ?ght its way back into the region for the ?rst time since World War II. In the second scenario, Iran defeats Saudi Arabia in a regional confrontation, thereby taking the top leadership spot in the Islamic world, making it a great power in its own right. Control of Middle Eastern oil exports would give Iran the ability to coerce and bully the United States’ European and Paci?c allies, and it would deny the United States any peaceful access to the Levantine Basin. The balancing dynamics against this new great power are di?cult to project, but regardless, the United States’ ability to control the strategic environment would be hampered markedly. Third, a long-term regional war between Tehran and a ?uctuating anti-Iran coalition composed of Saudi Arabia, other Sunni Gulf states, and Israel would cause widespread bloodshed. As the 1980s Iran-Iraq War demonstrated, both Iran and Saudi Arabia would be likely to attempt nuclear breakout. With Iran, this would mean closing the small technological gap that now exists between its low-enriched uranium to the higher level of enrichment needed for a nuclear weapon.

disclosure interp

Debaters must disclose previously-read positions on the National Debate Coaches Association Public Forum wiki. The disclosure must be under their own school, team name, and correct side and must happen at least 30 minutes before the round and must include the author name, taglines, a hyperlink to the evidence, and open sourced full-text of all parts of the evidence they cite in context.* specifics are open sourced *we will read specifically open source disclosure if we feel up to it

AC r4 and on

C3: Economic Growth Without a UBI, the United States is highly likely to enter a recession.  Kenneth Thomas, Daily Business Review, "Miami Economist Sees 80 Probability of a Recession in 2020", November 1, 2019, Error! Hyperlink reference not valid. The PETOD effect existed in five of those eight elections with recessions beginning during each election year in four cases (1860, 1920, 1960 and 1980) and in the previous year in one case (June 1899 before the 1900 presidential election). The PETOD effect of 63 (five of eight) would have been 75 (six of eight) counting the Y2K recession. Also, the PETOD effect existed for two of the last three (67) and four of the last six (67) such presidential elections; these results would have been three of the last three (100) and five of the last six (87) counting Y2K. Considering traditional economic factors and my nontraditional anomalies, I believe there is an 80 probability a recession will begin next year. Fortunately, Cash Transfers will provide a foundation for our economy offering money to each individual Chris Leeson, Medium, "We Need To Talk About Universal Basic Income", July 23, 2017, https://medium.com/@_C_Leeson/we-need-to-talk-about-universal-basic-income-f5c46f577d71 No one needs to be sold on the worthiness of alleviating poverty. Not even those caricatured as being indifferent to poverty actually are; it’s just that they’re unwilling to countenance the tradeoffs required for doing so. But if a system could alleviate poverty while keeping other things equal or even augmenting other points along the wealth distribution continuum, then it’s a no-brainer. One of the selling points of the UBI is that it is superior to automatic stabilizers, such as existing welfare and welfare-like structures. It is the assumption that giving everyone money is better than assisting the targeted few. By contrast, Australia has just embraced “needs” based school funding which functions in line with existing transfer payments for social welfare and provides more funding to schools with kids of lower socio-economic backgrounds. What happens when we move away from means-tested strategies and toward universal strategies? Let’s consider the institutions we’d want to universalize and the costs associated with a UBI. Healthcare, elderly care, education, transportation, communications infrastructure — these are the essentials; the tools of opportunity. The cost of a UBI of $15,000 per person in America would be approximately $4.83 trillion, not including administrative costs. That’s 27 of GDP. Currently, according to OECD data, the United States spends approximately 20 of GDP on social welfare, so moving to a UBI would represent a 7 percentage point increase. But the question was never over the dollar amount; it’s always been about efficiency and effectiveness.  Is it more efficient to give everyone money, or to target particular needs. Here are some facts. Preventive measures are more cost-effective than reactive measures. There is a natural rate of unemployment. UBI creates “choice” based spending. Recipients are able to choose whether they participate in society, get an education, and pay for the dentist or buy drugs, alcohol, and be a part of the underground/illegal economy. One can make a good case for thinking that a and UBI will increase standards of living.  It may do that in the short term — the problem is: when it comes to the long term, we just don’t know. We know that free markets have delivered a better quality of life, and we know that command governments, such as the various communisms of the 20th century, have failed. We also know there has been rising wealth inequality and we have the possibility of fitting a UBI program within a broader capitalist system. It could be just what is needed. Leisure Time, Innovation, Entrepreneurship, Education A UBI provides some economic security and a fall back position that will enable entrepreneurship, education, and leisure time. But a big problem stems from the possibility that our inclinations to be lazy are stronger than our inclinations to be industrious. A universal basic income won’t suddenly turn people into creatives or business magnates. Those people arguably have that drive and those traits regardless of the environment you put them in. Investing now rather than waiting to implement a stimulus package revitalizes stabilizers. This is needed, as   Sara Estep, Center for American Progress, "The Importance of Automatic Stabilizers in the Next Recession", June 17, 2019 americanprogress.org/issues/economy/news/2019/06/17/471120/importance-automatic-stabilizers-next-recession/ The United States is experiencing one of the longest periods of economic expansion in its history, but downturns are difficult to predict, giving policymakers reason to worry about whether the country is prepared for the next recession. Automatic stabilizers—policy features that automatically expand spending or reduce tax receipts during economic downturns in order to inject stimulus—helped reduce the severity of the Great Recession a decade ago. In order to improve the U.S. economy’s resilience against future recessions, policymakers must strengthen automatic stabilizers. Otherwise, families could be left struggling to keep a roof over their heads and put food on the table as Congress takes time to act. This column offers a brief explanation of automatic stabilizers, their role in mitigating a recession, and how they can be improved for the future. What are automatic stabilizers? Automatic stabilizers are features of the federal government’s budget that automatically injected funds into the economy through transfer payments or tax reductions when the economy goes into recession or otherwise slumps. They are “automatic” because they do not require action by Congress; in other words, they are built into already enacted policies. Many government policies serve as automatic stabilizers simply by their nature. For example, when many workers lose their jobs around the same time, the unemployment insurance program receives more claims and pays out more in benefits. The progressive income tax system also serves as an automatic stabilizer because when people’s incomes fall, they pay less in taxes. Some programs could have additional features built into them that would react when certain macroeconomic indicators were triggered. (see Table 1) In fact, a UBI is literally designed to prevent shocks in the market and protect against drops in investor confidence Robert Jameson, Yahoo, "Would a universal basic income be an effective stimulus during a recession?", October 10, 2017, https://answers.yahoo.com/question/index?qid=20171009191552AAR2KSH It is designed to help provide stability - to be there year in, year out, whether there is a recession on or not! It’s entirely possible, however, that the stability it a UBI provides might helps prevent the economy falling into a recession in the first place. Confidence levels may be more stable when people have the security of a Basic Income - and that may potentially reduces the likelihood of sudden falls in aggregate demand that could lead to a recession. A US recession will push millions of people into poverty.  Isabel Sawhill ofBroookings Institute, "Simulating the Effect of the “Great Recession” on Poverty", September 10, 2009, https://www.brookings.edu/research/simulating-the-effect-of-the-great-recession-on-poverty/ ?In short, our results show that recessions can have long-term scarring effects for all workers but especially for the most disadvantaged, whose skills and attachment to the work force are already somewhat marginal. A prolonged lack of jobs reduces the amount of on-the-job training or experience that people receive, discourages them from making the effort needed to climb out of poverty, and can even lead to a deterioration in their health or family life that adversely affects opportunity. There were 37 million people in poverty in 2007, so our results indicate that the lastrecession would increased the number of people in poverty by about 8 million, or 22 percent. Our estimates for the increase in poverty amongst children are even more dramatic. There were about 13 million children living in poverty in 2007, and we estimate that further, the number of poor children could increasede by at least 5 million, or 38 percent. To: a. save 42 million women from abusive relationships b. 9/10 of the people in poverty and reduce poverty by 74 c. and to save the millions of people who are going into poverty in the next recession, vote pro

offs

1- Gift K A UBI is a form of a Gift Arjo 96 ~~A gift is~~ any 'good', including money, that is transferred, conveyed or transmitted from one party to another when the nature, the value and the timing of the return of an equivalent is left undetermined. Thus - A UBI is a gift Gift becomes a commodity for the ego Arrigo and Williams explain, the notion of gif-giving, assures the giver that they will enjoy an elevated status. The idea of a true and whole hearted gift is crushed by the need for reciprocating the gift. AandW find that the need for reciprocacy puts the receiver at a stage of psychological subjugation. Thus, the act of gift giving, becomes an act of egoism. Impacts ~~1~~ Authoritarianism Stanford 11 writes, sustenance and other bequests to members of the community maintained elevated status It could preserve the status of authority and control the public. Gift giving economies help put the givers at the top while the receivers are subjugated. ~~2~~ Silence THe gift creates a notion of thankfulness and pity, the false sentiments can create silence and perpetuate the superiority of the giver. In this way, the UBI becomes a gift from the government to the public, perpetuating silence and authoritarianism The Alt is to reject the Aff Implementing a UBI would encompass the entirety of the public under the receiver. UBI would increase governmental authority and support authoritarianism. The larger the UBI, the easier it would be for the government. Even if the intention was not so, the subconscious psychological effects felt, perpetuated the impacts. ROB: The ROB is thus to vote for the team who best protects rights, liberty, and autonomy ~~1~~ Autonomy is a prereq for a good life, and for people's ability to act ~~2~~ For people to be valued, their autonomy must be respected 2- PC DA Aff eliminates important Welfare Programs: There are 3 Main Impacts The First is losing Housing. The CBPP found in 2019 that over 10 million Americans use federal assistance to afford modest housing. Cutting this program for a UBI would hurt these Americans as Weiss of the ABA in 2019 explains that without housing assistance, the majority of families would be homeless or living in substandard conditions because they would not be able to spend on rent. For this reason, Weiss furthers that in 2017 alone, welfare programs for housing assistance lifted 3 million people out of poverty. A UBI would not replace these benefits since Goulden of the JRF in 2018 corroborates that a UBI would not be nearly enough to make up for market-based rents for people in the lower and middle classes as these would sky-rocket without government aid. Removing housing would be disastrous as the current 10 million recipients would be pushed onto the street The Second is losing Healthcare. Leonard of US News finds that over 70 million people are dependent on Medicaid - a means-tested healthcare program. Medicaid provides healthcare for any American that makes less than 30 above the poverty line. Broddus of the Center of Budget and Policy Priorities in late 2019 finds that this is detrimental as Medicaid coverage is seen to decrease mortality in older Americans by up to 64 and the medicaid program helped to save 19,000 people over a span of a few years. And the Third is losing SNAP. Feeding America explains that SNAP stands for the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program. SNAP is a federal program that helps millions of low-income Americans put food on the table. The CBPP 19 corroborates that SNAP benefits reach anyone who qualifies under program rules. For this reason, 40 million people depend on SNAP and were taken out of a situation of food insecurity. They further said that in 2016 alone, this program helped to keep 7.3 million people out of poverty and lift 1.9 million children above the poverty line. 3 - IDA Calder 17 finds implementing a UBI will decrease political support for immigration, thus immigration will decrease. Zwolinski 13 writes, "A ~~UBI~~would restrict immigration even more than it already is." He continues, that this will be caused by the government's inability to fund immigrant UBI. Impacts ~~1~~ Resentment A UBI will create anti-immigrant resentment. Dahner 13 corroborates, a UBI fuels anti-immigrant lobbying and supports radical nationalism which causes racial and ethnic prejudice. Resentment lowers cultural diversity, and hurts those who need to migrate. Parijis 12 agrees, they say anti-immigration leads to solidarity and resentment between communities. ~~2~~ Racism and Exploitation The increased resentment will develop into racism. As a result, ethnic minorities become the target of hate. This is exactly what Parijis 12 finds when they say a culturally diverse community is needed to prevent solidarity and prejudice. Moreover, this resentment and racism leads to exploitation of immigrant workers. Collins of the IPS in 2017 finds this is empirically evident in Dubai. A sustainable UBI "makes low wage work less attractive." This sets up for immigrants to be forced to fill in for these jobs.

1- JR Masterman Disclosure Policy

Cases will be disclosed after being broken, and updated at the end of the day if case args change. Interps are disclosed before hand, the rest of the shell will be disclosed if it's read. Email Lucas at lucasabowerman@gmail.com if you have any questions about anything!

Contact Info

1. Carson Kennedy (He/Him) - Carson1658@gmail.com 2. Ethan Taylor (He/Him) - taylorethan001@gmail.com Feel free to contact us with any questions you have.

