Judge_argument
stringlengths 3
11k
⌀ | Respondent_argument
stringlengths 3
6.57k
⌀ | text
stringlengths 43
11k
|
|---|---|---|
Well, Mr. Larkin the Government did not petition for review in this case. | Correct. | <s>[INST] Well, Mr. Larkin the Government did not petition for review in this case. (Sentiment: Correct.) [/INST] </s> |
And it's simply here is a respondent, right? | Correct. | <s>[INST] And it's simply here is a respondent, right? (Sentiment: Correct.) [/INST] </s> |
Is it permitted to raise a separate question from that raised by the petitioners? | Normally, no. There is only one small category of cases where we think that could be done. We think this case fits into that category. | <s>[INST] Is it permitted to raise a separate question from that raised by the petitioners? (Sentiment: Normally, no. There is only one small category of cases where we think that could be done. We think this case fits into that category.) [/INST] </s> |
What's the authority for that exception? | The exception would be where the matter is jurisdictional, and we think that the way this Court discussed this type of issue in the case of Block v. Community Nutrition Institute that it treated these types of issues as being... as the Court said in Block... in effect jurisdictional. The last footnote in the Block case, footnote 4, was the footnote in which the Court said that it declined in that case to resolve the Article III question that was before the Court. The question in that case under Article III was whether the plaintiff's net lawsuit had standing. There was an additional question in that case of whether or not review was precluded under the APA. The Court resolved the case by looking to the preclusion issue and not resolving the standing issue. So we think that both what the Court said in the Block case and what the Court did in the Block case indicates that the Court believes an issue like this is one that can be raised in this sort of matter. | <s>[INST] What's the authority for that exception? (Sentiment: The exception would be where the matter is jurisdictional, and we think that the way this Court discussed this type of issue in the case of Block v. Community Nutrition Institute that it treated these types of issues as being... as the Court said in Block... in effect jurisdictional. The last footnote in the Block case, footnote 4, was the footnote in which the Court said that it declined in that case to resolve the Article III question that was before the Court. The question in that case under Article III was whether the plaintiff's net lawsuit had standing. There was an additional question in that case of whether or not review was precluded under the APA. The Court resolved the case by looking to the preclusion issue and not resolving the standing issue. So we think that both what the Court said in the Block case and what the Court did in the Block case indicates that the Court believes an issue like this is one that can be raised in this sort of matter.) [/INST] </s> |
Even though... even though not jurisdictional in any strict sense of the word at all. | Well, the term "jurisdictional", Your Honor, is one, I readily admit, has been used to cover a variety of different types of claims. For example, sometimes the word jurisdictional is used when really the word authority is an issue. Sometimes the word jurisdictional is used to discuss threshold issues which would normally not be jurisdictional in the Article III sense. They would be threshold issues such as whether or not someone has exhausted remedies in the administrative process. But the peculiar factual scenario in the Block case tends to indicate, I think, that the Court meant that in the stronger jurisdictional sense because there was in fact an Article III question that was presented by the Government in that case. We brought a challenge on that type of ground to the decision below. It was one of the questions that we briefed in the case, and the Court, rather than resolve the Article III issue, resolved this other issue. So that is why, Your Honor, even though I readily confess that we did not raise the issue below, we raised it for the first time in our brief in opposition, and that normally a respondent, of course, cannot interject a new issue into the case. We think nonetheless this fits into that category. And there is another and a smaller reason, I might like to add at this point, why you... Court may wish to consider it. | <s>[INST] Even though... even though not jurisdictional in any strict sense of the word at all. (Sentiment: Well, the term "jurisdictional", Your Honor, is one, I readily admit, has been used to cover a variety of different types of claims. For example, sometimes the word jurisdictional is used when really the word authority is an issue. Sometimes the word jurisdictional is used to discuss threshold issues which would normally not be jurisdictional in the Article III sense. They would be threshold issues such as whether or not someone has exhausted remedies in the administrative process. But the peculiar factual scenario in the Block case tends to indicate, I think, that the Court meant that in the stronger jurisdictional sense because there was in fact an Article III question that was presented by the Government in that case. We brought a challenge on that type of ground to the decision below. It was one of the questions that we briefed in the case, and the Court, rather than resolve the Article III issue, resolved this other issue. So that is why, Your Honor, even though I readily confess that we did not raise the issue below, we raised it for the first time in our brief in opposition, and that normally a respondent, of course, cannot interject a new issue into the case. We think nonetheless this fits into that category. And there is another and a smaller reason, I might like to add at this point, why you... Court may wish to consider it.) [/INST] </s> |
A narrow one. | A narrow one. The narrow one is this. As the Court pointed out in the opinion by Justice White in the Clarke case, the zone of interest tests is principally a gloss on section 702 of the APA. If, therefore, we are right in this case and the APA is inapplicable to the Postal Service, then that is the type of issue you would want to consider in deciding whether or not the zone of interest test is the proper way of looking at this case. We think the zone of interest test has not been satisfied by the unions. | <s>[INST] A narrow one. (Sentiment: A narrow one. The narrow one is this. As the Court pointed out in the opinion by Justice White in the Clarke case, the zone of interest tests is principally a gloss on section 702 of the APA. If, therefore, we are right in this case and the APA is inapplicable to the Postal Service, then that is the type of issue you would want to consider in deciding whether or not the zone of interest test is the proper way of looking at this case. We think the zone of interest test has not been satisfied by the unions.) [/INST] </s> |
That surely is not a jurisdictional argument. | True. That... that's not a jurisdictional one, I agree. That's more a prudential one. And I bring it to your attention because we thought, since this is one of the issues that a court looking at this sort of problem would have to consider that is one the Court would probably want to keep in mind. | <s>[INST] That surely is not a jurisdictional argument. (Sentiment: True. That... that's not a jurisdictional one, I agree. That's more a prudential one. And I bring it to your attention because we thought, since this is one of the issues that a court looking at this sort of problem would have to consider that is one the Court would probably want to keep in mind.) [/INST] </s> |
Mr. Larkin, in addition to the APA problem I guess there's also the question whether the postal express statutes create a private cause of action, and of course you say, you say they don't. Is that a jurisdictional issue also in your view? | Well, there is indication of that in the case that is cited in footnote 4 in the Block opinion, which is the Amtrak case, where in that case the Court resolved a cause of action issue without, to the best of my recollection, resolving a different type of standing issue. So if that case... that case would therefore tend to indicate that a private right of action case, perhaps only where you're dealing with the Government rather than a private party, would at least be seen on that sort of parallel. But I would also admit the Amtrak case did not use the word "forfeit". It didn't say that this was the type of issue that could not be forfeited. Normally, a private right of action issue is not one that you would think of as a jurisdictional issue. That I agree. | <s>[INST] Mr. Larkin, in addition to the APA problem I guess there's also the question whether the postal express statutes create a private cause of action, and of course you say, you say they don't. Is that a jurisdictional issue also in your view? (Sentiment: Well, there is indication of that in the case that is cited in footnote 4 in the Block opinion, which is the Amtrak case, where in that case the Court resolved a cause of action issue without, to the best of my recollection, resolving a different type of standing issue. So if that case... that case would therefore tend to indicate that a private right of action case, perhaps only where you're dealing with the Government rather than a private party, would at least be seen on that sort of parallel. But I would also admit the Amtrak case did not use the word "forfeit". It didn't say that this was the type of issue that could not be forfeited. Normally, a private right of action issue is not one that you would think of as a jurisdictional issue. That I agree.) [/INST] </s> |
Mr. Larkin, you didn't raise this below? | Correct, we made a mistake. | <s>[INST] Mr. Larkin, you didn't raise this below? (Sentiment: Correct, we made a mistake.) [/INST] </s> |
Well, do you know of any other instance where we take up a point that wasn't raised below? | Well, generally the Court doesn't resolve questions that weren't raised below, but for example, if the Court believes it's necessary properly to resolve the case... yesterday's opinion is some indication that the Court will resolve the case at least on a basis that wasn't-- | <s>[INST] Well, do you know of any other instance where we take up a point that wasn't raised below? (Sentiment: Well, generally the Court doesn't resolve questions that weren't raised below, but for example, if the Court believes it's necessary properly to resolve the case... yesterday's opinion is some indication that the Court will resolve the case at least on a basis that wasn't--) [/INST] </s> |
Do you know-- | --argued by the parties. | <s>[INST] Do you know-- (Sentiment: --argued by the parties.) [/INST] </s> |
