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StefanMGreen

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Visual approaches were working fine all morning. All of the sudden, without warning from San Diego tower or NZY Tower personnel, clouds rolled in and obscured the two airports. One airliner missed approach at SAN, which means the aircraft will be entering my airspace. SAN Local Controller coordinated a heading of 250 degrees for the missed approach due to subsequent departure on the roll. No non-standard heading was coordinated with the subsequent departure, but the Local Controller took the aircraft, Air Carrier X, off the SID and assigned a heading of 275 degrees without coordinating with me. As the above scenario was unfolding, an arrival to NZY request a PAR approach instead of the coordinated visual approach. This aircraft was going fast and was only approximately 12 miles from the airport, almost straight in. The NZY PAR was showing out of service on the SAIDS. I informed the pilot of this aircraft that the PAR was listed as out of service and to expect an ASR approach. In my scrambling to do all of the manual coordination to get this aircraft quickly called in and handed off to NZY GCA, I experienced a stuck mike on my frequency. NZY GCA also informed me that the PAR was not out of service after all. The note on the SAIDS was incorrect. With all the manual coordination inherent to this sector, the sudden change of approach caused a sharp increase in my workload, as did having to deal with a stuck mike. I did not notice until Air Carrier X entered an adjacent sector without prior coordination that the aircraft had not turned as expected to comply with the SID that I was expecting the aircraft to fly. All of the scrambling to handle these unexpected events could have been averted had someone in each of the two control towers been alert enough to advise this TRACON of the deteriorating weather conditions. Had we had such information, the arrival to SAN would have been put on an instrument approach instead of a visual approach, and the arrival to NZY would have been assigned an ASR approach much sooner. Also, when NZY Tower called in the morning upon opening, no one on our end or their end reviewed the notes on the SAIDS for their accuracy. All of the above factors were made worse by the overly loud noise level of the SAN area controllers on duty this morning. The supervisors do not ever take action to quiet the unprofessionally loud controllers until complaints are made by the affected controllers. When action is taken, it is only temporarily less noisy. Recommendation, I believe all of these factors were caused by a lack of professionalism. SAN and NZY towers have windows for those tower personnel to use to observe traffic and weather conditions. Someone in each of these two towers should have informed SCT TRACON of the deteriorating weather conditions. Also there was a lack of professionalism on both the towers and SCT TRACON for not reviewing notes on the SAIDS for accuracy. I believe the lack of professionalism is due to the increase of inexperienced people being hired to work in complex facilities such as SAN tower, NZY tower, and SCT TRACON. I know for a fact that hiring people with no experience off the street to work at SCT TRACON is creating a more dangerous aviation environment. Safety is being sacrificed just to get bodies in the building. There is also a lack of professionalism being displayed by front line managers. The supervisors do not control the noise level until it gets so far out of hand that a responsible controller has to ask the supervisors to quiet people down. There are also many controllers who socialize way too much while working and do not focus on their traffic, or observe deteriorating weather conditions. As far as the age old stuck mike scenarios, there needs to be a way for Air Traffic Control transmitters to overpower the signal generated by the stuck mike aircraft. Then we could keep doing our jobs of ensuring the safety of the flying public during such times.

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Weather Alert Update Controller Tower and coordinate current traffic

This report details one specific event but also describes other aspects leading up to, and after, the event. I took responsibility for RADAR East. The FLM's were conducting a briefing so that one could go on a break. There was a large area of weather across the Runway 17L/17R Final Approach Course (FAC). The area was approximately 6 miles north of AUS, and extended east/west about 10 - 20 miles. PIREPS were indicating light-moderate turbulence, and these were forwarded to Flight Data for dissemination. Final was combined to RADAR West at the time, and we were 'sharing the final'. RADAR West had one aircraft execute a go-around from Runway 17R, and I was told that the aircraft was too high. I initiated an automated point-out for my next arrival to Runway 17L, and then started to sequence my arrivals for close-in visuals inside of the band of weather. All pilots were concerned about the weather. Tower said that the area looked dark, but that visuals should work from the east. My first aircraft went around and I informed the new FLM and RADAR West about this situation. When I informed the FLM, there were approximately 8 - 10 individuals in the TRACON standing immediately behind me and the RADAR West Controller. I had to step around these folks to coordinate with the RADAR West Controller, as the conversation was too loud and distracting to use the land line. I had to ask the FLM to remove these individuals from the TRACON because of the noise and distraction. At the time of my go-around, the weather was well defined on the RADAR display; and the Integrated Weather System Display indicated that a gust-front was approaching. I asked the FLM to tell me what the plan was with regards to a runway change to get the arrivals in and avoid the weather, but there was no response. I was able to get two more arrivals, plus the previous go-around, inside of the weather before the fourth stated that he did not want to land south. I turned this aircraft south and then started vectoring all of the other aircraft for 35L/35R. There were still a bunch of people in the TRACON at the time and the FLM still had not assisted with a runway change. Final was still not open. The Certified Professional Controller (CPC) on RADAR West was relatively new, and I found it difficult to 'share the final' with him during the change because of the 'cross-overs' that were going to take place. About this same time a CPC arrived at my sector to train with a Developmental. The CPC had not trained with the Developmental in 3 - 5 months, so he/she really wasn't up-to-speed on how the Trainee was doing, or even what the Trainee's strength/weaknesses were. I was too busy to provide a proper Position Relieve Briefing, so I told them to standby while the mess was sorted-out. The FLM was not in sight, and I could not ascertain that any help was being given to any of us. I told the CPC and his/her Trainee that they should get a Final Controller to help before they took the sector. The CPC had to find and ask the FLM to open Final. The Trainee assisted me with land line calls, hand-off's, and coordination. I finally gave-up the RADAR East Sector to the CPC and the Trainee and went to take a break. Several minutes later I was called back into the TRACON to work Flight Data. Several minutes later, an aircraft declared an emergency. The RADAR East Controller shouted-out that he/she had an emergency, but the FLM was not in the TRACON. I ran to the TRACON office, but the FLM was not there. I went out into the hall, but the FLM was not there. I ran back into the TRACON and plugged a headset into a Coordinator position to monitor the situation at RADAR East and coordinated with the Tower FLM to ring-out the TRACON. We did not have all of the necessary emergency information at the time, but this was eventually given to me, and I was able to forward this information to the Tower. The TRACON FLM still was not present. I then coordinated with the Final Controller and the Tower FLM to have the emergency aircraft placed on our local emergency frequency to assist with airborne and ground communications. The TRACON FLM arrived and I told the Supervisor briefly what was happening, then I continued to assist with coordination. The Tower was launching departures into the weather and the pilots were requesting immediate turns away from the weather. These deviations were impacting training and traffic on RADAR East. The Trainee bailed-out of the sector after losing the picture. I called the Tower and stopped east departures, then sat down with the RADAR East Controller to assist with hand-off's, coordination, and to serve as an extra set of eyes. All of this happened while I was signed-on to the Flight Data position. The RADAR East trainee asked if separation had been lost between the emergency aircraft and an air carrier on final. I did not see a loss of separation, but there were many things happening at the same time. Recommendation, this is par for the course at AUS. We are not getting the help we need on a daily basis. When the traffic level increases, we rarely get speed and/or spacing restrictions at the boundary. When the weather is bad, we rarely get any assistance through pre-planning of flow or runway changes. When an emergency situation arises, we are left to handle much of the coordination on our own. When the strip bays are filled to capacity with inbound flights, Final is often closed and underutilized. When the Traffic Situation Display (TSD) indicates that traffic is coming, the decision to open Final is almost always too late. When PIREPS indicate that an arrival corner post is about to be shut-down, we wait until there's a back-log of traffic at the corner-post with screaming pilots before we do anything. We operate from a knee-jerk and reactionary position, and many times the response is to simply do nothing until one of the controllers screams for help, or until aircraft are spinning in circles and executing a go-around or missed approach when all of the signs were present? Why must we ask to have Final opened? Why must we ask for 250 KTS at the boundary? Why must we ask for 10 miles in-trail from ZHU? Why do we wait until aircraft are going around due to wind-shear or tailwind before initiating a runway change? Why do we allow controllers to go down the tubes before calling for a hand-off position to be open? Why is the TRACON Coordinator position never utilized? Why are trainees helping with land line coordination? Why is the Flight Data Controller required to step in and assist with hand-offs, land line coordination, and relaying emergency information when this is not part of the duties associated with Flight Data? Why are we still 'sharing the Final' when we have no defined procedures or practices which allow this to be conducted in a safe manner? Why do I have to ask the FLM to get all unnecessary personnel out of the TRACON because they are being a distraction to the operation? Why is AUS the most investigated and scrutinized facility in the Central Service Area, yet we continue to repeat the same behavior day after day... week after week... month after month? How many teams of FAA 'investigators' have come to AUS and how many investigations does it take for someone to stand-up, come forward, and actually address what is happening here?

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Weather Alert Update Controller Tower and coordinate current traffic

I was working Hood Sector which in an arrival and departure sector. A DH8D, departed PDX southwest bound climbing to 3,000. After RADAR identifying the aircraft, I instructed them to climb to 8,000 and turn left direct to TIMEE intersection. While the DH8D was in the turn, I noticed a departure tag up south of PDX on a Newberg tag, which is an adjacent sector. I called traffic the traffic to the DH8D, which was a B350. The DH8D did not have the aircraft in sight, which was not a worry to me as the B350 should initially be climbing to 3,000 and the highest that Newberg can climb them is 4,000. I kept watching the B350 and noticed them climbing fast through 3,000 and again issued the traffic to the DH8D, but they still did not have the aircraft in sight. When I looked back I saw the B350 at 4,200, so I immediately displayed the DH8D to the Newberg Controller and questioned them on what the B350 was doing. They immediately issued a turn to the B350, who informed the Controller they were climbing to 9,000. I later found out that the aircraft had never checked in on frequency and that Clearance Delivery in the Tower incorrectly gave the pilot 9,000 as their assigned initial altitude. The DH8D and the B350 eventually got each other in sight when they were at the same altitude and a little less than a half mile apart horizontally. Recommendation, Clearance Delivery, who issued the incorrect altitude, was newly certified on that position in the Tower. I'm not sure of this Controller's background and if this is their first position or not, but maybe more supervision needs to be done on newly certified controllers. It's possible that the Clearance Delivery Controller's training time was inadequate and that more time training would be helpful. It also was found that Local Control waited longer than normal to switch the B350 to departure and was confused on what frequency to give the aircraft. Timely switching to the Departure Controller, where they would have hopefully heard the incorrect altitude the aircraft was climbing to, would have prevented the incident.

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Traffic Alert Switch Craft to departure and coordinate current traffic

I was working the Radar Sector. I noticed that a ghost track for Aircraft X was displayed on my radar scope, but we never received a phone call. Looking at the flight plan, it appeared that the flight would be a simple point-out as they would never enter my airspace. A few minutes later, I took the hand-off on Aircraft Y. Aircraft Y checked on as a 'flight'. I was a bit surprised by this and asked him to verify. His response was, 'Fort Worth Center, that's affirmative. We have a flight of 5 F18's with us.' I verified it was indeed Aircraft X, which he affirmed. I questioned my Handoff person if this had been coordinated as the flight plans didn't match. She was shocked and said no. I had her call and ask if we missed something. Apparently, the individual was [new to] training on the sector. Their response was, 'Ummmm, yeah we're not sure, but we think they want to break up in your airspace.'I immediately asked Aircraft Y, to verify the flight plan of Aircraft X. After being off-line for a few minutes, he returned with a much different flight plan. They were going to be a flight until the next Center's airspace and they weren't even landing in my airspace! My Handoff put the amendment in and corrected the flight plan information. While this was happening, I asked my supervisor what the heck was going on. The supervisor started going through paperwork on the desk and found ALTRV paperwork that the morning supervisor was given, but never posted at the sector. I checked with the next sector, to find out if they had anything. Big negative. So my supervisor went and made a copy, to pass along.I was blown away about every part of the lack of communication, much less a trainer allowing this to all happen without ANY coordination. Not to mention whether the correct separation standards had been used (non-standard with 6 aircraft as opposed to only 1). After I got off position, I went to the Operations Manager desk and sat down with my Operation Manager(OM). We went over everything and pulled up data. Apparently, the issue went all the way back to the previous Center. The routes were never updated and nothing was coordinated correctly. If we hadn't caught it, the next Center would have had an ugly surprise. My OM reassured me that he would follow up. I apologize for my untimely filing. I did report it to management immediately and wanted to be sure the data was captured here. I know that there is guidance coming out soon about ALTRV and Formation Flights, that the importance is placed on ensuring accurate information is always forwarded.

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None

MRI departed a VFR Aircraft Y on what I can only assume to be a Campbell departure. Aircraft Y seemed to shortcut the corner of the departure and was clearly going to clip the 'Seward Segment' (described in the Alaska Chart Supplement).Aircraft X, a known [type] to climb slowly, departed shortly after Aircraft Y from ANC RWY 7L. Aircraft X was assigned an Anchorage 8 departure, a departure that the aircraft is unable to comply with due to climb gradient restrictions.Both aircraft were on a course and climb gradient to place them in unsafe proximity with one another and mitigating action was required which included both a traffic and low altitude alert.Aircraft Y went to the wrong frequency and was talking to North RADAR (NR) while heading southbound into my airspace, the NR Controller did a fine job figuring out the pilots' intentions and then noticing the conflict. I was working South RADAR (SR) and was talking to Aircraft X. Both the NR Controller and myself grew very concerned about the conflict as soon as we noticed Aircraft X acquire its tag and projected the two aircraft to be in unsafe proximity. We both issued traffic and applied merging target procedures to our respective planes while coordinating with one another for a mitigating action. The NR Controller attempted to turn his VFR aircraft to the east in order to provide more space for my Aircraft X to climb to the south; however, the VFR Aircraft Y was failing to respond and the situation was growing dire.Once Aircraft Y failed to respond to NR controlling prompts, he instructed me to turn my Aircraft X even though we were both fully aware of the MVA (Minimum Vectoring Altitude) factor which complicated vectoring of Aircraft X. I issued the traffic alert and an immediate turn to the southwest to Aircraft X. Then I issued a low altitude alert and instructed the aircraft to expedite its climb and gave the appropriate MVA information. Aircraft X effected its turn but seemed to struggle to climb, assumedly due to the rate of turn bleeding climb performance from the already underpowered aircraft. Once Aircraft X committed to the southwest turn, Aircraft Y then came back to the NR Controller and complied with the turn to the east which further mitigated the conflict.Safe separation was achieved due to the turn of an IFR aircraft below the MVA.Closest proximity was 1.22 nm and 500 feet.A) Tower needs to be held accountable for issuing traffic to aircraft that will be in unsafe proximity immediately on departure. Aircraft X advised that traffic was not issued by the Tower despite both aircraft clearly being in direct conflict with one another.B) Aircraft that cannot comply with the SID off RWY 7L need to be assigned the climbing gradient for the 7L DVA (Diverse Vector Area) procedure. Aircraft X was allowed to be at an egregiously low altitude and allowed to remain on a SID that he was not able to climb in compliance with. The SID's ground track would have been extremely unsafe and I was forced to disregard MVA procedures in order to ensure safe separation of aircraft.C) The 'Seward Segment' needs to be addressed. Our facility has raised issue with this particular airspace several times to no avail.

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Traffic Alert Update and Change Possible route

Tower was call for release in North Flow. Aircraft Y departed VFR northbound. Tower got release with heading 270 for Aircraft X. After Aircraft X rolled, Tulsa TRACON called on shout line and FLM (Front Line Manager) answered that line. TRACON APPREQD Aircraft Y return for landing. No special handling was requested, just a turn back to downwind. About a minute later, the LC controller saw Aircraft Y southbound northwest of the airport and asked what Aircraft Y was doing. The FLM told him he had approved it. The LC controller asked about the departure on a 270 heading. The FLM told him to turn the departure to 300 heading, contrary to release given. The controller issued the 300 heading and then switched the Aircraft X to departure. Aircraft X reported traffic in sight but did not acknowledge the frequency change. After traffic was no factor, the FLM told the controller to turn departure to 270 heading. The controller replied he had already switched. The FLM then APPREQD a 300 heading. TRACON called and asked to try Aircraft X again and they were switched to departure. The FLM said he thought the returning aircraft had some sort of problem. This all happened during all hands meeting concerning conflicts with management over leave policy. All CPCs (Certified Professional Controller) except the one on LC were in meeting and the Staff Specialist was on Ground. FLM was CIC.If the controller is too busy to answer the line, FLM should not approve actions out of the ordinary. If FLM does not have the whole traffic picture, do not approve things out of the ordinary. If the FLM is going to do things to disrupt a controller's plan, tell them a new plan ' Change Aircraft X to a 300 heading, but don't switch him until he passes Aircraft Y who I approved back inbound.' A request to return for landing is not automatically an emergency to be approved without question.