Saudi and NATO

1AC We affirm, Contention 1: Keeping Peace in the Middle East Recent events have put major strains on the U.S.-Saudi relationship, Foreign Policy in 2017 writes John Hannah, Foreign Policy, 5-20-2017 Trump Should Salvage U.S.-Saudi Relations, https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/03/27/trump-should-salvage-u-s-saudi-relations/, 10-13-2019//rjs The U.S.-Saudi relationship is in real trouble. And things could get worse—even much worse. Bipartisan majorities in Congress have already made clear their desire to punish Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman for a long series of transgressions, including the kingdom’s role in Yemen’s catastrophic civil war and the murder of dissident U.S.-based journalist Jamal Khashoggi. These efforts will only intensify as the 2020 U.S. presidential election cycle ramps up. For the ever-expanding list of Democratic aspirants, the temptation to outdo each other in attacking President Donald Trump’s close links to the kingdom’s leadership will be nearly irresistible. It’s a truism of U.S. politics that there’s no downside to Saudi bashing. That’s doubly true today, with the controversial Mohammed bin Salman at the helm, and with talk of the use of bone saws on journalists, the detention and torture of U.S. citizens, and the abuse of women’s rights activists dominating the headlines. Even if Congress falls short of getting any new anti-Saudi legislation past the president’s veto, the constant drip, month after month, of hearings, bills, and public criticism targeting the kingdom risks doing serious long-term damage to the two countries’ strategic relationship. It’s true that there’s a lot of ruin in U.S.-Saudi ties. The relationship has endured oil boycotts, the 9/11 attacks (15 of the 19 hijackers were Saudi nationals), and more than 70 years of constant clashing of cultures and values. The national interests that have bound Washington and Riyadh together through the decades, despite their deep differences, remain formidable. But real changes are now afoot in the underlying dynamics of the relationship. They should at minimum give pause to anyone who blithely assumes that there’s no amount of public derision that the United States could heap on the kingdom that might put the broader U.S.-Saudi partnership at risk, and the Trump administration should take notice. One such change is the rapid rise of Saudi nationalism—especially among the country’s large youth population. As part of his reform agenda for transforming the kingdom, Mohammed bin Salman has consciously sought to build a new sense of identity among Saudis, grounded in nationalism rather than Wahhabism, the fundamentalist religious sect that served as an ideological gateway for terrorist groups such as al Qaeda and the Islamic State. While largely a positive development, the nationalist tide could have a double edge, as I learned on an Atlantic Council trip to Riyadh in February. Thankfully, the U.S. can use offensive cyber operations to provide Saudi Arabia to fill the gaps within the relationship. Deutch in 2018 explains, Ron Deutch and Yoel Guzansky, Dec-2018 INSS, “Cyberspace: The Next Arena for the Saudi-Iranian Conflict?” https://www.inss.org.il/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/Deutch-Guzansky.pdf//rjs This article examined the feasibility of cyberspace developing into the next arena for widespread conflict between Saudi Arabia and Iran. In fact, cybernetic clashes between the two have already occurred, although this is not yet the focus of friction between them. Therefore, when discussing the Saudi Iranian conflict in cyberspace, a distinction must be made between the short to medium term and the long term. As their experiences show, both these countries suffer from cybernetic weaknesses, which have the potential of opening them up to highly significant strategic damage. These weaknesses could turn out to be the cracks that bring down one of the two regimes, if one succeeds in landing a sufficiently severe blow. Since this is the case, the risks and opportunities that cyberspace represents for both Saudi Arabia and Iran make it tempting, particularly when it is a question of long-term investment of resources. At present, it appears that the cybernetic capabilities of both these countries are too meager to cover full-scale conflict between them. They fulfill an important supporting role but are still insufficiently developed to provide a response for each country’s security concept. Evidence of this can be found in the relatively simple means of aggression used by both Saudi Arabia and Iran in cyberspace. They include, above all, the dissemination of “fake news” and subversion through social media. Neither Saudi Arabia nor Iran possess wide-scale cyberattack capabilities; as far as it is known, Saudi Arabia still lacks independent technological abilities, and while Iran may be more advanced in this respect, it still relies to a large extent on semi-random “mercenaries.” The more interesting question that should be asked concerns the long term trends. As already mentioned, decision makers in both Saudi Arabia and Iran are aware of the potential for both damage and benefit inherent in cyberspace and are taking steps to position themselves as players in this field for the long term. To this must be added the strategic balance that the two have between them: neither Saudi Arabia nor Iran can has the capabilities to defeat the other side using only conventional military means. This being the case, the decision to turn to the cyber channel—with the options it presents—is the obvious step. In this sense, we cannot rule out the possibility that we are seeing the first signs of a Saudi-Iranian technological race, in addition, of course, to all the cybernetic threats that separately occupy each of these two countries. It is hard to predict the outcomes of such a race: On one hand, although it is possible to argue over Iran’s status as a regular cyber power, at present Iran undoubtedly has an advantage over Saudi Arabia in this field. Iran has relatively well developed defensive infrastructures and valuable experience gained during the years of dealing with Israeli and American attacks. Also, unlike Saudi Arabia, which lacks real “hard” attack capabilities, Iran has demonstrated its ability to attack Saudi and western targets—American in particular—over the internet, even if it is apparently unable to mount a systematic and broad attack like Israel, Russia, and the United States. Finally, and above all, while Saudi Arabia is lacking technological and human infrastructure in the cyber field (or at most, only the first stirrings of such infrastructure), Iran has already invested extensive resources in providing university training and in working with foreign institutions, and even in stealing knowledge. All this has placed Iran several steps ahead of Saudi Arabia, and over time, this gap could become fatal for the kingdom. On the other hand, there are two important factors that could work to the benefit of Saudi Arabia in the long-term technological race and block Iran’s advancement. The first is the Saudi Kingdom’s huge advantage in resources. The Saudi security forces enjoy some of the largest annual budgets in the world. If they are properly channeled and the smart investment in cyberspace is increased, alongside those in advanced technological education, Saudi Arabia can accelerate its technological progress. Meanwhile, Iran, buckling under the burden of international sanctions, has difficulty in allocating similar resources to the development and acquisition of new capabilities. Another important factor is the defense umbrella and the cooperation existing between Saudi Arabia and the world’s largest cyber power—the United States. As a central ally, the United States can provide Saudi Arabia with the cybernetic defense umbrella and offensive technological capabilities that will enable it to catch up with the Iranians. To this can be added what appears to be covert but frequent cooperation with Israel, which, as already stated, is a cyber power in itself. The relative weight of these benefits will increase as time passes. If they are wisely exploited by the kingdom, they could emerge as a real asset and give it a decisive advantage over Iran. An examination of the current cyber capabilities of Saudi Arabia and Iran shows that a wide cybernetic conflict between these two countries is probably not imminent; however, the nature of cyberspace and its structural vagueness make it particularly suited to the way their concept of operational conduct. Therefore, in the medium-long term, we can expect both to make increased use of cyberspace as an additional way of damaging the enemy, in contrast to the limitations of their conventional forces, which have held them back until now Moreover, Lynch in 2018 reports Saudi Arabia is relying on the United States Justin Lynch, Fifth Domain, 10-16-2018 After 2012 hack, Saudia Arabia relied on US contractors, https://www.fifthdomain.com/international/2018/10/16/after-2012-hack-saudia-arabia-relied-on-us-contractors/, 10-14-2019//rjs Lawmakers are urging President Donald Trump to reconsider America’s relationship with Saudi Arabia following the Kingdom’s alleged role in the murder of a commentator, but the U.S. defense industry and the Saudi government have a tangled history on the topic of cybersecurity. Following a 2012 hack, the Middle Eastern country Saudi Arabia has relied heavily on American and Western cybersecurity contractors, according to public records, former intelligence officials and experts. Financial details of the relationship between the Saudi government and American cybersecurity contractors are not public. But the Department of Commerce has approved more than $166 million in sales of controlled information security equipment and software to Saudi Arabia from 2012 to 2017, according to an analysis by Fifth Domain of documents that detail approved exports from the Bureau of Industry and Security’s commerce control list. According to the Department of Commerce, the items are controlled because they relate to encryption capabilities that are tied to information security. The analysis shows that 2016 was the largest year of approved information security equipment and software sales to Saudi Arabia, when the Department of Commerce signed off on nearly 50 million dollars in sales to the Kingdom. The list was obtained by Fifth Domain through a Freedom of Information Act request. In addition, according to public statements of the Saudi government and American defense contractors, the Kingdom has relied on U.S. companies and individuals for improved cybersecurity. The American firms who have partnered with the Saudi government or public institutions make up a roster of high-profile U.S. cyber talent. The list includes IronNet Cybersecurity, led by Keith Alexander, former head of the National Security Agency and U.S. Cyber Command and some of the largest military contractors of the U.S. government, Raytheon, Booz Allen Hamilton, Northrop Grumman and Lockheed Martin. Saudi Arabia is “no different than the rest of us. We are under constant attack, we are under constant threat. That is the world that we live in. Most of the countries we deal with over there, they are just trying to catch up,” John DeSimone, the vice president of cybersecurity and special missions at Raytheon told Fifth Domain in a Sept. 6 interview. A spokeswoman for the Saudi embassy in Washington did not return requests for comment regarding how the country built its cybersecurity and intelligence capabilities. Kingdom regrouped after crisis In 2012, Saudi Arabia suffered one of the world’s largest digital attacks on critical infrastructure at the time when hackers targeted its national oil producer, Saudi Aramco. Roughly 30,000 computers were reportedly destroyed in the Shamoon event. “Following the 2012 Saudi Aramco incident, the Saudi government started investing significant resources toward advancing its cybersecurity capabilities and implementing both domestic and international measures to address its cyber insecurity,” according to a 2017 report from the Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, a Virginia-based think-tank. In the aftermath, the Kingdom partnered with American and Western cybersecurity firms to bolster its digital defenses. In 2017, Raytheon signed a memorandum of understanding with Saudi Arabia to cooperated on defense projects that included defensive cybersecurity systems and platforms. Saudi Arabia, UAE and other countries are “very similar to what you see in the (federal and civilian) space — cyber systems integration, really tying together the information they have, providing the tools to do analytics, hunt, threat — but all on the defensive side,” said DeSimone, of Raytheon. Spokespeople for Raytheon did not respond to requests for details regarding the company’s relationship with Saudi Arabia. The impact of maintaining US-Saudi relationship is preventing a financial fiasco. According to Reuters 18, the United States is dependent on Saudi oil, and in the past Saudi has threatened to teeter with oil prices. Reuters 10/16/18 Reuters. US, Saudi Arabia Have Leverage on Each Other; Using It Has Costs. October 16, 2018. https://www.voanews.com/a/us-saudi-arabia-have-leverage-on-each-other-using-it-has-costs/4616830.htmlBE WASHINGTON — The United States and Saudi Arabia have had a mutually dependent relationship for seven decades based on a central bargain: the kingdom would pump oil and the superpower would provide security. The interests that bind, and sometimes divide, the two range from the price of oil and containing Iran, to counter-terrorism, the wars in Syria and Yemen, Saudi investment in the United States and efforts to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Relations have been strained by the Oct. 2 disappearance of Saudi journalist and Washington Post contributor Jamal Khashoggi when he visited the Saudi consulate in Istanbul. Turkey believes he was murdered and his body removed. Saudi Arabia has denied that but, according to published reports, may be considering describing the incident as an attempted rendition gone wrong. Below are descriptions of the leverage each side has and the risks of exercising it. Oil As the world's largest oil exporter, Saudi Arabia has some ability to flood the market to depress oil prices or to curb supply and raise them. The kingdom generally seeks a sweet spot to maximize current oil revenues without endangering future earnings, which could happen if prices rose so high that they chilled demand or encouraged development of alternatives. Saudi Arabia needs oil revenue to fund state expenses and its Public Investment Fund, a sovereign wealth fund slated to play a leading role in its drive to develop non-oil industries. On Sunday, the Saudi Press Agency (SPA) quoted an unnamed Saudi official making a veiled threat to respond to pressure by tinkering with oil supplies. With the boom in production of U.S. shale oil, the United States is less dependent on imported oil. However, a Saudi decision to shrink global oil supplies and raise prices could hurt U.S. President Donald Trump by slowing economic growth and denting his 2020 re-election prospects. It could also undercut the U.S. effort to shrink Iran’s oil revenues, part of a wider U.S. strategy of forcing Tehran to curb its nuclear and missile programs as well as its support for proxies in Yemen, Syria, Lebanon and Iraq. High oil prices would raise Iran's revenues just as Washington wants to reduce them. Trump called Saudi King Salman on Sept. 29 to discuss efforts to maintain supplies to ensure oil market stability and global economic growth, Saudi state news agency SPA reported. Empirically, decreasing US commitment has caused Saudi Arabia to stop pumping oil. Alkhalisi 18 finds Alkhalisi 10/15/18 Zahraa Alkhalisi, CNN Business. Saudi Arabia's oil is a powerful weapon. But using it has big risks. October 15, 2018. https://www.cnn.com/2018/10/15/economy/saudi-arabia-oil-prices/index.htmlBE (CNN Business) – Forty-five years ago, Saudi Arabia and its allies cut off oil supplies to the United States over its support for Israel. Oil prices quadrupled, delivering a huge shock to the global economy. Now the kingdom is facing threats of punishment over the unexplained disappearance of a Washington Post journalist, Jamal Khashoggi, and is talking of retaliation if America imposes sanctions. A leading Saudi commentator has even hinted that oil could once again be used as a weapon. Writing in a personal capacity, Turki Aldakhil, general manager of the Saudi-owned Al-Arabiya news channel, warned on Sunday that the United States would "stab its own economy to death" and oil prices would soar to $200 a barrel if Washington imposes sanctions on Riyadh. Oil prices were flat on Monday, suggesting markets have for now dismissed the risk that Saudi Arabia could restrict supplies. Speaking in India, Saudi energy minister Khalid al-Falih said Monday that the kingdom would continue to act as "the central bank of the oil market" to keep supply and demand in balance, according to media reports. But if the crisis over Khashoggi escalates, that commitment could crumble, say oil experts. A rhetorical threat to withhold additional supplies "could certainly exert some upward pressure on prices," said Helima Croft, global head of commodity strategy at RBC Capital Markets. And the kingdom could go further, by "slow-walking" output increases to make up for reduced Iranian supplies when US sanctions take effect next month, Croft added. Filling the gap left by Iran Saudi Arabia pumps around 10.5 million barrels of oil a day, according to OPEC data. It has previously said it is willing, along with Russia, to fill the gap created by the return of sanctions on Iran. "We expect Iran's crude production to decline by nearly 1 million barrels per day," said Bjørnar Tonhaugen, head of oil market research at Rystad Energy. "Saudi Arabia is the only country that has spare production capacity ... to compensate for such losses." World oil markets have been transformed by a doubling in American output over the past decade. For the first time since 1973, the United States is the world's largest producer of crude oil, according to preliminary estimates published last month. As a result, America is far less dependent on Saudi oil that it once was. In 2017, the United States imported 9 of its oil from the kingdom, according to the US Energy Information Administration. Imports from Saudi Arabia have almost halved over 25 years. Unfortunately, Mullaney 17 explains oil market disruptions lead to recessions Tim Mullaney, 07-23-2018, “Risks are rising that oil prices will cause next recession,” CNBC, https://www.cnbc.com/2018/07/13/risks-rising-that-oil-prices-will-cause-next-recession.html In July 2008, even when the Federal Reserve was still betting that it had a handle on the economy, Warren Buffett warned that “exploding” inflation — whether in the price of oil or steel — was the biggest risk to the U.S. economy. “Quickly rising oil prices have been a contributing factor to every recession since World War II,” said Moody’s chief economist Mark Zandi. Odds of a 2020 U.S. recession have risen to 34 percent, from 28 percent before this year’s spike in crude oil, Moody’s stated in a report. Bradford 13 then quantifies; the effects of a recession would be tragic writing Harry Bradford, 4-5-2013, "Three Times The Population Of The U.S. Is At Risk Of Falling Into Poverty," HuffPost, https://www.huffpost.com/entry/global-poverty-900-million-economic-shock_n_3022420?guccounter=1andguce_referrer=aHR0cHM6Ly93d3cuZ29vZ2xlLmNvbS8andguce_referrer_sig=AQAAAF9nVzk8iHxI1O7O13JJEv7jFiVPR_eCHUD2w20gDE1HQFtQxIBJFap6YIPtLZyBHKKv7Bzc9EuoP-KzzgM_PXCEcmtTpr74uELT4NisvL_TzIPjPW05CGzltRU3M39gKmW5z99BvdyG7g9cKG0PJDhykj1TlEly2UD7sJkr7SU5 A recent study by the International Monetary Fund warns that as many as 900 million people could fall back into poverty in the event of an economic shock like the Great Recession. That figure is three times the size of the U.S. population. Contention 2: NATO Currently, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, or NATO, an intergovernmental military alliance comprising 29 countries, is moving the use of offensive cyber operations into its pipeline. Emmott 18 elaborates Robin Emmott, 10-16-2018, "NATO cyber command to be fully operational in 2023," U.S., https://www.reuters.com/article/us-nato-cyber/nato-cyber-command-to-be-fully-operational-in-2023-idUSKCN1MQ1Z9 A new NATO military command center to deter computer hackers should be fully staffed in 2023 and able to mount its own cyber-attacks but the alliance is still grappling with ground rules for doing so, a senior general said on Tuesday. While NATO does not have its own cyber weapons, the U.S.-led alliance established an operations center on Aug. 31 at its military hub in Belgium. The United States, Britain, Estonia and other allies have since offered their cyber capabilities. While NATO does not have its own cyber weapons, the U.S. will lead the way in deploying those operations. Indeed, Tucker in 2019 corroborates Patrick Tucker 19, 5-24-2019, "NATO Getting More Aggressive on Offensive Cyber," Defense One, https://www.defenseone.com/technology/2019/05/nato-getting-more-aggressive-offensive-cyber/157270/ At an event in May, Gottemoeller said NATO was in the processes of establishing a new innovation board to “bring together all of the parts of and pieces of NATO that have to wrestle with these new technologies to really try to get a flow of information. Many of you having served in any international institution or government, you know how things can get stove-piped. So we are resolved to break down those stove-pipes, particularly where innovation is concerned,” she said. NATO is building a cyber command that is scheduled to be fully operational in 2023 and will coordinate and conduct all offensive cyber operations. Until then, whatever NATO does offensively, it will rely heavily on the United States and the discretion of U.S. commanders, according to Sophie Arts, program coordinator for security and defense at the German Marshall Fund, who explains in this December report. Consequently, the use of cyber operations through NATO will be directed by the U.S. Ali of Reuters in 2018 explains Idrees Ali, 10-3-2018, "With an eye on Russia, U.S. pledges to use cyber capabilities on behalf of NATO," U.S., https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-nato-russia-cyber/with-an-eye-on-russia-u-s-pledges-to-use-cyber-capabilities-on-behalf-of-nato-idUSKCN1MD0C The United States is expected to announce in the coming days that it will use offensive and defensive cyber capabilities on behalf of NATO if asked, a senior Pentagon official said, amid concerns about Russia’s increasingly assertive use of its cyber capabilities. The 29-nation NATO alliance recognized cyber as a domain of warfare, along with land, air and sea, in 2014, but has not outlined in detail what that entails. “We will formally announce that the United States is prepared to offer NATO its cyber capabilities if asked,” Katie Wheelbarger, the principal deputy assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs, told reporters during a trip to Europe by U.S. Defense Secretary Jim Mattis. Wheelbarger said the United States will keep control of its people and capabilities but use them in support of NATO if asked. She added that it was a part of a British-led push to increase NATO’s cyber capabilities. In a recent summit, member nations said NATO would create a cyberspace operations center to coordinate NATO’s cyber activities. NATO has also talked about integrating individual nations’ cyber capabilities into alliance operations. Last year, officials said the United States, Britain, Germany, Norway, Spain, Denmark and the Netherlands were drawing up cyber warfare principles to guide their militaries on what justifies deploying cyber attack weapons more broadly. In Europe, the issue of deploying malware is sensitive because democratic governments do not want to be seen to be using the same tactics as an authoritarian regime. Senior Baltic and British security officials say they have intelligence showing persistent Russian cyber hacks to try to bring down European energy and telecommunications networks, coupled with internet disinformation campaigns. U.S. intelligence officials have found that in the campaign leading up to the 2016 U.S. presidential election, Russian hackers breached the Democratic National Committee and leaked confidential information. “It sends a message primarily aimed at Russia,” Wheelbarger said. She added that the move would make clear that NATO is capable of countering Russian cyber efforts and would help in creating a more coherent cyber policy across the alliance. “U.S. together with the United Kingdom clearly lead in the level and sophistication of capabilities and if used, they would likely lead to tactical success,” said Klara Jordan, director of the Cyber Statecraft Initiative at the Atlantic Council think tank in Washington. However, Russia is becoming a more prevalent threat in the cyber realm. Fortunately, Marten 17 writes using offensive cyber operations establish key elements to unite NATO. Kimberly Marten, 03-xx-2017, "," Reducing Tensions Between Russia and NATO, https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/pdf/2017/03/CSR_79_Marten_RussiaNATO.pdf The most significant NATO actions in response to the perceived Russian threat were announced at the 2016 Warsaw Summit, envisioning the establishment over the next year of an “enhanced forward presence” in NATO’s east. Four new battalions (together equivalent to approximately one new combat brigade) will be deployed. The United Kingdom will oversee a new battalion in Estonia; Canada, a battalion in Latvia; Germany, one in Lithuania; and the United States, one in Poland, where this new multinational division will be headquartered.52 Although details have not been made public, reportedly each new battalion will include around one thousand troops.53 NATO also expressed How to Assess and Respond to a Crisis 27 some support for Romania’s ideas about a new multinational Black Sea maritime presence but announced no new NATO deployments there. Furthermore, at its 2014 Wales Summit, NATO had declared that cyber defense was part of its collective defense planning, and, at the Warsaw Summit, current Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg affirmed that cyberspace is an operational domain of conflict, potentially making way for member states with offensive cyber programs (including the United States, France, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom) to use such weapons on NATO’s behalf.54 The force increases envisioned in the Warsaw Summit are far below the recommendations of more hawkish Western defense analysts. But they do establish persistent multinational forces near Russia’s borders and are a strong symbol of NATO’s deterrent tripwire. When capable allies—such as the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, and Canada—demonstrate that they are willing to put themselves in harm’s way to answer an outside attack, it sends a strong signal that the alliance will hold. Recent enhanced NATO military cooperation with neutral states, including Sweden and Finland, has also helped demonstrate a unified Western deterrent Stavridis 19 contextualizes, a strong NATO brings many benefits including the deterrence of Russia. James Stavridis April 4, 2019, 7-11-2018, "Why NATO Is Essential For World Peace, According to Its Former Commander," Time, https://time.com/5564171/why-nato-is-essential-world-peace/ Moreover, despite all the frustrations of coalition warfare, most observers would agree with Winston Churchill that “there is only one thing worse than fighting with allies, and that is fighting without them.” The greatest single advantage the U.S. has on the global stage is our network of allies, partners and friends. That network is under deliberate pressure: from China, with its “One Belt, One Road” competitive strategy, and from Russia, with its relentless attacks on coalition unity. A strong NATO means not only having allies in a fight, should it come to that, but also a powerful deterrent to the aggression of ambitious adversaries. Perhaps NATO’s greatest accomplishment is not even its unblemished record of deterring attack against its members but rather the fact that no alliance nation has ever attacked another. NATO’s most fundamental deliverable has been peace among Europe’s major powers for 70 years after two millennia of unhesitating slaughter on the continent. The disasters of the 20th century alone pulled the U.S. into two world wars that killed more than half a million Americans. History provides few achievements that compare to those seven decades of peace. They were built not on the ambitions of cold-eyed leaders but something more noble. NATO is a pool of partners who, despite some egregious outliers, by and large share fundamental values–democracy, liberty, freedom of speech, freedom of expression, gender equality, and racial equality. Admittedly we execute those values imperfectly, and they are stronger in some NATO countries than in others. But they are the right values, and there is no other place on earth where the U.S. could find such a significant number of like-minded nations that are willing to bind themselves with us in a defensive military treaty. So what can NATO do to ensure the alliance continues to provide value for all the members in general, and for the U.S. in particular? What would a NATO 4.0 look like? The alliance should up its game in cybersecurity, both defensively and in the collective development of new offensive cybertools. Geographically, the alliance needs more focus on the Arctic; as global warming opens shipping lanes and access to hydrocarbons, geopolitical competition will increase. We should taper off the Afghan mission, perhaps maintaining a small training cadre in country and continuing to help the Afghan security forces push the Taliban to negotiate peace. There is work to do in consolidating the Balkans, where tensions among Serbs, Croats and Balkan Muslims threaten to erupt into war again. NATO can continue to have a small mission there to help continue the arc of reconciliation. The alliance will need to be forthright in dealing with Russia, confronting Putin where we must–in its invasion and continued occupation of Ukraine–but at the same time attempting to reduce operational tensions and find zones of cooperation. Geographically, the biggest challenge ahead will be the Middle East. The NATO nations do not agree on an approach with Iran, which is an aggressive actor in the region with significant ambitions that will impact NATO. Developing better partnerships with the Arab world, which began in earnest with the Libyan campaign and continued into Syrian operations against the so-called Islamic State alongside various NATO allies in the U.S.-led coalition, makes sense. Working far more closely with Israel would pay dividends for the alliance. And what of other tiny, would-be members, the next Montenegros? NATO should accept North Macedonia to stabilize the south Balkans, then halt expansion. It should build global partnerships with democracies like Japan, Australia, New Zealand, India and other Indo-Pacific nations. Should we be prepared to fight and die in a NATO campaign? Yes. On balance, the alliance still provides strategic benefit to the U.S. We should support this venerable organization, encourage our allies to increase their defense spending and push them to operate with us on key challenges. We should demand that they help us build a NATO 4.0 that is even more fit for the decades ahead. We should also remember how dangerous the world can be. As NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander for four years, I signed more than 2,000 personal condolence letters; about a third of them were to the grieving family members of European soldiers. I visited the thousands of non-U.S. troops in Afghanistan often, and they were uniformly brave, professional and motivated. As a democracy, it is right that we should debate whether NATO is worth dying for. I can tell you that our NATO allies have shown time and again they are willing to fight and die for us. For these reasons, we affirm