--Do you know of any instance, other than the one you gave, where this has been done? | Not off the top of my head, no. | <s>[INST] --Do you know of any instance, other than the one you gave, where this has been done? (Sentiment: Not off the top of my head, no.) [/INST] </s> |
Off of any other part? [Laughter] | You've got... the rest of me can't come up with an answer either. And we think for the reasons I have said now and tried to summarize in our brief that it's an issue that the Court would want to consider and proper-- | <s>[INST] Off of any other part? [Laughter] (Sentiment: You've got... the rest of me can't come up with an answer either. And we think for the reasons I have said now and tried to summarize in our brief that it's an issue that the Court would want to consider and proper--) [/INST] </s> |
Well, what is different from that and an amicus curiae? | --Well, we, as a respondent, I don't think, Your Honor, don't have any greater right to-- | <s>[INST] Well, what is different from that and an amicus curiae? (Sentiment: --Well, we, as a respondent, I don't think, Your Honor, don't have any greater right to--) [/INST] </s> |
The trouble is you can't be a respondent and an amicus curiae. | --Correct. | <s>[INST] The trouble is you can't be a respondent and an amicus curiae. (Sentiment: --Correct.) [/INST] </s> |
But aren't you doing just that? | I don't think so. I'm not trying to. I don't want to try to force something on the Court, but-- | <s>[INST] But aren't you doing just that? (Sentiment: I don't think so. I'm not trying to. I don't want to try to force something on the Court, but--) [/INST] </s> |
Well, you won't. You won't. [Laughter] | --But it is... it is the way we looked at the case, and we think that it's one that the Court could decide. And under it's precedents, as I pointed out, there would be reasons to believe that the Court should decide it. Now the issue-- | <s>[INST] Well, you won't. You won't. [Laughter] (Sentiment: --But it is... it is the way we looked at the case, and we think that it's one that the Court could decide. And under it's precedents, as I pointed out, there would be reasons to believe that the Court should decide it. Now the issue--) [/INST] </s> |
Mr. Larkin, in the case that we decided yesterday... I assume you're referring to Arcadia? | --Yes, sir. | <s>[INST] Mr. Larkin, in the case that we decided yesterday... I assume you're referring to Arcadia? (Sentiment: --Yes, sir.) [/INST] </s> |
There, it was difficult to decide correctly the issue that was initially presented, namely whether you needed a conflict or there was field preemption, without first deciding... it bore upon that question whether the field you're talking about was the entirety of FURC jurisdiction. Now, is that same situation here that we couldn't resolve the other issue intelligently without first reaching the APA coverage issue? | I think that bears on my answer to what I gave to Justice White. | <s>[INST] There, it was difficult to decide correctly the issue that was initially presented, namely whether you needed a conflict or there was field preemption, without first deciding... it bore upon that question whether the field you're talking about was the entirety of FURC jurisdiction. Now, is that same situation here that we couldn't resolve the other issue intelligently without first reaching the APA coverage issue? (Sentiment: I think that bears on my answer to what I gave to Justice White.) [/INST] </s> |
Which I didn't understand, I guess. | Well, what the Court in the Clarke case said, that the zone of interest inquiry is best looked at... best looked upon as analysis of section 702 of the APA. It's a gloss, if you will, on the test of section 702 of the APA. And its zone of interest inquiry, the Court said in Clarke, is also far more generous than the type of analysis someone... a court would have to employ under a Cort v. Ash. So whether or not the APA applies, therefore, determines to some extent the type of analysis you have to follow. | <s>[INST] Which I didn't understand, I guess. (Sentiment: Well, what the Court in the Clarke case said, that the zone of interest inquiry is best looked at... best looked upon as analysis of section 702 of the APA. It's a gloss, if you will, on the test of section 702 of the APA. And its zone of interest inquiry, the Court said in Clarke, is also far more generous than the type of analysis someone... a court would have to employ under a Cort v. Ash. So whether or not the APA applies, therefore, determines to some extent the type of analysis you have to follow.) [/INST] </s> |
Well, we'd still decide the zone of interest thing the same way. I mean, we wouldn't... it wouldn't affect how we came out on this zone of interest issue. | Well, I-- | <s>[INST] Well, we'd still decide the zone of interest thing the same way. I mean, we wouldn't... it wouldn't affect how we came out on this zone of interest issue. (Sentiment: Well, I--) [/INST] </s> |
All you're saying is that the zone of interest test maybe shouldn't be applied, but we could... we would still apply it correctly even though it might be unnecessary. | --Well, you... the zone of interest test wouldn't be applied differently, but as you say, you may or may not want to apply it. Now, in our view they haven't satisfied the zone of interest test. The private express statutes are the relevant statutes to look to in this sort of context, and the unions cannot make out a satisfactory showing that they are within the zone of interest of the private express statutes. For that reason I believe the unions have in part also tried to raise what they call a common law, non-statutory type of claim. Now, this Court has in some limited circumstances allowed that type of showing to be sufficient, basically in two types of circumstances. One is where someone can satisfy the prerequisites for obtaining mandamus. That the unions cannot do here. In fact, they've made no real effort to try to satisfy the strict requirements for mandamus. And the other is best illustrated by the Court's discussion in the case of Stark v. Wickard... is a situation in which Congress has implicitly granted someone the right to bring a suit. That also is not the type of showing that we think the unions can make out. That is essentially the type of showing a union would have to make out to satisfy the Cort v. Ash test, and we don't think they can satisfy that very strict showing. So if you look at it as a matter of the zone of interests analysis, we don't the unions can satisfy that. They can't show that they are within the zone of interest. And to be perfectly candid, I think no one is within the zone of interest except the Postal Service. The purpose of the private express statutes was to protect the Postal Service's ability to obtain sufficient revenue so that it could serve the Nation at a uniform rate. It wasn't designed to protect the unions or postal employees, which... and the concept of postal employees unions would have been unheard of in 1845, when the statutes essentially took their current shape... and the statutes weren't designed to protect anyone else. It was designed basically to protect the union... excuse me, the Postal Service and, therefore, the public as a whole. So therefore, it's really the Postal Service that fits within the... the zone of interest of the private express statutes. And as we've explained in our brief and I've tried to summarize here, the unions also cannot satisfy the necessary prerequisites for making out an implied right of action. If I can, then, I'd like to say a few words about the merits of the case in the remaining time. And that is this. We think that this record here is an excellent example of precisely how Congress intended the rule-making process to operate. The Postal Service started out with a rule, a proposed rule, in which it believe that the international remailing practice was unlawful. After hearing from considerable commentary by both members of the public and... as well as other Government officials, the Postal Service changed its mind in reliance on those comments and ultimately adopted the international remailing rule. The unions have, I think, essentially two arguments that they've made to try to criticize the Postal Service in this case. The first is that the rule is not likely to benefit the public as a whole and is likely to benefit those businesses that engage in international business. I think that's a misdirected inquiry. The question is not whether the entire public can make use of a suspension, but is whether the suspension will benefit the public. In this case, the Postal Service concluded that it would for a variety of reasons benefit the public, and that was based upon information from parties not only in the private sector, as I said, but also from Secretary of Commerce, the Chairman of the President's Council of Economic Advisors, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, and the Attorney General of the United States. Those comments indicated that this will help American businesses sell goods overseas, which is in the public interest. The second challenge that the unions have raised is that the postal service did not adequately consider the potential revenue effect of the suspension on its ability to serve the public as a whole. And we think that criticism is unfair. The Postal Service admitted both at the out-- | <s>[INST] All you're saying is that the zone of interest test maybe shouldn't be applied, but we could... we would still apply it correctly even though it might be unnecessary. (Sentiment: --Well, you... the zone of interest test wouldn't be applied differently, but as you say, you may or may not want to apply it. Now, in our view they haven't satisfied the zone of interest test. The private express statutes are the relevant statutes to look to in this sort of context, and the unions cannot make out a satisfactory showing that they are within the zone of interest of the private express statutes. For that reason I believe the unions have in part also tried to raise what they call a common law, non-statutory type of claim. Now, this Court has in some limited circumstances allowed that type of showing to be sufficient, basically in two types of circumstances. One is where someone can satisfy the prerequisites for obtaining mandamus. That the unions cannot do here. In fact, they've made no real effort to try to satisfy the strict requirements for mandamus. And the other is best illustrated by the Court's discussion in the case of Stark v. Wickard... is a situation in which Congress has implicitly granted someone the right to bring a suit. That also is not the type of showing that we think the unions can make out. That is essentially the type of showing a union would have to make out to satisfy the Cort v. Ash