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Traffic Alert FLM made changes. Update Traffic Data and coordinate with current traffic

On announcing to LOU Ground my request to taxi, my tail number was read back to me incorrectly by Ground. I clarified that my aircraft is Aircraft X [my tail number]. Clarification done and read back correctly. I taxied to Runway 33 as told by Ground. As I approached Rwy 33, a 'seasoned' voice that I recognized with LOU Tower frequency stopped all chatter to clarify the various numbers that were getting confused. Clarification done and accepted by all aircraft. I was then cleared by Tower to depart [Runway] 33, VFR to remain below Class Charlie, right turn out to a 090 heading. I departed on [Runway] 33, right turn out and to a heading of 090. I noticed on the Tower frequency how busy the Tower was with arriving traffic. LOU is a busy airport (Class D) with training flights and training ATC employees. About 3 miles east of LOU at approximately 1,600-1,700 feet MSL, I heard the seasoned ATC voice telling someone to turn left to southeast direction immediately to avoid other aircraft. I never heard a tail number in this order to turn immediately. I was heading 090, but wanted to clarify if they were calling for me to turn. I keyed Tower and asked if that was for my aircraft. He immediately said yes. I believe I asked which direction I needed to turn and I believe he said there was an aircraft coming toward me at my altitude. I explained I was heading 090 and a left turn would not be SE direction but NE. As I looked to my left, I saw a jet aircraft fly by my tail. I cannot tell you how far away the jet was, but it was much too close. I could tell that the jet was flying extremely fast. After this, I heard the pilot of the jet ask for clarification on how long Runway 33 is. Tower told him the distance and the pilot said that was too short for him to land and he needed a longer runway. I heard Tower start to vector him away from [Runway] 33 to Runway 24. At this time, I had cleared the airspace and changed frequencies to continue my flight.On arrival back to LOU, I was cleared to land on Runway 33 and rolled out to Bravo Taxiway. After receiving taxi clearance from Ground to taxi from Bravo to the hangar, Ground asked me to call Bowman Tower and gave me the number to call. I told them I would be glad to call, but needed to put my plane away first and it would be maybe 10 minutes.I called the Tower once the above was accomplished. The voice of the seasoned ATC was the one with whom I was speaking. He asked me if I knew what a 'Safety Alert' is. I said 'yes.' He said he issued one and I was 'slow' to respond. I acknowledged, but explained that I never heard a tail number issued and that is why I keyed the Tower to find out if the alert was for me. At this time, the controller acknowledged that he was undoubtedly 'walked on' by all the other chatter on the Tower frequency as he was trying to issue the Safety Alert and acknowledged that I probably did NOT hear my tail number. We chatted about my 090 heading and he acknowledged that I had followed my departure instructions as directed. He went on to say that he had a trainee. I acknowledged that problem and praised him for stepping in to clarify the confusion of the numbers. He knew that the trainee had read back my tail number incorrectly prior to taxi and that I asked for clarification at the beginning of my taxi to [Runway] 33. He also acknowledged that I speak slowly and clearly because I asked him if I come across 'mumbled.' He denied any mumble chatter on my part. We returned to the issue at hand and I asked him about the jet flying on approach. The controller stated to me that the jet was 'screaming through the airspace' over 250 knots. I believe I heard him say close to 300 knots. I asked the controller what in the world was the jet pilot doing flying that fast in controlled airspace. The controller stated that the pilot said he had a tailwind. THAT IS FALSE. The winds were NOT in excess of 50 knots at 1,600 feet MSL. I would not have been flying! I explained to the controller I heard the jet pilot ask how long Runway 33 is and state that Runway 33 was too short for him. I also told controller that I heard the jet pilot ask for an alternative which would be Runway 24. Obviously, the jet pilot was not familiar with LOU and had not even prepared himself for landing at LOU. I went on to tell the controller that I never saw the jet and he was around me before I ever realized it and I saw him pass very closely to my tail. The controller said that this particular flight had been passed on to LOU by ATC at SDF and the type of aircraft had not been made clear to LOU. Evidently, this type of aircraft can be in single engine piston or turbine. LOU expected the piston variety and the aircraft was turbine and much faster than anticipated.There are so many causative factors to this situation: trainees, unprepared pilot, a pilot of the jet that blew through airspace speed limits, busy airspace, similar aircraft numbers, frequency that is jammed with approach chatter, and walking on 'alerts' being made by ATC.I do not fault the ATC seasoned controller. I do fault the frequency being constructed such that an 'alert' can be walked on by other chatter. An alert should be like a 'red phone' in that ATC should have the ability to walk over all other chatter to issue an alert. I fault the jet pilot. I'd like to know if he was spoken to and reported. I followed all my directions and he did not. I also think that this is a great opportunity for a review for proactive measures to be adopted [and] etc. How was the handoff of the jet flight handled from SDF to LOU? Was the type of aircraft made clear? Was there read back of the hand off? How fast was that jet going? We may never know, but I am sure it exceeded the speed in approach areas. There was no 50 knot wind that morning at 1,600 feet around the LOU airspace. If that pilot indeed claimed that, he lied. He should be held completely accountable.

You will generate detailed solutions based on the input and output provided and create steps to resolve the problem

None

I made contact with Tower, 9 miles to the west of the airport requesting a visual approach for landing and was instructed to head for the downwind for Runway 07. At approximately 4 miles from the airport, I made a call to ATC to confirm I should head for a right downwind, which is the published pattern for Runway 07. I was told to transition to a straight-in approach, and was cleared to land, number one, on Runway 07. I read back the landing clearance, but I had not clearly heard my call sign on the transmission from the Tower, so I asked for and received a second confirmation that I was cleared to land on Runway 07 with a straight in approach. I do not recall hearing any communications between the Tower and any other aircraft in the pattern after I was cleared to land. At 1.5 miles out on final, the Tower made an urgent call to a Cessna, asking if the Cessna had turned base. I immediately scanned for the traffic in the vicinity and spotted the Cessna on a right base, near and ahead, heading directly for my flight path. The Cessna must have spotted me at this point, or realized he was not instructed to turn base, because he made an evasive turn to the left to avoid collision. The Tower then instructed the Cessna to make a left 270 degree turn and rejoin the base for spacing. I called the Tower and told them that it was a close call, and reminded them again of my position, which was now 1 mile on final. The remainder of the approach and landing was nominal. I feel there were several errors made that led to this near mid-air collision. It was a busy afternoon at the airport, and the Tower Controller appeared to be the only controller on duty, because he was handling both the Tower and Ground frequencies. The Controller seemed to have forgotten about the Cessna on downwind (or was preoccupied with another task), and failed to instruct the Cessna to extend downwind for traffic. The Controller was not providing position reports to aircraft in the pattern. On a VFR Sunday afternoon, a larger volume of traffic should be expected at this popular fly-to destination; more controllers should have been on duty. The second error was on the part of the pilot of the Cessna. He never received instructions from the Tower indicating he was cleared to land, or that he should turn base. He should not have turned base without a positive indication from the Tower. He also failed to maintain situational awareness that there was traffic on a straight-in approach, despite the fact that I had received two landing clearances on the frequency. Another error was on my part. I was lax with my scan pattern for traffic and failed to see the Cessna on its downwind to base turn. Had I seen him during the turn, I could have notified the Tower, who could have handled the situation before it became a close call.

You will generate detailed solutions based on the input and output provided and create steps to resolve the problem

None

This report identifies potential human factors traps in the design of the ROZZE.ROZZE2 RNAV Arrival in MHT. They were observed during our flight into MHT. There were no known violations of FAA Regulations. The flight operated normally and safely. The following were observed: on the arrival, there are multiple fixes that begin with the same letter of the alphabet. This could potentially cause the crew to select the incorrect fix if cleared to one of these fixes to join and continue the RNAV arrival. I have noticed this on other RNAV arrivals, and it is a potential human factors trap. I suggest that each fix begin with a different letter of the alphabet, to avoid potential pitfalls in a high workload environment, such as when a crew is issued this arrival while already approaching the terminal environment, thus causing them to reconfigure the FMS automation. Note that fixes 'PNARD' and 'NUUKM' are overlaid upon each other, making it impossible to determine which fix applies to the transition to land south on Runway 17, via 'PURBL', or Runway 24, via 'JSTNN', or land to the north on Runways 6, via 'TEETO' or Runway 35, via 'SHOWZ'. Note that the notes for 'PURBL', 'TESTO, and 'SHOWZ' indicate that the pilot may expect either RADAR VECTORS to the final approach course; reading the notes as written, it is easy, again from a human factors viewpoint, to read that the pilot can expect vectors for one of the approaches. However the intent of the note is that the pilot may be issued either RADAR VECTORS for the approach or, will be expected to fly a transition off of one of the fixes, 'PURBL', 'JSTNN', 'TEETO', or 'SHOWZ'. Again, in a high workload environment, the intent of this wording may be easily misunderstood. The wording should include the phrase, 'expect to fly the transition for the respective approach, or RADAR VECTORS to the final approach course.' ATC verbal instructions should include the verbiage, 'after PURBL', fly the ILS transition for the ILS 17 Approach.' However ATC may actually issue a clearance which very much sounds like a restatement of the clearance to fly the RNAV STAR, verbalizing only the expected runway transition on the STAR itself, such as 'ROZZE2, PURBL, ILS 17.' A pilot may easily interpret this as a clearance or re-clearance to fly the ROZZE2 RNAV with the transition for a landing to the south via 'PURBL' and then expect further instructions for one of the options listed, e.g. RADAR VECTORS to the approach, etc. Also, late issuance of the type of option to fly, e.g. RADAR VECTORS or the transition from the IAF listed on the approach plate, may cause a delay in sequencing the FMS logic in a timely manner. The following are a summary of suggestions to enhance clarification of RNAV STARS, specifically in this example, the ROZZE.ROZZE2 RNAV arrival into MHT: Each RNAV fix should begin with a different alphabet letter; no two fixes should begin with the same letter of the alphabet. RNAV fixes should be clearly delineated on the chart; fixes should not be overlaid so close that the transitions associated with them cannot be clearly identified and understood. Expectation instructions listed on the RNAV chart should be clearly written, e.g. 'Landing Runway 17, EXPECT to fly the ILS 17 transition, or, EXPECT RADAR VECTORS to the final approach course.' ATC instructions should clearly communicate the actions that the pilot is to take, e.g. 'after 'PURBL' fly the ILS transition to the ILS Runway 17 Approach' or, 'after 'PURBL' fly heading ### and expect RADAR VECTORS to the ILS 17 Approach.'

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None

We were in a normal VMC climb to FL340. Climbing through FL300 ATC issued a heading deviation of 10 degrees and a further climb clearance to FL400. We both thought we had heard 'turn left one zero degrees, vectors for climb' clearance and turned the airplane 10 degrees to the left. A few minutes later, ATC queried the crew if they had turned to the left or to the right.At that same time TCAS issued an RA and a descent command. The crew began an immediate descent, simultaneously with another ATC clearance to descend back to FL340. TCAS showed the traffic conflict at 400 FT above flying in the opposite direction. We had visual contact with the conflicting traffic throughout the event and at no time felt that a collision was imminent. Neither the crew nor the Controller could definitively remember which direction was issued. We don't know the horizontal distance between us and the conflicting traffic.

You will generate detailed solutions based on the input and output provided and create steps to resolve the problem

Provide cordinate and request confirmation

This is actually 2 events. First, on the departure off ZZZ1 there were 3 aircraft in trail climbing out: Air Carrier W, then Air Carrier X (aircraft 1), then Air Carrier Y (aircraft 2). ZZZ1 Approach issued Air Carrier Y 250 KTS to keep in trail spacing behind Air Carrier X. Air Carrier Y overtook Air Carrier X despite the speed restriction of 250 KTS. I was training an R-Side Developmental at the time. He issued 270 KTS to Air Carrier X and then I keyed up and issued Air Carrier Y 30 degrees left. We also stopped the Air Carrier Y at FL180, and requested a report out of FL190 on Air Carrier X. It seems that either Air Carrier Y was going faster than 250 KTS or Air Carrier X was climbing at a reduced rate of 220 KTS or maybe even less. We did not ask the pilot of Air Carrier X his climbing speed. Separation was about 5 miles or 1,000 FT, but it was close to being a loss of separation. Meanwhile, another sector called to point out an Emergency aircraft that was descending at a rapid rate. They said he was descending to 16,000 FT. I informed him of traffic, Air Carrier Y at FL180. The emergency aircraft was descending so quickly that the altitude was XXX'ed out. He said that a different Sector was actually talking to him. Called traffic to the Air Carrier Y, informing him that the emergency would be descending through his altitude. The other sector called back to say that the emergency was through 13,000 FT. Air Carrier Y never reported the Emergency aircraft in sight. Be aware of reduced rates of speed during the climbing portion of the flight.

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Traffic Alert Speed Resctriction Averted Re Coordinate traffic

I was cleared for a practice ILS 24 approach. During the approach, my HSI (Horizontal Situation Indicator) directional gyro failed, distracting me from the approach and making it difficult to complete the approach. Additionally, the Controller kept me very high (3000 FT) when the approach normally would start at 1700 FT, for a transiting aircraft at 2000 FT. The missed procedure was simply given as 'fly east.' The actual published missed is 'Climb to 600, then climbing right turn to 2000 direct to the VOR and hold.' Due to the distractions of the HSI failure and the high approach, I called missed before getting to the decision altitude, and executed a right turn, ending it at an easterly direction, at 2000 FT. The Controller questioned what my clearance was, and I said I was told to go east. At no time was I told which direction to turn, so I assumed that he wanted me to fly the missed to the right as the plate shows. He stated that by turning right and then going east I would fly through final. However, since I was at 2000 FT, I was well above pattern altitude and therefore there was no conflict with traffic in the landing pattern. I apologized and requested a return to my home base because of the failed gyro. I should have clarified the missed because the Controller didn't fully describe it, or could have assumed to turn left because that would be the shortest turn.

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Traffic Alert Unusual height for transitioning please update and clarify coordinated instructions

[Air carrier flight] [aircraft X] cleared to land on Runway 4R. C172 [aircraft Y] [cleared to land] on Runway 4L. [Another] C172 [aircraft Z], holding short of Runway 4R at Taxiway F. Local Control cleared [aircraft Y] for take off on Runway 4L. A squelch was heard on the read back possibly indicating that another aircraft was transmitting. [Aircraft Y] began take off roll and [aircraft Z] entered Runway 4R with [air carrier X] within 1/2 mile final. Local Assist advised Local Control that [aircraft Z] was moving. Local Control advised [air carrier X] to go around. Subsequently the ASDE-X alarm advised that Runway 4R was occupied, go around. Pilot [aircraft Z] reported that she read back what she thought was her clearance and proceeded on the runway and was not aware of the traffic on final. I do believe that the call signs of the aircraft were similar. The Controller should have let the two aircraft know that there were similar sounding call signs on frequency and that they should use caution. I think also that after hearing the squelch when the aircraft read back the take off clearance that the Controller should have verified that the take off clearance was for [aircraft X] only.

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Trafic Alert Controller should clarify coordination instructions and update frequency

Departed 36C and issued heading by tower instead of BUCKL8 SID that we had briefed. This heading was given with instructions we would be joining the SID later. First Officer (FO) was flying pilot, hand flying and after given several headings by departure control, [was] cleared direct to a fix we could not understand and was not in the FMS. I asked for several read backs and FO pointed to a fix (CODGI) in the FMS and I assumed Controller was using a different pronunciation than I was used to. I read back CODGI, we selected CODGI, confirmed and activated. As aircraft was turning Controller said we weren't going to the fix and issued another heading for now what we understood was KATSE intersection. KATSE had dropped out of the database during the vectors. Controller then advised 'never mind' and cleared us further south on the SID to BUCKL. 1. Tower changing instructions at takeoff clearance...heading ....instead of RNAV departure.2. Vectors by departure control causing fix to drop out of database.3. FO hand flying put us in a higher workload4. Poor pronunciation/headset/radio transmission by departure control.5. Assuming I finally understood fix instead of getting phonetic spelling.6. Being familiar with CLT and assuming the fix was something given commonly instead of where we were cleared. Get a phonetic spelling when I can't understand a transmission. Which I always do in unfamiliar areas but flying out of CLT so many years lead to complacency.

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None

A B737 and a Dash 8 were inbound from the northwest. The B737 assigned 280 KTS or greater and 100 FT to 'pass' the Dash 8 who was assigned 190 KTS at 090. After the B737 passed the Dash 8, I assigned the Dash 15 degrees left to provide extra space to the Final Controller. Next I assigned the B737 to reduce speed to 250 KTS, then descend and maintain 090. Separation was lost when the B737 descended through 100. We were in the middle of an arrival 'push' and the FLM approved 2 photo missions both at 085 VFR. They were both doing east to west lines from about 20 NM west of the airport. The first was approximately 10 NM going east to west and the other was passing from east to west right over the airport where all arrivals from the north were descending through. I asked the FLM if we could work them in later after the push was over and he disregarded my request. I had to call traffic on each one of my aircraft coming from the north to each of the photo takers and vise versa. This included the arrival RADAR East's traffic because of the path of both photo takers took them east of the airport. During busy periods, the FLM should not approve any non-essential missions that require so much attention from the controller. Having to call traffic so many times absolutely took a lot of my focus off of arrival traffic. There was no reason we couldn't have delayed the photo missions for 45 minutes due to volume, especially when controller makes the request to the FLM. Another contributing factor was whether the B737 complied with the speed restriction first then descended through 100. At the point when I gave the restriction the B737 was 90 KTS faster than the Dash 8 and already in front.

You will generate detailed solutions based on the input and output provided and create steps to resolve the problem

None

I was the instructor for a student on his first solo flight. As usual, we completed 3 full stop landings, then taxied back so I could hop out of the plane and monitor the student's solo landings from the ramp with my hand-held radio. Weather was marginal VFR, but satisfactory for student solo work in the pattern. As we flew our third landing, I noted some thin, scattered clouds near pattern altitude, but away from the airport. There was one other airplane from my flight school in the pattern. I decided it looked good enough for my student to solo, so I climbed out of the plane and he taxied out for his first solo.After the student's first takeoff, tower told to him do 360 turns on the base leg until further notice due to multiple arriving aircraft. He complied, but stated he would do them on the downwind (per my instructions NOT to circle at low altitude with flaps down). Tower agreed and told him to remain north of Runway 8/26 (non-active runway) while circling. Using my phone, I called the tower and asked the supervisor to not ask students to do holding turns at low altitude on the base leg. This is the second time over the course of the last 8 months that I have made a call to the tower for this reason.After 3-4 turns, the student was cleared for his first stop and go. From the ground, I looked to the departure end of the runway and noted a cloud, but could not tell its altitude from my perspective. With the student on short final, using my hand-held radio, I called the tower (on tower frequency) and asked them to hold the student on the ground due to clouds asked for a PIREP. Tower cleared my student to land and he stopped on the runway. The instructor in the other plane from my flight school called back (on tower freq) and said the cloud was well above pattern altitude. I called tower and said we could let him takeoff. The student was not on the runway much longer than was required for a normal student solo stop-and-go. His remaining two landings were safe and uneventful. After the flight, the tower controller called me to discuss the two issues with this event. I explained the safety issue with new students attempting slow, low altitude maneuvers with flaps down, and he agreed to ask for turns on the downwind leg, rather than the base leg. He then told me I should never, in any circumstance, talk on the tower frequency using a handheld radio, and that I could be subjected to fine and imprisonment by the FCC for doing so.Issue 1: Is there any guidance on tower instructions for aircraft to hold while in the pattern? Asking a new student to hold at 500-800 AGL while configured to land is a perfect recipe for a stall-spin accident. I brief my students to listen carefully to ATC and comply unless ATC instructions compromise safety. In that case, do what is safe and communicate what you're doing.Issue 2: I understand the need to avoid extraneous communications on the tower frequency, however, as the flight instructor for a student's first solo, I am also responsible for his safety. I do not think that what I did was unsafe or illegal. My intent was to prevent my student from taking off into a cloud. I only spoke to the tower directly on the radio when I did not feel that I had sufficient time to make a phone call.