CyberOps Lay AFF

C1: Defending the Nation Mohan Gazula, MIT, "Cyber Warfare Conflict Analysis and Case Studies", May 2017, https://cams.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017-10.pdf "The low cost ... U.S. information infrastructure." Beatrice Chirstofaro, Business Insider, "Cyberattacks are the newest frontier of war and can strike harder than a natural disaster. Here's why the US could struggle to cope if it got hit", 05/23/19, https://www.businessinsider.com/cyber-attack-us-struggle-taken-offline-power-grid-2019-4 "James Andrew Lewis ... visible to them." Steve Ranger, ZDNet, "What is cyberwar? Everything you need to know about the frightening future of digital conflict", 12/4/18, https://www.zdnet.com/article/cyberwar-a-guide-to-the-frightening-future-of-online-conflict/ "However, it's likely ... US Cyber Command," Kevin Freiburger, GCN, "On the offense: How federal cybersecurity is changing", 08/27/19, https://gcn.com/articles/2019/08/27/cybersecurity-offense.aspx "Offensive cybersecurity means ... and military infrastructure." Stratfor, "The U.S. Unleashes Its Cyberweapons ", 07/5/19, https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/us-unleashes-its-cyberweapons-iran-russia-china-cyberwar "From an empirical ... outbreak of conflict." Michael Sulmeyer, Foreign Affairs, "How the US Can Play Cyber-Offense", 03/22/18, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/world/2018-03-22/how-us-can-play-cyber-offense "If subtle measures ... them otherwise useless." Jen Wieczner, Fortune, "FireEye Stock Plunges As Big Hacks Drop, Earnings Miss, Layoffs Coming", 08/05/16, https://fortune.com/2016/08/05/fireeye-stock-feye-earnings/ "FireEye's stock plummeted ... or five machines." University of Cambridge, "Lloyds Emerging Risks Report", 2015, https://www.jbs.cam.ac.uk/fileadmin/user_upload/research/centres/risk/downloads/crs-lloyds-business-blackout-scenario.pdf "By its design ... country's economic production." Paul Mee, HBR, "How a Cyber Attack Could Cause The Next Financial Crisis", September 2018, https://hbr.org/2018/09/how-a-cyber-attack-could-cause-the-next-financial-crisis "But the next ... on short notice." Bob Pisani, CNBC, "A cyberattack could trigger the next financial crisis, new report says", 09/13/18, https://www.cnbc.com/2018/09/13/a-cyberattack-could-trigger-the-next-financial-crisis.html "So who's right? ... the broader economy." Olivier Blanchard, IMF, "Jobs and Growth: Analytical and Operational Considerations For The Fund", 03/14/13, https://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2013/031413.pdf "Although we are ... and Prospects, 2013."

EU Infra AFF

Contention 1 is the EU infra gap EU Governments struggling, having to cut spending Ian M Dixon, Medium, "The Infrastructure Footrace: Why is Europe Stick in Neutral", May 15, 2018, https://medium.com/fitch-blog/the-infrastructure-footrace-why-is-europe-stuck-in-neutral-439739385838 "Austerity During the ... consequently major delays." Crisis means the EU governments have to rein in spending, EU needs to triple infra value for the future Micheal Collins, Euractiv, "European infrastructure needs more than public funding – EURACTIV.com", January 2, 2017, https://www.euractiv.com/section/euro-finance/opinion/european-infrastructure-needs-more-than-public-funding/ "Infrastructure provides the ... Europe's vital infrastructure" China doesn't care about profits, 3 trillion in reserves Wade Shepard, Forbes, "China's Challenges Abroad: Why The Belt and Road Initiative Will Succeed", October 17, 2017, https://www.forbes.com/sites/wadeshepard/2017/10/17/chinas-challenges-abroad-5-reasons-why-the-belt-road-will-succeed/#367506484a82 "In developing this ... initiative anytime soon" Italy got 22 billion dollars of infrastructure Kinling Lo, South China Morning Post, "Italy becomes first Western European nation to sign up for China’s belt and road plan | South China Morning Post", March 23, 2019, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3002986/china-wants-invest-ports-maritime-transport-italy-xi-jinping "Italy has signed ... by Italian media" EU has strict FDI screening Manoj Joshi, “China and Europe: Trade, Technology and Competition”, ORF Occasional Paper No. 194, May 2019,https://www.orfonline.org/research/china-europe-trade-technology-competition-51115/ "These are all ... undermine European interests" Bad behavior elsewhere along BRI cannot happen in EU Jasmina Buresch, Project 2049, "The Final Link: The Future of The Belt and Road Initiative in Europe", December 5, 2018, https://project2049.net/2018/12/05/the-final-link-the-future-of-the-belt-and-road-initiative-in-europe/ "The BRI's effect ... modest in scale ! China can create grid across Europe John Psaropoulos, Washington Examiner, "China Ventures into Europe", February 02, 2018, https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/weekly-standard/china-ventures-into-europe "Over the past ... in electricity transmission" China has unique economic incentive for this grid Phillip Cornell, Atlantic Council, "Energy Governance and China's Bid for Global Grid Intergration", May 30, 2019, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/energysource/energy-governance-and-china-s-bid-for-global-grid-integration "In China's case ... most to China.)" This grid allows for spillover of energy, lower costs European Commission, "Electricity interconnection targets | Energy", August 29, 2019, https://ec.europa.eu/energy/en/topics/infrastructure/projects-common-interest/electricity-interconnection-targets "When a power ... via new interconnections" Bad energy infrastructure making heating a luxury Stefan Bouzarovski, University of Manchester, "Energy poverty in the European Union: landscapes of vulnerability - Bouzarovski - 2014 - Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Energy and Environment - Wiley Online Library", August 20, 2013, https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1002/wene.89 "In the context ... on household budgetss" 125 million people in energy poverty, 100,000 die every year as a result FOE, "Energy Poverty | Friends of the Earth Europe", No Date, http://www.foeeurope.org/energy-poverty "Up to 1 ... and energy waste." !!Recession-prevention EU heading to recession The Economist, "The euro area is back on the brink of recession - Free exchange", January 24, 2019, https://www.economist.com/finance-and-economics/2019/01/24/the-euro-area-is-back-on-the-brink-of-recession "GDP data scheduled ... euro-area encore" Infrastructure stabilizes economy Josh Bivens, Economic Policy Institute, "The potential macroeconomic benefits from increasing infrastructure investment | Economic Policy Institute", July 18, 2017, https://www.epi.org/publication/the-potential-macroeconomic-benefits-from-increasing-infrastructure-investment/ "Infrastructure investment could ... the long run." China has used this system to avoid recession Noah Smith, Bloomberg, "China's Economy Is Different: No Recessions in a Quarter-Century - Bloomberg", July 19, 2018, https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2018-07-19/china-s-economy-is-different-no-recessions-in-a-quarter-century "For the last ... again in 2017." Poland only EU country not to be affected by the 08 recession because of infrastructure spending. Connor Sheets, IB Times, "The East European Miracle: How Did Poland Avoid The Global Recession?", September 29, 2012, https://www.ibtimes.com/east-european-miracle-how-did-poland-avoid-global-recession-795799 "Poland is the ... Warsaw subway system." Millions at risk of poverty Eurostat, "Europe 2020 indicators - poverty and social exclusion", May 2018, https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/pdfscache/29306.pdf "In 2016, 118.0 ... Europe 2020 target"

INFO

Everything here except for runoffs was read paraphrased.