test, and we don't think they can satisfy that very strict showing. So if you look at it as a matter of the zone of interests analysis, we don't the unions can satisfy that. They can't show that they are within the zone of interest. And to be perfectly candid, I think no one is within the zone of interest except the Postal Service. The purpose of the private express statutes was to protect the Postal Service's ability to obtain sufficient revenue so that it could serve the Nation at a uniform rate. It wasn't designed to protect the unions or postal employees, which... and the concept of postal employees unions would have been unheard of in 1845, when the statutes essentially took their current shape... and the statutes weren't designed to protect anyone else. It was designed basically to protect the union... excuse me, the Postal Service and, therefore, the public as a whole. So therefore, it's really the Postal Service that fits within the... the zone of interest of the private express statutes. And as we've explained in our brief and I've tried to summarize here, the unions also cannot satisfy the necessary prerequisites for making out an implied right of action. If I can, then, I'd like to say a few words about the merits of the case in the remaining time. And that is this. We think that this record here is an excellent example of precisely how Congress intended the rule-making process to operate. The Postal Service started out with a rule, a proposed rule, in which it believe that the international remailing practice was unlawful. After hearing from considerable commentary by both members of the public and... as well as other Government officials, the Postal Service changed its mind in reliance on those comments and ultimately adopted the international remailing rule. The unions have, I think, essentially two arguments that they've made to try to criticize the Postal Service in this case. The first is that the rule is not likely to benefit the public as a whole and is likely to benefit those businesses that engage in international business. I think that's a misdirected inquiry. The question is not whether the entire public can make use of a suspension, but is whether the suspension will benefit the public. In this case, the Postal Service concluded that it would for a variety of reasons benefit the public, and that was based upon information from parties not only in the private sector, as I said, but also from Secretary of Commerce, the Chairman of the President's Council of Economic Advisors, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, and the Attorney General of the United States. Those comments indicated that this will help American businesses sell goods overseas, which is in the public interest. The second challenge that the unions have raised is that the postal service did not adequately consider the potential revenue effect of the suspension on its ability to serve the public as a whole. And we think that criticism is unfair. The Postal Service admitted both at the out--) [/INST] </s> |
Well, maybe it's right? | --No, it's not. It's worse than not right. It's unfair. The Postal Service at the outset and at the conclusion of the process admitted that it did not have the hard data that it would have liked. It asked the public for that data, but it wasn't forthcoming. The Postal Service therefore faced a decision, because making no decision... that is, not adopting a suspension or deferring a suspension would be as much of a decision as allowing suspension to go into effect. What the Postal Service did was use a worst-case scenario. It took a very high over-estimate of the potential loss that it would suffer, and using that over-estimate of its potential loss, nonetheless came to the conclusion that the potential benefits out weighed the potential loss. And that's not an irrational result. Under a public interest standard, an agency is entitled to make that sort of assessment, particularly since the agency has the ability over time to monitor the situation. If in fact it were to prove that this would be too financially debilitating, the Postal Service would have the ability to modify the suspension or repeal it entire... in its entirety. But what the respondents would have us do in this case is, in the absence of complete and perfect data, take no action at all, basically to stymie the agency until it had the type of data that, I'm told by the Postal Service, it really can't ever get. In those circumstances, that would simply be forcing upon the Postal Service a rule that's inconsistent with this Court's decisions in cases such as Listeners Guild. For these sorts of reasons and the ones laid out in our brief, we ask the Court to uphold the Postal Service's decision in this case on the ground that it was eminently reasonable and satisfied all of the requirements of the APA. | <s>[INST] Well, maybe it's right? (Sentiment: --No, it's not. It's worse than not right. It's unfair. The Postal Service at the outset and at the conclusion of the process admitted that it did not have the hard data that it would have liked. It asked the public for that data, but it wasn't forthcoming. The Postal Service therefore faced a decision, because making no decision... that is, not adopting a suspension or deferring a suspension would be as much of a decision as allowing suspension to go into effect. What the Postal Service did was use a worst-case scenario. It took a very high over-estimate of the potential loss that it would suffer, and using that over-estimate of its potential loss, nonetheless came to the conclusion that the potential benefits out weighed the potential loss. And that's not an irrational result. Under a public interest standard, an agency is entitled to make that sort of assessment, particularly since the agency has the ability over time to monitor the situation. If in fact it were to prove that this would be too financially debilitating, the Postal Service would have the ability to modify the suspension or repeal it entire... in its entirety. But what the respondents would have us do in this case is, in the absence of complete and perfect data, take no action at all, basically to stymie the agency until it had the type of data that, I'm told by the Postal Service, it really can't ever get. In those circumstances, that would simply be forcing upon the Postal Service a rule that's inconsistent with this Court's decisions in cases such as Listeners Guild. For these sorts of reasons and the ones laid out in our brief, we ask the Court to uphold the Postal Service's decision in this case on the ground that it was eminently reasonable and satisfied all of the requirements of the APA.) [/INST] </s> |
But you don't have to give reasons not to adopt a rule, do you? You have to give reasons to adopt one, and that's, I guess, if you have no data, you don't adopt. | Well, you had a request in this case and you had a difference of opinion between some officials in the Executive Branch and the Postal Service over whether or not for example this was a practice that could be conducted under the regulations that existed beginning in 1979. The Postal Service included its most forthright way of resolving this problem was to go ahead and adopt a regulation setting forth its considered view of the matter. And in that circumstance, we believe that what they did was eminently reasonable. Now, maybe they could have done nothing, but it would have left this cloud, as Chairman McKean said. They thought that the most responsible thing for the agency to do was to dissipate that cloud. Thank you. | <s>[INST] But you don't have to give reasons not to adopt a rule, do you? You have to give reasons to adopt one, and that's, I guess, if you have no data, you don't adopt. (Sentiment: Well, you had a request in this case and you had a difference of opinion between some officials in the Executive Branch and the Postal Service over whether or not for example this was a practice that could be conducted under the regulations that existed beginning in 1979. The Postal Service included its most forthright way of resolving this problem was to go ahead and adopt a regulation setting forth its considered view of the matter. And in that circumstance, we believe that what they did was eminently reasonable. Now, maybe they could have done nothing, but it would have left this cloud, as Chairman McKean said. They thought that the most responsible thing for the agency to do was to dissipate that cloud. Thank you.) [/INST] </s> |
What do you think the word "arbitrary" suggests to courts of appeals? Is... are they supposed just to say, well, the union is guilty or is liable because we wouldn't have done what they did? | --Your Honor, I don't think it's that complicated at all. | <s>[INST] What do you think the word "arbitrary" suggests to courts of appeals? Is... are they supposed just to say, well, the union is guilty or is liable because we wouldn't have done what they did? (Sentiment: --Your Honor, I don't think it's that complicated at all.) [/INST] </s> |
xxx not answering my question-- | What arbitrary means I believe, Your Honor, is simply the question as to whether a reasoned decision was needed and whether a reasoned decision was made. And in deciding that, what needs-- | <s>[INST] xxx not answering my question-- (Sentiment: What arbitrary means I believe, Your Honor, is simply the question as to whether a reasoned decision was needed and whether a reasoned decision was made. And in deciding that, what needs--) [/INST] </s> |
--The court is permitted to say, well, we wouldn't have done it this way because we don't think it was reasonable? | --Absolutely not, Your Honor. And second-guessing is not what the court-- | <s>[INST] --The court is permitted to say, well, we wouldn't have done it this way because we don't think it was reasonable? (Sentiment: --Absolutely not, Your Honor. And second-guessing is not what the court--) [/INST] </s> |
What are they... what should they say then? | --They should look at the decision, Your Honor, and try to find out and look at what the relevant factors were that the union officials considered in making a decision and then determine if the decision was based upon an in fact consideration of those factors. And if in fact the judgment or conduct is not based upon a reasoned consideration of relevant union factors, then the conduct is arbitrary. But this-- | <s>[INST] What are they... what should they say then? (Sentiment: --They should look at the decision, Your Honor, and try to find out and look at what the relevant factors were that the union officials considered in making a decision and then determine if the decision was based upon an in fact consideration of those factors. And if in fact the judgment or conduct is not based upon a reasoned consideration of relevant union factors, then the conduct is arbitrary. But this--) [/INST] </s> |