You will generate detailed solutions based on the input and output provided and create steps to resolve the problem

None

Aircraft X [helicopter] on an IFR flight plan at 4000, northbound over ABC VFR Checkpoint, declared an emergency due to a transmission failure. He requested vectors to ZZZ for a landing. I assigned him a 090 heading to maintain 4000. I quickly advised the two adjacent sectors and the Tower at ZZZ of the situation and observed Aircraft X turning toward ZZZ and descending. At nearly the same time I observed the limited data block on Aircraft Y and issued the traffic. I believed that the pilot said 'contact' with the traffic and I told him to maintain visual separation. At the same time the adjacent sector Controller, who was working Aircraft Y, issued a turn away from the traffic. The helicopter continued in to land safely at ZZZ. Upon further review of the tapes, the pilot actually said 'no contact' with the traffic. Recommendation, the situation was one in which there was little or nothing that I as the Controller could have done to change the outcome. The Pilot was unable to comply with my control instructions due to his emergency and needed to get to the airport as soon as possible. Aircraft Y was already airborne when the situation developed and was vectored away as soon as possible. My incorrect hearing of the Pilot was almost irrelevant due to the fact that separation had been lost by the time I tried to issue visual separation anyway. Emergency situations can only be seen as a time in which to do your best to keep aircraft apart and get the emergency aircraft to the ground as soon as possible.

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Traffic Alert EMERGENCY LANDING UPDATE TRAFFIC DATA AND COORDINATE with current traffic

We were shooting the LDA DME approach. The Center Controller was very busy and never told us to switch to Tower. When we turned inbound on the final approach course, we decided to switch to Tower at a 13 mile final. When we got to Tower, they started pointing out Traffic Alerts. Then we got a TA. We were searching for traffic, then we got an RA. We were at 11,200 feet and the traffic showed at 10,900 feet. I never saw the traffic. I followed the RA of 'Maintain Altitude,' and the traffic was still coming at us. I decided to do a Go Around and climb away from the traffic. After a couple seconds, we got a Clear of Conflict and then executed the Missed Approach Procedure. We advised Tower and Center of the RA.The cause of the event was the Controller being too busy to handle all the aircraft in the sector and the General Aviation not following instruction from Tower to stay South of Approach Course. I suggest letting [the nearby] airport to have its own Approach Control.

You will generate detailed solutions based on the input and output provided and create steps to resolve the problem

None

A C182 was handed off to me from Richmond Sector 7 miles northwest of OAK for a transition to HWD. I was informed by the C1-1 Coordinator that the pilot was very unfamiliar and was on a 130 heading at 2,500 FT. I instructed the pilot to continue on his heading and 'begin a VFR descent at or below 1,400.' The pilot read this back correctly. A few minutes later, I observed a P180 on a 9 mile final for Runway 27R on the Visual Approach. I estimated that on the present heading the C182 would pass behind and below the P180 at about a 5 mile final. When the C182 was 7 miles from HWD I pointed out the airport to him and he called the airport in sight. I called HWD, and informed them that the C182 was very unfamiliar and had the airport in sight. I terminated radar services on the C182 and instructed him to contact HWD Tower. At this point the C182 was at about 2,100 FT and was tracking to pass behind the P180. About 1 minute later I noticed that the C182 kept tracking towards the P180 and was not descending. I attempted to call HWD twice; when I got them I asked what they planned to do about the conflict involving the C182 and the P180, they asked for a 360 in my airspace, I approved any operation to keep the C182 north of the Runway 27R final. My next call was my first transmission to the P180, I called traffic, and he said he was looking. There was another aircraft departing HWD to the north and I chose not to issue traffic to this target as I considered it no-factor. As the C182 and the P180 targets continued to merge, I told the P180 to stop his descent if he didn't have traffic in sight. The P180 and the C182 targets appeared to merge and the P180 had to climb to avoid. The P180 described the traffic as 'Close,' he indicated that he wasn't aware that there were two targets and he only saw the C182 when they were close. I wasn't aware that the P180 had been given that traffic by Approach Control. The P180 climbed to about 2,300 FT and was unable to land due to his altitude. I instructed the P180 to go around and kept him on my frequency in a right turn for Runway 27R. I coordinated this go-around with Local Control 1 and Grove Sector. The P180 landed without incident. I could have ensured the descent was completed before I transferred the C182 to HWD. I could have chosen to talk to the P180 first and given him a climb in time to safely avoid traffic. I could have turned the C182 on a heading 090 as a guarantee to pass behind the P180. I don't know when the C182 actually switched to HWD frequency or what instructions he was given, but this could have been a factor. It's normal operation for HWD Tower to miss IFR aircraft on approaches to Runways.

You will generate detailed solutions based on the input and output provided and create steps to resolve the problem

None

While working local control at SDL i observed a C172, on radar, on a Biltmore sector VFR tag about 20 miles west of SDL. The scratchpad indicated the aircraft was destined for SDL. The Controller working Biltmore sector (TRACON) called and asked how weather looked to the west and north to attempt to get this inbound aircraft below the cloud layer, I gave my best estimate. I assumed the aircaft was going to request special VFR when/if he got below the clouds. About 10 minutes after the conversation with TRACON, I observed the VFR data tag enter SDL airspace from the northwest, without contacting the tower. The aircraft entered a right downwind for Runway 21 and only contacted the tower when he was abeam the numbers. I informed the aircraft that 'the airport is below basic VFR and to say intentions', the aircaft said, 'I intend to land.' I exchanged several transmitions with this VFR aircraft expecting him to request special VFR, and he never did. In his last transmition the pilot said, 'I am IFR.' Not quite sure how to handle this, as his data tag said he was VFR, and that by this time the aircraft was turning base, I gave him the weather and cleared him to land. When the pilot landed we asked him to call the Tower. The Controller-in-Charge spoke with the pilot who again indicated he was on an IFR flight plan. I still don't know, if he was really IFR or who changed him to VFR. Tracon indicated that he gave the pilot a frequency change in a timely manor so he could call SDL before entering the airspace. The tracon also indicated to his knowledge the aircraft was VFR and was instructed that radar services were terminated just before giving a frequency change. Looking back, it may have been a good idea to indicate to the Biltmore Controller that SDL was IFR, while he should have known this already, he may have said something to the pilot and other questions would have been asked at that time. Also, had the Cessna understood that 'radar services terminated frequency change approved' is not something told to IFR flight in poor weather, he could have questioned the instruction.

You will generate detailed solutions based on the input and output provided and create steps to resolve the problem

None

This event occurred during a skill check. The supervisor is not certified on the position, and I was the CPC plugged in with the trainee. The trainee had Aircraft X on the right downwind for ILS-X at 040. Aircraft Y was on the opposing base descending to 030 but with adequate space to put Aircraft X in front. The trainee turned Aircraft X heading 320 and descended to 035 (the lowest the MVA would allow). This was an inadequate base turn and aimed him towards Aircraft Y, although there was still adequate space for the sequence to work. The trainee gave a late turn-on clearance for the ILS-X to Aircraft X and gave the wrong call sign, so Aircraft X did not respond to the clearance. There was still adequate space for the sequence to work, but as Aircraft X was crossing the localizer northwest bound the trainee issued an ILS clearance with a heading of 050 to intercept (this was not going to intercept). The pilot read back reluctantly but didn't immediately turn because the clearance did not make sense with an incongruent intercept angle. As Aircraft X was not yet turning, separation was becoming an issue. The supervisor called attention to the situation and said, 'Do something.' Had Aircraft X immediately accepted the clearance that did not make sense and at least turned to the 050 heading, lateral separation would have been maintained and diverging courses would have existed. When told to do something the trainee stuttered a couple times and then turned Aircraft X heading 040. I took over and turned Aircraft Y right, heading 280 and eventually heading 030, effectively spinning him. This increased separation which may have already decreased to less than standard, but had allowed Aircraft Y to briefly spill into a 040 MVA.As the 'Safety' controller plugged in for the skill check, I had avoided input as much as possible. I had delayed for too long, however, and allowed the trainee to paint himself into a corner. The situation reached a point where there was no good solution. I may have traded an MVA violation for a LOSS [Lack Of Standard Separation]. On the other hand, the LOSS may have already happened. It was close to 3 miles.I know that as the Certified Professional Controller [CPC], I was responsible for the position. Frequently I observe a CPC telling the trainee what to do, and asking questions during a skills check with a supervisor who's not certified. This was what I was trying to avoid. Ultimately my reservations led me to wait too long to correct the problem.Although everyone knows, or ought to know his role in this type of skill check scenario, it would serve the facility well to brief or pre-brief the session on roles, responsibilities, expectations.

You will generate detailed solutions based on the input and output provided and create steps to resolve the problem

None

During a routine pre-solo traffic pattern flight we had a near mid-air with a Bell Jet Ranger helicopter. The runway in use at Prescott was Runway 30 with the winds out of the north with gusts to 22kt, and visibility greater than 10SM. We had been cleared for a touch and go on 30 from the left downwind. Sometime before turning base tower gave right traffic entry instructions for a helicopter that was approaching the airport from the east (I do not recall the exact instructions that were giving to the helicopter). Soon after we turned on an approximately 2.5NM final I heard the helicopter report right base. The helicopter did not give a distance out, and tower told him to turn back to the right downwind. This caught my attention and I begin to scan for traffic off the right wing tip, and behind the wing. This was where I determined that helicopter would be according to their radio calls. I checked the MFD for any ADS-B traffic, but due to a radar outage any non-ADS-B equipped aircraft would not show on the MFD. The student continued to fly down final. When we were on an approximately 1.5NM final I turned my attention back to our final approach course, as I was unable to locate the helicopter off my right side. I located the helicopter shortly after looking back at final. We were still about 1.5NM out and approximately 500 feet AGL. The helicopter was at our one o'clock and headed straight for us (approximately 150 feet lateral and -100 feet vertical). I took evasive action by pulling hard on the elevator and banking to the left to avoid sudden impact with the helicopter. My best guess is we were 3 seconds from impact. I continued to climb to TPA on runway heading. My student never saw the helicopter.The helicopter pilot then reported to tower that he had a near mid air, I responded that he had just crossed the final approach course. Tower then had him turn back to the right downwind for 30.Other contributing factors were that Prescott tower's radar feed was also out of service, which left the tower without a valuable aid in sequencing aircraft arrivals. This coupled with the fact the helicopter was a transient aircraft that may have not been adequately familiar with the area.

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Traffic Alert Update and Change Possible route of helecopter craft

When [I was] about six miles out from PDK from the northeast, I called the Tower for clearance into Class D airspace. I was told to enter straight in for Runway 20L. Two to three miles from the runway, I was told to change to Runway 20R (number two) and to look for traffic one half mile in front of me and 200 FT low. Unable to see the aircraft, I told the Tower that I was unable to see the traffic and I requested that I do S-turns or a 360 for spacing. Tower authorized a right S-turn and that's exactly what I did. Once getting back on the approach the spacing was still not within a safe limit. I should have initiated a go-around at this point, so I requested a 360. Given that I thought no traffic was on the left side (Runway 20L) I initiated a left 360 because there was traffic on right base for 20R, so to avoid that traffic I initiated a tight left 360. Once 180 degrees into the turn I saw a light jet approaching head on and I took evasive action, nose down and increase bank to the left. The jet initiated a go-around. The separation in my opinion at the time fell to 1/6-1/8 mile and less than 100 FT vertical. The jet traffic on the parallel Runway (20L) was talking to Atlanta Approach and not the Tower at the time, thus he was not on the frequency and I could not hear where he was relative to the airport. Once out of the way, I was cleared to land number one for Runway 20R and landed safely. The jet initiated a go around and announced now to the Tower that separation was not within safe limits and he had to take action as well as myself to avoid a collision. The Tower said everything was fine and that he (the jet) should just make left traffic and re-enter the approach for 20L. Contributing factors were: poor viability due to severe amount of direct sunlight from setting sun, unable to see other traffic. Controllers sequencing aircraft so close that safety was compromised if traffic following is not immediately spotted. Poor judgment calls on the Controller's part by switching runways when aircraft are so close to the runway. [It was the] pilot's error for not going around at the first sign of a very tight spacing conflict [and] pilot error for making a left turn into the parallel traffic. Corrective actions: Evasive Maneuvers, go around by jet traffic. Other thoughts: Training at many flight schools is such that students are not taught to turn on all lights prior to landing (to save money because of the bulbs). I had all the lights on and that is perhaps why the jet traffic saw me and could take prompt action. Schools need to teach to have all lights on regardless of time of day so that an aircraft can be more easily identified in the vicinity of the airport.

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Traffic Alert Update and Change Possible route of craft to accommodate for incoming craft

Aircraft X crossed the landing threshold. Then I instructed Aircraft Y to Line Up and Wait and informed them of Aircraft Z on the approach behind them. I instructed Aircraft X to turn right on a taxiway F, exit the runway and contact ground. After Aircraft X exited I cleared Aircraft Y for takeoff. When I noticed Aircraft Y wasn't rolling, I realized insufficient runway separation would exist so I sent Aircraft Z around on about a 3/4-1 mile final. When Aircraft Z didn't respond I tried another 2 times. I attempted to switch headset jacks within the same communication console. The other Local Controller also attempted to key up and send Aircraft Z around on his communication console, but got no response. During this time period Aircraft X mistakenly transmitted on the Local Control frequency, like they were on the Ground Control frequency, checking in and requesting to taxi to their gate. I again informed Aircraft X to contact Ground Control. The Ground Controller attempted numerous times to get in contact with Aircraft X. Aircraft Z who was on very short final keyed up and said 'I guess we need to go around'. By then I had switched to our backup communication console and was able to confirm and instruct Aircraft Z to go around.Aircraft Z did over fly Aircraft Y still holding in position. I believe Aircraft X had a stuck transmitter on the Local Control frequency in their attempt to request taxi to their gate with Ground Control. Aircraft Z executed a self-missed approach very short final with Aircraft Y holding in position. This created a very unsafe situation. The pilot should have gone around much earlier when they realized an aircraft was holding in position. The transmission power of our Local Control frequency needs to be reviewed. I should have been able to key over the frequency, even with an accidental stuck transmitter.

You will generate detailed solutions based on the input and output provided and create steps to resolve the problem

None

From 10 miles away the student pilot called the Tower and informed them of our position to the east, that we had the ATIS information and that the transponder had not been working. Controller 1's instructed us to report a 3 mile final for runway 24. Shortly after another aircraft, an Archer called and said he was over Sky Acres (44N), which was roughly our position, for landing as well. Controller 1 asked him to report a left base for runway 24 and we were asked to ident, I replied 'negative transponder,' Controller 1 then reported us to the Archer andporting three mile final the male controller gave us landing clearance, which the student read back. On very short final Controller 2 came on the frequency and said 'Archer s-turns approved,' I heard no request for s-turns or reply from the Archer. We touched down on runway 24 before taxiway B and began our landing roll. While crossing runway 15/33 Controller 1 instructed us to turn left on taxiway E without delay for traffic on short final. We read back the instructions and proceeded down the runway without braking, once clear of 15/33, while still on the landing roll on runway 24 and before turning onto taxiway E (between 15/33 and taxiway E on runway 24) I looked behind us to see the Archer in the flare and touching down for landing on 24, the same runway we were positioned on. Turning on taxiway E we applied almost full power to attempt to clear the runway but we were still well inside of the hold short line (still on the runway side) when the Archer rolled past us on 24. A collision would have been inevitable if we had been unable to clear the runway for an unexpected reason, such as a flat tire, or if we had attempted to stop at an earlier taxiway before instructed to take taxiway E, causing a delay, or if we had a slower approach or the Archer had a faster approach and the separation distance was smaller. As the Archer rolled past us on 24 Controller 1 instructed them to make the right turn on taxiway G and to taxi to Juliet on the tower frequency, and then Controller 2 said 'sorry about that, training in progress.' We then proceeded to taxi to the terminal via taxiway E with a clearance from the ground control frequency. The main cause of this near miss is the failure of the Archer to execute a go-around with traffic still on the runway, which was caused by a combination of failing to see traffic on the runway as a possible conflict, and the controller not calling a go-around after clearing the Archer for landing with very little separation. Contributing to the situation that lead to the near miss was not having an operable transponder [in our aircraft], although it is not required in the airspace the aircraft was in, sequencing a slower aircraft before a faster aircraft from a similar position relative to the airport, not informing the aircraft in front of the faster aircraft of the proximity of the second aircraft, distraction of the controller by the Skyhawk from the north making requests and distractions to the controller resulting from the training they were doing. The only environmental factor that may have had an effect was the sun in the west potentially making it difficult for the pilot of the Archer to see traffic ahead of them.

You will generate detailed solutions based on the input and output provided and create steps to resolve the problem

Traffic Alert Update and Change Possible route for landing craft to avoid collision

I contacted Tower approximately 6 NM northwest and requested an established VFR helicopter route arrival from the north. (The route involves descending to 1,600 FT MSL (500 FT AGL) in preparation for a mid-field crossing at the tower location on a heading perpendicular to the Runway Heading with a left turn inside of the fixed wing pattern and a termination to either the Runway The Local Controller was working several VFR aircraft in the traffic pattern at the time of the call. I reported that I had listened to the current ATIS information and continued inbound to the VFR reporting point north of the tower. While approximately 2 miles out from the airfield, I heard a Citation jet reporting inbound on the VOR-A procedure from the southwest. The pilot of the jet also requested a missed approach and a low approach over the runway. The Controller asked if the pilot was VFR or IFR and the pilot replied that he was IFR. The Controller advised the pilot that he would have to cancel IFR and proceed in VFR conditions. I did not hear the Controller issue my aircraft as traffic at any time to the Citation pilot. She did issue the traffic call out to me as I was approaching the Control Tower on the north side of the airport. I expected the Citation pilot to climb to the VFR pattern altitude after crossing the VOR on the south side of the airport in order to make a right traffic pattern for Runway 26. I could not see the jet upon the initial traffic call out and immediately notified the Tower that I did not have the jet in sight. Because the Controller did not respond to my call, I advised the Tower that I was turning east to avoid the jet. At the time of the turn I saw the Citation jet flying right at my position in the clean configuration. The aircraft made no heading correction to avoid me and was actually below my altitude (approximately 1,300 MSL) which is only 200-300 AGL. I hesitated several seconds again and requested clarification of my clearance to cross over the tower and used the words, 'confirm that helicopter X is cleared to cross and cleared to land on the south parallel taxiway'. The Controller replied 'affirmative, cleared to land.' At no time did I hear any restrictions issued to the Citation pilot nor did I hear any traffic issued to the Citation regarding my aircraft that was now going to land on a taxiway south of and parallel to the runway that the jet was going to overfly. As I turned final along the established noise abatement flight pattern for our aircraft, I was surprised to see the Citation jet make a high speed low level pass down the runway adjacent to me. His estimated altitude was less than 100 FT and he was in the 'clean' configuration - gear up, flaps up. His speed was much faster than a 'low approach' airspeed and the configuration was not what I expected for a VFR missed approach to a busy general aviation airport on a spring afternoon that hosts a high amount of student pilot activity. As he overflew the entire length of the runway at that low altitude, he commented that he was 'doing it for the tower's benefit'. I felt that the Controller was negligent in not instructing the jet pilot to avoid flying through the VFR traffic pattern at a low altitude and the Citation pilot was negligent for his impromptu 'air show'. There was no need for the pilot to descend below the pattern altitude once the IFR flight plan was canceled just prior to the MAP. In this situation, he was now VFR and needed to comply with the pattern altitude due to the VFR traffic in the pattern and a helicopter arrival from the north. It was too close for me and my crew.