1 - SEPTOCT - Tariffs DA

C1 Tariffs Trigkas ‘18 Vasilis Trigkas, 6 July 2018, "Nato, China summits a chance for Europe to assert itself," South China Morning Post, https://www.scmp.com/comment/insight-opinion/united-states/article/2153948/nato-and-china-summits-give-europe-chance However coercive Trump has become, Europeans have no need to undo years of painstaking fiscal consolidation and spend big in building guns abroad when the threats at home are transnational and demand tailored security policies. Even Russia, often framed as an existential threat for Europe, is not defying the EU’s security by unleashing tank battalions. Instead, it is going hybrid – utilising misinformation and smart propaganda to exacerbate intra-European populism. Trump’s rage should inspire Europe to spend on strategy instead: to follow up on French President Emmanuel Macron’s security initiative; take the Permanent Structured Cooperation on steroids and move faster towards a fully fledged security union with its own information agencies and regional security agenda to protect borders; stabilise failed states across its periphery; and, ultimately, integrate the European defence industry into civil innovation, similar to the US Defence Advanced Research Projects Agency. In Beijing, EU leaders may have a seemingly easier task negotiating with the Chinese on trade but caution is always a wise counsellor. According to reports from the meeting of the vice-president of the European Commission, Jyrki Katainen, and Chinese Vice-Premier Liu He in June, the two sides are ready to present their detailed market access conditions by mid-July and reboot the dormant discussions on a bilateral investment treaty. If negotiations accelerate and China and the EU reach a final accord by the end of the year or early 2019, this would complicate US efforts to rebalance its economic relations with China. It could push trigger-happy Trump to unleash tariffs against European exporters at a moment when the EU has just found its economic pace. Any benefits from a bilateral investment treaty with China may be undone by a full-scale transatlantic trade war and an utterly divided West. Jiangtao ‘19 Shi Jiangtao, South China Morning Post, 29 May 2019, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3012205/china-or-us-europes-impossible-choice-trade-war Growing tensions between China and the United States over the escalating trade dispute – and the resulting global uncertainty – are forcing other countries to choose between the two economic superpowers. The European Union, which is the world’s largest trading bloc and a top trading partner of both China and the US, is in a difficult spot since US President Donald Trump’s decision to ratchet up pressure on Beijing early this month – a move that included signing an executive order which effectively banned Chinese telecoms giant Huawei from accessing US supply chains. “Europe is finding itself today in an extremely inconvenient position in which countries that seek to coexist with both China and the US are called to make an impossible choice and prove their allegiance to one of the parties over the other,” said Gal Luft, co-director of the Institute for the Analysis of Global Security, a Washington-based think tank. As nationalist rhetoric heats up in the wake of an early-May breakdown in US-China trade talks, top officials from both countries have engaged in intense shuttle diplomacy aimed at securing support and shoring up alliances across Europe. Chinese Vice-President Wang Qishan, a close ally of President Xi Jinping who formerly led trade talks with the US, is visiting Germany and the Netherlands this week, just days after another top Xi aide, Li Zhanshu, the Communist Party’s third-most powerful cadre, wrapped up a trip to Hungary, Austria and Norway. Wang’s trip will coincide with US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo’s arrival in Berlin for talks with Chancellor Angela Merkel on Friday. The US State Department said Pompeo would also visit the Netherlands, Switzerland and Britain. Pompeo’s four-nation trip is expected to pave the way for further travel by Trump himself, who is set to visit Britain and France early next month. The EU is in a delicate balancing act, as deteriorating US-China relations coincide with its own widening rift with the US over trade. European ties with Beijing stand at a crossroads, amid signs of a gathering storm and growing rivalry. In a landmark shift in its policy on China, the European Commission – the executive arm of the EU – for the first time labelled it an “economic competitor” and “a systemic rival” in a policy paper in March. Observers say that, with the return of trade war tensions, Europe – already caught in the middle of the unfolding US-China rivalry – will become an important battlefield for the two giant nations’ geostrategic political machinations. Barkin ‘19 Noah Barkin, 6-4-2019, "The U.S. Is Losing Europe in Its Battle With China," Atlantic, https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2019/06/united-states-needs-europe-against-china/590887/ After two years of escalating tensions between the United States and Europe over issues ranging from trade and Iran to defense spending and Russian gas pipelines, China should be the issue that unites the two sides, or at least eases some of the transatlantic strain. The European Union—with Germany and France leading the way—has adopted a much tougher stance on China over the past year, introducing new rules allowing for closer scrutiny of Chinese investments in European countries, exploring changes to the EU’s industrial, competition, and procurement policies to ensure Beijing is not unfairly advantaged, and, after years of avoiding clashes with Beijing, declaring China a “strategic rival.” This shift mirrors the harder line adopted by Washington under President Donald Trump, who has dialed up his two-year confrontation with Beijing several notches over the past month by raising tariffs on Chinese goods and putting the Chinese telecommunications group Huawei and scores of its affiliates on an export blacklist that could severely restrict their access to vital U.S. technology. But conversations I had with dozens of officials on both sides of the Atlantic—many of whom requested anonymity to talk about diplomatic and intelligence issues—suggest that instead of coming together, Europe and the U.S. might be in the early stages of a damaging divergence on the China challenge. Trump’s latest moves, which raise the specter of a prolonged economic Cold War between Washington and Beijing, are likely to deepen the divide, taking the U.S. down a path that is unpalatable for even the hardest of European hard-liners. “If you listen to the people in the Trump administration, who view China as an existential threat, they are not in a place most Europeans can get to,” says Evan Feigenbaum, who held senior Asia-focused roles in the State Department during George W. Bush’s presidency and is now at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. The dissonance raises the prospect of a Western split on what both sides agree is likely to be the biggest geopolitical challenge of the 21st century—responding to the rise of an authoritarian China. A series of meetings in recent months, and the disparate ways in which they were interpreted by either side, illustrate the widening chasm. The European diplomat who discussed the April meeting likened Washington’s uncompromising stance on Belt and Road to its position on the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) a few years prior. Back then, the United States, under President Barack Obama, failed to convince allies to join a boycott of the new China-led development bank, leaving the Americans embarrassed and isolated. U.S. officials, by contrast, point to talks months before the meeting in Foggy Bottom, when Washington was pushing for a joint declaration denouncing human-rights abuses in Xinjiang, the western Chinese region where more than a million members of the Muslim minority have been detained in reeducation camps. That effort was also abandoned after what U.S. officials described as an exasperating back-and-forth with the European Union and individual member states. Among the American officials I spoke with, there was an air of what felt like panic—over what they saw as the global spread of Chinese influence through Xi’s Belt and Road initiative, the lack of an American alternative to Huawei, and the persistent failure of the World Trade Organization to tackle China’s unfair trade practices. One senior administration official likened discussions of China policy to the period after the 9/11 attacks. Inevitably, this person said, there will be an “overreaction” from Washington, with “collateral damage” for other countries, before U.S. policy settles down. In Brussels, senior officials are comparing the Trump administration’s China policy to Brexit. Both, they say, are based on the deluded notion that a fading great power can reverse the course of history and return to its glorious past. The irony is that senior U.S. administration officials acknowledge in private that American success in its competition with China might ultimately hinge on what happens in Europe. Yet many U.S. officials have no patience, at least in the highest ranks of the Trump administration, when it comes to working with European allies. Nor do they have much appreciation for the steps Europe has taken over the past year to push back against China. Several U.S. officials described the EU’s recent measures as baby steps that fall far short of what is needed. “The Americans are out to beat, contain, confront China,” a senior EU official who asked not to be identified told me. “They have a much more belligerent attitude. We believe they will waste a lot of energy and not be successful.” This does not mean that transatlantic channels of communication on China have broken down. A group of hawkish pragmatists including Matt Pottinger, who oversees Asia policy at the National Security Council, and Randall Schriver, a senior Pentagon official, have been trying to reach out to Europe for months, U.S. and European officials confirm. Last year, discussions focused on measures to protect against Chinese acquisitions. More recently, they have shifted to talks on next-generation 5G mobile networks, as well as joint responses to Belt and Road, an issue about which Washington and Brussels agreed last month to hold quarterly coordination meetings, according to EU officials. And last month, an American delegation traveled to Berlin for talks with German officials on China as part of a biannual get-together that began under the Obama administration and has continued, without a hitch, under Trump. Other changes are under way too: Last year, according to U.S. and European officials, the State Department appointed China point people in many of their European embassies, with officials estimating that roughly 150 U.S. diplomats on both sides of the Atlantic now spend at least part of their time focusing on China in Europe; at a meeting of NATO foreign ministers in Washington in late March, China was on the agenda for the first time; and Belt and Road could be a discussion point when France hosts a G7 summit in Biarritz in August, European officials have suggested. The outlines of what a transatlantic agenda might look like are not difficult to discern. In responding to Belt and Road, the U.S. and Europe could work together to develop common transparency, environmental, and social standards for infrastructure projects, while pooling their financial resources. At the very top of the priority list would be a set of common rules for data privacy and artificial intelligence, alongside joint efforts to make telecommunications infrastructure and supply chains bulletproof against Chinese espionage and sabotage. In Washington, some officials I spoke with suggested that a transatlantic consortium—grouping Huawei’s European rivals Nokia and Ericsson with U.S. firms—could be the solution to the 5G conundrum. On trade, the U.S. and Europe could form a powerful coalition with Japan, Canada, Australia, and other like-minded democracies to push back against unfair Chinese practices, perhaps in a comprehensive joint complaint to the World Trade Organization. (The Trump administration’s cooperation with other countries on trade has been limited, though, beginning with the president’s withdrawal of the U.S. from the Trans-Pacific Partnership, a trade deal aimed in large part at containing China.) Some China hawks in Europe are holding out hope that progress on a more comprehensive agenda could come if a Democrat replaces Trump in 2020. While all the leading candidates, including Joe Biden, Bernie Sanders, Elizabeth Warren, and Pete Buttigieg, have been critical of China, they have stressed the need to work more closely with allies in pushing back against Beijing. Still, Europeans should be careful what they wish for. The bullying tone that the Trump administration has frequently employed with Europe on China might disappear if a Democrat enters the White House. But so would one of the Europeans’ main excuses for not compromising with the United States on China and a range of other issues: Trump himself. Europe has profited in the short term from Trump’s confrontation with Beijing, wringing concessions from a Chinese government desperate to prevent a transatlantic front. When Xi held his Belt and Road summit in April, half a dozen EU heads of state and government attended, while the Americans stayed home. European companies continue to invest heavily in China, including in sensitive new technologies such as artificial intelligence. When push comes to shove, will the Europeans be ready to give up the advantages they have gleaned from playing the nicer cop? Will they be prepared to put long-standing commercial ties with China at risk? And will they consider assuming more of the military burden in their own backyard as a future U.S. administration pares back its security commitments in Europe to help pay for domestic priorities like health care, education and infrastructure? “You may have more civility at the top with the Democrats,” says Orville Schell, the director of the Center on U.S.-China Relations at the Asia Society. “But there is no constituency anywhere in American politics right now for cooperation with China.” Regardless of who is in the White House, European countries must prepare for a world in which they will be viewed by Washington through a China prism—much in the same way that Europe was seen through a Soviet lens during the Cold War. If no common agenda is possible, the transatlantic relationship might be headed for even more trouble, Trump or no Trump. Aliyeva ‘18 Kamila Aliyeva, 13 March 2018, AzerNews, Interview with Charles Stevens the founder on the New Silk Road Project, https://www.azernews.az/business/128676.html Q.: What would it mean for Western European countries to join the Belt and Road initiative? Do you expect more countries to join it in future?A.: I think it would mark a great success for BRI as a strategy. With the UK leaving the European Union the economic region has had a jolt to its confidence. Whilst the EU does not have a united policy towards BRI some countries, particularly in Eastern Europe have been more receptive. This includes Belarus which is not formally part of the EU but participates in the EU’s Eastern Partnership. It would signal a decisive shift in strategic direction and historic allegiances were Western European countries to align more closely with BRI. China has been clever in presenting BRI as a development which is open for any countries to participate in – this includes the US. Duesterberg ’19 Thomas Duesterberg (Foreign Policy). Trans-Atlantic Trade Is Headed Toward Disaster. Published April 5 2019. https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/04/05/trans-atlantic-trade-is-headed-toward-disaster/ After an Oval Office meeting last month between U.S. President Donald Trump and Irish Prime Minister Leo Varadkar, Trump took a hard line on trade with the European Union. “We’re going to tariff a lot of their products,” he said, unless Europe compromises on long-standing trade issues. U.S. Trade Representative Robert Lighthizer, responding to pressure from Congress, added that the trade agreement between Washington and Brussels would be a “dead letter” absent the inclusion of agricultural issues. On the European side, however, trade commissioner Cecilia Malmstrom reiterated the refusal to include any discussion of agriculture in these talks. Moreover, the European Parliament failed to endorse the proposed European Commission mandate for negotiations, and both institutions mulled banning all talks until the United States rejoined the Paris climate accord, a position that French President Emmanuel Macron has advanced. The French also blocked the adoption of a negotiating mandate in late March. Unless both sides reconsider their intractable positions, and Malmstrom gets approval to open talks, an impatient Trump could impose 25 percent auto tariffs. Such a move would likely put the already weak European economy into a recession and cause a breakdown in trans-Atlantic economic cooperation, which has been a pillar of the global economic order since the Bretton Woods system was established in 1944. The EU enjoys a nearly $170 billion merchandise trade surplus with the United States, of which Germany alone accounts for some $70 billion. In some part, this represents trade benefits built up by Europe over time as the United States assisted it in regaining economic vitality after World War II, which were never relinquished despite continued U.S. efforts over many decades. Europe also has not been especially helpful to the United States in mounting a serious challenge to Chinese mercantilist practices. The U.S. Treasury has put Germany on its watch list for currency manipulation, partly because it consistently runs a global trade surplus around 8 percent of GDP. As a member of the eurozone, Germany can hide behind the easy monetary policy of Mario Draghi’s European Central Bank, which was recently renewed, and the currency weakening effects of being in the same currency zone as Southern European economic laggards. Germany also resolutely refuses to stimulate its weakening economy, consistently running budget surpluses against the advice of the European Commission. European and German economic policy hence promises to exacerbate trade imbalances with the faster-growing U.S. economy The United States has traditionally been tolerant of the EU’s soft protectionism, especially in the decades devoted to bringing Europe back to prosperity and into the anti-Soviet bloc after World War II and later to help convince the Chinese to move in a democratic, market-oriented direction. But in recent decades the costs of the growing trade imbalances on the industrial and technology sectors have led to a shift in thinking about the trade-offs in a liberal trade regime and helped propel Trump to the presidency. The other serious trans-Atlantic conflict is over reform of the WTO. All sides agree that current rules fail to cover issues of great importance to the 21st-century economy, such as digital trade, subsidized state-owned enterprises, and protection of intellectual property. The rise of the huge, mercantilist Chinese economy is an important stimulus to agree on new rules. Since the George W. Bush administration, the United States has also built a critique of the operations of the WTO, centered on its desultory pace of action and the judicial activism of its Appellate Body, which settles disputes. The United States, the EU, and Japan have been working diligently since late 2017 to devise solutions to the problems of the WTO. But European unwillingness to recognize in a substantial way the U.S. critique of the Appellate Body overstepping its mandates and assuming rule-making powers threatens this process as well. (The emblematic case of this overreach is the 2006 ruling invalidating the methodology for imposing anti-dumping duties used by the United States and accepted in the negotiations establishing the WTO.) Since the Appellate Body will cease to be operational by December because the United States, beginning under the Obama administration, has refused to appoint new judges to it, the future of the WTO itself may be hanging in the balance. Moreover, the need for consensus on new rules has paralyzed the WTO since its inception and has led many to question the effectiveness of the institution. Trump certainly does not help matters by constantly invoking the looming threat of tariffs. While his proposed auto tariffs are a bad idea, Trump’s frustration with Europe can certainly be understood. Congress could help by limiting the president’s power to use tariffs but needs to suggest alternatives to incentivize Europe to act. Failure to bridge differences in the dispute settlement problem and agree on broader WTO reform could result in the effective demise of this foundational part of global economic order. Unfortunately, some EU leaders in recent weeks have further raised tensions by promoting subsidized industries, as they did with Airbus and contemplate doing for artificial intelligence and electric batteries, in the guise of national champions; renewing an easy money policy that weakens the euro; siding with the Chinese mobile communications powerhouse Huawei in the dispute over 5G deployment; and joining China’s multibillion-dollar Belt and Road Initiative. This may be enough to provoke Trump into pulling the trigger on auto tariffs and send the global economy into a tailspin. Burchard ‘19 Hans Von Der Burchard, Politico, 21 July 2019, https://www.politico.eu/article/europe-braces-for-trump-trade-war/ His 2020 reelection campaign risks escalating the conflict, Hufbauer said: "Trump really believes that confrontation with foreign countries gets him votes." In an interview with POLITICO on Thursday, U.S. ambassador to the EU Gordon Sondland said Brussels should get ready for "less whining, more action" from the Trump administration and warned that Washington had "a whole bunch of different tools" at its disposal, including car tariffs, that will have "immediate financial consequences for our friends in Europe.” Heeb ’19 Gina Heeb, Markets Insider, 7-23-2019 ~"Trump'S Proposed Car Tariffs Could Trigger A Global Growth Recession, Baml Says", https://markets.businessinsider.com/news/stocks/trump-tariffs-cars-could-trigger-global-growth-recession-baml-2019-2-1027973273 7-24-2019 A Commerce Department report submitted to the White House this week was widely expected to present auto imports as a threat to national security, giving Trump 90 days to decide whether to follow through with threats to impose import taxes of 20 to 25 on vehicles and parts. While that could benefit some American automakers and reduce bilateral trade deficits, it would also risk adding thousands of dollars to the price of vehicles, and raises the threat of retaliatory duties that could worsen global trade tensions. "In a worst case scenario, full¬blown tit¬for¬tat auto tariffs could trigger a global recession," analysts at Bank of America Merrill Lynch wrote in a research note out this week, adding they would expect growth in the world economy to fall nearly a percentage point to 1.2. By increasing the price of vehicles and imported materials, they could threaten jobs, consumer spending, and investment. The analysts estimated that they would add $2,000 to $7,000 to price tags of both imported and American-made vehicles, posing even greater risks than the global trade tensions that emerged last year. "The auto tariffs will directly hit consumers in a way that the other tariffs have not," the analysts said. "We have to consider the direct impact via auto sales and production as well as the indirect through a confidence shock." World Bank/Alexander ’10 Douglas Alexander, 27 January 2010, Global Policy Volume, https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/j.1758-5899.2009.00018.x This collapse in economic activity?–?from investment to trade and remittances?–?has turned the financial crisis into a social crisis. For the poorest people in the least developed countries, this comes shortly after the rise in food prices in 2008 that is estimated to have pushed between 130 and 155 million people into poverty (World Bank, 2008). The United Nations has estimated that the worldwide recession has pushed 100 million more people below the poverty line (UN, 2009). That could set back progress towards meeting the first of the Millennium Development Goals – to halve extreme poverty – by up to three years (Alexander, 2008).