How's that any different than negligence? | --It's a higher standard, Your Honor, than negligence. | <s>[INST] How's that any different than negligence? (Sentiment: --It's a higher standard, Your Honor, than negligence.) [/INST] </s> |
Well, you say so. But how do you distinguish between a negligently conducted negotiation and an arbitrary one? | You have to look at the factors, Your Honor, that went into the conduct that the union followed and look at the actual circumstances that were taken into consideration which were going to be numerous, and then balance to see if the decision was made based upon a rational consideration of those factors. | <s>[INST] Well, you say so. But how do you distinguish between a negligently conducted negotiation and an arbitrary one? (Sentiment: You have to look at the factors, Your Honor, that went into the conduct that the union followed and look at the actual circumstances that were taken into consideration which were going to be numerous, and then balance to see if the decision was made based upon a rational consideration of those factors.) [/INST] </s> |
Because-- | That's a higher standard than simply breaching the... breaching a duty or a negligence. | <s>[INST] Because-- (Sentiment: That's a higher standard than simply breaching the... breaching a duty or a negligence.) [/INST] </s> |
--Well, it may not have a community standard of care component. I suppose that's the only difference. I find it very, very difficult to distinguish the two. | Those are difficult items to distinguish, Your Honor, and what we are dealing with is a continuum of arbitrariness, and there comes a point in time like in the Rawson case where this Court has decided that an allegation based upon pure negligence is not sufficient to staying a breach of duty of fair representation. But an allegation based upon conduct that is more serious than that, not taking into consideration relevant factors, and then moving off and making the decision that's not based upon those factors, it's arbitrary, Your Honor. | <s>[INST] --Well, it may not have a community standard of care component. I suppose that's the only difference. I find it very, very difficult to distinguish the two. (Sentiment: Those are difficult items to distinguish, Your Honor, and what we are dealing with is a continuum of arbitrariness, and there comes a point in time like in the Rawson case where this Court has decided that an allegation based upon pure negligence is not sufficient to staying a breach of duty of fair representation. But an allegation based upon conduct that is more serious than that, not taking into consideration relevant factors, and then moving off and making the decision that's not based upon those factors, it's arbitrary, Your Honor.) [/INST] </s> |
Mr. Harper, would you standard require detailed examination of how the union officials went about reaching this agreement? You say it has to have... they have to must have considered all the factors. That opens up, I presume, just, you know, what went on at the meetings of the officials who were given the responsibility for trying to settle the thing. | Mr. Chief Justice, it would require the plaintiffs in this type of situation to identify as best they can through discovery and the trial the factors that were actually in fact considered by the union negotiators or the union officials when they made a decision and then would have to go step further to demonstrate whether or not the decision was based upon a consideration of those factors. In this case, what has happened, Your Honor, is many of the arguments that have been advanced here to justify what the union did are post hoc arguments of counsel. | <s>[INST] Mr. Harper, would you standard require detailed examination of how the union officials went about reaching this agreement? You say it has to have... they have to must have considered all the factors. That opens up, I presume, just, you know, what went on at the meetings of the officials who were given the responsibility for trying to settle the thing. (Sentiment: Mr. Chief Justice, it would require the plaintiffs in this type of situation to identify as best they can through discovery and the trial the factors that were actually in fact considered by the union negotiators or the union officials when they made a decision and then would have to go step further to demonstrate whether or not the decision was based upon a consideration of those factors. In this case, what has happened, Your Honor, is many of the arguments that have been advanced here to justify what the union did are post hoc arguments of counsel.) [/INST] </s> |
What if a court reviewing the union's conduct feels, yes, the union considers all... considered all the factors that it said it was going to consider. But in the view of the court there was a factor that it should have considered but didn't. | Your Honor, the court does not substitute as judgment for that and if you go back to the case here, the O'Neill case, and look at the basis upon which the Fifth Circuit rendered its opinion, which is the Tedford opinion, you will find exactly that sort of analysis in the Tedford opinion. In the Tedford opinion, there are a couple of judgments that the union officials could have made. The court of appeals went out of its way to say we are not going to select whether or not it was correct for the union to do one or the other. All we're going to do is to analyze that the decision that was made... to ensure it was based upon relevant factors and that the judgment was based upon relevant factors. If it is, it would be arbitrary. | <s>[INST] What if a court reviewing the union's conduct feels, yes, the union considers all... considered all the factors that it said it was going to consider. But in the view of the court there was a factor that it should have considered but didn't. (Sentiment: Your Honor, the court does not substitute as judgment for that and if you go back to the case here, the O'Neill case, and look at the basis upon which the Fifth Circuit rendered its opinion, which is the Tedford opinion, you will find exactly that sort of analysis in the Tedford opinion. In the Tedford opinion, there are a couple of judgments that the union officials could have made. The court of appeals went out of its way to say we are not going to select whether or not it was correct for the union to do one or the other. All we're going to do is to analyze that the decision that was made... to ensure it was based upon relevant factors and that the judgment was based upon relevant factors. If it is, it would be arbitrary.) [/INST] </s> |
And if a court says we see a factor we think the union should have considered. The union didn't purport to consider it, it didn't consider it, that would allow it to set aside the decision? | Not necessarily, Your Honor. | <s>[INST] And if a court says we see a factor we think the union should have considered. The union didn't purport to consider it, it didn't consider it, that would allow it to set aside the decision? (Sentiment: Not necessarily, Your Honor.) [/INST] </s> |
But it's a possibility? | The trier of fact may find that in the totality of the circumstances, the union didn't act rationally or reasonably in going about the decision that it made. Take into consideration factors as evidence that the union officials might not have considered which would support the conclusion by the trier of fact that the conduct was arbitrary. | <s>[INST] But it's a possibility? (Sentiment: The trier of fact may find that in the totality of the circumstances, the union didn't act rationally or reasonably in going about the decision that it made. Take into consideration factors as evidence that the union officials might not have considered which would support the conclusion by the trier of fact that the conduct was arbitrary.) [/INST] </s> |
But of course if you say the union didn't act reasonably, that isn't far from a negligence standard, is it? | Under some circumstances, Your Honor, in this area it... the line starts to fuzz. Well, we do not believe-- | <s>[INST] But of course if you say the union didn't act reasonably, that isn't far from a negligence standard, is it? (Sentiment: Under some circumstances, Your Honor, in this area it... the line starts to fuzz. Well, we do not believe--) [/INST] </s> |
Well, you could... could you live with a standard that says that the court should ask if any rational union negotiator could possibly have come to this conclusion? | --We're not-- | <s>[INST] Well, you could... could you live with a standard that says that the court should ask if any rational union negotiator could possibly have come to this conclusion? (Sentiment: --We're not--) [/INST] </s> |
Which is certainly more a... that's a... that gives them a lot more room than insisting that they have to be reasonable. | --Your Honor, all we are are... our position is that all we need to have is an obligation upon these union officials to consider relevant facts and make a decision based upon those. | <s>[INST] Which is certainly more a... that's a... that gives them a lot more room than insisting that they have to be reasonable. (Sentiment: --Your Honor, all we are are... our position is that all we need to have is an obligation upon these union officials to consider relevant facts and make a decision based upon those.) [/INST] </s> |
Well, if a union... if the court thinks a... that there are factors a union... they think the union didn't consider, shouldn't they also ask, well, would any rational person... could any rational person have put those factors aside? | That's a relevant consideration when you evaluate at the trial level the conduct of the union. In this case, for example, the record does... shows or demonstrates that during the critical negotiation the individuals who made the decision did not consider an unconditional offer to return to work as a viable alternative before they decided to settle with Continental under the terms and conditions that they did. That is evidence of arbitrary conduct, we [inaudible]. | <s>[INST] Well, if a union... if the court thinks a... that there are factors a union... they think the union didn't consider, shouldn't they also ask, well, would any rational person... could any rational person have put those factors aside? (Sentiment: That's a relevant consideration when you evaluate at the trial level the conduct of the union. In this case, for example, the record does... shows or demonstrates that during the critical negotiation the individuals who made the decision did not consider an unconditional offer to return to work as a viable alternative before they decided to settle with Continental under the terms and conditions that they did. That is evidence of arbitrary conduct, we [inaudible].) [/INST] </s> |