You will generate detailed solutions based on the input and output provided and create steps to resolve the problem

Traffic Alert Update and Change Possible route of helecopter craft

I was conducting a discovery flight a requested flight following on the ground with a departure out to the southeast of the field near City X to fly over the house of the client. I was cleared to takeoff of Runway XX. On the climbout I was not sure if Tower wanted me to make a left or right turn towards the south east so I asked for clarification. He said 'you're going to the east right?' And I repeated stating we were going to the southeast. He replied back with instructions to make a right turn to head that way. Right as I turned onto the downwind, Tower switch me to Approach. I switched frequencies and began explaining something to the student as I started to cruise the plane out at 1,500 MSL. About 15 seconds after I switched frequencies to Approach, I gave them a call to check in telling them the altitude I was at and the direction I was headed, southeast. Immediately after I called in, I saw a King Air to my right that was supposedly on final for XX. They were on a track towards us but were in a climb. I saw they were climbing so I immediately started descending. After that is when Approach called in to tell me about the traffic saying that I was intercepting the final approach course for XX. When I looked at my ground track after the flight, I did drift slightly right when I was on the extended downwind, but I never intercepted the final approach course. I did not receive notice from the Tower about the King Air on final before being switched to Approach and it wasn't until after I checked in with Approach that they gave me the advisory. The King Air's TCAS system showed that we reached within 100 feet of each other but myself and the pilots in the King Air agreed that it was much more that 100 feet. I overall feel like there was a lack of communication from all parts that could have possibly prevented this occurrence. I personally could have been more specific with tower on where I was going. I could have been more watchful of my track to stay clear of final. The winds were from the northwest so that could have been a factor in why I was slightly drifting. That is why it is important to know where your winds are coming from to maintain a constant ground track along the ground and prevent drifting.

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Traffic Alert Update and Change Possible route Alert craft off updated coordinated flight path

This was a near midair collision between Aircraft X and Aircraft Y at the Denver Centennial (KAPA).Aircraft X was making right closed traffic for runway 17R, doing touch and goes. The pilot in command was a student pilot on their first solo flight. Aircraft Y was a CE-182 departing off of runway 17L. I was the pilot in command of Aircraft Z, also working in the pattern doing full stop landings. APA Tower cleared Aircraft Y for takeoff on runway 17L, and instructed the aircraft to fly straight out. APA Tower instructed Aircraft Z to 'line up and wait' on runway 17RAPA Tower then cleared Aircraft Z for takeoff on runway 17R instructing us to 'follow the Cessna'.APA Tower pointed out traffic to Aircraft X, and the pilot said he had the aircraft in sight.APA Tower then instructed Aircraft Y to turn right and fly westbound to I25, then northwest on course.Aircraft Y incorrectly reads back 'turn left', fly to the interstate, then on courseAPA Tower corrects Aircraft Y and says 'gonna be a right turn, right turn, west of I25 Right turn'Aircraft Y doesn't answer initially and eventually asks if the last transmission was for them. APA Tower says, 'Affirmitive, in order to go to the west you need to make a right turn'Aircraft Y then reads back, 'Roger, right turn...inside of the interstate', which is incorrect according to the clearance. Tower missed the end piece of the readback, but I will say that I was unable to make out what was said until reviewing the recording this evening.Aircraft Y asks tower to verify that I25 is the highway running north to south, obviously still confused.APA Tower acknowledges the aircraft, and says 'affirmative, I need you on the west side.'At this point, Aircraft Y, was quickly approaching Aircraft X who was now on downwind and still climbing to pattern altitude. Aircraft Y was on a collision course for Aircraft X. The radios were silent indicating that tower was unaware of the conflict. I saw the quickly closing conflict, and verifying that the two aircraft were getting dangerously close using both visually references, and ADS-B TIS display, I keyed my PTT switch and broadcasted 'Stop your climb, stop your climb Aircraft X'. The pilot acknowledged that he was stopping the climb, and had the traffic in sight. The conflict was averted, but only by a small margin. After talking to the pilot of Aircraft X after the flight, we estimate that the two aircraft were within only 100 feet or less of one another. This near accident is the result of failure of the pilot of Aircraft Y to adequately follow ATC Clearance, and failure of the tower controller to verify the incorrect read back of Aircraft Y. Additionally, the tower controller failed to realize that Aircraft Y was on a dangerous collision course with Aircraft X.A radar monitor position, with a no transgression zone, and a specific controller in charge of issuing breakout instructions during operations on the close parallel runways at Denver's Centennial airport, could have helped prevent this near accident from ever happening. Additionally, use of better control instructions such as 'fly heading 270', rather than 'fly west to the interstate' could help unfamiliar pilot better understand the air traffic procedures at Centennial.

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Traffic Alert Update Possible Collision Update Current flight paths

A C172 checked on my frequency with the intent to land PRC. I issued standard pattern entry instructions per local directives for the current runway configuration and airspace delegation. The instructions issued were for left traffic Runway 12. A second C172, checked on my frequency from the other Local Control position on departure heading 15 degrees left of runway heading. The VFR departure strip I had in front of me indicated the aircraft was requesting an eastbound departure. There was additional traffic, a helicopter, not involved with this report but was a factor for the second C172. After the helicopter traffic vs. the C172 was resolved, I issued instructions to the C172 to proceed on course which I expected to be eastbound. At this time the first C172 was inbound on the left 45 VFR pattern entry talking to the other Local Controller for descent and landing instructions. The second C172 actually turned to an approximate heading of 010, northeast bound, a flight path that conflicted with the first C172. I continued to work additional in-bounds and diverted my attention from the second C172. Moments later I received a report from the second C172 that they were passing under the first C172 by about 100 FT and that they have them in sight. I acknowledged the report, visually acquired both aircraft, and notified the other Local Controller of the traffic who was working the first C172 inbound. Recommendation, there were multiple factors that led to this event. The non-verbal coordination written on the VFR departure strip indicating the aircraft was requesting an eastbound departure was incorrect. My instructions to the aircraft were not specific enough, 'on course approved, rather than eastbound approved', to listen and verify that the aircraft would comply. Traffic volume and complexity were both building at the time and my attention could not be fully applied to the second C172.

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None

I was flying the 18 DME arc segment of the VOR/DME-C approach to KFCH, between BLEAR and IKOGY. While flying at 2000 AGL, at approximately the 195 radial, TRACON called VFR traffic not in communication with approach, opposite direction at 2500 AGL. I reported visual contact and the other aircraft (another Beechcraft) passed 500 feet overhead. A short time later, TRACON reported the traffic had reversed direction to follow me. I checked and verified traffic at my 5 o'clock position. TRACON called for a turn to the north, by which time the traffic had passed toward my 7 o'clock position. I regained visual contact with the traffic and saw it moving toward my 9 o'clock position, approximately 150 feet laterally to my left and 100 feet above my altitude. I replied that I would be deviating from the route and assigned altitude as required to maintain separation. The other aircraft basically flew in formation at my 9 o'clock position maintaining 150 feet lateral and 100 feet vertical separation for 15-30 seconds, followed by a pitch up and right turn to cross over my aircraft.By this time, I was flying through the final approach course and TRACON asked for my intentions, offering a clearance or vectors as desired. I requested and was cleared for the approach with the intent of a missed approach to the hold. The conflict situation was a significant distraction, and the controller and I did not coordinate an altitude for the missed approach hold prior to executing the missed - however, we coordinated on the go for 3000 AGL.Two things stand out. First, attempting formation flight without prior coordination or communication was an unprofessional act on the part of the other pilot. Second, the best course of action on my part would have been vectors to a new approach.

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Traffic Alert Update Possible Collision Update Current flight paths

I was transitioned to CDW for clearance through Delta Enroute to ZZZ. CDW acknowledged and approved descending transition. Target for ZZZ inbound was BINGG at 2000. Aircraft Y departing N07 announces inbound. Tower advises Aircraft X traffic at 2 o'clock and 3 miles and 12 o'clock 1 mile at which point Aircraft X sights Aircraft Y crossing approximately 200 feet below. Aircraft Y misstated position several times and then passed Aircraft X at close range twice when he should have been clear of Aircraft X path after initial crossing if he were on track.Tower did not clear Aircraft X from Aircraft Y's path nor inform Aircraft X that Aircraft Y was misreporting location. Tower conversations did suggest the Aircraft Y pilot was not following directions however Aircraft X was not able to determine Aircraft Y's position until near misses occurred. Near misses were not fully realized until noise abatement tapes were reviewed along with archived ATC recordings. Aircraft Y did not appear on Aircraft X ADSB traffic nor on traffic display.

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Traffic Alert Update Possible Collision Update Current flight paths

Myself, a Commercial pilot, CFI-I and a Private Pilot who owned the aircraft were flying back into ZZZ and had requested the overhead break approach. The approach controller cleared us for the approach and informed us to report a 2 mile initial for the approach. At the same time a C172 was on the ILS XX at ZZZ above us. When we reported the 2 mile initial for the overhead break we had just passed underneath the C172 and subsequently lost visual contact on the aircraft as they were above and behind us. The tower cleared us for a right break over the departure end of Runway XX and to wait for the tower to call the base turn. I am not sure why but both myself and the other pilot on board misinterpreted the exact location to start the approach. We both believed that we should start the turn over the approach end of Runway XX, even after correctly repeating back the instructions for starting the turn on the departure end. Again, I am not entirely sure why two experienced pilots both misinterpreted a relatively simple instruction, but a misunderstanding between pilot and controller was evident. The pilot who was on the radio asked the control tower for clarification on when to start the break and we were met with no answer. I began the right turn over the approach end of the runway. The control tower immediately requested to know what our intentions were. Again, we asked for clarification on when to start the turn on the break and the tower instructed us to continue the downwind and wait for clearance to turn base. This was where the major mistake was made, as I continued the right turn into the final approach corridor. I am not sure why I made this mistake, most likely due to stress and loss of situational awareness, however I believe continuing the right turn was probably the worst reaction to those stressors as I knew there was an aircraft somewhere near my altitude and on a converging path. The appropriate reaction would have been to turn away from the final approach corridor. We came close to colliding with the C172, although I never had visual contact on the aircraft so I am not sure how close. A few key points that I believe helped in creating the misunderstanding were the clearance for the overhead break. The intentions of the tower and the intentions of the pilots were very different in this case. The tower needed us to extend our upwind and then extend our downwind. We were anticipating an overhead break approach where we kept a tight break into a descending approach onto final. I believe both myself and the tower could have made our mutual intentions clearer to each other to help avoid this near miss from happening. I believe there was also an error with the sequencing of the aircraft. We were brought in underneath an aircraft on the ILS and that led to loss of SA, knowing that we were going to be turning back into the direction of that plane.

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Traffic Alert Update Possible Collision Update Current flight paths

I was working Local Control East receiving IFR and VFR arrivals and departures. The 2 FLMs were having a random personal conversation, not paying attention to the operation during an arrival departure bank. I called Local Control West and received a release on a R60112 a BE1900 that was going to be a left turn to 280 heading. I departed the BE1900 in between 2 arrivals. Once the BE1900 was rolling down the runway [it was] given a left turn 280. The Local Control West Controller shouted out he had 2 close arrivals. I looked at his 2 close ones and said it would never work. We coordinated together, I was going to drag my BE1900 out on a 340 heading and he was going to turn his go-around (an A319 ) left on a 260 heading (our primary go-around procedure), once we had separation I would turn my BE1900 back to a 280 heading. I was unaware the Local Control West Controller was not talking to the A319 the aircraft that was going around. The FLM in charge snapped to and started coordinating. I learned the Final Controller was going to send the A319 around and Local Control West was not going to talk to the go-around aircraft. I ask the 2 FLM's what do you want me to do with my departure? The FLM in charge responded with AHH! I realize that he in not aware of what is going on and I called the Final Controller, as I key up on the landline, I heard him switch the go-around to another Controller that works the straight-out departures. I now know he had no idea about the BE1900, the aircraft the go-around was heading for that was 4 miles ahead of him. I ask what do you want me to do with this BE1900 4 miles north. After he figure out what was going on, the Final Controller said to stop him. I stopped the BE1900 at 8,000 and turned to the FLM's and ask what do you want me to do. I was told the A319 was climbing to 11,000 then 8,000 in the same sentence. I ask about 4 more time what do you want me to do. I'm unable to turn the BE1900. If I turn to the right the BE1900 will hit the mountain range if I turn the left he will be more of a problem with the A319. After several minutes, the A319 turned westbound to get separation. The FLM in charge told me to have him contact 135.5 the frequency for the Departure Controller that works the straight departures. I was later told the FLM that was in charge had coordinated with the TRACON to have the final Controller work the go-around and had the go-around fly heading 350 climbing to 11,000. I don't recall the A319 ever climbing out of 8,000 until he was westbound. The Local West Controller and I had the go-around all worked out. It was a standard go-around. If the FLM that was not paying attention to the operation would have got himself involved, it would have worked out fine. First, ask the FLM to pay attention to the operation. Also, stick to the primary go-around procedures. I'm also very disappointed I asked for help so many times and received nothing.

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None

FLM [Front Line Manager] was giving a skills check on Local position. Aircraft Y was on a right downwind VFR at 3,500 feet approximately midfield to approach end. Aircraft Y checked in on the frequency with Aircraft X in sight. The Developmental told Aircraft Y caution wake turbulence RWY26L cleared to land. I advised the FLM that 'Shouldn't he be telling Aircraft Y to maintain visual separation caution wake turbulence in addition giving positive control instruction and telling Aircraft Y to pass behind the aircraft, if that's what is intended.' The FLM seemed to disagree and also stated that at 3,500 feet there was no way they were going to turn ahead of Aircraft X that was at 4NM final at the time. He also said that TRACON should have done their job and have issued it therefore we were not responsible for advising aircraft to maintain visual separation. Aircraft Y ended up turning base directly behind Aircraft X and turned final about 1.5nm behind and was 500 feet above which degraded to 100-200 feet above (approximately) on short final. I later called Approach Supervisor's desk to ask them and verify responsibility for VFR aircraft and wake turbulence. To which they said since we (ZZZ) sequence VFR aircraft and are responsible to provide the separation. At this point I began filling out the report.Previous to this issue, about 10-15 prior to the skill check, the Developmental cleared a [carrier] for takeoff after being released for what I calculated 4 minutes. We are allotted 3 minutes for IFR release. So I asked the Developmental what time they were released to verify and prevent an IFR aircraft departing outside an IFR release window. The FLM turned around and aggressively waved their hands and said 'Safety only!' I guess as in don't say anything unless planes are going to hit? I understand that training needs to be accomplished but I don't feel comfortable working a supervisory position where spot corrections are mandatory but unable to voice my concerns with the operation. I don't mind allowing time for the Developmental to work or allowing time for the FLM on position to wait to see if the Developmental is going to correct a situation before stepping in to fix the issue, but the FLM was just allowing the Developmental to work without ensuring conflicts were getting resolved. I have spoken with the ATM [Air Traffic Manager] within the last week regarding previous safety concerns that supervisors should not be directly plugged in with a developmental during skill/certification checks. They should look into having controllers plugged in while FLM's observe the position. There have been other issues within the last month among other FLM and other skill/certification check operations. This doesn't appear to be an isolated event.

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Traffic Alert Update Possible Collision Update Current flight paths

I was working LC4 and an A380 was inbound to Runway XXL. We have written procedures for this arrival and I asked the FLM to clarify them so we were on the same page. He told me that the A380 would land Runway XXL, roll to the end, then back taxi down Runway XXR to MXX and then into Ramp XS. The briefing I got in team training stated that he should not stop because when he started up he would blow debris all over the runway and taxiways. That FLM took a break and FLM Number 2 was working TSS and a new LC3 sat down. FLM Number 2 placed the stop sign down in front of LC3 to stop his departures because the A380 would be taxiing on Runway XXR, so I thought. The A380 rolled to the end and I coordinated on the landline with LC3 and ask him to use his runway to back taxi. He said no, he was rolling one more departure. FLM Number 2 said to hold the A380 short of Runway XXR and switch his frequency to LC3. It appeared from my viewpoint that he was clear of Runway L. I thought the coordination was for me to turn the A380 onto Runway XXR. I'm really glad that I asked first, my long ATC experience kicking in. Too many cooks in the kitchen. Not only do we routinely deviate from a written procedure, each FLM/OM has a different interpretation. I can't count how many times one FLM tells you to do something and another FLM comes up behind you immediately tells you to do something different. I understand that in a busy facility we have to constantly change and adapt to situations, but this is getting crazy. Pick one person to be in charge! And heaven help you if you ask a question, you mean you can't read the FLM's mind? Totally unacceptable.

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Trafic Alert Controller should clarify coordination instructions and update frequency

Aiken, SC is one of the outlying airfields used by corporate/charter/GA for sporting events. [This] week there was a high volume of traffic using AIK. I witnessed an aircraft land in the opposite direction of prevailing traffic without making a single position or intent to land call. Also, the 'Ground' frequency advertised on ATIS was actually a Ramp Control frequency. It turned out to be someone in a golf cart with a hand held radio coordinating parking spots. It was nearly impossible to hear him when he was in close proximity to operating aircraft on the ramp. In addition there was an aircraft making practice approaches during this busy time. He was practicing holding at a fix directly along the route that departure vectored us to pick up the SAMMI 2 departure. In the future ATC should issue a NOTAM identifying AIK as a high volume traffic airport during sporting events to discourage practice approaches. The idea of a Ramp Control frequency/Parking Coordinator was a good one. Better execution would put this person away from the high decibel output of jet engines.