4 - FEB - Los Chicos DA

Child Poverty Programs Goulden ‘18 Chris Goulden, Joseph Rowntree Foundation, 25 April 2018, https://www.jrf.org.uk/blog/universal-basic-income-not-answer-poverty Compass, in research funded by JRF, modelled a range of different UBI schemes. These are all effectively ruled out as undesirable and/or implausible because it is not possible to raise the revenue needed to support them from taxation ¬– even by increasing the basic rate to 30 from 20. The UBI schemes also INCREASE poverty for children, working-age adults and pensioners compared to the current tax-benefit system: child poverty rises by over 60. This is because of the effects referred to above, namely that the middle/lower-middle of the income distribution pull away from those who are worst off – almost perfectly designed to increase relative income poverty! Coleman ‘19 Patrick A Coleman, 20 August 2019, Fatherly, https://www.fatherly.com/love-money/child-welfare-programs-pay-for-themselves-new-study-finds/ A new study from Harvard University economists Nathaniel Hendren and Ben Sprung-Keyser found that social programs that are aimed at children, and particularly impoverished children, offer real returns on the money spent. According to their study, A Unified Welfare Analysis of Government Policies, that’s simply not the case with welfare programs for adults. Moreover, looking at spending data related to a wide range of social programs directed at a diverse age range of beneficiaries, the duo discovered that not only do social programs for kids pay for themselves, but do so well into the future. To reach the finding the Harvard researchers calculated the ratio between a social welfare programs’ cost to the government and the value of the benefit to the recipient. Programs aimed at children’s education like the Carolina Abecedarian Study, which provided high-quality education to a study group of at-risk children, were calculated to not only have paid for themselves but also offered returns to the government beyond the cost of the program. The 56 kids who received early intervention from the Abecedarian study when it began in 1972, are now in their 40s. Looking at their outcomes offers an excellent insight into how exactly these programs aimed at at-risk children can recoup their costs. The Abecedarian participants are far more likely to have graduated with a four-year college degree, are more likely to be engaged in a high-skilled job and are five times less likely to have relied on public assistance as an adult. Education is not the only area where investment in children pays off. Studies prior to the Harvard analysis have shown that investment in children’s health also appears to pay for itself in the long run. This is of particular interest as state governments mull over the decision to expand Medicaid, which has been proved to increase the number of children with medical insurance in participating states. Since the passage of the Affordable Care Act in 2014, 36 states have decided to expand Medicaid. Another 17 states have declined. This has set up a natural experiment allowing researchers to look at outcomes of the Medicaid expansion programs over the past five years. Children’s Defense Fund ‘19 https://www.childrensdefense.org/2019/new-census-data-reveals-continued-child-poverty-crisis-in-america/ Data released by the Census Bureau today also made clear why we must not only protect, but further invest in programs proven to reduce child poverty. Data from the Supplemental Poverty Measure (SPM) expands on the Official Poverty Measure by analyzing the impact of various government and other programs on family resources. The SPM suggests that in 2018, 10.7 million children were lifted out of poverty by programs and policies including: Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) or food stamps: 1.3 million children Housing subsidies: 926,000 children National School Lunch Program: 702,000 children Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants, and Children (WIC): 160,000 children Supplemental Security Income Program: 515,000 children Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) and general assistance: 209,000 children Earned Income Tax Credit and other refundable credits: 4.2 million children “Enough is enough. We know how to reduce child poverty in this country. The 10.7 million children lifted out of poverty last year by effective policies and programs like SNAP proves it. Now we need to invest in these proven programs to lift millions more children out of poverty and ensure every child in America, no matter their race, background, or zip code, can live up to their full potential.” In April of this year, the Children’s Defense Fund released its latest Ending Child Poverty Now report, which showed that the United States could lift millions out of poverty now by improving and investing in existing policies and programs to increase employment, make work pay and meet children’s basic needs. The report detailed how investing an additional 1.4 percent of the federal budget into these proven policies and programs could reduce child poverty at least 57 percent, lift 5.5 million children out of poverty and make an immediate down payment on ending child poverty for all children. Sherman ‘17 Arloc Sherman and Tazra Mitchell, 17 July 2017, Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, https://www.cbpp.org/research/poverty-and-inequality/economic-security-programs-help-low-income-children-succeed-over Government economic security programs such as food assistance, housing subsidies, and working-family tax credits — which bolster income, help families afford basic needs, and keep millions of children above the poverty line — also have longer-term benefits, studies find: they help children to do better in school and increase their earning power in their adult years. One in three U.S. children spend a year or more below the poverty line before their 18th birthday.1 Children experiencing poverty tend to be worse off in a range of ways, including being more likely to enter school behind their peers, scoring lower on achievement tests, working less and earning less as adults, and having worse health outcomes.2 This pattern is especially clear for the poorest and youngest children and those who remain in poverty a long time during childhood.3 Further, these adverse outcomes happen “in part because they are poorer, not just because low income is correlated with other household and parental characteristics,” a recent systematic research review concludes.4 That is, income itself matters. ECONOMIC SECURITY PROGRAMS CAN BLUNT THESE NEGATIVE EFFECTS OF POVERTY AND BRING POOR CHILDREN CLOSER TO EQUAL OPPORTUNITY. Economic security programs can blunt these negative effects of poverty and bring poor children closer to equal opportunity, numerous studies find. For example, a study of the long-term effects of the introduction of food stamps (now known as SNAP) in the 1960s and 1970s found that young children who had access to food stamps grew up to have higher high school graduation rates and lower rates of certain health problems such as heart disease and obesity, as compared to similar disadvantaged children who lacked access to food stamps because their county hadn’t yet implemented the program. In addition, women who had access to food stamps as young children had improved economic self-sufficiency in adulthood. Other economic security programs have been found to improve health outcomes at birth, raise reading and math test scores in middle school, increase high school completion and college entry, lift lifetime income, and extend longevity. The findings come from studies of the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC), anti-poverty and welfare-to-work pilot programs in the 1990s, an earlier public assistance program for mothers, and various negative income tax experiments in the late 1960s through early 1980s, among others. In addition, a recent well-known housing study found that housing vouchers that help poor families move to less poor neighborhoods before children turn 13 raise the earnings of these children by 31 percent when they reach adulthood.5 Researchers are still exploring the reasons why more adequate family income helps children over the long term. One way that the added income may help is, for example, by reducing severe poverty-related stress, a condition that scientists have linked to lasting consequences for children’s brain development and physical health. Another may be by helping families afford better learning environments from child care through college. Important gains for children have been found both in programs that boost income by raising parental employment and in programs that raise income without an increase in parental employment. Overall, the weight of the evidence indicates that economic security programs not only open doors of opportunity for participating low-income children but also lift their future health, productivity, and ability to contribute to their communities and the economy in ways that benefit society as a whole Trisi and Saenz ‘19 Danilo Trisi and Matt Saenz, Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, https://www.cbpp.org/research/poverty-and-inequality/economic-security-programs-cut-poverty-nearly-in-half-over-last-50 Using a version of the federal government’s Supplemental Poverty Measure (SPM) — a more comprehensive metric than the official poverty measure — we calculate that the poverty rate has fallen by nearly half since 1967, largely due to the growing effectiveness of economic security programs such as Social Security, food assistance, and tax credits for working families. Poverty fell from 26.0 percent in 1967 to 14.4 percent in 2017 by this measure. Most of the improvement came from economic security programs. Earnings and other non-government sources of income did not improve sufficiently over this period to reduce poverty substantially. In 1967, economic security programs lifted above the poverty line just 4 percent of those who would otherwise be poor. By 2017, that figure had jumped to 43 percent. In 2018 poverty fell again to a new record low of 12.8 percent by our measure: the SPM with an inflation-adjusted poverty line. Changes in the Census Bureau’s survey methods make 2018 data not strictly comparable to 1967.1 But the Census Bureau provides enough data about this survey transition to make clear that the SPM poverty rate reached a record low in 2018 by our measure.2 Parrott ‘14 Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, 3 December 2014, https://www.cbpp.org/research/policymakers-often-overstate-marginal-tax-rates-for-lower-income-workers-and-gloss-over A recent review of research on how various income-tested programs affect people’s choices about work, which Robert A. Moffitt co-authored, concluded that most low-income benefit programs have at most a modest impact in reducing work. Overall, the study found, programs’ work disincentives are sufficiently small as to have “almost no effect” in diminishing the safety net’s success in reducing poverty.22 They found that, after accounting for these modest overall behavioral effects, the safety net lowers the poverty rate by about 14 percentage points, a very large amount. In other words, one of every seven non-poor Americans would be poor without the safety net. That translates into more than 40 million people.