Mr. Harper, the word arbitrary is not a... really a new one for us. We've been using it for half a century to review agency action under the Administrative Procedure Act. I think Mr. Gold has probably asked us to use it a number of times in that context... arbitrary, capricious, and abusive discretion, or otherwise not in according to the law. Do you think that its meaning here in reviewing union action is about the same as its meaning in reviewing agency action under the Administrative Procedure Act? | I think it's very close to that, Your Honor. In those types of considerations, you look at, if, for example, an agent... head of an agency has changed a policy and in order to have that act substantiated, there has to be some explanation, for example, as to why that policy was changed. That's fundamentally the same sort of analysis that we think is appropriate here. | <s>[INST] Mr. Harper, the word arbitrary is not a... really a new one for us. We've been using it for half a century to review agency action under the Administrative Procedure Act. I think Mr. Gold has probably asked us to use it a number of times in that context... arbitrary, capricious, and abusive discretion, or otherwise not in according to the law. Do you think that its meaning here in reviewing union action is about the same as its meaning in reviewing agency action under the Administrative Procedure Act? (Sentiment: I think it's very close to that, Your Honor. In those types of considerations, you look at, if, for example, an agent... head of an agency has changed a policy and in order to have that act substantiated, there has to be some explanation, for example, as to why that policy was changed. That's fundamentally the same sort of analysis that we think is appropriate here.) [/INST] </s> |
And a court may think it's wrong but still not think that it's arbitrary. | Absolutely, Your Honor-- | <s>[INST] And a court may think it's wrong but still not think that it's arbitrary. (Sentiment: Absolutely, Your Honor--) [/INST] </s> |
I see. | --if in fact the decision has considered relevant factors. It may be wrong. It may be atrocious, as the district court said here. It may be beyond what is reasonable as the chief negotiator said here. It may have... if it's wrong and the process is intact, then the conduct would still be considered to be nonarbitrary, and as a result there's no liability associated with it. | <s>[INST] I see. (Sentiment: --if in fact the decision has considered relevant factors. It may be wrong. It may be atrocious, as the district court said here. It may be beyond what is reasonable as the chief negotiator said here. It may have... if it's wrong and the process is intact, then the conduct would still be considered to be nonarbitrary, and as a result there's no liability associated with it.) [/INST] </s> |
Do you think the Fifth Circuit was true to that position? | I think it absolutely was, Your Honor. What they did was on summary judgment look at the record, which the trial court never did, and determine, based upon the review, that there were substantial facts in dispute-- | <s>[INST] Do you think the Fifth Circuit was true to that position? (Sentiment: I think it absolutely was, Your Honor. What they did was on summary judgment look at the record, which the trial court never did, and determine, based upon the review, that there were substantial facts in dispute--) [/INST] </s> |
There was a triable issue of fact about arbitrariness. | --And-- | <s>[INST] There was a triable issue of fact about arbitrariness. (Sentiment: --And--) [/INST] </s> |
And about discrimination. | --And discriminatory. And all they did is leave it for the trial court to decide, based upon an appropriate standard, whether the conduct by the union breached the duty of fair representation. That's all the Fifth Circuit did. | <s>[INST] And about discrimination. (Sentiment: --And discriminatory. And all they did is leave it for the trial court to decide, based upon an appropriate standard, whether the conduct by the union breached the duty of fair representation. That's all the Fifth Circuit did.) [/INST] </s> |
Whether there was enough evidence in the record that somebody could have concluded that it was arbitrary, defined in the right way. | That's correct and we haven't gotten there yet, Your Honor. This is on summary judgment, and I think that the Fifth Circuit did exactly the right thing in leaving the ultimate issues as to whether or not this was a breach of the duty fair representation until trial. | <s>[INST] Whether there was enough evidence in the record that somebody could have concluded that it was arbitrary, defined in the right way. (Sentiment: That's correct and we haven't gotten there yet, Your Honor. This is on summary judgment, and I think that the Fifth Circuit did exactly the right thing in leaving the ultimate issues as to whether or not this was a breach of the duty fair representation until trial.) [/INST] </s> |
Mr. Harper, is there a genuine issue of material fact here as to whether the union acted in bad faith? | Your Evidence, there's evidence in the record and inferences that can be drawn from the evidence in the record at this particular time that in fact the union did act in bad faith. And also that they acted in a discriminatory manner and in an arbitrary manner, and all of those items are included or-- | <s>[INST] Mr. Harper, is there a genuine issue of material fact here as to whether the union acted in bad faith? (Sentiment: Your Evidence, there's evidence in the record and inferences that can be drawn from the evidence in the record at this particular time that in fact the union did act in bad faith. And also that they acted in a discriminatory manner and in an arbitrary manner, and all of those items are included or--) [/INST] </s> |
Did the Fifth Circuit review the evidence with an eye toward the bad-faith allegation? | --It does not appear from the record, Your Honor, that the court did that, but I don't think that the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal purported to look at all of the items of conduct that this union engaged in and to make a conclusive decision on all elements at the summary judgment level. | <s>[INST] Did the Fifth Circuit review the evidence with an eye toward the bad-faith allegation? (Sentiment: --It does not appear from the record, Your Honor, that the court did that, but I don't think that the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal purported to look at all of the items of conduct that this union engaged in and to make a conclusive decision on all elements at the summary judgment level.) [/INST] </s> |
Mr. Harper, may I ask you two questions? First, is it your position that if the record showed that the union did consider what... which would be better, the settlement or a surrender, an outright return to work, they considered it, but they came to an erroneous conclusion on the issue, you would lose? | If that was the only judgment, Your Honor, that was involved in this case, then the answer would be yes. | <s>[INST] Mr. Harper, may I ask you two questions? First, is it your position that if the record showed that the union did consider what... which would be better, the settlement or a surrender, an outright return to work, they considered it, but they came to an erroneous conclusion on the issue, you would lose? (Sentiment: If that was the only judgment, Your Honor, that was involved in this case, then the answer would be yes.) [/INST] </s> |
So it's not critical for us to decide whether this was a worse deal than a return to-- | Absolutely not. | <s>[INST] So it's not critical for us to decide whether this was a worse deal than a return to-- (Sentiment: Absolutely not.) [/INST] </s> |
--But it is critical to decide whether they considered it. And is it your position on that that the record is absolutely clear based on admissions by the union that they didn't or a total absence of evidence of any discussion of it? | Your Honor, based upon the record as we developed it through deposition testimony and through the gleaning of notes and records that the negotiators that we were entitled to depose, they did not consider at that critical point in time the unconditional offer to return to work. I'd like to point out to the Court-- | <s>[INST] --But it is critical to decide whether they considered it. And is it your position on that that the record is absolutely clear based on admissions by the union that they didn't or a total absence of evidence of any discussion of it? (Sentiment: Your Honor, based upon the record as we developed it through deposition testimony and through the gleaning of notes and records that the negotiators that we were entitled to depose, they did not consider at that critical point in time the unconditional offer to return to work. I'd like to point out to the Court--) [/INST] </s> |
But I'm asking you do you say that because there's a failure of... in absence of any evidence showing they did discuss it or is there evidence of an admission that they did not discuss it? Which is it? | --There's evidence of the admission that they did not consider it at this point... at the point in time. | <s>[INST] But I'm asking you do you say that because there's a failure of... in absence of any evidence showing they did discuss it or is there evidence of an admission that they did not discuss it? Which is it? (Sentiment: --There's evidence of the admission that they did not consider it at this point... at the point in time.) [/INST] </s> |
I see. Do you refer to that evidence in your brief? | Yes, we do, Your Honor, through the attachments, and it's probably set forth in a little bit more detail in connection with a motion for reconsideration. | <s>[INST] I see. Do you refer to that evidence in your brief? (Sentiment: Yes, we do, Your Honor, through the attachments, and it's probably set forth in a little bit more detail in connection with a motion for reconsideration.) [/INST] </s> |
I see. | But in fact it is. And again it would be evidence at trial. | <s>[INST] I see. (Sentiment: But in fact it is. And again it would be evidence at trial.) [/INST] </s> |
But we don't have to resolve that in order to decide this case. | Not at this... not at this level, Your Honor. Not at all. | <s>[INST] But we don't have to resolve that in order to decide this case. (Sentiment: Not at this... not at this level, Your Honor. Not at all.) [/INST] </s> |