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Traffic Alert Controller should clarify coordination instructions and update frequency

I was training a developmental on Ground Control when we were advised by the CIC of an Alert II emergency for an air carrier on about a 6 mile final for Runway 24R with a burning smell. Single emergency vehicle and fire trucks then called for driving permission to their predetermined Runway 24R positions. Both vehicles were given instructions to hold short of Runway 24L by my trainee. As the vehicles were approaching Runway 24L I coordinated with the Local Controller to cross Runway 24L with the emergency vehicles. I was surprised when Local told me he had an aircraft rolling on Runway 24L when we needed to get the emergency vehicles to Runway 24R and I could cross behind the departing aircraft. We then crossed single emergency vehicle at Taxiway S first and a little later fire trucks at Taxiway K, by now our emergency aircraft was landing on Runway 24R. The emergency vehicles proceeded to hold short of Runway 24R not realizing the emergency aircraft had just landed and was holding short of Runway 24L at Taxiway N. Single emergency vehicle then asked if the emergency aircraft was next to land and I told them the aircraft had landed and was holding short of Runway 24L at N. I then told the vehicles they could drive either via Taxiway G or C, which kept them between the runways, to the aircraft. Local then told us the pilot wanted the vehicles to check his right engine before proceeding any farther. The aircraft was still holding short of Runway 24L at N. All vehicles were near the aircraft between the runways on Taxiway N. Fire trucks was told about the right engine check the pilot wanted. We then talked to some other ground aircraft when we heard the CIC yell out about an ARFF vehicle near Runway 24L and Taxiway N as Local had just given a take off clearance on Runway 24L. When I looked towards that intersection I saw an ARFF vehicle at the edge of Taxiway N headed Westbound away from the runway. The AMASS alert system never went off because the departing aircraft had barely started his take off roll. We had then known either a pilot deviation, runway deviation or something had possibly happened. We later learned through all the confusion that neither single emergency vehicle nor fire trucks ever reported verbally clear of Runway 24L after the initial Runway 24L crossing as they should by the LOA. We are now waiting to hear the outcome from all of this. Although the vehicles never reported clear everyone in the tower saw them clear of Runway 24L, then holding short of Runway 24R, then drive via Taxiway G and/or C to the aircraft holding between the runways. We think the ARFF vehicle never should have gone back onto Runway 24L without permission, approximately 3 minutes after the initial crossing and just because they never reported clear of Runway 24L, but everyone saw them clear, doesn't mean Runway 24L is still theirs. And the last clearance given to them was drive via Taxiway G or C to the aircraft holding short of Runway 24L at N. Anytime an emergency is in progress possibly stopping all other traffic from departing or arriving other runways ASAP to allow emergency equipment to get to their positions and continue until all emergency equipment are all clear again. This incident happened more because of aircraft continuing to depart when emergency vehicles were around the runway environment before and after the emergency aircraft landing.

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Traffic Alert Update Possible Collision with emergency taxing vehicles Update Current flight paths

We landed on Runway 15 and taxied onto Taxiway C eastbound via Runway 19 as advised by Burlington Tower. We called Burlington Ground, who advised us to taxi to parking to GA parking at the end of Kilo via Charlie and Kilo. A regional jet landed on Runway 15 after we landed and exited the runway onto Charlie westbound; the two planes were a safe distance apart but pointed at each other.Typically at BTV, when two aircraft are on Charlie in opposite directions, ground control advises one aircraft to sidestep onto the GA ramp adjacent to Charlie while the other aircraft passes. The ground controller advised the regional jet to taxi to the terminal via Charlie and Alpha and then advised us to sidestep onto the GA ramp adjacent to Charlie. There was a work area on the GA ramp. We no longer had space to sidestep ahead of the work area due to the incoming regional jet. The jet was getting too close for comfort for me, so we sidestepped through the work area between two empty trucks, ensuring that we were far clear of any personnel in the area. After the jet taxied past us, we returned to Charlie, not crossing the work area a second time.When we returned to our GA ramp, a Burlington Airport Operations representative was waiting for us. He advised us that we had taxied through a NOTAMed work area. He told us that ATC shouldn't have put two planes in opposite directions on the same taxiway. I told him that we had to move out of the way of the jet heading toward us. He replied that I should have told the controller that I was unable to sidestep. I would have violated my personal margins for operational safety if I had not reacted as the regional jet taxied closer to us.

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Traffic Alert Update Possible Collision Update Current flight paths

I was working the Squib and Sparta RADAR positions combined. The Assistant RADAR position was also staffed. There was Aircraft X flying from ORD to GRR at 13,000 feet. By Letter Of Agreement, Sparta descends GRR arrivals down to 9,000 feet in the Southwest corner of GRR approaches airspace, near PMM. Any GRR arrival from any other direction is descended to 11,000 feet. I think I then descended Aircraft X to 11,000 feet, upon noticing the departure of Aircraft Y off BIV. I the called the GRR controller, to APREQ either a lower altitude for Aircraft X, 9,000 feet or below, and was going to release 17,000 feet to Aircraft Y, so that GRR approach could use their air traffic rules and flip-flop the airplanes in altitude. At this point I noticed a departure off of MKG airport climbing Southbound. This was noticed during the coordination with GRR approach, so I told him I could not release higher for Aircraft Y and queried if 9,000 feet was still approved for Aircraft X. The controller stated in the affirmative and I told the controller I would call back when I had higher for Aircraft Y. I then called the MKG controller and gave instruction for the Southbound plane to be cleared to a point further down on his route of flight Southwest of where this situation was developing, therefore not becoming a factor. I call GRR approach back and released 17,000 feet on Aircraft Y with respect to Aircraft X, whom I had already transferred communications to GRR approach, and the controller read back the 17,000 feet. My traffic and complexity of the sector was increasing and as Aircraft Y checked on the frequency leveling at 10,000 feet as GRR approach was calling on the shout line and my Assistant RADAR controller was answering. I noticed that Aircraft X was descending through 11,500 feet, and due to the fact that Aircraft Y was calling on leveling at 10,000feet, I thought the GRR controller was telling my Assistant RADAR controller that he had stopped the Aircraft X at 11,000 feet and to keep Aircraft Y at 10,000 feet until separation was established. The next update was Aircraft X descending through 10,600 feet and Aircraft Y stated he was responding to an RA. I then climbed Aircraft Y up to 17,000 feet. My next clearance to Aircraft Y was to clear him direct LAN. Recommendation, If all the GRR arrivals went to 11,000 feet instead of 9,000 feet, this problem would have never occurred, especially due to the close proximity of BIV airport and MKG approach. BIV departures should not be climbed to 10,000 feet without coordination with GRR approach when there are GRR arrivals from the Southwest. This solution would as well alleviate this potentially extremely hazardous situation. MKG approach or GRR approach should take control of the airspace up to 10,000 feet in the shelf of airspace around the PMM VOR. This too, would solve this situation.

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Traffic Alert Possible Conflicting Coordinates Update Coordinates and flight paths

While working as CIC, I observed the following incident develop for Local Control, a position in which OJTI (On-the-Job Training Instructor) was being provided at the time of this event. Aircraft X made a short approach to Runway 31 and after appearing to roll past Taxiway Bravo, made a greater than 90 degree turn back to start exiting Bravo. Due to an airport reconstruction project, aircraft are proceeding onto Runway 31 at Bravo for departures and there was an aircraft holding short of Bravo waiting to depart. The Local Controller instructed the aircraft to turn right onto Taxiway Zulu, which is the opposite direction of the ramp, but the only way the arrival could fully exit the runway. Aircraft X did not understand the instruction and held on Bravo, which was not fully clear of the runway. I pointed that out to the Local Controller.The OJTI then intervened to send an aircraft, Aircraft Y, who was just inside a 1/4 mile final to go-around. Aircraft Y did not respond and the OJTI made repeated calls for them to go-around. On the third call, Aircraft Y acknowledged and started to go-around, by which time they had already crossed the runway threshold, though they did not touch down. An overflight did not occur due to Aircraft X holding just shot of Taxiway Zulu, which is still offset from the runway. I then had a Controller relieve the Local Controller and OJTI while also calling the Supervisor working downstairs to relieve me and cover the report as I was minutes away from the end of my shift. I consulted with the Supervisor if we should issue a brasher warning to Aircraft X, who I felt did not follow ATC instructions in exiting the runway. But, the Supervisor declined. The Supervisor then filled out the report as I was at the end of [the] shift.Our ATIS already mentions a fair bit of extra instructions for the unusual closure at Taxiway A. I question if there is more information that could be made available to pilots via other means that could go into more detail about the closer, expected routes, and the required read backs during the unusual set up.

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Traffic Alert Update and Change Possible route Alert craft off updated coordinated flight path

[I was] assigned Local East on a north operation using Runway 36R. Winds are out of the northeast around 5 to 7 KTS. TRACON called and wanted to change to a south 23 converging operation. [We were] departing 18L landing 23 a crossing runway. Landing 18R and departing 18C. I was under the impression the Supervisor did not want to change because of the wind, but appeared to be overridden. The next push began and the wind increased as expected per the Supervisor (FLM). Wind direction was between 340 to 050 and at a rate of up to 12 KTS. A weather area was located south of the airport and west moving east. Jackal transition aircraft which normally depart Runway 18C were moved to Runway 18L. Arrivals were landing Runway 18R and 23, they do not intersect. Aircraft landing Runway 23 were on visual approaches, I do not know about 18R. Terminal Doppler Weather Radar (TDWR) indicated wind shear activity at some point in the push, and I stopped my departures. The FLM had already left the Tower to talk with the Operations Manager and had put a CIC in charge. The strength of the wind shear began at 15 KTS and peaked at 30 KTS. The precipitation to the west of the airport was heavy, possible extreme, with lightning. This cell was very close to 18R. The precipitation to the south was not as strong but intensity was heavy at some point. Departures were turning to a heading of 120 before the wind shear started and then I stopped rolling. My concern is that safety was compromised because of landing with a tailwind of 12 KTS [and] landing with wind shear between 15 KTS to 30 KTS. Converging approaches with thunderstorms west and south of the field. Go arounds would have very little room to maneuver. I am not sure what my plan B would have been if aircraft had starting go around due to the conditions. It appears to be contrary to the safety culture we learned about during recurrent training. The day before I was told that Tech Ops requested the TDWR for an upgrade during the time a heavy precipitation area was close to the field. I was told when they returned the equipment to the Air Traffic; wind shear events were already taking place on the field. The conditions were such that I believe the FAA would have had a hard time defending itself, if an event would have occurred. Recurrent training seems to indicate a desire to avoid such scenarios but it appears to have made little difference. A survey of controllers, TMC, and management might reveal why we continue to do things that seem contrary to the stated desires of the FAA.

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Weather Alert Update Controller Tower and coordinate current traffic

I plugged in to work Position 1 and Position 2 Low by myself. Staffing was a major issue. The Controller-in-Charge had tried to call in overtime, but no one was available until later in the afternoon. (Our only overtime was Controller Z. He had worked the mid the previous night.We had multiple controllers go over 2 hours on position, many without D-sides or any help.The Controller in Charge, Controller Y, worked over almost 11 hours. This is of course well over the prescribed 10-hour shift. He was forced to work Controller A's handoff and D-side while he also worked the Controller-in-Charge position.I was aware of the staffing situation, but at the time I was not aware that they would mandate Controller Y work more than 10 hours in a row. Thus, I was anticipating the loss of another Controller. Position 1 and Position 2 would be going red (or above the facility delineated 'safe' number) in the next 45 minutes. And I knew that I would still be on position.I called the surrounding ZZZ1 Center Sectors XX, YZ, YA, YB and advised them that we were short staffed, and I was going to be on a 'red' sector. As a result, I needed 25 nm in trail to ZZZ Center International. ZZZ1 Center was extremely accommodative. The operations manager at ZZZ Center then came down to the area and began to pressure the CIC Controller Y to relieve the mile in trail restriction. With XX years' experience working arrival aircraft into ZZZ, I did not think that was a prudent decision. The Operations Manager countermanded my request and told ZZZ1 [Center] to disregard my control instructions. I was made aware of this development, and I reiterated to ZZZ1 Center that for safety, staffing and volume I would have to enforce the restriction. Keep in mind that I gave ZZZ1 at least 45 minutes lead time on this development. I was not springing anything on them. All the controllers were extremely accommodative, and I thanked them for their help. Operations Manager came up to me in an intimidating manner while I was working, and told me that I was not allowed to put in-trail restrictions on ZZZ1. I told him to call me on the line if he was going to order me to do something. I wanted any interaction recorded for self-preservation purposes. He did leave but refused to call me on a recorded line. He appeared later and told me that I was not allowed to make in-trail restrictions for my sector. I told him that if he wanted to take responsibility for the aircraft he could, but I did not think that it was safe. I refused to be intimidated. He then threatened me with an investigation and told me that I would 'need a rep.' I told him that I no longer felt safe working a busy sector by myself with the threat of an investigation hanging over my head. [Thankfully], CIC Controller Y assigned newly-arrived overtime Controller Z to relieve me.Operations Manager called the X area and ordered CIC Controller Y page me back to work. I advised him that I would return shortly after using the bathroom. Controllers should be allowed what restrictions they put in place for their sector. There is a culture of fear, intimidation and completely disregard for law, rule and regulation.

You will generate detailed solutions based on the input and output provided and create steps to resolve the problem

None

Flying from ZZZ-BUR we were in cruise assigned by ATC to start a descent from FL220 to FL180. Upon passing through FL215 ATC asked us to stop our descent at FL210, we complied and stopped at 210. Upon reaching 210 we received a TCAS TA. The FO and myself immediately looked at the TCAS screen and started to visually look for the traffic. He was getting closer to our six mile ring and he was still climbing, we saw him on our TCAS inside of our six mile ring and now at our same altitude. It was at this time the we received an RA. The FO immediately disconnected the autopilot and started to comply with the RA. At this time ATC told us to climb to FL230 I told him we were complying with an RA event and we could be unable to climb to 230. The RA initially gave us a command to descend at 3200 FPM and then the rate of descent was increased by the RA to 4500 FPM which was complied with. We leveled the aircraft off after the RA was complete at FL190. We asked ATC if he had any further instructions for us, he said to level at 190 and he would be back momentarily. He proceeded to give the other aircraft that caused the RA a phone number to contact center. The pilot sounded like he was possibly in distress in a potentially hypoxic situation from the tone and behavior of his radio calls and struggle to follow any ATC instructions at the time. We continued to descend into Burbank and now on SoCal Approach were given a heading of 150 and 5k feet which took us right over a mountain that gave us a terrain warning momentarily as we leveled at 5k feet. We cross this terrain at 5,000 often on a vector from ATC we happened to cross right over the very peak of this terrain and with the descent rate down we suspect that the rate of closure was too much for the GPWS. Upon landing in Burbank on the ILS Z 8 we received on more TCAS TA/RA as we crossed over ZZZ1 traffic in the pattern below caused our TCAS to give us a 'Monitor vertical speed' we complied and landed at Burbank without further incident.All events that took place were as a result of other aircraft and ATC vectors. We as a crew exercised all appropriate training to comply with all events.

You will generate detailed solutions based on the input and output provided and create steps to resolve the problem

None

I was working at the Ultra High position. The event was a loss of separation between two aircraft. Previous to this event, I believe the transmitters were struck by lighting, causing tremendous static and a loss of the frequencies. At this point in the day there were numerous cells of weather leading to aircraft on many abnormal routes and requiring diversions around weather. With assistance from my D-Side the RADAR team informed the surrounding sector to use the workload frequency. This increased the workload and complexity during this outage. The RADAR team had to identify which aircraft were on the incorrect frequency and place them on the correct one. Simultaneously, the RADAR team had to keep up with route/altitude requests and keep the computer entries updated in the machine. When a C550 made is request to FL390 he was in a climb profile to FL360 above FL350 in my judgment at the time of the request the aircraft had enough time to clear the Airbus with a standard rate of climb. When I observed the rate of climb was less than standard, I ask the pilot to report leaving FL380. At this point the aircraft's histories were not converging, but a loss in minimums occurred. I recommend during thunderstorms, always use altitude to separate aircraft until a safe lateral distance is established. Do not hesitate to ask for another set of eyes after a major unusual event such as emergency situations, loss of frequencies, loss of RADAR, or immediately following a session of large volume for an extended length of time.

You will generate detailed solutions based on the input and output provided and create steps to resolve the problem

Weather Alert Update Controller Tower and coordinate current traffic

Sector 16 had lost its radios on the mid-shift due to a lightning strike, meaning that 6 and 16 had to remain combined up in order to use 6's frequencies. This presents no problem when traffic is light and controllers can change transmitters based on where the aircraft are in the sector. However, when traffic volume increases, frequency congestion becomes a problem. Add in some weather deviations and the situation becomes unsafe. The situation I was involved in was due to a culmination of all the above factors. When I sat down at the sector it was busy. The relief briefing took about 10 minutes due to the amount of transmissions the R-Side was giving. I took control of the sector and proceed to work the traffic. It was busy, but traffic was flowing. Meanwhile, the URET list began to increase which was no problem as long as nothing out of the ordinary happened. I had two Vegas arrivals coming in over CLARR about 10 in trail. There was a small weather cell so I informed both pilots that they could expect to deviate to the left. My D-Side called Granite Sector at Vegas to APREC this routing and they denied arrivals as requested, and said take them in over FUZZY or CADDY. I then issued them 320 heading to sequence them over FUZZY with another arrival coming in from BTY. Meanwhile, numerous airplanes are checking on, stepping on me while I try to last-minute sequence three arrivals. Then 17 and 38 hand me a stack of Vegas arrivals who, on initial check-in, both ask for deviations. Also, there was a stream of fighters coming from Sector 10, all aimed at a large cell. Each one of them was also asking for a change in altitude or deviations, continually stepping on me and all the other pilots. Meanwhile, the Supervisor was out of the area, which he had been most of the day. When he was in the area, he was giving skill checks to trainees. I am no expert on when skill checks need done, but it was the beginning of the month, not the last day. I was disappointed in this situation for three reasons: I was unable to provide quality service to our customers (airplanes), there was little help from surrounding sectors including Vegas, and a supervisor who is paid to lead was not leading also, the unsafe situation the pilots where in because I could not grant them their deviation requests in sufficient time. I left the sector feeling angry and embarrassed: the flying public deserves better service than what I gave them. I did the best I could, but I was angry that I was in the situation to begin with. There was a CIC. There were other things going on in the area. He should not have been in this situation either. He did the best he could. My recommendation would be simple: the Supervisor should lead, and the easiest way to lead is by being in the area watch what is going on. When I came in the morning and saw that the sectors were combined, I thought that the people in charge would take action to ease the workload of the sector. Senior controllers around me said 'Yeah right.' They were correct and I was left disappointed that we were not helped out more. In this situation, things would have been much manageable if several things had happened. It begins with an active supervisor watching the traffic and being proactive. I saw no reason why Vegas would not take the two arrivals over CLARR deviating. When I was forced to sequence them with the other FUZZY arrival, it created many, many more transmissions that I did not have time to make. Second, the fighter coming from 10 should have been rerouted over IGM. We could have taken point-outs on them and kept them out of the weather and off the frequencies. Third, 17 and 38 could have been courteous and not handed us a stack of arrivals heading right for weather. When uncommon situations occur, such as combined sectors with one frequency on a busy day, leaders should lead. Being pro active would have provided a safer and more efficient use of the airspace. It would also have been courteous of our fellowcontrollers to understand our circumstance and help us out.