6 - APR - PowerWar-ISIS-Israel NC

If the US were to withdraw, Iran would be emboldened to fill in the gap. Cropsey ‘19 Foreign Policy, 17 December 2019, https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/12/17/us-withdrawal-power-struggle-middle-east-china-russia-iran/ The Ottoman Empire was the last entity to command regional hegemony in the Middle East. No country or group has made a legitimate claim to the mantle of a regional caliphate since. While a united Middle East under any version of a reconstituted caliphate could undermine U.S. interests by projecting power globally, a divided Middle East monopolized by a hostile great power could have the same effect. Either an external power or a regional hegemon could prevent the United States from communicating and coordinating among forces and allies in Europe and Asia and disrupt global economic activity by interrupting U.S. and allied shipping. Eliminating U.S. naval dominance would upend the current balance of power, with severe consequences for Europe and Asia. The pursuit of this mantle in the 21st century has only one true aspirational contender: Iran. But Tehran lacks the resources to conquer the Middle East, and its Shiite character would inflame old sectarian enmities in an explicit imperial campaign. For that reason, Iran’s strategy involves expanding its influence through proxies supported by well-placed special operations forces in an attempt to wear down Saudi and Israeli strength. Eliminating U.S. naval dominance would upend the current balance of power, with severe consequences for Europe and Asia. Israel and Saudi Arabia are the two main challengers to Iran’s ambitions. The Israeli Defense Forces are the only military in the region of Western quality and proficiency. Israel likely operates a secure nuclear second-strike capability, and its foreign intelligence service, Mossad, is one of the world’s best. While Saudi Arabia’s armed forces are of lesser quality, the kingdom has been remarkably adept at cultivating support from Sunni radical groups—necessitated by the United States’ strategic neglect of the region after 2008. And despite questions about its legitimacy, the House of Saud remains custodian of Islam’s two holy cities, Mecca and Medina, a position of great religious and political importance. And Iran is committed to expansion Ansari ‘19 Professor of Iranian History, Univ of St Andrews, 11 Feb 2019, Tony Blair Institute for Global Change, https://institute.global/policy/ideology-and-irans-revolution-how-1979-changed-world Western policymakers have underestimated Iran’s commitment to upholding and exporting 1979’s revolutionary ideology. That commitment is held by leaders across the spectrum, from those perceived by the West as hardliners to those seen as moderates. The revolution overturned this entire structure. While it inherited the Pahlavi state, the revolution did not inherit its worldview: the first foreign leader to visit Tehran was Yasser Arafat, chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO). The seizure of the US Embassy in Tehran on 4 November 1979 confirmed Iran’s anti-Western credentials, while Tehran’s call for an Islamic revolution among the ummah, or global Muslim community—and the oppressed of the world—served notice of its global ambitions. This international vision was quickly transformed into a constitutional commitment to “export the revolution” and defend the ummah at all costs, a vow that still stands. Khomeini called for the people of Iran to “endure hardships and pressures” to allow the country’s officials to “carry out their main obligation, which is to spread Islam across the world”. And for this reason, war will break out as Iran expands to fill the power vacuum left by the US. Cropsey ‘19 Foreign Policy, 17 December 2019, https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/12/17/us-withdrawal-power-struggle-middle-east-china-russia-iran/ The Kurds are arguably the most relevant of these, because of their highly disruptive presence in Turkish, Iraqi, Iranian, and Syrian national politics and, additionally, because their transnational character gives them the ability to stoke interstate conflict. Iran’s significance will, as a result of its economic woes, likely continue to decline, but the political vacuum it helped create in Iraq and Syria will persist, giving Russia and especially Iran the diplomatic cover to expand their influence. The unique mix of political forces in the Middle East suggests three possibilities in the event of U.S. naval withdrawal from the region, and none favor U.S. interests. First, Russia may broker a political arrangement among Turkey, Israel, and Iran, or, alternatively, support a coalition pitting some of those states against another in an effort to manufacture a manageable regional balance of power and allowing it to shift its attention back to Europe. The final shape of this strategy would depend on several variables: Turkey’s approach to Syria, Israel’s posture against Iran (and its proxies), the outcome of Saudi Arabia’s war in Yemen, the Kurdish question, and the possibility of the Islamic State’s resurgence. Regardless of these factors, Russia will still bid for control of the Mediterranean Sea, which the United States will be hard-pressed to counter, particularly if China can manipulate its European economic partners into limiting or expelling the U.S. Navy from its Mediterranean bases. If that happens, Washington will have to fight its way back into the region for the first time since World War II. In the second scenario, Iran defeats Saudi Arabia in a regional confrontation, thereby taking the top leadership spot in the Islamic world, making it a great power in its own right. Control of Middle Eastern oil exports would give Iran the ability to coerce and bully the United States’ European and Pacific allies, and it would deny the United States any peaceful access to the Levantine Basin. The balancing dynamics against this new great power are difficult to project, but regardless, the United States’ ability to control the strategic environment would be hampered markedly. Third, a long-term regional war between Tehran and a fluctuating anti-Iran coalition composed of Saudi Arabia, other Sunni Gulf states, and Israel would cause widespread bloodshed. As the 1980s Iran-Iraq War demonstrated, both Iran and Saudi Arabia would be likely to attempt nuclear breakout. With Iran, this would mean closing the small technological gap that now exists between its low-enriched uranium to the higher level of enrichment needed for a nuclear weapon. The Saudis could pay scientists from a sympathetic Sunni nuclear state—such as Pakistan—or simply buy nuclear weapons from Islamabad. An increasingly fractured and war-ravaged Middle East would spawn more jihadist organizations, and the West would be their primary target. Absent a reliable U.S. presence, Saudi Arabia and perhaps even Israel would increasingly turn to Russia and Chinarisking further entanglement as great-power guarantors, leaving U.S. officials in the unfortunate position of hoping polar ice will melt quickly enough to allow unrestricted year-round access over the Arctic, diminishing the importance of the Mediterranean. C2 ISIS Noack ‘20 Noack, Rick 1-10-2020, "Here’s what might happen if the U.S. were to suddenly quit Iraq" https://outline.com/j7yTAw “Among the biggest legacies of the Americans in Iraq has been the training and funding of Iraq’s counterterrorism service. It is the country’s only counterterrorism force that is multiethnic and largely uncorrupt. In comparison, many of the other militias who have fought the Islamic State are controlled by Iran,” he said. “If the United States were to withdraw its troops from Iraq, the governmental counterterrorism force would likely be merged with Iranian-backed militias. It would both undermine their reputation and constitute a blow to the Iraqi state, which the U.S. has sought to strengthen.” Like Neumann, Goldenberg fears that a U.S. withdrawal from I Iraq could result in a resurgence of the Islamic State there causing a humanitarian disaster and major displacement of people. If the Islamic State were to return to some parts of the country, he cautioned, “then the humanitarian effect will be devastating, putting these people back under ISIS rule, causing major displacement of people again,” he said. A U.S. departure from Iraq “makes it harder to do all the humanitarian and diplomatic work that needs to be done to … really help sustain in the long-term an effective counter-ISIS campaign,” he said. And Coronavirus makes states especially vulnerable Crisis Group ‘20 International Crisis Group. March 31 2020. “Contending with ISIS in the Time of Coronavirus.” https://www.crisisgroup.org/global/contending-isis-time-coronavirus As the COVID-19 pandemic swiftly reorders the priorities of policymakers and the public worldwide, conflicts that only recently occupied centre stage in the global policy and media debate are receding into the background. The fight against the Islamic State (ISIS) in Iraq, Syria and elsewhere is no exception. But while UN Secretary-General António Guterres has argued that mankind faces a common enemy in COVID-19, and thus appealed for a “global ceasefire”, ISIS has made clear that it sees things differently. In a new editorial in its weekly newsletter, ISIS has told its membership that their globe-spanning war is to go on, even as the virus spreads. Moreover, it has told them that the national and international security regimes that help keep the group in check are about to be overloaded, and that they should take maximum advantage. In Crisis Group’s recent briefing on COVID-19’s likely implications for politics and conflict globally, we warned that this public health crisis brought on by the COVID-19 Pandemic could afford jihadists the opportunity to attack pandemic-weakened states already combating insurgencies, as militants opportunistically “exploit disorder”. ISIS has now instructed its affiliates worldwide to do just that. Meaning, a US withdrawal now would be a disaster as the timing is terrible. Crisis Group ‘20 International Crisis Group. March 31 2020. “Contending with ISIS in the Time of Coronavirus.” https://www.crisisgroup.org/global/contending-isis-time-coronavirus By contrast, local Syrian and Iraqi forces and their international partners managed to beat back ISIS through joint effort and unity of purpose, if only incompletely and temporarily. Since then, preventing the group’s resurgence in both countries has depended on continuing international cooperation and on avoiding destructive new conflict that could relieve pressure on ISIS’s insurgent remnants. Take the case of Iraq, the original epicentre of what became ISIS’s transnational campaign. There, it is local forces that have done most of the fighting and dying against ISIS on the ground. But those Iraqi forces have also relied on the U.S.-led international Coalition to provide key technical capabilities such as air support,intelligence, and surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) to enable their continuing fight against ISIS insurgents. Noack ’20 futhers that upon a US withdrawal, Noack, Rick 1-10-2020, "Here’s what might happen if the U.S. were to suddenly quit Iraq" https://outline.com/j7yTAw “Among the biggest legacies of the Americans in Iraq has been the training and funding of Iraq’s counterterrorism service. It is the country’s only counterterrorism force that is multiethnic and largely uncorrupt. In comparison, many of the other militias who have fought the Islamic State are controlled by Iran,” he said. “If the United States were to withdraw its troops from Iraq, the governmental the US trained counterterrorism force in Iraq would likely be merged with Iranian-backed militias. It would both undermine their reputation and constitute a blow to the Iraqi state, which the U.S. has sought to strengthen.” Like Neumann, Goldenberg fears that a U.S. withdrawal from I Iraq could result in a resurgence of the Islamic State there. If the Islamic State were to return to some parts of the country, he cautioned, “then the humanitarian effect will be devastating, putting these people back under ISIS rule, causing major displacement of people again,” he said. as a U.S. departure from Iraq “makes it harder to do all the humanitarian and diplomatic work that needs to be done to … really help sustain in the long-term an effective counter-ISIS campaign,” he said. And for this reason, Noack concludes that a US withdrawal would lead to a devastating humanitarian catastrophe in Iraq as Noack ’20 WaPo, 10 January 2020, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2020/01/09/heres-what-might-happen-if-us-were-suddenly-quit-iraq/ Like Neumann, Goldenberg fears that a U.S. withdrawal from Iraq could result in a resurgence of the Islamic State there. If the Islamic State were to return to some parts of the country, he cautioned, “then the humanitarian effect will be devastating, putting these people back under ISIS rule, causing major displacement of people again,” he said. According to the United Nations, about 1.8 million internally displaced people are in Iraq. More than 6 million people are in need of humanitarian assistance. A U.S. departure from Iraq “makes it harder to do all the humanitarian and diplomatic work that needs to be done to … really help sustain in the long-term an effective counter-ISIS campaign,” he said. Contention Three is the Israeli Conundrum. A significant US withdrawal from the region would spell disaster for Israel. Horovitz ‘19 (David Horovitz is the founding editor of The Times of Israel, 9-8-2019, "Trump’s new actions, inactions on Kurds, Syria, Iran have Israel deeply worried," The Times of Israel, https://www.timesofisrael.com/trumps-new-actions-inactions-on-kurds-syria-iran-have-israel-deeply-worried/ President Donald Trump’s withdrawal of US troops from a crucial area of the Turkey-Syria border, widely seen as an abandonment of America’s Kurdish allies there, has reinforced the resonance of a series of “emergency” warnings issued by Israeli leaders in the days leading up to Wednesday’s solemn Yom Kippur. Israel’s concern, as Channel 13’s military analyst Or Heller put it on Wednesday night, is that “Trump’s isolationism” will encourage Iran to do what it did to Saudi Arabia’s oil facilities last month: attack. When the new Knesset was sworn in last Thursday, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu warned that Israel was facing a dire challenge from an increasingly emboldened Iran. “This isn’t spin, it’s not a whim, this is not ‘Netanyahu trying to scare us,’” he insisted. “Anyone who knows the situation knows that Iran is getting stronger and is attacking around the world, saying clearly, ‘Israel will disappear.’ They believe it, they are working toward it, we need to take them seriously. That reality obligates us to act. Remember my words and heed them.” The concern in Israel, TV analyst Heller said Wednesday, is that a US president’s hands-off approach in the wake of the Abqaiq attack “will encourage the Iranians to act against Israel” in the same way, “with cruise missiles and drones.” Soleimani’s al-Quds force has “an account to settle with Israel,” because of Israeli strikes at Iranian targets in Syria and Lebanon, he noted. And a significant withdrawal of US presence in the Persian Gulf would be the brink for Israel. Caspit ’20 explains that a Ben Caspit, Al Monitor, 8 January 2020, “US withdrawal from Iraq is Israel’s worst case scenario” https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2020/01/israel-us-iran-iraq-syria-qasem-soleimani-letter-withdrawal.html The letter of Gen. William H. Sili, commander of US military operations in Iraq, was leaked and then rapidly disseminated among Israel’s most senior security figures Jan. 6. In fact, a translated version in Hebrew appeared only minutes after the letter was leaked to the media, sweeping up the WhatsApp groups of Israel’s most top-secret (coded) defense systems. The content of the letter — that the Americans were preparing to withdraw from Iraq immediately — turned on all the alarm systems throughout the Defense Ministry in Tel Aviv. More so, the publication was about to set in motion an Israeli “nightmare scenario” in which ahead of the upcoming US elections President Donald Trump would rapidly evacuate all US forces from Iraq and Syria. Simultaneously, Iran announced that it is immediately halting its various commitments regarding its nuclear agreement with the superpowers, returning to high-level uranium enrichment of unlimited amounts and renewing this combined with Iran’s its accelerated push for achieving military nuclear abilities. “Under such circumstances,” a senior Israeli defense source told Al-Monitor under condition of anonymity, “We truly remain alone at this most critical period. There is no worse scenario than this, for Israel’s national security.” After a few hours, it became clear that the letter had been leaked accidentally. Nevertheless, the American denial, which began from US Defense Secretary Mark Esper and trickled down from there, did not really calm down Israel’s defense-system sources. “It is sad to see the US president’s conduct has also ‘infected’ the military,” a senior Israeli security figure told Al-Monitor on condition of anonymity, “It is not clear how this letter was written, it is not clear why it was leaked, it is not clear why it was ever written to begin with. In general, nothing is clear with regard to American conduct in the Middle East. We get up every morning to new uncertainty.” Twenty-four hours after the letter, the following assessment formed in Israel: Trump hasn’t decided if he’s staying or leaving. His inclination is to leave; he has no desire to see caskets of US soldiers being airlifted in Washington during an election year. Trump would be happy to leave Syria too, as he promised a long time ago. The US Army is trying to prepare a framework working plan toward an exit. And it was the preparations of this work plan that eventually generated the incident in which the letter was sent and then leaked. That, and perhaps also some unclarities in the American command chain. One way or the other, Israel must prepare for the worst-case scenario, because the odds are increasing that such a scenario may arise. According to this scenario (described in Al-Monitor in an earlier article), Trump would choose to abandon the Middle East and leave Israel alone on the battleground toward the 2020 elections. This would constitute the worst and most dramatic possible timing imaginable, when Iran would gradually abandon the nuclear agreement and inch its way toward the bomb. The assessment is that Israel will inflict heavy pressure on Trump in the coming weeks and try to convince him not to abandon the Middle East in general, and Iraq and Syria in particular, before the US presidential election. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu will use all the tools at his disposal in this context. Thompson ‘12 (Loren Thompson, former professor at Georgetown and Harvard, “What Happens When America No Longer Needs Middle East Oil?” https://www.forbes.com/sites/lorenthompson/2012/12/03/what-happens-when-america-no-longer-needs-middle-east-oil/#100a4c8a3a77 Dec 3, 2012. DoA 3/5/20) Israel too would likely be a big loser. Washington spends billions of dollars each year subsidizing the security of the Jewish state. The reason that isn't controversial even though Americans usually want to cut foreign aid ahead of every other type of federal spending is because it is hard to separate securing Israel from securing Middle East oil. The same U.S. military forces and programs that help protect Israel from Iranian missiles and Islamist terror groups also protect Arab oil-producing states. But if America's role in the Persian gulf securing the oil were to wane . It would be harder to ignore the cost of defending Israel, and that might forcing Jerusalem to become more self-sufficient. There would be plenty of other losers too, from the nations that depend on a steady flow of Middle East oil to stabilize global energy prices to the shippers that count on the Fifth Fleet for protection to the local companies that help sustain U.S. forces in the region. No doubt about it, a lot of players dependent on America's military presence in and around the Persian Gulf would be hurt if America went home. But there would be winners, too. Critically, Porther ’15 furthers that Israel views Iran as Porther, Gareth. Fall 2015. “Israel’s Construction Of Iran as an Existential Threat.” https://jps.ucpress.edu/content/45/1/43.full.pdf+html Netanyahu, who had abandoned the Rabin government’s rhetoric of demonization after becoming prime minister, now returned to it and surpassed his predecessor’s characterizations, potrays the Islamic Republic of Iran as the most serious threat Israel had ever faced. In an interview with the BBC in November 1997, Netanyahu said Iran “wants to be a world power of fundamentalist domination, seeing the West as its great enemy and it seeks to have the weapons to back up that ideology. That is even more dangerous than Saddam, because there is . . . an ideological fanaticism attached . . . to the acquisition of these weapons.” 64 In January 1998 Netanyahu was calling Iran “the most serious threat to Israel since 1948” and a few weeks later, he described Iran’s weapons capabilities as “posing an existential threat to the State of Israel.” 65 The Netanyahu government’s threat of preemptive attack and its portrayal of Iran as an “existential threat” were introduced just as legislation forcing the Clinton administration to crack down on Russia over the alleged sale of highly sensitive missile technology to Iran was about to be introduced in the U.S. Congress. Problematically, Horschig ‘19 Horschig, Doreen. June 20 2019. The Conversation. “Israel could strike first as tensions with Iran flare.” https://theconversation.com/israel-could-strike-first-as-tensions-with-iran-flare-119146 Israel, which has faced threats to its national security since its founding as a Jewish homeland in the Middle East in 1948, is known to take aggressive, preventive action to protect itself – including by launching preemptive strikes on neighboring nations it perceives as threatening. If international relations with Iran grow more volatile, Israel could take dramatic, unilateral action against its neighbor and longtime adversary. Reardon ‘12 PhD in Political Science @ MIT, published for the RAND Corporation (Robert, “Containing Iran: Strategies for Addressing the Iranian Nuclear Challenge,” p. 93-95) Iran also has successfully established ties of support with Pal- estinian organizations, especially Hamas, which politically controls Gaza and has used the territory to launch attacks against Israel. Israel's invasion of Gaza in 2009 uncovered evidence of Iranian support for Hamas in the form of finances, arms, and materiel. Iran's support for terror attacks on Israel, its efforts to undermine the Israeli-Palestin- ian peace process, and its rhetorical commitment to the destruction of Israel has, in Israel's eyes, justifiably made Iran a chief security threat. A nuclear-armed Iran would be an unacceptable threat to many Israeli decisionmakers. Tensions between Israel and Iran worsened after the election of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and the political ascendancy of conservatives in Iran. Ahmadinejad has adopted unusually inflammatory anti-Israeli rhetoric, even by Iran's normally hostile standards. The rise of politi- cal conservatives and their willingness to adopt a more confrontational posture toward the United States and the West on the nuclear issue has increased Israeli anxieties about Iran's nuclear program, which many in Israel doubt is aimed at developing nuclear weapons. Israel's military capabilities are likely sufficient to conduct opera- tionally successful air strikes against Iran's principal nuclear facilities at Fordow, Natanz, Isfahan, and Arak. However, it is questionable whether such an attack could sufficiently delay the Iranian nuclear pro- gram to justify the cost.13 Many Israelis have expressed an apprecia- tion of these potential costs, which include regional diplomatic fallout, the possibility of Iranian retaliation, and negative effects on Israel's relationship with the United States. 14 Air strikes could trigger retalia- tory attacks by Iran's regional proxies, and could even lead to a wider conflict. An Israeli attack also could set back the Arab-Israeli peace process, push Arab states in the region into Iran's orbit, and lead to negative domestic political consequences in nearby states affected by the Arab Spring, such as Egypt, whose domestic politics are already unstable and highly uncertain, and are susceptible to the influence of extremists. The costs and risks are likely viewed in Tel Aviv as being sufficiently high to warrant restraint, particularly while the United States continues to pursue negotiations and sanctions. A central concern for Israel is its relationship with the United States, and in the status quo Israel is reluctant to use force against Iran without Wash- ington's approval.15 However, if Israel was would likely have to be convinced that Iran's crossing of the nuclear threshold was imminent, and that the United States was unprepared to act to stop it. Regardless of where Israel's red line lies, the United States will have significant influ- ence over Israel's decisions. 16 Nonetheless, there is likely a point at which the Israelis would be willing to act unilaterally against Iran in spite of U.S. opposition. To reach this point, Israel would likely have to be con- vinced that Iran's crossing of the nuclear threshold was imminent, and that the United States was unprepared to act to stop it. Regardless of where Israel's red line lies, the United States will have significant influ- ence over Israel's decisions. 16 It is for this reason, that US assurances to Israel are essential. And an Israeli preemptive strike would be devastating. Horschig explains that if Israel was to preemptively strike Iran, Doreen, doctoral candidate in Security Studies at the School of Politics, Security and International Affairs at the University of Central Florida (UCF), M.A. from New York University and B.A. from Manhattan College; "Is Israel Thinking About a Military Strike on Iran? History Tells Us It's Possible.," National Interest, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/israel-thinking-about-military-strike-iran-history-tells-us-its-possible-63976 Of course, potential Israeli attacks on Iran present their own serious risks. Because most of Iran’s reactors are in full operations, air strikes may mean cutting off the power supply to Iranian citizens and could release large amounts of radioactive contaminants into the air. Iran, a militarily well-equipped country, would surely retaliate against any Israeli attacks. That, too, would triggering a conflict that would spiral throughout the Middle East. Of course, Israel faced similar dangers when it went after the weapons programs of Syria, Iraq and other neighbors. If history is any guide, Israel may strike Iran while the world quietly watches. Baffa 18 furthers that this would - senior international/defense policy researcher at the nonprofit, nonpartisan RAND Corporation. Nathan Vest is a research assistant and Middle East specialist at RAND (Richard, “The growing risk of a new Middle East war,” RAND, https://www.upi.com/The-growing-risk-of-a-new-Middle-East-war/8591534858245/) Despite a steady string of altercations and provocations, neither Iran, its primary proxy Lebanese Hezbollah (LH), nor Israel appear to be seeking all-out war, at least for now. Iran has exercised a measure of restraint in its attacks, and Israel's responses have been intended to eliminate a specific threat and restore a measure of deterrence, not escalation. Moreover, Iran reportedly withdrew its forces in Syria 85 kilometers away from Israel's border to placate Israel; however, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu asserted that Israel would not accept any Iranian presence in Syria. Additionally, Tehran's objective to establish a permanent military presence in Syria from which it can support LH and threaten Israel is wholly unacceptable to Jerusalem. Furthermore, Israeli attacks thus far have not deterred Iran, setting up an escalation logic that could be difficult curtail. Past Israeli conflicts, such as the 2006 Hezbollah War, reveal common signposts on Israel's "road to war," in which a series of provocations prompted large-scale Israeli operations. Today, Israel's threat perception is much higher, as Tehran seems intent on pressing its perceived advantage in Syria and bolstering LH's precision strike capability with advanced weapons and an indigenous production capability. A robust precision targeting capability could be a game changer for LH, allowing it to hold vital Israeli infrastructure and population centers at risk with far fewer weapons due to increased accuracy. A new war between Israel and LH that directly involves Iranian forces would potentially be far larger in scope and more destructive than the 2006 conflict. LH has a more-capable military, battle-hardened from years in Syria, and a rocket and missile force that can strike deep into Israeli territory. Corresponding Israeli operations would involve wide-ranging air and land campaigns targeting LH positons throughout Lebanon. Operations would likely also bleed into southwest Syria, where Israel would seek to uproot Iranian-backed militias before they can irreversibly entrench along the Golan. Finally, for Israel, the 2006 war ended inconclusively; thus, it almost certainly will aim to achieve a decisive battlefield victory by significantly degrading LH's military capabilities. A large-scale conflict pitting Israel against Iran and its proxies would submerge the already war-torn region in a new wave of violence, potentially drag the United States into another regional conflict. Farley ‘20 Robert Farley, 3 January 2020, National Interest, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/if-israel-goes-war-iran-will-it-go-nuclear-111006 The idea that Israel might lose a conventional war seems ridiculous now, but the origins of the Israeli nuclear program lay in the fear that the Arab states would develop a decisive military advantage that they could use to inflict battlefield defeats. This came close to happening during the 1973 Yom Kippur War, as the Egyptian Army seized the Suez Canal and the Syrian Arab Army advanced into the Golan Heights. Accounts on how seriously Israel debated using nukes during that war remain murky, but there is no question that Israel could consider using its most powerful weapons if the conventional balance tipped decisively out of Israel’s favor. The idea that Israel might lose a conventional war seems ridiculous now, but the origins of the Israeli nuclear program lay in the fear that the Arab states would develop a decisive military advantage that they could use to inflict battlefield defeats. This came close to happening during the 1973 Yom Kippur War, as the Egyptian Army seized the Suez Canal and the Syrian Arab Army advanced into the Golan Heights. Accounts on how seriously Israel debated using nukes during that war remain murky, but there is no question that Israel could consider use its most powerful weapons if the conventional balance tipped decisively out of its favor. Finally, Dallas ’13 terminalizes that May 2013, Research Gate, Univ of Georgia, researchgate.net/publication/236689331_Nuclear_war_bwetween_Israel_and_Iran_Lethality_beyond_the_pale Background The proliferation of nuclear technology in the politically volatile Middle East greatly increases the likelihood of a catastrophic nuclear war. It is widely accepted, while not openly declared, that Israel has nuclear weapons, and that Iran has enriched enough nuclear material to build them. The medical consequences of a nuclear exchange between Iran and Israel in the near future are envisioned, with a focus on the distribution of casualties in urban environments. Methods Model estimates of nuclear war casualties employed ESRI's ArcGIS 9.3, blast and prompt radiation were calculated using the Defense Nuclear Agency's WE program, and fallout radiation was calculated using the Defense Threat Reduction Agency's (DTRA's) Hazard Prediction and Assessment Capability (HPAC) V404SP4, as well as custom GIS and database software applications. Further development for thermal burn casualties was based on Brode, as modified by Binninger, to calculate thermal fluence. ESRI ArcGISTM programs were used to calculate affected populations from the Oak Ridge National Laboratory's LandScanTM 2007 Global Population Dataset for areas affected by thermal, blast and radiation data. Results Trauma, thermal burn, and radiation casualties were thus estimated on a geographic basis for three Israeli and eighteen Iranian cities. Nuclear weapon detonations in the densely populated cities of Iran and Israel will result in an unprecedented millions of numbers of dead, with millions of injured suffering without adequate medical care, a broad base of lingering mental health issues, a devastating loss of municipal infrastructure, long-term disruption of economic, educational, and other essential social activity, and a breakdown in law and order. Conclusions This will cause a very limited medical response initially for survivors in Iran and Israel. Strategic use of surviving medical response and collaboration with international relief could be expedited by the predicted casualty distributions and locations. The consequences for health management of thermal burn and radiation patients is the worst, as burn patients require enormous resources to treat, and there will be little to no familiarity with the treatment of radiation victims. Any rational analysis of a nuclear war between Iran and Israel reveals the utterly unacceptable outcomes for either nation.