Mr. Harper, are you saying that in affirming the result below as you want us to do, we could do so consistently with your position and still repudiate the second of the factors which the court of appeals considered? In other words, could you get where you want to go and in fact are you arguing that you should get where you want to go by having us hold that the court of appeals was correct in saying that a non-arbitrary decision must be based on relevant factors, but repudiate that second part of the test in which the court of appeals was saying that it must also be a rational result of considering those factors? Do you want to jettison point 2 and still win? | We are not claiming and our position is that we have to focus on the result. What our... what our argument is and it must be a rational consideration of those factors and the judgment based upon that-- | <s>[INST] Mr. Harper, are you saying that in affirming the result below as you want us to do, we could do so consistently with your position and still repudiate the second of the factors which the court of appeals considered? In other words, could you get where you want to go and in fact are you arguing that you should get where you want to go by having us hold that the court of appeals was correct in saying that a non-arbitrary decision must be based on relevant factors, but repudiate that second part of the test in which the court of appeals was saying that it must also be a rational result of considering those factors? Do you want to jettison point 2 and still win? (Sentiment: We are not claiming and our position is that we have to focus on the result. What our... what our argument is and it must be a rational consideration of those factors and the judgment based upon that--) [/INST] </s> |
But if-- | --and the result is only evidence, Your Honor, of the conduct that the union negotiators engaged in. | <s>[INST] But if-- (Sentiment: --and the result is only evidence, Your Honor, of the conduct that the union negotiators engaged in.) [/INST] </s> |
--Well, then I guess I'm having the same trouble then that I think has been expressed earlier in this argument. You apparently want us to go beyond or want courts to go beyond a finding that the appropriate factors were considered. You want us... you want the courts to intrude to some degree into a... an assessment of the results achieved by considering those factors, don't you? | Yes, Your Honor. | <s>[INST] --Well, then I guess I'm having the same trouble then that I think has been expressed earlier in this argument. You apparently want us to go beyond or want courts to go beyond a finding that the appropriate factors were considered. You want us... you want the courts to intrude to some degree into a... an assessment of the results achieved by considering those factors, don't you? (Sentiment: Yes, Your Honor.) [/INST] </s> |
And are you satisfied... going back to Justice White's question, would you be satisfied if the Court stopped at saying this is one possible result within the realm of reasonableness so that if that test were satisfied, that would be the extent of the Court's scrutiny? | And if it's one possible result based upon a... the analysis that we have urged the Court, and if the... that determination then is that it's nonarbitrary because of the process that went through, then the results would be okay. | <s>[INST] And are you satisfied... going back to Justice White's question, would you be satisfied if the Court stopped at saying this is one possible result within the realm of reasonableness so that if that test were satisfied, that would be the extent of the Court's scrutiny? (Sentiment: And if it's one possible result based upon a... the analysis that we have urged the Court, and if the... that determination then is that it's nonarbitrary because of the process that went through, then the results would be okay.) [/INST] </s> |
But that involves more than just considering all the factors. There are certain boundary beyond which your consideration, even if you've considered them all, your conclusion is just arbitrary. I mean, a man comes up to you and puts a gun to your head and says, your money and... your money or your life, and you consider it very carefully and you say my life. [Laughter] I mean, that's... that's ridiculous, isn't it? Just because you've considered that-- | The two choice, Your Honor. | <s>[INST] But that involves more than just considering all the factors. There are certain boundary beyond which your consideration, even if you've considered them all, your conclusion is just arbitrary. I mean, a man comes up to you and puts a gun to your head and says, your money and... your money or your life, and you consider it very carefully and you say my life. [Laughter] I mean, that's... that's ridiculous, isn't it? Just because you've considered that-- (Sentiment: The two choice, Your Honor.) [/INST] </s> |
--Yes. Can't you reach a conclusion that is nonetheless arbitrary even if you've considered both? | That... you can, Your Honor, and that's why I think that there's more to it in the duty of fair representation, because there are... in contexts like this, there are a number of things that the union negotiators are going to take into consideration in arriving at the conclusion that they arrive at. As long as those factors are relevant factors and the basis is... the decision is based on that. | <s>[INST] --Yes. Can't you reach a conclusion that is nonetheless arbitrary even if you've considered both? (Sentiment: That... you can, Your Honor, and that's why I think that there's more to it in the duty of fair representation, because there are... in contexts like this, there are a number of things that the union negotiators are going to take into consideration in arriving at the conclusion that they arrive at. As long as those factors are relevant factors and the basis is... the decision is based on that.) [/INST] </s> |
Can I ask you the same question I asked Mr. Gold? Is one of the relevant union factors... are all the relevant union factors only factors that relate to this bargaining unit, or can the union in effect say, well, this result may be better for this bargaining unit but we have other fish to fry? | The union, Your Honor, has a duty to represent under the Railway Labor Act the members of this craft or class, and their conduct has to be a... on behalf and the benefit for the craft or class. So for the most part-- | <s>[INST] Can I ask you the same question I asked Mr. Gold? Is one of the relevant union factors... are all the relevant union factors only factors that relate to this bargaining unit, or can the union in effect say, well, this result may be better for this bargaining unit but we have other fish to fry? (Sentiment: The union, Your Honor, has a duty to represent under the Railway Labor Act the members of this craft or class, and their conduct has to be a... on behalf and the benefit for the craft or class. So for the most part--) [/INST] </s> |
But that's not just the bargaining unit. That craft or class in other bargaining units as well, no? | --In this case, Your Honor, the craft or class were the Continental pilots at Continental Air Lines. | <s>[INST] But that's not just the bargaining unit. That craft or class in other bargaining units as well, no? (Sentiment: --In this case, Your Honor, the craft or class were the Continental pilots at Continental Air Lines.) [/INST] </s> |
Not pilots at large in other airlines as well? | And what the problem is, Your Honor-- | <s>[INST] Not pilots at large in other airlines as well? (Sentiment: And what the problem is, Your Honor--) [/INST] </s> |
Well, I-- | --if you go beyond the class or craft, you're-- | <s>[INST] Well, I-- (Sentiment: --if you go beyond the class or craft, you're--) [/INST] </s> |
--Let's make it clear what I'm asking you. Suppose the union says it will be better for this bargaining unit, but we will just get clobbered in later negotiations with other airlines. Our other pilots will be harmed if we simply, after a 2 years' worth of a bitter strike, throw in the towel. Net... given all the pilots that we have to represent, it's better for all of them that this bargaining unit may not do as well, but we come to a negotiated end to the strike rather than simply abandoning it. Is that... is that a reasonable decision? | --It may not be, Your Honor, because the problem with that is that that craft or class becomes a minority group within a larger class, and they run the risk, if they don't have this broad duty of fair representation, of being treated very badly in a discriminatory and arbitrary way by the union. | <s>[INST] --Let's make it clear what I'm asking you. Suppose the union says it will be better for this bargaining unit, but we will just get clobbered in later negotiations with other airlines. Our other pilots will be harmed if we simply, after a 2 years' worth of a bitter strike, throw in the towel. Net... given all the pilots that we have to represent, it's better for all of them that this bargaining unit may not do as well, but we come to a negotiated end to the strike rather than simply abandoning it. Is that... is that a reasonable decision? (Sentiment: --It may not be, Your Honor, because the problem with that is that that craft or class becomes a minority group within a larger class, and they run the risk, if they don't have this broad duty of fair representation, of being treated very badly in a discriminatory and arbitrary way by the union.) [/INST] </s> |
So you say the reasonable factors that can be taken into account are only factors relating to the particular bargaining unit to which the negotiations pertain? | And what benefits them and what the union needs to do on their behalf in the context of that particular representation. | <s>[INST] So you say the reasonable factors that can be taken into account are only factors relating to the particular bargaining unit to which the negotiations pertain? (Sentiment: And what benefits them and what the union needs to do on their behalf in the context of that particular representation.) [/INST] </s> |
The union cannot make a sort of command decision, saying we realize we're not doing very well by the Continental pilots and we could do better, but the long-run interest of the airline pilots we represent with all the other airlines would be served by this deal that doesn't do very well for Continental? | Those are considerations that the union might take into consideration, Your Honor, with respect to representing the craft or class-- | <s>[INST] The union cannot make a sort of command decision, saying we realize we're not doing very well by the Continental pilots and we could do better, but the long-run interest of the airline pilots we represent with all the other airlines would be served by this deal that doesn't do very well for Continental? (Sentiment: Those are considerations that the union might take into consideration, Your Honor, with respect to representing the craft or class--) [/INST] </s> |
Well, but it's-- | --but they can't override. | <s>[INST] Well, but it's-- (Sentiment: --but they can't override.) [/INST] </s> |