You will generate detailed solutions based on the input and output provided and create steps to resolve the problem

None

When I arrived at work for my XB00-XJ00 shift there was a CIC on the Supervisor desk. The area was still combined at the mid sector (XX) except for sector XY which sits 4 inches from sector XX. Sector XY was open and staffed by a Supervisor not wearing a face covering over any part of his face other than his neck. This Supervisor has been repeatedly told to do so, but most of the time doesn't do so. The adjacent airspace was ATC zero for a positive COVID case that had been reported the previous afternoon. This Supervisor often opens this sector between XA00 and XC00 am to avoid going to stand up and also avoid any sort of volume or complexity in the airspace. I understand normally it's not an issue besides that it's an awkward configuration that confuses everyone in and around the area, but today it was much more than that. Today marked ZZZ's X confirmed positive COVID case in X days' time and X [number] in X weeks. This supervisor not wearing a mask and opening the sector to get time was not only dangerous but just plain rude as the controllers sitting next to him were forced to work the other sectors while properly adhering to mask wearing guidance. I wish this was the end of this report however the day progressed to be even worse. During the morning the contingency plan was abandoned and we were told we could go through the sterilized airspace however far 'we felt comfortable.' In fact we were told it would be OK to give IFR clearances off the ground in the sterilized airspace as well. I don't think this is a safe idea. One person's comfort level could be more than a different person's. We don't know how far frequency coverage goes into the sterilized airspace and this could result in NORDO aircraft in conflict in the airspace with no way to resolve the confliction. To add further to this, later in the day a D-side trainee was brought to the area to give an over the shoulder for the resumption of training. 4 people were plugged in to one sector while the same Supervisor still wore his mask around his neck. This put 3 more controllers at risk unnecessarily during the middle of a facility outbreak. This D-side trainee is now fully certified again on all the area D-sides after working a total of 1 week in the past 7 months which presents even more risk both to proficiency and also to proper social distancing measures. After this certification was complete he was used throughout the day and told to 'pick a D-side' at the instruction of the Supervisor further combating any social distancing guidelines that have been set in place by state health officials, NATCA, and facility management.If this is how ZZZ center is going to continue to operate this is only the tip of the iceberg with how much crossing paths there is since the return of normal schedules and staffing. Supervisors do not need sector currency.

You will generate detailed solutions based on the input and output provided and create steps to resolve the problem

None

We were told that we were going to be operating DARC only during the shift and switched back prior to the transition to the heavy and complex traffic later in the shift. We were operating DARC only for ERAM. Sometime along the way Tech Operations came up with a brilliant idea to 'piggyback' the ERAM crossover with a last minute host update/maintenance as well. Piggybacking the two is well known to have catastrophic repercussions, and yet Tech Operations suggested it and the AMIC approved it! As expected there was a problem; a big, big problem! I don't know what exactly happened because nobody will take accountability for the disaster that unfolded. I do know that my RADAR side and I were counting data blocks, and writing and passing flight plans as fast as we could. I don't know how many of you who read this has worked a late night shift or remember what it's like, but I'll tell you, you're tired! I've compared it to running a car without oil at 70 MPH down the highway. Now let's do it for 2-1/2 hours. It's horrible to think people should have to react and work that hard during the middle of the night to cover for others mistakes and poor decisions. For two and half hours we worked heavy and complex traffic without all of the normal tools or staffing we needed to accomplish our job safely. Last year we were assigned an extra person to have the sector split and manned by two people at each sector. Not this year? Money over safety? Instead we had the 'help' of a controller from outside our area of the facility and an ERAM person 'helping' us type in flight plans. Brilliant! If only the pilots and flying public knew. I know we're human and people make mistakes, I just don't understand why we continue to allow the same bad mistakes to be made over and over again. I believe that a lot of the unsafe operations continue to be made during the late night shifts because management is home sleeping. Unless there is a near miss on these shifts we live by the old adage, 'No blood, no foul.' For those of us who were in the trenches it's hard for us to just go home and get some sleep. I blame Tech Operations for suggesting to 'piggyback' an ERAM crossover with a host update when this is known to be an unreliable and unsafe procedure. And I blame the AMIC for giving the final approval to allow it. Recommendation, don't allow this scenario to occur again, because it is known to have disastrous effects.

You will generate detailed solutions based on the input and output provided and create steps to resolve the problem

None

Aircraft X departs north, labeled as a FOOOT departure. I can see the aircraft still headed northbound instead of turning for the RNAV SID when the Supervisor comes over to tell me the aircraft has flames in an engine. [Another sector] calls on the land line and says something like, they called me and asked what heading so I gave them a 260. I assumed that meant the aircraft had checked on with her by mistake and was turning west. I said I'd call Local and stop departures. When I called Local, I assumed they didn't know anything about the aircraft, asked them to stop departures and told them Aircraft X was turning southbound, returning with flames in an engine. They said they knew and they needed to know what heading and frequency to put them on. I was shocked and asked them to confirm that they in fact still had the aircraft. They said yes and asked again what I wanted and to what frequency. I said something to the effect of turn him back towards the airport. When they responded with, we don't know what to do, I gave them a heading and told them to switch to me. I am angry and embarrassed to be part of a system that offers such poor service to an aircraft in distress.The fact that the Tower does not know how to handle an [urgent situation] in their pattern to expedite them to the field is adding a tremendous and unnecessary risk to the safety of the aircraft. There is a reason we are to keep transmissions, instructions and frequency changes to a minimum. Departure should not be forced to get involved in these cases to get the aircraft back to the field. Tower needs training to understand the priorities when handling [aircraft] that need to return immediately.

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Traffic Alert EMERGENCY LANDING UPDATE TRAFFIC DATA AND COORDINATE with current traffic

Aircraft X checked in at the FAF for the right runway. The Data Tag was in the proper position and indicated the left runway. I cleared Aircraft X to land on the left runway. Pilot read back 'cleared to land'. I did not notice the omission of the runway in his readback. I crossed the next two departures across left runway to depart the right runway. I told the first departure, to 'Line up and wait, 28R'. At this point he had not gotten to the runway hold bars yet. At a 1.5 mile final Aircraft X is observed on lined up for the right runway. I immediately told the departure to hold short of the right runway. Aircraft X continued his approach and landed safely on the right runway without incident or loss of separation. The pilot was never cleared to land on the right runway. According to the Supervisor who investigated the event and talked to the Supervisor at the TRACON Aircraft X had been told by the feeder sector to expect the right runway and was initially tagged for the right runway. Subsequently the Finals sector cleared the pilot for the left runway approach and changed the tag to the left runway. The pilot read back '28R.' Finals sector did not notice.The tag direction and scratch pad saying 'LFT' is the biggest factor that causes expectation bias. I never heard that on check in or on landing clearance readback. Aircraft X never read back the runway assignment to me. The only reason I caught this is that his altitude out the window didn't look right for the left runway, and the ground radar clearly showed him lined up for the right runway. Had I not been monitoring the final I don't know if I would have caught it.The problem here started at TRACON, was exacerbated by the final controllers. I missed the first opportunity to correct it when the pilot checked on over right runway fix and the pilot not reading back the runway. Luckily I caught the error on my second chance once the aircraft showed up on the ground radar.I know that a safety review has already been initiated, but the pilot of Aircraft X should be contacted in order to make him aware that the incident occurred and to hear his perspective, and to let him know he was a contributing factor. We should look into TRACON's procedure in terms of what they do when a pilot is told to 'expect' a runway by one controller, and then assigned a different Runway by the next controller. Is there a 'change to' phraseology? Is feeder required to coordinate to the final controller about the previous runway expectation? The main issue for everyone from TRACON to the pilot to the tower is the power of expectation bias. If Finals sector had known the pilot had previously been told to expect the right runway, I'm certain he would have scrutinized the left approach clearance readback more diligently.We already have put up a sheet in the tower reminding the controllers what fixes are on what approach. Knowing the Runway 28R final approach fix and being aware of that I could have caught the error sooner. Management recently required us to monitor the final inside of 1.5 miles based on a previous similar incident. I was already doing so prior to it being mandatory for exactly this purpose. Monitoring the final on the ASSC (Airport Surface Surveillance Capability) is a great improvement to safety in these situations.

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Traffic Alert Update Possible Collision Update Current flight paths

I was working DR3 (Departure Radar) and climbing departures around and over the [Runway] XX final to ZZZ. I am not sure if a TM (Traffic Management Coordinator) was on position but [Initials] was working CI (Coordinator TRACON) and used to be a TM. He came over to tell me that the arrival gate was going to have too many arrivals and they'd need to cross a few over. We'd coordinated any crossovers descend to 15,000 ft., XX arrivals would descend in my airspace to 11,000 ft. and I could use 14,000 ft. until I crossed to climb. This was working well with 4 or 5 crossovers and was very safe. It appeared the arrival controller may have been improperly fed by [Center] and next thing I know, several aircraft were reassigned a north runway to crossover and were at several different altitudes intermixed with the XX arrivals. From my perspective that created a wall of aircraft at multiple altitudes and I had no choice but to stay away. I ended up with several aircraft outside the 20 miles that I share with DR2, outside of that I have to coordinate but didn't have time to. This put me in a situation where I felt I had to use visual to assure separation and was regularly head on with arrival aircraft and making dramatic turns to get climbed above in time. After watching the replay, I did not see any losses on my part, but it was a very unsafe situation. I was told later that the arrival controller was panicking and missing turns and was unable to be coordinated with. Had I known any of this was going to happen, I would not have climbed a single aircraft and would've tunneled instead. I also would have stopped departures.This was my first position assignment after working extremely busy and for long periods of time on position the day before. I was still thinking about a safety event I'd been involved with the day before and would have liked time to file the report and get it sorted out in my mind before working again. This added to a continued feeling of being unsupported and trying to handle an unreasonably difficult situation.We desperately needed a TM on position to handle and coordinate this kind of volume. Something should have been done with [Center] to assure a proper feed or help the arrival controller in some way. When I became saturated with aircraft, it would've helped me to have the departures shut down but I did not have time to do so. This is also something a TM could've done. I would like time to do my report immediately following a safety event so I can try not to bring it into the next day. I would also like to be relieved of position immediately following a safety event, perceived or otherwise.

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Traffic Alert Possible Conflicting Coordinates Update Coordinates and flight paths

Maintenance truck, needed five minutes on Runway XXL and was granted this access while holding short of Runway XY on Runway XXL. Meanwhile, Aircraft X began taxiing to Runway XXL while an inbound was about 10 miles out for Runway XY. The South radar controller briefly called to coordinate something, but then hung up and this got the Trainee and I in a brief discussion about what APREQ [Approval Request] they may have been considering. We were using the correct memory aid to show that Runway XXL was occupied and unavailable, however, our scan broke down and Aircraft X was cleared for takeoff while taxiing on Taxiway D towards D1, as the Runway XY lander was already crossing the Runway XY/ XXL intersection. Maintenance Truck, then reported exiting Runway XXL as he heard our clearance and saw the A320 turning from D1 to begin taking the runway. I quickly verified that Maintenance Truck had exited Runway XXL, and he confirmed this immediately and then Aircraft X continue lining up on Runway XXL and he then commenced his takeoff roll. Training on local control was in progress and I was the OJT instructor.I could have refrained from discussing a theoretical APREQ and maybe this would helped the Trainee and I from having a degraded runway scan that is obviously much more important.

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Traffic Alert Update Possible Collision with emergency taxing vehicles Update Current flight paths

I was assigned Tower CIC position. After receiving a briefing, I took the position. Training was being conducted on Local and the Ground position. I observed Local clear a Cherokee depart Runway 17R. A T38 was on an ILS 17R Approach. Apparently Approach called and wanted Local Controller to change climb out instructions to the T38 to a northeast climb out. I observed the Cherokee tag indicate a VFR aircraft. The T38 flew the length of Runway 17R and started his climb out turn to the northeast. Cloud conditions over the airport were much lower than the weather observation indicated. I saw the T38 enter the clouds and I asked the Ground Controller if the Cherokee was on an IFR clearance. He responded that he was local IFR and I told him that he should have been on an 'N' tag, i.e. The Cherokee to indicate IFR status. The T38 turned slowly and slid to within a 1/2 mile of the Cherokee. The Local trainee was confused what could have been done because the RADAR Controller had issued the climb out. I was told by the Local Control that the Cherokee was supposed to be on runway heading and that would have provided initial separation. The Cherokee had obviously had drifted or turned southeast and that caused the lack of separation. The OJTI did not initiate action to prevent the event from occurring. I believe that the RADAR Controller was not aware that the cloud bases were about 400 FT lower than the weather observation and that contributed to the event. I believe the inexperience of the OJTI was one factor that led to the event. The failure to identify and pre-plan was the main factor. Our airport does not see many IFR situations and the relatively new CPC conducting OJTI was an underlying factor. As Tower CIC, I had just relieved another Developmental who is Tower CIC qualified. I was at fault also because I was not up to speed having just taken the position and should have immediately identified the situation developing. By the time the T38 entered the low cloud base departing, it was too late. The trainee indicated that he/she 'forgets' that he/she can call and coordinate with RADAR to assign another climb out. This however is the responsibility of the OJTI. If the OJTI would have either held the Cherokee until after the T38 completed approach or had the T38 execute missed approach prior to the runway, the event would have been averted.

You will generate detailed solutions based on the input and output provided and create steps to resolve the problem

Weather Alert Update Controller Tower and coordinate current traffic

I had just completed a position relief briefing from previous Controller. A special airspace circle of 5 NM radius was depicted on the RADAR map located on the LIN113012 for unmanned rocket activity up to 15,300 FT. The special airspace zone mentioned above was active. I had taken RADAR on Aircraft X from the Sunol Sector and noticed the aircraft was descending below 16,000 FT; the route of flight went through the middle of the special use airspace. As I was attempting to call Sunol to correct this situation, Sunol called me to inform me that the Aircraft X has not been advised of the rocket activity. I instructed Sunol to turn the Aircraft X out to avoid the special use airspace and another voice gets on the line and says negative, the airspace is not a TFR, we don't have to avoid it. Apparently OJT was in progress. The Aircraft X checked on still on flight plan route, descending to 14,000 FT headed into the active rocket airspace. I turned the Aircraft X westbound for avoidance and advised him why. The assigned vector was barely able to miss the rocket airspace due to speed and position of aircraft when I received communication. Sunol never did inform the pilot of the rocket activity. I gave the Sunol Controller a control instruction which was blatantly ignored. I immediately informed the Supervisor who went over to Area C to address the incident. Apparently, the Sunol Sector had been descending aircraft into the active rocket airspace since it went active, basically over an hour. Nothing had been addressed until I made a complaint. The Student came over shortly thereafter to talk with me. The Student said his/her Instructor was instructing that once a NOTAM has been issued, ATC did not need to or have to advise pilots of special use or restricted airspace because it is the pilot's responsibility to get the NOTAM and miss the airspace. The Instructor went on to explain that it is the pilot's responsibility to file IFR routing to avoid special use airspace. Because the special use airspace had not been designated a TFR, it was not necessary for ATC to ensure the aircraft avoid the area. Apparently the Area C Supervisor agreed with this interpretation as the Supervisor was aware of this situation and allowed it to continue. I asked the Student how he/she would respond if an aircraft was knowingly sent through airspace with active rocket launches and no advisory, and if a rocket hit the aircraft, destroyed the aircraft, killed all aboard and people on the ground. What would be his/her defense? After the incident with the Aircraft X, I instructed Sunol to either vector around the airspace, I didn't care what heading, or leave the aircraft at 16,000 FT. This was passed on to the relieving Controller as well. What is amazing to me is the complete disregard for human life and safety. To actually provide instruction that encourages reckless behavior is unbelievable. To actually provide instruction that promotes unsafe attitude and control actions is unbelievable. To instruct a student to knowingly send an aircraft into a known unsafe situation, especially since the airspace was so easily avoided, is unbelievable. To have an operational supervisor standby and watch it happen and do NOTHING to correct the problem is unbelievable. Why are we even here if this is the type of service that is provided? This conduct violates the public trust. A remark that came out of the Supervisor conversation was that the rockets were small and weren't expected to get very high, so going through the airspace wasn't that unsafe. Size matters where safety is concerned? The designated airspace for this rocket activity was from the surface up to 15,300 FT and not predicated on rocket size. Any size rocket could seriously damage or destroy an aircraft. Thanks to the Area D Supervisor who understood the problem and immediately corrected it. No pilot would want to fly through this type of airspace. No Controller concerned with safety would knowingly send aircraft into this type of activity. Pilots on IFR flight plans expect ATC to use vectors and/or altitude to avoid unsafe/restricted/special, etc. use airspace when needed. VFR aircraft should expect this as well. Another concern is how long this problem had been going on before it got to me. Why were the supervisors on duty at the time allowing this to happen? The Area D Supervisor who addressed the problem was doing other administrative duties prior and had just returned to the floor. I would also observe that FAA is providing not only a serious disservice to pilots, but also to the Student involved in this incident. Students represent future performance and service in the FAA for years to come. FAA instructors should be providing a sound foundation not only of correct procedure but emphasizing the importance of safety. The FAA would have no defense if an aircraft were impaled by rocket due to a control instruction or lack thereof by the FAA and that is the bottom line. What can one recommend when the FAA's operational supervisors are aware of and go along with this type of operation?

You will generate detailed solutions based on the input and output provided and create steps to resolve the problem

Traffic Alert Update Possible Collision Update Current flight paths

I was conducting training on the Radar position. The weather was MVFR with multiple IFR aircraft both in and outbound. We previously had worked Aircraft X for an IFR approach before they entered the VFR traffic pattern. I had been keeping track of their pattern work even though they were squawking VFR. Local Control switched Aircraft X to us without any coordination. When they checked in I observed their radar target 4 miles south of the airport southbound at 1400 ft. On initial call, they reported their position and requested an IFR clearance for practice approaches. We instructed them to stand by because as far as we knew they were VFR and we had multiple IFR aircraft on approaching the airport that needed to be sequenced.About a minute later they called again. They were instructed to reenter the VFR pattern. At this point they told us they were unable to maintain VFR. Noting their position now further south of the airport at 1800 ft in a 3500 ft MVA (Minimum Vectoring Altitude) headed straight for a 2200 ft obstacle, I immediately yelled to the CIC (Controller in Charge) I was [using my authority] and issued a turn away from both the obstacle and other traffic and a climb above the MVA. I then issued an IFR clearance. They were able to after they had climbed up to the MVA and were no longer in danger. We resumed normal operations. After the incident, I learned that Aircraft X had told Local Control that they could not maintain VFR. The controller working Local Control at the time is a trainee currently training on radar and is struggling. He was alone in the tower working all positions including CIC. Their inexperience in combination with lack of understanding of the big picture led them to just switch the aircraft to another controller rather than solve the problem themselves. Had the aircraft taken the frequency wrong it likely would have resulted in an accident, additionally, they should have asked for help when they didn't know what to do. I have many times complained about trainees receiving CIC certification in the tower before they are ready. It seems to be the practice of as soon as they are eligible to train and certify them with no concern for how they might actually perform in the position.The primary motivation for this is they are then useful for staffing. As such this problem is twofold. If staffing numbers were better there might not be the push to use trainees for staffing, which could have prevented this situation. Additionally, I think having a committee vote for someone before training them for CIC would help prevent those who aren't ready from being checked out. Who better to make the judgment than the controllers who work with the individual every day?