0 - Disclaimer

Hey Y'all! We just started debating public forum during the march topic and we are really excited!! This is the space where we will upload all the cases we've read!!! If you have any questions about Mr. Pribe or Mr. Beck feel free to slide into our dm's and ask!!!!!!!!

Belt and Road Negative v1 - Peachtree Ridge

==Contention 1 – Spreading Chinese Influence== ====Christopher Balding argues in 2019 that:==== Christopher Balding, 6-17-2019, "Is China Exporting Authoritarianism?", Date Accessed 6-23-2019 // JP One of the major misconceptions China doves have begun to gravitate to is that China AND promoting the growth or authoritarianism is simply to deny the obvious empirical facts. ====Unfortunately, there are severe limitations to spreading this influence as Atul Singh indicated on September 4 is that:==== Atul Singh, 9-4-2019, "Is China's Belt and Road Initiative Strategic Genius, Arrogant Overreach or Something Else?," Fair Observer, https://www.fairobserver.com/region/asia_pacific/belt-and-road-initiative-bri-china-trade-chinese-silk-road-world-news-32389/, Date Accessed 9-5-2019 // JM Beijing is also having to balance divergent imperatives. One of the BRI's aims is AND is not backed by an inspiring idea. That is its biggest limitation. ====However joining the BRI will change the way the BRI is perceived. Andrea Kendall-Taylor argued in August that:==== Andrea Kendall-Taylor and Rachel Rizzo, 8-12-2019, "The U.S. or China? Europe Needs to Pick a Side," POLITICO Magazine, https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2019/08/12/us-china-europe-relations-227614, Date Accessed 8-12-2019 // WS China is a close and important partner for Europe; the two sides trade roughly AND that it will unequivocally side with America to uphold democratic norms and standards. ====Specifically, the CSIS wrote in 2019 that:==== CSIS, "How will the Belt and Road Initiative advance China's interests?," https://chinapower.csis.org/china-belt-and-road-initiative/, Date Accessed 6-23-2019 // JP If successfully implemented, the BRI could help re-orient a large part of AND Turkmenistan (22), Pakistan (32), and Sri Lanka (36). ====When China's political landscape becomes more appealing – China will seek to export more of its military influence through the BRI. Hal Brands wrote this week that:==== Hal Brands, 9-15-2019, The 'China hands' got China wrong, but listen to them now, American Enterprise Institute, https://www.aei.org/publication/the-china-hands-got-china-wrong-but-listen-to-them-now/, Date Accessed 9-18-2019 // JM A key question today is not whether China will become an ambitious revisionist power, AND on any single source of insight about what that country is up to. ====This materializes in increased arms sales and military hardware – Ely Ratner argued in 2018:==== Ely Ratner, 1-25-2018, "Geostrategic and Military Drivers and Implications of the Belt and Road Initiative", https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Ratner_USCC20Testimony20CORRECTED.pdf, Date Accessed 9-18-2019 // JM Domestic instability in recipient countries: Belt and Road routes through distinctly unstable and ungoverned AND recipient countries, Beijing will face considerable domestic pressure to respond with force. ====These arms sales increase risk of conflict, as Vincent finds that,==== James Vincent, 2-9-19, "China is worried an AI arms race could lead to accidental war", The Verge, https://www.theverge.com/2019/2/6/18213476/china-us-ai-arms-race-artificial-intelligence-automated-warfare-military-conflict, Date Accessed:// 9-6-19, LNW Experts and politicians in China~~'s~~ are worried that a rush to integrate AND ." "I think that's a real and legitimate threat," says Allen. ====This would be deadly as Smith quantifies,==== David Smith, 01-27-2011, "New report discusses China's role in Africa's conflicts." The Guardian, https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/poverty-matters/2011/jan/27/china-role-africa-conflicts, Date Accessed 09-05-2019//SMV Africa holds only 14 of the world's population, but from 1990 to 2005 AND And on average, civil war shrinks an African nation's GDP by 15. ==Contention 2 is Trump's Retaliation== ====Recently Trump has delayed talks of imposing EU auto tariffs in favor of further trade talks as Sam Meredith reports in 2019 that==== Sam Meredith, 5-23-19, "Trump car tariffs would be a 'first-order slap in the economic face,' Citi's Buiter says," CNBC, https://www.cnbc.com/2019/05/23/trump-car-tariffs-would-be-a-first-order-slap-in-the-economic-face-citis-buiter-says.html, Date Accessed 7-21-2019 // WS However, Trump stopped short of imposing auto tariffs last week, choosing instead to AND be a first-order slap in the economic face," he added. ====Unfortunately joining the BRI creates necessitates a Trump response as it represents a geopolitical shift. ==== ====Thomas Canvanna indicates in 2018 that: ==== Thomas Canvanna, 6-5-2018, "What Does China's Belt and Road Initiative Mean for US Grand Strategy?", The Diplomat, https://thediplomat.com/2018/06/what-does-chinas-belt-and-road-initiative-mean-for-us-grand-strategy/, Date Accessed 9-3-2019 // JM The United States' response to a rising China has largely focused on bolstering military capabilities AND - and long-term benefits for the American people and the West. ====Moreover, Noah Barkin explains in 2019 that joining the BRI:==== Noah Barkin, 6-4-2019, "The US is losing Europe in its battle with China", The Atlantic, https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2019/06/united-states-needs-europe-against-china/590887/, Date Accessed 7-19-2019 // SDV But conversations I had with dozens of officials on both sides of the Atlantic— AND power can reverse the course of history and return to its glorious past. ====This overreaction comes in the form of unleashing tariffs. Vasilis Trigkas furthers in 2018 that if trade negotiations accelerate between China and the EU==== Vasilis Trigkas, 6-6-18, "Nato, China summits a chance for Europe to assert itself," South China Morning Post, https://www.scmp.com/comment/insight-opinion/united-states/article/2153948/nato-and-china-summits-give-europe-chance, Date Accessed 8-27-2019 // WS In Beijing, EU leaders may have a seemingly easier task negotiating with the Chinese AND serve as a model for a prospective commercial rapprochement between Beijing and Washington. ====Putting tariffs on the EU sends the global economy into a tailspin. Thomas Duesterberg writes in 2019 that:==== Thomas Duesterberg, 4-5-2019, "Trans-Atlantic Trade Is Headed Toward Disaster," Foreign Policy, http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:wj2zcclEw_sJ:https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/04/05/trans-atlantic-trade-is-headed-toward-disaster/andamp;hl=enandamp;gl=usandamp;strip=1andamp;vwsrc=0, Date Accessed 7-18-2019 // WS After an Oval Office meeting last month between U.S. President Donald Trump AND the trigger on auto tariffs and send the global economy into a tailspin. ====And since the EU's economy is interconnected across the globe this recession would go global as Gina Heeb explains that==== Heeb, Gina. "Trump's proposed car tariffs could trigger a global growth recession, BAML says." Market Insider. February 1 2019.//GG, https://markets.businessinsider.com/news/stocks/trump-tariffs-cars-could-trigger-global-growth-recession-baml-2019-2-1027973273 President Donald Trump has doubled down on threats to levy duties on car imports from AND posing even greater risks than the global trade tensions that emerged last year. ====This is problematic as Duesterberg concludes that==== Thomas Duesterberg, 4-5-2019, "Trans-Atlantic Trade Is Headed Toward Disaster," Foreign Policy, http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:wj2zcclEw_sJ:https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/04/05/trans-atlantic-trade-is-headed-toward-disaster/andamp;hl=enandamp;gl=usandamp;strip=1andamp;vwsrc=0, Date Accessed 7-18-2019 // WS After an Oval Office meeting last month between U.S. President Donald Trump AND the trigger on auto tariffs and send the global economy into a tailspin. ====The impact of preventing this recession is massive as Harry Bradford writes that the next==== Harry Bradford, 4-5-2013, "Three Times The Population Of The U.S. Is At Risk Of Falling Into Poverty," HuffPost, span class="skimlinks-unlinked"https://www.huffpost.com/entry/global-poverty-900-million-economic-shock_n_3022420/span, Date Accessed 7-28-2019 // WS Economic Shock Could Throw 900 Million People Into Poverty, IMF Study Warns A recent AND figure is three times the size of the U.S. population.