--I think you can give a better... give a yes or no answer to something like that. It seems to me you're quite nebulous on the point, unless you intend to be nebulous. | I don't intend to be nebulous at all, Mr. Chief Justice. The... in this case the union should have taken into consideration only those factors that benefit this craft or class. | <s>[INST] --I think you can give a better... give a yes or no answer to something like that. It seems to me you're quite nebulous on the point, unless you intend to be nebulous. (Sentiment: I don't intend to be nebulous at all, Mr. Chief Justice. The... in this case the union should have taken into consideration only those factors that benefit this craft or class.) [/INST] </s> |
Well, okay, but answer a hypothetical question. The union decides that the proposed deal we're about to enter into with the... for the Continental pilots is not the best we could do for them, but if we don't take this, we are going to greatly harm pilots with American, United, all the other airlines we... so we're going to have to sacrifice a little bit of the interest of the Continental pilots in order to help all of the pilots we represent. Can it do that? | Not to the detriment of the craft or class that they're representing, Your Honor. | <s>[INST] Well, okay, but answer a hypothetical question. The union decides that the proposed deal we're about to enter into with the... for the Continental pilots is not the best we could do for them, but if we don't take this, we are going to greatly harm pilots with American, United, all the other airlines we... so we're going to have to sacrifice a little bit of the interest of the Continental pilots in order to help all of the pilots we represent. Can it do that? (Sentiment: Not to the detriment of the craft or class that they're representing, Your Honor.) [/INST] </s> |
Well, but that doesn't... I think you could answer the question yes or no and then explain if you want to. By hypothesis it is to the detriment of the Continental pilots. | And then that conduct, Your Honor, could be made. It could be bad faith, it could be discriminatory, and it could be arbitrary in the way that they go about making that decision. Because they're putting motives and events that are beyond what is on... in the best interest of the craft or class in these negotiations, and that is a breach of the duty of fair representation. | <s>[INST] Well, but that doesn't... I think you could answer the question yes or no and then explain if you want to. By hypothesis it is to the detriment of the Continental pilots. (Sentiment: And then that conduct, Your Honor, could be made. It could be bad faith, it could be discriminatory, and it could be arbitrary in the way that they go about making that decision. Because they're putting motives and events that are beyond what is on... in the best interest of the craft or class in these negotiations, and that is a breach of the duty of fair representation.) [/INST] </s> |
You say it could be arbitrary, but is it as a matter of law arbitrary when they rely on the factors the Chief Justice described? | I would say no, Your Honor. | <s>[INST] You say it could be arbitrary, but is it as a matter of law arbitrary when they rely on the factors the Chief Justice described? (Sentiment: I would say no, Your Honor.) [/INST] </s> |
It's not arbitrary? | Let me... it would... I'm sorry... if they put the national interest above? | <s>[INST] It's not arbitrary? (Sentiment: Let me... it would... I'm sorry... if they put the national interest above?) [/INST] </s> |
Yes. | It would be arbitrary conduct. | <s>[INST] Yes. (Sentiment: It would be arbitrary conduct.) [/INST] </s> |
As a matter of law in every case? | Uh-- | <s>[INST] As a matter of law in every case? (Sentiment: Uh--) [/INST] </s> |
Counsel, do you... do you think the court of appeals applied the test they set down in the Tedford case? | --Yes, I do, Your Honor. | <s>[INST] Counsel, do you... do you think the court of appeals applied the test they set down in the Tedford case? (Sentiment: --Yes, I do, Your Honor.) [/INST] </s> |
Well, that test is a three-part test that says to be nonarbitrary the decision must be based upon relevant, permissible union factors; second, a rational result of the consideration of these factors; and three, and inclusive of a fair and impartial consideration of the interests of all employees. So do you think that... you think a court has to get to the issue of fairness with respect to the various groups of employees? | In some regard they have to-- | <s>[INST] Well, that test is a three-part test that says to be nonarbitrary the decision must be based upon relevant, permissible union factors; second, a rational result of the consideration of these factors; and three, and inclusive of a fair and impartial consideration of the interests of all employees. So do you think that... you think a court has to get to the issue of fairness with respect to the various groups of employees? (Sentiment: In some regard they have to--) [/INST] </s> |
Well, this is... what the Tedford test is, and that's what the court of appeals applied so they have a free wheeling... they can just decide whether it's fair or not, is that it? Non-arbitrary? | --No. It's part of the three-step procedure and analysis that the Tedford court requires, and in this case the results are evident, Your Honor, that the conduct was arbitrary because it was worse than an unconditional offer to return to work. | <s>[INST] Well, this is... what the Tedford test is, and that's what the court of appeals applied so they have a free wheeling... they can just decide whether it's fair or not, is that it? Non-arbitrary? (Sentiment: --No. It's part of the three-step procedure and analysis that the Tedford court requires, and in this case the results are evident, Your Honor, that the conduct was arbitrary because it was worse than an unconditional offer to return to work.) [/INST] </s> |
Well, literally, this test means that the union... even if the union took... considered all relevant factors and gave rational consideration to it, nevertheless, they might be unfair, an unfair result. | In this case, the result... I don't know if it's unfair, Your Honor, but it has been characterized by the chief pilot negotiator as beyond what was reasonable, has been characterized by him as bastardizing forever the seniority system, and has been characterized by the district court as being atrocious. Now if that's the same as being unfair, then those are the ways it has been characterized. | <s>[INST] Well, literally, this test means that the union... even if the union took... considered all relevant factors and gave rational consideration to it, nevertheless, they might be unfair, an unfair result. (Sentiment: In this case, the result... I don't know if it's unfair, Your Honor, but it has been characterized by the chief pilot negotiator as beyond what was reasonable, has been characterized by him as bastardizing forever the seniority system, and has been characterized by the district court as being atrocious. Now if that's the same as being unfair, then those are the ways it has been characterized.) [/INST] </s> |
I take it you have a right to jury trial under that Terry case? | Yes, Your Honor, as a result of the Terry opinion. | <s>[INST] I take it you have a right to jury trial under that Terry case? (Sentiment: Yes, Your Honor, as a result of the Terry opinion.) [/INST] </s> |
Then reasoning backwards, I suppose it helps your position that we have to have a standard that manageable for the jury. | Absolutely. There has to be a way-- | <s>[INST] Then reasoning backwards, I suppose it helps your position that we have to have a standard that manageable for the jury. (Sentiment: Absolutely. There has to be a way--) [/INST] </s> |
It's backwards reasoning, but I think perhaps we're compelled to engage in it. | --And that's all that... what happens, Your Honor, in cases like suits against fiduciaries, trustees, officers and directors of a corporation, or governmental agents, you have to be able to describe for the jury or the trier of fact where the conduct crosses the line. And that's why I submit-- | <s>[INST] It's backwards reasoning, but I think perhaps we're compelled to engage in it. (Sentiment: --And that's all that... what happens, Your Honor, in cases like suits against fiduciaries, trustees, officers and directors of a corporation, or governmental agents, you have to be able to describe for the jury or the trier of fact where the conduct crosses the line. And that's why I submit--) [/INST] </s> |
I don't know that a jury could manageably consider an APA-type... Administrative Procedure Act-type of standard as to whether or not they... the unit acted rationally. I don't know if the jury is capable of doing that. | --Justice Kennedy, the jury is capable though of making key decisions in antitrust, securities, breach of contract suits, and Justice Stevens has mentioned just last term that the reality of the employment relations are typical grist for a jury judgment. So, in fact, it is our position that, given the correct instructions of law by the court, that it is perfectly... a jury is perfectly capable of judging the conduct engaged in by a union. I'm getting close to the end. One thing I would like to point out here that we have not talked about-- | <s>[INST] I don't know that a jury could manageably consider an APA-type... Administrative Procedure Act-type of standard as to whether or not they... the unit acted rationally. I don't know if the jury is capable of doing that. (Sentiment: --Justice Kennedy, the jury is capable though of making key decisions in antitrust, securities, breach of contract suits, and Justice Stevens has mentioned just last term that the reality of the employment relations are typical grist for a jury judgment. So, in fact, it is our position that, given the correct instructions of law by the court, that it is perfectly... a jury is perfectly capable of judging the conduct engaged in by a union. I'm getting close to the end. One thing I would like to point out here that we have not talked about--) [/INST] </s> |
Mr. Harper, before you do that, let me get... this relates to what the Chief Justice was asking you about. All of your clients are union members in this case, isn't that right? | --That's correct, Your Honor. | <s>[INST] Mr. Harper, before you do that, let me get... this relates to what the Chief Justice was asking you about. All of your clients are union members in this case, isn't that right? (Sentiment: --That's correct, Your Honor.) [/INST] </s> |