You will generate detailed solutions based on the input and output provided and create steps to resolve the problem

Traffic Alert Update Possible Collision Update Current flight paths

Aircraft X and Aircraft Y were both arrivals into MCI. My airspace was from FL240 and above. I gave both arrivals FL240 and handed them off to ZMP Sector 26. Aircraft X was in front so I assigned hem 300 knots or greater; Aircraft Y I assigned 280 knots or less. They were both indicating 500 knots (Aircraft X was descending through FL250 and Aircraft Y was descending through FL310. Sector 26 took the hand off on both aircraft and entered their new assigned altitude of FL190. I issued the new altitudes to both aircraft. As Aircraft X was descending through FL230 for FL190, I noticed that his airspeed indicated 462 knots while Aircraft Y, who was descending through FL300 to FL190 was indicating 503 knots. Aircraft X and Aircraft Y were 9 miles apart with a large overtake. Aircraft Y was leaving FL250 for FL190 and 30 knots faster than Aircraft X who was level at FL190. I increased Aircraft X's airspeed to 310 or greater and stopped Aircraft Y at FL200. This was all done 4000-5000 feet below my airspace! I then had to coordinate with the ZKC sector my new plan since they had the hand off on both aircraft. I also needed to coordinate my new plan with Sector 26 (both aircraft were in his airspace). Apparently, after reviewing the Falcon, ZKC didn't like my plan and told the ZMP Sector 26 to descend Aircraft Y to FL190 and increase his airspeed to 300 knots or less. What? Speed that back guy up and assign him the same altitude as the aircraft in front? There was only 6 miles of separation! ZKC also said that FL200 was not approved on Aircraft Y. I was providing positive separation on these two aircraft and ZKC was trying to be difficult by denying us to use FL200. Sector 26 had to back coordinate to me to tell me this information because ZKC called the sector that should be working these two aircraft. I never received this information and shipped both aircraft to ZKC without incident. This new procedure is flawed and dangerous! Sector 39 is working aircraft 5000 ft. below their airspace for no reason! I am coordinating with two sectors and controlling aircraft that are no longer in my airspace! I had no time to do all of that coordination! I did not hear ZKC unable FL200 or issue the new speed assignments! This whole situation would be resolved if I had descended both aircraft to cross 10 west of PWE at FL240 and shipped them both to sector 26! Sector 26 could have amended the speeds/altitude and coordinate with ZKC themselves on two aircraft that were in their own airspace! This new procedure is unsafe! The high altitude sector is always busier [than] Sector 26 to have this many distractions and restrictions! Critical safety information was missed because the sectors around us don't realize ZMP high altitude sectors are working aircraft in the low altitude sectors! There is no reason to have this procedure! Altitudes are being entered in the data block by a sector that is not working or controlling those aircraft! We are relying on good memory to determine if that altitude was issued or not. There [are] no tools to indicate if the altitude was issued or going to be issued! Unsafe!

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None

MKC/MCI were in a South flow. Runway 19 was the main runway. The Cessna was in contact with Departure East maneuvering about 5miles SW to SE at 4500 on a photo mission. MCI instructed MKC to stop jets at 4000. Satellite South called and gave me missed approach instructions for Aircraft X on a practice ILS to Runway 19. The instructions were 'give Aircraft X standard jet departure and 318.1'. The standard jet departure is turn right heading 230 and maintain 5000. At that time the Cessna was 5 miles SSE and moving east so I didn't think to much of it. As Aircraft X started to execute his climb out I observed the Cessna had turned back to the West and was closing on the T38. I issued traffic and the pilot 'rogered' them but did not call the traffic in sight. I issued the traffic again and the pilot stated that he was level at 5000. The T38 climbed so fast that the Mode C went from 3500 to 5000 in one sweep so I don't know how close the airplanes actually were to each other. I would estimate 1 mile and 500 feet. The Approach Controller should have been more specific in his instructions and I should have questioned him about the altitude restriction.

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Traffic Alert Update Possible Collision Update Current flight paths

While flying to HWD airport, I was cleared to the initial approach fix for OAK and accepted the clearance incorrectly. This was due to similar sounding initial fixes for similar runways while flying in IMC with turbulence.While planning the flight from [departure airport] to Hayward (KHWD) I reviewed weather from multiple online sources as well as received a standard weather briefing via the Lockheed Martin Flight Services Garmin Pilot weather report. Weather at departure, enroute, and at the destination at the time of arrival was all forecast to be VFR.I departed and contacted departure and requested VFR flight following to HWD. While enroute we began to see some accumulating clouds. I began a decent [when] it appeared that we could maintain VFR below clouds up ahead. When it became clear that we would not be able to remain VFR below the clouds, I requested an IFR clearance and to climb above the clouds.I was cleared by Center direct to KARNN V301 SUNOL. When handed off to Nor Cal approach I requested the GPS RWY 28L approach and was given a 320 vector and told to descend to 6,000. I was expecting to be taken to JOBUS which has an initial approach altitude of 5,700. I was handed off to another Controller and told them that I was 'level 6,000, 320 heading, with [Hayward information ATIS code].' The controller told me to maintain 6,000 and that I was cleared direct JUPAP for the approach.While flying in IMC with slight to moderate turbulence, I activated the vector to final on my GPS and saw the localizer start to come in. I told the controller that I was established on the localizer and he responded 'Roger' and that he would clear me for the approach as I got closer to JUPAP.While re-reading the approach plate I did not see JUPAP on the plate. I switched back to IFR chart and began to look for both JOBUS and JUPAP. I could not find either. Soon after the controller came on to ask me if I was 'still heading to Hayward.' I responded that I was.Upon landing I realized that JUPAP is the initial fix for Oakland's GPS Runway 28L. The controller had been directing me to Oakland, not my destination of Hayward.This could have been avoided by me vocalizing my confusion and questioning the clearance to JUPAP. I should not have accepted a clearance to a fix I was not familiar with. Additionally, the controller should have noted that the information I provided was for Hayward. When I told him I was established that should have been another clue that I was not aligned for Oakland. Lastly, I do not believe similar runways, both are 28L, should have similar sounding initial fix names.

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None

ZMP called ZDV and alerted them to the fact that Aircraft X and Aircraft Y are going to lose separation and that Aircraft Y has a lot of speed on Aircraft X. The ZDV person says he'll take care of it. ZMP suggests that maybe one of them can take higher. ZMP Controller calls ZDV Controller and calmly asks: 'What's your plan with Aircraft Y?' ZDV responds: 'Ahhh, looks like he's going to fall behind him ahhhhh just fine.' ZMP tells ZDV that Aircraft Y has 100 knots on him. ZDV replies: 'Looks good over here, but if you want us to do something let us know.' ZMP responds: Yes, I do.' ZDV calls back and asks: 'What do you want us to do with that Aircraft Y?' ZMP replies: 'Turn him behind Aircraft X or change his altitude.' ZDV replies: 'You want us to turn him left? How much?' ZMP replies: 'Do you still have Aircraft X? ZDV: 'Yep.' Why don't you change his altitude then?' ZDV: 'You want him higher or lower?'. ZMP: 'Whatever he'll take.' ZDV: 'Roger. A mysterious voice come on the line, which we now assume is the trainer, 'Those were not control instructions.' ZMP: 'Say again?' ZDV: 'None of them were control instructions. You have to issue control instructions.' ZMP: 'Aircraft X, climb him to FL330.' There was no reply from either 'Controller' from ZDV. A full minute and 15 seconds goes by and Aircraft Y has not started a turn and Aircraft X has not started his climb! ZDV calls and advises that Aircraft X is climbing to FL330. ZMP replies: 'Thank you,' 50 seconds later, ZDV calls and says: 'Change of plans, Aircraft X doesn't want FL330, he's going back to FL310.' ZMP replies: You're turning Aircraft Y behind him then?' ZDV: 'Yep.' The two aircraft passed 7 miles in trail with the second aircraft, same altitude, over 110 knots faster than the front! Without a turn, the two aircraft would have been 3 miles apart at the same altitude!The Supervisor was made aware of this situation and it was immediately brought up to the Operations Manager (OM). The OM's response to this scenario after reviewing it is that the ZMP Controller should have done more, that he should have reached out earlier to resolve this situation! Clearly, the OM's first priority is not safety! I have brought several [of these situations] to [personnel] and he always replies that we at ZMP should have done more. We did reach out to ZDV in ample time for them to correct their separation error and we gave them several suggestions on how to fix it in their airspace! Every phone call made to ZDV was combative, argumentative and unprofessional which could have resulted in an air disaster! We at ZMP have always protected ZDV and their incompetence! The aggression showed by the unprofessional 'Controllers' at ZDV are going to one day result in injured passengers or worse. Their job is to separate known traffic! They purposely tried to provoke and antagonize the controller at ZMP in an attempt to draw him into a defensive argument which would have resulted in two unprofessional controllers with neither one of them doing their job! Luckily, we stayed calm and professional and spoon fed ZDV basic control instructions in how to separate two aircraft in their airspace! Sadly, our OM stands firm that we should have done more. The other startling thing is that clearly the person working the 'Radar side' at ZDV was a trainee. The person training this individual was coaching him to act in an unprofessional and argumentative nature! The Trainer should be held accountable and relieved of his training duties.

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Traffic Alert Update Possible Collision Update Current flight paths

I was working Sector 46, when the Sector 26 Controller walked over and pointed to an uncorrelated beacon target at FL280 in Sector 23 about 15-20 miles east of my eastern boundary headed west. He advised it was a flight of 2 T-38s that someone had removed strips on, and I should watch out since he would enter my sector. I said, 'Point out approved', and waited for either 23 to correct the situation or coordinate with me in the meantime. They did neither, but called me after the aircraft were now well inside my sector and tried to explain why they couldn't start a track. I had a brief and confused conversation with the 23 Controller over it before I finally decided to just fix it myself. I accepted the hand off and about 30 seconds later, the flight checked in and requested to deviate south for weather. I verified that it was a flight of 2 and asked for the destination. The pilot said affirmative, flight of 2, and they were going to DLF. I cleared him to deviate south and when able direct DLF and advise. I put in a VP message with the call sign, and amended the altitude from VFR to FL280. I called up the next sector and coordinated that he was deviating south for DLF and handed him off. This took all of 30 seconds to a minute. I am very concerned about the number of inexperienced controllers and the knowledge and skill level displayed in situations like this lately. Apparently, the whole thing started when a Controller west of San Antonio mistakenly removed the active flight plan on the flight to tag up a VFR flight using that call sign without verifying why there was already an active flight plan and overriding the eligibility check (/OK). Then the Sector 23 Controller was apparently unaware of the dropped track, and then didn't know how to handle the situation once it was called to his attention. It was only the experience of the Sector 26 Controller and myself that probably kept the situation from getting worse and in fact, rectified it in a matter of a minute. Recommendation, the training program at ZHU is completely inadequate, and it is starting to bear rotten fruit. There are CPCs working traffic that have no idea how to handle certain situations, to include keying in flight plans and other basic functions. Situational awareness, focus and duty priorities are lacking because they have been rushed through training due to the Agency's complete ignorance of the coming retirement wave they knew was coming years in advance. In addition, functional training is a disaster and should be eliminated post haste and ZHU returned to a sane, EN ROUTE training program.

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None

Sector XX verbally pointed out Aircraft X at FL370 eastbound, crossing 30 miles west at 310. There was no traffic for Aircraft X at this time. Aircraft had been deviating around undepicted precipitation all evening, which led to increased workload. The adjacent center flashed Aircraft Y, FL340 westbound deviating left ZZZ VOR when able, to sector YY which caused conflict alert to go off between aircraft Y and aircraft X . At this time, aircraft X was out of FL360 descending to 310. I turned aircraft Y 30 left to get some lateral space between them and to keep aircraft Y from turning back on course. The two aircraft were more or less opposite direction, heads up. I thought I heard the sector XX controller say he was no longer talking to aircraft X because ZZ already had the handoff, so I called sector ZZ to ask if aircraft X was maintaining FL350. They said FL350 approved, and I responded saying that I wasn't talking to the aircraft and asked if they were. They said negative. I immediately got off the line, saw aircraft X leaving FL355 so I descended aircraft Y to FL320. Both aircraft started down at a good rate of descent. The sector XX controller yelled over saying that he was using altitude to separate the two aircraft. I told aircraft Y to maintain FL340, however, the aircraft showed FL335 and said they were already at FL320, apparently having expedited in the descent. I reissued another climb to maintain FL330. All this occurred while the sector XX controller was issuing an increased rate of 3000 feet per minute descent to aircraft X to get below aircraft Y. We were both unaware of the other's control actions as there was no coordination between the two of us. I think this occurred because of my inexperience and the lack of coordination between myself and the sector XX controller. Had I Plan View Displayed (PVDd) aircraft Y to sector XX as soon as I could before the two aircraft flashed and referenced the traffic, it would have been a non issue. Also, had the sector XX controller made it clear to me what was happening with aircraft X and that he was indeed working the aircraft, I would have only issued the vector to the south and not descended aircraft Y. My actions were taken on the presumption of sector XX no longer talking to the aircraft, which does not make much sense considering I had called the other center to verify control actions were being taken to separate the traffic and they said they were not talking to aircraft X . I should have realized that sector XX had communications with aircraft X and trusted the controller's experience. Encourage land line coordination as that probably would have kept the entire situation from happening. I should have called sector XX to verify actions were being taken to separate the aircraft, but I did not because hearing the sector XX controller say/yell something confused the situation. Had one of us used a landline when the conflict alert went off, there would not have been a loss.

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Traffic Alert Update Possible Collision Update Current flight paths

While being vectored for a visual approach to Runway 19R at TPA, Tampa Approach advised us of traffic which we attempted to gain sight of at about our 10 o'clock position and below us. We couldn't see the traffic however we had the airport in sight and reported that. At that time approach cleared us for a visual approach to 19R. We began slowing as we intercepted the final approach course to the runway using the ILS for additional navigation and awareness. At this point we were flying at 3000 ft outside of FADDI intersection. We were still attempting to locate the traffic visually but had a TCAS target in the vicinity of where approach advised. I noted that the traffic on TCAS was only 300 ft below our altitude. As we began to configure for the approach and landing we, as well as our jump seat observer, were still looking for the traffic. Approximately 1-2 miles outside of FADDI we got a TCAS RA of 'MONITOR VERTICAL SPEED' at which point [the] Captain disconnected the autopilot and followed TCAS instructions. Our jump seat observer then located the traffic as it was about to pass underneath us noting that he believed it to be a Piper. Shortly after the initial RA, we received a 'CLIMB' RA, at which point [the] Captain pitched up to follow TCAS instructions. This required greater than 1900 fpm climb rate. I monitored his maneuver to ensure he was following the TCAS and back him up. For a significant amount of time, I noticed the intruder aircraft was still 300 feet below our altitude. This led me to believe that the intruder aircraft pitched up and was climbing into us directly beneath us posing a serious risk of a collision. I also notified approach that we were responding to an RA. They acknowledged and asked numerous times prior to the end of the conflict if we can still make the approach. I ignored it until clear of conflict. Because we were already beginning to configure for approach, we already had flaps out. Due to this and the distraction by ATC we encountered a brief flap overspeed by 10 knot for between 5 and 10 seconds which [the] Captain immediately reduced power to correct the situation. Once clear of conflict and in a normal state of flight I advised ATC we would not be able to make the approach and would need to be vectored back around for another approach. The intruder aircraft did not maintain any kind of visual separation and appeared to even climb up toward us while passing beneath us. I do not know if this aircraft was under ATC control or was even in communication with any ATC facility. The floor of the Class B airspace where this occurred is 3000 ft MSL. Although the intruder aircraft was initially below the Class B shelf, when he began to climb while we were responding to the TCAS RA he entered the airspace. I also do not know if the aircraft had clearance to do so or not. With regards to Tampa Approach, when we advised we were responding to the RA the controller asked more than once if we could still make the approach or need to be vectored. This led to a distraction which made the situation for us in the cockpit more difficult.I do not know what can be done about the intruder aircraft because I don't know what his clearance was or if he was even talking to anyone. However, when an aircraft advises ATC of responding to a TCAS RA, they should respond with 'Roger' and standby until the affected aircraft advises no more conflict. Anything more is a distraction. They certainly should not be asking several times if the aircraft can still make the approach.

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Traffic Alert Update Possible Collision Update Current flight paths

The North Satellite airspace light was on-had to protect the airspace. Departed Aircraft X off Runway 9R, was a westbound normal operations would be on a 320 heading after protecting for a missed approach off 9L, since the North Satellite light was on, after protecting for the missed approach I turned Aircraft X to a 040 heading (that is as far left as I can turn while protecting the airspace). Then I departed Aircraft Y runway heading, Aircraft Y was also a westbound, but a jet. During the time Aircraft Y was off the departure end climbing, the North Satellite light went out, and the North Tower called in my ear to tell me that 'Aircraft A went on his own' I was unsure what they were talking about and said say again at least once, then the controller said 'the guy on tango.' It took me a minute to realize they were speaking of an aircraft on Taxiway Tango reference my 9R arrival, there was an aircraft in the OCS (Obstacle Clearance Surface) and my arrival need to be sent around. I sent Aircraft Z around, had to climb to 4000 and fly heading 090. I then turned Aircraft Y to a 320 heading that is the standard heading for westbound on East Flow, and then turned the missed approach in trail of Aircraft Y. Approach control called to question if I turned Aircraft Y to a 320 I said yes, not sure but it looked like they turned the propeller after the light went out so they were worried that Aircraft Y was going to be in conflict with him. I had a lot going on in those seconds that I don't know if separation was lost.The North Tower needs to state exactly what they mean, I have traffic in the OCS (Obstacle Clearance Surface) send your arrival around. And the TRACON should coordinate with the Tower if they are going to turn a propeller off the assigned heading. We are required to not give the TRACON a jet on the same heading as a propeller until the propeller is at least 8 miles from the airport, I gave the TRACON the propeller on a 040 heading, there was no coordination done to tell me that propeller had been turned from that heading.