Love K

The Affirmative’s representation of death is a symptom of their fear of dying- depicting this world in this way makes us try to overcome our fear of death by accepting it- we love death in liu of loving life Bell Hooks, 2000 (All About Love p 191-192) Images of death displace our fear instead of reducing it- we begin to fear “the other” or strangers Bell Hooks, 2000 (All About Love p 193-194) Spectacles of death feed our fear for it, creating a death drive for others Butterfield, Dep. of English at the University of Wisconsin, 2002 (Bradley, Postmodern Culture 13.1, projectmuse) For example, the affirmatives images of death in venezuela have lead to people calling for more killing Gregory Weeks, The Washington Post, "The U.S. is thinking of invading Venezuela. That’s unlikely to lead to democracy.", March 25th, 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/03/25/us-is-thinking-invading-venezuela-thats-unlikely-lead-democracy/ The Alternative is to refuse the affirmatives images of death and demand representations based on love instead of fear for political action This act can transform our culture of death and domination- rejecting the Affs representations is empowering in the way we think Bell Hooks, 2000 (All About Love, p. 93-100)

UBI~-~-~-~-~-~-AFF~-~-~-~-~-~--1

opensourced

Infra Lay

=1AC= We affirm ===Our sole contention is Infrastructure Development=== ====When looking to the EU today, we see a lack of infrastructure spending==== Bruce Barnard, 02-08-2018, " Europe infrastructure underinvestment hits shippers," No Publication, https://www.joc.com/regulation-policy/europe-infrastructure-underinvestment-hits-shippers'20180208.html?destination=node/3420516 LONDON – Europe is a major player in global trade. It is home to AND Investment Bank (EIB) warned in its 2017/18 investment report. ====Luckily enough, the BRI’s main goal is an increase in infrastructure development.==== Austin Strange, xx-10-2017, "," No Publication, http://docs.aiddata.org/ad4/pdfs/WPS46'Aid'China'and'Growth.pdf However, these established donors and lenders no longer dominate the development finance market ( AND ) Infrastructure development is good for two reasons, the first is: ===A. Trade=== ====Problematically, The EU and China see trade barriers in the status quo. This comes mainly in the form of transportation time.==== Amighini, A. A. (2018). Beyond Ports and Transport Infrastructure: The Geo-Economic Impact of the BRI on the European Union. Securing the Belt and Road Initiative, 257–273. doi:10.1007/978-981-10-7116-4'14 What has been partly overlooked in the design of the EU TEN-T corridors AND hours, which is much longer than the world average of 406 hours). ====Amighini continues by explaining how the BRI will benefit transportation times.==== Switching to railway transport has great potential for saving transport time: according to data provided by GEFCO, infrastructure construction would reduce railroad travel time from China to Europe to 16–21 days (depending on departure and arrival location), compared to 37–45 days for sea freight, port to port.4 This explains why in some hightech sectors (such as electronics) international freight forwarding agencies are already switching to railroad, for example, Hewlett-Packard is planning to rely solely on railway transport by 2017 for shipping its made-inChina PCs to Europe. This runs counter to recent trends and near-future expectations, and has prompted shipping agencies and major port authorities to redesign sea lanes to reduce shipping times and improve the interconnectedness between the ports and the inland railway network. ====Transportation time leads to an increase in trade.==== Anna Knack, xx-xx-2018, "China Belt and Road Initiative: Measuring the impact of improving transportation connectivity on trade in the region" With regard to transport connectivity, we find that a lack of rail connection between AND indices, which may absorb some effect of the trade variation among countries. ====This is important because of the trade potential between the EU and China.==== JACQUES PELKMANS , xx-xx-2016, "," No Publication, https://www.ceps.eu/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/EUCHINA'FTA'Final.pdf A FTA between China and the EU is worthwhile for a host of reasons. AND logical sequel’ in its trade policy vis-á-vis dynamic East Asia ====Trade growth has increased economic growth linearly, we see this when looking to==== BORGEN, 5-3-2018, "China’s Belt and Road Initiative: Aid, Investment or Something Else?," https://www.borgenmagazine.com/defining-chinas-belt-and-road-initiative-aid-investment-or-something-else/ The economic aspect of BRI is evident, as trade with the 68 member countries AND win contracts. The next reason why infrastructure is good is for: ===B. Econ growth=== ====Developing hard infrastructure across the EU leads to an increase in businesses and employment.==== ====Stephen Gibbons, 03-xx-2019, "New road infrastructure: The effects on firms," No Publication, https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0094119019300105 ==== ====The ward-level regressions provide strong evidence that road improvement schemes increase the number of establishments and employment in places that get better network access relative to others. A 1 gain in accessibility leads to a 0.3–0.5 increase in number of establishments and employment. Establishment level estimates suggest that employment in incumbents is largely unchanged, so employment gains come through establishment entry. Output per worker and wage increases for incumbent establishments, as well as the use of goods and services inputs. This suggests that accessibility improvements may attract establishments that benefit most from transport accessibility, bidding up local wages relative to other input prices and transport costs. Incumbent establishments that do not exit also increase purchases of goods and services inputs and their output per worker. The sectoral picture is less clear, but reveals aggregate employment effects dominating in the producer services, transport and administrative sectors. In common with other papers that use accessibility indices (despite some claims to the contrary), we cannot shed light on whether these effects arise because new roads improve access to output markets, intermediate inputs or workers, or just reduce travel times in general. Accessibility indices constructed to measure access to destination employment, residential population, or simply the number of destinations, are all highly correlated and yield similar results. ==== ====This effect is further quantified by==== Mario Holzner , 08-xx-2018, "," No Publication, https://wiiw.ac.at/a-european-silk-road—dlp-4608.pdf For our calculations on the growth effects of investments in the European Silk Road, AND that this is a level effect over an investment period of one decade. ==== This econ growth helps lift millions out of poverty.==== Deep Policy, 6-18-2019, "Success of China’s Belt and Road Initiative Depends on Deep Policy Reforms, Study Finds," World Bank, https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2019/06/18/success-of-chinas-belt-road-initiative-depends-on-deep-policy-reforms-study-finds "Improvements in data reporting and transparency—especially around debt—open government procurement, and adherence to the highest social and environmental standards will help significantly." If implemented fully, the initiative could lift 32 million people out of moderate poverty—those who live on less than $3.20 a day, the analysis found. It could boost global trade by up to 6.2 percent, and up to 9.7 percent for corridor economies. Global income could increase by as much 2.9 percent. For low-income corridor economies, foreign direct investment could rise by as much as 7.6 percent. At the same time, the cost of BRI-related infrastructure could outweigh the potential gains for some countries. Infrastructure investment into the EU is critical for, ===C. Recession=== ====Unfortunately, we can see that a recession is on the way.==== Thomas Franck, 08-21-2019, "Morgan Stanley: Risk of a global recession is ‘high and rising’," CNBC, https://www.cnbc.com/2019/08/21/morgan-stanley-risk-of-a-global-recession-is-high-and-rising.html The downtrend in some global economies is becoming contagious as weakness in the manufacturing sector begins to spread, according to Morgan Stanley, which warned clients that "the wheels for a slowdown are in motion." "Even as we have been revising our growth projections lower, we continue to highlight that the risks remain decidedly skewed to the downside," Chetan Ahya, the bank’s chief economist, warned in a note published Tuesday. "We expect that if trade tensions escalate further ... we will enter into a global recession (i.e., global growth below 2.5Y) in three quarters." The risk of tighter financial conditions, which would trigger a global recession, "is high and rising," he added. Despite claims that the U.S. remains an exception to the global deceleration, the effects of the international slowdown are already filtering into American data, the economist wrote. Ahya highlighted the "significant loss of momentum" in payrolls data in the past seven months, falling to 141,000 on a six-month moving average in July from 234,000 in January. But recent manufacturing barometers have also been of concern. The IHS Markit Manufacturing Purchasing Managers’ Index fell to 50.4 in July, down from 50.6 in June, its lowest level since September 2009. Signals above 50 indicate expansion while those under 50 represent contraction. "Falling business spending at home and declining exports are the main drivers of the downturn, with firms also cutting back on input buying as the outlook grows gloomier," Chris Williamson, chief business economist at IHS Markit, said on Aug. 1. "US manufacturers’ expectations of output in the year ahead has sunk to its lowest since comparable data were first available in 2012." ====A recession would be devastating.==== Harry Bradford, 4-5-2013, "Three Times The Population Of The U.S. Is At Risk Of Falling Into Poverty," HuffPost, https://www.huffpost.com/entry/global-poverty-900-million-economic-shock'n'3022420?guccounter=1andguce'referrer=aHR0cHM6Ly93d3cuZ29vZ2xlLmNvbS8andguce'referrer'sig=AQAAAF9nVzk8iHxI1O7O13JJEv7jFiVPR'eCHUD2w20gDE1HQFtQxIBJFap6YIPtLZyBHKKv7Bzc9EuoP-KzzgM'PXCEcmtTpr74uELT4NisvL'TzIPjPW05CGzltRU3M39gKmW5z99BvdyG7g9cKG0PJDhykj1TlEly2UD7sJkr7SU5 A recent study by the International Monetary Fund warns that as many as 900 million people could fall back into poverty in the event of an economic shock like the Great Recession. That figure is three times the size of the U.S. population. ====Luckily, in times of recession, infrastructure investment becomes more effective.==== Mario Holzner , 08-xx-2018, "," No Publication, https://wiiw.ac.at/a-european-silk-road—dlp-4608.pdf Figure 15 illustrates that the effects of a change in public investment activities on the economic performance in downturns (characterised by a negative output gap, i.e. economic underutilisation) is significantly stronger than in upswings. In the upswing the economic output rises by only 0.6 after a public investment shock amounting to one percentage point of the GDP in year four; cumulatively, the effect in the first four years is 1.5. In comparison, with 2.6 the increase is more than four times higher in the downturn in year four; with 7.0 in the downward swing, the cumulative effect is even almost five times more than in the upswing. This result is consistent with the current empirical literature, which shows particularly high fiscal multiplier effects in downswing periods (e.g. IMF, 2014; Abiad et al., 2015; Gechert, 2015; Heimberger, 2017). ====Empirically, infrastructure has been a tool to lift countries out of recession, as we see in Poland.==== Connor Adams Sheets, 9-29-2012, "The East European Miracle: How Did Poland Avoid The Global Recession?," International Business Times, https://www.ibtimes.com/east-european-miracle-how-did-poland-avoid-global-recession-795799 As the European Union fell into the global recession that began in 2008, only one nation in the region kept growing while its neighbors saw their economies fall. That title belongs to Poland, which made it through the period without experiencing a single year of falling gross domestic product. Growth slowed down, but even at the lowest point, Poland’s economy continued to expand slightly, and Polish officials remain bearish. "Poland is the only country that was not negatively impacted by the recession. We have been calculating that from 2008 until now, we have almost 16 percent growth," Under-Secretary of State Beata Stelmach said in Warsaw last week. "It’s very difficult to predict economic growth for the next five years. However, at our worst, in 2009, our growth was still 1.6 percent. We were green and everybody else was red." According to the CIA World Factbook, Poland experienced 4.8 percent, 1.7 percent, 3.8 percent and 4.4 percent growth in 2008, 2009, 2010 and 2011, respectively. The same source shows that the EU as a whole experienced 0.8 percent, negative 4 percent, 1.8 percent and 1.6 percent growth in the same years. Poland’s enduring economic health is beyond dispute, as Ernst and Young noted in its 2012 European Attractiveness Survey, claiming that "although many countries remain in economic difficulty, Poland, by contrast, is enjoying dynamic growth." Its future is not as certain, as an external assessment of Poland's economic situation compiled by the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade points out: "The OECD predicts growth will slow to around 3 per cent over the next two years, due to a combination of weaker external demand, Euro zone uncertainty, ongoing fiscal consolidation, the deceleration of public investment following the 2012 soccer championships, and the leveling off of EU funds in 2013." The department did add, however, that "Poland is one of the few emerging economies to still enjoy stable credit ratings." Looking back over the past several years, it’s not yet clear exactly what enabled Poland to be an exception in a world brought to its knees by financial crisis. Polish business leaders and officials including Stelmach offer a range of explanations, which they believe combined to create an environment conducive to growth in a number of sectors of Poland’s maturing market economy. Rafal Szajewski, team lead for the services section at Poland's Foreign Investment Department, described three key factors that he believes helped the nation weather the economic storm. The first is the huge amount of European Union funds that have been spent on improving infrastructure and completing other projects in Poland since the nation joined the EU in May 2004. "All the benefits and funds we got when we joined the EU have helped a lot to improve the business environment and drive change," Szajewski said at an outsourcing discussion held last week in Warsaw. Stelmach also cited the infusion of E.U. funds as one of the big drivers of Poland’s recent prosperity and economic flowering. "Look at other countries, some of them don’t have ideas about what to do with the money," she said. "So infrastructure is another sector that has boosted our economic growth." In 2010, for instance, Poland received more than 1.39 trillion Euros in such funding, according to the European Commission. Those benefits — which Szajewski estimates were responsible for 0.5 to 1 percent of the nation’s GDP growth per year during the recession — include billions of dollars of infrastructure investments, including major overhauls of the nation’s highway system and of the Warsaw subway system. To prevent millions from going into poverty, we are proud to affirm

Pre-ToC Disclosure

If you would like to contact us for disclosure, here's our contact info: Khegan Meyers - (813) 731-3722 - Khem6th@gmail.com - FB: Khegan Elijah Meyers Harsh Bagdy - (813) 422-9614 - harsh.bagdy@gmail.com - FB: Harsh Bagdy