Now, I can understand why a nonunion member might have a cause for feeling aggrieved if the union didn't take it into account, exclusively the interest of his bargaining unit. But all your union members join this union knowing it was an industrywide union that, you know, one for all and all for one. They get some benefits from joining an industrywide union. They could have had a union just for that shop, couldn't they? | That's correct. | <s>[INST] Now, I can understand why a nonunion member might have a cause for feeling aggrieved if the union didn't take it into account, exclusively the interest of his bargaining unit. But all your union members join this union knowing it was an industrywide union that, you know, one for all and all for one. They get some benefits from joining an industrywide union. They could have had a union just for that shop, couldn't they? (Sentiment: That's correct.) [/INST] </s> |
Just a special union for Continental. But they chose to join ALPA in order to have the benefit of an industrywide union. Now doesn't there go along with that the understanding that the union's going to bargain in the interest of the whole industry, not... not in the interest of just this bargaining unit? | They're going to bargain on behalf of the craft, Your Honor, and that the craft's interest has to come ahead of the national interest of the-- | <s>[INST] Just a special union for Continental. But they chose to join ALPA in order to have the benefit of an industrywide union. Now doesn't there go along with that the understanding that the union's going to bargain in the interest of the whole industry, not... not in the interest of just this bargaining unit? (Sentiment: They're going to bargain on behalf of the craft, Your Honor, and that the craft's interest has to come ahead of the national interest of the--) [/INST] </s> |
But they have obligations... they have obligations to these other units as well, don't they? | --Absolutely. | <s>[INST] But they have obligations... they have obligations to these other units as well, don't they? (Sentiment: --Absolutely.) [/INST] </s> |
Can they settle this one to the detriment of the other ones? | No, Your Honor, they cannot do that. | <s>[INST] Can they settle this one to the detriment of the other ones? (Sentiment: No, Your Honor, they cannot do that.) [/INST] </s> |
They can't do that and yet they can't take it into account either. | I'm sorry. I misunderstood your... they can't settle it to the disadvantage of this particular craft, Your Honor. | <s>[INST] They can't do that and yet they can't take it into account either. (Sentiment: I'm sorry. I misunderstood your... they can't settle it to the disadvantage of this particular craft, Your Honor.) [/INST] </s> |
They could if they had a multiemployer bargaining unit, but they do not. | We do not have that here, Your Honor. This is the master executive counsel for only the craft of pilots at Continental Air Lines. And, Justice Scalia, one... I think what demonstrates where there is a real problem here with these pilots being represented by their union is in the superseniority aspects of it. Because there the union did go beyond what was in the best interest of their pilots and they gave away to the non-striking pilots future vacancies to the detriment, the serious detriment, of the pilots who have been out on strike for 2 years. And that's why we have to look at this thing as conduct that breaches the arbitrary standard, the discriminatory standard, and the bad-faith standard. And that has been the standard that this Court has articulated for 24 years, and we think it ought to be the standard that applies here. We ask this Court, with the Solicitor, to hold that the union leadership add full-scale responsibilities to its members. We ask you to decide, as the Fifth Circuit did, that there was enough evidence in the record to show that the union defaulted on these responsibilities so that a trier of fact is entitled to pass upon that question. We ask this Court to conclude that the... no union leadership is above the law, immune to the law, or should be permitted to be indifferent to the law. The Air Line Pilots Association is not immune from its responsibilities which goes with that control. | <s>[INST] They could if they had a multiemployer bargaining unit, but they do not. (Sentiment: We do not have that here, Your Honor. This is the master executive counsel for only the craft of pilots at Continental Air Lines. And, Justice Scalia, one... I think what demonstrates where there is a real problem here with these pilots being represented by their union is in the superseniority aspects of it. Because there the union did go beyond what was in the best interest of their pilots and they gave away to the non-striking pilots future vacancies to the detriment, the serious detriment, of the pilots who have been out on strike for 2 years. And that's why we have to look at this thing as conduct that breaches the arbitrary standard, the discriminatory standard, and the bad-faith standard. And that has been the standard that this Court has articulated for 24 years, and we think it ought to be the standard that applies here. We ask this Court, with the Solicitor, to hold that the union leadership add full-scale responsibilities to its members. We ask you to decide, as the Fifth Circuit did, that there was enough evidence in the record to show that the union defaulted on these responsibilities so that a trier of fact is entitled to pass upon that question. We ask this Court to conclude that the... no union leadership is above the law, immune to the law, or should be permitted to be indifferent to the law. The Air Line Pilots Association is not immune from its responsibilities which goes with that control.) [/INST] </s> |
Could I ask you... do you read the court of appeals' opinion as saying that the... that there's evidence of discrimination as an independent reason for reversing the district court? | Absolutely, Your Honor. Towards the end of the opinion, on the second or third page from the end, the court of appeals addresses that specifically and says that there's substantial evidence in the record to suggest that the union acted in a discriminatory way, and it's left up to the trial for... the point in time for the union is to answer why it did. | <s>[INST] Could I ask you... do you read the court of appeals' opinion as saying that the... that there's evidence of discrimination as an independent reason for reversing the district court? (Sentiment: Absolutely, Your Honor. Towards the end of the opinion, on the second or third page from the end, the court of appeals addresses that specifically and says that there's substantial evidence in the record to suggest that the union acted in a discriminatory way, and it's left up to the trial for... the point in time for the union is to answer why it did.) [/INST] </s> |
What do you think discrimination means in that sense? Is it... it's intentional discrimination? Invidious discrimination or hostile or what is it? | It's conduct that is not based upon the best interest of the unit and disadvantages an individual or a group within the unit. It can't be based upon irrelevant considerations like race, when the DFR first started back in Steele. And we think that the decision here on the super-seniority issue to give up the future spaces to the non-strikers is a fundamental right that these strikers had upon the return to work, and without any justification, and if in fact justification is even permitted, these... this union acted discriminatorially towards these pilots by giving those away. Thank you. | <s>[INST] What do you think discrimination means in that sense? Is it... it's intentional discrimination? Invidious discrimination or hostile or what is it? (Sentiment: It's conduct that is not based upon the best interest of the unit and disadvantages an individual or a group within the unit. It can't be based upon irrelevant considerations like race, when the DFR first started back in Steele. And we think that the decision here on the super-seniority issue to give up the future spaces to the non-strikers is a fundamental right that these strikers had upon the return to work, and without any justification, and if in fact justification is even permitted, these... this union acted discriminatorially towards these pilots by giving those away. Thank you.) [/INST] </s> |
Mr. Shapiro, would you say the rule would be valid even if there were no extraordinary circumstances-- | --I believe that it would, Your Honor. | <s>[INST] Mr. Shapiro, would you say the rule would be valid even if there were no extraordinary circumstances-- (Sentiment: --I believe that it would, Your Honor.) [/INST] </s> |
--exception? | Yes, I believe that it would. I think the Board was very wise in including an extraordinary circumstances exception in the record... in the rule, but I do not believe that anything in the act or the legislative history of the 1974 act requires such an exception, or indeed analogous precedents of this Court in other areas. The rule is in fact, we submit, a model of how the administrative process should work. Now it has been challenged by the petitioner-- | <s>[INST] --exception? (Sentiment: Yes, I believe that it would. I think the Board was very wise in including an extraordinary circumstances exception in the record... in the rule, but I do not believe that anything in the act or the legislative history of the 1974 act requires such an exception, or indeed analogous precedents of this Court in other areas. The rule is in fact, we submit, a model of how the administrative process should work. Now it has been challenged by the petitioner--) [/INST] </s> |
Even though it's the first time in history they have ever tried to do it? | --It's unfortunate that it has taken so long, Your Honor. | <s>[INST] Even though it's the first time in history they have ever tried to do it? (Sentiment: --It's unfortunate that it has taken so long, Your Honor.) [/INST] </s> |
They did pretty well on the first try, is that it? [Laughter] | I think they did magnificently, because they knew how important this process was. | <s>[INST] They did pretty well on the first try, is that it? [Laughter] (Sentiment: I think they did magnificently, because they knew how important this process was.) [/INST] </s> |
A lot of courts and commentators have criticized the Labor Board in the past, haven't they-- | Yes, Indeed. | <s>[INST] A lot of courts and commentators have criticized the Labor Board in the past, haven't they-- (Sentiment: Yes, Indeed.) [/INST] </s> |
--for not conducting rulemaking? | Yes, indeed, and I think the Board has been responsive to those criticisms in an area where there was a singular need for that kind of response. | <s>[INST] --for not conducting rulemaking? (Sentiment: Yes, indeed, and I think the Board has been responsive to those criticisms in an area where there was a singular need for that kind of response.) [/INST] </s> |
End of preview. Expand
in Dataset Viewer.
README.md exists but content is empty.
- Downloads last month
- 36