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Traffic Alert Controller should clarify coordination instructions and update frequency

As FLM, I was quick-looking the sector from another sector due to weather, deviating and moderate-high traffic volume. Sector was split and, although it was not 'red', I put a D-Side in. When Air Carrier X and Air Carrier Y were approximately 60 miles apart and head-on, I noticed Air Carrier X had been given climb from FL350 to FL370. With head-on traffic at FL360 and weather/precipitation in the area, I measured the distance of the head-on traffic on the scope that I was using to quick-look. The climb clearance was a good clearance and did not originally look risky, although it beared watching. Air Carrier X was climbing at a normal rate which was working well to top the traffic but, as the traffic continued, Air Carrier X started to slow the climb at FL366 and stayed at FL366 for a few 'hits'. At this point, I walked over to the sector. The aircraft reached FL367 for 1 'hit'. The head-on traffic, Air Carrier Y, was 20 NM away at that point. The altitude read out then descended and read FL366 again. I heard the Controller inquire about the climb. I told her to turn the aircraft. She issued a 'turn 20 degrees right...correction left.' There was very little time as the closure rate was high and I told her again to turn the aircraft. I told her to give him a heading. She again issued a degree turn. I told her to turn the other aircraft too. She issued a degree heading to Air Carrier Y also at that time. Air Carrier Y had to be turned left/South, which was toward the weather he was deviating around. The sector was split and there was a D-Side working with the Radar Controller, assigned by me. It was not a 'red' sector. When the R-Side Controller and I discussed the event, I recommended the use of an assigned heading rather than a degree turn. That way, the pilot has less to think about and can just enter a heading into their equipment. Also, we discussed how weather/precipitation in the vicinity can affect traffic in unexpected ways. With precipitation and deviations, do not issue a climb with head-on traffic. I also recommended the R-Side pay more attention to the tone of voice. Listening to the tapes, the Controller realized how 'NOT' urgent the control actions seemed. The Controller originally thought that they were using a stern tone of voice. We talked about how, in actuality, the tone of voice was quite pleasant, and did not convey urgency. We discussed the balance of not panicking but letting the pilots know more of the story so they respond how we need them to.

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Traffic Alert Update Possible Collision Update Current flight paths

Aircraft X, a CRJ2, landed Runway XXL and was instructed to 'turn left and contact ground point 8'. He exited, but did not entirely clear the runway. He informed Ground Control that he had a steering issue and was having problems exiting. We had no arrivals for about 25 miles and none were lined up on final yet and no departures ready to depart. Aircraft X informed me that he was trying to exit and I informed him to switch over to Ground Control and that we were aware of his situation. I then informed my Supervisor of his problem. She called Airport Operations and they closed the runway. She took my 'Open Runway' strip and replaced it with a 'closed runway' strip. Aircraft Y, who was having some maintenance problems prior to this now reported that he was ready to depart. I informed him of the CRJ still with his tail on the runway and informed him that he would have to taxi and depart XXR and shipped him to Ground for taxi instructions. Just as I did this, Aircraft X taxied clear of the runway and (I assume) informed Ground Control of this. I visually confirmed this and verified it with ASDE, which was operating in normal mode. I had Ground Control give me the Aircraft Y strip and had him shipped to me so I could depart him as originally intended. My Supervisor then called Airport Operations and told them that the runway was now clear. This portion is secondhand information, as I was not on the phone. Apparently, she told Airport Operations this and they did not indicate to her that the runway was to remain closed until they reopened it. I do not know if this was on a recorded line. My supervisor came and took the 'Closed Runway' strip and returned my 'Open Runway' strip. I then explained to Aircraft Y that the CRJ was off of the runway and issued him a takeoff clearance. I also put the next departure into position. OPS then calls and requests access to Runway XXL. I assumed that he wanted to take it for the usual morning runway checks and told him to hold short and that I was going to depart one more. He then informed me that the runway was still closed. I then granted him access to Runway XXL from D Taxiway. I informed my Supervisor what had just transpired. OPS exited at P3 (I believe) and reopened the runway. I then departed the next departure. At no point was anyone on the closed runway when Aircraft Y departed and AMASS did not alarm. I know that my Supervisor wishes that she would have been clearer with Airport Operations regarding the status of Runway XXL when she informed them that Aircraft X was off the runway. She and I thought the exact same thing, the problem was now removed, and we could now use that runway as normal. I don't know if I could have done anything different.

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None

Almost immediately after assuming the LAW1 position, I heard Final Monitor 3 cancel the approach clearance for a MD82 who was following a B777 Heavy on the ILS 18R approach. Because this was my first cognizant recollection of the MD82's presence on frequency, I did not apply the 'J-Ring' to ascertain distance behind the B777 Heavy, but rather commenced to coordinating the go-around heading and hand off with DR1. The MD82 was assigned a heading of 185 and an altitude of 3,000 by LW1 and this was coordinated with DR1. Within that same time frame, an E145 was told to 'Line Up and Wait' on Runway 18L pending appropriate separation being established with the MD82 on the go-around. The E145 was filed via the AKUNA RNAV SID which would require what is known as an 'inside track' departure from DFW's West Complex after being released by the East Tower because an AKUNA departure would ideally depart the east complex of DFW. Separation requirements between a preceding conventional departure followed by a RNAV 'inside track' departure is 5 miles, and this would have been the appropriate separation between the MD82 and the E145, but the LW1 Controller issued takeoff clearance to the E145 when the MD82 was only 3 miles ahead. This created a 'cut-off' scenario once the E145 was airborne and flying the RNAV departure and I did observe this on the RACD with closest proximity being approximately 2 1/2 miles and approximately 1,000 FT, although I did not verify this using RACD equipment. Recommendation, first, regarding the in-trail scenario between the B777 Heavy and the succeeding the MD82, 'immediate' vigilance on my part as an Assistant might have helped pre-plan the go-around better and be certain as to what separation actually existed. Second, because we were being question by the FLM with regard to distance and actual location of the MD82 when their approach clearance was canceled, in an effort to determine whose responsibility, Tower or D10 TRACON, it had been for separation during that incident, I was hesitant to draw further attention to the Local West position by reminding LW1 that the appropriate separation between the MD82 on the go-around and the succeeding the E145 was five miles, not three miles. But, as I saw the 'cut-off' scenario develop in a more-pronounced-than-usual way, I felt remorse that I had not clued the LW1 Controller in regarding his mistake in calculating separation requirements. In the future, I will A.) Maintain constant awareness and vigilance upon assuming position to eliminate the possibility of 'surprises', and B.) Will absolutely speak up whenever I see that incorrect separation minima has been applied.

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None

As a NE/SE RADAR Controller I was responsible for southeast, east, and northeast bound departures off OKC. I noticed Air Carrier X 'tag up' off the departure end of Runway 17L. At the same time I noticed Aircraft Y 1 mile off the departure end of Runway 17R turning east bound. Aircraft Y had a 'W' in his scratch pad indicating they should be turning to a 260 heading. The RADAR targets merged 1 mile south of Runway 17L at 3,000 FT MSL just as Air Carrier X called initially on frequency. I immediately issued traffic as 'off your right' as the targets were so close I couldn't give an accurate 'o'clock' position. Air Carrier X reported the traffic in sight I issued a climb clearance to 15,000 FT and turn east bound. Air Carrier X later asked if they had done something wrong. The answer was negative. Recommendation, attention to detail by the initial RADAR Controller who issued the climb out instructions would have alleviated the wrong scratch pad information. The Local Controller should have been looking out the window to ensure all aircraft were on correct headings. The Local Controller had the last opportunity to save the situation. A quicker frequency change to Departure Control would have allowed the two controllers aware of the situation to rectify it prior to the dangerous proximity. However, procedures dictate the Local Controller shall not switch the frequency of a departure until the departure 'tags up' on the radar scope. This procedure proved to be more of a detriment than an asset in this situation. The Aircraft Y Controller and I both had to wait as the situation developed as we were not talking to either aircraft.

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Traffic Alert Update Possible Collision Update Current flight paths

The Sector feeding us a 3 aircraft sequence from the east. Two SNA arrivals followed by a ZZZ arrival. The first aircraft, Aircraft Y was coming from the north and they were making that aircraft number one in the sequence, followed by Aircraft X landing SNA and Aircraft Z landing ZZZ. They misjudged the spacing when putting Aircraft Y first and allowed Aircraft X to get to close behind. My trainee reached out to them and asked to slow Aircraft X to 190 knots so that we could build some spacing and not feed the next sector a compressing sequence to the final. Even with this 190 knot speed reduction, it was not enough. At this point we are still not talking to Aircraft X. They realized that the spacing is not going to work so he pulled Aircraft X off the arrival and turned him on a northerly heading. Please note that no coordination has been done regarding any of the aircraft. We thought that they were going to either re sequence Aircraft X behind Aircraft Z or do a little zig zag with Aircraft X to build in a couple of miles in between Aircraft Y.But again we were told nothing by the feeding Controller. So Aircraft X was on a northerly heading for a couple of miles and then we observe the other Controller turning Aircraft X on a southerly heading and it appeared that they were going direct to a fix to rejoin the arrival. Aircraft X was allowed to descend to 7,600 feet by the Controller. This is in the handoff Letter of Agreement between our two sectors that the aircraft will be descending to 7,600 feet. At this time Aircraft Z, the third aircraft in the sequence, has a rapid overtake on Aircraft X. Aircraft X was slowed to 190 knots per my trainee's instructions to the sector and it appeared as if the Controller did not slow down Aircraft Z. So the spacing between the two aircraft was compressing rapidly and a loss of separation was likely. During this time my trainee was dealing with other aircraft and coordination involving a helicopter what was requesting to climb to 10,500 feet and maneuver. When Aircraft X checks in, they are over the fix and are not observed in the turn. My trainee sees that they are not joining the arrival, that they are about to enter a Minimum Vectoring Altitude (MVA) of 7,900 feet while at 7,600 feet and also the Aircraft Z behind Aircraft X is less than three miles with a significant speed overtake. My trainee assigned Aircraft X 8,000 feet and issued a heading of 180. The trainee then issued a low altitude alert to Aircraft X. The trainee chose to keep Aircraft X southbound due to the proximity of Aircraft Z behind. If we turned Aircraft X on a westerly heading climbing to 8,000 feet they would have been dangerously close to Aircraft Y and could have resulted in a mid-air. We knew that the EOVM (Emergency Obstruction Video Map) altitude over the peak was 6,000 feet and chose to climb and direct Aircraft X southbound and to an altitude above the MVA knowing the altitude of the EOVM to avoid an aircraft accident. As soon as she issued these instructions to Aircraft X I called the other sector and told them to move Aircraft Z because we were climbing Aircraft X due to high terrain.There is no way that Aircraft X was going to be able to make the turn at the fix to rejoin the arrival. The turn was too sharp. I do not know what the other sector instructed Aircraft X to do because no coordination was done. This is just my assumption.

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Traffic Alert Update Possible Collision Update Current flight paths

Training on both RADAR arrival positions, H and V. Aircraft Y being vectored by H trainee for visual approach to Runway 4R, handed off to V trainee approximately 5NM northeast of HNL. V trainee turns Aircraft Y to a 220 heading, downwind, and descends him to 060. Air Carrier X departs Runway 8R, turning to a 155 heading, climbing to 050. I tell V trainee we're stopping at 050. V trainer and trainee say they're stopping Aircraft Y at 060. Their courses cross approximately 5 NM South-Southeast of HNL. V trainee then descends Aircraft Y to 015, then goes back and stops him at 030 for inbound traffic. Meanwhile, H trainee turns Air Carrier X to a 260 heading. V trainer sees Air Carrier X turning and asks what he's doing. I tell him he's turning to a 260 heading stopping at 050. V trainer stops Aircraft Y at 050. Aircraft Y asks for the altitude again and V trainer says turn right heading 300. V trainer then issues Aircraft Y a traffic alert and tells him again to turn right heading 300. Meanwhile, you hear a couple clicks on H frequency. You hear H trainee say ' Air Carrier X' twice, but give no instructions. H trainee gives traffic call to Air Carrier X and he reports Gulfstream in sight at which point H trainee tells Air Carrier X to maintain visual separation, however separation was already lost. After both aircraft are separated Air Carrier X uses the words 'traffic avoiding' or 'traffic avoidance' and advises heading 260 maintaining 050. Air Carrier X never stated that he was responding to a TCAS RA, however, he did climb to about 055 or 056 when H trainee was issuing traffic. Along with his wording of the 'traffic avoiding' and climb I believe he was responding to a TCAS-RA, but did not advise of it. Recommendation, H, W and V personnel were assuming each was doing something different. H was under the impression that V was going to keep Aircraft Y above Air Carrier X as he turned westbound. That is what I thought H was going to do as well, even though that was not a wise decision. Aircraft Y would get screwed due to having to fly a 20 mile downwind while Air Carrier X got out of the way as he flew westbound. V thought H was going to leave Air Carrier X on his initial departure heading of 155 and continue his climb after their courses had crossed, which is why he descended Aircraft Y when he did. I made mention that something had to be done with Air Carrier X, a turn or descent, something, but I was not forceful enough. The H trainee had no idea of what to do to ensure they did not hit. Separation was lost, there was nothing that could salvage that situation, however, after acknowledging that the situation was turning from bad to worse, the trainee couldn't say anything and was clearly shaken after the incident. I should have told him what to say since the H trainer didn't say anything. In the H trainee's defense, he did ask his trainer repeatedly what he should say. I should also have told V when Air Carrier X was given the 260 heading, but more importantly I should have noticed Aircraft Y descending and told the H trainee not to turn Air Carrier X, instead leave him on his 155 heading. In short, I should have told each person to wake up and pry these two airplanes apart, and been forceful about it, rather than waiting for each trainee and trainer to get it done.

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None

We were operating on our alternate runway configuration due to winds with an inexperienced crew (and inexperienced feed from approach). We had a string of arrivals from the southwest (normal on this configuration), and a C421 from the southeast. Approach spun the C421 to build space but didn't descend the aircraft. Local Control called to approach to ask what the plan was when the C421 came over on a 1 mile final above 3000 FT. Local Control asked if he could make it down and the pilot replied 'no'. Local Control called approach to get missed instructions and was told, 'it's a visual approach...keep him in the pattern'. Approach mistook the visual approach for VFR and should have given instructions. The Local Control said he would handle it, and started to issue vectors below the MVA. The C421 was in sight at all times as was the terrain, so it was never in danger. By the time everything was over, I realized the C421 was vectored below the MVA, but Local Control really had no choice, except to possibly keep the aircraft doing 360's until there was adequate spacing. Recommendation, make sure approach knows that a visual approach, while IFR, needs missed approach instructions and can not descend over 2000 FT in a mile. Remind controllers that IFR aircraft may not be vectored below the MVA.

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Weather Alert Update Controller Tower and coordinate current traffic

Aircraft Y was on the BOJID1 arrival, descending to 6,000. North Departure splatted Aircraft Z on my scope, [Aircraft Z was] a departure who was climbing slowly. North Departure never called for a point-out. I splatted Aircraft Y on North Departure's scope so he would be aware of the traffic. At this point, both aircraft are at 6,000, with the minimum separation tool showing the two aircraft projected to be less than a mile apart. North Departure did not turn Aircraft Z away from Aircraft Y, so I turned Aircraft Y 20 degrees left to create a little more separation from traffic that was not coordinated to be in my airspace. While I was preoccupied with the Aircraft Y/ Aircraft Z situation, I missed a traffic call to Aircraft X who I had also descended to 6,000 for Aircraft Z. I did not see the VFR traffic right in front of him until the conflict alert sounded. I then issued the traffic to Aircraft X, and told him he could stop his descent. He reported the VFR traffic in sight. I turned Aircraft Y back on course as Aircraft Z was now 1,200 above him. Aircraft X then reported that he had had to climb back up to 7,000 for the traffic. I assume he received an RA and followed it rather than take the chance that the traffic he saw was not the one for which he was receiving an RA. There are several issues causing this; first, sloppy and incomplete coordination. This is quite common at PHL. The North Departure Controller made little effort to avoid my traffic in my airspace and entered my airspace at the lowest altitude I own, climbing above my airspace. How am I to avoid his traffic when that occurs? Second, PHL, unlike any other TRACON I know of, climbs departures out over arrivals. This forces the arrivals much lower than they should be, resulting in turbojets flying 40 + miles at 8,000 or even as low as 6,000 before they even start a base turn for the approach. This exposes them to much more VFR traffic, since quite a bit of this flying is done, as was the case for Aircraft X, outside of the Class B airspace. In addition, there is an enormous need for North Departure to pay attention to the climb rates of departures, especially with the DH8 and A321 departures and in the summer, so that North Departure can top North Arrival's airspace. Last, perhaps the prop traffic should be handed off at low altitudes to the adjacent Approach Control facilities for climb to Center altitudes outside of the PHL airspace. That would have eliminated this issue.

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Traffic Alert Update Possible Collision Update Current flight paths

I was working Meacham South. I had just started talking to Aircraft X west bound on the south airway at 8,000 feet. I descended him to 6,000 feet on initial contact because it was coordinated to leave him at 6,000 feet and hand him off to Meacham North to by-pass all the GKY traffic I was working. Unknown to me, and my hand-off, there was Aircraft Y level at 6,000 feet right under Aircraft X. Aircraft Y was going to GKY, but we didn't see him since he wasn't in hand-off status and there were numerous aircraft tags in the same area. Once we seaw Aircraft Y, Aircraft X was descending through 7,200 feet, and I told him to maintain 7,000 feet. He was descending too rapidly and went down to 6,600 feet then climbed back up. Dallas South turned Aircraft Y north to avoid Aircraft X.The whole GKY arrival push was the busiest I've seen since I've been here, busier than the Super Bowl! The traffic display over-head was completely full of GKY traffic! We needed to open Meacham North, Meacham West, Meacham South, Hand-off Meacham South and AR9. There was no pre-planning for this event at all. ZFW had to stop the corners a couple times for the GKY arrivals because we had too many aircraft landing there in our airspace. We had to slow aircraft to 170 knots on initial contact, and I was vectoring into 2 down-winds. Aircraft were being vectored so many more miles, a lot declared minimum fuel, and a few had to divert to other airports. The south airway crossing traffic (southeast corner to FTW, AFW, etc. and southwest corner to DAL, ADS, etc.) should have been routed around outside of our airspace to eliminate the crossing of traffic and the congestion by GKY. During major events at AT&T stadium, more needs to be done to set flow in GKY and eliminate the congestion around the GKY airport. The crossing traffic on the south airway should not be occurring either. The Meacham positions need to be split and opened a lot sooner.

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Traffic Alert Possible Conflicting Coordinates Update Coordinates and flight paths